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**YESTERDAY'S "SEPARATISTS" ARE
TODAY'S "RESISTENCE FIGHTERS":
A CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS
OF THE REPRESENTATIONS OF IRAQI KURDS IN
THE GLOBE AND MAIL AND *THE NEW YORK TIMES***

by

JAFFER SHEYHOLISLAMI, B.A.Honours, C.T.E.S.L.

**A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of**

Master of Arts

School of Linguistics and Applied Language Studies

**Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario
September 19, 2001
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***The undersigned recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
acceptance of the thesis***

***"Yesterday's "Separatists" are Today's "Resistance Fighters:" A Critical Discourse
Analysis of the Representations of Iraqi Kurds in The Globe and Mail and The New York
Times"***

submitted by Jaffer Sheyholislami

***in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the degree of Master of Arts***

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the representations of the Iraqi Kurds through a critical discourse analysis of news on the Iraqi-Kurdish conflict in *the Globe and Mail* and *the New York Times*, in 1988 and 1991. The significance of these two time periods is that in 1988 Iraq was not an enemy of the West, but in 1991 it was. However, in both years, Iraq was in conflict with the Kurds. Through a comparative analysis of sampled data of 35 headlines and seventeen full-text articles, this study demonstrates that there was a differential representation of the Kurds by both papers. In the light of the examined historical and political contexts of the conflict in both years, it is suggested that the determining factor for this differential representation could have been the difference in the Western powers' relationships with Iraq in the two time periods in question.

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List of Abbreviations

CBCA	Canadian Business and Current Affairs
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CL	Critical Linguistics
<i>GM</i>	<i>The Globe and Mail</i>
HRW/ME	Human Rights Watch/Middle East
KDP	Kurdistan Democratic Party, Iraq
<i>NYT</i>	<i>The New York Times</i>
PUK	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
SFL	Systemic Functional Linguistics
U.N.	United Nations
U.S.	United States

1 Introduction

If it weren't for the tongue, the head would be safe
(A Kurdish proverb)

1.1 Goal of the research

This thesis is about investigating the function of language as a social practice in itself and as constituting other social practices, such as media discourse. The main objective here is to investigate the ways in which language is employed by the press as a powerful social institution that produces discourse to represent the world and to construct certain realities.

There are several reasons for being interested in studying and analyzing media texts and discourses (Garrett & Bell, 1998, pp. 3-4). First, they are ready and accessible data that provide rich sources for research, studying and teaching. Second, media discourses not only represent speech communities' use of and attitudes towards language but they also influence them. Third, and along the same lines, the formation and expression of culture, politics, ideological beliefs and social life are not only reflected in the media but also influenced and created by them. Fourth, because of what they represent, media discourses can reveal a great deal about social meanings and stereotypes embedded in, produced and reproduced through discourse and communication. Finally, most of what we know about other nations, if not about our own, is through media.

Some media critics argue that the mainstream media do not simply mirror the truth (Chomsky, 1989; Hackett, 1991; Karim, 2000). There are rather certain constraints on media, such as the economy of the media, concentration of ownership, institutional constraints, and news production practices among others that prevent the media from representing the world in an objective way, and this leads to a mediated view of issues.

As for the international news, it has been strongly argued that the mainstream media's representations of international events and stories for the most part correspond to the foreign policies of the states (Chomsky, 1989; Hackett, 1991; van Dijk, 1998; Karim, 2000). It has also been maintained that representation of international stories and actors by the media corresponds to the general stereotypes and common beliefs of the Western societies about them (Brookes, 1995; van Dijk, 1988, p. 34). This thesis will examine one such international set of representations about one group, Iraqi Kurds, in the *Globe and Mail* (the *GM*) and the *New York Times* (the *NYT*), during 1988 and 1991¹.

1.2 Kurds and Kurdistan

Kurds, estimated at about 25 to 30 million people (Ciment, 1996, p. 76), are the largest stateless nation, and live in the Middle East, in an area called Kurdistan², which comprises parts of Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Syria (see map 1-1). Although there has never been a state called Kurdistan (van Bruinessen, 1992, p. 11), the history of Kurdish dynasties goes back as far as the 8th century (Hassanpour, 1992, p. 50). These dynasties were overthrown as a result of the Saljuq Turks invasion (11th-12th centuries). After the Mongol invasion (13th century), Kurdish municipalities were resurrected, and, according to Hassanpour (1992), by the end of the 17th century, there were about 40 Kurdish municipalities. The division of Kurdistan by and between Ottoman and Persian empires, which started in mid-17th century, was completed by mid-19th century. Finally, as a result of the European powers', particularly Britain and France, re-mapping of the Middle

¹ The significance of these two years will follow.

² "Kurdistan has been virtually wiped from the map in the twentieth century. Only in Iran is a single, truncated province labeled Kordistan. This cartographic obliteration has its origins in politics. No country,

East, right after the First World War, a part of Kurdistan, the region that has been inhabited by the Kurds for centuries, was annexed to the newly created state of Iraq.

Map 1-1 Greater Kurdistan³

1.2.1 Kurds in Iraq and International news

Kurds in Iraq constitute about 28% of the country's total population (Hassanpour, 1992, p. 13). They are estimated at about 4 million (Ciment, 1996, p. 76). They live in the northeast part of Iraq bordering Iran, Turkey, and Syria (see Map 1-2). Since the division of Kurdistan after the First World War, for most of the time, the Iraqi Kurds have been in a constant conflict with the Iraqi central government in an attempt to gain

with the partial exception of the old Soviet Union, has been keen on promoting Kurdish identity" (Ciment, 1996, p. 75)

³ Hassanpour, Amir. (1992) *Nationalism and Language in Kurdistan, 1918-1985* (p. 2). San Francisco: Mellen Research University Press

cultural and political autonomy. During the conflict between the Kurds and the Iraqi government, there are two specific time periods that stand out. One is 1988, during which Iraq, according to the Human Rights Watch/Middle East (HRW/ME, 1995, p. xvii), committed "crimes against humanity and genocide," and the second period is 1991, right after the Gulf War, during which the international community witnessed "the most dismal refugee crisis of a fading century" (*NYT*, April 22, 1991, p. A9), thanks mostly to the media coverage of the event.

During the late 1980s, the Iraqi government launched a series of military campaigns against its Kurdish minority living in Northern Iraq (HRW/ME, 1995; Black, 1993). The climax of those campaigns was a campaign called *Anfal*⁴, which took place in 1988. According to the HRW/ME, "the parallels" between "the Nazi German Holocaust" and *Anfal* "are apt and are often chillingly close" (1995, p. xvi).

Anfal, according to Black (1993), consisted of a series of campaigns that

were characterized by mass summary executions and the mass disappearance of many tens of thousands of noncombatants, including large numbers of women and children, and sometimes the entire population of villages; the widespread use of chemical weapons; the wholesale destruction of some 2,000 villages, including homes, schools, mosques and wells; the looting of civilian property; the arbitrary arrest and jailing in conditions of extreme deprivation of thousands of women, children and elderly people; the forced displacement of hundreds of thousands of villagers; and the destruction of the rural Kurdish economy and infrastructure.

Thus, the campaign constituted "crimes against humanity and genocide" (HRW/ME, 1995, pp. xvii, 20).

⁴ According to the Human Rights Watch/Middle East (1995, p. 21), the word *Anfal* means, "spoil," [spoils of war], and it is the name of the eighth Sura of Qur'an, the Muslim's holy book.

Despite the scope of the events in the Kurdish region in Iraq, in 1988, the mass media in Canada and the U.S. reacted very little to them, as I will later illustrate in further details.

Map 1-1 Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan⁵

On August 02, 1990, Iraq occupied Kuwait. The Western countries led by the United States, mobilized their military forces to push the Iraqi army out of Kuwait. This military campaign was accompanied by massive propaganda against Iraq carried out mainly by the media (Karim, 2000). One part of this campaign was encouraging unrest inside Iraq, for example in American president George Bush's speech on February 15, 1991, to oust the central government (Schorr, 1991). Iraqi Kurds, who had been in a

⁵ Human Rights Watch/Middle East (1995). *Iraq's Crime of Genocide: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds* (p. ii). New Haven: Yale University Press

constant conflict over their ethnic rights with the Iraqi central government for decades, were one of the ethnic groups who were motivated by the Allies to rise up against Saddam Hussein (Gowing, 1991; Carruthers, 2000, pp. 210-211). Within a few days, Iraqi Kurds managed to take control of most of the Kurdish region in Northern Iraq. However, at the end of March 1991, in a counter attack, the Iraqi military forces retook the Kurdish towns and cities. As a result, about two million Iraqi Kurds fled the Iraqi military and headed for the neighboring countries of Turkey and Iran. This massive exodus, however, did not go unnoticed in the West due to its coverage by the Western media.

The media carried images of malnourished Kurdish refugees mostly women and children who were slowly dying of starvation and exposure to the weather in the mountainous borders of Iraq, Turkey and Iran. In fact, the media coverage was so powerful in drawing the public sympathy towards the Kurdish refugees that the Kurdish community in Canada, particularly in the Western Ontario region, where I happened to live at the time, could hardly keep up with organizing and handling all the things (blankets, warm clothes, shoes, canned food, etc.) that were donated by the Canadian public to help the Kurdish refugees overseas. Since as a Kurd, although from Iran and one who had recently immigrated to Canada, I sympathized with the Iraqi Kurds, I was grateful to the Canadian and America media for bringing the plight of the Iraqi Kurds not only to the North American public but also to the rest of the world. However, this unprecedented media coverage of the Kurds in 1991 also created some curiosity about the lack of attention on the part of the media to the same group of people, namely Iraqi Kurds

in similar circumstances, in 1988. It is this curiosity that led me to choose the Iraqi Kurds during these two periods as the subject for this research.

1.3 Significance of the study

Every now and then stories on Kurds appear in the Canadian and American press. However, there has not been any analysis of the nature and quality of the coverage of the Kurds in the Canadian press, and neither has there been any analysis of the coverage of the *New York Times*⁶ within the theoretical and analytical approach that has been used here, *Critical Discourse Analysis* (CDA)⁷. To my knowledge, my thesis will be the first analysis of Kurds' representation in the North American press within that approach.

1.4 Research questions

Working within the framework of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), this thesis will investigate and analyze the representation of the Iraqi Kurds by the *Globe and Mail* (GM) and the *New York Times* (NYT) in two different periods of time: 1988 when Iraq was not considered to be an enemy of the West, since it was the enemy of the enemy (Iran) (Karim, 2000; Chomsky, 1989), and 1991, when Iraq, after invading Kuwait, was considered to be the enemy of the West.

My choice for selecting these two time-period stems from the framework by which this study is informed, namely CDA. Fairclough (1995b) suggests that for a critical analysis of media discourse

⁶ For another analysis of the *New York Times*' coverage of the Kurds see Saeedpour, Vera Beaudin. (1989). Kurdish Times and the "New York Times". In *Documentation of the International Conference on "Human Rights in Kurdistan", 14-16 April 1989, Hochschule Bremen* (pp. 144-158). Bremen: The Institute for Human Rights in Kurdistan

⁷ More on this in the next chapter.

One focus of analysis should be on how wider changes in society and culture manifest in changing media discourse practices. The selection of data should correspondingly reflect areas of variability and instability as well as areas of stability. (p. 33)

During the two years in question, the participants of the events (Kurds and Iraq), their relationship (conflict), and also the place where the events took place (Kurdistan/northern Iraq) are the same. However, the relationship of these actors, particularly the Iraqi government, with the countries where the newspapers under investigation were published (e.g. U.S.), was not the same. In 1988, Iraq was supported by the U.S. in its war with the Iranian government which was an enemy of the West at the time. In 1991, Iraq became the enemy of the West. I was curious to see whether this stability of the main participants (Iraq and the Kurds) and their relationship, and at the same time, the instability in the relationship between Iraq and the West, was reflected in the data under investigation.

There is no doubt that the questions I ask in this research stem from certain hypotheses about both discourse and the media. I think that discourse is ideological. That is, all discourses embody certain values of the discourse producer. Media discourse is not an exception. In particular, some media critics (Chomsky, 1989; Hackett, 1991; Karim, 2000; van Dijk, 1998b) believe that when it comes to representing international affairs the media reflects the foreign policy of the country where the media institution operate (e.g. the *NYT* reflects the U.S. foreign policy).

If that is true, then the representation of Iraq in the media in 1988 could be different from 1991, because of the different foreign policies regarding Iraq in each year. If that is so, then since the Iraqi Kurds were in conflict with Iraqi

government in both time periods, their representation by the media in the two time periods could be different.

Based on these assumptions, this study asks the following questions: 1) Is there a difference between the representation of the Kurds in the *GM* and the *NYT*, in 1988 and 1991? 2) How are those differences manifested in the discourse of the newspapers? 3) How do the *GM* and the *NYT* compare? 4) Why were there such differences; were they for technical reasons (e.g. access of the media to the events), editorial practices (e.g. newsworthiness), or for ideological reasons? 5) If so, what do they reveal about the place of media in our society particularly in informing the public regarding international issues and other nations, and its relationship with the state and its foreign policy? 6) And finally, do these differences constitute bias in the media?

1.5 Limitations of the research

The findings, discussions and conclusions of this study are limited by at least two factors. First and foremost, similar to the subjects of my study, Iraqi Kurds, I am from a Kurdish background myself although from Iran. Throughout this study, I have kept this in mind in order to safeguard myself from any ethnic bias that might affect my study.

The other factor limiting my study is the fact that the data under analysis here are from only two newspapers, and may not represent the discursive practices and thus ideological perspectives of all the papers from Canada or the United States. Thus any conclusions that I will make here might only apply to the *NYT* and the *GM*. Furthermore, even conclusions about the discursive practice of these two papers need to be regarded as

tentative, because even though I have used some standardized methodology for random sampling of data⁸, the selection certainly cannot be said to represent the entire discursive practices of the two newspapers.

1.6 Chapters

This study is divided into six chapters:

Chapter 2 presents the theoretical background for this research namely CDA. It also consists of a literature review of studies that specifically deal with the issue of bias in the media in its representations of minority groups and international actors and events.

Chapter 3 presents the source newspaper, procedures of data selection and sampling the data, and finally the method of analysis. Analytical tools used for the analysis will be discussed: grammar of transitivity, naming choices, re-lexicalization, overcompleteness, and voice.

Chapter 4 analyses the data in two parts. First it deals with news stories from *GM* and then news stories from the *NYT*. In each part, the headlines of the sampled articles will be examined through the analysis of the transitivity system, and then samples of full-text articles will be analyzed using related analytical tools.

Chapter 5 will be devoted to a discussion of the findings. My objective here will be one of interpreting the results of the analysis in terms of an intertextual analysis. That is, I will attempt to explain the findings by discussing the social and political context within which the data under investigation was produced. This means that discursive practices of the two newspapers will be tied to Iraq's relationship with the West, and

hence to the foreign policy of the states where the two newspapers were published, U.S. and Canada.

Chapter 6, as the concluding chapter, will provide a summary of the key parts and points in this study. I will close the chapter with some final remarks regarding the importance of critical discourse analysis of media discourse.

⁸ Shavelson, Richard J. (1988). *Statistical Reasoning for the Behavioral Sciences* (2nd Ed.). Needham Heights: Allyn and Bacon

2 Theoretical background and Literature Review

The tongue never lies
(A Kurdish proverb)

2.1 Introduction

This study aims at examining the language and discourse of the press. The framework and methodology used here, and the subsequent data analysis and discussion, will be based on certain understandings of and assumptions about the media and language. It is necessary, therefore, to lay out a framework that not only provides the basis for understanding language but also media with its production and consumption dimensions. Furthermore, since the study is about the discourse of media, such a framework has to offer a theoretical basis for understanding of, and the tools for analyzing, the discourse of the media, and more importantly, ways of explaining and interpreting the relationships between the discourse and its wider socio-cultural and political contexts (Fairclough, 1995b). The framework that meets such demands is Critical Linguistics (CL) or what more recently has come to be labeled as Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) some versions of which are rooted in the Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999; Fairclough, 1989, 1992, 1995a, 1995b; Fowler, 1991; Hodge & Kress, 1993; Fowler, Hodge, Kress & Trew, 1979).

This chapter will be presented in the following order. First, I will briefly discuss the absence of a systematic linguistic analysis of media discourse within the traditions of media studies. Second, an overview of CDA, its evolution, development, theoretical foundations, based on three core approaches in CDA: van Dijk, Wodak, and Fairclough

will be presented. Fairclough's approach will be then tied to an outline of a framework for analyzing media discourse. This part involves discussing specific dimensions of media, such as access to media, economy of the media, and politics of the media. Finally, to illustrate the application of CDA's theoretical and analytical framework, I will outline some studies of the media discourse.

2.2 The need for linguistic and discourse analysis in media education and studies

It has been argued that media studies for the most part, largely prior to the last decade, have not taken into account the important role of language in studying media in general and media discourse in particular (Boyd-Barrett, 1994, p. 22; Bell, 1998, p. 4). Boyd-Barrett (1994) identifies two *critical* and "intellectual" sources for the analysis of media in mass media education: the interpretative tradition and the social science tradition. Whereas the interpretive tradition primarily focuses on analyzing the text, the social science tradition places the main emphases on the context. The main concern for Boyd-Barrett, however, is the fact that neither tradition takes a systematic and analytical account of language in their analysis (p. 22).

According to Boyd-Barrett (1994), the interpretive tradition's analysis of media is based on texts. In this approach, "there may or may not be an attempt to relate the meaning of a text to features of the world beyond that text, but where it occurs it is in the text itself that evidence is sought" (p. 23). That is, the emphasis in this approach is on text rather than on the context (i.e. social and economic factors that have influenced the production and consumption of the text). This approach, according to Boyd-Barrett (1994), has been more influenced by literary theories such as that of Derrida rather than

linguistics. One of the consequences of this approach is that "there is no evidence of interest in the analysis of particular linguistic variables or of language variation, whether internal to texts or in relation to social contexts (p. 23)." Instead, this approach holds that the meaning of a text, if accessible, is primarily possible by a "comprehensive analysis of a holistic discourse" (p. 23) rather than its discourse features such as phonology, morphology, syntax or lexicon.

Whereas the interpretive tradition in media studies is said to be text-based, although it excludes linguistic features at the micro level, the social science tradition is context-based (p. 23). According to Boyd-Barrett, social science researchers in media studies have been reluctant to search for meanings of texts for they believe "meanings of a texts are not fixed within texts but are the product of the interrelationship between texts and their different readers" (Boyd-Barrett, 1994, p. 24).

Overall, Boyd-Barrett's message is clear: a systematic analysis of language, the medium with which the media, the press in particular, communicates and through which it creates meanings and gets messages across, has generally been absent from media education and studies. In order to fill this gap in media education, he reviews the works by three authors whose works are rooted in linguistics: Tuen van Dijk (1988, 1991), Roger Fowler (1991), and Allen Bell (1991). Boyd-Barrett suggests that the works of these authors "[fuse] the best of both traditions" in media studies. Two of these authors whose works he has reviewed are among the founders of CDA: Fowler and van Dijk. Thus, perceiving CDA as an alternative to other approaches to studying media discourse, led me to choose CDA framework to guide me in this study since it not only provides sufficient understanding of the context of the media with its political economy,

production and consumption dimensions, but also provides analytical tools for a systematic analysis of media discourse (i.e. Couliaraki & Fairclough, 1999; Fairclough, 1995b; Fowler, 1991; Fowler et al., 1979; van Dijk, 1988, 1991, 1993; Wodak, 1995).

2.3 Theoretical Background

According to van Dijk (1998a) Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is a field that is concerned with studying and analyzing written and spoken texts to reveal the discursive sources of power, dominance, inequality and bias. It examines how these discursive sources are maintained and reproduced within specific social, political and historical contexts. In a similar vein, Fairclough (1993) defines CDA as

discourse analysis which aims to systematically explore often opaque relationships of causality and determination between (a) discursive practices, events and texts, and (b) wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes; to investigate how such practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles over power; and to explore how the opacity of these relationships between discourse and society is itself a factor securing power and hegemony. (p. 135)

To put it simply, CDA aims at making transparent the connections between discourse practices, social practices, and social structures, connections that might be opaque to the layperson.

2.3.1 Evolution of CDA

In the late 1970s, Critical Linguistics was developed by a group of linguists and literary theorists at the University of East Anglia (Fowler et. al., 1979; Kress & Hodge, 1979). Their approach was based on Halliday's Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL). CL practitioners such as Trew (1979a, p. 155) aimed at "isolating ideology in discourse" and showing "how ideology and ideological processes are manifested as systems of

linguistic characteristics and processes." This aim was pursued by developing CL's analytical tools (Fowler et al., 1979; Fowler, 1991) based on SFL.

Following Halliday, these CL practitioners view language in use as simultaneously performing three functions: ideational, interpersonal, and textual functions. According to Fowler (1991, p. 71), and Fairclough (1995b, p. 25), whereas the ideational function refers to the experience of the speakers of the world and its phenomena, the interpersonal function embodies the insertion of speakers' own attitudes and evaluations about the phenomena in question, and establishing a relationship between speakers and listeners. Instrumental to these two functions is the textual function. It is through the textual function of language that speakers are able to produce texts that are understood by listeners. It is an enabling function connecting discourse to the co-text and con-text in which it occurs.

Halliday's view of language as a "social act" is central to many of CDA's practitioners (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999; Fairclough, 1989, 1992, 1993, 1995b, 1995a; Fowler et al., 1979; Fowler, 1991; Hodge & Kress, 1979). According to Fowler et al. (1979), CL, like sociolinguistics, asserts that, "there are strong and pervasive connections between linguistic structure and social structure" (p. 185). However, whereas in sociolinguistics "the concepts 'language' and 'society' are divided...so that one is forced to talk of 'links between the two'", for CL "language is an integral part of social process" (Fowler et al., 1979, p. 189).

Another central assumption of CDA and SFL is that speakers make choices regarding vocabulary and grammar, and that these choices are consciously or unconsciously "principled and systematic" (Fowler et al., 1979, p. 188). Thus choices are

ideologically based. According to Fowler et al. (1979), the "relation between form and content is not arbitrary or conventional, but . . . form signifies content" (p. 188). In sum, language is a social act and it is ideologically driven.

2.3.2 Further development of CDA

Over the years CL and what recently is more frequently referred to as CDA (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999; van Dijk, 1998a) has been further developed and broadened. Recent work has raised some concerns with the earlier work in CL. Among the concerns was, first, taking into consideration the role of audiences and their interpretations of discourse possibly different from that of the discourse analyst. The second concern has called for broadening the scope of analysis beyond the textual, extending it to the intertextual analysis.

Fairclough (1995b) has raised both issues. He claims that the earliest work in CL did not adequately focus on the "interpretive practices of audiences." In other words, he claims that CL has, for the most part, assumed that the audiences interpret texts the same way the analysts do. In a similar vein, commenting on Fowler (1991), Boyd-Barrett (1994) asserts that there is "a tendency towards the classic fallacy of attributing particular 'readings' to readers, or media 'effects,' solely on the basis of textual analysis" (p. 31).

The other issue put forward by Fairclough (1995b) is that while earlier contributions in CL were very thorough in their grammatical and lexical analysis they were less attentive to the intertextual⁹ analysis of texts: "the linguistic analysis is very much focused upon clauses, with little attention to higher-level organization properties of whole texts" (p. 28). Despite raising these issues with regards to earlier works in CL,

⁹ Fairclough's notion of intertextuality will be explored in section 2.3.3.3.1

Fairclough (1995b) inserts that "mention of these limitations is not meant to minimize the achievement of critical linguistics--they largely reflect shifts of focus and developments of theory in the past twenty years or so" (p. 28). The "shifts of focus and developments of theory" which Fairclough (1995b) talks about, however, have not resulted in the creation of a single theoretical framework. What is known today as CDA, according to Bell & Garret (1998), "is best viewed as a shared perspective encompassing a range of approaches rather than as just one school" (p. 7). Also, van Dijk (1998a) tells us that CDA "is not a specific direction of research" hence "it does not have a unitary theoretical framework." But, van Dijk (1998a) asserts, "given the common perspective and the general aims of CDA, we may also find overall conceptual and theoretical frameworks that are closely related."

2.3.3 Directions in CDA

Among the scholars whose works have profoundly contributed to the development of CDA are van Dijk (1988, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1998b, 1998a), Wodak (1995, 1996, 1999), and Fairclough (1989, 1992, 1993, 1995a, 1995b, 1999).

2.3.3.1 Van Dijk (Socio-cognitive model)

Among CDA practitioners, van Dijk is one of the most often referenced and quoted in critical studies of media discourse, even in studies that do not necessarily fit within the CDA perspective (e.g. Karim, 2000; Ezewudo, 1998). In the 1980s, he started to apply his discourse analysis theory to media texts mainly focusing on the representation of ethnic groups and minorities in Europe. In his *News Analysis* (1988), he

integrates his general theory of discourse to the discourse of news in the press, and applies his theory to authentic cases of news reports at both the national and international level. What distinguishes van Dijk's (1988) framework for the analyses of news discourse is his call for a thorough analysis not only of the textual and structural level of media discourse but also for analysis and explanations at the production and "reception" or comprehension level (Boyd-Barrett, 1994).

By structural analysis, van Dijk posited analysis of "structures at various levels of description" which meant not only the grammatical, phonological, morphological and semantic level but also "higher level properties" such as coherence, overall themes and topics of news stories and the whole schematic forms and rhetorical dimensions of texts. This structural analysis, however, he claimed, will not suffice, for

Discourse is not simply an isolated textual or dialogic structure. Rather it is a complex communicative event that also embodies a social context, featuring participants (and their properties) as well as production and reception processes. (van Dijk, 1988, p. 2)

By "production processes" van Dijk means journalistic and institutional practices of news-making and the economic and social practices which not only play important roles in the creation of media discourse but which can be explicitly related to the structures of media discourse.

Van Dijk's other dimension of analysis, "reception processes", involves taking into consideration the comprehension, "memorization and reproduction" of news information. What van Dijk's analysis of media (1988, 1991, 1993) attempts to demonstrate is the relationships between the three levels of news text production (structure, production and comprehension processes) and their relationship with the wider

social context they are embedded within. In order to identify such relationships, van Dijk's analysis takes place at two levels: microstructure and macrostructure.

At the microstructure level, analysis is focused on the semantic relations between propositions, syntactic, lexical and other rhetorical elements that provide coherence in the text, and other rhetorical elements such quotations, direct or indirect reporting that give factuality to the news reports.

Central to van Dijk's analysis of news reports, however, is the analysis of macrostructure since it pertains to the thematic/topic structure of the news stories and their overall schemata. Themes and topics are realized in the headlines and lead paragraphs. According to van Dijk (1988), the headlines "define the overall coherence or semantic unity of discourse, and also what information readers memorize best from a news report" (p. 248). He claims that the headline and the lead paragraph

express the most important information of the cognitive model of journalists, that is, how they see and define the news event. Unless readers have different knowledge and beliefs, they will generally adopt these subjective media definitions of what is important information about an event. (van Dijk, 1988, p. 248)

For van Dijk (1988, pp. 14-16), the news schemata ("superstructure schema") are structured according to a specific narrative pattern that consists of the following: *summary* (headline and the lead paragraph), *story* (situation consisting of episode and backgrounds), and *consequences* (final comments and conclusions). These sections of a news story are sequenced in terms of "relevance," so the general information is contained in the summary, the headline and the lead paragraph. According to van Dijk, this is what the readers can best memorize and recall.

Van Dijk (1995) essentially perceives discourse analysis as ideology analysis, because according to him, "ideologies are typically, though not exclusively, expressed

and reproduced in discourse and communication, including non-verbal semiotic messages, such as pictures, photographs and movies" (p. 17). His approach for analyzing ideologies has three parts: social analysis, cognitive analysis, and discourse analysis (1995, p. 30). Whereas the social analysis pertains to examining the "overall societal structures," (the context), the discourse analysis is primarily text based (syntax, lexicon, local semantics, topics, schematic structures, etc.). In this sense, van Dijk's approach incorporates the two traditional approaches in media education discussed earlier: interpretive (text based) and social tradition (context based), into one analytical framework for analyzing media discourse. However, what noticeably distinguishes van Dijk's approach from other approaches in CDA is another feature of his approach: cognitive analysis.

For van Dijk it is the *sociocognition*--social cognition and personal cognition--that mediates between society and discourse. He defines social cognition as "the system of mental representations and processes of group members" (p. 18). In this sense, for van Dijk, "ideologies ... are the overall, abstract mental systems that organize ... socially shared attitudes" (p. 18). Ideologies, thus, "indirectly influence the personal cognition of group members" in their act of comprehension of discourse among other actions and interactions (p. 19). He calls the mental representations of individuals during such social actions and interactions "models". For him, "models control how people act, speak or write, or how they understand the social practices of others" (p. 2). Of crucial importance here is that, according to van Dijk, mental representations "are often articulated along Us versus Them dimensions, in which speakers of one group will generally tend to present themselves or their own group in positive terms, and other groups in negative terms" (p.

22). Analysing and making explicit this contrastive dimension of Us versus Them has been central to most of van Dijk's research and writings (1988, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1996, 1998a, 1998b). He believes that one who desires to make transparent such an ideological dichotomy in discourse needs to analyze discourse in the following way (1998b, pp. 61-63):

- a. Examining the context of the discourse: historical, political or social background of a conflict and its main participants
- b. Analyzing groups, power relations and conflicts involved
- c. Identifying positive and negative opinions about Us versus Them
- d. Making explicit the presupposed and the implied
- e. Examining all formal structure: lexical choice and syntactic structure, in a way that helps to (de)emphasize polarized group opinions

2.3.3.2 Wodak (*Discourse Sociolinguistics*)

Discourse Sociolinguistics is one of the directions in CDA associated with Wodak and her colleagues in Vienna (The Vienna School of Discourse Analysis). Wodak bases her model "on sociolinguistics in the Bernsteinian tradition, and on the ideas of the Frankfurt school, especially those of Jürgen Habermas" (Wodak, 1995, p. 209).

According to Wodak (1996, p. 3):

Discourse Sociolinguistics...is a sociolinguistics which not only is explicitly dedicated to the study of the text in context, but also accords both factors equal importance. It is an approach capable of identifying and describing the underlying mechanisms that contribute to those disorders in discourse which are embedded in a particular context--whether they be in the structure and function of the media, or in institutions such as a hospital or a school--and inevitably affect communication.

Wodak has carried out research in various institutional settings such as courts, schools, and hospitals, and on a variety of social issues such as sexism, racism and anti-

Semitism. Wodak's work on the discourse of anti-Semitism in 1990 led to the development of an approach she termed the *discourse historical method*. The term *historical* occupies a unique place in this approach. It denotes an attempt on the part of this approach "to integrate systematically all available background information in the analysis and interpretation of the many layers of a written or spoken text" (1995, p. 209). The results of Wodak and her colleagues' study (Wodak et. al., 1990) showed that the context of the discourse had a significant impact on the structure, function, and context of the anti-Semitic utterances" (p. 209). Focusing on the historical contexts of discourse in the process of explanation and interpretation is a feature that distinguishes this approach from other approaches of CDA especially that of van Dijk.

In the *discourse historical method* approach (similar to Fairclough's) it is believed that language "manifests social processes and interaction" and "constitutes" those processes as well (Wodak & Ludwig, 1999, p. 12). According to Wodak & Ludwig (1999), viewing language this way entails three things at least. First, discourse "always involves power and ideologies. No interaction exists where power relations do not prevail and where values and norms do not have a relevant role" (p. 12). Second, "discourse ... is always historical, that is, it is connected synchronically and diachronically with other communicative events which are happening at the same time or which have happened before" (p. 12). This is similar to Fairclough's notion of intertextuality, as we will see. The third feature of Wodak's approach is that of interpretation. According to Wodak & Ludwig (1999), readers and listeners, depending on their background knowledge and information and their position, might have different interpretations of the same communicative event (p. 13). Therefore, Wodak & Ludwig

(1999) assert that "THE RIGHT interpretation does not exist; a hermeneutic approach is necessary. Interpretations can be more or less plausible or adequate, but they cannot be true" (emphasis in original) (p. 13). This point has been raised by Fairclough (1995b, pp. 15-16), as well.

2.3.3.3 Fairclough

The third main approach in CDA is that of Fairclough whose theory has been central to CDA over more than the past ten years. Fairclough, in his earlier work, called his approach to language and discourse *Critical Language Study* (1989, p. 5). He described the objective of this approach as "a contribution to the general raising of consciousness of exploitative social relations, through focusing upon language" (1989, p. 4). This aim in particular remains in his later work that further develops his approach so that it is now one of the most comprehensive frameworks of CDA (Fairclough, 1992, 1993, 1995a, 1995b; Chuliaraki and Fairclough, 1999). In this section, I will present a general overview of Fairclough's work in CDA, and a more detailed account of his framework for analyzing media discourse, because this will provide the basis for the framework that I use in this study.

For Chuliaraki and Fairclough (1999), CDA "brings social science and linguistics ... together within a single theoretical and analytical framework, setting up a dialogue between them"(p. 6). The linguistic theory referred to here is Systematic Functional Linguistics (SFL), which has been the foundation for Fairclough's analytical framework as it has been for other practitioners in CDA (Fowler et. al., 1979; Fowler, 1991; Hodge & Kress, 1979). Fairclough's approach also draws upon a number of critical social

theorists, such as Foucault (i.e. concept of *orders of discourse*), Gramsci (concept of *hegemony*), Habermas (i.e. concept of *colonization of discourses*), among others (Fairclough, 1989, 1992, 1995a, 1995b).

Chuliaraki and Fairclough (1999) posit that CDA has a particular contribution to make. They argue that, "the past two decades or so have been a period of profound economic social transformation on a global scale" (p. 30). They believe that although these changes are due to particular actions by people the changes have been perceived as "part of nature" (p. 4), that is, changes and transformations have been perceived as natural and not due to people's causal actions. The recent economic and social changes, according to Chuliaraki and Fairclough (1999), "are to a significant degree . . . transformations in the language, and discourse" (p. 4), thus, CDA can help by theorizing transformations and creating an awareness "of what is, how it has come to be, and what it might become, on the basis of which people may be able to make and remake their lives" (p. 4). With such an objective in mind, Chuliaraki and Fairclough (1999) claim that

CDA of a communicative interaction sets out to show that the semiotic and linguistic features of the interaction are systematically connected with what is going on socially, and what is going on socially is indeed going on partly or wholly semiotically or linguistically. Put differently, CDA systematically charts relations of transformation between the symbolic and non-symbolic, between discourse and the non-discursive. (p. 113)

In this approach of CDA, there are three analytical focuses in analysing any communicative event (interaction). They are *text* (e.g. a news report), *discourse practice* (e.g. the process of production and consumption), and *sociocultural practice* (e.g. social and cultural structures which give rise to the communicative event) (Fairclough, 1995b, p. 57; Chuliaraki & Fairclough, 1999, p. 113). These closely resemble van Dijk's three dimensions of ideology analysis: *discourse*, *sociocognition*, and *social analysis* [analysis

of social structures] respectively. What seems to be the main difference between Fairclough's and van Dijk's approach is the second dimension, which mediates between the other two. Whereas van Dijk perceives social cognition and mental models as mediating between discourse and the social, Fairclough believes that this task is assumed by discourse practices--text production and consumption-- (Fairclough, 1995b, p. 59). In this case, these two approaches of CDA, are "similar in conception" (Fairclough, 1995b, p. 59).

2.3.3.3.1 *Fairclough's framework for analyzing a communicative event*

A) *Text:*

The first analytical focus of Fairclough's three-part model is *text*. Analysis of text involves linguistic analysis in terms of vocabulary, grammar, semantics, the sound system, and cohesion-organization above the sentence level (Fairclough, 1995b, p. 57). Linguistic analysis is applied to text's lexical-grammatical and semantic properties, two aspects that have mutual impact on each other (pp. 57-58). Following SFL, Fairclough also views text from a multifunctional perspective. According to Fairclough, any sentence in a text is analyzable in terms of the articulation of these functions, which he has relabeled *representations*, *relations*, and *identities*:

- Particular representations and recontextualizations of social practice (ideational function) -- perhaps carrying particular ideologies.
- Particular constructions of writer and reader identities (for example, in terms of what is highlighted -- whether status and role aspects of identity, or individual and personality aspects of identity)
- A particular construction of the relationship between writer and reader (as, for instance, formal or informal, close or distant). (Fairclough, 1995b, p. 58)

According to Fairclough (1995), linguistic analysis is concerned with presences as well as absences in texts that could include "representations, categories of participant, constructions of participant identity or participant relations" (p. 58).

B) *Discourse practice:*

According to Fairclough (1995, p. 58-59), this dimension has two facets: *institutional process* (e.g. editorial procedures), and *discourse processes* (changes the text go through in production and consumption). For Fairclough, "discourse practice straddles the division between society and culture on the one hand, and discourse, language and text on the other" (p. 60), as shown in the following figure.

A framework for critical discourse analysis of a communicative event (Fairclough, 1995b, p. 59)

Institutional process, in terms of media discourse, will be outlined further below when I discuss Fairclough's framework for analyzing media discourse. *Discourse processes*, however, can be best explained through discussing a core concept in his approach: *intertextuality*.

- **Intertextuality and intertextual analysis**

In this analytical framework, while there is linguistic analysis at the text level, there is also linguistic analysis at the discourse practice level that Fairclough calls "intertextual analysis" (1995b, p. 61). According to Fairclough (1995b),

Intertextual analysis focuses on the borderline between text and discourse practice in the analytical framework. Intertextual analysis is looking at text from the perspective of discourse practice, looking at the traces of the discourse practice in the text. (p. 16)

According to Fairclough, "linguistic analysis is descriptive in nature, whereas intertextual analysis is more interpretative" (p. 16). Fairclough (1992, p. 84) defines intertextuality as, "basically the property texts have of being full of snatches of other texts, which may be explicitly demarcated or merged in, and which the text may assimilate, contradict, ironically echo, and so forth."

Fairclough (1992, p. 85) identifies two types of intertextuality: "manifest intertextuality," and "constitutive intertextuality." The former refers to the heterogeneous constitution of texts by which "specific other texts are overtly drawn upon within a text." This kind of intertextuality is marked by explicit signs such as quotation marks, indicating the presence of other texts. Constitutive intertextuality, on the other hand, refers to the "heterogeneous constitution of texts out of elements (types of convention) of orders of discourse (interdiscursivity)" (p. 104). This kind of intertextuality refers to the structure of discourse conventions that go into the new text's production.

Fairclough (1992) provides several examples of these processes of intertextuality. He analyses an article published in a British national paper, *The Sun*, which is a report about an official document about drug trafficking produced by a committee of the British House of Commons. What he finds are two main points: (1) there are linguistic forms

that do not explicitly represent the official document. They are sub-reports supposedly about the issue that are not present in the official document at all; (p. 2) there are linguistic and semantic signs which indicate the merging of the voice of *The Sun* with the voice of the official document. This is evident in the fact that *The Sun* supports the recommendations that the official document makes to the House of Commons, as if they are *The Sun*'s recommendations. But at the same time, The Sun does not merely repeat the official document but rather rephrases things and expresses them in its own words and language. The paper manages to do this in two ways: (I) by shifting away from the formal language and legal jargon towards a conversational vocabulary and spoken language (e.g. "traffickers" becomes "peddlers"), (II) by converting the written monologue of the official document to a conversational dialogue. That is, the newspaper turns an official document into a popular speech that is appealing to its particular and loyal audiences. This example of intertextuality shows that while *The Sun* report is based on a previous text, it responds to the future utterances, expectations of its readers, by configuring the original text into its own discourse type.

Fairclough (1995, p. 189) claims that intertextual properties of a text are realized "in its linguistic features" since it is assumed that texts "may be linguistically heterogeneous." Nevertheless, Fairclough (1995b) asserts that,

linguistic analysis is descriptive in nature, whereas interpretative analysis is more interpretative. Linguistic features of texts provide evidence which can be used in intertextual analysis, and intertextual analysis is a particular sort of interpretation of that evidence . . . (p. 61)

C) *Sociocultural practice:*

For Fairclough (1995b, p. 62), analysis in this dimension pertains to three aspects of the sociocultural context of a communicative event: economic (i.e. economy of the media), political (i.e. power and ideology of the media), and cultural (i.e. issues of values). According to Fairclough, one does not have to carry out analysis at all levels but any level that might "be relevant to understanding the particular event" (p. 62). These key concepts of the sociocultural practice will be discussed in the following section as a part of outlining a framework for media analysis.

2.3.3.3.2 *Additional considerations for analyzing media discourse*

Fairclough (1995b) posits that "an account of communication in the mass media must consider the economics and politics of the mass media: the nature of the market which the mass media are operating within, and their relationship to the state, and so forth" (p. 36). Among the aspects and properties of mass media that have attracted attention are *access* to the media, *economics* of the media, *politics* of the media, and practices of media text *production* and *consumption*.

a) *Access to the media:*

One of the issues of considerable importance is *access* to media: who has access to mass media and what implications the answer to this question has regarding the place of the media in society. As Fairclough (1995b) argues, there are many individuals and social groups who do not have an equal access to the mass media in terms of writing, speaking or broadcasting. Fairclough argues that this is because "media output is very much under professional and institutional control, and in general it is those who already have other forms of economic, political or cultural power that have the best access to the

media" (p. 40). According to van Dijk (199?)¹⁰, access to discourse, for example, to that of the media, is important, because

access to discourse is a major (scarce) social resource for people, and that in general the elites may also be defined in terms of their preferential access to, if not control over public discourse. Such control may extend to the features of the context (Time, Place, Participants), as well as to the various features of the text (topics, style, and so on). (p. 10)

b) *Economy of the media:*

Another important property of media to discuss is its economics, because according to Fairclough (1995b), "the economics of an institution is an important determinant of its practices and its texts" (p. 40). The mass media are no exception. Like other profit making institutions, the media have a product to sell. Their product is the audience of interest to advertisers (Chomsky, 1989; Fairclough, 1995b). As a result, according to Fairclough, the mass media "are very much open to the effects of commercial pressures" (p. 42). For the press, for example, these effects could be important in determining what is selected as news and in what ways such news is published (Fowler, 1991, p. 20). This issue of the effects of the economic aspects of media, particularly its advertising practices, has been the center of much discussion in critical media studies (Achbar, 1994; Chomsky, 1989; Hackett, 1991; Winter & Hassanpour, 1994).

Closely related to the issue of advertising, is the issue of ownership and more specifically concentrated ownership of the mass media, which according to many analysts has essential influence on media discourse (Fairclough, 1995b, p. 43; Chomsky, 1989;

¹⁰ This is from van Dijk's website, <http://www.hum.uva.nl:80/~teun/beliar.eng>, though without a date. However, a link has been made to this article in 1998 from

Hackett, 1991, p. 65; Winter & Hassanpour, 1994). According to Fairclough, a few large corporations own most of the commercial media in the West. For example, according to Winter & Hassanpour (1994),

two corporations, [Southam chain and Thomson corporation-the owner of the *Globe & Mail*], control 59 per cent of Canadian daily newspaper circulation, and they are corporations with extensive interest outside the newspaper industry, run by the corporate elite. (p. 15)

The impact of concentration of ownership "manifests itself in various ways, including the manner in which media organizations are structured to ensure that the dominant voices are those of the political and social establishment, and in the constraints on access to the media ..." (Fairclough, 1995b, p. 43).

c) The politics of media:

The politics of media, according to Fairclough (199b, p. 36), should be considered in media analysis as well. Many critics, (Chomsky, 1989; Fairclough, 1995b; Fishman, 1980; Fowler, 1991; Hackett, 1991; van Dijk, 1991, 1993), argue that the commercial mainstream media works ideologically and is in the service of the powerful, the elite, and the state. Fairclough (1995b) argues that media discourses "contribute to reproducing social relations of domination and exploitation" (p. 44). At the same time, he observes that sometimes the interests of the media are in conflict with the state, for example in the case of the Vietnam war when American television, by showing images of the war turned the public opinion against the war (Fairclough, 1995b, p. 45). Gowing (1991) and Schorr (1991) also speak of the impact of television, in 1991, in convincing the Bush administration to intervene in Northern Iraq to help the Kurdish refugees.

Chomsky, however, believes that periodical criticisms of the state or major corporations by the media are a part of the doctrine of dominant elite groups to "aggressively portray themselves as spokesmen for free speech and the general community interest" (as cited in Achbar, 1994, p. 53). The same critics of the media, however, admit that the state in the West does not overtly dictate to the mass media. How is the media an instrument of the powerful then?

To explain this, Fairclough and other analysts such as Hackett (1991), following Gramsci, use the concept of *hegemony*. Similarly, Chomsky (1989) and van Dijk (1998a) point to the media's power of *manufacturing consent*. According to Fairclough & Chuliaraki (1999),

Hegemony is relations of domination based upon consent rather than coercion, involving the naturalization of practices and their social relations as well as relations between practices, as matters of common sense-hence the concept of hegemony emphasizes the importance of ideology in achieving and maintaining relations of domination. (p. 24)

The mainstream media, according to Hackett (1991), are "agents of hegemony" (p. 56). According to Hackett, no power could last forever through imposing force. As he observes, this is particularly true of democratic countries such as the U.S. and Canada where the public is mostly literate, has a history of experiencing the freedom of expression, and has a right to vote (pp. 56-57). In these countries, the ruling class needs to achieve the public's consent through persuasion in order to maintain its domination, and the mass media is one of the essential elements in manufacturing this consent (Chomsky, 1989; van Dijk, 1998a; Hackett, 1991; Fowler, 1991).

d) *Practices of media text production and consumption:*

Production and consumption of media texts are two other important dimensions of media and their institutional practices. Production involves a set of institutional routines,

such as news gathering, news selection, writing, and editing (Fairclough, 1995b; Fowler, 1991; van Dijk, 1993). Consumption mainly refers to the ways in which readers, in case of the written text (i.e. the press), read and comprehend text.

Selecting news reports is one of the important practices of text production. Mass media always have far more material than space, therefore, not all news makes it to the newscast (Fowler, 1991, p. 11). This means that there is a process of selecting news, what to weed out and what to publish. In terms of criteria for such selections, according to Carruthers (2000, p. 16) and Eaman (1987, p. 51), newsworthiness is not an inherent characteristic of events and news items. It is rather determined by the news production and institutional practices. So, "events become news when transformed by the news perspective, and not because of their objective characteristics . . . news is consciously created to serve the interest of the ruling class" (Eaman, 1987, p. 51). As a result "the world of the Press is not the real world", rather a partial one, which is "skewed and judged" (Fowler, 1991, p. 11).

Selection by journalists and the media is also involved in choosing the sources of information, for example, who gets interviewed or who gets to be quoted or heard in news. According to Fairclough (1995b),

one striking feature of news production is the overwhelming reliance of journalists on a tightly limited set of officials and otherwise legitimized sources which are systematically drawn upon, through a network of contacts and procedures, and sources of 'facts' and to substantiate other 'facts.' (p. 49)

In contrast to officials, ordinary people, whenever they are used as sources, are mostly allowed to speak about their personal experience rather than expressing opinions on an issue (Fairclough, 1995b, p. 49). According to Fairclough (1995b) and Fowler (1991, p. 22-23), this heavy reliance on officials as sources of information is tied to the media's

dependence on the status quo to keep their ownership, and continue their profitability. The consequence of this, according to Fairclough, is "a predominantly established view of the world, manifested textually in, for instance, ways in which the reporting of speech is treated" (1995b, p. 49).

Once a news item goes through the production process it becomes ready to be read and understood; that is, it becomes ready for consumption, but how it will be consumed has been the center for much debate in the analysis of media discourse in particular (Boyd-Barrett, 1994; Fairclough, 1995b; Fowler, 1991; Widdowson, 1998). Discourse analysts naturally make assumptions about how audiences read and comprehend texts. They even appear to interpret texts on behalf of the audiences. The issue at stake here is how a discourse analyst knows how audiences consume media discourse, how and what they comprehend or what sorts of impacts these reports have.

I think it is safe to say that all analysts, including CDA practitioners, agree that different audiences may interpret texts differently. This, however, is one of the strongest arguments that critics of CDA have brought forward against discourse analysts who base their conclusions on their own interpretations, regarding the impact of media discourse on audiences (Fairclough, 1996; Widdowson, 1995). CDA practitioners are the first to acknowledge that different readers might read similar texts differently (Fairclough, 1995b, p. 15-16). In a similar vein, van Dijk (1993) states that "media recipients [are] active, and up to a point independent, information users" and they may form interpretations and opinions of news reports different from those the newspaper projected or implied (van Dijk, 1993, p. 242). This seems to indicate that it is not possible to say how people read and interpret a news report for instance.

However, CDA practitioners have reasons to believe otherwise. There are at least two reasons. First, readers usually are not trained to be critical readers of texts (Fowler, 1991, p. 11; van Dijk, 1991). Second, audiences interpret texts against their background knowledge and the information they already have about the subject in question (van Dijk, 1993, p. 242). Ironically, according to van Dijk, "for specific types of social and political events . . . the news media are the main source of information and beliefs used to form the interpretation framework for such events . . ." (van Dijk, 1993, p. 242-243). It follows that describing and analyzing the media discourse could help us in making assumptions about the impact of the media on audiences. Fairclough defuses the idea that texts have no meanings on their own, without the interpretations of readers (1995b). He states,

It strikes me as self-evident that although readings may vary, any reading is a product of an interface between the properties of the text and the interpretative resources and practices which the interpreter brings to bear upon the text. The range of potential interpretations will be constrained and delimited according to the nature of the text. (p. 16)

Fairclough, however, believes that reception studies (for example, asking the audiences about their actual interpretations of texts) could help discourse analysis in identifying meanings and effects of texts. Nonetheless, he believes that text analysis should be the central element in media analysis provided that it is accompanied by analysis of text production and consumption (Fairclough, 1995b, p. 16).

2.3.4 Principles of CDA

By way of concluding this section, principles of CDA, outlined by CDA practitioners (Fairclough, 1995a; Kress, 1991; Hodge & Kress, 1993; Van Dijk, 1998a; Wodak, 1996) can be summarised as follows:

1. Language is a social practice through which the world is represented.

2. Discourse/language use as a form of social practice in itself not only represents and signifies other social practices but it also constitutes other social practices such as the exercise of power, domination, prejudice, resistance and so forth.
3. Texts acquire their meanings by the dialectical relationship between texts and the social subjects: writers and the readers, who always operate with various degrees of choice and access to texts and means of interpretation.
4. Linguistic features and structures are not arbitrary. They are purposeful whether or not the choices are conscious or unconscious.
5. Power relations are produced, exercised, and reproduced through discourse.
6. All speakers and writers operate from specific discursive practices originating in special interests and aims which involve inclusions and exclusions.
7. Discourse is historical in the sense that texts acquire their meanings by being situated in specific social, cultural and ideological contexts, and time and space.
8. CDA does not solely *interpret* texts, but also *explains* them.

2.4 Review of critical discourse analysis of media discourse

Reworking theoretical issues, broadening the scope of research to many parts of social life, and developing further analytical tools over the past 20 years has resulted in CDA attracting a great interest among "specialists not only in linguistics and language studies but also within other social science disciplines"(Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999, p. vii). One of these disciplines is media study. As we will see, according to Bell and Garret (1998), during the 1980s and 1990s the majority of studies on media discourse have been carried out by practitioners of CDA, and as a result CDA "has arguably become the standard framework for studying media texts within European linguistics and

discourse studies" (Bell & Garret, 1998, p. 6). In what follows a number of these studies will be reviewed.

Exploring bias in the media discourse has been the criterion for selecting the following studies for review because my study is primarily concerned with issues of bias. There are two aims in doing so: 1) to further demonstrate how the different research directions in CDA have informed studies of media discourse to provide analysts with the necessary theoretical framework and analytical tools; 2) to illustrate how these frameworks and analytical tools have allowed analysts to tackle media discourse and the language of the press in particular to make transparent the biases that may be embedded in media discourse. Because my study is interested in exploring such biases regarding international actors (the Kurds in Iraq), the works reviewed here focus on media representations of minority and immigrant groups and international actors and events. Thus I have divided the review into two parts: (1) *Representations of minority groups and immigrants*; (2) *Representations of international actors and events*. I should point out, however, that assigning studies to the categories mentioned above is not always clear-cut. Furthermore, not all the studies have necessarily been carried out from a CL/CDA perspective. Nonetheless, they all take the language of the press and its discursive practices into account in their analysis.

2.4.1 *Representations of minority groups and immigrants*

Representation of minority groups and immigrants has received a great deal of attention from analysts of media discourse who are interested in exploring biases in the media, particularly that of the racism. A racist discourse is defined by Wetherrell &

Potter (1992, p. 70) as "discourse (of whatever content) which has the effect of establishing, sustaining and reinforcing oppressive power relations" (as cited in Otto Santa Ana, 1999, p. 27). According to van Dijk (1993),

The role of the mass media in the reproduction of racism in contemporary European and North American societies is as fundamental as its general role in the political, social, and ideological reproduction of modern societies. (p. 241)

Raising awareness about this role of the press is important, because, according to van Dijk (1993), the Western public's attitudes regarding the minority groups and immigrants in their countries is partially but in crucial ways shaped by the mass media.

One of the earliest studies that examined this is that of Trew's (1979a). Aiming at isolating ideology in media discourse, Trew (1979a) analyses two British newspapers' representation of the disturbances that took place during the London's Notting Hill Carnival in 1977. The author examines the texts using various analytical tools such as the grammar of transitivity, passivization, nominalization and over-lexicalization.

Transitivity analysis is concerned with causality through identifying types of processes (e.g. material, mental, and relational), the role of participants in the processes (e.g. agent, patient, and beneficiary), and also the circumstances (e.g. time and space)¹¹. Closely related to transitivity are the linguistic features passivization and nominalization. Passivization takes place when an active structure is turned into a passive one. For example, the sentence *Joe ate the apple*, as a result of passivization could be turned into (1) *the apple was eaten by Joe*, or, (2) *the apple was eaten*. In the first passive version, *Joe* is removed from its primary grammatical position as the subject (agent). In the latter, *Joe* is completely removed. This has resulted in hiding the agent of the action.

Nominalization takes place when a verb is turned into a noun, for example in *attack leaves city of dead*. From this sentence alone, we don't know who has *attacked* the city. We don't know when that happened either. In other words, nominalization can hide both the agent of an action and also the time (tense) of the action. And finally, *over-lexicalization* "is the provision of a large number of synonymous or near-synonymous terms for communication of some specialized area of experience" (Fowler & Kress, 1979). Examples of this, in Trew's analysis, are 'lout,' 'thug,' 'yob' and 'hooligan' which work towards changing attitudes regarding protesters in this particular context.

Trew's major focus in this study, however, is on the grammar of transitivity. According to Trew, the two newspapers, the *Morning Star* and the *Sun*, demonstrate very different ideological stances, and this difference, as Trew illustrates through linguistic analysis, is clearly evident in the different ways in which they represent the same event. For example, in the *Morning Star* the police are the most prominent active participants and they are the ones who initiate the action against the demonstrators. In the *Sun*, however, the police are not just the initiators of actions but also experiencers and patients of demonstrators' actions. Trew clearly demonstrates that "ideology and ideological processes are manifested as systems of linguistic characteristics and processes" (p. 155). In other words, for Trew discourse is "a field of both ideological processes and linguistic processes." He further concludes that linguistic transformations in texts lead to corresponding transformations in the ideological meaning of those texts.

Exploring discrimination against racial minorities in media discourse further, Sykes (1985) examines a text that describes the situation of homeless black teenagers in Britain in a monthly magazine produced by the Community Relations Commission. In

¹¹ For a more detailed discussion on transitivity see chapter 3, section 3.2.2

examining the extract from that text, Sykes primarily focuses on a feature of discourse that deals with the designation of responsibility or blame for the problem of homelessness. This inevitably engages her in the examination of the pattern of transitivity which "indicates the relationships between participants and processes and is hence of prime importance in representing causality" (p. 89). Sykes observes that the young blacks' actions are non-transactive. That is, their actions do not extend to other entities. In this way, the article does not assign to the young blacks any responsibility for their predicament. The problem, however, is that other causal agents who might have been identified as being responsible for the young blacks' situation have been deleted or kept unidentified. As a consequence, while the black teenagers are not so much blamed for what they *do*, since little causal agency has been attributed to them, they are blamed for what they *are*: "*young blacks are overwhelmed by the problems of individual and ethnic identity*" (p. 91), an impression given throughout the article.

According to Sykes (1985), because of the particular sequencing of events in this article, the story results in the following explanation: because young blacks have identity problems they become homeless and ultimately resort to committing crime. In this manner the young blacks' identity is seen as the cause of the problem rather than economic or social factors. This leads to a more serious social and human rights problem that contributes to the mystification of the real causes of social issues. According to Sykes (1985), representing social and economic inequalities this way, in which victims are identified as being responsible for their situation, leads to a process that she calls "welfarization," a process by which "issues of basic rights and the denial of equal opportunity" are turned into welfare problems (p. 93). This welfarization process leads

readers to concentrate on people's temporary needs rather than to focus on a possible long-term solution to their homelessness by searching for the social and economic causes of the problems.¹²

Studies conducted in Australia confirm that the Australian mainstream press does not represent minority groups in that country any more positively than the press in Western European countries mentioned above. Teo (2000) employs CDA to "probe for ideological construction of racism" embedded in the discursive practice of news reporting about a Vietnamese gang in two Australian newspapers in Sydney. Examining various linguistic and discourse properties such as quotations, over-lexicalization, and transitivity, he finds the two papers reports of the Vietnamese gang "inherently prejudiced." He observes that the police are the prominent definers of events, and the Vietnamese voice, as a community, is not heard. Partially, as a result of the absence of Vietnamese voices, and secondly through the discursive strategy of generalization, the media discourse manages to extend the representation of a gang to the entire Vietnamese community in Australia. Consequently, and similar to other studies (van Dijk, 1991; Santa Ana, 1999; Young, 2000) the presentation of another ethnic minority, Vietnamese, in a Western society, is within the "Us" verses "Them" dichotomy (Teo, 2000, p. 23). Through a detailed analysis of the summary of reports and a more in-depth analysis of two sample full stories, the author makes transparent the ideological constructions at both levels, micro-and macro-structural, of the two newspapers' discourse.

Similar to Europe and Australia, immigrants have been represented negatively by the mainstream media in the United States. Santa Ana (1999) examines the metaphoric

¹² For further discussion of Sykes' *welfarization* concept see Sykes (1988).

structure associated with immigrants in their coverage by the *Los Angeles Times* of a political debate and campaign in California over an anti-immigrant referendum in 1993-1994. According to Santa Ana (1999), the American public discourse toward immigrants is not consistent, rather it has two faces: one is shown when immigrants are needed for work and cheap labor, and the other when they are not required as workers even for poorly paid jobs:

When Americans scorn essential labor, workers from other countries are procured for the lowest paid and least desirable work . . . However, as the economic cycle wanes, the second face is manifest toward the immigrants and their children. Then the immigrant is regaled as a burden and menace. (p. 192)

In other words, the American attitude regarding immigrants changes in accordance with the United States' economic conditions and interests.

Santa Ana (1999) is primarily concerned with the metaphorical structure of the *Los Angeles Times*. Drawing upon Lakoff and Johnson (1980), the author defines metaphor as

a conceptual mapping from one semantic source domain to a different semantic target domain. The source domains are often those things we as humans can easily think about . . . The target domains are most frequently conceptual ones, hidden from our senses or otherwise unknown to us. (p. 194)

From this conceptualization, metaphor is perceived as embodying "the common-sense world-view of its target domain" (p. 192). According to Santa Ana, metaphors facilitate social and political institutions and organizations such as media in their quest for social and political control over the public domain.

Santa Ana's close analysis of more than 190 instances of metaphors pertaining to immigrants in 107 articles from the *Los Angeles Times* (*LAT*) leads to the conclusion that immigrants' characterization by the *LAT* is dehumanizing. This dehumanization is represented in the following metaphors: "immigrants are animals," "weeds," "debased

people," "commodities," "dangerous waters," and soldiers of an "army" who have "invaded" the "castle" of the American nation. The social implication of this negative representation of immigrants as animals allows for the deprivation of their "human rights" and treats this as natural and common. Animals after all do not enjoy such social and human rights (p. 202). Of course there is another way to interpret this: since "immigrants are animals" then failure to grant rights is not the result of any wrong doing by the American system and authorities. In other words, no one is responsible for the immigrants' predicaments but themselves because of what/who they are. This is similar to the study by Sykes (1988) which illustrated that particular discursive practices by the press led the readers to blame the young blacks in Britain for their own homelessness.

Studying the representations of immigrants and minorities in the Canadian media, through analyses of their discursive practices, has been pretty much absent from the literature so far. The only study in this direction within the Canadian context which I am aware of is Young (2000). Young (2000) examined and compared the representations of two ethnic groups, Poles and Sri Lankans, which appeared in ten of the largest Canadian newspapers, in terms of distribution, during the years 1996 and 1997. Analyzing the discourse of the stories on two fronts, topics and the representation of the social actors, she found the representation of Poles more positive than that of the Sri Lankans. She shows that Sri Lankans, particularly Tamils from that country, are portrayed as a faceless group whose voice is hardly heard in the Canadian press, and the range of activities reported on is limited to violence. Poles, on the other hand, appear in stories about well-known individuals such as the Pope and Walesa who are engaged in positive and "normal" social activities. Unlike stories about Poles, for Sri Lankans *nationality* is

frequently the nucleus of the news reports. As a consequence of such representation, Sri Lankans are seen as "Them," and Poles as "Us."

Van Dijk (1991, 1993) has also shown this dichotomy, Them versus Us, in media discourse. Van Dijk (1991) finds consistent patterns in reporting on ethnic minorities in the Western media. He observes that, in reporting on ethnic events, "the minority group members are quoted less often and less extensively than majority group members, even when the topics directly concern them, and even if there are minority experts available to give an opinion" (p. 174). The result is that ethnic minorities become marginalized and portrayed as having "literally little to say," and consequently only the white authorities define their affairs. Van Dijk (1991) observes that the press, in general, chooses speakers in defining the events by partisanship, and they quote those whose views do not contradict the standpoint of the newspapers (p. 175). Furthermore, similar to Sykes (1985), van Dijk (1991) observes that instead of searching for or identifying the roots of minorities' social problems, the press, instead, has "racialized" the conflicts as being natural to minorities because of what and who they are. Furthermore, they are only talked about in relation to "crime," "violence," and "unacceptable cultural differences" which results in portraying minorities as Them and clearly different from Us. Consequently, their problems and possible solutions are not the same as those of the dominant population.

Another important point regarding the representations of minorities in the press that was raised by van Dijk (1991) was that minority groups in Europe were not represented the same way in all papers. In his study of the representations of minorities in the European press (1991), for instance, he observed that a leftist paper was less hostile

to minorities compared to a conservative paper. Furthermore, even in the same conservative paper, not all minority groups were represented in a similar manner. For example, whereas Tamils in the Dutch papers were portrayed as economic refugees, and as van Dijk puts it as "scroungers," Vietnamese refugees were viewed more positively because they fled a communist system. Given this kind of representation of minorities and immigrants by the press, and according to van Dijk (1991), the overall power of the media in shaping the social cognition (i.e. attitudes and beliefs) of the members of a society in developing attitudes and beliefs towards "others," it is necessary to examine the connection of this sort of representation by the press to the wider social and political context of the Western societies.

Van Dijk (1993) believes the power of the mass media in shaping the social cognition is due to certain media-related factors: the production of news (i.e., hiring of journalists, news collecting, "social cognition") and the actual reporting of the news (i.e., subjects of the news apparent in the headlines, quotations, and the microstructures of news reports). In terms of production, with regard to hiring in the newsrooms, van Dijk finds that only a few newspapers have top editors with ethnic backgrounds. He also observes that the minority journalists are promoted less, are not assigned to cover serious political, social and economic issues, and are perceived not to be skilled and reliable. This partially leads, as van Dijk observes, to a limited number of news reports on minorities focusing on stereotypical topics and contents. As a consequence, overall "minorities or their presence are semantically defined in news discourse as different, problematic, deviant, or threatening" (van Dijk, 1993, p. 249). He also observes that the

issues that are important to minorities are excluded and anti-racism voices are marginalized (p. 251).

It is interesting when we see that such concerns raised by a discourse analyst such as van Dijk are also raised by some journalists themselves. Loreen Pindera, a reporter with the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), in a television interview in 1993, has been quoted as saying:

I think that mainstream media still mostly represent the status quo, middle-ground, middle-class, white, male Canadian reality. Whatever is outside of that seems "other". Newsrooms are changing these days in terms of reporters, but the gatekeepers are still male, white journalists, and the Aboriginal world is outside of their reality. (as cited in Roth, 1996)

Loreen Pindera calls for having trained minority journalists in the newsrooms in order to achieve "an accurate reflection of all the layers of a story." Nonetheless, her comment about the "gatekeepers" still being "white" is of great concern for others as well. Irshad Manji (1995), another Canadian journalist with Vision TV, provides a first hand experience regarding the issue:

My own experience in a newsroom tells me that when I sat on the editorial board of *The Ottawa Citizen*, there were maybe five people of color in the newsroom. Only one shared my interest in writing an article about racism for the staff newsletter. The rest hesitated for fear of being seen as complainers and making it onto the editor's hitlist at a time of recession.

These institutional constraints are only one of the reasons for the mass media to represent the world including minority and immigrant affairs the way they do.

Van Dijk (1991) believes that the press is "a representative of the white power structure" (p. 20). Thus it could be suggested that the portrayal of the ethnic minorities in the Western press is in accordance with the dominant ideology in those countries. For example, Wodak (2000), who analyzed parliamentary debates regarding immigration and minority issues in various Western European countries, contends: "the discourses of the

political elites in the states we investigated frequently seem to be determined by intolerance, prejudices and stereotypes toward immigrants, refugees and other groups of foreigners." Although Wodak (2000) finds the discriminatory practices vary from country to country, she asserts "ethnic minorities are subject to stigmatization and discrimination in all of the countries."

From this brief review of studies examining the discourse of the press on minorities and immigrants, the representation of ethnic minorities and immigrants, non-white groups of people living in Western countries, by the mass media in Western societies might be summarized as follows:

- Ethnic minorities are underrepresented in the newsrooms: white and male journalists mainly dominate the discursive practices of news reporting.
- Social and economic difficulties of ethnic minorities are attributed to their ethnic or racial identity rather than social and political causes.
- Minorities are portrayed as problems for our societies since they are engaged in particularly negative social activities involving "violence" and "drug trafficking".
- They are dehumanized and as a result perceived unlike "Us." This may lead to a view that they do not have to have the same social and economic opportunities as us.

The impact of the elite power over the mass media's representation of the "other" and the impact of media's reproduction of such a power, which has resulted in practicing biases towards minorities and immigrants, has been extended to representations of other nations in the press. As will be shown in the following section, the nations that are

negatively represented in our media are those where most of the immigrants of the Western countries originate. In addition, these are nations whose social and political interests do not necessarily coincide with ours.

2.4.2 Representation of international actors and events

The studies in the previous section suggested that there is a mutual consent between the media's representation of and the elite's treatment and attitudes towards the minorities and immigrants in Western societies. Some of the studies argued that both the media and the elite correspondingly contribute to sustaining and reproducing the dichotomy of "Us" versus "Them" as we have seen. This section's objective is to see whether the correspondence between media, the elite, and foreign policy makers in particular, exists, and if so, how the dichotomy of "Us" versus "Them" is embedded in the discourse of the press. It also focuses on the question, how do foreign policy makers relate to news? My own hypothesis about the influence of media and foreign policy makers on each other is that it is mutual.

Trew (1979b), in another study, analyzed the British press (*The Guardian* and *The Times*) coverage of an event, taking place in 2 June 1975, in Harare, Salisbury, in which "police opened fire directly for about 40 seconds into a crowd of unarmed people and killed five of them" (p. 94). Six more "angry" demonstrators were killed later the same day. According to *The Times*,

The shooting was the climax of a day of some violence and tension during which rival black political factions taunted one another while the African National Council Executive committee met in the township to plan its next move in the settlement issue with the government. (Trew, 1979b, p. 94)

Operating on the assumption that "the linking of particular events to a network of causal relations and to structures of objects or forces is a part of all judgment and perception" (p. 96), Trew (1979b) used linguistic tools to analyze the causal relationship of the event in question and its representation in the British press. He attended to such questions as who the participants are in the event, what kind of processes they are involved in (i.e. what they do or what they say) and in what circumstances.

Trew (1979b) demonstrated that "linguistic analysis . . . can be used . . . as a means of revealing ideological process in the production of discourse" (p. 116). According to Trew, examining the grammar of transitivity, passive vs. active structure and lexicalization reveals that the press identified the main cause for the event as being "factionalism," that is, the division among Africans themselves, rather than the police who opened fire on the demonstrators. The responsibility of the police for the death of the demonstrators was further reduced by the use of passive structures. In this way the police were removed from the prominent agent positions so that they were not perceived as being responsible for the shooting. These linguistic choices, according to Trew, were ideologically driven. The press' account of the event shifted readers' focus to non-causal elements, and the truth became abstract. Why, one may ask? The response to this question may lie in Trew's assertion that the voice of the South African movement, at the time, "[was] not heard, except at a remove and marginally" (p. 115). This, for Trew, is seen as one of the reasons for the absence of "an alternative ideology . . . widely available" (115) to provide a different picture of the events in Africa. He believes that "liberation movements and solidarity organizations do make available to newspapers

much that they do not use or do not value as information" (116). Instead, he asserts, "the British media generally reproduce the official view" (116).

Interestingly, sixteen years after Trew's study, a similar representation of Africa in the British press is illustrated by Brookes (1995). By analyzing 133 headlines of news stories about Africa in two British papers, *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph*, Brookes shows how the discourse of the news on Africa gives rise to a "neo-colonial racist representation of Africa and Africans" (p. 462). Brookes' analysis is of two sorts: linguistic and intertextual. According to Brookes, the first focuses on choice of form and meanings, the latter is concerned with traces of historical and other contemporary texts on Africa that the writers of the texts and their readers draw upon in the processes of consumption and interpretation.

Categorizing the content of the news articles and clustering them into several subjects and themes in Brooks' study reveals that there is a homogenous selection of subjects such as civil war, human rights, crime and disaster that appear regularly in the news stories on Africa. She argues that the collective effect of this categorization is "the construction of a stereotypical representation of Africa in the minds of readers" which portrays Africa "as a homogenous block with violence, helplessness, human rights abuses and lack of democracy as its main characteristics" (p. 465). This stereotypical representation of Africa in the minds of readers, as Brook demonstrates, is reinforced through "macro propositions," the propositional contents of the headlines, and other linguistic features and processes, such as lexicalization/wording, re-lexicalization, nominalizations, grammar of transitivity, quotations and metaphor.

In examining over-lexicalization, Brookes (1995) finds that co-occurrence of certain words/meanings with negative connotations such as "deaths," "killings" and "heavy losses" results in a portrayal of an image of an Africa that is permeated by violence, death and crimes.

There is also the issue of re-lexicalization. For example, "loan" to the African countries becomes "aid" which, according to Brookes obscures exploitation or implies that Africa is helpless. This representation of Africa as being in need of help and "aid" is also evident in Brooks examination of the grammar of transitivity: whereas the Western states and participants enjoy "positive agency" roles such as promising or giving "aid" to Africa, the African participants are portrayed as being agents of violence and repression against each other and verbal wrangling and requesting help. African states and powers are further delegitimized by the ways in which they are referred to or named. Brooks observes that whereas Western powers are referred to as "Britain," "France," and "USA," African powers are identified through their leaders who are referred to by their name. Brooks asserts that such references, for example "*Doe clings to power*," have the effect of portraying state actions as personally motivated and suggest a lack of legitimacy (p. 477).

The findings of van Dijk (1993), discussed earlier, regarding the voice of the minorities in the Dutch press, has an echo in Brooks (1995). Brooks (1995) in examining the issue of voice, observes that the Africans are either silent or they are quoted on irrelevant or trivial topics (e.g. dress). Furthermore, their statements are signaled by words such as "alleged" and "accuse" which, according to Brooks, act as discrediting devices. In addition, whereas the papers exclude quotation marks from the statements of Western participants, which, according to Brooks, act as a sign of endorsement, they

place Africans' statements in quotation marks to distant themselves from the opinions of the African speakers, and as a result invalidate their statements.

This sort of representation of the Africans by the British press is not only evident at the textual level but also the intertextual one. In her intertextual analysis, Brookes finds a striking similarity between the British newspapers representation of Africa and what the colonial literature, historical travelers, missionaries and anthropologists recorded on Africa. This similarity has been observed by Ezewudo (1998) as well.

Ezewudo (1998), in his MA thesis, carries out a uniquely Canadian research project on the representation of Nigeria, as "Africa's most influential nation," in three major Canadian newspapers: *The GM*, the *Ottawa Citizen* and *La Presse*. The study is mainly concerned with examining the coverage of the mentioned papers of the hanging of the Nigeian activist and playwright Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni ethnic rights activists in 1995. One of the important issues the author looks into is who defined the Nigerian event. He finds that the definers of the story, the sources of the story, those that have been quoted and referred to in that story, are activist groups, Nigerian opposition and leaders of the Western countries including Canada. Along the same lines, he observes that the view of the Nigerian government on the event was "readily discredited, and delegitimized" and alternative view points expressed by Nigerian neighbours, for being in favor of the Nigerian government, were "interpreted as due to weakness and fear of Nigeria's reprisal"(p. 184). As a result, the author found "a total absence of non-Western news operatives in the papers studied" (p. 190).

Ezewudo (1998) further observes that labeling the event in Nigeria as "human right abuse" provided a justification for Canada and the other Western countries to react

to Nigeria the way they did and the media played an essential role in getting that message across by labeling it as such. Looking at the Canadian press representation of Nigeria, Ezewudo (1998) observes that the media coverage of the Nigerian event "flew along with Canadian foreign policy" which was for turning "Nigeria back to democracy and human rights," as opposed to being ruled by a military system of governance (pp. 183-184). Ezewudo (1998) further observes, similar to Brookes (1995) that the perception of Africa is very much that of the nineteenth century provided to the Western public by the missionaries, explorers and colonizers (p. 189). As a result of these observations, Ezewudo concludes that, "the Canadian/Western press qualifies the coverage of Nigerian as basically ideological and hegemonic" (p. 184).

According to van Dijk (1988) this kind of mutual correspondence between the media and the states and the overall economic and political interests of the Western societies determine the process of news selection. Van Dijk (1988) states that, "... foreign news products are basically selected according to the interests of political, military, and business elites. Indeed, most foreign news is about political, military, and economic events, and not about social and cultural events" (p. 40). It is as though there are no cultural events, economic or scientific progress, and human-interest stories in the underdeveloped or developing parts of the world. No wonder war and violence at the international scene receives wide coverage especially when that war involves the Western powers directly or indirectly (Carruthers, 2000). One of the reasons for that, as suggested by Carruthers (2000), is that coverage of war by mass media sells well. However, as the three studies reviewed below show, the mass media does not merely report on wars, it also participates in projecting, sustaining and ending wars.

Whereas most studies in CDA have dealt with events that have already taken place, in the past, Dunmire (1997) examines how the American press projected the Gulf War prior to its actual happening. She demonstrates how immediately after the Iraqi military's invasion of Kuwait on August 02, 1990, the *NYT* and *Washington Post* (*WP*) news reports, August 3-7, made the invasion of Saudi Arabia by Iraq, something that never happened, seem as though it had actually occurred. Dunmire calls this a "projected event": "a state of affairs that an individual or group claims will occur at some point in the near future" (p. 221). The author examines various linguistic devices in the news texts of the two papers in order to find out how a projected event can be constructed linguistically and rhetorically so that it could appear "as factual accounts of the social world." She observes that, as a result of constructing the reports in a combination of nominal forms (to hide the tense and agents of processes), present tense (to make an event imminent), and conditional clauses, "the projected event of Iraq invading Saudi Arabia was not presented as a hypothetical scenario that could (should) be discussed and evaluated. It was immediately assumed to be part of future reality" (p. 249).

Dunmire (1997) clearly shows that the information about the threat of Saudi Arabia's invasion by Iraq qualifies as hearsay information since the spokespersons and sources of information are often unidentified. Dunmire asserts that newspapers, by relying on hearsay information, achieve at least two things: 1) distancing themselves from the statements and shielding themselves from any possible criticism regarding the validity of the claim being made; and (2) "legitimizing their views in the absence of precise and actual sources of information" (Dunmire, 1997, p. 230). The importance of

hearsay information and its effects in news reporting has been highlighted by other media discourse analysts as well (van Dijk, 1993, 1995).

As observed by Dunmire, another linguistic device that plays an important role in posing a projected event as an account of the social world is tense. In examining the tenses used in the texts, the author observes that the papers, instead of expressing the threat of Saudi Arabia's invasion in the future tense, since the event is only a projected one, construct the texts in the present tense making the invasion appear imminent and closer to reality (p. 234). On the implication of tense, Dunmire cites Fleischman as asserting that "the greater the likelihood that a situation will be realized, i.e. the closer to 'reality' the speaker perceives it as being, the closer to 'now' (=present) will be the tense used to represent it" (p. 234). This discursive practice by the *NYT* and the *WP*, Dunmire suggests, served "as the rationale for the initial deployment of U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia" (p. 228). In other words, by making imminent the possibility of invading Saudi Arabia by Iraq, which meant a serious threat to American interest, the media served the American government's aim to get the citizens to support the deployment of troops to the region, not only to rescue Kuwait, but also to prevent Iraq from invading other U.S. allies (i.e. Saudi Arabia). According to Dunmire, *NYT* and *WP* news reports' representation of the event in question favored the U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East at that particular time in history (p. 248).

Whereas Dunmire's study examined how a war can be projected in media discourse, Vaughan (1995) examines the discourse of the press to illustrate how a war can be maintained by creating and intensifying animosity among the parties in a conflict discursively. Vaughan analyses 60 editorials on the Lebanon crisis in 1982 published in

four major newspapers from four nations involved in the conflict: the American *New York Times*, the Israeli *Jerusalem Post*, the Lebanese *An-Nahar*, and the Palestinian *Al-Fajr*. Her linguistic analysis of the editorials focuses on the use of imagery, metaphors in particular, and how they work to support the main arguments and the characterizations of the key terms embedded in the editorials discussing war and peace.

Vaughan (1995) identifies four major types of imagery: (1) military metaphors, which are primarily applied to the enemy. Through these metaphors the nations are reduced to "war machines" that act unconsciously, and "[hide] out amongst civilians"; (2) images of primitivity are used against the enemy who are characterized as "squatting"; (3) bipolar divisions in which "Us" is presented as brave and honorable as opposed to "Them" who are presented as "terrorists" who have started a "beastly invasion"; and (4) familial imagery in which the relationship between the U.S. and Israel is portrayed by the *NYT* as that of father and son. Palestinians and Lebanese, on the other hand, in the Arabic newspapers, are portrayed as orphans left out by their Arab family at the time when they are needed the most.

The ideological implications of this study, as stated by the author, are that propositions suggested by the editorials "[surely] indicate a deep-seated belief in the power, and the value, of war and/or military options to solve disputes among nations." (72). Vaughan (1995) successfully demonstrates how metaphors are used in the press to create and sustain hostile images of the enemy among nations, and how that image contributes to maintaining the animosities that lead to war.

Whereas Dunmire (1997) examined the role of media discourse in *initiating* a war, and Vaughan (1995) looked at the role of the press in *sustaining* a war, Musolff

(1995), investigates how a war can be *ended* by discursive means. By investigating the rhetoric of Allied news management in the Gulf War, Musolff (1995) explores the language of peace and the way it was practiced by politicians and the media in the United States to achieve the promise of ending the Gulf war: liberating Kuwait from Iraq. To answer the question "when and how a war ends," he investigates how and why the war started and points out that a war is not ended for those who enter it unless the aims for starting the war are achieved, particularly when one side, the U.S. for example, is eager to come out of the war victorious.

By applying Austin's speech act theory, Musolff (1995) attempts to find out "how we can assess the relationship between a political promise and the subsequent presentation of the object of that promise." Furthermore, he hopes that this theory may allow us to find out how "supposedly rational peace-promising declarations of war aims become prophecies, which, rather than 'fulfilling' themselves, turn into agendas of aggression" (p. 106). According to Musolff, the U.S. and its allies were more concerned with oil in Kuwait than simply the invasion of one nation by another. The problem, however, was that they couldn't convince, or were afraid of trying to convince the Western public of the need for sacrificing lives for the sake of oil. As a result, they resorted to the "rescue scenario" which automatically entailed action in the form of a military operation "Desert Storm." This war, and perhaps all wars, could not end without having a clear-cut announcement of who was the winner and who was the loser.

After unprecedented pressure from the international community including some Arabic countries and the allies' use of threatening rhetoric against Iraq, on 27 February, Iraq announced its compliance with the United Nations resolutions including

withdrawing from Kuwait. According to Musolff, since the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait occurred without an actual war and confrontation with the allies forces already stationed in the region, it could not demonstrate that clear-cut victory for the allied forces. As the author points out, letting Iraq withdraw quietly and without confrontation could have been interpreted as a defeat for the Western allies whose authority was defied by a relatively small Middle Eastern country. They needed to claim that Kuwait was “rescued” and “liberated” by the West to mark the end of the war.

An example of the linguistic and rhetorical means employed by the allies to achieve such a goal, claiming victory, is reflected in one of George Bush's speeches: "He [Saddam Hussein] is not withdrawing. His defeated forces are retreating . . . " (p. 100). Musolff asserts that it is clear from this statement and others that it was crucial for the allies to label the act of leaving Kuwait by Iraq as "retreat" and "defeat" rather than "withdrawal" which implies a voluntary act. Once again, the importance of discourse in our social life is demonstrated. While a war can be projected through discursive devices, it can also be sustained, or ended.

2.5 Conclusion

Studying media has to be accompanied by analysis of its discourse (Bell, 1998; Fairclough, 1995b). This literature review has shown that CDA, over the past two decades, has developed effective analytical tools with which discourse analysts have been able to analyze media discourse effectively and sufficiently. An effective use of CDA in analyzing media discourse can provide us with an understanding of both media and language, and the ways in which these two phenomena interact in shaping our understanding of the world, and at the same time shaping each other in that quest.

I find it helpful, to end this chapter by summarizing Fairclough's desiderata for a critical analysis of the media discourse especially that of the press (1995b, pp. 32-34):

- **Analysis of discourse should focus on the manifestation of social, cultural, and political changes in media discourse practices**
- **Analyzing media texts should include analyzing both language and texture plus visual images**
- **Examining practices of text production and text consumption should be a part of discourse analysis**
- **Relations of power and ideology, as a part of the wider sociocultural practices of the media, should be included in discourse analysis**
- **Analysis of text should involve both linguistic analysis and intertextual analysis**
- **Texts should be perceived as multifunctional and analyzed accordingly**
- **Linguistic analysis should include all aspects of both language (grammar, phonology, lexicon, metaphor) and also macrostructure or schemata in van Dijk's terms**
- **Media texts should be conceived in a dialectical relationship with society and culture: "texts are socioculturally shaped but they also constitute society and culture, in ways which may be transformative as well as reproductive" (p. 34)**

3 Methodology

3.1 Data

3.1.1 *The newspapers*

The data for this thesis is comprised of news stories from two newspapers: the Canadian *Globe and Mail (GM)* and the American *New York Times (NYT)*, from two years: 1988 and 1991. I initially intended to base my data on Canadian papers only. However, after a careful search it turned out that there was too little coverage of the Iraqi Kurds in 1988 by the other Canadian dailies to bother with. Even the *GM* had only six articles. In order to have enough data for analysis and at the same time expand the scope of the analysis beyond one newspaper I settled for a U.S. daily. This selection, however, has some implications for this study that I will discuss further.

I have chosen the *GM* for two reasons. First, it was the only Canadian national paper at the time, therefore representing a Canadian viewpoint on international events across the country. Second, the *GM* is one of the Canadian "elite dailies" that is perceived by Canadians, both the public and the policy makers, as "a source of general intelligence about world affairs" (Hackett, 1991, p. 15). The *GM* with a daily circulation of about 320,000¹³ is the second largest Canadian newspaper. Its owner, Thomson Newspapers Co. Ltd., according to Winter & Hassanpour (1994, p. 13), held 21% of the daily newspapers national circulation share in 1992.

¹³ *Canadian World Almanac and Books of Facts* (1989). Toronto: Global Press

I have also chosen the *NYT*, because according to the magazine published out of U.S., *Lies of Our Times* (March-April, 1993, p. 2), it is "one of the most cited news medium in the U.S." and also the American "paper of record." In a survey of "American's best newspapers," conducted by *Columbia Journalism Review* (November/December 1999), the *NYT* held the number one spot on the list ahead of all the American dailies. It was described as "head and shoulders above everyone else," and "still the nation's newspaper of record." Furthermore, van Dijk (1998) believes that the *NYT* "probably exhibit[s] fragments of an overall 'American' ideological perspective on news events and the world" (p. 21). The *NYT* is owned by the New York Times Company which is the owner of 23 other newspapers, including the *Boston Globe*, five information services such as The New York Times Electronic Media Company, nine television stations, two radio stations, two paper product companies, and an investment of \$15 million in *TheStreet.com*.¹⁴ The *NYT* had a daily circulation figure of 1,117,376 (Monday-Friday) in 1988¹⁵.

Regarding the mass media from the two countries, Canada and U.S., however, there are some assertions which will be tested in this study. This relates to one of the questions that I posed in the introduction, which can be restated as, how do the *GM* and the *NYT* compare in representing the Iraqi Kurds?

Karim (2000) believes that

Newspapers in Canada tend to be heavily reliant on American, British, and French global wire services for foreign news...Canadian dailies' foreign news content is often based on reports by correspondents of American sources like the Associated Press, The New York Times . . . (p. 14)

¹⁴ Columbia Journalism Review. (n. d.). *Who owns what: The New York Times*. Retrieved July 14, 2001, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.cjr.org/owners/nyt.asp#newspapers>

¹⁵ *Information Please Almanac* (1989). Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.

This influence, Karim asserts, causes the American journalists to "significantly influence" the Canadian dailies' coverage of international affairs, particularly and more importantly when the coverage is about "regions of the world in which the U.S. government has strong foreign policy interests" (p. 14). For example, as Karim (2000) notes, a study¹⁶ found the television news coverage in Canada and U.S. of the invasion of Panama essentially similar. Iraq is another example where it has been important to the Western interest particularly U.S. and Britain with which Canada has close relationships. In this sense, this study, as one of its hypotheses, will examine Karim's assertion within the framework of CDA.

3.1.2 Data selection and sampling

To search for the news stories I had to use a different collection method for each newspaper, because there was not a single index for both papers. I used the *Canadian Business and Current Affairs*¹⁷ database to search for stories in the *GM*. For the *NYT*, I used the newspaper's own index (*New York Times Index*). Two things need to be pointed out here regarding searching both indexes. News coverage of Iraq has not been and is not restricted to the Iraqi-Kurdish conflict only. And, Kurds do not live in Iraq alone, but also in Iran, Turkey, Syria and elsewhere. Thus I searched for and selected stories that pertained to the Kurdish-Iraqi conflict. The result is shown in the following table: from the *GM*, six stories in 1988 and 70 from 1991; and from the *NYT*, 33 stories in 1988, and 240 in 1991.

¹⁶ Soderland, W.C. H. W., Ronald & Pemberton, Ian C. (1994). Cheerleader or Critic? Television News Coverage in Canada and the United States of the U.S. Invasion of Panama. *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 27 (3), 581-604

¹⁷ A database that contains citations of articles published in Canadian newspapers and magazines.

Year	Total News Stories	
	<i>GM</i>	<i>NYT</i>
1988	6	33
1991	70	240

Table 3-1 Total number of stories on Iraqi Kurds in 1988 and 1991

The second thing to be mentioned regarding data selection is that I was only interested in news stories and articles not editorials or opinion letters since these latter pieces of information require a different approach of analysis because they are different in schemata and genre type.

Two sets of data have been investigated here: headlines and full-text stories. In selecting the number of articles for analysis, both of headlines and full-text stories, several factors have been taken into consideration. First, the data had to be manageable for a relatively comprehensive and thorough analysis. Second, since I was dealing with articles published in two papers from two different countries and two different time periods, I had to consider the circulation figures of the papers and the population of their audiences in order to treat all parts of the data equally. For example, in 1988, about 320,000 copies of the *GM* were circulated among a population of 28 millions (Canada's population), and about 1,100,000 copies of the *NYT* were circulated among approximately 250 million people (U.S. population). The proportion is similar in 1991. Dividing the population over the number of circulation resulted in this: choosing one article from the *NYT* was equal to choosing 2.6 articles from the *GM*. For example, in 1988, the *GM* had only six articles. I chose all the six articles (100%). The *NYT* had 33 articles in 1988 on Iraqi Kurds. I divided this number by 2.6 to equal 13. This means that I decided to analyze six headlines of the *GM* from 1988, and 13

of the *NYT* in the same year. Deciding to analyze only 10% of the coverage in 1991, I ended up with seven headlines of the *GM* and nine of the *NYT*. To select this number of articles, except for that of the *GM* in 1988 all of which were selected, a random sampling method was used¹⁸.

For full-text analysis, approximately 50% of the selected headlines have been chosen. For example, there were six stories from the *GM* published in 1988. While the headlines of the six stories have been selected, only the full-text of three of the six stories (50%) have been selected, through random sampling, for full-text analysis. The implication of this and other factors in data selection is illustrated in the following table:

Papers	<i>The the GM</i>			<i>The NYT</i>		
	Total number of stories	Selected through sampling		Total number of stories	Selected through sampling	
		Headlines	Full-text		Headlines	Full-text
1988	6	6 (100%)	3 (50% of selected headlines)	33 $\times 1/2.6=13$	13 (100%)	6 (50% of selected headlines)
1991	70	7 (10%)	4 (50% of selected headlines)	240 $\times 1/2.6=92$	9 (10%)	4 (50% of selected headlines)

Table 3-2: Selected and sampled stories

As illustrated in table 3-2, for 1991, I had to choose a different method of selecting and sampling since the number of articles was about ten times greater than the number of articles in 1988. Thus, for 1991, I chose 10% of the headlines from both

¹⁸ Shavelson, Richard J. (1988). *Statistical Reasoning for the Behavioral Sciences* (2nd Ed.). Needham

papers and 5% of the full-text articles, through random sampling. In total, the data analyzed in this thesis consists of 35 headlines and seventeen full-text articles.

3.2 Method of analysis

The method of analysis that I have adopted here is a combination of analytical tools and approaches practiced by CDA practitioners, rooted in SFL. The effectiveness of these tools in analyzing media discourse was illustrated in chapter two. In this section I will further describe the analytical tools that I selected to use in this study. As is clear by now, I have two sets of data: headlines, and full-text stories. In what follows, I will describe the analytical tools that I use for analyzing each set of data and my motivations and aims for using those tools. My adopting certain tools stems from my goal in beginning to answer the questions that I have posed in this study.

3.2.1 Analysis of headlines according to grammar of transitivity

According to van Dijk, headlines

define the overall coherence or semantic unity of discourse, and also what information readers memorize best from a news report... They express the most important information of the cognitive model of journalists, that is, how they see and define the news event. Unless readers have different knowledge and beliefs, they will generally adopt these subjective media definitions of what is important information about an event. (as cited in Ezewudo, 1998, p.121)

Thus headlines, in this sense, embody the world that journalists themselves and possibly their readers experience. To analyze such a world in the headlines, I have deployed Halliday's transitivity system, transitivity is the grammar of experience (Halliday, 1994). Furthermore, since the data under investigation represents the conflict

between the Iraqi Kurds and the Iraqi government, I am interested to see who is identified as agent (e.g. doer or sayer), who is acted upon, and who benefits from the doings or sayings. That is, I am interested in representing causality in relation to the conflict. As I showed in chapter two, causality is in important ways represented by transitivity, because it specifies the relationships between participants and the processes they are involved in (Brookes, 1996; Sykes, 1985; Trew, 1979a, 1979b).

According to Halliday (1978), "a human being becomes a personality, in consequence of...his occupancy of social roles" (p. 15). Identifying social roles, however, requires identification of social processes and activities in which the participants are involved. For Halliday (1994), the clause "embodies a general principle for modeling experience--namely the principle that reality is made up of PROCESSES" (p. 160). That is, Processes embody the "world of experience" such as "goings-on--happening, doing, sensing, meaning, and being and becoming" (p. 160). The clause is the representation of all these goings-on. The clause manages to carry such representation through the grammatical system of TRANSITIVITY (Halliday, 1994, p. 60).

Transitivity, according to Halliday (1994), realizes three metafunctions. Ideationally, it is realized by three processes in transitivity: material, mental, and relational (p. 106). On the boundaries of these three, there are three additional processes: behavioural, verbal, and existential. Each type of process consists of three components: (1) the process itself; (2) participants; (3) circumstances (time and location) (Halliday, 1994, p. 107). In Halliday's words, "Material processes are processes of doing," such as *go*, *write*, or *flee*, which are processes of action and physical doing. Or, they can also be abstract, such as *resign*. Material processes can have two participants. One is the *Actor*,

which is obligatory, and the other is *Goal*, which is optional (Halliday, 1994, p. 110).

Mental processes are "processes of sensing," perception, cognition and affection, such as *see, think, or feel* (Halliday, 1994, p. 112). Two participants are involved here: *Senser*, a "conscious being" that feels or senses, and the *Phenomenon*, the one/thing that is sensed or felt. Relational processes are processes of "being," such as *is* or *have*. This type of processes is further subdivided into Attribution and Identification; the first is process of "attributing" and the latter of "identifying." *Carrier* and *Attribute* are identified as participants in attribution processes, and *Identified*, *Identifier*, and *Token* and *Value* in identification ones (see table 3-3). Behavioral processes are processes of "behaving", such as *smiling* or *sleeping*. There is only one participant in this process, which is the *Behaver*. Verbal processes are processes of "saying," such as *say, tell, or accuse*. There are two participants in these types of processes: the *Sayer* and the *Target*. Finally, the Existential processes are processes of "existing," as in *there is a tree*. Similar to behavioral processes, these processes have only one participant, which is the *Existent*.

Process type	Category meaning	Participants
Material: action event	'doing' 'doing' 'happening'	Actor, Goal
Behavioural	'behaving'	Behaver
Mental: perception affection cognition	'sensing' 'seeing' 'feeling' 'thinking'	Senser, Phenomenon
Verbal	'saying'	Sayer, Target
Relational: attributon identification	'being' 'attributing' 'identifying'	Carrier, Attribute Identified, Identifier; Token, Value
Existential	'existing'	Existent

Table 3-1: Process types, their meanings, and key participants, Halliday (1994, p. 143)

Halliday (1994, p. 161) provides a second approach to interpreting the clause, which is the ergative analysis. This interpretation is more explicitly concerned with causality in processes. In the ergativity system, the Medium is the primary participant through which the process is realized (p. 163), for example, in *The door was opened*, *door* is the medium. The Agent is the "participant functioning as external cause" (p. 164), for example, in *I opened the door*, *I* is the agent. Beneficiary, on the other hand, is the one that "gains" from the process, for example, in *I opened the door for him*, *him/he* is the Beneficiary. Finally, Range determines the scope or domain of the process (p. 167), for instance, in the previous example, *door* is the range.

Because in this research I am primarily concerned with causality, what happened to whom, by whom, why and where, I have focused on both approaches of Halliday for analyzing clause: transitivity and ergativity, in addition to certain CDA practitioners'

tools (Fowler, 1991; Fairclough, 1989). Therefore, while identifying all types of processes, according to Halliday's system, I have focused primarily on three types of participants: *Agent*, the external causer of the process, the *Patient*, the one that is affected by the process, and finally, the *Beneficiary*, the participant that benefits, in a positive sense, from the process. In this way I was able to analyze the headlines to find out about the world that is pictured in them, the role of the two main participants, Iraq and the Kurds, and be able to unpack the causal relationship between the processes and the participants: what happened (processes) in northern Iraq? What did the Iraqi government and the Kurds do (agent role)? Who was affected by whose action or activity (patient role)? And, finally, who benefited (beneficiary role) from whose action, Iraq, the Kurds, or the West?

3.2.2 *Analysing the full-text stories*

I think it is safe to suggest that most of us read headlines more than full news stories, however, we do also read some stories in full, particularly stories that we are interested in for various reasons. The message we get from the whole story, at least sometimes, could be different from the message that the headline conveys. As mentioned earlier, van Dijk believes that headlines

define the overall coherence or semantic unity of discourse, and also what information readers memorize best from a news report . . . They express the most important information of the cognitive model of journalists, that is, how they see and define the news event. Unless readers have different knowledge and beliefs, they will generally adopt these subjective media definitions of what is important information about an event. (as cited in Ezewudo, 1998, p. 121)

Boyd-Barrett (1994), however, finds it difficult to "reconcile the view that macrostructures are represented in news headlines and lead paragraphs with the view that macrorules which generate macrostructures are subjective" (p. 27). In fact, Bell in his study (1998) comes across a headline that does not exactly correspond to the full story. Thus, he suggests that headlines are "not always a valid representation of the story as whole" (p. 83). One of the reasons for that could be the possibility that the actual story might be written by a journalist but the headline could be assigned by a "copy-editor." It is this concern that calls for analysis of full-text stories in addition to the headlines.

In analyzing the full text stories, I will focus on discourse features other than transitivity, those of naming choices, lexical choices, overcompleteness and voice. I will explain these later. However, I have chosen different analytical tools for analyzing the full-text sampled stories to illustrate a wider variety of CDA tools in analyzing discourse, and further illustrate how analysis through related tools contributes to a broader picture and to making ideologies in discourses more transparent.

- *Naming choices*

In analyzing the articles for naming choices, I will examine the ways in which the participants of the events, Iraq and Iraqi Kurds, are referred to. According to Fowler & Kress (1979), "the different possibilities [of naming] signify different assessments by the speaker/writer of his or her relationship with the person referred to or spoken to, and of the formality or intimacy of the situation" (p. 200). They point out that there are various forms of addressing people. For example, an extreme formality would be title plus complete, unabbreviated, such as "Foreign Minister Mohammed Ibrahim Kamel." A neutral form for the *Observer*, they observe, would be title plus first name and last name

as in "Mr. Stanley Clinton Davis." Very-well known public figures tend to be called by title plus last name, for instance, "Mrs. Thatcher," and children and wives are referred to by only their first name, for example, "Sonia," or "Keith."

My own interest in this study is to see how formal, informal, respectful or disrespectful, Iraq and the Kurds have been referred to in the *GM* and the *NYT*. In addition, I will examine whether there is difference between the ways they are referred to in the two different time periods in question. Focusing on this discursive feature helps me to identify "different ideological affiliations" of the newspapers with the participants (Sykes, 1985, p. 87).

- *Lexical choices*

Closely related to naming choices are lexical choices. Fairclough (1989) argues that "a text's choice of wordings depends on, and helps create, social relationships between participants" (p. 116), thus lexical choices are ideologically significant. Sykes (1985) observes that choosing different words for referring to the same thing by different speakers reveals "different ideological affiliations" on the part of the speakers (p. 87). Her example of these different choices are "chairperson" versus "chairman", "freedom fighter" versus "terrorist." Along the same veins, Brookes (1996), in her study of the representation of Africa in the British press, found that choice of wordings "construct particular ideological representations of experiences or events" (p. 471). For this study, as with the other tools, examining lexical choices will contribute to identifying the world of experience that is created in the news stories.

- *Overcompleteness*

Overcompleteness, revealing implications embedded in media discourse, is one of the analytical tools that has not been exploited to its full potential in CDA. According to van Dijk (1993), "we say that a passage is overcomplete when it gives information that is relatively irrelevant to the description of the events. Such overcomplete passages may be used to convey a negative picture of a news actor" (p. 258). One of the examples, of overcompleteness, given by van Dijk, is when the *Daily Telegraph* refers to Bradford's Mayor as "former peasant farmer from Pakistan." He finds this piece of information irrelevant because it "does not exactly contribute to an impression of expertise or credibility" given the kind of responsibilities he has. Along the same lines, he finds a pattern of overcompleteness when minorities' race or ethnicity is mentioned in news reports on crimes (p. 259).

Following van Dijk, I will focus on statements or parts of the reports that are irrelevant to the main story but are there to serve other purposes. As van Dijk's examples show, overcomplete statements, on the surface, often appear to be necessary pieces of information which provide background knowledge about social actors, but in reality are not really necessary. Examining the background information about Iraq and the Kurds with this tool will enable me to see whether the papers have used this feature to negatively portray any of the participants.

- *Voice*

Finally, in examining voice, I will focus on what Fairclough (1992) considers as a part of intertextual analysis, more specifically "manifest intertextuality", which refers to the heterogeneous constitution of texts by which "specific other texts are overtly drawn

upon within a text.” Examples of this are quotations and indirect reporting. In writing news reports, journalists, for various purposes, often rely on quotations or indirect reporting of what others say. Van Dijk (1993), in his study concerning the representation of minorities the European press, observes that,

Few properties of news are as revealing about the practices of news-making as quotations. They show not only with whom reporters have been talking, who have special access to the media, which news actors are found important and credible enough to be actually quoted, who are allowed to give their own opinions, but also how the journalist evaluates quoted opinions. (p. 252)

In addition, he asserts that to see who is quoted less or more is not sufficient. The discourse analyst rather needs to see how speakers get quoted, in what context, about what, and more importantly, needs to see whether the journalist or other news actors evaluate the sayers' utterances. For example, he suggests that when a saying is placed in quotation marks, or it is accompanied by such words as "claim," "alleged," or "accuse," "we may conclude that the reporter takes at least some distance from the statement" (p. 252). That is, these discursive moves suggest that the journalist may not share the opinion of the speaker.

Since the events described in the data (Iraqi-Kurdish conflict) are far away from the immediate experience of the Canadian and American audiences, it is very important to see whose opinions are brought in to construct the discourse of representing the events, and to construct the world that the readers would experience: the Kurds, the Iraqi government, or others. I will also be keen on the context in which their voice appears, that is who speaks after whom and in what manner. Furthermore, I will identify whose voice the newspapers support, whose they don't, and how these practices are carried out discursively.

4 Data Analysis

The tongue moves in all directions
(A Kurdish proverb)

4.1 Introduction

This chapter will be presented in the following way. The data from each newspaper will be analyzed separately. I will first examine the data from the *GM*, and then the *NYT*. The analysis of the data from each paper will be divided into two main parts: 1988, and 1991 coverage. In each year, I will first analyze the representation of Iraq and the Kurds in the headlines according to the *transitivity* system. Then I will analyze the full-text articles by applying the discursive devices *naming choices*, *lexical choices*, *overcompleteness*, and finally *voice*. Although interpretation of the findings will be discussed in the next chapter, nonetheless, following Fairclough (1995b), an intertextual analysis in terms of connecting the data at hand with other related discourses and the context within which the discourse was produced and consumed will accompany the data analysis.

4.2 The *Globe and Mail* (GM)

4.2.1 *Headlines and analysis of transitivity*

Identifying processes and the roles of the participants involved in those processes is the focus of this section. I will first analyze and compare Iraq and the Kurds representation in 1988. This will be followed by analyzing the data from 1991 in the same manner (for a list of headlines of the *GM* see Appendix 1).

4.2.1.1 1988

- *Iraq*

In the headlines from 1988, Iraq's participation is well distributed between two processes: material (50%) and verbal (50%). 75% of the time Iraq has been assigned the role of agent, and 25% of receiver. A close look at the types of processes associated with Iraq and its role in those processes, and the nature of its involvement reveals that the representation of Iraq, in 1988, by the *GM*, is a positive one.

Processes→	Material	Mental	Relational	Verbal	Behavioral
Role→	%	%	%	%	%
Agent/sayer	50			25	
Patient/receiver				25	
Beneficiary					

Table 4-1 Iraq's roles in processes, in percentage, the GM, 1988

In material processes Iraq plays the agent role, as in,

*GM4 Gulf cease-fire allows Iraq to **fight** Kurdish insurgency* (My emphasis)

Here, Iraq is the agent/actor of a positive action since it, as a state, fights an *insurgency* within its territory. This positive agency role of Iraq is extended to its role as sayer in verbal processes:

*GM6 Kurds offered **full amnesty** by Iraq* (My emphasis)

Note that what Iraq offers to Kurds is not just an amnesty but also a *full* one. It is important because as I will show later, in the full-text analysis, this amnesty was not a "full" amnesty; it excluded one of the most prominent Kurdish leaders.

In verbal processes Iraq also occupies the patient (receiver) role:

*GM2 Kurds **accuse** Iraqis of **massacre*** (My emphasis)

Here, Iraq is the receiver of a negative verbal process initiated by the Kurds. It is clear also, that Iraq is the agent of *massacre*. However, this agency is backgrounded and at the same time obscured in two ways. First, the predicate *massacre* has been nominalized and as a result Iraq has been removed from the grammatical position of the subject (agency). In addition, even if the reader is able to demystify the process of nominalization and assign the agent role to Iraq the headline still does not say that Iraq has massacred, but rather it has been *accused* of it. Therefore, it may not be true (van Dijk, 1993, p. 256).

There are some headlines in which Iraq does appear as a participant that either acts on the Kurds or is the receiver of processes initiated by the Kurds. However, there are others in which Iraq's participation is completely suppressed:

*GM5 Kurds claim revenge for **killing of civilians*** (My emphasis)

*GM1 **Poison-gas attack** leaves city of dead: at least **4000 killed** in Halabja*
(My emphasis)

In the first example, because of *kill*, which has been transformed into the nominal '*killing*,' there is no reference to the agent of the *killing of civilians*. A more drastic suppression of agent is evident in *GM1*, which refers to one of Iraq's chemical bombardments of a Kurdish populated town in the Kurdish region in Iraq, in March 16, 1988. There are several things to be mentioned here. First, the agent in this headline is inanimate or what Fowler (1991, p. 75) calls *force*. As a result, it is not the Iraqi army (conscious beings) that '*leaves city of dead*,' but an '*attack*' by *poison-gas*. In addition, removing Iraq from the process is achieved through passivization of the transactive verb *kill*: . . . *4000 killed* Again, the reader is not informed who killed 4000 in Halabja. This becomes important when we realize that at the time of this attack it was well known

that Iran and Iraq had been at war for eight years bombing towns and villages on both sides. From the headline one could assume that Iran had attacked Halabja.

Casting doubt on whether Iraq used chemical weapons against the Kurds, interestingly, is also evident in a Canadian official document. A day after this article was published in the *GM*, Joe Clark, the Secretary of State for External Affairs at the time, in the House of Commons, after being asked to take a stand regarding Iraqi chemical attacks in northern Iraq, issued a news release¹⁹ (see Appendix 3, for the full version). The discursive moves of the news release are very similar to that of the *GM* in that both cast doubt on whether Iraq has committed that action, and both cast suspicion on Iran instead. The title reads "Chemical Weapons Attack on Kurdish Civilians in Northern Iraq." There is no mention of Iraq being suspected of this action. In the first paragraph there is no mention of Iraq at all. The rest of it reads,

Canada strongly opposes and condemns all use of chemical weapons. All parties to the 1925 Geneva protocol banning chemical weapons--including Iraq and Iran--must abide by their legal obligation.

The Department of External Affairs convoked the Ambassador of Iraq to convey the foregoing and also communicated it to the Government of Iran.
(My emphasis)

In the entire document there is no clear indication as to who has done the killings, Iraq or Iran.

This mystification of Iraq's gassing and *killing* (*GM5*) the Kurds becomes clearer when we realize that the readers of the *GM* possibly were not aware of the situation in northern Iraq. The reason for this is that prior to 1991, Kurds were virtually unknown to the world outside the Middle East (Saeedpour, 1989, p. 144; Hassanpour, 1992, p. xxvi).

¹⁹ Canada. Department of External Affairs. Secretary of State for External Affairs. (1988, 25 March). *News Release*, No. 068

Furthermore, this single article on Iraq's use of chemical bombs in Halabja (*GM*, March 24, 1988, pp. A1, A14) was the first article on the Iraqi-Kurdish conflict to appear in the *GM* in about five months (CBCA)²⁰. Therefore, one could assume that the Canadian public did not know much about the Iraqi-Kurdish conflict. Therefore, they may have subscribed to the ideological construction of the discourse of the *GM* and Canada's Department of External Affairs.

In sum, in the headlines of 1988, Iraq is the agent of fighting 'Kurdish insurgency,' offering a 'full amnesty,' but being accused of 'massacre.' The only negative role assigned to Iraq in these headlines is being the agent of 'massacre,' however, that is not certain, since the *GM* reports it as an ['*accusation*'] by the Kurds. In addition, Iraq's role in 'killing,' 'attack' and *gassing* is suppressed. In fact, there is a pattern of mystification of agency in the processes Iraq is or could have been involved in. When the patients of the processes (e.g. 'kill' 'attack') are Kurdish civilians (e.g. *GM*1 and *GM*5), the agency (Iraq) is suppressed in the headlines. Therefore, overall, Iraq's role of agency is diminished in the *GM* discourse of 1988.

This representation by the *GM* covers the time period when Iraq was committing "crimes against humanity and genocide" (HRW/ME, 1995, p. 20; Randal, 1997, p. 205) in the Iraqi Kurdish region. It is at the time, when according to Black (1993), "50,000 and possibly as many as 100,000 persons, many of them women and children, were killed out of hand between February and September 1988" alone, in addition to the chemical bombardment of Halabja in March, 1988, which resulted in "6,000 deaths, mostly civilians" (Ciment, 1996, p. 63).

²⁰ The article before this one was published in November 6, 1987, p. A8. The one before this one was published in Aug. 16, 1986, p. A9.

- *Kurds*

The *GM*'s positive representation of Iraq, in 1988, is in contrast to that of its opponents, the Kurds. As I will demonstrate, the Kurds in 1988, for the most part are either agents of negative or non-transactive processes, patients of agentless processes, or the beneficiary of the actions or sayings of their opponent.

Processes →	Material	Mental	Relational	Verbal	Behavioral	Existential
Roles ↓	%	%	%	%	%	%
Agent/sayer	18			18		
Patient/receiver	45					
Beneficiary				18		

Table 4-2: Kurds' roles in processes, in percentage, the GM, 1988

Table 4-2 illustrates that Kurds, similar to Iraq, are involved in two processes, material and verbal, but they have been assigned all three roles. In material processes they are in roles of both agent and patient. However, note that they are agents of *non-transactive* actions (25%) of the time in processes such as *fleeing*:

GM3 Turkey pledges to assist Kurds fleeing Iraq (my emphasis)

A non-transactive, or what Halliday calls "intransitive", verb such as *flee*, does not extend "to some other entity" (1994, p. 110). That is, no other participant is affected by a non-transactive verb. Sykes (1985) suggests that agents of non-transactive verbs, in her study of Blacks, denote irresponsibility on the part of the actors because they do not act on others but only themselves. This reading of the headline becomes more credible when there is no indication provided as to why Kurds *flee*, in the headline.

In other material processes (25%), the Kurds are backgrounded as agents of transactive and at the same time negative actions such as *insurgency*, through nominalization:

*GM4 Gulf cease-fire allows Iraq to fight Kurdish **insurgency*** (My emphasis)

As I pointed out earlier, Iraq is the agent of "fight" in this clause. However, the Kurds, while being the patient of Iraq's action, are also agents of "insurgency." It may follow that it is natural to be fought by Iraq.

In the material processes, while the Kurds are sayers of negative utterances (e.g. *GM1: claim revenge*), they are also *patients* of *transactive* actions:

*GM1 Kurds claim revenge for **killing** of civilians* (My emphasis)

*GM5 Poison-gas attack **leaves** city of dead: at least **4000 killed** in Halabja*
(My emphasis)

Note that in either headline the agents of the processes ('*killing*,' '*leaves*,' '*killed*') of which Kurds are patients are not identified. In other words, it is as though the Kurds are killed and attacked by a mysterious force, and not Iraq.

Nonetheless, Kurds are given some space to speak out and, at least on one occasion (*GM2*), identify the agent:

*GM2 Kurds **accuse** Iraq of massacre* (My emphasis)

*GM1 Kurds **claim** revenge for killing of civilians* (My emphasis)

Here Kurds are assigned the role of *sayer* (agent) which is important, because as sayers they seem to contribute to the discursive structure that is defining their situation.

However, a closer look at the kinds of sayings they are associated with seems to prove the opposite. According to van Dijk (1993, p. 257), words such as *accuse* and *claim* are

discrediting devices²¹. In other words, it appears as though the *GM* perceives what happened in Halabja as [*accusation*]. In this way, the paper undermines the Kurds' assertion, therefore, does not support the Kurds' opinion.

Kurds' negative affiliation with verbal processes is extended to their role as the beneficiaries of the same processes:

GM6 Kurds offered full amnesty by Iraq (My emphasis)

GM3 Turkey pledges to assist Kurds fleeing Iraq (My emphasis)

What is interesting here is that the Kurds are benefiting from Iraq's offer of a '*full amnesty*,' the same government that Kurds '*accuse*' of '*massacre*' and the use of chemical weapons.

The picture drawn here by the *GM*'s discursive moves can be summarized as follows: Iraq, as a legitimate government, [*fight*s] '*Kurdish insurgency*'; however, the Kurds [*accuse*] Iraq of '*massacre*,' something that, we cannot be sure of, because it is at best an [*accusation*]. Not only this, but Iraq also [*offers*] a '*full amnesty*' to the Kurds. On the other hands, the Kurds, both rebels and civilians, come under '*poison-gas attack*' and are '*killed*' by the thousands, but by unspecified agents. In addition, they accuse others of wrong doings and '*claim revenge*.' It appears that the newspaper does not find the Kurds' claim credible. In addition, the agent of what has happened to them is not clear. This follows, that they might be responsible for their own situation. As I will illustrate later, in the full-text analysis, this ideological construction of the Iraqi Kurds is further strengthened through other discursive moves such as lexical choices and overcompleteness by which the Kurds are blamed for their predicaments and portrayed as deserving what the Iraqi government has done to them.

²¹ For more on this see 3.2.2

4.2.1.2 1991

- *Iraq*

Transitivity analysis of the headlines from 1991, *GM*, reveals that Iraq's representation in that year is in a sharp contrast to Iraq's representation in 1988.

In 1991, as demonstrated in table 6, 85.8% of the time, Iraq is the agent of material, and 14.3% receiver of verbal processes.

Processes→	Material	Mental	Relational	Verbal	Behavioral	Existential
Role→	%	%	%	%	%	%
Agent/sayer	85.8					
Patient/receiver				14.3		
Beneficiary						

Table 4-1: Iraq's roles in processes, in percentage, the GM, 1991

Most of material processes of which Iraq is the agent are negative transactive processes:

*GM10 Allies order Iraqis to leave refugee areas: Hussein's forces **intimidating** Kurds, White House says (My emphasis)*

*GM12 Hussein **putting squeeze** on Kurds (My emphasis)*

*GM7 Iraqi **massacre** reported by Kurdish rebels: gunships **strafed** civilians after **roundup** by Hussein's troops, Iranian news agency says (My emphasis)*

In the first two headlines, Iraq is in the subject position of processes '*intimidating*' and '*putting squeeze*,' thus a clear agent of negative and transactive actions, when Iraq's actions are extended to the other main participant, the Kurds. They were carried out against Kurds during "the tumultuous, heart-wrenching events of early 1991 familiar to most readers from their television sets" (Black, 1993, p. xi). Transactive and negative are

also processes in *GM7*: '*massacre*,' '*strafed*,' and '*roundup*.' *GM7*, however, requires further explanation.

GM7 is rather interesting, because it resembles another headline from 1988: *GM2* '*Kurds accuse Iraqis of massacre*.' Both headlines (*GM2* and *GM7*) report on the same theme that took place in two different time periods. In both cases, the predicate '*massacre*' has been nominalized. However, the difference is that in 1988 this nominalized action by Iraq is referred to as an "accusation" by the Kurds, whereas in 1991, the same action is *reported*. Needless to say, reports are given more credit than accusations. The other difference between these two headlines is that in *GM2* Iraq is backgrounded, whereas it is foregrounded in 1991: *GM7*, thus has assigned a clearer agency.

In addition to being assigned negative roles in material processes, in 1991, Iraq is also the receiver of verbal processes initiated by the Allies:

GM10 Allies order Iraqis to leave refugee areas: . . . (My emphasis)

This means that Iraq not only commits negative actions but is reduced to taking orders.

In sum, in 1988, Iraq's agency in '*killing*,' '*attack*,' and ['*gassing*'] the Kurds was backgrounded, but in 1991 it is clearly identified by assigning Iraq the grammatical position of subject for the most part. Thus, Iraq is held responsible for the treatment of the Kurds in 1991, as we will see.

- *Kurds*

In 1991, the representation of Kurds by the *GM* is quite different from that in 1988 by the same paper. The Kurds are involved in three processes: material, relational, and verbal.

Processes →	Material	Mental	Relational	Verbal	Behavioral	Existential
Roles ↓	%	%	%	%	%	%
Agent/sayer	14.28		28.57	14.28		
Patient/receiver	28.57					
Beneficiary				14.28		

Table 4-2: Kurds' roles in processes, in percentage, the GM, 1991

These roles have been assigned to Kurds: agent of material 14.28%, of relational 28.57%, and of verbal processes 14.28%; patient of material processes 28.57%; beneficiary of verbal processes 14.28% percent.

The material processes are non-transactive, similar to 1988:

GM13 Kurds plod into the unknown (My emphasis)

However, there is a difference between being the agent of the same processes in the two years. Following Sykes (1985), I suggested that being the agent of only non-transactive processes suggests that the Kurds are responsible for their own action. For example, there was no one else clearly identified as being the cause of Kurds' 'fleeing,' or their being 'killed,' and gassed by unidentified agents.

In 1991, Kurds are also patients of material process initiated by Baghdad:

GM10 Allies order Iraqis to leave refugee areas: Hussein's forces intimidating Kurds, White House says (My emphasis)

GM12 Hussein putting squeeze on Kurds: Relief workers report 'time running out' in northern Iraq (My emphasis)

In these headlines Kurds are assigned the clear object positions in relation to transactive processes with Iraq in the role of agent. In this respect, constructing the discourse around the Kurds in 1991 makes them partners of the West who have the same enemy. Since the enemy is unquestionable now, the Kurds are easily portrayed as victims; not victims of their own predicament, as was the case in 1988 representation, but victims of the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's actions. The White House and also relief workers attest to the victimization of the Kurds by the Iraqi government.

This positive and sympathetic representation of the Kurds is extended to its role as sayers. In contrast to 1988, where Kurds were sayers of negative verbal processes such as 'accuse,' in 1991, they are sayers of reporting:

*GM7 Iraqi massacre **reported** by Kurdish rebels: . . . (My emphasis)*

Furthermore, Kurds are not only credible sayers themselves in reporting their situation they are also beneficiaries of processes of Western sayers:

*GM8 Canada **offers plan for Kurdish plight**: Clark proposes UN supervisory team as an alternative to EC call for enclave (My emphasis)*

Here, Kurds are beneficiaries of Canada's offer to help, whereas in 1988 they were beneficiaries of the same government that committed genocide against them (Black, 1993, p. 12).

From this brief analysis of the *GM*'s headlines, using the transitivity system, it could be suggested that the representation of Iraq is the opposite of the representation of its Kurdish minority in the *GM* in both years. In 1988, when Iraq was not an enemy of the West, the *GM* seems to favor Iraq over the Kurds, in 1991, on the other hand, when Iraq is the enemy of the West, the Kurds are favored over Iraq. In 1988, although Kurds

get killed, the agency of their killings is often backgrounded or entirely suppressed from the clause. Furthermore, despite being threatened and killed, Kurds are still defiant and *claim revenge* for something that has *no clear agency* in the *GM's* discourse (*GM1*).

Furthermore, their case is labeled as an ['accusation'], thus not necessarily true. In 1991, however, the Kurds are portrayed as victims, especially victims who have a common enemy with the West, Iraq. They become credible reporters, clear victims of, in Bush's words, a "new Hitler," thus they deserve sympathy and help.

4.2.2 Full-text analysis

4.2.2.1 Naming choices

It is quite normal and natural to call governments and their officials and institutions by their formal names and titles. Formality, in this sense, could even suggest respectfulness. Informality, on the other hand, could suggest the lack of respect on the part of the speaker or writer. Journalists usually stick to formality in naming governments and officials, which could indicate what they claim to be bound to, namely objectivity. The data here shows that while the *GM's* naming choice for Iraq in 1988 is in these terms objective, thus respectful, in 1991 it is not only informal but also disrespectful. The naming choice for the Kurds, however, is the opposite of that for Iraq.

- *Iraq*

Lexical items for referring to Iraq can be divided into two categories: Iraqi officials, and armed formations (Appendix 4). In 1988, naming for both categories is quite formal. For example, the Iraqi government is referred to as *Iraq, government* and the *ruling Revolutionary Council*. The Iraqi military is referred to as *Iraqi forces, Iraqi*

military, soldiers and troops. These choices are quite natural and neutral for referring to an official state and its representatives. These naming choices correspond to a more positive representation of Iraq, which was revealed in analyzing the headlines.

In 1991, however, the *GM*'s naming choices seem to work towards undermining the legitimacy of the state of Iraq and its president. In 1991, the above choices for naming Iraq are interchangeable with others that are not only informal but also what one could regard as disrespectful. For example, Iraq is interchangeable with *Saddam*, the first name of Iraq's president. Correspondingly, Iraqi military is interchangeable with *Saddam's troops* or *armed Iraqis*. These choices of naming could imply that what Iraq has is not a military in the conventional sense but a bunch of armed militia or paramilitary group under the control of one single person.

- *Kurds*

Similar to the headlines, representations of Kurds are different in the two time periods, and they are different from that of Iraq in both years (Appendix 5). There is a variety of naming for the Kurds in both 1988 and 1991. Those that are present in both years are *Kurds, civilians, people, refugees, and rebels*. In both years references have also been made to specific individuals usually acting as sources of information (more on this will follow).

Aside from similarities, there are some differences in the names that have not been used in both years. In 1988, the title *rebels*, which exists in both years, is interchangeable with *insurgents, separatists* and "*Iranian traitors*" (quotation in original). These choices for referring to Kurds, in 1988, are in line with the negative representation of Kurds demonstrated in the headlines from the same year. On the other hand, in 1991,

the same label, *rebel*, is interchangeable with *resistance fighters*, and *Kurdish forces*.

The word '*forces*' is very much associated with armies of states rather than guerrilla movements. It is as though the Kurdish guerrillas are the armed forces of an officially recognized state, and as a result legitimized.

Furthermore, and in contrast to 1988, Kurds, in 1991, receive a wider range of titles, especially as civilians, such as *refugees*, *children*, *old lady*, and *old man*, *families*, and *mothers*, most of which do not denote any negativity, but more importantly, do create sympathy for them. In the context of events in 1991, labels that have negative connotations in 1988 turn out to be positive in 1991, for example the title *rebels*. Although this may not be a favorable label to an average reader of the *GM*, given the reputation of Iraq portrayed by the media in 1991, basically as the number one enemy of the West, it is possible that the label *rebel* was considered admirable at the time. The following two headlines provide an example of the context within which those naming occurred in 1991:

- *Hussein a menace, Nixon says: would have had Iraqi leader killed* (*GM*, April 15, 1991, p. A9)
- *Kurds plod into the unknown* (same source)

These two headlines appeared on the same page and parallel to each other, and also positioned at the same level horizontally. It is within this context that being called a *rebel* or *guerrilla* may not have a negative connotation, whereas, the same label, in 1988, had negative connotations, because it was interchangeable with '*separatists*,' '*insurgents*,' and '*traitors*,' portraying the Kurds as breaking up and making trouble for a country, Iraq that was not represented negatively (at least that is what my data has shown so far).

Thus, it might be suggested that the naming choices in 1988, similar to the headlines, worked towards representing the Kurds as responsible for their predicaments because of what they are, namely 'separatists,' and 'Iranian 'traitors.' Further analysis below will add more credibility to this possibility, when we will see that there is a pattern of portraying Kurds as 'separatists' seeking 'independence' from Iraq, and Iranian collaborators who have sided not only with the enemy of Iraq but of the West, namely the Islamic Republic of Iran.

4.2.2.2 *Lexical choices*

In addition to what has been discussed in the previous section, there are other concepts and phenomena that are different in the two periods of time in question. Two of these phenomena are of particular importance for this study. First is the use of different words for the cause of the conflict between Iraq and the Kurds: demand for 'independence,' in 1988, versus demand for 'autonomy,' in 1991²². Second is the use of different words for referring to the location of that conflict: 'Northern Iraq' in 1988, versus 'Kurdistan,' in 1991. The lexical choices of the two phenomena seems to work towards first, portraying Kurds as seeking 'independence' and posing a danger to the integrity of a sovereign state, Iraq, and thus might deserve punishment, and second, portraying the Iraqi-Kurdish conflict as an *internal* matter of Iraq, thus not the international community's business.

Independence, during the 1980s, was not the aim or demand of the two Kurdish major parties, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and Kurdistan Democratic Party

²² *Independence* is defined as "the time when a country becomes politically independent," whereas *Autonomy* is defined as "the right of self-government or management of one's own affairs, especially of a

(KDP). Instead, they demanded "*autonomy*" or "self-determination" within Iraq. Their aim remains the same today, even after having had their own semi-independent regional administration since 1992 under the protection of the Allies²³. Of course one could argue that independence is the aspiration of Kurdish nationalists. In fact, a survey conducted by the Kurdish Library's Center for Research in New York, "indicated that 99 percent of Iraqi Kurds who responded wanted independence for all of Kurdistan" (Saeedpour, 1993, p. 21). However, as Saeedpour suggests, "Iraqi Kurdish leaders keep this to themselves; they have been warned by their Western friends that if they tell the truth, support will evaporate." The Iraqi Kurdish leaders believed in 1988, and they continue to think this way, that demand for independence will not upset only one state (i.e. Iraq) but at least three other neighboring states, Iran, Turkey, and Syria who have been in conflict with their Kurds as well, let alone the West, as Saeedpour suggested.

The main reason for that is that granting independence to Kurds in any of the states will set a precedent for others. This would mean the disintegration of at least four states, including Turkey, which is a permanent member in NATO and the closest ally of the West. This would also lead to a major re-mapping of the Middle East. However, the *GM* appears to represent this aspiration of Kurds differently.

According to the *GM*, in 1988, Kurds '[wage] a separatist struggle for an *independent homeland in Northern Iraq*.' In 1991, on the other hand, they are '*fighting...to gain greater autonomy*' (my emphasis). There is a substantial difference

state or group within a country" (emphasis added) (*Longman Dictionary of English Language and Culture*. (1998). (p. 70). Essex: Addison Wesley Longman

²³ A part of PUK's program reads, "the PUK strives for the right of self-determination for the Kurdish people within a unified democratic Iraq." Available on line <http://www.puk.org/aboutpuk.htm#hist> Similarly, a part of KDP's program reads, "preservation of unity and integrity of Iraq is an aim of the party." Available on line <http://www.kdp-ankara.org.tr/whatis.html>

between *independence* and *autonomy*. *Autonomy* is about self-governing *within a country*, but *independence* refers to self-governing of *a country*. It could be said, that demands for "autonomy" are politically more acceptable. However, there is a pattern of using these two words for referring to the same phenomena in the *GM*, and this seems to serve a purpose: corresponding to re-naming the Kurds from '*separatists*' to '*resistance fighters*,' and from *troublemakers* who want to destroy a state (Iraq) to *victims* who only demand their basic human rights, *autonomy*. It seems to be the case, that in 1988 the Kurds deserved Iraq's punishment, but in 1991 our sympathy and support.

Closely related to this, is the *GM*'s lexical choices for referring to the location of where the events took place in Iraq: '*Northern Iraq/North Iraq*' versus '*Kurdistan/Kurdish North*.' *Kurdistan* refers to the homeland of the Kurds, and it encompasses portions of Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Syria. The term is used by all Kurdish nationalists, and also by most Western researchers to refer to the homeland of the Kurds. However, none of the states where Kurds live, including Iraq, uses the term, because the term *Kurdistan* strongly denotes distinctiveness and nationhood²⁴.

The discourse of the *GM*, in 1988, situates most of the events in Iraq in the region that is labeled '*Northern Iraq*' or '*North Iraq*.' In 1991, however, the same place and region is referred to as '*Kurdistan*' or '*Kurdish north*' along with the terms used in 1988. My hypothesis is that in 1991, the terms '*Northern Iraq*' and '*North Iraq*' are interchangeable with the terms '*Kurdistan*' and '*Kurdish North*.' It appears that *GM*

²⁴ Kordestan (note the different spelling) is only used in Iran to refer to one of the provinces that is inhabited by Kurds. The province of Kordestan, however, encompasses only a portion of the Iranian Kurdish area. Kurds also make up the majority of people living in the provinces of West Azarbaijan, Ilam, and Kermanshah. In fact, the birthplace of the first independent Kurdish Republic (1945-1946) in Mahabad, located in north-Western Iran, is not a part of the province Kordestan.

referred to the place of events as *Northern Iraq* to situate the Kurdish issue in 1988 as an internal matter, and thus one that should not concern us in Canada since it would constitute intervention in the business of a sovereign state, Iraq. In 1991, however, calling the same place '*Kurdistan*,' seems to serve the purpose of separating the Kurds from Iraq, making the Kurdish issue a non-internal matter, and consequently making it easy for Canada to join the Allies in intervening in the Kurdish region, in Iraq.

This discursive practice becomes important when we read in the *GM* (April, 10, 1991, p. A10) that Canada was indeed concerned with Iraq's sovereignty issue in helping the Kurds. Commenting on the establishment of an enclave for Kurds in Northern Iraq by the UN and whether Canada should support the plan or not, the Secretary for the Department of External Affairs, Joe Clark, says, "we have some doubts about the sanctuary plan because of the sovereignty issue." It is from this point of view that separating the Kurds from Iraq and portraying their conflict as an *external* matter may work towards legitimizing Allies' intervention in Northern Iraq.

4.2.2.3 *Overcompleteness*

There are numerous passages, in the news stories on Iraqi Kurds in the *GM*, in 1988, which constitute overcompleteness. These passages might be thought to provide background information about the events in northern Iraq, but they turn out to be intended for negative purposes. They tie the Kurds to states that were not only enemies of Iraq but also of the West, such as Iran and Syria who were, at the time, on the U.S. list of terrorist states (Karim, 2000).

In 1988, after Iraq's major offensive against the Kurds, following which about 100,000 Iraqi Kurds took refuge in Turkey and Iran, the Iraqi government released a

decree in which amnesty was given to all Kurds except for one of the Kurdish leaders, Jalal Talabani (GM3). According to the GM, the decree *'said Mr. Talabani was excluded because he had betrayed previous agreements with the government.'* The next sentence, right after that reads, *'Mr. Talabani met Syrian president Hafez Asad on Monday. Iraq and Syria are bitter political and ideological enemies.'* Discussing the relationship between the Kurdish leader and Syria in this context could be irrelevant for two reasons. First, the Kurdish leader visited Syria after he was excluded from the *amnesty*, which is the main topic of the story. Second, according to the GM, the reason for excluding Mr. Talabani, was that *"he had betrayed previous agreements with the [Iraqi] government."* This reason itself is interesting. The passage *'he had betrayed previous agreements with the government'* is intriguing because it has an echo in a passage in another article of the GM published in 1991, but with a twist (GM12): *'Iraqi President Saddam Hussein had broken the original 1970 autonomy agreement with the Kurds²⁵.'* In 1991, After the Allies decided to help the Kurdish refugees in Iraq and also set up a safe haven in northern Iraq, the Iraqi government entered a series of negotiations with the Kurds hoping to win them over. This later passage is about this event, which casts doubt whether reaching any agreement with Iraq would be a good idea for the Kurds. It seems rather ironic that in 1988, when Iraq is the friend, its enemies, the Kurds, are said to betray agreements, but in 1991, when Iraq is the enemy, it is Iraq that is said to do the same.

²⁵ The late 60s witnessed the strongest Kurdish revolt and armed struggle against the Iraqi central government ever. In 1970, Iraq finally agreed to autonomy for the Kurds. However, in 1974 the war between Iraq and Kurds broke out. The Kurds were openly supported by the CIA and the Shah of Iran to force Iraq to give up Shatul Arab, to Iran. In 1975, Iraq agreed to withdraw its claim to Shatul Arab, and in return, the CIA and the Shah withdrew their support from the Kurds. The Kurdish revolt experienced a bitter defeat.

Another example of overcompleteness is a story published in 1988, with the headline, *'Kurds accuse Iraqis of massacre'* (GM4). It is reported that Kurds accuse Iraq of using chemical weapons against Kurdish civilians. In the middle of the story, we read, *Iraq's 3.5 million Kurds have been waging their separatist struggle on and off for 50 years. Iran has helped them* (my emphasis). In this instance, again, tying the Kurds to Iran, which at the time, like Syria, was considered a threat to the West's interests in the region, and who was also at war with Iraq, may have contributed to the negative description of Kurds because they side with an enemy of the West. This relationship between the Kurds and Iran is evident in all the stories on Iraqi Kurds in 1988.

Another example of this overcompleteness is a news report (GM1) about the bombardment of Halabja, a Kurdish town in northern Iraq, on March 16, 1988. According to later reports released by the Human Rights Watch (Black, 1993), an estimated 4-5000 people died as a result of being gassed by Iraq. Paul Koring, a GM reporter, writes the only report on this incident, which also made the front page eight days after the event (GM, March 24, 1988, p. A1). The interesting part of this report is that in a story of about 1000 words (32 paragraphs), 25 references to Iran have been made. Mentioning the Iranian army at the scene is not surprising since they are there and Koring observes them. What is surprising though is that he tells almost the whole story, particularly about the use of chemical bombs by Iraq, through the voice of the Iranian revolutionary guards or the Iranian news agency. Koring, even after talking to a Kurdish survivor from the bombarded town, writes, *'all [what the survivor said] were generally in accord with the official Iranian line that Halabja was bombed with gas and high explosives 24 hours after being taken on March 15 by Iranian forces possibly aided by*

Kurdish rebels.' It is true that the Iraqi Kurds did collaborate with the Iranian army to gain control of their own region, but, in 1988, Iranian news agency and Iranian revolutionary guards were possibly the least credible sources of news in Canada. Karim (2000, p. 121), on the Iranian image at the time writes, "as the Iranian leadership decried Washington as the 'Great Satan,' American propagandists produced a similarly demonic picture of the theocratic government in Tehran." This might have been the same in Canada, because "the coverage of foreign news in Canada is significantly influenced by the manners in which American journalists perceive it" (Karim, 2000, p. 14).

Mediating the report on Halabja in this way not only makes the whole assertion of the Kurds less credible but it may also justify Iraq's use of chemical weapons against the Kurds because they have been portrayed as Iranian collaborators against Iraq. Here, what seems to have been implied by the *GM* reporter is that the Kurds deserved chemical bombardment. Such an assumption is based on two factors. First, the *GM* reporter had access to the people who had witnessed the Iraqi planes attack on that town. He could, thus, have avoided relying entirely on the Iranian sources for gathering information in Halabja. Second, mention of the tie between the PUK and the Iranian government is only made in 1988, but not during 1991 when that Kurdish group continued its close ties with Iran.

4.2.2.4 *Voice*

Again, as with analysis in other sections, there is a clear difference in the representation of Kurds and Iraq in 1988 compared to 1991 by the *GM*. In 1988, the Kurdish voice is occasionally heard, either through quotations or indirect reporting. However, the majority of times their reports and words are discredited or challenged.

One of the ways this is one is by labeling them as '*accusations*' or '*claims*,' as in this example:

A Kurdish rebel group in Iraq accused the Iraqi army of slaughtering 1,300 unarmed Kurdish civilians this week . . . The reports were among many accusations of Iraqi atrocities against Kurds, . . . The Iraqi News Agency quoted "an official source" as denying that chemical bombs were used in northern Iraq. (GM4) (My emphasis)

There are two important points here. First, according to van Dijk, the least that words such as *accuse* do is enable the reporter to keep a distance from what has been said and to indicate a non-sharing of the opinion of the accuser. Second, the Iraqi voice is present to *deny* the report. This pattern is dominant in 1988. For example, in the same story, further down, we read:

A spokesman for the KDP said in a telephone interview from a West European capital that soldiers arrested about . . . The report could not be independently confirmed . . . the spokesman . . . refused to give his name. (GM4) (My emphasis)

Or, in another story, we read,

Kurdish rebels said they have killed or wounded 7,000 Iraqi soldiers who attacked their mountain strongholds in Iraq with chemical weapons, ..., Iraq denied both assertions. (GM5) (My emphasis)

Several examples of this discursive move, in the four sampled full-text articles, show that there is a pattern of Kurds *accusing* or *saying*, but Iraq *denying*. However, the same pattern does not exist in 1991. In fact, in 1991, Iraq's voice is hardly heard. On the other hand, Kurds' voice is heard throughout and their assertions are hardly refuted. It could be suggested that whereas in 1988 Iraq contributes to defining the events, in 1991 the Kurds become the primary source of information and thus definers of events in northern Iraq.

4.3 The New York Times (NYT)

4.3.1 Headlines and grammar of transitivity

Similar to analyzing the *GM*, I will first analyze the two participants, Iraq and the Kurds, in 1988, and then in 1991. Throughout the analysis I will make comparison between the *NYT*'s representations and that of the *GM* to illustrate the differences and similarities between the two papers in their representations of Iraq and the Iraqi Kurds.

4.3.1.1 1988

- *Iraq*

In 1988, Iraq's role, similar to that of the *GM*, is distributed between two processes, material and verbal:

Processes→	Material	Mental	Relational	Verbal	Behavioral	Existential
Roles▼	%	%	%	%	%	%
Agent/sayer	41.5			24.9		
Patient/receiver	8.3			16.6		
Beneficiary						

Table 4-1: Iraq's roles in processes, in percentage, the NYT, 1988

However, the roles that the *NYT* has assigned to Iraq are somewhat different. Whereas in the *GM*, Iraq was the agent of material processes 50% of the time, it is the agent of the same type of processes 41.5% of the time. Iraq has also been assigned the role of the receiver of verbal processes less. The other difference is that in the *GM* Iraq was not the patient of material processes, but it is in the *NYT*, in one headline. Despite these differences, in what follows, I will illustrate that there is no significance difference between the two papers in their overall representation.

In 1988, the *NYT* assigned the role of agent to Iraq, in material processes, 41.5% of the time:

*NYT1 Iraq says it **routed** Iranians and Kurds in **fight** in Northeast*

*NYT3 Iraqis reported to **mount drive** against Kurds: Gas is **used** in assault, protest to U.N. says*

*NYT4 Shultz to see Iraqi on reported **gassing** of Kurds*

*NYT7 Anti-U.S. **protest** in Baghdad*

*NYT11 Iraq **used** gas against Kurds Senate Staff Report charges (My emphasis)*

80% of these processes are transactive, such as 'rout,' 'mount drive,' 'gassing,' and 'used,' and they are all carried out against the Kurds. Only the process 'protest' is carried out against the U.S. Although this process is nominalized, its agent, Iraq, is still clear²⁶. Iraq's roles in these headlines of the *NYT*, in contrast to the *GM*, is clear as agent, suggesting a more negative representation of Iraq in the *NYT*, compared to the *GM*. However, further analysis proves the opposite, as we will see.

Another role that Iraq assumes is that of sayer in verbal processes (24.9%), which is almost the same as that in the *GM*:

*NYT1 Iraq **says** it routed Iranians and Kurds in fight in northeast (My emphasis)*

*NYT3 Iraqis **reported** to mount drive against Kurds: gas is used in assault, protest to U.N. says (My emphasis)*

*NYT8 Iraq's right to chemical arms **upheld** by official (My emphasis)*

In these instances, Iraq for the most part is the source of information, and in the meantime is given space to uphold its 'right' to chemical weapons (*NYT8*).

²⁶ The anti-U.S. protest in Baghdad took place after the House passed a resolution against Iraq's use of chemical weapons.

Overall, and in this first stage of analysis of processes and roles, the picture of Iraq that is painted seems to be negative. However, the negativity is diminished through several devices. To show this, identifying the dominant theme or topic of the headlines is essential and will be helpful in understanding the prevailing discursive practice here.

The dominant theme in the headlines is Iraq's use of chemical weapons in its war with the Kurds. The readers of these headlines, however, cannot be sure if Iraq actually used chemical weapons, because the discursive constructions of all the headlines concerning this topic consist of certain linguistic elements that cast doubt on whether Iraq used such weapons or not:

*NYT3 Iraqis reported to mount drive against Kurds: Gas is used in assault, **protest** to U.N. says* (My emphasis)

*NYT4 Shultz to see Iraqi on **reported** gassing of Kurds* (My emphasis)

*NYT5 Kurds' symptoms: gas or **poor diet**? Refugees cite Iraqi attacks, but **doctors are skeptical*** (My emphasis)

*NYT11 Iraq used gas against Kurds Senate Staff Report **Charges***

*NYT12 Poison gas traces are found in Iraq: report by British television gives support to **charges** of attack on the Kurds* (My emphasis)

In these headlines, the use of poison gas by Iraq is either reported by unknown agents (Sayers), as is the case in *NYT3* and *NYT4*, or it is doubted by doctors (*NYT5*), or at best it is not more than a *charge* (*NYT11*, *NYT12*).

This representation of Iraq's action is similar to that of the *GM* on the same issue. We saw that the *GM* referred to sayings about Iraq's use of chemical arms as *accusations*, similar to the *NYT*'s word *charge*. As was the case with the *GM*, the *NYT* reporters with this particular representation of this matter, seem to distance themselves from the event.

This will become clearer when we look at the representations of the Kurds in the same time period.

- *Kurds*

Similar to the *GM*'s, the *NYT*'s representation of the Kurds in 1988 is quite different from that of Iraq in the same year. Also, the distribution of the roles of the Kurds and the processes they are associated with are close to that of the *GM* with only a few differences:

Processes →	Material	Mental	Relational	Verbal	Behavioral	Existential
Roles ▼	%	%	%	%	%	%
Agent/sayer	28.9			14.3		
Patient/receiver	49.2					
Beneficiary						

Table 4-2: Kurds' roles in processes, in percentage, the *NYT*, 1988

Compared to the *GM*, Kurds here assume 10.9% more of agent role in material processes, about 4% more of patient role in material, and 4% less sayer role in verbal processes. However, whereas in the *GM*, in 1988, Kurds were beneficiaries of verbal processes initiated by Iraq, they have not assumed this role at all here. Despite these few differences, as I will illustrate, the overall representation of the Kurds in 1988, is the same in the two papers.

Similar to the *GM*, the *NYT* assigns agent role to Kurds in material processes that are either nominalized or non-transactive:

NYT1 *Iraq says it routed Iranians and Kurds in **fight** in northeast*
(My emphasis)

NYT2 *Kurdish chief gains support in U.S. **visit*** (My emphasis)

In *NYT1*, the process in which the Kurds are involved is nominalized. That means that the Kurds do not occupy the grammatical position of the agent. Thus their role as agents of transactive actions is diminished, similar to what we saw in the *GM*. Minimizing the Kurds' role as agent is also evident in *NYT2* where they are agents of the non-transactive process '*visit*.' Similar to the *GM*, the *NYT* portrays Kurds as not-active and somewhat passive participants, thus, perhaps victims of their own predicament. Tying them to 'Iranians,' similar to the *GM*, as I showed earlier, further strengthens this. It may even suggest that Kurds are 'routed' because they, as Iraqi citizens, are siding with Iran, a foreign country that calls the U.S. the 'great Satan' and who is on U.S.'s list of "terrorist states."

The passivity of Kurds is further evident in the fact that the Kurds occupy the patient role in 54%, which is close to that of the *GM* (45%):

NYT1 *Iraq says it routed Iranians and Kurds in **fight** in northeast*
(My emphasis)

NYT4 *Shultz to see Iraqi on reported **gassing of Kurds*** (My emphasis)

NYT11 *Iraq used gas **against Kurds** Senate Staff Report charges* (My emphasis)

NYT12 *Poison gas traces are found in **Iraq**: report by British television gives support to charges of **attack on the Kurds*** (My emphasis)

The discursive diminishing of the agency of Iraq in using gas, is also achieved by casting doubt on Kurds' sayings:

NYT5 *Kurds' symptoms: gas or poor diet? Refugees cite Iraqi attacks, **but doctors are skeptical*** (My emphasis)

The word 'diet' deserves some attention, especially in its combination with the words 'symptoms,' 'poor,' 'doctors,' 'refugees,' and 'skeptical,' which create a preoccupation with 'poor diet,' since refugees often suffer from having a poor diet. That is, the lexical

choices illustrated give more an impression of a disease than a chemical warfare. Thus, once again, whether Iraq has used chemical weapons against the Kurds is put into doubt.

4.3.1.2 1991

The *NYT*'s representation of Iraq in 1991, similar to that of the *GM*, is quite different from that in 1988 as far as analysis of transitivity is concerned.

Processes →	Material	Mental	Relational	Verbal	Behavioral	Existential
Roles ▼	%	%	%	%	%	%
Agent	50					
Patient	50					
Beneficiary						

Table 4-1 Iraq's roles in processes, in percentage, the *NYT*, 1991

In contrast to 1988 where Iraq had a wide range of roles, in 1991, has been assigned just agent and patient roles in material processes.

As agent, Iraq is assigned the agency role in transactive and negative actions, 50% of the time:

NYT15 . . . Bush condemns "brutality" by Hussein against rebels-No Iraqi reply To U.N.; U.S. urges Turkey to open borders to Kurdish refugees
(My emphasis)

NYT19 Iraq acts to halt the spread of Allied zone for the Kurds (My emphasis)

In the first example, although Iraq is not a grammatical agent of a process, given the political context of 1991, namely the media coverage of the Gulf War, Iraq's agency in the negative action of 'brutality' against the Kurds is a given. Note that the 'brutality' of Iraq is not only acknowledged by the U.S. president but also condemned.

The other difference between the role of Iraq in 1988 and 1991 is that in contrast to 1988, where Iraq was 'reporting' and also 'upholding' its 'right' to chemical weapons, in 1991 it has no role in verbal processes. In addition to this, Iraq is not a sayer even when it is supposed to be:

NYT15 ...No Iraqi reply to U.N...(My emphasis)

Overall, the representation of Iraq in 1991, similar to that in *GM*, is negative compared to 1988. This negativity will become clearer when I discuss the representation of the Kurds in 1991, in the next section, where they are patients of negative actions by Iraq but beneficiaries of the Allies' positive and "humanitarian" actions.

- *Kurds*

Similar to that in the *GM*, the representation of the Kurds in 1991 is quite different from their representation in 1988. In 1991, they are assigned at least one role in every heading and subheading; that is, they are present and noticed:

Processes →	Material	Mental	Relational	Verbal	Behavioral	Existential
Roles ▼	%	%	%	%	%	%
Agent/sayer/Senser	18.75	6.25		12.5	6.25	
Patient/receiver/phenomenon	18.75	6.25				
Beneficiary	31.25					

Table 4-2 Kurd's roles in processes, in percentage, the NYT, 1991

As agents, the Kurds, 18.7% of the time, are involved in material processes. Two third of these processes are transactive:

NYT21 Kurds have firm grasp on Iraqi city (My emphasis)

NYT22 U.S. military takes over relief for Kurdish refugees in Iraq: Tolls stir anxiety (My emphasis)

The Kurds '*have full grasp on [control] Iraqi city,*' and, because of their high '*toll*' as '*refugees,*' they '*stir anxiety*' of relief works and U.S. military, who are helping the Kurds. In contrast to 1988, Kurds here are direct agents of transactive processes. In this way they are portrayed as active participants who control '*Iraqi city,*' thus acting against the enemy of the West, Iraq.

The Kurds are also agents of non-transactive processes:

NYT15 U.S. urges Turkey to open borders to fleeing Kurds: ...Bush condemns 'brutality' by Hussein against Kurds (My emphasis)

The Kurds' agency in the non-transactive verb *flee*, may not suggest irresponsibility, as it did in 1988, but rather being victims of Iraq's '*brutality,*' which is confirmed in the words of the President Bush.

The Kurds are also agents of behavioral processes:

NYT17 Kurdish refugees from '88 exodus still languishing in Turkish camps (My emphasis)

Note that this headline is written in 1991, but is referring to the refugees who fled Iraq in 1988. This reference to previous years could work towards not only creating further hatred towards the Iraqi government, but also legitimizing the Kurds' fear of that government. As we will see later, in the full-text analysis this discursive move, linking the present to the past, is evident.

The major role the Kurds were assigned in 1991 is that of beneficiary (31.25%). Whereas in 1988 the Kurds had no such role, in 1991 they benefit from various actions of which the West, especially the U.S., assumes agency roles (*NYT15* (3 times), *NYT19*, *NYT22* (2 times)). A look at the lexicalization of these headlines could easily suggest that Kurds deserve all the help they can get, because they are '*fleeing*' Iraqi military (as a

given in 1991) which 'acts to halt' the Allies help for the Kurds, and without ['*food*'] and '*shelter*.'

In short, representation of Kurds in 1991, might be summarized as follows:

Because they are the object of '*brutality*' by Iraq, they '*flee*,' so they have no choice but to '*await rescue*' by the Allies. As a result, the Allies, which are the enemy of the enemy of Kurds (Iraq), help the Kurds in every way they can. This representation of solidarity with the Kurds is further illustrated by lexical choices of describing the Kurds as '*alone*,' '*hungry*,' '*desperate*,' '*languishing*,' and without '*shelter*.' As was the case with the *GM*, the discursive construction of the headlines in the *NYT*, in 1988, portrayed the Kurds as victims but victims without clear agency, thus victims of their own passivity, and siding with the enemy, thus victims of their own actions. In 1991, however, the Kurds are still victims, but victims that are active, and instead of siding with Iran side with the West. In conclusion, it could be suggested that it seems the *NYT* favored Iraq over the Kurds, but in 1991 did the opposite. Analyzing the full-text articles will provide more evidence for this suggestion.

4.3.2 Full-text analysis

4.3.2.1 Naming choices

- *Iraq*

Representation of Iraq in the *NYT* regarding naming choices is very similar to that of the *GM* discussed earlier (see Appendix 6). As illustrated, in 1988 Iraq is referred to formally throughout. The state of Iraq is referred to as '*Iraq*,' '*Baghdad*,' '*Iraqi government of President Saddam Hussein*' and so forth. The only label used for the Iraqi

state which might carry a negative value, is the term '*Iraqi regime*' which appeared three times in six articles. In 1991, however, in addition to '*regime*,' there are more informal terms and these carry negative connotations for Iraq. The Iraqi government, in 1991, is also labeled '*Baath government*,' and '*Saddam's government*.' The first term identifies the Iraqi state as an ideological element, and the latter as a government in the hands of one person, and a dictatorship. In all the six articles analyzed from 1988, the name of the Iraqi president appears with the title '*president*,' whereas in 1991, the same name frequently appears without such title, either as '*Hussein*,' '*Mr. Hussein*,' or just '*Saddam*,' his first name. Although in English calling head of states by their last name (e.g. Hussein) may not be a sign of disrespect, calling them by their first name in the media is highly unusual; thus, disrespectful. Therefore, it could be suggested that these choices of naming by the *NYT* work towards questioning the legitimacy of the head of the Iraqi state as its president in 1991.

The *NYT* strengthened this negative representation of Iraq through quotations of others, who attribute additional negative labels to the Iraqi state and its president. For example, the Kurds are quoted as calling Iraq a '*tyrannical regime*,' and '*regime of Saddam Hussein gang*,' and its president as just '*Saddam*.' The *NYT* and Kurds' attitude towards Iraq seems to have been justified by quoting the U.S. president at the time, George Bush, who called Saddam Hussein the '*new Hitler*.'

Overall, in 1988, Iraq is referred to formally by mentioning the official titles of its president and other government officials such as ministers and ambassadors, but in 1991, the terms '*Baghdad government*,' and '*Mr. Hussein*' become interchangeable with

informal and at the same time negative labels such as '*Saddam's government*,' and the '*new Hitler*.' These naming choices for Iraq in the *NYT* correspond to that in the *GM*.

- *Kurds*

Similar to Iraq's case, regarding naming choices, the *NYT*'s representation of Kurds also is very similar to the *GM*'s representation of the same group. Some of the names used in referring to the Kurds are present in both years, such as '*Kurds*,' '*rebels*,' or '*guerillas*.' There are, however, some differences in the frequency of these names that occur in both years. One of the examples of this is referring to Kurds as '*refugees*.' In 1988, according to the *NYT*, there were 100,000 Iraqi Kurdish refugees, who fled Iraqi chemical weapons, in refugee camps in Turkey, but the term *refugees* was used only twice, in six articles most of which deal with the issue of the use of chemical weapons in northern Iraq as a result of which 100,000 refugees fled to Turkey and Iran. In 1991, however, in only four analyzed articles, there are 25 references to *refugees*.

The second example is referring to Kurds as *civilians* or related words such as *children*, *women*, or *men*. Compared to 1988, there are more references to civilians as individuals and other than the rebels, such as *babies*, *infant*, and *women* in 1991. In 1988, most of the time, Kurds are more often referred to as either '*guerillas*' or '*rebels*.' In contrast to 1988, in 1991, Kurds are presented more as civilians, and one could say normal people rather than rebels or guerillas.

The major difference between naming choices for Kurds in 1988 and 1991, however, is evident in the labels and titles that are used in one year but not in the other. In 1988, when Kurds are in conflict with the Iraqi government, which is not an enemy of

the West yet, the *NYT* refers to them as '*separatists*,' and '*dissident elements*.' As discussed earlier, in the *GM* section, the two major parties that the *NYT* refers to (PUK and KDP), were not asking for *independence* at the time these events were reported in the *NYT*, therefore they could not be '*separatists*.' It could be suggested that labeling Kurds as '*separatists*' makes them more vulnerable to Iraq's punishment. That is, since they aim at destroying a sovereign nation, Iraq, their being punished by Iraq is not unnatural and they are to blame themselves.

This discursive construction in 1988 is strengthened by the fact that the *NYT* quotes Iraqi officials, who call the Kurds '*Saboteurs*,' and their leader, Jalal Talabani, a '*traitor and terrorist*.' Note that in 1988, Iraqis are quoted to label the Kurds, but in 1991, Kurds are quoted to label the government of Iraq and its leader. However, in 1991, the terms '*separatist*' or '*terrorist*' for labeling the Kurdish rebels do not exist, instead there are terms that portray the Kurds positively, such as '*Iraqi opposition*,' and '*Peshmargas*.'²⁷

4.3.2.2 Lexical choices

As with the *GM*, there are different choices of words for referring to the same phenomenon or concept in the *NYT*: the cause of the conflict between the Kurds and the Iraqi government (*autonomy* versus *independence*), and the location of that conflict (*Northern Iraq* versus *Kurdistan*).

In 1988, according to the *NYT*, similar to the *GM*, the Kurds are '*separatists*' who fight the Iraqi government because they want to gain '*independence*' from Iraq: '*The*

²⁷ A native Kurdish and at the same time common title used by the Kurds themselves for Kurdish fighters. None of the states where Kurds live uses the word to refer to the same individuals Kurds call Peshmarga. The word has a highly positive connotation: the armed Kurd who dies for other Kurds.

²⁷ Iraqi official referring to Jalal Talabani, a Kurdish leader visiting Washington to report Iraq's use of chemical weapons against the Kurds

Kurdish insurgency is one of several efforts in this century to win some independence or autonomy form Baghdad (NYT, June 22, 1988, p. A3),' or, *'the Kurdish struggle for autonomy or independence from Iraq ... (NYT, Sept. 13, 1991, p. A6)'* (my emphasis). It is rather peculiar that the *NYT* seems to use the two words as synonyms, because there is a clear difference between them. Whereas *independence* denotes a separate country with its borders and totally independent government and entities, *autonomy* means self-rule 'within a country,' or 'self-determination,' and that is what the Iraqi Kurds wanted at the time and continue to demand. Nonetheless, since the word '*independence*' is not used in 1991, we can assume that in 1988 the *NYT* really means '*independence*' by both words. It seems that in the *NYT*, similar to the *GM*, choosing to use '*independence*' instead of '*autonomy*' in 1988 corresponds to calling Kurds '*separatists*' and "*traitors*." Sticking to '*autonomy*' in 1991, on the other hand, corresponds to labeling Kurds as '*Iraqi opposition*' and '*Peshmargas*.' Thus, it could follow that since in 1988 Kurds were fighting to destroy a country, Iraq, might deserve the punishment they get, however, in 1991, as our allies, they just ask for their rights, autonomy, thus deserve our support and help.

The other interesting lexical choice pertains to the location of the conflict between Iraq and the Kurds. In 1988, that location is identified as '*Northeast of Iraq*,' '*Northern Iraq*,' '*Kurdish region*,' '*Kurdish Iraq*.' There are also references to some specific villages and towns in that region, for example '*Kurdish villages*,' or '*Halabja, a Kurdish city*.' In the six articles analyzed, in 1988, there is just one reference to "*Kurdistan*" which is closed in quotation marks as a part of a passage uttered by the Kurdish leader, Jalal Talabani.

Kurdistan means "the land of Kurds" (van Bruinessen, 1992, p. 11). The word Kurdistan denotes distinctiveness and statehood, thus mostly used by Kurdish nationalists and often researchers. The Iraqi government, however, does not use the word to refer to the same region. In contrast to 1988, in 1991, the terms used above, for referring to the location of the conflict between Iraq and the Kurds, is interchangeable with the term '*Kurdistan*.' For example, in one of the articles (*NYT*, March 20, 1991, p. A12), there are six references made to '*Kurdistan*.' This representation of the *NYT* by way of lexical choices is similar to the *GM*'s usage of this linguistic feature.

One could suggest that these lexical choices contribute to the overall representation of Iraq and the Kurds in 1988: portraying the Kurds as deserving Iraq's genocidal campaign because of being "separatists" and fighting for "independence," and also portraying the Kurdish predicament as an Iraqi internal issue and not the international community's (e.g. U.S. or U.N.) business. In 1991, it is the opposite.

4.3.2.3 *Overcompleteness*

Overcompleteness is another linguistic feature through which the negative representation of the Kurds, in 1988, is achieved. As we saw in discussing this feature in analyzing the data from the *GM*, *overcompleteness* is often a part of the background information about either the participants or the issue on hand in a story. Its significance is in how relevant this background information is to the main issue or event of the story.

Similar to the *GM*, in the *NYT*, a recurring piece of information in stories from 1988, when Iraq is not the enemy of the West, is the Kurds' close ties with Iran, which was at war with Iraq and was considered to be an enemy of the West. For example, in a medium size story, about half a page (*NYT*, June 22, 1988, p. A3), there are 12 references

made to Iran and the Kurds tie with Iran: '*... Kurdish separatist groups in Iraq that are cooperating with Iran ...*' or '*a turncoat funded and armed by Iran ...*' The latter refers to a Kurdish leader, Jalal Talabani.

In another story of about 240 words, there are ten references made to Iran, for example, '*Jalal Talabani, a leader of the Kurdish separatists backed by Iran ...*' (NYT, April, 03, 1988, p. A14). In short, the data shows that there is a pattern of making the Kurds tied to Iranian government, which was, at the time, at war with Iraq, and which referred to the U.S. "the great Satan" (Karim, 2000). Although the major Kurdish opposition groups continued to have their ties with Iran during 1991 there is no mention of such relationship by the NYT, similar to the GM.

Instead, in 1991, the background information about the Kurds speaks of decades long '*repression*' and '*atrocities*' done to Kurds by the Iraqi government. Referring to the 1970s, when one of the most persistent Kurdish revolts collapsed, the NYT writes, '*tens of thousands of Kurds were arrested and sent to detention camps in southern Iraq* (NYT, March 20, 1991, p. A12).' About 1988, and in the same article, the reporter writes, '*during Iran-Iraq war, the Iraqi government moved ruthlessly against Kurdish rebels ... the repression included the relocation of Kurdish civilians and attacks like the chemical weapons strike at the town of Halabja in 1988 that killed about 5,000 Kurds...*' (My emphasis).

Whereas in 1988, the NYT termed Kurds' reporting on the Iraqi military's use of chemical weapons '*charges*,' '*accusations*,' and '*allegations*,' the NYT, in 1991, reports on the same event as a fact. Relevant to this is the different figures the NYT, in two different time periods, provides for the number of people that were killed in the same incident in

Halabja. The *NYT*, in 1991, estimates the number at 5,000, as we just saw in the example above, similar to the number that the Kurds in Iraq always estimated. In 1988, however, the *NYT* estimated the number of people killed in that attack at 2000 (*NYT*, June 22, 1988, p. A3). Furthermore, in 1991, to reinforce what Iraq did to Kurds in 1988, and thus to create more hatred towards the President Saddam Hussein, the *NYT* devoted one of the articles of my six sampled articles to reporting on the refugees from the Halabja bombardment: '*Kurdish refugees from '88 exodus still languishing in Turkish camps*' (*NYT*, April 13, 1991, p. A4).

This analysis illustrates some essential differences between the kinds of background information the *NYT* provided on the Kurds in the two time periods; they are very different, as is the case with the *GM*. It could be suggested that in 1988, the *NYT*'s discourse works towards discrediting the Kurds as sayers, and as friends of Iran. However, in 1991, Kurds are portrayed as decades long victims of Iraq's '*brutality*.'

4.3.2.4 Voice

In the six articles sampled for detailed analysis, from 1988, the Kurds' voice is heard in only two of them (*NYT1*, *NYT2*), and even here, their voice is discredited in several ways. First, the Kurds do not *report*, but most of the time '*accuse*,' '*allege*,' or '*charge*,' therefore, discredited. In this way, the *NYT* reporters keep a distance from what the Kurds say (van Dijk, 1993). Second, when their statements are not in line with that of the *NYT*, and also of Iraq, it ends up closed in quotation marks: '*He said in London on Friday that Iraq was "waging a genocide campaign against our people through the daily use of poison gas"*' (*NYT1*). Again, the *NYT* distances itself from what the Kurds say.

Another way of discrediting the Kurdish voice is best illustrated in another article (NYT2), where a Kurdish leader has been given lots of space to express himself on Iraq's use of chemical weapons; however, his description by the *NYT* diminishes his credibility. While he has been described as '*a former journalist and lawyer*,' in a paragraph close to the beginning of the article, in the next paragraph we read: '*To Baghdad, Mr. Talabani is not a romantic leader . . . but a turncoat funded and armed by Iraq.*'

In the next paragraph, Iraq's Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, expresses his disappointment with U.S. officials for meeting with the Kurdish leader, Talabani. In the next paragraph, Iraq's ambassador to U.S., and '*a classmate of the Kurdish leader*', according to the *NYT*, calls Mr. Talabani '*a traitor and a terrorist.*' Later in the same article, Mr. Talabani is described as a '*master politician who has easily shifted his alliances over the years*' and who '*defends his close ties with the Iranian regime of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.*'

Now, one could suggest that just because he has been described as a "*terrorist*" or "*turncoat*" does not entail that he is not a credible sayer. This could be the case, that is, Mr. Talabani could still be represented as a credible sayer in the *NYT*. However, the second last paragraph leaves no room for Mr. Talabani's credibility: '*State Department officials also say the **credibility** of Kurdish leaders has been **tarnished** by their practice of seizing foreigners in Kurdish-controlled areas and obtaining ransoms for their release*' (My emphasis).

This was the only article in 1988 where an Iraqi Kurdish leader had a chance to report on their situation, but denying his claims through the voice of two top Iraqi officials and other discursive moves of the *NYT* leaves him little chance to be heard. In

contrast to 1988, in 1991, various Kurdish voices, such as refugees, including refugees from 1988 who were still in Turkey at the time, a Kurdish surgeon living in U.S., Mr. Talabani himself, representatives of other Kurdish groups, the representative of the Kurdish Institute in Paris and so forth are heard in the *NYT* denouncing the government of Iraq and its president, who became the enemy of the West in 1991.

The representation of Iraq, again, and similar to that of the *GM*, is completely the opposite of that of the Kurds in both years. In 1988, Iraq's voice is heard through its various officials and representatives whenever the Kurdish issue comes up. Iraq is given enough space to deny all charges, made against Iraq not only by the Kurds but even the United States Senate, for using chemical weapons against Kurds. Furthermore, in an article (*NYT*, Sept.16, 1988, p. A11) the Iraq's Defense Minister openly '*reserve[s] the right to use chemical weapons if it felt that circumstances warranted it.*' In that article, the Iraqi official did not specify those circumstances; however, the *NYT*, in another article (Sept.13, p. A6) seems to clarify the dilemma: '*Experts say that international law is unclear whether the prohibition [of the use of chemical weapons] also applies to military action within a country directed against dissident elements.*' Here, what seems to have been implied by the *NYT* is that if Iraq uses chemical weapons against dissidents it will not be against the international law. Contrary to this favorable, or at least not hostile representation of Iraq in 1988 by the *NYT*, in 1991, Iraq's voice is completely silent.

4.4 Summary

I carried out this analysis of the headlines according to the transitivity system, and of the full-text articles according to naming choices, lexical choices, overcompleteness, and voice. The analysis suggested that there was a similar representation of the Iraqi

Kurds, and of Iraqi government by the two newspapers, the *GM* and the *NYT*. Whereas in 1988, when Iraq was not an enemy of the West, they favored Iraq, in 1991, when Iraq became an enemy of the West, they favored Iraq's opponents, the Kurds.

The transitivity system, according to Halliday (1994), embodies the world of experience. Analysis of transitivity in the headlines from 1988, from both papers, revealed that the Kurds were associated with either nominalized or intransitive processes. By being the agent of these processes, for the most part, they were portrayed as passive participants who did not act upon others. Their role as patient of passive and nominalized processes, made them passive and also victims, however, victims without a clear agent acting on them. Their role as sayer was diminished by being undermined through discrediting devices, such as labeling their statements as 'accusations,' and 'allegations.' A combination of these discursive moves identified them as helpless victims. Furthermore, since no clear agent was identified for their victimization, it seemed that they were responsible for their own situation.

The victimization of Kurds in 1988 was further revealed through applying other discourse analytical tools. Although there were signs of diminishing the agency role of Iraq in using chemical bombs against the Kurds, the suspicion was still present in the discourse. Perhaps, because of this suspicion, Kurds were portrayed as '*separatists*,' '*Iranian collaborators*' and '*terrorists*' whose aim was to gain '*independence*' and thus destroy the state of Iraq. So, if there is any suspicion of Iraq using chemical weapons it used them to keep the integrity of the country.

Also, the location of the Iraqi-Kurdish conflict, in 1988 was called '*Northern Iraq*' or '*Iraq North*' to locate the site of the Iraqi-Kurdish conflict inside the borders of Iraq,

thus an *internal* matter of that state, and consequently not our business. In 1991, however, the same location was called '*Kurdistan*,' or '*Kurdish North*,' so that the Kurdish issue could appear as an *external* matter and thus appropriate and proper for the Allies intervention.

Finally, in 1988, Kurds either had little voice or, when allowed, was discredited by the Iraqi officials, or discredited by the papers' discursive moves such as labeling their statements as 'accusations,' 'charges,' and 'allegations.' In 1991, however, Kurds became credible sayers who defined the events without being discredited by the papers or Iraqi officials, since Iraq had almost no voice in 1991, in either paper.

Based on the analysis presented here, it could be suggested that both papers, the *GM* and the *NYT*, represented the Kurds in 1988 in a particularly negative way. The same conclusion could be made for the Iraqi government, that the two papers represented it in the same way in 1991, at least in reporting on its conflict with Kurds. However, my study is concerned primarily with the representation of the Kurds in their conflict with the Iraqi government. In the next chapter I will try to begin to answer the questions that were set out at the beginning of this study in relation to the Kurds.

5 Discussion

5.1 Introduction

The findings in this research have provided information to begin to answer the questions that were set out at the beginning of this study. In this section, and in the light of the findings, I attempt to provide some answers and explanations. That is, I will go into more intertextual analysis in terms of interpretations of the findings by connecting the discourse of the two papers in question to the wider societal, historical and political contexts within which the analyzed data was produced and consumed.

In order to put things into perspective, let me first restate the questions: 1) Is there a difference between the representation of the Kurds and the representation of Iraq, in the *GM* and the *NYT*, in 1988 and 1991? 2) How are those differences manifested in the discourse of the newspapers? 3) How do the *GM* and the *NYT* compare? 4) Why there were such differences; were they for technical reasons (e.g. access of the media to the events), editorial practices (e.g. newsworthiness), or for ideological reasons? 5) If so, what do they reveal about the place of media in our society particularly in informing the public regarding international issues and other nations, and its relationship with the state and its foreign policy? 6) And finally, do these differences constitute bias in the media?

The findings illustrated that in the case of both newspapers, in representing the Iraqi Kurds, there were differences between 1988 and 1991. The first difference was in the size of the coverage, or the numbers of articles that were devoted to stories on Iraqi Kurds in the two time periods. The second difference was in the content of the stories and the papers discursive moves and practices. My attempt here is to search for some

explanations that might help to begin to answer the rest of the questions or at least make suggestions as to what possible answers could be there.

5.2 Media discourse as agenda setting

In 1988, the *GM*, as the only Canadian national daily at the time, had only six stories on the Iraqi Kurds, but 70 in 1991. The *NYT*, as the United States' "paper of record," had about 33 stories in 1988 compared to 240 in 1991. This comparison is necessary and important because it says a great deal about what the media, and as a result our societies in the West, focus on.

One of the functions of the media, according to Hackett (1991), is setting the agenda for both the policy makers and the public by covering an issue. In a similar vein, Cohen asserts that, "the press may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about" (as cited in Whetmore, 1993, p. 38). Then, what determines what is on the agenda or not?

This issue of agenda setting is closely related to the media's practice of news selection--what is newsworthy and what is not. According to Carruthers (2000, p. 16) and Eaman (1987, p. 51), newsworthiness is not an inherent characteristic of events and news items. It is rather determined by the news production and institutional practices:

News organizations do not float detached from their society's political, cultural and economic structures. The 'news values' that determine what passes muster as news in different polities are the product of these broad 'invisible' influences, as well as more specific, institutionalized practices. Although news-people often claim otherwise, 'news values' do not inhere in stories; the news agenda is therefore not self-selecting. (Carruthers, 2000, p. 15)

Rather, news stories are selected by news editors who determine what makes a 'good story' and for how long it should be covered based on their judgment which is shaped by

"cultural norms as much as by idiosyncratic, individual preferences" (Carruthers, 2000, p. 16).

According to Carruthers, there are many factors that contribute to the news selectors' judgments. What factors are stronger or prevailing, however, fall into two camps of media studies. One camp, mostly championed by the political-economy approach to the media, argues that, "news organizations at root reflect the interests and needs of their commercial sponsors, or broader economic systems and their supporting ideologies as a whole" (Carruthers, 2000, p. 18). The opposite camp argues that precisely because the mass media rely heavily on advertising and subscription revenues, they have to satisfy their customers, audiences, by responding to their interests and concerns. In this way, they can sell the advertisers products to the audiences.

The dilemma here, however, is how the editors determine what concerns their audiences. For example, how they determine what war to cover and what not. Closely related to this study is the question, what can explain the difference in the size of the coverage of the Iraqi Kurds in 1988 versus 1991?

In both years the Kurds were in conflict with the Iraqi government. During 1988, chemical weapons were used and Iraq committed "crimes against humanity and genocide" (HRW/ME, 1995; Black, 1993; Randal, 1997). This does not seem to be less of a human-interest story than the war and refugee crisis in 1991, which was described as "the most dismal refugee crisis of a fading century that groans under the ordeal of the displaced" (NYT, April 22, 1991, p. A9). Then what could count for the different attention the media paid to the Kurds in the two different periods in question.

One of the reasons could be the fact that in 1988, the West was not directly involved in a war in the Middle East, which could involve Iraq or the Kurds as it did in 1991. Carruthers (2000) observes that news stories about war sell well. She notes that during the Gulf War, "twenty of American's twenty-five largest circulation newspapers [the *NYT* included] enjoyed circulation gain during that conflict, while Cable News Network (CNN) experienced a two-fold increase of its audience" (p. 3). This, however, does not extend to the coverage of every war. She believes that the extent to which war could be a profitable topic for the mass media in a given country depends on that country's involvement in the war. In other words, the war coverage in the West, for example, will be greater if the West is involved in the war. Canada and the U.S., where the two papers in question are based, were involved in the war. Thus, it seems natural for the two papers to have a more extended coverage of the Iraqi Kurds whose refugee crisis was believed to be the result of the Gulf War.

During the war, on February 15, 1991, the Kurds were encouraged by President Bush to rise up against the Iraqi government (Gowing, 1991, p. 111; Schorr, 1991, p. 1; Carruthers, 2000, p. 211). After their brief success in taking control of most of the Iraqi Kurdistan, within days, Iraqi military counter offensive forced about two million Kurds to the borders of Turkey and Iran. In this sense the Iraqi Kurds' predicament was viewed as a byproduct of the Gulf War, therefore the Western public's concern. Thus, the media's extensive coverage of the Kurds in 1991 was a response to public interest. On the other hand, the chemical bombardment of the Kurds by the Iraqi military, in 1988, was not related to Canada or the U.S. involvement in a war. It follows that the Kurdish issue in

1988 was not a public concern in Canada and the U.S., thus the events did not receive the same coverage by the media as 1991.

This indeed could be a valid explanation for the difference in the amount of coverage of the Iraqi-Kurdish conflict, except for the fact that the difference was not only in the extent of the coverage but also in the quality, that is the content of the coverage, and the discursive practices that were employed to represent the conflict.

5.3 Media discourses as differential representations

Analysis of the discourse of the *GM* and the *NYT*'s coverage revealed that, in both papers, there were subtle differences between the representations of Iraqi Kurds in 1988 and 1991. As illustrated, the differences were embedded in various discursive structures and moves, such as that of the transitivity system, naming choices, lexical choices, overcompleteness, and voice.

Differential representations of the Kurds, in the discourse of the *GM* and the *NYT*, in 1988, seemed to result in three things:

- Portraying the Kurds as passive and irresponsible people, agentless patients, and thus *victims of their own actions*. Therefore, no one, including the Iraqi government, could be precisely held responsible for the Kurds' situation.
- Portraying them as *separatists* and *trouble makers* who wanted to diminish the sovereignty of Iraq, thus deserving Iraqi government's punishment
- Situating their conflict within the borders of *Iraq*, thus an Iraqi *internal* matter and not the Western public's business.

In contrast to this representation of Kurds in 1988, the discourse of the papers portrayed the Kurds differently in 1991:

- Victims of the '*brutality*' of '*the new Hitler*,' the Iraqi president, Saddam Hussein.
- Normal human beings who had been deprived of their ethnic rights thus not deserving Iraq's punishment, but the Western sympathy and help.
- The scope of the Kurdish refugee crisis as 'the most dismal refugee crisis of a fading century that groans under the ordeal of the displaced (*NYT*, April 22, 1991, p. A9)' was so great that the West's 'moral obligation' and the West's responsibility for the 'security of the region' allowed the West to view the Kurdish issue as an *external* Iraqi matter, and thus to violate the sovereignty of Iraq.

The portrayal of the Kurds in the two papers in 1988, and its difference with their representation in 1991, clearly seems to be an instance of different representation. As I discussed earlier, the Kurds of Iraq, in both years, continued to demand self-determination within the borders of Iraq. The two major parties that were leading the Kurdish armed struggle, PUK and KDP, were the same. The Ba'th party ruled the Iraqi government, in both time periods, with President Saddam Hussein as the head of the state. Then, the question remains: why did the *GM* and the *NYT* represent the Iraqi Kurds differently in the two time periods in question? The following section will be an attempt to provide some explanations towards a possible, yet tentative, answer.

5.4 Media discourse: the mirror of public interest or the status quo?

There might be different explanations for this difference of representation of the Iraqi Kurds in the two time periods. However, before beginning to discuss the

explanations, recapturing the political and historical context is helpful in making sense of the explanations.

5.4.1 Historical and political context revisited

In both time periods, 1988 and 1991, the Iraqi government and the Kurds were in a conflict over the Kurds' demands for political and cultural autonomy within Iraq. In both periods, the cause of the conflict, the location of the conflict and the two main participants were the same. What was different was the relationship between the West and Iraq.

One of the major events in the Middle East that took place prior to 1980 was the overthrow of the monarchy in Iran, in February 11, 1979. Anti American slogans during the revolution, and the hostage taking of the American embassy personnel in Tehran, initiated bitter relations between the U.S. and Iran. According to Karim (2000, p. 124), Iran was perceived in the West as a "threat to world peace." Iran was invaded by Iraq in 1980, which was the onset of a war that lasted for eight years.

The Iran-Iraq war was the beginning of change in the U.S. and European foreign policies towards Iraq. According to Randal (1997),

Two years after [Iraq] invaded Iran in 1980, the United States had abandoned its previous neutrality and given Iraq soft loan credits by American farm produce; . . . diplomatic relations with Baghdad were restored in 1984 and the Reagan administration proclaimed its preference for Iraq the following year. (p. 77)

During the Iran-Iraq war, the northern media, Canadian and the U.S. media included, "generally portrayed Iraq as bravely defending the Persian Gulf kingdoms and emirates from the virulent influence of 'Shi'ite fundamentalism' [Iran]" (Karim, 2000, p. 125). Even after the Iran-Iraq war ended in August 1988, according to Randal (1997), "the

United States singlemindedly backed Iraq as the strongest military force in the Persian Gulf region" (p. 87).

After the Iran-Iraq war, the Iraqi military intensified its campaign against Kurdish rebels and their families (Galbraith, 1988). The use of chemical weapons has dated back to April 1987 (Black, 1993, p. xiv). The treatment of the Kurds by Iraq, at the time, was considered to be *genocide* by Kurds themselves, but their assertion at the time was ignored (Randal, 1997, p. 80). It was only a few years later that the same categorization, *genocide*, was used as a reference to the Iraqi government's treatment of its Kurdish minority in 1988 (Black, 1993; HRW/ME, 1995; Randal, 1997).

Randal (1997), describes Iraqi's military operations against the Kurds in 1988 in the following words:

Massive deployment of force on the ground and in the air, destruction of villages, the use of gas, and trick amnesties enticing the naïve into surrendering only to condemn them to disappearance and almost certain death . . . families were targeted and women and children arrested in giant search-and-destroy efforts designed to exterminate a people. Kurds were funneled into forts, the men separated from their womenfolk and children. Beaten, stripped to their undershorts, and ill fed, they never stayed long before disappearing, handcuffed, in convoys of filthy vehicles to killing fields hundreds of miles from the theatre of operations. (p. 232)

This campaign, according to Black (1993), resulted in the death of "50,000 and possibly as many as 100,000 persons, many of them women and children . . . between February and September 1988" (p. xiv). According to Randal (1997), thousands of Kurds fled to Turkey.

The refugees in Turkey started to draw some attention from the Western media. The Kurdish activists also tried to gain support from the international community for their claim that Iraq had used chemical weapons against the civilians and had committed

genocide against them (*NYT*, June 22, p. A3). The U.S. and the European community had previously criticized Iraq for using gas in its war with Iran (Randal, 1997). The Kurdish conflict, however, prompted suspicions about Iraq's mass killing of civilians.

A Staff Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate (Galbraith, 1988) described the situation as follows:

The powerful **eyewitness** accounts, the threads of **physical evidence**, and the pattern of past Iraqi use of chemical weapons provide **overwhelming evidence** that Iraq dropped chemical weapons on its Kurdish population in the northeastern reaches of Iraq from August 25 through August 27 . . . The Iraqis have not only used gas to ferret out fighters hiding in caves, they have used it indiscriminately against Kurdish **villagers**. The chemical massacre of Kurdish villagers in Halabja last March demonstrated the Iraqi's willingness to use chemical weapons not just as instruments of war, but as tools for **mass murder**. (My emphasis) (pp. 32-33)

This report, although being reported very briefly in the *NYT* (Sept. 22, 1991, p. 21) only five days before the end of Iraq's genocidal campaign, left no doubt that Iraq did use chemical weapons against the Kurdish civilians. Note that the report is getting very close to use the term genocide by referring to '*mass murder*.' Based on this report, the U.S. Senate proposed a bill of sanctions against Iraq. But, according to Randal (1997),

the Senate's sanctions bill collapsed because of a jurisdictional fight in Congress: wheat, rice, and other powerful lobbies doing business with Saddam Hussein had intervened. The administration was only too happy to find such a lucrative market for American food exports and showed no outward concern about the wisdom or folly of allowing domestic lobbies to dictate policy toward such a controversial country. (p. 80)

Nonetheless, neither the U.S. nor Canada kept silent about the events. According to Randal, "the gassing eventually drew a pointed but fleeting rebuke from Secretary of State George P. Shultz. A State Department spokesman denounced this renewed use of chemical weapons as 'unjustifiable and abhorrent' and 'unacceptable to the civilized world' (p. 79). Earlier, Joe Clark, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, in a

parliamentary debate on March 25, 1988, had had similar remarks, "we consider the use of chemical weapons in these circumstances or in others, certainly in the proportions that have been reported to us, to be atrocious and to be inhuman."

However note, that in the same parliamentary debate, Mr. Bill Blaikie, the MP for Winnipeg-Birds Hill, criticized Joe Clark saying that, "the minister [Joe Clark] appeared to entertain some doubt about whether or not Iraq was responsible for this when it seems that it clearly is" (Blaikie, 1988). As discussed earlier, Joe Clark, in a news release, issued on the same day, appeared to cast that doubt (see Appendix 3). As for the U.S. administration, according to Randal (1997), it continued allowing exports to Iraq, "and in 1989 the Bush administration formally favored giving further assistance to Iraq" (p. 87)²⁸.

This kind of reaction to Iraq was not unique to the U.S. or Canada but rather common to the West as a whole. According to Chomsky (1991), "Western corporations took an active role in building up Iraq's military strength, notably its weapons of mass destruction" during the 80s. He notes the reaction of another Canadian and U.S. ally, Britain, to Iraq at the time:

Britain was no different. When Saddam was reported to have gassed thousands of Kurds at Halabja, the White House intervened to block any serious congressional reaction and not one member of the governing Conservative Party was willing to join a left-labor condemnation in Parliament.

Further, he explains why, despite that knowledge, Western states came short in punishing the Iraqi government and in listening to the calls of the Kurds, as one could say they did in 1991:

²⁸ According to Salih (1995), the Bush transition team, in January 1989, prepared a guideline for the new administration's policy towards Iraq in which the administration was advised, "to recognize Iraq's present and potential power in the region and accord it relatively high priority." According to Salih, "even though they described Iraq's human rights records as 'abysmal,' Bush's foreign analysts concluded that 'in no way should we associate ourselves with the 60 year Kurdish rebellion in Iraq or oppose Iraq's legitimate attempts to suppress it.'"

It was, of course, understood [in 1980s] that Saddam Hussein was one of the world's most savage tyrants. But he was "our gangster," joining a club in which he could find congenial associates. Repeating a familiar formula, Geoffrey Kemp, head of the Middle East section in the National Security Council under Reagan, observed 'We weren't really that naive. We knew that he was an SOB, but he was our SOB.'

Given this political situation, and the support for the Iraqi military as the "necessary other" for "defending the Persian Gulf kingdoms and emirates from the virulent influence of [Iran]," (Karim, 2000, p. 125), one could say that the Kurdish insurgency in Iraq was not favorable to the West in 1988.

This "necessary other", however, in 1991, and after invading Kuwait, became "the New Hitler" or even "worse than Hitler" (Schorr, 1991). The Kuwaities and later the Kurds, on the other hand, became victims of that "worse than Hitler." And, the involvement of the West in going to war against the Iraqi military, and 'protecting' Kuwait and the Kurds, echoed in the words of Western leaders:

The American president said about the involvement of the U.S. in the war, 'our cause is just. Our cause is moral. Our cause is right.' Canada's prime minister was quoted by newspapers as stating that one of the main issues guiding its involvement in the Gulf War was 'simple morality.' (Karim, 2000, p. 149)

It seems that only within the political and historical context described can this study begin to tackle the rest of the questions posed in this research, especially questions four and five which have to do with the reasons for which such representation of Kurds might have taken place, and whether that would constitute bias on the part of the *GM* and the *NYT*.

5.4.2 Media discourse: the mirror of public interest or the status quo?

The description of the events pertaining to Iraqi-Kurdish conflict in 1988, portrayed by Black (1993)²⁹, Randal (1997)³⁰, Galbraith (1988)³¹, is very different from what we saw in the discourse of the papers. This difference could be the result of several factors.

One of the possible factors for this difference, as claimed by the *NYT*, was that the journalists did not have the evidence of the things that later became facts. For example, they did not have access to the same documents that HRW/Me had; the documents that belonged to the Iraqi military, and contained detailed descriptions of the Iraqi campaign against the Kurds. It was these documents that convinced HRW/ME and other Western researchers that genocide had taken place in 1988. Thus not calling the Iraqi campaign against the Kurds 'genocide,' in 1988, might be understandable. Especially when we realize that even a well-known researcher and scholar as Edward Said, again apparently because of the lack of hard evidence, doubted the use of chemical weapons by Iraq against civilians. In March 1991, he wrote:

The claim that Iraq gassed its own citizens has often been repeated. At best, this is uncertain. There is at least one War college report, done while Iraq was a U.S. ally, claims that the gassing of the Halabja was done by Iran. Few people mention such reports in the media today. (as cited in Salih, 1995)

However, there are some reasons, which could make one doubt whether lacking hard evidence by the *GM* and the *NYT* could be the only reason for the differential representations of the Kurds.

The first one is that the Kurds did claim at the time that genocide had taken place against them, but as illustrated in the analysis, they were not found to be credible. I do

²⁹ See page 4

³⁰ See page 126

³¹ See page 127

not intend to suggest that they should have been credible, but rather to suggest, if they were not credible in 1988, then the same group of people equally shouldn't have been credible in 1991. Yet, in 1991, they are credible reporters, and as shown in the analysis, their statements were not doubted.

The second reason is that the *GM* reporter, Paul Koring, did go to Halabja, the site of the Iraqi gas attack and did have a chance not only to see dead bodies but also eyewitnesses. But, as we saw, Mr. Koring described the events almost entirely according to the statements of the Iranian revolutionary guards. And, as I suggested earlier, they were the last resource to be believed in the West at the time, given the negative image that was portrayed of Iran at the time. The *NYT* reporters also had a chance to visit Kurdish refugees in Turkish camps (*NYT*, Sept. 12, 1988, p. A1), and even visit Iraqi Kurdistan (*NYT*, Sept. 18, 1988, pp. A1, A14). In the latter report, the journalist Haberman, reporting on the leveled Kurdish villages, writes "The razing of these villages has eliminated hundreds of possible havens and recruiting grounds for guerrilla bands..." implying that Iraqis "final offense" was not against the civilians but the "*guerilla bands*."

There is also at least a reason that could make one doubt whether the papers were interested in having evidence of Iraq's use of chemical weapons at all. Dr. Amir Hassanpour, a Kurdish specialist and an assistant professor at the Windsor University's Department of Communication in 1988, recalls that in the April of that year, he visited the three major newspapers in Toronto, the *Sun*, the *Star*, and the *GM*³². He had some articles and pictures testifying to the events in Iraq and a list of destroyed villages by Iraq, prepared by one of the main Kurdish opposition groups, PUK. Dr. Hassanpour, at all the three papers, was told that the person responsible for the Middle East was not

there. Although he left his phone number and address with them, they never contacted him. It is rather intriguing, and at the same time ironic, that Dr. Hassanpour was one of the interviewees in the *GM*, and on CBC and CTV, as a *Kurdish specialist*.

There are additional reasons that could make one suspicious of the objectivity the *GM* and the *NYT*, like the rest of the mass media, claim to be. The analysis carried out in this study showed that they could have even distorted some facts. For example, they claimed that Kurds were 'waging a war' to gain '*independence*.' As I have shown, was not the case. Further, I have shown that there were certain discursive moves that were different in 1988 and 1991, and I suggested that they could have been for specific purposes. For example, in 1988, there seemed to be a clear pattern of tying the Kurds to the Iranian government and military, and portraying the Kurds as "Iranian collaborators" and thus "traitors." If that is so, that siding with the enemy makes one a traitor, then Kurds in 1991 could have equally been called *traitors* because they sided with the West, Iraq's enemy. But, we saw that this was not the case. Not only this, but despite the fact that PUK continued to have his close ties with Iran in 1991, there was no sign of such a pattern in the discourse of the two papers.

5.5 Bias or objectivity?

According to Fowler (1991), "the world of the Press is not the real world," rather a partial one, which is "skewed and judged" (p. 11). However, on what basis the judgment is made is one of the most debated issues in media studies (Carruthers, 2000). As with the criteria for news selection, discussed earlier, there are at least two camps at

³² Amir Hassanpour (personal communication, July 20, 2001)

the two ends of the spectrum about what determines the representations embedded in the media discourse.

On the one hand, it is claimed that the media's discourse is based on the audiences' taste, concerns and interests. For example, in war-time, according to Carruthers (2000), "decisions about how much of war to reveal--where to draw boundaries around the showable and sayable--are often rationalized with reference to public sensibilities, not state sensitivity" (Carruthers, 2000, p. 20). This view, according to Carruthers, claims that this is a "common feature of the media's behavior" not only in wartime but also in peacetime. In this case, one wonders what could account for the different representation of the Iraqi Kurds in 1988 and 1991. Is it possible to suggest that the public in U.S. and Canada were interested in differential representations of the Kurds in the two time periods in question? Answering this question, even it were possible through extensive surveys and interviews of audiences, is beyond the scope of this thesis.

However, the other camp provides some very different explanations on the media behavior. Fairclough (1995b) asserts that "an account of communication in the mass media must consider the economics and politics of the mass media: the nature of the market which the mass media are operating within, and their relationship to the state, and so forth" (p. 36). Of interest here, is the relationship between the media and the state, and more specifically, the foreign policies of the states towards Iraq.

According to Hackett (1991), the mainstream media are "agents of hegemony" (p. 56)³³. He argues that in countries such as the U.S. and Canada, where the system of governing is based on parliamentary tradition in which people can speak out, the ruling class needs to achieve the public's consent through persuasion, not coercion, in order to

maintain its domination. For example, the governments in these countries need to have the consent of the public of their foreign policies in order to be implemented. The mass media is one of the essential instruments in manufacturing this consent (Chomsky, 1989; Fowler, 1991; Hackett, 1991; van Dijk, 1998a).

As discussed earlier, it was not in the interests of the West to speak of Iraq's wrong doings in 1988. Accordingly, it could be suggested that the discourse of the *GM* and the *NYT*'s representations of Iraqi Kurds worked towards manufacturing consent to support normal relations with the Iraqi government, in the same period of time. That is, since our foreign policies approved of Iraq in 1988, it could not spontaneously favor the Kurds.

It seems that in 1988, the *GM* and the *NYT* followed the same path that Hackett (1991) identifies for the mainstream media production in general and in which "human rights abuses committed by pro-American regimes are ignored, minimized, or excused, dismissed as isolated excesses or as the actions of extremists beyond the control of the government" (p. 34). Thus, it could be suggested that to minimize "human rights abuses" committed by Iraq, the use of chemical weapons by Iraq was ignored in 1988, because Iraq was "the enemy of my enemy," namely Iran, therefore, a friend, a "pro-American".

In a Canadian parliamentary debate, in March 22, 1988, Mr. Alex Kindy, MP for Calgary East, asked Joe Clark, the Canadian minister for the External Affairs, if Canada was going to send medical aid to help the victims of the Iraqi chemical bombs in Halabja, requested by "Charge d'affaires of Iran." Mr. Clark responded, "that is a complex problem that requires co-operation between federal and provincial government" (Kindy,

³³ For a brief account of hegemony see chapter 2, section 2.3.3.3.2

1988). There appeared to be no report of such help forthcoming. The U.S. did not provide any direct help to the Kurdish refugees in 1988 either.

However, in 1991, both countries helped the Kurdish refugees. The Allies' protection of the Kurds continues to be in effect even today, as a result of which the Iraqi Kurds have enjoyed their own regional administration, semi-independent from Baghdad, since 1992. The findings in this study suggest that, in 1991, the media favored the Iraqi Kurds not only compared to the representation of Iraq, but also to their own in 1988. Chomsky (1989) observes that, "atrocities against the Kurds, and their search for self-determination, are proper themes--...when they are useful for other ends" (p. 287).

Punishing Iraq, and thus supporting Kurds in 1988, did not seem to be good for any ends, because the Western governments needed Iraq as the necessary other, and also the Western corporations saw Iraq as a lucrative market (Chomsky, 1991; Randal, 1997). It seems that the different representations of the papers of Kurds in the two time periods in question go along those lines. The papers diminished Kurds' claims about Iraq's genocidal campaign, wrongly labeled them as 'separatists' who wanted to destroy Iraq, and they became Iranian 'traitors.' In 1991, however, when the Iraqi president became "the new Hitler," the Kurds became '*proper themes*' for the media, and perhaps for other ends.

These other ends in 1991, could be several things: 1) presenting the Kurds as victims of "worse than Hitler" and thus creating a great sympathy towards the two million Kurdish refugees; 2) this could have created further hatred towards Saddam Hussein among the Canadian and the American public; 3) as a result, guaranteeing the public

consent to the Allies' continuing animosities against Iraq and intervening in Northern Iraq in the name of securing a Kurdish enclave in the northeast part of Iraq.

As van Dijk (1993) observes, media discourses are "ideological icebergs." This study has only touched the tip of two icebergs, the *GM* and the *NYT*. Thus the conclusions here, as suggested at the outset, are at best tentative and not generalisable. Having said that, and given the findings in this study, and the political and historical context within which the data under analysis was produced and consumed, it could be suggested that the different representations of the Kurds by the two papers could be called bias.

6 Conclusion

With soft words you can coax a snake out of its hole
(A Kurdish proverb)

I started out this study by outlining its aim, which was to examine the function of language as a social practice in itself and as constituting other social practices, such as media discourse. As an example of this wider goal, I stated that my focus in this study was to examine the representations of the Kurds from Iraq, by the *Globe and Mail (GM)* and the *New York Times (NYT)*, in two time periods: 1988 and 1991.

To illustrate the significance of those two years, I provided a brief background of the events covered in the data. It was stated that in 1988, Iraq committed the "crimes against humanity and genocide" (HRW/ME, 1995, p. 20; Black, 1993, p. 12; Randal, 1997, p. 80), at the time when "U.S. was in cozy terms with Iraq" (Saeedpour, 1993, p. 21). The Kurds' claims of being subjected to genocide and chemical bombardments against civilians, however, were perceived to be without evidence and thus unproved, and Iraq continued to be perceived as the protector of the friendly kingdoms in the Gulf from the threat of the "fundamentalist Iran" (Karim, 2000, pp. 124-127)

In 1991, however, when Iraq threatened the Western interests in the region by invading Kuwait, it became the enemy of the West. As a consequence, the Kurds, being the enemy of Iraq, became well-known victims of the "worse than Hitler," president Saddam Hussein, and they were believed this time when they said that they had been the subject of genocide by the Iraqi government, and they were also helped by the Allies.

Knowing these facts, and based on the assumption that mass media conforms to the foreign policies of the states (Chomsky, 1989; Hackett, 1991; Karim, 2000), I hypothesized that the representation of the Iraqi Kurds, by the *GM* and the *NYT*, could be different in the two time periods in question: 1988 and 1991.

I asked six questions in this study: 1) Is there a difference between the representation of the Kurds and the representation of Iraq in the *GM* and the *NYT*, in 1988 and 1991? 2) How are those differences manifested in the discourse of the newspapers? 3) How do the *GM* and the *NYT* compare? 4) Why were there such differences, for technical reasons (e.g. access of the media to the events), editorial practices (e.g. newsworthiness), or for ideological reasons? 5) If so, what do they reveal about the place of media in our society, particularly in informing the public regarding international issues and other nations, and its relationship with the state and its foreign policy? 6) And finally, do these differences, if they exist, constitute bias in the media?

In order to begin to answer these questions, in chapter two, I first argued that a systematic linguistic and discursive analysis of the media discourse was absent in media studies for a long time. I illustrated, that practitioners of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), within the past two decades, have proven that this research direction is capable of offering the theoretical foundation and analytical tools that could provide a better understanding of media discourse as "ideological icebergs." I illustrated that using a CDA framework could provide researchers not only with necessary perspectives on the political and social context of the media but also with analytical tools for a systematic analysis of media discourse.

Then, based on the outline I made of CDA's main approaches (van Dijk, Wodak, and Fairclough), I adopted a framework for this study. This framework called for not only a textual (lexical-grammatical) but also an intertextual analysis. The framework also called for taking into account various other dimensions of media: access to the media, economy of the media, the politics of the media, and practices of media text production and consumption. To illustrate how such a framework has helped other researchers, I presented a review of some studies focusing on analyzing media discourse. Since this study has been concerned with the issue of bias embedded in the discourses of the media, the reviewed studies were clustered into parts: (1) representations of minority groups and immigrants; (2) representations of international actors and events. The studies illustrated the crucial role of media discourse in creating and reinforcing stereotypes and negative attitudes towards minorities and immigrants in Western countries. The studies also revealed the mutual influence between media discourse and state policy makers. Although these studies arrived at similar findings, their analytical tools were not always similar.

Out of these analytical tools, I adopted those that I believed would enable me to analyze my data sufficiently and effectively. They were, the transitivity system, for analyzing 35 headlines, and other analytical tools to analyze the sampled seventeen full-text stories: *naming choices*, *lexical choices*, *overcompleteness*, and *voice*. In discussing the two papers in question, it was stated that both the *GM* and the *NYT* were important sources of information and also world knowledge for their extensive foreign news coverage compared to their counterparts in each country. In addition, I showed that each paper was owned by different and wealthy financial institutions.

The analysis, in chapter 4, was carried out at two levels: first, analyzing the data from the *GM*, and second, the data from the *NYT*. Within each level, the representations of both the Iraqi government and the Kurds in each year, 1988 and 1991, were examined. The findings appeared to suggest that both newspapers demonstrated a differential representation of the Kurds in 1988, when Iraq was not an enemy of the West. This tentative conclusion was based on the following findings about the discursive structures of the two papers in representing the Kurds:

First, analysis of the transitivity system revealed that the Kurds' world of experience, in 1988, was represented as one of passivity or irresponsibility. That is, the Kurds were either agents of nontransactive actions or nominalized processes. In addition to being portrayed as passive beings, they were also described as patients (done to) without agents (doers). Furthermore, examining the verbal processes, and also the issue of 'voice' in the full-text articles, revealed that the Kurds' reports about being the victims of genocide were either diminished as unfound '*accusations*' and '*charges*' without '*evidence*,' or they were denied by the present Iraqi officials' evaluative voices. Thus, I suggested that the Kurds, in 1988, appeared to have been portrayed as victims whose trouble was self-inflicted. That is, no one else was responsible for what happened to them, but themselves.

Second, and along the same lines, in 1988, the Kurds were portrayed as '*separatists*' who were making trouble for seeking '*independence*' and thus destroy the sovereign state of Iraq, its government being a "necessary other" for the West at the time (Karim, 2000). The discursive moves of the papers through *naming choices*, *lexical choices*, and *overcompleteness*, portrayed the Kurds as '*Iranian collaborators*.' I noted

that the Iranian government at the time, was considered by the West to be a threat to the Western powers' interests in the Middle East. In addition, in the discourse of the two papers, the targets of Iraqi chemical weapons were mostly identified as '*rebels*' and '*guerillas*' rather than *civilians* or *refugees*. Consequently, it seemed that such a representation worked towards portraying the Kurds as troublemakers and "*traitors*," who deserved the Iraqi government's punishment, and perhaps not the Western public's sympathy or the intervention of the international community to stop the genocidal campaign that was carried out against them by the Iraqi government.

Recapturing the historical and political contexts of the two years in question, in chapter 5, suggested that the only factor that could count for such difference in representation was the difference in the relationships of the Western countries with Iraq in the two time periods.

In 1988, Iraq was a lucrative market for Western companies (Randal, 1997). In addition, the Iraqi government was perceived as "the necessary other" for protecting the Persian Gulf kingdoms from the "threat" of the Iranian government. Thus, although the Western powers were aware of Iraq's treatment of its Kurdish minority, and thus criticized Iraq periodically, it was not in their interest to intervene in the *internal* matters of Iraq.

In 1991, however, and after invading oil-rich Kuwait, Iraq became the '*tyrannical*' state ruled by a '*menace*' '*worse than Hitler*,' as the discourse of the two papers suggested. Within this context, the enemies of the Iraqi government, the Kurds, became *the enemy of my enemy* and thus friends. The Allies helped about two million Kurdish refugees to go back to Iraqi Kurdistan. They established a no fly zone in northern Iraq, as a result of

which Kurds could hold free elections, establish regional administrations independent from Baghdad, and enjoy the Allies' financial support.

The findings in this study seem to correspond to these relationships. That is, the representation of the Kurds, by both papers, seemed to change according to the relationships between the West and Iraq. For example, in 1988, Iraq was a friend of the West. In the same year, the papers favored Iraq over the Kurds. Similarly, in 1991, the Iraqi government became the enemy of the West. In the same year, the papers favored the Kurds over Iraq. Because of this correlation, this study has come to the tentative conclusion that since the representation of the Iraqi Kurds, in the two papers, seemed to be based on the U.S. foreign policies, it could constitute yet another example of the mainstream media's discourse of bias.

Nonetheless, I remind the reader that the conclusions reached here are tentative. They do not apply to the discourse of all the mainstream media. They may not be generalized even in terms of the two papers because the analysis was based on sampled data and not the entire news coverage of the Kurds in each year.

However, this study has illustrated that CDA as a research direction can provide the necessary theoretical basis and analytical tools for analyzing and understanding the intricateness of discourse and discursive practices. It has also illustrated that examining the discourse of the mainstream media, as a source of information and knowledge about world affairs, could reveal how events and issues come to be news, and how the media mediates them. Since our knowledge about the world is to a large extent informed by the media, particularly in terms of

foreign news, understanding how the events are mediated by the media may put us in a better position in becoming more critical audiences.

Although CDA has been productive in many areas of inquiry including the mass media, the researchers within that direction have not attended to the coverage of foreign news as much as they should have. In the age of satellites and the Internet where we would like to think that the world is becoming smaller and smaller, it becomes more important to know other nations, recent or new members of "the global village." Since most of us know about international affairs and other nations, at least in part, through the media, it is hoped that understanding media discourse might help us to understand how well we know the rest of the world. I believe, it is more important to know how our media mediates the identities and issues of those nations who have not been or may not be able, for years to come, to join that global village.

It is hoped that further CDA analysis of the media's foreign news discourse could not only provide a better understanding of discourse and its profound place in our social, economic, and political life, but also a better understanding of the relationships we have with the rest of the world. In other words, it is hoped that a better understanding of our societies' discursive practices, including that of the media, will help us to realize how we perceive our world, and what we think of members of our community, "the global village." After all, we are what we think and what we read, and possibly what we say.

Appendices

Appendix 1 Headlines from *The Globe and Mail*

Note: Headlines marked with an asterisk have been sampled for full-text analysis as well.

1988

GM 1* Poison-gas attack leaves city of dead: at least 4000 killed in Halabja
(March 24, pp. A1, A14)

GM2 Gulf cease-fire allows Iraq to fight Kurdish insurgency
(August 30, pp. A1, A14)

GM3 Turkey pledges to assist Kurds fleeing Iraq
(Sep. 02, p. A12)

GM4* Kurds accuse Iraqis of massacre
(Sep. 03, p. A5)

GM5 Kurds claim revenge for killing of civilians
(Sep. 06, p. A13)

GM6* Kurds offered full amnesty by Baghdad
(Sep. 07, p. A8)

1991

GM7* Iraqi massacre reported by Kurdish rebels: gunships strafed civilians after
roundup by Hussein's troops, Iranian news agency says
(March 15, p. A11)

GM8 Canada offers plan for Kurdish plight: Clark proposes UN supervisory
team as alternative to EC call for enclave
(April, 10, p. A10)

GM9 Kurds plod into the unknown: Iraqi refugees fleeing to Iran are dying daily
on a desperate trek through a hostile mountain pass without shelter from
the wind and the rain
(April 15, p. A9)

GM10 Nervous refugees reluctant to return: Iraqi secret police officers have little
to do in nearly deserted town, aside from watching US fighters fly
overhead
(April 24, p. A12)

- GM11*** **Allies order Iraqis to leave refugee areas: Hussein's forces intimidating Kurds, White House says**
(April 26, pp. A1, A2)
- GM12*** **Kurds, Iraq reach deal: Agreement would allow free elections for Kurdish parliament, rebel leader says**
(June 24, p. A10)
- GM13*** **Hussein putting squeeze on Kurds: Relief workers report 'time running out' in northern Iraq**
(Nov. 04, p. A14)

Appendix 2 Headlines from *The New York Times*

Note: Headlines marked with an asterisk have been sampled for full-text analysis as well.

1988

- NYT1*** Iraq Says It Routed Iranians And Kurds In Fight In Northeast
(April 03, p. A14)
- NYT2*** Kurdish Chief Gains Support In U.S. Visit
(June 22, p. A3)
- NYT3** Iraqis Reported To Mount Drive Against Kurds: Gas Is Used In Assault, Protest To U.N. Says
(Sept 01, pp. A1-A14)
- NYT4** Shultz To See Iraqi On Reported Gassing Of Kurds
(Sep. 8, p. A16)
- NYT5*** Kurds' Symptoms: Gas Or Poor Diet? Refugees Cite Iraqi Attacks, But Doctors Are Skeptical
(Sep. 12, pp. A1, A5)
- NYT6*** U.S. And Allies Ask U.N. To Send Team To Kurdish Areas: A chemical-war inquiry; Specific evidence of Iraqi use of gas would be sought--Access is uncertain
(Sep. 13, pp. A1, A6)
- NYT7** Anti-U.S. Protest In Baghdad
(Sept. 13, p. A6)
- NYT8** Iraq's Right To Chemical Arms Upheld By Official
(Sept. 16, p. A11)
- NYT9*** Kurds Can't Go Home Again, Because The Homes Are Gone
(Sept. 18, pp. A1, A14)
- NYT10** Demands For U.N. Investigation
(Sept. 16, p. A11)
- NYT11*** Iraq Used Gas Against Kurds Senate Staff Report Charges
(Sept. 22, p. 21)

- NYT12** House Approves Sanctions Against Iraq
(Sept. 28, p. A8)
- NYT13** Poison Gas Traces Are Found In Iraq: Report By British Television Gives
Support To Charges Of Attack On The Kurds
(Dec. 04, p. A25)

1991

- NYT14*** Kurds Alone Viewed as Unlikely to Oust Hussein
(March 20, p. A12)
- NYT15*** U.S. Urges Turkey To Open Borders To Fleeing Kurds:
Ankara Bars Mass Entry: Bush Condemns "Brutality" By Hussein
Against Rebels-No Iraqi Reply To U.N.
U.S. Urges Turkey To Open Borders To Kurdish Refugees
(April 05, pp. A1, A9)
- NYT16*** Kurdish Refugees From '88 Exodus Still Languishing In Turkish Camps
(April 13, p. A4)
- NYT17** U.S. Presses Military Relief Effort; Hungry Kurds Await Rescue
(April 14, p. A10)
- NYT18** Efforts To Move Kurds Takes On Growing Urgency
(April 22, p. A8)
- NYT19** Iraq Acts To Halt The Spread Of Allied Zone For The Kurds
(May 10, p. A10)
- NYT20*** Kurds Spurn Rebel Advice; Reject Plan To Return To City
(May 13, p. A8)
- NYT21** Kurds Have Firm Grasp On Iraqi City (July 22, 91: A3)
- NYT22** U.S. Military Takes Over Relief For Kurdish Refugees in Iraq:
Tolls Stir Anxiety: Plan to Feed 700,000 a Day and Establish Temporary
Shelter
(April 13: A1)

Appendix 3 News Release, Department of External Affairs, Canada, March 25, 1988³⁴

News Release

Department of
External
Affairs

Communiqué

Ministère des
Affaires
extérieures

No. 068

March 25, 1988.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS ATTACK ON KURDISH CIVILIANS IN NORTHERN IRAQ

The Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, today condemned the use of chemical weapons against civilians in northern Iraq. Canada has asked the Secretary General of the United Nations to consider the sending of experts to enquire into the circumstances in which this tragedy occurred.

Canada strongly opposes and condemns all use of chemical weapons. All parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning chemical weapons -- including Iraq and Iran -- must abide by their legal obligations.

The Department of External Affairs convoked the Ambassador of Iraq to convey the foregoing and also communicated it to the Government of Iran.

- 30 -

ICE ONLY Secretary of State
TAKEN for
RARY External Affairs

Secrétaire d'État
aux
Affaires extérieures

³⁴ Canada. Department of External Affairs. Secretary of State for External Affairs. (1988, 25 March). News Release, No. 068

Appendix 4 Naming choices for Iraq, *The Globe and Mail*

Categories	1988	1991
Officials	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ "An official source" ○ Iraqi news agency (x3) ○ Baghdad's official news agency ○ Government ○ Ruling Revolutionary Council ○ Iraq (x7) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Government- controlled newspaper Babylon ○ Government, the ○ Iraqi Government (x11) ○ Iraqis (x7)³⁵ ○ Iraqi diplomat in UN ○ Baghdad ○ Hussein, Mr. (x 3) ○ Hussein ○ Iraqi president Saddam Hussein
Armed formations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Iraqi Army/Troops (x5) ○ Soldiers (x3) ○ Iraqi forces ○ Iraqi military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Government troops ○ Iraqi troops/army troops (x3) ○ Baghdad's army ○ Iraqi fire ○ Iraqi forces ○ Iraqi officers ○ Iraqi policemen ○ Armed Iraqis ○ Iraqi security forces ○ Iraqis (x7) ○ Iraq's military ○ Hussein's troops/ Hussein's forces (x2) ○ Saddam's troops (x2)

Note: Names in bold are considered to be unusual and the points of difference in naming choices in the two years

³⁵ "Iraqis" could refer to both Iraqi officials and the army

Appendix 5 Naming choices for Kurds, *The Globe and Mail*

Categories	1988	1991
Armed formations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Separatists ○ "Traitors" (x2) ○ Rebels (x7) ○ A spokesman for Kurdish Democratic Party (x2) ○ [Insurgents] ○ Kurds (x7) ○ Iraqi Kurds (x4) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Resistance fighters ○ Guerrilla forces ○ Rebels (x5) ○ Kurdish forces ○ Kurdish opposition groups ○ Kurdish political parties ○ Kurds (x12) ○ Iraqi Kurds
Civilians	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Civilians (x6) ○ Individuals, named (x2) ○ People (x2) ○ Refugees (x4) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Civilians (x 3) ○ Individuals, named (x2) ○ People (x4) ○ Refugees (x14) ○ Families ○ Children (x2) ○ Kurdish men (x2) ○ Mothers (x3) ○ Old lady ○ Old man ○ Desperate man

Appendix 6 Naming choices for Iraq, *The New York Times*

Categories	1988	1991
Officials	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Baghdad (x5) ○ Baghdad radio ○ Centrally appointed Governor ○ Government in Baghdad ○ Iraqi/government (x4) ○ Iraqi regime (x3) ○ Iraq's Ambassador to the U.S., Abdul-Amir Al-Anbari ○ Iraq's Defense Minister ○ Iraq's foreign acting foreign minister, Hamdun ○ Iraq's foreign minister, Tariq Aziz ○ Iraq (x43) ○ Iraqi government of President Saddam Hussein (x2) ○ Officials/authorities/Iraqi _ (x4) ○ President Hussein (x2) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Baghdad (x3) ○ Baath Party/_government (x2) ○ Baghdad Government (x2) ○ Iraqi government (x2) ○ Regime ○ "Regime of the SaddamHussein gang" ○ Iraq (x11) ○ "Saddam Hussein" ○ Hussein ○ Hussein government (x2) ○ Hussein, Mr. (x6) ○ Hussein, Saddam ○ Iraqi Administration ○ Iraqi leader ○ Iraqis ○ "New Hitler" ○ President Saddam Hussein (x4) ○ "Saddam" (x2) ○ Saddam's government ○ "Tyrannical regime"
Armed formations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Iraqi army (x2) ○ Government soldiers ○ Iraqi/government forces (x5) ○ Iraqi/government troops (x2) ○ Military men 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Iraqi army (x2) ○ Iraqi troops (x2) ○ Iraqi general ○ Iraqi soldiers ○ Iraqi commanders

Note: Names in bold are considered to be unusual and the points of difference in naming choice in the two years

Appendix 7 Naming choices for Kurds, *The New York Times*

Categories	1988	1991
Armed formation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [Insurgents] ○ Dissident elements ○ Dissident Kurds ○ Guerillas (x7) ○ Iraqi Kurds ○ Jalal Talabani/Mr. Talabani/_ Iraqi Kurdish leader (x16) ○ Kurdish chief [Talabani] ○ Kurds³⁶ (x16) ○ Kurdish Democratic Party ○ Kurdish leaders (x2) ○ Kurdish separatist groups ○ Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (x2) ○ Rebels (x5) ○ "Saboteurs" ○ "Those who walk before death" ○ "Traitors and terrorist" ○ Kurds (x16) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Guerilla commander ○ Guerillas (x3) ○ Iraqi opposition (x2) ○ Kurdish guerilla organizations ○ Jalal Talabani/Mr. Talabani (x2) ○ Kurdish commanders ○ Kurdish leaders ○ Kurds (x30) ○ Mr. Barzani [Kurdish leader] ○ Non-Arab ○ Peshmargas³⁷ ○ Rebel group ○ Rebels (x4) ○ Kurds (x30)
Civilians	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Civilians (x2) ○ Kurdish families ○ Kurdish population ○ Kurdish villagers ○ Kurds (x16) ○ Refugees (x2) ○ People (x2) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Babies ○ Infant ○ Iraqi Kurds ○ Kurdish tribal leaders³⁸/clan and family chief tains (x2) ○ Kurds (x30) ○ Refugees (25) ○ Women

³⁶ The term *Kurds* is a generic term by which the paper could refer to all Kurds, both rebels and civilians. As a result I have included it in both rows (armed formations and civilians) in the table.

³⁷ See the note above on Peshmarga. However, notice that in contrast to 1988, this time the actual word, Peshmarga, is used by the *NYT*, and also it is not closed in quotation marks, whereas the translated version of it in 1988 was.

³⁸ This is not referring to Kurdish political or rebel leaders but to leaders of Kurdish tribes around the city of Dahok who didn't listen to Kurdish rebel leaders who advised them to leave the mountains and return to the cities after Allies' troops moved to the region to establish safe havens for refugees.

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