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FACTORS AFFECTING THE LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION OF KOREAN WOMEN

by

BONNIE KIM, B.A.

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

Masters of Arts

Department of International Affairs

Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario

1991

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The undersigned hereby recommend to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies and Research acceptance of this thesis,
submitted by Bonnie Kim, in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Christopher J. Maule, Director
The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs

Professor A. Ritter, Supervisor

Carleton University

ABSTRACT

Over the past four and a half decades, South Korea has experienced fundamental and extensive changes. The economy has evolved into a highly industrial structure through rapid industrialization and high, continuous growth rates; and the Korean society has been modernized by the introduction of Western ideas, technology and culture. For Korean women, these changes have led to a rapid increase in their labour force participation. However as traditional opinions of women have prevailed in the minds of economic actors, women's labour force participation has been distorted, marginalized and limited. This thesis examines the labour force participation of Korean women since the advent of changes in South Korea. It looks at how women have contributed to the economic development and the factors which have shaped their economic participation and activities. As this paper is informed and guided by perspectives in feminist theory, it also looks at how these forces of distortion and marginalization can be and are being addressed through reforms in state policy and the education system in South Korea.

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INTRODUCTION

In four and a half decades, South Korea has developed into a modern, highly industrialized nation with a strong, self-sustaining economy. Its economic success has been truly phenomenal. In 1988, per capita income reached US \$4,040 and the real growth of GDP was 16% (Asia Yearbook, 1990). In fact, the average GDP growth from 1984 to 1988 was 17.5%. The manufacturing and services sectors dominated 80% of the economic structure and labour force. As well, since 1986, South Korea has been experiencing a current account surplus of over seven million US dollars. Such optimistic and impressive figures have earned South Korea the title of being one of the four 'tigers' in East Asia who have become a powerful force in the international economy. This current economic situation marks a strong departure from South Korea's post World War II economy when the per capita income had been US \$82 and the GNP was approximately US \$2,271 (both figures from 1962). The country then was predominately agricultural with the manufacturing sector commanding less than 9% of the GNP in the 1950s and there was substantial dependence on imports and financial aid from the US.

South Korea's economic achievements have drawn international attention and interest. Extensive studies have been conducted to understand and evaluate the Korean success. As a consequence, numerous economic models and strategies have been constructed and detailed quantitative and qualitative measurements have been taken on the South Korean economy. As well, there has been growing interest on how the rapid economic growth and the particular economic strategy that South Korea has pursued (namely export- oriented industrialization) have affected the Korean people.

Not surprisingly, economic development in South Korea has been accompanied by substantial and fundamental changes in the activities and lifestyles of the Korean people. There has been a massive migration from rural to urban centres transforming the country into a highly urban nation with over 65% of the population living in cities. The majority of South Korea's labour force is now employed in the secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy where wage earnings are the primary source of income. Women have entered the workforce in astonishing numbers increasing their presence in all three sectors of the economy. Their participation in the labourforce has created fundamental and radical changes to the economic and social conditions of Korean women and to the family situation in South Korea. As well, their participation has been a crucial and important contribution to the development of the Korean

economy. It is this last phenomenon that is the focus of this research.

PURPOSE AND GOALS OF THE THESIS

The purpose of this paper is to examine how women have been participating in South Korea's economic transformation and growth, what form that participation has taken and in what conditions. For as the UN Decade of Women forums have recognized, women are not merely the beneficiaries of development but active participants. As well, this paper will try to understand and analyze the factors which have shaped and influenced their participation in the labour force. It is the goal of this thesis to examine what the form of Korean women's economic participation has been and the factors which have influenced it in order to determine ways in which that participation can be further encouraged and be more fruitful and beneficial to both the individual women and the nation. For the term DEVELOPMENT is not referring solely to the economic development of a country but also entails the political, social and individual development that a nation has achieved and is striving for.

THE OUTLINE OF THE RESEARCH

This paper will be divided into two parts totaling five chapters. The first part is a largely quantitative look at the

development of the South Korean economy and the labour force participation of Korean women. The second is an analysis of the factors which have shaped the economic activities and participation rates of Korean women. In this latter part, the emphasis is on the understanding of how these factors have come into play in the South Korean context and on the exploration of how these factors are being changed in order to create different circumstances and results.

The first chapter examines the development and growth of the South Korean economy from 1945 to the present. In particular, the structural changes in the economy and the economic strategies pursued by the Korean government are highlighted in order to understand the transformations that have occurred in the four and a half decades of rapid growth. As well there is an analysis of the interplay between domestic factors and international circumstances which provides an additional element of comprehension in illuminating the context and formula for South Korea's success. The final section of this chapter examines the future direction of the Korean economy and assesses what its new labour force requirements are going to be. It is only with the complete picture of South Korea's economic development and direction that one can begin to see how women have and can 'fit' into the economic scene.

The second chapter provides a quantitative and qualitative measurement of Korean women's labour force participation. These

statistics offer a clear picture of the economic status and situation of Korean women addressing basic questions such as what types of occupations they have been employed in, what their working conditions have been like and how long they have been in the work force, etc. From these quantitative and qualitative analyses, definite patterns and distinct characteristics of Korean women's labour force participation emerge. As well, this chapter also explores the changing circumstances of women's life cycles and the family in South Korea. The focus is on the changes themselves rather than their causes because the future participation of women in the labour force is greatly affected by these changes in the situation of women's lives. It is important to see how the changing personal situation of Korean women is compatible with the changing labour force requirements in the Korean economy.

The third chapter marks the beginning of the second section of this paper; the next three succeeding chapters focus on the factors which have influenced the labour force participation of Korean women in the past four and a half decades. Three key factors are identified: culture, education and the state. Each factor is examined in its historical significance in the Korean society to understand how they influence the current situation. It becomes readily apparent that all three factors are both crucial components in the Korean society and sources of oppression and subordination in the labour force participation

of women. Consequently, it is through changes within these three elements that gender equality can be achieved in the Korean labour market. Given this focus, examples and directions of change that have been implemented in these three areas are presented and evaluated. Micro- level studies and recent policies targeting women have been the primary mechanisms of change within these three factors. The theme of change is most appropriate for South Korea for throughout the last half of this century, South Korea has been changing - rapidly and fundamentally - in almost every aspect of its society. South Korea and its people have proven that change is possible and even desirable and that it can be a powerful vehicle for improving the quality of their lives.

THEORETICAL FOUNDATION OF THE RESEARCH

The theories that have informed this research have been drawn from a relatively new and, perhaps from some viewpoints, unconventional body of literature and school of thought - namely, feminist theory. Accompanying the sudden explosion of the civil rights and women's movements in the 1960s, there has been a growing body of literature and thought which have espoused feminism as an alternative perspective in understanding the system of interpersonal, economic, social and political structures in the highly industrialized countries of the West. In the field of international development, feminist

theories have also been applied in attempting to understand the patterns of underdevelopment and oppression that have been characteristic in the Third World countries. In particular, feminist theories have attempted to explain why women in the Third World have not benefitted from the economic 'development' of their countries and why they have been marginalized from the mainstream of the development process. Although there is a large and diversified range of opinions within the feminist school of thought, it does offer an alternative point of reference in analyzing the problems of development and the structures of oppression in the less developed countries. Feminist theory also directly challenges the traditional theories of development in the 'Modernization' school of thought and provides alternative solutions and strategies to address the question of development.

Upon examining the economic status and situation of Korean women and the definite and continuous patterns of subordination, devaluation and discrimination that have characterized women's labour force participation in South Korea, it becomes readily apparent that certain factors have been influencing the labour market system and specifically the actions and opinions of Korean employers to create the conditions of inequality. Neo- classical, economic theories of labour productivity and labour market segmentation offer potential and reasonable explanations as to why Korean women

have been discriminated and subordinated but they are not entirely accurate or applicable in the South Korean labour market context. As will be further elaborated at the end of chapter two, there is substantial evidence to question the validity and applicability of these neo- classical theories in the South Korean case. Rather certain arguments and theories within the feminist school of thought have been more helpful in explaining the characteristics and patterns in the Korean labour market system regarding women's participation and activities.

The arguments that have informed and guided this research are feminist theories which advocate that sexual inequalities and gender stereotypes in the work place are products of the patriarchal structures in the institutions (such as education and the state) of a country and the culturally constructed social ideologies which devalue and subordinate women. According to Ester Boserup in her article, "Economic Change and the Roles of Women", the role of the education system has been "not only to teach intellectual skills and scientific knowledge but also to indoctrinate pupils with the dominant cultural values" (Boserup, 1990, p.19). Unfortunately however, cultural education has meant the teaching of traditional biases against women and the early socialization of children to accept the existing sex hierarchy of male superiority and female inferiority. The perpetuation and reinforcement of negative,

stereotypical notions of women have marginalized and distorted their participation in the workplace. For example, as women are perceived to be inferior, they are given lower wages than men for similar work. Since in a monetized society economic status is associated with wage levels, the higher wage levels of men represent their higher status in the workplace (Boserup, 1990, p.21). Therefore, regardless of the similar work being done, sex inequalities in the labour market are maintained along with the sex hierarchy. Furthermore, the relative prices of products and services have tended to adapt to the traditional wage differentials leading to cheaper prices for products made exclusively or mainly by women (Boserup, 1990, p.21). In this manner, women's work has been devalued in market economy.

Boserup also asserts that greater educational opportunities and increased educational participation have not improved women's economic status or occupational positions in the labour market because women are usually educated to lower levels or in less prestigious fields of study than men (Boserup, 1990, p.19). This has occurred because the rapidly increasing education of women has been perceived as a potential threat to male dominance, particularly in developing societies where education has been gradually replacing "physical strength and ability in weapon use as male status symbols" (Boserup, 1990, p.19). By educating women to lower levels or in fields which are not challenging to male dominance or superiority, they are

being pushed into jobs which are either subordinate to men or in lower positions relative to their male counterparts. In this manner, it has been difficult for women to rise above the middle level positions or to escape low status, unskilled female jobs.

In Boserup's final analysis, she argues that the perpetuation and reinforcement of negative images of women through the education system have produced and reproduced sex inequalities in the workplace. Furthermore, as long as gender biases and stereotypes are maintained in the society and as patriarchal structures protecting male dominance are entrenched in the institutions, increased educational participation or greater access to technology and training will not lead to improved economic status or occupational positions for women in the labour market [1].

By pinpointing the source of the problem, the solutions become apparent - institutional changes which eradicate sexism and the creation of new images and conceptions of women are necessary to ensure gender equality and the full realization of women's rights in the labour force. In the South Korean context, an examination of the educational institutions and the state system provides evidence of patriarchal structures which have been directly and indirectly placing women at a disadvantage in the labour force. As well, the dominant culture of Confucianism has established and perpetuated the

subordinated and devalued status of Korean women. Therefore, these arguments have been more informative in offering explanations to existing patterns and in suggesting strategies for encouraging and improving the labour force participation of women in South Korea.

LEVEL OF ANALYSIS

The factors and circumstances at all three levels - the society, state and international arena - have played an equally significant and relevant role in the development of South Korea's economy and labour market conditions. Therefore, the level of analysis is not exclusive to any one perspective but rather the focus is on the dialectic interplay of all three levels. Micro- level studies on the opinions of Korean employers, attitudes of teachers and job recruitment practices are examined to provide insight into the economic actions and behaviours of labour force participants while macro- level analyses of the economic, social and political situation of South Korea paint a clear picture of the forces affecting labour market patterns. International circumstances which have affected South Korea directly or indirectly explain the context in which certain policies and strategies have been introduced and have been successful; as well foreign influences have played a very powerful role in reshaping and directing all aspects of the Korean society from school systems to religion.

Only a complete awareness of all the contributing factors at each of the three levels can produce a comprehensive analysis of this research.

METHOLOGICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE DIFFICULTIES

The researching of this paper has faced several difficulties and the problems encountered must be illustrated in order to ensure precise understanding of the information that is presented. Firstly, there have been enormous difficulties in finding current, up-to-date studies on Korean women's labour force participation and the factors that have influenced it. Most of the information is redundant and descriptive with very little analysis and theoretical basis. Rather the studies focus on quantitative accounting of the figures presented by the Ministry of Labour and the Economic Planning Board. The problem with the heavy reliance on government statistics especially in South Korea is that the figures do not take into account differences by gender. Not until 1979 has there been some attempts to classify by gender the statistics gathered by the government. For example, the degree of occupational segregation can not be accurately measured because job categorization is very limited and much of the statistical information does not provide distinctions by gender. As well, as in many other countries, a significant proportion of Korean women, particularly among married women in

the urban sector, work in jobs or activities that are not formally calculated in the government statistics on labour force. Therefore, sole reliance on government provided statistics prevents an accurate accounting of the labour force participation of Korean women. Many women fall into the area of informal sector because the Korean government defines businesses and companies too narrowly (ie. 5 or more workers must be employed) and because social norms prevent women from working in certain jobs or even from working at all if they have familial obligations to consider. It is the studies conducted in the WOMEN'S FORUM published by the Korean Women's Development Institute that contain most of these problems; this is unfortunate as these studies are one of the few sources of recent, available information and research on Korean women's labour force participation.

Another major problem has been the application of Western theories to the Korean situation. Authors such as Sa Won Hong, Hye Chae Lee and Pil Wa Chang have attempted to explain the inequalities in the labour market as results of 'housewifization' of women and 'feminization' of certain occupations. These are Western concepts that do not accurately describe the Korean case; it has been the maintenance of Confucian ideals of women that have either prevented women from entering the work force or have subordinated women in the work place. Although the results are the same as the Western

concepts, it is important to understand the traditional roots.

One of the most difficult problems has been to find recent studies on state policies toward women and women's labour force conditions. From the early 1980s, there has been an absolute dearth of information on Korean women. Most available studies have been done in the 1970s and are focused on the enormous contribution of Korean women in the export, manufacturing industries that have been at the heart of the export success. There has been very little interest and record of the sudden focus on women in the government since the presidency of Chun Doo Hwan. Ironically, most of the policies on women have only been initiated in the last decade and the least amount of information on women has been in this period. There have also been very little analysis of how state policies and the educational system has limited and/or discouraged women in the Korean labour force. The absolute shortage of comprehensive studies on Korean women's labour force participation and the factors that have influenced it points to the necessity of more detailed and theoretical analysis of this topic. Hopefully, this research can contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of this subject.

CHAPTER ONE

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1945 - 1989

In 1945, immediately after the partition of the country and the end of Japanese colonial rule, South Korea was paralysed with economic chaos and political instability. When the American Occupation Forces entered South Korea, it was confronted with a mostly agrarian country with 90% of its population engaging in subsistence farming and a minor industrial base composed entirely of light manufacturing and mining activities. This backward, pre-modern nation seemed a formidable task to stabilize and set on the path to modernization and economic development. However, today South Korea is one of the most dynamic, newly emerging nations in the global economy having achieved rapid industrialization and tremendous growth rates over the past four and a half decades. From every economic and statistical analysis that has been done on South Korea's development, the conclusions are the same: South Korea's economic development is a true success story. The most important aspects of South Korea's development are that the economic transformation and growth have been both

fundamental and self-sustaining and that the entire country has been radically transformed into a modern, highly industrial state.

This chapter will analyze the four and a half decades of economic development in South Korea focusing on the structural changes in the economy and the economic strategies that have been employed to achieve growth and transformation. As well the international circumstances that have directly or indirectly affected South Korea's development will be outlined. Future directions and labour demands in the Korean economy are reviewed in the last section of this chapter as they are determined by the strategies and plans that have been constructed over the years of development and modernization in South Korea.

THE LEGACIES OF JAPANESE COLONIALISM AND THE PARTITION OF THE COUNTRY, 1945 - 1960.

At the end of the Second World War, Korea experienced tremendous economic chaos and political instability as the country was divided into North and South and as the Japanese colonial rulers and settlers were repatriated. The economic chaos stemmed from the division of the country and its economic resources and from the sudden removal of Japanese technicians and planners who had been the key supervisors and economic

leaders of Korea for almost half a century during the colonial period. When the Korean peninsula was divided along the 38th parallel, South Korea was cut off from the heavy and chemical industries (which produced 90% of the metal products and 82% of the chemicals) and the mining activities that produced practically all of the iron ore and coal and more than 70% of the gold, silver, tungsten and graphite because they were situated in North Korea (Kim and Roemer, 1979, p.23). As well South Korea was particularly hard hit by the loss of electrical power as the majority of the electricity plants were located in the North. Rather South Korea was left with a predominantly agricultural and fishing economy with a negligible capability in light manufacturing products such as textiles, printing, wood products and processed foods (Kim and Roemer, 1979, p.24). However many of the industrial plants in South Korea had to suspend their production activities immediately following Liberation because of the loss of Japanese technicians and managers and/ or because of the separation from their markets (Japan and Manchuria). In fact, manufacturing output in South Korea dropped 15% from its 1939 level and all the manufacturing sectors declined by 60 to 90% between 1939 and 1948 (Kim and Roemer, 1979, p.27).

The economic chaos was further heightened by the political instability that engulfed South Korea after the partition. The inexperienced Syngman Rhee failed to pull the country together

amidst the confusion and dislocation of hundreds of North Korean refugees and repatriated Koreans from Japan that flooded into South Korea after 1945 (1). Rhee's weaknesses and blunders were magnified in comparison to Kim Il Sung's orderly and rapid reconstruction and development of North Korea.

Despite the severe disorganization, Rhee was able to recover the economy with the financial and technical assistance of the American Occupation Forces. In 1948-49, a massive land reform was designed and implemented by the Rhee government and the American Forces which resulted in a high degree of equity in the rural sector. Approximately 577,000 hectares of land were redistributed from the landlords to the tillers. The redistribution of land in favour of the tenants meant that there was an increase of nearly 33% in the incomes of the Korean tenant farmers and that the income inequality level in the rural sector was considerably reduced (Mason, Kim and et al., 1980, p.421). Since 90% of the population was in the rural sector, the land reform established a high degree of income equality in South Korea at the advent of development (2). As well, technical advice and managerial assistance from the American Forces enabled industries such as textiles and food processing to recover more rapidly. By 1948, the economic growth rate was an astonishing 7%. However, the steady recovery of the South Korean economy was abruptly halted by the outbreak of war in June 1950.

products accounted for over 60% of total exports (Cole and Nam, 1969, p.27).

The success of the FFYP was continued in the Second Five Year Plan (SFYP) which also employed the same strategy of high growth rates fueled by rapid industrialization and export oriented focus. As shown in Table 1.1, the planned targets were exceeded in almost every case with the exception of the primary sector which grew at only 2.5% rather than the expected target of 5.0%. Particularly exceptional was the performance of the manufacturing and mining sector which achieved almost double its expected growth level. As well, the other remarkable change was the slowdown of population growth. The realized figure was substantially lower than its planned figure.

By the end of the first decade of state-led development, the economic structure had changed considerably from its post war state. Exports reached US \$1,132.0 million and the manufacturing sector commanded 24.4% of the GNP (Table 1.1). On the whole, South Korea exported about 17% of its total domestic production by 1973 marking a stark contrast to the figure of less than 4% during 1955 to 1963 (Kim and Roemer, 1979, p.111). The primary sector was decreasing in importance and contribution to the economy, dropping from 45% to 26.5% of GNP in 1971 (Table 1.1).

The employment structure also changed dramatically as the dynamic manufacturing sector created jobs for the vast number

particularly significant in the period between 1954 to 1957 when it amounted to US \$2 billion including the program of Public Law 480 goods, which was US \$158 million. During this period, the economic assistance financed roughly 70% of all South Korean imports and it equaled almost 80% of total fixed capital formation (Chung, 1983, p.188).

The US also took an active role in formulating development plans. Between July 1953 and April 1960, the Rhee government was preoccupied with supplying daily necessities to the people and maintaining the constant flow of assistance from the US that it had very little time or ability to conceive a development plan. Therefore, an American planning committee, Robert Nathan Associates, framed the 'Economic Programme for Korean Reconstruction' in March 1953. The program became the basis of the management of aid provided by the UN Reconstruction Agency which amounted to US \$120 million (Kim and Roemer, 1979, p.41). However the Korean government never participated in preparing the plan and as a consequence it had many shortcomings.

The plan did not aim at long range development with a view to exploiting development potentialities of South Korea rather it explicitly aimed at producing the daily necessities that were in severe shortage and to reduce the heavy dependence on imports (Cho, 1980, p.38). The plan suggested that the mining industry which dominated the export sector should be expanded

to become the key mechanism to improve the balance of trade and that import substitution industrialization (ISI) would reduce the burden of the trade deficit and make South Korea more independent (Cole and Nam, 1969, p.25). To this end, the policy of reconstruction, particularly of infrastructure and industrial facilities that were destroyed by the fighting, were implemented. By 1957, with the extensive use of economic assistance to finance the reconstruction, most of the industrial plants and infrastructure projects were completed (Kim and Roemer, 1979, p.41). Then the emphasis turned to price stabilization and import substitution industrialization. Economic assistance provided by both the UN and the US helped finance a substantial proportion of imports so that prices could be stabilized and the trade balance would remain manageable. As well, through the sale of goods provided under the Public Law 480, the government was able to generate funds to subsidize agricultural products in the urban sectors (Cho, 1980, p.40). The Rhee government also kept the interest rates at the banking institutions low throughout the 1950s in order to promote investment in the manufacturing industries and overvalued the exchange rate to inflate the local currency. High tariffs were maintained along with various quantitative restrictions in the late 1950s to offset the progressive inflations of the currency. The low interest rate, overvalued currency and restrictive tariffs helped to establish import

substitution industries and accumulate capital in the hands of big business (Cho, 1980, p.39). The mining sector was expanded rapidly during this period and mineral exports dominated the export sector in 1958. Mineral exports valued at \$10 million composed nearly two-thirds of the total exports of \$16.5 million. However, even with the rapid expansion of the mining sector, mineral exports did not exceed \$25 million in the succeeding years.

As a result of these policies of reconstruction, stabilization and ISI, the GNP grew at an annual average rate of 4.4% during 1953 to 1961 with the manufacturing sector (which grew at 12.1%) leading the economic growth during this period [4]. However, the whole structure of economic development had been hinged on the continuous input of economic assistance creating a situation in which the Korean economy was heavily dependent (rather than reducing dependency) on imports and foreign capital for growth. Starting from 1959, the gradual decline of economic aid from the US triggered a concomitant slowdown of economic activity from 5% to 3% (Chung, 1983, p,187). Although the American plan provided the population with sustenance and made possible the restoration of basic economic activities, it did not create a comprehensive or viable economic strategy for continuous, sustainable growth. The result was that the South Korean economy was revived but not dynamic in its development.

THE ERA OF STATE-LED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1961 - 1980

Although the three phases of reconstruction, stabilization and ISI failed to stimulate dynamic growth, they did provide a solid basis on which the next phase of economic development could be successful. When General Park Chung Hee came to power following a military coup in 1961, an era of strong, authoritarian-style government with a highly centralized, technocratic state bureaucracy was established in South Korea. Unlike Rhee whose political agenda was on the unification of Korea, Park focused on economic development. He had worked under the Japanese during the colonial era, and as a graduate of the Manchuko and Japanese military academies, he learned the developmental models of the Meiji restoration and had come to realize the vast power and security associated with economic strength (Lee, 1985, p.45). He quickly crushed all opposition forces and ended the political turmoil which plagued and toppled the Rhee government in order to establish a stable basis on which economic development could occur.

Park's strategy was to formulate a comprehensive long term economic plan in which high growth rates were the central objective. The rapid development of manufacturing industries and exports were to be the twin engines behind the high growth rates. In the First Five Year Plan (FFYP) 1961 - 1966, the GNP growth rate was set at a high level of 7.1% per annum - high in

comparison to the growth levels achieved in the past decade. The primary sector (agriculture, forestry and fishing) was targeted to grow at 5.7%, the manufacturing and mining industries at 15.1% and the social overhead capital and services sector 5.4% (Cho, 1980, p.41). The plan obviously called for the manufacturing sector to be the leading sector in the economy. To facilitate the rapid development of industries and high levels of exports, a series of policies which mobilized and diverted scarce resources (raw material, capital, etc.) to export- oriented industries were implemented over the next few years.

A package of policy reforms were undertaken during the period 1964 to 1967 to promote export oriented industrialization. First, the Won was devalued by almost 50% from 130 to 255 Won per US dollar in May 1964 and a 'managed' unitary floating exchange rate system was adopted in March 1965. Following the exchange rate reform, the government doubled the interest rates from 15% to 30% on bank deposits and loans in September 1965 to increase voluntary private savings and simultaneously to decrease unproductive use of bank credit. These efforts to mobilize both domestic and foreign savings made possible a significantly higher ratio of investment to national income. The government also carried out price stabilization and tax reform programs to control inflation and raise the ratio of tax revenue to GNP. Finally trade liberation

and tariff reform programs followed in 1967 (Kim and Roemer, 1979, p.45).

Along with these policy reforms, the government also intensified incentives to exporters through the following measures: preferential credit, indirect tax exemptions on input into export production and export sales, a 50% reduction in income tax on export earnings (abolished in 1973), tariff exemption on imported raw materials and equipment for export production, wastage allowances on imported raw materials for export production and government support for export marketing activities (Kim and Roemer, 1979, pp.45-46). The government also initiated the building up of infrastructure to facilitate industrial activities and to provide employment to the growing number of unemployed workers in the urban areas. The emphasis on infrastructure helped to remove serious bottlenecks and activate lagging sectors in the economy [5].

The results were phenomenal. The actual performance of the economy during the planned period exceeded almost every target. The GNP grew at an average rate of 9%. The manufacturing sector jumped from 11% to 22% of GNP during the planned period. The value of exports increased from \$33 million in 1960 to \$138.1 million in 1966 while imports only grew from \$343 million to \$492.3 million in the same period (Cho, 1980, p.41). As well, the prediction that agricultural and mineral products would dominate the export sector was inaccurate as manufactured

products accounted for over 60% of total exports (Cole and Nam, 1969, p.27).

The success of the FFYP was continued in the Second Five Year Plan (SFYP) which also employed the same strategy of high growth rates fueled by rapid industrialization and export oriented focus. As shown in Table 1.1, the planned targets were exceeded in almost every case with the exception of the primary sector which grew at only 2.5% rather than the expected target of 5.0%. Particularly exceptional was the performance of the manufacturing and mining sector which achieved almost double its expected growth level. As well, the other remarkable change was the slowdown of population growth. The realized figure was substantially lower than its planned figure.

By the end of the first decade of state-led development, the economic structure had changed considerably from its post war state. Exports reached US \$1,132.0 million and the manufacturing sector commanded 24.4% of the GNP (Table 1.1). On the whole, South Korea exported about 17% of its total domestic production by 1973 marking a stark contrast to the figure of less than 4% during 1955 to 1963 (Kim and Roemer, 1979, p.111). The primary sector was decreasing in importance and contribution to the economy, dropping from 45% to 26.5% of GNP in 1971 (Table 1.1).

The employment structure also changed dramatically as the dynamic manufacturing sector created jobs for the vast number

of unemployed and underemployed Koreans in both the rural and urban sectors. Migration from rural to urban areas was substantial from 1953 to 1974; however, the largest increases were recorded during the 1965 to 1970 period in which the urban growth rate reached an astonishing 9.2% (Mills and Song, 1979, p.7). More than two-thirds of the urban growth had resulted from rural to urban migration and the driving force behind this urbanization was the growth of manufacturing employment. As evident from Table 1.2, the employment percentage of the primary sector declined considerably from 63.1% to 45.8% from 1963 to 1974 while the percentages in the secondary and tertiary sectors increased. By 1970, Seoul, the capital city of South Korea and where most of the initial manufacturing industries were located, became the largest administrative area containing 18% of the national population (Kwon, Lee and et al, 1975, p.75) [6].

The strategy of export oriented industrialization and high growth rates was successful in gradually transforming the South Korean economy into an industry oriented, dynamic, urban structure. However a large component of the success of this strategy must be attributed to the favourable international trading conditions. During the 1960s, there was an unprecedented growth in international trade. From 1965 to 1975, total world exports jumped from US \$201 billion to US \$883 billion (Blake and Walters, 1987, p.15). The substantial

reduction of tariffs under the auspices of GATT created an open, liberal trading regime which promoted international exchange and greatly assisted South Korea's strategy of export-led growth.

The Third (1972-1976) and Fourth (1977-1981) Five Year Plans continued the same strategies and goals as the previous two Five Year Plans with only slight modifications. Throughout the 1970s, export oriented industrialization was intensified to maintain high growth rates. However, there was also an attempt to correct the imbalances that developed during the 1960s. The low level of investment in the agricultural sector (only 8% during the Second Five Year Plan) coupled with the deliberate depression of rice prices below the market value (in order to subsidize the urban sectors) caused the income disparity between the urban and rural sectors to grow wider during the late 1960s. In 1965, the income gap was only 23% but by 1970 it had grown to 43% (Mills and Song, 1979, p.21).

To eliminate the regional imbalance, the government raised the prices of rice and other major grains and launched the New Village Movement. The New Village Movement was focused on improving the quality of rural life through the extension of community infrastructure and services. As well, the Movement included projects such as irrigation, reclamation, afforestation and the development of agroindustries to promote

income growth (Suh, 1980, p.122). As a result, the income disparity improved considerably during the 1970s reaching back to the levels of 10 to 25% (Kim and Roemer, 1979, p.165).

The government also attempted to address the imbalances that existed among industries. During the 1960s, labour intensive, light manufacturing industries were focused upon because of the shortage of capital and abundance of labour. However, by the 1970s, there was a conscious and planned effort to develop the heavy and chemical industries of the manufacturing sector. The focus shifted away from light, labour intensive industries to heavy and chemical industries in order to deepen the industrial structure and to reduce the import level by creating backward linkages. South Korea was heavily dependent upon imported machinery and capital products and hence it experienced a chronic trade deficit which grew throughout the 1960s. It was hoped that the development of industries such as machinery, steel, chemical products and electronics would replace some of these imported goods and decrease the growing deficit (Lee, 1980, p.99). By the end of the Second Five Year Plan, the blueprints for a petrochemical complex and steel mill were drawn and completion of these projects was due in the Third Plan period (Cole and Nam, 1969, p.29).

During the Third Five Year Plan, 61.4% of total fixed investment in manufacturing was allocated for heavy and

chemical industries and the share increased during the Fourth Five Year Plan to 67.6% (Cho, 1980, p.50). Consequently, the heavy and chemical industries grew more rapidly than the light industries. By 1976, the heavy and chemical industries were 40.2% of the manufacturing sector marking a tremendous increase from its share of 17.8% in 1971. As outlined in Table 1.3, from 1970 to 1975, the heavy and chemical industries became a significant proportion of the manufacturing sector. As well, during the Fourth Five Year Plan, there was a push to make the heavy and chemical industries competitive and export oriented. As shown in Table 1.4, exports of heavy and chemical products was approximately US \$6,215 million and they composed 47.8% of the total exports in 1981 while light industry exports composed only 43.5%. The growth rates of the machinery and shipbuilding industries were especially impressive leading the average growth rate with 31.3% and 31.4% respectively during the period of 1977-1981.

As a result of the rapid growth of the heavy and chemical industries, there was substantial backward linkages and import substitution in the Korean economy. Industries such as textiles and clothing which originally relied upon imports for 100% of its raw materials managed to reduce its import ratio significantly by using synthetic and petrochemical materials produced by Korean chemical industries. By the mid 1970s, the domestic production of synthetic fibers supplied nearly 60% of

the industry requirements. (Parvez, 1976, p.128) As well, the tremendous growth of exports from the heavy and chemical industries contributed significantly to the growth rate of the export sector and to the reduction of the trade deficit. In 1976, the export growth rate was 56.2% and total exports reached US \$7,814 according the Statistical Handbook of Korea 1977. The trade deficit also decreased from US \$1,671.4 million in 1975 to US \$590.0 million in 1976. (Statistical Handbook 1977) In fact, the trade situation became so favourable during the mid 1970s that for the first time since 1945 South Korea experienced a current account surplus in 1977 and 1978.

From 1961 to 1980, the South Korean economy achieved impressive growth rates, rapid industrialization and fundamental changes in its structure. Each of the four Five Year Plans was highly successful in surpassing its targets. Particularly during the 1970s, when the 1972 oil shock created adverse conditions for South Korea in terms of energy imports and restrictive export environment, the growth rate and export targets were greatly exceeded as shown in Table 1.5 and Table 1.6. The average annual growth of GNP and GNP per capita from 1960 to 1976 was an impressive 8.7% and 6.2% respectively. South Korea's growth rate far exceeded the GNP growth rates of both the advanced industrialized countries and the developing

countries which were 4.9% and 5.1% respectively (Cho, 1980, p.17). As well, the economic structure transformed radically over this period. In 1960, the primary sector was 45% of GNP while the manufacturing sector was a mere 11%. However by 1981, the manufacturing sector was 40.9% of GNP and the tertiary sector was 40.6% while the primary sector had declined to 18.5% (Statistical Handbook of Korea, 1982). The manufacturing ratio to GNP reached 35.1% in 1976 and exports increased 43% from 1962 to 1976 (Rim, 1980, p.206). The share of manufactured products in total exports increased from around 20% in 1962 to more than 85% in 1976 (Park, 1980, p.23).

Concomitantly with the changes in the economic structure, the employment structure also changed dramatically. As illustrated in Table 1.2, in 1963, 63.1% of the total labour force was working in the primary sector while the manufacturing sector employed only 8.0% of the economically active population. By 1981, the percentage in the primary sector was reduced to 32.5% while the secondary sector grew to 20.4% of a much increased labour force. The total labour force increased about 4.5 million during this period (Bai, 1980, p.157).

It was the strategy of export oriented industrialization implemented by a strong, authoritarian government that was the key mechanism through which South Korea was able to achieve its impressive economic development in the 1960s and 1970s. However, by the end of the 1970s, there were overwhelming

international circumstances and events which halted South Korea's era of high growth rates and forced Korean planners to restructure the economy.

DRIVE TO MATURATION - THE SHIFT TO A TECHNOLOGY- AND CAPITAL-INTENSIVE INDUSTRIALIZATION

According to the Korea Development Institute's 1978 economic report on future prospects and projections, there was a general consensus among the leading economists of the necessity to shift the industrial structure to a technology- and capital- intensive base. As the country was now facing a labour shortage rather than a labour surplus, wages were being driven upward and South Korea could not compete with other developing countries that had abundant and cheap labour such as China, India and Indonesia (KDI, 1978, p.1). As well, although the development of heavy and chemical industries during the 1970s deepened the industrial structure and created backward linkages, they "did not have very bright prospects in the near future" because these industries were highly dependent on imported raw materials and required a capital intensive production process (KDI, 1978, p.76). The report suggested that South Korea, being a resource and finance poor country with a highly educated population, was ready and capable to make the shift; in fact, a technology- and capital- intensive industrial structure better suited the country's capacities and the

strategy would enable the economy to be self-sustaining and competitive. Therefore, it recommended that:

Strong policy support from the government [was] needed to effectively develop an advanced industrial structure. Future industrial policy should be redirected from the present emphasis on direct export subsidies to a structure oriented incentive system. ... [In the past,] the export subsidies [had] been given on the basis of export earnings, irrespective of the nature of export products. Future industrial policy and export incentive schemes should be directed toward supporting those industries which have potential comparative advantages (KDI, 1978, p.77).

Several events and circumstances in the international economy that arose in the late 1970s created new problems for the Korean economy and forced Korean planners to accept and adopt these recommendations. In 1979, another substantial price increase by the OPEC nations sent oil prices soaring upward and gravely affected the economies of the advanced and semi-industrialized countries as oil was the main fuel used to run their industrial equipment. The oil shock triggered high inflation rates and a global economic stagnation during the early 1980s which came to be known as 'stagflation'. The situation of high oil prices, increasing inflation rates and general economic stagnation contributed to worsen and accelerate the growing protectionist mood among the advanced

industrial countries.

For South Korea, the oil price increase sent production costs soaring as it imported almost 100% of its petroleum and crude oil. According to the Asia Yearbook 1983, the balance of payments increased sharply to US -\$4,151.2 million in 1979 from its balance of US -\$1,085.2 million in 1978 and the debt service ratio (to GNP) increased to 14.7% in 1979 from 11.9% in 1978 and 10.7% in 1976 (Asia Yearbook, 1983, p.5). The growing protectionism of the AICs severely restricted the growth of Korean exports especially in light industrial goods like textile, clothing and footwear during the early 1980s. In 1981, exports of light industrial goods declined 2.7% in seven months (Asia Yearbook, 1983, p.184). As well, the deteriorating economic situation was worsened by the assassination of President Park at the end of 1979 which created political chaos and instability. The combined effects of high production costs, limited export growth and political chaos caused an economic slowdown in South Korea for the first time since the advent of state-led growth in 1961. The average growth rate of GNP from 1978 to 1982 was 3.4% - a significant reduction from the double digit growth rates of the 1970s (Asia Yearbook 1983, p.184). The actual value of GNP went down in 1980 to US \$56.5 billion from US \$58.0 billion in 1979 (Asia Yearbook 1983, p.4). Exports rose at only 19% per annum in the early 1980s compared to an average rate of 37% during the decade of 1970 to 1980

(Asia Yearbook 1983, p.184).

In response to the events in the international economy and to the sudden slowdown in the Korean economy during the 1980s, the new regime of Chun Doo Hwan focused the Fifth Five Year Plan on the philosophy of export-led economic growth and industrial restructuring. In an attempt to regain export competitiveness, a wage freeze was initiated in the manufacturing sector and the Won was devalued by almost 36% in 1980 and 5% in 1981 (Asia Yearbook 1981, p.179). Consequently, exports rose 24% in 1981. The government also took measures to stimulate economic activity by lowering the interest rate to 10% from 13.5% and revoking the self imposed money supply ceiling increasing it to 32.5% from 22% (Asia Yearbook 1983, p.184). As well, the government pressured industries to modernize and rationalize their production processes. For example, in the textile industry, excess capacity and obsolete facilities were the most urgent problems. The concentration on expanding capacity and production during the 1970s left many textile companies with outdated and overabundant facilities. In 1982, over 50% of all textile machines were older than the depreciable life allowed by Korean tax law (Jung, 1986, p.13). To address this problem, the government created a special fund - which was jointly financed by the government and the textile companies - to assist in the modernization and rationalization process in the textile industry; however, due to the slow

growth of the industry in the early 1980s, the fund could not meet the necessary costs [7].

The gradual adjustment in the Korean economy slowly improved the economic situation; by 1983, there was a vigorous upswing with the GNP growth rate reaching 9.5%. (Asia Yearbook 1985, p.5) The economic situation continued to improve as a result of the adjustment policies of the Chun government and the economic recovery of the United States in 1984. In fact, by 1986, the performance of the Korean economy was outstanding in every respect. Its growth rate reached 12.5%, the GNP rose 15.3% and prices stabilized with an annual inflation rate of less than 3% but perhaps the most significant factor was that the nation's current account shifted from a chronic deficit to a surplus which amounted to 5% of GNP (Kim and Ro, 1988, p.43). In 1987, GNP growth was 12% and the current account surplus ballooned to US \$10 billion. Exports continued to soar reaching US \$59 billion by 1988 (Asia Yearbook 1989, p.155).

The incredible economic performance since 1986 was attributed to both favourable international conditions and continuous economic reform policies. In the international arena, the favourable conditions arose out of the 'three lows' - low oil prices, low international interest rates and low US dollar vis-a-vis the Japanese Yen (Kim and Ro, 1988, p.46). The collapse of the oil prices by 47% decreased production costs in

South Korea. The low interest rates provided some relief of the massive debt burden. (This was especially important for South Korea which was the fourth largest debtor nation among the developing countries.) The appreciation of the Yen and other European currencies against the US dollar made Korean goods more competitive vis-a-vis Japanese goods resulting in a surge of Korean exports which filled the void left by Japan in the US market (Schott, 1988, p.101). The combined effect of the 'three lows' was estimated to have improved the 1985-86 balance of payments by 90% (Kim and Ro, 1988, p.47).

The economic reform policies that continued throughout the 1980s were focused on decreasing government budget deficits, promoting price stability and greater efficiency, and curtailing monetary growth. To this end, the Korean government froze its budget in 1982, including the salaries of the civil servants and the grain purchase price level, in order to curb excessive government spending. As a result, the fiscal deficit was reduced from 4.7% of GNP in 1981 to 0.1% in 1986 (Il, 1988, p.8). The stable and low inflation rate allowed positive real interest rates to rise, attracting domestic savings. The national savings - GNP ratio rose to 32.8% in 1986 while the investment- GNP ratio stabilized around 31% meaning that domestic savings could be the financial basis for future economic growth (Kim and Ro, 1988, p.47). As well the reduction of government intervention in price controls, the beginning of

privatization of commercial banks, the liberalization of import barriers and the reduction of control over foreign investment were initiated since 1986 to achieve greater efficiency in Korean industries and businesses by becoming more attuned to market signals (Il, 1988, p.9). These adjustment measures led to price stability, increased industrial productivity and overall efficiency in the economy. They also enabled the Korean economy to achieve continuous, dynamic growth throughout the late 1980s and provided impetus to restructure the industrial base.

The government focused on design, technological capabilities, research and development and the establishment of high tech industries such as telecommunications and information processing. Concomitantly the service sector ballooned in proportion and importance. In 1987, the tertiary sector generated 57.1% of GNP while the secondary and primary sectors were 31.5% and 11.4% respectively (Statistical Handbook of Korea, 1988). The tertiary sector also employed 50% of the total labour force while the secondary sector displaced the primary sector increasing to 28.1%. As well for the first time the electronics industry surpassed textiles as the leading export in 1988 (Asia Yearbook 1989, p.155).

The government encouraged more R&D in almost every industry. From 1977 onward, overall investment in R&D increased substantially with the total number of research institutes

increasing from 567 in 1976 to 626 in 1977 and expenditures rising from 60,900 million Won to 108,286 million Won in the same period (Statistical Handbook of Korea 1980, p.106). In 1978, investment in R&D rose 41% over the 1977 level to 152.4 billion Won making the R&D ratio to GNP 0.75% compared with 1977's 0.72% (Statistical Handbook of Korea 1980, p.105). Although the level of investment and R&D ratio to GNP went down in 1980 - mainly due to the economic hardships, by 1982 and continuing into the late 1980s, the level of R&D investment increased remarkably. In 1982, R&D percentage of GNP reached 0.88% and by 1986, the percentage was 1.98% (Statistical Handbook of Korea 1988, p.118). As well the government share of R&D was reduced from 76.7% in 1975 to 41.3% in 1982 and 26% in 1986 (Statistical Handbook of Korea 1988, p.118).

By the end of the 1980s, the Korean economy has broadened and matured considerably. The industrial structure has deepened with the gradual shift to a technology- and capital- intensive base. The secondary and tertiary sectors have become the dominant forces in the economy employing more than two-thirds of the labour force and representing almost 80% of the GNP. Consequently, the labour demands of the Korean economy have changed dramatically. During the first two decades of rapid industrialization, the demands have been for cheap, unskilled labour; however, now with the technology- and capital-

intensive industries, they require highly skilled and educated labour with knowledge in areas such as engineering, design, natural science and business management. The changing industrial structure and labour demands have created new challenges for the Korean labour force - particularly women who have been the primary source of cheap, unskilled labour in South Korea. The challenge will be to maintain, improve and increase women's labour force participation in coming years.

Over the past four and a half decades, South Korea has experienced rapid growth and radical transformation. From its initial beginnings as a backward, predominantly agricultural society in 1945, South Korea has become a modern, highly industrialized nation with over 65% of its population residing in the urban sector. The economic transformation has been fundamental and pervasive touching and changing almost every aspect of the Korean society. As South Korea enters a new decade, the economy continues to evolve with industrial restructuring and changing conditions in the labour market as well as in the Korean industries.

The strategy of export oriented industrialization has been the engine behind this economic success. Not surprisingly, this strategy has been maintained since its inception in the early 1960s with only slight modifications. As well, events and actors in the global economy have played a crucial role in

influencing South Korea's development process by providing opportunities, creating new pressures and supplying financial support.

This chapter has presented a macrolevel analysis of the economic development of South Korea over the past four and a half decades. Structural changes, economic strategies and international events have been the focus of this analysis. Although a macrolevel analysis does not provide very much insight on the effects - benefits and problems - of these changes on the Korean people, an understanding of the economic context does enable one to link the forces transforming the labour force participation of women in South Korea.

CHAPTER TWO

KOREAN WOMEN'S LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION: CONDITIONS, CONSEQUENCES AND EFFECTS

One of the biggest problems of development research has been the blindness to women's issues and problems in the analysis of economic development. Until the UN Decade of Women which generated greater awareness of women's roles in the development process, there have been very few attempts at integrating women into the development strategy as active participants and at understanding the roles that women have played in the development process. South Korea has been no exception to this problem. Most of the studies and researches that have been done on South Korea's economic development have either ignored or excluded women's contributions (and roles) in the past four and a half decades of development. Rather separate studies which focus exclusively on women have had to be conducted in order to evaluate the roles that women have played in the national development process. Essentially one has had to retrace the development process and 'add' women into the equations. Unfortunately, like these former studies, this

chapter also employs the same procedure mainly because as a secondary research, this study is inhibited by its sources of information. Hopefully, this chapter can clarify where and how women 'fit' into the whole picture.

This chapter is divided into three sections - the roles and conditions of women's labour force participation, the consequences of their involvement and the prospects for future participation. The first two sections are essentially an exercise in statistical analyses and quantitative measurements of changes, trends and patterns in women's labour force participation and in their lives. The last section examines the future prospects and projections of women's involvement in the Korean economy particularly in light of the structural transformations and changing labour demands in the recent decades. As well, economic theories on why women have been relegated to their current status and situation are examined and criticized with facts, counter-arguments and theories.

KOREAN WOMEN IN THE WORK FORCE, 1960 - 1980

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Korean women entered the workforce in significant proportions. As indicated in Table 2.1, the female labour force participation rates increased tremendously rising from 29.4% in 1960 to 44.7% in 1980. The growth of women's participation in the workforce was particularly intensive during the period from 1960 to 1975,

rising from 29.4% to 49.2%. Since the total labour force grew from 7 to 12.7 million in this same period, the actual number of economically active women rose from 2 million to 5 million (Hong, 1984, p.8). In contrast, men's participation in the workforce declined from 71.5% of the total in 1960 to 61.4% in 1975, although their participation rates increased from 71.3% to 78.1% during the same period (Hong, 1984, p.8). As well, the rates and absolute numbers of unemployed were lower for women than men during the two decades as illustrated in Table 2.2 (11).

The female labour force participation rates increased in all three of the sectors of the Korean economy. From 1965 to 1980, women's participation rate rose from 41% to 53% in the farm sector while their share of the total agricultural labour force increased from 36% to 43% during the same period (Cho and Koo, 1983, p.523). In the manufacturing sector, women's participation level increased 50% and the actual number of women employed in the secondary sector grew 7.4 times from 160,000 to 1,178,000 during the period from 1960 to 1975 (Cho, 1985, p.83). Meanwhile the female labour force in the tertiary industries grew by 2.1 times. During the two decades of rapid economic development in South Korea, women's labour force participation increased rapidly and significantly on the whole and within each sector of the economy.

However, Korean women were not evenly or equally

distributed across the different sectors or positions in the economic structure, rather definite patterns and characteristics emerged in the employment of women in the economy. Korean women were disproportionately represented in the agricultural sector, the export industries which employed labour intensive production processes and the low status positions in the manufacturing and service sectors. This pattern emerged as a result of the economic strategies that the Korean government pursued and of the subsequent changes in the employment and industrial structures which occurred during the decades of the 1960s and 1970s (outlined in Chapter one, section two).

WOMEN'S LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR

The economic 'pull' of the manufacturing sector resulted in the massive outmigration of men and young women from the rural sector. As quantified in the first chapter, the largest increases in the urban growth rate was during the decade of 1965 to 1975 in which the period from 1965 to 1970 was the highest. Two thirds of the urban growth was attributed to rural- urban migration (Mills and Song, 1979, pp.7-8). The actual size of the population of farmers decreased from 14,559,000 in 1960 to 9,668,000 in 1982 representing an absolute reduction of 5,000,000 farmers during the two decades. The growth of manufacturing employment was pinpointed as the primary reason for this massive migration (Mills and Song,

unemployed, married women, this expanded leisure time could provide the impetus to participate in the labour force.

3) changing family structure - from extended to nuclear family size: The structure and size of a Korean household increasingly changed throughout the 1960s and 1970s. In 1966, one to two generation families composed 73.4% of total households while in 1980, the percentage rose to 77.9%. Three to four generation families decreased from 26.6% in 1966 to 17.2% in 1980 (Kim, 1986, p.101). The shift to a one to two generation household signified the structural change of the average household in South Korea from an extended to a nuclear family. As well, the average size of a household in South Korea continued to decline throughout the two decades. However, on the whole, the average household size was bigger in the rural areas than in the urban centres. The size of the average urban household was 5.4 persons in 1960, 4.9 in 1970 and 4.4 in 1980 while in the rural sector, the sizes were 5.6, 5.5 and 4.7 persons respectively (Chang, 1989, p.70). The factors contributing to this phenomena were the massive migration to urban centres, the increase of the urban population and subsequent decrease of the rural areas, and the gradual loosening of traditional family functions and obligations.

In urban centres, living spaces were on the whole considerably smaller than in the rural areas. The cramped living spaces in the urban sector (which were more expensive

government in the late 1960s [3]. The Korean government was focused on developing the manufacturing sector and minimizing labour wages. To this end, it subsidized the costs of the urban sector by reducing the prices of agricultural products (Kim, 1986, p.117).

As well, there was very little investment or development efforts directed at the agricultural sector until the Saemaul Movement in the Third Five Year Plan in 1972. As indicated in the first chapter, the agricultural sector received less than the investment amount planned for in the first two Five Year Plans. The results were to keep the agricultural sector undeveloped, technologically backward and stagnant. Health facilities, roads, educational institutions and employment opportunities were severely limited. The microlevel study revealed that more than 90% of rural women delivered their babies at home leading to the highest mortality rate in the country at 40 per 1000 (Kim, 1985, p.145). As well, the study concluded that over 17.8% of the total rural population was illiterate with the percentage being higher among rural women (Kim, 1985, p.148). The agricultural employment opportunities were extremely limited especially for rural women who were denied access to modern machinery and the knowledge to use agricultural machineries such as tractors, cultivators, threshers, etc. There was also a considerable wage gap between rural men and women. As of 1982, a male adult was paid 8,163

Won per day including a food fee of 2,379 Won while a female adult was paid 6,211 Won including 1,997 Won as the food fee (Kim, 1985, p.144).

As a direct result of the state policy to develop the manufacturing sector and export industries, the agricultural sector was ignored and undeveloped. The employment structure shifted away from the agricultural sector towards the manufacturing and services sector. Although there was an overall decline in the proportional percentage of the female labour force in the primary sector (Refer to Table 2.3), women's labour force participation rates increased tremendously as they were left to fill the labour shortage in the rural sector. As well, rural women's economic situation continued to worsen as the government diverted agricultural capital to urban areas through the lowering of agricultural prices and ignored the needs and conditions of the rural sector during the two decades of rapid economic growth.

WOMEN'S LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION IN THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR

During the first decade of Park's economic strategy, efforts and investment were directed at increasing light manufacturing industries with labour intensive production processes. Since South Korea was in a situation of labour abundance and capital shortage in the early 1960s, light, labour intensive industries were initially the focus of the export oriented industrialization and rapid growth. During the

period from 1961 to 1972, exports consisted mainly of light industry items such as textiles, clothing, shoes, plywood, toys, wigs and electrical appliances which composed 70% of the total exports earnings (Cho, 1985, p.84).

The growth of these light, labour intensive, export industries provided new and expanded employment opportunities - especially for Korean women. During the 1960 to 1975 period, the female labour force participation rate rose from 19% to 30% in the urban areas (Hong II, 1984, p.195). In industries such as textiles and clothing, toys, shoes and wigs, women composed 80% of the total workforce (Jones, 1984, p.46). In fact the shift to manufacturing activities was so dramatic, Hong noted that "in 1960, working women were 1.7 times more in service jobs than in production and manufacturing activities. By 1975, this pattern changed: there were 1.8 times more women in manufacturing than in services" (Hong, 1984, p.20).

These export oriented, labour intensive, light industries specifically employed women because of their production cost requirements and their exposure to competition in the international market. In Susan Joeke's 1987 study for the UN, she explained that "the growth of manufactured exports from less developed countries ... led to a specific demand for female labour and relatively fast growth of female employment in industry ... because women were [the] sources of the cheapest labour" (Joeke, 1987, p.94). Since wages were more

important than capital as a factor in costs of production in labour intensive industries, in competitive (export) markets light industrial firms needed to minimize their unit labour costs through either enhancing productivity and/or paying lower wages. Since enhancing productivity in these industries were limited to training and organizational work flow improvements or changing machining methods and tool design, real savings in production costs were generated from minimizing wages (Joeke, 1987, p.88). Women's lesser education and lower expectations of receiving training made them particularly suited for unskilled, monotonous jobs with little advancement and low wages. Their docility also made them more compliant and less willing to form and join labour unions (Joeke, 1987, p.90).

Consequently, most of the women that were employed in these industries were single, young women between the ages of 14 and 29 who migrated from the rural sector [4]. Their educational attainment was generally low with either a primary or middle school level education (Hong, 1984, p.20). As well, their wage levels were on average 45.1% of their male counterparts (Hong, 1984, p.24). Women remained in the lowest positions with very few opportunities for upward mobility or for management level positions. They worked long hours (usually 50 hours a week and up to 7 days a week) in harsh conditions (bad ventilation and poor lighting) mainly because the export industries needed to keep their production costs down in order to remain

internationally competitive (Kim, 1985, p.33).

Many of the light, labour intensive, export industries experienced feminization of their workforce as women composed the majority of the workers. For example, 85% of the workforce in the textile industry and 90% of the food processing industry was composed of women workers (Jones, 1984, p.46). With the light, export oriented industries employing mainly female workers, the level of occupational segregation increased during the two decades from 1960 to 1980. Since levels of occupational segregation resulted from two processes - changes in the occupational structure and changes in the sex composition of each occupation, the expansion and growth of the light, export oriented industries during the 1960s and early 1970s heightened the level of occupational segregation as they continued to employ mostly women workers (Jin and Stevens, 1987, p.99). In 1960, the index (5) was approximately 13 indicating that about 13% or one in six male or female workers would have to switch their occupation before there would be no evidence of sex segregation in the labour force. However, by 1970, the overall level of sex segregation had increased to about 20 and then decreased slightly to 18 in 1980 (Jin and Stevens, 1987, p.100). The decrease in sex segregation was attributable to the fact that the growth of the heavy and chemical industries during the 1970s led to the employment of more men in the manufacturing sector (Kim, 1986, p.125). The heavy and chemical

industries usually had capital intensive production processes which required semi- skilled and skilled labour; therefore, male workers were generally hired by these industries (Kim, 1986, p.125). As well, more women began to enter the tertiary sector in greater numbers during the end of the 1970s lowering the degree of occupational segregation in the services sector [6].

Although the growth of the manufacturing sector particularly light, labour intensive, export industries provided employment opportunities for women and increased female labour force participation rates in the secondary sector, the working conditions were harsh and Korean women were relegated to the lowest positions in the manufacturing sector.

WOMEN'S LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION IN THE TERTIARY SECTOR

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the tertiary sector grew concomitantly with the manufacturing sector and the urban sector. Retail, wholesale, foods, accommodation businesses, restaurants, financial services, etc. all grew tremendously during the two decades of rapid growth. On the average the tertiary sector grew at a rate of 9.1% from 1961 to 1975 (Kim, 1986, p.127). During the 1960s, women's participation in the tertiary did not grow as quickly as the agricultural and manufacturing sectors; however, by the end of the 1970s, the growth of women in the services sector was faster as the

proportion of women in the sales, clerical and services occupations increased tremendously. As indicated in Table 2.3, from 1963 to 1976, the percentage of women in the tertiary sector rose only 6.1% from 24.3% to 30.4% while during the period from 1976 to 1980, the percentage rose very rapidly from 30.4% to 40.8%.

However, Korean women were largely concentrated in the low status, unskilled positions in the tertiary sector. According to Table 2.4, by 1980, women only held 3.2% of the professional and administrative occupations while in the clerical, sales and service jobs, they made up 35.2%. For example, the number of women in clerical positions increased 14.8 times reaching 117,000 persons during the decade of the 1970s (Kim, 1986, p.125). Women were usually waitresses, street vendors, sales girls, clerical staff and hostesses in hospitality services. They were paid low wages and worked long hours. Through a series of interviews with 20 Korean women in Seoul conducted by Barbara Mintz during the 1970s, an insightful and revealing analysis (although limited in representativeness) of the working conditions in the tertiary sector was produced. Mintz discovered that women working as waitresses, bus ticket collectors, restaurant hostesses, etc. were working 7 days a week and 10 hours a day. They were given one day off every two weeks and they received no benefits (Mintz, 1977, p.155). Even in the professional and administrative occupations, women were

mainly pharmacists and nurses rather than doctors, teachers rather than principals and bank tellers rather than financial analysts (Cho and Koo, 1983, p.529).

It was also in the services sector that a great number of Korean women worked in the informal sector as street vendors, domestic maids, petty market traders and money lending. They even operated grocery stores, family restaurants and beauty parlours through the informal system [7]. Although the informal sector enabled many Korean women to generate income earnings, informal activities tended to be irregular and unstable as a source of income (Cho and Koo, 1983, p.525).

The growth of the tertiary sector during the two decades of rapid economic growth led to the increase of employment and labour force participation rates of women. However the occupations and working conditions of Korean women in the tertiary sector were similar to those of the secondary sector in that they were harsh and unrewarding. In the tertiary sector, women experienced low economic status as cheap, unskilled workers.

CONSEQUENCES AND BENEFITS OF WOMEN'S LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION

With the advent of modernization and industrial development, Korean women's personal situations changed dramatically. Many of these changes were directly linked to their active and increasing involvement in the labour force.

Other changes were induced by the effects of modernization and development which occurred in the Korean society.

1) later marriage age: The marriage age of Korean women increased rapidly over a relatively short period of time. From 1955 to 1975, the marriage age rose from 20.4 to 23.6 (Hong, 1984, p.9). By 1985, the average age at first marriage increased to 25.1 (Steinberg, 1988, p.76). This phenomena was a consequence of two factors. First, since Korean women's primary roles and responsibilities were to tend to her family and children, there was an effective cultural barrier to continuing economic activities in the labour force after marriage. As a result, Korean women delayed their marriage plans in order to participate in the labour force (Hong, 1984, p.31). The resulting increase in unmarried women in all age groups, especially those 20 to 29 years old, served to raise the female labour force participation rates. Unmarried women made up 31.9% of the female labour force in 1975, up from 24.0 in 1966 (Hong, 1984, p.9). Korean parents did not oppose the delay because they welcomed and even encouraged the additional cash income that the women contributed to the family. In many instances, girls were sent to earn an income to help pay for their brothers' education (Steinberg, 1988, p.77). The second factor was the infiltration of modern ideas challenging the traditional role of woman as dependent on her family and husband (Lee and Cho, 1977, p.147). Korean women wanted an

opportunity to work and be economically independent before thinking about marriage. However the harsh working conditions, limited occupational categories and low wages made them realize that they could not live a comfortable, economically independent life and therefore opted for marriage after only a few years of employment (Yoon, 1977, p.163).

2) lower fertility rates and changing tempo of fertility: Fertility rates have decreased greatly and the average number of crude births per woman also declined from 4.7 children in 1967 to 2.6 children in 1979 (Chang, 1989, p.70). By 1985, the fertility rate reached 2.05 (KWDI, 1989, p.25). The substantial reduction of fertility rates was a direct result of the massive family planning program implemented by the Korean government as a part of its population policy in the 1960s. Contraception was legal, supported and administered. Consequently, the use of contraception increased substantially - in 1964, only 9% of all married women aged 15 to 44 were reported to be using contraception; however, by 1977, the figure rose to 44% (Donaldson and Nichols, 1978, p.247). In 1985, the Korean Women's Development Institute reported that 70.4% of Korean couples were now using contraceptive methods (Shreir, 1988, p.166). As well, abortion was permitted up to 28 weeks' gestation in cases where continued pregnancy constituted a threat to the women's life or health, where the pregnancy was the result of rape or incest and in cases of abnormal foetal

indications (Shreir, 1988, p.166).

There was also a change in the tempo of fertility among Korean women. In a study conducted by Donaldson and Nichols in 1971, it was discovered that not only was the total number of pregnancies and live births declining for those couples most recently married but they were also having their first children more quickly after marriage and bearing subsequent children more rapidly (Donaldson and Nichols, 1978, p.234). There were several reasons cited for this change. First, the marriage age of Korean women had increased prompting them to have children more quickly after marriage and secondly, the better health conditions of Korean women since the rapid development of the economy in the 1960s and 1970s reduced the incidences of irregular menstruation and the stress of frequent pregnancies (Donaldson and Nichols, 1978, pp.238-240).

The combined effects of the decreasing number of children and the increasing tempo of childbearing during the early years of marriage were to lower the age at which the last child entered school. In 1955, women's age at their last child's school admittance was 38.4 years old while in 1980, women's age was on average between 33 to 36 (Chang, 1989, p.71). Coupling the lower age at which the last child enters school with the increase of women's life expectancy from 57.7 in 1950 to 71.3 in 1975 (Chang, 1989, p.70), the number of leisure years in the lives of Korean women increased to almost 25 years. For

unemployed, married women, this expanded leisure time could provide the impetus to participate in the labour force.

3) changing family structure - from extended to nuclear family size: The structure and size of a Korean household increasingly changed throughout the 1960s and 1970s. In 1966, one to two generation families composed 73.4% of total households while in 1980, the percentage rose to 77.9%. Three to four generation families decreased from 26.6% in 1966 to 17.2% in 1980 (Kim, 1986, p.101). The shift to a one to two generation household signified the structural change of the average household in South Korea from an extended to a nuclear family. As well, the average size of a household in South Korea continued to decline throughout the two decades. However, on the whole, the average household size was bigger in the rural areas than in the urban centres. The size of the average urban household was 5.4 persons in 1960, 4.9 in 1970 and 4.4 in 1980 while in the rural sector, the sizes were 5.6, 5.5 and 4.7 persons respectively (Chang, 1989, p.70). The factors contributing to this phenomena were the massive migration to urban centres, the increase of the urban population and subsequent decrease of the rural areas, and the gradual loosening of traditional family functions and obligations.

In urban centres, living spaces were on the whole considerably smaller than in the rural areas. The cramped living spaces in the urban sector (which were more expensive

than in the rural sector) limited the size and structure of the household (Mills and Song, 1979, p.142). As the population in the urban sector increased, the number of nuclear families and/or smaller families continued to rise. As well, the extensive migration from the rural to the urban sector which occurred for three decades after the Korean War led to the permanent or temporary separation of families. Whereas temporary migration usually involved the separation of nuclear family members, permanent migration was often associated with a separation of the nuclear family from other kin (Hugo, 1987, p.147). The migration and separation of families not only reduced the size of households but also began to break down the traditional family patterns and obligations. Furthermore, the growth of the urban sector and the continuous migration of farmers to the urban centres meant that more people were being exposed to modern ideas, had better access to family planning facilities and were able to enhance their employment and educational opportunities (Hugo, 1987, p.149) [8].

The reduction of the household and family size had both negative and positive effects on Korean women. The positive factor was that women did not have as many people to care for. In the traditional, multigenerational household, women were essentially servants (Steinberg, 1989, p.75). In a nuclear household or at least in a smaller sized family, women enjoyed more freedom in their marital life and in the management of

their households (Lee and Kim, 1977, p.149). For unemployed, married women, smaller family size meant that they had more leisure time and time away from their household chores in which to expand their realm of activities and interests (Kwon, 1987, p.186). However, with the smaller family and/or nuclear family, Korean women also lacked the support and help from other members of the family (Ju, 1963, p.18). Since traditionally the support and care of family members were the sole responsibility of the family unit, the Korean government did not institute many social services such as daycare centres, old age homes, unemployment insurance, etc. (Hong II, 1984, p.199). Consequently, Korean women had to shoulder these family burdens and in a smaller household, there were fewer people who could offer assistance.

4) the growth of labour saving conveniences: With the rapid industrialization of the Korean economy and the continuous exposure to modern ideas, lifestyles and devices, there was a concomitant growth of labour saving conveniences in the Korean society. Although the high tariff levels and import quotas limited the influx of modern conveniences to the Korean household, there was a gradual availability and use of these labour saving devices with the heightening demand caused by the increase of women in the labour force (Park, 1979, p.26). In a 1987 microlevel study on rural women's conditions, it was discovered that even in the rural sector, there was a

considerable improvement in the distribution and use of convenience facilities and household appliances. The survey concluded that 83.4% of rural households had tapped water supply facilities, 46.2% had sewage systems, 34.3% a sink unit in the kitchen, 92.8% a cupboard in the kitchen and 61.1% coal briquet heating system (Kwon, 1988, p.26). As well, on average, each household had 4.4 convenient appliances such as an electric rice cooker, an electric iron, a refrigerator, a gas fueled cooking table and a washing machine (Kwon, 1988, p.26). In the urban sector, the access and use of labour saving appliances and modern facilities were greater. Manufactured goods were cheaper in cities because they did not have the added shipping costs when sold in rural areas and because there was less competition among the rural retailers (Mills and Song, 1979, p.20).

The growth and availability of labour saving conveniences made the household chores more convenient and manageable. Although these modern devices did not necessarily lessen the time spent on housework, they did enable other members of the household to contribute to housework more readily (Park, 1979, p.27). Without these conveniences and devices, many household chores were rather complex and required a certain degree of learning such as sewing, making rice, cooking, etc. With these new appliances, children and husband could now assist in the household chores. However, cultural attitudes and strict

division of labour were the factors working against this redistribution of household chores.

5) higher educational attainment: Generally the level of education of Korean women improved considerably since 1945. The proportion of female students as a percentage of the total student body was 35.6% in middle school, 33.4% in high school and 22.5% in university in 1965; in 1986, the respective figures were 48.4%, 47.4% and 26.6% (Chang, 1989, p.128a). Although the rate of female students moving up to higher levels had been consistently slower than that of male students, the total number of female students increased by 54.1% from 1945 to 1972 while the total number of male students increased only by 25.3% during the same period (Kim, 1975, p.84). By 1985, the literacy rate among women reached 90% (compared with 97% of men) (Shreir, 1988, p.165).

The primary factors influencing the improvement of Korean women's educational attainment were the increase of educational opportunities since the end of Japanese colonialism and the implementation of a compulsory primary education legislation. During the period of Japanese colonialism, educational opportunities and institutions were limited for Korean students (Kim, 1975, p.54). However with liberation, there was a substantial restructuring of the school system in which the Christian values of gender equality was promoted along with the development of more educational facilities (Kim, 1975, p.24).

Consequently, women began to enter the educational system in greater numbers. Furthermore, the enactment of the compulsory primary education legislation in 1947 increased the educational level of Korean women (KWDI, 1989, p.10).

The higher educational attainment did not necessarily promote labour force participation and in cases of university educated women, the effect was to actually lower participation rates. For example, the unemployment rate for women with no schooling was 3.6% while for college graduates, it was 8.6% (Roh, 1988, p.61). As well, the highest labour force participation rate (58.1%) appeared among the women with only elementary school education while the lowest participation rates were in the category comprised of college and university dropouts (Shim, 1985, p.111). The lack of adequate jobs for women with a high or higher degree of education was the principal reason for the negative relationship between women's educational attainment and economic involvement (Roh, 1988, p.61). Although Korean women's higher educational attainment did not increase labour force participation, it did create a pool of educated women available and willing for active economic participation. In a 1985 survey at Ewha Women's University, it showed that 97% of coeds desired to work upon graduation and 80% expressing the wish to resume careers after raising children (Hein Kim, 1988, p.98).

Korean women's personal situations and the tempo of their lives have been substantially altered by their increased participation in the labour force and by the modernization of the society. However these changes have also enhanced their ability to engage in economic activities in the future. Smaller family sizes and more labour saving conveniences have enabled women to have more time away from their household responsibilities and therefore have provided them with the opportunity to engage in activities outside of the domestic sphere. As well, the lower fertility rate, greater concentration of childbirth in the earlier years of marriage and expanded life expectancy have prolonged the period in which Korean women have leisure time away from household and children obligations. Finally, the higher educational attainment of Korean women has provided them with the tools and the incentive to engage in economic activities and to pursue a career even after marriage and childbirth. These changes have all contributed to potentially raising the labour force participation rate of Korean women in the future.

FUTURE PROSPECTS OF KOREAN WOMEN'S LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION
AND THEORIES ON WOMEN'S DISADVANTAGED STATUS IN THE LABOUR
MARKET

In the 1980s, Korean women's labour force participation has not grown as consistently and as rapidly as the previous two

decades. As shown in Table 2.1, the percentage of women in the total labour force increased rapidly from 28.5% in 1960 to 38.6% in 1975; however, by 1981, it declined to 37.4%. Even in 1985, the percentage did not reach its 1975 level. From 1960 to 1975, the growth of women in the total labour force was 6.7% per year on average while the growth from 1981 to 1989 was 3.5%. Although the participation rate has grown to 49.3% in 1989, it has only been a minor improvement above the level achieved in 1975.

The reduction and slower growth of Korean women's participation rates and percentage of total labour force can be attributed to two factors - the economic climate of the early 1980s and the continuous restructuring of the Korean industrial base. First, in the beginning of the 1980s, there was an economic crisis and slowdown in South Korea precipitated by events such as the growing protectionism among the AICs, the second oil shock, the global economic recession and the political instability in the domestic sphere caused by the assassination of President Park (Tak, 1987, p.71). Korean women's participation in economic activities was negatively affected as women's labour was more sensitive to the global recession being disproportionately represented in the export industries and as women were traditionally viewed as reserve labour in South Korea's labour market (Tak, 1987, p.72). According to Table 2.1, both the female participation rate and

the percentage of women in the total labour force in 1981 and 1985 were lower than the corresponding levels in 1975. Secondly, the continuous restructuring of South Korea's industrial structure from a labour- intensive base to a capital- and technology- intensive one has considerably withered away the labour intensive industries such as textiles, clothing, footwear and toys in which Korean women have predominately been employed. In 1988, 24,000 jobs have been lost in these industries despite a third consecutive year of 12% economic growth (Clifford, 1989, p.54). With the economy expected to expand at a more moderate rate of 7-8% from 1989 onward and with the labour intensive industries bearing the brunt of the slowdown, jobs in these industries are expected to disappear more rapidly in the coming years (Clifford, 1989, p.54). Consequently, Korean women in the manufacturing sector have experienced and can anticipate higher unemployment rates and less employment opportunities in this sector.

Throughout the 1980s, Korean women have maintained their disproportionate representation in the relatively undeveloped agricultural sector, in the labour intensive, export industries and in the low status, unskilled jobs of the service sector. As Table 2.4 indicates, the percentage of females in agricultural occupations has continued to grow suggesting that although the absolute number of women in the sector has declined, women workers have remained longer in the primary sector than men.

The fact that women are more easily retained in less developed sectors relative to men indicates that there is a developmental lag in Korean women's labour force participation (Chang, 1989, p.103).

Amongst female workers in the manufacturing sector, nearly 80% are still concentrated in the textile, clothing and leather industries (55.4%), the electronics industry (15.3%) and the chemical industries (7.6%) despite the fact that capital intensive industries such as automobiles, steel production and shipbuilding have been the fastest growing industries since the 1970s (Chang, 1989, p.104). The concentration of women in labour intensive rather than technology or capital intensive industries implies that women are still relegated to unskilled positions in the manufacturing sector.

As well, in the tertiary sector, women have remained in the low status, unskilled jobs. As shown in Table 2.4, only 4% of all administrative and managerial positions were occupied by women while 38.9% of clerical and 47.2% of sales positions were held by women. Furthermore, even in the clerical and sales positions, Korean women have been relegated to the lowest occupations. For example, in 1985, 94.7% of typists and 62.0% of bookkeepers were females while only 1.4% of clerical supervisors were women (Chang, 1989, p.104). In sales positions, women were in more retail rather than wholesale trading businesses. In addition, women workers who represented

61.3% of service occupations were heavily concentrated in small- scale businesses (Roh, 1988, p.67). According to a survey conducted in 1985, about 90.9% of women working in the wholesale and retail trade and 72.1% working in social and personal service industries were in businesses that employed 1 to 4 persons (Roh, 1988, p.67). Small- scale businesses tend to be more unstable financially and offer little upward economic or occupational mobility. The relative absence of women in administrative and managerial positions and the high percentage of women in the low status positions of the clerical, sales and service sectors represent the maintenance of Korean women in the unskilled, low status occupations of the tertiary sector.

Perhaps the one encouraging figure has been the rapidly growing percentage of women in professional and technical positions. By 1989, women occupied 38.2% of these positions (Table 2.4). However the enthusiasm must be tempered by the understanding that approximately 70% of that figure was comprised of occupations such as teacher and nurse. The fact that the employment rate of highly educated women dropped from 52.9% in 1975 to 26.6% in 1986 indicates that Korean women are confronted with narrow occupational options and limited rewarding positions in the Korean labour market (Shin, 1989, p.208). Furthermore, the wage disparity between men and women has not been reduced leaving women's wages at approximately 45% of their male counterpart's while the degree of occupational

of the Confucian perspective on women, it becomes evident how (and why) women have been relegated to a marginal and subordinate position in the labour force. The second section examines how the Confucian philosophy has been implemented in the Korean labour market context and how it has affected women's economic participation and activities. As long as the Confucian understanding of women informs employment decisions, women's economic involvement continues to be distorted and marginalized in the Korean economy. The third section tackles the question of how to face this cultural challenge. Beginning with the premise that culture is not stagnant and constant in nature but rather is a changing and developing force, one can be hopeful that the cultural fetters, namely Confucian prejudices against women, can be overcome by looking at historical examples of cultural transformations which have occurred in Korea. The last section further advances the argument presented in the third section by highlighting and examining the forces which are creating cultural changes in the Korean society today.

CONFUCIAN UNDERSTANDING OF WOMEN AND THEIR ROLES

When the Yi Dynasty consolidated its power in 1392, Confucianism was adopted as the principle religious and cultural ideology in Korea. The indigenous shamanism and Buddhism were violently suppressed and restricted [2] (Lee,

from economic theories of human capital and of market segmentation. The human capital approach suggests that women earn less than men because they have lower levels of human capital - mainly education, training and on-the-job experience - and therefore have lower labour productivity (Anker and Hein, 1986, p.7). Women accumulate less work experience and their periods of withdrawal from the labour force are greater because of their childbearing and rearing responsibilities (Anker and Hein, 1986, p.7). The market segmentation theory is a refinement of the human capital theory in that it views the labour market as stratified or segmented by institutional barriers (Anker and Hein, 1986, p.10). This theory recognizes that the labour market is distinguished into two types of jobs - unskilled and skilled. The unskilled job market has low wages, low security and little possibility for advancement while the skilled job market has relatively good pay, security and economic mobility. In the skilled job market, the worker's skills are firm-specific and the employers' need for stability in this part of the workforce leads them to offer high wages and good prospects for advancement (Anker and Hein, 1986, p.10). Since worker stability is important to the employers, men are preferred for jobs in the skilled market sector because they are perceived to be more stable than women. Even in pre-entry recruitment and subsequent advancement, the chances for men are better because they are perceived to be more committed

to their careers and is less likely to interrupt their employment for family obligations (Anker and Hein, 1986, p.10).

In the South Korean context, these economic arguments have often been used to justify the unequal treatment of women in the workforce and the predominance of women in the unskilled labour market. In a survey conducted in 1982, "the standard reasons given by employers for the differential treatment by sex are: restricted female education and skills; short-term employment prospects, hence, too 'uneconomical' (females work only until marriage); lower productivity; split loyalty (between family and work); and the need for extra facilities" (Hong II, 1984, p.29). To a certain extent, these reasons have been valid. In the late 1960s and 1970s, young single girls were highly concentrated in the labour intensive, export industries because they were poorly educated with low levels of skill who had migrated from the countryside for the express intention of seeking employment in the urban sector (Hong II, 1984, p.193). As well, there was an educational gap between Korean men and women because women were prone to get less education if family incomes could not finance educational expenses (Kim, 1975, p.29). However, in many cases, the unequal treatment of Korean women in the labour force and their concentration in the unskilled, low status positions are not explained by these economic reasons. Rather it seems that other

factors are at play in the South Korean labour market.

In a microlevel study conducted between October 1982 and May 1983, it has been revealed that in many companies, there is a wage disparity for males and females in the same rank positions. As the study notes, "[i]n company F, for the lowest 5th rank positions, the lowest pay for males is 125,000 Won whereas the pay for females is 97,000 Won. The same situation is found in company G where the lowest pay rate given to its 3rd rank employees is 145,300 Won for males and 112,100 Won for females" (Moon, 1985, p.70). These industrial firms have referred to the low level of productivity of women as the rationale behind their unequal pay practices. However there has been no indication or documented evidence that women have been less productive than men in the same positions (Moon, 1985, p.72). Rather it has been the belief that women are only secondary workers supplementing their husbands' incomes that have led to lower wage levels for women in the same positions.

In the same study, it has also been discovered that many companies place women with equal educational levels in lower ranking positions. For example in corporation C, the personnel regulations stipulate that "first-class, fourth rank positions are to be filled by male high school graduates who meet other qualifications ... [while] second-class, fourth ranked positions are to be filled by female high school graduates who meet other qualifications" (Moon, 1985, p.69). The lower

ranking of women with equal qualifications is a blatant act of sex discrimination which seems to stem from employers' view of women as being inferior to men rather than from a rational economic justification of human capital considerations or productivity levels.

Furthermore Korean women have been denied access to certain types of jobs as a result of the sex discriminating recruitment practices of Korean companies and businesses. In the above-mentioned study, an examination of the job advertisements in the three major Korean daily newspapers over a one year period has discovered that 35% of all advertisements have specifically been 'male-only' positions and 22% have been 'female-only' positions (Moon, 1985, p.65). The 'male-only' positions have been mostly in the high ranking, skilled positions in the large corporations meaning that Korean women have been systematically excluded from those occupations (Moon, 1985, p.65). Within the 'female-only' positions, the majority of the jobs have been in low status, unskilled positions such as department store attendant, road salesperson, restaurant hostess, guides, electronic goods compiler, elevator operator, etc. (Moon, 1985, p.65). The 'female-only' condition for these peripheral and nonessential jobs ensures that women are relegated to the unskilled sector of the labour market. The stipulation of gender as a job qualification indicates that human capital considerations, skill levels and productivity concerns are not

at the base of the unequal treatment rather it is the gender itself which is at the crux of the discrimination.

As well it has been a general practice to retire Korean women prematurely usually when they get married or have their first child. In some cases, the premature retirement condition is placed in the work contract at the beginning of the woman's employment; otherwise, it is an implicit assumption that the woman will retire upon marriage or her first child (Moon, 1985, p.76). Even when the woman explicitly states to her superiors that she wishes to continue in her position after marriage, she is usually pressured by her supervisors and her colleagues to leave her job (Moon, 1985, p.76). This practice of retiring Korean women when they get married or have children has arisen from the prevalent belief among employers that women's primary function and role are to be a good wife and mother. Economic factors do not explain the common practice of retiring Korean women prematurely.

From these examples, it has become evident that economic reasons have not been the only restrictive and limiting factors subordinating women in the labour force. Rather it appears that other elements such as cultural and institutional circumstances can explain more clearly why Korean women have been disadvantaged in the work place. The sexual inequalities and gender stereotyping in the work place seem to be derived from negative ideas of women as being subordinate and inferior to

men. As well, there is a prevalent assumption that Korean women's primary roles are to be wife and mother. According to feminist theory, these social ideologies of women are culturally constructed and reinforced by patriarchal institutions in the society. Therefore, "to change gender stereotypes and widen opportunities [in the labour market], [feminists] argue that we must understand the processes that reproduce existing patterns. This implies that we must 1) understand sexual hierarchy as a product of culturally created social ideologies and the material conditions of women's and men's lives and 2) appreciate that sexual divisions of learning and work are not immutable behavioural specializations to be justified as functional or as vestiges of early human evolution. Rather the school and the workplace are cultural and political environments where rules and norms are perpetuated and legitimated by contemporary ideologies of exclusion, segregation and avoidance. Fundamental to this perspective is an understanding of how institutions shape meaning and values as well as how individuals can both internalize and challenge social norms" (Bourque and Warren, 1990, p.93).

In the South Korean context, it has specifically been the Confucian culture, educational institutions and state policies which have been the leading culprits in generating and perpetuating the negative and stereotypical views of women which have limited and disadvantaged Korean women's labour

force participation. Since these are the major forces of subordination and oppression, changes within these factors will be the process by which the labour force participation of Korean women can be maintained and enhanced. The subsequent chapters will examine each of these factors in detail explaining how they have acted as forces of subordination and how they have been changing over the past several decades.

CHAPTER THREE

CULTURE IN KOREA: CONFUCIANISM

With the establishment of the Yi Dynasty in the fourteenth century, Confucianism was adopted as the national religion and ethical standard. A series of laws were enacted to institute Confucian ethics, customs and teachings. Although the Yi Dynasty officially ended in 1910, Confucianism has remained the leading cultural and ethical influence in South Korea. It is the Confucian understanding of women and their social roles that has been at the root of gender inequalities in South Korea and that has placed women in subordinate and disadvantaged positions in the economic, political and social spheres of the Korean society. Thus it is imperative to fully understand the Confucian position on women in order to comprehend the constraints and prejudices which underlie the oppression of Korean women.

This chapter is in four sections. The first section entitled, Confucian Understanding of Women and Their Roles, looks at the philosophical basis of the traditional roles of women and women's status in society. Through an understanding

of the Confucian perspective on women, it becomes evident how (and why) women have been relegated to a marginal and subordinate position in the labour force. The second section examines how the Confucian philosophy has been implemented in the Korean labour market context and how it has affected women's economic participation and activities. As long as the Confucian understanding of women informs employment decisions, women's economic involvement continues to be distorted and marginalized in the Korean economy. The third section tackles the question of how to face this cultural challenge. Beginning with the premise that culture is not stagnant and constant in nature but rather is a changing and developing force, one can be hopeful that the cultural fetters, namely Confucian prejudices against women, can be overcome by looking at historical examples of cultural transformations which have occurred in Korea. The last section further advances the argument presented in the third section by highlighting and examining the forces which are creating cultural changes in the Korean society today.

CONFUCIAN UNDERSTANDING OF WOMEN AND THEIR ROLES

When the Yi Dynasty consolidated its power in 1392, Confucianism was adopted as the principle religious and cultural ideology in Korea. The indigenous shamanism and Buddhism were violently suppressed and restricted [2] (Lee,

1980, p.302). The new bureaucrats mobilized all their power toward putting Confucian ideals into practice, not only in the domain of politics but in every aspect of social life. In fact, this was a consistent policy throughout the Yi Dynasty (Lee, 1980, p.303).

It is important to point out that the form of Confucianism practiced by the Yi Dynasty was Neo- Confucianism. The only orthodox interpretation of the Chinese classics or scriptures was that of Chu Hsi, the Founder of Neo- Confucianism, and any other interpretation was dismissed as heresy (Lee, 1980, p.303). Neo- Confucianism is particularly authoritarian in its orientation with a fixed social status and strict hierarchical order. This last point has an especially important significance for the understanding of women's social position in the Korean society.

On gender issues, the principles of Yin and Yang in the philosophy of I-ching offer some theoretical basis in the Confucian classics. Whether women are viewed as equal to men or as inferior to men depends largely on whether the elements of Yin and Yang are taken as hierarchical or as equal qualities with differences [2] (Chang, 1989, p.43). In Neo- Confucianism, the strict observance and adherence to a hierarchical social order creates a gender hierarchy in the form of male supremacy and female subservience [3].

In the Confucian Classics, there are few direct references

to women [4]. Women do not enter into the content of the original Confucian teachings except in relation to men (Chang, 1989, p.43). The way a woman is defined in Confucian thought is best summed up in the four syllable word - SAM JONG JI DO 삼종지도 - meaning the virtue of 'obedience to father, husband and son' (Chang, 1989, p.52). Thus a woman's life and social roles are conceptualized in terms of her relationship to men. She is first seen as a daughter, then as a wife and then finally as a mother (Chang, 1989, p.52). A Korean woman does not have a public or individual identity; she is always referred to as someone's wife, mother or daughter. In this manner, women are not recognized as full human beings on their own but rather they are identified and accepted only in terms of their relationship to men.

As a daughter in a Confucian society, a Korean woman is considered only as a temporary member of her natal family. She is expected to get married and move into the home of her husband leaving her natal family forever. Her filial duty towards her own parents is not to bring shame and dishonour to her natal family by misbehaving in her new family or by not getting married (Chang, 1989, p.53). Since a daughter is considered only as a temporary family member, Korean parents tend to limit their financial and emotional investment towards their daughters leaving them in a marginal position within their own families [5] (Chang, 1989, p.53).

With marriage, a daughter has to break her ties with her natal home, encompassed in the term 'CHUL GA OE IN' meaning 'she who left the family and has become a stranger' (Chang, 1989, p.54). The daughter's name is removed from her natal family's register and added to her husband's family register. The woman is then considered as a member of her husband's family and has to shift her loyalty and filial piety to her parent's-in-law. The woman's principal duties as a wife are to produce children to continue her husband's lineage and to serve his ancestors through her preparation and organization of the ancestral worship ceremonies (in which she does not take an active part) (Chang, 1989, p.54).

A woman's position in her husband's home is not secured until she has fulfilled these duties. By law, a wife who has committed any of the seven evils can legitimately be divorced and a divorcee brings shame to her natal family as well as a marginal social position for herself. The seven evils are - disobedience to parents-in-laws, bearing no son [6], adultery, jealousy, hereditary disease, garrulity and larceny (Chang, 1989, p.43). In this kind of environment, the sooner a wife can produce an heir and make the transition of redirecting her filial piety towards her husband's parents, the more secure and stable her social position becomes both in her new family and in the Korean society.

As a mother, a Korean woman's status is secured and she is

accepted as a full member of her husband's family. As well, as a mother, a woman's power and influence grows markedly within the family (Chang, 1987, p.58). However this power is derived from her relationship with her son and her ability to influence him. Since the power is derived from the son and his power base lies in a patriarchal system, a mother's power can not challenge the patriarchal structure (Chang, 1989, p.58). Rather the mother actively enforces patriarchal rules in her own interest.

The roles of daughter, wife and mother are the only three functions that a woman is expected (and which are acceptable) to perform. The dedicated and complete fulfillment of these roles provides women with a secure social, political and economic position in the Korean society. Deviation from these roles or from fulfilling these functions place women in a marginalized and disadvantaged position in the social and household structure [7].

As well, in the Classical writings, women's attributes and worth are measured only in terms of how they affect men. For example, a woman is deemed virtuous and good if she contributes to the growth of husband and sons in power and virtue. On the other hand, a woman is considered evil and bad if she brings destruction and disaster to the men with whom she has contact (Chang, 1989, p.44). In this portrayal, women are dichotomized into those who are virtuous and those who are evil. Good women

are those who fulfill their roles as mother and wife. By fulfilling these roles, a woman is supporting and serving the men and in that function a woman is considered virtuous. The evil of women lies in their sexuality - beautiful and sensuous women are considered deadly and destructive to men and thus are considered obstacles to the path of virtue (Chang, 1989, p.44).

In the Confucian text, the term for sex is in the character 'saek' (colour) and the term for woman is 'yo'; however, there is hardly any distinction between the two words. In other words, women are identified with sex or as sexual objects for bodily and worldly temptations which men must resist and keep at a distance (Chang, 1989, p.44). This forms a theoretical basis for sex segregation. The danger of falling under the power of a beautiful and therefore evil woman is so greatly feared that men and women are completely segregated from each other from the age of seven until they are married (Chang, 1989, p.44).

From the age of seven, they are allocated separate spaces. Women were confined to the domestic, private sphere while men occupied the external, public world. By and large, women were excluded from this public world. Women were not allowed to venture in the streets during daylight and could only go out between the hours of 9:00 P.M. and 2:00 A.M. when men were restricted to their homes (Chang, 1989, p.41). A woman could

not even stroll in her garden during the daytime except under certain conditions. Since a woman should not be seen by men who were not her close relatives, when she did go outside the house, she had to be completely veiled (Chang, 1989, p.41). The physical restrictions on women's movement beyond her home severely limited the participation of Korean women in social, political and economic activities.

In the boundaries of her home, women were relegated to the inner most room of the house called the 'anbang' 안방 while men were in the outer room which entertains guests and accepts visitors (Chang, 1989, p.44). The segregation of men and women and the confinement of women in the private, domestic sphere implied that the "role of women is to control the private affairs of the family within the inner doors of their homes, while men were to rule over public and external matters" (Chang, 1989, p.45). In this manner, the physical segregation of men and women also led to the strict division of labour in which women were expected to manage the house and men were to manage the affairs of the external world - political positions, economic functions, etc.

The Confucian understanding of women as a private member belonging to the family and specifically to men has created a subordinate and marginal view of women. Women are seen as subordinate and subservient to men and their principal functions are restricted to the roles of mother and wife.

Consequently, Korean women have been treated unequally and as an inferior. In the labour market, many of the gender inequalities can be attributed to this negative perception of women and as a result, women's economic participation has been distorted, disadvantaged and limited.

CONFUCIAN ETHICS IN THE KOREAN LABOUR MARKET: CONSEQUENCES FOR
WOMEN'S LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION AND ACTIVITIES

As Confucian principles and philosophy have continued to shape the beliefs and attitudes of Korean people, their actions have reflected these values. In the labour market, the behaviour and opinions of employers have tended to be guided more by Confucian beliefs rather than economic reason. Employers often have biased views of women and their capabilities and they have acted on their opinions to the detriment of women workers and their businesses. There has been virtually no evidence to support these negative economic views of women; in fact, to the contrary, women have been recognized for their greater ability to concentrate, work diligently and be more productive. Despite the growing evidence of women's economic capabilities and achievements, they are still discriminated against in the labour force. The influence of Confucian ethics and philosophy in the Korean labour market has had many negative consequences for Korean women's labour force participation.

Women have been given lower wages than their male counterparts because they are perceived to be secondary workers supplementing their husband's income. On average, women working full time have earned approximately 153,475 Won per month in 1983 which is 45.2% of the average wage for men (Chang, 1989, p.111). As well the earning gap becomes greater with increasing years of work. For females under 18 years of age, they make about 89% of what the same age males do, but for women aged 30 and over, their average earnings is less than half of men's (Hong, 1984, p.24). For women 40 years and older, they receive only about a third of what the men do. The negative relationship between age and earning power occurs because at the younger ages, both women and men are at the lowest positions in terms of wages and occupation. Hence the wage gap is not very significant at this low level; however, after several years, men progress upward in both their occupational and wage levels while women remain in their relatively low positions and low wages. The earning gap then becomes much more prominent (Hong, 1984, p.25). This latter phenomena leads us to the next point.

Korean women have also been relegated to low status positions with little or no access to positions of authority and power. Chances for promotion and access to high level management positions are very limited for women because they are perceived to be temporary workers whose training will be a

waste of resources as they will soon leave to get married and because they are considered to be inferior in ability to men. In a survey conducted in May 1988, only 59.6% of the women workers in the survey said that they have been promoted during the past year. Further examination of the promotion of women indicates that women workers are usually only promoted to the middle tier ranks such as assistant manager, section chief, etc (Seo, 1989, p.135). As well, women seldom receive further training to advance in their positions. In the public vocational training centres which have been established since 1967, the proportion of women has decreased significantly from 17.6% in 1967 to only 5% in 1986 (Chang, 1989, p.138).

As well, early or forced retirement for women (usually when she gets married or has the first child) has been a common practice in the Korean labour market. Women are usually expected to leave their jobs when they get married or have their first child because it is believed that a woman's primary responsibilities and roles are to be mother and wife. Even if the woman is working out of economic necessity, it is still not acceptable and is considered undesirable. In a survey conducted in October 1985, 48.2% of husbands disapproved of their wives' employment. 80.4% of the surveyed husbands said the reason for their disapproval was that the wife's employment impaired her performance of domestic and childrearing duties (Roh, 1988, p.87). Employers either make the 'early' retirement a condition

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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
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STANDARD REFERENCE MATERIAL 1010a
(ANSI and ISO TEST CHART No. 2)

of the initial employment contract or pressure the women workers to retire prematurely by reducing their workload and/or giving them meaningless work. Although high turnover in workers is detrimental to productivity (except perhaps to export industries), employers continue to enforce the premature retirement policy because they adhere to the Confucian principles that women's primary functions are to be a mother and wife (Tak, 1987, p.92). Consequently, the average length of employment for women has been less than 5 years in any one company (Seo, 1989, p.147). In the May 1988 survey, approximately 40.6% of the women surveyed indicated that they wanted to continue working as long as their health permitted. They felt capable and willing to work even after they were officially retired (Seo, 1989, p.148). This indicates that a significant percentage of women resisted the premature retirement and would have continued working if the discriminatory practice of early retirement had not been enforced. Furthermore, this practice of early retirement for women has severely limited the career opportunities of Korean women. As mentioned above, the chances for promotion is restricted by the assumption that women are temporary workers who will leave after they get married. In this manner, premature retirement of women has not only limited the economic participation of Korean women but has disadvantaged them in their economic activities.

In the Korean labour market, the degree of occupational sex segregation has increased as more women have entered the work force. The occupational segregation stems from the traditional segregation of men and women and from the strict division of labour created by the segregation of the sexes. In the Korean labour market, many jobs are gender-specific as is proven by the 'female-only' or 'male-only' conditions on the job advertisements in many of the Korean occupations (Chang, 1989, p.117). Men are usually given positions of authority and decision-making while women are relegated to subservient or supplementary jobs. For example, jobs specifically advertised for women are not frontline business activities but are mostly secretarial jobs or receptionist positions (Chang, 1989, p.118). Certain industries and jobs are dominated by one sex because there is a tendency to hire only one gender group in its labour force. For example, over 80% of the labour force in the textile and electronics industries are women while in the automobile and steel industries, almost the entire work force is composed of men (Cho, 1985, p.85). Even in the female dominated jobs or industries, men are usually hired in the positions of authority and decision-making while women are employed as unskilled, low wage workers. The occupational segregation restricts employment opportunities and access for women and relegates them to low status, low wage, unskilled positions in the Korean labour market.

These negative consequences have been a direct result of the underlying Confucian ethics that have influenced and informed the actions of the employers and workers in the Korean labour market. As long as Confucian values remain the guiding principle in the economic sphere, women will continue to be underemployed, underpaid and discriminated in the labour force.

FACING THE CULTURAL CHALLENGE

Understanding the Confucian philosophy of women and recognizing its detrimental effects on women's labour force participation, it is evident that these cultural barriers and obstacles must be overcome for the full and fulfilling participation of women in the Korean labour market. Yet how can culture or cultural norms be overcome? And what does 'overcoming' culture mean?

There has been a dominant group of Confucianists and traditional thinkers in South Korea who believe that 'overcoming' has meant the destruction of Korean culture and in particular Confucianism in South Korea. In their opinion, Confucianism must be maintained in order to preserve Korea's cultural identity and foundation. They feel that the goal of equality is a Western ideal, imposed from without, rather than one required by Koreans' own social needs (Koh, 1983, p.159). In other words, the notion of 'gender equality' is a Western ideology which is not shared by the Oriental philosophy. For

them, social and cultural changes are not desirable or necessary because they see no harmful effects from the present inequality (Koh, 1983, p.159). They argue that if 'feminist' tendencies are allowed to destroy Confucianism in Korea, South Korea will be transformed into a 'Western' cultural satellite. Although this opinion presents a powerful and emotional argument, it is based on the assumptions that Confucianism is the essence and foundation of Korea's cultural identity and that the notion of 'gender equality' is a foreign or 'Western' ideology not shared or present in the Korean philosophy. By examining Korea's history, both assumptions are proven to be incorrect.

Firstly, Confucianism has not been the foundation of Korea's cultural identity. Throughout Korea's history, culture and cultural practices have changed and evolved. Confucianism has only been a cultural force in Korea since the Yi Dynasty. It was imported in from China by the leaders of the Yi Dynasty and it replaced a more egalitarian culture that was less restrictive and sexist. The indigenous culture was different from Confucian traditions in many ways and it was the implementation of Confucian laws that expanded and deepened gender inequality in Korea.

In the indigenous culture, it appeared that men and women were quite free in their social contact. Women did not have to be 'hidden' away from men and confined to the private sphere of

the home as was the practice during the Yi Dynasty [8] (Lee, 1980, p.303). As well the marriage and inheritance customs practised in ancient Korea were far more egalitarian than the Confucian traditions. During the Koguryo Dynasty (37 B.C.- 668 A.D.), the typical marriage custom was 'sol-su hon' in which the wedding ceremony took place at the bride's house and the couple lived there with the bride's family until their first child reached the age of ten (Lee, 1980, p.303). Then the couple with their children returned to the husband's home. This practice enabled the couple and the children to form a greater attachment to the wife's family and the familial ties of the woman were not severed with marriage. In fact under this marriage system, there were equal mourning periods for parents on both the father's side and mother's side (Lee, 1980, p.304). This marriage custom ran counter to the Confucian patriarchal family system and patrilocal practices. In the Yi Dynasty, the women were expected to sever all ties with their natal family and become a member of their husband's family. The focus of the marriage was on the maintenance of the patrilineal lineage (Chang, 1989, p.83). It was also the practice to move the women to their husband's kin group at marriage; this patrilocal tradition weakened the economic and social position of the women by separating them from their natal family property and by making them a producer but nonowner in the household of another kin (Chang, 1989, p.7). The replacement of the ancient

marriage custom with the Confucian tradition directly weakened and disadvantaged the economic and social position of Korean women.

As well in the inheritance customs of the indigenous culture, women were more equally considered. According to Hae Young Lee, "Korean law was similar to the Chinese system of equal division rather than to the Japanese, but different in that it entitled daughters to inherit as well. ... Sons and daughters alike, whether married or unmarried, had the right to inherit" (Lee, 1980, p.305). With this inheritance custom, women's economic positions were enhanced as they were able to become economically independent or secure through their inheritance. However with the implementation of Confucian inheritance traditions, the custom was slowly changed to a system of primogeniture in which only the legitimate eldest son could inherit the entire family property (Lee, 1980, p.305). Consequently the Confucian inheritance tradition severely weakened the economic situation of Korean women.

From the examples above, it is evident that Confucianism on the whole and gender inequality in particular have not been the foundations of Korea's cultural identity but rather they have been foreign imports which have taken several centuries and major government propaganda and laws to institute in Korea. Although Confucianism is the principal philosophy shaping cultural and ethical norms in South Korea at present, the

cultural identity of South Korea is not based on the maintenance of Confucianism as argued by Confucianists but rather the culture of Korea is a product of the interaction and amalgamation of old cultural traditions and new influences in the Korean society.

Secondly, the notion of 'gender equality' is not solely a 'Western' ideology foreign to the Korean philosophy or mentality. Throughout Korea's history, there are numerous examples of indigenous movements which have demanded gender equality as one of their principal goals. For example, in the 17th century, there was the emergence of the Silhak (a philosophy of realism) which promoted human rights and equality (regardless of social class and sex) as its ideological basis (KWDI, 1989, p.8). Another example was during the 1860s when Western influence was most feared and the first nationalistic movement arose in Korea. The Tong Hak movement was externally against Japanese and Western aggression and internally against Confucian traditions (Jayawardena, 1986 p.217). It advocated defense against the invasion of foreign influence and upheld the principle of equality between social classes and sexes (Kim, 1975, p.32). Tong Hak (meaning 'Eastern Studies') opposed Western science, technology, armed forces and religion and praised 'Eastern' attributes. However, it also scrutinized the traditional idea of male superiority. The founding father of the movement, Choi Jae Woo, displayed his belief by freeing two

of his female servants, adopting one as his daughter and marrying the other (Kim, 1975, p.33). The Tong Hak movement contributed to the awakening of the principles of humanity and equality among the Korean people which had been dormant for many centuries [9].

From these examples, it is evident that the ideology of 'gender equality' is not a foreign concept in South Korea imposed by outside forces. Rather the principle of gender equality has been a part of Korean beliefs and goals throughout its history. In contrast to the arguments of the Confucianists, the goal of gender equality and the desire for social and cultural change have arisen from within the Korean people.

In facing the cultural challenge, it is important to recognize that culture is not stagnant and constant but rather is a continuously changing and evolving force in the society. If culture is viewed as adapting and adopting new influences and challenges in the society as they materialize, then cultural norms and principles will not act as fetters to the dynamic forces in the society. Within South Korea's own history, cultural transformation has occurred many times and it has still remained a culturally rich country. Cultural changes have occurred through powerful and overwhelming forces which have grown out of the time period and political context as well as the desires and goals of the people at that period. In the same way, there are growing forces and pressures within the

Korean society today that are creating changes and cultural transformation.

FORCES OF CULTURAL TRANSFORMATION

Since the turn of the century, many new ideas and forces have confronted the Korean people as they have experienced new political regimes, economic change and social confusion. Events such as the slow 'opening up' of Korea to foreign cultures and ideas in the late nineteenth century, the imposition of Japanese colonial rule, the division of the country and the Korea War have torn away at the fabric of Confucian traditions in South Korea. Although Confucianism is still the prevalent ideology shaping cultural norms and practices in South Korea, new elements and ideas from both within and outside of the Korean society are exerting pressure to force changes and radical alterations in the dominant Confucian culture.

One of the greatest challenges to Confucianism has been the sudden exposure to Western, particularly American, culture during the latter half of the century. As Kim Yersu states in his UNESCO study on cultural policy in South Korea, "suddenly confronted with the vitality of Western culture during the second half of the last century, Koreans blamed their own political and cultural traditions for all the stagnancy, ineffectiveness and injustice in their society. They associated the ignoble demise of Yi Korea with a Confucian tradition

rendered defunct by factionalism and a regressive world-view" (Kim, 1976, p.10). After the Second World War, Koreans have been highly receptive to Western political, social and cultural ideas and institutions because they have been part of the culture of a welcomed liberator. Unlike many of the developing countries of Latin America and Africa, there has been favourable attitudes and openness to Western culture and ideas in South Korea because its colonizer has not been any of the Western powers but its oriental neighbour, Japan (Lee, 1980, p.284). Therefore, the essential elements of Korean nationalism has included positive attitudes toward Western democracy and liberal culture (Lee, 1980, p.285). The infiltration of Western ideas and culture and the open responsiveness of the Korean people to these foreign influences have created powerful forces of cultural transformation in South Korea.

Evidence of the changing cultural needs of the Korean people can be found in a survey conducted in November 1966 on the issues of modernization and social change in South Korea. An overwhelming majority (80%) of the surveyed professors and journalists felt that change in the social order was necessary for the modernization of Korea (Hong, 1980, p.296). They often expressed the view that modernization of Korea would be impossible without drastic change in Confucian values; therefore, they felt that it was their "urgent duty to

modernize numerous aspects of Korean traditional thinking and life" (Hong, 1980, p.293). From this survey, it is evident that the traditional values of Confucianism are under attack in South Korea and that at least among the academic circle, there is the belief that cultural and social changes are necessary for the modernization of the country.

Another major force promoting change has been the introduction and growth of Christianity in South Korea. The introduction of Catholicism and Protestantism has had a great impact on traditional thinking. The Christian religions have propagated the belief that men and women are equal before God (Kim, 1975, p.29). They have also built schools - secondary and higher educational institutions - and churches to spread their message. As the number of churches and Christians have grown over the last century or so, Christian beliefs have challenged traditional attitudes of gender inequality in the Korean society. In 1960, Christians composed less than 4% of the population in South Korea; by 1977, the percentage rose to around 20%. In 1984, the percentage of Christians has risen to 30% of the total population (10) (Statistical Handbook of Korea, 1985, p.133). In particular, the Christian religion has had a tremendous impact on Korean women. In the 1920s, Christian churches organized women's groups for various purposes such as a campaign against men's drinking, a campaign to stop early marriage and a movement against concubinage (Yi,

1970, p.120). In more recent times, Christian principles have been the basis of women's movements and arguments against Confucian laws (McBeth, 1987, p.38). As well the first few women who have chosen to work at the professional level have been Protestants (Park, 1979, p.50). As Christianity continues to grow in South Korea, its principles and teachings have concomitantly spread throughout the country. The Christian principle of equality and philosophy of individualism have seriously challenged the traditional Confucian beliefs and have encouraged social changes.

There have also been pressures developing within the country to change the traditional practices and gender inequalities. The gradual shift from a situation of labour surplus to a shortage has encouraged the productive use of all economically active persons in the labour market (Tak, 1987, p.76). The widespread practice of retiring women when they get married or have their first child will become increasing difficult in a situation of labour scarcity. In many ways, the economic 'crisis' has already forced many companies to rehire women they have 'officially' retired - some as part- time and many as full- time. This practice has been called the System of Re- appointment; a worker in this system retires with the due retirement grants when she reaches the retirement age and then is rehired under the terms of a new work contract (Seo, 1989, p.139). The rate of companies re- employing women who have

resigned on account of marriage or pregnancy has been approximately 51.5% of a 101 companies surveyed in May 1988. The majority of the re-employed women have signed on as a regular employee with the same salary they have been receiving when they resigned (Seo, 1989, p.139). In these cases, the practice of premature retirement for women has turned into a symbolic action. Sooner or later, the futility of the practice will be apparent as more married women are in the workforce. As well the practice of concentrating women in unskilled, repetitious jobs will become economically unfeasible if the demand for skilled positions are growing and there is a pool of highly educated and economically inactive women in South Korea. As Hi Jun Tak postulates in her article on labour utilization in South Korea, "if the condition of supply and demand for female workers is urgent, discriminatory practices excluding the informal sector can not help but be abolished or greatly amended" (Tak, 1987, p.92).

As well, within the country, there has been a growing number of indigenous women's movements which have demanded changes in Confucian laws discriminating against women and in equal opportunities in the labour market. The first Korean women's movement dates back to around the 1920s. In this period (just right after the March 1, 1919 Independence Movement), declarations and assertions of basic equality for women have been voiced: "we too are human, we too need freedom and life

... we are sexually and economically subjugated by male oppression" (Chang, 1989, p.61). However, like the Independence Movement, the women's movement was suppressed by the Japanese colonial rulers who feared that any disruption in the social order would undermine their power base in the country. Since the end of Japanese colonial rule in South Korea, there has been a continuous growth of women's groups and movements. Their activities are diverse ranging from political lobbying to welfare support groups to research institutes. For example, a coalition of over 80 different women's groups have been lobbying the government to reform the Family Law in South Korea. The campaign has been going on since 1958 and gradual amendments have been made (Chang, 1989, p.149). The crux of the demands has been centred on changing the Confucian 'head-of-family' system in the Family Law. This system requires that a family continue through the male line. Therefore, surnames are very important for inheritance and adoption laws. Under this system, couples with the same surname and from the same clan can not legally be married (McBeth, 1987, p.38). In a country with only 249 different surnames, this law creates an immense restriction for many people. As well under this system, women are usually discriminated against in cases of division of property or inheritance and in cases of child custody disputes (McBeth, 1987, p.38). The coalition women's group has run straight up against the Confucianists who are trying to

maintain Confucian traditions in the legal system. However the women's group has been lobbying for many years and they are determined to change the discriminatory elements of the present system. As well the growth of interest and demands from Korean women has lead to the development of the first Women Studies program in the Asian region. In 1977, Ewha Women's University in Seoul has instituted a Women's Studies Program (WSP) which has tried to promote research (and dissemination of information) on women's issues (Yoon, 1979, p.751). The program has tried to understand the differences and similarities in the experiences of women in South Korea and the Western countries. In this manner, this program has attempted both to bridge the gap between cultural differences and to find a Korean path for women's liberation and equality (Yoon, 1979, p.761). The development of the WSP in 1977 and the continuous growth and activity of women's groups in South Korea have begun to strip away at the Confucian traditions and have initiated social changes toward a more equal society for Korean women.

Finally and perhaps most importantly, the state and education system have also been key mechanisms for implementing change in the Korean society. Although these institutions have traditionally been forces of oppression, there has been considerable modernization and transformation within these institutions that have worked to the benefit of women. The number of women in all levels of education have increased

tremendously and this has enabled some women to demand more economic equality. The state has also been initiating policies and laws which are breaking down the traditional sexism and oppression. Particularly in the last decade, women's issues have been recognized by the leading political figures and have been elevated to the status of national objectives. However there are still many obstacles to be overcome in these two institutions. Since they are powerful instruments in the Korean society, these two institutions warrant further and intensive study. The next chapters will examine these institutions in greater depth.

CHAPTER FOUR

EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS - BIASES, PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES

Education has been an important and highly revered aspect in Korean society. It has been the mechanism for social mobility and personal honour throughout Korean history and particularly in today's society. Education has played a crucial role in modernizing the country and in enabling its participants to contribute to national development. As mentioned in the previous chapter, educational institutions are a key vehicle through which cultural changes can be initiated and implemented. However, the educational system and women's schools in particular have only been partially successful in accomplishing this goal. Embedded within a certain cultural context and time period, the education system and institutions reflect the biases, traditions and standards in South Korea. In order to establish a system which will promote equality, self actualization and productive pursuits for both men and women, the problems and biases limiting the educational system must be identified and 'corrected'.

This chapter is divided into four sections examining the

historical and present educational system in South Korea and the inherent problems and biases within the system that must be addressed. The first section examines the historical development of women's schools and the traditional functions of education in Korea. A study of the initial problems and functions of women's schools and education reveal the basis of the inadequacies and weaknesses in the current system. The second section looks at the present status and design of the education system. Quantitative measurements of enrollment growth and of gender percentages at each level of schooling are used to determine the current status of women in education. As well the factors inhibiting women's educational participation are discussed particularly stressing those which have been created by political neglect and cultural biases. The third section examines the problems and biases within the education system which have inhibited women's full development especially in the area of career encouragement and preparation. Gender-biased attitudes of teachers and learning materials as well as inadequate career training programs for women are some of the major problems and biases inherent in the educational institutions today. The last section identifies initiatives and efforts which have been made to rectify the problems in the education system. The recent legislation calling for the decentralization of the school system and the new policy addressing the sexist language and images in school materials

are some of the measures being taken at present to correct these problems. This section also engages in a theoretical discussion on the general importance and effectiveness of educational institutions in modernizing and changing the attitudes of the Korean people.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCATION AND WOMEN'S SCHOOLS

In Korea, education was first formalized and systematized at the end of the fourteenth century. In 1398, Korean King Taicho, the founder of the Yi Dynasty, established a university in Seoul (the capital of Korea) and organized schools according to provincial districts (Kim, 1975, p.39). Education in the schools and university was based on the Chinese model. The principal subject of study was the works of Confucius and the principal reward (given to students) was the prospect of passing the final examination which gave them official rank and made them eligible for official appointments (Kim, 1975, p.39). This system existed for about 500 years with no substantial change and it produced no other type of scholar than the Confucian philosopher.

Although the education system was open to all students, it was usually the men of 'Yangban' class that engaged in this educational pursuit. Men from lower social classes did not participate in the education system because they did not have the leisure time to engage in academic pursuits. The immediate

demands of feeding the family and working on their farms prevented them from getting an education. However for Korean women, the situation was rather different. Although women from lower social classes did not have the leisure time to spend on education, the women from the 'Yangban' class did. Yet these 'Yangban' women did not participate in the education system because the cultural biases against women as well as the narrow orientation of the education system acted as an effective barrier against the education of women. In fact, the gender restrictions of the traditional education system were so prohibitive that the development of the first woman's school and the formal education of women did not occur until the traditional system was dismantled by foreign influences and forces which infiltrated Korea at the end of the nineteenth century.

In 1866 and 1871, Korea was first visited by Westerners aboard ships dispatched from France and the United States. Western technology, armaments and religion (Christianity) were introduced to Koreans in this period (Kim, 1975, p.22). Starting from 1884, a growing number of American Christian missionaries who consisted of doctors and teachers began to flow into Korea [1]. In 1885, an American missionary named Appenzella established a boys' school in Seoul with two students which was the first modern school ever built in Korea. In the following year, in 1886, an American missionary, Mary

Scranton, opened the first girls' school in Seoul (Kim, 1975, p.36).

This girls' school was called Ewha, meaning 'Pear Flower' in Korean words, and it opened with one student. The first pupil was a concubine of a government official who came to the missionary's home in hopes of learning enough English to become the interpreter for the Queen (Yi, 1970, p.112). By the end of the first year, the number of students reached four. Most of the initial students were from poor or poverty stricken families [2] and therefore the school provided both shelter and clothing for the girls. In this manner, the school was able to eliminate the class barriers to education and was able to introduce Western clothing to the girls [3] (Yi, 1970, p.114).

Despite its humble beginnings, the school gradually grew and by 1888, there was approximately 18 girls enrolled; the number increased to 47 in 1899 and 174 in 1909 (Kim, 1975, p.44). The initial slow growth of the school was a result of the strong opposition to women's education among the Korean people and of the fear and suspicion of foreigners and Western influence in Korea. For example, Mrs. Pak, the mother of Mary Scranton's second student, went to the school to reclaim her daughter because she had heard rumours that the missionaries were taking the students to Western countries. Mrs. Pak finally agreed to let her daughter remain in school only after Mrs. Scranton drew up a formal, written agreement stating that the

child would never to be taken out of the country (Yi, 1970, p.113). In 1888, a rumour spread that Westerners were abducting Korean children and using their eyes to make fluid for developing photographs. In response to such stories, enraged crowds twice raided the Ewha Institute with the object of rescuing the students from their bloody fate; consequently, the Institute was forced to hire guards to protect its students and the building itself from violent attack (Yi, 1970, p.116). As well the strong opposition to women's education was revealed by a newspaper article written in 1920 which stated: "On the first of this year, Kim In-Sun, the 15 year old daughter of Kim Ik-Hae, of Pongsan in Hwanghae-do, was sent to study at the Toksong School, an institution established in that area by Christian missionaries. It had been reported that In-Sun was doing very well in her studies. Recently In-Sun's grandfather was suddenly taken very ill. Kim Ik-Hae consulted a fortune teller and was told that the grandfather's illness was caused supernaturally as a punishment for In-Sun's attendance at school. If In-Sun were not taken out of school, the fortune teller insisted, the grandfather would never recover. ..." (Yi, 1970, p.113). From this article, it was evident that there existed deep rooted opposition and superstition against women's education in Korea. There were also growing incidences of schoolgirls being pulled out of school suddenly or not coming back once they visited home. For a time in the 1890s, female

students visiting their homes had to be chaperoned in order to ensure that they returned to the schools. As Yi described, "the strange incongruous spectacle of a schoolgirl and her older chaperone, dressed in her blue uniform with gold buttons, journeying together along a Korean country road became one of the more common sights of the transformation era" (Yi, 1970, p.115).

The growth and development of women's education was further hindered by the restrictions and interferences of the Japanese colonial rule in Korea. In 1895, the Law of Modern School Organization was enacted establishing a new educational system according to a German- Japanese model. The German- Japanese model was based on the idea of educating elites and therefore the access to higher education or education on the whole was to be extremely limited (Kim, 1975, p.176). The law was created in order to control the education system in Korea and to establish schools in which the government had control over the subjects of study, method of teaching and the pupils to be taught. The approximately 2,250 private schools already established in Korea (15 of them were girls' schools) did not receive government funding and were not officially recognized (Kim, 1975, p.49). In the same year, a Government Primary School was established in which girls were excluded. During the period from 1906 to 1909, 79 government schools were created with government funding - none of these schools permitted female

students (Kim, 1975, p.49).

In response to this exclusion, a women's club was formed in September 1898 whose major goal was to realize the establishment of a 'Korean' girls' school (one that was not created and administered by foreigners). This club, identified as Chanyang Hwe, was made up of approximately 400 Korean women. From its efforts (4), a 'Korean' girls' school named Soonsung was established by December of 1898 (Kim, 1975, p.46). The activities of the women's club also included drawing up a petition urging the government to establish a school for girls and marching to the King's Palace to submit the petition to the King to voice their complaints.

Incidents such as the Chanyang Hwe march and other such demonstrations prompted the government to decree the establishment of a girls' secondary school in 1908. Hansong Girls' High School became the nation's first public school for women and it signified the formalization of women's education in Korea (KWDI, 1989, p.9). The establishment of the first government secondary girls' school naturally led to the need for the establishment of primary schools for girls. To meet such a need, the government was forced to permit the existing government schools to attach a class for girls within the same campus. The total number of girls in these classes were 423 in 1909 (Kim, 1975, p.50). By 1910, the first woman's college was established - Ewha Woman's College.

Despite these 'victories' of the early 1900s, Korean women's education and schools continued to be restrained throughout the era of Japanese rule. In fact, education on the whole was distorted and dampened for all Koreans during that period. The Ministry of Education, under the supervision of Japanese advisors, transformed both the content and substance as well as the objectives/ goals of education. Learning Confucian principles and philosophy was rejected as the purpose and function of education. Rather under the new system, the goals were to teach students how to serve the country and contribute to its development. Education and schools were also used to transmit ideas of loyalty and patriotism to Japan and to assimilate the Koreans into the Japanese 'way' (Kim, 1975, p.54). In 1908, the Ministry of Education stipulated that 6 hours of Japanese language was to be taught along with the 6 hours of Korean language upon all students in the Government Primary Schools (Kim, 1975, p.49). By the late 1930s, schools were prohibited from using Korean language at all and educational institutions were used to spread Japanese propaganda [5]. As well a significant percentage of the students in these government schools were Japanese, especially at the higher levels. The percentage of Japanese students in primary schools were only 7.1% of the total number of students but at the high school level, the number of Japanese students was 42.2% of the total student body. Considering that Japanese

settlers amounted to only 2.9% of the total population in Korea as of 1939, the percentage of Japanese students at both the primary and secondary levels were very high given the context of the total Japanese population (Kim, 1975, p.64). The high percentage of Japanese students meant that Korean students were being marginalized or excluded from the formal education system during this period.

At the university level, the access to higher education was even more limited. In 1922, the Japanese Governor- General revised the original 1911 Education Ordinance to include provisions to establish an Imperial University. In 1924, the Imperial University was established in Seoul and this was the only university which existed in Korea prior to the Liberation in 1945 (Kim, 1975, p.54). The revision was made in order to restrict access to higher education and to control higher education by granting only the government- sponsored university the official university status. Private colleges of which there were 19 in 1941 were relegated to secondary status. [6]

It was not until the Liberation of Korea in 1945 and the subsequent division of the country that education and women's schools changed and grew rapidly in South Korea. As part of the American sphere of influence, the education system in South Korea was reorganized according to the US school and education model. Principles of gender and class equality along with the increased educational facilities led to the quantitative and

qualitative growth of South Korea's education system in general and women's educational participation in particular.

PRESENT STATUS OF EDUCATION AND WOMEN'S SCHOOLS

After Liberation in 1945 and the division of Korea into North and South, a new education system was created in South Korea. South Korea, being a part of the American sphere of influence and control, based the new system on the US model of a six year primary school (compulsory), a three year junior high school, a three year senior high school and a four year college/ university schooling system (Kim, 1975, p.72). Diagram 4.1 illustrates the new school system in South Korea. This new system was a radical departure from the old system which was composed of a six year primary education and a four or five year college (specialized school) education [7].

The new education system in South Korea not only modeled its school structure along the US 6-3-3-4 system but it also adopted the same educational ideals fundamental in the American education system. For example, the previous German- Japanese model based on the idea of educating elites was abandoned for the American model and ideals of class and gender equality in education. The 'equal educational opportunity' concept was a dominant principle in the new system (Kim, 1975, p.176). Starting from 1945, there were coeducational institutions at every level of education. Although there was still women's only

and men's only schools and colleges, there were also a growing number of coeducational institutions as the new public schools were usually coeducational (Kim, 1975, p.76). As Table 4.2 shows, by 1975, all public schools were coeducational and there were more coeducational middle schools than sex segregated middle schools. As well, although at the high school level, there were more sex segregated schools, coeducational schools far outnumbered the sex segregated schools at the tertiary level. Coeducational institutions not only enabled boys and girls to get the same education, they also increased the availability of schools for girls. As well, the enactment of a compulsory primary education legislation in 1947 along with a corresponding development of educational facilities by the Korean government enabled poor or lower class children to attend school (KWDI, 1989, p.10). In this manner, the new system was able to eliminate class and gender restrictions in education.

Consequently there was a rapid and tremendous increase of both female and male students at all levels of education (8). According to the Statistical Handbook of Korea 1962, there were 2,082,724 males students and 1,772,055 female students at the primary level, 669,858 males and 229,217 females at the secondary level and approximately 117,582 males and 24,994 females at the university/ college level by 1961 (Statistical Handbook of Korea, 1962, p.46). These figures represented a 4.8

time increase of male students and a 6.2 time increase of female students since 1939. Table 4.3 quantifies the increase in school enrollment at every level of education from 1945 to 1989. At each level, there was an exponential growth in the number of students - particularly at the higher levels of education where the initial numbers were small.

Although the initial ratio of female to male students was less than a third at every level, the percentage of female students rose quickly as the total number of women students increased by 45.1% while the total number of male students increased by only 25.3% during the period from 1945 to 1972 (Kim, 1975, p.84). By 1971, there were 51,289 female students in total at every type of learning institution in South Korea; this represented a 4,535% increase since 1939 (Kim, 1975, p.63). The percentage of female students continued to grow so that by 1986, the proportion of female students was 49% at the primary level, 48.4% at middle school, 47.4% at high school and 26.6% in university (Chang, 1987, p.128a).

However, as shown by the last statistical figures, there was a problem of fewer girls advancing into higher levels of education. In 1966, only 33% of girls entered middle school after the primary level while 50.9% of the boys went on to middle school. At the high school level during the same year, the rate of girls attending was only 19.6% while for the boys the rate was 35% (Chang, 1987, p.128a). Although by the 1980s

the total percentage of boys and girls advancing onto higher levels had increased, there was still a disparity between the sexes. According to the KWDI report on the status of Korean women: "[t]he ratio of primary school graduates advancing to middle school was 99.5% for girls and 99.6% for boys in 1988, the ratio of middle school graduates advancing to high school in the same year stood at 92.1% for girls and 94.9% for boys showing a little margin between males and females. The ratio of high school graduates entering college and university in 1988 was 32.7% for females and 37.0% for males. Of total enrollments in college and university in 1988, women accounted for (only) 30.6%" (KWDI, 1989, p.10).

The factors hindering women's educational participation particularly at the higher levels of education can be understood in terms of political neglect and cultural biases. One of the greatest barriers to education especially at the high school or university levels is the high cost of school fees, books, extra tutoring, etc. [9]. Primary education is almost completely financed by public funds but as one goes up to middle schools or universities, the proportion of private funds becomes much larger (Chung, 1980, p.140). The Korean government's expenditure on education has consistently been approximately 14% to 16% on average since from 1948 to 1988 as shown by Table 4.4. Although the growing government budget has increased the absolute amount of education expenditure, the

number of students have increased as well requiring more funds and facilities. In short, the high costs of education have not been adequately met by government expenditure. Table 4.5 outlines both the total educational expenditures and the expenditures paid by students. According to Table 4.5, students had to pay approximately 65% of the total educational expenditures from 1966 to 1975. Considering that in the 1980s the percentage of government expenditure on education has remained relatively similar to the previous two decades and that the number of students has steadily increased, there has not been much difference in the burden of educational costs on students in the 1980s as there has been in 1975. In other words, Korean students have consistently been burdened by high educational costs and these restraints have forced many parents to limit the educational opportunities of their children.

The low public expenditure on education has meant that the burden of financing education has fallen on the parents. The high private costs of education works against the chances of education for women as the traditional beliefs that men should be the 'provider' of the family and so therefore should be the ones to be educated (education will increase the chances of getting a better job/ occupation) are still prevalent among the Korean people (Chang, 1989, p.127). From a government survey, it has been shown that while 54.9% of parents want their male children to graduate from college or higher, only 35.2% of the

parents wish the same for their daughters (Chang, 1989, p.127). As well there have often been cases or incidences where a girl from a poor family has had to limit her own education and begin working in order to help finance/ support the education of her brothers. Korean parents particularly stress the education of their sons because it not only raises the status of their family when the son is highly educated but a successful son can mean a secure and comfortable future for the parents when they retire (Chang, 1989, p.128). In this manner, the combined problems of low public financing of education and cultural biases against daughters have resulted in the lower participation rate of women in education especially at the higher levels.

However for girls who do receive an education in South Korea, there are many problems of inadequate career training and preparation and of blatant and hidden gender biases within the education system that have hindered the full development of women in the labour force after their graduation. The education of women in South Korea has not necessarily promoted their status in the labour market or has increased their labour force participation rate. In fact due to the problems and biases of the education system, education has dampened Korean women's labour force participation as mentioned in Chapter two. Therefore it is important to understand the problems and biases in the Korean education system.

PROBLEMS AND BIASES OF THE EDUCATION SYSTEM

The major problem of the Korean education system is the rampant sexism that exists within the schools. According to several micro- level studies on the education system in South Korea, four factors and aspects of Korean schools are identified as being responsible for maintaining and replicating the sexism in the system. They are: segregation of the sexes in both schools and school curriculum, gender biased educational materials, sexist and biased attitudes of teachers and insufficient career training programs for women in schools. It is important to understand how each of these factors are maintaining the sexism in the system and how they are negatively affecting women in terms of seeking employment after graduation.

1) system of sex segregation: The cultural tradition of sex segregation has also been replicated in the education system. Since the opening of the first women's school at the turn of the century, Korean women's education has traditionally existed separately from the men's system. Only since 1945 have coeducational schools been fully developed. Therefore, Korean parents have preferred to send their daughters to women's only schools in keeping with the traditional segregation that has been inherent in their cultural practices over the past 500 years (Park, 1979, p.68). However, the system of sex

segregation has disadvantaged women's education as different courses and different educational goals are pursued in these separate institutions.

In women's universities and colleges, many fields of study are not offered. For example, none of the women's colleges and universities offer specialization in engineering, agriculture and forestry, and marine and fishery (Kim, 1975, p.146). Even in the first and second largest women's tertiary level schools - Ewha Women's University and Sukmyung Women's University (the only two women's schools with university status) - do not offer specialization in these areas. The other seven women's colleges do not go beyond the limits of such fields as language and literature, arts, history, social sciences, physical education, science and education (Kim, 1975, p.146). Consequently, women who attend women's schools have been denied the opportunity to pursue these fields of study. The only option for women who want to pursue these fields of study has been to enroll in men's colleges and universities where coeducation is practiced.

As well, female students in women's colleges and universities are required to take one or two special courses 'designed specifically for women'. For example, at Ewha Women's University, students are required to take 'Women and Culture' for 3 credit hours and at Sukmyung Women's University, juniors are all required to take 2 credit hours of 'Family Relations

and Family Management' while seniors have to take 'Public Health' for 2 credit hours (Kim, 1975, p.147).

The limited fields of study and the mandatory requirements of 'home economics' type courses in women's schools are a result of different educational goals and objectives in women's schools in comparison to men's or coeducational schools. In women's schools, the goals are usually to develop the student into a good person who will be a good wife and mother and who will also be a good citizen. The reason for this domestic orientation is that traditionally Korean parents have opposed women's education because they have believed that women's only functions and roles should be that of wife and mother and therefore in order for women's formal education to be fully accepted, the goals of women's schools (and education) have had to be 'the fostering and training of a woman to be a good wife and mother'. As outlined in an article in the Korea Journal on the "New Direction for Education of Women", the goals and objectives of women's education and schools should be to "produce a good wife, mother and citizen" (Ko, 1964, p.13). The article goes on to elaborate that "a woman should, before anything else, be aware of and then carry out the role and function that society set aside for her, and her alone. Since most of our women today want to marry, to be good wives and mothers and to become good citizens of their society ... the primary objective of education should be to make the women into

these things" (Ko, 1964, p.13).

In a survey conducted in the mid- 1970s, it is revealed that the goals of women's schools are in fact 'to prepare (the students) for married life' (Kim, 1975, p.209). Out of twenty different objectives, the goal of 'preparing for married life' has been ranked as both the preferred and actual objective of women's schools. Table 4.6 lists the twenty different objectives that were available. The goals of 'ensuring the understanding of the ideas of great thinkers', 'produce students who are capable to use knowledge for social reform' and 'teach research techniques' are among the lowest ranked objectives both in terms of preferred and actual goals; they have been ranked 16th, 13th, and 12th respectively (Kim, 1975, p.209). This indicates that women's schools are dedicated to producing future mothers and wives and not to producing academics, career women or public leaders.

The combined effects of different courses and domestic-oriented rather than career-oriented goals of women's schools have disadvantaged women's labour force participation. It has been noted that women from women's colleges and universities have been less career-oriented than their peers from coeducational universities in the sense that the former students have preferred to have an occupation only until they have married or have had their first child (Park, 1979, p.68). For the majority of those women at women's schools, it seems as

though having a career is an intermediary process before they enter marriage life. Two separate surveys on Korean college women which have been done in 1971 and in 1976 have verified these observations. The results of the 1971 study reveals that women from women's schools have low career aspirations. About 40% of the women in the study have indicated the desire to work 'until [they] get married' and about 11% have said that they 'will stop working when [they get] married and continue when [their] children go to school'. The majority of women in this study have vague ideas about the purpose of working and having a career has not been a serious part of their lives (Park, 1979, p.70). In the 1976 survey of college women, the results have shown that "women at coeducational universities [have been] more career- oriented than those in women's universities" (Park, 1979, p.70).

2) sexist educational materials: In 1986, a survey was conducted in order to evaluate the textbooks of primary and secondary schools on the basis of their gender stereotypes and portrayals. Evaluating textbooks for their content is important in that ideas and images portrayed in the books transmit values and perceptions of gender notions. Sexist or stereotypical images of women as housewives and as passive persons in textbooks reinforce the notion that women should be relegated to the domestic sphere and that women should passively submit to their marginalization. Particularly for children in primary

and middle schools, they tend to accept as a matter of fact the discriminatory teaching without understanding or realizing that sexist and biased ideas are being taught. In this manner, sexist attitudes and values of male dominance and superiority are transmitted through the educational system.

The survey revealed that there was a greater number of male characters in the 310 Korean language and literature textbooks examined and that there was a tendency to portray in both ideas and pictures a stereotypical and biased image of the sexes. For example, out of the 422 characters in 32 of the textbooks, 78.9% were males and 21.1% were females making the sex ratio 3.74 to 1 (Kim, 1988, p.111). The lesser number of women in the textbooks create two problems: first, it suggests that women are not as important as men and secondly it reduces the number and variety of role models for women to emulate. In fact there is a great problem of inadequate role models for women. As one student explains: "[t]he only other kind of women I knew, growing up, were old- maid high school teachers, the librarian, the one woman doctor in our town, who cut her hair like a man and a few of my college professors. None of these women lived in the warm center of life as I had known it at home. Many had not married or had children, I dreaded being like them" (Park, 1979, p.59).

Among the 200 heroes, 75% were males (120 boys or men) while only 25% were females (50 girls or women); as well, among

the 89 females characters, only 41.6% (46 girls) had occupations - the majority of them were either students or housewives (48.8%) (Kim, 1988, p.112). Furthermore, the male characters had certain behavioural characteristics such as intelligent, dominant, independent, active, courageous, aggressive and ambitious while female characters had characteristics which were unintelligent, dependent, obedient, active and patient (Kim, 1988, p.113). These genderized characteristics as well as the portrayal of women as housewives and of men as heroes give messages that women should be primarily be in charge of domestic duties and that they should be passive and submissive in their characters.

The survey also discovered that there were fewer female characters in high school textbooks than there were in middle or primary school textbooks. As well, there were more stereotyping of sex roles in the high school textbooks than in the textbooks of the lower grades (Kim, 1988, p.112). For example, in primary school books, girls and boys were portrayed as equal in both ability and in personality characteristics; however, high school textbooks showed males as being leaders while females were most often portrayed in a domestic or school setting (Kim, 1988, p.112). This suggests that as the level of education goes up, the degree of sexism becomes more severe. In this manner, as women advance in the education system, they are taught to see themselves as housewives and mothers rather than

as career women or public leaders. It is also interesting to note that of the 310 textbooks, 92.6% of them have been written by men while only 7.4% have been written by women (Kim, 1988, p.111). This indicates that most of the textbooks are written from a male perspective and are reflective of the values of these male authors.

From this survey, it is evident that textbooks at the primary and secondary levels are transmitting sexist ideas and stereotypical gender images. As discussed above, negative or stereotypical gender images of women tend to discourage women's career ambitions and to influence them to aspire to domestic roles. As long as these limiting images and ideas of women are perpetuated and reinforced in the education system through educational materials, Korean women will continue to distort and limit their own abilities and ambitions.

3) sexist and biased attitudes of teachers: According to a survey conducted on the attitudes and opinions of teachers in primary and high schools, it was revealed that the majority of both male and female teachers had sexist notions of the abilities of girls in comparison to boys and had unequal expectations from the students depending on their gender. For example, of the 1,009 teachers surveyed in 1986, 73.6% believed that "boys are better than girls in mathematics and science" and 62% also agreed that "girls are better in writing and Korean Language than boys" (Kim, 1988, p.124). As well, on the

subject of leadership and chastity, 46% of the surveyed teachers said that they emphasized leadership more to boys than to girls and 39.7% of the teachers said that they emphasized the value of chastity more to girls than to boys (Kim, 1988, p.131).

From these results, it is evident that teachers in the Korean school system have sexist and biased opinions of their students. The teachers tend to believe that boys are better in scientific things such as mathematics, pure and applied science and reasoning and that girls are more proficient in subjects such as languages, reading and writing. These sexist opinions can be detrimental to students in that teachers may fail to stimulate the reasoning and space perception abilities of female students and to stimulate the artistic ability of male students due to their biased gender role expectations (Kim, 1988, p.125). As well, the emphasis of leadership qualities in boys and of the value of chastity in girls reinforces traditional and sexist expectations of the sexes. Males are expected to become leaders, public figures, etc. while women are tied to their domestic responsibilities of reproduction, maintenance and care of the home, etc. In this manner, the biased opinions of the teachers not only inhibit certain characteristics and abilities of each of the sexes but they also ascribe certain roles to the sexes.

In the survey, it was also discovered that teachers tended

to block or discourage female students from aspiring to career positions. A hypothetical case was given in which a brother and sister (twins) were both in the last year of high school and in which the sister had better grades than her brother. The teachers were asked who should be sent to university if the family financial situation allowed for only one of the twins to go (Kim, 1988, p.125). 48.1% of the teachers responded that the girl with better grades should be supported and 23.6% said that the boy should be supported. The results indicated that less than half of the teachers would support the girl even though she had better marks while almost a quarter stated that they would support the boy regardless of his lesser ability. As well, in another situation presented to the teachers in which a girl wanted to become a lawyer and they were asked whether they would encourage her or not, 84.4% said that they would encourage her but 13.3% said that they would advise her to choose a more feminine occupation (Kim, 1988, p.125). The response indicated that at least over 10% would actively discourage a girl from pursuing a profession such as lawyer. In the face of such meagre support and encouragement, it is not surprising that women do not continue onto higher education or have high career aspirations.

The attitudes and opinions of teachers are very important in that they influence the formation of students' career consciousness by establishing their values and expectations.

Teachers have a great impact on students because they spend the most time with the students in the course of their education. As Jea In Kim states in her article "An Analysis of Career Education for School Girls", "[teachers] influence upon the students the attitudes necessary for career life and often cause them to have negative self- images by expressing stereotypes consciously or unconsciously" (Kim, 1989, p.178). Therefore, as long as Korean teachers have sexist and biased opinions and they enforce these opinions through how they evaluate the students or how they encourage or discourage the students, women will be caught in a system which limits their abilities and disadvantages their labour force activities and aspirations.

4) Insufficient career training programs for women in the schools: Korean girls going through the educational system at the primary and secondary level have not had adequate career training or counselling. In a study conducted in 1986 examining the curriculum of high schools, it was revealed that female students were denied adequate career planning and training because there were sex segregated subjects in the curriculum of the secondary schools. According to the study, there were two courses which provided career guidance and vocational training in the secondary schools; these courses were business and home economics (Kim, 1988, p.115). Unfortunately these courses were sex segregated in which the female students took the home

economics course and the male students took the business course.

When comparing the educational goals and course contents of the business course with the home economics course, it becomes clear that the school curriculum forces the girls and boys to take sexually segregated subjects which reinforce the traditional division of labour. In the home economics course, they deal with home management, budgeting and care. For example, in the textbooks of the home economics course, it teaches the girls how use home appliances as consumers; there are no attempts to explain the structure and operational principles of the appliances (Kim, 1988, p.116). Therefore, women are alienated from the knowledge of technology leaving them with only the role of consumer and not producer. In contrast, the business course is dedicated to the planning of a career. In the business textbook, Industrial Technology, there is a step by step outline of how to plan and prepare for a career. For example, aptitude tests are given in order to determine ability; then a detailed description of ideal occupations for each aptitude area is presented in order to give the student some ideas for his future career. The book even goes on to elaborate the other considerations such as physical condition, personality, family background, financial situation, etc. that are needed for certain careers or occupations (Kim, 1988, p.117). This sort of detailed and step

by step instruction is crucial to the adequate preparation and training for a career. By being denied from this business course, female students are not receiving sufficient career training in the Korean education system.

The results are that when (or if) they enter university, Korean women often relegate themselves to traditionally 'feminine' careers or fields of study such as teacher, pharmacy, accounting and nursing, etc. (Han, 1987, p.257). The proportion of women entering careers or fields of study such as engineering or lawyer are less than 2.8% (Han, 1987, p.157). As indicated in Table 4.7, female enrollment was significant in areas such as fine and applied arts, home economics, natural sciences and teachers' training. However in fields of study such as engineering, law, social sciences, and agriculture and forestry, the enrollment of women was barely over 10% on average.

Career training programs are essential for women in terms of preparing them for university and eventually for labour force participation. Without these programs, female students will continue to limit their opportunities to the areas which they have traditionally been associated with. Inadequate career training has also led to undeveloped career ambitions or weak career orientation in Korean women.

STEPPING TOWARDS A REFORMATION: USING EDUCATION AS AN

INSTRUMENT OF CHANGE

From the above analysis of the Korean education system, it is evident that the problems and biases within the system have made education and schools in South Korea a source of subordination and discrimination for women. With the sexist school materials, prejudiced attitudes of teachers, inadequate career training for women and segregated school system, the Korean education system seems to be perpetuating "gender inequalities ... by regulating access to knowledge and by teaching worldviews that justify the status quo" (Bourque and Warren, 1990, p.95). Under such circumstances, women develop restricted viewpoints and ways of thinking and they are socialized to be satisfied with their passive role centred around the family (Kim, 1989, p.199). When education replicates and reinforces the traditional and cultural biases against women, increased educational opportunities for women do not close the earning gap between men and women or improve the status of women in the workforce. Nor does the "expanded educational opportunities end the underrepresentation of women in science and technology ..." (Bourque and Warren, 1990, p.95). In fact, education becomes just another instrument of oppression against women.

With these criticisms and evidence of education being a source of oppression for women, it has often been suggested that conventional education is a 'mistaken focus' for changing

women's social and economic situations. However, as Susan Bourque and Kay Warren argue in their article, "Access is not Enough: Gender Perspectives on Technology and Education", education and greater participation in the education system is necessary for women, particularly women in the developing countries, because they "will have very little impact on national development priorities, political ideologies and development planning until they are literate and have the basic arithmetic skills with which to analyze their political and economic systems" (Bourque and Warren, 1990, p.96). As well, particularly in developing countries, education has become a key mechanism through which modern ideas and cultural/ social transformation have been spread (Chung, 1980, p.148). Therefore, it is important that the education system in South Korea is focused upon and reformed in order to make it an instrument of change.

To a certain extent, the need to reform the education system in South Korea has been recognized and initiatives have been made in the latter part of the 1980s to address this. For example, in 1989, the Ministry of Education has committed the 5th School Curriculum Study Council to review sexual prejudices in school curricula (KWDI, 1989, p.11). As well, the sex segregated courses of business and home economics have been merged into one subject in which both the boys and girls have to take this new class (KWDI, 1989, p.11). Furthermore, as part

of the strong emphasis on career development in the Sixth Five Year Plan, women's welfare centres which conduct various programs designed to improve the education of women have been established (KWDI, 1989, p.14). These centres are financed and supported by the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs and they provide courses in both formal (english, music, labour laws, history, etc.) and nonformal (farming, family planning, sanitation and farming techniques) education (KWDI, 1989, p.14).

Perhaps the most significant reform to date has been the 1989 announcement to decentralize the education system (Chung, 1989, p.258). The decentralization of the education system is considered a tremendous breakthrough for women's goals because the centralized system of the past four and a half decades has limited and excluded the 'voice' of women in the decision-making process of the education system. For example, in the centralized system, textbooks and school curricula have been controlled exclusively by the Ministry of Education and Korean Educational Development Institute (Kim, 1988, p.102). The Ministry of Education appoints a committee of experts, teachers and writers to both approve textbooks and write educational materials. Thus far, the majority of the committee members have usually been men (Kim, 1988, p.104). In this manner, there is a strong possibility of the textbooks and educational materials being influenced by the belief system of a small minority of

people and of the opinions of many concerned (women's) groups to be excluded (Kim, 1988, p.104). As well, the Korean Ministry of Education has been "unequivocally decisive in shaping the goals and policies of education in South Korea" (Kim, 1975, p.167). Therefore, all the educational activities have had to be initiated and sanctioned by the central ministry of education. This has meant that a very small group of people in the government bureaucracy has been dictating all the educational programs, materials and goals in South Korea. Given the fact that there are not many women in the state bureaucracy on the whole (elaborated in the next chapter), women's 'voices' are not considered in these educational matters or decisions.

The overall decentralization of the system and the establishment of a system of new provincial self government for education will enable Korean women to have a greater influence and voice in the decision making process of the education system. As these new provincial level education bureaus are formed, Korean women can try to increase their participation by running for positions as board members, voting in new leaders and petitioning for a greater women's role in these new offices (Chung, 1989, p.259).

These reforms and initiatives are working toward eradicating those elements which reinforce, permit and condone sex discrimination and inequality in the education system in South Korea. The reforms have also signified an attempt to

implement a more humanizing education system for Korean women (Han, 1987, p.170). Hopefully as these reforms change the education system in South Korea to one which promotes gender equality, career preparation and self-actualizing goals for both sexes, increased educational opportunities and attainment will lead to greater labour force participation and improved economic status for Korean women. In this manner, education can be a strong and effective instrument for social change and cultural transformation.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE STATE AND PUBLIC POLICY

There has been a tradition of a strong state system in Korea. For example, throughout the Yi Dynasty, there was a highly developed state which exercised extensive power over the Korean people. The legacy of a dominant state has supported the development of a strong, highly centralized, authoritarian state system in South Korea today whose influence has been all encompassing in the economic and social spheres of the Korean society. The state has played a dominant role in leading the economic development of the country and in manipulating the social conditions of the Korean people. The long arm of the state has proven to be very effective in controlling most aspects of the Korean society.

Although traditionally the state has been an instrument of oppression toward women, internal and international forces have changed both the nature of the Korean state and its orientation. It is slowly beginning to open up to the influences and voices of the Korean people and to implement policies that have supported the equality and self-

actualization of Korean women. In this way, the state can also play a powerful role in changing the social conditions of Korean women and in encouraging and improving their economic participation.

The first of the four sections of this chapter looks at the dominant state system in South Korea - its historical roots and the present 'strong state' system. From this analysis, it becomes evident that the state has been an effective instrument of social and cultural change throughout Korean history. The second section examines the state oppression of women through direct or indirect policies. Although the Korean state has not had an explicit policy for women, the social and economic conditions of Korean women have been immensely influenced and shaped by state action particularly in the areas of population control and economic development. The third section provides an explanation as to why state policies have tended to oppress women and/or ignore women's issues. The primary reason seems to be that the political participation of Korean women either through forming interest groups to voice their opinion or through constituting a significant part of the politico-administrative structure has been very weak and marginal. The fourth section looks at how women's issues have come to the forefront of state policies in the late 1980s. It appears that despite the weak political participation of Korean women, internal and international events throughout the 1980s have

brought women's issues to the level of national priority. Consequently, the Korean government has initiated several policies to address women's concerns and to change the social and economic situation of Korean women. In particular, numerous reforms and laws have been implemented to promote women's labour force participation and to improve the economic status of Korean women.

DOMINANT STATE IN SOUTH KOREA: HISTORICAL ROOTS AND PRESENT SITUATION

Despite the propaganda of democracy and self- government, the state system in South Korea in recent years has been more reminiscent of the highly centralized, bureaucratic- authoritarian style states of Latin America than the liberal- democratic states of the Western industrialized countries. Many political scientists and East Asianists have attributed this phenomena to the experiences and influences of the Japanese colonial era in Korean history; however, this explanation is only partly accurate for there has been a historical tradition of a strong state system in South Korea. Since the Three Kingdoms period of ancient Korea, there has been a highly developed state with extensive political and social power over the Korean people. Consequently, the Korean people have traditionally deferred to the state and its actions rather than actively participating in political and social affairs [1].

Throughout Korea's history, one can find numerous examples of the strength and influence of the Korean state in controlling and dictating all aspects of the society. One such example is the adoption and implementation of Confucianism in Korea during the Yi Dynasty. The first Yi King and his government officials were able to uproot and destroy a popular indigenous culture and replace it with a foreign import - Confucianism. This was accomplished through the implementation of explicit policies enforcing Confucian customs and the distribution of educational materials teaching Confucian ethics.

Starting from the late 15th century, the Korean state began to implement laws which enforced Confucian customs and practices. In 1471, the King promulgated an edict that prohibited the marriage of persons within the radius of second cousins (Chang, 1989, p.39). This edict was a mechanism to ensure that there was a clear distinction between marriageable and unmarried matrilineal kin; it was also a way to establish lineage exogamy and patrilocal residence rules by ensuring that daughters of a certain kin had to go outside of their kin group to seek a husband (Chang, 1989, p.37). Lineage exogamy and patrilocal residence practices were important in that women could not be at the centre of a kin group. Rather the focus was on men and the continuation of their kin group; this was the whole emphasis of Confucian tradition. In 1485, the King promulgated another edict, KYUNG- GUK- TAE- JON, which

strengthened the authority of the household head, prohibited marriage across classes or between people of the same clan, outlawed the remarriage of widows, and enforced sex segregation (Chang, 1989, p.40). The reasons for instituting this law were that under Confucian practices: the head of the household, the oldest male family member, was to have absolute control over his kin, marriage was for the maintenance of the patrilineage, women could only belong to one man (therefore widows could not remarry) in order to maintain the purity of the children's blood line, and the sexes had to be segregated in order to ensure that men could not be enticed by women and be led astray; therefore, through this law, many of the Confucian practices were forced onto the Korean people. Consequently, it was through the implementation and enforcement of these two laws that Confucian customs and practices were followed in Korean society.

As well throughout the same period, the state distributed educational materials which tried to teach the Korean people about Confucian ethics and values. In 1432, the Korean government published a series of 'instructive' books which outlined Confucian moral standards to 'guide' the rightful behaviour and marriage customs of the Korean people (Chang, 1989, p.38). The government also published a book directed specifically to Korean women entitled SAMGANGHAENGSI-TO (meaning 'the three principles to virtuous conduct'). This book

was to indoctrinate women into the so-called womanly virtues as dictated in the Confucian teachings; the book also provided many exemplary cases of 'virtuous women' to help guide Korean women in following the Confucian ethics (Chang, 1989, p.38).

The state even went as far as to reward those women who rigorously followed the Confucian standards and to punish those who failed to abide by the Confucian rules. In this manner, the Korean government during the Yi Dynasty was able to implement Confucianism with very little opposition or backlash.

This example illustrates the power and dominance of the state in Korean society. It also provides an excellent example of the strong state system which has prevailed throughout Korean history. The current strong state system in South Korea is a legacy and continuation of this political tradition.

The state in South Korea today is very active and powerful in all aspects of the Korean society. Since 1961, the state has played a leading role in commanding the development of the economy and in shaping the social conditions of the Korean people. It has been able to do this by employing tactics and mechanisms similar to those of the states in the Yi Dynasty.

For example, as Chapter One has detailed, the military government which took control in 1961 implemented extensive rules, regulations and laws governing almost every aspect of the economic sphere in order to change the economy from an inward looking, low growth, highly agrarian structure to one

which was export- oriented, highly industrialized and targeted for rapid growth (Chapter One, section two). Through these policies, the Korean economy experienced rapid industrialization and high growth rates for over three decades. The state was also able to manipulate the business community to do its bidding by controlling the banks and the credit flow and it suppressed the labour demands of the unions by using police actions and union breaking tactics [2]. In this manner, the Korean state was able to plan the growth and development of the economy and to keep a tight grip on the economic situation of the country.

As well, through active intervention and explicit policies in the areas of family planning and population control, the Korean state was able to influence some aspects of the social situations of the Korean people. The population control policy which emerged in the late 1960s in conjunction with the Second Five Year Plan was concerned with the negative effects of the rapid growth of the population in the post Korean War period (Chang, 1989, p.141). It stressed family planning and control over fertility and reproduction as the primary solutions. Through this policy, numerous programs centred on the distribution of birth control methods were initiated. There were also educational attempts to teach people how to use these new contraceptive methods and to convince couples to limit themselves to only two children [3] (Chang, 1987, p.141).

Consequently there was a considerable decrease in the size of the Korean family; this in turn lead to a change in both the family life and individual life of the Korean people (This point is further elaborated in Chapter two).

As the above examples illustrate, the South Korean state has been a powerful and influential actor. It has been effective in initiating and implementing change in the Korean society and economy; and it has made no pretense to be noninterventionist or democratic in its actions. As in most other developing countries, the state in South Korea has been a necessary and crucial agent for development. However, in the South Korean case, the state has been more successful than other developing country states largely because there has been a historical tradition of a strong, interventionist state.

STATE OPPRESSION OF WOMEN

Given the dominance and influence of the state in Korean society, it becomes an obvious focus for initiating change in the economic and social conditions of Korean women. Unfortunately however the Korean state has traditionally been a source of oppression for women rather than an instrument of change and liberation. Although there has been no explicit policies against women, state actions or policies in other areas have directly or indirectly disadvantaged Korean women. For example, the present Constitution upholds equal rights

before the law and prohibits sexual discrimination; however, these provisions have been invalidated by the sexism in the Family Law of the Civil Code and the non-enforcement of the Labour Standard Act which addresses sex discrimination in the labour force.

The Family Law in the Civil Code violates the sex equality declaration in the Constitution by its adherence to sexist Confucian principles. It has made patrilineal lineage, exogamy and patrilocalty the ideological basis of the family structure in South Korea. The systems of 'Head of the Family (hoju)' and 'Family Register (hojok)' both symbolically and practically support the patriarchal family structure (Chang, 1989, p.83). The 'Head of the Family' system decrees that the oldest male in the household is given the position of Family Head. This position gives him the privilege of inheriting the family property and the responsibility of supporting the family (Chang, 1989, p.84). The stipulation that the 'hoju' must be male relegates the women to a secondary position in the family structure. The 'Family Register' system is an important part of the Korean family life in that it provides a record of all the births of four generations or more of consanguineous and conjugal family members (Chang, 1989, p.83). The Family Register which is kept at the district office of the permanent address of the 'hoju' is needed for the purposes of identification, filing applications for schooling and jobs, and

sometimes for spouse selection (Chang, 1989, p.83). The Register even records all criminal records of a family and provides family historical background. The Register is also important for determining who inherits the family property by recording the first, legitimate son of the family (Chang, 1989, p.84). The 'hojok' system is sexist in that women are given marginal status in the Family Register. Upon marriage, a woman's name is removed from her natal family's register and placed in her husband's family register; this name transfer is equivalent to a marriage certificate (Chang, 1989, p.84). In this way, a woman is automatically excluded from her family inheritance and her personal and family identity is lost. As well, under this system, only sons can continue the family line as women are eliminated from the hojok upon marriage.

The Family Law also violates the 'equal rights before the law' provision in the Constitution because it stipulates many family regulations that create asymmetrical rights between the husband and wife. First of all, the definition of immediate relatives is wider for the paternal lines than the maternal lines. While the wife is considered related to her father-in-law's third cousins, only the parents of the wife are considered to be related to the husband (Chang, 1989, p.84). The definition of immediate family is important in cases of medical insurance and other benefits where only the 'immediate family members' are covered. Secondly, in the case of

remarriage, the wife automatically becomes the step- mother to the children of her husband's previous marriage; however, her children are not automatically considered her new husband's children until he formally adopts them and enters their names in his family register (Chang, 1989, p.85). This places the wife's children at a disadvantage in terms of inheriting either her previous husband's or her new husband's family property. Thirdly, the husband's children born from women other than his legal wife can be entered in the 'hojok' without his legal wife's consent but the wife cannot do likewise without the written consent of both her husband and the 'hoju' (if they are not the same persons) (Chang, 1989, p.85). Finally, in the event of a divorce, the joint property is regarded as belonging to the husband unless the wife legally owns it (Chang, 1989, p.85). Under this stipulation, there is very little provision for the wife in the event of a divorce if she does not have her own property before marriage. This creates a tremendous economic barrier to divorce for Korean women.

The Family Law has undermined and almost eradicated the principles of 'gender equality' and 'equality before the law' through its adherence to Confucian practices and its sexist regulations. By not amending the Family Law and by fully implementing it, the state is an oppressive force to women in the Korean society for it is through this Family Law that Korean women are subordinated and marginalized in their social

status and economic condition.

As well the non- enforcement of the Labour Standard Act (LSA) has made the state an accomplice to the economic subordination of Korean women. The LSA has had general provisions to address and counter sex discrimination in the Korean labour market. Article 5 of the Labour Standard Act declares that "employers cannot discriminately treat the workers on the grounds of sex" (Seo, 1989, p.121). This fundamental principle of equal treatment of men and women has been drawn from Clause 1, Article 11 and Clause 4, Article 32 of the Constitution. The LSA also provides for a penalty in the event of a proven violation of Article 5; the employer who has violated the article is fined a maximum amount of 2,500,000 Won in accordance with Article 11 of the LSA (Seo, 1989, p.122). However despite these provisions in the LSA and in the Constitution, there is still extensive sex discrimination in the Korean labour market. Korean women are getting lower wages, limited to few opportunities and constantly being overlooked for promotions and advancements. The sex discrimination in the labour force has not been countered because the state has not actively enforced the LSA. Very few employers have ever been fined under Article 11 and many workers (both male and female) do not even know of the LSA. The non- enforcement of the LSA by the state has lead to the maintenance of the status quo in which women have an inferior and marginalized status in the

economic sphere. As long as sex discriminatory behavior is not addressed, Korean women's labour force participation will continue to be distorted and limited.

From these examples above, it is evident that despite the rhetoric of gender equality in the Constitution, the Korean state has actively oppressed Korean women through explicit policies such as the Family Law or through state action such as the non-enforcement of the LSA. The absence of women's 'voices' in state policies and actions can be attributed to the weak political participation of women in South Korea.

LOW PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN IN THE POLITICAL SPHERE

Due to the traditional views of women in Korean society, there has been very little acceptance of women in political activities. As a consequence, Korean women have been severely under-represented in the political sphere. Both in the state apparatus and as interest groups lobbying for a political voice, women's political participation has been marginal and uninfluential. Although there have been prominent female leaders in Korea's history, they have never directly held power and they have been few and far in between.

In the state bureaucracy, there has only been 55 female legislators in the National Assembly since 1945; this figure accounts for only 2.1% of the total 2,620 seats that have been available (Seo, 1989, p.40). The percentage of women members

have never exceeded 5% of the representatives at any given time and this figure even includes the women members who have been appointed to the Assembly through the party lists used in proportional representation (Chang, 1989, p.158). In fact, it appears that the number of female Assembly members has been decreasing since the 1950s. In 1948, the number of female candidates was 21 but by 1985, the number had declined to 7 (Chang, 1989, p.158). The reason for this decline was that at the initial formation of the South Korean government in 1948, many women who had actively fought for national liberation before 1945 were given a seat in the government as a reward for their contribution to the liberation movement. However with the slow stabilization of the country and the memories of the national liberation struggle fading, women were being 'pushed' out of their political roles (Chang, 1989, p.158). The only other time that there was an increase of female Assembly members was during the late 1970s; however, this increase was due to the appointment of eight women by the ruling party, Democratic Justice Party, to give the 'appearance' of female representation in the government.

The problem with having the majority of the female Assembly members be appointed rather than elected is that appointed Assembly members are severely limited in their capacity to work for issues or to take positions that are not party concerns. As well since the appointed female Assembly members have been

chosen for the express purpose of 'giving the appearance of female representation', they are just symbols of female participation rather than actual participation. This sort of tokenism does not work towards incorporating women's 'voices' and issues in the political system rather it is merely a mechanism to stabilize the system. The eight appointed women in the late 1970s were only symbolic representatives for during their time in office, they did very little to 'voice' women's concerns (Seo, 1989, p.34).

As civil servants in the state structure, women have constituted a very small percentage of the total number and they have been limited to the lowest positions in the official rank. The number of female public officials working for either the central or regional government was approximately 59,392 as of 1983; this figure accounted for only 17.1% of the total (Seo, 1989, p.40). The corresponding number for male officials was 287,976 (Seo, 1989, p.40). As well there were no female officials in the first- class position, only one in the second class position, and three in the third class position which is generally considered the dividing line between administrative positions and those that involve participation in the decision-making process (Chang, 1989, p.153). As Table 5.1 illustrates, the majority of female civil servants were in the lowest positions (eighth and ninth grade) as of 1983 while the largest percentage of male civil servants were in the sixth grade

position.

The exclusion of women from the top ranking positions prevents them from being a part of the decision-making process and in this way, women's voices are not being considered or heard during the policy formulation period. As well with the small total number of female public officials in the Korean government, Korean women are also excluded from the implementation stage of a policy. The implementation part of a policy is very important in that a considerable part of the way a policy turns out depends on the implementation stage of the policy (Seo, 1989, p.25). The combined problems of insufficient participation in the government and exclusion from high ranking positions have severely limited Korean women from actively influencing state policies and actions.

Furthermore, the number of women appointed to state committees has been extremely marginal. As of 1984, there have been 364 committees and they have had a total of 7,071 members; out of these members, only 156 have been women (making the female ratio 2.2%) and these women have worked in only 35 of the 364 committees (Seo, 1989, p.43). To make matters worse, the small number of women are clustered in a few subject and/or issue areas such as education, health and social welfare, and women's issues (Chang, 1989, p.153). The limited number of women in the state committees and their relegation to a narrow sphere of subjects have prevented Korean women from influencing

policies and issues in all aspects and spheres of the Korean society. For example, as women are excluded from the committees which discuss foreign policy, economic planning and national defence issues, they are denied an opportunity to shape policies in these areas and in this way, women's concerns are not reflected in these policy areas.

Participation in the state bureaucracy either as an Assembly member or as a civil servant has been very important because it has enabled the participant to play a part in the policy making process as well as the implementation process. For a country like South Korea, it is particularly important to participate in the state apparatus because the South Korean state is highly centralized and relatively autonomous from the society. The Korean policy making process is characterized by the low input of public opinion and the dominance of bureaucrats in initiating and shaping policies (Seo, 1989, p.26). Due to the unresponsive nature of the Korean state, it is very difficult to shape policies unless one is active in an influential part of the state apparatus.

One of the major problems of women's groups in lobbying for political influence has been the unresponsive and autonomous nature of the Korean state. The only social groups that have had influence in the policy-making process have been the associations formed by lawyers, doctors, pharmacists, industrialists, the chamber of commerces, religious bodies and

teachers (Seo, 1989, p.29). Other groups such as women's organizations, labour unions, etc. have not been successful in initiating or changing state policies. In addition, most of the women's groups have not had much experience in lobbying for political power. In fact, women's organizations on the whole have paid little attention to organizing concrete political activities or to forming a political agenda. Rather they have been concentrating all their energies on raising the consciousness of Korean women (Seo, 1989, p.63). Furthermore, there have been few political vehicles through which women's groups can voice their concerns. Both the ruling party and the leading opposition party have not been interested in women's issues and very few of the powerful politicians have actively supported or fought for women's rights (Chang, 1989, p.159). Consequently, women's groups in South Korea have not been very successful in shaping or influencing state policies over the past four and a half decades.

The low and marginal presence of women in the state structure and the ineffectiveness of women's groups have lead to a weak and limited participation of Korean women in the political sphere. This in turn has lead to the virtual exclusion of women's concerns and issues in the Korean political system. As long as women's 'voices' are not heard in the political sphere, there is a strong tendency for the state to act as an oppressive force towards Korean women.

THE EMERGENCE OF WOMEN'S ISSUES IN SOUTH KOREA: THE STATE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT

Despite the weak political participation of Korean women, women's issues have come to the forefront of Korean politics in the 1980s. The emergence of women's issues in South Korea has been sparked by several international events and domestic changes during the late 1970s and early 1980s. In response to the increasing awareness of and demand for women's rights, a series of state policies and committees have been established during the latter part of the 1980s to address the needs and problems of Korean women. It appears that for the first time in Korean history, women's concerns and issues have become a national priority.

During the late 1970s, a series of events, spearheaded by the United Nations, heightened the awareness and interest of women's issues in South Korea and around the world. The UN International Women's Year in 1975 stimulated Korean women to understand the issues of 'women and development' and to start looking for solutions to the problems that women faced not only in South Korea but all over the world (KWDI, 1989, p.3). The UN Decade for Women which started with the International Women's Year maintained this interest and momentum. The conferences and studies which were sponsored by the UN as a part of the Decade for Women awakened Korean women to the strong need for research

policy formulation on various women's issues (Kim, 1987, p. 11). The programs and activities of the UN Decade for Women also provided women's groups in South Korea with an opportunity to exchange and gather information with women's groups in other countries.

Furthermore, the adoption of the 'Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women' by the UN General Assembly in 1979 forced countries around the world to deal with the sex discrimination in their laws and policies as this Convention set international standards for women's rights in the political, economic, social, educational and cultural fields (Kim, 1987, p.7). The ratification of the Convention in 1981 brought the Convention into effect and placed global pressure on countries to ratify and comply with the Convention. As these events unfolded in the late 1970s, there was tremendous interest and activity on women's issues. Afraid of appearing traditional and backward, Korean leaders embraced women's issues as a new concern of the nation.

The establishment of a new regime in 1981 also contributed to the new interest and embrace of women's issues in South Korea. The Fifth Republic, headed by President Chun Doo Hwan, came into power amidst the confusion of President Park's assassination in 1979 and a military coup in 1980. In an attempt to gain international legitimacy and internal

popularity, the new regime took various measures to 'make' the government appear democratic and broad-based (Chang, 1989, p.134). As a part of this new orientation, women's issues and concerns were incorporated as one of the developmental goals of the country. President Chun appointed more women to official positions in order to improve their representation and he initiated new policies and committees to deal with women's issues.

In April 1983, the government established the Korean Women's Development Institute (KWDI) as a part of the state bureaucracy. The KWDI was to conduct comprehensive studies on women's issues in order to make suggestions and recommendations to the government (KWDI, 1989, p.6). Their primary functions were to 'advise' the government on state policies, disseminate information on women's issues and conduct research on various policy areas regarding women. To date, the KWDI has produced numerous studies and research papers on many economic and social issues concerning Korean women. Although KWDI's input into the policy-making process has been limited (having only an advisory role), the information generated by the studies and research has produced a significant source of current, up-to-date data and information on Korean women's economic and social situation.

In May 1983, the Korean government signed the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against

Women. Although the ratification caused great debate and uproar in the country, the Convention was adopted by the Chun government in an effort to gain international legitimacy and acceptance (Kim, 1989, p.9). The debate was sparked by the fact that several Korean laws (for example, the Family Law) had to be amended in order to ratify the Convention but rather than changing these laws, the government had initially decided to ratify the Convention with reservations on five of the clauses (Chang, 1989, p.144). Women's groups were angered by this 'self serving' attempt and they demanded that the Convention be adopted in whole to remain true to the spirit and letter of the Convention. A National Council consisting of 63 women's groups and senior policymakers was formed in order to discuss how to change the existing laws to compile with the UN Convention (Kim, 1987, p.9).

As a result of the activities of this Council, the National Assembly passed a number of amendments to the Family Law in 1989 (Korea Business World, 1990, p.22). The new Family Law which will take effect in January of 1991 has two major effects on women. First, under the old law, when a man died his wife was usually his second heir after the first son. However under the new law, the wife is entitled to receive one and a half as much as all the other children. As well, the system of primogeniture is abandoned as the new law stipulates that all the children (including daughters) are to inherit an equal

share of the inheritance (Korea Business World, 1990, p.22). Secondly, the Family Law has been amended so that a woman can now become the head of the household. This amendment finally ends the patriarchal 'Head of the Family' system in South Korea (Korea Business World, 1990, p.22). These changes in the Family Law have been a great movement towards realizing the UN Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women in South Korea.

In December 1983, the Committee to Review and Appraise Women's Policy was established under the auspices of the Prime Minister's Office (Kim, 1987, p.8). This committee was created in order to coordinate the policy making on women's issues by the various branches of the government. It was also to assess state policies and make recommendations as to how women's employment and social participation could be increased and as to how Korean women's general status could be promoted. The Prime Minister, himself, chaired the meetings and the committee members included the president of the KWDI, women experts and ministers of relevant ministries (Kim, 1987, p.8). To date, the committee has been credited with the formulation and adoption of two major documents: the Master Plan for Women's Development and the Guideline for Improvement of Sexual Discrimination. Both of these documents have lead to concrete policies in the areas of long term planning of women's development and of eliminating sex discrimination in the workforce.

The 'Master Plan for Women's Development' has been the basis for a section on women in the Sixth Five Year Plan (1987-1991). This has been the first time that a section dedicated specifically to women has been included in the Five Year economic plans. The section not only recognizes "the strong influence of Confucianism as a cause of sexual discrimination" but it also outlines a series of policies to be pursued to achieve its goal of "improving and promoting women's development" (Chang, 1989, p.144). The policies are: 1) implementation of equal employment procedures, expansion of childcare facilities, creation of part-time jobs for women, expansion of volunteer activities to increase women's participation in social projects, 2) reinforcement of women's vocational training, fostering consciousness of equality between the sexes through school education, revision of civil laws, and 3) development of effective support systems (Chang, 1989, pp.144-145). Some of these policies have resulted in actual laws but most have not been addressed. Although many of these policies have not yet been legislated into concrete laws, they are a recognition of the problems to be solved.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Act which was enacted in 1987 was based on the 'Guideline for Improvement of Sexual Discrimination' and was initiated as a part of the "development of women" plan in the Sixth Five Year Plan. The Equal Act went into effect in April 1988 and it legislated equal opportunity

in employment and in the terms of contract (Seo, 1989, p.123). The act also had provisions to fine and punish employers for violating the equal opportunity principle and for discriminating against persons on the basis of gender. For example, Article 8 of the Equal Act states that "the business proprietor is not to discriminate against women in the terms of retirement and dismissal on the ground of sex" and the violation of this article carries with it a fine of 2,500,000 Won maximum (Seo, 1989, p.125). Although there has been controversy over the quick implementation of the act (4), the Equal Act is a significant step forward in the fight against sex discrimination in the workforce.

Starting from 1986, the Korean government also began to implement policies which tried to improve the health and welfare of Korean women. In 1986, the Maternal Child Health Act of 1973 was revised. The new act issued medical check-up books to all pregnant and nursing mothers and guaranteed medical examinations for expectant mothers on a regular basis. The new act also provided free vaccines for all new babies (KWDI, 1989, p.26). As well the government ended the discrimination against women in the field of medical insurance by ensuring that medical insurance schemes of 'daughters' were extended to cover her parents if they were not covered through anyone else (Chang, 1987, p.142). These changes in existing health acts eliminated elements of sex discrimination and worked towards

improving the welfare of Korean women.

Although the Korean state has traditionally been a force of oppression for Korean women, recent events in the international and domestic sphere have forced the Korean government to champion the concerns and issues of women. All these new state actions and policies mentioned above have worked towards improving the economic and social status of Korean women and eliminating the cultural biases that have entrenched sex discrimination in the Korean society. With the state slowly starting to implement policies which support the equality and self-actualization of Korean women, it has become a powerful instrument through which women's goals of economic and social equality can be realized.

In South Korea, the state is a particularly effective and powerful instrument for implementing change. The Korean state has traditionally been a dominant actor in the Korean society and it has been able to control almost every aspect of the country. If the Korean state can bring about the massive growth of the economy, then it can surely be able to eradicate sex discrimination and cultural biases in the country. Although the weak political participation and presence of women in the state has led to oppressive state policies and actions, the recent events in the international arena and in the domestic sphere have brought women's issues to the forefront of Korean

politics. As the Korean state begins to slowly implement policies to eliminate sex discrimination and to promote the status of Korean women, women's labour force participation is expected to expand and improve particularly with the full implementation of policies such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Act and the "women's development" plan in the Sixth Five Year Plan.

CONCLUSION

In the four and a half decades of rapid economic development and transformation, Korean women have entered the workforce in tremendous proportions. Women's participation rates have increased substantially in all three sectors of the economy and their percentage of the total workforce has reached almost 50% by 1989. Particularly during the 1960s and 1970s, when economic growth was intensive, employment opportunities in the manufacturing and service sectors ballooned for women. Women took jobs in labour intensive, export industries such as textiles, footwear, toys, electrical goods, etc. or in commercial and service businesses as secretaries, waitresses and salesgirls. The growth of employment opportunities in these two sectors resulted from the policy of export oriented industrialization which led to the rapid development of the manufacturing sector and to the concomitant growth of the tertiary sector. As outlined in Chapter one, the policy of export oriented industrialization shifted the focus of development to the manufacturing sector which quickly took the lead in economic growth. In particular, labour intensive, export industries which employed mostly women were the primary

forces of economic growth and dynamism. However, as the economy evolved and the industrial structure deepened in the late 1970s and 1980s, the focus shifted to capital and technology intensive industries, as described in Chapter one. Although the focus shifted, Korean women were largely left in the labour intensive export industries, in low status, unskilled jobs and in the undeveloped agricultural sector. Therefore, although women's labour force participation has increased as a result of the economic development of South Korea, their participation has been characterized by patterns of marginalization, subordination and disadvantage.

In an attempt to understand why Korean women have been left disproportionately represented in the undeveloped sectors of the economy, one has to examine the factors which have influenced women's labour force participation. Economic theories which assert that the lower productivity levels and lower human capital resources of women are the principal reasons for their disadvantaged positions do not offer accurate explanations in the South Korean case. In many incidences, Korean women have been given lower positions and wages than men although they have been performing similar work or have attained similar levels of education, as elaborated at the end of Chapter two. Therefore, it becomes evident that sex inequalities in the Korean labour market have been created by factors other than differences in productivity and human

capital resources.

The feminist arguments offered by theorists such as Ester Boserup, Susan Bourque, Kay Warren and Susan Joeke provide some explanations to the patterns of marginalization and subordination. For example, Boserup argues that women are disadvantaged in the workplace because there are patriarchal structures in the educational and state institutions which perpetuate and reinforce negative images of women. As long as women are considered inferior, they will be denied better wages and occupational positions. Furthermore, as long as institutions within a society maintain the gender hierarchy, increased educational opportunities and greater access to technology and training will not lead to improved economic status for women.

Upon examining the educational system and the state structure and policies in South Korea, it is evident that the patriarchal structures within these institutions have hindered women's labour force participation and have maintained the subordinate status of women in both the society and the economy. The gender biased attitudes of teachers and educational materials in Korean schools have reinforced the negative Confucian notions of women and the lack of proper career training has systematically hindered women's economic ambitions. As Chapter four details, the problems and biases in the education system have been a principal factor in limiting

the development of women's full economic potentials and opportunities. The low participation and representation of Korean women in the state structure have led to the exclusion of women's issues and voice in the political process. In this manner, state policies have tended to be biased against women. As illustrated in Chapter five, state policies such as the Family Law and the inadequate Labour Standard Act have perpetuated the inequalities in the workplace and in the household. As long as state policies maintain and reinforce inequalities, women's economic and social status can not improve.

As the factors have been identified, the solutions are apparent - patriarchal structures must be dismantled and negative, Confucian ideas of women must be changed. As outlined at the end of Chapter three, four and five, many attempts have already been made to change the structures of discrimination and subordination. Forces such as the development and growth of women's groups, the growing influence of Christianity and Western values, and the emergence of women's issues in the political agenda will all work towards addressing inequalities and gender stereotypes in the Korean economy and society.

Perhaps the most optimistic realization has been that these factors are being recognized as the forces which are distorting and marginalizing women's labour force participation. This is perhaps the most important first step towards addressing the

problems and rectifying the situation. In the final analysis, it is encouraging to know that South Korea is an evolving country whose success factor has been the ability to change and adapt. As the economy has transformed, so has the society. Hopefully with the reforms that have been initiated and the forces that are at play in the society, the realization of a economic and societal structure which develops women's full potentials will be met in South Korea.

ENDNOTES - INTRODUCTION

1 The conclusions from her 1990 article are a slight modification of the early arguments in her groundbreaking 1970 book, Women's Role in Economic Development. In her 1970 book, she argued that women had been less productive or efficient because they were being systematically denied access to technology and training (Jacquette, 1990, p.61). The unequal access was at the heart of unequal productivity and efficiency levels of the sexes. Therefore, Boserup's conclusion was to recommend equal access and greater educational opportunities to women in order to make them more efficient producers.

However, her arguments based on merit and equality have been challenged by a new wave of development feminists such as Jane Jacquette, Susan Bourque, Irene Tinker and Susan Joeekes who claim that equal access to technology and educational training has not been the prime cause of women's economic marginalization but rather the factors have been institutional patriarchy and the prevalence of negative, stereotypical ideas of women (Jacquette, 1990, p.65). Sex inequalities and discrimination have been produced and reproduced by maintaining the sex hierarchy of male superiority and female inferiority in the society. Increased educational opportunities will not eliminate these biases until the sex hierarchy has been addressed (Jacquette, 1990, p.65).

In response to this change in perspective, Boserup elaborates her initial argument to include the recognition that increased educational opportunities are not sufficient (although perhaps necessary) conditions to improve the economic status of women in developing countries. She concurs that when patriarchal structures are entrenched in the education system and in the workplace, greater access to technology and increased educational participation will not eliminate sex inequalities.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1

1 It is estimated from the 1944 and 1949 Censuses that a net of 2.6 million people entered South Korea during the period between the liberation of Korea in 1945 and the 1949 Censuses. Those repatriated from overseas into South Korea numbered 1.8 million and the returned and refugees from Soviet-occupied North Korea were estimated as 740,000 at the 1949 Census. The repatriated Koreans from Japan accounted for 75% of the total repatriated from overseas and 55% of the total net increase of population in South Korea by migration during the period from 1945 to 1949 (Kwon, Lee, et. al., 1975, p.32).

2 The Rhee government also instituted laws preventing most forms of landlordism and limiting the size of farms to 3 hectares as measures to effectively counter the tendency for land ownership to become concentrated again (Mason, Kim and et al., 1980, p.421).

3 Military assistance was also considerable. From 1950 to 1968, US military aid amounted to US \$2.5 billion representing more than 27% of all US military aid given to East Asia and the Pacific during this period (Levin and Sneider, 1983, p.39). The provision of substantial military assistance by the US relieved the weak Korean economy from the burden of maintaining a strong military force and enabled scarce resources to be directed toward economic development.

4 After 1953, the rural sector was largely ignored. The US policies of reconstruction, price stabilization and import substitution industrialization were mainly targeted toward the manufacturing and mining sectors. The rural sector was ignored because the massive land reform implemented before the Korean War defused the social tensions in the rural sector. Government attention was diverted away from the rural sector to the urban areas which were volatile and dangerous (Steinberg, 1989, p.146). As well, Rhee did not want to strengthen the agricultural sector too much because his political opposition was based in the rural sector (Steinberg, 1989, p.127).

5 In the summer of 1960, when the First Five Year Plan was being planned, the new government was pressured by a different set of demands than those confronting Rhee. Severe demands of the unemployed and students for increased employment opportunities prompted the Democratic Party to try to formulate policies and programs which would create jobs. Accordingly, the plan concentrated on certain key types of infrastructure or overhead capital and tried to use labour intensive methods of construction in so far as it was possible (Cole and Nam, 1969, p.17).

6 In an effort to divert the migration flow away from Seoul, the government created Export Processing Zones near the city in order to alleviate the pressure and to cope with the shortages of industrial cities during the late 1960s. In 1970, the government announced the Local Industrial Development Act and Free Export Zone Act to accelerate the development of these industrial estates. Infrastructure was built in the estates by public investments and then private investments were induced into the estates through various measures such as tax exceptions, subsidies and controlled land prices (usually below the market value) (Suh, 1980, p.119). These Export Processing Zones also helped to strengthen the international competitiveness of Korean industries by reducing their production costs.

7 Necessary funds to replace 1% of the obsolete machines was estimated at 38 billion Won but during the period from 1981 to 1984, total support reached only 15 billion Won (Jung, 1986, p.14).

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2

1 This phenomenon could be a result of the fact that women tended to report themselves as economically inactive rather than as unemployed when they were actually unemployed.

2 Between 1961 and 1975, more than 60% of the women who migrated were between the ages of 10 and 29 (Hong II, 1984, p.193). The age distribution of female migrants reflected the greater propensity of younger women to migrate for employment reasons or educational opportunities.

3 In the early 1960s, government- created cooperative apparatuses bought rice and barley crops at prices lower than production costs in order to sell them at a low price in the urban areas; this led to the growing income disparity between the rural and urban sector in the late 1960s. Since there were no alternative markets, farmers had to accept the depressed prices (Steinberg, 1989, p.146). This situation continued until 1970 because the US (through the PL-480 program) was supplying surplus agricultural commodities to South Korea allowing basic reforms of the agricultural sector to be postponed (Steinberg, 1989, p.146).

4 In 1975, 51.1% of all single women in the urban sector were employed in production jobs. In contrast, only 18.3% of married women in the urban sector were employed in the production sector (Cho and Koo, 1983, p.523). Rather the biggest percentages of married women were in the sales (37.5%) and services (19.5%) jobs.

5 The index was interpreted as the percentage of men (or women) who would have to change their occupational grouping for the occupational distributions of men and women to be equal. The exact computing formula was:

$$D = 0.5 \sum \left| \frac{M_i}{\sum M_i} - \frac{F_i}{\sum F_i} \right| \times 100$$

where M_i referred to the number of men in the i -th occupation, and F_i referred to the number of females in the i -th occupation (Jin and Stevens, 1987, p.100).

6 The concern with high levels of occupational segregation was that a large portion of the inequities between the sexes in earnings and status was attributable to the fact that Korean men and women were employed in different occupations.

7 The informal sector, particularly in the urban areas,

offered employment opportunities and income generating activities to married women. Informal sector activities are especially important to married women because they do not make a clear separation between domestic and nondomestic work. Most of the jobs are very flexible and can be held on an intermittent or irregular basis (Cho and Koo, 1983, p.525). Hence, in South Korea, when a majority of wage earning single women disappear from the labour statistics after they get married, they usually move into the informal sector to engage in income earning activities (Cho and Koo, 1983, p.525).

8 Better educated women tend to have a broader perspective about their choices and they usually have less children. As well, with more employment opportunities available, women tend to restructure their cost-benefit accounting of childbearing and rearing (Hugo, 1987, p.149).

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3

1 The indigenous Shamanism and Buddhism had the most influence on the mentality and behavioural pattern of Koreans for ten centuries from ancient Korea to the Koryo Dynasty (Lee, 1980, p.302). In the case of Buddhism, its position was solidified by the full support of the royal household. In the Koryo Dynasty, Buddhism was at its peak of prosperity as the national religion. But it was also during this period that corruption and degradation of Buddhist temples and monasteries occurred (Lee, 1980, p.302). Buddhist temples began to acquire land and extend their political power. Part of the attack on the Koryo Dynasty by the Confucian elites of the Yi Dynasty was on the corruption and greed of Buddhist temples and monasteries (Lee, 1980, p.302). Ironically, the other important part in the attack against the Koryo Dynasty was on the behaviour of women - they were too frequently engaged in social activities (Chang, 1989, p.38).

2 On a theoretical level, the qualities of Yin and Yang are supposed to be essentially complementary and not hierarchical (Chang, 1989, p.66a). Therefore the qualities of man and woman are supposed to be different but not unequal. The qualities of Yang are dynamism, light, etc. while the qualities of Yin are stillness, dark, etc. (Chang, 1989, p.66a). Men are supposed to be Yang and women are Yin.

3 Under the interpretation of Neo-Confucianism, there is definitely an ideology of male supremacy and female subservience in both theory and practice (Chang, 1989, p.66a). In following the strict hierarchical order of Neo-Confucian tradition, it has often been said that Koreans have 'out-Chinesed' the Chinese. Perhaps that is why there is less gender inequality (especially in terms of division of labour in the household) in China than in South Korea. Among Korean women, it has often been said that a Chinese husband is better than a Korean one because the Chinese man will do a lot of the housework.

4 Most of the original Confucian text had been compiled with the intention of teaching the rulers how to govern the people and the people on how to be governed (Chang, 1989, p.43). Since both the rulers and the people to be governed are assumed to be men, women seldom enter into the original teachings.

5 The formal education of women has been severely limited by the fact that Korean parents have not been willing to finance the schooling of their daughters and have wanted to utilize their daughters' labour resources before they got married. Daughters have also been the last ones to receive medical and

dietary attention in their families. Grandparents, fathers and brothers have always been the first ones considered.

6 Being sonless in a Confucian society is a very big problem for a family. Since the continuation of the family line can only be maintained through a son, having boys becomes an all important goal for families. If a family is sonless, the Korean wife is held primarily responsible for the problem (Koh, 1983, p.166). Even today, biological facts concerning reproduction, conception and gender determination carry little weight in a society where there are deeply entrenched beliefs that women are to blame for any reproductive 'failures'.

7 Divorced women are virtually treated as outcasts. Natal family members usually do not want to accept divorced daughters back into the home because it brings shame to their house. Widows (if they have no sons) are either forced to stay with their in-laws (if they are willing to keep them) or be cast out. It is also a general rule that widows are not to remarry because a good woman is only to 'know' one man in her lifetime. Other women who do not fit into any of the three roles such as 'kisaeng' (prostitutes) have more social and political freedom but they are also considered the lowest social class of women (Jayawardena, 1986, p.216).

8 During the period before the Yi Dynasty in Korea, women have held important and even prominent positions in the Korean society. In the beginning of the 7th century, Queen Sondok reigned over Silla Korea and in the Korean annals, she was spoken of with great respect and admiration. She was succeeded by her cousin, Chindok (Jayawardena, 1986, p.214). Gender was not that important in terms of lineage continuation during this period; a king who died without an heir could nominate his sister as his successor (Jayawardena, 1986, p.214). In ancient Korea, women could also function in roles other than wife and mother. Religious healers and leaders (shamans) were about 70% women. Women also played the role of soothsayer and psychic (Jayawardena, 1986, p.216).

9 Although the Tong Hak movement gained momentum as many peasants joined in and initiated a series of revolutionary uprisings, it was crushed when the leaders of the Yi Dynasty invited China and Japan to come to Korea's rescue (Kim, 1975, p.32). At its peak in 1894, the movement had spread throughout almost the entire country.

10 In South Korea, the most prevalent religion is Buddhism. Confucianism is more of a philosophical and cultural ideology rather than a religion. Although Buddhism forms the largest religious group in the Korean society, the percentage of Buddhists has declined in proportion to the growth of

Christians. In 1960, over 70% of the Korean population was Buddhists. In 1977, the figure went down to 46% and by 1984, the percentage was 37% (Statistical Handbook of Korea, 1985, p.133). Despite the fact that Buddhists are the largest religious group in South Korea, it has been the Christians and atheists who have dominated the educational and political spheres of the Korean society mainly because the inherent philosophy in Buddhism discourages public activity and active social involvement (Park, 1979, p.142).

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4

1 According to Chung Han Kim, the American missionaries made outstanding and long lasting contributions to not only the development of modern education in Korea but also to the medical profession and healthcare activities. For example, in 1887, the first clinic of gynecology was founded in Seoul (Kim, 1975, p.36). From 1890 to 1893, over 5,500 Korean women were treated in this clinic. As well the clinic provided medical training for Korean women in order to produce future doctors and nurses in the field of gynecology (Kim, 1975, p.36).

2 The second student came to the school because of the poverty-stricken situation of her family. She came for the shelter and food. The third pupil was a young girl found by Mary Scranton's husband, Dr. Scranton, out by the city wall. The young girl and her mother were first taken to a hospital and treated by Dr. Scranton, and then she was enrolled in Mrs. Scranton's school (Kim, 1975, p.43).

3 The first school uniform for girls, worn at Ewha, appeared in 1886. According to Kyu Tae Yi, author of Modern Transformation of Korea, the uniform consisted of "a bright scarlet blouse and skirt, made of imported Russian cloth" (Yi, 1970, p.114). When the number of older students increased, it was decided that the scarlet colour was too garish for the older girls and the uniform was changed to a light blue skirt and white blouse (Yi, 1970, p.114). The school even provided the students with stockings and undergarments so that the dress code was strictly observed and so that there would be no distinction amongst the girls to indicate their social status.

4 The financing of the school was borne by the 400 members through their regular club fees and the responsibility of operating the school was divided among them (Kim, 1975, p.46).

5 Many patriotic Koreans refused to send their children to these government schools because of the enforcement of the Japanese language rules. In this way, many Korean children did not receive an education. As well in the late 1930s, as a part of the assimilation program of the Japanese colonial rulers, schools were used to obliterate Korean language by not allowing the Korean children to speak Korean and by changing the Korean names into Japanese ones.

6 Out of the 19 private colleges in 1941, 4 were women's colleges. 2 of the 4 of the women's schools were medical colleges which were established in 1928 and 1938 respectively (Kim, 1975, p.55).

7 Under the new education system, the specialized schools were upgraded to colleges where they shared an equal status with the universities (Kim, 1975, p.76).

8 In the 1950s, the number of students especially at the university level increased tremendously despite the fact that employment opportunities were not growing and the economy was stagnate (Kim, 1975, p.110). The increase of college students irrespective of job opportunities signified or represented the traditional emphasis of education in the attitudes of the Korean people.

9 In South Korea, there is an unusually high degree of out-of-school tutoring in both the middle and high school levels. Extra tutoring activities have been a product of the intense competition to get into university (particularly to one of the top three universities). However the additional burdens of providing extra lessons have been hard on the Korean parents. Extra tutoring fees have amounted to almost 10% of the parents' total income.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5

1 The idiom 'KWAN- JON- MIN- BI' meaning superiority of bureaucracy and inferiority of people still prevails in the minds of Korean people in regards to the nature and role of the state in Korean society (Chang, 1989, p.132).

2 Under Park's rule, labour unions were totally banned from striking. As well all unions were deregistered and many union activists were arrested. He also attempted to control the labour unions by creating an umbrella labour organization, Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU), under the watch of the government. All unions that wanted to exist legally had to be affiliated with the FKTU (Deyo, 1987, p.185). Up until the mid 1970s, the only activities that the 'legal' unions did were to moderate union demands, implement government policy and discipline recalcitrant locals (Deyo, 1987, p.185). The unions acted more on the behalf of the government and business management than for the labourers. The Korean Central Intelligence Agency also played a prominent role in undermining union activities (Deyo, 1987, p.189).

These anti- union tactics continued in the early 1980s under the Chun government. New legislation in 1980 banned interference by third parties in local collective bargaining; this provision "eliminated an important organizational role of the FKTU while simultaneously outlawing [the] involvement [of the] churches and other activist organizations in industrial disputes" (Deyo, 1987, p.189). Chun also dismissed or forced the resignation of union leaders who played prominent roles in the 1970s.

3 The strong boy- preference of Korean parents hindered the population control policy of the government; therefore, it had to initiate a program to promote the idea of having only two children regardless of their gender. Slogans such as 'STOP AT TWO' filled the media circuit during the 1970s.

4 The Equal Act was enacted in a hurry with "an eye to the coming presidential election in December 1987 and the general election in April 1988" (Seo, 1989, p.123). The government wanted to fulfill its campaign promises of eliminating sex discrimination in the workforce. The Equal Act was passed to fulfill this promise.

As well, since the Equal Act was 'hurried' through in its formulation and passage, there was very little input from women's groups who had no opportunity to scrutinize the act and make suggestions or reforms before the act was passed. This exclusion provoked an outcry from many women's groups who immediately tabled a tentative revision plan for the Equal Act (Seo, 1989, p.124).

APPENDIX ONE

TABLE 1.1
SECOND FIVE YEAR PLAN, 1965-1971

	1965 BASE YEAR	1971 PLANNED FIGURE	1971 REVISED PLAN	1967-1971 AVERAGE REALIZED FIGURE	1971 REVISED PLAN	1967-1971 AVERAGE REALIZED FIGURE
RATE OF GROWTH						
PRIMARY SECTOR	-0.9	5.0		3.3	5.0	4.3
SECONDARY SECTOR	231.1	10.7		16.9	10.7	20.2
TERTIARY SECTOR	9.9	6.3		8.9	6.6	10.7
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE						
AGRICULTURE	23.0	34.0	23.1	26.5		
MANUFACTURING	21.7	26.3	30.2	24.4		
AND MINING						
SOCIAL OVERHEAD	40.3	39.2	41.7	44.2		
CAPITAL AND OTHER SERVICES						
STRUCTURE OF MFG INDUSTRY						
HEAVY AND CHEMICAL INDUSTRY	27.8	33.6		39.2		
LIGHT INDUSTRY	72.2	66.4		60.8		
INVESTMENT AND SAVING						
RATE OF INVESTMENT	22.7	19.9	25.7	25.6	19.1	26.3
RATE OF DOMESTIC SAVING	6.1	14.4	18.3	14.6	11.6	16.0
FOREIGN SAVING	6.6	5.6	7.4	11.3	7.6	9.6
ALLOCATION OF INVESTMENT						
PRIMARY SECTOR	11.6				16.3	8.5
SECONDARY SECTOR	27.2				30.7	28.4
TERTIARY SECTOR	61.2				53.0	63.1
RATE OF POPULATION GROWTH	2.7	2.0		1.6	2.3	1.9
FOREIGN TRADE						
EXPORTS (US \$MILL)	175.1	550.0	1000.0	1132.2		
IMPORTS (US \$MILL)	462.0	693.6	1634.9	2179.2		

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TABLE 1.2

EMPLOYMENT BY SECTORS, 1963-1981

(UNIT: %)

YEAR	EMPLOYED POP.	PRIMARY	SECONDARY	TERTIARY
1963	100	63.1	8.0	28.2
1967	100	55.2	11.7	32.0
1971	100	47.3	13.3	37.4
1974	100	45.8	17.4	34.0
1977	100	39.9	21.6	35.8
1981	100	32.5	20.4	44.5

SOURCE: From Developing to a Newly Industrialized Country: The Republic of Korea, 1961-1982. by Tony Michell. Geneva: International Labour Organization Publications, 1988. p.34.

TABLE 1.3

TRENDS OF INDUSTRIALIZATION
(CONSTANT 1970 PRICES)

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
MANUFACTURING	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
HEAVY AND CHEMICAL INDUSTRY	38.9	37.8	35.6	38.0	40.2	39.0
CHEMICAL	8.5	8.7	8.3	7.6	7.6	7.9
COAL AND PETRO.	9.1	9.1	8.1	7.5	6.0	5.7
GLASS AND POTTERY	4.8	4.8	4.2	4.4	4.1	3.7
BASIC METAL	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.7	3.1	2.7
METALLIC PRODUCTS	1.3	1.1	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2
MACHINERY	1.5	1.2	1.2	1.4	1.2	1.1
ELECTRIC PRODUCTS	4.2	4.2	4.6	7.0	9.1	8.9
VEHICLES	5.1	4.3	3.9	4.3	6.1	5.9
LIGHT INDUSTRY	61.1	62.2	64.4	62.0	59.8	61.0
FOODS	12.8	12.4	12.3	10.3	8.9	8.7
BEVERAGES	7.7	8.0	6.9	6.3	6.1	6.1
FIBERS	14.7	14.6	16.2	15.2	13.1	13.4
SHOES AND CLOTHING	6.0	9.6	9.6	13.1	14.7	15.3
LEATHER	0.3	0.3	0.8	1.3	2.4	3.2
RUBBER PRODUCTS	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.3

SOURCE: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL CHANGE, 1980, ed. Park

no	no. of subjects	age (years)	height (cm)	weight (kg)	body mass index (kg m ⁻²)	mean (SD) heart rate (b min ⁻¹)	mean (SD) stroke volume (L min ⁻¹)	mean (SD) cardiac output (L min ⁻¹)	mean (SD) stroke volume index (L min ⁻¹ m ²)	mean (SD) cardiac output index (L min ⁻¹ m ²)
1	10	22.5 (2.5)	175.5 (10.5)	75.5 (15.5)	24.8 (3.5)	72.5 (12.5)	12.5 (2.5)	12.5 (2.5)	5.2 (0.8)	5.2 (0.8)
2	10	23.5 (2.5)	178.5 (11.5)	78.5 (16.5)	25.5 (3.5)	75.5 (13.5)	13.5 (3.0)	13.5 (3.0)	5.5 (0.9)	5.5 (0.9)
3	10	24.5 (2.5)	181.5 (12.5)	81.5 (17.5)	26.5 (3.5)	78.5 (14.5)	14.5 (3.5)	14.5 (3.5)	5.8 (1.0)	5.8 (1.0)
4	10	25.5 (2.5)	184.5 (13.5)	84.5 (18.5)	27.5 (3.5)	81.5 (15.5)	15.5 (4.0)	15.5 (4.0)	6.0 (1.1)	6.0 (1.1)
5	10	26.5 (2.5)	187.5 (14.5)	87.5 (19.5)	28.5 (3.5)	84.5 (16.5)	16.5 (4.5)	16.5 (4.5)	6.2 (1.2)	6.2 (1.2)
6	10	27.5 (2.5)	190.5 (15.5)	90.5 (20.5)	29.5 (3.5)	87.5 (17.5)	17.5 (5.0)	17.5 (5.0)	6.4 (1.3)	6.4 (1.3)
7	10	28.5 (2.5)	193.5 (16.5)	93.5 (21.5)	30.5 (3.5)	90.5 (18.5)	18.5 (5.5)	18.5 (5.5)	6.6 (1.4)	6.6 (1.4)
8	10	29.5 (2.5)	196.5 (17.5)	96.5 (22.5)	31.5 (3.5)	93.5 (19.5)	19.5 (6.0)	19.5 (6.0)	6.8 (1.5)	6.8 (1.5)
9	10	30.5 (2.5)	199.5 (18.5)	99.5 (23.5)	32.5 (3.5)	96.5 (20.5)	20.5 (6.5)	20.5 (6.5)	7.0 (1.6)	7.0 (1.6)
10	10	31.5 (2.5)	202.5 (19.5)	102.5 (24.5)	33.5 (3.5)	99.5 (21.5)	21.5 (7.0)	21.5 (7.0)	7.2 (1.7)	7.2 (1.7)
11	10	32.5 (2.5)	205.5 (20.5)	105.5 (25.5)	34.5 (3.5)	102.5 (22.5)	22.5 (7.5)	22.5 (7.5)	7.4 (1.8)	7.4 (1.8)
12	10	33.5 (2.5)	208.5 (21.5)	108.5 (26.5)	35.5 (3.5)	105.5 (23.5)	23.5 (8.0)	23.5 (8.0)	7.6 (1.9)	7.6 (1.9)
13	10	34.5 (2.5)	211.5 (22.5)	111.5 (27.5)	36.5 (3.5)	108.5 (24.5)	24.5 (8.5)	24.5 (8.5)	7.8 (2.0)	7.8 (2.0)
14	10	35.5 (2.5)	214.5 (23.5)	114.5 (28.5)	37.5 (3.5)	111.5 (25.5)	25.5 (9.0)	25.5 (9.0)	8.0 (2.1)	8.0 (2.1)
15	10	36.5 (2.5)	217.5 (24.5)	117.5 (29.5)	38.5 (3.5)	114.5 (26.5)	26.5 (9.5)	26.5 (9.5)	8.2 (2.2)	8.2 (2.2)
16	10	37.5 (2.5)	220.5 (25.5)	120.5 (30.5)	39.5 (3.5)	117.5 (27.5)	27.5 (10.0)	27.5 (10.0)	8.4 (2.3)	8.4 (2.3)
17	10	38.5 (2.5)	223.5 (26.5)	123.5 (31.5)	40.5 (3.5)	120.5 (28.5)	28.5 (10.5)	28.5 (10.5)	8.6 (2.4)	8.6 (2.4)
18	10	39.5 (2.5)	226.5 (27.5)	126.5 (32.5)	41.5 (3.5)	123.5 (29.5)	29.5 (11.0)	29.5 (11.0)	8.8 (2.5)	8.8 (2.5)
19	10	40.5 (2.5)	229.5 (28.5)	129.5 (33.5)	42.5 (3.5)	126.5 (30.5)	30.5 (11.5)	30.5 (11.5)	9.0 (2.6)	9.0 (2.6)
20	10	41.5 (2.5)	232.5 (29.5)	132.5 (34.5)	43.5 (3.5)	129.5 (31.5)	31.5 (12.0)	31.5 (12.0)	9.2 (2.7)	9.2 (2.7)
21	10	42.5 (2.5)	235.5 (30.5)	135.5 (35.5)	44.5 (3.5)	132.5 (32.5)	32.5 (12.5)	32.5 (12.5)	9.4 (2.8)	9.4 (2.8)
22	10	43.5 (2.5)	238.5 (31.5)	138.5 (36.5)	45.5 (3.5)	135.5 (33.5)	33.5 (13.0)	33.5 (13.0)	9.6 (2.9)	9.6 (2.9)
23	10	44.5 (2.5)	241.5 (32.5)	141.5 (37.5)	46.5 (3.5)	138.5 (34.5)	34.5 (13.5)	34.5 (13.5)	9.8 (3.0)	9.8 (3.0)
24	10	45.5 (2.5)	244.5 (33.5)	144.5 (38.5)	47.5 (3.5)	141.5 (35.5)	35.5 (14.0)	35.5 (14.0)	10.0 (3.1)	10.0 (3.1)
25	10	46.5 (2.5)	247.5 (34.5)	147.5 (39.5)	48.5 (3.5)	144.5 (36.5)	36.5 (14.5)	36.5 (14.5)	10.2 (3.2)	10.2 (3.2)
26	10	47.5 (2.5)	250.5 (35.5)	150.5 (40.5						

TABLE 1.4
EXPORT COMMODITY STRUCTURE

	1975		1977		1981		1977-1981 (AVERAGE GROWTH RATE)
	VALUE	STRUCT. RATIO	VALUE	STRUCT. RATIO	VALUE	STRUCT. RATIO	
TOTAL EXPORTS	5,081	100.0	7,568	100.0	13,000	100.0	16.0
PRIMARY PRODUCTS AND PROCESSED FOODS	770	15.1	840	11.1	1,130	8.7	8.4
MANUFACTURED PRODUCTS	4,311	84.9	6,728	88.9	11,870	91.3	16.9
HEAVY AND CHEMICAL PRODUCTS	1,492	29.4	3,040	40.2	6,215	47.8	24.7
(PRIMARY METAL)	367	7.2	635	8.4	1,040	8.0	18.9
(MACHINERY)	289	5.7	530	7.0	1,415	10.9	31.3
(ELECTRONICS)	409	8.0	950	12.6	1,700	13.1	22.0
(SHIPBUILDING)	138	2.7	330	4.4	910	7.0	31.4
LIGHT INDUSTRY	2,819	55.5	3,688	48.7	5,655	43.5	10.9

TABLE 1.5
THIRD FIVE YEAR PLAN, 1972-1976

	1970 BASE YEAR	1978 PLANNED FIGURE	1978 REALIZED FIGURE	1972-76 PLANNED FIGURE	1972-76 REALIZED FIGURE
RATE OF GROWTH					
GNP	9.7	8.5	15.0	8.6	10.9
PRIMARY SECTOR	2.0	4.5	7.0	4.5	5.3
SECONDARY SECTOR	17.4	12.3	26.7	13.0	120.1
TERTIARY SECTOR	10.2	8.3	11.8	8.5	8.5
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE					
AGRICULTURE	28.4	22.4	23.9		
MINING AND MANUFACTURING SERVICES	21.7	27.9	31.9		
	49.9	49.7	44.2		
STRUCTURE OF MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY					
HEAVY AND CHEMICAL INDUSTRY	35.9	40.5	40.2		
LIGHT INDUSTRY	64.1	59.5	59.8		
INVESTMENT AND SAVING					
RATE OF INVESTMENT	26.1	24.9	27.7	24.9	27.0
RATE OF DOMESTIC SAVING	16.9	21.5	21.0	19.5	17.8
FOREIGN SAVING	9.2	3.4	6.7	5.4	
ALLOCATION OF INVESTMENT					
PRIMARY SECTOR				13.6	9.3
SECONDARY SECTOR				27.5	32.0
TERTIARY SECTOR				58.9	58.7
FOREIGN TRADE					
RATE OF POP. GROWTH	1.8	1.5	1.69	1.52	1.7
EXPORTS (US \$MILL)	882	3,510	7,560		
IMPORTS (US \$MILL)	1,982	3,893	8,155		

TABLE 1.6
FOURTH FIVE YEAR PLAN, 1977-1981

	1975 BASE YEAR	1981	1971-81 AVERAGE
RATE OF GROWTH			
GNP	8.3	9.0	9.2
PRIMARY SECTOR	7.1	4.0	4.0
SECONDARY SECTOR	12.9	12.8	14.2
TERTIARY SECTOR	5.8	7.7	7.6
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE			
AGRICULTURE	25.4	18.5	
MINING AND MANUFACTURING SERVICES	29.7	40.9	
	44.9	40.6	
STRUCTURE OF MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY			
HEAVY AND CHEMICAL INDUSTRY	42.4	49.5	
LIGHT INDUSTRY	57.6	50.5	
INVESTMENT AND SAVING			
RATE OF INVESTMENT	27.3	26.0	26.2
RATE OF DOMESTIC SAVING	18.0	26.1	24.2
FOREIGN SAVING	11.3	-0.1	2.0
ALLOCATION OF INVESTMENT			
PRIMARY SECTOR			8.6
SECONDARY SECTOR			34.1
TERTIARY SECTOR			36.7
RATE OF POPULATION GROWTH			0.6
FOREIGN TRADE			
EXPORTS (US \$MILL)	2,847	14,165	
IMPORTS (US \$MILL)	3,870	13,826	

APPENDIX TWO

TABLE 2.1

ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION; ACTIVITY BY SEX (1960-1989)

(UNIT: %)

YEAR	MALE	FEMALE	FEMALE % OF TOTAL LABOUR FORCE
1960	71.3	29.4	28.5
1966	74.7	33.3	30.9
1970	76.7	40.4	34.8
1975	78.1	49.2	38.6
1981	73.1	44.7	37.4
1985	68.9	44.1	38.4
1989	75.4	49.3	40.2

TABLE 2.2

UNEMPLOYMENT RATE BY SEX

(UNIT: %)

YEAR	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL UNEMPLOY- MENT RATE
1963	5.6%	2.5	8.1
1970	1.7	0.5	2.2
1980	3.9	1.3	5.2
1985	2.2	0.5	2.7
1989	1.8	0.7	2.5

SOURCE: Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 1962-1990. by International Labour Organization. Geneva: ILO Publications.

TABLE 2.3

DISTRIBUTION OF FEMALE WORKERS BY SECTOR, 1963-1989

(UNIT: %)

SECTOR	1963	1966	1970	1976	1980	1985	1989
PRIMARY	68.7	58.3	58.9	48.6	37.5	27.1	21.3
SECONDARY	7.0	12.2	14.5	21.0	21.7	25.8	28.5
TERTIARY	24.3	29.5	26.6	30.4	40.8	49.1	50.2
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

SOURCE: Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 1965-1990. by International Labour Organization. Geneva: ILO Publications.

TABLE 2.4

EMPLOYMENT BY SEX AND OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY, 1955-1988

(IN THOUSAND PERSONS)

OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY	M	1955 F	F % OF TOTAL	M	1970 F	F % OF TOTAL
PROF & TECHN	116	18.5	13.8%	249.1	73.7	22.8%
ADMIN & MANAG	60	1.9	3.0%	92.4	3.4	3.5%
CLERICAL	197.8	11.2	5.4%	492.8	100.6	17.0%
SALES	260	106.3	29.0%	684.4	343.7	33.4%
SERVICE	88.8	82.9	48.3%	293.2	385.4	56.8%
PRODUCTION	544.9	83	13.2%	1,671.5	526.3	23.9%
AGRICULT	3,521.7	2,914.3	45.3%	3,013.3	2,134.7	41.5%
TOTAL	4,853.3	3,219.7	39.9%	6,752.6	3,624.9	34.9%

OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY	M	1980 F	F % OF TOTAL	M	1989 F	F % OF TOTAL
PROF & TECHN	372	176	32.1%	670	415	38.2%
ADMIN & MANAG	173	9	5.0%	236	11	4.0%
CLERICAL	852	415	32.8%	1,331	849	38.9%
SALES	1,116	867	43.7%	1,357	1,211	47.2%
SERVICE	454	630	58.1%	728	1,154	61.3%
PRODUCTION	2,883	1,106	27.7%	4,170	1,876	31.0%
AGRICULT	2,612	2,040	43.9%	1,852	1,536	45.3%
TOTAL	9,020	5,434	37.6%	10,344	7,052	40.4%

SOURCE: Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 1962-1990. by International Labour Organization. Geneva: ILO Publications.

APPENDIX THREE

TABLE 4.1: THE NEW SCHOOL SYSTEM IN REPUBLIC OF KOREA

The Economic and Social Modernization of Korea. by Mason, Kim, Perkin, et. al., 1980, p.347.

TABLE 4.2
DISTRIBUTION OF SCHOOLS BY SEX, 1975

LEVEL	MALE	FEMALE	COED
PRIMARY	0	0	6,367
MIDDLE	505	398	1,064
HIGH	267	227	179
COLLEGE & UNIVERSITY	1	13	58

SOURCE: Education and Development in Korea. by Noel F. McGinn, Donald R. Snodgrass, et. al. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980. p.9

TABLE 4.3
INCREASE IN SCHOOL ENROLLMENT BY LEVEL, 1945-1989

(1945 = 100)

LEVEL	1945	1955	1965	1975
PRIMARY	1,366,024 (100)	2,947,436 (216)	4,941,345 (362)	5,599,074 (410)
MIDDLE	-- (100)	475,342 (163)	751,341 (258)	2,066,823 (709)
HIGH	50,343 (100)	141,702 (281)	254,095 (626)	648,149 (1,287)
TERTIARY	7,819 (100)	80,391 (1,028)	193,591 (2,476)	296,640 (3,794)

LEVEL	1983	1986	1989
PRIMARY	5,590,000 (410)	--	--
MIDDLE & HIGH	4,410,000 (1,290)	4,864,045 (1,422)	4,545,896 (1,329)
TERTIARY	734,900 (9,399)	1,514,784 (19,373)	1,573,369 (20,122)

SOURCE: Education and Development in Korea. by Noel F. McGinn, Donald R. Snodgrass, et. al. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980. p.5 AND Statistical Yearbook 1989. by UNESCO. Paris: UNESCO Publications, 1989.

TABLE 4.4

GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE ON EDUCATION, 1948-1988

YEAR	GOV'T BUDGET (MILLION WON)	MOE BUDGET (MILLION WON)	EDUCATION % OF GOV'T BUDGET
1948	19.5	1.7	8.7%
1955-56	2,8143.9	2,663.3	9.5%
1959	40,002.4	5,986.4	15.0%
1965	94,652.3	15,331.2	16.2%
1969	370,882.3	59,579.5	16.1%
1975	1,291,957.4	206,987.9	16.0%

SOURCE: Education and Development in Korea. by Noel F. McGinn, Donald R. Snodgrass, et. al. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980. p.46.

YEAR	GOV'T BUDGET (US \$ MILLION)	MOE BUDGET	EDUCATION % OF GOV'T BUDGET
1979	7,600.0	--	15.0%
1985	13,937.0	--	20.0%
1988	24,670.0	--	20.1%

SOURCE: Statistical Yearbook 1989. by UNESCO. Paris: UNESCO Publications, 1989.

TABLE 4.5: EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES PAID BY STUDENTS

(MILLION WON)

	1966	1969
A) In-school expenditures	19,208	39,242
Rents, Fees	10,587	22,402
Others	8,621	16,840
B) Out-of school expenditures	45,142	76,580
C) Expenditures Paid by Students (A+B)	64,350	115,822
D) Total Educational Expenditures	90,789	184,288
E) C/D (%)	70.9	62.8
	1972	1975
A) In-school expenditures	102,611	174,833
Rents, Fees	57,497	100,191
Others	45,114	74,642
B) Out-of school expenditures	138,063	283,472
C) Expenditures Paid by Students (A+B)	240,674	458,305
D) Total Educational Expenditures	372,692	692,992
E) C/D (%)	64.6	66.1

THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL MODERNIZATION OF KOREA. by Mason, Kim, Perkins, et al., 1980, p.267

TABLE 4.6: GOALS OF WOMEN'S SCHOOLS - TWENTY CHOICES

- 1) Prepare for Married Life
- 2) Train to be Socially Useful
- 3) Teach to be Ethical
- 4) Understand World Trends and Problems
- 5) Provide Education Suitable to characteristics of Women
- 6) Produce Scientifically Minded Students
- 7) Train in the Spirit of Korean National Heritage
- 8) Provide a Good Program of Extra-Curricular Activities for Women Students
- 9) Provide Leadership in Various Fields of Specialization
- 10) Teach Students to be Physically Healthy
- 11) Provide Further Education for Women through Extension Programs
- 12) Teach Research Techniques
- 13) Produce Students who are Capable to use Knowledge for Social Reform
- 14) Assist Students to Develop Language Skills (Foreign Language)
- 15) Ensure the Understanding of the Ideas of Great Thinkers
- 16) Teach Women Science and Technology
- 17) Maintain Quality Education in order to Exceed Men
- 18) Provide Leadership in Women's Equality Movement
- 19) Develop Inner Character of Students so they become religiously minded
- 20) Prepare Students for Jobs

THESE TWENTY GOALS ARE PRESENTED IN RANDOM ORDER

TABLE 4.7

COLLEGE ENROLLMENT BY SEX AND FIELD OF STUDY, 1965-1988

FIELD OF STUDY	M	1965 F	TOTAL	M	1974 F	TOTAL
EDUCATION	2,561 (49.7)	2,636 (50.7)	5,197 (100)	5,496 (48.6)	5,782 (51.4)	11,251 (100)
HUMANITIES	2,180 (52.0)	2,014 (48.0)	4,194 (100)	2,736 (59.5)	1,863 (40.5)	4,599 (100)
APPLIED & FINE ARTS	386 (24.2)	1,211 (75.8)	1,597 (100)	497 (19.4)	2,060 (80.6)	2,557 (100)
LAW	1,945 (96.9)	63 (3.1)	2,008 (100)	--	--	--
SOCIAL SCI	6,913 (83.1)	1,406 (16.9)	8,319 (100)	6,510 (84.6)	1,181 (15.4)	7,691 (100)
NATURAL SCI	880 (31.4)	1,922 (68.6)	2,802 (100)	1,393 (39.6)	2,215 (60.4)	3,518 (100)
MEDICAL SCI	1,595 (53.2)	1,402 (46.8)	2,997 (100)	2,283 (40.2)	3,400 (59.8)	5,683 (100)
ENGINEER	5,023 (96.7)	192 (3.7)	5,215 (100)	12,758 (95.0)	671 (5.0)	13,429 (100)
AGRICULTURE	2,627 (92.1)	225 (7.9)	2,852 (100)	4,579 (94.1)	288 (5.9)	4,867 (100)
TOTAL	24,110 (68.5)	11,071 (31.5)	35,181 (100)	38,889 (67.4)	18,793 (32.6)	57,682 (100)

SOURCE: Statistical Yearbook, 1969-1990. by UNESCO. Paris: UNESCO Publications.

FIELD OF STUDY	M	1983 F	TOTAL	M	1988 F	TOTAL
EDUCATION	7,704 (36.8)	13,235 (63.2)	20,939 (100)	58,368 (41.0)	83,997 (59.0)	142,365 (100)
HUMANITIES	6,203 (56.0)	4,874 (44.0)	11,077 (100)	116,138 (53.6)	100,696 (46.4)	216,834 (100)
APPLIED & FINE ARTS	2,368 (21.4)	8,681 (78.6)	11,049 (100)	27,356 (36.4)	47,763 (63.6)	75,119 (100)
LAW	2,029 (94.9)	109 (5.1)	2,138 (100)	44,483 (89.1)	5,436 (10.9)	49,919 (100)
SOCIAL SCI	6,641 (78.9)	1,780 (21.1)	8,421 (100)	67,461 (75.1)	22,339 (24.9)	89,800 (100)
BUS. ADMIN	12,043 (77.7)	3,459 (22.3)	15,502 (100)	208,933 (84.4)	38,715 (15.6)	247,648 (100)
MASS COMMUN	412 (29.7)	974 (70.3)	1,386 (100)	6,345 (46.8)	7,203 (53.2)	13,548 (100)
HOME ECON	350 (7.4)	4,356 (92.6)	4,706 (100)	2,512 (5.6)	42,512 (94.4)	45,024 (100)
SERV TRADE	75 (90.4)	8 (9.6)	83 (100)	12,810 (62.5)	7,689 (37.5)	20,499 (100)
NATURAL SCI	2,688 (44.1)	3,405 (55.9)	6,093 (100)	42,668 (72.0)	16,564 (28.0)	59,232 (100)
MATH & COMPUTER	949 (58.7)	667 (41.3)	1,616 (100)	56,576 (73.0)	20,899 (27.0)	77,475 (100)
MEDICAL SCI	6,227 (47.7)	6,815 (52.3)	13,042 (100)	40,460 (49.8)	40,852 (50.2)	81,312 (100)
ENGINEERING	54,698 (96.0)	2,265 (4.0)	56,963 (100)	218,408 (97.1)	6,575 (2.9)	224,983 (100)
ARCHITECT	344 (86.2)	55 (13.8)	399 (100)	36,408 (92.4)	2,980 (7.6)	39,388 (100)
TRADE	3,509 (85.6)	591 (14.4)	4,100 (100)	24,599 (97.5)	633 (2.5)	25,232 (100)
TRANSPORT	1,557 (85.5)	265 (14.5)	1,822 (100)	6,562 (85.0)	1,155 (15.0)	7,717 (100)
AGRICULT	9,105 (84.9)	1,617 (15.1)	10,722 (100)	79,196 (84.0)	15,115 (16.0)	94,311 (100)
OTHERS	1,297 (69.4)	571 (30.6)	1,868 (100)	12,219 (66.6)	6,119 (33.4)	18,338 (100)
TOTAL	118,199 (68.7)	53,727 (31.3)	171,926 (100)	106,002 (69.4)	467,242 (30.6)	1,529,244 (100)

SOURCE: Statistical Yearbook, 1969-1990. by UNESCO. Paris: UNESCO Publications.

APPENDIX FOUR

TABLE 5.1: GENERAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES BY GRADE AND SEX IN 1983

GRADE	WOMEN	FEMALE (%)	MEN	MALE (%)	TOTAL
1			38		
2	1	0.4	245	99.6	246
3	3	0.8	387	99.2	390
4	31	1.0	3,089	99.0	3,120
5	142	1.1	12,693	98.9	12,835
6	738	1.7	41,581	98.3	42,319
7	2,670	6.7	37,332	93.3	40,002
8	6,967	16.2	36,136	83.8	43,103
9	9,279	21.2	34,518	78.8	43,797
TOTAL	19,831	10.7	166,019	89.3	185,850

SOURCE: Pil Wha Chang. Women and Work: A Case Study of a Small Town in the Republic of Korea. PhD Dissertation. Department of Development Studies. England: University of Sussex, 1989.

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