

Governing Tomorrow's Terrorists Today: Counter-Radicalization, the Security Complex and Muslims in Contemporary Governmentality

by

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Abstract

In grappling with the terrorist threat, states, together with security agencies and governmental bodies rely upon neo-Orientalist constructions of Islam to detect symptoms of the 'known' terrorist that legitimate counter-radicalization policies. Drawing on a governmentality perspective, the thesis unpacks the genealogy of terrorism to elucidate how the terms 'radical' and 'radicalization' have both rendered operative the social construction of risk encircling violence. The thesis argues that the emerging practice of counter-radicalization as a technology of risk has resulted in a permanent state of insecurity. Consequently, in the alleged War on Terror, certain groups are protected and 'Others' subject to scrutiny and stigmatization, particularly Muslims. The thesis goes on to analyze the practice of counter-radicalization in the emerging War on Terror, arguing that its pre-emptive logic legitimates the managing of risks based on future threats. It is posited that a shift from a pre-emptive approach to *happening* or substantively-developed threats might eschew managing future risks.

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

CCCEPV	Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence
CSIS	Canadian Security Intelligence Service
CVEWG	Combating Violent Extremism Working Group
NCEIS	National Centre of Excellence for Islamic Studies
PSC	Public Safety Canada
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police

Chapter 1: Introduction

In the immediate aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre in America, the War on Terror rapidly became official policy. “Terrorism” has since become ubiquitous in Western political and academic discourse - one of the most researched topics in international relations for the past decade.¹ Even though there has been a vast amount of research output, there has been an increasing dissatisfaction amongst scholars with the quality of this research in terrorism studies.² Terrorism studies has been denigrated for its failure to develop an accepted definition of terrorism and an ensuing failure to develop rigorous theories and concepts.³ As a result, there has been substantial discrepancy among authoritative scholars about how to best approach “terrorism”.⁴ Despite the web of intricacies interwoven in terrorism discourse, counter-radicalization is a “soft power” approach that adheres to the pre-emptive logic of counter-terrorism. The language of Islamic terrorism and extremism is appropriated in counter-radicalization efforts that endeavours to ebb radical Islamic ideology. In contrast to soft power, “hard power” strategies focus on military intervention and coercive statecraft to enforce national interests.⁵

The political and academic discourses of terrorism and, in particular ‘Islamic terrorism,’ are highly politicized and contested. Today, politicians, governments, policy-makers, and the media incessantly remind us that we live in this ‘age of terror,’ that Islamist-based terrorism presents a vaster threat than any other threat, and that the key in preventing this threat is to develop policy that combats terrorism. Inundated with warnings of the threat, this seemingly

¹ Ken Booth & Tim Dunne, *Terror in Our Time* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012) at 496.

² *Ibid.*

³ Alex P Schmid & Albert J Jongman, *Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data bases and Literature* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017) at 1.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Ernest J Wilson III, “Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power” (2008) 616:1 *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 110 at 114.

'new' terrorist phenomenon has permeated into political circles, and is considered to pose the maximum threat to our national security. The underlying fear that the Western civilization is under this 'new' and ostensible terrorist threat has compelled nation-states to develop far-reaching policies in order to respond to this threat. Instituted in response to terrorism, counter-radicalization practices have become an aspect of security programs. In the wake of 9/11 and ensuing terrorist attacks such as the Madrid train bombings in March 2004 and the London bombings in July 2005, many nation-states have introduced counter-radicalization policies that aim to thwart violent extremism and its alleged end product - terrorism. Amongst the states that have espoused some of the most vigorous counter-radicalization policies are the United Kingdom (UK), the United States (US), Australia, the Netherlands, and Canada.

The underlying objective of the practice of counter-radicalization, amongst other things, is to permanently induce 'at risk' individuals to jettison violence, which will purportedly prevent the emergence of a new terrorists in the future. It is important to note that these programmes focus generally on countering the apparent threat of radicalization in Muslim communities. Yet employing negative perceptions and conceptualizations of Muslim minorities is fundamental to counter-radicalization practices. Moreover, although extremism is not a new manifestation, it is increasingly problematized as an indicator of the risk of terrorism in contemporary government.

Moreover, these practices operate under a pre-emptive logic to prevent terrorism, which extends into spheres of deciding who is 'suspect' and designates the threshold of radicalization in specific communities. In other words, a pre-emptive approach to security practices reserve the right always to cripple or obstruct terrorist operations before they occur. It is precisely these security practices, specifically, counter-radicalization programmes that can potentially challenge, and at times, discard civil liberties in the name of national security. The balance between liberty

and national security has, noticeably, shifted since September 11. Ensuing terrorist attacks has however engendered a web of complexities that make it difficult to recalibrate an appropriate balance between the two. Viewed from this perspective, policy shifts and emergent security practices in responding to the terrorist threat, almost certainly, place national security above all else, with ominous effects on civil liberties and minority groups. In this thesis, I attempt to tackle two queries concerning the pervasive practice of counter-radicalization amongst nation-states: “How does Canada’s counter-radicalization initiative, as a contemporary security practice, seek to counter the threat of radicalization and upon what logics?” “How might these policies affect the civil liberties of Muslim communities?”

In order to respond to these inquiries, I demonstrate, through the concept of governmentality, how the risk calculus of terrorism, in its current form, makes possible the intervention of counter-radicalization policy. Governmentality will make explicit the different problematizations surrounding terrorism in present-day government. Specifically, it will demonstrate the ways in which radicalization and counter-radicalization discourse and practices create a particular mentality of conditions that render terrorism thinkable. In using governmentality, I demonstrate the quandaries that arise from the discourses under examination. Governmentality raises particular questions about the discourses of radicalization and counter-radicalization. Governmentality, moreover, is useful in showing how ‘risky subjects’ are given statistical identities as a means of trying to make them *governable*. It will also elucidate how different counter-terrorism practices exploit the concept of terrorism. Viewed in this light, my thesis argues that practices of counter-radicalization reinforce Muslims’ exclusion in contemporary Canada and links this exclusion with governmentality and the production of security concerns in the current state of affairs.

In order to analyze counter-radicalization, this thesis heavily relies on theoretical underpinnings of terrorism, textual analysis of primary sources, governments documents and newspapers, as well as secondary literatures. A review of primary and secondary sources brings together information on counter-radicalization policies, the dynamics and complexities of the pervasive nature of terrorism and its governance, and the processes by which these policies produces ostracizing and stigmatization. A heterogenous secondary literature helps to clarify how different works, events and government documents have influenced and informed counter-radicalization practices.

It is important to note that the thesis does not use every single English-language source on counter-radicalization that exists, nor does it embrace every possible criticism of counter-radicalization programmes. An overview of the entirety of the literature on these subjects is well beyond the scope of this thesis. Thus the thesis does not offer a broad overview but instead uses select sources to illustrate points in relation to specific aspect(s) of counter-radicalization as a practice. In this regard, the thesis cannot pretend to be a summary of each and every discourse ever written about counter-radicalization.

Conceptual Framework: Governmentality

Prior to explaining how the thesis employs governmentality, I should note that I create a *partial* genealogy of terrorism. In this regard, the thesis cannot face fault for not fitting every possible reader's potentially divergent interpretation of genealogy. Moreover, the thesis acknowledges the diversity and challenges within counter-radicalization discourse. The different theoretical models of counter-radicalization or the varied practices of counter-radicalization between countries all seem to demonstrate that counter-radicalization discourse is not indivisible

but a product of constant contestation between different groups. Moreover, the thesis focuses on the effects of counter-radicalization policies in relation to Muslim populations. However, the discourse that it examines might have similar effects on other groups through practices that draw in whole or in part on the same lines of reasoning. This is to say that the thesis acknowledges that Muslim-focused counter-radicalization practices are not necessarily altogether distinct from those practices targeting certain other groups. An examination of where and how overlap occurs between counter-radicalization measures targeting different groups is beyond the scope of the thesis' inquires.

A partial genealogy is thus an implication of the limits to just what the thesis attempts to do, as well as what it can do in the space available. This thesis therefore reviews the potential strengths that a governmentality perspective offers for critical terrorism studies. To achieve this aim the chapter considers creating a partial genealogy of terrorism through Foucault's account of governmentality to demonstrate how terrorism is not to be understood as a singular phenomenon, and instead, understood through its historical precedents and occurrences. The thesis considers the analytical insights of governmentality, particularly its challenge to the art of governing and the production of security concerns with respect to the terrorist phenomenon today. In doing so, governmentality renders visible the inevitability to consider terrorism as a self-evident phenomenon but one that is vastly context-dependent and historicized. It reveals the various shapes and identities that terrorism has obtained in contemporary society. In this way, a governmentality lens provides insights into the ways in which terrorism is both problematized and governed. As an illustration, there was no discourse of radicalization or counter-radicalization during the *Le Front de Liberation du Quebec* (FLQ) crisis in Canada.⁶ Yet,

⁶ Reg Whitaker, "Keeping Up with the Neighbours: Canadian Responses to 9/11 in Historical and Comparative Context" (2003) 41:2/3 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 241 at 249 [Whitaker, "Keeping Up with the Neighbours"].

contemporary dialogues speak of terrorism in such a way that it implies a presumption that *we* know *what* it is and *who* it is. Terrorism, then, is understood as a universal term in modern-day parlance. Thus, governmentality renders visible the different problematizations (radicalization/counter-radicalization) accompanying terrorism, and grasps their specificity.

Moreover, the operation of counter-radicalization practices makes terrorism *thinkable* as a set of processes that distribute in certain spaces. Counter-radicalization is predominantly concerned with questions concerning the anticipation, prediction, or intervention in places by which susceptible areas or communities are becoming ‘radicalized’. Radicalization, seemingly, transpires by encountering people (e.g. radical religious authorities) who create a *certain mentality of conditions* amongst the vulnerable whereby acts of terror, for example, martyrdom and suicide bombing can ensue. Dialogues on radicalization/counter-radicalization often view radicalization as a process that involves a speech mediated by religious authorities who *convert* and *infect* marginalized and vulnerable communities.⁷ Although there has been attempts to understand and conceptualize terrorism through other prominent discourses such as the old Orientalist discourse,⁸ the War on Terror discourse,⁹ and Critical Discourse Analysis, this thesis relies on the discourse of radicalization.¹⁰ Radicalization, then, has developed as a privileged discourse for problematizing terrorism, and the prevailing modality in which security agencies

⁷ Cora Alex Døving, “Position and Self Understanding of Sunni Muslim Imams in Norway” (2014) 3:2 Journal of Muslims in Europe 209 at 209.

⁸ Orientalism represents Muslims as the “Other” whereby their irrationality and violence underpins the ascendancy of Western states whom fosters rationality, cultivation, and advancement. This discourse also emphasizes a critical contradiction of the War on Terrorism. See Mervat F. Hatem, “Discourses of the War on Terrorism in the U.S. and its Views of the Arab, Muslim, and Gendered Other” (2004) 11/12:2/1 The Arab Studies Journal 77.

⁹ This discourse configures public dialogues and contestations in the US and transnationally while social actors in Europe, Asia, the Middle East evoke its language as how best to rationalize, respond to, and justify an array of political, economic and social occurrences. See also *Discourse, War and Terrorism*, eds, Adam Hodges & Chad Nilep (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2007) at 3.

¹⁰ Critical Discourse Analysis studies the ways that the misuse of power, supremacy, and inequality are implemented, emulated and resisted by text and dialect within the social and political circles. See Emmanuel Sarfo & Ewuresi Agyeiwaa Krampa, “Language at War: A Critical Discourse Analysis of Speeches of Bush and Obama on Terrorism” (2013) 3:2 International Journal of Social Science & Education 378 at 379.

and states are engaging Muslim communities. Thus, while it is understood that extremism is one of the main trajectories of radicalization and consequently terror, such conceptions render terrorism thinkable and governable through notions of risk. Assessing the notion of terrorism through the Foucauldian looking glass, and specifically governmentality, captures the mutations and different characteristics which the former has taken in contemporary society.

Although I attempt to understand the diffusion of terrorism in the fabrics of existing Western societies through a Foucauldian logic, I wish to also be attentive to other critical approaches that have been employed in grappling with this social issue. The burgeoning surge of interest in terrorism and counterterrorism research has spawned in a self-contained academic field and, the present formulation of ‘Critical Terrorism Studies’. Scholars have adopted and utilized Critical Terrorism Studies to challenge dominant understandings of terrorism that extend beyond its conventional and limited discussions.¹¹ Orthodox terrorism theory is another approach to understanding the terrorism phenomena - a discourse founded upon a legitimate/illegitimate binary that constructs non-state violence as terrorism while state violence is considered as legitimate.¹²

William Walters has been one of the very few scholars to attempt to set an overarching framework and introduce the phenomenon ‘anti-policy’ for the discussion of security in relation to counterterrorism, amongst other examples. Walters describes anti-policy as a way of understanding or capturing the ubiquity of measures, policies and discourses that aim to halt or foil “bad things” in Western politics.¹³ Walter argues that anti-terrorism, anti-poverty, anti-corruption, anti-racism, antitrust, and anti-trafficking, as well as declared wars – the war on

¹¹ Lee Jarvis, “The Spaces and Faces of Critical Terrorism Studies” (2009) 40:1 Security Dialogue 5 at 6.

¹² Jason Franks, *Rethinking the Roots of Terrorism* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) 159 at 159-160.

¹³ William Walters, “Anti-policy and Anti-politics: Critical Reflections on Certain Schemes to Govern Bad Things” (2008) 11:3 European Journal of Cultural Studies 267 at 267.

drugs,¹⁴ war on crime,¹⁵ and War on Terror are all integral to the analytical framework of anti-policy.¹⁶ Despite the fact that the aforementioned political enterprises have been placed under scrutiny amongst many scholars especially anti-terrorism, they seldom are discussed or juxtaposed in relation to one another.¹⁷

Moreover, Walters questions the extent, and propensity to which Western states' emphasize countering or remedying the 'bad things' they so keenly oppose, in direct relation to their core fundamental values that they predicate themselves on.¹⁸ Counterterrorism is an eminent example of this sort of friction whereby existing measures and nascent capabilities to combat terrorism, on the one hand, are seen as pivotal to the continuity of liberal democracies, and on the other, as posing an even greater threat to the liberal way of life.¹⁹ In a similar way, Barry Hindess registers anti-corruptions as another political enterprise which has become a key scheme that which enables global governance.²⁰ Hindess nods towards the notion that, similar to the war on drugs or counterterrorism schemes, the idea of anti-corruption may insinuate distinct and covert agendas, but that there may be more to the programmes than they purport.²¹ Moreover, George Rigakos, from a Marxist and a political economy perspective, asserts that the threat of terrorism such as Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the mujahideen has intensified the state of 'insecurity' following the terror attacks of September 11.²² These developments

¹⁴ David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992) at 210.

¹⁵ Jonathan Simon, *Governing through Crime: How the War on Crime Transformed American Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 7.

¹⁶ Walters, *supra* note 13 at 268.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Ibid* at 267.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ Barry Hindess, "Investigating International Anti-corruption" (2005) 26:8 Third World Quarterly 1389 at 1389-1390.

²¹ *Ibid* at 1390.

²² George Rigakos, *Security/Capital: A General Theory of Pacification* (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2016) at 84.

illuminate the dissemination of insecurity in the capitalist world economy.²³ Yet, however, Rigakos cautions against marking 9/11 as the most conspicuous event that give rise to what he (and rightfully so) calls the “fetishization for security”.²⁴

In framing his analysis, Rigakos further focuses on the burgeoning of private security and its global reinforcement, and the ubiquity of surveillance cameras in cities that have been proliferating since the 1970s.²⁵ He asserts that although a milieu of fear and insecurity has been long existed, the fetishization of security has become so ever widespread that “we now literally eat, breathe, and sleep security,” whereby terrorism is but one side effect within the broader scope of general insecurity.²⁶ The fetish of security, thus, evinces itself in day-to-day and commonplace ‘commodities,’ such as, for example, a shoe.²⁷ In this way, a political economy whereby insecurity is transmitted through commodity owing to channels of manufacturing and consumption, amplifies security on a global scale.²⁸ Viewed in this light, Rigakos argues that security is hegemonic - in that it is pervasive, widespread, and determines the faith of all “social transactions”.²⁹

In a similar vein, Mark Neocleous posits that the proliferating domain of food security has manifested itself as a new and robust discursive landscape.³⁰ There are various journals that are committed to food security, just as there are several international conferences pertaining to food security which attracts security experts and foreign relations experts.³¹ While the objective of the idea of food security is to counterbalance cataclysms and preserve supply chains, what is

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Ibid* at 100.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ Mark Neocleous, *Critique of Security* (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2008) at 156.

³¹ Rigakos, *supra* note 22 at 101.

recently referred to as this food security was once understood to be “world hunger”.³² More recently, institutions render food security into an issue of security. Information transmitted or conveyed on food security by local participants is understood or absorbed as “security intelligence” in the security network but limited by the capitalist economy.³³ Within this view thus, the economy must be at ease especially against the social and environmental catastrophes it itself generated.³⁴

In order to understand how terrorism inhabits discursive spaces today, this thesis thus employs the theoretical perspective of a Foucauldian governmentality in an effort to contribute to the existing discourse on counter-radicalization and political terrorism. A governmentality approach offers analytical strengths to understanding terrorism and its governance through its genealogy rather than as a singular phenomenon. The approach has critical potential to illuminate the contested nature of terrorism and its shifting governmentalities. Terrorism’s multifaceted nature and the production of security concerns has enjoyed long histories. Yet contemporary security dialogues assume a nexus, however unrelated they may be, between the process of radicalization and terrorism. The radicalization-terrorism nexus represents a shift in the exercise of power and the governance of terrorism. This shift resonates in policies and practices intended to redress this presumed connection which often aim towards ‘targeted’ populations. The contemporary articulations of terrorism suggest the governing of Muslims and the shift in focus to security concerns. To be clear, governmentality helps us to see how the entrenched narratives (although limited) of governing terrorism have evolved and has become particularly associated with Muslims today. Where Orthodox terrorism theory focuses on stark legitimate and illegitimate binaries, and the War on Terror discourse discursively constructs almost anything as

³² *Ibid.*

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ *Ibid.*

alleged imperatives of national security, this thesis uses governmentality to give greater attention to the emergence of radicalization discourse wherein Muslims are often located in the spectacle of this parlance.

While radicalization ought to be approached like any other phenomenon, it should not be supposed that its momentum will subsist in anti-terrorism or security discourse in what lies ahead. Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to utilize the concept of governmentality to distinguish amongst generic terrorism and the specific form of terrorism that has occupied the discursive space in contemporary society. The thesis does not refer to “terrorism” as an occurrence(s) or manifestation. Instead, I focus on terrorism as a discursively-constructed object of the state which is a major fact of our time. Michel Foucault was first to inscribe, in the late 1970s the assertion that the general economy of power in contemporary society is largely a realm of security.³⁵ Foucault’s term, ‘governmentality’ refers both to a process of being governed (i.e., to an art of government) as well as a methodology, a way of thinking about the practices of government (i.e., a rationality of government).³⁶ Most commonly, it is referred to as the ‘conduct of conduct’.³⁷ Foucault best describes this as,

‘Government’ did not refer only to political structures or to management of states; rather, it designated the way in which the conduct of individuals or groups might be directed – the government of children, of souls, of communities, of the sick ... To govern, in this sense, is to control the possible field of action of others³⁸

³⁵ Bal Sokhi-Bulley, “Government(ality) by Experts: Human Rights as Governance” (2011) 22:3 Law and Critique 251.

³⁶ *Ibid* at 253.

³⁷ Colin Gordon, ‘*Governmental Rationality: An Introduction*’, in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller, eds, *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991) at 96 [Gordon, *Governmental Rationality*].

³⁸ Nikolas Rose, Pat O’Malley & Mariana Valverde, “Governmentality” (2006) 2:93 Annual Review of Law Social Science 83 at 83.

Foucault broadly defined governmentality as “techniques and procedures for directing human behaviour”.³⁹ Governmentality, he argued, was a certain mentality which had become the common ground of all modern forms of political thought and action. Foucault further argued that governmentality was an “ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, and calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power.”⁴⁰

Foucault’s genealogical work on power and government encapsulated in his account of governmentality provides an insight into contemporary security practices. These insights can be retained in rendering visible the modes of governance or art of governing involved in the struggles around terrorism in the Canadian context. In posing inquiries about the nature of modern-day social orders, the conceptualization of power, human freedom and the parameters, possibilities and sources of human actions, Foucault formulated such issues in his lecture entitled ‘Governmentality’.⁴¹ ‘Governmentality’, for Foucault, referred to a historically particular economy of power in which societies are commanded in a de-centred way and where society’s members play a dynamic role in their own self-governance.⁴² In such societies there is a concern with both individuals and aggregates such as populations.⁴³

Foucault’s ideas shed light on the non-linear transformation of the state in modern-day society. The study of governmentality views the modality of power and authority as anything *but* obvious. Governmentality thus requires substantial analytical resources.⁴⁴ While the concept was fundamental to Foucault’s project in the discussions held in 1978 and 1979, governmentality has

³⁹ Matt Macdonald, “Securitization and the Construction of Security” (2008) 14:4 *European Journal of International Relations* 563 at 563.

⁴⁰ Rose, O’Malley & Valverde, *supra* note 38 at 84.

⁴¹ Danica Dupont & Frank Pearce, “Foucault contra Foucault” (2001) 5:2 *Theoretical Criminology* 123 at 123.

⁴² *Ibid* at 125.

⁴³ *Ibid*.

⁴⁴ Mitchell Dean, *Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society* (London: Sage, 2010).

generated vigorous debate amongst scholars about who/what it refers to.⁴⁵ The scholarship on governmentality has explained the term in a way that echoes with Foucault's dialogue on knowledge/power as a political rationality that forms the 'conditions of possibility' for thinking and acting in a certain way.⁴⁶ Colin Gordon posits that governmentality is a form of thinking about the nature of the practice of government that is capable of making some form of that activity thinkable and feasible both to its practitioners and to those upon whom it is practiced.⁴⁷ In a similar vein, Thomas Lemke has stated that governmentality refers to a mentality of governing.⁴⁸ Lemke writes that governmentality or political rationality 'constitutes the intellectual processing' of the reality which political technologies can challenge. Other scholars such as Rose et al. note that governmentality shows how problems such as the moral order or the economy are 'made thinkable and practicable' as knowable and administrable domain[s].⁴⁹ Given these definitions, it is evident that Foucault's work on political government involved the application of the knowledge/power framework to new production of objects of power.⁵⁰

Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller shed further light on the analysis of the political power concerning the problematics of government.⁵¹ Government, for them, is the historical site within which schemes, tactics and engineers of authorities seek to condition the beliefs and conduct of others.⁵² It is within this matrix of government that political forms of rule in the West define,

⁴⁵ Stephen J. Collier, "Topologies of Power: Foucault's Analysis of Political Government beyond 'Governmentality' (2009) 26:6 Theory, Culture & Society 79 at 79.

⁴⁶ *Ibid* at 96.

⁴⁷ Gordon, *supra* note 37 at 96.

⁴⁸ *Ibid*.

⁴⁹ *Ibid*.

⁵⁰ *Ibid*.

⁵¹ Nikolas Rose &

Peter Miller, "Political Power Beyond the State: Problematics of Government" (1992) 43:2 The British Journal of Sociology 173 at 173.

⁵² *Ibid* at 175.

demarcate and relate themselves.⁵³ Fundamental to modern forms of government, Rose and Miller argues, are the interconnections produced amongst entities constituted as ‘political’ and the schemes, strategies and practices of those authorities – economic, legal, spiritual, medical, technical. Such authorities’ venture to govern the lives of others in view of what is virtuous, ordinary, and efficient.⁵⁴ Knowledge thus plays a pivotal role to those endeavours of government and to the formation of its objects.⁵⁵ The government is thus the sphere in which an array of contingencies such as cognitive, calculative, experimental and evaluative practices emerge, exceeding the state.⁵⁶ Law, conversely, can be viewed as the specific way in which the problematics of government are codified, regulated and distributed.⁵⁷

Scholars have found key mechanisms of advanced liberal government such as ‘government at a distance’. As an analytical concept, governmentality, draws attention to the certain ways that Muslims in Canada ought to think and *act* in modern-day society. Governmentality makes it possible for Muslim populations to be governed at a distance through security legislation. Thus, the concept of advanced liberalism is valuable in understanding the conditions of possibility of certain ways of understanding and acting and for comprehending what is general to different governmental forms in distinct sites.⁵⁸ Such different governmental forms, notably, new radicalization and counter-radicalization practices in the post-9/11 era authorize new specific modes of risk management which poses a peril to Muslim populations.

Moreover, liberalism recognizes that various authorities govern the conduct of citizens in different sites to achieve different objectives rather than a single body such as the state.⁵⁹ From

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ *Ibid* at 177.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ Rose, O’Malley & Valverde, *supra* note 38 at 84.

an analytical perspective, governmentality asks specific questions of the phenomena it seeks to comprehend: Who is governed and by whom, and per what logics?⁶⁰ Viewed in this light, it is important to note that in terms of power, the state is not the primary source but rather an instrument. In the exercise of power, it is not the sole governing actor, but rather a part of a broader sector of governance. It is only one example of an instrument of power within a competing set of knowledges. In a Foucauldian sense, liberalism then, is a form of governmental rationality or governmentality. Liberalism is but one example of a practice of governing. It reinforces the inattention to the existing conceptualization of terrorism and its governance. These modes of governing intensify the continuation security practices that often exclude some subjects over others. It is the ethos of technologies of governing, on the one hand, that secure liberal regimes, and on the other hand, evoke insecurity and engender other disruptions amongst citizens of a particular religion against terrorism. As a result, states, security agencies and leading scholars' contemporary engagement with counter-radicalization discourse only reimagines and deepens the governing of terrorism toward the governmentality of populations deemed a threat in the face of risks.

Overview of the Thesis' Chapters

The first chapter of this thesis, Chapter 1: "Counter-Radicalization Strategies in Comparative and Historical Perspectives" discusses how the concept of 'radicalization,' as a pathway to terrorism, has propagated throughout political debates, and many nation-states. Specifically, the chapter contours the development of counter-radicalization practices in four countries: The United Kingdom (UK), United States (US), Australia and the Netherlands. By mapping the emergence of these practices, the chapter outlines how governments have

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

complemented traditional hard power approaches to terrorism with soft power strategies that take the impact of radical ideology as a pressing concern. Moreover, through a historical and comparative assessment, the chapter illustrates how the practices of counter-radicalization across these nation-states are deeply involved in undermining radical narratives. Most significantly, these policies aim to counter the threat of radicalization in Muslim communities, who are often perceived as susceptible to becoming radicalized.

Chapter 2: “Counter-radicalization Practices in Canada,” focuses specifically on counter-radicalization strategies in the Canadian context. This chapter offers a broad survey of the policies, practices, concepts, and discourses of counter-radicalization policies. Canada’s propensity to adopt and embrace discourses of radicalization and extremism can, to a large degree, be attributed to the concept of “homegrown” terrorism in other Western states. The tenuous link between radicalization and terrorism upholds the logic behind attempts to combat radicalization. Moreover, the chapter considers the varied definitions of radicalization offered by Canadian security agencies and other government units such as Canadian Security Intelligence Services (CSIS), Public Safety Canada (PSC), and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). Concepts such as ‘radicalism’ and ‘extremism,’ shrouded in confusion, are employed interchangeably in Canadian counter-radicalization practices. The chapter concludes by suggesting that ‘radicalization’ lacks an absolute definition amongst Canadian security and governmental bodies. The lack of a clear definition and the social construction of risk encompassing radicalization to violence can potentially result in defining Muslim communities as ‘suspect’ and the erosion of their civil liberties.

As a consequence of the particular contemporary entanglement of radicalization and terrorism, the emergence and implementation of counter-radicalization is fraught with a quite

specific set of problematics. “Chapter 3: The Shifting Calculus of Risk: A Critique of Counter-Radicalization Practices in Canada,” presents the Canadian phenomena of violent extremism as complex and multifaceted. To this end, the chapter scrutinizes and offers a set of critiques concerning counter-radicalization practices specifically in the Canadian context. Moreover, the chapter examines the ways in which concepts such as ‘extremism,’ ‘radicalization,’ and ‘terrorism,’ continue to elude definition even among government institutions. As well, the chapter adopts Michel Foucault’s account of governmentality to demonstrate how security practices, as they have arisen in the contemporary War on Terror, have experienced mutations. Governmentality helps to trace terrorism through its genealogical manifestations. The historical occurrences of terrorism then reveal the reactions, often overstated, to groups ostensibly deemed to pose a menace to national security. The chapter takes the view that counter-radicalization practices, as a technology of risk, fails to protect national security, and contrarily, risks undermining security. At the same time, these policies can potentially amplify and bolster Muslims’ exclusion from Canadian society. To alleviate the friction between preserving national security and civil liberties, I therefore suggest that counter-radicalization practices ought to rely on *happening* or substantively-developed threats, in place of implicating itself upon a pre-emptive logic, in advance of a future threat that may or not may transpire. This may potentially minimize the targeting of Muslims in the social construction of risk, while at the same time, upholding security and liberties - emphasizing one over the other is often bound to render both inoperative.

I have begun this thesis with a historical and comparative chapter to map the transformations and mutations of the governance of terrorism across four nation-states; for it is these conversions that elucidates the pervasive nature of terrorism today. Chapter 2: “Counter-

radicalization Practices in Canada,” is particularly useful for demonstrating Canada’s adoption of counter-terrorism, in line, and on a part with its US and European counterparts. The ensuing chapter is significant for applying theory to, and calling attention to how overt mechanisms of governance operate through the suppression of some citizens and not others. This chapter is important for evincing the many shortcomings of counter-radicalization and, particularly in Canada.

Counter-radicalization Policy: Practically Counter-productive?

In this thesis, I demonstrate how concepts and notions such as ‘violent extremism,’ ‘radicalism,’ and ‘terrorism,’ although not new phenomena, are constructed to understand the complexity of terrorism, have given rise to counter-radicalization programmes. The conceptual ambiguities of these terms demonstrate that the underlying assumptions of counter-radicalization are rather flawed and highly contestable. Moreover, the continuous impulse of nation-states to combat radicalization based on calculating the probability of terrorist attacks on the horizon of the future reasserts the pre-emptive and bigoted security practices.

It is within the purview of counter-radicalization practices that we find one of the more influential ways in which terrorism is rendered thinkable as a pressing concern today. Understood this way, certain communities, specifically Muslims, are placed under mass suspicion of being susceptible to radicalization, and casts them as potential terrorists. I therefore argue, in this thesis, that counter-radicalization practices are but one example of an emerging complex security practice that as a potential solution to the seemingly catastrophic risk in the War on Terror. Moreover, counter-radicalization policies clear considerable space for the targeting of Muslim communities, who are, almost always, the targeted population under the

rubric of the War on Terror. These programmes can potentially cast suspicion on innocent Muslims, while seriously endangering their civil liberties. It is precisely liberties that is most at stake in the practice of counter-radicalization.

Chapter 2: Counter-Radicalization Strategies in Comparative and Historical Perspectives

The rise in Islamist-based terrorism has brought the concept of radicalism to the vanguard of the political and academic lexicon. Radicalism has become the dominant framework for explicating, and thwarting young Muslims from engaging in radical undertakings.⁶¹ Following the attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States, concepts such as “home grown terrorism” have become increasingly salient.⁶² Thus, since mid-2000s, several countries have developed far-reaching counter-radicalization⁶³ programs as part of their counter-terrorism strategies.⁶⁴ The main objective of these programs is to de-radicalize or disengage devoted radicals and to thwart the radicalization of new ones.⁶⁵ This chapter will survey how approaches to terrorism have changed, and it will place the focus on counter-radicalization strategies. In what follows I provide an outline of counter-radicalization strategies from a comparative and historical perspective. The chapter focuses on four countries with some of the most substantively developed and extensive counter-radicalization initiatives: United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and the Netherlands.

2.1 Approaches to Terrorism Pre-2001

⁶¹ Yanique A. Anderson, *Terrorists Created? The Radicalization of Muslims in Denmark* (BA Thesis, Trinity College, 2015) at 3.

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ Counter-radicalization efforts occur preceding any suspected criminal act. See Katherine E. Brown, *Gender and Counter-Radicalization: Women and Emerging Counter-terror Measures* in Margaret L. Satterthwaite & Jayne C. Huckerby, eds, in *Gender, National Security and Counter-terrorism: Human Rights Perspectives* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013) at 36.

⁶⁴ Lorenzo Vidino, “Europe’s Experience in Countering Radicalisation: Approaches and Challenges” (2010) 7:2 *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism* 163 at 163 [Vidino, “Europe’s Experience in Countering Radicalisation”].

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

In the 1920s, the League of Nations attempted to define and criminalize terrorism.⁶⁶ The various attempts to find a generic definition of terrorism was seldom considered to have been holistic.⁶⁷ Within this frame, the problem of defining terrorism has hampered scrutiny since the beginning of studies of terrorism in the early 1970s.⁶⁸ Since the upsurge of modern terrorism more than 50 years ago, the international community, especially the United Nations, responded in a muddled way.⁶⁹ The West lacked a vigorous strategy and was on the defensive against both domestic and international terrorism.⁷⁰ There were numerous reasons for a perplexity of this sort. In the first, many nations, outside of the Western world, had just arisen from colonialism. This meant that in some cases they viewed terrorists as fellow insurgents who would join them in the ‘community of nations’.⁷¹ In the late 1960s and 1970s the widespread political and intellectual climate in various Western countries encouraged an unusual lenience to violent political action.⁷² This made it permissible for terrorists to demand and receive public consideration for their ‘causes’.⁷³ Terrorist acts such as kidnapping, kneecapping and murder obtained an atmosphere of ‘romance and adventure’.⁷⁴

Terrorist attacks began to draw public indignation in the 1970s.⁷⁵ This stemmed from a perceived increase in the range of targets potentially facing terrorist attacks.⁷⁶ Governments and people became more aware of the increasing threat of terrorists attacking anyone, including

⁶⁶ Ben Saul, “Attempts to Define ‘Terrorism’ in International Law” 52:1 Netherlands International Law Review (2005) 57 at 57.

⁶⁷ “United Nations Office of Legal Affairs”, online: United Nations <<http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism.asp>>.

⁶⁸ Martha Crenshaw, “An Agenda for the 21st Century” (2000) 21:2 Political Psychology 405 at 405.

⁶⁹ L. Paul Bremer III, “The West’s Counter-terrorist Strategy” (1992) 4:4 Terrorism and Political Violence 255 at 255-256.

⁷⁰ *Ibid* at 256.

⁷¹ *Ibid*.

⁷² *Ibid*.

⁷³ *Ibid*.

⁷⁴ *Ibid*.

⁷⁵ *Ibid* at 257.

⁷⁶ *Ibid* at 278.

former followers.⁷⁷ In the United States, the seizure of the US Tehran Embassy in 1979 jolted people's opinion and led to demands for efficient government action.⁷⁸ Due to the foregoing changes, governments in the West began to develop more clear strategies in dealing with terrorism.⁷⁹ In order to implement such strategy, actions on two levels was required: the growth of political will to respond to the threat of terrorism and the distribution of more resources to countering it.⁸⁰

Moreover, among the oppressive options, it was repressive legal responses to terrorism that were most common throughout the 1970s.⁸¹ Viewed in this light, the criminal justice model predominated in domestically and the reinforcement of international legal mechanisms by various international bodies in the international context.⁸² The operation of force is usually a police responsibility within the criminal justice model of counter-terrorism.⁸³ One result of this, during the 1970s, has been the tendency toward a militarization of the police, especially when the threat of terrorism is regarded to be acute on a domestic level.⁸⁴ One of the most clear indication of this has been the creation of special forces or 'third forces' that are instructed to use force, such as to terminate hostage sieges.⁸⁵ When the military route is taken, special forces are deployed for what might otherwise be usual police work for arresting suspects and for searches and seizures.⁸⁶ While the police use the least possible level of force necessary to seize suspects, the military are trained to use maximal force to make certain that "the enemy is put out of

⁷⁷ *Ibid* at 257.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ Ronald D. Crelinsten & Alex P. Schmid, "Western Responses to Terrorism: A Twenty-five Year Balance Sheet" (1992) 4:4 *Terrorism and Political Violence* 307 at 307, 314.

⁸² *Ibid* at 314.

⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶ *Ibid* at 334.

commission.”⁸⁷ Viewed in this way, the individual soldier is not liable for his/her action, but the police officer is held accountable.⁸⁸ Thus, while the legal-repressive responses persisted to play a part in approaches to countering terrorism in the West during the 1980s, the ‘military’ or ‘war model’ began to gain significant eminence in the international domain.⁸⁹

Much of the counter-terrorist policy in the West has largely emphasized the rule of law,⁹⁰ but at the same time, demands for a military approach to counter-terrorism became persistent in the 1980s.⁹¹ Academic and professional dialogues focused little on the usage of a military approach, despite it being considered as one possibility.⁹²

In the wake of the attacks of 9/11 and Canada’s obligation to join in a new global war on terrorism, a lack of historical experience in coping with terrorists was not the case.⁹³ In October 1970, Canada was confronted with its most severe internal security watershed. The crisis involved cells of the violent separatist group, FLQ, who abducted the British Trade Commissioner, James Cross, and kidnapped and subsequently murdered the Quebec Minister of Labour, Pierre Laporte.⁹⁴ In being confronted with this formidable crisis, the Canadian government invoked the sweeping *War Measures Act*, turning a blind eye to civil rights⁹⁵. The power to apprehend and debrief without charge, and exclusive of counsel, and *habeas corpus* was largely employed. Despite the overlapping techniques wielded, the FLQ and its terrorist propensity of the sovereignty movement in Quebec, was eliminated.⁹⁶

⁸⁷ Grant Wardlaw, *Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics, and Counter-Measures*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) at 90.

⁸⁸ Crelinsten & Schmid, *supra* note 81 at 314.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁰ See, e.g., Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism and the Liberal State* (London: Macmillan, 1982).

⁹¹ Crelinsten & Schmid, *supra* note 81 at 314.

⁹² *Ibid.*

⁹³ Whitaker, “Keeping Up with the Neighbours,” *supra* note 6 at 249.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

In the late 1940s, Canada joined the Cold War against Soviet Communism. In the same way that Canadian troops have found themselves combatting terrorists in Afghanistan, Canadian soldiers were battling Communists in Korea during the Cold War.⁹⁷ Both wars accompanied domestic measures against supposed internal enemies.⁹⁸ In both wars, Canada was closely involved with the Americans. Moreover, at their preliminary and fretful juncture, both wars elevated issues of individual and group rights and the demands of the community for security.⁹⁹ The long-term ramifications were the solidification of democratic culpability and vaster concern for the protection of rights.¹⁰⁰

2.2 United States (US)

The attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent terrorist events in Europe have marked the existence of extraordinary measures and the introduction of radicalization discourse and counter-radicalization practices. In the name of national security, the US government, along with federal and local governments are progressively involving themselves in the lives of Muslims and Islam itself.¹⁰¹ These interventions range from intelligence gathering and analysis to prison management, as well as community outreach, all of which form a fundamental part of what is generally called “counter-radicalization”.¹⁰² Moreover, the increased use of border and transport surveillance, the expansion of biometric technology, and the imposition of “no-fly” lists are engendered by the War on Terror.¹⁰³ The new and extraordinary anti-terrorism legal codes have spawned in its wake that sanction corresponding legal frameworks for non-citizens, subpar trial

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ Samuel James Rascoff, “Establishing Official Islam? The Law and Strategy of Counter-Radicalization” (2012) 64:1 *Stanford Law Review* 125 at 125.

¹⁰² *Ibid* at 126.

¹⁰³ Colleen Bell, *The Freedom of Security: Governing Canada in the Age of Counter-Terrorism* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2011) at 2.

proceedings, and tenuous justifications for charges of guilt by association.¹⁰⁴ Since the War on Terror provides a breeding ground for a “new security environment,” Western leaders often appeal to policies interconnected with the former as an effective antidote.¹⁰⁵ Within this frame, the notion of counter-radicalization remains indeterminate and undertheorized. However, the underlying suspicion behind counter-radicalization is that the deterrence of future violence entails official involvement in influencing the ideational currents that are thought to legitimize violence.¹⁰⁶ Counter-radicalization in the domestic scene has been part of American foreign policy for a decade and signifies a crucial development in American counter-terrorism.¹⁰⁷ Ongoing domestic counter-radicalization thus represents the Obama Administration’s continuation of his predecessor’s counterterrorism policy.¹⁰⁸

Although radicalization discourses are not new, contemporary understandings of the concept of ‘radicalization’ focus overwhelmingly on Islam. Viewed from this perspective, since Islamist-based radicalization is often seen as a precursor to terrorism, governments aim to halt or cripple the threat of terrorist actions in the future. The shift towards a concern with risk management coincides with broader trends in government as a task particularly by using risk management and a logic of pre-emption. Firstly, counter-radicalization adheres to the preventative logic under the rubric of counter-terrorism, which centres around strategies that curtail the risk and intensity of future terrorist attacks.¹⁰⁹ Counter-radicalization seeks to thwart people from supporting terrorism or violent extremism. Second, the United States is not clear on how it addresses radical measures. For example, the United States has a mixed record in its use of “hard power” counter-

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ Rascoff, *supra* note 101 at 127.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

terrorism methods, such as interrogation, detention, and targeting of lethal force against American citizens in alliance with al Qaeda.¹¹⁰ Viewed from this perspective, detractors of the national security state views counter-radicalization as a “soft power,” or “therapeutic” alternative approach to counter-terrorism that may be both more efficient and friendly to the government’s reputation at home and abroad.¹¹¹ Third, the turn to counter-radicalization mirrors an appreciation that the present-day terrorist threat has a “homegrown” aspect, which requires a domestic pre-emptive approach.¹¹² A series of recent terrorist plots and occurrences concerned with individuals of a certain descent, born or raised in the United States has put increased pressure on the government to pursue effective counter-terrorism policy at home, including counter-radicalization.¹¹³ For example, the Bipartisan Policy Center released a report which observed that “[t]he American ‘melting pot’ has not provided a firewall¹¹⁴ against the radicalization and conscription of American citizens.¹¹⁵ Thus, much attention has been drawn to the problem of domestic radicalization by designated representatives, such as Muslim minority groups.¹¹⁶

While domestic counter-radicalization is on an upsurge, it could potentially face legal tensions and tactical confusions.¹¹⁷ From a legal perspective, counter-radicalization conflicts with the fundamental principle of religious freedom incorporated in the First Amendment’s

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹¹ *Ibid* at 128.

¹¹² *Ibid.*

¹¹³ *Ibid* at 129.

¹¹⁴ The widespread ambivalent opposition to multiculturalism and the fact that it has failed in Western nation-states has become a common trope in counter-radicalization discourse. This failed integration thus has resulted in the need for more muscular measures in managing minorities. See Anthony Heath & Neli Demireva, “Has multiculturalism failed in Britain?” (2013) 37:1 *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 161 at 161-162.

¹¹⁵ Rascoff, *supra* note 101 at 129.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*

Religion Clauses.¹¹⁸ A stark problem that can arise out of the logic of counter-radicalization is that it may contribute to the “establishment” of “Official Islam”:¹¹⁹ a government-sponsored interpretation of “mainstream Islam” offered by the state instead of radical doctrinal alternatives.¹²⁰ The formulation of a preferred conception of Islam endorsed by the government is potentially antithetical to the core values of the Establishment Clause in the United States.¹²¹ While the government has moulded religious beliefs and practices previously, there is no convincing legal underpinning for the present-day preoccupation with Official Islam.¹²²

The continuous tension between security and liberty may even supply “[t]he defining character of American constitutional government.”¹²³ Framed in this way, in a government with divided powers, who determines what is a reasonable degree of guaranteed freedom; be it in war or peace is not well delegated to the Executive Branch of Government, whose obligation is to preserve security.¹²⁴ Moreover, warfare engenders a challenge to the protection of rudimentary rights.¹²⁵ However, the interrelationship between religious freedom and national security has seldom been explored.¹²⁶

The post-September 11 era has brought many important inquiries to the forefront about the approach to religion and security.¹²⁷ According to Silvio Ferrari, it is difficult to contend that

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁹ *Ibid* at 130 (asserting that “Official Islam” indicates the Islam in the imagination of national security professionals whose objective is to interject an account of Islam that is sponsored by the state as an alternative to radical variants. However, there are a myriad of conflicting descriptions of Official Islam. For example, certain officials or contractors have taught law enforcement officers that Islam is fundamentally to blame for contemporary terrorism). See also Dana Priest & William M. Arkin, “Monitoring America”, *Washington Post* (20 December 2010), online: <<http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/articles/monitoring-america/>>.

¹²⁰ Rascoff, *supra* note 101 at 130.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*

¹²² *Ibid.*

¹²³ *Hamdi v Rumsfeld*, 542 US 507 at para 545, (US 2004).

¹²⁴ *Ibid* at para 545.

¹²⁵ Rascoff, *supra* note 101 at 131.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*

¹²⁷ Silvio Ferrari, “Individual Religious Freedom and National Security in Europe After September 11” (2004) 2004:2 *Brigham Young University Law Review* 357 at 357.

religious freedom is an inalienable right or that fundamental human rights can be enjoyed in a secure and enabling environment.¹²⁸ While Ferrari accepts both statements as true, he argues that one should not be prioritized over the other, but that a common ground ought to be determined between religious liberty and security to simultaneously produce both.¹²⁹ Furthermore, Ferrari argues that acts of terror stemming from religion are not merely confined to Muslims, but rather can include Christianity.¹³⁰ However, in the West discourses surrounding religion and security often place Islam as the pivot of analysis.¹³¹ The concepts, then, that this chapter mentions are not merely any type of “counter-radicalization” or insurgency, but one imagined in a particular way. Within this context, while counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency is alleged to have rich conceptual underpinnings, counter-radicalization lacks the same type of groundwork.¹³²

Advocates of counter-radicalization suggest that indications of violent extremism are embedded in ideas and social-behavioural processes.¹³³ Comprehending and tackling those ideas and processes will counteract future attacks and thus ought to play a critical role in American counter-terrorism policy.¹³⁴ Nevertheless, these rudimentary suppositions produce a diverse array of theoretical possibilities about what counter-radicalization is, how it ought to be conducted, and how the government can allocate its resources in grappling with security threats in modern-day society.¹³⁵

To achieve its counter-radicalization objectives, the government may employ secular and religious methodologies.¹³⁶ In instances where counter-radicalization employs a secular

¹²⁸ *Ibid* at 358.

¹²⁹ *Ibid* at 359.

¹³⁰ *Ibid*.

¹³¹ *Ibid*

¹³² Rascoff, *supra* note 101 at 137.

¹³³ *Ibid*.

¹³⁴ *Ibid*.

¹³⁵ *Ibid*.

¹³⁶ *Ibid* at 138.

methodology, the government attempts to address the socio-political conditions that make objectional religious ideas appealing “without direct reference to or interference in religion or ideology.”¹³⁷ Posed from this perspective, foreign policy representatives refer to the U.S. financial support for majority-Muslim countries as discharging a counter-radicalization purpose.¹³⁸ The State Department’s top counter-terrorism official has observed that “[s]ome of our aid programs will help address underlying conditions for at-risk populations. Reducing corruption and building legitimate institutions with our assistance will also reduce the appeal of extremism.”¹³⁹ An example of secular counter-radicalization, on the home front, is provided by government-supported sports leagues intended to operate as channels for youthful energy among teenagers perceived to be at risk for radicalization.¹⁴⁰ Programs of this sort are correlated with police department programs and are intended to target children and teenagers at stake for gang affiliation or other criminal activity.¹⁴¹ Additionally, the Obama Administration touted the use of “good governance programs – including those that promote immigrant integration and civic engagement, protect civil rights, and provide social services” as part of its domestic counter-radicalization strategy.¹⁴² In sum, the precise logic of these sorts of counter-radicalization programs rests on preventing individuals from adopting extremist ideologies and becoming radicalized, even though they arguably operate through more benign yet prevalent means.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

¹³⁹ Daniel Benjamin, “Keynote: Jamestown Yemen Conference”, Remarks (2010) Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, online: <https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/041510-DB-Jamestown-Yemen-FINAL.pdf>>.

¹⁴⁰ See, e.g., “NYPD Forms Cricket League for New York City Youth” (22 July 2008), online: NYPD <http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/pr/pr_2008_029.shtml>.

¹⁴¹ Rascoff, *supra* note 101 at 139.

¹⁴² In August 2011, the Obama Administration formally debuted its domestic counter-radicalization strategy. See, US, White House Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States (2011), online: http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/empowering_local_partners.pdf>.

In some cases, as previously discussed, counter-radicalization pursues some of its objectives through secular methodologies and employs a religious means to achieve its purpose in other cases.¹⁴³ For instance, under the command of General Doug Stone, American officials charged with supervising the detention of Iraqi prisoners of war produced a “directory” that contrasted “moderate” and “radical” passages from the Quran. Stone aimed to disprove prisoners when they use certain passages to advocate a radical understanding of Islam.¹⁴⁴ They also created “the world’s most moderate Hadith” to coordinate conventional Islamic learning with American strategic objectives.¹⁴⁵ Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller refer to these apparatuses of control as *governmental* technologies that encompass calculations, techniques, frameworks and systems that which authorities employ as a means to employ and exert the objectives of liberal democracies.¹⁴⁶ Similarly, the US State Department has also subsidized trips to Muslim countries by Muslim-American religious leaders as part of an official effort to “bring a moderate perspective to foreign audiences on what it’s like to be a practicing Muslim in the United States.”¹⁴⁷ At a Senate committee hearing committed to aspects of contemporary counter-radicalization, a veteran FBI and CIA official required an informal *imam* training¹⁴⁸ as part of a

¹⁴³ Rascoff, *supra* note 101 at 139.

¹⁴⁴ Scott Thompson, “House of Wisdom or a House of Cards? Why Teaching Islam in U.S. Foreign Detention Facilities Violates the Establishment Clause” (2009) 88:2 Nebraska Law Review 341 at 341.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid* at 344.

¹⁴⁶ Rose & Miller, *supra* note 51 at 273-274.

¹⁴⁷ Matthew Lee, “U.S. State Department Sending Imam of Proposed New York Mosque to Middle East”, *Washington Post* (12 August 2010), online: < <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/11/AR2010081106254.html> >.

¹⁴⁸ Following the attacks of 9/11 and the expansion of the use of violence often legitimated by religion in Islamic countries, *imams* as religious actors supporting Muslim segregation and the lack of inclination to integrate - became the pivot of public dialogues. Thus, politicians considered *imams* to be the root cause of the failure of integration of Muslims in Europe. Trained *imams* thus have the duty to promote the integration of Muslims, thwart violence, resolve enigmas between society and Muslims and advance the enlightenment of Islam. See Ednan Aslan & Zsofia Windisch, *The Training of Imams and Teachers for Islamic Education in Europe* (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2012).

larger tactic. However, training of this sort was not meant to be a theological approach.¹⁴⁹

Viewed from this perspective, the core values of the Establishment Clause face serious risks when the government employs overtly religious modalities to attain its counter-radicalization objectives.¹⁵⁰

Undoubtedly, contemporary societies' Western-led War on Terrorism (also referred to as the Global War on Terror)¹⁵¹ marks rights contraventions. The War on Terror is the pivot of polemical controversy in attempts to strike a balance between heightened security measures and freedom of speech that liberal democracies pride themselves on.¹⁵² Despite a brief and since reversed shift towards a more reasonable policy oratory in the post-George W. Bush era, the persistence of the War on Terror in media and political debates is an omnipresent dictum for a series of measures. Such measures generate new policing powers of search and seizure and curbs mobility and privacy rights in a myriad of complex ways.¹⁵³

Responses to September 11 have undeniably, created a climate of fear, insecurity, and religious conflicts. Viewed from this perspective, terrorism and counter-terrorism experts have commonly accepted the view that terrorism is contingent upon the radicalization of its fomenters and perpetrators.¹⁵⁴ This is most evident in the expert testimony Sageman¹⁵⁵ gave to the US Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs whereby he stated that “the understanding of this process of ‘radicalization’ is critical to assessing the threat facing the West

¹⁴⁹ US, *A Ticking Time Bomb: Counterterrorism Lessons from the U.S. Government's Failure to Prevent the Fort Hood Attack: Hearing Before the Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs*, 112th Cong 11 (2011) (J. Philip Mudd).

¹⁵⁰ Rascoff, *supra* note 101 at 140.

¹⁵¹ Jeffrey H. Michaels, *The Discourse Trap and the US Military* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

¹⁵² Bell, *supra* note 103 at 2.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁴ David R. Mandel, *Radicalization: What does it mean?* in Thomas Pick, Anne Speckhard & Beatrice Jaunch, eds, *Home-grown Terrorism: Understanding and Addressing the Root Causes of Radicalization Among Groups with an Immigrant Heritage in Europe* (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2009) at 101.

¹⁵⁵ US, *Radicalization of global Islamist terrorist: Testimony presented to US Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs* (2007) (Marc Sageman) at 1, online: <http://www.globalfuturesforum.org/ReadingDetail.php?rid=520>.

and should be the basis guiding our interventions to counter it”.¹⁵⁶ Radicalization serves as a vehicle for motivational and cognitive preconditions that is ripe for terrorism.¹⁵⁷ The foregoing seems to suggest that the first step in combating terrorism, effectively and at an earlier stage, is understanding and combating radicalization.¹⁵⁸

Moreover, Sageman, among others, have dismissed the idea that radicalization occurs aptly in a fixed series of phases, and in contrast, others view radicalization as the precursor to terrorism that is characterized by a methodical sequence of stages.¹⁵⁹ Silber and Bhatt,¹⁶⁰ two senior intelligence analysts from the New York Police Department’s Intelligence Division, suggests a four-stage model comprising of pre-radicalization, self-identification, indoctrination, and “jihadization” stages, correspondingly.¹⁶¹ In the pre-radicalization stage, the individual lives an ordinary life and has not yet been introduced to extremist ideology. In the self-identification stage, the individual begins to consider the radical ideology, which is often generated due to a “cognitive opening” or predicament which changes his/her formerly held beliefs.¹⁶² In the indoctrination stage, the individual’s radical beliefs is amplified, often with support and encouragement from compatible group members under the tutelage of an ideological leader.¹⁶³ In the final jihadization stage, individuals voluntarily commit themselves to carrying out acts of terrorism or becoming martyrs.¹⁶⁴ According to Silber and Bhatt’s stage models, radicalization

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁷ Mandel, *supra* note 154 at 101.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁰ New York, New York Police Department, *Radicalization in the West: The homegrown threat*, (New York: New York Police Department, 2007) at 6 (Mitchell D. Silber & Arvin Bhatt).

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶² *Ibid.*

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.* For a definition of martyrdom, see Lindsay R. Calhoun, “Islamic Martyrdom in the Postcolonial Condition” (2004) 24:3/4 *Text and Performance Quarterly* 327 (Martyrdom is a spectacle of violence that is intended to draw attention to the act itself and to freeze the viewer in an act of witnessing. Individuals often commit themselves to martyrdom to devote themselves to a ‘higher power’ by means of, often, violent tribulation, resulting in demise or self-sacrifice).

provides the pathway leading from the ordinary life of individuals to committing oneself to terrorist activity.¹⁶⁵ However, according to David Mandel, such models do not account for the psychological, structural, and social processes and factors that draw individuals into becoming radicalized initially, and the persistence of radicalization leads people to commit acts of terror.¹⁶⁶

Despite radicalization often being viewed as an antecedent to terrorism or even a fundamental cause thereof, it is commonly accepted that, although radicalization proliferates the possibility for such acts of violence, it does not require any of them.¹⁶⁷ Viewed from this perspective, not all radicals are terrorists and thus radicalization cannot be viewed as the fundamental and sufficient cause of terrorism.¹⁶⁸ This suggests why the term *violent radicalization* is often highly contested in discourses surrounding terrorism. If violence was compelled by means of radicalization, the qualified term would be superfluous.¹⁶⁹ Thus, the widespread use of terms like violent radicalization and militant radicalization would seem to indicate that most theorists do not view radicalization as a putative cause of terrorism or any other forms of violence.¹⁷⁰ Moreover, radicalization does not seem to necessitate terrorism. In this view, if the process of radicalization is viewed predominantly as a psycho-social one (as Silber and Bhatt's model suggests),¹⁷¹ then planned and deliberate acts of terror would indicate that radicalization is redundant for terrorism to transpire.¹⁷² It is, then, important to dismiss the idea that radicalization is the sufficient cause for terrorism when grappling with the question of how to characterize the relationship between the two.¹⁷³ Thus, Mandel suggests that it is

¹⁶⁵ Mandel, *supra* note 154 at 102.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁷¹ Silber & Bhatt, *supra* note 160 at 6.

¹⁷² Mandel, *supra* note 154 at 102.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*

incumbent on terrorism scholars and counter-terrorism practitioners to first clearly define what *radicalization* means prior to demarcating the relationship between radicalization and terrorism.¹⁷⁴

Since there is no widely accepted definition of radicalization, which in turn, engenders many contentions that surround its definition, Scholar Peter Neumann¹⁷⁵ pursues a similar line to that of Mandel.¹⁷⁶ Neumann argues that while radicalization is not a myth, the paradox rests between radicalization that accentuate extremist beliefs ('cognitive radicalization')¹⁷⁷ and those that emphasize extremist behaviour ('behavioural radicalization').¹⁷⁸ Neumann presents two areas of controversy and ambiguity of radicalization: its 'end-points,' its context and issues surrounding its normativity.¹⁷⁹ The idea of radicalization as a process does not pose a particular controversy for Neumann. In fact, almost all academic models of radicalization such as Fathali Moghadam's 'staircase',¹⁸⁰ Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko's 'pyramid',¹⁸¹ or Zeyno Baran's 'conveyor belt'¹⁸² commonly accept that extremism is not triggered by one single factor but rather conceptualize the latter as a phenomenon that occurs over time and encompasses a wide array of causes.¹⁸³

To explore the foregoing models in more detail, Moghaddam's 'staircase' rests on the supposition that terrorists are produced through a process driven by different psychological

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁵ Peter R. Neumann, "The Trouble With Radicalization" (2013) 89:4 *International Affairs* 873 at 873.

¹⁷⁶ Mandel, *supra* note 154 at 102.

¹⁷⁷ According to Anne Aly and Jason-Leigh Striegher, 'cognitive radicalization' is the adherence to a set of radical ideologies. See Anne Aly & Jason-Leigh Striegher, "Examining the Role of Religion in Radicalization to Violent Islamist Extremism" (2012) 35:12 *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 849.

¹⁷⁸ Neumann, *supra* note 175 at 873. Anne Aly and Jason Leigh Striegher describes 'behavioural radicalization' as a predisposition to adopting violence as a means to an end. See Aly & Striegher, *supra* note 177 at 850.

¹⁷⁹ Neumann, *supra* note 175 at 874.

¹⁸⁰ Fathali M. Moghadam, "The staircase to terrorism: a psychological exploration" (2005) 60:2 *American Psychologist* 161 at 161.

¹⁸¹ Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, "Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism" (2008) 20:3 *Terrorism and Political Violence* 415.

¹⁸² Zeyno Baran, "Fighting the War of Ideas" (2005) 84:6 *Foreign Affairs* 68.

¹⁸³ Neumann, *supra* note 175 at 874.

factors.¹⁸⁴ He depicts terrorism as the final stage of a six-step narrowing staircase.¹⁸⁵ The concept of a narrowing staircase indicates that the individual is facing, to an increasing extent, a finite set of options for action as he/she moves into the later stages of the model.¹⁸⁶ As the individual continues aloft the Staircase to Terrorism, committing acts of terror will become germane as a choice of action, until in the last stage, terrorism is perceived to be the only solution to the individual's problems.¹⁸⁷ Alternatively, McCauley and Moskalenko's 'pyramid' suggests that since terrorists consist of a limited group of individuals in relation to all those who share their beliefs and ideologies, terrorist may be thought of as the apex of the pyramid.¹⁸⁸ Framed in this way, the base of the pyramid constitutes all of those who support with the goals the terrorist claim they are fighting for.¹⁸⁹ From base to apex, higher levels of the pyramid are linked with declining numbers but increased radicalization of ideologies and behaviours.¹⁹⁰ Thus, their model conceptualizes radicalization in such a way that it differentiates terrorists from those who sympathize with them.¹⁹¹

Lastly, Zeyno Baran's 'conveyor belt' model refers to the obscure, yet complementary organization to al Qaeda, devoted to ideological struggle, namely, Hizbut-Tahrir (HT, or the Party of Liberation) to explicate his conveyor belt.¹⁹² HT is a transnational movement that has served as a radical Sunni Islamism's ideological forefront.¹⁹³ While HT is not a terrorist organization, it can be considered as a conveyor belt for terrorists. It inculcates individuals with extremist beliefs and prepares them for recruitment by more extreme organizations where they

¹⁸⁴ Moghadam, *supra* note 180 at 161.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid* at 161.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁸ McCauley & Moskalenko, *supra* note 181 at 415.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid* at 417.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁹² Baran, *supra* note 182 at 68.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*

can participate in actual operations.¹⁹⁴ While these models diverge with respect to length and intricacy, all models conceptualize the idea that becoming a ‘radical’ is a process and that studying radicalization is about the revelation of that progression.¹⁹⁵

While the relationship between radicalization and the notion of extremism has been hailed with suspicion, the uncertainty lies in extremism.¹⁹⁶ The latter, according to Roger Scruton, can have several definitions.¹⁹⁷ It can describe *political ideas* that are antipodal to a society’s fundamental values. There can be many forms of racial or religious hegemony, or beliefs, in liberal democracies in particular, that repudiate basic human rights or democratic values.¹⁹⁸ On the other hand, it can be described by the *methods* that actors employ to fulfill political objectives, specifically by ‘show[ing] disregard for the life, liberty, and human rights of others’.¹⁹⁹ Viewed from this perspective, the “end-state” of radicalization is yet to be determined. For some, radicalization is a merely a cognitive phenomenon that reaches its pinnacle due to extremist ideologies about the art of governance in a given society, while for others it is defined purely by the violent actions in which those beliefs result.²⁰⁰

The second area of controversy surrounding radicalization, for Neumann, relates to context and normative issues.²⁰¹ He argues that the content of the word ‘radical’ varies depending on what is viewed and accepted as orthodox in a society or a particular time period.²⁰² The word ‘radical’ is then context-dependent; stimulated by differences in political, cultural, and

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁵ Neumann, *supra* note 175 at 874.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid* at 874-875.

¹⁹⁹ Roger Scruton, *The Palgrave Macmillan Dictionary of Political Thought*, 3rd ed (Basingstroke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

²⁰⁰ Neumann, *supra* note 175 at 875.

²⁰¹ *Ibid* at 876.

²⁰² *Ibid.*

historical contexts.²⁰³ For example, while the doctrine of free speech would be considered radical in North Korea, Western liberal democracies view it as a mainstream belief.²⁰⁴ Freedom of speech is one of the cornerstones of democratic states and if rendered illusory or ineffective, then such a state is democratic in theory, but not in practice. Similarly, gay marriage was viewed as radical in the 1980s, however, those who oppose the idea in modern-day society are depicted as ‘fundamentalists’ and ‘radicals’.²⁰⁵ Thus, labelling people or individuals as radicals often raises the question of “radical in relation to what?”²⁰⁶ This holds true for the progression of *becoming* radical – often dependent on what is considered orthodox or tolerable and the espousal of certain beliefs that may be perceived as radical.²⁰⁷

Since the content of the word ‘radical’ is dependent upon its context and often equivocal, it is not always associated with extremism.²⁰⁸ Contrarily, the United States is an example where not only is being radical no crime, but the idea of ‘radicalism’ has positive connotations in a nation whose establishing principles were viewed as both radical, yet ground-breaking, especially at the time.²⁰⁹ Historian Gordon S. Wood best describes this as, “[The American revolution] was the greatest revolution the world has known, a momentous upheaval that not only fundamentally altered the character of American society, but decisively affected the course of subsequent history.”²¹⁰ As a result, American history books emphasize constitutionally guaranteed freedoms (often taken for granted) that were fought for by individuals who were labelled and denounced as dangerous ‘radicals’.²¹¹ Similarly, those advocating for the eradication of slavery were

²⁰³ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁷ Mandel, *supra* note 154 at 102.

²⁰⁸ Neumann, *supra* note 175 at 875.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid* at 877.

²¹⁰ Gordon S. Wood, *The Radicals of the American Revolution* (New York: Vintage, 1991) at 5.

²¹¹ Neumann, *supra* note 175 at 877.

confronted with vicious mobs and inimical policy-makers; women who campaigned for their voting rights were called “hysterical” and were not allowed to speak publicly; and Martin Luther King Jr, a civil rights activist, faced threats from the government.²¹² The aforementioned experiences are employed by the US government to persuade its contemporaries that ‘radicals’ have been the drivers of revolutionary change.²¹³

It is not surprising, then, that critics often see the term ‘radicalization’ as an antithesis to rights and freedoms. This meant that the government had ulterior motives, rather than combating terrorism their objective was to criminalize people who held views that were antithetical to the status quo.²¹⁴ Viewed from this perspective, the notion of radicalization, “was little more than a Trojan horse allowing governments to clamp down on dissent and portray progressive and unconventional views as dangerous.”²¹⁵ What can be gathered from all this is that the word ‘radicalization’, similar to terrorism, is often employed by governments and officials to serve political agendas that hamper its potential as an object of study.²¹⁶ The matter of definition and conceptualization of radicalization, like terrorism, can take many forms amongst different people or groups. Posed from this perspective, “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter”.²¹⁷ While the struggle to define terrorism is pronounced, it is even more difficult to clearly explicate radicalization. Terrorism is often defined in relation to its motivations and the *modus operandi* of individual terrorists.²¹⁸ While the foregoing might be an aside, it is worth noting that what constitutes acceptable warfare is no more natural than what constitutes radicalization, since rules

²¹² Timothy McCarthy and John McMillian, *The Radical Reader: A Documentary History of the American Radical Tradition* (New York: Free Press, 2003) at 3-4.

²¹³ Neumann, *supra* note 175 at 877.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*

²¹⁶ *Ibid* at 878.

²¹⁷ See Boaz Ganor, *Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?* (nd), online: International Institute for Counterterrorism <<https://www.ict.org.il/Article/1123/Defining-Terrorism-Is-One-Mans-Terrorist-Another-Mans-Freedom-Fighter>>.

²¹⁸ Neumann, *supra* note 175 at 878.

for warfare are merely arbitrary products of culture.²¹⁹ Thus, what amounts to acceptable warfare and unacceptable (i.e. terrorism) is also context-dependent.

2.3 United Kingdom (UK)

Notwithstanding that it has been more than a decade since the 9/11 attacks of 2001 against the Twin Towers of the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, scholars like Hamed El-Said evinces that organized terrorism persists as a major threat in many communities on a global scale.²²⁰ Thus, as the ‘War on Terror’ persists in contemporary society and the fight against radicalism and its by-product, violent extremism, is of paramount concern to several states,²²¹ many countries are launching counter-radicalization programs seeking to disengage committed militants.²²² Within this context, the United Kingdom, accompanied by other European states, like the Netherlands,²²³ has espoused a community-focused de-radicalization²²⁴ strand as a central constituent of its counter-terrorism strategy.²²⁵ CONTEST, is the UK’s counterterrorist strategy, which has described radicalization as the process by which people promote or support violent extremism and even join terrorist groups in some cases.²²⁶ This definition appears to

²¹⁹ Frédéric Mégret, "From 'Savages' to 'Unlawful Combatants': A Postcolonial Look at International Humanitarian Law's 'Other'" in Anne Orford, ed, *International Law and Its Others* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 265 at 308-310.

²²⁰ Hamed El-Said, *New Approaches to Countering Terrorism: Designing and Evaluating Counter-Radicalization and De-Radicalization Programs* (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015) at 2.

²²¹ *Ibid.*

²²² *Ibid* at 5.

²²³ Teun Van Dongen, “Mapping Counterterrorism: A Categorisation of Policies and the Promise of Empirically Based, Systematic Comparisons” (2010) 3:2 *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 227 at 227 [Dongen, “Mapping Counterterrorism”].

²²⁴ Whereas counter-radicalization efforts occur prior to any suspected criminal act, de-radicalization interventions take place afterwards. See Brown, *supra* note 63 at 36.

²²⁵ Therese O’Toole, Daniel Nilsson DeHanas & Tariq Modood, “Balancing Tolerance, Security and Muslim Engagement in the United Kingdom: The Impact of the ‘Prevent’ Agenda” (2012) 5:3 *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 373 at 373.

²²⁶ UK, United Kingdom Home Department, *Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism*’ (2009) at 11, online: <http://www.northants.police.uk/sites/default/files/The%2520Governments%2520Counter%2520Terrorism%2520Strategy%5B1%5D.pdf>.

contain the notion that radicalization is inseparably concomitant with violence.²²⁷ However, Demos noted that the last decade has seen a rise in a range of ‘*non-violent* radicalization’. Demos thus contended that the efficacy of counterterrorism strategies ought to be grounded on a clear understanding of such discrete forms of radicalization.²²⁸

Alongside the Protect, Pursue and Prepare filaments of ‘CONTEST’, covering security, surveillance and detection and civil preparedness is Prevent. The broad remit of Prevent is to halt especially vulnerable persons from becoming radicalized, joining extremist groups and carrying out terrorist-related activities through engagement with Muslim communities.²²⁹ The Prevent strategy appeared in the government’s CONTEST counter-terrorism approach that was launched in the United Kingdom in 2003 by the then New Labour government. However, it contained an inconsequential role in comparison to other filaments and or strands.²³⁰ Following the London attacks of 7 July 2005, Prevent became a much more vigorous component of CONTEST as the government grappled to deal with the threat of ‘home-grown’ terrorism.²³¹ Prevent was envisaged as a “hearts and minds” approach designed at ‘challenging the violent extremist ideology and supporting mainstream voices’.²³² This scheme viewed partnering with Muslim communities as vital to confronting radicalization and the spread of violent extremism.²³³

In the Prevent strategy, a ‘hearts and minds’ approach was assumed necessary to counter a disconcerting feature of the terrorist attacks that had occurred, namely, the London attack in

²²⁷ Anthony Richards, “The Problem with ‘Radicalization’: The Remit of ‘Prevent’ and the Need to Refocus on Terrorism in the UK” (2011) 87:1 *International Affairs* 143 at 145.

²²⁸ The Demos report defines non-violent radicalization as ‘the process by which individuals come to hold radical views in relation to the status quo but do not undertake, or directly aid or abet terrorist activity’. See Jamie Bartlett & Carl Miller, “The Edge of Violence: Towards Telling the Difference Between Violent and Non-Violent Radicalization” (2011) 21:1 *Terrorism and Political Violence* 1 at 6.

²²⁹ O’Toole *et al*, *supra* note 225 at 373.

²³⁰ UK, House of Commons, “Preventing violent extremism: sixth report of session 2009-10. Communities and Local Government Committee” (2010).

²³¹ O’Toole *et al*, *supra* note 225 at 373.

²³² *Ibid.*

²³³ *Ibid.*

2005 – such that they had involved British-born Muslims as opposed to foreign operatives.²³⁴

The approach of the New Labour government of the time was to provide community engagement across a variety of policy fields. This strategy was reinforced through a communitarian logic that viewed communities as not only possessing the social capital and resources to reach policy goals, but also as having a responsibility to actively participate in governance, service delivery and addressing policy problems, such as antisocial behaviour or youth disaffection.²³⁵ This broader agenda also encompassed the mobilization of Muslim communities to partner with government in order to tackle radicalization along religious lines.²³⁶ Engagement with faith-based organizations was, considerably, a progressively remarkable feature of the governance landscape under New Labour.²³⁷ Faith groups, to an increasingly extent, were considered as important participants in British society, and the New Labour government viewed their engagement as critical to policies of social inclusion.²³⁸ The UK government’s interest in relation to faith communities became conspicuous with the advent of the Inner Cities Religious Council in the Department of Environment (subsequently DETR).²³⁹ It is thus important to emphasize that the genealogy of counter-radicalization in the UK embraced matters that had little to do with terrorism, but focuses more on ideas of community, ethnicity, “immigration,” and “public order.”²⁴⁰

²³⁴ *Ibid.*

²³⁵ Ash Amin, “Local Community on Trial” (2007) 43:4 *Economy and Society* 612 at 612.

²³⁶ O’Toole *et al*, *supra* note 225 at 375.

²³⁷ Adam Dinham & Vivien Lowndes, “Religion, Resources, and Representation: Three Narratives of Faith Engagement in British Urban Governance” (2008) 43:6 *Urban Affairs Review* 817 at 817.

²³⁸ *Ibid.*

²³⁹ Greg Smith, “Faith in Community and Communities of Faith? Government Rhetoric and Religious Identity in Urban Britain” (2004) 19:2 *Journal of Contemporary Religion* 185 at 192.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid* at 192 (indicating that this approach can be seen as a response to the concerns enunciated in the *Faith in the City* report commissioned by the Archbishop of Canterbury following upheavals in urban areas in the early 1980s).

As a response to the conflicts in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham in the summer of 2001, the government introduced the Community Cohesion programme.²⁴¹ The disturbances were characterized by hostilities amongst young Muslims of Pakistani heritage and the police.²⁴² The Cantle Report which was the official report on the conflicts, placed ethnic isolation as the pivotal point in which the disturbances arose.²⁴³ This suggested that ethnic groups in the affected areas were living ‘parallel lives’ and suggestions were made to foster ‘Community Cohesion’ in place of what was viewed as more separatist policies of multiculturalism.²⁴⁴ Subsequent to the events of 9/11, dialogues on separatism and the failures of multiculturalism became less concerned with ethnicity and shifted more towards religion. Discourses of separatism focused more on assertions about Muslims’ lack of assimilation, which increased succeeding the London attacks in 2005.²⁴⁵ The shift towards Community Cohesion by the Home Office, in placing importance on Community Cohesion, defined a unified community as one where all communities have a sense of belonging. Moreover, the Home Office envisaged that positive relations are being developed amongst people from different ethnicities in the workplace, as well as schools and within neighbourhoods.²⁴⁶ In working towards attaining its objectives, the Community Cohesion agenda stressed community engagement, contending that cohesion and change that is ‘real’ can only happen when different sections of the community are involved.²⁴⁷ This engendered a host of initiatives at local level to encourage binding social capital across ethnic and religious groups.²⁴⁸

²⁴¹ O’Toole *et al*, *supra* note 225 at 376.

²⁴² *Ibid*.

²⁴³ *Ibid*.

²⁴⁴ *Ibid*.

²⁴⁵ *Ibid*.

²⁴⁶ Local Government Association, “Guidance on Community Cohesion” (2002) at 6, online: <
<http://www.tedcantle.co.uk/publications/006%20Guidance%20on%20Community%20Cohesion%20LGA%202002.pdf>>.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid* at 10.

²⁴⁸ O’Toole *et al*, *supra* note 225 at 376.

The New Labour government considered Community Cohesion critical to recognizing the goals of Prevent.²⁴⁹

The Prevent strategy requires specific response, but we must also make the most of the links with wider community work to reduce inequalities, tackle racism and other forms of extremism (e.g. extreme far right), build cohesion and empower communities [...] Likewise, it is recognized that the arguments of violent extremists, which rely on creating a ‘them’ and an ‘us’, are less likely to find traction in cohesive communities.²⁵⁰

Following the relaunching of the Prevent strategy in 2007, four key purposes were identified.

These objectives cogitated concerns and the ways in which diversity was governed, stated as:

“promoting shared values, supporting local solutions, building civic capacity and leadership and strengthening the role of faith institutions and leaders”.²⁵¹ The 2007 strategy thus intended to

place a strong emphasis on improving attitudes and practices of British Muslims. This was to be

deployed through a series of interventions and reforms in the religious domain and civic

organization, political representation and youth and community work.²⁵² These included

capacity-building projects to amend the governing of mosques and sources of religious

influencers in the UK, with the creation of the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board.²⁵³

It encouraged the development of religiously based narratives to counter ideologies that was

encouraged by al-Qaeda through projects such as the Radical Middle Way.²⁵⁴

Moreover, by creating the National Muslim Women’s Advisory Group and the Young Muslims Advisory Group in 2008, it also aimed to diversify the structures surrounding Muslims’

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁰ UK, Department for Communities and Local Government, *Delivering Prevent – Responding to Learning* (London: Department for Communities and Local Government, 2008) at 6-7 [UK, Department for Communities, *Delivering Prevent*].

²⁵¹ UK, Department for Communities and Local Government, *Preventing Violent Extremism – Winning Hearts and Minds* (London: Department of Communities and Local Government, 2007b) at 5 [UK, Department for Communities, *Preventing Violent Extremism* 2007b].

²⁵² O’Toole *et al*, *supra* note 225 at 376.

²⁵³ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁴ Shane Brighton, “British Muslims, Multiculturalism and UK Foreign Policy: ‘Integration’ and ‘Cohesion’ in and Beyond The State” (2007) 83:1 *International Affairs* 1 at 1.

representation, and persons on which the government trusted for consultation purposes.²⁵⁵

Additionally, there were several youth engagement, women's and counter-radicalization developments at the local level, with funding for outreach such as Strategy to Reach Empower and Educate Teenagers. The latter was a group based in Brixton, which aimed to connect with young people perceived to be at risk of radicalization, and for Quilliam, a 'counter-extremism' committee that received €2.7 million funding to participate in counter-radicalization projects – making it the greatest recipient of Prevent funding. By way of such interventions, the Labour government specified its desire to “fundamentally rebalance our engagement”.²⁵⁶

Following its commencement and implementation, Prevent was largely criticized. One commenter viewed it as being ‘failed and friendless’.²⁵⁷ Specifically, Prevent was hailed with suspicion by those Muslim communities with whom the government sought to partner who tended to see it as an instrument for the surveillance of Muslim populations.²⁵⁸ Moreover, many were critical of the ways in which the Prevent programme was fused with the government's Community Cohesion²⁵⁹ agenda.²⁶⁰ Fusing or merging of this sort, in turn, dissipated the objectives and justification of Prevent and at the same time, securitized and undermined Community Cohesion.²⁶¹ The new strategy stipulated numerous new guidelines for Prevent. The Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) was to focus on unity and

²⁵⁵ O'Toole *et al*, *supra* note 225 at 376.

²⁵⁶ UK, Department for Communities, *Preventing Violent Extremism* 2007b, *supra* note 251 at 5.

²⁵⁷ Paul Thomas, “Failed and Friendless: the UK's ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ Programme” (2010) 12:3 *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 442 at 442.

²⁵⁸ Yahya Birt, “Promoting Virulent Envy? Reconsidering the UK's Terrorist Prevention Strategy” (2009) 154:4 *The RUSI Journal* 52 at 52.

²⁵⁹ ‘Community cohesion’ is widely considered as the ‘new’ framework by which race relations policy are governed in the UK. See Claire Worley, “It's Not About Race. It's About the Community’: New Labour and ‘Community Cohesion’” (2005) 25:4 *Critical Social Policy* 483.

²⁶⁰ O'Toole *et al*, *supra* note 225 at 374.

²⁶¹ Thomas, *supra* note 257 at 442.

integration.²⁶² Moreover, the new strategy also heralded that the government strengthen its position on how it engages with Muslim groups - underscoring that engagement ought to be restricted to those groups that embrace a communal commitment to fundamental British values.²⁶³

According to O'Toole et al., the values-led approach raised three serious difficulties and consequences.²⁶⁴ In the first, the strategy implicitly and at times was overtly fixated on restructuring values and attitudes held by British Muslims.²⁶⁵ Consequently, many Muslims who demurred to the stigmatizing effects of this focus were estranged in this process.²⁶⁶ The 'Preventing Violent Extremism' (PVE) programme itself signified some frictions regarding this. PVE noted, on the one hand, that there has "always been a tiny minority who oppose tolerance and diversity."²⁶⁷ On the other hand, its calculated goals predominantly targeted Muslims, in which it specified a "key measure of success will be demonstrable changes in attitudes among Muslims".²⁶⁸ This approach faced much criticism by Muslim actors in the government as designating Muslims as a problem.²⁶⁹ A former senior equalities public servant, Waqar Azmi, stated that:

I advised senior people in government at that time that the approach we were taking is wrong. That we shouldn't be saying that this is a Muslim problem. We shouldn't be saying that Islam is a problem [...] if you were to do that then the very communities that we need in order to deal with this issue will not be with us.

²⁶² O'Toole *et al*, *supra* note 225 at 374.

²⁶³ *Ibid*.

²⁶⁴ *Ibid* at 377.

²⁶⁵ *Ibid*.

²⁶⁶ *Ibid*.

²⁶⁷ UK, Department for Communities and Local Government, *Preventing Violent Extremism – Winning Hearts and Minds* (London: Department of Communities and Local Government, 2007a) at 1 [UK, Department for Communities, *Preventing Violent Extremism* 2007a].

²⁶⁸ *Ibid* at 7.

²⁶⁹ O'Toole *et al*, *supra* note 225 at 377.

According to Teun van Dongen, while Muslim community engagement has appeared notably within the UK's counterterrorism and de-radicalization strategies, its implementation has been rather complex.²⁷⁰ This element has been largely disparaged as part of the counterterrorism policy, specifically since it has coincided with strategies of cohesion and integration.²⁷¹ The separation of these programs became a priority for the government that followed the New Labour government in the UK²⁷² Many local actors oppose this objective – for them, Community Cohesion is vital to a efficacious Prevent strategy.²⁷³ Accordingly, there has been no symptom that these agendas will not be detached in practice, notwithstanding that local actors often have different purposes when contending for a continued relationship amongst Prevent and cohesion.²⁷⁴ This is, to some degree, due to the nebulous or flexible nature of 'Community Cohesion'.²⁷⁵ Yet, whether cohesion is significant to the delivery of Prevent remains questionable. This is to say that the position of the Coalition government of this time faced criticism for creating difficulties for local actors and the implementation of Prevent on the ground.²⁷⁶

In particular, to the extent that an effectual integration strategy is considered as imperative to the success of Prevent, O'Toole et al., contends that the then Coalition's declaration on integration offers little direction to local actors.²⁷⁷ Posed in this way, the Coalition's position on "muscular liberalism", and conditions vis-à-vis abstaining from engagement with non-violent extremists (i.e. 'Islamists'), was regarded as constricting the terms of engagement with

²⁷⁰ Dongen, "Mapping Counterterrorism," *supra* note 223 at 227.

²⁷¹ O'Toole *et al*, *supra* note 225 at 386.

²⁷² *Ibid* at 387.

²⁷³ *Ibid*.

²⁷⁴ *Ibid*.

²⁷⁵ *Ibid*.

²⁷⁶ *Ibid*.

²⁷⁷ *Ibid*.

Muslims.²⁷⁸ It is also believed to restrict local authorities' engagement with a variety of major organizations and partners.²⁷⁹ This has suggestive consequences in Tower Hamlets, where 'Islamist' organizations such as the East London Mosque are profoundly entrenched in local governance networks and forums and key to the delivery of local priorities. Thus, disembedding them would be onerous, but also counterproductive.²⁸⁰ With respect to the involvement of the community, the new Prevent strategy has been criticized for tendering an insubstantial conception of community engagement.²⁸¹ If the new Prevent strategy may indicate less involvement with communities and less acceptance of non-liberal Muslim groups, local actors motivated by operational or normative concerns are pursuing rather different objectives.²⁸² It is then, suggested that such inadvertent localism may bear more participatory modes of engagement with Muslims.²⁸³

2.4 Australia

Australia has seen a significant increase in its Muslim populations since the 1970s.²⁸⁴ The events of 9/11 have raised concerns about the place of Islam and Muslims in Australia.²⁸⁵ The London bombings of 7 July 2005 propelled further questions about integrating Muslims into secular societies and liberal democracies.²⁸⁶ In 2005, the Australian Government under Prime Minister John Howard assembled the Muslim Community Reference Group for guidance in responding to the threat of "home-grown" terrorism and the most effective way of responding to

²⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁸¹ *Ibid.*

²⁸² *Ibid.*

²⁸³ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁴ Shahram Akbarzadeh, "Investing in Mentoring and Educational Initiatives: The Limits of De-Radicalisation Programmes in Australia" (2013) 33:4 *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 451 at 451.

²⁸⁵ *Ibid* at 453.

²⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

it.²⁸⁷ This Group comprised eminent Muslim community leaders and several younger Muslims to capture the variety of the Australian Muslim population. The recommendations of this Group have had a long-lasting effect on how the Australian Government manages or governs its Muslim populations. The Australian Government places emphasis on three pivotal areas with the objective of preventing home-grown terrorism: youth issues, education (including Islamic education for *imams*) and interfaith/intercultural relations.²⁸⁸

Following a set of proposals made by the Muslim Reference Group, a National Action Plan was developed to build social cohesion, harmony and security. The National Action plan, as part of its key component, established a national centre for Islamic studies at a prominent Australian university.²⁸⁹ On July 16, 2006 the Australian Minister of Education, Science and Training and the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs made a joint declaration regarding a \$8 million pledge to set up a superlative Islamic studies centre over the period of four years.²⁹⁰ In January 2007, the University of Melbourne in association with the Griffith University and the University of Western Sydney were designated as the hosts to the new National Centre of Excellence for Islamic Studies (NCEIS). The NCEIS project conceived close community involvement in the development of the curriculum to tackle the lacunae recognized in preceding reports and discussed by the Muslim Reference Group.²⁹¹ While the Australian Government did not openly stipulate that *imams* be trained, there was however, a clear expectation that NCEIS would make a direct contribution to *imam* training and education.

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²⁸⁷ *Ibid* at 455.

²⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁹ *Ibid* at 456.

²⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁹¹ *Ibid.*

²⁹² *Ibid.*

The significance of education and *imam* training in Islamic scholarship across Australian universities was to prevent the further radicalization of Muslim youth.²⁹³ However, while it was intended that the NCEIS would contribute to the training of *imams*, it lacked the capacity to fulfill the expectations for *imam* training.²⁹⁴ NCEIS could not function outside the framework of the university, which overtly and implicitly encourages scrutinizing conventional wisdom and doctrine.²⁹⁵ The NCEIS association, instead, fostered a scholarly study of Islam and Islamic civilization at the undergraduate and post-graduate levels. The subjects taught encompass an array of topics, from the Quran and Hadith to Islamic civilizations, to the media treatment of Islam and Muslims, to the politics of the Middle East.²⁹⁶ While this may be a significant service to the Australian society by providing education to the public on a religion that is vastly misconstrued, Imams have remained outside the reach of the NCEIS.²⁹⁷

Policy recommendations from the Muslim Reference Group have persistently informed the Australian Government.²⁹⁸ The Labour Government that came into office after the defeat of the Liberal-National coalition upheld the high level of investment in measures to thwart radicalization.²⁹⁹ In 2010 the Australia Attorney-General Department developed the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Taskforce.³⁰⁰ As its first measures, the Department's aim was to commission a report. The report titled, *Countering Violent Extremism Literature Review* and released by the Australian Government Defence Department, identified several issues surrounding the concept of radicalization.³⁰¹ The most notable concern was the limited

²⁹³ *Ibid* at 452.

²⁹⁴ *Ibid* at 456.

²⁹⁵ *Ibid* at 457.

²⁹⁶ *Ibid*.

²⁹⁷ *Ibid*.

²⁹⁸ *Ibid*.

²⁹⁹ *Ibid*.

³⁰⁰ *Ibid* at 458.

³⁰¹ *Ibid*.

collaboration between university centres of research and scholarship and government units that were charged with producing and enacting policies on the menace of Islamic radicalism.³⁰² In order to alleviate this gap, the CVE report suggested investment in research and scholarship into a range of factors conducive to violence and fabricating techniques for governmental agencies to benefit from this prowess.³⁰³

Moreover, the CVE begun two grant plans: Building Community Resilience Youth Mentoring Programme and Building Community Resilience. The mentoring dimensions incorporated in most youth programmes matches youth from at-risk communities with successful role models to train them with the most useful social and political skills.³⁰⁴ This mentoring feature operates on the logic that engagement of Muslim youth in the political system will strengthen their “sense of purpose.” This sense of purpose is intended to steer them away from extremism, which is commonly understood to feed on frustration and a lack of trust in the system.³⁰⁵

Under the Building Community Resilience scheme, three major areas of concern is recognized: the need to offer communities the skills and resources to address bigotry and discourage violent extremism, support individuals most susceptible to violent extremism, and to provide education about participation in political debate.³⁰⁶ Projects funded under this scheme largely emphasize on youth education, both in Islamic scholarship and also in generic leadership skills.³⁰⁷ One of the unique projects was *Sharing Humanity*, governed by the Lebanese Muslim Association in Sydney. The project designated 10 men and 10 women who were Muslim to take

³⁰² *Ibid.*

³⁰³ Shandon Harris-Hogan, Kate Barrelle & Andrew Zammit, “What is Countering Violent Extremism? Exploring CVE Policy and Practice in Australia” (2015) 8:1 Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression 1 at 10-11.

³⁰⁴ Akbarzadeh, *supra* note 284 at 458.

³⁰⁵ *Ibid* at 458.

³⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

part in a leadership programme that comprised education on Islamic scholarship. This was to provide the participants with a counter-narrative to the radical reading of Islamic texts.³⁰⁸ The project was originated in 2011 with the intention to:

...work to build understanding and equip Muslims with the ideological fundamentals that counter extremist ideologies, dispel misconceptions and develop their role as citizens, leaders and positive role models so that they can become “leaders” for mainstream Islam and assert their Australian identity.³⁰⁹

Moreover, another similar project, namely, *Peer to Peer: Building Capacity and Resilience* aimed at educating at-risk Muslim youth was introduced by the Australian Multicultural Foundation. The project predominantly aimed to: engage with ten Muslim youth identified by Imams, community leaders and Muslim Youth Leaders as being predisposed to radicalization.³¹⁰ With the support of Imams and Muslim Youth Leaders as mentors, these youths would develop an understanding of the fundamental principles of Islam, as opposed to violent extremist ideology.³¹¹ These, generally, indicate that countering the jihadi understanding of Islam is crucial to subverting the threat of extremism.³¹²

Educating individuals at risk of adopting extremist ideologies is viewed, by government agencies, as highly significant to subverting or reversing the process of Islamic radicalization.³¹³ Australian agencies are learning from the experience of other states and note the significance of former jihadis in mounting a challenge to the fundamental belief system of Islamic extremism. Al-Sayyid Imam and Abdul-Aziz al-Sharif, two former jihadis, have written expansively on the shortcomings of al-Qaeda.³¹⁴ Abdul-Aziz al-Sharif has published two books in Arabic,

³⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

³¹⁰ *Ibid* at 459.

³¹¹ *Ibid.*

³¹² *Ibid.*

³¹³ *Ibid.*

³¹⁴ *Ibid.*

challenging Zawaheri's interpretation of the concept of jihad³¹⁵, particularly as it pertains to violence against civilians.³¹⁶ For Zawaheri, jihad is an obligation for Muslims around the globe, and more specifically, when non-believers encroaches on the lands of Muslims.³¹⁷ Publications have had a tremendous impact in contesting extremist ideologies and their assertion to the reliability of Islam. Earlier jihadi writers utilize terminology and vocabulary that is recognizable to radical extremists, which in turn, confirm the radical interpretation of the relationship amongst Islam and the West.³¹⁸

Furthermore, the distinction between the former jihadi and current jihadi beliefs has little to do with the view of the world, but rather how difficulties amongst Muslims can be contained.³¹⁹ Former jihadis disprove the rightfulness of violence against civilians by referring to Islamic texts and Prophetic Traditions. Thus, they are more reputable among other young jihadis in present times. As a result, it is assumed that much of the literature on counter-extremism has the potential to deter young jihadis from committing violent acts.³²⁰ Education is thus understood to counteract extremism since the latter is supposed to be rooted in a lack of awareness and familiarity, as well as a selective interpretation of Islam. The educational approach has, to some extent, been perceived as worthwhile to countering extremism.³²¹ However, the counter-

³¹⁵ Jihadism is used to describe Islamist militant movements often perceived as a threat to the West. A jihadist group may consist of small or large, for which violence is the only means to achieve their objectives. See Mohammed M. Hafez, *Suicide Bombers in Iraq* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007).

³¹⁶ Akbarzadeh, *supra* note 284 at 459.

³¹⁷ Thomas Joscelyn, "Zawahiri Lectures on Global Jihad, Warns of National Boundaries", online: (2017) Long War Journal <<https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/06/zawahiri-lectures-on-global-jihad-warns-of-national-boundaries.php>>.

³¹⁸ Akbarzadeh, *supra* note 284 at 460.

³¹⁹ *Ibid.*

³²⁰ *Ibid.*

³²¹ *Ibid.*

extremist strategy has been criticized for disregarding the broader context within which young Australian Muslims undergo the process of radicalization.³²²

2.5 Netherlands

Similar to the US, UK and Australia, the Netherlands have adopted counter-radicalization measures in response to the threat of extremism.³²³ Dutch authorities were among the first in Europe to encounter the threat of homegrown terrorism.³²⁴ This was largely due to a group of young Muslim youth, most of whom were Dutch-born, belonging to the purported Hofstad network disseminated their radical ideology and planned attacks in 2002.³²⁵ The assassination of Theo van Gogh in 2004 created apprehension, however Dutch authorities believe that the most violent forms of radical Islam receive little support among Dutch Muslims.³²⁶ Moreover, Dutch officials believe that individuals engineering acts of terror in the Netherlands entail merely an isolated minority.³²⁷ However, Dutch officials have observed the growth of a different element of radical Islam in the country, which they state to be “political Salafism” or “radical *da`wa*.”³²⁸ Political Salafists do not attain their objectives through violence, but rather aim to establish small Muslim societies within mainstream Dutch society.³²⁹ While most values embraced in the West are rejected by the political Salafists, the latter group uses complex methods to turn Muslims away, both physically and mentally, from the societies which surrounds them.³³⁰ Viewed from this perspective, Dutch officials view the process of radicalization as both, a threat to security as

³²² *Ibid.*

³²³ Lorenzo Vidino, “A Preliminary Assessment of Counter-Radicalization in the Netherlands” (2008) 1:9 Combating Terrorism Center <<https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/a-preliminary-assessment-of-counter-radicalization-in-the-netherlands>> [Vidino, “Preliminary Assessment”].

³²⁴ *Ibid.*

³²⁵ Lorenzo Vidino, “The Hofstad Group: The New Face of Terrorist Networks in Europe” (2007) 30:7 Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 579 at 579.

³²⁶ Vidino, “Preliminary Assessment,” *supra* note 323.

³²⁷ *Ibid.*

³²⁸ Netherlands, General Intelligence and Security Service, *The Radical Dawā in Transition*, (Netherlands: 2007) [Netherlands, GISS, *The Radical Dawā in Transition*].

³²⁹ Vidino, “Preliminary Assessment,” *supra* note 323.

³³⁰ Netherlands, GISS, *The Radical Dawā in Transition*, *supra* note 328.

well as to the democratic legal order, as it generates social disruption and mounting polarization.³³¹

In an effort to tackle the threat of terrorism and radicalization, the ‘plan’ was envisaged by the Dutch government in 2004 in response to Islamic fundamentalism (sometimes applied to ring-wing militancy) and has considerably advanced since then.³³² It is important to note that the Dutch counter-radicalization model is notably different than the US and the UK in considering the application of some its measures to groups that are not Muslim. The plan has two key characteristics: its local focus and the high number of parts involved.³³³ With regards to the local focus, the Dutch government deems local authorities as better suited to identifying problems and implementing solutions.³³⁴ Central authorities, on the one hand, provide general guidelines, training, and part of the funding, on the other, local authorities have almost complete discretion on how to act.³³⁵ As a result, large cities in the Netherlands have created their own programs, each having distinctive characteristics, despite that most are designed after Amsterdam’s program (called *Wij Amsterdammers*).³³⁶ The plan is characterized by the collaboration of ministries, governmental agencies, local authorities, social services, education facilities, think-tanks, religious institutions and freelance consultants.³³⁷ The concept of openness, the sharing of information and constant inputs tend to be the guiding principles of the plan.³³⁸

One of the key characteristics of all the programs is their flexibility which grants authorities with a series of measures and approaches to apply according to their targets and

³³¹ Netherlands, Municipality of Amsterdam, *Amsterdam Against Radicalisation*, (Amsterdam: 2007).

³³² Vidino, “Preliminary Assessment,” *supra* note 323.

³³³ Netherlands, Netherlands National Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, *Counterterrorism at Local Level: A Guide*, (Netherlands: 2007) [Netherlands, NNCC, *Counterterrorism*].

³³⁴ Vidino, “Preliminary Assessment,” *supra* note 323.

³³⁵ *Ibid.*

³³⁶ *Ibid.*

³³⁷ *Ibid.*

³³⁸ *Ibid.*

intended objectives.³³⁹ Measures that are repressive can be deployed by authorities when dealing with individuals who may exert the use of violence.³⁴⁰ However, if an individual is believed to have become radicalized and that their radical ideologies can be reversed, authorities may employ a curative approach. Distinct from approaches to countering radicalization, a curative approach applies deradicalization measures that are intended to steer away individuals from their radical ideologies and bind them back into mainstream society.³⁴¹ The programs deal with individuals confronting an identity crisis through various measures intended to assist them search for a meaningful place in society that adheres to democratic values in lieu of Salafism.³⁴²

Lastly, there are an array of activities available to authorities which target the sense of disaffection with mainstream society experienced or felt by Muslim youth, the supposed “breeding ground.”³⁴³ Dutch officials have noted that there are numerous factors that can engender such breeding grounds. Of the most discernible factor is the perception of injustice and discrimination that can lead disenchanted young Muslims to break contact with mainstream society and find an alternative in Salafism. To address the breeding ground, all programs offer many preventative measures that accentuate mutual tolerance and acceptance that are calculated to sway Muslim youth from radical messages.³⁴⁴

Many programs intended to counter the threat of radicalization tend to place emphasis on empowering individuals and to make them feel like members of society.³⁴⁵ Barbara Cruikshank reminds us that “technologies of citizenship,” are power that is exercised in the learned and well

³³⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

³⁴¹ *Ibid.*

³⁴² *Ibid.*

³⁴³ *Ibid.*

³⁴⁴ Netherlands, NNCC, *Counterterrorism*, *supra* note 333.

³⁴⁵ Vidino, “Preliminary Assessment,” *supra* note 323.

established ways that citizenship is embodied.³⁴⁶ It is through these technologies of power that communities are charged with their own management. These technologies do not rely on institutional governance or power that lies within the state but rather entail the conformity of citizens.³⁴⁷ The conferences, meetings, training sessions, and neighbourhood projects organized by Dutch officials rely on this technology of empowerment. In the same vein, many initiatives are also proposed to contest the undesirable depiction of Islam amongst the Dutch population, often viewed as an impediment to integration.³⁴⁸ Many cities have thus organized events to unite ethnic Dutch and Muslims, such as interfaith discussions and neighbourhood festivals. The city of Amsterdam, in particular, arranged a Ramadan festival that was intended to appeal to all ‘Amsterdammers’.³⁴⁹ Moreover, some programs are specifically designed for women, the liberation of whom is considered a critical step in enhancing social cohesion, while others are devised to accommodate particular age groups.³⁵⁰ Some programs are also designed to provide public officials and social workers with skills to identify, counteract, and combat radicalization.³⁵¹

Dutch authorities have suggested that radicalization is not merely due to poor economic conditions. They argue that improving life conditions and creating work opportunities amongst communities that are poor can increase social cohesion.³⁵² Dutch authorities claim that by offering professional skills designed to facilitate the entrance of minority youths in the job

³⁴⁶ Barbara Cruikshank, *The Will to Empower: Democratic Citizens and Other Subjects* (New York, Cornell University Press, 1999) at 124.

³⁴⁷ Marcus Leaning, eds, *In Issues in Information and Media Literacy: Criticism, History and Policy* (Santa Rose: Informing Science Press, 2009) at 24-25.

³⁴⁸ Vidino, “Preliminary Assessment,” *supra* note 323.

³⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

³⁵¹ *Ibid.*

³⁵² Netherlands, Netherlands Ministry of Immigration and Integration, *Policies of Integration and Prevention of Radicalisation in the Netherlands: A Progress Report*, (Netherlands: 2006).

market, they will assist in counteracting radicalization.³⁵³ Additionally, counter-radicalization programs are harmonized with the Ministry of Housing to improve living conditions in impoverished neighbourhoods.

Moreover, the focuses of self-empowerment in the Dutch programs have all the hallmarks of gang prevention programs implemented in the United States rather than counter-radicalization programs.³⁵⁴ There are profuse reasons as to why Dutch authorities have decided to limit religion as their key focus. In the first, the existence of constitutional norms appertaining to the separation of church and state make it a challenge for officials to interpose in religious matters.³⁵⁵ Secondly, Dutch authorities have acknowledged that a religious-based approach might be more beneficial in deradicalization efforts rather than the prevention of radicalization.³⁵⁶ Since the Dutch believe to have only some ‘hardened radicals,’ a preventative approach rooted in self-empowerment and the construction of a positive view of Dutch society is viewed as the appropriate approach in radicalization prevention.³⁵⁷ Lastly, the difficulties arising from selecting partners among Muslim communities have prevented Dutch authorities from introducing more religious-based programs.³⁵⁸ Many programs have reached out to notable figures in the community in an attempt to employ them as mentors. However, selecting religious figures as partners has been a challenging task.³⁵⁹ While the involvement of religious organizations is vital for the success of the programs, officials recognize that there is not one particular Muslim community with a cohesive leadership. Thus, the decision of whom to engage

³⁵³ Vidino, “Preliminary Assessment,” *supra* note 323.

³⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

or select is rather difficult.³⁶⁰ Moreover, despite that most of the Muslim organizations and individuals that partake in the programs and receive public funding are apolitical, some others espouse a form of Islamism.³⁶¹

In countering radicalization, Dutch officials are confronted with the same predicament that most other Western countries have been faced with; whether non-violent Islamists be involved and used as partners against violent radicalization.³⁶² Moreover, Dutch representatives have contemplated whether political Salafists in the Netherlands can become partners against the appeal of jihadists.³⁶³ They advise that many ‘voices’ can be involved insofar as they do not encourage violence, since excluding or isolating non-violent Islamists may potentially result in undesirable consequences.³⁶⁴ However, authorities have noted that non-violent Islamists cannot be permanent partners since there is a clear understanding that these groups and their ideologies are antithetical to the fundamentals of democracy, integration and a cohesive society.³⁶⁵

An assessment of whom to engage is evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Framed in this way, authorities engage non-violent Islamists where a common ground is established.³⁶⁶ This policy first originated prior to the release of the film *Fitna* by Dutch Member of Parliament Geer Wilders which generated a great deal of controversies. There were several meetings held by security services with radical Salafist imams in the Netherlands. The purpose of these meetings was twofold: to inform the Salafist imams that the Dutch government did not support Wilders’ views and to obtain a vow from the imams that they would advise their supporters against

³⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

³⁶¹ *Ibid.*

³⁶² Peter Mandaville, “Engaging Islamists in the West” (2008) 1:7 Combating Terrorism Center <<https://ctc.usma.edu/engaging-islamists-in-the-west/>>.

³⁶³ Vidino, “Preliminary Assessment,” *supra* note 323.

³⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

responding violently to the movie.³⁶⁷ Yet, security services do not designate political Salafists as trustworthy partners and even instruct local authorities against doing so.³⁶⁸ Advice provided by security services is most significant since political Salafists have been approaching municipalities and provinces offering partnership in counter-radicalization and integration programs.³⁶⁹

Lorenzo Vidino, an expert on Islamism in Europe and North America, describes the relationship between Dutch officials and political Salafists as a complex “game.” While political Salafists exhibit some form of moderation to partake in the system, Dutch representatives herald some openness but remain dubious of Salafists’ claims.³⁷⁰ Vidino notes that the Dutch appear to handle the situation well with political Salafists. However, Vidino also asserts that their duty becomes even more difficult in evaluating the aims of individuals who are more ambiguous.³⁷¹ The most stark example of an ambiguous figure is Mohammed Cheppih, Moroccan Dutch who is infamous to authorities for having suspicious networks.³⁷² Cheppih was the Dutch representative of the Saudi-based Muslim World League and the Belgian-based Arab European League, an organization that Dutch domestic intelligence has designated as antipodal to integration.³⁷³ In the last few years, Cheppih has denounced his associations from the past and has claimed to be supportive of integration.³⁷⁴ In present times, Cheppih is involved in numerous government-sponsored counter-radicalization programs and leads the Poldermoskee, a mosque situated in Amsterdam’s Slotervaart area.³⁷⁵ While Cheppih’s past connections remain unclear and whether

³⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

³⁷¹ *Ibid.*

³⁷² *Ibid.*

³⁷³ Netherlands, General Intelligence and Security Service, *2002 Annual Report* (2002) at 26.

³⁷⁴ Vidino, “Preliminary Assessment,” *supra* note 323.

³⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

his recent moderation is opportunistic, authorities have nonetheless chosen to consider him a reliable source.³⁷⁶

Having assessed the effectiveness of the programs, Vidino asserts that there are many challenges.³⁷⁷ According to him, one of the challenges that some programs have faced is the difficulty in getting participants to their courses. This is largely due to radicals targeting young Muslims from the neighbourhood who wish to attend.³⁷⁸ Schools that are critical to the programs have also been indisposed to participate due to little consideration for the fact that some of their students may potentially espouse radical ideas.³⁷⁹ Consistent with Vidino's assessment, most programs do not lack funding (*Wij Amsterdammers* alone had an €8 million budget in 2007), are well-designed, and continuously adjust according to the results and responses from the field.³⁸⁰ While most Western countries are looking to form counter-radicalization plans, Vidino suggests that the UK is the only other Western country that has a well-financed plan, and argues that the Dutch initiative ought to be further enhanced.³⁸¹

Conclusion

The events of 9/11 in the United States have, indeed, had tremendous impacts on both international politics and the everyday lives of Muslims, particularly in Europe and the US.³⁸² Although 9/11 may have given new impetus and exigency to counter-radicalization, many of the programmes and their logics and practices, predate the purported events of transformation. Thus, many European countries have established comprehensive counter-radicalization programs as

³⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

³⁸¹ *Ibid.*

³⁸² Mikkel Rytter & Marianne Holm Pedersen, "A decade of suspicion: Islam and Muslims in Denmark after 9/11" (2014) 37:13 *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 2303 at 2303.

part of their counter-terrorism strategies in order to thwart the threat of radicalization.³⁸³

Authorities are now grappling with determining clear metrics to evaluate the efficacy of their counter-radicalization programs.³⁸⁴ As a result, assessing the potency of counter-radicalization measures remains an intrinsically arduous task.³⁸⁵

Nonetheless, it is possible to categorize the counter-radicalization approaches of different countries based on their focus, objectives or measures. Viewed from this perspective, the U.S. largely adheres to the preventative logic of counter-terrorism which focuses on strategies that reduce the risk and intensity of future terrorist attacks.³⁸⁶ The UK³⁸⁷ and the Netherlands, on the other hand, have adopted a community-focused de-radicalization strand as part of their counter-terrorism strategy.³⁸⁸ More distinctively, Australia's counter-radicalization strategy is national and university focused.³⁸⁹ To prevent home-grown terrorism, the Australian government places emphasis on issues relating to youth, education and inter-faith/intercultural relations.³⁹⁰

Thus, in examining counter-radicalization across different states, it can be said that some states have local or national models, while others are community or university focused. Moreover, states have differing agendas or approaches to countering radicalization. For example, the Netherlands adopt a preventative approach that is grounded in self-empowerment in the prevention of radicalization, while Australia focuses on education in universities, including Islamic education for *imams*. The overlapping or different agendas may potentially exaggerate

³⁸³ Vidino, "Europe's Experience in Countering Radicalisation," *supra* note 64 at 163.

³⁸⁴ Lorenzo Vidino & James Brandon, "Countering Radicalization in Europe" The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (2012), online: ICSR <<http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/ICSR-Report-Countering-Radicalization-in-Europe.pdf>> at 2 [Vidino & Brandon, "Countering Radicalization in Europe"].

³⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁸⁶ Rascoff, *supra* note 101 at 127.

³⁸⁷ O'Toole *et al*, *supra* note 225 at 373.

³⁸⁸ Vidino, "Preliminary Assessment," *supra* note 323.

³⁸⁹ Akbarzadeh, *supra* note 284 at 456.

³⁹⁰ Akbarzadeh, *supra* note 284 at 455.

the apparent threat of radicalization amongst youth that seemingly leads to future terrorist attacks.

It is reasonable to conclude this chapter by asserting that “counter-radicalization” and “countering violent extremism” (CVE) programs across different nation states are employed to combat “terrorism” before it transpires. State interventions that may be invasive are thus legitimated as pre-emptive measures to terrorist attacks without requiring anyone to violent or any crime to be committed.³⁹¹ These pre-emptive approaches raise serious questions about the civil liberties of citizens in the West,³⁹² by casting Muslim populations as risks to be managed. Counter-radicalization strategies across states such as the US, UK, Australia and the Netherlands provoke various debates about the development of such programmes in Canada. The following chapter will discuss the discourses, laws, and policies pertinent to the approaches of those counter-radicalization initiatives in Canada.

³⁹¹ Azeezah Kanji, “Counter-Radicalization Requires a Radical Rethink”, *The Star* (1 December 2016), online: <<https://www.thestar.com/opinion/commentary/2016/12/01/counter-radicalization-requires-a-radical-rethink.html>> [Kanji, “Counter-Radicalization Requires a Radical Rethink”].

³⁹² *Ibid.*

Chapter 3: Counter-Radicalization Policy in Canada

The preceding chapter elucidated how the term ‘radicalization’ has both contributed to, and been the subject of the social construction of risk encircling violence and radicalization across many nation states. To this end, contemporary discussions of radicalization related to ideas of predisposition and vulnerability to ‘extremism’ present in counter-radicalization discourse raises a set of problematics. Whereas the previous chapter set out counter-radicalization strategies in the US, UK, Australia and the Netherlands from a comparative and historical perspective, this chapter will solely focus on counter-radicalization initiative(s) in Canada. While Canada has only recently introduced its own counter-radicalization program, it can consult with leading Western countries with an array of distinctive approaches to combating the threat of violent extremism.³⁹³ Despite the robust counter-radicalization programs established in various countries, their efficacy remains dubious. This chapter will provide an extensive review and engagement with counter-radicalization policies, discourses, concepts, institutions, and laws in Canada.

3.1 Counter-Radicalization Debates in Security Agencies

While ‘radical’ and ‘radicalism’ have long been part of political thought, ‘radicalization’ is a relatively novel element twenty-first century. However, as illustrated in the preceding chapter, the leitmotif of radicalization has become more prominent post-9/11 particularly with regard to Islam.³⁹⁴ In Canada, security agencies have, to an increasing extent, become

³⁹³ Evan Dyer, “Canada De-Radicalization Dilemma: Lots of Approaches But No Clear Formula for Success” *CBC News* (20 August 2016), online: < <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/deradicalization-approaches-us-denmark-britain-germany-1.3727930>>.

³⁹⁴ Jeffrey Monaghan, “Criminal Justice Policy Transfer and Prison Counter-Radicalization: Examining Canadian Participation in the Roma-Lyon Group” (2015) 30:3 *Canadian Journal of Law and Society* 381 at 386.

apprehensive about the threat of domestic radicalization.³⁹⁵ Radicalization and violent extremism are frequently cited interchangeably. However, radicalization specifically is used as a description of the departure from modest and conventional beliefs towards radical views.³⁹⁶ The relationship between radicalization (mainly branches of Islam) and the threats of political violence which fall within the threshold of homegrown terrorism is what binds radicalization and extremism together.³⁹⁷ Listed as a preeminent threat to the national security of Canada,³⁹⁸ “violent Islamic extremism” has become the pivot of programs targeting Muslim populations,³⁹⁹ much similar the United States, United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Australia as discussed in the preceding chapter.

The focus on domestic and/or “homegrown” terrorism appears to have taken shape in the mid-late 2000s.⁴⁰⁰ Canada’s adoption of discourses relating to radicalization and extremism can largely be ascribed to domestic “homegrown” attacks in other Western countries such as the Madrid bombings, London’s 7/7 attacks, as well as the detainment of Momin Khawaja in 2006.⁴⁰¹ Khawaja was the first person to be charged and impeached under the criminal procedures set out in the 2001 *Anti-Terrorism Act*.⁴⁰² According to Andrew Crosby and Jeffrey Monaghan, the medium of potential national security threats have included a myriad of potential groups including unspecified protests and Indigenous movements.⁴⁰³ In particular, violent stalemates between police and Indigenous peoples in Canada are not new and have aroused as a

³⁹⁵ Jeffrey Monaghan, “Security Traps and Discourses of Radicalization: Examining Surveillance Practices Targeting Muslims in Canada” (2014) 12:4 *Surveillance & Society* 485 at 485 [Monaghan, “Security Traps”].

³⁹⁶ See Canada, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, *Radicalization: A Guide for the Perplexed* (Ottawa: Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 2009) at 1 [Canada, RCMP, *Radicalization*].

³⁹⁷ Monaghan, “Security Traps,” *supra* note 395 at 485.

³⁹⁸ Canada, Public Safety Canada, *Building Resilience Against Terrorism: Canada’s Counter-terrorism Strategy*, (Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2012).

³⁹⁹ Monaghan, “Security Traps,” *supra* note 395 at 486.

⁴⁰⁰ *Ibid* at 487.

⁴⁰¹ *Ibid*.

⁴⁰² *Ibid*.

⁴⁰³ Andrew Crosby & Jeffrey Monaghan, “Settler Governmentality and the Algonquin of Barriere Lake” (2012) 43:2 *Security Dialogue* 420 at 422 [Crosby & Monaghan, “Settler Governmentality”].

result of conflicts over land claims and treaty rights.⁴⁰⁴ This is mostly evident in regions such as Gustavson Lake, Caledonia and Barriere Lake, which has generated substantial attention in the media and state imaginary.⁴⁰⁵ Canadian officials, and Canadians as a whole, promote the idea that espouses equal rights for everyone in postcolonial times.⁴⁰⁶ However, despite the fact that violent standoffs routinely occur between Indigenous peoples, the contemporary political climate largely focuses on Islamic terrorism.⁴⁰⁷ The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) preserves an Intelligence Assessment Branch (IAB) that claims to have gathered and analyzed data on Islamic extremism, homegrown terrorism and violent radicalization in Canada for more than a decade.⁴⁰⁸ Despite that Canadian authorities have proposed various definitions of key concepts (radicalization, homegrown extremism, terrorism),⁴⁰⁹ their lack of clarity and consensus continue to perpetuate ill-defined narratives.

In 2005, CSIS⁴¹⁰ issued its first report on “how Canadian Islamic extremists were radicalizing.”⁴¹¹ Following this, CSIS published various reports emphasizing Islamic radicalization and extremism.⁴¹² Some of these reports were titled: *The Radicalization of Canadian Muslims* (2005); *From Radicalization to Jihadization: The radicalizers: the Islamist extremism threat to Canada from within* (2006); *A Study of Radicalization: The Making of Islamic Extremists in Canada Today* (2011).⁴¹³ These esoteric titles illustrate the constructions of Muslims as inherently fanatical and susceptible to violence, thus opening up discursive spaces

⁴⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰⁷ Monaghan, “Security Traps,” *supra* note 395 at 487.

⁴⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴¹⁰ Canada, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, *Access to Information Act request 117-2012-440*, (Ottawa: Canadian Security Intelligence, 2012) at 42-60 [Canada, CSIS, *Access to Information Act request 117-2012-440*].

⁴¹¹ Monaghan, “Security Traps,” *supra* note 395 at 487.

⁴¹² *Ibid.*

⁴¹³ Canada, CSIS, *Access to Information Act request 117-2012-440*, *supra* note 410 at 42-60.

for the expansion of national security resources. Moreover, much of the earlier focus on homegrown terrorism was largely concerned with Westerners leaving to join jihadist movements,⁴¹⁴ such as the case with Canada's Khadr family or that of John Lindh, known as the "American Taliban."⁴¹⁵ Although much interest remains in cases of citizens who join foreign conflicts, the considerable upsurge in studies of radicalization have refocused attention towards the threat of violence occurring *within* Western states.⁴¹⁶

In 2009, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) published the initial public guide on radicalization and domestic extremism as subject matters.⁴¹⁷ Under the abstruse title, *Radicalization: A Guide for the Perplexed*,⁴¹⁸ the RCMP⁴¹⁹ define radicalization as "the process by which individuals, usually young people, are introduced to an overtly ideological message and belief system that encourages movement from moderate, mainstream beliefs towards extreme views"⁴²⁰ However, the RCMP has advised that not all forms of radicalism or extremism leads to violence and has provided examples like Gandhi, Jesus, and Gloria Steinem. The RCMP guide states that "radical views only become a problem when they are used to promote or condone violence or other forms of extremist behaviour, including terrorism".⁴²¹ One of the significant components of the *Guide for the Perplexed* is the acknowledgement that radicalization surpasses ideological, class, religious and ethnic boundaries.⁴²² Framed in this

⁴¹⁴ Bell Stewart, *Cold Terror: How Canada Nurtures and Exports Terrorism Around the World* (Etobicoke: Wiley, 2004).

⁴¹⁵ Monaghan, "Security Traps," *supra* note 395 at 487.

⁴¹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴¹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴¹⁸ Canada, RCMP, *Radicalization*, *supra* note 396 at 1.

⁴¹⁹ Monaghan, "Security Traps," *supra* note 395 at 488.

⁴²⁰ Canada, RCMP, *Radicalization*, *supra* note 396 at 1.

⁴²¹ *Ibid.*

⁴²² Monaghan, "Security Traps," *supra* note 395 at 488.

way, Jeffrey Monaghan asserts that flexible notions of radicalization permit the evaluation of an overarching range of potential threats.⁴²³

As early as October 2010, CSIS altered their definition of radicalization by integrating a ‘Islamic-component’ to it.⁴²⁴ It is fundamental to note that this definition of radicalization incorporates an explicit reference to Islamic radicalization, whereas the latter was not subject to such direct consideration in CSIS’s former descriptions. The conditions of possibility concerning the vacillating and ambivalent relationship between terrorism and radical Islam as a form of statecraft merit special attention. While, on the one hand, security agencies surmise the idea that terrorism is concomitant with Islam; on the other hand, in a liberal democracy committed to equality and non-discrimination, they scruple from drawing an explicit connection between the two. The employment of terms such as “radicalization” then become the dominant way in which security agencies render terrorism a problematic in the contemporary political state of affairs, similar to William Walters and David Moffette’s notion that “immigration” has become the privileged code for conceptualizing “race”.⁴²⁵

CSIS thus defines Muslim radicalization as the process of departing from moderate beliefs to extremist ideologies. In particular, Islamist radicalization is the movement from conventional Islamic beliefs to a tenet that legitimizes violence to shield Islam against its rivals, to promote a fundamentalist understanding of Islam and an intolerance of both non-believers and those considered to be “impure” Muslims.⁴²⁶ CSIS builds upon the RCMP’s definition of radicalization and suggest that it is the departure from conventional beliefs and behaviours that

⁴²³ *Ibid.*

⁴²⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴²⁵ David Moffette & William Walters, “Flickering Presence: Theorizing Race and Racism in the Governmentality of Borders and Migration” (2018) 12:1 *Studies in Social Justice* 92 at 96-97.

⁴²⁶ Canada, Public Safety Canada, *Access to Information Act* request A-2013-00017. A-2011-00186 (Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2011) at 5 [Canada, PSC, *Access to Information Act* request A-2013-00017. A-2011-00186].

are acceptable to those which are, to an increasing extent, unacceptable.⁴²⁷ However, it is important to note that this shift to a language of accepted and unaccepted nonetheless perpetuates the neo-Orientalist binary of “good” and “bad” Islam. Edward Said’s work on Orientalism illustrates that Orientalists’ work served to legitimize and promote the ascendancy of Western civilizations. This was done so by fabricating a dualistic view of the West and Islam.⁴²⁸ Scholars have since noted a revival of Orientalist discourse in a new form. This neo-Orientalism, redeploys and reimagines structures of older Orientalism to construct Islam and the Muslim world as an ‘enemy’ or an ‘existential threat’ to the West.⁴²⁹ CSIS thus appears to circumvent making explicit statements on Islam as “good” or “bad” and instead, uses a lexical of “accepted” and “unaccepted” to pursue their objectives. Nonetheless replacing “good” and “bad” with “accepted” and “unaccepted” serve to make clear how CSIS continues to rely on an oppositional binary in their analysis. Moreover, emphasizing the nexus between the adoption of ideas that are intolerable with the menace of potential areas of criminal activity, CSIS suggests that radicalization, in its most extreme form, leads to the utilization of or encouragement for violence.⁴³⁰ However, just what these intolerable ideas are, and what makes them intolerable, remains unclear in the CSIS account.

There are other Canadian agencies that have also put forward elucidations of radicalization and extremism.⁴³¹ In a presentation to the Combating Violent Extremism Working

⁴²⁷ CSIS, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, *Access to Information Act* request A-2012-321 (Ottawa: Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 2012c) at 33.

⁴²⁸ Edward W. Said, “Orientalism reconsidered” (1985) 27:2 *Race & Class* 1 at 1-4.

⁴²⁹ Salim Kerboua, “From Orientalism to neo-Orientalism: Early and Contemporary Constructions of Islam and the Muslim world” (2016) 41:1 *Intellectual Discourse* 7 at 8. See also Mohammad Samiei, “Neo-Orientalism? The Relationship Between the West and Islam in our Globalised World” (2010) 31:7 *Third World Quarterly* 1145 at 1146.

⁴³⁰ Monaghan, “Security Traps,” *supra* note 395 at 488.

⁴³¹ *Ibid.*

Group (CVEWG) in June 2010,⁴³² PSC explains the connection between radicalization and domestic extremism by providing the RCMPs “two-point” definition of radicalization.⁴³³ PSC indicates that violent extremism can be the “end-point” or final stage of the process of radicalization. Noting that radicalization concomitant with Islamic extremist ideology is of particular concern, PSC states that the aim of domestic security, intelligence and law enforcement is to identify and disrupt violent extremism.⁴³⁴ Moreover, PSC also emphasizes that the process of radicalization is a precursor to terrorism.⁴³⁵ PSC concludes that radicalization resulting in violence is increasingly a security concern both in Canada and globally; thus tackling its causes and effects has become of particular interest in international counter-terrorism efforts.⁴³⁶ PSC situates the discourses of radicalization and violent extremism as the focus of counter-terrorism practices in Canada. By doing so, PSC claims to ensure that domestic efforts to counter the threat of radicalization are combined with the global dimensions of the “war on terror.”⁴³⁷

The PSC (as the chair department of the Combating Violent Extremism Working Group) has been essential to association between definitions of radicalization provided by CSIS and RCMP. These definitions explicitly target Muslims and link radicalization with broader efforts of countering terrorism and national security complexes.⁴³⁸ In a briefing produced by PSC, violent domestic extremism was elucidated under the circumstances of national security risks to

⁴³² The CVEWG, also referred to as the Interdepartmental Working Group on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism, is a dominant network for the increasing of security knowledge on matters pertaining to domestic extremism and radicalization. See Monaghan, “Security Traps,” *supra* note 395 at 486.

⁴³³ Canada, PSC, *Access to Information Act* request A-2013-00017. A-2011-00186, *supra* note 426 at 140, 172.

⁴³⁴ *Ibid* at 172.

⁴³⁵ *Ibid*.

⁴³⁶ *Ibid*.

⁴³⁷ Monaghan, “Security Traps,” *supra* note 395 at 488.

⁴³⁸ *Ibid*.

Canadians.⁴³⁹ The briefing stated the threat of violent extremism poses a menace to the national security of Canada in several direct ways. These include: when individuals, either residing in Canada or overseas, plan to execute violence against Canadians and the interests of Canadians at home or abroad; when radical undertakings on Canadian soil are deployed to orchestrate, enable or launch attacks against other countries; and when foreign extremists plan attacks against Canadian allies and international partners, destabilizing Canadian interests in security on a global scale.⁴⁴⁰ Moreover, CSIS asserts that Islamic extremism will be diffuse and an intricate threat. As such, “the insider threat,” will result in small groups of Canadians who will continue to be motivated by Islamic extremism and pursue to participate in extremist activities in Canada and overseas.⁴⁴¹

The plethora of definitions of radicalization and how it ought to be understood have come to be reflected amongst various Canadian security agencies, such as CSIS and the RCMP as well as PSC. What can be gathered from the diverse array of the definitions is that policy approaches towards countering radicalization is each embedded in different presumptions and past experiences with terrorism involving radical Islamist groups. Each agency appears to have different motives and modalities in approaching the apparent threat of violent extremism. Some definitions, such as that of PSC⁴⁴² focuses largely on the process of radicalization. Interestingly, PSC makes no explicit reference to the manifestation of violence as the final stage of radicalization. This account does not rest on the assumption that individuals undergoing radicalization will ultimately perform acts of terror. In contrast, CSIS offer an explicit account of radicalization by making clear reference to Islamic radicalization.

⁴³⁹ Canada, PSC, *Access to Information Act* request A-2013-00017. A-2011-00186, *supra* note 426 at 168.

⁴⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴¹ Canada, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, *Threat Environment to 2025*, (Ottawa: Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 2012) at 9-11.

⁴⁴² Canada, PSC, *Access to Information Act* request A-2013-00017. A-2011-00186, *supra* note 426 at 172.

3.2 Countering Radicalization to Violence

In the month of November in 2015, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau released a mandate letter to each of his new Cabinet Ministers.⁴⁴³ As the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, the letter made it incumbent on the Honourable Ralph Goodale to establish an Office of the Community Outreach and Counter-Radicalization Coordinator.⁴⁴⁴ Following this, Canada's counter-radicalization centre – the Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence (CCCEPV) was launched in 2015 by Public Safety Canada. By working with youth, communities, academia and stakeholders, CCCEPV coordinates efforts to prevent radicalization to violence.⁴⁴⁵ Under the definition set out by Public Safety Canada, “radicalization to violence” is the process whereby person(s) or a group adopts extremist ideas or beliefs and uses violence to support them.⁴⁴⁶ These violent acts can transpire in Canada as well as overseas.⁴⁴⁷ Radicalization to violence occurs amongst different groups of people for various reasons and thus, it is not a problem encountered merely by one religion, culture or background.⁴⁴⁸

Moreover, PSC has claimed that establishments and frontline employees offer the most effective solutions to combatting radicalization to violence.⁴⁴⁹ In addition, families, friends and community members are also significant actors in preventing individuals from becoming

⁴⁴³ Sara K. Thompson, Daniel Hiebert & Larry Brooks, “On the Creation of the Office of the Community Outreach and Counter-Radicalization Coordinator” *TSAS Policy Brief* (2016), online: TSAS Policy Brief <<http://www.tsas.ca/policy-brief-on-the-creation-of-the-office-of-the-community-outreach-and-counter-radicalization-coordinator/>> [Thompson et al, “On the Creation of the Office of the Community Outreach”].

⁴⁴⁴ *Ibid* at 1.

⁴⁴⁵ Public Safety Canada, “*Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence*” *Public Safety Canada* (4 May 2018), online: Public Safety Canada <<https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/bt/cc/index-en.aspx>> [Public Safety Canada, “*Canada Centre for Community Engagement*”].

⁴⁴⁶ *Ibid*.

⁴⁴⁷ *Ibid*.

⁴⁴⁸ *Ibid*.

⁴⁴⁹ *Ibid*.

radicalized to violence.⁴⁵⁰ The *Community Resilience Fund*, led by the CCCEPV contributes to intervention programming and research that reflect communities' realities.⁴⁵¹ Moreover, PSC asserts that, while radicalization to violence amongst people in Canada is currently low, one act of violence can result in calamitous consequences.⁴⁵² To that end, PSC emphasizes the numerous Government of Canada associates who work together to halt violent extremism. These include Global Affairs Canada, which works on efforts at the international level, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in law enforcement.⁴⁵³

3.3 The Existing State of Countering Violence Extremism (CVE)

According to academics and practitioners such as Sarah K. Thompson, Daniel Hiebert, and Larry Brooks, the Liberal government's decision to create the Office of the Community Outreach and Counter-Radicalization Coordinator is critical for Canada's national security in the future.⁴⁵⁴ With substantial knowledge and operational involvement on matters pertaining to radicalization to violence and community outreach, the insights of Thompson, Hiebert and Brooks help to inform the current dialogues around this initiative. Their claims particularly provide a criticism of Canada's counter-radicalization efforts. They assert that CVE, alone, cannot succeed in dealing with Canada's national security challenges.⁴⁵⁵ Instead, CVE embodies an inchoate apparatus that, if used together with other measures, could ensure public safety for Canadians.⁴⁵⁶

⁴⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵¹ "Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence Funds Project to Combat Hate", *Cision* (12 September 2017) online: Cision <<https://www.newswire.ca/news-releases/canada-centre-for-community-engagement-and-prevention-of-violence-funds-project-to-combat-hate-644009473.html>>.

⁴⁵² Public Safety Canada, "*Canada Centre for Community Engagement*," *supra* note 445.

⁴⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵⁴ Thompson *et al.*, "On the Creation of the Office of the Community Outreach," *supra* note 443 at 1.

⁴⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

Thompson, Hiebert and Brooks assert that current CVE programs and strategies are incongruent and lack uniformity.⁴⁵⁷ Viewed in this way, there is no fundamental catalogue or an established co-ordination of efforts amongst jurisdictions.⁴⁵⁸ As a matter of fact, numerous programs continue to function without ample funding and proper assessment.⁴⁵⁹ These issues, altogether, hamper endeavours to determine, detect and reproduce “best practices”.⁴⁶⁰ However, this occurrence is not particularly unique to Canada, in fact, the domain of CVE evaluation is still emerging.⁴⁶¹ Accordingly, Thompson et al. argues that a national scheme that highlights and allocates funding for processes of systematic program evaluation would present Canada with an opportunity to enrich CVE evaluation on a global scale.⁴⁶²

Moreover, Thompson et al. argues that Canada’s national security policies, like other nation states, largely emphasizes “hard security” approaches, that include investigation, arrest, detention, and imprisonment.⁴⁶³ “Soft security” approaches, which target at preventing individuals from radicalizing to violence at the onset, or to “disengage” those who have espoused violent behaviour, instead, is afforded insufficient funding and effort.⁴⁶⁴ However, Thompson et al. notes that the employment of hard and soft security approaches does not and should not rest upon being understood as an either/or judgment.⁴⁶⁵ Thus, they contend that in order for CVE strategies to be operative and viable, significant attention ought to be placed on pre-emptive and

⁴⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶¹ *Ibid* at 1-2.

⁴⁶² *Ibid* at 2.

⁴⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

plans to build resilience, and concurrently, tackling threats that may undermine national security in Canada.⁴⁶⁶

Moreover, CVE is not only within the domain of federal departments, but also other directives of governments as well.⁴⁶⁷ Viewed from this perspective, efficacious CVE is dependent upon vigorous participation and guidance at the level of civil societies.⁴⁶⁸ Thompson et al., argues that CVE initiatives presently in Canada lack a coordinated approach that would permit effectual cooperation amongst various governmental units and agencies, and between national and local enforcement agencies nationwide.⁴⁶⁹ Furthermore, Canada has yet to participate and fund in assembling multidisciplinary capacity amid front-line service providers in other divisions of government and the general public.⁴⁷⁰ Remediating this will necessitate the formation of an approach that involves coordinated partnerships implicating government; corrections; parole; police and national security agencies; social services agencies, communities and community organizations; and religious leaders.⁴⁷¹

Moreover, Thompson et al. believe that the creation of the Office of the Community Outreach and Counter-Radicalization Coordinator is a landmark opportunity that could assist in forming a more synchronized approach to counter-terrorism in Canada. This approach can be grounded on a more balanced use of “hard” and “soft” security apparatuses.⁴⁷² A comprehensive approach of this sort can be, at best, attained through continuous discussions with participants at various levels, and the establishment of programs that are espoused by directed and independent

⁴⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷² *Ibid.*

research.⁴⁷³ This will give impetus to Canada to become an international leader in debates surrounding CVE policies as a newly developing arena.⁴⁷⁴ Thompson et al. assert that the existing counter-terrorism efforts in Canada are in their nascent stages, and that governmental agencies combating violent extremism lack cohesion. The continuity of a lack of consensus can largely be ascribed to the fact that counter-radicalization practices are incipient. Thus, policy-makers and commentators often worry whether they will respond effectively to the supposed challenges that radicalization raises in present times.

3.4 The Logic of Counter-Radicalization Practices

In September 11, 2015, the former Conservative Leader Stephen Harper dedicated new money to research terrorism and radicalization.⁴⁷⁵ Harper announced that he would provide \$10 million over the course of five years to the Kanishka Project, an initiative founded in 2011 aimed at targeting terrorism-related issues on a broader scale. The project was named in remembering the Air India bombing that resulted in the fatality of 331 people in 1985 with the aim of better understanding the threat of radicalization and establishing preventative measures against potential attacks.⁴⁷⁶ Prior to October of 2014, Canada had managed to circumvent successful terrorist attacks until Martin Couture-Rouleau struck down two members of the Canadian Armed Forces with his car in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu.⁴⁷⁷ Two days later, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau drove

⁴⁷³ *Ibid* at 4.

⁴⁷⁴ *Ibid*.

⁴⁷⁵ Catherine Cullen, “Stephen Harper pledges \$10M to Research Terrorism, Radicalization”, *CBC News* (11 September 2015), online: < <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-election-2015-harper-security-attacks-1.3223995> > [Cullen, “Stephen Harper pledges \$10M to Research Terrorism”].

⁴⁷⁶ *Ibid*.

⁴⁷⁷ Maxime Deland, “Radicalized Quebecer Shot Dead After Running Down 2 Soldiers in Suspected Terrorist Attack”, *Toronto Sun* (20 October 2014), online: < <https://torontosun.com/2014/10/20/possible-terror-attack-as-soldiers-run-down-in-quebec-parking-lot/wcm/74cb0855-23bb-4782-a244-7aea18da1cf2> >.

to the War Memorial in Ottawa and shot Corporal Nathan Cirillo,⁴⁷⁸ both events dramatically impacting Canadians. In an effort to respond to intense public concerns, Public Safety Canada has provided funding for research by academics in Canada and overseas through the Kanishka project. A case in point is the government issuing a request for how jihadists utilize the internet in October 2014. Subsequently, it was revealed that the project would provide \$170,000 over two years to an Australian sociologist studying the reasons behind the conversion to Islam amongst Canadians.⁴⁷⁹

Moreover, with the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISIS), Harper emphasized that security is a key concern. He also stated that Canada's participation in the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria led by the US is acute to the wellbeing of Canadians.⁴⁸⁰ Highly condemnatory of the NDP and the Liberal government's unwillingness to join or contribute to the anti-ISIS bloc, Harper asserted that, "[a]s long as the most violent and barbarous individuals in the world are committing massacres... and as long as they continue to threaten to do the same things to Canada and Canadians, this Conservative government will remain in the international coalition fighting ISIS."⁴⁸¹

Domestically, the issues of radicalization and the significance of undermining extremist narratives loomed large under the former Harper regime, and has continued to be present in more recent Liberal policy debates under the mandate of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. Viewed from this perspective, Canadian author and academic, Monia Mazigh, and Azeezah Kanji, Director of Programming at Noor Cultural Centre, 'counter-radicalization' is often presented as an evident

⁴⁷⁸ Daniel Leblanc, "Zehaf-Bibeau's Video Proves He Was a 'Mujahadeen,' Ottawa says" *The Globe and Mail* (6 March 2015), online: <<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/rcmp-releases-video-made-by-ottawa-shooter-shortly-before-attack/article23328493/>>.

⁴⁷⁹ Cullen, "Stephen Harper pledges \$10M to Research Terrorism," *supra* note 475.

⁴⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸¹ *Ibid.*

solution to homegrown terrorism as a problematic.⁴⁸² Thus, the federal government has pledged \$35 million over five years to launch an Office of the Community Outreach and Counter-Radicalization Coordinator, now called the CCCEPV.⁴⁸³ This amount is not new and comes from the government's budget from the year 2016. Most of this money will be allocated amongst groups and organizations at the community level that are, as Public Security Minister Ralph Goodale puts it, best suited "to intervene in the right way, with the right tools and at the right time."⁴⁸⁴ However, while under Harper's administration, funds were apportioned from the government; the Trudeau government requires that the CCCEPV will distribute the funding.⁴⁸⁵

The Ottawa-based Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence will not itself have direct involvement in intervention and prevention work.⁴⁸⁶ As an illustration, one particular project receiving funding is specifically targeted at developing "indicators and guidelines" for effective counter-radicalization efforts.⁴⁸⁷ Amarnath Amarasingam, a Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Resilience Research at Dalhousie University, works on a unique project on foreign fighters with the University of Waterloo which receives funding. A former Toronto Star reporter, Tamara Khandaker, worries not all the projects funded under the direction of the CCCEPV will involve adequate hands-on work of dealing with those who commiserate with the Islamic State.⁴⁸⁸

⁴⁸² Monia Mazigh & Azeezah Kanji, "Is 'Counter-Radicalization' Just Another Way of Blaming All Terrorism on Muslims?", *iPolitics* (8 April 2016), online: <<https://ipolitics.ca/2016/04/08/is-counter-radicalization-just-another-way-of-blaming-all-terrorism-on-muslims/>> [Mazigh & Kanji, "Is Counter-Radicalization Just Another Way of Blaming All Terrorism on Muslims"].

⁴⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸⁴ Katherine Wilton, "Canadian Government Pledges \$35 Million to Fight Radicalization", *Montreal Gazette* (15 August 2016), online: <<http://montrealgazette.com/news/canadian-government-pledges-35-million-to-fight-radicalization?>>.

⁴⁸⁵ Tamara Khandaker, "Canada's Anti-Radicalization Centre Won't Actually Be Deradicalizing Anyone", *Vice News* (29 June 2017), online: <https://news.vice.com/en_ca/article/595qab/canadas-anti-radicalization-centre-wont-actually-be-deradicalizing-anyone> [Khandaker, "Canada's Anti-Radicalization Centre"].

⁴⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

Moreover, the ways in which counter-radicalization policy and funding operate at a local initiative and the complexities that may arise from it can be demonstrated through the search for a coordinator to lead the CCCEPV since 2015.⁴⁸⁹ To select a coordinator for the CCCEPV, three requirements must be met: they must be reliable, hold a position as an academic, and have familiarity with and connections in government agencies.⁴⁹⁰ Michael Day, a former lieutenant general of the Canadian Forces has commented on the issue of finding someone who meets all three requirements by asserting that, “[t]hose aren’t three solitudes that are easy to reconcile, quite frankly.”⁴⁹¹ Day advises that a liberal coordinator’s views may be at odds with various groups that the CCCEPV will engage with, and in its place, that a coordinator may be a traditionalist.⁴⁹² He suggests that, “[t]he huggy, kissy, lovey public view of what a liberal is – I’m not sure that’s going to be a demographic to look for in a candidate.” Day also asserts that the coordinator must be Muslim, adding the caveat that “in five or ten years, it may have to be another religion or demographic.”⁴⁹³ The new coordinator may potentially be tasked with picking up the RCMP’s efforts in countering radicalization, and aiming to integrate or coordinate a multitude of counter-radicalization initiatives in Canada. These efforts range from physicists at Canadian Nuclear Laboratories designing mass spectrometer that could support nuclear counter-terrorism, to sociologists at the University of Waterloo studying foreign fighters travelling overseas to Syria and Iraq to seek significance.⁴⁹⁴

There are various research projects that are receiving funding in Canada, and amongst them is one at the University of Waterloo. This project focuses on Westerner’s views on those

⁴⁸⁹ Meagan Campbell, “Canada’s Counter-Radicalization Program Has a Problem”, *Maclean’s* (2 October 2017), online: < <http://www.macleans.ca/politics/ottawa/canadas-counter-radicalization-program-has-a-problem/>>.

⁴⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹² *Ibid.*

⁴⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

who encourage or join militant movements in Iraq and Syria and the ways in which they utilize social media.⁴⁹⁵ Furthermore, the project examines the extent to which Canadians are knowledgeable on radicalization and hate speech, as well as an initiative that analyzes what tools or resources are required for frontline professionals to be able to determine, evaluate and involve those at risk of online extremism.⁴⁹⁶ An example of an initiative that has already received funding by the CCCEPV is Project SOMEONE (Social Media Education Every Day) at Concordia University in Montreal, Quebec. Project SOMEONE advocates for the use of social media and art in schools with the aim of assisting youth from becoming radicalized, prevent hate speech, and become more informed of the media.⁴⁹⁷ Another example is two projects intended to assist the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) to establish resources that train law enforcement officers and community allies in countering the threat of radicalization.⁴⁹⁸ The various projects that the CCCEPV has funded thus seek to increase understandings of why Canadians may radicalize to violence. Moreover, the projects will help to inform the development of programs to prevent violent extremism and the creation of training tools for law enforcement and government officials.

Interestingly, these diverse projects are undertaken by scholars and other researchers in universities which raises questions about the projects' legitimacy and impartiality towards Muslim communities. This is to say that scholars may have a preconceived notion of extremism through sensationalized, erroneous, and imbalanced depictions of the association between Islam and terrorism, which may in turn, risk further stigmatizing Muslims through little productive interaction with these communities. Moreover, the involvement of universities and academic

⁴⁹⁵ Khandaker, "Canada's Anti-Radicalization Centre," *supra* note 485.

⁴⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

research is especially particular to Canada and Australia's counter-radicalization models. The US, on the other hand, emphasizes the role of law enforcement, and while the UK strategy espouses a community-focused counter-radicalization strand in combating terrorism, including universities.⁴⁹⁹ Thus in terms of their legal responsibilities, UK universities are now part of a broader counterterrorism effort which entails institutional collaboration in advanced and more potent ways with security and intelligence as well as law enforcement agencies.⁵⁰⁰

Funding provided by the CRF has abounded in research projects, spawned new investors, and supported a range of academics. An example of how the *Community Resilience Fund*⁵⁰¹ interacts and funds research is best exemplified through the federal government's support for Ryerson University to study counter radicalization to violence.⁵⁰² In February 2018, Michael Levitt, Member of Parliament for York Centre, in support with the Honourable Ralph Goodale, proclaimed \$546,000 from the *Community Resilience Fund* to encourage a research strategy that assesses approaches to countering radicalization to violence in Canada.⁵⁰³ Ryerson University was funded over a period of two years for its project *Developing Canadian Partnerships for Countering Violent Extremism*. The project investigates three distinct agencies' strategies,⁵⁰⁴ and in doing so, the project will cultivate advanced methods to evaluate as to what is most effective in combatting radicalization ensuing in violence.

⁴⁹⁹ Adrienne Ou, "Hearts and Minds: A Comparison of Counter-Radicalization Strategies in Britain and the United States" (2016) 9:21 *Cornell International Affairs Review* 1 at 1.

⁵⁰⁰ Liam Gearon, "Terrorism and Counter-terrorism Policy and Research in UK universities (1997-2017): An Analytic-structural Review of the Literature and Related Sources" (2018) 2:1 *Policy Reviews in Higher Education* 32 at 41.

⁵⁰¹ The *Community Resilience Fund* has \$2.4 million finances for projects in 2017 and current projects in 2018, with an additional \$4.4 million in funds for 2018-2019. For the years 2019-20 and in what lies ahead, this fund will have \$7 million available each year for prevailing and new projects. See "Federal Support for Ryerson University Study to Counter Radicalization to Violence", *Cision* (20 February 2018) online: <<https://www.newswire.ca/news-releases/federal-support-for-ryerson-university-study-to-counter-radicalization-to-violence-674620013.html>>.

⁵⁰² *Ibid.*

⁵⁰³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰⁴ *Ibid* (multi-agency approaches require spokespersons from various sectors working together to study cases of individuals at risk of radicalizing to violence, and to assemble an innovative intervention best suited to a single individual and their regional circumstances).

Moreover, while the Liberals have earmarked \$35 million towards countering the threat of radicalization to violence, it is interesting to note, as a point of comparison, that other social programmes receive a significant more amount of funding. For example, in February 2018 the federal government announced to set aside billions of dollars with the aim of reconciling with the Indigenous Peoples in Canada, and for addressing the distinct needs of First Nations, Inuit and Metis.⁵⁰⁵ A budget of \$4.7 billion has been apportioned over the following five years, and to a large extent, is intended to support Indigenous families and children, advance housing and health, and prompt First Nations towards autonomy. Finance Minister Bill Morneau has claimed that restoring and enhancing Canada's relationship with Indigenous is critical to ensuring reconciliation.⁵⁰⁶ More recently, the Co-Operative Housing Federation of Canada insisted on the federal, provincial and territorial governments to protect more households inexpensive housing in the country.⁵⁰⁷ In responding to this request, the Liberals have promised to devote \$500 million in the interest of protecting 55,000 federally regulated social housing units through temporarily extending rent supplements and establishing new funding programs.

In contrast to Canada, the UK's Prevent strategy receives funding from multiple sources and funds numerous projects.⁵⁰⁸ The following statistics specifies the size and distribution of this funding. In 2007, the Department for Communities and Local Government spent £6 million setting up the Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Fund, which was subsequently distributed to 70 regional councils to devote on community Prevent work. In 2008, this was increased by a £45 million grant to regional councils with further money to be allocated.

⁵⁰⁵ Geordon Omand, "Government commits \$4.7B to Indigenous Funding in 2018 Budget", *The Canadian Press* (27 February 2018), online: < <https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/government-commits-4-7b-to-indigenous-funding-in-2018-budget-1.3821350>>.

⁵⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰⁷ Emily Mathieu, Liberals Roll Out Social Housing Funding to Keep 55,000 Units in System", *The Star* (4 April 2018), online: < <https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2018/04/04/liberals-roll-out-social-housing-funding-to-keep-55000-units-available-for-low-income-families.html>>.

⁵⁰⁸ Vidino & Brandon, "Countering Radicalization in Europe," *supra* note 384 at 18.

Researchers has estimated that £61.7 million was given to local councils to carry out Prevent work by April 2011.⁵⁰⁹ With regarding to police funding, it is difficult to know precisely how much due to funding being included into various budgets. Nonetheless, in 2010/11, the Home Office gave the police £24 million for Prevent work.⁵¹⁰ Moreover, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) funding for the undertakings of Prevent overseas was roughly £19 million in 2009/10 and approximately £17 million in 2010/11.⁵¹¹ The Home Office Prevent funding (incorporating funding to the police) was £47 million in 2009/10; and £37 million in 2010/11.⁵¹² In 2011/12, the Home Office allocated approximately £36 million for Prevent project, including funding to the police.⁵¹³

Comparably, the Dutch government passed the national Action Plan on Polarization and Radicalization for 2007-2011 to preclude extremist groups from forming, as part of their “broad approach” to counterterrorism and counter-extremism.⁵¹⁴ This \$38 million plan emphasized on the criminal prosecution of terrorism suspects, growth on intelligence activities, and the utilization of immigration laws against suspects found overseas.⁵¹⁵ Another point of comparison in relation to Canada, is the Australian’s government financing in efforts to combat the threat of violent extremism. In May 2015, former Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott revealed a \$1.2 billion security package to tackle extremism and prevent Australians from joining conflicts

⁵⁰⁹ HM Government, “Prevent Strategy” *HM Government* (June 2011), online: <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97976/prevent-strategy-review.pdf> at 101-102. [HM Government, “Prevent Strategy”].

⁵¹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹¹ Vidino & Brandon, “Countering Radicalization in Europe,” *supra* note 384 at 18.

⁵¹² *Ibid.*

⁵¹³ HM Government, “Prevent Strategy,” *supra* note 509 at 101-102.

⁵¹⁴ “The Netherlands: Extremism & Counter-Extremism” (nd) Counter Extremism Project 1 at 9 online: <https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/country_pdf/NL-07132017.pdf>.

⁵¹⁵ *Ibid.*

overseas.⁵¹⁶ The funding package allotted \$450 million “to strengthen intelligence capabilities and to counter extremist messaging.” Additionally, the Australian government spent nearly \$449 million on ways of targeting extremists online.⁵¹⁷

Despite the fact that an array of projects has been funded by the CCCEPV, funding apportioned towards by countering violent extremism is relatively low in comparison to other social programmes and the efficacy of counter-radicalization programmes remains doubtful. In a report issued in February 2016, UN Special Rapporteur on counter-terrorism and human rights Ben Emmerson denounced the whole mission of the existing and rampant approaches of counter-radicalization as being conceptually unsound and ineffectual.⁵¹⁸ As such, Emmerson asserted that, “many programmes directed at radicalization are based on a simplistic understanding of the process as a fixed trajectory to violent extremism with identifiable markers along the way.”⁵¹⁹ If Emmerson is correct and radicalization as a precursor to terrorism is merely a baseless idea that prevails in terrorism studies, as some critics argue, what then, will Canada’s new Office of Counter-Radicalization counteract?⁵²⁰ Canadian security agencies have provided answers that often lack transparency. Their reports vis-à-vis the mythological association amongst religiously-motivated/ideological radicalization and “terrorism” is predominantly grounded in suppositions that are not adequately proven.⁵²¹

⁵¹⁶ Clarke Jones, “Security Gets \$1.2b, Community Programs to Counter Violent Extremism \$40m – That’s a Foolish Imbalance”, *The Conversation* (1 August 2017), online: < <https://theconversation.com/security-gets-1-2b-community-programs-to-counter-violent-extremism-40m-thats-a-foolish-imbalance-81829>>.

⁵¹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵¹⁸ It is important to note that Emmerson does not identify a particular country as the object of his criticism. See Mazigh & Kanji, “Is Counter-Radicalization Just Another Way of Blaming All Terrorism on Muslims,” *supra* note 482.

⁵¹⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵²⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵²¹ *Ibid.*

Moreover, consultation with leading countries on counter-radicalization and their experiences has only further complicated matters for Canada.⁵²² Many detractors contend that counter-radicalization programs have been “thinly-veiled” exercises in targeting Muslims in the West, although non-Muslims have been responsible for most occurrences of political violence in America and Europe.⁵²³ A study done by CSIS in 2011 established that the configurations and tendencies of radicalization remains nebulous. Following that, CSIS formed a report claiming that the service had obtained a firm understanding of the topic.⁵²⁴ The reports and publications produced by CSIS often cast all Muslims as suspicious in Canada. According to one unsubstantiated CSIS assessment, “Islamic radicalization” can ensue “just about anywhere... these people gather.” Critical to note, here, is that the reference to “these people” is not described any further in the assessment beyond the implicit presumption that “these people” are Muslims, as the assessment is discussing the radicalization of adherents to Islam. Moreover, even though the Toronto Star has obtained documents from CSIS that portray right-wing and white-supremacist violence as a greater menace than violence perpetuated by Muslims, CSIS nonetheless places significant emphasis on Muslims as a problem site.⁵²⁵

Furthermore, Mazigh and Kanji argue that far-right-wing incidents have killed more people than have extremist/radical Muslims since the events of 9/11 in the US. However, American theories of radicalization are immersed in depicting Muslims’ identity (i.e. beards, traditional clothing) and Islam as antecedents to radicalization.⁵²⁶ Despite that these theories have been rigorously negated by scholars, Mazigh and Kanji assert the state continues to

⁵²² *Ibid.*

⁵²³ *Ibid.*

⁵²⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵²⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵²⁶ *Ibid.*

exorbitantly surveil Muslim communities.⁵²⁷ Thus seemingly benign initiatives that engage with Muslim communities have served as “intelligence” outlets for law enforcement on Muslims’ sentiments and undertakings.⁵²⁸ Furthermore, Mazigh and Kanji claim that the notion of the “single narrative” of a conflict between “Islam” and “the West” in theories of counter-radicalization is presented as a “potent force” for Muslims’ alleged predisposition to radicalize.⁵²⁹ Yet, however, they argue that the very constitution of the “single narrative” found in counter-radicalization casts Muslims as “suspect communities” and susceptible to radicalization.⁵³⁰ The “single narrative” that appears in counter-radicalization is premised on the notion that Muslims are risks needing management. Within this framework, the single narrative of counter-radicalization theory seems to vary from that which appears as an ostensible contributor to radicalization - the idea that there exists a friction between Islam and the West. Thus, Mazigh and Kanji asserts that whether the CCCEPV will challenge the principal causes of radicalization or will continue to denounce particular communities so as to uphold national security remains complex.⁵³¹

Conclusion

This chapter has delineated the debates, policies, institutions, and practices encircling counter-radicalization policies within the Canadian context. In particular, the chapter discussed the practice of counter-radicalization and its related definitions amongst Canadian security agencies. Despite the fact that agencies such as CSIS, PSC, and the RCMP have offered their diverse accounts of radicalization and its derivative counter-radicalization, radicalization as a concept lacks an absolute definition. The use of concepts such as ‘radicalism’ and ‘extremism’

⁵²⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵²⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵²⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵³⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵³¹ *Ibid.*

remain interchangeable in Canadian counter-radicalization efforts. The assumptions underlying many of the current policy approaches to Islamist radicalization and the alleged notion that extremism is a precursor to terrorism seems to be similar in Europe, Australia, the Netherlands and Canada.

To this end, the preceding chapter set forth the ways in which the US emphasizes the role of law enforcement and adheres to a preventative logic of countering future threats. The UK, on the other hand, employs a community-focused model and collaborates with universities to counter the so-called terrorist threat. The Netherlands model is national and university and community focused. In contrast, Australia's model accentuates university education for imams and emphasizes issues pertaining to youth. Placed against these countries, Canada's counter-radicalization efforts provides national guidance on deterring terrorist threats by collaborating with various levels of government, law enforcement, not-for-profit organizations and communities at large. Most importantly, Canada devotes much less funding towards countering violent extremism in comparison to other the other nation states. The functional and effectual results of Canada's policy nonetheless remain in an aura uncertainty in the face pre-emptive threats.

Indeed, terrorism is a discursively-constructed object of the state. This is manifested in CSIS's description of radicalization embodying an Islamic component,⁵³² which prejudice the conclusion that all forms of Islamic extremism lead to violence. Moreover, at the policy level, the various overlapping and fuzzy elucidations of these concepts can potentially result in a dramatization of the apparent threat to national security in Canada. The myriad scope of definitions of threats can potentially give rise to an increased range of civil liberties complications. An assorted range of nebulous descriptions such as Muslims as either the

⁵³² Monaghan, "Security Traps," *supra* note 395 at 488.

“radicalized” or the fanatical Other can result in the oversimplification of threats wherein *anything* can be purported a threat. Posed in this way, any act of commission or omission can render Muslims as risky subjects. If, then, the conceptualization of radicalization as a fundamental concept is hindered, the same must be true for its derivative - counter-radicalization. This raises questions about Canada’s countering radicalization initiatives and CVE apparatuses. The next chapter methodically examines counter-radicalization strategies and offers a rigorous assessment of these practices in Canada.

Chapter 4: The Shifting Calculus of Risk: A Critique of Counter-Radicalization Practices in Canada

The preceding chapter highlighted that the emergence of counter-radicalization strategies is based on a national security agenda with a particular emphasis on Islamic fundamentalism. The Canadian discourse centering on radicalization leading to violent extremism is thus diverse, multidimensional, intricate, and often conflicting. To help situate governmentality's distinctive value, I will draw on the concept in order to contextualize and historicize terrorism. The concept challenges the tendency to consider terrorism as a self-evident phenomenon, stressing instead that it is vastly context-dependent and can be understood through its genealogical roots. Tracing the terrorism genealogy provides a window into the assumptions and urgencies informing contemporary counter-radicalization discourse. In this chapter, I endeavour to explain the ongoing production of fear and insecurity in the War on Terror. In keeping with a Foucauldian logic, I assert that contemporary security practices are undergoing a rescaling, with radicalism leading to violence penetrating all levels of governance as a security concern in the Canadian context.

Moreover, in view of the heightened concern about the specter of homegrown Islamic terrorism and the increasing desire to address it through counter-radicalization, the chapter offers a degree of criticality regarding counter-radicalization practices in Canada. In particular, the chapter sketches an account of the various impasses and excesses that can potentially render state interventions of this sort fruitless and, even counter-productive. First, Canada's counter-radicalization programmes reproduces the insecurity that it seeks prevent in its efforts to contain the terrorist threat. Secondly, the programmes overstate terms such as "extremism," "radicalism," and "terrorism". Lastly, the logic of pre-emption embedded in the programmes makes threats governable based on futurist threats that may not come to pass. Furthermore, given

the potential worrisome state of affairs enclosing highly contested and ill-defined concepts (radicalization, extremism, terrorism), the chapter will conclude by making recommendations for the future policy implications of the practice of counter-radicalization in Canada.

4.1 Profound Uncertainty: On the Subjectivity of Radicalism/Extremism Perceptions

It has been demonstrated throughout the second and third chapters that defining what precisely radicalization is or who the term ‘radical’ refers to is as complex as defining terrorism.⁵³³ Numerous scholars, such as Mina Al-Lami, argue that there is no one specific definition of radicalization that is used across the field.⁵³⁴ Most commonly, the terms ‘radicalization’, ‘radicalize’ and ‘radical’ are utilized in a way that indicates they are well-defined concepts.⁵³⁵ To further complicate matters, the terms are employed in a circular manner – implying that “a radical is someone who has radical ideas or who has been radicalized.”⁵³⁶ However, to date, there is no recognized definition of, nor theory with reference to, radicalization.⁵³⁷ Viewed in this light, Peter R. Neumann asserts that its definition will always be disputed.⁵³⁸ Most radicalization experts thus would agree that radicalization is a process,⁵³⁹ however, beyond that there is vast discrepancy that makes the existing discourse unparalleled.

Here, it is in my view, vital to question the legitimacy or efficacy of implementing and invoking counter-radicalization policies as a response to Islamist radicalization given that there is a lack of any cogent definition or profile that can help identify potential terrorists. Thus, getting

⁵³³ Australia, Department of Defence, *Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Literature Review*, (Edinburgh: Department of Defence, 2011) at 13 [Australia, Department of Defence, *Countering Violent Extremism*].

⁵³⁴ *Ibid* at 12. See also Mina Al-Lami, “Studies in Radicalisation: State of the Field Report” (2009) Royal Holloway University of London Working Paper No 11.

⁵³⁵ Australia, Department of Defence, *Countering Violent Extremism*, *supra* note 533 at 13.

⁵³⁶ *Ibid*.

⁵³⁷ Neumann, *supra* note 175 at 874.

⁵³⁸ *Ibid*.

⁵³⁹ Randy Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories” (2011) 4:4 *Journal of Strategic Security* 7 at 7.

precise definitions of terms such as terrorism, radicalism, and extremism can help states to gain analytic leverage on these concepts. It should be stated from the onset that it is outside of my endeavour to define the previously-mentioned concepts in this chapter and in my thesis' entirety, respectively. However, I question the soundness of a whole array of the definitions presently in use, on which there is no consensus and yet still informs counter-radicalization strategies. Thus, it is important to question the implications of the use of equivocal concepts notwithstanding challenges that may emerge from a "high standard" in policy-making. Here, a genealogical analysis of terrorism is presented which helps to illustrate the modalities through which these practices have been guided and have consequently emerged.

The literature on radicalization appears to suggest that people are radicalized on the grounds that they hold radical beliefs and as a result are radicals.⁵⁴⁰ The distinction, within the framework, between religiously-motivated violence and terrorism is blurred. The various pathways to understanding terrorism has made the concept moot insofar as terrorist actions is a discursive construction of the state. Thus, the supposedly importance of ideological extremism in terrorism involvement is untenable especially in the absence of psychological research evidence that would suggest a link between the two.

While there are myriad perspectives on radicalization, the focus tends to be largely on its mechanisms and specifically, recruitment and indoctrination. This seemingly explicates the shift in individuals from merely being infuriated or malcontent towards accepting violence as a political battle.⁵⁴¹ Nasser-Eddine et al., asserts that commentators have yet to explain as to why some individuals become terrorists, while not others.⁵⁴² In the same vein, it is not difficult, post

⁵⁴⁰ Australia, Department of Defence, *Countering Violent Extremism*, *supra* note 533 at 13.

⁵⁴¹ *Ibid* at 14.

⁵⁴² *Ibid*.

factum, to demonstrate how radical ideas are adopted and internalized by terrorists.⁵⁴³

Consequently, they argue that recruitment and indoctrination as the pivot of analysis altogether fails to explain why people exposed to radical beliefs are not radicalized. Most commonly, in fact, many people who encounter radical ideas are nonetheless not radicalized.⁵⁴⁴

Understandings of violent extremism and countering violent radicalism can be said to be mutually constitutive of one another. Put differently, the conceptualization of violent extremism informs a myriad of strategies that are established and executed to counter radicalization. These discourses have reinforced the climate of suspicion hovering over young Muslims since 11 September, resulting in the encouragement of deradicalization programmes in many nation-states. However, despite that 9/11 was the defining event of the early War on Terror, its later phase has been shaped and aggravated over the terrorist attacks in Europe: the train station bombing in Madrid (2004);⁵⁴⁵ the murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam (2004),⁵⁴⁶ and the 7/7 attacks on the London transportation system (2005).⁵⁴⁷ The hijackers on 9/11, like the militants involved in the foregoing events, were known to be profoundly entrenched in a specific form of Islam.⁵⁴⁸ Understood through the governmentality lens, 9/11 and these subsequent terrorist attacks have cleared the path for the emergence and performing of new

⁵⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴⁵ The terrorist bomb explosions in four commuter trains in Madrid, Spain, resulted in 191 casualties and another 2,050-people injured in the attacks. See Jytte Klausen, "British Counter-Terrorism After 7/7: Adapting Community Policing to the Fight Against Domestic Terrorism" (2009) 35:3 *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 403 at 403.

⁵⁴⁶ In November, filmmaker and tv-show host Theo van Gogh was shot in Amsterdam by a 26-year old Dutchman with Moroccan roots. The killer had converted to radical Islam and had admitted that the motivation behind the act of crime was predominantly religious. See Pieter A. Gautier et al., "Terrorism and Attitudes Towards Minorities: The Effect of the Theo van Gosh Murder on House Prices in Amsterdam" (2009) 65:2 *Journal of Urban Economics* 113 at 111-126.

⁵⁴⁷ The 7/7 attacks consisted of three suicide bombers in a subway system in London, which resulted in the death of 39 people with another hundreds of passengers injured. See Hamilton Bean, Lisa Keranen & Margaret Durfy, "This Is London: Cosmopolitan Nationalism and the Discourse of Resilience in the Case of the 7/7 Terrorist Attacks" (2011) *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 427 at 427-428.

⁵⁴⁸ Paul Bramadat, *The Public, the Political, and the Possible: Religious Radicalization and Securitization in Canada and Beyond*, eds, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014) at 12 [Bramadat, *The Public, the Political, and the Possible*].

security practices based upon the presumption of future risks. The practice of counter-radicalization is but one security practice that operates on the horizon of future risks which pervades in present-day government. Governmentality sheds light on how these state interventions are justified by the fear of violent extremism in the contemporary War on Terror.

Scholars Paul Bramadat and Lorne Dawson argue that the discerning of a particular form of radical Islam has become the overriding framework for policymakers and members of the Western public.⁵⁴⁹ Posed from this perspective, officials worry that there is *something* intrinsic in Islam that renders it a threat to the Western civilization.⁵⁵⁰ This interpretation, as Bramadat and Dawson notes, has a protracted history.⁵⁵¹ According to, Jocelyne Cesari, “it is striking how the idea of Islam as an international ‘risk factor,’ current since the 1980s, is bolstered by centuries-old representations of Islam ... [F]ixed ideas of Islam as an inherently violent and fanatical religion are continually re-invoked and readjusted to fit changes in international and domestic situations.”⁵⁵² Cesari argues that there is a “convergence of European and American political discourse”⁵⁵³ that has contributed to the targeting of Muslims in the West. In a similar vein, Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations”⁵⁵⁴ theory continues to inform the work of David Kilcullen, a leading draftsman of US counter-insurgency initiative.⁵⁵⁵ The former Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper commented on the threat environment in an interview with the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation in 2011, declaring that “the major threat is still

⁵⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵² Jocelyn Cesari & Sean McLoughlin, *European Muslims and the Secular State* (Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005) at 39.

⁵⁵³ *Ibid* at 38.

⁵⁵⁴ Samuel Huntington’s hypothesis of the “clash of civilizations” suggests that cultural and religious identities will be a key source of conflict in the post-Cold War era. In this light, he argued that Islam would become the greatest threat to world peace. See Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” (1993) 72:3 *Foreign Affairs* 22 at 48.

⁵⁵⁵ Bramadat, *The Public, the Political, and the Possible*, *supra* note 548 at 13.

‘Islamicism’[sic].”⁵⁵⁶ Viewed from this perspective, the continuous depiction of Muslims as violent and radical extremists is a visible tendency in security practices and in the construction of risk. Thus, the rise in anti-Islam rhetoric in the post-9/11 era continuously reasserts that Islam stands as threat to Western civilization. This anti-Muslim sentiment is most evident in counter-radicalization practices wherein Islam is framed as a violent religion and Muslims are perceived as carriers of ferocious acts. Moreover, the War on Terror and subsequent terrorist attacks has served as a catalyst for states and policy-makers to demarcate Muslim minority groups as the ‘Other’.

4.2 Living in a Post-9/11 Canada

In this section, I argue that policy shifts in Canada, specifically, towards more rigorous measures to counter the ostensible terrorist threat, are increasingly placing Muslims at the pivot of analysis as generically categories of risk. In particular, the practice of counter-radicalization further exacerbates the rising levels of Islamophobia by producing unfounded fear and animosity under the presumption that Muslims are likely to radicalize. While it is true that the ‘War on Terror’ began with the terrorist attacks of September 11th on US soil, the political climate since those events have shaped counter-terrorism efforts, facilitating in the implementation of counter-radicalization programmes in Canada. Federal and state policies/efforts to prevent radicalization and potentially future terrorist attacks, raise questions about Muslims’ legitimacy and place in society. Perhaps, counter-radicalization initiatives are where the most conspicuous evidence can be seen of Canada’s relative ambivalence regarding Muslims.

⁵⁵⁶ Tarek Fatah, “Harper Was Right – Islamism is a Threat”, *Toronto Sun* (9 September 2014), online: <<http://torontosun.com/2014/09/09/harper-was-right---islamism-is-a-threat/wcm/c13a13f0-5734-4252-8d9c-183eb662da8a>>.

The Canadian state has historically fought to protect national security in the face of adversity. Wartime or national emergency, thus creates a dilemma for liberal democracies; that is - whether to encroach on civil liberties so as to uphold national security. This balancing generates a set of problematics insofar as it raises concerns about the liberties of Muslims often portrayed as risky in the context of the contemporary War on Terror. Today, startled politicians, policy-makers, and government agencies push for a sweeping counter-radicalization policy that will reveal all terrorist entities and impede all terrorist operations before they occur. These policies have the potential to infringe on the rights of those it targets, especially Muslim communities who have been largely subject to scrutiny post-September 11th politics.

As a counter-radicalization venture, the Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence (CCCEPV), focuses largely on Muslim communities. Counter-radicalization efforts often purport to have a broad-spectrum in their scope, claim not be keen on any one religion or ethnic group.⁵⁵⁷ For example, a counter-radicalization program which grew out of a present gang-prevention program in Rexdale in northwest Toronto,⁵⁵⁸ declares to be concerned with various forms “extremism,” ranging from Islamic, White supremacist and environmentalist extremism.⁵⁵⁹ However, various security agencies such as CSIS makes explicit references to Islamic radicalization and extremism. An illustration of this is seen in the CSIS report titled *The Radicalization of Canadian Muslims*.⁵⁶⁰

Counter-radicalization policies can thus potentially reinforce and reproduce a biased and selective view of Muslims whereby they are perceived as ‘suspect communities’ under the

⁵⁵⁷ Kanji, “Counter-Radicalization Requires a Radical Rethink,” *supra* note 391.

⁵⁵⁸ Shanifa Nasser, “Toronto Lifts Curtain on Extremism Prevention Plan Quietly Operating for More Than 2 Years”, *CBC News* (26 November 2016), online: <<http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/toronto-police-deradicalization-program-1.3867442>>.

⁵⁵⁹ Kanji, “Counter-Radicalization Requires a Radical Rethink,” *supra* note 391.

⁵⁶⁰ Canada, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, *Access to Information Act request 117-2012-440*, (Ottawa: Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 2012a) at 42-60.

auspices of the War on Terror in present-day government. Scholars Adrian Cherney and Kristina Murphy argue that the manufacturing and reinforcement of a ‘suspect community’ by counter-terrorism apparatus and security practices that have emerged in the aftermath of the War on Terror suggests that Muslims are subjected to a form of “collective attribution”.⁵⁶¹ This is to say that the perception of all Muslims is marred due to acts of terror committed in the name of Islam.⁵⁶² The underlying assumptions of thwarting radicalization and violent extremism thus, echoes the notion that Muslims possess an innate ability to radicalize. It is in this light of the growing anti-Muslim sentiment that the logics underpinning counter-radicalization programmes blatantly produce and reproduce the idea that Muslims have a greater intrinsic capacity and susceptibility to radicalize than others.

The dichotomy between the ‘moderate’ and the ‘extremist’ that prevails in the practice of counter-radicalization and contemporary political debates continues to burden Muslims communities with the effects of stigmatization. This stigmatization is further exacerbated by the slippery nature of concepts such as extremism and radicalism, and its by-product terrorism - however they be ultimately defined. These concepts, ambivalent as they are, have left open the possibility for a plethora of definitions and elucidations. This has not only resulted in numerous academic and governmental definitions of the concepts but also in an oversimplification of the terms. Thus, for example, the 1970 Le Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) crisis in Quebec⁵⁶³ perpetuated by right-wing fundamentalists, was viewed and understood as an act of terror.⁵⁶⁴ Yet, contemporary discourses on terrorism and anti-terrorist security measures, generally, make

⁵⁶¹ Adrian Cherney & Kristina Murphy, “Being a ‘suspect community’ in a post 9/11 world – The Impact of the War on Terror on Muslim Communities in Australia” (2016) 49:4 Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology 480 at 483.

⁵⁶² Baljit Nagra, “Our Faith Was Also Hijacked by Those People: Reclaiming Muslim Identity in Canada in a Post-9/11 Era” (2011) 37:3 Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 425 at 434.

⁵⁶³ Whitaker, “Keeping Up with the Neighbours,” *supra* note 6 at 242.

⁵⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

no reference to its historical precedents and instead attacks involving Muslims are overlaid in the political realm. In its place, counter-terrorism and counter-radicalization strategies currently in use, show vigorous enthusiasm for the targeting of the Muslim minority as a threat to security.⁵⁶⁵

In all of its manifestations, ‘terrorism’, as a concept that has ostensibly emerged as a distinct phenomenon today, ought to be understood through its historical precedents. There does not exist a singular thing called ‘terrorism,’ but rather it can be understood as a phenomenon through the historical paradigms that defines terrorism and reveals its mutations, contingencies, and controversies. Yet, contemporary security practices largely focus on Muslims and Muslim youth’s individual connection to, or propensity for, terrorist activity. Significantly, counter-radicalization measures in Canada are, generally, silent about the targeting of Muslims: it neither explicitly condones nor prohibits their targeting. Muslims in Canada thus assume a different stigma based on their religion post-9/11 than the FLQ or right-wing fundamentalists.

In the earlier sections, I mapped the contours of modern-day security practices that register Muslims as the ‘enemy within,’ and construct Islam as an inevitable threat to the Western civilization. The emergence and proliferation of pre-emptive security measures engendered by 11th September, and counter-radicalization strategies now justified *post hoc* by ensuing terrorist attacks, have produced and compounded fear. Such fear is based upon looming danger and through the depiction of Muslims as the ‘dangerous internal Other’.⁵⁶⁶ Counter-radicalization practices emerged under the banner of the War on Terror, favour the rendering of pre-emptive decisions. However, it serves as an impetus for the *modus operandi* of governing.

⁵⁶⁵ Douglas Pratt, “Islamophobia as Reactive Co-Radicalization” (2015) 26:2 *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 205 at 205-206.

⁵⁶⁶ Rita Dhamoon & Yasmeen Abu-Laban, “Dangerous (Internal) Foreigners and Nation-Building: The Case of Canada” (2009) 30:2 *International Political Science Review* 163 at 163.

These policies raise serious questions about the potential stigmatization and humiliation of the populations that counter-radicalization programmes seek to counter the “radicalization” within. Indubitably, the objective effect of countering the threat of radicalization has resulted in the ethnic profiling of Muslims in practice. Here, I want to move the focus of my analysis to broader themes on security. In doing so, I probe some inquiries underpinning the raft of counter-terrorism strategies implemented in Canada. Before delving into the leitmotifs on security, I should pose a few key inquiries: What is peculiarly unique about terrorism as a phenomenon that infects the minds of policy-makers, politicians, and citizens worldwide, and penetrates all levels of governance? What type of menace and repugnance, specifically, do ‘we’ associate with terrorism? And lastly, are nation-states and policy-makers concerned about civilian casualties, in other words, the ‘cost of life’ that eventuates owing to terrorist manifestations?

To best situate my analysis, I want to begin by presenting what Gabe Mythen et al., refer to as the process of *risk subjectification*, whereby institutionally-defined classifications demarcates Muslims as hostile and ‘risky’.⁵⁶⁷ Despite that Mythen et al. focus their study on the political climate of the UK, this helps to shed light on the introduction of counter-radicalization policies in Canada. A vast amount of sociological research embarked since 9/11 indicates that trends in hostility towards Muslim communities have grown which points to the rise in Islamophobia,⁵⁶⁸ labelling of Muslims in media outlets,⁵⁶⁹ racially driven ferocity,⁵⁷⁰ and arbitrary counter-terrorism measures.⁵⁷¹ Despite that ethnic minorities in Britain have long faced

⁵⁶⁷ Gabe Mythen et al, “‘Why Should We Have to Prove We’re Alright?’: Counter-terrorism, Risk and Partial Securities” (2012) 47:2 Sociology 383 at 383 [Mythen et al, “Why Should We Have to Prove We’re Alright?”].

⁵⁶⁸ See Chris Allen, *Islamophobia* (London: Routledge, 2010) at 4.

⁵⁶⁹ Kerry Moore, Paul Mason & Justin Mathew Wren Lewis, “Images of Islam in the UK: the representation of British Muslims in the national print news media 2000-2008” (2008) Cardiff University School of Journalism Media and Cultural Studies Working Paper July 7, 2008.

⁵⁷⁰ See Diane Frost, “Islamophobia: “Examining Causal Links Between the State and Race Hate from Below” (2001) 28:11/12 International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy 546.

⁵⁷¹ See Robert Lambert, “Ignoring the lessons of the past” (2008) 73:1 Criminal Justice Matters 22.

the effects of institutional racism, following 9/11, the construction of Muslim minority groups as ‘risky’ by the media, politicians, and the judiciary became ever ubiquitous.⁵⁷² Posed from this perspective, while the formal aim of state counter-terrorism practices is to increase safety to citizens, Mariana Valverde argues that, in practice, a milieu of uncertainty has appeared for law-abiding individuals from communities fraught with danger.⁵⁷³

In a similar vein, Mythen et al. argues that modern security practices indicate a departure from universally guaranteed and protected rights to the ‘sectoral defence’ of civil liberties.⁵⁷⁴ This shift implicates a security environment wherein the safety of particular racial groups exceeds those viewed as the ‘dangerous internal Other’. The ‘Others’ are subjected to legitimated scrutiny and espionage, and thus treated as objects under the rubric of skepticism.⁵⁷⁵ Thus, under the rubric of the War on Terror, the protection of some groups over others has become key in various modes of governance. Moreover, Walter Laqueur asserts that traditional forms of terrorism, separatist (e.g. FLQ) or ideological had political and social objectives, such as gaining autonomy or establishing a new social order.⁵⁷⁶ In contrast, the ‘new terrorism’ is, more often than not, unconcerned with social and political demands and instead aims to cause mass casualties and target civilians.⁵⁷⁷ Laqueur goes on to argue that, “[i]n its maddest, most extreme form it [terrorism] may aim at the destruction of all life on earth [...]”⁵⁷⁸ Laqueur’s view on the purportedly ‘new terrorism’ raises a set of problematics. In the first, he appears to find an acceptable code of behaviour and metrics for traditional forms of terrorism involving nationalist

⁵⁷² Mythen *et al.*, “Why Should We Have to Prove We’re Alright?,” *supra* note 567 at 384

⁵⁷³ Mariana Valverde, “Questions of security: A framework for research” (2011) 15:1 *Theoretical Criminology* 3 at 7.

⁵⁷⁴ Mythen *et al.*, “Why Should We Have to Prove We’re Alright?,” *supra* note 567 at 384.

⁵⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷⁶ Walter Laqueur, *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) at 81.

⁵⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

or ideological groups. He detaches the stigma from conventional forms of terrorism by virtually justifying violence generated by separatist and ideological groups in the name of attaining diffuse political demands. Secondly, Laqueur equates Islam with terrorism. Within his purview, Laqueur seems to indicate that discourses of religiously-motivated terrorism ought to rest solely on Islam. An analysis of this sort fails to consider the extent to which “traditional” terrorists use “new terrorism” techniques. Moreover, religion has served as the impetus for separatists’ efforts in “traditional” terrorism, which Laqueur also seems to disregard by focusing largely on religious-motivated terrorism as solely linked to Islam.

With Laqueur in mind, what is most important for this discussion is that post 9/11 the idea of ‘new’ terrorism has become pervasive in the language of politicians, policy-makers, and scholars across many nation-states. Most notably, this language has become the harbinger for the expansion of broader counter-terrorism strategies. The new terrorism is presumed to be new for having various conspicuous features. First, the perpetrators of terrorism act transnationally and function through loosely networks. Second, these perpetrators take their inspiration from religion and are understood to be religious extremists. Third, they seek to cause mass casualties through weapons of mass destruction. Lastly, they indiscriminately target.⁵⁷⁹ Professed experts on terrorism studies seek to interpret and capture the “novelty” and modernity of terrorism presenting it as a pressing concern of our times. Thus, this new terrorism is not the only terrorist phenomenon that is perceived to be, above all, new.⁵⁸⁰

Despite the fact that the contemporary nature of the purportedly ‘new terrorism’ has not yet been fraught with scrutiny, the concept of terrorism itself has been subject to a great deal of

⁵⁷⁹ Isabelle Duyvesteyn, “How New Is the New Terrorism” (2010) 27:5 *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 439 at 444.

⁵⁸⁰ *Ibid* at 439.

debate.⁵⁸¹ Richard Jackson duly notes that the lexicon of counter-terrorism encompasses various assumptions, theories and understandings of the nature of terrorism and terrorists.⁵⁸² Viewed in this way, counter-radicalization interventions of the Canadian state establish the norm of what behaviours are acceptable or unacceptable. These discourses and practices institutionally categorize Muslim minorities groups as dangerous or risky. Assuming that they know what a terrorist *looks like*, policy-makers and security agencies employ religious and racial physiognomies as a medium by which Muslims are demarcated in policies as the suspected ‘Other’. It is thus within this construction of ‘risk’ by which Muslims are rendered as suspect populations, thereby reinforcing the process of what Mythen et al. refer to as *risk subjectification*.⁵⁸³

Contemporary trends of associating Islam with Otherness have resulted in a predominant negative perception of Muslims. The fixation on bolstering security practices in the context of the supposedly new terrorism wave, and the extent to which Muslims have been placed under an increased surveillance gaze and scrutinized is worrisome. The following explanations help to illuminate as to why the new terrorism is considered to be distinct from traditional forms of terrorism. Moreover, they offer insights into why nation-states are so heavily bound up with developing counter-radicalization policies to contain the seemingly terrorist threat, particularly in the Canadian context.

Contemporary counter-terrorism oratory claim that the new terrorism phenomenon poses a threat to many things. Amongst them are threats to security, freedom, democracy, and the sheer

⁵⁸¹ For further reading see Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Cambridge: Polity, 1999).

⁵⁸² Richard Jackson, *Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counterterrorism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005) at 9 [Jackson, *Writing the War on Terrorism*].

⁵⁸³ Mythen *et al*, “Why Should We Have to Prove We’re Alright?,” *supra* note 567 at 384.

existence of a civilization itself.⁵⁸⁴ Indeed, the threat is said to be pronounced to the extent that it presents a grander threat than the threats posed by incursion, war, accident, natural disasters, and criminal activity.⁵⁸⁵ While there are many aspects of contemporary terrorism that states occupy themselves with, I want to place the role of casualties as the nucleus of the analysis herein. Insofar as I acknowledge that terrorist acts maim and murder individuals, there are other arguably daily activities that pose a more serious and more likely threat to human life than terrorism. Statistics have shown that terrorism is an insignificant threat to life in comparison to many other actions, especially in the West. For the last thirty-five years, terrorism has resulted in no more than approximately 7,000 fatalities per annum on a global scale, including the year 2001.⁵⁸⁶ In fact, lightning strikes, bee stings, or do it yourself (DIY) mishaps poses a vaster threat to life than terrorism.⁵⁸⁷ Similarly, the fatalities attributed to automobile accidents account for hundreds of thousands of deaths each year globally.⁵⁸⁸ The annual numbers of deaths owing to sport utility vehicles (SUVs) is reported to be far greater than the total number of casualties instigated by all terrorist acts combined.⁵⁸⁹ Given these numerous examples of day-to-day activities, the evidence in counter-radicalization rhetoric that terrorism poses a real and existential threat than other threats is misleading.

⁵⁸⁴ Jessica Wolfendale, "Terrorism, Security, and the Threat of Counterterrorism" (2007) 30:1 *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 75 at 76 [Wolfendale, "Terrorism"].

⁵⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸⁶ Jackson, *Writing the War on Terrorism*, *supra* note 582 at 5.

⁵⁸⁷ Wolfendale, "Terrorism," *supra* note 584 at 77.

⁵⁸⁸ Andrew Shaver, "You're More Likely to be Fatally Crushed by Furniture than Killed by a Terrorist" *The Washington Post* (23 November 2015), online: < https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/11/23/youre-more-likely-to-be-fatally-crushed-by-furniture-than-killed-by-a-terrorist/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.62869dbdaae2>.

⁵⁸⁹ Russell Hardin, "Civil Liberties in the Era of Mass Terrorism" (2004) 8:1 *The Journal of Ethics* 77 at 79. Richard Jackson has also noted that "...the estimated 1,000-7,000 yearly deaths from terrorism pales into insignificant next to the 40,000 people who die every day from hunger, the 500,000 people who are killed every year by light weapons and the millions who die annually from diseases like influenza (3.9 million annual deaths), HIV-AIDS (2.9 million annual deaths), diarrhoeal (2.1 million annual deaths) and tuberculosis (1.7 million annual deaths). For further reading see Jackson, *Writing the War on Terrorism*, *supra* note 582 at 92-93.

Moreover, the likelihood of a terrorist attack in some countries that have presently adopted counter-terrorism measures is relatively low. For example, Christopher Michaelson has contended that even though Australia has not experienced a terrorist attack, the Australian government has nonetheless implemented one of the most drastic counter-terrorism measures.⁵⁹⁰ However, it is important to note that Michaelson asserted this claim prior to the otherwise contestable instance of terrorism that took place in the Sydney hostage crisis in December 2014.⁵⁹¹ If casualties resulting from terrorist acts are significantly low in comparison to other day-to-day activities, then it would be difficult to assume that states, particularly in Canada, is concerned primarily with civil casualties vis-a-vis terrorism. Instead, casualties of terrorism may be a sacrifice that the state readily makes as a condition of maintaining a particular way of life. Viewed in this way, various governmental bodies such as CSIS denotes “Islamic fundamentalism” when referencing terrorism. This embodies a gamut of purportedly “radical” or “extremist” ideologies that are supposedly objectionable for Western governments. Casualties of terrorism thus potentially echo a prioritization of certain tenets over the lives of subjects wherein the state makes it permissible for some people to die in order for a particular way of life to exist.

Most markedly, the attempt to secure the ‘bodies’ of some subjects at the expense of marginalizing and ostracizing others, resonates in the modes of governance by which Western states target Muslim minority communities. This is remarkably apparent in the bedrock of counter-radicalization programs that seek to endorse a chosen vision of Islam. These efforts that aim to render an “unacceptable” version of Islam defunct on the logic that this will protect the

⁵⁹⁰ Although the US, UK and Canada have adopted similar legislation, Australia’s counter-terrorism legislation is the only country that permits the detention of people who are not suspected of any crime.” Christopher Michaelson, “Antiterrorism Legislation in Australia: A Proportionate Response to the Terrorist Threat?” (2005) 28:4 *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 321 at 326.

⁵⁹¹ John Bacon and Sandra Lee, “Aussie gunman, 2 hostages killed”, *USA Today* (14 December 2014), online: <<https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/12/15/sydney-hostage-standoff/20422553/>>.

bodies of subjects with “acceptable” beliefs. A choice amid cultural and biological lives results from a refusal of the state in conform to the demands of the presumed threat. In this way, the social construction of the War on Terrorism as a new and ‘different’ kind of war compels states to make a choice between the cultural and biological lives of those subjects that the state otherwise seeks to “make live”.⁵⁹² More specifically, Islamist terrorism seemingly aims to use unlawful and indiscriminate violence in order to produce fear amongst masses of people or to achieve financial, religious, or ideological demands. States then take extraordinary steps to combat the terrorism threat by implementing far-reaching policies and, in particular counter-radicalization measures. The concept of “make live” elucidates the fetishizing with the production of security concerns wherein subjects with acceptable values are protected, while others are increasingly subject to scrutiny and marginalization.

To be sure, the state does not exclusively ‘let die’ Othered groups owing to terrorist attacks, inasmuch as such attacks affect Othered communities but also the very populaces that the state seeks to ‘make live’. Thus, a particular way of life seems to be more significant to states than protecting all lives to that extent that casualties may be preventable if the state adheres to the demands of alleged terrorists. The cultural lives of Othered groups, however, seems to be something that the state will let die in its endeavour to combat terrorism through stigmatization and profiling, and attempts to produce “acceptable” versions of Islam. On the other hand, the state seemingly remains stagnant in regard to the cultural lives of groups who are characterized as otherwise (e.g. non-Othered groups) in its efforts to forestall deaths. In effect, however, this seems to present a friction within the priorities of states in contemporary society that might make

⁵⁹² Michel Foucault’s reliance on ‘biopolitics’ – as in to “make live” explains modern regimes of power, contrary to the purportedly prior sovereign-judicial and disciplinary modes of governance. Foucault’s describes the distinction in *The History of Sexual* (1978) between sovereignty as the power “to make die and let live” and biopolitics as the power “to make live and let die”. See Mathew Coleman & Kevin Grove, “Biopolitics, Biopower, and the Return of Sovereignty” (2009) 27:3 *Society and Space* 489 at 497.

terrorism an exigent national concern for states, which may in turn help to explain the extravagant attention that it receives.

Another factor on the significance that terrorism receives that might help to shed light on the processes by which governments present the threat of terrorism as both a looming and far greater threat than other threats, is that terrorism characterizes a hurdle to indirect forms of government. If liberal democracies embrace pre-emptive measures that rely on supposedly natural rates and regularities, terrorist attacks thus interrupt the “natural.” Understood in this way, one cannot predict the attacks, for their potential exists in largely undetectable mental states. The state can never entirely detect or know one’s thought processes. Brian Massumi argues that the reaction to this type of potential interference is especially significant due to the interconnectedness of the apparently ‘natural rhythms’ or ‘regularities’ by which the state governs.⁵⁹³ Viewed from this perspective, states tend to heavily rely on pre-emptive measures in managing risk.

Massumi’s account points to the logic of pre-emption which resonates in the saliency of counter-radicalization programmes and the rendering of Muslim communities as suspect. Thus, by the time that a documented act of terror has occurred, its already had its upshots. Yet, surveillance of communities believed to manufacture and generate potential terrorists treats Muslim communities under a preventative logic. In this way, the pre-emptive logic of counter-terrorism policies treat Muslim communities as threats, even if they have not committed an act of terror. Instead of aiming to foil individuals from committing acts of terror once they have premeditated to commit such attacks, counter-radicalization programmes operate under the surmise that people already need redirection from terrorism. That is to say, it acts on the

⁵⁹³ Brian Massumi, *Ontopower: War, Powers, and the State of Perception* (Durham; London: Duke University Press, 2015).

uncertain future in a way that does not necessitate an act of terror to have already been committed; thereby, as Louise Amoore best puts it, “risk is uncertainty made certain.”⁵⁹⁴

States respond to this alleged threat by treating it as if the threat has already occurred in advance of an incalculable future event. Most remarkably, Massumi argues that this logic applies to all supposed threats, be it economic irregularities⁵⁹⁵ or for example, the storms in the Gulf of Mexico.⁵⁹⁶ It is thus the role of the logic of pre-emption, and the disruption to indirect government practices that can elucidate terrorism’s prominence in the modalities of governance that rely on the unknown future. Thus, terrorism might receive the profuse significance that it does in contemporary times due to the pre-emptive logic in government.

Lastly, another aspect of terrorism that might make it distinct in present-day government could be its definition as something that is widely accepted as illegitimate. Historically, piracy was the first state-fought war against a non-state attacker, thus providing the breeding ground to use any measures without legitimate restrictions.⁵⁹⁷ Mikkel Thorup has argued that the terrorists of the present-day mass terrorism have since assumed the role of pirates and are branded as the unlawful combatants who fall outside the protection of legal and moral laws.⁵⁹⁸ In this way, the pirate and now the terrorist are actual examples of what the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben calls *homo sacer*,⁵⁹⁹ persons whom everyone can torture without having to face punishment or being ethically tormented.⁶⁰⁰ The various accounts of terrorism presented by governments and

⁵⁹⁴ Louise Amoore, “Risk Before Justice: When the Law Contests its Own Suspension” (2008) 21:4 *Leiden Journal of International Law* 847 at 850.

⁵⁹⁵ Brian Massumi, “National Enterprise Emergency: Steps Toward an Ecology of Powers” (2009) 26:6 *Theory, Culture & Society* 153 at 176.

⁵⁹⁶ Brian Massumi, “The Half-life of Disaster” *The Guardian* (15 April 2016), online: <
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/apr/15/half-life-of-disaster>>.

⁵⁹⁷ Mikkel Thorup, “Enemy of Humanity: The Anti-Piracy Discourse in Present-Day Anti-Terrorism” (2009) 21:3 *Terrorism and Political Violence* 401 at 402 [Thorup, “Enemy of Humanity”].

⁵⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹⁹ Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).

⁶⁰⁰ Thorup, “Enemy of Humanity,” *supra* note 597 at 410

security agencies in many nation-states and especially in Canada, discusses terrorism, by its very nature, as deplorable. Consequently, terrorism provides the breeding ground for ultranationalist and populist policies that disregard the rights of the accused – who are, almost always, devalued as the ‘enemy’. That is, there is an ease with which states can vindicate anti-terrorism measures. The characterization of terrorism as both pressing and of great magnitude has limitless boundaries which then justifies and legitimates a host of counter-terrorism measures.

The sheer nature of terrorism which presents itself as the ‘known,’ but the *actual* act that is the unknown spectacle; one that can seemingly occur at any time and place has led to the unconventional measures in the present conflict. Framed in this way, the state can adopt and implement a plethora of policies in combatting terrorism, with considerably less contestations that they might receive for policies that speak to otherwise “lawful” practices. This may, in turn, result in a reinforcing loop, wherein politicians and policy-makers that call for rigorous measures to real and potential terrorists repeatedly reproduce the fear that they primarily intend to make nonessential. The promulgation of fear and apprehension is reinforced by states’ representation of terrorism as a grand threat and thus the need to adopt measures to counter this threat. Those who question the legitimacy of such measures may be confronted with potential backlash in the face of arguing for the rights of an ‘aggressor’ whose manifestation is predominantly defined as illegitimate in terrorism discourse. Thus, detractors of anti-terrorism measures may have account for their positions pertinent to terrorism, which successively reasserts its continued potential existence. The ‘unlawfulness’ of terrorists thus subjects them to persecution, which warrants the host range of counter-terrorist measures for virtually any government to adopt. This, in turn, may colour the significance of 9/11 in the current state of affairs, but also the reverberations elicited by these events that continue to fuel, and ricochet, in terrorism discourse.

I began this analysis by presenting three factors that might shed light on the particularity of terrorism in the current political circles: First, I proposed that casualties of terrorism may be a sacrifice that the state deliberately makes in order to continue a particular way of living. Second, terrorism may present a threat to indirect government. Lastly, I suggested that the definition of terrorism is widely accepted as illegitimate, for terrorists are unlawful combatants and they pose severe challenges to the democratic state. These trends therefore are all helpful in enlightening the particular sort of fear that is concomitant with terrorism in the present-day government. Moreover, the indeterminate yet catastrophic imageries of a terrorist attack, coupled with the imperative to act, explains the extent to which surveillance measures are enabled through counter-radicalization practices. These developments have given rise to profound concerns over civil liberties and democratic values in the War on Terror in Canada and beyond. Moreover, it is in the context of pre-emptive measures that current controversial counter-radicalization strategies and surveillance of communities become possible.

Security practices that have been adopted in many Western nation-states have the potential for the isolation and demonization of moderate segments of the Muslim citizenry. These practices especially risk curtailing civil liberties for minority groups. Many nation-states and, Canada in particular, justify its counter-radicalization efforts as a necessary means to enhance their anti-terrorist and security measures; which in turn, has serious implications for Muslim communities. The nature and logic of counter-radicalization strategies often equates Islam with terrorism. In an effort to, ostensibly, safeguard against any future terrorist attacks, counter-radicalization efforts operate under the assumption that Muslim communities are at risk of radicalization and the need to counteract this. For example, the notion of “community engagement” is present in both the UK and the Australian government’s counter-terrorism

strategies, and similarly, in Canada. The notion of community engagement in relation to radicalism is especially problematic for Muslim communities for two reasons. First, this approach contains the underlying conjecture that places Muslim communities as the pivot of the issue of radicalism, thereby rendering “community engagement” operable. Second, community engagement places the onus upon Muslim communities, by working with state authorities to help combat terrorism. This is to say that, states place the onus on communities rendered suspicious in countering the ostensible threat of radicalization. Viewed in this way, states exempt themselves from grappling with their role in countering this seemingly threat.

Moreover, it is difficult to determine whose voice is heard in these communities, especially if these groups embrace various tenets of Islamist ideology that make them radical in the view of Western states. The voices of some Muslim community leaders may potentially be perceived as less credible sources in helping to combat extremism. Engagement within the framework of Canada’s counter-radicalization model is especially problematic because it operates according to a binary opposition of an accepted and an unaccepted account of Islam. Individuals whose views are perceived to be radical are inevitably associated with extremism and thus relegated to the ‘unaccepted’ category. Government-fostered approaches to countering radicalization in communities ostensibly susceptible to violent extremism often rely upon Muslim identities that are legitimate in the view of policy-makers and security agencies. In this way, state security practices, coupled with policies and rhetoric provide the formal framework to determine whose ideological tenets are rendered legitimate/illegitimate. Those whose ideological and religious practices deviate from traditional practices may be deemed as both vulnerable and ‘illegitimate’. The exceedingly general terms entrenched in counter-radicalization policies, virtually any innocuous activity or beliefs could be considered as radical, one that could

potentially result in violent extremism. Posed from this perspective, the notion of community engagement may, in turn, render its function inoperative by making the very communities that it intends to engage, feel stigmatized.

Thus, state intervention in communities that are rendered suspicious speaks to the production of security concerns by governmental bodies and scholars that make the governance of terrorism imaginable. The practice of counter-radicalization permits both the proliferation of risk practices for the performance of security but also leaves open the possibility for intervention into the lives of ‘risky’ communities. counter-radicalization initiatives enable an environment where Islamophobia and an anti-Muslim fervour can flourish. Having manifested itself as a formal mechanism of control, counter-radicalization practices then are grounded upon exclusion rather than the inclusion of Muslim minorities groups at an institutional level, even if inadvertent. Framed in this way, counter-radicalization initiatives demonize the Other and contribute to an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ mentality.

Insofar as terrorism is rare in Canada, Canadian counter-radicalization policies thus appear to be devoting funds, although a trivial amount, in order to be seen as actively endeavoring to reduce the terrorist threat. This perhaps best characterized by Reg Whitaker’s concept of “keeping up with the neighbours,”⁶⁰¹ wherein Canada emulates the footsteps of other Western states, in dealing with a perceived terrorist threat, one that is multifaceted enterprise. Canada’s responses post-9/11 suggests that keeping on par with its Western counterparts is, to some extent, an imperative guide in developing policies that combat the multilateral threat of terrorism. In this sense, Canada seems to evaluate its identity or sovereignty through its willingness to adopt and implement counter-terrorist policies that enables a pre-emptive approach, in line with other Western nations.

⁶⁰¹ Whitaker, “Keeping Up with the Neighbours,” *supra* note 6 at 265.

Furthermore, the role of the state in legitimating counter-radicalization policies is inextricably linked to their role and complicity in the construction of identities, in line with Western values. Scholars Michael Omi and Howard Winant argue that the state is the leading contested site wherein racial conflicts take place.⁶⁰² The state has always implicated itself in the active construction of identities of difference; wherein the ideological and religious tenets of Other is demarcated as abnormal. Post 11th September, however, subsequent terrorist attacks are a new area wherein this making of identities and codes of ‘acceptable’ conduct happens. In this way, Islam has been hailed with suspicion and criticism – often portrayed as bigoted, intransigent, fanatical, and, when resisted, violent. Thus, Muslims’ identity and their faith serves as the marker of terrorist functions which operates as an isolating element in Canada’s counter-radicalization initiatives, despite its aspect of ‘community outreach and engagement’. Those who exhibit an interest or piety in their religion are automatically perceived to be radical and thus vulnerable to pursuit by security agencies in the hopes of halting or impeding seemingly terrorist operations. Viewed from this perspective, since there is no consensus amongst policy-makers, scholars and security agencies regarding ill-defined terms such as radicalism, extremism, and terrorism, almost any element of Muslims’ religious tenets can be viewed as radical.

Furthermore, on the pretext of protecting Canadians from the threat of terrorism, counter-radicalization policies can potentially undermine civil liberties, one of the cornerstones of liberal democracies. Throughout history, Canada, among many other nation-states such as the United States, has grappled with the problem of balancing civil rights against security in times of war or

⁶⁰² Michael Omi and Howard Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States*, 3rd edition (New York: Routledge, 2015) at 138.

national emergency, or as Agamben pithily put it, the “state of exception”.⁶⁰³ In a similar vein, the Roman dictum, “Silent leges inter arma,” devised by Cicero is often mentioned when referring to a state of national emergency, which has been largely understood as “the power of law is suspended during war.”⁶⁰⁴ This is to say that, a national emergency legitimates the eschewal of liberties in the name of protecting national security. The FLQ crisis in October 1970 is an example of this eschewal of civil liberties. The crisis led to the invocation of the *War Measures Act* under the Trudeau government at the time,⁶⁰⁵ authorizing the suspension of what is otherwise normal peacetime civil liberties.⁶⁰⁶ The Canadian state wittingly utilized the political immensity of the catastrophe to vindicate emergency measures as a means of intimidating nationalists and separatist groups.

Counter-radicalization policies specifically construct Muslims as illiberal. In turn, this construction renders them as the Other thereby imagining them as a threat. This Othering reproduces the idea that legitimate Muslim stand antithetical to democratic values in their theocentric practices that supposedly encourage violent extremism. Counter-radicalization programmes, in my view, do more harm than good to state security. Thus, it might be worth devising and formulating these policies in terms of ‘*happening*’ or substantively evidence-based threats in place of focusing on future threats. The pre-emptive logic rooted in Canada’s counter-radicalization programme will only subject law-abiding Muslim communities to suspicion for their presumptive potential for violence in an indeterminate future.

⁶⁰³ Giorgio Agamben’s “state of exception” is a makeshift situation in which aspects of a nation’s laws and legal norms (the “juridical order”) are suspended so as to protect the extant society, Giorgio Agamben, *State of Exception* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).

⁶⁰⁴ Jules Lobel, “The War on Terrorism and Civil Liberties” (2002) 63 *University of Pittsburgh Law Review* 767 at 767.

⁶⁰⁵ The *War Measures Act* is replaced by the *New Emergencies Act*, and allows the Canadian Governor in council (i.e., the federal Cabinet) to exercise extraordinary powers without getting the prior approval of Parliament. For further reading see Peter Rosenthal, “The New Emergencies Act: Four Times the War Measures Act” (1991) 20 *Manitoba Law Journal* 563 at 563.

⁶⁰⁶ Whitaker, “Keeping Up with the Neighbours,” *supra* note 6 at 249.

In Canada's case, these policies point to two significant shifts in the tolerance of minority groups, specifically Muslims, in present-day government. *Firstly*, granted that Canada has in recent years understood itself as a multicultural society,⁶⁰⁷ counter-radicalization strategies shed discriminatory nuances in favour of countering radicalization and eradicating the alleged 'terrorist'. These anti-terror measures instituted by the government kindle the rampant insular stereotyping of Muslims as "terrorists", fanatical, and violent – all of which are ripe for terrorism. The concept of community engagement embedded in counter-radicalization programmes approaches Muslim communities with a preconceived notion that they are already at risk of radicalization, thus designating them these as a problem site. Indeed, it is the designation of these communities as a problem site that justifies the spending under counter-radicalization initiatives.

Moreover, counter-radicalization rhetoric aggravates the menace of terrorism by producing further fear and anxiety. Fear is then used to justify the notion of community engagement, which seeks to tame these communities from becoming radicalized. At best, community engagement can 'de-radicalize' individuals it renders the suspected Other. At worst, and most notably, it can reproduce the fear that it intends to contain which, in turn, can potentially legitimate the detention and seizure of many innocent individuals, and infringe upon their civil liberties. Jeremy Waldron argues that legally entrenched civil liberties were initially envisioned to serve as a protection against the state due to the disbelief that "power given to the state is seldom ever used only for the purposes for which it is given, but it always and endemically liable to abuse."⁶⁰⁸

⁶⁰⁷ Joseph Garcea et al, "Introduction: Multiculturalism Discourses in Canada" (2008) 40:1 Canadian Ethnic Studies 1 at 1.

⁶⁰⁸ Jeremy Waldron, "Security and Liberty: The Image of Balance" (2003) 11:2 Journal of Political Philosophy 191 at 203-205.

This statement is particularly true in the case of counter-radicalization strategies since the sheer fact that the terrorist threat is seemingly real does not minimize the threat that state power presents to individuals and communities.⁶⁰⁹ Thus, the ramifications of these policies as an enterprise of the state can seriously undermine fundamental freedoms, but also create a permanent state of suspicion towards Muslim communities. *Secondly*, the underpinnings of practices of counter-radicalization largely encourages the anti-Muslim fervour which raise questions about notions of citizenship and diversity in Canada. Viewed in this light, counter-radicalization policies fail to represent the diversity of Islam as a religious practice. By failing to represent the heterogeneity of Islam, counter-radicalization practices instead foster hostility which can further yield violent backlash against Muslims in Canada. Furthermore, this negative representation, by the constitution of their faith, reinforces the casting of suspicion on Muslims operable. Even though they may practice or perform what is compatible with membership of Western states, or if they deviate from those expected practices, Muslim communities are nonetheless equally deemed 'risky'.

4.3 Governmentality: From "Traditional Terrorism" to "Modern Terrorism"

In order to demonstrate how terrorism cannot be reduced to a singular event or entity, but rather understood through its set of historical presences, this thesis draws on governmentality to construct a genealogical analysis of terrorism. As the introduction noted, governmentality has been largely defined as the 'conduct of conduct' or the social practices that endeavour to shape, direct, or affect people's behaviour.⁶¹⁰ The concept of governmentality as an analysis of the

⁶⁰⁹ *Ibid* at 205.

⁶¹⁰ Gordon, *Governmental Rationality*, *supra* note 37 at 2.

depiction of social tribulations⁶¹¹ emphasizes the developments of diverse counter-radicalization measures. Governmentality thus captures the targeting of Muslim communities by these policies, and the rendering of communities as suspect on the horizon of future terrorist attacks - wherein an overwhelmingly negative construction of Islam is applied towards most or all Muslims. Categorized as risks, Muslims have since assumed to be problematic, violent, and dangerous. The protection of national security in the so-called age of terrorism, thus, is a political priority in governments, and used as a mode of governmentality to govern certain populations. This form of governmentality in the current political circles is based on the rendering of suspicion on certain segments of the population for the reassuring and preserving national security. Governmentality is then useful in showing how the calculation of security practices, as they have emerged post-9/11, no longer rest upon threats that are occurring at the time but rather on the catastrophic projections of the future. Even though the so-called 'War on Terror' is not a conventional war, governmentality unveils how this 'war' is made governable insofar as it sees the terrorist threat as a risk practice that has developed and shown multifarious overtime.

The 'War on Terror' has thus emerged as a new intricate discursive that generates a host of policies to combat the threat of terrorism and prompts new surveillance tactics. The 'governmentality of risk' was once grounded on scientific logic and group profiling. However, profiling can only become operable for risk if the contingency of it is unknown. Thus, risk cannot be calculated through an imaginary future.⁶¹² Modern security practices and, in particular, the practice of counter-radicalization deploys conceptions of susceptibility to render a good/bad account of Muslims, presenting an understanding that these communities are at risk of becoming

⁶¹¹ Claudia Aradau & Rens van Munster, "Governing Terrorism Through Risk: Taking Precautions, (un)Knowing the Future" (2005) Political Science Publications University of Southern Denmark Working Paper No 11/2005.

⁶¹² *Ibid.*

radicalized. The construction and deployment of risk and susceptibility in counter-radicalization policies gives the impression that terrorism is governable. Today, the engineering of risk both relies upon and constructs the internalized Other or the imaginary terrorist. Thus, insofar as terrorism is made tenable, future action is rendered pre-emptively governable. In the name of managing risk then, contemporary security practices frame Muslims as their object of governance in the context of the War on Terror. What is then new about terrorism in contemporary society is that it has given rise to the emergence of counter-radicalization practices that necessitate prospective terror threats to be averted at any cost.

4.4 Countering Just What Radicalization?

As the War on Terrorism continues to penetrate political debates inasmuch as security becomes the pursuit of liberal democracies, little heed is paid to the impacts of these policies on certain communities. In this portion of the analysis, I focus on the various accounts of radicalization amongst Canadian security agencies that makes this concept, as Mark Sedgwick best puts it, “a source of confusion”.⁶¹³ The preceding chapters have shown that there are various accounts of ubiquitous terms such as ‘extremism,’ ‘radicalism’, and ‘radicalization’ amongst many nation-states, including Canada. Interpretations and definitions of what these terms constitutes has resulted in a polarized debate about what they mean amongst academics, policy makers and politicians. Thus, just as there has is no consensus on these nebulous in other governments, the same is true for Canadian security agencies.

Moreover, the nebulous definitions of these concepts that guide counter-radicalization policies have not been proven to be fruitful in understanding the seemingly threat of violent

⁶¹³ Mark Sedgwick, “The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion” (2010) 22:4 *Terrorism and Political Violence* 479 at 479.

radicalization and at the same time have failed to secure security. The many interpretations of these vague terms in counter-radicalization policies indicate that these programmes will do more harm than good. The definitions are more than likely to be pernicious towards Muslims and exclude them as possible terrorists. Moreover, the fuzzy conceptualizations of these terms are likely going to generate friction and competing definitions amongst Canadian security agencies. The identification of purported ‘risks’ by different security agencies can vary whereby some agencies can risk discerning individual behaviours or particular events as a security threat which, in turn, can hamper civil liberties for communities. Thus, such ill-defined concepts will, by implication, potentially marginalize and ostracize Muslim communities, especially when situating Muslims at the hub of Islamist extremism. This is apparent in the CSIS account of radicalization which draws an explicit reference to Islamic radicalization. Understood as a precursor to terrorism, radicalization, then, acts as an impetus for counter-radicalization programmes. However, counter-radicalization policies are not so much an answer to the threat of radicalization but rather a vindication of the construction of ‘us’ versus ‘them’. Thus, it is important to be aware of the implications of such policies insofar as they construct Muslims as risky and reinforce their exclusion in Canada. In this sense, it is unclear whether these initiatives will contain the specious security threat.

4.5 Towards dealing with ‘threats in the present’

The events of 9/11, and subsequent terrorist attacks have undoubtedly resulted in the mass surveillance of certain populations. Concepts such as extremism, radicalization, and terrorism have been largely conceptualized interchangeably in the context of the War on Terror. Additionally, the nexuses between these concepts, which has given birth to counter-

radicalization policies, reveals how security practices reduce the terrorist threat to Islamist terrorism, in the post 9/11 era. These concepts, fixed in counter-radicalization policies, as a technology of governance, have indeed made terrorism thinkable and practical today. Moreover, it prompts us to consider how the War on Terror functions as a continuous political tug-of-war between the need to uphold national security and, at the same time, protecting civil liberties. The governance of terrorism through risk most often than not undercuts liberties so as to uphold national security. The FLQ crisis is a glaring example of an instance where civil liberties were suspended for security measures. To manage dangerous terrorist functions at the horizon of the future, counter-radicalization policies can potentially characterize and regiment all or most Muslims as suspicious. These policies construct and define their objects of governance and, at the same time, offer an antidote. These solutions blur the lines between *real* and *perceived* terrorist threats.

Counter-radicalization developments ought to be formulated post-9/11 to address “happening”, or substantively-developed terrorist threats in lieu of a pre-emptive approach that seeks to cripple the manifestation of threats in the future. The sheer construction of risk founded upon illusory catastrophes should not guide counter-radicalization policies; for it reproduces the fear and vulnerability that it intends to counteract. The growing levels of danger, uncertainty, and indeterminable outcomes, especially in a period of heightened concerns over security are likely to further exacerbate the growing anti-Muslim sentiment. It is thus advisable that despite whether a threat is substantively-developed or evidence-based, it is of paramount importance to eschew developing counter-radicalization policies in incendiary terms. Policies introduced and implemented swiftly can potentially result in poorly advised and constructed initiatives that risk marginalizing some people over others. Viewed from this perspective, the terrorist threat cannot

be reduced to Muslims, exclusively. Contra to security and counter-radicalization discourses, Muslims have come to be the locatable dangerous enemy, aggravated by the racialized constructions of the perpetrators of 9/11 and Islamophobia. Against the background of the September 11th context which has conjured a global war, national security is particularly deemed to be in danger due to the terrorist threat posed by Muslims. The conceptualization of terrorism as a calamitous event renders counter-radicalization practices at the cutting edge of security practices in present-day government.

Having analyzed the contingencies and paradoxes that arise from the so-called modern terrorist phenomenon, it is not convincing that Canada currently faces a threat that would justify exclusionary security practices and, specifically counter-radicalization policies. The legitimization of these practices and their ramifications not only undermine national security, but also reinforce the omission of Muslims in society. Whatever one makes of the potential danger that terrorism poses, the implications of counter-radicalization policies are nonetheless disproportionate to the threat. The mania with containing the seemingly terrorist threat can potentially place Canada in a state of permanent war equilibrium, or state of emergency that was present during the FLQ. This thesis suggests that we must bear in mind the encroachments on civil liberties during the FLQ catastrophe that stemmed the invocation of the *War Measures Act*. In remembering this formidable crisis, we can eschew from applying far-reaching measures that can potentially result in the violation of civil rights and liberties, especially for Muslims communities. This thesis suggests that in order to justify counter-radicalization measures, “happening” or substantively evidence-based threats as opposed to future threats ought to guide policy-making. Counter-radicalization policies may potentially undermine security by disregarding threats that, for example, ring-wing fundamentalists might pose. Practices of

counter-radicalization not only risk isolating Muslims and deeming them as risks founded upon the incalculable threat of the future, but also fails to increase national security.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

The most rampant and consequential effect of the events of 11 September 2001 was the swift transformation wherein security became the major focus of many Western nation-states. Since then, terrorism has become the most single important security issue; generating a host of new anti-terrorism laws, measures, policies, programmes, and initiatives have spawned in its wake. This chapter argues that the notion of ‘Islamic terrorism,’ laden with confusion, has become a ubiquitous feature of contemporary terrorism discourse. The thesis’ account of governmentality captures how the ‘new’ purported terrorism is rendered thinkable and governable in present-day government; within which security remains central. Moreover, the intensified production of counter-radicalization policies to combat terrorism suggests that the issue of national security remains. Thus, this thesis asserts that governance of terrorism has been reconfigured in the contemporary discursive governmentality of Muslim populations in the functioning and conditions of the War on Terror. Combatting radicalization, an ostensibly prerequisite for terrorism, has become dependent upon the governmentality of future risks.

Moreover, the underlying assumption that violence – and by association, terrorism – is intrinsic to Islam has become central to the discourse counter-radicalization and counter-terrorism discourse. In the context of the War on Terrorism, then, this thesis has demonstrated that the narrative of ‘Islamic terrorism’ is concomitant with Muslims and founded upon the deployment of various discursive formations, categories, labels, and terms: ‘extremism’, ‘radicalism’, ‘jihadists’, ‘al-Qaeda’, amongst others. The use of these kinds of labels, which are often arranged into a set of oppositional binaries, are omnipresent in contemporary security practices, and fail to eschew expressions of intolerance against Muslims. Moreover, the seemingly association between radicalization and terrorism embraced in counter-radicalization

policies bolsters the construction of the widely accepted knowledge that Islam is, by nature, violent. Calculated or not, this thesis has shown that counter-radicalization programmes function to reinforce the perception that contemporary 'Islamic terrorism' ascends from, or is embedded in, Islam or Islamic doctrine.

I began this thesis by sketching the array of counter-radicalization programmes that have emerged as instruments of security practices across many nation-states such as the US, UK, Australia and the Netherlands, with a particular focus in the Canadian context. In tracing the genealogical roots of terrorism, and dissecting the assumptions, narratives, and social construction of 'risks' embraced in the practice of counter-radicalization, this thesis suggests that these practices prove to be counter-productive. It concludes that counter-radicalization programmes risk isolating Muslims in Canadian, not least because these policies are vastly politicized and largely counter-productive in grappling with risks on the horizon of the future - that may or may not come to pass.

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