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THE SINC-JAPANESE RELATIONSHIP:
A DIFFERENT APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

by

David Steuerman, B.Sc.

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Department of Political Science

Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario
August 25, 1994
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**THE SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONSHIP:
A DIFFERENT APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

submitted by

David Steuerman, B.Sc.

in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts

Chair, Department of Political Science

Thesis Supervisor

Carleton University
September 20, 1994

ABSTRACT

This paper will explore the dynamics of the modern Sino-Japanese relationship and place it within a historical context. In so doing, the important informal elements of this relationship, namely those which go beyond the explicitly codified treaties and agreements between the two countries, are considered. To this end, a framework is developed, based upon the Confucian and Taoist philosophies, which helps to explain the often informal behaviour of China and Japan in the international environment. These philosophical teachings stress the importance of morality and ritual in relationships and politics. Additionally, the virtue of strength through weakness and action through inaction is also stressed. The two nations' relationships with the Superpowers, the United States and the former USSR, are then discussed utilizing this framework. This analysis shows that cultural misreadings often abound due to a lack of understanding of these informal elements in East Asia.

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An acknowledgements page such as this should be the easiest part of a thesis to write, but after having written over one hundred and seventy pages, any non-academic writing is difficult. Therefore, I ask the reader to bear with me while I say a few thank-yous to people who helped me. First off I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Jeremy Paltiel who put up with endless questions and threw me stacks of books so that I would have some clue as to what to write. I would also like to thank other members of the faculty of Political Science at Carleton University, especially Professor Piotr Dutkiewicz, who similarly helped me develop my ideas. Beyond these people, I also must thank my parents, being the good son that I am, without whose emotional and financial support this thesis would have been far more difficult. I should also specifically thank Angela Pasceri, Fabiola Boza, Jennifer Logie, Maureen Roberts and Jerry Lam who all proof-read sections of this paper for me. Finally, I want to thank all those in Ottawa, Toronto and Quebec City who helped to keep me sane this year. You know who you are. Hopefully you, the reader, will enjoy this paper, or at the very least find it moderately useful. Cheers/Kampai.

David Steuerman,
September 20, 1994

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MASTER'S THESIS

CHAPTER I---INTRODUCTION:

Throughout most of the past few centuries, the West has dominated the Global stage and consequently set the standard by which the world has conducted its affairs. The end of the Soviet-American cold war, however, has created the conditions by which other, non-Western, countries can rise to the fore and conduct their affairs on their own terms. Within the pages of this thesis, two such nations, namely Japan and China¹, will be examined with regard to their mutual interactions. These have been chosen because they are the most powerful states in East Asia, currently the world's most dynamic region. The way these two nations conduct their affairs, as well as the results of their relationship, cannot but have significant effects on the rest of the world. However, these nations are most definitely not replicas of the 'traditional' Western powers. They are separated by a great gap in terms of culture, philosophy and modes of behaviour. Consequently, traditional, Western based theories of international relations often exhibit weaknesses when attempting to explain the relationships of these Asian countries. This thesis will therefore take a different approach, one based on East Asian modes of thought and philosophy, that should be better suited

to explain these ancient and newly powerful states. The next few pages will outline the method to be used in this endeavour and will also identify some of the assumptions behind the ideas to be examined in the thesis.

Thesis Statement

This paper will examine the mechanics of the Sino-Japanese relationship and consider the informal aspects of the association. In so doing, a novel approach will be taken, based upon Confucian and Taoist principles, that will help explain the two states' behaviour. The wider applicability of this framework will then be tested by way of China and Japan's relationships with the United States and the ex-Soviet Union.

There are several details in this thesis statement that will be briefly elaborated upon in this introductory section. One issue that deserves immediate discussion is the logic behind selecting the Sino-Japanese relationship for study. As already mentioned, Japan and China represent the two most powerful nations in the increasingly dynamic East Asian region. Japan's economic might has been an issue throughout much of the last quarter century, and its military potential was amply demonstrated during the Second World War. Due to its searing wartime experiences, there is generally no reason to believe that Japan will reassert itself militarily anytime in

the near future. However, understanding how this country views international relations, and discerning what drives it in that realm, is of importance not only in dealing with today's economic challenges, but also with the political and security issues that Japan will likely have a hand in shaping in the future.

China, although having the world's largest population, and being the cultural heart of East Asia, had not demonstrated its true potential in international relations for almost five hundred years². However, in the past fifty years or so, since the unification of the mainland under the Communists, China has become more politically assertive on the world stage, as its interactions with the Superpowers³, its attitude towards its neighbours⁴ and its stand on Hong Kong⁵ all demonstrate. Additionally, in the past fifteen years it has exhibited remarkable levels of economic growth⁶ that could, potentially, lift it into a position of world leadership within a few decades.

In order to understand how Japan and China may function on the world stage in the future, it helps to understand how they have interacted in the past. Due to factors of geography, cultural affinity and simple economic and political expediency, Japan and China have had more to do with each other than with almost any other nation on the planet⁷. Additionally, their relations have ranged from outright hostility and war, during the late nineteenth century and also

in the 1930s and 1940s⁸, to the conditions of relative cordiality and cooperation which is presently the case. Understanding the Sino-Japanese relationship as the nations concerned see it, as well as the informal aspects that make it so volatile, cannot but enhance the general understanding of these two powerful nations and facilitate successful interactions with them.

The contrast between *formal* and *informal* relations with regard to East Asia is of central importance to this thesis. In very general terms, this contrast derives from the nature of the power structures that shape the relationships. Formal power is ideally based upon an impersonal and non-arbitrary set of codified rules and regulations that are binding on all parties involved. Informal power, on the other hand, is more dependant on interpersonal relationships and ties of loyalty. Additionally, the rules of conduct in informal relationships are often not explicitly defined as they are in formal contracts and treaties⁹.

The informal elements in the Sino-Japanese relationship stem from a variety of sources, including domestic power structures, historical factors and cultural considerations that favour informal personal ties over formal and impersonal contracts. Partially as a result of this informality, the traditional Western models of international relations are often not fully appropriate for the task of explaining East Asian associations. Although this topic will be fleshed out in

the body of the paper, a few words on this subject are pertinent here.

The Western international relations models were developed primarily to explain the actions and interactions of European nation-states, which have fundamentally different philosophical and cultural histories than do the nations of East Asia. One of the greatest differences between the two cultures was touched on by Lucian Pye in his work Asian Power and Politics. He asserts that while Western societies stress individualism, East Asia places a higher value upon the group¹⁰. The result of this in society is a form of highly ritualized behaviour and a specific set of social hierarchies that affects all members of the community. Prime examples of this can be found in both the workplace¹¹ and in the family, where a strong sense of filial piety is pervasive¹².

One of the central arguments of this thesis is that these types of domestic cultural factors and behaviours can directly affect the realm of international relations in East Asia. While this is not to say that culture is the only determining factor in a nation's politics and its foreign relations, the role of cultural traditions in the formation of a state's political, economic and social structures cannot be readily discounted¹³. Because these important cultural factors are rarely taken into account, the traditional international relations theories often give an incomplete picture when used to examine events in East Asia.

This cultural element also leads to a second reason why the Western theories are somewhat deficient when it comes to explaining East Asian interactions. These societies, by placing such value on hierarchies and set forms in relationships, stress that an ordered social, and by extension international, system is both desirable and sustainable. In Chinese society especially there is an immense unease about the prospect of *Luan* or confusion and disorder¹⁴. This can be seen by the fact that the Chinese in their social interactions take great care to avoid instances of *Luan*¹⁵. By contrast, Western societies and the Western-based international system as a whole seems to exist in a constant state of *Luan*, or, as it is termed in Realist theory, anarchy. Therefore, the major Western international relations theories are based either on accepting and functioning within an anarchic world, or attempting to find a coping mechanism that will at least provide for some form of cooperation or security. The former strategy provides for the impetus for the Realist paradigm¹⁶, whereas the latter coping strategy suggests a Liberalist approach¹⁷. A third model, Dependency theory, while more global in its outlook, essentially exists to explain how nations have been peripheralized, and exploited, by stronger powers, thus making them increasingly vulnerable in a predatory, insecure world¹⁸. Thus, these three traditional approaches, while they certainly explain many facets of the Sino-Japanese relationship, are not, in of themselves,

sufficiently complete explanations. This is due to the fact that the Western and Eastern societies approach relationships, and thus many of the problems in international relations, in profoundly different ways.

What this thesis proposes to do is utilize a different approach to international relations that takes into account the cultural uniqueness of the East Asian nations. In order to do this, this approach, which has been dubbed the *Sempai-Kohai* theoretical framework after the Japanese terms for Senior and Junior, will examine some of the elements in the East Asian world view. Two of the most important elements in this are Taoism and Confucianism.

Confucianism is, in essence, a guide to the proper forms of behaviour within relationships among individuals and groups¹⁹. This is important as its teachings will offer some insight into how the East Asian nations perceive international relations and proper etiquette on the world stage. This philosophy, not surprisingly, is at the crux of the *Sempai-Kohai* framework. It is only when one considers the importance of form and ritual, both of which are stressed in Confucianism, that much of China and Japan's behaviour becomes comprehensible²⁰.

Taoism, meaning literally "the Way", promulgates the notion of action through inaction and utilizing the path of least resistance in dealing with problems²¹. This is most elegantly put forward in Sun Tzu's The Art of War when dealing

with strategic concerns, which have to be an important consideration in any theory of international relations. This philosophy is quite different from the Western drive to overcome all obstacles by whatever means possible. Seeking the path of least resistance and using an adversary's power to maximum advantage has been typical of much of Japan's postwar strategy in dealing with the outside world²². The discussion of Sino-Japanese relations, as well as the later consideration of the Superpower relationships with these nations, will demonstrate these principles quite clearly.

Methodology

The methodology that this thesis shall pursue will first involve an examination of the mechanics of the Sino-Japanese relationship in Chapter II. Next, using the information garnered in that section, Chapter III will discuss some of the weaknesses of Western based international relations models as they are applied to East Asia. This will then lead to the introduction of the *Sempai-Kohai* theoretical framework. In Chapter IV, this framework will then be more closely examined utilizing an additional example, this time involving the relationships of Japan and China to the United States and the former Soviet Union. This chapter will illustrate the importance of the *Sempai-Kohai* approach by highlighting the misunderstandings, simply in terms of basic cultural and

political differences, that the Superpowers have often had in their dealings with these two East Asian states. Finally, the various elements of the paper will be tied together and some prospects for the wider applicability and continued viability of this approach will be discussed.

The logic behind this arrangement of ideas deserves some explanation. The *Sempai-Kohai* framework, which is at the heart of this thesis, is designed to help interpret the behaviour, in the international arena, of Japan and China. However, in order to more fully appreciate the relevance of this approach, it is necessary to have some knowledge of the history of the relationship of these two countries, as it is this upon which the *Sempai-Kohai* approach is based. Therefore, it was deemed advisable to place the historical discussion ahead of the theoretical analysis so that the reader would be quickly able to gain a general understanding of the trends of the Sino-Japanese relationship. It should be noted, however, that this historical summary will be fairly general and show only major trends. This is done both to facilitate the later discussion and also because a lack of space precludes a more comprehensive survey.

CHAPTER II---THE SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONSHIP:

The Sino-Japanese relationship is quite striking due to the variety of interactions that have taken place between these two nations. The association has passed through various phases, ranging from nearly complete isolation to total war to relative amity. This chapter seeks to examine the dynamics of the relationship. In doing so, the analysis will be broken down into three main sections. The first section will consist of a general summary of the history of the relationship up until the present day. While this discussion will primarily focus upon the modern era, some earlier history will also be considered. This is important, not only because the roots of the modern relationship go so far back, but also due to the fact that Japan owes a lot of its culture and societal structures to China. Thus the early history of the Sino-Japanese relationship had a significant influence on Japan's domestic scene.

For the purpose of this thesis, the modern era will be assumed to have begun in Japan and China with their "opening" to the West in the mid-Nineteenth century. This period has witnessed a tremendous change in the relationship, with Japan assuming a dominant role while China descended into relative weakness. Only in the recent, post-war era has this shown some signs of change. Speculation on the future of the relationship

will be left until the concluding chapter of this thesis.

The second section of this chapter will examine the relationship from the Chinese perspective, while the third part will conduct a similar analysis for Japan. In both cases, this chapter will be examining the way in which the two nations shaped, and reacted to, the events surrounding the modern relationship, as described in the first section. This is useful as it permits a fairly detailed study of each state's structures and political circumstances as they pertain to the Sino-Japanese relationship. From this analysis it should be possible to extract many of the elements that will be needed in order to formulate the *Sempai-Kohai* framework as well as facilitate the general theoretical investigation of the relationship, both of which will be accomplished in chapter three.

General Survey of the Sino-Japanese Relationship

Early History

The past century of Sino-Japanese relations has been rather atypical in that, for the first time in over two thousand years of association, Japan was ascendant over China. Previously, it had unquestionably been China that was the stronger of the two countries. This is most clearly reflected in the strong Chinese influences that still pervade Japanese

society. This section will briefly discuss this early relationship and explore some of the patterns that are relevant to the modern era.

Early Japanese contact with the mainland was often facilitated by Korea. History shows that much of the mainland culture reached Japan's shores, even in neolithic times, by this route¹. Prior to the establishment of the T'ang Dynasty in China (617-907 A.D.)², there was little direct contact between China and Japan. There are records indicating that the Chinese were familiar with the Japanese people as early as the Third century B.C., although there is nothing concrete concerning any sort of relationship³. By the time the Han Dynasty was fully established in China, however, there is more evidence of contact. This includes a record of a 'Japanese' envoy to the Chinese court in A.D. 57⁴. Japan, at this time, consisted of various factions all attempting to increase their relative strength by contact and trade with the superior Chinese culture. Hence, even at this early stage, the progression of Japanese culture was being strongly influenced by its more advanced mainland neighbours.

Japanese assimilation of Chinese culture began to grow in the fifth and sixth centuries as Japan itself had become increasingly united⁵. Once again, however, this was primarily through the conduit of Korea. During this period Korea was divided into three warring states, all seeking allies in their efforts to unite the peninsula. Additionally, there existed a

small Japanese enclave at the southern tip of the country⁶. Due to the turmoil in China following the fall of the Han Dynasty in 220⁷, it was difficult for Japan to maintain direct contact with the mainland. Needless to say, China's ability to act as a teacher was also severely curtailed at this time. However, due to Japan's actions in Korea, various elements of Sinitic culture continued to be absorbed. This included the formal adoption of the Chinese written language in the early fifth century⁸ and Buddhism, which was introduced to Japan in the mid-sixth century⁹. Many of the scholars who came to Japan during this period were probably Chinese who were coming via the Korean peninsula¹⁰. By the early seventh century the foreign influences were strong enough for Japan to begin implementing new systems of administration based upon them. One of the first of these codes, promulgated in A.D. 604 by Prince Umayado, who was said to be quite proficient in the Chinese learning being absorbed at the time, strongly incorporated the new Buddhist and Confucian principles¹¹.

By the Seventh Century, China was reunited under the Sui and, later, T'ang Dynasties. This, coupled with the cessation of the military situation in Korea, allowed Japan to redirect its attention towards China and begin a much more thorough process of contact and learning. This was initiated as described by George Sansom,

The first official envoy to the Chinese court representing the whole of Japan appears to have been one Ono no Imoko. He left Japan in 607, with an interpreter named Kuratsukuri...and in the

autumn reached the then capital of China, Lo-yang, where he presented a letter from his sovereign. The opening words were "The Emperor of the sunrise country writes to the Emperor of the sunset country." The Sui emperor was annoyed at being thus addressed as an equal, and is said to have refused to accept the letter, observing that the barbarian memorial was insulting and could not be listened to. However, the trouble was somehow got over, for Ono returned in the following year, accompanying two envoys from the Sui court, who were received in Japan with great ceremony. The letters which they brought were couched in the language usually held by the Chinese towards foreign states. Japan was treated as a vassal.¹²

This passage is interesting as it illustrates a principle that often guided China in its relations with other states, that of the tributary relationship. This view, as will be seen later in this chapter, still held sway into the Nineteenth century and was a factor contributing to China's inability to deal effectively with the incursions of the West. The passage also shows that Japan learned early how to deal with China. Simply by creating the appearance of subordination, even though it rankled somewhat in the Japanese court, Japan was able to gain "favours" from its neighbour. As will be discussed later, this pattern has continued, in one form or another, right up to the present day.

Direct contact with Sui and T'ang China was of inestimable value to the Japanese in the evolution of their culture and society¹³. Fully describing these contributions would go far beyond the scope of this paper. It is worth noting, however, that amongst many other changes, the Japanese modified their administrative system along Chinese lines¹⁴.

One notable result of this was the Taikwa reform edict in 646, involving a new system of land tenure, local government and taxation, all of which was based upon the system used in T'ang China¹⁵. Unfortunately, due to the differing conditions in the two lands, what proved workable in China was far less successful in Japan. The fact that these reforms eventually precipitated economic and societal difficulties indicated the limitations inherent in directly transferring Chinese institutions to Japan¹⁶.

By the late ninth century, official relations with China were ended. There were several reasons for this, including the fact that T'ang China was entering the end phase of its dynastic cycle and conditions there were thus becoming increasingly unstable. Additionally, the Japanese realized that they required some time to assimilate what had been absorbed from China¹⁷. Considering that the direct importation of Chinese models to Japan had sometimes yielded undesired results, this period of domestic reticence was probably not ill-conceived. There was also the problem for Japan that often what was imported represented simply the form, rather than the essence, of a thing¹⁸. Therefore it is not surprising that after formal relations were suspended, the Japanese and Chinese societies began drifting apart¹⁹. This was despite the continuation of study by individual Japanese monks and students in China as well as the maintenance of a general trading relationship²⁰.

The next major interaction that Japan had with the mainland came in the form of the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century, which the Japanese survived as much by good fortune as by good planning. The Mongols, under Khubilai Khan, had managed to subjugate all of China in 1279, and had extended their empire as far west as Europe and Persia²¹. Two invasions were launched against Japan; the first in 1274 and the second seven years later in 1281. Both forces were quite formidable, but the Japanese were reasonably well prepared. By a combination of good military fortune and natural calamities befalling the Mongols, Japan managed to retain its independence²². With regard to the latter point, it is interesting to note that the Mongol force of 1281 was eventually forced to give up the invasion attempt, after seven weeks of fighting, due to a storm which the Japanese refer to as a *Kamikaze*, or "Divine wind"²³. That this was the name given to the suicide fighters in the second world war, some 700 years later, gives some impression of how deeply these events affected Japan at the time. It can be argued that the threat of invasion may have produced some degree of "national" unity in Japan²⁴. However, the heavy costs and increasing discontent of the military eventually weakened the power of the Kamakura Shogunate, which precipitated its eventual decline²⁵.

Following the fall of the Mongol (Yuan) dynasty in 1368 and the rise of the Ming in China²⁶, Sino-Japanese relations

restarted, albeit on rather restricted terms. The Japanese sought trade with China not only as a source of income but also in an effort to revitalize and modernize their society²⁷. The Chinese, although rather indifferent to trade with Japan, accepted it as "tribute" from a "vassal". The Japanese willingness to accept these terms, as well as their efforts to deal with the problem of Japanese pirates, facilitated a renewed, although somewhat limited, trading relationship²⁸.

The final pre-modern contact of historical importance was Japanese general Hideyoshi's attempt to conquer China in the late sixteenth century. Toyotomi Hideyoshi, along with Oda Nobunaga and Tokugawa Ieyasu, were together responsible for unifying Japan after over a century of war²⁹. Hideyoshi, who was the second of these great generals, initiated a campaign for the conquest of China. This followed his suppression of domestic dissent and was seen as a possible first step towards even wider conquests. In 1592 he launched an initial invasion of Korea, which was still the traditional staging post for dealings between Japan and China, consisting of some 150-200,000 men. Although his initial successes disturbed the Chinese, they originally sent in only a small military counter-force. This was partly due to the fact that the Chinese still viewed themselves as the powerful "Middle Kingdom" and were thus not overly concerned by the Japanese military threat. This initial Chinese force was consequently

slaughtered by the Japanese. Hideyoshi subsequently withdrew the majority of his forces when a much larger Chinese army was sent against them. China sent envoys to Japan to discuss a settlement, which was tentatively reached in 1596, but then quickly rejected. In 1597 Hideyoshi sent a second force to Korea, which met heavy resistance but won several major battles. With Hideyoshi's death in 1598, the Japanese forces were finally withdrawn.

It is noteworthy that the expense of these campaigns was something that the already weakened Ming dynasty in China could ill-afford¹⁰. The fact that the dynasty collapsed in 1644 was at least partially due to these enormous outlays. This fact highlights a general trend that can be seen throughout much of the early period of the relationship, namely the gradual shift in relative power between the two states. It is important not to read too much into this statement. Hideyoshi cannot be seen in this context as the direct forerunner of twentieth century Imperial Japan. Nor can China be seen as being irretrievably weak, for even at this point it is evident that China was still the superior power, as was evident by its defeat of Japan in Korea. Rather, China had entered a long period of relative decline, while Japan was in relative ascension. Whether or not this trend, in and of itself, would have resulted in the shift of power that was manifested in the late-Nineteenth century, due to impact of the West, is a moot point. The important issue is that by the

sixteenth century Japan had stopped being a student of China, and was in the slow and halting process of becoming a major power in its own right.

Shortly following the Korean escapade, Japan entered upon the Tokugawa period which lasted until the mid-1800s. One striking feature of this period was the policy of seclusion, which limited outside contact to Dutch and Chinese traders on an island in Nagasaki harbour. This policy was adopted soon after the final consolidation of Tokugawa rule. The reason behind this was the perceived threat of European ideas and religion that were beginning to permeate Japanese society¹¹. China had also imposed a similar isolation upon itself, involving managed trade and contact with the West through the port of Canton¹². These policies effectively severed Sino-Japanese relations, except for some very limited and controlled trade, until these two realms were forcibly re-opened by the West in the mid-Nineteenth century.

The Western Incursions to World War II

The impact of the West on both China and Japan in the nineteenth century was profound, to say the least. Ironically, however, one of the most important results of the Western encroachment was that it brought Japan and China back into full contact after over two centuries of relative isolation. Newly founded Meiji Japan sent emissaries to China in 1868 in

order to request modern treaty relations, and in 1870 a Japanese ambassador was received in Peking³³. At this time, Japan hoped to garner treaty concessions similar to those that the Western powers had obtained, a fact which naturally generated suspicion in China³⁴, so as to distance itself from that "backward" country³⁵. Japan was unsuccessful in this endeavour as it lacked the power to coerce China, a fact which was soon to change. Hence, an "equal" treaty was soon drawn up between the two countries³⁶.

An early example of Japanese ambitions involved their actions on Taiwan, which was then under Chinese sway. Due to the murder of a Japanese fisherman there, Japan launched a punitive expedition. This potentially dangerous situation was diffused by the British. The settlement involved Chinese compensation for the people killed during the incursion and for "improvements" left on Taiwan by the Japanese³⁷. This early incident, though minor, was a foretaste of things to come in the next half century of the relationship.

The Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95 represented a major turning point, not only in the modern relationship, but also the centuries old balance of power in East Asia. Not surprisingly, given the earlier discussion, Korea was the focus of this conflict. Ostensibly a battle over control of the peninsula, which was a traditional Chinese vassal, it also allowed Japan to demonstrate her prowess and the fact that she was truly embarked on a course of modernization, as opposed to

China³⁸. Despite the Japanese reforms, a Chinese victory was expected by outside observers as it was still perceived to be the more powerful state. The Japanese success, therefore, was not only a vindication of its reform programs, to be discussed below, but also a stunning blow to China. By the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which ended the war, China;

(1) recognized the independence of Korea; (2) ceded to Japan the Liaotung Peninsula, Taiwan and the Pescadores; (3) agreed to pay an indemnity of 200 million taels within a seven-year period; and (4) extended to Japan the full range of privileges earlier given Western countries under the unequal treaties. In addition four more treaty ports (one of them Chungking) were to be opened to all nations, the Japanese were granted navigation rights on the Yangtze and the right to develop manufacturing on Chinese soil.³⁹

Japan was subsequently forced to relinquish its claim to the Liaotung Peninsula, and thus its major interests in Korea, by the Triple Intervention of Russia, Germany and France⁴⁰. While this stirred up resentment in Japan, it did little to help China, which had had its weakness graphically demonstrated. The Japanese victory had a multitude of effects on the Sino-Japanese relationship itself. In a way, the Chinese loss in 1895 was made all the worse by the fact that it was defeated by an Asian, and thus historically inferior, country. The humiliation China felt was coupled with a fear of further Japanese encroachments. On the other hand, there was also a strong current of admiration for Japan within China. As the victory had demonstrated Japan's success in modernizing itself, it became a model for China to learn from. Japan, for

its part, supported the reform efforts that China embarked on in the wake of its defeat⁴¹.

Japan's rise at the expense of China continued with its participation in the Boxer suppression at the turn of the century. This rebellion, which was one of many plaguing China at the time, had a strong anti-foreign and anti-Christian component to it. Eventually, this dissent was co-opted by conservatives in the government in an attempt to rid China of foreign influences⁴². The movement, which was for the most part restricted to the northern part of China, was ultimately defeated. However, during the height of the disturbances, the foreign legations in Peking were besieged for two months. They were only relieved when allied armies entered the city in August 1900⁴³. Japan played an important role in this operation with a sizeable contingent of troops. It is interesting to note, however, that Japan waited until a request for its assistance was received from Great Britain, before committing its troops. This was part of the low posture it was pursuing on the mainland following the 1895 restoration of diplomatic relations with China⁴⁴. The reason behind this stance is the fact that many civilian leaders in Japan wished to see China remain intact, despite the various leaseholds being acquired by the other powers⁴⁵. Thus Japan elected to abstain from overtly meddling in China's affairs unless it received a request for assistance or its own interests were in jeopardy.

As a result of its participation in the suppression of the rebellion, Japan was one of the powers to benefit from the Boxer protocol. This involved the following provisions;

China would apologize for the victims of Boxer outbreaks with monuments in international cemeteries and visits to Japan and Germany by high officials to atone for the murders of Japanese Legation Chancellor Sugiyama and the German minister, Baron von Ketteler. China accepted restrictions on its import of arms; it agreed to raze the forts at Taku in order not to impede communications between Peking and the sea; it agreed that the legation quarters would be under foreign control and without rights of residence for Chinese; and it agreed to maintain key connection points between Tientsin and Peking in foreign hands, to publish edicts forbidding membership in anti-foreign societies, and to ban civil service examinations in cities where foreigners had been killed. China agreed to punishment for ten high officials and over one hundred others, and it promised to pay in gold an indemnity of 450 million taels over a period of forty years.⁴⁶

These provisions were humiliating to China and the indemnity added to its already substantial economic and political woes. The sense of humiliation and powerlessness was made even more extreme by the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05 over Manchuria and Korea⁴⁷. Once again, Japan surprised observers by emerging victorious, although at quite a high cost to the nation⁴⁸. By defeating a major European state, Japan greatly enhanced its position vis-a-vis the other powers. Victory gave Japan control over Korea, which it formally annexed in 1910⁴⁹, as well as Southern Manchuria. Additionally, it was able to avenge itself upon Russia for its part in the Triple Intervention of the previous decade⁵⁰.

During the next two decades, Sino-Japanese relations

followed a rather uneasy course. Although this period did not witness the same unremitting pressures that Japan was to apply in the 1930s, there was nevertheless the perception in China that Japan was a predatory power. This is best illustrated by Japan's actions in China during the First World War. Following the collapse of the Ch'ing dynasty in China in 1911⁵¹, Japan was forced to deal with a radically altered political landscape. Unfortunately, Japan did not have a particularly coherent policy given the conflicting interests of the business, government and military sectors⁵². Yuan Shih-k'ai, who had assumed the presidency of the new Chinese republic, alienated Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary camp, which was supported, in part, by the Japanese. In the process of suppressing some domestic uprisings, the new government also committed several "anti-Japanese" acts⁵³. This resulted in domestic pressure in Japan for a stronger policy regarding China. The opportunity arose with the outbreak of World War I, which the Japanese entered on the allied side. After capturing the German holdings in China, including possessions in Shantung, they presented China with the infamous Twenty-one demands in early 1915.

The Demands were arranged in five groups of which the first related to Shantung province. All of Imperial Germany's rights there were to be transferred to Japan. Group II extended the lease and the privileges in south Manchuria and east Inner Mongolia which the Japanese had taken over from Imperial Russia in 1905. Group III confirmed the pattern of joint Sino-Japanese administration of the Hanyehp'ing Company that had been sought earlier by Japanese interests. In Group IV China

was to promise not to alienate any port or island along the China coast to any other country, in "the interest of preserving China's territorial integrity." None of these went much beyond previous requests that had been made of China. Group V, however, contained more difficult problems. It consisted of seven items that were offered as the "desires of the Imperial (Japanese) Government,"...Japanese would be employed as political, financial and military advisers; Japanese hospitals, schools and temples would have the right to own land in the Chinese interior; Japanese would be appointed to police positions where needed; China would purchase Japanese arms or approve the establishment of a Sino-Japanese arsenal; Japan would be permitted to construct railways connecting the Yangtze Valley with the South China coast; Japanese capital would be given first call for the development of Fukien province; and Japanese would be permitted to do mission work in China.⁵⁴

Needless to say, these demands, especially the fifth group, were an extreme affront to the Chinese. Negotiations got under way, and the demands were somewhat modified, with the fifth group eventually being dropped. However, as talks dragged on the Japanese grew impatient. They finally issued an ultimatum on May 7, 1915, a date known as "National Humiliation Day" in China⁵⁵. This, combined with the results of the 1919 Versailles Treaty, which granted the German concessions to Japan rather than having them revert back to China⁵⁶, brought the hitherto underdeveloped power of Chinese nationalism to the fore. The irony of this entire situation is that in an effort to enhance their position in China, the Japanese helped to create the very force that would increasingly make their situation more precarious. Additionally, the Japanese reaction to Chinese nationalism led to a hardening of their position

vis-a-vis the mainland and eventually resulted in the uncontrolled militarism that soon engulfed the entire region.

Before discussing the events that finally led to all-out war, it is worth briefly mentioning some of the more positive aspects of the pre-war Sino-Japanese relationship. As was mentioned above, there was a grudging admiration of Japan in China. This can be seen not only in the support that Japan provided for the early reform efforts, but also by the fact that many Chinese went to work or study in Japan⁵⁷. Although the numbers of Chinese doing this began to peter out by the 1910s, due to the growing ill-feeling between the two nations, there were still a sizeable contingent in Japan until the 1930s. Much of this was paid for by the disbursement of Japan's share of the Boxer indemnity⁵⁸. There were also a number of proposals for various joint institutions, cultural exchanges and humanitarian projects put forward and implemented. Unfortunately, the worsening political climate precluded much harmonious interaction of this type⁵⁹. Economically, Japan and China were, throughout this period, becoming increasingly important to one another. This is demonstrated by the growing interdependence⁶⁰ of the two countries' economies and the fact that, even in 1930, the volume of Japanese trade with China was three times larger than Japan's trade with its colonial possessions⁶¹. However, despite these instances of cooperation, much Japanese activity in China was perceived as being tinged with the stain of

imperialism.

The road to war was not, in many ways, a conscious Japanese policy. As shall be seen below, the Japan of this period was less a ravening imperialist monster than a headless entity drifting towards a situation not necessarily of its choosing. This point is shown by the fact that military units on the mainland began taking independent initiatives or interpreting their orders very loosely⁶². This was coupled with the growing strength of the military command in Tokyo and the continuing weakness of the civilian leadership. However, it should be noted that many non-military elements of Japanese society supported the exploitation of China and were generally in favour of the harder military line when the Chinese protested. Thus, while it is true that the military adventurism that characterized the 1930s was the result of independent actions by members of the armed forces, the overall Japanese policy orientation during this period was such that conflict in Asia would probably have been inevitable.

The most prominent examples of this military adventurism involved the actions of the Kwantung army in Manchuria. In 1928, a Kwantung Army staff officer, Colonel Komoto Daisaku took direct action against the Northern warlord Chang Tso-lin, who had been a recipient of Japanese assistance against other warlords and the Chinese Nationalists (KMT). While Chang was retreating from the KMT in Peking, Komoto blew up his train,

thus removing a potential obstacle to the Japanese domination of Manchuria⁶³. This particular incident, which had no sanction from Tokyo, failed to produce the desired response in Manchuria, which would have "allowed" Japanese troops to fully secure the territory. Three years later, however, the Kwantung Army staged the "Manchurian Incident". This involved inducing disturbances by playing up the imported Korean minority against the native Chinese in the area. The resultant turmoil, which sent ripples throughout China, along with the murder of a Japanese army officer on a mission near Mongolia⁶⁴, were used by the army as a pretext for action. On September 18, 1931, after blowing up a short section of the South Manchurian Railway, the Kwantung army used this final "incident" as a justification for seizing control of the major cities of the region. Shortly thereafter they established the state of "Manchukuo" with P'u-Yi, the last Ch'ing emperor, as the puppet ruler⁶⁵. This was presented to Tokyo as a fait accompli, which the government had little choice but to accept, lest it admit it had no control over the army⁶⁶.

Other examples of this sort of activity included the Tsinan Incident (May 1928)⁶⁷, the Shanghai Incident (1932)⁶⁸, the Jehol Invasion (1933)⁶⁹ and various schemes for separating parts of Northern China, including Inner Mongolia, from the rest of the country. Although these actions often did not have official sanction from Tokyo, they helped encourage the Japanese government, which was increasingly dominated by

militarists and ultra-nationalists, to take a harder line with regard to China⁷⁰. This attitude was demonstrated by the "Amo Doctrine" of 1934. Amo Eiji, the head of the information division of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, made the following statement on April 17, 1934 in response to a reporter's question regarding Western financial agreements with China;

We oppose therefore any attempt on the part of China to avail herself of the influence of any other country in order to resist Japan. We also oppose any action taken by China, calculated to play one power against another. Any joint operations undertaken by foreign powers, even in the name of technical or financial assistance at this particular moment after the Manchurian and Shanghai Incidents are bound to acquire political significance...Japan therefore must object to such undertakings as a matter of principle. Negotiations with China by individual nations on matters of economic and trade may, in point of fact, aid China. But in that their results will threaten the peace of East Asia, Japan must oppose such aid.⁷¹

As can be expected, this statement was not well received in either the West or China. Given this set of circumstances, it is not surprising that a full scale war soon erupted between Japan and China.

The clash that finally sparked the war, the so-called "China Incident", occurred on the night of July 7, 1937 near the Marco Polo Bridge just west of Peking. The Japanese army reported a missing man and requested permission to search the area. Although the missing man showed up, shots were exchanged with nearby Chinese units, and a military buildup began. For several days nothing occurred as both sides were awaiting reinforcements and a potential diplomatic settlement. But the

political drift and nationalist pressure on both sides, combined with the increasing numbers of troops prepared on the ground, created its own imperative. Thus the general war began a few days later⁷².

Although the Japanese secured many victories, they were never able to pacify the entire country and were subject to constant harassment and battle from both KMT and Communist forces. Early Japanese attempts to cow the population into submission, possibly coupled with a lack of control of the units involved, led to such incidents as the notorious "Rape of Nanking" in 1937, in which it is claimed 340,000 were killed⁷³. The war, which was to last eight years, resulted in millions of deaths on both sides⁷⁴, devastated both China and Japan and destroyed, for better or worse, the old order in East Asia. This legacy, not surprisingly, has had a profound effect on the postwar Sino-Japanese relationship.

Post-War Relationship

Immediately following the close of World War II, neither China nor Japan were in a state to resume any sort of relationship. Japan was occupied and in ruins, whereas China had launched into a renewed civil war between the KMT and the Communists⁷⁵. The resumption of Sino-Japanese relations was conditioned not only by the outcome of the Chinese civil war, but also on the emerging cold war between the United States

and the Soviet Union⁷⁶. The Communist victory in China, in October 1949, followed by the signing of the Sino-Soviet military alliance in 1950 and the subsequent outbreak of hostilities in Korea, prompted the United States, the primary occupying power in Japan, to take a fairly hard line vis-a-vis the Communist powers⁷⁷. A general peace treaty, officially ending the Pacific war, was signed by the Americans, various allied powers and Japan in San Francisco in 1951, but neither the KMT in Taiwan nor the new government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) were invited to participate⁷⁸. However, it was arranged that Japan would secure a settlement with one of the Chinese governments at a later date. In 1952, the Japanese signed a separate peace treaty with Taiwan. This was due, in part, to an American threat that it would not ratify the San Francisco agreement if Japan recognized the PRC⁷⁹. It would therefore have seemed that the China issue was settled for Japan at this point in time. However, over the next twenty years, various types of informal contacts, such as friendship trade and cultural exchanges, were instigated between the PRC and Japan, thus setting the stage for the resumption of formal relations in 1972.

The general pattern of the relationship during this period was nicely summed up by Chae-Jin Lee as follows,

...the predominant pattern of Japanese relations with China moved in a cyclical way, typically starting with a period of intense political friction followed by a period of relative relaxation. Accordingly, the entire twenty-three-year span under consideration can be divided into

six major periods: (1) formal estrangement, 1949-52; (2) gradual relaxation, 1953-57; (3) total collapse, 1958-62; (4) limited adjustment, 1963-65; (5) extreme hostility, 1966-70; and (6) comprehensive reconciliation, 1971-72."

Much of the vacillation of this period resulted from Beijing's reaction to various policies and statements within the Japanese government. A couple of specific examples will illustrate this general point.

Shortly after the signing of the 1952 treaty, the PRC began making overtures towards Japan in an effort to improve relations. An important element of this included gradually increasing levels of informal "Friendship" trade⁴¹, which reached a postwar peak in 1956. Additionally, commercial exhibits were staged in the mid-1950s in both countries and cultural contacts were generally on the increase⁴². However, the friendly discourse cooled considerably following the rise of Kishi Nobusuke to the position of Japanese Prime Minister in 1957⁴³. This decline in relations was precipitated by Kishi's strong pro-American and Taiwan attitude.

The actual breakdown in relations between Japan and China was triggered by a relatively minor incident. In May 1958, a Japanese youth tore down a small PRC flag at a Chinese stamp exhibit show in Nagasaki. When he was only lightly charged, it caused an uproar in China, which promptly suspended all trade and cultural interactions⁴⁴. There were several reasons behind this Chinese action. By suspending trade relations they hoped to mobilize the Japanese business community and

undermine Kishi's position in the upcoming elections. At the same time, they were able to demonstrate their displeasure with current Japanese policies without taking overly provocative action. Additionally, given the recent successes of Sputnik and the Soviet ICBMs, both symbols of the "superiority" of the Socialist system, as well as the domestic confidence China was exhibiting in their "Great Leap Forward", it is not surprising that the Chinese leadership would take a generally hard line towards "unfriendly" capitalist countries⁵⁵. Relations did not begin to improve until after Kishi had left the scene in 1960, and the new Prime Minister, Ikeda Hayato, adopted a "Low Posture" towards the PRC⁵⁶.

The second period of rough relations between Japan and China also involved a complex mix of domestic and international concerns. While China was embroiled in the Cultural Revolution during the late 1960s, Japanese Prime Minister Sato assumed a fairly strong pro-US/Taiwan stance⁵⁷. These two factors, rabid Communist excess in the PRC combined with an "unfriendly" Japanese attitude, meant that governmental relations between the two countries were almost nonexistent. During this period, however, contact was maintained through unofficial, informal channels and various forms of "People's Diplomacy". This latter activity, which had been initiated during the earlier period of contention by several of Japan's opposition parties, involved forums, demonstrations and discussions which illustrated Japanese

support for the PRC¹⁸.

Normalization of relations became possible between the two nations following US President Nixon's historic visit to China in early 1972¹⁹. Even before this, China had been applying pressure to Japan by way of economic coercion, which, considering the importance of the China market to Japan, was a most effective strategy. Beijing placed "politics in command" in order to get maximum utility out of the growing trade interaction with Japan²⁰. An example of this was "Chou's four conditions", which were brought into existence in 1970 following Chou Enlai's trip to North Korea. These conditions precluded dealings with the following Japanese companies;

- (1) factories and firms helping South Korea's intrusion into North Korea or Taiwan's "come back to the mainland" attempt,
- (2) factories or firms with large investments in South Korea or Taiwan;
- (3) enterprises supplying arms and ammunition to U.S. war efforts in Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia; and
- (4) U.S.-Japanese joint ventures or subsidiaries of U.S. companies in Japan.²¹

Needless to say this tactic brought responses from the Japanese business community and thus applied considerable pressure on the Japanese government²².

The fact that China was unwilling to deal with Prime Minister Sato also had effects on the Japanese domestic scene. The China issue helped to pave the way for the succession of Tanaka Kakuei, who quickly concluded negotiations for the resumption of diplomatic relations. These were re-established on September 29, 1972²³. The joint statement issued at the

time stated that Japan "... 'deeply reproaches itself' for having caused enormous damages in the past to the Chinese people through war" and contained nine points which included an affirmation that "The 'abnormal state of affairs' between China and Japan is declared closed", a recognition by Japan that "... the PRC is the sole legal government of China" and "... that Taiwan is an 'inalienable part' of [the PRC's] territory", a renunciation by China for war indemnities, an agreement to conclude a treaty of Peace and Friendship, and an anti-hegemony clause⁴. It is interesting to note that this declaration reflects many Chinese demands and, for the most part, Japanese acceptance thereof. This is typical of the postwar relationship in that, despite Japan's superior economic power, it generally gives the appearance of yielding to Chinese pressure.

Since 1972, Sino-Japanese relations have generally been amicable. In August 1978 the Treaty of Peace and Friendship was concluded between Japan and China, although the actual significance of this treaty is debatable⁵. Not surprisingly, economics has been at the forefront of the relationship. Japan and China are of immense economic importance to each other and are major trading partners, although Japan tends to dominate this aspect of the relationship with China⁶. Despite the volume of business, there has often been an underlying uneasiness among Japanese investors regarding China. Although it is seen as a huge potential market, the bureaucratic

difficulties, potential political instability and occasional tendency towards shoddiness and inefficiency make it a somewhat difficult business environment". Additionally, the Chinese perception of Japan's domination of their economy has generated resentment and protest in China. This manifested itself in the fall of 1985 with the anti-Japanese student protests". There were other reasons behind these protests, including some genuine domestic discontent ranging across a gamut of issues such as high inflation rates, official privileges, bureaucratic inefficiency, the dumping of Mao's revolutionary values, and the "vulgarization of society through the foreign content of modernization and the official approval of personal enrichment"". However, the following poster, which depicts a Japanese businessman, appears to sum up the general mood, "Forty years ago I chopped 50 Chinese heads off with my sword, but now my firm sells you hundreds of thousands of colour televisions"¹⁰⁰.

The attitude expressed during these protests is not atypical of the general feeling underlying the Sino-Japanese relationship. Throughout the 1980s, various minor incidents in Japan prompted a great deal of rhetoric in China. Examples of this include the textbook scandals of 1982 and 1986¹⁰¹, the blowup over Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in 1985¹⁰² and the storm of contention surrounding the Kokaryo Student Hostel in Kyoto. A couple of these cases deserve a bit more explanation in order to

demonstrate the general dynamic at work between China and Japan.

The dispute over the textbook issue in 1982 was sparked by reports in various Tokyo newspapers charging the Japanese Ministry of Education with "softening" the language in school textbooks regarding Japan's actions in the war. The resultant fervent reaction throughout Asia forced Tokyo to pledge to restore the original language in the books. Beijing's response to the textbook scandal was nearly a month in coming due to high level discussions and planning sessions. The result of these plans was a very harsh and prolonged media campaign aimed at reminding the Chinese people of past Japanese aggression, as well as a general condemnation of "renewed" Japanese militarism. There is, however, more to this than first meets the eye. During this period, China was putting out feelers for a renewal of Sino-Soviet relations. In order to do this, China had to be seen to be taking a firm stance against the capitalist world. An anti-imperialist campaign aimed at Japan served this purpose quite well¹⁰³.

The dispute over the Kokuryo Hostel case involves a similar mix of domestic and international politics. Built in 1931, the hostel was purchased by the Taiwan government in 1950 to be used for Chinese students. In 1967, a problem arose concerning eight radical students who had seized control of the building. Taiwan appealed to the Japanese courts to evict them, and the case dragged on until 1974. By this time,

relations with the PRC had been normalized, and Beijing insisted that it be given ownership of the hostel. The case wound its way through the Japanese legal system until February 1987. At this time, the Osaka High Court supported an earlier decision that the hostel did indeed belong to Taiwan¹⁰⁴. Not surprisingly, the PRC government was not pleased with this decision. Beijing claimed this was a manifestation of Japan's so-called "two China" policy and claimed that Japan was violating the spirit of the earlier diplomatic agreements with the PRC¹⁰⁵.

The reaction to this incident was heightened in Beijing due to the recent dismissal of Hu Yaobang as general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). There were several reasons for his ouster, including fallout from the 1986 student demonstrations, ideological differences with other members of the party and his so-called "mishandling" of recent Sino-Japanese relations¹⁰⁶. At any rate, this domestic action resulted in a harder line against Japan, as manifested by the furore over the hostel dispute.

The diplomatic situation was made all the worse by assertions from both sides later in the year. Deng Xiaoping, China's paramount leader, made the following rather imperious statements while receiving Yano Junya, who was head of the Japanese Komeito party,

Frankly speaking, Japan is indebted to China more than any other nation in the world. At the time of diplomatic normalization, we did not raise any demand for war reparations...From the viewpoint of

Asian people, we are thinking of principle and I think Japan should make much greater contributions in order to assist China's development.¹⁰⁷

Deng also made the following comments regarding the hostel case and the "new militarism" evident in Japan. This latter point was stressed due to Tokyo's recent decision to let military expenditures rise to 1.004% of GNP, thus breaking the traditional 1% barrier¹⁰⁸.

Japan's military expenditure exceeds France and West Germany. It is definitely not small. Why is it necessary to go through the one percent framework? If it is done once, there can be a second and third breakthrough...in accord with some segments of people who wish to make Japan a big military power...I want Japanese politicians to be more humble when considering these problems. I do not want them to take a high posture...[While] 99% of the Japanese people desire friendship, a handful have never forgotten Taiwan. They never forget to interpret the constitution from a different angle and to cause friction between Japan and China. This is very unfortunate.¹⁰⁹

These statements elicited the anonymous and unofficial statement, "I think Deng has become a person above the clouds". It was later revealed that Yanagiya Kensuke, a Vice Minister at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had made this statement in response to a reporter's question¹¹⁰. The fact that Deng's high-handed statements brought only an unofficial reaction is remarkable. The fact that the fallout from this unofficial statement in China eventually caused the Japanese to back down is even more so¹¹¹. However, this seems to illustrate the general postwar political pattern between Japan and China. It is especially interesting to note that these patterns existed even before relations were normalized in

1972. In that sense, the formal relationship has not fundamentally changed the Sino-Japanese relationship, or the method of dealing with diplomatic difficulties. Former general secretary of the CCP Zhao Ziyang most likely had this in mind when he made the following statement, "If the political problems are not handled correctly, they will do greater harm to Sino-Japanese relations than economic problems."¹¹²

With the thawing of the cold war and the new political realities emerging in its wake, the Sino-Japanese relationship faces a number of difficult challenges. The massacre at Tiananmen Square in 1989 created a number of serious problems for China in the international community. But while the West was condemning the incident in no uncertain terms, Japan's appraisal was much less harsh. It included the following from Chief Cabinet Secretary Shiokawa,

The government watches carefully the result of the situation. The government thus does not consider any (sanction) measures at present [due to the fact that Sino-Japanese relations are]...burdened by the heavy history of the past¹¹³.

Prime Minister Uno Sosuke also spoke to this same point,

I say clearly that Japan invaded China 40 years ago. Japan cannot do anything against a people who experienced such a war. Sino-Japanese relations differ from Sino-United States relations¹¹⁴.

This statement is especially striking, as a major bone of contention between China and Japan has been the latter's unwillingness to fully and officially take responsibility for its wartime actions¹¹⁵. The reason behind this rather cautious stance can be seen rather more clearly in the

following comment from Hauro Suzuki, a Japanese opinion leader,

So long as China is not stabilized, the stability of the rest of Asia and the world cannot be expected. In this sense the stability of China is extremely important to Japan. To help stabilize China, therefore, Japan must give whatever advice and cooperation are required. (And we need to have the) faith that when we work with China to help develop the country, we cannot expect happiness on Japan's part without working with the spirit of love.¹¹⁶

Stability in China is essential for Japan's interests there and in the rest of Asia. Although Tokyo did join the other major powers in placing sanctions upon China, it lobbied for their relatively rapid removal. Shortly after the Houston G-7 summit in 1990, Japan began to gradually unfreeze its loans to China¹¹⁷.

The phenomenal growth of China's economy in the early 1990s has kept Japan interested, and relations seem to have smoothed out somewhat since the Tiananmen incident. However, the old patterns still persist between the two countries. This was illustrated in 1992 when the Japanese Diet passed a bill, after a long and arduous debate, that would allow Japan to participate in various United Nations peace-keeping missions such as Cambodia. Predictably, the first response to this from Beijing, as well as Taipei and Seoul, was to lodge a complaint in Tokyo protesting against the "renewed militarism" evident in Japan¹¹⁸. These protests were rather ludicrous when one considers the number of restrictions that were placed upon the troops to be sent overseas¹¹⁹. Another example of this was

the outraged reaction throughout Asia, and especially China, to the recent remarks by the former Japanese Justice Minister Shigeto Nagano concerning Japan's actions in the Second World War¹²⁰. Not surprisingly, he eventually had to resign and the Japanese were forced to apologize for the incident¹²¹. Thus, even in the post-Cold war world, some things do not substantially change.

As can be seen, Japan and China have had a very long and quite turbulent relationship. It is difficult to find any discernable pattern running through the course of the relationship, due mostly to the intense shifts it has undergone. Just in the past century and a half this has involved the transition from seclusion (pre-1870) to relative cordiality (1870-1894) to growing suspicion and conflict (1894-1937) to outright hostility (1937-1945) to relative political seclusion (1945-1972) and then finally the current general amiability tinged with a mutual wariness. One could argue that this volatility indicates that, despite the contact that Japan and China have maintained over the past two thousand years, there is no real formal relationship as it would be understood in the West. This shall be discussed in more detail below. What is certain, however, is that China and Japan have had profound effects on each other over the course of their association. This has been especially true in the last 150 years.

The remainder of this chapter will now turn to a specific analysis of how China and Japan have each perceived and functioned within the framework of the modern relationship described above. This will involve briefly describing some of the institutions and systems within the two societies as they pertain to the Sino-Japanese relationship. Additionally, an examination of how the two nations have evolved over the last 150 years due, at least in part, to the effects of this most unusual association, will be conducted.

Chinese Perspectives

Political Culture

When contemplating Chinese actions in the modern Sino-Japanese relationship, one must bear in mind that the last 150 years of history have been extremely traumatic for that country. Not only did China suffer a variety of humiliations at the hands of "barbarous" foreigners, but it was also forced to relinquish, at least temporarily, its role of being the leading power in East Asia to Japan. The reasons behind this weakness are worth briefly investigating, as they give some insight into China's dealings with Japan and the world in general.

Before discussing specifics, however, a couple of brief general comments regarding China's political culture and its

world view are in order. Richard Solomon, in his work Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture, presents the thesis that the Chinese are wary of authority and yet require strong figures to effectively lead the nation¹²². This attitude, he feels, comes from the socialization process of Chinese children, in which their parents instill in them feelings of both dependence and deference towards their superiors. However, any feelings of loyalty may not extend much beyond one's immediate circle, as there is an unwillingness to communicate with or challenge authority. Therefore, these hierarchical associations are fraught with constant tensions¹²³. Thus, these pressures, combined with the general atmosphere of ambivalence towards authority, creates a situation that is always potentially unstable. Additionally, peer relationships, where there is no hierarchical framework, may be strained due to the internalized mistrust of the intentions of others and the consequent fear of conflict and confusion, referred to in China as *Luan*¹²⁴. Therefore, Chinese politics has a rather odd quality about it in which the very fear of, and ensuing attempts to avoid, *Luan*, often create just the opposite effect, as will be demonstrated shortly.

Another effect of this ambivalent attitude towards authority is the preponderance of "informal" connections, or *Guanxi*, throughout society¹²⁵. As a result of this, real power is often not to be located where it should formally be.

This is most aptly demonstrated by the relationship of formal and informal power in the top leadership. Shortly following Mao's death on September 9, 1976, Hua Guo-feng assumed the reins of power in China¹²⁶. Hua officially held the posts of Chairman of the CCP and Premier of the State Council, thus securing a great deal of formal power for himself¹²⁷. However, Hua's informal power base was comparatively small, which made him vulnerable. Deng Xiaoping, on the other hand, held virtually no formal power at that moment, having been recently purged from the party leadership for the third time¹²⁸, but still retained a great deal of informal power from his connections in the party and the military. The fact that Deng was able to undermine Hua's leadership in a relatively short period of time, and assume power himself, illustrates the prime importance of *Guanxi*¹²⁹. Deng has maintained his position of pre-eminence in China to the present day, despite the fact that he currently holds no official government posts¹³⁰.

This type of informal power was (and still is) also evident in China's international dealings. Unlike Europe, which formed a complex system for dealing with international affairs, East Asia, lacked this type of inter-state organization. Instead, the region generally made do with the informal, China-centred tributary system¹³¹. This traditional order, based upon the Confucian notion of hierarchies and paying deference to superiors, persisted well into the

Nineteenth century. One explanation for this is given by Marius Jansen in his work Japan and China from War to Peace. According to him, before the Western incursions in the Nineteenth century,

China, Korea and Japan were governed by men who wanted to be left alone. They desired no change in the international system they knew, and they had little desire for closer contact with their near neighbours. There were no formal relationships between the governments of Japan and Korea or China; Chinese merchants came to Nagasaki, and Japanese merchants to Korea, but neither group carried the status of national representatives.¹²²

The Western encroachment, and the consequent shift in the traditional balance of East Asian power, effectively destroyed this system. However, vestiges of this traditional attitude still colour Chinese policies towards Japan and the world. This will be revealed in the following discussion of China's role in the Sino-Japanese relationship.

Pre-War Weakness

China's weakness in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when it was under pressure from the Europeans, and later the Japanese, stemmed from a variety of sources. Two are especially worth discussing here, as they have a direct bearing on China's modern day actions. The first is the rather arrogant attitude China exhibited towards outsiders. As a result of its experience with the Tributary system, China tended to regard all foreigners as either barbarians or

tribute bearing vassals. While in the past, this traditional Chinese attitude was generally backed by considerable power, by the Nineteenth century the country had entered a period of decline. Much of China's former power was being gradually dissipated by the pressures of a rapidly increasing population and imperial corruption¹³³.

However, due to this Chinese attitude of arrogance and uncertainty towards foreigners, the British, and other Europeans in China, were forced to trade only through Chinese merchants, the *Hong*, and had to deal with excessively restrictive conditions placed on any foreign contact. Additionally, and perhaps more to the point, the British were running a fairly serious trade deficit with China. As a result of these tensions, conflict erupted between Britain and China during 1839-1842, in what became known as the Opium War¹³⁴. The Ch'ing rulers, already facing domestic problems, and saddled with an increasingly inefficient military organization, were unable to deal with the superior power of the British. The subsequent Treaty of Nanking, which settled the conflict, involved the payment by China of war indemnities, various stipulations regarding extraterritoriality and tariffs, the opening of ports other than Canton to trade, and the surrender of Hong Kong to Britain. This was but the first of many unequal treaties forced upon China¹³⁵. In order to rectify the problems plaguing the nation, the Chinese Imperial government adopted

a package of limited reforms. Basically, they felt that by using a *minimum* of foreign technology, without fundamentally changing the internal economic and governmental structures of the country, China could respond to the external threat of the West¹³⁶. The limited "Self-Strengthening" reforms, begun in the 1860s, were launched with this in mind¹³⁷.

China's defeat in the 1894-95 Sino-Japanese war, as discussed earlier, was a humiliating blow to the nation. It also showed how far it had fallen behind the West, and Japan, despite its program of reform. China's loss was made all the more galling by the fact that another Asian nation had proved able to transform itself into a modern, powerful society. However, as will be discussed below, Japan was, from the start, better able to deal with the West than China. One reason was the generally unified, if not always ordered, approach of Japan during this period. This is in sharp contrast to China and brings up a second source of that nation's weakness in the pre-war era, namely the domestic turmoil that vexed the nation for almost a century.

China's ability to cope with the Western incursions, and later Japan, was severely hampered by the fact that it was entering the "terminal" phase of its dynastic cycle in the mid-Nineteenth century. The dynastic cycle has been a feature of Chinese society for millennia. In almost all cases, the change of a dynasty is preceded by disintegration and violent conflict¹³⁸. The strife during this period was made all the

more intense by the fact that the Ch'ing dynasty was an "alien" presence in China, having originated in Manchuria¹³⁹. Thus, the attempts to cope with the West very soon became entangled with the struggles against this regime. Probably the most serious manifestation of this was the Taiping rebellion in the middle of the Nineteenth century. While the details about this episode are beyond the scope of this thesis, it is noteworthy that the leader, Hong Xiuquan, was heavily influenced by Christian teachings. As a result, the subsequent uprising was an odd mix of traditional Chinese and Western elements¹⁴⁰. Although this particular rebellion proved to be unsuccessful, it severely weakened the already troubled central government. This helped to set the stage for the eventual collapse of the monarchy and the later splintering of the country.

Immediately following the fall of the Ch'ing dynasty in 1911¹⁴¹, China was fractured and beset by Warlords. The next twenty years of almost constant strife were a result of various factions attempting to gain control of the nation. The most serious, and long lasting conflict was the prolonged war between the KMT and the Communists. The two parties had originally been allied in the early 1920s as partners in a "national" revolution. What this meant, initially, was that both parties wished, above all else, to achieve the goal of national re-unification. Many of the actions taken by the KMT and Communists, as well as other Chinese actors, can be seen

as being driven by the desire to minimize the *Luan* evident in the country during this period of dissolution. However, these very attempts to stabilize the nation actually created ever more turmoil, until the final Communist victory on the mainland in 1949.

The KMT-Communist alliance was initially quite beneficial to both parties. The KMT had access to Soviet arms, money and advisors. The Communists, for their part, were able to gain wider access to Chinese society under the auspices of the KMT structure¹⁴². However, given the increasing foreign and domestic pressures on China, radical nationalism began to emerge as a powerful force¹⁴³. While this helped to build up the strength of the two parties, it also exposed the differences between them. As a result, once the KMT grew sufficiently strong to do without its Soviet backers and Communist allies, it turned on its erstwhile partner and launched a series of extermination campaigns, beginning in 1927 and continuing well into the 1930s, which virtually destroyed the CCP¹⁴⁴.

The top priority for the KMT was the task of national unification and, as a byproduct of this, the final elimination of the Communists in the countryside. As a result of this, Japanese encroachments into the north, such as the acquisition of Manchuria in 1931, proceeded virtually unchecked¹⁴⁵. Chiang Kai-shek, the leader of the KMT since the mid-1920s, made the decision to appease the Japanese as a result of the

unstable conditions still existing throughout China. His plans could be summed up as, "first internal pacification, then external resistance"¹⁴⁶. The Japanese military, however, was able to capitalize on this by fostering intrigue and playing off one Chinese faction against another¹⁴⁷. It was not until the Sian incident of December 1936, when Chiang was detained by several of his nominal warlord allies and forced to come to an agreement with the Communists in order to deal with the extreme threat from Japan, that China was able to fully turn its attention to its perilous external environment¹⁴⁸.

Even during the extremes of war, however, it can be argued that domestic politics still played an important role. The KMT was perceived as virtually collaborating with the Japanese due to their early policy of non-resistance. This, coupled with increasing levels of repression and internal chaos, led to a tremendous loss of support for the nationalist government. Additionally, the KMT were forced to bear the brunt of the Japanese attack, which further eroded their power¹⁴⁹. While the Communists also suffered greatly during this period, they were able to refine the tactics of guerrilla warfare and enhance their political position in the countryside. This is evident from the following passage by Edgar Snow regarding his 1965 interview with Mao Tse-tung,

After reaching an agreement with Chiang Kai-shek to wage a joint war, in 1937, Mao's troops had avoided combat with the main enemy forces and concentrated on establishing bases among the peasants. The Japanese had been of great help. They had physically occupied and burned villages over large

parts of eastern China. They educated the people and quickened their political consciousness. They created conditions which made it possible for Communist-led guerrillas to increase their troops and expand their territory. Today, when Japanese came to see Mao, and apologized, he thanked them for their help. He said that he had hoped they would go as far as Sian and even Chungking. Had they done so the guerrillas' strength would have grown even more rapidly.¹⁵⁰

As a result of their wartime experiences, the CCP was strong enough to defeat the KMT when the Chinese civil war began anew following the defeat of Japan. On October 1, 1949, when the People's Republic was declared, mainland China stood united for the first time in almost half a century. It was during this new era of unity and strength that China's traditional haughtiness began to reassert itself.

Post-War Assertiveness

The earlier description of the postwar Sino-Japanese relationship highlighted many of the instances when Chinese domestic concerns influenced its policy towards Japan. What is quite interesting to note, however, is the relative consistency of China's policy towards Japan, despite the apparent volatility in the relationship itself. This has been a desire for peaceful relations, generally on Chinese terms, coupled with a constant show of vigilance against renewed Japanese aggression. Even during the instances when China has assumed a harder line against Japan, such as during the 1982 textbook scandal or the 1987 Kokaryo Student Hostel dispute,

the essential fabric of the relationship has not been overtly damaged. The reason for this consistency is the underlying informality of the relationship.

An example of this is the way in which the legacy of the war has been utilized over the past 20 years. At first glance, the strategic and diplomatic value of this legacy to China would appear to be debatable, as it renounced reparations and willingly re-established relations with Japan. It is also highly unlikely that the PRC seriously fears renewed Japanese aggression in the near future. Japan is still quite firmly in the American camp, and thus restrained by that power¹⁵¹. Additionally, China is no longer the weak, divided country that it was in the early part of this century. It is thus reasonable to assume that it could defend itself against Japan, should the need arise. Finally, given the torturous experience of simply getting even a peace-keeping bill through the Japanese Diet, it is highly unlikely that China believes that Japan will turn into a ravaging, neo-imperialist, militaristic power overnight. Despite these facts, China continually accuses Japan of renewed militarism and recounts its prewar and wartime actions.

What is interesting is that these charges do appear to chasten Japan and cause it to offer deference, in word and sometimes deed, to China. This can be seen by the fact that Japan very often responds to China's wishes. Japan also goes out of its way to avoid overtly antagonizing China, as was

shown by its cautious reaction to the Tiananmen incident. Whether or not there is a genuine feeling of responsibility in Japan regarding its war actions, an issue that will be briefly discussed in the next section, there is undoubtedly a consciousness that they owe something to China. This is evident from the Japanese attitude regarding government loans. As one Hong Kong banker remarked, "Financially these loans make no sense. Politically they are really disguised reparations."¹⁵² This is echoed by Japanese officials who asserted, "We owe it to China. We must help after all the damage we did to them."¹⁵³ China's ability to successfully play on this conscience indicates a willingness to use its "moral ascendancy" in the Sino-Japanese relationship in a rather traditional manner.

It is noteworthy that the pressure China applies to Japan is strictly a one-way affair. Any external pressure placed upon China has created a great deal of resentment in that country. A prime example of this was the widespread international condemnation of the 1989 Tiananmen massacre. China remained defiant, despite the fact that the sanctions imposed by many countries adversely affected the all-important economic reforms. This attitude is reflected in the statement, "China will never bow to any external pressure", issued shortly after the 1989 Tiananmen massacre¹⁵⁴. Japan was one of the few nations to understand that coercion of this sort would prove ineffective against China. However, even its very

limited sanctions, which were quickly removed, drew animosity from China. A partial explanation for this hard line is the legacy of China's century of humiliation at the hands of the Europeans and Japan. The indignities China experienced have, if anything, strengthened its traditional attitudes regarding foreigners and made it all the more determined not to be coerced by other powers. The "Middle Kingdom" complex, while perhaps an unavoidable legacy of China's long past, nevertheless means that this country can often be difficult to deal with in a traditional, straightforward diplomatic manner. However, as will now be seen, the Japanese have been relatively successful in their recent dealings with China. This is precisely because they play the diplomatic game with a similar set of informal rules.

Japanese Perspectives

Political Culture

As can be discerned from the above discussion, Japan coped considerably better with the Western incursions than did China. There are a number of explanations for this, ranging from cultural considerations to the societal structures present in Tokugawa Japan. A brief discussion of some of these factors will help illuminate Japan's actions in the modern era.

Of particular interest is the fact that although a similar Confucian ethic existed in both China and Japan, the effects it had in the latter were much more conducive to a stable, unified polity than in the former. Robert Bellah, in his study Tokugawa Religion, stresses the fact that Japanese loyalties could be extended well beyond the family, and other immediate groups, and be given to one's superiors and even to the state, in the embodiment of the Sovereign¹⁵⁵. Often this ethic of loyalty to superiors superseded all else, even one's duty to the family. This may partly be explained by the fact that the Confucianism imported from China was interpreted in such a way as to blend with traditional Japanese feudal patterns¹⁵⁶. Both Bellah and Lucian Pye stress that this blend created something quite unique in Asia; a highly purposeful, goal-oriented nation¹⁵⁷. These differences in Confucian interpretation were summed up quite neatly by Robert Bellah; loyalty superseded filial piety in Japan, whilst in China filial piety was of greater import and loyalty was somewhat more circumscribed¹⁵⁸.

As a result of this, the Samurai ethic of *Bushido*, the Way of the Warrior, which could also be interpreted as a 'religion of loyalty', permeated much of Japanese society¹⁵⁹. Related to this concept was the idea of *On*, or blessings, from those in authority¹⁶⁰. These blessings could take different forms, such as the Shogunate bestowing peace upon the people of Japan, or granting stipends to the Samurai class. In

conjunction with these blessings was the concept of *Hoon*¹⁶¹ which involved the return of *On* by the people. This involved a general respect for, and compliance with, political authority. However, this could also take more extreme forms, as demonstrated by the willingness of the Samurai to commit ritualized suicide if so ordered by their lord or the willingness of the Japanese *Kamikaze* pilots to go on suicide missions for the Emperor¹⁶². This type of loyalty ethic, being much more intensive than that found in China, generally allowed for a greater degree of political focus and harmonization in Japan, assuming there were not several competing centres of authority.

Another concept worth briefly discussing is that of *Amaeru* and *Amai*. A good definition of this, given by Douglas Mitchell in his work *Amaeru*, is as follows;

Generally, to *amaeru* is to behave self indulgently in a special relationship with another person or group of people. The one will *amaeru*; the other will be *amai* [generous, indulgent] in response.¹⁶³

Mitchell feels that *amaeru* originates from childhood experience, when the mother fully indulges her children. This encourages them to be dependent and thus form these types of relationships¹⁶⁴. In later life, this *amaeru* relationship can be transferred to those in authority. This can be seen as being the basis of the Japanese polity. However, as will be discussed shortly, it may be possible to use *amaeru* in such a way as to oblige obedience to a certain point of view. The following passage partially explains this;

(The Japanese child) is encouraged to be *sunao*, or obedient. In this context of dependency the Japanese also develop a capacity, by passive means, to induce nurturant behaviour toward themselves by others. The inductive manipulation of others to secure care for oneself is expressed in the Japanese word *amae*...Japanese mothers are conscious that, in order to maintain compliance and obedience, they must satisfy the feelings of dependency developed within an intense mother-child relationship. Goodwill must be maintained so that the child will willingly undertake the increasingly heavy requirements and obligations placed upon him in the school and the home. There is a direct cultural linkage between contentment and compliance.¹⁶⁶

Having provided some of the cultural framework of Japanese society, it is now possible to explore Japan's actions during the past 150 years with regard to China.

From Headless Fascism...

Despite its later successes, Japan was arguably no better prepared to deal with the West, in the mid-nineteenth century, than was China. The first major incursion occurred when Commodore Perry's "Black Ships", from the United States, came to Japan in 1853¹⁶⁶. At this time, the traditional feudal patterns in the country were starting to break down and the Tokugawa Shogunate, which had ruled the nation for two and a half centuries, was losing its grip on power. However, Japan went through far fewer convolutions in its attempt to adapt to the West, and to slough off the decaying Shogunate, than did China. Part of the reason for this was the general unity of the nation during this period. While it is true that during

the Tokugawa era there was a distinction made between the *Fudai* and the *Tozama* fiefs¹⁶⁷, regionalism in modern Japan, never became as intense a force as it was in China. This was partially due to Japan's smaller size and greater homogeneity. The underlying Japanese loyalty ethic, coupled with the unifying force embodied in the person of the Emperor, also played a substantial role in keeping the nation together. Additionally, the fate of China, which had lost the Opium War some ten years earlier, was being viewed in Japan with considerable alarm¹⁶⁸.

Partially for these reasons, Japan quickly adopted a policy of learning from the West and embracing the new methods, rather than offering arrogant, and largely ineffectual, resistance as the Chinese were doing. There is a certain irony here in that, during the past two millennia, Japan had generally learned from China's strength. Yet now, on the eve of Japan's rise, the final, albeit indirect, lesson that China imparted was due to its profound weakness in the face of the Western challenge.

There were a number of quite serious disturbances in Japan prior to the fall of the Shogunate. In the end, however, a brief civil war, in which two *Tozama* feudal domains, Satsuma and Choshu, rose up against the Tokugawa, was quickly concluded and the "Meiji Restoration" was begun in 1868¹⁶⁹. This period saw the final destruction of the decaying feudal system, with many of the Samurai and Daimyo being "pensioned"

off, and the setting up of a modern industrial society¹⁷⁰. It is worth noting that although the changes sweeping Japan seemed quite profound, they were actually little more than a natural, if slightly accelerated, conclusion to the trends that had been apparent throughout the Tokugawa era. The Pax Tokugawa that had existed for 250 years had effectively destroyed the role of the Samurai warriors in society. In addition, a lively merchant class had begun to develop and flourish¹⁷¹. Thus, by the 1860s, the Meiji restoration was less a revolution than simply a logical transformation to a more modern societal structure.

Chalmers Johnson, in his book MITI and the Japanese Miracle, describes in considerable depth the various governmental structures that were set up at this time, the details of which largely go beyond the scope of this thesis. One important point, however, is the fact that many of the officials of the early Meiji-era were from the Samurai class. This meant that they brought the *Bushido* ethic with them into the governmental bureaucracy. In order that they would be allowed some measure of control over the course of Japan's evolution, the bureaucracy and cabinet, both of which they initially dominated, preceded by some time the formation of the Diet (the Japanese Parliament), the Meiji Constitution and the various political parties¹⁷². The result was a weak parliament and a strong bureaucracy, a pattern which persists to the present day. This was initially beneficial in so far as

it allowed Japan to develop very rapidly by focusing the population and industry on the tasks that were required.

However, there were, and still are, several major flaws in this system. One significant problem is the fact that the centre for governmental responsibility is often hard to locate in Japan. Therefore, power can sometimes be utilized in an apparently arbitrary, headless, manner¹⁷³. Karel van Wolferen, in his book The Enigma of Japanese Power, sees the Japanese system as consisting of a series of overlapping, and competing, bureaucracies and organizations, which makes coherent and responsible government a somewhat elusive aspiration¹⁷⁴. An additional difficulty was the lack of any effective civilian control upon the military during the pre-war period¹⁷⁵. Because of this, the military was also competing for power in the Japanese government. Due to the nature of the organization, it is not terribly surprising that it did eventually succeed in achieving power, although not total control, over Japan by the 1930s.

Japan's early actions against China, while setting the stage for the later militarism, were not the same sort of unrestrained military adventurism seen in the 1930s. Rather, Japan was attempting to secure its position in the new international order vis-a-vis the European powers. It is therefore not an insignificant point that 1894, besides being the start of the first Sino-Japanese war, was also the year that the unequal treaties Japan had signed with the Western

powers were reformed¹⁷⁶. There are three other points worth considering with regard to the early Sino-Japanese conflicts prior to the mid-1920s. The first is that Japan was modelling itself on the dominant powers of the era, most of which were engaged in some form of imperialism¹⁷⁷. Thus, it is hardly surprising that the Japanese government saw imperialism as one means of raising itself to great power status.

A second point is discussed in Barrington Moore's work, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. He sees Japan as being fairly typical of late-developing, conservative states which attempted to catch up to the established powers by conducting a top-down restructuring of society. These policies opened the door to militarism as follows;

The most successful of the conservative regimes accomplished a great deal, not only in tearing down the old order but in establishing a new one. The state aided industrial construction in several important ways. It served as an engine of primary capitalist accumulation, gathering resources and directing them toward the building of an industrial plant. In the taming of the labour force it again played an important role, by no means entirely a repressive one. Armaments served as an important stimulus for industry. So did protectionist tariff policies. All of these measures at some point involved taking resources or people out of agriculture. Therefore they imposed from time to time a serious strain on the coalition between those sectors of the upper strata in business and in agriculture that was the main feature of the political system. *Without the threat of foreign dangers, sometimes real, sometimes perhaps imaginary...the landed interests might well have balked, to the point of endangering the whole process.* [Italics Added]¹⁷⁸

Moore goes on to reinforce this point;

In the short run, a strong conservative government

has distinct advantages. It can both encourage and control economic growth. It can see to it that the lower classes who pay the costs under all forms of modernization do not make too much trouble. But Germany and, even more, Japan were trying to solve a problem that was inherently insoluble, to modernize without changing their social structures. The only way out of this dilemma was militarism, which united the upper classes. Militarism intensified a climate of international conflict, which in turn made industrial advance all the more imperative...¹⁷⁹

Therefore, Japan's path of development, coupled with the structural flaws inherent in its government, contributed to the nation being a virtual 'ticking timebomb'. When the system finally broke down, in the 1930s, the resultant uncontrolled militarism engulfed the entire region.

A final point worth considering relates back to the concept of *Amaeru*. It can be argued that the Japanese felt they were actually helping, that is being indulgent of, the Chinese and Koreans, and later the rest of Asia. As Peter Duus put it,

...Japanese propaganda emphasized that the Sino-Japanese War was not a struggle over power or territory, but a conflict between a backward-looking China seeking to keep an equally backward-looking Korea under its control and a progressive, forward-looking Japan determined to bring the benefits of "civilization" to the peninsula.¹⁸⁰

This view of *Amaeru*, mixed with self-serving interests is also evident in the following quote from the Meiji Emperor, in August 1910, concerning the annexation of Korea;

We, attaching the highest importance to the maintenance of permanent peace in the Orient and the consolidation of lasting security for our Empire and finding in Korea constant and fruitful sources of complication...have now arrived at an

arrangement for such permanent annexation...All Koreans, being under Our direct sway, will enjoy growing prosperity and welfare, and with assured repose and security will come a marked expansion in industry and trade...(With future cooperation and compliance, it concluded) Our subjects may long enjoy the blessings of peace and tranquillity.¹⁸¹

This same attitude is reflected in Japanese dealings with China itself. Japan felt itself duty bound "by the dictates of civilization and the higher law of history" to bring the benefits of civilization to the mainland as a whole¹⁸². The later efforts by Japan to support China's initial reforms as well as its cultural diplomacy and education of Chinese students all fit into this pattern. However, Japan's endeavours were not generally met with gratitude. Rather, they encountered hostility as Chinese nationalism rose in response to the increasing foreign incursions. As was mentioned above, the Japanese regard obedience and compliance as being the natural response to *Amaeru*. Thus, Chinese intransigence would be seen as a deliberate affront. Therefore, this likely prompted the harder line that was eventually seen in Japan. Thus there emerged a vicious circle in which Chinese resistance and Japanese aggression fed off each other. This pattern was an important factor leading to the outbreak of the second world war and the destruction resulting therefrom.

A similar *Amaeru* argument can be put forward to explain the military's actions in North China in the 1930s. One can perceive that the military saw itself as bestowing a favour upon a beleaguered Japan, which was then suffering serious

effects from the great depression¹⁸³, by granting the country the territory of Manchuria. The fact that the government accepted the favours, having little choice, meant that the military factions responsible, most notably the Kwantung army, were encouraged to continue with these independent actions. Similarly, the army high command in Tokyo could demand obedience after subduing the attempted military coup in Japan in February 1936¹⁸⁴. The role this type of political intrigue by the army had on the general situation in Japan was nicely summed up by Sadako Ogata in her study Defiance in Manchuria;

The effective and determined control of the central army authorities in military operations was in marked contrast to the extremely ineffective control they exercised over the political activities of the Kwantung Army...Political maneuvering was very much the established practice of the Japanese military in view of the instability of the Asian scene. The series of activities that led to the creation of the State of Manchukuo was based upon the decision of the Kwantung Army staff to establish a pro-Japanese regime in South Manchuria through means of political maneuvering...No effective and responsible decision making can be exercised when political maneuvering is sanctioned. Even if Japan were to have overcome the "independence of the Supreme Command" and enforced civilian control over the military, neither the government nor the official military leaders could have claimed complete control of decision making and execution when a vast area remained outside official supervision. In short, the Japanese military had not brought the entire sphere of action into the realm of rational control...What remained after the Manchurian Affair was a system of irresponsibility that prevented the formulation and the enforcement of a rational and consistent foreign policy.¹⁸⁵

This system of irresponsibility, combined with all of the other factors discussed above, ultimately led to Japan

becoming a headless, ravening militaristic monster in China and the rest of Asia. The lack of governmental responsibility was epitomized by the fact that there is no single Japanese leader responsible for the country's actions, unlike Hitler in Germany, Stalin in the USSR or Mussolini in Italy. This system, which eventually led to war with the United States and almost all the other non-fascist powers on earth, ultimately resulted in the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This marked the end of Japan's overt attempts at achieving suzerainty in Asia.

...To Directed Reactiveness

Postwar Japan has often been characterized as being an "economic giant but a political pygmy"¹⁸⁶. Its economic success is undoubted. However, there would also seem to be more behind its politics than first meets the eye. Following the war, America and its allies occupied Japan and "remoulded" the society. In actual fact, other than sloughing off the independent military apparatus, and getting rid of certain "militaristic attitudes" such as Imperial prerogative and state supported Shinto¹⁸⁷, there was little substantive change. The following passage thus sums up the situation rather nicely, "Americans, it is said, found Japan occupied by the Japanese army, and left it occupied by the bureaucracy."¹⁸⁸

As a result of this bureaucratic government, which remains fundamentally similar to the prewar organization described above, as well as the wartime legacy, Japan has often been forced to react to other nation's initiatives¹⁹. As a result of this, Japan has had to carefully balance American and Chinese demands throughout the postwar era when pursuing the Sino-Japanese relationship. In the process, although it sometimes appears unprincipled, it has generally managed to avoid alienating either power. Few other countries can make that claim. Therefore Japan's reactivity is not necessarily a weakness, nor is it indicative of Japan being a "political pygmy". This policy of reactivity has served the country well in its relationship with both the United States, which will be discussed in Chapter Four, and China.

Although it might appear from the earlier discussion that China runs diplomatic circles around Japan, this is not the case. Once again the wartime legacy serves as a good example. It has long been a bone of contention between the two nations that Japan has not fully come to terms with its wartime actions²⁰. Yet, as was discussed earlier, in numerous cases Japan has backed down and acquiesced to China's demands after being accused of renewed militarism. However, it has generally done so without explicitly acknowledging the correctness of China's position.

This behaviour is not without precedent in the Sino-Japanese relationship. During the earliest phases of the

association, Japan often accepted an inferior status to China in order to obtain trade or learning from the mainland. In this way, therefore, Japan's modern actions are not fundamentally dissimilar to those in the pre-modern era, with regard to China. In the modern case Japanese acquiescence results in a reasonably amicable neighbour and favourable market conditions.

An alternate, although not necessarily contradictory, explanation of this behaviour is that the Japanese genuinely look to China in order to repent and seek spiritual guidance as a result of the war¹⁹¹. The "disguised" war reparations discussed earlier can also be seen to fit into this interpretation. However, to the Western mind, this explanation seems unlikely due to the reluctance of the Japanese to accept responsibility for their wartime actions. One recent example of this was Emperor Akihito's apologies for Japan's wartime actions to Chinese Premier Li Peng in April 1989 and South Korea's President Roh Tae Woo in May 1990. Both of these apologies raised a great deal of controversy in Japan, thus indicating that the situation there still remains unresolved after almost five decades¹⁹².

As a result of this, Japan is still not wholly trusted by the other Asian powers. However, they tend to use informal means, such as the mass campaigns described above, in order to express their unease. Part of the reason for this is the fact that there is no "centre" of government in Japan that could,

or would, take responsibility for either the wartime actions or the present charges of militarism or economic imperialism. Additionally, China, and the other nations of the region, would not willingly give up Japanese economic assistance unless backed into a diplomatic corner. Therefore, while it is true that Japan's postwar system appears weak to outsiders, it is precisely this "low posture" that allows it to manoeuvre. Until Japan changes its governmental system and is fully forgiven for its wartime actions, neither of which is likely to happen soon, this political dependence and weakness may, paradoxically, be Japan's greatest strength.

The fact that the Sino-Japanese relationship, in recent years, has been relatively beneficial and free of overt tension is due to the fact that the two nations, for the most part, understand each other and the informal strategies both have for dealing with problems. The breakdown during the early period of the modern relationship (1894-1945) was due as much to the domestic problems in both China and Japan as the external friction between them. The postwar era has seen both countries stabilize domestically and pursue a mutually fruitful association.

This chapter has discussed some of the basic mechanics of the Sino-Japanese relationship as well as explaining some aspects of the behaviour of the two countries towards each other. In the next chapter, the relationship will be analyzed

on a more theoretical level and the *Sempai-Kohai* framework will be presented. This should help provide a more concrete basis for understanding the informal nature of this most remarkable relationship.

CHAPTER III---THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND THEORY BUILDING

Discussing a theoretical framework for the Sino-Japanese relationship can be a challenge due to the informal nature of the association. For this reason, this thesis will utilize an approach that will compensate for some of the weaknesses which will be found in the examination, to be conducted shortly, of the traditional international relations theories. Some of the basic reasons for these weaknesses were mentioned in the introductory chapter of this paper. These explanations will be expanded upon in this chapter. Before this is done, however, it would be prudent to precisely define what is meant by formal and informal relationships. Additionally, the role of culture in this discussion must be very carefully considered. While it is true that Japan and China differ from the West quite markedly in their outlook, one has to be careful not to overemphasize the role of culture in society. Neither modern Japan nor China are theocratic states based solely on Confucian or Taoist teachings, just as modern America and Britain are not run only according to biblical scripture or Socratic principles. However, as should be evident from the earlier discussion, this paper does stress the importance of cultural factors as they relate to international politics. In considering these elements, the thesis will then be able to develop the *Sempai-Kohai* theoretical framework. This approach

will attempt to explain certain patterns of behaviour that both China and Japan have often exhibited in their dealings not only with each other, as discussed in Chapter Two, but also with other nations. This will be accomplished by examining and utilizing the cultural and philosophical traditions that these two societies share, specifically Taoism and Confucianism. Comprehension of these traditions and how they are utilized in the modern world should facilitate an understanding of Japanese and Chinese actions, not only with each other, but also the world in general.

Formality vs. Informality and the Role of Culture

In Chapter Two of this thesis, much was made of the fact that the Sino-Japanese relationship was based upon informal methods. What exactly is meant by *informal* as opposed to *formal* relationships or structures? A good general explanation is provided by Peter Blau in his work On the Nature of Organizations. He first explains the concept of formal organizations;

In theoretical terms, formal organizations may be considered to make power liquid and for this reason make it possible for much power to be concentrated in few hands. The economic concept of liquidity refers to the ease with which valuable objects can be exchanged for any others, which also implies that they can be transferred, stored and accumulated.

He then contrasts this to informal organizations in which arbitrary personal power plays an important role;

Personal power is restricted in scope by its limited liquidity. To be sure, it can be used to obtain other valuables in a sort of exchange, by employing coercive threats or having charismatic appeal. But the coercive force of an individual is confined to those he can subdue, and the influence of a charismatic leader is confined to those inspired by his charisma...Personal power cannot be readily transferred to other persons or stored to be added to later and accumulated for successors. The difficulty of transferring personal power is reflected in the crisis of succession that typically occurs at the end of an individual's charismatic leadership and in the consequent transformation of charismatic authority, centred on a person into bureaucratic authority grounded in an organization...¹

Evidence of informal personal power can be quite readily seen in China, as was made apparent in Chapter Two. In Japan, power cannot be said to be personalized in the same manner, rather power is very much in the hands of various bureaucracies and organizations. However, while there is a definite formal authority structure discernable within these bureaucracies and organizations, it appears to break down at the top ranks of society. Japan often appears headless because, quite literally, no one person or organization holds a position of true authority and responsibility. Therefore, China and Japan can be seen as representing opposite extremes of the same basic problem, namely the difficulty of creating a system by which true power is wielded by responsible actors in a manner which does not depend upon personal charisma for legitimacy.

Returning to the definition of formal power, Blau explains how formal organizations make power liquid;

In sum, formal organization makes power relatively liquid by transforming the potential power of

financial resources, which are inherently liquid, into actual power over employees dependent on their incomes, and by vesting this power in the form of institutionalized authority in official positions. Since both financial resources and official authority reside in the formal organization and do not belong to its particular members, the powers emanating from them can readily be transferred from existing personnel to new replacements and from one position to another. Indeed, the entire power of an organization may be transferred to enhance that of another, as illustrated by mergers of companies and by reorganizations that combine several government departments into one superdepartment. The hierarchy of authority makes it possible for the limited power of many lower managers to be accumulated through the chain of command into much controlling power of top executives...Thus, organizational power can be accumulated in very large amounts as well as transferred, which makes it more liquid than personal power.²

This liquidity of power means that no one man or institution can arbitrarily and completely control all the levers of society. As a result, power is utilized in an explicit and non-charismatic manner. One important point that should be noted here is that the formal type of organization described above is somewhat idealized. In accounting for this, Blau goes to great length to elaborate the many informal practices and structures that are also found in many types of organizations³.

Therefore, it can be seen that a degree of informality in various power structures is not at all unique to China and Japan. What makes them interesting, however, is the degree to which informal patterns and structures are utilized in society. Often it is merely just a matter of degree that separates one society's practices from those of another. Karel

van Wolferen expressed this concept well in his discussion of Japan, and it is equally applicable to China;

When studying a people by comparing them to other people one faces the age-old choice of whether to emphasize 'sameness' or 'otherness'. In the case of Japan this has led to great discrepancies in the views held by informed commentators. No important human practices and attitudes found elsewhere in the world are entirely unknown to the Japanese. Conversely, in other countries one can recognize habits and institutions corresponding with those in Japan. But to describe the Japanese experience more often than not requires the addition of phrases such as 'much more so' or 'much less so'. There is a point at which differences in degree and in the combination of elements add up to a difference in kind, particularly in the context of socio-political organization...'

Taking this as something of a caveat, it is possible to push forward and examine some of causes behind the informality evident in Sino-Japanese relations.

Development of Formal Organizations and Relations

From what has been said up to this point in this thesis, one could be left with the impression that formal institutions have generally been the norm whereas informal power structures are aberrations. In fact, quite the opposite is true. Formal structures with explicitly codified rules for all parties involved, be they pauper or king, are a relatively new concept which had its origins in the West. This formal system developed as a result of the intense political, economic and military competition that has been evident in Europe for centuries. Paul Kennedy's work, The Rise and Fall of the Great

Powers, makes this thesis explicit. He claims that while most of the great empires of the pre-modern world, such as Ming China and the Ottomans, were unified and therefore relatively secure, the fragmented political scene in Europe made intense competition a necessity. In his words;

To say that Europe's decentralized states system was the great obstacle to centralization is not, then, a tautology. Because there existed a number of competing political entities, most of which possessed or were able to buy the military means to preserve their independence, no single one could ever achieve the breakthrough to the mastery of the continent.⁵

There are two important implications evident from this statement that Kennedy elaborates upon. One is that, due to this lack of a unifying force, there developed a regularized, predictable system that permitted the various states in the system to trade such that new technologies could be diffused⁶. The second implication is that, from time to time, alliances were formed to prevent any one player, be it the Hapsburgs, French or Germans, from gaining hegemony in Europe⁷. This meant that there had to be a set of rules developed by which the various alliance partners understood their obligations. Both of these factors facilitated the development of the formal systems that are now familiar in the West.

This analysis is strongly supported by Charles Tilly in his study, Coercion, Capital, and European States. According to Tilly, this process of competition and war was essential to the process of state formation in Europe⁸. His argument is that, in order to make war successfully, certain formal

structures were required that would have to be set up and developed. The resultant infrastructure would eventually become self-perpetuating and grow of its own accord'. Additionally, successful war would provide the victor with conquests which would have to be administered, thus increasing the level of organization that would have to be evolved. Eventually, this infrastructure would reach a point where it actually began to inhibit the process of making war by sheer virtue of its size and the growth of civilian demands¹⁰. Therefore, the increasing organization and specialization of various elements of society further reinforced the need for formal and responsible structures of government in Europe.

An additional factor is provided by Barrington Moore, who has stated that this societal specialization, in conjunction with the various "Bourgeois revolutions" that occurred in the West, allowed for the elimination of the "Royal Absolutism" that the traditional ruling classes had previously enjoyed¹¹. What this essentially meant was that power could no longer be arbitrarily used and that the elites in society were no longer above the law. Therefore, power could only be legitimately utilized by and through the formal systems developed in the state. This stands in marked contrast to the power wielded by the Chinese emperors, or the leadership of the CCP in modern times, as well as the Shogunate and later Meiji Oligarchs in Japan who acted in "the name" of the Emperor.

The importance of this point is also stressed by George

Schopflin in his article, "The Political Traditions of Eastern Europe"¹². He stresses that the strength of the Western democracies, in both political and economic terms, was the development of a variety of autonomous centres of power in society¹³. He feels that this originated from a growing conflict between the church and state, which allowed secondary areas of power, such as the commercial, scientific and urban spheres, to emerge relatively unfettered¹⁴. Although Schopflin feels that the West had been moving towards this type of political pattern for quite some time, he stresses that there were occasional backlashes against this trend¹⁵. It is arguable that had the revolutions which Moore describes not taken place, the elite classes would have been strong enough to reverse these trends and reassert their own power.

Thus, as Kennedy has asserted, while the various Oriental empires were stressing uniformity and absolutism vis-a-vis religion, war, political authority and commerce, the West was creating autonomous spheres that had to find a formal, regularized method to interact on both the national and international level¹⁶. Any interference on the part of the local aristocracy meant that commercial interests would simply find a more favourable and predictable environment. This would decrease the revenues available and thus make the principality more vulnerable to hostile neighbours¹⁷. Therefore, the decentralized system created, especially in Western Europe which was composed of a series of independent nation-states,

its own imperative towards development of regularized, formal business and diplomatic relationships.

This formal system can be contrasted to that which existed in East Asia. Except for those rare instances of extreme disunity and *Luan* in China at the end of a dynastic cycle, the environment was not generally characterized by independent territories jockeying for position¹⁸. Most of the nations in the region existed within the Chinese tributary system. Exceptions such as Japan were, for the most part, peripheral to this system. One reason for this was China's overwhelming power in the region up until the Nineteenth Century. While it is true that certain small groups occasionally rose up and actually "conquered" China, such as the Mongols or the Manchurians, this normally occurred only when China itself was severely weakened, such as when it was entering the terminal phase of its dynastic cycle. Additionally, there was never any instance of coalitions of territories or states uniting against China or any other power in East Asia. The closest to this was the Chinese assistance given to its Korean vassal when it was attacked by the Japanese in the Sixteenth century. As has been seen, this "Middle Kingdom" complex is still quite evident in China's modern diplomacy.

The Japanese rise to power in East Asia at the end of the nineteenth century might have heralded the beginning of a new, Japan-centred, order in the region. However, the methods by

which Japan attempted to achieve said dominance, namely overt imperialism and, eventually, unrestrained militarism, actually undercut its position. As will be discussed shortly, there appear to be certain "standards" of behaviour, mostly along Confucian and Taoist lines, that must be followed in East Asia. During the early part of this century, Japan violated virtually every one of these standards. As a result, despite its current enormous economic power, Japan is often compelled to "yield" to Chinese demands and leadership.

It was an effort to explain the anarchic, competitive European system, and the various patterns of behaviour that arose from it, that gave rise to the traditional theories used in the international relations discipline. Therefore, it is not surprising to discover some shortcomings when these same theories are applied to the different circumstances found in East Asia. In the following sections, the paper will examine these shortcomings as they relate to the prevalence of informality in the Sino-Japanese relationship. The weaknesses of the traditional frameworks will then be used as a basis upon which to construct and examine the *Sempai-Kohai* framework.

The Question of Culture

Before this theoretical investigation is performed, one more definition must be provided, that of culture. As the

Sempai-Kohai framework will, to a large degree, be culturally based, it is important to have a clear definition of what is meant by "Culture" and why it is important. A good definition of culture is provided by the Anthropological school;

First, culture has been used to refer to the "pattern of life within a community - the regularly recurring activities and material and social arrangements" characteristic of a particular human group...In this sense, culture has referred to the realm of observable phenomena, of things and events "out there" in the world. Second, culture has been used to refer to the organized system of knowledge and belief whereby a people structure their experience and perceptions, formulate acts, and choose between alternatives. This sense of culture refers to the realm of ideas.¹⁹

For the purposes of this political science thesis, the second definition of culture is most useful. This is due to the fact that the first definition is more involved with the physical basis of existence, something well beyond the scope not only of this paper, but, for the most part, political science in general. The second sense of culture can be more rigorously defined as follows;

Cultures in this sense comprise systems of shared ideas, systems of concepts and rules and meanings that underlie and are expressed in the ways humans live. Culture, so defined, refers to what humans learn, not what they do and make...[T]his knowledge provides "standards for deciding what is,..for deciding what can be,..for deciding how one feels about it,..for deciding what to do about it, and...for deciding how to go about doing it."²⁰

These shared systems form the basis for society. As these systems differ from each other given separate circumstances and experiences, so the societies they form will also differ in their norms and behaviour. Acknowledging these differences

is the first step towards understanding them.

The point of this above section has been to define what is meant by formal and informal relations and show that there are specific structural reasons that states have emphasized one type or the other. Culture will come into play when one examines specific cases of informal relations between nations and the informal codes of conduct governing their behaviour. In the case of China and Japan, their actions will often be influenced by Confucian and Taoist teachings, both of which will be key elements of the *Sempai-Kohai* framework to be discussed shortly. The use of the traditional theories in East Asia suffers from an assumption of universality without the realization that they were developed to deal with a specific system, namely that of the European order. This paper is not saying, or even implying, that the traditional theories are invalid in the case of East Asia or that there is no evidence of formal ties in the modern Sino-Japanese relationship. Rather, a deeper investigation, such as was conducted in Chapter Two, reveals that there is more than simply a set of formal ties binding these two nations. These informal ties are something that the conventional theories, such as Realism, are somewhat less well-equipped to deal with.

China, Japan and the Traditional Paradigms

Before discussing the traditional theories, it is perhaps a good idea to properly define them. A good general survey of these frameworks is to be found in Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi's International Relations Theory. They outline three major paradigms, with Realism being the most traditional of the theories. The other two, Liberalism, referred to as Pluralism, and Dependency Theory, termed Globalism, are alternate views of the International System often based upon the strengths and weaknesses of the Realist school²¹.

Realism

The Realist paradigm is based upon four key assumptions. First, states are seen as the principle actors in the system. This is the case whether one is dealing with ancient Greek city-states or modern nation-states. Secondly, the state is viewed as being a unitary actor in the system. Therefore, realists see the state as essentially speaking always with one voice. Third, realists usually assume that the state is a rational actor which therefore undertakes a rational foreign policy decision-making process. This includes a clear understanding of objectives, considering all alternatives in terms of the state's capabilities, determining the relative likelihood of attaining these objectives by the alternatives

under consideration, and analyzing the costs and benefits associated with each course of action. Finally, realists tend to place great emphasis on issues of national security. As a result, military considerations, and other related political issues, tend to dominate world politics. Therefore, power becomes an extremely important concept. As a result, military security and strategic issues are often perceived as high politics, whereas economic and social issues are viewed as less important low politics.²²

Liberalism

The first alternative to the above paradigm is Pluralism which stands in marked contrast to realism in a number of ways. First, non-state actors, such as international organizations and multinational corporations are viewed as being important entities that should not be ignored. Secondly, pluralists do not view the state as a unitary actor. Seeing it in this manner only serves to mask the political process that occurs within the state, which is composed of individual bureaucracies, interest groups, and individuals all attempting to formulate or influence foreign policy. Additionally, realism misses the transnational dimension of state and non-state actors which operate across national boundaries.

Following from this argument against the unitary state, pluralists also challenge the realist assumption that the

state is essentially a rational actor. This is due to the fact that foreign policy decisions are often the result of clashes, bargaining, and compromise between and among different actors, a process that does not always yield the optimal rational decision. Finally, pluralists maintain that the international agenda is not, or at least should not be, dominated primarily by military-security issues. Pluralists assert that over the past thirty years economic and social issues have often come to the fore of foreign policy debates.²³

It should be noted that Viotti and Kauppi see Pluralism as being composed of two types of "Liberalism", that of the individual and also that of the "Interest Group". In the former case, individuals are seen as the primary unit of analysis, with the state playing a minimal role, acting primarily as an arbiter of disputes and maintaining societal harmony²⁴. In the latter case,

...conflict and competition among interest groups play an important role. There is a proliferation of interest groups. Individuals form interest groups in an attempt to outmanoeuvre, end-run, or overwhelm opposing groups or coalitions. Viewed in this way, politics is a game but a game with very real stakes to be won or lost. Authoritative choices (or decisions) are made by government decisionmakers as the outcome of this process.²⁵

Dependency Theory

The third framework under consideration is Globalism. The first assumption of this school is that there is a global

context within which states and other entities interact. Therefore, in order to explain a state's actions, one must first grasp the essence of the global environment within which it takes place. This means that one must understand how the global system conditions and predisposes certain actors to act in certain ways.

Secondly, globalists see it as imperative that international relations be viewed from a historical perspective in order to understand the current environment within which world politics takes place. To many globalists, the defining characteristic of the international system is that it is capitalist. Globalists also tend to focus their analysis on understanding the mechanisms of domination they see as inherent in international relations, whereby some states, classes or elites manage to benefit from the capitalist system at the expense of others. Specifically, globalists are interested in the development and maintenance of dependency relations among the northern, industrialized states and the Third World. They perceive that the structure of the global political economy keeps the Third World countries underdeveloped and dependent upon the rich northern states.

Finally, globalists emphasize the importance of economic factors to a much greater degree than do either realists or pluralists, but this is in conjunction with their theory of enforced Third World dependency²⁶. The difference between

this view and the pluralist school can be summed up as follows;

The globalist would tell a pluralist that the outcome of bargaining among various actors is in most cases predetermined if it involves a North-South issue. Such interactions take place within the context of an exploitative and dependent relation that works, at the most general level, to the benefit of maintaining the world capitalist system and, more specifically, to the benefit of particular groups or classes.²⁷

An interesting spin on the Globalist theory was put forward by Immanuel Wallerstein in what he terms the "World System Theory"²⁸. In this theory he explains the concept of "Core", those areas that are the most advanced and prosperous, "Periphery", the least advanced areas that provide needed raw materials to the core, and the "Semi-Periphery", the areas that exhibit characteristics of both core and periphery and can act as an outlet for investment for the core economies. As Wallerstein explains it,

Contrary to the liberal economic notion of specialization based on comparative advantages, this division of labour requires as well as increases inequality between regions. States in the periphery are weak in that they are unable to control their fates, whereas states in the core are economically, politically, and militarily dominant. The basic function of the state is to ensure the continuation of the capitalist mode of production.²⁹

States and regions may, over time, move from core to periphery status and back again, depending upon prevailing international and, to a lesser degree, domestic circumstances.

Having now outlined the three dominant paradigms

prevalent in International Relations theory, it is possible to explore their weaknesses vis-a-vis the Sino-Japanese relationship. As Realism is the dominant theory upon which the other two base their criticisms, it is prudent to primarily examine this theory and expose its shortcomings. Following this, the *Sempai-Kohai* framework will be described and then contrasted to the Pluralist and Globalist schools in order to highlight the uniqueness of this approach.

Realism Critique

The Realist Paradigm runs into several problems when attempting to explain the actions of Japan and China. This becomes evident when one examines the basic assumptions put forward by the realists. The first two, referring to the centrality of the state in international relations as well as its unitary nature, run into immediate problems when used to explain Japanese actions. Former Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone summed up the problem quite well when he wrote, "As far as the Japanese are concerned, there is no state, it has such a scant existence."³⁰ Karel Van Wolferen's book The Enigma of Japanese Power is built around a similar premise. Not only is the Japanese state seen as being weak, but it is also difficult to perceive it as a unitary actor. The bureaucratic infighting and lack of a centre of governmental responsibility, discussed earlier, means that the

country is often "headless", often giving only the illusion of unity and purposefulness. This was most evident during the war years, when the Japanese military waged campaign after campaign, while the civilian government rather reluctantly capitulated to the army's increasing demands. What was most fascinating about this episode, however, was the fact that the Japanese economy and society were not fully mobilized for war until well into the 1940s³¹. Thus even during the extremes of war, the Japanese nation could not be truly seen as a unitary state, but rather a series of overlapping organizations and bureaucracies all struggling for power. This was nicely summed up by Michael Blaker in his article "Evaluating Japanese Diplomatic Performance" as follows;

Stripped of its nonessentials, Japan's approach to foreign policy is scrutable enough. It follows from highly bureaucratized policymaking in a highly pluralistic society. Viewed from outside, the system looks tightly cohesive, stable, and bound by consensus. But in fact, any significant foreign policy issue manages to rock the domestic political boat, with politicians and bureaucrats in charge of policy constantly in motion, scrambling about to put out fires, plug leaks, and paper over cracks just to keep the vessel afloat. The task is complicated, too, by certain perceptions, notably an ambivalence toward the outside world, a preoccupation with Japan's vulnerability, and hypersensitivity to any form of anti-Japanese sentiment abroad.³²

China, for its part, generally does not suffer from this lack of unity to quite the same degree. In the post-war era, China has been dominated by two men, Mao Tse-tung and Deng Xiaoping. Both have exercised virtually absolute and, to a large degree, arbitrary power in their country. As a result,

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PM-1 3½"x4" PHOTOGRAPHIC MICROCOPY TARGET
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the Chinese state can be realistically viewed as a "unitary actor" in many instances. However, Chinese foreign policy with regard to the Sino-Japanese relationship, as well as some of its other associations, can become somewhat "erratic" when domestic challenges to the dominant policies occur. Examples of this, which are covered in Chapter Two, include the 1985 anti-Japanese student protests and the flare-up over the Kokaryo hostel in 1987.

Realism can also run into problems with regard to the question of rationality in foreign policy, which is the third assumption. Due to their tremendous power, China's leaders can, and often have, acted in an ill-advised, seemingly irrational manner. Domestic examples of this include the Great Leap Forward in the late 1950s³³, the "Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution" from 1966-1976³⁴ and the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre³⁵. All of these cases adversely affected China's diplomacy to some degree. During the early stages of the Cultural Revolution China saw its international diplomatic efforts virtually extinguished by the domestic chaos³⁶. The Tiananmen incident, carried out in full view of the world's press, once again led to a degree of Chinese isolation at a time when the country desperately needed external trade and assistance for its burgeoning economy. These actions all call into question the rationality of the state as it is personified by its paramount leaders.

A final major critique of the realist school has to do

with its fourth assumption regarding the overarching importance of national security and therefore military issues. While there can be no doubt that this was a major concern in the anarchic European system, the East Asian order was quite different. Some of the reasons for this, including the existence of the traditional Chinese-centred tributary system, were discussed earlier. What is fascinating, however, is that there is still evidence of this type of pattern at work in East Asia.

Post-war Japan is probably one of the most striking examples of the disparity between economic might and military and political power. Japan's economy is recognized to be second only to that of the United States³⁷, yet its military might is severely limited as is its political power. Part of the reason for this is, of course, the legacy of the war and the consequent desire of the Japanese to maintain a low profile. However, when one compares the Japanese situation to that of Germany, which had many of the same constitutional and political constraints following its wartime actions, it is remarkable how isolated the Japanese actually are. In Europe, organizations such as NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), the European Community and even the former Warsaw Pact all included either West or East Germany as fully integrated and functional members. Japan's only binding political tie, outside the United Nations, is the bilateral treaty with the Americans. It can be argued that the various

organizations that Germany belongs to allowed it to pursue international policies, within the group, that it would not have been allowed to independently follow. Japan, by contrast, has appeared to be almost totally dependent on the United States for its military security as well as its political direction. However, it can also be argued that this has best served Japan's interests, for it would not have been able to be militarily effective in isolation against either the United States or the former Soviet Union. However, even Japan's actions vis-a-vis other powers seems to violate the realist assumption of power being the dominant factor in international relations.

This can be clearly seen in the earlier description of the Sino-Japanese relationship. China, which has been the weaker economic partner, appears to dictate terms to Japan, and the Japanese, for the most part, appear to acquiesce. It is highly unlikely that Japan fears Chinese military action if relations turn sour. Additionally, while being denied access to the Chinese market would undoubtedly hurt Japan, it is evident, from the importance that China now places on foreign trade and technology³⁸, that it would suffer far more than Japan if contacts were to be completely severed. Therefore, it is apparent that the mechanism at work between the two countries functions differently than would be predicted by the realist paradigm.

China also often operates in ways that seem to violate

the realist assumption regarding the importance of military and security issues. This is most evident when one examines its actions during the conflicts it has had since World War II. In several of these cases, China committed considerable resources but did not seize territory or completely eliminate the threat, despite being in a position to do so. Rather, it has simply acted in order to prove a point. This can be quite clearly seen in its limited skirmishes with India in 1962³⁹ and Vietnam in 1979⁴⁰. While there were certain *Realpolitik* considerations in these border wars, most notably concern over the Soviet Union and the strategic balance of power in Asia, the wars themselves appear to have been fought primarily to preserve status and demonstrate moral and military superiority rather than to destroy a threat or create a new order. This can be seen by the fact that relations between India and China remained poor until the late 1980s⁴¹ and those between China and Vietnam only began to improve, as a result of the disintegration of the USSR, in the early 1990s⁴². Therefore, considering all of the issues outlined above, it can be seen that the Realist paradigm has some weaknesses when it is applied to the East Asian powers.

The Sempai-Kohai Theoretical Framework

The Realist framework encounters problems in the East Asian context primarily because it does not take into account

the long cultural and philosophical traditions of the area. Some specific examples of this were discussed in Chapter Two. These included the concept of the Japanese *Amaeru*-type dependency relationships, the informal, but important, *On-Hoon* and *Guanxi* ties in Japan and China respectively, and the intense fear of *Luan* in China. Additionally, the traditional political situation in East Asia, with its China-centred tributary system, has also been briefly considered. The question that naturally arises is whether there is some sort of underlying connection linking together these concepts.

An answer to this can be found when one examines the philosophical traditions of China and other Sinitic-influenced civilizations. In Chapter Two, Japan's cultural debt to China was briefly examined and shown to be quite substantial. However, one must be careful not to overstate this point. Although the common philosophical influences, most notably Confucianism and Taoism, but also Buddhism which was originally imported from India to China⁴³, are quite strong, Japan and China have retained quite distinct cultural and political identities, as was also demonstrated in Chapter Two. Providing an in-depth analysis of the Japanese and Chinese civilizations and the different effects that Confucianism and Taoism have had on them would go far beyond the scope of this thesis. However, a more limited discussion illustrating some of the basic tenets of these two philosophies that both nations share should be sufficient to illustrate some of the

mechanisms at work in the nations' international political behaviour.

One final point that should be made at this time is to indicate the basic unit of analysis of this approach. Despite some of the shortcomings pointed out in the Realist paradigm with reference to its emphasis on states as the primary actors, they remain the single best element for analysis. However, as will be described below, the way a state conducts itself under the *Sempai-Kohai* framework is somewhat different from the actions expected by the Realist school.

Derivation of the Sempai-Kohai Framework

Confucian Elements

There are several teachings that arise from Confucianism that are important to consider when examining the politics and philosophy of the region. One of the most important of these is the concept of Filial Piety. This forms the basis for much of the political culture in the region, for the relationships developed within the family resonate throughout society⁴⁴. The stress Confucianism places upon this concept can be seen by the following citations taken from The Analects of Confucius;

Someone, when talking to Master K'ung, said, How is it that you are not in public service? The Master said, The Book says: "Be filial, only be filial and friendly towards your brothers, and you will be

contributing to government." There are other sorts of service quite different from what you mean by "service". [Book II, Chapter 21].⁴⁵

The Master said, In serving his father and mother a man may gently remonstrate with them. But if he sees that he has failed to change their opinion, he should resume an attitude of deference and not thwart them; may feel discouraged, but not resentful. [Book IV, Chapter 18].⁴⁶

The Master said, Min Tzu-ch'ien is indeed a very good son. No one can take exception to what his parents or brothers have said of him. [Book XI, Chapter 4].⁴⁷

Leading from this concept of filial piety one arrives at the more generalized notion of loyalty. As was discussed earlier, loyalty is a paramount concern, especially in Japan where it supersedes even filial piety. This particular Japanese emphasis can be accounted for by the importation of Chinese teachings into the Japanese feudal system. It is evident nonetheless that Confucianism places a great deal of stress upon loyalty;

The Master said, Shen! My Way has one (thread) that runs right through it. Master Tseng said, Yes. When the Master had gone out, the disciples asked, saying What did he mean? Master Tseng said, Our Master's Way is simply this: Loyalty, consideration. [Book IV, Chapter 15].⁴⁸

The Master took four subjects for his teaching: culture, conduct of affairs, loyalty to superiors and the keeping of promises. [Book VII, Chapter 24].⁴⁹

Fan Ch'ih asked about Goodness. The Master said, In private life, courteous, in public life, diligent, in relationships, loyal. This is a maxim that no matter where you may be, even amid the barbarians of the east or north, may never be set aside. [Book XIII, Chapter 19].⁵⁰

Duke Ting...asked for a precept concerning a ruler's use of his ministers and a minister's service to his ruler. Master K'ung replied saying, A ruler in employing his ministers should be guided solely by the prescriptions of ritual. Ministers in serving their ruler, solely by devotion to his cause. [Book III, Chapter 19].⁵¹

Tzu-kung asked about government. The Master said, Sufficient food, sufficient weapons, and the confidence of the common people. Tzu-kung said, Suppose you had no choice but to dispense with one of these three, which would you forgo? The Master said, Weapons. Tzu-kung said, Suppose you were forced to dispense with one of the two that were left, which would you forgo? The Master said, Food. For from of old death has been the lot of all men; but a people that no longer trusts its rulers is lost indeed. [Book XII, Chapter 7].⁵²

This last quote makes explicit the reason for the emphasis upon loyalty, for if disloyalty is allowed to run rampant, then general insecurity is greatly increased. This is seen during the periods of dynastic change in China, when there is no centre to which the people can offer loyalty and a condition of *Luan* therefore prevails.

The link between loyalty and filial piety can be directly seen in the next quote;

Chi K'ang-tzu asked whether there were any form of encouragement by which he could induce the common people to be respectful and loyal. The Master said, Approach them with dignity, and they will respect you. Show piety towards your parents and kindness towards your children, and they will be loyal to you. Promote those who are worthy, train those who are incompetent; that is the best form of encouragement. [Book II, Chapter 20].⁵³

The importance of the link from the family to the greater society is evident. Without the intrinsic sense of filial piety, there can be no sense of loyalty developed within the

larger community, and as a result all that will remain is Luan.

Tied into the concept of filial piety and loyalty is also the sense of knowing one's place in society. One becomes aware of what is owed to one's superiors, or seniors, and what one may expect from one's subordinates, or juniors. This concept is at the core of the *Sempai-Kohai* framework, which, as mentioned earlier, takes its name from the Japanese terms for Senior and Junior. The Analects stresses the importance of knowing one's place in several instances;

Tzu-hsia said, A man who
Treats his betters as betters,
Wears an air of respect,
Who into serving father and mother
Knows how to put his whole strength,
Who in the service of his prince will lay down his
life,
Who in intercourse with friends is true to his
word--
others may say of him that he still lacks
education, but I for my part should certainly call
him an educated man. [Book I, Chapter 7].⁵⁴

When the Master said, He who holds no rank in a
State does not discuss its policies, Master Tseng
said, "A true gentleman, even in his thoughts,
never departs from what is suitable to his rank."
[Book XIV, Chapters 27,28].⁵⁵

Yuan Jang sat waiting for the Master in a sprawling
position. The Master said, Those who when young
show no respect to their elders achieve nothing
worth mentioning when they grow up. And merely to
live on, getting older and older, is to be a
useless pest. [Book XIV, First part of Chapter
46].⁵⁶

As was mentioned above, a lack of loyalty can lead to insecurity. Not knowing one's place in society may also lead to serious problems, not the least of which is a breakdown of

the bonds of loyalty within society. This can be seen from the following quotation;

Duke Ching of Ch'i asked Master K'ung about government. Master K'ung replied saying, Let the prince be a prince, the minister a minister, the father a father and the son a son. The Duke said, How true! For indeed when the prince is not a prince, the minister not a minister, the father not a father, the son not a son, one may have a dish of millet in front of one and yet not know if one will live to eat it. [Book XII, Chapter 11].⁵⁷

Turning for a moment to the international arena, this Confucian philosophy can be seen to reflect the situation that existed, prior to the coming of the West, in East Asia. The Chinese tributary system meant that all the various nations in the region knew where they stood in relation to the central power. Additionally, the tributary regime assured at least the appearance of loyalty within the East-Asian system, and thus a measure of security. This can be contrasted to anarchic and insecure international system that existed in Europe, where the various nation-states were continually striving against one another in an attempt to gain some form of advantage. Thus, the international system in Europe functioned similarly to the Hobbesian "State of Nature", in which there exists a war of all against all⁵⁸. This is precisely what the Confucian teachings seeks to avoid. Therefore, the first part of the *Sempai-Kohai* framework can be summed up by the following; It is important to know one's place in the community, be it a local village or the community of nations, and to therefore act correctly and loyally to one's superiors

and juniors.

This leads directly into a discussion on the virtues of proper behaviour. Confucian teaching is fairly explicit that good behaviour should be maintained at all times;

The Master said, Yen P'ing-Chung is a good example of what one's intercourse with one's fellowmen should be. However long he has known anyone he always maintains the same scrupulous courtesy. [Book V, Chapter 16].⁵⁹

Tzu-yu said, In the service of one's prince repeated scolding can only lead to loss of favour; in friendship, it can only lead to estrangement. [Book IV, Chapter 26].⁶⁰

This good behaviour is facilitated by the use of "ritual", which is an essential element of Confucian teaching. The use of "ritual" can often help explain a state's behaviour. A prime example of this is the show of deference Japan has so often made towards China. While both states realize that Japan is actually the dominant economic power, the show of deference helps to smooth relations. The centrality of ritual to Confucian philosophy can be ascertained from the following;

Master Yu said, In the usages of ritual it is harmony that is prized; the Way of the Former Kings from this got its beauty. Both small matters and great depend upon it. If things go amiss, he who knows the harmony will be able to attune them. But if harmony itself is not modulated by ritual, things will still go amiss. [Book I, Chapter 12].⁶¹

Yen Hui asked about Goodness. The Master said, "He who can himself submit to ritual is Good." If (a ruler) could for one day "himself submit to ritual," everyone under Heaven would respond to his Goodness. For Goodness is something that must have its source in the ruler himself; it cannot be got from others. [Book XII, First part of Chapter 1].⁶²

The Master said, He whose wisdom brings him into

power, needs Goodness to secure that power. Else, though he get it, he will certainly lose it. He whose wisdom brings him into power and who has Goodness whereby to secure that power, if he has not dignity wherewith to approach the common people, they will not respect him. He whose wisdom has brought him into power, who has Goodness whereby to secure that power and dignity wherewith to approach the common people, if he handle them contrary to the prescriptions of ritual, is still a bad ruler. [Book XV, Chapter 32]."

The last quote illustrates the Confucian ranking of virtues, with adherence to ritual being at the top. This ranking can be applied to the modern Sino-Japanese relationship in a rather interesting way. It could be argued that the Japanese achieved a modicum of power in the early Twentieth century due to their "wisdom", in other words their ability to utilize the technology of the Western nations. However, because they lacked the other virtues, including the proper use of "ritual" in interacting with their neighbours, they were unable to maintain their power and were ultimately defeated. Therefore a second component of the *Sempai-Kohai* framework involves the adherence to "proper practices" and maintaining at least the appearance of "correct behaviour" when dealing with other nations, especially when in a hierarchical framework.

A question that arises out of this discussion is what virtues distinguishes a *Sempai* from a *Kohai*, and what are the qualities that make leaders worthy of the loyalty that they are due. In Asian society, seniority is often denoted by virtue of age and experience. This is likely related to the earlier concept of filial piety, in which one is required to

respect their elders. Related to this, seniors, and especially leaders, are generally assumed to have a special quality, which derives less from raw power than from a moral quality. The Confucian teachings on this subject are frequent and varied;

The Master said, He who rules by moral force (*te*) is like the pole-star, which remains in its place while all the lesser stars do homage to it. [Book II, Chapter 1].⁶⁴

The Master said, Govern the people by regulations, keep order among them by chastisements, and they will flee from you, and lose all self-respect. Govern them by moral force, keep order among them by ritual and they will keep their self-respect and come to you of their own accord. [Book II, Chapter 3].⁶⁵

Chi K'ang-tzu asked Master K'ung about the art of ruling. Master K'ung said, Ruling (*cheng*) is straightening (*cheng*). If you lead along a straight way, who will dare go by a crooked one? [Book XII, Chapter 17].⁶⁶

Chi K'ang-tzu asked Master K'ung about government, saying, Suppose I were to slay those who have not the Way in order to help on those who have the Way, what would you think of it? Master K'ung replied saying, You are there to rule, not to slay. If you desire what is good, the people will at once be good. The essence of the gentleman is that of the wind; the essence of the small people is that of grass. And when a wind passes over the grass, it cannot choose but to bend. [Book XII, Chapter 19].⁶⁷

The Master said, If the ruler himself is upright, all will go well even though he does not give orders. But if he himself is not upright, even though he gives orders, they will not be obeyed. [Book XIII, Chapter 6].⁶⁸

The Master said, If a Kingly Man were to arise, within a single generation Goodness would prevail. [Book XIII, Chapter 12].⁶⁹

Thus, a ruler leads less by wielding his power than by setting

a moral example which others can then follow. This is a concept which is stressed in Lucian Pye's work Asian Power and Politics⁷⁰. There is, related to this, also an idea that moral leaders should perhaps be above everyday politics, as related in the following passage;

Jan Yung, having become steward of the Chi Family, asked about government. The Master said, Get as much as possible done first by your subordinates. Pardon small offenses. Promote men of superior capacity. Jan Yung said, How does one know a man of superior capacity, in order to promote him? The Master said, Promote those you know, and those whom you do not know other people will certainly not neglect. [Book XIII, Chapter 2].⁷¹

Therefore, a final Confucian component to the *Sempai-Kohai* framework is the importance of morality in politics. This can be demonstrated by the fact that Japan, by its pre-war and wartime actions, forfeited its potential for leadership in Asia, despite its enormous economic power and potential. China's pattern of harping on about Japan's wartime actions and the threat of militarism can be seen to fit into this pattern by reminding Japan who has the moral "upper-hand".

Taoist Elements

The other school of philosophy that must be briefly considered in the formation of the *Sempai-Kohai* framework is that of Taoism. In many ways, Taoism and Confucianism are at odds with each other. This can be plainly seen in the first part of the following passage from Lao Tzu's Tao-Te-Ch'ing,

one of the classic works of Taoism;

If we stop looking for "persons of superior morality" (hsien) to put in power, there will be no more jealousies among the people. If we cease to set store by products that are hard to get, there will be no more thieves. If the people never see such things as excite desire, their hearts will remain placid and undisturbed. Therefore the Sage rules

By emptying their hearts
And filling their bellies,
Weakening their intelligence
And toughening their sinews
Ever striving to make the people knowledgeless and desireless.

Indeed he sees to it that if there be any who have knowledge, they dare not interfere. Yet through his actionless activity all things are duly regulated. [Chapter III].⁷²

Here there is an attack on making the people more knowledgeable, as would be the case if they were properly versed in Confucian ritual. However, despite the differences, and there are others, consideration of which would go beyond the scope of this paper, it can be argued that;

Actually, Taoism and Confucianism have a great deal in common. Both share a theoretical heritage, such as the symbolism of the I Ching. Beyond this, they follow common moral and philosophical presuppositions. In fact, they have influenced each other since quite early in their development. Considerable evidence suggests that Confucius himself met Lao Tzu and regarded him with great respect. Major differences do exist between the two traditions - as approaches to life and as teachings - but the nature of these differences is such that it is more accurate to think of them as complementary rather than conflicting. While the Taoist path of Lao Tzu is passive and inward, the teachings of Confucius are more actively extroverted in their ideal of virtue. When properly understood, the alleged disparity between these two approaches to human conduct do not compete with one another; indeed, they actually advance alternate sides of the same outlook on life and the universe.⁷³

One example of the passiveness of the Taoist teachings can be found at the end of the earlier passage. The concept of "Actionless Activity", which can be termed in Chinese *Wu-Wei*, is extremely important in Taoism⁷⁴. Although it seems somewhat paradoxical, this philosophy asserts that the less one tries to do, the more one may accomplish. This can be more clearly seen in the following citation;

Heaven is eternal, the Earth everlasting.
 How come they to be so? It is because they do not
 foster their own lives;
 That is why they live so long.
 Therefore the Sage
 Puts himself in the background; but is always to
 the fore.
 Remains outside; but is always there.
 Is it not just because he does not strive for any
 personal end
 That all his personal ends are fulfilled? [Chapter
 VII].⁷⁵

This same general attitude is expressed in the next passage taken from Sun Tzu's Art of War, which utilizes many important Taoist precepts;

Generally, in war the best policy is to take a state intact; to ruin it is inferior to this. To capture the enemy's entire army is better than to destroy it; to take intact a regiment, a company, or a squad is better than to destroy them...For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without the fighting is the supreme excellence.⁷⁶

In many respects, this can be seen to be the Japanese strategy in dealing with China and other powers during the postwar era. Rather than struggling ineffectually against American domination or Chinese arrogance, Japan has simply accepted the situation as it exists and come out much stronger as a result.

The Chinese have also used a variant of this strategy in their dealings with the world. They have often managed to secure substantial objectives using a relative minimum of force. This was mentioned earlier in connection to China's confrontations with India and Vietnam. Additionally, China's handling of the two superpowers, which will be discussed in Chapter Four, often utilized this Taoist principle of struggle without overt fighting.

A related Taoist concept is the idea of strength from weakness. Just as one can win without fighting, so apparent weakness can often be a source of profound strength. A few examples from the Tao-Te-Ch'ing should help to illustrate this point;

What is in the end to be shrunk
Must first be stretched.
Whatever is to be weakened
Must begin by being made strong.
What is to be overthrown
Must begin by being set up.
He who would be a taker
Must begin as a giver.
This is called "dimming" one's light.
It is thus that the soft overcomes the hard
And the weak, the strong.
"It is best to leave the fish down in his pool;
Best to leave the State's sharpest weapons where
none can see them." [Chapter XXXVI]."

A large kingdom must be like the low ground towards which all streams flow down. It must be a point towards which all things under heaven converge. Its part must be that of the female in its dealings with all things under heaven. The female by quiescence conquers the male; by quiescence gets underneath. If a large kingdom can in the same way succeed in getting underneath a small kingdom then it will win the adherence of the small kingdom; and it is because small kingdoms are by nature in this way underneath large kingdoms that they win the

adherence of large kingdoms. [First part of Chapter LXI].⁷⁸

When he is born, man is soft and weak; in death he becomes stiff and hard. The ten thousand creatures and all plants and trees while they are alive are supple and soft, but when they are dead they become brittle and dry. Truly, what is stiff and hard is a "companion of death"; what is soft and weak is a "companion of life". Therefore "the weapon that is too hard will be broken, the tree that has the hardest wood will be cut down". Truly, the hard and mighty are cast down; the soft and weak set on high. [Chapter LXXVI].⁷⁹

How did the great rivers and seas get their kingship over the hundred lesser streams?

Through the merit of being lower than they; that was how they got their kingship.

Therefore the Sage

In order to be above the people

Must speak as though he were lower than the people.

In order to guide them

He must put himself behind them.

Only thus can the sage be on top and the people not be crushed by his weight.

Only thus can he guide, and the people not led into harm.

Indeed in this way everything under heaven will be glad to be pushed by him and will not find his guidance irksome. This he does by not striving; and because he does not strive, none can contend with him. [Chapter LXVI].⁸⁰

The Art of War also yields an interesting interpretation of this same concept;

All warfare is based on deception. Therefore, when capable of attacking, feign incapacity; when active in moving troops, feign inactivity. When near the enemy, make it seem that you are far away; when far away, make it seem that you are near.⁸¹

Therefore, appearing weak, or yielding in a proper manner to a superior power, can actually substantially increase one's own strength. This Taoist concept is a mainstay of most East Asian martial arts, which ideally uses an opponent's force

against him. This is opposed to many Western forms of fighting, which rely upon raw power to overcome an adversary. Relating this to the international scene, it can be seen that this principle has often been successfully used by China and Japan. During the late nineteenth century, when China was besieged by the various Western powers and Japan, its very vulnerability meant that many of the powers worked to ensure that it was preserved as a whole and not carved up. While this was ostensibly done in order to prevent any other power gaining an advantage, China was nevertheless spared the trauma of total dismemberment and foreign domination.

Japan's use of this strategy allowed it to secure postwar American protection against foreign threats. Additionally, Japan's "low posture" has allowed it to mend relations with most of its Asian neighbours, while also allowing it to grow into the second most powerful economy in the world.

It is possible to more explicitly tie the concept of *Wu-Wei* and strength through weakness together using the analogy of water, which is a potent Taoist symbol. Two Taoist teachings which utilize this analogy are as follows;

What is of all things most yielding [Water]
 Can overwhelm that which is of all things most hard
 [Rock].
 Being substanceless it can enter even where there
 is no space;
 That is how I know the value of action that is
 actionless.
 But that there can be teaching without words,
 Value in action that is actionless,
 Few indeed can understand. [Chapter XLIII].⁸²

Nothing under heaven is softer or more yielding

than water; but when it attacks things hard and resistant there is not one of them that can prevail. For they can find no way of altering it. That the yielding conquers the resistant and the soft conquers the hard is a fact known by all men, yet utilized by none. [First part of Chapter LXXVIII].⁸³

This analogy is also used in the Art of War as a strategy for dealing with one's enemies;

Now, an army may be likened to water, for just as flowing water avoids the heights and hastens to the lowlands, so an army should avoid strength and strike weakness. And as water shapes its flow in accordance with the ground, so an army manages its victory in accordance with the situation of the enemy. And as water has no constant form, there are in warfare no constant conditions. Thus, one able to win the victory by modifying his tactics in accordance with the enemy situation may be said to be divine.⁸⁴

Therefore, the Taoist component of the *Sempai-Kohai* framework would be to apply *Wu-Wei* whenever possible to dealings with others, allowing one's opponent to show their strength, and then adapting correctly to it. Additionally, it is often better to yield to a superior power such that one can gain an eventual advantage than to merely ineffectually fight with it to no avail. A final comment from the Art of War is also very important in this consideration;

Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles, you will never be defeated. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy and of yourself, you are sure to be defeated in every battle.⁸⁵

Understanding one's opponent is of course essential, but one must also understand one's own nature in order to successfully deal with international politics. Japan and China

are generally able to dance around each successfully precisely because they do understand each other. However, as was discussed in Chapter Two, when the informal structures linking the two nations breaks down, this understanding is lost, and the result can be, as it was for the first part of this century, intense *Luan*.

These elements form the basis of the *Sempai-Kohai* framework. Needless to say, this does not provide an exhaustive investigation of the teachings of Confucianism or Taoism, but as was stated earlier, that was not the intention of this thesis. Rather, those elements that are most applicable to politics and international relations, and that have been observed from the conduct of the Sino-Japanese relationship, have been utilized. No theory can perfectly explain all aspects of a nation's behaviour, and the *Sempai-Kohai* approach is, of course, no exception to this rule. However, it does offer some insight into certain "peculiarities" that both Japan and China often exhibit. That said, it should be noted that both nations have on occasion violated one or more of the precepts outlined above. Despite some of the difficulties that the Realist paradigm runs into in this region, which were discussed earlier, both China and Japan have conducted policies that have utilized cold-blooded realist calculations. Examples of this include Chinese policy towards Tibet⁶ and Taiwan⁷ as well as Japanese behaviour

during the early part of this century and its recent reticence towards Russian overtures".

Before moving on to a consideration of China, Japan and the Superpowers as a test of the *Sempai-Kohai* approach, it is first prudent to briefly highlight the differences between this framework and the Liberalist and Dependency schools outlined above.

The *Sempai-Kohai* Framework vs. Liberalism and Dependency Theory

While the *Sempai-Kohai* framework is an alternative approach to that of the Realist paradigm, it remains to be shown how it differs from the Liberalist and Dependency schools discussed earlier. What is especially noteworthy about Liberalism and Dependency Theory is their emphasis upon dependency and interdependent relationships amongst states. While this is in sharp contrast to the Realist school, it does bear a resemblance to what has been discussed so far concerning the *Sempai-Kohai* framework. Some additional elaboration with regard to certain aspects of this approach should help to facilitate this discussion.

Much was said earlier about the importance of Filial Piety and Loyalty in Asian societies. The bonds that are generated as a result are a form of dependency, but dependency with certain very specific, although not explicit, rules and regulations. The discussions in Chapter Two regarding *Guanxi*

tics in China as well as the *On-Hoon* and *Amaeru* relationships in Japan illustrated this point quite thoroughly. There are two primary points that can be drawn from this earlier analysis. The first is that there is no shame associated with being in a dependency relationship in East Asia. As Lucian Pye puts it;

In every Asian culture the basic strength of informal power is the bonding quality of personal reciprocal relationships between superiors and subordinates. The amazing strength of those relationships can be seen not only in the intense feelings of obligation and indebtedness which they evoke, but also in their tendency to endure even when they cause annoyance and trouble - as when subordinates manipulate superiors.⁸⁹

He then goes on to compare the Western and Asian view of dependency relationships;

In Western thinking, from moral philosophy to modern psychology, the emphasis has been on the virtues of independence and autonomy, the assumed prerequisites for self-realization and healthy, complete personal development. Dependency is thought to have only negative qualities. At best, it is associated with immaturity and a phase of childhood which needs to be outgrown if effective, creative development is to be realized. At worst, dependency is a sign of a permanent liability, of distorted growth, and of inevitable weakness. Yet in the Asian cultures examined...dependency is thought of in a positive way. Moreover, in those cultures people conceive of power in a way that makes dependency a constructive force in national political development.⁹⁰

The second point is that relationships in East Asia are generally viewed as being goals in and of themselves, rather than simply a means to an end⁹¹. In other words, it is the relationship that is established that is often of primary importance, rather than the deals or goods that may emanate

from it. The Confucian emphasis upon rituals and correct behaviour then facilitate the positive aspects of these relationships. This view can be strongly contrasted to the predominant Western attitude which was well expressed by a former British Prime Minister, "England has no friends, only interests."²²

Liberalism

The Liberalist view of interdependence differs from the Asian view of relationships in a number of ways. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye describe interdependence in the following manner;

In common parlance, dependence means a state of being determined or significantly affected by external forces. *Interdependence*, most simply defined, means *mutual* dependence. Interdependence in world politics refers to situations characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries...Our perspective implies that interdependent relationships will always involve costs, since interdependence restricts autonomy; but it is impossible to specify *a priori* whether the benefits of a relationship will exceed the costs.²³

Beyond this, their definition of interdependence utilizes a number of the elements discussed earlier in the general examination of Liberalism. These include the importance of non-state actors and the realization that states are not unitary actors, as well as the diminution of the importance of military might and the recognition of other important issues on the agenda.

The primary difference between this and the *Sempai-Kohai* approach is the nature of the relationship. As was mentioned above, in East Asia the relationship is in itself a goal. The immediate utility of the association is often of secondary importance. Additionally, the Liberalist interdependent relationships are often not governed by any codes of conduct, other than the formal treaties and agreements that secured the relationship in the first place. As Keohane and Nye themselves say, interdependent relationships do not guarantee a cessation of conflict and disagreements⁵⁴. In East Asian dependency relationships, by contrast, there is generally an implicit, informal understanding of the obligations required from both parties, as well as an expectation that both parties will act according to "correct" ritual which will ensure correct behaviour. This understanding goes beyond any formal contracts or treaties that may have initially secured the relationship.

An additional concept to consider is that of superior and subordinate parties forming asymmetric relationships, an idea that is at the core of *Sempai-Kohai* framework. Although this notion is not explicitly introduced into Keohane and Nye's thesis, there is a realization that certain states, such as the United States, will often have asymmetric relationship with other, weaker actors⁵⁵. They state, "Asymmetry is politically important. Being less dependent than other actors in an interdependent system can be an important source of power."⁵⁶ However, as has been repeatedly discussed in these

pages, being in a dependent relationship in East Asia is seen as a great source of security, influence and power. Being isolated not only means that one lacks leverage over others, but it also forces one to more fully expose strengths and weaknesses to the outside world. As was illustrated from the earlier study of Taoism, this latter point can often be seen as a strategic disadvantage.

One final detail worth mentioning is that interdependence, as defined by Keohane and Nye, can often involve a number of states operating in a multi-lateral context⁷⁷. However, by its very nature, the *Sempai-Kohai* framework, which deals with the relations between a Senior and Junior, best lends itself to simpler bilateral relations. The traditional Chinese tributary system could, in fact, be seen as merely a series of bilateral associations between China and the other Asian lands. In the postwar era, East Asia has not seen any meaningful integration along the lines of the European Union or the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), although some purely economic projects, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC), have recently been initiated⁷⁸. However, these do not seem destined, in the short term at least, to herald a new era of Asian multi-lateralism. The fact that neither China nor Japan are deeply involved in multi-lateral arrangements seems to indicate that they prefer bilateral ties, something that is in general

accordance with the *Sempai-Kohai* approach.

Dependency Theory

Turning now to Dependency Theory, the differences between this and the *Sempai-Kohai* framework are somewhat more explicit. As was explained earlier, this school sees dependent relationships as being, by their very nature, exploitative, with the rich and powerful core denuding the weaker periphery. Additionally, this school bases its definition of "Core" and "Periphery", which could be seen as a very rough equivalent to the terms *Sempai* and *Kohai*, on economic terms. As was stated earlier, the *Sempai-Kohai* framework utilizes the, albeit slightly fuzzy, standard of "Moral Force" in determining which actors play the roles of Senior and Junior.

If Dependency Theory in fact accurately described the state of International Affairs in East Asia, then Japan, as the economic Core should be the actor calling the shots in the Sino-Japanese relationship. China would be very much the subordinate periphery, although certain high-growth areas of the country would likely qualify for semi-periphery status. This actually was close to the case in East Asia in the early part of the century. However, as was illustrated in Chapter Two, it is China that has taken the overt lead in the postwar Sino-Japanese relationship. There is, of course, no doubt about the continued Japanese economic dominance in the

relationship, which has aroused occasional protest in China, as was evidenced by the 1985 student demonstrations. However, the evidence presented in this thesis strongly points to China being the *Sempai* in the relationship and Japan playing the role of the *Kohai*.

One additional point that bears repeating is that in East Asia, dependency relationships are not seen in a negative light. As has been said, in East Asia it is often the weaker party that manipulates the relationship and therefore has the advantage over their superiors. By contrast, Dependency Theory views these types of relationships as being highly exploitative of the weaker partner. In the Sino-Japanese relationship, it is evident that both sides manipulate each other. But neither China nor Japan appears, despite the occasional politically expedient protest, to have been particularly exploited by the other in the postwar era.

The thesis will now test the *Sempai-Kohai* approach in order to determine its applicability vis-a-vis China and Japan's relations in the wider world. It should be said that this framework does not seek to be the definitive last word concerning Sino-Japanese relations. In general, however, when the domestic and international situation is stable, the *Sempai-Kohai* framework should offer some unique insights into the mechanics of this informal, and unusual, relationship. The next chapter will extend this analysis by investigating

Chinese and Japanese behaviour with regard to their relations with the Superpowers.

CHAPTER IV---JAPAN, CHINA AND THE SUPERPOWERS

The last two chapters of this thesis have been focused on describing the Sino-Japanese relationship and developing a theoretical framework to explain Chinese and Japanese behaviour within that association. It can then be asked how applicable the *Sempai-Kohai* framework is to China and Japan's other relationships. Therefore, the question to be addressed here is whether the *Sempai-Kohai* approach retains any explanatory power when dealing with Chinese or Japanese associations with other, non-Asian, powers.

This chapter will demonstrate the general applicability of the *Sempai-Kohai* framework by investigating the postwar relationships that Japan and China have maintained with the Superpowers, namely the United States and the former Soviet Union. Due to space limitations, these Superpower relationships will not be as thoroughly examined as was the Sino-Japanese association. Rather, this section of the paper shall consider the general trends that have shaped these relationships over time and examine how they have developed along lines that can be discerned by utilizing the *Sempai-Kohai* approach.

Japanese Power Through Dependence

Since the ending of the Second World War, Japan has found itself in a very close and unusual association with the United States. This relationship has proven to be of immense value to both parties as their mutual economic prosperity has skyrocketed and they have both garnered a considerable degree of security. However, during the last twenty years or so, tensions have arisen which have put considerable strain on the association. With the ending of the cold war and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, there have been those who foresee the possibility that these tensions may cause a rift between the two powers, potentially leading to a severance of the special relationship and even outright animosity¹. In order to better understand these arguments it is useful to comprehend the true nature of the U.S.-Japanese relationship. As this section will show, while it is based upon an economic and security framework, it also has a deeper element of dependence which should cause the relationship to endure for some time to come. In a similar manner, the coolness of the Japanese towards President Gorbachev's reformed Soviet Union, and now President Yeltsin's "democratic" Russia, would appear to go beyond a simple cold war mentality and actually indicate a type of anti-Amateru relationship. These patterns, and how Japan's actions vis-a-vis the Superpowers fit into the wider Sempai-Kohai framework, will now be examined.

Japan and America

Early Dependence: Security from Weakness

At the end of the Second World War, Japan lay in ruins and was forced to endure the humiliation of foreign occupation, an unprecedented event in its history. However, due in part to the actions of these conquerors, primarily the Americans, Japan quickly emerged from the wreckage of war to become a major economic power. In addition, it enjoyed an unprecedented level of security thanks to the defense arrangements undertaken with the United States. By not imposing harsh terms on Japan at the end of the war, the U.S. secured an immense amount of goodwill from the Japanese people². Examples of this early American benevolence abounded. They sloughed off the military elements in Japan, which had been keeping a tight grip on the country as the war wore on, while not overtly interfering with the workings of the Japanese government³. They also permitted the Emperor to retain his position, if not his deified status and overt political centrality, in Japanese society⁴.

Another significant reform was the "peace" constitution that the Americans designed for Japan in 1947. This document entrenched "democratic" values in Japanese society and ensured that there would be no repetition of the wartime aggression. Article IX of the constitution was specifically designed to

perform this latter task by constraining any future militarism in Japan. The relevant text is as follows,

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will never be recognized.⁵

There were two interesting effects that resulted from these reforms. First, the Japanese became strongly dependent upon the United States. This dependence stemmed not only from Japan's immediate economic and military weakness, but also was a response to the indulgences that the Americans bestowed upon them. The second, related, effect was the enforced military weakness of Japan due to its constitution. While this might be perceived as disadvantageous, it has actually been a remarkable source of strength for the country. Due to the fact that their military forces had to remain small, so did their military expenditures. This has, in no small way, contributed to the astounding success of the Japanese economy. Japanese military expenditures have remained, since the end of the American occupation, at approximately 1% of GNP, as compared to 4.5-9% of GNP for the industrialized powers of the West⁶. Had Japanese spending levels been closer to those of the other industrial powers, it is estimated that its economy may have been up to 30% smaller than it is at present⁷.

A second hidden strength (this military weakness is the

fact that Japan has been able to maintain a relatively low posture in East Asia and the world. This has allowed the country to mend relations with its neighbours and pursue its economic development without appearing overtly threatening. This strategy of strength and security through weakness is directly in line with the Taoist elements of the *Sempai-Kohai* framework. The Security Treaty that was signed with the Americans at the time of the San Francisco Peace Conference in 1951 assured the Japanese of American protection in the advent of external attack, thus facilitating their policy security through weakness⁸.

The pattern of U.S.-Japanese relations soon began to resemble the pattern that was earlier demonstrated in postwar Sino-Japanese relations. The dominant power in the relationship, be it America or China, makes demands upon Japan, which in turn makes a show of compliance and deference⁹. During the early part of the U.S.-Japanese relationship, the demands were often quite substantive, and caused considerable controversy. Due to their initial weakness, the Japanese often had little option but to acquiesce. Examples of the more onerous demands included the recognition of the Nationalist government on Taiwan over the PRC, the creation of nascent armed forces following the outbreak of the Korean War¹⁰, and the renewal of the Security Treaty in 1960¹¹. However, the benefits that Japan continued to secure from this relationship outweighed these relatively

minor disturbances. Aside from the military protection that the Americans provided, they were also very helpful with regard to the both the Japanese economy and its re-establishment of relations with its neighbours. Due to American support in the early postwar period, and its relatively open markets, Japan was able to rapidly enhance its export-sector, which spurred its phenomenal economic development¹². For much of the early postwar period, the Japanese Yen was pegged to the American dollar at a very favourable rate, which also stimulated the economic recovery¹³. Additionally, the United States sponsored Japanese accession to the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) despite resistance from certain other members¹⁴. Finally, the United States smoothed the early fears of several of Japan's neighbours, including the Philippines and Australia, by offering them security guarantees against a possible revival of the Japanese threat¹⁵.

Needless to say, the Americans were not acting in a purely altruistic manner. The early postwar period was one of increasing tension between the United States and the Soviet Union. A weak, vulnerable and isolated Japan was seen as being susceptible to communist influences. This fear was reinforced by the "loss" of China in 1949. Thus, the United States was determined to make Japan into a bulwark of American power and democracy in the Far East. Despite the occasional difficulties mentioned above, the Americans were quite successful and the

U.S.-Japanese relationship proved to be remarkably stable and beneficial.

The early postwar relationship actually fits the parameters of the *Sempai-Kohai* framework quite well. The roles of the two powers were well defined, with America unquestionably being the Senior partner. The demands being made by the Americans were not especially unreasonable and both sides generally maintained "proper" behaviour towards each other. Finally, as mentioned earlier, Japan was able to achieve security and growing strength due to its relative weakness, an interesting application of the principle of *Wu-Wei*. By providing the first kindness, a benevolent occupation and subsequent rebuilding of Japan, and then "indulging" Japan, the United States quickly found itself involved, whether it was aware of it or not, in an *Amaeru*-type relationship¹⁶.

By the late-1960s several things began to change. Japan was recovering its economic strength and rapidly transforming itself into a major economic competitor of the United States. Additionally, American involvement in Vietnam was sapping both its vitality and its will to commit troops to the defense of East Asia. This was made quite evident by the Nixon (Guam) doctrine of 1969, in which the President called upon the allies to be more self-reliant¹⁷. Tensions were also exacerbated due to the growing dispute over Japanese textile imports to the U.S. and the emergence of American trade

deficits with Japan¹⁸. Although this period bore witness to the revision of the Southern Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, including Okinawa, to Japan¹⁹, nevertheless difficulties continued to mount. These reached a crescendo of sorts in the early 1970s with the combination of the so called "Nixon Shocks" as well as the "Oil Shock". Although Japan managed to weather these crises quite well, it was evident that the era of overt American indulgence and benevolence was over. However, Japan's responses to these new circumstances demonstrated a remarkable continuity and were relatively consistent with what would be expected from the *Sempai-Kohai* framework.

Growing Equality: Strength Through Weakness

The "Nixon Shocks" of the early 1970s were political and economic in nature. The first of these was the surprise announcement of the intended visit by Nixon to Beijing in July 1971²⁰. This move caught the Japanese, who had been following the American line on China, off guard. However, they quickly recovered and soon established full relations with the PRC, as was discussed in Chapter Two. The second "Nixon" shock was the sudden suspension of the American dollar's convertibility into gold, thus undermining the entire Bretton-Woods financial system and forcing a revaluation of the Yen. In addition, the United States imposed a temporary surcharge on imports in a

move at least partially designed to put pressure on the Japanese vis-a-vis the ongoing textile dispute²¹. Finally, the Oil Shock of 1973-74 highlighted the potential Japanese vulnerability with regard to foreign suppliers of raw materials²². The Japanese response to this was not a fundamental re-evaluation of their treaty with the United States, nor a complete change in the nation's economic course. Rather the Japanese pursued a steady policy that permitted them to maintain their low political profile, conserved their relationship with the United States and allowed for continued economic growth.

Japan's approach to the new environment involved several modifications of its existing policies. Examples of this were the new regulations permitting foreign direct investment by Japanese firms, which generally enhanced Japan's overall economic profile, as well as some liberalizations in the domestic economy²³. Japan's security establishment also underwent some political tinkering in the 1970s. One new proposal, the National Defense Program Outline also known as *Taiko*, was unveiled in 1976²⁴. While this was hailed as being an important step forward in terms of meeting American pressures for greater self-reliance, it actually changed very little of significance. This is evident from the plan's outline, which was addressed during the fourth defense build-up plan as follows;

Japan's basic defense policy is to possess an effective defense capability of its own to prevent

aggression, while maintaining the Japan-US security arrangements. Against nuclear threat, Japan will rely on the nuclear deterrent capability of the United States.

Should aggression occur, Japan will repel indirect aggression and small-scale direct aggression without relying on external assistance, and aggression of a larger scale with US cooperation.²⁵

This can be compared to Japan's original defensive posture which was first delineated in 1956 when the Diet provided for the First Defense Build-up plan. At that time the Basic National Defense Policy was outlined as follows;

The goal of national defense is to prevent direct and indirect aggression in the future; and, if by chance aggression occurs, to repel it; and thereby to preserve our country's independence and peace which takes as its basis the principles of democracy. To achieve this goal, the basic policy is as follows...To support the United Nations, to promote international cooperation, and to achieve world peace...To firmly establish the necessary basis to stabilize people's livelihood, increase their patriotism, and guarantee the security of the state...To gradually build up effective forces to provide the minimum degree of defense necessary in accord with national strength and national sentiment....Until the United Nations is able to acquire the ability to effectively stop external aggression, to deal with it on the basis of the security system with the United States²⁶.

The Taiko policy was seen as being a potential alternative for Japan during the era of Detente. However, as can be seen, it really did not fundamentally alter the nature of Japan's defense planning, merely the form in which it was presented.

With the ending of Detente and the renewal of cold war in the early 1980s, Japan once again came under American pressure to contribute more to its own defense, as well as that of the region. In 1981, Japan agreed to protect the sea lanes out to

1000 miles beyond its territory. Additionally, through the late-1970s and early 1980s various joint training agreements were reached between the United States and Japan²⁷. Despite this expanded role, Japanese spending on defence, as a percentage of GNP, did not increase. Therefore, Japan's effectiveness in its "new" expanded role was somewhat questionable.

This attitude towards defense is very similar to Japan's attitude towards economic issues. Since the textile dispute mentioned above, America and Japan have contended over a number of other trade issues. The general pattern has been that the United States issues several demands in order to gain access to some "closed" sector of the Japanese economy or rectify some sort of serious trade imbalance. The Japanese, in response, vacillate for a time and then, as tensions build, make a conciliatory gesture which resolves the immediate problem but does little to address the larger issues²⁸. This pattern of American demands and Japanese responses has persisted even with fairly substantive issues, such as the Yen revaluation in 1985 under the Plaza accords²⁹, the contention surrounding the FSX fighter plane³⁰, the Structural Impediment Initiative Talks (SII) in 1989-90³¹, and even the debate surrounding the issue of military support during the 1990-91 Gulf Crisis³². As was said earlier, this is very much like the relationship that exists between Japan and China, in that the Senior partner is making demands of the Junior,

which, despite the show of deference, may not follow in quite the spirit the Senior had intended. Although there still exists a dependency relationship of sorts, the current pattern seems to indicate that the earlier Amaeru-type of U.S.-Japanese relationship prior to the 1970s is over. As was discussed in Chapter Two, Amaeru depends on the Senior partner in the relationship being indulgent of the Junior. It is very difficult to argue that the United States has been particularly indulgent of Japan over the past couple of decades. The question that then arises is whether, in the post-cold war world, the U.S.-Japanese relationship will endure.

Before addressing this issue, it is worth pointing out an apparent ambiguity in Japanese policy. In the previous chapters, it has been stated that the Japanese government consists of competing bureaucracies that can often paralyse the system. It can therefore be asked how such a system can possibly generate the type of "organized" strategy being discussed here. In fact, the very nature of the system actually lends itself to this type of dependency arrangement.

The thesis of the Japanese reactive state, which was briefly mentioned in Chapter Two, rests on the assumption that foreign pressure can create action simply by temporarily upsetting the internal status quo³³. The bureaucratic Japanese government would be at a disadvantage in playing the role of overt *Sempai* simply because of its "headless",

irresponsible nature. However, reacting at a minimum to demands and subtly manipulating one's partners in order to maintain equilibrium, as Japan's government is forced to do, is in line with the *Kohai* role in the dependency relationship. This type of arrangement in government and foreign policy is tolerable to the Japanese precisely because it does correspond to a dependency-style relationship, and Japan's manoeuvring has an almost Taoist quality to it. Hence, without the cultural underpinnings, as described earlier, the resultant bureaucratic structures would likely never have survived.

It is the opinion of this paper that the U.S.-Japanese relationship will probably be maintained for some time to come. First of all, as was stated earlier, the current U.S.-Japanese relationship resembles the Sino-Japanese relationship. If Japan has strong reasons not to alienate China, then these can only be greater in the case of the United States. America still offers Japan significant protection, even if the Japanese are now partially footing the bill for the troops stationed on its soil³⁴. Additionally, the United States remains a huge market, which, if suddenly closed, would undoubtedly have serious repercussions in Japan.

On another level it can be argued that American pressure, even if it is occasionally resented, does provide a service by facilitating decision making in Japan, as was mentioned above. The Japanese actually have a term for this phenomenon, *Gaiatsu*, literally meaning external pressure³⁵. Evidence of

the usefulness of Gaiatsu can be seen by the generally positive Japanese domestic response to the American-initiated SII talks³⁶.

Finally, maintaining a form of dependence upon the United States allows Japan to retain its low political posture in Asia and the world. Were the American security treaty suddenly to be renounced and Japan left to its own devices vis-a-vis security, its Asian neighbours would all become very uncomfortable. If one considers the outcries China and Korea have made over virtual non-issues, such as Japan officially breaking the 1% GNP ceiling on defense spending by 0.004% or sending essentially unarmed Peace-Keepers to Cambodia, then the reaction to an independent, potentially nuclear-armed Japan does not bear contemplating. This fact is recognized by both the Americans and Japanese, who do see the American troops in Japan as serving a dual purpose, defense of Japan and acting as a "cap in the bottle"³⁷.

This conclusion generally fits with what the *Sempai-Kohai* approach would see as Japan's proper actions, strength through weakness, maintaining proper behaviour towards superiors and "knowing" one's place in the world. There is no doubt that there are tensions on both sides of the Pacific. This fact is made abundantly clear by the profusion of hostile works being published. Examples include Sintaro Ishihara's The Japan That Can Say No, George Friedman and Meredith Leband's The Coming War With Japan and even Michael Crichton's popular work

Rising Sun. On the Japanese side, these squabbles are not dissimilar to what it endures with China. The potential problem may arise on the American side. Unlike the dynamics of the Sino-Japanese relationship, where both sides generally understand the game that is being played, in the U.S.-Japanese relationship the two sides do not totally understand each other on the same cultural, informal level. One example of this is the Japanese stress upon "form" as opposed to the greater importance Americans place on "substance"³⁸. While these cultural and structural differences are sometimes discussed in the mainstream press³⁹, more often than not they are misunderstood or totally ignored. However, due to the importance of the Japanese economy to America as well as the continued geo-strategic value of Japan to American interests⁴⁰, a severance of relations by America is also rather unlikely in the immediate future. The U.S.-Japanese relationship may have lost some of its *Amaeru*-type quality, but it is still of vital importance to both nations.

Japan and the Soviet Union/Russia

In marked contrast to the beneficial and generally positive U.S.-Japanese relationship stand the rather frosty relations that exist between Russia and Japan. In part, the coolness between these two countries could be said to spring from the cold war tensions, their territorial dispute, and

their earlier history of animosity. As will be recalled from Chapter Two, Russia and Japan went to war in 1904. They also skirmished at the start of the Second World War. However, previous conflict did not prevent the dependency relationship that developed between the United States and Japan. Cold War tensions also did not preclude the formation of the modern Sino-Japanese relationship. Additionally, the fact that China and Japan have an unresolved territorial dispute over the Diaoyu Islands has not generally interfered with the formation of their relationship⁴¹. It would appear, therefore, that the primary difference between the USSR/Russia on the one hand, and the United States and China on the other, is the strongly negative behaviour undertaken by the former in its dealings with Japan. Due to this, it appears that Japan's association with the USSR, and later Russia, has an almost "anti-Amaeru" quality to it.

Before discussing this concept of "anti-Amaeru" and its implications more fully, it is helpful to give some background to the Russian/Soviet-Japanese relationship. As was already mentioned, Japan and Russia had a history of conflict right up to the Second World War. Following a series of border clashes in 1939, which the Japanese lost, a Neutrality pact was signed between the two nations⁴². This treaty served both nations' interests as it freed Japan to pursue its interests in Southeast Asia and its war in the Pacific as well as sparing the USSR the disaster of a two-front war. The Japanese

honoured this agreement even after the Germans invaded the USSR in 1941, despite the fact that the two Axis powers together could quite possibly have crushed the Soviet Union.

This Japanese action was not reciprocated by the Soviets, who entered the Pacific war literally during its last days. It could be argued that this was in line with allied interests, which at the time were predicting the need to mount a costly invasion of the Japanese home islands. However, it is difficult to see Stalin's move to enter the war on August 9, 1945, shortly after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, and seize strategic territory in anything but a cynical and opportunistic light³. Additionally, some 600,000 Japanese were captured and sent to Siberian labour camps as prisoners of war, which was in violation of the Postdam Declaration calling for swift repatriation of Japanese after the war⁴.

As the Soviet Union did not sign the 1951 peace treaty, the outstanding territorial issue between the two nations, the four islands of the Southern Kuriles or, as Japan refers to them, the Northern Territories, remained unresolved. Although Japan did acknowledge the loss of these territories in the treaty, it refused to accept legal Soviet possession thereof⁵. Several opportunities have arisen since 1951 that might have led to the resolution of this issue, but in all cases the terms were unacceptable to either Japan or the Soviet Union. Following Stalin's death positive signals emerged that the two nations might reach some sort of

agreement. Peace talks to this end began in London in 1955. However, Japanese resistance to a return of only two of the four islands meant that these peace talks were stalemated⁴⁶. Despite this failure, diplomatic relations were normalized in 1956, and in 1957 a treaty of trade and commerce was signed⁴⁷. The renewal of the Japanese-American Security Treaty in 1960 caused the Soviet Union to harden its position vis-a-vis the Kuriles. Under the new conditions, known as the Gromyko Memorandum, the USSR offered to return the Habomai Islands and Shikotan only after a peace treaty was signed and all foreign troops were removed from Japan⁴⁸. Once again, the Japanese took this as sign that the Soviets were dealing in bad faith.

During the mid-1970s, the era of Detente, Soviet-Japanese relations showed some signs of improvement with proposals afoot for the development of Siberian resources. However, the territorial issue remained a stumbling block. This combined with doubts about the benefits of the Siberian project and growing Sino-Japanese ties resulted in a gradual loss of enthusiasm for a closer Soviet-Japanese association. Additionally, the increase of Soviet forces in Asia as a counter to China also increased Japanese discomfort⁴⁹. Finally, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 led to a deepening of the Cold war and a further cooling of Soviet-Japanese relations⁵⁰.

The accession of Mikhail Gorbachev to the Soviet

Presidency cleared the way to a general easing of cold war tensions in the world. However, Japan consistently appeared somewhat less eager about the "new" Soviet Union than did the Americans or the Europeans. Evidence of this can be seen by the fact that during the 1990 G-7 Houston summit, Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu managed to insert the following passage into the political communique which asserted that, "we support the early resolution of the northern territorial issue is an essential step leading to the normalization of Soviet-Japanese Relations"⁵¹. Japan also vetoed Soviet entry to the GATT, PECC, APEC, the Asian Development Bank and other international organizations⁵². Additionally, Japanese aid and assistance towards the USSR, and later Russia, has been somewhat paltry, and given rather reluctantly, compared to the Americans and Europeans⁵³. Gorbachev's visit Japan in 1991 generated some measure of general goodwill and a number of minor accords were signed, but the status quo did not appreciably change between the two nations⁵⁴. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, negotiations with Russian President Yeltsin also proved to be fruitless in resolving the outstanding territorial issue⁵⁵.

It can be seen that the former USSR's actions were not particularly conducive to the formation of a positive relationship with Japan. Despite the intransigence of the territorial dispute, there does seem to be another dynamic at work between the two nations. This was referred to above as

"anti-Amaeru". As *Amaeru* involves the formation of a relationship based on an initial indulgence or kindness, so "Anti-Amaeru" could be looked upon as forming a permanent animosity based upon a misdeed. In this particular case the initial misdeed was the Soviet seizure of Japanese territory in direct violation of the 1939 neutrality pact. Since the war, the Soviet Union's actions and often bullying attitude have simply acted to reinforce this existing animosity⁶⁶. Japan's attitude is bolstered by the fact that, unlike the United States or China, trade with the Soviet Union, and now Russia, is not of particular importance to Japanese business interests nor is the current Russian economy seen to be a particularly attractive place to invest⁶⁷. One final point is that Japan's dependency relationship with the United States during the cold war meant that relations with the USSR would have been difficult. An important reason for this is that loyalty, in the Confucian sense, cannot generally be split, especially between two adversarial *Sempais*. Thus, Japan did not normalize relations with the PRC until after the United States had cleared the way. Similarly, it would have been extremely bad form for Japan to have established warm relations with the Soviets while its closest ally saw it as a mortal threat. Although this line of reasoning carries less weight in the post-cold war world, it is yet another factor that helped drive the USSR and Japan apart.

Utilizing the *Sempai-Kohai* framework, it can therefore be

seen that the Soviet Union violated several of the principles outlined in Chapter Three with regard to Japan. It had been a bullying power, both diplomatically and militarily, and thus it has not behaved well in a Confucian sense. Additionally, in its actions towards Japan and other nations it can be said to have been evidence of its lack of proper "Moral" decorum. Finally, any vestige of respect that Japan may have had for it in terms of its Superpower status vanished when the Soviet Union collapsed.

It is noteworthy that in its relations with both China and America, Japan has often utilized informal methods of achieving its aims. Additionally, it has almost always been the more passive actor, responding, in its own way, to American and Chinese demands. In the case of the Soviet Union, and now Russia, it is Japan that has been making formal demands for the return of the Northern territories. Until the Russians make some effort to amend relations, such as returning the islands, it is unlikely that relations will significantly improve. Given the current situation facing Boris Yeltsin⁵⁴, it is therefore very likely that this situation will persist for some time to come.

China's Balancing Act

China's relationship with the two Superpowers has been considerably different from Japan's. Whereas Japan's policy

has been fairly consistent in the postwar period, China has shifted its policies vis-a-vis America and the USSR quite dramatically since the People's Republic was declared in 1949. Part of the reason for this was that China did not emerge from the Second World War with any predetermined alliances. Although there was an initial turn towards the Soviet Union following Mao's victory on the mainland, differences soon tore this alliance apart. This eventually led to a period of growing hostility, and even outright conflict, between the two Communist powers. It was during this period that China turned towards the United States and established relations with that nation, which have been maintained to the present day. In recent years, China has experienced phenomenal economic growth and has the potential to emerge as a true Superpower in its own right. Additionally, the Soviet Union has collapsed, leaving the United States, at least temporarily, in a position of unchallenged supremacy. China has therefore been forced to readjust its policies, and its relationships, to take these new realities into account.

Early Deference to Stalin's USSR

The People's Republic of China, which was declared on October 1, 1949, was forged in a revolutionary war between the KMT and the Communists. Not surprisingly, the Americans were fairly hostile to the Communists from the start. Although the

Americans were also not particularly enamoured with the corrupt KMT, they felt that they had little choice but to support them in order to prevent China from falling into communist hands⁵⁹. The USSR under Stalin was also leery of the new, and very large, communist power emerging in the East. Stalin's fears were twofold. First, he felt that increasing communist victories might prompt a large-scale American intervention, with the result that the USSR would lose all influence in the area. His second fear, which eventually proved to be correct, was that Communist China might undermine the Soviet position of leadership in the Socialist world⁶⁰. As a result, while both Superpowers supported their nominal allies in the struggle, neither did so with any particular enthusiasm.

These facts point to the conclusion that the early Sino-Soviet alliance was not a predestined event. There is some evidence that American hostility towards the new Communist regime, and its desire to protect the Nationalist regime on Taiwan, pushed the PRC into the arms of the Soviets⁶¹. At any rate, Mao left China for the first time in his life to go to Moscow for negotiations with Stalin in December 1949⁶². The symbolism of this event cannot have been lost on Mao or the Chinese. The image of the leader of the newly unified China travelling to Moscow was quite reminiscent of the old tributary missions China's neighbours undertook in past centuries. This view was reinforced not only by the fact that

the Chinese were seeking military and economic assistance from the USSR⁶³, but also because the Soviet Union, and Stalin himself, were seen as being at the pinnacle of the Communist world's hierarchy⁶⁴. Over the next few years relations between the two powers were fairly amicable, with the Soviet Union providing economic assistance and protection, secured by a thirty year treaty of friendship, union and mutual assistance⁶⁵, against the perceived danger of the United States.

The issue of security was tested early on with the outbreak of the Korean War. Even before this, the Sino-Soviet treaty created considerable alarm and hostility in the United States⁶⁶. The Korean conflict, which had tacit support from Mao and Stalin⁶⁷, merely reinforced American fears of an omnipotent communist block forming in East Asia. The initially dismal performance of the South Korean regime in the war eventually prompted a serious American intervention, albeit under cover of the United Nations flag. As the Americans gradually pushed north towards the Yalu River, Beijing began to issue warnings to halt the advance, although the Americans were signalling that they were not interested in involving China in the conflict⁶⁸. A combination of confused signals and ignored warnings eventually brought China into the war. After some initial Chinese successes, the battle ground to a bloody stalemate. While it is true that the Americans could have theoretically altered the balance by using their nuclear

weapons, as General MacArthur apparently advocated, the Sino-Soviet treaty acted as a strong deterrent". While China's actions at this time can be viewed as being primarily defensive, their overall tactics in the conflict were generally in line with Sun Tzu's teachings on flexibility in war and knowing one's opponent⁷⁰.

Sino-Soviet relations had temporarily taken on the appearance of a dependency relationship not totally unlike that which formed between Japan and the United States, with China being the Junior partner to the Soviet Union. Stalin's death on March 5, 1953⁷¹ initially strengthened the Sino-Soviet relationship as the new leaders in Moscow were less reticent than Stalin about giving economic aid to China⁷². However, the conviction of absolute Soviet leadership in the communist world became somewhat less certain after Stalin's death. Franz Schurmann explains one aspect of this as follows;

Stalin's death appears to have signalled a dramatic change in the relationship between Russia and China. Chou Enlai rushed to Moscow and was the only non-Soviet communist invited to be a pallbearer of Stalin's coffin. While China clearly was Russia's most important ally in the world, this symbolic gesture was meant to have a larger meaning...If there were growing subsurface frictions in the Sino-Soviet alliance, might China not begin to tread the Titoist path, as had been predicted only a few years before? The symbolism of Chou Enlai carrying Stalin's coffin could only mean that the Russians for the first time were showing that they needed China. Until then, it was the Chinese who needed the Russians.⁷³

One aspect of the *Sempai-Kohai* framework is that the participants know their place in the community of nations and

especially within their associations. Stalin's death suddenly altered certain political realities in the Sino-Soviet relationship. While relations remained positive for some years to come, the seeds of the Sino-Soviet split were laid at this point.

From Sino-Soviet Estrangement...

Soviet economic aid and continued American hostility meant that the USSR and China maintained a firm basis for cooperation. But during the 1950s and especially into the 1960s tensions emerged which eventually destroyed the alliance and brought the two nations close to the brink of all-out war. The first serious cracks emerged out of a speech by Soviet President Nikita Khrushchev at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956. At that time he condemned Stalin's crimes as well as the personality cult that he had developed⁷⁴. While the debunking of the personality cult was embarrassing for the Chinese leadership, which was living with the growing cult of Mao, the condemnation of Stalin himself proved to be more profound. The new leadership was attacking Stalin's Soviet Union, which, for better or worse, the Chinese had taken as their "Moral centre" in the communist world. Another factor adding to the budding tensions in the relationship was the hard-line the United States began to pursue after a relative thaw in East-West tensions in the

mid-1950s⁷⁵. Whether this renewed toughness was a response to the Soviet actions in Eastern Europe, vis-a-vis the Hungarian uprising of 1956⁷⁶, or simply a calculated American action designed to put pressure on the Sino-Soviet alliance⁷⁷, the end result was a series of additional strains regarding policy which eventually led to an outright break.

The Chinese response to this American pressure was to begin shelling the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu in 1958. This had the dual purpose of testing both the resolve of the United States and the commitment of the Soviet Union⁷⁸. This was an alarming crisis as it once again raised the spectre of war between China and America. Although the Soviets did back the Chinese, there is evidence that China felt that the level of support was somewhat wanting, in that Moscow issued a warning to the U.S. only after the crisis had peaked and was well on the way to being resolved⁷⁹.

China's seemingly provocative behaviour only reinforced Khrushchev's view that the country was playing a dangerous game with the Americans and could therefore not be trusted to behave responsibly⁸⁰. As a result, in 1959 the Soviet Union terminated its aid to China's nuclear program. This effectively broke a 1957 agreement in which the USSR had promised technical assistance and even a prototype nuclear weapon⁸¹. Aside from fears of Chinese recklessness, the Soviet decision to suspend aid was part of their new policy of peaceful coexistence with the United States⁸². Khrushchev's

visit to the U.S. simply accentuated the growing tensions with the Chinese, who felt that many of Khrushchev's policies were becoming increasingly revisionist.

Although the prospects of Detente with the United States appeared to fade with the various crises of the early 1960s, including Berlin in 1961 and Cuba in 1962⁸³, the Sino-Soviet rift continued to widen. The Chinese criticisms of Soviet policy steadily became both more public and more strident, as did the Soviet responses. In July 1960 the Soviet Union suddenly withdrew all the specialists they had sent to work in China⁸⁴. The timing could not have been worse for the Chinese, who were just emerging from the disaster of the Great Leap Forward. From this time forward, relations between the two nations deteriorated at an accelerating pace. During the 1962 Sino-Indian border conflict the Soviets maintained an officially neutral policy, although there was evidence that they tacitly supported India⁸⁵. In 1963 the Soviets signed the nuclear test ban treaty with the United States. This infuriated the Chinese who viewed it as evidence of Soviet and American collusion to keep them out of the nuclear club⁸⁶. In actual fact, they were not completely wrong. The Americans and Soviets did voice concerns to each other about the prospect of a nuclear China, and there was even some consideration of the possibility of preemptive strikes to deny them this option⁸⁷.

Sino-Soviet border violations began to occur through the

mid-1960s with increasing frequency⁸⁸. In addition, the onset of the Cultural Revolution in China produced a rather ugly spate of anti-Soviet incidents⁸⁹. This conflict reached a peak of sorts with the serious border clashes in 1969 over the Ussuri river and other territories⁹⁰. Although tensions did eventually subside, Sino-Soviet relations did not become cordial again until the mid- 1980s⁹¹.

The *Sempai-Kohai* approach is quite useful when one examines the origins and the eventual ferocity of the Sino-Soviet split. As has been mentioned, Stalin's USSR, for all its faults, was regarded as the ideological centre of the Communist world, which could be viewed as a contemporary version of the traditional Confucian moral centre. By providing economic assistance and military security the Soviets fulfilled the role of a protective, indulgent, moral Senior to China's Junior. However that changed when the new leadership attacked Stalin and thus appeared to abandon his ideology. This was made worse by the Chinese attitude towards Khrushchev himself;

One cannot understand the emotional depth of the Sino-Soviet dispute unless one sees the contempt in which the Chinese held Khrushchev - a contempt that even his successors shared when they accused him of harebrained schemes. Moscow was China's "Rome", the fountainhead of the world view of Marxism-Leninism. For all Stalin's errors, crudities, and cruelties, the Chinese always felt that he maintained the integrity of the doctrine, even though what he did in practice strictly followed his own and Russia's practical interests. But Khrushchev began to gyrate ever more wildly, both in theory and in practice. The Chinese might have overlooked the ludicrous scene of his wishing to visit Disneyland and then

his pounding the desk with a shoe in the United Nations if it were not a reflection of his generally wild and adventuristic nature. Such a man had the audacity to speak of peaceful coexistence as a new principle, as a creative development of Marxist-Leninist theory...To the Chinese, and to Mao in particular, Khrushchev seemed to be using Russia's ideological and political power to make his own interests those of the socialist camp as a whole."

This can be viewed as an interesting example of Blau's thesis of informal power and relationships resting, to a large degree, on personal charisma, as was discussed in Chapter Three.

The breaking of the economic and military ties in the 1960s simply reinforced the sense of abandonment and showed that the Soviet Union had lost the "mandate" to lead. Chinese activity in fostering revolution in the Third World can thus be partially viewed as an attempt to assert itself as the new centre of world communism by emphasizing ideologically correct doctrine". It is rather ironic, therefore, that at the height of the Sino-Soviet split, the beginnings of the Sino-American rapprochement were evident. While it may show some degree of ideological inconsistency on the part of the Chinese, it definitely made sense strategically and economically.

...To Sino-American Reconciliation

During the early phases of the Sino-Soviet split, the prospects for Sino-American cooperation still appeared quite

bleak. In fact, as was mentioned above, the United States was very concerned about China in the mid-1960s. With America's increasing involvement in Indochina, war between the two powers appeared to be an imminent possibility⁴. War did not occur due to the fact that some of the lessons of the Korean War had been learned. Both sides were clearer in their signals to each other, and the Americans were careful to pay closer attention this time. Once Mao was convinced that the United States did not intend to escalate the war to a point which would involve China, he was free to launch the Cultural Revolution⁵. This may also have been an additional sign, of sorts, to the Americans about China's intentions. After all, the Chinese were not likely to take on a superpower while they were fully involved in tearing their own country apart.

Although China was still outwardly aggressive towards the United States and its "imperialistic" policies, the late-1960s and early 1970s bore witness to a series of events which ultimately culminated in Nixon's dramatic visit to the PRC in 1972. American policy towards China in the late 1960s consisted of a series of small steps designed to create a more positive atmosphere in which Sino-American relations could be developed⁶. The Americans also utilized a series of intermediaries, including French President de Gaulle, Romanian President Ceausescu and Pakistani President Yahya Khan, in order to sound out the Chinese⁷.

The Chinese during this period was not unified on the

question of reconciliation with the Americans. Although the policy was generally favoured by Chou Enlai, it was strongly opposed by Lin Biao, the Minister of Defense and designated successor to Mao⁹⁸. It was only following Lin's fall from power, after a confrontation with Mao in 1970, that relations with the United States were able to proceed⁹⁹.

Nixon's visit was preceded by a number of informal signals which set the stage for the "breakthrough" in relations. These included an invitation by China to an American table-tennis team, from which the term "Ping-pong diplomacy" originated, informal discussions with intermediaries such as American journalist Edgar Snow regarding the improvement of Sino-American relations, further easing of the American trade restrictions towards China, and finally a secret visit by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in July 1971, during which the Nixon visit itself was agreed upon¹⁰⁰. President Nixon finally visited China in February 1972. Although this occasion did not mark the establishment of formal diplomatic ties, which would have to wait until January 1979¹⁰¹, it was an important recognition of the PRC and led to a significant improvement in Sino-American relations.

The fact that both Kissinger and Nixon travelled to Beijing has likely had an interesting effect on the nature of Sino-American relations. As will be recalled, it was Mao who had had to travel to Moscow in order to see Stalin, and it was also the Chinese who had to make concessions in order to gain

Moscow's favour¹⁰². In the run up to the establishment of formal Sino-American relations, however, it was primarily the Americans who had to make a show of acquiescence;

In order to clear the way to normalization in 1978, Washington acceded to "three conditions" that Beijing had demanded since 1975. They were: (1) withdrawal of all U.S. military forces from Taiwan, (2) severance of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Taiwan, and (3) termination of the U.S.-Taiwan mutual security treaty of 1954. Beijing [also] made several important concessions on the Taiwan issue. It agreed to establish normal U.S.-PRC relations one year prior to the actual cancellation of the 1954 U.S.-ROC [Republic of China] treaty. It agreed to normalize relations, even though Washington said it would continue supplying weapons to Taiwan. It agreed not to contradict publicly a unilateral U.S. statement of concern about the peaceful future of the people of Taiwan. Beijing also agreed to make a unilateral statement regarding its intention of using peaceful means to settle the Taiwan question. At the same time, however, it insisted that "as for the way of bringing Taiwan back to the embrace of the motherland and reunifying the country, it is entirely China's internal affair."¹⁰³

As a result of this, there is an interesting similarity between Sino-American relations and Sino-Japanese relations. In both cases China needs the relationship quite badly. However it also demonstrated the "Middle Kingdom" complex once again, making demands and often treating the Americans, in a similar fashion to the Japanese, as though China were bestowing favours upon them. Given this Chinese attitude, it is thus valid to question conventional views of the Soviet-American-Chinese strategic triangle. As Roy Medvedev put it;

Many articles and books were devoted to the use of the "China card" in the great political game and especially in the "game" against the Soviet Union. In reality, observers ought also to have been

talking about the "American card" which China wanted to use in its new entry into the international arena.¹⁰⁴

Hence, there can be little doubt that the Chinese were as interested in "using" the Americans as the U.S. was in using them.

Lucian Pye, in his work Chinese Negotiating Style, offers some additional insight into China's behaviour. He feels that the Chinese tend to form dependency-type relationships with their stronger American counterparts. However, as was discussed in the previous two chapters, these types of relationships often strongly obligate the Senior partner to be generous and indulgent to the Junior¹⁰⁵. China's often arrogant "Middle Kingdom" complex, as well as its general sensitivity to perceived slights, can emerge from this sense of dependence, as Pye explains;

Psychologically consistent with what has just been described is the Chinese practice of aggressively denouncing the behaviour of another party, accusing it of violating "principles," being "unfriendly," or even being "an enemy of the Chinese people," because of things it may be doing with a third party. It is of course partly an exaggeration of the importance of whatever activities they are a part of - a form of Sinocentrism - and relations among all others belong to the periphery of the Chinese world...This behaviour reflects a form of dependency, analogous to the way a dependent child expects to get his way by creating an awkward scene. This use of verbal attack, which can be seen as quite insulting, is intended not to break the relationship but oddly to strengthen it. For the Chinese often feel that they can positively influence others by scolding, shaming and embarrassing them.¹⁰⁶

This analysis offers some interesting insight into another

cause of the Sino-Soviet split. When Khrushchev's policies ran counter to Chinese expectations he was harshly criticized by them. However, the Soviet response to this was not the indulgent actions expected of a Senior. Rather, the reaction was aggressive and resulted in a suspension of aid to China, which, as mentioned above, led to a sense of abandonment and thus set the stage for the overt confrontation. While China and America have remained on relatively amicable terms since their rapprochement, a similar lack of mutual understanding has resulted in occasional tensions and recriminations.

Chinese Dependence and Arrogance into the Post-Cold War World

The late 1970s was a period of increasing tension in the acrimonious Sino-Soviet relationship. The new Chinese closeness with the United States, combined with the renewal of cold war tensions following the Afghanistan invasion, meant that the USSR felt particularly threatened¹⁰⁷. During the 1980s this tension began to ease off, partly as a result of a new Chinese policy to assume a more equidistant position between the two superpowers. While a reduction of Sino-Soviet tensions was in Beijing's interest, this was not the only factor motivating this policy shift. Another major concern was the Reagan administration's strong pro-Taiwanese stance¹⁰⁸. Additionally, by assuming a more equidistant stance, China increased its ability to balance the two Superpowers off one

another. However, despite the tensions over Taiwan, China generally maintained a beneficial trading relationship with the United States as well as a series of military links, most of which were aimed at the Soviet Union or its allies such as Vietnam¹⁰⁹.

The appearance of Mikhail Gorbachev on the world stage and the subsequent downgrading of the cold war led to a number of changes in the Soviet-American-Chinese strategic triangle. Probably the most significant effect was the gradual reconciliation that occurred between the USSR and China, culminating in Gorbachev's visit to Beijing and the re-establishment of relations in May 1989¹¹⁰. Even before this period, Sino-Soviet relations had been improving and cross-border trade had resumed in 1984¹¹¹. The differences between this rapprochement and the earlier establishment of Sino-Soviet relations are quite significant. While the Chinese had supplicated to Stalin in the early 1950s, in the 1980s this policy had altered;

China demanded that Moscow remove "three obstacles" before there could be "normal" Sino-Soviet relations. These three "obstacles" were: (1) Moscow must pressure Vietnam to withdraw its military forces from Cambodia; (2) Soviet forces must withdraw from Afghanistan; and (3) Moscow must withdraw militarily from Mongolia and substantially reduce its forces along the Sino-Soviet border.¹¹²

It is also interesting to note that Gorbachev came to Beijing to see Deng. Once again, the Chinese can be perceived as bestowing rewards and beneficence for proper behaviour.

Ironically, it was Gorbachev's visit that helped trigger

the Tiananmen incident of 1989¹¹³, an event which gravely affected Sino-American relations. As was discussed in Chapter Two, Western nations were appalled by the brutality of the repression in China and promptly imposed a variety of sanctions, which China stridently denounced as attempted interference in its internal affairs. American reactions since then has been rather mixed. Many, including former-President George Bush, understand the strategic and economic importance of China, but do not wish to be seen to be "coddling dictators". The recent American policy of publicly linking Most Favoured Nation (MFN) trading status to Chinese performance on human rights has backfired in many ways. The Chinese see the American policy as interference and a form of bullying and therefore have remained defiant¹¹⁴. The Americans are thus torn between principle and practical concerns. President Clinton's May 1994 decision to renew China's MFN status seems to indicate, at least for the moment, a strong degree of American pragmatism when dealing with the PRC¹¹⁵.

The Chinese, for their part, are having to rethink their strategy in the world. The collapse of the Soviet threat, followed by the Soviet Union itself in 1991, means that it can no longer attempt to play one Superpower off another, essentially using "barbarians to check barbarians". Sino-Russian relations remain fairly positive¹¹⁶, although the situation in the latter nation is so volatile it is impossible

to predict what may occur there even in the next few months. Sino-American relations also remain fairly amicable, but the tensions discussed above could yet cause a rupture. Mutual understanding of the policies and ideologies at work in each country can only facilitate the relationship, misunderstandings may create a split and consequent destruction of the existing relationship. That scenario could have worldwide ramifications on a par with the Sino-Soviet split of the 1960s and 1970s.

Japan and China can thus be seen to be similar in their behaviour towards the two Superpowers. In both cases, their actions are strongly governed by the Confucian and Taoist teachings evident in the *Sempai-Kohai* framework. Correct behaviour is an extremely important component of this. As can be seen, the Soviet Union's conduct was such that it eventually alienated both Asian powers and suffered as a result. While the American experience has generally been more positive, it too has encountered difficulties in its dealings with Japan and China. As the dependency relationship is seen to entitle the Junior partner to rely on the Senior's generosity and indulgence, both the Japanese and Chinese have manipulated the United States to get their own way, and then complained when criticized for doing this.

The Taoist teachings can be especially seen in Japan's strategy towards the United States. Much like in its

relationship with China, the Japanese will make a show of acquiescing to demands, be they of a military or economic nature, and then continue on more or less the same course as before. The Chinese policy of playing one Superpower off the other also incorporated some Taoist notions of fighting without fighting and using another's strength to one's own advantage.

However, when the relationships break down, as was the case with both the Sino-Soviet and Soviet-Japanese associations, then much colder, *Realpolitik* considerations can be seen to be dominant. Hence the Japanese stand on the Northern Territories issue and the vehemence of the Chinese anti-Soviet line in the 1960s and 1970s. This finding of intransigence and hostility is consistent with the earlier discussion of the Sino-Japanese relationship during the early part of the Twentieth century, when the basis for the informal relationship had disintegrated.

It is true that the *Sempai-Kohai* framework primarily deals with the informal aspects of a relationship. However, as this thesis has shown, there has to be a basis for establishing and maintaining that type of informal association. For without that basis, all one is left with is formal animosity and *Luan*.

CHAPTER V---SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This final chapter of the thesis will serve to review and tie together the various concepts that have been discussed throughout the paper. One of the most important of these is the role of informality in Chinese and Japanese relationships. This tends to make the Sino-Japanese relationship rather volatile and difficult to understand using traditional international relations theories. As a result, this thesis has utilized an approach, the *Sempai-Kohai* framework, which is designed to provide some explanation of Japan and China's international relations behaviour. This chapter will briefly review this approach and discuss some of its implications. Additionally, the potential for the wider applicability of the *Sempai-Kohai* framework in Asia will also be discussed.

In the final section of the thesis, some speculations regarding the future of the Sino-Japanese relationship will be made. This will partially rely upon a review of the current literature as well as an application of the concepts discussed in this paper to the emerging world order as it affects both Japan and China.

Informality and the Sempai-Kohai Theoretical Framework

The Role of Informality in Sino-Japanese Relations

In the previous chapters of this thesis, informality has been shown to be of extreme importance in explaining Sino-Japanese relations. There are several explanations that account for this phenomenon. The first is the historical pattern of relations between the various nations of East Asia. Unlike Europe, which was in a constant state of turmoil with various states attempting to gain strategic advantages over their rivals, the East Asian arena was characterised by loose bilateral ties radiating out from China. These ties took the form of tributary relationships which maintained the stability of the system. Due to this relatively simple pattern of association, there was generally no need to maintain alliances against other powers or form complex, formal, trading relationships in this system. This is in marked contrast to Europe, which lacked a central "organizing" power and therefore had to compensate by creating a formal framework by which interactions could be governed.

The second explanation deals with the nature of power and how it is organized within society. In contrast to the Western powers, Japan and China both suffer from a lack of a single, impersonal, responsible body to govern the nation. In the case of China, the paramount ruler, be it an Emperor or Communist

ruler, exercises tremendous power but it is charismatic in form. As a result, it is difficult to transfer power from one ruler to the next, with the result being a series of succession struggles following the death of a leader¹.

The problem in Japan is related but has different consequences. There is no single charismatic leader in Japan, quite the contrary in fact. Japan suffers from an apparent power vacuum at the pinnacle of society. There is no one single individual or organization that can, or will, assume final responsibility in Japan. As a result, the country is ruled by a series of conflicting bureaucracies and organizations which can often result in governmental paralysis.

Related to this last point is an additional complication common to both Japan and China. This is the fact that formal and informal power do not always coincide with each other in the two societies. In China this can be seen from the importance of the *Guanxi* ties which are the basis of real power in government. As a result, those with strong *Guanxi* relationships wield power without necessarily holding any formal positions in government. Additionally, those holding formal positions but lacking informal power are often extremely vulnerable and their positions of power rather tenuous.

Japan's system of overlapping bureaucracies and "headless" government means that power is diffused throughout

the various organizations and not concentrated in formal centres such as the Cabinet or the Diet. This entrenched irresponsibility means that government by consensus, between business, the bureaucracies, the Diet and other groups, is the only way things can get done. As a result of this system, one cannot overtly affect the consensus by merely applying formal pressure to one element of society. Rather, there has to be a more generalized approach which will affect the other power-holders in the society.

Due to these systems in China and Japan, the two governments are aware of the need to utilize informal methods in their dealings with one another. However, as was demonstrated in Chapter Four, this approach can often lead to misunderstandings when dealing with other nations that are used to more formal methods of conducting a relationship. These difficulties can only be overcome if both sides understand each other and the type of relationship they are involved in. This second point is important as often the international associations of Japan and China result in some form of dependency relationship. It should be noted that dependency is here used in the East Asian sense of the term and not the more traditional, exploitative connotation common in the West. East Asian dependency rests on the assumption that the Senior partner will be indulgent and generous towards the Junior. As a result of this, the Junior partner is often able to manipulate the Senior and get their own way. However,

this type of hierarchical relationship also comes with the expectation that the Junior will respect the Senior and grant them deference. In the Sino-Japanese relationship, Japan can be seen to be giving the appearance of acquiescence to China, which is constantly making overt demands. However, the fact that Japan is playing the role of the Junior to China's Senior, despite the latter's inferior economic power, indicates a mechanism at work that runs quite contrary to traditional Western expectations of hierarchy. In an effort to come to terms with this apparent ambiguity, this thesis has utilized an approach to explain the informal behaviour of China and Japan in their international dealings. The workings of this approach, the *Sempai-Kohai* theoretical framework, will now be briefly reexamined and commented upon.

Review of the Sempai-Kohai Framework

The *Sempai-Kohai* framework is based upon the philosophical teachings of Taoism and Confucianism which are common to both China and Japan. There are four primary elements which have been identified as being central to the understanding of Chinese and Japanese behaviour. First, it is important to know one's place in society, be it a local village or the community of nations, and in one's relations. Tied into this concept, it is important to therefore act correctly and loyally to one's Seniors and Juniors in order to

ensure harmony and an absence of *Luan*. A second component of this theory, which directly pertains to the idea of acting correctly towards others, is the importance of adhering to "proper practices" when dealing with other nations, especially when in a hierarchical framework. This can be seen as corresponding to the Confucian idea of Ritual, which can function to facilitate relations between individuals or groups. Without this formula of correct behaviour, relationships can become strained and may even be dissolved. Correct behaviour can have several meanings in the Confucian sense. It implies that one act in a fashion that is appropriate to one's station in life. In other words, if one is in an overtly Junior role in a hierarchical relationship, proper behaviour implies that one will pay deference, or at least make the appearance of doing so, to one's Seniors. A Senior, on the other hand, will be expected to be indulgent and generous towards the Junior partner in the relationship. Additionally, while a Senior may legitimately expect some measure of acquiescence from subordinates, this should not be extracted by overt coercion or bullying. The former Soviet Union and prewar Japan were both guilty of improper behaviour and both paid the price, by way of soured relationships and even outright conflict, as a result.

A third element of the theory is the importance placed upon "morality" in international affairs. Ideally, a Senior should lead not by virtue of raw power but rather by "moral

example". This can cover a multitude of possibilities, depending upon the circumstances of the relationship. An example that was provided in Chapter Four involved the ideological leadership of the Soviet Union under Stalin. This could be seen as the moral centre of the Chinese leadership. When this centre came under attack from Khrushchev, the USSR was seen to lose its mandate to lead and the Sino-Soviet split emerged. Another example of this is the fact that Japan essentially forfeited its potential leadership role in Asia due to its "immoral" wartime and imperial actions.

The final component of the *Sempai-Kohai* approach is essentially an application of the Taoist notion of action through inaction. Related to this is the idea of strength through weakness. Postwar Japan is perhaps one of the best examples of the application of these two concepts. Despite its enormous economic strength, it retains a low posture and merely reacts to the demands of other powers. While it is true that there are certain structural limitations in Japan that inhibit independent action, nevertheless the *Wu-Wei* strategy has allowed Japan to emerge as one of the world's great powers.

Although it cannot be said that China has kept a particularly low posture, it has adopted certain Taoist elements in its dealings with the Superpowers. By generally balancing the Soviet Union and the United States off against one another, China was eventually able to achieve a modicum of

security. One interesting aspect that does emerge in China, however, is the strong contradiction between the Taoist ideal of Strength through Weakness and the Confucian inspired notion of a natural hierarchy. Lucian Pye identified this contradiction in his work The Mandarin and the Cadre and he sees it as a dominant theme running throughout the whole of Chinese society². This may partially account for the turmoil which is often seen in Chinese politics. This contradiction is somewhat less pronounced in Japan, with the result that politics in that nation tend to be considerably more stable. As will be seen in the final section, this is an extremely important fact to consider when contemplating the future of the Sino-Japanese relationship.

Prospects for Wider Applicability

This thesis has been focused upon the bilateral relationship that has existed between China and Japan, and their interactions, again on a bilateral basis, with the Superpowers. The *Sempai-Kohai* framework has shown itself to be reasonably well suited to explaining certain aspects of Chinese and Japanese behaviour in these circumstances. However, it is fair to ask whether this approach might have wider applicability in Asia, and the world, and possibly form the basis for understanding an East Asian multi-lateral arrangement. This section will briefly touch upon this subject

and show some possible directions for future research.

The *Sempai-Kohai* framework, which explains aspects of the informal behaviour of Japan and China, is in some ways limited in its utility by the fact that it is derived from Chinese philosophy. Although Confucian and Taoist teachings can be of immense value to all cultures, they are nonetheless specific to the Sinitic-influenced societies of East Asia. As a result, it is quite probable that the *Sempai-Kohai* approach would hold only a limited degree of applicability outside of East Asia. Evidence of this can be seen from the constant misunderstandings and tensions that have plagued American and Soviet relations with China and Japan. However, within East Asia itself, it is quite probable that the *Sempai-Kohai* framework would be fairly appropriate for explaining certain behaviours. One problem obviously becomes defining what is meant by East Asia. To simply say all states bordering China would be inaccurate, for Russia is essentially a European flank power and it is apparent that India developed a philosophical system quite apart from the teachings of Confucianism and Taoism¹. However, nations that have been strongly affected by Chinese culture, such as Korea, Vietnam, Taiwan and Singapore, as well as those in its traditional tributary circle, such as Mongolia, Burma (Myanmar) and parts of South-East Asia, may all respond in a manner that could be at least partially described by the *Sempai-Kohai* framework. Although investigation into the behaviour of Korea and Vietnam, to say

nothing of the other nations mentioned above, would go far beyond the scope of this particular thesis, it may present an interesting route for future investigation.

Beyond simply analyzing the political behaviour of the other Asian nations, another fascinating topic would be the utility of the *Sempai-Kohai* approach in describing the framework of a potential multi-lateral system in East Asia. As will be recalled, East Asia has never had any international system comparable to the European structures. Although there are a variety of historical reasons for this, including the traditional dominance of China, there may also be a cultural consideration. Confucian teachings stress the importance of knowing one's place in society and acting accordingly. There is also a strong tendency to form asymmetrical dependency relationship in East Asian societies. Related to these two points, there appears to be a distinct unease evident when one is confronted by peers who are equal in the hierarchical framework of society⁴. As a result, it is quite likely that a situation of relatively equal multi-lateralism, as it exists in the European Union, would simply not be appropriate for East Asia at present⁵.

As a result of this situation, East Asian multi-lateralism could conceivably take the form of interlinking bilateral ties, with one strong central power acting as the general leader. Not surprisingly, this system would probably quite strongly resemble the old Chinese tributary system in so

far as China would likely be the political and moral centre, with Japan likely taking a secondary role while remaining the dominant economic power. Evidence of the embryonic emergence of this type of arrangement was seen in mid-1994 with the Japanese and South Korean leaders journeying to Beijing in order to obtain Chinese help with regard to the problem of North Korea⁶. While the emergence of this type of organization is by no means certain, it would generally fit within the parameters set by the *Sempai-Kohai* approach. Additionally, given the past history of the area, if there is no organizing framework, it is quite conceivable that the entire region could become enmeshed in a series of power struggles and eventually descend into *Luan*.

The Future of Sino-Japanese Relations

Whatever the possibilities for East Asia, one certainty is that the Sino-Japanese relationship will play a pivotal role in the affairs of the region, and increasingly those of the world. This thesis has described in considerable detail the history and general mechanics of this relationship, and has provided a theoretical framework to help explain Chinese and Japanese behaviour therein. It is therefore reasonable to ask whether any general trends for the future of this association can be discerned using this information. Given the informal nature of the relationship, it is necessary to

consider the prospects for stability in China and Japan, as well as their important neighbours and allies. The reason for this is that severe domestic instability in Japan and China was shown, in Chapter Two, to be a strong contributing factor to the breakdown of relations during the late 1920s and into the 1930s. Therefore, if one can discern the general trends in these two nations it should be possible to draw some tentative conclusions regarding the Sino-Japanese relationship itself.

Problems With Predictions

Before examining the prospects for the Japanese and Chinese domestic situations, it is first necessary to insert a small caveat regarding the perils of predictions. Much of the literature regarding the foreign policies of China and Japan is obsolete due to the fact that the international political situation has changed so drastically and unpredictably in the past five years. Few scholars in the mid-1980s would have taken seriously the notion that the Berlin Wall would fall in 1989 or that the Soviet Union would follow suit just two years later.

The dust is still settling following the international turmoil of the past few years and there can be little doubt that there are many surprises left to come. Therefore, examining the political situation of any country, and

especially one with as volatile a recent history as China's, is fraught with risk. However, by utilizing a combination of current literature and extrapolating general trends that have appeared fairly stable, it should be possible to get some sort of idea of the road ahead.

China's Inherent Instability and Potential

As just noted, one of the most difficult countries to make accurate predictions for is China. Since the initial forcible opening of the country by the British in the nineteenth century, the nation has kept many guessing by its apparently unpredictable behaviour. The following rather lengthy quotation from Lucian Pye aptly illustrates this point;

China's remoteness and isolation and variety of political forms complicate the study of China. But even more troublesome is the extraordinary record of China's propensity to let down all who have sought to 'understand' and champion it. The earliest Western defenders of Confucian and Taoist wisdom were not only ignored by the Chinese but abandoned by them when China turned away from the imperial tradition and sought to become a republic. Those who were quickest to see democratic potentialities in China were soon let down by events. Westerners emotionally attached to the idea of virtuous and decent China being violated by vicious Japan found that the Chinese leaders they had admired were not living up to their ideals. When the Communists came to power, their advocates suggested that they would be more pragmatic and less ideological than most Communists, but soon the advocates were shown to lack understanding of Mao's communism. When the Chinese seemed to move toward organizational efficiency, they attracted a new group claiming to understand them, who spoke

unfavourably of the rest of the developing world on the grounds that Peking had a greater sense of economic priorities, technical competence, and no-nonsense discipline. These apologists of China were soon made to seem completely out of touch with the real China when the Maoist vision of revolutionary commitment replaced the Chinese 'model' of development. Then radicals throughout the world began to wonder whether Mao's China had turned its back on them and the cause of revolution when Peking received President Richard Nixon and his special assistant, Henry Kissinger...The problem, of course, has always been that friends as well as critics have persisted in making China an abstraction and treating it as a symbol of good or evil.'

To this list one could also add the dramatic shift to market reforms, the resultant phenomenal economic growth rates and the vicious crackdown in 1989 undertaken in the glare of the world's media.

Given all of this to-ing and fro-ing, what can one say about China's future prospects. On the surface, it would appear that China is headed for Superpower status. The economic figures currently show China maintaining the world's highest growth rates'. It is also modernizing its armed forces and asserting itself politically in regional and world affairs'. However, there are also a number of serious issues facing the country that all have the potential for creating unrest and instability.

First and foremost is the issue of leadership. Deng Xiaoping is an old and, according to reports, ill man. There does not appear to be any successor waiting in the wings to take over the party leadership. As the experience of Hua Guo-feng should illustrate, an "appointed" successor may not

necessarily be an able leader. Professor Scalapino, amongst others, sees the possibility for collective leadership following Deng's demise¹⁰. However, any weakness in the leadership structure, or a serious power struggle, could further undermine the Communist party's already shaky credibility.

A second problem involves the economic situation itself in China. Although the economy is growing by leaps and bounds, it is doing so in an uneven fashion, creating increasing disparities between the prosperous coastal regions and the interior¹¹. This disparity is creating an army of migrant workers within the country whose presence could lead to increasing social unrest¹². Finally, the overheated economy is resulting in high levels of inflation, creating economic problems which could potentially translate into political unrest¹³. It is worth remembering that many of the serious protests of the last decade or so, including those in 1985, 1986 and 1989 were at least partially triggered due to economic pressures¹⁴. As of the initial writing of this chapter, the fifth anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen massacre had just passed peacefully. However, the heightened security presence and the unease of the government indicate that a remembrance protest could get caught up with an economic protest, creating a very unpleasant situation.

A final factor to consider is the upcoming absorption of Hong Kong in 1997 and the continuing problem of Taiwan. Were

a hardline government to crack down on the colony, it would likely have economic and political repercussions throughout the country¹⁵. However, if Hong Kong is allowed to maintain its current freedoms, and democracy is introduced by the British before the 1997 handover, this too could be a source of political unrest in China¹⁶. The fact that the Beijing government has begun to re-emphasize Shanghai's development, possibly in an effort to reduce the country's dependence on Hong Kong¹⁷, could be an ominous sign for the colony. How the coastal provinces would react to a weak, but belligerent, central government could thus become a question of extreme importance.

The Taiwan issue could also prove to be quite troubling to China. Although steps have been taken towards a rapprochement between the two old enemies¹⁸, the tensions still exist. One particularly ominous sign is the growing movement in Taiwan that wishes to declare the territory totally independent state and not a "lost" province of China. Beijing has stated that it will not permit this, and would consider armed intervention to prevent such an occurrence¹⁹.

This litany of doom is not meant to imply that China is destined to collapse and repeat the experience of the 1920s. However, it is important to show the tensions underlying the impressive statistics of Chinese growth. Some, such as Scalapino, feel that China is probably going to go the route of non-Communist authoritarianism in the long run²⁰. This

would ensure continued growth and allow China to emerge as an area of relative stability. Given the current emphasis on growth, which requires stability, one can be guardedly optimistic. However, one always has to bear in mind that China's tremendous potential is always matched by its potential for *Luan*.

Japan's Quiet Strength

Given the end of the cold war, there has been considerable speculation concerning Japan's new role in emerging world order. While some have speculated that Japan may attempt to revive its military and embark on a renewed course of adventurism²¹, many others feel that Japan will, at least in the short run, retain a generally low political posture, relative to its economic might, and concentrate on world issues via its economic prosperity²². Although the Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) hold on power has been recently shattered, giving way to a series of shifting and rather unstable coalitions²³, this does not seem to have adversely affected Japan's stability. Similarly, Japan's recent economic downturn, while quite severe, does not appear to have fundamentally altered the nation's way of doing business²⁴.

The Gulf War crisis of 1991 demonstrated the constraints on Japanese foreign policy and its inability to effectively

lead on political issues. However, these constraints also allow it to maintain its dependence upon the United States which not only guarantees its security but also a measure of stability. There is some concern that were the U.S.-Japanese alliance to be severed it could lead to more belligerent Japanese policies. This fear is supported by the fact that Japanese aggression in the 1920s began shortly after the severance of the Anglo-Japanese treaty, which left the country feeling isolated and vulnerable²⁵. Japan's small steps towards a greater world role, including its relatively recent dispatch of Peace Keepers to Cambodia²⁶, do not signal a new militarism in Japan. Rather, it is the healthy sign of the country finally coming to terms with its role in the world.

The potential danger from Japan, therefore, is likely not that it will once again become a ravaging imperialistic monster. Rather, it may become a blundering headless giant that could inadvertently destabilize the region. As will be recalled from Chapter Two, Japan's wartime aggression was not so much government policy as independent military initiatives. Although Japan's military was contained following the war, the inherent weaknesses in the governmental structures remain. During the early part of the century, this resulted in the military being able to achieve dominance over the rest of society. Japan's current internal balance could also be disrupted under the right conditions. These might include either a serious threat to Japanese security or the country

being thrust into a leadership role for which it was not ready. While neither situation might result in outright militarism, it can be fairly certain that profound instability in Japan would eventually spill over into the rest of the region. For the immediate future, however, Japan appears stable and ready to continue to play a quietly strong and supportive role in the East Asian region and the world.

Korea and America

One of the few areas that can truly affect Japan's security is the Korean peninsula, and specifically North Korea. The current nuclear game that this country is playing threatens the stability of the entire region²⁷. North Korean missiles can potentially reach Japan, and it appears that the regime is not above issuing threats towards that country. China would also be adversely affected by a general conflict on its Korean flank. With the litany of problems discussed above, a regional war, which would also likely involve the Americans and possibly the Japanese, could only create further problems for Beijing.

Historically, Korea has always been a point of contact and contention between Japan and China. The conflicts over the peninsula have traditionally had profound effects on both nations. In 1594, Hideyoshi's attempts to conquer Korea signalled both Japan's emergence as an important military

power and contributed to the weakening of China's Ming dynasty. The Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95 saw Japan emerge as the pre-eminent Asian power and was one of the events that finally destroyed Imperial China. It is not inconceivable that 1994-95 may witness another fundamental shift in the relationship²⁸, possibly further destabilizing Communist China and forcing Japan to assume a more assertive, even nuclear, military posture. Alternately, a crisis in Korea may see China rise to the occasion and greatly enhance its political posture, while Japan stays warily uninvolved.

An additional factor to consider is the possibility of Korean reunification, whether through war or peaceful means. South Korea has, in recent decades, become a significant economic power in its own right. Were it to peacefully absorb the North's population and resources, along the German model, the country could eventually emerge as a major power in Asia and a challenger to Japan. Given the historical animosity that exists between the two nations, this would probably not be a particularly welcome development from Japan's perspective²⁹. Needless to say, a strong and independent Korea would also affect Sino-Japanese interactions simply by its very presence and strength in the region³⁰.

Another important player in the Asian balance is the United States. The associations America currently maintains with both Japan and China were discussed in some detail in Chapter Four. Although relations are generally amicable,

tensions have emerged in both cases which could eventually undermine America's position in Asia. Additionally, the current mood in America seems to indicate a growing reluctance to commit personnel and resources overseas. Despite the economic problems currently besetting the United States, and the loss of an obvious adversary and international purpose, America's role in Asia remains important. Some scholars have likened the United States' position in the Asia-Pacific region to that of Great Britain in 18th and 19th century Europe, in so far as it is able to act as a relatively neutral balancer between the other powers³¹. This arrangement provides Asia with some degree of stability in the short to medium term and may allow for a security system to be put in place for the longer term.

Were the United States to suddenly withdraw from the region, which has been threatened ever since the 1970s, Asia could suddenly find itself very destabilized. One of the most important problems would be an independent Japan, which would be regarded with suspicion and thus worry the entire region. Additionally, Chinese power, which is currently regarded with some suspicion in Southeast Asia³², could also be seen as a threat if it were not checked by the United States. Thus, while the era of Pax Americana may be coming to an end, the United States still retains an important position in the Asia-Pacific region, and thus has a direct bearing on the course of Sino-Japanese relations.

China and Japan into the Twenty-First Century

The Sino-Japanese relationship stands as something of an enigma in the international arena. These two distinct societies have interacted with each other for over two thousand years, and yet it was only a little more than a century ago that they formalized their relations, and only two decades since they were fully normalized. Therefore it is evident that the informal aspects of the relationship have much deeper roots than do the formal elements. This informality has thus lent the Sino-Japanese relationship a striking degree of volatility which makes predictions rather difficult. Hidenori Ijiri sees the current pattern of Japan's subservience and China's arrogance as evidence of an unhealthy interaction which will be forced to change³³. On the other hand the former Singaporean Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, writing a speculative article for The Economist, sees the following scenario for the early Twenty-first century;

The relationship between China and Japan has been crucial for stability and growth. Reassured by the US-Japan security alliance, Japan cautiously expanded trade and investments with China. Under continuous pressure from APEC members, by 2007 Japan finally eliminated all barriers to imports. By then, a generation of Japanese leaders born after the second world war and not burdened with war guilt settled all "blood debts" with Chinese, Korean and ASEAN peoples. Japan gained in moral strength to play a role commensurate with her economic and technological prowess. However, as in the hierarchy of sumo wrestlers, Japan accepts China's precedence as the older civilization with the greater mass.³⁴

Leading towards this situation, he sees the current political situation in the 1990s remaining relatively constant;

Tensions between China and Japan are likely from time to time. War is unlikely because the consequences would be horrendous. Moreover, America must intervene to prevent one from taking over the other and becoming too powerful...America can remain the dominant player in the Pacific: China and Korea will not accept Japanese leadership; co-leadership by China and Japan is not likely. The most probable outcome is that China will have considerable political influence; but that Japan, in tandem with America, will have even greater political and economic influence.³⁵

A different take on the future emerges from another Economist piece which foresees Japan yielding to an extremely powerful, and assertive, China, which then proceeds to expand, in conjunction with the Islamic world, throughout much of Asiatic Russia and right up to the borders of Europe.

From then on Japan was to China what Switzerland had been to its big European neighbours: a rich, efficient provider of specialized financial and business products. Independent in its domestic affairs, but small and unassertive enough (Japan's population was now less than a tenth of China's and aging fast) to be any kind of rival on the international scene³⁶.

Other writers see Japan playing the dominant role in Asia for some time to come, and potentially overshadowing China on the global level as well³⁷.

The conclusions that this thesis has reached would tend to support Mr. Lee's view of the future, with a qualification. Assuming that Japan and China remain internally stable, then a continuation of the present state of affairs makes sense. Japan will be best able to utilize its phenomenal economic

strength in a discrete fashion, making a show of yielding to Chinese "moral" leadership. As Mr. Lee mentioned, China and Korea will likely not accept overt Japanese control in either the political or economic spheres. However, Japan's bureaucratic system has shown itself to be adept at the Taoist strategy of *Wu-Wei*, and this would be difficult to achieve were Japan thrust into the political spotlight. By maintaining the show of deference towards China, Japan is able to keep this somewhat prickly country friendly and cooperative. China, for its part, is focused on internal economic reform and thus requires the assistance of Japan. Reconciling traditional Chinese attitudes, which frequently appear arrogant, with its current dependence means that China will appear domineering. However, it also places great importance on the association with Japan. China would therefore be unwilling to fundamentally disrupt relations.

If China does succeed in fully reforming its economy and maintaining the current high growth rates, it could then eventually assume a truly dominant position in Asia and possibly the world. In such a situation, there are elements in Japan that might be tempted to assert the nation's strength and avoid being marginalized. A much more likely scenario, given the logic of the *Sempai-Kohai* approach, would be for Japan to accept its Junior status and utilize its formidable power, and the indulgence of China, to its maximum advantage. The country has followed this pattern before, with the

Americans in the latter half of this century and with the Chinese prior to the Nineteenth century. It is also significant that China never launched a truly aggressive war against Japan, excluding the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century, despite its historically greater power. Modern Japan's power is such that it would likely never have to fear Chinese military aggression in the future. China has demonstrated that it generally has no interest in fighting with its neighbours, so long as correct and proper relations are maintained. Japan has shown itself to be quite adept at observing the correct form, if not always the intent, of such relations.

This generally optimistic scenario rests on one basic assumption, namely that Japan and China remain domestically stable. The *Sempai-Kohai* approach has been useful in explaining elements of the Sino-Japanese relationship even when no formal treaties exist between the two countries. This was the case in the postwar period before 1972 and throughout much the relationship prior to the coming of the Europeans. However, when the domestic, informal, power structures break down, then the informal aspects of the relationship virtually disappear and all one is left with is *Luan*. Hideyoshi's attempt to invade China and the Mongol's attack on Japan were both instances of internal disorder turning outwards in an aggressive fashion. However, in both of these instances, only one of the nations was affected, and the other was thus able

to defend itself. During the 1930s, both China and Japan, in different ways, were suffering internal dislocation due to the recent upheavals that had occurred in their societies. The result was a protracted war that left both nations, and much of the rest of Asia, in ruins. The potential for domestic instability in Japan and China was discussed above. Thus, although one can be guardedly optimistic regarding the future of Sino-Japanese relations, one cannot totally discount the potential for Luan in this ancient association.

Alexis de Tocqueville, writing in the mid-nineteenth century, said that he foresaw the United States and the Russia as each being "marked out by the will of Heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe"³⁸. Although his prediction proved to be extremely insightful, he ignored the sleeping dragons of Asia. Napoleon had advised that it was best to leave China to sleep, "for when China wakes, it will shake the world"³⁹. During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Japan's emergence shook the world and changed the balance of global power. China's potential emergence as a true Superpower promises to be even more profound⁴⁰. In order to deal with these nations, the West must understand them, on their own terms. There is no better way to do this than by understanding the Sino-Japanese relationship. The nations of East Asia have had over a century to learn about the West, and they have thrived as a result. Not utilizing the chance to

comprehend East Asia will simply lead to tensions and a loss of a historic opportunity for global understanding and prosperity. The experience of the Soviet Union is instructive in this case. If the informal rules are not understood or followed, then all that can result is mutual suspicion and hostility. Given East Asia's growing prominence, the world thus faces a choice between understanding and global prosperity or deliberate ignorance and entrenched *Luan*.

NOTES TO CHAPTER I

¹Note that throughout this paper, unless otherwise stated, China will refer to the mainland, which since 1949 should more properly be referred to as the People's Republic of China (PRC). If and when mention is made to the Republic of China (post 1949) it shall be referred to simply as Taiwan.

²Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987), pp. 3-9 & pp. 16-30. Also see Jim Rohwer, "When China Wakes: A Survey of China," in The Economist (November 28, 1992), p. 3.

³John W. Garver, Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1993), pp. 32-112.

⁴Paul H. B. Godwin, "China's Asian Policy in the 1990s: Adjusting to the Post-Cold War Environment," in Sheldon W. Simon, East Asian Security in the Post-Cold War Era (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1993), pp. 118-143.

⁵Garver, pp. 231-237.

⁶William H. Overholt, The Rise of China: How Economic Reform is Creating a New Superpower (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1993), pp. 26-32.

⁷The one exception to this may be Korea. However given the complicated cold-war politics that divided the country, the earlier subjugation that it had been under, indirectly to China and directly to Japan, and the fact that it will probably not enjoy the same sort of status on the world stage that either Japan and China can reasonably expect, it has been generally put aside for the purposes of this paper.

⁸Specifically, Japan and China were at war during 1894-95 and 1937-45, although throughout the 1930s there were a variety of incidents that brought the two countries to the brink of open conflict. See chapter two for a more detailed account.

⁹Peter, M. Blau, On the Nature of Organizations (New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1974), pp. 18-35. These ideas will be more fully and explicitly examined in the opening section of Chapter III.

¹⁰Lucian W. Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press, 1985), pp. 26-29.

¹¹See examples of this in Ronald Dore, British Factory-Japanese Factory: The Origins of National Diversity in Industrial Relations (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1973) and Andrew G. Walder, Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1986).

¹²Page references from Robert N. Bellah, Tokugawa Religion: The Values of Pre-industrial Japan (New York: The Free Press, 1957), pp. 79-82 & pp. 92-98, and Richard H. Solomon, Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 28-38.

¹³Pye, pp. 341-344.

¹⁴Solomon, pp. 99-104 & pp. 126-134.

¹⁵Solomon, pp. 99-104.

¹⁶Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1987), pp. 6-7.

¹⁷Viotti, pp. 7-9.

¹⁸Viotti, pp. 9-10.

¹⁹See Arthur Waley, The Analects of Confucius (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1964).

²⁰This refers to the apparent subservience of postwar Japan to China, despite the former's superior economic power. This will be discussed in detail in Chapter Two.

²¹Max Kaltenmark, Lao Tzu and Taoism, Translated by Roger Greaves, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1969), pp. 32-37.

²²This strategy of Japan's has been likened to Aikido, which is a martial arts form that utilizes the opponent's energy in such a way that they can be easily controlled. "A Way to Stop the Spear," in The Economist (May 15, 1993), p. 114.

NOTES TO CHAPTER II

¹George B. Sansom, Japan: A Short Cultural History, Revised Edition, (London: The Cresset Press, 1952), pp. 3-15.

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²Conrad Schirokauer, A Brief History of Chinese and Japanese Civilizations (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1978), p. 100.

³Sansom, pp. 15-16.

⁴Sansom, pp. 18-20.

⁵Sansom, p. 33.

⁶Schirokauer, pp. 140-141 & Sansom, pp. 64-65.

⁷Schirokauer, p. 78.

⁸Sansom, pp. 35-36.

⁹Sansom, pp. 65-69.

¹⁰Sansom, p. 70.

¹¹Sansom, pp. 69-73.

¹²Sansom, p. 87.

¹³Sansom, p. 84.

¹⁴Sansom, pp. 91-92.

¹⁵Sansom, pp. 95-97.

¹⁶Sansom, pp. 103-107.

¹⁷Sansom, pp. 210-211.

¹⁸Sansom, pp. 108-112.

¹⁹Schirokauer, pp. 257-258.

²⁰Sansom, pp. 311-312.

²¹Schirokauer, p. 216.

²²Sansom, pp. 313-322.

²³Schirokauer, p. 264.

²⁴Sansom, p. 319.

²⁵Schirokauer, p. 265.

²⁶Schirokauer, p. 221.

²⁷Sansom, p. 356.

²⁸Sansom, pp. 356-357.

²⁹Sansom, pp. 404-406. Check also Sansom, *Japanese History 1333-1615*.

³⁰Schirokauer, p. 253.

³¹George B. Sansom, *A History of Japan, 1615-1867* (Stanford, California: Stanford University press, 1963), pp. 36-45.

³²Jack Gray, *Rebellions and Revolutions: China from the 1800s to the 1980s* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 24.

³³Marius B. Jansen, *Japan and China: From War to Peace, 1894-1972* (Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing Company, 1975), p. 17.

³⁴Gray, pp. 48-51.

³⁵Marius B. Jansen, *Japan and China: From War to Peace, 1894-1972* (Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing Company, 1975), pp. 17-18 and Peter Duus, "Japan's Informal Empire in China, 1895-1937: An Overview," in Peter Duus, et al., eds., *The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895-1937* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1929), p. xx.

³⁶Jansen, pp. 17-18.

³⁷Jansen, p. 18.

³⁸Jansen, pp. 20-24.

³⁹Jansen, p. 25.

⁴⁰Jansen, p. 72.

⁴¹Allen S. Whiting, *China Eyes Japan* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1989), pp. 29-30.

⁴²Gray, pp. 136-139 & Jansen, pp. 40-44.

⁴³Gray, p. 138.

⁴⁴Ian Nish, "An Overview of Relations Between China and Japan, 1895-1945," in *The China Quarterly* (London: School of Oriental and African Studies, December 1990), p. 602.

⁴⁵Duus, p. xxiii.

⁴⁶Jansen, p. 44.

⁴⁷Jansen, pp. 77-81.

⁴⁸Japanese costs during this war amounted to two billion yen and 230,000 lives lost. Nish, p. 604.

⁴⁹Jansen, p. 127.

⁵⁰Jansen, p. 84.

⁵¹Gray, pp. 139-146.

⁵²Jansen, pp. 206-207.

⁵³Jansen, pp. 207-208 & Nish, pp. 606-607.

⁵⁴Jansen, pp. 213-214.

⁵⁵The documents were finally signed on May 25, 1915, but other than what was provided in Manchuria, where the leasehold was extended to 99 years, little was accomplished. The Japanese gave up claims in Shantung at the 1921-22 Washington conference and China was in little position to effectively deal with the other claims during much of the 1920s and 30s. Whiting, p. 33, Jansen pp. 215-218 & Nish, pp. 607-608.

⁵⁶Nish, pp. 609-610.

⁵⁷Sophia Lee, "The Foreign Ministry's Cultural Agenda for China: The Boxer Indemnity," in Peter Duus, et al., eds., The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895-1937 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 276-277.

⁵⁸Like the other powers, Japan eventually funnelled much of its share of the Boxer Indemnity back to China for use in a variety of cultural exchanges. Lee, pp. 278-279.

⁵⁹Lee, pp. 279-300.

⁶⁰Mizoguchi Toshiyuki, "The Changing Pattern of Sino-Japanese Trade, 1884-1937," in Peter Duus, et al., eds., The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895-1937 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 30.

⁶¹"Trade and Investment," in Peter Duus, et al., eds., The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895-1937 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 4.

⁶²Sadako, N. Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria: The Making of Japanese Foreign Policy, 1931-1932 (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1964), pp. 37-137.

⁶³Alvin D. Coox, "The Kwantung Army Dimension," in Peter Duus, et al., eds., The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895-1937 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 404-407.

⁶⁴Parks M. Coble, Facing Japan: Chinese Politics and Japanese Imperialism, 1931-1937 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1991), pp. 22-26.

⁶⁵Coble, p. 11 & Whiting, pp. 35-36 & Nish pp. 615-616. For details on Manchukuo, see Nakagane Katsuji, "Manchukuo and Economic Development," in Peter Duus, et al., eds., The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895-1937 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 133-157, as well as Edward Behr, The Last Emperor (Toronto: Futura, 1987).

⁶⁶Whiting, p. 35.

⁶⁷Coble, pp. 19-21.

⁶⁸This incident occurred as a result of Japanese troops responding to anti-Japanese activities (following the seizure of Manchuria). In this case, they met with a fair degree of resistance and the battle lasted nearly two months. Coble, pp. 39-50.

⁶⁹Coble, pp. 93-95.

⁷⁰Coble, p. 154.

⁷¹Coble, p. 154. (Originally sourced to *Gendaishi shi-ryo*, vol. 8, pp. 25-26.)

⁷²Jansen, pp. 393-396.

⁷³Whiting, p. 37.

⁷⁴Casualty figure estimates range for these countries. In terms of war dead, one source estimates 1,500,000 Japanese and 2,200,000 Chinese. Norman Polmar and Thomas B. Allen, World War II: America at War, 1941-1945 (New York: Random House, 1991), p. 193. Other figures give much higher casualty estimates, roughly 3,000,000 Japanese and 17,000,000 Chinese. Sourced from the Japanese and Chinese embassies in Ottawa.

⁷⁵Gray, pp. 284-286.

⁷⁶Chae-Jin Lee, Japan Faces China: Political and Economic Relations in the Postwar Era (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 23.

⁷⁷Lee, Japan Faces China, pp. 23-24.

⁷⁸This was due primarily to a split between the Americans and the British as the latter had recognized the PRC in early 1950. Lee, Japan Faces China, pp. 24-25.

⁷⁹F. C. Langdon, Japan's Foreign Policy (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1973), p. 94.

⁸⁰Lee, Japan Faces China, pp. 185-186.

⁸¹This "Friendship" trade stands opposed to the later, semi-official, "Memorandum" trade. This second type was begun in 1962 "as a gradual and cumulative method for normalization of economic and diplomatic relations between Japan and China". Lee, Japan Faces China, p. 143.

⁸²Lee, Japan Faces China, pp. 28-34.

⁸³Lee, Japan Faces China, p. 34.

⁸⁴Lee, Japan Faces China, pp. 37-38.

⁸⁵Lee, Japan Faces China, pp. 38-39.

⁸⁶Lee, Japan Faces China, pp. 42-46.

⁸⁷Lee, Japan Faces China, pp. 49-82.

⁸⁸Lee, Japan Faces China, pp. 34-35 & pp. 64-78.

⁸⁹Lee, Japan Faces China, pp. 98-101.

⁹⁰Lee, Japan Faces China, p. 134.

⁹¹Lee, Japan Faces China, p. 162. (Originally sourced to *Asahi Shimbun*, April 29, 1970).

⁹²Lee, Japan Faces China, pp. 162-168.

⁹³Lee, Japan Faces China, pp. 106-111 & pp. 121-125. As a result of this normalization of relations, the Japan-Taiwan treaty was abrogated, although "informal" trade relations still exist between them.

⁹⁴Lee, Japan Faces China, pp. 123-124. The anti-hegemony clause could be seen as being directed at the USSR, as this was perceived as being the major threat to peace at the time. See John W. Garver, Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1993), p. 93.

⁹⁵Hidenori Ijiri, "Sino-Japanese Controversy Since the 1972 Diplomatic Normalization," The China Quarterly (London: School of Oriental and African Studies, December 1990), p. 643.

⁹⁶Whiting, p. 93 & p. 99.

⁹⁷Whiting, pp. 95-106. This general attitude of Japanese business caution towards the China market can also be seen in Christopher Howe, "China, Japan and Economic Interdependence in the Asia Pacific Region," The China Quarterly (London: School of Oriental and African Studies, December 1990), pp. 662-693 and Yoichi Yokoi, "Plant and Technology Contacts and the Changing Pattern of Economic Interdependence Between China and Japan," The China Quarterly (London: School of Oriental and African Studies, December 1990), pp. 694-713.

⁹⁸Whiting, pp. 66-79 & Hidenori, pp. 651-654.

⁹⁹Whiting, p. 76.

¹⁰⁰Hidenori, p. 651.

¹⁰¹Whiting, pp. 46-51 & pp. 56-60. Also see Hidenori, pp. 646-648.

¹⁰²The Yasukuni Shrine, a Memorial to Japanese war dead located in Tokyo, contains the name cards of class B and C war criminals as well as 14 class A war criminals, including wartime PM Tojo Hideki. Prior to 1985, Japanese Prime Ministers attended the remembrance ceremonies as private citizens, although even these unofficial visits prompted comment in China. In 1985, the fortieth anniversary of Japan's defeat in World War II, Nakasone broke with precedent and attended the commemoration ceremony in his official capacity as Prime Minister. This is despite the fact that the Chinese foreign ministry had reportedly asked Japan to handle the matter carefully, but it was ignored. The resultant storm of protest in China was a contributing factor to the student uprising in 1985. Whiting, pp. 53-58.

¹⁰³Whiting, pp. 46-51 & pp. 56-60. Also see Hidenori, pp. 646-648.

¹⁰⁴Whiting, pp. 152-153.

¹⁰⁵Whiting, p. 153.

¹⁰⁶Whiting, pp. 149-152 & Hidenori, pp. 654-655.

¹⁰⁷Hidenori, p. 642. (Originally sourced to *Asahi Shimbun*, June 5, 1987).

¹⁰⁸Whiting, p. 134.

¹⁰⁹Whiting, pp. 158-159.

¹¹⁰Whiting, p. 149 & pp. 159-160.

¹¹¹Whiting, pp. 161-163.

¹¹²Whiting, p. 182. (Originally sourced to Zhao Ziyang, speech to joint meeting of Japanese and Chinese cabinet officials, Xinhua Domestic Service, June 27, 1987, in FBIS, June 30, 1987, D4-5).

¹¹³Hidenori, p. 656. (Originally sourced to Asahi Shimbun, June 7, 1989).

¹¹⁴Hidenori, p. 656. (Originally sourced to Asahi Shimbun, June 7, 1989).

¹¹⁵Lee, Japan Faces China, p. 122. This problem was also at the heart of the textbook and Yasukuni Shrine incidents discussed earlier.

¹¹⁶Yoichi, p. 713. (Originally sourced to Hauro Suzuki, "Hopes for Stabilized Politics and Economy in China," Nichu Keiza Kyokai Kaiho (Aug-Sept, 1989), pp. 2-5).

¹¹⁷Se Hee Yoo, "Sino-Japanese Relations in a Changing East Asia," Gerald L. Curtis, ed., Japan's Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping With Change (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1993), p. 303 & p. 320.

¹¹⁸"Rising Sun," The Economist, (June 20, 1992), p. 33.

¹¹⁹The restrictions on Japanese troops included this little titbit of tortured logic. If the cease-fire agreement between the belligerent parties, a precondition for the SDF being sent in, breaks down, the forces must be withdrawn. Also weapons may not be used except to protect the life of the individual or members of the corps. However, if a situation arose where weapons would be needed, the SDF troops would have to be immediately withdrawn. Essentially, an armed peace-keeping force was being sent in without being allowed to use its arms, except in such a case as would preclude its being withdrawn, Kiyofuku Chuma, "The Debate over Japan's Participation in Peace-Keeping Operations," Japan Review of International Affairs (Fall 1992), pp. 239-242 & p. 250.

¹²⁰Shigeto Nagano was appointed Justice Minister by Tsutomu Hata when he succeeded to the Prime Ministership in April 1994. He stated that "It is wrong to say the war was a war of aggression...We thought seriously about the liberation of colonies, to liberate a (greater East Asia) co-prosperity sphere." He also claimed that the Nanking massacre was a hoax. "Rape of Nanking denied," in The Globe and Mail (May 5, 1994), p. A14. Although Prime Minister Hata expressed regret over the statements, he did not request Mr. Nagano's resignation, until the pressure began to mount. Charles Smith, "Foot in the Mouth," in The Far Eastern Economic Review (May 19, 1994), p. 30.

¹²¹"Japan in Denial," in The Economist (May 14, 1994), p. 18.

¹²²Richard H. Solomon, Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1971), p. 78.

¹²³Solomon, p. 120.

¹²⁴Solomon, pp. 99-104 & pp. 126-134.

¹²⁵Lucian W. Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press, 1985), pp. 70-74 and pp. 292-298.

¹²⁶The basis of Hua's claim, accepted by the Party leadership, was a note that Mao had penned saying "With you in charge, I am at ease", thus designating him as successor. Immanuel Chung-yueh Hsu, China Without Mao: The Search for a New Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 30.

¹²⁷Maurice Meisner, Mao's China and After (New York: The Free Press, 1986), p. 451.

¹²⁸Deng's was first purged in 1933 from the Secretariat of the Kiangsi Soviet over policy disagreements such as land reform. Gray, pp. 266-268. The second purge was during the Cultural Revolution when Deng was denounced as the "number two capitalist roader", the number one capitalist roader being Liu Shao-ch'i. Chi Hsin, Teng Hsiao-Ping: A Political Biography (Hong Kong: Cosmos Books, 1978), pp. 44-45. The third purge followed after the death of Chou Enlai in January 1976. Soon after his death, there were demonstrations in Tiananmen Square for the purpose of honouring Chou on Ch'ing Ming, the traditional day of mourning in China. Because these demonstrations were also felt to be veiled criticisms of the Gang of Four and their clique, the disturbances in the square were suppressed by the authorities. The entire incident was blamed on Deng, who was categorized as "an unrepentant capitalist roader" and was, once again, temporarily driven off the political scene. Meisner, p. 425, and Hsu, China Without Mao, p. 4.

¹²⁹Meisner, pp. 451-453.

¹³⁰Lowell Dittmer, "Patterns of Leadership in Reform China," in Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, ed., State and Society in China: The Consequences of Reform (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press Inc., 1992), pp. 37-43.

¹³¹Gray, pp. 33-34.

¹³²Jansen, p. 7.

¹³³Gray, pp. 2-3.

¹³⁴The name of this conflict is derived from the fact that the British, in order to remedy their trade deficit with China, began importing Indian Opium to the country. The Chinese government, finding both an alarmingly high net loss of silver from their coffers and a correspondingly high level of Opium addiction among the population, took steps to restrict the importation of the drug. This led to an effort to outlaw the substance. The subsequent actions taken by the Chinese officials and the responses of the Western powers eventually resulted in the conflict. Gray, pp. 38-48, and Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York: W.W Norton & Co., 1990), pp. 121-130.

¹³⁵Gray, pp. 48-51.

¹³⁶Pye, Asian Power and Politics: the Cultural Dimensions of Authority, p. 212.

¹³⁷Gray, pp. 102-119. Also see Paul Cohen, "Ch'ing China: Confrontation with the West, 1850-1900," Modern East Asia: Essays in Interpretation, Ed. James B. Crowley (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World Inc., 1970), pp. 32-33.

¹³⁸Solomon, p. 99.

¹³⁹The Ch'ing dynasty began in the mid-17th century when a population of Jurchen tribesmen, from Manchuria, swept into China. The invaders were organized into tight military and administrative units and were able to establish the Ch'ing dynasty in 1644 out of the remnants of the decayed Ming regime when they conquered Beijing. They subsequently remained in power for the next 267 years as the 25th, and as it turned out final, monarchical dynastic line of Imperial China. Spence, pp. 3-4, and Immanuel Chung-yueh Hsu, The Rise of Modern China, Fourth Edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 25-26 and p. 440.

¹⁴⁰Gray, pp. 55-60.

¹⁴¹Gray, pp. 145-146.

¹⁴²Meisner, pp. 21-23.

¹⁴³The May Thirtieth Movement of 1925 was one of the most important triggers of this nationalism. Following a series of strikes in Shanghai, a Chinese worker was killed by a Japanese foreman. The resultant protests led to other conflicts between Chinese and foreigners, and thus caused the unrest to spread throughout China. This culminated in a clash in Canton, where British and French forces killed 50 demonstrators. As a result, there was a general boycott of British goods and a prolonged strike in Hong Kong, which also severely hurt British trade. Meisner, pp. 23-24.

¹⁴⁴Meisner, pp. 26-27.

¹⁴⁵Coble, pp. 11-12.

¹⁴⁶Coble, pp. 88-89.

¹⁴⁷Coble, pp. 30-31.

¹⁴⁸Coble, pp. 342-351.

¹⁴⁹Gray, pp. 276-277.

¹⁵⁰Edgar Snow, The Long Revolution (New York: Random House Inc., 1971), pp. 198-199.

¹⁵¹Sheldon W. Simon, "Regional Security Structures in Asia: The Question of Relevance," in Sheldon W. Simon, ed., East Asian Security in the Post-Cold War Era (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1993), pp. 14-16, Donald S. Zagoria, "The Changing U.S. Role in Asian Security in the 1990s," in Sheldon W. Simon, ed., East Asian Security in the Post-Cold War Era (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1993), pp. 45-49, & John Creighton Campbell, "Japan and the United States: Games That Work," in Gerald L. Curtis, ed., Japan's Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping With Change, (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1993), pp. 43-59.

¹⁵²Whiting, p. 123.

¹⁵³Whiting, p. 123.

¹⁵⁴Hidenori, p. 658.

¹⁵⁵Robert N. Bellah, Tokugawa Religion: The Values of Pre-Industrial Japan (New York: The Free Press, 1957), pp. 81-82.

¹⁵⁶Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority, pp. 57-58.

¹⁵⁷Bellah, pp. 13-23 and Pye, Asian Power and Politics, pp. 57-58.

¹⁵⁸Bellah, pp. 189-190.

¹⁵⁹Bellah, pp. 81-82 & pp. 90-98.

¹⁶⁰Bellah, pp. 20-21.

¹⁶¹This same concept can also be expressed as *Giri*.

¹⁶²Bellah, p. 21.

¹⁶³Douglas D. Mitchell, Amaeru: The Expression of Reciprocal Dependency Needs in Japanese Politics and Law (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press Inc., 1976), p. 3.

¹⁶⁴Mitchell, pp. 19-42.

¹⁶⁵Mitchell, p. 55. (Originally sourced to George A. DeVos, Socialization for Achievement (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1973), p. 47.)

¹⁶⁶Sansom, A History of Japan, 1615-1867, pp. 232-240.

¹⁶⁷The *Fudai* were hereditary vassals who generally held the Eastern Seaboard provinces and who had followed Ieyasu at the beginning of this period. The *Tozama*, literally "Outside Lords", held territory in the West and submitted to Ieyasu only after his regime was more or less consolidated following the fall of Osaka. Sansom, A History of Japan, 1615-1867, p. 19.

¹⁶⁸Schirokauer, p. 410.

¹⁶⁹Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975 (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1982), pp. 37-38. Also see Sansom, A History of Japan, 1615-1867, pp. 240-242.

¹⁷⁰Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), pp. 275-280.

¹⁷¹Sansom, A History of Japan, 1615-1867, pp. 54-58 and pp. 75-76. Also see Johnson, pp. 36-40.

¹⁷²Johnson, pp. 37-38.

¹⁷³Johnson, p. 22.

¹⁷⁴Karel van Wolferen, The Enigma of Japanese Power: People and Politics in a Stateless Nation (London: MacMillan London Ltd., 1989), pp. 26-49.

¹⁷⁵J. W. M. Chapman, et al, Japan's Quest for Comprehensive Security (London: Frances Pinter Ltd., 1983), pp. 24-25.

¹⁷⁶Jansen, p. 71.

¹⁷⁷Duus, "Japan's Informal Empire in China, 1895-1937: An Overview," pp. xiv-xx.

¹⁷⁸Moore, p. 440.

¹⁷⁹Moore, pp. 441-442. Moore's general thesis is that a nation must pass through what he terms a "Bourgeois Revolution" in order to reach a state of democracy. Moore, p. 413. In his words once again, "The first and earlier route through the great revolutions and civil wars led to the combination of capitalism and Western democracy. The second route has also been capitalist, but culminated during the twentieth century in fascism. Germany and Japan are the obvious examples...I shall call this the capitalist and reactionary form. It amounts to a form of revolution from above...The third route is of course communism, as exemplified in Russia and in China." Moore, pp. xv-xvi.

¹⁸⁰Duus, "Japan's Informal Empire in China, 1895-1937: An Overview", p. xx.

¹⁸¹Jansen, p. 127.

¹⁸²Jansen, pp. 21-22.

¹⁸³Ogata, pp. 22-29.

¹⁸⁴Coble, pp. 297-298.

¹⁸⁵Ogata, pp. 191-192.

¹⁸⁶Robert Z. Lawrence, "The Reluctant Giant: Will Japan Take Its Role on the World Stage?", in The Brookings Review (Summer 1991), p. 36.

¹⁸⁷David A. Titus, "Accessing the World: Palace and Foreign Policy in Post-Occupation Japan," in Gerald L. Curtis, Japan's Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping With Change (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1993), pp. 71-72.

¹⁸⁸Roy Thomas, Japan: The Blighted Blossom (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1989), p. 23.

¹⁸⁹Kent E. Calder, "Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State," in World Politics (July 1988), pp. 517-541. Also see Wolferen, pp. 340-346.

¹⁹⁰Lee, Japan Faces China, p. 122.

¹⁹¹Akira Iriye, "Chinese-Japanese Relations, 1945-90," in The China Quarterly (London: School of Oriental and African Studies, December 1990), p. 635.

¹⁹²Titus, pp. 66-67.

NOTES TO CHAPTER III

¹Peter, M. Blau, On the Nature of Organizations (New York: John

Wiley & Sons Inc., 1974), p. 18.

²Blau, pp. 19-20.

³Blau, pp. 32-33 & pp. 135-214.

⁴Karel van. Wolferen, The Enigma of Japanese Power: People and Politics in a Stateless Nation (London: MacMillan London Ltd., 1989), p. 15.

⁵Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987), p. 22.

⁶Kennedy, p. 19.

⁷Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 3-48.

⁸Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States: AD 990-1990 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Basil Blackwell, 1990), p. 15.

⁹Tilly, p. 20.

¹⁰Tilly, pp. 20-21.

¹¹Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), pp. 16-17 & pp. 108-109.

¹²George Schopflin, "The Political Traditions of Eastern Europe," in Eastern Europe...Central Europe...Europe, ed. Stephen R. Graubard, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press Inc., 1991), pp. 59-94.

¹³Schopflin, p. 61.

¹⁴Schopflin, pp. 61-62.

¹⁵Schopflin, p. 61.

¹⁶Kennedy, pp. xvi-xvii.

¹⁷Kennedy, pp. 19-21.

¹⁸During these periods, a situation not unlike that in Europe existed. Examples of this include the Warring States Period (403-221 B.C.), when military competition within "China" was at its height and, to a lesser degree, the era of Warlords during the early twentieth century. Conrad Schirokauer, A Brief History of Chinese and Japanese Civilizations (New York: Harcourt Brace

Jovanovich, Inc., 1978), pp. 30-38 & pp. 474-488.

¹⁹Roger M. Keesing, Cultural Anthropology: A Contemporary Perspective Second Edition, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston Inc., 1981), p. 68. (Portions originally sourced to W.H. Goodenough, "Comment on Cultural Evolution," in Daedalus (1961), p. 521).

²⁰Keesing, pp. 68-69. (Portions originally sourced to W.H. Goodenough, "Comment on Cultural Evolution," in Daedalus (1961), p. 522).

²¹Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1987), pp. 5-6.

²²Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1987), pp. 6-7.

²³Viotti, pp. 7-9.

²⁴Viotti, pp. 194-195.

²⁵Viotti, p. 197.

²⁶Viotti, pp. 9-10.

²⁷Viotti, p. 10.

²⁸Viotti, pp. 410-411. (Originally sourced to the following works: Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century (New York: Academic Press, 1974); and Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System II: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy, 1600-1750 (New York: Academic Press, 1980)).

²⁹Viotti, p. 410.

³⁰Masaru Tamamoto, "The Japan That Wants to Be Liked: Society and International Participation," in Danny Unger and Paul Blackburn, Japan's Emerging Global Role (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1993), p. 37. (Originally sourced to Yasuhiro Nakasone, Atarashii hoshu no ronri (A New Conservative Theory) (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1978), p. 33).

³¹Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975 (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1982), pp. 157-160.

³²Michael Blaker, "Evaluating Japanese Diplomatic Performance," in Gerald L. Curtis, Japan's Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping With Change (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1993), pp. 2-3.

³³For general details about the Great Leap Forward and the events leading up to it see Maurice Meisner, Mao's China and After (New York: The Free Press, 1986), pp. 167-227; Richard H. Solomon, Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 268-405; Jack Gray, Rebellions and Revolutions: China from the 1800s to the 1980s (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 301-322; and Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China, Second Edition, (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1968), pp. 17-497.

³⁴For details see Schurmann, pp. 501-592; Solomon, pp. 405-509; Meisner, pp. 309-393; Gray, pp. 326-379; and Lucian Pye, The Mandarin and the Cadre: China's Political Cultures (Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan Center for Chinese Studies, 1988), pp. 109-134.

³⁵See Gray, pp. 420-426 and Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, "Introduction," in Arthur L. Rosenbaum, State and Society in China: The Consequences of Reform (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press Inc., 1992), pp. 1-30.

³⁶Lucian W. Pye, China: An Introduction (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972), pp. 350-353.

³⁷Robert Z. Lawrence, "The Reluctant Giant: Will Japan Take Its Role on the World Stage?", The Brookings Review (Summer 1991), p. 36.

³⁸William R. Feeney, "Chinese Policy Toward Multilateral Economic Institutions," and Denis Fred Simon, "The Changing Role of Science and Technology in China's Foreign Relations," in Samuel S. Kim, China and the World: New Directions in Chinese Foreign Relations (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1989), pp. 237-293. Also see John W. Garver, Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1993), pp. 193-248.

³⁹Tensions between China and India had been building for some time due to questions regarding the exact position of the border, and even more important the status of Tibet. When the serious border clashes broke out, starting in September, 1962 and then escalating in October of that year, China was victorious. However, on November 21, 1962, China announced a unilateral cease-fire and declared that it would withdraw its troops from the conquered territory. Gyaneshwar Chaturvedi, India-China Relations: 1947 to Present Day (Agra, India: MG Publishers, 1991), pp. 29-85. The

reasons for this withdrawal can be seen when one examines China's reasons for the conflict; "The Chinese objectives behind the border war in October-November 1962 were to demolish the prestige of India abroad; (2) to expose the hollowness of nonalignment as a concept; (3) to prove decisively the superiority of communism in Afro-Asian world; (4) to prove the ineffectiveness of India's political and military leadership; (5) to isolate India from the West, the USSR and the Afro-Asian world; (6) to build up pressure on the USSR to seek better relationship with China; and (7) to secure only strategically important territory from India. They were not interested in large-scale territorial annexations... Looking back at the border war in 1962 Lord Caccia, former Permanent Under-Secretary at the British Foreign Office, said that as far as he knew 'the Chinese withdrawal to their original lines after a victory in the field (was) the first time in recorded history that a great power has not exploited military success by demanding something more.' But it was not territory that China sought, it was a settled boundary, and the military operation had been directed to that end." Chaturvedi, pp. 102-103. (Portions originally sourced to Sunday Times, June 12, 1966).

⁴⁰Sino-Vietnamese relations had been deteriorating throughout the 1970s as a result of regional rivalry in Indochina, increasing Sino-Soviet tension and finally the growing turmoil in Kampuchea (Cambodia). When Vietnam invaded Kampuchea in late 1978, China began to build-up forces along the border. On February 17, 1979 China launched a "self-defensive counter attack" against it in order to "teach Vietnam a lesson". After achieving some important territorial gains, China announced its forces would completely withdraw. Although the Chinese strategy was not wholly successful, its armies suffered heavy casualties against the battle-hardened Vietnamese, it did clearly demonstrate to Vietnam that the price of Kampuchea would be continued hostility with its larger neighbour. This did apparently limit some of Vietnam's actions against the Kampuchean guerrillas. Anne Gilks, The Breakdown of the Sino-Vietnamese Alliance, 1970-1979 (Berkeley, California: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1992), pp. 224-233. As Anne Gilks explains it, "China's objectives in the war may be related to its various conflicts of interest with Vietnam - bilateral, regional and strategic - which had reached their present pitch largely as a result of the changing pattern of triangular relations vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. One limited objective was to pacify the border and to force Vietnam to enter negotiations... The principle objective of the war was to redefine Sino-Vietnamese relations within the context of the triangular relationship vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. China faced a threat not from Vietnam per-se, but from Soviet encirclement posed by Soviet-supported Vietnamese domination of Indochina... A limited border war with Vietnam was necessary to lend credibility to China's threat to 'teach Vietnam a lesson'. By maintaining pressure on the border thereafter, China would force Vietnam to divert its forces from Kampuchea. To this end Beijing had a dual purpose: to relieve pressure on Kampuchea

and in the longer term to weaken Vietnam both militarily and economically, eroding its ability to continue its occupation of Kampuchea...A guerrilla war waged by local forces in Kampuchea, as opposed to direct Chinese military intervention, and a limited war against Vietnam would, it was hoped, help keep the Kampuchean conflict limited and avoid a Soviet attack against China in the north. The longer Vietnam was bogged down in Kampuchea, the greater the prospects of highlighting and aggravating the tensions between Moscow and its client, Hanoi...In demonstrating that the Soviet Union and its Vietnamese proxy were paper tigers, China hoped to tarnish the Soviet Union's credibility as an ally. Hanoi's perceived cockiness after its victory in the Second Indochina War had certainly rankled in Beijing, but the need to shatter Vietnam's invincibility as a Soviet client underlay China's decision to 'teach Vietnam a lesson.'" Gilks, pp. 228-230.

⁴¹Chaturvedi, pp. 164-180. Also see Paul H.B. Godwin, "China's Asian Policy in the 1990s: Adjusting to the Post-Cold War Environment," in Sheldon W. Simon, East Asian Security in the Post-Cold War Era (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1993), pp. 137-140.

⁴²Godwin, pp. 134-135.

⁴³Ch'u Chai, & Winberg Chai, Confucianism (Woodbury, New York: Barron's Educational Series Inc., 1973), pp. 113-117. This is a very important influence and has a hand in shaping Taoist and Confucianist thought through the centuries. However, as its teachings do not appear to directly affect the political environment to quite the same degree as Taoism or Confucianism, Buddhist thought will not be explicitly included in the construction of the Sempai-Kohai framework.

⁴⁴Richard H. Solomon, Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 28-38, and Lucian W. Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press, 1985), pp. 55-89.

⁴⁵Arthur Waley, The Analects of Confucius (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1964), pp. 92-93.

⁴⁶Waley, The Analects of Confucius, p. 105.

⁴⁷Waley, The Analects of Confucius, p. 153. The legend of Min Tzu-ch'ien's piety is as follows; "Min Tzu-ch'ien's mother died when he was a child and his father married again. One day when he was driving his father's carriage he let the reins slip. His father found that he wearing such thin gloves that his hands were numbed with cold. On going home he looked at the gloves worn by the two children born to him by his second wife and found that they were thick and warm. He said to his wife, 'I married you solely in order

to have someone to look after my motherless children. Now I can see that you have been imposing on me. Leave my home at once!' Tzu-ch'ien said, 'If my step-mother remains, one child will be imperfectly clad; but if she goes, several children will be cold.' His father said no more about it. (Fragment of lost portions of *Shuo Yuan*, quoted under heading 'filial piety' in *I Wen Lei Chu*.)" Waley, The Analects of Confucius, pp. 245-246.

⁴⁸Waley, The Analects of Confucius, p. 105.

⁴⁹Waley, The Analects of Confucius, p. 128.

⁵⁰Waley, The Analects of Confucius, p. 176.

⁵¹Waley, The Analects of Confucius, pp. 98-99.

⁵²Waley, The Analects of Confucius, p. 164.

⁵³Waley, The Analects of Confucius, p. 92.

⁵⁴Waley, The Analects of Confucius, pp. 84-85.

⁵⁵Waley, The Analects of Confucius, p. 187.

⁵⁶Waley, The Analects of Confucius, p. 192.

⁵⁷Waley, The Analects of Confucius, p. 166. The expression "One may have a dish of millet in front of one and yet not know if one will live to eat it" denotes a situation of utter insecurity.

⁵⁸Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Edited by C.B. MacPherson, (London: Penguin Books, 1968), pp. 183-188.

⁵⁹Waley, The Analects of Confucius, p. 111.

⁶⁰Waley, The Analects of Confucius, p. 106.

⁶¹Waley, The Analects of Confucius, p. 86.

⁶²Waley, The Analects of Confucius, p. 162.

⁶³Waley, The Analects of Confucius, pp. 199-200.

⁶⁴Waley, The Analects of Confucius, p. 88.

⁶⁵Waley, The Analects of Confucius, p. 86.

⁶⁶Waley, The Analects of Confucius, p. 167.

⁶⁷Waley, The Analects of Confucius, p. 168.

⁶⁸Waley, The Analects of Confucius, p. 173.

⁶⁹Waley, The Analects of Confucius, p. 174.

⁷⁰Pye, Asian Power and Politics, pp. 41-43.

⁷¹Waley, The Analects of Confucius, p. 171.

⁷²Arthur Waley, The Way and Its Power: A Study of the Tao-Te-Ching and Its Place in Chinese Thought (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1968), p. 145.

⁷³Da Liu, The Tao and Chinese Culture (New York: Schocken Books, 1979), pp. 27-28.

⁷⁴Max Kaltenmark, Lao Tzu and Taoism, Translated by Roger Greaves, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1969), pp. 53-58.

⁷⁵Waley, The Way and Its Power, p. 150.

⁷⁶Tao Hanzhang, Sun Tzu's Art of War: The Modern Chinese Interpretation, Translated by Yuan Shibing, (New York: Sterling Publishing Co. Inc., 1987), p. 99.

⁷⁷Waley, The Way and Its Power, p. 187.

⁷⁸Waley, The Way and Its Power, p. 217.

⁷⁹Waley, The Way and Its Power, p. 236.

⁸⁰Waley, The Way and Its Power, p. 224.

⁸¹Tao, p. 95.

⁸²Waley, The Way and Its Power, p. 197.

⁸³Waley, The Way and Its Power, p. 238.

⁸⁴Tao, p. 107.

⁸⁵Tao, p. 100.

⁸⁶Tibet, and certain other areas surrounding China, have, for several centuries, been regarded as integral parts of the country by the Chinese. Although China's control over Tibet was weak during the first part of the Twentieth century, following the collapse of imperial dynasty in 1912, no country officially recognized Tibetan independence. In 1950, Chinese Communist troops began to move into Tibet. Following an armed clash in October, 1950, during which the Tibetan forces were defeated, negotiations were started that resulted in a Sino-Tibetan agreement in which Tibet agreed to Chinese rule in exchange for certain guarantees. Michael C. van Walt van Praag, The Status of Tibet: History, Rights, and Prospects

in International Law (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987), pp. 337-340. Later in the decade a series of revolts against Chinese Communist rule broke out, the most serious being in Lhasa in 1959. The revolt was crushed and Chinese rule was tightened. Although certain aspects of life have improved for Tibetans, the Chinese are absolutely set on their policy of keeping control over Tibet and resisting external interference. Van Praag, pp. 119-204, Chris Mullin, The Tibetans (London: Minority Rights Group Ltd., 1980), pp. 7-12, and Zhang Yijun, "The Chinese Perspective on Asian Security" (Ottawa: Lecture given at Carleton University, March 8, 1994).

¹⁷Godwin, pp. 140-142 and Allen S. Whiting, "Chinese Foreign Policy Options in the 1990s," in Samuel S. Kim, China and the World: New Directions in Chinese Foreign Relations (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1989), pp. 305-308.

¹⁸This Japanese policy is due to a long standing territorial dispute over the Kurile Islands, which Japan claims were illegally seized at the end of World War II. Motohide Saito, "Japan's 'Northward' Foreign Policy," in Gerald L. Curtis, Japan's Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping With Change (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1993), pp. 274-302, Paul Marantz, "Moscow and East Asia: New Realities and New Policies," in Sheldon W. Simon, East Asian Security in the Post-Cold War Era (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1993), p. 36-39, "Those Cossacks," The Economist, September 12, 1992, pp. 37-38.

¹⁹Pye, Asian Power and Politics, p. 326.

²⁰Pye, Asian Power and Politics, p. 334.

²¹Lucian W. Pye, Chinese Negotiating Style: Commercial Approaches and Cultural Principles (New York: Quorum Books, 1992), pp. 88-89, and Douglas D. Mitchell, Amaeru: The Expression of Reciprocal Dependency Needs in Japanese Politics and Law (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press Inc., 1976), pp. 72-73 and 83-86.

²²Andre Fontaine, "Britain and France: So Near, and Yet So Far," in The Economist (April 30, 1994), p. 22.

²³Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "Realism and Complex Interdependence," in Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1987), pp. 381-382.

²⁴Keohane, pp. 382-383.

²⁵Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "International Interdependence and Integration," in Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1987), pp. 365-

366.

⁶Keohane and Nye, "International Interdependence and Integration", pp. 365-366.

⁷Keohane and Nye, "International Interdependence and Integration", pp. 364-366.

⁸Robert Gilpin, "The Debate About the New World Economic Order," in Danny Unger and Paul Blackburn, Japan's Emerging Global Role (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1993), pp. 32-33.

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

¹Donald S. Zagoria, "The Changing U.S. Role in Asian Security in the 1990s," in Sheldon W. Simon, East Asian Security in the Post-Cold War Era (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1993), p. 53. (Originally sourced to Samuel Huntington, "America's Changing Strategic Interests," Survival (January/February, 1991)); Norman D. Levin, "Prospects for U.S.-Japanese Security Cooperation," in Danny Unger and Paul Blackburn, Japan's Emerging Global Role (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1993), pp. 76-83; and Jacquelyn K. Davis, "Charting the Course of U.S.-Japanese Relations in a Changing Global Security Environment," in Mike Mochizuki, et al., Japan and the United States: Troubled Partners in a Changing World (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Institute For Foreign Policy Analysis Inc., 1991), pp. 131-137. One of the most alarmist works on this subject is George Friedman and Meredith Lebard, The Coming War With Japan (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991).

²Ben-Ami Shillony, "Victors Without Vanquished: A Japanese Model of Conflict Resolution," in Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, and Eyal Ben-Ari, Eds., Japanese Models of Conflict Resolution (London: Kegan Paul International, 1990), p. 134.

³Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975 (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1982), pp. 172-73.

⁴David A. Titus, "Accessing the World: Palace and Foreign Policy in Post-Occupation Japan," in Gerald L. Curtis, Japan's Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping With Change (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1993), pp. 62-63.

⁵F. C. Langdon, Japan's Foreign Policy (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1973), p. 25.

⁶Donald C. Hellmann, "Japanese Politics and Foreign Policy: Elitist Democracy Within an American Greenhouse," in Takashi Inoguchi and Daniel I. Okimoto, The Political Economy of Japan: Volume 2, The Changing International Context (Stanford, California:

Stanford University Press, 1988), p. 357.

⁷Hellmann, pp. 357-358.

⁸Langdon, pp. 27-29.

⁹Stephen D. Krasner, "Japan and the United States: Prospects for Stability," in Takashi Inoguchi and Daniel I. Okimoto, The Political Economy of Japan: Volume 2. The Changing International Context (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1988), p. 402.

¹⁰With the onset of the cold war, the Americans began to actively push Japan to assume some measure of its own defense. The first step occurred in 1950, following the outbreak of the Korean War, when General MacArthur ordered the creation of a 75,000-strong National Police Reserve. This was ostensibly done in order to cope with potential Communist insurrections while many of the American troops normally stationed in Japan were sent off to fight in Korea. Malcolm McIntosh, Japan Re-armed (London: Frances Pinter Ltd., 1986), p. 31, and Langdon, p. 27.

¹¹The renewal of Security Treaty, with several new provisions to make it more palatable to the Japanese, including previously missing consultative measures, in 1960 proved to be extremely tumultuous in Japan. While this was partly due to outright opposition to the Security Treaty, it also became tied in with party politics and Prime Minister Kishi's somewhat underhanded method for ramming the necessary bills through the Diet. Langdon, pp. 7-21, and I. M. Destler, et al., Managing an Alliance: The Politics of U.S.-Japanese Relations (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1976), pp. 12-23 and pp. 106-107.

¹²Takashi Inoguchi, "The Ideas and Structures of Foreign Policy: Looking Ahead With Caution," in Takashi Inoguchi and Daniel I. Okimoto, The Political Economy of Japan: Volume 2. The Changing International Context (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1988), p. 30.

¹³Takashi, p. 30. This exchange rate was, until 1971, Y360 to \$1. Koichi Hamada and Hugh T. Patrick, "Japan and the International Monetary Regime," in Takashi Inoguchi and Daniel I. Okimoto, The Political Economy of Japan: Volume 2. The Changing International Context (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 114-116.

¹⁴The countries that offered resistance to Japan's membership in the GATT included Great Britain, France, the Netherlands and India. They feared aggressive Japanese trading practices which would adversely affect local industries. Ryutaro Komiya and Motoshige Itoh, "Japan's International Trade and Trade Policy, 1955-1984," in Takashi Inoguchi and Daniel I. Okimoto, The

Political Economy of Japan: Volume 2, The Changing International Context (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 178-130.

¹⁵Langdon, p. 28.

¹⁶Destler, pp. 108-111.

¹⁷Langdon, pp. 121-122 and J. W. M. Chapman, et al., Japan's Quest for Comprehensive Security (London: Frances Pinter Ltd., 1983), p. xi.

¹⁸This problem had been a recurring source of difficulties between the United States and Japan since the 1950s. However, it was only in the late-1960s, with the contention over the issue of manmade fibres and "voluntary" Japanese export restrictions, that the tensions between the two nations begin to show. Destler, pp. 35-45.

¹⁹These islands had previously been under American military administration. Destler, pp. 23-35 and Langdon, pp. 126-132.

²⁰Destler, p. 44.

²¹Destler, pp. 1-2 and Langdon, pp. 151-153.

²²Chapman, p. 189, Destler, p. 3, and T.J. Pempel, "From Exporter to Investor: Japanese Foreign Economic Policy," in Gerald L. Curtis, Japan's Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping With Change (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1993), 114-116.

²³Pempel, pp. 116-117.

²⁴Harrison M. Holland, Managing Defense: Japan's Dilemma (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1988), p. 21. Prior to Taiko, there had been four defense buildup plan. The first one, initiated in 1956, was a three year program, while the subsequent three were each five year plans. McIntosh, p. 118.

²⁵Yoshida Soeya, "Japan's Defense Policy into the 1990s," Chapter 8 from Pacific Maritime Security (1988), pp. 5-6.

²⁶F.C. Langdon, Japan's Foreign Policy (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1973), pp. 36-37.

²⁷Yoshida, p. 12.

²⁸John Creighton Campbell, "Japan and the United States: Games That Work," in Gerald L. Curtis, Japan's Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping With Change (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1993), pp. 48-53.

²⁹The Plaza accord was initiated in response to a widening U.S.-Japanese trade deficit which was seen as being caused, at least in part, by the undervaluation of the yen against the dollar. It was therefore hoped that an appreciation of the yen would make American imports more competitive. The yen actually appreciated quite significantly, from roughly Y260 to the dollar in 1985 to Y120 to the dollar in December 1987. Big Japanese business was not particularly hurt by this rise, although small business did feel some pressure. Rather ironically, the Japanese government's attempts to aid these firms prompted American criticism for supposed "export subsidies". Other industries benefited immensely from the yen appreciation as import costs dropped. Additionally, Japanese banks also showed tremendous gains, as reflected by their newly dominant position in world-wide comparison tables. Finally, the stronger yen allowed for greater Japanese investments abroad, which simply exacerbated other U.S.-Japanese tensions. Frances McCall Rosenbluth, "Japan's Response to the Strong Yen: Party Leadership and the Market for Political Favors," in Gerald L. Curtis, Japan's Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping With Change (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1993), pp. 145-152.

³⁰The FSX controversy involved joint American-Japanese development of an advanced fighter based on the American F-16. Although the Americans originally pushed the issue, they then backed away, regarding it as a "technological give-away" to Japan which might have eroded the American lead in Aerospace. Martin E. Weinstein, "Japan's Foreign Policy Options: Implications for the United States," in Gerald L. Curtis, Japan's Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping With Change (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1993), pp. 224-225. For an interesting Japanese perspective on this issue see Shintaro Ishihara, The Japan That Can Say No, Translated by Frank Baldwin, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), pp. 45-47 and pp. 65-71.

³¹The Structural Impediments Initiative was initiated in response to American concerns over the continuing trade deficit with Japan, despite the earlier appreciation of the yen. In effect, these talks were aimed at correcting certain "irregularities" in the Japanese economy which contributed to its astounding success. Many of the policies were welcomed by Japanese interests in that they were seen as necessary to fix certain outdated systems and further liberalize the economy. However, the effect that these talks have had in addressing the economic problems underlying the U.S.-Japanese relationship is debateable. Reizo Utagawa, "The U.S. Structural Impediments Initiative (SII): Implications for Japan," in Mike Mochizuki, et al., Japan and the United States: Troubled Partners in a Changing World (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Institute For Foreign Policy Analysis Inc., 1991), pp. 90-103.

³²There were actually five schools of thought in the debate, which was triggered by the American demands. First there were the Minimalists, who felt that Japan should keep an independent course

and not get involved. Second were the Realists, who felt that Japan had to practice a version Realpolitik and get involved to protect the established Nation State system, and also that Japan had a stake in the mid-East. Third were the Moralists, who felt that Japan must act because it was the ethically right thing to do. Fourth were the Utilitarians, who felt that Japan must act in order to protect its reputation abroad. Finally, the fifth school, that of the Bilateralists, felt that Japan had to act so as not to antagonize the United States and therefore potentially drive it out of Asia. Eugene Brown, "The Debate Over Japan's International Role: Contending Views of Opinion Leaders During the Persian Gulf Crisis," (Vancouver, B.C.: Delivered at the 32nd Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, March 22, 1991), pp. 5-28.

³³Kent E. Calder, "Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State," in World Politics (July 1988), pp. 526-535.

³⁴Donald S. Zagoria, "The Changing U.S. Role in Asian Security in the 1990s," in Sheldon W. Simon, East Asian Security in the Post-Cold War Era (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1993), p. 47. Also see Tsuneo Akaha and Frank Langdon, "Japan and the Posthegemonic World," in Tsuneo Akaha and Frank Langdon, Japan in the Posthegemonic World (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), p. 7.

³⁵Campbell, pp. 56-57.

³⁶Utagawa, pp. 94-98.

³⁷Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, "Soviet-Japanese Relations in the 1990s," in Mike Mochizuki, et al., Japan and the United States: Troubled Partners in a Changing World (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Institute For Foreign Policy Analysis Inc., 1991), p. 87.

³⁸Destler, pp. 114-117.

³⁹An example of this is the series of articles published by James Fallows in The Atlantic Monthly in which he addresses some of the cultural and structural differences between Japan and America, and how not understanding these differences has adversely affected the American economy. James Fallows, "Looking at the Sun," in The Atlantic Monthly (November 1993), pp. 69-100; James Fallows, "How the World Works," in The Atlantic Monthly (December 1993), pp. 61-87; and James Fallows, "What Is an Economy For?". The Atlantic Monthly (January 1994), pp. 76-92.

⁴⁰The Japanese islands guard the entrance to the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk, which provided for a practical way to bottle up the Soviet, and now Russian Pacific fleet. Additionally, Japan could act as ideal staging post for operations in the Korean

peninsula and it provides a potential counterweight to growing Chinese power. Noboru Yamaguchi, "The Future of the U.S.-Japanese Security Relationship," in Mike Mochizuki, et al., Japan and the United States: Troubled Partners in a Changing World (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Institute For Foreign Policy Analysis Inc., 1991), pp. 53-56.

"These islands, which are known as the Senkakus in Japan, were given to Japan by the United States at the time of the revision of the other Ryukyu Islands. While the dispute is occasionally mentioned, it is a fairly minor issue between the two countries. Allen S. Whiting, China Eyes Japan (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1989), pp. 68-69.

"The brief conflict between the Soviet Union and Japan, which involved a series of battles around Nomonhan, ended on September 13, 1939. The Neutrality Pact between the two nations was signed on April 13, 1941. George Alexander Lensen, The Strange Neutrality: Soviet-Japanese Relations During the Second World War (Tallahassee, Florida: The Diplomatic Press, 1972), pp. 2-18.

"Motohide Saito, "Japan's 'Northward' Foreign Policy," in Gerald L. Curtis, Japan's Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping With Change (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1993), p. 275. While this action can be viewed as a rather cold-blooded example of Stalin's opportunism, one must also bear in mind that the USSR had secretly committed itself, during the 1945 Yalta conference, to enter the Pacific War following the cessation of hostilities in Europe. Therefore Stalin's move, while perhaps not ethical, was not, as such, illegal. Roy Medvedev, China and the Superpowers, Translated by Harold Shukman, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 13 and pp. 72-73, and Franz Schurmann, The Logic of World Power: An Inquiry into the Origins, Currents, and Contradictions of World Politics (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974), pp. 85-86.

"Saito, p. 275.

"Saito, p. 275.

"There was also some pressure exerted by the Americans so that the Japanese would not get too cosy with the Soviets. This took the form of a threat to annex Okinawa if the Kurile islands were given away. The Soviets offered to return the Habomai Islands and Shikotan while retaining control of Kunashiri and Etorofu. Saito, pp. 276-277 and Langdon, pp. 132-133.

"Saito, p. 279.

"Saito, pp. 279-280 and Langdon, pp. 133-134.

"Chapman, pp. 101-103.

⁵⁰Saito, pp. 280-282.

⁵¹Saito, p. 287. (Originally sourced to *Asahi Shimbun*, July 18, 1990). It should be noted that at roughly this same time the Japanese were also pushing for a reduction of sanctions against China following the massacre in Tiananmen Square.

⁵²Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, "Soviet-Japanese Relations in the 1990s," in Mike Mochizuki, et al., Japan and the United States: Troubled Partners in a Changing World (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Institute For Foreign Policy Analysis Inc., 1991), p. 62.

⁵³Saito, pp. 285-287 and Masashi Nishihara "Northeast Asia and Japanese Security," in Danny Unger and Paul Blackburn, Japan's Emerging Global Role (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1993), p. 89.

⁵⁴Saito, pp. 288-289.

⁵⁵"Stuck in the Sand," in The Economist (August 28, 1993), p. 32.

⁵⁶Hasegawa, pp. 63-65.

⁵⁷Hasegawa, pp. 58-60 and pp. 64-65.

⁵⁸Yeltsin is under pressure not to give up territory from a number of sectors of Russian society. Not the least of these is the far Right. The attitude and comments of Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the leader of Russia's Liberal Democrats, including his threat to "Nuke Japan" will not do anything to enhance the diplomatic impasse. "Islands of Lost Hope," in The Economist, (December 25, 1993), p. 46. An additional complication is the fact that many of the residents of the disputed territories opposed revision of the islands to Japan. Hasegawa, p. 75. (Originally sourced to Vitalii Gulii, "Otogibanashi o Genijitsuni" ("Let's Change a Fairy Tale into Reality"), Sekai (No. 4, 1990), p. 114), and Saito, p. 296. (Originally sourced to *Mainichi shimbun*, (June 27, 1990)).

⁵⁹Schurmann, The Logic of World Power, pp. 168-169 and Medvedev, pp. 71-72.

⁶⁰Medvedev, pp. 18-20.

⁶¹Schurmann, The Logic of World Power, pp. 172-174 and John W. Garver, Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1993), pp. 40-43.

⁶²Medvedev, pp. 21-22.

⁶⁹Jack Gray, Rebellions and Revolutions: China from the 1900s to the 1980s (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 320.

⁷⁰Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China, Second Edition, (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1968), pp. 24-45 and Medvedev, p. 29.

⁷¹Medvedev, p. 21.

⁷²The Chinese and Soviets concluded a thirty year treaty of friendship and alliance on February 14, 1950. It was ostensibly directed against Japan and any allied state, meaning, of course, the United States. Medvedev, p. 80 and Garver, pp. 40-43.

⁷³Garver, pp. 285-286.

⁷⁴Garver, pp. 286-289 and Schurmann, The Logic of World Power, pp. 240-241.

⁷⁵Medvedev, pp. 83-84.

⁷⁶China's tactics altered over time according to circumstances. While they did suffer heavy losses, they also managed to fight the Americans to a standstill, which they regarded as a significant accomplishment. In terms of understanding one's enemy, the Chinese were aware that the Americans would soon grow weary of battle and that their resources so far from home were not infinite. Gerald Segal, Defending China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 49-50 and pp. 92-111. The experience in Korea proved to be instructive to the Americans. During the later Vietnam war, they paid closer attention to Chinese signals. As a result, despite some debate concerning the feasibility of attacking the PRC, the Americans restricted their actions to a degree so that they would not appear overtly to China and draw that country into conflict yet again. Schurmann, The Logic of World Power, pp. 510-524.

⁷⁷Gray, p. 11.

⁷⁸Medvedev, pp. 22-28.

⁷⁹Schurmann, The Logic of World Power, pp. 246-247.

⁸⁰Maurice Meisner, Mao's China and After (New York: The Free Press, 1986), pp. 174-177 and Medvedev, pp. 29-31.

⁸¹Schurmann, The Logic of World Power, pp. 248-254.

⁸²Medvedev, p. 86.

⁸³Garver, pp. 56-57.

⁸⁴Garver, pp. 57-60.

⁷⁹Garver, p. 58 and Richard H. Solomon, Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1971), p. 328.

⁸⁰Garver, p. 60.

⁸¹Garver, pp. 60-61 and Schurmann, pp. 302-303.

⁸²Garver, pp. 61-62.

⁸³Schurmann, The Logic of World Power, p. 328.

⁸⁴According to Roy Medvedev, the specific reason behind this action was that the Chinese had been distributing documents detailing their criticisms of the Soviet Union to these specialists. After Moscow issued several protests, which the Chinese ignored, Khrushchev took the decision to withdraw the Soviet personnel. Medvedev, p. 34.

⁸⁵Schurmann, The Logic of World Power, pp. 349; Medvedev, p. 33; and Gray, p. 324.

⁸⁶Garver, pp. 71-72 and Schurmann, The Logic of World Power, p. 391.

⁸⁷These thoughts were never actually put into action. China exploded its first nuclear device in October, 1964. Schurmann, The Logic of World Power, pp. 387-398.

⁸⁸Medvedev, pp. 45-49.

⁸⁹Medvedev, pp. 45-47.

⁹⁰The Ussuri River is a prime example of one the legacies of the old unequal treaties. The Russians, and later Soviets, hold the entire river from bank to bank, rather than having the border run down the centre of the waterway. Throughout the 1960s China and the USSR had been building up their forces along the border. Additionally, the Chinese had started to denounce the old Sino-Russian unequal treaties as a result of the Sino-Soviet schism. Open fighting occurred sporadically in 1969 in and around several of the islands in the river, as well as in areas of the Chinese border with Kazakhstan. Although talks opened in October 1969, following the funeral of Vietnamese leader Ho Chi-minh, the tensions remained high until the early 1970s. Medvedev, pp. 47-57 and Segal, pp. 176-193.

⁹¹Efforts at rapprochement actually began in the mid-1980s but did not reach fruition until 1989. Garver, pp. 100-103.

⁹²Schurmann, The Logic of World Power, pp. 319-320. The depth of dislike for the man can also be seen during the Cultural Revolution. Liu Shao-ch'i, who had appointed Chairman of the PRC in 1959, was being viciously attacked and denounced during this period and was constantly referred to as the "Chinese Khrushchev" in the press, which obviously was regarded as being an extremely detrimental title. Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China, p. 523.

⁹³Schurmann, The Logic of World Power, pp. 339-340 and Garver, pp. 133-163.

⁹⁴Schurmann, The Logic of World Power, pp. 508-510.

⁹⁵Maurice Meisner, Mao's China and After (New York: The Free Press, 1986), pp. 397-398.

⁹⁶These steps included lifting the ban on travel to China for some American citizens, trade restrictions were gradually eased and the American Seventh Fleet was withdrawn from the Taiwan Straits in December 1969. Medvedev, pp. 95-96.

⁹⁷Medvedev, p. 96.

⁹⁸Meisner, pp. 399-400.

⁹⁹The confrontation occurred at the Second Plenum of the Ninth Party Congress in Lushan in August 1970. While this occasion marked a serious political setback for Lin, it did not serve to totally excise him from the power structure. Lin Biao was apparently killed in plane crash in Mongolia in September 1971. The official story is that he was fleeing to the Soviet Union following an abortive coup attempt against Mao. The timing of this "coup", and Lin's subsequent death, was probably not coincidental, for it was at this same time that definite plans were being laid for Nixon's visit to China. Meisner, pp. 401-405.

¹⁰⁰Medvedev, pp. 98-100 and Schurmann, The Logic of World Power, pp. 556-558.

¹⁰¹Medvedev, p. 117.

¹⁰²These concessions included the establishment of joint Sino-Soviet companies to develop the resources of Xinjiang, a somewhat unfavourable currency exchange rate, the continuation of Soviet special rights in Manchuria for some years and the acceptance of Mongolian independence. Medvedev, pp. 21-22 and pp. 39-40.

¹⁰³Garver, p. 91. (Segments originally sourced to "People's Republic of China Statement," in China: U.S. Policy Since 1945 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly), p. 342).

¹⁰⁴Medvedev, p. 117.

¹⁰⁵Lucian W. Pye, Chinese Negotiating Style: Commercial Approaches and Cultural Principles (New York: Quorum Books, 1992), pp. 97-103.

¹⁰⁶Pye, Chinese Negotiating Style, pp. 98-99.

¹⁰⁷Garver, pp. 98-99.

¹⁰⁸An obvious manifestation of this policy was the decision to significantly increase military aid to Taiwan, from \$330 million in 1981 to \$800 million in 1983. Additionally, the Reagan administration was strongly anti-Communist and thus his policies and attitude towards China was harsher than that of his predecessors Medvedev, pp. 132-135 and Garver, p. 100.

¹⁰⁹Garver, p. 102 and Medvedev, p. 127.

¹¹⁰Garver, pp. 101-102.

¹¹¹Garver, p. 101.

¹¹²Garver, p. 101.

¹¹³Gray, pp. 422-423. Also see "Four Days That Shook the World," in The Economist (May 20, 1989), pp. 37-38.

¹¹⁴"Colliding With China," in The Economist (March 12, 1994), pp. 37-38; "China 1, America 0," in The Economist (March 19, 1994), pp. 37-38; "Clinton's Chinese Lessons," in The Economist (May 21, 1994), p. 13; and "Overall Significant Cock-Up," in The Economist (May 21, 1994), pp. 37-38.

¹¹⁵"Cornered By His Past," in The Economist, (June 4, 1994), pp. 13-14.

¹¹⁶While there are no formal military agreements between the two nations, the Chinese have been taking advantage of the abundance of inexpensive ex-Soviet military hardware on the international market. Official figures have recently shown a drop in Sino-Russian trade. The primary reason behind this is both nations' desperate need for hard currency, whereas their recent trade has generally been based on a barter system. Lincoln Kaye, "Courtship Dance," in The Far Eastern Economic Review (May 26, 1994), p. 24

NOTES TO CHAPTER V

¹This can be seen from the series of appointed successors to Mao who were purged from power such as Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Biao as well as the succession struggles following Mao's death in 1976. Maurice Meisner, Mao's China and After (New York: The Free Press,

1986), pp. 330-338, pp. 397-406 and pp. 448-458. Given the purge of several of Deng's potential successors such as Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, as well as the current uncertainty surrounding the leadership after the death of Deng, it would appear that history is repeating itself. Jack Gray, Rebellions and Revolutions: China from the 1800s to the 1980s (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 396 and pp. 423-426; Thomas P. Bernstein, "Ideology and Rural Reform: The Paradox of Contingent Stability," in Arthur Rosenbaum, State and Society in China: The Consequences of Reform (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press Inc., 1992), pp. 148-156; and Carl Goldstein, "Death Watch," in The Far Eastern Economic Review (February 24, 1994), pp. 17-18.

²Lucian W. Pye, The Mandarin and the Cadre: China's Political Cultures (Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan Center for Chinese Studies, 1988), pp. 38-70.

³Lucian W. Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press, 1985), pp. 133-157.

⁴Richard H. Solomon, Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 125-134.

⁵This situation may change in the not too distant future. There are a couple of reasons behind this statement. First, the West has had a strong influence on Asia over the past century or so. It is therefore likely that certain Western ideals would fall on sympathetic ears in East Asia. Another reason may involve the dynamics at work inside the countries themselves. An interesting example of this can be seen in China, as concerns the link between the socialization experience of the Cultural Revolution and the 1989 Tiananmen incident. Although student protests were not unusual in China, having as their model the May 4th Movement of 1919, they were often directed at weak governments or were manipulated from above. While the 1989 movement, and the earlier 1986 demonstrations, may have been somewhat subject to this same sort of manipulation, the determination of the students is surprising given the "typical" Chinese passivity towards, and reluctance to directly challenge, authority. Andrew G. Walder, Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1986), pp. 103-105. However, Richard Solomon makes the argument that Mao's purpose behind the "struggles" he initiated, especially the Cultural Revolution, aside from testing loyalty, was to change this traditional Chinese view of authority. Richard H. Solomon, Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1971), p. 182 and pp. 409-410. Thus, it may be that the 1989 incident in Tiananmen showed that Mao had partially succeeded in altering people's attitudes towards authority. It may also be that the severity of the crackdown was an

effort to re-establish the traditional deference to authority. However, it is probably too early to make any definitive statements about whether or not Chinese culture has truly altered because of the Cultural Revolution. In Japan, the process of modernization over the past century has also eroded certain traditional, deferential types of behaviour. R. P. Dore, "Introduction," in R. P. Dore, Aspects of Social Change in Modern Japan (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 11-14. Also see Sebastian Mallaby, "Oriental Renaissance: A Survey of Japan," in The Economist (July 9, 1994).

⁶"A Nervous Posse Assembles Against North Korea," in The Economist (March 26, 1994), pp. 39-40 and "The Piggy in the Middle," in The Economist (April 2, 1994), pp. 35-36.

⁷Lucian W. Pye, China: An Introduction, Second Edition, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1978), pp. 7-8.

⁸Country Report: China (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2nd Quarter 1994).

⁹"China's New Model Army," in The Economist (June 11, 1994), pp. 29-30.

¹⁰Robert Scalapino, "China and the United States." (Ottawa: Lecture Given at the Ottawa National Arts Centre, October 4, 1993).

¹¹"China's Communists: The Road From Tiananmen," in The Economist (June 4, 1994), p. 21. It should be noted, however, that others, such as William Overholt, do not see this trend as being as pronounced or destabilizing as is so often reported. William H. Overholt, The Rise of China: How Economic Reform is Creating a New Superpower (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1993), pp. 102-111.

¹²Scalapino, "China and the United States".

¹³Overholt, pp. 60-62.

¹⁴Allen S. Whiting, China Eyes Japan (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1989), pp. 76-79 and Lowell Dittmer, "Patterns of Leadership in Reform China," in Arthur Rosenbaum, State and Society in China: The Consequences of Reform (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press Inc., 1992), pp. 46-48.

¹⁵Overholt, pp. 208-224.

¹⁶Overholt, pp. 202-203.

¹⁷William S. Ellis, "Shanghai: Where China's Past and Future Meet," in National Geographic (March 1994), pp. 4-35.

¹⁸Overholt, pp. 326-332. One interesting example of the desire for peaceful reunification is the use of Hong Kong's peaceful and stable integration into China, under the "One Country, two systems" formula, as a model for Taiwan to follow. Overholt, pp. 188-189.

¹⁹Robert Scalapino, "China and the United States".

²⁰Scalapino, "China and the United States".

²¹See George Friedman and Meredith Lebard, The Coming War With Japan (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991).

²²See Yoshio Okawara, "Japan's Global Responsibilities," in Danny Unger and Paul Blackburn, Japan's Emerging Global Role (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1993), pp. 55-67; Danny Unger, "What Next?", in Danny Unger and Paul Blackburn, Japan's Emerging Global Role (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1993), pp. 197-201; Koji Taira, "Japan as Number Two: New Thoughts on the Hegemonic Theory of World Governance," in Tsuneo Akaha and Frank Langdon, Japan in the Posthegemonic World (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), pp. 251-263; and Frank Langdon and Tsuneo Akaha, "The Posthegemonic World and Japan," in Tsuneo Akaha and Frank Langdon, Japan in the Posthegemonic World (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), pp. 265-282.

²³"Hata in the Ring," in The Economist (May 14, 1994), pp. 37-38.

²⁴Country Report: Japan (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2nd Quarter 1994).

²⁵There is actually an interesting Canadian twist to this particular incident. According to Frank Langdon, during the interwar period, Canada was worried about the prospect of war between the United States and Japan. Given that Canada was still an integral part of the British empire, there was a fear that an American war with British allied Japan might drag Canada into the middle of the conflict. As a result, Canada successfully petitioned Britain to cancel the treaty. Frank Langdon, "The Posthegemonic Japanese-U.S. Relationship," in Tsuneo Akaha and Frank Langdon, Japan in the Posthegemonic World (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), pp. 70-71.

²⁶Kiyofuku Chuma, "The Debate over Japan's Participation in Peace-Keeping Operations," in Japan Review of International Affairs (Fall 1992). Also see "Over There," The Economist, July 13, 1992, pp. 33-34, and "Rising Sun," The Economist, June 20, 1992, p. 33.

²⁷"Bombs and Bombast," in The Far Eastern Economic Review (February 10, 1994), pp. 16-18; "The Yongbyon Test," in The Economist (June 4, 1994), pp. 14-15; and "North Korea: A Dangerous

Game," in The Economist (May 28, 1994), pp. 19-22.

²⁸The significance of the years '94-95 with regard to the triangular relationship of Korea, Japan and China was pointed out by Professor Jeremy Paltiel. Although the suggestion that these dates might be meaningful was made half-jokingly, the current crisis suggests that 1994-95 may end up alongside 1594 and 1894-95 as significant turning points in Sino-Japanese-Korean relations.

²⁹Scalapino, "Japan's Uncertainties as a Super Power". It is interesting to note that Japan's postwar reconciliation with South Korea was fraught with difficulty and caused a great deal of controversy in Japan. This was one of the few examples of Japan placing domestic political considerations over economic and commercial opportunities. The Koreans are also uncomfortable with Japan given the aggression and colonial occupation they had to endure during the first half of this century. F.C. Japan's Foreign Policy (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1973), pp. 82-83.

³⁰The recent death of the "Great Leader" Kim Il Sung has made all of these questions all the more relevant. There is no guarantee that his son and successor Kim Jong Il (the Dear Leader) will be able to govern the nation effectively. The situation, as of this writing, is still very uncertain, but this is likely to change, for better or worse, in the not too distant future.

³¹Donald S. Zagoria, "The Changing U.S. Role in Asian Security in the 1990s," in Sheldon W. Simon, East Asian Security in the Post-Cold War Era (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1993), p. 46.

³²Paul H.B. Godwin, "China's Asian Policy in the 1990s: Adjusting to the Post-Cold War Environment," in Sheldon W. Simon, East Asian Security in the Post-Cold War Era (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1993), pp. 135-137.

³³Hidenori Ijiri, "Sino-Japanese Controversy Since the 1972 Diplomatic Normalization," in The China Quarterly (London: School of Oriental and African Studies, December 1990), pp. 660-661.

³⁴It should be noted that this quote is written from the future perspective of 2025. Lee Kuan Yew, "News From a Time-Capsule," in "The Next 150 Years: The Future Surveyed," The Economist (September 11, 1993), pp. 13.

³⁵Lee Kuan Yew, p. 17.

³⁶"Looking Back From 2992, A World History, Chapter 13: The Disastrous 21st Century," The Economist (December 26, 1992), pp. 17-19.

³⁷John W. Garver, Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1993), pp. 332-333 and Se Hee Yoo, "Sino-Japanese Relations in a Changing East Asia," in Gerald L. Curtis, Japan's Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping With Change (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1993), pp. 318-320.

³⁸Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Edited by Richard D. Heffner (New York: New American Library, 1984), p. 142.

³⁹Jim Rohwer, "When China Wakes: A Survey of China, " in The Economist (November 28, 1992), p. 3 & p. 18.

⁴⁰"A Billion Consumers: A Survey of Asia," in The Economist (October 30, 1993), p. 22.

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