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THE MEDIA AND TERRORISM: AN EXAMINATION
OF NEWS COVERAGE OF ARMENIAN
TERRORISM IN CANADA

by

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A.B., Assumption College, 1970
M.A., University of Ottawa, 1975

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in the
Department of Political Science

Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario.

September 1986

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ISBN 0-315-09351-3

The undersigned hereby recommend to
The Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
acceptance of the thesis,
"TERRORISM AND THE MEDIA:
AN EXAMINATION OF NEWS COVERAGE
OF ARMENIAN TERRORISM IN CANADA"

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Abstract

This thesis examines terrorism as a form of political communication. This examination is founded on the premise that terrorism is a political resource, an activity that fits within the range of strategic options that politically active groups have at their disposal and, thus, a rationally explicable phenomenon. Terrorism, it is argued is employed as a means of gaining political leverage and influencing political behaviour and political outcomes by political groups who consider themselves to be otherwise powerless or disenfranchised. The political objectives of such groups can range from a change of policy to a change of polity. Through the resort to terrorism, they hope to be able to circumvent normal political processes and compensate for their lack of traditional political resources.

One of the primary considerations in almost all terrorist acts is publicity. The potential of terrorism as a political resource is highly dependent on media response. The so-called terrorism/media relationship has become a subject of substantial controversy in most countries that have experienced terrorist attacks in recent years. This thesis identifies and attempts to empirically examine some of the major issues underlying this controversy, while looking

at the overall question of terrorism as a form of political communication.

The major focus of this thesis is Canadian media coverage of Armenian terrorism. It is examined using both a structural and substantive analysis of newspaper and television news accounts of the three major incidents of Armenian terrorism that have occurred in Canada.

Armenian terrorist attacks in Canada attracted substantial and prominent media coverage. As a consequence, these attacks were successful in drawing public attention to the Armenian cause and in raising the profile of legitimate spokesmen of the Canadian Armenian community. At the same time, the terrorists were vilified in the press and editorial coverage of the attacks and their actions and objectives were roundly condemned by the media.

Acknowledgments

A number of people have contributed to the completion of this thesis through their assistance and encouragement. My greatest debt of gratitude is to Sheila Garlepy Kelly, whose patience and impatience, as well as her encouragement were a major factor in finishing this work. I am also indebted to her considerable conceptual and editorial abilities. My daughter, Mariel, also made a substantial contribution to this effort through her arrival, which provided a definitive time limit for this work.

I am also greatly indebted to my dissertation supervisor Professor Michael Whittington, for his encouragement, advice and assistance from the initiation to the conclusion of this thesis. Similarly, I owe a great deal of appreciation to Professor Robert J. Jackson for his continued support and encouragement throughout my Ph. D program. I would also like to thank the other member of my dissertation committee, Professor Peter Johansen, for his insightful and constructive criticism.

Special thanks must also go to many friends and colleagues. Chief among them is Dr. Thomas H. Mitchell, a long time friend and associate, who provided encouragement through both word and example. Other friends and colleagues, including Dr. Chummer Farina and Michael Laslovich, provided

both substantial encouragement and technical assistance. I am also indebted to Louise Gariepy Pegg for her assistance in the laborious task of extracting and coding of the data used in this thesis. Appreciation must also be expressed to my former employment supervisor, Dr. Richard Bower, for both encouraging me to finish and providing me with the time to do so.

Research for this thesis was principally undertaken at the National Library of Canada in Ottawa and at the library of the University of Ottawa. An expression of thanks is owed to the staff of these two libraries for their assistance. I would also like to thank the CBC in Toronto, particularly Ms. Laura Marshall, for providing me with the news transcripts used in this analysis.

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INTRODUCTION

In the past few decades, the media have come to play a singularly important, if not dominant, role in political life. Observers have noted, for example, the media's influence on the style of political leadership (Gilbert, 1976; Minnow et. al., 1974) and political campaigning (Mendelson and Crispi, 1970; Mickelson 1976). They have also remarked upon the growing use of the media by politicians to circumvent the normal, and sometimes cumbersome, political channels which characterize democratic societies (White, 1976). Politics in the latter half of the twentieth century is increasingly the politics of stage managed events and photo opportunity sessions.

The media's influence on political behavior, however, has by no means been confined to establishment politics. Profound transformations have also occurred in the tactics and activities of extraparliamentary and dissident groups, as their appreciation of the power of the media to raise the political salience of issues and to accord political visibility and credibility has grown (Lewis, 1974, Rada, 1977). Media access and attention, in particular, provide groups poor in traditional political resources with a means of compensating for their weaknesses and bypassing

established political channels for redressing their grievances. As a result, such groups have increasingly resorted to dramatic and sensational activities that focus media attention on themselves and their causes.

The use of the media by so-called "challenger groups" has taken on a deadly and worrisome dimension in recent years with the rapid growth of terrorist activity. Dissident and radical groups have used extreme acts of violence to attract national and international attention and to enhance their political leverage. The ability of such groups to attract massive publicity through assassinations, hijackings, bombings, and kidnappings has caused a great deal of concern and attention to be directed at the relationship between terrorism and the media.

The result has been an on-going and emotionally charged debate between the media's critics, who tend to view the fourth estate as a fifth column in the war against terrorism, and its defenders, who see such criticism as another case of attacking the bearer of bad news. For the most part, neither side has taken a close look at the nature of terrorism or at the central role that is accorded to the media in the terrorist strategy. In general, criticism of media coverage

of terrorism has tended to be disjointed and the evidence, upon which it is based, fragmentary and contradictory.

For the most part, Canada has been on the sidelines of the media/terrorism controversy, having had little terrorism to contend with during the last decade or so. However, the attack by Armenian terrorists on the Turkish embassy in Ottawa in March of 1985 and other recent incidents have begun to focus the attention of news editors, journalists, police officials and public policy makers on some of the critical issues related to media coverage of terrorism.

This thesis offers a theoretical and empirical context for examining some of the key issues in the terrorism coverage controversy, particularly from a Canadian perspective. It places the phenomenon of terrorism in the context of a growing body of theoretical literature on political violence, which views it as a political resource. Particular attention is devoted to the role of the media in the terrorist strategy, and to the strategies and tactics used by the terrorists to command media attention.

The principal objective of this thesis is to examine terrorism from a political communications standpoint. It will look at the extent to which media coverage provides

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terrorists with attention, recognition and legitimacy. This examination is based on a detailed and systematic analysis of the structure of, and the images and issues contained in the coverage given to incidents of Armenian terrorism in this country by ten major Canadian dailies and the two national television networks.

CHAPTER 1

TERRORISM AS A POLITICAL RESOURCE

This chapter explores some of the definitional and conceptual controversy that surrounds the study of terrorism. It offers a definition of the phenomenon as an instrumental activity used by dissidents as a resource in the pursuit of specific or broad political objectives. It argues, furthermore, that contemporary terrorism is primarily an exercise in political communications and is thus reliant on the media for its impact.

TERRORISM: DEFINITIONAL AND CONCEPTUAL ISSUES

In recent years, a substantial amount of attention has been devoted by academics to the study of terrorism. While this has resulted in a greater awareness of terrorist activity, questions have been raised as to how much it has contributed to our understanding of the phenomenon (Stohl, 1979; Kelly and Mitchell, 1981). Shultz (1978) and Miller (1980), among others, have severely criticized the contemporary literature on terrorism for its lack of both conceptual clarity and theoretical incisiveness. These deficiencies are generally attributed to the intense ideological controversy surrounding the use of the concept

"terrorism". As a result of these problems, Kupperman (1982, p. 25) has observed that terrorism, although a ubiquitous phenomenon, has not proven amenable to formal definition.

Laqueur (1977, pp. 5-7) has also expressed serious reservations about the possibility of achieving any consensus on a definition of terrorism. He cites as evidence the fact that many have used the term as an "ideological weapon" or political slogan, as opposed to a precise analytical construct. This tendency has been particularly evident, for example, in the selective attribution of the term "terrorism" in the case of hijackings. In the early 1960s, opponents of Castro who hijacked airplanes in an effort to flee to the United States were frequently received in that country as heroes. However, hijackers with destinations less acceptable to the West were, and continue to be, labelled as terrorists.¹ The dissonance underlying the use of the term is perhaps best expressed by a Boston Irishman who, when speaking on the Northern Ireland question on British TV, defined terrorists as "those whom the British do not like" (Wilkinson, 1977, p. 5).

The difficulty in arriving at a definition of terrorism is epitomized by the efforts of the United Nations to define the phenomenon within the context of international

law.² The previous example of airline hijacking provides an excellent illustration of the intense "terrorist/freedom fighter" debate which characterized this effort. The increasing incidence and violence of terrorism prompted UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim in 1972 to request that the UN General Assembly consider measures to prevent terrorism (Wardlaw, 1982, p. 105). A year later the General Assembly created the Ad Hoc Committee on Transnational Terrorism to investigate the subject. The efforts of this committee, as well as all subsequent UN efforts, including the Draft Resolution and Convention on Terrorism put forward by the United States, foundered for over a decade on political and ideological divisions over the definition of terrorism. It was only in 1985 that some minimal progress was made in this area.³

The conceptual confusion surrounding the term has been exacerbated by the use of the word "terrorism" by members of the media. Reporters and editors have used the term to characterize a diverse assortment of violent and sometimes bizarre events ranging from the attempted coup in Spain in 1981 to the 1983 "Tylenol killings" in the United States. The promiscuous use of terrorism as a synonym for rebellion, demonstrations, riots, coups and a range of criminal and

psychopathic behavior has served only to further confuse understanding of the phenomenon.⁴

The academic literature is also limited in its ability to provide a usable conceptualization of terrorism, despite the multitude of different definitions that it contains. The majority of these definitions tend to understate the true complexity of the phenomenon. Most conceptualizations in the scholarly literature focus on either systematic and highly organized terrorism or on the fear- and anxiety-generating aspects of the phenomenon. Among the former, there is a tendency to focus almost exclusively on revolutionary terror (i.e. terror directed against the overthrow of a regime) as exemplified by the definitions of Thornton (1964), Aron (1966), Moss (1971), Watson (1976) Iviansky (1977), Crenshaw (1978; 1982) and Pontara (1979).

Wilkinson (1976) is one of the few who emphasizes the non-revolutionary uses of terrorism yet he too focuses on systematic terrorism, excluding unique incidents from his purview. While most contemporary terrorism is both highly organized and systematic, the exclusive focus on systematic terrorism and the exclusion of unique or isolated incidents from the ambit of political terrorism in these definitions is, as Wardlaw (1982, p. 14) has noted, a serious limitation.

Indeed the activities of groups such as the Hanafis, Direct Action, the Wimmins Fire Brigade and the Animal Rights Militia are no less terrorist even though they have been, for the most part, unique or unsystematic. A usable definition of terrorism must be broad enough to permit the inclusion of such incidents.

A focus on the fear- and anxiety-generating aspects of terrorism is also common to a number of definitions, including those of Leiden and Schmid (1968), Silverman and Jackson (1970), Gunther (1972), Neale (1973), Paust (1974), Mikelous (1977; 1978), Bassouini (1981), Miller (1981), Wardlaw (1982) and Jenkins (1975).⁵ While the term "terrorism" invokes notions of fear and anxiety, this, as Shultz (1978, p. 8) points out, is not the primary aim of all terrorist acts. Such activities may have certain tactical and strategic aims quite apart from instilling fear, for example, generating publicity for the group and its cause, intimidating opposition, creating a bargaining situation, freeing prisoners or obtaining funds.

While some scholars of terrorism feel definitional clarity to be elusive, there are sound reasons for pursuing it even at the cost of adding a new definition to the plethora that already exists. Definitional and conceptual

plethora that already exists. Definitional and conceptual clarity are essential if the phenomenon is to be examined within a public policy context. Moreover, as the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards (1976, p. 4) has noted there are other important reasons for insisting upon them:

Terrorism is an attention-getting word. Casual or imprecise use of the term can engender a climate of fear and uncertainty that can spread further afield through the popular media. Eventually a mystique is built up that allows for a reduction of actual violence while fear itself is increased and the mere threat suffices to achieve the terroristic objective.... In this way the notion of terrorism is propagated, the fear of victimization increases in the community and a false dimension of the problem is created.

In response to some of the limitations inherent in the current academic literature on terrorism, this thesis offers its own conceptualization of the phenomenon. This conceptualization draws heavily on the conceptual legacy of Thornton (1964), who emphasized the symbolic nature of terrorism, and on the collective violence literature which looks at violence as a political resource.

TERRORISM AS A POLITICAL STRATEGY

Definition and Typology

For the purpose of this study, terrorism will be defined as:

the clandestine or semi-clandestine use or the threat of extranormal violence⁵ by a government, group or individual in order to register a calculated psychological impact on an audience beyond the immediate target as a means of altering the political balance in favour of the perpetrators or effecting the creation of a political climate conducive⁶ to the attainment of their political objectives.

○ This definition approaches terrorism as a form of armed propaganda or psychological warfare used by its perpetrators in an effort to achieve political leverage. Terrorists can attain such leverage in a variety of ways, including mobilizing popular support through "consciousness raising" activities or destabilizing society by sewing unrest and fear among the population. In the case of government or state terrorism, leverage is typically gained through intimidation and repression of opposition.

A rudimentary typology differentiating between terrorism sponsored by the state and terrorism directed against the state is implicit in most definitions of terrorism in the academic literature. Walter (1969) has labelled these two types of terrorism as "reign of terror" (employed by those in power) and "siege terror" (employed by rebels). A similar distinction is made by May (1974). Thornton (1964) and others have labelled these categories "enforcement terror" (used by those in power to suppress challenges to their authority) and "agitational terror" (the terroristic

activities of those who wish to disrupt the existing order and ascend to political power themselves). Both Shultz (1978, pp. 8-9) and Wardlaw (1982, p. 12) have criticized these two-part typologies for understating the conceptual complexity of terrorism and being unable to support sophisticated conceptual analysis. They point, in particular, to the failure of such typologies to differentiate within the two categories and to present related comparative variables that generate assayable hypotheses within and between categories.

Shultz (1978, pp. 9-10) addresses the typology problem by offering a comprehensive delineation of what he deems to be the relevant dimensions of terrorism: Dividing the phenomenon into three fundamental categories: Revolutionary Terrorism, Sub-Revolutionary Terrorism and Repressive or Establishment Terrorism. These he defines as follows:

Revolutionary Terrorism: the threat and/or employment of extranormal forms of political violence, in varying degrees, with the objective of successfully effecting a complete revolutionary change (change of fundamental political-social processes) within the political system. Such means may be employed by revolutionary elements indigenous to the particular political system or similar groups acting outside of the geographical boundaries of the system.

Sub-Revolutionary Terrorism: the threat and/or employment of extranormal forms of political violence, in varying degrees, with the objective of effecting various changes in the structural-functional aspects of

the particular political system. The goal is to bring about certain changes within the body politic, not to abolish it in favour of a complete system change. Perhaps the broadest of the three categories, groups included here span the political spectrum from left to right (i.e. ethnic, religious, linguistic, regional, anti-colonial, secessionist, reactionary, restorationist, etc.). Such means are employed primarily by groups or movements indigenous to the particular political system, though similar elements beyond the system's geographical boundaries may also rely on such means.

Establishment Terrorism: the threat and/or employment of extranormal forms of political violence, in varying degrees, by an established political system, against both external and internal opposition. Specifically, such means may be employed against other nation-states and groups external to the particular political system, as well as internally to repress various forms of domestic opposition/unrest and/or to move the populace to comply with programs/goals of the state.

Shultz's categories of Revolutionary and Sub-Revolutionary Terrorism are the principal foci of this thesis.

Within the categories of Revolutionary and Sub-Revolutionary terrorism, Shultz makes the distinction between domestic and transnational terrorism. The term domestic terrorism refers to terrorist activity carried out by an indigenous group whose political motivations derive from domestic grievances or conflicts. Examples of domestic terrorist groups are the FLQ (Canada), Direct Action (Canada), Front de Liberation de la Bretagne (France), and the Red Brigades (Italy). Transnational terrorism⁷ is used to classify groups which operate without regard for

national boundaries. Such groups include the several Palestinian terrorist organizations, Armenian terrorists and the Japanese Red Army. It should be noted that the increasing level of cooperation between domestic and transnational groups,⁸ in many cases, blurs the distinction between these two categories (Kelly and Mitchell, 1983).

Terrorists As Rational Actors

Implicit in the definition of political terrorism offered in this study is the notion that it constitutes an instrumental political activity. Indeed, few terrorists fit the wild-eyed-bomber stereotype that has been created by many politicians and some segments of the media. However, the portrayal of the terrorist as a psychopath and of terrorism as malignant aggression permeates much of the literature on, and the popular conception of, the activity. For example, Wagenlehne (1978) has attributed German terrorism of the Baader-Meinhoff era to an acute fear and aggression on the part of the terrorists and to their masochistic desire to be pursued. He attributes this psychopathology to the German family structure. Morf (1970) in his study of Quebec terrorism invokes similar explanations, attributing it to the problems of adolescence and a permissive society. Dr. David Hubbard (1971), a psychiatrist, also discounts political motivations.

Generalizing from his work with lone skyjackers, he attributes terrorism (i.e. hijacking) to arrested personal development caused by abnormalities in the hijackers' vestibular system. Dr. F Gentry Harris (cited in Stohl, 1979, p. 22) another psychiatrist, in testimony before the now defunct U.S. House Committee on Internal Security, insisted on the need to understand and deal with terrorism as a psychopathological problem. Similarly, Metvin (1973) has argued that terrorists are psychologically disturbed and that their grievances are not amenable to rational accommodation.⁹ The psychodynamic approach, as outlined by Kent and Nichols (1977), argues that terrorism is likely to occur whenever political conditions provide social legitimation for the acting-out of deeply repressed hatred.¹⁰

While some terrorists may indeed suffer from psychological disorders, it is highly simplistic to approach the phenomenon exclusively from this perspective. Jenkins (1975) argues, for example, that political terrorism is a means to an end as opposed to an end in itself. This position is supported by Stohl (1979, pp. 6-7), who insists that the madman depiction is a myth because many terrorist groups have particular goals which they pursue as part of an ongoing political struggle.

Political motivations should not be obscured in the search for psychodynamic explanations. Numerous studies support the view that terrorists are engaged in a rational, as opposed to an emotionally expressive, activity.¹¹ Studies by Gurr (1979, p. 38), Mickolus (1980, pp: xix-xxv) and the CIA (1981, p. 11) have indicated that terrorists' activities are generally meticulously planned, with terrorist groups engaging in an explicit risk-attractiveness calculation with respect to targets and tactics in an effort to maximize the political impact of their activity while minimizing their own vulnerability.¹² The risk aversion of terrorists is substantiated by evidence cited by both Mickolus and the CIA, indicating that measures designed to raise the cost of certain terrorist activities have induced terrorists to choose other types of tactics, the cost of which has not risen. This suggests a conscious and very rational substitution effect.¹³

As a form of instrumental political behaviour, terrorism can be fitted within the range of strategic options that politically active groups have at their disposal. It can perhaps best be conceptualized as a political resource. This conceptualization is found in much of the recent literature on collective violence. Lipsky (1968), Nieberg (1962), Oberscholl (1973), Gamson (1975), Tilly (1975), Frank and

Kelly (1979) and Kelly and Mitchell (1981) have all associated the use of political violence with groups weak in traditional political resources¹⁴, attempting to gain political leverage and influence political behaviour and political outcomes. Powerless or disenfranchised groups, as Lipsky (1968) points out, cannot call on existing resources to achieve their objectives but must create their own. He argues that this typically occurs through activities designed to raise public awareness of, and support for, a group's cause. While Lipsky has focused his attention on what may be called "street politics" such as demonstrations and sit-ins, the political resource conceptualization can also be extended to more extreme forms of violence in which the objective is either to heighten public awareness or to cause social disorientation. As Van der Vat (1982, p. 26) has noted, Clauswitz would likely describe terrorism as a continuation of protest by other means.

Like street politics, terrorism has been employed by resource-poor groups in an effort to attain political objectives. It has been described by Crozier (1974), Laqueur (1976) and Fromkin (1975, p. 27) as the weapon of the weak. Similarly, Livingstone (1982, p. 58) has suggested that terrorist movements are, almost by definition, small elite organizations without significant popular support. Crenshaw

(1981, p. 387) has also argued that terrorism is the strategy of a minority that, by its own judgement, lacks other means of attaining its political objectives. She sees terrorism as a function of the power ratio of government to challengers. Crenshaw suggests that when such groups perceive their strategic options to be limited, terrorism holds an attraction because it is a relatively inexpensive and simple alternative, and because its potential is high. The potential is high because terrorism provides a way for groups to draw attention to themselves and to their grievances, and to disrupt the social and political fabric of a society.

Gurr (1970, p. 236) has also noted that different forms of political violence are the result of different configurations of regime and dissident support. Referring to what he called the "coercive balance", Gurr envisages terrorism as a tactic chosen by dissidents facing a regime with a preponderance of coercive power. Correlatively, he sees internal or revolutionary warfare as based on more of an equality of forces.¹⁵ According to Gurr, "If dissidents are very weak relative to the regime, they may decide that their best chance of success is to engage in conspiratorial activity, i.e. terrorism". Furthermore, he hypothesizes that the likelihood of terrorism was linearly related to the

degree of discrepancy between dissident and regime coercive control.

The Strategic Uses of Terrorism

As a political strategy terrorism is used by groups in pursuit of both revolutionary and non-revolutionary objectives. Specific terrorist acts also have a range of tactical objectives such as attracting attention, mobilizing support, undermining national and international security, damaging international relations and causing panic.¹⁶

Terrorist activities are also frequently undertaken with a view to the organizational imperative of the terrorist group. Groom (1978, p. 67) notes that participation in terrorist activities may serve as a bleeding device. Once a recruit has incriminated himself with an act of terror, it is harder for him to defect, and he can be controlled with the threat of exposure by his associates. A similar view was offered by Franz Fanon (1967 p. 67) in The Wretched of the Earth, his classic study of Algerian terrorism. Watson (1976, p. 17) has pointed to the morale-building and confidence-inspiring functions of terrorism for members of the terrorist group. Terrorism has also been used to secure the release of captured comrades, to obtain financing for a continuation of the struggle, to recruit new members to the

organization, to discipline existing members and to intimidate rival factions.¹⁷

Revolutionary Terrorism

As previously noted, a majority of the theoretical literature on terrorism approaches it as a revolutionary activity. In this vein, Thornton (1964, p.73) has proposed that terrorists may achieve their revolutionary objectives by either mobilizing forces sympathetic to their cause or by immobilizing the forces of their antagonists, i.e. the incumbent authorities. In both instances terrorism is an indirect strategy focused on winning a psychological, as opposed to a military, victory.

A common objective of most revolutionary terrorist groups, be they domestic or transnational, is to evoke popular sympathy or to attain some level of legitimacy for their grievances. As Schmid and de Graaf (1982, p. 20) have pointed out, contemporary terrorism derives some of its focus from Mao's thesis that winning public support is the essential precondition for the "great victory". According to Mao, if public opinion could be won, the defeat of the enemy would be a foregone conclusion. The aim in the early stages of the conflict was, therefore, to win people to the cause

rather than the military defeat of the enemy. Attacks were to be designed to have a psychological impact on the population, as opposed to a military impact on the existing regime.

Terrorism is viewed by many revolutionaries as a useful instrument for raising the consciousness of a target population whom they see as lethargic and unaware of, or unconcerned with, the abuses of governments. As Devine and Rafalko (1982, p. 46) have suggested, terrorists see themselves as leaders or as a vanguard taking the initiative and enlisting support by rousing the public from its lethargy. The stimulation of public consciousness as a vehicle for revolutionary change is thus a central element in the strategy of many terrorist campaigns.

A classic illustration of consciousness-raising terrorism is found in the activities of the Front de liberation du Quebec (FLQ). The FLQ undertook terrorism "pour sensibilizer des gens". Through its target selection and related propaganda activities the FLQ hoped to make the masses in Quebec aware of the "oppressive colonial situation in which they existed", with a view to mobilizing support and accelerating the historical process leading to the independence and socialist transformation of Quebec

(Laurendeau 1975; Kelly and Mitchell 1981; and Fournier 1982). In the words of one FLQ sympathizer (Savoie, 1963, p.19):

Il ne s'agit pas seulement de déposer des bombes, il faut savoir pourquoi et faire comprendre à la population le but de ces manifestations; la réveiller, lui exposer son état d'aliénation. Les bombes ne sont que des moyens à attirer l'attention.

Based on this premise the FLQ undertook a campaign of terrorism (mostly bombings) directed at symbols of the federal and the English presence in Quebec. As their preliminary communique indicated¹⁸, the FLQ attacks were to be directed at:

All colonial (federal) symbols and institutions, in particular the RCMP and the Armed Forces.

All means of information in the colonial language (English) that slight us.

All enterprises and commercial establishments which practice discrimination against Quebecois which do not employ French as a first language and which have publicity signs in the colonial (English) language.

All factories which practice discrimination against francophone workers.

Over the course of the struggle, which commenced officially in February of 1963 with the bombing of radio station CKGM in Montreal and ended with the October Crisis, successive waves of FLQ terrorists carried out attacks directed at targets ranging from the Wolfe Monument in Quebec City to the Montreal Stock Exchange. Most of these were accompanied by communiques explaining the purpose of the incident.

In an effort to recruit popular sympathy and support for their revolutionary activities, many terrorist groups have also adopted Robin Hood tactics. For example, they may confiscate ransom money for altruistic purposes, such as medical aid or food for the poor, or demand that similar action be taken by the government, company or family of a kidnap victim as a condition of his or her release. Such tactics have been especially popular in Latin America where they received much impetus from the activities of the Tuparmaros (see Porzecanski, 1974). Perhaps the best known example of this kind of activity in North America was the abduction of Patricia Hearst by the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) and the resulting demands that the Hearst family distribute \$6 million worth of food to the needy.

The activities of transnational revolutionary groups, because of their resource limitations and the complex international character of their activity, are largely directed at consciousness raising, mobilizing popular support and bringing international pressure to bear on the resolution of their grievances. Popular recognition of their claims has been a primary objective of Palestinian terrorists, a history which is well documented (Alexander 1976; Bishop 1979). The Palestinians (i.e. the PLO) have been credited with devising the concept of transnational terrorism (Crenshaw, 1981, p. 389). Having earned a poor reputation in combat within the context of the Six Day War in 1967, and realizing that a military victory against Israel in the foreseeable future was unlikely, the Palestinians subsequently used terrorism to capture headlines and to draw the attention of the world to the Palestinian movement and its purposes.

Revolutionary terrorists may also seek to overthrow an incumbent regime by undermining its authority. As Thornton (1964, p. 74) has pointed out, terrorists engaged in a revolutionary struggle may attempt to discredit a government, by introducing a climate of overreaction and disorientation into the society. According to Thornton one of the first and most vital tasks of an insurgent group is to disrupt the relationship between the rulers and the ruled:

In order to do this the insurgents must break the tie that bonds the masses to the incumbents within the society and they must remove the structural supports that give society its strength or at least make those supports seem irrelevant to the critical problem that the masses must face. This process is one of disorientation....

Abraham Guillen (1973), a major theoretician of revolutionary terrorism, has noted that the objective of the true terrorist is to create widespread chaos through fear and uncertainty. Terrorists pursuing revolutionary objectives frequently aim to undermine the political confidence and morale of liberal governments to make them more vulnerable to political and social collapse. Through the use of systematic and, in many cases, apparently random terrorism they can have a significant impact on both the social structure and the individual, upsetting the framework of precepts and images which members of a society depend on and trust. Since individuals no longer know what sort of behaviour to expect from other members of society, the system can become disoriented. The formerly coherent community dissolves in view of the breakdown of society, law enforcement and protection mechanisms into a mass of anomic individuals each concerned only with personal survival (Hutchinson, 1972, p. 388; Dallin and Breslauer, 1970; Grabosky, 1979, p. 61).¹⁹

As a means of augmenting the disorientation caused by their activities, a related political stratagem of terrorists

is to push the liberal state into authoritarianism. In this way the state can be coerced into denying its constitutionalism through the abandonment of all humane restraints and checks on power. It becomes a paramilitary or police state and a mirror image of the terrorism it is supposed to be defeating (Wilkinson, 1977, p. 80). This idea has been called by Carlos Marighella (1971, pp. 61-97) "militarizing the political situation". Marighella, who headed the Brazilian Accao Libertadara Nacional (ALN), prescribed trapping the authorities into brutal repression and alienation which would generate substantial dissatisfaction and which the terrorist acting as the vanguard could channel into the revolution.

Over the years the tactic of provoking repression has been widely employed and refined. The struggles of the Front de liberation nationale (FLN) against the French, the Palestinians against Israel, the Red Army Faction (RAF) against the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) against the British all appear to have involved terrorism as provocation (Crenshaw, 1981, p. 387). In several colonial situations (e.g. the FLN in Algeria) and in some nationalist conflicts, it has been used with some effectiveness by groups who managed to discredit the existing government by provoking it to concentrate its coercive power

on a particular segment of the population with which the terrorists sought to identify. Certainly this objective underlies many of the activities of the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland. For the most part, however, the actual strategic outcome of the doctrine, as distinct from its theoretical assertions, has not been what terrorists have sought or anticipated. Terrorism when used by the Tupermaros in Uruguay did not cause a popular uprising but rather a military coup, which eliminated both the terrorists and Latin America's oldest democracy. In Turkey, in 1980, this scenario was repeated. In West Germany and Italy terrorism provoked the enactment of harsh anti-terrorist legislation which sacrificed civil liberties to preserve order.

Sub-Revolutionary Terrorism

Within his category of sub-revolutionary terrorism Schultz (1978, p. 10) includes terrorist acts by ethnic and secessionist groups with no aspirations of wholesale systemic change. In recent years a wide range of "dispossessed" ethnic groups including the South Mollucans, the Armenians, the ethnic Germans in the Tyrol in Italy, Corsicans and Bretons in France, etc. have used terrorism as a means of bring their struggle to international attention.

To a lesser, but growing, extent terrorism has also been used as a strategic instrument of policy influence. It has provided a vehicle for aggrieved groups and individuals who wish to have a particular issue placed on the public agenda. There are currently several indications of a significant shift away from terrorism related to broad historical ideologies to more issue-oriented terrorism. Existing terrorist groups are increasingly launching attacks linked to popular causes (e.g. environmental pollution) and frustrated non-violent protest groups are sprouting terrorist fringes (Kempe, 1983, p.1). Several terrorist organizations have recently engaged in issue-oriented attacks related to computer technology (France, the Committee for the Liquidation of Computers), nuclear power (Switzerland, Radical Ecologists), pornography (Canada, the Wimmis Fire Brigade), animal experiments (Britain, Animal Rights Militia) and others. The 1982 bombing of the Litton Industries plant in Toronto by the group Direct Action, while accompanied by a manifesto of revolutionary rhetoric, was largely designed to stimulate opposition to the testing of the American cruise missile in Canada. Nuclear missile deployment has been a growing justification for terrorist activities directed at American military establishments in Western Europe.

Overall, non-revolutionary terrorism appears to be almost exclusively a consciousness-raising activity. It is undertaken as a means of attracting attention and recognition to an issue as a basis for mobilizing popular support. The target of such activity is public opinion.

TERRORISM AS A COMMUNICATIONS STRATEGY

As evident from the above discussion, communication is to a significant extent the essence of both revolutionary and non-revolutionary, domestic and transnational terrorism. Thus, it is important to consider closely the all important symbolic aspects of the phenomenon. Thornton (1964, p. 77) has contended that the symbolic nature of terrorism is the major determinant of its relatively high efficacy:

If the terrorist comprehends that he is seeking a demonstration effect, he will attack targets with a maximum symbolic value. The symbols of the state are particularly important, but perhaps even more are those referring to the normative structures and relationships that constitute the supporting framework of society. By showing the weakness of this framework, the insurgents demonstrate, not only their own strength and the weakness of the incumbents but also the inability of the society to provide for its members in a time of crisis.

Terrorists focus their actions on targets that symbolize their cause and provide a basis for communicating a message to the general public. Miller (1981, p. 5) has noted that

terrorism is largely concerned with the manipulation of political symbols as a means of getting access to, or controlling the public agenda. The terrorist's target is typically not the immediate victim, but a larger audience shaping the climate of public opinion (Cooper, 1977; Stohl, 1979; Alexander, 1979; Jenkins, 1974). As Jenkins (1975) has noted, terrorists want a lot of people watching, as opposed to a lot of people dead. Terrorists use violence against one victim to persuade others. As such, an act of terrorism is in reality an act of communication.

A useful way of approaching the dynamics of the terrorist communication process is provided by Schmidt and de Graaf (1982, p. 176) in their triangle of insurgent terrorism presented in Figure 1. It is evident from this depiction that terrorists use their victims as instruments to communicate a message. Targets are victimized primarily for the impact on third parties. The message that the terrorist may wish to direct to the audience may be one of explicit propaganda in the case of symbolic targets such as those selected by the FLQ or Direct Action. Or it may attempt to traumatize or demoralize an audience through random target selection which symbolizes and conveys the vulnerability of every member of society and enhances general insecurity.

The critical linkage between the terrorist, his victim, his enemy and the public at large is made via the media. Access to the media is essential to both the propaganda- and the fear-generating impacts of terrorism. Indeed, it is clearly the ability to manipulate the media that gives terrorism its potential as a political resource. The political leverage that resource-poor dissident groups can exercise, both in a democratic society and in the international system, is largely contingent on their ability to generate publicity. Since regular access to the media tends to be restricted to those who are already endowed with substantial political resources,²⁰ powerless individuals and groups frequently attempt to exploit certain characteristics of the media's news-value system which emphasize the abnormal, unusual, dangerous or violent. By creating events that fit into the reporting needs of the mass media, such groups can obtain media coverage (Schmid and de Graaf, 1982, p. 217). Myerhoff (1972, p. 252) has referred to this activity as disruptive access, the making of news by somehow crashing through the ongoing arrangements of news-making to generate surprise, shock or some more violent form of reaction.

FIGURE I
THE TRIANGLE OF INSURGENT TERRORISM

(IT= Insurgent Terrorists; VA= Victim belonging to camp of State Authorities; VP= Victim being part of Public; TA= Authorities as Target; TP= Public as Target.)

Source; Schmid and de Graaf (1982, p. 176)

Although terrorist groups have, from time to time, published regular newspapers and newsletters of their own to develop their political following, they rely on the conventional media to reach a larger audience and achieve a large-scale political impact.²¹ Wilkinson (1982, p. 41) has summarized what terrorists seek to achieve through the exploitation of the conventional mass media:

Maximum attention for their cause and demands, to communicate threats to their target audience and create a climate of fear and a belief in terrorist invincibility; to convey their propaganda and self-justification; to acquire an aura of legitimacy and authority; to vilify and smear the government, police and judiciary; to portray their own operators as "heroic freedom-fighters", or "soldiers" of liberation and to inspire others to join the terrorist movement and encourage existing activists to commit further outrages.

As emphasized above, advertising the cause is a basic objective of both revolutionary and non-revolutionary terrorism. Through the publication of the violence and drama associated with its acts, a terrorist organization can draw attention to its existence, its goals, and its enemies (Amos and Stolfil, 1982, p. 74). By staging acts that ensure national and international attention, terrorists are able to gain recognition and project themselves as a group that must be listened to and considered a credible political force (Wardlaw, 1982, p. 38). As Goldenberg (1975, p. 1) notes:

Through the media issues are frequently brought to the attention of the public and of government officials. News coverage is used by groups in gaining status and visibility, in expanding the scope of conflict in reinforcing attitudes, in activating third parties on their behalf and in gaining a hearing in the political process. In effect media attention is itself a political resource.

Terrorists and the Media

The use of terrorism as an attention-getting, consciousness-raising technique derives its impetus from the "propaganda par le fait" activities of 19th Century anarchists. According to the well-known historian of anarchism, George Woodcock (1962), the concept of propaganda by the deed can be traced back to an Italian, Carlo Pisane, who had written that ideas emanate from deeds and that intellectual propaganda was an empty gesture. It was Paul Brasse, however, an early French anti-parliamentarian, who coined the term "propagande par le fait" (Stafford, 1971). Brasse argued that propaganda disseminated by way of newsletters, public meetings and pamphlets was of limited value. The message could be countered by the lies of the bourgeois press and distorted by bourgeois orators. Moreover, he suggested that the hard-working and largely illiterate masses had little time or inclination to attend to intellectual debate or literature. This situation forced revolutionaries to find new means of drawing attention and

adherents to their cause. What was necessary, according to Brasse and his disciples, was a practical demonstration, an exemplary deed, which could not be ignored and would awaken the consciousness of the masses.

Peter Kropotkin, a leading ideologist of the anarchist movement in the 1870's, was clearly aware of the potential of what was later to be called armed propaganda. Kropotkin suggested that:

By actions which can compel general attention, the new idea seeps into people's minds and converts. One such act may in a few days make more propaganda than a thousand pamphlets. Above all it awakens the spirit of revolt. (Iviansky, 1977, p. 45).

Contemporary terrorists recognize the benefits of extensive publicity for their actions. Carlos Marighella (1971, p. 87) expected that the exemplary deed would, when made known by the media, mobilize all sorts of discontents. By simply reporting the news of a successful guerrilla payroll robbery, for example, the media would provide a free advertisement for the revolution. Furthermore, he insisted, people would get ideas and follow the example. Similarly, in their book Prairie Fire the Weather Underground (1974) declared that armed actions push forward

people's consciousness and commitment and are a great teacher and example.

Modern terrorists, like their 19th Century anarchist counterparts, have sought by their activities to create news, cognizant that established news organizations will report their actions and deeds for them and communicate their existence, ideas and power to the general public. As Livingstone (1982, p. 59) has noted, all terrorists need to do ~~is~~ produce an event and the news media will do the rest.

Transnational terrorist groups have been some of the most successful practitioners of the propaganda of the deed, with the various Palestinian groups setting the example. Perhaps the first great media extravaganza perpetrated by a Palestinian organization was the simultaneous hijacking of three airliners and 276 passengers to Dawson Field in Jordan, where the planes were eventually destroyed. As Schmid and de Graaf (1982, p. 28) have noted, for the entire six day duration of the incident, and for some days after, the attention of the entire Western world was riveted on the Jordanian desert. In the words of a local Peoples Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) leader, this event was "a direct assault on the consciousness of international opinion".

By far the greatest "media event" orchestrated to date by the Palestinians, or any other group, was the seizure of Israeli athletes during the Munich Olympics in 1972. This incident, which took place in front of a large contingent of reporters from around the world, turned into a media extravaganza with live television coverage both from the Olympic Village where the hostages were being held and from the airport as the Black September terrorists were leaving with their hostages. Kelly and Mitchell (1981, p. 283) in their study of press coverage of terrorism noted the preoccupation of two of the world's elite dailies, the New York Times and The Times of London, with this incident. Perhaps more important from the standpoint of the perpetrators was the massive television audience captured by this event, which has been estimated at between 500 million (Clutterbuck, 1982, p. 82) and 800 million (Commer, 1972, p. 13).

The PLO has gone to extreme lengths to attract and maintain the attention of the world media, in many cases adding jolting embellishments to what might otherwise have been rather straightforward guerrilla actions (Watson, 1976, p. 55). To some extent this strategy has proven to be highly successful in heightening its profile on the world

scene, to the point where other channels of expression become available (Bell, 1978, p. 38). There is little doubt that it was partly through the political impacts of his terrorist activities that Yassir Arafat was granted a forum at the United Nations.

Other groups, buoyed by the Palestinian experience, have also used terrorism to draw international attention to themselves. Before the train hijackings in the Netherlands few people in the world had ever heard of the South Moluccan Islands. Similarly, before the April 1980 seizure of the Iranian Embassy in London, few people likely knew of the existence of an Arab minority in Iran. Reference has already been made to the use of terrorism by Armenian dissidents to bring the killing of 1.5 million Armenians by the Turkish Government in 1917 to world attention.

Croatian dissidents have also used the international media to draw attention to their crusade for the liberation of their homeland from Yugoslavia, largely through attacks on Yugoslav Embassies and Consulates. Perhaps the most spectacular incident of Croatian terrorism occurred on September 10, 1976 when five Croatians hijacked a Transworld Airlines flight out of Chicago. According to Bell (1978, p. 11) for the price of five one-way tickets from Chicago to New

York, one real bomb, some fake bombs and some pamphlets, worth perhaps \$500 in all, they received publicity worth millions of dollars if placed as prime time advertisements. The Croats issued written demands and a 3500 word manifesto and stipulated that both texts had to appear in their entirety in the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, the Chicago Tribune and the International Herald Tribune.²² Moreover, the Croats demanded that their pamphlets be dropped over New York, Montreal and Chicago. After releasing some of the hostages in Newfoundland, the terrorists forced the pilot to fly to Europe; where further pamphlets were dropped over London and Paris. According to Schmid and de Graaf (1982, p. 35), the terrorists explained the purpose of their hijacking as an effort to communicate their grievances to the world. At the conclusion of the incident in Paris, one of the hijackers was heard to exclaim "That's show biz".

Access to the international media has been a particularly important consideration of terrorists engaged in an anti-colonial struggle, even determining to a significant extent the location of their activities. Abone Randome, the man responsible for having moved Algerian guerrilla warfare from the countryside to the city, made the observation that the act of killing ten French people in the desert went unnoticed while the killing of one French person on a busy

street in Algiers received extensive coverage in the international press (Gauches, 1965, p. 262).

A major media objective of many of the groups engaged in a struggle against a colonial power has been to convey a sense of futility in the overseas capital by portraying the struggle as costly and not winnable. Miller (1982, p. 20), for example, has suggested that wars against colonial masters are as likely to be won by turning around public opinion in the dominating states as on the battle field. The Irgun in Palestine in 1949 and the FLN in Algeria provide successful examples of this strategy. Another interesting example is found in the efforts of Cypriot terrorists to expel the British from their island. EOKA (the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters), in a backhanded strategy, assassinated British soldiers to provoke reprisals against the population in order to induce the media to report the repressiveness of colonial rule. The objective was to alienate foreign publics from the British government (Schmid and de Graaf, 1982, p. 19). While the military losses of the British were relatively small, the public pressure and the political repercussions were sufficient to cause a British withdrawal from Cyprus. The IRA's campaign of terrorism in both Ulster and the

United Kingdom is designed to have a similar impact on the British presence in Ireland.

Propaganda and media manipulation are also central elements of terrorism directed at the overthrow of a domestic regime. Many domestic groups in the early stages of their insurgency focus their attacks on symbolic targets while attempting to provide a critique of the current state of the regime or the socio-economic order. This has been the case with groups such as the Red Brigades in Italy, the Red Army Faction in Germany, the Weather Underground and the New World Liberation Front in the U.S.A. An excellent example of this kind of activity was the bombing campaign of the Angry Brigade in the United Kingdom, which was largely undertaken in an attempt to direct attention to the Brigade's critique of contemporary capitalism and its inherently repressive culture. The group also hoped to shake the working class from its attitude of apathetic acceptance and to promote revolutionary rank and file activity (Chibnall, 1977, p. 103). Another group, the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA), probably never numbering more than a dozen individuals, managed through a genius for media manipulation to occupy the attention of the American public for almost two years. Similarly, Uruguay's Tupermaros demonstrated substantial artistry in manipulating the media. This group engaged in

several incidents which gave it a Robin Hood image, attracting widespread public support before it was quashed in a military coup.

Terrorists have used the media to communicate both their destructive power and the vulnerability of society, and to create a climate of fear, social disorientation and capitulation (Kuppérman, 1982, p. 24; Hickey, 1978, p. 111). As Schmid and de Graaf (1982, p. 53) have argued, terrorists use the media as a vehicle for translating the physical violence against one individual into psychic violence against millions. With respect to the kidnapping of Aldo Moro by the Red Brigades, they have suggested:

The nature of modern mass media, their ability to make the experience of one simultaneously the experience of millions, transformed Moro's murder into thirteen million murders on Italy's as many television screens and into 56 million murders in the eyes of the Italian people. Of all the terrorist uses of the media, this, the use of amplification and magnification by the media is the most important one. It gives contemporary insurgent terrorism much of its power and, by implication, its *raison d'être*.

While recognition for the cause and, in some cases, fear generation are the major publicity objectives of terrorist undertakings, terrorists from Kropotkin to Marighella have also recognized other important functions of publicity. One is the recruitment value inherent in the publicity accruing

to terrorist activities. Schmid and de Graaf (1982, p. 51) have suggested that, by reporting the exploits of the Red Brigades and giving the life history of its goals and strategies, the media contributed greatly to the recruitment of new members to its ranks. It has also been suggested that thousands of Palestinians joined the ranks of the PLO after the Munich incident (Hacker, 1976, p. 168).

Publicity also serves to build morale and inspire confidence among the members of a group through the establishment of celebrity status (Watson, 1976, p. 17). Another contribution of publicity surrounding the "exemplary deed", as Marighella has noted, is to inspire emulation among followers and potential followers. Kazo Okamoto, the JRA terrorist captured and sentenced to life imprisonment for his part in the Lod Airport Massacre on May 30, 1972, claimed in his testimony: "The Arab world lacks spiritual fervour; we the Japanese Red Army felt that through this attempt we could probably stir up the Arab world". According to Wilkinson (1977, p. 112), situationist and anarchist terrorist groups frequently use the propaganda of the deed to arouse and heighten the popular consciousness of state and capitalist oppression and to induce others to undertake such actions. Indeed, this seems to have been one of the fundamental objectives of the bombings of the Direct Action group at the

hydroelectric station on Vancouver Island and at the Litton Industries plant in Toronto.

Techniques of Media Manipulation

Given the fundamental importance of publicity to terrorist strategy, a public relations assessment has almost become a prerequisite to any terrorist plan. Just as Luchent, the assassin of Empress Elizabeth, was concerned that one must kill someone important so that it gets into the papers (Tuchman, 1966), the modern-day terrorist appears to be preoccupied with selecting targets and devising tactics that will provide him with maximum media exposure. This evaluative process is called, in the rhetoric of the Tupermaros, a diagnosis of the coyuntura, or the political, economic and military and organizational conditions of both society and the social movement.

Jenkins (1975, p. 4) and Kupperman (1982, p. 27) suggest that terrorists choreograph their violence while Bell (1978, p. 48) suggests that they script it. Wardlaw (1982, p. 38) refers to them as stage managing their spectacles for maximum audience impact. Indeed, considerations about obtaining media exposure have become a major factor influencing the intensity and duration of

terrorist events as well as where they take place (Bell, 1978, p. 48). The availability of communications facilities largely conditions the terrorist's choice of locale.²³ For example, it has been suggested that the terrorists involved in the seizure of the Iranian Embassy in London chose it as the site of their TV spectacular because they believed London's media coverage to be the best in the world for their purposes. With its large number of Arab and other Islamic residents and visitors, London is one of the largest sources of Arabic journals in the world. These represent every shade of political opinion, with the result that London has come to be known as the information capital of the Middle East (Observer Staff, 1980, p. 31). Other terrorists have chosen events such as the OPEC Ministers' conference or the Munich Olympics because of the extensive media presence already in place.

Efforts by terrorists to manipulate the media are evincing an increasing degree of sophistication. Like the Tupermaros, many groups conduct an extensive media impact assessment of their planned activities. According to Schmid and de Graaf (1982, p. 51), the Red Brigades in Italy preferred Wednesdays and Saturdays for their operations, knowing that on Thursdays and Sundays papers were thicker and

had higher circulation figures. Moreover, they simultaneously called several papers and broadcasting stations in various towns, inciting the media to compete against each other. In this way, they were able to induce papers to bring special editions to the streets and radio stations to interrupt their regular programs in an effort to be first with the story.

Greer (1982, p. 68) has cited a similar level of media sophistication on the part of the Irish Republican Army, suggesting that the bombing in London on October 10, 1981 was timed so as to catch the weekend television news and the Sunday newspapers. An analysis of IRA bombings in 1974, cited by Clutterbuck (1982a, p. 92), suggested that over 80 percent were timed to attain maximum coverage on television news. Clutterbuck goes on to suggest that similar timing was planned for shooting incidents designed to provoke the army. These, would be timed so that the IRA's pre-drafted story, amended as necessary, could be issued to the press in time for news bulletins or newspaper deadlines - but carefully calculated so that police or army accounts would be too late. The IRA has become very adept at manipulating the media, as indicated by the use it has made of hunger strikes, funeral marches and clandestine press conferences.

In perhaps the most direct approach to media use, the Tupermaròs, unwilling to rely on the whims of the media, periodically hijacked radio stations and used them to transmit revolutionary messages to listeners. On one occasion they interrupted a soccer match in the middle of a broadcast and substituted their own programming. On another they took control of the FM station which provided the background music to local department stores, replacing the music with propaganda statements (Porzecanski, 1974, p. 43).

SUMMARY

This chapter has examined some of the definitional and conceptual problems which have posed obstacles to theoretical advances in the study of terrorism. It has argued for a theoretical approach to terrorism related to theories of collective violence which views the phenomenon as a political resource employed by groups and individuals to enhance their political leverage. Terrorism is conceptualized as an instrumental activity designed to achieve a psychological impact on a target population as a means of producing a political climate conducive to the attainment of either broad or specific objectives. The perceived instrumentality of terrorism is essentially unrelated to any questions of

justification which have tended to obscure much of the academic and legal scholarship on this issue. Irrespective of one's position on terrorism, it is difficult to deny that it is a form of political behaviour.

Implicit in the theoretical approach offered in this chapter is the idea that terrorism is above all a strategy, the success of which is highly dependent on media exposure. Through media recognition resourceless dissidents can project an image of credibility and power and develop the ability to influence and terrorize. Contemporary terrorism is, therefore, an exercise in media manipulation, a consideration which should be fundamental to any discussion of the public policy implications of various aspects of media coverage.

In the following chapter an in-depth examination will be made of some of the many controversies surrounding the media's coverage of terrorism. This will serve as a prelude to an empirical examination of some of these questions.

1 In reality few of these hijackings would actually constitute political terrorism as defined in the majority of the academic literature. Most Cuba to U.S. hijackings were of a purely instrumental nature, i.e. the hijacker was concerned solely with fleeing Cuba and not with the broader political implications of the act. On the other hand, the available evidence suggests that a majority of the U.S. to Cuba hijackings were carried out by criminals or individuals suffering from psychopathological disturbances. See Hubbard (1971).

2 Attempts to define terrorism within the context of domestic law have not encountered political divisions to the same extent as have international efforts. The results, however, have not contributed to the quest for definitional clarity. The ambiguity of some legal efforts to define terrorism is aptly demonstrated by the Texas Legislature's enactment in 1973 of a criminal offence entitled Terroristic Threat. This act provides punishment for those who threaten to commit:

any offense involving violence or any person or property with intent to 1. cause a reaction of any type to this threat by an official or volunteer agency organized to deal with emergencies; 2. place any person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury; or 3. prevent or interrupt the occupation or use of a building; room; place of assembly; place to which the public has access; place of employment or occupation; aircraft; automobile, or other form of conveyance; or other public place. (Texas Penal Code, Section 22.07(a), effective January 1, 1974).

This bill could ostensibly cover, particularly under subsection 3, a wide range of nonviolent and violent political activities from sit-ins to hostage takings.

3 In December 1985, the General Assembly adopted a resolution unequivocally condemning all criminal acts, practices and methods of terrorism. At the same time, however, it reaffirmed each people's inalienable right to self determination, and the legitimacy of struggles against colonial and racist regimes and other forms of alien

domination. The debates preceding and following the adoption of this resolution make clear that many states continue to believe that "wars of national liberation" justify or excuse terrorist acts. See Sofaer (1986, p. 905).

⁴ The media have also been criticized for their one-sided use of the term terrorism. Epstein (1977), in a content analysis of the coverage of political violence in Latin America by three North American newspapers during 1970-71, concluded that terrorism was generally used as an expression of "left wing extremism" referring to political kidnappings, bombings and assassinations by anti-government organizations. Epstein strenuously objected to the fact that many of the repressive activities of Latin American governments such as the disappearances, the torture of political prisoners and assassinations by government sponsored death squads, while undertaken with the same intention to intimidate as those underlying the left wing activities, were seldom called terrorism.

⁵ Thornton's definition of terrorism also focuses on its extranormal quality. According to Thornton the use of terror is the upper level of a continuum of political agitation, above political violence such as riots. It is the extranormal nature of the use of terror that distinguishes it from other forms of political violence.

⁶ This is based on the definition of terrorism used in Kelly and Mitchell (1983).

⁷ There exists a great deal of confusion in the literature with respect to the terms "transnational" and "international terrorism". In many cases the two are used interchangeably to describe groups that operate across international boundaries. However, the term international terrorism has also frequently been used (Crozier, 1974, Jenkins, 1974, Kelly and Mitchell, 1983) to describe terrorism supported and controlled by a nation state as part of a process of surrogate warfare against an enemy or enemies. Libya, Syria, Iraq and Iran, among others, have frequently been accused of employing terrorist groups in this fashion.

⁸ For an examination of the linkages among terrorist groups see Sterling (1981) and Alexander (1979).

⁹ A similar position is taken by Cooper (1977c) who argues that neither politics nor ideology make a terrorist. Both of these, he suggests, are rationalizations for terrorism while the seeds of terrorism are in people's souls rather than their brains.

¹⁰ Some interesting contradictory evidence is offered by Elliot and Lockhart (1980) who have shown in the research in Northern Ireland that despite remarkably similar socio-economic backgrounds, juvenile scheduled offenders (broadly those found guilty of terrorist related offenses) in their study were more intelligent, had higher educational attainments, showed less evidence of early development problems and had fewer court appearances than ordinary juvenile delinquents.

¹¹ While rational actor models are becoming quite common in political science (see Muller, 1974), there have been few explicit applications of them in the study of terrorism. Two studies of note are Corsi (1981) and Sandler, Tscherhart and Cauley (1982). The latter study characterizes terrorists as engaging in legal activities to further their cause or planning and executing an illegal activity. The choice of activity in their view is dependent on the cost that must be paid to engage them.

¹² The risk aversion is further demonstrated by the findings of a study of terrorist bombings undertaken by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The study noted that over 60% of such incidents involved the placement of a bomb away from the target, or against a wall, a windowsill or a door, places where there was little risk of detection or confrontation. See Mengel (1976, p. 460).

13 Despite the fact that many terrorists attribute to themselves the label suicide commandos, few would appear to be suicidal. Corsi (1981) suggests that only about one percent of terrorists could be classified as suicidal. Testimony to this effect comes from Gabriel Hudon (1977, p. 74) an early member of the FLQ, who wrote:

Que dire des commandos suicide? Je n'en ai pas connu un seul et, dois je preciser, je n'en etait pas un moi meme. Plusieurs d'entre nous etions certainement dispose a nous battre les armees a la main et a en accepter tous les risques, mais il n'y avait pas dans cette determination un quel conque esprit suicidaire.

14 A political resource is usually defined as anything that can be used by an individual or group to gain access and influence in a particular political system. Such resources include: 1. money and credit; 2. control over jobs; 3. control over the information of others; 4. status; 5. knowledge and expertise; 6. popularity, esteem, charisma; 7. legality, constitutionality, officiality; 8. cohesion; 9. the right to vote; 10. overlapping membership with targets; 11. size; 12. feelings of political efficacy; 13. location; 14. legitimacy in the eyes of public, target, third parties - brought about by the group image as representative and moral; 15. credibility (of claims and threats) - whether at polls or in the streets - brought about by attitudes expressed by members and leaders, past behaviour, lack of other options, public declaration and commitment; 16. visibility; and, 17. intensity of feeling. For a comprehensive discussion of the concept of political resources see Dahl (1960).

15 This proposition has received widespread support in the literature on revolution. See for example Janos (1964), Timasheff (1965) and Calvert (1970).

16 Ariel Merari (1978, pp. 335-339), offers a list of the tactical/operational goals of terrorist organizations on the basis of whether the terrorists are engaged in transnational or domestic activities. He lists the tactical goals of transnational terrorists as being: 1. Attraction of international attention; 2. Harming the relations of the target country with other nations; 3. Induction of insecurity, damaging the economy and public order in the target country; 4. Building feelings of distrust and hostility toward the government among the target country's population; and, 5. Causing actual damage to civilians, security forces and property in the target country. For Merari the tactical objectives of domestic terrorists are 1. Undermining internal security, public order and the economy in order to create distrust in the government's ability to maintain control; 2. Acquiring popular support and sympathy by positive action; 3. Generating popular repulsion from extreme counterterrorists repressive measures; 4. Damaging hated foreign interest; 5. Harming the international position of the existing regime; and 6. Causing physical damage and harassing persons and institutions that represent the ruling regime.

17 In recent years the use of terrorism in the context of the internecine struggle within the Palestinian movement has become quite common. Various extremist Palestinian factions have been engaged in terrorist attacks against more moderate factions as exemplified by the assassination of Sarvati, a leading Palestinian moderate, in 1982.

18 See Savoie (1963, p. 37)

19 Perhaps the best description of this process is found in Arendt (1963).

20 According to Goldenberg (1975, p. 144) the group resources most important for gaining media access are a) status and officiality; b) location; c) information and knowledge; d) money; e) size, legitimacy and intensity; and f) credibility.

21 Examples of newspapers published by terrorist groups have included La Congee (FLQ), Combatiente and Estrella Roja (Argentina), Osawatomi (Weather Underground), The Urban Guerrilla and The Dragon (New World Liberation Front)

22 The use of hijacking and kidnapping as a means of media blackmail has in fact been quite common. In 1970 the FLQ used the Cross and Laporte kidnappings as bases for forcing the broadcast and publication of their manifesto. In 1975 Montenegro terrorists in Buenos Aires kidnapped the industrial director of the German Mercedes Benz Corporation, releasing him after extracting several concessions from the company, in particular the publication of advertisements in newspapers in Europe, Washington and Mexico denouncing the economic imperialism of multinational corporations (Alexander, 1979, p. 162). A year later, a guerrilla organization called the Revolutionary Command kidnapped William Niehouse, an American general manager for the Venezuelan subsidiary of the Owens Illinois Company. The terrorists demanded that a "political manifesto" be published by the company in leading newspapers or Niehouse would be executed. The company subsequently placed an ad containing the manifesto in the New York Times, The Times of London and Le Monde of Paris (Editor and Publisher, 1976; 10). More recently, the Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers (PRTC) kidnapped two American employees of Beckman Industries in San Salvador and used them to blackmail the company into buying double page ads in the Los Angeles Times and the New York Times, as well as several Central American and European papers denouncing American imperialism. The cost of the ad in the New York Times alone was \$30,960.

23 This is perhaps one reason for the large number of acts of transnational terrorism in Western Europe. Recent CIA Estimates (1982) suggest that between 1968 and 1982, 33 percent of all incidents of transnational terrorism occurred in Western Europe.

CHAPTER 2

THE MEDIA AND TERRORISM: CRITICISMS AND CONCERNS

This Chapter will examine some of the major criticisms of the way that the media have responded to and covered terrorist incidents, and will review the quantitative and qualitative literature on which they are based. Particular attention will be focused on the nature of the interaction between terrorists and journalists, and on the factors that make the media susceptible to terrorist exploitation. It will focus on the two major areas of controversy in media coverage of terrorism. The first of these concerns the amount and type of attention that the media devote to terrorism. The second comprises some of the thorny questions surrounding contemporaneous coverage of terrorist incidents which have resulted in widespread accusations of media irresponsibility. This Chapter will also look at some of the putative social and political consequences of terrorism coverage.

THE MEDIA/TERRORISM RELATIONSHIP

Of the numerous types of events covered by the media, few have raised as many difficult ethical, moral and legal

questions as terrorism. The growth and spread of terrorism in the last decade have brought intense scrutiny to bear on the interaction between terrorism and media coverage.¹ The result is an on-going, and frequently vitriolic, debate between critics and defenders of media coverage and behavior. Some critics have gone so far as to lay the responsibility for the growth of present day terrorism at the feet of the media, suggesting that lavish media coverage gives terrorists a raison d'être and makes terrorism a viable political strategy. Others vigorously discount any relationship between media coverage and terrorism, maintaining that coverage of such events is necessary and compatible with the public's right to know.

Among the harshest critics of media coverage of terrorism, is Laqueur (1976, p. 104), who argues that the media are "the terrorists' best friend". Hacker (1976, p. 161) has alleged that the mass media willingly serve as the propaganda agents of terrorism. Smart (1972, p. 234) accuses the media of assisting terrorists at every step by "informing them of potential targets, reporting their acts, according them status and giving credibility to subsequent menaces". Podhoretz (1980, p. 86) has ventured that the media have been in collusion with terrorists and have helped to make it a successful political weapon in our time. Similarly, the U.S.

National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards (1976, p. 9) has alleged that in many ways the modern-day terrorist is the very creation of the media. Hubbard (cited in Hickey 1978, p. 89) has also placed much of the onus for terrorism directly on the media. Impugning its morality, he quotes a hijacker he examined: "television is a whore; any man who wants her full favours can have them in five minutes with a pistol".

A somewhat more cautious assessment of the terrorism/media relationship is offered by Miller (1982, p. 5). He suggests that, while terrorism as we have come to know it is, to some extent, a creation of the news media, the media are in fact unwitting accomplices of the terrorist. Among those who defend the media against allegations that they support and encourage terrorism, it is popular to look upon the media as being victimized by the terrorists. The phrase "highjacking the media" is used.² Characteristic of this position is Jenkins' (1977, p. 4) view that the news media are responsible for terrorism to about the same extent that commercial aviation is responsible for hijacking. In his opinion, the vast communications network is simply another vulnerability in a technologically advanced and free society.

It is difficult, however, to view the media as playing only a responsive role in contemporary terrorism, given the fundamental symbiosis, or coincidence of interest, that appears to exist between reporters and news editors on the one hand and terrorists on the other. This symbiosis is based on the putative news-value of terrorism. Schmid and de Graaf (1982, p. 72), for example, have described the relationship between the terrorist news-promoter and the professional journalist news-assembler as the result of "parallel event needs".³ Terrorists need the publicity that the media affords their activities as a basis for attaining their political objectives. At the same time, the availability of attention-getting content inherent in acts of terrorism serves the audience-attracting needs of the communications industry and has contributed, in recent years, to the success of the media in a business sense (Catton, 1978, p. 713). For this reason, reporters and terrorists tend to collaborate instinctively. Both parties have a common interest in reaching a large audience. Both want attention. Terrorism provides the media with real life drama, sensational events, visual excitement and something of the vicarious thrill of the battlefield as the terrorists confront the forces of law and order (Wilkinson, 1978, p. 3). Perhaps Calbraith (1981, p. 42) in his study of the media and the Ku Klux Klan offers the most succinct depiction of the

type of symbiotic embrace that many suggest describes the relationship between terrorists and the media:

The Klan provides the press with a sensationalist topic that it can cover under the guise of watching out for the public interest, in return the Klan gets help from the press in achieving its nefarious goals.

It is clear that because of this symbiosis the media do more than simply respond to terrorist incidents. Rather, media coverage has become an essential and integral part of these events.

Reporting Terrorism

Terrorism As News

The symbiotic relationship described above is predicated on the news value of violent activity. Clutterbuck (1973, p. 245) has observed that nothing is so newsworthy as violence. A radio news reporter, interviewed by Jackson et. al. (1976, p. 282) in their study of civil violence in the Ontario media, bluntly echoed this view, saying: "violence is news - N.E.W.S. - do I have to spell it out for you?" Similarly, Hall (1973, p. 184) has argued that the most salient operational news-value in the domain of political news is that of violence.

News-value, however, is an ambiguous concept. Lemert (1974), in his study of the news content of U.S. network newscasts, found news selection according to news-value to be done almost intuitively in the absence of any clear cut rules. Nevertheless, he found that, despite the lack of clear guidelines, different media competing for the same audience and with similar institutional structures tended to produce highly uniform news. In his study, 70 percent of the stories used in the newscasts of the two networks he examined were found to be identical.

While the concept of news-value may be highly problematic, few journalists would deny its existence or the importance that it exerts on media representations and accounts of reality. This has led communications scholars to try to delineate some of the major factors which cause an event to be deemed newsworthy. Perhaps the most widely cited work in this area is the seminal study by Galtung and Ruge (1973). In this work, the authors attempt to set forth some of the basic considerations used by the media in their determination of news-value. Included in their list are factors such as recentness, intensity, rarity, unpredictability, clarity, ethnocentricity, continuity, elite nations and persons, personalization, and negativity.

Detailed lists of the properties of events which increase the likelihood that an item will be perceived as newsworthy have also been provided by Chibnall (1977, p. 23) and Peterson (1979, p. 124). Chibnall offers a list of eight "professional imperatives" which, he suggests, act as implicit guides to the construction of news stories: immediacy, dramatization, personalization, simplification, titillation, conventionalism, structured access and novelty. Peterson's scheme includes frequency, threshold, unambiguity, consonance, unexpectedness, personalization and negativity.

It is quite obvious that political violence fits many of the criteria of newsworthiness specified by the authors cited. It is unexpected, negative, immediate, easily dramatized, unambiguous, unpredictable, subject to personalization in terms of victims and perpetrators, novel and, perhaps most of all, titillating. Moreover, in the case of terrorism, it frequently involves elite people such as Aldo Moro, Patricia Hearst.⁴

The high news-value of political violence and especially terrorism has also been related to the structural biases inherent in different media. In particular, it is suggested that the technical possibilities of the various media determine newsworthiness and impose news preferences. For

example, according to both Murdock (1973, p. 173) and Mankiewicz and Swerlow (1978, p. 77) it is imperative that television news be visually attractive. In this context, Hickey (1977, p. 112) has noted that some terrorist incidents, which receive back page treatment in the press, receive prominent treatment in television newscasts because of their visual drama and excitement. Visual aspects determine television newsworthiness to such an extent that, in many cases, the few scenes of violence that occur in a lengthy and otherwise peaceful demonstration are likely to be the main focus of media exposure. Schmid and de Graaf (1982, p. 38) quote the editor of a U.S. national television network as explaining "our job is to cut all the dead wood and dull moments".

Not only do technical possibilities determine what is news, they also prescribe a particular form to news stories. Epstein (1975, p. 204) has suggested that network news stories must be self contained, with a beginning in which the protagonists are identified in a few words and pictures, a climax in which some visual action takes place, and a denouement in which the conflict is resolved. Furthermore, in order to retain the interest of the national audience, he suggests network news must be constructed around visual elements that have universal appeal. For example, fires,

riots, bloodshed, and armed confrontations, no matter where they occur, can be comprehended at a very basic level by viewers in all parts of the country.

Terrorism is ideally suited to television news. As Bowyer Bell (1978, p. 50) has pointed out, the terrorist scenario contains drama, blood, villains, heroes and innocents in a sensational mix which corresponds to the characteristics of television news stories. He goes on to argue that the medium cannot help broadcasting a story that seems to be tailored to fit its standards. Livingstone (1982, p. 62) offers a concurrent viewpoint, suggesting that, unlike wars and most revolutions, which are usually protracted and highly complex events that are too broad in scope to be grasped readily and easily understood, acts of terrorism normally have a beginning and an end, can be accommodated in a few minutes of air time, possess a large degree of drama and involve participants who are ideally suited to media exploitation.

There is little doubt that terrorism's news-value is also grounded in commercial considerations. Instant books and movies on events such as Entebbe are only one indication of commercial value of terrorist incidents.⁵ There is also some evidence that terrorism news sells newspapers. Schmid

and de Graaf (1982, p. 68) offer, for example, an indication of the commercial value of the Moro kidnapping. According to the authors, the circulation figures of the Italian paper La Stampa increased by 35 percent in the course of the week after the kidnapping of Aldo Moro; Italy's biggest daily, Il Corriere sold 38.8 percent more copies the day Moro was kidnapped, the second day sales were up 40 percent and on the third, eventless, day they were still 19.6 percent higher than usual. When Moro was found dead, the figures increased to 56.5 percent, dropping back to 24.7 percent the next day.

Greer (1982, p. 68) has pointed out that under the conditions of severe competition in which all of the media operate today, a primary consideration of publishers, editors, camera teams and reporters is attracting audience attention. The frequency with which news clips of terrorism and political violence are used as teasers for the evening news indicates the attitudes of news editors concerning its drawing power. Terrorist onslaughts, as Van der Vat (1982, p. 25) has argued, make news, sell newspapers, and draw millions to the television set, adding handsomely to the profits of media owners, advertisers, and shareholders. Bob Ferrante (Arlen, 1977, p. 20) News Director of WGBH TV in Boston has stated " ... the news departments justify the coverage of terrorism by saying that news is news and the

sales department is thrilled to death". While it may seem extremely simplistic to explain the media's interest in terroristic activity and other violence by commercial profit motives alone, it is a factor that cannot be easily dismissed. This is particularly true of the popular press and the electronic media, which derive their income from advertisements based on audience ratings.

It is, therefore, the media's news-value system that make them susceptible to terrorist manipulation. By providing the media with dramatic events, terrorists have been able to captivate and co-opt editors and journalists, to force their way onto the public agenda and to circumvent the normal political process. They have become masters of what Boorstein (1976) has called the "pseudo event". Boorstein spoke of the pseudo event as a synthetic novelty; arguing that it is not a spontaneous happening but comes about because someone has planned, planted or incited it. Moreover, it is planted primarily for the immediate purpose of being reported or reproduced and it is thus arranged for the convenience of the reporting or reproducing media.

CHARACTERISTICS OF MEDIA COVERAGE OF TERRORISM

While there are some who question the intrinsic newsworthiness of terrorism because of its synthetic nature, the most controversial question is not whether incidents of terrorism merit news coverage but the nature of that coverage. Critics have charged that the media have provided terrorists with coverage out of all proportion to the importance of their activities, sensationalized and glamorized terrorists and terrorists' exploits and turned terrorism coverage into mass entertainment by stripping the political and historical context from events.

The Overemphasis on Terrorism Coverage

The question of whether the media overemphasizes the coverage of terrorism is conceptually, and hence empirically, difficult to examine. Opinion on this matter ranges widely. For example a Gallup Poll conducted in the United States in April of 1977 found an almost even split between those who thought the news media overemphasized terrorism and those who thought that this coverage was necessary to keep the public fully informed (de Boer, 1979).

There would appear to be a similar division among those who pretend some expertise in the area. Johnpoll (1977, p. 157) has suggested that there is no evidence that the media in the U.S. or in most other western democratic nations have overplayed terrorist activities. Moreover, he argues that a careful perusal of terrorism coverage (which he did not undertake) would indicate that it was kept to a minimum, even underplayed at times. Those who voice the opposite opinion tend to base their assertions on anecdotal evidence related to spectacular incidents of terrorism. For example, Watson (1976), citing the the Munich incident in 1972 and the kidnapping of Patricia Hearst in 1974, has noted that both accounted for as much media time and space as some minor wars in the past. Several explicit illustrations of what are deemed to be "excessive" media coverage of terrorist incidents are offered by Schmid and de Graaf (1982, pp. 76-78). These include:

- During the 57 days of the Moro story the newspaper La Stampa dedicated the entire front page to the story for eleven days, while Il Giornale and La Repubblica did the same for thirteen and twelve days respectively.
- In covering the kidnapping of Berlin Mayoral candidate Peter Lorenz in 1975 the two most popular German papers Die Welt and Bild Zeitung devoted 42.8 percent and 72.5 percent respectively of their total political pages to the story (during the six days from Lorenz's kidnapping to his release and press conference). Other major German newspapers used between 31.7 percent (Stuttgarter Zeitung) and 36.7 percent (Frankfurter Rundschau) of their space.

- During the so called drama in the Mountain forest on February 28, 1972 when 3000 policemen stormed the place where Japanese Red Army terrorists were hiding, 3 out of 7 television stations in Tokyo covered the drama live during the ten hours and forty minutes. Among them was Nippon Haso Kyo Kai (NHK) the Japanese Broadcasting Corporation with its nationwide network. An estimated 70 million Japanese followed the coverage.

- During the Hanafi incident in Washington the Washington Star used the whole front page for reporting the March 1977 incident on the day it began. The Washington Post allowed just one more story on the front page. In the rest of the country the twelve gunmen made banner headlines.

Miller (1983, p. 31) has argued The Washington Post so overexposed the Hanafi incident that it relegated a major address by President Carter to the inside pages and put the Hanafis on the front page. He also points out that a local Washington station (WTOP-TV) spent between \$70,000 and \$75,000 to cover the incident. Moreover, NBC flew in camera crews from as far away as Chicago and Burbank to make up the 13 crews they used to cover the story. Miller notes that NBC spent 53 percent of its total evening network news time on the story, with ABC and CBS spending 40 percent and 30 percent of their respective news times on it.

In the absence of sound empirical criteria and more comparative evidence, the question of whether news coverage of specific terrorist incidents is excessive or appropriate to the need to keep people informed will remain a subjective

one. However, the debate has not addressed the question of whether the news coverage of terrorism reflects its actual occurrence. On this point there is some empirical evidence. For example, a study by Delli Carnini and Williams (1982) found that between 1969 and 1980 the media coverage of what they referred to as "international terrorism" varied in a random fashion, showing no relationship to the amount of terrorism occurring year in and year out. Terrorism was found to receive relatively large amounts of coverage in years in which there were few actual incidents, and little coverage in years with significant numbers of incidents. The authors also found that even when terrorism directly affected U.S. citizens, U.S. network coverage bore little relationship to actual events.

The findings of Delli Carnini and Williams concerning the randomness of media coverage of terrorism are consistent with those of some of the literature on the media and crime news (Davis, 1973).⁶ They raise some significant questions concerning the general self image of the western news media and dispute the media's assertion that it simply provides a mirror of reality, and is just reporting what has occurred. If this were indeed the case, then one might assume that changes in the actual rate of terrorism would be reflected in changes in the amount of news coverage that terrorism

receives in the media. The available evidence would seem to suggest, however, that the coverage of terrorism is independent of any occurrence of the phenomenon in the real world.

Glamorization of Terrorist Activities

The emphasis placed by the media on terrorist events is only one of the major issues of contention. Equally controversial is the character of the coverage. The media has been widely castigated for romanticizing and glamorizing terrorism. Many observers have expressed particular alarm at what they perceive as sympathetic portrayals of terrorists in the media, seeing this as a major source of support and recruitment for terrorist organizations (Livingstone, 1983, p. 64). Wilkinson (1980, p. 5), has decried the media characterization of some terrorists as Robin Hood types or social bandit heroes, stealing from the rich to give to the poor. After the two assassination attempts against President Gerald Ford in 1975, both houses of Congress attacked the media for glamorizing the assassination attempts and the would-be assassins. They attributed to this the rash of crank calls and threats against the President that followed the events (Editor and Publisher, October 4, 1975, p. 9). The U.S. National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards (1976) also expressed serious concern over the

media stressing the romantic, powerful and noble aspects of terrorism.

Much of the controversy surrounding the media's portrayal of terrorists and terrorism has focused on the labels used, specifically the uncritical adoption by the media of the terrorists' own vocabulary. Through labelling terrorists as independence groups, people's armies, liberation forces, guerrillas, nationalists, etc., it has been suggested that the media can confer legitimacy on a violent movement.⁷ According to Wilkinson (1980, p. 5):

... a serious and remarkably prevalent abuse has been the uncritical adoption by some sections of the media of the terrorists' own vocabulary, myths and rationale. To describe terrorists as guerrilla soldiers or freedom fighters flatters the terrorists' self esteem and misleads the public as to the real nature of their methods and their actual, political and legal status. When the press uses, without even the benefit of quotation marks, the terrorists' own terms to describe their murders - "execution", "an act of revolutionary justice", "revolutionary punishment for crimes against the people", etc... they are in effect becoming the tools and mouthpieces of the terrorist propaganda.

Wilkinson's concern is supported by Lafflin (1973, p. 113) who in discussing the publicity given to Arab terrorists has noted:

Fedayeen have had extraordinary good publicity in the West... being presented pretty much on their own terms as heroes and resistance fighters... a gallant few facing fearful odds. They were romanticized by the

media in the U.S., Britain and much of Europe to appear as idealistic dare-devils and die-hards.

The empirical evidence available would seem to cast suspicion on the contention that the media help to legitimize violent groups and their activities. Paletz et.al. (1982, p. 168), in an examination of the characterizations of terrorist groups in the U.S. media, found that over 70 percent of first referents to such groups in the media and 75 percent of the second referents were negative. They found that only 3.2 percent of the first referents were positive or sympathetic to the groups. This figure may actually be exaggerated due to the fact that the authors defined the translation of the Puerto Rican group the F.A.L.N. which is the Armed forces of National Liberation as a positive referent.⁸

The Appropriation of Terrorism as Entertainment

Another frequent criticism of media coverage of political violence, in general, and terrorism, in particular, is that it tends to be more oriented towards entertainment than information.⁹ This criticism was first widely voiced with respect to U.S. press coverage of American racial disturbances in the 1960s. The Report of the U.S. National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1968, p. 368) offered

an indictment of newspapers for being generally unwilling to publish stories that dealt with the underlying problems or issues related to racial disturbances. A related criticism was offered by Shepard Stone (1967, p.32) who suggested:

a race riot is news, but there was news, significant news in the city before the riot, news of the conditions and forces that lead to it. The U.S press has not seen the story. It has not reported the underlying facts.

Concerning the lack of context in press coverage of extraparliamentary political behavior, Whale (1971, p. 48) has suggested: "Journalists are better at reporting the fact than the matter of protests. The antics of nuclear disarmers were always better copy than their arguments". Jackson et. al. (1976) have addressed a similar criticism to the Canadian media's coverage of political violence.¹⁰ The same charge against the media has been leveled by Elliot (1976) in his study of the British media's coverage of Northern Ireland. This coverage, according to Elliot, tended to simplify violent incidents, avoid historical backgrounds, and present terrorism in the terms of human interest stories.

It has been argued that the event orientation of news coverage has resulted in a concentration on the form rather than the content of violent political opposition, stripping from it any apparent political rationale or historical context. Barthes (1972, p. 151) has described this process

as the miraculous evaporation of history from events. He suggests that, when cast as news stories, events tend to be denuded of the historical context and history of development which gives them meaning for their participants. It has further been suggested (Murdock 1973, p. 166; Chibnall 1977, p. 79) that the decontextualization of news facilitates the dramatization of various forms of violent dissent, including terrorism, and its ultimate appropriation as entertainment. In this vein, Kohl and Litt (1974) argue:

Urban Guerrillas have been presented in the media largely through their actions with no sense of their history, direction or social context. Diplomatic kidnappings and occasional hijackings are newsworthy events but their newsworthiness derives from the spectacle and the drama and thus the underlying relationship of the urban guerrilla to the revolutionary process is ignored. The act is often appropriated by the media, filtered through news angles and produced more as entertainment.

While Podhoretz's (1980) dissenting voice has argued that the social causes of terrorist groups are given undue attention by the media this, does not appear to correspond to the conclusions of a growing body of empirical evidence in this area. As noted, Jackson et. al. (1976) in their study of press coverage of political violence in Ontario found little attention on the underlying causes. Kelly and Mitchell (1981) in their study of transnational terrorism in the New York Times and The Times of London reached a similar

conclusion. More recently, Paletz et. al. (1982a) in a study of the evening news programs of three networks found that television news generally ignored the motivations, objectives and long term goals of violent organizations. In another study of newspaper coverage, Paletz and his associates (1982b), found that mention of the social, economic and political conditions prevailing in the country from which the group originated occurred in only 7 percent of the articles they surveyed.

Related to criticisms concerning the event orientation of news coverage, are those which focus on the lack of media attention on the post-dispositional process of the criminal justice system.¹¹ The U.S. National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards (1976, p. 403) noted the stark contrast in the amount of attention by the media to coverage of political violence and that devoted to the disposition of the cases of arrested participants. Its report suggested that the overall impression conveyed by the media was that involvement in those acts had few adverse consequences for criminal participants. Livingstone (1982; p. 71) has brought some empirical perspective to this issue. His random survey of various newspapers in Europe and the U.S. found that stories focusing on the punishment of terrorists received less than five percent as many column inches of space as

stories pertaining to the actual crimes with which the terrorists are charged.

NEWS GATHERING AND REPORTING PRACTICES

While the type of coverage that the media have accorded terrorism is a subject of considerable controversy, some of the news gathering and reporting activities of some members of the media have engendered equally contentious and heated debate. Critics have, on occasion, charged reporters with being in complicity with terrorists because of some of the activities they have undertaken in pursuit of a story. The media have also been accused of provoking violence through their presence on the scene, with interfering with police attempts to manage incidents, particularly hostage incidents, and with disseminating information that has endangered lives.

Complicity with Terrorists

There have been, in recent years, a number of occasions on which the media have been charged by critics with orchestrating or instigating or exacerbating violent incidents.¹² Schmid and de Graaf (1982, p. 36) have suggested that cameramen in their quest for sensational action film footage have on occasion encouraged the use of violence. Wilkinson (1982, p. 44) alleges that some journalists in Northern Ireland have paid youths to throw

petrol bombs and to stage attacks on security forces in order to obtain more sensational film.

Reporters have also on occasion become direct participants in terrorist activities. A reporter and photographer from Der Spiegel actually accompanied members of the Baader-Meinhoff gang in the attack and sacking of a house in Hamburg (Cooper, 1977a, p. 147; Grabosky, 1979, p. 58). In a similar case, the Provisional IRA invited an American television documentary group to accompany a terrorist team on a bombing run (Grabosky, 1979, 58; U.S. Senate, 1974-75, part 5, pp. 273-275). In yet another instance, a British television program Panorama cooperated with the Provisional IRA in filming a roadblock at Carrickmore (Wilkinson, 1980, p. 6). According to Wilkinson, the Provisionals wished to use the program to boast of their ability to operate with impunity in broad daylight in the middle of a Northern Ireland town without let or hindrance by the Royal Ulster Constabulary or the British Army. He suggests that this was a clear-cut case of the BBC lending one of its TV film crews to the PIRA to make the propaganda or recruiting film of the terrorists' choice.¹³

In other instances, the media have been accused of being accessories after the fact. In 1979, the BBC chose to

broadcast on its program Tonight a recorded film interview with a member of the Irish National Liberation Army who was one of the self-confessed murderers of Airey Neave, the Conservative spokesman for the Irish question. The BBC allowed the man's identity to remain undisclosed and enabled him to evade capture by the Police. This incident caused the British government to threaten legal action and resulted in a series of heated exchanges between the government and the management of the BBC.¹⁴

Contemporaneous Coverage of Terrorism

Incidents like those cited above are the exception. A much more common problem lies in the presence of the media at the scene of violent incidents. The behaviour of media representatives at the scene of terrorist events has engendered some rather vehement conflicts between the media and the police and raised some fundamental questions concerning the nature of press freedom.

The Heisenberg Effect

There are a number of potentially serious conflicts that can occur between the media and the police at the scene of a live terrorist incident such as a hostage taking or embassy siege. One of the most obvious is crowd control.

It has frequently been suggested that having a number of reporters with their obtrusive equipment and lighting at the site may physically interfere with the free movement of law enforcement personnel and attract crowds that burden police with crowd control problems and distract police decision-makers from their first priority (Bassiouni, 1982, p. 132). Critics have also charged that the presence of the media may alter the dynamic of the situation by, for example, encouraging the terrorist to remain barricaded to increase coverage or to demand a press conference to gain direct personal or political publicity (Bassiouni, 1982, p. 133).

The impact of live coverage on the outcome of terrorist incidents is a species of the Heisenberg effect¹⁵ and has been noted by many previous studies of civil violence and the media. The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders in its 1968 report indicated that most newsmen were aware and concerned that their very physical presence was capable of exacerbating a small disturbance. After the antiwar demonstrations at the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago, journalists were criticized for becoming part of the story and having instigated, through their presence, some acts of violence (Quill, 1977 July/August, p. 22). Evidence uncovered by the Royal Commission of Inquiry in Relation to the Conduct of the

Public and Metro Toronto Police in the Kosygen Affair (Viannini Inquiry 1972, pp. 66-67) suggested that the media, especially television crews, stimulated and added to some of the turmoil and confusion during the riot in front of the Ontario Science Centre. Furthermore, Jackson et. al. (1976) in their study for the Ontario Royal Commission on Violence in the Communications Industry found most of the newsmen to be aware that some of the violent behaviour of demonstrators/protesters is attributable to media presence.

According to the U.S. National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards (1978, p. 388), a species of the Heisenberg effect can be observed in the development of every major news story that requires contemporaneous coverage. The Task Force noted "subtly or blatantly the act of reporting changes the character of the events reported". A survey of senior Canadian police officials (Kelly, 1986) found that 65 percent of the respondents felt that the intrusion of cameras into a scene of civil disorder serves as a provocation to violence. Indeed, the CBC guidelines¹⁶ for the coverage of such incidents clearly recognize this problem:

The intrusion of cameras into a scene of riot or civil disorder raises complex problems, and places heavy responsibility on the broadcaster. There is every

evidence that in some situations, the presence of television cameras has had a moderating effect on violent incidents. In other cases it is clear that the presence of cameras has been a provocation to violence. Where plans are being made for coverage of events where civil violence may be expected, every precaution should be taken that the presence of CBC reporters and cameras is not used as a "provocation".

The Question of Access

As Miller (1982, p. 3) has noted, many members of the media hold strongly the belief that freedom of the press implies the unimpeded right to gather information. This has resulted in several on-site conflicts between police and reporters.

One of the most controversial issues is direct media contact with the perpetrator while an incident is under way. On a number of occasions, members of the media in their eagerness for first hand, fast breaking coverage of a major news story have become overtly involved and even direct participants in the incident. Critics point to incidents in which journalists have tied up phone lines leading into a location that was held by terrorists, thus denying authorities direct communication with the hostage takers and thereby further complicating negotiations (Livingstone, 1982, p. 67).¹⁷ During the Hanafi incident in Washington, D.C., fifteen calls came from newspaper and radio

stations in Australia alone. Journalists and reporters from London and Ottawa also called to talk to the hostage takers. Later Khaalis, the leader of the group, became more discriminating, picking very carefully the newsmen and the news media that he spoke to, turning down one interview after he found out the Texas station on the line had only 20,000 watts.

In some instances, media personnel in direct contact with terrorists have goaded them into action or incited them by the use of certain inflammatory questions or phrases. Bassiouni (1982, p. 132) has charged that, in instances where media representatives have become a party to the negotiations, they have frequently upset the bargaining environment by unnecessarily upsetting the terrorists, interrupting the pattern the police have attempted to inculcate, or giving them the comfort of company. An excellent example of media irresponsibility occurred in Calgary in 1976 in a non-terrorist situation. Two robbers, having shot a policeman and taken three hostages, were on the point of exchanging their hostages when they were advised by a radio reporter that to do so would seriously compromise their bargaining position (More, June 1977, p. 19). Similarly, in the Hanafi incident a newsman interviewing Khaalis on the phone suggested that police were trying to

trick him, "pulling a fast one"; while pretending to negotiate in good faith. This caused Khaalis to fly into a rage and to threaten to start executing the hostages (Fenyvesi, 1977, p. 78).

There are increasing complaints from police officials of being diverted from their major responsibility; dealing with the terrorist incident, by members of the media attempting to achieve direct access to the scene or deluging them with questions. Sixty-seven percent of the American police interviewed by Sommers (1982) said that reporters should only communicate with terrorists with police consent; while 33 percent felt that this should occur under no circumstances. Ninety-five percent of the police surveyed by Kelly (1986) saw media phone contact with terrorists while an incident was in progress to be a major problem.

The Dissemination of Tactical Information

Another area of contention involves media dissemination of information tactically useful to the terrorist while an incident is in progress. When terrorists barricade themselves and their hostages their contact with the outside world, both in terms of communication and monitoring their situation, is via the media. They therefore equip themselves

The media's reporting of tactical information became a central controversy during the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 to Beirut in June 1985. U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and other Reagan Administration officials strongly criticized the media for its reporting the movement of the Delta Force from its U.S. base and that of Navy ships from Hafia and other ports to the Lebanese coastline. Pentagon spokesman Michael Burch stated bluntly: "For the price of a twenty-five cent newspaper or a nineteen inch television, a group of hijackers who only represent the back pew of some mosque have a very elaborate intelligence network" (Jones, 1985, p. C8). In this particular instance, media spokesmen countered these allegations by claiming that the administration was using the media to communicate a message to the hostage takers through selective leaks of this information (Joyce, 1986, p. 174).

It should be noted that many positive aspects of the contemporaneous coverage of terrorism and civil disturbances have also been observed. It has been suggested, for example, that such coverage has played a particularly important role in controlling rumors by disseminating accurate information and keeping people away from the incident site by making them aware of potential dangers. Commenting on the Hanafi incident, both Washington Police Chief Patrick Murphy (1982) and Leonard Downie Jr., Assistant Managing Editor of The

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with a radio or television to allow them to monitor news broadcasts. According to Bassiouni (Chicago Sun Times, 1982), in almost every terrorist hostage incident in the last ten years, terrorists have gone in equipped with a radio. Thus, the media are often in the position of acting as the intelligence arm of the terrorist by broadcasting the latest operational activities of the police, the presence of hidden persons who could become hostages, or any developments or tricks planned by law enforcement officials.

While Hoge (1982, p. 90) has denied that media coverage, specifically the dissemination of tactical or other intelligence, has ever resulted in the loss of life, it has been strongly suggested that there are cases in which the premature reporting of information has caused the deaths of hostages and many others in which it has put lives in jeopardy. According to Schmid and de Graaf (1982, p. 102), one such incident took place on 22 November, 1974 when four hijackers had taken over a DC10 from British Airways on its way from Dubai to Libya. The hijackers demanded the release of thirteen imprisoned terrorists in Egypt and two in the Netherlands in exchange for the hostages. An aircraft which was supposed to be carrying the freed terrorists from Cairo arrived on the airfield. At this point a local reporter revealed in a live account that there were no freed prisoners

aboard the Egyptian aircraft and that the terrorists were ~~being duped~~. The authors argue that one of the hostages, a German banker, was killed by the terrorists as a direct consequence of this broadcast.

In another case that took place in 1974, terrorists took over part of the courthouse in Washington, D.C. The hostage takers kept their victims in a room separated by a two-way mirror from another room which allowed the police to watch them constantly. In case the hostages' lives were immediately threatened, the police could have killed the terrorists by shooting through the mirror. This element of relative safety for the hostages was removed when the media disclosed the existence of the mirror, whereupon the terrorists ordered the hostages to cover it.

In yet another case, the British television network ITN covertly defied police instructions and hid a camera at the back of the Iranian Embassy in London. This camera betrayed the presence of SAS soldiers and showed the minute by minute progress of preparations to storm the Embassy and liberate the hostages (Greer, 1982, p. 68; Wilkinson, 1982, p. 43). Wilkinson noted that the terrorists had access to a television set and hence could have monitored the moves being made against them. He has suggested that had it not been for

a fortuitous four minute delay in relaying the film, it is highly probable that the terrorists would have gunned down all the hostages and a number of the SAS men as well.

Perhaps the most widely cited incident of this kind occurred after the kidnapping and death of Hans Martin Schleyer. Several terrorists hijacked a Lufthansa jet and forced it to fly to the Middle East. The news media followed the plight of the jetliner and its passengers with maximum attention and reported that the captain was passing information about the hijackers to the authorities. The hijackers learned about this through radio broadcasts and executed the pilot. In the same series of events an Israeli amateur radio operator had intercepted messages between the German rescue plane and its home base and passed them on to the French News Agency. Israeli television broadcast the news of the flight of the German anti-terrorist team to Mogadishu despite a plea by the Germans that it hold the story. Two British newspapers The Times and the Daily Telegraph, after consulting each other at a senior level, also decided to ignore the plea and published the story, making it possible for the terrorists to pick up an international press review of the dispatch of the GSG 9 unit (Van der Vat, 1982, p. 25).

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Washington Post (Jaehnig, 1978, p. 131), have argued that the paper's coverage of the incident helped to keep the city at ease by keeping people fully informed of what was happening, thereby allowing them to continue their normal activities.

REPORTED POLITICAL AND SOCIAL IMPACTS OF MEDIA COVERAGE

While there is a slowly growing body of empirical literature on the character of media coverage of terrorism, the social and political impacts, being more difficult to measure, remain highly speculative. Nevertheless, the media's critics have alleged that, beyond the immediate police/press problems cited, above media coverage of terrorism has: increased its salience as an issue beyond all relationship to its actual importance; enhanced the fear-generating ability of terrorists; provided them with a reward for their activities in terms of profile, recognition and credibility; and undermined the ability of the state to deal with terrorism. It has also been alleged that the significant attention that the media have accorded terrorism has had an important impact on the prevailing forms of dissident activity within a society and provided other groups with models to emulate. It has been suggested, as well, that such attention has often created a climate receptive to repressive measures. Finally, and perhaps most

important, critics have argued that the frequent appropriation of political violence as entertainment has greatly inhibited public understanding of domestic and international political antagonisms.

Media Coverage and The Salience of Terrorism as a Political Issue

One of the most pervasive allegations concerning the impact of the media's coverage of terrorism is that it has made the phenomenon a more important political factor than it deserves to be on the basis of its occurrence or the damage it causes. This allegation is based on a well documented phenomenon in the communications literature referred to as agenda setting. The basic agenda setting hypothesis asserts a relationship between media content and the issue rankings of the audience (McCombs and Shaw, 1970; McLeod et. al., 1974). It thus refers to the process by which problems become salient as political issues.

Halloran (1978, p. 825) has suggested that the media help to define the social/political agenda by selecting, organizing, emphasizing and defining. As Cohen (1963) has pointed out in his book on the media and foreign policy, the

media focus attention on some events and actors rather than others. According to Cohen:

The press is significantly more than a purveyor of information and opinion. It may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about. And it follows from this that the world looks different to different people, depending not only on their interest but also on the map that is drawn for them by the writers, editors and publishers of the papers they read.

Similarly, Welch (1972, p. 222) has noted that sustained coverage of an event by the press can assure that attention will be given to it by the public and by decision makers not initially involved in the situation.

Bassiouni (1981) has suggested that by frequently focusing on terrorist events, television and other media probably engender the feeling in the viewing public that these phenomena are common and therefore more dangerous and important than they really are. Although claims such as this are rarely accompanied by hard supporting evidence it is, perhaps, not unreasonable to hypothesize that what people read in the papers, hear on the radio, and see on television might influence their views about the nature and extent of violence in our society. Supporting this suggestion are studies carried out in the United States several years ago, which indicated that public estimates of the amount and type

of crime in a community were more closely related to newspaper reports than to the actual amount of crime recorded by police (Davis, 1973, p. 127).

It probably would not be an exaggeration to suggest, therefore, that the high issue salience of terror as indicated by the few public opinion polls on this subject can be attributed to the publicity it has received. For example, a Harris Poll taken in 1977 (de Boer, 1979, p. 412) indicated that 90 percent of Americans considered terrorism to be a very serious problem. A similar SOC poll taken in the United Kingdom in 1978 (de Boer, 1979, p. 412) determined that 85 percent of Britons felt the same way. Moreover, the U.S. poll also provided evidence that 60 percent of Americans felt terrorism to be a very serious problem within the U.S. This would appear surprising, given the lack of significant terrorist threat in that country at the time.¹⁸

Augmenting the Power and Credibility of the Terrorist.

Another alleged consequence of the extensive media coverage accorded terrorism is the enhancement of its fear generating capabilities (Grabosky, 1979, p. 58). As one commentator has contended, "the continuous, voluminous comprehensive coverage of terrorism in countries consistently threatened by it has contributed to the impact

and fear generating capacity of very small groups of people" (U.S. Senate, 1974-75, p. 5). Similarly, Schmid and de Graaf (1982; 112) have argued that "this material (i.e. media coverage) might form a carrier wave creating a latent public anxiety, on which the terrorists with their real violence cash in". Gerbner (1980), furthermore, has argued that if terror were not conveyed by the media this fear of victimization would not be so great. Indeed there are many students of the phenomenon who would agree with Bassiouni (1982, p. 128) that the psychological impact of terrorism is more media created than intrinsic to the act.

A related, and perhaps more contentious issue, is the ability of terrorists via publicity for their actions to become a credible political force and obtain a level of legitimacy. As noted in Chapter I, many, if not a majority of, terrorists aspire by their actions to cultivate support or to effect an attitude or opinion change within a target audience. According to Schmid and de Graaf (1982, p. 142):

Media reporting on insurgent terrorism affects public opinion and can change the political climate in a country. By presenting their cause through the mass media directly to the public, insurgent terrorists are also capable of undermining the authority of the established government.

Bell has argued that, by taking groups such as the S.L.A. seriously, the media invented them as a real political force (Hickey, 1978, p. 173). Supporters of this thesis, however, are able to offer only anecdotal proof. For example Schmid and de Graaf (1982, p. 130) offer evidence from a tenuously related context, the large opinion change (15 percent) in West Germany on the subject of a time limitation on war crimes prosecutions as a result of the American television series Holocaust. In contrast, the submission of Schmid and de Graaf to the U.S. National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards (1976, p. 237) noted that "reports from some nations where terroristic crime is both common and well publicized indicate little apparent effect on public attitudes or conduct".¹⁹ Moreover, Paletz et. al. (1982, p. 162) have contended that, rather than legitimizing terrorists, media coverage of their actions has probably increased loyalty to government and undermined the cause of radical change. Because of the difficulty in obtaining evidence, the legitimacy question is likely to remain highly problematic.

The Structuring of Dissident Activity

Perhaps one of the most significant allegations related to media coverage of terrorism and the news value system which underlies it, relates to its impact on the character of

dissident activity in society. In the first chapter it was argued that terrorism is an effort to gain access to the media. Previous content analysis (Kelly and Mitchell, 1981) indicates that, if nothing else, terrorists have been largely successful in this endeavor. This success is seen as having a significant impact on the nature of extraparliamentary opposition.²⁰

Speaking on the subject of protest behavior, Lang and Lang (1972, p. 97) argue that publicity has transformed street demonstrations into a useful substitute for conventional lobbying. Similarly, Fenyvisi (1977, p. 18), a journalist who was taken hostage during the Hanafi affair in Washington D.C. has suggested "the news media, particularly television, suggest ways to earn fame and recognition". The avenues available for publicity would appear to affect the prevailing forms of protest in a society.²¹ There is a growing fear in this regard that the media, by showering publicity on or according recognition to, individuals who engage in political violence and terrorism, could, in the long run, serve to institutionalize these activities as a means of political conflict. In this vein, Schmid and de Graaf (1982; 206) have noted:

If these biases (for violence) are inherent in television, reflecting news values of the medium some logical deductions can be made which are disturbing.

For instance, a social movement of equals is presented by television in such a way that over time a restructuring of the movement into one of the hierarchical type is favoured. Alternatively, if there are two social movements fighting for the same cause but with different means, the one with violence, the other without, the media will cover the violent movement more extensively. The cause can in this way be associated with the violence, discouraging some media spectators from joining the cause while encouraging others to do so. By giving more coverage to the violent than to the nonviolent movement the media can in fact predetermine the mobilization chances of the two movements. The "bias" of the medium in the assignment of a greater news value to violence, can, in such a way, intervene in the competition of the two movements for followers.

Concern has also been expressed that the extensive publicity given to spectacular acts of terrorism serves to encourage repeat performances. Clutterbuck (1982, p. 89) has suggested that there is good reason to believe that the immense publicity given to the Irish National Liberation Army after the murder of Airey Neave was a major factor in the IRA's decision to match it by murdering Earl Mountbatten. At the same time, many analysts fear that, as particular types of terrorism become commonplace, groups will be forced to escalate their activities in order to continue to receive publicity. Livingstone (1982, p. 69) contends that this could lead to a situation where few potential targets would be spared, and actions previously regarded as unthinkable will become acceptable as the desperation of terrorist groups to be heard mounts.²¹

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A related and extremely controversial argument is that the amount of publicity that the media have accorded terrorism and other forms of political violence serves as a stimulus to similar incidents. This is widely referred to in the social sciences as the "contagion effect".²² The feelings of Johnpoll (1977, p. 165) and Hoge (1982, p. 90) that little or no evidence exists indicating that publicity spawns terrorism does not appear to be widely shared. According to Schmid and de Graaf (1982, p. 142), the most serious effect of media reporting of insurgent terrorism is the likely increase in terrorist activity. The media, the authors argue, can provide potential terrorists with all the ingredients that are necessary to engage in this type of violence. They can reduce inhibitions against the use of violence, offer models and know-how, and provide a motivation for terrorism in terms of the publicity they provide. Clutterbuck (1975) has asserted in a Times of London article that "ideas travel through the normal news media... people watching and listening to reports get ideas about doing the same things themselves". Hence, according to Clutterbuck, the more publicity given to bomb scares the more bomb scares there are likely to be.²³ Similarly, more reports about plane hijackings lead to more plane hijackings. Likewise, Cooper (1977a, p. 93) has argued that what seems to work for

terrorists is quickly imitated. He attributes the cyclical nature of terrorist modalities to this factor. Hubbard (cited in Hickey, 1978, p. 107), a Dallas psychiatrist who has studied dozens of skyjackings, has stated that: "hijackers are stimulated towards action by news coverage, are educated towards successful crimes by it and are provided with the guaranteed publicity such criminals require before they act".

A slightly more moderate view on the question of contagion is offered by Wardlaw (1981, p. 78), who argues that there is no clear evidence that publicity is responsible for significantly affects the occurrence of terrorism. Rather, he suggests that it is more likely to affect the form as opposed to the frequency of political terrorism. Despite his point concerning evidence, there does appear to be substantial public concern over the issue of publicity induced contagion. Seventy-eight percent of the respondents of an American survey agreed that news coverage of terrorism encourages further acts (de Boer, 1979). A similar survey conducted in the United Kingdom found that 60 percent of the respondents agreed with this attitude (de Boer, 1979). In another survey (Sommers 1982), 93 percent of American police chiefs surveyed believed that live TV coverage of terrorism encouraged it. This attitude was shared by 43 percent of

newspaper editors and 35 percent of TV news editors. However, newspaper editors, by a 2 to 1 margin, did not believe newspaper coverage of terrorism encouraged further terrorism. In Kelly's survey (1986) 70 percent of the Canadian police officials surveyed felt live coverage encouraged terrorism.²⁴

The Impact of Media Coverage on Government Policy and Options

It is feared in some circles that the extensive publicity accorded to acts of terrorism can lead to the creation of an environment conducive to the introduction of repressive measures. De Salas (1980, p. 4) has suggested that the climate of fear and victimization that results from the media's amplification of the terrorist threat will cause the public to be receptive to, if not to demand, the imposition of harsh measures to deal with the terrorists. Similarly, Laqueur (1977b) has pointed out that whenever terrorism becomes more than a nuisance there will be an outcry for very strict measures. He notes that, for better or worse, society can exist without freedom whereas it cannot exist without order. Laqueur views the restriction of civil liberties as perhaps the major threat of terrorism.

Available public opinion polls would appear to support Laqueur's concerns. In particular, polls cited by de Boer (1979) indicate that people in societies experiencing significant incidents of terrorism are prepared to endorse any possible solution to the problem, even if they would not normally approve of the method employed. For example, a poll taken in the Netherlands in 1978 indicated that 62 percent of those surveyed were in favour of placing South Moluccans under strict surveillance even if the country would somewhat resemble a police state (de Boer, 1979). Similarly, in West Germany, several opinion surveys have demonstrated the willingness of people to sacrifice their personal rights and liberties, and to accept a strengthened influence of the state and police, if this would serve to combat terrorism (de Boer, 1979).

Extensive publicity is also felt to have significant consequences for a government's ability to deal with incidents at the time of their occurrence. The frequent demand for action by a frenzied public makes it extremely difficult for officials to devise a discriminate response. Intense public pressure on government officials assigned to deal with the situation can often lead to reactive, repressive and unnecessary measures which only serve to exacerbate the situation.

The situation is particularly complex in hostage incidents. The ability of the media to transmit a direct view of the plight of hostages, and of the anxiety of their relatives, makes it extremely difficult for state authorities to pretend to be indifferent to the hostages' safety. Television, because of its immediacy and emotional impact, is particularly vulnerable to the accusation that it pressures governments to weigh actual human beings on the screen more heavily than abstract national interest. According to Braestrup, (Newsweek, July 1, 1985, p. 33): "The problem is when TV shows weeping people and the implicit message is 'Mr. President, how long are you going to keep this up'. As Schmid and de Graaf (1982, p. 107) have pointed out, public opinion in such cases takes a strong interest in the fate of the hostages, and it takes a tough government to dare to go against public pressure to save the hostages at almost any price, including giving in to the terrorists. Clutterbuck (1977, pp. 13-14) has suggested that the strongest single factor which leads governments to give way to terrorists, internationally and internally, is television, stating: "... governments can only stand firm insofar as they are able to carry public opinion with them".²⁵

Media Coverage and Public Understanding of Terrorism

The decontextualization of terrorism coverage and its appropriation as entertainment have several important implications for public understanding of terrorism. On the one hand, it is likely to make political violence less, rather than more, explicable by causing terrorism to appear as shocking and senseless. Yurick (1974, P. 21), criticizing media coverage of the Patty Hearst kidnapping, suggested that the lack of context fostered "emotion organizing", disinformation and propaganda. It has also been argued that the decontextualization of news facilitates the idealizing of news content. While newspapers may not provide a context for understanding a violent political event, they do, either implicitly or explicitly, provide a framework for its interpretation. The results of recent studies strongly suggest that the news media provide many people with the framework of definitions and explanations with which they approach and understand situations (Murdock, 1973, p. 172). To quote Cooper (1977, p. 147): "The role of the media is by no means confined, of course, to the simple reporting of newsworthy events. The media plays a most influential part in the formation of public opinion through analysis and comment upon news and other matters of interest."

Hard news is only a small element of the media's copious production. Rather, the general public is offered for consumption a highly processed and somewhat synthetic new product. Moreover, objectivity is not a characteristic of this process. Indeed, for the general public, interest lies in the subjectivity of the presentation, the colour or patina which these events take on as seen and interpreted by the more influential media figures. Here, presentation is of the essence, for it is in this process that the truly skillful exercise their art so as to make the event something distinctive and captivating. As Burgelin (1972, p. 323) has observed, mass communications are plainly not just so much raw material of which the consumer can make absolutely anything he likes; they are products which have already been extensively pre-structured by the conditions under which they were manufactured. In part, according to Burgelin, this pre-structuring takes the form of standardized formats and conventional selection procedures but it is also reflected in recurrent explanations, legitimations and evaluations of social phenomena.

Many of the evaluations of political violence provided by the media are the products of particular political or ideological dispositions. Frank et. al. (1983) in an examination of the coverage of selected historical incidents

of political violence in Canada by Canadian newspapers, found these incidents frequently portrayed as the acts of criminals, lunatics and conspirators. Chibnall (1977, p. 115) has called this portrayal of political violence as law and order news, suggesting that it is designed to neutralize deviant world views by either denying their status as beliefs to be taken seriously by sensible people or condemning them as manifestations of wickedness and corruption.

Questions of bias in the news industry's portrayal of terrorism can have an extremely important impact on how the public views the causes of terrorist activities and the character of social antagonisms in their society. Moreover, as Miller (1982, p. 19) points out, the public appraisal of terrorism also has implications for foreign policy decisions, particularly if the public perceives terrorism as being sponsored by certain nations (e.g. Libya, Iran, Syria or the Soviet Union). While some may fear that increased attention to the causes and motivations underlying terrorist incidents may serve to legitimize terrorist activity, it is equally likely that the lack of perspective which often characterizes media reporting of this phenomenon makes it a more dangerous phenomenon by causing it to appear irrational and inexplicable.

SUMMARY

The media have been widely criticized for the "excessive" zeal that they have shown in both reporting and news gathering practices related to incidents of terrorism. In particular, their critics have castigated them for over-emphasizing the importance of the phenomenon, sensationalizing it, glamorizing the terrorist and terrorism and reporting incidents in such a way that they are devoid of any political or social context. At the same time, they have charged the media with behaving irresponsibly in their efforts to gather news about and during terrorists incidents. Particular concern has been expressed over reporters interfering with the attempts by police to manage terrorist incidents by telephoning terrorists and by broadcasting or reporting information about the operations and plans of security forces.

Overall, it has been averred that the way that the western media have tended to cover terrorism has increased its salience as an issue, augmented the power and credibility of those perpetrating it, caused more dissident groups to contemplate violent activity because of the publicity rewards, and posed a variety of problems for

governments in their efforts to deal with terrorist incidents.

○ A majority of the criticisms and allegations concerning the media and terrorism are based on anecdotal or fragmentary evidence or on a few spectacular cases. There have been relatively few attempts to examine these issues empirically or systematically. In the absence of such evidence, the debate between the members of the media and their critics tends to resemble "un dialogue de sourds" with each group unwilling to move from their preordained positions. The remainder of this study will attempt to untangle some of the rhetoric and offer some preliminary data related to some of the more controversial issues in the terrorism/media relationship.

¹ The issue of media coverage of terrorism has engendered several major conferences and a great deal of self-examination on the part of the media. For a review of some of these conferences see Alexander (1975).

² See, for example, Graham (1986) and Joyce (1986).

³ According to Hacker: (Hickey 1975, p. 227), "if the mass media did not exist, terrorists would have to invent them. In turn, the mass media hanker after terrorist acts because they fit into their programming needs, namely sudden acts of great excitement, that are susceptible, presumably of quick solution. So there's a mutual dependency".

⁴ While there are few empirical studies of the news value of political violence, inferences can be made from some recent studies. For example, one Canadian study analysing 12,913 items on television and in the written press found that 24 percent of all items consisted of outright violent material and no less than 40 percent of all items were classified as conflict and violence related (Gordon and Singer, 1976). In another study undertaken under the aegis of an Ontario Royal Commission, Jackson et. al. (1976, p. 259) in a random sample of 11 years of the Globe and Mail found 7 percent of the articles and 8 percent of the photographs were related to the specific theme of political violence (e.g. riots, violent demonstrations and terrorism). This theme was found to account for almost 8 percent of the total first page volume during the period. Perhaps the best evidence concerning the news value of political violence comes from Peterson (1979, pp. 122-23) who, in a survey of 98 newsmen from the Times of London, found that despite a wide divergence of opinion on the newsworthiness of a sample of 30 different events, one event, a political assassination, was almost universally acclaimed as news by her respondents.

⁵ In an interesting twist, the Washington Post quoted a prominent publisher of instant books as saying: "Had the Hanafis chopped a single head there would have been a better market for a quick journalistic book. But since only one man was killed in gunfire, the siege was not worth a book." See Fenyvesi (1977, p. 17).

⁶ In an examination of forty Ontario newspapers, Dussuyer (1979) found no association between the official crime rate

of local communities and the number of crime items in the newspapers covering those communities. Rather, he found a negative relationship between the communities' crime rates and the number of crime related editorials.

7 The question of labelling such groups has become a growing concern for many media enterprises. The BBC for example holds a weekly meeting of its upper management and senior representatives of the news room which issues directives on nomenclature. Here semantic usage is decided upon and a determination is made as to whether a violent movement will be presented to the audience as consisting of freedom fighters, guerrillas or terrorists.

8 It should perhaps be noted that the use of negative referents in media reports of terrorist activities has also come under criticism. In Canada this recently emerged as an issue during the arraignment of the five members of the group Direct Action in Vancouver. Defense lawyers for the accused argued that the extensive pre-trial publicity and in particular the "invidious, negative and emotionally loaded" references to the accused had infringed on their right to a fair trial. Jay Shulman, a New York sociologist and reported expert in jury behavior, suggested during the arraignment that newspaper stories concerning the arrest of the five accused contained some 557 negative references to them. See the Ottawa Citizen (September 14, 1983, p. 13).

9 Garlofalo (1981, p. 325) has noted a similar tendency with respect to crime news, suggesting that it consists primarily of brief accounts of discrete events with few details, little background material and no attempt to put the problem of crime into a larger context.

10 An exception to this situation, as Siegel (1983, p. 214) has noted, was the coverage accorded by French daily newspapers in Quebec to the October crisis of 1970. He noted that there was an emphasis on background stories which explained the ramifications of the event. In many cases these background pieces were prepared by outside experts such as political scientists or sociologists.

11 Again, a similar situation has been widely observed with respect to general crime news. See for example, Sherizen (1978), Dussuyer (1979), Graber (1980) and Garofalo (1981).

12 Jackson et. al. (1976, p. 276) noted similar allegations concerning the CBC. It was alleged in this case that CBC cameramen were actually involved in orchestrating the violence in Yorkville in 1962.

13 Clutterbuck (1982, p. 88) has noted that Northern Ireland has offered an excellent proving ground for giving young journalists a chance to make their name. In an attempt to scoop the competition and enliven their stories, many of them have established clandestine contacts with members of terrorist movements on one or both sides. He also noted that a reputation for readiness to transmit propaganda would lead to the development of more contacts, more information, and more original and exciting articles.

14 Another dispute between the government and the BBC arose in August 1985 over the BBC documentary Real Lives on the Edge of Union. The program, which focused on two leading Catholic and Protestant extremists in Ulster, was initially banned by the government at the request of Home Secretary Leon Brittan who argued that it provided "a gratuitous platform for terrorist advocates", the incident led the National Union of Journalists to call for a one day strike. The show was subsequently shown at a later date.

15 The Heisenberg effect refers to the thesis that the act of observing a phenomenon changes the way it behaves. See Lang (1979, p. 153).

16 See Jackson et. al. (1976, p. 280)

17 As Schmid and de Graaf (1982, p. 90) have noted, there are other problems with live on the scene interviews with terrorists in that the reporter tends to have very little control over his source, frequently becoming a mere show host providing free publicity to the terrorists.

18 The number of terrorist incidents in the U.S. declined gradually between 1977 and 1981. In 1977 there were 111 acknowledged terrorist incidents. In 1981 the figure was 42.

19 In a related context Schrieber (1976) noted that media coverage of anti-war protest in the U.S. during the Vietnam war did not seem to boost anti-war sentiment among the public at large.

20 Clutterbuck (1982, p. 54) has noted that the national news media will not bother to send their reporters to cover a demonstration unless there is a prospect of either significant disruption or violence. He noted further that there is an almost irresistible temptation for the organizers of political demonstrations to arouse the expectation of some kind of conflict.

21 In this context, Snyder and Kelly (1977, p. 14) have noted that conflict behaviours are differentially likely to be reported according to their intensity. Moreover they noted that as types of conflict activity have evidenced secular increases in frequency and routinization in form they become less newsworthy. The media are more sensitive to novel as opposed to routinized behaviour.

22 Contagion is defined as the spread of a particular type of behaviour through time and space as the result of a prototype or model performing the behaviour and either facilitating that behaviour in the observer or reducing the observer's inhibition against performing the same behaviour.

23 Some evidence of a contagion effect has also been provided by recent studies of riot activity. For example, studies of the extensive rioting in the United Kingdom in the summer of 1981 noted that youths imitated television film of violence in Northern Ireland. A report by the Centre for Contemporary Studies noted that the youth wore masks and threw gasoline bombs at police, copying scenes of youths attacking security forces in Belfast (Globe and Mail, October 27, 1981, p. 13).

24 The evidence supporting a contagion effect is, at present, highly anecdotal. For example, Watson (1976, p. 17) cites as evidence of a contagion effect the rash of similar incidents engendered by the Hearst kidnapping in 1974; in particular the kidnapping of the editor of the Atlanta Constitution by a group calling itself the American Revolutionary Army. Similarly, Heyman (1980, p. 190) points to the stealing of U Thant's body from its resting place several weeks after the

Montaneros in Argentina abducted ex-President Pedro Aramburu's body from its crypt and threatened to hold on to it until the government met certain political demands. Furthermore, Schmid and de Graaf (1982) have noted the occurrence of 27 copy-cat hijackings after the famous D. B. Cooper hijacking in 1972, whereas Mazur (1982) cites the 600 bomb threats which occurred within a week of a highly publicized bombing at Kennedy Airport in 1981. Hubbard (1971) in support of the contagion thesis notes that skyjackers often kept scrapbooks of news clippings about other hijackers in order to learn how to do it. In something of a reverse argument Pitcher *et. al.* (1978, p. 30) remarked that the epidemic of U.S. to Cuba hijackings ended shortly after six U.S. hijackers returned voluntarily from Cuba to certain prison terms in the United States. Their bitter complaints about housing, sanitation and food in Cuba were given wide coverage in the media creating, according to the authors, a disincentive to other potential hijackers.

Hard evidence of a contagion process, however, is as Wardlaw (1982) has noted, somewhat more difficult to come by. Some interesting inductive models have examined the spread of terrorism as a contagion phenomenon by analysing the goodness of fit between some statistical distributions and the actual distribution of terrorist incidents (Midlarsky, 1979, 1978; Midlarsky, Crenshaw and Yashida, 1980; Hamilton and Hamilton, 1981). In another study, Bandura (1973) compared the hijackings of U.S. airliners and foreign airliners for the period 1947-1970. Except for the first wave, he found that the two curves paralleled quite closely, suggesting in his view the existence of a contagion process at work. Another study (Heyman and Mickolus, 1981, p. 126) found that in 78 of the 88 cases of new countries experiencing transnational terrorism after 1968, the country shared a border with a state which had previously experienced such incidents. The authors suggested the existence of a contagion process at work within the regions that they had examined. None of these studies, however, examined the possible role of the media in this process.

25 During the TWA hijacking to Beirut in June 1985 critics charged that the intensive media coverage made it difficult for the U.S. administration to handle and resolve the crisis. In particular, it was charged that the media escalated the hijacking and hostage holding far beyond its actual importance and that the interviews and news conferences with hostages in Beirut and their families back home put the Reagan administration under enormous pressure to abandon its policy of no concessions and reach a quick solution.

CHAPTER 3

ANALYSING NEWS COVERAGE OF TERRORISM

The previous two chapters have attempted to establish a framework for exploring the terrorism/media relationship in a coherent and systematic manner. As articulated in Chapter 1, the theoretical framework on which this exploration is to be based conceptualizes terrorism as a political resource. Specifically, terrorism is viewed in this conceptualization as a rational strategy employed by resource poor groups to enhance their ability to effect broad or specific political changes. Terrorism provides such groups with an effective way of compensating for their lack of traditional resources by bypassing accepted methods and channels of grievance articulation. The news media are seen as a central element in the terrorist strategy in that they provide the communications link between terrorist groups and their target audiences. By gaining access to the media agenda, terrorists can attain public visibility for themselves and their cause, as well as some measure of political credibility and legitimacy.

Chapter 2 has provided a detailed overview of the central issues in the ongoing terrorism/media coverage debate

and a look at how these issues are viewed by the media's critics and defenders. This overview is based on an extensive review of the qualitative and quantitative literature on this subject. Perhaps the most striking finding to come out of Chapter 2 is that the majority of the current criticisms and defenses of media coverage of terrorism lack both theoretical perspective and empirical validation.

Using the theoretical framework outlined in the first chapter and the issue inventory provided in Chapter 2, the present chapter will isolate some of the key coverage issues related to the political resource conceptualization of terrorism. These issues will be presented as testable hypotheses and a methodology will be defined for empirically examining them.

HYPOTHESES AND CASE FOCUS

A central consideration in the political resource conceptualization of terrorism is the communications impact of terrorist events. Terrorism is likely to be effective as a political resource only if it attracts media attention which provides a platform for terrorist propaganda. This thesis explores the extent to which terrorists can influence

the media agenda through their activities, as well as the kinds of messages, images and perspectives that are communicated by the media in the context of their coverage of terrorism. The central hypothesis is as follows:

- o Terrorism provides political dissidents with access to the media agenda and with public attention and recognition via the media.

The study will also attempt to offer some initial insights into a question that is critical to the political resource conceptualization of terrorism but difficult to measure. This is the ability of groups to legitimize themselves and their causes through the publicity accorded terrorist's acts. To examine this question in depth, four hypotheses derived from the review of Chapter 2 of the literature on the nature of terrorism coverage will also be tested. These are:

- o In their coverage of terrorism, the media emphasize the dramatic and human interest aspects of the incident over its political and instrumental aspects;
- o Media coverage glamorizes terrorists and their activities by using favourable descriptions and references in the coverage;
- o Media coverage confines itself to expressing opinions that fit within the official orthodoxy by limited commentary to government and police officials, and;
- o Media coverage of terrorism ignores the political context and objectives of terrorist incidents.

The thesis will also look at some of the other issues raised in the previous chapter, such as coverage of media judicial processes related to acts of terrorism and the types of solutions to terrorist violence advocated by the media. As well, some of the issues relating to on-site coverage of terrorism will be discussed in the context of this analysis. The latter are, however incidental to the principal focus of this study.

To provide a basis for testing these hypotheses and examining some of the questions enumerated above, this thesis analyses a group of case studies. The central focus of the analysis is the Canadian media's coverage of the incidents of Armenian^b terrorism that have occurred in this country. It is this coverage, that has sparked the current controversy concerning the Canadian media's coverage of terrorism.¹ An overview of the history of the Armenian question, the origins of contemporary Armenian terrorism and terrorist groups the causes the espouse, as well as a brief overview of their activities in Canada, is provided in Chapter 4.

ANALYSING MEDIA COVERAGE: CONTENT ANALYSIS

One of the most efficient and widely used techniques in the study of human communications is content analysis. Berelson (1952, p. 18) has described content analysis as a research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communications. The technique has been widely employed in political science to analyse a wide variety of phenomena including the operational codes of political leaders (George; 1959; Herman 1980), news coverage of wars and political campaigns (Gamson and Modigliani, 1971) and the political content of school history textbooks (Axline and Sladojeveric-Sola, 1976). It has also been one of the major techniques used by sociologists, political scientists, psychologists, and communications researches in the study of the general relationship between the media and violence. Perhaps one of the most thorough and multidisciplinary Canadian collections of content analyses of violence in the mass media is to be found in the seven volume report of the Ontario Royal Commission on Violence in the Communications Industry (Lamarsh Commission, 1976).²

While there is a large and growing content analysis literature on the subject of violence and the media, the

principal focus of this literature is on violence presented by entertainment industry. There is currently a small but growing body of content analytic studies concentrating on media coverage of political violence and terrorism (Jackson et. al., 1976; Siegel, 1976; Kelly and Mitchell, 1981; Delli Carni and Williams, 1982; Paletz et. al., 1982; WurthHough, 1983). The Canadian literature in this area is comprised of only a handful of studies. Siegel (1976) in his Doctoral Thesis looked at the Canadian press' coverage of the October Crisis. Jackson et. al., (1976), in their study for the Lamarsh Commission, explored the Globe and Mail's coverage of selected incidents of political violence in Ontario between 1965 and 1975. The absence of a more substantial empirical literature on this subject belies the heated controversy that exists over this issue and the scholarly attention it has received elsewhere in the world.

Although content analysis can provide us with some useful insights into how political violence and terrorism impact on the agenda setting activities of the media and the kinds of coverage they are given, the limitations of this technique must be clearly appreciated. As Kelly (1985, p. 312) has noted; because content analysis tends to be deceptively simple and carries assumptions of statistical respectability, it is one of the most frequently misused

techniques in the social sciences. In particular, the obsession with quantification and measurement has often caused studies based on content analysis to sacrifice insight for precision.³

Perhaps the major problem with content analysis, as Litchy and Bailly (1978, p. 112) have pointed out, is that it is often done for the wrong reason, such as to try to prove the audience effects of media coverage. Too often, content analyses have been premised on what Adams (1978, p. 9) has called the hypodermic model. This model presumes a direct correlation between the amount of coverage a particular news item receives and the impact that it has on the viewer. As Gordon and Singer (1976, p. 637) stated in their Lamارش Commission study:

One of the most frequently heard objections to content analysis of violent communications is that it provides a census of acts, an inventory of violent actions or a body count, but does not generally go beyond that. Notwithstanding some excellent content analysis of violence during the last decade, much of it from Dean George Gerbner's Annenberg School at the University of Pennsylvania, it is true that we cannot be sure of the first level effects of a given violent content upon an audience. What kind of impact does the content have upon a given audience? Does the audience see what the content coders see, feel what they feel?

This criticism is as true of news coverage of political violence as it is of the media's presentation of entertainment violence.

Content analysis cannot be relied upon to establish the consequences of content for the reader or viewer. It cannot, for example, tell us how the public is affected by the media coverage that terrorism receives. Nor, as Adams (1982, pp. 1920) has noted, can it be used to establish the determinants of the content.⁵ Its value is, for the most part, restricted to its ability to provide answers to two questions. These are frequently referred to as agenda and depiction questions.

Agenda questions focus on the priority given to the coverage in the context of the overall news report. The agenda priorities of various events are indicated by such factors as emphasis, frequency, length and place in the news report. The analysis of questions of this type is based on the previously discussed agenda-setting hypothesis, which suggests that the media, in effect, tell people what to think about (as opposed to what to think) by selecting the most visible events and issues of the day.

Depiction research takes agenda priorities a step further, examining the way in which particular news items were covered in terms of slant, depth or form. The most common approach in this type of research is to study the direction or slant of a story; whether the coverage is favourable or unfavourable to the governments, parties,

institutions, issue positions, political actors or newsmakers which it mentions. These efforts are frequently referred to as "bias studies" (Adams 1978, p. 20), although it cannot be inferred that unfavourable coverage of a subject can by itself establish the prejudices of news personnel. Depth research, on the other hand, explores the thoroughness of coverage given to a news item, while form research is not issue specific (Adams 1982, p. 21) and looks into general categories of news, such as bad news, violent news, or aspects of the technical and visual presentation of the news.

Data Sources

Most content analytic studies of news coverage have focused on the print medium, specifically newspapers. In recent years, however an increasing amount of attention has been directed toward the analysis of television news. There is currently some controversy, particularly among North American communications analysts, over the relative merits of using television or newspapers as the basic data source for the content analysis of news coverage. This controversy is founded in the debate over which medium is the preferred news source in North America and which has the greatest influence on the general public.

Studies done in the United States beginning in the 1960s have continually found that television describes itself

as the major news source of Americans (Carter and Greenberg, 1965; Jacobson, 1969; Roper, 1977). Such studies have also shown the rising dependence on and increasing credibility of television. According to a poll conducted by the Roper Organization, 64 percent of the respondents mentioned television as their source of news as opposed to 46 percent mentioning newspapers.⁶ Despite a recent challenge to this finding by Lichty (1983) who suggests that closer analysis of the data confirms that Americans rely more on newspapers than television for their news, the preponderance of evidence is still in favour of television as America's primary news source.⁷ Many, however, still subscribe to Livingstone's (1982) view that the print medium is still a power in American life, especially with respect to influencing the beliefs of decision makers.

The data on the media preferences of Canadians need to be looked at from several different perspectives. In a 1975 CRTC study, the results of which are shown in Table 3.1, Canadians were found to prefer television news to newspapers by a margin of 40 percent to 37 percent. This total, however, was found to mask some rather significant ethnic differences in the selection of media. For example, English-speaking Canadians were found to prefer newspapers to television by 39 percent to 36 percent, whereas

TABLE 3.1
PREFERRED MEDIA RELIANCE OF CANADIANS FOR NEWS
BY LANGUAGE

<u>Media</u>	<u>English</u> <u>Speaking</u>	<u>French</u> <u>Speaking</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>Canada</u>
TV	36%	53%	40%
Radio	25%	15%	22%
Newspaper/ Magazine	39%	31%	37%

Source: Research Branch, CRTC Fall 1975 Survey

French-speaking Canadians preferred television to newspapers by a significant margin of 22 percent. Siegel (1983, p. 32) has attributed this finding to what he terms the oral basis of French Canadian culture.

A study done by Leonard Kubas (1981) for the Canadian Royal Commission on Newspapers (The Kent Commission) found that there was no single preferred information medium.⁹ In his survey 42 percent of the respondents named newspapers as the best information source, while 41 percent chose television. Overall, Kubas found there to be distinct preferences for different media based on the type of news or information event being covered. He found a general preference for television as a source of international and national news and newspapers for local news. On further exploration of the data, however, he found these results to be education, class and age dependent. Newspapers received much higher scores for being the preferred information source among those with the highest levels of education and income and those between 25 and 54 years of age.

Despite these equivocal findings concerning their preferred information source, Canadians would appear to have greater trust in television news than in what they read in newspapers. A national Gallup poll conducted in 1978 found

that if there were conflicting press reports of an event, Canadians were likely to believe television rather than the printed press.¹⁰ Kubas (1981) found that television received the highest rating for being the most believable, most influential, most unbiased and fairest news source.¹¹ These results confirm the findings of similar studies of the American public which have found a widespread feeling that television is a more accurate news source and is manned by better and more skilled journalists (Wilson and Howard, 1978, p., 14).

The question of preferred or most trusted news source cannot be the only basis on which to select a data source for a news analysis. It is equally important that the agenda setting relationship among the various media be taken into consideration. According to Siegel (1983, p. 32), it is the printed press, especially the daily newspapers, that provide depth to news collection. He suggests further that in Canada, as in the U.K., U.S., and most other countries, broadcast journalism has not yet produced a comprehensive news service that is independent of the newspaper system. As evidence, he cites the impact on the electronic media of newspaper strikes at geographically critical sources of news collection and the low Canadian content of weekend broadcast news due to the dearth of Canadian Sunday papers.

The effects, Siegel suggests, in the absence of newspapers, television stations are deprived of their major reference points as to what is newsworthy.

While the precise relationship between television and newspapers in the agenda setting process is still being established, evidence clearly suggests that the broadcast medium uses the product of the print medium. According to Bagdikian (1974, p. 138), one of the foremost specialists on the American media, "instead of creating a comprehensive news system that offers a service independent of the printed news networks, broadcasting uses the product of the printed news". Examinations of the Canadian media (McNaught, 1962; Siegel, 1976) have reached a similar conclusion; newspapers play a key role in preparing the messages that are disseminated by other media channels. Siegel (1983, p. 9) has suggested that the birth of a message in the Canadian communications process is very often linked to the news gathering facilities of the daily newspapers and the Canadian Press wire service. Agenda setting may be a two stage process, with newspapers initiating public issues at an earlier stage than television and the issue salience increased and an additional audience obtained when the story is given prominence on television (Shaw and McCombs, 1977, pp. 89-105).

In an effort to be systematic and to provide some basis for comparing the coverage of different media, this study will examine both newspapers and television coverage to the extent possible. Patterson (1977) has emphasized the utility of employing comparative research designs in the analysis of news content. He maintains that this strategy provides perspective and prevents researchers from entirely attributing the content findings to the unique properties of one or the other media. In studies of phenomena such as political violence or terrorism, which frequently have strong visual elements, and perpetrators who usually wish to articulate a message, it is important that both press and television coverage be analysed.

Newspaper Sources

The Canadian press system is second only to the American in terms of fragmentation and regionalization. There are an astonishing number of cities (about 100) which have daily newspapers providing local, national and international news (Siegel, 1983, p. 125). While the Toronto Globe and Mail introduced a "National Edition" in the Fall of 1980, its claim to be Canada's National Newspaper is still somewhat tenuous.¹² Siegel (1983, p. 128) notes that the "National Edition" remains, for the most part, a second newspaper for the reader also buying the local daily. He suggests that it

is still some distance from having a readership that would reflect a wide and deep appeal across the country, as in the case of national newspapers published in Tokyo, London and Paris.

For the purposes of this analysis, the country was divided up into five regions; Atlantic Canada, Quebec, Ontario, the Prairies and B.C.; with major papers selected from each region.¹³ Siegel (1976, p. 20) has suggested that the papers published in these regions perform the dual function of local, as well as national newspapers. The papers chosen for analysis in each region are shown in Table 3.2.

Because this analysis focuses on the English media, the newspapers selected are all English publications with the exception of Le Droit. This paper and the Ottawa Citizen were included in the sample because the incidents in question took place in Ottawa. Two Toronto papers were also selected for the sample -- the Toronto Star because it has the largest circulation in Canada, as well as in Toronto, and the Globe and Mail. The latter was selected because, as John Porter (1965, p. 486) suggested, it is the only Canadian daily with

TABLE 3.2

SELECTED SAMPLE OF TEN CANADIAN DAILIES
BY REGION, CITY OF PUBLICATION AND
1982 CIRCULATION

<u>Region</u>	<u>City</u>	<u>Paper</u>	<u>1982 Circulation</u>
Atlantic	Halifax	Chronicle Herald	129,216
Quebec	Montreal	Gazette	223,512
Ontario	Ottawa	Citizen	178,725
	Ottawa	Le Droit	46,129
	Toronto	Star	514,317
	Toronto	Globe and Mail	339,193
Prairies	Winnipeg	Free Press	196,065
	Regina	Leader Post	69,078
	Calgary	Herald	145,317
British Columbia	Vancouver	Sun	379,017

Source: Audit Bureau of Circulation

any claims to being a national newspaper. Referred to as Canada's paper of record the Globe and Mail is recognized by Merrill (1968) as a member of the press elite: the top thirty newspapers of the world. Other papers were selected because of their importance as regional newspapers. It is felt that these ten newspapers provide an acceptable cross-Canada perspective on the coverage that the Canadian press accorded the occurrence of Armenian terrorism in this country. In 1982, these papers had a circulation of over 2.2 million. For the purpose of consistency, the final edition of the dailies was the one used. In the case of the Globe and Mail the national edition was used.

Television News Sources

In 1982 there were 1,191 licensed television transmitters in Canada. The majority of these were affiliated with the two major networks, CBC and CTV. In 1982 CBC had 30 stations and 32 affiliated stations and CTV had 25 stations (CRTC, 1983). The major daily news programs of these two networks are The National (CBC) and CTV National News. In 1982 The National had a cross-Canada audience of 1.9 million nightly viewers compared with an audience of 1.2 million for the CTV National News. This analysis of television news coverage focuses on the national news programs of the two Canadian networks.

Lichty and Bailly (1978) have noted that it is preferable to do a complete analysis of television news coverage on the basis of actual newscasts in context, including video, than to use summary indices and transcripts. It is extremely difficult to follow this advice, however in ex post facto assessments. Although it is now easier to obtain film of complete television newscasts with the help of video recorders, most researchers continue to find themselves forced to rely on news transcripts. American researchers of television news have benefitted greatly from the compendium of news transcripts and film footage available through the Vanderbilt Television Archive. No such source exists in Canada. As a result, this content analysis of news coverage was based largely on news transcripts obtained from CBC. These were supplemented, where possible, by videotapes of CBC and CTV news coverage.¹⁴

TECHNIQUES OF ANALYSIS

Newspaper coverage and television news coverage of three incidents of Armenian terrorism were subjected to both a structural and substantive content analysis. The difference between the two types is a question of form of presentation versus content. Structural content analysis refers to how the material is presented, i.e. the style of presentation.

It is concerned with such questions as the number of items on the incident in the news report, their placement or position and the time or space devoted to the coverage. Substantive content analysis, on the other hand, is more concerned with what is communicated. It focuses on such aspects of the coverage as themes, descriptions of the incident or participants and news angles (Manheim and Rich, 1981, pp. 158-162). While structural analysis tends to be non-judgmental, a number of judgmental techniques are brought to bear in substantive analysis. Coding sheets for the structural and substantial analyses are contained in Appendix 1.

For each newspaper in the sample, 12 consecutive editions (i.e. two weeks of coverage) were analysed. Overall, 600 newspapers were examined. Transcripts and videotapes of network newscasts, based on availability, were analysed for the day of each incident and for four subsequent days. Fewer newscast than newspapers were examined on the often confirmed assumption that news issues grow stale faster for television than for newspapers.

Structural Analysis

The structural analysis performed for this study focuses on the number of news items on the incident in each news

report, the placement or position of the coverage, the space or time allocated to it and the extent of follow-up coverage.

The Number of News Items

One indication of the importance assigned by news editors to a given event or incident is the number of articles or reports concerning it in the newspaper or newscast. This variable is also an indication of the fact that there are several different news angles that the editors wish to use on the story. For all newspapers, the number of articles concerning an incident were coded. The same was done with the television news. When a television news story had multiple segments with reports presenting different story angles, each segment was coded as a separate item.

The Placement/Position of the Coverage

The placement/position measurement focuses on what is referred to as the "amount of news play". Through an examination of the positioning of stories in the news report, inferences can be made concerning the relative importance (i.e. news value) and the drawing power that editors have assigned to the item.

The front page of a newspaper is a key focus of coverage analysis. Obviously, stories and photographs assigned to the front page are deemed to have significantly more news value than those which have been relegated to the inside pages. The very make-up of page one of a newspaper indicates the importance attached to a story and is, therefore, an indication of agenda setting patterns. Previous studies have determined that positioning on the front page is also a major consideration. Some (Kelly and Mitchell 1981) have argued ~~that~~ the upper half of the page or the area above the fold is reserved for the most prominent or the feature stories. Mott (1969) has suggested that custom or reading habit set values on the eight columns which make up the first page of the typical newspaper. He argues that column eight, that is the right hand column on page one is generally regarded as the most important spot on the page, and therefore the day's most important (usually the headline) story usually starts in this column. All newspaper coverage of the incidents in question was therefore coded in terms of its positioning the newspaper. First page coverage was further coded in terms of its position relative to the fold.

Similar considerations apply to television news, which has frequently been referred to as the electronic front page (Harney and Stone, 1966, p. 112). Television news

stories located near the beginning or "lead" of a newscast, have been shown to have more impact on the viewing audience than those items that close a broadcast, with the exception of the editorial spot typically called the commentary (Wurth-Hough, 19883, p. 409). The total number of stories in a newscast varies, both with the individual broadcasting system and over time, often resulting from changes in news formatting. Overall, it is felt that any report within the first six stories of a telecast is indicative of editorial emphasis, regardless of whether the claims total number of stories presented that evening on an individual system is twenty or thirty. As Green (1969, p. 240), a former television newsman has written, "when the show progresses, its hard news element diminishes while its philosophical feature content increases". All television news stories related to an incident were coded in terms of their relative position in the newscasts.

Space/Time Allocation

An expression of the newsworthiness of a given piece of information can also be derived from the volume of coverage or space/time allocated to it. This is largely a function of two considerations, the first absolute and the second relative. In assigning importance to a story, news editors typically face a basic dilemma in that some news is more

important and deserves more attention than other news. Space/time constraints influence the amount of coverage that can be devoted to a particular item. The importance of a particular story or incident can be determined by the use of two separate types of measures. The first is the measure of total space/time devoted to the story or incident and the second relates it to the total news space/time available in the edition of the paper or the newscast in which it appears.

The total volume of coverage (articles and photographs) devoted to a particular incident in each of the ten newspapers was measured through the standard means of the newspaper column inch. For all first day coverage of a particular incident this measure was subsequently related to the paper's news hole. This relational measure compensates for the relative differences in the sizes of the papers. The news hole is generally defined as the amount of general news space available to the editors on a given day (McLeod, Becker and Byrnes, 1974, p. 164). The particular measure used here for newspapers is what Ryan and Owen (1968, p. 640) have referred to as the live news hole. In measuring the live news hole, items such as display and classified ads, stock market listings, radio and television schedules and comic strips which could be considered standing items are excluded.

It has generally been determined that the average news hole comprises about 33 percent of any given newspaper (Editor and Publisher, March 21, 1981, p. 11).

In effect, two news holes were actually used for each newspaper. Apart from the total coverage/live news hole calculation for first day coverage, first page coverage was related to the first page news hole as a further determinant of the importance assigned to the story.

An indicator of television emphasis is the length of time devoted to a news item. Given, the time constraints on a twenty to twenty-five minute broadcast, a typical news story according to Wurth-Hough (1983, p. 410), averages slightly over a minute on the air, with "in depth coverage" lasting one minute and forty-five seconds. Pattern and McClure (1976, p. 85) quote Av Westin, a former executive producer of ABC News, as saying:

The audience has a very short attention span and welcomes the change The result is that the audience never gets bored if it finds its attention span taxed as the newscast switches from time, place and subject to provide a sense of forward movement.

The time of each item in the newscast related to an incident was recorded. Furthermore, the total amount of time devoted to coverage of the incident was related to the news program's news hole. The news hole in this case was defined as the total time available for news in a program. This excluded commercial time and promotional segments.

Substantive Content Analysis

The substantive content analysis of news coverage of Armenian terrorism in Canada will concentrate on the issues it raises and the ideas and images it attempts to convey. This will entail an analysis of the news angles used, photographs, the descriptors, (the nouns and adjectives) used to described the perpetrators of the incident and others involved, editorial base themes and backgrounds. The news analysis will be complemented by an evaluation of editorial coverage.

News Angles/Themes

Paletz et. al. (1982, p. 162) have suggested that headlines and story heads encapsulate the primary subject of the article. They attribute their importance to the fact that many readers treat the newspaper selectively and headings are frequently the only part of the story read or

remembered. Headlines and story heads have frequently been used as an indication of the news angle that is being used in the presentation of the story (Siegel, 1976). To get an indication of the news angles that were being used in the coverage of the three incidents of Armenian terrorism, all the stories found in the 600 newspapers examined were classified into themes and then into categories.

A panel of four coders was used to assign themes to each news story based on the story heads.¹⁵ They then aggregated these themes into categories. Random sampling was done of the results of the classification by category and the outcome was regarded as most satisfactory. Interrater and interrater reliability were also tested, and are presented in the relevant analyses.¹⁶ Throughout, an analysis was conducted of the correspondence between the story category and its placement in the newspaper. This subsequently led to a determination of what will be called here Categories of Front Page Emphasis.

The panel of judges was also given the text of stories from the television newscasts relating to each event. They were asked to assign a general theme to the story based on this text.

Visual and Photo Themes

As Stuart Hall (1973, p. 176) has noted, photographs add new dimensions to the meaning of a text. Roland Barthes (1972) has observed "pictures are more important than writing, they impose meaning at one stroke without analysing or diluting it". The content of photographs not only serves to attract the interest of readers but also to convey a substantial amount of information, helping the reader to form impressions about a particular event or story. Photographs play a particularly important role in this respect. As Hall (1973, p. 188) notes, the choice of the moment of an event, of this person rather than that person, of this angle rather than any other, even the selection of a particular photo can be used to represent a whole complex chain of events and meanings and is a highly subjective procedure. Similarly, Kreighbaum (1972, p. 8) has suggested that, contrary to popular opinion, pictures can lie. They rest in a frame of reference, which for most of them requires captions and commentary.

Profound influence has been attributed to news photographs. Kreighbaum (1972, p. 8) has noted, in particular, the impacts that the photos of a Buddhist monk killing himself by self-immolation and a Saigon police

officer shooting a Viet Cong suspect had on American public opinion on Viet Nam. Similarly, he sees the pictures of police dogs in Birmingham and the sheriff's deputies in Selma, Alabama as having had a significant influence on the support for the civil rights movement in the U.S.

All photos related to an incident, including captions, were assigned themes by the panel of coders and placed into categories. The same was done for the visual themes in the available television news videotapes.

The Characterization of Participants

As noted in Chapter 2, a great deal of controversy surrounds the way in which terrorists, and their acts have been characterized in the media. Several of the media's critics have complained about the use of favourable referents to describe terrorists, e.g. "commandos", "guerrillas". Similarly, it has been argued that the referents used to describe the victims of terrorism and police and security forces influence in subtle ways the perception of the incident by the general public. To look at how the media referred to the various parties in the conflict, all nouns and adjectives used in both press and television news coverage to describe the terrorists and their actions, their victims were extracted. These were then given to the panel

of judges, who rated them as being favourable, unfavourable or neutral references.

Information Sources

As Paletz et. al (1982, p. 167) have noted, while an act of political violence may be a palpable event, the reader's impressions will likely be influenced by the perspective(s) used in the news story. In speaking of television coverage of terrorism, they have suggested that the opinions presented are almost always confined to the holders of power in major institutions: government ministers, politicians, senior members of the police force and judiciary and those who speak for accredited pressure groups, such as churches and professional organizations. As a result, they argue, television news tends to be a closed form of presentation operating predominantly in terms of official perspectives..

To explore this argument more fully, all sources quoted in the coverage of the three incidents were extracted and listed. These were then categorized by the panel of judges.

Editorial Analysis

It is on the editorial page that the perspective of the paper towards an event is officially articulated and reinforced and solutions and prescriptions offered. There

were 30 editorials in the coverage of the three incidents of Armenian terrorism on which this analysis was based. These were given to the panel of judges to be categorized according to the issues receiving the most attention. The judges also evaluated the language used in these editorials to describe the perpetrators, the incident, the victim, and the phenomenon of terrorism. Editorial analysis also focused on the editorial prescription for dealing with Armenian terrorism and terrorism in general.

'Characterization of the Terrorists' Cause

In order to determine the ability and success of the terrorists involved in these incidents to put their grievance before the public, the amount of space devoted to discussions of the cause underlying the incident, the depiction of that cause and specific goals of the terrorists were all analysed. This analysis also focused on the extent to which the media examined both sides of the Armenian-Turkish conflict, thus providing a balanced perspective on the historically controversial events motivating Armenian terrorism. A detailed discussion of the history of the Armenian question is provided in Chapter 4. This was used as a baseline for the analysis of this aspect of the news coverage. All

stories on and references to the Armenian cause were extracted from the newspapers and news transcripts.

SUMMARY

This chapter has articulated some of the key questions that are to be explored in the remaining chapters. The principal focus of this study is on the utility of terrorism as a method of political communication. Other questions related to specific aspects of the media's coverage of terrorism have also been set out for empirical investigation.

This chapter has described the methodology to be used in this examination. Both a structural and substantive content analysis will be performed on the news coverage afforded by ten Canadian dailies and the two national television networks to the major incidents of Armenian terrorism which have taken place in this country.

The next chapter looks at the historical roots of Armenian terrorism, describes its contemporary manifestations and the groups involved and looks at its occurrence in Canada. This chapter will be used as a back drop for the analysis of the coverage given to the Armenian incidents.

1 The seizure of the Turkish embassy in Ottawa by Armenian terrorists on March 12, 1985, and the ensuing criticism of media actions caused a great deal of discussion in the Canadian media about the role they play in such incidents. Numerous stories about the media and terrorism appeared in the press in the days after the event, and the CBC news program The Journal devoted an entire segment to a round table discussion of the issue on April 1, 1985.

2 The Ontario Royal Commission on Violence in the Communications Industry was established by Order in Council in May, 1985. Its seven volume report containing 28 independent studies of the media, over 50 percent of which were based on content analysis, was released in 1976.

3 For a discussion of some of the major methodological problems with content analysis see Kelly (1984, pp. 312-313).

4 This issue was discussed in detail during the Kerner Commission Inquiry (1968). See also B. D. Singer (1968, pp. 56-58) for a review of this Commission's critique of television.

5 There are basically three different types of media inquiry usually termed production research, content research and effects research. Different methodologies and issues apply to each area. Production research examines the determinants of how news is chosen, compiled and produced. Participant observation and institutional level analysis are the usual methodologies. Production research asks the question: What factors influence the selection and shaping of news content? Content research is concerned with the composition of news. Quantitative measures are derived from the formal techniques of content analysis. Content research asks: What are the patterns, textures and substance of news reports? What are the priorities of news stories and how are those stories portrayed? Effects research studies the consequences of news for the viewers of reader and society. Surveys and experiments provide the data for most effect studies. Effect research asks: What are the processes through which exposure to news reports informs or influences viewers or readers? What impact does the news report have on the citizen orientations towards politics and society.

6 Totals add up to over 100 percent as a result of multiple responses.

7 Livingstone (1982, p. 52) attributes the popularity of television news to the fact that it is readily comprehensible and digestible and the concise and snappy format created by television.

8 Canada has one of the world's most highly developed communications systems. Surveys show that the average newspaper in Canada is read by nearly three persons and that almost every Canadian old enough or literate enough to read, examines a Canadian daily on a regular basis. There are more television sets than there are households and there are more radios in use in Canada than there are people.

9 For his study of national attitudes and behaviour Kubas used a random sample of 3,511 Canadian adults.

10 See the Gallup Opinion Index, Report 156, (July, 1978).

11 According to Kubas' survey, 54 percent of Canadians ranked television as the most believable medium, as opposed to 34 percent for newspapers. Sixty-seven percent saw television as the most influential medium and 53 percent rated it as the most fair and unbiased. This compares to ratings of 23 percent and 29 percent respectively on these two attitudes for newspapers.

12 In the Fall of 1980, the Globe and Mail introduced a "national edition" in two cities. In 1982, this edition was being printed simultaneously in five cities: Moncton, Ottawa, Winnipeg, Calgary and Vancouver. Despite its national availability, the majority of the paper's current circulation (80 percent) is still in Ontario.

13 For a discussion of the different approaches for classifying regions in Canada, see Paul Fox (1969) and J. E. Hodgetts (1966).

14 The managing editors of both CBC and CTV National News were contacted concerning access to news transcripts. CTV would not provide any transcripts. The CBC, on the other hand, provided all available transcripts for the dates requested. Unfortunately, many transcripts relating to the Gungor and Altikat shootings were missing from the archives.

15 The panel of four coders contained a specialist in terrorism, a communications specialist and two individuals who could be classed as general readers/viewers.

16 Intercoder reliability refers to the degree to which observers or coders are consistent in their categorization of

subjects; whereas intracoder reliability relates to the degree to which coders are internally consistent over time.

CHAPTER 4

ARMENIAN TERRORISM

This chapter will provide the backdrop for the detailed examination of the Canadian media's coverage of the activities of Armenian terrorists in Canada in Chapters 5 and 6. It will examine the historical roots of Armenian terrorism, the proximate causes of the current campaign of violence, contemporary groups, their stated objectives, modus operandi, international connections and media orientation. It will also provide a general overview of the activities of Armenian terrorists in Canada.

BACKGROUND

According to Laqueur (1977, p. 22), Armenian organizations were among the first practitioners of politically motivated and systematic terrorism in the pre-1914 period. Terrorism was used by the Armenians in their bloody struggle for autonomy with the Ottoman authorities in the late 1880s and 1890s. A brief resurgence occurred in the immediate post World War I period when several Ottoman leaders who were held responsible for the massacres of Armenians during the war were assassinated. After this,

terrorism related to the Armenian cause disappeared from the world stage for over half a century.

In 1975 Armenian terrorists began an extensive and global campaign of terrorism, intimidation and armed propaganda in the name of national self determination and justice. Over the last ten years they have launched over 200 operations against Turkish Embassies and commercial interests around the world, killing 41 Turkish diplomats and family members. Attacks have also been directed at the property and nationals of other countries, in many cases in retaliation for the apprehension by these countries of Armenian terrorists comrades. Operations have taken place on four different continents and in some 21 countries including some behind the Iron Curtain.¹ In 1983 alone, Armenian terrorists were responsible for attacks in Brussels, Paris, Belgrade, Berlin, Istanbul, Tehran, Lisbon and Marseilles with aborted attempts in London, Lyons and Stockholm.²

Among contemporary terrorist organizations, Armenian groups have developed a reputation for being among the most active, mobile and lethal. Their growing prowess and prominence and the paucity of attention that has been paid to them caused Fred Ilke, U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, to comment before a U.S. Senate Committee that

Armenian terrorist groups are the deadliest, yet least studied, of all international terrorist organizations.³

The extent and nature of their activities over the last decade has led Paul Wilkinson (1983, p. 348) to suggest Armenian terrorism has replaced Palestinian terrorism as the archetype of international terrorism. The activities of contemporary Armenian terrorist groups are seen as providing a classic example of transnational and nationalistic terrorism directed largely at placing and keeping an issue (the alleged genocide of 1915) on the international public agenda. They also present an extremely useful case study of how a terrorist group can exploit a frustrated constituency, cause destruction and disruption far out of proportion to its numbers and use violence as a political resource in its struggle to attract international attention to its cause.

The Roots of the Armenian Struggle

As with many other terrorist groups espousing a nationalist cause, the motivation for Armenian terrorist violence is rooted deep in the national psyche and traditions of the Armenian people and their desperate passion for the cause of national liberation. To adequately comprehend the passions and emotions involved in the contemporary violent

expression of Armenian nationalism it is imperative that one appreciate the polemics, contradictions and utter confusion which surround the events that took place in Turkey in the early part of the this century leading up to what Armenians regard as a genocide. An understanding of these events and of the different interpretations which exist today among Turks and Armenians as to what took place during this period provide an excellent indication of why the Armenian-Turkish struggle continues to be a violent and intractable political conflict.

Historical Armenia

The origins of the Armenians are obscured by well over a millennium of history. Historians consider them to be among the oldest of the civilized races of Western Asia. They were also the first state in the world to adopt Christianity as the official religion. Gunther (1983, p. 4) has noted that the Armenians were settled in Eastern Anatolia more than 1500 years before the Turks first entered and conquered the area in beginning in the eleventh century A.D. Throughout most of their history, however, the Armenians were an oppressed and-subjected nation. According to Walker (1980, p. 85) the Ottoman conquerors found them to be in a wretched state after the Mongols had wreaked devastation on them for a number of

years, causing many to flee to the mountains and reducing those remaining to abject poverty.

Under the regime of the Ottoman conquerors, the Armenians lived under a unique millet system of self government which was used for all non Muslim minorities. According to Sanjian (1965; 5) each millet was, to a large extent, a self-governing entity; permitted to keep its own institutions. Internal, personnel matters such as marriage, inheritance, schooling, etc. were controlled within the community itself with no Turkish interference. Walker (1980, p. 87) has noted that the major obligation imposed on the Armenians and other minorities by the Ottoman ruling class was to pay their taxes and create no disturbances.

As a method of administration for conquered peoples the millet system was, according to Walker (1980, p. 87), morally ahead of anything to come out of Europe at that time or for sometime after. Nevertheless, he points out that it did have certain important features that ensured the subjugation of non Muslim peoples. Perhaps the most significant of these was the inapplicability of Muslim law to non Muslims and the inability of non Muslims to get justice in Muslim courts where non Muslim testimony was forbidden. Christian nations in the Empire, like the Armenians, also suffered certain

specific discrimination. For example, they were not permitted to bear arms. This frequently left them at the mercy of some of their predatory Muslim neighbours. As well, they were subject to the *derishime*, or boy collection whereby Ottoman officials would take children from the Christian community, educate them as Muslims and put them into the Ottoman civil service. Perhaps the most oppressive and demeaning demand, however, and one which was unique to the Armenians was the obligation to provide free winter quarters for periods of up to six months for nomadic Kurds and their flocks.

The Rise of Armenian Nationalism

While there were widespread feelings of oppression and disaffection among Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, there was little in the way of nationalist feeling, in the sense of an awareness of a unity of interest among them, until the third quarter of the nineteenth century. Several factors came to influence the development of nationalist sentiments among the Armenians during this period. Perhaps one of the most important was the Russian conquest of the Caucasus and the creation of Russian Armenia on the Ottoman borders. This provided the Armenians in the Ottoman empire with a standard against which to measure their situation. The gradual improvement in conditions for Russian Armenians led to

widespread relative deprivation among those remaining in the Ottoman Empire and raised the consciousness of their collective plight. As well, radical populist political notions were becoming well entrenched in Russian Armenia and were beginning to spread across the border. Armenians were also beginning to assimilate European intellectual currents, which at the time were strongly focused on nationalist issues, through American protestant missionaries and through the offspring of wealthy Armenians who had been educated in Europe. They were also influenced by the nationalism that was occurring among other ethnic minorities within the empire.

The Ottoman Armenians were sadly disappointed that they did not secure an independent state in the Treaty of Berlin of 1878 which followed the Russian defeat of the Ottomans in the 1877-1878 war. They had been hoping for some form of local self government within the framework of the Ottoman Empire. This disappointment further fueled Armenian national consciousness. Within the next decade Armenian nationalism began to strongly manifest itself in the formation of political organizations for self protection and to voice the desire for a free Armenia.⁴

The first recognizable Armenian political party, according to Walker (1980, p. 126), was the Armenakan party which was founded in 1885. The central aim of this party was to win the right for Armenians to rule over themselves through revolution. He notes, however, that their concept of revolution was low key compared with that of succeeding organizations. Terrorist agitation and militant demonstrations were frowned upon by the Armenakans. They placed most of their hope in intervention by the great powers to rescue the Armenians from Ottoman terrorism in line with the Treaty of Berlin and the Cyprus Convention.⁵ This hope in great power intervention was perhaps the single greatest error of the revolutionary parties throughout the period 1885 to 1908.

In 1887 another revolutionary party, the Hashnaks was created. This party was founded on Marxist precepts. Its stated aims were the achievement of socialism and the freedom of Turkish Armenia. It, too, saw this as only coming about through revolution but unlike the Armenakans it did not rule out agitation and terror. Three years later, in 1890, the Federation of Armenian Revolutionaries was founded as an umbrella organization for all Armenian nationalist groups. Within a year, however, this coalition foundered as a result of strong and irreconcilable ideological differences. In

1891 the Hunchaks left the organization which soon after changed its name to the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaks). This set the stage for a rivalry which continues to this day with the Hunchaks giving priority to socialism and the Dashnaks to nationalism. The one point on which the two factions did agree was the need to use terror and intimidation in the struggle for Armenian independence.

According to Laqueur (1977, p. 67) the methods of the Armenian revolutionaries of this period were largely borrowed from the Narodnaya Volya.⁶ For example, the program of the Dashnak party (1892) stated that revolutionary bands intended to terrorize government officials, informers, usurers and every kind of exploiter. The strategy that the Armenians followed was largely one of provocation; one which still has currency among contemporary nationalist terrorist groups. It was their assumption that attacks upon the Turks would cause Ottoman officials to react with savage punitive measures against the Armenian community. This they hoped would radicalize the Armenian community and rally them to the cause. More decisively, it was felt that the Western powers, appalled by the massacres would intervene as they did for the Bulgarians two decades earlier.⁷ Lastly, they hoped that their example would lead to uprisings among other

nationalities in the Ottoman Empire, as well as perhaps as inspiring disaffected Turks.

The campaign of terror lasted for several years. According to some Turkish sources (Elekdag, 1983) the massacre of Moslems was the main tactic of the Armenian groups. Entire Muslim villages were said to have been wiped out in order to trigger reprisals by aggrieved Moslems against the Armenian community. They cite in particular the Armenian riots in Istanbul in 1895; the Zeytun revolt of 1895, Armenian raids in Moslem villages, attacks in Izmir, Ankara, Diyarbakir, Urfa, Maras, Van; the seizure of the Ottoman bank in Istanbul in 1896; and the Adena riots of 1906.⁸ While Armenian terrorism was successful in bringing down savage retaliation on the Armenian community, the expected great power intervention never occurred.

The Turkish Reaction

The rising tide of nationalism among Armenians in the Ottoman Empire was viewed by the Turks as a serious internal threat. This situation was compounded by the concentration of the Armenians in the heart of the Empire. Moreover, although the point is still hotly disputed, the evidence, as Gunther (1983; 5) notes, would appear to suggest that Armenians constituted a minority in the area for which they

were seeking independence.⁹ The Turks perceived Armenian independence as a logical absurdity and a threat to their very existence. Thus began what Bernard Lewis (1968, p. 356) has characterized as the struggle between two nations for the possession of a single homeland.

The Turkish concerns, however, appear to have gone beyond Armenian agitation. According to Elekdag (1983) they saw the hand of opportunistic foreign powers in the Armenian unrest. Several European countries were blamed for exploiting the ambitions of Armenian extremist movements for their own imperial interest. The sympathetic atmosphere that the Armenians found for their demands in Europe was attributed by the Turks to the interest of British, French and Russian policy makers in extending national spheres of influence in the so-called "Sick Man of Europe". Each of these powers was seen as using the Armenian cause as an instrument to further its geopolitical aims in the area.

It is also essential to realize that the irruption of western nationalism into the 500 year old mosaic of peoples and religions that constituted the Ottoman empire occurred during a period of fervent nationalism among the Turks. As the subjected peoples of the empire began to assert themselves, Young Turk reformers who had taken power in 1908,

calling themselves the Committee for Union and Progress, took up the cause of Turkish nationalism. They had, as their major objective, to consolidate their core territory and link up to the Turks of central Asia under Russian rule to fulfill their dream of a greater Turan; a union of all Turkic peoples.

The result of all of this was an extended period of nationalist turmoil within the Ottoman Empire involving bloody repression of minority nationalism by the Ottoman government. Walker (1980, p. 200), for example, has argued that the massacres of Armenians was the natural result of meticulous Turkish racism, Turkish nationalism, and the "Turkey faces the East" ambitions of the pan Turkists. The first of three waves of Armenian killings took place in 1894. According to Gunther, (1983, p. 5) estimates of the number of Armenians killed during the period 1894 to 1896 range between 200,000 to a quarter of a million. A subsequent massacre took place in 1909. On April 17 and 24, 1909 more than 30,000 Armenians were massacred in an effort to suppress the national ambitions of the Armenian people. These massacres culminated in 1915 with the wholesale slaughter of the Armenian population of the Turkish Empire.

The 1915 Massacre

It is to the events of 1915 that contemporary Armenian terrorism has attempted to draw world attention. In that year, the virtual extinction of Turkish Armenia occurred in a series of bloody massacres which the Armenians and their supporters refer to as the first genocide of the Twentieth Century. The Turks vehemently resist the allegations of genocide, suggesting instead that Armenian deaths during this period can be attributed to wartime anarchy and Armenian treachery. A major point of historical controversy thus turns on the events of this era and the motives of the Ottoman authorities.

In late October of 1914 Turkey entered the war on the side of the Germans and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. At this time, the government of The Committee for Union and Progress pressed the Dashnaks to use their influence to encourage Russian Armenians to rise against the Tzar and facilitate the Ottoman invasion of Russia. In return the Armenians were promised semi-autonomy. Corsun (1982, p. 32) has suggested that partly out of distrust of the Young Turks and encouraged by the principle of self-determination the Armenians refused to cooperate with the Turks. What followed was a series of events in which hundreds of thousands of Armenians were killed and others spread across the world as a diaspora.

The interpretation of the events of this period that is now firmly rooted in Armenian tradition and culture is that they were part of the planned and systematic extermination of the Armenian people by the Turkish authorities. Armenians and their supporters contend that the Ottoman Government led by the Triumverate of Taalat Bey, Minister of the Interior, Enver Pasha, Minister of War and Jemal Pasha carefully planned and orchestrated a systematic genocide of 1.5 million of its Armenian population (approximately 60 percent of its Armenian population). Amid fighting in Turkey's Eastern Anatolian provinces, the historic home of Christian Armenians, the Turks allegedly rounded up and killed numerous Armenian men of military age including members of the Ottoman Armed Forces and ordered the deportation of all other Armenians in the region. The Armenians were marched from the Anatolian highlands to the Syrian dessert in what Gunther (1983, p. 6) has described as ghastly conditions of plague, starvation and sheer exhaustion. Marauding tribes plundered and massacred the columns. Whether the deaths were 1.5 million as often cited or 600,000 to 700,000 as estimated by some scholars, about half the Armenian population died.¹⁰ Many of those who survived or escaped were incorporated into Soviet Armenia in the Caucasus. The rest were spread as a diaspora throughout Europe, the Middle East and North America.

The Armenian position is based on a formidable array of eyewitness testimony and historical documentation. Detailed historical accounts have been offered by the German historian Johannes Lepsius (1919), the great English Historian Lord Bryce, head of a British wartime commission to investigate the Armenian Massacres and his young assistant Arnold Toynbee (1916). The Bryce-Toynbee accounts are based on a compilation of over 600 pages of eyewitness testimony which provided graphic detail of the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of Armenians. Explicit accounts of the suffering inflicted on Armenian men, women and children have also been provided by Henry Morgenthau (1919) who was U.S. Ambassador to Turkey from 1913 to 1916.

Turkish sources¹¹ hotly contest the Armenian contentions of a genocide, claiming that the allegations are based on gross distortions and omissions of historical fact. The counter argument offered by the Turks is that the tragedy was part of the war. The Ottoman government viewed the refusal of the Armenians to participate in the war effort as treasonous, especially in light of the fact that Turkey was suffering heavy military reversals. Engaged in battle on five different fronts the Young Turks perceived themselves as being threatened by a stab in the back by the Armenian population, the majority of which resided in the

sensitive area of the Russian border. It is the Turkish contention that a number of Armenians betrayed Turkey during the war by joining the invading Russian army and by engaging in guerrilla activities behind the Turkish lines. They argue that in response to this situation and to the open Armenian uprisings and the threat of further revolts the Ottoman authorities had no alternative but to relocate them from the Eastern front region to Syria and Palestine (at that time parts of the Ottoman Empire).

The Turks directly attribute the Armenian deaths during this period to the chaos of wartime. Their firmly held position, as stated by Elekdag (1983), is that warfare in Eastern Turkey together with famine and epidemic resulted in the suffering and deaths of members of all ethnic groups. The Turks contend that while some 100,000 or so Armenians may have died between 1915 and 1918 this was no greater a percentage than that of the Turks and other Muslims who died as a result of the same conditions, in the same places, at the same time. Other Armenians, they suggest, died as a result of Greek and Armenian launched massacres. They remain steadfast in their argument that the allegations that the slaughter of Armenian civilians on any scale was systematically planned, organized and executed by the Ottoman authorities cannot be sustained by the historical evidence.

The deaths of vast numbers of Armenians resulted in this century's first war crimes trial. While British troops occupied Istanbul after World War I, a short lived liberal Ottoman Government condemned the Young Turk triumverate of Taalat Bey, Enver Pasha and Jemal Pasha to death in absentia.¹² The Turkish government today claims that the verdict was coerced and dismisses as forgeries the most damning evidence, a series of telegraphed messages ordering the extermination. Other crucial documents such as prosecutors' reports in the trial remain locked up in the largely uncatalogued Ottoman Archives. Many of the contemporary reports, including those of Bryce-Toynbee and Morgenthau, are dismissed by the Turks as war time propaganda. In their view, contemporary Armenian terrorism is a continuation of the Armenian campaign to defame and vilify Turkey.

There exists no consensus nor even, it would appear, a basis for agreement on the historical record. Despite their protestations to the contrary and the condemnation of what the Armenians cite as Turkish revisionist history, the death of hundreds of thousands of Armenians does not appear to be as clear cut and as indisputably a systematically planned and orchestrated mass killing as the genocide perpetrated by Germany on the Jews during World War II to which Armenians

frequently equate it. The controversy surrounding the historical interpretation of the events of this period is illustrated by the caveat in the U.S. State Department study on Armenian terrorism (Corsun, 1982, p. 35) which states that, because of the ambiguity of the historical record of the 1915 events in Asia minor, the Department of State does not endorse allegations that the Turkish Government committed genocide against the Armenian people.

Post War Armenia

Armenian hopes for independence rose with the conclusion of World War I,; particularly in light of the numerous promises by the victorious powers concerning restitution and independence throughout the immediate post war period. It was not until 1920, however, that these issues were put on the agenda of the peace conference. On August 10 of that year, the Western powers formally established the independent Republic of Armenia which was guaranteed by the treaty of Sevres, signed by Turkey, the Allied Powers and Armenia. The articles of this treaty recognized Armenia as a free and independent state and compelled Turkey to renounce any claim to the ceded land. The U.S. was empowered to establish the boundary between the two states. The delay in taking action on Armenian independence, which Walker (1980, p. 291) suggests was due to the Allies' preoccupation at the time

with Bolshevism and the global maneuvering that ensued, made the treaty impossible to implement. This, he argues would have taken another war to do. The new Armenian Republic was, therefore, essentially defenceless against its enemies. Pressure from both the Turks and the Communists forced it to collapse within a few months. Armenia was subsequently divided between the Soviets and Turkey. The new Turkish Republic of Attaturk soon after effectively nullified the relevant clauses of the Treaty of Sevres. In 1923 the Treaty of Lausanne betrayed Armenian aspirations by recognizing Turkish control of the territory.

There was a brief resurgence of Armenian terrorism in the period immediately after the war. For a few years in the early 1920s, a group called Nemesis was active in Europe and the Middle East. Nemesis was organized by the Dashnak party at the end of the war to track down and execute those Ottoman leaders that the Armenians believed to be responsible for the massacres. It carried out a number of assassinations of former Ottoman officials. In 1921 Taalat Bey was gunned down in Berlin. Said Halim, Ottoman Foreign Minister, was assassinated in Rome in the same year. In 1922, two other former Ottoman officials were gunned down in Berlin and another was killed in Tiflis, Georgia. Nemesis disappeared after these incidents but the Armenian struggle has been kept

alive by a number of organizations such as the ANC (Armenian National Committee, which have pursued quite seriously, peacefully, the Armenian Struggle for liberation.

CONTEMPORARY ARMENIAN TERRORISM

The results of the First World War radically altered the distribution of Armenians over the world. In particular, it increased the number living under Russian rule. Almost 70 percent of all Armenians now reside in the Soviet Union including around 3.2 million in the Armenian S.S.S.R. and about 1 million in other parts of the country. The areas in Anatolia, which the Armenians claim as their traditional homeland are today occupied almost exclusively by Turks. The entire Armenian community in Turkey, centered mostly in the Istanbul region, currently numbers about 60,000. The largest Armenian community in the diaspora lives in the United States, about 600,000 and is concentrated in Los Angeles which has become a major center of Armenian terrorism. There are about 300,000 in France and there were, before the civil war, about 150,000 in Lebanon. Despite being spread across the globe, however, the aspirations of the Armenians for an independent homeland have not dissipated. Armenians have drawn both inspiration and hope from the success of Jewish Zionism to which they draw parallels to their own efforts.

Contemporary Armenian terrorism has sometimes been referred to as the cause that slept (Economist, October 3, 1981, p. 51). There was over a half a century lag between the activities of Nemesis and the re-emergence of Armenian terrorism as a full blown campaign in the 1970s. In the interim, a number of Armenian groups strove to keep alive the events of the early part of the twentieth century. Their efforts, however, produced little in the way of international support or recognition for the Armenian cause.

There have been many explanations offered as to why Armenian terrorism re-emerged after such a long hiatus. Some have attributed it to growing frustration, especially among young Armenians, resulting from the failure of the traditional nationalist groups over a period of 60 years to focus world attention on their grievances and to internationalize and legitimize the Armenian cause. Kashmeri (1985, p. 10) notes that the score of violent acts linked to the Armenian cause have been committed by young men and women who are two generations removed from the slaughter of the early 1900s. He suggests that the current young generation of Armenians, still closely attached to this tightly knit ethnic community, has begun to look back in anger at the failure of their elders to fulfill their collective mandate:

winning justice for the wrong done. Gunther (1983, p. 33) provides a similar explanation. He attributes the current wave of Armenian terrorism to the failure of the traditional Armenian organizations to develop sufficient political strength to present their case in a conventional way. This failure was typified by what Kuper (1981, p. 350) called the disappearance of the Armenian issue down the U.N. memory hole. The efforts of traditional Armenian organizations to obtain recognition of the 1915 Genocide collapsed in 1978 when the U.N. Human Rights Commission (specifically Turkish members) deleted any reference to it in its report on genocide.¹³ Subsequent attempts to raise the issue before the Commission were unsuccessful until 1983 when, at the urging of several countries on the commission, a special rapporteur was appointed to revise the earlier study. The reference to the Armenian genocide was eventually reinserted in the 1985 revision against the strong opposition of Turkey.

Perhaps the major catalyst for the contemporary campaign of Armenian terrorism was the Lebanese Civil War of the mid 1970s. A sizable element of the Armenian Diaspora came to settle in Lebanon after the events of 1915. By the second half of the twentieth century they had come to number between 150,000 and 200,000 or about 6 percent of the country's population. According to Gunther (1983, p. 13),

strong divisions within the Armenian community in Lebanon based on traditional political rivalries can be traced back to the 1940s. In the years since, the Dashnaks have continued their pro-western position while the Hunchaks have become increasingly more Marxists in their outlook and affiliations. Both Walker (1980, p. 366) and Corsun (1982, p. 32) attribute the bitter outbreak of violence within the Armenian community after the 1958 Lebanese Civil War, in which over 50 deaths occurred, to these internecine antagonisms.

The divisions in this community became further solidified as Lebanese Armenians were caught up in the communal warfare that broke out in Lebanon in the 1970s. During this period, the Dashnaks developed close alliances with the right wing Christian Phalange of Pierre Gemayal while the Hunchaks rallied around Kemal Jumblatt's left wing Progressive Party. The major event, however, which widened fissures in the Armenian community would appear to be the decision by the Phalangists to use the Armenian section of East Beirut to launch attacks against the the Muslim stronghold in the adjacent west sector. One element of the Armenian Community felt a duty to take up arms and support their Christian brothers. Others, particularly left wing Armenian youth having developed close contacts with the

Palestinians in Lebanon through university attendance and the proximity of their neighborhoods, came to realize that they shared a similar situation. They had been driven from their homeland and they had a large diaspora community. Moreover, both they and the Palestinians had failed in their attempt to use legal methods to bring their cause to world attention. According to Corsun (1982, p. 32), young Armenians in Beirut were particularly impressed by the success that the Palestinians had achieved in gaining international attention for their cause through the use of terrorism. Disaffected young men began to drop out of the established Dashnak and Hunchak parties and join together under the rubric of the vaguely Marxist-Leninist national liberation ideology.

In addition to the events taking place in Lebanon, there were a couple of other events which appear to have played a precipitatory role in the outbreak of contemporary Armenian terrorism. In 1972, Jean Marie Cazoni, the son of an Armenian French painter called for coordinated attacks against Turkey while speaking in Marseilles. A more direct and immediate inspiration occurred the next year in California. In what was apparently an individual act of revenge unconnected to any organization, Gourgen Yanikian, an eighty-four year old Armenian emigre, apparently deranged by the childhood memory of seeing most of his family

slaughtered, lured two Turkish Consuls to the Biltmore Hotel in Los Angeles on the pretext of returning a valuable tapestry and shot them dead. Within a year a new group The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) arose in Beirut claiming Yanikian as the "god-father of modern Armenian Terrorism".

The New Campaign of Armenian Terrorism.

The latest campaign of Armenian terrorism was officially launched in 1975. ASALA announced itself on January 20, 1975 by bombing the Beirut headquarters of the World Council of Churches. It denounced this organization for what it called the "white genocide" of sponsoring Armenian emigration and assimilation to the U.S. On October 22 of the same year another group, the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG) leapt onto the international stage with the assassination of the Turkish ambassador to Austria in Vienna. A short two months later in December, this group murdered the the Turkish ambassador to France in Paris.

Estimates of the actual number of Armenian terrorist groups in operation today vary considerably. Corson (198, p. 33) suggests that Armenian extremists have carried out

attacks under 19 operational names. Edward F. Mickolus (1980) identifies 11 different Armenian terrorists organizations. Several newspaper estimates have put the number between four and six.¹⁴ A recent Turkish university study cited by Gunther (1983, p. 18) points to five major groups. Like other terrorist organizations, however, the Armenians appear to operate under several different names to convey a false impression of their strength and to imply a broader base of support within the international Armenian community, as well as to confuse police and security forces.¹⁵

Despite the plethora of organizational titles there appear to be only two main terrorists groups: The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG). Another group the Armenian Revolutionary Army (ARA) is thought to be an off-shoot of one of these two. Whatever name they use, the various Armenian terrorist groups share essentially the same basic aims. These include avenging the Turkish genocide of the Armenians, forcing the present Turkish state to accept responsibility for the crimes of the past and pay reparations to the victims, and the creation of an independent and fully sovereign Armenian Homeland to which the diaspora would be able to return.¹⁶

The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia

ASALA has over the years demonstrated itself to be the most deadly and ruthless of the two groups. According to Adams (1983c), it is currently one of the most feared and secretive of all terrorist groups and also one of the most difficult to penetrate because of its tightly knit ethnic constituency. The communiques of this group are replete with Marxist-Leninist rhetoric and it considers the Armenian question to be part of the international revolutionary movement. ASALA has publicly avowed its ties to the Soviet Union and its support for other revolutionary movements, particularly the Palestinians. Despite their references to Gourgen Yanikian as the god-father of modern Armenian terrorism, Szaz (1983, p. 389) has suggested that the real god-father of ASALA was George Habash, the Chairman of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the most radical and pro-Soviet member of the PLO. Habash is said to have provided ASALA with a territorial base in West Beirut, in which the PFLP exercised some amount of sovereignty, and with equipment and training and contact with Moscow. According to St. John (1985, p. 7), Habash in a 1980 press conference revealed that throughout the 1970s in Beirut and South Lebanon he had been training Armenian and Kurdish terrorists with the aim of destabilizing Turkey.

It is largely under the auspices of Habash and the Palestinians that ASALA entered the terrorist big time. Through the PLO, ASALA is said to have developed relations with most of the major revolutionary movements in Europe. Some of its closest ties were developed with other Marxist-Leninist groups attacking the Turkish government, such as the Kurdish Workers Party, other ethnic groups claiming part of Eastern Anatolia and revolutionary Turks. According to Adams (1983b), it would also appear that they have trained with radical left wing Palestinian groups (the PFLP and the PDFLP) and have sent over 100 members through Fatah's school for foreign terrorists in Hamouriah, south of Damascus in Syria. With the support and assistance of the Palestinian Network, ASALA has managed to orchestrate a campaign of violence against Turkish targets around the world, from embassies to travel agents.

In its early years, ASALA concentrated its attacks on Turkish installations and diplomatic personnel, with the single exception being the above mentioned attack on the headquarters of the World Council of Churches. During its initial phase, the group devoted much of its attention to expanding its organization and base of operations in preparation for a broader and more highly organized campaign

of terrorism. According to Corson (1982, p. 34), ASALA entered a second phase of their campaign on November 13, 1979 in Paris, with the triple bombing of the airline offices of KLM, Lufthansa, and Turkish airlines. In a communique that followed this incident, ASALA set out its ideology and established a theme for future operations:

Let imperialism and its collaborators all over the world know that their institutions are targets for our heroes and will be destroyed. We will kill and destroy because that is the only language understood by imperialism (Corson, 1982, p. 34)

While ASALA has done its share of assassinating Turkish officials, its principal modus operandi has been the bomb. Moreover, as Corson (1982, p. 33) notes, over half of these bombings have been directed against western targets. The group has also carried out some rather elaborate operations such as the 15 hour takeover of the Turkish Consulate in Paris in 1981 and the attack at Orly airport.¹⁷ As well, ASALA has gained a reputation for retaliatory is in their terminology, "military operations" against any country that has attempted to jail or try one of its operatives. In the past few years it has been responsible for the bombing of French diplomatic property in West Berlin and Iran in revenge for France's arrest of the Orly airport bombers and for a bombing campaign against Swiss targets, in a successful effort to have the Swiss government release two Armenians who

had been arrested after a bomb exploded in their hotel room. Canada has also figured in ASALA's wrath. On May 31, 1982 three alleged ASALA members were arrested for attempting to bomb the Air Canada cargo building at Los Angeles Airport. This attempted bombing appeared to be in retaliation for the May 18, 1982 arrests of four alleged ASALA members in Toronto on extortion charges.

ASALA also appears to have engaged in attacks in gratitude for Palestinian aid. One such may have been the car bomb explosion at the Paris synagogue on Rue Copenic on October 3, 1980 that killed four passers-by and stirred an international outcry. As well, it has developed a widespread reputation for extorting money from Armenian business people by threatening to kill their wives and children in the event of non-compliance.

ASALA is thought to have suffered a severe setback with the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, which dealt a severe blow to the PLO and many of its terrorists proteges. It has been suggested (Adams 1983c) that six of its leading members may have been killed in the shelling and bombing in Beirut. With the loss of its main base, ASALA's attacks fell off as it searched for a new location. One of its last major operations was the suicidal attack on the Ankara airport,

which resulted in at least nine deaths and seventy-two wounded. The organization is now thought to operate principally out of Athens and Damascus, with major cells in Paris, Cyprus, Tehran and Los Angeles.

The Armenian Secret Army is currently thought to be divided between an American/European wing that wants to restrict its attacks to Turkish targets and a Middle Eastern wing that favours indiscriminate terrorism. Cordes et. al. (1984, p. 20) suggest that hard-liners within ASALA, mainly Armenians of Syrian and Iraqi origin, have gained the upper hand over moderates since the group left its Beirut headquarters during the PLO pull-out in September of 1982, leading analysts to expect more indiscriminate actions on the part of this group. Szaz (1983, p. 394) has estimated ASALA's current strength to be in the neighborhood of five to eight hundred.

The Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide

In contrast to the Marxist orientation of ASALA, the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide appear more closely aligned with the policies of the right-wing Dashnak party. Adams (1983c) has argued that the enthusiasm for ASALA's attacks ran so high among Armenian youth that the

Dashnak party was compelled to organize a competing right wing terrorist alternative. While this allegation has been vigorously denied by Dashnak officials, the JCAG would appear to share the same basic objectives as the Dashnak Party. The primary goals of the Dashnak are to reclaim their lost homeland as specified in the Treaty of Sevres and to obtain reparations and recognition of the crimes committed against their people by Turkey. In essence, they seek a solution similar to Germany's admission of guilt and reparations to Israel after World War II.

The JCAG offered a clear statement of its objectives in a communique that followed bombings in New York City and Los Angeles on October 12, 1980. The communique stated:

We make clear that our struggle today against the Turkish Government is not to be regarded as revenge for the 1915 genocide in which 1.5 million Armenian men women and children were massacred. Our struggle today is directed to have the Turkish government to admit to its responsibility for that murderous act as well as to return to the Armenian people the lands taken forcibly and today occupied by the imperialist Turkish government since the genocide. We demand once again that the Turkish government admit its responsibility for the genocide of 1915 and make appropriate territorial and financial reparations to the long suffering Armenian people (Corsun, 1982, p. 34).

Unlike ASALA, the JCAG appears to shun other international terrorist connections and has concentrated its

operations, in line with the philosophy articulated above, almost exclusively on Turkish interests. After it murdered the Turkish Consul general in Los Angeles in 1982, for example, JCAG announced in part: "Our sole targets are Turkish diplomats and Turkish institutions". Also unlike ASALA it tends to avoid press conferences.¹⁸

The Armenian Revolutionary Army

Another group that has made the headlines is the Armenian Revolutionary Army (ARA). The origins of this group remain widely debated. There has been some speculation that the group was part of a power struggle within ASALA. Szaz (1983, p. 394) subscribes to this thesis arguing that the ARA is a splinter group of ASALA with good ties to the Soviets. Others according to Cordes et. al. (1984, p. 25) have found the rhetoric of the ARA to mirror that of the JCAG. This view is offered by Kashmeri (1985, p. 10) who considers the ARA to simply be the latest personification of the JCAG. Whatever its origins the group appears to have added a new dimension to Armenian terrorist tactics. The Armenian Revolutionary Army came on to the scene in the last days of July 1983, stunning the international community with a suicide operation. Five Armenians stormed the Turkish Embassy in Lisbon. They retreated to the Embassy residence when their attack was repelled by Portuguese police, taking

with them the wife and son of the Turkish Charge d'Affaires. The terrorists made no demands but rather announced their intention to sacrifice themselves by blowing up the building with all its occupants. This they did, killing themselves, the wife of the Charge d' Affaires and a Portuguese policeman. This event, according to Cordes et. al. (1984, p. 25), became a symbol to the Armenian community of the continuing martyrdom of the Armenian people in the face of Turkish denials. In March of 1985 the ARA seized the Turkish Embassy in Ottawa. This event ended on a more peaceful note than the one in Lisbon.

International Sponsorship of Armenian Terrorism

The role that the Palestinian Liberation Organization and some of its factions have played in Armenian terrorism has been described earlier in this chapter. There has been a great deal of speculation in the last several years that ASALA is being supported by the Soviet Union and some of its Middle Eastern allies. The connection with the Soviets is easy to suspect in Armenian terrorism. It fits very neatly into what appears to be a destabilization campaign against the NATO ally Turkey.

Claire Sterling (1981) and Paul Henze (1982) have both laid the blame for domestic turbulence in Turkey at the doorstep of the Soviet Union.¹⁹ In her study The Terror Network, Sterling offers a strong circumstantial case for Soviet involvement in efforts to destabilize Turkey, the only strong pro-western power on its southern border. Henze, a member of the U.S. National Security Council during the Carter Administration, has suggested that the Soviets have spent more in destabilizing Turkey through terrorism and subversion than it has spent on any single country since Vietnam. In particular, he points to the sixty year lag between nominal cause and effect in the case of Armenian violence. Henze also puts Armenian terrorism in the context of a much broader effort to destabilize Turkey. He points to the fact that, in recent years, Turkish domestic terrorism of all stripes has surged dramatically and has involved vast amounts of weapons and money not available through internal sources. Similarly, Szaz (1983) has argued that ASALA is almost completely dependent on the Soviets and Syrians for safe havens and cash. Adams (1983c) has presented the case that Syrian refuge is putting ASALA at the bidding of President Hafiz al Assad's foreign policy.

A very strong circumstantial case for Soviet support of Armenian terrorism does exist. However, solid evidence, or

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the proverbial smoking gun, however, has been impossible to find. There are also a large number of skeptics who feel that, while the Soviets may play a supportive role for international terrorism in general, this role is much less active and direct than many people have concluded. Gunther (1983, p. 31) for example, suggests that the Soviets probably calculate that, since ASALA's territorial aims on Eastern Turkey are virtually impossible to accomplish, too much support for a losing cause would not be in their own best interests. He also points out that overt Soviet support might cause ill will among the Turkic and Muslim minorities in the Soviet Union, who vastly outnumber the Soviet Armenian population. Others have observed that the Soviets invariably have preferred more indirect contacts and suggest that ASALA's embarrassingly open appeals for Soviet help may constitute the strongest argument that it is not under Soviet direction.

Gunther (1983, p. 32) also notes that there has recently been considerable speculation in Turkish circles about a Greek Cypriot link to Armenian terrorism. The Turks see this as revenge for the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus. Allegations have focused on the provision of training facilities and shelter for Armenian terrorists. In 1982 Turkish Newspapers claimed that between 250 and 1200 Armenian

guerrillas had surreptitiously entered Cyprus along with their PLO allies evacuating Beirut.²⁰ The substance of these allegations, as of those related to Soviet support, remain difficult to prove.

Armenian Terrorism and the Media

Adolph Hitler is reported to have responded "who speaks for the Armenians" when confronted with the concerns of his associates that the Jewish genocide might one day lead to retribution. It is the desire to keep the memory of the "Armenian Genocide" alive and to reawaken a sense of Armenian identity and nationalism that motivates much of the activity of Armenian terrorism. By attracting publicity to themselves and to their cause they hope to keep the Armenian issue on the international public agenda, to gain for it recognition and legitimacy and to bring international pressure to bear on the resolution of their grievances. To quote an Armenian terrorist cited in Micklous (1980) "with these explosions we are keeping the world aware of the existence of the Armenian people".

The strategy of Armenian terrorists has been largely one of the propaganda of atrocity. Through attacks on symbolic targets around the world, such as Turkish diplomats and facilities, they have attracted publicity and achieved

media access to communicate their message. Over the last decade this strategy has met with some success. Wilkinson (1983, p. 349) has stated that it must unfortunately be admitted that, until the current ASALA campaign, very few people knew anything about the grievances of the Armenians against the Turks. This sentiment is echoed by Corsun (1982, p. 31) who has suggested that by resorting to terrorism, Armenian extremists were able to accomplish in seven years what legitimate Armenian organizations had been trying to do for almost seventy years; internationalize the Armenian cause.

ARMENIAN TERRORISM IN CANADA

There are some 44,000 Armenians currently living in Canada. The Armenian community in this country goes back to the 1880s when a number of Armenians came to Canada to work for the Canadian Pacific Railroad. For the most part, the community is today concentrated in Central Canada. About 22,000 Armenians live in Montreal with another 22,000 in Southern Ontario, mostly in Toronto.

Armenian nationalist organizations have existed in Canada for several decades and have, from time to time, lobbied vigorously on behalf of the cause of Armenian

independence. For a number of years, and with little success, the Canadian Armenian community has been making representations to the Federal Government to get it to press for a U.N. conference to tackle the Turkish/Armenian problem.

Outward manifestations of Armenian nationalism in Canada had been relatively rare until recently and were largely related to the annual April 24th demonstration in front of the Turkish Embassy in Ottawa. These were for the most part peaceful mass protests. The tone of Armenian protests changed in 1980 when demonstrators threw rocks and red paint at the Embassy building. A year later, about 2500 Armenians marched on the embassy. Stones and eggs were hurled and there was some scuffling with the police. In subsequent years police security has been increased substantially and there have been fewer incidents.

Several other incidents occurred in the early 1980s that have added a new dimension to Armenian activism in this country. In 1982, Armenian terrorism officially came to Canada. In January of that year, a bomb exploded in the stairwell of a Toronto office building which housed the offices of William Baxter, a Toronto publisher and the Honorary Counsel of Turkey. Police defused another bomb on the site which apparently would have caused substantial

damage had it gone off. A person claiming to be a member of an Armenian liberation group said that his organization was responsible for the explosion.

A few months later, on April 8, 1982, Kemalettin Kani Gungor, a Commercial Counsellor at the Turkish Embassy in Ottawa was shot in a garage outside his home as he was preparing to leave for work. The attack on Gungor was followed by calls from Athens and Beirut claiming responsibility for the operation in the name of ASALA. The Athens caller warned the Canadian Government not to take any action against "our" militants, otherwise "Canadian establishments all over the world will be "our" target. At a news conference in Toronto later that week, the political wing of the Secret Army, The Peoples Movement of ASALA, which claimed to have about 50 members in the Toronto area, again claimed the act for ASALA.

Almost a month after the attack on Gungor, Toronto police arrested an Armenian on extortion charges. A few days later three more Armenians were picked up on the same charges. The four men allegedly demanded \$5,000 from one Toronto Armenian businessman, and \$4,000 from another to support the Armenian cause. The home of one extortion victim was fire-bombed less than a day after he refused to comply.

The victim of the second extortion attempt contacted police. In a bail hearing related to the charges the four were described as members of ASALA. One of them, the publisher of an Armenian newspaper in Toronto, was described by newspapers as the kingpin of a twelve member ASALA cell in the Metro area.

Shortly after the four men were arrested, ASALA issued a warning to a number of countries holding "Armenian political prisoners". These "political prisoners" specifically included the four arrested in Toronto. Some twelve days later a bomb was discovered and diffused at an Air Canada Terminal in Los Angeles. ASALA claimed responsibility for the bomb. In the wake of the bombing attempt in L.A. and the denial of bail to the four suspects in Toronto, the Canadian Department of External Affairs issued a worldwide warning to Canadian diplomatic officials and business executives.

One of the more bizarre events relating to Armenian terrorism in Canada occurred a few weeks later in June of 1982. A former CIA employee, who was purported to have a professional relationship with the RCMP, and who described his occupation as intelligence director of the Ontario Klu Klux Klan, revealed to the Globe and Mail that he was offered money to kill an Armenian woman. He was supposed to kill the

woman, the wife of a prominent member of the Toronto Armenian community by bombing her place of work. While there was some speculation that this was related to the events of the previous month, this was never proven.

In August of 1982, Armenian terrorists struck again at a Turkish diplomat in Ottawa. This time the target was Colonel Attila Altikat, a military attache at the Turkish Embassy. Altikat, the twenty-third Turkish diplomat to have been assassinated since 1973, was murdered on August 28 on his way to work. A call to the Beirut office of Agence France Presse from a person who identified himself as a member of the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide, claimed responsibility for the attack on Colonel Altikat. The Altikat slaying came just weeks after ASALA's August 7th bombing and shooting attack at the Ankara airport in Turkey. At the time of the attack, ASALA issued a deadline for the release of 85 Armenian prisoners, including the four held in Toronto on extortion charges. It warned that, if the prisoners were not released, further bombings and assassinations would follow in Canada the U.S. and several Western European countries.

Armenian terrorists struck again in Canada in March of 1985 when three men claiming to be members of the Armenian

Revolutionary Army took over the Turkish Embassy in Ottawa, killing a security guard. The terrorists held the Embassy and a number of hostages, including the Ambassador's wife and daughter for four hours before surrendering.

Two weeks after the seizure of the Turkish Embassy, on Tuesday, March 26th, Toronto RCMP received a letter from a group calling itself The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Our Homeland. The letter demanded the release of the three Armenians charged with murder in the Embassy siege and a fully fueled aircraft to take them away after the release. The letter set a deadline of 10:30 A.M. Friday, March 29 for the release of the three. If their conditions were not met, the group threatened to explode bombs in the Toronto subway system on April 1. Toronto's Armenian community reacted to the bomb threat by offering a \$25,000 reward for information leading to the arrest and conviction of the people responsible. A press release from the Armenian Community Centre expressed "abhorrence towards such cowardly acts" and condemned the irresponsibility of those involved. Several members of the Community laid the blame for the incident on Turkish agent provocateurs. While there were numerous false alarms during the period of the threat, and several suspicious objects were exploded by bomb disposal experts, no bombs were found on the transit system.

SUMMARY

Contemporary Armenian terrorism provides an excellent example of terrorism used as a political resource and as a communications tool. It also provides a useful case study of the operations of transnational terrorist groups. While the motivation underlying the activities of Armenian terrorists today is a series of events which took place in 1915, the current occurrence of Armenian terrorism is, in large part, attributable to the inability of traditional Armenian political organizations using traditional means to keep the Armenian question alive and to bring international pressure to bear on its resolution.

The activities of present day Armenian terrorists, like those of their predecessors around the turn of the century, are directed at building political consciousness in the Armenian community and at generating international public awareness and recognition for their grievance against the Turkish government. Unlike the the revolutionary Dashnaks and Hunchaks of the late Ottoman Empire, who operated internally and based their activities on a strategy of provocation terrorism, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, The Justice Commandos of the Armenian

Genocide and other contemporary Armenian groups operate transnationally and have focused their efforts largely on consciousness raising or symbolic terrorism. Theirs is a strategy of keeping the Armenian issue on the international public agenda and bringing the pressure of international public opinion to bear on the Turkish government for the resolution of their grievances. The publicity resulting from their activities is felt by many to be a major factor in this struggle and media access to be a principal concern of all Armenian terrorist groups.

This chapter has explored the historical origin of Armenian terrorism and contemporary factors associated with it. It has provided an overview of terrorist groups, their objectives, ideologies, tactics, international connections and media orientation. It has also looked at the occurrence of Armenian terrorism in Canada. The objective of this chapter has been to illustrate the communications goals and orientation of Armenian terrorists and to provide a detailed back drop for the empirical analysis of the coverage given by the Canadian media to incidents perpetrated by Armenian terrorists in this country.

The next two chapters will look at the amount and nature of the publicity obtained by Armenian terrorists as a result

of their actions in Canada. Chapter Five will look at the attack on Turkish commercial counsellor Kani Gungor by members of the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, and the assassination of Turkish military attache Attila Altikat by the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide. Chapter Six will examine media coverage of the seizure of the Turkish Embassy in Ottawa by members of the Armenian Revolutionary Army.

- 1 In particular, Armenian terrorists have been responsible for attacks in the USSR, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. In 1979 the Soviets hanged three Armenians accused of setting a bomb in the Moscow subway. In September of 1982 a Turkish diplomat was assassinated in Burgas, Bulgaria and in March of 1983 another was killed in Belgrade, Yugoslavia.
- 2 The majority of Armenian terrorist operations have occurred in Western Europe, particularly in France, Switzerland, Italy and Spain. England, Denmark, Belgium, Greece, West Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and Portugal have also been the scene of Armenian terrorism. In the Middle East, Lebanon and Turkey have been the main sites. Over 20 attacks have taken place in North America and there have been a few in Australia.
- 3 Testimony by Fred Ikle, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Senate Judiciary Committee, March 11, 1982, p. 6.
- 4 For a useful survey of Armenian Revolutionary Organizations during this period see Louise Nalbandian (1963).
- 5 In the Cyprus Convention, signed on June 5, 1878, Britain agreed to protect the Sultan by force of arms should Russia attempt to take further Ottoman territories. In return, the Sultan agreed to introduce reforms for the protection of Christians in the Empire. In the Treaty of Berlin, signed on July 8, 1878, the Sultan agreed to carry out without further delay the improvements and reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by Armenians and to guarantee their security against Circassians and Kurds. See Sir Edward Hertslet (1891).
- 6 For a brief history of Narodnaya Volya see Laqueur (1977b, pp. 47-54).
- 7 A revolt in Bulgaria in April of 1876 was cruelly put down by Ottoman authorities. Between 12,000 and 15,000 men, women and children were reportedly massacred and over sixty villages destroyed. This caused an uproar in Europe, particularly in Britain. The resulting wave of anti-Turkish agitation persuaded Disraeli to convene a conference on the

ills of the Ottoman Empire. The Conference met in December 1876 in Constantinople and ended in January 1877. The proclamation of the Ottoman Constitution on December 23, 1876 effectively made the work of the conference redundant. See M.S. Anderson (1966).

⁸ Perhaps the most spectacular incident during this period was the seizure of the Ottoman Bank in Constantinople in August of 1896. The Bank was chosen as a target by Armenian terrorists because it employed people of various nationalities which would allow them to exert pressure on the major European powers to, in turn, exert pressure on the Turks to accede to their demands. It was also felt that the seizure would dazzle fellow Armenians and win their support. The occupiers threatened to blow up the bank and its employees if the demands they had issued were not met. The incident itself was brought to a peaceful conclusion without any demands being met through the intercession of the British. It did, however, result in a three day massacre of Armenians, in the face of which, according to Walker (1980, p. 167), the European powers showed murderous indifference.

⁹ According to Walker (1980, p. 96), one can say with reasonable certainty that for most of the nineteenth century, the Armenians constituted about one-third of the total population of Turkish Armenia and in an area where all peoples were minorities they were the largest.

¹⁰ Recent demographic work done by Justin McCarthy of the University of Louisville puts the Armenian casualties at six to seven hundred thousand. As he assumes a lower total Armenian population, his estimate of the proportion that died is around 50 percent, consistent with previous estimates. See Adams (1983c).

¹¹ For a detailed exposition of the Turkish position see Bilal N. Simsir (1982)

¹² The War Crimes Tribunals sat throughout 1919 and 1920. Only one man was tried, convicted and hanged in conjunction with the Armenian massacres. No effort was made to extradite those who had been sentenced in absentia.

¹³ In 1978, in the Subcommittee on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities of The U.N.

Human Rights Commission, a paragraph long reference to the 1915 massacre was deleted from the Study of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide originally drafted in 1973. The deleted paragraph read "Passing to the modern era, one may note the existence of relatively full documentation dealing with the Massacres of Armenians which have been described as the first case of genocide in the twentieth century".

14 See the New York Times, April 4, 1983:6 and the Boston Sunday Globe, May 30, 1982:2.

15 Armenian terrorists have carried out operations under a variety of different names including: the Armenian Red Army; The Avengers of the Armenian Genocide; The October Third Organization; The June Ninth Organization; Swiss Armenian Group 15.

16 These goals are frequently referred to as the three Armenian Rs: Recognition of the Genocide, Reparations for the victims and Return of the land.

17 In July 1983, 8 persons were killed and 56 injured when a bomb in a suitcase went off at the Turkish Airlines check-in counter at Orly Airport. The suitcase was to be placed on a Turkish Airlines flight to Istanbul. ASALA claimed that the bomb was meant to go off once the plane was airborne. This incident is seen as indicating a notable increase in the groups determination and willingness to harm innocent bystanders in the course of their campaign against Turkey.

18 Adams (1983c) has suggested that, after ASALA was driven out of Beirut by the Israeli invasion, the JCAG yielded to CIA pressure exerted through Dashnak intermediaries and froze their own campaign.

19 See Behind the Armenian Terrorists, Foreign Report, August 19, 1982. For a full review of the literature on international support for Armenian terrorism see Gunther (1985).

20 See the press accounts on this subject in the New York Times August 29, 1982, E2.

CHAPTER 5

MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE GUNGOR AND ALTIKAT SHOOTINGS

The principal focus of this Chapter is the Canadian media's coverage of the attacks by Armenian terrorists on Turkish diplomats Kemal Kani Gungor and Atilla Altikat in Ottawa in 1982. Selective comparisons will also be made between this coverage and that given to the arrest of four suspects in the Gungor attack and their initial court appearance. The first part of this Chapter provides a background on the events in question. This is followed by a profile of the structural aspects of the coverage of all 4 events as a means of determining their agenda-setting impact. An in-depth examination of the substantive elements of the coverage of two shootings, including the news angles employed, the coverage of the political motivations behind Armenian terrorism and media perspectives on the events, is also performed to provide some initial insights into the messages and images communicated by the media.

BACKGROUND

On April 8, 1982, Kemalettin Kani Gungor, a Commercial Counsellor at the Turkish Embassy in Ottawa, was shot in a

garage outside his home as he was preparing to leave for work. The gunmen opened fire from short range with automatic pistols, wounding Gungor in the chest and leg. The attack was followed by calls from Athens and Beirut claiming responsibility for the operation in the name of the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA). The Athens caller warned the Canadian Government not to take any action against ASALA militants, otherwise Canadian establishments all over the world would be targeted. The Beirut telephone call was followed by a typewritten note to the Associated Press office in that city which reiterated the warning and added that "the commando had completed his mission and returned to his base safe and sound". At a news conference in Toronto later that week, the political wing of the Secret Army, The Peoples Movement of ASALA again claimed the act for ASALA.

In August of 1982, Armenian terrorists struck at another Turkish diplomat in Ottawa. This time the target was Colonel Attila Altikat, a military attache at the Turkish Embassy. Altikat, the twenty-third Turkish diplomat to have been assassinated since 1973, was murdered on August 28 on his way to work. He was shot at least 10 times at close range as his car waited for a red light on Ottawa's Western Parkway during the morning rush hour.

Immediately after the attack, Operation Red Leaf went into effect with a massive roadblock effort covering the Ontario and Quebec sides of the Ottawa River. About 50 people were reportedly picked up and questioned by police but there were no arrests. Soon after the attack, the FBI and Interpol were alerted as the search for Altikat killer became worldwide. Police still have no clues in the Altikat's assassination.

A call to the Beirut office of Agence France Presse from a person who identified himself as a member of the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG) claimed responsibility for the attack on Colonel Altikat. The caller said that Altikat was shot because "the Turks massacred 1.5 million Armenians in 1915". He added: "We are an independent organization. Our Targets are Turkish diplomats and institutions. We will strike again." The Altikat slaying came just weeks after ASALA's August 7th bombing and shooting attack at the Ankara airport in Turkey. At the time of the attack ASALA issued a deadline for the release of 85 Armenian prisoners, including the four held in Toronto on extortion charges. It warned that, if the prisoners were not released, further bombings and assassinations would follow in Canada, the U.S. and several Western European countries.

Almost a year after the attack on Kani Gungor and seven months after the Altikat assassination, the federal government offered a reward of \$100,000 for information leading to the conviction of those responsible for the attacks. The reward, announced by then Minister of External Affairs Alan MacEachen and Solicitor General Robert Kaplan, was the first ever offered by the Canadian government related to an act of terrorism. It was publicized in advertisements in both Canadian and American newspapers. The reward offer resulted in numerous phone calls to police, but few leads.

On March 12, 1984, almost two years after Gungor was gunned down, four North York men were arrested in a joint raid by Ottawa and Metro Toronto police and the RCMP and charged with attempted murder and conspiracy to commit murder. One of those arrested was awaiting trial on charges of extorting money from members of the Toronto Armenian community. The four were arraigned during a week long hearing which took place in Ottawa under heavy security.

Eight months after the arrest, a judge in Ottawa ruled that there was insufficient evidence to send the Toronto men to trial for the attempted murder of Gungor. He decided, however, that there was enough evidence to send three of the

men (charges against one had been dropped during the preliminary hearing for lack of evidence) to trial for conspiracy to murder an unnamed Turkish diplomat between January 1, 1981 and April 10, 1982. Several weeks later an Assistant Crown Attorney involved in the trial filed a motion for a preferred indictment in Ontario Supreme Court in an attempt to reinstate the attempted murder charge. The case did not go to trial until April of 1986.

ANALYSIS OF NEWS COVERAGE

The Structural Aspects

The Intensity of Coverage

As discussed in Chapter 3, there are several ways of measuring the intensity of media coverage that an event receives. Three separate ones are employed here: the number of news items (articles and photographs), news space and follow-up coverage. One hundred and twenty newspaper editions were examined for each of the four events described above.

Overview

The attempted assassination of Kani Gungor, generated a total of 42 articles, 11 photographs and one editorial, as well as 7 letters to the editor.¹ It also merited a story on the CBC National News on two consecutive days. The total news coverage that this incident received in the ten papers in the sample amounted to approximately 1088 column inches.² Total national news time on the CBC was 2.5 minutes.³

By comparison, the assassination of Attila Altikat generated 95 articles, 53 photographs and a dozen editorials plus 3 editorial cartoons and 3 letters.⁴ CBC news coverage was difficult to assess, as the only available transcript was for the day after the attack.⁵ The total news space devoted by the ten dailies to the Altikat killing was 3,973 column inches. This was three and one half times the volume of the coverage given by the same papers to the Gungor shooting.

The arrest of the four men suspected in the Gungor shooting was covered by just nine of the ten papers. Total press coverage given to this event consisted of 23 articles and 16 photos encompassing 1095 column inches of news space; an amount almost equal to that devoted to the shooting itself. Stories on two consecutive days were also carried on

this event by the CBC news, comprising a total of 48 seconds of news time. By comparison, the initial court appearance of the four suspects was covered in only five of the ten papers, for a total of 6 articles and 74 column inches of news space. There was no television news coverage of this event.

Table 5.1 provides a comparison of the coverage that the ten newspapers gave to these events. Differences in the amount of publicity that the four incidents received are quite notable. For the Gungor shooting, typical coverage in the ten papers consisted of 3 articles and about 34 column inches of news space.⁶ Only the two Ottawa papers and the Montreal Gazette carried any photographs as part of their Gungor coverage. In comparison, typical coverage of the Altikat killing consisted of 8 articles, 5 photographs and 341 column inches of news space.

TABLE 5.1A
PRESS COVERAGE: THE SHOOTINGS

<u>Paper</u>	<u>Gungor</u>			<u>Altikat</u>		
	<u>Art- icles</u>	<u>Photo- graphs</u>	<u>News Space</u>	<u>Art- icles</u>	<u>Photo- graphs</u>	<u>News Space</u>
Chronicle- Herald	5	-	114	3	-	73
Gazette	1	1	34	8	10	547
Citizen	15	9	552	20	10	900
Le Droit	4	1	107	15	10	599
Globe & Mail	6	-	126	8	5	341
Toronto Star	2	-	19	10	7	362
Free Press	2	-	53	11	3	344
Leader-Post	2	-	27	7	2	229
Herald	2	-	29	6	4	312
Sun	3	-	34	7	1	286
Totals	42	11	1095	95	53	3973

Note: Newspaper titles have been abbreviated in this table and those which follow.

TABLE 5.1B
PRESS COVERAGE
ARREST AND INITIAL DISPOSITION

<u>Paper</u>	<u>Arrest</u>			<u>Charges</u>		
	<u>Art- icles</u>	<u>Photo- graphs</u>	<u>News Space</u>	<u>Art- icles</u>	<u>Photo- graphs</u>	<u>News Space</u>
Chronicle- Herald	1	1	39	*	*	*
Gazette	1	*	22	1	*	9
Citizen	10	9	578	2	*	38
Le Droit	2	3	167	1	*	8
Globe & Mail	2	2	119	1	*	10
Star	2	1	73	1	*	9
Free Press	2	*	35	*	*	*
Leader-Post	*	*	*	*	*	*
Herald	1	*	22	*	*	*
Sun	2	*	29	*	*	*
Totals	23	16	1084	6	*	74

In those papers that covered the event, the arrest of the four men suspected of shooting Gungor typically received two articles and 39 column inches of space. The initial disposition of the charges obtained, on average, one article and 9 column inches of space in the papers covering it.

As can be seen in the table, the Gungor shooting had a significant impact on the news agenda of only a few papers. Eighty-five percent of the press coverage that the Gungor shooting received occurred in four papers: the Citizen and Le Droit of Ottawa, Toronto's Globe and Mail and the Halifax Chronicle-Herald. The Citizen with its 15 articles, 9 photographs and 552 column inches of news space gave by far the most exposure to this incident. Citizen coverage accounted for 36 percent of the articles, 82 percent of the photographs and 50 percent of the total news space devoted to the incident. It was also the only paper that deemed the incident to be of significant import to run an editorial as part of its coverage.⁷

While the Altikat assassination received both greater and broader coverage than the Gungor shooting, here too some concentration was evident. Three papers, the Citizen, Le Droit and the Montreal Gazette, were responsible for 45 percent of the articles, 57 percent of the photos and 51

percent of the volume of coverage that this attack received. Dominant in the Altikat coverage were the two Ottawa papers, the Citizen and Le Droit. The largest single amount of coverage that the assassination obtained was in the Citizen, which ran 20 articles and 10 photographs and devoted 900 column inches to it. The Citizen accorded almost as much news space to the Altikat incident as that given by all papers to the Gungor shooting. Le Droit's coverage of this event entailed 15 articles and 10 photographs, encompassing 638 inches of news space. Together they accounted for 36 percent of the articles, 38 percent of the photos and 38 percent of the volume of coverage received by this incident in the ten papers.

Ottawa papers were also responsible for providing most of the coverage related to the arrests and to the initial disposition of the charges. The Citizen and Le Droit provided 52 percent of the articles, 75 percent of the photos and 69 percent of the volume of coverage. The Citizen alone was responsible for almost half the articles and more than half of the photos and total news space. On the initial disposition of charges story, Citizen coverage equaled that of all other papers reporting this event.

First Day Coverage

An overview of the first day coverage of the four events is provided in Table 5.2. In the case of the Gungor incident, papers broke the story on different days because of the Easter holidays. In most newspapers, the first report of the attack on Kani Gungor did not take place until Saturday, April 10, two days after it occurred. As noted before, some of the wide variation in the coverage given to this event by the ten papers is attributable to this factor.

First day coverage of the Gungor incident included 14 articles, 7 photographs and 633 column inches of news space.⁸ Overall, 33 percent of the articles, 70 percent of the photos and 61 percent of the news space given to the attack was contained in first day reports. As illustrated in Table 5.2A, coverage of this incident was, for the most part, relegated to the inside pages of the papers. CBC News devoted 1:15 minutes of coverage to the first report of the incident.

As noted in Chapter 3, one of the best measures of the importance accorded to a story is the proportion of the live news hole devoted to it. The proportion of the live news hole devoted to the first reports of the Gungor

TABLE 5.2A

FIRST DAY COVERAGE:
THE SHOOTINGS

Oquirrh

Altitude

Page	Articles	Photos	News Space	1 Headline	Location	Articles	Photos	News Space	2 Headline	Location
Oronicle Herald	1	•	42	1	Page 1	1	•	37	3	Page 1
Gazette	1	1	34	1	Page 7	3	3	176	8	Page 1
Citizen	5	5	345	14	Page 1	2	1	105	5	Page 1
Le Droit	1	1	81	5	Page 3	5	4	239	10	Page 1
Globe & Mail	1	•	38	2	Page 8	3	3	172	6	Page 1
Star	1	•	25	1	Page 6	4	5	238	19	Page 1
Free Press	1	•	22	1	Page 1	5	2	106	11	Page 1
Leader Post	1	•	21	1	Page 2	1	•	30	2	Page 1
Herald	1	•	18	1	Page 3	3	2	192	8	Page 1
SUN	1	•	7	2	Page 1	1	1	78	4	Page 1
Totals	14	7	633	•	•	28	21	1449	•	•

TABLE 5.28

FIRST DAY COVERAGE:
ARREST AND DISPOSITION

<u>Paper</u>	<u>Articles</u>	<u>Photos</u>	<u>News Space</u>	<u>2 Headline</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Altitude</u>				
						<u>Articles</u>	<u>Photos</u>	<u>News Space</u>	<u>2 Headline</u>	<u>Location</u>
Dynonicle Herald	1	1	39	2	Page 4	*	*	*	*	***
Gazette	1	*	22	1	Page 8	1	*	9	*	Page 6
Citizen	3	7	375	14	Page 1	1	*	28	1	Page 1
Le Droit	1	2	81	3	Page 1	1	*	8	*	Page 2
Globe & Mail	1	*	14	1	Page 1	1	*	10	*	Page 24
Star	1	*	15	1	Page 3	1	*	9	*	Page 8
Free Press	1	*	10	*	Page 12	*	*	*	*	***
Leader Post	*	*	*	*	***	*	*	*	*	***
Herald	1	*	22	1	Page 16	*	*	*	*	***
Sun	1	*	20	1	Page 13	*	*	*	*	***
Totals	11	10	508	*	***	5	*	64	*	***

shooting ranged from 0.2 percent in the case of the Vancouver Sun to 14 percent in the Ottawa Citizen. The majority of papers devoted less than 1 percent of their total news space to breaking the Gungor story. The CBC devoted 5 percent of its April 8, 1982 newscast to the story.

For the majority of newspapers in this sample, the first report of the Altikat assassination occurred on August 28th. Only the Citizen and the Vancouver Sun reported the incident on the day it occurred, August 27th. This event generated 28 articles, 21 photographs and 1449 inches of news space as part of first day coverage; almost twice the first day coverage of the Gungor shooting.⁹ In the Altikat coverage 29 percent of the stories, 40 percent of the photographs and 36 percent of the news space devoted to the incident was involved in first day coverage. As shown in Table 5.2A, the assassination was first page news across the country.

In contrast to the Gungor shooting, the Altikat killing had a substantial impact on press agenda patterns, as indicated by the proportion of available news space that the ten papers devoted to introducing this story. This ranged from 3 percent to 19 percent, with a median of 8 percent. The Toronto Star devoted almost 20 percent of the available news space in its August 28, 1982, edition to the Altikat

incident. Also noteworthy was the coverage of the Winnipeg Free Press and Ottawa's Le Droit, which gave 11 percent and 10 percent of their news holes respectively to introducing the story.

First day coverage of the arrest accounted for 48 percent of the articles, 63 percent of the photos and 55 percent of the news space devoted to this story. As seen in the Table 5.2B, the news hole proportions ranged from 1 to 14 percent in the nine papers covering the story. The typical news hole was around 1 percent for the first day of coverage. The CBC devoted 1 percent of The National to the first report of the story. Almost all coverage of the initial disposition of charges was contained in first day reports. News hole proportions in the five papers covering the event were negligible.

Follow-up Coverage

Another measure of the importance of an event as viewed by news editors is the number of days after it occurs that it continues to be considered newsworthy. As illustrated by Figure 5.1, follow-up press coverage varied widely across papers and events. For example, the number of days subsequent to its occurrence that the Gungor shooting

remained in the news in the two week period examined varied from none in the Montreal Gazette to seven in the Ottawa Citizen. For the majority of papers the story had only a one or two day life span. Follow-up coverage was most extensive in the Ottawa Citizen (7 days), the Globe and Mail (5 days), and the Halifax Chronicle-Herald (4 days). The CBC National News also gave the Gungor shooting one day of follow-up coverage.

The Altikat story, by comparison, averaged about 5 days of follow-up coverage across the ten papers. The range here varied from 3 days in the case of the Chronicle-Herald and the Calgary Herald to eight in the case of the Citizen. The CBC news gave the incident at least one day of follow-up coverage. However, due to the unavailability of transcripts the actual extent of subsequent coverage is difficult to ascertain.

As can be seen from Figure 5.1 the arrest and the initial disposition of charges were given little in the way of follow-up coverage. The exception was the Citizen which ran stories related to the arrests for another 5 days after it was first reported. One day of follow-up coverage was also given to this event by the CBC news. The Citizen was

NEWSPAPERS

FIGURE 5.1
FOLLOW-UP COVERAGE

the only paper to give any follow-up to the dropping of charges story.

The Prominence of News Coverage

As noted earlier, it is on the front page that the reader supposedly learns at a glance the significant developments at home and abroad. The most important story, or at least the one deemed by the editors to be of greatest interest to the reader, gets headline play. Television, which has frequently been referred to as the electronic front page, also has a status hierarchy with stories considered to be the most important coming at the top of the newscast. Table 5.3 provides a summary of the major elements of first page coverage of a story: its location, its headline status and the percentage of the first page it occupies.

The shooting of Kani Gungor was first page news in only four of the papers in the sample: the Halifax Chronicle-Herald; the Vancouver Sun; the Winnipeg Free Press; and the Citizen. There were six first page stories in these papers; four of which occurred on the first reporting day. In none of the papers was the shooting a headline story, nor did any story appear in the prime section of the first page above the fold. The proportion of total first page news space devoted to the Gungor shooting ranged from 3 percent in the Vancouver

Sun to 16 percent in the Citizen. The National's coverage of the story was placed third in the newscast on the first day and fifth on the second day.

By comparison, the assassination of Altikat was first page news across the country. The ten dailies contained 26 first page stories in the two week period examined. There was at least one first page story in each of the ten papers. The Ottawa Citizen ran five. Fifty percent (13) of page one stories were headline stories. On the first reporting day the Altikat assassination was the headline story in nine of the ten papers. Moreover, 73 percent (19) of first page Altikat stories were contained in the prime section of the page.

On the day the story was first reported, the Altikat assassination completely dominated the first page in several of the papers. As can be seen in Table 5.38 the Citizen, the Toronto Star and Le Droit all devoted over 50 percent of their first pages to breaking the story. Second day coverage in the Citizen comprised 65 percent of the first page. In many papers, the incident continued to be given substantial first page treatment several days after it occurred.

TABLE 5.3A

THE FIRST PAGE
THE GUNNER SHOOTING

<u>Paper/Date</u>	<u>Articles</u>	<u>Photographs</u>	<u>News Space</u>	<u>% First Page</u>	<u>First Page Placement</u>
<u>Chronicle Herald</u>					
April 9, 1982	1	0	14	6	Lower
April 10, 1982	1	0	25	10	Lower
<u>Citizen</u>					
April 10, 1982	1	1	41	16	Lower
April 14, 1982	1	0	25	14	Lower
<u>Free Press</u>					
April 10, 1982	1	0	12	6	Lower
<u>Sun</u>					
April 8, 1982	1	0	7	3	Lower

TABLE 5.38

THE FIRST PAGE
THE ALTIKAT SHOOTING

<u>Paper/Date</u>	<u>Articles</u>	<u>Photographs</u>	<u>News Space</u>	<u>% First Page</u>	<u>First Page Placement</u>
<u>Chronicle Herald</u>					
August 28, 1982	1	0	15	17	Upper
August 30, 1982	1	0	19	20	Lower
<u>Gazette</u>					
August 28, 1982	1	0	24	14	Headline
<u>Citizen</u>					
August 27, 1982	2	1	103	57	Headline
August 28, 1982	2	3	111	65	Headline
August 30, 1982	1	0	14	8	Lower
August 31, 1982	1		27	16	Upper
September 3, 1982	2 *	1	86	48	Upper

TABLE 5.30 (cont.)

<u>Paper/Date</u>	<u>Articles</u>	<u>Photographs</u>	<u>News Space</u>	<u>% First Page</u>	<u>First Page Placement</u>
Le Droit					
August 28, 1982	1	1	93	56	Headline
September 8, 1982	1	1	27	15	Lower
Globe and Mail					
August 28, 1982	1	2	63	32	Headline
August 30, 1982	1	0	22	11	Upper
Star					
August 28, 1982	1	1	88	54	Headline
August 29, 1982	1	0	35	41	Headline
August 31, 1982	1	1	15	9	Lower
Free Press					
August 27, 1982	1	0	37	20	Headline
August 30, 1982	1	0	13	7	Lower

TABLE 5.38 (cont.)

<u>Paper/Date</u>	<u>Articles</u>	<u>Photographs</u>	<u>News Space</u>	<u>1. First Page</u>	<u>First Page Placement</u>
Leader Post					
August 27, 1982	1	1	30	15	Headline
August 28, 1982	1	1	52	26	Headline
September 3, 1982	1	0	5	3	Lower
Merald.					
August 28, 1982	1	0	36	22	Headline
August 30, 1982	1	0	18	11	Lower
Sun					
August 27, 1982	1	1	78	39	Headline

TABLE 5.3C

THE FIRST PAGE
THE ARREST AND INITIAL DISPOSITION
OF CHARGES

<u>Paper/Date</u>	<u>Articles</u>	<u>Photographs</u>	<u>News Space</u>	<u>% First Page</u>	<u>First Page Placement</u>
<u>THE ARREST</u>					
Citizen					
March 13, 1985	1	3	156	68	Headline
Le Droit					
March 13, 1985	1	2	81	40	Headline
March 14, 1985	1	1	86	40	Upper
Globe & Mail					
March 13, 1985	1	0	14	6	Lower
<u>THE DISPOSITION</u> <u>OF CHARGES</u>					
Citizen					
January 9 1985	1	0	28	12	Upper

The arrest generated four first pages stories and the initial disposition of charges generated one! The arrest story was headline news in both the Citizen and Le Droit. No headlines were published relating to the initial disposition of charges. The amount of first page space devoted to the arrests in the Citizen and Le Droit was impressive. The Citizen devoted 68 percent of its first page to breaking the story. Le Droit ran the story for two days giving it 40 percent of the first page each day. As noted previously, the item was also covered on two consecutive days by the CBC National news. On March 12th it was the number two item in the newscast, receiving 25 seconds of coverage. On March 13 it was seventh in the newscast, occupying 23 seconds.

Summary of Structural Coverage

The preceding analysis provides some initial impressions of the news value of the four events and of the impact of the two diplomatic shootings by Armenian terrorists on the agenda setting patterns of the Canadian media.

It is particularly interesting to note that the shooting of Kani Gungor by ASALA terrorists appears to have had a very limited impact on the media agenda. The national media coverage that this incident received was neither substantial nor prominent. In terms of press coverage, only the Ottawa

Citizen gave the shooting a great deal of news play. While reported by the press elsewhere in the country, the story was relegated to the inside pages. Although the limited press coverage that this event obtained may be partly attributed to its timing, its treatment by television news is a good indication that it was perceived to have limited news value. The Gungor story did not appear until 10 minutes into CBC's The National on the day that it happened.¹⁰

In contrast, the JCAG achieved a substantial publicity impact with the dramatic assassination of Atilla Altikat. The Altikat killing resulted in a shower of publicity, capturing headlines across the country. Many newspapers devoted substantial proportions of both their first pages and their news holes to the story. In several parts of the country, the assassination continued to receive first page treatment days after it occurred. While it is difficult, in view of the many missing transcripts, to make an accurate assessment of its impact on television news, it is perhaps indicative of its news value that the CBC ran the Altikat story as the lead item in its national newscast the day after event.

The evidence relating to the coverage of the arrest and initial disposition of charges is somewhat difficult to interpret. As noted in Chapter 2, it has frequently been alleged that the media downplays or ignores stories relating to the arrest of terrorists and the subsequent judicial processes. The evidence here suggests that this is not always the case. The arrest of the four suspects in the Gungor shooting received almost as much publicity as the shooting itself, although it was concentrated in fewer papers. In terms of national television coverage, the shooting and the arrest received similar treatment with respect to their position in the newscast, although the shooting received twice the news time. It is interesting, however, that the initial disposition of the charges against the accused was given little press coverage and no CBC television coverage.

SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS: THE SHOOTINGS

News Themes

The two shootings generated a total of 137 stories in the ten papers and at least three on the CBC television news. Stories on both incidents were classified into categories by the panel of four judges.¹¹ In all, six different news

themes were identified. These were Shooting, Security, Victim, Political Motivation, Police Investigation, and Response/Reaction. Table 5.4 provides a depiction of the themes in the press coverage of each event and their frequency of occurrence.

The category label for each theme indicates the principal thrust of the story. For example, Shooting incorporates those stories in which the attack on either Gungör or Altikat was highlighted. Victim includes stories related to the background, condition, family, etc. of either of the two victims. Security is indicative of stories which focused on the protection afforded the victim, embassy and embassy personnel and other government officials. Political Motivation covers those stories providing background on the cause and objectives of Armenian nationalists or the Turkish position. Police Investigation includes stories on the hunt for the ASALA and JCAG attackers. Response/Reaction contained stories dealing with the responses of national and international political leaders.

TABLE 5.4
NEWS THEMES: THE SHOOTINGS

<u>Theme</u>	Gungor		Altikat	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>%</u>
Shooting	7	17	10	11
Victim	12	29	7	8
Security	15	36	22	24
Political Motivation	4	10	15	17
Police Investigation	3	7	16	18
Response/ Reaction	*	*	20	22

As illustrated in the Table, of the five story themes in the Gungor coverage, the one given the most emphasis was Security. Thirty-six percent of Gungor stories in the ten papers focused on the security of Gungor and other Turkish officials in Canada, as well as concerns about the vulnerability of Turkish personnel and facilities to future terrorist attacks. Several of these focused on security concerns related to the upcoming annual April 24th Armenian demonstration in front of the Turkish Embassy, and the concerns of embassy officials and police about possible violence in light of the attack on Gungor and the violence that had occurred the previous year.

The second most prominent story theme in the Gungor coverage concerned the Victim. Twelve of the 42 stories (29 percent) focused on Gungor's condition in hospital, his chances for recovery and the "lonely bedside vigil" of his wife. One of the two CBC stories on the Gungor shooting focused on this theme.¹²

Far down the list of news themes was Political Motivation. Only four stories were devoted to the historical or political grievances underlying Armenian terrorism. It is

interesting to note that all of these stories were in the Ottawa Citizen.

The story themes in the Altikat coverage were the same as those in the Gungor coverage with the addition of the Response/Reaction theme. In the coverage of the Altikat shooting, the most prominent story theme was Security. Twenty-four percent (22) of the Altikat stories focused on security issues. The only CBC story picked up also was on this theme. Not far behind was Response/Reaction. Twenty-two percent (20) of all Altikat stories were placed in this category. The assassination also generated a number of Political Motivation stories. Seventeen percent (15) of the stories dealt with some aspect of the political rationale behind the violence. Six of the ten papers ran Political Motivation stories as part of their Altikat coverage. Victim was farther down the list with eight stories.

First Page Themes

Of particular interest are the story themes that made the front page because they provide an indication of the importance attached by editors to particular aspects of the event. Table 5.5 provides the first page story themes for each event and an indication of the percentage of stories with that theme appearing on the first page.

TABLE 5.5
CATEGORIES OF FIRST PAGE EMPHASIS:
THE SHOOTINGS

<u>Themes</u>	Gungor		Altikat	
	<u>Front Page</u>	<u>Inside Page</u>	<u>Front Page</u>	<u>Inside Page</u>
Shooting	4 (57%)	3 (43%)	8 (80%)	2 (20%)
Victim	2 (17%)	10 (83%)	1 (14%)	6 (86%)
Security	*	15 (100%)	3 (14%)	19 (86%)
Police Investigation	*	3 (100%)	7 (44%)	9 (56%)
Political Motivation	*	4 (100%)	1 (7%)	14 (93%)
Response	*	*	3 (15%)	17 (85%)

As noted earlier in this Chapter, 6 of the 42 Gungor stories made page one. While security related stories dominated the coverage, the first page focused on Shooting (4) and Victim (2) stories. All other themes in the Gungor coverage were confined to the inside of the papers. While the total number of stories is, overall, relatively small, the Table indicates that the major news emphasis in the Gungor coverage was placed on dramatic and human interest aspects. It is interesting to note, for example, that while Shooting represented only 17 percent of total stories, it accounted for 66 percent of first page Gungor stories.

Twenty-three of the 95 Altikat stories were on the front page. As with the Gungor coverage, the major first page theme was Shooting. Eight of the 23 first page stories focused on a description of the killing of Altikat. Seven of these were headline stories.

The second most prominent first page theme in the Altikat coverage was Police Investigation. Seven of these stories made the front page. Four were headline stories. There were an equal number (3) of Security and Response/Reaction stories on the first page.¹³ Both categories accounted for one headline story. There was only one first page Political Motivation story.

categories accounted for one headline story. There was only one first page Political Motivation story.

Again, it is interesting to note the extent of first page emphasis accorded various themes. Eighty per cent of the Shooting stories made page one. Also notable was the emphasis placed on the Police Investigation theme. Forty-four percent of these stories were placed on the first page.

Photo Themes

As discussed in Chapter 3, photographs play a very important role in helping the reader form an impression about an event.

There were 64 photos related to the two terrorist shootings in the ten papers. The four judges assigned a theme to each photograph based on its visual content and caption.¹⁴ Table 5.6 provides an overview of the photo themes related to each of the events and their frequency.

In total, eight different photo themes were identified. As with the story themes, Victim related to photos of Gungor and Altikat or members of their family. Security encompassed

contained photos of Turkish Embassy personnel and government officials. Political Motivation included photos of Armenian community spokesmen, historical figures and maps of the historic homeland of the Armenians. Suspects encompassed police sketches of Altikat's assassin. Response involved photos of Canadian and international political figures commenting on the incident. Police encompassed photos of police and security officials involved in the investigation and Attack included photos of the scene of the shootings.

There were 11 photos in the Gungor coverage covering five themes. Most photographs (5) were of the victim. Three papers, Le Droit, the Citizen and the Gazette, ran photos containing a right side profile of the victim. The only first page photo in the coverage was one of these.

Fifty-three photos were contained in the coverage of the assassination of Atilla Altikat covering all eight themes. As can be seen from Table 5.6, Victim was again by far the most prominent photo theme. Forty percent of the photos in the ten papers were of Altikat or Altikat and his wife. The

TABLE 5.6
PHOTO THEMES: THE SHOOTINGS

<u>Themes</u>	<u>Gungor</u>		<u>Altikat</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>First Page</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>First Page</u>
Victim	5	1 (20%)	22	7 (32%)
Turkish Official	2	*	8	2 (25%)
Police	1	*	1	*
Political Motivation	2	*	6	*
Shooting	1	*	2	*
Security	*	*	5	1 (20%)
Response	*	*	6	*
Suspects	*	*	5	1 (20%)

photo used most often in the coverage (it was run in seven of the ten papers) under various headings such as "death silhouette", "death car", and "the horrible visage of death", was of the slain Altikat, head slumped back as seen through the shattered window of his car. The Victim theme also dominated the first page photos, accounting for 7 of 11 (64 percent). Five of these photos were of the "death silhouette".

Descriptors

As discussed in Chapter 3, there has been a growing debate on the terminology used by the media in their coverage of terrorism. All descriptors for the perpetrators, the event and the victim were extracted from the press and television coverage of the two shootings. A complete list of these is found on the coding sheets in Appendix 2. These were given to the four judges to be ranked on a scale ranging from unsympathetic/unfavourable to sympathetic/favourable.¹⁵

Twelve different nouns and adjectives were used in media coverage of the incident to describe those carrying out the attack on Gungor. In the opinion of the judges only one of the descriptors used for the perpetrators of the attack, the term "commando", because of the connotations of war time heroics, might in any way be construed as favourable.¹⁶ Of

the remaining 11, four were deemed to be neutral referents. These included "Armenian group", "Army for the Liberation of Armenia", "ASALA" and "Liberation Army Members". Six others were judged to be unfavourable references including "Marxist terrorist group", "Armenian anarchists", "secretive terrorist group", "gunmen", "Armenian terrorists", and "secret terrorist organization".¹⁷

Fifteen different nouns and adjectives were used to describe the attack itself.¹⁸ These ranged from "terrorist murder attempt" to "a vicious and cowardly act". None of the 15 were judged to be favourable or sympathetic. Eleven were felt to be unfavourable, including referents such as "terrorist attack", "assassination attempt" and "terrorist murder attempt". Four others were determined to be strongly unfavourable. Of these, three referents, "a vicious and cowardly act", "a despicable act of violence" and "sickening and disgusting" were all contained in quotations by Canadian Government officials.¹⁹

Seventeen different descriptors were used for the victim Gungor. For the most part, he was depicted in what the judges felt to be neutral terms. The most frequent descriptors used for Gungor were "Commercial Counsellor", "Turkish Diplomat" and "envoy". Three of the references to

him were judged to be sympathetic. These were references to his family status such as "father of two", "married with two teenage daughters" and "100 percent family man".²⁰

In the Altikat coverage, 12 different descriptors were used for the perpetrators of the incident. There was some divergence among the judges over one of them. This was a reference to their being well trained. Two of the judges found this to be a favourable reference, whereas the other two found it to be unfavourable. Of the 11 remaining descriptors, 3 were considered to be neutral. These were group names such as Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide or Armenian Guard. Eight others were considered to be negative, including references to them as "killers", "terrorists", "murderers", and "extremists".²¹

Thirty-four descriptors were used for the shooting itself. Three of the four judges deemed three of them to have positive connotations. These were "a well planned operation", "well planned and executed" and "professionally done"; all positive comments on the groups capabilities. Twelve referents were deemed to be negative including the use of terms such as "slaying", "murder", "gunning down" etc. The remaining 19 descriptors were determined to be strongly negative. These included "barbaric", "a brutal senseless

act", "ignoble act", "brutal murder", "odious crime" etc.

The Toronto Star, for example, headlined its first day coverage "This Brutal Senseless Crime" leaving no doubt as to where its editors stood on this incident.

As in the Gungor coverage, the majority of the twelve referents used to describe Altikat were judged to be neutral. For the most part Altikat was described in the media coverage as "a Military Attache", an "Envoy" and "a former Turkish Air Force pilot". Three references to him were judged to portray him in a favourable light. These were, as in the case of Gungor, references to his family connections and character such as "45 year old father of two", and a "bright officer and a gentleman".

News Sources

As noted in Chapter 3, Paletz et. al. (1982, p. 167) have noted that the opinions presented in media coverage tend to be those of the holders of power in major institutions. All sources quoted by name in the coverage of the two shootings were extracted. Overall, there were 69 direct quotations in the Gungor coverage from 24 different sources. The Altikat coverage contained 228 direct quotations from 47 different sources. All sources were placed into general

categories by the judges. Table 5.7 provides a breakdown of these categories by frequency.²²

The most frequently quoted sources in the Gungor coverage were Turkish government officials who accounted for 30 percent of all quotes. The most quoted source in the coverage was the then Turkish Ambassador to Canada, Turgut Sunlap, who was cited 14 times. Second to this group were Police officials who were responsible for 23 percent of the quotations used. The extent to which Armenian sources were quoted in the coverage is particularly noteworthy in light of Paletz's assertions. Fifteen percent of the quotes came from a range of prominent Canadian Armenians active in the Armenian cause. One of these, Katchig Hagopian, the President of the Armenian National committee of Canada, was quoted six times in the coverage.

Police officials were the most frequently quoted sources in the Altikat coverage, accounting for 30 percent of all direct quotations. One official in particular, Ottawa Police Inspector Lester Thompson was quoted 28 times. Police sources were followed by Turkish Officials (22) and Turks (17). Once again, a number of Canadian Armenians were quoted. There were 30 quotes from Armenian sources, comprising 13 percent of all quotations.

TABLE 5.7
NEWS SOURCES: THE SHOOTINGS

<u>Sources</u>	<u>Gungor</u>	<u>Altikat</u> •
Police Officials	16 (23%)	62 (30%)
Turkish Officials	21 (30%)	51 (22%)
• Canadian Officials	10 (15%)	37 (16%)
• Armenian Community	10 (15%)	30 (13%)
Turkish Community	2 (3%)	38 (17%)
• Other*	12 (17%)	10 (4%)

*Other consists of academics, neighbours, witnesses, etc.

Coverage of The Political Rationale for Armenian Terrorism

As noted in Chapter 2, one of the major criticisms of the media's treatment of terrorism is that it seldom provides any historical or political context for understanding terrorist events. While the earlier analysis of news and photo themes gives some indication of the importance accorded to the political causes underlying Armenian terrorism, it understates somewhat the amount of attention devoted to causal factors. Table 5.8 provides an indication of the number and percentage of articles in each paper containing a reference to the historical or political factors underlying the shootings and the total amount of news space devoted to this aspect of the coverage.

A total of 681 column inches of news space in the coverage of the two shootings focused on the historical or political context of Armenian terrorism. This was 16% of the total article space given to these two events. Seventy-one percent (30) of the articles in the Gungor coverage made some mention of an underlying political motivation. Both Gungor stories on the CBC news made an oblique reference to the Armenian grievance. Fifty-five percent (52) of the Altikat articles also contained a mention of the political motivation behind the incident.

TABLE 5.8

NEWS COVERAGE OF
POLITICAL MOTIVATION

				<u>Gungor</u>		<u>Altikat</u>	
<u>Paper</u>	<u>Articles</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>News Space</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Articles</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>News Space</u>
Chronicle Herald	4	80	13	11	2	66	5
Gazette	1	100	8	7	6	75	140
Citizen	9	60	154	28	8	40	22
Le Droit	4	100	5	5	5	33	53
Globe & Mail	5	83	5	4	6	75	65
Star	1	50	1	5	3	30	38
Free Press	2	100	4	8	7	64	15
Leader Post	1	50	4	15	5	71	28
Herald	1	50	3	10	5	83	18
Sun	2	66	1	3	5	71	115
Totals	30	..	192	..	52	..	499

Armenian terrorists were particularly successful in drawing attention to their cause as a result of the Altikat assassination. Almost 500 column inches, or 17 percent of the total news space was comprised of discussions of the motivational factors behind the attack. Two papers, in particular, the Montreal Gazette and the Vancouver Sun paid substantial attention to this part of the story. Together they accounted for 51 percent of the coverage devoted to the political/historical aspects of the Altikat killing. Forty-seven percent of the Sun coverage of this event pertained to its motivational aspects. This was the case with 40 percent of the Gazette's coverage.

One hundred and ninety-two column inches, or 18 percent of the Gungor coverage in the ten papers was devoted to a discussion of the motivational aspects of the shooting. Eighty percent of this occurred in the Ottawa Citizen, which devoted 28 percent of its total coverage of the event to this news angle.

While a majority of articles in the coverage of both shootings contained references to the cause of the terrorists, or the political rationale for Armenian terrorism, these typically consisted of one or two line statements such as:

o Armenian attacks are in revenge for the Turkish massacre of 1.5 million Armenians in 1915.

o Armenians blame Turkey for the 1915 Massacre of more than one million of their countrymen. The territory that once was Armenia is now occupied by Turkey and the Soviet Union.

o ASALA seeks to liberate lands that were once Armenia. The territory is now occupied by Turkey and the Soviet Union.

o The Turks sought to annihilate the Armenians because of their aspirations to form an independent state and their resistance to the Ottoman empire.

The most common explanation of Armenian terrorism in the media coverage was that of revenge. Eighty percent of the papers that contained a reference to the historical grievance of the Armenians explained the terrorists attacks in terms of revenge for the 1915 massacre. CBC in its coverage of the Gungor shooting stated, for example, that the shooting was "a reprisal for the alleged slaughter or deportation of 2.5 million Armenians by Turkey in 1915".

The Ottawa Citizen, as a part of its coverage of the Gungor attack took a close look at the conflicting Armenian and Turkish interpretations of the events of 1915. On Saturday April 24, the anniversary that the Armenians observe of the genocide of 1915, and the last day of Gungor coverage in the sample, the Citizen devoted the entire first page of its Focus section to a discussion of the historical events of

the era. The feature entitled "Was it Genocide" consisted of three articles, one by a staff writer, one written by the Armenian Cultural Association of Ottawa, and a third written by Turgut Sunlap, the then Turkish Ambassador to Canada.

The articles by the Armenian Cultural Association and Ambassador Sunlap provided readers with some appreciation of the irreconcilable positions taken by the two sides in the conflict. The article by the Armenian Cultural Association of Ottawa, entitled "Why Should Turkey be Left Unpunished" restated the Armenian position outlined in Chapter 4 and quoted the standard historical sources used to support this view. The article concluded with the question; "Why should Turkey still benefit from this genocide by ruling over our deserted Armenian homeland".

In contrast, the article by Turkish Ambassador Sunlap, entitled "Armenians Massacred Innocent Turkish Civilians", articulated the Turkish position that the Armenians were the architects of their own fate, having fought with Russians during the war and massacred innocent Turkish civilians in the rear. Sunlap argued that the 1915 incident involved the displacement of the Armenian population from sensitive areas to less vulnerable provinces. He maintained that two fundamental Armenian claims were false, suggesting that

Armenians never achieved independent statehood within established boundaries and that, contrary to Armenian assertions, the actual death toll as a result of war and displacement was two million Turks and a few hundred thousand Armenians. Sunlap, in his article, also raises the Soviet connection, suggesting that ASALA is manned by Soviet Armenian instructors and trained in international communist and anarchist camps around Lebanon. He laid specific blame for the the attack on Gungor on the House of Commons Resolution of February 25, 1982, and a W5 (CTV) program on April 4, 1982.²³

The Citizen staff writer, attempting to portray himself as a neutral observer, argued that the position of neither side is unassailable. His article outlined the opposing positions of the Turks and Armenians and proferred what he suggested was a less emotional reconstruction of events.²⁴ The major themes in this purportedly unbiased view were:

The Armenians of the period were not blameless, having engaged in provocative behavior;

The killings of Armenians were organized and carried out systematically;

Estimates of the number killed are likely to be excessive and number in actuality around 750,000;

The Armenian Tragedy is part of a much larger human tragedy of the time, i.e. World War I, and;

No evidence exists from the Ottoman Archives that what

happened was done on the advice of the Ottoman government.

Ambassador Sunlap's assertion of Soviet involvement in Armenian terrorism was echoed by several of the papers in the sample. For example, Eric Downton in an article in the Vancouver Sun entitled "Another Mark in Armenia's Tragic Ledger" argued that:

...the terrorism now stalking Canada is not the work of a genuine Nationalist movement. It is an aberration of protest, probably the tool of international forces concerned not with the (restoration of Armenian nationhood but with the destabilization of Non-communist regimes.

Taking the standard line of those adopting this position, Downton suggested that it was revealing that the Armenian terrorists were not making territorial demands on the Soviet Union nor had they turned their guns on Russian officials. This despite the fact that Moscow had annexed a huge slice of former Armenian realms and overthrew a short-lived independent Armenian state created during the closing stages of World War I. While noting Armenian grievances, the article insisted that there is no widespread Armenian national liberation movement and no traditional assertion of destiny among the Armenians. Rather, it placed Armenian terrorism within the network of international terrorism strongly supported by the Russian organization for espionage and subversion, the KGB.

The theme of a Moscow connection was also profiled by the Regina Leader-Post in an article entitled "Terrorists said Guided by Moscow". This article provided a platform for American writer Claire Sterling's assertions, discussed in the previous chapter, that Armenian terrorists are not true Armenian nationalists but are directed from Moscow and trained and financed by the Russians.

Many papers, in their coverage, recognized the desire of Armenian nationalists to draw attention to their historical grievances through the news media. Katchig Hagopian, President of the Armenian National Committee of Canada, was quoted in several papers as saying the acts (i.e. terrorist acts) were a way of drawing the attention of the news media and the public and should not be interpreted as vengeance. Addressing the last point directly, Hagopian, when asked by Gazette reporters what he thought could be accomplished by gunning down a man in cold blood, replied by asking rhetorically if the press would be interested in looking into the Armenian question if the shooting had not happened.²⁵

Editorial Coverage

The attack on Gungor drew one editorial and 7 letters to the Editor, all in the Ottawa Citizen. The assassination

of Altikat elicited 12 editorials, two in both the Citizen and the Chronicle Herald and one in each of the other papers. There were also three editorial cartoons and two letters in the Altikat coverage. In total, the two shootings generated approximately 542 column inches of editorial page commentary. The panel of judges assessed each editorial in terms of its primary and secondary themes and the language used.

Editorial Themes

According to the judges, there were three primary and nine secondary themes in the 13 editorials that the two shootings elicited. These are shown in Table 5.9.²⁶ The dominant themes in the editorial coverage were the illegitimacy of terrorism, international terrorism comes to Canada, and security. Other themes that were common to the editorials were bringing the perpetrators to justice, the Soviet connection in Armenian terrorism, and the Armenian community in Canada. Several editorials also made reference to the political motivation underlying Armenian terrorism.

The Illegitimacy of Terrorism

This was the principal theme in the one editorial in the Gungor coverage and seven of the twelve Altikat editorials. The Citizen editorial of April 13, 1982, entitled "Attack on Diplomat Barbaric", exemplifies the view

TABLE 5.9
 EDITORIAL THEMES:
THE SHOOTINGS

<u>Themes</u>	<u>Base</u>	<u>Secondary</u>
Illegitimacy/Futility	8	1
Terrorism Comes to Canada	4	7
Security	1	4
The Soviet Connection	*	3
Bring Perpetrators to Justice	*	5
The Canadian Armenian Community	*	3
The Armenian Cause	*	6
The Turkish Position	*	1
The Need for Conciliation	*	1

contained in many of the editorials focusing on this theme. In the perspective of the paper's editors:

The savages who sought to assassinate a Turkish diplomat in Ottawa will not get any sympathy from Canadians. Nor should they. Attempted murders of innocent beings can never be condoned by civilized people anywhere. In Canada where people from all over the world to live in a free tolerant atmosphere, such barbarism is particularly obnoxious.

The editorial goes on to call the incident "a cowardly barbaric insane crime", asserting that violence has no place in the resolution of such historical grievances.

This perspective was echoed in many of the Altikat editorials. The Vancouver Sun, in an editorial on August 31, 1982, entitled "Murder in Ottawa" stated:

What ever the merits of the Armenian cause, however cold-bloodedly their ancestors were murdered by the Turks, however burning their passion for an independent homeland, there can simply be no moral justification for the violent actions of these terrorists.

This sentiment was shared by Le Droit's editorial of September 1, 1982 "Terreur sur la place public":

on ne saurait trop reprocher ces actes criminal a individus qui sèment la perturbation et la mort pour assouvir de vieilles vengeance et qui recourent a la violence pour faire valoir une cause qu'ils pourraient defendre par des moyens plus conformes a nos coutumes.

Similarly, the Leader-Post editorialized in "Endless Chain of Vengeance Results from Justice by Terror" that, "not even

a concession that terrorism is a last resort for those whose voices are not being heard in the legal or popular channels of life, can be used as a justification for the carefully planned campaign of Armenian terrorists".

Other editorial writers took the opportunity to decry the increasing resort to terrorism by aggrieved groups. The Chronicle-Herald, in its August 31, 1982, editorial "Terror Strikes at Home", referred to terrorism as "a device employed by those who know the cause which they espouse has no convincing philosophical foundation". The Gazette, on August 28th, in "No One Can Be Immune", editorialized "no country is immune from "mindless international terrorism". It went on to state that these actions speak for anarchism and anarchy. The Calgary Herald on August 30th, editorialized in "Terror in Ottawa": "the repulsiveness of the act speaks for itself as do all senseless killings done in the name of revenge". The Winnipeg Free Press titled its editorial commentary "Terror for a Lost Cause". In it, the paper argued that one of the most alarming developments in modern terrorism has been the appearance of groups that have either no goals or goals that are unattainable. It went on to suggest that, a group that seeks an identified political goal, is a group that can be theoretically accommodated in the normal political system.

Terrorism Comes to Canada

This was a major theme in four of the Altikat editorials and an important secondary theme in seven others.

The Globe and Mail editorial of August 28, 1982 entitled "Terror in Ottawa" provides a good example of the perspective contained in the editorial page on the occurrence of transnational terrorism in Canada. In it, the paper's editors expressed specific concern about Ottawa becoming an attractive target for terrorists:

The Assassination of Colonel Atilla Altikat, the Turkish Military Attache, in Ottawa is further chilling evidence that our Capital is by no means immune from attacks which have recently bloodied London, Paris and Ankara... This suggests a worrying possibility that Ottawa is becoming the preferred hunting ground for the cold blooded killers of the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia.

This sentiment was shared by Le Droit's editors:

Entre-temps Ottawa a la triste honneur de s'inscrire sur la liste de la terreur international.... Pas plus qu'on ne saurait tolérer que les gens qui ont décider de venir chercher chez nous un nouveau foyer, violent le lois de hospitalité Canadienne au nom de haines, de frustration et de rancouers, transporte dans leur bagage et viennent ajouter aux problèmes déjà suffisant qui existent chez nous.

The Vancouver Sun bluntly told Armenians to take their violence somewhere else;

It seems that more and more countries are becoming battle grounds. The murder by Armenians of a Turkish diplomat in Ottawa brings the phenomenon close to home... There is no justification for bringing this dispute to Canada... If Nationalist Armenians wish to promote their cause in Canada let them use peaceful means. Our country must not become a battleground.

The Citizen editorial of August 28th, entitled "Morning of Horror", decried "the detestable invasion of a peaceful city and nation". It demanded that terrorists be rooted out of the Canadian scene. The Calgary Herald of August 30th, pursued the same line, suggesting in its editorial that Ottawa, unlike other national capitals such as Paris or London in which such acts are taken for granted, has up to now, remained free of the taint of outside terrorism.

"Now there is an uncomfortable feeling that Canada is not to be left to the side of the world's stage, smug in its safe streets ... If vengeance from the other side of the globe can cause blood to flow on the quiet streets of Ottawa who can be complacent anymore".

Security

While several editorials commented on what they felt to be the inadequacy of Canadian security, only one raised this as a principal issue. The Chronicle Herald of September 1, 1982 ran an editorial entitled "Security in the Cold" in which it commented on the inadequacies of Canadian security preparations with respect to terrorism and attributing them

to the changes under way at the time in the Security Service. The editorial expressed concern that Canada would be viewed as the weak link in the Western security network, a situation which it foresaw would have grave consequences:

If Canada allows a security vacuum to develop we should not doubt for a moment that there will be a move by a friendly intelligence service to expand their operations in Canada because this would be in their own self interest.

The Chronicle-Herald urged Ottawa to act quickly and expeditiously to fill the security vacuum.

Bringing the Perpetrators to Justice

A common subtheme in the editorial coverage was the need to bring those who committed the shootings to justice as quickly as possible. Typical was the suggestion by the Chronicle-Herald that the guilty should be dealt with promptly, summarily and severely. The Citizen suggested that they (the perpetrators) should be hunted down and made to pay the severest penalty possible for their bloodthirsty crimes. Similarly, the Toronto Star editorialized: "It is fervently hoped that the perpetrators of the shooting will be apprehended and swiftly brought to justice as a warning to terrorists whoever they may be that they and their murderous activities won't be tolerated here".

The Soviet Connection

Reference was made in several editorials to the Soviet sponsorship of Armenian terrorism. The Gazette suggested that: "Any independence (Armenian) today even if the territory could be detached from Turkey would be strictly Soviet style. It is worth noting that Soviet officials have carefully refrained from criticizing Armenian Extremists". Similarly, the Vancouver Sun noted:

Canadians should still be concerned by their attempts abroad to weaken Turkey, a NATO ally. Some analysts suspect the Soviets are using Armenian terrorists in an attempt to destabilize the government there. This would be hard to prove but the lack of Armenian attacks on the Soviet Union, despite the fact that it contains much of their homeland is curious.

Suggestions of a Soviet connection were downplayed by the Leader-Post which, taking exception to one of the articles it ran in its coverage of the Altikat shooting, stated that suggestions by the writer Claire Sterling in The Terror Network that Moscow controls various supposedly Armenian groups would seem far fetched. It went on to argue that Sterling's evidence is inconclusive.

Armenian Canadians

Several of the editorials made a point of disassociating the Armenian community in Canada from the terrorists. For

example, the Globe and Mail argued that "Canadians should not make the mistake of associating this murderous gang with the Armenian Canadian community which itself has been subject to extortion attempts by extremists and strongly condemns the bloody-minded marauders". According to the editors of Le Droit: "La communauté Armenian du Canada, intégrée en majeure partie à la population, ne paraît pas impliquée dans ce complot". Others stressed the "law abiding" history of the Armenian community in Canada.

The Political Motivation of Armenian Terrorism

Six of the editorials in the coverage of the two shootings made reference to the historical roots and political objectives of Armenian terrorism. While there was some editorial sympathy for the Armenian grievance against the Turks, particularly in the Globe and Mail, which wrote of "the belated redress from Turkey for the genocide committed against the Armenian nation in 1915", most editorials saw little point in what the Leader-Post referred to as "keeping old wound inflamed". In its editorial response to the Gungor shooting the Citizen stated:

History records are full of massacres, brutalities and murders of people all over the world and at various times in the past. If every religious, racial, national or ethnic group tried to avenge past injustices, even

murders that it says were committed against its people, there would be no safety for anyone in the world.

This perspective was reaffirmed in the Citizen editorial in response to the Altikat Assassination, entitled "Condemn Don't Justify", which voiced agreement with U.N. Secretary Perez de Cuellar's assertion that there is no place in today's world for such vendettas.

On the stated goals of Armenian terrorism the Free Press exemplifies the editorial perspective of the papers in the sample:

Recently it has been suggested that the goal of Armenian terrorism is the establishment of an independent Armenian state on the lands that the Armenians inhabited until the First World War. Unfortunately the aim is not very helpful in finding a settlement and ending the terrorism because those lands are in an area that is split between Iran, Turkey and the Soviet Union. Turkey's current government could decide to concede statehood but could guarantee no such concessions by the Soviets or Iranians.

Editorial Prescription

Few of the editorials offered any advice for dealing with the subject of terrorism other than the need for the Canadian government to tighten security. The Chronicle-Herald, however, suggested a three-pronged program which it encouraged government to pursue. This included:

- improved security arrangements for foreign diplomatic staff members, specifically those from Turkey;
- greater investment in intelligence operations;
- sterner immigration procedures to ensure less likelihood of those who may be involved in terrorism from getting into the country.

The Winnipeg Free Press, however, directed its prescription at the Armenian-Turkish dispute, suggesting that it would be wise for the the Turkish Government to discuss the Armenian grievance with them, to agree on a version acceptable to both of what happened between other Turks and other Armenians long ago and find ways of assuaging the pain perhaps by new political arrangements.

Editorial Attitudes

The newspapers saved their strongest language for their editorials. Armenian terrorists were referred to as "savages", "cold blooded killers", "criminal animals", "bloody minded marauders" and "murderers and maimers". Their actions were called "barbaric", "odious crimes", "cowardly and barbaric", "insane", "repulsive" and "outrageous". Moreover, terrorism as a contemporary phenomenon was termed: "the tool of the coward", "a disease", "a heinous crime" and "mindless".

8 Because of the Easter holidays, the first report in the press of the Gungor shooting occurred on different days in the various papers. The Sun carried the story in its April 9 edition whereas the Globe and Mail and the Chronicle-Herald carried it on April 9. All other papers, including the Ottawa papers, did not carry a report of the Gungor shooting until April 10.

9 The August 28 report of the CBC National News had a 1:15 minute piece on the Altikat attack.

10 The lead item in the newscast was the possibility of war between the U.K. and Argentina over the Falkland Islands. The Gungor report followed a report on then Prime Minister Trudeau's holiday.

11 Intercoder reliability for this procedure was a more than satisfactory 90 percent.

12 The other CBC story was a description of the shooting itself.

13 The Response/Reaction theme consisted largely of stories that Turkey planned to send out "hit squads" to deal with Armenian terrorists.

14 Intercoder reliability for this procedure was determined to be 80 percent.

15 Overall, there was 90 percent agreement among the judges on the direction of the rankings and a 75 percent agreement on the intensity.

16 Two of the judges thought this to constitute a favourable reference while two other rated it as unfavourable.

17 Three descriptors were used for the perpetrators in the television news coverage. These were "Armenian extremists", "Armenian terrorists" and "gunmen".

was left in the news coverage about where the media stood regarding these attacks. The perspectives contained in the news coverage were reinforced and more strongly articulated in editorial coverage of the incidents.

Initial conclusions with respect to media coverage of the political or historical context surrounding the attacks are more equivocal. A majority of the articles in the coverage of both shootings made some reference to the historical grievance of the Armenians, their political aspirations, or the objectives of the attacks. Nevertheless, many of these consisted only of short and repetitive statements focusing on the themes of revenge and retaliation. Only a few papers went beyond this, to examine in depth the historical and political context of Armenian nationalism and terrorism.

Contrary to what was expected, was the extent to which the coverage integrated the perspectives of what may be termed "dissident" sources. While the vast majority of perspectives on the incident were from official sources, there were in both cases a significant number of quotations from members of the Armenian community in Canada, many of whom supported the cause espoused by the terrorists and some

of whom defended the taking of dramatic action to draw attention to Armenian grievances.

Editorial coverage of the two shootings contained two principle themes. The first was that the use of terrorism by such groups as the Armenians is both illegitimate and futile. Editorial writers across the country were unequivocal in their condemnation of these acts. The second major perspective offered in the editorial pages was that Canadians have little tolerance for acts of terrorism in this country, particularly as they are related to foreign issues and grievances. The outrage of editors over these events was particularly evident in the language used on the editorial pages. Those who carried out the shootings were portrayed as "criminal animals", "savages" or "barbarians" while their acts were described as "heinous and horrible crimes".

SUMMARY

This chapter provides a structural analysis of the attacks by Armenian terrorists on Turkish diplomats Kani Gungor and Atilla Altikat in Ottawa in 1982 and of the coverage of the arrest and initial disposition of the charges of those accused of the Gungor shooting. It also offers a substantive analysis of the news coverage of the two

shootings. Generally, the analysis presented in this chapter provides some initial indication of the impact that the events had on the media agenda and some perspective on the images and information conveyed in the coverage.

The findings so far demonstrate the ability of terrorist groups to completely capture the media agenda for a period of time, particularly in the case of the Altikat assassination. They also provide some support to the hypothesis that media coverage of terrorism places a heavy emphasis on the dramatic and human interest aspects of the event. The analysis in this chapter, however, does raise questions about some of the other hypotheses presented in Chapter 3. There was, for example, no evidence in the coverage that the media glamourized terrorists and their exploits. On the contrary, both were described largely in negative or unfavourable terms. Nor were dissident perspectives excluded, as evidenced by the attention paid to spokesmen for the Armenian community. The findings with respect to the coverage of the political motivation behind the act are somewhat more equivocal. While many articles alluded to the Armenian grievance, they offered at best a simplistic and superficial treatment of this issue.

Building on the analysis presented in this chapter, Chapter 6 will examine the coverage given to the seizure of the Turkish Embassy by Armenian terrorists in 1985. In this case, the structural and substantive content analysis will be supplemented by an exploration of some of the controversy surrounding the coverage of this incident and some of the resulting self-examination that occurred in the Canadian media. A concluding chapter will examine the findings from both Chapters 5 and 6 in the context of the major hypotheses.

8 Because of the Easter holidays, the first report in the press of the Gungor shooting occurred on different days in the various papers. The Sun carried the story in its April 9 edition whereas the Globe and Mail and the Chronicle-Herald carried it on April 9. All other papers, including the Ottawa papers, did not carry a report of the Gungor shooting until April 10.

9 The August 28 report of the CBC National News had a 1:15 minute piece on the Altikat attack.

10 The lead item in the newscast was the possibility of war between the U.K. and Argentina over the Falkland Islands. The Gungor report followed a report on then Prime Minister Trudeau's holiday.

11 Intercoder reliability for this procedure was a more than satisfactory 90 percent.

12 The other CBC story was a description of the shooting itself.

13 The Response/Reaction theme consisted largely of stories that Turkey planned to send out "hit squads" to deal with Armenian terrorists.

14 Intercoder reliability for this procedure was determined to be 80 percent.

15 Overall, there was 90 percent agreement among the judges on the direction of the rankings and a 75 percent agreement on the intensity.

16 Two of the judges thought this to constitute a favourable reference while two other rated it as unfavourable.

17 Three descriptors were used for the perpetrators in the television news coverage. These were "Armenian extremists", "Armenian terrorists" and "gunmen".

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16 Two of the judges thought this to constitute a favourable reference while two other rated it as unfavourable.

17 Three descriptors were used for the perpetrators in the television news coverage. These were "Armenian extremists", "Armenian terrorists" and "gunmen".

18 Two descriptors were used by the CBC for the incident. These were "attack" and "shooting".

19 Sources quoted included Pierre Trudeau, Robert Kaplan, and Alan MacEachen.

20 The descriptors used in television news coverage were "Turkish diplomat", "commercial attache", and "Fifty year old diplomat".

21 The only descriptor used in television news coverage was "assassin".

22 Placement reliability with respect to sources was almost 100 percent.

23 On April 4, 1978 CTV's weekly newsmagazine W5 carried a program containing material supporting the Armenian view of the events of 1915. This program engendered a number of complaints from the Turkish community in Canada, who saw it as biased and distorted.

24 The most widely quoted "unbiased" source in this article was the Encyclopedia Britannica.

25 Quoted in Mayer (1982; 85).

26 Intercoder reliability among the four judges on the assignment of editorial themes was 75 percent and deemed to be satisfactory.

CHAPTER 6

THE TURKISH EMBASSY SIEGE

This Chapter looks at media coverage of the March 12, 1985, seizure of the Turkish Embassy in Ottawa by the Armenian Revolutionary Army (ARA). A structural and substantive analysis is offered of both the press coverage and network news coverage of this incident. Media coverage of events at the Embassy also raised some serious questions concerning the live coverage of terrorist incidents, which will also be examined. As well, this Chapter will look at some of the self examination by the Canadian media that occurred as a result of the siege coverage.

BACKGROUND

On March 12, 1985, shortly before 7 a.m., three men in a rented van stormed the Turkish Embassy in Ottawa. They shot and killed the Canadian security guard of the Embassy on duty at the Embassy gate and blew open the front doors of the Embassy with explosives. Turkish Ambassador Coskun Kirca, probably their intended target, jumped from the Embassy's second floor window breaking his arm, leg and pelvis in the process. He lay at the side of the Embassy for the duration of the siege. The terrorists, however, managed to capture

several staff members and the ambassador's wife and daughter inside the Embassy.

Upon seizing and securing the Embassy, the terrorists immediately established contact with the media. At around 7:15 A.M. they called the Canadian Press to identify themselves as the Armenian Revolutionary Army and to announce their occupation of the Embassy. The caller stated "We have hostages, we have demands and we plan to stay". He further stated that the group wanted Turkey to pay for the Armenian genocide and "we want our lands back".

Five minutes after the first call, the same caller phoned CP and told them to tell the police about the takeover. He stated that he would not talk to police but would talk to the media. Two further calls were placed to CP during the morning. The terrorists also made a call to the CTV morning program Canada A.M. to make demands concerning the return of Armenian lands and accusing Turkey of the Armenian genocide.

The siege ended surprisingly, inexplicably and peacefully less than five hours after it began. Shortly before noon, the terrorists released the hostages and surrendered to police. Three Armenians, two from Montreal

and one from Toronto, were taken into custody by police and charged with murder. The three were arraigned later that week.

MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE EMBASSY SEIZURE: A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS

Press Coverage

The Intensity of Coverage

By any standard, the Turkish siege generated an enormous amount of publicity in the Canadian press. In the ten papers used in this study, it generated 160 articles, 112 photographs, and 17 editorials.¹ The total news space devoted to the coverage of this event was 9,124 column inches. This was more than twice the amount of coverage given to the Altikat incident and almost eight times that given to the attack on Kani Gungor.

Table 6.1 provides an overview of the coverage of the siege in the ten papers. As can be seen from this Table, typical press coverage of the event consisted of 11 articles, 7 photographs and 676 column inches of news space in the two week period following the incident.²

TABLE 6.1
PRESS COVERAGE OF THE
EMBASSY SIEGE

<u>Paper</u>	<u>Articles</u>	<u>Photo- graphs</u>	<u>News Space</u>
Chronicle- Herald	10	5	550
Gazette	15	17	1091
Citizen	29	23	1843
Le Droit	24	19	1371
Globe & Mail	22	5	979
Star	19	16	1122
Free Press	9	7	460
Leader-Post	11	4	556
Herald	11	7	676
Sun	10	9	476
TOTAL	160	112	9124

There were some notable regional variations in the intensity of coverage given to this event. Table 6.1 indicates that it received substantially more coverage in the five "central Canadian" papers, the Gazette, the Citizen, Le Droit, the Globe and Mail and the Toronto Star, than it did elsewhere in the country. Overall, 67 percent of the articles, 66 percent of the photos and approximately 70 percent of the news space devoted to the event were contained in these five papers. The five each ran an average of 20 articles and 14 photos covering the incident and devoted an average of 1122 column inches to it. By comparison, the other papers in the sample each carried an average of 10 articles, 7 photographs and 602 column inches or about half as much coverage.

The most extensive coverage of the incident was found in the two Ottawa papers, the Citizen and Le Droit. Each ran 23 articles on the Embassy attack. Moreover, Le Droit ran 18 photographs and the Citizen 13. The Citizen devoted the most news space of any paper to the event, 1402 column inches; followed by Le Droit with 1311. The two papers together accounted for almost 32 percent of the volume of coverage of the siege by the ten papers.

An overview of first day coverage is provided in Table 6.2. In most cases, the first press report of the story was carried on March 13, although the Citizen, Le Droit and the Sun did provide some coverage in their final editions on March 12. The Embassy seizure story was page one news in all ten papers. In seven of the ten it was the headline story.³ Overall first day coverage accounted for 37 percent of all articles, 51 percent of photographs and 48 percent of total news space.

The extent of the impact of the embassy siege on the agenda of the ten papers is indicated by the proportions of live news holes devoted to it. These ranged from 5 percent in the Winnipeg Free Press to almost 40 percent in Le Droit. Once again the regional variation in the agenda impact is worth noting. The amount of the news hole the the five "Central Canadian" papers ranged from 14 to the aforementioned 40 percent, with an average of 27 percent. The range of the other five was between 5 percent and 13 percent, with an average of 9.6 percent.

TABLE 6.2

THE EMBASSY SEIGE: FIRST DAY COVERAGE

<u>Paper</u>	<u>Articles</u>	<u>Photographs</u>	<u>News Space</u>	<u>News Hole</u>	<u>Location</u>
Chronicle Herald	2	2	170	9X	Headline
Gazette	6	10	530	31X	Headline
Citizen March (March 12)	6	10	441	18X	Headline
(March 13)	10	7	644	20X	Headline
Le Droit (March 12)	1	1	60	3X	Page 1
(March 13)	12	15	886	39X	Headline
Globe & Mail	8	2	413	29X	Headline
Star	7	4	462	14X	Headline
Free Press	1	3	135	5X	Page 1
Leader Post	1	1	225	8X	Headline
Herald	5	5	381	13X	Page 1
Sun (March 12)	1	0	39	2X	Page 1
(March 13)	4	4	279	13X	Page 1
TOTAL	56	53	4125	*	****

Prominence of Coverage

A summary of the major elements of first page coverage of the embassy seizure is provided in Table 6.3. Overall, this event appeared on the first page of thirty-two editions in the ten papers. There were 42 first page stories and 28 first page photographs. Each of the ten papers ran at least two first page stories. The Ottawa Citizen had the most with 8, while Le Droit ran six page one stories.

Of the 32 editions in which the story received first page treatment, it was the headline story in 16. Only the Sun and the Free Press did not accord the story headline status. In the Citizen and Le Droit the story was headline news for four days in the two week period. In the Gazette and the Globe and Mail, it was accorded headline status on three different days. More than half (23) of the 42 first page stories appeared above the fold.

The percentage of first page news holes devoted to the coverage varied widely with respect to both first and subsequent day coverage. For the first day of the story, the first page news hole ranged from 7 percent in the Sun to 85 percent in Le Droit. Six papers, the Star (54 percent), the Gazette (70 percent), the Globe and Mail (52 percent), the Citizen (78 percent), the Chronicle-Herald (50 percent)

TABLE 6.3

THE FIRST PAGE
THE EMBASSY SEIGE

<u>Paper/Date</u>	<u>Articles</u>	<u>Photographs</u>	<u>News Space</u>	<u>% First Page</u>	<u>First Page Placement</u>
Chronicle Herald					
March 13, 1985	2	2	117	50	Headline
March 14, 1985	1	1	57	24	Lower
March 16, 1985	1	0	29	11	Lower
March 21, 1985	1	0	18	8	Lower
Gazette					
March 13, 1985	2	5	175	70	Headline
March 14, 1985	1	1	90	36	Headline
March 16, 1985	1	0	6	3	Lower
Citizen					
March 12, 1985	2	2	182	63	Upper
March 13, 1985	3	3	189	78	Headline
March 14, 1985	1	0	23	10	Lower

TABLE 6.3 (cont.)

<u>Paper/Date</u>	<u>Articles</u>	<u>Photographs</u>	<u>News Space</u>	<u>% First Page</u>	<u>First Page Placement</u>
<u>The Citizen</u>					
March 15, 1985	1	0	23	10	Headline
March 16, 1985	1	0	17	8	Upper
<u>Le Droit</u>					
March 12, 1985	1	1	60	22	Upper
March 13, 1985	2	2	161	85	Headline
March 14, 1985	1	1	82	43	Headline
March 16, 1985	1	0	47	26	Headline
March 20, 1985	1	0	33	17	Headline
<u>Globe & Mail</u>					
March 13, 1985	2	1	121	52	Headline
March 14, 1985	2	1	102	45	Headline
March 16, 1985	1	0	13	13	Lower
March 20, 1985	1	1	57	25	Upper

TABLE 4.3 (cont.)

<u>Paper/Date</u>	<u>Articles</u>	<u>Photographs</u>	<u>News Space</u>	<u>1st Page</u>	<u>First Page Placement</u>
<u>Star</u>					
March 13, 1985	2	3	115	54	Headline
March 14, 1985	2	0	38	18	Upper
<u>Free Press</u>					
March 13, 1985	1	2	93	42	Upper
March 14, 1985	1	0	13	6	Upper
<u>Leader Post</u>					
March 13, 1985	1	1	77	30	Headline
March 16, 1985	1	0	36	15	Headline
March 20, 1985	1	0	38	16	Lower
<u>Herald</u>					
March 13, 1985	1	1	81	34	Upper
March 14, 1985	1	0	43	18	Headline
<u>Sun</u>					
March 12, 1985	1	0	39	17	Upper
March 13, 1985	1	0	15	7	Lower

and Le Droit (85 percent) devoted more than half of their first pages to breaking the story. In eight of the ten papers, the Embassy story remained page one news on the second day (March 14) with first page news hole proportions ranging from 13 percent to 45 percent.

Follow-up Coverage

Follow-up coverage of the attack on the Turkish embassy, as indicated in Figure 6.1, was substantially greater than that accorded the two shootings examined in the previous chapter. It ranged from five to nine days in the ten papers, with the two week average being six days. The Globe and Mail provided the most follow-up coverage with nine days, while the Citizen and Le Droit gave the incident eight and seven days respectively.

Network News Coverage

CBC and CTV coverage of the Embassy siege was examined for the day of the event and four subsequent days. Table 6.4 outlines the major structural elements of the coverage of March 12-15. Neither network covered the story on March 16. As can be seen from the Table, both networks gave substantial first day coverage to the incident. CBC and CTV both ran it as the lead story. In the CBC coverage, the first four

NEWSPAPERS

FIGURE 6.1
FOLLOW-UP COVERAGE: EMBASSY SEIZURE

4

MED
MEDICAL EQUIPMENT

TABLE 6.4.

NETWORK NEWS COVERAGE: EMBASSY SEIGECBCCTV

<u>Date</u>	<u>Items</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Duration</u>	<u>News hole</u>	<u>Items</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Duration</u>	<u>News hole</u>
March 12, 1985	4	1	8:00	37X	3	1	7:07	32X
March 13, 1985	2	1	3:53	16X	1	5	2:12	12X
March 14, 1985	1	4	0:19	1X	1	9	0:24	1X
March 15, 1985	1	1	2:00	10X	1	8	0:41	2X

items (36 percent of all items in the broadcast) and almost 40 percent of The National were devoted to it. CTV had three stories on the siege at the front of the newscast, comprising more than 7 minutes or 30 percent of the total news time available that evening.

On March 13, the day the story hit most of the papers across the country, the CBC continued to give it top story status with two stories at the front of the newscast and 17 percent of total air time. CTV, however, had relegated it to fifth place, devoting about 13 percent of its news hole to it.

For the remaining two days, the story received much less play on CTV. On March 14, a 25 second item was run in ninth position and on March 15, a 41 second item was run in eighth place. The CBC had a 20 second item on the March 14 broadcast and a two minute item at the top of the newscast on March 15.

Summary: Structural Coverage

There is little doubt as to the influence that the Armenian Revolutionary Army managed to exert on the agendas of the Canadian media as a result of the attack on the

Turkish Embassy in Ottawa. This attack was the number one news item on the day it occurred, completely dominating the first pages of papers across the country and the prime news time of the national networks. The publicity generated by this attack in the ten papers surveyed was enormous, amounting to over 9,000 column inches. This is the equivalent of having four entire newspapers devoted to it.⁴ This was supplemented by the 24 minutes of national network news time devoted to the incident.

Based on the structural attributes of the coverage, it is clear that if the intent of the terrorists was to gain national attention and recognition, they were extremely successful. The five hour siege generated headline and prime time television news coverage on the day that it occurred and for many days following, causing the attention of Canadians to be focused on the ARA and the Armenian demands.

SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS

News Themes

All 160 press stories and 14 network news stories were classified into categories by the four judges.⁵ In all, ten different news themes were identified. Table 6.5 provides a list of these themes and their frequency of occurrence.

TABLE 6.5
NEWS THEMES: EMBASSY SEIZURE

Themes	<u>Press</u>		<u>Network</u>	
	Total	%	Total	%
Security	69	44	8	57
Political Motivational	13	8	2	14
Victim	17	11	1	7
Police	6	4	*	*
Media	7	4	*	*
Reaction	7	4	*	*
Court	16	10	1	7
Siege	10	6	2	14
Perpetrators	4	3	*	*
Armenian Terrorism	9	6	*	*
<hr/>				
Totals	158	100	14	100

As in the analysis of the two shooting incidents, the category label for each theme indicates the principal thrust of the story. For example, Security relates to stories on security at the Turkish Embassy and the debate that ensued in the House of Commons over whether Turkey had warned Ottawa of an impending attack. Political Motivation comprises stories related to the historical grievances of the Armenians or the specific objectives of the Armenian Revolutionary Army. Victim incorporates stories on the slain security guard, the Turkish Ambassador and family members of both. Police contains stories, for the most part personal profiles, about police officials involved in the incident. Media includes stories related to press and television coverage of the incident. Reaction focuses on the reaction by governments specifically Turkey, and of the Armenian and Turkish communities in Canada to the incident. The category Court incorporates stories related to the three perpetrators and their subsequent court appearances. Siege contains stories that focused on the event itself. Perpetrators focuses on the backgrounds of the three Armenians involved in the incident. The final category, Armenian Terrorism, is a general category containing stories on past attacks and sources of support for various Armenian extremists groups.

As in the Gungor and Altikat coverage, the most prominent news theme in both press and network news coverage of the embassy siege was Security. Sixty-eight press stories (44 percent) and eight (57 percent) network news stories dealt with this theme. Shortly after the incident occurred, a debate began in Parliament over whether Canada had been warned by Turkey to expect the attack.⁶ Over 70 percent of the security stories focused on this debate.

The second most prominent category in press coverage of the incident, although far behind security related stories was Victim. Seventeen stories (11 percent) focused on the two principal victims of the attack, Pinkerton Security Guard Claude Brunelle and Turkish Ambassador Kirca. Ten newspaper stories focused on the Ambassador and his medical condition. The one Victim story in the network news coverage of this incident also focused on this angle. Seven stories in seven different papers focused on the slain security guard. Close behind Victim was the category Court with 16 stories, or 10 percent of all stories.

The extent to which both the press and network news focused on the Political Motivation theme is noteworthy. Eight percent (13) of press and 14 percent (2) of television news stories focused on the historical/political issues.

underlying the act. Seven of the ten papers ran at least one story related to the Armenian cause. Both the CBC and CTV ran a Political Motivation story in the context of their first day coverage of the event.⁷

Of special interest is the category Media. There were seven stories in press coverage of the incident on the role that the media played in the siege and the debate over media coverage that ensued. Six papers ran stories related to the media behavior in the context of the Embassy siege. This theme will be dealt with in more detail later in this Chapter.

As mentioned earlier there were 42 first page stories in the ten papers related to the Turkish Embassy siege. Table 6.6 identifies the news themes emphasized on the first pages of the newspapers in this study.

Fifty-five percent of the first page stories dealt with security issues. As can be seen in the Table, 34 percent of all Security stories were on page one. Far behind Security in terms of page one stories, were those dealing with the court appearance of the suspects. These were followed by Siege stories. It is interesting to note that 60 percent of these stories were accorded first page status. There were

TABLE 6.6
CATEGORIES OF FIRST PAGE EMPHASIS:
EMBASSY SEIZURE

<u>Theme</u>	<u>Front Page</u>		<u>Inside Page</u>	
	<u>Total</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>%</u>
Security	23	34	45	66
Siege	6	60	4	40
Victim	3	18	14	82
Court	8	50	8	50
Political Motivation	1	8	11	92
Police.	1	20	4	80
Media	*	*	7	100
Reaction	*	*	7	100
Perpetrators	*	*	4	100
Armenian Terrorism	*	*	8	100

three first page Victim stories and one Political Motivation story.⁸

Security was also by far the most prominent headline theme in the coverage of the embassy attack. Of the 16 headlines in the coverage, 10 (67 percent) were related to the security issue. Three headlines focused on Court, whereas another three were concerned with Siege.

Photo/Visual Themes

As noted earlier, there were 112 photographs in the embassy siege coverage. There were also found to be 52 visual items in the 14 network news stories related to the incident.⁹ Table 6.7 provides a breakdown of both the photographs and visual items in terms of the categories assigned to them by the panel of judges.¹⁰

There were, according to the judges' assessment, 8 photo themes in the press coverage of the incident and 7 visual themes in the network news coverage. Security consists of photo and film footage of security at the Turkish and other embassies in Ottawa and political personalities involved in the security debate. Police, a category unique to press coverage, entails photos of police officers involved in the incident. Court Focuses on judicial and legal officials

TABLE 6.7

PHOTO/VISUAL THEMES:
EMBASSY SEIZURE

<u>Themes</u>	<u>Press</u>		<u>Network</u>	
	<u>Total</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>%</u>
Victim	32	32	13	25
Security	17	17	15	29
Siege	21	21	6	12
Suspects	10	10	1	2
Police	7	7	*	*
Political Motivation	4	4	9	17
Court	2	2	3	6
Armenian Terror	*	*	5	10
Totals	101	100	52	100

related to the court proceedings. Victim contains photographs and footage of Claude Brunelle, Ambassador Kirca and of the hostages. Siege involves film and photos of the embassy takeover and the surrender of the terrorists. Political Motivation includes film footage of the victims of the 1915 massacre, maps of historical Armenia and photos and film of spokespeople representing the Turkish or Armenian positions. Suspects comprises photos and footage of the three Armenians arrested in the incident. The category Family, again unique to press coverage, contains photos of Claude Brunelle's immediate family. Armenian Terrorism, a category unique to the visual elements of network news coverage, contains footage of previous Armenian attacks around the world such as the Ankara airport massacre.

As indicated in the Table 6.7, the most frequent photo theme, as in the coverage of the earlier shootings, was Victim. Thirty-two percent (32) of the photos were placed in this category. Included were 16 photographs of Turkish Ambassador Kirca and 7 of guard Brunelle's body. There were also several photos of Kirca's obviously distraught daughter fleeing the scene.¹¹ Victim was also the second most prominent theme in the film coverage of the incident. Twenty-five percent (13) of the visual items focused on this theme.

The most prominent theme in the film coverage of the embassy siege was Security. Twenty-nine percent (15) of all visual items were categorized as belonging to this theme. Security was the third most prominent category in the photo coverage with 17 percent (17) of all photos. Most news photos were related to the debate which ensued in the House of Commons immediately after the incident as to the adequacy of security and whether Canada was warned by Turkey. Prominent in this category were photographs of the major personalities involved in this debate: Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark; Solicitor General Elmer Mackay; Deputy Prime Minister Erik Nielsen and Liberal leader John Turner.

The second most prominent photo theme was Siege. Twenty-one percent of the photos were of the scene of the attack. One of the most frequent of these was a Reuters photo of the surrender of the terrorists. It is interesting to note that Siege ranked fourth in the film categories, representing 14 percent (6) of all visual items.

The extent to which the film coverage of the incident contained visual elements related to the political motivation underlying the incident is most interesting. Twenty-one percent (9) of all visual elements in the network news

coverage were placed by the judges in the Political Motivation category. Both networks, as part of their coverage, broadcast film of Turkish troops massacring Armenians in 1915, Armenians being lynched and rows of bodies of the victims of the alleged Turkish massacres. Five percent (5) of news photos fell into this category.

As can be seen from Table 6.9 the Victim theme dominated front page photographs. Thirteen of the 24 first page photos (38 percent) focused on this theme. Eight of these were photographs of Ambassador Kirca. The most frequent of these was the photo of the ambassador on a stretcher being removed from the scene. Another three first page photos were of the Ambassador's daughter fleeing the scene at the conclusion of the event. A first page photo in Le Droit showed the body of security guard Brunelle lying in front of the embassy.

The second most prominent first page photo theme was Siege. There were seven first page photos of the scene of the Embassy during the siege. The most frequent was a photo of the three Armenians surrendering, surrounded by the police tactical squad. This photo was featured on the first pages of five of the ten papers.

TABLE 6.8

FIRST PAGE PHOTO THEMES:
EMBASSY SIEGE

<u>Themes</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>%</u>
Victim	10	50
Security	1	5
Siege	7	35
Suspects	1	5
Police	1	5
Totals	20	100

Descriptors

Twenty-seven nouns and adjectives were used to describe the events that took place at the Turkish Embassy. Another 35 were used to describe the perpetrators. Forty-eight separate references were made to the two principal victims of the attack, Ambassador Kirca and Claude Brunelle.¹²

Of the 27 different descriptors used for the incident in the press coverage, 22 (81 percent) were judged to be negative. These included terms such as "hostage taking", "embassy siege", "terrorist raid" and "occupation". Four other descriptors were rated as having strongly negative connotations. Included among these were "bloody strike", "despicable act", and "bizarre and tragic event". One descriptor "commando raid" was determined by three of the judges to be a favourable reference, while one other rated it as negative.

Only three descriptors were used for the incident in the 14 stories that constituted the network news coverage. Two of these "attack" and "hostage taking" were judged to be negative, while the other "drama" was felt to be neutral.

The three perpetrators of the attack were characterized for the most part by negative descriptors in the press

coverage. Altogether, 20 (57 percent) of the 35 referents were judged to be unfavourable. These included descriptors such as "attackers", "armed group", "armed intruders", "militants", "radicals" etc. However, there were also judged to be a number of positive references to the three Armenians involved in the incident. Overall, 8 (23 percent) of the descriptors were characterized as favourable. These included "direct, assured and business-like", "well equipped and seemed to know what they were doing", "complete professionals" and "very competent". The term "commando" was also used to describe the perpetrators and, again, three of the four judges rated it as a positive referent. The remaining 6 descriptors were judged to be neutral. Included in this category were "three Armenians in their twenties", "a landed immigrant from Lebanon", "a Syrian-born Canadian" and "three men of Armenian descent".¹³

Twelve referents were used to describe the perpetrators in the network news coverage. The majority of these (9), which included terms such as "extremist Armenians", "Armenian gunmen" and "Armenian revolutionaries", were judged to be

negative. The remaining three "three Armenians", "three men", "Armenians" were judged to be neutral.

Of the 48 descriptors used in the press for the two victims, 9 concerned Turkish Ambassador Kirca while the remaining 39 were for the slain security guard Claude Brunelle. Of the 9 referring to Kirca, the majority (6) were deemed to be neutral. These included terms such as "ambassador", "veteran diplomat", and "Istanbul educated lawyer". Two others were judged to be favourable, including references to him as "married with two teenage daughters" and "one of Turkey's top ten diplomats".

Of the the 39 different referents used for Claude Brunelle, 21 were felt by the judges to be strongly favourable. In many cases these were descriptions by friends and neighbors quoted in the coverage. Brunelle was described as "a perfect gentlemen", "an exceptionally nice man", "a man with a pleasant disposition", "educated", "an excellent student" and "a fine boy". Five others were judged to be favourable including "a regular person" and "apolitical". The remaining 13 referents including terms such as "private security guard", "a native of Antigonish", "a seven year veteran of security work" were determined to be neutral.

All three victim references in the network coverage were judged neutral. Kirca was referred to only as "ambassador" and Brunelle was described as a "security guard" or "security agency employee".

News Sources

Coverage of the Embassy siege in the ten papers contained 676 attributed quotations. Another 33 were contained in the 14 stories comprising network news coverage of the event. Table 6.9 offers a breakdown of these news sources by category.¹⁴

Canadian officials were by far the most frequently cited news sources in both press and network coverage of the incident. Fifty-six percent (379) of press quotations and 50 percent (17) of the quotations used in the television news reports were placed in this category. Among them, the most frequently cited source was Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark.

As in the Gungor and Altikat coverage, sources in the Canadian Armenian community were also quoted prominently in the news reports of the incident. Armenians was the second most prominent category in network news coverage (tied with

TABLE 6.9
NEWS SOURCES: EMBASSY SEIZURE

<u>Sources</u>	<u>Press</u>		<u>Network</u>	
	<u>Total</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>%</u>
Police/Security	80	12	6	18
Turkish Officials	55	8	1	3
Canadian Officials	379	56	17	52
Armenian Community	49	7	6	18
Turkish Community	6	1	1	3
Judicial Officials	20	3	*	*
Family & Neighbors	30	4	*	*
Academics	25	4	*	*
Other	32	5	2	6
Total	676	100	33	100

Police and comprising 18 percent (6) of all sources. In the press coverage, 49 quotations (7 percent) were attributed to the Armenian Community. Among those interviewed were officials from Armenian organizations, as well as a number of elderly Armenians who recounted their memories of the 1915 massacre.

Coverage of the Political Motivation

As noted earlier, there were 13 stories whose news themes alluded to the political motivation underlying the incident. Table 6.10 shows the total volume and percentage of all coverage focused on the motivational aspects of the Embassy siege. It is interesting to note that, despite the prominence of political motivation as a news theme as determined by story heads, the actual news space that was accorded to this news angle was relatively limited. Many articles that alluded to historical grievances in their themes focused the contents of the story more on a recitation of previous terrorist attacks. The total news space devoted to this factor was 460 column inches or 5 percent of the total volume of news coverage that the incident received.

TABLE 6.10
PRESS COVERAGE OF POLITICAL
MOTIVATION: EMBASSY SEIZURE

<u>Paper</u>	<u>Articles</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Volume</u>	<u>%</u>
Chronicle-Herald	1	10	5	1
Gazette	3	20	106	10
Citizen	5	17	15	1
Le Droit	4	17	20	1
Globe & Mail	5	23	20	2
Star	4	21	67	6
Free Press	2	22	3	1
Leader-Post	2	18	45	8
Herald	6	55	30	22
Sun	5	50	9	2
Totals	37	*	364	*

CBC and CTV devoted to coverage of the political motivation underlying the attack a total of approximately three minutes (12 percent) of the twenty-five minutes of news time that they collectively gave to the incident. Over and above this, however, and a major propaganda coup as far as the terrorists were concerned, the CBC news program The Journal devoted its entire 40 minute program on March 12 to the Turkish-Armenian dispute.

Reference to the political objectives of the Embassy attack came, in several instances, directly from the mouths of the perpetrators. In telephone interviews carried on both networks and widely reported in the Canadian press, the hostage takers, demanded that in return for the release of the hostages, Turkey acknowledge what they called the 1915 Armenian holocaust and return Armenian lands confiscated by Turkey.

As with press coverage of the two previous incidents, the principal explanation in press coverage of the motive behind the embassy attack was revenge. For example, the Chronicle-Herald called the ARA "one of several Armenian terrorist groups that has pledged revenge for atrocities that occurred more than 70 years ago". According to the Sun "The Armenian terrorists who took over the Turkish Embassy in

Ottawa Tuesday are believed to be a small contingent in a worldwide army united in one goal - retaliation against the Turks for a 1915 massacre". The Citizen referred to the terrorists as seeking revenge for the killing of one million Armenians in 1917.

Two papers, the Gazette and the Star ran articles providing a historical perspective on the Armenian grievances. The former, in an article entitled "Campaign of Terror Rooted in Centuries of Domination", reviewed events of the era leading up to the massacre and assertions that the Turks took part in a systematic campaign to exterminate the Armenian people. The Gazette article also raised the question of whether Armenian terrorism had been inspired by the Soviet Union to destabilize Turkey, which it called "a strategically situated but deeply troubled member of NATO". The paper noted that some observers feel that the theory is supported by the fact that, while the terrorists seek the liberation of about 147,630 square kilometres of Armenian Turkey, they have never demanded independence for Soviet Armenia, the smallest of the Soviet Republics, covering 29,800 square kilometres on the Turkish border. Commenting on the Armenian demand for the liberation of their homeland, the Gazette noted in this article that historically the Armenians had been a conquered and subjected people.

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The Star took a close look at the demands being made by the terrorists. On the Armenian demand for compensation, it noted that the possibility is slight as Turkey is in deep economic trouble. Furthermore, the Star noted, the Government of Turkish Prime Minister, Turgut Ozal, also had to cope with the aspirations of 8 million Kurds who want to form an independent state.

The CBC ran a story on the political motivation behind the attack as part of its March 12 coverage. The newscaster, Knowlton Nash, provided the following introduction to the story:

The Armenians have a long standing grievance against the Turks. It goes back to 1915, and its been called the first genocide of the 20th century. Turkey denies that it ever happened, but Armenians don't accept that. Most of them have been waging a quiet peaceful campaign to change Turkey's mind. But some Armenians, such as the men at the embassy in Ottawa today, have turned to violence.

The subsequent report by CBC reporter Claude Adams contained interviews with two Toronto area Armenians, Zaven Sirkassen and Atken Armenian, who noted the frustration that has built up among Armenians, especially the young, in pursuit of the Armenian cause. It also showed a number of elderly Armenians at a community centre with the commentary "the cause is a sacred one to these old Armenians, and it's one

their grandchildren are fighting for today". Showing an elderly woman, the commentator noted that she was eight years old when the Turks raped her sister and killed her parents and four brothers. He concluded that the Armenians say a million and a half of their people were slaughtered, and they want Turks to acknowledge the genocide. And they want back the homeland that was absorbed by neighboring countries after the war.

In the CTV coverage, reference to the political motivation was made by newscaster Lloyd Robertson at the top of the newscast:

Terrorists said they were out to avenge the mass slaughter of Armenians in 1915 and also called for the return of Armenian lands.

The network played the telephone interview with the perpetrators with captions for the audience. It also ran a segment on the motivation behind the attack containing film footage of dead Turkish diplomats, and of the Armenian exodus and 1915 massacre. The newscaster noted that many survived the atrocities committed in their homeland allegedly by the Turks and that the Turks vehemently deny the Armenian interpretation of events.

The CTV coverage of the political motivation contained interviews with two sources. One, an Canadian Armenian

suggested that, while he deplored the terrorism, it was clear that peaceful means, years of making speeches and writing letters haven't worked: "I don't agree with what they are doing, but it appears that what they are doing is working". The second interview was with a member of the Toronto Turkish community, who took issue with the Armenian interpretation of the events of 1915, arguing that Turks as well as Armenians perished during the period.

As mentioned above, the terrorists reaped a major publicity windfall for the Armenian cause in the March 12 edition of CBC's The Journal. The show, entitled "Armenian Terror: Violence in the Name of a Lost Homeland", preempted the beginning of what was to be the first of a special series on the Geneva Arms Talks. The feature, according to the show's co-host, was going to provide viewers with an exploration of the roots of the "forgotten genocide". The show provided an overview of the emotion surrounding the Armenian/Turkish dispute and the conflicting interpretations of history in the two communities.

The lead interview in the program was from Ankara, Turkey with Altimar Kilic, who was identified as a journalist and diplomat and personal friend of Ambassador

Kirca. Killic suggested that the Armenian version of the events of 1915 was a corruption of history, ~~in~~ that there was no massacre but a series of unfortunate incidents occurring during a war situation. He too, put forth the argument that many Turks died and were killed by Armenian terrorists at the time and that tragedies occurred on both sides. Killic articulated the Turkish position that the Turks will not apologize for any act that they have not committed, and would never cede any territory.

The most vivid and controversial part of the show occurred about eight minutes into it. This was a three minute segment called "the Painful Legacy: the History Behind the Conflict", containing excerpts of a movie called "The Forgotten Genocide" produced by the Armenian Assembly of America and narrated by American television star of Armenian extraction Mike Connors. Viewers were informed at the outset by the The Journal's host that the film had been passionately written from the Armenian point of view.

The Armenian film contained vivid film footage and photographs of the "massacre" and deportation of the Armenians in 1915, including photos of the bodies of Armenians hanging in the streets, floating in rivers and lined up on the road and Western newspaper headlines of the

day announcing the deaths of thousands of Armenians.

According to the film's narrator; "beginning on April 24, 1915, on secret government orders, Armenians were arrested and removed from their homes on the pretext that they were being moved to a non-military zone. Along the way they were slaughtered". He went on to aver that the world powers knew what was happening but that they let the massacre run its course and that the cover-up of the facts continues.

The film also contained interviews with elderly Armenians offering eyewitness accounts of rape, torture and killing of family members and friends during the era. It also presented American Armenian academics proffering the Armenian version of the history, of the era.

Following the film, the Journal broadcast an interview with Aram Aivazian, a 73 year old Armenian living in Burlington, Ontario, who was 4 years old when the genocide started. Aivizian recounted his personal experience, claiming to have been put into a German missionary orphanage by his mother to save him from the killing. He stated that, if the present Turkish government is not responsible for the genocide, it should return to the owners the lands that were taken. Concerning the Embassy seizure, Aivizian suggested that he was sorry, but that the fact must be understood by

the Canadian people that these actions are forced on the Armenians, who "have used peaceful means for seventy years in defense of legitimate, well-established rights and freedoms". He disagreed with the characterization of the event as terrorism, suggesting rather that it was a case of freedom fighting, the same kind of fight for a country that the U.S. and Israel had engaged in. The interview concluded with Aviziam making a David and Goliath analogy, arguing that Armenians must use the sling since they have tried all other peaceful means.

The final segment of the Journal was a dialogue between representatives of the Armenian and Turkish communities in Toronto on the question of the existence of a basis for compromise between the two sides. Both representatives articulated the perspectives of their own communities on the events of 1915, with the Armenian representative accusing the spokesman from the Turkish community of "Zundelism". Viewers were left with the very clear impression from the discussions that it was a dialogue de sourd and that the Armenian grievance has little prospect of finding a peaceful solution.

Editorial Coverage

Editorial coverage of the Embassy siege in the ten papers comprised 17 editorials and two cartoons and encompassed 743 column inches of editorial space. All of the newspapers ran at least one editorial on the incident. Eight ran an editorial in conjunction with their March 13 coverage. Three newspapers, the Citizen, Le Droit and the Chronicle-Herald accounted for over 55 percent of the editorial coverage of the incident. The most substantial editorial coverage was provided by the Chronicle-Herald, which may be attributed, in part, to the fact that the slain security guard, Claude Brunelle, was a Nova Scotian.

Editorial Themes

Table 6.11 shows the base and secondary themes of the 17 editorials as assigned by the panel of judges.¹⁵ Overall, there were 5 base themes in the editorial coverage and 9 secondary themes. As with news themes, the most prominent base theme was Security. This was the principal issue addressed in 9 of the editorials and an important secondary theme in 4 others. Four editorials focused on the illegitimacy/futility of terrorism and three others had this as a prominent secondary theme. The attitudes of members of the Armenian community in Canada was a base theme

TABLE 6.11
EDITORIAL THEMES: EMBASSY SEIZURE

<u>Themes</u>	<u>Base Theme</u>	<u>Secondary Theme</u>
Security	9	3
Futility/Illegitimacy of Armenian Terrorism	4	3
Armenian Community Support For Terrorism	2	2
Canada as a Terrorist Target	1	9
The Need to Confront Terrorism	1	*
Turkey Should Concede its History	*	3
Nationalism as a Dangerous Force	*	1
Dealing Firmly with the Perpetrators	*	5
Innocent Victims of Terrorism	*	2
The Historical Grievance of the Armenians	*	1

in two editorials and an important secondary theme in two others. By far the most prominent secondary theme in the 17 editorials was Canada as a terrorist target. This theme occurred in 9 editorials as a secondary theme and in one other as a base theme.

The Security Issue

There was a clear consensus on the editorial pages that the Embassy seizure once again demonstrated Canada's lack of preparation and, some editors insinuated, lack of resolve, in the face of a growing terrorist threat. Several commentators saw the continuing inadequacy of security as presenting an open invitation to terrorist groups from around the world to focus their attention on Canada, and particularly on Ottawa.

For example, the Citizen worried aloud about Canada being considered a soft target by every species of "cowardly madman". The Regina Leader-Post echoed this feeling, calling Ottawa the "happy hunting ground for Armenian terrorists". The Leader-Post saw a growing interest in Canada on the part of terrorists, attributing it to the fact that Europe, "the favorite theatre for assorted purveyors of violence for the last decade", has become less hospitable to terrorist operations as a result of tighter security and increasing cooperation among governments. The paper went on to suggest

that Europe is no place for the amateur terrorist and that the less sophisticated may look for easier marks and, in seeking the line of least resistance, find Canada to be a land of opportunity. Le Droit on its editorial page, proffered a similar viewpoint:

Le repetition de pareilles attaques toujours plus "efficaces" indique clairement que ces groupes de l'ombre ont identifie Ottawa comme une "fenetre de vulnerabilite" grande ouverte puisqu'ils se sont encore sentis capables d'intervenir violemment dans la capitale sans trop de risque d'echec.

The seriousness of the Federal government's commitment to dealing with terrorism was questioned by a Citizen editorial evocatively titled "Ottawa Dithers While Terror Burns". The thrust of this editorial was that, in laying only one charge of first-degree murder against the three Armenians involved in the incident when a wide variety of criminal infractions had occurred, Ottawa was sending the wrong signals to other potential attackers about Canada's determination to eradicate terrorism on its soil.

On the specific issue of embassy security, the Citizen editorial questioned both the adequacy of the RCMP protection accorded the embassy, i.e. the sufficiency of its hourly patrol, and that of the training of the private security guards providing embassy protection. It took particular

issue with the comment of Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark that "there is no defense against these types of attacks":

There is no absolute defense. But surely there is common sense enough in government to recognize which diplomatic missions are most vulnerable and to organize tailored to measure deterrence. After two earlier episodes and repeated threats, it did not take genius to imagine the Turkish embassy as a prime target.

The Gazette, in an editorial entitled "Better Security is Needed", also pointed to the "appalling" ease with which Armenian extremists took over the embassy. It, too, noted that this is the third time in three years that the Canadian government's security measures for Turkish diplomats had failed. Referring to the presence of the single private security guard, the Gazette suggested that:

It should not require 20-20 hindsight to realize such an arrangement was totally inadequate. It may not be possible to fully protect diplomats on public streets, but the embassy itself should have been safeguarded better.

This theme was also highlighted in the Sun editorial, "Terror in Ottawa", which noted that prudence should have dictated strong protection for the embassy in light of previous attacks. Similarly, Le Droit questioned how the embassy could have been attacked when it was widely known that the attention of Armenian terrorists is "focused constantly on Ottawa". According to Le Droit "...it has

happened before and we knew because of the patient persistence of Armenian terrorists that it would likely happen again".

In the context of their focus on the security issue, several editorials questioned whether, in the face of recent events, it was time to establish a special tactical force to deal with incidents such as the embassy siege. The Citizen raised this question in its "Ottawa Dithers" editorial, noting that such a force was set up for the 1981 Montebello summit, although disbanded shortly afterward.

The issue of a special tactical squad was the principal focus of a March 13 editorial in the Star entitled "The Siege in Ottawa", which suggested that Canadian authorities are not equipped to stop terrorists in the absence of an "elite force of commandos to strike at terrorists before they can do their worst and trained to rescue hostages". The Star, coming back to this theme a few days later in its March 15th editorial entitled "When Terrorists Strike", asked whether the embassy incident demonstrated the need for a crack commando force to take charge in the event that a hostage-taking incident presents an immediate risk of a killing spree. The paper suggested that, had the incident deteriorated instead of ending in a negotiated surrender, conventional police at the

scene would have lacked the split second timing and tactics for an effective assault and rescue operation.

The Futility and Illegitimacy of Armenian Terrorism.

The Citizen, in an editorial entitled "Tragedy on Wurttenberg Street", typified the perspective of editors on this issue:

Even less does historic anger give any group, sect, religion or nationality the right to take the law into its own hands to take hostages, to kill, to frighten, to terrorize... Terrorism tolerated is chaos respected. It's the end of the state of law and order that enables Armenians to live in Canada in freedom and acceptance.

In an editorial entitled "Nationalistic Futility", the Gazette noted that "the saddest part of the Armenian attack on the Turkish embassy in Ottawa is its futility. Three members of the Armenian revolutionary Army killed a man for nothing." According to the Gazette editorialist:

Their chances of reconstituting an Armenian state are near absolute zero, and murder today is hardly a way to prod the Turkish government into a confession of mass murder of Armenians in 1915. In any case it is not the terrorists who have been harmed, nor is the present government responsible for the horrors of 70 years ago.

Focusing in on one of the principal stated goals of Armenian terrorism, the return of historic lands and the

establishment of an independent state of Armenia, the Gazette raised the question:

Where do these fanatics propose to place their new Armenia? In Turkey, yes. But do they propose to seize ancestral land from the Soviet Union as well? Do they favour nationhood for other peoples of the region--for Kurds say, or Azerbaijanis? What would they do about the present inhabitants: expel the Turks as the Turks once expelled them... It is difficult to think of a better trigger for a major war. Unfortunately we hear more of killing than plans.

The Gazette editorial concluded by placing Armenian demands in the context of nationalism, noting that intolerance shading too easily into hatred, remains the obverse side of nationalism's virtues. Looking again at the demand for a homeland, the paper stated:

Our planet is too small to allow all peoples to have their own countries. There are far more who do not than who do. Like most human arrangements, that of nations is not fair but it is true, and Armenians like others will have to live with it.

The Calgary Herald put the theme bluntly in its editorial "Terrorism Intolerable" which was directed at statements by Katchig Hagopian, President of the Armenian National Committee of Canada, that the Embassy incident was a means of attracting attention to the Armenian cause:

For the third time in as many years, terrorists wearing the cloak of Armenian nationalism have resorted to violence in Canada's capital city. Such behavior is not one whit more tolerable, not a particle less despicable than it was the first time.

To Hagopian's assertion it responded:

Indeed it is not the kind of attention that Hagopian should want. Any cause is desecrated by the use of such methods to advance it. Anger and contempt are the natural reactions of Canadians.

The Chronicle-Herald, in an editorial entitled "Terror in Ottawa", also focused on this theme:

The incident only magnifies the old adage that he who rules by terror does grievous wrong. To Canadian minds there is nothing that can be done to redress the history that brought Armenian terrorist to our soil to engage in murder and mayhem.

Support For Terrorism in the Armenian Community

Several editorials reacted to expressions of support or sympathy for the attackers by elements of the Armenian community in Canada. The Chronicle-Herald, in an strongly worded editorial entitled "For the Love of Tolerance", singled out widely reported statements by Montreal lawyer Chahe Phillipe Arslanian, whom it identified as a consulting lawyer for two of the three men charged in the incident, that the attack was a political rather than a criminal act. It also attacked statements by two Montreal Armenians, Hasnik Kanadjian and Kezrok Koussaogli, acquaintances of the accused, who expressed their pleasure and pride over the attack.¹⁶ Likening their statements to hate propaganda, the Chronicle-Herald stated:

There are some opinions that our society should always despise and vigorously reject if it is to maintain its heritage of freedom and tolerance. Two of them were to be heard in this country this week in the aftermath of the slaying of security Guard Claude Brunelle in Tuesday's terrorist attack on the Turkish Embassy in Ottawa... We have a public duty not to leave unchallenged the statements of Mr. Arslanian and the two Montreal residents interviewed by the Canadian Press who are not accused of any crime before the law. Their remarks betray an absolute ignorance of, or total disregard for the nature of the society and the culture of which they have chosen to be a part. It is dangerous, seditious ignorance, for the values they espouse have the effect of inciting further violence. Their words are in any meaningful sense hate propaganda.

Referring to Mr. Arslanian's remarks in particular, the paper argued:

In choosing an out of court forum to expound the vicious theory that a political motive can exonerate what would otherwise be a criminal act--even one so grave as the taking of an innocent young man's life--Mr. Arslanian has betrayed both the rule and the sense of our law. He has given the colour of legal opinion to an argument in favour of lawlessness. And he has thereby encouraged every violent fanatic to follow a deranged conscience without any regard for innocent life.

Unlike Mr. Arslanian's theory, the "pride" expressed by the two Montreal residents makes no attempt at posturing at law. It is however chilling evidence that we have accepted people to live among us without imparting to them the faintest understanding of or sympathy for what we are and what they pledged to be also. And that is a terrible tragedy.

For those who don't let them think of why they came to Canada, and why it was worth coming to. Let them think of why people flee to this land and not from it. If they can think at all clearly, it will occur to them that one answer is that it is a place where neither politics, nor ethnic pride, nor ancient grudges are above the law. It is a place where no cause, no

faction, no impassioned conscience is entitled to do violence to another. It is a land where the individuals right to live in peace is absolute and where personal freedom is unsurpassed... And if someday Canada were to become something else, let them ponder this: where else would their children flee.

The Globe and Mail in its editorial "Death Be Not Proud", also directed its attention to the statements by Kanadjian and Koussaogli. According to the Globe "some people are happy and proud, surprised and proud. For them, life is better because of the events in Ottawa this week". It contrasted their pleasure with a sympathetic description of Claude Brunelle and of the sorrowful reaction of his bereaved parents.

Terrorism In Canada

A prominent subtheme on the editorial pages was the feeling that Canada was not party to this quarrel and should not be the battleground for the resolution of historic Armenian grievances. According to the Chronicle-Herald:

A young Canadian man, a Nova Scotian, has been the innocent victim of a heinous crime, from a far away time, half a world away. It is more than 70 years since that act against humanity, and time alone makes it inappropriate to use Canada as a battleground. There may indeed be sympathy for the lost cause of Armenia, but none whatsoever for those who would disturb the peace of this country for it.

Similarly, the Gazette stated: "Canadians have no patience with terrorism, especially when it springs from imported quarrels". The Star editorialized, "Canadians will sadly reflect that one of our own, once again, has been killed in someone else's quarrel". The Citizen saw the attack as an affront to the hospitality that Canada offers to groups such as the Armenians:

Armenians may have legitimate grievances with the Turkish government but so do many other minorities throughout the world have grievances. That does not give them any right to act on these in the territory of another country, especially one such as Canada which welcomes distressed nationalities more generously than most countries.

While most of the editorials were concerned with security issues and with the fact that Canada was becoming a battleground in the Armenian Turkish struggle, one paper in particular took issue with the "intransigent" manner in which Turkey had dealt with the Armenian grievance. In its editorial "The Terrorist Route", the Globe and Mail, while decrying the use of terrorism, took on the Turkish position equating it with that of Ernst Zundel.

But while few Canadian Armenians emulate the terrorists' methods, many share their fury over the fate suffered by their parents and grandparents at the hands of the Turks during the First world War. The Armenians were the victims of this century's first mass murder. Pan Turkish Nationalists liquidated many hundreds of thousands of them in 1915.

The ultimate humiliation proved to be Turkey's sustained attempt to minimize the dimensions of the Armenian disaster, to blame the Armenians for having provoked it and to insist that what happened on the Anatolian plains was not a planned genocide. Unlike Germany, Turkey has never accepted any responsibility for its war crimes and has never compensated survivors.

Turkey's present leaders bear no blame for what the Young Turks did 70 years ago but they do themselves no honour by their Zundel-style revisionism.

Editorial Attitudes

Over and above specific editorial themes, the 17 editorials and the two editorial cartoons were explicitly examined for their attitudes towards the players and issues involved in the incident.

Armenian terrorists received strongly negative or unflattering characterizations in the editorial pages. They were variously referred to as "fanatics", "a desperate handful", "extremists", "a group crazed by the desire to rewrite history", "cowardly assassins" and "dangerous and well trained zealots". Perhaps the most damning portrayal of them was an editorial cartoon in the Free Press entitled "The Armenian Revolutionary Army on Parade" which depicted them as a line of roaches.

Few of the editorials extended their discussion of Armenian terrorism to the phenomenon of terrorism in general. One that did, the Citizen, referred to terrorists as "international desperados". It suggested that "terrorists know no boundaries, no laws, no sense of right and wrong, except their own grievances real or imagined, old or new, justified or not". On the subject of terrorism, the Citizen opined: "Terrorism is insidious, frightening, illegal, unethical, untenable, and a scourge of the twentieth century".

While there was wholesale condemnation in the editorial pages of the use of terrorism and of those who use terrorism to redress historical Armenian grievances, this did not extend to Armenians in general or to their cause. As in the Altikat coverage, editorials tended to disassociate Armenian Canadians from the terrorism and to put them in a positive light. According to a Citizen editorial "The great majority of Armenian Canadians are peace loving citizens. They keep their people's understandable grief at the 1915 massacre as a deep but private wound". The Globe and Mail noted: "Though one of Canada's smaller ethnic minorities, the Armenians have been one of the most industrious". The Chronicle-Herald pointed to their "rich liturgical and Christian literary tradition" and "their ancient and advanced culture".

This favourable attitude also extended to the Armenian cause. There was little sympathy in the editorial pages for the Turkish position. In describing the events of 1915, evocative language such as the "final solution" (The Gazette) was used. The Calgary Herald referred to the massacre of Armenians during this era as a "heinous crime", while the Chronicle-Herald referred to the "holocaust of 1915" and called it a sorry chapter in the history of that part of the world. The Globe and Mail referred to "this century's first mass murder" and the Star equated it with the Jewish and Kampuchean genocides and called it a tragedy of history. In discussing the Turkish refusal to acknowledge historical responsibility, the Globe and Mail stated that "Past injustices must be acknowledged not forgotten or they will continue to cast a shadow over the present generation"

Editorial Prescription

Few of the editorials on the embassy siege offered much in the way of prescription for dealing with such events. As the principal theme of the majority of editorials was security, most of the solutions were viewed in this context. Apart from suggestions that embassy security be put in the hands of well trained professionals, presumably the RCMP, many (five of the ten papers) called for government to

urgently review its security against terrorism. As noted above, a few of these editorials called for the establishment of a specially trained commando force to deal with terrorist hostage takings.

Two papers, the Chronicle-Herald and the Free Press, gave some explicit hints concerning the kinds of security measures that they thought Canada should have. According to the Chronicle-Herald "We must make our preparations to make the work of terrorists of any cause too costly to dare". The Free Press editorialized "We should create security measures so rigorous that they make any future attempt seem like a suicide mission".

Several papers, however, also put the onus on Turkey to make conciliatory gestures to the Armenians. According to the Globe and Mail:

Ankara should encourage the formation of a panel of Turkish, Armenian and neutral historians to review the events in question. As a display of Academic freedom, such scholarship would bolster Turkey's doubtful claim to be a Western democracy. As a belated act of atonement, it would help heal the wounds that fester in the Armenian psyche.... If Turkey were finally to open its historical archives, its shift from cover up to cooperation would lessen the sympathy which some expatriate Armenians now have for the terrorists and thereby leave them isolated and vulnerable.

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The Gazette suggested that "Turkey should concede its history and set a precedent that all nations need". Arguing that Turkey can do much more than it has to make the lives of living Armenians easier, the Gazette noted that governments are not much given to apologizing. According to the paper: "They prefer making excuses. Just look at Canada's struggle to apologize to Japanese Canadians for their treatment during World War II."

Summary: Substantive Analysis

The substantive analysis of the media coverage of the embassy siege provides a further indication of the character of the coverage given to terrorism by the Canadian media, particularly as it relates to the news angles employed and the perspectives conveyed. As in the coverage of the two shootings analysed in Chapter 5, the predominant focus of both press and network news coverage of the incident was security. Security was also the dominant headline and first page theme, far surpassing any other news angle in terms of its frequency of occurrence.

With respect to visual themes the emphasis, as in the Altikat and Gungor coverage, was on the human drama and personal tragedy elements of the event. By far the most frequent and prominent theme in the photo coverage of the

embassy siege was Victim. This was also a prominent visual theme in the network news coverage of the event, following security images.

This analysis also provides further evidence that the Canadian media do not typically glamorize terrorists and terrorist activities. Again the referents used in the news coverage to describe the terrorists and their actions were largely unfavourable or strongly unfavourable. In contrast the victims, particularly the slain security guard, were portrayed in an extremely positive and sympathetic light.

Again, as in the previous Chapter, it is interesting to note the extent to which the attack brought media focus to bear on Armenian community spokesmen. This was particularly true of network news coverage. In effect, the takeover of the embassy resulted in a platform being given to representatives of legitimate Armenian organizations in this country to air their grievances and to bring their cause and demands to public attention.

While media depiction of the political motivation behind the event again tended to focus on the revenge factor, the particular nature of the event and the presence of the media at the scene provided the terrorists with the opportunity to

articulate their objectives and demands directly to the Canadian public through live television interviews which were also widely quoted in the press. The attack also generated a publicity coup for the Armenian terrorists in the form of the CBC Journal's airing of a segment of a graphic and emotional Armenian film on the events of 1915. This film was probably the first exposure that most Canadians had to some of the scenes of horror and killings, and undoubtedly had a more substantial impact on the viewer than the "balanced" interviews with both Turks and Armenians that the program broadcast.

The dominant concern in the editorial coverage of the event was security. The embassy siege further heightened concerns among Canada's opinion leaders about the apparent inability of the government and its security apparatus to provide adequate protection for both diplomats and citizens against terrorist attacks. There was a shared fear, in the editorials elicited by the siege, that continued inadequacies in security and the resultant vulnerability to terrorist attack would make this country attractive to terrorists. The concern for security was complemented by a revulsion with the use of terrorism. As in the Gungor and Altikat coverage, terrorism was viewed in the editorials as illegitimate and unjustifiable. This was particularly the case with respect

to its occurrence in Canada. Outrage that Canada would be chosen as a venue for foreign terrorist's operations ran through the majority of editorials.

Despite the condemnation of the use of terrorism and the clearly unflattering descriptions and depictions of Armenian terrorists in the editorial coverage, there was some indication that newspaper editors were being sensitized to the Armenian perspective on the events of 1915. Some papers, such as the Globe and Mail were quite overt and unequivocal in their condemnation of Turkey's "Zundel style revisionism". Others gave more subtle cues as to their position on the Armenian issue through the use of terms such as "final solution" to describe the Turkish activities of the period.

MEDIA COVERAGE AND THE ENSUING DEBATE

The attack on the Turkish Embassy focused attention on the role that the media played in the event. Before the five hour drama ended, the terrorist's demands had been carried, in many cases live, on radio and television across the country. Live footage of the positioning of police sharpshooters had been broadcast and television reports had

stated, incorrectly, that bomb experts were preparing to blow up the back of the embassy to get in.

One of the key problems that police officials arriving on the scene encountered immediately concerned telephone access to the ARA members inside the embassy. A Citizen article (Lindgren, 1985) noted that the police were one of the few players in the drama unable to contact the hostage takers by telephone. Police officials were confronted by a busy signal for over two hours while the calls went back and forth between reporters and the terrorists. The tie up of the phone lines forced police to use a bull horn to negotiate with the hostage takers. Telephone lines were finally cut at about 9:50 A.M. By that time, reporters from the Citizen alone had called the terrorists five times.

Not only did journalists tie up telephone lines during the early stages of the incident, but several engaged in some questionable interviews with the hostage takers. For example, during the morning coverage of the embassy siege by the CTV program Canada A.M., a reporter from BCTV in Vancouver called the embassy to talk to the terrorists. He asked the group for its demands, whether they were negotiating and what would happen if the Turkish government did not give in to their demands. A similar query was made

by a reporter from CBC radio news in Ottawa. Not only did the live broadcast of such calls provide a propaganda platform for the terrorists, but the question as to what the terrorists might do if their demands were not met could have added to the volatility of the incident.

Another controversy arose over reporters broadcasting police preparations and plans. In many cases, these were only speculations on the part of the journalists. For example, during the same Canada A.M. broadcast, a CTV reporter speculated on camera as to what police would likely do and announced that a SWAT team was in position. Throughout the morning, live film coverage of police positioning was broadcast by stations covering the event.

Perhaps the most controversial action by a member of the media were those of a CBC reporter on the scene. At one point, this reporter noted that police were hoping to arrange the removal of the injured Turkish Ambassador by using a green army truck for cover to move closer to him. The reporter, who was filmed holding a police band radio to monitor police transmissions, at one point informed viewers that the police had wired the back of the ~~embassy~~ with explosives and were planning to blow a hole in the wall and

enter through that means. This CBC reporter was later given an ACTRA award for his coverage of the incident.

Shortly after the event, some newspaper columnists began to closely examine some of the coverage given to the incident and the role of the media during it. Charles Lynch, a nationally syndicated columnist, wrote an article entitled "Terrorists Playing to the Media" in which he argued that terrorists are attracted to Canada not only because our security is so lax, but also because "our media is so vulnerable, so available". Recognizing the obvious attempt by Armenian terrorists to manipulate the media, Lynch suggested: "For them, the message was the thing and the way to get into the papers and on the air was to kill a guard, take some hostages and answer the phone when reporters called." He likened their technique to that used by Ernst Zundel to get the media to provide massive exposure to his version of history.

Lynch noted that the resultant coverage must have exceeded the wildest dreams of the Armenian terrorists. He criticized, in particular, the amount of coverage given to the Armenian cause, suggesting that such the publicity would be an inducement to further terrorism:

Terrorist acts can be committed anywhere, but nowhere else I think would there be such coverage of the terrorists' cause, the very thing that the terrorists are seeking to achieve.... If we arm ourselves to the teeth, guarding embassies and our own democratic institutions do we continue to report fully on the claims and demands of terrorists when they strike... It is the publication of the Armenian grievance that makes such terrorisms worthwhile.

Lynch also criticized the coverage for depicting the Turks and not the Armenians as the aggressors.

The Gazette carried an article by another columnist, Clair Balfour, entitled "Both sides manipulate the Media". Balfour argued that, based on his review of files in the Gazette library, Armenians have been getting increasing coverage, mostly for terrorist acts, and have also begun to sensitize some editorial writers and columnist to their point of view. Like Lynch, he pointed to the attraction that "bold, destructive premeditated violence" has for the media. He did note, however, that some in the media are becoming nervous about their role in passing on the messages or the propaganda that rides piggyback on the news of such events.

On the question of whether the media should cover such incidents, Balfour argued that a determined terrorist can always get headlines by simply using a more devastating tactic. Where the media have a responsibility, he suggested, is in ensuring that reporters, photographers and others

covering such stories are cool enough to do their jobs without endangering anyone's safety or inciting terrorists to additional violence.

Balfour dismissed concerns about the press tying up phone lines and disseminating tactical intelligence. On the first issue, he suggested that there is other sophisticated equipment that could have been used to make contact. With regard to the media reporting police plans, Balfour suggested that, if part of a terrorist plan is to exploit the media and monitor radio and television then a sophisticated police or government response should make use of radio and television to feed messages right back to those who are doing the monitoring.

Balfour also took issue with those who suggest that media overexposure of terrorism is a stimulus to further terrorism. His retort was that the reverse is more likely the case; that the lack of media reaction will produce a higher level of terrorism for those striving for new ways of getting attention. He also suggested that terrorists who use the media for propaganda will find the public revolted by the violence and killing.

The Ottawa Citizen also explored the media role in the incident in an article entitled "Do Journalists Aid the Terrorists". With respect to the actions of some members of the fourth estate at the scene of the incident, the paper quoted Bob Beaton, then President of the Radio Television News Directors Association of Canada, to the effect that some of the judgements exhibited by the media during the incident were questionable. According to Beaton, journalists were there to observe and report: "I don't think that it is our role to contribute to the situation by tying up phone lines and broadcasting the stationing of police officers."

The Citizen article also addressed the complex issue of the blatant desire for publicity, typical of most terrorist groups, and the ready acquiescence of the media. Joe Scanlon, a Journalism professor at Carleton University, took specific issue with the coverage given to the Armenians by the CBC show The Journal suggesting that it would never have devoted so much time to the Armenian grievance if the embassy hadn't been seized and one person killed. Scanlon suggested that the most journalists can do under these circumstances is to show some restraint in the amount of coverage devoted to the issue, as it is predefined by the terrorists, and to present both sides of every story.

The exploration of this question culminated in the April 1 edition of CBC's The Journal entitled "Terrorism and the Media". Noting the extensive publicity reaped by the Embassy siege and the subsequent threat, ostensibly by Armenian terrorists, to blow up the Toronto subway, the show posed the question to a panel of news editors and media critics whether, by giving large amounts of air time and column inches, are the media in fact playing into the hands of terrorists?

Several interesting issues were raised in the context of this program relating to the publicity value of terrorism and the ability of terrorists to crash their way onto the media agenda. The program noted that spokesmen from the Turkish and Armenian communities had discussed the Armenian genocide on its March 12 edition (which had included excerpts from the Armenian film) and the fact that it had never addressed this subject before. Later in the program, a spokesman from the Armenian community in Toronto and a member of the panel noted that he had been a representative of this community for a number of years and had never been successful in raising media interest in the Armenian grievance. In the few weeks after the embassy siege, however, he had appeared on national television three times.

Another testimony to the publicity value of terrorism was presented by CBC reporter Doug James in a special report to the The Journal. James contrasted the unsuccessful efforts of the Bahai to have their grievance brought to the public's attention through press releases and the like, which he notes no one pays any attention to, and the enormous publicity that accrues to groups who engage in terrorist acts. Suggesting that many groups now turn to violence to get their point across, James notes that so far the media have seemed only too willing to comply.

Despite the evidence presented with respect to terrorists manipulating the media, most of the journalist and news editors on the panel were vigorously defensive of the coverage given to the events of the previous three weeks, arguing that the media had no options with respect to the publicity they gave. Typical was the view of Globe and Mail editor Geoffrey Stephens, that the Embassy siege was a failure in security, not a failure in coverage.

SUMMARY

This Chapter looked at the media coverage of the siege of the Turkish Embassy in Ottawa by members of the Armenian Revolutionary Army in March of 1985. There is little doubt

that this event was designed to capture the interest and attention of the Canadian media. This is abundantly clear from the desire of the terrorists to deal with and through the media. By all measures they were successful in attracting the attention and recognition that they desired. The event was given enormous and prominent coverage by the press across the country. It also received high profile coverage on the major national network news programs. Apart from attention and recognition, there is also some subtle evidence that the media accorded the terrorist cause, if not the terrorists, some legitimacy. Inferences to this effect can be drawn from the number of Armenian community spokesmen and other Armenians quoted in the coverage, the broadcast of an Armenian propaganda film by one of the major networks and the perspectives evident in some of the editorial coverage.

The Embassy siege also raised some serious questions concerning the hows and whats of terrorist reporting by the media. There were some very questionable, and in some cases potentially inflammatory, activities on the part of news reporters and news organizations. This led to a debate within the media community and in the media over the role of the media in this incident and in terrorism in general. While many may view the debate as unsatisfactory, given what might be perceived as the knee-jerk defense of their conduct

by some journalists and news editors, this event sensitized both the public and the media community in Canada for the first time to some of the important issues and concerns related to media coverage of terrorist acts.

¹ As was the case in the Altikat and Gungor shootings, a significant amount of the press coverage (37 percent of all stories) came off the Canadian Press wire service.

² The median was again used to measure typical coverage so that the result would not be distorted by the large amount of coverage given to the event by a few papers such as the Citizen's 1900 column inches of news space.

³ The headline in the Vancouver Sun concerned a youth gang being linked to the killing of a Chinatown couple, whereas in the Free Press it concerned an increase in Winnipeg School taxes. The Herald headlined its March 13 edition with a story on the funeral of Soviet leader Chernecko.

⁴ This statement is based on the average news hole of 2200 inches in the ten papers.

⁶ Intercoder reliability for this procedure was 90 percent.

⁷ For almost two weeks after the embassy siege, a debate raged over whether Canadian security had been lax and whether Canada had been warned by Turkey to expect an attack by Armenian terrorists. External Affairs Minister Joe Clark initially told Parliament that no such warning was given. Later after a further examination of the allegation, he admitted that such a warning had been given.

⁸ This story was in fourth position on the CBC news and third place on the CTV news.

⁹ This was a story on the first page of the March 14 edition of the Globe and Mail entitled "Killing a Political Act: Lawyer Says".

¹⁰ Coders were shown videotapes of the network news coverage of the event and asked to list all the visual images in the related film coverage. These were then categorized by the

coders into themes. Coder reliability for the identification of visual themes was approximately 70 percent. For the category placement it was 75 percent. Both were deemed to be satisfactory.

11 One of the most frequent "security" images and one which was used as a back drop for CBC coverage of the incident was an artist's rendering of a Maple Leaf with a chain with a broken lock across it.

12 The "Victim" photos in this coverage contained two photos each of the victims of previous attacks Kani Gungor and Atilla Altikat.

13 There was 90 percent agreement on the direction and 75 percent on the intensity of the descriptors.

14 The pattern of one of the coders in particular is interesting to note. For this coder, references to Armenian or Syrian origins took on negative connotations with respect to the embassy attackers. This was not the case, however, with this person coding coverage of the Gungor and Altikat attacks.

15 There was almost 100 percent agreement on the category placement of news sources.

16 Reliability for editorial theme placement was approximately 75 percent.

17 CP coverage of the incident contained two controversial quotes by members of the Montreal Armenian community. One, Kezork Koussaogli, a former employer of two of the accused was quoted as saying he was surprised but proud when he learned what happened. Hasnik Kanadjian, a neighbor of the two, responded that he was happy and proud as a result of the embassy attack.

CONCLUSION

This thesis has attempted to evaluate terrorism as a form of political communication. This evaluation has been grounded on the premise that terrorism is a political resource; an activity that fits within the range of strategic options that politically active groups have at their disposal and thus a rationally explicable phenomenon. Terrorism, it has been argued, is employed as a means of gaining political leverage and influencing political behavior and political outcomes by political groups who consider themselves to be otherwise powerless or disenfranchised. The political objectives of such groups can range from a change of polity to a change of policy. Through the resort to terrorism, they can circumvent normal political processes and compensate for the lack of traditional political resources. Theoretically, terrorism provides such groups with a means of raising public consciousness, intimidating opponents and causing widespread social disorientation.

The potential of terrorism as a political resource is highly dependent on the media response it evokes. Terrorists, therefore, focus their actions on targets that symbolize their cause and which, therefore, provide a basis

for communicating a message to the general public. As a political phenomenon, terrorism is concerned with the manipulation of political symbols with a view to getting access to or controlling the media agenda. Through media attention the terrorists can hope to gain political visibility and status and to establish themselves as credible political forces.

The news media provide the critical linkage between the terrorist, his enemy, his victim and the public at large. Terrorists can achieve access to the public agenda via the media by creating events that take advantage of the media's reporting needs and structural biases. The importance of publicity to terrorist groups is evidenced by the fact that many have developed elaborate and sophisticated strategies to command media attention. Publicity considerations have frequently been found to determine the timing and location of terrorist acts, as well as the tactic used.

The dramatic increase in terrorist activity over the last decade has caused a great deal of attention to be focused on the so-called terrorism/media relationship. Many critics have gone so far as to lay the blame for the increase in contemporary terrorism at the doorstep of the media. Editors and reporters have been criticized for providing

terrorists with coverage out of all proportion to the importance of their activities, sensationalizing and glamourizing their exploits and turning terrorism coverage into mass entertainment by stripping the political and historical context from events. At the same time, reporters have been criticized for provoking violence through their actions on the scene, interfering with police attempts to manage incidents and disseminating information that endangers lives.

As noted previously, most of the criticisms that have been leveled at the media are based on anecdotal and fragmentary evidence. This is particularly the case in Canada. There have been few systematic and detailed assessments of media coverage of terrorism. Many of the criticisms do not lend themselves easily to empirical evaluation, as they really represent intractable philosophical differences. It is also particularly difficult to empirically verify some of the putative social and political impacts of media coverage of terrorism.

This thesis has placed the terrorism/media question in both a theoretical and empirical context. It has provided a systematic look at media coverage of terrorism in Canada by isolating some of the key and verifiable issues found in the

literature on terrorism and the media and offering a methodology for evaluating them. The primary foci of this study have been the ability of terrorists to influence the media agenda through their actions and the messages and images that are communicated by the media in the context of their coverage of terrorism.

One major hypothesis and four related hypotheses derived from the literature were offered to provide a basis for drawing inferences concerning the political resource value of terrorism. The principal hypothesis is:

o Terrorism provides political dissidents with access to the media's agenda and with public attention and recognition via the media.

Some doubts were expressed, however, about the ability of groups to politically legitimize themselves and their grievances through the publicity accorded terrorists' acts. These doubts were based largely on the suggestions in Chapter 2 concerning the nature of media coverage given terrorist incidents and the nature of the issues, values and perspectives emphasized. To derive some initial insights into this question, four other hypothesis were also tested. These were:

o The media emphasizes the dramatic and human interest aspects of the incident over its political and instrumental aspects.

- o Media coverage glamorizes terrorists and their activities by using favourable descriptions and references in the coverage.

- o Media coverage confines itself to expressing opinions that fit within the official orthodoxy by limiting commentary to government and police officials.

- o Media coverage of terrorism ignores the political context and objectives of terrorist incidents.

In addition to these issues, this study also looked at some of the controversy surrounding the reporting activities of various journalists during the siege at the Turkish embassy in Ottawa and the self-examination that took place within the media community in Canada over their role in the incident.

This thesis was based on a group of case studies of Armenian terrorism in Canada. The various Armenian groups are considered to be among the most active and deadly of contemporary terrorists. For over a decade, these groups have carried out an extensive and global campaign of terrorism, intimidation and armed propaganda in the name of self determination and justice. Their actions have explicit communications goals; to keep the Armenian issue on the international public agenda, to gain for it recognition and legitimacy, and to bring international pressure to bear on the resolution of their grievances. The strategy of Armenian terrorists has been largely one of

"propaganda of atrocity". Through attacks on symbolic targets around the world, such as Turkish diplomats and facilities; the Armenian terrorists attempt to achieve media access to communicate their message. Because of this, Armenian terrorists were felt to provide an excellent case for a political communications analysis of terrorism.

The evaluation of media coverage of Armenian terrorism in this country was based on both a structural and substantive content analysis. The former looked at the style of presentation and the specific news priority accorded the various incidents. The latter looked at the nature of the coverage, especially the themes that dominated the coverage and the issues raised and images conveyed. The data base on which the analysis was based was derived from ten major Canadian dailies deemed to be nationally and regionally representative and the two national television networks. In the latter case, both news transcripts and videotapes were used.

The analysis presented in this thesis has verified some of the conventional wisdom concerning media coverage of terrorism. However, it also calls into question several of the allegations presented in Chapter 2, as well as some of the previous research on news coverage of terrorism.

First and foremost, there can be little doubt, based on the evidence presented in Chapters 5 and 6, about the efficacy of terrorism as a strategy for influencing the news media's agenda. While the Gungor attack had a limited impact on the media's agenda, the other two incidents, the Altikat shooting and the takeover of the Turkish Embassy, were both the major national news items on the day on which they occurred and for some days after. Coverage of these two incidents dominated the first pages and news holes of newspapers across the country, as well as the nightly news programs of both national television networks. In Ottawa, Toronto and Montreal, the attacks pushed all other news off the first page.

While limited inferences can be made from the three case studies concerning the communications impact of various types of tactics, differences in the amount of coverage given to the two shootings and the hostage takeover appear to be noteworthy. Overall, these differences further confirm the previous findings of Kelly and Mitchell (1981) about the high media impact of dramatic incidents such as facility takeovers, hijackings and kidnappings in which the terrorists have the potential to dictate the media agenda and keep media attention riveted on their actions and their victims.

The evidence presented here also appears to confirm the hypothesis that media coverage of terrorism emphasizes the dramatic and human interest aspects of the incidents. The analysis of story and photo/visual themes and their placement clearly indicates that the news coverage tended to focus on the daringness of the attack, the carnage, the plight of the victim and the human tragedy. The photo/visual themes, in particular, drew attention to the human interest elements of the various incidents. An excellent example of this emphasis was the "death silhouette" photo showing the silhouette of the slain Altikat slumped against the wheel of his car. This picture was run on first pages across the country and was perhaps the major image that Canadians took away from this incident. Similarly, in the Embassy attack the largest number and most prominent images were those of the victims, Ambassador Kirca, his daughter and the slain security guard.

It should be noted, however, that while the human interest elements tended to dominate the coverage, they did not completely obscure other, perhaps more substantive, stories. For example, the assassination of Altikat generated a number of stories on the political history behind the attack. The extent to which television news coverage of the

Embassy siege contained visual elements related to the historical grievance of the Armenians is also noteworthy. Given that television news is the main source of images of terrorism for most people, (Schlesinger et. al., p.35) one can only imagine the impact on the viewer of the images of Turkish troops massacring Armenians in 1915, Armenians being lynched and rows of bodies of victims of the Turkish massacres which were presented in the newscasts.

Contrary to what was anticipated, the evidence presented in this study does not sustain allegations that the media glamourize terrorists and their exploits. Rather, the evidence is pretty unequivocal that, in the case of the Canadian media, the opposite occurs. Through the labelling of the terrorists and their actions, media coverage consistently stripped them of any pretense of legitimacy. References to the perpetrators of the attacks were judged to be largely unfavourable with many deemed to be strongly unfavourable. Based on the terminology employed in the coverage, the Canadian media viewed the Armenians involved as radicals, murderers and extremists. Editorial page commentary was even less complementary, calling them criminal animals, bloody minded marauders and savages. Similar verbiage was used to describe the attacks themselves, which were termed repulsive, odious crimes, barbaric, brutal and

senseless. Hence, the image the media tended to convey of the Armenians involved in the incidents was one of criminality and psychopathology and their activities were portrayed as being well beyond the bounds of legitimate political behavior.

With respect to the question of labelling, it is perhaps interesting to note that the Turkish diplomats who were the targets of the two shootings both tended to be viewed by the media in dispassionate terms. Mention of them usually focused on their occupation or official position at the embassy. This was not the case, however, with Claude Brunelle, the Canadian security guard killed in the Embassy takeover. Brunelle was portrayed in terms of his lovable human qualities as described by family and friends. This sympathetic depiction appears to be in line with the underlying and widespread editorial revulsion over innocent Canadians in their own land being the victims of foreign quarrels.

Another finding, which was again contrary to what was expected, was the extent to which the attacks brought media attention to bear on legitimate members of the Armenian community. While "establishment" or "official" sources dominated the coverage, as is typically the case, the

Canadian media did not confine itself completely to the official orthodoxy. Rather, they frequently looked to prominent members of the Armenian community in this country for commentary and views. In so doing, they provided a further forum for the airing of Armenian grievances and endowed the issue and the spokesmen with some additional legitimacy.

The prominence in the news coverage of spokesmen from the Canadian Armenian community is also relevant to the question of how the media treat the political rationale for the attacks. As was noted in Chapter 2, it has frequently been alleged, and in several cases empirically verified, that media coverage of terrorism tends to divorce incidents from their historical context. The evidence presented here, however, raises some questions about the generalizability of this assertion. The analysis of this aspect of the coverage suggests that the three attacks were successful in getting the essence of the historical grievance of the Armenians placed before the Canadian public. The publicity concerning the political motives and objectives behind the attacks may not always have been prominent. Moreover, in many cases, it was oblique and distorted (e.g. the predominant emphasis on the revenge theme). Nevertheless, several papers ran stories delving into the historical grievances and struggles of the

Armenians and the conflicting Turkish and Armenian interpretations of history.

The Turkish Embassy siege, in particular, provided a forum for the terrorists to have the Armenian cause placed directly before the Canadian public. Network news coverage provided live interviews with the terrorists, including statements of their demands. These demands were also given substantial play in the press coverage of the incident. Perhaps the major propaganda coup that Armenian terrorism has achieved in Canada, however, occurred during the 40 minute program that the CBC program The Journal ran as part of its March 12, 1985, coverage of the Embassy siege. A three minute segment of this program entitled The Painful Legacy: The History Behind the Conflict was taken from a film made and distributed by the Armenian Assembly of America. The film gave national exposure to vivid images depicting the Armenian interpretation of events of the 1915 period. It contained footage of the massacre and deportation of Armenians in 1915, bodies hanging from posts, lying in the streets and floating in rivers. It also contained eyewitness testimony by elderly Armenians of rape, torture and the killing of family members. It can be argued that the vivid images in this film were far more powerful than the attempts by The Journal to provide a balanced view through the airing

of interviews with supporters of the Turkish and Armenian positions and far outweighed the public impact of news articles on the events of the period.

Some of the most interesting aspects of the coverage were related to the editorial commentary. Particularly noteworthy are the common themes used and perspectives articulated by editors across the country concerning the events in question, the actors involved and their implications. The editorial commentary offered some interesting insights into the nature of the social and political consensus espoused by the media and its view of the morality of political violence. Apart from the pervasive concern on the editorial pages with security, the themes that were hammered home most consistently were the illegitimacy of terrorism and the unwillingness to see foreign quarrels carried out in Canada. Terrorism was generally viewed in the editorial pages as an enterprise lacking in moral justification, as "the tool of the coward", and as a futile and counterproductive exercise. Moreover, such behavior was seen as alien to our political culture, especially to the extent that it was carried out by foreigners. Armenian terrorists and their supporters and those with similar quarrels were told, in no uncertain terms, to take their violence and their hatred elsewhere.

CODING SHEETS: NEWS THEMES

INSTRUCTIONS: AFTER EACH STORY TITLE WRITE IN A FEW WORDS WHAT YOU THINK THE THEME OF THE STORY IS. For example, the theme of a story could be security; the condition of the victim, the political motivation for the attack, the police investigation, etc.

GUNGOR SHOOTINGLE DROIT

An Armenian group claims credit for the attack

Envoy in serious but stable condition

Concern at the Turkish Embassy

Security measures augmented

Peaceful demonstration on the Hill

TORONTO STAR

Man gets death threat: Ex Turkish Council in metro under protection

Wounded diplomat taken off hospital's critical list

VANCOUVER SUN

Turkish Diplomat shot in Ottawa

Shot Diplomat improving

Shot Turkish Diplomat still in Intensive Care

The question of legitimacy is, however, more problematic and certainly more difficult to measure. The available evidence offers equivocal and contradictory insights. On the one hand, the depictions of the terrorists, their activities in the news and editorial coverage was certainly directed at delegitimizing Armenian terrorism. On the other hand, while editors decried the immorality of these acts, they evinced a certain sympathy for the Armenian cause and news coverage brought media attention to bear on legitimate spokesmen from the Canadian Armenian community. Telling in this regard was the suggestion by Katchig Hagopian, President of the Canadian Armenian Association, to a Gazette reporter that the press would not be looking into the Armenian question if Altikat had not been killed. In a similar vein, a spokesman for the Armenian community in Toronto, who noted that he had been for several years striving to no avail to raise media interest in the Armenian grievance, ruefully pointed out that in the weeks after the Embassy siege he had appeared on national television three times. Hence, while the attacks may not have increased the political credibility and legitimacy of Armenian terrorists, they did result in the media according greater legitimacy to the Armenian cause and to spokesmen from traditional Armenian nationalist organizations.

The obvious conclusion that can be drawn from all of this is that the use of terrorism in this country by Armenian groups as a means of building public awareness and raising the issue salience of their grievance was, by and large, successful. Armenian terrorists were rewarded for their actions with extensive and prominent publicity and with a public airing in the media of their grievances. Their success in this regard raises some very serious, difficult and pressing questions for both news editors and public policy makers. Other thorny questions have also arisen as a result of some of the activities of reporters covering the Turkish embassy siege. In general, the media in Canada and elsewhere must come to terms with the fact that they are a central element in both terrorist tactics and strategy and that it is through them that political power and legitimacy is conferred on terrorist groups and causes. There can be little doubt that publicity is, as Margaret Thatcher (1985) has stated, "the oxygen" on which the terrorist depends. Publicity lends political potency to terrorism and can make it make an effective substitute for traditional politics.

APPENDIX I

Coding/Extracting Sheets: Press Coverage
Coding/Extracting Sheets: Network News
Coding Sheets: T.V. News Themes
Coding Sheets: Descriptors
Coding Sheets: Editorial Coverage

Extracting/Coding Sheet (Network News)

codes

1. record number

1. _____

2. Incident, name _____

2. _____

3. Incident, date _____

3. _____

4. Reporting day _____

4. _____

5. Network CBC / CTV

5. _____

6. Position of coverage in newscast _____

6. _____

7. Number of items in newscast _____

7. _____

8. Time devoted to item (seconds) _____

8. _____

9. Time devoted to all items (seconds) _____

9. _____

10. Adjectives or Nouns used to describe the incident:

10. _____

11. Adjectives or Nouns used to describe the terrorist(s) or the terrorist group involved in the incident:

11. _____

12. Discussion of cause or related social conditions Yes / No

12. _____

13. Focus of Coverage (victim, violence etc.)

13. _____

14. Sources interviewed or quoted

(i) _____

14(i) _____

(ii) _____

14(ii) _____

(iii) _____

14(iii) _____

15. Editorial Comment Yes / No

15. _____

16. Target of Editorial

16. _____

17. Prescription of editorial (quote)

17. _____

Extracting/Coding Sheet (Newspapers)

codes

	1. record number	1.	_____
2. Incident, name	_____	2.	_____
3. Incident, date of occurrence	_____	3.	_____
4. Reporting day	_____	4.	_____
5. Newspaper	_____	5.	_____
6. Number of Articles	_____	6.	_____
7. Author/Source of Articles			

(1)	_____	7(1)	_____
(2)	_____	7(2)	_____
(3)	_____	7(3)	_____
(4)	_____	7(4)	_____
(5)	_____	7(5)	_____

(articles 6 to 10 use a second sheet)

8. Volume per Article (column inches ²)			
(1)	_____	8(1)	_____
(2)	_____	8(2)	_____
(3)	_____	8(3)	_____
(4)	_____	8(4)	_____
(5)	_____	8(5)	_____

(articles 6 to 10 use a second sheet)

9. Location of Articles (section / page number)			
(1)	_____ / _____	9(1)	_____
(2)	_____ / _____	9(2)	_____
(3)	_____ / _____	9(3)	_____
(4)	_____ / _____	9(4)	_____
(5)	_____ / _____	9(5)	_____

(articles 6 to 10 use a second sheet)

(2)

extracting/coding sheet (newspapers)

10. Headline Article yes / no

10. _____

11. Location of Page 1 article(s)

11. _____

12. Volume News Hole (column inches²)

12. _____

13. Photographs, Source

- (a) _____
- (b) _____
- (c) _____
- (d) _____
- (e) _____

13(a) _____
13(b) _____
13(c) _____
13(d) _____
13(e) _____

14. Photographs, Volume (inches²)

- (a) _____
- (b) _____
- (c) _____
- (d) _____
- (e) _____

14(a) _____
14(b) _____
14(c) _____
14(d) _____
14(e) _____

15. Photographs, subject (X)

action / background / victim

- (a) _____
- (b) _____
- (c) _____
- (d) _____
- (e) _____

15(a) _____
15(b) _____
15(c) _____
15(d) _____
15(e) _____

16. Photographs, location (section / page)

(1)	_____ / _____	16(a)	_____
(2)	_____ / _____	16(b)	_____
(3)	_____ / _____	16(c)	_____
(4)	_____ / _____	16(d)	_____
(5)	_____ / _____	16(e)	_____

17. Location of Page 1 Photographs

17. _____

18. Adjectives or Words used to describe the terrorist group or the terrorist: 18. _____

19. Adjectives or Words used to describe the incident: 19. _____

20. Volume of coverage used to describe damage / destruction: (column inches²) 20. _____21. Volume of coverage of personalities involved (terrorists, victims, victims' families): (column inches²) 21. _____22. Volume of coverage devoted to cause or motivation: (column inches²) 22. _____

23. Sources interviewed or quoted in articles

- (i) _____ 23(i) _____
(ii) _____ 23(ii) _____
(iii) _____ 23(iii) _____
(iv) _____ 23(iv) _____
(v) _____ 23(v) _____

24. Editorial Comment, volume (column inches²) _____ 24. _____

25. Volume all editorials (column inches²) _____ 25. _____

26. Tone of editorial (describe, see vocabulary list) _____ 26. /

27. Editorial prescription (quote) _____ 27. _____

28. Target of editorial / relationship to incident _____ 28. _____

TELEVISION ANALYSIS

INSTRUCTIONS For each of the attached news stories describe briefly the primary and secondary themes.

1.) What is the major theme of this news story?

2.) What is the secondary theme, if any?

CODING SHEETS: NEWS THEMES

INSTRUCTIONS: AFTER EACH STORY TITLE WRITE IN A FEW WORDS WHAT YOU THINK THE THEME OF THE STORY IS. For example, the theme of a story could be security; the condition of the victim, the political motivation for the attack, the police investigation, etc.

GUNGOR SHOOTINGLE DROIT

An Armenian group claims credit for the attack
Envoy in serious but stable condition
Concern at the Turkish Embassy
Security measures augmented
Peaceful demonstration on the Hill

TORONTO STAR

Man gets death threat: Ex Turkish Council in metro under protection
Wounded diplomat taken off hospital's critical list

VANCOUVER SUN

Turkish Diplomat shot in Ottawa
Shot Diplomat improving
Shot Turkish Diplomat still in Intensive Care

WINNIPEG FREE PRESS

Group admits shooting

Turks fear Armenian Rally in Ottawa will be violent

GLOBE AND MAIL

Turkish Official shot in Ottawa: security increased at Embassy

Turkey's Ex Consul hires armed guard after death threat

Threat on life perplexing to Ex Consul

Turkish Diplomat in serious condition

Turks want to stop demonstration

RCMP sends embassy more guards

Armenians remember the massacre of 1915

THE GAZETTE

Armenian group says it ordered attack on Turk

LEADER POST

Turkish official shot in Ottawa reported in serious condition

Diplomat's condition serious

CALGARY HERALD

Armenian attack confounds police

Wounded diplomat stable

HALIFAX CHRONICLE HERALD

Turkish official shot in Ottawa

Armenian Secret Army responsible for shooting

Turkish Embassy official's condition serious but stable

Gungor still in hospital

Turkish Embassy wants Ottawa to stop Armenian Protest Rally

THE CITIZEN

Turkish diplomat survives terrorist murder attempt

Easier for them to go for low level staff

Secret Army kills to avenge genocide

Canada still considered a safe posting

Turkish community fearful after attack on diplomat

Armenian protest at Turkish Embassy on despite shooting

Man faces two charges

Diplomat's wife keeps lonely bedside vigil

Embassy's guard raised after attack

Shootings unconnected

No block on Armenian Protest in spite of official Turkish request

Flannigan demands action to control demonstrators

Why should Turkey be left unpunished

Was it genocide

Armenians massacred Turkish civilians

Armenian Rally closely guarded

ALTIKAT SHOOTING

LEADER POST

Turkish attache slain in Ottawa

Two suspects sought in attache's slaying

Terrorist said guided by Moscow

No developments in shooting

Turkish Ambassador says terrorists won't scare us

Terrorist could exploit Canada's shaky national security

Body flown home

HALIFAX CHRONICLE HERALD

Turkish military attache shot

Police getting nowhere in assassination probe

Turkey will not give up any territory

CALGARY HERALD

Ottawa terror: few leads in murder of Turkish attache

RCMP denies Turkish diplomats unprotected

Murder Of diplomat shocks U.S.

Hit squads likely: Turkey vows revenge

Condemn killing: widow appeals

Turks vow to stop Armenian terrorists

VANCOUVER SUN

Turkish Military attache assassinated in Ottawa

Police draw blank in Turk's murder

Another mark in Armenia's tragic ledger

Turkey set to combat terror

Hunt for killers fruitless

Turkish staff urged to use police escort

Political violence triggers tougher security moves on Parliament Hill

WINNIPEG FREE PRESS

Terrorist vanish after assassination

Revenge attack seventh this year

RCMP says envoy did not seek escort

U.S. voices shock at attache slaying

Armenian terrorist will be stopped: Turkish general

Assassins eluding police

Turkish ambassador firm

Attache's body to be sent home

Turkish leader vows to deny false claims

Turkish ambassador to Ottawa given tight security

Police guard advised for Turkish embassy staff

THE GAZETTE

Diplomat shot dead in Ottawa

Canadian envoys, embassies, target of Armenian terrorists

Fanatical terrorists groups are linked to 23 killings

Security is tight as envoy visits Schreyer

Attache's killing unjust: widow tells Canadians

World has no place for vendettas: UN Secretary General tells lawyers

Police draw blank on envoy's death

Their Lost Nation Haunts Montreal Armenians

GLOBE AND MAIL

Killed Turkish Attache in Ottawa Armenian Terrorist Group Claims

Armenians want justice for their dead

Armenians claimed on move to Cyprus

Turks set to counter attacks by terrorists

Turkish diplomat praises protection despite shooting

Chretien seeking new powers to combat terrorism in Canada

Security surrounds Turkish envoy

Turkish diplomat slain in Bulgaria

Another envoy killed

TORONTO STAR

This brutal senseless crime

All are victims in retribution survivors insist

RCMP denies protection lifted

PM vows to put end to blight of terrorism

Ottawa boosts security after assassination

Turkey vows to hit back at terrorists

Canada called an easy target for terrorists

Terrorists use courts for platform: expert

Turkish envoy's wife goes home protesting "unjust shooting"

Turkish bankers get extra protection

THE CITIZEN

Diplomat's widow condemns terrorists

Witnesses sought at murder site roadblock

Turkish officials heavily guarded

Diplomats pay respect to slain attache

Armenian youth lost patience

Time to abandon feuds: un chief

Experts agree you cannot make terrorism impossible

Turkish ambassador has bitter memories of terrorists

Turk attache slain

Threats worried shooting victim

Armenian community understands why attacks taking place

Ambassador condemns slaying

Despicable cowardly crime: PM

Terrorist carry out August threat

Armenian genocide and the Canadian connection

Slaying sparks worldwide hunt
Slain attache did not ask for protection
Police get many tips few leads in slaying
Turk hit squads not welcome

LE DROIT (TRANSLATIONS)

The commando strikes again
"A cowardly and despicable crime"
A tight net
Operation Red Leaf engages the entire police force
The Armenians have struck four times
We understand the feelings of the young who are behind these acts
"I have known for a long time"
Turk Everin wants to put and end to it.
The hunt for the terrorists continues
The population is assisting in the investigation.
Nothing new
Strict security measures
Another Turk has been assassinated
Mrs. Altikat exhorts Canada
The victim was without an escort

EMBASSY SEIZUREREGINA LEADER POST

Security at Ottawa embassies being reviewed after attack

Armenians have long-standing conflict with Turkey.

Slain guard called quiet, studious.

Policeman praised for helping diplomat.

Messages were relayed through media.

Attacked denounced.

Turkish officials question security.

"Turks haven't asked for more security recently" Clark says.

Turkey may have made request, Clark makes apology over security warning.

Embassy security talks revealed.

Men charged with murder of guard plead not guilty

HALIFAX CHRONICLE HERALD

Terrorist seize Turkish Embassy, one guard killed.

Slain guard a native of Nova Scotia.

Ottawa under fire in wake of embassy seizure.

Hostage taking unsuccessful by terrorists standards.

Embassy siege suspects plan not guilty pleas.

Clark admits Turk's request.

Agency role in siege questioned.

How far do we go to provide security from terrorism.

Clark denies Canada warned to up security.

Clark reverses stand on security request.

THE WINNIPEG FREE PRESS

Three charged in slaying of Turkish mission guard.

Canada warned Turks say.

Embassy security okayed Ottawa says.

"Hostage taking publicity imperils fair extortion trial," lawyer says.

Clark denies embassy made recent security request.

Clark retracts statement, Turks may have questioned security he admits.

Embassy warning not sent MP says.

RCMP acted on Turkey's request for tighter security, Clark says.

Not guilty pleas planned in embassy attack hearing.

THE GAZETTE

Terrorist storm Turkish Embassy.

Truck used in attack was rented in Chomedey.

Campaign of terror rooted in centuries of domination.

Years of frustration sparked attack.

Turkey had approved security at embassy.

Slain guard loved books and was quiet.

Ottawa got attack alert ten days ago.

Embassy raid workers were hard workers ex boss says.

Clark denies Turkey issued alert ten days before raid.

Embassy killers, bungling pros or amateurs.

Joe Clark apologizes.

Turks may have given warning, Clark admits.

Mounties beef up security

Ex justice minister will defend three charged with Embassy killing

VANCOUVER SUN

Turkish Embassy under police siege after envoy shot.

Three face murder charge in embassy attack.

Terrorists target Ottawa.

Aftermath, one dead, one a hero.

Assassination campaign; the legacy of a bitter feud.

1982 Review of embassies still studied.

Drug kingpin finances terrorists.

Ambassador recovering well.

Clark faces house over security lapse.

Not guilty plea predicted.

GLOBE AND MAIL

Toronto courtroom is guarded closely in trial's first day

Security gap cited in terrorist's raid.

Ottawa favorite hunting ground for Armenians.

At least sixty killed in decade of Armenian terrorist attacks.

Turkey denounces attack on embassy.

Unlikely setting for terrorism now feared as site of violence.

Guard a quiet, studious neighbor.

Embassy security revised before attack Neilsen says

Killings a political act lawyer says.

Drugs finance terrorism.

Embassy guard called poorly paid and trained.

Neighbors of accused are shocked but proud.

Stories of attack are damaging to trial lawyers tell court.

Security complaints by Turkish officials revealed by Clark.

CSIS knew of terrorist's threat, Liberal says.

PCs faulted over embassy siege.

Envoy from Turkey reported on the mend.

Security statement an error, Clark says.

Three charged in embassy siege plead not guilty.

No warning came of increased threat by Turkey.

Security at high risk embassies tightened abroad.

TORONTO STAR

Three to face murder charge in Ottawa embassy siege.

Security gap allowed attack Ottawa says.

Turkey call in our envoy to protest attack.

Armenian terror a bid to avenge genocide of 1915.

Canada has no elite unit to handle terrorist acts.

Metro Turks Armenians debate embassy attack.

Three groups have killed Turks around the world.

Attack on embassy too easy, Turner says.

Canada was warned Turkey says.

Officer the hero of Turkish Embassy siege.

Montreal Armenians voice shock, pride at attack.

Envoy recovering after surgery.

Drug kingpin helps finance Armenian attacks, expert says.

Clark admits Turks may have warned Ottawa.

The lost cause of Armenian terrorism.

Were they professionals or just amateurs.

Are guards cannon fodder for terrorists.

Allegations low blow company says.

Three to plead not guilty in embassy attack.

THE CITIZEN

Murder charges laid In embassy siege.

Security measures urged in review never implemented.

Officer risked life to save envoy.

Guard shot by terrorist just doing duty.

Guards say inadequate training, long shifts make them vulnerable.

Veteran diplomat took threat of terrorism in his stride.

I was warned to keep back by two officers armed with rifles.

Gunshots signaled start of siege.

Terrorist group claims 20 killings.

Turkish community condemns attack.

5 of/de 5

MICRO

Government inaction cited on embassy siege.

Guard broke procedure: RCMP.

Turkish ambassador progressing well.

Soviets fear security inadequate at their embassy.

RCMP told embassy to expect trouble.

Hostage negotiator a tough cop known for delivering results.

Error made on security says Clark.

Guards dispute RCMP claim.

Did journalist aid the terrorists.

Envoy security unit in U.K. walks softly and carries a big stick.

Clark expected to answer charges warning on terrorism ignored.

Turkey sought more security, Clark admits.

Hard liner on terrorism to defend Armenians charged in embassy siege.

LE DROIT

Ottawa admits a gap in security.

The progression of events.

The three terrorists are indicted for murder.

I all of a sudden feared the worst confides the victim's mother.

Everything started in 1915.

The third attempt in Ottawa in three years

En lieu sur grâce un policier.

Paix et chaleur pres de l ambassade.

Un coup de feu tire par mégarde.

Kirca est un diplomate en vue.

The ARA struck for the first time in 1983.

Turkey denounces the attack.

Ottawa essuie les reproches de la Turquie.

Court date set for May 20.

Judge Flannigan pays homage to agent Brunelle.

Surprised but proud.

Kirca se remet.

Turkey was satisfied: Neilsen.

The opposition accuses Ottawa of negligence.

Turkey has asked for nothing since mid February, Clark.

Turkey should have warned Canada Clark says.

Turkey manifested its fears on two occasions: Clark.

CALGARY HERALD

Three charged with murder after siege

Worldwide attacks are revenge on Turkey.

Ottawa dangerous for Turks

Survivors see more violence.

Terrorist rage against centuries of tyranny.

Ottawa warned of attack.

Clark contradicts claims by Turkey

Terrorists playing to media.

Embassy security comes under fire.

Security request may have been bungled.

RCMP quick on response

DESCRIPTORS OF INCIDENT THE PERPETRATORS
AND THE VICTIM

INSTRUCTIONS: After each descriptor place a "1" if you think that it implies a strongly sympathetic or favourable reference, a "2" if it is a favourable or sympathetic reference, a "3" if the reference is neutral, a "4" if it is unsympathetic or unfavourable and a "5" if it is strongly unsympathetic or unfavourable.

GUNGOR

PERPETRATORS

Secretive terrorist group

"Commando"

"Armenian anarchist"

Marxist terrorist group.

ASALA

Army for the liberation of Armenia

Gunmen

Armenian terrorists

Secret terrorist organization

Liberation army members

Armenian group

Armenian extremists

Savages

INCIDENT

Attack

Terrorist murder attempt

Assassination attempt

Terrorist attack

Shooting attempt

Wounding

"Vicious and cowardly act"

Terrorist act

Attempted assassination

Shooting attack

Gunned down

Shooting

Ambush

"Despicable act of violence"

"Sickening and disgusting"

Barbaric attack

VICTIM

Wounded diplomat

Turkish diplomat

Commercial counsellor

50 year old father of two

50 year old commercial counsellor

50 year old Turkish Embassy commercial counsellor

882
Fourth ranking diplomat at the embassy

Fourth ranking official

Envoy

55 year old diplomat

Turkish Embassy official

Turkish commercial attache

Diplomat

Married with two teenage girls

One of embassy staff.

Fifty year old

ALTIKAT KILLING

PERPETRATORS.

Justice commandos against Armenian genocide

Suspected Armenian terrorists

Armenian terrorists

JCAG

Well trained

Gunmen

Murderers

Expert killers

Killers

Armenian militants

Terrorists

Armenian extremists

Criminal animals

Armenian guard

Cold blooded killers

Murderous gang

Murderers and maimers

INCIDENT

Attack

"Very well planned"

"barbaric"

Fatal shooting

Well planned and executed operation

Slaying

Shooting

Assassination

Murder

Lightening quick assassination

"Brutal and senseless"

"Callous, cowardly and ignominious"

Gunning down

Killing

Shooting death

"Ignoble act"

"Brutal murder"

"Cowardly crime"

"Barbaric and senseless murder"

"Ignominious and unjust shooting"

"Professionally done"

"Despicable and cowardly crime"

"Stain on humanity"

"Inhuman attack"

"Deplorable act"

"Cold blooded murder"

Heinous and horrible crime

Detestable invasion of a peaceful city and nation

Bloodthirsty crime

Fatal shooting

Senseless killing

Terrorist outrage

Odious crime

Tragic incident

VICTIM

Military attache

Turkish attache

Former Turkish air force pilot

Turkish diplomat

45 year old military attache

Married with a daughter and son

The latest victim

Military attache of Turkish embassy

Slain Turkish diplomat

Envoy

"Bright officer, nice gentlemen, destined to be a general"

45 year old father of two

TURKISH EMBASSY SEIZUREINCIDENT

Early morning occupation

Assault

Siege

Occupation

Commando attack

Hostage taking

Bloody strike

Four hour siege

One of Ottawa's greatest dramas

Embassy siege

Terrorist raid

Terrorist attack

Storming

Seizure

Bloody attack

Raid

Embassy attack

Dramatic siege

Four hour occupation

Armenian terrorist attack

Four hour hostage taking

Drama

Takeover

Early morning raid

Despicable act of terrorism, indeed cowardice

Bizarre and tragic event

Slaying

Foul and intolerable affront

Bloody assault

Tragic

Killing

Spectacular and odious aggression

PERPETRATORS

Armenian commando

Three Armenian extremists

Armenian Liberation Army

Hostage takers

Assailants

Armenian terrorists

Three Armenians in their twenties

Commando

Group of heavily armed Armenians

Three Canadians of Armenian origin

Two Montrealers and a Toronto man

Syrian born Canadian

Landed immigrant from Lebanon

Heavily armed terrorists

Three armed Armenian terrorists

Three men of Armenian descent

Armenian nationalists

Well armed

Three armed men

Direct, assured, business-like and in a hurry

Three Armenian terrorists

Gunmen armed with shotguns and revolvers

Well equipped and seemed to know what they were doing

Hard workers

Three men of Armenian extraction

Professionals who planned the assault in fine detail

Complete professionals

Very competent

Armed intruders

Armed group

Attackers

Radicals

Militants

Three heavily armed gunmen

Raiders

Fanatics

Cowardly assassins

Trio of killers

Extremists

THE VICTIMSTHE AMBASSADOR

58 year old ambassador

Ambassador

New ambassador

Veteran diplomat

Married with two teenage daughters

One of Turkey's top ten diplomats

Istanbul educated lawyer

Turkish envoy

Turkish ambassador

THE SECURITY GUARD

31 year old security guard

Man with seven years experience in security work

Security guard

Lone security guard

Studious, quiet

One of three children

Lover of books and classical music

Perfect gentleman

Exceptionally nice man

Reserved

Man with a pleasant disposition

Pinkerton guard

A Guard on contract to the federal government

31 year old unmarried employee of Pinkerton

Slain guard

Canadian guard

Considerate tenant

Educated

Very quiet, very nice

A real gentleman

Quiet, studious man from Antigonish Nova Scotia

Seven year veteran of security work

A native of Antigonish

Great lover of books

Private security guard

Quiet young man

One of three children

Excellent student

Regular ordinary person

Not athletic

Top of the class

Quiet fellow

Well liked

Had no enemies

A fine boy

A fairly quiet fellow and better than average student

Very cooperative

A completely apolitical Canadian who had nothing to do with it

A young Canadian security guard

A Canadian

One of our own

An educated man

Very serious student

Quiet and very serious boy

A son of Nova Scotia

A soft spoken studious young man

Nova Scotian

A young Canadian man

Innocent victim

Innocent young man

EDITORIALS

1.) Title of Editorial

2.) Who/What is the target of the Editorial?

3.) What is the major theme of the Editorial?

4.) What is the secondary theme, if any?

5. Does the Editorial take a national or international perspective?

6 Using the five point scale below rate the editorials on the following issues by placing an "X" under the number that corresponds to the editorial's attitude.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Favourable	Favourable	Neutral	Unfavourable	Strongly Unfavourable

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

The objective of Armenian terrorist

Terrorism in general

The Armenian cause

The position of Turkey on the Armenian issue

Armenians

Turks

The adequacy of Canadian security

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