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**THE NEW POLITICAL SCALES OF CITIZENSHIP IN A GLOBAL ERA:
THE POLITICS OF HYDROELECTRIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE JAMES BAY REGION**

Jean Rousseau
Department of Political Science
Carleton University
Ottawa

September 2000

**A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfilment of the
requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy**

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acceptance of the thesis,

**THE NEW POLITICAL SCALES OF CITIZENSHIP IN A GLOBAL ERA:
THE POLITICS OF HYDROELECTRIC DEVELOPMENT
IN THE JAMES BAY REGION**

submitted by

Jean Rousseau, B.A., M.A.

in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Chair, Department of Political Science

Thesis Supervisor

External Examiner

Carleton University
August 17, 2000

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Abstract

In this dissertation, I examine the current reconfiguration of citizenship in Western societies in a period marked by the expansion of globalisation. Specifically, I focus on the spatial implications of globalisation via a comparative analysis of the politics of hydroelectric development in the James Bay region of Québec, Canada. I discuss the struggles surrounding its two main phases: the construction of the La Grande complex (1970-1975) and the aborted launching of the Great Whale project (1988-1994). I pay close attention to the mobilisation of the Cree people and ecology groups who launched successive campaigns to prevent the construction of both projects, reflecting what I depict as process of jumping scales. Whereas their campaigns were unsuccessful during the first phase, they became much more potent during the second phase. This transition reveals an important remapping of citizenship politics through which its national and territorial scales are being unbundled and no longer exclusively restricted to national state borders. As a result, citizenship politics becomes embedded in various locales - from the local to the emerging global. Each represents a political scene in which citizens can make claims and participate in debates around the recognition of their rights.

This dissertation would contribute to the debates on citizenship and globalisation. It suggests that globalisation not only imposes new constraints on citizenship policies from above, but also creates new spaces in which citizenship is reframed or rather, rescaled. This dissertation also provides insights into the implications of globalisation. It illustrates how the globalisation of politics results from non-state actors, reflecting what is called "globalisation from below". This reveals contradictory forms of globalisation and implicitly, different political projects.

Résumé

Cette étude traite des récentes transformations de la citoyenneté au sein des sociétés occidentales. Nous cherchons à démontrer comment cette reconfiguration de la citoyenneté est influencée par la globalisation de la politique occidentale. Cette discussion repose sur une analyse comparative des luttes politiques autour du développement hydroélectrique de la région de la Baie James dans le Nord du Québec qui sont survenues lors de ses deux principales phases : la construction du complexe La Grande (1970-1974) et le lancement du projet Grande Baleine (1988-1994). Ces luttes ont opposé les Cris la Baie James et des groupes écologistes au gouvernement du Québec et à Hydro-Québec qui en étaient les promoteurs. Alors que la mobilisation des Cris et des écologistes fut en quelque sorte veine lors de la première phase, elle s'est avérée beaucoup plus déterminante durant la deuxième phase, contribuant ainsi au report du projet Grande Baleine. Notre analyse vise à montrer que ce changement indique une importante redéfinition des espaces politiques de la citoyenneté qui ne se limitent plus exclusivement aux frontières des États. Il en résulte un décloisonnement de ses dimensions nationales et territoriales qui ne peuvent être discutées comme étant nécessairement imbriquées l'une dans l'autre. Cela signifie que la citoyenneté s'articule autour d'espaces différenciés parmi lesquels un nouvel espace politique global occupe une place de plus en plus importante. Quoique les frontières nationales des États continuent à jouer un rôle important, d'autres échelles doivent être prises dorénavant en considération pour saisir la dynamique politique structurant la citoyenneté.

Cette thèse devrait permettre de jeter un nouvel éclairage sur les rapports entre la citoyenneté et la globalisation. Ainsi, il apparaît que la globalisation du politique impose non seulement de nouvelles contraintes au niveau national, mais aussi ouvre un nouvel espace politique au sein duquel la citoyenneté se redéfinit. Une autre contribution est de proposer une lecture politique de la globalisation en privilégiant le rôle joué par des acteurs non-étatiques. Cela laisse entrevoir l'existence de différents processus de globalisation. Elle montre que cette dernière ne se réduit pas à la formation d'un marché mondial. Une dernière contribution est de

faire ressortir les récents changements spatiaux de la politique québécoise depuis les années 1980.

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THE NEW POLITICAL SCALES OF CITIZENSHIP IN A GLOBAL ERA: THE POLITICS OF HYDRO-ELECTRIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE JAMES BAY REGION

The substantive focus of this dissertation is the politics of hydro-electric development in the James Bay area of Quebec. It involves a comparison of the politics surrounding the two phases – the construction of La Grande in the 1960s and 1970s and the abandonment of the planned Great Whale project in the late 1980s/early 1990s. These struggles, and the way they played out, are of broader interest for what they tell us about the reconfiguration of citizenship in a period marked by deepening globalisation. It is the dimensions and dynamics associated with this reconfiguration which constitute the dissertation's theoretical focus.

Citizenship has reemerged as an important concept over the two last decades.¹ The renewed interest has occurred precisely at the moment when the citizenship configuration that had characterised the postwar period had begun to erode. While women's groups, environmentalists, anti-poverty activists and others sought to expand its implications, neo-liberal projects sought to narrow it, redefining who are entitled to citizenship rights and the scope of their entitlements. A particularly important dimension of these debates, which will constitute the focus of this dissertation, involves the redefinition of the political and institutional boundaries of citizenship politics. Whereas the boundaries of citizenship politics previously coincided with the *national* borders of the Keynesian state, this territorial focus can no longer be taken for granted. A remapping of Western citizenship is thus occurring and the redrawing of its political and spatial contours has become a crucial political issue. In other words, what is at stake is not only the definition of the citizen's identity or citizen's entitlements, but also the citizen's location in political space, from which they make their claims to participate in political debates.

This dissertation will explore the remapping of citizenship politics in Western societies by looking at the impact of the globalisation of politics as this is exemplified by the politics of James Bay hydro development.² It will be argued that the current reconfiguration of citizenship implies its territorial "unbundling", opening the door to its "rescaling" in multiple political loci. These terms – unbundling and

rescaling – require some elaboration. Unbundling involves not only the redrawing of the various citizenship spaces within the state borders, but also on the redefinition of the role of the state's territorial frontiers in the structuring of citizenship politics. The borders of national states had come to be defined and legitimated as marking the exclusive space for claiming and exerting citizenship entitlements and it is this framework that is being seriously undermined by the globalisation of politics. This spatial reconfiguration of citizenship is opening the door to a rearticulation of the territorial and national dimensions of citizenship politics. The articulation of citizenship politics around the established division of political space (local, regional, national, and international or transnational) in which the national has been a privileged site, is increasingly called into question. The rescaling of citizenship politics thus involves new sites, located across and outside national state borders. The politicisation of these new locales reveals the emergence of a new spatial hierarchy of multiple nested loci of citizenship spaces, from the local to the emerging global. This does not mean that the national space is no longer relevant and replaced by a global space, but that it is being “decentered”.

This dissertation analyses the debates and struggles around the hydroelectric development of the James Bay area as an example of the rescaling of citizenship politics. We will compare two historical moments in this development: the construction of the La Grande complex and the abortion of the Great Whale project. The debates, which brought the Cree and ecology groups into conflict with the Québec government and Hydro-Québec, had important implications in terms of citizenship politics. The redrawing of the frontiers of Québec and Canadian citizenship became a core issue through the struggles of the Cree and the environmentalists for the right to participate in decisions affecting that territory. Whereas the Cree struggles aimed at the recognition of their aboriginal rights and the protection of their national homeland, the ecology struggles were based on the protection of the James Bay ecosystem against eventual local, national and global environmental problems. Both called into question the state definition and the national delimitation of the James Bay territory. Their struggles involved the recognition of new citizenship spaces within and outside Québec territory which revealed the growing porosity of the Québec and Canadian borders. The politics of James Bay not only indicate how the delimitation of political space has become a strategic issue but also the changing relation of national space with other political spaces. The conflict between Québec and Aboriginal nationalisms that was so central to the controversies around the Great

Whale project highlights the changing spatiality of the national. Lastly, their struggles illustrate the political implications of globalisation.

The following pages review the main challenges to citizenship politics in Western societies since the 1970s. We will see how these challenges involve a spatial reconfiguration of citizenship through which the interrelations between the various citizenship spaces are redefined. The main concepts employed to produce the thesis will be introduced. The second section draws out the spatial implications of globalisation of politics, focussing on the process of "rescaling". In doing so, we discuss the redefinition of the national and territorial dimensions of citizenship politics occurring in a global context. The last section of this introduction provides an overview of the James Bay controversies, presenting the main actors and issues involved in these struggles. In doing so, we will explain why the comparison the struggles during the two phases provides important insights into the remapping of citizenship politics.

1 The New Geography of Citizenship

The recent debates around citizenship in Western politics suggest that major changes are taking place. New interpretations and concepts are required to come to grips with the political implications of these changes. "Globalisation" too calls for new thinking. Although globalisation is widely invoked, its political dimensions remain unclear. Too often it is reduced to the formation of a global market and the restrictions this places on state sovereignty. This dissertation aims at developing a more appropriate theoretical framework. The emphasis on the spatial implications of the reconfiguration of citizenship allows us to go beyond a statist framework to "decenter" the national. Without denying the continued importance of the national, it is important simultaneously to look at other political sites that have gained a new importance over the last decade. The global constitutes an important site and one which will be highlighted in this dissertation. Rejecting the view that globalisation is an "external" force imposing new constraints upon national citizenship policies, the thesis will argue that it represents a new space for citizenship politics. It is still too soon to affirm that a global citizenship is being constituted which supersedes national citizenship. Rather globalisation is adding a new political scale to the existing spatial division of citizenship politics at the same time as it redefines the role of the national space. From this perspective, globalisation appears as a set of open-ended and hybrid processes which are becoming increasingly part of citizenship

politics. It is shaped by political struggles occurring at other scales as well as those which are explicitly cast as global in scope. This opens the door to the consolidation of a global political space.

During the 1970s, the significance and implications of citizenship in Western societies became subject to renewed interest and debate³, as the extension of citizenship rights in the postwar period associated with the development of the welfare state was called into question. From that moment, some significant, and at the same time, contradictory changes in citizenship politics occurred which indicated that the postwar configuration was in jeopardy. This configuration rested on three main categories of citizenship rights: civil rights, political rights, and social and economic rights⁴. Each of these created specific spheres of activities through which citizens could get access to the public sphere. Common to all of these was the fact that access to citizenship rights was the nationality granted by the state and linked to residence within its territorial boundaries. State borders imposed frontiers on citizenship, circumscribing a territorial, homogeneous and sovereign political community. Although this did not prevent the constitution of different categories of citizens⁵, national identity has remained the core political identity structuring citizenship politics. During the 1970s, the coherence of this configuration began to weaken as some of its components were contested. No longer simply seen as a legal status, citizenship was recognised as a contested issue, one with important political implications.

The first signs of the disruption of the postwar configuration of citizenship occurred with the mobilisation of contemporary social movements such as the women's movement, the ecology movement, the gay and lesbian movement, and the Indigenous peoples' movement. The empowerment of these new political actors brought about a major redefinition of Western identity politics, while opening new spaces for political participation. These struggles politicised new representations of citizen, and resulted in the recognition of new loci from which citizenship rights can be claimed and implemented. The politicisation of new citizenship claims involved demands for an extension of social and economic rights, or the publicising of new citizenship rights as they appeared with the ecology movement or the Indigenous peoples' movement. In this context, citizenship politics became increasingly shaped by the politics of difference, calling for the rethinking of fundamental citizenship values like equity and solidarity. Another important impact of the contemporary social movements on citizenship politics was the reinforcement of transnational

links between the various national movements⁶. Although connections among national movements had existed before, in this period they were substantially strengthened. This opened new political sites for mobilisation of support beyond national boundaries. Recourse to transnational mobilisation also indicated a clear attempt, on the part of these movements, to redefine the relation with their states.

The extension of citizenship rights fostered by the contemporary social movements has, however, been checked by the spreading of the New Right's discourse and the adoption of neo-liberal policies by most Western governments. In contrast to the contemporary social movements, neo-liberalism and the New Right have worked to tighten and reduce the criteria of accessibility to citizenship. This is visible in the modifications brought, for example, to social policies or immigration policies, which decreased access to citizenship rights for some groups. This opened the door to the constitution of different categories of citizens, among whom some do not have full access to citizenship rights nor the ability to exert them.

Over the last decade, it has become clear that the current remapping of citizenship politics has broader political implications than the recognition of new citizenship entitlements or the shrinkage of citizenship rights. The reconfiguration of postwar citizenship also has important spatial implications. This "remapping" includes its national and territorial dimensions which have been institutionalised through the nation-state framework as coterminous. Various political changes have challenged the existing equation between the state borders, the national scale, and the frontiers of citizenship as such. These include the recognition of global environmental problems, the constitution of some extraterritorial modes of governance such as the EC, the signature of free trade agreements, the debates around UN humanitarian interventions, the erosion of state sovereignty, the resurgence of nationalist movements which have relaunched debates about self-determination, etc. The reference to economic globalisation in the neo-liberal discourse as a critical constraint justifying the public cutbacks and deregulation also involves a remapping of national citizenship. All of these developments indicate that the spatial bases of citizenship politics are being challenged at different scales - from above the state borders and from below. Two overlapping trends can be drawn from these political changes: 1) a (re)politicisation of the national dimension of citizenship through which the state's delimitation of the national is called into question; 2) a reterritorialisation of citizenship politics which brings about a redefinition of the role of state territory and the

recognition of other political spaces. These changes suggest that the national dimension of citizenship politics is being redefined on new spatial grounds. It can no longer be merely assumed that it is coterminous with the state territory. As this dissertation will show, the struggles of the contemporary ecology and the world indigenous peoples movements are delimiting other scales, which have a different territorial base.

This study will explore this reconfiguration of postwar citizenship by focussing on the redefinition of its spatial framework associated with the rescaling of citizenship politics. Even if the nation-state retains a certain importance, it no longer constitutes the decisive setting for citizenship politics. This representation of the territorial map as a neutral framework for locating the political actors and issues⁷ is no longer adequate. The politicisation of new citizenship spaces across and outside state borders calls into question the exclusiveness of the territorial division of the political space, and at the same time, the primacy of the national state. The transformation of the national and territorial dimensions of citizenship politics also involves the consolidation of other political locales. This reveals a rather complex portrait of citizenship politics including different but overlapping scales, which needs to be clarified. It is important to understand how this remapping is taking place and where it may be leading.

Some authors have argued that globalisation constitutes a new political horizon of citizenship which opens the door to a major rearticulation of its spatial bases.⁸ Indeed, the issues previously mentioned suggest that the current reconfiguration of citizenship is also being shaped by global changes. Thus, the impact of neo-liberalism on citizenship is very much connected to the economic restructuring brought by globalisation. For the most part, however, the impact of the globalisation of politics on citizenship remains largely unspecified. This study aims to help to fill this gap by looking at globalisation as having opened a new political space in which citizenship politics are increasingly embedded. The latter calls into question the existing nested hierarchy of political spaces which revolved around the national territory. Globalisation thus involves territorial and national unbundling of citizenship politics. We will seek to specify how the rescaling of citizenship politics has been shaped by the deepening of globalisation while contributing in return to the broadening of global politics. A key concept here is what some have called a

process of “jumping scales” launched at the national level by which citizenship issues and struggles have been recast at the global level⁹.

2 The Impact of Globalisation: A New Spatio-Temporal Framework

Globalisation is generally seen as a major change that has greatly broadened and deepened the restructuring of Western politics since the 1970s.¹⁰ It has been associated with economic and/or cultural processes questioning the regulative and integrative capabilities of nation-states and constraining them to redefine their spheres of activities. From this standpoint, globalisation appears to imply the transformation of the world into an interdependent and interconnected place which would link all the different societies. It is usually presented as a new phase or a turning point in world history involving a break from the modern period. At the same time, there exists a lot of scepticism about the real impact of globalisation on Western politics.¹¹ States are still seen as the main actors having the required political authority to impose order. It is argued that globalisation is used indistinctly to explain too many different things such as the deregulation of financial markets, the development of narcotics traffic or the increase of the flows of migrant workers. The avenue that we will explore for discussing the implications of globalisation for citizenship politics is to look at its political dimension.

The political consequences of globalisation are often discussed in terms of changes in state politics and societies. Political changes introduced by globalisation that occur outside and beyond national territories have thus far received less attention.¹² Globalisation is thus quite often seen as intrinsically economic and cultural issue. This tendency was reinforced by the wide-spread perception of globalisation as an homogenous and unidirectional processes affecting all societies which would eventually lead to the formation of a world society and governance similar to the national societies.¹³ Insofar as this scenario is still hardly observable, it tends, of course, to relegate politics in the backward of globalisation.

One avenue for tackling the political implications of globalisation is to discuss it in spatial terms. It is also on this basis that we can come to grips with its impact on citizenship politics. As noted earlier, a critical change introduced by the deepening of globalisation is the remapping of Western politics through a dialectical process of deterritorialisation versus reterritorialisation of social relations and/or state politics

across and beyond state borders. This contributes to the disembedding and the unbundling of state territory which has been imagined and structured as the determining political scene. Globalisation implies a rescaling of the spatial division of politics (local, regional, national, international) while calling into question the primacy and exclusiveness of state territory.¹⁴ Other political spaces gain an importance and become locales structuring social and power relations. This involves not only the constitution of a global space without a delimited territorial basis, but also to the "rediscovery" of the local which increasingly appears as a site of resistance for many social movements. It is in taking into account these spatial shifts that we can discuss the globalisation of politics and not only the impact of globalisation on territorial politics.

To grasp the impact of globalisation on the current reconfiguration of citizenship politics raises a two-fold challenge. It requires us to pay attention to the increasing importance of non-statist and non-territorialised politics across and beyond state borders, revealing the "decentring" of the national political scene. This, in turn, necessitates a reappraisal of the existing division of political space and a revision of our conceptual and political maps. It requires a shift from a politics of place to a politics of scale. Instead of using the notion of territorial boundary to delimit space, it is more promising to use the notion of scale for dealing with spatial changes. This provides the opportunity to tackle the various representations of space which are raised by globalisation: areal (territory), networks, flux or flows.¹⁵ All of these involve political scales around particular spaces which may fit with notions of specific bounded territory. To understand the reconfiguration of postwar citizenship in terms of scale politics allows us to come into terms with the multiple political loci shaping contemporary citizenship.

In summary, this dissertation will discuss the impact of globalisation on the reconfiguration of post war citizenship in Western societies. We will examine the emerging configuration of citizenship resulting from the rearticulation of the national and territorial scales of citizenship politics around global politics. Their disentangling is brought in by the processes of jumping scales launched through globalisation, revealing the deterritorialisation/reterritorialisation of citizenship politics. One important consequence of this process that we will be examined in this study is the unbundling of state territory through the development of other citizenship spaces located out of the national state's borders, notably at the global level. This thus

suggests the development of a political framework resting on the overlapping of different citizenship spaces, including some which are not territorially based and global.

3 The Politics of the James Bay Development

This dissertation will be not limited to theoretical discussions of the reconfiguration of citizenship politics. The theoretical issues previously outlined will be elaborated through an empirical analysis of the hydro-electric development of the James Bay region in Northern Québec. This development has been marked by two crucial moments. The first was the construction of a mega hydro-electric complex (the La Grande complex built on the La Grande River) at the beginnings of the 1970s. The second moment occurred at the end of the 1980s when the Québec government unsuccessfully attempted to launch a new mega hydro-electric complex called the Great Whale project (located on the Great Whale river). They were quite often respectively called the James Bay I and the James Bay II. Although the relevance of this case-study may appear a priori doubtful, due to the primacy of economic and energy issues, it nevertheless constitutes a very interesting case. It involved three main actors linked to secondary actors which became part of the debates¹⁶: 1) the Québec government and Hydro-Québec, and indirectly, the Québec nationalist movement; 2) the Cree people, and indirectly, the Canadian Aboriginal nationalist movement and the World Indigenous Peoples movement and; 3) the ecology and environmentalist groups, including the Québec, Canadian and the global ecology movements. By looking at their transformations over the two phases, we will be able to shed light on the changes of their agendas and repertoires of action and, at the same time, on the political context framing their debates. The two phases will be discussed via a diachronic comparison. In doing so, we will examine how the controversies and debates around the Great Whale project reveal a transformation of the scale politics of citizenship, indicating the globalisation of politics.

The debates around the James Bay hydroelectric development help to illustrate the remapping of Québec and Canadian citizenship. Indeed, the struggles against the two projects reveal an important redrawing of the diverse scales of citizenship configurations over that period. This rests on two main changes: 1) the recognition of new citizenship claims raised by the ecology groups and Aboriginal peoples and implicitly, the recognition of new political identities through which they gained access to the public

sphere on new grounds; 2) the opening of new citizenship spaces at the margins of the Québec and Canadian political scenes, which illuminates the disjunction between the frontiers of citizenship and state borders. This process of rescaling launched by the Crees and ecology groups occurred in the aftermath of a process of jumping scales launched by the Québec nationalist movement during the Quiet revolution. One of its achievements was the redefinition of the Québec political scene from a provincial to a national scene, delimited by Québec borders. This helped to transform the James Bay hydroelectric development into a national stake while throwing light on the variability of the Québec political frontiers.

The transformation of the James Bay region into a political scene created room for the ecology movement and the Cree people who thereafter succeeded in being recognised by both governments. It allowed them subsequently to broaden their participation on the Québec and Canadian scenes and even to get access to the international political scene. Although the Cree people and the ecology movement were allied, their citizenship struggles do not, however, have the same implications. Each called for the reconfiguration of Québec and Canadian citizenship in particular ways. The Cree mobilisation aimed at the recognition of aboriginal rights and the protection of their traditional homeland. Over the years, their right to national self-determination came to constitute a priority, revealing the redefinition the James Bay territory onto a national basis. The ecology movement sought the recognition of environmental rights which were claimed not only for the Crees, but also for the Québec people and the humankind as well. Both mobilisation suggest the development of a citizenship with a variable geometry for the Cree people and ecology groups.

The relevance of the debates around the James Bay development is reinforced by its spatial implications, indicating a major transformation of the territoriality of Western politics. More specifically, the struggles have two distinct spatial dimensions which indicate the richness of this case-study. First, the debates around the hydro-electric development rest on an opposition between two different perspectives on territory. While reflecting a conflict between two political representations, the debates also indicated an opposition between two cultural conceptions of the Québec territory referring to different ways of imagining and inhabiting the territory. Indeed, the opposition from the Aboriginal peoples throws light on two contradictory political representations of the Québec territory, each with sovereignty implications: the Cree

homeland versus Québec's national territory. Moreover, the debates implied an opposition between a modernist and productivist view of territory underlying by the proponents, and the sustainable perspective forwarded by ecology groups. In this context, the James Bay region could not be seen merely as a physical landscape. These contradictory representations reveal different forms of territoriality which largely contrast with the predominant geopolitical perspective generally used in the discussions about territory.

Secondly, the debates raised by the opposition of the Crees and the ecology groups reveal the interplay between different political scenes, especially around the Great Whale project: the Cree regional political scene, the Québec national political scene, the international political scene, and even a transnational political scene resting on the overlapping of global networks. The comparison between the two phases will reveal that their respective importance and implicitly, the hierarchy between them has been redefined over the years. Whereas the debates around the La Grande project were mainly restricted to the Québec national political scene, the struggles against the Great Whale project were shaped by the politicisation of new sites outside the Québec and Canadian territories. This resulted from the processes of jumping scales which had been respectively launched by the Crees and the Québec ecology movement. Their struggles against the La Grande project aimed to obtain a national recognition and to overcome their exclusion from the Québec and Canadian political scene. Canada's boundaries constituted the "natural" limits to their jumping scales. By contrast, the struggles against the Great Whale project challenged these boundaries, indicating a second step in their processes of jumping scales. The national recognition sought by both actors was linked to various political scenes whose boundaries no longer coincide with the boundaries of the Québec and Canadian political scenes.

Thus the spatial delimitation of the James Bay region, that is, its definition as a local, regional, national or transnational, constituted a strategic issue which has shaped the empowerment of Cree people and ecology movement. The debates suggest that the delimitation of the scales of the political scenes turns out to be a crucial stake determining the participation or the exclusion of the actors and consequently, their empowerment or their disempowerment. They reveal an opposition between different forms of spatiality. This shows the relevance of making a distinction between political space and territory,

each of which is linked to specific political and social relations. This is why the debates around the hydro-electric development of the James Bay cannot be reduced to an energy or economic issue.

Finally, one major issue shaping the debates was the definition of the national as a political space. The opposition of the Crees and ecology groups called into question the Québec government's definition of the national dimension of the hydroelectric development. The "export" of the debates out of Canada reflected the disjunction between the national political space and the territorial borders. Even if the development projects were recognised as national, the debates, especially those around the Great Whale project, suggest the inclusion of an external perspective in the spatial definition of the national. Another issue reflecting a different understanding of the national was the opposition between the Québec nationalist movement and the Cree nationalism which came to shape the debates. The clash between these nationalist movements reveals two different political identities linked to specific political projects having different implications with regard to the role of the state and Québec territory. At a broader level, it shows a significant redrawing of the Québec identity politics.

In the next chapter, this theoretical questioning about the rescaling of citizenship will be developed and tightened. We will elaborate the theoretical framework to be used to analyse the debates around the James bay development. In this respect, we will make a brief review of the literature which will be used in our theoretical framework. In the second section, we will define the main concepts which support our theoretical questioning. We will focus on four main concepts which are not however of equal importance: citizenship, space, globalisation and sovereignty. The methodological device used for analysing our case-study will be also introduced in this section. These theoretical discussions will be followed by a more detailed outline of our case-study in the third section. We will conclude the chapter in making an outline of the thesis chapters which follow a chronological order.

NOTES

¹ See: Joe PAINTER & Chris PHILO, "Spaces of Citizenship: an introduction", *Political Geography*, vol. 14, no 2, 1995, pp. 107-110; Will KYMLICKA, Wayne NORMAN, "Return of Citizen: a Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory", in *Theorizing Citizenship*, edited by Ronald BEINER, New York, State University of New York Press, 1995, pp. 283-322.

² . It can be useful to specify here that the reference to the James Bay politics has to be seen as an illustration of the theoretical argumentation which is developed in the dissertation. This aims to show the relevance of the concepts that we elaborated. It does not constitute an objective proof about the deepening of the globalisation of politics. Other case-studies are needed to strengthen our argumentation.

³ . See on this point: Ursula VOGEL and Michael MORAN, "Introduction", in *The Frontiers of Citizenship*, London, Macmillan, 1991, pp. X-XXL; Ruth LISTER, "Women, Economic Dependency and Citizenship", *Journal of Social Policy*, vol. 19, 1990, pp. 445-467; Bart Van STEENBERGEN, "The Condition of Citizenship: An Introduction", in *The Condition of Citizenship*, edited by Bart van STEENBERGEN, London, Sage, 1994, pp. 7-9.

⁴ . Although this configuration of citizenship was largely similar in all Western countries, this does mean that some differences existed between them. There exists different trajectories. This has been particularly evident with the social and economic rights which have been differentially implemented across Western societies. Different factors explaining these variations have been raised on this score such as the state-making process, the mobilisation of working class, the electoral programs adopted by political parties. See on this point: Gosta ESPING-ANDERSEN, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1988; Jane JENSON, "Citizenship and Equity: Variations across Time and Space" in *Political Ethics: A Canadian Perspective*, edited by J. HIEBERT, Toronto, Dundurn Press, 1992, (coll. Research Studies of the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing), pp. 195-228; Michael MANN, "Ruling Class Strategies and Citizenship", *Sociology*, vol. 21, no 3, 1987, pp. 339-354; Maurice ROCHE, *Rethinking Citizenship. Welfare, ideology and Change in Modern Society* Cambridge, Polity Press, 1992, 272 pages + index.

⁵ . Despite the universalist logic of the modern citizenship, citizenship entitlements had been restricted at the beginnings restricted to the white-male bourgeois and proprietary. In Western societies, this signified that citizenship had been initially granted to a rather restricted groups of people. Subsequent struggles around the extension of universal suffrage or the development of welfare state indicated revealed important struggles aiming to redefine the criteria of accessibility for citizenship and at the same time, revealed the existence of different categories of citizens. See: Joe PAINTER, Chris PHILO, *op. cit.*, pp. 107-120; Christopher McALL, "Les murs de la cité: territoires d'exclusion et espaces de citoyenneté", *Lien social et Politiques - Revue Internationale d'action communautaire*, no 34, 1995, pp. 81-92; Mary DIETZ, "Context is All: Feminism and Theories of Citizenship", in *Dimensions of Radical Democracy. Pluralism, Citizenship and Democracy*, edited by Chantal MOUFFE, New York, Verso, 1992, pp. 63-87; Iris Marion YOUNG, "Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship", *Ethics*, vol. 99, no 2, 1989, pp. 250-274

⁶ . Cf. Zsuzsa HEGEDUS, "Social Movements and Social Change in Self-Creative Society: New Civil Initiatives in the International Arena", in *Globalization, Knowledge and Society*, edited by Martin ALBROW & Elizabeth KING, London, Sage/International Sociological Association, 1990, pp. 263-280; Jan Aart SHOLTE, "The Geography of Collective Identities in a Globalizing World", *Review of International Political Economy*, vol. 3, no 4, 1996, pp. 565-607; Tony SPYBEY, "Global Social Movements", in *Globalization and World Society*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1996, pp. 137-150; Cecylia LYNCH, "Social Movements and the Problem of Globalization", *Alternatives*, vol. 23, no pp. 149-173.

⁷ . See: Akhil GUPTA & James FERGUSON "Beyond "Culture": Space, Identity, and the Politics of Difference", in *Culture, Power, Place. Explorations in Critical Anthropology*, edited by Akhil GUPTA & James FERGUSON, Durham & London, Duke University Press, 1997, pp. 33-51; John AGNEW & Stuart CORBRIDGE, *Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International Political Economy*, London, Routledge, 1995, pp. 78-102; Michael KEITH & Steve PILE, "Introduction Part 2: The Place of Politics", in *Place and the Politics of Identity*, London, Routledge, 1993, pp. 22-40; Gearoid O TUATHAIL, "Postmodern Geopolitics? The Modern Geopolitical Imagination and Beyond", in *Rethinking Geopolitics*, edited by Gearoid THUATHAIL & Simon DALBY, London, Routledge, 1998, pp. 16-38; Peter J. TAYLOR, Michael J. WATTS, Ronald J. JOHNSTON, "Remapping the World: What Sort of Map? What Sort of World?", in *Geographies of Global Change. Remapping the World in the Late Twentieth Century*, edited by Ronald J. JOHNSTON, Peter J. TAYLOR, Michael J. WATTS, Oxford, Blackwell, 1995, pp. 377-385

⁸ . Roy SMITH, "Identification and the Global", in *Identities in International Relations*, edited by Jill KRAUSE and Neil RENWICK, New York & Oxford, St. Martin's Press (in association with St Anthony's College), 1996, pp. 193-212; Frederick KRATCHOWIL, "Citizenship: On the Border of Order", in *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*, edited by Yosef LAPID, & Fredrich KRATOCHWILL, Boulder & London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996, pp. 181-201; Richard FALK, "The Making of Global Citizenship", in *The Condition of Citizenship*, edited by Bart van STEENBERGEN, London, Sage, 1994, pp. 127-141; Howard NEWBY, "Citizenship in a Green World: Global Commons and Human Stewardship", in *Citizenship Today. The Contemporary Relevance of T. H. MARSHALL*, edited by Martin BULMER & Anthony M. REES, London, UCL Press, 1996, pp. 209-222; Bryan S. TURNER, "Contemporary Problems in the Theory of Citizenship", in *Citizenship and Social Theory*, edited by Bryan S. TURNER, London, Sage, 1993, pp. 12-16

⁹ . Cf. Kevin R. COX, "Introduction: Globalization and its Politics in Question", in *Spaces of Globalization*, New York, Guilford Press, 1997, pp. 1-17; David DELANEY, Helga LEITNER, "The Political Construction of Scale", *Political Geography*, vol. 16, no 2, 1997; Neil SMITH, "Homeless/Global; Scaling Places", in *Mapping the Futures. Local Cultures, Global Changes*, edited by John BIRD, Barry CURTIS, Tim PUTNAM, et al, New York, Routledge, 1993, pp. 87-118; Kevin R. COX, "Spaces of Dependence, Spaces of Engagement and the Politics of Scale, or: Looking for Local Politics", *Political Geography*, vol. 17, no 1, 1998, pp. 1-23; Dennis R. JUDD, "The Case of Missing Scales: A Commentary on Cox", *Political Geography*, vol. 17, no 1, 1998, pp. 29-34.

¹⁰ . Cf. V. Spike PETERSON, "Remapping in the Context of Globalization", in *Globalization: Theory and Practice*, edited by Eleonore KOFMAN & Gillian YOUNGS, London, Pinter, 1996, pp. 11-28; David HELD, Anthony McGREW, David GOLDBLATT, Jonathan PERRATON, *Global Transformations. Politics, Economics and Culture*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1999, pp. 14-28; Siskia SASSEN, *Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1996, 134 pages; Richard FALK, "State of Siege: Will Globalization Win Out?", *International Affairs*, vol. 73, no 1, 1997, pp. 123-136; Zdravko MLINAR, "Individuation and Globalization: The Transformation of Territorial Social Organization", in *Globalization and Territorial Identities*, edited by Zdravko MLINAR, Aldershot, Avebury, 1992, pp. 15-34;

¹¹ . See on this point: Paul HIRST & Grahame THOMPSON, *Globalization in Question. The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1996; Herbert DITTGEN, "World Without Borders? Reflections on the Future of the Nation-State", *Government and Opposition*, vol. 34, no 2, 1999, pp. 161-179; Michael MANN, "Has Globalisation Ended the Rise of the Nation-State?", *Review of International Political Economy*, vol. 4, no 3, 1997, pp. 472-496

¹² . The political implications of globalisation have been mainly discussed in reference to its impacts at the national or local levels. They have been quite often presented as reactions occurring at those political levels against global economic or cultural changes. However, the discussions regarding the political changes occurring at the global level started to be more important. It is possible to identify some perspectives which have been proposed for explaining the globalisation of politics, suggesting a new way : the emergence of a global civil society, the setting up of a global cosmopolitan democracy or the setting up of a globality. See: David HELD, *Democracy and the Global Order. From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995; Martin ALBROW, *The Global Age*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1996, 230 pages + index; Manuel CASTELLS, *The Rise of the Network Society*, Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 532 pages + index; Ronnie D. LIPSCHULTZ, "Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil Society", *Millennium*, vol. 21, no 3, 1992, pp. 389-420; Martin SHAW, "The State of Globalization: Towards a Theory of State Transformation", *Review of International Political Economy*, vol. 4, no 3, 1997, pp. 497-513; Anthony G. McGREW, "The Globalisation Debate: Putting the Advanced Capitalist State in its Place", *Global Society*, vol. 12, no 3, 1998, pp. 299-322.

¹³ . See on this point: Anthony GIDDENS, *The Consequences of Modernity*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1990; 186 pages; Roland ROBERTSON, "Mapping the Global Condition", in *Globalization. Social Theory and Global Culture*, London, Sage, 1992, pp. 49-60; Michael SMITH, "Modernization, Globalization and the Nation-State", in *Global Politics. Globalization and the Nation-State*, edited by Anthony G. McGREW, Paul G. LEWIS et al, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1992, pp. 253-268;

¹⁴ . See: Peter J. TAYLOR, "Embedded Statism and the Social Sciences : Opening Up to New Spaces", *Environment and Planning A*, vol. 28, no 11, 1996; Bertrand BADIE, *La fin des territoires*, Paris, Fayard, 1995; Anthony McGREW, "Globalization and the Territorial Democracy: An Introduction" in *The Transformation of Democracy*, edited by Anthony McGREW, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1997, John AGNEW, *Geopolitics*, New York, Routledge, 1998, pp. 11-31; John R. RUGGIE "Territoriality at Millennium's End, in *Constructing World Polity*, London, Routledge, 1998, pp. 172-197; James ANDERSON, "The Shifting Stage of Politics: New Medieval and Postmodern Territorialities", *Society and Space*, vol. 14, no 2, 1996, pp. 142-150; David SLATER, "Spatial Politics/Social Movements", in *Geographies of Resistance*, edited by Steve PILE & Michael KEITH, London, Routledge, 1997, pp. 258-266; Kevin R. COX, "Introduction: Globalization and its Politics in Question", *op. cit.*, pp. 1-18;

¹⁵ . Cf. Murray LOW, "Representation Unbound: Globalization and Democracy", in *Spaces of Globalization*, edited by Kevin R. COX, New York, Guildford Press, 1997, pp. 240-280; Manuel CASTELLS, *The Rise of the Network Society*, *op. cit.*, pp. 376-427; Arjun APPADURAI, "Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Political Economy", in *Modernity at Large. Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1996, pp. 27- 47; Bertrand BADIE, Marie-Claude SMOUTS, *Le retournement du monde. Sociologie de la scène internationale*, Paris, Presses de la Fondation Nationale des sciences politiques & Dalloz, 1992, 242 pages + index; Tim INGOLD, "Globes and Spheres. The Topology of Environmentalism", in *Environmentalism. The View from Anthropology*, edited by Kay MILTON, London & New York, Routledge, 1993, pp. 31-42; Jacques LÉVY, *Le monde pour Cité*, Paris, Hachette, 1996, 143 pages

¹⁶ . We should specify that we will not discuss the involvement of the Inuit people in the debates. This is a methodological choice aiming to limit our field of investigation. It does not mean that Inuit have played a less important role than the Crees.

CHAPTER 1. THE NEW SCALES OF CITIZENSHIP POLITICS: BEYOND THE NATIONAL

This dissertation will explore the impact of globalisation on citizenship politics in Western societies through a comparison of the controversies surrounding two phases of hydroelectric development in the James Bay region in Northern Québec. In the conflicts which arose between the Cree and environmentalist groups on the one hand, and the Québec government and Hydro-Québec on the other, the national location of citizenship came to constitute a critical issue. That is, as the struggle developed over the two phases, the national and territorial dimensions of citizenship politics was redefined in important ways. In particular, the congruence of nation and territory was called into question. The politics of James Bay development suggests a reconfiguration of citizenship politics that no longer fit the boundaries of the nation-state. Reflecting a broader process of globalisation of politics, these struggles reveal its rescaling around multiple loci, across and outside state borders, in which citizens can claim their rights.

The changes in the horizons of those who challenged James Bay hydro developments raise important challenges for political scientists. The citizenship struggles in the James Bay politics involve a confrontation between different political scales (local vs. national vs. global, etc.), calling into question the centrality of national state borders. While involving the disentangling of its national and territorial dimensions, they also indicate that other political sites, which can be located at the local or the global levels, have become part of citizenship politics. They thus shed light on new aspects of citizenship which have been only lightly discussed. The changes in citizenship politics thus confront us with the need to reappraise the concepts that have been hitherto been used to map its main dimensions.

In this chapter, we shall outline the theoretical framework used to examine the impact of the globalisation on the spatial reconfiguration of citizenship politics in Western countries. This discussion has two main objectives. The first objective is to specify the theoretical perspective underlying the analysis of the politics of the James Bay development. It will involve the definition and highlighting of the interrelations between the main concepts used in this dissertation: citizenship, space, globalisation and sovereignty. In this dissertation, these concepts are not, however, of equal importance. "Space" constitutes the central

concept. It is through the redefinition of the territorial dimensions of citizenship that the impact of globalisation and the weakening of territorial sovereignty can be highlighted.

The second objective of this chapter is to present the methodology used to discuss the controversies around the James Bay hydroelectric development. It will sketch a diachronic comparison between its two phases, focusing on the role of the main actors: the Cree people, the ecology movement, the Québec government and Hydro-Québec, and the federal government. In looking at the changes that occurred during the second phase, we will be able to specify more clearly the impact of globalisation on citizenship politics. Here the structurationist perspective developed by Anthony Giddens¹ will be used. We will look at the discourses and strategies of mobilisation used by the social movements and governments that have been involved in the two phases, while taking into account the structural constraints.

The chapter begins with a sketch of the theoretical framework that will be set in relation to the key literatures on which this dissertation draws. Here the importance of looking at the spatial implications of citizenship politics and globalisation will be emphasized. In the second section, the main analytical concepts – citizenship, space, globalisation and sovereignty - will be developed. The next section will present the methodology supporting the theoretical framework, identifying the main dimensions to be used in the comparison.

1.1 The Theoretical Problematic: the Rescaling of Citizenship Politics in Western Societies

The theoretical approach to be developed in this dissertation aims to illuminate the impact of globalisation on the redefinition of citizenship politics that has been taking place since the 1970s. It revolves around three main propositions to be explored through the analysis of the controversies surrounding the James Bay development. The first proposition is that the recent debates and struggles around citizenship involve a spatial reconfiguration of the postwar regime of citizenship. Of particular interest here is the disentangling of the national and territorial dimensions of citizenship, which have called into question the hegemony of the nation-state. The latter has been historically recognised as the setting in which geographical, economic, cultural, and political boundaries have been established around citizenship

politics. It was assumed that the frontiers of the nation-state "contained" a distinct and homogenous citizenry.

The second proposition is that Western societies are being increasingly reshaped by the deepening of globalisation of politics. This opens the door to the relocation of state activities and social relations at the global level, contributing to the unbundling of state territory and the "decentring" of the national space. Globalisation is fostering the consolidation of a global political scene which, in turn, has become more complex as a result of the increasingly important part played by non-state actors. Globalisation calls into question the primacy of the national politics in the structuring of political communities and in the institutionalisation of state sovereignty. This involves a major rearticulation of citizenship, a status that has, in the modern period, come to play such a critical role in the legitimisation of state authority and in the maintenance of a cohesive national political community.

The third proposition, which largely springs from the two preceding propositions, is that the restructuring of Western politics has involved the politicisation of various representations of space, calling into question the hegemony of the territorial representation. The greater impact of international and transnational events and institutions over the last decades and implicitly, the growing interconnectedness between countries, notably the development of economic and cultural flows associated with globalisation, throw light on the increasing importance taken by non-territorial space. They question the primacy and the exclusiveness of a conception of territory that has constituted the predominant spatial form. Increasing reference to the development of networks or the extension of flows across state borders involves unbound representations of space, not based on a landscape.

The theoretical framework used in this dissertation rests on the bridging of these propositions. It finds its starting point in recent debates in social theory about the restructuring of the postwar citizenship configuration. Over the last decades, it came to be acknowledged that the postwar model, largely based on the development of the Keynesian state, had entered into a period of crisis. New issues raised, for example, by contemporary social movements, suggested its incremental replacement by a new model² even though the latter has yet to be consolidated. These developments have sparked a renewal of interest in the concept of "citizenship", particularly in the field of sociology. The sociological approach has

broadened the path opened by the works of T. H. Marshall.³ Broadly speaking, the sociological approach focuses on why and how citizenship varies in time and across space. This perspective pays attention to the social and power relations that impose a particular meaning on citizenship and consequently, shape the conditions of membership and participation. It involves a discussion of the socio-cultural and political setting and especially, the political struggles through which a citizenry is constituted and integrated. In this perspective, citizenship, more than simply being a formal-legal status, also constitutes a mediating site between social relations and institutional and cultural norms which shape the repartition of power resources between citizens. A citizenship configuration might thus include: a set of rights and obligations, the discourses and the socio-cultural practices establishing the criteria of accessibility to citizenship entitlements and structuring the citizen's identity, the state policies and social institutions and the location of these elements within a particular spatio-temporal setting. These elements represent different avenues by which citizenship is redefined and which can subsequently lead to the emergence of new configuration.

The development of sociological studies of citizenship broadened and deepened the discussions on citizenship while dismissing the formalism and legalism that previously predominated. They suggest that the politics of citizenship are shaped not only by the political struggles and the modifications brought to state policies, but also by its spatio-temporal location. The delimitation of space appears in this respect as a significant factor effecting changes in citizenship. The spatial implications of citizenship have been discussed in two different ways. The release of a number of historical comparative studies on the development of citizenship in Western societies threw light on the existence of distinct trajectories delimited by state boundaries.⁴

Each model of citizenship is generally described as part of the national history of the country. In this perspective, state boundaries drew frontiers around citizenship politics and consequently, delimited a citizenry. These analyses revealed different models of citizenship (i.e. Scandinavian, Canadian, British, etc.) which called into question the universalising pretension of the Western model of citizenship. They showed that the history of citizenship in each country has been marked by the extension of citizenship rights, involving a redefinition of both the criteria given access to citizenship entitlements and the locales in which citizenship could be exercised. These analyses explained the differences between various models of

citizenship with reference to factors such as: the struggles led by social movements, the policies adopted by the governments, the economic crises or the wars. Their impacts have been generally interpreted as bringing transformation of the different categories of citizens and consequently, a redefinition of the meaning given to citizenship. Although some of these issues were international, it has been generally assumed that the changes shaping citizenship were mediated at the national level. This was confirmed by the release of studies discussing the interrelations between citizenship and nationhood.⁵

The recent emergence of studies deriving from human geography⁶ and the social movement literature⁷ brought into focus the spatial implications of citizenship. Spatial analyses on citizenship reveal the importance of distinguishing between state borders and the frontiers of citizenship. These analyses suggested that the latter cannot be limited to the territorial division of politics (international, national, regional) which distinguishes historical models of citizenship. They draw attention not only to the various categories of citizens that have differential access to citizenship rights, but also to different citizenship spaces. They show that the sites in which citizens can claim their rights are as critical in the recognition and enforcement of citizenship rights. The rights of some groups would be denied or, at least restricted, within particular sites relative to other groups. They refer, for example, to the situation of immigrants or women whose rights are not fully recognised in parliaments or in workplaces. These analyses draw attention on the presence of various geographies of citizenship within the state boundaries. They suggest that politics of citizenship are shaped by overlapping boundaries (cultural, geographical religious, economic, ethnic, etc.) which differentiate various spaces of citizenship. Their frontiers are never fixed and subsequently redefined through the struggles of groups who are opposed to their exclusion from these spaces.

The relevance of distinguishing state and citizenship boundaries clearly appears through the recent discussions on the impact of globalisation on citizenship.⁸ In contrast to previous discussions, the latter involve a questioning of the state territorial framework of citizenship, suggesting that it is being redefined on new spatial grounds. Globalisation imposes new external constraints upon states that redefine citizenship policies. Such constraints have been discussed in two ways. First, some authors refer to the globalisation of economy to explain the shrinkage of social rights. Second, some authors link cultural

globalisation to the increasing plurality of identity politics which fosters the fragmentation of citizenship. This confronts states with a greater difficulty in maintaining the unity and homogeneity of its citizenry. Reference is often made in this regard to the emergence of new, regionally based nationalisms or to the discussions of multiculturalism that attempted to cope with this new political context. Both perspectives suggest that globalisation brings about the disruption of the postwar model of citizenship, weakening the state's capacity to maintain the political and institutional bases of citizenship rights. This raises critical challenges in regard to the effectiveness of democracy and protection of social rights, which is why some authors emphasise the need to develop some form of global citizenship which would be the equivalent of the national citizenship.⁹

Both perspectives share the view that the postwar model of citizenship has been disrupted by the state's inability to cope with the growing influence of external constraints. Globalisation thus calls into question the congruence of state borders with the territorial frontiers of citizenship while calling into question the primacy of the national space. This raises major challenges insofar as the state borders have been largely taken as the "natural" borders of citizenship distinguishing and at the same time, "bundling" citizenship on a national basis. Its impact thus goes beyond the redefinition of citizenship policies and the scope of citizenship entitlements, involving a transformation of the spatial bases of citizenship. This opens the door to the remapping of citizenship through a redefinition of its territorial and national bases.

The implications of the spatial redefinition of citizenship remain, however, largely undefined in these discussions. Globalisation is quite often presented as resulting from processes that impose constraints upon citizenship politics. The interrelations between globalisation and citizenship remain largely unknown. The extent to which recent changes in citizenship politics within Western societies can also shape globalisation has received little attention. Nor is the rearticulation of the national and territorial dimensions of citizenship clearly sorted out. Whereas the two dimensions have closely overlapped in the history of Western citizenship, the blurring of state political boundaries suggests that they are being disentangled. This perspective remains relatively unexplored in the current literature on citizenship.

Various aspects of globalisation have been explored by different theoretical approaches and disciplines.¹⁰ Despite this diversity, there are certain shared assumptions¹¹. It is assumed that one of the

main changes brought by globalisation is the remapping of world politics which calls into question the predominance and exclusiveness of the nation-state. The deepening of globalisation implies the transformation of the world into a single and unbound place in which the different parts of the globe become interconnected and shaped by the same processes. The impact of globalisation is reinforced by the spreading of a global consciousness among the various peoples. Globalisation thus opens the door to the disembedding of state territory and questions the adequacy of the internal/external or the national/international division of politics. Without a bounded territorial basis, the global space is based on the overlapping between the international, the transnational and the supraterritorial space.¹² In contrast to international politics, global politics cannot simply be seen as an extension of nation-state politics. This suggests the need to go beyond the predominant state-centric and (national) society-centred perspectives on politics.

Some recent theoretical discussions on globalisation have produced a more nuanced perspective on its spatial implications.¹³ Without denying the remapping introduced by globalisation, they reject the homogenising and universalising views, insisting instead on the openness and unevenness aspects of globalisation. In other words, globalisation does not mean the reproduction of national politics on a broader scale. Rather it has a differential impact in different regions of the world. In other words, various peoples and regions are not equally affected by globalisation processes. These analyses have also undermined the "end of geography" thesis which underlay many analyses. Instead of stressing the disappearance of territorial constraints and the transformation of the world into an interconnected grid of networks and flux, they rather insist on the variable geography of globalisation and would highlight its differential impact at the local or regional levels. These analyses do not deny that supraterritorial changes occur at the global level. However, they argue that "place still matters" and that the constraints imposed by globalisation are experienced at the local level in different ways. Whereas some "local" places are harshly affected by globalisation, others rather succeed to mediate them and even to use them at their advantages such as it has occurred with the emergence of global cities.¹⁴ It is through the interactions between the local and the global that the meaning and implications of globalisation are redefined over time and across space.¹⁵

Among the changes introduced by globalisation, the emergence of new forms of territoriality, i.e., the transformation of the processes by which political territory is socially constructed, attributing it a particular meaning and a geographical location¹⁶, turns out to be quite challenging. This new territoriality derives from two changes which largely overlap: 1) the “decentring” of the national space and 2) the “unbundling” of state territory.¹⁷ The discussions of local struggles suggest that the national space no longer appears as central as before in the regulation of state policies or in the reproduction of social relations. Globalisation would bring in a rearticulation of politics around a local/global axis, opening the door to the constitution of a global political scene. It then appears that the spatial division of politics established around the national/international is eroded and is gradually replaced by a new one that remains blurred. In this context, the primacy, exclusiveness, and spatio-historical homology attributed to the nation-state territory is called into question. The latter can no longer be seen simply as empty, disjointed and mutually exclusive containers.¹⁸ Consequently, the national borders of state represent less and less the determining vector structuring state's authority and legitimacy and maintaining the cohesiveness of a national political community. Their increasing porosity reveals the impossibility of assuming a congruence between the economy, the culture and politics on a national bases. Other political spaces are gaining a political relevance while having a greater impact on the definition of political agenda's of countries. Reference is often made in this regard to the mobilisation of the new nationalist movements such as the Catalan, Scottish or Native people whose primary objective does not revolve around the establishment of a sovereign nation-state.¹⁹ Their projects are rather based on more flexible political arrangements providing them political autonomy within a regional territory.

An interesting avenue proposed by some authors²⁰ to explain the spatial remapping brought in by globalisation is to discuss it in terms of a double process of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation of politics. This process characterises the stretching out of social relations and the relocation of state policies across or outside of state borders. It suggests that the latter can no longer be taken as the central pivot establishing the location of politics and mediating the relations between the various territories. This process throws light on the variable geometry of globalisation which derives from the disentangling of national and territorial dimensions of nation-state politics. Whereas some issues are redefined out of state territory such as it has occurred with the trading relations between states, other issues are relocated on a local or regional

basis as it often appears with the struggles of the ecology movement. To refer to the process of deterritorialisation vs. deterritorialisation of politics allows us to come into grips with the different spatial implications of globalisation, especially with the on-going rearticulation of the relations between the local, the national and the global spaces. In this perspective, the development of a global political scene cannot be simply seen as the extension of state activities from the national to the global space. It is also shaped by the struggles occurring within state borders which seek to be recognised as a global issue while also involving non-state actors. Consequently, globalisation cannot be reduced to what occurs at the global level. It is also shaped by the political struggles and institutional changes at the other political levels.

To discuss globalisation in terms of deterritorialisation confronts us with the necessity of revising the ways in which political space is represented and mapped.²¹ It does not mean simply taking into account various spaces (global, national, regional, local), but also various spatial representations. The process of deterritorialisation opens the door to the emergence of a global space which differs to some extent from the state territory. The emphasis given to the role played by the networks and flows in globalisation reveals a different representation of space²², visible in the discussions of the development of global telecommunications or the recent changes in stock or currency exchanges. In contrast to territorial representations, these representations of space are unbound and non-areal, and consequently, cannot be mapped in a cartographic sense. Of course, they remain in one way related to some areas between which they establish connections. The taking into account of this spatial representation thus raises significant challenges insofar as politics in Western societies have been exclusively defined in terms of bounded areas.²³

A critical implication of the processes of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation is the redefinition of the scales of nation-state politics.²⁴ What is at stake in both processes is not only the redefinition of the role of state borders, but also the redrawing of the different political scales of Western politics (from the local to the emerging global scale). This involves the redefinition of what has been previously defined as a local or regional issue into, for example, a global issue. The rescaling of politics can be understood as a process of "jumping scales", a process which can move upwards or downwards.²⁵ It involves the redefinition of the scales of an issue, transforming it, for example, from a local issue into a regional or

national issue. This process has broader implications than the redrawing of the spatial limits defining an issue or an actor's sphere of actions. It also comes along with the imposition of a particular meaning which reflects certain actors' interests and consequently, particular social and power relations. By this process, the actors who were excluded and or marginal within a space can be recognised as legitimate and thus, empowered. The process of jumping scales constitutes a key element structuring the process of deterritorialisation or reterritorialisation characterising globalisation. In this perspective, the global scale can be seen as a site of struggles. Different analyses nicely illustrated how the redefinition of the scales implies different sites such as it has occurred in regional development policies.²⁶ Elaborated at the national level, these policies have been quite often confronted with local resistances while being shaped by the historical and institutional importance of the regional level. These two factors largely explain the outcomes of regional development policies which greatly differ from one country to another.

Therefore, to look at the politics of scale allows us to come to terms with the spatial implications of both processes, and especially, with the unevenness of globalisation. In this perspective, globalisation is not reduced to what occurs at the global level, i.e. outside of state territory. It also involves the other political levels that may represent meaningful political sites in which global issues are debated. Moreover, to focus on the scale politics of globalisation provides the opportunity to deal more easily with the two main representations of space (areal and non-areal) discussed above, which are involved in the delimitation of the scales. It is become possible to look at how the (re)drawing of scales can result from the interactions between the recognition of boundaries and/or the establishment of networks linking two bounded spaces.

Discussing the scale politics of globalisation opens up a new perspective for coming into grips with the impact of globalisation on citizenship. In making an overview of the existing readings discussing this issue,²⁷ many of them refer to the eventual constitution of a global citizenship which would be similar to the national model. Although this perspective is relevant, it does not grasp all changes in citizenship politics and especially, the redefinition of its national and territorial dimensions. To discuss the recent transformations of citizenship by referring to the processes of reterritorialisation/deterritorialisation appears more promising. In this perspective, state territory no longer constitutes the unique and impassable horizon of citizenship politics. It allows us to deal with two possible avenues that can result from the global

rescaling of citizenship politics: 1) the emergence of global sites out of state territory in which citizenship issues are debated and subsequently, redefined as global issues; 2) the discussion of global issues within citizenship sites located within or across state borders. The key issue underlying each avenue is the processes of jumping scales which are launched through citizenship struggles. Therefore, the exploration of the impact of globalisation on citizenship politics will be done in this dissertation in looking at its rescaling around multiple sites, among which some are global.

1.2 The Main Concepts

The theoretical framework that will be used in this dissertation centres on spatiality and, in particular, the notion of "jumping scales." As will be argued, the latter is particularly helpful in illuminating the struggles around the James Bay hydroelectric development. By looking at the process of jumping scales, we will be able to see the way these struggles help to bring forth the reconfiguration of citizenship linked to globalisation. This approach allows us to come into grips with the processes of deterritorialisation or its reterritorialisation. It broadens the debate by requiring us to look beyond the constraints imposed by globalisation. The exploration of this theoretical avenue is linked, however, to the redefinition of the key concepts used in the theoretical framework. This is the task of this section. In the following pages, we will discuss the main concepts underlying our questioning: citizenship, space, globalisation and sovereignty.

Citizenship

By drawing attention to changes in citizenship across time and space, sociological approaches to citizenship have served to highlight the historicity and spatiality of modern citizenship. They demonstrate the importance of looking at citizenship politics, i.e. the discourses and struggles around citizenship, to explain the reconfiguration of the different citizenship models in time and space. Drawing on this body of work, this dissertation uses a conception of citizenship which has two main components.²⁸ First, each citizenship configuration is based on a set of rights and obligations granted by the state to individuals and groups, providing them membership in a political community. It is linked to the imposition of a number of social characteristics and qualities defining the citizen's identity, i.e. who can be a citizen, on the one hand and on the other, to the institutionalisation of state policies. The postwar Western configuration of

citizenship, which is currently undermined, revolves around the recognition of three categories of citizenship entitlements:

"the civil element, the rights which are necessary in terms of individual freedoms - freedom from arbitrary detainment, freedom of speech, freedom of belief, property and contract rights, and access to an egalitarian justice system ; the political element, the right to participate in the exercise of government, either as members of a governing body or as participants in their nomination ; and the social element, a minimum share in economic wealth and social security through the distribution of goods which are available and valued in a given society"²⁹.

The second component of modern citizenship is the establishment of different sites ensuring the participation of citizens in the public sphere.³⁰ Citizenship, conceived in terms of political participation, is the result of successive struggles that aimed to redefine the conditions of membership, in order to eliminate the different forms of exclusion embedded in existing citizenship configurations. Recognition of the issue of participation drew attention to the existence of different citizenship sites within the state borders that shape the definition of the citizen's identity while ensuring the implementation of citizenship entitlements. It is through these different sites that the meaning given to citizenship is recognised and redefined.³¹ The most important sites or locus have been historically the parliaments and courts. However, the extension of social citizenship revealed that other sites has also an impact on the recognition and consolidation of citizenship rights. The struggles of contemporary social movements indicate that the family, the workplace, the media, the school, or the neighbourhood represent various sites as well as important than the courts or parliaments.

Citizen participation in Western societies has been shaped by a process of social and spatial closure.³² Through this process, the various configurations of citizenship have been established, each resting on the recognition of specific conditions of membership and sites of political participation. The process of social and spatial closure represents the main channel mediating the changes in citizenship politics. Struggles for the recognition of new citizenship claims have been framed by the distinction between "us" and "them".³³ This process has been linked to the construction of a "we-ness" in opposition to the "otherness". It has been a key element in the delimitation of a citizenry and especially, in the maintaining of its cohesiveness. Although state borders have historically constituted the determining

frontiers framing this process, the various struggles aiming to broaden the definition of the “we-ness” have thrown light on other boundaries (linguistic, ethnic, religious, gender, class, sexual orientation, etc.) involved in this process of closure. The importance of these various citizenship boundaries will clearly appear in our discussion of the recent changes in citizenship politics in Québec and Canada in the following chapters.

The boundaries of the nation-state have thus far constituted the predominant framework underlying the processes of social and spatial closure of modern citizenship. These boundaries have determined the limits of these processes. Indeed, despite the differences in the postwar models of citizenship across the West, all shared common assumptions about the centrality of its national and territorial dimensions. The acquisition of nationality and the importance of residency have been the key criteria for distinguishing citizens from foreigners or aliens. Both criteria came to be recognised as predominant characteristics of modern citizenship. Their primacy results from the overlapping between the implementation of national citizenship and the affirmation of national sovereignty. The predominance of national citizenship in Western polity has strengthened the legitimacy of the national political space and its hegemony over the other political spaces. Citizenship struggles occurring in other political spaces, notably the international level, were treated as secondary. In addition, the conferring of nationality through citizenship furthered the homogenisation of the national space.³⁴ This has involved the depoliticisation of cultural differences that could have challenged the primary allegiance to the national identity. Think, for example of the debates around the granting of citizenship rights to national minorities, generally qualified as ethnic groups, within multinational states. The same applies to the recognition of rights to Aboriginal populations. As we shall see in the following chapters, mobilisation of the Cree at the national and international levels raised important challenges. While claiming the recognition of new citizenship rights, they also questioned the criteria defining nationality. Their struggles reveal the increasing multinational and pluri-ethnic character of Canadian society and they have opened the door to a major reconfiguration of Canadian citizenship.

Space

The core concept within this dissertation's theoretical framework is space. Space, and assumptions about space, have clearly shaped the definition of modern citizenship, as the previous

discussion argued. Its implications go beyond the localisation of citizenship struggles or citizenship policies. It has also helped to define citizenship in relation to a particular setting and to establish citizen identity within the state borders. The conception of space used in this dissertation is drawn from the theoretical renewal in human geography that began at the end of the 1970s.³⁵ These debates helped to overthrow the then-predominant conception of space, characterised by Henri Lefebvre³⁶ as "absolute space". The new geography argued against the conception of empty, neutral, abstract space based on Euclidean geometry and cartography. From this perspective, space appeared as a geographical landscape external to actors. This absolute notion of space can be contrasted to the notion of relative or relational space.³⁷ Dismissing the neutrality attributed to space, this notion postulates that space is always embedded in social relations and is thus socially and differentially constructed. The notion of "relative space" involves a conception of space as contingent, multiple and relational. Its different geographical forms result from the struggles between actors and the relations with the other spaces. Instead of perceiving space as a unique geographical setting, this perspective throws light on various interrelated spaces which are differently experienced by social actors. In other words, the various social relations (class, gender, ethnic, linguistic, etc) of a particular actor are located in different and contingent spaces. The localisation of social relations has thus an impact on their reproduction and consequently, contributes to establish social inequalities between actors,

The notion of relative space allows us to tackle the spatiality of politics, i. e. its embeddedness in different and interrelated spaces whose relations are redefined over time. It opens new perspectives on the various spaces structuring politics (local, national, regional and international) and their variable geometry. The notion of relative space highlights three main elements involved in the construction of space: 1) material practices (lived space); 2) representations of space (imagined space), including cultural meanings and spatial forms (areal, flow, flux) ; and 3) a locale or a setting in which social relations are constituted on an informal or institutional basis. It is through the localisation of these elements that a particular area of issue is recognised by the actors as local or national.³⁸ This localisation is always (re)framed by social and economic processes and at the same time, in relation to other spaces. It thus explains how some spaces and assume different meanings for different actors. This clearly appears when we discuss the mobilisation of the Cree people against the La Grande project some months after its launching. Whereas the Québec

government saw the James Bay region as one of its regions, for the Cree, it represented their homeland and the basis of their livelihood.

To conceive space as relational opens a new perspective on territory that has hitherto been largely apprehended as an absolute space. The conception of territory in terms of relative space focuses attention on the processes involved in the construction of the modern territoriality. Modern territoriality has revolved around the nation-state that came to be represented and institutionalised as the critical political space relative to scales "below" and "above" it. National territory has been represented as a physical landscape, delimiting and localising state activities and social relations within a bounded area.³⁹ It was through the latter that territory is embodied and became significant. The national/international division, to which was associated the distinction domestic/foreign has constituted the central vector in the localisation of politics and in the definition of identity politics. The recognition of national sovereignty as the principal mode of territorial division of politics has played a critical role in this regard. It contributed to establishing a homology between the national scale and state borders. Thus modern citizenship came to be "centred" around the national space and nationality.

One important implication of the modern territoriality has been the definition of the politics in terms of "politics of place".⁴⁰ That is, modern politics were institutionalised in relation to particular place, i.e., closed and bounded setting with which people identify. These places have been understood as mutually exclusive and homogeneous, with a set of distinctive characteristics constituting an "identity". What occurs between these places or outside the "places" is understood in relation to what occurs within these places or simply ignored. The predominance of the "politics of place" contributes to the "bundling" of state and territory, represented as a self-regulating and cohesive setting. We will see in the following chapters that the modern territoriality has been seriously called into question by the mobilisation of the ecology movement. Rejecting the territorial division of politics by states, the ecology movement has privileged a conception of the world as an global ecosystem which thwarts the logic of sovereignty. In its practices too, the ecology movement moves beyond the politics of place, acting simultaneously at all levels, the local, the national and the global.

Scale is a key issue in the construction of space and, consequently, in the definition of modern territoriality. Until recently, the different scales (local, regional, national, international) were taken as different levels of analysis. Instead of seeing them as neutral, it is more interesting to discuss the different scales as socially and politically constructed, and thus, as contingent and variable⁴¹. This is what is meant by the concept of (re)scaling. The scales of a particular space are always contested and eventually redrawn on new bases. The drawing of scales involves the construction of limits around a particular space in relation to other spaces, giving location and scope to issues and the social relations circumscribed therein. This can occur in two different ways: 1) by fixing boundaries around a particular area and 2) by the establishment of networks or flows between areas. The redrawing of the scales goes beyond a geographical remapping. It comes along with the embodiment of particular representations of the space and the imposition of a particular configuration of social and spatial relations. For example, the localisation of an issue or an actor at the local level implies the recognition of a number of characteristics (geographical, economic, political, cultural, etc.) and the embeddedness of social relations. It is on this basis that the local becomes associated with particular representations and implications and consequently, acquires meaning. In this dissertation, we shall see that the definition of the scales of Québec politics has constituted a crucial stake shaping the Québec political agenda, especially since the Quiet revolution.

One key element explaining why and how political scales are redefined across time and space is the launching of a process of jumping scales.⁴² As noted above, the construction of scales is always shaped by power relations and itself plays an important role in their reproduction. The way the scales are defined constitutes a field of opportunities and constraints for the actors. This implies that some actors are excluded or marginal within a space, whereas others are empowered. Consequently, a particular space can constitute a space of dependence, and even survival, for some actors while representing for other actors a space of resistance or emancipation. The ability of the excluded or marginal actors to redraw the scale with respect to their political agenda and to be recognised as a local or national actor may involve thus the passage from a space of dependence to a space of resistance or emancipation. This ability to redefine the political signification of a space around a new political scale and to be included within the latter constitutes a process of jumping scale. This can occur in both upwards or downwards directions – or from the smallest to the broadest and vice versa. Understanding the process of jumping scales cannot be

reduced to the strategies of actors and their choice of direction. It also linked to the historical significance and role given to scales. Thus the national borders of state have, until recently, formed the key scale – and one that proved impassable for some actors. It is thus important to examine the politics of scales to come into grips with the redefinition of territoriality. We will see in this dissertation that the Cree people's and ecology groups' ability to launch different processes of jumping scales proved critical to their success. From being excluded or at least very marginal on the Québec and Canadian political scenes, both (especially the Cree) came to be recognised as national actors by both governments.

Globalisation

The third concept is globalisation. As noted above, over the last decades, deepening globalisation has thrown light on its various dynamics and processes, indicating the variable geometry and geography of globalisation. Globalisation, as the emergence of a world or global society, has a differential and asymmetrical impact on various societies and world regions. It is the result of various processes (economic, cultural, technological and social) which contribute to the consolidation of a global space and at the same time, to the unbundling of national and territorial constraints upon social agency and change. In contrast to other political spaces, the global space does not have a priori a territorial basis, although it remains linked to state territory. The consolidation of this global space involves the formation of a global scale as additional political scale. This development opens the door to the redefinition of the hierarchy between the existing political scales – or rather, it broadens the political horizon, delimiting the processes of jumping scales. Accordingly, the global space can be a space of dependence, a space of resistance or a space of emancipation. Thus far, the configuration of the global space remains somewhat blurred. Different representations such as "the global market," "trading blocs" or the "humanity", each reflecting a distinct political agenda, are on offer but none have thus far become hegemonic.⁴³ Although the global space currently constitutes a space of neo-liberal affirmation, neo-liberals have begun to face a more serious opposition. As the democratic mobilisation around the Seattle Conference on the MAI suggests, the process of jumping scales launched by some neo-liberal forces has yet to become institutionalised. In this dissertation, the way that global space came to constitute a space of resistance for the Cree and the ecology groups will be highlighted.

The consolidation of a global scale opens the door to a major redefinition of modern territoriality by bringing about the disentangling of the national and territorial dimensions of state politics. This redefinition will be discussed in the following chapters as the result of a double process of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation. Deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation represent two different outcomes that may spring from the processes of jumping scales launched at the global level. The direction taken by the latter depends on the definition of the issues (material and representational) and the forms of the scale, i. e. in terms of bounded area or in terms of networks and flux. Therefore, the rescaling brought in by globalisation can occur in two different ways. First, an issue may be cast as global and debated at the global level (e.g. recent debates on environmental problems). Second, an issue which is locally or regionally based (territorial based) can be nonetheless redefined as having global implications by its inclusion in transnational and global flows or networks. The struggles around the Great Whale reflect this second form.

Sovereignty

The fourth concept is that of sovereignty. A classic concept of political science, in the contemporary era, many see globalisation, and the growing porosity of state borders associated therewith, as a threat to sovereignty.⁴⁴ This is the perspective many Western governments seem to have adopted judging from the way they try to legitimate their new commercial or budgetary policies. The importance of sovereignty for this thesis derives from its key role in the definition and institutionalisation of modern territoriality. The articulation of politics around the principle of sovereignty made state territoriality important in Western politics. It is the state's borders that delimit the bases of its authority in regard to two different spheres of politics: an internal ("national" politics) and external (international politics as inter-state politics). To each of these political spheres has been attributed a specific set of activities and at the same time, particular spatial representations.⁴⁵ Whereas internal space has been represented as homogeneous, congruent and orderly, external space has been described as anarchic, heterogeneous and threatening for the internal sphere. The institutionalisation of sovereignty has thus contributed to the bundling of state territory through which the state borders have been recognised as the most determining political scale circumscribing a distinct and homogenous political community with its own culture and economy.

This dissertation focuses on the principle of national sovereignty, the predominant form of sovereignty in the 20th century.⁴⁶ It is precisely this form of sovereignty that is being called into question by the deepening of globalisation. The recognition of national sovereignty stemmed from the nationalisation of state borders and the institutionalisation of the nation as the hegemonic form of political community. The accountability of the state thus came to be defined on a national basis and circumscribed by the state borders. It was based on the setting up of a triptych that has constituted the architecture of Western politics: state, nation, and territory. The recognition of national sovereignty furthered the articulation of citizenship around the principle of nationality, which became the main basis for granting citizenship entitlements. The process of spatial and social closure of citizenship thus became articulated around the national scale of politics and at the same time, the state borders. Consequently, the redefinition of the national dimensions of citizenship necessarily would thus involve a transformation of the national sovereignty. This is why the opening of political spaces outside of the state borders calls into question the significance of national sovereignty. This, we argue, is how the struggles around the Great Whale project, which raised questions about the accountability and even legitimacy, of national decisions.

1.3 Methodology

The core of the thesis can thus be stated as follows: The politics of James Bay hydroelectric development constitutes an interesting example of the restructuring of Western citizenship linked to globalisation. This argument places the new geography of Western citizenship, which can no longer be located exclusively within the borders of national states, at the centre of the investigation. This new geography can be understood in terms of the rescaling of the national and territorial dimensions of citizenship politics around multiple loci (from the local to the global), revealing the increasing differentiation of citizenship spaces. This process of rescaling reflects the growing impact of globalisation on national politics. It involves the unbundling and disembeddedness of state territory while contributing to the consolidation of a global political space. The addition of a new political scale to citizenship politics opens the door to the emergence of a new political arena in which the meaning and structure of social and spatial relations framing citizenship can be challenged and redefined.

The thesis will be developed through a diachronic comparison of the two phases of the James Bay development. Each phase entailed a struggle to transform the existing citizenship regime through jumping scales. The struggles around the La Grande project (1970-1975) were marked by the processes of jumping scales launched by the Aboriginal peoples and ecology groups at the national level. Whereas both groups had largely been excluded from the Québec public sphere, in their struggles against the La Grande project sought national recognition of their citizenship rights. Although their struggles thus reveal the predominance of the national and territorial dimensions of citizenship politics, they nonetheless involved a rearticulation of the different citizenship spaces within the Québec borders. Twenty years later, the struggles around the Great Whale project showed that important changes were occurring in citizenship politics. This time, the citizenship struggles of the Aboriginal peoples and ecology groups involved new scales. This time, jumping scales included the global level. It is thus this second phase of James Bay hydroelectric politics that reveals the unbundling of territorial constraints on citizenship politics. The struggles around the Great Whale project thus throw light on the broadening and differentiation of citizenship spaces which are no longer strictly delimited by state borders while being increasingly shaped by the globalisation of politics. Rather than suggesting the development of a global citizenship coming along the lines of national citizenship, these struggles indicate the consolidation of various loci which frame citizenship politics.

This comparison will be based on an epistemological and methodological framework which is largely drawn from Anthony Giddens' structurationist perspective.⁴⁷ This perspective is based on the interplay of two levels of analysis: actors and social processes or structures. Thus while social actors (individuals and groups) initiate and mould change, they cannot be understood in isolation from the social and spatio-temporal relations in which they are embedded. These social processes legitimise specific forms of actions and discourses on change, and particular conceptions of time and space, providing a field of opportunities and constraints which empower (and disempower) particular individuals and groups. Social processes are (re)produced through the individual and collective actions and their unintended consequences of their action. In this perspective, the history and geography of a particular setting (workplace, region, nation, etc.) are always open-ended. At the same time, it is nonetheless possible to trace back a trajectory, that is, their passage from a particular configuration to another one.

The comparison of the two phases will involve in the discussion of the role played by the three main actors in the controversies around the James Bay development: the Québec government and Hydro-Québec; the Cree people; and the Québec ecology movement. We will focus on their discourses and strategies of mobilisation (decisions, alliances with other actors, institutional innovations, etc.) throughout the two phases, highlighting their continuities and their discontinuities. In discussing each actor, we will also refer to socio-cultural and spatial setting which framed their participation in the debates. The emphasis put on the various processes of jumping scales implies that we will look at the national and international political contexts surrounding the debates. Thus, we have to examine the role played by the Québec and federal governments. Their actions will be set in relation to the structural changes that shaped Quebec and Canadian politics during these two periods. The nationalist projects of both governments will be important here. The Quebec nationalist movement is especially important here for it is the latter which gave the hydroelectric projects a broader political significance. Similarly, the analysis of the Cree's mobilisation will show how their strategic options were shaped by, on the one hand, the Canadian Aboriginal peoples' movement and the World Indigenous Peoples movement and on the other, changes in the policies of the Québec and Federal governments toward aboriginal peoples as these developed over the two periods. With regard to the ecology movement, we will present the main changes in the mobilisation of the Canadian ecology movement and global ecology movement while looking at the environmental policies of both governments.

The methodological tools used in our case-study are mainly based on qualitative methods. The information related to the debates on the James Bay hydroelectric development has been collected in two different ways: 1) interviews with the actors involved in the debates and 2) the analysis of documents and publications. The examination of documents involves two different sources of information: primary sources (briefs, reports, speeches, etc.) and secondary sources of information (newspapers, books, periodicals). The main source has been the documents. They were supplemented with selective interviews designed to enhance the understanding of the issues at stakes. A list of those interviews will be found as an appendix.

These methodological tools are used in referring to a constructivist approach. The discussions in this dissertation do not pretend to describe an objective reality which would be detached from its context, but rather deals with a situated knowledge. It is thus assumed that the so-called reality is composed of

various representations which are contested and redefined over time and space, and then reflecting specific interests. The following discussion does not pretend to be neutral and value-free. It reflects a particular perspective with its own bias and values, i.e., the perspective of a white male francophone Québécois.

1.4 Chapter Outline

The structure of the thesis follows chronologically the history of the James Bay development. It is divided in two broad sections which correspond respectively to the two phases. Whereas the first three chapters revolve around the La Grande project, the last three are based on the struggles around the Great Whale project. In the chapter two, we briefly retrace the history of the Québec "Quiet revolution" focussing on the important economic and political expansion of Hydro-Québec and on the integration of the Québec northern region into the Québec government politics. This provides the background for analysing the La Grande project, allowing us to show how its national and territorial dimensions became crucial stakes. The third chapter presents the mobilisation of the Cree people against the La Grande project. Attention will be paid to the way that their struggles challenged the political and spatial significance of the national level, as well as to the subsequent institutionalisation of a Cree regional political scene. As we shall see, mobilisation of the Aboriginal peoples on the Canadian and international political scenes opened new spaces for the Cree to make claims. The fourth chapter completes the story of the La Grande project, analysing the role played by the emergent Quebec ecology movement. While the latter constituted an important ally for the Cree, ecology and environmentalist groups introduced new issues to the debate, notably, a different form of territoriality.

The last three chapters focus on the controversies around the Great Whale project. It is here that we shall really begin to see how the political framework ("politics of place") constituted by the national state is being undermined. Although its centrality was contested in the debates around the La Grande project, the national (in the double sense: Quebec and Canada) remained the predominant political scene. The processes of jumping scales launched during the controversies around the Great Whale project challenge this to the extent that they invoked a global political scene. In the fifth chapter, we will show how the issue of globalisation became part of the legitimating discourses deployed by the Québec government and

Hydro-Québec. Reference will be made to the important structural changes affecting Hydro-Québec and to the redefinition of the Québec nationalist movement. The sixth chapter will focus on the mobilisation of the Cree people. Having become national and transnational actors, the Cree succeeded in taking the debates beyond the Québec and Canadian borders. In this way they redefined its spatial implications. The last substantive chapter focuses on the participation of the ecology movement. The latter also helped to redefine the spatial implications of the Great Whale project, by highlighting its global implications. Again they constituted important allies for the Cree, enabling them to become part of global networks linking various ecology movements around the globe.

NOTES

¹ . Anthony GIDDENS, *The Constitution of Society*, Berkeley, University of California Press 1984; Anthony GIDDENS, *The Nation-State and Violence*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1987; 387 pages + index; Anthony GIDDENS, *Modernity and self-identity*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1991,

² . For a review of the different debates related to the issue of citizenship, see: Bryan S. TURNER, "Contemporary problems in the Theory of Citizenship", in *Citizenship and Social Theory*, London, Sage Publications, 1993, pp. 1-18; Ronald BEINER, "Why Citizenship Constitutes a Theoretical Problem in the Last Decade of the Twentieth Century", in *Theorizing Citizenship*, edited by Ronald BEINER, New York, State University of New York, 1995, pp. 1-28; Pierre BIRNBAUM, "Sur la citoyenneté", *L'année sociologique*, vol. 46, no 1, 1996, pp. 57-85; Chantal MOUFFE, *The Return of the Political*, London, Verso, 1994, 154 pages + index; Iris Marion YOUNG, "Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship", *Ethics*, vol. 99, no 2, 1989, pp. 250-274.

³ . The Marshall analysis on citizenship retraced the historical development of citizenship since the 18th century within capitalist societies. He argued that the development of citizenship brought in the democratisation and especially an equalisation of life conditions for the working class. The recognition of citizenship rights to the working class thwarted the market principle of capitalism. What has been retained from the Marshall's discussion is his typology of citizenship rights : civil, political and social rights. For Marshall, these citizenship rights have successively emerged as a result of working class struggles, revealing the importance of political participation in the definition of citizenship. Each type of rights opens the door to the participation of this one within specific institutional locales. The Marshall's conception has been recently criticised during the recent years. Its teleological and universalising dimensions were pointed out. It was argued that it only reflected the history of Great Britain and that other national histories reveal different trajectories. Moreover, the incremental emergence of citizenship rights was also called into question. In contrary, it turns out to be more adequate to explain the extension of citizenship rights as having overlapped in many countries. One last point raised in feminist analyses is the lack of taking into account of other social relations having shaped the development of citizenship. They pointed out the gender-blindness of his analysis. Cf. T. H. MARSHALL, *Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays*, London, Pluto Press, 1992, pp. 3-54. For a critical discussion of Marshall analysis, see: Bryan S. TURNER, "Outline of a Theory of Citizenship, in *Dimensions of Radical Democracy*, edited by Chantal MOUFFE, London, Verso, 1992, pp. 6-12; Barry HINDNESS, "Citizenship in the Modern West", in *Citizenship and Social Theory*, edited by Bryan S. TURNER, London, Sage, 1993, pp. 17-35; Mary DIETZ, "Context is All: Feminism and Theories of Citizenship", in *Dimensions of Radical Democracy*, edited by Chantal MOUFFE, London, Verso, 1992, pp. 63-82.

⁴ . Many studies on citizenship in historical sociology constituted a response of the Marshall's studies on citizenship by attempting to overcome its "British" centrism. They have proposed comparative models

which can give a more accurate account of the differences in the history of citizenship politics in Western countries. See on this point: Reinhard BENDIX, *Nation-Building and Citizenship: Studies of Our Changing Social Order*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1977, 449 pages; Anthony GIDDENS, "Class, Sovereignty and Citizenship" in *The Nation-State and Violence*, Berkeley & Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1987, pp. 198-221; Bryan S. TURNER, "Outline of a Theory of Citizenship", *op. cit.*, pp. 1-12; Jurgen HABERMAS, "Citizenship and National Identity", in *The Condition of Citizenship*, edited by Bart van STEENBERGEN, London, Sage Publications, 1994, pp. 20-35; Michael MANN, "Ruling Class Strategies and Citizenship", *Sociology*, vol. 21, no 3, 1987, pp. 339-354; Jane JENSON & Susan PHILLIPS, "Regime Shift: New Citizenship Practices in Canada", *Revue Internationale d'études canadiennes*, no 4, 1996, pp. 111-130.

The comparison between distinct historical trajectories has also been made in studies focussing on more specific dimensions of citizenship, such as the development of social policies or the extension of universal suffrage. These studies threw light on the existence of categories of citizens whose definitions have been modified over the years, transforming the forms of exclusion embedded in citizenship policies. They showed how citizenship has been (re)framed by particular social relations (gender, class, ethnic/race, sexual orientation, etc.) For example, see: Gosta ESPING-ANDERSEN, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1988; Jane JENSON, "Citizenship and Equity: Variations across Time and in Space", in *Political Ethics: A Canadian Perspective*, edited by J. HIEBERT, Toronto, Dundurn Press, 1992, (coll. Research Studies of the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing), pp. 195-228; Helga M. HERNES, "The Welfare State Citizenship of Scandinavian Women", in *The Political Interests of Gender*, edited by Kathleen B. JONES & Anna JONASDOTTIR, London, Sage, 1988, pp. 187-193; J. M. BARBALET, *Citizenship: Rights, Struggles and Class Inequality*, Milton Keynes, Open University Press, 1988; Jean LECA, "Individualisme et citoyenneté", in *Sur l'individualisme*, edited by Pierre BIRNBAUM & Jean LECA, Paris, Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1991, pp. 159-209.

⁵ . See on this point: Jurgen HABERMAS, "Citizenship and National Identity", *op. cit.*, pp. 20-35; Rogers BRUBAKER, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1992, 253 pages; Nira YUVAL-DAVIS, *Gender & Nation*, London, Sage publications, 157 pages; T.K. OOMMEN, "Introduction: Conceptualizing the Linkage between Citizenship and National Identity", in *Citizenship and National Identity. From Colonialism to Globalism*, edited by T. K. OOMMEN, London, Sage, 1997, pp. 13-51

⁶ . See on this point: Ursula VOGEL, Michael MORAN, "Introduction", in *The Frontiers of Citizenship*, edited by Ursula VOGEL, Michael MORAN, London, Macmillan, 1991, pp. X-XXI; Joe PAINTER, Chris PHILO, "Spaces of Citizenship: an Introduction", *Political Geography*, vol. 14, no 2, 1995, pp. 107-120; Christopher McALL, "Les murs de la cité: territoires d'exclusion et espaces de citoyenneté", *Lien social et Politiques/RIAC*, no 34, 1995, pp. 81-92; Susan J. SMITH, "Society, Space and Citizenship: Human Geography after the New Right", *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, vol. 14, no 2, pp. 144-156; Gillian ROSE, "The Struggle for Political Democracy: Emancipation, Gender and Geography", *Society and Space*, vol. 8, no 4, 1990, pp. 395-408; Eleonore KOFMAN, "Citizenship for Some but not for Others: Spaces of Citizenship in Contemporary Europe", *Political Geography*, vol. 14, no 2, 1995, pp. 121-138;

⁷ . The literature on social movement has grown in many directions over the recent decades. Cf. Hank JOHNSTON, Enrique LARANA, Joseph R. GUSFIELD, "Identities, Grievances, and New Social Movements", in *New Social Movements. From Ideology to Identity*, Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1994, pp. 5-35; Manuel CASTELLS, *The Power of Identity*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1997, 434 pages; Alberto MELUCCI, *Challenging Codes. Collective Action in the Information Age*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994, 430 pages + index; R.B.J. WALKER, "Social Movements/World Politics", *Millennium*, vol. 23, no 3, 1994, pp. ; Peter MARDEN, "Geographies of Dissent: Globalisation, Identity, and the Nation", *Political Geography*, vol. 16, no 1, 1997, pp. 37-52; Jan Aart SCHOLTE, "The Geography of Collective Identities in a Globalizing World", *Review of International Political Economy*, vol. 3, no 4, 1996, pp. 565-607; Paul ROUTLEDGE, "Resisting and Reshaping the Modern: Social Movements and the Development Process", in *Geographies of Global Change. Remapping the World in the Late Twentieth Century*, edited by R. J. JOHNSTON, Peter J. TAYLOR, Michael J. WATTS, Oxford, Blackwell, 1995, pp. 263-280; David

SLATER, "Spatial Politics/Social Movements", in *Geographies of Resistance*, edited by Steve PILE & Michael KEITH, London, Routledge, 1997, pp. 258-266; Margaret E. KECK and Kathryn SIKKINK, *Activists Beyond Borders. Advocacy Networks in International Politics*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1998, 217 pages + index.

⁸ . The discussions linking globalisation and citizenship remain marginal in the literature on citizenship. There is not yet a distinct field of literature. Rather, this issue has been raised in various fields of research such as: the literature on contemporary social movements; the critical perspectives in international relations, the literature on nationalism, or the regulationist perspective on social policies. See on this point: Richard FALK, "The Making of Global Citizenship", in *The Condition of Citizenship*, edited by Bart van STEENBERGEN, London, Sage, 1994, pp. 127-141; Gilles BOURQUE et Jules DUCHASTEL, Éric PINEAULT, "L'incorporation de la citoyenneté", *Sociologie et sociétés*, vol. 31, no 2, 1999, 41-64; Jocelyn LÉTOURNEAU, *Les Années sans guide. Le Canada à l'ère de l'économie migrante*, Montréal, Boréal, 1996, pp. 179-200; Gilles BRETON, Jane JENSON, "Globalisation et citoyenneté: quelques enjeux actuels", in *L'ethnicité à l'heure de la mondialisation*, edited by Caroline ANDREW, et al., Hull, ACFAS-Outaouais, 1992, pp. 35-55; David HELD, "Democracy, the Nation-State and the Global System", in *Political Theory Today*, edited by David HELD, London, Polity Press, 1991, pp. 197-235; Tony SPYBEY, *Globalization and World Society*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1996; Paul WAPNER, *Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics*, New York, State University of New York Press, 1996.

⁹ . The recent theoretical discussions on citizenship largely focused on the challenges raised by the politics of difference and the protection of minority rights within multinational and pluriethnic states. Some authors would refer with this respect to the establishment of a post-national state. Although they point out the growing inadequacy of the nation-state framework, its replacement by another political institution and spatial framework got less attention. Then, the theoretical propositions aiming at redefining citizenship outside of the nation-state framework remain marginal in the literature. One interesting avenue in this regard derives from the discussions around the establishment of a cosmopolitan democracy at the global level. Cf. Bryan S. TURNER, "Contemporary Problems in the Theory of Citizenship", *op. cit.*, pp. 1-18; Jean LECA, "Questions of Citizenship", in *Dimensions of Radical Democracy*, edited by Chantal MOUFFE, London, Verso, 1992, pp. 17-32; Mary DIETZ, "Context is All", *op. cit.*, pp. 63-82; Will KYMLICKA, *Multicultural Citizenship*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995, 280 pages; Bart van STEENBERGEN, "Toward a Global Ecological Citizen", in *The Condition of Citizenship*, London, Sage, 1994, pp. 141-152; Richard FALK, "The Making of Global Citizenship", *op. cit.*, pp. 127-140; Andrew LINKLATER, "Community and Citizenship in the Post-Westphalian Era", in *The Transformation of Political Community. Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1998, pp. 179-212.

¹⁰ . The literature on globalisation is quite heterogeneous. It is very difficult to present a coherent overview. While being integrated into existing theoretical approaches seeking to explain recent changes, some theories of globalisation have also been elaborated. In this perspective, globalisation is seen as a new step in Western history which would involve the transformation of modernity. Similarities can be found with the way that modernisation was previously discussed in the 1950s and 1960s. For a review of the debates about globalisation, see: Malcolm WATERS, *Globalization*, London, Routledge, 1995, 180 pages + index; Alan SCOTT, "Introduction - Globalization: Social Process or Rhetoric?", in *The Limits of Globalization. Cases and Arguments*, edited by Alan SCOTT, London & New York, Routledge, 1997, pp. 1-22; Gilles BRETON, "Mondialisation et science politique: la fin d'un imaginaire théorique", *Études internationales*, vol. 24, no 3, 1993, pp. 533-547; Steven YEARLEY, "The Sociology of Globalization", in *Sociology. Environmentalism, Globalization*, London, Sage, 1996, pp. 1-25; Susan STRANGE, "Globaloney" *Review of International Political Economy*, vol. 5, no 4, 1998, pp. 704-711; Mike FEATHERSTONE (editor), *Global Culture. Nationalism, Globalization, and Modernity*, London, Sage, 1990, 411 pages; V. Spike PETERSON, "Shifting Ground(s): Epistemological and Territorial Remapping in the Context of Globalization(s)", in *Globalization: Theory and Practice*, edited by Eleonore KOFMAN & Gillian YOUNGS, London, Pinter, 1996, pp. 11-20;

¹¹ . See on this point: Anthony GIDDENS, *The Consequences of Modernity*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1990; David HARVEY, *The Condition of Postmodernity*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1989; Martin ALBROW, *The Global Age*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1996; Roland ROBERTSON, *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture*, London, Sage, 1992; David HELD, Anthony MCGREW,

David GOLDBLATT, Jonathan PERRATON, *Global Transformations. Politics, Economics and Culture*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1999, 498 pages + index ; Barry ALXFORD, *The Global System. Economics, Politics and Culture*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1995, 245 pages + index

¹² . This notion has been proposed by Scholte who wants to emphasise the spatial rupture introduced by globalisation. It indicates that global space is placeless and unbound space and consequently, different from state territory. Cf. Jan Art SCHOLTE, "Towards a Critical Theory of Globalisation", in *Globalization: Theory and Practice*, edited by Eleonore KOFMAN & Gillian YOUNGS, London, Pinter, 1996, pp. 48-52

¹³ . See in this point: James ANDERSON, "The Shifting Stage of Politics: New Medieval and Postmodern Territorialities", *Society and Space*, vol. 14, no 2, 1996; Eleonore KOFMAN "Introduction: A Second Wave", in *Globalization: Theory and Practice*, London, Pinter Publishers, 1996, pp. 1-11; Jan Aart SCHOLTE, "Towards a Critical Theory of Globalisation", in *Globalization: Theory and Practice*, edited by Eleonore KOFMAN & Gillian YOUNGS, London, Pinter Publishers, 1996, pp. 43-67; Kevin R. COX, "Introduction: Globalization and its Politics in Question", in *Spaces of Globalization*, edited by Kevin R. COX, New York, Guilford Press, 1997, pp. 1-17; Gary BRIDGE, "Mapping the Terrain of Time-Space Compression", *Society and Space*, vol. 15, no 5, 1997; Martin ALBROW, John EADE, Jörg DÜRRSCHMIDT, Neil WASHBOURNE, "The Impact of Globalization on Sociological Concepts: Community, Culture, and Milieu", in *Living The Global City. Globalization as a Local Process*, edited by John EADE, London & New York, Routledge, 1997, pp. 20-36; Arjun APPADURAI, *Modernity at Large. Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1996, pp. 1-65

¹⁴ . See on this point: Anthony D. KING (ed.), *Re-presenting the City; Ethnicity, Capital, and Culture in the 21st-century metropolis*, London & New York, Routledge, 1991; Neil BRENNER, "Global Cities, Glocal States: Global City Formation and State Territorial Restructuring in Contemporary Europe", *Review of International Political Economy*, vol. 5, no 1, 1998; Saskia SASSEN, *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1991, 397 pages; Roger KEIL, "Globalization Makes States: Perspectives of Local Governance in the Age of the World City", *Review of International Political Economy*, vol. 5, no 4, 1998, pp. 616-646

¹⁵ . In many analyses, the local is posed in a dialectical way with the global. Globalisation comes along with the transformation of the local level which becomes more and more important. It turns out to be a mediating place through which people tackle changes occurring at the global level. In other words, the local is presented as replacing the national level and consequently, as the locus for politics. It is seen as a locus of resistance from which people can resist to global changes and/or impose to them a new direction. The struggles at the local level explains why globalisation is lived differently over the world and follows various paths. Robertson proposed in this regard the notion of glocalisation to highlight the constant interactions between the global and the local. Cf. Roland ROBERTSON, *op. cit.*, 1992; Jonathan FRIEDMAN, "Global System, Globalization and the Parameters of Modernity" in *Global Modernities*, edited by Mike FEATHERSTONE, Scott LASH, and Roland ROBERTSON, London, Sage, 1995; Stuart HALL, "The Local and the Global; Globalization and Ethnicity", in *Culture, Globalization and the World-System*, edited by Anthony D. KING, Binghamton, State University of New York at Binghamton/Department of Art & Art History, 1991; pp. 19-40; Chadwick F. ALGER, "Local response to global intrusions", in *Globalization and Territorial Identities*, edited by Zdravko MLINAR, Aldershot, Avebury, 1992, pp. 77-104

¹⁶ . For a definition of territoriality, see: Robert SACKS, *Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986, 286 pages; John G. RUGGIE, "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations", *International Organization*, vol. 47, no 1, 1993, pp. 107-143;

¹⁷ . The notion of "unbundling" has been proposed by Ruggie for explaining the emergence of a new form of territoriality which marks a rupture with the modern territoriality. Cf. John G. RUGGIE, "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations", *op. cit.*, pp. 107-108.

¹⁸ . Cf. John AGNEW, Stuart CORBRIDGE, *Mastering Space*; London & New York, Routledge, 1995; James ANDERSON, "The Shifting Stage of Politics", *op. cit.*, 1996; Peter J. TAYLOR, "Embedded Statism and the Social Sciences: Opening Up to New Spaces", *Environment and Planning A*, vol. 28, no 11, 1996; David B. KNIGHT, "People Together, Yet Apart: Rethinking Territory, Sovereignty and Identities", in *Reordering the World. Geopolitical Perspectives on the 21st Century*, edited by George J. DEMKO and

William B. WOOD, Boulder, Westview Press, 1994, pp. 71-86; Doreen MASSEY, "A Global Sense of Place", in *Space, Place and Gender*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1994, pp. 146-154; Jacques LÉVY, *Le Monde pour Cité*, Paris, Hachette, 1996, 143 pages; Jan Jindy PETTMAN, "Border Crossing/Shifting Identities: Minorities, Gender, and the State in International Perspective", in *Challenging Boundaries. Global Flows, Territorial Identities*, edited by Michael J. SHAPIRO and Hayward R. ALKER, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1996, pp. 261-284

¹⁹ . In contrast to historical nationalist movements, the recent nationalist movements aim the setting up of more flexible political arrangements than the establishment of a nation-state. Although the expression "new nationalisms" tends to be applied unrestrictedly to any nationalist movement, it nonetheless reveals the political and spatial changes which seem to characterise the recent changes in the mobilisation of a number of nationalist movements. Cf. Michael KEATING, *Nations Against the State: the new politics of nationalism in Québec, Catalonia and Scotland*, London, Macmillan Press, 1996; Monserrat GUIBERNAU, *Nations without States. Political Communities in a Global Age*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1999, 206 pages + index; Anthony D. SMITH, *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995, 205 pages + index; Peter MARDEN, "Geographies of Dissent: Globalization, Identity and the Nation", *Political Geography*, vol. 16, no 1, 1997, pp. 37-52; Eric J. HOSBAWN, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: program, myth, reality*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990, 191 pages

²⁰ . Cf. Jan Aart SCHOLTE, "The Geography of Collective Identities in a Globalizing World", *op. cit.*, 1996, pp. , Josée BERGERON, *Les frontières matérielles et imaginaires de l'État-providence: les politiques familiales en France, au Canada et au Québec*, Ph.d. Thesis Unpublished, Carleton University, 1997; James ANDERSON *op. cit.*; 1996, pp.; Erik SWYNGEDOWN, "Neither Global nor Local: "Glocalization" and the Politics of Scale", in *Spaces of Globalization*, edited by Kevin R. COX, New York, Guildford Press, 1997; Neil BRENNER, "State Territorial Restructuring and the Production of Scale", *Political Geography*, vol. 16, no 4, 1997; Michael STORPER, "Territories, Flows, and Hierarchies in the Global Economy", in *Spaces of Globalization*, edited by Kevin R. COX, New York, Guildford Press, 1997, pp. 19-44; Arjun APPADURAI, "Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Political Economy", in *Modernity at Large. Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1996, pp. 27-47.

²¹ . The debates in human geography which occurred in the 1970s threw light on the social and spatial implications of space. The importance of looking at the social implications of space was demonstrated, for example, in important studies of regional development or about the inner-cities. Cf. Neil SMITH, *Uneven Development: Nature, Capital and the Production of Space*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1991, 2nd edition; Doreen MASSEY, "Politics and Space/Time", in *Space, Gender, and Gender*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1994, pp. 249-273; Paul CLOKE, Chris PHILO, David SADLER, "Introduction: Changing Approaches to Human Geography", in *Approaching Human Geography. An Introduction to Contemporary Theoretical Debates*, New York Guildford Press, 1991, pp. 1-27; Roger FREIDLAND, Deirdre BODEN, "NowHere: An Introduction to Space, Time, and Modernity", in *NowHere*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1994, pp. 1-10; Peter J. TAYLOR, Michael J. WATTS, Ronald J. JOHNSTON, "Remapping the World: What Sort of Map? What Sort of World?", in *Geographies of Global Change. Remapping the World in the Late Twentieth Century*, edited by R. J. JOHNSTON, Michael J. WATTS, Peter J. TAYLOR, Oxford, Blackwell, 1995, pp. 377-385; Gearoid O TUATHAIL, "Postmodern Geopolitics? The Modern Political Imagination and Beyond", in *Rethinking Geopolitics*, edited by Gearoid O TUATHAIL and Simon DALBY, London & New York, Routledge, 1998, pp. 16-38

²² . See on this point: Bertrand BADIE, Marie-Claude SMOUTS (sous la direction de), *Le retournement du monde. Sociologie de la scène internationale*, Paris, Dalloz & Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1992, 242 pages + index ; Manuel CASTELLS, *The Rise of the Network Society*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1996; Murray LOW, "Representation Unbound: Globalization and Democracy", in *Spaces of Globalization*, edited by Kevin R. COX, New York, Guildford Press, 1997, pp. 240-280; John URRY, "Is the Global a New Space of Analysis", *Environment and Planning A*, vol. 28, no 11, 1996, pp. 1977-1982

²³ See on this point: Murray LOW, *op. cit.*, pp. 240-256; John G. RUGGIE, "Territoriality at the Millennium's End", in *Constructing the World Polity*, London & New York, Routledge, 1998, pp. 172-197; John AGNEW, *Geopolitics. Re-Visioning World Politics*, London & New York, Routledge, 1998, 143 pages + index; R.B.J. WALKER, "State Sovereignty and the Articulation of Political Space/Time", *Millennium*, vol. 20, no 3, 1991

²⁴ . The notion of scale has recently got attention by some authors who argued for the need of theorising it. It has generally taken as a geographical characteristic specifying the location of an issue or object. Its political implications have been so far left aside. They argued that the delimitation of the scales constitutes a critical stake which explain why some issues are localised within some spaces and excluded from others. This is why some authors refer to the politics of scale for illustrating the social and power implications of the delimitation of scales. To look at the notion of scale allows to broaden the understanding of the various facets of the social construction of space. See on these points: Neil SMITH, "Geography, Difference and the Politics of Scale", in *Postmodernism and the Social Sciences*, edited by Joe DOHERTY, Elspeth GRAHAM, Mo MALEK, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1992, pp. 57-79; John AGNEW, "Representing Space: Space, Scale, and Culture in Social Science", in *Place/Culture/Representation*, edited by James DUNCAN, James LEY, New York, Routledge, 1993, pp. ; David DELANEY, Helga LEITNER, "The Political Construction of Scale", *Political Geography*, vol. 16, no 2, 1997, pp. 93-97; Andrew JONAS, "The Scale Politics of Spatiality", *Society and Space*, vol. 12, no 3, 1994, pp. 257-264;

²⁵ . Cf. Neil SMITH, "Homeless/Global: Scaling Places", in *Mapping the Futures. Local Cultures, Global Changes*, edited by John BIRD, Barry CURTIS, Tim PUTNAM, et al, New York, Routledge, 1993, pp. 87-119; Kevin R. COX, "Spaces of Dependence, Spaces of Engagement and the Politics of Scale, or : Looking for Local Politics", *Political Geography*, vol. 17, no 1, 1998, pp. 1-24; Dennis R. JUDD, "The Case of Missing Scales: a commentary on Cox", *Political Geography*, vol. 17, no 1, 1998, pp. 29-34; Lynn A. STAEHEL, "Empowering Political Struggle: Spaces and Scales of Resistance", *Political Geography*, vol. 13, no 5, 1994, pp. 5-16.

²⁶ . Cf. Kevin R. COX, "Introduction", 1997, pp. 1-10 ; Erik SWYNGEDOWN, *op. cit.*, pp. 115-136; Alain LIPIETZ, "The Local and the Global: Regional Individuality or Interregionalism?", *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, vol. 18, 1993, pp. 8-18; Neil SMITH, *Uneven Development: Nature, Capital, and the Production of Space*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1991; Simon DUNCAN, Mike SAVAGE, "Space, Scale and Locality", *Antipode*, vol. 21, no 3, 1989, pp. 179-206.

²⁷ . Cf. Richard FALK, *op. cit.*, 1993, pp. 127-140; Bart van STEENBERGEN, *op. cit.*, 1993, pp. 141-152; Bryan S. TURNER, *op. cit.*, 1994, ; Albert WEALE, "Citizenship Beyond Borders", in *The Frontiers of Citizenship*, edited by Ursula VOGEL & Michael MORAN, London, Macmillan, 1991, pp. 155-165; Howard NEWBY, "Citizenship in a Green World: Global Commons and Human Stewardship", in *Citizenship Today. The Contemporary Relevance of T. H. Marshall*, edited by Martin BULMER & Anthony M. REES, London, UCL Press, 1996, pp. 209-221;

²⁸ . There is not as such a definition of citizenship which is widely accepted by the authors discussing citizenship. Of course, there are some common elements which can be identified and which distinguish the modern citizenship from the previous models. Cf. Bryan S. TURNER, Peter HAMILTON, "General Commentary", in *Citizenship. Critical Concepts*, edited by Bryan S. TURNER and Peter HAMILTON, vol. 1, London, Routledge, 1994, pp. I-XI; Jean LECA, "Questions of Citizenship", *op. cit.*, pp. 17-32; Stephen KALBERG, "Cultural Foundations of Modern Citizenship", in *Citizenship and Social Theory*, edited by Bryan S. TURNER, London, Sage, 1993, pp. 91-114; Herman van GUNSTEREN, "Four Conceptions of Citizenship", in *The Condition of Citizenship*, edited by Bart van STEENBERGEN, London, Sage, 1994, pp. 36-48; Ursula VOGEL, "Is Citizenship gender-Specified?", in *The Frontiers of Citizenship*, edited by Ursula VOGEL and Michael MORAN, London, Macmillan, 1991, pp. 58-85; Stuart HALL & David HELD, "Citizens and Citizenship", in *New Times*, edited by Martin JACQUES & David HELD, London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1991; Pierre BIRNBAUM, *op. cit.*, pp. 57-85; Jean LECA, "La citoyenneté entre la nation et la société civile", in *Citoyenneté et nationalité: perspectives en France et au Québec*, edited by Dominique COLAS, Claude EMERI, Jacques ZYLBERBERG, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1991, pp. 479-505.

²⁹ . Cf. Jean LECA, "Questions on Citizenship", *op. cit.*, p. 17.

³⁰ . The importance of the issue of the participation of citizens has been nicely demonstrated in the Marshall's analysis. This issue has played a critical role in the history of modern citizenship. It is through the redefinition of the forms and locales of political participation that citizenship has been redefined over the years. See on this point: Joe PAINTER, Chris PHILO, *op. cit.*, pp. 107-120; Michael MORAN & Ursula VOGEL, *op. cit.*, pp. X-XXI; Bart van STEENBERGEN, "The Condition of Citizenship: an Introduction",

edited by Bart van STEENBERGEN, London, Sage, 1994, pp. 1-10; Nancy FRASER, "Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy, in *The Phantom Public Sphere*, edited by Bruce ROBBINS, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1993, pp. 1-32.

³¹ . For an illustration of citizenship sites, see: Christopher McALL, *op. cit.*, pp. 81-92; Anthony GIDDENS, "Class, Sovereignty, and Citizenship", *op. cit.*, pp. 198-221; Bryan S. TURNER, "Contemporary Problems in the Theory of Citizenship", *op. cit.*, pp. 1-18.

³² . Cf. Jean LECA, "Questions of citizenship", *op. cit.*, pp. 17-32; Roger BRUBAKER, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, Harvard, Cambridge University Press, 265 pages + index; Dominique SCHNAPPER, *La communauté des citoyens. Sur l'idée moderne de nation*, Paris, Gallimard, 1994; Christopher McALL, *op. cit.*, pp. 81-92;

³³ . See on this point: Joe PAINTER, Chris PHILO, *op. cit.*, pp. 107-112; Nira YUVAL-DAVIS, "The Citizenship Debate: Women, the State and Ethnic Processes", *Feminist Review*, no 39, 1991, pp. 58-68; Frederick KRATCHOWIL, "Citizenship: On the Border of Order", in *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*, edited by Yosef LAPID & Fredrich KRATOCHWIL, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996, pp. 181-201; bell hooks, *Yearning: Race, Gender and Cultural Politics*, London, Turnaround, 1991.

³⁴ . See on this point : Jean LECA, "Questions on Citizenship", *op. cit.*, pp. 21-22; Peter MARDEN, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-64; Jurgen HABERMAS, *op. cit.*, pp. 255-264; Charles TILLY, "The Emergence of Citizenship in France and Elsewhere", *International Review of Social History*, vol. 40, no 3, 1995, pp. 223-236.

³⁵ . The debates in human geography which occurred in the 1970s sought to give to space an epistemological and ontological status to space similarly to the one given to time. They sought to demonstrate that spaces makes a difference. They threw light on the social and spatial implications of space. For a review of this debates, see: Doreen MASSEY, "New Directions in Space", in *Social Relations and Spatial Structures*, edited by Derek GREGORY & John URRY, London, Macmillan, 1985, pp. 9-19; Paul CLOKE, Chris PHILO, David SADLER, "Introduction: Changing Approaches to Human Geography", in *Approaching Human Geography. An Introduction to Contemporary Theoretical Debates*, New York, Guildford Press, 1991, pp. 1-27; Roger FRIEDLAND, Deirdre BODEN, "NowHere: An Introduction to Space, Time, and Modernity", in *NowHere*, edited by Roger FRIEDLAND and Deirdre BODEN, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1994, pp. 1-10, Edward W. SOJA, *Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory*, London, Verso, 1989; Gillian ROSE, *Feminism and Geography. The Limits of Geographical Knowledge*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1993, 202 pages + index

³⁶ . Cf. Henri LEFEBVRE, *The Production of Space*, Translated by Donald NICHOLSON-SMITH, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1991, 434 pages + index

³⁷ . See on this point: Neil SMITH, "Geography, Difference, and the Politics of Difference", *op. cit.*, pp. 57-76; Doreen MASSEY, "Politics and Space/Time", in *Space, Place and Gender*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 19994, pp. 249-273; John AGNEW, "Representing Space: Space, Scale and Culture in Social Sciences", *op. cit.*, 1993, pp. 251-271.

³⁸ . Cf. John AGNEW, "Representing Space", *op. cit.*, p. 263,

³⁹ . Cf. John AGNEW, *Geopolitics. Re-visioning World Politics*, London & New York, Routledge, 1998, pp. 49-66; Peter MARDEN, "Geographies of Dissent: Globalisation, Identity, and the Nation", *op. cit.*, pp. 37-64; R. B. J. WALKER, "State Sovereignty and the Articulation of Political Space/Time", *Millennium*, vol. 20, no 3, 1990, pp. 452-463;

⁴⁰ . See on this point; Murray LOW, *op. cit.*, pp. 240-255; John AGNEW, *Place and Politics: The Geographical Mediation of State and Society*, Boston, Allen & Unwin, 1987, pp. 1-35; Akhil GUPTA & James GERGUSON, "'Beyond Culture': Space, Identity, and the Politics of Difference", in *Culture, Power, Place, Explorations in Critical Anthropology*, Durham, Duke University Press, 1997, pp. 33-51; R. B. J. WALKER, "State Sovereignty and the Articulation of Space/Time", *op. cit.*, pp. 452-463;

⁴¹ . Cf. Neil SMITH, "Homeless/Global: Scaling Places", *op. cit.*, pp. 87-118; Andrew G. JONAS, *op. cit.*, pp. 257-264; Kevin R. COX, "Spaces of Dependence, Spaces of Engagement, and the Politics of Scale, or Looking for Local Politics", *op. cit.*, pp. 1-24; Lynn A. STAEHLI, *op. cit.*, pp. 383-397; Andrew HEROD,

"The Production of Scale in US Labour Relations", *Area*, vol. 23, 1991, pp. 82-88; Byron MILLER, "Political Empowerment, Local-Central State Relations, and Geographically Shifting Political Opportunity Structures: Strategies of the Cambridge, Massachusetts Peace Movement", *Political Geography*, vol. 13, no 5, 1994, pp. 393-406; Helga LEITNER, "Reconfiguring the Spatiality of Power: The Construction of a Supranational Migration Framework for the European Union", *Political Geography*, vol. 16, no 2, 1997, pp. 123-143

⁴² . See on this point; Kevin R. COX, "Spaces of Dependence, Spaces of Engagement", *op. cit.*, pp. 1-24; Dennis R. JUDD, "The Case of Missing Scales", *op. cit.*, pp. 29-34; Kevin R. COX, "Representation and Power in the Politics of Scale", *Political Geography*, vol. 17, no 1, 1998, pp. 41-44

⁴³ . V. Spike PETERSON, "Shifting Ground(s): Epistemological and Territorial Remapping in the Context of Globalization(s)", *Globalization: Theory and Practice*, edited by Eleonore KOFMAN & Gillian YOUNGS, London, Pinter, 1996, pp. 11-14; Richard FALK, *Predatory Globalization. A Critique*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1999, 213 pages + index; Zygmunt BAUMAN, *Globalization: The Human Consequences*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1998, 133 pages + index; Ralf DAHRENDORF, "Economic Opportunity, Civil Society and Political Liberty", in *Social Futures, Global Visions*, Oxford, Blackwell and UNRISD, 1996, pp. 19-38

⁴⁴ . Globalisation has been largely discussed as bringing in a decrease of state sovereignty. It was expected that the emergence of supranational modes of governance such as the European Community (EC) or the trading treaties, would gradually gain a greater political authority. However, some recent studies show that the opposition between globalisation and state sovereignty is not straightforward. It has been argued that globalisation would rather imply a redrawing of the state sphere of interventions beyond and across state borders, suggesting the redefinition of its sovereignty outside of state borders and not necessarily its disappearance. Those studies rather suggests that state sovereignty is being reinforced with respect to some sectors of activities, notably at the economic level. Cf. Kenichi OHMAE, *The End of the Nation-State: The Rise of Regional Economies*, New York, Free Press, 1995; Joseph A. CAMILLERI, Jim FALK, *The End of Sovereignty? Politics in a Shrinking and Fragmenting World*, Aldershot, Elgar, 1992; Stephen D. KRASNER, Janice THOMPSON, (to be completed); Robin BROWN, "Globalization and the End of the National Project", in *Boundaries in Question. New Directions in International Relations*, edited by John MACMILLAN & Andrew LINKLATER, London, Pinter, 1995, pp. 4-53

⁴⁵ . Cf. R.B.J. WALKER, "Sovereignty, Identity, Community: Reflections on the Horizons of Contemporary Political Practice", in *Contending Sovereignities. Redefining Political Community*, edited by R.B.J. WALKER & Saul H. MENDLOVITZ, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990, pp. 159-186; Alexander B. MURPHY, "The Sovereign State as Political-Territorial Ideal: historical and contemporary considerations", in *State Sovereignty as Social Construct*, edited by Thomas B. BIERSTEKER & Cynthia WEBER, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 81-120; Joseph A. CAMILLERI, Jim FALK, *op. cit.*, pp. ;

⁴⁶ . The recognition of national sovereignty was based on the integration of two different forms of sovereignty: state sovereignty and popular community. Whereas the first is based on the recognition of the state as the exclusive basis of political authority, the second rather insists on the delegation of its authority by the people. With the notion of popular sovereignty came along the idea of state legitimacy and popular participation in politics. Of course, to discuss about the recognition of national sovereignty makes only sense in regard to the situation of Western countries. In other world regions, this notion largely constitutes a fiction. For a discussion about the implications of national sovereignty, see: J. Samuel BARKIN, Bruce CRONIN, "The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and the Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations", *International Organization*, vol. 48, no 1, 1994, pp. 107-130; Roxanne Lynn DOTY, "Sovereignty and the Nation: Constructing the Boundaries of National Identity", in *State Sovereignty as Social Construct*, edited by Thomas J. BIERSTEKER, Cynthia WEBER, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 121-147; Charles TILLY, "States and Nationalism in Europe, 1492-1992", *Theory and Society*, vol. 23, no 1, 1994, pp. 137-142; James ANDERSON, "Nationalist Ideology and Territory", in *Nationalism, Self-Determination and Political Geography*, edited by R. J. JOHNSTON, D. B. KNIGHT, and e. KOFMAN, London, Crown Helm, 1988, pp. 18-39;

⁴⁷ . Cf. Anthony GIDDENS, *The Constitution of Society*, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-41; Derek GREGORY, "Presences and absences: time-space relations and structuration theory", in *Social Theory of Modern Societies*.

Anthony Giddens and His Critics, edited by David HELD & John B. THOMPSON, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 185-214..

CHAPTER 2. THE LAUNCHING OF THE JAMES BAY PROJECT: THE PURSUIT OF QUÉBEC'S NATIONAL AFFIRMATION?

For most Québécois, the James Bay region was almost unknown until the Liberal government of Robert Bourassa launched its hydroelectric project in 1971. The region was represented by the government in terms of its promising economic potential which was supposed to constitute a new gold rush. The hydro-electric development of the James Bay hydraulic basin constituted a major decision which subsequently framed the energy policy of Québec government. It also represented a turning point in the history of Hydro-Québec. However, this issue goes beyond its economic consequences. In spite of what the Bourassa government affirmed at the time, it was more than simply an economic policy. The subsequent struggles around the project revealed its cultural and political implications. The first phase of James Bay hydro-electric development, which was mainly based on the La Grande complex, brought in new political issues raised, among others, by Native peoples of that region and by ecology and environmentalist groups. It revealed the empowerment of contemporary social movements within Québécois and Canadian societies and at the same time, the reconfiguration of both political scenes. While resulting from the political setting established by the Quiet Revolution, the James Bay project was the prelude to major political and socio-economic changes which took place during the 1970s. It thus revealed a major remapping of Québec citizenship which became strongly articulated to the Québec territory.

This chapter introduces the principal actors and dimensions of the James Bay hydroelectric development during the first phase. Its genesis, and especially its political and cultural backgrounds, will be discussed. Through these discussions, we map the politics of the James Bay project, bringing out the articulations of the first phase with particular territorial and national representations of the Québec state politics. This will indicate how the James Bay project referred to specific conceptions of citizenship and sovereignty. Another objective of this chapter is to highlight some major transformations of the Québec political scene which formed the socio-political context in which the James Bay project was rooted. The

launching of the project, and the significance given to it by the Bourassa government, were undeniably linked to the restructuring of Québec politics which occurred during the "Quiet Revolution". The discussion of these two objectives aims to illustrate the dual spatiality of the James Bay project. Although it was a regional project framed by the bio-physical characteristics of the James Bay area, it also constituted a national issue which was linked to the rescaling of Québec politics launched by the "Quiet Revolution".

This chapter is divided in three sections. In the first section, we will have a brief overview of the main changes which occurred during the so-called "Quiet Revolution". We will emphasise the major redefinition of the state's role and the transformation of the parameters structuring the formation of collective identities. Particular attention will be paid to the nationalisation of Hydro-Québec which came to symbolise more than any other institution the newness brought by the "Quiet Revolution". In the second section, we will discuss the political "discovery" of the James Bay region during the 1960s. Although this region came to be under the Québec jurisdiction in 1912, it was only from the 1950s that the Québec government started to manifest interest and to develop infrastructure. Although it did not resolve the ambiguity around the legal status of this territory, we will see that the establishment of the Direction Générale du Nouveau-Québec by the Québec government was in this regard a turning point. Finally, we will describe the launching of the James Bay project, focussing on its technical and political implications. A particular attention will be paid to the arguments used by the Liberal government to legitimate the project.

2.1 The "Quiet Revolution": the Entrance of Québec into a New Era

The beginning of the "Quiet Revolution" is generally associated with the election of the Liberal Party in 1960. This election was seen as ending a long period of "grande noirceur" associated with the rule of Maurice Duplessis, leader of the "Union Nationale" party. The election of a new government led by Jean Lesage came to signify the advent of modernity within the Québec.¹ That significance resulted not only from the electoral platform of the Liberal Party, but also from the several issues raised during the preceding decade. This event assumed a large symbolic and political importance, coming to be seen as a "rupture" with the past which deeply transformed Québec society. This electoral campaign signified to a

large extent the achievement of many discussions and debates which had gradually reached the political realm in spite of the opposition of the Duplessis government. This furthered the insertion of new issues within the public sphere, notably social and economic rights issues. The slogan "*c'est le temps que ça change*" used by the Liberal Party reflected this attempt to present the election as a turning point for Québec society. The establishment of a new model of society which would be more adequate, democratic, and conform to a modern society became itself a major issue of the electoral campaign.

Although the two mandates of the Liberal government with Jean Lesage as Prime Minister are generally seen as key period of the Quiet Revolution, the political dynamic engendered at that time went well beyond that. Until the end of the 1970s, Québec politics was still largely shaped by the political discourses and institutions originating from the Quiet Revolution. This did not mean that the changes were continuous. The end of the 1960s was a period during which criticisms of the reforms and policies previously adopted surged. It was at that time that the Québec government was confronted with political violence from F.L.Q., which was the prelude to the "October crisis", and serious economic problems (inflation, unemployment). This period was marked by important strikes in the public sector which brought in substantial reforms in labour relations. The expected changes, notably at the economic level, had not come yet, especially for the labour unions, social movements and the popular sector. Popular discontent in Québec also reflected the vast demonstrations that occurred in the other Western countries in the same period. Although the Bourassa government adopted important reforms (health insurance) and established new institutions which deepened and broadened the previous reforms of the Quiet Revolution, it was not able to recreate a large-scale mobilisation around its political program. The election of the Parti Québécois in 1976 with a social-democratic and sovereigntist platform constituted a turning point. Its election represented in many respects an extension of the Quiet Revolution, especially by incarnating a new era in Québec history.

In the following pages, we will sketch out some major changes which resulted from the "Quiet Revolution". We will emphasise three important structural changes which framed this redefinition of Québec social and power relations: the reinforcement of Québec state sovereignty; the process of rescaling of Québec politics engaged by the Québec nationalist movement; and the development of

Québec citizenship politics. They reflected an important rescaling of Québec politics through which the Québec territory came to be seen as the predominant Québec political scene. This involved the redrawing of national scales around it, and consequently, the calling into question of the Canadian scale. By discussing these political and economic changes, we will outline the political setting which framed the launching of the James Bay project. This will allow to explain how and why its national and territorial dimensions came to be at stake.

The Beginning of a Period of Transition during the 1950s

Although the "Quiet Revolution" is often seen as a sudden and vast upheaval of the Québec society, this passage to the "modernity" was not so abrupt.² The discourse legitimising the "Quiet Revolution" tended to describe the Duplessis era more as conservative and hidebound than it was. In fact, the reforms of the Liberal government of Jean Lesage confirmed some changes which appeared during the Duplessis era.³ Although the Catholic Clergy and the Duplessis government attempted to perpetuate a "traditional" societal framework, the traditional society based on the French-Canadian collective identity had largely vanished after the Second World War. There was a gap and the contradictions were becoming more and more apparent between the Québec socio-economy on the one hand and on the other hand, the ruling institutions and the polity. The collective representations of the society carried by the dominant political and social discourses became less significant and at the same time, more contested. During the fifties, it was clear that Québec no longer constituted a pre-industrial society despite the elites' rhetoric. The Clergy was no longer able adequately to fulfil its obligations in the education and social sectors. The social fabric was greatly modified by many deep changes such as the growing urbanisation, the intensification of industrialisation and demographic changes. This was furthered by the economic prosperity which occurred during that period. The structure of the labour market and the family were considerably altered and increasingly resembled to those of the other industrialised countries. Increased participation by women in the labour market as well as the rise of a labour movement outside of the Clergy's structure signalled the disintegration of the existing social order.⁴

Furthermore, the kind of specificity of French-Canadian society claimed by the political and

religious elites continued to weaken insofar as the Québec economy during the 1950s became integrated into the continental economy. The greater presence of the U.S. multinational corporations resulting from the rise of U.S. investments largely accelerated this integration. This significantly increased the foreign or more particularly the U.S. control on the Québec economy with the assent of the Duplessis government. Duplessis' economic policy which consisted of granting the exploitation of natural resources to U.S. companies at very advantageous conditions gave rise to several discussions and concerns.⁵ The control of the main economic sectors by the Anglophone bourgeoisie of Montréal or by American interests was seen more and more as alienating and a barrier to the accession of Francophones to the decision-making process. This grievance constituted during the sixties a major public issue that the "Quiet Revolution" attempted to remedy.

These economic and social changes opened the way for a restructuring of social relations in Québec while furthering a new configuration of power relations. This constituted a fertile soil for the growth of new ideas and new identities. During the fifties, there was an intellectual ferment reflecting a greater plurality within the society.⁶ Different economic, political and social currents traversed society and contributed to delegitimise the ruling authorities. The ideological spectrum became more diversified with the rise of a Left which oscillated between socialism and social-democracy; Catholicism itself became more divided between its social branch and its conservative branch. Ideological diversity appeared through the several criticisms formulated against the Duplessis regime and debates raised at that time. Criticism coming from different groups within civil society contained many elements which constituted the basis of the "Quiet Revolution".⁷ In spite of the substantial divergences between them, there were some convergences. While reclaiming the end of the bribery and corruption, the diverse criticisms and analyses pointed out the necessity to deeply reform a society which appeared to them to be backward. Democratisation and the modernisation of society by economic, political and social reforms emerged as two major claims expressed by many groups and by the new generation of intellectuals.

The criticisms and claims acquired a significance since they fit into the political context of the time. They rested not only on an internal analysis of the society, but also on a comparison with the neighbouring societies. They were related to a major questioning about the French-Canadian society

provoked by the Duplessis government. The specificity of Québec and its future constituted central concerns of many discussions. They underlay the major political project of Duplessis, that is, to achieve provincial autonomy. Defence of provincial autonomy determined relations with the federal government which was accused of having centralising designs. The desire to repatriate constitutional powers and, by the Québec government, to protect its prerogatives introduced a dynamic in federal/provincial relations which persisted well past this time. Although that objective was largely defined by Duplessis in terms of constitutional powers, it also had a nationalist connotation. Provincial autonomy could be easily presented and understood as required for the preservation of the distinctiveness of the French-Canada.⁸

Those concerns about the rights and powers and the future of the French-Canada were also raised by the "Commission Tremblay" or more exactly the Québec Royal Commission on Constitutional Problems. This commission, set up in 1953, was initially supposed to clarify the division of powers between the different levels of government but, it went beyond its mandate. Its report released in 1956 defined in an exhaustive way the specificity of French-Canada and identified the main problems threatening its survival. The authors pointed out that the French-Canada faced important perils, notably, the assimilation through industrialisation and the centralisation of powers by the federal government. They proposed, then, a clear separation of the powers between the governments in order to preserve the specificity of French-Canada. In other words, the Tremblay Commission provided arguments for the provincial autonomy sought by Duplessis. It is important to point out that this Commission had an impact on Québec politics even if its recommendations were not followed up. It introduced some new ideas which were subsequently adopted. For example, the Commission saw the Constitution as a treaty between two peoples and not only between provinces. Furthermore, the authors affirmed that the Québec constituted the cornerstone of French-Canada and at the same time, the only structure which could defend it. They also raised major problems, such as the education system and the social security, which were taken into consideration by the Lesage government.⁹

This very brief overview of changes occurring during the 1950s reveals that Québec society was to a large extent at a turning point. A growing part of the population demanded reform; and different representations of society filtered into the public sphere. This prepared the ground for the leaders of the

"Quiet Revolution" who succeeded in grasping this opportunity. The "Quiet Revolution" was thus represented as the beginning of a new phase in the Québec history. Even if the thesis of "rupture" can be contested, this is the interpretation that the Lesage government carried and imposed. The "Quiet Revolution" constituted thus a particular response to the gap between the socio-economy and the polity. That response entailed, among other things, three major structural trends which are particularly relevant for our analysis: the intensification of Québec state-making process, the empowerment of a new collective identity, that is, the modern Québécois opposed to what became the traditional French-Canadian; and the redefinition of the spatiality of Québec politics and implicitly, the emergence of a new territoriality. Our discussion of these three trends in the following pages will illustrate how they contributed to modify the contours of the Québec political community. These processes favoured the emergence of a new configuration of power relations within Québec, and at the same time, the redefinition of the place of Québec at the national and international levels. They opened up spaces for new identities within the political realm while redrawing the sphere of state intervention. These social and political changes which had important cultural repercussions lay within a movement of democratisation of Québec society. The redefinition of the nationalist movement which became dominant but also more fragmented will be stressed insofar as it concerned these processes and directly brought up the issues of citizenship and sovereignty.

The Emergence of a New Discourse on Québec

The beginning of the "Quiet Revolution" is inseparable from the adoption and the imposition of a new political discourse on both the Québec and the Québécois. The Lesage government succeeded to impose it with the support of a new intelligentsia which played an important role at that time.¹⁰ The intellectuals were simultaneously actors and interpreters of the "Quiet Revolution".¹¹ They contributed to legitimise the reforms undertaken by the Lesage government while participating in their elaboration. The Lesage government got also the support from French Canadian business people and manufacturers. The new discourse carried by these social forces rested on two important assumptions. Firstly, using a liberal modernist framework, it assumed that neighbouring societies were entering into a specific phase of the modernity. This phase was seen as the age of scientific rationalisation in which the social and economic

development of society can be planned. The state and science were two fundamental tools playing a major role on that score. Largely influenced by the Keynesian ideas, they perceived that the capitalism itself had changed since the Great Depression. Considering that the period of "competitive capitalism" had ended, they envisaged a greater involvement of the state in the economy as well as a transformation of labour relations. It is on the basis of that particular representation of modernity that many important reforms of the "Quiet Revolution" were elaborated. That constituted the horizon that must be reached. This opened the door to the emergence of a technocracy which framed important reforms undertaken by the successive Québec governments at the end of the 1960s.¹²

The second assumption stems to a large extent from the first. In relation to that conception of modernity, French-Canadian society was then defined as backward and a prisoner of its past. Some important structural problems which stood in the way of Québec's access to modernity were pointed out. The deficiencies of the education system, the economic inferiority of the French-Canadians and a traditional mentality resistant to progress were often identified as major obstacles which had to be overcome.¹³ Thus, it became more and more underlined that the Québec trajectory should be modified and the advent of modernity had to be provoked. The setting up of a modern society and collective being appeared as the solution to the Québec backwardness. This necessity of remedying the economic and political backwardness of French-Canadian society was a dominant issue which came out of academic research as well as from the major parliamentary commissions during the sixties. To catch up to the train of modernity, and more particularly Ontario, was the leitmotiv shared by those who sustained the "Quiet Revolution". Ontario constituted on many aspects the measure for determining the progress that had to be done.¹⁴

The dynamic underlying the "Quiet Revolution" was then based on the political will to achieve the economic and political development of Québec. This was linked to a new discourse that contributed to construct two collective identities opposed to each other. The representation of what should be the modern Québec society and the Québécois was related to the traditional French-Canadian society and the French-Canadian. A Québec society which should be modern, democratic, rational, secular and educated was counterpoised to the French-Canadian society defined as traditional, rural, Catholic and

inward-looking. However, this did not imply a complete rejection of the French-Canadian past, but rather the re-invention of a tradition aiming to reinforce the specificity and the authenticity of the Québec collective identity.¹⁵ This rested on a new way of seeing the distinctiveness of Québec which has always been an important political issue through the Québec history. In the following pages, we will emphasise two elements of this new discourse: its nationalist and territorial dimensions. Both proposed new representations of Québec referring to a new Québec-ness and contributed to redefine the scales of Québec politics.

The Transformation of the Québec Nationalist Movement

The issue of the Québec distinctiveness remained important insofar as the modernist discourse behind the "Quiet Revolution" was largely shaped by nationalist arguments. This new collective identity framed by the "Quiet Revolution" was not only thought as modern, but also as being national.¹⁶ This objective of developing a Québec modern society was often discussed through a nationalist framework. The period of the "Quiet Revolution" constituted in fact a period where the nationalist movement saw important transformations, and at the same time, a growing visibility. The transformation of the Québec nationalist movement implied then the empowerment of a new discourse and new representatives and leading groups. What is often characterised as a neo-nationalism¹⁷ corresponded to the emergence of new actors as well as to the redefinition of the meaning systems structuring the nationalist discourse. It clearly appeared at that time that the nationalist debates reflected different ways of representing the Québec nation in comparison to the preceding period while using different and/or new terms for defining and articulating its interests. The fading away of the discourse associated to the French-Canadian nationalism which was mainly disseminated by the Clergy and the Duplessis government indicated that the nationalist movement was taking new directions. French-Canadian nationalism was confronted with new and competing representations of the nation which was decreasingly defined as French-Canadian, but rather as Québécois. This representation of French-Canadian people as rural, Catholic and not necessarily living in the province of Québec was gradually dismissed. The conservatism characterising that nationalism appeared increasingly inconsistent and even in contradiction with the modernist aspirations expressed by several groups.¹⁸

This redefinition of the nationalist discourse reflected a broader transformation of the Québec nationalist movement during the 1960s. It revealed the launching of a process of jumping scales by the nationalist movement which involved a rearticulation of its spatial basis around the Québec territory or the province of Québec. The latter became the main locus around which revolved its claims and strategies of mobilisation. This downward process aimed to transform the Québec political space into an emancipatory space. It appeared that the process was largely successful with the predominance of nationalist claims in the Québec universe of political discourse and on the Québec political agenda. This was particularly evident with the emergence of contemporary social movements such as the women's movement, the ecology movement and the anti-nuclear movement. They have been confronted with the nationalist movement which often constituted a filter or an obstacle for their claims. Whereas their claims are not necessarily on the nationalist movement's agenda, their agendas are quite often shaped by the nationalist claims.

The content as well as the significance given to national issues thus were changing. The political community grasped or, to paraphrase Benedict Anderson¹⁹, "imagined" by nationalists was now restricted to the Québec boundaries. Québec was less and less designated as a province and more discussed as a state or as people inhabiting a territory. The Québécois emerged as the new identity figure of the nationalist movement. This implied new definitions of what constituted the "us" and the "other". The development of a modern nation that would allow Québec to get the same political status of the European countries became a core claim within the nationalist discourse. That consciousness of forming a modern nation brought out the issue of transforming Québec into a nation-state and therefore, the question of independence.

Although this issue of independence became central to the nationalist movement, it is important to point out that the latter was at same time fragmented or divided by different ideological trends. There were in fact different responses to the issue of independence and more generally, different definitions of the Québec nation. We can identify three types of nationalism which have had an influence on Québec politics during the 1960s and 1970s: a liberal nationalism, a social-democratic nationalism and a socialist nationalism.²⁰ Each of these nationalisms proposed different and quite often opposite readings of the

Québec situation.

The liberal nationalism had been the one that largely legitimated and shaped the "Quiet Revolution". The main slogans used by the Lesage government such as "maîtres chez nous" reflected very well this type of nationalism. While recognising the historical specificity of Québec society, the necessity of becoming a modern, industrial, secular and urban society was a central issue for the liberal nationalism. The Québec state appeared as the main tool for coming out of its backwardness. The economic and social reforms that were advocated by this new nationalism conformed to the main principles of political and economic liberalism. Although liberal nationalism did not support the Québec independence, it demanded, however, new constitutional arrangements that would take into account the historical role of Québec in the federation. It is from that type of nationalism that the claims based on the "Québec particular status" or on the "theory of two founding nations" emerged. This opened the door to claims made at Québec level as well as the federal level about the recognition of francophones. Moreover, it is this type of nationalism which explained the departure of the "trois colombes" (Trudeau, Marchand, Pelletier) for Ottawa and the Québec Liberal party's constitutional position.

The two other types of nationalism overlapped since both were based on two ideological movements that acquired an increasing influence during the sixties: socialism and social-democracy.²¹ These nationalisms revealed some similarities, notably in regard to their reading of the Québec political, economic and social situation. Contrarily to liberal nationalism, they did not represent Québec society as being monolithic and homogeneous, as they recognised that it was divided by class struggles. The national issues were posed within a class framework. In addition, both assumed that Québec constituted a minority whose interests were not taken into consideration within the federal system. The impossibility of reforming federalism as the necessity of ending the existing forms of exploitation made it clear that independence was the only possible avenue. Furthermore, Québec independence was also justified by both nationalisms in regard to the right of peoples to self-determination recognised by international law. Strongly influenced by movements of national liberation in Africa and Asia, the Québec was described as being under a colonial situation.²² The process of decolonisation occurring at that time, which was supported by the United Nations provided a legitimisation for their claims.

However, those elements of convergence between the socialist nationalism and the social-democratic nationalism did not imply that they had the same political program. Social-democratic nationalism appeared less radical insofar as it did not advocate a dramatic change to the Québec political regime. Through the years, it became closely associated with the Parti Québécois which has rather tended to put aside the radical and controversial aspects in order to broaden its electoral basis.²³ Until the end of the 1970s, however, it maintained its independentist orientation through the sovereignty-association option within a social-democratic program; the latter was very close to the social-democracy existing within the Scandinavian countries. The situation of socialist nationalism was quite different insofar as it did not mobilise large sectors of the population. But, it nevertheless had an important impact on Québec politics.

Socialist nationalism was favoured by intellectuals, but it also exercised a strong influence over the labour unions. Its dissemination had been facilitated through the review "Parti Pris" which, during the 1960s, had a vast intellectual influence. For the left, it represented the equivalent of "Cité libre". Using a marxist-leninist framework, socialist nationalism questioned the conditions allowing the exploitation of Québécois and at the same time, the requirements for the Revolution. This form of nationalism was the only one which raised the issue of the use of violence for transforming society. The Front de libération du Québec (F.L.Q.), a terrorist group which was particularly active at the end of the sixties, constituted the most visible manifestation of socialist nationalism. The "October Crisis" in 1970 discredited upon the latter which became quite marginal; the rise of the Parti Québécois at the beginning of the 1970s which, at that time, also claimed to represent the left contributed to keep it in the background.

Although the "October Crisis" had a demobilising impact for a short period, it did not disempower the nationalist movement.²⁴ Rather it had a kind of "boomerang" effect on the federal government which was strongly criticised within Québec for its armed intervention. From the 1970s, the history of the nationalist movement was marked by the ascendancy of the Parti Québécois which became the main representative of the nationalist movement and consequently, by the predominance of the social-democratic orientation. The election of the Parti Québécois in 1976 was critical on this score. At that time, the Québec nationalist movement constituted a critical political force which was quite often allied with

other critical social movements and grass-roots groups. Repression by the federal government during the "October crisis" accentuated the emancipatory dimension of the nationalist discourse. This period was also marked by the strong support given by Québec artists, and to a lesser extent by Canadian artists, to Québec political independence, and indirectly, to the Parti Québécois. Many of them such as Gilles Vigneault, Gaston Miron, and Félix Leclerc, actively participated in the debates around the national issue, though they took part to other debates as well. They helped to publicise the Québec nationalist movement's claims within Québec and abroad.

During the 1970s, the Québec nationalist movement became a major political force redefining the boundaries of the public sphere. It was one of the main channels by which claims for social reforms and debates raised by other social movements were mediated. This period saw the achievement of this process of jumping scales launched in the 1960s. The election of the Parti Québécois and especially the 1980 referendum on sovereignty-association were essential in the rescaling of Québec political space by the nationalist movement. Both events contributed to the transformation of Québec space from a space of resistance into a space of engagement. Having gained legitimacy, the nationalist movement began to modify the Québec political agenda. It forwarded a congruence between the Québec territory and the Québec national space. It can be even argued that the Québec political space constituted a space of emancipation. Although the 1980 referendum was a failure, the Québec nationalist movement has remained a powerful actor on the Québec political scene. The issue of the Québec sovereignty has become a major issue on Québec and Canada political agendas. But, as we will see in the chapter 5, the spatiality of the nationalist movement was redefined during the 1980s, modifying its scales.

The New Time/Space Framework of Québec Identity Politics: the Rediscovery of the Québec Territory

The overlapping between the modernist discourse and the nationalist discourse brought in a transformation of the parameters by which collective identities were defined and discussed during and after the "Quiet Revolution". Clearly, a new identity paradigm structuring the economic, political and cultural relations was emerging at that time.²⁵ This paradigm introduced new parameters which contributed to the definition of collective identities and shaped the process of representation giving access

to the public realm. The calling into question of a traditional-based framework put at the forefront some "new" characteristics: modern, secular, territorial, outward-looking and future-orientated. They became elements used in the construction of identities, and implicitly, in the formation of power relations. The redefinition of the parameters revealed the increasing plurality and reflexivity of Québec identity politics. It provided evidence that the ethnic basis of Québec society began to crumble and at the same time, to become more heterogeneous. The framework of Québec identity politics was thus deeply altered: some existing identities were replaced by new ones whereas others were redefined. In addition to the redefinition of national identity, the Catholic identity was gradually supplanted which opened space for the redrawing of labour and women's identities. This implied the empowerment of some actors insofar as they succeeded in acquiring a legitimacy and in imposing their claims on the political agenda. This was particularly noticeable with the nationalist movement as some authors pointed out.²⁸ The emergence of neo-nationalism reflected very well the new identity paradigm brought in by the "Quiet Revolution". It revealed not only a new political discourse with specific claims, but also the replacement of former representatives.

This emerging identity paradigm which was largely drawn by the "Quiet Revolution" rested on the construction of a "Québec-ness". Cultural, economic and political representations of Québec took on new meanings which challenged the existing ones. What was perceived as being the Québec reality became defined differently using, to a large extent, a new vocabulary. The extent of changes expressed through this Québec-ness was noticeable with the emergence of new forms of spatiality and temporality shaping the public sphere and identity politics. Both dimensions (time and space) contributed to give a particular meaning to this identity paradigm and helped to modify the bases on which the different issues (national, religious, labour, etc.) were discussed.

It was previously noted that the framework of the "Quiet Revolution" was thought and articulated according to an tradition/modernity axis. Whereas "French-Canadian society" was largely shaped by a will to preserve the past, emerging from the "Quiet Revolution", Québec society was turned towards the future in which reforms and changes occupied an important place. For a large number of people, the latter came to symbolise an acceleration of the Québec history; this represented the meaning that the main leaders of

the "Quiet Revolution" sought to impose. It is possible to identify two ways of using the time appearing in the discourse of the "Quiet Revolution" and through the diverse reforms. On the one hand, this particular project was defined in relation to an historical continuum and then, rooted within a particular period. This implied the recognition of Québec society as urban and industrial which, in comparison to an agrarian society, involves a different organisation of time.²⁷ These changes were particularly obvious at the political level with the reforms set up by the Lesage government that reflected new politics of time. On the other hand, history itself became one major argument legitimising the "Quiet Revolution". Different readings of Québec history, each of them having particular implications, were opposed. This will to modify Québec's historical trajectory rested on the re-writing of its history in which the "Quiet Revolution" marked the first year of this new epoch. The rise of an awareness about the backwardness and the different obstacles faced by Québec society constituted an important source of legitimisation. There was thus a different relation with time underlying representations of Québec and Québécois raised by the "Quiet Revolution". The collective identity figure characterising Québec-ness appeared as resolutely modern and having consequently, a specific historicity.²⁸ We will see that the mobilisation of Aboriginal peoples and ecology movement against the James Bay project called into question this form of temporality.

The Québec-ness drawn through the "Quiet Revolution" was also linked to a rearticulation of the Québec political spaces. This process of rescaling rested on a new form of spatiality which transformed the spatial references of Québec identity politics and of the institutions established at that time. This new spatiality resulted from two main changes. The first was the renaming of the provincial political space by using the term national, as the different dimensions of Québec politics started to be defined, or labelled, by the Québec government as national. Of course, the empowerment of the nationalist movement was also critical on this score. It revealed the primacy given to the Québec political scene, and at the same time, the centralising orientations of the Québec government which were predominant during the 1960s and 1970s. The predominance of this spatial representation of Québec politics opened the door to a redefinition of Québec relations with the federal government and the international political scene. While competing with the federal definition of the national, the Québec national scale implied the redefinition of Québec international relations outside of the Canadian framework. The name as well as the significance

that should be given to this space emerged as an issue in Québec and Canadian politics which still remains unresolved.

The "nationalising" of Québec politics came along with a rearticulation of relations between the international, continental, national, regional, and local political levels. The regional and international levels acquired a new political relevance in Québec politics. Indeed, the Quiet Revolution was marked by a deliberate attempt from the Québec government to consolidate the administrative and political structures of the regional and local political spaces. They challenged the primacy of the parish organisation which was the predominant structure regulating local politics. We will see in the following pages that the policy of regional development was a key issue in the process of state-making launched at that time. Moreover, it was also at that time that the Québec government developed its own international relations. A new conception that the Québec government tried to shape on its external environment, and consequently on itself, could be found in economic exchanges and the opening of offices abroad.²⁹ The fear of outside, which was during a long time kept alive by the Clergy, was replaced by a new will of affirmation. It is important to point out that the isolation of Québec society was posed as an issue during the "Quiet Revolution". For the latter, this isolation furthered the backwardness of the Québec society. However, the historical isolation of the Québec society from abroad was somewhat exaggerated. It was used to legitimise the changes advocated by those leaders.

The second change indicating a new spatiality was the politicisation of the Québec territory. More than merely being the physical landscape, the Québec territory came to be imagined and institutionalised as the main and determining locus of Québec politics. The increasing regulation of the territory by the Québec state revealed its attempt to embed key dimensions of Québec politics within its boundaries. The Québec territory with its population and natural resources came to constitute a political and economic stake for the Québec development. This revealed a new form of territoriality by which the Québec territory became an issue structuring the social relations. The territory turned out to be one essential dimension defining the Québécois identity whereas it was much secondary for defining the French-Canadian identity. Although the Québec territory was central, it also included other territorial pieces (other provinces and Louisiana).³⁰ The same question was also raised about the Québec boundaries. Their legal and political

status were in that context redefined and came to represent important stakes for the Québec government.

The Empowerment of the Québec State

The "Quiet Revolution" also implied the creation of an institutional setting in which the Québec state acted as the main catalyst. The significance given to that period as being one of great upheavals came to a large extent from the numerous institutional changes made during the sixties. It is through them that the leaders of the Quiet Revolution succeeded in imposing their views and ideas and that a new social force, the technocracy, began to emerge. In this section, we will make a brief overview of the state-making process engaged by the Quiet Revolution. It was a clear attempt to reorient and to accelerate the development of Québec society under the guidance of the Québec government, with important social, political and economic implications. Two of them will retain our attention: the reinforcement of Québec state sovereignty and the development of citizenship politics within the state structure, but also outside. The last part will focus on the emergence of Hydro-Québec which came to symbolise the national affirmation of Québécois.

The major bureaucratic reforms during the 1960s and 1970s implied not only an impressive expansion of state activities and the growth of public sector³¹, but also a new discourse on the role of Québec state. This discourse contained elements related to Keynesianism and social democracy, like in many European countries. The Québec situation could appear on this point not very different from the trajectories followed by the industrialised countries in the post-war period. But, insofar as that discourse was shaped by modernist and nationalist arguments, this nonetheless conferred a specificity to the Québec trajectory. For this new group elected in 1960, the state represented the solution to their problems. It was perceived as the unique way to promote the economic and political development of Québec. The Québec state was perceived and at the same time, legitimised as the chief which should orchestrate development, allowing Québec to leave behind the old mentalities and institutions.

State intervention was required to allow Québécois francophones to catch the train of modernity and to come out of their economic backwardness. The Québec state represented the solution to the old problem of the control of the Québec economy by foreign interests which had been quite often denounced

by nationalist groups. In addition to the creation of many jobs for a growing number of professionals and executives, the state could end economic colonialism.³² The slogans used by the Lesage team during the electoral campaigns of 1960 and 1962 such as *"Maîtres chez nous"* or *"L'Etat, c'est nous"* reflected very well the importance given to the state. The legitimisation of state intervention rested on the requirements of a modern and democratic society as well as on the protection of national interests. This strong legitimacy given to the state did not just come from the Lesage government discourse. It was also expressed in the claims of different groups such as the intelligentsia, the new francophone bourgeoisie and the growing number of white-collar workers.

The structure of the Québec state was widely transformed in only a few years. Feeling invested with a new mission and disposing of an "army" of social sciences experts, the Lesage government launched major reforms of the government and the public administration. The redefinition of the fields of state intervention aimed to achieve many goals: the modernisation of the state bureaucracy, the economic and social development and the full exercise of its constitutional jurisdictions.³³ This led to the creation of new departments, which subsequently played a determinant role, and consequently, to the swelling of the number of civil servants.³⁴ For example, during its first year, the Lesage government set up four important departments: the Department of Natural Resources (*"Ministère des Richesses naturelles"*), the Department of Social Affairs (*"Ministère des Affaires sociales"*); the Department of Federal-Provincial Relations (*"Ministère des Relations fédérales-provinciales"*); and the Department of Cultural Affairs (*"Ministère des Affaires culturelles"*). Furthermore, this governmental "face lift" included the establishment of many public and para-public bodies which extended state competencies in different sectors of activities. Some of them such as the *"Conseil d'orientation économique"*, the *"Société générale de financement"* and the *"Caisse de dépôt et de placement"* have become powerful economic levers. Those institutions have become dominant actors in the Québec economic landscape.³⁵

The setting up of the *"Conseil d'orientation économique"* was the result of the government aim to elaborate an indicative planning system largely similar to the French one. Although the Lesage government gave up this policy in 1964, the Council was nonetheless maintained. It provided expertise and guidelines about different economic issues raised by the government. It was replaced in 1968 by the

"Office de planification et de développement du Québec" (O.P.D.Q.) which has continued to advise the government on economic issues. It has played, among other things, an important role with respect to regional development. The "Société générale de financement" (S.G.F.), created in 1962, constitutes a holding and credit institution for Québec private firms. Since that time, the S.G.F. has been an indispensable tool which has been a great help to many enterprises and industries. The creation of the "Société de développement industriel" (S.D.I.) in 1968 followed the same objective although its mandate is more specific. Both institutions showed the predominant place that the Québec government took within the economy. Regarding the "Caisse de dépôt et de placement", it appears as important as the others. When it was set up in 1965, its main objective was to invest funds from the Québec Pension Plans ("Régime des rentes du Québec"). Since that moment, the "Caisse de dépôt" has taken charge of the funds of other pension plans. It is become a powerful financial institution which has to administer assets of billion of dollars. The Québec government also established other institutions which manage specific sectors of economic activities such as the mining industry (S.O.Q.U.E.M.), the forest industry (R.E.X.F.O.R.) and the steelworks (S.I.D.B.E.C.).

Another dimension of the state-making process launched during the Quiet Revolution was the expansion of the welfare state.³⁶ This implied that the retreat of the Clergy from this sphere of intervention which became from that moment exclusively regulated by the state. During the 1960s and 1970s, the Québec government adopted different measures and policies which broadened the social protection given to Québec citizens. Among the different measures, we can mention the establishment of collegial network (CEGEPS) which has facilitated the accession to postsecondary education, the adoption of state health scheme (régime d'assurance-maladie) and state scheme relative to industrial injuries (Commission de la santé et de la sécurité au travail). The election of the Parti Québécois with its social-democratic platform largely based on the Swedish model contributed to solidify the foundations of the Québec welfare state.

The New Scales of Québec State Politics

In 1963, the adoption of a development regional policy clearly indicated the primacy given to the state in the regulation of Québec society. The objectives, programs and institutions elaborated for its

realisation were typical of the ideological and political climate at the time of the "Quiet Revolution". This policy symbolised the high level of expectations in regard to the state ability to transform the society which existed at that time. It also reflected the greater attention paid to Québec territory that we previously noted. Aiming to achieve a planned and integrated development of Québec territory, the government created an impressive bureaucratic machinery which rapidly became the privileged field of experimentation of a technocracy. This constituted an attempt to implement a new form of territoriality from above. The government proceeded to a redrawing of the borders of Québec regions by renaming some of them or by creating new regions. It implied that some historical regions were erased from the new Québec administrative map. Our discussion of the creation of Nouveau-Québec in the next section will illustrate this new territoriality imposed by state.

Jean-Jacques Simard's³⁷ analysis on the experience of the Bureau de l'aménagement de l'Est du Québec (B.A.E.Q.) clearly demonstrates how the state bureaucracy was seen as the best tool for the development of Québec regions. It also revealed the predominance of the technocratic rationality which shaped that experience. The experts who were sent to that region aimed to plan its development on a scientific and rational basis. Although they used a discourse based on the participation of the population in the decision-making process, the latter became in few years perceived as alienating by those people. Some projects, notably the closure of many villages, aroused dissatisfaction and anger. It fostered the mobilisation of the population against those projects and consequently, the development of a regional consciousness. This led to the setting up of some regional initiatives aiming to revitalise the economy³⁸. That regional mobilisation was part of a larger movement of criticisms of the Québec state which emerged during the 1970s. The state was no longer glorified as it had been before.

These institutional developments modified the boundaries of Québec politics. The opening by the state of new political spaces was not limited to the Québec territory. It is also during the "Quiet Revolution" that the Québec government sought to affirm its presence at the international level. In a relatively short period of time, the Québec government paved the way for its international recognition. If the creation in 1961 of a "Service du Canada français d'outre-frontières" linked to the Department of Cultural Affairs constituted the first step, it was the signature of two agreements with France in 1965 which

triggered the development of Québec government international relations.³⁹ During the same year, the Québec government created the "Commission interministérielle des relations extérieures" which was supposed to co-ordinate the external activities of the departments. Two years later, the Department of Inter-governmental Affairs ("Ministère des Affaires intergouvernementales") was set up, confirming the will of the Québec government to elaborate its own foreign policy. Through the following years, the Québec government continued to strengthen its international activities, notably through the development of a specialised bureaucracy, the building-up of a diplomacy, and the signatures of diverse agreements.⁴⁰ From that moment, it has started to develop a network having a basis on the five continents in which the "Francophonie" receives greater attention.

The Québec government's aim to develop its own foreign policy fit perfectly into the ideological and political climate which had given rise to the "Quiet Revolution". This contributed to the accentuation of the political and social changes occurring at that time. The emergence of that new field of state intervention was legitimised by nationalist and constitutional arguments.⁴¹ The objective of bringing and defending the Québec "national" interests at the international level was based on the idea of Québec distinctiveness within the Canadian federation and the North America. This also reinforced the expansion of the state bureaucracy. The latter acquired a new political status which became closer to that of a nation-state. Besides this transformation, the establishment of inter-state relations confirmed the predominant role of the Québec state in the organisation of the space. This allowed it to become one of the main actors which delimit the spatial horizon of the Québec society. The elaboration of its foreign policy has led the Québec government to draw a line between the external and internal politics. This prerogative gave it a greater ability to redefine Québec's frontiers.

The development of its own international relations by the Québec government is linked in many respects to the process of redefinition of the spatiality of Québec society discussed above. This conferred on the Québec state the legitimacy and the resources to play a determining role in this process. It has become one important channel, notably at the political and cultural levels, by which the external environment is interpreted and mediated. This leads to a redefinition of its geopolitical situation and more particularly, of its borders. Although these were not modified in the legal sense, it remains, however, that

the signatures of agreements and the development of a diplomatic network have brought a transformation of the political and symbolic boundaries of Québec. The setting up of a foreign policy capacity has represented the addition of a new discourse on the place of Québec within the world and on the world situation itself. Québec society no longer simply appeared as a piece within the Canadian federation, but also as part of North America or the "Francophonie". The importance taken by the latter in the following years reflects very well that transformation. The links with the "Francophonie" added another dimension to the redefinition of the Québec-ness occurring at that time. Then, the spatial references of the public sphere have become more diversified. Of course, this did not constitute in itself a novelty in Québec politics. There were at that time other actors such as the Catholic Clergy and the business class which proposed their own representations of the Québec external environment and at the same time, maintained relations with abroad. However, what changed was the degree of emphasis given by the government to international issues in the formation of the public sphere.

One important consequence of the major state reforms undertaken by the Lesage government and pursued by the following governments was the reinforcement of Québec state sovereignty. The state-making process allowed the Québec state to acquire some characteristics generally attributed to sovereign states. These reforms and institutional changes augmented the political authority and legitimacy of the Québec state. The Quiet Revolution conferred a determining and central role to the state in the regulation of Québec society. This did not mean that it became a neutral actor. However, the dissemination of the representation of the state as a tool of economic emancipation and democratisation contributed to significantly increase its legitimacy. It was not confronted with a strong opposition which rejected the state's competencies. The potential forces of opposition such as the Clergy and the business sectors did not express a strong resistance to this movement. This context strengthened the state authority. Moreover, the expansion of state intervention in many spheres of activities and the establishment of many public agencies gave to the Québec state a greater capacity to shape the social relations. This furthered the development of state legislations and norms increasingly regulating various sectors of activities. In this context, the bases of state power were extended and strengthened.

The Québec state sovereignty was also reinforced by the politicisation of the nation-state model.

Although the Québec state had only a kind of quasi-sovereignty, it remains that the idea of national sovereignty became implanted in the political landscape. It came to constitute a legitimate political horizon that began to challenge more effectively the federal system. National sovereignty was the framework underlying some of the policies and institutional reforms which were set up at that time. The Québec government's claim to an international recognition and the development of its own international relations outside of the federal government auspices. Moreover, the relevance of the nation-state model was forwarded by the increasing influence of the nationalist movement over the Québec universe of political discourse. Its impact turned out to be particularly important since it shaped the reconfiguration of the political community occurring through the period. It has contributed to "nationalise" this latter or more exactly, to disseminate the representation of the Québec political community as a nation.

The Development of Citizenship Politics in the Québec Public Sphere

The restructuring of the Québec political community also had an impact on citizenship. Although the latter still remained framed by Canadian laws, there was nonetheless a transformation which became noticeable. It was from that time that the bases of Québec citizenship were consolidated and that citizenship became a political issue and not only a legal status. It came to constitute a privileged arena for individuals and groups seeking to get access to political scene or to redraw the limits of state intervention. Moreover, the new services or agencies that the government created were discussed in reference to Québec citizens and not only to the population or the electorate. Québec citizens were presented as both the centre of those reforms and the main beneficiary. This increasing importance of citizenship in Québec politics during the 1960s resulted from two changes: 1) the extension of citizenship rights, and especially the development of economic and social rights; and 2) the establishment of institutional mechanisms securing access to citizenship. Both contributed to the broadening of citizenship politics. In this section, we will discuss these two factors (new citizenship claims and institutional developments) by looking at the role played by the Québec government and the contemporary social movements. Both contributed to enlarge the scales of citizenship politics. The overlapping of these two factors have furthered the reinforcement of the provincial level as the main arena for the settlement of citizenship claims while giving it a national dimension. It was at this level that Québec citizenship gained a coherence and a specificity.

The Québec territory became a competing site to the Canadian territory in the definition and institutionalisation of Québec citizenship. The period covered by the discussion includes the 1960s and the 1970s. The latter turned out to be particularly important in the consolidation of Québec citizenship on a national basis. It also confirmed many changes which were emerging during the debates around the La Grande project.

The Quiet Revolution had a determining impact on Québec citizenship. The different reforms set up at that time were legitimated by the government in terms of citizenship. The redefinition of citizenship became part of the state-making process. This occurred through the dissemination of a new discourse on Québec citizenship and the extension of citizenship rights. The redefinition of Québec identity politics around the "Québécois" and the empowerment of the nationalist movement contributed to impose a new representation of the citizen-model. The latter to whom the dominant political discourse referred and who was gradually embodied within the political institutions became defined according to new criteria: French language, Québec territory and modernity. The Québec territory was posed as the political community circumscribing citizenship politics. The Québec government expected that Québec-ness constructed during the Quiet Revolution would develop a sense of belonging to Québec citizenry. However, although it was defined in universal terms, the citizen-model embedded in the governmental discourse was based on the Francophone white-male naming itself as a Québécois. It was not a priori more egalitarian than Canadian citizenship.

The configuration of Québec citizenship was also transformed by the extension of citizenship rights which resulted from the politicisation of new criteria for citizenship entitlements. While strengthening civil and political rights, the "Quiet Revolution" set in motion the expansion of social rights. The broadening of Québec citizenship has been particularly shaped by the development of the welfare-state which was accelerated during the 1960s and 1970s. The adoption by the successive Québec governments of universal social, education, cultural and regional development policies brought in the recognition of new social and economic rights while opening new spaces for making citizenship claims. Moreover, there were reforms brought to, for example, the civil code, the electoral law, or the labour code during that period that furthered a redefinition of civil and political rights. They contributed to impose limits

to arbitrary state action seen during the Duplessis era. These changes created new places where citizenship could be exercised. They opened the door to the institutionalisation of citizenship politics within the state structure which consequently became an important avenue to modify the boundaries of the public sphere. The inclusion of the participatory ideology in the government discourse at the end of the 1960s consolidated this change. These citizenship developments furthered the reinforcement of state political authority and at the same time, of political allegiances. They contributed in this way to reinforce the sovereignty of the Québec state at the expense of the Canadian state sovereignty.

The labour movement and the more contemporary social movements such as the women's, the ecology, the youth/student, and the urban/community-based movements also played an important role in the broadening of Québec citizenship.⁴² They contributed to widen the space of citizenship created by the Québec state policies. Even if their impact has been differentiated, we can nonetheless point out three main avenues by which they brought about a remapping of the Québec citizenship configuration. First, they have called into question the main characteristics defining the Québec citizen-model leading to its "fragmentation".⁴³ It would be perhaps more adequate to write that they add new dimensions or facets to citizenship politics, contributing to the emergence of politics of difference. These movements have helped to break down the universal and uniform conception of citizenship which framed the construction of the Québec public sphere. They highlighted new identities by which citizenship claims were made. They put forward new discourses and new issues which challenged the existing construction of the "we-ness" embedded in the definition of citizenship. Youth, popular groups, or feminists came to represent collective identities through which have been channelled their political participation within the public sphere while reflecting different citizen-figures.

The second change in Québec citizenship affected by the contemporary social movements was the reinforcement and extension of citizenship rights and especially of social and economic rights. They have played an important role in the development of collective rights. In doing so, they have revealed the historicity and spatiality of citizenship rights. The debates raised by contemporary social movements have furthered the enlargement of civil and political rights by discussing them in regard to specific and concrete contexts. The women groups claims' related to conjugal violence, their struggles for the accession of

women to higher posts in public administration and politics, or the struggles led by citizens committees for the democratisation of municipal politics helped to introduce changes in citizenship rights.⁴⁴ However, although their impact on civil and political rights had been significant, it was mostly in regard to the recognition and implementation of social and economic rights that the mobilisation of contemporary social movements turned out to be particularly determinant. Their struggles around the democratisation of labour relations, the removal of barriers preventing the accession to labour market, or the protection of environment have furthered the recognition of citizenship rights for new categories of citizens, that is to say, citizens located in specific contexts. The implementation of aboriginal rights has reflected very well the appearance of new social rights while revealing the formation of new categories of rights which do not fit however in the three categories of rights. Their struggles have thus contributed to the democratisation of citizenship politics by providing different ways of access.

The last, and related, change is the appearance of new places structuring Québec citizenship. They have created new political spaces through which citizenship claims could be made.⁴⁵ This did not only consist in the reinforcement of the institutional arenas or forums in which citizenship rights can be defended such as it has been argued by Marshall and Giddens.⁴⁶ It has also involved the recognition of particular spaces such as the family, the school, the factory or the urban landscape as arenas broadening or restricting the exercise of citizenship rights. It is not only the parliament and the courts which shape their content and determine their effectiveness. The discourses and the trajectories followed by these contemporary social movements have thrown light on the different social and spatial relations in which the configuration of Québec citizenship is embedded. They showed that the latter is traversed by differential or variable power relations allowing some individuals and groups to exercise their citizenship rights in different places whereas others are excluded. This reveals the existence of variable citizenship practices, that is to say, differently experienced by citizens.⁴⁷ Moreover, it showed that the scale of citizenship rights is not only delimited by the Québec state borders, nor only by the contours of the public sphere. The delimitation of economic, cultural and territorial spaces also frames the exercise of citizenship rights. The struggles of popular groups within important cities or the mobilisation of groups against regional development plans such as the Opération Dignité showed how citizenship policies are embedded within

different spaces.⁴⁸ It also shows how the delimitation of scales of citizenship rights represents in itself a determinant issue for the groups making citizenship claims.

However, the social movements have not been the only ones who have created a space for citizenship in Québec. There is also the "Ligue des Droits et Libertés du Québec (LDL)" which has played an important role for the recognition and protection of human rights since its setting up in 1963.⁴⁹ It has contributed to legitimate citizenship claims and to transform them into a political stake. It has developed a sphere of activities such as the publication of booklets (or files) on specific topics, the writing of briefs for parliamentary commissions, and the press conferences, which makes citizenship politics meaningful for larger parts of the Québec population.⁵⁰ The LDL has actively struggled for the enlargement of the public sphere and consequently, for the reinforcement of Québec democracy. It was a key actor which contributed to publicise the project of a Québec charter of rights and at the same time, to bring pressures to bear on the government. It was also at the forefront to reclaim the recognition of new collective rights aiming to eliminate discrimination against groups and minorities. It has constituted a strategic allied for the social movements.

This period was also marked by important institutional changes which contributed to consolidate the new citizenship rights and therefore, to broaden the space of Québec citizenship. From the end of the 1960s, the Québec government established specific institutions aiming to protect citizenship rights: the Québec Public Protector, the Québec Charter of Rights, and the Québec Human Rights Commission.⁵¹ Based on the Neo-Zealand and Scandinavian models, the Public Protector ("Protecteur du citoyen), or the Québec ombudsman, was established in 1968 with the mandate to prevent state abuses and bureaucratic arbitrary decisions and to provide recourses to citizens.⁵² However, it was only during the 1980s that it became more publicised and increasingly used by citizens. Another determining institutional mechanism was the adoption of a Québec Charter of rights and liberties in 1975 by the Bourassa government. The Québec Charter did not appear particularly innovative.⁵³ The rights which had been included are similar to those recognised in the existing international conventions on human rights. Yet, even if it largely rested on individual rights, the Québec Charter opened the door to the recognition of collective rights and notably in regard to ethnic minorities rights.⁵⁴ This project also implied the establishment of the Québec Human

Rights Commission ("Commission des droits de la personne") which constitutes a watchdog monitoring the implementation of the Charter. It constitutes an additional recourse to the courts to prevent any violation of Charter rights. Its decisions can bring modification to governmental norms and legislations which appear to be discriminatory. As the Public Protector, the Québec Human Rights Commission has become an important actor on the Québec political scene which often introduces critical standpoints in the debates.⁵⁵ For example, the Commission's public declaration in 1978 against the policy of extinguishing Aboriginal rights indicated that it can be a trigger to larger public debates.⁵⁶ This Commission's stance included criticisms against the Québec government attitude on the James Bay issue which denounced the legal optic underlying the James Bay agreement which violated some Charter dispositions.

In the Québec political context shaped by the nationalist movement, the development of Québec citizenship has raised important challenges to Canadian citizenship. It has called into question its primacy. From the mid-1960s, Canadian citizenship began to be contested and redefined. The model of citizenship based on the two founding nations which had been established by the 1867 Constitution started to crumble at that time.⁵⁷ The mobilisation of the Québec nationalist movement and of the Aboriginal peoples movement questioned the adequacy of this model. Both have sought to impose a different model which would take into account their political claims and consequently, which would be more egalitarian. Other breaches have been opened by the mobilisation of contemporary social movements which raised new citizenship claims. The redefinition of Canadian citizenship was also brought about by the federal government. During the 1960s, it adopted important bills such as: the bill of rights, the multiculturalism policy, and the "omnibus" bill which extended citizenship entitlements while modifying its institutional basis.⁵⁸

The Creation of Hydro-Québec

One event reflecting the turmoil created by the Quiet Revolution was the nationalisation of hydro-electricity in 1963, which came up quite unexpectedly. It did not represent an issue that had been widely discussed during the 1950s, nor was it central to the electoral campaign of 1960. Its announcement created, however, a huge stir among the population and notably, among the private producers of hydro-

electricity. The reform was one of the most controversial and at the same time, one of the most significant of the Lesage government.⁵⁹ The nationalisation of hydro-electricity formed an important part of the dynamics of the "Quiet Revolution", reinforcing many of its changes. The nationalisation of hydro-electricity confirmed the greater participation of the state in the regulation of the economy. It also constituted an attempt to reduce the control of the Québec economy by foreign capital. This goal overlapped with the nationalist arguments legitimising the nationalisation project. The latter consequently gained a symbolic weight to which successive governments were to appeal. The subsequent empowerment of Hydro-Québec also contributed to assert the new territoriality which was shaping Québec politics.

In fact, the formation of Hydro-Québec constituted the second step in the process of nationalisation launched in 1944 by the Liberal government of Adélard Godbout. The idea of nationalisation of hydroelectricity had emerged during the 1920s when the practices of some private utilities producing hydro-electricity started to be denounced.⁶⁰ They were suspected artificially raising the cost of electricity and of financial manipulations. This campaign was backed up by the creation of a governmental commission in 1934 (Lapointe Commission) which examined, among other things, the possibility and impact of nationalisation of private companies, the municipalisation of urban networks and the rural electrification. Its report confirmed the abuses of companies and raised the issue of nationalisation as an eventual solution.⁶¹ In 1938, the *Régie provinciale de l'électricité* produced a report which drew up similar recommendations. It pointed to the dubious management of the Montreal Light, Heat and Power Consolidated.⁶² These reports help to illuminate the decision of the Godbout government to nationalise the latter and its subsidiaries and then, to set up the *Commission hydroélectrique du Québec*, more often called Hydro-Québec. They were closely akin to criticisms from nationalist groups denouncing the politics of trusts. Using the slogan "*Non aux trusts*", the nationalist groups pointed out the necessity to develop Québec natural resources and to reject the colonialism of trusts. The impact of nationalisation, which was subjected to heavy criticism by the business sector, was limited to the Montréal region. At that time, Hydro-Québec supplied only 15% of hydro-electricity. In response to the subsequent growth in demand, Hydro-Québec underwent a rapid expansion, via the starting of mega-projects on

Bersimis and Beauharnois rivers and the extension of its distribution network to Gaspésie, Côte-Nord and Western Québec.⁶³

The issue of nationalisation of hydro-electricity was reinserted in the political agenda by the inaugural speech of René Lévesque, Minister of Hydraulic Resources, during the national week of electricity in February 1962. On this occasion, he highlighted numerous problems related to the lack of uniformity in terms of production and distribution of electricity between the forty-six producers.⁶⁴ The Minister demonstrated that the rates varied greatly from one region to another, the farthest regions having the highest rates. Moreover, production costs were to be increased as a result of the lack of coordination of investments and the overlap of transmission of lines. This was explained by the fact that the construction of power stations responded more to the need of companies than to those of the population. In addition, René Lévesque argued that nationalisation would allow a saving of \$5 million in income taxes sent by companies to the Federal government. Lévesque's conclusions were based on the 1962 recommendations of the Conseil d'orientation économique which in turn drew on an earlier report submitted by the Ministry of Natural Resources.⁶⁵ The Conseil d'orientation économique gave the project economic credibility.

René Lévesque's speech created a stir among the companies which, under the leadership of the Shawinigan Water and Power Co., launched a public campaign against the nationalisation project. It was the start of an important public debate regarding the economic development of Québec, the place of the Francophones and the role of the state.⁶⁶ The private utilities attacked this strategy of nationalisation arguing the inefficiency and rigidity of state bureaucracy and the impossibility of reducing rates. The power companies also invoked the spectre of socialism and the flight of capital from Québec. Moreover, they tried to justify their management and the very small number of francophones within their administration. In spite of their efforts to rebuild their image, they were, however, unable to defeat the Lesage government's strategy.⁶⁷ René Lévesque travelled through Québec to explain the political and economic advantages of his project.⁶⁸ He won support from many groups such as labour unions, the Fédération des Sociétés St-Jean Baptiste, youth associations and the main francophone newspapers. This important debate led the Lesage government to call elections for November on the issue of

nationalisation of electricity.⁶⁹

The main slogan used by the Lesage government during the electoral campaign, "*Maîtres chez nous*", reflected very well the arguments used to legitimate the project. Government rhetoric went beyond the economic advantages associated with the project. Of course, the reduction of rates, the standardisation of the network and the recuperation of profits occupied an important place. Moreover, a greater control over the production and distribution of electricity by the government would further the Québec industrialisation and notably of the farthest and poorest regions. However, these economic objectives were interpreted as a tool for the economic liberation of Québécois.⁷⁰ The latter were represented as a colonised people unable to fully participate to the economic activities nor to get jobs in organisations controlled by Anglophones. The Québec economy appeared as dominated by foreign trusts, while the state was presented as the only avenue to reverse this situation and allow Québécois to take the control over their economy. The nationalisation of electricity was to give to Québécois the "Clefs du royaume" (keys of kingdom). This became the symbol used in government publicity, and appeared that this project involved cultural and political dimensions.⁷¹ It was supposed to represent appropriation by the Québécois Francophones of their natural resources and with this, the opportunity to shape their own collective destiny.

The nationalisation of electricity reinforced the links between the state, nationalism and territory in Québec politics. The legitimisation of the project clearly referred to demands raised by the nationalist movement since the 1930s. Now, however, they were presented as part of the state's role in modern Québec.⁷² The debates around the nationalisation project revealed the overlapping of nationalist discourse and discourses on the Québec state. While giving a prominent space to nationalist claims within the public sphere, they provided a further legitimacy and centrality to the Québec state. The latter was represented as the main actor that could rectify some historical injustices and consequently, shape Québec historicity. The state and, more generally, the public sector appeared more than ever the most dynamic force which could carry out major changes, giving them a large political and symbolic weight which afterwards marked the Québec collective imaginary. Moreover, nationalisation brought to Hydro-Québec political and cultural dimensions. Hydro-Québec was no longer simply a public enterprise in

production and distribution of electricity. It became the representative of the Lesage government's politics of affirmation. The success of Hydro-Québec during the 1960s showed that a public enterprise could be efficient and profitable. Its credibility opened the way for the subsequent public and para-public institutions set up by the government.⁷³

The debate over the nationalisation of electricity contributed to political awareness of Québec's territory. It reinforced the new form of territoriality which was emerging. This resulted from the particular significance given to electricity in the Québec context.⁷⁴ It represented an abundant resource which was essential to the acceleration of Québec industrialisation. Through Hydro-Québec, the production of electricity constituted an economic activity in which Québécois have known success. It responded to this will of affirmation and collective appropriation of natural resources which was expressed in the dominant social and political discourses. Moreover, with the launching of mega-projects during the 1950s, electricity became a collective symbol at the political and cultural levels.⁷⁵ Being produced from the harnessing of distant and large rivers, the production of electricity revealed the vastness and the abundance of hydraulic resources characterising the Québec territory. Throughout Québec history, water has taken on an importance which gave it an evocative power in the collective imaginary. It has represented much more than a natural resource. Water and, more particularly, the rivers of Québec have played a key role in its development. While having shaped Québec socio-economy, water has also constituted a source of inspiration for many artists. It has participated in the structuring of the Québec collective identity. This had repercussions on electricity whose importance was enhanced by this symbolic appeal. In addition, electricity served as a link between the different regions. The will to establish a distribution network reaching all the regions revealed a new way of mapping the Québec territory by the government.

The re-election of the Lesage government in November 1962 signified that it could go ahead with the nationalisation project as the election became a kind of plebiscite centered on this issue. Moreover, the government's re-election also indicated popular support for the different reforms launched during the two preceding years. It gave the Quiet Revolution renewed energy. Some weeks after the election, the committee investigating how the networks of private distributors would be integrated under Hydro-Québec submitted its report. In February 1963, the government submitted an offer of \$600 million which was

ratified April 30 1963.⁷⁶ The government also bought the coopératives d'électricité owned by the Association des coopératives d'électricité du Québec, invoking the aims of uniform rates and cheaper electricity for farthest regions. Ultimately, 60% of the hydro-electric production came under the control of Hydro-Québec. Hydro-Québec also began to buy municipal and private networks. The government had always excluded all the self-producers, that is the industrial enterprises, mainly those in the sectors of pulp and paper and of transformation of metal, consuming a high quantity of electricity.⁷⁷

Hydro-Québec was now in a position to exert a monopoly over the production, transport, and distribution of electricity. At that time, it reached more than 90% of the Québec households. During the 1960s, the expansion of Hydro-Québec did not aim merely to take over existing facilities. It also sought to meet growing consumer and industry demand by launching mega-development projects. Hydro-Québec projected during the 1960s and 1970s an annual growth rate of 7%.⁷⁸ The mega-projects would also help to create demand. The surpluses resulting from new power plants were to be used to open up new markets. The building of the Manicouagan-Outardes complex illustrates very well Hydro-Québec's development strategy. This project added seven power plants to the Hydro-Québec network. The participation of Hydro-Québec in the construction of the Churchill Falls project, which brought the signature of an advantageous contract between Newfoundland and Hydro-Québec, also expanded significantly the Hydro-Québec's power supply. Both projects contributed not only to increase the number of Hydro-Québec's customers, but also to extend the grids of transmission lines. Québec's self-sufficiency was thus assured for the 1970s.

These projects were important not only on economic grounds. The Manicouagan-Outardes complex fostered technological innovations of international calibre.⁷⁹ The technology and the engineering developed by Hydro-Québec allowed it to acquire a reputation which went beyond the national borders. It served to reinforce the links between Hydro-Québec and the nationalist movement. These successes fostered a collective pride which fit with changes launched by the "Quiet Revolution". It gave concrete expression to the slogan "Maîtres chez nous". It showed that Québécois could develop their natural resources with their own skills and have visible success in their struggles against economic colonialism. These two mega-projects also confirmed the capacity of Hydro-Québec to borrow money on financial

markets. The fact that Hydro-Québec built the hydro-electric complex on time and without exceeding the financial estimates provided the Québec state international credibility and helped to secure foreign investors.⁸⁰ Hence, it acquired a political weight allowing it to assume a role in the Québec public sphere.

2.2. The Historical Background of the James Bay Territory

The appearance of the James Bay hydroelectric development on Québec's political agenda in 1970 occurred without any prior public discussions, taking a large part of the population and especially the Native Peoples of that region by surprise. At the beginning, this project appeared to a large extent tinged with political opportunism. At the same time, the project was a continuation of those political and economic changes occurring within Québec since the beginning of the sixties. Its launching in the James Bay region was based on the same political dynamic raised by the Quiet Revolution. The James Bay development project represented an important step of the recent Québec government policy to develop the northern territory. It fostered the integration of the Nouveau-Québec region to the Québec polity and economy. In the following pages, we will briefly discuss the history of the James Bay region since the 1960s. We will look at the various Québec government's political interventions in this territory aiming to affirm its sovereignty. In looking at these changes, it becomes easier to grasp the significance of the James Bay development project and the different issues raised by the opposition.

The "Discovery" of Northern Québec

It was only with the creation of the Direction Générale du Nouveau-Québec in 1963 that the Québec government decided to affirm its presence in the James Bay region. The northern territory and its Native inhabitants had been largely ignored by the previous governments.⁸¹ Since 1912, this part of the territory had been under the jurisdiction of Québec. The extension of northern boundaries of Québec was in fact realised in two steps. After the purchase of Rupert's Land in 1870 by the Federal government, the province had gradually obtained some parts of this territory.⁸² Thus, in 1898, the boundaries of Québec were extended northward to the Eastmain River. The other transfer of land occurred some years later according to the Québec Boundaries Extension Act of 1912. The territory involved stretched east to Labrador and north to Hudson and Ungava Bays, constituting then the current Québec territory. However,

this territorial extension was conditional on Québec government's recognition of the rights of Native peoples living in that territory and the negotiation of land-cession treaties with them, as Canada government have previously done in other regions.⁸³ The possibility for Québec government to claim its sovereignty over this territory was limited by legal conditions. The territory granted to Québec constituted the homeland of many Native peoples who previously had very little contact with the provincial government and to whom an aboriginal title had been recognised.⁸⁴

Although the government of Québec formally accepted these provisions, nothing was done to meet its obligations. This lack of interest by the government can be explained by political and economic reasons. At that time, the James Bay region was not seen to have an economic value.⁸⁵ The impossibility to implement profitable economic activities based on the exploitation of natural resources and agriculture largely contributed to keep the Québec government and private companies away from the region. It is precisely the economic activities related to the primary sector which has sustained the development of the peripheral regions in Québec. It took then some decades before that model of development became applicable to the James Bay region. Moreover, the distance from the urban centres and the lack of access roads rendered any attempt to colonise this region and to develop economic activities extremely difficult and very expensive. The predominant market activity was the fur trade which was mainly controlled by the Hudson's Bay Company. The fur trade was then not really integrated to the Québec economy. The beginning of its decline from the 1930s contributed to weaken the economic potentialities of the James Bay territory.

The lack of interest for the northern territory above the 49th parallel was also due to political factors. The fact that the territory was not yet inhabited by some small Québécois settlements did not put pressure on the government to extend its administration. For a large part of the Québec population, this territory appeared to be uninhabited and inhospitable. The lack of political will explains to a large extent why the Québec government did not try to establish significant relationships with Native peoples living in the northern territory before the 1960s. Signing treaties with them would have implied financial compensations. The struggles with the Federal government concerning the Inuit during the 1930s indicated that the Québec government was not interested in assuming its financial obligations.⁸⁶ This

follows the traditional policy of Québec towards the Native peoples which was based on ignorance and the refusal to engage in compromising discussions. The extension of Québec territory have been generally made at the expense of the Native peoples, as the land was gradually appropriated by the settlers, reducing more and more the land occupied by Native peoples. As long as the lands of Native peoples were not required for the development projects, the Québec government did not generally seek to engage in discussions with them. The fact that the Native peoples were not politically organised also meant that no pressure was brought to bear on the government. Their exclusion from the public sphere until the 1960s furthered the government's indifference. During the 1960s, however, the Québec government adopted a new attitude resulting from its increasing concerns about its jurisdictions and thus, began to consider the Native peoples as falling under its own jurisdictions.

During the 1950s, the lack of interest in the northern territory, often known as "Radissonie"⁸⁷, began to fade. The development of mining industry and the need of new sources of electricity to respond to the growing demand explained to a large extent the change. Some mining companies started to prospect in the James Bay region, and many important deposits were found in the Abitibi and Temiscamingue regions which have greatly helped to improve their economic prospects. This encouraged the companies to pursue northward their exploration.⁸⁸ They brought pressure to bear on the government to build some infrastructure in that region. In the same period, the Shawinigan Water and Power Company, a private utility producing electricity in the region of Montreal, began to study the hydrography of the southern rivers (de Rupert, Nottaway and Broadback) flowing into the James Bay to determine their hydroelectric potential. Those explorations allowed an improvement of the cartography of the James Bay territory which was until that time largely deficient.⁸⁹ It is only during the 1950s that the map of the James Bay territory became sufficiently detailed.

This new interest for the North was of course not specific to Québec. Throughout Canada, after the Second World War, the North received greater attention and became an object of investigation. The federal government set up its first policy of northern development which led to the formation of a Department for the Northern Affairs.⁹⁰ The governmental interventions were no longer limited to the protection of the borders. They now aimed to establish federal administration for those territories and at

the same time, to exploit their natural resources. The North was thus acquiring a political and economic value which opened the door to the launching of the development projects in the 1960s and the 1970s. It is also during that period that the North became integrated into the Canadian culture. It has acquired, notably through the literature, a symbolic dimension. The territorial appropriation of the North led to a redefinition of the Canadian-ness.⁹¹ The North has represented the new step in the construction of the Canadian spatiality; the legitimisation of the development projects in the North often referred to this latter as being "the land of the future".

The Creation of the Direction Générale du Nouveau-Québec (1963)

A new attitude from the Québec government in regard to the northern territory began to appear in 1960. Two events indicated that a change was coming.⁹² One of them was the election of the Liberal Party under the leadership of Jean Lesage. The new governmental team included some people who expressed an interest in the northern Québec, notably Jean Lesage and René Lévesque. Whereas the first had been a former federal minister of northern affairs, the second was the first who publicly talked about the necessity to elaborate a governmental policy for the northern Québec. René Lévesque played an important role in the implementation of a provincial administration within what will be called "Nouveau-Québec". The other event was the replacement of the R.C.M.P. by the "Sûreté du Québec" (S.Q.), the provincial police, at the same period.⁹³ This event was interpreted by the Québec government as a withdrawal of the federal government from the Québec government's jurisdictions and then, as an affirmation of the Québec presence within the territory.⁹⁴ The dissemination and politicisation of the northern Québec's representation as part of the Québec territory where the Québec jurisdictions were encroached by the federal government had been a significant impetus to that political will of the Québec government.

The establishment of the D.G.N.Q. marked the beginning of a new period of conflicting relations with the federal government. It also indicated the use of a nationalist political discourse in relation to northern Québec. It revealed that the Québec government became aware about the importance of its northern territory and then, convinced of the necessity to elaborate a policy of northern development.

Those discussions brought the formation of the *Direction Générale du Nouveau-Québec* (D.G.N.Q.) in April 1963 to implement the Québec administration within the northern territory. The D.G.N.Q. initially had two main goals.⁹⁵ It would extend services such as health, education provided to Québec citizens to the inhabitants of this territory. Furthermore, the D.G.N.Q. should also replace the federal government in the fields of activities which are under provincial jurisdiction. Although it was not explicitly underlined, the will to further the development of the economic resources of the region also explained the government's decision; the pressures brought by some private companies interested in mining resources also created some incentives for the government. These objectives indicated that the creation of that bureaucracy responded clearly to the will of Québec to exert its sovereignty over that territory.⁹⁶ The Québec government presented this project as a process of national affirmation against the federal government which more or less represented as an "usurper". Those services were also conceived as vehicles that would help the implantation of French language in the region. However, this tended to create a climate of confrontation with the federal government which led to a duplication of services between the two levels of government rather than a replacement. The control over the territory and the search for the allegiances of the Aboriginal populations became important stakes opposing the two governments. The bureaucracy deliberately competed with the Federal bureaucracy which generated a greater suspicion from Aboriginal populations towards the provincial agents.⁹⁷ The historical ignorance of Québec government largely fuelled this distrust.

The struggles between the federal and provincial governments occurred throughout the 1960s. They were to a large extent fed by provocative declarations from provincial civil servants; the objective of replacing all the federal employees was often mentioned. Furthermore, these struggles were not only presented as a jurisdictional dispute, but also as a linguistic issue. The disputes between the Québec and federal governments appeared to involve an opposition between a French and Catholic government and an English and Protestant government. The several discussions and negotiations between the two levels did not bring some significant results. It is only at the end of the sixties that the relations between the Department of Northern Affairs in Ottawa and the *Direction Générale du Nouveau-Québec* became less conflictual. A federal-provincial commission was set up in 1970, co-chaired by B. Robitaille and F.J.

Neville, to study the eventual transfer of the federal administration in regard to Aboriginal peoples to Québec government; this initiative followed from the new federal Indian policy which had been clearly expressed in the White Paper released the year before. A tour of the Aboriginal communities was organised to consult them about this transfer. These consultations revealed that the Aboriginal communities were opposed to the project; the project remained on the political agenda some years and was forgotten.⁹⁸

The establishment of the Direction Générale du Nouveau-Québec had two major implications: 1) the beginning of a political recognition of Aboriginal peoples by the Québec government and 2) the reinforcement of the new kind of territoriality which came with the Quiet Revolution. This administrative structure represented, then, an important tool allowing the Québec government to claim its sovereignty over its whole territory, but within the limits established by the constitution. This territorial appropriation confronted the government with the necessity of establishing relations with the Aboriginal populations inhabiting this territory. The Québec government expressed its intentions to recognise them as Québec citizens as opposed to Canadian citizens and at the same time to ensure the maintenance of their culture.⁹⁹ One of the main objectives underlying this opening was the development of political allegiance of Aboriginal populations to the Québec government. It assumed that Aboriginal peoples living in northern Québec were interested in taking part in the modern development of Québec and consequently, that the building of infrastructures as well as the delivering of services in the areas of education, health and professional training would fuel this interest.¹⁰⁰ The D.G.N.Q. forwarded the insertion of Aboriginal peoples within the Québec state structure. This represented a departure in Québec policy towards Aboriginal peoples insofar as the government now sought to assume some of its treaty obligations. Such recognition was however partial and limited. It did not involve Aboriginal populations inhabiting other regions and was not supervised, in contrast to the federal government, by a department or specific agencies. The Québec opening did not constitute the premise of a Québec aboriginal policy.

The impact of the Québec political programs for Aboriginal populations was not, however, very different from the federal government's Indian policy. In both cases, the Aboriginal populations were taken charge rather than the administrators of programs. It did not seek to reverse the process of dependency

which had increased since the 1950s.¹⁰¹ It was at that time that the decrease of the economy of subsistence based on traditional activities became noticeable whereas the government transfers and the wage economy started to be important sources of revenues for a growing part of Aboriginal populations. This furthered a decrease of their self-sufficiency and the increase of their dependency from outside. The Québec will to take charge of the Aboriginal populations did not bring many changes during the sixties and even after. This shift occurred only at the end of the 1970s when the Québec government started to elaborate an aboriginal policy. The resistance of the Aboriginal populations and the difficulties faced by the D.G.N.Q. largely explained why the changes of the Aboriginal-Québec relations during the sixties had been very slow and timid. The same thing can be written about the experience of the D.G.N.Q. which had not been successful as it was expected.¹⁰²

The second consequence was the strengthening of the territoriality emerging from the Quiet Revolution, and especially, the inclusion of the North. The development of the Nouveau-Québec constitutes a significant example of the use of territory to mould a new Québec identity. It showed how the representation and organisation of the Québec territory were changing. The name itself revealed that the northern territory acquired a political and symbolic value which cannot be merely explained by its economic potentialities. Although this project can be seen as another step in the process of colonisation of the Québec regions by the successive governments, it nonetheless represented an important turning point in the government's policies. The establishment of a governmental administration over the territory constituted a transition between the colonisation policies, strongly influenced by the Clergy, and the policies of regional development which will be the prerogative of the technocracy during the sixties. The dismantling of the ministry of colonisation in 1960 and the establishment of a ministry of natural resources revealed the on-going transformation of the political perception and organisation of the space; this also indicated a change in power relations within Québec. For example, the colonisation of the Abitibi region during the Great Depression responded to the need of improving the economic situation of thousands of people. This economic objective was embedded within the discourse of the Catholic Church which emphasised the importance of the family and agriculture. This pattern of colonisation had been organised around the setting up of parish. This pattern was largely similar to that of the colonisation of the

Laurentides (northern Montreal region). However, the opening of Nouveau-Québec followed a different path insofar it was the economic value of the territory which created incentives. Instead of talking of colonisation, the government referred to the development, what suggested a complete different form of legitimisation.

The D.G.N.Q. opened the door to the exploitation of the natural resources of that vast territory which had remained until that time quite marginal. This involved the remapping of the Québec political space. It implied the recognition by the Québec government of what Louis-Edmond Hamelin¹⁰³ called the "nordicity". He refers both to the cultural and political conceptualisations of the North and to northern governmental interventions aiming to integrate this territory with its southern counterpart. The North became a new field of intervention for the government and this entailed modifications to the existing social relations within that territory. Moreover, the North also began to be increasingly integrated into Québec's collective imagination and polity. The greater importance given to the North in the economy as well as in the culture implied the diffusion of new representations of the Québec society. One of them was the division of the Québec according to an axis North/South in addition to the existing geographical divisions by regions. Moreover, as far as the North became part of the popular imagery, its Native inhabitants became known.

The political integration of the northern territory furthered the redrawing of the Québec map which resulted from the modification of the internal borders of Québec society. It may be relevant to distinguish the internal borders from the external borders, particularly when we looked at the historical situation of the Québec North; this distinction is also applicable to the Canadian situation. Although the North had been under the jurisdiction of Québec government since 1912, its policies did not apply to that part of its territory. Whereas the external borders are defined by the constitutional and international law and through the inter-state relations, the internal borders are largely determined by state policies and the configuration of social relations. The internal borders are shaped by the form of occupancy of a territory which rests, among other things, on cultural and political norms and institutions. These factors explain why in some countries there is a non-coincidence between the external and internal borders. The development of Nouveau-Québec was an attempt to remedy to this situation. It brought a rescaling of Québec politics by

relocating the internal borders. It clearly indicated the Québec government aim of strengthening its political authority in all regions. It thus reflected the affirmation of the Québec state sovereignty within its boundaries.

The Dorion Commission

The Québec government attempt to impose a new territoriality clearly appeared with the setting up of a *Commission d'étude sur l'intégrité du territoire du Québec* (the Dorion Commission) led by Henri Dorion in 1966. The Dorion Commission's mandate was to study the external and internal dimensions of the Québec territory. Its mandate was complex and vast since it included the borders issues such as Labrador or the limits to territorial waters and the existence of federal title and territorial rights within Québec. In other words, the Commission had to resolve those issues which could infringe on Québec's title or territorial rights. The examination of the Native peoples territorial situation appeared on this score as unavoidable. On the one hand, the federal government held territorial rights springing from the existence of reserves. On the other hand, the Natives peoples claimed territorial rights in accordance with treaties and constitutional acts. The Commission was then asked to make recommendations regarding the rights of Indians and Inuit over that territory which included Nouveau-Québec and at the same time to specify the status of Indian reserves.¹⁰⁴

The Dorion Commission reported in 1971, which almost coincided with the launching of the James Bay hydroelectric project; this report entitled *Le domaine indien* was the fourth of the Dorion Commission's reports. One of its main conclusions was that all territorial rights claimed by Aboriginal peoples cannot be considered as equivalent to propriety title or sovereignty.¹⁰⁵ They would correspond more exactly to usufructuary rights since there is no real occupation of this territory by Aboriginal peoples. The Commission also made three recommendations.¹⁰⁶ It proposed the creation of a Amerindian fund for development (Fonds de développement amérindien). This money would come mainly from an agreement between Québec government and Aboriginal peoples which would fulfil the obligations contracted by Québec government under the Québec Boundaries Extension Act of 1912. These funds would also include sums from Federal government. The second measure proposed by the Commission was the

abolition of Indian reserves and the creation of Amerindian municipalities which would be largely similar to Québécois municipalities. The last recommendation was the creation of an electoral district gathering all the Amerindian municipalities for the election of an Amerindian representative to the National Assembly; this latter would hold a kind of veto over all the bills related to Amerindians. The recommendations clearly responded to the will of the Québec government of eliminating any ambiguities about its title. They indicated that Aboriginal peoples' claims should be resolved in order to allow the Québec government fully to exert its sovereignty over its territory.

What emerged from this report was an opposition between two cultural and social conceptions of a territory. To a territory conceived as an object which can be mapped, held, and thus having a political and legal status was opposed a conception which attributed symbolic and religious dimensions to a territory in including it in a way of life. As the report was shaped by a legalist perspective, it was the first territorial conception that was privileged. Moreover, the Dorion report revealed the challenges and contradictions faced by Aboriginal peoples in regard to their territorial claims. The main challenge for the latter was to connect their own territorial representations to the dominant representation involving a different meaning system without weakening or contradicting their positions. In other words, they had to conceive their lands as a territory in using a discourse which had hitherto been unknown and largely meaningless for them. The Aboriginal peoples were constrained to refer to the modern view of territory as a framework for making their claims to be listened to by the government. The Aboriginal peoples' ability to exert some political leverage was then linked to the learning of some main concepts as propriety rights and title. This challenge which is still unresolved was then very important.

Although the report reflected the dominant political understanding in regard to Aboriginal peoples situation¹⁰⁷, it nonetheless constituted an important signal for the government, indicating the necessity of starting negotiations. The fourth report of the Dorion Commission revealed important similarities with the new federal policy formulated in the White Paper on Indian Affairs released in 1969 while adopting it to the Québécois context. The solution to the "Indian problem" rested on their integration in the Québécois society and on their participation within the existing political structures. The only specificity recognised to them was linked to their traditional way of life which was defined by the right to fish, trap, and hunt. This

point of view fit perfectly with an assimilationist policy involving the extinguishment of their rights which was also the current policy followed by the federal government. We will see in greater detail in the next chapter that the release of that report occurred when the mobilisation of Aboriginal peoples began to be more visible and significant.

2.3 The Laborious Launching of the James Bay Project

The James Bay project started to be discussed during the 1950s and was constructed twenty years later. In the meantime, the Québec political scene was deeply transformed, imposing a different signification to the project. Being initially undertaken by a private utility, it came to represent a state-led project, symbolising the Québécois national affirmation. Its location in the Nouveau-Québec territory and its promotion by Hydro-Québec largely contributed to its embedding in the political setting set up by the Quiet Revolution. This is why its implications went well beyond the construction of a hydro-electric complex. In this section, we will present the main steps in the launching of the James Bay project. While outlining the history of the project, we will present its broad economic and technical characteristics. We will look at more particularly the role played by Robert Bourassa, the Québec Prime Minister and Chief of the Québec Liberal Party, which was determining. This section can be seen as an introduction to the next chapters which examine the opposition faced by the Québec government and Hydro-Québec.

The Preliminary Studies

During the construction of Manicouagan-Outardes complex and Churchill Falls dams, the Québec government began to consider the exploitation of hydro-electric resources of the James Bay territory. The interest in hydro-electric potential of the James Bay rivers came initially from one private utility, the Shawinigan Water and Power Co. Between 1950 and 1959, Shawinigan Water and Power had sent up a team of researchers led by H.M. Finlayson to study the hydrology of the Rupert, Nottaway and Broadback rivers in the south of the James Bay territory.¹⁰⁸ During the same period, the Federal government set up its own network of "*stations de jaugeage*" on the main rivers of the region. The Québec government also showed at the end of the 1950s an interest for the hydrology of James Bay and Hudson rivers. It had hired firms of consulting engineers until 1961 when the agencies of the new Ministry of Natural resources

undertook to do its own studies.¹⁰⁹

The nationalisation of Hydro-Québec contributed to bring the project of hydro-electric development of the James Bay territory back on the agenda. Hydro-Québec asked the hydrologists, who were formerly hired by the Shawinigan Water and Power, to update all the studies made of the rivers of the James Bay and Hudson Bay since 1950 and to give a review on the hydro-electric potential of those rivers.¹¹⁰ This investigation was not, however, fortuitous. In the same period, the Direction Générale du Nouveau-Québec planned to build an access road to Nouveau-Québec which would facilitate the territory's economic development. This project was supported by the Ministry of Lands and Forests interested in the exploitation of forest resources. This project was thwarted, however, by the report of the research group which was sent to Hydro-Québec at the end of 1964. The main conclusion was that the hydro-electric development would be too expensive and not profitable. The experts' report nevertheless gave more specific information about the future hydro-electric potential of the five rivers (Nottaway, Broadback, de Rupert, Eastmain, La Grande) estimated around seven or eight million of kilowatts.¹¹¹

The James Bay and Hudson Bay rivers continued to be studied in a sporadic way. The election of Daniel Johnson in 1966 as Prime Minister brought a momentary revival of interest in the hydro-electric development of the James Bay rivers. In giving its approval to the Churchill Falls project, the Johnson government asked Hydro-Québec to activate its hydrologic studies of the South rivers of the James Bay (Broadback, Nottaway and de Rupert).¹¹² At the end of the following year, however, the Johnson government cut back in Hydro-Québec budget, obliging it to reduce its research activities in the James Bay territory. The reasons were not only financial. The growing popularity of nuclear energy at this time made hydro-electric development less attractive for the government. The American and Swedish governments had set up programs of research and started to build nuclear power stations. The Canadian government launched its own programs with the formation of Atomic Energy of Canada and its nuclear reactor, Candu, appeared successful. Nuclear energy appeared not only to be cheaper, but also to be the technology of the future, leading to important economic transformations. These were strong incentives for the Québec government to develop its own technology. Jacques Parizeau, at that time financial adviser of the Johnson government, was a strong advocate of nuclear energy. Nevertheless, given that Hydro-

Québec lacked expertise in this area and seemed reluctant, the development of nuclear energy was very slow.¹¹³ One agreement was concluded between the Federal agency and Hydro-Québec leading to the Gentilly project.

The Lifetime Project of Robert Bourassa

The harnessing of the James Bay rivers became again an important issue with the arrival of Robert Bourassa on the Québec political scene. In effect, during a session of the Commission parlementaire des richesses naturelles in December 1969, Robert Bourassa, opposition financial critic and candidate for the leadership of the Québec Liberal party, asked questions about the future energy needs of Québécois and on Hydro-Québec's intentions regarding the hydraulic resources of the James Bay rivers.¹¹⁴ He was informed by Robert A. Boyd, new commissioner of Hydro-Québec, that the project was still considered seriously by Hydro-Québec. The issue of hydro-electric development of the James Bay territory occupied an important place in the Bourassa leadership campaign. One of his speeches delivered at Val d'Or explaining the importance of this project echoed through the Québec media. Bourassa affirmed the necessity to start the James Bay project by 1972 to satisfy the growing energy needs of Québécois, and he predicted an energy deficit in 1982. Bourassa also argued that hydroelectric development would allow the economic development of that region. Campaigning under the slogan "Non au séparatisme" and promising to create 100 000 jobs, Robert Bourassa was elected as prime Minister in April 1970. The economic development of Québec became his favourite theme throughout the next twenty years.

A few months later after its election, the new Liberal government decided to give priority to the James Bay project, asking Hydro-Québec to intensify its studies. In fact, knowledge of the James Bay hydroelectric development was very fragmentary at that moment as Hydro-Québec only had information on the main rivers. The engineering department had tended to focus its attention on the Nottaway, Broadback, and de Rupert rivers, little on the La Grande river. Furthermore, the economic advantages of hydroelectricity had still to be proven in comparison to thermal and nuclear energy. Hence, it was not very obvious to most that the harnessing of James Bay rivers could start in the near future since the project's

profitability had not yet established. The newly elected Liberal government decided to reverse this situation. In May 1971, under the supervision of Gilles Massé, Minister of Natural Resources, an inter-departmental ad hoc committee involving Hydro-Québec and other ministers was formed in order to survey the James Bay studies.¹¹⁵ The committee focus was not only hydroelectric development, but more the whole James Bay territory. The exploitation of forestry and mining resources remained an important objective.

The Bourassa government asked Hydro-Québec to accelerate its studies of the James Bay rivers to specify their hydroelectric potential. Two new elements were introduced by the government.¹¹⁶ The Eastmain and La Grande rivers were also envisaged as future sites. Following a recommendation from the government, Hydro-Québec hired two consulting engineering firms to conduct their own studies.¹¹⁷ Robert Bourassa and Paul Desrochers, the main economic adviser of Bourassa, went in USA and Europe during the last months of the 1970s to look for eventual sources of financing.¹¹⁸ During the next spring, the situation changed rapidly. Whereas the consulting engineering firms were supposed to submit their reports in September, Robert Bourassa required them for the month of March. A meeting was organised the March 26th 1971 between Paul Desrochers, representatives of Hydro-Québec and the two consulting engineering firms in order to finalise the discussions and eventually to elaborate an outline of the project.¹¹⁹ It was a long and difficult meeting from which a weak consensus emerged. Whereas some argued for the development of the La Grande River, other were more favourable to the harnessing of Broadback, Nottaway and de Rupert rivers. There were also discussions about the costs of the project, evaluated around \$1,5 billion, and the project management. These discussions revealed that the government was firmly decided to go ahead with this project and even to bypass Hydro-Québec.

The Launching of the Project

One month later, Robert Bourassa announced during an important partisan political assembly that the government decided to launch the development of hydroelectric resources of the James Bay region. The assembly started with an audiovisual show of the James Bay region which presented the main elements of the project, called at this occasion the "projet du siècle" (project of the century). The

commentary enumerated a list of numbers and facts while insisting on the uniqueness and vastness of the project. It was claimed that 125 000 jobs would be created and that an investment of \$6 billion will be required. Afterwards, Robert Bourassa gave an emotional speech aimed to arouse a collective pride and enthusiasm. While insisting on the project's economic benefits, he also used a nationalist appeal in evoking the need to overcome the Québec economic inferiority. He affirmed that "le développement de la Baie James est un projet sans précédent dans l'histoire économique du Québec, c'est un point tournant de notre histoire. La Baie James est la clef du progrès économique et social du Québec".¹²⁰ He focussed on two dimensions of the James Bay project. Firstly, it would imply the development of the whole James Bay territory. The conquest of Québec North was presented as the new challenge for all Québécois. Secondly, a public corporation or a governmental board with subsidiaries would be established to manage the project, bypassing Hydro-Québec. This was justified by the complexity of the project and the required financing.

There clearly was an attempt to recreate this dynamism which occurred during the first years of the "Quiet Revolution". The Liberal government wanted to mobilise the Québécois around the project. The use of a rhetoric largely similar to that elaborated by the successive governments during the 1960s indicated its intention. The James Bay project was presented as a continuation of the Québécois collective affirmation. It was supposed to constitute a new step in this process of re-writing the history launched by the Québécois. Robert Bourassa legitimised it later as a challenge similar to space exploration.¹²¹ This image was also used by some ardent advocates of the project. Moreover, the government tried to use the good reputation of Hydro-Québec to give some credibility to its project. The close association with the project initiated a change of status for Hydro-Québec. Although it still sought to present itself as a public utility, Hydro-Québec became a political actor allied with the government in the James Bay project, and came to be submitted to a greater public scrutiny. We will see in the next chapters that the constitution of an opposition confirmed this shift of status for Hydro-Québec.

Bourassa's speech revealed that the launching of the James Bay project resulted from political as well as economic incentives. The necessity to fulfil Québécois' energy needs was generally invoked as the main justification. The energy crisis forecast for 1982 was not, however, the only factor explaining why

the project was launched at this moment. Other factors can be found to explain the eagerness of Bourassa.¹²² The launching of the project happened some months after the "October crisis". The latter tore Québec society apart and tarnished Bourassa's public image. The political climate was rather morose and uncertain. Furthermore, the Québec government was confronted with serious economic difficulties. Unemployment reached an unexpected level and the construction sector, one of the most important sector of economic activity, was in difficulty. The government had also to face the claims of the labour unions which were very critical of government policies and highly militant. A shift in governmental policies was necessary. The James Bay project could appear in this context as a solution to the current economic and political difficulties. It provided to the government an opportunity to rebuild its image and to mobilise the population around a large project. The insistence of Bourassa on the economic spin-offs for all Québec regions revealed those macro-economic objectives aimed by the government.

The spectacular launching of the James Bay project did not have the kind of impact expected by the government as it was rather received with suspicion.¹²³ The government was confronted with an emerging opposition and had subsequently to demonstrate very carefully the project's feasibility and profitability. The presentation of the Bill 50 in June 1971 at the National Assembly creating the James Bay Development Corporation ("Société de développement de la Baie James") was the main trigger. The Bill gave to the JBDC the mandate to proceed to an integrated and global development of the James Bay territory.¹²⁴ This signified that it had to develop all territory resources such as hydraulic, mining, tourist and forestry. The JBDC received to this end the power of setting up subsidiaries which would be in charge of a particular resource; the existing public corporations such as REXFOR and SOQUEM would be under the authority of the JBDC. It was specified that the exploitation of hydraulic resources will be done by a specific subsidiary. Furthermore, the JBDC was entitled to buy proprieties, to hold titles and to expropriate if it was required for the transport and the distribution of electricity. The Bill made provision for the creation of the James Bay municipality which would be administered by the JBDC. It was specified that the Indian reserves were however excluded from the municipality. Finally, the protection of environment was also included in its mandate. It was enacted that the JBDC should protect the natural milieu and prevent pollution.

The Opposition from the Parti Québécois

This long list of provisions provided to the JBDC a great capacity and autonomy. The JBDC appeared in many respects as a powerful organisation which was close to a state. The setting up of this corporation by the Bill 50 gave rise to many questions and fears within the Parliament as well as outside. The Parti Québécois, which constituted at that time the official opposition at the National Assembly, and the Union Nationale criticised virulently the general orientation of the project, and especially, the establishment of the JBDC. They reclaimed the convoking of a parliamentary commission to examine carefully the project. The opposition of the Parti Québécois was based on three issues.¹²⁵ The first issue was the partisan dimension of the project, as they perceived a partisan appropriation of Hydro-Québec. The second issue was the creation of the JBDC which appeared for the Parti Québécois as a second Hydro-Québec. They did not see the relevance of a new organisation whereas Hydro-Québec had the required expertise for the project. The last point raised by the Parti Québécois concerned the necessity of launching the project at that moment. The James Bay project seemed to be hasty and somewhat improvised. It denounced the lack of information about the project itself which prevented democratic debates. The Parti Québécois expressed some concerns about the costs of the projects which would constitute a too heavy burden for the Québec economy. Nuclear energy would have constituted on this score a cheaper solution.

The last issue addressed by the Parti Québécois reflected its energy policy, which was based on the development of nuclear energy in addition to the hydraulic energy.¹²⁶ For the Parti Québécois, nuclear energy represented the technology of the future which would allow to adequately respond to the growing energy demand. The steady growth of demand since the 1950s suggested that hydraulic energy would be insufficient in the long term, and consequently, the recourse to alternative sources of energy would be unavoidable. Moreover, the Parti Québécois argued for the involvement of Hydro-Québec in research on nuclear energy. The development of its own expertise would allow Hydro-Québec to gain a world leadership. In this context, the James Bay project constituted a definitive choice for hydraulic energy and the dismissal of nuclear energy. As comparative studies undertaken by Hydro-Québec were not complete, this decision was prematurely taken. It was not yet established that the James Bay project represented the

most efficient and cheapest way to produce energy.

The opposition to the project also came from different groups such as the media and Hydro-Québec's syndicates. Their opposition, or at least, their reluctance were related to two major issues¹²⁷. On the one hand, the cost of the project which was estimated to \$6 billion gave rise to many questions regarding its requirement and its eventual financing. The ability of the Québec government to find sources of financing was seriously called into question. On the other hand, the decision to set up the James Bay Development Corporation was strongly denounced. The confinement of Hydro-Québec to play a secondary role appeared unjustified given its expertise. The prerogatives and powers attributed to the corporation were perceived as too broad. The possibility of creating a state within the state and of implementing a system of political favouritism through this body were pointed out.

Those criticisms obliged the Bourassa government to provide a more detailed justification for the project. According to Bourassa, the setting up of the JBDC was a consequence of the governmental aim to develop the North-western Québec region.¹²⁸ The global and multi-dimensional approach of development chosen by the government would impose the creation of a flexible and broad structure of management ("structure de gestion"). Furthermore, he specified that Hydro-Québec would have a determinant role in regard to hydro-electricity production and distribution and that it would also be the main shareholder of the subsidiary in charge of hydro-electric development. Robert Bourassa reaffirmed that the James Bay project could become a symbol of Québécois cohesion and vitality. He compared it to a great adventure involving the construction of a new world.¹²⁹ These public specifications were followed by some amendments to the Bill 50.¹³⁰ One of them specified that Hydro-Québec will hold the majority of shares (51% and more) and the right to vote on decisions taken by the subsidiary which will supervise the harnessing of the five rivers. Another amendment brought in some restrictions to the JBDC authority by stating that JBDC should respect the existing laws in the different jurisdictions (mining, tourism, forestry, colonisation, etc.) affected by the project.

The Beginning of the Construction Works

The adoption of Bill 50 in July 1971 did not end the criticisms and the opposition against the

James Bay project. In spite of the government efforts to prevent it, the James Bay project became a politicised issue. The responses given by the government still appeared unsatisfactory and incomplete. There remained many important unknown variables. The choice of the rivers as the financing of the project were not yet determined. Furthermore, the structure and the role of the subsidiary in charge of the exploitation of hydraulic resources were very vague. Even if the government provided some guarantees about the future role of Hydro-Québec, its degree of implication was still nebulous. The inability of the government to clarify these points tended to reinforce the suspicion about the project's purposes.

It was only during the following months that the government brought some answers to these core issues. In December 1971, the government created the James Bay Energy Corporation ("Société d'énergie de la Baie James"). The composition of its board of directors indicated that Hydro-Québec would have control over the decision-making process.¹³¹ Some months later, the JBEC announced that the James Bay project which consisted in the harnessing of the La Grande river and Eastmain river will start by the La Grande complex and not by the NBR complex. The choice of the La Grande complex was determined by economic and political factors. Its relative lower cost and the fact it would be less harmful for the Aboriginal populations and the environment have been determinant factors.¹³² More specifically, the works began with Phase 1 of the La Grande complex. This phase consisted in the construction of three power stations (LG-2, LG-3, LG-4) on La Grande river. Phase 2 which was scheduled later on implied the construction of five power stations (LG-1, Brisay, LA-1, LA-2, EM-1) on La Grande, Eastmain and Laforge rivers. It must be pointed that the Phase 1 was the most important, owing to the scale of required works and by the expected level of hydro-electric production.

The first months of 1972 seemed to indicate that the government had succeeded in overcoming the different obstacles. But, just as the project was becoming more and more structured and concrete, two actors emerged on the public scene in calling into question its legitimacy and its rationale: the ecology groups and the Aboriginal peoples inhabiting the James Bay region. The Bourassa government was confronted with a new form of opposition. Although some of their claims overlapped with the Parti Québécois' claims, they nonetheless raised new issues. Their mobilisation opened new political spaces which called into question the existing boundaries of Québec politics. We will discuss in the following

chapters each of these actors which highlighted the political dimensions of the James Bay project.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we outlined some major political and socio-economic changes stemming from the Quiet Revolution which brought in a major transformation of Québec politics. We argued that these changes revealed an historical and spatial shift which framed the launching of the James Bay hydroelectric development. Among the changes introduced by the Quiet Revolution, two of them had been determinant in this respect: 1) the extension of the Québec state's sphere of interventions which allowed it to acquire a greater sovereignty and 2) the redefinition of Québec identity politics, notably through the empowerment of the Québec nationalist movement. Both furthered a remapping of Québec politics which implied the politicisation of a new form of territoriality revolving around the Québec territory. This redrawing of Québec political space clearly appeared through the development of Québec citizenship politics which came to challenge the primacy of Canadian citizenship. This new political setting explained why the James Bay development project turned out to be a state-led project, whose territorial and national dimensions became important political stakes when the Bourassa government was confronted by opposition.

The opposition faced by the proponents indicated that the political and institutional legacy of the Quiet Revolution began to be contested. The attempt by Robert Bourassa to legitimate its project by using similar arguments appeared insufficient to silence them. The criticisms raised by other political parties and the media obliged the Liberal government to defend the rationale of the project and to modify it. Originally defined as a regional development project aiming to respond to the growth of energy needs, the James Bay project became redefined as a political project having national implications. The opposition drew attention on two important issues which were previously excluded from the public sphere: the role of Hydro-Québec and the democratisation of energy policy. This redrawing of the Québec public sphere through the James Bay project also followed from the mobilisation of ecology groups and Aboriginal peoples inhabiting the James Bay area. Although they became allied, each of them raised specific issues and developed their own strategies of mobilisation. They sought to open new spaces allowing them to

participate in the debates and therefore, to modify the outcomes of the project. In the following chapters, the mobilisation of these actors will be respectively discussed. It will be argued that their participation reflected a process of jumping scales by which they sought to overcome their exclusion and to be recognised as legitimate Québec political actors. Their opposition to the project reflected in this way citizenship struggles.

NOTES

¹. Cf. Jocelyn LÉTOURNEAU, "Le "Québec moderne". Un chapitre du grand récit collectif des Québécois", *Revue française de science politique*, vol. 42, no 5, 1992, p. 766.

². It should be noticed that Québec society was not a typical traditional society. Many of its characteristics were modern such as: a democratic regime, a civil society, an industrial infrastructure based on the market economy, and a secular state. This is why the use of modern in the context of the Quiet Revolution was part of a political discourse and did not have a strong sociological basis. Cf. *Idem*; Kenneth McROBERTS, "La thèse tradition-modernité: l'histoire québécois", in *Les frontières de l'identité. Modernité et postmodernité de l'identité*, edited by Mikhaél ELBAZ, Andrée FORTIN, Guy LAFOREST, Sainte-Foy & Paris, Les Presses de l'Université Laval & l'Harmattan, 1996, pp. 29-45; Gilles GAGNÉ, "Tradition et modernité au Québec: d'un quiproquo à l'autre", *Les frontières de l'identité. Modernité et postmodernité au Québec*, Sainte-Foy & Paris, Les Presses de l'Université Laval & l'Harmattan, 1996, pp. 65-81.

³. We can find in the recent literature a number of critical analyses on the "Quiet Revolution". They tended to relativise the extent of the changes brought by the "Quiet Revolution" and to show that the Québec society began to change before the election of Jean Lesage. The brief rule of Paul Sauvé who succeeded to Maurice Duplessis as Prime Minister in 1959 indicated that the will of modernise the Québec was not limited to the Liberal Party. Furthermore, even under the Duplessis government during the 1950s, some changes, notably the increase of the public spending, were emerging. Cf. Jean-Jacques SIMARD, "La longue marche des technocrates", *Recherches sociographiques*, vol. XVIII, no 1, 1977, pp. 93-132; .

⁴. During the 1950s, some important strikes which had a broad impact within the population helped to crystallise the opposition against the Duplessis government. The "Asbestos strike" in 1949 was particularly determinant. It was during this strike that a public confrontation between the Duplessis government and the Clergy occurred whereas they were until that very close allies. This strike marked to some extent the gradual withdrawal of the Catholic Church from the field of labour relations. Whereas the Clergy used generally to play the role of mediator, it became less involved and even excluded from the subsequent strikes. That situation within the society was not an exception. Throughout the fifties, the Catholic Church became progressively less omnipresent within the different sectors of the society. The Clergy could be no longer the dominant actor within the fields of education and health and that the government had to become more involved. One other consequence of the "Asbestos strike" that we should mention was the publication of a book in 1956 entitled the "La grève de l'amiante" under the direction of Pierre-Elliott Trudeau. This book which gathered many intellectuals from diverse circles created a considerable stir. Through their analyses of the strike, the authors denounced some characteristics of the Québec society, notably the social conservatism, the political authoritarianism and the repression of the working class. This book reflected very well and at the same time, was part of the growing discontent against the Duplessis government. Cf. Susan MANN TROFIMENKOFF, *Visions nationales. Une histoire du Québec*, Traduit de l'anglais par Claire et Maurice Pagnier, Montréal, Editions du Trécaré, 1986, pp. 378-398.

⁵. One example of these existing agreements between the Duplessis government and some U.S.

companies was the grant to the company Iron Ore of a large part of the "Côte Nord" for thirty years for a derisory amount of money. Those agreements which were contradictory with the Duplessis discourse were criticised in diverse milieus. They were seen as a very cheap sale of natural resources to Americans which restricted the opportunities for the economic development and as a manifestation of the American imperialism. The criticisms pointed out the fact that the transformation of the natural resources was done outside, limiting then the eventual economic spin-offs. Those criticisms about the broad place occupied by foreign interests within the Québec economy was not new in Québec politics. Similar criticisms were done during the thirties concerning the private companies selling electricity; they explained to a large extent the setting up of Hydro-Québec. Cf. Richard JONES, "Duplessis and the Union Nationale Administration", in *Québec since 1945. Selected readings*, edited by Michael D. BEHIELS, Toronto, Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1987, pp. 6-20; John A. DICKINSON, Brian YOUNG, *Brève histoire socio-économique du Québec*, Traduit par Hélène Filion, Sillery (Qc), Septentrion, 1992, pp. 285-314.

⁶. The fifties demonstrated an ideological pluralism which strongly contrasts with the conservatism generally associated to that period. The issues raised at that time were not something completely new in the Québec political landscape. Many of those debates were to a large extent drawn from the period following the First World War. The release in 1933 of the "programme de restauration sociale" represents, maybe, the most significant example of those issues debated at that time. This program constituted a project of reform of the society with many innovative measures such as: increasing state intervention, the end of the electricity companies' monopoly, and reforms in regard to workers and farmers. Although the measures of that program were not implemented, they remained however in the margins of politics. Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 304-305; Marcel RIOUX, "Sur l'idéologie de rattrapage", *Revue de l'Institut de sociologie*, vol. 41, 1968, pp. 105-124; (to be completed)

⁷. During the 1950s, there were important groups and social movements which largely contributed to the popular discontent against Duplessism. Under the leadership of Georges-Émile Lapalme, the Liberal Party was one element of a larger movement of opposition. The labour movement free itself from the control of the Catholic Church and began to increase its political visibility. The "Bloc populaire" was an other movement which had an impact during that period in using the mass media. This movement which raised issues of the welfare state and the co-operative movement. That protestation was sustained by some media which largely contributed to sustain that ideological renewal. Besides "Le Devoir" which channelled many of those criticisms, there were also two important reviews which played an important role during the Quiet Revolution: "Cité libre" and "Parti Pris". Whereas the first generally proposed discussions in suing a liberal framework sometimes tinged with social-democracy, the second became the main channel for the leftist analyses; both contributed to the renewal the nationalist discourse. It must be mentioned that some publications which had a large impact within the population many discussions came from some members of the clergy. The first was in fact a private document written by two priests, Gérard Dion and Louis O'Neill, for the Québec City diocese on Québec politics. This document was publicised by the media. The authors drawn a very dark portrait of the political practices of the government (corruption, bribery, threat and blackmail, etc.). They indicated that those practices violated the Christian values and recommended that the Catholic Church stands aloof from the government. The second document was written by one Catholic Brother and anonymously published. This book or more exactly this lampoon entitled "Les insolences du frère Untel" constituted a fierce criticism of both the education system and the Québec popular language and consequently, of the role of the Clergy. The author denounced the deficiencies of the education in pointing out, among others things, the lack of knowledge of the teachers and its growing anachronism. This book which rapidly became a best seller provoked many reactions. This was the first time that the Clergy was directly called into question. Cf. Susan MANN TROFIMENKOFF, *op. cit.*, pp. 385-398; John A. DICKINSON, Brian YOUNG, *op. cit.*, pp. 306-313; Michael D. BEHIELS, "Quebec: Social Transformation and Ideological Renewal, 1940-1976", in *Quebec since 1945*, edited by Michael D. BEHIELS, Toronto, Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1987, pp. 21-44.

⁸. The nationalist tinge of the Duplessis' discourse on provincial autonomy had an echo within the population. The struggles against the federal government were also seen as struggles against a government defending the interests of the English-Canadian majority. This vision was supported by the Clergy discourse as well as by some intellectuals. Cf. Susan MANN TROFIMENKOFF, *op. cit.*, pp. 364-

365; Louis BALTHAZAR, *Bilan du nationalisme au Québec*, Montréal, L'Hexagone, 1986, pp. 103-123.

⁹. There existed some links between the reports of the Tremblay Commission and the changes introduced by the Quiet Revolution. Although the Commission Tremblay reflected a vision of French-Canada which was shaped by traditional nationalism, it also created a space for a new type of nationalism. Its reports reveal that the authors recognised that the society was changing but at the same time resisted to these changes. Cf. Susan Mann TROFIMENKOF, *op. cit.*, pp. 368-371.

¹⁰. The alliance between the intelligentsia and the business and manufacturing sectors was more a coincidence than a deliberate strategy. Both furthered the creation of a consensus about the necessity to mould Québec society according to the requirements of a modern and industrial society. But each social force had specific objectives. The intelligentsia (journalists, leaders of social movements and university professors), aware of the social and economic situation of European and American societies, assumed that those societies had entered in a period of scientific rationalisation. Privileging a nationalist and collectivist framework, they reclaimed a modernisation of society and more particularly, of capitalism itself. The intelligentsia claims pretended to represent the whole Québec society. They nonetheless reflected the claims of the popular sectors. The standpoint of the business and manufacturing sectors was more specific and pragmatic. They insisted on the necessity of establishing an industrial policy and putting aside the old elites who prevented their economic rise. Those reforms were required in order to allow French-Canadians to control a greater part of the economic activities and to further a better redistribution of the collective wealth. Cf. Jean-Jacques SIMARD, *La longue marche des technocrates*, Montréal, Éditions coopératives, Albert St-Martin, 1979, pp. 15-52; Kenneth McROBERTS, Dale POSGATE, *Développement et modernisation du Québec*, Montréal, Boréal Express, 1983, pp. 115-144; Marcel RIOUX, *op. cit.*, pp. 112-118.

¹¹. Jocelyn Létourneau insists on the double role of Québec intellectuals during the Quiet Revolution, especially the post-war generation. Through their writings which largely criticised the Duplessis regime and insisted on the necessity to implement important reforms, this generation of intellectuals participated to the launching of the Quiet Revolution. They also contributed to give a particular significance to those transformations related to the Quiet Revolution, notably its founding impact of the modern Québec. It is those intellectuals who succeeded afterwards to impose a new reading of the Québec history in which the Quiet Revolution constituted a turning point. The "Faculté des sciences sociales" de l'Université Laval as some departments of the Université de Montréal provided many of those influent intellectuals. See Jocelyn LÉTOURNEAU, *op. cit.*, pp. 766-767.

¹². See on this point: Jean-Jacques SIMARD, *La longue marche des technocrates*, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-42; Gilbert RENAUD, *À l'ombre du rationalisme. La société québécoise, de sa dépendance à sa quotidienneté*, Montréal, Editions Saint-Martin, 1984, pp. 57-159; Marc RENAUD, "Québec's New Middle in Search of Social Hegemony: Causes and Political Consequences", in *Quebec since 1945: Selected Readings*, edited by Michael D. BEHIELS, Toronto, Copp Clark Pitman LTD, 1987, pp. 48-79.

¹³. The economic backwardness of Québec and the economic inferiority of the Québécois notably in comparison to Ontario were two issues largely discussed during the 1950s and 1960s. Many studies were done aiming to identify the nature and the causes of that inferiority. Whereas some researchers attempted to explain it by the values and the lack of institutions and economic leverages furthering the mobility of Québécois, others identified the Québec status of colonised nation since the Conquest of 1760. However, it emerged a consensus about the necessity to modify this trajectory and to catch up the English Canada. Cf. Jocelyn LÉTOURNEAU, "Le Québec moderne", *op. cit.*, pp. 777-778; Kenneth McROBERTS, "The Sources of Neo-Nationalism in Quebec" in *Quebec since 1945. Selected Readings*, edited by Michael BEHIELS, Toronto, Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1987, pp. 80-105.

¹⁴. Jocelyn LÉTOURNEAU, *op. cit.*, pp. 776-777; .

¹⁵. Jocelyn Létourneau rightly pointed out that this dichotomy between the modern Québec and the traditional French-Canada implied the construction of two archetypes. All the modern aspects of the French-Canadian society were put aside. This did not mean that this latter became dismissed, but rather submitted to a different interpretation. One clear objective underlying this new reading of the past was

mostly to put aside all marks of looser associated with the French-Canadian such as; "scieur de bois", "porteur d'eau", and "mangeur de soupe aux pois". See on this point: *Ibid.*, pp. 778-779.

¹⁶. Since the 19th century, the Québec nationalist movement has passed through successive phases of mobilisation and through different debates. It has constituted a driving force in the definition of the public sphere. The representation of Québec society as a legitimate and specific political community became an issue to which successive governments were confronted. The period of the "Quiet Revolution" was not an exception. The modernist intelligentsia supporting the "Quiet Revolution" had been to a large extent influenced by the nationalist debates occurring during the 1920s and the 1930s. Many of the ideas and writings of the nationalist leading figures of that time such as Laurendau, Olivier Asselin, Henri Bourassa and the Chanoine Groulx were still discussed. See on this point: Louis BALTHAZAR, *Bilan du nationalisme québécois*; *op.cit.*, 1986, pp. 37-122; Michael BEHIELS, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-44; William COLEMAN, *The Independence Movement in Québec, 1945-1980*, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1984.

¹⁷. The expression of neo-nationalism is used by many authors to explain the changes of the nationalist movement and more particularly, the rise of the sovereignist or independentist option during the sixties. This concept is to a large extent useful to show the major transformation of the Québec nationalism from the fifties. However, what this concept did not really show is the different trends within the nationalist movement. See Louis Balthazar, "L'évolution du nationalisme québécois" dans Gérard DAIGLE (sous la direction de), *Le Québec en Jeu. Comprendre les grands défis*, Montréal, Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1992, pp. 648-650; Kenneth McROBERTS, "Sources of Neo-Nationalism in Quebec", *op. cit.*, pp. 80-105.

¹⁸. French-Canadian nationalism is rightly designated by Léon Dion as a conservative nationalism. Its discourse was based on the preservation of the French-Canadian traditional society, that is to say, a pre-industrial society in which the Church and the extended family were the two central institutions. The idea of the "survivance" of the French-Canadian people represented a key issue structuring its discourse. This nationalism assumed that since the Conquest in 1760 the French-Canadians people constitute a minority which is threatened and thus, must be protected. It is only in remaining faithful to their way of life that the French-Canadians will not be assimilated. This way of life was mainly defined by three elements: Catholicism, the French language, and agriculture. Farming was especially emphasised in being presented as conforming to the French-Canadian temperament. This constituted a protection against urbanisation and industrialisation which could corrupt and lead French-Canadians off their path. Conservative nationalism furthered the rejection of industrial activities which were seen as being the private ground of the Anglophones. It strongly promoted the colonisation of new regions through farming activities instead. Although conservative nationalism did not appear a priori political, there were nonetheless some political options that were favoured. Its main representatives supported a very paternalistic corporatism and a decentralised federalism. The notion of provincial autonomy which have been used by many governments reflected their view of federalism. Cf. Léon DION, *Nationalismes et politique au Québec*, Montréal, Hurtubise HMH, 1975, pp. 29-41; Louis BALTHAZAR, *Bilan du nationalisme québécois*, *op. cit.*, pp. 65-80.

¹⁹. Cf. Benedict ANDERSON, *Imagined Communities*, London, Verso, 1991.

²⁰. I refer to the typology established by Léon Dion. His typology is still today one of the most interesting which provides an overview of the nationalist movement during the 1960s and 1970s. The different political, social and economic issues raised by the different nationalist groups are clearly explained. Dion goes beyond the issue of independence which is often the only issue that many authors point out when they explained the nationalist movement since the 1960s. Cf. Léon DION, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-24

²¹. It is important to point out that those ideas did not suddenly emerge in 1960. Both were previously discussed, but remained quite marginal. It is only during the sixties that they became ideological movements with significant social bases. Two factors largely contributed to their spreading. On the one hand, the failure of the autonomist trend within the liberal nationalism to obtain more powers from Ottawa and the rejection of the diverse attempts to reform the Constitution gave a credibility to the independentist option. Under these conditions, this latter appeared as the only possible option. We can add that one

particular event in 1964 which was called afterwards the "samedi de la matraque" reinforced this trend. During a visit of the Queen Elisabeth II in Québec city, there was a demonstration which was repressed by the police. This event was highly publicised and became for many nationalist groups a symbol of the British imperialism. On the other hand, the development of a socialist ideology was linked to a large extent to the running out of steam of the "Quiet Revolution" from the mid-sixties. It appeared that the reforms launched by the Lesage government were insufficient, notably at the economic level. They were unable to meet the high level of expectations which have been created when the Lesage government came into office. The government could not respond to the demands coming from diverse social groups such as the labour unions, the community-based groups and the peripheral regions asking for deeper changes. That disappointment was particularly important among the intellectuals and the increasingly educated youth. Both ideas began to mobilise popular and political groups which will elaborate major criticisms of the society emerging of the "Quiet Revolution". They constituted the core of the Québec progressive politics during the two following decades. For a more detailed history of those ideologies, see: Gilles BOURQUE, Jules DUCHASTEL, *La société fragmentée*, Montréal, Fides, 1996, pp. 1-106; Michael D. BEHIELS, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-44

²². This argumentation had been mostly elaborated by the socialist nationalism. The colonisation of Québec was explained in referring to its economic and political situation. The federalism as well as the strong American influence appeared as the main factors perpetuating the Québec oppression. This reflected a new international environment in which the nationalist issues were discussed at that time through a tiers-mondist framework. The Franz Fanon's book, *les damnés de la terre*, had a considerable impact among the nationalists. It constituted an appealing symbol which brought several discussions. That idea was largely explained in the Pierre Vallières's book, *Les nègres blanc d'Amérique*, which became a best-seller, the Vallières' book had been one of the most important books of the left nationalism during the sixties. This picture of Québec raised by the socialist nationalism constituted a response to the will of national affirmation, particularly at the economic level, expressed by the Lesage government. It became significant as it appeared that the Lesage government's economic policies did not really modify the Québec economic dependence. Cf. Louis BALTHAZAR, "Conscience nationale et contexte international", in *Le Québec et la restructuration du Canada, 1980-1992. Enjeux et perspectives*, Sainte-Foy, Editions du Septentrion, 1991, pp. 33-48.

²³. The formation of the Parti Québécois in October 1968 resulted from the merging of two groups: the "Ralliement national" and the "Mouvement souveraineté-association" led by René Lévesque. This merging occurred in a period where the independentist movement discussed the different directions that it should take in order to be more powerful. The formation of the Parti Québécois was thus one strategy retained by some groups. However, this solution did not lead to the disappearance of the same tensions and questions which shaped the independentist movement since the beginning of the sixties. Besides the opposition between the left and the right, there was also a division regarding the future political status of Québec, that is to say, to become completely separated from Canada or a solution aiming to maintain some links such as sovereignty-association. The Parti Québécois, which represented a response to those questions, has nonetheless remained until today haunted by the latter. This started shortly after its formation when the "Rassemblement pour l'indépendance nationale" (R.I.N.) broke up and invited its members to join the Parti Québécois. The R.I.N. had previously refused to merge with the Parti Québécois owing to major disagreements on the question of independence. This group had been since the creation in 1960 favourable to the complete Québec independence and more leftist than the two preceding groups. The fact that many members of the R.I.N. joined the Parti Québécois contributed to keep alive those divisions. See Léon DION, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-93; William COLEMAN, *op. cit.*, .

²⁴. Cf. Louis BALTHAZAR, "L'évolution du nationalisme québécois", *op. cit.*, pp. 647-666;

²⁵. I refer here to the concept of hegemonic paradigm developed by Jane Jenson. This concept allowed to explain that the definition of the political sphere is always contingent and shaped by the power relations within the society. To different historical periods would correspond a particular form of politics involving particular actors and particular discourses. This empowers some actors while excluding others. See Jane JENSON, "'Different' but not 'Exceptional': Canada's Permeable Fordism", *Canadian Review of Political Science*, vol. 23, no 4, 1990.

²⁶ . See William D. COLEMAN, *op. cit.*, 1984; J. Yvon THÉRIAULT, "L'individualisme démocratique et le projet souverainiste", *Sociologie et sociétés*, vol. 26, no 2, 1994, pp. 19-32.

²⁷ . Cf. Gilles PRONOVOST, Daniel MERCURE (sous la direction de), *Temps et société*, Québec, Institut québécois de recherche sur la culture, 1989, 258 p.; Barbara ADAM, *Timewatch: The Social Analysis of Time*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995

²⁸ . Cf. Jocelyn LÉTOURNEAU, "Le "Québec moderne". Un chapitre du grand récit collectif des Québécois", *op. cit.*, pp. 772-778.

²⁹ . The opening towards the outside as the external influences, whatever cultural, religious, or economic, on Québec society did not constitute something new in Québec history. For example, the Catholic Church in Québec had always maintained links with abroad and at the same time, attempted to mediate its influence. The dissemination of the doctrine of the Church of Rome or the sending of missionaries away in foreign countries represented different examples of those links with abroad throughout the Québec history. Those influences clearly appeared in studying the Québec history of social and political ideologies. See on these points: Gérard BOUCHARD, "Une nation, deux cultures. Continuité et ruptures dans la pensée québécoise traditionnelle", in *La construction d'une culture. Le Québec et l'Amérique française*, edited by Gérard BOUCHARD (with the collaboration of Serge COURVILLE), Sainte-Foy, Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 1993, pp. 3-47; Louis BALTHAZAR, "Conscience nationale et contexte international", *op. cit.*, pp. 33-48; Jean-Philippe THÉRIEN, Louis BÉLANGER, Guy GOSSELIN, "La politique étrangère québécoise", in *Québec: État et société*, edited by Alain G. GAGNON, Montréal, Québec/Amérique, 1994, pp. 255-278

³⁰ . This distinction between the two societies did not imply that the perception and the organisation of the space within the French-Canadian society was less important. David Kaplan made an interesting and relevant analysis on this issue. He rightly showed that the spatial organisation of the French-Canadian society was organised around the parish. This organisation of the space mainly responded to cultural and religious considerations. What appeared during the period of the "Quiet Revolution" was a greater organisation of the space at the political level, notably by the state bureaucracy. The conceptualisation of space became to a large extent based on economic, scientific and political considerations. For a more detailed discussion on those differences, see David H. KAPLAN, "'Maitres Chez Nous': The Evolution of French-Canadian Spatial Identity", *American Review of Canadian Studies*, vol. XIX, no 4, 1989, pp. 407-428; Serge COURVILLE, "Espace, tradition et modernité", *Recherches sociographiques*, vol. 34, no 2, 1993, 211-231.

³¹ . It must be pointed out that the growth of the state activities had begun before that period. Jean-Jacques Simard has shown that the public expenditure had risen at a significant level during the 1950s. The end of the post-war economic prosperity giving place to serious economic difficulties, notably a high level of unemployment, forced the Duplessis government to intervene at the socio-economic level. During the period 1957-60, the government spendings in the social services and human resources sectors had already started to significantly increase. Cf. Jean-Jacques SIMARD, "La longue marche des technocrates", *op. cit.*, pp. 93-132; Susan MANN TROFIMENKOFF, *op. cit.*, p. 410.

³² . Susan MANN TROFIMENKOFF, *op. cit.*, pp. 410-418.

³³ . James Iain GOW, "La vie mouvementée de l'administration publique québécoise", in Gérard DAIGLE (ed.), *Le Québec en jeu. Comprendre les grands défis*, Montréal, Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1992, pp. 670-671.

³⁴ . In two decades, there was more than a doubling of the number of people working in public services. From 1961 to the mid-1980s, its numbers rose from 61 000 to 141 000. Since that time, there was rather a decrease which is not yet ended. Cf. John A. DICKINSON, Brian YOUNG, *op. cit.*, p. 330.

³⁵ . Cf. Susan MANN TROFIMENKOFF, *op. cit.*, pp. 411-412; James Iain GOW, *op. cit.*, pp. 669-675.

³⁶ . See on this point: Carol LEVASSEUR, "De l'État-providence à l'État disciplinaire", in *L'État du Québec en devenir*, edited by Gérard BERGERON and Réjean Pelletier, Montréal, Boréal Express, 1980, pp. 285-

328; Gilles BOURQUE, Jules DUCHASTEL, *op. cit.*, pp. 59-79. For a review of the postwar period, see: Yves VAILLANCOURT, *L'évolution des politiques sociales au Québec, 1940-1960*, Montréal, Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1988, 513 pages.

³⁷. See Jean-Jacques SIMARD, *La longue marche des technocrates*, *op. cit.*, 1978

³⁸. See: Serge CÔTÉ, "Enjeux régionaux et luttes pour le pouvoir", in *La transformation du pouvoir au Québec*, edited by Nadia ASSIMOPOULOS, Jacques GODBOUT, Pierre HAMEL, et al, Montréal, Éditions coopératives Albert Saint-Martin, 1980, pp. 137-143; Alain G. GAGNON (editor), *Les opérations Dignité: naissance d'un mouvement social dans l'Est du Québec*, Montréal, Leméac, 1981, 262 pages; Marc-André DESCHÊNES, Gilles ROY, *Le JAL: trajectoire d'une expérience de développement local*, Rimouski, GRIDEQ, 1994, 232 pages.

³⁹. Those two agreements which concerned culture and education were the first official mechanisms of co-operation between France and Québec. They reflected very well the dominant particularities of Québec foreign policy during its first decade: the great political and symbolic place given to France and the priority given to cultural affairs. However, these Québec-France agreements of 1965 were contested by Ottawa which denied their official character. This latter reacted in signing with the French government an outline agreement which was supposed to frame the Québec/France relations. This has opened a legal debate in regard to the nature of an international agreement signed by a province. For the Federal government, these agreements can not be considered as officials owing to the indivisibility of the Canadian foreign policy. Whereas for the Québec government, they represent an international extension of the provincial constitutional jurisdictions; this position became known as the "doctrine Gérin-Lajoie". It was finally the Québec interpretation which was retained insofar as it created an opening in the Canadian juridical doctrine. This opening have been afterwards used by the other provinces. The end of the 1970s constituted to some extent a turning point. The Québec government decided at that time to give a greater attention to economic affairs and to increase its representations to the USA government. See: Jean-Philippe THÉRIEN, Louis BELANGER, Guy GOSSELIN, *op. cit.*, pp. 257-260.

⁴⁰. The signature of agreements with other countries has been perhaps the most determining in the development of the Québec foreign policy. It justified new bureaucratic developments and/or the opening of new consulates or diplomatic offices. The Québec diplomatic network has rapidly expanded. In 1993, it included 28 diplomatic agencies which employed around 430 people. Cf. *Ibid.*, pp.260-261.

⁴¹. Daniel Latouche explained the development of the Québec international relations during the 1960s by two factors: state-building and nation-building. For Latouche, their development cannot be only explained as a consequence of the expansion of state activities which occurred at that time. The legitimisation of that new field of activities was also shaped by nationalist arguments. There was the acknowledgement that Québec has its own national interests which are not enough well defended by Ottawa. See Daniel LATOUCHE, "State Building and Foreign Policy at the Subnational Level", in Ivo D. DUCHACEK, Daniel LATOUCHE and Garth STEVENSON (eds), *Perforated Sovereignities and International Relations. Trans-Sovereign Contacts of Subnational Governments*, Westport, Greenwood Press, 1988, pp. 29-42.

⁴². We recognise that the labour movement was not recent as the others in Québec history. However, it became a dominant actor at the end of the 1960s and particularly following from the unionisation of public and para-public employees. It is through their important strikes that Québec labour relations have been redefined and democratised. The adoption of a new labour code during the first mandate of Parti Québécois which implied, among others things, the anti-scab law, contributed to democratise and at the same time pacify industrial relations. Similar statements can be made about the feminist movement. Its impact on citizenship has been noticeable well before the end of the 1960s. Their struggles around the right to vote which had been finally granted in 1940 constituted an important step in the extension of Québec citizenship rights. This opened the door to a complete redefinition of the Québec citizen-model. For a discussion of the recent history of these social movements, see: Jacques BOUCHER, "Les syndicats : de la lutte pour la reconnaissance à la concertation conflictuelle", in *Le Québec en jeu*, edited by Gérard DAIGLE, Montréal, Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1993, pp. 107-131; Roch DENIS, Serge DENIS, "L'action politique des syndicats, de la révolution tranquille à aujourd'hui", in *Québec : Etat et société*, edited by Alain G. GAGNON, Montréal, Québec/Amérique, 1994, pp. 153-180; Paul R.

BÉLANGER, Benoît LÉVESQUE, "Le mouvement populaire et communautaire: de la revendication au partenariat (1963-1992)", in *Le Québec en jeu*, edited by Gérard DAIGLE, Montréal, Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1993, pp. 713-748; Yolande COHEN, "Le rôle des mouvements de femmes dans l'élargissement de la citoyenneté au Québec", in *Québec: Etat et société*, 994, pp. 181-202; Diane LAMOUREUX, *Citoyennes? Femmes, droit de vote et démocratie*, Montréal, les éditions du remue-ménage, 1989; Paul R. BÉLANGER, Benoît LÉVESQUE, "Le Mouvement social au Québec: continuité et rupture (1960-1985)", in *Animation et culture en mouvement: Fin ou début d'une époque?*, edited by P.R. BÉLANGER, B. LÉVESQUE, R. MATHIEU, and F. MIDY, Québec, Presses de l'Université du Québec, 1987, pp. 253-266; Juan Luis KLEIN, "Autonomie et dépendance des mouvements sociaux dans la régulation post-keynésienne", in *L'autre économie, une économie alternative?*, edited by B. LÉVESQUE, A. JOYAL, and O. CHOUINARD, Québec, Presses de l'Université du Québec, 1989, pp. 297-307.

⁴³. Cf. Christopher McALL, "Les murs de la citoyenneté", *RIAC/Lien social et politique*, 1pp. 81-92; J. Yvon THÉRIAULT, "La société globale est morte ... vive la société globale", *op. cit.*, pp. 19-34; Jane JENSON, "Le refus de la dualité. Nouvelles revendications de la citoyenneté au Canada", in Jocelyn LÉTOURNEAU (ed.), *La question identitaire au Canada francophone. Récits, parcours, enjeux, hors-lieux*, Sainte-Foy, Presses de l'Université Laval, 1994, pp. 189-204; Gilles BOUQUE, Jules DUCHASTEL, *op. cit.*, pp. 163-198.

⁴⁴. Cf. Diane LAMOUREUX, "Nos luttes ont changé nos vies. L'impact du mouvement féministe", in *Le Québec en jeu*, edited by Gérard DAIGLE, Montréal, Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal, pp. 696-700; Marie-Andrée COUILLARD, Ginette CÔTÉ, "L'engagement des Québécoises: trajectoire identitaire", in *Les identités*, edited by Jacques HAMEL and J. YVON THÉRIAULT, Montréal, ACSAALF/Méridien, 1994, pp. 177-206; Paul R. BÉLANGER, Benoît LÉVESQUE, "Le Mouvement social au Québec: continuité et rupture (1960-1985)", *op. cit.*, pp. 253-266; Pierre HAMEL, *Action collective et démocratie locale*, Montréal, Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1991; .

⁴⁵. See on this point: Christopher McALL, "Les murs de la citoyenneté", *op. cit.*, pp. 87-91.

⁴⁶. Cf. T.H. MARSHALL, *Social Class and citizenship*, pp. ; Anthony GIDDENS, *The Nation-State and Violence*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1987, pp. 201-209.

⁴⁷. Christopher McALL, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

⁴⁸. Alain G. GAGNON (editor), *Les opérations Dignité: naissance d'un mouvement social dans l'Est du Québec*, *op. cit.*, 262 pages

⁴⁹. The *Ligue des Droits et Libertés du Québec* was initially called the *Ligue des Droits de l'Homme* until 1975. We should mention that the *Comité Juif Ouvrier* created in 1936 also participated to the implementation of citizenship rights in Québec. For a detailed history of the *Ligue des Droits et Libertés du Québec*, see: Lucie LAURIN, *Des luttes et des droits. Antécédents et histoire de la Ligue des Droits de l'Homme de 1936 à 1975*, Montréal, Editions du Méridien, 1985, pp. 19-56; LIGUE DES DROITS ET LIBERTÉS, *Dans la mêlée*, Montréal, 1988 (to be completed)

⁵⁰. Cf. *Ibid.*

⁵¹. In addition to these institutions dealing in a general way with citizenship rights, during the 1970s and 1980s, the Québec government established different agencies or bodies whose mandates revolve around with the defence or protection of a category of citizens, such as: the Conseil du statut de la femme, l'Office des détenus, l'Office de la protection du consommateur, l'Office des personnes handicapées, etc. These agencies provide information and support to citizens while bringing pressures to bear on the government to modify legislations. Many of them resulted to a large extent from the mobilisation of groups and organisations reclaiming further protection for discriminated groups. These public agencies are not merely channels transmitting governmental informations. They constitute additional arenas in which citizenship rights are claimed and discussed. They thus contribute to delimit the state authority in regard to the recognition and definition of citizenship rights.

⁵². The mandate given to the Public Protector mainly consists in making an investigation upon the

application of an individual who would have been abused. This can lead to the formulation of recommendations besides the concerned governmental body. Cf. COMMISSION DES INSTITUTIONS, *Examen du mandat, des orientations, des activités et de la gestion du protecteur du citoyen*, Québec, Gouvernement du Québec, 1991, pp. 3-7.

⁵³ . The project of adopting a charter of rights had been discussed within Québec since the beginnings of the 1960s. The charter was seen as a political progress for Québec democracy while connecting Québec society to the Western movement of recognition of human rights. It would constitute the domestic version of the Universal Declaration on human rights. Moreover, it was argued that the charter would provide additional protection to Québec citizens against the invading intrusion of state in the everyday life. Another argument was the establishment of some general values and principles for Québec society which would characterise and at the same time, unify this one. This was required since the latter was becoming less and less monolithic and communitarian-based. Cf. ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE DU QUÉBEC, *Débats de l'Assemblée Nationale*, 12 novembre 1974, pp. 2741-2749; Gilles BOURQUE, Jules DUCHASTEL, *op. cit.*, pp. ; .

⁵⁴ . There are four types of rights which are explicitly recognised in the Québec Charter: the civil and judiciary rights; the political rights; the social and economic rights; and the right to equality which is explicitly defined by a set of anti-discriminatory measures (gender, sexual orientation, age, ethnic or national origins, social condition, religion, disability, etc.). These measures opened the way to the adoption of new dispositions in 1982 implying the creation of positive access programs ("programmes d'accès à l'égalité") for discriminated groups such as Aboriginal peoples and ethnic minorities. Cf. ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE DU QUÉBEC, *op. cit.*, pp. 2741-2749; Pierre LEPAGE, "Rôle et défi de la Commission des droits de la personne du Québec face aux droits des peuples autochtones", *Recherches Amérindiennes au Québec*, vol. 13, no 3, 1983, pp. 201-204.

⁵⁵ . In addition to hear complaints and requests about violations of Charter rights, the Commission became the main organisation in charge of programs of affirmative action ("programmes d'accès à l'égalité"). It can also refer cases to the Québec Human Rights Tribunal ("Tribunal des droits de la personne"). This one has the jurisdiction to issue binding decisions in regard to a determining number of Charter dispositions. Both organisations have more than a symbolic value and can impose modifications to bills or governmental regulations.

⁵⁶ . This declaration was the basis of a document on Aboriginal peoples' territorial rights. Resulting from its own initiatives, the Commission's aim was to set up a new dynamic in the Québec/Aboriginal peoples relations. In referring to international law, its declaration pleaded for the recognition of Aboriginal peoples as distinct peoples having historical rights and as having the same legal and political status as Québec people. They could not thus be treated as ethnic minorities within Québec. Cf. COMMISSION DES DROITS DE LA PERSONNE DU QUÉBEC, *Il faut respecter les droits des peuples autochtones et négocier en conséquence avec eux*, (Déclaration sur le problème des droits territoriaux), Québec, 1978; Pierre LEPAGE, *op. cit.*, pp. 210-204.

⁵⁷ . See on this point: Jane JENSON, "Le refus de la dualité. Nouvelles revendications de la citoyenneté au Canada", *op. cit.*, pp. 189-214; Daniel SALÉE, "Autodétermination autochtone, souveraineté du Québec et fédéralisme canadien", in *Bilan du fédéralisme canadien*, edited by François ROCHER, Montréal, VLB éditeur, 1992, pp. 372-405 ; Alan C. CAIRNS, "The Fragmentation of Canadian Citizenship", in *Belonging. The Meaning and Future of Canadian Citizenship*, edited by William KAPLAN, Montreal & Kingston, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993, pp. 181-220.

⁵⁸ . See on this point: Leslie PAL, *Interests of State*, Montréal/Kingston, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993; Jane JENSON, "Le refus de la dualité", *op. cit.*, pp. 189-214; Gary CALDWELL, "Evolution of the Concept of Citizenship (1945-1995): An English Canadian Perspective", in *La nation dans tous ses États: Le Québec en comparaison*, edited by Gérard BOUCHARD & Yvan LAMONDE, Paris, L'Harmattan, 1997, pp. 297-310; Cynthia WILLAITS, "The Changing Nature of Citizens Rights", in *Constitutionalism, Citizenship and Society in Canada*, edited by Alan CAIRNS, Cynthia WILLIAMS, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1995

⁵⁹. The nationalisation of hydro-electricity and the reform of education, which led to the establishment of the Department of Education in 1964, were two controversial reforms and perhaps the most of the numerous reforms launched during that period. Both did not initially appear on the Lesage government's political agenda. They constituted two determinant reforms which contributed to reinforce the impact of the "Quiet Revolution". Each of them reflected changes in social relations and brought in a rearticulation of state/society relations. Furthermore, each project tended to call into question the power of a particular actor which previously played an important role. The reform of the education system implied notably the replacement of the Clergy and to a great extent, its discredit. Even if it did not lead to a complete secularisation of the education system, it remains however that it clearly signified the disempowerment of the Clergy. The report of the Parent Commission clearly recommended the setting up of a new education system which would be similar to the North American ones. The specificities of the existing system were described as archaic and obsolescent, setting back the development of the Québec society. The several discussions raised by the project revealed two opposed views of Québec society. The establishment of a "modern" education system represented for its advocates a turning point for the Québec society. See on this point: Susan Mann TROFIMENKOFF, *op. cit.*, pp. 405-406.

⁶⁰. Philippe FAUCHER, Johanne BERGERON, *Hydro-Québec. La société de l'heure pointe*, Montréal, Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1986, p. 35.

⁶¹. *Ibid.*, pp. 35-36.

⁶². *Idem.*

⁶³. André BOLDUC, Clarence HOGUE, Daniel LAROUCHE, *Hydro-Québec. L'héritage d'un siècle d'expression*, Montréal, Libre Expression & Forces, 1989, pp. 154-155.

⁶⁴. There were at that time four major companies which controlled 85% of the production of electricity: Hydro-Québec, Aluminium Company of Canada (Alcan), Shawinigan group including Shawinigan Water and Power Co, and Gatineau Power Co. The producers were divided in two groups. One group was producers which distribute and sell electricity to population from one particular region. The other group included self-producers, more generally private utilities having built power stations for their own needs. Cf. *Idem.*

⁶⁵. The René Lévesque's speech was the result of previous discussions and researches within the Ministry of Natural Resources on the issue of nationalisation of electricity. Those discussions led to a report which was afterwards submitted to the Conseil d'orientation économique; this governmental agency played a determinant role in establishing the governmental economic priorities. The Conseil d'orientation économique submitted in January 1962 its recommendations to the Conseil des ministres. Cf. *Idem.*

⁶⁶. André BOLDUC, Clarence HOGUE, Daniel LAROUCHE, *op. cit.*, pp. 160-165.

⁶⁷. The arguments raised by the private utilities were similar to those used by the Montreal Light, Heat and Power in 1944. In both cases, the companies tried to justify their management without to be able to disprove the government's claims. Cf. *Idem.*

⁶⁸. It must be pointed out that René Lévesque played a determinant role in the success of the nationalisation project. Even if the social and political context strongly influenced the result, the Lévesque's ability to explain in a convincing way the main stakes was also important. Being a former journalist, Lévesque expressed himself with ease in the media which gave him an advantage. The election of the Lesage government in 1960 had revealed the increasing influence of the television on public debates.

⁶⁹. The opposition from the private companies was not the only factor which could explain the call for elections. A division within the Cabinet and the possibility that some ministers would resigned may have influenced the Premier's decision. André BOLDUC, Clarence HOGUE, Daniel LAROUCHE, *op. cit.*, p. 168.

⁷⁰. *Ibid.*, pp. 168-169.

⁷¹. Philippe FAUCHER, Johanne BERGERON, *op. cit.*, pp.40-41; Alain CHANLAT, avec la collaboration de André BOLDUC et Daniel LAROUCHE, *Gestion et culture d'entreprise. Le cheminement d'Hydro-Québec*, Montréal, Québec/Amérique, 1984, pp. 60-65.

⁷². Many issues discussed during the electoral campaign such as the economic colonialism of foreign trusts had been previously raised. However, they were raised in a different context which gave them a new meaning. Whereas they had been previously discussed by groups or political parties criticising governmental policies, this time they became part of the governmental discourse and consequently, were legitimised. The inclusion of nationalist issues constituted the major difference between the electoral campaign of 1960 and the one of 1962. Whereas the first was largely dominated by the issue of modernisation, the second was organised around nationalist issues. The latter contributed to increase the power of the nationalist movement since it got a broader exposure. The nationalist became subsequently embedded within the state institutions.

⁷³. Cf. Alain CHANLAT, *op. cit.*, pp. 85-88.

⁷⁴. See on this point: Sylvie VINCENT, "La leçon de l'hydroélectricité", in Sylvie VINCENT, Garry BOWERS (sous la direction de), *Baie James et Nord québécois: dix ans après*, Montréal, Recherches Amérindiennes du Québec, 1988, pp. 239-240; Alain CHANLAT, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

⁷⁵. The existence of an annual week of electricity was a good illustration of its symbolic importance. This national week aimed to inform the population in regard to the recent developments and progress in the area of electricity. The government made at that time a general overview of the Québec situation. Cf. André BOLDUC, Clarence HOGUE, Daniel LAROUCHE, *op. cit.*, p. 261.

⁷⁶. The seven companies implied in the transaction accepted the governmental offer without to require further negotiations or to engage legal procedures. The fact that the financial value was very advantageous for the companies. Moreover, in being backed up by financial loans from USA, the government had an important room for manoeuvre. It also could have easily proceeded by expropriation as it did in 1944.

⁷⁷. Philippe FAUCHER, Johanne BERGERON, *op. cit.*, p. 41

⁷⁸. It is only at the beginning of the 1980s that Hydro-Québec revised its annual previsions. They became based on an estimate of 3% per year. This change can be explained by a stabilisation of the demand and mostly by the existing surpluses. Cf. Philippe FAUCHER, Johanne BERGERON, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-72.

⁷⁹. The engineering used for the building of dams such as the Barrage Daniel Johnson (Manic 5) constituted a world premiere. Furthermore, owing to that this complex were far from the urban centres, Hydro-Québec developed a transmission line of 735 Kv which represented almost the double of the existing transmission lines at that time. Cf. André BOLDUC, Clarence HOGUE, Daniel LAROUCHE, *op. cit.*, pp. 162-164

⁸⁰. Roger LACASSE, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-21.

⁸¹. See Jean-Jacques SIMARD, "Terre et pouvoir au Nouveau-Québec", *Etudes Inuit*, vol. 3, no 1, 1979, pp. 101-102.

⁸². See on this point: Toby Morantz, "Aboriginal Land Claims in Québec", in Ken COATES (ed.), *Aboriginal Land Claims in Canada, A Regional Perspective*, Toronto, Copp Clark Pitman Ltd, 1992, p. 104.

⁸³. *Idem*.

⁸⁴. The extension of Québec boundaries implied some changes in the legal status of many Natives peoples. It affected the Montagnais, Atikamek, Algonquin, Naskapi, Cree and Inuit. However, its concrete impact became only noticeable some decades later.

⁸⁵. See Eric Gourdeau, "Québec and the Aboriginal Question", in Alain G. GAGNON (ed.), *Québec State and Society*, Toronto, Nelson Canada, 1993, p. 350.

⁸⁶. Those disputes with the Federal government were solved by the decision of the Supreme Court in 1939

which decided that Inuit were Indians and then, under the jurisdiction of the Federal government. See Jean-Jacques SIMARD, "Terre et pouvoir au Nouveau-Québec", *op. cit.*, pp. 102-107

⁸⁷. There were different names used to identify the northern territory of Québec before it became officially called Nouveau-Québec in 1963. The most popular name for the James Bay region was "Radissonie" in reference to Radisson, the French *coureur de bois* who was one the first to reach this region. The most northern part which correspond to the Inuit territory was often called the Ungava. One other name for the whole region was "Hudsonie" in distinguishing the upper and the lower parts. Those specific names which have geographic and historical connotations were mostly used by people who had an interest for that region. It did not exist one official name as for the other regions of Québec.

⁸⁸. The Abitibi-Témiscamingue region was opened in 1910 with the construction of a railway road. It was only during the 1930s that the population began to increase. The governmental initiatives and the pressures from the Catholic Church explained to a large extent that rise. The development of the mining activities (gold, copper, nickel) from the 1940s speeded up the economic development of that region. That development was mostly controlled by American investments. Cf. John A. DICKINSON and Brian YOUNG, *Brève histoire socio-économique du Québec*, Translated by Hélène Filion, Montréal, Septentrion, 1992, pp. 286-294.

⁸⁹. Roger LACASSE, *Baie James. L'extraordinaire aventure des derniers pionniers canadiens*, Paris, Presses de la cité, 1985, pp. 21-22.

⁹⁰. During the 1950s, the federal interventions in the Canadian North became more important and more structured. This ended a period during which the private developers enjoyed a great room of manoeuvre in the exploitation of the northern resources. The period between the two world wars had been characterised by an attenuation of the federal administration in the North. The important famines occurring within the Aboriginal communities during the 1930s and 1940s and the Second World War had however obliged the federal government to increase its interventions and at the same time, increased its awareness of the North. The election of new Members of Parliament after the Second World War convinced by the development of the North was also another factor explaining the new direction taken by the federal government. Cf. Louis-Edmond HAMELIN, *Nordicité Canadienne*, Montréal, Hurtubise HMH, 1975, pp. 161-166.

⁹¹. See Jean MORISSET, *Canada: Indianité et luttes d'espace*, UQUAM, Département de géographie, 1983, no 83-01.

⁹². There also was one other event less a priori political showing that the Québec government desired to increase its authority over the northern territory. It was the formation in December 1960 of the Université Laval's "Centre d'études nordiques" which was supported by the Québec government. This support was not only financial, but also implied a close collaboration with the Ministry of Natural Resources. This scientific centre was seen as a preliminary step for an eventual provincial administration. It clearly appeared that the government did not want to limit the Québec presence within that territory to scientific groups. See on this point: Louis-Edmond HAMELIN, *op. cit.*, pp. 254-255.

⁹³. The R.C.M.P. came initially in the northern Québec during the 1910s to open one border post. In 1922, the R.C.M.P. started to visit each year the different aboriginal communities. Those annual tours which became known as the Eastern Arctic Patrol were not limited to guarantee the respect of the law. They also delivered some medical services. They turned out to be particularly important during the 1930s when a severe famine occurred within many communities. Cf. Jean-Jacques SIMARD, "Terre et pouvoir au Nouveau-Québec", *op. cit.*, p. 105.

⁹⁴. Louis-Edmond Hamelin pointed out that the federal government had a different explanation in regard to the withdrawal of its policemen. This would have followed from the setting up of new programs by the Department of Indian Affairs which implied, among other things, that the tasks of the R.C.M.P. would be fulfilled by new civil servants. The presence of the R.C.M.P. in the northern Québec was a priori related to the aboriginal population and not to the white population. This not really corresponded to a political will to respect the Québec prerogatives. Insofar as the white population within the northern Québec began to grow during the 1950s, it became necessary to set up a police service. Cf. Louis-Edmond HAMELIN, *op.*

cit., p. 255.

⁹⁵. *Idem*, p. 272.

⁹⁶. *Idem*, pp. 272-273.

⁹⁷. See Jean-Jacques SIMARD, "Les aumoniers du régiment et le Québec amérindien", *Recherches amérindiennes au Québec*, vol. 9, no 4, 1980.

⁹⁸. See on that point: Louis-Edmond HAMELIN, *op. cit.*, pp. 268-275; Jean-Jacques SIMARD et Gérard DUHAIME, "Praxis Autochtone et stratégies techno-bureaucratiques. L'épisode de la consultation de l'hiver 1970 au Nouveau-Québec; ses tenants et ses aboutissants", *Recherches Amérindiennes au Québec*, vol. 11, no 2, 1981, pp. 115-132.

⁹⁹. Cf. Louis-Edmond HAMELIN, *op. cit.*, p. 256.

¹⁰⁰. Eric GOURDEAU, *op. cit.*, p. 350.

¹⁰¹. Jean-Jacques SIMARD et Gérard DUHAIME, *op. cit.*, pp. 126-128.

¹⁰². The Direction Générale du Nouveau-Québec had had to overcome many important difficulties which harmed the development of a Québec northern policy. Besides the struggles with the federal government, there was the relative inexperience of the bureaucrats with the northern affairs. They had to learn about the North and at the same time, to find the appropriate ways to develop this unique and largely unknown region; they could not rely on the same tools used in the South. Therefore, a competency in regard to northern affairs had to be developed. Furthermore, the election of subsequent governments implied that the northern development passed through many fluctuations. The political will required for the northern development was not consistent. Some important projects such as the establishment of a department of northern affairs and a department for Indian and Esquimaux Affairs were not followed up. One other difficulty, which is perhaps the most important, was the necessity for the D.G.N.Q. to collaborate with others departments in the administration of the Nouveau-Québec. The D.G.N.Q. did not have all the administrative powers and then, had to make some trade-offs between divergent interests. Being linked to the Department of Natural Resources, the D.G.N.Q. have to deal with this latter about some issues such as the health and school which were very far from the field of actions of that Department. See Louis-Edmond HAMELIN, *op. cit.*, pp. 258-263.

¹⁰³. Cf. Louis-Edmond HAMELIN, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-12.

¹⁰⁴. COMMISSION D'ETUDE SUR L'INTEGRITE DU TERRITOIRE DU QUÉBEC, *Rapport de la Commission d'étude sur l'intégrité du territoire du Québec: Le Domaine Indien*, vol. 4, Québec, 1971, pp. 7-8.

¹⁰⁵. COMMISSION D'ETUDE SUR L'INTEGRITE DU TERRITOIRE DU QUÉBEC, *op. cit.*, pp. 291-292.

¹⁰⁶. COMMISSION D'ETUDE SUR L'INTEGRITE DU TERRITOIRE DU QUÉBEC, *op. cit.*, pp. 399-406.

¹⁰⁷. See on this point: Augie FLERAS, Jean Leonard ELLIOTT, *The Nations Within. Aboriginal-State Relations in Canada, the United States and New Zealand*, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 42-44.

¹⁰⁸. Cf. Roger LACASSE, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

¹⁰⁹. Eric GOURDEAU, *Le processus décisionnel dans la conception et la réalisation du développement nordique du Canada. Un cas d'espèce: La Baie de James*, Québec, Conseil des sciences du Canada, 1974, p. 13.

¹¹⁰. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

¹¹¹. André BOLDUC, Clarence HOGUE, Daniel LAROCHE, *op. cit.*, p. 258.

¹¹². The appearance of the Churchill Falls project on the Québec political agenda may explain why the interest of the Lesage government for the development of the James Bay territory decreased. The Union Nationale government of Daniel Johnson had no choice to accept the decision of the Liberal government.

Cf. Eric GOURDEAU, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-17.

¹¹³. André BOLDUC, Clarence HOGUE, Daniel LAROUCHE, *op. cit.*, pp. 260-261

¹¹⁴. Roger LACASSE, *op. cit.*, pp. 56-57.

¹¹⁵. Pierre GRAVEL, Pierre VENNAT, "Un projet qu'il fallait lancer en 71" dans Roger LEROUX (sous la direction de), *La Baie James: projet du siècle*, Montréal, Editions La Press, 1979, p. 8.

¹¹⁶. See on this point: Eric GOURDEAU, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-22; Sean McCUTCHEON, *Electric Rivers. The Story of the James Bay Project*, Montreal, Black Rose Books, 1991, pp. 31-32.

¹¹⁷. One of these firms was the firm Asselin, Benoit, Boucher, Ducharme et Lapointe Inc. (ABB DL). The other was the former ACRES Ltd, which fearing to be identified as being to tied to Anglophone interests, changed to Rousseau, Warren et Sauvé.

¹¹⁸. Roger LACASSE, *op. cit.*, pp. 58-59.

¹¹⁹. See Roger LACASSE, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

¹²⁰. Roger LACASSE, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

¹²¹. Robert BOURASSA, *La Baie James*, Montréal, Editions du Jour, 1973, p.

¹²². Sylvie VINCENT, *op. cit.*, pp. 240-241; Sean McCUTCHEON, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-37.

¹²³. See Roger LACASSE, *op. cit.*, pp. 67-69.

¹²⁴. The James Bay Development Corporation was modeled on the Tennessee Valley Authority. The latter which was created during the 1960s had also the objective of proceeding to a multi-dimensional development. Cf. Sean McCUTCHEON, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

¹²⁵. This is based on an interview with Guy Joron who was one of Parti Québécois MPs. Cf. Louise LAMARRE, *Forces*, no 28, 1979, pp. 20-21.

¹²⁶. Until its election in 1976, the PQ advocated the development of nuclear energy. This choice was motivated by the great potential attributed to the latter. The nuclear energy did not appear more expensive than hydraulic energy. This plea for nuclear energy was also supported by the Québec Corporation of Engineers which lobbied the government. It published in 1972 a comparative study which showed, among other things, that the nuclear energy required less investments while having similar costs. The PQ published the same year a document in which it advocated the development of nuclear energy. It would guarantee the technological lead of Hydro-Québec. It must be pointed out that nuclear energy appeared at the end of the sixties as a concurrential and reliable technology. The diverse experiences in the world were at that time positive. The storage of radioactive waste was not yet seen as a major problem. The Gentilly project in Québec, which aimed the operation of nuclear power stations, was going on without to be confronted to any major problems. Cf. Phillipe FAUCHER, Johanne BERGERON, *op. cit.*, pp. 62-63.

¹²⁷. Roger Lacasse, *op. cit.*, pp. 68-72.

¹²⁸. See on this point: *Ibid.*, p. 70

¹²⁹. *Idem.*

¹³⁰. See *Ibid.*, pp. p. 71.

¹³¹. The JBEC board of directors was composed of five people, three of whom were from Hydro-Québec (the director and two commissioners). Furthermore, Hydro-Québec provided more than 70% of JBEC's capital-stocks and got 99% of shares coming from this capital. The presumed marginalising of Hydro-Québec in the realisation of the James Bay project did not occurred. The establishment of this corporation tended rather to reveal that Hydro-Québec was becoming one of the main actors involved in the project. The outcry resulting from the initial governmental intentions had certainly had an impact. The grievances coming from Hydro-Québec and its political power constituted two factors to which was confronted the Bourassa government. The capacity of Hydro-Québec to shape the realisation of the James Bay project

became noticeable during the discussions about the project management within the JBEC. These discussions gave rise to a conflict between the JBDC and Hydro-Québec about the choice of consulting-engineering firms which would manage the project in association with Hydro-Québec. The conflict was based on the hiring of Bechtel Québec Ltée, a subsidiary of Bechtel Inc. Whereas the representatives of the JBDC wanted to hire two Québec consulting-engineering firms, the representatives of Hydro-Québec wanted to hire Bechtel which had been involved in the Churchill Falls project. The main reason invoked for hiring this multinational firm was its expertise. One other reason was the credibility which will be to the project and consequently, a greater facility to find out financing in USA. This conflict resulted in the resignation of Pierre Nadeau, president of the JBDC, in August 1972. The Hydro-Québec's choice was then confirmed in September 1972. The JBEC announced during a major press conference that two consulting-engineering firms will participate to the management and the construction of the project: Bechtel Québec Limitée and Lalonde, Valois, Lamarre, Valois et Associés. This decision confirmed the subordinating of the JBEC to Hydro-Québec. However, the choice of Bechtel Québec was however received with suspicion. It tended to reinforce the perception of the James Bay project as orientated towards American interests and thus, as reinforcing the American imperialism. Cf. André BOLDUC, Clarence HOGUE, Daniel LAROCHE, *op. cit.*, pp. ; Roger LACASSE, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-81.

¹³². Cf. Roger LACASSE, *op. cit.*, pp. 75-77.

CHAPTER 3: THE MOBILISATION OF CREE PEOPLE: THE DIFFICULT RECOGNITION OF A NEW POLITICAL ACTOR

The James Bay project resulted from an increasing interest by the Québec government in its northern territory during a period in which the structures of the Québec state were being modified. This was also the time of the transformation of the Québec nationalist movement which highlighted the idea of sovereignty. In this chapter, we discuss the mobilisation of the Cree people during the first phase of the James Bay project (1970-1975). The latter contributed strongly to transforming what was presented by the Bourassa government as an "economic" issue into a national political issue. This chapter aims to relate the history of the Cree mobilisation against the James Bay project, emphasising its political and spatial implications. The discussion will show that their opposition involved a rescaling of Cree politics which challenged the federal Indian policy framework and the Québec political setting established by the Quiet Revolution. Attention will be paid to the constitution of a Cree polity which was consolidated with the signature of the *James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement*. The second objective of this chapter is to illustrate the links between the mobilisation of Cree people and the rise of an Aboriginal peoples' movement at the national and international levels. The rise of this movement implied the recognition of Aboriginal peoples as national actors and thus, the transformation of national political scenes into spaces of resistance. This raised two major challenges which will be discussed: the remapping of state territory and the rewriting of national histories.

This chapter is divided in three sections. In the first section, the rise of the Aboriginal people movement will be discussed. Although we will refer to the openings made at the international level, we will focus on the changes occurring on the Canadian and Québec political scenes from the beginning of the 1960s. This period was marked by the increasing visibility and militancy of Aboriginal organisations and by the incremental opening of governments to the Aboriginal claims. This represented the beginning of a redefinition of the Indian-ness and at the same time, a modification of the power relations between the Aboriginal peoples and the Canadian state. In the second section of this section, we will discuss the mobilisation of the Cree people against the James Bay project. After having drawn a historical and political portrait of the Cree communities, we examine the claims and strategies of mobilisation used to prevent the construction of the project. The last section will discuss the

resolution of this conflict. We will emphasise two determining steps: the establishment of the Grand Council of the Cree and the signature of the *James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement*. We look at how they brought in a redefinition of the Cree polity and of the Québec/Aboriginal people relations.

3.1 The Rise of the Aboriginal Peoples Movement

The 1960s proved to be a turning point for Aboriginal peoples. Various events of that time contributed to open spaces for Aboriginal peoples' claims, notably in the Western world. The process of colonisation and marginalisation affecting Aboriginal peoples around the world started to be called into question by various groups. Their denizen status and their, often imposed and forced, assimilation were increasingly denounced and perceived as discriminatory and racist. The period was marked by the emergence of a new discourse on Aboriginal peoples on the one hand, and on the other hand, by the rise of the level of militancy of organisations representing and/or defending Aboriginal peoples' rights. Both paved the way for the recognition of the Indigenous peoples movement which began to have a significant impact on the world polity from the mid-1970s. Although these changes had international ramifications, it was the national political scene which was the main locus of struggles for Aboriginal peoples at that time. In the following pages, we will highlight some of the changes at the international level which subsequently furthered the empowerment of Aboriginal peoples in Canadian and Québec politics: the decolonisation movement of Third World countries and the civil rights movement; the formation of non indigenous international organisations; the development of some transnational relations between Aboriginal peoples; and the signature of the *Alaska Native Land Claims Settlement Act*. In this section, we do not intend to present a history of the Indigenous peoples movement; but rather focus on some of the elements which contributed to the redefinition of the political horizon of Aboriginal peoples at the national level during the 1960s. We are perfectly aware that these events did not have the same impact over the Western countries and did not necessarily occurred in each country. However, it is nonetheless possible to point out some structural changes although they are presented from a Western and white perspective.

The Emergence of Fourth World Politics: Some Openings at the International Level

The growing visibility of Aboriginal peoples in the "Western" world resulted from the overlapping of various events which contributed to weaken the world-scale process of colonisation afflicting them. This did not

mean that Aboriginal peoples did not previously fight and resist to this process. From the 1960s, however, the political context changed in a manner that allowed them to oppose a greater resistance and even to challenge this process. This reflected a redefinition in Aboriginal peoples' agency which involved a redefinition of their discourses and strategies of mobilisation. Their fragmentation and divisions which were used by the governments, began to be somewhat overcome, allowing them to adopt more effective large-scale strategies. It was at that time that Aboriginal peoples, mostly those living in Western countries, launched processes of "jumping scales" on a collective basis by politicising the "Indian" or Aboriginal identity and redrawing the internal scales of Western countries. These processes have involved the politicisation of two scales on new bases: the national and the international or transnational. Being excluded from these two political spaces, Aboriginal peoples have attempted to transform them into spaces of resistance and therefore, to reverse the historical process of disempowerment.¹

These processes of jumping scales have rested on the politicisation of new representations carried on by Aboriginal peoples through a discourse rejecting the predominant assimilationist framework and reclaiming new policies. They came to be seen as an oppressed cultural and political group whose historical rights have been unfairly denied through the years by an increasing number of groups in Western countries. This discourse was based on their representation as sovereign peoples having been unfairly despoiled and marginalised in opposition to their definition as a cultural minority by the national states. Their political situation, especially for those living under the reserve system, started to be described as a form of colonisation, even "apartheid". Their claims became not only more publicised, but also increasingly legitimated. The second element of this process was the adoption of new strategies of mobilisation by non indigenous organisations (international and national) or by Aboriginal peoples themselves which became supported by grassroots movements. Although their mobilisation has national and international implications, the national space was initially the privileged arena for their mobilisation. It is only during the 1980s that Aboriginal peoples began to invest seriously in the international political scene. This shift allowed them to assert their political status as peoples while making an attempt to overpass the governments' reluctance to their political recognition. This contributed to highlight the world or supranational dimension of the Aboriginal peoples movement.

One important factor that contributed to create room for Aboriginal peoples' claims was the decolonisation movement of the Third World countries.² It contributed to raising public awareness of the grievances of Aboriginal peoples while providing some key arguments subsequently integrated into their discourses. The use of the notion of "internal colonisation" which derived from the similarities drawn between the situation of Third World countries and the situation of Aboriginal peoples helped them to gain legitimacy and public support. In this political context favourable to the abolition of colonisation, the ignorance of their claims by national governments could be more easily challenged. Moreover, the decolonisation movement raised two important issues on the world political agenda which came to be part of the Aboriginal peoples' agenda: the recognition of the right to national self-determination and the recasting of the issue of minority rights in international law.³ The political assertion of both issues threw light on the particular situation of Aboriginal peoples who constituted minorities with a specific culture and historical mode of governance. Both issues provided discursive tools which became part of the Aboriginal peoples movement 's discourse while constituting strategies to get access to their respective national political scenes and to the international political scene. Their integration became noticeable at the beginning of the 1970s when some Aboriginal leaders and advocating groups began to use the notion of "Fourth World" to characterise the world situation of Aboriginal peoples.⁴ It reflected a strategic choice to widen the political trajectory opened by Third World countries and consequently, to get a greater political recognition. The reference to this world collective identity implied a reappraisal of their situation from the Aboriginals' standpoint.

The inclusion of Aboriginal peoples' claims in the Western political discourse was also aided by the spreading of identity politics. The "Aboriginal" came to be recognised as a legitimate identity by which Aboriginal peoples could claim rights and therefore, participate in political debates. The recognition of Aboriginal rights became a meaningful political issue on the political agenda mobilising other groups which supported Aboriginal claims. The US civil rights movements, which drew public attention to the racial discrimination against Aboriginal peoples, played an important role in this regard.⁵ It contributed to link their claims with the broader discussions on minority rights occurring in Western countries, fuelled by the claims of contemporary social movements. The struggles of Aboriginal peoples for the protection of their rights became part of the on-going debates about the recognition of social, economic and cultural rights. They were embedded in the larger process of democratisation based on the extension of citizenship entitlements which shaped Western politics from the end

of the 1960s. Although the issue of Aboriginal rights had been raised previously, the discussions of collective rights provided an opportunity to Aboriginal peoples to join these debates.

The process of jumping scales was also supported by the shift in the level of mobilisation of Aboriginal peoples. The 1960s were marked by the rise of activism of Aboriginal peoples which reflected the emergence of a new generation of leaders more educated and better prepared to deal with governments.⁶ Their resistance started to be more efficient and visible. This involved public demonstrations and uprisings sometimes leading to confrontations with governments, often receiving a wide coverage in the media. It clearly revealed what was called "Red power". This indicated that Aboriginal peoples were now political actors who could no longer be ignored and silenced. This increased activism of Aboriginal peoples was especially noticeable in Western countries. The struggles of the American Natives during the sixties illustrated very well this change.⁷ One significant example was the struggle of Alaska Natives against successive development projects which encroached more and more their lands. This led to the signature in 1971 of the *Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act*.⁸ This had a tremendous impact on Canadian Indian policy during the 1970, as it became a reference used by the federal government in the land negotiations. As we will see, the James Bay agreement reflected the same political orientation.

The impact of the mobilisation of Aboriginal peoples was also broadened by two overlapping factors: the development of transnational relations between the Aboriginal peoples and the emergence of international non governmental organisations (NGOs) advocating the recognition of Aboriginal rights.⁹ During the 1960s, contacts between the various Aboriginal groups started to be more frequent. This allowed them to exchange information and to develop some links, despite the extreme cultural and political diversity among Aboriginal peoples. The formation of some international organisations such as *Cultural Survival*, and the *International Work Group on Indigenous Affairs* (IWGIA) was particularly important in this respect. While facilitating the diffusion of Aboriginal peoples' concerns and claims, they transposed the discussions of Aboriginal issues beyond a statist framework. They became key elements framing Fourth World politics.

The process of jumping scales launched by Aboriginal peoples raised a major challenge to governments. In representing themselves as sovereign peoples inhabiting ancestral lands, they call into question the primacy of national sovereignty claimed by states. Their struggles rest on a recognition of a new

territoriality no longer exclusively defined by state borders on a national basis. They call for the remapping of world politics which implies to leave the Westphalian system behind. Moreover, the recognition of the Red power which occurred almost simultaneously in various public spheres indicated the porosity of national frontiers. Although it was embodied in various national political agendas, some core issues had the same meaning systems. The opposition of Aboriginal peoples to the exclusiveness of state national sovereignty was not, however, a new issue on their agenda. Aboriginal peoples have long sought to assert their international status. Their sovereignty was somewhat recognised in certain treaties signed with the European powers at the beginning of the colonisation period. In the decolonisation context, however, the rearticulation of their sovereignty claims around the right to self-determination contributed to reframe it and at the same time, to broaden its impact.

The Redefinition of Canadian Indian Policy: The Beginning of Decolonisation

The new phase of the mobilisation of Aboriginal peoples was also noticeable on the Canadian political scene. The redefinition of the Canadian political agenda contributed to opening room for Aboriginal peoples' claims. The greater concern for social and economic equality and the spreading of the discourse on participatory democracy drew public attention to the marginalisation of Aboriginal peoples. Discrimination against them came to be seen as a political issue. Furthermore, the beginning of the discussions on national unity during the 1960s brought in a redefinition of federalism while furthering the redrawing of the Canadian nation's contours. Those discussions, which have been to a large extent fuelled by the successive demands of the Québec government for decentralised constitutional arrangements, have reflected different and opposed readings of the Canadian history and at the same time, contradictory representations of the Canadian political community.¹⁰ The characterisation of Canadian society as bicultural and later on, as multicultural, has created favourable conditions to rethink the place of Aboriginal peoples within Canada. This new political context led to the "rediscovery of the Indian problem". Aboriginal concerns, which had been restricted to governmental departments, began to be diffused within Canadian society. It thus became increasingly apparent that the Indian Act was no longer adequate.

These political discussions prepared the terrain for the important burst in the federal/Aboriginal relations at the end of the 1960s.¹¹ Different events occurring in a relative short period of time contributed to

weaken the bases of the wardship system established by the Indian Act. The first was the release of the Hawthorn Report released in 1967.¹² Aiming to increase the effectiveness of its programs, the Department of Indian Affairs commissioned a national survey of the conditions of Indians, the Hawthorn-Tremblay Commission. The Hawthorn Report was the first comprehensive study of their situation. It clearly stated that Indians suffered from poverty, underdevelopment and unemployment while having also a high drop-out rate. The portrait of the Indian communities was one of social disintegration. The authors recommended the federal government to offer greater choice of lifestyle and to end the policy of assimilation. One other important finding of that report was the concept of "citizen plus". It was proposed that Indians should keep their special status (aboriginal and treaty rights) while having better access to federal and provincial programs. This presupposed the granting of a dual citizenship to Indians. In addition to their rights linked to their status, they would also get access to the same citizenship rights as Canadians and especially to social and economic rights. The authors also suggested that the provinces should become involved in the delivery of services to Indians. Although few recommendations of the Hawthorn Report were adopted, it nonetheless reached a wide audience. Its impact was also enhanced by the fact that its major concerns overlapped with some of the main policy orientations of the Pearson government.¹³ For example, its political will to reduce poverty, which was popularised by the slogan "the war against poverty", was sustained by the way the Report highlighted the poor socio-economic conditions in which most Aboriginal were living.

By highlighting the necessity of modifying federal Indian policy, the Hawthorn Report opened the way to the release of the White Paper on Indian Policy by the Trudeau government in 1969. The White Paper proposed major reforms aiming to institute new relations between the federal government and Native peoples. Based on a liberal individualist perspective, the White Paper wanted to abolish the special status of Indians which it saw as discriminatory.¹⁴ The elimination of discrimination rested on the termination of the reserve system and the Indian Act. The Indians were to become full Canadian citizens regardless of their ancestry and blood. This proposition contradicted the proposition of the Hawthorn Report aiming at the recognition of the notion of citizenship plus. Another important element of the White Paper was the transfer of Indian administration to provinces which would have put an end to the trusteeship role of the federal government and to the Department of Indian Affairs. The band councils would thus have become similar to municipal

governments. Although the federal government tried to legitimate its proposals through a discourse of integration and individual justice, the idea of assimilation still remained the privileged solution.

The release of White Paper aroused massive opposition from Aboriginal peoples. It was seen unanimously as a threat for their lands and their rights, leading to cultural genocide. It acted as a powerful "catalyst in raising the political consciousness of Indian peoples".¹⁵ It produced a nation-wide mobilisation that helped to thwart their political division and to increase the level of militancy. The most significant and visible answer of the Aboriginal peoples to the White Paper was the publication of the Red Paper by the National Indian Brotherhood in June 1970. The Red Paper conclusions reached on many points the Hawthorn Report. This paper, entitled *Citizens Plus*, emphasised the need to preserve special rights and recognised constitutional status. The demands concerning the recognition of aboriginal title and treaty rights and the setting up of educational and socio-economic development programs were reiterated. It provided many recommendations and propositions aiming to solve problems Native peoples faced.

The Red Paper broadened the impact of the Aboriginal peoples' political discourse and at the same time, heightened its legitimacy. Aboriginal peoples were able to overcome their political division which had been until that time profitable for the government. The withdrawal of the White Paper was interpreted as a victory by the Indian leaders and thus contributed to give a credibility and a weight to Indian organisations.¹⁶ This episode allowed the National Indian Brotherhood and various provincial organisations to increase their representativity and their effectiveness.¹⁷ Established in 1969, the National Indian Brotherhood, which represented status Indians, acquired a national prominence and leadership. It was also at that time that the federal governmental started to grant funding to Indian organisations. While enabling them to support their research in regard to their claims and their rights, the funding helped to consolidate their staff activities. It provided, then, a certain stability and an impetus. This was noticeable with the setting up of two other national organisations the year after: the Native Council of Canada (Métis and non-status Indians) and the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (Inuit). It thus resulted an increasing visibility of national organisations on the Canadian political scene and at the same time, the possibility of influencing more effectively the decision-making process.¹⁸

Aboriginal organisations began to be more effective during the 1960s.¹⁹ Although they were confronted with many pitfalls, notably the lack of funding and unity, and the difficulty to mobilise large constituencies, those

organisations gained a greater legitimacy. The arrival of a young generation of chiefs more educated (in the White world) and more skilled in dealing with the federal government was an important factor here. The federal government was confronted with a stronger opposition from aboriginal organisations. Being afraid that movement could become too powerful, the federal government responded to it.²⁰ It decided to provide grants for the setting up of organisations which will be designed as an official interlocutor. This also constituted an opportunity to restore its public image in suggesting that it was open to Aboriginal grievances and willing to propose solutions. Hence, for most of them, those new organisations adopted a different approach, which did not mean, however, that they did make any claim.

The mobilisation against the White Paper had been fostered by a growing awareness of their cultural heritage and their identity. It revealed the opposition between two representations of the "Indian". More than being a legal status, the Indian identity became a political issue around which Aboriginal peoples mobilised. It involved a redefinition of the "Indian" identity and implicitly, a rewriting of their history and a remapping of their political spaces. The latter came to be used to claim their cultural and political distinctiveness and to fight their political marginalisation. This involved the erasing of the negative connotations which have been historically attached to the "Indian" identity and the substitution of the state criteria.²¹ As a result of cultural revival and political mobilisation, the definition of Indian-ness started to be controlled by Aboriginal peoples. This revealed the emergence of Red power in Canadian politics. Of course, they still remain confronted with the Indian Act which appears more than ever a racist and anachronistic law.

The redefinition of the place of Aboriginal peoples within Canadian society was also supported by the involvement of some "Canadian" groups that raised public concerns about the fate of Aboriginal peoples. The Indian policy started to be increasingly perceived as discriminatory and paternalistic.²² The growth of public awareness created a more favourable climate to press aboriginal claims and at the same time, brought pressure to bear on government to bring in policy changes. It furthered the politicisation of Aboriginal issues out of the framework imposed by the Indian policy. Some advocate groups played a significant role on that score. The Indian-Eskimo Association, which was renamed at the beginning of the 1970s the Canadian Association in Support of Native People, constituted the best example of that change. During the 1960s, it was the most prominent public group trying to raise public consciousness about the poor socio-economic conditions of

aboriginal communities. While providing legal advice to Aboriginal peoples and financial support to organisations, the group advocated many changes in Indian policy as well as new programs. These groups contributed to broaden the bases of the Aboriginal peoples' movement. They confirmed that their mobilisation went beyond the redefinition of Aboriginal organisations' fields of action. An explanation in terms of interest groups would be too partial.

The Transformation of the Québec Political Scene

It is only during the sixties that the Québec/Aboriginal relations began to be redefined on new grounds as changes at the Canadian or international levels had an impact. Before that, the Québec government had refused to negotiate any major agreement or simply ignored their claims and claimed to respect federal jurisdiction. The hydroelectric development illustrated very well the lack of respectful relations. Previous hydro-electric projects which encroached on the territories of Aboriginal peoples had been elaborated, developed and built without informing and consulting the populations. The Gouin dam on the St-Maurice river in 1914 in the heart of Attikameks' territory or more recently, the Manicouagan-Outardes hydro-electric complex located in the Montagnais' territory had been built without prior negotiations.²³ The projects went ahead in spite of the grievances of Aboriginal peoples. Both projects brought deep disruptions of hunting territories. It was only after construction had been completed that Aboriginal populations were contacted for an eventual settlement to cover damages suffered. That indifference towards Aboriginal populations was not restricted to government. It can be easily argued that this attitude was largely widespread among the population.²⁴ These projects did not mobilise some groups, except the concerned Aboriginals. Their grievances and problems had not been echoed in the media. Nevertheless, the building of the Manicouagan-Outardes complex and especially the Manic 5 dam, later renamed for Daniel Johnson, got wide coverage in the media. There was little mention about the Aboriginal peoples living in that area.

These events showed that, until the sixties, the Aboriginal peoples in Québec remained politically marginal. Their claims about their land title or aboriginal rights were excluded from the public sphere. Despite its formal engagements, the Québec government had not yet assumed its obligations under the 1912 Québec Extensions Boundaries Act. The absence of a specific Québec Indian policy furthered this political indifference. Moreover, the Aboriginal peoples living in Québec were not politically united and organised. During the 1960s,

however, important changes occurred which put an end to the government's ignorance. In this section, we will look at some of these changes that brought about this shift: the formation of the Indians of Québec Association (IQA); the launching of a round of negotiations by the Commission de négociations des affaires indiennes; and the Dorion Commission's report on Indian Lands. While advancing the political recognition of Aboriginal peoples living in Québec, they also contributed to the rise in public awareness of Québec people. They opened the door to the recognition of citizenship rights to Aboriginal peoples by the Québec government. These changes reflected and at the same time reinforced, the empowerment of Aboriginal peoples on the Canadian political scene.

The formation in 1965 of the Indians of Québec Association (IQA) at the instigation of three chiefs brought in many changes. The establishment of the IQA posed a major challenge.²⁵ It required not only the development of an institutional framework and a common political agenda, but also the legitimisation of that organisation in the view of the various Aboriginal peoples in Québec. This task was rendered more difficult insofar as that organisation was created, as we mentioned, with the financial support given by DIAND. The IQA nevertheless succeeded in gathering all Aboriginal peoples and imposing a stronger voice within Québec. This constituted a clear attempt to rescale on a national basis the discussions and negotiations with the Québec government and consequently, to exert a greater leverage. In doing so, they sought to fight the dividing strategy used by the government which privileged the negotiations at the local level.

The IQA raised contentious issues which constituted for most of them previous claims about their rights ignored by the government. The IQA reiterated their claims for the recognition of their land title and of their hunting and fishing rights. In 1967, it submitted a brief to the Québec Department of Tourism, Hunting and Fishing ("Ministère du Tourisme, de la Chasse et de la Pêche") in which it officially demanded the recognition of their aboriginal rights. The IQA argued that these rights had been recognised by the Royal Proclamation (1763) and since that time, have never been extinguished. In referring to the B.N.A.A., they also claimed that the Québec government did not have jurisdiction over Indians and thus, its laws regulating hunting and fishing activities did not apply to Indians.²⁶

The brief, which called into question Québec's jurisdiction, aroused strong reactions from the Québec government. It took some years, however, before the Québec government paid attention to those claims. The

turmoil created by the White Paper and the beginning of discussions between Québec and Ottawa about the eventual transfer of services falling into provincial jurisdictions to put an end to the inertia. In 1969, the Québec government became involved in a tripartite committee, including the IQA and the Canadian government, to resolve the contentious issue.²⁷ The involvement reflected its official position on aboriginal rights which were restricted to the recognition of hunting, fishing and trapping rights.²⁸ By early 1970, a temporary agreement on these rights had been reached. However, the election of the Liberal government of Robert Bourassa some months later prevented the finalisation of that agreement.²⁹ Yet, similar to the federal government, the Québec government rejected the Aboriginal peoples' claims about land title based on ancestral occupancy.

In the following years, the IQA raised other important issues which also aimed at recognition of their rights and at the same time, of their particular political status. The demand for a tax exemption on retail sales within reserves, as it is specified in the Indian Act and recognised in the jurisprudence, represented one of those issues.³⁰ In 1968, the IQA submitted in 1968 a brief to the Québec Department on Revenue ("Ministère du revenu") on that issue. The Québec government acquiesced to the request in 1972. Generally speaking, this demand, as well as their claims on fishing, hunting and trapping rights, implied the predominance of the jurisdiction of the Indian Act over Québec laws. The IQA called for the granting of the particular political status to Aboriginal peoples inhabiting is territory. It called for the recognition of a distinct citizenship status which would embrace Québec citizenship, but at the same time, included other citizenship entitlements.

Another important event which broadened the space of Aboriginal peoples in the Québec public sphere was the Dorion Commission. In 1969, public hearings of the Dorion Commission on Indians' territorial rights provided the IQA the opportunity to raise the whole issue of aboriginal rights. They contributed to publicise aboriginal issues among the population and to increase the political visibility of the IQA. The latter submitted a brief at this occasion which strongly asserted their stance. Two elements retained attention.³¹ First, they claimed that Indians still had rights to the major portion of Québec territory which had not been surrendered by treaties. The territorial delimitation to which they referred was the one established by the Royal Proclamation of 1763. Referring to the clauses of the 1912 Québec Boundaries Extension Act, they also included in their claims the territory in the James Bay and Ungava Bay area, which was part of the Rupert's Land at that time. The IQA specified that their territorial rights were usufructuary rights on the lands, forests, wildlife, lakes, rivers, and

territorial waters.³² The specification necessarily included their claims on fishing, trapping and hunting rights. The reference to a traditional way of life was underlined. Secondly, they estimated the worth of their land claims at \$5 billion. As they did before, they invited the Québec government to open negotiations as soon as possible. The brief brought about some official reactions from the Québec government for the first time. Prime Minister Bertrand sent a letter two weeks later to the IQA executive in which he indicated that his decision would be taken after the release of the Commission Report.

By the end of 1969, various events marked a significant shift in the relations between the Québec government and Aboriginal peoples. They involved the broadening of Indian citizenship. While granting additional citizenship rights to Indians, the Québec government facilitated their participation in public debates. It was at that time that the Québec government granted the right to vote to Indians. The following year, the Department of Natural Resources set up a commission, the *Commission de négociations des affaires indiennes*; aiming to define avenues for the establishment of more harmonious relations with the Aboriginals. The on-going debates around the White Paper had an undeniable influence on that decision.³³ As the Dorion Commission did in 1971, the Commission pointed out the centrality of the territorial issue in the relations Québec/Aboriginal peoples.³⁴ Both recognised the existence of territorial rights to Aboriginal peoples and pressed the government to resolve this issue. It was also in March 1971 that the Québec government recognised officially the Indians of Québec Association as the spokesperson for all Indian issues, confirming thus its will to negotiate. Therefore, Aboriginal peoples came to be increasingly seen as legitimate Québec or national political actors. However, this did not mean that they were from that moment no longer discriminated and marginalised. The launching of the James Bay project clearly indicated that there still remained important obstacles before they could modify the government's agenda.

3.2 The Political Resistance of the Cree: The New Scales of Cree politics

The way the James Bay project was launched without consulting the Aboriginal groups living there reflected historical relations between Quebec government and the Natives peoples. For Aboriginal peoples living in the James Bay region, the project represented the beginning of a long process of political mobilisation aimed at gaining recognition by both levels of government as a legitimate representative. Their struggles also involved the pursuit of the process of decolonisation previously launched by Aboriginal peoples. In this context,

their implications were not only regional, but also national and international. This is why the struggles of the Crees overlapped with the struggles of other Native peoples occurring at the Québec level as well as at the Canadian level and elsewhere. In the following pages, we will outline the main steps of the colonisation of the Cree people. In doing so, we will present the main characteristics of the Cree livelihood which have been reproduced over the years and which have nonetheless shaped the process of colonisation. Two of them have been particularly important in this regard: their geographical isolation and their way of life based on hunting, trapping and gathering activities. The launching of the James Bay project was seen by the Crees as threatening and consequently, they became important political stakes. This will constitute the background of our discussion on their mobilisation to halt the construction of the James Bay project.

The Historical Context: The Progressive Disruption of Hunting-Gathering Society

In contrast to many Aboriginal groups in Canada, the Cree people were confronted with the disruptive effects of colonisation during the 20th century. Their relative geographical isolation and the lack of interest in their territory by developers and by the Québec government contributed to delay the social upheavals resulting from colonisation. Of course, the Cree of the James Bay area were administered by the 1876 Indian Act which imposed over them a new political and administrative structure and a new collective identity having racial connotations. However, their social relations and their livelihood had not significantly altered by this. Change began in earnest with the intensification of fur trade with the Hudson Bay's Company at the turn of the century and the extension of governmental interventions in the post-war period. Both introduced important economic and social changes in a relative short period of time which increased the dependency of Cree society on the outside. They involved the imposition over them of new forms of social relations and institutions. In this perspective, the launching of the James Bay hydroelectric project, which involved an appropriation of their homeland, of course represented a new step in their colonisation.

In the anthropological literature, the Cree are generally described as a hunting, fishing and gathering group resting on a subsistence economy.³⁵ They had a nomadic way life organised around distinctive seasonal activities and based on hunting territories. In more concrete terms, the basic social unit was an extended family resting on patrilocal and patrilinear relations.³⁶ Each family was generally associated with a particular hunting territory, called the bush. It is important to notice that "the bush" has not only a material dimension, but also a

cultural one which is essential in the definition of the Cree identity. The Eastern James Bay Cree do not seem to have historically constituted an institutionalised cultural and political group which would correspond to a tribe or a clan. They were rather scattered groups over the James Bay territory moving around according to a seasonal pattern. Until recently, ecological and demographic considerations have represented ordering principles by which social relations were framed. Their social organisation was thus very flexible since the necessity of ensuring their survival was their first priority.

It is difficult to determine exactly how the territory was appropriated by the Cree. In fact, there was not a recognised Cree territory understood in a modern sense, that is, having fixed boundaries which are claimed against other groups and at the same time, embracing a society. It was the notion of distance instead of the notion of boundary which was the ordering principle of space.³⁷ The way by which Cree organised space was basically by the delimitation of hunting territories and by the observance of religious practices and rituals. It was through the latter that the Cree people experienced a sense of place. "There was a social definition of territory rather than a territorial definition of society".³⁸ The notion of ownership of hunting territory did not correspond to the notion of private property to which rights were associated.³⁹ What seems to be claimed by the leader of a hunting group is more an ownership over the animal resources rather than the territory itself. It refers to what they call in modern law an usufruct, that is, ownership rested on the hunters' seniority and skills and especially on their religious links with the animals. It seems that when a leader of a hunting group resided in an area over the years, this area became to be identified with this leader. Kinship, but also ecological and climatic considerations, were thus central factors framing their localisation.

In summary, it is this way of life that was challenged and eventually disrupted by colonisation. The colonisation process confronted Cree people with different social and spatial structures and value systems. It also involved the recognition of boundaries around their society and the definition of the latter as traditional, and implicitly, as a backward society. The traditional/modern axis became the political horizon of Cree people. It implied the broadening of the reflexivity of their society in relation to their neighbouring societies. The Cree people were confronted with representations of themselves and of their "society" coming from outside that were at first meaningless. They had to develop their own discourses about themselves and their society and

struggled to impose their own representations. In this context, the definition of the "traditional" came to constitute an important political stake.

The history of the colonisation of the Cree is indissociable from the history of the fur trade. Among the anthropologists, it seems largely assumed that the fur trade was not disruptive for the Cree social organisation until the late nineteenth century.⁴⁰ Throughout the previous two centuries, its development had been rather incremental and remained shaped by Cree way of life. It was based on Cree skills. In fact, it was the Europeans who were dependent on the Aboriginals of that region.⁴¹ Since the James Bay region was very far and inhospitable, the collaboration and the skills of the Aboriginals were essential to the establishment of trading posts and to the survival of European traders. During the late nineteenth century, however, the increasing importance of the fur trade in the Cree way of life introduced some changes in their social organisation and at the same time, a shift in the power relations between the two groups. Among the changes which became noticeable, we can mention: the beginning of a settling process around the trading posts; the development of a market economy; and the increasing influence of Anglican missionaries.

The economic value taken by the sale of furs for a growing number of Cree people marked a turning point. It involved the development of trapping activities for the fur market parallel to the hunting and gathering activities required for their subsistence. It opened the door to the consolidation of a market economy within the Cree communities. Moreover, the expansion of fur trade under the instigation of the Hudson Bay's Company contributed to increase the importance of trading posts in the Cree livelihood. While becoming economic centres delivering services and products to Cree people, the trading posts came also to be a meeting place for cultural and religious activities. It thus contributed to set up a process of settlement which called into question the historical nomadic way of life of Cree people. Of course, the growing monetarisation of the fur trade had not been the only factor explaining the settling process. Various factors such as the extension of the credit system, periods of starvation, technological changes in trapping activities, and the establishment of schools, have contributed over the years to reinforce the links between a trading post and the surrounding hunting groups. Another impact of the growing importance of the fur trade was the consolidation of a particular land tenure system resting on family-owned hunting territories. The production of furs for the market contributed to the development of smaller social groups and more individualised ownership of resources. A type of land

tenure system was fostered through some policies of the Hudson's Bay Company during the nineteenth century such as resources conservation measures.⁴²

The disruptive impact of trading posts was also broadened by the arrival of Anglican missionaries who came to "convert and educate Cree people according to the Western way of life."⁴³ The impact of the missionaries was not restricted to converting James Bay Aboriginals to Protestantism. In taking the Cree prayer and school books used for the Cree living in the west of the Hudson's Bay, they started to identify the James Bay people as Cree.⁴⁴ There was not a term in their language which would correspond to Cree. Rather they used a variety of terms which designated groups of people according to their geographical and ecological locations like living near a lake. Except in the case of Mistassini, any of these names travelled down the ages.⁴⁵ This can partly be explained by the fact the Hudson's Bay traders designated them as coasters and inlanders Indians and later on, according to their association with a trading post such as Rupert's House or Eastmain Indians. In fact the James Bay Cree language constitutes one dialect of the Montagnais language spoken in the Québec-Labrador peninsula. The fact that the Cree received their schooling in English whereas the Montagnais received it in French worked to separate the two groups. Nor has the existence of social relations as well as economic exchanges with the Western Cree been demonstrated.⁴⁶

The period since World War II represented the second step of the process of colonisation of Cree people. The entrance of the Federal government and Québec government was of central importance.⁴⁷ During the 1940s, the federal government began significantly to increase its interventions in Northern Québec.⁴⁸ The creation in 1953 of the Northern Affairs and National Resources Department, brought in a new impetus that increased and widened the federal interventions. They contributed to accelerate the settling process of Cree people. The delivering of social services and education in the trading posts reinforced their centrality in the Cree way of life. "As schools and medical aid facilities were built at the posts, family allowances received for children attending school, old age pensions paid, and subsidised housing built, the number of people living year-round "at the post" increased dramatically".⁴⁹ This reinforced the place of trading posts in the Cree economy.

The most significant change imposed by the federal government, however, occurred through the recognition of the trading posts as bands under the jurisdiction of the Department of Indian and Northern

Affairs. From the 1930s, the establishment of the first band councils which involved the designation of chief and council by election brought about not only new institutions within the Cree communities, but also a redefinition of the power relations. It represented, in fact, the imposition of a new form of leadership which came to question the predominance of the leadership exercised by stewards and elders.⁵⁰ Moreover, this involved the emergence of a political power within the Cree communities which seemed until that time to be stateless, that is, without Western political institutions. Formal recognition of bands by Indian government agents did not, however, imply the designation of formal reserves. These reserves had an ambiguous political status. They were not based on a treaty signed between the Cree people and the Federal government which would have implied the recognition of their land as Crown land. Owing to the fact the Québec government refused to recognise these lands as federal land, they were declared "reserves for the purposes of the Indian Act".⁵¹

One major consequence was the transformation of the political horizon of Cree people through the imposition of a new form of territoriality revolving around the band councils. It called into question the predominance of hunting territories which were the main component in the regulation of Cree social and spatial relations. The increasing importance of band councils also helped to politicise the Cree identity as well as delimit some borders around the Cree territory. The relative isolation of Cree people "from the South" had definitely ended. They were designated as local political communities in relation to the federal government. This confirmed their inclusion within broader political spaces (regional, Québec and Canadian) which implied a further dependency and consequently, their disempowerment. The recognition by the Cree of this new political horizon fostered the emergence of a symbolic and political identity among the Cree people, that is, they are people living in the North while the South was associated to the "White" way of life. Moreover, the latter came to be perceived as the source of the political alienation of the Cree where the orientations shaping their society are taken.

The establishment of band councils institutionalised a Cree political scene framed by two scales: a local characterising the band council's activities, and a regional based on the District office, representing the Department of Indian Affairs. At the beginning, both constituted spaces of dependence for the Cree people. Indeed, one of the main responsibilities of the elected band council was to represent the community to the government agent and other external agencies. Elected leaders were confronted with a lack of information and

resources to deal effectively with those new actors.⁵² The ability, however, for the newly elected leadership to make demands and to respond to decisions taken by external agencies was then very restricted. They were often limited to transmitting decisions taken elsewhere. In this context, it was the District Officer who played a critical role in Cree politics. The District Officer provided the link between the various bands and their representative in the negotiations with the offices in Québec and Ottawa. It was the mainspring by which the government attempted to manage changes affecting the Cree bands. This led to the empowerment of the District Office which was responsible for the administration of the programs established by the Indian policy and more generally, to determine what were the needs of the Cree people.⁵³ The building of new houses, the control of the expenditures, the planning of school enrolment or the setting up of programs for economic development constituted some of the activities in which it was involved.

During the sixties, the Québec government began to impose its presence within that part of its territory. As we discussed in the preceding chapter, the Quebec Boundaries Extension Act of 1912 had transferred the Ungava territory under the Québec jurisdiction with some conditions. The most important was that the Québec government had to sign a treaty with the Indians living in that region by which they agreed to surrender their title on the land in exchange of financial compensation. There was thus a formal recognition of an Indian title and at the same time, the recognition of Québec obligations towards James Bay Aboriginals. Although that the Québec government never signed such a treaty, the Lesage government decided nevertheless to affirm Québec's sovereignty over the territory in the 1960s. This led to a period of competition with the federal bureaucracy, and consequently, to a duplication of services offered by them. The building of physical and financial infrastructure, the development of programs in areas such as education, health, justice represented some of Québec interventions aiming to take in charge of Aboriginal peoples.⁵⁴ They became part of the Québec government's decision to develop the Nouveau-Québec region. The Québec government interventions did not imply a restructuring of Cree politics. The local/regional division was reproduced without modifying the unequal relations. The major implication of the Québec government's involvement was the replacement of the federal government at the national level, a political space from which the Cree people were excluded.

The Cree People at the Crossroads

At the end of the 1960s, the political and economic situation of the Cree bands was changing. The Cree communities were a terrain crossed by contradictory trends. They faced many challenges which called into question their historical social organisation and livelihood. The latter has not been swept away, but rather was gradually redefined. The eight existing bands were becoming villages. An increasing number of people began to have a house in a village even if they still spent most their time in the bush.⁵⁵ The fact that some services such as primary schools were implemented in different communities with the emergence of a very small local bureaucracy, increased the importance of each band. The transfer of administrative services to the bands allowed the hiring of full-time band managers. What was originally an administrative structure became the locus of a micro-society. The development of permanent settlement also implied the arrival of new outsiders, mostly in the fields of education and health and social services. They brought in new resources and also new values. Life in the "bush" was then no longer the main factor structuring social relations. This did not mean that it was meaningless and disappearing. At the end of the 1960s, the majority of the Cree still lived in the bush.

The opening of the Nouveau-Québec region affected the Cree economy. The development of economic activities related to mining and forestry industries and the building of roads had transformed the landscape and at the same time, contributed to break down the isolation of the region.⁵⁶ It fostered the development of a wage economy which provided job opportunities for the Cree. The decline of fur prices in the 1950s and the need for cash inputs meant that an increasing number of hunters took summer jobs. Furthermore, the government agents put pressure on Cree hunters in order to speed up the transition to a wage economy.⁵⁷ They shared the idea that the hunting economy would fade out before long and would be replaced by a wage economy. The change of the conditions for getting government aid or the withdrawal of some services constituted some of the ways used by the Indian government agents. The setting up of programs aiming to "develop" the Cree communities at that time increased their room of manoeuvre. The development of a wage economy implied the encapsulation of the Cree communities within the growing regional economy.

Schooling also had an important impact which raised important challenges. Its intensification during the sixties implied not only a rise in the number of children going to primary school, but also that a large number

had to leave their parents and their communities.⁵⁸ The continuation of their schooling signified that they were obliged to go south and be submerged into a different culture. This had had two major consequences. The children were confronted with different values and ways of life. Moreover, they were kept away from the hunting way of life during key periods of the year. One of the consequences of was that the return of young educated Cree in the South required a more diversified economy.

These changes that were becoming more noticeable signified that the Cree society could no longer be simply characterised as a hunting-gathering society. Even if it remained important, the hunting way of life could no longer ensure the cohesion of the Cree society as it did before. The development of schooling, as the establishment of permanent settlement, contributed to questioning its centrality. Whereas the hunting economy no longer succeeded to provide subsistence to the whole population, wage labour was, however, too limited and chaotic to constitute a viable alternative. In the meantime, structural changes aroused concerns and discussions among the Cree. Confronted with economic, political and social problems, which were more obvious in some communities, the Cree leaders faced many questions about the fate of their communities.⁵⁹ The continuation of their traditional way of life was becoming a stake requiring adequate political decisions. The fragmentation of political power and the lack of an unified Cree political discourse represented at that time some serious obstacles for the Cree leaders.

During the 1960s, however, some changes occurred reducing the political fragmentation of the Cree communities. They revealed an incremental transformation of the local space into a space of resistance and, therefore, a slight modification of the power relations between the Cree and the "White governments". Some modifications in Indian policy aiming to further Indian participation in DIAND administration played a role on that score.⁶⁰ One "regional chief" was named from some groups of bands to work with the District Office and at the same time, to maintain links with chiefs of those bands. There were at that time three regional chiefs among the Cree, one each in Fort George, Mistassini, and Rupert's House. In addition, a former chief was designated as adviser to the District Office in Val d'Or. Even if the role of those bureaucrats was limited, they did acquire some knowledge about the bureaucratic processes. They also reduced the political isolation of Cree communities by helping to develop informal and institutional relations between them. The participation of the Cree chiefs within the Indians of Québec Association constituted another occasion where they could develop networks and share

experiences and concerns.⁶¹ Through that forum, they met with southern chiefs who had generally a longer experience of dealing and negotiating with governments.

The will to recover greater political autonomy has been also fuelled by another factor: the election of young leaders coming back from the South during the sixties.⁶² The new generation generally had higher education levels and the kind of skills needed to deal with the new constraints. The young leaders furthered the reappropriation of local political institutions by the Cree people. A better knowledge of both government institutions and Canadian society turned out to be strategic tools enabling the Cree to challenge the existing power relations. The new leadership did not supplant, however, the traditional form. Rather, an interdependency was developed since the legitimacy of that new leadership rested on the support of the stewards and the elders.⁶³

One important impact of the new leadership within the communities was an increasing political activism. It led to a stronger assertion of their claims and to the constitution of a political agenda. The latter expressed specific issues to the Cree communities, but also concerns and claims discussed by Aboriginal peoples in Québec and Canada.⁶⁴ One objective underlying those demands was to regain the control of their own fate. At the end of the sixties, it seemed that three major issues were raised and reiterated by Cree leaders in their discussions with government officials: the recognition of their land title, self-determination, and the preservation of their way of life.⁶⁵ Those demands were in fact interrelated. "A major motivation to achieve self-determination was preservation of aboriginal hunting rights and Native culture and language".⁶⁶ These demands reflected a growing awareness among the Cree population of social and economic problems threatening the traditional way of life while revealing that the Cree collective identity was becoming a political issue. Another important issue was demands for better government services (housing, school) and support for socio-economic development.

When the James Bay project was launched, the Cree people were facing important challenges. Although many of these political and economic changes had been imposed upon them, they nonetheless continued to maintain their traditional way of life and were determined to ensure its survival. The launching of the James Bay project occurred when Cree politics was reshaped. Although the Cree mobilisation against the James Bay project passed through different steps, their claims remained however the same. Their opposition

was based on two main claims: 1) the recognition of their aboriginal rights and land title and 2) the protection of their traditional way of life (hunting and fishing activities). In contrast, each of the phases of their mobilisation were characterised by particular strategies based to a large extent on a specific political scene. During the first phase, the Cree people attempted to build a coalition around the IQA to bring pressure to bear on the Québec and federal governments. They sought to launch a public debate in Québec and Canada. The second step occurred when the Cree decided to launch lawsuits in the Québec Superior Court and demanded for a legal injunction. The last phase was the intense negotiations from the end of 1973 between the Cree and Hydro-Québec, the JBDC and the Québec government aiming to resolve the impasse. This led to the signature of the James Bay Agreement. In the following pages, each of these phases will be discussed. In a few years, the political situation of the Crees was drastically transformed, revealing a new political setting that had to be appraised by the latter.

The Initial Responses to the James Bay project (July 1971- October 1972)

The first step of the Cree mobilisation occurred some weeks after the spectacular announcement of the project by the Premier Robert Bourassa.⁶⁷ It was through reading the newspapers that some Cree leaders became informed of the project. Using friendship linkages, young Cree leaders established informal networks between the different communities.⁶⁸ Despite the rudimentary information in the media, they easily perceived that a large portion of their land would be disrupted. They decided to call a meeting to discuss possible responses to the project and more particularly to see if they could stop it. In the meantime, the Cree leaders asked the IQA attorneys to inform the DIAND that their rights were threatened by the project and the urgency of resolving the issue of aboriginal rights.⁶⁹ Although that the Minister of DIAND sent a letter in June to Québec Prime Minister, the main result was the intensification of the tripartite committee of the hunting, fishing, and trapping issues.

The first meeting called by the Cree was held at Mistassini at the end of June 1971 (29th June-1st July). The meeting gathered around 35 people, including Cree chiefs, traditional leaders and two IQA representative.⁷⁰ The main objective of the meeting was to figure out what were the implications of the project and the different ways to oppose to it.

"It was pointed out that (1) the project would cause severe damage to the lands, the animals and to the Cree communities; (2) that the project would serve whites not Indians, and those who would benefit from the jobs would be whites first and Indians second; nor would the jobs last. It was unanimously decided to oppose the project."⁷¹

Three options were raised during this meeting: to stop the project; to delay it as it had been done with the oil pipeline in Alaska; or to demand compensation from governments.⁷² The Cree leaders agreed on a petition asking the Minister of Indian Affairs, given its trusteeship role, to intervene to protect their rights. They also agreed to mobilise support from Indian organisations. It was also decided to inform the Cree communities about the project and to find out their reactions.

The first meeting was thus the starting point of a process which led to the emergence of a regional Cree leadership. It did not, however, follow from a particular strategy adopted by Cree leaders. The constitution of a regional leadership was, in fact, a response to different events which occurred throughout the following months. During the summer, many meetings were called within the eight communities in order to report the discussions of the Mistassini meeting.⁷³ The meetings organised by Chiefs and councillors aimed to provide information on the project and to seek support and to discuss legal and political grounds for their opposition. Those meetings revealed a serious lack of information about the implications of the project. There was a common feeling among the Cree communities that the Québec government was putting them aside. Furthermore, there was not a large consensus around the opposition to the project. While some raised the possible economic benefits that such project could bring, others talked about the destruction of their lands and their hunting territories. Many expressed scepticism about the possibility of stopping the government.

Initial meetings revealed that the idea of opposing the project was not widespread among the population: the consensus that Cree leaders wanted to obtain had to be built. Successive meetings providing more information and more inputs coming from the Cree chiefs, helped to widen that consensus. Other events occurring at other political levels also had an influence. The issue was put on the agenda of the general meeting of the IQA held in Québec city at the end of July. The meeting represented an opportunity for the Cree leaders to exchange information on potential sources of political leverage and the legal status of their lands.⁷⁴ Moreover, a press conference was held at the end of the meeting allowing the Cree to mobilise support within

the Québec and Canadian societies. For a large part of the public, the press conference was the first time that they were informed about the existence of the Cree people. At that occasion, the Cree leaders and the IQA executive made known their opposition to the James Bay project. They affirmed that they were trying to stop the project and would demand the intervention of the federal government. They also required a settlement on the issue before that the project go ahead. It was necessary, owing to the legal obligations of Québec government and the political status of Indians. They clearly expressed that they did not consider themselves as Québec citizens.⁷⁵ The public support to the Cree came also from the National Indian Brotherhood. During a press conference held in August, George Manuel, chairman of NIB, declared that all Indians were opposed to that project which constituted an infringement of aboriginal rights.⁷⁶

The public initiatives of IQA against the James Bay project did not imply that it broke off the on-going discussions and negotiations with the Québec government. This conformed to the long-term strategy of IQA which aimed to negotiate different agreements on aboriginal rights at the provincial level.⁷⁷ If the Québec government did not want to recognise rights, the IQA demanded thus a financial compensation; both demands were often put forward at the beginning of negotiations. The release of the Dorion Commission Report at that time brought back the issue of territorial rights on the political agenda and created strong incentives for the government to undertake negotiations with Aboriginal peoples. Moreover, the recommendations of the Report brought support to the IQA and Cree opposition to the James Bay project.⁷⁸ Following its release, the IQA requested the beginning of negotiations with the Québec government regarding the Indian land title. By the late September 1971, those negotiations started with a low public profile. Some sessions were subsequently held. In January 1972, the Ministry of Natural Resources announced that it refused to discuss the compensation formula put forward by the IQA.⁷⁹ The latter reclaimed \$5 billion for the potential losses of hunting territories in the James Bay region. Despite the refusal, the negotiations over the territorial rights which also included the Cree contentions about the James Bay project were still pursued. In the meantime, the IQA attempted to mobilise support from non-Native groups as well as the federal government in order to bring additional pressure to bear on the provincial government.

The mobilisation of the Cree was fuelled by a JBDC initiative which initially sought to defuse it. During the fall of 1971, the JBDC set up an information program and hired Cree liaison workers to prepare a Cree

summary of a preliminary report on the environmental impacts of the project.⁸⁰ In January 1972, the JBDC representatives with the Cree workers started to make the tour of Cree communities to discuss the report. That initiative from the JBDC turned out to be a failure. It increased the suspicion among the Cree people towards the Québec government and the public corporations involved in the project. The JBDC workers were not able to gain a legitimacy since they did not get support from the IQA and from the Cree chiefs and leaders.⁸¹ Moreover, the Cree-English summary reports inflamed the situation. They were first of all very poorly translated and then, difficult to understand: the summary reports of three pages were too superficial. They could not provide answers to many questions from the Cree. They also contained some claims about the Cree way of life which insulted them. It was mentioned, among other things, that the Cree were no longer dependent on the wildlife and had rather become dependent upon white society.⁸² The information tour favoured the mobilisation of the Cree against the project and strengthened their unity. The perception that the Québec government did not respect them became widespread among the Cree communities.

In the meantime, the federal government on which the Cree had placed their hopes decided not to intervene and adopted instead a position of "alert neutrality". The major role that it played was to provide grants for research and eventually for the court case. The DIAND provided small grants in October 1971 to IQA in order to provide information to Cree population about the James Bay project. Other grants were successively provided in early 1972 to pay communication workers and to make additional research about the impact of the project. The refusal of the Canadian government to take a firm stand against the project must be related to the Québec political situation. A strong intervention against the project, presented by the Bourassa government as a national symbol, would have probably fuelled the sovereignty option advocated by the Parti Québécois.⁸³ The federal government had then preferred to stay in the background.

The federal government, nevertheless, became involved in a Federal-Provincial Task Force on the Environment, chaired by André Marsan, established in July 1971 to study the ecological impact.⁸⁴ It was supposed to identify the components of the area's ecosystem. Furthermore, this committee had to make recommendations about the choice between the La Grande complex and the NBR complex. This constituted the first impact study conducted in the region. The new initiative from the Bourassa government aimed to respond and, mostly to prevent, the criticisms pointing out the lack of studies. The report of the task force,

known as the Marsan Report, was issued in February 1972. The report had an influence on the debate, but not in the way expected by the Bourassa government. It neither provided strong arguments for the Québec government, nor against it. Indeed, the Report pointed out the impossibility of defining and limiting the eventual ecological impacts of the hydro-electric development, although it recognised that the project would have an impact on the wildlife and forests. It also indicated that the project would have a major impact on the Native peoples. It pointed out that the traditional way of life would be modified and that a massive influx of workers from a different culture would cause a disruption of their values and their traditions. This was the first time that a governmental report on the hydro-electric development of the James Bay area mentioned an eventual impact on Native people. The Report underlined that the existing data was very limited.⁸⁵ The necessity to conduct other studies and to set up an information program for the local population were recommended. The general nature of the report opened the door to many well-founded criticisms.⁸⁶

The Development of Alliances

It is only in early 1972 that the opposition of the Cree became more visible and structured. Various events contributed to publicise the controversies around the James Bay project. This period was marked by the increasing affirmation and autonomy of the Cree people in the defence of their interests. This reflected the increasing participation of Cree leaders at the regional level and the reinforcement of the regional dimension of Cree politics. This brought in some tensions with the IQA which became, over the years, more important. The other change occurring in this period was the formation of ad hoc coalitions around ecology groups which supported the Aboriginal peoples' struggles. They contributed to broaden the discussions around the James Bay project and to diffuse Cree claims at the national level.

During the first months of 1972, some divergences appeared between the Cree leaders and the IQA executive about the negotiation strategy adopted by the IQA.⁸⁷ The IQA perceived the James Bay issue as a leverage to conduct negotiations in regard to the whole province. For the Cree leaders, it was urgent that the Québec government discussed the project with them before it went too far. The compatibility between them gradually crumbled insofar as the Cree leaders became dissatisfied with the pace of the negotiations. The inflexibility of Québec government in the negotiations increased the suspicions of the Cree regional leaders. Their second meeting with two IQA executive members in Val D'Or in January 1972 was the first step in that

direction. Some important decisions were taken at that time which reflected the Cree leaders' aim to set up their own strategy.⁸⁸ It was decided to hire two communications workers which would make the tour of the communities over the next two months. Philip Awashish and Billy Diamond, who played a determinant role in the mobilisation of the Cree, were appointed. The Cree leaders viewed it as essential to provide information as complete as possible.

The meeting with the JBDC representative at that occasion convinced the Cree chiefs and delegates that the appeal to an injunction constituted the only way to stop the project. A request for an injunction was drafted and signed by the Cree attending the meeting. They asked at the same time the IQA to proceed with legal action. The decision of the Cree leaders to turn towards the courts determined the agenda of the two communications workers. During their visits to the communities in February and March 1972, Philip Awashish and Billy Diamond tried to mobilise support for their decisions to appeal an injunction and asked band councils to pass resolutions demanding to the IQA to proceed with court action. The mobilisation for the legal proceedings by the communications workers also signified the political recognition of the Cree regional leadership.⁸⁹

In the meantime, the mobilisation against the James Bay project was widened with the addition of new actors into the debate. One of them was the Inuit of northern Québec who asked the Minister of Indian Affairs in March 1972 to be represented at the negotiations. They considered that the project could have an impact on them, especially for the southern communities. The next month, they joined the Cree in their struggles. The alliance was to a large extent informal. It did not lead to the formation of a decisional structure gathering the two peoples.

In addition to the Inuit, new actors emerged at the same period and introduced new issues. In early January 1972, during a meeting at McGill University organised by the Centre d'information sur la pollution et l'environnement, the James Bay Committee was formed to pressure the Québec government for the setting up of a public inquiry on the project. The meeting gathered groups coming from diverse circles such as la Fédération québécoise de la faune, la Voix des femmes, le Sierra Club, Citizens for Social Responsibility of Science, la Société pour vaincre la pollution (SVP). There were new groups coming from the social movements which were making their entrance on the Québec public scene. Several discussions pointed out that both the

Québec government and the James Bay Development Corporation had not satisfactorily established the social utility of the project nor its economic profitability. They called a halt to the on-going development works and reclaimed the launching of a public and democratic debate on the project.⁹⁰ The James Bay Committee played a key role in the democratisation of the debates.

Public support for the Cree opposition also came from other groups and organisations within Québec and Canadian society.⁹¹ Both the Anglican Church and the Catholic Church, through the intermediary of the Assemblée des évêques du Québec, made public declarations against the project, claiming that the Québec government should respect the rights of Indians.⁹² Some public seminars and conferences were held in many universities against the project. McGill University's Programme in Anthropology of Development and the anthropology review *Recherches amérindiennes du Québec* released documents on the issue. Moreover, pamphlets and books were published aiming to raise public awareness of the James Bay project.⁹³ Of course, public support was not based on some grassroots and large-scale movements.⁹⁴ It was mostly restricted to some circles that expressed concerns for aboriginal and/or environmental issues. Although they supported the Cree protests, the groups challenged the government and the public corporations on different grounds. The role of the James Bay Committee and by extension, the mobilisation of some environmentalist and ecology groups will be discussed in the next chapter.

A Determining Step in the Conflict: The Legal Proceedings (1972-1973)

The Cree strategy to appeal to legal proceedings to stop the project and to oblige the government to negotiate with them was decided at the meeting held in Fort-George in April 1972. The meeting gathered IQA Board of Directors, Cree leaders and Inuit representatives. The IQA lawyers had been asked to prepare for the meeting recommendations concerning the means of proceeding with an injunction. At the meeting, the divergences with the IQA executive became from that moment more obvious.⁹⁵ The fear that IQA might make some trade-off with the government became widespread among the Cree leaders. Notwithstanding their reluctance, the Cree leaders gave a mandate to the IQA for the undertaking of legal actions in order to halt the project. They also set up a network of community liaison officers. The network was supposed to maintain links between the communities and to provide information about the decisions and activities undertaken by the Cree leaders and chiefs at the regional level. The liaison workers had to pass on legal and political information, but

also technical information about the project. They became part of the regional political decision-making process which emerged gradually. They contributed at the same time to its legitimacy.

The commitment of the Cree was pursued at the meeting held on 28 April 1972 gathering IQA lawyers and Cree leaders.⁹⁶ They agreed on two court actions drafted by the IQA lawyers. The first, against the attorney general of the province and the crown corporation, asked the court to declare the unconstitutionality of Bill 50. They referred to the non-respect of the statutory obligation in the 1912 Québec Boundaries Extension Act which imposed on the Québec government to obtain the surrender of aboriginal interests in the land. Moreover, it was argued that many dispositions of Bill 50 establishing the James Bay Development Corporation and the James Bay Energy Corporation violated many federal jurisdictions. The second, against the crown corporation and all sub-contractors, asked the court for a permanent injunction to stop the current works in the James Bay region. The legal proceedings revolved around the existence of a legal and historical aboriginal title on the one hand, and on the other hand, the historical occupancy and use of the land by the Aboriginal peoples. A week later, press conferences by IQA, Cree chiefs and Inuit representatives were held to publicise and to explain their proceedings for an injunction. It was mentioned that this option was chosen since the on-going negotiations with the Québec government did not lead to any agreement. In addition, the Québec government told them that the construction of the dams was not negotiable.⁹⁷

The legal injunction required by the Cree revealed two long-term goals: to modify the project to preserve the Cree political and economic autonomy and at the same time, to guarantee the Cree participation within regional development.⁹⁸ These goals had been to a large extent determined during the tours of the Cree communities by the communication workers during the winter and spring of 1972. The Cree elders appraisal of the hydro-electric project had been largely taken into account. They viewed the project in the light of non-native development of the region which had always excluded and silenced natives. Their opposition to the project was seen as offering the possibility of restructuring the relations between the Cree and the "whites".⁹⁹ Harvey Feit pointed out that the issue of aboriginal rights and the maintenance of their traditional way of life were not the main goals of their opposition at the beginning.¹⁰⁰ They became more important as the Cree were gradually engaged into a judicial process.

The launching of the court actions did not have the impact that the Cree leaders expected. Neither the Canadian nor Québec governments modified their positions, although the federal government did become more involved. Without condemning the project as the Cree had requested, it justified its intervention by insisting on the respect for its jurisdictions. The concerns expressed by some groups as well as by the Opposition in the House of Commons may explain why the federal government did not want to show that it tried to keep its hands off. The most concrete impact of the pressures generated by the Cree was the beginning of tripartite negotiations (IQA, federal government, provincial government) in June 1972. Until then, the negotiations on the issue of aboriginal rights and by extension, on the James Bay project only involved the IQA and the Québec government.

In spite of the presence of the federal government, these meetings did not water down the differences between the Cree and the Québec government. Whereas the Cree were inclined to open a series of negotiations, the Québec government denied all their grievances and claims.

"The position of the Government of Québec at the time was that the plans for the project were not negotiable, and that the indigenous peoples had no special rights, or at least none that warranted anything more than an expropriation of their interest in the land and monetary compensation for that interest."¹⁰¹

The position of the Québec government rested on a refusal to recognise a different political status to the Cree. They were simply considered as a group similar to other groups. This conformed to a liberal individualist standpoint. The government did not want to allow that the Cree could participate within the public sphere on the basis of their "Cree-ness". The Cree claims were also dismissed by the belief of the government in the technological progress. The scientific rationality used by the government and the contractors to justify the project presupposed a mechanical view of the environment which was very different from the Cree's understanding. The government argued that the impacts of the project could be easily remedied, notably by using environmental management techniques.

At the end of the month of October 1972, events started to move faster. The official announcement by the Québec government that there would be no modifications to the project and the abortion of an official meeting between the Premier Bourassa and Inuit and Cree leaders convinced the latter to accelerate the legal

proceedings.¹⁰² The courtroom appeared for them the remaining possibility to attain their objective. The Cree and Inuit filed a motion for an interlocutory injunction on 7 November 1972. One month later, Justice Albert Malouf of the Superior Court of Québec accepted to hear the request of the Inuit and the Cree.¹⁰³ The main issues underlying the hearings were the existence of aboriginal rights and the question of the balance of convenience. This latter implied that the judge had to determine which party was likely to suffer the most damages, depending of the continuation or the stoppage of the project. Hence, the Cree had to prove that they still had *prima facie* aboriginal rights which could be opposed to the government. In addition, they had to show that the project threatened their economy based on hunting and trapping activities which still represented a way of life for the majority of the population. It was necessary to demonstrate the dependence of the Cree on the wildlife and the land. The Cree argument before the court relied on the proof that the environmental damages resulting from the project would affect permanently the Cree way of life. Moreover, they had to prove that the works in progress would prevent them from exerting their rights in land.¹⁰⁴ That explained why the testimonies of the hunters during the hearings had been so important. They were the most appropriate people to discuss the use and the occupancy of the land and also the Cree dependence on wildlife resources.¹⁰⁵

The legal proceedings had significant political repercussions, especially on Cree politics.¹⁰⁶ The political side of the project was propelled to the fore, challenging the Bourassa government which had hitherto stressed the technical and economic aspects. The coverage of the hearings in the media implied that a large part of the Québec population became informed about the existence and the way of life of the Aboriginal peoples in Northern Québec. This allowed the release of information about the project which until then had been limited. Furthermore, the participation of hunters and leaders in the hearings gave rise to extensive debates within each community. In addition to the discussions of the potential impact of the hydro-electric development project, the Cree communities were confronted with the need to rethink the significance of their way of life as their future. In other words, they were obliged to define collectively what the Cree way of life was since this was no longer given. A consensus emerged from those discussions on the necessity of redefining their relations to the governments and Québec and Canadian society.¹⁰⁷

In March 1973, the Québec government and the JBDC started to present their cases. Their argumentation rested on two main issues.¹⁰⁸ On the one hand, they denied the existence of aboriginal rights.

The only type of rights that the government would recognise would be the old treaty rights: reserves lands, annual per capita cash payment, the right to hunt on the unoccupied Crown lands. On the other hand, they argued that the Aboriginal peoples no longer had a distinctive way of life and they were becoming similar to the Euro-Canadians. They attempted to demonstrate that the hunting activities were practised by a decreasing number of peoples which implied that the majority were now dependent on the government transfer payments. It was also argued that damages to the environment could be prevented or repaired. In addition, the Québec government pleaded the legal immunity of the Crown. Finally, they claimed that the Bill 50 was constitutional since it concerned the development of natural resources, a provincial jurisdiction.

On the 15 November 1973, after five months of deliberation, Justice Albert Malouf granted the interlocutory injunction. That long judgement of more than 180 pages constituted at that time an important victory for all Aboriginal peoples within Canada. It went farther than the Calder case involving the Nishga in British Columbia by recognising that aboriginal rights were enforceable and thus, had a legal impact.¹⁰⁹ Justice Malouf ordered Hydro-Québec and the other developers to cease all works, operations and projects on the territory since they constituted a violation of the rights of the Cree and the Inuit. More specifically, Justice Malouf recognised that the Cree and the Inuit had rights in the territory which had not been extinguished; those rights were qualified as private and usufructuary.¹¹⁰ He clearly stated that the Cree and the Inuit have occupied and used the land since "time immemorial", notably by their fishing, hunting, and trapping activities. He maintained that the continuation of their way of life still depended upon the access to their lands¹¹¹. In regard to the balance of convenience, the judge Malouf rejected the financial arguments put forward by Hydro-Québec and the other contractors in mentioning that the damages caused to the Cree and Inuit would be greater.¹¹²

The decision constituted to a large extent a surprise for the Cree and Inuit. It represented a significant step in the recognition of aboriginal rights while strengthening their bargaining position.¹¹³ They reiterated their will to open serious negotiations with both levels of governments. For the Québec government and the public corporations, the decision came as a brutal shock. It implied heavy financial losses. The works were stopped and many workers were repatriated to the South. The day following the Malouf decision, the James Bay Development Corporation the other contractors asked the Québec Court of Appeals to suspend the interlocutory injunction pending the hearing against the merits of the Malouf decision. One week later, on 22

November 1973, the Québec Court of Appeal decided unanimously to suspend the effects of the interlocutory injunction until the final decision on its merits would be issued. Their decision only referred to the issue of balance of convenience.¹¹⁴ They justified their decision by invoking the superiority and weighty of interests of Québec over the interests of 2 000 of its inhabitants. The opposition between the interests of the Cree and Inuit and the interests of Québécois consecrated that "might makes rights".¹¹⁵ The Cree and the Inuit filed a motion in the Supreme Court of Canada on the 21 December 1973 for leave to appeal the Court of Appeal decision. However, that request was denied.¹¹⁶

3.3 The Signature of the James Bay Agreement (1974-1975)

Justice Malouf's decision was a turning point in the Cree mobilisation. By recognising the validity of Aboriginal peoples' claims, it modified the power relations between the Cree people and the Québec government. It brought about a return to the negotiation table. Indeed, four days after the Court of Appeal's decision, Premier Bourassa announced that he wanted to negotiate a settlement with the Cree and the Inuit. John Ciaccia was appointed as negotiator on behalf of the government. The fear of an eventual legal impasse which could imply new delays and at the same time, supplementary financial costs had probably been one important factor explaining the Québec government opening.¹¹⁷ It thus constituted a shift in the government strategy. In this section, we will discuss the last phase of the Cree mobilisation which largely revolved around the negotiations with the Québec government and Hydro-Québec. We will pay attention to the signature of the *James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement* which settled the issue and which imposed a new political setting to Cree people. It opened the door to the remapping of Cree politics.

At the end of November 1973, Bourassa submitted a 11-point provincial offer to the IQA executive and the Cree and Inuit representatives. It contained some of the following elements: modifications to the project; recognition of hunting, fishing and trapping rights; environmental protection; financial compensation (\$100 million); creation of a native development agency; the setting up of social and economic programs, notably a guaranteed annual income program for hunters; transfer of lands to the Cree and Inuit (2000 m²); and native participation in the administration of the region.¹¹⁸ Those propositions aimed to respect and to preserve their way of life and their cultural heritage while at the same time furthering their adaptation to the changing conditions and new "modern" realities.¹¹⁹

The Québec government's proposal, which was welcomed by the federal government,¹²⁰ and the Québec Court of Appeal decision confronted the Cree with crucial choices. They could pursue the legal proceedings in order to gain recognition of their aboriginal rights or they could reopen negotiations with the governments. They had also to envisage the possibility of an imposed settlement which would be disadvantageous for them. The Cree leaders undertook in December 1973 a consultation of their communities about the different options and the governmental offer. However, some important arguments tended however to favour the negotiation process.¹²¹ The judgement of the Supreme Court suggested for many Cree leaders and the legal advisers that the Malouf judgement would probably be quashed by the Quebec Court of Appeal. The bargaining position would, therefore, weaken. Furthermore, time was against them and in favour of the contractors. As the time went by, the construction of the project went ahead. The impact of an eventual stoppage would be increasingly meaningless. The capital investment becoming more massive, it would be less and less probable that the government would accept the abandonment of the project by a legal decision. Moreover, the damages that the Cree wanted to limit would have been made anyway. One other argument concerned the issue of aboriginal rights. Until that time, the courts had not defined specifically the content and the scope of the aboriginal title; that could be a double-edged sword. A legal definition of their aboriginal rights, even if it was favourable, would not respond to all their claims, notably those related to their will to assume a greater control over their development.

In the view of those uncertainties about the outcomes of the legal proceedings, the Cree and the Inuit decided to renew negotiations with the governments. They asked the IQA to undertake negotiations and to arrange financing. They also requested that it conducted consultations with the communities prior to start the negotiations. However, this did not imply that the legal proceedings were left aside. They were pursued to keep pressure on the government. The Cree and Inuit decision to open negotiations was criticised by the environmentalist and ecology groups and by the other Aboriginal peoples within Québec and Canada.¹²² It signified that their objective to stop permanently the project would be hardly attainable. The other Aboriginal peoples within Québec and Canada who wished that the Cree and Inuit pursued their court case were also disappointed.

Although they accepted to negotiate with the government, the Cree and Inuit rejected Premier Bourassa's proposal.¹²³ They were dissatisfied with the provisions on the issue of local and regional autonomy and the land repartition. The modifications to the project suggested by the government did not appear sufficient to guarantee the preservation of their distinct way of life.¹²⁴ They thus proposed a counter-proposal, entitled "Our Land, Our Demand". They took up each proposition of the government's offer, widening its content and its scope. They insisted on the necessity to undertake serious negotiations between the four interested parties (Canada, Québec, Inuit, Cree). They also included the whole issue of aboriginal rights throughout Québec.¹²⁵ In February, a negotiation table was established with the goal to reach in the first time an agreement in principle and afterwards, to proceed to the final agreement. The negotiation process was organised around a central committee and subcommittees.

The negotiation process was laborious. This resulted from the great number of actors who had their respective objectives and deadlines.¹²⁶ Whereas some actors, such as the developers and Aboriginal peoples, wanted a resolution of the issue as soon as possible, the other actors did not face the same temporal constraints. The participation of the federal government was linked to the defence of its jurisdictions. It was also concerned about the creation of a precedent which would have obliged it to commit itself vis-à-vis the other aboriginal land claims throughout Canada. The position of Québec government was more ambitious. The Québec government wanted to reach an agreement which would ensure the realisation of the project and its economic profitability, and resolve aboriginal grievances and claims. From this perspective, the extinguishment of the rights claimed by Aboriginal peoples was an important political stake for the Québec government. The government argumentation was based on the replacement of those undefined rights by more specific and modern rights, leaving aside any ambiguity. The government sought to strengthen its sovereignty over the northern territory which would allow it, among other things, to subsequently launch other development projects without further complications.

According to Philip Awashish, who was one of the Cree negotiators, the Cree sought an agreement which would acknowledge their rights while proposing corrective measures to take into consideration their way of life. The issues relative to fishing, hunting and trapping activities were considered as central.¹²⁷ The negotiations about the project represented for them an opportunity to establish relations with governments, and

more broadly, with the non-native world on new grounds. They aimed to reverse the process of dependency and, therefore, to launch a process of self-determination. Self-government was raised as the objective permitting the maintenance and the strengthening of their culture and their way of life.¹²⁸ The Cree leaders wanted to acquire the programs and institutions to establish their own governments at the local and regional levels. There was an attempt to mould their future; that suggested that the historicity of their society was implicitly acknowledged by the Cree leaders.

The Formation of the Grand Council of the Cree

Although some divergences between the Cree and the IQA had previously appeared, they became more substantial after the beginning of the negotiations. The slow progress of the discussions at the negotiation table and the administration by the IQA of funds set aside for the negotiations raised dissatisfaction among the Cree leaders. Above all, the main divergence concerned the pace of the negotiations given by the IQA. The Cree felt that the IQA did not share their objective to resolve as quickly as possible their issues.¹²⁹ Therefore, during a meeting held at Fort George on April 10, 1974, the Cree leaders and chiefs decided partially to cancel their mandate given to the IQA. A negotiating team of three Cree was set up. The new mandate clearly indicated that the priority should be given to Cree interests. The relations between the Cree and the IQA continued to deteriorate progressively. The mandate was further restricted at another meeting of the Cree chiefs and negotiators held in June 1974. The responsibilities of the Cree negotiators were extended.

Those tensions culminated with the departure of the Cree from the IQA. The Cree formed their own political organisation which would take over the negotiations. The Grand Council of the Crees (of Québec) got its letters patent on the 5 September 1974. Its Board of Directors included the administrative chief and another leader from each community whereas its executive was composed of four regional leaders.¹³⁰ The Grand Council received, therefore, the mandate to conduct negotiations, but with the obligation to submit the final offer to the communities. One of the consequences of the entrance of the Grand Council was the intensification of the negotiations. One month later, final offers were exchanged between the Cree and the Québec government.

The Signature of the Agreement in-Principle

During the first two weeks of October 1974, the outline of the Agreement in Principle was consolidated. The Cree negotiators with their advisers returned afterwards to their communities to present the main lines of the settlement. That proposition was accepted by the Cree people. On November 15, 1974, the Agreement in Principle was signed by the seven parties to the negotiations: the federal government, the Québec government, the Grand Council of the Crees, the Northern Québec Inuit Association, Hydro-Québec, the James Bay Development Corporation (JBDC), and the James Bay Energy Corporation (JBEC).

The agreement-in-principle contained many sections dealing with some Cree claims. The modifications to the hydro-electric project and the associated remedial and compensatory measures were clearly spelled out. The protection of the environment and the necessity to conduct social and environmental impact studies for future developments were also set out. Furthermore, the Cree obtained the recognition of their hunting, fishing and trapping rights. This was made through the setting up of a kind of regime which would include one committee and programs such as a guaranteed annual income scheme. One other section important for the Cree was the setting up of a land regime determining the allocation and the size of lands for each community; a distinction was established between three categories of lands, each of them having particular implications for the Cree communities and the Québec government. Monetary compensations to be paid to Cree and Inuit were also determined. The amount of \$150 million was largely publicised in the media. The agreement-in-principle contained other provisions responding to some Cree claims, notably measures aiming the establishment of self-government at the local and regional levels. Unlike the previous provisions, these were, however, very broad.

Other provisions were not so favourable to the Cree position. The first provision of the agreement was the extinguishment of Cree titles and interests in the land in exchange of rights which were unspecified at that time; that would cancel the Québec's statutory obligations of the 1898 and 1912 Acts. It was specified that their citizenship rights at the federal and provincial levels would not be affected by the agreement. The possibilities for the Cree to oppose other development projects in the region would be very limited. Their only room of manoeuvre came from the right to be consulted for the impact studies. Moreover, the Cree were obliged to

suspend their legal proceedings related to the James Bay project until the end of the negotiations. A deadline (November 1 1975) was imposed for the signature of the final agreement.¹³¹

The agreement-in-principle was presented by Billy Diamond, one of the main negotiators and regional leader, as a "big victory" for them. They had succeeded in challenging the government and the engineers by obtaining modifications of the project despite their limited resources and number of people.¹³² Moreover, their rights and their traditional way of life had been protected and their future was guaranteed. The provision aimed at the extinguishment of their aboriginal rights was not perceived as harmful since they were supposed to get specific rights allowing them to continue their existence as a distinct people.¹³³ They believed that their lands claims had not been settled once and for all.

The IQA took a totally different stand on the agreement. They were strictly opposed to the extinguishment of the aboriginal rights and titles in exchange for a monetary compensation. The IQA reiterated the position during the negotiation process for the final agreement. The IQA viewed the extinguishment of rights as antithetical to the principle of the recognition of human rights. They urged the Cree and Inuit to keep their land titles and their rights and to negotiate instead their participation within the James Bay project.¹³⁴

The divergence between the Cree and the IQA needs to be understood in the light of their historical trajectory and political situation.¹³⁵ The notion of aboriginal rights did not have the same meaning and appeal for the Cree in contrast to the southern bands for whom those rights had been already extinguished and represented one of their core claims. The claim was not associated with the preservation of their collective identity as it was for many southern bands in Québec. The recognition of aboriginal rights was not an objective in itself. Furthermore, the colonial legacy had also an important influence. "The Cree saw themselves as a people who had maintained extensive autonomy in the face of earlier intrusions by Euro-Canadian interests, and they saw themselves neither as losing their distinctiveness as a people, nor primarily as victims".¹³⁶ The launching of the James Bay hydro-electric project and the court case constituted the first time the Cree really had to think about their links to the lands and their identity as people. They did not at that time represent themselves as a nation.

One week later, the Québec Court of Appeal reversed the Malouf judgement. The arguments presented by the lawyers were not different from those presented before Justice Malouf. The decision of the Québec Court of Appeal was argued on the existence of a "serious doubt about the existence of an Indian title" over the lands in the James Bay region. Moreover, in regard to the issue of the balance of convenience, they concluded that the inconvenience would be greater for the developers if the works would be stopped.¹³⁷ The Supreme Court leave to appeal from the Court of Appeal judgement of the last November on February 13, 1975. The Cree and Inuit decided, however, to pursue the negotiations.¹³⁸

The last round of negotiations went from January 1975 until July 1975. But this time, the negotiations were carried out mainly by sub-committees reflecting the highly complex and technical nature of the subjects under discussion. It was necessary to give detailed specifications to rights and regimes included in the Agreement in Principle and at the same time, to establish a legal framework for exercising them.¹³⁹ Each sub-committee drafted a section of the final agreement which had afterwards to be revised and approved by the central negotiating committee.¹⁴⁰ One consequence of the technical proceedings of the sub-committees was the necessity for the Cree people to rely on external expertise in order to defend their interests. It required at the same time a greater awareness from the Cree leaders and an intensification of the role played by the Cree liaison workers. The objective of ensuring a legitimisation of their activities by the Cree communities still remained a priority. In August 1975, during the general assembly, the Cree people decided to pursue negotiations to obtain a final settlement. Moreover, the Grand Council of the Cree was authorised to sign the final agreement on behalf of the Cree people. During the months of September and October 1975, the central negotiating committee took the leading role. Intensive negotiations occurred during these two months in order to finalise the work done by the sub-committees and to resolve the remaining contentious issues; in October, the chiefs and band councils from each community became involved in the final negotiations in order to review the Agreement and to ratify any last changes.¹⁴¹

The central negotiating committee was still confronted with many difficulties. The large number of parties to the negotiations with their specific interests and the complexity of issues covered by the Agreement in Principle rendered the task more difficult. Both governments wanted to avoid the creation of precedents. They were very reluctant towards the participation of the Cree and Inuit in the administration of the region.¹⁴² On their

side, the Cree insisted that the Agreement was written with a technical and legal language in order to clearly specify their rights and to ensure their application.¹⁴³ The period of very intensive negotiations led nevertheless to the signature of the final agreement on the November 11, 1975. All the parties involved in the negotiations welcomed the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement in pointing out its historic character and its innovations. Its signing ended all the legal proceedings launched by the Cree and Inuit.

The James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement: A Turning Point for Cree People?

The content of the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement was largely similar to the Agreement-in-principle. The two main changes were the increase of the financial compensation from both governments (\$225 million) and no payment of royalties. The James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement is very extensive and goes further than a land settlement. It aims not only the organisation and the development of a territory of 1 062 000 km², representing one third of Québec territory, but also the governance of two distinct populations. In regard to the Cree people, the Agreement created new institutions and embodied new social and political relations. The establishment of new relations between the Cree people and both levels of governments has implied, among other things, a greater place for the state regulation of their way of life and the strengthening of the Cree regional political institutions. This Agreement played an important role not only in the reinforcement of local political realms in each community, but also in the emergence of a regional political scene. Another impact of the implementation is the ending of the relative isolation of the Cree communities from each other and also from the surrounding societies. The Cree people became, on this basis, Québec and Canadian political actors. It must be pointed that the programs, committees and bodies implemented by the Agreement applicable to the Cree people have an ethnic basis in opposition to a territorial basis. The people who are entitled to rights and benefits are the one who are designated Cree by the Indian Act or who have Cree ancestry.

The Agreement has modified the political situation of the Cree peoples on many aspects. It was meant that the Indian Act would be replaced by a new legislation, the Cree Act. This act established the bases of a Cree local administration which give them a greater governmental autonomy. The adoption of the Cree/Naskapi (of Québec) Act on self-government by the federal government in 1984 concretised this promise. The Agreement made provisions for the extension of powers attributed to each band council, notably in matter of taxation and disposition of the land. Furthermore, the Agreement provided funds for the setting up of a public

corporation representing each Cree community. In other words, the band council and the public corporation represent the two branches of Cree local self-government. What distinguishes them is the fact that each of them has a jurisdiction over a specific territory. Each Cree community got an administrative and political status largely similar to that of Québec municipalities.¹⁴⁴

The Agreement opened also the way to the establishment of regional political structures. All the public corporations are attached to the Cree Regional Authority. It constitutes to a great extent the counterpart of the Grand Council of the Cree. Whereas the first is more a body having important administrative and economic impacts on each community, the second is more political in defining the general policies and in representing the Cree people in their relations with the governments. The Cree Regional Authority plays an important role in being involved in the management of the programs, consultative bodies, and institutions created by the Agreement. It has to provide services and programs to the scattered Cree Bands and to further their development. It is responsible for organisations such as Air Creebec, the Cree Housing Corporation, the Cree Construction Corporation which became later on Creeco. It constitutes in some extent a kind of regional municipal government and has thus become throughout the years very powerful.¹⁴⁵ The Cree Regional Authority is assisted by the Board of Compensation which manages the financial compensations given by the governments. This Board is in charge of the financing of the Cree Regional Authority.

The implementation of the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement has signified the setting up of some regimes to maintain the Cree way of life: the land regime, the hunting, fishing, and trapping regime, and the environmental and social protection regime. Although they are specific regimes, they also overlap to some extent. It is through those regimes that the hunting, fishing and trapping rights are taken into account and protected. The land regime divides the territory covered by the Agreement in three categories of land, each of them having particular consequences on the exercising of Cree rights. Most of the territory is classified as category III on which the Cree can pursue their traditional activities. It is, however, the categories of land I and II which are the most significant for the maintenance of the hunting and trapping way of life. The most significant category for the Cree people is the category I. These lands are reserved for their exclusive use and constitute the basis of their self-governance. In regard to the lands of category II, the Cree people can only exercise their hunting, fishing, and trapping rights. Even if the government can use these lands for its future development

projects without the Cree consent, the former should replace them by other on which the Cree people will pursue their traditional activities. However, the Cree people do not have property rights on any of these categories.

The hunting, fishing, and trapping regime is also determinant for the perpetuation of the traditional way of life. This regime rests on two main elements. Its implementation is dependent from the "Comité conjoint-Chasse, pêche et trappage". This committee, which is a consultative body, is composed of representatives from the Québec and Canadian governments and of Cree and Inuit members. It is then responsible for the regulation of hunting, fishing and trapping activities within the diverse categories of lands and the management of the wildlife. The recognition of hunting, fishing and trapping rights was done by the granting of a right of exploitation to Native groups; this right must be compatible with the principle of resources conservation. It was also recognised that some animal species were exclusively allocated to Aboriginal populations. The other main element of this regime is a guaranteed income security program for the people who live by hunting, fishing, and trapping way of life. This program is administered by the Income Security Board.

The environment and social protection regime constitutes the other major regime in which the Cree traditional way of life was taking into account. The regime aims to ensure that any development or development project occurring within the territory will, as far as possible, not have any harmful consequence on the environment and on the Native communities. It must also follow the provincial and federal legislations in matter of environment protection. This regime is administrated and managed by a consultative committee on the environment (Comité consultatif sur l'environnement de la Baie James) and also by one person appointed as the administrator of the services in matter of environmental protection. The importance of the regime comes mostly from its impact assessment review process which involve both governments and Aboriginal peoples.¹⁴⁶ That procedure can lead to the imposition of substantial modifications and even to the refusal of a development project. The launching of this procedure is under the responsibility of the administrator. Insofar as the evaluation and the examination of a particular development project must take into account the physical and the social impact, this may cause some controversies.

Although the Agreement attempts to secure the traditional way of life by providing mechanisms for the enforcement of the hunting, fishing, and trapping rights, it contains a number of clauses aimed at the

implementation of modern institutions and structures. The James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement contained provisions allowing the Cree people to have substantial control over education, health, police, and justice. Similar institutions and structures to Québec institutions have been set up such as the Cree School Board, the Cree Board of Health and Social Services, and tribunals. Although they have to respect Québec laws, the Cree are nonetheless involved in their administration. The implementation of the agreement led also to the creation of several other semi-autonomous bodies and committees, notably in relation to the economic and social development of the Cree communities. We can mention, among others, the existence of the James Bay Native Development Corporation (SODAB) which has the mandate to further the development and the diversification of the Cree economy.

The Implications of the JBNQA

The Québec government as well as the Cree leaders called it a victory. Both actors saw the Agreement as instituting new relations between the Aboriginal peoples and the Québec government. Both pointed out that the participation of the Cree in the management and in the decision-making process of the diverse regimes and institutions (police, health, school) will further their development. In spite of those convergences, there existed some differences between the two positions, notably in regard to the implications of some principles. In addition to the issue of the extinguishment of the land title, the notion of self-government was not envisaged in the same way. Whereas the Québec government saw the local and regional institutions created by the Agreement as similar to the municipalities, the Cree leaders saw those institutions as being part of a new mode of governance of their society controlled by them. Billy Diamond, chairman of the Grand Council of the Cree, affirmed at that occasion that the Agreement secured their way of life and clearly recognised their rights.¹⁴⁷ He pointed out that the James Bay Agreement provided the opportunity to the Cree people to choose between the traditional and the new way of life of the surrounding society. The Cree leaders who negotiated the agreement did not see the extinguishment clause as harmful and threatening. They agreed with the governmental standpoint which presented the extinguishment of their rights and interests in the territory as an exchange for more specific rights. They believed that the Agreement provided a recognition and a protection of their aboriginal rights, notably the hunting, fishing and trapping rights and the right to self-government.¹⁴⁸

John Ciaccia, the Québec negotiator, presented the Agreement as responding to two main objectives.¹⁴⁹ On the one hand, this Agreement allowed the government to fulfil its obligations towards the Native populations inhabiting the northern regions. While securing their cultural survival, the Agreement clarified their rights and provided the required tools for their development. Ciaccia underlined that the Agreement amended the injustices committed towards those Native populations and gave them the same status that the Québec citizens have. He characterised the Cree and Inuit as cultural minorities having a particular way of life who are nonetheless Québec citizens. On the other hand, John Ciaccia pointed out that the Agreement allowed the Québec government to affirm its presence and its authority over the territory and to develop it. The Agreement provided the opportunity to "defend the integrity of Québec territory".¹⁵⁰ The establishment of new institutions for the "Native collectivities" was presented as the extension of the Québec institutions and services. In other words, the sovereignty of the Québec government was reinforced since its responsibilities and its jurisdictions were clearly specified and at the same time, widened. Thus, Québec could develop that portion of its territory according to its national interests.

The divergence between these two interpretations revealed an opposition about the political status given to the Cree by the Québec government and the one claimed by the Cree people. The latter did not identify themselves as Québec or Canadian citizens, but rather as Aboriginals, and more particularly, as Aboriginal people living in the North and different from those living in the South. This clearly revealed that the Cree's struggles were inherently politics of representation, revealing the increasing plurality of Cree identity politics.¹⁵¹ Through their mobilisation, there was a gradual politicisation of the Cree identity. The building of an opposition and the process of negotiation obliged the Cree communities to find out a political representation of their society that they could oppose to the representation forwarded by the Québec government and Hydro-Québec. Their departure from the IQA showed that their interests were also linked to their particular history and their way of life. Although the hunting and gathering activities were claimed as a core dimension of their identity, the Cree had to take a stance on other issues such as the issue of aboriginal rights and the delimitation and management of their territory. The James Bay Agreement has thus represented one way to affirm their "Creeness" while imposing specific markers. The Cree public discourse on their identity remained at that time largely embedded in the problematic of aboriginal rights. It was not clearly articulated on the basis of a particular political space as the Québec dominant public discourse.

One important issue of Cree identity politics which was redefined by the James Bay Agreement was its spatial basis. It implied a rearticulation of the Cree identity around two forms of territoriality. Although the James Bay Agreement recognised the Cree historical occupancy of the James Bay territory, it nonetheless confronted the Cree with the necessity to integrate a new form of territoriality based on a the logic of sovereignty. The Cree opposition revealed two different views on the James Bay territory. Hunting territories were opposed to dams, reflecting two different ways of appropriation and occupancy of a territory, having quite different economic and political implications. The James Bay Agreement confirmed the predominance of the logic of sovereignty which brought in a reinterpretation and remapping of Cree hunting territories, notably with their division in three categories. This does not mean that the historical and cultural perspective privileged by the Cree was left aside, but rather reinterpreted in the light of a new setting. The major challenge was then to redefine the portion of Québec territory into a Cree homeland.

The James Bay Agreement imposed, then, a new political and territorial setting to Cree people. This brought in the broadening of Cree polity which largely resulted from the increasing reflexivity of their social organisation and the addition of new political scales. By specifying the components of their livelihood and by mapping their homeland, the Agreement opened the door to the discussions and the debates of the Cree identity and their way of life on a spatio-temporal continuum. The desire to preserve their history and to have a control over their fate became two crucial issues which shaped the mobilisation of the Cree. Furthermore, what appeared over the years is the consolidation of a regional political scene which came to constitute the privileged arena for these issues. The formation of the Grand Council of the Crees constituted a clear attempt to redefine the regional scale of Cree politics and to transform it into a space of resistance. The ratification of the Agreement by the Cree people confirmed the relevance and the centrality of this objective in Cree politics.

The James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement became the first modern comprehensive land claims settlement within Canada. In December 1975, the Cree communities ratified by the intermediary of a referendum the Agreement. A 70-page text on the Agreement had been previously distributed. The Agreement was ratified by a strong majority (922-to-1), representing, however, 24% of the Cree population. The implementation of the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement (JBNQA) took a long time. Bill 32 in Québec and the Bill C-9 in Ottawa giving effect to the Agreement were only enacted on October 31, 1977. The

long delay can be explained by the fact that the JBNQA is a lengthy document containing some innovative provisions which have never previously been implemented. It was necessary to find out the way to do it in taking into account the interests of both sides. Furthermore, its implementation depended upon the setting up of a legislative and administrative process which rendered the task more heavy. Given its complexity and its extent, the JBNQA required between twenty and thirty legislative bills in order to implement all the provisions. A co-ordinating office attached to the Québec Department of Natural Resources was set up in January 1976 to ensure that all the departments would respect the government's obligations.

Another factor explaining the slow implementation of the Agreement was the lack of the political will of the governments which tried to delay it. They often attempted, when they drafted the legislation, to modify the provisions which led sometimes to new negotiations.¹⁵² This subsequently created a climate of suspicion between the two parties, especially for Aboriginal peoples. The Cree called often into question the good faith of the governments and had to pressure them to respect of the negotiated provisions. Instead of ending the negotiations, the signing of the Agreement had involved continuous interactions and negotiations between the Cree and the two levels of governments.¹⁵³ This tended to strengthen the political role of the Grand Council of the Cree and at the same time, to further the development of a Cree bureaucracy enabling it to deal effectively with the governments. It remained, however, that it took some years before that the Cree people made a whole evaluation of the Agreement.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we related the story of the mobilisation of the Cree people against the construction of La Grande hydroelectric complex. Their struggles had been a turning point in many respects. The James Bay project constituted a critical step in the process of colonisation of the Crees which came to be more important during the 1950s. It represented a vast intrusion in their homeland that threatened their livelihood while opening the door to a deep disruption of their social tissue. The Crees became integrated within a foreign political and economic setting which imposed upon them new rules, discourses and institutions. At the same time, the Cree struggles were the starting point of a process of jumping scales indicating their willingness to increase their capability to mould these changes coming from outside, and consequently, to halt their disempowerment. The signature of the James Bay Agreement imposed upon them a new socio-political setting which confronted them

with the need of rethinking their social and political organisation in relation to a new spatio-temporal axis. Their livelihood, redefined as traditional, was transformed into a political and economic stake and became regulated by various norms and regimes. Moreover, the James Bay Agreement also implied the reappraisal of a new form of territoriality based on a logic of sovereignty. It revealed the growing disembeddedness of their political space which was no longer limited to their homeland. The attempts to prevent the project and the subsequent negotiations around the James Bay Agreement confronted the Cree with the necessity of developing strategies at the Québec and federal levels. They aimed to be recognised as a national actor to bring a greater pressure to bear on the Québec government and to gain some room of manoeuvre.

The increasing empowerment of the Grand Council of the Crees reflected these contradictory trends in the Cree struggles. Resulting from a strategic necessity of developing rapidly more efficient tactics to block the government initiatives and to protect their own interests, the Grand Council became a key actor of that process of jumping scales by which the Crees attempted to redefine their regional political scene and the Québec national political scene into spaces of resistance. The mobilisation of the Cree involved the launching of a regional process of jumping scales. The construction of the La Grande project and the signature of the James Bay Agreement had signified the transformation of the James Bay region into a space of dependence for the Cree. They were confronted with a new territoriality which imposed a new administrative structure and a remapping of their homeland whose meanings and implications were at first unknown. The tripartite division of their lands nicely illustrated the rescaling of the James Bay territory from the Québec perspective. This confronted the Cree with the necessity to appraise these regional divisions and to redefine them in a way that would reflect their interests. Their mobilisation on a regional basis was then the beginning of process of jumping scales by which they sought to transform their regional space into a space of resistance and subsequently, into a space of affirmation as it occurred with their struggles against the Great Whale project. Moreover, the process of jumping scales of the Cree was not only regional but also national. The rupture with the IQA and the signature of the James Bay Agreement conferred to the Cree a national status and at the same time, revealed their will to open a space at this level. It appeared that the national level was as critical as the regional level in the defence of the Cree's interests. The national process launched by the Cree overlapped with a broader process previously launched by the Aboriginal peoples at the Québec and Canadian levels by which they

sought to break up the wardship system and to be recognised as citizens with a special status. The latter gave to the Cree mobilisation a greater visibility and legitimacy.

This double process of jumping scales in which the Cree were involved reflected an important remapping of their citizenship struggles. Similarly to what occurred in other provinces, the Cree struggles aimed to the recognition of their aboriginal rights, including citizenship rights granted to Canadians, by both levels of governments. Their struggles were articulated on the affirmation of their Cree-ness and their accession to the Québec and Canadian political scenes. As a result, they questioned the Québec citizenship configuration which resulted from the Quiet Revolution, and more particularly, its identity and territorial bases. The Cree claims confronted the Québec government with the ethnic-bias of its citizenship politics. They highlighted the "white" representation of citizenship entitlements which excluded them. Moreover, they threw light on the existence of some internal frontiers within the Québec borders in which their citizenship rights were denied. This contradicted the changes of citizenship brought by the Québec government since the Quiet Revolution which aimed to develop its own citizenship politics over its territory in opposition to the federal government, trying to relegate it outside of its borders.

In the following chapter, we will see that the Cree struggles had also been shaped by the involvement of ecology groups that helped to publicise the Cree claims. They helped to draw public attention on the existing threats on their rights brought by the project. Moreover, they called into question the spatial implications of the project and furthered the redrawing of its scales, that is, its redefinition at the national level. However, the participation of ecology groups also rested on a specific agenda. In the next chapter, we will discuss the political implications. We will see how they challenged the Québec configuration of citizenship and, more broadly, the political setting deriving from the Quiet Revolution.

NOTES

¹ . We do not affirm here that it was the first time that Aboriginal peoples launched processes of jumping scales. Different forms of resistance were opposed to the process of colonisation and to regain control over their lives. Their political exclusion and oppression confined often them to organised their resistance on a local and/or regional basis. However, these did not prevent them to struggle at the national and international levels. It is only during the post colonisation period that the processes of jumping scales began to be more effective and that their resistance had a greater impact. Although any of these authors use the notion of jumping scales, they presented an overview of the struggles of Indigenous peoples, especially the Aboriginal peoples in Canada, which revealed how they attempted to transpose their struggles at different scales. Cf. C. Radha JHAPPAN, "A

Global Community?: Supranational Strategies of Canada's Aboriginal Peoples", *Journal of Indigenous Studies*, vol. 1, no 2, 1992, pp. 59-97; Douglas SANDERS, "Aboriginal Rights: The Search for Recognition in International Law", in *The Quest for Justice. Aboriginal Peoples and Aboriginal Rights*, edited by Menno BOLDT & J. Anthony LONG, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1985, pp. 292-303; Alison BRYSK, "Acting Globally : Indian Rights and International Politics in Latin America", in *Indigenous Peoples in Latin America*, edited by Donna LEE VAN COTT, New York, St. Martin's Press (in association with the Inter-American Dialogue), 1995, pp. 29-52; Sylvie VINCENT, "Les choix politiques des nations amérindiennes entre le XVIIe et le milieu du XXe siècle", in *Peuples autochtones de l'Amérique du Nord: De la réduction à la coexistence*, edited by Serge BOUCHARD, Sylvie VINCENT, José MAILHOT, Louise SAUVÉ, Sainte-Foy, Télé-Université, 1989, pp. 233-286.

² Cf. Franke WILMER, *The Indigenous Voice in World Politics*, London, Sage, 1993; Hurst HANNUM, *Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination. The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights*, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990, pp. 74-88; Isabelle SCHULTE-TENKOFF, *La question des peuples autochtones*, Paris & Bruxelles, L.G.D.J. & Bruylant, 1997, 235 pages; J. Rick PONTING, "Internationalization: Perspectives on an Emerging Direction in Aboriginal Affairs", in *Identities and State Structure*, edited by Joe SAWCHUK, Brandon, Bearpaw Publishing, 1992, pp. 207-234.

³ The decolonisation of the Third World countries constituted the second important period during which the issue of minority rights was posed. The first occurred after the First World War in regard to the status of religious and linguistic minorities in the Balkans. The protection of minorities remains until today an unresolved issue. The basic difficulty is to find out a workable definition of a minority. See Hurst HANNUM, *op. cit.*, pp. 74-89; Robert VANDICKE, "Les droits des minorités: quels droits, pour quelles minorités? Du concept à une typologie des minorités", in Jean LAFONTANT (ed.), *L'Etat et les minorités*, Saint-Boniface, Les Éditions du Blé/Presses universitaires de Saint-Boniface, 1993, pp. 81-94.

⁴ Cf. Franke WILMER, *op. cit.*, pp. 162-170; George MANUEL, Michael POSLUNS, *The Fourth World: An Indian Reality*, Don Mills, Collier-Macmillan, 1974; Noel DICK, "Representation and the 'Fourth World': A Concluding Statement", in *Indigenous Peoples and the Nation-State*, edited by Noel DICK, St. John's, Institute of Social and Economic Research/Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1992, pp. 236-241.

⁵ Cf. : J. R. MILLER, *Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens. A History of Indian-White Relations in Canada*, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1991, p. 223-223; SALLY M. WEAVER, *Making Canadian Indian Policy. The Hidden Agenda 1968-1970*, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, pp. 12-16.

⁶ Cf. Franke WILMER, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-17;

⁷ See on this point: Stephen CORNELL, *The Return of the Native*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1988.

⁸ See Ernest S. BURCH Jr., "Native Claims in Alaska: An Overview", *Études Inuit*, vol. 3, no 1, 1979, pp. 7-30.

⁹ Cf. Franke WILMER, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-22;; Pierre-GERLIER FOREST, Thierry RODON, Les activités internationales des autochtones du Canada, *Études internationales*, vol. 26, no 1, 1995., pp. 35-40

¹⁰ See on this point: Jane JENSON, "Naming Nations. Making Nationalist Claims in Canadian Public Discourse", *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology*, vol. 30, no 3, 1993, pp. 337-358.

¹¹ I refer here to the following analyses: Sally M. WEAVER, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-50; France ABELE, "Understanding What Happened Here: The Political Economy of Indigenous Peoples", in *Understanding Canada. Building on the New Canadian Political Economy*, edited by Wallace CLEMENT, Montréal & Kingston, McGill-Queen's University Press, pp. 118-1400; Adrian TANNER, "Introduction: Canadian Indians and the Politics of Dependency", *The Politics of Indianness. Case-Studies of Native Ethnopolitics in Canada*, St. John's, Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1983, pp. 1-30; J. R. MILLER, *op. cit.*, pp. 211-266; David LONG, "Culture, Ideology and Militancy: The Movement of Native Indians in Canada, 1969-1981", in *Organizing Dissent*, edited by William K. CARROLL, Toronto, Garamond Press, 1992, pp. 118-134.

¹² The first trigger was the 1959 Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons which was appointed to examine the Indian administration. The committee's report (1961) recommended a series of program innovations and various measures to increase the integration of Indians within the DIAND administration, reflecting the participatory democracy discourse. Its public hearings revealed that aboriginal issues started to

have a wider public impact. It was followed by other reforms such as the community development programs and the Indians advisory boards. The government expected that the transfer of some responsibilities would eventually facilitate the integration of Indians into the Canadian society. Cf. Sally M. WEAVER, *op. cit.*, p. 12-40.

¹³. *Ibid.*, pp. 20-27.

¹⁴. Dimitrios KARMIS, "Cultures autochtones et libéralisme au Canada: les vertus médiatrices du communautarisme de Charles Taylor", *Revue canadienne de science politique*, vol. 26, no1, 1993, p. 73.

¹⁵. Menno BOLDT, J. Anthony LONG, "Introduction", in Menno BOLDT, J. Anthony LONG (eds), *The Quest for Justice. Aboriginal Peoples and Aboriginal Rights*, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1985, pp. 7-8.

¹⁶. See on this point: J. R. MILLER, *op. cit.*, pp. 232.

¹⁷. *Ibid.*, pp. 232-233.

¹⁸. Throughout the twentieth century, many aboriginal organisations were formed and disappeared some years later. All the diverse attempts to form pan-canadian organisations such as the North American Indian Brotherhood failed. They faced many obstacles, notably the religious, geographical and legal divisions. However, the situation was different at the provincial level where aboriginal organisations have faced less difficulties and have experienced a longer lasting. It is only at the end of the 1960s that we saw the formation of three national organisations which showed a greater stability. They constituted a political platform that has shaped the following decades. Cf. Sally M. WEAVER, *op. cit.*, p. 180; Joe SAWCHUK, "The Metis, Non-Status Indians and the New Aboriginality; Government Alliances on Native Political Alliances and Identity", in *Identities and State Structures*, edited by Joe SAWCHUK, Brandon, Bearpaw Publishing, 1992, pp. 70-86.

¹⁹. See on this point: David LONG, *op. cit.*, pp. 118-134; Sylvie VINCENT, "La révélation d'une force politique: les Autochtones", in Gérard DAIGLE (sous la direction de), *Le Québec en jeu. Comprendre les grands défis*, Montréal, Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1992, pp. 753-754; James S. FRIDERES, "Natives Rights and the 21st Century: The Making of Red Power", *Canadian Ethnic Studies*, vol. 22, no 3, 1990, pp. 1-7.

²⁰. *Idem.*

²¹. Cf. Joe SAWCHUK, "Introduction: State Structure and Imposed Identities: the Invention of Indian", in *Identities and State Structure*, edited by Joe SAWCHUK, volume 2, Brandon, Bearpaw Publishing, 1992, pp. 1-7; Deirdre T. JORDAN, "Aboriginal Identity: The Management of a Minority Group by the Mainstream Society", in *Identities and State Structures*, edited by Joe SAWCHUK, Brandon, Bearpaw Publishing, 1992, pp. 263-300; Paul L.A.H. CHARTRAND, "Terms of Division: Problems of Outside-Naming for Aboriginal Peoples", *Journal of Indigenous Studies*, vol. 2, no 2, 1991, pp. 1-22..

²². The group became less active and visible as the aboriginal organisations were getting more attention and more effective. From that moment, it played a more supportive role. Cf. Sally M. WEAVER, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

²³. See Pierre LEPAGE, "L'apprentissage difficile d'une coexistence harmonieuse", in Garry BOWERS, Sylvie VINCENT (sous la direction de), *Baie James et Nord Québécois: dix ans après*, Montréal, Recherches amérindiennes au Québec, 1988, pp. 26-27; Paul CHAREST, "Les barrages hydro-électriques en territoire montagnais et leurs effets sur les communautés amérindiennes", *Recherches amérindiennes au Québec*, vol. 9, no 4, pp. 323-337.

²⁴. Pierre LEPAGE, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

²⁵. The Indians of Québec Association was formed at the instigation of three chiefs: Max Gros-Louis (Huron-Wendat), Andrew T. Delisle (Mohawk), Aurélien Gill (Montagnais). The two first had acted respectively as chairman and secretary-treasurer. Sylvie VINCENT, *op. cit.*, p. 754.

²⁶. The IQA reclaimed the recognition of the fishing and hunting rights not only on legal grounds, but also in using social and economic arguments. It was argued that hunting and fishing activities were still the main livelihood of a large number of Indians. In addition, the IQA asked that the Québec government stopped all legal proceedings against Indians who committed infractions in regard of the laws on fishing and activities. Cf. ASSOCIATION DES INDIENS DU QUÉBEC, "Mémoire soumis au Ministère du Tourisme, de la Chasse et de la

Pêche", in *Rapport de la Commission d'étude sur l'intégrité du territoire du Québec, 4. Le domaine indien, 4.2. Mémoires*, Québec, Éditeur officiel du Québec, 1968, pp. 177-215.

²⁷. Sylvie VINCENT, *op. cit.*, p. 754.

²⁸. See Billy DIAMOND, "Aboriginal Rights: The James Bay Experience", in J. Anthony LONG, Menno BOLDT (eds), *The Quest for Justice: Aboriginal Rights and Aboriginal Peoples*, Toronto, Toronto University Press, 1985, p. 268.

²⁹. Ignatius LA RUSIC, Serge BOUCHARD, Alan PENN, et al, *Negotiating a Way of Life. Initial Cree experience with the administrative structure arising from the James Bay Agreement*, Montréal, ssDcc Inc, 1979, p. 3

³⁰. The demand for an exemption from provincial sales tax affected several Quebec laws dealing with sales tax (tobacco, meal, gas, licenses, etc). The normalisation was complicated owing to the fact that some bands did not live on reserves, but rather on settlements. Cf. ASSOCIATION DES INDIENS DU QUÉBEC, "Mémoire soumis au Ministère du Revenu", in *Rapport de la Commission d'étude sur l'intégrité du territoire du Québec, 4. Le domaine indien, 4.2. Mémoires*, Québec, Éditeur officiel du Québec, 1971, pp. 219-239.

³¹. See on this point: ASSOCIATION DES INDIENS DU QUÉBEC, "Mémoire soumis à la Commission d'étude sur l'intégrité du territoire du Québec", in *Rapport de la Commission d'étude sur l'intégrité du territoire du Québec*, Québec, Éditeur officiel du Québec, 1971, pp. 36-37.

³². The IQA referred to the jurisprudence and mostly to the decision "Ste-Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co. vs. The Queen (1888) 13 S.R.C. 577". They argued that their rights were not merely usual usufructuary rights since they restricted the exercise of provincial property rights over Indian lands. *Ibid.*, p. 30-34.

³³. See on that point: SECRÉTARIAT AUX AFFAIRES AUTOCHTONES, *Les Autochtones et le Québec. Le chemin parcouru*, Québec, Les Publications du Québec/Secrétariat aux affaires autochtones, 1991, p. 30.

³⁴. *Idem.*; Donat SAVOIE, "Le rapport Dorion et les droits territoriaux des Indiens de la baie de James", *Recherches amérindiennes au Québec*, vol. 1, nos. 4-5, 1971, p. 32.

³⁵. See on this point: Daniel FRANCIS, Toby MORANTZ, *Partners in Furs. A history of the Fur Trade in Eastern James Bay 1600-1870*, Kingston and Montréal, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1983.

³⁶. Until recently, the dominant analyses of the Cree society rested on the assumption that it was matrilinear. Toby Morantz argued, however, that a more detailed reading of the Hudson Bay Company's records let to see that it was not the case. See Toby MORANTZ, *An Ethnohistoric Study of Eastern James Bay Cree Social Organization, 1700-1850*, Dossier no 88, Ottawa, Service canadien d'ethnologie, 1983, pp. 87-90.

³⁷. See on this point: Anthony GIDDENS, *The Constitution of Society*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1984, pp.

³⁸. Edward W. SOJA, *The Political Organization of Space*, Washington, Association of American Geographers, 1971, Resource Paper no 8, p. 13.

³⁹. See Adrian TANNER, *Bringing Home Animals. Religious Ideology and Mode of Production of the Mistassini Cree Hunters*, St John, Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1979, no 23, pp. 1-13.

⁴⁰. Cf. Toby MORANTZ, *op. cit.*, pp. 95-96

⁴¹. Adrian TANNER, *Bringing Home Animals, op. cit.*, pp. 1-2.

⁴². The application of conservation measures involved some ownership over resources and that some boundaries can be drawn around a territory. The efficiency of these measures rested on an alternance between some parts of the hunting territory. See Edward S. ROGERS, *The Hunting Group-Hunting Territory Complex among the Mistassini Indians*, Ottawa, National Museum of Man, 1963, p. 84.

⁴³. The establishment of missions among Aboriginal peoples aimed to transform them into "good Christians" and civilised people in reference to Western criteria. This did not mean that Aboriginal peoples were not educated nor did have religious systems.

⁴⁴. Daniel FRANCIS and Toby MORANTZ, *Partners in Furs, A History of the Fur Trade in Eastern James Bay 1600-1870*, Kingston & Montréal, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1983, p. 11.

⁴⁵. Cf. Roland LAMONTAGNE, *La baie James dans l'histoire du Canada*, Montréal, Librairie Beauchemin Limtée, 1974, pp. 53-67.

⁴⁶. See on this point: Toby MORANTZ, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-14.

⁴⁷. The first interventions of both governments occurred at the end of the 1930s. Responding to a crisis created by white trappers, the Québec government decided to outlaw the trapping of beavers by non-Indians in the northern region. In the mid-1930s, this was extended to Indians. When beaver harvesting, which was the major component of the fur trade, was again permitted some years later, the federal and provincial mapped the hunting territories and thus, established a registered system of traplines. This aimed to set up a wildlife management scheme based on the stewards who had each year to calculate the number of beaver lodges and consequently, to allocate a number of hunters on each hunting territory in following the government agents' recommendations. Although that system was not very different from the already existing land tenure system, it was developed from an opposite perspective. "The government thought that Cree hunting was regulated and supervised by government legislation and authority, and that they determined the Cree rights to hunt. The Cree thought the government had recognised their own system of tenure and self-governance". Cf. Harvey A. FEIT, "Hunting and the Quest for Power, The James Bay Cree and Whitemen in the Twentieth Century", in R. Bruce MORRISON and C. Roderick WILSON (eds), *Native Peoples. The Canadian Experience*, Toronto, McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1986, pp. 188-189.

⁴⁸. The previous interventions of the federal government were in fact limited to the patrols made by the RCMP. The establishment of some posts aimed to affirm the Canadian sovereignty over that part of the territory which was coveted by the American government. It was then strategic considerations which influenced those interventions. Cf. Louis-Edmond HAMELIN, *Nordicité canadienne*, Montréal, Hurtubise HMH, 1975, coll. Les Cahiers du Québec, pp. 266-267.

⁴⁹. Richard F. SALISBURY, *op. cit.*, p. 9

⁵⁰. The change was very incremental. Those new political institutions had been in a large extent adapted to the existing forms of leadership. The elected leaders were often stewards or hunting group leaders, or elders having authority given their religious and social activities. The Indian government agents which had to prepare band membership lists used the same channels that were used by the missionaries and the Hudson's Bay Company traders. They tended to use the same elders dealing with those latter. Cf. Harvey A. FEIT, "Legitimation and Autonomy In James Bay Cree Responses to Hydro-Electric development", in Noel DYCK (ed.), *Indigenous Peoples and the Nation-State: "Fourth World" Politics in Canada, Australia and Norway*, St-John's, Memorial University of Newfoundland/Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1985, pp. 35-36.

⁵¹. Richard F. SALISBURY, *op. cit.*, pp. 18-19.

⁵². Harvey A. FEIT, *op. cit.*, 1985, p. 36.

⁵³. Most of the Cree bands were part of the Abitibi District, the District Office being located in Val D'Or. While Mistassini was part until 1969 of the Pointe-Bleue District, Great Whale River was in Northern District. Cf. Richard F. SALISBURY, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-33.

⁵⁴. Eric GOURDEAU, "Québec and the Aboriginal Question", in Alain G. GAGNON (ed.), *Québec State and Society*, Toronto, Nelson Canada, 1993, Second Edition, p. 350.

⁵⁵. At the end of the sixties, there were eight bands which were recognised by both levels of government. Three of them (Eastmain, Mistassini, Waswanipi) had been designated as reserves by the Québec Loi des terres et forêts in February 1962. The other five bands (Fort George, Fort Rupert, Némiscau, Nouveau-Copmtoir or Paint Hills (previously Old Factory), Poste-de-la-Baleine of Great Whale River) occupied a territory which did not have a legal status. Even if these bands were established at trading posts of the Hudson's Bay Company, the hunting territories surrounding them represented for the Cree ancestral territories. It must be pointed out that most of the bands' names were still those one of the trading posts. During the thirties, the Hudson's Bay Company closed two hinterland trading posts (Neokskweskau, Nitchequon) which were also gathering place for the Cree. Those places were afterwards gradually abandoned by the Cree. Cf. Richard F. SALISBURY, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-25.

⁵⁶. It was mostly the southern bands of the James Bay territory which were affected by those economic activities. The contact was generally very brutal. The economic development of that region had major impacts. On the one hand, those activities disturbed hunting activities while destroying some hunting territories. There was a clash between two different conceptions and ways of occupancy of a territory. Those developments were made without to take into consideration the population and mostly, in spite of the protests made by the chiefs. On the other hand, economic development provided some job opportunities. It furthered the development of a wage economy in which, however, the Cree were at the bottom. Some Cree were hired by forestry and mining companies whereas others worked as guides for tourism and exploration activities. The casual jobs were mostly limited to the summer period. As the bands became more structured, others jobs were also available. See on this point Harvey A. FEIT, "Hunting and the Quest for Power: The James Bay Cree and Whitemen in the Twentieth Century", *op. cit.*, pp. 190-194.

⁵⁷. The role of the government agents had become more prominent insofar as an increasing number of Cree relied on government aid and services. Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 192-193.

⁵⁸. See in this point: *Ibid.*, p. 194.

⁵⁹. *Idem.*

⁶⁰. See on that point: Richard F. SALISBURY, *op. cit.*, p. 33

⁶¹. W. Ken BARGER, "Inuit and Cree Adaptation to Northern Colonialism", in Ernest L. SCHUSKY (ed.), *Political Organization of Native North Americans*, Washington, University Press of America, 1980, p. 202.

⁶². Harvey A. FEIT, "Legitimation and Autonomy in James Bay Cree Responses to Hydro-Electric Development", *op. cit.*, pp. 36-37.

⁶³. Harvey Feit pointed out that the appointment of those new leaders could have not occurred without to take into account the concerns of the community. The influence of the stewards and the elders was determinant for all the questions relating to land and resources. Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 37-38.

⁶⁴. Barger pointed out that some claims of the Cree were shaped by concerned outsiders, such as Indian regional leaders, teachers, government workers, and missionaries. It appeared that the situation of southern Indian communities was used as a reference for their claims. Their situation was often perceived negatively and then, reinforced their wish to preserve their status. See on this point: W. Ken BARGER, *op. cit.*, pp. 202-203.

⁶⁵. *Ibid.*, p. 202.

⁶⁶. *Idem.*

⁶⁷. The following chronology of the events is drawn from the three following sources: Jean-Guy DESCHÊNES, Sylvie VINCENT, "La Convention dans la marche des Autochtones vers leur autonomie: Eléments de chronologie: 1967-1987", *op. cit.*, pp. 215-238; Harvey A. FEIT, "Negotiating Recognition of Aboriginal Rights: History, Strategies and Reactions to the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement", *Canadian Journal of Anthropology*, vol. 1, no 2, 1980, pp. 159-172; Ignatius LA RUSIC, Serge BOUCHARD, Alan PENN, et al, *Negotiating a Way of Life. Initial Cree experience with the administrative structure arising from the James Bay Agreement*, Montréal, ssDcc Inc, 1979, pp. i-X and 1-25.

⁶⁸. The informal linkages between the eight bands had been created through the schooling. The fact that Cree students were sent to the same residential schools reinforced those links. Those informal channels were important in the beginning of that mobilisation. See. Harvey A. FEIT, "Negotiating Recognition of Aboriginal Rights: History, Strategies and Reactions to the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement", *op. cit.*, p. 160.

⁶⁹. The announcement provoked reactions from the bands and also from the IQA executive. Chiefs started to call meetings in their respective communities about eventual responses. Some of them such as Billy Diamond, chief of Rupert House, took firm stand against the project. While pointing out the destruction of hunting territories, he was doubtful about the economic spin-offs for the Cree population. That position was similar to the IQA's secretary-treasury, Max Gros-Louis, who was strongly opposed to the project. Cf. Harvey A. FEIT, "Legitimation and Autonomy in James Bay Cree Responses to Hydro-Electric Development", *op. cit.*, p. 39.

⁷⁰. The meeting was initially supposed to be informal and only included the Cree chiefs. The IQA became involved few days before. Its participation and mostly its financial resources led to the holding of a larger meeting. The fact that the IQA had not been involved can be explained by the suspicion on the part of some younger Cree towards the IQA. The latter was at that time criticised for ignoring northern concerns and then, being too preoccupied with southern problems. They were afraid that the IQA put aside the concerns of northern people in order to reach an agreement for the whole province. See on this point: Ignatius LA RUSIC, Serge BOUCHARD, et al, *Negotiating a Way of Life*, *op. cit.*, p. 4

⁷¹. Harvey A. FEIT, "Legitimation and Autonomy in James Bay Cree Responses to Hydro-Electric Development", *op. cit.*, p. 41.

⁷². The IQA representatives pointed out different ways that the Cree could take. Max Gros-Louis proposed among other things, to establish links between all Indians within Québec and also to mobilise support throughout Canada and abroad. The IQA legal counsel indicated that the Québec government could go ahead without to require their consent. And that a court case against the Québec government did not appear to be a successful strategy. He rather suggested to demand assistance to the Department of Indian Affairs which could intervene on their behalf. It represented at that time the most secure way. He also mentioned that if the Department decided to keep its hands off, the only solution will be to ask compensations. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 48.

⁷³. We refer here to some reports of those information meetings held in three communities: Waswanipi, Mistassini, Fort George. Those reports showed large similarities between the three communities. See on this point: Ignatius LA RUSIC, "La réaction des Waswanipis à l'annonce du projet de la Baie James", *Recherches amérindiennes au Québec*, vol. 1, nos. 4-5, 1971, pp. 15-21; Yves LÉGER, "Le projet de la Baie James: l'envers de la médaille", *Recherches amérindiennes au Québec*, vol. 1, nos. 4-5, 1971, pp. 36-43; Harvey A. FEIT, "Legitimation and Autonomy in the James Bay Cree Responses to Hydro-Electric Development", *op. cit.*, pp. 41-47.

⁷⁴. *Ibid.*, p. 64.

⁷⁵. "Le Chef des Hurons, M. Max Gros-Louis, compte bien qu'Ottawa bloquera le projet de la Baie James", *Le Devoir*, le 29 juillet 1971, p. 1.

⁷⁶. During that press conference, George Manuel also rejected the representation of Canada based on two founding nations. He affirmed that it implied the denial of aboriginal rights. "M. George Manuel, président de la Fraternité nationale des Indiens, critique la décision du gouvernement du Québec de mettre en oeuvre le projet hydroélectrique de la Baie James", *Le Devoir*, 24 août 1971, p. 1.

⁷⁷. Harvey A. FEIT, "Legitimation and Autonomy in the James Bay Cree Responses to Hydro-Electric Development", *op. cit.*, p. 47.

⁷⁸. The reception of the Dorion Commission Report by the IQA was nuanced. The recognition of Indian territorial rights on large portion of Québec territory confirmed one of its claims which was the most contentious. However, they rejected the interpretation of those rights which were characterised as private and usufructuary and the recommendations of the Report. Cf. Donat SAVOIE, *op. cit.*, p.32.

⁷⁹. *Le Devoir*, 27 janvier 1972, p. 3.

⁸⁰. See on this point: Harvey A. FEIT, "Legitimation and Autonomy in the James Bay Cree Responses to Hydro-Electric Development", *op. cit.*, p. 64.

⁸¹. The JBDC attempted to convince the IQA to join them for the preparation of that information program. Moreover, meetings were held to co-ordinate the visits of the communities. However, the IQA declined that offer. They feared that the JBDC aimed through that program to sell the project. That decision was supported by Cree leaders and chiefs. Cf. *Idem*, p. 45.

⁸². *Ibid.*, pp. 45-46.

⁸³. Harvey A. FEIT, "Negotiating Recognition of Aboriginal Rights", *op. cit.*, p. 160.

⁸⁴. The study group included around fifty scientists and bureaucrats. The Aboriginal people were only consulted. The study was supposed to be done in three steps. In the short term, the urgent problems and the respective

solutions had to be identified. In the mid-term, it was expected to propose some guidelines in regard to the negative impacts of the building sites. Finally, the group had to elaborate in the long term a policy of regional development. However, the two last objectives were subsequently dropped. Cf. *Le Devoir*, 10 septembre 1971, p. 1

⁸⁵. Cf. *Le Devoir*, 3 février 1972, pp. 1-2.

⁸⁶. The credibility of the Marsan report had been easily called into question. The short lapse of time during which the Report was written as the limited data constituted important weaknesses. Moreover, many important questions regarding the necessity of the project and the existence of alternative were left aside. See Sean McCUTCHEON, *op. cit.*, pp. 46-47.

⁸⁷. Harvey A. FEIT, "Legitimation and Autonomy in the James Bay Cree Responses to Hydro-Electric Development", *op. cit.*, p. 50.

⁸⁸. See on this point: *Ibid.*, pp. 49-51.

⁸⁹. *Ibid.*, p. 47.

⁹⁰. *Le Devoir*, 17 janvier 1972, p. 6.

⁹¹. See on this point: Sean McCUTCHEON, *op. cit.*, pp. 52-54; Harvey A. FEIT, "Legitimation and Autonomy in the James Bay Cree Responses to Hydro-Electric Development", *op. cit.*, p. 52.

⁹². The Anglican Church of Canada was the first which took a public stand against the James Bay project. During the 26th synod held at mid-may 1973, a resolution was adopted which demanded to all Anglicans to support the struggles of the James Bay Indians. That resolution demanded to both levels of government to recognise and respect the aboriginal rights. Cf. *Le Devoir*, le 14 mai 1973, p. 11. Some months later, the Québec city archbishop, Maurice Roy, took a public stance in favour of the respect of aboriginal rights. Representing the Québec catholic bishops, he demanded to the Québec government to study carefully the rights of the aboriginal peoples and also to consider the eventual social problems following from the hydro-electric development. Cf. *Le Devoir*, le 14 juillet 1973, p. 3.

⁹³. See for example: Boyce RICHARSON, *James Bay: The Plot to Drown the North Woods*, Toronto, Sierra Club, 1972; *A Brief Guide to the James Bay Controversy*, Toronto, Canadian Association in Support of the Native Peoples, 1973.

⁹⁴. Sean McCUTCHEON, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

⁹⁵. The distrust of the Cree leaders was fuelled by the IQA inaction. Some days before the meeting, they learned that the IQA postponed the sending of a letter to the Minister of Indian Affairs which was accompanied by a petition signed by the Cree chiefs requiring its interventions. They required the holding of a special debate in the House of Commons about the prerogatives of the federal government in the James Bay project. Harvey A. FEIT, *op. cit.*, p. 51

⁹⁶. *Ibid.*, p. 54.

⁹⁷. *Le Devoir*, 6 mai 1972, p. 1.

⁹⁸. Harvey A. FEIT, "James Bay Cree Self-Governance and Land Management", in Edwin N. WILMSEN (ed.), *We Are Here. Politics of Aboriginal Land Tenure*, Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1989, pp. 70-71.

⁹⁹. *Idem*

¹⁰⁰. Harvey A. FEIT, "Legitimation and Autonomy in the James Bay Cree Responses to Hydro-Electric Development", *op. cit.*, p. 55.

¹⁰¹. Harvey A. FEIT, "Negotiating Recognition of Aboriginal Rights", *op. cit.*, p. 160.

¹⁰². The announcement occurred during a meeting between the IQA and representatives of Québec government and the crown corporations. The meeting was part of the series of discussions and negotiations launched since the fall 1971 on the whole aboriginal issues. It is very hard to specify exactly the number of meetings which were held, although the number was relatively small. The Malouf decision on the granting of the interlocutory injunction referred to those meetings. What appeared is that the James Bay project was discussed

more specifically between June and October 1972. It is only during those meetings that the questions relative to the scope, the impacts and the eventual modifications of the project were raised. Cf. *La Baie James Indienne. Texte intégral du jugement du juge Albert Malouf*, Montréal, Editions du Jour, 1973, pp. 157-158.

¹⁰³. That case became formally known as "Robert Kanatewat et al. vs. James Bay Development Corporation et al.". The hearings for the interlocutory injunction lasted from December 11, 1972 to June 21, 1973. During the 71 days of testimony, 167 witnesses were heard, including almost 100 Cree and Inuit hunters.

¹⁰⁴. For a more detailed description of the Cree argumentation before the Court, see: Ignatius LA RUSIC, Serge BOUCHARD, Alan PENN, et al, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-8; Guy DESHAIES, "Les Indiens expliquent pourquoi les travaux doivent être bloqués", *Le Devoir*, 6 décembre 1982, pp. 3,6.

¹⁰⁵. Ignatius LA RUSIC, Serge BOUCHARD, Alan PENN, et al, *op. cit.*, p. 8. In addition to the testimonies of the hunters, the request of the Cree relied also on testimonies from experts in anthropology and ecology. The works of the James Bay Task Force had been very important. It was during the fall 1972 that the diverse studies were released. The vegetation, the fauna, the rivers, as the subsistence economies of the bands constituted some of the topics which were specifically studied in order to assess the impact of the proposed scheme. See for example: John A. SPENCE (ed.), *Not by Bread Alone*, James Bay Task Force, 1972.

¹⁰⁶. See on this point: Ignatius LA RUSIC, Serge BOUCHARD, et al, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-9.

¹⁰⁷. See Harvey A. FEIT, "Negotiating Recognition of Aboriginal Rights", *op. cit.*, p. 162

¹⁰⁸. *Ibid.*, p. 161.

¹⁰⁹. James O'REILLY, "The Role of the Courts in the Evolution of the James Bay Hydroelectric Project", in Garry BOWERS, Sylvie VINCENT (eds.), *Baie James et Nord québécois: Dix ans après*, Montréal, Recherches amérindiennes au Québec, 1988, pp. 33-34.

¹¹⁰. According to the Justice Malouf, the existence of those rights followed from the statutory obligation in the 1912 Quebec Boundaries Extension Act. He also referred to the pre-Confederation treaties as well as to the post-Confederation period to conclude to the recognition by the Crown of an aboriginal title. He did not however specified the nature and the scope of that aboriginal title. Cf. *La baie James Indienne, op. cit.*, p. 56-57.

¹¹¹. *Ibid.*, p. 72.

¹¹². *Ibid.*, p. 197.

¹¹³. Guy DESHAIES, "Les Indiens se sentent en position de force", *Le Devoir*, 16 novembre 1973, pp. 1,8.

¹¹⁴. See on this point: Guy DESHAIES, *Le Devoir*, 23 novembre 1973, p. 1

¹¹⁵. See James O'REILLY, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-36; Henri BRUN, Denis FERLAND, Hubert RIED, "La Cour d'appel, les Indiens et la justice", *Le Devoir*, 21 décembre 1974, pp. 5,2.

¹¹⁶. Cf. *Le Devoir*, 22 décembre 1973, p. 1.

¹¹⁷. Sean McCUTCHEON, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

¹¹⁸. See François BARBEAU, "Québec offre \$100 millions aux Indiens; Une proposition "négotiable" en 11 points", *Le Devoir*, 26 janvier 1974, pp. 1,2.

¹¹⁹. "Les propositions de Québec aux Indiens de la baie James", *Le Devoir*, 28 janvier 1974, pp. 5,7

¹²⁰. Pierre O'NEILL, "Jean Chrétien approuve l'offre faite aux Indiens", *Le Devoir*, 29 janvier 1974, p. 1.

¹²¹. I refer here to the explanations provided by two authors: Billy DIAMOND, *op. cit.*, pp. 279-280; Harvey A. FEIT, "Negotiating Recognition of Aboriginal Rights", *op. cit.*, pp. 162-163.

¹²². *Ibid.*, p. 163.

¹²³. Pierre O'NEILL, "Les Indiens et Inuit rejettent carrément les offres de Québec", *Le Devoir*, 6 février 1974, p. 1.

¹²⁴. See on this point: Philip AWASHISH, "The Stakes for the Cree of Québec", in Garry BOWERS and Sylvie VINCENT (eds), *Baie James et nord québécois: dix ans après*, Montréal, Recherches amérindiennes au Québec, 1988, p. 43.

¹²⁵. Cf. Ignatius LA RUSIC, Serge BOUCHARD, et al, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

¹²⁶. See on this point: Harvey A. FEIT, *op. cit.*, pp. 166-167; John CIACIA, "The Practical and Philosophical Stakes", in Garry BOWERS and Sylvie VINCENT (eds), *Baie James et nord québécois: dix ans après*, Montréal, Recherches amérindiennes au Québec, 1988, p. 39.

¹²⁷. There were many particular claims raised by the Cree: "modifications to Complexe La Grande, with remedial works to assist Cree hunters, fisherman, and trappers; recognition of Cree hunting, fishing, and trapping rights; land and territorial rights; community development with sufficient lands; programs and assistance for Cree hunters, trappers, and fishermen; police and justice; Cree local and regional self-determination and self-government; economic and social development; health and education; monetary compensation". Cf. Philip AWASHISH, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

¹²⁸. *Idem*

¹²⁹. Ignatius LA RUSIC, Serge BOUCHARD, et al., *op. cit.*, p. 13.

¹³⁰. Harvey A. FEIT, "Negotiating Recognition of Aboriginal Rights", *op. cit.*, p. 165.

¹³¹. From the interviews made in various Cree villages during the Fall 1993, there are two main reasons which may explain why the Cree accepted it. First, they were confronted with the inflexibility of both governments which posed it as precondition to any agreement. The negotiations happened at the same time than the construction works. As they progressed pretty fast, it became more and more urgent for the Cree to reach an agreement and consequently, to make some compromises. Moreover, the implications of this provision had not been fully grasped at that time by the negotiators. It was part of the federal policy and did not appear as "exceptional".

¹³². Billy DIAMOND quoted in Harvey A. FEIT, "Negotiating Recognition of Aboriginal Rights", *op. cit.*, p. 167.

¹³³. Billy DIAMOND, "The James Bay experience", *op. cit.*, p. 280.

¹³⁴. The IQA represented at that time most of the Aboriginal groups in Québec: Hurons of Québec, the Abénakis from Bécancour and Odanak, the Montagnais from Lac St-Jean, Sept-Iles, and the Côte Nord, the Iroquois from Montréal and St-Régis, the Micmacs from Restigouche and the Gaspésie, the Attikameks from St-Maurice, and the Algonquins from the Abitibi-Témiscamingue region. Cf. "L'Association des Indiens dénonce l'entente que Cris et Inuit vont signer", *Le Devoir*, 26 septembre 1975, p. 7.

¹³⁵. Harvey A. FEIT, "Negotiating Recognition of Aboriginal Rights", *op. cit.*, pp. 164-165.

¹³⁶. *Ibid.*, p. 164.

¹³⁷. Three jurists who had analysed the Court of Appeal decision found some deficiencies. Some documents and jurisprudence were leave aside when they examined the existence of a aboriginal title. That decision posed also the question of the protection of the rights of a minority. See Henri BRUN, Denis FERLAND, Hubert REID, *op. cit.*, pp. 5,6.

¹³⁸. New actors on the aboriginal side emerged in 1975. In addition to the Inuit dissident movement, the Naskapi became also concerned by the negotiating process. In January 1975, the NQIA and the Grand Council of the Cree (GCCQ) visited the Naskapi in Shefferville to explain that their rights and their territory would be affected by the eventual agreement and invited them to join them. A part of the hunting territories of the Naskapis were included in the territory covered by the agreement-in-principle. They constituted the Third parties to the Agreement. The Naskapis signed an agreement in March 1973 with the NQIA by which this latter will represent their interests and will support a small team of Naskapi negotiators. The Naskapi broke that agreement in September and decided to form their own negotiating team. Their efforts were not, however, successful. Their request aiming to defer the signing of the Agreement until they can sign it was rejected by all the parties to the negotiations. With the signing of the Agreement, the Naskapi's territorial rights were then extinguished without their agreement. The Naskapi made afterwards publicly known their opposition and reclaimed a settlement of

their land claims. In January 1977, the Québec government decided to negotiate with the Naskapi and shortly after, the federal government, the Northern Inuit Quebec Association and the Grand Council of the Cree (of Quebec) did likewise. Those negotiations led to the signing of the *Northeastern Québec Agreement* on the January 31, 1978.

¹³⁹. Harvey A. FEIT, "Negotiating Recognition of Aboriginal Rights", *op. cit.*, p. 167.

¹⁴⁰. The final negotiations were then conducted at two levels. Even if the sub-committees played a central role, it remained that the central committee was still important by its co-ordinating role. In fact, it acted as an editorial board in reviewing all the documents coming from the diverse sub-committees and in taking final decisions when it was required. Many sub-committees were set up during those months of negotiations dealing with the main issues included in the Agreement in Principle: sub-committee on hunting, fishing and trapping; sub-committee on lands, sub-committee on environment, sub-committee on the modifications to the project; sub-committee in regard to the regional and local self-government. Later on, as the works in the sub-committees made progress, other sub-committees were formed to deal with other issues: economic development, police and the administration of the justice, health, education, taxes and compensation, the creation of legal bodies and the study of constitutional problems. See on this point: Ignatius LA RUSIC, Serge BOUCHARD, Alan PENN, et al, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-16.

¹⁴¹. *Ibid.*, p. 21.

¹⁴². Armand COUTURE, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-52. It must be pointed out that the involvement of the Québec government was still more important and determinant. Most of the departments were concerned by the negotiations since the Québec government sought, among other things, to affirm its jurisdictions over the northern territory through the agreement. The divergence of their interests was in a large extent reduced by the appointment of a negotiating team composed of senior civil servants. It was only at the level of the cabinet that the departments could present their claims and express their grievances. The cabinet became involved after the end of the negotiations when came the time to accept the agreement. The attitude of the federal government at the negotiating table did not really change from the previous period of negotiations. The Department of Indian Affairs and the Department of Justice still sought to maintain the "status quo" in regard to the federal obligations. The Department of Justice was in fact the leading federal agency. While largely contributing to determine the share and the responsibilities of the federal government in the agreement, this department was also responsible for the inclusion of the extinguishment clause. See on this point: Ignatius LA RUSIC, Serge BOUCHARD, Alan PENN, et al, *op. cit.*, pp. 18-19.

¹⁴³. Billy DIAMOND, *op. cit.*, p. 281.

¹⁴⁴. The authority of the Cree local administration is restricted to the lands of category I. In regard to the lands of category II, the Agreement made provisions for the creation of a "Conseil régional de la zone de la Baie James". This body was composed of members appointed by the Cree Regional Authority and by the "Municipalité de la Baie James" which was set up by the Bill 50. That Council exerts municipal powers and is in the last instance dependent from the Municipalité de la Baie James.

¹⁴⁵. The Cree Regional Authority rests on an elaborated administrative structure. The main element is the Council which is composed of the chiefs of the bands *ex officio* and one elected member from each Band. The Council appoints the members of the executive, except the chairman and vice-chairman who are elected. See Ignatius LA RUSIC, Serge BOUCHARD, Alan PENN, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-33.

¹⁴⁶. The procedure for the environmental impact assessment of development projects is very elaborated and bureaucratic. The environmental procedure is framed by territorial and constitutional factors. The Agreement made provisions for two procedures, one covering the Cree territory and the other, the Inuit territory. The separation between the two is the 55th Parallel. The environmental evaluation within the two territories can be conducted by two different committees. If the development project concerns the provincial jurisdiction, a committee composed of Québec and Aboriginal representatives will be set up. The same thing occurred when the projects affect the federal jurisdictions. In regard to the Cree territory, that procedure is initially set up by the administrator. Depending of the nature of the project, the administrator can submit the project to the "Comité d'évaluation" (COMEV). This Committee is composed of representatives from the Cree Regional Authority, the Québec government, and the Canadian government. After having studied the project presented by the developer, the Comité d'évaluation makes recommendations to the administrator about the necessity to submit

the project to the evaluation and examination procedure. This Committee can also recommend that the developer conducts additional impact studies by emphasising the environmental repercussions. If a project is then submitted to the evaluation and examination procedure, other committees will be set up. Depending on whether the project is a concern of federal or provincial jurisdictions, two different committees may be formed: the "Comité provincial d'examen" (COMEX) and the "Comité fédéral d'examen au Sud du 55^e parallèle" (COFEX-SUD). They are composed of representatives from the governments and the Cree Regional Authority. Those committees have to submit a report to the administrator with recommendations about the realisation of the project. Both the evaluation committee and the examination committees can held public audiences. The procedure is slightly the same in regard to the Inuit territory. It is still a two-step procedure which is applied. There are, however, some differences in the functioning of the committees.

¹⁴⁷. Billy DIAMOND quoted in Roger LACASSE, *op. cit.*, p. 217.

¹⁴⁸. See Philip AWASHISH, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

¹⁴⁹. Those objectives reflected what John Ciaccia called the philosophy of the Agreement. This philosophy was explained the first time by Ciaccia before the Commission parlementaire Des Richesses naturelles et des Terres et Forêts. That commission was convoked by the Québec government at the beginning of November 1975 in order to discuss the final agreement and to make recommendations about its acceptance. That process appeared to be more a masquerade than a democratic exercise. The Opposition did not have a copy of the agreement and the groups opposed to this latter were not allowed to participate. Cf. Roger LACASSE, *op. cit.*, pp. 212-213.

¹⁵⁰. John CIACCIA, "Bientôt une Convention qui fera époque dans l'histoire de l'Amérique du Nord", *Le Devoir*, 7 novembre 1975, p. 5.

¹⁵¹. Cf. Jane JENSON, "Representation in Crisis: The Roots of Canada's Permeable Fordism", *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, vol. 22, no 2, 1990, pp. 653-683.

¹⁵². Harvey A. FEIT, "Negotiating Recognition of Aboriginal Rights", *op. cit.*, p. 168.

¹⁵³. Ignatius LA RUSIC, Serge BOUCHARD, Alan PENN, et al, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

CHAPTER 4. THE NEW CHALLENGES OF ECOLOGY GROUPS: THE BROADENING OF THE POLITICAL AGENDA

The controversies raised by the first phase of the James Bay project involved one other major actor that would assume an increasing importance through the subsequent years. While supporting Aboriginal claims, environmentalist groups added new dimensions to the debate which had been ignored or simply put aside by the Québec government and Hydro-Québec. They proposed a different reading of the James Bay project which highlighted other economic, bio-physical and social implications. The opposition of the environmentalist groups confronted the project's proponents with the need to justify the project. It revealed a political dimension which had hitherto been hidden. Their entrance in the debate reflected a transformation of the Québec political scene. Their participation testified to a different dynamic from that which shaped the "Quiet Revolution". This indicated the emergence of a critical appraisal of that objective of "modernising" Québec society which constituted the leitmotiv of the 1960s. This furthered a redrawing of Québec identity politics in which the dominance of the nationalist discourse was called into question. The emergence of this "new" social movement revealed, as we will see, a transformation of Québec civil society which, this time, was not fuelled by the state: their emergence reflected structural political and cultural changes shaping Western societies. It was the beginning of a period of turmoil which brought in a redefinition of the political setting of Western societies, including Québec.

In this chapter, we relate the story of the participation of environmentalist and ecology groups in the debates on the James Bay project. We pay attention to the political and spatial implications of their mobilisation. By discussing their role, we will illustrate another process of jumping scales which overlapped with the one engaged by Aboriginal peoples. Their mobilisation constituted an attempt to transpose their struggles around this regional issue to the national level and to be recognised by the Québec government as a national actor. Even though their actions confirmed the primacy of national political space, we will argue that the struggles of environmentalist groups implied the politicisation of a non-statist and disembedded representation of national politics. Besides the discussion of this broad

argument, this chapter also aimed to respond to three additional objectives linked to our story. The first objective is to retrace the history of their mobilisation by presenting their claims and strategies of mobilisation. We will examine the bases of their alliances with Aboriginal peoples and at the same time, the specific issues and challenges raised by them. The second objective is to discuss the impact of their mobilisation on the political framework resulting from the Quiet Revolution. We will examine how the environmentalist groups opened new citizenship spaces, and at the same time, contributed to a reconfiguration of the spatiality of Québec politics. The last objective is to draw a picture of the main dimensions of environmental politics at the Québec, Canadian and international levels. In doing so, we will present the agenda which shaped the struggles around the James Bay development. The description of this context will allow us later to highlight subsequently the continuities and ruptures with the struggles against the Great Whale project.

Our discussion of the mobilisation of environmentalist groups is divided in three parts. In the first part, we will present the historical and political context which framed this mobilisation. The description of the changes which occurred at the international and national levels will allow us to explain how these groups gained some legitimacy. We will pay more attention to the impact of the 1972 Stockholm conference which set a common environmental agenda for humankind. Furthermore, we will look at the constitution of a realm of activities by the NGOs and INGOs, entailing breaches in state sovereignty. The formation and the role of the Comité pour la défense de la baie James will be taken up in the second section of this chapter. Although other Canadian and Québec groups were involved in the debates, the Comité was the most visible and important actor. We will look more specifically at its claims and its strategies of mobilisation. Finally, we will discuss in the last part of this chapter the political implications springing from the involvement of the Comité. We will see how this ad hoc coalition opened up new spaces within the public sphere and challenged the division between the state and the civil society. This opposition to the project raised issues which go beyond the project's economic and environmental dimensions. It revealed a redefinition of Québec national space questioning the predominant statist and territorial framework.

4.1 The Emergence of International Environmental Politics: From the Local to the International and vice versa

In the preceding chapter, we noted that the launching of the James Bay project occurred in a period during which important political and cultural changes were taking place within Western societies. It was the beginning of a period of redefinition of the institutional and normative setting characterising their mode of governance. The growing contestation of state authority and as well as the public recognition of different crises in which Western societies would be embedded marked this period. The mobilisation of Aboriginal peoples nicely illustrated the importance of these changes. The emergence of the ecology movement which occurred at that time was equally significant. It raised important challenges to existing policies and institutions, foreshadowing important changes.¹ The appearance of this new actor was linked to the development of a growing awareness about the Western neglect of the environment during the 1960s. The increasing recognition of major environmental problems by scientists and by citizen groups, and subsequently by some governments, served to politicise environmental issues. The concerns about the destruction of the environment came to be interpreted as a crisis requiring the development of a public awareness and at the same time, urgent and major actions.² This suggested that different levels of action had to be used in order to reverse the situation. It confronted national states with their own neglect while questioning their ability to remedy to the situation. In this section we will discuss some dimensions of the politics of environment in Western societies which shaped the debates on the James Bay project. We will emphasise two of these. The first is the questioning of state sovereignty resulting from the discussions about the environmental crisis and the mobilisation of citizens and ecology groups. The second is the inclusion of environmental issues on the international political scene through the setting up of a supranational agenda by the 1972 Stockholm Conference and related conferences, and the establishment of some networks bypassing the national states.

The Conservationist Prelude

The origins of environmentalism can be traced back to the last half of the nineteenth century³. It is at that time that the protection of the environment began to be publicly discussed and gave rise to the mobilisation of groups within most of the Western countries. As the industrial revolution generated

massive pollution and damaged landscapes, awareness of nature grew. These discussions, claims and actions about environmental matters constituted different manifestations of what became a social movement having its bases in Western countries, especially the most industrialised. Although it is the precursor of the ecology movement of the 1960s, there are some important differences between them⁴. Indeed, the former movement was framed by a conservationist perspective. It aimed to solve the most obvious problems such as the protection of threatened species and the preservation of natural sites without calling into question the existing socio-political order. The conservation movement carried a fragmented conception of environmental problems; it generally sought to focus attention on specific issues without referring to a broader framework explaining their origins. The object of concern was the modern conception of nature which was legitimised and diffused by the development of natural sciences such as zoology, biology and botany. In contrast to the environmentalist perspective, this implies a perspective which established a demarcation between "men" and "nature".

Despite these political and ideological divergences between the two movements, the conservationist movement traced the path for the environmentalist movement. It introduced significant changes in Western politics which contributed to set environmentalist politics: The first impact of the conservationist movement was the development of groups and organisations struggling for the preservation of some natural areas or specific species. They were key in developing awareness of the necessity to preserve nature while presenting a different conception of the latter. Some international organisations, which are still part of environmental politics, were set up at that time. The mobilisation of conservationist groups revolved around three main issues.⁵ The first, and perhaps the most important, was the protection of birds, notably migratory birds, and more particularly, the ban of bird plumage trade. Important public campaigns aiming to create an awareness and to put pressure on governments to introduce legislation were organised throughout Europe and North America by a growing number of birds protection groups; some of them such as the National Audubon Society and the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) have acquired an expertise which is still recognised. The second issue was the protection of national historical sites or areas of natural significance. It was raised by some groups such as the Sierra Club (US) and the National Trust (UK) which are still important actors. The most visible

result of their mobilisation was the creation of natural reserves and parks by many Western governments. The preservation of the wildlife constituted the third issue which mobilised conservationist groups. Their concerns were not limited to the Western world and embraced also the "exotic wildlife living in the colonies".⁶

The second impact of the conservationist movement was the adoption of measures and policies by most of the Western governments. In adopting particular legislation and in signing international treaties, they created space for "nature" in the public sphere and gave it institutional and legal support. Moreover, this contributed to defining the preservation of nature as a national and international issue, and thus, part of two distinct political scenes. Indeed, at that time, most of the Western countries took conservation initiatives to protect, for example, forests, inland waters, or some forms of wildlife. These interventions did not, however, mean that states had become conservationists. They did not rest on a comprehensive view of the nature and did not aim to prevent future environmental problems. They had in fact different meanings. It is only some of them which appeared to be conservative measures. Economic factors and national interests were usually central to state involvement.⁷

Moreover, states pursued their conservation efforts at the international level through the signing of bilateral and multilateral agreements. These efforts mainly concerned the protection of migratory wildlife, the management of the marine resources and of the uses of international waters. Some of them became international conventions, and in some cases, bodies in charge of their implementation were established.⁸ These agreements opened the way to the development of international law and international diplomacy on environmental matters. Their impact was however rather limited.⁹ Very few were successful in introducing significant changes. Most of the time, the agreements resulted from long and arduous negotiations during which each state sought to defend its interests and consequently, to avoid making strong commitments. One of the main objectives was to clarify jurisdictional disputes and to affirm state sovereignty over contested resources, relegating conservation issues to a position of secondary importance. Although these treaties did not expressively restrain state sovereignty, they nonetheless suggested a redefinition of the notion of sovereignty. They were based in fact on the state's inability to resolve transboundary problems. As Caldwell suggests, states in practice began to merge their sovereignties.¹⁰ They could no

longer claim their exclusive sovereignty over their national resources in regard to some environmental issues. Furthermore, these agreements revealed a new articulation of the links between sovereignty, territory and the national political space. The definition of the state sovereignty in these agreements referred in this context to extra-territorial resources.

The last impact of the conservationist movement which shaped environmentalist debates in the 1960s was the organisation of international conferences, contributing to set the agenda and bypassing reluctant states. Conservation issues were taken to the international level through the conferences organised by national conservation groups and the scientific congresses held, among others, by botanical, ornithological and zoological societies. These private initiatives furthered the exchange of information between the diverse groups and societies' members and contributed to increase the awareness of conservation issues.¹¹ These international meetings at times constituted the basis for future international non-governmental organisations. Furthermore, they have established networks in which citizens and scientists participated.¹² These networks were an important factor in the expansion of the conservation movement to other countries. Moreover, it prepared the groundwork for the recent developments at the international level. It was through international conferences that the conservation movement maintained to a large extent its international ramifications during the interwar period and after.¹³ Such conferences also contributed to the reappearance of environmental issues on the Western governments' public agendas during the 1960s.

The Emergence of the Environmentalist Movement

The 1960s proved, in fact, to be a turning point for the nature conservation movement. Through the period, environmental problems became more extensively discussed not only by scientists or conservationists, but also by different citizen groups. The spread of environmental concerns in Western societies opened a space for the discussion of environment protection. A second wave of mobilisation occurred, giving rise to new groups and new claims. This led to the formation of the "environmentalist" movement. The conservation movement became more and more contested by new actors carrying different representations of the environment and different solutions for environmental problems. It is within

this context that the environmentalist movement was empowered and succeeded in imposing its own definition of environmental problems.¹⁴ In contrast to the conservationist perspective, the environmentalist perspective rests on a global or holistic understanding of environmental problems.¹⁵ Instead of nature, its analytical framework is based on the notion of the ecosystem and thus, includes humankind as one of its component. Environmentalism rests on the recognition of the notion of social environment in addition to the bio-physical component. In this perspective, environmental problems are explained as a result of the industrial and productivist model of development characterising Western societies which brought about the exhaustion of natural resources and pollution.

Another major element distinguishing the two perspectives is the type of solution advocated for resolving environmental problems. The environmentalist perspective has usually reclaimed cultural and economic reforms aiming to remedy urgent environmental problems or to prevent polluting practices. It urges for the fixation of limits to industrial development which is perceived as a dead end. Selective measures appear insufficient in this regard. Moreover, the focus on the quality of the environment suggests that the definition of what constitutes the environment and environmental problems are never fixed. They can always be contested, reflecting their variability in time and space. The rise of the ecology perspective involved a radicalisation of the environmentalist discourse. While rejecting the productivist development model, it also argued for the transformation of the consumerist way of life and for the democratisation of politics based on decentralisation and self-management.¹⁶ It thus calls into question the logic of capitalism. The ecology perspective, which can be seen as a variance of environmentalism, became predominant during the 1970s and especially with the growing visibility and impact of ecology groups and the establishment of Green parties later on. It was the ecology perspective which became the dominant representation in the universe of political discourse of Western societies. Given the heterogeneity of the environmentalist movement, however, the distinction between environmentalism and ecologism has never been clear-cut.

Like other contemporary social movements, the development of the ecology movement followed a double trajectory during the 1960s and 1970s. Their main locus has been the national political scene. It was around this political scale that their claims and struggles were elaborated. Other political spaces were

not excluded from their discourses. Yet, their empowerment resulted from their ability to be recognised as a national actor by states and then, to participate in national political debates. At the same time, the ecology movement has also been part of the international political scene. The establishment of a Western environmental agenda and the existence of transnational networks resting on the NGOs and international conferences related to environmental issues contributed to give to the international political scene a structuring role. While being determining in the construction of a Western ecology discourse, it came to represent an important locus in the legitimating of ecology claims. In the following pages, we will outline the political context having furthered the empowerment of the ecology movement and, of course, which also shaped the mobilisation of environmentalist and ecology groups against the La Grande project. We will focus on two major elements of this context which entailed important changes: 1) the recognition of an environmental crisis by national governments and groups and 2) the organisation of the UN Stockholm Conference in 1972. Both contributed to articulate ecology claims and struggles around these two political scales.

The Environmental Crisis in Western Societies

The prominence of environmentalist issues in Western societies largely resulted from the public recognition of an environmental crisis that threatened the survival of humankind. This came to constitute the predominant framework through which environmental problems were politicised during the 1960s. Two factors were particularly important in the spreading of the awareness of the environmental crisis. One was the publication of books and reports written by scientists that drew public attention to unresolved environmental problems. One of the best known of these was Rachel Carson's *The Silent Spring*, alerting citizens and public officials to the world environmental crisis.¹⁷ In pointing out the imminence of a catastrophe, such publications gave to environmental issues a sense of urgency and threat. These interpretations gave rise to important controversies about the causes and the nature of the environmental crisis which are still on-going. The demographic explosion, the economic growth or the use of non-disposable technologies were some factors which were debated.

It is the objective of ending the controversies that underlay the Club of Rome's studies which had major scientific and mostly political repercussions.¹⁸ The first of them, *The Limits to Growth*, which was released in 1972, became rapidly a popular success. It is from this study that emerged the concept of "zero economic growth" which shaped afterwards the discourses on environment during the 1970s. Its publication was particularly significant in the development of the environmentalist movement.¹⁹ The huge publicity it got greatly enforced the social and political importance of the environmental question in the Western world. It set the public agendas at that time. It had a major influence on the political discourses on environment. The argumentation developed by the Club of Rome's studies became used by governments and by environmentalist groups. Furthermore, these publications showed more than ever that the environmental crisis was international and every country was then concerned. They pose a fundamental challenge to governments which could not be easily ignored.

The impact of these publications was further enhanced by important environmental disasters which occurred during the 1960s in Europe as well as in America. For example, the running aground of a supertanker, the *Torrey Canyon*, which made an enormous oil spill in the English channel in 1967 or the blow-out in 1969 of an oil drilling platform off the Santa Barbara coast which severely damaged the California coastline. Both events made the headlines in the media and propelled the environmental issues in the foreground.²⁰ They constituted concrete examples which lent credibility to the environmental crisis thesis. They showed that everyone could be affected and even threatened by environmental problems. Furthermore, the discussions gave rise to a greater public attention to other environmental problems with less obvious repercussions.²¹ The different consequences of pollution not only in relation to landscapes, but also to human health, began to be under scrutiny. This furthered the public demands for a better environment protection and put pressure on the governments for new legislations.

The political recognition of the environmental crisis fixed some parameters to the debates. It imposed a framework which shaped the power relations between the actors involved in the debates. In this perspective, environmental problems were a priori seen as having world-wide repercussions that required immediate and comprehensive solutions. This specific representation rested on particular conceptions of the spatiality and the temporality of environmental problems. It located a specific spatio-

temporal setting which called into question the territorial and state-bounded division of the world, turning, therefore, the definition of time and space into a conflicting issue. Both became an important stake for defining the origins of the environmental crisis and for evaluating the different responses. Indeed, to discuss them in terms of crisis refers to the idea of a breakthrough which announces the end of a period. The future constitutes the predominant time-scale to evaluate the relevance and adequacy of corrective solutions. In this context, environmental problems hardly could be perceived as temporary and limited. This opened the door to the adoption of impact assessment review process by Western governments that confronted with the necessity of adopting a long-term perspective in regard to environmental problems. Moreover, the environmental crisis representation questioned the validity of the geopolitical vision of the world. The primacy given to the national state territory appeared irrelevant and inadequate, especially in regard to transboundary problems. It called for the establishment of some supranational decision-making process which would overcome the shortcomings of state policies.

The 1972 Stockholm Conference

The spread of concerns about the environmental crisis and the claims from ecology groups and citizens confronted governments with their inability to resolve adequately their environment problems within their own jurisdictions. By the end of the 1960s, the development of international co-operation was coming to be seen as necessary. The *United Nations Conference on the Human Environment* held in Stockholm in June 1972 constituted a turning point, marking the transition from international conservation efforts to international environmental politics.²² It revealed the prominent role which would be subsequently played by the international political scene in environmental politics. The Stockholm Conference confirmed the centrality of UN institutions while paving the path to the participation of developing countries in environmental debates. Their legitimate concerns about the impending constraints of environmental protection upon their development raised important challenges but these were largely ignored until the 1987 Brundtland Commission. The creation of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) whose programs came to be articulated around the notion of ecodevelopment during the 1970s reflected these new dimensions of international environmental politics.²³

Among the changes introduced by the Stockholm Conference, two of them are particularly relevant for our story. The first is the setting of a world environmental agenda which questioned the adequacy of the principle of state national sovereignty. The second change was the recognition and integration of NGOs in international environmental politics, furthering the transnationalisation of the ecology movement. The Stockholm Conference Declaration and action program set up an agenda which proposed a redefinition of environmental issues and a reversal of perspective on state accountability.²⁴ Conceiving environmental protection as a world-wide concern and an international responsibility for each state, it then challenged the existing geopolitical framework which subordinates the protection of environment to the defence of national interests. This questioning of state sovereignty also resulted from the displacement of normative bases of the environmental discourse out of state territory. The Conference's principles and recommendations provided norms and standards which could be afterwards implemented by governments at the national level or reclaimed by environmentalist groups against state inaction. In this respect, the Conference contributed to draw attention on pollution as the major environmental problem, and at the same time, introduced a broader and comprehensive understanding of the environment based on the interrelations between its social and its bio-physical dimensions.

The second change of the Stockholm conference was the legitimating of NGOs which came to constitute an actor in international environmental politics as well as significant than states. The setting up of the Environment Forum by the Swedish government during which the NGOs "unofficial" gatherings were held added new dimensions to the debates, and at the same time, challenged the dominant interstate framework.²⁵ By providing information feed-back to their media and their population, they widened the popular impact of the Conference and increased public awareness. The participation of NGOs was meaningful for two main reasons. First of all, it created a space for the participation of non-state actors in environmental politics, altering the Westphalian organisation of world polity. It opened the door to the development of transnational environmental politics overlapping with the interstate political scene, but not reducible to it. The Environment forum contributed to reinforcing the links among the environmental NGOs and to consolidating existing networks. It provided the opportunity to strengthen a common identity. It is from these discussions that the Environment Centre Liaison was established and

which aimed to facilitate communications and exchanges between environmental NGOs.²⁶ It was thus the prelude to the transnationalisation of the ecology movement which became noticeable during the 1980s.

The NGOs involvement also meant the diffusion of a more critical and somewhat radical environmentalist discourse having major economic and political implications. Some key issues raised by the ecology movement such as the dismissal of productivism and state bureaucracy were placed on the agenda. The industrial model of development was now identified as the main cause of the destruction of environment. In this perspective, environmental problems were linked to poverty and inequality, both having the same origins.²⁷ Moreover, the debates pointed out the limits to state interventions as way of addressing environmental issues such as the transboundary problems and called for the transcendence of the national sovereignty principle which would lead to the establishment of some forms of international jurisdictions on environmental matters.

During the Environment Forum, the James Bay project was discussed.²⁸ It was strongly criticised in the temporary newspaper, *Eco*, which was published during the Conference. The article pointed out that the situation of the Canadian government with respect to the protection of environment was not at all exemplary. They pointed out the lack of rigorous impact studies on the ecosystems of the James Bay basin. It mentioned, among other things, the flooding of territories inhabiting by 5 000 Indians and Inuit who were not informed and consulted prior to the undertaking of the project. This article was largely based on the position taken by Georges Manuel, a non-governmental observer with the Canadian delegation at the Conference. The National Indian Brotherhood had prepared a report entitled *Les populations indigènes du Canada et leur environnement*. This report constituted a very critical appraisal of the Canadian government interventions. It also called into question the relevance of the concept of national sovereignty which would be meaningless in regard to the cultural heterogeneity of Canadian society.

4.2 The Emergence of Environmental Politics at the National Level

The development of international environmental politics largely overlapped with the politicisation of environmental issues at the national level. It was at the end of the 1960s that the Western governments began to take environmental issues more seriously. Pressure from conservationist and environmentalist

groups at the national and international levels, as well as the growing concerns of citizens about an eventual environmental disaster echoed in the media, created strong incentives to state interventions.²⁹ The protection of the environment came to be seen as a legitimate field of intervention. The earlier conservationist policies were no longer perceived by the governments as adequate. This opened the door to the adoption of more comprehensive and effective legislation. Various states enacted new and comprehensive legislations to protect environment. During the 1970s, the struggle against pollution would constitute the major objective of the legislation. The USA became a leader in adopting the *National Environmental Policy Act* (NEPA) in 1969. This was the first law enacted in the Western world that established a process of environmental assessment for development projects, legislation and major programs. A number of governments established specific departments or ministries dealing with environmental matters. These developments contributed to the institutionalisation of the environmental debates on a national basis.

These changes had an impact on the Canadian and Quebec political scenes. At the beginning of the 1970s, the Canadian and Quebec states began to assume a greater role in the protection of environment. Each developed a new field of intervention and created a space for environmental issues within the public sphere. During the first years, the Canadian government undertook important initiatives at the domestic level as well as at the international level. It emerged as an international leader on environmental matters. The role it played at the Stockholm Conference greatly contributed to its reputation.³⁰ The domestic involvement of the Canadian government was marked by two key events: the establishment of the Department of Environment in 1971 and the establishment of the Environmental Assessment and Review Process (EARP) in 1973. Both suggested that the protection of environment was a priority on the government agenda. Indeed, the creation of the department was followed by the adoption or the consolidation of legislation that largely revolved around air and water pollution.³¹ Moreover, the adoption of the assessment process represented an important step at that moment whereas many mega-projects had been launched without considering environmental impacts.³² Therefore, the rise of controversies around the La Grande project occurred at the time that the federal government began to be more active in the protection of environment.

It appeared very soon, however, that the expected results did not come, revealing important deficiencies in the federal interventions on environmental matters.³³ The Department of Environment was confronted with internal divisions and a weak statutory capacity. Moreover, the environmental legislations were rather piecemeal and more reactive than anticipatory. The same disillusion happened in regard to the EARP. The lack of a clear mandate, and of sufficient financial and staff resources contributed to weaken its authority and efficiency which meant it could easily be bypassed. The assessment process was strongly criticised by environmentalist groups for the exclusion of citizens from the process. It was only at the end of the 1980s that the federal government undertook important reforms to increase the efficiency of its interventions, suggesting its intention to pay more attention to environmental problems. The adoption of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA) in 1988 was in this respect an important step.

4.3 The Environmental Challenges in Québec Politics

These institutional developments on the Canadian political scene also had been noticeable on the Québec political scene. However, from the beginning there emerged some slightly differences in the trajectory followed by the Québec government. In this section, we will examine some important changes which shaped Québec environmental politics. We will look at the development of state intervention and the mobilisation of environmentalist and ecology groups in highlighting the way both were influenced by the debates occurring at the national and international levels. The period covered by this discussion goes well beyond the period of the debates around the La Grande project. In fact, the mobilisation of environmentalist groups against the latter was the prelude to the subsequent important changes occurring at the end of the 1970s. It was thus that the Québec government introduced important reforms to the environmental policy and the struggles of the ecology movement intensified. The political setting created then came to form part the political framework of the debates around the Great Whale project.

The Incremental Involvement of the Québec Government

In 1970, the Bourassa government designated a Minister of Environment who was also the Minister of Municipal Affairs (Affaires municipales) without creating, however, a distinct department; it was

only in 1979 that the Parti Québécois created a Québec Department of Environment. The new minister got the mandate to propose legislative measures, regulations and norms aiming both to better co-ordinate and to increase the efficiency of governmental initiatives in regard to the struggles against pollution and the environmental conservation.³⁴ In March 1971, the Québec government set up the Environmental Protection Services ("Services de protection de l'environnement"). This new agency was to be the governmental watchdog on environmental matters.³⁵ In December 1972, the Bourassa government adopted the Environment Quality Act. This blueprint law ("loi-cadre") still constitutes the main Québec legislation on environmental matters. It framed the definition of environmental issues by attributing to them particular meanings. The Environment Quality Act introduced into the Québec political discourse a broader understanding of the environment, reflecting the spreading of environmentalism in Western societies. The definition of environment specified in the bill referred to the interrelations between the living species and their ambient milieu. Social environment was thus recognised as a political issue. Even if it was not clearly mentioned, this conception relied on the notion of "biosphere" thus being discussed at that time at the international level.

The Québec Environment Quality Act designated three main actors in the protection of environment: the Minister of Environment, the Environmental Protection Services³⁶, and the Advisory Council on Environment. ("Conseil consultatif de l'environnement") The mandate of the new agency included three main activities: to provide advice and recommendations to the Minister regarding the bill provisions; to undertake studies on any environmental issues; and to receive and to hear requests and complaints from individuals and groups in relation to the different bill provisions. It was expected that the Council would provide the scientific and political expertise on environmental matters.³⁷ But, the Advisory Council on the Environment opened the door to the democratisation of environmental policy by establishing a channel for the participation of citizens in the definition of environmental issues.³⁸ Public participation occurs through the Council's departments of research and hearings. It has developed links with scientists, environmentalist and conservationist groups, and representatives of different sectors such as consumers and industrials, concerned with environmental questions. This did not imply that the citizens participate in the evaluation of environmental problems. They can draw attention on specific issues, but it

is still the government which sets the agenda, and the latter's effectiveness is linked to the political will of the Minister and to its ability to influence the Cabinet.

Although the adoption of the Environment Quality Act was a turning point in Québec environmental politics, suggesting a major reorientation in governmental policies, it rapidly became obvious that the Bourassa government was not willing to enforce it.³⁹ It opposed environmental protection to economic development, privileging the latter. The election of the Parti Québécois in 1976 represented a shift with the adoption of a new environmental policy. A ministerial delegate was designated. The new Minister strongly affirmed that he wanted to increase the political importance and the effectiveness of the Department and to imply all citizens in the protection of environment. He insisted on the necessity of applying the existing rules while developing others that were more adequate.⁴⁰ The new Minister showed a determination which was welcomed by the groups, the Department's officials and by large sectors of the population.

In 1978, important amendments to the Environment Quality Act were brought in. Two of them were particularly meaningful and suggested a deeper governmental involvement in environmental protection. They paved the way for the democratisation of environmental politics and broadened the space of ecology groups. Both affirmed the national dimension of environmental policy. The first change was the establishment of an environmental impact assessment procedure for development projects. This procedure involves the holding of public hearings during which any person, group or municipality can reclaim the modification or the withdrawal of the project.⁴¹ It created a space for the participation of citizens in the evaluation of development projects. The "Bureau d'audiences publiques sur l'environnement" (BAPE) which was set up at that time provides the institutional framework to this public participation. In addition to the holding of public hearings, the "Bureau" conducts inquiries on any question relating to the quality of environment submitted by the Minister and sends back to the latter a report including its analyses and its findings.⁴²

The second change was the recognition of environmental rights. It was enacted that every person has a right to a healthy environment and to the protection of the living species inhabiting it; this allows the

granting of an injunction if a violation of this right is committed. This recognition has meant a greater codification of environment insofar as it has led to the adoption of new state rules and to the development of a jurisprudence. Even if this environmental right was granted to individuals and not to groups, its effectiveness has remained dependent on state interventions.⁴³ Some links can be traced back to the Stockholm Declaration on Environment which had an influence on the subsequent recognition of environmental rights by Western governments. The Declaration clearly associated the protection of environment with human rights.⁴⁴

The environmental right recognised by the Québec government was somewhat ambiguous. It is difficult to clearly identify what is the "subject" of this right. It can not be considered as a liberal individualistic right. Even if it was defined as such, its implications are social. Environmental protection aims a priori at the ambient milieu which is perceived as a requirement for the preservation of the person's integrity. The environmental right constitutes in this regard a new type of social rights. It is granted to a "situated" individual by referring to particular social and bio-physical conditions. To some extent, the role attributed to the state is similar to the role played by the welfare state. There is the idea of protection against risks which underlies its effectiveness.⁴⁵

The introduction of these changes in 1978 opened the door to a redefinition of Québec citizenship. This redefinition occurred in two different but nonetheless complementary ways. On the one hand, the recognition of environmental rights implies the entitlement of new claims which modify the relations between the state and citizenry. This revealed the empowerment of a new representation of the citizen by which he or she can make claims. It was not necessarily the environmentalist citizen who was entitled, but rather the citizen located in its environment or its milieu. On the other hand, the redefinition of citizenship came from the enlargement of political participation within the environmental impact assessment procedure. This has furthered the acknowledgement of new bases on which citizens can make claims. It opened the door to the participation of environmentalists and ecology groups in the process of definition of environmental issues. Moreover, this participation was also opened to groups and not only to individuals. This forwarded the inclusion of the environmentalist/ecology identity in Québec identity politics and within the state structure. The criteria used to allow this participation tends to define a

representation of the environmentalist/ecology groups in allowing some particular claims and some specific forms of participation. They were subsequently contested by environmentalists which found them too restrictive.

The Recognition of the Québec Ecology Movement as a National Actor

It thus appeared that the Québec government during the 1970s reinforced the institutional bases of its environmental policy. The place of environmental issues on the governmental agenda was consolidated, especially after the election of the Parti Québécois. Without being a top priority, the protection of environment came to be recognised as a national concern and could not be neglected easily. Its reforms widened the space for the environmentalist and ecology groups' claims. At the same time, their struggles also contributed to the institutional strengthening of Québec environmental policy. The two histories are very similar since both were marked by some periods of important changes followed by periods of tranquillity and even setback. A brief overview of the history of the Québec ecology movement since the end the 1960s until the mid-1980s reveals two important phases: the beginning of the 1970s (1969-1974) and the beginning of the 1980s (1977-1982).⁴⁶ It was marked by periods of visibility followed by periods of latency. In the following pages, we will briefly discuss each of these periods. While the first phase embraced the struggles against the La Grande project, the second phase was nonetheless important since some of the characteristics of the ecology movement which shaped their struggles against the Great Whale project emerged at that time. Each phase reflected the predominance of particular discourses and strategies of mobilisation. Furthermore, we will pay attention to the energy issue which has constituted to some extent the link between the two phases. It has been one central issue on the ecology movement agenda since the beginning of the 1970s.

Although these two phases reflected distinct configurations of the Québec ecology movement, it is possible to outline some broad trends which framed the two periods. Three of them are particularly relevant for our story: the empowerment of ecologism, the consolidation of their struggles at the national level and the redefinition of Québec territoriality. The mobilisation of the ecology movement throughout this time revealed the predominance of the ecologism over the other environmental orientations. It

became the main representation of environmental issues in the Québec universe of political discourse. Although the claims raised by groups were more conservationist or environmentalist, they came to be perceived as ecologist. The empowerment of the ecology movement implied the greening of Québec politics. The protection of environment was increasingly integrated to everyday life and to Québec universe of political discourse. It became used as a criteria for defining state accountability.

Furthermore, the empowerment of the ecology movement reflected and, at the same time, contributed to the launching of a process of jumping scales. The diverse struggles around, for example, the development of recycling facilities, the development of measures against water and air pollution or the adoption of alternative sources of energy, revealed the will to be recognised as a national actor. The national political scene was prioritised although struggles were carried at the municipal or regional levels. This then involved the rescaling of ecology movement' discourse and struggles around the national political scene. Of course, the national definition of ecology struggles did not necessarily have a territorial basis corresponding to the Québec territory. They often involved the redefinition of a region-based issue into a national one which would concern all Québec citizens. We will see that the James Bay issue is a good example of this dimension.

The last trend that is closely related to the preceding is the politicisation of a new reading of the Québec territory which contributed to weaken the hegemony of the nationalist reading. The emphasis is out on the bio-physical aspect and on the interdependence. Instead of being represented as a "homeland" delimited by state boundaries, the ecology discourse brought in a conception of territory in terms of a non-bounded ecosystem. Although they are not a priori antithetical, they were as such in the Québec context. The ecology discourse suggested a reappraisal of some key elements of the nationalist discourse which were seen as harmful to environment. It called into question the existing economic representation, and at the same time, the role of the state regarding the management of the Québec territory. Another point of friction between the ecology and the nationalist discourse was the reference to other political spaces, involving the relativisation of the national. The local or the international space constitutes different angles posed on the Québec territory which appeared as relevant as the national.

The Emergence of Environmentalism

The Québec ecology movement followed a trajectory that was similar to those of other Western societies.⁴⁷ During the 1960s, the conservationist groups experienced a revitalisation while environmentalist groups were formed.⁴⁸ This involved a greater politicisation of environmental issues since most of the groups that emerged from the moment, carried out a wider and more critical understanding of the environmental problems.⁴⁹ What appeared at the time, and which remains over the years a predominant characteristic of the Québec ecology movement, was its great heterogeneity in regard to its formation and its agenda. Many environmentalist groups were oriented towards one particular issue at the local level whereas others had a larger membership and raised issues having regional or national implications. Often confronted with a lack of financial resources, many of them, and especially the local groups, disappeared shortly after having raised their issue. Another important characteristic of the ecology movement was the participation of citizens committees. In referring to their citizen status, many people became involved in the struggles against pollution. This followed from the earlier development of citizen committees at the municipal level which reclaimed, for example, specific policies on housing or health.

During this first period, in spite of its fragmentation and diversity, the ecology movement struggles came within the national political space. This occurred in two complementary ways. Important groups which have subsequently become significant national actors were formed at that time. Among them, we should mention the *Société pour vaincre la pollution* (SVP), the *Society to Overcome Pollution* (STOP) and the *Conseil québécois pour l'environnement* (CQE).⁵⁰ Furthermore, the *Centre d'information sur la pollution de l'environnement* published the first and the last issue of *Ecologie-Québec* which contributed nonetheless to shape the subsequent environmental debates. The first initiatives to establish an umbrella organisation gathering environmentalist and ecology groups were also taken then. The first attempt occurred in 1974 with the formation of the *Regroupement québécois pour l'environnement*. The launching of this ad hoc committee was decided during the Week of Environnement ("Semaine de l'environnement"). The Regroupement became rapidly confronted with the great diversity of interests, and consequently, with the extreme difficulty to elaborate a platform. This gathering did not succeed to overcome its internal

divisions. In 1976, there was a second attempt to relaunch the latter during what was called the General Estates on Environment ("Les états généraux de l'environnement"). Many groups attended this meeting. Again, the extreme diversity of interests and political objectives constituted insurmountable obstacles.⁵¹

This variability also characterised the agenda of the Québec ecology movement during this first period. Although environmentalism was the predominant political discourse shaping the ecology movement, other discourses emerged at the time. Ecologism began to be raised by some groups such as *Les Amis de la Terre de Québec*.⁵² The reforms of economic and political institutions and the adoption of new environmental regulations were seen as insufficient. The main solution to environmental problems presented by this trend is the establishment of an alternative society or an ecosociety which would be more egalitarian, democratic and self-sufficient while having equal relations with developing countries. The politics appears as the determining arena. The diffusion of the ecologist discourse contributed to publicise progressive issues in Québec politics such as the North/South gap and the participatory democracy while proposing a critical and outward reading of the Québec environment situation. It thus suggested a radicalisation of the Québec ecology movement. Furthermore, there also appeared an important counter-cultural trend having a communitarian ("communautaire") orientation. This embraces different groups such as the *Mouvement pour l'agriculture biologique et le Monde à bicyclette* which aims to develop an alternative way of life which will be compatible with environmental protection. The development of biological agriculture and the setting up of a network of co-operatives of natural food were some issues which have been raised by this trend.⁵³

The Québec ecology movement appeared thus very fragmented in regard to its political orientations and its organisational basis. The same evaluation could be made about its agenda. However, some issues were nonetheless predominant even if they were interpreted differently by the diverse groups. From 1971, the attention of most of the environmentalist groups was drawn on the different types of water and air pollution, the protection of St-Lawrence river, and the development of public transport. Criticisms of the consumer society started to be increasingly discussed in the discourse of many groups. The "oil crisis" in 1973 put at the forefront the energy issue and the issue of scarcity of food resources. In

1975, the issue of nuclear energy became another major concern of the ecology movement. The latter and more generally, the energy issue came to be important stakes on its agenda during the second phase.

The Rescaling of the Ecology Struggles Through the Energy Issue

The second phase of mobilisation of the ecology movement was marked by the greater mobilisation of the ecology movement at the national level. This revealed the predominance of ecologism in the Québec ecology movement's discourse, and implicitly, its greater politicisation. Even if the socio-cultural sphere remained privileged by many groups, the political scene acquired a greater importance. It came to be perceived as decisive for the implementation of the ecology movement's agenda and especially for the establishment of an ecosociety. This rescaling was shaped by three important issues: the renewed effort to establish a representative national organisation; the predominance of the energy issue on the agenda; and the consolidation of the links with other social movements. All were key dimensions of the process of jumping scales launched by the Québec ecology movement.

Despite the two failures, the project of creating a national umbrella organisation did not disappear. In 1978, a new attempt was launched this time through the development of an anti-nuclear movement which resulted from the interaction of the ecology movement and the peace movement.⁵⁴ The starting point was the creation of the *Front commun anti-nucléaire* (FCAN) in September 1977.⁵⁵ Important events occurring at that time contributed to launch a public debate on the nuclear energy. The main trigger of the development of an anti-nuclear opposition was Hydro-Québec's plan to build 35 nuclear power plants. Different national and international events which occurred during the preceding year such as the Harrisburg accident raised suspicion in the population about the profitability and the reliability of nuclear energy. In February 1977, many ecology groups presented briefs to the Québec parliamentary commission on natural resources and reclaimed a moratorium. The results of this commission were, however, perceived by the most radical groups as insufficient. After successive meetings, the *Front commun anti-nucléaire* was launched simultaneously in three towns (Montréal, Alma and Trois-Rivières). This coalition gathered national groups (STOP, SVP, le Monde à bicyclette, Sauvons Montréal, Contact-

Conservation, etc.) and many local groups such as the *Librairie coopérative d'Alma*, les comités de protection de l'environnement de Grondines et de Sainte-Croix, etc.

During a subsequent meeting, it was decided to launch a process that would lead to the creation of a permanent anti-nuclear coalition in Québec and to the establishment of a new, more militant and more flexible, Québec ecological organisation. The first step in this process occurred in February 1978 when the *Alliance Tournesol*, an anti-nuclear and ecological organisation, was established. The *Alliance* rapidly became the basis of the anti-nuclear opposition in Québec.⁵⁶ In June 1978, the whole process was completed during an important meeting gathering more than 180 groups. A new decentralised organisation was effectively created at this occasion. The *Regroupement écologique québécois* was organised on a national/regional basis with autonomous local groups.⁵⁷ This representative political structure aimed to facilitate the implementation of an ecosociety. While diffusing the ecology criticisms and claims, it had to maintain links between its local groups and to co-ordinate broader strategies of mobilisation. The local groups were nonetheless seen as the most determining actors. The establishment of this organisation did not, however, eliminate the existing tensions between the groups privileging socio-political orientations and the others which were less radical. The unity remained fragile. The *Regroupement écologique québécois* did not have a long political existence. Many important groups stood aloof from the *Regroupement* as late as 1980. Although this was presented as an official split, this contributed nonetheless to decrease the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the *Regroupement*.

The establishment of this national ecologist structure was supported by the release of the Ecologist Manifesto ("Le Manifeste écologiste") during the fall of 1978. It represented a platform which attenuated the fragmentation of the ecology movement by identifying some core issues. The Manifesto was generally welcomed by the environmentalist and ecology militants. As the *Regroupement écologique québécois*, it thus sought to create a space for the ecology movement on the national political scene besides the other political actors. The publication of the Manifesto gave to the ecology movement the opportunity to take a clear stand on the main Québec political and economical problems. Its main objective was to propose an alternative project of society with concrete and immediate practices which would forward the local and regional autonomy. By outlining the great characteristics of a future

ecosociety, the Manifesto illustrated that ecology claims were not limited to the protection of environment.⁵⁸ The agenda raised in the Manifesto was not limited to Québec environmental problems. References were also made to the world agenda set up since the Stockholm Conference.

The Manifesto revealed how the mobilisation of the Québec ecology movement was embedded in different political spaces. While giving priority to the regional and the local to implement an ecological way of life, it pointed out the importance of the national and the planetary levels in the development of an ecosociety.⁵⁹ The insistence on the local action was not only justified for the experimentation of "alternatives". It was also seen as the best way for the free diffusion of information which would help to the implementation of a participatory and egalitarian society. The local action constituted the best rampart against state repression. A particular attention also was paid to the international or planetary level. This was linked to the Third World stance adopted in the Manifesto and to the transboundary nature of some environmental problems. It was pointed out that the advent of an egalitarian and participatory ecosociety implied the end of the exploitation of the poor nations by the rich nations. Moreover, the spatial implications of the ecosociety did not only include a rearticulation of the interrelations between the local, the national and the international. The Manifesto underlined the importance of taking into consideration the biosphere and therefore, to adopt a global and perspective on environmental problems.

The national mobilisation of the ecology movement was concretised around the energy issue. Although the attempt to develop an institutional basis at the national level soon failed, the energy issue represented a more promising avenue by which the ecology movement gained a legitimacy on the Québec political scene. This issue allowed them to push further their process of jumping scales. The formation of a large ad hoc coalition called the *Front commun pour un débat public sur l'énergie* was on this score a determining trigger.⁶⁰ It followed from the previous debates raised by the anti-nuclear movement and especially from the mobilisation of *Alliance Tournesol*. This vast coalition gathered at that time more than 80 groups and associations coming from different political horizons (ecology and anti-nuclear groups, labour unions, women groups, associations for the defence of consumers, student associations, scientists, citizen committees, etc.). Its main objectives were to set up a public debate on the energy policy and to democratise the decision-making process. During the 1980s, this ad hoc coalition went from periods of

latency during which some changes occurred to periods of visibility. It became one major actor challenging the governmental and Hydro-Québec discourses and especially in the debates around the Great Whale project.

The last meaningful characteristic of this second phase of the mobilisation of the ecology movement was the reinforcement of the links with other social movements. This contributed to widen the existing issues-based networks linking the ecology groups. The above discussions revealed the strength of the links which were formed with the peace and anti-nuclear movements. The ecology movement started to develop some common strategies with the labour movement. Economic problems such as unemployment and occupational diseases became increasingly discussed by ecology groups and were used to justify the development of an ecosociety. There also emerged an eco-feminism through the inclusion of women groups within the anti-nuclear and ecology movements.⁶¹ These groups sought to develop some alternatives to modify the life conditions of women. The last important orientation was the rapprochement with organisations working in international development. The Ecologist Manifesto revealed the importance that was given to the situation of the Third World countries. The reference to international politics was not limited to the environmentalist and ecologist claims. Some links were established with groups in other countries. The struggles were no longer limited to the Québec political scene. We should add that the rapprochement with other social movements also resulted from the inclusion of ecology concerns on their agenda. This contributed to diffuse ecology claims without the support of specific alliances.

4.4 The Involvement of the James Bay Committee

Throughout the 1970s, the ecology movement gained a greater visibility and legitimacy. The increase of public awareness and the adoption of environmental policies by Western governments broadened the space for their claims. The development of international environmental politics was also important to consolidate their political representation. When the James Bay project was launched, most of these changes were emerging. The James Bay project was announced at the same moment that the Bourassa government started to elaborate administrative and legislative tools for protecting the

environment. In this section, we will describe the mobilisation of the ecology movement against the James Bay project. Although their attempt to prevent the construction of this hydro-electric complex failed, their struggles were not meaningless. Environmental concerns were afterwards integrated into Hydro-Québec's discourse and even a direction relative to environmental protection was eventually established. In this section, we will describe the main dimensions of the mobilisation of the ecology movement which largely contributed to this shift. Attention will be paid to its claims and criticisms of the project and its strategies of mobilisation. In doing so, we will examine the rescaling of the James Bay project to which the ecology struggles contributed. This involved the passage from a local environmental issue to national one with international ramifications.

The Formation of the Comité pour la défense de la Baie James/James Bay Committee

It was in January 1972 that an opposition to the project coming from the Québec society and abroad was emerging. From that moment, the debates were no longer restricted to an opposition between Québec people and the "Indians". The first step of the ecology mobilisation was a meeting on the James Bay project organised at McGill University by some environmentalist, ecology and peace groups: the *Centre d'information sur la pollution et l'environnement*, the *Citizens for social responsibility of science*, the *Fédération québécoise de la faune*, la *Voix des femmes*, the *Sierra Club* (Atlantic Chapter), la *Société pour vaincre la pollution* (SVP), and the *Society to Overcome the Pollution* (STOP). This meeting gathered citizens, militants and independent scientists and other experts to discuss the ecological, legal, political, economic and social aspects of the James Bay project.⁶² As a result of these discussions, a campaign of opposition to the development project was launched. Two main objectives were established. First, they demanded a complete halt of the works until the relevance and the profitability of the project were debated and clearly proven. Most of the people who attended the meeting concluded that neither the Québec government nor the James Bay Development Corporation had demonstrated the economic profitability as well as the social relevance of the project. The lack of preliminary discussions and impact studies and, more broadly, the governmental haste, were strongly denounced. The second conclusion was to call for the establishment of a public and independent inquiry on the project. A permanent committee was created in this respect to achieve this, the *James Bay Committee/ Comité pour la défense de la baie James*,

whose mandate was to bring pressure to launch such inquiry and to create a public and democratic debate. The main focus of the committee became public education, to increase awareness and to bring pressures to bear on political authorities.⁶³

The *James Bay Committee* was formally established on February 8, 1972, by various groups and organisations: *Fédération québécoise de la faune*, *Indians of Quebec Association*, *Montréal Field Naturalist Club*, *Quebec Metis and non-Status Indians Association*, *Sierra Club (Atlantic Chapter)*, *Société pour vaincre la pollution (SVP)*, *Society to Overcome Pollution (STOP)*, *Survivre et Vivre*, *Terra Nova*, *Voice of Women*.⁶⁴ These groups were the first to officially support the activities of the James Bay Committee. In 1973, other groups and organisations joined the coalition: *Canadian Arctic Ressources Committee (C.A.R.C.)*, *Canadian Nature Federation*, *Canadian Wildlife Federation*, *Dam the Dams Campaign*, *Greater Montreal Anti-Poverty Coordinating Committee (G.M.A.P.C.C.)*, *Green Spaces*, *La Ligue Anti-Chômage (Anti-Unemployment League)*, *National Indian Brotherhood (NIB)*, *Pollution Probe* (at the University of Toronto).

The James Bay Committee constituted a very heterogeneous coalition, bringing together scientists, environmentalists, ecologists, Aboriginal people and feminists. The addition of new groups did not modify the characteristics and orientations of the Committee, revealing that it was strongly linked to various but progressive critical social movements. The formation of the James Bay Committee rested on the redrawing of the boundaries of Québec politics. The involvement of Canadian groups opened the door to the deterritorialisation of Québec national issues. They transposed outside Québec borders what was largely defined by the project's proponents as a territorial issue concerning Québécois. It called into question the nationalist appeal used by the Québec government for legitimising the James Bay project and at the same time, the closure of the Québec political scene. Furthermore, the mobilisation of the James Bay Committee was linked to the politicisation of new collective identities which came to represent new channels of political participation within the Québec public sphere. It reflected the appearance of new political actors raising issues which questioned the legacy of the Quiet Revolution. It was, however, the ecology movement which came to constitute the main collective identity representing the James Bay Committee and which gave it its cohesion. This predominance resulted to its historical role in the Québec

ecology movement. The Committee was an important platform furthering the development of links among the different Québec environmentalist and ecology groups. The James Bay project was one of the first national issues which gave rise to the mobilisation of environmentalist groups from Québec and abroad.

One important characteristic of the James Bay Committee was the role given to citizenship in the construction of a common identity. The documents prepared by the James Bay Committee presented their mobilisation as citizens' action.⁶⁵ The participation of the different groups through the committee was defined as citizen claims and not a priori as representative of their own collective identities. Their objective of rising a public and democratic debate was justified in regard to their citizen status. It reflected the mobilisation of citizenship groups around new political issues. They did not, however, refer to specific citizenship rights which would be denied by the government, nor to the citizenship status defined by the Québec state or the Canadian state. They reclaimed the widening of the democratic process. Their actions concerned the widening of political participation in order to address new questions by political actors which had been excluded. They sought to enlarge its definition and its signification. In this way, they refer to the notion of popular sovereignty.

The James Bay Committee's Claims

Throughout the two following years, the James Bay Committee sought to give rise to a democratic debate on the James bay development. Its opposition was based on two main claims. Firstly, it demanded a complete and immediate halt to any development activities occurring in the North. Secondly, the Committee demanded the establishment of a public debate engaging Native peoples and Québec people about the rationale of the project and its social and economic implications.⁶⁶ It called for a comprehensive and public evaluation of the project, including adequate research and consultation before to proceed to its construction. This presupposed that the Québec government hold public hearings on all proposed aspects of the project and that all documents, reports, and technical information which were not yet released were made available to the public. The James Bay Committee argued that the governmental argumentation that would justify the project as well as the documents and studies which had been released did appear not

sufficiently convincing. Too many questions remained unanswered, revealing a flagrant lack of social, economic and environmental planning.

The James Bay Committee raised four particular issues which were not sufficiently addressed or merely ignored by the proponents of the James Bay project: 1) the protection of Aboriginal rights and of their traditional livelihood; 2) the project's legal implications and environmental impacts; 3) the comparison of hydro-electricity with other alternative sources of energy; and 4) the political and social implications of the productivist development model framing the James Bay project. They constituted the bases of its opposition and provided the justification for the establishment of a public debate. Whereas the two first issues overlapped with the Aboriginal peoples' claims, the two others reflected more specifically the environmentalist concerns of the James Bay Committee. Of course, these four issues are interrelated and were all linked to the productivist logic propelled by the Québec government. However, we will separately discuss each of these issues in pointing out the solutions proposed by the Committee and the implications for the debates.

From its formation, the James Bay Committee became an important ally of Aboriginal peoples. It is important to specify that the relations between were not perfectly harmonious between the Cree and the James Bay Committee. These relations deteriorated when the Cree started to negotiate the James Bay Agreement. It clearly revealed an important difference between them in terms of citizenship. The Cree struggles aimed not only the protection of their livelihood and their land, but also the recognition of their rights. Although the James Bay Committee supported their right claims, it did not have the same importance for them since most of its members were already citizens in contrast to Cree people.

The James Bay Committee perceived the James Bay project, and especially the beginning of the construction work, as a denial of Aboriginal rights on the one hand, and on the other, a threat to their traditional way of life and their culture. The lack of prior discussion with Aboriginal peoples as well as their exclusion from the decision-making process constituted important prejudices to Indian rights and notably to their right of self-determination. Being the first occupants of this territory, this would confer to Aboriginal peoples some territorial rights which confronted the Québec government with the necessity to reach prior

agreements For the Committee, the violations of Aboriginal rights had to a large extent begun with the refusal by the Québec government to assume its responsibilities. The floating legal ambiguity was seen as very threatening. The James Bay Committee pointed out in this respect the two provisions of Bill 50 which mentioned that the Corporation should protect the natural environment and prevent any form of pollution in the territory on the one hand, and on the other hand, recognise and respect the existing rights (hunting, fishing and territorial rights) of Indians inhabiting the region. Both provisions which seemed to limit the Corporation's prerogatives were not clearly specified, notably the sanctions which could be imposed.⁶⁷ This legal uncertainty came also from the 1912 Québec Boundaries Extension Act which appeared as determining as Bill 50. First of all, the extent of powers transferred to Québec by this Act and the constitutionality of this territorial transfer were not yet clearly specified.⁶⁸ Secondly, the Act imposed on the Québec government the obligation to recognise the rights of Indians inhabiting the region and to negotiate the surrender of such rights. Although these were not clarified, it conferred to Native peoples some territorial rights or propriety titles which could be claimed against the government.⁶⁹ Without the settlement of this highly contentious issue, the launching of the project involved a violation of the Indian rights.

The situation of the Native peoples was also discussed by the James Bay Committee through their examination of the social impacts of the James Bay project. The Committee denounced what appeared as a total ignorance of the Native peoples' way of life. They argued that the James Bay project entailed more than the destruction of hunting territories and that it would deeply transform and even devastate the Cree homeland which do not have some monetary value. This contradicted the Corporation public statement affirming that "the inhabitants of the region will be the first to benefit from the development".⁷⁰ What appeared particularly frightening and unforgivable for the James Bay Committee was that the most important impact of the James Bay project would be the destruction of the natural food resources on which the Native peoples depended for their livelihood.⁷¹ All animals used as food and as a source of cash income are related to the aquatic habitats.⁷² The project's proponents also totally ignored that the hunting and trapping way of life was part of their culture. Hence, the willing and planned destruction of the first could be rightly interpreted as a policy of cultural genocide. The James Bay project as it was conceived

and developed would be leading to "the destruction of the viable Cree culture, by people from outside the region, totally without consulting the Cree people, and completely against their wishes".⁷³ The flooding of some areas would not only destroy the habitats of the wildlife, but also some historical sites such as the cemeteries which are part of the Cree culture. It was by extrapolating the implications of the James Bay project that the James Bay Committee raised the spectrum of a cultural genocide.⁷⁴

It was essential for the Committee that Native peoples became involved in the decision-making process since they were the real experts on the area and they would be the ones who would be directly affected by the decisions. The development of the James Bay area should be done in accordance with the Native peoples' livelihood. The James Bay Committee claimed that the development of the region should allow the use of resources area for different purposes, especially hunting and trapping activities. It was seen by the Committee as an essential prerequisite for aboriginal traditional way of life which is the basis of their culture and still provides subsistence for an important part of the population.⁷⁵ Moreover, the Committee pointed out that Aboriginal peoples have practised since many generations ecologically-sound resource management despite the adoption of white men's technology.⁷⁶ Therefore, they could teach about principles of human ecology to white men and thus, provide insights for resolving the environmental crisis.

The James Bay Committee's claims carried a representation of Aboriginal Peoples differing from governmental representations which was at that time largely marginal. It was based upon their recognition as peoples who live beside the Québec people, with their own history, culture and institutions. They were not reduced to the status of an ethnic or cultural group within the Québec society. The obligation of the Québec government to start negotiations with them did not only spring from their legal rights, but also from their historical occupation of this territory. In contrast to the Bourassa government, the James Bay Committee did not define them on the tradition versus modernity continuum. They interpreted the James Bay controversy as a conflict on livelihood or in other words, an opposition between two societies. One particular aspect on their way of life which was emphasised by the James Bay Committee was the knowledge and respect of the nature and the lack of pollution problems. Their livelihood appeared, from an ecologist standpoint, as an ideal from which we could learn. This vision is very close to the

"Rousseauist" interpretation of the "good savage". It has subsequently acquired a political and symbolic weight in the struggles around the second phase of the James Bay hydroelectric development.

The second issue raised by the James Bay Committee was the environmental impact of the James Bay project. It constituted to some extent an extension of the preceding issue. They referred more to the bio-physical impacts of the project. For the Committee, the negative impacts of the project, which were more numerous and important than the positive impacts, were not discussed in the documentation released by its proponents. The James Bay Committee was very sceptical about the environmental impact assessment that had been done. They concluded that the Québec government and the JBDC had proceeded to a very superficial evaluation of the eventual environmental impacts.⁷⁷ Most of them seemed to have been underestimated or merely ignored. The Committee's concerns were based on the lack of detailed knowledge of the geology, the hydrology, and the ecology of the James Bay area. In this context, many questions raised by the project could not be satisfactorily answered. Moreover, they also referred to the recent projects of dams building in other provinces and countries.

The Committee drew attention to certain environmental impacts that needed more attention from the government and the JBDC. One of them was the inducing of earthquakes following from the strong correlation between major dam sites and seismic activity. The James Bay Committee referred to the minimal knowledge of the structural geology of the region and to the presence of fault zones in the north of the St-Lawrence Valley system. It mentioned that the construction of major dams in India and in Zambia in the recent years generated earthquakes whereas there had been no seismic activity in these areas before this.⁷⁸ Another environmental impact raised by the Committee was the climatic effects of the James Bay project. Insofar as the James Bay project implied the creation of huge reservoirs, the diversion of rivers, and the modification of the seasonal flow pattern of fresh water for power generation, the James Bay Committee expected climatic modifications which would have detrimental consequences on wildlife resources and Native peoples while evoking that it could also affect some Québec regions. It mentioned that climatic changes had been observed after the construction of dams in Siberia.⁷⁹ Among these impacts that were identified, there were the modification of the level of precipitation and the extension of winter periods for some Québec regions.⁸⁰

Besides these environmental aspects, the James Bay Committee drew attention to the ecological consequences of this project. It expected unforeseen detrimental consequences, or it what called "ecological backlashes", which would bring new problems and thus, require additional money to correct these new ones.⁸¹ The lack of well-documented studies on the effects of dams on ecological systems in Canadian sub-arctic prevented the Committee to predict exactly what would be the ecological effects of the James Bay development. The experiences of the Aswan Dam (Egypt), the Kariba Dam (Zambia) or the W.A.C. Bennett Dam on the Peace River which revealed major and harmful ecological repercussions on the neighbouring areas proved its claims.⁸² Even if the James Bay Committee recognised that it could not draw a complete portrait of the eventual environmental impacts, it mentioned that the independent experts consulted were nevertheless sure about one impact: "environmental modifications necessarily resulting from the James Bay Project would severely reduce and possibly completely destroy, the living resources upon which the native people of the area depend".⁸³ This could range from the modification of habitats to the extinction of species.⁸⁴

The James Bay Committee also drew attention to the legal implications of the environmental impacts of the James Bay project. The encroachment on many federal legislations was presented as another important obstacle faced by the Québec government.⁸⁵ In addition to the *Indian Act*, there was the *Navigable Water Protection Act* which required to obtaining a permit from the Minister of Transport before building any construction that will block navigation on a river. The rivers which are included in the James Bay project were classified as navigable within the legal definition of the term. Another federal legislation was the *Fisheries Act*. This one contains several sections prohibiting the disposal of solid waste materials in rivers on which fishing activities are carried on or upon their shores, beaches or banks. This definition could be also applied to the James Bay rivers. The *Canada Water Act* also opened the door to the federal intervention. It gave to the Federal government legislative authority to take unilateral action for maintaining the quality of management of waters which have become a matter of national concern. Finally, the *Migratory Birds Act* appeared as relevant as the preceding since the James Bay area is an important zone for the reproduction of migratory birds. This federal legislation constituted different avenues by which the Federal government could decide to bring in important modifications to the James Bay project.⁸⁶

They revealed Québec's constitutional inability to resolve itself all the environmental issues raised by the James Bay project. However, the James Bay Committee was very doubtful about a direct Federal intervention since this would harm its alliance with the Bourassa government.⁸⁷

These two issues raised by the James Bay Committee highlighted an opposition between two different representations of Québec territory having specific political implications. On the one hand, the James Bay Committee raised a cultural representation of territory when it referred to the livelihood of Native Peoples of the area. Their discussions revealed a clash between two territorial conceptions underlying the James Bay project. Whereas the Québec government defined the James Bay region as a part of Québec territory containing important natural resources, the Natives Peoples called it their homeland. Instead of talking of their territory, they referred to their land. The James Bay Committee's claims supported the Aboriginal conception of territory for whom this land was an essential component of their livelihood and their culture. On the other hand, many concerns expressed by the James Bay Committee regarding the feasibility of the project were based on a bio-physical conception of the territory. The importance of the latter was not seen in regard to its economic or strategic values. They rather emphasised the ecological value of the territory. It was more often the notion of ecosystem than the notion of territory which was used. The territory did not consequently appear as an external and inanimate object to human population, but rather an essential component of human habitat.⁸⁸ This then furthered the politicisation of a more complex representation of territory which goes well beyond of a geopolitical reading.

The James Bay Committee also raised broader issues which questioned the relevance and the rationale of the project. One of them was the energy and economic implications of the James Bay project. They had serious doubts about the choice of building a mega-project to produce cheaper electricity and to create jobs. The James Bay project did not appear as the cheapest and the most environmental-friendly source of energy. In this context, the Committee demanded the establishment of a public debate about the development of environmentally acceptable sources of energy which would satisfy long-term energy needs. This debate, which was required more than ever in the context of an on-going energy crisis, was left out by the Québec government. In this respect, the launching of James Bay was largely precipitated.

The James Bay Committee also argued that that the debate about these alternatives could not be dissociated from a larger debate about the huge rate of energy consumption in Québec and throughout North America. The James Bay project did not provide on this score any satisfactory response to the energy crisis. It could only contribute to accentuate the later insofar as it would further the growth of the Québec rate of energy consumption instead of limiting it. For the Committee, the James Bay project represents not more than a stop-gap measure which postpone the setting-up of a wide debate about the necessity to restrain energy needs of Québec society.⁸⁹

The James Bay Committee also questioned the economic implications linked to the construction of a mega-project. They argued that too many questions were left out by the government to determine the necessity and profitability of the project. In contrast to what the government argued, the Committee was not convinced that the latter would benefit the whole of Québec. The James Bay project, rather, was presented as an heavy economic burden. It discussed in this regard three main economic aspects of the project: the number of jobs created and their costs; the financing of the project; and the selling of electricity surpluses. For each point, the James Bay Committee presented its own explanations which contradicted the government position.

The James Bay Committee expressed many doubts about the presupposed jobs resulting from the project. It strongly rejected the governmental argumentation presenting the James Bay project as a solution to Québec unemployment by creating around 125 000 jobs. According to the Committee, the project would not resolve at all the unemployment problem and would rather contribute to maintain the traditional economic structure based on the exportation of staple products.⁹⁰ Most of these jobs would be temporary since the number of permanent jobs created once the complex was operational would be only around 1000. This does not constitute in fact an interesting perspective for the Native peoples. Moreover, the James Bay Committee questioned the economic value of these jobs insofar as the cost per job appeared exorbitant. Whereas a temporary job at the peak construction would cost about \$290 000, the cost for a permanent job would be about \$5,8 million.⁹¹ In comparing these costs to the ones in the manufacturing sector, the relevance and the profitability of the James Bay project could be largely questioned. This questioning appeared fully justified for the Committee since the James Bay project would

reinforce the Québec traditional industrial structure based on heavily capital-intensive staple producing industries.⁹²

The issue of financing of the project aroused many concerns from the James Bay Committee. They were related to the large amount of money (around \$6 billion) which was required and which obliged the Corporation to borrow money.⁹³ This would increase the Québec public debt. This would not constitute an economic burden only if the project was going ahead without facing any major difficulties and if the Québec economy was experiencing a sufficient economic growth. If not, the Committee expected that the Corporation and Hydro-Québec would have difficulties to repay their debt. The recovering of these losses would probably require the Québec government intervention and consequently, this would imply for the Québec customers higher taxes and electric rates. Moreover, the Committee's concerns were strengthened by the fact that this large amount of money had to be borrowed from abroad. This entailed severe economic and political consequences which could be disastrous for the Québec economy.⁹⁴ The James Bay Committee mentioned that the dependence on US investments could have important consequences for the political and economic independence of Canada and Québec. By linking the James Bay project to the American Continental Resource Plan which was discussed at that time, Canadian independence appeared particularly threatened in the long-term. The Continental Resource Plan implied the signing of a deal between the Canadian and the American governments aiming to create a free North American market in energy resources. This scheme, according to the Committee, would limit the Canada role as being the supplier of raw materials and consequently, would restrict the Canada to develop its own industrial structure outside of the American interests' framework.⁹⁵

The last economic concern was the existing confusion and even contradictions about the project's ends. Whereas the government initially announced that the project would be required for fulfilling the Québec's energy needs, it affirmed at other occasions that energy would be sold to US markets.⁹⁶ For the James Bay Committee, this unresolved contradiction suggested that the market for this energy had not been secured prior to the launching of the project. The consequences of this uncertainty could be very costly for the Québec taxpayers.⁹⁷ The Committee mentioned that the selling abroad of electricity surpluses could turn out to be detrimental to their interests.⁹⁸ Québec could become bound to contracts

which could be no longer profitable some years later. On the other hand, the recent rate increases announced by Hydro-Québec to finance the James Bay project suggested that the public would have to pay larger amounts of money; in other words, they would have to subsidise the James Bay energy.⁹⁹ Consequently, whether if electricity is sold out or not, the Committee did not see if the Québec would really benefit from the James Bay Development project.

The last issue addressed by the James Bay Committee was the relevance and adequacy of the development scheme framing the James Bay project. By their questioning on the value of this project, they also proposed a critical reading of the political framework imposed by the Quiet Revolution. The Committee was not against the development of this region.¹⁰⁰ The James Bay Committee saw in the James Bay development project the perpetuating of the pattern of industrial development which is no longer sustainable. It postponed the setting up of solutions to the Western civilisation crisis and rather tended to deepen it.¹⁰¹ The James Bay project did not propose re-orientations which could meet social, economic, scientific and political priorities and which would lay the foundations of future ecosociety. The James Bay Committee argued that it could only lead to the broadening of the environmental and economic crises affecting Québec society. While presenting major ecological threats, the project such as it was elaborated would increase social inequalities. "All evidence indicates that the project would yield economic profits to a few at the cost of penalising many. Despite its size, it would offer little, if any, practical benefit to the people of Québec. Choosing as a lavish and unnecessary a scheme as James Bay over socially beneficial development projects such as housing and urban transport is, at best, an error in economic and social priorities."¹⁰² Contrarily to what Bourassa affirmed, the James Bay Committee did not see the project as a new step in the Québec history. In referring to the information and reports which had been released, the James Bay project constituted a dead-end.

By proposing a different interpretation of the James Bay development project, the James Bay Committee called into question the modernist and nationalistic arguments used by the developers to justify the project. Instead of seeing the project as being a requirement to the pursuit of Québec industrialisation and modernisation, the James Bay Committee perceived it as a further step leading Québec to an eventual disaster. The project appeared for them unjustified insofar as it would lock the

Québec into a non-sustainable model of development. Furthermore, the James Bay Committee contributed to make more relative the specificity of the project that was claimed by its promoters. Whereas the developers presented the James Bay project as being both a lead and a follow-up to the previous Québec hydroelectric development projects, the James Bay Committee compared it with similar projects that were realised in other countries such as Russia and Egypt. It clearly established the links with other energy mega-projects which were discussed or launched in the other Canadian provinces at the same time. It appeared as much linked to the discussions about energy crisis at the Canadian level and to the Québec economic and social context.

The importance of the James Bay Committee can be fully grasped if we look at the political, economic and social context of the time. Whereas the Bourassa government attempted to legitimise the James Bay project by referring to the political dynamic underlying the "Quiet Revolution", the opposition of the James Bay Committee questioned the symbiotic relation between the Québec state and the population which had been created during the "Quiet Revolution".¹⁰³ It was rather based on a dynamic revealing the transition from this phase to another one not yet defined. Instead of presenting the state project as a tool for the liberation of Québécois, the Committee suggested that the rationale underlying the James Bay project would rather perpetuate its colonisation by foreign capital. It called into question the equation between the Québec state policies, modernisation and development which had been made during the 1960s. As a result of the James Bay Committee's efforts, many groups no longer assumed that Québec state's projects would bring social and economic development. Moreover, their criticisms were also directed at Hydro-Québec which was confronted for the first time by a public and broad opposition. Hydro-Québec's expertise and reliability was no longer taken for granted. Those critical standpoints about these two key actors of the "Quiet Revolution" came from a very mitigated evaluation of its results.

In summary, the Committee found out that the project would:

"bind the taxpayers of Quebec for the next 50 years to an enormous debt (\$6 billion for the initial investment, and double that with the interests), bind Quebec to the economic role of a resource hinterland, destroy the environment of the area in question, upset the ecology of the North, destroy the livelihood of thousands of Indian and Inuit people, spend money that should be going to serve real public needs (unemployment, housing, poor health care, public transportation, sewage

treatment plants, to mention only a few pressing items), and give enormous profits to a handful of private corporations."¹⁰⁴

These implications which were hidden explained why the holding of a public debate on the James Bay project became one of the Committee's objectives. Insofar as the project could impose major burden on the Québec society, it appeared necessary that a large societal debate should occur before passing the point of no return.

The Committee's Strategies of Mobilisation

All strategies used by the James Bay Committee revolved around one main objective: the launching of a public and democratic debate about the project's finality and implications. Its mobilisation was marked by two types of actions: 1) the publication of reports and documents about the project and 2) the organisation of public hearings during which the project was debated. The first task of the James Bay Committee was the formation of working groups in charge of studying specific aspects of the James Bay development project. Each of them tried to collect information and data regarding the social, environment, energy requirement, political, economic and legal aspects of the project.¹⁰⁵ The results of working groups' research aimed to publicise information about the project and draw public attention to dimensions which were not raised by the Québec government or by the JBDC. They sought to thwart the politics of secrecy followed by the James Bay project's proponents.¹⁰⁶ During the following months, letters and booklets based on the material gathered by the James Bay Committee were published. In July 1972, the James Bay Committee released a document entitled *The James Bay Development: Progress or Disaster?* in which it exposed its position in relation to the different dimensions of the project. This paper constituted the main publication which explained the argumentation justifying its opposition to the James Bay project.

This publication coincided with the release of a dossier on the project by the *Société pour vaincre la pollution* (SVP).¹⁰⁷ While pointing out the eventual ecological consequences of this development, the SVP insisted particularly on Québec's energy needs. In addition to questioning the accuracy of the governmental previsions, they also brought to the fore aspects which the government had ignored, notably

the issue of alternative modes of production of electricity. These two main publications were followed by other small brochures, booklets and letters in the newspapers. The James Bay Committee's claims were also publicised by the different journals of the environmentalist groups which supported the Committee. It was an issue which was discussed by the emerging alternative press in Québec. In all of them, the James Bay Committee reclaimed public hearings on the project and the release of the diverse studies which had been done. They aimed to allow public participation within the decision-making process and then to break down the secrecy and the precipitating surrounding the project.

Pressure was brought to bear on the Bourassa government to organise public hearings on the project. In May 1972, members of the James Bay Committee presented briefs at the Natural Resources Committee hearings at the National Assembly.¹⁰⁸ They questioned the Québec government and Hydro-Québec representatives about the economic, environmental and social implications of the project. They also made appeals for public hearings and for the release of the studies which had been conducted. These requests were, however, ignored. Moreover, their request for a meeting with Premier Bourassa were also rejected. In spite of their efforts to oblige the Bourassa government to open some discussions, the James Bay Committee was confronted each time with a blunt refusal. The government's desire to avoid any debate on the project clearly appeared during the preparations to the National Workshop "Man and Resources" in November 1972.¹⁰⁹ During the preparatory workshop, the government deliberately attempted to erase the James Bay project off the agenda. Some activists succeeded nonetheless to influence delegates which adopted a resolution demanding public hearings and more public information.¹¹⁰

Following the successive refusals of the government to open public discussions on the project, the James Bay Committee decided to organise its own public hearings. The latter were held on the April 7th, 1973 at Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM). During these hearings, 63 briefs were presented to the twelve enquirers designated by the Committee.¹¹¹ They gathered individuals and organisations coming from all corners of North America which discussed the different aspects (economic, social, environmental, energy and legal) of the James Bay project. The participants had very different backgrounds. Besides the citizens, the hearings were attended, among others, by scientists, environmentalists, conservationists,

labour union representatives, religious groups, economists and anthropologists. The only point of view which was not discussed was the one of the developers who refused to participate in these hearings.

The conclusions which were drawn from the public hearings were similar to the concerns and claims of the James Bay Committee.¹¹² They rather contributed to give them a legitimacy. All participants rejected the project and asked that it be stopped. The lack of informations about the project and of rigorous environmental impact studies and feasibility studies was strongly criticised. Most of the presentations raised various questions relative to the environmental repercussions, the economic costs or the existence of alternatives. The only topic which was less discussed was the situation of the Native Peoples since it was *sub judice*. All participants agreed on the partiality and incompleteness of the existing documentation released by the government. Two major questions remained unanswered: Who would benefit from this project and Who would be the real master of the situation? Several participants suggested that the people of Québec could finally lose much more than they could have some unspecified benefits. Furthermore, most of the briefs analysed the James Bay project from a broader and global perspective.¹¹³ Whereas some briefs compared the James Bay project to the energy mega-projects in the other provinces, others saw in the development of the James Bay area the opening of this region to the problems afflicting the Western societies. While destroying the fragile ecological equilibrium of this non-polluted region, this development implied the pursuit of this idolatry of the technological progress and consumption.¹¹⁴ The James Bay Development project would further the increase of energy consumption and the waste of resources instead of implementing alternatives to these major problems. From the different presentations which were made during this day, the Board of Enquirers prepared afterwards a report which recommendations supported the James Bay Committee's claims.

The Board of Enquirers of the Public Forum presented their report during a meeting with Premier Robert Bourassa and to Robert Boyd, President of the James Bay Energy Corporation, on May 28, 1973. They submitted their recommendations which were, however, rejected by Bourassa. After having denounced the lack of available information, the enquirers questioned the rationale for a such project. To their questions about the future energy demand, the importance of the quality of life and the fate of the Native Peoples, Bourassa and Robert Boyd used the same arguments which had been previously

made.¹¹⁵ This meeting was very fruitless. The James Bay Committee decided to publish most of the briefs which during the Public Forum and the report of the Board of Enquirers as well. The book, *The James Bay Forum*, was presented by the Committee as "a popular outcry against the practice of decision-making behind close doors on matters that need public exposure".¹¹⁶ With this publication, they wanted to provide further information on the James Bay project and to draw public attention on its implications.

The organisation of this public forum occurred a few days before the beginning of the "Week on the James Bay" (April 9th to April 15th, 1973). During this week, many activities were held at Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM) aiming to amass around \$25 000 to support the Native Peoples' court proceeding.¹¹⁷ Different artistic activities such as exhibitions of Native arts and crafts and shows with Québec singers were organised on this score. These activities were related to the Fund for the James Bay ("Fonds pour la défense de la Baie James") which had been set up in March 1973 by the James Bay Committee.¹¹⁸ The main objective of this financial fund was to amass money for the defence of the Aboriginal rights and then, for the pursuit of the court proceeding. The organisation of different artistic activities was also planned for helping to diffuse Native culture.

The beginning of negotiations between the Québec government, the JBDC and the Native Peoples in 1974, and notably the signature of an agreement-in-principle, undercut the James Bay Committee's struggles to establish a public forum. Insofar as this agreement meant that the project would now get underway, the holding of a public debate on the project appeared less relevant. The James Bay Committee rejected the James Bay Agreement signed up the following year. They strongly denounced the extinguishing clause. Furthermore, for the Committee, this agreement did not clearly resolve the issue of environmental impacts. It was not preceded by further studies which would have deepened the knowledge of the ecosystems of the area and delimited more precisely the environmental impacts.¹¹⁹

It was only after the signature of the agreement that the protection of environment came to be seriously considered by the James Bay Development Corporation and the James Bay Energy Corporation. The James Bay Agreement set up a specific regime for the protection of environment and for the evaluation of the environmental impacts of the future development projects. It also brought the setting

up of the "SOTRAC" which was in charge of the corrective works to reduce the negative impacts on the environment. The mandate of this society is limited to the fauna and to hunting and trapping activities. It did not aim to improve all the territory disturbed by the construction works.

The James Bay Committee continued, however, to take public stands on the new developments of the project. In January, 1975, they sent a letter to the Advisory Council on the Environment. It requested that the Council undertake an independent study relative to the protection of environment on the James Bay territory. The Committee raised the existence of serious threats and damages to the quality of environment and wondered if the Environment Quality Act was applied in the James Bay territory.¹²⁰ Representatives of the James Bay Committee met officially with the Advisory Council on May 23, 1975. In this meeting, Committee's members reiterated its claims, placing particular emphasis on the lack of some environmental control of the on-going works.¹²¹

The Advisory Council decided only to consider the ecological aspects of the Committee's request.¹²² The Council set up an ad hoc committee which had to study the level of environmental protection and to make subsequent recommendations. In October 1975, it submitted its reports, and therefore, the Council decided to organise public hearings during which representatives of the James Bay Development Corporation and the James Bay Energy Corporation testified. The Council submitted preliminary recommendations to the Minister of Environment in April, 1976, before the completion of its final report the following year.¹²³ The Council's report revealed that the James Bay Committee request was well-founded. While recognising that the authorities worried about the protection of environment, the Council found out that the latter was nonetheless deficient. The bypassing of recommendations and rules, the weak control by the authorities, and the lack of sufficient financial resources and staff constituted important problems identified in the report.¹²⁴

The implementation of the environmental impact assessment procedure has afterwards imposed constraints when the further development projects were built. It opened the door to the participation of other actors in the decision-making process and then, can constitute a locus of opposition. Moreover, although the protection of environment did not constitute an absolute priority on the terrain, it came to be

used nevertheless as an argument to legitimise future projects. However, the environmental dispositions contained in the Agreement did not impose a radical shift. The appearance of a mercury contamination of fish at the beginning of the 1980s which obliged Native People to stop their consumption of fish revealed how the environment was treated as a secondary issue. The realisation of the project also implied that the rate of consumption of energy would continue to be too high and that the debate about the development of alternatives to reduce the latter will not occur. These two issues maintained their political relevance and were still subsequently claimed. The organisation of a public debate on energy became one of the major issues which mobilised ecology groups.

4.5 The Political Importance of the James Bay Committee

The importance of the opposition of the James Bay Committee cannot be grasped by looking at the outcomes of the debates. Its demands may not have been met by the project's proponents, but its mobilisation was nonetheless meaningful. Its attempt to launch a public and democratic debate contributed to open a new political space for new actors and new issues in Québec politics. It participated in the spread of political changes introduced by the contemporary social movements in Western societies. The James Bay Committee was an extension of new actors raising issues which were not previously discussed as a political stake. Among the changes carried by the James Bay Committee, four appeared particularly relevant for our analysis: 1) the redefinition of the Québec political agenda and implicitly the Canadian one; 2) the questioning of the "Quiet Revolution" legacy; 3) the politicisation of a new temporality; and 4) the transformation of Québec spatiality and territoriality. Of course, these changes did not necessarily occur during the period of controversies around the La Grande project. However, they became part of this political context having framed the empowerment of the ecology movement through the 1970s and the subsequent debates around the Great Whale project.

The James Bay Committee contributed to the redefinition of the Québec political discourse. Being at the crossroads of various social movements, it opened the door to the inclusion of new issues in the Québec public sphere. James Bay contributed to politicise the energy issue and the protection of environment and to a lesser extent, the issue of Aboriginal peoples' rights. In each case, it opposed its

own representations to the hegemonic state representations in pointing out their inadequacies. Another issue raised by the James Bay Committee, which was a major stake for legitimising its claims, was science itself. The questioning of the anticipated bio-physical impacts of the project or Hydro-Québec's forecasts of energy demand showed that the scientific arguments were in this context very political. The Committee's counter-discourse opened the door to the recognition of new political actors which occupied a greater place on the Québec political in the following years. The emergence of the *Front commun pour un débat public sur l'énergie* constituted the best example illustrating the importance of the James Bay Committee.

The second impact was the diffusion of a very critical perspective on the achievements of the Quiet Revolution which constituted a departure from the predominant political context. While proposing a redefinition of the Québec-ness, it carried a critical discourse on the Québec state. The James Bay Committee's claims raised questions and criticisms that were left aside by the nationalist movement and the labour movement. It revealed to a certain extent an alternative voice which was at that time important political forces of opposition to the Bourassa government. Its distance towards these two movements derived not only from its agenda. It also rested on the definition of the "Québec-ness" underlying the James Bay Committee's discourse. Although it was not very explicit, it is, however, possible to grasp some constitutive elements. Its discourse highlighted new criteria for defining Québec people or in other words, the "us" and "them". The internationalist orientation of the James Bay Committee's discourse was in this regard an important element. Québec society was not seen as a backward society or as an oppressed nation. It was rather treated as an industrial society largely similar to other Western countries that faced major pollution problems; the enormous waste of resources and the high rate of energy consumption characterising the Québec society were particularly emphasised. Its trajectory did not appear quite different from its neighbours' trajectories. This portrait was, in sum, very critical insofar as it highlighted major economic and social problems and political deficiencies. The inequality and poverty, the inadequacy of social, environmental and economic policies, and the lack of democracy were the main aspects which retained the Committee's attention. Instead of adopting a discourse of national affirmation to resolve these problems, the James Bay Committee rather looked on the creation of a new model of

development, the "ecosociety". The Québec state was no longer invested with an historical mission. Although the Committee recognised that the state has an important role to play, it was not designated as the main tool for implementing the required changes. The Québec state was seen as being largely similar to its neighbours and thus, as an important wheel of the capitalist development.

Thirdly, through its discussion of the energy and environmental issues, the James Bay Committee furthered the politicisation of a different temporality from the dominant that of the Québec nationalist movement. Instead of looking critically to the past to justify contemporary changes, the James Bay Committee opposed two possible representations of the Québec society future: the ecosociety vs. the industrial and productivist society. To one representation describing the Québec society as confronted with shortage of natural resources, environmental problems, and social and economic disparities, they opposed a representation suggesting a society ecologically viable, decentralised and egalitarian. Whereas the first rests on a temporality defined by human beings, the second carries out a conception of time based on the evolution of ecosystems and thus, on the nature. This distinction revealed the James Bay Committee's aims to root the production and reproduction of social relations within a different temporal framework. Rejecting the industrial organisation of time, they seemed to privilege an organisation of time which would be moulded by both the human needs and nature cycles.

Finally, the process of jumping scales engaged by the James Bay Committee suggested a reconfiguration of the Québec political space and mostly its widening. It carried out a specific form of spatiality which implied a different way of defining the Québec spatial relations. The Committee rejected the Québec government's delimitation of the political space. Most of Committee's claims implied a redefinition of the division between the private sphere and the public sphere. The state did not appear as the pole around which this redefinition was done. Moreover, they also furthered a different way of looking at the vertical division of the political space, that is to say, the division between the local, the national and the supranational political space. The mobilisation of the diverse groups against the James Bay project showed that the Québec national space was variable and could not be limited to the Québec boundaries. The formation of the James Bay Committee suggested that it was not homogeneous and closed, but rather porous and shaped by events and actors from abroad. Although it was specific to the Québec

political context, its claims revealed the influence coming from international debates. In this respect, Québec society did not appear as isolated or unique. It was embraced by the recent developments in international relations and the emergence of social movements embracing the diverse Western societies

Moreover, their discussion of the implications of the James Bay project revealed how the three levels of political space (regional, national, and international) were inter-related. Even if the James Bay project could be considered as a local or a regional development project, the Committee's argumentation suggested nonetheless that it would have consequences at the national and international levels. While making worse the socio-economic situation of Québec peoples, it would perpetuate the exploitation of the Third World countries. International politics were part of their argumentation. The development of a growing non-state international relations was particularly influential. The James Bay Committee represented a channel by which the impact of international conferences and international non-governmental organisations was diffused in Québec society; they were used for legitimising their claims. This reflected a different way of appraising international politics comparing to the one which was forwarded during the "Quiet Revolution". The latter rested on a reading of international relations which was limited to the inter-state relations. The recognition of Québec on the international political scene was based on an understanding of international relations largely reflecting the interpretation given by international law. The James Bay Committee carried out a different reading, though it was rather marginal. While being critical of the existing pattern of inter-state relations, it drew attention to the growing presence of non-state actors which began to have a significant impact at the international level.

Conclusion

The involvement of the James Bay Committee in the debates surrounding the James Bay project introduced new questions which were left out by the developers. Its opposition to the project was connected to the opposition of Native Peoples, but at the same time went beyond. It sent back to the Québec society a quite different representation of the type of development which was forwarded by the project. The importance of the James Bay Committee cannot be grasped only in relation to the James Bay issue. From a strategic standpoint, it did not become a major actor insofar as it remained in the margins of

the debates. The James Bay Committee did not succeed in engaging the project's promoters in discussions and negotiations. But this does not imply that it was meaningless. Many issues raised by the James Bay Committee have acquired in the successive phases of the James Bay hydroelectric development a relevance. They could not be so easily put aside by the Québec government and Hydro-Québec. The protection of the environment was perhaps the most obvious in this regard. The James Bay Committee had a broader impact at the Québec level. Its mobilisation was a key element in the empowerment of the Québec ecology movement. The ecology groups gained a visibility and a legitimacy which could not be denied so easily by the government. This revealed not only a transformation of the Québec political agenda, but also the redrawing of Québec identity politics by which the "ecologist" became a meaningful identity. The mobilisation of the James Bay Committee which overlapped with the development of a Québec environmental policy opened the door to a redefinition of Québec citizenship politics. Environmental issues became a new avenue for getting access to public sphere and for making citizenship claims.

In the next chapter, we will discuss the launching of the Great whale project. This constitutes the second part of our dissertation. We will pay attention to the changes in Québec politics which framed the Great Whale project. Our discussion of the modifications of environmental policy introduced by the Parti Québécois and the struggles of the ecology movement around the launching of a public debate on energy suggested that significant changes occurred between the two projects even if the same actors had been involved. They reveal the emergence of a political framework which show important differences with the political setting imposed by the Quiet Revolution. We will continue to emphasise the spatial consequences of these changes in highlighting the increasing reference to globalisation. They suggest an important rearticulation of citizenship politics.

NOTES

¹ . The ecology movement has been only one element revealing, and at the same time, fostering, a new configuration of politics. The other contemporary social movements which emerged at that time were as well as significant. Many authors have pointed out how these social movements furthered the politicisation of new collective identities. Their claims and their strategies of mobilisation have challenged the boundaries between the public sphere and the private sphere and then, largely contributed to redefine the

contours of politics. It is only very recently that the presupposed "newness" of these social movements became questioned. See on this point: Lorna WEIR, "What's so New in the New Social Movements?", *Studies in Political Economy*, no 40, 1993, pp. 73-102; Alberto MELUCCI, "The New Social Movements Revisited: Reflections on a Sociological Misunderstanding", in *Social Movements and Social Classes. The Future of Collective Action*, edited by Louis MAHEU, London, Sage, 1995, pp. 107-118.

² . The identification of the different environmental problems as a "crisis" with which the different governments and societies were confronted have had a determining impact on the subsequent debates on this question. Although this interpretation has been contested, it nonetheless became dominant. This represents one premise which is largely accepted in the literature. See: Russell J. DALTON, "The Environmental Movement in Western Europe", in Sheldon KAMIENIECKI (ed.), *Environmental Politics in the International Arena. Movements, Parties, Organisations, and Policy*, New York, State University of New York Press, 1993, pp. 50-53; Jean-Pierre ROGEL, *Un paradis de la pollution*, Québec, Presses de l'Université du Québec/ Québec Science, 1981, pp. 93-106.

³ . It is very difficult to identify one particular period from which environmental concerns became a public issue. It nonetheless appeared that affirm that the end of the nineteenth century was a turning point. As Dalton pointed it out, it is extremely difficult to specify one determining factor which can explain why the protection of environment became a public issue. There were rather a combination of different factors such as the industrialisation, the urbanisation, the development of natural sciences and the emergence of romanticism which idealised the nature. Cf. Russell J. DALTON, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-43.

⁴ . See on this point: *Ibid.*, pp. 59-62.

⁵ . We refer here to the distinction established by Dalton. He pointed out that the demarcation between the three fields of activities were not so clear-cut. Some groups were involved in the three fields. Cf. Russell J. DALTON, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-48.

⁶ . This expression was used by the conservationist organisations to designate what was located outside the Western world. This reflected the predominance of the Western and colonialist perspectives over the environmentalist movement.

⁷ . It is nonetheless important to point out that the pressures of the conservationist groups had also an impact on the adoption of conservation measures by states. Cf. Lynton Keith CALDWELL, *International Environmental Policy. Emergence and Dimensions*, Durham (NC), Duke University Press, 1984, p. 27.

⁸ . Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 36.

⁹ . The assessment of the agreements which were signed at that time reveals that most of them remained ineffective. Some of them became effective only after the Second World War. There was nonetheless some exceptions such as the Fur Seal Convention (1911) and the International Joint Commission of Canada and of the United States; this one was set up by the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty which aimed to protect the water levels and the navigability of the boundary waters such as the Great Lakes between the two countries. These international treaties reflected a utilitarian view of nature which was also predominant in the national legislations. It was quite often the economic value of resources which determined the state efforts. In other words, the protection of nature was designed to support the economic activities and was not based on a comprehensive view of the environment. Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 27-28; Ved P. NANDA, *International Environmental Law & Policy*, New York, Transnational Publishers Inc., 1995, pp. 73-76.

¹⁰ . See on this point: Lynton K. CALDWELL, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

¹¹ . Until the Second World War, most of the international conferences were not concerned by intergovernmental relations. The different governments did not take part to the debates. The congresses and conferences represented important sources of information which could be used to sensibilise public opinion and to bear pressures on states. Although they had no enforcement powers, they contributed nonetheless to shape the political discourse and therefore, to empower particular representations of nature problems. The International Congress for the Protection of Nature (Paris, 1909), the International Congress for the Protection of Flora, Fauna, and Natural Sites and Monuments (Paris, 1923) and the

International Congress Study for the Protection of Birds (Geneva, 1927) were among the most important congresses held at that time which had an undeniable influence on the definition of agenda for each issue. It is only after the Second World War that the participation of states to international congresses sponsored by scientific or conservationist organisations will become more frequent and that the interactions between them will be more structured. Cf. Lynton K. CALDWELL, *op. cit.*, pp. 36-37.

¹² . Despite its very informal structure, it is nonetheless relevant to discuss in terms of network. The frequent contacts and exchanges of information between groups as the similarities in terms of issues which was raised within each country could not be seen simply as coincidences. Cf. Russell J. DALTON, *op. cit.*, pp. 47-48.

¹³ . The conservation movement did not know important developments after the First World War. The most difficulty faced by the movement was its exclusion from the public agenda. Although it became less visible, it nonetheless maintained its organisational structure. Membership within existing groups grew slowly and new groups emerged. One of them which became a central actor at the international level was the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN). This later was formed after a conference held in Fontainebleau on October 1948, sponsored by UNESCO, during which was adopted its basic charter; this conference was a follow-up of a conference sponsored by the Swiss League for Protection of Nature held in July 1947. This later was particularly important since it helped to re-establish the old networks of co-operation between groups. The IUCN has developed a particular mode of functioning since it gathered scientists and government representatives. It was mainly orientated towards administrative functions such as the exchange of scientific informations and policy advises. This contributed to strongly limit the public participation. One other limitation was the lack of money. The will to overpass the IUCN's limitations led some European conservationists to create at the beginning of the 1960s a new organisation more opened to public participation: the World Wildlife Fund (WWF). This organisation brought in many changes in relation to the existing conservations organisations. It was the first multinational environmental group which has branches in different countries. It contributed to expand the financial and popular support for conservationist issues. Moreover, the WWF has reflected the transition from conservationist group to environmentalist group. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 49; John McCORMICK, "International Nongovernmental Organisations: Prospects for a Global Environmental Movement" in *Environmental Politics in the International Arena*, edited by Sheldon KAMIENIECKI, New York, State University of New York Press, 1993, p. 134.

¹⁴ . The emergence of the environmentalist movement did not mean that it has replaced the conservationist movement. The latter did not disappear, but gradually lost its centrality. The conservationist movement became in fact a particular trend within the later. This did not imply that it was less visible. The development of the environmentalist movement brought in rather a revitalisation of the existing conservationist groups. See on this point: Russell J. DALTON, *op. cit.*, p. 49; .

¹⁵ . See on this point: Dimitrios ROUSSOPOULOS, *L'écologie politique: au-delà de l'environnementalisme*, traduit par Annie CHAUVEAU, Montréal, Éditions Écosociété, 1994, 144 pages; Luc FERRY, *Le nouvel ordre écologique: l'arbre, l'animal et l'homme*, Paris, Grasset, 1992, 274 pages; Steven YEARLEY, *The Green Case. A Sociology of Environmental Issues, Arguments and Politics*, London, Routledge, 1992, pp. 1-77; Klaus EDER, "The Institutionalisation of Environmentalism: Ecological Discourse and the Second Transformation of the Public Sphere", in *Risk, Environment and Modernity. Towards a New Ecology*, edited by Scott LASH, Bronislaw SZERSZYNSKI, Brian WYNNE, London, Sage, 1996, pp. 203-223; David PEPPER, *The Roots of Modern Environmentalism*, New York & London, Routledge, 1989, pp. 1-36.

¹⁶ . See on this point: Jean-Guy VAILLANCOURT, "Deux nouveaux mouvements sociaux québécois: le mouvement pour la paix et le mouvement vert", in *Québec en jeu*, edited by Gérard DAIGLE, Montréal, Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 199, pp. 791-807; Michel JURDANT, *Le défi écologiste*, Montréal, Boréal Express, 1984; Robert C. PAEHLKE, *Environmentalism and the Future of Progressive Politics*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1989, pp. 217-273

¹⁷ . The Rachel Carson's book was the first of a series of books written by American and European authors such as Barry Commoner and Paul Ehrlich. The importance of these books springs rather from the vulgarisation of scientific findings to warn the population. It is mainly through these books that the idea

of an impending environmental crisis was diffused. However, this consensus was to some extent very thin since each author privileged specific factors to explain the crisis. Cf. Russell J. DALTON, *op. cit.*, p. 50; Jean-Pierre ROGEL, *op. cit.*, pp. 94-96; Robert C. PAEHLKE, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-40.

¹⁸ . The Club of Rome was formed in April, 1968. It represented an international group gathering scientists, industrialists and civil servants from different cultures and political horizons. The link uniting them was the search of solutions to problems which were unresolved by traditional institutions and by politics. The main objective of this group was to study the relations between men and nature in focusing on the growing "world problematic". They assumed that humankind was becoming more interdependent while facing important constraints and threats. They wanted to find out new politics and ways of life which would orientate humankind in a more secure and rational direction. This objective gave rise to five different research projects which were subsequently published. The *Limits to Growth* was the first of a series of studies undertaken by the Club of Rome. The proposals of this study aimed the development of a steady-state economy. They suggested that the solutions to environmental problems rested on the respect of the limits set by environmentally-improved technologies. They refer to a "managerialist" approach of the environment which assumes that we can manage the limits imposed by the economic and technological model of development. The authors of this report discussed the important physical limits faced by humankind in a context of an exponential demographic and economic growth. It gave rise to methodological and substantive criticisms which, consequently, kept going on controversies. In using other analytical methods more sophisticated in their following studies, their conclusions were however similar. They still urged the need to bring in major changes to the industrial pattern of growth and development. The following report, *Mankind at the Turning Point*, was released in 1974. The authors elaborated a computer-based model for improving the decision-making process in regard to the world problems and inequalities. The third report, *Reshaping the International Order - RIO*, which was published in 1976, discussed of an eventual new international order which should be implemented. The two last reports were released in 1977. The first of them, *Beyond the Age of Waste*, discussed the role of science and technology for resolving humankind problems. It focused on three sectors: food, natural resources and energy. The last report, *Goals for Mankind*, presented what are the choices faced by humankind in a context of growing interdependence. See on this point: Robert Macdonald, "Energy, Ecology and Politics", in *Ecology versus Politics in Canada*, edited by William Weiss, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1979, p. 190, Aurelio PECCEI, "Le Club de Rome a dix ans", *De toute urgence*, vol. 9, no 2, 1978, pp. 25-31; Ted BENTON, "Biology and Social Theory in the Environmental Debate", in *Social Theory and the Global Environment*, edited by Michael REDCLIFT and Ted BENTON, London, Routledge, 1994, pp. 33-38.

¹⁹ . Cf. Robert MACDONALD, *op. cit.*, p. 190.

²⁰ . Cf. Russell J. DALTON, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-51.

²¹ . *Ibid.*, p. 51.

²² . The Stockholm Conference had been particularly important. It gathered 114 governments and got huge media coverage. This contributed to stimulated the growing awareness not only in the developed countries, but also in the developing countries. This meeting was to a large extent the culmination of many international conferences and meetings which were held during the preceding years. They had contributed to raise worldwide consciousness about the environment. The Stockholm Conference output was quite impressive. It consisted of the Declaration on the Human Environment, the Declaration of Principles, the Recommendations for Action (109), and the Resolution on Institutional and Financial Arrangements. It also included some less important resolutions on World Environment Day, nuclear weapons tests and a second UN Conference. There was one other conference that we should mention which was particularly important in the recognition of a new conceptualisation of environment. It was the Intergovernmental Conference of Experts on a Scientific Basis for a Rational Use and Conservation of the Resources of the Biosphere held in 1968 which was sponsored by the UNESCO. This conference, more often called the Biosphere Conference, contributed to politicise the biosphere concept. It implies the definition of environment in terms of a life-system including the human beings vision and not only in terms of bio-physical resources. It thus rests on a comprehensive understanding of environment. See on this point: Lynton K. CALDWELL, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-63.

²³ . See on this point: *Ibid.*, pp. 53-60

²⁴ . The agenda of the Conference was divided into six main issues: planning and management of human settlements for environmental quality; the environment aspects of natural resources management; the identification and control of pollutants and nuisances of broad international significance; educational, informational, social and cultural aspects of environmental issues; development and environment; international organisational implications of action proposals. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 54

²⁵ . The Stockholm Conference was organised as an intergovernmental conference. The presence of many nongovernmental organisations and mostly their will to participate to the debates led the Swedish government to organise an unofficial conference for them. Although there were any links between the two gatherings, this nevertheless allowed ONGs to diffuse their claims which carried out a different reading of environmental problems. Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 55-58.

²⁶ . In addition to provide information exchange between NGOs in different countries, the Centre became involved, among other things, in the development of an environmental education network and in the promotion of the annual World Environment Day. See on this point: *Ibid.*, p. 97.

²⁷ . See *Ibid.*, p. 50.

²⁸ . Cf. *Le Devoir*, 16 juin 1972, p. 6.

²⁹ . Cf. Russell J. DALTON, *op. cit.*, pp. 52-53; Lynton K. CALDWELL, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

³⁰ . The Canadian government was a strong advocate for the setting up of the Stockholm Conference. It strongly supported the environmental initiatives which were adopted at that moment. Its support also occurred during the following important conferences on environment. It must be pointed out that this leadership was sometimes real and sometimes more symbolic. More generally, the Canadian government has appeared more successful in the multilateral arena than in the bilateral one. Cf. G. Bruce DOERN and Thomas CONWAY, *The Greening of Canada. Federal Institutions and Decisions*, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1994, pp. 124-137.

³¹ . These new legislations followed the list of department goals which was established prior to its launching: the continuation of established resources programs and services; the clean up and control of pollution; the assessment and control of the environmental impact of major development; the initiation of long term environmental programs; the promotion and support of international environmental initiatives; and the development of an environmental and education program. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 52.

³² . The EARP was strongly influenced by the US National Environmental Policy Act. It borrowed some of its characteristics and at the same time, sought to avoid its weaknesses. The DOE officials were opposed to its entrenchment in a specific law. The US experience showed that it was excessively expensive and time-consuming. They opted for a more restrictive process. "The decision established that the EARP was to be based on self-assessment. Federal government departments and agencies were to develop their own screening procedures and apply them to their own proposals. Projects deemed to have potentially "significant" environmental impacts were to be referred to the minister of environment for review, but the assessment panel was to comprise only bureaucrats from the DOE and the initiating department. Public review would not yet have a major role to play, and socio-economic factors were not to be part of environmental-impact assessment" (p. 195). Being administered in first by the Lands Directorate, the assessment panel-stage of the process was placed under the responsibility of the Federal Assessment and Review Office (FEARO) in April 1974. This one was a quasi-independent organisation component within the Department. Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 192-202.

It faced however from the beginning some difficulties which rapidly became obvious. The FEARO was confronted with a lack of financial and staff resources. Moreover, its authority was not very well grounded. There not existed a clear delineation between the DOE and the FEARO. The assessment process was also strongly criticised by environmentalist groups who denounced the lack of public involvement. These external criticisms as well as the internal concerns confronted the DOE officials to the necessity of undertaking reforms. Some minors reforms will be bring in 1977. But, it is only during the 1980s that the assessment process will acquire a greater impact. Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 192-202.

³³ . See on this point: *Ibid.*, pp. 192-202

³⁴ . CONSEIL CONSULTATIF DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT, *Rapport annuel 1973-74*, Québec, Gouvernement du Québec, 1975, p. VI.

³⁵ . Even if they were part of the Ministry of Municipal Affairs, the Environmental Protection Services were nonetheless autonomous. They were administered by a director who has important powers. He was responsible to oversee and control the quality of environment. This allowed him to start legal proceedings against polluters and to impose fines. But, he can not overpass the minister of environment and consequently, was somewhat dependent from the political will of the government. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. VII.

³⁶ . The bill specified more clearly the structure and the spheres of action of the Environmental Protection Services. It set out its fields of action: 1) the quality of water and the management of waste water; 2) the cleaning up of air; 3) the waste management; 4) the sanitary conditions of immoveables and public places; 5) the protection against rays and other energy vectors; 6) the control of noise. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 37.

³⁷ . The Advisory Council on the Environment do not have adjudicating powers. Its principal role is to provide information. It is by this way that it can shape the environmental policy. It was supposed to play a role similar to the Canadian Environmental Advisory Council. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

³⁸ . During the first years, the Advisory Council on the Environment acquired a high level of legitimacy which however decreased afterwards. The idleness of the Minister largely explained this decrease. While refusing to publicise the Council's studies, the Minister did not follow up its recommendations. Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13; Jean-Pierre ROGEL, *op. cit.*, pp. 112-115.

³⁹ . The Minister postponed the adoption of many rules and norms while quite often not applying the existing ones. Despite the Minister's promises of setting up clean-up programs in response to the requests of several municipalities and citizen groups, the air and water pollution were still tolerated. Furthermore, the government refused quite often to start legal proceedings against polluting companies or, in some cases, merely imposed very small fines. See on this point: *Idem*.

⁴⁰ . Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 115

⁴¹ . It was only in 1980 that the environmental impact assessment and review procedure became effective. The definition of the parameters used in the screening procedure gave rise to many debates. It appeared that many projects would not be submitted to the evaluation process. It is only at the end of the last year that the Québec government announced that the environmental impacts of major industrial projects would be evaluated. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 118.

⁴² . The environmental impact assessment and review procedure rests on many steps. The proponent of the project which is retained for the procedure must transmit to the ministry a notice explaining the nature of his project. The Minister should indicate afterwards to the proponent the nature, the scope and the extent of the environmental impact assessment statement that he should prepare. The second step consists in the publicising of the proponent statement. This includes the diffusion of public information and the organisation of public consultations in regard to the project. It is at this level that any person, group or municipality can ask for the holding of a public hearing. If the Minister accepts this request, it is the Bureau d'audiences publiques sur l'environnement which holds a public hearing and reports its findings to the Minister. This can lead whether to the demand of further studies from the proponent, or to the modification of the project, or to the dismissal of the project. This procedure can be however overpassed by the Minister or by the Cabinet.

The functions of the "Bureau d'audiences publiques sur l'environnement" overlapped to some extent with the Consultative Council's mandate. Both played an advisory and informative role. Its role and mostly its structure were transformed in 1987. It was merged with the Advisory Council on the ecological reserves ("Conseil consultatif sur les réserves écologiques") and became the Council on the conservation and the environment ("Conseil de la conservation et de l'environnement"). This new Council has continued to exert the same functions than its predecessor. The main change was that it has to deal with the issue of conservation beside the issue of environmental quality. The conservation was defined as being the preservation, the sustainable use, the restoration and the improvement of the natural milieu. This reform

was related to the Bruntland Commission which reflected the growing importance which was given to conservation of resources and to sustainable development. Without to be officially dismantled, this Council stopped its activities in August, 1995. Moreover, the Environment Protection Services were dismantled in 1979. The creation of a distinct and official Ministry of Environment brought in a new administrative and political structure.

⁴³ . These reforms adopted in 1978 carried out some limitations, notably in regard to the recourse to an injunction. The person who wants to demand an injunction must frequent the place of the vicinity of the place. Moreover, the collective recourse is not allowed. This possibility of injunction is only applicable for violations of the Environment Act and can not be applied if a project has been previously authorised. Despite these limitations, the most determining factor is the political will of enforcing the law. Cf. Jean-Pierre ROGEL, *op. cit.*, pp. 140-144.

⁴⁴ . See: Alexandre KISS, "Définition et nature juridique d'un droit de l'homme à l'environnement" in Pascale KROMAREK (sous la direction de), *Environnement et droits de l'homme*, Paris, UNESCO, 1987, pp. 13-28; "La Déclaration sur l'environnement", *De toute urgence*, vol. 4, no 1, 1973, p. 69-73.

⁴⁵ . There is also an other logic underlying the state interventions. Historical links can bet traced between the protection of environment and the first measures in public health during the 19th century. It was at that time that was established the first measures to control air and water quality. It is related to the development of what Foucault called the bio-power. See on this point: Pierre ROSANVALLON, "L'Etat hygiéniste" dans, *L'Etat en France de 1789 à nos jours*, Paris, Seuil, 1990, pp. 128-135; Michel FOUCAULT, "Deux essais sur le sujet et le pouvoir", in *Michel Foucault. Un parcours philosophique*, edited by Hubert DREYFUS and Paul RABINOW, Paris, Gallimard, 1984.

⁴⁶ . We should add that the end of the 1980s also constituted a turning point. This point will be discussed in the chapter 7. Cf. Jean-Guy VAILLANCOURT, "Deux nouveaux mouvements sociaux québécois: le mouvement pour la paix et le mouvement vert", *op. cit.*, pp. 797-802

⁴⁷ . We refer here to the description of Vaillancourt which is one of the most complete. There is few studies about the history of the Québec ecology movement. Cf. Jean-Guy VAILLANCOURT, *Évolution, diversité et spécificité des associations écologiques québécoises: de la contre-culture et du conservatisme à l'environnementalisme et à l'ecosocialisme*, dans *Essais d'ecosocialisme*, Montréal, Editions Cooperatives Albert Saint-Martin, 1982, pp. 77-78.

⁴⁸ . The conservationist movement has been implemented in Québec since the end of the 19th century. It appeared as diversified as the other countries' movements. It originated from the concerns of botanists, biologists and protectors of the nature such as the *Société de géographie de Québec*, la *Société linéenne de Québec* et les *Clubs 4-H*. The conservationist trend has known important changes since the 1960s. The rise of an environmental consciousness has furthered the "rediscover" of the nature and by the same way, the development of many activities linked to the nature. New groups gathering fishers, hunters, rowers or ornithologists were formed and have integrated the protection of nature in their concerns. Moreover, there was a rise of the militancy among many groups which finally has tended to blurry the boundary between conservationism and environmentalism. We should point out on this regard the empowerment of two organisations which have played afterwards an important role: the "Fédération des associations pour la protection de l'environnement et des lacs" (FAPEL) which gathers local associations of riverside residents or lakeside residents and the "Association québécoise des techniques de l'eau" (A.Q.T.E.) which includes private and municipal water engineers, technicians and hygienists. Cf. Jean-Guy VAILLANCOURT, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-79; Jean-Pierre ROGEL, *op. cit.*, pp. 128-129

⁴⁹ . Cf. Jean-Guy VAILLANCOURT, *op. cit.*, pp. 75-96.

⁵⁰ . During the 1970s, the SVP and STOP became two important actors on the environmental scene. They strongly contributed to widen public awareness about environmental issues through the publications of briefs, the organisation of public manifestations and their participation to parliamentary commissions. The SVP also released dossiers on specific issues such as the water fluor, the purification of waste water, the James Bay project, and the nuclear energy. Moreover, the SVP published during the two last decades a journal, *L'Environnement*, which strongly contributed to diffuse the ecologist thought in Québec. On its

side, STOP was publishing the journal *STOP Press*. Whereas STOP was exclusively based in Montréal, the SVP is implemented in different regions. We can mention that SVP is similar to the group *Pollution Probe* which is based in other provinces. The Conseil québécois de l'environnement (CQE) was launched during a scientific colloquium at the *Jardin botanique de Montréal*, mainly through the impulse given by the Association des biologistes du Québec. In addition to organise many symposiums on different environmental issues, the CQE published during several years a journal, *De toute urgence*. The latter contributed to diffuse the results of scientific studies while presenting an overview of the international environmental scene. It quite often published the declarations or resolutions which were adopted during the important international conferences such as the Stockholm Conference. In contrast to the two previous organisations, the CQE was less politically involved. In addition to these three important groups, other groups were also formed in 1970: *Survivre* (association de scientifiques pour la survie de l'homme et de la vie) and the *Citoyens pour la responsabilité sociale dans la science* (to fight against pollution of the company Union Carbide at Beauharnois), the *Mouvement pour l'agriculture biologique*, les *Ami(e)s de la Terre de Québec*, and le *Monde à bicyclette*. The SVP published in 1974 a dossier, *Le Citoyen protège son environnement*, which listed more than one hundred of groups and environmentalist actions in Québec. Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 78-80; Jean-Pierre ROGEL, *op. cit.*, pp. 127-128.

⁵¹ . This second attempt did not turn out to be a greater success. It appeared that each group was preferring to act alone or only with groups having similar objectives and ideological orientations. Moreover, they were not very inclined to be subordinated to a grouping together or a federation. They preferred to keep their autonomy. The insistence in the ecologist discourse on decentralisation and on local democracy did not further this kind of gathering. Cf. Jean-Guy VAILLANCOURT, "Évolution, diversité et spécificité des associations écologiques québécoises", *op. cit.*, p. 81.

⁵² . The ecologist discourse in Québec share many similarities with the discourses raised in other countries. Cf. Jean-Pierre ROGEL, *op. cit.*, pp. 126-128; Jean-Guy VAILLANCOURT, "Deux nouveaux mouvements sociaux québécois: le mouvement pour la paix et le mouvement vert", *op. cit.*, pp. 797-800.

⁵³ . The impact of the counter-cultural trend has been increased with the publication of some reviews such as *Mainmise et le Répertoire québécois des outils planétaires*. This trend furthered the spreading of environmental friendly behaviors in the everyday life. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 79.

⁵⁴ . In contrast to the ecology movement, the peace movement is not recent. Its origins can be traced back to the beginning of the 20th century. Moreover, the peace movement and the anti-nuclear movement have had ramifications throughout Canada. Whereas the ecology movement which was centered on Québec politics, they were more embedded in Canadian politics. The more recent phase of mobilisation started during the 1950s. The cold war and the nuclear arm races provoked a consciousness about the destructive potential of atomic arms. This gave rise to the formation of many groups and associations of citizens and scientists throughout Canada reclaiming the end of the arms race and campaigning for nuclear disarmament. Among these groups, we can mention: l'*Organisation Pugwash*, the *Société canadienne d'éducation et de recherche pour la paix* (SCERP), the *Projet Plowshares*, the *Voices of Women/Voix des Femmes*. In 1961, these groups which have particularly sought to inform the population became part of a larger canadian coalition, the *Campagne canadienne pour le désarmement nucléaire* (SOS). The explosion of an atomic bomb by India in 1974 which was made through the CANDU technology led the peace movement to redefine its discourse and its targets. In contrast to what the Canadian affirmed, this explosion showed that the nuclear civil technology can have military implications. This marked its entrance in a second phase of mobilisation which will be marked by the struggles against the nuclear energy. This re-orientation of the peace movement was set with the formation of the *Regroupement pour la surveillance du nucléaire* (RSN)/*Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility* (CCNR) in July 1975. This Pan-Canadian group gathered around 45 associations and groups coming linked to the ecology movement and the peace movement. The Coalition reclaimed that the government imposed a moratorium on further development and set up an independent commission on the canadian nuclear program. This coalition was joined by In addition to the latter, other groups such as *Pollution Probe*, *Energy Probe* (linked to *Pollution Probe*, STOP and the SVP's Energy-Environment Committee. The launching a public and democratic debate on nuclear energy became the main objective of the anti-

nuclear movement. This mobilisation at the Canadian level occurred simultaneously in all provinces. This contesting was extended to the whole issue of the energy policy. Cf. Ronald BABIN, *op. cit.*, pp. 130-134.

⁵⁵ . See on this point: Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 144-150; Jean-Guy VAILLANCOURT, *op. cit.*, pp. 82-83.

⁵⁶ . The *Alliance Tournesol* was in Québec the main actor which organised anti-nuclear struggles. It rested on a decentralised structure which is based on local cells which were linked by regional centres. It organised different activities: public letters, manifestations, conferences, audio-visual productions (video, radio), publication of journals and documents, bank of informations on nuclear issues, etc. Its militancy contributed to the spreading of informations on nuclear energy while creating a space for a public debate. Cf. Jean-Guy VAILLANCOURT, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

⁵⁷ . The letter of convocation sent to groups and associations presented the objective of the colloquium as laying the foundations of a "grand Mouvement écologique québécois (à baptiser), décentralisé mais unifié dont le but sera de créer une force socio-politique qui révolutionnera globalement et radicalement la société productiviste, hiérarchique et destructrice dans laquelle nous vivons, en contestant les choix et les valeurs sous-jacentes de son orientation actuelle et en proposant des alternatives d'une société écologique en harmonie avec l'écosphère de la planète Terre. Les chapitres locaux de ce mouvement pourront canaliser l'activité des aspirants soit vers les groupes écologiques déjà existants, soit vers le développement d'un chapitre local ou régional qui favorisera la polyvalence des préoccupations écologiques selon les priorités locales et/ou nationales." Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 95.

⁵⁸ . The Manifest was divided in four sections. Whereas the first section presented who are the ecologists, the second section discussed the main ecological problems. The third section defined the main characteristics of an ecosociety. It indicated the required economic, technological and political reforms to the establishment of an ecosociety. A program of action was elaborated in the last section. It was in this section that was defined the strategy of mobilisation chosen by the ecologists which involved local and national actions. This section revealed the diversity of issues raised at that time: the industrial and agricultural pollution, the problems of labour organisation, the development of public transports and of cycling tracks, the development of small co-operatives, the setting up of preventive health programs, etc. The right of self-determination by Aboriginal nations was also mentioned in this section. Cf. *Idem*.

⁵⁹ . Cf. "Manifeste écologique du Regroupement écologique québécois" in Jean-Guy VAILLANCOURT, *Essais d'écologie sociale*, *op. cit.*, pp. 161-173.

⁶⁰ . The *Front commun pour un débat public sur l'énergie* was formed in November 1979, some months after the accident of Three Mile Islands which had a huge impact. Cf. Ronald BABIN, *op. cit.*, pp. 164-165.

⁶¹ . The eco-feminist groups make links between the exploitation of nature and the exploitation of women. The setting up of an alternative society also required the destruction of the patriarchal structures. See on this point: *Ibid.*, pp. 188-189.

⁶² . The deliberations of the meeting were influenced among others by the interventions of John Spence who had conducted studies on the ecosystems of the James Bay area for the Indians of Québec Association. Although the first studies of its research team were only released in the next Fall, he nonetheless important insights. Cf. *Le Devoir*, 17 janvier 1972, p. 6; THE JAMES BAY COMMITTEE, *The James Bay Development: Progress or Disaster?*, Montréal, p. 2.

⁶³ . Cf. Dorothy ROSENBERG, Lucia KOWALUK, "The James Bay Development Project: a Trojan Horse", *Our Generation*, vol. 9, no 1, p. 20.

⁶⁴ . Cf. LE COMITÉ POUR LA DÉFENSE DE LA BAIE JAMES, *Aménagement de la Baie James: Progrès ou Désastre*, Montréal, 1973, p. 2.

⁶⁵ . The analysis of Rosenberg and Kowaluk which reviewed the James Bay Committee's claims presented its actions as coming from citizen groups. Cf. Dorothy ROSENBERG, Lucia KOWALUK, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-20.

⁶⁶ . See on this point: THE JAMES BAY COMMITTEE, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

⁶⁷ . These two provisions of the Bill 50 were perceived as willing to reflect a good image of the government whereas this one did not have until that time seriously taken into consideration these issues. Moreover, the Bill appeared contradictory in regard to the protection of environment. The article 42 mentions that the SDBJ can overpass the provincial regulations on environment. It was then impossible that the SDBJ was both judge and judged. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 14; SOCIÉTÉ POUR VAINCRE LA POLLUTION, *La Baie James, c'est grave, grave, grave ...*, Montréal, Éditions Québécoises, 1972, pp. 22-23.

⁶⁸ . SOCIÉTÉ POUR VAINCRE LA POLLUTION, *op cit.*, p. 22.

⁶⁹ . The James Bay Committee identified two categories of rights which were affected by the project. The first are the territorial rights which are defined in a legal sense as personal and usufructuary rights. They allowed Indian peoples to be recognised as owners of the property. These rights had been confirmed by the Dorion Commission. The second category of rights relates to the rights which can be affected by any expropriation or displacement of the Indians. "Property rights of Indians, including their homes, the interest in the lands upon which they are actually settled, their hunting, fishing and trapping rights, which are recognised to a limited degree even under provincial regulations are rights which are susceptible of being affected by the carrying out of the project". Cf. The JAMES BAY COMMITTEE, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-16.

⁷⁰ . Pierre NADEAU, January 18, 1972, quoted in the JAMES BAY COMMITTEE, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

⁷¹ . *Ibid.*, p. 25.

⁷² . This major issue was left out of the Federal Task Force Report which was the first impact study on the project having been released. It was strongly criticised by the James Bay Committee. It contained many important errors on the native way of life. According to the Committee, the most striking was the description of the Native peoples as being economically and politically strongly dependent on white men's society. Contrarily to what the Report stated, the James Bay Committee affirmed that most of the Native peoples continue to live by hunting and trapping despite that wage employment have been available since many years. Cf. *Idem*

⁷³ . Cf. SOCIÉTÉ POUR VAINCRE LA POLLUTION, *op cit.*, p. 22.

⁷⁴ . Even if the use of the term genocide may seem exaggerated, it appears justified in respect to the two meanings of the international convention: "causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group" and "deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part". It is only by taking into account these specifications that the James Bay project could lead to the cultural genocide of Cree people. Cf. Dorothy ROSENBERG, Lucia KOWALUK, *op cit.*, p. 13.

⁷⁵ . *Idem.*

⁷⁶ . *Idem.*

⁷⁷ . See on this point: JAMES BAY COMMITTEE, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

⁷⁸ . The correlation between huge dams sites as in the James Bay project and earthquakes had been established by scientific studies. The research which was done after the earthquakes in India and Zambia confirmed the correlation. The Konya Dam in India built in 1967 generated an earthquake which had major repercussions in killing many people. The Kariba Dam which was built in 1963 induced a series of important quakes in regions of Rhodesia and Zambia. These areas had never known seismic activity prior to the building of these major dams. Cf. JAMES BAY COMMITTEE, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

⁷⁹ . The Russian experience showed that the construction of dams and reservoirs could bring about soem climatic changes. Some small-scale changes have been observed in areas within a 30 kilometer radius of reservoirs. They were brought by "an increase in the surface area of inland waters and a change in the hydrological (water) balance". *Ibid.*, p. 15.

⁸⁰ . *Ibid.*, p. 16.

⁸¹ . The notion of "ecological backlashes" was drawn from the analysis of E. P. Odum. In looking at the impacts of important dams such as the Aswan Dam (Egypt) and the Kariba Dam (Zambia), he found out

that important ecological problems have been subsequently created. Odum perceived them as a double tragedy since the original investment are lost and additional money must be spent for resolving these problems. This study clearly showed the importance of undertaking ecological studies before the building of major dams. The James Bay Committee appeared in this regard justified to raise concerns about the impact of the James Bay project and mostly, to expect detrimental consequences. These fears have been strengthened by the Québec Minister of Environment who had publicly admitted that the decision to go ahead was taken prior to any ecological research. Cf. THE JAMES BAY COMMITTEE, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-21.

⁸² . Each of these dams had detrimental ecological consequences which however could not be compared. In the case of the Aswan Dam, a transformation of the Nile Delta was observed. This led to the decimation of the sardine fisheries and to its erosion which eliminated the supply of silt downstream enriching agricultural lands and the Delta. The formation of the Lake Kariba behind the dam furthered the appearance of diseases propagated by insects. Moreover, the loss of agricultural lands was not compensated by fish catch from the Lake. The construction of the Bennett Dam entailed also some negative impacts which had not been foreseen by the promoters. It was disastrous for wildlife resources and other biological resources of the Peace-Athabasca Delta and adjacent areas. Insofar as the James Bay project implied larger environmental modifications than the Bennett Dam, major ecological ruptures could be expected. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 21.

⁸³ . JAMES BAY COMMITTEE, "James Bay Development", *op. cit.*, p. 22.

⁸⁴ . For a greater discussion of these impacts, see: JAMES BAY COMMITTEE, *Ecological Considerations of the James Bay Project*, Montréal, 1972.

⁸⁵ . Many of these legislations are related to the fact that under the *British North America Act* legislative authority over navigation and shipping is given to the Federal government. They were particularly relevant in regard to the James Bay project since the rivers which were supposed to be harnessed fell under the diverse definitions included in legislations. For our overview of the federal legislations, we refer to: *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17; SOCIÉTÉ POUR VAINCRE LA POLLUTION, *op. cit.*, pp. 23-24.

⁸⁶ . Cf. SOCIÉTÉ POUR VAINCRE LA POLLUTION, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

⁸⁷ . Cf. Dorothy ROSENBERG, Lucia KOWALUK, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-15.

⁸⁸ . The ecological standpoint on territory rested on a reading of the space which appeared very different of the modern conceptualisation of the space. This one mainly springs from the development of cartography and physics during the 16th century. It implies a conception of space as being emptyable, measurable and neutral. The modern conception tended to exclude any kind of social relations of the definition and production of space. The ecological conception seems to challenge this one insofar as it is based on the relations between human beings and nature. The space appears in this regard as being shaped by multiple bio-physical and social relations and then, having different forms. For a history of the modern conception of space, see: Henri LEFEBVRE, *The Production of Space*, Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith, Oxford, Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1991, pp. 229-292.

⁸⁹ . The James Bay Committee had some reserves about the public debate on energy. They recognised that this debate would be very somewhat partial with the weak development of alternative and cleaner sources of energy such as the solar and wind energy. They feared that the debate will oppose hydro-electricity to nuclear energy. Although the hydroelectricity appeared to be a cleaner source of energy, it was no longer sure if it represented a cheaper alternative to nuclear energy. The James Bay Committee expected that the nuclear energy will probably gain a pre-eminence owing to its lower economic costs. Cf. JAMES BAY COMMITTEE, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

⁹⁰ . The James Bay Committee based its estimations on the construction of the Churchill Falls project which was the same size as the projected La Grande phase. The number of jobs created by the project was only 6 500 people. Moreover, the Hydro-Québec forecasts suggested that the number of jobs created would be around 20 000 in 1977 when the construction stage would be at its peak. The number of 20 000 jobs which would be created for a period of 3 to 4 years would not necessarily constitute new jobs for people who were unemployed. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

⁹¹ . These numbers are based on the assumption that the total capital investment of the La Grande complex would be about \$5,8 billion. Cf. *Idem*

⁹² . It was expected that the output of the James Bay project would be mostly the development of mining and forestry industries and not manufacturing industries employing a large number of workers. Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

⁹³ . It must be pointed out that the required amount of money was not definitive. Since Bourassa announced the project in April 1971, this amount has raised. It was nonetheless assumed that \$500 million will have to be borrow each year from the major financial markets until 1981; it was at that time that the construction was supposed to be finished. Moreover, the interest payments which will amount to \$1 billion per year have to be taken into account. Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

⁹⁴ . The James Bay Committee draw attention on three consequences. First of all, the importation of such amount of foreign capital would affect the balance of payments of both Canada and Québec. It would probably further the inflationary tendency of the Canadian dollar which would subsequently adversely affect certain industries exporting their product. Secondly, some economists suggested that the spending of this money in a relatively short period of time would undermine the ability of Québec to raise other loans for general purposes. Thirdly, for attracting foreign investors, the government may provide economic benefits which can turn out to be disadvantageous for the Québec economy. This concern was based on different examples showing that considerable sum of public money were sunk into shaky projects just for minimising risks for foreign investors. The Québec government has already granted lucrative contracts to construction companies for building the roads. The construction of this road which would provide access to the James Bay territory appears to be an important factor for securing mining companies' interests in the region. See on this point: JAMES BAY COMMITTEE, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-12.

⁹⁵ . The Continental Resources Plan was drawn from the Schultz Report which was elaborated by a U.S. Cabinet Task Force. The latter should find out solutions to the American energy crisis. The Schultz report which was released in February 1970 called for a continental energy deal. The signing of a long-term energy agreement with Canada was designated as the best solution. "According to the report Canada is the safest resource supplier both because the country is considered politically secure and because oil is available through overland transport which is military safer than transport by sea. (...) The Schultz report also considers it important that imports come as much as possible from countries where industry has a high degree of American ownership, where that industry is likely to purchase goods in return thereby not harming their balance of payments position". (pp. 10-11). These considerations suggested that this energy deal could only reinforce the dependence of Canada. It would maintain its economic structure based on raw material exports. It is important to point out that there was not only the James Bay project which could fit in the Continental Resources Plan. The projects of diversion of the Peace and Athabasca rivers and of oil drilling in the Mackenzie River Delta could also be included. See on this point: Dorothy ROSENBERG, Lucia KOWALUK, *op cit.*, pp. 10-12.

⁹⁶ . These contradictions was not only appeared in the successive Bourassa's speeches, but also in the government reports on the project. The James Bay Development Corporation released on May 1972 a small brochure entitled *Development of the James Bay Territory - Initial Phase* in which it mentioned that the produced energy could be sold to other provinces of Canada or to the United States. A later brochure was published in September by the James Bay Energy Corporation which rather affirmed that the energy will be used to meet the demand of Hydro-Québec's customers. Cf. Dorothy ROSENBERG, Lucia KOWALUK, *op cit.*, p. 4.

⁹⁷ . See on this point: *Ibid.*, pp. 4-6.

⁹⁸ . The possibility of exporting electricity surplus was mainly used by the promoters as a way for attracting foreign investors. They assumed that this can be an interesting solution to the US energy crisis which largely discussed since 1970. Ontario Hydro which planned at that time to export electricity to US Consolidated Edison of New York and several utility companies in New Brunswick and in New England appeared as a serious potential customer. The situation was slightly different in the case of the US power utility companies. It required the construction of costly transmission lines between the James Bay and the

different US states. The spokesperson of Consolidated Edison, which could be seen as being representative of other utility companies, talked about long-term contracts for making this expenditure financially worthwhile. More specifically, he referred to a contract of 2 000 000 kW for a twenty-year period. Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

⁹⁹ . See on this point: *Ibid.*, p. 9.

¹⁰⁰ . The Committee did not reject a priori the development of the James Bay area. It was the type of development proposed by the government and mostly, the lack of any prior discussion and consultation which gave rise to their mobilisation against the project. In quoting the Sierra Club motto, they furthered "not blind opposition to progress, but opposition to blind progress". Cf. THE JAMES BAY COMMITTEE, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

¹⁰¹ . This link between the James Bay project and the industrial development was a response to the argumentation of the Liberal government. This link also sprang from the global criticism of the industrial civilisation which was made by the emerging political ecology discourse. The environmental crisis which was analysed revealed a deeper crisis of the Western society's development. In this context, the James Bay project revealed not only the crisis of the Western model of development, but also the crisis of Western values. See: SOCIÉTÉ POUR VAINCRE LA POLLUTION, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-9.

¹⁰² . THE JAMES BAY COMMITTEE, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-30.

¹⁰³ . This distrust towards the Québec state was not only forwarded by the James Bay Committee. The labour unions had also had an undeniable influence in this respect. From 1970 to the election of the Parti Québécois in 1976, the Québec was torn apart by important strikes and especially in the public sector. In 1972, the first Common Front (Front commun) involving the three labour unions in the public sector was terminated by a special law and by the imprisonment of the three directors. The adoption of a "Code du travail" in 1977 by the Parti Québécois brought an important improvement of the work relations and a decrease of both the number and the duration of the strikes. Cf. John A. DICKINSON, Brian YOUNG, *Brève histoire socio-économique du Québec*, Sillery, Editions du Septentrion, 1992, pp. 340-342.

¹⁰⁴ . Dorothy ROSENBERG, Lucia KOWALUK, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

¹⁰⁵ . Cf. JAMES BAY COMMITTEE, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

¹⁰⁶ . *Ibid.*, p. 31.

¹⁰⁷ . The dossier of the SVP constituted a complement to the James Bay Committee's publications. Its ecological, economic and ethnological aspects were successively discussed. This dossier attempted to refute the governmental argumentation. It suggested that the project was not sufficiently planned and consequently, did not appear well planned and mostly required. It also raised several questions which were ignored by the government, notably in regard to its environmental impacts. The SVP as well as the James Bay Committee denounced the lack of democracy which had characterised the governmental decision process. In conclusion, the SVP reclaimed:

"- que le gouvernement du Québec effectue des études détaillées sur les effets écologiques, sociologiques et économiques du projet de la Baie James,

- que les résultats de ces études soient intégralement publiés,

- que des séances d'information et des audiences publiques concernant ce projet soient tenues,

- que les électeurs québécois soient appelés à se prononcer sur l'opportunité de ce projet."

Cf. SOCIÉTÉ POUR VAINCRE LA POLLUTION, *La baie James, c'est grave, grave, grave...*, Montréal, Editions Québécoises, 1972, 110 pages.

¹⁰⁸ . It was during these hearings that the Premier Bourassa announced that the James Bay project will start with the La Grande complex. He still reiterated that the project will involve the development of the region. Furthermore, Hydro-Quebec reclaimed during these hearings that its mandate was clarified in regard to the one of the James Bay Development Corporation. Representatives of some environmentalist

groups linked to the James Bay Committee participated to the debates. Their questions and their objections were however not taken into consideration by the government. This contributed to increase their suspicion towards the governmental approach. Cf. *Le Devoir*, 17 mai 1972, p. 1; *Le Devoir*, 19 mai 1972, p. 1.

¹⁰⁹ . See on this point: Dorothy ROSENBERG, Lucia KOWALUK, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

¹¹⁰ . This National Workshop held in Montebello marked the launching of the "Man and Resources Year" which ended by a national conference in Toronto in November 1973. This sprang from the setting up of the program "Man and Resources" which aimed to stimulate awareness of the Canadian population about the necessity of using rationally the resources. Local, provincial and national meetings were organised for allowing the concerned citizens to express their ideas and their solutions. An intergovernmental co-ordinating body, the *Canadian Council of Resource and Environment Ministers*, was created by the federal and the provinces for monitoring this program. At the preparatory meeting, the Québec delegates adopted four recommendations in regard to the James Bay project. They were prepared by a small group of delegates which formed the group "Baie James". These were:

- "1. That work on the James Bay project cease immediately until proof is brought to indicate that the project is necessary and in the best interest of Québec;
2. That detailed studies be made on the possible ecological, socio-cultural, economic consequences of the James Bay project;
3. That the results of these studies be made public integrally and publicised at information meetings.
4. That public hearings be held to assess the validity of the project."

These recommendations were sent to the Prime Minister who did not answer. The same group demanded to the Canadian Council of Resource and the Minister of Environment to invite the Indian and Inuit people from the James Bay area to send delegates to the Montebello National Workshop. They did not also get an answer. At the Montebello national Workshop, the delegates listed twelve problems which were supposed to be discussed in the following meetings. Two of them were related to the James Bay project: "the development of the North and the quality and amount of information available to justify decision-making processes". The delegates adopted resolutions which connected these problems with the launching of development mega-projects which did not have serious social and environmental impact studies and public scrutiny such as the James Bay Power Project in Québec, the diversion of the Churchill into the Nelson River in Manitoba and the construction of the Mackenzie Valley Highway in the North West territories. These projects were denounced as being violations of integrity of Canadians and their environment. They reclaimed that these projects were stopped or delayed until impartial studies were conducted and publicly discussed, providing clear evidence that they will not create irreparable damages. Cf. Michelle TRUDEL in Fikret BERKES (ed.), *James Bay Forum. Public Hearing on the James Bay Project held in Montreal, April 1973*, Montréal, The James Bay Committee, 1973, pp. 11-13.

¹¹¹ . These public hearings which were designated as a Public Forum were presided by a "Board of Enquirers". "The Board consisted of prominent Quebecois from a variety of backgrounds, representing a number of geographical areas. They were invited by the James Bay Committee to be "enquirers" at the Public Forum on the basis of their past concern with problems of society. None of them had taken a public stand for or against the James Bay Project prior the hearings." The Chairman of the Board was Gilles Vigneault. The Board had subsequently prepared a report summarising the arguments and points of view presented during the Public Forum. Cf. Fikret BERKES, "Epilogue", in the *The James Bay Forum*, *op. cit.*, p. 147

¹¹² . Cf. *Le Devoir*, 9 avril 1973, p. 3. See also the report from the Board of Enquirers in Fikret BERKES (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 147-148.

¹¹³ . See in particular the first section of the edition of the public hearings. Cf. *The James Bay Forum*, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-20.

¹¹⁴ . *Le Devoir*, 9 avril 1973, p. 3.

¹¹⁵ . During this meeting with the promoters, the Enquirers attempted to open some doors for discussion, but they got rebuff. The Premier justified one more time the project as required to respond to the energy demand. Without the project, he predicted an energy crisis in 1984 which would oblige hospitals and factories to shut down. Even if the enquirers contested the Hydro-Québec's projected growth in energy demands by presenting a revised projection (4,0-4,5% instead of 7,9% a year), they were answered by the President of the SEBJ that they should have faith in the infallibility of Hydro-Québec. They obtained the same kind of cynical answers when they called into question the Hydro-Québec's policy to increase the consumption of electricity. For the President of the SEBJ, this policy was good since hydro-electricity was an important Québec natural resource. The enquirers concluded the Premier was more interested by economics than by the degradation of the quality of life. Finally, in regard to the fate of Native Peoples, they were answered that a choice was made between 5000 Indians and six million Quebecois. This discussion appeared then rather fruitless. Cf. The JAMES BAY COMMITTEE, "Vox Populi, Vox Dei", in Fikret BERKES (ed.), *The James Bay Forum*, op. cit., p. 149

¹¹⁶ . *Idem*.

¹¹⁷ . Cf. *Le Devoir*, 6 avril 1973, p. 7.

¹¹⁸ . Cf. *Le Devoir*, 10 mars 1973, p. 23.

¹¹⁹ . Cf. *Le Devoir*, 28 avril 1976., p. 7.

¹²⁰ . Cf. CONSEIL CONSULTATIF DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT, *Audiences sur les impacts environnementaux du développement de la Baie James*, Tome 2: Annexes, Québec Gouvernement du Québec, 1977, p. 3.

¹²¹ . The James Bay Committee presented in its brief an evaluation of the James Bay project since it was launched four years ago. It still perceived a high level of improvisation insofar as many questions were still unanswered. The technical plans were constantly changing. Given the lack of substantial foreign investments, it was finally the Québécois which assumed the cost of the project. Moreover, the demand of electricity did not seem to follow the Hydro-Québec's projections. The number of jobs created by the project was quite inferior to what was expected and did not concerned Native Peoples. Furthermore, whereas that any environmental impact studies was previously done, the works were going on without taking into account their eventual impacts on the fragile sub-arctic environment. The Committee pointed out different cases of pollution and environmental damages. It particularly deplored the lack of control by the Québec services of environmental protection and the legal fuzziness about the application of the Environment Quality Act over this territory. Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 11-13.

¹²² . The Advisory Council decided to not retain the other aspects of the James Bay Committee's request which would not correspond to its mandate. Diverse points mentioned by the latter justified the Council's decision: 1) the absence of preliminary environmental impact studies and the lack of planning in the development; 2) the absence of environmental control over the on-going works which brought about environmental damages and pollution problems; 3) the probable absence of municipal rules and an ecological code providing an effective protection of the environment; 4) the absence of the Québec Services of environmental protection; 5) the insufficiency of the existing jurisdictions and laws for providing the protection of environment and the integrated development of the James Bay territory; 6) the probable inability of the Environment Quality Act to control pollution in the James Bay territory. These points appeared for the Advisory Council well founded. This convinced it to set up an ad hoc committee for study more carefully these issues. Cf. CONSEIL CONSULTATIF DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT, *Rapport annuel 1975-76*, Québec, Gouvernement du Québec, 1976, p. 61.

¹²³ . It decided to sent a report to the Minister of Environment containing recommendations for the JBDC and the JBEC. The Council affirmed that there could not be an effective protection of the quality of environment on the James Bay territory owing to the administrative mess. This conclusion was reinforced with the resignation of the director of the SEBJ's services of environmental protection some months ago. While agreeing with the latter, the Council also noticed that the number of inspectors relative to environment was too small. It then recommended to the Minister that the SEBJ's Service of environmental protection should be empowered to directly intervene on the ground and that its inspectors should have a large field of interventions. It also recommended that the Minister oversee itself the quality of environment

in the James Bay territory. The Council underlined the lack of involvement of the Québec Services of protection of the environment. Cf. *Le Devoir*, 28 juillet 1976, p. 11; CONSEIL CONSULTATIF DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT, *Rapport annuel 1975-76*, op. cit., pp. 62-65.

¹²⁴ . Many of the Council's recommendations underlined the need to increase the co-ordination between the Québec Services of the protection of environment, the JBDC and the JBEC. They required that each of them adopted more appropriate decisional mechanisms and more effective measures of control. They recommended in this respect to the JBDC and JBEC that they transmitted to the Québec Services of protection of environment the existing programme of rearrangement and correction of perturbed and polluted sites by the works. The Council also recommended that the JBDC adopted as soon as possible a development programme of the territory as it was announced when the project was launched. It suggested the establishment of links with the "Office de la planification et de développement du Québec" for co-ordinating the development of the James Bay region with the neighbouring regions. The Council pointed out that it was only the hydro-electric resource which was developed until that time. Consequently, this would impose constraints to the development of other region's resources. We can also mention that the Council recommended to the JBEC the adoption of a programme of development of its reservoirs before of proceeding to their filling up. Finally, the Advisory Council insisted on the need of giving access to the public to the James Bay territory. Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 159-165.

CHAPTER 5. THE LAUNCHING OF THE GREAT WHALE PROJECT: THE RESCALING OF QUÉBEC POLITICS

The time between the end of the La Grande project and the announcement of the Great Whale project in 1988 may have been short, but it was a period marked by important political and social changes occurred. The Quebec and Canadian socio-political context was substantially redefined in these years. Both political scenes entered a period of crisis of the political arrangements that had been in place since 1945. The political and economic restructuring that ensued involved a major transformation of the spatio-temporal settings structuring both political scenes. This went beyond a redefinition of the political agenda, i.e. the politicising of new issues, the empowerment of new actors, to redraw the political horizon in a way that challenged the existing hierarchy of political spaces (local, regional, national and international). Among the changes involved in this process of rescaling, two are particularly important for our discussion. The first is the politicisation of a global space through the discourses and policies related to globalisation. The second is the breaking up of the predominant political framework structuring the national space. These broader changes markedly affected the Great Whale.

This chapter will examine how these broader changes in Quebec and Canadian politics shaped the debates and disputes around the Great Whale project. This discussion will highlight the centrality and the complexity of the debates around the national question. One important aspect is the dissolution of the post-war political framework resting on the triptych state-nation-territory. In this period, the inadequacy of existing political institutions, given the plurinational and multiethnic character of both the Canadian and Québec political, increasingly apparent. Moreover, the emergence of other forms of territoriality, notably through the recognition of Aboriginal peoples' political and legal rights, challenged the predominance of state territoriality. Consequently, the definition of what constitutes the national on one hand and the relation of state and the territory on the other, became key political issues in Canada and Québec.

This chapter is divided in three parts. The first provides a broad overview of some important changes of Québec and Canadian politics from the end of the 1970s to the beginning of the 1990s. Three

important issues will be discussed: the increasing adoption of a neo-liberal agenda by both governments; the opposition between Québec nationalist movement, the Aboriginal nationalist movement and Canadian nationalism, and the transformation of the political and institutional bases of citizenship politics. The second part presents an overview of the trajectory followed by Hydro-Québec in this period. The challenges and contradictions faced by Hydro-Québec in a period of transition will be examined. Particular attention will be paid to the redefinition of its institutional mandate which included the development of a hydro export strategy. This period also marked the end of the consensus around Hydro-Québec with the rise of a more vocal opposition and the emergence of different internal problems. The last part of this chapter will compare the main characteristics of the Great Whale project to the La Grande project. After having retraced its history and its place in the hydro-electric development of the James Bay region, the main arguments used by Hydro-Québec and the Québec government to legitimate the project will be analysed. Here the project's spatial implications will be highlighted. The strategic importance accorded exports of hydro-electricity to USA in the justification of the project suggest that the delimitation of the scales had now become an important stake.

5.1 The Remapping of Canadian and Québec Politics

The launching of the Great Whale project at the end of the 1980s occurred when the map of Québec politics and Canadian politics was being redrawn. Just as the La Grande project was shaped by the politics of the 1960s and 1970s, the Great Whale project was shaped by the debates and issues of the 1980s. Each project is thus rooted in distinct political contexts that provided different opportunities and constraints to the actors involved in the projects. This does not mean that there are no similarities. The same actors were involved in both and the Great Whale project was initially seen as part of the James Bay hydroelectric development project. Certain changes that underlined in earlier discussion of the La Grande project became more important in the discussions around the Great Whale project. Despite these links between the two phases, however, their embeddedness within different spatio-temporal settings is critical to understanding why the Great Whale project was temporarily, and perhaps definitely, shelved by the Québec government. In this section, we will sketch out some important changes of the Québec and Canadian political scenes during the 1980s which revealed the emergence of a new political context.

The Changing Canadian State Trajectory

The restructuring of Québec politics has been shaped by the political changes having taken place on the Canadian political scene. These interactions between the two political spaces go well beyond the constraints deriving from the federal system. They are also linked to the blurring of the spatial and political bases of both societies as they became increasingly plural and heterogeneous. The end of the 1970s and the 1980s constituted a period of turmoil in Canadian politics, marked by surfacing of debates that signalled the end of the postwar era. The process of restructuring arose out of a deep internal political crisis which is far from resolved.¹ Canadian society became visibly pluri-national and pluri-ethnic. It is traversed by different types of allegiances and Canadian identity is framed by different, and quite often opposing, definitions. Despite the establishment of the Royal Commissions, national debates, and referenda aiming to recreate new political arrangements, the issues have not been resolved. Without presenting a detailed history of Canadian politics during these two decades, we want to highlight certain changes which had an impact on the politics of the Great Whale project. Particular attention will be paid to the reframing of the federal state's sphere of interventions and to the broadening and plurality of Canadian identity politics. Both suggest an important remapping of Canadian politics, one that questioned the existing hierarchy established between the various political spaces. This opened the door to the unbundling of the national space that has redefined its meaning and scales.

The 1970s constituted a turning point in Canadian politics.² The nation-state building process launched after the World War II began to be questioned by various developments. In the postwar period, the adoption of Keynesian policies worked to reinforce the Canadian economy and to reduce regional and socio-economic disparities by reinforcing economic and political links among the regions of Canada. The adoption of the Citizenship Act in 1947, which included a naturalisation policy for immigrants, constituted another important nation-building step. In the 1950s, the implementation of specific policies dealing with Northern development affirmed Canadian sovereignty over this region. During the 1970s, however, many key elements of this political setting came into question. New actors and discourses carrying new spatial and historical representations of the Canadian society began to emerge. The end of the postwar era was clear with the failure of "the Third National Policy" the Liberals attempted to implement after the 1980

election. This policy package aimed to reassert the central role of the federal state while reaffirming the predominance of the Canadian national identity over the other forms of political allegiance and in particular, growing provincialism.³ It represented an attempt to preserve the post-war political configuration that revolved around a strong Federal state and a pan-Canadian identity. Its abandonment implicitly signified the need for a redefinition of Canadian federalism and Canadian society.

The 1980s confirmed the abandonment of economic policies aiming a national self-regulation. The election of the Mulroney government in 1984 and the publication of the Macdonald Commission Report⁴ in 1985 symbolised the end of the Keynesian era in Canadian politics. They opened the door to the redefinition of the federal state's bases of legitimacy and spheres of intervention.⁵ This became noticeable with the spreading of a new discourse of federal state largely shaped by neo-liberalism and by the discourse on the "public debt crisis". Indeed, the election of the Conservative government brought a new discourse to the fore which represented the federal state as a kind of private enterprise delivering services to its clients – but one which needed to become more efficient.⁶ This analogy was also raised by the business sector and by the media. The management of state activities based on the private enterprise rationale came to be seen as the best solution to the deficit. Greater efficiency of state services now meant giving the market a greater role in the regulation of economy. This ideological and political shift revealed the increasing hegemony of a new political agenda which included privatisation, deregulation and cutbacks in public spending. The Conservative government's adoption of the Agenda for Economic Renewal set the path for this new political program.

The economic discourse on the state framed the reform of the federal public administration and the modifications brought to economic and social policies during the 1980s. Although the election of the Mulroney government played a critical role in this regard, other factors also helped. The political importance given to the Public Accounting reports reflected and legitimised the predominance of this discourse. The constraints imposed by the world market further underlined the necessity for change. Thus the debates around the signature of the FTA and NAFTA played an important role in the redefinition of the federal state's economic horizon. These agreements were presented as critical to the revitalisation of the Canadian economy.

Inspired by reforms in Britain and New Zealand, the Conservative government proceeded to a reallocation of public spending and to the redrawing of state institutional boundaries. This reconfiguration of state interventions did not involve a shrinkage of the federal state. Thus, for instance, the Mulroney government developed relatively new spheres of activities related to, for example, the protection of environment.⁷ What was involved, however, was a redrawing of the federal state's role and of Canadian federalism. The most significant changes were the reforms and cutbacks in social programs and the privatisation of some sectors of activities such as the energy and transport. Another major change was the signing of the two free-trade agreements that in turn entailed a redefinition of federal economic policies and deepened the integration of the Canadian economy into a North American economic space. Finally, the adoption of the 1982 Constitution Act, and the Supreme Court's decisions indicated the emergence of new political setting which has questioned the national role of the federal state, and more broadly, the principles and norms of Canadian federalism. This is evident in disputes about the cutbacks in transfer payments to the provinces and the application of national norms related to education and health such as the universality of provincial health programs.

The new setting of Quebec politics was largely similar to that which occurred in Canada, though it emerged somewhat earlier at the federal level.⁸ For both it involved a questioning of the state's legitimacy and territoriality. The bases of the federal state's political authority are contested from many directions (provincial governments, Aboriginal peoples, women's groups, cultural minorities, etc.). The reshaping of Canadian state economic policies and more generally, of the structure of economic relations have also revealed a reconstruction of the scales of Canadian economy which no longer clearly fits the borders of the federal state. A disjunction has appeared between the Canadian political space and the Canadian economic space with the latter less and less structured around the Canadian territory. Even if the Canadian economy has long been relatively open and largely dependent on the outside, successive Canadian governments have nonetheless sought to attain some form of self-sufficiency and to increase control over the national economy. This objective came into question in the 1980s. The picture of the Canadian economy shows various and contradictory competing logics of restructuring among which the globalisation constitutes one rather nebulous facet.⁹

The Quest of a New Canadian National Identity

The redefinition of the federal state has occurred at the same time as the national character of the Canadian society came into question. Trudeau's policy of multiculturalism which aimed to reinforce citizens allegiance to Canadian state and to build up national unity did not bring the expected results. In the 1980s it became evident that the Canadian political community was fragmented among different political allegiances. The greater plurality of identity politics confronted the federal government with the need to find new principles and norms that could bridge these differences. The failure of constitutional discussions suggests that this challenge remains unanswered. The difficulty of defining Canadianness increased with the emergence of other national representations which questioned the primacy of the federal government's. In addition to Québec nationalism, two other factors contributed to the weakening of the old pattern of Canadian nationhood: province-building and the Aboriginal nationalism. This section focuses on the latter two as the impact of Québec nationalism will be taken up in the next section.

The emergence of province-building in the 1970s introduced significant breaches in Canadian national unity.¹⁰ The provinces' drive to develop their own policies and to acquire a greater political autonomy called into question the federal policies establishing national norms. The impact of province-building was magnified by the revival of regionalism.¹¹ The division of Canada into three large regions (Western, Central and the Atlantic) has been highlighted by the recent constitutional debates or the federal/provincial meetings on economic issues. The two last federal elections, which failed to produce an official opposition that could claim to represent all Canada regions confirmed this new framework of Canadian polity. One important consequence of provincial-building is the empowerment of a new collective representation of the Canadian political community. Instead of imagining Canada in terms of two founding nations, it came increasingly to be defined as ten equal provinces. The confrontation between these two representations has clearly emerged through the various constitutional debates and negotiation rounds since the 1980s.¹²

These were not the only conceptions of Canada that began to jostle one another in the 1980s, however. Plurinational and pluriethnic representations have gained increasing importance.¹³ In this

respect, the mobilisation of Aboriginal peoples at both provincial and federal levels during the 1970s played an important role. Their political exclusion was called into question resulted in their increased participation in political institutions. In turn, the growing representativity and militancy of Aboriginal organisations and the growing awareness of Canadian governments furthered this shift of the political balance.¹⁴ Aboriginal peoples successfully widened the space or the breaches created by Québec sovereignists' claims. They applied the arguments invoked to support to Québec's claims to their situation. The recognition of aboriginal and treaty rights in the Constitution Act of 1982 on the one hand and on the other, the naming of Aboriginal peoples as First Nations contributed to this political shift. Legal and institutional changes in turn gave them room to manoeuvre, allowing them to consolidate channels of participation. One major consequence is the growing legitimacy of the notion of three founding nations, i.e. French, English and Aboriginal. In contrast to the "ten equal provinces" representation, the "Three Nations" representation remains linked to the historical representation of two founding peoples since both refer to Canadian history.

The redefinition of Aboriginal peoples' political space at the federal and provincial levels went hand in hand with the transformation of Aboriginal peoples' collective identity. The incremental replacement of Indians by First Nations in political and constitutional discourse involved not only a reconfiguration of the political setting framing Aboriginal politics, but also a shift in power relations between Aboriginal peoples and non-aboriginal people ("allochtones").¹⁵ The First Nations came to constitute the new collective identity around which Aboriginal peoples are mobilised. It indicated a new phase in the representation of Aboriginal peoples.¹⁶ This reflected a greater involvement of Aboriginal peoples in shaping their own identity, an identity that constitutes the basis of their claims. Contrary to the name of Indian, which was imposed from outside, First Nations reveals a reflexive identity chosen by Aboriginal peoples. The transformation of the Aboriginal peoples movement into a nationalist movement entailed a rethinking of the terms by which they imagine and construct a "We-figure" versus the "Other," one that called into question the other-figure defined from the White colonial standpoint.

The nation-building process launched by Aboriginal peoples challenges previous conceptions of Canadian nationhood insofar as it contests its historicity, its spatiality and even its legitimacy.¹⁷ Aboriginal

leaders advanced a reinterpretation of the earlier reading of Canadian history in terms of two founding peoples. This implied a redrawing of the contours of the Canadian national community insofar as Aboriginal nation-building overlaps with other national levels. It suggests a disconnection between the Canadian state borders and the frontiers of the Canadian national community, that is, the latter no longer fit the state territory. Contrary to Québec nationalist claims, the First Nations refer to many nations not confined to a delimited territory and which do not necessarily share the same history and political culture. They then call for the recognition of a new political setting which would have diverse national levels with different meanings and scales. The issue of Aboriginal self-determination clearly reflects important transformations of Aboriginal politics having occurred during the 1980s. It confronted the federal and provincial governments with the need to find new ways of articulating the recognition of Aboriginal rights to the establishment of a pluri-national order. It is in this sense that the empowerment of Aboriginal peoples opened the door to the redefinition of Canadian nationhood and citizenship.¹⁸

The Questioning of the Quiet Revolution Legacy

The 1980s revealed some important transformations of the Québec political scene.¹⁹ Its contours, its actors, its discourses and issues began to be defined on new grounds. Québec faced similar challenges and crises to Canada's and many other Western societies. It does not appear to be so "distinct" in this regard.²⁰ Its increasing pluri-ethnic character, the fragmentation of its citizenry and the shrinking of its public sphere constituted major issues for most of the Western governments. Even the growing visibility of Aboriginal peoples brings a set of issues that are also raised in countries with a colonial or "white settler" legacy. Moreover, the Québec state has been facing a major and enduring crisis of governance revealed by its growing difficulty developing effective solutions. Although the state remains an important actor, its ability to mobilise allegiance around its authority and to formulate collective projects is in question. In the 1980s, it is the spatial rather than the temporal dimension that frames these debates. This was noticeable in the redrawing of boundaries of state intervention and the transformation of Québec nationalist movement. Both issues will be examined below. It will be argued that both called the convergence between the national and territorial dimensions of politics into question, revealing a new phase in the process of jumping scales launched by the Québec nationalist movement.

The New Space of Neo-Liberalism: a New Agenda for the Québec Government

The Québec state entered in a period of crisis at the end of the 1970s, at the same time as many other Western states. The Keynesian model of the postwar decades no longer seemed to work. Lacking an alternative model to put in its place, successive Québec governments tried different economic strategies and policies with limited success. To characterise this transition, we can suggest that the Québec government began to abandon the Swedish social democratic model for the neo-liberal model being pioneered by the British and New Zealand. The economic recession at the beginnings of the 1980s showed the fragility of the Québec economy, revealing the Québec government's declining ability to control the different economic levers. The high unemployment rate and the rise of public expenditure became two critical issues on the Québec government's agenda. It has been argued that the unilateral decision by the Lévesque government in 1982 to impose a " wage freeze " on the public and parapublic sectors employees was the first step of this redefinition.²¹ The control of the public debt and the need to reduce public expenditure became the major economic imperatives. The discourse and policies of the Quebec government were increasingly shaped by neo-liberal ideas that were being embraced by most Western societies.²² This ideological stream legitimated the market as a more efficient way to create collective wealth and to resolve economic difficulties, dismissing the leadership of the state. It also served to present the world market as the new economic horizon of the Québec economy.

The Québec neo-liberal experience has not been, of course, very radical in comparison to the British and Neo-Zealand experiences. It has not meant the dismantling of state activities to let market mechanisms regulate the economy. Given the Quebec state's historical role in the formation of francophone capital and its institutional weight in the regulation of Québec society, the application of a strong neo-liberal logic would have meant an important rupture. State interventionism has not been abandoned, though the establishment of new state corporations or the state control of some economic activities was definitively discredited. It is rather the legitimacy, the forms and the scale of state intervention that have been redefined.²³ This was visible in the proliferation of discourses and public documents reclaiming the deregulation of economic activities, privatisation and a general move to reduce the size of the state sector.²⁴ Subsequent reforms to social and health policies involved significant cuts.

More recently, the adoption of the "zero deficit" budgetary policy confirmed the redefinition of state interventions along a neo-liberal axis. The emphasis put on conciliation, "concertation" and partnership between capital, labour and government suggests that the Québec state is still involved in the management of economy, but it is no longer willing to be the main player.²⁵

The on-going reconfiguration of Québec state interventions has political and spatial implications. It has not only involved the redrawing of the division between the private and public sectors, but also a rearticulation of the spatial basis of the state. The rescaling of state activities on new spatial grounds which opened the door to the unbundling of territorial bases of Québec economy. In contrast to the Quiet revolution's spatial framework which rested on the convergence on the Québec economy and polity within the territorial borders, the policies adopted by recent governments suggests a different spatial framework. This opened the door to the redefinition of the national scale which came to be primarily represented as economic, revealing the empowerment of business groups and the spread of neo-liberal discourse. This does not mean that the political and territorial aspects of the national space became irrelevant. The debates raised by the nationalist movement or by the labour movement indicated that both representations were still important but no longer uncontested. This redefinition of the national space came along with the greater importance given to the international and to emerging global space in the construction of Québec's legitimacy and in the structuring of state intervention.²⁶ The political recognition of what came to be called the *Québec Inc.* model and the debates around the free-trade agreements are good examples of the rescaling of state activities.

During the 1980s, attention has been increasingly paid to Québec Inc, the so-called Québec economic development model.²⁷ Even if we can trace its history to the Quiet revolution, it is only during the first mandate of the Parti Québécois, and more particularly with the publication of development plan in 1978 entitled *Bâtir le Québec*, that Québec inc. assumed a coherent form. Michael Smith²⁸ identified four components of the Québec inc. model: 1) greatly increased francophone ownership and control of corporations, combined with broad popular approval for business ; 2) a core of large financial organisations (e.g. the Caisse de dépôt et de placement, the Mouvement Desjardins, and the Banque Nationale); 3) a substantial governmental presence in the economy ; and 4) co-operation between labour,

capital and government. In other words, the Québec inc. model rested on the collaboration between the private and public sectors in managing Québec's economic development. The formal articulation of this economic development model, however, occurred at the precise moment that it began to lose its efficacy. In that it politicised debate about Québec's way out of crisis, it helped to undermine confidence in the state's ability to revitalise the economy, even while it created room for business groups, which were seen as an essential component of this model. It suggested that the Québec state had to rely on partnerships with other actors, especially the private sector.²⁹

Debate over the Québec Inc. model indicated a transformation of Québec identity politics that became increasingly visible throughout the 1980s. In the new discourse, the business sector was given a prominent role in the definition of Québec's political agenda. This reflected a broader transformation of the political and cultural status of the private entrepreneur who became a prominent figure in the Québec collective imaginary.³⁰ The emphasis was put on the successful entrepreneurs - the "winners" such as Bombardier, Lavallin, Québecor. In this context, the business sector and by extension, all the people linked to economic activities, were empowered. Their visibility in the media significantly increased, and during elections, their candidature was eagerly sought by political parties. They began to replace the intellectuals and artists who had been at the forefront in the 1960s and 1970s. This change tracked the spread of liberal individualism within Québec society.

This change was also apparent in the framing of Québec's external policies. Whereas in the earlier period, the development of foreign and diplomatic relations represented the Québec government's main international objective, the conquest of the world market came to constitute the primary objective. The need to find a niche on the global market became the leitmotiv underlying the governmental economic policies and business sector's claims. It contributed to reordering the political agenda. Increased competitiveness and attraction of foreign investments came to constitute paramount objectives of the industrial and commercial policies. Both objectives have been integrated within the everyday discourses and public discussions. One important dimension of this discourse on the global market is its determinist and a-political argumentation.³¹ Prosperity is now seen to hinge on success in world markets.

This discourse on the global market and implicitly, this vision of the world were legitimised by the two trade agreements on continental integration. The Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between Canada and USA and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between Canada, USA and Mexico confirmed the on-going process of restructuring of Québec economy and at the same time, the reconfiguration of the Québec state.³² The signature of the free-trade agreements was supported by the leaders of both political parties (Parti Québécois and Québec Liberal Party) and by a large part of the business sector. Opposition came from the labour unions, some business groups and some social movements (ecology, women). What was surprising was the Parti Québécois leadership's support for these agreements. Rather than limits to state sovereignty, the leadership now viewed them as opportunities to secure Québec's economic development.³³

One important consequence of the rescaling of the Québec state is the increasing gap between its political space and its economic space. The free-trade agreements played an important part here. The establishment of a North American economic space opened the door to a dislocation between the Québec politics and economy, revealing the porosity of Québec's frontiers. The American continent and the global/world market became two economic spaces through which economic actors like Bombardier and Hydro-Québec redefined their strategies. The agreements also helped to strengthen the North-South axis over the old East-West axis constructed by through earlier pan-Canadian policies.³⁴ In other words, while Québec politics have remained largely territorialised, its economy has become increasingly deterritorialised by its integration into the North American economy. Québec policies are now understood in relation to an economic space overlapping, but not necessarily bounded by, the territory of Québec.

The New Challenges of the Québec Nationalist Movement

The increasing visibility of business sector within the discourse on "entrepreneurship" formed part of the reframing of Québec identity politics. This was reinforced by changes in the Québec nationalist movement in the 1980s.³⁵ The nationalist project, which emerged during the Quiet revolution, had been linked to the development of the welfare state, and fuelled by a social democratic discourse in which the notions of social justice and equality formed key elements. The project aimed to achieve a sovereign

nation-state, including the creation of a civic political community articulated around the majority francophone culture. In this discourse, the modern Francophone Québécois constituted the representative identity figure. This portrait was significantly altered with the substantial remapping of the Québec political scene during the 1980s. In the following pages, our discussion will focus on three issues reflecting this transformation of Québec nationalist movement: the reconstruction of the We-identity around the entrepreneur figure; the growing visibility and heterogeneity of the Other; and the differentiation between its spatial and territorial bases. These three issues called into question the adequacy of the representation of the Québec nation and the associated political project.

The redefinition of the Québec nationalist movement was propelled by two major events at the beginning of the 1980s. The first was the 1980 referendum on the sovereignty-association proposition which was rejected by 60% of the Québec population. The referendum introduced two significant changes to the Québec nationalist movement's strategies. The first is the consolidation of the sovereignty-association option, which came to be seen as the most likely to gain the requisite support. The establishment of an economic association with Canada became the privileged option over the complete political independence option.³⁶ Québec nationalist leaders had come to feel that independence would frighten off the undecided. The 1980 referendum also made it clear that the PQ would have to win the support of the business sector and the ethno-cultural communities. Second, the 1980 referendum politicised the whole referendum process. The technicalities surrounding Québec's accession to sovereignty became the focus of party strategists, rather than the more visionary question of the kind of social and political institutions that would constitute a sovereign Québec.³⁷

The second event was the unilateral decision of the Trudeau government to repatriate the Canadian Constitution from the British Westminster parliament.³⁸ The impact went well beyond the Québec nationalist movement, introducing major changes in Canadian politics. Repatriation involved in the adoption of the Constitutional Act of 1982 by the Federal government but it has never been recognised by the Québec government. In the 1980s and early 1990s, there were important constitutional negotiations aimed at winning Québec's consent. In particular the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords sought to respond Québec's historic grievances and thus demonstrate the possibility of renewing

Canadian federalism.³⁹ Their failure strengthened the Québec nationalist movement and deepened the crisis of Canadian national unity.

This new political framework opened the door to an important redefinition of Québec nationalist movement. Of course, the establishment of a Québec sovereign nation-state was still seen and presented as the primary objective of the Québec nationalist movement. This objective remained the basis of its mobilisation. It became linked, however, to a new political agenda suggesting a swing from Left to Right. Indeed, the constitutional debates revealed a redefinition of the collective identity-figure put forward through the nationalist claims.⁴⁰ During the 1980s, the francophone private businessman (and not businesswoman) came to be presented as the representative identity-figure of the Québec nationalist movement. As we have argued, this constituted a turning point since the business sector had been largely hostile to the sovereignist option. The nationalist entrepreneur was defined as a francophone Québécois with a clear individualist and neo-liberal ethos.⁴¹ This new nationalist identity was also portrayed as open and engaged with the world. Québec multinational firms or internationally successful artists like Bombardier and the Cirque du Soleil assumed a new prominence. The conquest of the global market was presented as an inescapable and at the same time, a valuable objective, reflecting the Québécois ability of to compete and thus to be truly sovereign. This helps to explain why nationalist leaders became such strong advocates for continental economic integration.⁴² The adoption of this new identity-figure came along with the redefinition of the role of the state in the nationalist discourse. Of course, the pursuit of the Québec state affirmation at the international level was still praised. They still privilege the development of its diplomatic activities, especially the ones related to Francophone countries. The state's role is no longer seen as orchestrator of Québec's social and economic development, but rather an accompanist for its national entrepreneurs, notably at the international level⁴³.

What appeared during the 1980s is a greater heterogeneity of the Québec nationalist identity-figure within the nationalist discourse. This political shift revealed contradictions within the movement. The neo-liberal perspective adopted by the leaders of the Parti Québécois was contested by the social-democratic forces who remain important within the nationalist movement. The unions, the women's organisations, popular and community-based groups and a large portion of the Parti Québécois grass-

roots membership expressed their rejection of a neo-liberal perspective and insisted on the necessity of elaborating a more egalitarian societal project. Their opposition asserted different ways of belonging to the Québec nation. Although entrepreneurship has been imposed as the dominant form, other forms such as the feminism, the ecology, or the ethnicity also remained important.⁴⁴

The changing definitions of the "we-ness" underlying the Québec nationalist movement have been linked to the transformation of the "Other". Indeed, the nationalist movement became confronted with an opposition within and outside of Québec more heterogeneous and at the same time, more visible and vocal. In addition to the federal government and the provinces, the Québec nationalist movement has also to respond the claims of the Québec ethno-cultural communities and Aboriginal peoples. Although some were previously part of the debates, they nonetheless gained a greater legitimacy and visibility in the debates. The Québec nationalist movement could not simply dismiss their claims. Various factors contributed to this reversal of perspective: the political and spatial redefinition of the Québec nationalist movement resulting from its process of jumping scales, the constitutional negotiations aiming to resolve the national crisis unity, and the transformation of the international context about nationalist issues.

One important consequence of the jumping scales made by the Québec nationalist movement during the 1960s and 1970s was the imposition of new power, and consequently, the redefinition of the relations with the opposition. The nationalist movement came increasingly to be represented as a dominant actor within the Québec borders and less as an historical minority within Canada. Yet, the need to increase popular support for sovereignty meant that Québec nationalist movement had to rethink their relations with the federal government and the other provinces as well as with Québec's ethno-cultural communities.⁴⁵ During the 1995 referendum, the involvement of the federal and the other provinces only underlined the importance of this strategic element. Nationalist leaders had to respond to show that the nationalist project was not only for the Québec Francophones.⁴⁶

Aboriginal peoples and Québec's ethnocultural minorities clearly had an important part to play in the redefinition of the political and spatial bases of the Québec nationalist movement. They forced the nationalist movement to confront its ethnic basis and to its exclusionary and discriminatory potential. Their

minority status within the nationalist project and the limited relations between their representatives and those of the nationalist movement contributed to a sense of distrust. Their mobilisation thus challenged the representative and integrative character of Québec nationalism. In doing so, they revealed the increasing multi-ethnic and pluri-national character of the Québec. They posed a critical challenge to the Québec nationalist movement which is still unanswered: to propose a pluralist and integrative political project.⁴⁷

Although the claims of ethno-cultural minorities and Aboriginal peoples against the nationalist movement overlapped, they do not have however the same implications. In contrast to the ethno-cultural minorities, the mobilisation of Aboriginal peoples confronted the Québec nationalist movement with a similar agenda and a different territoriality. The empowerment of this new social movement involved not only the growing visibility of a new political actor on the Québec political scene, but also the calling into question of the legitimacy and the hegemony of Québec nationalism within the Québec public sphere.⁴⁸ The self-naming as First Nations constituted an important change in the political setting of Québec nationalism.

The affirmation of an Aboriginal nationalism reflects the growing political visibility of Aboriginal peoples. Although they remained in the margins of the Québec society during the 1980s, they were no longer ignored. Different factors played a role on this score. Their struggles against the La Grande project had broken down the historical ignorance of the Québec government. Another significant factor was the Lévesque government's development of a policy toward Aboriginal peoples, including the establishment of specific institutions. This resulted from various meetings and parliamentary commissions between 1978 and 1985.⁴⁹ The 1983 Declaration by the National Assembly by which the Québec government established principles defining the Québec/Aboriginal peoples relations was a turning point. Although the Québec government clearly affirmed and repeated that this recognition of Aboriginal rights did not affect its sovereignty and its territorial integrity, this meant the redrawing of its political scene on a pluri-national basis. It has opened the door to a redefinition of the Québec citizenship. While willing to further integrate Aboriginal populations within the Québec public administration, the Québec government reiterated that they were historically and culturally different. They could not be considered simply as citizens of Québec.

For the Québec government, this justified the establishment of new relations with them within a political framework, and outside the courts. The recognition of this particular status occurred in 1980 with the governmental decision to abolish the distinction between status Indian and non-status Indian defined in the federal law. The Québec government began to use the expression, "person of Indian ancestry" ("personne d'appartenance amérindienne"), instead of Indian in the governmental documents and legislation.⁵⁰ This revealed the governmental recognition of an indianness and at the same time, created a space for Aboriginal populations to participate in the definition of their own identities.

Nevertheless, a tension has persisted between Québec and Aboriginal nationalisms since the political recognition of the one's claims are understood as a threat and a denial of the other's. The nationalist claims of Québec's First Nations deeply challenge many key structuring elements of the Québec nationalist movement. Whereas during the 1960s the Québec nationalist discourse was shaped by Third World liberation movements, the Aboriginal nationalist discourse presents Québec as a colonial force and focuses attention on its historical violations of Aboriginal rights, particularly their right to self-determination. It presents a totally different and legitimate rewriting and remapping of the Québec history and geography.⁵¹ Québec nationalist claims are centred on Québec territory as the basis for establishing relations with Canadian, continental and global political spaces. Aboriginal nationalist claims propose a political map based on their ancestral lands located within the Canadian political space and quite often implying a reconfiguration of the Québec territory. The recognition of their territorial claims presupposes the delimitation of internal boundaries within the Québec territory. In other words, the Aboriginal nationalism calls into question the inclusiveness and representativity of Québec nationalism in regard to the same political space. It draws attention on the pluri-national dimension of the latter while reasserting the authority of the federal government over the Québec territory. Québec nationalist leaders have not yet found out a way of accommodating the Québec First Nations' claims.

The increasing plurality of the Québec nationalist identity revealed then that the nationalist discourse was enmeshed within different but overlapping political spaces: Québec, Canadian and global political spaces.⁵² The latter, in fact, embraces various communities: the Francophone countries, the continental economy, the world market and the global political community. Each of these political spaces

came to constitute spatial references used by nationalist leaders to construct the Québec national community and to legitimate nationalist claims. They represent political arenas in which they have carried on their struggles. This does not mean that the Canadian or the international political scene were previously ignored. Yet they gained a strategic importance in the discourse of the Québec nationalists that of their opponents. The predominance of the sovereignty-association option and the empowerment of business interests in the nationalist discourse contributed to this shift. One important consequence was the decentring of the Québec territory. Although it still keeps an historical and cultural importance in the Québec nationalist discourse, it lost its exclusiveness in the definition of the nationalist spatial imaginary. The convergence between the Québec territory and the Québec national space previously sought by the nationalist leaders appeared to be left aside. The Québec borders are no longer the ultimate locus for defining and resolving the nationalist issues.

What emerges from the debates around the Québec nationalist movement is the increasing reference to the global or the world as a sphere of action and a legitimate framework. This not only implies the remapping of Québec political spaces through which new ones appear and/or older are renamed, but also their reordering since the hierarchy which has been built around the provincial/national political space is called into question. These debates indicated the redrawing of the scales of the Québec national space insofar as new forms of exclusion are highlighted and denounced.⁵³ The mobilisation of Aboriginal peoples nicely illustrated the contesting of Québec national scales. At a broader level, these debates revealed the increasing plurality of Québec identity politics that entailed a new cultural and economic geography of the Québec society. This can be seen as a continuation of the redrawing of Québec margins, which occurred with the empowerment of social movements during the 1970s.

5.2 The Reconfiguration of Citizenship: Plurality or Fragmentation?

The redefinition of Québec and Canadian nationhood called into question the bases and the contours of both political communities. Overlapping the process of economic restructuring and the spread of neo-liberal ideas, this identity shift opened the door to the "decentring" of the state in the regulation of politics. The economic de-legitimisation of the state seems to contradict the increasing importance of the

issue of political integration. Both governments have to deal with a political setting shaped by the heterogeneity whereas the existing political arrangements and institutions assume homogeneity and assimilation. In this context, citizenship constitutes a major political stake since it has been the main avenue by which both governments resolved the issue of homogeneity. We will discuss the recent transformations of Québec and Canadian citizenship since the end of the 1970s. We will see that the national and territorial framework moulding citizenship policies is increasingly questioned by diverse political forces.

The Challenges of Québec Citizenship: The Redefinition of French Language as a Civic Issue?

As noted earlier, the Quiet revolution brought in a complete redefinition of Québec citizenship. The intensification and acceleration of the state-making process, which was shaped by a nationalist framework, brought about a reconfiguration of the Québec political community. The provincial level became the main arena for the settlement of citizenship claims. This involved the politicising and implicitly, to the empowerment of the idea of citizenship as the dominant form of political representation and channel of participation within the state structures. In other words, the idea of citizen was increasingly used as a political identity for making claims to the Québec state. The mobilisation of contemporary social movements, and especially the mobilisation of a civic rights movement around the *Ligue des Droits et Libertés du Québec*, played a decisive role in opening new spaces of citizenship outside of state institutions. The dominant citizen-figure at that time was the Francophone white-male, claiming the name of Québécois. It was on this basis that the Québec political community was restructured. A distinct Québec citizenship was taking form and becoming legitimate, although it remained embedded within the existing framework of Canadian citizenship.

During the 1980s, a new political context was taking place. Diverse trends resulted in the questioning of the basis of Québec citizenship. The institutional basis of Québec citizenship was consolidated with the creation of a specific state department. Following from a 1981 electoral promise, the Lévesque government created the Secretariat for Citizen Relations ("Secrétariat aux relations avec les citoyens"). Its main objective was to improve state-citizens relations by transmitting citizens' grievances to

the concerned governmental departments and agencies.⁵⁴ It was to constitute a barometer, reflecting the degree of satisfaction with the quality and efficiency of governmental services. Similar objectives had cited when the Minister for Relations with the Citizens and for Immigration was created in September 1996. Its mandate contains three main objectives: to improve and simplify the relations between state and citizens; to control immigration and support the socio-economic and linguistic integration of immigrants; and to promote human rights and civic responsibilities.⁵⁵ The main objective is to develop solidarity among all people living in Québec, whether they are recent immigrants or "Québécois de souche". Instead of using the notions of cultural communities and immigrant, the Québec government prefers that of citizen to represent all Québécois and Québécoises.⁵⁶ The inclusion of different dimensions of citizenship policies in one ministry constitutes the solution chosen by the government for dealing with the pluralism of Québec society.

These institutional transformations occurred at the same time as language of rights became significant elements in Québec politics. Rights discourse became the main language of minorities demanding political recognition of their own identities. The recognition and/or the defence of their identity-claims were mainly articulated in terms of rights allowing them to be heard by the government. This became particularly evident in the debates related to the protection of French language in education and commercial activities. The politicising of citizenship rights was reflected by the extension of the Public Protector's activities to different spheres of state interventions.⁵⁷ Its role as a counter-weight to the government became more significant. This extension of citizenship politics has been, to some extent, been propelled by the Québec government itself. During the 1980s, the latter engaged in a political process to eliminate existing forms of discrimination. The establishment of positive discrimination programs for women, sexual or cultural minorities was encouraged, as were the rights of disabled peoples and children.

These changes led to a growing differentiation or fragmentation of civil and political rights. The criteria of citizenship rights were challenged, opening the door to recognition of new forms of political participation linked to different identities.⁵⁸ The modifications to governmental policies brought the recognition of new parameters defining the citizen-figure markedly different from the Québécois identity

that lay behind the Quiet revolution. The political will to recognise certain Aboriginal rights furthered this growing distinction. The 1985 Declaration adopted by the National Assembly, which constituted a framework for an Aboriginal citizenship, marked a significant step in this regard. Aboriginal citizenship rights, which are linked to a double nationhood, represent a new type of rights, though their political and legal implications remain to be specified. Aboriginal peoples inhabiting the Québec territory attained a political status different from that of cultural communities, but one which at the same time lacked the prerogatives of nation-peoples. In this sense, nationhood and sovereignty are dissociated.

These changes reflect the impact of the idea of collective rights in Québec politics. The nationalist movement played a critical role in this regard. The political importance of Québec's self-determination and the protection of the French language meant that the recognition of collective rights was linked to the recognition of the new Québécois identity. These collective rights played an important role in the construction of the sense of "we-ness" that came to characterise that period. The establishment of the new Ministry for Relations with the Citizens in 1996 reflected the introduction of a different discourse on citizenship. This discourse of the Bouchard government aims to promote a civic identity as the basis of the Québec political community. It represents an attempt to rejuvenate a universal conception of citizenship, asserting the predominance of the citizen identity over other particularistic identities. It also responds to the Parti Québécois leadership's intent to downplay the nationalist connotations of the sovereignist project while privileging its civic dimension.⁵⁹ The only cultural characteristic of the new civic community retained is the predominance of the French language. This new definition of Québec citizenship aims to reinforce social cohesion and solidarity by breaking up a "segregationist" interpretation of Québec policies. It constitutes an explicit attempt to present Québec as an inclusive, open society, without going so far as to use the language of multiculturalism. This new discourse thus responds to the criticisms coming from the cultural communities, the other provinces and the federal government. It is also attempts to legitimise the sovereignist project at the international level, by pre-empting concerns that Québec's independence would lead to ethnic purification.

The institutional consolidation of a new form of Québec citizenship occurred at the same time as the discourse on state services shifted. The adoption of neo-liberal and managerialist policies by the

Québec governments brought in a new political setting shaping the formulation and application of citizenship policies. This new discourse and the associated reforms, moreover, matched those of the federal government and other provincial governments. One important indicator of this reorientation has been the gradual replacement of the notion of citizen by the notion of client. The relations between the state and citizen thus came to be defined as relations between the service state and its clientele. Another closely related notion is that of the "tax payer"; the citizenry as a group of tax payers who seek government services at the lowest possible cost. This shift in the political vocabulary is symptomatic of the on-going redefinition of citizenship. It rests on an economistic understanding of citizenship, stripped of the social and political.⁶⁰ Such citizens do not define the main orientations framing policies, nor are they called upon to participate to their elaboration and their implementation. The citizenry is reduced to a group of consumers, unconnected by common values and principles.

The older configuration of Québec citizenship was also challenged by cutbacks in social services, education and health sectors. These cuts were integral to the restructuring of social policies designed to put an end to universalism.⁶¹ These changes involved the reduction of services and the introduction of control measures aimed specifically at social security beneficiaries. This not only halted the extension of social and economic rights, but actually contributed to the erosion of rights earlier gained. The predominance of the liberal logic and the greater recourse to market mechanisms for social regulation have meant the creation of two categories of citizens: 1) those who can still exercise all their citizenship rights and fully participate in the public sphere, and 2) citizens faced with increasingly limited opportunities to participate in public debates and to claim their citizenship rights.⁶²

This restructuring of social and economic rights has also a spatial dimension. The political recognition of the two categories of citizens suggests a remapping of the political scenes in which citizenship is defined.⁶³ The first category of citizens can accommodate, and even embrace, the global market in their citizenship claims whereas for the second, globalisation becomes a structural constraint, limiting their social and civil (e.g. industrial relations) rights. The Quebec government has actively abetted the intrusion of the global market in the definition of citizenship rights. Social policy reforms are presented as a requirement for maintaining or increasing Québec global competitiveness. In other words, the spatial

framework in which social citizenship rights are to be conceived takes the (economic) global as a key referent. The same spatial fuzziness also appears in regard to the other group of citizens whose rights are being limited or denied. Many have turned to local and/or grass-roots organisations to provide services and struggle for the recognition of their rights.⁶⁴ The local has thus come to constitute the new interface of Québec citizenship. It is at this level that "second-class citizens" can acquire a political representativity and some form of civic existence.

Québec citizenship is still traversed by these two contradictory trends. The austerity policies of the Bouchard government, have, however, tended to confirm the establishment of a dual citizenship. These contradictions highlight the differential or variable power relations that allow some individuals and groups to exercise their citizenship rights while others are largely excluded. This has meant the institutionalisation of variable citizenship practices, that is to say, differently experienced by citizens.⁶⁵ Moreover, these changes suggest that the scales of citizenship rights are no longer delimited solely by Québec and Canadian state borders, nor by the contours of the public sphere. The delimitation of economic, cultural and territorial spaces also frames the exercise of citizenship rights.

The Contradictory Development of Canadian Citizenship

Since the 1980s, the trajectory of Canadian citizenship policies has been similar to Québec's. In fact, important changes at the federal level have opened the way to subsequent changes in Québec. In both cases, the national dimension has become fuzzier, even while it remains a crucial stake for obtaining citizenship entitlements. Changes in federal citizenship policy at the end of the 1960s paved the way for such redefinition.⁶⁶ The politicising of the criteria used by the federal government to define citizenship entitlements illuminated the variability of the frontiers of the configuration of Canadian citizenship. It revealed an opposition between different ways of belonging to the Canadian political community and between contradictory representations of the citizen-figure. The federal government's main objective in the 1970s and 1980s was the development of a national civic identity through the recognition of the cultural diversity of Canadian society.⁶⁷ This objective was subsequently called into question by the federal government when it became apparent that the two principles diverged rather than reinforcing each

other. Thus during the 1980s, two contradictory trends in citizenship politics emerged at the Canadian political level: 1) the extension of citizenship rights largely interpreted as a fragmentation⁶⁸ and 2) the erosion of social and economic citizenship rights resulting from the adoption of austerity policies and cutbacks in social policies.

As in the other Western countries during the 1970s, the Canadian public sphere was being shaped by the development of politics of difference, largely as a result of the emergence of new social movements. The establishment of specific federal programs, such as the Official Language Minority Groups, Multiculturalism and the Women's Program, altered the configuration of Canadian citizenship. This implied the politicisation of new claims and new channels of political participation. They contributed to the political empowerment of new "citizen-figures" such as the disabled persons, gays and lesbians, and Aboriginal women, while establishing particular forms of political participation by which citizenship rights could be claimed. These changes meant the institutionalisation of a differential, or egalitarian, conception of citizenship that challenged the dominance of the liberal and individualist conception. The adoption of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982 confirmed the entrenchment of both conceptions and at the same time, widened the space of citizenship politics within the Canadian public sphere.⁶⁹ Citizenship rights appeared as privileged channels for getting access and making claims. They brought in new definitions of the Canadian political community and created space for the discussion of competing understandings of its national character.

Even while citizenship rights were being extended, certain changes to government policies were being made that would undermine them. Whereas the Citizenship Branch of the Secretary of State began to be affected by political and administrative confusion over its ends. Its restructuring in 1983 signified the beginning of a period of stagnation. Rather than becoming a focused and powerful department, the institutional home of citizenship policy remained weak and unstable. Co-ordination between the existing programs is inadequate and difficult to secure. Moreover, the election of the Conservative government in 1984 resulted in financial cuts and the political orientation of the Citizenship Branch.⁷⁰ Reforms adopted by the Liberal government over the last decade also depart from the political orientations that framed Canadian citizenship from the 1970s.⁷¹ The government separated multiculturalism and citizenship into

two distinct departments. The 1998 bill on citizenship reveals the influence of neoliberalism with its emphasis on citizen responsibility and the establishment of partnership with new citizens.

More broadly, the adoption of a neo-liberal agenda by the successive federal and provincial governments since the 1980s has imposed limits to the democratic and emancipatory dimensions of citizenship politics. Recent modifications of social policies and immigration policies have contributed to this insofar as the application of citizenship rights has become more restricted.⁷² For example, measures limiting access to social security while imposing a greater administrative control, have been adopted by most of the provincial governments. The application of different criteria limiting citizenship entitlements have challenged the egalitarian logic which had previously shaped citizenship politics. The universal logic seems to have been replaced by a logic based on individual needs and merits.

These transformations of Canadian citizenship have been shaped by the changes in the politics of identity. The empowerment of the contemporary social movements redrew the boundaries between the public and the private spheres. The recognition of their claims broadened the democratic bases of Canadian polity while confronting the federal and provincial governments with the need to elaborate policies dealing with the multiple facets of the Otherness.⁷³ In this respect, of course, Canada is not unique. What is more specific to the Canadian experience is the predominance of the issue of national unity. The Trudeau governments' bilingualism and multiculturalism policies contributed to this by encouraging the pluriethnic and plurinational character of the Canadian society. Moreover, different and competing ways of belonging to the Canadian political community and implicitly, different definitions of the "national" have emerged.

The current reconfiguration of Canadian citizenship reveals the variability and contested nature of its scales. The election of regional political parties which formed the Official Opposition in the House of Commons or the formation of the Action Canada Network following from the debates around the NAFTA revealed the growing discordance between the territorial map of Canada and the emerging divisions of the Canadian political space. In this context, the federal government has not been able to recreate consensus around a common definition of the national. The mobilisation of Aboriginal peoples and more particularly,

their self-definition as a nation, introduced new stakes while considerably increasing the level of difficulties for finding an appropriate solution that also take into account the plurinational dimension of the Canadian political community.⁷⁴ The debate on the 1998 citizenship bill suggests that the government refused to recognise the different ways of belonging. A similar statement can be made with regard to the debates on citizenship policy in Québec.

5.3 The Transformation of Hydro-Québec: The Search for a New Status

The launching of the Great Whale project thus occurred while the Québec and Canadian political scenes were being restructured largely according to a neo-liberal agenda. This opened the door to the reconfiguration of the links between state, territory and nation, which figured so prominently in the politics of James Bay I. Indeed, the competition between different national political loci and the recognition of a global space through the imperatives of the global market involve the rearticulation of the political scales framing Canadian and Québec politics. This rescaling questions the centrality and the exclusiveness of territory since it involves the separation between its physical dimension (landscape), its representative or imaginary dimension (homeland) and its political dimension (civic community). Territory tends to become less constraining in the definition of the conditions of security while the state appears less appealing and efficient in the regulation of economic and environmental problems. This opens the door to significant modifications to state sovereignty.

Another important change was the growing politicisation of the issue of globalisation. It has increasingly integrated into the political discourses of both governments, as part of their neo-liberal agendas. Globalisation thus came to be represented as an emerging world market, imposing a new division of labour on countries. The spread of this representation through the media and business groups played a role in the unbundling of state territoriality. In the following pages, we will discuss the political and institutional changes of Hydro-Québec since the 1970s in relation to these broader changes. This period was particularly turbulent as Hydro-Québec's institutional mandate was modified by the Québec government. Its transition from a public utility, representing a nationalist symbol, to a competitive enterprise seeking to export its electricity on external markets will be emphasised.

The 1980s marked a period of turbulence in which Hydro-Québec was confronted with new challenges similar to those that were reshaping Québec politics. Its first decade of activities had been intrinsically linked to the modernisation of Québec economy and society. Hydro-Québec had often been characterised as a symbol of Québécois' new self-confidence and greater autonomy.⁷⁵ Its economic achievements and its technical innovations were part of the new collective imaginary created by the Quiet Revolution. This symbiotic relation between Hydro-Québec, the Québec government and the Québécois started to be questioned at the end of the 1970s. This did not imply a rupture, but rather a transformation of the terms of the equation. Hydro-Québec began to face a growing number of challenges and criticisms which called into question its immaculate image. Whereas the opposition to La Grande could be seen as coming from the margins of Québec society, by the time that Great Whale was launched, this was no longer possible. The opposition was now much broader and more diverse.

The Institutional Redefinition of Hydro-Québec

The Parti Québécois government introduced some key reforms that greatly modified the trajectory of Hydro-Québec. These reforms were, in part, related to the "energy crisis" which transformed energy into a crucial political stake. Although the energy crisis was attenuated by Québec's reliance on abundant hydraulic resources, it did highlight the latter's dependence on Canadian energy sources and hence energy policy and thus the need to control the production and the use of energy resources. The trigger was the adoption of a energy policy by the Québec government.⁷⁶ The 1977 White Paper on energy policy, followed the next year by a policy outlining the main objectives and implications of a Québec energy policy, laid the foundations for this shift. This document, entitled *Assurer l'avenir. La politique québécoise de l'énergie*, defined a strategy of economic development which would supply the Québec industrial policy.⁷⁷ Until then, Québec's energy policy had been largely limited to Hydro-Québec's development plan. Political control over Hydro-Québec's decisions by the government had been minimal. The transformation in 1977 of the Department of Natural Resources into the Department of Energy to which Hydro-Québec is accountable reflected the new policy orientation.

The White Paper argued the need to increase Québec's presence in the energy sector and to

encourage energy conservation and efficiency measures.⁷⁸ This constituted a radical shift for Hydro-Québec which had always supported the increase of demand for hydro-electricity. It presupposed a transformation of Hydro-Québec's development strategy and Québécois' consumption habits. Another objective raised in the White Paper was to double Québec-based sources of energy over the next twelve years and thus to reduce Québec's dependence on foreign sources of energy. The Québec government wanted to avoid a repetition of the first "oil shock".⁷⁹ Furthermore, the White Paper proposed that Hydro-Québec export electricity on a regular basis and not only when surplus to Québec's needs. Hydro-Québec was seen as a potential driving force for Québec's economy.⁸⁰ Whereas its economic spinoffs had earlier been more indirect, i.e. through the distribution of electricity of the construction of hydro-electric complexes, its activities would now become integral to the government's economic policies.⁸¹ Hydro-Québec would thus assume diverse roles in relation to regional development, job creation, technological development, exportation on foreign markets, etc. This was in marked contrast to its initial mandate - the production and distribution of electricity to Québec consumers at the cheapest price. Hydro-Québec would become a commercial enterprise.

The major changes outlined in the White Paper were concretised through three successive bills. Hydro-Québec became a commercial enterprise having international activities, and at the same time, a political agency directly integrated to state institutional setting. The adoption of the Bill 41 in 1978 laid the basis for Québec's new energy policy while implementing important modifications to Hydro-Québec management. Among the changes introduced by this bill were the obligation for Hydro-Québec to adapt its forecasts and its annual planning to the government's energy policy. The growth of domestic demand no longer appeared as a sufficient argument for accepting the Hydro-Québec's development plan. The Québec government would now be able to modify Hydro-Québec's tariff grid⁸² and this it did with the establishment of different commercial programs since 1981 involving the granting of preferential tariffs to Québec and foreign enterprises. In this way, Hydro-Québec became more directly a component of the Québec industrial policy. The government also used its pricing policy to try to attract foreign investment by signing contracts with foreign firms promising to supply electricity at advantageous prices over a relative long period. One version of this type of contracts involves the fixation of lower tariffs than the market

price. This type of contract was signed with some European aluminium companies such as Norsk Hydro (a Swedish company). In the 1990s, the secrecy surrounding such contracts became highly controversial.

The other political change introduced by the Bill 41 was the strengthening of Parliamentary Commission on Economy and Labour to which Hydro-Québec had to report annually. The Commission became a democratic forum in which groups or individuals concerned and/or opposed to Hydro-Québec plan and projects could submit their briefs, expose their grievances, and question Hydro-Québec's executive board about their decisions and future projects. These helped to highlight the political role of Hydro-Québec. While democratising the energy policy, it broadened the accountability of Hydro-Québec to Québec people.

Bill 41 also transformed the institutional structure of Hydro-Québec by creating three state agencies: Hydro-Québec, the James Bay Energy Corporation and Hydro-Québec International.⁸³ The latter's mandate involves the exportation of technological expertise related to the construction of dams and the management of mega-projects. It is through this agency that Hydro-Québec became involved in hydro-electric projects around the globe. Another dimension of the internationalisation of Hydro-Québec activities has been its participation in international networks and accords such as the World Conference on Energy and the E7 which includes the eight world leader producers of electricity.⁸⁴ The expansion of Hydro-Québec International fit the new identity figure of nationalist discourse during the 1980s. It was consistent with the new form of "Québécoisité" (entrepreneurial and open to the world).

The second redefinition of Hydro-Québec status occurred in 1981 with the adoption of the Bill 16.⁸⁵ While increasing political control over Hydro-Québec, the major impact of this bill was substantially to modify its financial structure. Hydro-Québec was transformed into a stock company with an authorised capital. The main difference between Hydro-Québec and other commercial enterprises is that the Québec government or more exactly, the Minister of Finance, is the unique shareholder. This modification meant that Hydro-Québec was obliged to pay dividends and taxes on capital to government. The second modification introduced by this bill was the abolition of the low tariff constraint, i.e. Hydro-Québec was no longer obliged to supply electricity at the cheapest prices. From that moment, Hydro-Québec could

establish its tariff grid according to its financial requirements, although the Department of Energy retains the right to approve tariffs or to fix new tariffs. These two modifications allowed the Québec government to appropriate the Hydro-Québec financial surpluses not required for its self-financing.⁸⁶ They appeared particularly useful at that time when deficits had become a mounting political concern.

Another important element in the Bill 16 was the authority given Hydro-Québec to establish energy conservation programs aiming to reduce the energy consumption and ultimately eliminate waste. This could appear largely contradictory insofar as the Hydro-Québec's strategy of development rested on the continuous growth of the demand for electricity. Through the 1980s, this contradiction persisted in its discourses and development strategies. On the one hand, Hydro-Québec adopted the discourse of conservation then current in international debates. Various programs of energy conservation related, for example, to house heating were set up in order to reduce the electricity wastage. Hydro-Québec's directors participated in the spreading of an awareness among the Québec population about the need of using electricity more efficiently and carefully. On the other hand, the various development plans submitted by Hydro-Québec during the same period reproduced the previous pattern of development. They still involved the pursuit of the hydro-electric development of the James Bay area (the completion of the La Grande complex and the feasibility studies of the Great Whale complex) and the building of less important dams on other rivers such as the Ste-Marguerite river (Côte Nord region). These projects assumed that the demand would remain as high as in the previous decade. The major difference is that the demand came to be estimated in relation not only to the Québec market but also to other markets, in particular the energy markets of the New England states. This revealed the rescaling of Hydro-Québec's activities which came to be structured around different political or rather economic spaces. Subsequent institutional transformations confirmed this remapping of Hydro-Québec.

The legislation which completed the institutional transformation of Hydro-Québec occurred in 1983 with the adoption of the Bill 4.⁸⁷ Hydro-Québec's mandate was again redefined, in still broader terms. Hydro-Québec became a commercial enterprise able to redefine its spheres of intervention in relation to fluctuations in the world energy market. Hydro-Québec is to supply energy and undertake any activities related to the production, research, and the promotion of energy. This Bill confirmed the

transformation of Hydro-Québec into a commercial enterprise by modifying the law on the exportation of hydro-electricity. This allowed Hydro-Québec to export electricity without any restriction beyond the approval of the Québec government and the National Energy Board ("Office national de l'énergie ") which regulates, among other things, the construction of international transmission lines and the delivering of export certificates. Hydro-Québec could thus export not only on the basis of the existence of domestic surpluses but also on the basis of demand in foreign markets. This implied a reversal of perspective on foreign markets. Instead of only providing supplementary incomes, they could be a direct source of financing by the signature of long-term contracts of exportation. The latter was subsequently integrated in the Hydro's development strategy and the Québec Department of Industry and Commerce policies. It was assumed that Hydro-Québec's activities would have a positive impact on Québec economy. Moreover, the signature of export contracts became one of the key elements of the Robert Bourassa's discourse when he made his come-back at the beginnings of the 1980s.⁶⁸

The Development of Hydro-Québec's International Activities

In this section, we focus on the spatial implications of these institutional changes. Attention will be paid to the internationalisation of Hydro-Québec's sphere of activities that led to a dissociation between its national and territorial dimensions. This new political setting implied the addition of new scales whose definitions came to be a conflicting issue. The restructuring of Hydro-Québec formed part of the remapping of Québec politics outlined above. Although Hydro-Québec maintained its predominant role, it no longer enjoyed a consensual climate. The correlation between the interest of the Québec people and that of Hydro-Québec began to be called into question. The political and institutional reorientation brought about by the Parti Québécois government created space for the diffusion of critical discourses on Hydro-Québec within the Québec public sphere. In various publications and briefs, Hydro-Québec presented itself as an major investor in the Québec economy, an efficient and productive enterprise competing at the international level, an enterprise privileging energy conservation and the protection of environment, and a corporation respecting Aboriginal peoples rights. The last two are emphasised in all documents related to the James Bay development. These different roles involved contradictory demands and not surprisingly, Hydro-Québec's directors did not give them equal weight. Reconciling its economic objectives and its

social concerns has perhaps constituted the biggest challenge for Hydro-Québec in the 1980s.

In addition to the diversification of its roles, Hydro-Québec became enmeshed in a political and economic setting that imposed a whole set of new structural constraints. Various factors contributed to this new setting. We are particularly interested in three: the redefinition of the Québec energy market; the constitution of a world energy agenda; and the growing opposition to Hydro-Québec. The beginning of the 1980s revealed an important structural transformation of the Québec energy market.⁸⁹ There was not only a change of the political and economic conjuncture, but also a redefinition of the great parameters of the Québec energy market. These changes confronted Hydro-Québec with the need to rethink development plans that had been still based on forecasts from the 1970s.⁹⁰ Internal demand for electricity became much less important. The severe economic recession imposed further financial constraints on Hydro-Québec as it diminished revenue while increasing the interest on debt. Moreover, the decrease of both domestic demand and electricity sales created important surpluses. These occurred after Hydro-Québec had imposed substantial rises of electricity tariffs to finance its investments. Since additional increases would have been opposed by Québec consumers, electricity exports seemed the best solution, especially since the redefinition of Hydro-Québec's mandate created incentives to do so. These export contracts were used to revamp Hydro-Québec's public image as its competitiveness, efficiency and entrepreneurship concurred with the new economic and ideological climate.

While the export contracts with New England states provided Hydro-Québec new sources of revenue, they also altered the logic of Hydro's operations as they became integral to Hydro-Québec's strategies of investment. Although Hydro-Québec expected that this new market would complement the domestic market, the two gave rise to conflicting interests. For example, exports required new infrastructure such as the transmission lines, located within Québec and the building of these lines was at times controversial. The contracts also meant that Hydro-Québec was obliged to guarantee a fixed amount of electricity irrespective of the level of domestic demand. Hydro-Québec's prices had also to be competitive with other sources of energy used in New England states such as the coal, thermal, or nuclear energy. Thus production costs had to be kept low. It was on this basis that Hydro-Québec reinforced its place on these markets and became part of the North-eastern American energy market.⁹¹

The conclusion of important agreements with Maine, Vermont and New York marked a turning point,⁹² confirming the viability of Hydro's export strategy. As these contracts committed it to providing significant amounts of energy over a long period, they brought stability to the Hydro-Québec forecasts regarding the rise of electricity demand over the next twenty years. More importantly, it was these contracts that became embroiled in the controversies around the Great Whale project as they were used to justify the launching of the second phase of the James Bay hydro-electric development. These contracts required that the construction dates of the two mega-projects in the James Bay area be moved up.⁹³ These contracts modified not only the forecasts of Québec energy needs, but also Hydro-Québec's development plan. As we shall see, they became important sites of struggles for defining the identities of actors involved in the Great Whale project.

Thus Hydro-Québec's sphere of activities became less and less restricted to Québec borders during the 1980s. As noted above, these institutional transformations implied a redefinition of its spatial framework. The new spatiality of Hydro-Québec rested on two overlapping changes: 1) the deterritorialisation of its planning and strategies of investment and 2) the restructuring of its economic activities around three political spaces (national/Québec, continental/North-eastern states, and international/world). Indeed, although the Hydro-Québec's new spheres of activities still aimed to reinforce Québec economy, Québec's territory was no longer the unique basis of its activities. In contrast to the era of the La Grande project, the national and territorial dimensions of Hydro-Québec's activities no longer necessarily converged. The development of its commercial activities reflected this disembeddness of Hydro-Québec sphere of activities. The second spatial change was the growing institutionalisation of three different markets: the Québec and the Canadian markets; the north-eastern American market; and the world market. Through the 1980s, Hydro-Québec has developed a specific field of activities at the North American and international level that does not rely on domestic developments. Moreover, the development of Hydro-Québec International Inc. reflected the rescaling of Hydro spheres of activities according to a logic which does not follow the domestic/international division. The new subsidiary brought Hydro-Québec into a small group of enterprises shaping the international energy market.

The Emergence of A World Agenda on Energy Issues

The upward rescaling of Hydro-Québec activities also resulted from the political constraints imposed by the constitution of a world energy political agenda. From the 1970s to the 1990s, energy questions came to be discussed as both a domestic issue framed by state policies and a global issue with implications for the whole humanity. This involved a major change in perspective. Previously, the acquisition of energy self-sufficiency, based on an accessible, reliable source of energy for each country, was seen as important to state sovereignty. The exploitation and the control of vast energy resources constituted a cornerstone of economic development. Attention was given to the technological factors and economic costs required for the production of energy. There was little room for energy conservation measures or the protection of environment. This perspective on energy production still predominated when the La Grande project was launched but had ceded place to the new one by the time Great Whale was on the drawing board.

The state-centric perspective began to be questioned during the 1970s. The Stockholm Conference in 1972 and the Oil Shock in 1973-74 played an important role in this regard. Each introduced important shifts in the way in which energy issues were understood. The debates raised by these key events served to highlight the political and social implications entailed by the energy choices states made. They helped to politicise a new classification of energy sources: renewable versus non renewable; polluting versus clean. These concerns went well beyond earlier preoccupations with availability and production costs. Dimensions previously excluded, such as the protection of environment and the North-South divide, now had to be taken into consideration. In addition, these debates opened the way to new spaces of political participation through which citizens and ecology groups made claims, resulting in a greater democratisation of the energy policies in Western societies and broadening the accountability of the state. This meant the inclusion of new actors and forms of agency, questioning the state's exclusive competency over the energy questions. This was particularly evident in the debates around nuclear energy. Strong opposition often required governments to justify their political decisions or delay/prevent the construction of power plants.

Moreover, energy questions were now understood in terms of global, as well as national concerns. The increasing number of international conferences, international agreements and international organisations (governmental and non governmental) dealing with energy issues introduced breaches in the statist framework based on national sovereignty. They broadened the path traced by the OPEC countries during the 1970s. It then appeared a process of networking operating at different scales and framed by different power relations. Although these networks have overlapped with inter-state relations, they are not reducible to them. The signature of international agreements, the accords between energy producers (firms and public utilities), and the release of world reports on energy have meant that the normative definition of energy policies is no longer confined to state borders. The inclusion of new actors has displaced the political locus of the construction of state legitimacy over energy questions. Thus, for example, even if many of their recommendations have not been implemented, the Brundtland Commission report and the World Commission on Energy report came to constitute a frame of reference for evaluating the energy policies of national states.

These new energy discourses and networks indicate a remapping of the spatial framework through which the energy issues have been historically defined. The implications of the energy production and consumption could no longer be delimited by state borders. The current framework of energy politics is more adequately characterised as one shaped by a variable geometry.⁹⁴ The spatiality of energy issues became an important stake, defining actors identities and strategies. The oil crisis considerably weakened the primacy of the national state in the regulation of energy production. The establishment of links between polluting forms of energy production and certain global environmental problems such as global warming, the greenhouse effect and acid rain, clearly revealed the porosity of state borders. The spatial delimitation of the impacts of the diverse forms of energy production no longer fit with the geopolitical map of the world. There has thus been a redefinition of the territoriality of energy politics that can be interpreted as a form of deterritorialisation. The definition of energy issues within other political spaces furthers the delinkage between state and territoriality. Other political spaces have come to be seen as critical to the resolution of energy issues. The development of international co-operation between states and the mobilisation of ecology groups against local development projects or nuclear plants underline the

new variable geometry of energy issues.

Since the mid-1980s, the growing legitimacy of the notion of sustainable development has confirmed this change of perspective on energy issues. The latter clearly no longer could be analysed as national issues, shaped by state economic policies. The debates on the implications of sustainable development clearly showed how the political and environmental dimensions of energy production confront all governments.⁹⁵ They also indicated the involvement of new actors. These changes have been to some extent integrated into Hydro-Québec's discourse. The latter's aim to become a world leader in hydro-electricity production pushes them to adapt their discourses to the new perspectives on energy. The issue of sustainable development thus was announced as the main objective of the Québec energy policy.⁹⁶ Hydro-Québec's marketing strategy now emphasises the renewable and environmental-safety dimensions of hydro-electricity.

The New Sites of Opposition to Hydro-Québec

These developments of energy politics at the international level have brought about a restructuring of Hydro-Québec's activities around two different political scenes: the Québec scene and the international/transnational scene. Although Hydro-Québec has sought to maintain a clear separation between them, both clearly overlap. This became noticeable through the claims of the opposition faced by Hydro-Québec at home. The empowerment of a more structured and visible opposition constituted another important dimension of the new political setting. Whereas Hydro-Québec's realm of activities was widened beyond the Québec frontiers, its room for manoeuvre within the Québec political scene became more limited than before. Hydro-Québec could no longer remain untouched by political debates. The growing opposition, which surfaced around its financial decisions and development projects, widened the breach established by the controversy surrounding the La Grande complex. It called into question the economic and technological rationality of Hydro-Québec's decisions, questioning Hydro's expertise and the competency that had been its trademark.

The criticisms of Hydro's export contracts reflected this changing relation between Hydro-Québec and the Québec population during the 1980s. Despite the successive efforts of Hydro's directors to justify

their positive impacts, the economic benefits of the export strategy has remained very controversial. Certain economists and ecology groups have questioned their projected spin-off benefits. Instead of illustrating Hydro's ability to conquer other markets, as claimed by the Québec government, the critics saw it as the perpetuation of dependent development based on cheap natural resources.⁹⁷ The controversies around the Great Whale project and the risk-sharing contracts with certain foreign companies contributed to public distrust. The Hydro directors' attempt to deny the political implications of electricity production only widened the gap between the corporation and the Québec population. In this section we will examine three important sites of opposition to Hydro-Québec: the opposition to the construction of new power lines; the demand for a public debate on energy; and the debates on the privatisation of Hydro-Québec. We will see that the opposition was itself heterogeneous and variable.

One pole of opposition formed around the construction of power lines through different Québec regions, to transport electricity from the James Bay region towards specific Québec areas or towards New England States.⁹⁸ From the mid-1970s on, these projects began to be seriously contested by a burgeoning local opposition which constrained Hydro-Québec to explain and justify its projects, and sometimes, to modify them. This opposition quite often consisted of ad hoc coalitions of local citizens groups and/or environmentalist groups, which dissolved when the final decision was settled. Their main impact has been the democratisation of the mechanisms of consultation. Instead of simply being a façade, the consultation process became more democratic. This transformation, while slow, allowed citizen groups to participate more actively in the debates and to impose significant modifications.⁹⁹ The process of consultation forced Hydro management to deal with other values such as the protection of environment or the preservation of particular sites. They were forced to realise that the financial compensations provided to landowners and the technical requirements were not sufficient to convince the diverse groups opposed to its projects. This did, of course, mean that the projects were frequently halted by local opposition. The creation of the BAPE (Bureau d'audiences publiques sur l'environnement) in 1978 and the adoption of the bill on the protection of agricultural territory modified the rules of the game, but only up to a certain point. The projects were now submitted to environmental impact assessment procedure supervised by the BAPE. Public hearings became arenas in which citizens could submit briefs and request modifications. The assessment process

reduced Hydro's room for manoeuvre while providing a more "objective" forum for the opposition. An epic battle occurred around the Grondines-Lotbinière power line in the mid-1980 which, following the BAPE recommendations, resulted in the construction of a "submarine line" crossing the St-Lawrence River.¹⁰⁰ This constituted a kind of victory for the citizens who had opposed to the project since their landscape. This struggle showed that Hydro-Québec's power could be restricted by citizens' efforts. Subsequent battles similarly constrained Hydro-Québec to prepare its projects with care, taking into account the need to improve its corporate image.

Another type of opposition came from the redefinition of the political agenda of Québec environmentalist and ecology groups.¹⁰¹ As noted in the preceding chapter, this occurred during the second phase of mobilisation when they tried to establish a national platform. It was at this time that most adopted an more global approach. At the same time, they emphasised specific issues delimiting their fields of activities. During phase one of the La Grande project, the energy issues was not primary but by the end of the 1970s, public debate on energy became one of the main issues mobilising the ecology movement. The Parti Québécois government elected in 1976 was more favourable to the ecology movement's claims on the one hand. On the other, the planned construction a new nuclear plant created new interest in these issues.¹⁰²

The real trigger was the formation of an ad hoc coalition called the "Front commun pour un débat public sur l'énergie" in November 1979. The Front gathered more than 80 groups and associations representing many different Québec social and popular movements (student associations; women groups, committee of citizens, housing co-operatives, anti-nuclear groups, etc.). Despite some minor divergences, all agreed on the need to democratise the energy policy decision-making process and to publicise available information to enable the making of more enlightened choices. The organisation of a serious public debate would allow the development of a complete portrait of the Québec energy development, including alternative energy sources. The Front denounced the technocratic character of the decision-making and the exclusion of the Québec population from the political decisions relative to energy issues. In 1980 the Front published a general proposition outlining the form and the content of an eventual public debate. The latter aimed to define political rules and institutions for a democratic energy policy. Their

proposition implied, among other things, the establishment of a popular consultation process throughout Québec, led by an independent commission. Moreover, it sought financial and technical support to facilitate the participation of all people and groups in the debate. Finally, the Front demanded the creation of an agency which would supervise Quebec's future energy development.¹⁰³ The Front recommended a moratorium on all future energy projects during the duration of the debate to eliminate possible constraints on the future decisions. In the chapter eight, we will discuss in a more detailed way how this issue has shaped the history of the Québec ecology movement during the 1980s.

The idea of a public debate on energy appeared innovative and at the same time, quite threatening to Hydro-Québec and the Québec government itself. It called into question their position as the main energy policy decision-makers and even the predominance of hydro-electricity over other sources of energy. Instead of restricting the discussions to the technological and economic dimensions as Hydro-Québec directors had previously done, the Front highlighted the political and social implications. It proposed to examine hydro-electric production as a specific model of development, and one which imposed high social costs. The Front demanded the complete evaluation of all forms of energy production. Although the Parti Québécois attempted to respond to the Front's demands, for the most part, the solutions fell short of its demands.¹⁰⁴ The government and Hydro-Québec rejected the demand for a form of public consultation that would have some real decisional power. The idea of a public debate on energy has been periodically reintroduced by the ecology movement. Thus Hydro-Québec and successive Québec governments continued to face the demand for a democratisation of the energy policy decision-making process. As a result they are constrained to convince Québec public opinion that hydro-electric development based on the construction of mega-projects still constitutes the most appropriate way of achieving sustainable development.

The spread of neo-liberalism also served to question Hydro-Québec's status by raising the spectre of privatisation. Although this prospect has never been seriously considered by the Québec government, it has not been rejected.¹⁰⁵ Several factors have given the notion a certain staying power. The difficulties faced by Hydro-Québec helped to discredit its economic leadership. The controversies around both the Great Whale project and the use of preferential tariffs for foreign enterprises certainly

tamished Hydro-Québec's public image. Moreover, the possibility of obtaining important sources of revenue by privatisation remained a tempting prospect for government concerned to deal with public deficits and debt. Hydro-Québec's financial difficulties, and its debt, also figured in these debates. Privatisation was touted not only as a means for improving efficiency, but also to depoliticise energy decisions.¹⁰⁶ These arguments have thus far failed to win over the government. Nevertheless a more limited and invisible privatisation of Hydro-Québec has occurred since the 1980s. Indeed, Hydro-Québec is now seen as a private enterprise in terms of competitiveness, profitability and efficiency. Its primary role is to deliver services to its clientele and to reinforce Québec's economic growth. Legislative changes introduced at the beginning of the 1980s facilitated this shift. New legislation introduced in the 1990s went in the same direction, allowing private entrepreneurs to build small power plants restricted to 750. It also opened the door to the development of plants based on co-generation. Hydro-Québec's monopoly over the production of electricity has begun to be eroded.¹⁰⁷

Recent discussions of deregulation of the North American energy market arising out of NAFTA raise similar challenges. The Bouchard government's embrace of this policy suggests that the Hydro-Québec's future is likely to be similar to that of private commercial enterprises struggling to consolidate their niche. Recent meetings with New England state governors pave the way to its implementation. Although the implications remain unclear, the eventual deregulation of the North American energy market conforms to the changes discussed above. It suggests that Hydro-Québec is now a transnational firm undertaking commercial operations on different markets. It also highlights the greater internationalisation of the energy issue insofar as some of its dimensions (commercial and environmental) are increasingly defined in a global political arena. The spatial definition turns out to be a crucial stake shaping power relations between the diverse actors involved in the debates.

The project of deregulating energy markets reveals the overlapping between different political spaces in the definition of energy politics and Hydro-Québec's spheres of activities. In contrast to the discussions on environmental consequences of energy politics, the neo-liberal framework used by the Québec government tends to obfuscate the political consequences by evoking the so-called economic requirements of the world market. The 'new commercial context' clearly is treated as a serious constraint

on state capacity. Although this is not recognised by the Québec government, this implies that its sovereignty is thus increasingly limited. The same global constraints also appear in the debates surrounding the environmental implications. In the context of an increasing transnationalisation of energy issues, these two portraits of the state's role suggest an important redefinition of sovereignty. Territorial sovereignty is in question as the Québec political space no longer coincides with the state's borders.¹⁰⁶ This does not mean however that the state has become irrelevant. In both cases, the state remains a predominant actor for implementing the rules at the environmental level or for removing the rules restricting at the commercial level.

5.4 The Launching of the Great Whale Project

As the above suggests, Hydro-Québec certainly experienced a redefinition of its place in Québec society. These changes were not simply the result of considerations internal to the company. Structural changes and the constraints imposed by a more visible opposition also modified its trajectory. To be sure, successive Québec governments continued to equate the development of Hydro-Québec and Québec's pursuit of self-determination. However, there were two especially important changes in this period: the rescaling of Hydro's spheres of activities beyond the Québec territory and the greater politicising of its role. Instead of being defined within a temporal framework (traditional vs. modern, economic development) as it was during the Quiet revolution, Hydro-Québec came to be increasingly legitimised within a spatial framework (export contracts, competing energy markets, international agreements). Hydro-Québec's development discourses and strategies are increasingly embedded within different spaces and therefore, revealed a disjunction between its territoriality and spatiality. Hydro's terrain of action is articulated around variable scales whose definitions have become important political stakes. The strategic importance of the export contracts or the development of its international subsidiaries showed that Québec is a less decisive factor in its calculations. It is but one site of activities among several, although it retains a certain priority. Moreover, Hydro-Québec has clearly become a political actor, in an increasingly structured sphere of energy politics.

These changes depict a new context that shaped the launching of the Great Whale project. In a

sense one could say that the Great Whale project has several, competing histories: a technical and administrative history versus a political history. The technical and cartographic history partially overlapped with the history of the La Grande complex but the controversies stirred by its official launching form part of its political history, shaped by a very different political context. The primacy of the first history, which was claimed by the Québec government and Hydro-Québec, became a crucial stake in the debates following the official launching. The rise of opposition opened the door to the redefinition of the meaning of Great Whale and to the participation of new actors raising issues that were marginal to the La Grande project. In this section, we retrace the technical and administrative history of the project, focusing on the arguments used by Hydro-Québec and the Québec government to legitimate the project. As we shall see, while the Québec government still defined it as a national project, its implications were not restricted to Québec territory.

The Origins of the Great Whale Project

From the standpoint of its technical history, the Great Whale project has much in common with the La Grande complex. As was argued in chapter two, the Great Whale project constituted one of three options originally considered for the hydro-electric development of the James Bay region in 1971. In fact, it was the option best documented at the time. The decision to begin with La Grande only postponed the realisation of the Great Whale complex. In the meantime, additional studies focused on the technical, economic and environmental implications of this project. These feasibility studies aimed to find the best development scheme of the Great Whale river basin i.e. the most profitable and the least harmful for the environment and the local population. At that time it was intended that the Great Whale complex would be in operation in 1990 to meet Québec's energy needs. Construction was to start in the mid-1980s. The basic plan was adopted in 1975,¹⁰⁹ which envisioned the construction of three power plants (GB 1, GB 2, GB 3) and the diversion of the Little Whale river towards the power station GB 1.¹¹⁰ This plan was included in the James Bay Agreement and plans for the Nottaway-Broadback-Rupert (NBR) complex. Its inclusion in the Agreement implied, for Hydro-Québec, that the Aboriginal populations had consented to the construction of both hydroelectric complexes. This would later be contested by the Cree and Inuit peoples.

From 1975 to 1981, impact assessment studies of the Great Whale project were conducted to determine the techno-economic and environmental implications.¹¹¹ It was during this phase that the Cree and Inuit peoples became more formally involved in the process. Specific tables of co-ordination, which brought together Cree and Inuit representatives with representatives of the James Bay Energy Corporation, were set up in 1978 to facilitate the exchange of information and discussions between the two parties. The participation of Aboriginal populations in these tables did not mean that they agreed with the project.¹¹² In fact they expressed numerous reservations, which were only reinforced as they began to experience the impact of the La Grande complex. As we will see in the next chapter, the difficulties faced by the Grand Council of the Cree in the implementation of the James Bay Agreement increased their reluctance and discontent. In 1981, Hydro-Québec submitted to the James Bay Agreement Administrator a final report on assessment studies in order to obtain authorisation to proceed. Yet while everything seemed to be settled, some unexpected events obliged Hydro-Québec to revise its schedule. The fall in demand for electricity, evident by 1982, compounded by a major economic recession led to the postponement of the Great Whale project.¹¹³ At that time, nothing suggested that the project would be indefinitely postponed.

The re-election of Robert Bourassa in 1985 gave a second impetus to the hydroelectric development of the James Bay region. Bourassa had made the completion of the James Bay hydro-electric development one of the main issues of the electoral campaign. Since his public come-back at the beginning of the 1980s, he had insisted on the necessity of speeding up the James Bay development.¹¹⁴ For Bourassa, Québec's hydroelectric resources still constituted the best solution to Québec's reliance on natural resources. The economic spin-offs would help get the Québec economy out of the recession. For Bourassa, the hydro-electric development of the James Bay area could transform Québec into the "eastern" Alberta. His discussion of the projects remained shaped by the modernist paradigm underlying the construction of the La Grande complex.¹¹⁵ Economic growth, scientific rationality and technological innovations still constituted the main pillars defining the project. The major difference between the Bourassa's conception and Hydro-Québec's was one of schedule.¹¹⁶ Hydro's directors were more reticent to launch the second phase while the economic outlook remained pretty uncertain.

Despite the continuity of the Bourassa's discourse, some new issues found their way into the discourse. These reflected the political and administrative changes in Hydro-Québec status described above. The main change was the emphasis on the export of electricity to North-eastern American states. Whereas this element was rather secondary in the arguments used for the La Grande complex, it was now at the forefront. Of course, Québec's energy needs were still presented as the primary objective of the Great Whale project¹¹⁷ but they were no longer the only ones. The export strategy would provide important revenues to finance the project while reinforcing the commercial position of Hydro-Québec.¹¹⁸ The key point here is that the spatial framework used to legitimise the project was no longer limited to the Québec political space but rather that of the North American energy market and to a less extent, the world energy market.¹¹⁹

Another new element was the inclusion of certain environmental concerns. In addition to energy conservation measures, the renewable character of hydro-electricity was now highlighted. Hydroelectricity's limited environmental impact was emphasised relative to other sources of energy such as nuclear energy or coal.¹²⁰ Hydro-electricity was also presented as a sustainable strategy of development as a result of Hydro's adoption of the Brundtland Commission's the discourse on sustainable development. This is not meant to suggest that the project made environmental concerns central. The notion of hydro's replacement by other even more environmentally-friendly alternatives, was rejected from the outset. Environmental impacts, such as the construction of reservoirs and transmission lines, were presented as easily handled. Moreover, the Bourassa government did not pay much attention to Aboriginal populations in discussing future development projects. It was assumed that the signing of the James Bay Agreement had settled the Aboriginal claims and would prevent any major conflicts.

The Nationalist Appeal of the Project

In terms of the way it was presented by the Bourassa government, the second phase of the James Bay development remained part of Québec identity politics.¹²¹ The Great Whale project was still justified as involving the affirmation of the Québec state sovereignty over its territory and the mastery of its economic development. It was (re)presented as a national project promoting the Québec interests or, for

using Bourassa's terms, the Québec superior interests. And this representation was used to delegitimise the claims and grievances of Cree peoples in characterising them as a campaign of defamation against Québec.¹²² Yet while it continued to be represented in terms of the main characteristics defining modern Québec since the Quiet revolution, there was an on-going redefinition of its components. Although the Liberals revived the project, the second phase project reflected the transformation of the Québec nationalist movement from a social-democratic, to a pro-business liberal orientation. The predominance given to the export of hydroelectricity and to the "conquest" of American energy markets fit very well with the nationalist movement's new identity figure, the entrepreneur, capable of conquering foreign markets. The importance given to the international arena as a locus for the construction of Québec identity was strengthened when the defence of the Québec's international image against the criticisms of that the project ignored the concerns of aboriginal peoples.¹²³ Moreover, emphasis on the entrepreneurial dimension coincided with the incorporation of neo-liberal ideas into Québec discourse.

The Bourassa government's election thus served to re-inscribe the James Bay hydro-electric development at the centre of the political agenda. Here the memory of the positive economic effects of the La Grande complex could be used to appeal to the people in a period of economic stagnation. It was also possible to draw connections between project and the Québec Inc. model. The expected investments and the creation of jobs furthered the development of an informal alliance between the Liberal government, the business sector and the labour unions related to the construction sector. This alliance was formalised in 1991 when a coalition was formed to foster the beginning of the project which was at that time in a period of turmoil. A slight rise in energy demand in turn provided the signal the government needed to relaunch the project. Shortly after his election in 1985, Robert Bourassa made a trip to New York city to meet with politicians, investment bankers, and bureaucrats related to energy issues, seeking to obtain financial and political support for his project.¹²⁴ Shortly thereafter, a consultative committee, including John Schlesinger, the Secretary of Energy in the Carter administration, was established to establish project's credentials. The main stake was not only to obtain financing, but also to sell out the future hydro-electricity produced with the new power plants. The Liberal government then prepared the terrain within Québec - and in the US as well.

Launching the Project: Towards a Dead-End

The launching of the Great Whale project was preceded by the official announcement of the second phase of the La Grande complex in March 1988, presented as the beginning of James Bay II. The project was to launch an economic boom, creating 40 000 jobs per year. The launching of the Great Whale project at that moment was justified by new forecasts of the future energy demand. The signing of important export contracts with several New England states, and the risk-sharing program with high-energy consumption such as aluminium refineries, helped "boost" demand, providing the Bourassa government the ammunition it needed to urge the start of construction.¹²⁵ The deadlines and constraints imposed by these contracts were used to legitimate the Great Whale project and to justify the moving on the schedule.

It should be noted that the second phase of the La Grande complex and the Great Whale project were rarely distinguished at the political level. The James Bay II label was used to designate both the Great Whale project and the second phase of the La Grande complex.¹²⁶ Only Hydro-Québec made a clear distinction between these two projects as a way of avoiding the political connotations underlying the label James Bay II.¹²⁷ The James Bay II label implied a political temporality whereas Hydro-Québec privileged a temporal framework defined by legal and technical factors. Their view did not prevail as it was the government's schedule which was "officially" adopted by Hydro-Québec. The government's use of James Bay II implied that the two development phases were related, with the new project simply building on the past. At the same time the government emphasised the themes of change. It was presented as part of a new beginning, or turning point, which would overcome the economic stagnation.

The Great Whale project was officially launched one year later, in January 1989.¹²⁸ Meetings were set up to inform the Cree and Inuit. Some informal meetings with the Cree communities of Chisasibi and Whapmagoostui, directly concerned by the project, had already been organised but Hydro-Québec wanted to set up working groups to integrate them into the new studies. These meetings were to ascertain the likely impact on their way of life and develop appropriate corrective measures in order to prevent future disruptive disputes. The Grand Council of the Cree (of Québec) responded in August 1989,

proposing the establishment of a Cree working group. Some weeks later, however, the Council withdrew this proposition and terminated discussions with Hydro-Québec. This was the beginning of the mobilisation of the Grand Council of the Cree against the project which, as we shall see, would prove successful.

In contrast to the debates around the La Grande project, the Québec government faced important challenges notably, a stronger and more visible opposition. Its schedule rapidly became disrupted and the Québec government and Hydro-Québec were often confronted with the need to react to strategies adopted by Cree people and ecology groups. The Québec government and Hydro-Québec adopted various strategies such as: press conferences, release of studies, testimonies in courts, participation in international conferences, etc. The most important was the launching of the impact assessment review process which will be discussed below. Although the government initially saw it as an administrative procedure, the hearings came to constitute a political and democratic site in which competing representations of the project were discussed and evaluated.

In May 1989, Hydro-Québec informed the provincial Administrator of the James Bay Agreement of its intention of relaunching the project. This meant that Hydro-Québec had to submit reports specifying its rationale, its characteristics and its impact. From 1989 to 1992, Hydro-Québec conducted additional techno-economic and environmental studies¹²⁹ which aimed to update the existing impact studies while taking into account the modifications brought to the project. Hydro-Québec submitted to the Administrator in 1991 a preliminary report on the transportation infrastructure. The following year a complete report including the complex and the infrastructure was submitted, followed by public hearings to complete the impact assessment policies. This was the first time that an impact review process had been opened to the participation of citizens. In September 1992, the Administrator submitted a directive on the impact review assessment of the whole project (complex and infrastructures). The directive emphasised five issues: the wealth of human and natural ecosystems; access to the territory; availability of resources; the social cohesion of Native communities; and the respect for their values.¹³⁰ In August 1993, Hydro-Québec submitted its impact assessment study to the different committees.¹³¹ Hydro-Québec concluded that the impacts of the project would be local, modest and easily corrected. The project would not threaten any

animal and vegetal species of the region, nor reduce their number and diversity. Secondly, the report dealt with positive and negative impacts for the Aboriginal populations, arguing that the latter would largely be limited to Kuujjrapik (Inuit village) and Whapmagoostui. For the most part, the projects impact should be seen as part of the social changes experienced by Aboriginal communities that had begun long before. Finally, the project would stimulate the economic growth of the local region and of the whole of Québec. Hydro-Québec thus presented the project as an opportunity for the Cree and Inuit to build a sustainable economic development. It was estimated that the investments for the project established in 1992 to \$6,8 milliards would create around 66 700 direct and indirect jobs in terms of person-year.

Diverse committees and commissions for the environmental evaluation then began their own studies to determine whether Hydro had responded sufficiently to the questions raised in the Directive. Their report, released in November 1994, concluded that the latter had many lacunae and did not satisfactorily respond to the questions.¹³² Firstly, it challenged the evaluation criteria used by Hydro-Québec for ignoring the issue of sustainable development. Secondly, it was critical of the lack of sufficient knowledge of the human communities which would be affected by the project. Nor were the latter's cultural values adequately considered. Thirdly, it highlighted the lack of an integrated analysis of the social and bio-physical impacts of the projects. Finally, it argued that the choice of the Great Whale project had not been sufficiently discussed. The analysis of other alternatives, such as the energy conservation programs and alternative sources of energy (solar energy, wind power and "biomasse"), was superficial. The report's release was the last step in the impact review process. It was also the last step in the political history of the Great Whale project. Several days later, the newly elected Parizeau government announced that the project had been deferred. This decision has been maintained.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we outlined the political and economic context which shaped the launching of the Great Whale project. We looked at the main changes in Canadian and Québec politics that occurred between the two phases of the James Bay hydroelectric development. This period opened the door to a rescaling of both political scenes. The adoption of a neo-liberal agenda, the institutional redefinition of

citizenship politics, and the disputes between the three nationalisms (Aboriginal, Québec, and Canadian) suggested an increasing unbundling of the national space. Its territorial bases have appeared more blurred, no longer merely coinciding with state territory. Another spatial change in this period was the politicising of the issue of globalisation, adding a new scale to Canadian and Québec politics. Although both government treated it as a predominantly economic issue, it nonetheless indicated an important remapping of Québec and Canadian political settings. Our discussion of the political and institutional redefinition of Hydro-Québec over this period illustrated the extent of these changes. While remaining a national symbol, Hydro-Québec has been redefined into a commercial enterprise with a growing sphere of international activities. Its activities too thus came to be articulated around various spaces.

The rise of an opposition to the launching of the Great Whale project, which will be dealt with in greater depth in the next two chapters, also reveal the emergence of a new political setting. The attempt by the Québec government to follow the same trajectory as La Grande project, failed. The establishment of the impact assessment review process confirmed that change. In the next chapter, we will discuss the mobilisation of the Cree people, which indicates a new phase in their process of jumping scales on that went beyond Québec's borders.

NOTES

¹ . Jane Jenson rightly argued that the process of restructuring did not lead to the renewal or the transformation of the Canadian political system. It rather widened the dislocation of existing political institutions and brought in a deep political crisis which is still unresolved. See on this point: Jane JENSON, "'Different' but not 'exceptional': Canada's permeable fordism", *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology*, vol. 26, no 1, 1990, pp. 84-88; Gilles BRETON and Jane JENSON, "La nouvelle dualité canadienne", in *Le Québec et la restructuration du Canada, 1980-1992. Enjeux et perspectives*, Sillery, Éditions du Septentrion, 1991, pp. 75-94.

² . It was during the post-war period that the federal state considerably expanded its activities and sought at the same time, to increase its legitimacy. This extension of state interventions responded to a large extent to the empowerment of a particular form of Canadian nationalism having emerged some years before. They furthered the formation of a "Canadian-ness" which was no longer defined in relation to the British empire. Moreover, these political changes reflected a deliberated effort of furthering a greater political centralisation of Canadian federalism. As we previously, this political will contributed to inflame relations with the Québec governments which have sought to increase their spheres of competency since 1960. Cf. Jane JENSON, "Different" but not "exceptional", *op. cit.*, p. 84-88; David R. CAMERON, "The Growth of Government Spending: The Canadian Experience in Comparative Perspective", in *State and Society : Canada in Comparative Perspective*, Toronto, Toronto University Press, 1985, pp. 21-51 ; Leslie A. PAL, *Interests of State. The Politics of Language, Multiculturalism, and Feminism in Canada*, Montréal

& Kingston, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993, pp. 61-101 ; David WOLFE, "The Canadian State in Comparative Perspective", *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology*, vol. 26, no 1, 1989, pp. 102-126.

³ . The Third National Policy can be seen as a last recourse for the federal government for counterbalancing the emerging forces undermining the post-war political arrangements. It included many elements: a constitutional recognition of individual rights through the Charter of Rights and Freedoms; the National Energy Program (NEP); a planned resource-driven restructuring of the industrial sector; and new regional development programs such as the Western Development Fund. This package aimed to counter provincialist and regionalist claims by giving to the Federal state a central role in the preservation of the Canadian identity. Cf. Jane JENSON, "Different" but not "Exceptional", op. cit. pp. 86-88; Rianne MAHON, *The Politics of Industrial Restructuring*, Toronto : University of Toronto Press, 1984; Janine BRODIE, "The New Political Economy of Regions", in *Understanding Canada. Building on the New Canadian Political Economy*, edited by Wallace CLEMENT, Montreal & Kingston, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997, pp. 240-261.

⁴ . The Macdonald commission or more exactly, the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada was launched at the beginning of the 1980s after the big economic recession which harshly affected the Canadian economy. This recession revealed the fragility of the Canadian economy and mostly, the inadequacy of government economic instruments for overcoming the latter. The mandate given to the Macdonald Commission was extremely broad. It consisted in reviewing and discussing the main problems and deficiencies of the Canadian economy and implicitly, its current and future challenges. In doing so, the Commission made a survey of the existing political and economic institutions. One of the main recommendations of the Report was the full-scale integration of the Canadian economy to the American economy and consequently, to leave aside the project of a self-regulated national economy. This was justified in order to adapt the Canadian economy to the new rules and of the international economy. Moreover, the Report emphasised the necessity of decentralising the federal system for increasing its flexibility. See on this point: Duncan CAMERON, "Selling the House to Pay the Mortgage: What is Behind privatisation ?", *Studies in Political Economy*, no 53, pp. 15-17; Neil BARDFOED, "The Policy Influence of Economic Ideas: Interests, Institutions and Innovation in Canada", *Studies in Political Economy*, no 59, 1999, pp. 34-41.

⁵ . For a deeper discussion of the recent changes of the federal state, see: Liora SALTER & Rick SALTER, "Displacing the Welfare State", in *Understanding Canada. Building on the New Canadian Political Economy*, edited by Wallace CLEMENT, McGill-Queen's University Press, pp. 311-337 ; John MYLES, "Decline or Impasse: the Current State of the Welfare State", *Studies in Political Economy*, no 26, 1988, pp. 73-107; Greg ALBO and Jane JENSON, "The State in an Era of Globalisation", in *Understanding Canada*, edited by Wallace CLEMENT, Montreal & Kingston, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997, pp. 215-239.

⁶ . See on this point: Isabella BAKKER, Katherine SCOTT, "From the Postwar to the Post-Liberal Keynesian Welfare State", in *Understanding Canada. Building on the New Canadian Political Economy*, edited by Wallace CLEMENT, Montreal & Kingston, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997, pp. 286-310

⁷ . We refer here to the argumentation proposed by Rocher and Salée who suggest that the federal state has extended its spheres of activities at the economic level since the beginning of the 1980s. The ratification of the free-trade agreements played in this regard a determining role. Both agreements have contributed to increase the federal intrusion within provincial spheres of competencies and consequently, to reinforce the centralisation of federal system. They attribute to the federal government a co-ordinating role which shape the provincial economies. This trend towards the centralisation of federalism is also reinforced by the Constitutional Act of 1982. The adjudication of the Charter of Rights by the Supreme Court contributes to impose federal norms and then, to increase the influence of federal institutions over the provincial ones. Cf. François ROCHER and Daniel SALÉE, "Logique d'Etat et fédéralisme canadien: l'improbable décentralisation", *Bilan québécois du fédéralisme canadien*, edited by François ROCHER, Montréal, VLB éditeur, 1992, pp. 93-123.

⁸ . The changes having occurred at the federal level during the 1980s were not fundamentally different from the ones that we pointed out in our discussion on the new Québec economic context. In both cases, both governments took a turn to the right while becoming "obsessed" by the public debt crisis. This created space for the emergence of "new" discourses on the Canadian economy as well as the empowerment of actors such as the Public Accounting and the General Governor of the Bank of Canada. It furthered the hegemony of an accounting and entrepreneurial reading of the state in both cases. The main distinction was based on the respective constitutional spheres of jurisdiction. The election of new governments at both levels did not bring in a breakthrough of this new economic climate. The implementation of this economic setting has been reinforced by political changes having occurred in other provinces. The neo-liberal policies adopted by the Romanov government in Saskatchewan and by the Klein government in Alberta, which became largely celebrated, created strong incentives for the other governments. Their relative success in regard to the reduction of the deficit size was interpreted as being the unique avenue that all governments in Canada should follow. Cf. Thom WORKMAN, "Hegemonic Modulation and the Discourse of Fiscal Crisis", *Studies in Political Economy*, no 59, 1999, pp. 61-90; William COLEMAN, "Macroeconomic Policy: Dwindling Options", in *Governing Canada: Institutions and Public Policy*, edited by Michael M. ATKINSON, Toronto, HBJ, 1993, pp. 207-241.

⁹ . We do not argue here that globalisation is the only driving force behind the restructuring of the Canadian economy. Different trends can be observed such as the emergence of international metropolis (Toronto, Vancouver) and consequently, different interpretations can be proposed. See on these points: Jocelyn LÉTOURNEAU, *Les années sans guide. Le Canada à l'ère de l'économie migrante*, Montréal, Boréal, 1996, pp. 87-93; Janine BRODIE, "The New Political Economy of Regions", *op. cit.*, pp. 240-261; Laura MACDONALD, "Going Global: The Politics of Canada's Foreign Economic Relations", in *Understanding Canada*, edited by Wallace CLEMENT, Montreal & Kingston, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997, pp. 172-196.

¹⁰ . We refer here to the concept proposed by Jane Jenson. She rightly argued that the Québec nationalism can be seen as a form of provincialism. It was the main initiator of this movement which brought in a new dynamic in the federal/provincial relations. Cf. Jane JENSON, "Different" but not exceptional", *op. cit.*, pp. 85-88.

¹¹ . We do not affirm here that the regional tensions within Canada only emerged during the 1980s. The regional divisions and disparities have always been part of federal politics. The analysis made by Janine Brodie revealed that the regional question has always shaped the history of Canadian federalism. However, they recently became much more significant insofar as they have appeared much more threatening for the federal regime. The opening and liberalisation of the Canadian economy, the claims of Québec sovereignist movement, the neo-liberal orientations of the federal government, and the setting up and mostly the reshaping of the third national policy contributed to renew the debates around the regional issue. Cf. Janine BRODIE, "The New Political Economy of Regions", *op. cit.*, pp. 240-261.

¹² . During the 1980s, the "two funding nations" (French and English) representation which have framed the former constitutional debates and which have provided an historical legitimacy to Québec claims has been increasingly called into question. The debates around the repatriating of the Canadian constitution and the new Constitution Act of 1982 revealed the emergence of a new representation of Canada as being formed by ten provinces. This one particularly emphasises the equality between the provinces and consequently, tend to put aside the historical readings underlying the first one. This contributed to amplify the national unity crisis insofar as the Québec claims, whether they come from the sovereignist or federalist forces, are basically linked to the first representation. This new political context opened the door to the discussions around the notion of asymmetrical federalism. Cf. Guy LAFOREST, "L'esprit de 1982", in *Le Québec et la restructuration du Canada, 1980-1992.*, Sillery, Éditions du Septentrion, 1991, pp. 147-164; José WOERLING, "La crise constitutionnelle et le réaménagement des rapports entre le Québec et le Canada anglais", *International Journal of Canadian Studies*, no 7-8, 1993. Pp. 9-40.

¹³ . Cf. Richard LARUE and Jocelyn LÉTOURNEAU, "De l'unité et de l'identité au Canada. Essai sur l'éclatement d'un Etat", *International Journal of Canadian Studies*, no 7-8, 1993, pp. 85-86.

¹⁴ . See on this point: Frances ABELE, "Understanding What Happened Here : The Political Economy of Indigenous Peoples", in *Understanding Canada*, edited by Wallace CLEMENT, Montreal & Kingston, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997, pp. 118-140; Daniel SALÉE, "Autodétermination autochtone, souveraineté du Québec et fédéralisme canadien", in *Bilan du fédéralisme canadien*, edited by François Rocher, Montréal, VLB éditeur, pp. 372-405;.

¹⁵ . We should point out that these changes that we broadly discussed do not mean that the Aboriginal peoples are became very powerful and succeeded to impose their own agenda. Since the failure of the Charlottetown Accord in 1992, it rather appears that their political gains were not so consolidated than they appeared. Cf. Frances ABELE, *op. cit.*, pp. 118-140 ; Radha JHAPPAN, "Inherency, Three Nations and Collective Rights: the Evolution of Aboriginal Constitutional Discourse from 1982 to the Charlottetown Accord", *International Journal of Canadian Studies*, no 7-8, 1993, pp. 187-206 ; Paul CHARTRAND, "Terms of Division" : Problems of "Outside-Naming" for Aboriginal People in Canada", *Journal of Indigenous Studies*, vol. 2, no 2, 1991, pp. 1-22.

¹⁶ . Cf. Radha JHAPPAN, *op. cit.*, pp. 187-206; Paul L. CHARTRAND, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-10

¹⁷ . Cf. Paul L. CHARTRAND, *op. cit.*, pp. ; David LONG, "Culture, Ideology and Militancy: The Movement of Native Indians in Canada", in *Organizing Dissent*, edited by William K. CARROLL, Toronto, Garamond Press, 1992, pp. 118-134; Jane JENSON, "Le refus de la dualité: Nouvelles revendications de la citoyenneté au Canada", in *La question identitaire au Canada francophone*, edited by Jocelyn LÉTOURNEAU (in collaboration with Roger BERNARD), Sainte-Foy, Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 1994, pp. 197-205.

¹⁸ . Cf. Jane JENSON, "Le refus de la dualité", *op. cit.*, pp. 197-205; Leslie PAL, *op. cit.*; Micheline LABELLE, Daniel SALÉE, "La citoyenneté en question: l'État canadien face à l'immigration et à la diversité nationale et culturelle", *Sociologie et Sociétés*, vol. 31, no 2, 1999, pp. 125-144.

¹⁹ . We do not pretend here to make an exhaustive history of the different changes having shaped the Québec society from the 1980s and which are still prevalent. We want only to pinpoint some of them which appear important in regard to our history. They do not constitute a rupture or at least, they are not interpreted in this sense. The major change is that they are not the result or the consequence of the decisions taken by a small group of actor. They are not linked to a global and holistic discourse on the Québec society and then, resting on a mobilising political project claiming to represent the Québec people. See on this point: Jean-Marie FECTEAU, Gilles BRETON, Jocelyn LÉTOURNEAU, "Introduction", in *La condition québécoise. Enjeux et horizons d'une société en devenir*, Montréal, VLB éditeur, 1994, pp. 7-15.

²⁰ . We refer here to the recent literature which discusses the current changes of Québec society in establishing comparisons and links with other societies. This trend of the literature contributes to break up the internal standpoint which is often used for discussing Québec political and social issues while "the national issue. Cf. J. Yvon THERIAULT, "La société globale est morte ... vive la société globale !", *Cahiers de recherche sociologique*, no 28, 1997 ; pp. 19-36 ; Gilles BOURQUE, Jules DUCHASTEL, "Pour une identité canadienne post-nationale, la souveraineté partagée et la pluralité des cultures politiques", *Cahiers de recherche sociologique*, no 25, 1995, pp. 17-58 ; Jocelyn LÉTOURNEAU, "The Current Great Narrative of Québécois", *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, vol. 94, no 4, 1995, pp. 1039-1054.

²¹ . Cf. Gilles BOURQUE, Jacques BEAUCHEMIN, "La société à valeur ajoutée ou la religion pragmatique", *Sociologie et Sociétés*, vol. XXVI, no 2, 1994, pp. 33-37.

²² . *Idem*

²³ . See on this point: Gilles BOURQUE, Jacques BEAUCHEMIN, *op.cit.*, pp. 33-37; Réjean PELLETIER, "L'État du Québec dix ans plus tard (1980-1990)", in *Le Québec et la restructuration du Canada 1980-1992. Enjeux et Perspectives*, edited by Louis BALTHAZAR, Guy LAFOREST, Vincent LEMIEUX, Sillery, Septentrion, 1991, pp. 13-30; Juan-Luis KLEIN, "De l'État-providence à l'Etat accompagnateur dans la gestion du social: le cas du développement régional au Québec", *Lien social et politiques -RIAC*, no

33/73, 1995, pp. 131-140; Yves BÉLANGER, "Québec inc. : la dérive d'un modèle", in Alain G. GAGNON, *Québec : Etat et société*, Montréal, Québec-Amérique, 1994, pp. 453-455.

²⁴ . This redefinition of the state role was clearly expressed with the publication of three reports in 1986 during the first year of the Bourassa government: the Beaulieu Report discussing the privatisation of state agencies (sociétés d'Etat); the Gobeil Report on the revision of the role and number of state bodies; and the Scowen Report on deregulation. Each of them, which was conducted by members of the Cabinet, proposed a complete redefinition of the Québec state role in reclaiming the disengagement and the reduction of state size. They clearly referred on many points to the Thatcher experience. Even if the recommendations of these reports have not been applied by the Bourassa government, they were not ignored. Their economic and ahistorical reading of the state and their liberal celebration of the private enterprise became dominant discourses shaping the public debates. These reports contributed to set up a new economic agenda involving a reversal of perspective on the Québec state to which the successive governments have been confronted. Cf. Gilles BOURQUE, Jacques BEAUCHEMIN, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-40

²⁵ . The reference to a neo-liberal framework was made by all Québec governments from the beginning of the 1980s. As noted earlier, the calling into question of Keynesian policies was noticeable during the second mandate of the Parti Québécois under the leadership of René Lévesque (1981-1985). It has been accentuated during the two following mandates of the Liberal government led by Robert Bourassa (1985-1993). The latter's re-election created room for the spreading of neo-liberalism. The new Bourassa government included many key figures from the private sector. It was during the two Bourassa mandates that the round of cutbacks in the public spending was launched. The social services, health and education sectors became privileged targets of the government struggles against the deficit. The election of the Parti Québécois under the leadership of Jacques Parizeau in 1993 constituted a departure from the Bourassa government experience. Until his resignation at the end of 1995, the predominance of the neo-liberal discourse was somewhat attenuated. The anti-state rhetoric was criticised by key members of the Cabinet and the privatisation program forecast by the Liberal government was left aside. Many Cabinet members reaffirmed the necessity of state interventions. This reflected the social-democratic orientations of the Parti Québécois program which have been maintained by its militants. This brief interlude was however ended with the designation of Lucien Bouchard as chief of the Parti Québécois and then, as Québec Prime Minister in 1996. Major cutbacks in public spendings legitimised by the key word "deficit zero" became the priority of the government. In other words, the Québec government applied the solution of Ontario and Alberta governments. Without denying the relevance of state interventions, the state role in the economy was legitimised by the Bouchard government as a support to the initiatives of the private sector. What distinguished the Parti Liberal and the Parti Québécois during the 1980s was the issue of sovereignty and the social-democratic orientation of the Parti Québécois program. The recent austerity policies of the Bouchard government appeared in this regard very contradictory. The presence of a leftist element within the Parti Québécois membership (labour unions, community-based and popular groups, leftist intellectuals), explained why the government referred to the notions of solidarity and social justice for legitimising its neo-liberal policies.

²⁶ . This rescaling of state interventions also occurred at the regional level. As noted in the second chapter, it was during the 1960s and 1970s that the Québec government elaborated regional policies and established specific institutions aiming to resolve the under-development of some regions. The establishment of the BAEQ and the regional structures for municipalities (Municipalité régionale de comté-MRC) and health services showed its will to increase the political importance of the regional level. Until now, the regional scale in Québec politics has remained somewhat marginal. It has not been yet fully recognised as a significant and distinct political level from the national or the local level. The recent regional policy adopted by the Bouchard government which emphasised the importance of supporting local and regional initiatives and of establishing partnerships with local actors appears in this regard particularly ambiguous, indicating the dismissal of previous governmental initiatives. Cf.: GOUVERNEMENT DU QUÉBEC, *Politique de soutien au développement local et régional*, Québec, Secrétariat au développement des régions, 1997, 50 pages; Juan Luis KLEIN, *op. cit.*, pp. 131-140; Benoît LÉVESQUE, Lucie MAGER, "L'institutionnalisation des nouvelles dynamiques de concertation locale et régionale au Québec: les acteurs sociaux à la recherche d'une stratégie gagnante", in *L'espace*

québécois, edited by Alain-G. GAGNON and Alain NOËL, Montréal, Québec/Amérique, 1995, pp. 135-170;

²⁷ . This so-called Québec economic development model is based on the economic and social initiatives undertaken during the Quiet revolution aiming to solidify and to rise the Québec control on its own development. It aims to reduce the foreign control on the main economic levers and to increase the presence of the Francophones within the economy. In other words, it is the pursuit of the slogan "Maîtres chez nous". It can rightly be argued that Québec inc. represents a corporatist variance similar to what we find in many small European countries without to be, however, formally institutionalised. One of its institutional forms has been the organisation of socio-economic summits ("sommets socio-économiques") which gather representatives from government, the political opposition, the business sectors, the labor unions and sometimes, the communitarian, cultural and social sectors. These summits constitute public forums aiming to find out concrete solutions to economic problems or long-term orientations to future Québec economic development. These summits perpetuate what we can call a consensual ideology which is dominant in the Québec political discourse from the 1980s. Even if the Québec inc. model seems to be still used during the 1990s, its efficacy appears very questionable. Some authors argue that it has not brought in effective and long-term solutions to the Québec structural economic problems. Moreover, the supposed economic benefits for the whole Québec population does not yet come. It is rather an important social and economic fracture which is appearing. For a critical discussion of the Québec inc. model, see: Michael R. SMITH, "L'impact de Québec Inc., répartition des revenus et efficacité économique", *Sociologie et Sociétés*, vol. 26, no 2, 1994, pp. 57-90; Yves BÉLANGER, "Québec Inc.: La dérive d'un modèle", in *Québec: Etat et société*, edited by Alain G. GAGNON, Montréal, Québec-Amérique, 1994, pp. 443-460.

²⁸ . Michael SMITH, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

²⁹ . *Ibid.*, pp. 57-80

³⁰ . See on this point: Jocelyn LÉTOURNEAU, *Les années sans guide. Le Canada à l'ère de l'économie migrante*, Montréal, Boréal, 1996, pp. 87-122.

³¹ . Gilles BOURQUE, Jacques BEAUCHEMIN, *op. cit.*, pp. ; Jocelyn LÉTOURNEAU, *op. cit.*, Montréal, Boréal, 1996, pp. 87-122; Gilles BRETON and Jane JENSON, "La nouvelle dualité canadienne", in *Le Québec et la restructuration du Canada, 1980-1992*, Sillery, Septentrion, 1991, pp. 82-88.

³² . François Rocher rightly argued that the debates preceding the signatures of the free-trade agreements revealed that they refer to a economic and political logic which can not be strictly qualified of neo-liberal. This continental strategy was presented by its supporters as the best solution to reinforce the control on the main economic levers of the Québec economy. They still referred to the will of developing a prosperous Québec economy which would be under the control of Québec capital and not dominated by foreign investors. In this perspective, the Québec state would create the conditions to increase the competitiveness of "winning" economic sectors while helping the weaker economic sectors to adapt themselves to the new economic context. The portrait of the Québec economy drawn by the supporters' arguments appeared thus different from a neo-liberal economy. However, the picture of the global economy depicted in the debates was largely shaped by neo-liberalism. Restricted to the global market, it was expected that the liberalising of commerce will be self-regulated. It appeared some contradictions between the two pictures. For a greater discussion of the different arguments raised in the debates about the free-trade agreements, see: François ROCHER, "Le Québec en Amérique du Nord: la stratégie continentale", in *Québec: Etat et société*, edited by Alain G. GAGNON, Montréal, Québec-Amérique, 1994, pp. 469-479; Gilles BRETON, Jane JENSON, *op. cit.*, 1991 pp. .

³³ . Cf. François ROCHER, *op. cit.*, pp. 476-479; Pierre MARTIN, "Le nationalisme québécois et le choix du libre-échange continental", in *L'Espace québécois*, edited by Alain G. GAGNON and Alain NOËL, Montréal, Québec/Amérique, 1995, pp. 105-133

³⁴ . Jocelyn LÉTOURNEAU, *op. cit.*, pp. 87-122

³⁵ . We do not have the space to present here a detailed discussion of the history of the Québec nationalism since the end of the 1970s. We will point out some of its major changes which are the most significant for our story. For a discussion of the recent history of the Québec nationalism, see : Louis BALTHAZAR, "Les nombreux visages du nationalisme au Québec", in *Québec : Etat et société*, edited by Alain G. GAGNON, Montréal, Québec/Amérique, 1994, pp. 23-40 ; Michael KEATING, *Les défis du nationalisme moderne. Québec, Catalogne, Ecosse*, Traduit par Pierre Desrosiers, Montréal/Bruxelles, Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal/Presses Interuniversitaires Européennes, 1997, pp. 83-136 ; Jane JENSON, "Naming Nations: Nationalisms in Canadian Public Discourse", *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology*, vol. 30, no 3, 1993, pp. 337-358; Jocelyn LÉTOURNEAU, "La nouvelle figure identitaire du Québécois : Essai sur la dimension symbolique d'un consensus social en voie d'émergence", *British Journal of Canadian Studies*, vol. 6, no 1, 1991, pp. 17-38 ; Gilles BOURQUE et Jules DUCHASTEL, "Démocratie et communauté politique supranationale", *Cahiers de recherche sociologique*, no 28, 1997, pp. 149-168..

³⁶ . The strategy used by the sovereignist forces recent referendum campaign in 1995 confirmed this shift. It was clear that the independentist option was less and less seen as viable and consequently, predominant. The re-negotiation of the federal system which would provide more powers to Québec while recognising its historical and cultural specificity became perceived as being the ultimate objective of the Québec nationalist forces. This option is also the one which seems to get more approvals in the opinion polls. This is why some authors such as Jocelyn Létourneau will use the term affirmationist rather than nationalist for characterising the Québec historical and political claims. Cf. Jocelyn LÉTOURNEAU, *Les années sans guide*, *op. cit.*, pp.

³⁷ . The democratic validity of the sovereignist project was not strongly questioned prior to the 1980 referendum. Its legitimacy was assumed by each of the actors taking part to the debates. The legality of the process and the democratic ideals of the sovereignist leaders were not questioned. The emphasis put on these issues by the opponents constitutes to a large extent a turning point in the debates following the 1980 referendum. Cf. Daniel LATOUCHE, "Démocratie et nationalisme à l'heure de la mondialisation", *Cahiers de recherche sociologique*, no 25, 1995, pp. 59-61.

³⁸ . It can be useful to point out that both events were interrelated. One of the major arguments of the no-side during the referendum campaign used by Trudeau was to promise a renewal of Canadian federalism in order to respond to the Québec historical grievances. This promise which came at the end of the campaign has been seen as an official engagement from the federal government by both sides. It has been interpreted as an important element explaining the defeat of the sovereignist option.

³⁹ . The decision by the federal government to repatriate the Canadian constitution has been a real political saga with many surprises. The exclusion of Québec from the new constitutional regime set up by the Constitution Act of 1982 had two major impacts. Firstly, it contributed to modify the Québec nationalist imaginary. It became interpreted by the nationalist leaders as proving the impossibility to adequately protect the Québec interests within the federal system. In other words, this would reveal the sclerosis and the impracticability of Canadian federalism. Secondly, it redefined the Canadian political agenda insofar as the reintegration of Québec and more generally, the Canadian national unity issue became on the top of the list. This explained the perpetual constitutional negotiations during the eighties and the elaboration of two unsuccessful Constitutional accords (The Meech Lake Accord, 1985 and the Charlottetown Accord, 1992) aiming to resolve, among other things, the Québec constitutional exclusion. For a discussion of this constitutional saga, see: Alain G. GAGNON, "Québec - Canada : circonvolutions constitutionnelles", in *Québec : Etat et société*, edited by Alain G. GAGNON, Montréal, Québec/Amérique, 1994, 85-106 ; Peter H. RUSSELL, *Constitutional Odyssey: Can Canadian Become a Sovereign People*, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1993, 317 pages.

⁴⁰ . See on this point : Louis BALTHAZAR, "Les visages du nationalisme au Québec", *op. cit.* ; Michael KEATING, *op. cit.*, pp. 90-100 ; Alain NOËL, Alain G. GAGNON, "Le monde, les régions, la nation: vers une nouvelle définition de l'espace québécois", in *L'espace québécois*, edited by Alain G. GAGNON and Alain NOËL, Montréal, Editions Québec/Amérique, 1995, pp. 17-37; Pierre MARTIN, *op. cit.*, pp. 105-133.

⁴¹ . Cf. ; J. Yvon THÉRIAULT, "L'individualisme démocratique et le projet souverainiste", *Sociologie et sociétés*, vol. 26, no 4, 1994, p. 26-29; Jocelyn LÉTOURNEAU, "La nouvelle figure identitaire des Québécois", *op. cit.*,

⁴² . This redefinition of Québec nationalism appeared during the debates about the FTA. The approval by the Parti Québécois of this agreement and the links created at this occasion with the business pro-free-trade suggested that a such re-orientation was occurring. This was confirmed during the Bélanger-Campeau Commission in 1990 set up by the Bourassa government when important representatives of the business sector took a stance for the sovereignist option. Cf. Louis BALTHAZAR, "Conscience nationale et contexte international", in *Le Québec et la restructuration du Canada, 1980-1992*, Québec, Editions du Septentrion, 1991, pp. 33-48; Pierre MARTIN, "Le nationalisme québécois et le choix du libre-échange continental", in *L'espace québécois*, edited by Alain G. GAGNON and Alain NOËL, Montréal, Editions Québec/Amérique, 1995, pp. 105-132.

⁴³ . Cf. Gilles BOURQUE, Jules DUCHASTEL, *L'identité fragmentée: Nation et citoyenneté dans les débats constitutionnels canadiens, 1941-1992*, Montréal, Fides, 1996, pp.

⁴⁴ . See on this point : Dimitrios KARMIS, "Interpréter l'identité québécoise", in *Québec : Etat et société*, edited by Alain G. GAGNON, Montréal, Editions Québec/Amérique, 1994, pp. 305-328.

⁴⁵ . The recognition of the diverse ethno-cultural minorities within the Québec borders revealed the empowerment of the Québec nationalist movement and more particularly, the transformation of Québec space into a space of affirmation. The diverse Québec linguistic legislation protecting the French language and the 1980 referendum have been important steps in their mobilisation and especially in the construction of their identities as a minority within Québec. Cf. GROUPE DE RECHERCHE ETHNICITÉ ET IMMIGRATION, "Immigrations et relations ethniques au Québec: un pluralisme en devenir", in *Le Québec en jeu*, edited by Gerard DAIGLE, Montréal, Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1992, pp. 451-482 ; Micheline LABELLE, François ROCHER, Guy ROCHER, "Pluriethnicité, citoyenneté et intégration: de la souveraineté pour lever les obstacles et les ambiguïtés", *Cahiers de recherche sociologique*, no 25, 1995, pp. 213-245.

⁴⁶ . Since the 1990s, the Parti Québécois leaders have privileged a political definition the Québec nation as a civic community linked by the reason and based on the respect of individual rights while attempting to exclude references to its cultural-linguistic component. This change of the discourse of the Parti Québécois leaders constitutes an answer to the criticisms and fears coming from by the cultural minorities and the federal government and others provinces as well. It also represents an attempt to legitimise Québec nationalism at the international level. See on these points: Daniel SALÉE, "Espace public, identité et nation au Québec: mythes et méprises du discours souverainiste", *Cahiers de recherche sociologique*, no 25, 1995, pp. 125-154 ; Dimitrios KARMIS, *op. cit.*, pp. 315-321.

⁴⁷ . Cf. Dimitrios KARMIS, *op. cit.*, pp. 315-321.

⁴⁸ . We do not intend to discuss in a very detailed way the different component of First Nations nationalism. This will be done in the next chapter. We do just want to highlight the political impact of the political visibility of Aboriginal nationalism in Québec identity politics. See on these points: Daniel SALÉE, "Identité québécoise, identité autochtone et territorialité : entre les frontières subjectives et objectives de l'espace québécois", in *L'espace québécois*, Montréal, Editions Québec/Amérique, 1995, pp. 263-292 ; Jane JENSON, "Naming Nations. Making Nationalist Claims in Canadian Public Discourse", *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology*, vol. 30, no 3, 1993, pp.337-358 ; Dimitrios KARMIS, *op. cit.*, pp. 315-322 ;

⁴⁹ . Cf. Eric GOURDEAU, "Le Québec et la question autochtone", in *Québec : Etat et société*, edited by Alain G. GAGNON, Montréal, editions Québec/Amérique, 1994, pp. 329-356 ; Renée DUPUIS, *La question indienne*, Montréal, Editions Boréal, 1995 ; GOUVERNEMENT DU QUÉBEC, *Eleven Contemporary Nations. The Amerindians and the Inuit of Québec*, Québec, Secrétariat aux Affaires autochtones, 1997.

⁵⁰ . The abolition of the distinction between status Indian and non-status Indian was an answer to the requests made by the Association des femmes autochtones du Québec. The latter strongly denounced the loss of the Indian status for all Indian women who married a non-Indian. Cf. Eric GOURDEAU, *op. cit.*, pp. 338-339.

⁵¹ . Cf. Daniel SALÉE, "Identité québécoise, identité autochtone et territorialité", *op. cit.*, pp. 263-292; Dimitrios KARMIS, *op. cit.*, pp. 315-322; Diom Roméo SAGANASH, "Gouvernement autochtone et nationalisme ethnique", *Cahiers de recherche sociologique*, no 20, 1993, pp. 21-44.

⁵² . Cf. Louis BALTHAZAR, "Conscience nationale et contexte international", *op. cit.*, pp. 41-46

⁵³ . See on this point : Christopher McALL, "Les murs de la cité : territoires d'exclusion et espaces de citoyenneté" *Lien social et Politiques - RIAC*, no 34/74, pp. 81-93.

⁵⁴ . The creation of this secretariat responded to the need of reinforcing the legitimacy of the Québec state. It attempted to put an end to the increasing criticisms against state services. The secretariat should bring in some corrections. It presented an annual report to the cabinet in which it pointed the problems raised by the population and the required orientations.

⁵⁵ . This new ministry does not have institutional links with the Secretariat. It has not been its successor. It rather resulted from the successive transformations of the ministries dealing with immigrations and cultural communities. The image of the Québec society as being pluralist and multiethnic was recognised. The new minister includes three sectors of activities: the sector Relations with the citizens providing informations on governmental activities and facilitating the accessibility to services; the sector Immigration and integration taking on the mandate of the former Ministry of Cultural Communities and Immigration; and the sector Civic Relations aiming to increase the participation of all citizens to the development of Québec society. It is became responsible for many governmental agencies and secretariats such as the Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse, le Conseil permanent de la jeunesse, le Curateur public, etc. This new ministry is then supposed to promote and protect the existing citizenship rights and at the same time, to contribute to increase solidarity and tolerance between Québec people. Cf. ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE DU QUÉBEC, *Allocation du ministre délégué aux Relations avec les citoyens*, Québec, 4 juin 1996, pp 1-18.

⁵⁶ . *Idem.*

⁵⁷ . COMMISSION DES INSTITUTIONS, *Examen du mandat, des orientations, des activités et de la gestion du Protecteur du citoyen*, Québec, Gouvernement du Québec, 1991, pp. 3-7

⁵⁸ . Cf. Christopher McALL, "Les murs de la citoyenneté", *op. cit.*, pp. 81-92; J. Yvon THÉRIAULT, "La société globale est morte ... vive la société globale", *op. cit.*, pp. 19-34 ; Jane JENSON, "Le refus de la dualité. Nouvelles revendications de la citoyenneté au Canada", *op. cit.*, pp. 189-204.

⁵⁹ . Cf. Daniel SALÉE, "Espace public, identité et nation au Québec", *op. cit.*, pp.

⁶⁰ . This conception of citizenship as being a clientele or a group of tax payers rests on a economist reading of the state. It puts forward a representation of the state as being a private enterprise which should provide services in a very efficient and cheapest way. It then portraits a very restrictive and incomplete picture of the state.

⁶¹ . Cf. Henri LUSTIGER-THALER, "La dignité et l'Etat: nouvelles assises de la citoyenneté", *Sociologie et sociétés*, vol. 26, no 2, 1994, pp. 145-164; Juan Luis KLEIN, "De l'Etat-providence à l'Etat accompagnateur dans la gestion du social: le cas du développement régional au Québec", *Lien social et politiques/RIAC*, no 33/73, 1995, pp. 133-141; Gérard BOISMENU, Alain NOËL, "La restructuration de la protection sociale en Amérique du Nord et en Europe", *Cahiers de recherche sociologique*, no 24, 1995, pp. 49-86.

⁶² . Some authors characterise these changes as resulting from the setting up of a dual mode of regulation involving the creation of two categories of citizens. Jocelyn Létourneau proposes in this regard an interesting typology. He suggests to name these two categories: the "winners" opposed to the "losers".

Whereas the first refers to the group of citizens who easily gets access to governmental services and governmental support for its activities, the other group is rather in the margins and get few benefits from the governmental. Cf. Jocelyn LÉTOURNEAU, *Les années sans guide*, *op. cit.*, pp. 74-83 ; Juan Luis KLEIN, "Autonomie et dépendance des mouvements sociaux dans la régulation postkeynesienne", in *L'autre économie. Une économie alternative ?*, edited by Benoît LÉVESQUE, André JOYAL, and Omer CHOUIARD, Sillery, Presses de l'Université du Québec, 1989, pp. 297-308.

⁶³ . Cf. Jocelyn LÉTOURNEAU, *Les années sans guide*, *op. cit.*,

⁶⁴ . Cf. Henri LUSTIGER-THALER, *op. cit.*, pp. 145-164;

⁶⁵ . Christopher McALL, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

⁶⁶ . The excellent analysis of Leslie Pal on the development of the citizenship policy and administration since 1945 points out the existence of successive phases through which their mandate and institutional bases. The adoption of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms contributed to significantly increase the political weight of citizenship rights. However, whereas citizenship policies became in itself an important stake shaping the public sphere, the institutionalisation of citizenship turned out to be much more arduous. The latter was rather characterised by periods of progress followed by periods of stagnation. The subsequent transformations of the department often consisted in the adoption of a new organisational division and at the same time, new names for the different programs. Cf. Leslie A. PAL, *op. cit.*, pp. 100-150

⁶⁷ . Cf. Gilles BOURQUE, Jules DUCHASTEL, *L'identité fragmentée*, *op. cit.*, 1996, pp. 133-199; Micheline LABELLE, Daniel SALÉE, "La citoyenneté en question: l'État Canadien face à l'immigration et à la diversité culturelle", *op. cit.*, pp. 129-132;

⁶⁸ . See on this point: Alan C. CAIRNS, *op. cit.*, pp. 181-220;

⁶⁹ . Cf. Leslie A. PAL, *op. cit.*, pp. ; Alexandra DOBROWOLSKY, "Of Special Interest": Interest, Identity and Feminist Constitutional Activism in Canada", *Revue canadienne de science politique*, vol. 31, no 4, 1998, pp. 707-742; Jane JENSON, "Le refus de la dualité", *op. cit.*, pp. 189-211

⁷⁰ . See on this point: Leslie A. PAL., *op. cit.*,

⁷¹ . Cf. Micheline LABELLE, Daniel SALÉE, *op. cit.*, pp. 129-139

⁷² . Cf. Katherine SCOTT, "The Dilemma of Liberal Citizenship: Women and Social Assistance Reform in the 1990s", *Studies in Political Economy*, no 50, 1996, pp. 7-36; Gilles BRETON, Jane JENSON, "Globalisation et citoyenneté : quelques enjeux actuels", in *L'ethnicité à l'heure de la mondialisation*, edited by Caroline ANDREW, Ottawa, ACFAS-Outaouais, 1992, pp. 35-55 ; Micheline LABELLE, Daniel SALÉE, *op. cit.*, pp. 125-144; .

⁷³ . It is important to point out that the politicisation of the issues raised by the contemporary social movements has been furthered by the policies set up by the federal government. Leslie Pal points out that the citizenship programs created by the latter framed by the ideology of participation and social animation turned out to be extremely receptive to social movements' claims. Moreover, the political emphasis put by the federal government on equity and social justice created a political climate favourable to the recognition of the discriminations pointed out by social movements. These changes contributed to widen the political space of Canadian citizenship. It seems more adequate of writing that they created new spaces of citizenship, i.e. new arenas in which citizenship rights can be claimed and exercised. Cf. Leslie A. PAL, *op. cit.*, pp. ; Charles TAYLOR, "Le pluralisme et le dualisme", *op. cit.*, pp. 65-73;

⁷⁴ . In the next chapter, we will discuss in a more detailed way that the current political status of Aboriginal peoples is became in itself much more complex. It is true that the formation of nationhood represents one important dimension which deeply challenges the categories created by the Indian Act. However, it appeared that other social relations such as gender, class, or traditional culture shape the Aboriginal peoples situation. Consequently, their political identity turns out to be more diversified. See on this point : Rennie WARBUTON, "Status, Class, and the Politics of Canadian Aboriginal Peoples", *Studies in Political Economy*, no 54, Autumn 1997, pp. 119-141 ; Frances ABELES, *op. cit.*, pp. 118-123.

⁷⁵ . Cf. Claude CORBO, "Préface" in *Hydro-Québec. Autres temps, autres défis*, edited by Yves BÉLANGER and Robert COMEAU, Ste-Foy, Presses de l'Université du Québec, 1995, pp. VII-VIII.

⁷⁶ . See on this point: Phillipe FAUCHER, Johanne BERGERON, *Hydro-Québec. La société de l'heure de pointe*, Montréal, Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1986, pp. 85-93.

⁷⁷ . *Idem*.

⁷⁸ . *Idem*.

⁷⁹ . The first oil shock resulted in 1973-74 from the decision taken by the OPEC (Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries) to quadrupled the petroleum price. This decision was taken just shortly after that OPEC cartels had imposed an embargo to Western countries. This caused a brutal shock insofar as it occurred in a context during which the demand for petroleum had greatly increased while inflation had reduced the real price of oil. It thus confronted Western countries with their great dependence on petroleum and especially, their inability to impose limits to the world energy price which were now under the control of OPEC. The major rise of oil price and the important shortage in energy sources experienced in many countries brought an international energy crisis which became somewhat attenuated after 1975. It raised important debates within Western countries about the need to reduce their dependence on foreign sources of energy and consequently, the necessity to develop alternative sources to petroleum. The White Paper released by the Québec government constituted then a response to the international crisis.

⁸⁰ . The publication of an other policy statement on Québec industrial policy entitled *Bâtir le Québec* in 1979 reflected the same political will of giving to Hydro-Québec a more expanding role within Québec economic development. It suggested a greater political control over the Hydro-Québec future development. However, the perspective on Hydro-Québec was slightly different insofar as this policy statement was elaborated by the Department of Industry and Commerce. This document proposed to use Hydro-Québec's electricity surpluses and its relatively low tariffs for attracting foreign industries which consume high amount of electricity. This would represent an undeniable comparative advantage increasing the competitiveness of Québec economy. Even if this strategy did not become initially the basis of the Québec energy policy, it was not however left aside. It became used during the 1980s during the negotiations relative to the establishing of foreign firms, notably the aluminium firms. Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 88-90.

⁸¹ . Cf. Robert A. BOYD, "Cinquante ans au service du consommateur", in *Hydro-Québec. Autres temps, autres défis*, edited by Yves BÉLANGER and Robert COMEAU, Sainte-Foy, Presses de l'Université du Québec, 1995, pp. 98-103.

⁸² . It is important to mention that the degree of constraints has never been clearly demonstrated. It is nonetheless sure that the resistance from Hydro-Québec directors to apply a more diversified tariff grid was stronger during the 1970s. The adoption of the Bill 41 in 1978 was a turning point insofar as it allowed the government to do so. This new governmental policy directly contradicted one of the major arguments used by the Liberal government to justify the nationalisation in 1963, that is to say, the reduction of the tariff disparities. The use of preferential tariffs as an industrial strategy went in the opposed direction. The main consequence of these commercial programs imposed by the government was the obligation for Hydro-Québec of dealing with a variable tariff grid and implicitly, with different forms of supplying obligations. Cf. Phillipe FAUCHER, Johanne BERGERON, *op. cit.*, pp. 142-146.

⁸³ . This implied more specifically that the Québec Hydro-Electric Commission previously directed by five commissioners was replaced by an administration board which became the new decision-making mechanism of Hydro-Québec. It was also stipulated that five of the eight members and the director (or president) of the Board would be appointed by the Minister of Energy. This opened the door to a greater political control over the Hydro-Québec decisions. Cf. Philippe FAUCHER, Johanne BERGERON, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

⁸⁴ . It is important to point out that we do not refer here to the exportation of hydro-electricity. It only concerns technologies and expertise acquired by Hydro-Québec in the construction of hydro-electric complex and the distribution of electricity. The development of Hydro-Québec's international activities has

steadily occurred during the 1980s. Even if Hydro-Québec faced important difficulties at home, this did not prevent the considerable expansion of its abroad activities. From this angle, Hydro-Québec is became over the years a transnational public corporation which was present in 1995 in more than 50 countries. It is important to point out that what can be seen as an international success on the world markets also involves some negative consequences. The impacts of some mega-projects to which Hydro-Québec was associated turned out to be sometimes particularly disastrous for the local population and environment such as it occurred in the construction of dams on the river in China. Cf. Richard DROUIN, "Hydro-Québec face à des enjeux planétaires", in *Hydro-Québec. Autres temps, autres défis*, edited by Yves BÉLANGER, Robert COMEAU, Sainte-Foy, Presses de l'Université du Québec, 1995, pp. 17-22; Dossier dans Option-Paix.

⁸⁵ . See on this point: Phillipe FAUCHER, Johanne BERGERON, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-93.

⁸⁶ . The Bill 16 allowed the Québec government to recuperate the exceeding financial surpluses of Hydro-Québec. Moreover, the possibility for Hydro-Québec to fix itself its tariffs gives it the possibility to control more adequately the level of consumption, and at the same time, to control its financial surpluses. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 93.

⁸⁷ . Cf. *Idem*.

⁸⁸ . You can refer to his book written in 1981 in which he still privileged the development of hydraulic resources by Hydro-Québec to redress the Québec economy. This constituted a plea for the two other hydro-electric complexes which are part of the whole James Bay project: the Nottaway-Broadback- Rupert complex and the Great Whale complex. Cf. Robert BOURASSA, *Deux fois la Baie James*, Montréal, Les Editions La Presse, 1981, 157 pages.

⁸⁹ . Cf. Philippe FAUCHER, Johanne BERGERON, *op. cit.*, pp.

⁹⁰ . Hydro-Québec had published in December 1980 its development plan for the next ten years. Its investment plan consisted of 55 milliards which rested on the double increase of hydro-electricity production during the same period. This presupposed that the demand for electricity would be of 6,2% per year, largely similar to the ones during the two last decades. Hydro-Québec expected that it will continue to benefit of the previous favourable context during it has pursued its steady growth. These previsions rapidly became obsolete. Hydro-Québec was rather facing during the first years of the 1980s a very different economic context imposing new constraints. The annual demand considerably decreased and was stabilised around 2%. The severe economic recession brought in an important reduction of electricity sales. Consequently, the Hydro revenues during this period seriously dropped. Instead of choosing if increasing electricity rates, Hydro-Québec decided to increase its sales and therefore, modified its strategies of commercialising. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 111.

⁹¹ . It should be pointed out that the commercial competitiveness of Hydro-Québec has been linked to the energy situation of New England states. The portrait of the latter at the beginning of the 1980s revealed a heavily dependence from oil. An important amount of electricity came from oil-fired or coal-fired power plants. This type of production turned out to be less and less economically advantageous. The increase of price oil since the oil crisis in 1973 and environmental concerns opened the door to alternative sources of energy. This occurred at the time that energy demand was increasing in New England states. It was much more profitable to buy up cheap electricity from Hydro-Québec rather than build new oil-fired power plants. This particular context furthered then Hydro-Québec. Cf. Sean McCUTCHEON, *Electric Rivers. The Story of the James Bay Project*, Montréal, Black Rose Books, 1991, pp. 80-84.

⁹² . The main impact of these contracts has been somewhat more political than economic. These contracts broadened the process of commercialisation of electricity which has started at the beginning of the 1970s. The signature of three contracts with some public services and enterprises of Vermont between 1970 and 1972 had constituted a determining trigger. Other contracts were signed afterwards with the New York Power Authority, a state-own public utility. The construction of a interconnection grid relying it to the New York Power Authority (NYPA) in 1978 greatly modified the technical infrastructure. It furthered he increasing of the number of contracts and their quantitative value. Instead of selling electricity via the Ontario grid, Hydro-Québec could do it directly and at its own conditions. From this moment, Hydro-

Québec signed more valuable contracts involving greater quantities of electricity. Additional contracts were signed with the New York Power Authority and the Vermont Public Service Board. Hydro-Québec concluded an agreement with the New England Power Pool (NEPOOL) in 1984 implying larger quantities (10 milliards of kWh) and better supplying guaranties. The signature of those contracts involved a major change owing to its clauses. Indeed,

" The first was with Central Maine Power, which planned to resell some of the 300 megawatts of firm power to other New England States (...) . The second, for up to 450 megawatts of firm power and firm energy, was with Vermont Joint Owners, a consortium of the major utilities in Vermont. Under this deal, Quebec would be providing as much as half of all the electricity used in Vermont during the 1990s. Finally, Hydro-Québec had also signed an agreement in principle for its largest ever export contract : to sell 1 000 megawatts of firm power over the course of 21 years to the new York Power Authority. By this contract, Québec would supply about six percent of New York State's electricity needs around the turn of century. (...) Together with existing export contracts, these new deals meant that if all options in all contracts were exercised, at the end of the century Hydro-Québec would be exporting more than 2 400 megawatts of firm power ".

Each of these contracts included clauses allowing each partner to cancel contracts if some of the initial conditions were altered. Cf. Sean McCUTCHEON, *op. cit.*, pp. 138-139 ; Philippe FAUCHER, Johanne BERGERON, *op. cit.*, pp. 108-11.

⁹³ . Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 140.

⁹⁴ . The use of the notion variable geometry implies here the recognition of the spatial variability of energy questions. The opposition between national versus international such as it was defined by states appears to be less and less appropriate. To assume that there is a greater variability in the spatial definition of energy issues does not mean that all definitions are possible. There are some structural constraints which restrict the recognition of some spatial definitions. One of them is the North-South divide. It is clearly appeared that the definitions of energy issues by Western countries are the ones which are put at the forefront.

⁹⁵ . We just present here some of the main changes having contributed to redefine the discussions of energy questions in Western countries and to politicise them. Although the Stockholm Conference and the Oil Crisis had a tremendous impact in drawing attention on the limits of energy resources, they do not explain everything. We can mention, among other factors, scientific findings, environmental problems and catastrophes related to oil spilling and nuclear power plants, the greening of international relations and pressures by citizens and ecologist groups. It resulted that environmental protection and energy development are now seen as being closely interrelated. The development of energy politics at the national level and international level as well created space for this new perspective. It is true that the release of the Brundtland Commission report and the subsequent debates around the notion of sustainable development constituted a new step. They confirmed the emerging trends and at the same time, introduced what we can characterise as a global perspective on energy issue. This did not lead to the adoption of a homogeneous and univocal perspective. The resistance of developing countries rather pointed out the existence of different political standpoints and more particularly, the power relations underlying the agenda setting-process. They also revealed the intertwining of energy politics within different political spaces. The discussions around the destruction of rainforest in Brazil or the Chernobyl nuclear accident reveal the overlapping between different political scales and mostly, that the definition of the latter was in itself an important stake. Their recognition as being a local, a national or a global issue has brought in important debates which often refers to a world political community. In each case, the state could not imposed so easily its scale definition of the problem in invoking its national sovereignty. Cf. Ronnie D. LIPSCHUTZ, Ken CONCA, "The Implications of the Global Ecological Interdependenc", in *The State and Social Power in Global Environmental Politics*, edited by Ronnie D. LIPSCHUTZ and Ken CONCA, New York, Columbia University Press, 1993, pp. 327-343; Thomas PRINCEN, Mathias FINGER, Jack P. MANNO, " Transnational Linkages", in *Environmental NGOs in World Politics*, edited by Thomas PRINCEN and Mathias FINGER, New York, Routledge, 1994, pp. 217-236; Jim MACNEIL, "The Greening of International Relations", *International Journal*, vol. XLV, no 1, Winter 1989-90, pp. 1-35.

⁹⁶ . This issue has been included in the recent energy policy adopted by the Québec government in 1988. This objective has been so far reiterated by the Québec government. Cf. GOUVERNEMENT DU QUÉBEC, *L'énergie motrice du développement économique. Politique énergétique pour les années 1990*, Gouvernement du Québec, Ministère de l'Énergie et des Ressources, 1998.

⁹⁷ . The economic profitability of the strategy of exportation has remained until today controversial. Despite the several statements and studies launched by Hydro-Québec and the Québec government aiming to demonstrate its positive impact, the weaknesses of this strategy continued to be discussed. The latter have never been totally refuted. Their advantages appear to be much more related to the particular conjuncture than structural. The cancellation of important contracts during the 1990s showed the fragility of their profitability. Cf. Philippe FAUCHER, Johanne BERGERON, *op. cit.*, pp. 112-113; Phillippe DUNSKY, "Jouer avec le feu", in *Hydro-Québec. Autres temps, autres défis*, Ste-Foy, Presses de l'Université du Québec, 1995, pp. 267-279.

⁹⁸ . See on this point: Jean-Guy VAILLANCOURT, "Localisation de lignes et transport d'électricité", in *Essais d'écologie sociale*, Montréal, Editions Coopératives Albert St-Martin, 1982, pp. 149-152; Sean McCUTCHEON, *op. cit.*, pp. 158-163.

⁹⁹ . Hydro-Québec set up these processes which aimed to inform the local population and to get their suggestions before it took the final decision over the localisation. The reality was however different from the initial objectives. The main purpose of these public consultations was to get the approval of the projects by the local population even if the decision was already taken. Moreover the discussions were often dominated by technical arguments from the Hydro's experts. The discontentment of the population grew up in this context. These consultations became rapidly perceived as rather meaningless insofar as the claims and suggestions coming from the population were more or less ignored. This democratic illusion and the technocratic character of these local meetings came to be denounced by the population. The greater mobilisation of citizen groups and the subsequent efforts of Hydro-Québec brought in some transformations of the process of consultation. It began to be less and less a kind of rubber stamp aiming to neutralise the criticisms. Cf. Jean-Guy VAILLANCOURT, *op. cit.*, pp. 149-159.

¹⁰⁰ . Cf. Sean McCUTCHEON, *op. cit.*, pp. 158-163.

¹⁰¹ . We refer here to the analysis of Vaillancourt who highlighted the predominance of the issue of energy throughout the contemporary history of the environmentalist and ecology groups. This constituted one major characteristic of the Québec ecology movement. Although other issues have been raised such as the pollution and the disposition of toxic waste, the production and distribution of energy has always been prioritised. Cf. Jean-Guy VAILLANCOURT, *op. cit.*, pp. 161-201.

¹⁰² . We should mention that different events having occurred in 1977 and 1978 brought in the idea of holding a vast and democratic debate on the Québec energy policy. The project of constructing an other nuclear power plant (Gentilly III) brought about the mobilisation of the ecology and anti-nuclear groups. They put forward the idea of imposing a moratorium on the development of nuclear energy and insisted on the necessity to clarify the Québec energy situation. They denounced the lack of informations which prevented to choose the most adequate and efficient source and form of energy production. Consequently, the idea of organising a public debate to determine the Québec energy needs and to choose among different alternatives became increasingly discussed. The brief submitted by the Société pour vaincre la pollution during the Parliamentary Commission on Energy held in February 1977 emphasised the necessity of organising a public debate on energy which would determine the future energy needs of Québécois. Even if it did not specify the form and the objectives of a such public debate, it nonetheless introduced this idea in the Québec public sphere which was discussed by other groups afterwards. The organisation of a public debate on energy was included in the Manifeste écologique of the Regroupement écologique québécois published in 1978. Cf. *Idem*.

¹⁰³ . We only mention here the most significant elements of this proposition which contained other ones.. Cf. *Idem*; "Pour un débat public sur l'énergie", *Le Devoir*, 5 octobre 1981; "Le débat public sur l'énergie aura-t-il lieu?", *Possibles*, vol. 5, nos. 3-4, 1981, pp. 277-288.

¹⁰⁴ . The beginning of the 1980s had been an important period of mobilisation and discussions around this issue. Given the extreme diversity and the representativity of the Front commun, its claims could not be so easily dismissed. We must point out that this occurred just before the beginning of the public psychosis around the deficit and the empowerment of the right. The political chessboard was more favourable to their claims. The Lévesque government proposed to the Front commun the holding of a parliamentary commission on energy during which the diverse people and groups would discuss different scenarios on the future energy policy. However, this proposition was rejected. Referring to the previous experience of the Commission on Energy held in 1977, the Front commun decided to boycott the new one which would only to listen them without taking into account their claims afterwards. This constituted a very pale democratic exercise which continued to deprive citizens of their decisional power. The Front commun decided to organise a national Week on Energy aiming to increase the public discussions and at the same time, to assess the Québec energy situation. One of the main objectives was to suggest that energy issues concerned all citizens and that they are rightly entitled to participate to the decision-making process. The main slogan of the colloquium, "A nous de choisir", revealed this emphasis put on citizen participation and responsibility. This week was ended by a colloquium of three days during which the different participants (members of Front commun, ecologist and environmentalist groups, citizens) highlighted the diverse facets and implications of the energy issue. The main objective was to assert the existing links between the energy development and Québec existing socio-economic problems (unemployment, equity, protection of environment, etc.). The colloquium constituted the prelude of a larger societal debate which did not really occurred afterwards. Its impact put pressure on the government which engaged itself some weeks later to set up a public agency which would manage the organisation of an itinerant public debate in all Québec regions. However, the re-election of the Parti Québécois and more particularly, the nomination of a new Minister of Energy rapidly revealed that the previous engagement will be very partially respected. It set up a special committee which was supposed to study the relevance of a debate relative to its political energy choices for the horizon 2000-2020 and at the same time, the necessity of a vast popular consultation on this score as it was reclaimed by the Front commun. This Committee organised private audiences without inviting the Front commun. The idea of a public debate was then put aside. It was only in 1995 that the Québec government organised a public consultation on energy which was however limited. Cf. Jean-Guy VAILLANCOURT, *op. cit.*, pp. 109-124

¹⁰⁵ . The issue of privatising Hydro-Québec has always been rejected by the different Québec governments. Even the Gobeil committee set up by the Bourassa government to examine the privatisation of all Québec public agencies did not include it on its agenda. It was rather the new Québec entrepreneurs-heroes and business representatives which were the most ardent advocates of this proposition. Cf. Léo-Paul LAUZON, "Continuer à privatiser Hydro-Québec ou consolider ses opérations", in *Hydro-Québec. Autres temps, autres défis*, edited by Yves BÉLANGER and Robert COMEAU, Ste-Foy, Presses de l'Université du Québec, 1995, pp. 305-322.

¹⁰⁶ . See in this regard the arguments used by one of its proponents: Marcel CÔTÉ, "La privatisation et Hydro-Québec", in *Hydro-Québec. Autres temps, autres défis*, edited by Yves BÉLANGER and Robert COMEAU, Ste-Foy, Presses de l'Université du Québec, 1995, pp. 283-290.

¹⁰⁷ . Léo-Paul LAUZON, *op. cit.*, pp. 305-322

¹⁰⁸ . For a broader discussion of the current redefinition of territorial sovereignty, see : Richard FALK, "State of Siege : Will Globalization win out ?", *International Affairs*, vol. 73, no 1, 1997, pp. 124-125; David J. ELKINS, *Beyond Sovereignty. Territory and Political Economy in the Twenty-First Century*, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1995, 298 pages + index .

¹⁰⁹ . Contrary to the history of the La Grande complex, the history of the Great Whale project has been less straightforward. The latter was submitted to the evaluation procedure which has been elaborated in the James Bay Agreement. Hydro-Québec has to pass through successive steps imposing specific constraints before obtaining the final authorisation. More specifically, it implies five steps : the feasibility studies aiming to determine the electric potential of a particular site ; the phase 1 of the assessment studies ("avant-projet") aiming to determine the best development scheme ; the phase 2 involving a detailed evaluation of the chosen development scheme and the preparation of an impact assessment

report specifying the social and bio-physical impacts of the project ; the delivering of a certificate of construction by the Québec government based on the acceptance of committees set up through the impact assessment procedure ; and the realisation of the project. In referring to this procedure, the feasibility studies were completed in 1975. It was from that moment that the assessment studies were conducted by Hydro-Québec. Cf. Hydro-Québec, *Complexe Grande-Baleine. Rapport d'avant-projet*, Tome 1, partie 2, Québec, 1993, pp. 1-69.

¹¹⁰ . The Great Whale complex such as it was defined in the Hydro-Québec documents constitutes an other mega-project similar to the La Grande complex. Its total cost was estimated in 1992 to 16 milliards. The construction of the three power plants implies the creation of four reservoirs which would have a total superficie of 3516km². It was also planned that an imposing infrastructure (airports, roads, and transmission lines) would be built up in order to get access to the complex and to connect the complex with the South. Cf. Jules DUFOUR, "Le projet Grande-Baleine et l'avenir des peuples autochtones au Québec", *Cahiers de géographie du Québec*, vol. 40, no 110, 1996, pp. 235.

¹¹¹ . From 1975 to 1981, Hydro-Québec conducted impact assessment studies. It submitted a preliminary report in 1980 to the James Bay Agreement Administrator in which Hydro-Québec described the different components of the development schema (dikes, power plant, infrastructures) and the policies related to the construction of the project (hiring the local population, corrective measures, sub-contracting, etc.). In response to the directives on the required impact assessment studies transmitted by the Administrator, Hydro-Québec deposited a final report the next year which involved a techno-economic description and an environmental evaluation of the project. It was presupposed that the impact of the project on Aboriginal populations and on the bio-physical environment would be specified. Hydro-Québec submitted a complementary report in 1983 that directly dealt with the final directives of the Administrator. Cf. HYDRO-QUÉBEC, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-13.

¹¹² . Cf. Jules DUFOUR, *op. cit.*, p. 237.

¹¹³ . Cf. HYDRO-QUÉBEC, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-14.

¹¹⁴ . Robert Bourassa published two books on this issue: *Deux fois la baie James (1981) et L'énergie du Nord (1985)*. In both cases, he discussed the future trends of the Québec energy market by analysing and comparing the different forms of energy used in Québec. He concluded by stating the superiority of hydroelectric development and the competitiveness of hydroelectricity on the American energy markets. Both books constituted a plea for the pursuit of the hydro-electric development of the James Bay region and more particularly, for its moving up in order to meet the future energy needs of Québec and North-eastern markets. Although the two books did not reveal a major redefinition of his own political agenda since the 1970s, some significant changes are nonetheless noticeable. Besides the primacy given to the US energy markets, the environmental issue is now taken into consideration as it appeared with the justification of the GRAND Canal project. Cf. Robert BOURASSA, *Deux fois la Baie James*, Montréal, 1981; *Power from the North*, Scarborough, Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., 1985, 182 pages.

¹¹⁵ . Cf. Guy MERCIER, Gilles RICHOT, "La Baie James. Les dessous d'une rencontre que la bureaucratie n'avait pas prévue", *Cahiers de géographie du Québec*, vol. 41, no 113, 1997, pp. 158-159.

¹¹⁶ . Cf. Sean McCUTCHEON, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

¹¹⁷ . The primacy of Québec energy needs was emphasised by Hydro-Québec. It was clearly mentioned in many of its documents that the construction of new dams did not aim to export hydroelectricity or to fulfil obligations from the existing contracts. HYDRO-QUÉBEC, *L'aménagement hydroélectrique dans le Nord du Québec: un choix bien pensé*, Québec, mai 1991, pp. 3-5.

¹¹⁸ . Robert BOURASSA, *Power from the North*, Scarborough, Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., 1985, pp.

¹¹⁹ . See, for example, the chapters 3 and 4 of his book, *Power from the North*, in which Bourassa used statistics of US energy consumption to justify the project. Throughout the book, the US energy market is mentioned to indicate the need of the future development. Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 39-77.

¹²⁰ Cf. HYDRO-QUÉBEC, *L'aménagement hydroélectrique dans le Nord du Québec*, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-9

¹²¹ . Guy MERCIER, Gilles RICHARD, *op. cit.*, pp. 159-1163 ; Daniel SALÉE, "Identité québécoise, identité autochtone, et territorialité : entre les frontières subjectives et objectives de l'espace québécois", in *L'espace québécois*, edited by Alain-G. GAGNON and Alain NOËL, Montréal, Québec/Amérique, 1995, pp. 268-278.

¹²² . See on this point: Daniel SALÉE, *op. cit.*, pp. 268-278; Louis BALTHAZAR, "Conscience nationale et contexte international", *op. cit.*, pp.

¹²³ . We will develop in a more detailed way this issue in the next chapter. Cf. Dietrich SOYEZ, "La baie James: faut-il rapatrier ou mondialiser le débat?", *Cahiers de géographie du Québec*, vol. 39, no 106, 1995, pp. 63-77.

¹²⁴ . Cf. Sean McCUTCHEON, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

¹²⁵ . Robert BOURASSA, *op. cit.*, 1985; Sean McCUTCHEON, *op. cit.*, pp. 138-140; Dietrich SOYEZ, *op. cit.*, pp. 63-67.

¹²⁶ . In addition to the construction of an additional powerhouse at La Grande 2 (LG-2A), the second phase of the La Grande complex included the construction of five other power plants (La Grande-1, Laforge-1, Laforge-2, Brisay, and Eastmain-1) and one transmission line. This aimed to respond to the peak demand from the mid-1990s. Their construction had been preceded by negotiations with Cree peoples which led to the signature of complementary agreements to the James Bay Agreement; in some cases, financial compensations were given to some communities. However, the main dispositions structuring the James Bay Agreement remained unchanged. Cf. Sean McCUTCHEON, *op. cit.*, pp. 142-143; HYDRO-QUÉBEC, *Plan de développement 1988*, Hydro-Québec, Direction des relations publiques, 1988; HYDRO-QUÉBEC, *Plan de développement 1987*, Hydro-Québec, Direction des relations publiques, 1987.

¹²⁷ . Cf. Sean McCUTCHEON, *op. cit.*, pp. 138-139.

¹²⁸ . We refer here to these two documents which related very well the process undertaken by Hydro-Québec: Jules DUFOUR, *op. cit.*, pp. 233-254; HYDRO-QUÉBEC, *Rapport d'avant-projet*, Partie 2: Complexe hydro-électrique, Tome I: Historique et études, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-79.

¹²⁹ . For a more detailed discussion of the different studies having been undertaken between 1989 and 1992, see: HYDRO-QUÉBEC, *Rapport d'avant-projet*, Partie 2, Tome 1, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-79.

¹³⁰ . See on this point: COMITÉ D'ÉVALUATION, COMMISSION DE LA QUALITÉ DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT KATIVIK, COMITÉ FÉDÉRAL D'EXAMEN AU NORD DU 55° PARALLELE, COMMISSION FÉDÉRALE D'EXAMEN DES ÉVALUATIONS ENVIRONNEMENTALES, *Directive. Étude des impacts sur l'environnement du projet Grande-Baleine*, Montréal, 1992, 113 p.

¹³¹ . See on this point: HYDRO-QUÉBEC, *Complexe Grande-Baleine: rapport d'avant-projet/résumé*, Montréal, Hydro-Québec, 1993, 294 p.; Jules DUFOUR, *op. cit.*, pp. 239-241.

¹³² . We refer here to the summary made by Jules Dufour. Cf. *Idem*.

CHAPTER 6: THE MOBILISATION OF CREE PEOPLE AGAINST THE GREAT WHALE PROJECT: BETWEEN THE LOCAL AND THE GLOBAL

For the Québec government, the official launching of the Great Whale project in 1988 was backed up by numerous studies undertaken by Hydro-Québec. Unlike the La Grande project, however, this time the Québec government and Hydro-Québec faced an effective opposition which transformed the delimitation of its spatio-temporal setting into a crucial stake. In other words, the opposition succeeded in politicising the economic, environmental and territorial dimensions of the Great Whale project. One of key opponents of the Great Whale project were the Cree people via the Grand Council of the Cree. Although the ecology movement was also involved in the struggles, this chapter focuses on the Cree. The structural changes framing their discourses and strategies of mobilisation will be analysed. The mobilisation against the Great Whale project represented more than the capacity to halt to a development project. It was an attempt to modify the political and power relations with Québec and Canada and to redefine them on a nation-to-nation basis. It reflected the Cree leaders' aim to exert a greater control over the decision-making processes affecting their economic and political lives.

In this chapter, it will be argued that the Cree mobilisation was based on a different process of jumping scales, one which opened new spaces at the transnational and global levels. Their struggles revealed the emergence of new citizenship sites outside of the territories of Québec and Canada. In contrast to their struggles around the La Grande project, this time, the debates were not limited to Québec's and Canada's borders. Other political scenes also framed the debates. The Cree's mobilisation revealed not only an opposition between two different representations of the national space, but also the increasing importance of other non-territorialised political spaces. The project was not only depicted as national, but as transnational and global too. In other words, the delimitation of the scales of the Great Whale project turned out to be a critical issue for determining the outcome.

This chapter has three major objectives. The first is to present the main dimensions of the Cree opposition to the Great Whale project. In providing an overview of the main claims and strategies used by the Grand Council of the Cree, we will draw out the main changes to the Cree polity which occurred since the signature of the James Bay Agreement. Particular attention will be paid to the "nationalisation" of the Cree political scene. The second objective is to discuss the global aspects of the Cree's people mobilisation. In focussing on the intertwining of the Cree opposition with the struggles of international social movements like the human rights movement and the Indigenous Peoples movement, we will see how the territorial and national dimensions of the Great Whale project became central issues. While providing a new narrative frame for legitimating their claims, these movements also opened up new spaces for the Cree people. Finally, the impact on the current configurations of citizenship and state sovereignty will be discussed.

The first section will discuss as the tremendous changes of the Indigenous peoples movement that occurred since the 1970s. The Indigenous peoples' movement has extended its basis across the world while becoming more institutionalised, notably through the UN system. The second section focuses on the empowerment of Aboriginal peoples in relation to recent transformations on the Canadian and Québec political scenes. Here, two issues are of particular concern: the rise of an Aboriginal nationalist movement and the recognition of Aboriginal citizenship rights. In the third section, the claims and means of resistance used by the Cree leaders will be examined in greater detail, notably the way in which these reflected political changes at the Canadian and international levels.

6.1 The Emergence of Indigenous Peoples Movement on the International Political Scene

The Crees' struggles against the La Grande project occurred at the time when the Aboriginal peoples were beginning to be recognised at the Canadian and international levels. Their call to end colonialism began to have a political resonance in the Western world. This coincided with the emergence of a new Aboriginal political identity. Even if the disputes around the La Grande project did not fully reflect this, they indicated that Western governments could no longer simply impose their development projects, ignoring Aboriginal peoples' claims. The struggles around this project raised awareness, and provided

ammunition, to Aboriginal peoples. By the time the Great Whale project was launched, the political situation of Indigenous peoples had been effectively transformed. A new political setting had emerged which confirmed the incremental political empowerment of Indigenous peoples. This was particularly noticeable in looking for the Cree whose political status had been redefined from "wardship" to "citizenship". This came along with the emergence of a nationalist discourse among the Cree which provided a legitimacy to their claim to peoplehood. Their mobilisation against Great Whale reflected not only their attempt to prevent a construction of a megaproject threatening their traditional livelihood, but also the affirmation of their right to self-determination.

The Emergence of the Indigenous Peoples Movement

In retrospect, the 1970s constituted an important period of transition for Aboriginal peoples. Two major changes occurred during this period. One is the transformation of Aboriginal peoples mobilisation into a social movement.¹ Their resistance to the existing government policies turned into a new form of militancy confronting Western states. Indigenous peoples became significant political actors, joining their voice to the other critical forces. This was aided by the redefinition of the Indigenous peoples' political identities and discourses as Indigenous peoples reappropriated their identities, challenging existing representations imposed from outside. This growing awareness was fuelled by their cultural and political affirmation and the elimination of the cultural stigma historically attributed to Indigenous peoples.² It was the beginning of a process of decolonisation which entailed a redefinition of the power relations between the governments and Indigenous Peoples. This was furthered by the revitalisation of indigenous organisations which began to adopt new agendas and new strategies of mobilisation. The links between the different organisations at the national and transnational levels were supported by the growth of grassroots activities. The struggles reached new institutional fora, beyond the various departments of indian affairs and even national parliaments.

The other change is the internationalisation of their struggles. In fact, the mobilisation of Indigenous peoples occurred almost simultaneously at the national and international levels.³ It was one of the contemporary social movements which began as an international social movement and became a

world movement. The development of international connections, of course, did not start in the 1960s.⁴ This time, however, their mobilisation marked the beginning of a process of decolonisation. Their struggles for citizenship rights became linked to the recognition of their right to self-determination. It reflected the launching of a process of jumping scales that has a double dimension.⁵ Indigenous peoples sought to transform the national and international levels into spaces of resistance. Their struggles were thus based on a simultaneous deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation within a political framework different from the Westphalian system.

The local level also played an important role in indigenous peoples' struggles. The local level has always been an important political space and, for a long time, it was the only one allowed them, especially when they were confined to reserves if they wanted to retain their status. In this context, the local space marked a space of dependence and quite often, merely a space of survival. The empowerment of Indigenous peoples has meant a shift in that hierarchy, politicising the local space and working to transform it into a space of engagement. This has also involved a deliberate attempt to open spaces at the two other political levels: the national and the international.

The Opening of a New Political Space: From the Third World to the Fourth World

The international level assumed a new strategic importance during the 1970s. The blossoming of international activities allowed Indigenous peoples to obtain a greater political visibility, providing them an opportunity to overcome the reluctance and, in many cases, the refusal of national states to recognise their rights. This resulted from certain changes initiated in the 1960s when the situation of Indigenous peoples surfaced in certain Western countries, including Canada. The opening of new space for indigenous issues was also aided by two then influential social movements: the human rights movement and the decolonisation of Africa and Asia.⁶ Both introduced important breaches in the hegemony of the Western and state-centric perspectives on world politics. The politicisation of human rights at the international level opened the door to the redefinition of the world political agenda while increasing the participation of non-state actors.⁷ It called into question the existing Western definition of rights, which rested on a liberal-individualist conception. In fact, both movements contributed to politicising the issue of

collective rights prerequisites. The subsequent developments of international law, such as the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, provided new opportunities for indigenous peoples.⁸ While the decolonisation of the Third World countries gave the right to self-determination a strategic value for other subordinated and oppressed minorities.

The decolonisation of Africa and Asia revitalised the United Nations. For a short period of time, the latter came to be perceived as a dynamic actor through which reforms of the international system could be introduced. The UN's political dynamism entailed an important normative and institutional development. The UN became a privileged forum for debates about issues excluded from national state agendas and for the participation of actors seeking political legitimacy. The impact of the UN was magnified by the diffusion of new discourses on world politics (academic and socio-political) and the growth of non-state actors, such as the non-governmental organisations, within or in parallel to UN structures.⁹ The growing involvement of the UN in the protection of human rights in the 1970s through its specialised agencies or through the adoption of specific declarations and conventions illustrates this change.

The empowerment of Third World countries created a terrain favourable to the emergence of Indigenous peoples at the UN, facilitating the formation of new non-governmental and non-indigenous organisations to defend indigenous peoples' rights.¹⁰ Three played an important role in raising public awareness of the adverse conditions afflicting Indigenous peoples: the International Work Group on Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA); Survival International (SI), and Cultural Survival. These advocacy groups struggled to change the discourses and policies largely based on an assimilationist perspective and to reverse "cultural genocide". They demanded the recognition of the cultural and political distinctiveness of Indigenous peoples. Their claims implicitly called for a major political redefinition of the international system and the adoption of new norms and discourses. They became an important ally of Indigenous peoples, supporting their claim to be recognised as the Fourth World.¹¹

The concept of "Fourth World" constituted the initial strategy used by indigenous peoples to obtain a visibility at the international level.¹² By linking their claims to the broader struggle for

decolonisation, indigenous peoples shed light on their situation. This allowed them to assert their historical, economic, political and cultural specificities in relation to the other international actors.¹³ Yet, the notion of Fourth World constituted a difficult basis for building a common identity. To have any real meaning, the important historical and cultural differences among the diverse Indigenous tribes or nations had to be surmounted. This was an important challenge as, for many Indigenous groups, it presupposes the adoption of a second identity whose meaning is linked to a distinct spatio-temporal order. It implies an interplay between different representations of themselves and of their interests.

The Emergence of Transnational Indigenous Organisations

An important turning point in the mobilisation of indigenous peoples at the international level was the meeting among indigenous representatives in 1975 held at Port Alberni, British Columbia.¹⁴ The meeting brought together Indigenous peoples' representatives from the different world regions, allowing them to share their experiences of oppression and to develop a common agenda (participation in UN activities, the preservation of their cultural identity, land resources). It was on this occasion that the notion of "indigenous people" emerged as a political identity transcending previously established groupings at the national level. The meeting also led to the establishment of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP). This non-governmental organisation marked the entrance of Indigenous peoples as collective actors on the international scene. It was the first truly indigenous international organisation. The granting of its consultative status by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations gave it a substantial symbolic and political weight.¹⁵ Although it is not a representative organisation with a clear mandate, the W.C.I.P. has nonetheless played an important role since its creation. While facilitating the sharing of information and the development of networks among the various Indigenous groups, its main contribution is in the dissemination of a general and inclusive language regarding indigenous rights and international instruments.¹⁶ It also became the main avenue for articulating distinct Indigenous interests on the international political scene.

Since 1975, Indigenous peoples' struggles have developed in various different directions at the international level. New organisations have emerged to represent Indigenous peoples' interests and new

international norms and standards have been established regarding their proper treatment. The issue of Indigenous peoples' rights has thus gained recognition within the Western public sphere, giving it a certain legitimacy. These changes reveal the growing inclusion of Indigenous peoples within world politics. They also suggest that the international political scene constitutes an important strategic tool in their mobilisation. Nevertheless, indigenous peoples still face major obstacles. The lack of statehood gives them an ambiguous political status. This explains the dual aspect of international politics around Indigenous peoples. Through their integration into the UN structure and other international organisations, on the one hand, they have succeeded in becoming part of the interstate system. On the other hand, they are part of the transnational sphere of activities made of non-state actors. In this way, they call into question the primacy of states in the international sphere.

Other indigenous organisations have been formed since the creation of the WCIP.¹⁷ The South American Indian Council (CISA) and the Association of the Small Peoples of the North clearly see the international political scene as a site for their struggles. Existing indigenous organisations, such as the Inuit Circumpolar Conference and the Nordic Saami Council, have become more involved at the international level. This has affected the framing of local struggles as various local struggles have been taken to the international level in order to bring pressures to bear on national governments. As we will see, this strategy was adopted by certain Aboriginal nations in Canada.¹⁸ The impact of Indigenous NGOs has increased through participation in important international meetings and conferences. Among the most significant conferences were the two Inuit Circumpolar Conferences (Alaska, 1977, and Greenland 1980), the International NGO Conference on Discrimination against Indigenous Populations in the Americas (Geneva, 1977), the International NGO Conference on Indigenous Peoples and the Land (Geneva, 1977), and the Indigenous 5000 Conference (Ottawa, 1991).¹⁹ In addition, Indigenous peoples have participated in more general international conferences organised, for example, by the UN. While allowing Indigenous peoples to establish contacts with other groups, these fora have often addressed their claims. The world conferences on the environment or human rights were particularly important for the recognition of indigenous claims and their inclusion within broader agendas. They facilitated the development of alliances between Indigenous peoples and other social movements. Although the human

rights movement has become a close ally,²⁰ some links have also been established with women's and ecology movements.

These diverse conferences provided an opportunity to reinforce the legitimacy of indigenous struggles vis-à-vis world public opinion. In addition, they facilitated the development of a common language. For example, the Declaration of San Jose which was adopted in 1982 at the UN Conference on Ethnic Development and Ethnocide in Latin America proposed a revision of the concept of "genocide" to adapt it to the situation of Indigenous peoples. Moreover, the world conferences facilitated the formation of transnational coalitions and networks in which the Indigenous NGOs play a determining role. The establishment of the Indigenous Peoples Network (IPN), the publication of newspapers like the Akwesasne Notes, or the use of internet have constituted other forms of collective action used by Indigenous peoples. The process of networking has opened up new political spaces for redefining the existing social and power relations. The recent debates around the struggles in Chiapas clearly reveal the potentiality of this process of networking.

The Institutionalisation of Indigenous Issues through the UN

The international impact of Indigenous peoples' struggles has been widened by their integration into UN machinery. In many respects, the UN has played a key role in the international recognition of Indigenous peoples and in their empowerment.²¹ The UN Economic and Social Council's granting of a consultative status to indigenous organisations has been particularly important. In 1987, the Grand Council of the Cree gained a consultative status.²² This was the first time that a government body representing a Native group had been awarded this status. The participation of Indigenous peoples in UN activities has developed in two directions: the formation of international norms and instruments for protecting Indigenous peoples' rights and the use of existing mechanisms to prevent the violation of Indigenous rights.²³ Thus far, the first has been the most fruitful, though the results have fallen short of Indigenous peoples' expectations. Appeals to UN institutions regarding allegations of violations of international laws, covenants or treaties have become more frequent, but their impact has been more limited.²⁴ Nevertheless, such appeals do offer an opportunity to embarrass a government.

Three main moments have shaped the integration of Indigenous peoples into the UN. The first was the decision taken by the UN ECOSOC to conduct a comprehensive study on the problem of discrimination against Indigenous peoples. The UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in 1971 appointed a Special Rapporteur, Jose Martinez Cobo, to study the problems and status of Indigenous peoples. The Final Report, released in 1986, presented a detailed overview of current conditions of Indigenous peoples and made 332 recommendations to governments and international and regional organisations. The report emphasised the need to recognise the Indigenous peoples in all world regions. While pointing out their historical and recent grievances, the report discussed at length Indigenous peoples' identity and rights and more particularly, the centrality of land rights.²⁵ It led to the drafting of a universal declaration of indigenous rights and the study on the existing treaties and arrangements between Indigenous peoples and States.²⁶

The second was with the creation of the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP) in 1982, later renamed the Working Group on Indigenous Peoples. The WGIP has become a key institution for Indigenous peoples in world politics. Its mandate is to review recent developments pertaining to the protection of human rights of Indigenous peoples and to develop international instruments and standards for indigenous rights.²⁷ Its annual report provides a complete portrait of the situation of human rights of Indigenous peoples and of various government policies pertaining to Indigenous peoples. In 1985, the Working Group started to draft a declaration on the rights of Indigenous peoples. This ambitious project would constitute the equivalent of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It would mark a major breakthrough in the recognition of Indigenous peoples. The current draft declaration is quite challenging since it grants Indigenous peoples a political status equivalent to statehood. It refers to Indigenous peoples' main claims such as their recognition as peoples with a distinct identity (history, culture, polity); their right to self-determination or to a complete political autonomy; and their rights to ancestral lands and natural resources.²⁸ The Declaration has yet to be completed as it involves complex negotiations and compromises among Indigenous peoples themselves and between them and national states. Once - or if - these have been completed, it will have to be

navigated through the numerous institutional steps required for ratification by the UN General Assembly.²⁹

The third was the International Year of the World's Indigenous Peoples. In 1993, special attention was paid to Indigenous peoples' rights and the development of new mechanisms for increasing the financial aid to Indigenous peoples.³⁰ Although the activities related to the International Year increased the visibility of Indigenous peoples, many Indigenous peoples expressed their disappointment. In response to this, the idea of a decade for Indigenous peoples (1995-2004) was accepted by the UN General Assembly. The idea of creating a permanent body for Indigenous peoples has been added.

In addition to UN institutions, Indigenous peoples have pressed other international organisations for recognition. All reinforce the space of Indigenous peoples in world politics and call for the development of international accountability of their national governments.³¹ The most significant change in this regard occurred in 1989 when the International Labour Organisation adopted the new Convention no. 169, *Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries*. This new convention breaks with the assimilationist position of the earlier convention (Convention no. 157) to emphasise the distinctiveness and autonomy of Indigenous peoples. It urges governments to recognise their cultural, social and economic rights and emphasises their special relation to the land. In addition to the lack of mechanisms of enforcement, however, the issue of self-determination was not addressed.³² In this sense, the ILO convention tends to support the status quo (predominance of national norms, state logical, territorial integrity).³³ In addition to the ILO, two other international organisations have also discussed the situation of Indigenous peoples: the World Bank and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), linked to the Organisation of American States.³⁴ In 1982, the World Bank issued guidelines imposing certain limits to development projects to protect Indigenous peoples. This constitutes a check-list of issues to be taken into account by developers. Although this guideline is not binding, it has provided arguments to Indigenous peoples and advocacy groups seeking to modify or to halt development projects. The IACHR has developed a preliminary draft dealing with the recognition and protection of Indigenous rights but the proposed means for realising this is still under negotiation.

The Challenges Raised by the World Indigenous Peoples Movement

This brief overview of Indigenous peoples' international activities by Indigenous peoples indicates how, in a short period of time, they have become enmeshed in different spheres of activities. Indigenous peoples have focussed on the existing interstate system. These activities have provided an opportunity to overcome resistance of their governments. They have also enabled Indigenous peoples to exchange information, to create new links and to develop some common strategies. The presence of Indigenous peoples on the international political scene, however, also challenges the hegemonic statist model of international relations and suggests its replacement by a more heterogeneous world political community, resting on the interweaving of state and non-state actors. Their recognition implies the passage from international politics to world or global politics. The division between the local, the national and the international appears increasingly blurred since all of these levels are often simultaneously involved in the struggles around a particular issue. Moreover, the mobilisation of Indigenous peoples has contributed to the opening of new political spaces: transnational and global spaces.

Indigenous peoples have also challenged the homogeneity of the nation-state model. Their claims to self-determination imply the recognition of a cultural and political diversity within the state system, involving a shared sovereignty between them and the national government; this would open the door to the expression of multiple national voices having different but, overlapping territorial bases. Indigenous peoples are still confronted by important obstacles on the current international political scene. Their mobilisation has not yet resulted in significant changes. Their major claims remain unanswered and they are still dependent of the willingness of states to respond to their demands. One key challenge for Indigenous peoples is to increase the political salience of these new political spaces and to reverse the power relations between them. This suggests that Indigenous peoples must try to shape the construction of these spaces in relation to their own interests. The marginal political status of these sites politicised by Indigenous peoples has to be challenged in order to establish a primacy over the international sphere.

6.2 The Increasing Visibility of Aboriginal Peoples in Canadian and Québec Politics

The empowerment of Aboriginal peoples in Canada coincided with the political emergence of Indigenous peoples in world politics. This does not mean that the same debates occurred simultaneously at both levels. The links between them have resulted from the involvement of Aboriginal leaders and the inclusion of Aboriginal issues in Canadian foreign policy. As we previously noted, Aboriginal peoples living in Canada have been particularly active at the international level and they have continued to be.³⁵ In addition, they began to have a greater impact on aboriginal policy of the Canadian government. The latter has sought to present itself as an international leader for the protection of Aboriginal rights, seen as an extension of its role in the promotion of human rights.³⁶ The Canadian government has remained involved in the discussions and preparatory works at the UN. Internally, the debates around the redefinition of the normative, political and institutional bases of the Canadian political community created a new space for Aboriginal peoples' claims. The repatriation of the Canadian Constitution at the end of the 1970s and the 1980 referendum on Québec sovereignty have been particularly important. Federal constitutional politics and Québec nationalist movement have combined to open the door to the rearticulation of the different components structuring the Canadian national community. The "two founding nations" representation, which underlay federal/provincial relations since 1945, was contested throughout the 1980s. The ability of Aboriginal leaders to join these debates gave them to get access to the public sphere beyond of the channels of the Department of Indian Affairs.

The mobilisation of Cree people in the second phase of James Bay development has thus occurred in a quite different national context. The mobilisation of Aboriginal peoples throughout the 1980s marked another phase of their process of jumping scales launched since the White Paper. Although they have succeeded in transforming the Canadian and Québec political spaces into spaces of resistance, they have not yet become national actors fully recognised by the federal government and provinces. In other words, they still have to redefine their spaces of resistance into spaces of affirmation. The redrawing of the scales of Aboriginal politics occurred at the time when both governments were modifying their citizenship policies. The analysis which follows focuses on the political factors that

resulted in the redefinition of the legitimacy of Aboriginal peoples. The transformation of the Aboriginal movement into a nationalist movement and the recognition of the Canada's representation as Three Nations will be given particular emphasis.

The New Developments of Aboriginal People's Citizenship

The mobilisation of Aboriginal peoples against the White Paper in 1969 revealed the formation of a new political identity resting on the adoption of new discourses and claims by Aboriginal leaders.³⁷ This involved the development of a collective awareness of their political dependency and the transformation of the social and political construction of aboriginality.³⁸ They have succeeded despite the federal government's ability to shape their representativity and to downplay alliances between them.³⁹ While still rejecting their recognition as a cultural minority, the Aboriginal leaders have reclaimed an extension of the spatial and institutional bases of their citizenship rights. Clearly, the band council and by extension, the local level was no longer considered adequate to address their citizenship claims. The national level appeared to be the critical political space for their empowerment and became the privileged locus in their mobilisation.⁴⁰ In doing so, they have revealed new political and social relations (national, gender, ethnic and class) shaping the Aboriginal identity and thereby, implying a transformation of the politics of Indianness.⁴¹ Among the changes which broadened the political space of Aboriginal peoples, four appear particularly important: the rescaling of Aboriginal identity politics on a national basis; the growth and diversification of Aboriginal organisations; the redefinition of their political agenda; and the broadening of political space of Aboriginal peoples beyond the local level.

During the 1980s, the redefinition of the parameters of Aboriginal identity politics were shaped by two factors: their recognition by the 1982 Constitution Act and the self-naming of Aboriginal peoples as First Nations, revealing the emergence of Aboriginal nationalism. Both reflected the greater involvement of Aboriginal peoples in the construction of aboriginality which was no longer the unique prerogative of governments. The constitutional negotiations around the repatriation of the Canadian Constitution provided a privileged forum in which Aboriginal peoples sought to redefine their place on the Canadian political scene. The subsequent recognition of three categories of Aboriginal peoples (status, non-status

and Metis) in the Constitution Act of 1982 constituted a significant step in this regard. The entrenchment of these categories provides greater political space and aids in the transition from an administrative category to a political identity. Discussions of Aboriginal peoples no longer revolved exclusively around the Indian Act or policies of multiculturalism.

The second, and the most significant change for our discussion, is the spread of a political and cultural nationalism among Aboriginal peoples.⁴² This was marked by the increasing use of "First Nations" to represent themselves and to define their relations with the federal and provincial governments. This identity reflected their claims to the same historical and political recognition granted in the past to the two founding nations. It implies a redefinition of the bases of the Canadian political community. The use of a nationalist discourse helped Aboriginal peoples to redefine their strategies. The nationalist claims within the Aboriginal movement's discourse arise at the moment during which the national characteristics defining "Canadian" were called into question. This provided Aboriginal peoples an opportunity to participate in the debates and thus to widen them. The nationalist appeal by Aboriginal peoples aimed also to facilitate their entrance on the international political scene since the nation is the privileged political actor.⁴³

These transformations of Aboriginal identity politics were reinforced by important changes in Aboriginal advocacy organisations. The reconfiguration of Aboriginal organisations involved the redefinition of the mandates of the existing ones and the formation of new ones. The most significant change was the dissolution of the National Indian Brotherhood (NIB) and its replacement by the Assembly of First Nations in 1981. This constituted an important step in the institutionalisation of Aboriginal nationhood. Although it still represents status Indian, the Assembly of First Nations has become the main Aboriginal organisation for dealing with governments.⁴⁴ The Métis National Council and the Native Women's Association of Canada (NWAC) were also formed in the early 1980s. Both responded to their constituencies who sought more responsive and representative organisations.⁴⁵ Certain band councils also became more active at the political level. Calling into question the institutional limits imposed by the Indian Act, these band councils began to present their claims at other political

levels. The Nisgha Band Council or the Grand Council of the Cree are two notable examples of this development.

These strategic and organisational changes coincided with the redefinition of their political agenda.⁴⁶ To some extent, the entrenchment of aboriginal and treaty rights in the Constitution Act of 1982 brought about a redirection of their targets.⁴⁷ Their initial struggles had focussed on the following issues: the recognition of land claims and treaty rights, the constitutional entrenchment of their rights; and the issue of self-government. They aimed to establish an Aboriginal citizenship and to end their political and social exclusion. They did not seek to obtain a similar status similar to the Canadian status, except for civil rights. Aboriginal peoples claimed a differentiated citizenship which would recognise their peoplehood. In the 1980s, new issues appeared: the recognition of their social and economic rights, the issue of women's rights; and the issue of self-determination.⁴⁸ These reveal the growing concerns about economic under-development and social problems affecting a large number of Aboriginal communities. These issues show the growing diversity of Aboriginal representations and the broadening of the bases of aboriginal citizenship claims. The emergence of organisations representing Aboriginal women provides a good illustration of this recent change. The politicisation of different social relations (gender, class, urban, racial) constitutes a major challenge for Aboriginal organisations whose strength depends, in part, in their ability to establish and maintain a certain unity.

The redefinition of Aboriginal peoples' claims has been shaped by the redrawing of the institutional limits circumscribing their political participation within the Canadian public sphere. Over the last decade the space occupied by Aboriginal peoples within the state structure has widened. Three factors have played a role in this regard: the constitutional negotiations; the development of international activities; and the emergence of a new paradigm framing the federal Indian policy. Each has helped to redraw the Canadian political landscape, questioning its national definition.

The constitutional debate has been particularly the most important.⁴⁹ Recognition of the claims to nationhood in the recent constitutional debates contributed to the redefinition of the state/Aboriginal populations. The recognition of the inherent right to self-government based on the historical recognition

of Canada as Three Nations brought about the greater inclusion of Aboriginal peoples within the Canadian political landscape.⁵⁰ They could be no longer considered cultural minorities. These constitutional negotiations passed through different, often contradictory phases for Aboriginal peoples. Openings which appeared at one moment were often closed in the next. The constitutional recognition of Aboriginal treaty rights in 1982 was a key step for Aboriginal peoples, giving them access to Canadian public sphere on a national basis. The constitutional conferences held between 1983 and 1987 tried to specify the content of these Aboriginal rights while the 1990 Meech Lake Accord was silent on the question.⁵¹ The 1992 Charlottetown Accord might have proved to be an other key step for Aboriginal peoples insofar as it dealt more adequately with their claims. It proposed the creation of a third level of government which would be specific to Aboriginal peoples. In spite of its failure, the 1992 Charlottetown Accord nonetheless revealed important changes of the constitutional discourses and of the Canadian imagined political community.

The development of their international activities also helped to broaden Aboriginal peoples' political space.⁵² They often assumed a leadership in the development of transnational relations between Indigenous peoples. They also made appeals to the existing international organisations for the recognition of their rights. For example, during the process of repatriation of the Canadian Constitution, Westminster Parliament was lobbied.⁵³ Their involvement in the UN Working Group on Indigenous Peoples should also be noted. One particular example of these interconnections between the Canadian political scene and the international was the decision of the UN Committee on Human Rights to declare the Indian Act discriminatory in regard to Aboriginal women's rights. This led the federal government to adopt Bill C-31 amending the Indian Act to remove the gender-based discriminatory dispositions involving the loss of status to Indian women who married non-Indian men.⁵⁴ The international repercussions of Canadian Aboriginal politics were also revealed during the Oka Crisis in 1990. The crisis resulted from a conflict opposing the municipality of Oka in Québec and the Mohawks from Kanehsatake and Kahnawake.⁵⁵ The Mohawks succeeded in embarrassing the Canadian government which had to justify its policies to different international tribunals and authorities.⁵⁶

Finally, a new political paradigm redefining the Canadian aboriginal policy has emerged.⁵⁷

Whereas previous federal Indian policy was based on the political and cultural assimilation of Aboriginal peoples, the new one revolves around the development of First Nations self-government. It rests on the recognition of their cultural and political specificity and involves the creation of new political arrangements between the Canadian government and the First Nations. It not only implies the implementation of their citizenship rights through negotiated agreements, but also opens the door to the recognition of an Aboriginal citizenship not reducible to the Canadian.⁵⁸ This new policy orientation was incrementally recognised during the constitutional talks. The release of reports from two standing committees appointed by the federal government, the Special Committee on Indian Self Government (the 1983 Penner Report) and the Task Force to Review Comprehensive Claims Policy (the 1985 Cooligan Task Force), and the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples drew public attention on the notion of Aboriginal self-government.⁵⁹ This new paradigm has also been shaped by the development of the Canadian jurisprudence since the 1970s. From the Calder Case in 1973 to the Sparrow Case in 1990, the Supreme Court's decisions have asserted the basis for the recognition of an Aboriginal title when they were not explicitly extinguished in treaties. Recent decisions went farther in discussing the existence of Aboriginal sovereignty which would not have been extinguished by Canadian state sovereignty.⁶⁰ This would represent an important challenge to Canadian aboriginal policy which is based on the extinguishment of Aboriginal sovereignty.

This new paradigm is, however, far from being implemented. Only two agreements reflecting the government's commitment to Aboriginal self-government have been signed: the Cree-Naskapi (of Québec) Act (1984) and the Sechelt Indian Band Self-government Act (1986). Both have been defined by the federal government as appropriate models of self-government to follow for other Aboriginal communities. From the perspective of Aboriginal peoples, these agreements fall short of self-government.⁶¹ Both agreements granted the Band councils powers similar to municipalities. They do not respond to Aboriginal claims about the constitutional entrenchment of the right to self-government and the creation of a third order of government distinct from the federal and provincial levels. The federal government has then not yet abandoned the policy of extinguishment of Aboriginal sovereignty despite

court decisions and the recommendations of certain study groups and task forces.⁶² The lack of any substantive policy development since the failure of the Charlottetown Accord and the tendency to ignore the recommendations of the 1996 Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples by the federal government suggest that the decisive changes are still to come.

The National Recognition of Aboriginal Peoples: Towards a New Space of Affirmation?

These discursive and organisational changes provided a new political context for debates on Aboriginal issues, revealing a rescaling of aboriginal politics on national basis. The use of a nationalist discourse had two important consequences for Aboriginal peoples: the opening of a new avenue to the public sphere and the redefinition of their political horizon. The spatial delimitation of their claims has become a crucial issue for the empowerment of Aboriginal peoples. Their struggles have involved the imposition of their own political scales in opposition to the scales used by the federal and provincial governments. In other words, they not only claimed their recognition as participants in national debates, but also of their issues as of national interest instead of local or regional. In this context, land rights are not the only spatial stake for Aboriginal peoples.⁶³ Self-government not only implies the devolution of powers, but also the delimitation of their own political space distinct from but, overlapping with, the Canadian political space.

The transformation of the Canadian political space into a space of affirmation is still to come. Aboriginal peoples are confronted with important challenges. The reluctance of the federal government and provinces still remains a major obstacle. Moreover, the Aboriginal nationalist movement also faces internal contradictions. Like other nationalist movements, including the Québec nationalist movement, it is framed by different discourses on nationhood. Aboriginal nationalism initially rested on ethnic and legalistic bases deriving from the colonial legacy of the Indian Act.⁶⁴ The latter reinforced the use of ethnic criteria (based on blood) to define the Aboriginal national community. Again, like many other nationalisms, including of course Québec and Canadian nationalisms, Aboriginal nationalism which displayed its male-bias.⁶⁵ The debates raised by Aboriginal women's organisations, however, suggest, the growing heterogeneity of the Aboriginal voice in Canadian politics.⁶⁶

The Widening Gap between the Québec Government and Aboriginal Peoples

Whereas the federal political scene was the scene of some important changes for Aboriginal peoples, the situation was somewhat different in Québec. No major breakthroughs occurred in the last two decades. Although some institutional changes were made by the Québec government at the beginning of the 1980s, the existing gap has deepened. This time, it was the issue of the political recognition of the Québec nationalist movement's claims which contributed to the deterioration of relations. In the preceding chapter, we saw the two became adversaries in the context of constitutional politics, effectively narrowing of the political opening the Parti Québécois government to the recognition of their distinct status as citizens.⁶⁷

Significant changes in Québec aboriginal policy were introduced in three steps. The first step of this political recognition occurred in 1978 through the adoption of a new cultural policy recognising the cultural specificity of Aboriginal nations with the creation of the *Secrétariat des activités gouvernementales en milieu amérindien et inuit* (SAGMAI).⁶⁸ The main objective of the latter was to co-ordinate the different governmental interventions relative to Aboriginal peoples to develop a coherent and comprehensive aboriginal policy. In 1987, the SAGMAI became the *Secrétariat aux affaires autochtones* (SAA) which was placed under the responsibility of a newly created Delegated Minister on Aboriginal Affairs ("Ministre délégué aux Affaires autochtones").⁶⁹

The second step was the official declaration of fifteen principles to constitute official guidelines defining the future relations between the Québec government and the Aboriginal nations inhabiting the Québec territory.⁷⁰ The latter revolved around three main issues. First, the Québec government officially recognised the existence of ten distinct nations, with a specific culture, language, traditions, and historical rights such as land title recognised by treaties and the constitution. Secondly, the Québec government opened the door to self-government which would imply the management of their lands; the control of their own institutions relative to health, education, social services, culture and economic development; and the signature of agreement providing financial assistance. Thirdly, however, the Québec government proclaimed the supremacy of Québec laws over the Aboriginal rights and the different institutional forms

of self-government. It affirmed that these principles did not impose restrictions on Québec's sovereignty nor breaches of its territorial integrity.

The third step was the adoption of a resolution by the National Assembly in March 1985 proclaiming the recognition by the Québec government of Aboriginal peoples' rights.⁷¹ This resolution recognised the existence of 10 Aboriginal nations, with a specific identity and ancestral rights recognised in existing treaties (James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement and the Northeastern Québec Agreement) or in the coming negotiated agreements. The government declared its intention to continue the process of recognition and definition of Aboriginal nations' rights owing to their historical legitimacy and the necessity for the Québec society to establish harmonious and respectful relations with them. Moreover, the government recognised the importance of negotiations to sign agreements that would recognise specific rights relative to their culture and traditional activities and self-government.⁷² The government also affirmed its intention to set up a permanent parliamentary forum which would allow Aboriginal peoples to present their needs, their claims and their rights. This motion became the cornerstone of Québec's aboriginal policy. The resolution was thus supposed to set up new relations with Aboriginal nations, ending the distrust and the exclusion that characterised them in the past.⁷³ It reflected the government's will to recognise a particular status to Aboriginal peoples and therefore, to establish a new type of relations based on peaceful coexistence. It put aside the notion of extinguishing policy of Aboriginal rights.⁷⁴

Although these principles represented a turning point in the relations between Québec and Aboriginal peoples, they did not completely respond to the political aspirations of Aboriginal peoples.⁷⁵ They implied the recognition of Aboriginal peoples as Québec citizens while gaining a greater legitimacy within the Québec public sphere. The new era of Québec/Aboriginal peoples relations, however, did not unfold as intended, even if the Malecite nation was recognised as the eleventh Aboriginal nation of Québec in 1989. The failure to settle a comprehensive land claims agreement between Québec and the Atikamekw and the Montagnais illustrates the lack of substantive changes during this period. This agreement would have been the second major one since the James Bay agreement. Its signing would have proved the good will of the Québec government and the rise of a new political climate. Moreover,

the Québec government's attempts to develop new relations with Aboriginal peoples occurred in the context of on-going disputes and opposition between them. While the struggles against the Québec government gave Aboriginal peoples an increasing political visibility, incidents like Restigouche affair, the Oka crisis, or the Cree opposition to the Great Whale project, have widened the gulf between Québécois and Aboriginal peoples. These conflicts reveal some misunderstanding and ignorance having a strong historical basis.⁷⁶

There are some important issues to be resolved. The question of land title has been only clarified for the Cree, the Naskapi, and the Inuit. For the other nations, this issue was still unresolved and more complex for those who cannot claim specific treaty rights. The Québec government's clear stand on territorial integrity further complicates the process. In addition to land title, administrative and financial problems have also contributed to inflame relations between the Québec government and Aboriginal peoples. The existing administrative programs have appeared unilaterally imposed and/or were inadequate for the problems. There is an important gap between the technocratic approach implemented during the 1960s and the approach based on the political autonomy of Aboriginal populations. Aboriginal peoples have demanded not only the establishment of equal partnerships for economic development, but also substantive financial dispositions to resolve their social and economic problems in the long term.

The most fundamental problem has been the lack of political will from the Québec government to apply its political decisions and to respect its financial engagements.⁷⁷ The momentum instituted by the Parti Québécois government was not followed by the newly elected Liberal government in 1985. For example, the permanent parliamentary forum has not been established and meetings between Aboriginal and governmental representatives have occurred irregularly since 1986. The Oka crisis during the summer of 1990 showed in a very brutal way that the lack of political will has not been left aside. The Bourassa government may have established a process to lead to the formulation of a specific governmental policy on aboriginal issues. Regional consultations and meetings with Aboriginal populations were conducted, but this process has not produced the hopeful result.⁷⁸ Bouchard government's package policy submitted to Aboriginal leaders during the spring of 1998 did not raise enthusiastic responses.⁷⁹

The Confrontation Between the Québec Nationalism and Aboriginal Nationalism

Tensions and conflicts between the Québec government and Aboriginal Peoples which often had a territorial dimension rest on a structural opposition.⁸⁰ Although they share some common characteristics, the leaders of both movements have been unable to find grounds for rapprochement. Both discourses are articulated around a number of issues: the control over one's political, economic and social development based on the right to self-determination; management of one's own institutions; the development of citizenship policies that recognise their ethnocultural distinctiveness; the consolidation of the territorial bases of a political community; and the international recognition of one's legitimacy. Aboriginal nationalist leaders do not reject the Québec nationalist aspirations but claim a similar political status based on the idea of self-determination within and outside Québec. In doing so, they question the historicity, the spatiality and the legitimacy of the modernist project launched by the Francophone nationalist forces during the Quiet Revolution.

It was suggested in the previous chapter that the current impasse results from the lack of political will on the part of Québec nationalist leaders to redefine their project to accommodate Aboriginal claims.⁸¹ Aboriginal peoples' claims call into question the homogenous representations forwarded by the Québec nationalist leaders', while contesting their hegemonic pretensions over Québec territory. Their recognition would impose important limits to the notions of the territorial integrity and state sovereignty. Such claims thus reveal important limits to the nation-state model underlying the Québec nationalist discourse.

It should be noted that the Aboriginal nationalist movement not only collides with sovereignist forces. Nevertheless, since the failure of the constitutional talks, especially the Meech Lake accord, the sovereignist project has constituted one of the main targets of Aboriginal leaders. The debates opened up by the sovereignist project provided an avenue for Aboriginal peoples to address their own claims. Without denying the Québec right to self-determination, they question its implications. They denounce a the potential colonialism involved in the sovereignist project.⁸² Their claims have also been used by anti-sovereignist forces. In the current political context, the Aboriginal nationalist movement came to represent

a means for calling into question the rationale and the legitimacy of the Québec nationalist movement. In other words, the recognition of one's claims came to be seen as coming the expense of the other's. The re-emergence of the partitionist discourse in the aftermath of the 1995 referendum on Québec sovereignty is a good illustration. The Aboriginal peoples' reserves were presented as future enclaves within territory currently part of Québec.

One important dimension of the mobilisation of Aboriginal peoples against the sovereignist project has been the recourse to different international forums to publicise the possible threats and violations of their rights and more particularly, to legitimate their own right to self-determination. They raised this issue during the 1993 UN World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna. While this strategy embarrassed both the Québec and Canadian governments, it constitutes an especially important challenge for the Québec nationalist movement. As these appeals can tarnish international reputation which Québec needs to secure international recognition of results of a victory referendum, the sovereignist forces cannot simply ignore them. Therefore, they have sought to refute Aboriginal claims by reaffirming the principle of territorial integrity recognised in international law.⁸³

6.3 The Empowerment of the Cree People: between the Local and the Global

The empowerment of Aboriginal peoples on the Canadian political scene called into question some major landmarks of Canadian politics. Their mobilisation around a new political identity helped to redefine the historical and discursive bases of the Canadian political community. The notion of Canada as based on Three Nations opened the door to the establishment of new spatio-temporal framework for Canadian and Québec politics. It also implies a rescaling insofar as the struggles of Aboriginal peoples revolve around the rearticulation of the division the local, the national and the international politics and the recognition of a transnational/global political sphere. The Québec Cree have been key-actors in the opening of these new spaces for Aboriginal peoples, since the signature of the James Bay agreement in 1975. The Cree leaders have been able to use the newly created opportunities by these changes to advance their claims and thus, to challenge the existing political setting.

In this section, we will discuss the way these political changes have shaped Cree politics during the 1980s. In doing so, we will point out some characteristics of the Cree agency and implicitly, the new political context framing their mobilisation against the Great Whale project. In the third chapter, it was noted that a regional political scene, unifying the eight band councils, had been built up through their struggles against the La Grande project, and a sense of a "Cree-ness" emerged among the diverse band councils. Although these two trends continued to play a role in the controversies around the Great Whale project, new factors have turned to be particularly important: the rise of grievances against the original James Bay agreement; the (re) construction of their "Cree-ness" on new discursive and institutional grounds; and the redefinition of Cree polity into a national and global political spaces. These changes modified the Cree's political landscape and gave the issue of hydroelectric development a different signification.

The Politics of the James Bay Agreement

The implementation of the James Bay agreement certainly confronted the Cree people with major challenges that helped bringing brought about a deep transformation of their social tissue.⁸⁴ The James Bay agreement accelerated the modernisation of the Cree communities, including the establishment of modern institutions (in a Weberian sense): the development of a wage-economy, the growth of state regulations and public spending, and the development of a public sphere articulating a Cree polity. Two changes have been especially important. First, the James Bay Agreement transformed relations between the Cree people and the Canadian and Québec states, jettisoning the "wardship" logic that had governed their relationship for so long and replacing it with a discourse based on the idea of self-government. This did not, however, eliminate, the unequal relations between the Cree and the governments. Although the Agreement granted them semi-autonomous political governance, it resulted an increasing economic dependence on the government fiscal transfers and public spending.⁸⁵ At the same time, the Agreement opened the door to the extension of Cree citizenship by recognising specific entitlements outside the Indian Act. The broadening of Cree citizenship also resulted from the opening of new spaces of political participation within the Québec and Canadian public spheres. The Cree started to participate in political

debates not necessarily related to "Indian affairs", such as their involvement in the debates around the issue of Québec sovereignty and the energy policy.

Second, the James Bay agreement opened up a Cree identity politics revolving around the distinction between traditional/land and modern/national space. These two poles shaped the politics of Cree-ness since the 1970s. Even if the traditional way of life based on hunting and trapping activities remains important, it no longer has the same centrality in the Cree way of life.⁸⁶ Cree traditional identity is reflected in the administrative structures created by the Agreement such as the Cree Hunters and Trappers Income Security Board. Although it still constitutes a major cornerstone of the Cree identity, it no longer appears the main social relation structuring Cree society. For the James Bay Cree, the traditional identity has become a space of resistance and engagement.⁸⁷ It is a crucial political stake since it represents the main avenue by which the Cree people participate in the debates within the Québec and Canadian public spheres.

The James Bay Agreement also remained a central element on the Crees' political agenda throughout the 1980s. This explains their ambiguous and even contradictory standpoints on the James Bay Agreement. Although the Cree leaders generally affirmed that the original agreement needed to be modified, they did not reject it. This can be explained by the dual historicity framing the James Bay Agreement. The agreement constituted a turning point or a rupture which can be interpreted from two different perspectives. On the one hand, the signing of the agreement put an end to the Cree's self-determination and imposed a foreign political system. In a sense, it represents the achievement of their colonisation. On the other hand, the agreement marked the beginning of a new era. From this perspective, the agreement helped to overcome their exclusion from Canadian society.⁸⁸ It opened the door to the establishment of a new type of relations, with both levels of governments guaranteeing them the political autonomy to manage the development of own territory. The Cree interpret it as a social contract between two peoples based on mutual recognition and equality. This is why they argue that James Bay Agreement is a basic document which needs to be periodically renegotiated and updated. It is mainly the second reading of the agreement that has been under the strain since the signing of the

agreement as the Cree leaders became increasingly disenchanted.⁸⁹ The initial promises have not been yet fulfilled and the hoped for future is still to come.

Two main factors help to explain the increase of grievances against the James Bay agreement. One is the dismissal of certain provisions which the Cree regarded as alienating. The other is the numerous difficulties and delays faced in implementing the agreement. These two factors have influenced each other. In particular, the Cree now regard the extinguishment clause as totally unacceptable.⁹⁰ For them, it is a vestige of colonialism and a violation of fundamental human rights.⁹¹ These criticisms have been raised at the international level, especially the sessions of the UN Working Group on Indigenous Peoples. Their struggles against subsequent Hydro-Québec development projects had made it clear that the clause prevented them from exercising sovereignty in the sense of being able to impose limits on development projects.

In addition, bitterness and disappointment about the James Bay agreement has mainly been fed by the laxity of Hydro-Québec in the implementation of the provisions and by the reluctance of both governments to respect their financial and political commitments.⁹² Whereas the Cree's hunting and trapping territories were to be protected by the James Bay agreement, they were disrupted by the flooding of important portions of lands, the construction of roads, the cutting of wood by forest companies, and mercury pollution. Their ancestral lands had been severely damaged, forcing them to modify the spatial organisation of their economic activities and their diet. Consequently, their traditional livelihood did not appear secure. Governmental reluctance to apply the provisions have led Cree leaders to bring pressures to bear on governments through the legal proceedings, the presentation of briefs to different parliamentary commissions and participation in the UN works on indigenous issues. The Cree leaders were particularly active during the discussions around the repatriation of constitution and the constitutional conferences on aboriginal rights. They used these national fora to present their claims and to accelerate discussions with the governments.

Health and environmental problems reveal limits to the degree of protection the Agreement afforded. For example, during the summer in 1980, some Inuit and Cree children died of gastro-enteritis

and more than 80 people had to be hospitalised. In explaining the epidemic, Cree leaders denounced the lack of adequate sanitary facilities, blaming the Québec government for not having implemented the provisions on health services, including the funding of new sanitation equipment. They called on both governments and the World Health Organization to conduct an inquiry into the matter. In response, the federal government set up the Tait commission. Its report, released in February 1982, blamed the federal government for not having respected its obligations. In 1983, the federal government announced that it would provide an additional \$60 million for the construction of housing, schools, and sanitary facilities.

In the same period, a research team from McGill University studied the mercury levels in the reservoirs of the La Grande complex and its effects on Native populations. They found out that the level of mercury concentration was higher than the threshold of safety and that many Cree from Chisasibi and Whapmagoostui had neurological problems associated with mercury consumption. The source of contamination was the fish caught in the reservoirs and in the downstream river. The study caused a stir among the Cree as fish constituted an important part of their diet. Mercury poisoning had two major implications for the Cree/government relations. First, it directly threatened the Cree traditional way of life which had been one of the cornerstones of the James Bay Agreement. Secondly, contrary to what Hydro-Québec had previously affirmed, the construction of the La Grande complex clearly had had environmental repercussions beyond those initially forecast. In reaction to the McGill study, a joint committee was set up to continue research on this issue. For its part, Hydro-Québec launched studies aiming to determine the level of concentration of mercury within the different reservoirs of the La Grande complex. A complementary agreement to the James Bay Agreement (the Mercury Agreement) was signed in 1986. It led to the formation of a tripartite committee to study solutions to remedy the problem. Hydro-Québec also provided \$18,5 million to be spent on additional research and information programs to encourage Cree to modify their fishery habits and to identify what kinds of fish could be eaten. Although the problem is less alarming today, it is expected that it will take 15 to 20 years before the level of mercury becomes normal.

Another environmental incident had an impact comparable to the mercury pollution issue. The drowning of ten thousand caribou in the Caniapiscau river in September 1984 raised a hue and cry

beyond Québec's borders. It was picked up by media and environmental groups in North America and Europe. The Cree, Inuit, certain environmentalist groups and other bodies called for the establishment of a independent inquiry to identify the causes. Rejecting this proposition, the Québec government conducted its own study which exonerated Hydro-Québec. Even if Hydro-Québec cannot be directly blamed for the drowning, many people and groups are persuaded that it was indirectly to blame.⁹³ This experience cast a doubt on the feasibility studies prepared by Hydro-Québec and on its ability to protect the environment.

The continuous difficulties related to the implementation of the agreement have perpetuated the climate of confrontation and mistrust between the parties. This did not mean that no development occurred. New Cree villages (Chisasibi, Waswanipi, and Oujé-Bougoumou) were built and various bodies related to the housing, health, school services were established. Moreover, complementary agreements to update the James Bay Agreement were signed. The most significant was the La Grande Agreement (1986) which resolved issues linked to the further development of the La Grande complex. It contained specific dispositions aimed to develop the Cree economy: the creation of the Société Eeyou, in charge of a \$110-million fund to stimulate development projects; the electrification of Cree communities; and the training of 150 Cree workers to be hired by Hydro-Québec. At the same time, the Cree renounced any suit against Hydro-Québec pertaining to the construction of additional power stations (LG1, LG2A, Brisay) as part of the La Grande complex. Despite these adjustments, the current generation of Cree leaders see important shortcomings which justify its renegotiation.⁹⁴ The expected political autonomy has not yet arrived. Instead there is a growing bureaucracy which administers budgets and projects elaborated outside of their territory. Moreover, the Cree leaders have become more aware of their economic dependency and therefore, of the necessity to strengthen the bases of the Cree economy.⁹⁵ These political and economic shortcomings are understood as obstacles to their self-determination.⁹⁶ The reconquest of their political autonomy and implicitly, of their territorial and ancestral rights, requires major modifications to the Agreement.

The Grand Council of the Crees: the Rescaling of Cree Political Relations

The reevaluation of the James Bay Agreement cannot be explained simply by the tensions and disputes between the parties, however. It also reflects the transformation of Cree political discourse and implicitly, of the parameters framing Cree politics. These changes reflect the involvement of Cree leaders in the Canadian Aboriginal peoples movement and, the world Indigenous peoples movement. Through the 1980s, the Cree became active on different political scenes (Québec, Canadian, international) via the Grand Council of the Cree, while developing their own political scene in the James Bay region.⁹⁷ This coincided with the transformation of Cree into a nationalist movement. The Cree now define themselves as a nation or, a gathering of different nations, with the right to self-determination. During this period, there also emerged another figure of the Cree political identity, that is, their definition as part of the Fourth World. These new identities reflect the politicisation of different representations of the Cree within their discourse (the traditional or the Indian, the nation, the Indigenous people). It is, however, the nation which has to come to predominate. Until now, Cree nationalism does not imply the creation of a nation-state which would be distinct from Canada. They want to be recognised as a people with a particular political status and a distinct territory.⁹⁸ This has had a significant impact on their political agenda. In brief, there was a shift from the protection of their traditional way of life to their political self-determination, which implied regaining their aboriginal rights and control over political and economic development.

The inclusion of these new dimensions in Cree identity politics largely resulted from the redefinition of the role of the Grand Council of the Cree during the 1980s. The variable geometry of the Cree identity reflects the participation of the Grand Council in different political scenes. Since the signing of the James Bay Agreement, its political horizon has been gradually extended. From a regional body linking eight band councils, the Grand Council of the Cree has become a national institution and a non-governmental organisation with an international presence. In this regard, two factors were especially important. The first was the federal government's adoption of the Cree-Naskapi (of Québec) Act in 1984. Respecting the commitments made during the negotiations preceding the signature of the James Bay agreement, this law increased the level of self-government of both groups. From that moment, they were

no longer under the jurisdiction of the Indian Act. The Cree acquired the capability to exert greater control over their territories than municipalities normally have. For example, they got jurisdiction over the definition of criteria used for specifying the membership in the Cree people. The second was the opening of embassies in Ottawa and Québec. This decision initially responded to pragmatic objectives insofar as it allowed the Cree representatives to be closer to both governments, making it easier to bring pressure to bear on them to implement the Agreement. Over the years, these two offices became the main institutional basis of the Grand Council of the Cree. The designation by the Cree of these as "embassies" reveals their intention to establish equal relations with both governments on a nation-to-nation basis. The expansion of these offices resulted in an informal division of the Grand Council's activities. On the one hand, there are the national activities resulting from the establishment of relations with both governments and international actors. These define the broad economic and political orientations that shape the development of the Cree nation. On the other hand, it is part of a regional political scene involving the band councils and the Cree Regional Authority. The regional level involves the everyday politics (social, health, and sanitary issues, hunting and trapping activities, unemployment and regional development, etc.). It deals with the social, environmental and economic impacts of the Agreement and with the social and economic issues related to the development of Cree communities.

In addition to the reinforcement of its national bases, the Grand Council of the Cree has developed an international sphere of activities.⁹⁹ At this level too, new trends became noticeable over the 1980s. As noted above, the Grand Council of Cree looked to the international political scene to bring pressures to bear on the Québec and Canadian governments. Representatives have been sent to international conferences on indigenous issues. Their first international forum was the 1981 UN Geneva Conference on Land where they raised the James Bay Agreement. Since then, their participation in international conferences has steadily increased. Over the years, the Grand Council of the Cree has developed close relations with the World Council of Indigenous Peoples. Through these meetings, diplomatic relations have been established with other Indigenous peoples, notably from Latin America. The establishment of these networks allowed Cree to exchange information and strategies and to develop solidarity links around common issues. The Cree have also been involved in the discussions of

the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations and in UN international conferences on human rights and environment such as the Rio Conference on environment and the 1993 Vienna Conference on human rights.¹⁰⁰ An important turning point was the achievement of a consultative status to the UN ECOSOC in 1987. This confirmed the Council's new political status and strengthened its legitimacy vis-à-vis the Québec and Canadian governments. The Grand Council of the Cree assigned Ted Moses, a former Grand Chief, as Cree ambassador to the UN. Although this title is informal, it has been recognised and respected by the Working Group.¹⁰¹

The Recognition of a New National Actor

The last aspect of the Cree politics which assumed importance in the 1980s is the transformation of Cree-ness. Their struggles around the implementation of the James Bay agreement shed light on the transformation of the process of construction of the Cree identity. One major issue discussed above is the emergence of a nationalist discourse. This reveals a clear attempt by the Cree leaders to take control over the definition of their identity and therefore, to break up their domination and exclusion. They have become involved in what Paul Chartrand called a self-naming process,¹⁰² through the reappropriation of "foreign" concepts whose meanings are linked to a different context. By using this language and adapting it the Cree concerns, the Cree are able to deal with both governments more effectively. The best example is the growing use of two Cree terms to replace concepts imposed by outside: the term Eeyouch designates them as people and Eeyou Astchee, their homeland and Cree territory. Thus, the name "cree", which is in fact a colonial legacy, is rejected in favour of their own names. In substituting their own meanings, they aim to gain political recognition from their adversaries on the home ground. The construction of the Cree identity has thus become more politicised than before.

In addition to the traditional representation of Indian embodied in the James Bay tradition, others such as the nation, the stewardship of nature (environmentalist) and the developing society started to appear in the Cree political discourse. The best example of different political representations of Cree appears in their discourses around their land.¹⁰³ Through their struggles against the La Grande project, the Cree people developed a territorial conception of their ancestral lands. Instead of focussing on their

traditional way of life (spiritual and hunting, fishing and trapping activities), the Cree integrated a modern conception of territory (property and sovereignty); it is this conception which is the basis of the James Bay agreement. In addition of their Indian identity, the Cree became Aboriginal peoples participating in Canadian and Québec politics. The recent use of the name of Eeyou Astchee can be seen as an attempt of integrate both conceptions. In doing so, the Cree claim their sovereignty, as do the Québec and Canadian government, over the territory of James Bay, defining as their ancestral land and not as geopolitical unit.

A significant remapping of Grand Council's activities has been advanced through their participation in the World Indigenous peoples movement too. The Grand Council of the Cree has developed transnational relations with other Indigenous nations, a move which reveals the porosity of the state system. Through networks, it has connected its struggles to those of the world Indigenous peoples. This was facilitated by the links between the Cree political discourse and the human rights and the ecology movements. In addition of having opened space for the Indigenous peoples claims, both social movements have become transnational, even global, movements. The Cree leaders' emphasis on the defence of human rights and on their role in stewardship of nature helps to explain why their struggles have become embedded within these movements.

The redefinition of the spatial bases of their political participation has thus opened the door to the transformation of their relations with the Canadian and Québec governments. The latter have had to recognise a new actor who questions the national definition of the political community.¹⁰⁴ The participation of the Cree people has rested on the politicisation of ethno-national criteria for defining their membership within the Canadian political community. They have sought to open the breaches existing around the definition of its civic and cultural dimensions. The second challenge resulting from the spatial extension of Cree politics is the redrawing of the Canadian scale politics. The mobilisation of Cree politics rests on the recognition of a national scale around the James Bay territory. In contrast, both governments would reduce it to a regional scale. The Cree are thus using different scales than those used by the governments. They support the recognition of new political scales, such as the transnational and the

global, which are not a priori structured by the principle of national sovereignty. They contribute to these new political spaces largely being shaped by non-state actors.

6.4 The Mobilisation of Cree People against the Great Whale Project

When the Bourassa government launched the Great Whale project in 1988, the political situation was very different from that of the earlier James Bay project in part because of the radical changes to Cree politics described above. Until the project's postponement, *sine die*, in November 1994, the Cree opposition followed diverse but overlapping avenues. While the struggles against the La Grande had shifted from the courts to the negotiating table, the struggles against the Great Whale project proved multidimensional, as a result of the complex alliances and networks deployed by the Grand Council of the Cree. The mobilisation against the project involved a continuous interaction among various actors acting on different political scenes. It thus followed parallel trajectories which overlapped.

The Cree People's Claims Against the Great Whale Project

In contrast to the La Grande project, the Great Whale project was still at the discussion level when the Cree became aware of the Québec government decision.¹⁰⁵ Although the Cree began to mobilise in 1989, they really intensify their activities after 1990. The government's intention to start construction pushed them to marshal their forces quickly. The Grand Council of the Cree respected the mandate that it had got from the Cree General Assembly.¹⁰⁶ The very urgency of the situation gave their claims a dual temporality: a short-term perspective and a longer perspective. The Cree's first objective had to be to prevent, or at least delay, the start of the construction. This required immediate measures to block further development. In addition, the Cree attacked the legitimacy of the project aiming to demonstrate that it was not required in the current economic and political context. They sought to raise broad debates which would prove the irrelevance of the project. This was clearly stated by Matthew Coon-Come who argued that: "les Cris ont voulu savoir si le projet était réellement nécessaire, s'il serait profitable à la population du Québec, et s'il existait des solutions de rechange pour atteindre les mêmes objectives."¹⁰⁷ Instead of seeing it strictly as an energy development project, the Cree brought to the fore

its political, social and cultural implications. By raising the issues of Québec energy, environmental, and Aboriginal policy, they hoped to stop the project and force the government to seek an alternative solution.

The Cree opposition revolved around three main issues. The first was that the construction of a second project would disrupt their traditional livelihood. The second issue was the environmental impact of the project. Given the vastness of the Great Whale project, the Cree foresaw important environmental damages on the James Bay region and even farther. The third main issue was the type of development model underlying the Great Whale project. It was seen in contradiction to the notion of sustainable development which got a world-wide recognition since the Brundtland Commission.

Referring to the La Grande experience, the Grand Council of the Cree argued that the Great Whale project would be disruptive, threatening their traditional way of life and the James Bay environment. A new development project endangered their culture and implicitly, their existence as a distinct nation/people. Whereas Hydro-Québec representatives characterised these changes as a progress¹⁰⁸, the Cree remained very sceptical. The Cree leaders feared that the construction of another hydro-electric complex would intensify the penetration of the "white" model of society. The first phase brought about major cultural and socio-economic changes. The Cree also faced increasing bureaucratisation and a greater dependence on the South for their consumption goods. The Great Whale project would introduce sociocultural upheavals similar to those associated with the La Grande complex.¹⁰⁹ More suicides, alcoholism, violence would be the result. Chisasibi is the community the most visibly affected by the La Grande complex. The studies Hydro-Québec made at that time had focused on particular aspects, failing to provide a comprehensive review of the social and economic changes introduced by the La Grande complex.¹¹⁰ Throughout the debates, the Cree people defined themselves by and through their relation to their ancestral lands. The hunting, fishing and trapping activities still constitute the core of their identity. Although they recognise that other economic activities have assumed greater importance, the traditional way of life remained a structuring element of Cree identity.¹¹¹

Another important issue raised by the Cree was the environmental impact of the Great Whale project, or more exactly, its biophysical impact. The Cree emphasised the environmental impact of the

Great Whale project, especially when they took their case abroad. If Hydro-Québec went ahead with the project, it would be an environmental catastrophe:

"James Bay II will cause considerable erosion, alter the seasonal patterns and quantity of water flow in the concerned rivers and water basins, adversely affect the wildlife and marine resources of Hudson Bay and of James Bay, including marine mammals and fish, flood the nesting and feeding sites of waterfowl, including migratory birds, destroy the habitat of fur-bearing animals, change the migration routes and adversely affect caribou, destroy spawning areas of fish, deplete subsistence food resources upon which we depend, severely increase mercury contamination of fish, change the ecology of Hudson Bay and of James Bay, endanger a fragile environment, threaten endangered species, cause substantial pollution, endanger the health, safety and welfare of the Native population and interfere with and cause extensive and irreparable damage, loss and prejudice to our livelihood, our way of life and our traditional use of the land and natural resources".¹¹²

The ecosystem of the region would be severely damaged and its biodiversity would decline. The Cree could point to the various environmental problems that have arisen as a result of the La Grande project. They argued that the environmental impacts of the Great Whale project would exceed the limits of the James Bay territory. It would affect the whole of North America environment through the impact on migratory birds and water levels of Hudson Bay. Whereas Hydro-Québec affirmed that the existing impact and feasibility studies were already exhaustive, the Cree argued that additional studies, taking into account both the social and bio-physical environment, were needed.

The last issue was the contested nature of the Great Whale project. The Cree argued that, since the release of the Brundtland Commission Report, the era of mega-projects was over. The Great Whale project represented an outdated model of development based on harmful energy, environmental and Aboriginal policies.¹¹³ The Great Whale project was an anachronism in a context where sustainable development, the energy conservation measures and the respect of Indigenous peoples cultures were gaining a new currency.¹¹⁴ In this context, the protection of their traditional livelihood was perfectly necessary. The Cree people present themselves at many occasions in different international forums as stewards of nature. Their sustainable way of life was in turn based on their spiritual and cultural conception of their land. The Cree refused to consider it strictly a hydro-electric complex.¹¹⁵ The ending of their exclusion, the recognition of their political autonomy, and the choice of the future development of

their territory, formed crucial stakes. This made it an issue for the Québec population as a whole. In this way, the Cree joined their voices to those within Québec demanding a public and democratic debate on energy policy.

The Cree used the extinguishment clause to focus on the growing recognition of international norms based on human rights. This extinguishment clause reflected the perpetuation of colonial policies towards Aboriginal peoples, the dispossession of their lands and threats to their survival. Matthew Coon-Come characterised the denial of their ancestral rights and the imposition of a foreign model of development over their territory as ecological racism.¹¹⁶ In declaring their lands *terra nullius*, the Québec government had launched a policy of racial discrimination under the pretext of development. The Cree drew links between the James Bay development and development projects and policies violating the rights of Indigenous peoples elsewhere.¹¹⁷ They established an alliance with the Kayapos from Brazil who had succeeded in drawing public attention to the destruction of Amazonian rainforests. A week of activities which included, among other things, an official visit of the chiefs Kayapos to Cree communities and a press conference in New York, was organised during the first week of October 1990. These official meetings helped to develop international dimensions of the Great Whale project.¹¹⁸ The alliance with the Kayapos suggested that the Great Whale project had global implications and gave added weight to the notion of ecological racism used by the Cree leaders.¹¹⁹

The critique of the Great Whale project as a Western model of development had important consequences for the Cree people. It allowed them to challenge the political setting in which the Great Whale project had been initially defined by the Québec government and Hydro-Québec. The representations of the project and the delimitation of its spatial limits became core issues. This opened the door to the formation of alliances with other Indigenous peoples, citizen groups and ecologist groups. It also facilitated Cree participation in supranational networks.

The emphasis put on the broad, global implications of the Great Whale project indicates that the Cree arguments were not restricted to the project itself. Opposition to the Great Whale project thus cannot be isolated from the debates which framed Cree politics during the 1980s. Indeed, while the

negative repercussions of the project were important, they by no means captured all the issues raised by the Grand Council of the Cree. The debates also brought to the fore the unresolved disputes arising from the James Bay Agreement.¹²⁰ Great Whale was evaluated in relation to the overall situation of the Cree society as it had come to be defined since the La Grande project. The Cree used the name "James Bay II" for designating the Great Whale project, suggesting a cumulative impact.

Hydro-Québec's representatives clearly rejected this label, insisting on the technical name (the Great Whale project). They claimed that the two projects were distinct and they did not necessarily have the same implications and repercussions. Hydro-Québec's and the Québec Department of Energy rejected all Cree claims. Instead of furthering a rapprochement with the Cree, they tended to inflame the discussions, widening the gap between the parties.¹²¹ Hydro-Québec also pointed out that the James Bay Agreement brought many benefits for the Cree people. In fact, they argued that the social and economic problems attributed to James Bay Agreement had already begun to emerge prior to its signing. Consequently, the criticisms were not well founded. Moreover, according to Hydro-Québec, by signing the James Bay Agreement, the Cree had already given their consent to their construction of the Great Whale complex.

The debates arose out of two contradictory representations of the James Bay territory. While it is an important step in the Québec economic affirmation, it also constitutes a foreign intrusion into the Cree homeland. In the debate, each of the protagonists referred to their respective nationalist aspirations, recalling particular episodes of their collective memories (the Quiet Revolution vs. the James Bay Agreement). In this context, it represented a clash between two competing claims to self-determination. Although the Québec government refused to discuss the Great Whale project's political implications, they were central for the Cree people who wished to negotiate a new social contract.¹²² Throughout the debates, the Cree leaders insisted that their decisions regarding the Great Whale project were motivated by the fate of the future generations.

The Overlapping Spaces of Cree Opposition

Over five years, the Cree people and their allies developed diverse strategies to publicise their claims, three of which will be focussed on here. For the Cree, they constituted means to achieve their main objective: to prevent the realisation of the Great Whale project. The first objective was the demand for a broad and democratic impact assessment review. Contesting the validity of Hydro-Québec's impact studies, the Cree demanded a review of the bio-physical and social impacts of the Great Whale project.¹²³ It was essential that the impact of the project on the territory and the Cree traditional livelihood be clearly outlined. This time, they wanted a detailed discussion of the eventual benefits for their communities. The Cree also demanded that the federal review panels, provided for in the James Bay agreement, be established again and that the project be submitted to federal environmental assessment process. This would have involved the Federal environmental Assessment Review Office (FEARO),¹²⁴ and the federal government was reluctant as this would also lead to a confrontation with the Québec government at a time when constitutional talks aimed at reintegrate Québec dominated the political debates.

The Cree sought an environmental impact assessment review that went beyond the project.¹²⁵ They wanted to use this opportunity to launch a vast public debate on the Québec energy policy and implicitly, on the energy choices of the Québec society. In doing so, they included within their own agenda one of the major issues raised by the Québec ecology movement since the beginning of the 1970s. The Cree demanded that the project should be discussed in the wider context of the choice of the most appropriate and most efficient energy policy. In this way, the Cree questioned the orientations taken by Hydro-Québec, its competency and its expertise. To Hydro's large-scale development project, they opposed the idea of energy efficiency programs. Referring to research in this area, the Grand Council of the Cree claimed that efficiency programs would create more jobs while being more environmental-friendly.¹²⁶ The controversy around the risk-sharing contracts signed with companies at the beginning of 1990 provided ammunition to the Crees. The contracts implied that Hydro-Québec provided low rate electricity to electric-intensive industries such as aluminium refineries over a specified period. The Cree

fuelled the debate by demanding that the conditions of these agreements be publicly released since they were kept secret by the Québec Department of Energy. The subsequent release of their contents showed that Hydro-Québec would indeed lose money. For the Cree, these contracts cast serious doubt on the promised economic spill-over of Hydro-Québec policies and suggested the need to hold a democratic public debate on energy policies.

The second objective was the cancellation of the hydro-electricity export contracts signed between Hydro-Québec and certain New England states. As these contracts were used by the Québec government to justify the project, the Cree decided to bring pressure to bear on New England states and power utilities. Their campaign also aimed to inform investors about the environmental and social implications of their decisions and at the same time, to prevent the signing of new hydro export contracts. The third objective was to attack the international reputation of the Canadian and Québec governments as protectors of Aboriginal peoples rights and the environment, calling into question their ability to respect their international engagements and the legitimacy of their policies. As Canada claims to be a leader on both issues, the Cree people's concerns and criticisms proved to be very embarrassing. In choosing this avenue, the Cree sought to draw the public attention of the world political community on their fate. They also aimed to increase the political debates within Canada and Québec by a "boomerang effect". Both objectives aimed to redraw the scales of the Great Whale project and to transpose the political debates outside of the Canadian political scene in order to modify the power relations with both governments.

The Conflicting Scales of Cree Mobilisation: From Local to Global

The pursuit of these three objectives occurred in different political scenes. From 1989, the Cree peoples used different sites to contest the project and to get a legitimacy. This was not so much a planned strategy. Rather, they often dealt with the obstacles faced at one place by shifting participation to other sites. The refusal of Québec government to suspend the project forced Crees to use different avenues. The political spaces opened at the Canadian and international levels proved to be useful in this context. In the following pages, we will present the main political scenes used by the Crees to publicise

their claims: the Québec and Canadian political scenes, the New England states; and the international/transnational political scene.

In Québec, an important obstacle was the conflict between Québec and Cree nationalism. Hydro representatives and certain cabinet members opposed Québec's economic development and the welfare of the Cree. Cree's opposition was thus often depicted as harmful, even threatening, to Québec's economic development. The numerical superiority of Québécois (6 million versus 10 thousand) was used to undermine the Cree's positions. Québec's and Hydro-Québec's representatives also accused the Cree leaders of misinformation, suggesting that the real motivation of Cree leaders was to get more money at the expense of Québécois.¹²⁷

The Cree thus turned to federal and provincial courts to halt the project and to prevent both governments from launching a global impact assessment review process. While the first objective failed, their second objective was more successful. Indeed, the Federal Court forced the federal government to submit the Great Whale project to its own impact assessment process. The Cree also appealed to the courts to secure a comprehensive and democratic evaluation. This initiative was taken in response to the Québec Department of Energy's intention to split the impact studies in two parts: access infrastructures and hydroelectric facilities. This decision, publicised in September 1990, brought about a strong opposition from the Cree, the Inuit and the environmentalist and ecology groups involved in the debates. It also raised discussions within the Québec Cabinet. Following another Federal Court decision in October 1991 requiring the federal government to conduct a global study, both governments decided to drop the idea of conducting two distinct environmental reviews. An agreement protocol setting conditions for the environmental review was finally signed on the 23rd January 1992.¹²⁸ To some extent, it constituted a turning point since it implied the transposition of the debates from the courts to the environmental evaluation process. Before approving the comprehensive review, the Québec government required that the Cree suspend their legal proceedings.

The signature of this protocol marked the beginning of the Great Whale project environmental impact assessment process that ended in November 1994. It passed through several steps: public

hearings to prepare the guidelines (August 1992); sending of the feasibility studies guidelines to Hydro-Québec; completion of the feasibility studies by Hydro-Québec, to determine the environmental and social impacts of the Great Whale project (August 1993); the Committees' evaluation of the impact studies in terms of the guidelines (November 1994). What really distinguished this impact assessment review from the other assessment reviews was the establishment of public hearings for the preparation of the guidelines. This was the first time that a democratic consultation had been organised to evaluate both the environmental and social impacts of a development project. The scope of the issues to be evaluated included: the justification of the project and its relevance in the future energy context; its different components; its biophysical impacts (fauna and marine habitats); its impact on the development of the Nordic communities; and the environmental follow up. These elements were discussed during the public hearings held within certain Cree and Inuit villages and a number of Québec cities. The hearings provided various groups and organisations from Québec, Canada and even USA the opportunity to present their briefs. The political situation of Cree and Inuit communities and the Québec energy policy were brought up in many briefs.¹²⁹ Upon receipt of the Hydro-Québec impact studies, in August 1993, the Committees and Commissions in November 1994 released their report which highlighted important weaknesses and deficiencies. Among other things, the Report mentioned that Hydro-Québec's studies did not sufficiently addresses the issues of sustainable development and the repercussions on communities inhabiting this region.¹³⁰ Hydro-Québec was blamed for not having sufficiently updated its existing studies or having considered alternatives to hydro-electricity. As compliance would have meant that Hydro-Québec would have to undertake new studies, the Parti Québécois government decided to postpone the project.

This brief history of the impact assessment review of the Great Whale project showed that, in addition to the courts, the Cree used state institutions to get access to the Québec and Canadian political scene. The diverse parliamentary commissions constituted diverse sites for making their claims. The Cree were also able to use the media. They hired a public relations firm to help them to publicise their side effectively. Cree participation in these different forums aimed to broaden and to democratise the debates around the Great Whale project. It was based not only on the recognition of the Cree interests in

the James Bay hydro-electric development but also to their struggles for recognition as citizens with particular collective rights. This reflected the politicisation of two representations of the Cree identity: as Aboriginal people inhabiting the James Bay territory and as First Nation's with a right to self-determination.

The political presence of the Cree people on the Canadian and Québec political scene was also facilitated by their alliances with citizen groups and ad hoc coalitions to block the construction of the Great Whale project. These coalitions included other actors such as the environmentalist and ecology groups, labour unions, scientific organisations, citizen committees, or Aboriginal organisations. Their spatial bases were also rather blurred as they included Canadian and USA groups. Despite their diversity, the latter nonetheless shared a desire: to halt the project for its environmental and social impacts; respect the rights of Aboriginal peoples inhabiting the regions; and an interest in a broad public debate on the future of Québec energy. These alliances were sometimes formal whereas in some cases, they were simply based on the support given to the Cree people. They passed through periods of visibility and latency. Three groups were particularly significant for broadening the debates: the *Coalition pour un débat public sur l'énergie*, the *Forum Grande-Baleine*, and the *Save the James Bay Coalition*. While the first two were mostly made up of Québec organisations, the latter included Canadian groups. In addition to participation in parliamentary commissions, these coalitions organised press conferences, scientific conferences, public manifestations or artistic demonstrations. Sometimes the Cree participated to these events, sometimes not. To see these alliances as fronts for the Grand Council of the Cree, as Hydro-Québec representatives did, would be too simplistic.¹³¹ These alliances involved a networking process, linking different political sites, which helped to open new political spaces for the Cree. Although some sites were more central, the establishment of connections between them played a significant role insofar as it increased the visibility of the James Bay issue and the publicising of the Cree claims. These groups will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.

Besides the Québec and Canadian political scenes, the Cree had recourse to the international and the emerging supranational political scenes.¹³² At these levels, the formation of coalitions and networks also proved strategically important. The implication of the Cree people at the international level

became more intense. More than ever, the Cree people used various international tribunes to draw attention to their situation. They appealed to the world political community to prevent the construction of the Great Whale project, characterising the latter as cultural genocide. The discussions having occurred outside Québec were not the product of specific Cree strategies, but inclusion of the Great Whale issue on the agendas of other actors did help to advance their cause. The ecology movement and the Indigenous peoples movement were the most important in this regard. The Great Whale project managed to get on the agenda at three different sites: New England, Europe and the United Nations. Not all of these were of equal importance; given its strategic importance in the justification of the Great Whale project, New England proved to be a key site for the Grand Council of the Crees.

The New England states and in particular Maine, Vermont and New York, became a locus of confrontation and negotiation between the Cree and Hydro-Québec. The Cree moved quickly to develop alliances with potential adversaries of the Great Whale project and lobbied State Governors and utilities to cancel their contracts. They also worked to prevent Hydro-Québec from signing other contracts. From 1989, the Cree intensified their work in the USA, drawing public attention to their fate and to the potential damage to the Northern environment. With their allies, they became involved in a broad range of activities: information campaigns; press conferences; public demonstrations in large cities; conferences and colloquia in colleges and universities; environmental public hearings in the three signatory states; and legal proceedings aimed at reopening contracts. Some of these proved especially fruitful, notably the press conference with the Kayapos previously noted, the Odeyak expedition and a one-page ad in the New York Times comparing the Great Whale project to the destruction of the tropical rainforests.¹³³

The Cree's move to subject Hydro-Québec's export contracts to environmental public hearings were also crucial. Through their alliances with US groups, the Cree succeeded in raising the issues of export contracts in hearings held in the three New England states. Although this did not lead to the cancellation of contracts that had already been signed, they did give rise to debates about the environmental impact in Northern Québec which sometimes led to the cancellation of agreements for future export contracts.¹³⁴ For example, a referendum organised in October 1991 by the residents of Burlington, Vermont, resulted in the cancellation of a contract of 15 megawatts with Hydro-Québec. The

most important occurred some months later when Governor Mario Cuomo of New York State announced the cancellation of a hydro-electricity contract of \$17 billion in March 1992. Although Cuomo gave economic reasons for his decision in referring to the adoption of conservation measures having decreased the demand and to the increase of the energy supply by the American power utilities, it is difficult to ignore the influence of political factors.¹³⁵ Two weeks before, the New York State legislature approved an independent environmental review of the project even if it was not under its jurisdiction. The various public hearings held in New England states were becoming political fora discussing what were considered as domestic Québec issues such as: the Québec energy policy, Aboriginal rights, and the James Bay environment. The Québec government and Hydro-Québec were forced to defend the project's rationale and their policies. The Québec accountability was raised in these foreign arenas even if they did not represent Québec citizens.

The diverse activities around the Great Whale project in New England states were carried out by different actors or rather, different forms of agency. Although some actors can be credited with certain interventions, the formation of coalitions and networks was critical for raising awareness about the Great Whale project and legitimising the Cree claims. The ecology groups especially, the Sierra Club, Greenpeace, the National Audubon society and the Natural Resources Defence Council, played a central role in the mobilisation against the Great Whale project. Themselves transnational organisations, there were often members of broader coalitions such as the James Bay Defence Coalition, the Vermont Coalition to save James Bay and the New England Coalition for Energy Efficiency and the Environment. Opposition to the Great Whale project also came from the local utilities competing with Hydro-Quebec.¹³⁶ The problem was that these utilities, often coal-based, were responsible for more pollution than Hydro-Québec. It has never been demonstrated, however, that they manipulated the grass-roots movements. The links between the diverse actors within USA derived from some common issues framing their claims.¹³⁷ Their opposition revolved around three main arguments: 1) severe damage to the environment, to the Aboriginal peoples' livelihood and implicitly, the violations of Aboriginal rights; 2) the greater ecological and economic value of energy efficiency programs; 3) the financial costs and risks of the whole operation as well as the lack of security of supply.

In contrast to their struggles in US, debates on the European continent and within the UN institutions did not aim at short-term and specific objectives such as the cancellation of contracts. They simply sought to generate added pressures on the Canadian and Québec governments to block the construction of the James Bay II. Here, the Cree focussed on the threat to their livelihood and destruction of traditional way of life which constituted a form of cultural genocide. James Bay II was a forced intrusion within their territory, a denial of their ancestral rights.¹³⁸ It conflicted with to their national aspirations to control their own economic development within their historical territory. This suggested that the Québec sovereignist project was presented as a potential threat to their rights if not preceded by recognition of the Cree right to self-determination.

Cree mobilisation in Europe was rather sporadic but they succeeded in linking their case to political events with wide media impact. In this way, they gained a higher political visibility. They were also able to use different sites to make their claims, notably: the European Parliament, the Vatican, the International Water Tribunal, the Barcelona Olympic Games in 1992, and international conferences on human rights or the environment. Some of these events gave rise to important discussions within Québec. One was the resolution denouncing the James Bay II project in the European Parliament. A Green Party MP, Mr. Paul Staes, presented the resolution several times, each time it was defeated. The hearing before the International Water Tribunal in Amsterdam in the beginning of 1992, gave a global dimension to James Bay II as the Tribunal was simultaneously considering the construction of the Les Trois Gorges dam in China. Alongside these European activities, the Cree used their status within the UN system to address their claims about the James Bay II. The parallels between the James Bay II and projects threatening Indigenous peoples elsewhere in the world were drawn at the sessions of the Working Group on Indigenous Peoples and various UN conferences such as the 1992 Rio Conference and the 1993 Vienna Conference on Human Rights. The Cree used the release of reports by two UN bodies (the Centre for Transnational Corporations and the Centre for Human Rights) in July 1991 to highlight their claims. Canada was compared to India and Brazil in regard to the treatment of their Aboriginal populations. Attention was also drawn to the negative social and environmental effects of the first James Bay development.

The participation of the Crees in these different political scenes served to make the Great Whale project an international issue. Hydro-Québec and the Québec government began to define their project on the international scene but concerns expressed by some New England governors and the dropping of negotiations about future exportation contracts forced them to recognise that this was no longer sufficient.¹³⁹ To claim that it was a domestic issue, while insisting on the excellent reputation of Québec and Canada governments, did not discredit the Cree claims. The Québec government became involved in information campaigns, lobbying European and American politicians and utilities, and cultural and scientific events as well as existing diplomatic representation in Europe and USA. The reopening of the Hydro-Québec office in New York and the opening a new office in Brussels formed part of Québec's counter-strategy.¹⁴⁰ Representatives were also sent to public events in which Cree were involved in such as the International Water Tribunal, the Barcelona Olympic Games or the Rio Conference.

6.5 Some Implications of the Cree People Mobilisation

Our discussion of the Cree opposition to the James Bay II suggested more was at stake than the construction of the Great whale project. Their attempt to prevent its construction reflected a new step in the process of jumping scales been launched with the La Grande project. This step rested on the remapping of the setting of Cree politics, and more particularly, on the politicisation of new sites outside of their territory in which they could make their claims and participate in the debates. Indeed, in challenging this project, the Cree offered new representations of their political identity and of their homeland and at the same time, redrew the frontiers of their political space. The project presented not only a threat to their traditional identity as Aboriginal people inhabiting the James Bay territory, but also to their national identity as Indigenous peoples struggling for the recognition of their rights and especially, their right to self-determination. The critique of the extinguishment clause revealed how both representations of their collective identity were at stake. Their struggles showed that the various representations of Cree people were not opposed to each other, but in fact complementary.

Furthermore, the Cree struggles involved a redefinition of the scales of the Great Whale project, revealing the disentangling of their political space from their political territory. In other words, the spatial

implications of their struggles went well beyond the limits of their homeland. The Cree succeeded in "exporting" the debates which allowed them to participate on different political scenes and therefore, to contest the spatial definition of the Great Whale project given by the Québec government and Hydro-Québec. Whereas the project was regional in regard to their homeland, they struggled to define it as a national and a global issue. It was a national through the affirmation of their new territoriality revolving around the James Bay territory and through the debates raised at the Québec and Canadian levels. It was a global issue through its implications for the world environment and for the Indigenous peoples. The process of networking in which they were involved was determining on this score.

The recognition of their rights and of their nationhood have thus become a central issue. An important challenge has been the definition of Cree rights in terms of their nationhood. This implies more than the recognition of a third order of government. The recognition of their rights has become articulated to different political spaces through which they have built up their legitimacy. The assertion of the Cree citizenship in different political spaces (regional, national, and global) not only opened important breaches within the configuration of Canadian and Québec citizenship. It revealed an important challenge to state sovereignty and state territoriality. The debates within New England about the export contracts showed how a domestic issue was redefined as an international one. The Cree mobilisation revealed the existence of other channels by which they could raise political debates and recognise as national actor.

Conclusion

In this chapter, the Cree mobilisation to prevent the launching of the Great Whale project has been examined. Their struggles have been linked to their recognition of their citizenship rights on a national basis. This reflected an important shift in their process of jumping scales engaged since the negotiations around the James Bay Agreement. While trying to transform Canadian and Québec political spaces into spaces of affirmation, they also aimed to redefine the international political space into a space of resistance. Their mobilisation was shaped by the emergence of the world Indigenous Peoples and by the affirmation of an Canadian Aboriginal peoples movement. During the 1970s and 1980s, both movements increased their levels of militancy and developed their institutional bases, obtaining a greater

visibility and legitimacy. They opened space for the mobilisation of Crees and contributed to give credibility and legitimacy to their claims.

The Cree struggles against the Great Whale project revealed important changes in the configuration of their citizenship. Although they remain officially Canadian citizens, i.e. on their passports, Canadian political community no longer appears as the exclusive site framing their citizenship. Recent transformations of Canadian and Québec citizenship show an important remapping which broadened their citizenship spaces beyond their reserves or local communities, suggesting a greater differentiation of both citizenship configurations. Their mobilisation revealed the emergence of other sites non-territorialised though which they sought to a recognition of their citizen identity and to publicise their claims. This suggests that Cree citizenship is increasingly based on a variable geography. It is articulated around different scales which do not have the same importance.

The rescaling of Cree citizenship politics revealed the emergence of transnational and global spaces. Although they overlapped with the international space, these new spaces cannot be reduced to it. The alliances of Crees with the ecology movement and human rights movement threw light on their growing importance in Western politics. In the next chapter, we will discuss the participation of the ecology movement in the struggles against the Great Whale project in looking at how they also contributed to the emergence of a global space.

NOTES

¹. Until now, few authors have discussed in a very extensive way the mobilisation of Native peoples in the Western societies in terms of a new social movement being similar to the feminist or the student movement. It is true that it appears somewhat different from the descriptions given, for example, by Inglehart or Melucci who emphasise the a-political and cultural dimensions of the NSMs. It constitutes to some extent an hybrid social movement which combines characteristics of the "old" and "new" social movements. The Indigenous peoples movement is political which seeks to modify the state policies. The will of reappropriating their political autonomy is a fundamental goal underlying their mobilisation. Moreover, although its claims have also cultural implications and raise the issue of modernity, they cannot be simply located on the axis modernity/postmodernity. Whereas the NSMs' claims shed lights on the limits of modernity and calls for its overcoming, the Indigenous peoples' claims bring in the issue of tradition or pre-modernity. It is not only an issue of temporal scale which is involved, but also the signification of the concepts used for discussing modernity. The discussions around the issue of self-determination which is at the heart of the Indigenous peoples' project are very highlighting in this regard. The impossibility of reaching an agreement about the signification and the political implications cannot

only be explained in terms of state interests. There is also the inadequacy of the existing political language which cannot adequately translate the Indigenous aspirations. Although the latter have succeeded to adapt their claims to the Western universe of political discourse, there is still a gap. For a discussion on the implications of the Indigenous peoples movement, see: David LONG, "Culture, Ideology, and Militancy: the Movement of Native Indians in Canada, 1969-91", in *Organising Dissent*, edited by William CARROLL, Toronto, Garamond Press, 1992, pp. 118-134; Jane JENSON, "Naming Nations. Making Nationalist Claims in Canadian Public Discourse", *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology*, vol. 30, no 3, 1993, pp. 337-358; Alison BRYSK, "Acting Globally: Indian Rights and International Politics in Latin America", in *Indigenous Peoples and Democracy in Latin America*, edited by Donna LEE VAN COTT, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1995, pp. 29-53; Monserrat GUIBERNAU, *Nations without States. Political Communities in a Global Age*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 67-88.

² . We do not affirm here that the beginning of the empowerment of Indigenous peoples implied that the denial of their rights and, in many cases, the political repression came to end at that time. The legacy of colonisation still continues to impinge their political situation. The recognition of their citizenship rights is still a major issue on the political agenda. Moreover, this movement has not occurred simultaneously in all world regions. The recent upheavals in Chiapas and the obstacles faced by Indigenous peoples around the recognition of the Declaration on Indigenous Peoples' rights show that their recognition is far from being achieved.

³ . It is true that it was initially a movement of Indigenous groups living in Western countries. The bases of the movement have been extended, however, in few years to all world regions inhabited by Indigenous peoples. Although this has increased its representativity, it has also implied greater difficulty in creating links insofar as the Indigenous groups from Africa or Asia, for example, have specific cultural and political backgrounds. Their colonial history is quite different from the one linked to the European imperial powers and particularly, the Great Britain, Spain and Portugal. Instead of being confronted to the colonising immigrant authority, they have to resist to the new political authorities having been set up in the aftermath of the decolonising process. Indigenous peoples enmeshed in this colonial pattern have to struggle against two types of colonisation which are, unfortunately, quite often very repressive. In this context, to maintain some unity and to elaborate some common strategies is very arduous. See on this point: Franke WILMER, *The Indigenous Voice in World Politics*, London, Sage, 1993, pp. 95-97; David STEA, Ben WISMER, "Introduction", *Antipode*, vol. 16, no 2, 1984, pp. 3-5.

⁴ . Although we have to be very careful about making generalisations, it is possible to trace some historical moments having shaped Aboriginal international relations. Several anthropological and archaeological studies discussed the existence of foreign relations between the sedentary Aboriginal groups and diverse types of political organisations prior to the European colonisation. The "discovery" of Americas by European imperial powers disrupted the existing relations between them while imposing new ones which became afterwards hegemonic. As Douglas Sanders pointed out, colonisation had two kinds of international implications for Indigenous peoples. First of all, it involved contacts with foreign countries imposing a new form of political relations. The signature of treaties on nation-to-nation basis was the prelude to their recognition as a distinct national group holding some kind of sovereignty. Secondly, it traced new political boundaries around various indigenous nations which constrained them to redefine their identity and to recreate some sense of belonging to a territorial community. This imposition of a new otherness came along with the creation of arbitrary territorial boundaries; this complicated matters furthered when some tribal groups were split by different national jurisdictions. These new international relations have been afterwards called into question when the European colonies got their political independence. This implied in most of the cases that indigenous relations came to be treated by these new governments as a domestic issue. The writing of these national histories presupposed that Indigenous peoples were from that moment represented as distinct ethnic minorities having most of the time any citizenship rights. See on this point: Douglas SANDERS, *The Formation of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples*, Document 29, Copenhagen, International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, 1977, pp. 4-12; C. Radha JHAPPAN, "Global Community?: Supranational Strategies of Canada's Aboriginal Peoples", *Journal of Indigenous Studies*, 1993, pp. pp. 63-64; Isabelle SCHULTE-TENCKHOFF, *La question des peuples autochtones*, Paris & Bruxelles, Bruylant & L.G.D.J., 1997, pp. 21-94.

⁵ . It is important to notice here that did not mean that it was the first time that Indigenous peoples launched processes of jumping scales, especially in Western countries. Throughout the twentieth century, Indigenous peoples launched jumping scales at the regional, national, and even international levels. This clearly occurred in Canada where Aboriginal peoples attempted to develop regional and national organisations to struggle their exclusion and then, to transform their spaces of survival into spaces of resistance. This also occurred with the Sami people in Scandinavia or with the Aboriginals living in Australia. However, during the 1960s, it appeared that their processes of jumping scales began to be more and more significant and successful. It also started to happen in other world regions. Moreover, it was less and less exclusively done on a nation basis as stronger links were developed between the Indigenous peoples. See: Frank WILMER, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-30; Augie FLERAS, Jean LEONARD ELLIOTT, *Aboriginal-State Relations in Canada, the United States, and New Zealand*, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1992, 260 pages; Stephen CRONELL, *The Return of the Native: Amerindian Indian Political Resurgence*, new York, Oxford University Press, 1988, 278 pages.

⁶ . Cf. Franke WILMER, *op. cit.*, pp. 135-147

⁷ . Cf. Jack DONNELLY, *Human Rights in Theory and Practice*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1989 .

⁸ . The recognition of Indigenous peoples' rights at the international level is very recent. The first important step had been the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention no. 107 adopted in 1957 (Convention Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries). Apart from treaties signed with Indian nations, the latter was the first legal instrument explicitly addressing the issue of Indigenous peoples. This document reflected the predominant orientation regarding indigenous peoples existing at that time. The primary perspective was their integration and/or assimilation into the dominant society. The convention recognised, among other things, the right of collective and individual land ownership, indigenous customary laws, and the right to compensation for land taken by the government. It was only at the ends of the 1970s that the issue of indigenous peoples started to be more seriously discussed and that new developments occurred. Their recognition remains an important challenge for Indigenous peoples and we can even add that, for many of them, they are more a fiction than a reality. The recent discussions at the international level do not prevent many governments to conduct policies of extermination against the Indigenous peoples inhabiting within their borders. The existing discussions on indigenous rights derive from two main issues in international law: the right to self-determination and the protection of cultural and racial minorities' rights. Until now, the first avenue which was reactivated in the decolonisation process of Africa and Asia involves important contradictions for Indigenous peoples. The latter are confronted to the notions of state sovereignty and territorial integrity which still remain important in the international legal discourse. The second avenue has been until now the most fruitful since it has contributed to create a room for Indigenous peoples' claims. The ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in 1969 and the subsequent studies conducted by the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities shed light on the violations of Indigenous peoples rights. They contribute to give a legitimacy to the Indigenous peoples' claims. For a more detailed discussion of the slow and contradictory process of recognition of indigenous rights by international law, see: Hurst HANNUM, *Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination. The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights*, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990, pp. 74-103; Isabelle SCHULTE-TENKOFF, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-94.

⁹ . Cf. Leon GORDENKER & Thomas G. WEISS, "Pluralizing Governance: Analytical Approaches and Dimensions", in *NGOs, the UN & Global Governance*, edited by Thomas G. WEISS and Leon GORDENKER, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996, pp. 21-25.

¹⁰ . These organisations were not the first advocacy groups aiming to defend Indigenous peoples. In addition to the International Labour Organisation that we previously mentioned, there was the Aborigines Protection Society which merged with the Anti-Slavery Society in 1909. Although its impact was rather limited, the latter sought to draw public attention on the bad living conditions of Indigenous peoples. It published in this regard diverse reports which sought to raise awareness about their deprivation. It was only at the beginning of the 1970s that a real impetus came. Cf. Frank WILME, *op. cit.*, pp. 140-142.

¹¹ . The notion of Fourth World is based on the political division of the world into three distinct groups. The latter was clearly visible during the 1970s. This division followed from changes in world politics after the Second World War. It occurred a division between the Western liberal countries and the socialist countries led by USSR. The formation of the Eastern Bloc based on the Warsaw Pact, the victory of the Communist Party in China and the emergence of socialist regimes in Africa and Asia contributed to consolidate the basis of the Second World. The Cold War established this world division. The decolonisation of Africa and Asia brought about the political recognition of the Third World. The economic underdevelopment characterising many of them became the main distinctive facet. The struggles of these countries in UN or through the Non-Aligned Movement contributed to increase the recognition of the Third World countries in world politics. The notion of Fourth World aimed to create a distinct category gathering all Indigenous peoples. Despite their lack of statehood, this involved the recognition of a particular political status and their attribution of some form of sovereignty.

¹² . Cf. Franke WILMER, *op. cit.*, pp. 177-179; David STEA & Ben WISNER, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-5.

We should mention that the notion of Fourth World did not get the expected impact. Without becoming irrelevant, it did not succeed to keep its potential of mobilisation. It was rather the notion of indigenous peoples which became at the end of the 1970s the most current label for identifying them at the international level. Contrary to the notion of Fourth World, the latter is not based on a particular historical context and also less politically charged. It is much less challenging for the states since it did not implicitly imply a reform of the international system.

¹³ . See: George MANUEL, Michael POSLUNS, *The Fourth World: an Indian Reality*, New York, Free Press, 1974, 278 pages.

¹⁴ . This meeting was the outcome of previous international conferences such as the UN Conference of Stockholm during which contacts between some Indigenous groups were made. It was in 1974 that the decision of organising this meeting was taken. See on this point: Douglas E. SANDERS, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-18.

¹⁵ . It is important to point out that the setting up of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP) resulted to large extent from the leadership of the National Indian Brotherhood (NIB). George Manuel, which was its head at that time, played a determining role in this regard. Since the beginning of the 1970s, he had established contacts with other Indigenous peoples while organising preparatory meetings for discussing the future setting up of the WCIP. Moreover, it was by the National Indian Brotherhood that the latter got its non-governmental status. Indeed, the NIB was granted status as a non-governmental organisation by the ECOSOC in 1974 on the behalf of the future international organisation of Indigenous peoples. As soon as the latter would be created, it was understood that the NIB would transfer its NGO status. Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.

¹⁶ . Cf. C. Radha JHAPPAN, *op. cit.*, pp. 65-66.

¹⁷ . In contrast to the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, these new organisations have a regional basis. Any of them pretends to have an universal membership as the WCIP. However, their regional representativeness is become over years more relative since most of them have developed a sphere of activities having international implications. Their geographical isolation is became more and more relative since they have also established contacts with other regional organisations.

¹⁸ . See: J. Rick PONTING, "Internationalization: Perspectives on an Emerging Direction in Indian Affairs", in *Identities and State Structures*, edited by Joe SAWCHUCK, Brandon, Bearpaw Publishing, 1992, pp. 207-211.

¹⁹ . Cf. Hurst HANNUM, *op. cit.*, pp. 82-83.

²⁰ . Cf. Isabelle SCHULTE-TENKOFF, *op. cit.*, pp. 99-100.

²¹ . The recognition given by UN to Indigenous peoples' claims from 1971 constituted an important shift and at the same time, a victory for Indigenous peoples. Their inclusion within the international political agenda signified that they were not only domestic concerns of the states involved. This responds to the

Indigenous peoples' efforts since the 19th century of getting an international recognition. They have contested the sovereignty claims of colonising states which modifies their political status. From being peoples or nations, they had become a national or rather, cultural minority and for most of them, denizens. Cf. Franke WILMER, *op. cit.*, pp. 187-188.

²² . In addition to the Grand Council of the Cree, the ECOSOC granted at that time a consultative status to seven other organisations: the South American Indian Council; the National Aboriginal and Islander Legal Services Secretariat; the Inuit Circumpolar Conference; the Indian Law Resource Centre; Four Directions Council; the National Indian Youth Council; and the Indigenous World Association. These nominations revealed the growth of the number of indigenous organisations since the 1970s. They shed light on their geographical and political diversity. Cf. Franke WILMER, *op. cit.*, pp. 187-190.

²³ . Cf. C. Radha JHAPPAN, *op. cit.*, pp. 61-62

²⁴ . There are many factors which explain why the appeals have rather a limited impact. One of them is that the states should have ratified the convention. Moreover, it is only state representatives or, in the case of the UN Committee on Human Rights, individuals which can make appeals. In the last instance, the Indigenous peoples remain confronted to the issue of state sovereignty and then, to their will of recognising the decisions ruled by other instances. Cf. Hurst HANNUM, *op. cit.*, pp. 75-96.

²⁵ . The impact of this report was not as important as it had been previously expected. It lost to a large extent its momentum by the initiatives taken by the UN at the beginning of the 1980s. The Cobo's report can be nevertheless seen as a cornerstone having strengthened the presence of Indigenous peoples on the international scene. It outlined what is become their agenda, that is to say, the main claims and issues raised by Indigenous peoples. It depicted an exhaustive picture revealing the diversity of Indigenous peoples at the economic, political and cultural levels. It made a plea for the recognition of their cultural specificity and the elimination of all kinds of policies attempting to "deindigenize" them. The Martinez Cobo's report insisted on the land as a constitutive element of their identity and then, gave a central importance to land rights. Cf. Franke WILMER, *op. cit.*, pp. 182-183; Isabelle SCHULTE-TENKOFF, *op. cit.*, pp. 103-109.

²⁶ . The undertaking of the study on treaties was decided in 1987. Some preliminary reports have been released in 1991 and 1992, but the final report is still expected. This ambitious study aims to draw a portrait of all treaties and agreements in looking at the extent to which they have been applied by states. Many states including Canada have clearly expressed their opposition insofar as the results can be very embarrassing. See on this point: Isabelle SCHULTE-TENKOFF, "L'étude des Nations Unies sur les traités entre peuples autochtones et Etats", *Recherches amérindiennes au Québec*, vol. 24, no 4, 1994, pp. 17-27; Hurst HANNUM, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

²⁷ . The creation of this working group followed to a large extent from the recommendations of the 1981 Geneva Conference on Indigenous Peoples and the Land. It is related to the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. The Martinez Cobo's report has constituted an important platform for the Working Group. The latter constitutes from now on the main forum on indigenous issues for the governments and for indigenous groups. Insofar as it furthers a wide participation from all indigenous organisations and not only the one having a consultative status, it became a meaningful forum for discussion and exchange of proposals about future standards and for gathering data and description of indigenous reality throughout the world. Moreover, even if it is not in its mandate and it has no authority for hearing human rights violations, the Working Group also constitutes a privileged forum for the criticisms and complaints from indigenous NGOs against different government policies. This has incited the different governments to send their representatives in order to respond to those criticisms and to "re-establish the truth". Discussions about the setting up of a permanent body within UN for Indigenous peoples have been undertaken. It would imply the institutionalisation of indigenous issues within the UN structure. Until now, the project is still in discussion. Cf. Hurst HANNUM, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-86.

²⁸ . Such it has been written, the draft declaration implies a deep transformation of the Westphalian system. It calls into question the notion of state sovereignty over its natural resources and its inhabitants

and the state territorial integrity. In other words, it proposes the overcoming of the international politics model and the recognition of a world community based on different types of relations (transnational, international, and global). Cf. Russel Lawrence BARSH, "La décennie internationale des populations autochtones", *Recherches amérindiennes au Québec*, vol. 24, no 4, 1994, pp. 5-14; Isabelle SCHULTE-TENKOFF, *op. cit.*, pp. 109-119

²⁹ . The adoption of the world declaration which is supposed to become a binding convention is not expected to be done in a near future. The initial draft was completed in 1988 and was afterwards discussed and revised in order to facilitate its eventual adoption. An important step was crossed in 1994 when the UN Sub-Commission approved the declaration project. The latter has been sent afterwards to the UN Commission on Human Rights which has to approved it before the ECOSOC and the General Assembly. Although the Commission of Human Rights is supposed to discuss it with diligence, this does not mean that the declaration would be rapidly adopted. Important obstacles need to be overcome. The discussions before the Commission involve representatives from the indigenous organisations having a consultative status and the states. The number of indigenous representatives is then more limited whereas the states are generally more involved than in the preceding levels. It should be expected that the latter will raise important objections and attempt to limit the implications of the declaration. A working group composed of state representatives has been formed for studying the declaration and making recommendations. The version having been adopted by the Sub-Commission is quite innovative and would require major transformations of the international system. Moreover, it does not exist a minimal consensus among the governments regarding indigenous peoples. For example, the government of India does not even accept the label indigenous peoples. Then, in this context, the probability that the current version of declaration would be adopted without major modifications is very weak and perhaps non-existing. Cf. Isabelle SCHULTE-TENKOFF, *op. cit.*, pp. 109-119; Russel Lawrence BARSH, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-14.

³⁰ . Cf. Russel Lawrence BARSH, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-7

³¹ . Cf. Franke WILMER, *op. cit.*, p. 180.

³² . Cf. C. Radha JHAPPAN, *op. cit.*, pp. 76-77; Franke WILMER, *op. cit.*, pp. 179-180

³³ . Cf. Isabelle SCHULTE-TENKOFF, *La question des peuples autochtones*, *op. cit.*, p. 128-132.

³⁴ . See: Radha JHAPPAN, *op. cit.*, pp. 76-77; Franke WILMER, *op. cit.*, pp. 179-180.

³⁵ . In this section, I use the name Aboriginal people for discussing the Canadian aboriginal politics instead of Indigenous which is more currently used at the global level. As noted above, Aboriginal peoples living in Canada have launched various processes of jumping scales at the national and international levels. The different attempts to establish national organisations or the lobbying of London to get protection of their rights constituted some of these processes. However, it was not supported by a vast mobilisation as it occurred after the release of the White paper in 1969. For an overview of the mobilisation of Aboriginal peoples prior to the 1960s, see; Paul S. TENNANT, *Aboriginal Peoples and Politics: The Indian Land Question in British Columbia, 1849-1989*, Vancouver, University of British Columbia Press, 1990, 305 pages; J. R. MILLER, *Skyscrapers Hide the Heaven: A History of Indian-White Relations in Canada*, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1991, pp. 1-103.

³⁶ . Cf. Russel Lawrence BARSH, "The Aboriginal Issue in Canadian Foreign Policy, 1984-1994", *International Journal of Canadian Studies*, no 12, 1995, pp. 108-109.

³⁷ . Cf. James S. FRIDERES, "Native Rights and the 21st Century: The Making of Red Power", *Canadian Ethnic Studies*, vol. 22, no 3, 1990, pp. 1-7; Joyce A. GREEN, "Towards A Détente With History. Confronting Canada's Colonial Legacy", *International Journal of Canadian Studies*, no 15, 1995, pp. 95-100.

³⁸ . See on this point: Sally WEAVER, "Political Representative and Indigenous Minorities in Canada and Australia", in *Indigenous Peoples and the Nation-State*, edited by Noel DYCK, St. John's, Institute of Social and Economic Research/Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1985, pp. 113-123; David LONG, *op. cit.*, pp. ; Joe SAWCHUK, "The Métis, Non-Status Indians and the New Aboriginality: Government

Influence on Native Political Alliances and Identity", in *Readings in Aboriginal Studies. Identities and State Structures*, edited by Joe SAWCHUK, Brandon, Bearpaw Publishing, 1992, pp. 70-86; Adrian TANNER, "Introduction: Canadian Indians and the Politics of Dependency" in *The Politics of Indianness. Case Studies of Native Ethnopolitics in Canada*, edited by Adrian TANNER, St. John's, Memorial University of Newfoundland/ Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1993, pp. 13-76.

³⁹ . As previously noted, the emergence of an "indianness" has constituted a re-appropriation of the political categories imposed by the federal government. The name Indian became a mobilising identity through Aboriginal peoples have sought to redefine their relations with the federal government. This has constituted a crucial challenge since it has implied the redefinition of its meaning and configuration and mostly, its linkage with a different political agenda. This has confronted the Aboriginal leaders to the necessity of dealing with a process in which the federal government has still the authority of defining the conditions of representativity and the political agenda. In other words, it still defines who can address claims and what types of claims can be discussed. This explains why the political recognition of Metis has been rather long and pretty arduous. In addition to the reluctance of the federal government, the division and disagreement among Aboriginal leaders prevented the integration of Metis' claims on the political agenda. The self-naming of Aboriginal peoples as First Nations represents in this context an important shift. Its political recognition has involved the redefinition of the political agenda and mostly, of the discourses used for discussing Aboriginal issues. Cf. Sally WEAVER, *op. cit.*, 1985, pp. 116-123; Paul L.A.H. CHARTRAND, "Aboriginal Self-Government: The Two Sides of Legitimacy", in *How Ottawa Spends. A More Democratic Canada ...? 1993-1994*, edited by Susan D. PHILLIPS, Ottawa, Carleton University Press, 1993, pp. 245-248; Adrian TANNER, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-14; Jane JENSON, "Naming Nations. Making Nationalist Claims in Canadian Public Discourse", *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology*, vol. 30, no 3, 1993, pp. 337-358.

⁴⁰ . The national level has always been meaningful for Aboriginal Peoples. The Indian Act (BNA Act s. 91(24)) and the primacy of the federal government in "indian affairs" played a determining role in this regard. What appeared is that Aboriginal peoples challenged more effectively the federal indian policy at the local and national levels. They contested more seriously the existing pattern which was largely unidirectional.

⁴¹ . Cf. Vic SATZEWICH, Terry WOTHERSPOON, *First Nations. Race, Class, and Gender Relations*, Toronto, Nelson Canada, 1993, pp. 219-242; Frances ABELE, "Understanding What Happened Here: The Political Economy of Indigenous Peoples", in *Understanding Canada. Building on the New Canadian Political Economy*, edited by Wallace CLEMENT, Montreal & Kingston, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997, pp. 118-140; Augie FLERAS, Jean LEONARD ELLIOTT, *The Nations Within. Aboriginal-State Relations in Canada, the United States, and New Zealand*, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 84-116.

⁴² . This redefinition of the Aboriginal social movement did not imply a radical shift. The existing treaties having been signed with the Crown were based on a nation-to-nation relation. The reference to national representation was already part of the political discourse of Aboriginal peoples. The main change is that the current reference to the nation results from a reflexive definition of aboriginality forwarded by them while responding at the same time to political strategies. It is from now on part of their political project. The pre-colonial period has become in this context an historical representation used for legitimating the current claims. It suggests that some of the nationalist claims of Aboriginal peoples are historically based. It contributes to give an history and then a collective memory to their nations. This turned out to be particularly useful and relevant for the struggles around the issue of Aboriginal sovereignty. Although the Aboriginal nations are quite different, the Aboriginal leaders wants to emphasise some historical continuity. Cf. David LONG, "Culture, ideology, and Militancy: the Movement of Native Indians in Canada, 1969-91", in *Organizing Dissent. Contemporary Social Movements in Theory and Practice*, edited by William K. CARROLL, Toronto, Garamond Press, 1992, pp. 118-132; Augie FLERAS, Jean LEONARD ELLIOTT, *op. cit.*, pp. 102-125; Jane JENSON, *op. cit.*, pp. 337-358.

⁴³ . Cf. J. Rick PONTING, *op. cit.*, pp. 207-234; Monserrat GUIBERNAU, *Nations without States. Political Communities in a Global Age*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1999, pp. 67-88; Rudolph RYSER, "Fourth World

Wars: Indigenous Nationalism and the Emerging New International Political Order", in *The Quest for Justice. Aboriginal Peoples and Aboriginal Rights*, edited by Menno BOLDT & J. Anthony LONG, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1985, pp. 304-315; Pierre-GERLIER FOREST, Thierry RODON, "Les activités internationales des autochtones du Canada", *Études internationales*, vol. 26, no 1, 1995, pp. 35-58.

⁴⁴ . The dissolution of the National Indian Brotherhood resulted from internal divisions and the growing dissatisfactions expressed by many Aboriginal groups. The formation of the Assembly of First Nations aimed not only to increase the empowerment of Aboriginal peoples, but also responded to the criticisms against the NIB. The lack of internal democracy and the great centralisation had been strongly denounced. This is why the Assembly of First Nations (A.F.N.) is based on a decentralised structure involving regional organisations and on a democratic decision-making process. Although some of NIB's problems were resolved, the A.F.N. did not succeed to unify Aboriginal peoples. Its representativity is contested by the other organisations. Its leadership is often called into question by its members. For the history of the replacement of the NIB by the AFN, see: Sally WEAVER, *op. cit.*, pp. 113-150

⁴⁵ . There are four other national Aboriginal organisations: the Aboriginal Congress which was formerly the Native Congress of Canada (representing non-status Indians), the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (representing Inuit people), the Pauktuutit (representing the Inuit women) and the Women of the Métis' Nation (or rather it is a federation of provincial and territorial First Nations and Metis Women). Some of these organisations such as the Assembly of First Nations and the Native Women's Association of Canada have regional arms dealing with more specific issues. Cf. Vic SATZEWICH, Sam WOTHERSPOON, *op. cit.*, pp. 230-232; Jo-Anne FISKE, "The Womb is to the Nation as the Heart is to the Body: Ethnopolitical Discourses of the Canadian Indigenous Women's Movement", *Studies in Political Economy*, no 51, 1996, pp. 65-73.

⁴⁶ . See on this point: Vic SATZEWICH, Terry WOTHERSPOON, *op. cit.*, pp. 232-236; Paul L.A.H. CHARTRAND, *op. cit.*, pp. ; Frances ABELE, *op. cit.*, pp. 121-131

⁴⁷ . Vic SATZEWICH, Terry WOTHERSPOON, *op. cit.*, pp. 233-235; James s. FRIDERES, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-7

⁴⁸ . It should be pointed out that the issue of self-determination often overlaps with the issue of self-government in the discourse of Aboriginal leaders. There is not a clear demarcation between them except for the federal and provincial government. The inclusion of the issue of self-determination has been forwarded by the emergence of nationalism and mostly, by the recourse to international institutions by Aboriginal leaders.

⁴⁹ . Cf. Radha JHAPPAN, "Inherency, Three Nations and Collective Rights: the Evolution of Aboriginal Constitutional Discourse from 1982 to the Charlottetown Accord", *International Journal of Canadian Studies*, nos. 7-8, 1993, pp. 255-259; Michael ASCH, "Aboriginal Self-Government and Canadian Constitutional Identity: Building Reconciliation", in *Ethnicity and Aboriginality. Case Studies In Ethnonationalism*, edited by Michael D. LEVIN, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1993, pp. 29-42.

⁵⁰ . It is relevant to specify that the representation as "Three nations" has primary political objectives. It aimed to displace the "two nations" model and consequently, to broaden the political room for Aboriginal peoples in constitutional politics. However, this representation is in itself unsatisfactory as it does not adequately reflect the heterogeneity of Aboriginal peoples.

⁵¹ . The four constitutional conferences set up between 1983 and 1987 have been particularly important in this regard. The initial goal was to specify the content and the implications of the Aboriginal rights having been recognised by the 1982 Constitution Act (article 35). They were a response to the concerns expressed by Aboriginal peoples and provincial governments about the undetermined implications of these rights. A gradual redefinition of Aboriginal peoples' claims appeared throughout these constitutional talks. The constitutional entrenchment of the right to self-government and more particularly, its definition and meaning came to be the dominant issue. One crucial point explaining the failures of the talks was the recognition of right to self-government as inherent and prior the establishment of Canadian sovereignty or as being subsequent to negotiations. Although the Aboriginal leaders publicly recognised that the

inherency does not call into the Canadian territorial integrity, the divergences remained too important for reaching an agreement. In this regard, the Meech Lake Accord constituted a retreat for Aboriginal peoples since their claims were not addressed. Its main goal was the reintegration of Quebec within the constitutional bosom. The Aboriginal issues were back again in the political arena with the opposition of Elijah Harper, a MP of Manitoba, who prevented the ratification of the Meech Lake Accord. Québec recognition as a "distinct society" and the ignorance of Aboriginal peoples was presented as being two sets of standards. The launching of the Royal Commission of Aboriginal Peoples the following year brought back public attention to Aboriginal peoples claims. This explained the dispositions contained in the Charlottetown Accord which were at that time the most innovative in the political recognition of Aboriginal Peoples. For a more detailed history of the constitutional talks, see: Radha JHAPPAN, "Inherency, Three Nations and Collective Rights", *op. cit.*, pp. 225-257; Frank CASSIDY, R. BISH, *Indian Government: Its Meaning and Practice*, Halifax, Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1989; Jo-Anne FISKE, *op. cit.*, pp. 65-87; René DUPUIS, *La question indienne au Canada*, Montréal, Boréal, 1991, pp. 69-117.

⁵² . See on this point: J. Rick PONTING, *op. cit.*, pp. 207-233; Radha JHAPPAN, *op. cit.*, 1992, pp. ; Douglas SANDERS, "Aboriginal Rights: the Search for Recognition in International Law", in *the Quest for Justice. Aboriginal Rights and Aboriginal Peoples*, edited by Menno BOLDT & J. Anthony LONG, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1985, pp. 292-303

⁵³ . See on this point: Douglas SANDERS, "The Indian Lobby and the Canadian Constitution, 1978-82" in *Indigenous Peoples and the Nation-State*, edited by Noel DYCK, St John's, Institute of Social and Economic Research/ Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1985, pp. 151-189.

⁵⁴ . This sexually discriminatory provisions of the Indian Act had been denounced well before the UN decision. After that all domestic appeals had been exhausted, Sandra Lovelace from New Brunswick decided to take the issue to the UN Human Rights Committee. She argued that some provisions of the Indian were sexually and racially discriminatory in regard to the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights. In 1981, the Committee declared that some provisions of the Indian Act were sexually discriminatory for Aboriginal women. Cf. Jo-Anne FISKE, *op. cit.*, pp. 68-69.

⁵⁵ . The municipality of Oka had planed to transform a portion of land which was formerly a Mohawk cemetery into a golf terrain. It should be mentioned that the project was one more element adding to the unsettled historical claims made by Mohawk people. In response to the municipality refusal of postponing the project, the Mohawks built up some barricades over a bridge for drawing public attention on their claims and for bearing pressures on governments. After that a Québec policeman was killed and the involvement of the armed Mohawk Warriors, the Canadian government sent his army for resolving the explosive situation. This conflict was finally resolved by a negotiated agreement. One important dimensions of the Oka crisis was its broad international impact. It was largely discussed in the media and was included on the agenda of the UN Working Group on Aboriginal Peoples which hold sessions at that time. Moreover, two international delegations which respectively came from the Paris-based Fédération internationale des droits de l'homme and the European Parliament were sent in the area for inquiring about the conditions of Mohawks. In each case, the Québec and Canadian governments were obliged to justify their policies and to respond to criticisms made in this regard. One other impact of the Oka crisis was the deterioration of the relations between Québécois and the Mohawks. It largely contributed to increase the racism and prejudice against Aboriginal peoples. For a mode detailed history of the Oka Crisis, see: J. Rick PONTING, *op. cit.*, pp. 89-105; Augie FLERAS, Jean ELLIOTT LEONARD, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-101.

⁵⁶ . The Oka Crisis occurred at the same time when it became evident that the Canadian government made a shift in its foreign policy about Aboriginal peoples. The international reputation of Canada as being a progressive country in the recognition of indigenous rights is now in jeopardy. The different standpoints recently adopted by the Canadian diplomats such as their opposition against the recognition of the right to self-determination or their several objections aiming to restrict the implications of the project of the Universal Declaration suggest that the Canadian government is now on the other side. These positions are close from the ones defended by the countries such as Indian and Brazil which are

generally opposed to a comprehensive recognition of indigenous rights. The eventual impact on domestic politics represents one determining factor which seems to orientate the Canadian diplomats positions. The UN activities have recently constituted at many occasions an epic forum in which the Canadian government and Aboriginal peoples are confronted to each other. Cf. Russel Lawrence BARSH, "The Aboriginal Issue in Canadian Foreign Policy, 1984-1994", *op. cit.*, pp. 113-124.

⁵⁷ . See on this point: Vic SATZEWICH, Terry WOTHERSPOON, *op. cit.*, pp. 23-236; Sally M. WEAVER, "A New Paradigm in Canadian Indian Policy for the 1990s", *Canadian Ethnic Studies*, vol. 22, no 3, 1990, pp. 8-16.

⁵⁸ . This redefinition have been also forwarded by the changes in the Aboriginal peoples discourse. It reveals the realignment of Aboriginal citizenship claims having occurred after the adoption of the 1982 Constitution Act. The struggles of Aboriginal peoples were previously based on the elimination of their denizen status and on the recognition of the existing Aboriginal and treaty rights. The Indian territory or rather their land was one major structuring element defining the Indian citizen. Although these issues are still part of their claims, the recognition of specific citizenship rights reflecting their political and cultural distinctiveness has been emphasised. The constitution of an Aboriginal nationhood largely based on the idea of self-determination is now the determining element shaping Aboriginal citizenship claims. The debates about the primacy of the Charter of Rights over the Aboriginal self-governments highlighted the gendered definition of Aboriginal nationhood. They show that the links between Aboriginal citizenship and the Canadian citizenship are representing an important and unsettled issue. Cf. Vic SATZEWICH, Terry WOTHERSPOON, *op. cit.*, pp. 219-220; Jo-Ann FISKE, *op. cit.*, pp. 65-87.

⁵⁹ . Cf. Sally M. WEAVER, *op. cit.*, 1990, pp. 8-12; Augie FLERAS, Jean LEONARD ELLIOTT, *op. cit.*, pp. 55-72.

⁶⁰ . Cf. Michael ASCH, "Aboriginal Self-determination and Canadian Constitutional Identity", *op. cit.*, pp. 39-44; Frances ABELE, *op. cit.*, pp. 124-125.

⁶¹ . It should be pointed out that the situation is slightly different with Inuit people insofar as the Nunavut and Nunavik (northern Québec) agreements set up political forms of self-government going well beyond a municipal form of government. The creation of the Nunavut Territory in which Inuit will form 80% of the electorate would be very determining for subsequent negotiations about self-government. Cf. Vic SATZEWICH, Terry WOTHERSPOON, *op. cit.*, pp. 234-235; Frances ABELE, *op. cit.*, pp. 122-125.

⁶² . See on this point: Joyce A. GREEN, *op. cit.*, pp. 96-97.

⁶³ . See on this point: Joseph MENSAH, "Geography, Aboriginal Land Claims and Self-government in Canada", *International Journal of Canadian Studies*, no 25, 1995, pp. 261-272.

⁶⁴ . We want to point out here that the Aboriginal nationalism emerging at the end of the 1970s was confronted to a specific spatio-temporal setting determined by the Indian Act which imposed on it specific constraints. This explained why Aboriginal nationalism has been a priori an ethno-cultural nationalism. The imagined political community of Aboriginal peoples has been then articulated around the traditional way of life and the land. The development of its civic components constitutes in this respect a major challenge for Aboriginal leaders. Insofar as Aboriginal peoples have been generally excluded until very recently from Canadian citizenship, this challenge appears thereby particularly important. See on this point: Adrian TANNER, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-14; Patrick MACKLEM, "Ethnonationalism, Aboriginal Identities, and the Law", in *Ethnicity and Aboriginality. Case Studies in Ethnonationalism*, edited by Michael D. LEVIN, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1993, pp. 9-23; Paul L.A.H. CHARTRAND, *op. cit.*, pp. 231-236.

⁶⁵ . See on this point: Jo-Ann FISKE, *op. cit.*, pp. 65-87.

⁶⁶ . Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 65-87.

⁶⁷ . This opposition did not emerge during the constitutional talks. Aboriginal peoples were confronted with the denial of the Québec government, and of the other provinces as well, to recognise aboriginal rights and title. However, during the negotiations around the Meech Lake Accord, it became evident,

especially around the issue of the recognition of the Québec distinct status. Aboriginal leaders made clear stands against the constitutional recognition of Québec without a recognition of Aboriginal peoples. The addressing of their claims came to be presented as a precondition to any discussions about Québec historical claims. Cf. Daniel SALÉE, "Autodétermination autochtone, souveraineté du Québec et fédéralisme canadien", in *Bilan québécois du fédéralisme canadien*, edited by François ROCHER, Montréal, VLB éditeur, 1992, pp. 372-406; Mary Ellen TURPEL, "Oui the People? Conflicting Visions of Self-Determination in Quebec", in *On the Land. Confronting the Challenges to Aboriginal Self-Determination in Northern Québec and Labrador*, edited by Bruce W. HODGINS & Kerry A. CANNON, Toronto, Betelgeuse Books, 1995, pp. 43-92.

⁶⁸ . The new cultural policy adopted by the Parti Québécois government in 1978 contained a section specifically dealing with Aboriginal culture. The Québec government mentioned that the Aboriginal peoples can not be considered as a minority similar to the others owing to their history. The government expressed its will of encouraging the development of Aboriginal culture. The recognition of vernacular languages through the education system has been one important element of the governmental will of recognising Aboriginal cultures; some specific dispositions of the Bill 101 adopted in 1977 had opened the way to this recognition.

This opening had been strengthened by the organisation of an historical meeting in December 1978 between governmental representatives and Aboriginal representatives coming from the 40 Band Councils and thereby, from the nine Nations inhabiting the Québec territory. This meeting between 12 Ministers and 125 Aboriginal delegates was historical since it was the first time that a Québec government and all Aboriginal Band Councils. This provided the opportunity to Aboriginal representatives of explaining their claims and grievances. While reclaiming the recognition of their ancestral rights and the giving up of the extinguishing policy, they demanded to be recognised and treated from that moment as nations by the Québec government. This first meeting brought in a new political dynamic suggesting a new momentum in the Québec/Aboriginal peoples relations. A dialogue between both parties was set up without having some development projects being forwarded by the government. Cf. Eric GOURDEAU, "Québec and the Aboriginal Question", in *Québec. State and Society*, edited by Alain G. GAGNON, Toronto, Nelson Canada, 1993, pp. 331-333.

⁶⁹ . The creation of the SAGMAI brought in the dismantle of the DGNQ. This one was no longer required with the setting up of the institutions elaborated in the James Bay agreement which implied the development of a autonomous regional administration involving Aboriginal peoples. This one constituted the first comprehensive policy adopted by the Québec government. The signature of the North-Eastern Agreement in 1978 with the Naskapis people and the complementary agreements to the James Bay Agreement extended and at the same time strengthened the newly created administration for the Northern Québec. The new secretariat pursued to a large extent the same objectives the DGNQ. Still wanting to remain a light structure, the SAGMAI was an office of co-ordination for the different governmental and para-governmental agencies intervening besides Aboriginal peoples. It does not constitute in itself a department with administrative responsibilities. It is under the responsibility of the Prime Minister Office. Three main objectives have been fixed by the government for justifying the creation of the SAGMAI : to co-ordinate and to provide coherence to all governmental interventions relatives to Aboriginal peoples (Inuit and Amerindians) ; to set up in collaboration with the latter a global Québec policy on Aboriginal affairs ; and to provide information to Aboriginal peoples on governmental programs and activities. Its replacement by the SAA did not imply a transformation of its mandate. However, its political representativity has been greatly increased. Although it does not constitute a department, it is no longer an administrative secretariat. Cf. Eric GOURDEAU, *op. cit.*, pp.; GOUVERNEMENT DU QUÉBEC, *The Amerindians and the Inuit of Québec. Eleven Contemporary Nations*, Québec, Gouvernement du Québec, 1997, pp. 21-26

⁷⁰ . They were the governmental following to the common front gathering the Inuit and Amerindian peoples created in 1982. In addition to urging the Québec government for the historical recognition of their rights, they reclaimed its participation to the federal constitutional conference on the definition of Aboriginal rights. The Québec government decided to participate in April 1983 to the federal-provincial conference. A Québec delegation including a majority of Aboriginal delegates went to this conference

despite the Québec official decision of no longer attending any constitutional conference related to the Constitutional Act of 1982. Cf. *Idem*.

⁷¹ . The adoption of this official resolution had resulted from a parliamentary commission held in December 1983. During three days, reports coming from Band Councils, specific Aboriginal groups and Aboriginal organisations which exposed their problems, needs and historical claims were presented to Members of Parliament. This contributed to raise their awareness and at the same time, to clarify the important sources of imbroglio. It was in this context that the idea of adopting a policy relative to Aboriginal issues emerged. Cf. Eric GOURDEAU, *op. cit.*, p. 333.

⁷² . In this motion, the Québec government explicitly recognised five categories of rights which can be included in the negotiated agreements:

- a) right to self-government within Québec;
- b) right to their own culture, language, and traditions;
- c) right to own and to control lands;
- d) right to hunt, fish, trap, harvest and participate in wildlife management;
- e) right to participate in, and benefit from, the economic development of Québec, so as to enable them to develop as distinct nations having their own identity and exercising their rights within Québec ;.

These specific rights were seen by the Québec government as allowing Aboriginal peoples to develop themselves and to assert their place within Québec society. It was also clearly specified that these rights are granted to men and women without distinction. Cf. GOUVERNEMENT DU QUÉBEC, "Le gouvernement et les nations autochtones du Québec: harmonisation des relations", Québec, SAGMAI, 1985, pp. 10-21; Eric GOURDEAU, *op. cit.*, pp. 353-354.

⁷³ . Although it was a significant step, the Declaration did not represent a breakthrough. The right to self-government recognised to Aboriginal nations does not involve an infringement on Québec government sovereignty and territorial integrity. The declaration specifies five types of rights recognised to Aboriginal nations:

- the right to self-government within Québec;
- the right to their own language, culture and traditions;
- the right to own and control land;
- the right to hunt, fish, trap, harvest and participate in wildlife management;
- the right to participate in, and benefit from, the economic development of Québec.

These rights were presented by the Québec government as being the future foundations of the relations with Aboriginal nations and more particularly, as being guidelines for the agreements signed up with them. Cf. GOUVERNEMENT DU QUÉBEC, *Eleven Contemporary Nations*, *op. cit.*, pp. 23-24.

⁷⁴ . Cf. Eric GOURDEAU, *op. cit.*, p. 335.

⁷⁵ . See on this point : Eric GOURDEAU, *op. cit.*, pp. 344-349 ; Daniel SALÉE, "Identities in Conflict. The Aboriginal Question and the Politics of Recognition in Québec", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 18, no 2, 1995, pp. 277-314.

⁷⁶ . Cf. Sylvie VINCENT, "La révélation d'une force politique", in *Le Québec en jeu*, edited by Gérard DAIGLE, Montréal, Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1992, pp. 749-753.

⁷⁷ . We should point out that the Québec government has increased its political and financial implication in the development (socio-cultural, economic, and communitarian) of Aboriginal communities since the 1970s while furthering their greater participation in the development projects. However, these punctual actions still appear insufficient for responding to Aboriginal claims. Cf. Eric GOURDEAU, *op. cit.*, pp. 348-349.

⁷⁸ . GOUVERNEMENT DU QUÉBEC, *Eleven Contemporary Nations*, *op. cit.*, pp. 18-20.

⁷⁹ . Cf. GOUVERNEMENT DU QUÉBEC, *Partenariat, développement, actions*, Québec, Secrétariat aux affaires autochtones, 1998

⁸⁰ . See on this issue: Dimitri KARMIS, "Interpréter l'identité québécoise", in *Québec: Etat et société*, edited by Alain G. GAGNON, Montréal, Québec/Amérique, 1994, pp. 305-329; Daniel SALÉE, *op. cit.*, 1995, pp. pp. 282-283; Pierre-W. BOUDREAULT, "Les relations amérindiens/francophones au Québec: le territoire comme symbolique de l'autonomie", *Espaces et sociétés*, no 70-71, 1992, pp. 13-31

⁸¹ . It is important to mention that the existing confrontation between the two nationalisms is largely fed by the leaders of Parti Québécois. While recognising the right to self-government to Aboriginal peoples, they still maintain the primacy of the respect of Québec territorial integrity. The issue of the right to self-determination is more than often left aside. This imposes a double standard in regard to Aboriginal nationalist claims. Moreover, the place of Aboriginal peoples within a Québec sovereign remains largely undefined. This was obvious during the last referendum campaign. However, there has emerged since the beginning of the 1990s some dissident voices within the Québec nationalist movement reclaiming the redefinition of its project in order to integrate the Aboriginal peoples claims. We can point out the Fédération des Femmes du Québec, the CSN and the short-lived Forum Paritaire Québec Autochtone. They affirm that the necessity of taking into account the Aboriginal peoples' claims since they share the same concerns and claims. Cf. Daniel SALÉE, "Espace public, identité et nation au Québec: mythes et méprises du discours souverainiste", *Cahiers de recherche sociologique*, no 25, 1995, pp. 125-154; Reg WHITAKER, "Sovereignities Old and New: Canada, Quebec and Aboriginal Peoples", *Studies in Political Economy*, no 58, 1999, pp. 69-96; FORUM PARITAIRE QUÉBÉCOIS-AUTOCHTONES, *Manifeste concernant l'avenir des relations entre les Autochtones et les Québécois*, Montréal, 1993, 19 pages.

⁸² . The Aboriginal leaders have generally recognised the Québec right to self-determination, even if some public statements denying it have been made by some leaders. However, this does not mean that they agree with the project of Parti Québécois. They are strongly opposed to an unilateral process of sovereignty without having been consulted and agreed on the future political arrangements. The different briefs having been submitted by the Québec aboriginal nations to the diverse parliamentary commissions discussing the Québec constitutional future (Commission Bélanger-Campeau, Commissions created by the Bill 150) clearly stated that the place and the role of Aboriginal peoples have to be negotiated and defined before the holding of a decisional referendum on Québec referendum. Their opposition and their eventual recognition entails the redefinition of two major components of the sovereignist project: the Québec territorial integrity and the limits to Québec government sovereignty. This would imply that the Québec state authority is limited to the non-aboriginal territory and rests on a shared sovereignty. It would imply that the Québec sovereign government finds out new political institutions reflecting these three forms of citizenship within the Québec territory. Cf. Daniel SALÉE, "Identité québécoise, identité autochtone et territorialité: entre les frontières subjectives et les frontières objectives de l'espace québécois", in *L'espace québécois*, edited by Alain G. GAGNON, Alain NOËL., Montréal, Québec/Amérique, 1995, pp. 282-284

⁸³ . The federal government has, for its part, a more ambiguous position insofar as it does not use the same arguments within Canada and outside. While it supports the claims and fears of Aboriginal peoples vis-à-vis the sovereignist project, Canadian diplomats refuse to discuss the issue of Québec sovereignty within international forums, defining it a domestic issue. Cf. Russel Lawrence BARSH, *op. cit.*, pp. 115-118;

⁸⁴ . We do not intend to present here a detailed picture of the impact of the James Bay agreement. We are limiting our discussion to its political implications. Until now, the impacts of the James Bay agreement have been largely discussed and studied if we look at other similar development projects. Apart from the political aspect, the socio-economic impacts of the James Bay agreement have received a lot of attention from Hydro-Québec and from different researchers. Moreover, the environmental impacts of the La Grande project or more particularly, its bio-physical impacts have been well documented by Hydro-Québec. It is probably this aspect which is the best known. Insofar as it was an essential condition to the

pursuit of the hydro-electric development of the region, Hydro-Québec invested a lot of money for conducting different studies aiming to specify the environmental impact of the La Grande complex. This also aimed to rebuild its public image in response to criticisms from environmentalist and ecology groups. Regarding its socio-economic changes related to the implementation of the James Bay agreement, it is much more difficult to draw a clear picture and to reach definitive conclusions. It remains impossible to determine very exactly what is specifically related to the implementation of the James Bay agreement and what came out from the large-scale processes of changes deriving from the inclusion (or colonisation) of Northern Aboriginal communities within the Canadian economy. Indeed, it became noticeable at the end of the 1960s that the Cree communities began to move from the traditional model of society based on hunting and gathering activities. The implementation of the agreement and more particularly, the setting up of semi-autonomous administration delivering education and social services greatly affected the traditional structures, bringing in new values, norms and institutions. However, the degree to which the James Bay agreement has speeded up these changes cannot be exactly determined. It is important to keep in mind that its impact has been rather differential. The La Grande complex affected much more the southern communities and particularly the community of Chisasibi which has been relocated. Cf. Ronald NIEZEN, "Power and Dignity: The Social Consequences of Hydro-Electric Development for the James Bay Cree", *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology*, vol. 30, no 4, 1993, pp. 510-529; Jean-Jacques SIMARD, et al. *Tendances nordiques. Les changements sociaux 1970-90 chez les Cris et les Inuit du Québec*, Québec, GÉTIC, 1996.

⁸⁵ . Cf. Gérard DUHAIME, "La gouverne du Nunavik. Qui paie quoi?", *The Canadian Journal of Native Studies*, vol. 13, no 2, 1993, pp. 251-277; Jean-Jacques SIMARD, et al, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-52.

⁸⁶ . We do not argue here that the Cree society is clearly divided into a modern sector and a traditional sector. For example, the different studies around the importance of a wage-economy in relation to a subsistence economy show that the division between the two-sectors is not clear-cut. It is true that the subsistence economy is no longer exclusive and predominant. However, it is not become insignificant. It has rather emerged different meanings associated to hunting and fishing activities depending on the socio-economic characteristics of individuals. As the wage-economy has changed over-time, the same thing applies to the subsistence economy. Cf. Ronald NIEZEN, *op. cit.*, pp. 515-517; Harvey FEIT, "Colonialism's Northern Cultures: Canadian Institutions and the James Bay Cree", in *On the Land. Confronting the Challenges to Aboriginal Self-Determination in Northern Québec and Labrador*, edited by Bruce W. HODGINS & Kerry A. CANNON, Toronto, Betlegeuse Books, 1995, pp. 105-129.

⁸⁷ . Cf. Adrian TANNER, "Le pouvoir et les peuples du quart-monde", *Anthropologie et sociétés*, vol. 16, no 3, 1992, pp. 28-32.

⁸⁸ . See in this regard: Billy DIAMOND, "Aboriginal Right: The James Bay Experience", in *The Quest for Justice. Aboriginal Peoples and Aboriginal Rights*, edited by Menno BOLDT, J. Anthony LONG, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1985, pp. 265-284; Roméo SAGANASH, "L'occupation conjointe d'un pays à revisiter", in *Hydro-Québec. Autres temps, autres défis*, Ste-Foy, Presses de l'université du Québec, 1995, pp. 23-33; GRAND COUNCIL OF THE CREES (of QUEBEC), *Sovereign Injustice. Forcible Inclusion of the James Bay Crees and Cree Territory into a Quebec Sovereign*, Nemaska, Eeyou Aschee, 1995, 494 pages.

⁸⁹ . Matthew COON-COME, "L'optique des Cris du territoire de la Baie James," in *L'avenir du Nord québécois. Symposium international sur l'avenir du Nord québécois*, edited by Louis-Edmond HAMELIN & Micheline POTVIN, Sillery, Presses de l'Université du Québec, 1989, pp. 81-88; GRAND COUNCIL OF THE CREES (of QUEBEC), *Environmental – Economic & Social Issues related to the James Bay Phase II Project*, Nemaska, 1993.

⁹⁰ . We should mention that the opposition of Cree people to the extinguishment clause has been furthered by the political constraints and obstacles faced by them. They realised that the extinguishment of their aboriginal rights largely thwarted the idea of-self-government underlying the agreement. It imposes an heavy burden on them. Moreover, this type of provision has become increasingly decried as repressive and colonialist by different commissions, reports and international conferences. It appears irrelevant and retrograde in the current political context. The Cooligan report released in 1985

recommended to the federal government its leaving aside. See on these points: Matthew COON-COME, "La lutte des Cris de la Baie James", in *Hydro-Québec. Autres temps, autres défis*, edited by Yves BÉLANGER & Robert COMEAU, Sainte-Foy, Presses de l'Université du Québec, 1995, pp. 195-203; Roméo SAGANASH, "La conception autochtone des territoires et de la frontière", in *Les frontières du Québec... D'hier à demain*, Québec, Université Laval, 1992, pp. 61-68.

⁹¹ . Matthew COON-COME, "Des partenaires consentants: les Cris de la Baie James, la sécession du Québec et le Canada", in *Pour l'amour de ce pays*, edited by Matthew W. BARRETT, Toronto, Penguin Books, 1995, p. 115; GRAND COUNCIL OF THE CREES (of QUÉBEC), *Sovereign Injustice*, *op. cit.*,

⁹² . See on this point: Guy MERCIER, Gilles RITCHOT, "La Baie James. Les dessous d'une rencontre que la bureaucratie n'avait pas prévue", *Cahiers de géographie du Québec*, vol. 41, no 113, 1997, pp. 159-160; Sean McCUTCHEON, *Electric Rivers*, Montréal, Black Rose Books, 1991, pp. 120-131.

⁹³ . Until today, the exact factors which would explain how and why a large number of caribou drowned at this moment and at this setting remain unknown. It seems that it is more a combination of different factors involving decisions of Hydro-Québec and weather factors. The drowning of this caribou had more a political impact than an ecological impact. It did not threaten the survival of the caribou in the region. But, it called into question the management capabilities and competency of Hydro-Québec. Cf. Sean MCCUTCHEON, *op. cit.*, pp. 105-107.

⁹⁴ . See on this point: Roméo SAGANASH, "L'occupation conjointe d'un pays à revisiter", *op. cit.*, pp. ; Guy MERCIER, Gilles RITCHOT, *op. cit.*, pp. 161-163; Matthew COON-COME, in *Pour l'amour de ce pays*, Toronto, Penguin Books, 1995, pp. 13-16

⁹⁵ . Daniel SALÉE, *op. cit.*, pp. 287-289

⁹⁶ . Cf. Roméo SAGANASH, "L'occupation conjointe d'un pays à revisiter", *op. cit.*, p. pp. 29-30

⁹⁷ . We will not focus in this chapter on the transformations of the regional political scene which came along with the reinforcement of the Grand Council of the Cree. The implementation of the institutions created by the James Bay agreement have introduced new challenges for the eight band councils. They have to deal with regional issues and with local issues which are specific to their communities. It cannot be seen as an homogenous block resting on a centralised and unilateral decision-making process. It is then crossed by tensions and debates particularly in regard to economic and social issues. As Richard Salisbury pointed out, the political participation of Cree within the different communities has significantly increased. Local politics has become much significant and democratic. Cf. Richard SALISBURY, *A Homeland for the Cree: Regional Development in James Bay, 1971-1981*, Montreal & Kingston, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1986, pp. 106-116.

⁹⁸ . In making an overview of the main discourses and briefs presented by the Grand Council of the Cree, the issue of self-determination is central. Contrary to the Québec nationalist movement, the Aboriginal nationalist leaders affirm that it does not call into question the territorial integrity of Canada. This position is also supported by the Grand Council of the Cree. This difference can be explained by the lack of discussion about the issue of sovereignty in the Aboriginal nationalism. This absence rather reveals an ambiguity. Whereas their claims revolving around their right to self-determination implicitly raise the issue of sovereignty, the latter is rather ignored. In reading their recent briefs and discourses, it clearly appears that the Cree leaders reclaim a form of sovereignty which would be non-territorial, that is to say, not exclusively defined in relation to the James Bay territory. Some authors discussing the ethnic revival and the re-emergence of nationalist movements in have argued that the issue of sovereignty is no longer a predominant issue on their agenda of their movements. The current discussions around the Cree nationalism would then support their thesis. Cf. Monserrat GUIBERNAU, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-67

⁹⁹ . See on this point: Dolorès FRANCEY, *Du Local au global: une ethnicité à géométrie variable pour les Cris de la Baie James*, Mémoire de maîtrise non publié, Université Laval, 1998; Dietrich SOYEZ, "La baie James: faut-il rapatrier ou mondialiser le débat?", *Cahiers de géographie du Québec*, vol. 39, no 106, 1995, pp. 63-78; Reg WITHAKER, *op. cit.*, pp. 88-91.

¹⁰⁰ . Cf. Rick J. PONTING, *op. cit.*, pp. 125-126.

¹⁰¹ . One example of this recognition by the Working Group was the appointment in 1989 of Ted Moses as Rapporteur of a working group on discrimination against Indigenous peoples. Cf. Russel Lawrence BARSH, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

¹⁰² . Cf. Paul L. A. H. CHARTRAND, "Aboriginal Self-Government", *op. cit.*, pp. 244-245.

¹⁰³ . See Roméo SAGANASH, "La conception autochtone des territoires et de la frontière", *op. cit.*, pp. 61-68.

¹⁰⁴ . See on this point: Adrian TANNER, "Le pouvoir et les peuples du quart monde", *op. cit.*, pp. 28-35.

¹⁰⁵ . The launching of the Cree campaign had been preceded by public discussions within the communities. The Great Whale project was not a priori completely dismissed. The eventual positive and negative impacts of the projects were debated. Although the job opportunities and the financial compensation resulting from the construction of the Great Whale project appeared interesting and enticing in the rather difficult economic context, the negative impacts of the project assumed an increasing prominence. Cf. Sean McCUTCHEON, *op. cit.*, pp. 150-157. This standpoint was also confirmed by my personal interviews conducted with Chief and one councillor from Whapmagoostui,

¹⁰⁶ . At this General Assembly, the decision of preventing the construction of the project was clearly reaffirmed. It was also decided that they will increase their activities within Québec. The Cree publicly affirmed that they exclude any recourse to violence in reference to the Oka crisis. Cf. *Le Devoir*, 11 août 1990, p. A1.

¹⁰⁷ . Matthew COON-COME, "La lutte des Cris de la Baie James", *op. cit.*, p. 200.

¹⁰⁸ . For the Hydro's representatives, the impact of the James Bay Agreement has rather been positive. The life conditions (wealth, health, education) have been significantly improved and their culture is well protected. Although they recognised that important changes (externalities) have been experienced, the different measures taken by Hydro-Québec have contributed to redress the situation. Cf. Armand COUTURE, "Les apports de la Convention de la Baie James et du Nord Québécois: le point de vue d'Hydro-Québec", in *Hydro-Québec. Autres temps, autres défis*, sous la direction de Yves BÉLANGER, Robert COMEAU, Ste-Foy, Presses de l'Université du Québec, 1995, pp. 211-212.

¹⁰⁹ . Cf. Roméo SAGANASH, "La position des Cris du Québec", *Revue Organisation*, Avril 1992, pp. 69-76; Ronald NIEZEN, *op. cit.*, pp. 510-513.

¹¹⁰ . Cf. Ronald NIEZEN, *op. cit.*, p. 514.

¹¹¹ . The centrality of the traditional way of life has been supported by the Cree leaders throughout the debates and even today. It was clearly expressed by the Grand Chief Matthew Coon-Come during a lecture given to Trent University. Aiming to present who are the Cree people at the beginning of his lecture, he went as follow: "We are a small sub-arctic Aboriginal people. We hunt, fish, and trap on our traditional lands on the east coast of the James and Hudson Bays, where we have lived for thousands of years. We have our own language, culture, traditions and laws, and a profound relationship with the land, of which we are really a part. We identify ourselves in relation to the land as hunters, fishermen and trappers. That way of life is still thriving, it is flourishing, it supports our families." This standpoint has been quite often expressed by him when he was abroad. It is not at all an exception. Cf. Matthew COON-COME, "Clearing the Smokescreen", in *On the Land*, edited by Bruce W. HODGINS & Kerry A. CANNON, Toronto, Betelgeuse Books, 1995, pp. 5-6

¹¹² . NATIONAL ENERGY BOARD, Hydro-Québec Applications to Export Electricity to the New York Power Authority and Vermont Joint Owners, Panel no 1 of the Grand Council of the Cree: Position of the Grand Council of the Crees (of Quebec), Testimony of the Grand Chief Matthew Coon-Come, February 14th 1990.

¹¹³ . Cf. Roméo SAGANASH, "L'occupation conjointe d'un pays à revisiter", *op. cit.*, pp. 23-31; Guy MERCIER, Gilles RITCHOT, *op. cit.* pp. 161-163.

¹¹⁴ . Sylvie VINCENT, *op. cit.*, p. 775.

¹¹⁵ . The Cree struggles against the project represented for them the possibility of reversing the existing relations having incrementally forwarded their exclusion and their dependency. As it was mentioned by Matthew Coon-Come shortly after the election of the Parti Québécois, "this phenomenon of the James Bay Cree is broader than our opposition to the to Hydro-Québec's mad plans to engineer and dam the vast ecosystem of which the Great Whale river is part. (...) The reason why we are doing these things is that the First peoples of this continent have been showed aside for far too long. Great Whale is only a symptom. The attempted dispossession of my people, and the purported the extinguishment of our rights, is the cause". They came to symbolise the resistance of Aboriginal peoples at the Canadian level. Cf. Matthew COON-COME, "Clearing the Smokescreen", *op. cit.*, p. 6

¹¹⁶ . Matthew COON-COME, "Les luttes des Cris de la Baie James", *op. cit.*, pp. 196-197

¹¹⁷ . *Idem.*

¹¹⁸ . This alliance with the Kayapos was very important for the Cree. It was recognised by the Cree leaders that they could learn from the strategies used by the Kayapos. The latter succeeded to get an international recognition in preventing the construction of an hydro-electric development project in the Amazonian rainforests. Their success largely resulted from their pressures made on the World Bank and the diffusion of their claims through the world media. The support given by Sting was also not negligible. The Kayapos struggles became a symbol linking the ecologist movement with the Indigenous peoples movement. Cf. *La Gazette*, 5 octobre 1990.

¹¹⁹ . The notion of ecological racism created important stir within Québec and was used by the Hydro-Québec and the Québec government for discrediting the Cree vis-à-vis the Québec population. Since it has been often mentioned by Coon-Come when he was abroad, they affirmed that the Québec was victim of a large campaign of misinformation. Cf. Dietrich SOYEZ, *op. cit.*, pp. 67-71

¹²⁰ . Cf. Sylvie VINCENT, *op. cit.*, pp. 775-776.

¹²¹ . Cf. Sean McCUTCHEON, *op. cit.*, pp. 138-149.

¹²² . The necessity of redefining the bases of the political relations between Québec and the Aboriginal peoples was constantly argued by the Cree leaders throughout the debates. As it was argued by Romeo Saganash,

"ces questions interpellent le peuple québécois dans ce qu'il a de plus fragile et cher à la fois: son identité et sa terre. Toutes les fois que surviennent un éclat ou une question difficile, les Québécois se sentent menacés, attaqués. Ça se comprend aisément, nous réclamons ce que vous réclamez: le même territoire, les mêmes ressources et les mêmes moyens de promotion socio-économiques et, surtout, la même soif de liberté. Mais nous réalisons que nous sommes en présence de problèmes complexes que nous devons regarder en face. Certains voudraient plutôt les éviter ou, à tout le moins, les reporter dans le temps. Nous croyons fermement, au contraire, qu'il nous faut les aborder dès maintenant dans l'espoir d'éviter, pour les années qui viennent, des malentendus profonds qui pourraient se traduire par une collision frontale entre les aspirations que nous défendons de part et d'autre."

Cf. Roméo SAGANASH, "L'occupation conjointe d'un pays à revisiter", *op. cit.*, p. 29

¹²³ . See on this point: Jules DUFOUR, "Le projet Grande-Baleine et l'avenir des peuples autochtones au Québec", *Cahiers de géographie du Québec*, vol. 40, no 100, 1996, pp. 233-240.

¹²⁴ . For the Cree, the obligation of the federal government of being part of the environmental review process of the Great Whale project was justified by its repercussions. Even if the project in itself was of provincial jurisdiction, it nonetheless fell under federal jurisdiction by, for example, its impact on migratory birds and navigable water. The federal government accepted to conduct its environmental assessment review defined by the James Bay Agreement. However, it was opposed to evaluate the environmental

impact of the Great Whale project via the FEARO which became in 1995 the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency (CEAA). Confronted to this refusal, the Cree filed a suit to the Federal Court concerning the federal government obligation in October 1990. The Federal Court issued a decision in March 1991 favourable to the Cree request. It constrained the federal government to hold its own public hearings on the project. The Court argued that the James Bay agreement was not a contract between consenting parts, but a federal law. This decision was ruled out in the aftermath of some important court decisions constraining the federal government of proceeding to the environmental evaluation of projects (the Rafferty-Alameda and Oldman River dams). The Federal Court decision was then an important victory for the Cree people. Cf. Kathryn HARRISON, *Passing the Buck. Federalism and Canadian Environmental Policy*, Vancouver, UBC Press, 1996, pp. 149-153.

¹²⁵ . Cf. Matthew COON-COME, "La lutte des Cris de la Baie James", *op. cit.*, pp. 199-200; Jules DUFOUR, *op. cit.*, p. 237.

¹²⁶ . This argumentation about the economic value of the hydro-electricity gave rise to a "battle of studies" with Hydro-Québec. This one strongly reacted in publishing its own studies showing that it was the best option for stimulating the development of the Québec economy. While furthering the creation of jobs, the construction of hydro-electric complex brought in important investments among the downstream industries. Moreover, Hydro-Québec argued that hydro-electricity was the energy option being the most favourable to the protection of environment. Being based on renewable sources of energy, it was only during the construction period that the negative repercussions on environment are noticeable. Cf. Daniel DUBEAU, "Le souci constant de l'environnement chez Hydro-Québec", in *Hydro-Québec. Autres temps, autres défis*, sous la direction de Yves BÉLANGER et Robert COMEAU, Ste-Foy, Presses de l'Université du Québec, 1995, pp. 241-254; HYDRO-QUÉBEC, *Les milieux naturel et humain au complexe La Grande*, Montréal, Hydro-Québec, 1992, 56 pages; Sean McCUTCHEON, *op. cit.*, pp. 171-172;

¹²⁷ . Rolande PARENT, "Hydro-Québec nie stimuler le racisme des Québécois à l'égard des Québécois", *La Presse*, 13 Mars 1992, p. A13; Christian RIOUX, "Comment les Cris ont planté Hydro", *L'Actualité*, 15 décembre 1991, pp. 46-50.

¹²⁸ . The splitting of the environment impact assessment went ahead despite the objections of the Minister of Environment. An agreement in principle with the Federal government for the holding of public hearings on the Great whale project was reached in January 1991. This agreement from which the Cree leaders were excluded implied the beginning of public hearings on the infrastructures during the summer 1991. However, due to the Cree opposition, the hearings which were supposed to be held within the Cree communities were cancelled. In August 1991, Bourassa announced the postponement of the project of one year and therefore, the launching of the construction works became in this context less urgent. Moreover, the decision of the Federal Court in October 1981 constraining the federal government of proceeding to a global environmental evaluation of the construction project around Eastmain, a Cree village, contributed to put aside the dual environmental process. Although it was not related to the Great Whale project, the Court ruled out that the federal government had to undertake a comprehensive environmental impact assessment. These different events created incentives for both governments to set up a comprehensive environmental assessment review for the whole project which would include the Cree people. An agreement protocol setting was then signed in January 1992 between the federal government, the Québec government, the Inuit people and the Cree people. This protocol specified the conditions of the review process: the language; the elements to be discussed regarding the project justification; the duration of the process; the form and type of consultations and public hearings; and the financing of the process. This protocol aimed to harmonise the federal environmental evaluation process with the regime defined in the James Bay Agreement. More specifically, it had to co-ordinate the jurisdictions of the six committees involved in the process: Evaluating Committee (COMEV), Kativik Environmental Quality Commission (KEQC), Federal Review Committee North of the 55th Parallel (COFEX-NORD), Federal Review Committee South of the 55th Parallel (COFEX-SOUTH), Provincial Review Committee (COMEX), and Federal Environmental Assessment Review Panel (FEARP). This protocol outlined the framework of the review process. Cf. Jules DUFOUR, *op. cit.*, pp. 237-238; COMITÉ D'ÉVALUATION, COMMISSION DE LA QUALITÉ DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT KATIVIK, COMITÉ FÉDÉRAL D'EXAMEN AU NORD DU 55e PARALLÈLE; COMMISSION FÉDÉRALE D'EXAMEN DES

ÉVALUATIONS ENVIRONNEMENTALES, *Directive. Etude des impacts sur l'environnement du projet hydroélectrique Grande Baleine*, Montréal, 1992, 113 pages.

¹²⁹ . These public hearings were held between the January 27th and March 1992. It gathered opponents and supporters of the Great Whale project.

"Ces audiences permirent d'entendre les témoignages de résidents et de dizaines de représentants des organismes intéressés par le projet (on entendit plus de 275 témoignages et reçut 90 mémoires au total). Parmi les organismes présents aux audiences, nommons l'Association des manufacturiers du Québec, Environnement Jeunesse, le Parti Vert du Québec, le Forum québécois pour l'examen public du Complexe Grande-Baleine, la Tungavut Federation du Nunavut, la Confédération des Syndicats Nationaux (CSN), le Keewatin Regional Health Board, le Comité de citoyens de Radisson, les Naskapis du Québec, les Métallo de la Baie James, l'Union québécoise pour la conservation de la nature, l'Association des Constructeurs de Routes et Grands Travaux du Québec, le Mouvement "Au Courant" et l'Association québécoise pour la maîtrise de l'énergie. Des représentants de quelques organismes de la Nouvelle-Angleterre ont aussi exprimé leur point de vue comme la Vermont Coalition to save James Bay, la New England Coalition for energy Efficiency and the Environment et le groupe du Vermont du Sierra Club."

Cf. Jules DUFOUR, *op. cit.*, p. 238.

¹³⁰ . The conformity analysis released by the Committees and Commissions revealed a gap between two types of development and probably two epochs. Hydro-Québec was not able to mould its studies within the sustainable development paradigm. However, we have to recognise that it was confronted to issues having a political dimension and consequently, the Québec government was also questioned. The Guideline raised questions which were related to the Québec energy policy and Aboriginal policy. It threw light on the deficiencies of the existing one. This can be noticed in reading the summary made by Jules Dufour of the main conclusions of the conformity report. He points out five main conclusions:

- "- il y a des imprécisions ou ambiguïtés concernant les limites de la zone d'étude et le calendrier de construction du complexe;
- l'étude n'est pas basée sur des critères d'évaluation valable et elle néglige notamment celui du développement durable;
- le contenu de l'étude indique qu'on n'a pas une connaissance suffisante des communautés humaines affectées par le projet ainsi que de leurs valeurs culturelles;
- on n'a pas procédé à une analyse intégrée des effets du projets sur l'environnement naturel et humain;
- le projet n'a pas fait l'objet d'une analyse permettant d'en justifier clairement le bien-fondé. On a sous-estimé le potentiel des filières alternatives (solaire, éolienne et biomasse) et le potentiel des programmes de gestion de la demande, et on n'a pas fait une évaluation satisfaisante de leurs effets sur l'environnement biophysique et social."

Cf. Jules DUFOUR, *op. cit.*, pp. 240-241.

¹³¹ . For a discussion of this hypothesis which was diffused by Hydro-Québec and the Québec Minister of Energy, see: Dietrich SOYEZ, *op. cit.*, pp. 67-71.

¹³² . These issues would be discussed more lengthily in the following chapter.

¹³³ . These two events had important mediatic repercussions in Québec. The Odeyak expedition consisted in the transportation of a canoe-kayak which went from Kuujuarapik to New York via Ottawa and Montreal. It put in at different cities in which press conferences were organised for publicising the negative impacts of the Great Whale project. It reached New York the April 30th 1990, the Earth Day, during which special activities had been organised. This expedition came to symbolise the resistance of Cree and Inuit peoples. It was the first wide-publicised event of the Cree struggles within USA. The

advertising in the New York Times (October 22nd 1991) constituted an other vent largely publicised which did not have however the same impact. This advertising was very hard against the Québec government and Hydro-Québec which were accused of threatening the survival of Aboriginal peoples and of damaging the environment without any rules. Its informations on the Great Whale project were more or less accurate. This created stir within Québec and contributed to increase suspicions against Cree people. For Hydro-Québec and the Québec government, this proved that the Cree diffused propaganda outside of Québec and therefore, their claims were untrue. Moreover, it created a gap with Québec environmentalist groups. The Cree admitted that they would have not signed if they would have been more informed about the content. Cf. Dietrich SOYEZ, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-75

¹³⁴ . Cf. Sean McCUTCHEON, *op. cit.*, pp. 160-165.

¹³⁵ . The signature of this contract had been previously reported in 1991. Political pressures had also had an influence at that time. Cf. Radha JHAPPAN, "Global Community?", *op. cit.*, p. 80

¹³⁶ . Cf. Sean McCUTCHEON, *op. cit.*, p. 162.

¹³⁷ . See on this point: *Ibid.*, pp. 162-163.

¹³⁸ . Cf. Matthew COON-COME, *op. cit.*, pp. 199-200.

¹³⁹ . The Québec government and Hydro-Québec did not hesitate to develop a large array of activities when they realised that the opponents to the project could make important gains.

"On décupla le travail de relations publiques au Québec même et dans les régions critiques, avec l'appui des professionnels internationaux en la matière (des brochures d'information en passant par les campagnes d'annonces, les conférences, le parrainage culturel et scientifique au niveau national et international, etc.), on rouvrit la représentation new-yorkaise d'Hydro-Québec, on créa une vice-présidence pour l'Europe avec siège à Bruxelles, on intensifia le lobbying d'hommes politiques, de parlementaires, de parlements locaux et régionaux, d'utilités et d'entreprises d'approvisionnement en électricité, en particulier aux États-Unis (surtout Albany, NY), et enfin on mit à contribution les canaux et les contacts des représentations diplomatiques du Québec à l'étranger (les ambassades du Canada sont souvent devenues elles aussi actives par l'information et le lobbying)."

Cf. Dietrich SOYEZ, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-72.

¹⁴⁰ . Hydro-Québec hired itself a firm of public relations, Burson-Marsteller. It asked them, among others things, to conduct a study about the groups and coalitions in Europe, particularly the ones linked to the protection of environment and human rights, which could be potential allies of the Cree. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 72

CHAPTER 7. THE STRUGGLES OF THE ECOLOGY GROUPS AGAINST THE GREAT WHALE

PROJECT: THE NORTHERN AMAZONIA?

The previous two chapters brought out some of the ways the Great Whale project marked a rescaling of politics. The constitution of different sites in which the implications of the project were debated revealed the decentring of the Québec national political scene. This involved a process of "jumping scales" in which the Great Whale project was simultaneously presented as a local, a national and a global project. This resulted from the inclusion of the debates in different political scenes, notably the international and the emerging global one. This chapter complete our story of the Great Whale project, outlining the participation of other political forces who became engaged alongside the Cree people, especially the ecology and environmentalist groups in this process of jumping scales.

The ecology and environmentalist groups helped to widen the debates raised by the Cree people. Their struggles revealed important political changes since the construction of the La Grande hydroelectric complex. Of course, some of their claims - such as a public debate on the Québec energy policy – also were raised in the La Grande debates. Yet, whereas the debates around the La Grande project were located within a local/national axis, the Great Whale debates centered on a local/global axis. In this chapter, this new spatio-temporal setting will be examined. We will examine how the Great Whale project became an issue within the networks structuring the world ecology movement and thus, a global issue. This will deepen the argument about the current transformations of state sovereignty and citizenship. The ecology and environmental groups called into question the state's national dimension, unbundling its territorial and popular components.

This chapter is divided in three main parts. The first part outlines certain major transformations of the Western environmental politics in the 1980s, with particular emphasis on the recognition of global environmental issues and the increasing number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) within world environmental politics. Both reflect the growing inadequacy of the state-centered framework for defining

the environmental issues. The second section focuses on the main changes in Canadian and Québec environmental politics between the two projects. We look at the new directions taken by both governmental policies and the trajectory followed by environmentalist/ecologist movement. Whereas the federal government started to assume a significant leadership role, the Québec government was much more ambivalent. The last section focuses on the mobilisation of the environmentalist and ecology groups against the Great Whale project. The main claims and strategies of mobilisation used by the ecology groups and ad hoc coalitions will be examined, asking why and how they succeeded in blocking its construction. While insisting on the movements' heterogeneity, we bring out their connections with other groups and the variability of their political horizons. This time, the involvement of groups outside of Québec proved as important as the Québec-based groups and coalitions.

7.1 The Redefinition of Western Environmental Politics: Between the National and the Global

As noted in the previous chapter, the controversies around the Great Whale project revealed major changes in aboriginal politics since the construction of the La Grande complex. The same can be said of environmental politics where the changes are even more marked. Indeed, between the two projects, the framework of environmental politics within Western societies was redrawn as new issues and new actors emerged. In the chapter four, it was noted that the launching of the James Bay hydro-electric development project occurred at a time when the protection of environment was becoming a political issue for Western states. It was in the early 1970s that they established regulatory agencies and environment departments, as result of two significant changes. First, new environmentalist organisations in the 1960s broke with the conservationist perspective in favour of an ecologist perspective. Second, environmental problems began to be raised at the international level. The 1972 Stockholm Conference and the creation of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) played a critical role in the emergence of an international environmental diplomacy and created a greater room for the NGOs. An increasing number of international accords and conventions consolidated the role of the international political scene in the regulation of environmental politics. Yet while the transboundary nature of certain environmental problems was slowly recognised by Western states, it was at the national level that these

concerns were institutionalised. In the 1970s, discussions of environmental problems were based on a national political framework for resolving them.

The emergence of the environment as a political issue marked a redefinition of Western citizenship and state territoriality. Protection of the environment became a mobilising issue involving a transformation of state accountability and representativity. The recognition of a new political agenda, the growing importance given to state international engagements, and the opening of new sites of political participation within and outside of the state institutions played a critical role. The greening of politics also meant the reappraisal of territory. Discussions of the bio-physical and social impacts of environmental problems revealed a conception of territory that appeared more complex than that underlying the regional development policies, for example. The notion of ecosystem broadened the significance of territory, challenging the hegemonic definition of state territory. Territory could no longer be seen as a physical landscape or a space traced out by geographical maps. The politicising of environmental issues also introduced significant breaches in the post-war configuration of citizenship insofar as it implied the recognition of environmentalist and ecology groups as legitimate actors and the emergence of green parties in many Western countries. These developments indicated that the 'ecology' identity has become an important political identity. It now constituted a locus for making claims and for participating in public debates. The ecology identity became one of the key figure of the citizenship configuration.

This broad picture of environmental politics was modified through the 1980s. The changes in this period constituted a new phase in the history in the ecology movement.¹ They were not as those of the previous two decades. Nonetheless, they suggested a significant reshaping of environmental politics in Western societies. This section outlines some of the changes that introduced a new political framework for the Great Whale project. Of particular importance is the globalisation of the political setting in which ecology issues came increasingly to be discussed. The globalisation of Western environmental struggles occurred in a relative short period, broadening the greening of Western politics and even of world politics. We focus on three changes which contributed to this spatial shift. The first is the emergence of a new political agenda revolving the recognition of global environmental problems, notably through the dissemination of the Brundtland Commission's report. The second issue is the rescaling of the ecology

movement which broadened its political horizon to the transnational and global political spaces. The emergence of ecology groups in the South and the important growth of environmental NGOs reflected the spatial widening of the bases of the ecology movement. Finally, the increasing importance of the "green diplomacy", revolving around states and the UN structure, helped to institutionalise the discussions of environmental issues outside of state borders. These developments help to explain why the global-local axis became increasingly significant for defining environmental issues.

The New Environmental Agenda

The term "global", as used in the literature on green politics, has two meanings which are not, however, contradictory.² On the one hand, the global is used to characterise the impact of environmental problems such as the greenhouse effect. This presupposes a representation of the planet or the earth as an ecosystem linking all regions of the world. This meaning has a scientific component insofar as it refers to the biophysical impact of environmental problems.³ The second meaning refers to the recent or new politics around environmental issues revolving around the recognition of a new political scale.⁴ It is linked to the emergence of a global sphere of activities dealing with environmental issues and the globalisation of environmentalism and ecologism. On the one hand, the notion of global is largely used to describe the recent shift in the activities of ecology and environmentalist non-governmental organisations or recent institutional developments of the UN on environmental matters. The latter open a new political space, the global, which reveals the inadequacy of the traditional state politics based on national sovereignty and appeals for its transcendence. On the other hand, the reference to the global in environmentalist and ecologist discourses has a prescriptive value. It constitutes a claim justifying a political shift from nation-state politics and legitimating this new political horizon. The famous slogan *think globally, act locally*, reflects this new representation of politics.⁵ The recognition of the interconnectedness between the different world regions would presupposes a reordering of political space revolving around the global space.

The new agenda rested on the recognition of a number of global environmental problems such as deforestation, the greenhouse effect, ozone depletion and the loss of biodiversity.⁶ Although these

problems particularly affect certain regions, they are generally seen to have a world-wide impact. The way these environmental problems were constructed also accentuated the urgent and serious character of the ecological crisis. It implied a new temporal conception insofar as these environmental problems require very immediate solutions.⁷ Global environmental agenda has been advanced by the increasing number of conventions and regimes.⁸ Notable in this regard are the 1985 Convention for the Protection of Ozone Layer (the Vienna Convention); the 1987 Montreal Protocol, the 1993 Convention on Biological Diversity and the 1994 Convention on Climate change. These conventions marked a significant step in the development of the international environmental law. They also came to represent key markers in the world environmental agenda used by ecology groups and NGOs. The debates and preparatory conferences that produced the conventions reveal the growing importance of environmental diplomacy. The participation of non-state actors in these conferences, or in parallel conferences, undermined the states' ability to claim to be the only valid actors.

The other emerging issue is the notion of sustainable development. This concept aims to reconcile the imperatives of economic development with the needs to protect the environment for the future generations.⁹ In political terms, it was also a response to the grievances of developing countries which saw environmental concerns as a Western countries' privilege and as an obstacle to their economic development. The road to sustainability remains until today the dominant horizon of the global environmental agenda. Sustainability represents the political objective to which all governments officially subscribe, even if few of them have implemented adequate policies. The idea of sustainable development was propelled by the report of the Brundtland Commission (World Commission on Environment and Development), *Our Common Future*, released in 1987. This Report constituted a turning point in environmental politics insofar as it proposed a complete appraisal of the world environment. Although it was rather conservative at the political level, it nonetheless rested on a reading of global environmental politics that took into account the role of grass-roots movements and non-governmental organisations.¹⁰ It thus created room for the recognition of other actors than states. In this respect, the Brundtland Commission's report reflected the emergence of a new political setting.

The Brundtland Report constituted a central element framing the world environmentalist discourse. It publicised the reference to the "global", instead of international, for the world environment. Moreover, it facilitated the involvement of the ecology movement in global politics. Two other changes have been important: the emergence of grass-roots movements within developing countries and the rise of transnational non-governmental organisations. Both developments contributed to the expansion of the ecology movement's spatial bases and the multiplication of the sites in which environmental concerns are debated. They not only participate in the politicising of a global political space but also create channels linking the different political scenes.

The New Horizon of the Ecology Movement: Between the National and the Global

The globalisation of ecology issues has been fuelled by the new spatiality of green politics, inaugurated by the ecology movement within Western countries. During the 1980s, they fashioned a new agenda, based on the identification of a new set of environmental problems, like acid rain, ozone depletion and global warming, and the expansion of environmental laws and regulations. This redefinition implied that the ecology movement shifted from the "new social movement model" defined in the literature¹¹ to a political actor dealing with - and, at times, confronting - states. The most important ecology groups have become bureaucratised and have to struggle to extend their membership or to gain media attention. The experience of many Green parties reflects the obstacles and the required compromises faced by the ecology movement.¹² The establishment of environmental impact assessment review processes also helped to reinforce the participation of ecology and citizen groups in the state structure. Although the institutionalisation of the review process represents a significant political change, it has also operated to mute the contradictions between economic imperatives and environmental requirements.

Among these changes, the most significant for our analysis is its spatial redefinition which occurred at two levels. The ecology movement became a world movement in that developing countries became involved in the debates. Although the Western countries continued to set the agenda, the environmental concerns were no longer seen as a privilege of rich countries. This did not, however, imply

homogenisation since the North/South divide has been reproduced.¹³ The mobilisation of NGOs creating interconnections between the different national political scenes also contributed to the integration of environmental issues into world politics. The spread of environmental concerns was also linked to the recognition of the certain global environmental problems as threats to the whole humankind. Unlike the transboundary problems discussed during the 1970s, like pollution, the political construction of these global environmental problems has called into question the national division of the world centred around the states. Their scope challenges geopolitics based on state borders. It was largely assumed that the states could not resolve these global problems without co-operating. Their inclusion in the ecology groups' discourses provided the opportunity for ecology groups to transform the global political space into a space of resistance.

The transformation of the spatial framework of the ecology movement opened the door to the remapping of its political and power relations. Its greater participation within the public debates politicised a spatio-temporal configuration defining specific interactions between space and place.¹⁴ During the 1970s, the struggles of the ecology movement occurred largely within the limits of the state territory. The national space was the main locus for getting recognition of their claims. National territory represented an abstract space in relation to different local places, like a river, a polluting industry, or development project. For many of the environmentalist/ecology groups, it constituted a space of dependence in which they were simply ignored or marginalised. Their struggles aimed to transform the latter into a space of engagement. Over the decade, some groups succeeded. The recent globalisation of environmental struggles and debates challenges this configuration, reconstructing their spatio-temporality. This raises two important challenges for the ecology movement. First, it imposes a redefinition of the dominant reading of political space as state territory.¹⁵ Secondly, it questions the centrality of the national space as the determining terrain of struggles and reorders political space by calling into question the role of state borders in the process of regulation and normalisation of politics.

The Greening of the South

The spatial redrawing of the ecology movement has been furthered by the strengthening of its links with other social movements. Three of them are particularly important in this regard: the women's movement, the Indigenous peoples movements' and the human rights movements.¹⁶ Through their new links, ecologist claims were be diffused throughout the South, gaining a new and broader significance. The connections have resulted from the convergence of their concerns and claims rather than deliberate strategy. Contrary to what occurred in Western countries, the discourse on the protection of environment is part of a broader political discourse articulated in terms of justice, democracy and human rights.¹⁷ Their struggles against the environmental destruction of their milieu are citizenship struggles and quite often, struggles for survival. In rejecting the model of development imposed on them, these groups make visible the gender- and ethnic-bias of the degradation of environment. This dimension represents one element of the strategies of resistance and empowerment of these marginalised and repressed voices.¹⁸

Grass-roots activism has thus constituted an important component of the Southern groups' struggles. There are numerous examples of women's organisations or Indigenous peoples mobilising to prevent the construction of development projects with major environmental repercussions. The Chipko Movement in Northern India, the Green Belt Movement in Kenya or the Kayapo people in Brazil drew world public attention to environmental struggles in developing countries. Although these women's and Indigenous groups have often arisen as local initiatives, transnational links have developed through the establishment of non-governmental organisations and international gatherings.¹⁹ Thus, women's and indigenous organisations became involved in global environmental politics such as the Women's Environment and Development Organisation (WEDO), the Women's Action Agenda 21, the Co-ordinating Body for the Indigenous Peoples of the Amazon Basin (COICA), and the World Council for Indigenous peoples. While developing large-scale strategies to modify the conditions underlying their members' local struggles, these organisations have sought to include their claims within the global agenda. The debates and conferences around the Brundtland Commission and the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio provided

important forums where they could challenge the predominant notion of sustainability and highlight the gender and indigenous implications.

The Reinforcement of the Transnational Political Scene

The emergence of these South-based environmental organisations contributed to a major expansion of the number of international organisations and transnational non-governmental organisations advocating environmental concerns.²⁰ The latter in a sense challenged the primacy of local and national organisations.²¹ In the previous chapter, we noted that similar developments occurred with the Indigenous people' movement during the same period. The rapid growth of the number of environmentalist organisations with international and/or transnational activities over the last decade contributed to broadening the role of NGOs in environmental politics. As Hurrell and Kingsbury²² argue, the NGOs came to play different roles: "issue identification, agenda setting, policy formation, normative development, institution building, monitoring, and implementation." These NGOs have been especially important in bridging the gap between the North and the South that formed an important obstacle to state environmental diplomacy and limited the work of international governmental organisations. It is in this sense that the environmental NGOs advocacy call into question the adequacy of national states for dealing with environmental problems. This extension of NGOs is also associated with the emergence of "purely" transnational non-governmental organisations and the development of transnational advocacy networks.²³

The development of transnational environmentalist organisations during the last decade represented an important step not only within the contemporary history of ecology movement, but also within the history of NGOs. Rather than national-based organisations with branches in different countries, these new NGOs have a central body for developing large-scale strategies and local organisations dealing with national or regional issues. Here again, the mapping of their activities no longer follows the territorial division of politics based on state borders. Although state territories remain points of anchorage, they no longer form the point of departure of their strategies. This is contributing thus contributes to the replacement of the hegemonic international-national-local division of politics by a

global-local division. Among the transnational environmental organisations are Greenpeace, Friends of Earth and the World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF). Another characteristic distinguishing these transnational organisations from the earlier environmentalist INGOs derives from their expertise and their financial resources. Whereas many NGOs faced a lack of money and staff, these problems have become less pressing for a small number of transnational NGOs that have a strong Northern membership.²⁴

The rise of international and transnational activities by environmentalist NGOs has still broader implications. It has brought about the development of transnational environmental networks. The latter have, in turn, reinforced the NGOs' realm of activities, notably in facilitating alliances with other social movements. These transnational environmental networks have become critical to the framing of widely discussed issues such as the deforestation in Amazon and Malaysia, seal hunting or the ivory trade ban. These developments cannot be explained primarily in terms of group pressures on governments. Although the NGOs have quite often played a central role within these networks, the latter also include international conferences and gatherings, local and other global social movements, and specific norms and discourses such as scientific studies and conventions. Thus, it is more useful to discuss the changes within global environmental politics in terms of transnational linkages and networks.²⁵

International conferences and gatherings have played a meaningful role in the formation of networks. While providing central forum for the different actors involved in networks, they are also important sources of norms and discursive frameworks. They constitute nodes structuring networks while at the same time relying networks. Moreover, it is through the process of networking that the ecology movement has extended its representativeness and globalised its discourses and spheres of activities. The cross-cutting of national borders has allowed environmentalist and ecology groups to deal with the global environmental problems and to bypass the state ignorance and/or opposition. This has been facilitated by their ability to create some form of global accountability and consequently, to exert pressure on states. As Paul Wapner argued, these transnational networks hold states responsible for global environmental well-being and have succeeded, to a albeit limited extent, in creating some accountability mechanisms.²⁶ Insofar as they are "sovereignty-free" actors not submitted to a territorial logic, they can play this role more easily.

The UN's Second Chance

In chapter four, it was noted that the UN has become a key actor in the internationalisation of environmental issues in the early 1970s. Although it extended its sphere of activities related to environmental issues, the process lost its momentum.²⁷ A number of substantial criticisms against the UN inefficiency were raised in the latter half of the 1980s.²⁸ The UN was increasingly presented as being largely unable to cope with global environmental problems and to respond to the urgency of the environmental crisis. Important shortcomings such as the predominance of the sovereignty and territorial logic and the lack of enforcement mechanisms were pointed out. It became obvious that it did not yet assume the leadership for the setting up a global governance which has been periodically reclaimed since the Stockholm Conference. It was in this context that the UN institutional structure relative to the protection of environment was redefined at the end of the 1980s. The strengthening of the interconnections between the NGOs and the UN system has been critical on this score.²⁹ They helped to its revitalisation.³⁰

The idea of organising the Earth Summit in Rio in 1992, 20 years after the Stockholm Conference, was launched. This second UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) occurred in the wake of the Brundtland Report and consequently, responded to many of its recommendations. The Earth Summit turned out to be as important as the earlier Stockholm Conference.³¹ Given its unprecedented size and its huge media coverage, it was itself an historical event. While constituting a global and comprehensive appraisal of the state of the environment, it established a new agenda and new institutional mechanisms that have helped to rejuvenate the UN system. The debates preceding and during the Rio Conference clearly revealed the growing heterogeneity and the multiple levels of environmental politics and at the same time, constituted an "official" recognition of these changes. Like the Brundtland Report, all discussions were framed by the "sustainable development" perspective, confirming the predominance of a globalising discourse for discussing environmental issues. Moreover, the Earth Summit recognised the increasing role of non-state actors within global environmental politics: the NGOs, the business and industrial groups, and the scientific community. This

was reflected by the participation of NGOs through the official discussions and through the parallel ones organised by the Global Forum, set up by the NGOs themselves.³²

The final declaration and the action programme adopted at the end of the conference seemed innovative. It was expected that the UN's lethargy and the reluctance of existing states would be overcome. The discussions and negotiations led to the adoption of three agreements (The Rio Declaration, Agenda 21, and the Statement of Forest Principles) and two conventions (the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Convention on Biological Diversity). The Commission on Sustainable Development was set up to monitor and examine the implementation of the Conference's agenda. Even if the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 were not binding on states, and even though they reaffirmed the principle of state sovereignty, they introduced new discursive frames and contributed to a decentred representation of global environmental politics. Moreover, in making an appeal to partnership with NGOs, the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 opened the door to the democratisation of world politics. The role of women, youth, and Indigenous peoples in the pursuit of sustainable development was explicitly recognised.³³

The renewal of the UN's environmental discourse and institutions has helped to broaden the margins of the existing international political scene. The remapping of green politics has contributed to the development of a transnational political scene revolving around environmental issues. Although the latter is not backed by coercive power, it has become more central in the construction of environmental problems. National borders are no longer the primary site framing the confrontation between the ecology movement and its opponents. The greening of national state politics should not of course, be exaggerated. Concern to protect the environment has not brought about a deep re-structuring of state policies, as the commitments made are dismissed when they are seen to run against national interests.³⁴ The predominant neo-liberal discourse of deregulation and international competitiveness also constitutes an important adversary of environmental regulations. The procrastination around the issue of acid rain provides a good illustration of this. Nevertheless, such procrastinations help to make it clear that the existing state environmental policies does not cope efficiently with the extent of environmental problems. They throw light on the opposition between the state economic policies, shaped by the so-called

constraints of the global market, and the need to protecting the population against global ecological threats.³⁵

The globalisation of environmental politics has contributed to a world-scale diffusion of environmental concerns. It resulted from various levels of change revealing, among other things, the unbundling of state territory. Even if the national state has remained an important site of struggles, its primacy is called into question with the emergence of other sites. The growing articulation of ecology movement claims around the global scale has redefined its structure of political opportunity. This by no means suggests that the ecology movement has been able to impose its own agenda to governments. As noted above, the predominance of neo-liberalism in Western politics constitutes a major challenge to ecology movement. The greening of politics coincided with the intensification of the liberalisation of world commerce which challenges the relevance of environmental regulations. Since the neo-liberalism remains hegemonic, the ecologist discourse remained at the best a counter-hegemonic discourse within the Western public spheres. In both cases, the global constitutes a new space of engagement shaping their discourses and their struggles but it represents a space of emancipation for neo-liberalism. The predominant representation of the global by many governments is of a global market, based on neo-liberal tenets (free-market, deregulation, no state interventions). Our discussion of Canadian and Québec politics in the fifth chapter revealed the growing importance which is given to the global market by both governments. The de-politicising effect of neo-liberalism has created a political terrain extremely favourable to its representatives. In contrast, the empowerment of the ecology movement rests on a political representation and understanding of the global space. It is linked to the transformation of the global space into a public sphere and implies the establishment of some forms of authority which would be able to impose some regulations. This is why for the ecology movement the global is not yet for the ecology movement a space of emancipation.

The process of globalisation clearly holds many implications for the ecology movement and state environmental policies. Two are of particular interest here. First, the redefinition of the spatio-temporal setting, framing the discussion of environmental issues and the mobilisation of actors, involves a time-space compression of green politics. It contributes to the politicisation of a global and interdependent

space as well as a time-scale defined by its immediacy. Yet the dominant time-space framework defining environmental issues continues to revolve around national state territory and a long-term perspective largely based on ecosystems and the life-span of human generations.³⁶ The mobilisation of ecology groups around environmental policies contributed to the primacy of the national space in the definition and institutionalisation of environmental issues. Moreover, public intervention was legitimised by reference to the harmful consequences for the future human generations of the destruction of ecosystems. This implied the recognition of a form of temporality which calls into question the hegemony of the industrial time. It was linked to the adoption of a long-term perspective for defining the environmental crisis and consequently, the required solutions. In contrast, current discussions of the global environmental crisis recognise different forms of temporality and spatiality. Its construction as a world-wide and urgent crisis requiring immediate and common solutions for the whole humankind, involves a single-point (the whole world) and short-term perspective. It requires a rapid and immediate response. This is why we refer to time-space compression for characterising this spatio-temporal framework underlying the construction of the global environmental crisis. Second, the territorial conception of politics based on state borders is called into question. The growing recognition of a global space involves a process of scaling up regarding the environmental issues and actors.³⁷ It can also be easily argued that a process of scaling down has also occurred with the "revitalisation" of local space.

7.2 The Pursuit of the Greening of Canadian and Québec Politics: a Fragile Road

A brief overview of Canadian and Québec environmental politics in the 1980s reveals the influence of the changes discussed above. In both cases, there was a redefinition of the spatial bases previously national issues. The globalisation of environmental issues meant that both levels of government faced an increasing complexity of environmental issues. The level of complexity was, however, greater for the federal government which has to deal with the international and transnational levels.³⁸ Indeed, the definition of environmental problems and, particularly global ones, turned out to be much more difficult in a context characterised by the recognition of the multidimensionality of environmental problems, the plurality of actors, and the overlapping of different political scenes. What distinguishes the Canadian political scene from Québec's was a question of delay in the implementation

of institutional reforms and policies. Whereas during the 1970s important debates and reforms regarding the protection of environment had occurred on the Québec political scene, this momentum had been lost by the last half of the 1980s. In contrast, the federal government became more involved in the 1980s, catching up the legislative progress earlier made by several provinces.

In the following pages, we sketch out the main changes on both political scenes during the 1980s³⁹, focusing particularly on the transformations of the ecology movement's and new directions taken by state environmental politics. This analysis of the globalising process of environmental issues will provide a brief picture of the on-going rearticulation between the global political space and the national. The trajectory followed by the Canadian and Québec ecology movement is in this respect particularly interesting. This section maps the new political and institutional landscape in Québec and Canada that would frame the debates around the Great Whale project.

The Catching Up of the Federal Government

At the end of the 1980s, the federal government introduced substantial environmental policy reforms.⁴⁰ As noted earlier, after a very successful takeoff, the development of this sector of activities has been rather chaotic. Expected federal leadership in environmental protection did not happen, revealing an important gap between the government's intentions and the outcomes. From the 1970s to the beginnings of the 1990s, the federal Department of Environment passed from a strategy centred on pollution controls through a strategy based on a society conservation to a strategy based on sustainable development. The new impetus came from the diffusion of discourses on the environment on the one hand and on the other, from political and institutional changes introduced by the Mulroney government. The resurgence of the environmental awareness followed important ecological catastrophes. The Chernobyl nuclear accident, the Exxon Valdez oil spill, and the tire fire in Hagersville, Ontario highlighted the fragility of environment and the need for more efficient and comprehensive solutions. This awareness was reinforced by recent scientific findings pertaining to the global warming and, the destruction of the ozone layer. The publication of the Brundtland Commission report provided additional credibility to these scientific findings while urging the modification of policies and models of development. The notion of

sustainable development became part of the Canadian governmental discourse on environmental problems. The Rio Earth Summit confirmed the new environmental agenda.

These different events created momentum,⁴¹ introducing a new perspective on environmental issues and implicitly, a new political agenda. The growing consensus about the existence of global environmental issues confronted the federal government, and the provincial governments, with the need to revise their standards. The new political setting for environmental issues suggested the increasing artificiality of the distinction between national versus global issues. The emphasis on the global character of certain environmental issues implied a considerable challenging shift insofar it confronted the federal government with the limits of its sovereignty. In this context, the signature of multilateral and bilateral treaties has become the only federal government's alternative. The difficulties faced by the Canadian government in the negotiations with the US government on acid rain clearly exposed its limited room of manoeuvre.

Following the release of the Brundtland Commission's Report, the federal government assumed more effective leadership at the Canadian level. At the end of the 1980s, it began to introduce reforms to its legal and institutional framework. Sustainable development became the new environmental paradigm in Canada too. The federal government initiated two main changes in this regard: the 1990 adoption of the Green Plan (a policy of sustainable development) and the 1995 adoption of the Bill C-13, *the Canadian Environment Assessment Act*, a major revision of the Canadian environmental assessment process. These reforms would prove to be critical to federal government involvement in the debates around the Great Whale project.

The Green Plan was a package deal, identifying specific targets and schedules of action and improving the efficiency of the environment decision-making process to achieve sustainable growth.⁴² It was an ambitious program proposing the integration of environmental concerns into the entire federal state institutions as well as a radical shift in the DOE's interventions. Yet, Green Plan constituted a such radical departure that it encountered numerous barriers. Nevertheless, the Green Plan clearly established a new political and environmental setting for the 1990s, which revealed the growing

overlapping between the Canadian environmental politics and the global one. It confirmed the entrance into Canadian environmental discourse, of the notion of sustainable development and a global perspective on environmental issues.

The other important piece of the federal reform was the changes to environmental assessment process announced by the Minister of Environment in 1990.⁴³ This followed the adoption of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA) of 1988.⁴⁴ While reasserting the federal presence in environmental regulation, the new bill brought together and updated the various laws related to the protection of environment. This new legislation provided a new momentum to the discussions around the necessity of reforming the Environment Assessment and Review Process (EARP). The results of the 1990 reforms aimed to increase the efficiency of the federal process and to harmonise it with the provincial processes. Among the various changes proposed, the most important was the clear statement of responsibilities and procedures for the environmental assessments of the projects involving the federal government. This replaced the existing Environment Assessment and Review Process (EARP) guidelines which was not entrenched in a bill. The new legislation was also more open to public participation, including ecology groups. The implementation of the Bill C-13 in 1995 led to the replacement of the Federal Environmental Review Office (FEARO) with the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency (CEAA). These changes would prove particularly important for the Great Whale project.

The federal government's increased involvement was also visible at the international level, through this marked less of a shift.⁴⁵ Indeed, as noted earlier, since the Stockholm Conference, the Canadian government had affirmed its intention to be recognised as an international leader in environmental protection. This was reaffirmed during the main landmarks of international environmental politics (the World Conservation Strategy, the Brundtland Commission, the Earth Summit). There is, however, a gap between the Canadian government's national and international engagements and the environmental norms and regulations applied by its departments and agencies. This become particularly obvious in the aftermath of the Rio Conference during where the Canadian government was criticised for not respecting its commitments.

The 1980s nonetheless marked some important changes in Canadian international environmental politics. While bilateral relations with the US government have continued to occupy an importance place on the federal government's environmental agenda, multilateral relations have gained increased prominence. The latter became much complex, enmeshed as they were, within a web of social and political relations. The development of its multilateral environmental relations has confronted the Canadian government with an increasing number of challenges from other states and non-state actors on issues such as reducing ozone depletion (the 30% Per Cent Club and the Montreal Protocol), or the negotiations on the inclusion of environmental concerns within the formerly GATT round and NAFTA.⁴⁶ These negotiations and debates highlighted two important changes having emerged in the early 1990s. One is the increasing linkage between environmental concerns and trade issues. The commercial policies adopted by the federal government and by the US government have rather tended to oppose them and consequently, to relegate the sustainability policy to the backyard.⁴⁷ The second change is the passage from an international to a global framework for defining Canadian environmental issues. The recognition of global environmental threats became part of the debates and at the same time, an issue for evaluating the adequacy of governmental interventions.

The New Spaces of the Ecology Movement in Canada

Changes in the Québec and Canadian ecology movement have contributed to the globalisation of Canadian environmental issues. In fact, both movements have largely followed the same trajectory during the 1980s. They share the same public sphere although the access to Québec public sphere is more restricted for English-speaking ecology groups and vice versa. Although they are not marginal as they were in the 1970s, the ecology and environmentalist groups have not become a powerful actor. The process of jumping scales launched at the end of the 1960s meant that the Canadian political space has been redefined in a space of resistance, giving them a greater visibility and legitimacy. The ecology movement appears to be as diversified and heterogeneous as it was earlier,⁴⁸ based mostly on a myriad of small-scale and local organisations, even if national-wide organisations such as Friends-of-the-Earth, the Sierra Club, Greenpeace, Pollution Probe, are the ones who get the most media attention. The coalition-

building and networking processes still constitute a privileged strategy for contesting policies and development projects or to draw public attention to environmental problems.⁴⁹

Nonetheless, some significant changes occurred during the 1980s, redefining some of their characteristics and marking the emergence of a new political setting. These changes were similar to the broader changes that we discussed in the previous section. Thus, greater emphasis was put on the existence of global environmental problems in their discourses. This was particularly noticeable among nation-wide groups. This rescaling of their political horizon included a remapping of the agenda of the groups that had previously focussed on the North-South gap and to the international division of labour. This global perspective was not new insofar as the ecologist political discourse has always privileged an holistic perspective on environmental crisis. Yet, it implied a re-naming process by which the ecology movement redefined its claims in order to gain a legitimacy within the public sphere. In other words, the adoption of a globalising discourse became an issue providing them new opportunities and constraints. The same thing occurred when sustainable development which became part of the dominant political discourse on environment. The various environmentalist and ecology groups were confronted with other actors' definitions of the global and sustainable development to which were linked their possibility of empowerment. The debates around the signatures of FTA and NAFTA nicely illustrated this opposition between contradictory conceptions of the global (global market vs. global problems and justice) and development (sustainability vs. profitability and competitiveness).⁵⁰

Another meaningful change in the 1980s was the transnationalisation of the Canadian and Québec ecology movement. First, certain international ecology organisations were restructured along transnational lines. The most current example was Greenpeace which became Greenpeace Canada with different branches. These organisations often have more resources and staff which, in return, allow them to be more visible and effective on the political scene. Nevertheless, these transnational organisations still represent a minority of ecology groups. Second, the ecology movement became rooted within a transnational political space through their participation in transnational networks and coalitions. The formation of the Pro-Canada network during the debates preceding the signature the FTA in 1987, and its the successor Action Canada Network, are very good examples of this. This broad coalition gathering

ecology groups, citizen groups, labour unions, and women's organisations pressed the Canadian governments to include social and environmental measures within the agreements.⁵¹ They feared that the participation of Mexico entailed the downsizing of Canadian welfare and social provisions. Contacts were also been established with other groups and coalitions from USA and Mexico.

The Québec ecology movement followed a very similar trajectory to the Canadian ecology movement.⁵² During the 1980s, it remained largely fragmented and decentralised, resting on a myriad of local and regional organisations. The mobilisation of groups generally alternated between periods of visibility and periods of latency, and grass-roots activism remained a predominant characteristic. This was reflected in the strong links between local groups and citizen committees. This did not mean that the national organisations were not important, but while they are more visible, they are not the most numerous. Moreover, heterogeneity has been furthered by the lack of a national platform,⁵³ as discussions aimed at the setting up a kind of umbrella organisation were abandoned. Such this fragmentation was not only noticeable at the organisational level, but also at the discursive level. The ideological diversity was still as predominant as ever. What became clearly visible during this period is what we may call a division of labor among the diverse groups and organisations. The heterogeneity of the Québec ecology movement was reinforced by the "specialisation" of the diverse groups. Instead of being mobilised around different issues, the groups have restricted their action to one or two specific targets.⁵⁴ Whereas some groups focussed on acid rain and greenhouse effects, others have been mobilised around the protection of lakes and rivers or waste disposal and recycling. This constituted a solution to the institutional weaknesses characterising the Québec ecology movement. Heterogeneity and specialisation in turn led to an emphasis on strategies based on networking and coalition-building.⁵⁵ Mobilisation around specific issues consisted in the gathering of diverse groups, with different political horizons (labour unions, popular sectors, citizens committees). This strategy proved particularly useful for overcoming the limited member staff and insufficient financial resources. Moreover, it made easier the publicising of their concerns and their access to the public sphere. Such coalitions, however, do not have a strong institutional basis, nor a long life-span.

One significant transformation of the Québec ecology movement was the extension of the political horizon of national organisations. Despite the predominance of local and regional organisations, national organisations played an important role in the empowerment of the ecology movement.⁵⁶ Indeed, it was during the 1980s that many of them managed to reinforce their institutional basis (increase of their membership and budgets, publication of bulletins or periodicals, extension of their local branches). Moreover, the global was increasingly recognised by groups (Environnement-Jeunesse, the Réseau des groupes écologistes du Québec, Greenpeace, l'Union québécoise de la conservation de la nature, the Regroupement national des Conseils régionaux de l'environnement du Québec). This was not, in itself, new since the international environmental problems and the north-south gap have long been part of their concerns. Yet, the global did become a new space of reference for evaluating the situation of environment in Québec. As attention was paid to the global environmental problems discussed elsewhere, their agendas also changed to reflect this. This increasing relativity of the national space also involved through the participation of Québec groups in transnational coalitions and networks. This strategy of mobilisation did not become, however, predominant.

Thus, the trajectory followed by the Québec ecology movement was very similar to that of other provinces. What did remain distinctive was the importance of the national question. Even if the national became less important in their mobilisation, the Québec ecology movement faced the predominance of the Québec nationalist movement in the Québec public sphere and this remained an important obstacle to its empowerment. Projects supported by the nationalist movement were still presented as untouchable. Consequently, the ecology groups' criticisms were rejected and their legitimacy was questioned. Thus, Québec environmentalist and ecology groups have to deal with competing definitions of national (Québec vs. Canada) for defining the issues and for addressing their claims. Moreover, linguistic and nationalist questions have inhibited opportunities to make alliances with Canadian groups. For the Canadian-based or transnational organisations, the establishment of a Québec branch or the development of alliances with Québec groups have required fluency in French.

The remapping of the ecology movement overlapped with the transformation of the Canadian and Québec political context which provided more space to ecologist claims. Environmental issues were no

longer limited to ecology and environmentalist groups and government representatives. This had two contradictory implications for the Canadian and Québec ecology movement. On the one hand, it contributed to broaden public discussions about environmental issues and consequently, strengthened the development of a public support for environmental protection. The development of recycling programs and facilities in municipalities, public spaces or in workplace illustrated the greater popular attention given to environmental issues. Environmental protection was becoming part of the everyday life. In this regard, the media played an important role. Media coverage of the environmental catastrophes such as Bhopal, the Exxon Valdez and Chernobyl or the "glorious" feats of Greenpeace helped to fuel public debates. Consequently, the ecology movement's claims reached a growing number of people. The emergence of Green Parties on the federal and provincial political scenes also played an important role. While transforming green issues into electoral stakes, they called into question the relevance of environmental measures as defined by the traditional political parties. The predominance of brokerage politics, however, prevented their rise, confining them to the margins of the electoral scene.

On the other hand, the ecology movement was confronted with other actors who had their own discourses on the environment and implicitly, their own agendas. This appeared with the intensification of the restructuring of the world economy legitimated by the discourse on global competitiveness which opposed jobs to environment.⁵⁷ Entrepreneurs, now important figures in the Québec, are critical of environmental norms, presenting them as limits to the competitiveness of enterprises. The redundancies or the factory closure and its relocation in a more economic-friendly context were often evoked to prevent the implementation of environmental regulations. This revealed that the discourse on sustainable development which seemed widely accepted and legitimate by all actors was far to be implemented. It showed that it is linked to various political agendas.

The Québec Environmental Policy: At the Crossroads

Contrary to what occurred at the federal level, there was no major institutional change in Québec's environmental policy in the 1980s. The existing Québec state structure relative to the protection of environment - Environment Quality Act, the Québec Environment Assessment Process (Bureau

d'audiences publiques) and the James Bay Agreement provisions - remained largely unchanged. Moreover, the weak leadership of the Québec Department of Environment (MENVIQ) was also confirmed insofar as the different plans (green papers), reports, roundtables, and projects raised throughout this period were not followed up.⁵⁸ The government did adopt the Brundtland Commission's discourse and consequently, the sustainable development became the new horizon of the Québec environmental policy. In addition, diverse piecemeal measures were adopted such as: the cleaning of St-Lawrence river banks, the programs for water sanitation within municipalities, and the decentralisation of environmental programs. Although there represented innovative measures, their implementation was often restricted by economic priorities.

Québec environmental policy faced important contradictions during the 1980s. The direction followed by the government could not be clearly delimited. Although on different occasions, it reiterated its intention to pay a greater attention to the environment, insufficient administrative and financial resources prevented the Department of Environment from playing an effective role. The account of the global in environmental discussions nicely illustrates the government ambiguity. On the one hand, the global came to constitute a new political level for defining state accountability on environmental matters. The adoption of the Brundtland Report's discourse on sustainable development was a turning point in this regard, providing an incentive to increase protection of environment. On the other hand, the discussions of environmental regulations during the debates on free-trade revealed a different meaning to global, one which was strongly endorsed by the Québec government. This reading furthered the dismissal of environmental regulations under the pretext of the need of a greater flexibility. At the beginning of the 1990s, the Québec state's began to disengage from environmental protection. The institutional weaknesses of the Québec Department of Environment within the state structure became increasingly apparent. This trend was subsequently confirmed with the re-election of the Parti Québécois under the leadership of Lucien Bouchard. The Department's budget and staff were downsized and public criticisms of BAPE decisions by other Ministers were tolerated. The funding programs for national environmental groups was eliminated.⁵⁹ More broadly, a discourse of deregulation and global competitiveness increasingly took precedence over environmental protection.

The energy issue nicely revealed the contradictions in Québec's environmental policies. After the failure of the first attempt in 1981 to setting up a democratic debate on energy policy,⁶⁰ the Québec government established a roundtable with public hearings to be held in different Québec regions. In the meantime, energy conservation measures were publicised and implemented by Hydro-Québec. yet this never became a priority. As noted in the fifth chapter, at the beginning of the 1990s, the Québec government adopted a strategy of sustainable development in which the production of hydroelectricity was presented as a key element.⁶¹ The Great Whale project was justified in these terms, as compatible with sustainable development. The economic and environmental advantages of hydro-electricity were emphasised relatively to the other sources of energy used in Québec, Canada and New England states such as coal, nuclear. Hydro-Québec also insisted that it was aware of the need to protect the environment and open to democratic impact assessment review. This revealed the Hydro-Québec's desire represent itself as responsive to the recent changes in world environmental politics and thus, as a "progressive" utility.

Following the report of the roundtable on energy in 1996, the Québec government adopted a new energy policy and established an administrative body, the Régie de l'énergie, which is to implement the new Québec energy policy. Its mandate includes the regulation of Hydro-Québec policy. Thusfar, it is not yet fully effective and the extent of its powers regarding the Hydro-Québec energy development (investment, exportation contracts, rates) remains blurred. It is quite uncertain whether it will succeed in imposing its authority over Hydro-Québec and its board of directors. The Québec government's strong commitment to the deregulation of its electricity market casts further doubts on the scope of its mandate.⁶²

7.3 The Involvement of the Ecology Movement in the Debates around the Great Whale Project

Our discussion of the Canadian and Québec environmental politics during the period between the two James Bay projects revealed a major redefinition of its spatial parameters. Growing recognition of global environmental problems opened the door to the politicisation of a global space. Although the national remains an important locus in environmental politics, its primacy came to be questioned by the

recent developments in world environmental politics. The latter has become one element of the political framework for defining Canadian and Québec environmental policies. The possibility of imposing its representation of the global constitutes an important stake in the relations between the ecology groups and both governments. The increasing importance of the global also appeared in the claims and strategies used by the Québec and Canadian ecology groups. Although their struggles still largely revolve around local and national issues, they also came to be shaped by global environmental politics. In this context, the global space represents a new space of engagement for the ecology movement. The emerging process of networking and coalition-building around the global/local axis indicates the development of political and power relations cross-cutting state borders.

The scales of Canadian and Québec environmental politics are thus being redrawn. This not only involves the addition of the global scale to the existing scales, but also calls into question the significance and territorial delimitation of each political scale structuring environmental politics. The definition of the global scale constitutes an important political stake for the government as well as the ecology movement. Contradictory representations of the global space (global market vs. global governance) are part of Canadian environmental politics. In this way, Canadian environmental politics are increasingly shaped by a variable power-geometry.⁶³ It does not appear very different from developments in the other Western societies.

In this section, we discuss the way these broader changes were reflected in the mobilisation of ecology groups against the Great Whale project. Their involvement here played a critical role in the scaling up of the struggles. They helped the Cree to broaden the impact of their claims, while giving them access to additional political scenes. By discussing the mobilisation of the ecology movement, some links will be drawn with the new political context at the global and Canadian levels. In contrast to the struggles of the ecology movement against the La Grande project, there was not one predominant actor who assumed a co-ordinating role similarly to the James Bay Committee. We focus on two main dimensions: the ecology groups' claims and the strategies of mobilisation used by them. Attention will be paid to the scale politics linked to their mobilisation. Our discussion will examine how the access to citizenship rights and the definition of state sovereignty became important issues in the debates.

The Involvement of Ecology Groups: Between the Grassroots and the Network

The involvement of ecology movement in the debates around the Great Whale project indicated important differences turned out to quite heterogeneous, decentralised and at times contradictory. Although some groups became more visible during some periods, this did not necessarily mean that they gained a greater representativity. Moreover, many of the groups involved were already engaged in struggles against other Hydro-Québec projects, especially the construction of power transmission lines, or the Québec energy policy. Consequently, the Great Whale project constituted a new issue on their agendas, not the trigger explaining their emergence. Thus, whereas the *Coalition pour un débat public sur l'énergie* emerged on the Québec political scene at the turning of the 1970s, the *Aboriginal Rights Coalition*, formerly known as the Project North, which brought several Canada's churches together, had already been engaged in the struggles against the La Grande project.

Despite their diversity, it nonetheless possible to identify two kinds of actors which took part into the debates.⁶⁴ The first type of actors were ecology and environmentalist groups with different geographical bases: Québec, Canadian, USA, and international or transnational organisations.⁶⁵ The debates showed that local and grassroots groups were mixed with national and transnational organisations. There was often a gap between their geographical bases and the political spaces in which they mobilised. To some extent, these groups constituted the "infrastructure" of the mobilisation insofar as they were often in charge of the material organisation of events at the local level and research activities. Each of these groups had their own membership and an agenda which included, but was not reducible to, the Great Whale project.

The label "ecology groups" should be read as a very broad and non-exclusive label. It embraced many different groups among we find out: citizen committees, consumer groups, labour unions, churches and popular groups. Even if the ecology groups often predominated, they were not the only ones to play a significant role. Moreover, important differences were noticeable between the ecology and environmentalist groups which were involved in regard to their political orientations. Whereas some groups were ecologists such as *Greenpeace International* and *Sierra Club*, others were more linked to

the environmentalist perspective reclaiming a sustainable management of natural resources and fauna such as the *Natural Resources Defence Council* or the *Union québécoise pour la conservation de la nature*. Contrary to the first which discussed the Great Whale project in terms of an energy development model, the second focussed on its negative impacts on the bio-physical environment and had a more piecemeal approach.

The second kind of actor was in the debates resulted from the formation of ad hoc coalitions and networks linking the ecology and environmentalist groups to other grassroots groups and organisations, often related to other social movements, especially the human rights movement and the Aboriginal peoples movement. Different coalitions have formed over the years that focused on media and political activities such as press conferences, the presentation of briefs to public hearings and parliamentary commissions, participation in public conferences, and public demonstrations such as the Hydro-Glasnost Campaign and the concerts "Ban the Dam Jam" held in New York City in October 1991.⁶⁶ While these activities allowed the smaller groups to share resources and information, they also aimed to gain a greater visibility vis-à-vis the governments and public opinion. In other words, the formation of these coalitions represented the avenue for overcoming the limited resources of many groups and to reach a wide audience. In addition to these strategic advantages, the coalition and networks contributed to the democratisation of the debates or rather to its recasting so that the issues of public accountability and sovereignty of government became central. While increasing the number of voices against the project, they widened the scope of the debates through the multiplication of different sites. In this way, it helped to emphasise other aspects and notably, the protection of Aboriginal rights and citizens' right to participate in the debates. Among the coalitions formed against the Great Whale project and/or supporting the Cree people struggles, were: the *Coalition pour un débat public sur l'énergie*, the *Forum Québécois pour l'examen public du Complexe Grande-Baleine* or *Forum Grande-Baleine*, the *Save the James Bay Coalition*. Other coalitions were also formed in USA such as the *James Bay Defence Coalition* (New York-based), the *New England Energy Efficiency Coalition*, the *Vermont Coalition to Save the James Bay*, to carry the debate there.

The formation of coalitions and networks remained in overall very loose and flexible. What tended to predominate in the debates is more the fluidity and openness of agency rather than the closure and permanency. Indeed, the contours of coalitions were rather fuzzy and blurred. They relied more on flows of information, circulating between the groups and in the media and the participation to various events, rather than on a fixed agenda and planned strategies. It suggested that their participation cannot be simply read as resulting from the mobilisation of an interest group with a precise agenda. In other words, the manipulation thesis (by American groups or by the Cree) raised by the project's proponents is clearly unfounded.

The use of new technologies of communication and media played an important role on this score. The participation of other social movements in these coalitions contributed to increase their porosity and flexibility. Moreover, the involvement of coalitions in the debates alternated between periods of latency and periods of visibility.⁶⁷ This followed from the variability of their membership as some groups disappeared whereas others joined. Some groups participated throughout the period of debates and were at the same time part of larger coalitions by which they publicly expressed their opposition to the project and presented some common claims. The best examples are Greenpeace and the Sierra Club which participated on their own and were at the same time part of Canadian-based (*Save the James Bay Coalition*) and US-based coalitions (*the James Bay Defence Coalition*).

The Ecology Groups' Claims

The claims raised by the ecology movement largely overlapped with the Cree people's claims that we discussed in the chapter 6. This helped to broaden the democratic and scientific bases of the Crees' claims while attenuating the ethnic dimension.⁶⁸ In other words, the debates could not be simply reduced to a conflict between Cree and Québécois. Broadly speaking, the Great Whale project was perceived as a serious threat to the Crees' rights while representing an heavy burden on Québec economy. It would have perpetuated an outdated model of development which contradicted the principles of sustainable development which has been world-wide acknowledged. They thus rejected Hydro-Québec's attempt to limit the discussions to its biophysical impacts and the energy dimensions of the project (Québec energy

needs and sustainable energy resource). Although energy issues were central in the debates, the social and political impacts turned out to be crucial stakes. In contrast to the regional dimension of the project presented by Hydro-Québec, the ecology groups and coalitions highlighted its national and global implications.

The opposition of ecology and environmentalist groups to the Great Whale project was articulated around three main claims.⁶⁹ First, the expected environmental impacts mobilised many groups who criticised existing impact studies conducted by Hydro-Québec as biased, insufficient and inaccurate. The complexity and vastness of the expected impacts represented a critical argument requiring that the relevance of the project has to be definitively established. Various biophysical impacts were raised: the disruption of marine ecosystems, notably by the methyl mercury contamination; the disappearance of some vegetable and animal species and in particular, migratory birds, and thus, loss of biodiversity; deforestation; the flooding of large areas furthering the release of greenhouse gases. Another issue, stressed by American groups, was the environmental and health impacts of power lines, notably the electromagnetic hazards. They argued that the project would have regional and even global environmental impacts and not only local impacts. Many of the groups insisted on the eventual disruption of the bio-region of the James Bay and Hudson's Bay, referring to the proposed construction projects of new dams in Ontario and Manitoba whose combined impacts would definitively have a major disruptive impact over the regional ecosystem.⁷⁰ For many groups, this appeared unacceptable since it would destroy one of the last wild regions of the globe.

They also referred to environmental impacts of the La Grande complex. The impact of Great Whale could not be separated from that of the La Grande complex impacts, but rather represented a cumulative threat. The huge impact of the first phase had already deeply disrupted the region's environment. Mercury pollution and the drowning of caribous had political and symbolic importance, drawing attention to the threatening impacts of the project. Moreover, there was too little time between the two projects to allow for a adequate assessment of the various impact. Given the fragility of the still largely unknown ecosystem, the disruptive potential of the Great Whale project was significant. The region's wilderness could be destroyed. The delimitation of its biophysical scales became in this context

a central issue. Contrarily to Hydro-Québec, which sought to minimise the issue of cumulative and long-term impacts with the La Grande complex, the ecology groups emphasised them.

The second major claim around which many groups were mobilised was the defence of the Cree people's rights. For many groups, the realisation of the second phase of the James Bay development threatened the traditional subsistence living of Native peoples of the area. It was argued that the disruption of ecosystems by the flooding and the diversion of rivers would deeply affect hunting, trapping and fishing activities that had already been disrupted by the construction of the La Grande project. In this context, the Cree's survival appeared seriously threatened. Moreover, the construction of this second phase would increase the acculturation of Cree people and consequently, would deepen social and economic problems introduced by the first phase. Some links were made between the Great Whale project and other mega-projects threatening Indigenous peoples in the world.⁷¹ The notion of ecological genocide forwarded by the former Cree chief, Matthew Coon-Come, proved particularly very powerful. The discourses of many ecology groups were based on the representation of Indigenous peoples as "stewards of nature". Their traditional way of life was presented as ecological and sustainable offering lessons for coming out of the existing ecological crisis. The Cree way of life was seemed as a model for preventing the on-going destruction of natural resources. Many groups thus argued that the assessment impact review should include environmental and social dimensions of the project.⁷²

In addition to the defence of Crees rights, the claims of many groups also referred to the recognition of their citizen rights (Québec, Canada and USA) and new rights linked to the protection of environment. The government's haste to launch the project without prior discussions was seen as a denial of their rights. They argued that they have been faced various obstacles preventing them from participating in the debates. In this regard, Hydro-Québec and Québec government were criticised for refusing access to all information relative to the project or to discuss the project's rationale. The Québec and federal governments were thus press to increase the transparency of the decisional process and establish some democratic mechanisms for public consultations. This was particularly emphasised by the groups and citizen committees who had previously mobilised against the construction of power lines and

whose opposition has been rebuffed.⁷³ The democratisation of the impact assessment review, launched in 1992, represented an answer to these claims.

The ecology groups, through this process of democratisation, claimed a different kind of citizenship of than what was claimed by the Cree people. Even if both actors sought the recognition of a differential and plural citizenship, their claims do not have the same political and cultural implications. Whereas the right to self-determination and the recognition of nationhood are central issues to Cree claims, these are less important for the ecology groups, whose members already possess a nationality. The mobilisation of ecology groups was linked, rather, to the survival of humanity which transcends national boundaries. They attempted to redefine the existing citizenship rights in relation to concerns about environment.

The last major claim raised by many ecology groups and coalitions concerned the energy predictions made by Hydro-Québec used to justifying the construction of the Québec and the economic spin-offs of the project anticipated by the developers. They questioned the presupposed imperative of the energy demand. Although they did not deny that the latter would grow in the following years, they did not believe that it would be as important as Hydro-Québec pretended. To respond to energy demand, the ecology groups and coalitions proposed energy efficiency programs and alternative sources of energy which would be less damaging to the environment, such as the solar energy and biomasse. These "soft" renewable sources of energy were being ignored by Hydro-Québec. Its studies focussed on fossil fuel and nuclear energy. For the groups, the development of energy conservation measures would decrease the energy demand while creating more and better jobs than the construction of dams. Thus, Hydro-Québec should could use other energy development which would engender less demand. This issue was particularly important in Québec. It had a strong emotional and political appeal since it directly called into question the monopoly of hydro-electricity over the other energy sources and at the same time, the Hydro-Québec's expertise.

In addition, the ecology groups questioned the economic benefits of the project. They had serious doubts about the number and the quality of jobs to be created by the project. Here they could point to the

La Grande project temporary, high costs, jobs predominated. The studies released by Hydro-Québec were seen as too partial and incomplete to base an enlightened decision on. The ecology groups demanded that Hydro-Québec examine the employment implications of all energy development options, and not only the hydro-electricity option. They also questioned the economic benefits of the export contracts and the risk-sharing contracts with large energy-consuming industries, as the incentives they offered did not represent a viable strategy of economic development. The economic (profitability and long-term obligation) and technological (power failure and breakdown of transmission lines) risks associated to these contracts were highlighted. The groups also questioned the financial implications of the project which were estimated around \$12 milliard. Serious concerns were expressed about the consequences for Québécois which would result from the substantial increase of Hydro-Québec's debt and the subsequent rise of annual payments for the interests. It was expected that it would impose an heavy financial burden to Québec, comparable to that of Third World countries. For the Québec groups, these economic concerns justified the organisation a democratic debate on Québec energy policy during which all development options would be discussed and evaluated.

In the American context, some additional arguments were also raised to convince American utilities and state governors that the burden of these export contracts could threaten US national interests.⁷⁴ Indeed, American groups insisted on the rise of the dependence of American states on Hydro-Québec for their energy provisions. The signature of these contracts would increase its share of the North-eastern energy market and Hydro-Québec would become an important energy supplier. They also mentioned the possible power failure which could result from some technological breakdown, or sabotage of transmission lines. The latter threat became more credible after the Oka Crisis. Some Cree might follow the Mohawk example and destroy the transmission lines to bear pressures on the government.

The Variable Geography of Ecology Struggles

It thus appears that many of the Cree claims overlapped with the claims and concerns raised by ecology groups and ad hoc coalitions. Indeed, the protection of the environment and the defence of human rights were critical issues on both agendas. They demanded the establishment of a democratic

impact assessment review which would take into account social and environmental dimensions. Both actors also argued for the recognition of Aboriginal peoples' rights, and Québec and American citizen rights which were threatened by the refusal of the Québec government to initiate prior discussions as well as by the project's implications. The link established between the traditional livelihood of Cree people and sustainable development contributed to strengthen the relations between them and at the same facilitated the diffusion of Cree concerns beyond the ecology and environmentalist circles.

The link between these two forces resulted from the overlapping of their claims, and of the political sites in which they presented their claims. The participation of the Cree in the coalition-building process launched by the ecology groups played a key role in this regard. The involvement of representatives from the Grand Council of the Crees in the various activities raised by the ecology groups or the coalitions largely helped to develop these links over the years. This allowed the Cree to publicise their claims and to reach a wider audience, especially in New England states.⁷⁵ They participated for example, in the different conferences and manifestations which organised on various campus in Canada and USA. And the Cree invited representatives from US organisations to visit their homeland, notably the area near the Great Whale river. These links also grew out of the involvement of the Grand Council of the Crees in the various ad hoc coalitions formed in Québec, the other provinces and the USA. The participation of Cree and transnational environmental organisations in these ad hoc coalitions opened the door to the development of networks by which the various sites came to be loosely related linked. They constituted networks of information about data and events rather than organisational networks.

Similarities can be drawn between the mobilisation of the ecology movement and that of the Crees depicted in the preceding chapter. Its participation in the debates was shaped by the multiplicity and simultaneity of the sites. The involvement of transnational organisations played an important role in this regard. They helped to publicise concerns about the Great Whale project in various locals and to expand its significance by adapting it to the "local" context. There was not, however, a clear geographical division nor a "division of labour" between the groups and coalitions. The mobilisation of ecology groups cannot be explained by pointing out central actors who established the main strategies. The famous ad in the New York Times signed by American groups and coalitions, which had negative repercussions on

Québec groups, requires us to look at other explanations.⁷⁶ It was more the lack of financial resources rather than a logic of sovereignty which framed their strategies of mobilisation. This was especially evident in regard to the Québec situation. The Québec groups generally focused on the Québec political scene as the Canadian and American groups focused on their political scenes. However, American and Canadian groups participated in Québec debates, notably during the public hearings for preparing the directives for the Hydro-Québec's impact studies.

It is possible to distinguish two different kinds of sites. One was state institutions such as the parliaments (Québec, federal and New England States), the parliamentary commissions related to environmental and energy issues, the courts, the public hearings held during the impact assessment review or by the National Energy Board of Canada. As noted above, the public hearings of the environmental impact assessment review of the Great Whale project (1992-1994) had a critical impact on the outcome. The other kind of site was more related to the publicising of the debates: media, cultural events, public forums and demonstrations, and scientific and political conferences (regional, national, and international). The environmental implications of the project, notably its sustainable dimension, facilitated its inclusion within broader agendas. Although they had a rather limited impact over the decision-making process, these sites had been nonetheless meaningful. It was from them that counter-discourses emerged, confronting the developers with contradictory representations of the project. They also served to consolidate the existing alliances between the Cree and ecology groups and to develop new ones. The frequent reference of project's proponents to the "misinformation and manipulation thesis" suggested that their impact had been greater than it may appeared.⁷⁷

The involvement of the ecology movement turned out to be decisive in the postponement of the Great Whale project. The strong mobilisation in the New England states which succeeded in offering a counter-representation of the Great Whale project (social and environmental implications) played a decisive role in the cancellation of some exportation contracts. The latter no longer appeared as an appropriate solution to the growth of energy needs in North-eastern America. The inclusion of a broader understanding of environment (social and biophysical dimensions) within the Québec impact assessment review process was decisive for the dismissal of Hydro-Québec's impact studies. The hegemony of the

sustainable development approach brought in a new understanding of development and environment issues. While emphasising the necessity to respect Aboriginal peoples rights, it also questioned the relevance of mega-projects as a form of development. It imposed important challenges to Hydro-Québec, notably the taking into account of social impacts. Its inability to update its own approach to development also explained the Parizeau government's decision.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have examined the involvement of the ecology movement in the struggles against the Great Whale project. Our discussion showed how it constituted an important ally of the Cree. The involvement of ecology groups and ad hoc coalitions played a critical role in the redrawing of scale politics around the Great Whale project and particularly, in the recognition of a global scale. The local/global axiom discussed by ecologism can be applied to the Great Whale project. Indeed, the mobilisation of the ecology groups against the Great Whale project threw light on competing scales for defining the project's implications and impacts. Whereas for its proponents, it constituted a territorial and local project, for the ecology groups, it had national and global implications. This revealed a major transformation of the political framework of environmental politics which occurred during the 1980s. Globalisation had come to constitute the new political horizon in the mobilisation of the ecology movement and in the legitimisation of state policies. These changes were noticeable in Canadian and Québec environmental politics. Recent developments at both levels suggest that the distinction between the global, the international and the national dimensions of environmental problems become an important political stake for the ecology movement.

Our discussion focussed on the missing elements of the process of jumping scales launched by the Cree. This process implied the redefinition of the territorial bases of the national space and the recognition of the global space. The involvement of the ecology groups helped the Cree to transform simultaneously the national space into a space of engagement and the global space into a space of resistance. At the same time, it also indicated the rescaling of the struggles of the ecology movement, reflecting its own effort to redefine the global into a space of engagement. Contrary to the struggles

around the construction of the La Grande project, the definition of the national space of the Great Whale project turned out to be a critical issue. This time, its primacy and its contours were questioned. What appeared is the growing distinction between the territorial and spatial dimensions of the national, revealing the emergence of a new form of territoriality which no longer revolved exclusively around state borders. The politicisation of the bio-physical and socio-political scales of the Great Whale project indicated the porosity of state borders for defining a national issue. Each was debated in different political spaces and implied quite different relations to the territory. Whereas the bio-physical impacts highlighted in relation to the Québec territory, the neighbouring provinces and the New England States, the discussion of its socio-political impacts referred not only to these spaces, but also to the international and global spaces. The connection with the Amazonian situation (violation of Indigenous rights and uncontrolled destruction of rainforests) nicely illustrated these spaces.

The participation of ecology movement in the debates suggests the necessity of rethinking the relation between territory and state borders. The recognition of a global interdependence as the emergence of new political sites through a process of networking opens the door to a transformation of territorial division of politics and consequently, of sovereignty.⁷⁸ The current configuration of the political space based on state sovereignty appeared inappropriate for coping with the current environmental problems. Even if the appearance of a global governance and the recognition of a global accountability for states are still very fragile, they nonetheless constitute significant breaches. This raises two important challenges. It presupposes a (re)conceptualisation of the territory. The latter maintains a certain relevance, notably on its bio-physical dimension. Nevertheless, the "container" representation no longer holds. The second challenge is the rethinking of the spatial implications of political change. It questions our ability of dealing with multiple sites in using a diachronic perspective and not only a synchronic one.

NOTES

¹ . We do not intend here to present here a detailed history of the ecologist movement during the two last decades. Moreover, we are fully aware that the latter is not homogeneous and that different political orientations can be easily identified. What we want to emphasise is the rescaling of the ecologist movement. Instead of being predominantly a Western social movement, it became a world movement with the spreading of environmental concerns within developing countries. Moreover, its sphere of

activities was increasingly redefined from international to global. For a more elaborated discussion of the recent history of the ecologist movement, see: Andrew JAMISON, "The Shaping of the Global Environmental Agenda: The Role of Non-Governmental Organisations", in *Risk, Environment and Modernity. Towards a New Ecology*, edited by Scott LASH, Bronislaw SZERSZYNSKI, and Brian WYNNE, London, Sage, 1996, pp. 227-234; Klaus EDER, "The Institutionalisation of Environmentalism: Ecological Discourse and the Second Transformation of the Public Sphere", in *Risk, Environment and Modernity. Towards a New Ecology*, edited by Scott LASH, Bronislaw SZERSZYNSKI, and Brian WYNNE, London, Sage, 1996, pp. 203-223; Dimitrios I. ROUSSOPOULOS, *L'écologie politique*, Montréal, Les éditions Écosociété, 1994, 144 pages; Lorraine ELLIOTT, *The Global Politics of the Environment*, New York, New York University Press, 1998, pp. 1-145.

² . Cf. Luther P. GERLACH, "Global Thinking, Local Acting. Movements to Save the Planet", *Evaluation Review*, vol. 15, no 1, 1991, pp. 127-128; Thomas PRINCEN, Matthias FINGER, and Jack P. MANNO, "Translational Linkages", in *Environmental NGOs in World Politics*, edited by Thomas PRINCEN & Matthias FINGER, London, Routledge, 1994, pp. 217-236.

³ . For a more detailed discussion on this point, see: Steven YEARLEY, *Sociology, Environmentalism, Globalization. Reinventing the Globe*, London, Sage, 1996, pp. 62-99; Brian WYNNE, "Scientific Knowledge and the Global Environment", in *Social Theory and the Global Environment*, edited by Michael REDCLIFT & Ted BENTON, London, Routledge, 1994, pp. 169-189.

⁴ . Cf. Lorraine ELLIOTT, *The Global Politics of the Environment*, New York, New York University Press, 1998, pp. 242-258; Kenneth H. KELLER, "Unpackaging the Environment", *Environmental Change and Security Project Report*, no. 3, 1997; Steven YEARLEY, "Social Movements and Environmental Change", in *Social Theory and the Global Environment*, edited by Michael REDCLIFT & Ted BENTON, London, Routledge, 1994, pp. 150-168.

⁵ . Cf. Luther P. GERLACH, *op. cit.*, p. 127; Steven YEARLEY, *Sociology, Environmentalism, Globalization, op. cit.*, pp. 86-98

⁶ . The recognition of these problems involved a redefinition of the earlier agenda revolving around the pollution, the management of hazardous waste and the energy crisis. The publicising of these global environmental problems still showed the importance of science in the green movement. It constituted one more time a trigger in this new phase. It was the combination of different scientific findings which drew attention on these new environmental problems and mostly, on their global implications. Cf. Andrew JAMISON, *op. cit.*, pp. 224-234; Bryan WYNNE, *op. cit.*, pp. 169-183.

⁷ . Cf. Barbara ADAMS, "Running Out of Time: Global Crisis and Human Engagement", in *Social Theory and the Global Environment*, edited by Michael REDCLIFT & Ted BENTON, London, Routledge, 1994, pp. 92-112.

⁸ . See on this point: Karen LIFTIN, "Eco-regimes: Playing Tug of War with the Nation-State", in *The State and Social Power in Global Environmental Politics*, edited by Ronnie D. LIPSCHUTZ & Ken CONCA, New York, Columbia University Press, 1993, pp. 94-118; Lorraine ELLIOTT, *op. cit.*, pp. 52-95; Andrew HURRELL and Benedict KINGSBURY, "The International Politics of the Environment: An Introduction", in *The International Politics of the Environment. Actors, Interests and Institutions*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, pp. 1-50.

⁹ . See on this point: WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, *Our Common Future*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987; Lorraine ELLIOTT, *op. cit.*, pp. 169-191.

¹⁰ . The Brundtland Commission had important repercussions which created an important momentum. Its setting up was a response to the pessimistic assessment having been made during the Nairobi Conference in 1982. This conference marked the tenth anniversary of the Stockholm Conference. The appraisal of the progresses realised for protecting the environment was rather negative. Moreover, scientific findings urged the necessity of making an important shift. The vast mandate given to the Brundtland Commission and the broad process of consultation having been set up increased its importance; a particular attention was given to developing countries in order to associate them to the

process. As noted earlier, the Report crystallised a new discourse on environment emphasising a global interdependence created by environmental problems. However, it did not constitute a plea for a radical shift as, for example, the Report of the Club of Rome did. The recommendations are rather moderated since they do not imply a deep transformation of the current world order.

"The report articulates an international division of labor between sovereign states and international organisations that legitimizes and extends the primacy of the state system, albeit while seeking to temper the worst excesses of individual states. The report's tendency to define environmental problems in technical-rational terms, and to call for technological adjustments in response, is thoroughly modern in spirit and substance. (...) And the commission's embrace of "sustainable development" as the key to a "new era of economic growth represents an attempt to steer the course of capitalist expansion rather than overturn it- particularly when contrasted with earlier "limits-to-growth" formulations of the environmental problematic".

Cf. Ken CONCA, "Environmental Change and the Deep Structure of World Politics", in *The State and Social Power in Global Environmental Politics*, edited by Ronnie D. LIPSCHUTZ & Ken CONCA, New York, Columbia University Press, 1993, p. 311

¹¹ . See on this point: Alberto MELUCCI, *Nomads of the Present: Social Movement and Individual Needs in the Contemporary society*, Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1989; Barry D. ADAM, "Post-Marxism and the New Social Movements", in *Organizing Dissent*, edited by William K. CARROLL, second edition, Toronto, Garamond Press, 1997, pp. 39-56.

¹² . In making a general appraisal of the history of the Green Parties since their emergence, we have to conclude that this choice has not been very successful. Few became majors actors on the electoral scene of Western countries. The lack of voting system based on proportional representation and the integration of environmental issues within the electoral program of "traditional" parties have turned out to be important obstacles. They may explain their electoral marginality. But, we have to mention that "national" factors such as the visibility of ecologist and environmentalist organisations have to be taken into account. For an history of the green parties, see: Chris ROOTES, "Environmental Consciousness, Institutional Structures and Political Competition in the Formation and Development of Green Parties", in *The Green Challenge. The Development of Green Parties in Europe*, edited by Dick RICHARDSON & Chris ROOTES, London, Routledge, 1995, pp. 232-252; Laurie ADKIN, "Counter-Hegemony and Environmental Politics in Canada", in *Organizing Dissent*, edited by William K. CARROLL, Toronto, Garamond Press, 1992, pp. 135-156.

¹³ . The ecology movement was not the only social movement which got a world-wide representativity. This was also noticeable, for example, with the women movement, the indigenous people movement, the human rights movement and the peace movement. This change has been forwarded by the mobilisation of groups outside of the Western world. The development of linkages between them contributed to expand the representativity of these social movements. We should point out that they constitute a key-element of the global civil society thesis. Cf. Luther P. GERLACH, *op. cit.*, pp. 120-148; Zsuzsa HEGEDUS, "Social Movement and Social Change in Self-Creative Society: New Civil Initiatives in the International Arena", in *Globalization, Knowledge and Society*, edited by Martin ALBROW & Elizabeth KING, London, Sage, 1990, pp. 263-280; Ronnie D. LIPSCHUTZ, "Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil Society", *Millennium*, vol. 21, no 3, 1992, pp. 389-420.

¹⁴ . See on this point: David HARVEY, *Justice, Nature & the Geography of Difference*, Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 1996, pp. 210-333.

¹⁵ . Cf. Zygmunt BAUMAN, *Globalization. The Human Consequences*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1998, pp. 27-45.

¹⁶ . See on this point: Lorraine ELLIOTT, *op. cit.*, pp. 147-168; Partha CHATTERJEE & Matthias FINGER, *The Earth Brokers*, London, Routledge, 1994; Richard FALK, "The Global Promise of Social Movements: Explorations at the Edge of Time," *Alternatives*, vol. 12, 1987, pp. 173-196.

¹⁷ . Cf. Lorraine ELLIOTT, *op. cit.*, pp. 147-160; Barbara GAMBLE, and Gareth PORTER, "Non-Governmental Organizations and the Making of US International Environmental Policy", in *The International Politics of the Environment*, edited by Andrew HURRELL & Benedict KINGSBURY, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, pp. 313-353

¹⁸ . The concept of "liberation ecology" elaborated by Peet and Watts appears in this regard very interesting for highlighting the emancipatory dimension of the Southern ecology organisations' claims. Their struggles have democratic and justice implications. The repression to which they are quite often confronted contributes to transform their local struggles for preserving their habitats into political struggles against governments' abuses and violations of human rights. In this context, some links can be established with the liberation theology elaborated by clergy members in South America. For a more detailed discussion of the notion of liberation ecology, see: Richard PEET, Michael WATTS, *Liberation Ecology. Development, Sustainability and Environment in an Age of Market Triumphalism*, London, Routledge, 1994, pp. 1-45.

¹⁹ . The relatively small number of organisations can be mainly explained by the lack of financial resources and time. It is not a deliberated choice made by them. Most of these local groups have to deal with scarce resources and the opposition from political authorities. They have to deal with many issues which can turn out to be impassable obstacles: the geographical distance; the costs for maintaining a communication between them (fax, phone, mail, etc.); nationalism and more generally, the linguistic and cultural diversity; and the degree of repression from political authority. Cf. Margaret E. KECK & Kathryn SIKKINK, *Activists beyond Borders*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1998, pp. 1-38; Lorraine ELLIOTT, *op. cit.*, pp. 147-168

²⁰ . We are perfectly aware that the general distinctions that we are making embrace multiple NGOs having quite different goals and using opposed strategies. The division North/South constitutes one important analytical dimension, but not the only ones. According to Keck and Sikkink, in making an overview of the different NGOs and networks having emerged since the 1970s, there appears three dominant groups gathering half of their total number, that is to say, the groups working on human rights, environment and women's rights. We can add that the growth of NGOs has been shaped by the "new social movements" politics. For Weiss and Gordenker, the increasing salience of the NGOs can be explained by three factors: the end of the Cold War and by extension, of the East/West tensions which create room for other issues than security; the development of communications technologies providing to them the possibility of scaling up or down their issues more easily; and their growing resources and professionalism. These factors would explain why the NGOs have a greater impact over international relations and have recently become able to extend their spheres of activities. In regard to NGOs in the developing world, additional factors must be considered for explaining their proliferation in these areas: (1) the increase of financial aid from Northern non-governmental agencies and from bilateral and multilateral development agencies; (2) the setting up of socio-economic programmes by the governments through which they are involved; (3) the fragmentation of the existing large-scale social movements which brings in the emergence of a myriad of small-scale movements in which NGOs participate.

We have to mention that the political implications deriving of the growth of the NGOs remain until today somewhat unknown. It is only recently that they got the attention from social scientists working on social movements theory and from critical IR scholars, and began to be seriously discussed. It was studied indirectly, that is to say, through the studies on international organisations or the studies on multinational corporations. The predominance of the realist perspective (including its variances) and the domestic/foreign division at the political level have prevented the development of analytical perspectives coming to grips with their implications and impacts on world politics. They were and are still perceived as inefficient given their lack of monitoring capability. See on these points: Margaret E. KECK & Kathryn SIKKINK, *op. cit.*, pp. 121-163; Paul WAPNER, *Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics*, New York, State University of New York Press, 1996, 238 pages; Thomas PRINCEN, Matthias FINGER, Jack P. MANNO, *op. cit.*, pp. 217-236; Leon GORDENKER & Thomas G. WEISS, "Pluralizing Global Governance: Analytical Approaches and Dimensions", in *NGOs, the UN, & Global Governance*, edited by Thomas G. WEISS & Leon GORDENKER, Boulder, Lynne RIENNER Publishers, 1996, pp. 17-51;

Gerard CLARKE, "Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Politics in the Developing World", *Political Studies*, vol. 46, no 1, 1998, pp. 36-52..

²¹ . Cf. Andrew JAMISON, *op. cit.*, pp.224-234.

²² . Andrew HURRELL & Benedict KINGSBURY, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

The effectiveness of NGOs within global environmental politics has been noticeable in two areas: the launching of "global" campaigns of informations and their participation at different degrees within international decision-making bodies. Indeed, the public appeals and the campaigns of informations launched by the NGOs turned out to be particularly determining for the recognition of the globality of environmental problems; their increasing renown expertise gave to their claims a credibility. While raising public's and politicians' attention on environmental problems, their campaigns threw light on the double standards of companies and the harmful policies of international financial organisations. Their impact has been broadened with the strengthening of the interconnections between the Northern and Southern groups on the one hand and on the other, through their linkages with development NGOs such as OXFAM. This increases the NGOs' ability to frame the agenda. Moreover, the environmental NGOs got some strategic advantages deriving from their structures widening the impact of their lobbying. Their credibility and their non-submission to the logic of national interests allow them to bear pressures on all states in referring to the leading reforming country having introduced the most progressive measures and to reclaim the optimal measures. This was particularly obvious in the discussions around the Earth Summit. These pragmatic trends provide to NGOs opportunities to set up an effective process of international co-operation. Some NGOs became involved in the realisation of self-reliance projects within specific communities or built up coalitions among communities and across regions and nations. See on these points: Steven YEARLEY, *Sociology, Environmentalism, Globalization*, *op. cit.*, pp. 86-92; Thomas PRINCEN, Matthias FINGER, Jack P. MANNO, *op. cit.*, pp. 225-228.

²³ . This concept proposed by Keck and Sikkink captures very well the fluidity and variability of global environmental politics. It allows to go beyond a reading focussing on organisations. According to these authors,

"the network concept travels well because it stresses fluid and open relations among committed and knowledgeable actors working in specialized issues areas. (...) Advocacy captures what is unique about these transnational networks: they are organized to promote causes, principled ideas, and norms, and they often involve individuals advocating changes that cannot be easily linked to a rationalist understanding of their interests". The fluid character of these networks is also linked to their membership which may include international and domestic NGOs; labour unions, churches, media, international intergovernmental organisations and even some branches of the government. However, they affirm that NGOs play a central role insofar as they "introduce new ideas, provide informations and lobby for policy changes".

Cf. Margaret E. KECK & Kathryn SIKKINK, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-9.

²⁴ . We can add that the transnational NGOs represent a very small part of the overall NGOs. A large number remains grassroots organisations working at the local level. This difference between NGOs goes well beyond the issue of financial resources. The striking growth of NGOs brought a diversification of their organisational size and political programs. It is now too presumptuous of assuming that all NGOs are ecologist and therefore, reclaimed a deep transformation of industrial economy and the democratisation of political life. Therefore, the picture that we can eventually draw would probably be rather fuzzy and blurred. Moreover, we previously mentioned that a number of NGOs' claims mix environmental concerns with other issues areas. It then appeared particularly difficult to clearly find out specific environmental NGOs. Cf. Lorraine ELLIOTT, *op. cit.*, pp. 134-138; Peter UVIN, "Scaling Up the Grassroots and Scaling Down the Summit; The Relations Between Third World NGOs and the UN", in *NGOs, The UN, & Global Governance*, edited by Thomas G. WEISS & Leon GORDENKER, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996, pp. 158-160.

²⁵ . It would be possible to make links between the notion of regimes used in IR literature and the notion of transnational networks since both throw light on the multiple actors and relations involved in environmental issues. The setting up of regimes implies in fact the crystallisation and empowerment of particular networks. One dimension of the notion of network which is until now less obvious with the notion of international regimes is its greater potentiality for discussing and explaining social and political changes. There is a dynamism inherent to networks. Based on their study on different networks including environmental networks, Keck and Sikkink identified four different ways or tactics used by networks for introducing changes:

"(1) information politics, or the ability to quickly and credibly generate politically usable information and move it to where it will have the most impact; (2) symbolic politics, or the ability to call upon symbols, actions, stories that make sense of a situation for an audience that is frequently far away; (3) leverage politics, or the ability to call upon powerful actors to affect a situation where weaker members of a network are unlikely to have influence; and (4) accountability politics, or the effort to hold powerful actors to their previously stated policies or principles."

Cf. Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn SIKKINK, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

²⁶ . Cf. Paul WAPNER, *op. cit.*, pp. 119-120

²⁷ . This does not mean that it was a period of stagnation during the 1980s. The space of environmental issues within world politics did not shrink during that time. The UN bodies have continued to be key actors in the agenda-setting and in the monitoring of environmental norms and regulations. They were still pushing for the recognition of a global accountability for all states. The bases of important declarations and conventions related, for example, to marine environment, biodiversity, the protection of atmosphere, or deforestation were laid at that time. Cf. Djamchid MONTAZ, "The United Nations and the Protection of the Environment: From Stockholm to Rio de Janeiro", *Political Geography*, vol. 15. nos 3/4, 1996, pp. 265-269.

²⁸ . Lorraine ELLIOTT, *op. cit.*, pp. 110-111.

²⁹ . One issue reflecting the growing interactions between the NGOs and the UN has been the significant increase of the number of NGOs having a consultative status before the ECOSOC. However, this constitutes one element among others. Referring to the Ken Conca's analysis, the picture of their interactions appears to be much more complex and diversified. The environmental organisations

"lobby in the diverse bodies that make up the United Nations system, from the specialised agencies to broader forums such as the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Environmental Organisations also shape the positions of member states through domestic pressures and, increasingly, transnational efforts. NGOs also provide information, analysis and value-based interpretations that now shape how problems, interests and solutions are defined. Finally, environmental organisations are playing a growing role in delivering services at the local, regional and even national level, receiving and administering UN funds in the process".

Cf. Ken CONCA, "Greening the UN: Environmental Organisations and the UN System", in *NGOs, The UN, & Global Governance*, edited by Thomas G. WEISS & Leon GORDENKER, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996, p. 105.

³⁰ . We have to mention that the recognition of environmental concerns by international organisations has not been limited to the UN system. They have been integrated to different degree on the agenda of the World Bank. They are also part of the institutional arrangements of the European Community and of the North American free trade agreements. It remains, however, that it is the UN which is until now the main vehicle for environmental issues at the international level. For a more detailed discussion of the UN role in the protection of environment since the 1980s, see: Djamchid MONTAZ, *op. cit.* pp. 263-271; Peter WILLETTS, "From Stockholm to Rio and Beyond: the Impact of the Environment Movement on the United Nations Consultative Arrangements for NGOs", *Review of International Studies*, vol. 22, no 1, 1996, pp.

57-80; Peter S. THACHER, "The Role of the United Nations", in *The International Politics of the Environment*, edited by Andrew HURRELL & Benedict KINGSBURY, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, pp. 183-212; Ken CONCA, "Greening the UN : Environmental Organisations and the UN System", *op. cit.*, pp. 103-120.

³¹ . See on this point: Peter WILLETS, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-80; Lorraine ELLIOTT, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-26.

³² . The Earth Summit represented more than a diplomatic meeting. It became a vast public and mediatic event. It was attended by 139 national delegations and by 1400 officially accredited NGOs. At the same time, there was the Global Forum organised by the NGOs which was attended by more than 30 000 people. This constituted a democratic forum which had nonetheless repercussions on the discussions held during the official forum. Both forums contributed to publicise environmental concerns beyond the diplomatic and environmentalist confines. Cf. *Idem*.

³³ . The results of the Rio Conference appeared very promising. The debates having occurred during the official and the parallel meetings suggested that an important step was overcome. An appraisal of the current situation since the Earth Summit turns out to be, however, much less optimistic insofar as the expected changes are still expected to come. The UN effectiveness as the further integration of NGOs are still largely unresolved. The authority of the Commission on sustainable development has not yet firmly entrenched. The global environmental crisis is still as threatening as before. See on this point: Peter WILLETS, *op. cit.*, pp. 75-76.

³⁴ . Cf. Steven YEARLEY, *Sociology, Environmentalism, Globalisation*, *op. cit.*, pp. 94-99

³⁵ . This contradiction has remained manageable insofar as the governments have not set up ecologist policies. The latter would have implied a redefinition of its capitalist structure. It was rather the ideas of environmental threat and survival of humankind which became structuring arguments for justifying governmental interventions. The repercussions of the Chernobyl nuclear accident symbolised very well this standpoint. Their vast scope and mostly the lack of a complete appraisal of its impact clearly revealed that governments were unprepared and unable to cope with it. In this context, it was the security requirement rather than the productivist system which was put at the forefront. This explained the increasing discussions around the notion of environmental security since the beginning of the 1990s. Contrary to ecologism, this reading of environmental crisis emphasised its impacts rather than its causes. It proposes a (re)writing of the security discourse which would give priority to environmental issues. See on this point: Ulrich BECK, *Ecological Enlightenment. Essays on the Politics of the Risk Society*, Translated by Mark A. Ritter, New Jersey, Humanities Press, 1995, 151 pages.; Kenneth H. KELLER, *op. cit.*, pp. ; Lorraine ELLIOTT, *op. cit.*, pp. 219-241.

³⁶ . See on these points: Barbara ADAMS, *op. cit.*, pp. 93-112; Steven YEARLEY, *op. cit.*, pp. 142-151; Klaus KÜMMERER, "The Ecological Impact of Time", *Time & Society*, vol. 5, no 2, 1996, pp. 209-235;

³⁷ . The global has become a meaningful and strategic site for a number of actors involved in green politics. Of course, not all actors have access to this space. A survey of the existing NGOs clearly suggests that some participate actively whereas others are excluded. Thus, the global is increasingly structured by social and power relations. Its constitution is not endogenous and autonomous and consequently, does imply the shrinking of the other political spaces (national, local and regional). In other words, the politicisation of the global space entails the redrawing of the relations with the latter, not necessarily their disappearance. Cf. Peter UVIN, *op. cit.*, pp. 159-176.

³⁸ . Cf. G. Bruce DOERN & Thomas CONWAY, *The Greening of Canada. Federal Institutions and Decision*, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1994, p. 147.

³⁹ . We have to specify that our review of the main changes of both political scenes will be very schematic. This is particularly true for the Québec situation. In contrast to the women movement or labour union movement, it seems that the Québec ecology movement got less attention. The literature on Québec environmental politics based on a macro-sociological perspective remains few developed. The recent changes which occurred since the 1980s have been until now not extensively discussed. A large part of the existing literature focuses on the different political orientations and their implications framing

the green movement. Moreover, there exists very few comprehensive studies on the history of the Québec Department of Environment and the environment policy.

⁴⁰ . In their analysis of the federal Department of Environment (DOE), Doern and Conway pointed out three historical phases. From 1971 to 1975, the newly created DOE delimited with a relative success its fields of activities, notably in regard to water and air pollution, and assumed a political leadership. This period was one of catching-up during which environmental-assessments to review projects were established. The following period from 1975 to 1986 put an end to the enthusiasm raised during the preceding period. The leadership was rather assumed by the provinces instead of being taken on the federal DOE. The inability of resolving the issue of acid rain revealed its political paralysis while raising many criticisms from the environmentalists and the population. It was the election of the Conservative party in 1984 which contributed to give a new impetus to the DOE. This period, which goes from 1986 to the mid-1990s, introduced important political and institutional changes which re-affirmed the leadership of the federal government for protecting environment. Cf. G. Bruce DOERN, Thomas CONWAY, *The Greening of Canada. Federal Institutions and Decisions*, Toronto, Toronto University Press, 1994, pp. 12-15; Glen TONER, "The Green Plan: From Great Expectations to Eco-Backtracking ... to Revitalization?" in *How Ottawa Spends 1994-95: Making Change*, edited by Susan PHILIPS, Ottawa, Carleton University Press, 1994, pp. 229-260; Kathryn HARRISON, *Passing the Buck. Federalism and Canadian Environmental Policy*, Vancouver, UBC Press, 1996, pp. 115-162.

⁴¹ . We should add two other factors which explained this new momentum. One of them was the stronger leadership exerted by the Ministers of Environment after the re-election of the Conservative Party in 1988. Contrary to their predecessors, they were able to keep environmental concerns among the governmental priorities. The second factor was the growing awareness of the Canadian population about the urgency and the large-scale of environmental problems. The wide public discussions about the Brundtland Report as the debates launched by environmentalist and ecologist groups around the signature of the Free-Trade Agreement contributed to draw public attention on environmental issues and then, bear pressures on the federal government. Cf. *Idem*.

⁴² . The Green Plan constituted an important shift and even a rupture for the federal government. It implied a reversal of perspective in giving priority to prevention rather than correction for dealing with environmental issues. It constituted a clear and ambitious engagement in favour of sustainable development. It furthered the overcoming of the sectarian approach based on departments' exclusive spheres of competency. It rested on eight components delimiting a sphere of activities which were budgeted. The Green Plan integrated in many regards new perspectives on environmental issues. While recognising the notion of "global environmental security", the Green Plan called upon the development of partnerships with other actors such as the provinces, Aboriginal organisations and environmentalist groups, and industry. Cf. G. Bruce DOERN, Thomas CONWAY, *op. cit.*, pp. 79-81; Glen TONER, *op. cit.*, pp. 236-242.

⁴³ . The reform of the federal environmental assessment process passed in fact through different steps starting in 1987 and ending in 1995. Indeed, the federal government began in 1987 extensive public consultations about an eventual reform of the EARP. The need for a more effective, open and accountable process was clearly and widely expressed. The release of the Brundtland Report created also incentives insofar as it suggested that the environmental assessment processes should become mandatory and entrenched in legislation in order to increase their effectiveness. One determining step was the two courts decisions (the Rafferty-Alameda and Oldman River dams) which concluded that the federal government had responsibilities and that the non-enforceable guideline was a legally enforceable law constraining the federal government. These different factors created an impetus for the 1990 package reform. It explained the different objectives underlying it (harmonisation with provinces, sustainable development, accountability). This package included three pieces: a legislation, a non-legislated environmental assessment process for new policy and program proposals, and a participant funding program. The new legislation was adopted in 1992 and proclaimed by the federal parliament in 1995 bringing in the setting up of a new agency regulating the environmental assessment process. Cf. G. Bruce DOERN, Thomas CONWAY, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-73; Kathryn HARRISON, *op. cit.*, pp. 128-140.

⁴⁴ . This new legislation aimed to put an end to the Department inertia and at the same time, to restore its credibility among the environmentalist and ecology groups and more generally, the Canadian population. One important issue which was introduced by the new legislation was the Enforcement and Compliance Policy which strengthened and codified the regulatory procedures. One of its implications which has been pretty conflicting was the signing of equivalency agreements with provinces for establishing some common standards defining what can be seen as infractions. Cf. G. Bruce DOERN, Thomas CONWAY, *op. cit.*, pp. 211-229; Glen TONER, *op. cit.*, pp. 248-257.

⁴⁵ . See on this point: G. Bruce DOERN, Thomas CONWAY, *op. cit.*, pp. 124-147; Jim MACNEILL, "The Greening of International Relations", *International Journal*, vol. XLV, no 1, 1989-90, pp. 1-35.

⁴⁶ . For a more detailed account of the multilateral relations, see; G. Bruce DOERN, Thomas CONWAY, *op. cit.*, pp. 132-147; Robert BOARDMAN, "The Multilateral Dimension: Canada in the International System", in *Canadian Environmental Policy: Ecosystems, Politics and Process*, edited by Robert BOARDMAN, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 224-245.

⁴⁷ . Cf. Ian WALLACE & Rob SHIELDS, "Contested Terrains: Social Space and the Canadian Environment", in *Understanding Canada*, edited by Wallace CLEMENT, Montreal & Kingston, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997, pp. 398-403; Lorna STEFANIK, Kathleen WELLS, "Staying the Course or Saving Face: Federal Environmental Policy Post-Rio", in *How Ottawa Spends 1998-99. Balancing Act: The Post-Deficit Mandate*, edited by Leslie A. PAL, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 243-269..

⁴⁸ . It is extremely difficult to determine the exact number of ecology/environmentalist groups. In referring to the statistics of the Department of Environment, there would be around 200 at the turning of the nineties. However, this only included the groups having applied for a grant and consequently, it provides a very partial portrait. There are also many groups and organisations which include environmental concerns within a larger agenda without being themselves an ecologist group. This is quite often current with the groups from other social movements. Moreover, the political orientations which go from conservationism to eco-socialism to deep ecologism (or fundamentalism) are still diversified as they were earlier. We are using here the term ecology for distinguishing this social movement from the others. See on this point: Laurie E. ADKIN, "Counter-Hegemony and Environmental Politics in Canada", in *Organizing Dissent*, edited by William K. CARROLL, Toronto, Garamond Press, 1992, pp. 135-156; Luc GAGNON, *Echec des écologistes? Bilan des Décennies 70 et 80*, Montréal, Éditions du Méridien, 1993, pp. 85-92.

⁴⁹ . See: Serge QUENNEVILLE, "Local Unions and the Québec Environment: three case studies, edited by Colin LEYS & Marguerite MENDELL, Montréal, Black Rose Book, 1992, pp. 95-108; Peter BLEYER, "Coalition of Social Movements as Agencies of Social Changes", in *Organising Dissent*, edited by William K. Carroll, Toronto, Garamond Press, 1997, pp. 134-152

⁵⁰ . See on this point: Peter BLEYER, "Coalitions of Social Movements as Agencies for Social Change: the Canada Action Network", in *Organizing Dissent*, edited by William K. CARROLL, Toronto, Garamond Press, 1992, pp. 102-118; G. Bruce DOERN, Thomas CONWAY, *op. cit.*, pp. 141-146; R. S. RATNER, "Many Davids, One Goliath", in *Organizing Dissent*, edited by William K. CARROLL, second edition, Toronto, Garamond Press, 1997, pp. 271-286.

⁵¹ . For a critical discussion about the formation and impact of Action Canada Network, see: Peter BLEYER, *op. cit.*, pp. 102-118.

⁵² . We refer mainly to the following discussions: Luc GAGNON, *op. cit.*, pp. 85-92; Jean Guy VAILLANCOURT, "Deux nouveaux mouvements sociaux québécois: le mouvement pour la paix et le mouvement vert", in *Le Québec en jeu*, edited by Gérard DAIGLE, Montréal, Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1992, pp. 791-807.

⁵³ . The project of setting up a national organisation was largely discussed at the turning of the 1980s. It followed from the release of the ecologist manifest in 1978. Two important meetings were organised in this respect. The important political divergences between the groups prevented the realisation of this project. Cf. Jean-Guy VAILLANCOURT, *Mouvement écologiste, énergie et environnement: essais d'écologie sociale*, Montréal, Éditions coopératives Albert Saint-Martin, 1982, pp. 125-145.

⁵⁴ . The focus on particular issues characterising the struggles of the Québec ecologist movement does not follow however the local/national division. This "division of labour" along the environmental issues is noticeable among the national groups. Indeed,

"la forêt est l'objet des préoccupations du Regroupement pour un Québec vert, l'énergie est le champ d'action d'Hydro-Glasnost, de la Coalition pour un débat public sur l'énergie, et du Comité Baie James, les pluies acides et la pollution de l'air sont surveillées par l'Association québécoise de lutte contre la pollution atmosphérique, les lacs et les rivières sont sous la garde de la SVP et de la FAPEL, les sols sont l'objet de préoccupations du Mouvement pour l'agriculture biologique, les déchets sont le champ d'action de la coalition de trente-cinq groupes mise sur pied par le groupe Action pour la défense de la nature (ADN) de Valleyfield, des GRIP (Groupes de recherche d'intérêt public) et du nouveau Front commun pour la gestion écologique des déchets, et les transports sont le champ d'action du Monde à Bicyclette, de Transports 2000 et de Vélo-Québec. Quant à la faune et à la flore, spécialement les espèces menacées, elles sont l'objet de la sollicitude de très nombreux groupes. C'est le cas aussi pour l'éducation à l'environnement, pour la recherche en environnement et pour la protection environnementale".

Cf. Jean-Guy VAILLANCOURT, *op. cit.*, 1992, p. 801

⁵⁵ . *Ibid.*, pp. 801-802.

⁵⁶ . We have to be careful about the real empowerment of the Québec ecology movement. It appeared during the post-Earth Summit period that its institutional basis was not so well established. Many groups had to reduce their activities due to the decrease of their funding. Some of them which were very active disappeared.

⁵⁷ . The binary opposition between the protection of environment and the job creation has threefold implications. It revealed the double standards of entrepreneurs. Moreover, it confronted the labour unions to a crucial dilemma. They have to choose between the preservation of jobs and the environmental measures which are linked to working conditions. Finally, it showed that the empowerment of the ecology movement was rather relative. See on this point: Serge QUENNEVILLE, *op. cit.*, pp. 95-108.

⁵⁸ . Jean-Guy VAILLANCOURT, *op. cit.*, 1992, pp. 801-802

⁵⁹ . The retreat of the funding program at the beginning of the 1990s had important financial repercussions for many groups, constraining them to reduce their activities. The involvement of many groups against the Great Whale project played a role in the government decision. It was only in 1998 that the Parti Québécois reintroduced the program with new criteria of admissibility. One important consequence was to prevent a lot of national groups to benefit this program. Cf. Louis-Gilles FRANCOEUR, "Québec reverra ses critères", *Le Devoir*, 4 février 2000, p. A4

⁶⁰ . See on this point: Corinne GENDRON, Jean-Guy VAILLANCOURT, "L'avant et l'arrière-scène de la politique énergétique du Québec", in *L'Énergie au Québec. Quels sont nos choix?*, edited by Corinne GENDRON and Jean-Guy VAILLANCOURT, Montréal, Éditions Écosociété, 1998, pp. 29-42

⁶¹ . The notion of sustainable development has been rapidly integrated within the Québec government discourse. The 1988 Roundtable on Environment and Economy submitted some recommendations relative to a strategy of sustainable development. It was also at that time that Hydro-Québec started to present itself as one of its advocates. In 1992, the Québec government released a public statement on the role of hydroelectricity in a strategy of sustainable development. While insisting on the replacement of non-renewable sources of energy, hydro-electricity was also presented as a solution to world energy problems. It appeared however important divergences between this strategy of sustainable development and the Brundtland Commission's recommendations. Cf. GOUVERNEMENT DU QUÉBEC, *Le choix de l'hydroélectricité: Québec, l'expérience du développement durable*, Québec, Ministère de l'Énergie et des Ressources, 1992, 25 pages; Barbara SÉRANDOUR, "Un public exclu des débats et des décisions sur l'énergie", in *L'Énergie au Québec. Quels sont nos choix?*, edited by Corinne GENDRON and Jean-Guy VAILLANCOURT, Montréal, Éditions Écosociété, 1998, pp. 59-66.

⁶² . The Québec government decision to deregulate its energy market was presented as a response to the broad movement of deregulation of energy in North America. Although the government recognised this movement as unavoidable, it argued however that it constituted the opportunity to increase the Québec share of the American market owing to the competitive advantage of hydroelectricity. In 1997, Hydro-Québec lost its monopoly on the transport of hydroelectricity within Québec. This was the first concrete step in the deregulation of this market. Cf. Martin POIRIER, "De la Révolution tranquille à la capitulation tranquille", in *L'énergie au Québec. Quels sont nos choix?*, edited by Corinne GENDRON and Jean-Guy VAILLANCOURT, Montréal, les éditions Écosociété, 1998, pp. 139-152

⁶³ . Cf. Doreen MASSEY, *Space, Place, and Gender*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1994, pp. 1-17

⁶⁴ . Cf. Dietrich SOYEZ, "La Baie James: faut-il rapatrier ou mondialiser le débat", *Cahiers de géographie du Québec*, vol. 39, no 106, 1995, pp. 63-77; Sean McCUTCHEON, *Electric Rivers*, Montréal, Black Rose Books, 1993, pp. 150-178;

⁶⁵ . We do not intend here to make a nomenclature of all groups having been involved in the debates. We can easily reach more than 30 groups having participated to different extent. It would then become very boring and perhaps confusing. However, it can be useful to mention some of them in order to draw a more concrete portrait. Among the Québec groups and organisations which were quite active and on the first line, there was: Mouvement Au Courant, Association québécoise de lutte contre les pluies acides, Union québécoise pour la protection de la nature, Comité Baie-James, Société pour Vaincre la Pollution (SVP). In regard to Canadian groups, there were: Energy Probe, Pollution Probe, Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, Cultural Survival Canada, Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility, and the Aboriginal Rights Coalition. We have to add some American groups which raised debates and organised activities within USA and particularly, within the New England States: National Audubon Society, National Resources Defence Council, and Environmental Defence Fund. For completing the picture, we should add some international and transnational organisations which largely contributed to publicise the issue through their branches: Greenpeace International, Friends-of-the-Earth, and the Sierra Club. These different levels were not at all isolated from each other. They were often connected to each other through the sharing of informations and the setting up of specific events.

⁶⁶ . The Hydro-Glasnost Campaign was launched in January 1990 by the James Bay Committee which was previously formed during the Green Energy Conference. The latter took place in September 1989 in Montreal on the occasion of the World Energy Conference. It was not the same committee which was opposed to the La Grande project. The Hydro-Glasnost Campaign reclaimed the setting up of a wide-ranging public inquiry on Hydro-Québec's new development plan. The terms of reference for such inquiry was diffused in all Québec regions and subsequently endorsed by many groups. Similarly to the *Coalition pour un débat public sur l'énergie*, the James Bay Committee called for complete openness and public accountability in energy matters. Regarding the "Ban the Dam Jam", they constituted an additional step in the mobilisation of Cree people and American ecology groups aiming to raise awareness among American population and to bear pressure on the New York state governor. The most important step of this campaign was the Odeyak (an hybrid canoe-kayak) travel which gathered 60 Aboriginal peoples (Cree and Inuit) who paddled from the Hudson bay until New York City by the Hudson River. They reached Times Square on the Earth Day, in April 1990. This constituted an important event which allowed Cree people to publicise their claims while consolidating their links with American groups. See on this point: THE JAMES BAY COMMITTEE (of the Green Energy Conference), *Brief presented to the Parliamentary Commission on the Economy and Labour*, Montréal, April 1990, 12 pages; Ingrid PERITZ, "Cree, Inuit 6-wee protest journey on", *The Gazette*, 20 April 1990, pp. A1-A2; Sean McCUTCHEON, *op. cit.*, pp. 150-177.

⁶⁷ . This was particularly obvious in Québec with the emergence of the *Forum québécois pour l'examen public du complexe Grande-Baleine* (The Québec Forum for a Public Review of the Great Whale River Complex) in 1991. It contributed not only to narrow the debates, but also to relegate in the background the existing coalitions, notwithstanding that they had some common members. As noted earlier, there existed some overlapping between the James Bay Committee (of the Green Energy Conference) and the

Coalition pour un débat public sur l'énergie. The latter gathered around 40 groups and organisations such as the ecology groups, Québec Aboriginal Nations, labour unions, and citizens committees. Some of them played a more active role by providing secretariat activities and by co-ordinating activities: Greenpeace, l'Association québécoise de lutte contre les pluies acides (AQLPA), the Grand Council of the Crees, le mouvement "Au Courant", and the Parti Vert du Québec (the Québec Green Party). this coalition reclaimed the organisation of a vast public and democratic debate on Québec energy development and consequently, a moratorium on all new hydro-electric developments, notably the Great Whale project. The formation of the Québec Public Forum occurred to some extent in reaction to the existing debates. Presenting itself as neutral and impartial, it sought to launch a rigorous and scientific environmental review of the Great Whale without linking it to the Québec energy issues. It organised in this regard various conferences gathering international specialists, university researchers and representatives from governments and organisations to evaluate the economic, social and environmental impacts of the projects. The Great Whale Forum contributed to some extent to weaken the Coalition for a public debate insofar as its growing visibility was made at the expense of the latter. Its emergence occurred shortly after the Coalition made a tour of Québec regions for publicising its activities and gathering support for its petition. The emphasis of the Great Whale Forum on its neutrality in the Québec context contributed to discredit the Coalition which appeared too radical. Cf. Stéphane GAGNÉ, "La Coalition pour un débat public sur l'énergie: Comment éviter les mégaprojets sans s'éclairer à la chandelle", *Contretemps*, no 23, 1991, pp. 9-10; David CLICHE, *An evaluation of the James Bay Hydroelectric projects in Northern Québec*, Conference delivered at the 1992 Arctic Conference of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1992, 15 pages

⁶⁸ . Marc BONHOMME, "Les Cris veulent rester au Québec. Mais si, on les bulldoze, que peuvent-ils faire?. Entrevue avec Luis Eguren", *Option-Paix*, vol. 9, no 2, 1991, pp. 9-15

⁶⁹ . We should mention that these three main issues have not been claimed by all groups having participated to debates. Our distinction can be perceived as arbitrary, but it tends to embrace the different claims having been raised by the groups for justifying their opposition. Sean McCUTCHEON, *op. cit.*, pp. 150-178; Nicole GALLANT, "Le discours sur la sécurité environnementale: le cas de Grande-Baleine chez les groupes américains", in *Environment & Security*, vol. 1, no 1, 1996, pp. 203-213; Jules DUFOUR, "Le projet Grande-Baleine et l'avenir des peuples autochtones au Québec", *Cahiers de géographie du Québec*, vol. 40, no 110, 1996, pp. 233-254; COMITÉ D'ÉVALUATION, COMMISSION DE LA QUALITÉ DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT KATIVIK, COMITÉ FÉDÉRAL D'EXAMEN AU NORD DU 55° PARALLÈLE, COMMISSION FÉDÉRALE D'EXAMEN DES ÉVALUATIONS ENVIRONNEMENTALES, *Directive. Étude des impacts sur l'environnement du projet hydro-électrique Grande-Baleine*, Montréal, 1992, 113 pages.

⁷⁰ . The reference to the construction project was raised in many briefs which were presented during the public hearings for the preparation of the guidelines for the impact assessment study. See for example: ODEYAK SUPPORT GROUP, Brief presented to the environmental assessment review panels and committees for the preparation of the guideline, March 16th 1992, 5 pages.

⁷¹ . Cf. Richard MASSICOTTE, "Complainte d'un environnementaliste en Alaska", *Contretemps*, no 28, 1993, pp. 12-16

⁷² . The social impact assessment of the Great Whale project represented a major innovation in the impact assessment review. It was the first time that such dimension was specifically raised. The Hydro-Québec failure to respond in a satisfying way in its impact studies was pointed out in the final report of the panels and committees review. Cf. Jules DUFOUR, *op. cit.*, pp. 233-254

⁷³ . Cf. PROTECT, Inc, *Brief presented during the public consultations on the scope of Great Whale Project Impact Study*, Montréal, March 17, 1992, 15 pages.

⁷⁴ . Cf. Richard MASSICOTTE, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-16; Sean McCUTCHEON, *op. cit.*, pp. 178-188

⁷⁵ . Sean McCUTCHEON, *op. cit.*, pp. 178-188

⁷⁶ . This advertising which contained erroneous information about the project's impacts was criticised in the followings days by some important Québec ecologist organisations such as Greenpeace and the AQLPA. It brought in the cancellation of benefice concerts which were supposed to be held in the following weeks. It resulted important financial problems for the groups. Moreover, this led to a institutional reorganisation of Greenpeace by which the Québec section became more autonomous. Cf. Dietrich SOYEZ, *op. cit.*, pp. 67-68.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 71-74

⁷⁸ . See on these points: Ken CONCA, "Rethinking the Ecology-Sovereignty Debate", *Millennium*, vol. 23, no 3, 1994, pp. 701-711; Luther P. GERLACH, *op. cit.*, pp. 1201-48; David J. ELKINS, *Beyond Sovereignty*, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1995, pp. 13-39; Ronnie D. LIPSCHUTZ & Ken CONCA, "The implications of Global Ecological Interdependence", in *The State and Social Power in Global Environmental Politics*, edited by Ronnie D. LIPSCHUTZ & Ken CONCA, New York, Columbia Press, 1993, pp. 327-344.

CONCLUSION: THE CHANGING SCALES OF WESTERN CITIZENSHIP

Contemporary debates about citizenship suggest that the postwar model that took shape in Western societies, revolving around the Keynesian state, has entered into a period of crisis. The adoption of new economic and social policies and the restructuring of state institutions have entailed a shrinkage of social and economic citizenship rights, opening the door to the emergence of second-class citizens and even of denizens. Many Western governments have also reformed their immigration policies, resulting in the adoption of greater restrictions on admission criteria. Globalisation is mentioned by many authors as an important factor behind the erosion of the postwar citizenship model.¹ Changes in states policies are interpreted as deriving from new constraints imposed by globalisation. These discussions raise important political issues regarding the democratic and emancipatory potential of globalisation for any emergent model of citizenship.

Although in this dissertation we have also assumed that a new citizenship model is replacing the postwar model in Western societies, we did not focus on the redefinition of citizenship rights (civil, political, and social and economic rights) granted by the Keynesian state. Rather, we emphasised the impact of globalisation of politics within this redefinition. Insofar as globalisation increases the porosity of state borders, this questions the exclusiveness of the national framework of citizenship politics. Our central hypothesis has been that the deepening of globalisation over the past two decades has brought about a redefinition of the scale of citizenship. The latter is no longer confined to state borders. In fact, the globalisation of politics brings about rescaling of the national and territorial dimensions of citizenship politics around various political loci – from the local to the emerging global. The rescaling of citizenship indicates two broader changes, which suggest a major remapping of Western politics: 1) the unbundling and the disembeddedness of the national state territory and 2) the consolidation of a global political space. Both spatial changes have opened the door to the emergence of new forms of territoriality that question the primacy of the national state territory in citizenship politics. This does not mean that the latter

has become meaningless. It can, however, no longer be taken as the exclusive and coterminous framework delimiting citizenship politics.

We developed these theoretical discussions about the new geographies of citizenship through a diachronic comparative analysis of the James Bay hydroelectric development in Northern Québec. This development occurred in two main phases, which involved the construction of two vast hydroelectric complexes: the La Grande complex (1970-1975) and the Great Whale project (1988-1994). The launching of each project gave rise to important debates and struggles that opposed the project's proponents (the Québec government and Hydro-Québec) to the Aboriginal peoples inhabiting the region (Cree and Inuit) and to environmentalist and ecology groups. Whereas the La Grande project was successfully pursued by its proponents, the Great Whale was abandoned as a result of effective opposition from the Cree people and ecology groups. Here, we focused on the changes in the political scales of citizenship both in Québec and in Canadian politics over the past three decades and showed the impact of globalisation in the redefinition of citizenship politics.

This discussion surrounding the current redefinition of citizenship politics has been both theoretical and empirical implications. In proposing a new political history of the James Bay hydroelectric development, it also suggests a theoretical perspective that can account for the spatial changes of citizenship politics. It proposed the examination of the scale politics of citizenship, to explain how the latter has been differentially redefined over time and across space, and how globalisation has broadened its spatial framework. A core element of this perspective is the notion of *process of jumping scales* to explain the current remapping of political space, notably, the (re)construction of territoriality. In the following pages, we will present the main findings of the dissertation and propose future avenues of research.

The Scale Politics of the James Bay Hydroelectric Development: Beyond the National Space?

In the first part of the dissertation, we related the story of the La Grande project, discussing successively the involvement of its three main actors: the Québec government and Hydro-Québec; the Cree people; and ecology and environmentalist groups. In this section, we argued that the debates centred on the La Grande project revealed a transformation of the citizenship spaces in Québec and

Canada, introducing significant breaches in the postwar model. We compared two different processes of jumping scales: a downward process involving the Québec nationalist movement and the Québec government, and certain upward processes involving the Cree and ecology groups. Despite their different implications, both processes were framed by the classical division of political space centred on the national space.

Three main findings may be drawn from the section on the La Grande project. Those debates confirmed the predominance of the national state territory, which remained the determining political scale in the construction of citizenship politics. This did not prevent the redefinition of the various political spaces characterising the Québec and Canadian political scenes. Indeed, the struggles of the Crees and ecology groups were based on the launching of processes of jumping scales, which called into question the signification of the national scales of citizenship politics. Their struggles aimed to transform the national scales into a space of resistance, whereas they delimited a space of affirmation for the Québec government, especially since the Quiet Revolution. The territorial location of national scales was not, however, called into question. Although the legitimacy of their struggles also derived from the discourses and events that occurred on the international political scene, the Canadian borders remained the determining political site for the resolution of their citizenship struggles.

Secondly, these chapters reveal an important reconfiguration of citizenship politics which resulted in the political recognition of the Cree people and ecology groups as legitimate actors. Both succeeded in overcoming their political exclusion from the Québec and Canadian political scenes. Their struggles resulted in pressure on the Québec and federal governments to broaden the recognition of Aboriginal and environmental rights. In doing so, they challenged the bases of the process of social closure underlying Canadian and Québec citizenship, redrawing the contours of "we-ness". Changes in citizenship politics also resulted from the empowerment of the Québec nationalist movement which brought about a redefinition of Québec citizenship at the national level. This underscored the overlapping, or, more exactly, the competition between Canadian and Québec citizenship, each characterised as "national" by their respective governments. Thus, the debates surrounding the La Grande project introduced new, alternative scales for the configuration of citizenship politics.

Lastly, these chapters address the political ramification for the Québec territory, as competing representations of the Québec territory were incorporated into the debates. The "nationalisation" of this territory, which came along with the development of Québec's international relations, constituted an important change. Québec territory gained a strong symbolic and political value that has been emphasised by successive governments since the Quiet Revolution. The launching of the James Bay development reflected this view. The debates raised by the Cree and ecology groups also entailed an opposition between competing forms of territoriality. Whereas the Cree people referred to the James Bay territory as their ancestral homeland, the environmentalist and ecology groups focused on its ecological dimension. As such, they both conceptualised and (re)presenting it as one small part of a global ecosystem. Those views challenged the Québec's and Canada's state territoriality, as based on the logic sovereignty.

The three subsequent chapters focussed on the Great Whale project. The objective of this section was to discuss the changes in the rescaling of citizenship politics that occurred in the debates surrounding this project, emphasising the role played by globalisation. Here, we explored the changes in the processes of jumping scales that resulted from the mobilisation of the various actors involved in the controversies. The discussion was based on the same three actors although a greater attention was paid to the involvement of the federal government, as it played a more important role at this time.

Two main findings can be drawn from these three chapters. First, the struggles against the Great Whale project shed light on some important changes in the processes of jumping scales. One was the politicisation of the global scale, which helped in the consolidation of a global political space. This global political space, in turn, became a site of struggles, as it was used in distinct ways by different social actors. The participation of the Cree and ecology groups in transnational and global networks played a critical role in this regard, as it provided them the opportunity to carry the debates beyond Québec's territory. This resulted in the juxtaposition of different representations of the global space: the world market and, more specifically, the world energy market on the one hand and humankind or, rather, a global political community on the other. This reveals that the globalisation of politics has occurred in two distinct ways: a globalisation from above, such it appears in the Hydro-Québec's strategies and, from

below through the Crees' and ecology groups' struggles.² By globalisation from below, we refer to the mobilisation of non-state actors who attempt to democratise the debates about globalisation and, at the same time, propose alternatives to the neo-liberal discourse that is predominant in the discourses linked to the globalisation from above.

The processes of jumping scales also involved a politicisation of the local scale of the James Bay region. The local definition advanced by the Cree and ecology groups paralleled that of other development projects in other regions of the world in which the rights of Indigenous peoples have been threatened. In contrast to the Québec and Canadian governments, the local scale around which their struggles revolved was not defined in relation to their national borders. Moreover, the local struggles cannot be seen simply as a reaction to changes occurring at the global level, especially at the economic level.³ The global appeared to be a political site occupied by Indigenous peoples and ecology groups, not only by states and neo-liberal forces. Even if they remain at the margins in the global space, their participation, which is linked to the development of non-state relations within and outside the UN, is nonetheless meaningful. According to this perspective, politics relates not only to what occurs at the local/regional levels, but also to events and changes at the global level.

The second finding reveals an increasing differentiation of citizenship spaces and the emergence of a new geography of citizenship with variable scales. A focus on the division between national and international - based on the existence of state borders -, does not allow us to come to grips with the various political spaces involved in the debates surrounding the James Bay hydroelectric development. This does not mean that the national no longer plays an important role in the definition of citizenship or that global citizenship is replacing it. The latter remains a project, at best, in the making.⁴ Nevertheless, the struggles around the Great Whale project indicate a dissolving of the presumed symmetry between the scales of citizenship and state borders. This is being reinforced with the growing recognition of the plurinational dimensions of Québec and Canadian societies, both of which raise important challenges and call for the establishment of new citizenship models. Struggles by Cree and ecology groups reveal a displacement of the accountability sites through the networks set up by the NGOs or by the media.⁵ They

show that their citizenship holds different meanings for these groups and is derived from different locales. Furthermore, the delimitation of their scales remains open.

New Avenues of Research

The theoretical framework developed in this dissertation raises many questions that require further exploration. First, there is the need to clarify the role of scales in the construction of territoriality and, more broadly, in the delimitation of spatial and power relations. This dissertation compliments recent studies that emphasise the need to pay more attention to scales, and to explore the social and political implications of space. The notion of jumping scales is particularly interesting in this regard. The struggles surrounding the James Bay territory shed light on contradictory processes of jumping scales, each of them reflecting various forms of territoriality informed by different histories and meanings. Our discussion illustrates the impact of what can be characterised as infraterritorial and supraterritorial scales and calls into question the centrality of state borders. Although they remain a determining scale, state borders are merely one form of scales among many others. This view challenges the predominant, state-centric, perspective on territory and, more generally, the cartographic vision of the world. It calls for the deepening and broadening of studies on the processes through which scales are historically and spatially constructed. It is crucial, then, to take a more careful look at the role played by economic and cultural issues in the delimitation of scales, since they became a central issue in the mobilisation of the Indigenous peoples movement.

This dissertation explores new research possibilities with respect to the impacts of globalisation. These possibilities provide an alternative to the predominant historicism which often frames the current discussions of globalisation.⁶ There exists a lot of confusion surrounding the meaning of globalisation and its implications. Globalisation does not only merely involve the spread of neo-liberalism and the consolidation of the world market, nor is it involves all changes occurring at the world level. In this dissertation, we sought to the debates about globalisation by illustrating two forms of globalisation carried out by different actors and involving distinct political agendas: globalisation from above and globalisation from below. We suggested that the globalisation of politics cannot be reduced to a political ideology. It entails significant changes that call for a reorganisation of the world polity, and, at the same time, a

redefinition of the theoretical tools used to better understand these changes. Furthermore, it necessitates greater specificity in the use of theory to understand the implications of globalisation, allowing to cope more efficiently with the on-going social/political change.

Another avenue of research might include a focus on the role of the marginal sites in the definition of citizenship politics, which may have a territorial basis. Another promising avenue would be to discuss the formation of diasporas in relation to national or cultural minorities. These research avenues challenge us to confront a major shortcoming in the social sciences in the global era: to explain the diversity, the mobility, the multiple spatiality and hybridity of social life. Instead of bringing about the formation of a world society, the recent change seem rather to intensify the difference and inequality within and between world regions. The representation of society as a bounded and homogenous space appears to be in jeopardy and thus, needs to be reconceptualised.

NOTES

¹ Cf. Saskia SASSEN, "On Economic Citizenship", in *Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1996, pp. 31-58; Patricia HEWITT, "Social Justice in a Global Economy?", in *Citizenship Today. The Contemporary relevance of T.H. Marshall*, edited by Martin BULMER & Anthony M. REES, London, UCL Press, 1996, pp. 249-267; Christopher PIERSON, *Beyond the Welfare State?*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1994; Jocelyn LÉTOURNEAU, *Les années sans guide. Le Canada à l'ère de l'économie migrante*, Montréal, Boréal, 1996, pp. 67-83; Ian CULPITT, *Welfare and Citizenship. Beyond the Crisis of the Welfare State?*, London, Sage, 1992, pp. 1-24; Christopher McALL, "L'État des citoyens et la liberté du marché", *Sociologie et sociétés*, vol. 31, no 2, 1999, pp. 27-40

² . We refer here to the distinction made by Richard Falk which nicely illustrates very well two contradictory portraits of globalisation. This opposition clearly appeared at the Millennium Conference organised by the World Trade Organisation in Seattle. Of course, globalisation from below still remains a marginal trajectory. Richard FALK, *Predatory Globalization. A Critique*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1999, pp. 3-5; Neil SMITH, "Global Seattle", *Society and Space*, vol. 18, no 1, 2000, pp. 1-5.

³ . See, for example, Manuel Castells' analysis on the mobilisation of social movements against globalisation. Cf. Manuel CASTELLS, *The Power of Identity*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1997, pp. 68-110

⁴ . John URRY, *Sociology Beyond Societies. Mobility for the Twentieth Century*, London & New York, Routledge, 2000, pp. 161-187; Andrew LINKLATER, *The Transformation of Political Community. Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1998, pp. 179-212;

⁵ . Similar analyses illustrating the development of supranational political sites through the extension of networks have been published recently. Cf. Margaret KECK, Kathrin SIKKINK, *Activists Beyond Borders*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1998; Jeffrey M. AYRES, *Defying Conventional Wisdom. Political Movements and Popular Contention Against North American Free Trade*, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1998; Alison BRYSK, *From Tribal Village to Global Village. Indian Rights and International Relations in Latin America*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2000, 334 pages + index; Paul WAPNER, *Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics*, Albany (NY), State University of New York Press, 1996;

Roland BLEIKER, *Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000.

⁶. Cf. Clive BARNETT, Murray LOW, "After Globalization", *Society and Space*, vol. 18, no 1, 2000, pp. 53-61.

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APPENDIX

List of Interviews:

André BEAUCHAMP, Président of AQLPA and member of the Coalition pour un débat publique sur l'énergie;

Abel BOSUM, Chief of the First Nation of Ouje-Bougoumou, Ouje-Bougoumou, October 1992

James BOBBISH, Cree Board of Health and Services, Cree Regional Administration, Chisasibi, October 1992;

Daphné CASTEL, Mouvement Au Courant and member of the Coalition pour un débat public sur l'énergie, Montréal, March 1993;

David CLICHE, President of Forum Grande-Baleine, Montréal, March 1993

Matthew COON-COME, Former Grand Chief of the Grand Council of the Cree(s), Ottawa, October-December 1992,

Brian CRAIK, Embassy of the Grand Council of the Cree(s), October 1992-March 1993;

Samuel GOLD, Member of the Band Council of Waswanipi, Waswanipi, November 1992;

Abel KITCHEN, President of Creeco, Val-D'Or, November 1992;

Hélène LAJAMBE, The James Bay Committee and member of the Coalition pour un débat public sur l'énergie, Montréal, January 1993,

David MASTY, Member of the Band Council of Whapmagoostui, Whapmagoostui, October 1992;

Henry MIANSUM, Chief of the First Nation of Mistassini, Mistassini, October 1992;

Matthew MUKASH, Chief of the First Nation of Whapmagoostui, Whapmagoostui, October 1992;

Eddie PACHANOS, Band Council of Chisasibi, Chisasibi, November 1992;

Rob PACHANOS, Board of Compensation, Cree Regional Administration, Val D'Or, November 1992;

Roméo Diom SAGANASH, Grand Council of the Cree(s), Québec, February 1993;

François TANGUAY, Responsable of the Energy Section, Greenpeace Québec. Montréal, April 1993;

Sam TAPIATIC, Band Council of Chisasibi, Chisasibi, November 1992;

In addition to these formal interviews, informal interviews and discussions were done with other actors involved in the debates during conferences, manifestations, special events. Moreover, discussions with other researchers working on similar questions, especially the researchers from the GETIC, were particularly useful.