

***THE ARCHITECTURE(S) OF NATION-BUILDING***

**by**

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## **Abstract**

The end of the Cold War was followed by a seemingly endless period of transition, accompanied by academic literature and predictions of revolutions in military affairs, the demise of the state and the over-turning of Westphalian order. Absent from political discourse have been new metaphoric systems and frames that adapt to the changing realities of the international system. Our political conceptions remain dominated by key metaphoric systems such as the STATE AS A CONTAINER, and the STATE AS A PERSON. As several authors have suggested, we are facing a crisis of metaphor, and continue to understand new realities through traditional metaphoric concepts.

This study investigates how successfully our metaphoric concepts are keeping pace with the changing realities of the international system. The study focuses on the role and implications of architectural metaphor in international political discourse, particularly as concerns the interventions conducted by the international community in the affairs of sovereign states. Nation-building is taken as the seminal intersection of a relationship between international relations, war and architecture. In juxtaposing the theory and practise of nation-building onto our dominant metaphoric systems, we can judge to what degree ideas and reality are converging or remain anachronous. It concludes that while our metaphors are roughly keeping pace with realities, that international relations theory is perhaps facing the same crisis as modern architecture.

**Keywords:** Architecture, nation-building, international relations, metaphor, war

## Acknowledgements

*You become subject to the tyranny of concepts* (Cohn 1987: 714).

The inspiration for this thesis was the personal and professional experience of interacting with Coalition Forces planners in the lead-up to the Iraq war of 2003. I went away from the experience enchanted by what I perceived as their grand architectural project of war and state reform. President Bush's message to the people of Iraq at the start of hostilities laid out a horizon of profound societal, economic and political change that Coalition forces intended to deliver. These dreams of future order were difficult to reconcile with the ground level truth I saw in southern Iraq in the first days of the conflict, or the heavily mediatized chaos immediately following the military victory. In translating these experiences from the anecdotal to the academic realm, I realise now that I was a victim of what George Lakoff describes as the pernicious nature of metaphors used in discourse surrounding foreign policy and the rationale for going to war.

A special thanks goes to an anonymous U.S. Colonel that I met in Camp Doha, Qatar, in late March 2003, in the final planning stages of the Iraq invasion. When I asked him how the Coalition forces were researching their plans for an eventual occupation of Iraq, he had no hesitation in his answer: "Google." If that wasn't the real inspiration for this thesis, I'll probably never know what was. Shame that I didn't have the foresight to ask for his bibliography, it might have saved me a bunch of research.

Raj Rana  
April 29, 2005  
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## **Chapter 1      IR, War, Architecture and Metaphor**

Last summer, in the lull of the August media doze, the Bush Administration's doctrine of preventive war took a major leap forward. On August 5, 2004, the White House created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization headed by former US Ambassador to Ukraine Carlos Pascual. Its mandate is to draw up elaborate "post-conflict" plans for up to twenty-five countries that are not, as of yet, in conflict. According to Pascual, it will also be able to coordinate three full-scale reconstruction operations in different countries "at the same time," each lasting "five to seven years." ... *Fittingly, a government devoted to perpetual pre-emptive deconstruction now has a standing office of perpetual pre-emptive reconstruction* (Klein 2005, emphasis added).

Once, nations were forged through "blood and iron." Today, the world seeks to build them through conflict resolution, multilateral aid, and free elections. But this more civilized approach has not yielded many successes. For nation building to work, some harsh compromises are necessary—including military coercion and the recognition that democracy is not always a realistic goal (Ottaway 2002: 16).

### **The Crossroads of Architectural Metaphor and War**

The reality of how and why the international community intervenes in the affairs of sovereign states lies somewhere between the contemporary snapshots that authors Naomi Klein and Marina Ottaway offer. The former example underlines how war and politics have collapsed onto each other, where diplomacy, war, and reconstruction are

being conceived of in the same spatial and temporal horizon, where real, potential and virtual wars are given equal treatment. In the new interventionist logic, nations' destruction and reconstruction are envisaged as a continuum, and the reconstruction 'campaign' parallels the military planning as if part of a broader National Security Strategy of pre-emption. Ottaway frames how we have arrived at this evolution, the result of an international community with an enlightened and holistic view of military interventions that imagine the full range of policy, moral and practical considerations, underwritten by a dogmatic faith in the superiority of participative and democratic forms of governance. This latter glimpse concludes on a more sobering note: 'building' nations is infrequently successful and there remain episodes where there is no choice other than military action, and that the 'spreading' of democracy cannot be viewed as the moral legitimization for all military interventions. To draw an ambivalent (and Orwellian) moral from these perspectives: war is peace, but war is still sometimes just plain war.

In an era where war is being re-framed as a constructive activity, where security and foreign policy are stuck spatially between lingering views of containment and progressive ideas of human rights-driven interventions, humanitarian engagement and 'Empire Lite', there is a notable seduction in basing political discourse on convenient euphemisms. 'Occupation' can be termed as nation-building, 'humanitarian war' describes war where the aggressor faces few losses, and 'liberation' is re-framed as the first step towards inevitable democraticization, and not the catastrophic human and material loss that accompanies military intervention. But these euphemisms are a first and simplistic reading of international political discourse.

Underlying much of the convenient deceptions embodied in euphemisms are the complex metaphors at play in political discourse, and particularly those surrounding war. We can conceive of war, both literally and figuratively through the use of metaphor- the STATE AS A CONTAINER metaphor grounds the understanding of an international system whose basic building blocks are states, and the variant of war where two container-states enter into armed conflict. In thinking in terms of the STATE AS A PERSON, we are able to distil the Iraq wars to a duel between Saddam Hussein and Presidents Bush; we frame the tragedy of the 1990 invasion of Kuwait as the RAPE OF KUWAIT, successfully bridging the literal rape of Kuwait, and the figurative rape of the STATE AS A BODY. Metaphor in all of these cases is first allowing us to conceive of what are otherwise abstract phenomenon, through items and images we know- the state through the body, the state as a container, military invasion as rape. Important to political discourse, metaphor often frames problem setting, or from the stating of the problem, already frames the solution. Told of the literal and figurative rape of Kuwait, a voting public sees little choice than to agree with their nation going to war- would we allow such a crime to go unpunished at home? To continue from this logic, if a population is convinced to think of war in terms of architecture- WAR IS ARCHITECTURE- it opens up the possibility to politically persuade a voting public that war is a constructive act. Who would contest going to war when the motivation and end-state was the improvement of lives of those to be 'liberated'?

Metaphors as a fixture of political discourse is not a new phenomenon. The shift towards specifically *architectural* metaphors and construction inferences is a compelling contemporary illustration of an evolving view of how and why the international

community is intervening militarily in the affairs of sovereign states. Architecture in this context is more accurately architecture(s) as there are more than one possible metaphor and associated inferences. We are now speaking of an international community that speaks of architecture in terms of the physical reconstruction following a conflict, the architecture of the international system that governs the use of force, war as an analogous to the architectural project, generals and diplomats as architects, and war- and peace-plans as 'blueprints'. When overwhelmed by the complex mapping of source and target domains implicated, it is little surprise that Ottaway's sobering appeal for modesty in nation-building projects is being ignored. Strict pragmatism no longer approximates our architecturally based fantasies of creating through destroying, or of undertaking grand architectural projects of physical, societal and political reform of states through war.

Globally, the contemporary intersection of politics, language and war described thus far is not entirely new. The notion that war is a catalyst for change is best captured by Charles Tilly's famous statement, "War makes states" (Tilly 1985: 170). The portrayal of the situation facing the United States in Iraq today, could be mistaken for that which they faced in Korea in 1952- replete with 'new battlegrounds' and enemies, reticence on the part of their British allies, and a 'Coalition of the Willing' who does not

pay its bills.<sup>1</sup> There has always been a ‘myth’ of war for which war is fought. If there was not, war wouldn’t survive the first contact, nor the first body bag. Yet the contemporary episodes of war present us with a whispered nuanced paradox: in an international system that is undergoing fundamental changes since the end of the Cold War, it is odd that our military and political actions and conceptions remain grounded in fundamentally outdated metaphoric frames and concepts. Despite the freedoms of an international system beyond the constraints of a bi-polar power structure, the actors within it lead remarkably similar political lives and maintain very traditional views.

Since the end of the Cold War, the international system has entered into a seemingly endless period of transition. There has been significant academic literature charting revolutions in military affairs, the demise of the state, the over-turning of Westphalian order and the new exercise of power in a uni-power world. However accurate these prognoses as a whole have proven, absent from political discourse have been new metaphoric systems and frames that adapt to the changing realities of the

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<sup>1</sup> Ekbladh (2004:1) narrates the situation as follows: “It was a grim autumn. The United States was trapped in an increasingly unpopular conflict, with much of the nation’s strength committed to a grinding, seemingly endless struggle. America was confronted by a dangerous new enemy in the world, but critics on both sides of the political spectrum argued that the current battleground was far from the best theatre in which to confront it. At the United Nations, the Security Council was in gridlock as other powers stymied U.S. initiatives. America’s allies, including the British, whose troops were fighting beside the Americans, were growing more and more uncomfortable with Washington’s bellicose rhetoric, worrying that the American’s loud talk would inflame the entire region. The United States could reassure itself with the thought that it headed an international coalition, but this was cold comfort when the U.S. Treasury was paying most of the bills for the foreign troops and local forces. There was no easy way out. Americans realized that military action had committed them inescapably to a prolonged effort to reconstruct and modernize a distant land. To abandon a country shattered by war and decades of authoritarian rule would be a poor advertisement for the type of political and economic system the United States wanted to promote” (Ekbladh 2004: 1).

international system. As several authors have suggested, we are facing a crisis of metaphor, and continue to use our traditional metaphoric concepts to deal with new ideas and realities.

George Lakoff expands upon the nuanced contemporary international political realities with an intricate example:

At a time when terrorist threats come from groups of *individuals* rather than states, when wars occur *within nations*, when "free markets" exist *without freedom*, when *overpopulation* threatens stability, when *intolerant cultures* limit freedom and promote violence, when *transnational corporations* act like oppressive governments, and when the *oil economy* threatens the planet's future, the central problems in today's world cannot be solved by state-level approaches (Lakoff 2004: 63, emphasis in original).

The revolution he is suggesting for international relations theory is almost tangential in the telling: the very dominance of *state-centric* thinking is precisely the contemporary problem. While there has been a recent return to international relations theory to the importance of strong states, structures and institutions, this is in contradiction with the growing complexities of the roles and actors in the international system. Lakoff quite cleverly assembles a collection of 'issues' that are incompatible with state-level solutions, employing problem-setting. Suggesting that state-level approaches are not the answer, is to project the question to an international system where governance is based on a metaphoric system that has not yet come to challenge the fixity of the STATE AS A CONTAINER. The rise of international organizations? The United Nations as a *bona fide* global government?

It is not surprising that architectural metaphor is given greater importance in attempting to understand the increasingly chaotic international system that Lakoff describes. In a world where determining order is increasingly difficult, there is a

withdrawal into a realm where idealized and sanitized views can reassure us. Ole Wæver underlines an important warning about ‘architecture’ tropes in the context of European debates on the changing security environment: “[m]etaphors of architecture and the insistent talk of institutions revealed a longing for fixity, for structures, for predictability” (qtd. in Klein 1998: 335). This reductive use of architecture as a metaphor is the most common found in international political discourse. Within this frame, architecture at best allows the illusion and dream of order; it is a very two-dimensional view of architecture, one that addresses a very ‘organigram’ founded understanding of architecture (perhaps better termed ‘organitecture’). At the other extreme of architectural metaphor, where architecture is used in its richest sense, architectural metaphor in politics can embody the spirit and vision of constructing, quite literally architectural ambitions in the political realm. This is exemplified by the variety of examples introduced, where WAR IS ARCHITECTURE, where planning for war and peace are ‘blueprints’ and where we treat war as a project for constructing nations- nation-building being the contemporary term of choice for encompassing much of the post- Cold War military interventions by the international community. But underlying the use of such metaphors is the sense that in claiming to launch wars under the guise of nation-building, and pre-emptively ‘nation-building’ ‘failed states’ for their perceived threat to security, we are talking about constructions, without stopping to ask what we are trying to build.

It is easier to be Dr. Frankenstein than to play God; it is easier to animate dead metaphors than to invent new ones (Rohrer 1995: 135).

This study takes as its over-arching question of how successfully our metaphoric concepts are keeping pace with the realities of the international system. The study focuses on the role and implications of architectural metaphor in international political discourse,

particularly as concerns the interventions conducted by the international community in the affairs of sovereign states. It takes the specific contemporary example of nation-building in its literal and metaphoric senses as the subject of study, as a seminal example of the intersection of war, international relations theory and architectural metaphor. It focuses on the contemporary use of the term and practise of nation-building, as a seminal example of what has been termed as the current crisis in metaphor, where we continue to employ Cold War, containment-based metaphoric systems, to understand the changing political realities of the international system.

In answering this question it will be necessary to draw upon diverse theoretic perspectives and academic domains, ranging from cognitive science, to international relations and architectural theory. Nation-building in the figurative and literal domains matches well the spirit of the times, reflecting the contemporary foreign policy approach of key nations. But while nation-building suggests imagery of constructing, building sites and foundations, reading beyond the existing academic literature suggests that actually constructing nations is the least tangible effect of the term, despite the largely scientific attempts to quantify its successful examples. Used in political discourse, metaphor has a pernicious quality in its capacity to highlight some possible meanings, while effectively veiling those less desirable- war re-framed as a constructive act, for example (Mac Ginty 2003: 613). In order to prove and disprove the implications of architectural metaphor, a dialogue is set up whereby nation-building is re-fit into the three of the key metaphoric systems that underlie international political discourse on war, and the challenges to the traditional metaphoric conceptions can be charted, and possible implications imagined.

While not focussing on a single example for its 'test', the investigation is limited to the post- Cold War period, and particular emphasis is put on the post- September 11, 2001 terror attacks, as it provides the best researched and illuminating examples of the germane issues. In focussing on the specific role of architectural metaphor in the discourse surrounding the interventions of the international community, of equal importance is keeping the broader context of the transition of the international system, and how power is exercised, by whom and for what purpose. The concluding emphasis is ultimately on the possible relationships and implications for both international relations and architectural theory and practise. The resonance of Rohrer's 1995 statement has to some extent be reconsidered.

## **Evolving Policies of Engagement**

In the immediate wake of the Cold War's end, as President George Bush was coining the term 'New World Order', the international community engaged in collective security action under UN mandate (Gulf War 1991), and morally motivated peacekeeping missions (Balkans, Somalia). How and why the international community intervened in the affairs of sovereign states was beginning its transition. It was no longer the Cold War security landscape and realities of containment, with the superpowers waging proxy wars, and infrequently replacing the odd dictator with a more friendly one. There was the final realization of the dream that had led to the founding of the League of Nations and then the United Nations: an end to armed conflict, and actions being taken in favour of the 'collective'. The Gulf War of 1991 from certain perspectives could be viewed as a stellar achievement of the United Nations, sanctioning a collective military response to a threat

to security, the force being a composition of over 34 states from well beyond the geographic range of the Gulf. To varying degrees, the peacekeeping action led by the United Nations in the 1990s carried much of the same benevolent spirit, with collective military action being underwritten by a dogma of human rights respect, and as the decade progressed, a new banner of democratization being the rallying point for multinational interventions.

The evolution of the collective 'interventionist' philosophy reached its high water mark in NATO's 1999 war in Kosovo, where a regional security organization, without sanction from the collective of the United Nations, undertook military action, largely in the name of human rights and defence of a persecuted minority. Without fighting a traditional battle or on a battlefield, they negotiated what constituted the occupation of sovereign Yugoslavian territory. Odder still, the United Nations eventually took on the role of interim administrator, creating a *de facto* parallel Kosovar state-within-a-state, with no intention of delivering it to sovereign status. The terming of the Kosovar conflict as 'humanitarian war' brought the evolution to its zenith. It is no surprise that multinational military interventions, with or without UN sanction, are referred to as part of a new 'humanitarian empire', and the unflattering comparisons to empire are only compounded by making parallels to its representatives as (in the case of Bosnia Herzegovina) the 'European Raj' (Knauss and Martin 2003).

This transition period of how the international community conceived of their military interventions in the affairs of sovereign states has been paralleled by a deepening crisis of metaphor in international political discourse. This crisis arose from attempting to frame the changing political realities into traditional, state-centric frames. It is not for

a lack of potential metaphors that this crisis occurred. Since 1989 and 1991, various academic literatures have confusingly claimed ‘The End of History’, a ‘Doctrine of International Community’ and a ‘Global Village’; the realities of international relations have remained state-based theories, policies and action. In 1995 Chilton and Lakoff underlined the problem: “The end of the Cold War has led to a metaphor crisis in European and American foreign policy. No new metaphorical concepts have been formed to handle what are very potent dangers in the new Europe” (44). They go on to explain that the convenient images of containment, and nation-state based modes of thinking continued to prevail, despite a rapidly changing security landscape defined by the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, the rise of inter-state conflict, and the proliferation of small arms and nuclear weapons. There was increasing use of the term ‘architecture’ in prescribing solutions to the security risks- re-thinking security ‘architecture’, redefining the ‘architecture’ of organizations and bodies of law.

While the richness of architectural metaphor was used to successfully bridge the gap between changing realities and conceptions for the (then) future European Union (the common European house metaphor- Chapter 2), there was a regression to a reductive, almost two-dimensional imagery of architecture. As Klein describes it, “The result is a chilling formalism – a caricature, if you will, of high-modernist planning that is joined when talk turns to ‘a new architecture’ of security for Europe and for a redesign of NATO” (1998: 331). This shift could be seen as a particularly two-dimensional concepts of ‘architecture’ where the political response to changing political and security realities, was to re-structure existing institutions. This crisis observed in 1995 is only more acute

in 2005, in light of a changing strategic and security environment following the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, and the nuanced challenges illustrated earlier by Lakoff.

The crisis of metaphor finds its parallel in the architectural realm. Modern architecture has been increasingly dominated by the economic, regulatory and programmatic demands of competitive business practise. The risk for architecture is clearly the threat that architecture will be constrained to the prosaic by the weight of constraints, and will with difficulty rise to the production of poetic works of architecture of past era. It poses curious questions as to whether nation-building and international relations theory are not facing the same issues as architecture: how to remain a science and a commercially viable profession, but without losing that which makes it an art.

R.B.J Walker captured the essence of the current challenges to traditional concepts of the international system when he observed: "...politics has not always played out where it is supposed to play out" (2003: 240).<sup>2</sup> To make a Walker-like parallel with the study between international relations, war and architectural metaphor, it can be asserted that architecture, politics and war are not occurring where, when or how we

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<sup>2</sup> Walker's article is part Magnusson and Shaw's, *A Political Space*. This collection of essays frames an argument around the possibility of interpreting the global through the local, re-imagining Clayoquot sound and the various debates around natural resource exploitation from outside the constraints of our political imagination. (Magnusson vii). They describe their form of inquiry as "a method that privileges the site itself rather than the interpretive frame that we bring to it" (Magnusson viii). Through consideration and re-consideration, the place and politics of Clayoquot dissolves to the point where there is no "one" Clayoquot sound. As one could define Clayoquot as a site of environmental debate, there is equally the Clayoquot of the First Nation's peoples, that of the Province of British Columbia, that of the logging companies, land claim lawyers, eco-tourists and hikers and so on. As the reader is forced to think outside of the metaphoric box of their own structuring, Clayoquot sound ultimately finds itself both the core and periphery of its own debate- the subject and the result, the object and the cause... or vice-versa.

would expect them to. The underlying question is where we might find such architectures, how they might work and imagine what it is that their authors seek to build. In understanding the international system, the foreign policies enacted within it, and the armed interventions and wars that result of it, the international community has withdrawn into a deceptive realm of architectural metaphor and imagery. But somehow we have confused our asking what exactly we are trying to build, or who is building what for whose benefit.

## **Plan of the Work**

In examining how literal and figurative nation-building are keeping pace with the changing realities of the international system, this study investigates the two elements separately, and then forces the two into dialogue when juxtaposed against some of the dominant metaphoric systems that ground international political discourse. Chapter 2 examines how metaphor functions and the particular case of architectural metaphor in political discourse. While the common European house metaphor shows the success of architectural metaphor in bridging new realities and concepts, it also perpetuates the abstractions that delineate and structure the discourse- speaking of the European Union as a house facilitates discussion, but avoids discussing the house's occupants. The crisis of metaphor, where we continue to understand new realities through our traditional conceptual frameworks, is developed as the bridge for examining the literal realm of nation-building. Chapter 3 is an examination of the practise and theory of literal nation-building that uncovers the deceptions of nation-building as a core intervention of the international community. While it is used as a literal term, when the how, what and why

are applied to the existing theory and practise, there seems less interest in the construction of nations, and more on the needs of the nation-builders. In Chapter 4, the metaphoric and literal nation-buildings are collided, attempting to fit the realities and implications of nation-building into 3 of the key metaphoric systems that underlie how we structure our understanding of the international system and international political discourse- the STATE AS A CONTAINER, the STATE AS A PERSON and the FAIRY TALE OF JUST WAR. This marriage of architectural metaphor and reality, tests to what extent we can- and can't- fit new ideas onto old metaphors. Chapter 5 concludes looking at the limits of metaphor and specifically the potential links between international relations theory and architectural practise. The conclusion brings the argument full circle to bring the lessons learned from the architectural realm to bear on the outcome of a discussion between the literal and figurative aspects of nation-building. It concludes that the state of modern architecture and international relations theory is remarkably similar. The key question that both face is how to take the 'constructions' from the constraints of the prosaic to the realm of the poetic, or how to take nation-building from science and to instil it with the qualities of an art.

## Chapter 2      Politics and Architectural Metaphor

If armed men invaded a home in this country, killed those in their way, stole what they wanted and then announced the house was now theirs -- no one would hesitate about what must be done. And that is why we cannot hesitate about what must be done halfway around the world: in Kuwait (President George Bush 1991).

Metaphorical thought, in itself, is neither good nor bad; it is simply commonplace and inescapable. The use of metaphor is as old as language itself, as is the debate of its use and value. The example of President Bush's *Open Letter to College Students on the Persian Gulf Crisis* (1991) sets the stage for the particular study of metaphor as used in foreign policy discourse. The campaign to legitimize collective military action to "liberate" Kuwait was strongly metaphoric, and has benefited from intense academic study (Lakoff 1991, Pancake 1993, Rohrer 1995, Voss 1992). His use of a domestic crime comparison, for a domestic audience, is not surprising. If WAR IS DOMESTIC CRIME, what citizen would not support deploying their armed forces to repel the thieves-- even if the thieves were half a world away? Yet he is founding his metaphor on a series of broader metaphors that citizens as individuals, and states as part of an international system, use to conceive and understand their broader political lives. Digging deeper into the imagery, one can unearth the metaphoric system of the STATE AS A HOUSE or CONTAINER, and infer that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait could be translated into

TERRITORIAL EXPANSION AS A DOMESTIC CRIME. As President Bush makes clear, no one would hesitate about what must be done. And few did.

Contemporary study on the use of metaphor ranges widely, from *Globalization*, to the *War Against Terror*, *Biotechnology and Biodiversity*, to *War and Environmentalism* (Higgott and Reich 1997, Lakoff 2001, Hellsten 2002, Romaine 1996). A tight community of scholars has pursued the study on the use of metaphor in political discourse, and specifically of war and security studies since the 1980's. Authors have addressed the construction of meaning around the term security (Chilton 1996), the evolution of metaphors in security discourse from images of containment to that of proliferation (Mutimer 1997), metaphor and foreign policy (Chilton and Lakoff 1995) the image of the common European house (Musolff 2000), and construction and movement metaphors in European politics (Schäffner 1996).

George Lakoff's articles investigating the use of metaphor in the decision to go to war against Iraq in both 1991 and 2003 are key to this chapter. Tim Rohrer's 1995 article *The Metaphorical Logic of (Political) Rape: The New Wor(l)d Order* fills in some of the academic gaps that Lakoff's general consumption pieces left. The consistent message throughout much of the contemporary work on metaphors in political discourse is the obfuscating character of metaphor in political discourse: metaphor hides potentially deeper meanings. Lakoff's appeal to the readers and voters is that we have an obligation to unpack the metaphors we use, and to take control of political discourse.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> This 'taking control of political discourse' is the core theme of his most recent work entitled, *Don't Think of an Elephant! Know Your Values and Frame the Discourse*.

Abstractions and enormously complex situations are routinely understood via metaphor. Indeed, there is an extensive, and mostly unconscious, system of metaphor that we use automatically and unreflectively to understand complexities and abstractions. Part of this system is devoted to understanding international relations and war. We now know enough about this system to have an idea of how it functions (Lakoff 1991: 3).

This chapter provides the basic foundation of metaphor for the remainder of the thesis, grounding the role, potentials and risks of metaphor usage in foreign policy discourse and international relations. The ground is prepared for the specific usage of metaphor as used in the rhetoric and inferences underlying the motivations to employ force and intervene militarily. The first section looks at how metaphor functions and the risks in its use. Particular emphasis is put on the role of metaphor in political discourse, taking examples from existing academic study. The second section looks at the specific use of an architectural metaphor in political discourse, using the case study of the common European house metaphor introduced in the 1980's. It shows the reciprocal relationship between political discourse and architectural metaphor, which both evolve over time. The final section looks at what some authors have described as a 'crisis of metaphor' since the end of the Cold War. This crisis is not the product of an absence of metaphors, but of trying to understand an international system which is undergoing significant transition, against what are proving to be unchanging metaphors and metaphoric systems. The challenge is in finding new ideas to fit changing realities.

## **How Metaphor Functions**

Metaphor is a means of understanding one domain of one's experience in terms of another—time in terms of money, life in terms of travel. Such metaphors are so automatic, conventional, and widespread as to seem natural (Chilton and Lakoff 1995: 3).

Cognitive linguistics describes metaphors as a means to understand a new, unknown domain (target domain) in terms of a familiar one (source domain). The source domain is mapped onto the target domain, allowing us to understand a complex concept (politics, the European Union as target) through a familiar term (war and house, as source domains). We would construct these metaphors as POLITICS IS WAR, and the EUROPEAN UNION IS A HOUSE. From simple analogies, we can progress to complex and inferential metaphoric constructions that re-interpret how we understand politics, and uncover how metaphor not only structures understanding, but leads action.

George Lakoff and Mark Johnson's seminal work, *Metaphors We Live By*, is a critical investigation of how our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature (Johnson and Lakoff 1980: 3). Lakoff's further work, particularly on the Gulf Wars and Terrorism (1991, 2001, 2003), are key references for investigations on the link between how we think, and the concepts that guide our relations to politics. The key warning is of the potential deceptions- the pernicious nature- of metaphor, and the critical call that the reader 'unpack' the metaphors that we unconsciously employ.

Lakoff makes the case that metaphor has a simply 'intuitive' quality, in that it facilitates the marriage between things we understand, and applies it to the complex and abstract. From a cognitivist viewpoint, metaphors can be a powerful tool to illuminate abstract and complex concepts " ... often giving a more concrete, vivid image of an abstract notion". (Musolff 2000: 218). Musolff interprets Lakoff and Johnson's definition of metaphor to go so far as to be physiologically 'wired' into our neural system as if we have fixed, predetermined images, albeit ones that are culturally grounded.

One of the key findings of the study of metaphors is that there are a series of dominant and pervasive metaphors that underlie the way we conceive of international relations and the international system. For example, grounded in a traditional Westphalian understanding of the world, states are typically conceived of in terms of the STATE IS A PERSON or STATE IS A CONTAINER metaphors. While we could re-conceptualize our understanding of international relations to one where the STATE IS A CORPORATION or the STATE IS A NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION these metaphors have not replaced our traditional metaphoric frames or concepts. This, despite the fact that realities might demand redefinition.

This conceptual mapping between source and target domains carries with it inevitable risks. In deploying any metaphoric frame to understand an event, or a concept, the human mind flattens the reality into a known image or narrative. As a result, certain elements are foregrounded, while others are edited out. For example, we regularly use and conceive of POLITICS AS WAR and SPORT AS WAR (Howe 1988). While both metaphors communicate a vivid illustration of their subjects, their salient image overwhelms other potential interpretations. In a world where POLITICS is conceived of as WAR, we overlook different models for politics- where politics is participative, where debate and politics is not a contest with clear winners and losers, and where politics is more complex than a two-party system implying 'enemy' and 'friendly' battle. Similarly, IDEAS conceived of as PLANTS, or COMMODITIES, or MONEY or FASHIONS each imply something different about the cultures that use them.

Inherent is the further risk that certain metaphors carry along language that creates a bond with certain cultures or groups, while excluding others. Carol Cohn provides a

lengthy illustration of the exclusivity of certain metaphors in expanding upon her yearlong experience with nuclear defence experts (1987). She writes about the seduction of discussing nuclear annihilation in abstract conceptual terms, those terms reflecting the abstract nature of nuclear war. Having tried to maintain her objectivity- and language- she was eventually obliged to adopt the concepts and acronyms of her counter-parts in order to communicate her ideas. She glibly concludes that discussing nuclear annihilation is almost fun when one can speak of the horrors of nuclear weapons in terms of “escalation dominance”, “pre-emptive strikes”, and “sub holocaust engagements” (708). The extension of Cohn’s experience has direct transfer to the international relations realm, where NATO’s war in Kosovo is described as “humanitarian war” and the use of lethal air-to-surface missiles is termed a “surgical strike”.

The following sections are brief illustrations oriented around Lakoff and Johnson’s work with metaphors. The goal is to take a simple, common metaphor, read its implications and then extend the process to a potential metaphor. Jumping off from their illustration of the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor we can then extrapolate the process to create a new metaphor, WAR IS ARCHITECTURE. The latter metaphor is further unpacked according to Tim Rohrer’s metaphorical inferences (1995)- the broader implications and meanings that any given metaphor might carry along with it in the conceptual mapping between source and target.

## ARGUMENT IS WAR

Your claims are *indefensible*

He *attacked* every weak point in my argument

His criticisms were *right on target*.

I *demolished* his argument.

I've never *won* an argument with him.

You disagree? Okay, *shoot!*

If you use that *strategy*, he'll *wipe you out*.

He *shot down* all of my arguments.

It is important to see that we don't just *talk* about arguments in terms of war... We can actually win or lose arguments... We gain and lose ground... Many of the things we *do* in arguing are partially structured by the concept of war... It is in this sense that the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor is one that we live by in this culture; it structures the actions we perform in arguing (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 4, emphasis in original).

Within Lakoff and Johnson's explanation, there is no separation between thinking and action, in the sense that we imagine arguments in terms of war, and actually perform those same functions in arguing. The title *Metaphors We Live By* drives home the point that the two authors intend.

From this simple structure and example, we can project towards politics to further deconstruct metaphors and their potential mappings. Following the methodology used by authors studying metaphor (Musolff 2000, Pancake 1995, Rohrer 1995, Voss 1992), one mines the press and published political statements looking for trends and examples of potential metaphors. From the collection of sources can be triaged the seminal metaphors

and themes. The following examines the trend of references to construction and architecture used in foreign policy discourse and war, and establishes a case where we can understand WAR through ARCHITECTURE. In this example, a series of examples around the Iraq war and security in the Middle East are listed, those in particular that relate to architecture:

## WAR IS ARCHITECTURE

Neo-Conservatives' 1998 Memos a *Blueprint for Iraq war* (ABC News 2003, emphasis added).

*Architect of Iraq war* visits to admire his handiwork (Reuters 2003, emphasis added).

Strategic Insight: U.S. *Security Architecture* in the Gulf: Elements and Challenges (Bravo and Russell 2003, emphasis added)

But the *architect of this 21st-century holy war* between the West, and its allies, and Islamic fundamentalism casts a large and daunting shadow across the Bush presidency and the American psyche (Lusetich 2003, emphasis added).

The *architecture of international peace and security*, in which we have invested so much over the past fifty years, hangs in the balance (Dauth 2003, emphasis added).

It centers on U.S. war chief General Tommy Franks, *the architect* of Operation Iraqi Freedom (Shawn and Porteus 2003, emphasis added).

From these examples we can establish that we conceive of and conduct war and conceptualize foreign policy through architecture, and that it is not just *talked* about through architecture. We can concretely *design* war, and the potential societal change that follows it. We see Generals, politicians and policy writers as *architects* or architectural characters. These *architects of war and foreign policy* take contexts, site,

geography and constraints, and mobilize the *workers* that bring their *blueprints* to life.

We think of peace and security as a physical *structure*, as *architecture* or an *edifice* that

can be attacked and threatened, balanced or weakened. In the same way that

ARGUMENT IS WAR is one that we live by in western culture, WAR IS

ARCHITECTURE is conceivably one that structures the actions we perform in

conceiving of- and implementing- foreign policy and war.

The risk of simple source-target references is that of over-simplifying how metaphor functions. To examine this metaphor more clearly, we can expand the conceptual mapping of this metaphor further:

<b>ARCHITECTURE</b> (source domain)	<b>WAR</b> (target domain)
Architect	General, Diplomat
Design, blueprint	War plans, end states
Site, locale	Battlefield, 'theatre', target
Project	Campaign
Foundation	Legitimacy
House	Nation, Region
Windows, doors	Opportunities, escape routes
Structure	Hierarchy, alliances
Renovation	Revising plans, counter-attacks

This mapping opens doors on to further metaphoric *entailments* and *inferences*.

To understand WAR through ARCHITECTURE is to bring along entire families of

associated meanings, though with some meanings activated, and others deactivated.

Within this metaphor, General Tommy Franks could be simply described as the ARCHITECT of the Iraq war; narratives can be carried on to his exploiting WINDOWS OF OPPORTUNITY, REVISING BLUEPRINTS and leading the state reform of Iraq as RENOVATING institutions.

While some metaphors can cross the bridge both metaphorically and figuratively, not all have the same freedom. Rohrer highlights an example where President Bush stumbles when asked to elaborate on comparisons between Saddam Hussein and Adolf Hitler (metaphor of HUSSEIN IS HITLER). Bush attempts to answer with an unconvincing parallel with the Holocaust, but his answer trails off when it is clear that he had never contemplated a concrete extension of his own metaphor (Rohrer 1995: 108-109). Conversely, his metaphoric framing of INVASION OF KUWAIT AS RAPE is a successful example where literally and figuratively President Bush found and elaborated upon a persuasive and flexible metaphor which caught the imagination of nations and cultures worldwide. While this may be a nuanced aspect of metaphor, it highlights that not all metaphors are equal.

One final risk with metaphors is potentially one of the most important. Bosman (1987) introduces the concept of problem setting, or the way in which a problem is conceptualized and verbalized, often in a diagnostic-prescriptive continuum. He suggests that problem setting is often metaphorical and already entails the solutions to the problem in its essence or imagery. He uses the example of urban slums being often referred to as DISEASED AREAS (Bosman 1987). Explicitly and inferentially, he is able to mobilize several metaphors and traditional metaphoric systems that lead any answer to urban

poverty. DISEASED suggests a medical condition; thus SURGERY, or ‘cutting away’ (demolishing) the prescription. In thinking in terms of sickness, the CITY AS A PERSON or BODY metaphor is illuminated, with linked domains of HEALTH, CONTAINMENT, CANCER, etc. being carried and mapped alongside DISEASED AREAS.

As a transitional conclusion in this chapter, the WAR IS ARCHITECTURE metaphor underlines some of the risks when used in political and foreign policy discourse. In general, the metaphor allows the decision of a nation going to war to be discussed in abstract terms, in addition to reframing the lethal results of war as a productive, ‘constructive’ act. From the problem setting perspective, destruction will lead to necessary reconstruction, and war is potentially a benign master plan of state reform. If a voting public makes its political decision from a conception of WAR IS ARCHITECTURE, unpacking the inferences shows that *war is a constructive act*, and *that war is waged abstractly to reconstruct the target state*.

### **Case Study: The Common European House**

This section looks at the concrete example of a specifically architectural metaphor and its potential and evolution in political discourse. Europe as a house or construction metaphor was the salient image in a period of transition from the well-known Cold War containment realities, to the uncertainty a new “regionalization” of European states and geography. Andreas Musolf’s “Political Imagery of Europe: A House Without Exit Doors?” (2000) and Christina Schäffner’s “Building a European House?” (1996) chart the introduction and evolution of President Mikhail Gorbachev’s

common European house metaphor, coined in a 1987 speech commemorating the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution. The first usage of the metaphor was concerning the deployment of NATO medium-range missiles in Western Europe. “The house metaphor enabled him [Gorbachev] to say, or imply: the occupants of a communal house are concerned with the security of the whole tenement block; Europeans are in the same block, therefore, they should not threaten to destroy the whole structure with nuclear weapons” (Chilton and Lakoff 1995: 54). From within their fixed conceptual frames of ‘containment’, western political and military audiences understood Gorbachev’s statement as being a new threat of territorial ambition on the part of their Warsaw Pact adversaries (Chilton and Lakoff 1995: 55). Such a change in mindset could be imagined as fundamentally different from the Soviet psychological profile of George Kennan’s 1946 *Long Telegram*. Whatever Gorbachev intended, his common European house metaphor laid the foundations of his ‘New Thinking’ foreign policy.

Gorbachev nonetheless persisted with the use of this metaphor. As his nascent policy of first *glasnost* (openness) and then *perestroika* (appropriately, reconstruction) took hold, the metaphor of the common House was eventually understood and accepted as a Europe that might eventually encompass 700 million inhabitants if the U.S.S.R. was to move into a geographically conceived ‘European House’. The house metaphor and construction imagery quickly became a means to discuss European policy issues, and particularly European unity and integration, through and beyond the dissolution of the USSR. “The metaphor of the common European house was to represent the idea of all European states, East and West of the ‘Iron Curtain’, living and working together on the basis of peaceful coexistence” (Schäffner 1996: 33).

In fitting architectural terms, the original common European house image evolved into a debate of *what kind of house* it would be, according to which *building code*, from what sort of *blueprints* they would build it, on what kind of property it would be *sited*, and what kind of *roof*, *rules* and *code of conduct* that its inhabitants might share. The political *foundations* were seen as *pillars*, the politicians debating its future were *architects* who could mobilize the necessary *workers* for the *project* at hand. *Doors*, *windows* and division into *apartments* fed the evolving discourse on how the eventual political *edifice* might be *designed* and the *spaces* distributed. Schäffner delineates the architectural references accordingly: "...the ontological correspondences concern the concrete result of a building process and the structural elements of buildings, and the epistemic correspondences are the entailments that are related to the construction process, to the design or blueprint, and to the architects or construction workers" (39).

Cultural specificity figures heavily in the use and interpretation of the metaphor. The conflicting cultural conception of what "house" was a barrier to dialogue. While Gorbachev's discourse was largely focused on the functional aspects of communal 'house' living, western discourse tended to focus on the differences in the conception of what house meant (Musolff 216-27, Schäffner 33-36). While western Europeans tended to imagine a house as an independent entity, housing one family, the Communist experience with home was collective, apartment style, with collective responsibilities (security, sanitation, etc.) (Chilton and Lakoff 1995: 54, Schäffner 1996: 33-36).

These fundamental differences in the perception of the metaphor's meaning were mirrored in reality. As patience waned with EU expansion, the metaphor's usage shifted from a fresh and positive view of 'constructing' a new Europe, to metaphoric imagery of

*half-finished construction sites, construction delays, poorly thought out renovations, structural deficiencies, houses built on sand foundations, and finally, the European Union as a lethal “firetrap” construction-* hence the title of Musolff’s article comparing European integration to “A House with no Exit Doors?”

Musolff and Schäffner underline an elasticity in the metaphor and its use over time. Musolff discovers that by comparing across the time period in question, and through divergent cultural and political interpretations, there is a reciprocal relationship to how we conceive of Europe as a political entity (Musolff 2000: 217). Specifically, the political discourse, and the architectural image or process applied to it, can both transform over time. In more technical terms, “The metaphorical ‘source domain’ of a building thus appears to adapt flexibly to divergent ‘target domains’. These findings contradict any *deterministic* view of ‘source domain’ structures as constraining the way in which political issues are conceived” (Musolff 2000: 216, emphasis added). Specifically, there is no one dominating house image in the EU debate, and both the source and target evolve freely. Enduring as the metaphor was, the metaphor was overtaken by the *literal* realities of the European Union, replete with a parliament, member states and a clear geographic boundary. When the European Union was born, there was little reason to try and imagine what it would be: it simply *was*.

### **Reconceptualizing and the Crisis of Metaphor**

The end of the Cold War has led to a *metaphor crisis* in European and American foreign policy. No new metaphorical concepts have been formed to handle what are very potent dangers in the new Europe (Chilton and Lakoff 1995: 44, emphasis added).

The common European house metaphor is a well-documented attempt to shift the

conceptual foundations of European political discourse from Cold War containment thinking, to finding new ideas and concepts that reflect the changing political and regionalization realities of contemporary Europe. Architecture was a new way to think about new realities. This finding underlines one of the core themes of this thesis. The specific need to adapt our metaphors and modes of thinking to the new realities that we face. As Gorbachev showed, architecture and architectural metaphors can fill the gap.

However important metaphor is to foreign policy discourse, the study of contemporary metaphor has suffered a drought, particularly in light of a changing strategic and security environment following the attacks of September 11, 2001. In *Foreign Policy By Metaphor* (1995) Chilton and Lakoff inductively frame the demise of the house metaphor leading to the ‘crisis of metaphor’ that we face. The crisis was not the result of a complete absence of new metaphors. Mutimer (1997) re-frames the post-Cold War SECURITY challenge from CONTAINMENT to that of PROLIFERATION, arguably a metaphor that still persists as *one* of several key contemporary strategic security issues. The success of Mutimer’s argument is not put in question: to understand the crisis it has to be situated in the complexity of a broader horizon, and particularly the fundamental metaphoric systems that dominate our thinking in international relations.

Chilton and Lakoff take the common European house metaphor and project it onto the next levels. Their eulogy of the common house attempts to underline that our metaphoric concepts have fundamentally not changed. In attempting to ‘refresh’ our idea of Europe, the common European house could be seen as a mere exercise in reanimation. They situate the common house metaphor into the existing STATE AS HOUSE metaphor: “If a state is a person, its land-mass and sovereign territory is its ‘home’, for a

home too is a bounded territory” (Chilton and Lakoff 1995: 53). This, they describe as being a subset of the dominant STATE AS CONTAINER and STATE AS PERSON metaphoric *systems* that ground much of our traditional conceptions of international relations. In their conceptual mapping, they infer a series of possible implications. Like a house, internal affairs are seen as domestic. Like a house, states then have ‘backyards’ and neighbours. These backyards must be kept safe. Threat from the neighbourhood (as in the Cold War and the Soviet Union) could be conceptualized as a ‘window of vulnerability’ to attack.

Given the changes in international order and security, we have to ask (metaphorically) what happens when HOME, BACKYARD, and WINDOW OF VULNERABILITY are twisted into new dimensions? Literally, with European integration looming on the horizon, and the ongoing collapse of the Soviet Union, BACKYARD, NEIGHBOUR, NEIGHBOURHOOD and even conceptions of SECURITY were being reduced to relative terms. There was no longer a clearly defined house, and container, no conveniently familiar FORTRESS EUROPE or IRON CURTAIN. Suddenly containment was being proposed in new directions, in the form of President Reagan’s Star Wars program, promising its citizens security in the form of a PROTECTIVE ROOF. Meanwhile, new security challenges including weapons proliferation and blossoming intra-state conflicts (notably, in the Balkans) went in relative terms, unaddressed. We were mixing new and old ideas, with changing realities.

From this point, we can expand the crisis of metaphor. Despite a rapidly changing security and international relations landscape, convenient images of containment, and nation-state based modes of thinking continued to prevail. Challenged

with the need to find a new metaphor to ‘reconceptualize’ European unity and security, political discourse took refuge in comparatively stale, two-dimensional architectural references. In the absence of new ideas on how to address the new realities, the literal and metaphoric reconceptualization was limited to re-writing the roles and mandates of various regional political security organizations. As Klein describes it, “The result is a chilling formalism – a caricature, if you will, of high-modernist planning that is joined when talk turns to ‘a new architecture’ of security for Europe and for a redesign of NATO” (1998: 331). Given the focus on structures and organigrams, Klein’s criticism might be better directed at the trend towards ‘organitecture’. Ultimately, many of the efforts read as mere euphemisms, and as Klein underlines, caricatures of how we think and conceive of a changing world order.

The following chapter addresses the post- Cold War political evolutions in greater detail. The end of the Cold War suggested an era of significant changes in the international system. As 45 years of policies and metaphors and containment were overturned and challenged, a clear path failed to present itself. There is no clear end in the debate on the changing order of the international system, in our strategic and security landscapes or fundamental threats to the traditional, state-based Westphalian order. The factors of this calculus are multiple- collapsing distances, information technology, multinational corporations, legitimacy, power, etc. (Adams 2001, Cohen 2004, Ignatieff 2000 and 2003, Klare 2001, Krahmman 2003, Krauthammer 1991, Singer 2003, Virilio 1986 and 2002). The changes in how, where and when politics are acted internationally are the subject of greater detail in chapter 3, in framing the evolution of nation-building

as a key tool in how the international community imagines their military interventions in the affairs of sovereign states.

This is not the final word on architectural metaphor. The common European house case can help guide further study of the meanings that architectural metaphor can carry. We talk in terms of architectural metaphor, but equally, architectural metaphor is one that structures the actions we perform in conceiving of- and implementing foreign policy and ultimately war. The use of architectural metaphor suggests 'constructions' as the result of foreign policy, while the deception could be exactly what we are constructing.

## Chapter 3      Nation-Building and Constructions

Since the collapse of the Roman Empire nation-building has been a permanent fixture of our political landscape. In more recent history, nationalism, colonialism and post World War II reconstruction show a continuum in its use in international relations. ... Colonial powers formed dozens of new states as they conquered vast swaths of territory, tinkered with old political and leadership structures, and eventually replaced them with new countries and governments. Most of today's collapsed states, such as Somalia or Afghanistan, are a product of colonial nation building. The greater the difference between the pre-colonial political entities and what the colonial powers tried to impose, the higher the rate of failure (Ottaway 2002: 17).

### Foundations

The invasion and occupation of Iraq by the armed forces of the United States of America and the United Kingdom is the most recently famous nation-building project. A quick survey of headlines since President Bush announced the end of 'major hostilities' on May 01, 2003 puts into question why nation-building has been embraced as a foundation of foreign policy and even as a rationale for launching war: *Failure as an Option: Looking at the Costs if Iraq Goes Up in Smoke* (Sanger 2004); *Blind Into Baghdad* (Fallows 2004); *Rebuilding Iraq on the cheap?* (Peterson 2004); and, *Building nations: Haste makes failure* (Malone 2004).

Chapter 2 opened some important doors, particularly as concerned metaphor in political discourse and rhetoric. One of the key risks with the use of metaphors is the highlighting of certain meanings and imagery, often at the expense of others. Conscious or not, there are potential metaphoric deceptions built into political discourse.

Robert Kagan provides a contemporary reality check of the power of metaphoric deceptions- the deception in this case being the nation-building project in Iraq. In attempting, *post facto*, to judge the legitimacy of the pre-emptive war against Iraq, he chooses as his measure precisely the seductive abstractions that nation-building embodies. Writing about the unfolding situation and its implications: “If, however, Iraq is *unstable* and *undemocratic*, and the *stability* of the region as a whole has not improved, then the *legitimacy* of American actions and of American foreign policy will be *eroded*” (2003a: 71, emphasis added). His measurement assumes as its baseline that war and nation-building were undertaken in Iraq to create stability (nationally and regionally), spread democracy, and bolster the global legitimacy of American foreign policy. His is a reading of the literal nation-building as a policy and intervention, and the metaphoric qualities that underlay it- and the deceptions- to be reality.

Without the recourse to a metaphoric mapping and unpacking of nation-building (the subject of Chapter 4), examining the contemporary term and action of nation-building can lead to remarkably similar conclusions as that of metaphor. Nation-building is used in international relations as being a literal construction of nations, institutions and democracy. This chapter examines quite literally what is being constructed by the nation-building project.

Nation-building has over-benefited from academic study since the end of the Cold War, and particularly so since the September 11, 2001 terror attacks. It would be understatement to claim that it is a loaded term. We only have to look at the range of contexts in which nation-building is used, to understand the confusion in its employment. Nation-building has been presented as a way of building security (Carpenter 2003), as a ‘tool kit’ approach to renovating failed states (Fukuyama 2004a, Mendelson-Forman 2004), a means of transition to democracy (Dobbins 2003), a complex mission of socio-political engineering (Lieven and Ottaway 2002), a means to combat terrorism (Chesterman 2004b, Dempsey 2002), a vector and cloak for extending empire or empire building (Ignatieff 2000, Rosen 2003, Boot 2003, Ferguson 2003), a core or staple task for modern armed forces (Priest 2004), a continuation of the civil-military identity crisis founded in the Vietnam war era (Ekbladh 2004), a means to win hearts-and-minds (Lennon 2003), an element of power and global power balance (Mearsheimer 2002), and a key vector along which to export democracy (Baker 2004, Byman, 2003, Carson 2003). Faced with such a contradictory range of possibilities, it is not surprising that the greatest proponents of nation-building (the United States, the United Nations) have no agreed upon definition or doctrine for it.

The seminal work on nation-building is Francis Fukuyama’s *State Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First Century*. It typifies the lightly schizophrenic understanding and practice of nation-building today: the title alone poses questions about how we conceive of the link between the inner-workings of the state and world order read through security. Over the first two thirds of his book, Fukuyama goes through a political science based *exposé* of what makes states strong, and what

contributes to the weakening of states. In mid-argument he shifts from state-building to nation-building (adopting the American driven usage of the term) and catapults state-cum-nation-building in the broader context of failed states, security, empire and the exercise of power in a changing international system. True, his point is that failed states are a key security threat to key western nations; thus by rebuilding states, the security threat is alleviated. Bosman's concept of problem setting seems personified in this argument. As with much of the logic of academic literature on nation-building, as Wagner (2003) concludes in his article on the paradoxically inexistent relationship between state-building and state-failing, *if nation-building was the answer, we're no longer sure what was the question.*

This chapter looks literally at what is literally being constructed in nation-building. It focuses on what nation-building means to its architects and authors, and not on the clients/citizens of the nation-building project- who are conspicuously absent from the literature on nation-building. The first section looks at what nation-building is, and an overview of basic definitions. Equally, it questions whether the contemporary usage of the term is in fact new. Next, it places nation-building into the broader context of foreign policy and international relations, particularly as a means and end-state in how and when the international community intervenes militarily in the internal affairs of sovereign states. The subsequent section examines the motivations of the nation-builders, illustrating that while the intent may be to build, it is often not nations that are the product.

The concluding section looks at the potentially Potemkin nation<sup>4</sup> that is the subject of such furious energy by academics and practitioners alike and finds that the literal nation-building is based on and perpetuates the deceptive nature of metaphor in political discourse.

## **Defining Nation-Building**

We define nation-building as “the use of armed force in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin the transition to democracy” (Dobbins 2003: 17).

Undeniably, the four pillars of post conflict reconstruction—security, social and economic well-being, justice and reconciliation, and governance and participation—are all inextricably linked, and a positive outcome in each area depends on successful integration and interaction across them (Feil 2002: 98).

While nation-building has become an integral part of the standard post- 9/11 vocabularies of international relations and security, few authors attempt to link the term to its historic roots. It was used as a largely pejorative term in the post-colonial period, where new leaders attempted to rally a population within often arbitrary territorial frontiers (Chesterman 2004: 13). The United State’s war in Vietnam used the term nation-building to describe much of its counter-insurgency efforts, with the term having fallen out of favour in light of the negative experiences (Harme 2002: 90, West 1972). The term as popularly understood, and illustrated by James Dobbins, is somewhat misleading, as it presumes a clear logic in the use of the same troops that wage war in

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<sup>4</sup> Marina Ottaway uses the term Potemkin villages in comparing the nation-building efforts in Iraq in 2003-2004 as being like the construction of fake villages by Grigori Aleksandrovich Potemkin, in anticipation of Catherine the Great’s 18<sup>th</sup> century tours of Ukraine and the Crimea.

leading reconstruction and formation of democratic government- this is an American-founded approach that follows from the hyper-specificity of American post World War II nation-building experience in Japan and Germany.<sup>5</sup>

There is a worrying revisionist tendency in contemporary discourse surrounding nation-building, in attempting to integrate a wide array of historic examples into the sphere of meaning around nation-building. For example, Japan and Germany were military occupations, where the core focus was addressing the physical and economic reconstruction that was caused through their military defeat; Dobbins, for example, bases much of his nation-building optimism on these extremely specific examples. As an example of revisionism, there seems a healthy dose of cynicism in contemporary nation-building literature to look back fondly on the 1992 UN mandated Chapter 7 peace enforcement operation in Somalia as being nation-building in any sense of the term. Interestingly, the revisionist assertions of nation-building go completely unchallenged in the international relations literature.

The contemporary usage of nation-building quietly came to the fore in 1995 following the Dayton Accords. The Clinton Administration carefully employed it as a *disclaimer*, claiming that their intervention in Bosnia, in essence taking charge after UN and European failure to end the conflict, would *not be* nation-building (Müeller 1998: 82-

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<sup>5</sup> “The transformation of West Germany and Japan into democratic states following World War II is the most successful nation-building exercise ever undertaken from the outside. Unfortunately, this process took place under circumstances unlikely to be repeated elsewhere. Although defeated and destroyed, these countries had strong state traditions and competent government personnel. West Germany and Japan were nation-states in the literal sense of the term—they were ethnic and cultural communities as well as political states. And they were occupied by the U.S. military, a situation that precluded choices other than the democratic state” (Ottaway 2002: 17).

83). It was a denial of nation-building, though no one had asked, nor was it expected.<sup>6</sup> While it was a diplomatic tip of the hat to Europeans, who pride themselves on being stronger at the exercise of 'soft' power, including institutional development and state-building.

The terms 'state-building' and 'nation-building' are often used interchangeably, despite there being fundamental differences between them. A state represents a clearly defined territory, along with inhabitants and a government. A nation represents a collection of people with some shared characteristics and common interests (language, religion, identity, a 'cause'). The simplest model is the coincidence of a nation-state where the people and the territory they inhabit coincide. Importantly, a nation does not necessarily coincide with the territory of a state, thus building-in the potential for conflict if external actors attempt to force a state on a nation or vice-versa. Nationhood or a sense of common identity by itself does not guarantee the viability of a state (Ottaway 2002: 17). Yet there are equally illustrative examples of where nations continue to exist, while their state collapses around them: Somalia and Haiti. At best, the two terms are linked but not inseparable, and in contemporary usage are approximate synonyms.

Imagined in terms of constructions, nation-building could theoretically precede or follow state-building. While the tools of state-building could be employed in the nation-building project, they are not necessarily the appropriate means to the end.

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<sup>6</sup> The ideological differences between Europeans and Americans were quite clear in their attempts at resolving the Balkan crisis. The Dayton Accords of 1995 were effectively nation-building, in that they proposed a three way split of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a complete departure from the initial UN-led peacekeeping action that had as its baseline the maintenance a multi-ethnic state.

The tools of state building include the more practical elements related to governance, institutions, civil administration, rule of law, security and defence: they have the seductive characteristic of being quantifiable entities. Nation-building activities and objectives imply (but not necessarily dictate) the less tangible, including reconciliation, truth commissions, even attempts of “...reviving and strengthening constructive national myths” (Weinbaum 2004: 3).<sup>7</sup> Again, lacking commonly agreed definitions, the bodies of meaning are ascribed interchangeably.

Ironically, the nation-building processes since the 1990s have been frequently characterized by violence. Either the descent into civil war prompted an international military intervention under the auspices of an UN-mandated or multinational force, or war was launched with a vision for the creation of new, or nation-built state. Afghanistan and Iraq fit loosely into the latter example. The former includes the cast of mixed successes that followed the end of the Cold War. Haiti managed to fail twice.<sup>8</sup> NATO launched war on Kosovo, inadvertently creating a homogenous, parallel Kosovar state within the remains of Yugoslavia, though with no intention on the part of the international community to deliver it to sovereign status.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Weinbaum uses this expression in the context of Afghanistan, and the necessity to promote social cohesion and national consciousness. Ambitious as his call is, it attempts to address the identity issues of who is an Afghan, and what citizenship in the Islamic state of Afghanistan could mean- of particular importance for a nation-state that has never reconciled the authority of the central government with the autonomous and ethnic realities found in its provinces. See also Byman and Khalilzad 2000, and Lieven and Ottaway 2002 for more on the challenges of creating a unified Afghan state.

<sup>8</sup> Malone, David M. and Kirsti Samuels (2004): “Congo remains largely ungovernable. In February, Haiti slipped back into chaos. In Western capitals, one question is being asked: Is state-building by international intervention doomed to failure? The answer is that unless we make fundamental changes in how we approach nation-building, it will be.”

<sup>9</sup> A theme elaborated upon at length in *Kosovo: An Unfinished Peace* (O’Neill 2002).

Nation-building is used in this thesis in its largest possible range of meanings, and addresses the period following the end of the Cold War. Examples seen since 1991 don't fit neatly into purely nation or state-building categories. Most multilateral interventions are being re-generalized as being or having been nation-building missions, trying to hold together states whose populations and territories were often artificially cobbled into being during the de-colonization and parceling-off of territories following the World Wars of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. To varying degrees all practical examples fit into the greyer meanings embodied in nation-building- from Japan and Germany, through Korea to Haiti, to Somalia and Afghanistan. While the expressed goal is nation-building, the tools are often limited to those of state building. That said, none of the examples listed were created in the absence of a state nor a nation; at best they were failed states, yet another term with an unclear definition, addressed later in this chapter. Nation-building is used synonymously with post-conflict reconstruction/stability, democraticization, stability/security building, peace building, and institutional development.

### **Schools of Thought**

Historically, nation-building attempts by outside powers are notable mainly for their bitter disappointments, not their triumphs (Pei and Kaspar 2003: 1).

There is a wealth of writing on the concept of nation-building that treat the subject as a science, attempting to quantify the factors that lead to successful and stable nations. The harsh, realists' lesson learned is that of Pei and Kaspar. Nation-building isn't easy, nor often successful.

Whatever the perspective on nation-building, existing literature on the subject tends to converge on a limited range of conclusions, particularly as concerns prescriptions for 'the way forward'. A nation/state suffers from a given illness, and international relations theorists and political scientists imagine a series of policy remedies that form part of possible cures. These remedies are the presumed constructions that are presented as the real and potential 'products' and constructions of the nation-building project. The following provides a general summary of the policy solutions that authors bring to the subject of nation-building. In broad terms, I have grouped the prescriptions into four functional 'schools of thought':

1. '*We must be cautious*': this school of thought understands that nation-building is a very complicated and time consuming undertaking. Historic examples show nation-building to be fraught with failure. Clearly pragmatists, they can equally be labelled pessimists who are closed to new ideas and approaches; they are those who, inductively, are responsible for the contemporary problems that the international community faces today. For example, those who ignored Afghanistan after the defeat of the Soviet Union by the proxy *mujahaddin* forces are inductively responsible for the failed state which brought about the Taliban and eventually Al Qaeda.
2. '*We must develop our capacities*': professional nation-building requires resources, will and expertise that are in short-supply at the national and international levels. This school of thought includes the pro-active optimists, who see only problems and solutions. Their critique concludes that the failing of nation-building projects (or the nations themselves) was a technical and institutional failure and not one of theory.

“If we will it (nation-building capacity), they will come.” There is a wasteful tendency to such an approach, as it suggests the more thrown at the problem (money, notably), the more likely its success.

3. *‘We must improve synergies’*: a successful nation-building project demands a careful balance of enlightened policy, commitment, multilateralism, political and financial will, realistic goals, adaptability, clear exit strategies, solid coordination and integration of lessons learned. Possibly the most dangerous school, as they focus on a simplistic view of symptoms and propose greater and greater (at times wilder and wilder) integration efforts of various actors who might not naturally cooperate: humanitarian organizations, civil society, multinational corporations, religious leaders, academics and warlords. Interestingly, for a product of democratic societies, based on accountability in the form of ‘checks and balances’, the synergists’ vision of total integration risks dissolving the boundaries amongst the roles and actors in the nation-building ‘community’ and stifling any democratic oversight. Synonymous with milestone-charted plans, replete with handover of responsibilities and quick exit strategies.
4. *‘We might have to exercise imperial roles’*: there is a growing consensus that a temporary period of foreign administration is a necessary evil (the Ignatieff (2003) *Empire Lite* school of thought), be it led by multinational military or political coalitions, or under the auspices of the United Nations. The imperialists look at nation-building as being a project done ‘for their own good’ - ‘them’ being the recipients and citizens of the nation to be built. Interestingly, the nation-building project is often about the good of the builders and architects of the nation-building

project; this is precisely the fault-line that will be addressed in the later sections of this chapter. The line between this enlightened post- Cold War imperialism and historic examples of colonialism is worryingly ambiguous, and the notion of ‘temporary’ in practise is proving to be mid- to long-term commitments.

## **Nation-building in a Broader Context**

But the greatest mistake by US planners [of the Iraqi war] may have been the assumption that previous UN nation-building efforts have achieved limited successes because of UN incompetence, rather than because of inherent contradictions in building democracy through foreign military intervention (Chesterman 2004:101).<sup>10</sup>

It's all part of what some diplomats here are calling the Bremerization of Afghanistan, adopting the pro-active management style of America's administrator in Iraq, Paul Bremer, to an Afghan context. And US officials and Afghan officials say it's a sign that America's involvement in Afghanistan is deepening and expanding beyond a narrow task of hunting for Al Qaeda remnants to a broader task of shaping a nation (Baldauf 2003).

In the early 1990s, the term peacekeeping finally became the accepted action of the United Nations,<sup>11</sup> as the international community was able to move on from a Cold

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<sup>10</sup> Dana Priest provides an in-depth overview of the risks involved in using the United State's military in an increasingly wide range of roles, a role taken on by default in the absence of appropriate state civilian capacity. She takes the logic of Chesterman's quote further when she compares the challenges of war-fighting and post-conflict reconstruction: "Although the war against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan was clear in purpose, we are now seeing that the hardest, longest, and most important work comes after the bombing stops, when rebuilding replaces destroying and consensus-building replaces precision strikes. As the U.S. Army's experience in Kosovo shows, the mind-set, decision-making, and training of infantry soldiers rarely mixes well with the disorder inherent in civil society. The mismatch of culture and mission can distort the goal of rebuilding a country. In the hands of poorly-formed, misguided troops, it can create disaster" (Priest 2004: 19).

<sup>11</sup> Of the 55 peace operations the United Nations has launched since 1945, 80% began after 1989 (Dobbins 2003a: 88).

War security concept of containment and assured mutual destruction. The strategic landscape of the Cold War had effectively limited the scope of military and political action by the major powers. Power and military force had been limited to preserving the *status quo*, at best to manage crises, overthrow the odd unfriendly regime and replace them with friendly ones. Bringing about substantial societal change through military intervention was not on the Cold War agenda. The end of the Cold War allowed key states to bring new optimism to their engagement with crisis and war occurring far away. In the case of the United States, their optimism in engaging in military interventions harked to the almost mythical success of their civil-military ventures in Japan and Germany in 1946, and the transformation of those states.

In the post Cold War landscape, client-states that had been previously propped up for security and geopolitical reasons quickly headed towards 'state failure'. Countries of the former Soviet Union and the Balkans were quickly embroiled in civil wars. The major powers were suddenly exercising their military power for tasks beyond maintaining a balance of force, and imagining how they could establish, bring or return stability to countries racked by internal conflict. As a subtext, they increasingly imagined how they could promote fundamental political, societal and economic change as a means of consolidating peace, and preventing further conflict.

Each succeeding international intervention of the 1990s was wider in scope and more ambitious in intent than its predecessors (Dobbins 2003a: 89). Much of the peacekeeping debate centered on how and when to use armed force under the auspices of the United Nations, while lamenting the successes (and considerable failures) of Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti. As such, the lessons learned view of engaging militarily in

the affairs of other states took on a more holistic view of how (and why) war was being waged. Political leaders became increasingly sensitive to ‘winning the peace’. Military intervention was re-framed as a means of conflict prevention: “If our intent is to avoid war, then at the end of a conflict we must create the conditions for peace, rather than for subsequent strife” (Mueller 1998: 80). The goal of war was re-framed as being to ‘win’ the peace, often without having defined what ‘winning’ represented.

The United States chose to involve itself in the politics of Yugoslavia. It chose freely, having had no prior obligations to do so. It interfered in the internal affairs of another country: a practice condemned in traditional international relations. In disregard of the Charter, it chose not to act through the United Nations, choosing NATO instead. Breaking with another rule of public international law, the United States has gone to war against Serbia without formally declaring war (Fromkin 1999: 164).

Fromkin sets the scene for an explicit challenge to how states employ war-  
Kosovo, 1999. Inspired by the failings in the architecture of the international system (here we speak of structural constraints, such as the veto power of 5 members of the UN security council, for example),<sup>12</sup> 1999 and the Kosovo conflict marked a major shift in the foreign policy of major powers. No longer satisfied to work within the multilateral architectures of law, charters and institutions, key NATO nations made a clear decision to violate the sovereignty of the Yugoslavian state, and exercise the use of force outside of the auspices of the United Nations- an organization formed precisely to regulate armed conflict. It was a clear challenge to Westphalian order and the state as its essential building block. Morally, it suggested that if a state was unwilling or unaccountable for

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<sup>12</sup> For more on security architecture see Krahnemann (2003) and Klein (1998).

the fate of its citizens, that responsibility should be assumed by the broader community of states.

Prime Minister Tony Blair's speech entitled, "Doctrine of International Community", explained the rationale for overlooking respect for state sovereignty, in select circumstances (Blair 1999).<sup>13</sup> While the intent of his speech was to rally support for NATO's nascent (and stumbling) war on Kosovo, his framing of the debate was for a new architecture in the international system, one that would periodically overturn any Westphalian concept of state sovereignty. In defying the UN charter in launching an unprovoked war on Yugoslavia, he explained that the international community was engaging in war based on values, and not territorial ambitions.<sup>14</sup> His vision went beyond the politics governing the use of force. It took theoretic questions to application: Who has the right to intervene? When should the right be exercised? Are there limits?

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<sup>13</sup> The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty's 2001 publication, *The Responsibility to Protect*, is the seminal reference for the legal, moral, operational and political questions surrounding the "right to intervene" to which Blair has referred. The study was proposed by the Government of Canada at the UN General Assembly in September 2000, and was delivered to the UN Secretary General in order to inform the ongoing debate. The report defines a clear hierarchy of responsibility: "Its central theme, reflected in the title, is "The Responsibility to Protect", the idea that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe – from mass murder and rape, from starvation – but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states. The nature and dimensions of that responsibility are argued out, as are all the questions that must be answered about who should exercise it, under whose authority, and when, where and how" (VIII). Equally importantly, one of the three responsibilities it prescribes to those who intervene militarily is, "The responsibility to rebuild" (XI), though the implications are equally physical, psychological and nation reconstruction.

<sup>14</sup> See Ignatieff (2000) for more on war based on values.

## Discussion

This is germane to nation-building as it illustrates fundamental reconsiderations of our traditional frames of reference in foreign policy and international relations. Not by chance, it is roughly contemporary with the crisis of metaphor observed by Chilton and Lakoff. As broader context, Blair's "Doctrine of International Community," went beyond the key issue of state sovereignty, and provided a snapshot of the vast horizon of contemporary challenges facing the international community, and suggested the remedy for the future (1999). In his speech, Blair integrated and manoeuvred deftly from globalization, to the spread of democracy, to calls for a "Marshall plan for Kosovo, Macedonia, Albania and Serbia" that would follow a successful occupation of Kosovo by NATO forces. Blair and his contemporaries were embracing a growing realization that economics, politics and security exist in the same continuum. Notions of core and periphery were no longer as clear and determinant as they had been throughout 45 years of Cold War. In perspective, they were facing the morals of Globalization in practice, and still attempting to integrate Fukuyama's article, *The End of History?* War was being placed in an ever-broadening landscape of factors.

The particular foreign policy adaptations to a changing geopolitical landscape (in 1999 and 2005) were not entirely new. It parallels conceptions of dissolving boundaries between states and politics, well before and after Blair's statement. The United States undertook war in Vietnam not only to 'check' the spread of Communism under the guidance of the 'New Frontiersmen' of the Kennedy administration of 1961 (Ekbladh 2004: 17). It was also with the realization that "international affairs were now internal affairs" (*ibid*: 15). Countless authors characterize nation-building as a quasi-imperial

ambition of the United States Government post- September 11, 2001, and embodied in the 2002 US Security Policy.<sup>15</sup> The Bush administration's 2002 doctrine of pre-emption and war with Iraq can be seen as a further radical shift from earlier policies that emphasized deterrence and containment, precisely because it depends on the periodic violation of sovereignty. The Clinton administration struck the path towards a security policy of development-intervention policy in their 1997 National Security Policy, with the promotion of democracy abroad being one of the three core objectives of the global strategy. Foreign policy, by its very nature of dictating relations with other states, wavers between policies containment and engagement, but the post- Cold War period proposed significant challenges to the dimensions and calculus of how containment and engagement were measured.

That said, the hysteria around the post Cold War challenges to Westphalian order have to be put into perspective. There is no end in the debate on the changing order of the international system, in our strategic and security landscapes or fundamental threats to the traditional, state-based international system. The factors of this calculus are multiple- collapsing distances, information technology, multinational corporations, the threats to traditional state roles and responsibility, etc. (Adams 2001, Cohen 2004, Ignatieff 2000 and 2003, Klare 2001, Krahmman 2003, Krauthammer 1991, Singer 2003, Virilio 1986

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<sup>15</sup> Summarized in the National Security Policy (President of the United States 2002). Chapter VII of this policy is entitled "Expand the Circle of Development by Opening Societies and Building the Infrastructure of Democracy." Dana Priest illustrates the concerns and ambitions of empire when she explains how the office of the U.S. Secretary of Defence in 2002, "...sponsored private study of the great empires- Macedonia, under Alexander the Great, Republican Rome, the Mongols- asking how they maintained their dominance. What could the United States learn from the success and failures of ancient powers?" (Priest: 30). Also addressed by Chesterman (2004a: 103).

and 2002). Fukuyama poignantly asks who would fill the gap left by strong sovereign states- “ ... a motley collection of multinational corporations, nongovernmental organizations, international organizations, crime syndicates, terrorist groups, and so forth that may have some degree of power or some degree of legitimacy but seldom both at the same time” (Fukuyama 2004: 163). While the role of non-state actors is significant, we have yet to enter an era where international organizations have replaced the state.

Fukuyama is nonetheless charting a trend in international relations of a renewed emphasis on state-oriented solutions, this in contradiction with the interventions of the 1990s and their orientation around respect for human rights, and the defence of the individual.

The role of private military and security providers is but one example of the much-publicized challenges to the roles and responsibilities of state, in the particular example of war. Using the Iraq conflict as an example, the use of private military firms reached new highs, with estimates rising to as high as 25,000 privately contracted arms carriers sharing responsibility with some 165,000 Coalition soldiers (Singer 2003, Spearin 2003). While companies like Haliburton, Kellogg Brown and Root and Blackwater attained certain notoriety, was their role such a *new* challenge to the state-centric views of warfare? Peter Singer, author of *Corporate Warriors*, while supporting the thesis that private military firms are part of the challenges to the international system, equally provides examples that underline how old the issue is. He cites the role of the Dutch East India Company in India as an early example of outsourcing occupation, or more generally, roles of the sovereign state in the example of the British empire’s India. The Dutch East India Company had “... became financially insolvent, but was kept in existence by the British crown to function as the government of India. The simple reason

was that no one could quite agree on how to replace the firm's rule" (Singer 2003: 36). While nation-building was a convenient euphemism to describe the situation in Iraq, it does not change the reality of the situation: Iraq was a sovereign state under military occupation, according to the rules of International Humanitarian Law, and accepted as such by the occupying states.

The point to highlight, in placing nation-building in a larger context, is that all things are relative. Nation-building is being treated as a new phenomenon, but is one which has deep historic roots. While the international community continues to labour over the limits and rationale for periodic violations of the state sovereignty, it remains the exception in international relations today. Clearly, even the major powers cannot imagine invading every state that commits human rights abuses, fails to control criminal or terrorist groups, or whose refugees and policies destabilize neighbouring states. Whatever the popularity in its usage, nation-building it is only one tool amongst others. The resort to nation-building as a 'fresh' policy of engagement is symptomatic of an international community that lacks the moral certainty of human rights dogma for underpinning its military interventions, and is to some extent returning to policies more oriented to strategic issues of security and stability.

## **Nation-Building Ambitions**

If state-building is the answer, what is the question? And the question seems to be, not, how does one construct something like a European state where none exists, but rather, how does one construct some sort of institutional arrangement in places where European-style states do not exist that *will protect the interests of the powerful states, avoid conflicts among them, and not require the expense and conflict associated with direct rule?* (Wagner 2003: 3, emphasis added)

The remainder of this chapter focuses on the literal deceptions of nation-building. Michael Ignatieff suggests a highly spiritual and even noble cause to nation-building, one of assisting enemies to reconcile, and transcending a painful past (2003: 32). While the spiritual may be one of several possible core motivations, he makes a more important point: that what *we say* we are building is quite different from *what and why we are actually constructing*. Unpacking what nation-building, is like peeling an onion. As we look at the motivations of nation-builders, we have to ask what they are actually constructing.

Wagner strikes at the core of this debate in suggesting that we are no longer sure of what question nation-building answers to. There are other, and often self-serving interests, that motivate the nation-builders. While spatially and geographically the building site is on the nation-state to be built, the actual construction of a nation seems to be at the bottom of the list. The construction of a nation at the level of the citizen- the aspect rarely addressed in academic literature on the subject- is often glossed over in the attempts at re-tooling the inner workings of the state or simply implementing some sort of institutional arrangement that ensures stability and limits the investment of the builders. The dimensions of the project are precisely those that are proving elusive. If we return to Walker's statement of politics occurring in places we don't expect, we can equally find nation-building constructing in dimensions- time, space and place- and for reasons- that are surprising.

This section unpacks some of the possible constructions that the architects and nation-builders are actually erecting. The relationships can be conveniently presented in pairs, going from the more obvious, to the implied. Architecturally, nation-building can

address the continuum of destruction-reconstruction found in war. Architecture is both target and victim of armed conflict; it is only natural that nation-building address the reconstruction; but reconstruction is writ large. Nation-building is considered in a continuum with the security threats posed by 'failed states' which in turn is linked to the security of the nation-builders. In an era where containment is no longer a core security strategy, nation-building can be a means of extending Empire, often by extension through campaigns of democratization. But in an international system where core and periphery are increasingly unclear, whose empire is being constructed, and where the imperial capital is found, remain more difficult to define. The remaining sections focus on the question of what is being constructed, and for whose benefit.

### **Destruction- Reconstruction Continuum**

And above all, we must make sure that no operation is launched without the guaranteed capacity to re-build afterwards and a vision of how the country will be re-built, which in the end has to be done by its own people (Bailes 2004).

Nation-building is being framed as part of a holistic continuum of destruction-reconstruction found in the military interventions conducted by the international community. Recent inter-state conflict is increasingly targeting architecture,<sup>16</sup> thus obligating any international intervention to have factored in reconstruction in their pre-

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<sup>16</sup> While inter-state conflict is used in this context to refer to a non-international armed conflict (using the legal definition provided in the Geneva Conventions), there is significant academic debate on defining contemporary armed warfare. The rise of inter-state conflict since the end of the Cold War has been accompanied by an eroding respect for civilians and civilian targets (including architecture) in warfare between non-state armed groups. Several authors apply the term post-modern war to distinguish the armed conflicts of the post- Cold War period- see in particular Gray (1997) and Ignatieff (2000).

intervention thinking. In the evolving thinking on how the international community intervenes, Bailes reframes reconstruction as a crucial milestone- in the decision making process of *deciding* to intervene militarily. Temporally interesting, in that reconstruction becomes a defining factor in the decision to employ force, considered *before* a military intervention is launched. It harks back to the political imperative of the potential nation-builders aspiring to ‘win the peace’.

While more traditional sequences posit the nation-building process as clearly a post-conflict task, Sanger (2003) underlines how the Iraq war of 2003 began to challenge this precept. Already two and a half months before the war, the ‘vision’ of a reconstructed (architecturally) post-war Iraq was being exploited as a precept and foundation for going to war. The White House briefing on New Year’s Day 2003 was filled with images of infrastructure (including terrorist), liberation, and creating “political space for Iraqi democratization”. Roger Mac Ginty echoes the same sentiments, going so far as to express the worry that the pre-war planning for post-war Iraq reframes war as a deceptively non-destructive activity (2003: 1). The deconstruction-reconstruction continuum reaches its zenith with Klein’s description of an office of pre-emptive reconstruction, and a vision of nation-building as part of a war-based state-making philosophy.

Nadia Schadlow arrives at different conclusions from observing the same anachronism. She re-labels nation-building ‘governance operations’ in order to distinguish between humanitarian and peace-operations and war-fighting mentalities. She imagines a greater synchronization between war and nation-building: “combat operations and governance operations are both integral to war and *occur in tandem*”

(Schadlow 2003: 86, emphasis added). Similar to Dobbins' claim linking democratic transition and employing force, but taking the idea one step further in suggesting that military and governance operations are inseparable and exercised simultaneously.

There is equally an argument that looks at the increasingly holistic nature of war, and the equal demand for holistic reconstruction responses. As Sarah Meharg explains:

Contemporary armed warfare aims to destroy all aspects of the social fabric, including political, economic, and cultural elements. Accordingly, the international community has recently demonstrated an increased attention concerning the area of post-conflict reconstruction, including the four "R's": repatriation, resettlement, reconciliation and reintegration (Meharg 2003: 65).

War that is waged against a broader range of targets, therefore the eventual (or simultaneous) nation-building project will demand a broader range of reconstructions. Reconstruction here is imagined beyond the bounds of the physical realm of buildings, cities, and infrastructure. It can be imagined as form of *rehabilitation* of a society that has endured wars, has grudges to settle, and must reclaim lost territory and occupied homes.<sup>17</sup> The meaning of nation-building begins to be stretched to encompass a far larger project than destruction-reconstruction, cause-effect prescriptions. The blueprints for military interventions encompass a plan for winning war, peace and the tools for the consolidation of the nation state.

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<sup>17</sup> Amongst the doctrine for post-conflict reconstruction is the concept of there being key "pillars" of the eventual nation-building project: "After conflict has ceased, societies often lack the mechanisms and institutions for upholding the rule of law and dealing with past abuses—processes that are crucial to rebuilding. Justice and reconciliation, in tandem, must be seen as a central pillar of any assistance for post conflict reconstruction and should receive priority attention early and throughout the life of an operation" (Flourney 2002: 111).

The nation-builders thus harness the destruction-reconstruction continuum in divergent ways. The enlightened would not consider intervention without a vision and capacity for reconstruction. Increasingly, nation-building and reconstruction are being imagined as integral to the war-planning, fighting, stability and post-conflict operations: nation-building *is* war. As the temporal and political are transformed, nation-building is not occurring where we expected: there is equally the issue of constructing space of ‘democratization’. In the most perverse case, modern armed forces, in an era of precision weapons, could go so far as to specifically target enemy infrastructure, for eventual reconstruction by their home states’ reconstruction-hungry corporations (Meharg 2003). In an era where a government is actively planning for pre-emptive post-conflict reconstruction (Klein 2005), it’s perhaps not so outlandish.

### **Failed States and Security**

Since the end of the Cold War, weak or failing states have arguably become the single most important problem for international order. Weak or failing states commit human rights abuses, provoke humanitarian disasters, drive massive waves of immigration, and attack their neighbours. Since September 11, it also has been clear that they shelter international terrorists who can do significant damages to the United States and other developed countries (Fukuyama 2004b: 125).<sup>18</sup>

Nation-building is framed as a response to failed states, the security risk posed by these failed states in turn linked to the security of the nation-builders. The construction

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<sup>18</sup> Echoed closely by Hamre: “One of the principal lessons of the events of September 11 is that failed states matter—not just for humanitarian reasons but for national security as well. If left untended, such states can become sanctuaries for terrorist networks with a global reach, not to mention international organized crime and drug traffickers who also exploit the dysfunctional environment. As such, failed states can pose a direct threat to the national interests of the United States and to the stability of entire regions” (Hamre 2002:85).

here lacks subtlety: the nation-builders seek to construct their own security, preemptively if necessary, through reconstructing nations construed as a threat. But this is a multi-tiered construction, where a series of legitimacies must be constructed. The fault-line to be probed here is that already observed by Robert Wagner (2003): the paradoxical isolation of academic literature on nation/state building and state failing.

State failure is clearly not new: political crises, civil wars, weak or absent governance or revolution are a continual feature of history. Robert Rotberg makes the case that state failure is of increased importance in an increasingly inter-connected world: “In less interconnected eras, state weakness could be isolated and kept distant. Failure had fewer implications for peace and security” (Rotberg 2002: 128). An interesting argument, considered in terms of distance and geography, and amongst the effects of globalization. Clearly there is a more arbitrary definition of the threat posed by an under-developed nation, thousands of kilometres away, as opposed to the potential security threat posed by an adjacent state with territorial ambitions.

The *measure of state failure* is thus the construction that needs first to be defined and eventually legitimized:

“Failed states” – extreme political crises in which institutions of central government collapse, often amidst protracted civil violence, lawlessness, ethnic conflict, and displacement – have become a depressingly familiar part of the contemporary political landscape (Menkhaus 2003: 2).

Failed nation-states – nation states that are unwilling or incapable of governance – are a common entity in the world today and continue to pose a threat to America’s national interests by potentially harbouring terrorists who promote regional turmoil and are a threat to peace (Carpenter 2003: 3).

Such fluid definitions are a poor match for the academic literature that treats the nation-building process as something of a science, though this is perhaps by intention.

Menkhaus' definition limits the scope of what could constitute a failed state. Arguably, the list of failed states could be long, by either definition. The exception puts into question the rule: in the case of Somalia, the absence of government did not mean that the state ceases to exist. Somalia has lacked a central government since January 1991, yet maintains its membership in the UN, is a client of the World Bank, and even has diplomats to represent its interests (in principle, at least). More importantly, Somalia's continued legal existence bars recognition of a successor or neighbours from partitioning or annexing its territory (Reno 2003: 5-6). Afghanistan under almost total Taliban government suffered from the opposite scenario, as the government of President Rabbani, as the sole elected government continued to be recognized as the legal government of Afghanistan, despite having lost control of the capital to the Taliban movement. The failure of state was in this example measured by the perceived lack of legitimacy of the party occupying the capital and not by the 'failure' of the state.

The legitimacy of a strategic security threat is the next necessary construction, to justify the nation re-building of a failed state. The logic in this instance is to some extent arbitrary, particularly in the case of Afghanistan. Al Qaeda was deemed responsible for the September 11, 2001 terror attacks; since the Taliban movement harboured those considered terrorists, this in turn justified the war and nation-building project of 2001.

There is a significant shift in international relations thinking embodied in the failed states- security continuum. In the evolution of military interventions by the international community, the shift from human rights based foundations to a state-oriented response (or failed state, in this example) represents a transformation from a moral choice to a strategic one. Nation-building in the failed states scenario is less driven

by the political imperative to be seen as ‘doing something’ and framed in the concrete security interests of the nation-builders. Theoretically, this shift could bring with it a positive trend towards more sustainable commitments, and not a process shortcut by quick exit strategies (Menkhaus 2003).

Stated in clear terms, the failed state- security equation should prompt the renaming of nation-building for what it clearly is: nation-building is *security*-building (Carpenter 2003). In the simple relationship of security of failed state to security of nation-building state, there is little doubt that the prescription is a problem setting solution. Carpenter defines security building as an integrated (synergists) approach: “ ... using all elements of power to help put a nation state on the road to a secure, stable, sustainable development plan for the future” (2003: iii). In this context, nation/security-building as a foreign policy tool and strategic security concern can provide its own legitimacy.

### **Empire and Democratization**

This American imperium is without colonies, designed for a jet and-information age in which mass movements of people and capital dilute the traditional meaning of sovereignty (Kaplan 2003).

It was because these nation-building wars [the Balkans] ended in catastrophic stalemate that foreign power had to come in to impose an imperial nation-building process of their own (Michael Ignatieff 2003: 118).

Nation-building is framed as a means of extending empire, though this modern empire is ill-defined with an unclear ruler, and multiple imperial capitals sharing the authority. In the empire-democratization continuum, we find many of the elements of the previous two relationships being encompassed. Whoever is leading the empire, the

product is no longer citizenship and Roman order, but there is unanimity on the civilizing influence that is to be delivered to its recipients: democracy and democratization, explicitly and implicitly extending this empire, often a 'humanitarian' one.

The obvious issue is how to define an empire. Contemporary investigations tend to direct the generally unflattering comparison to the United States of America, particularly in examining its exercise of power, notably military, in a world where it has no rival. There is no shortage of academic literature opening onto the subject. Boot (2003) asks the core question of whether the United States is in fact an empire. He makes the distinction that the American empire is not Roman by nature, but a particular American brand of 'liberal imperialism' referring to what Thomas Jefferson called the 'empire of liberty'. The argument goes that America, liberty and freedom minded by its origins, cannot possibly be an empire as it lacks imperial ambitions. Whatever motivations it has to intervene military, politically and economically, must be benevolent and seek to spread liberty and democracy- its highest values- to those nations that it graces with its interventions. Empire is re-framed as an act of charity, a benevolent political act. Michael Ignatieff repeated paraphrasing of Joseph Conrad's *Heart of Darkness* makes sense when understood as a benevolent act: empire is not a pretty sight when observed close up: what redeems it, is only the idea (1995, 2003).

The international community has wholeheartedly embraced this imperial script and populated it with characters. The idea of the historical warrior-statesmen, bringing order and ideals from the imperial capital has been reborn, according to Dana Priest. She describes one of the U.S. Command's Commander in Chief as a modern day proconsul of empire (Priest 2004: 70). Ignatieff expands upon this humanitarian empire as a motley

collection of willing and unwilling participants: a humanitarian empire of European money, American military power and ample humanitarian motive bring the project to life (Ignatieff 2003: 20). The power in this humanitarian empire is “exercised as a condominium, with Washington in the lead, and London, Berlin and Tokyo following reluctantly behind” (Ignatieff 2003: 17). Democraticization is their banner (or human rights, for Ignatieff), the nation-building crusade becomes a practical question of the exercise of power and legitimacy.

It is not an exercise without risks. The unflattering view of how foreign oversight in contemporary Bosnia-Herzegovina can take on distinctly non-democratic, unlimited authority is the subject of *Travails of the European Raj* (Knauss and Martin 2003). In attempting to educate the locals, the decisions of a plenipotentiary (though on behalf of whom it acts is unclear), multi-national, and democraticization mission look oddly colonial. Knauss and Martin express some amazement at the audacity and frequency with which the Office of the High Representative over-rules parliament, the constitution and national law: “It reflects an extraordinary political reality in contemporary Europe: the unlimited authority of an international mission to overrule all of the democratic institutions of a sovereign member state of the United Nations” (Knauss and Martin 2003: 60-61).

The essential paradox of nation-building is that temporary imperialism - empire lite - has become the necessary condition for democracy in countries torn apart by civil war (Ignatieff 2003: vii).

The thinking today is that, with enough money, bureaucratic administrators, and military force of arms, outsiders can impose modern economic and democratic state structures on any county in the world. And if a country is composed of antagonistic groups, then it is the duty of the West to ensure that they live together until they like it (Dempsey 2002: 14).

Ignatieff describes the nation-building efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq as not only pre-emptive humanitarian interventions, but also ‘the maintenance of order over barbarian threat’. The dimensions of his case are intentionally vague, as the threat is on the distant borders of the empire, and the threat an unclear case at best (Ignatieff 2003: 22). While the foundation of this empire is the supposed security of the nation-builders, woven in is an odd contradiction of democracy itself. It reads something like, ‘We might have to dictate, in order to deliver you to democracy’. If we understand this as the spirit of ‘Empire Lite’, the existence of a modern-day Raj in continental Europe is made clearer. Nation-building is framed as being ‘good for you’, the ‘you’ being the recipient states.

While the spread of democracy, and the perceived barbarian threats on the fringes of the ill-defined empire are already worrying enough, there remains the inevitable question of hubris, in this case moral. Describing nation-building as the inescapable responsibility of the world’s only superpower (Dobbins 2003b) shows the dangerous narcissism that the nation-building empire can become. When the international community undertakes the fundamental nation-building reform of far away nations, in ‘our’ (liberal democratic) image, the failures might seem all the more personalized and subjective. Within this scope, nation-building as part of empire encompasses the two previous themes: the holistic enlightenment of deconstruction-reconstruction thinking, engaging failed states and their security threats as part of enlightened foreign policy, bundled into a policy of holding together nations until they like it.

## **Building Potemkin Nations?**

Unfortunately, much of the administration's \$ 20.3 billion supplemental appropriation proposal for Iraq looks less like the essential components of a reconstruction project than the building of Soviet-style Potemkin villages- isolated, unsustainable projects that do not relate to the country's reality (Ottaway 2004, emphasis added).

Empirically and qualitatively, nation-building is a complicated, expensive venture and one that rarely succeeds. That said, the major powers have redoubled their efforts, forgotten lessons learnt, and continue to pretend that each nation-building venture is their last, while making commitments even more ambitious than the previous. Beyond the perceived strategic construction of security- the barbarians on the fringe of empire, however temporary that empire might be- the cycle of failed states, war, nation-building and stumbling successes moves forward. Worse, in efforts to make historic comparisons, distinctly non-nation-building military interventions are being re-written as examples of a long continuum of nation-building, whatever the cynicism.

Little commentary is made on the sentiment and motivations of the intervening states, beyond trying to fit their nation-building into a frame of strategic interest, keeping the 'barbarians at bay', and accepting that historic conventions of territory, borders, influence and core-periphery are in constant evolution. When we cut through the basic policy prescriptions for how to 'do better' nation-building, we find that what is being constructed has stronger links to the builder than the client. These other faces of nation-building aren't quite as pleasant, nor do they complement the pessimists, optimists or synergists. Here we find that nation-building can be seen as endorsing destruction to make way for future reconstruction. At some level, the issues glibly devolve to new questions of the exercise of power and the exercise of liberal imperialism, humanitarian

war and Empire Lite. This final section looks at the ultimate question of whether contemporary nation-building is not contenting itself with the construction of Potemkin nations.

The case thus far has been largely oriented towards framing nation-building, looking at the ends and not the means of nation-building. Focusing on the means risks putting into question the enduring construction that the contemporary nation-building ventures in Afghanistan and Iraq represent. Sami Makki zeroes in on the real will of nation-builders to construct nations when he observes that nation-building is increasingly limited to milestone-driven roadmap of externally dictated 'achievements' to measure the success of the project. The common such milestones are the introduction of new currencies, or precipitous elections.<sup>19</sup> If the goal is to build nations in the image of the democratic builders, force fitting a series of arbitrary criteria, assembled in the imperial capitals thousands of miles away, then it seems an exercise where the means become the ends of the project. In the case of Iraq, Makki criticizes the invention of civil society as a product of set criteria of 'good governance'. He questions whether such exercises aren't the artificial fabrication of a civil society, constructed to fit the allure of democracy in an American military protectorate (Makki 2004: 10). Chesterman poignantly uses the following example of elections to underline the failures: "...staging elections in conflict zones has become something of an art-form, though more than half a dozen elections in Bosnia have yet to produce a workable government" (2004b: 7). These examples show evidence of the construction of Potemkin nations, and not the broad reaching

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<sup>19</sup> Snyder (2000) makes a similar warning about forcing elections before other institutions and norms essential for the functioning of democracy are established (316-320).

architectural project and reform that was promised. It remains unclear whether this is by design or default. It begs the question of whether it is a nation-building project, or the construction of Potemkin nations that attempt to satisfy and legitimize the armed intervention that permitted it, and the nations that financed it.

When the means are downgraded to mere tools, the Potemkin hypothesis looms on the horizon. A recent example is a proposal put forth by the Crisis Management Initiative, known as 'GooB- Government out of a Box': "The need to create a stable government is just as important as security, and this is where the concept of a Government out of a Box becomes useful" (Mendelson-Forman and von Schulenburg 2004: 22). While what they describe is the need for stable government and governance, what they propose is a private sector *software* initiative that is little more than a collection of electronic tools, bundled with a rapidly deployable telecommunications system, that can facilitate (at best) the back office support to civilian administration in a post-conflict setting. One senior participant to the discussion offered the following reality check: "He argued that the GooB is modest enough to deal with some of these topics [is the goal of nation-building stability or transformed societies? Does the international community have the stamina for such ambitious operations? Is there a contradiction between liberalizing and maintaining control of the process?]; however, it deals with the body of the problem while leaving the soul, the politics, outside" (26). Despite the valid comments, 'GooB' as is has been destined for field trials in two contexts that could benefit from state and nation-building- Haiti and Gaza. It seems that the scientific allure of quantifiable lessons learned, milestones achieved, and institutions

or tools implemented is more alluring than the disappointing complexity of constructing durable nations.

Bremer -- dressed in a business suit but wearing tan combat boots -- said he was proud to have been able to return sovereignty. He said he was confident the new government was ready to meet the challenges ahead ... Less than an hour later, he boarded a helicopter, according to coalition military spokesman Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmett, and within two hours, he was out of the country (*U.S. Returns Sovereignty to Iraq* 2004).

The Potemkin nation-building project alludes to the deepest fear: that the international community is more interested in *the image and symbol of the nation-building project*, than the construction of stable, democratic nations themselves. To talk of nation-building in current day Iraq is certainly a more appealing euphemism than talking about it for what it was- a legal occupation by two states who launched unprovoked war, outside the bounds established by the UN charter. As Bremer 'returned' sovereignty to Iraq, and within two hours had departed the country, perhaps the US and UK had mastered an important lesson. As Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak dryly concluded: "... Israel had learned the hard way that there's no way to win an occupation; the only issue was to choose the size of your humiliation" (Younge 2004). All the talk of nation-building, its strengths and weaknesses, its primary and secondary agendas, fail to address a particularly new production or construction.

An effective nation builder must understand people and relate to them, not buildings (Anderson 2004: 50).

The abstraction of speaking in nation-building terms conveniently overlooks the people in the process. Anderson is prescribing a solution that has been conveniently forgotten by numerous domains of practise, development and architectural practise amongst them. Interestingly, none of the academic literature on nation-building writes

concretely about the clients of the nation-building project. The citizens of the nation to be built figure in as some abstract entity, seen as a secondary plot within the broader concerns of the builders- from a strategic and doctrinal perspective, a normal outcome, excepting that there is little in the way of 'tactical' field manuals on nation-building available to nation-builders. There is equally no academic literature written by the recipient nations, letting alone the fact that the vast majority of thinking on the subject is written by American authors. As we can question the enduring construction of the nation-building project, we can equally question the enduring *practise* of nation-building. Its contemporary usage just more than a decade old, but it appears to have a generous amount of elasticity in it.

Bauer notes, for instance, the danger in the metaphor of "nation building," a handsome neoclassical building in which political prisoners scream in the basement. The figure of a building treats people as "lifeless bricks, to be moved by some master builder." Nation building is not "merely" a metaphor, "mere" ornamental rhetoric, but a political argument put into a word (Bauer 1984 qtd in McCloskey 1987: 251).

As Bauer clearly states, nation-building is a political argument (and a complex one) put into words. Similar to Cohn's experience with the seductive abstractions of speaking of nuclear annihilation as 'fun' metaphors and acronyms, Bauer's neoclassical building, in the new nation-built, comes off as a tarnished architectural image when its basements are filled with screaming political prisoners. This can help explain why Ambassador Bremer's 'surprise' return of sovereignty to Iraq and his departure within the hour is nonetheless overlooked in the enthusiasm of the Iraqi nation-building project.

This chapter has travelled through the literal realm of nation-building in international relations, examining the realities and theory of nation-building, summarizing the explicit and implicit implications and constructions of nation-building.

Through a critical unpacking, it is illustrated that the motivations of nation-building are more closely linked to the needs and image of the builders, than the clients.

This brings us full circle to the intent of this thesis: mixing new and old ideas to address the changing realities of the international system. Contemporary nation-building is an old idea, with strong historical origins and ties to colonialism and imperialism. It is a new idea, as it is part of evolving thinking on how and why the international community chooses to intervene in the internal affairs of sovereign states. In terms of language, politics and policy, we find many of the convenient deceptions that metaphor usage allows in political discourse, embodied in how we think figuratively about building nations, while ultimately building in the image and motivations of the builders. Nation-building is being framed and undertaken as a foreign policy 'construction', without asking what is being built. As imperial ambition, or plain occupation, nation-building risks being the historically unpopular entity of its less euphemistic predecessors, and while enlightened and in step with the international relations, strategic security, and moral considerations, ultimately comes to many of the same constructions.

## **Chapter 4      Metaphoric Systems and Nation-Building**

Because the concept of war doesn't fit, there is a frantic search for new metaphors (Lakoff 2001).

This chapter juxtaposes the cases made in the preceding two. It seeks to expose what can be learned from obliging a dialogue between the potential for architectural metaphor in political discourse, and the constructive deceptions embodied in the practise and policy of nation-building in contemporary interventions by the international community. It is the meeting of the literal and figurative nation-buildings, being juxtaposed against three key metaphoric systems that ground our conceptions of the international system.

In Chapter 2, the usage of architectural metaphor in political discourse illustrated an anachronism of new ideas being force fit into traditional metaphoric frames that ground and facilitate our understanding of foreign policy. Architectural metaphor was used a new idea and concept, to address the new realities. Ultimately, the foundations of the new metaphor were old metaphoric systems, and new European political realities. Chapter 3 exposed a critical gap between the intended construction of nations, and the true motivations and constructions of the nation-builders. Without resorting to metaphor, the literal realm carried with it similar risk of deceptions: nation-building is about constructing, but the not often about literally building nations. The aim in this chapter is

to identify the salient fault lines between our conceptual metaphoric frames, and their application to the contemporary realities of the international community's military interventions. While there is some proof of the durability and resilience of our existing metaphoric systems, we find important stresses on the boundaries of these foundations of the international system. We are somewhere between new and old ideas, and new and old realities. While there is a frantic search for new metaphors, we have to establish whether nation-building is a new metaphor, or the force fitting of refreshed ideas into our traditional conceptual thinking.

The cipher or structure used to facilitate the colliding of two distinct academic realms of study is found in George Lakoff's article entitled *Metaphor and War: The Metaphor System Used to Justify War in the Gulf* (1991). In a populist article that became a banner for the anti-war cause on the eve of the 1991 Gulf War, Lakoff makes his case in two phases. First, he outlines several key metaphoric systems that structure discourse on international relations and war. From this foundation, he applies these figures to the example of the (then) imminent Gulf War of 1991. His point is that there are several key metaphoric systems that underlie the bulk of how we conceive of international relations, and that all events- war, in particular- can be deciphered and unpacked accordingly.

This chapter takes three of his key metaphoric systems that we use to ground our understanding of international relations, and those that best allow a critical dialogue between the literal and figurative nation-building. The specific metaphoric systems are: STATES AS CONTAINERS, STATES AS PERSONS and the metaphoric narrative structure he entitled the FAIRY TALE OF JUST WAR. Each section addresses the basic

implications of their respective metaphoric system, examines the challenges that the nation-building and contemporary modes of international intervention represent, and discuss further implications.

While this chapter looks at the metaphors framing and surrounding nation-building, there has been no explicit attempt to construct it as a metaphor- *X IS NATION-BUILDING*. It is clear that the implication is on this potential; but the emphasis is on the related realms of meaning that are contained in the existing term of nation-building, and situating the act within broader metaphoric systems. Evidently, in simple source-target relations, nation-building could be imagined as metaphors including, *WAR AS NATION-BUILDING*, *EMPIRE AS NATION-BUILDING*, or *SECURITY IS NATION-BUILDING*.

That said, *NATION-BUILDING* can be conceptually mapped in the same way that *WAR IS ARCHITECTURE* was mapped in Chapter 2. *NATION-BUILDING* inferentially carries with it the concept that we can *build* or *construct* a nation. The nation's *design* can be guided by *blueprints*, the *construction* overseen by *architects*, the *workers* can take many forms- administrators, developers, soldiers, corporations, citizens and relief workers. These same processes of *design* and *blueprints* can be applied to war planning and foreign policy vision and post-conflict stability. There are *structural* elements of the nation-to-be-built that must be addressed: *pillars* of the future nation that need to be *constructed*, be it governance and administration, the economy, education, national reconciliation, truth commissions or health care. In the event of a 'faulty *design*' the *architect* and *nation-builders* could be held liable. *Site inspections* might be necessary, in the form of donor oversight, international experts, a transitional

administration, or external auditors. The nation-building project can be sent to *tender*, and *change orders* issued. Nations that already exist can benefit from *renovation* and *reconstruction*. Stumbling nation-building projects could be seen as *firetrap constructions*, abandoned or bankrupt *building projects*, or *cookie cutter solutions*.

## STATES AS CONTAINERS

The state-as-container is an image that is deeply rooted in political discourse, and it provides the conceptual basis for much of the argumentation in international relations also (Chilton and Lakoff 1995: 50).

The basic concept of the container schema entails the notion of contents, whose spread, extrusion and even explosion is prevented by the container. What is more, as the semantic nature of English indicates, there is a tendency to conceptualize wild animals, wild emotions and one's very self in the same terms. In realist discourse, nation states, conceptualized as persons with wild egos threatening to break out, need to 'contain' themselves or be 'contained' (Chilton 1996: 133-34).

### Foundation

The state-as-container metaphor is an essential image of how we conceive of the international system and international relations. We can discuss these concepts, only because we conceive of the basic building blocks as being its composite states. Each state has to have its own fixed envelope or container in order for both the structure and construction of the international system to exist. Relations between states exist because of their separation and distinction from one another. Globalization has challenged this conception of clearly delimited states and state responsibility, but has yet to clearly override it. States maintain the monopoly of force, despite private sector actors taking on increased importance. Foreign policy is enacted between STATES AS

CONTAINERS, whatever the role and importance of non-state actors. We ultimately cling to our traditional Westphalian conceptions of international order and structure.

Various images derive from the state-as-container metaphoric system. The power balance amongst states-as-containers can be conceived as objects in a force field. As if governed by the laws of physics, magnetic force, bipolar in nature, assures that major forces 'repel' (Chilton and Lakoff 1995: 50-51). This metaphor was particularly appropriate to the Cold War, and the traditional metaphors of containment and bi-polar power structure born of 1947. Certain political one-liners contain greater depth than on first inspection. President George Bush 'drawing a line in the sand' in illustrating how Iraq would not be allowed to expand beyond Kuwait, reinforce the delineating nature of containment. Kagan (2003b) in describing the differences in how America and Europeans conceive of power poignantly describes the Cold War partnership where America was 'manning the walls' of Europe, inferring fortress imagery that could hark to the World War II FORTRESS EUROPE metaphor.

The STATE AS HOUSE metaphor can be neatly fit into this metaphoric system. The common European house model illustrates how an accepted model- containment and the Cold War- can be challenged (Chilton and Lakoff 1995: 53-55). Metaphor helped conceive and communicate a new concept for the (then) European Community, a regionalization, a new structure of power, a change in container and containment. The eventual literal realities of the European Union, replete with elected representatives, a dedicated parliament building and a fixed geographic boundary have relegated the common European house metaphor to infrequent usage. The policies of Europe and the European Union still quietly challenge Westphalian traditions. As an example, it is

without debate that NATO, an Atlantic-based security organization, has been given tasks as far flung as Afghanistan and Iraq- on the edges of empire, also engaging in broader nation-building projects. While the container of Europe is writ large, the *security effect* of containment is exported to other regions. The figurative BACKYARD is perhaps no longer attached to the house-state.

Politically and architecturally the origins of the NATION-STATE in the CITY-STATE pose interesting questions about containment, and the evolution of government. Dahl (1999) argues that from the Roman Empire to the 18<sup>th</sup> century, our political life was structured around a conception of government at the level of CITY-STATE. While his argument is that governance at city level is perhaps not the most appropriate to that of the state, his follow on question opens doors of investigation for containment. Will the next architectural and political evolution be towards governance by international organizations? This puts the case study of the common European house to closer scrutiny, as the issues of regionalization and containment could take on greater importance.

One of the key risks of the STATE AS CONTAINER metaphoric system is the seduction of abstracting the *contents* and *citizens* within it. “The container concept of the state used by IR discourse hide the contents. Governments deal with other governments perceived as being in some sense legitimate, even if non-democratic. Wars, such as the Gulf War, are then seen as being waged against governments, and the effects on inhabitants are marginalized in official discourse” (Chilton and Lakoff 1995: 57). Outside of war-centric examples, speaking abstractly about the literal security of the STATE AS CONTAINER may have little to do with the domestic security of the citizen.

While the borders of the Afghan STATE AS CONTAINER might today be more secure, the improvement in the personal security or liberty of a citizen is overlooked in this mode of thinking. If the realities of war are masked by discourse that centers on the outlines of containers and not the contents, then nation-building is part of a discourse that covers the failings of trying to 'build' nations by focusing on the container and the construction materials. This approach conveniently forgets the design and blueprints that might have guided the architectural reform, and equally, the nation-citizens that live through the construction project and in theory benefit from its outcome.

### **Challenges**

Nation-building genuinely reinforces the STATE AS CONTAINER metaphoric system. The international community has returned to a dogmatic faith in the state-centric building blocks of the international system with their contemporary interventions. In all examples since the end of the Cold War, almost exaggerated respect has been given to maintaining the existing borders of the STATE AS CONTAINER to be nation-built. An Afghanistan or Iraq, partitioned along ethnic lines, could have been potential outcomes of the respective 2001 and 2003 interventions.

In practical nation-building, the international community mobilizes various efforts to restructure and hold together the nation that parallels and that fills the container. Particularly for 'failed' states, they are initially 'contained' by external force, and once nation-built, given the tools (security apparatus, new armed forces, border police) that allow them to 'contain' themselves.

The Iraq war of 2003 illustrates this model, but with nuances. In problem-setting fashion, once the perception of Iraq as a security threat was constructed, then a new

regime, and a new nation-built Iraq could be understood as being in American security interests. Just below the surface of this we find challenges to the traditional STATE AS CONTAINER model. As Walker argues that politics isn't taking place where we expect it, the vision for the nation-building project was distilled by Iraqi expatriates and opposition groups in exile, in Washington D.C., and then parcelled off to Department of Defence officials for its execution. A series of further actors plotted their own roles and interests, from their own peripheries, worldwide- corporations, developers, humanitarian organizations, concerned citizens, etc. Politics is not necessarily enacted by whom, when or where we necessarily expect it to.

The *motivations* of container and containment are equally challenged by nation-building. Notions of empire are key to contemporary commentary on the evolving STATE AS CONTAINER metaphoric system. The unflattering comparisons of American Imperial interests are a resurgence of the same commentaries of the 1950's and 60's in relation to Vietnam. "Empire is the rule exercised by one nation over others both to regulate their external behaviour and to ensure minimally acceptable forms of internal behaviour within the subordinate states" (Rosen 2003: 52).<sup>20</sup> American hegemony can be read through this definition as influencing allies and adversaries on their internal and external actions, within and between their containers. The hubris (and motivation) might

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<sup>20</sup> Rosen argues that America is a powerful nation, but not an empire. Max Boot (2003) takes the opposite position in his article "The Liberal Empire Strikes Back", making the case that the United States has historically been in favour of imperial projects, albeit under different guises including military occupation and nation-building. Kaplan (2003) argues that the United States possesses a Global Empire, albeit different from Britain's and Rome's in "Supremacy by Stealth", and imagines the necessary 'tools' at the tactical level to consolidate the Imperial project.

also be the attempts of nation-building in our own image (Chilton and Lakoff 1995: 41). The STATE AS CONTAINER perceiving a distant security threat on the horizon will imagine that the only solution is to transform the threat into a contained state that is stable, and non-threatening, according to their own measure. In this vein, if liberal democracy truly triumphed over all systems of governance with Fukuyama's seminal article of 1989, then we seek to construct culturally adapted models of this prophecy with every successive nation-building venture.

### **Discussion**

Domestically, Americans are all too familiar with the consequences of allowing certain places to sink into despair and squalor. Most Americans have no regular contact with inner cities, and... the ghettos are largely isolated from the mainstream of U.S. life. But still, their cost to the public at large is enormous... While most of the violence of inner city residents is targeted at one another, some of it is perpetrated against citizens in the wider society. Global ghettos like Burundi and Kurdistan have similar effect... The violence from within them regularly overflows in the form of terrorism or drug and arms exports (David Callahan, qtd. Dempsey 2002: 3).

While the promised end-state of nation-building is the construction of a nation, the final result risks being a decorative renovation of the container, a restructuring of the state's architecture of governance, but little evidence of a new or renovated nation. Amongst the more interesting challenges are notions of shaping the container or landscape, and the possibly new metaphor of SECURITY AS CONTAINMENT. The container is as unclear as what security might encompass.

Krahmann (2003) argues that that the exercise of power in the international system is fragmenting, and a new concept of security governance is required. As the boundaries of state sovereignty is blurring, and an increasing range of actors assume

quasi- state responsibilities, a new idea needs to emerge to adapt to the realities. Realities that recognize the absence of a core (or a vague imperial capital), and looks at shoring up the periphery. Ideas that recognize the security of individuals, and not merely containers.

Security itself is no longer centered around states, as Adams suggests in *Virtual Defense* (2001). In the broadening range of warfare, and particularly attacks on information systems, warfare is no longer centered on the STATE AS CONTAINER. Of particular concern is the continuing collapse of distance between public and private realms, where an individual system can employ the sort of threat or destruction that previously only a state could wield. Amongst the possibilities, a civilian could 'hack' the computers that control water management, and potentially unleash a dam's contents onto an urban area. Klein (1998) poses questions on political spaces, arguing (along the lines of the risks of focusing on the container and not the contents in the STATE AS CONTAINER metaphor) that it is time to unpack the homogenous inner workings of a state, to open up dialogue with the increasingly chaotic and heterogeneous geography of the international system (329). Both of these authors arrive at the paradox of Fukuyama where 'World Order' is conceptualized as in a continuum with the inner workings of STATES AS CONTAINERS. The core is periphery. And vice-versa.

The spatial conceptions and bounds under discussion suggests that the STATE AS CONTAINER metaphoric system increasingly seems to have 'sprung holes'. While the international system leaks into the inner workings of the state and vice-versa, the logic between the two realms is unclear. Is the call for a return to the manageable scale of the city-state, where environments can be shaped? Or is it a projection of national SECURITY concerns into a boundless VIRTUAL CONTAINER, the chaotic,

heterogeneous space of the international system? Nation-building in this metaphoric system appears to act as an intermediary conceptual solution, founded on traditionally state-centric models, but straddling fault-lines of security, core-periphery and political space.

## **STATES AS PERSONS**

The major metaphor that dominates thought about foreign policy is that the state is a person. It is understandable that this should be the case. Organizations of all kinds tend to be personified. Legal discourse speaks of corporations as 'legal persons'. Since states have become the most powerful form of political organizations over the last four hundred years, and have their origins in the power of individual princes, it is not surprising to find this metaphor (Chilton and Lakoff 1995: 39).

The Gulf War duel between Saddam Hussein's Scud ballistic missiles and President Bush's Patriot missiles created an interactive dialogue of images, which fitted precisely the credible news frame (Stech 1994: 45-46).

### **Foundation**

At a basic level of reading, STATES AS PERSONS represents a convenient euphemism or a natural personification to facilitate the discussion of war. As a metaphoric system it opens up glimpses on more profound meanings that it contains. War can be understood as a literal duel between heads of state. Morality is a strong image that is often linked to notions of 'good' and 'bad' people person-states. The construction of person-state COMMUNITIES opens up questions of how power is exercised amongst STATES AS PERSONS or adversarial groupings (Warsaw Pact, NATO, etc.).

The Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003 provided strong evidence of how they were strongly narrated around the STATE AS PERSON metaphor. Both wars were sold along the simple slogans of ‘Saddam is a tyrant: He must be stopped’. In an INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AS GLOBAL NEIGHBOURHOOD, populated by various person-state characters, one finds friendly nations, hostile nations, rogue states, and indifferent states (Lakoff 2003). This community has its respect for law and order, with some states-as-persons being ‘outlaws’ and some acting as ‘sheriff’.<sup>21</sup>

International bodies of law for this community act as pillars and frames that govern potential ‘fist-fights’ between person-states, or the broad ‘schoolyard’ dynamics. Person-states going to war find friends- ‘Allies’- and of course determine their enemies.<sup>22</sup> There are clearly ‘good’ and ‘bad’ STATES AS PERSONS. Some states are ADULT STATE PERSONS (developed, mature, healthy) and CHILD STATE PERSONS (immature, under-developed, ill) (Voss 1992). It is the responsibility of the developed adult states to supervise and coach the under-developed children, in notably pejorative terms. All states are clearly not considered as equal.

Foreign policy is a narrative of the competition, both perceived and real, amongst the person-states in the community. Reich speaks of four essential American stories that he describes as the basis for all successful American political rhetoric: the Triumphant

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<sup>21</sup> See Huntington’s *The Lonely Superpower* (1999) for an examination of how power is exercised in the post- Cold War world, and particularly his terming of the United States as alternatively the “rogue superpower” (42) and the “lonely sheriff” (46).

<sup>22</sup> “We are joined in this operation by our staunch friend, Great Britain. Other close friends, including Canada, Australia, Germany and France, have pledged forces as the operation unfolds. More than 40 countries in the Middle East, Africa, Europe and across Asia have granted air transit or landing rights. Many more have shared intelligence. We are supported by the collective will of the world” (Bush 2001a).

Individual, the Benevolent Community, the Mob at the Gates and the Rot at the Top (Reich 2005). While some of these narratives function better domestically, the Benevolent Community and the Mob at the Gates lead to relevant STATES AS PERSON models. The GLOBAL NEIGHBOURHOOD can be transferred to the BENEVOLENT COMMUNITY in describing how the international community sees its contemporary interventions in the affairs of sovereign states, along the lines of *The Responsibility to Protect*. Within this metaphoric frame, all their actions are considered as ‘just’. The MOB AT THE GATES has its roots in the STATE AS CONTAINER system, but the model is here conceived of as those person-states (MOB, AXIS OF EVIL) that threaten domestic security.

The STATE AS BODY has strong links to this metaphoric system. A ‘sick’ person state can require treatment. Any ‘ill’ (any behaviour or attitude that deviates from the normal, healthy person state) can be grounds for drastic measures and treatments. The possibilities for metaphors are endless at the STATE AS BODY level- DEBTS AS A CANCER; POVERTY AS A CYST. Even the posture of the STATE AS BODY has political implications. Those states that are ‘strong of spine’ are seen as having ‘moral’ posturing. Allies stand ‘shoulder to shoulder’ with their person-state ‘friends’. Rape becomes a violation of the STATE AS PERSON/BODY, invading the boundaries of their CONTAINER (Rohrer 1995). This partly explains the success of President Bush’s rape metaphor for describing the invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

The elements hidden by the STATE AS PERSON metaphor are the more detailed reality of state, society and citizens, similar to that of the STATE AS CONTAINER metaphor. “The state-as-person metaphor hides the most basic realities of the lives of

individual citizens. The state may be secure in its home while many of its citizens are not. The state may be 'healthy' in that it is rich, while its citizens may not be able to afford real health care" (Chilton and Lakoff 1995: 56). The nation-building metaphor masks a fundamental question of whether the nation-built (the 'beneficiaries' of the project) actually need the project, or if in fact they benefit. While the STATE AS PERSON- President Karzai, for example- might well be satisfied with the political, financial and diplomatic attention he is being paid, the actual citizens are typically overlooked. While the nation-building project is launched auspiciously under the guise of improving the lives of citizens, liberating them from dictatorship and delivering them from darkness to freedom, the situations in Iraq today is a questionable reality check to these statements.

### **Challenges**

Nation-building adapts to this metaphoric system, but takes control of its narratives and characters in fresh ways. As there are strong and weak person-states, there are those who are potential nation-builders, and those who need their nation-built, or potential clients. Some state-citizens propose an architectural reform of legal and international institutions to govern the GLOBAL NEIGHBOURHOOD (regional security organizations or the International Criminal Court; the European approach to 'soft power' for example). Other citizens doubt the validity of such renovations, largely based on their being strong states-as-persons, or their STREET/BLOCK (their region in the broader NEIGHBOURHOOD) having specific and divergent perspectives and means.

Increasingly, STATES AS PERSONS form collectives or cooperatives, working as NEIGHBOURHOOD COUNCILS at regional levels for political, economic or

security ends. As a BENEVOLENT COMMUNITY project, nation-building can be a sort of ‘Habitat for Humanity’, a collective construction involving many volunteer person-states (as in Afghanistan) or very few (Iraq). The definition of some neighbourhoods is more based on shared values than geography. This might explain why the military partners for the Coalition in Iraq included the U.S., the U.K. and Australia, and not homogenous geographically based military coalitions (the Gulf states, the European Union, etc.)

Since September 11, 2001, there have been calls from various quarters to embrace nation building as a tool for combating terrorism. The logic behind the idea is that “good” states do not do “bad” things, so Washington should build more “good” states (Dempsey 2001: 1).

The qualification of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ person-states is given increasing importance in the contemporary environment. If ‘bad’ STATES AS PERSONS are the problem, the narrative is to somehow ‘populate’ the world with good states (Mearsheimer 2002 15-16). The body-state could interpret this as attempts to foster the ‘reproduction’ of good, democratic states, or, in further reproductive terms, suggest why there are regular examples of DEMOCRACY IS A PLANT, where the ‘seeds’ of democracy are ‘sown’. In this narrative and metaphoric structure, those person-states that insist on being ‘bad’ bring the trouble upon themselves. They ‘deserve’ nation-building to bring them back into community of nations. It is the role of the BENEVOLENT COMMUNITY, of morally TALL STANDING STATES AS PERSONS, to do so. Nation-building can be a form of rehabilitation or therapy for the disease of under-development of weak states-as-persons. The healthy can engage in the charitable act of sharing their nation-building energies on behalf of the weak, poor, sick and under-developed state-persons.

There are many new characters that increasingly confuse the traditional STATE AS PERSON metaphoric system. In the post- September 11, 2001 world, there are new characters that pretend to be person-states- notably, Al Qaeda. This could be extended to multi-national corporations, non-governmental organizations, or privatized military providers. None of these are entirely new, but they are further assuming person-state responsibilities and roles, and with different integration into the existing legal and regulatory system that governs the collection of person-states.

### **Discussion**

Nation-building risks becoming a complicated cast and characters. The complexity arises from the volume of characters that are assuming STATES AS PERSONS roles, while remaining non-traditional characters. In the Iraq war of 2003, there was the standard fare of Presidents Saddam Hussein and George W. Bush; but there were also Lakhbar Brahimi the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary General envoy; General Tommy Franks, the American Commander of U.S. Central Command; Osama Bin Laden, apparently the source for messages linked to Al Qaeda; the various activist 'human shields'; political pundits... the list is long. The characters and narratives are increasingly important to the important media coverage of war, and the need to deliver compelling (and short) 'news' to their audience.

Stech (1994) argues that in 'CNN Wars' success is measured as the ability to create a narrative metaphor that allows politics to engage in a dialogue with the effect and message of CNN. The simplicity of how CNN delivers the 'news' is then mirrored in how government analysts are obliged to share information with their political masters. At some point, it is no longer clear who controls the story and their 'spin' if they want to

remain in a dialogue with the makers of news, the providers of images, and the consumers of CNN wars. The narrative structure itself risks overwhelming any potential dialogue that CNN might maintain.

As concerns characters, Williams (1995) makes an interesting case for *über*-persons. He uses the example of the United Nations, which while being a representative, collective organization, takes on the persona of a superior 'being' in a system populated by STATES AS PERSONS (interesting implications for Dahl (1999) and the shift from city-state to nation-state and eventual governance by international organizations). This is one of possible *über*-STATES AS PERSONS, with Al Qaeda being the most perplexing contemporary example. The acceptance of al Qaeda's state-like persona wavers between those person-states who accept them as individuals in the neighbourhood of state-persons, and even suggestions that Al Qaeda is a sort of *über*-person-state, given their alleged trans-national nature. This same organization is seen by other states-as-persons as a disease or infirmity that needs to be culled.<sup>23</sup>

Underlying this, there is an increasingly moral slant in the contemporary security environment and by extension, to the STATES AS PERSONS that inhabit this GLOBAL NEIGHBOURHOOD. The community of person-states comprises both the just and unjust states-as-persons. The just can be portrayed as 'successful' states, and by popular

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<sup>23</sup> Al Qaeda has shown particular creativity in their adaptation to the Global War Against Terror, and their role as a potential person-state. This (allegedly) trans-national criminal organization has alternatively declared war on democracy (Associated Press 2005), and offered a truce to European nations who would withdraw their forces from Iraq (Burgess 2004, BBC 2004). The behaviour as a STATE AS PERSON and the ultimate acceptance of this purported role by some persons-states is particularly baffling, given that Al Qaeda is better defined as an ideology than an organization, in the absence of more compelling proof.

definition, those that are liberal democracies. The unjust can be seen as the failed states, those who persist in their chaotic and dark ways. The unjust can be grouped into alliances, with appropriately venomous imagery- 'Axis of Evil'. The coalition of the just (and at times the willing) risk forming their own state-as-person 'mobs' who mete out justice, within or without the community's rules.

## **FAIRY TALE OF JUST WAR OR PEACE**

You, the viewer, are not in Afghanistan, Cambodia, or Bosnia so much as you are in humanitarian-tragedy-land- a world of wicked warlords, suffering and innocent victims, and noble aid workers. And whether you know why or not, you have the distinct impression that you have been there before (Rieff 2002: 33).<sup>24</sup>

The most natural way to justify a war on moral grounds is to fit this fairy tale structure to a given situation. This is done by metaphorical definition, that is, by answering the questions: Who is the victim? Who is the villain? Who is the hero? What is the crime? What counts as victory? Each set of answers provides a different filled-out scenario (Lakoff 1991: 26).

### **Foundation**

In poetic terms, Lakoff distils the Gulf War down to the most basic elements of a fairy tale with a traditional narrative, characters and outcome- the 'happy ending'. The fairy tales allows us to understand war as a simple story, an allegory, with moral

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<sup>24</sup> David Rieff narrates the Somalia crisis of 1992 as a similar cast of characters, though putting emphasis on the victims and the call for military action: "There is a starving girl, unnamed; there are marauders, unidentified and there are relief workers, also unspecified... there are no real individuals in the story- only victims, victimizers, and relief workers who want to help and urgently need the means, which for Johnson at the time meant military force to escort relief convoys and fight the Somalis who preyed on them" (2002: 35).

characters that have predictable behaviour and values. It is the most seductive of metaphoric structures, as it privileges a dominant and successful narrative at the expense of other possible interpretations of unfolding- and already established- history. The simplest fairy tale construction of the 1991 Gulf War has the victim as Kuwait, and Saddam Hussein as the villain, responsible for an unprovoked invasion of Kuwait. The hero would be the U.S. led- and U.N. sanctioned- force that eventually liberated Kuwait.

There are multiple layers and meanings that can be attached to the *Fairy Tale of the Just War*, depending on how it is unpacked. Referring to the sovereign state of Iraq as Saddam Hussein is using the STATE AS PERSON metaphor, and ascribing him (and his person-state) all the villainous characteristics that go with it. While the victims could well be seen as the Kuwaiti people, they could also be seen as the heroes- having organized (in this case, financed) the liberation of their country from their exile. While the hero is the ‘international community’, it is alternatively the United States (acting in a nascent role as the global sheriff in Bush’s ‘New World Order’), the Arab community (banding together to face a common Arab security threat) and at its simplest level, the coalition soldiers fighting in the field, willing to risk their own lives to secure the freedom of Kuwait from ‘tyranny’. This is but one alternate version of the fairy tale.

This FAIRY TALE OF JUST WAR can be alternatively entitled the “Rescue Story” (Lakoff 2003) or the “Self-defence scenario” (Tugendhat 1995, Williams 1995). Both have in common a core battle of ‘good’ versus ‘evil’, a ‘righting of wrongs’, of dispensing justice and protecting the weak person-states. The construction of JUST WAR is a key figure, the narrative attempts to metaphorically construct popular legitimacy domestically and internationally.

A key example of nurturing the public on FAIRY TALES of war was President Roosevelt's "fireside chats" (by radio) with the American nation during World War II. Roosevelt presented detailed and dramatic narratives of how the fighting advanced, encouraging his listeners to buy maps to follow the story more closely, and referring them to photographs published in *Life* and *Time* magazines to illustrate his narrative. In an attempt to protect the operational security of aviators in the Pacific theatre of war, he "whimsically preserved security and added to the propaganda effect by identifying the aviators' base as "Shangri-La," referring to the mythical locale in a popular novel and movie" (Walsh 1995: 42). The lines between political reality and fiction were effectively collapsed into a FAIRY TALE narrative.

The risks of this metaphoric system need little explanation. When war becomes over-simplified to the point of becoming a FAIRY TALE OF JUST WAR, discourse has merely surpassed abstractions of reality. When the public begins to imagine war as little more than a story, where international relations has degraded nothing but a parable about 'good' and the 'bad' person-states, the moral of Ignatieff's *Virtual War* comes true: "If violence ceases to be fully real to the citizens in whose name it is exercised will they continue to restrain the executive resort to precision lethality?" (Ignatieff 2000: 163).

### **Challenges**

This FAIRY TALE metaphoric structure is the most poetic and appropriate metaphoric system for re-imagining and re-framing contemporary nation-building. The RESCUE STORY is a seductive way of reframing war- and thus nation-building- as a means to *rescue* 'failed' states. The RESCUE STORY allows STATES AS PERSONS to rally their energies to rescue not only the failing person-state, but its society and

inhabitants, overcoming the bounds of the STATE AS CONTAINER. Arguably the Iraq war of 2003 was clearly narrated along the lines of a more sophisticated narrative. There were continued attempts to present a FAIRY TALE of an unjust ruler to be toppled (person-state), while the BENEVOLENT COMMUNITY (albeit a very small collection) would liberate noble and deserving citizens. Ultimately the risks are the same as talking about STATES AS CONTAINERS and not their contents; war attacks the container-state and its citizens equally.

The legitimacy of war is in transition: the old notion of using war to re-establish the *status quo ante* is no longer sufficient, it is not a case of justice in end-states. War is therefore not merely the application of military force to liberate sovereign Kuwait. War is imagined as a tool for fundamental political and societal change, reconstruction and redesign of the state as a grand architectural project. In the context of the changing rationale for military intervention and nation-building, the existing metaphoric system of the FAIRY TALE OF JUST WAR would be better entitled: the FAIRY TALE OF JUST PEACE.

The point is that the contemporary case of pre-war reconstruction for Iraq reached such a degree of sophistication that it marked a seminal leap in the attempt to redefine war as a humanitarian activity. Many commentators have noted the sanitization of perceptions of warfare in the post-Cold War world (Baudrillard, 2000; Ignatieff, 2000). The deployment of weapons technologies that remove the perpetrator from the victim, the invention of a terminology that minimizes reflection on human casualties (collateral damage, consequence management, etc) and the corralling of the media so as to limit access to the conflict zone have all contributed to the notion of an antiseptic war. The pre-war emphasis on reconstruction is a further step in this process, postulating war and reconstruction as a 'one stop shop' in which cause, effect and response seamlessly meld into one. Thus war is not framed as a wholly destructive enterprise (Mac Ginty 2003: 613).

Given the propensity for labelling wars as ‘humanitarian’, this FAIRY TALE OF JUST PEACE is all the more appropriate a metaphoric system. As such, NATO’s ‘antiseptic’ air war against Kosovo fits its label of humanitarian intervention- NATO as hero, Kosovars as victims, President Milosevic as person-state villain. Nation-building can be read into the eventual occupation of Kosovo, the imposition of a UN-led administration with Raj-like powers, addressing the disease of tyranny and human rights violations, with benevolent states bringing the construction materials. The contradictory construction of a state-within-a-state nation-building exercise (i.e. an autonomous Kosovar province, but with no will to create a sovereign entity, despite what looked like a state-building on the part of the international community) continues today, but even that could be excused in the construction of legitimacy of the just peace fairy tale.<sup>25</sup>

A few questions remain in dissecting Lakoff’s FAIRY TALE metaphoric system, but it is from this point that the fairy tale starts to struggle under the contemporary challenges. To complete the equation, one simply needs to elaborate on the characters, the crime, and what counts as victory, to understand the FAIRY TALE OF JUST PEACE.

The Western need for noble victims and happy endings suggests that we are more interested in ourselves that we are in the places, like Bosnia, that we take up as causes (Ignatieff 2003: 42).

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<sup>25</sup> While Kosovo was the first use of the term ‘humanitarian intervention’ to describe what was an international armed conflict, Ignatieff takes the concept further in *Empire Lite*, going so far as to describe American hegemony as personified in a ‘humanitarian empire’. “In the new humanitarian empire, power is exercised as a condominium, with Washington in the lead, and London, Paris, Berlin and Tokyo following reluctantly behind... A new form of ostensibly humanitarian empire - in which Western powers, led by the United States, band together to rebuild state order and reconstruct war-torn societies for the sake of global stability and security” (17 and 19).

*Who are the characters?* The supposition of characters in a nation-building exercise suggests architects- certainly figuratively, but possibly literally. While the Gulf War of 1991 had machismo, heroic soldiers and surgical strikes, there was no talk of blueprints, workers or constructive metaphors, and little evidence of architects. Beyond the journalists based in neighbouring countries, no civilians were in sight. ‘Good’ and ‘evil’ fought the classic land battle for which they had trained for over 40 years. While the military operation’s names carried their own metaphoric references- ‘Desert SHIELD’ and ‘STORM’- there were clearly no pretensions of state-construction or reform of institutions involved.

Nation-building exercises are entirely different animals, with a fresh cast of heroes and characters, described earlier. Beyond the STATES AS PERSONS catalogue, at a less-publicized hierarchic level there is an equally complex cast. As in 1991, there are still soldiers, heroic, grimy and dedicated as before. But rallied behind the FAIRY TALE OF JUST PEACE, there are countless participants, willing and unwilling, bundled into the nation-building crusade. In the Empire Lite ‘power condominium’, all of the actors are obliged onto this nation-building template, by mere fact of sharing the same geography, if not the same values. We find private sector actors (Bechtel, Haliburton and the like); the NGOs, UN and others; and state civilian agencies (Donors, Developers and Diplomats). While there has never been a consensus on who could/should participate to the nation-building mission, all of the players are present and active.

An archetypal figure of the FAIRY TALE OF THE JUST PEACE /nation-

building narrative is the fictional hero of John Hersey's *A Bell for Adano*, the resourceful American Major Joppolo (1988 orig. 1946).<sup>26</sup> Joppolo, a military administrator dispatched to administer a liberated Italian town in WW II, delivers his democratic ideals to the liberated Italians, and along the way understands that there is more to occupation than efficiency. Learning of the theft of the town's bell by retreating Fascist troops, Joppolo sets out to restore a bell to the town and, symbolically, its moral well-being. While he is eventually removed from his post for having disobeyed an incoherent army regulation, his final triumph is, touchingly, to hear the replacement bell ringing as he leaves. A happy ending at the field level, where a grass roots level 'architect' of nation-building succeeds. Interesting, in that the example dates from World War II and is used as core reading in US armed forces Civil Affairs training today.

Contemporary nation-building has a parallel heroic character, personified best by the Special Forces soldiers that Ignatieff describes as, 'the men with floppy hats'. "But without the Americans in floppy hats nobody is going to feel safe enough to start building

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<sup>26</sup> Though a syrupy drama with heavy moral overtones, the book reflects the difficulties and possible successes that armed forces can achieve in taking on civilian tasks. As Kaplan suggests in *Supremacy by Stealth* that rule no. 1 to guaranteeing success for contemporary nation-building today is, "Produce More Joppolos". The same moral message- and characters- are found in Graham Greene's *The Quiet American* (1953) and William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick's *The Ugly American* (1958). Both focus on American foreign policy in Indo-China in the 50's and 60's, and look at the successes and failures to U.S. foreign policy. Often underlined is the naivety in attempting to export American values and *savoir-faire* to contexts where it is not culturally adapted.

houses with his bricks" (2003 108).<sup>27</sup> Modern day Joppolos, Special Forces soldiers were amongst the little public evidence of progress in a war without a clear enemy (the war against terror), with no clear enemy base or country, and no end in sight. Images of Special Forces soldiers working with Afghan militias, repairing municipal infrastructure, and threatening recalcitrant warlords with attitude adjustment in the form of precision missile strikes, were amongst the few good stories that the American public could associate both the 2001 Afghan campaign, and the broader War Against Terror. Joppolos, yet symbolic Joppolos for an invisible war that needs camera friendly local 'architects'.

Defining the crime is increasingly difficult. Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1991, there was little explanation necessary. The example of Afghanistan provides perplexing evidence of the crime. Al Qaeda was responsible for the September 11, 2001 attacks; the Taliban were guilty for aiding and abetting international terrorists. As the discourse evolved, the Taliban were accused of being medieval dictators, robbing the Afghan people of the liberty they deserved. With only floppy-hatted men to show for their efforts, it is no surprise that nation-building took center stage as the foundation for continuing war against Afghanistan. If the end-state was a stable and secure Afghanistan,

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<sup>27</sup> This quote taken in the context of a discussion that Ignatieff has with an Afghan brick builder, a man who breaks off the conversation, as he is too busy building bricks. He continues his perceptions of the 'floppy-hatted' men: "Yet the Special Forces aren't social workers. They are an imperial detachment, advancing American power and interests in Central Asia. Call it peacekeeping or nation-building, call it what you like, imperial policing is what is going on in Mazar. In fact, America's entire war on terror is an exercise in imperialism. They may come as a shock to Americans, who don't like to think of their country as an empire. But what else can you call America's legions of soldiers, spooks and Special Forces straddling the globe?" (2003: 79).

war against a formless, territory-less enemy was not the answer. Regime change, respect for human rights and freedom for its people, ergo, nation-building, was.

The final element to define is what counts as victory. The contemporary approach to nation-building demands as its end state profound societal and political change. But nation-building provides few clear yardsticks on how to measure its terminus. In the absence of a clear definition or measure of what success means in nation-building, the happy ending is projected off towards a distant temporal horizon. There is no clear end state, and the fairy tale becomes a perpetual FAIRY TALE OF JUST (and seemingly perpetual) PEACE.

## Discussion

As military expert Anthony Cordesman has wryly noted, ‘one of the lessons of modern war is that war can no longer be called war.’ Instead in Kosovo, our leaders spoke of strikes and coercive diplomacy. In practice, of course, we were at war: our forces were taking and returning fire. In this fashion, *linguistic subterfuge helped turn the real into the virtual* (Ignatieff 2000: 177, emphasis added).

The FAIRY TALE OF THE JUST PEACE offers the most simplistic, but possibly most successful metaphoric system for understanding international relations, and shows an elasticity greater than the previous two examples. Yet its pernicious nature needs little emphasis: if war and nation-building are best understood in the moral simplicity of good and evil, heroes, villains and happy endings, there is little hope for critical international political discourse. In an important shift, the nation-building fairy tale is one where victory and end states are non-existent. As the war against terror can seemingly be extended in perpetuity, the nation-building project becomes a continually regenerating veil and legitimization for almost any foreign policy action- ‘Empire Lite’,

‘Security Building’, ‘Democratization’, etc. One only has to refresh the characters, plot, crime and definition of victory to reinvent its foundations. War might be war and peace, but now war is an endless project of reform and reconstruction.

This chapter effectively provided the test for the over-arching question of this study, of whether our metaphors are keeping pace with the realities of our international system. The answer is not categorical, as it shows that both new and old ideas, are addressing new and old realities. While nation-building genuinely reinforces the STATE AS CONTAINER (it is, after all, grounded in state-centric thinking), there is also the finding that the container states appears to have ‘sprung holes’. The projection of national SECURITY concerns into a boundless VIRTUAL CONTAINER, imagines nation-building as an intermediary conceptual solution, founded on traditionally state-centric models, but straddling fault-lines of security, core-periphery and political space. The populating of the GLOBAL NEIGHBOURHOOD with new *über*-persons, whose actions and acceptance is both state-centric and supra-state in nature, clashes with the basic state building blocks of the international system. We come to the same initial conclusion that study of the common European house metaphor arrive at: that both source and target domains evolve simultaneously and freely over time. In this case, the broader metaphoric systems continue to evolve simultaneous with the international system they purport to describe.

## **Chapter 5      An Architectural Conclusion**

In short, the new world order is not new words, but a new word order (Rohrer 1995: 135).

### **Something New, Something Old**

It has been shown in the foregoing discussion that our metaphors are to a partial extent keeping pace with the changing realities of the international system; part of the problem is that the realities themselves are changing, so the measure is inexact. We are ultimately mixing new and old ideas in adapting to the transitional realities of the international system. That said, there are glimpses of how the very metaphoric systems upon which we base our understanding of international relations are under transformation. It is significant to imagine the rigidity of the container state metaphoric system springing holes or being replaced by a seemingly virtual container, just as it is perplexing to find *über*-persons taking on state roles, legitimacy and responsibility. There are glimpses of fundamental changes in how we conceive of the international system and international relations.

In many ways the crisis of metaphor remains quite real: we are relying on the accommodating and dominating nature of our existing metaphors and metaphoric systems, and inventing few new ideas to deal with changing realities. Interestingly, the post- Cold War period is showing a clear rise and relevance of the architectural metaphor

in political discourse. While the case is made that this importance is linked to the appropriateness of architectural metaphor to the spirit of the times, there are further links that can be made. The increasing complexity of the international systems, with its increasing range actors, narratives and challenges is demanding a means to further structure and 'make sense' of it all. While architecture in this sense is often be constrained to a very reductive role (a form of 'organitecture') it is serving as an accommodating interim metaphor, for an era of ongoing political transition.

While the rise of architectural metaphor and inferences in post- Cold War international political discourse is an excellent illustration of the dialogue and interplay between metaphors and realities, the literal outcome is not substantially different from historical precedent. When we compare the statements of British General F.S. Maude to the people of Mesopotamia on March 19, 1917 with the message of President George W. Bush to the people of Iraq on April 04, 2003 we can only underline how similar the

messages are (Ferguson 2003: 154)<sup>28</sup> - this, despite the introduction of an enlightened policy of holistic war, and a re-framing of war and nation-building as a constructive act intending to deliver profound societal, economic and political reform. This underlines to a large extent that much of the 'enlightened' evolution of the interventionist thinking on the part of the international community in the 1990s has similarities to both imperial and colonial approaches in engagement with other states, despite the strong protests to the contrary. Tim Rohrer's warning of the 'New World Order' being nothing more than a new word order have some resonance. To take the conclusion of much of the academic literature on the use of metaphor in political discourse, caution has to be exercised in the careless or deceptive use of metaphor. When we try to evaluate the success of the Coalition's 2003 war in Iraq, using the very metaphors that were used to justify it as the measure, we risk orbiting in a circular discourse of linguistic subterfuge, closed to an evolution of either realities or metaphors.

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<sup>28</sup> "Our armies do not come into your cities as conquerors or enemies, but as liberators. ... It is [not] the wish of [our] government to impose upon you alien institutions. ... [It is our wish] that you should prosper even as in the past, when your lands were fertile, when your ancestors gave to the world literature, science, and art, and when Baghdad city was one of the wonders of the world. ... It is [our] hope that the aspirations of your philosophers and writers shall be realized and that once again the people of Baghdad shall flourish, enjoying their wealth and substance under institutions which are in consonance with their sacred laws and their racial ideals. – General F.S. Maude to the people of Mesopotamia, March 19, 1917. ... The government of Iraq, and the future of your country, will soon belong to you. ... We will end a brutal regime ... so that Iraqis can live in security. We will respect your great religious traditions, whose principles of equality and compassion are essential to Iraq's future. We will help you build a peaceful and representative government that protects the rights of citizens. *And then our military forces will leave.* Iraq will go forward as a unified, independent, and sovereign nation that has regained a respected place in the world. You are a good and gifted people – the heirs of a great civilization that contributes to all humanity. – President George W. Bush to the people of Iraq, April 4, 2003 (Ferguson 2003: 154, emphasis added).

In the concrete example of nation-building, architectural metaphor is nonetheless offering a ray of hope. If we accept that metaphors are in fact *Metaphors We Live By*, then the aspiration should be that a nation-building metaphor or metaphoric system will embody all the potential that architectural metaphor has to offer, and structure the ‘constructive’ engagement of the international community in the affairs of sovereign states. However, despite its potential, contemporary nation-building remains anchored in state-centric thinking and literature. In order to start thinking in terms of nation-citizens and not nation-state-containers, analogy to the architectural project, and the lessons learned from architectural practise, might suggest future ways forward.

This concluding chapter will begin with a re-capitulation of the conclusions reached about architectural metaphor and nation-building respectively, with particular attention paid to the potential risks and seductions they pose in international political discourse. The following section will attempt to explain some of the shortcomings of nation-building, through considering it as a literal architectural project and the implications from architectural practise. Re-positing the crisis of metaphor into the context of the crisis of modern architecture can offer some important conclusions on the study of international relations and the limits and potentials of the nation-building project itself.

## **Ground Covered**

Old ideas may not fit the emerging reality: the “war against terrorism” requires international cooperation that doesn’t exist in theory or practise (Walter 2002: 936).

As found in chapter 2, architectural metaphor can be a powerful tool in political discourse, equivalent to other source domains in richness and inferences, and in continual dialogue and evolution with the target domain to which it is conceptually mapped. The fear remains that metaphors are pernicious when they highlight some aspects and hide others- “Metaphors can kill” to quote George Lakoff’s famous warning of how important metaphors were in political discourse leading to the 2003 Gulf War (2003). If a voting population is able to re-think of war through the metaphor of WAR IS ARCHITECTURE, then they can be led to think that the deployment of their nation’s armed forces to war abroad is part of a constructive act.

Chapter 3 inductively challenged whether metaphors are structuring our actions, through investigating the literal practise of contemporary nation-building. The answer is somewhat ambivalent: the practise of nation-building is about constructing, but the authors render it nearly impossible to judge the project, as their focus is entirely on the external milestones imposed, and the builder’s own needs, motivations and strategic concerns: nation-building currently is not a particularly quantifiable science. The absence of writing about the nation-building clients, in its own turn provides evidence of the risks of metaphor. As Cohn wrote about the seduction of discussing nuclear annihilation in abstract acronyms, it is far easier to speak abstractly about the nation-built (STATE AS CONTAINER or STATE AS PERSON) than it is to speak about the construction of the *nation-citizens*, and *nation-building communities*. The real constraint of contemporary nation-building is the state-centric thinking that is limiting its potential in theory and application.

The juxtaposing of the literal and figurative architectural metaphors onto three of the major metaphoric systems that ground our conceptions of the international system in chapter 4 provided an interesting glimpse of the over-arching question of this study. Nation-building fits largely into our traditional conceptual thinking, and genuinely reinforced some elements of the metaphoric systems. It equally suggested some worrying fault lines- STATES AS CONTAINERS that seemed to have sprung leaks, and *über*-persons that are populating the GLOBAL NEIGHBOURHOOD, pretending to be- and being accepted as- STATES AS PERSON, despite their vaguely criminal, transnational or commercial nature. The worrying outcome is the ease with which nation-building is framed in the FAIRY TALE OF JUST WAR metaphoric system. Beyond the commentary on our translating of international politics into digestible fairy tales of hero, villains and victims, there was an important twist: the end state, victory, or happy ending is even more elusive than when the fairy tale is used to understand war. Nation-building becomes a perpetual project with ill-defined 'victory' and 'threat', that seems conveniently coupled with the perpetual war on terrorism launched in 2001.

### **Bridging the Literal and the Figurative**

One of the best measures of a metaphor's resilience is its capacity to bridge the figurative and literal realms. In chapter 2, the example of the RAPE OF KUWAIT showed how rape figuratively and literally was a highly successful metaphor for the military invasion of Iraq, and the subsequent framing of the justification for the international community to go to war. A reality check of nation-building and

architectural metaphor is to bring it back across the divide to the literal realm of architectural practice. What if nation-building was an (literal) architectural project?

As an architectural project, nation-building simply doesn't cross the divide. While there are many aspects that have been established in this study as being similar- blueprints, workers, designs, work plans, contracts and architects- the possible analogy collapses at the level of client-architect relationship. Nation-building as an architectural project would be one where the client was being held (quite literally, in the case of Afghanistan and Iraq) *at gunpoint*. While this illuminates an important incompatibility in the potential metaphoric mappings of nation-building to the architectural project, it does begin to explain the ineffectiveness of the architect-centric nation-building project as practised today.

This failure to cross the figurative-literal divide does reveal something about the essence of the nation-building project: what would be completely unprofitable as a commercial architectural project is *precisely the project that only a state can undertake*. While unprofitable for an architectural firm, the Coalition state members were able to see an immediate and invaluable strategic value of having a dependent ally in the Middle East- in addition to the mid- and long-term financial gains for their domestic economy and corporations. While an architectural firm could never bring in and hold their client at gunpoint, this is behaviour that only a state, albeit in extreme cases, could undertake and legitimize. While no firm could undertake a project without a client (dream though it might be) this is sadly the commercial advantage that state actors possess. The absence of resulting nation-citizens, or communities of nation-builders is not anachronous: it is inevitable in the very conception of nation-building today.

... how to promote governance of weak states, improve their democratic legitimacy, and strengthen self-sustaining institutions – thus becomes the central project of contemporary international politics. We arrive at this conclusion either as a result of our desire to reconstruct conflict-ridden or war-torn societies, out of a desire to eliminate spawning grounds for terrorism, or out of a hope that poor countries will have a chance to develop economically. *If there is a science, art of techné to state-building then it will serve all of these goals simultaneously and be in extremely high demand* (Fukuyama 2004b: 133-134, emphasis added).

Francis Fukuyama frames the implications in his imagining of what nation-building *might* become. While it is treated as something of a science, what is lacking is the *art* of nation-building. Here, the crisis of metaphor finds its parallel in the architectural realm. Modern architecture has been increasingly dominated by the economic, regulatory and programmatic demands of competitive business practise. The result is that architecture has been reduced to the ‘production’ of shelter as an economic activity. The resulting prosaic character of built form is despite the aspiration of architectural practise to create poetic architectural works.

This crisis of modern architecture poses curious questions as to whether nation-building and international relations theory are not facing the same issues as architecture: how to remain a science that is systemically and institutionally replicable, but how to discover that which makes it an art, as Fukuyama suggests. Perhaps truly ‘poetic’ international relations theory and nation-building practise will be the eventual result of an artistic imagination that eventually breaks free of the constraints of what remain dominant metaphoric thinking for how we conceive of the international system. While the prescription and aspiration is good, it should be noted that architecture has yet to resolve its own challenge, despite lively debate and its own ‘schools of thought’.

## Conclusion

When President Reagan repeatedly quoted Governor Winthrop in speaking of the United States as a “shining city on a hill,” his words had great resonance for many Americans. This feeling leads at times to a typically American tendency to confuse its own national interests with the broader interests of the world as a whole (Fukuyama 2004b: 154).

We want and deserve tin-can architecture in a tin-horn culture. And we will probably be judged not by the monuments we build but by those we have destroyed (*New York Times* editorialist, On demolition of Pennsylvania Station, 28 Oct 63).

As the adage goes, history never looks like history when you are living through it.

This study looked at the transition of ideas and realities as they evolve, and has to be excused for making conclusions on the fly, so to speak. When Chilton and Lakoff observed a crisis in European and American policy metaphors, it was not for a *lack* of potential metaphors that the crisis occurred. The difficulty, then and now, was in inventing new metaphoric foundations that would represent a changing world order, as it unfolded. Since the Cold War’s end, we can conclude today that history did not end, non-state actors did not overturn Westphalian foundations, and the state, despite the changing power, security and political realities, remained the basic building block of the international system. In short, it is just as well that some restraint was shown in inventing new metaphors, as the realities still allow our traditional metaphors to function. Ultimately, the concern should be Rohrer’s warning: that exploiting dead metaphors in international political discourse risks degrading it to conceiving of a new word order, and not the new world order we *need* and seek to understand. In this vein, nation-building should be approached with caution.

While we continue to focus our efforts on the building of nations, we continue to fail to rise to the challenge of building societies and nation-citizens. Chilton and Lakoff's crisis of metaphor has become a largely systems oriented response to problems: limiting architectural metaphor to a reductive role of describing systems oriented solutions—security architecture, legal frameworks, new institutions, etc. If nation-building were to rise to the challenge facing architecture, and equally suggested by Fukuyama, it might embrace the higher calling to become an art.

The goal of this investigation has been to make the point that architectural metaphor in foreign policy discourse and war is more than a means to understand complex and abstract concepts. Yet, the sub-text is that while architectural metaphor can play a fundamental role in structuring our political discourse and actions, the lure of dealing in abstract entities will deliver international relations theory to the same fate as Penn Station. If international relations thinking does not move beyond state-centric foundations, nation-building risks being tin-horn metaphoric concepts, leading to the construction of Potemkin nations. The moral form of intervention we seek, the nations we seek to build, are all conceived of as “shining cities on a hill”, laden with the narcissistic dream of building in our own image and lack the democratic checks and balances of the architect-client relationship. The call is to perhaps master the role of the state level architect; as the realities of the international system grow even more chaotic, the dream of order will only grow more important.

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