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**EXIT, VOICE AND SUB-PARTY POLITICS: IDEOLOGY,
STRATEGY AND FACTIONALISM IN THE SCOTTISH NATIONAL PARTY**

by

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B.A. (Econ), M.Sc.

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
in Political Science

CARLETON UNIVERSITY, OTTAWA

March, 1989

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IDEOLOGY, STRATEGY AND FACTIONALISM
IN THE SCOTTISH NATIONAL PARTY"

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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ABSTRACT

Factions, or organized sub-party groups which espouse particular ideological and strategic perspectives or support rival candidates for leadership positions, are a common occurrence among political parties in western democracies, and party organizations have responded in various ways to the development of intra-party conflict. Yet the study of party-based factions remains theoretically underdeveloped with respect to both the emergence and, especially, the alternative outcomes of sub-party competition. In this thesis, the case of the rise of two organized factions, the "SNP 79 Group" and the "Campaign for Nationalism in Scotland", within the Scottish National Party in the early 1980s and their subsequent proscription by the party is used to elaborate a new approach to the analysis of sub-party factionalism.

As a theoretical point of departure, the author develops a conceptual and explanatory framework derived from Albert O. Hirschman's "Exit/Voice" model of organizational behaviour, in which sub-party factions are defined as "organized expressions of collective Voice" by party activists dissatisfied with a perceived decline in the organizational performance of the party. This revised Exit/Voice approach serves as a broadly integrative model which permits analysis, within the same conceptual framework, of both the emergence and outcome of sub-party factional competition and into which idiosyncratic or culturally specific variables may be incorporated to facilitate the comparative study of sub-party factions in diverse socio-political contexts.

Drawing upon original survey data and interviews with key protagonists, as well as a variety of secondary sources, the author examines the sources of discontent among SNP faction members and explains why they resorted to "organized collective Voice" (sub-party activity) rather than Exit (leaving the SNP) or individual expressions of Voice in order to alleviate their dissatisfaction with the performance of the party. The study finds that both the emergence of sub-party factions within the SNP and the party's response to them were consistent with the logic of the revised Exit/Voice model. In the absence of viable Exit options, the SNP 79 Group and the Campaign for Nationalism took advantage of opportunities for collective mobilization of Voice within the party to express their respective members' dissatisfaction with the performance of the SNP and, in particular, with changes in the ideological and strategic orientation of the party. In turn, the party organization subsequently resorted to the suppression of organized Voice and the selective expulsion of faction members when factional activity threatened to reduce the SNP's electoral credibility and its capacity to attain goals for a majority of its members.

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Iain More, then Research Officer and Headquarters Director of the Scottish National Party not only persuaded the party's National Executive to co-operate with my survey and arranged for me to have access to party records but also, with his wife Pamela Siler, provided accommodation and hospitality during my research trips to Edinburgh.

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Chapter One
SUB-PARTY POLITICS:
AN INTRODUCTION

Students of party politics have long recognised that political parties are rarely as cohesive and internally unified as their leaders would have us believe. Parties are, by their very nature, "political" organizations and debates over policies, goals, strategies and the allocation of party resources are a normal feature of intra-party life. But under what circumstances do these debates take the form of conflict or competition between organized factions, each seeking to impose its own vision on the party as a whole? And how do party leaders, and parties as collective organizations, respond to the emergence of factionalism?

The dictates of representative and responsible government and of electoral campaigning in western parliamentary democracies require that, on important occasions at least, political parties, and especially parliamentary parties, behave in a disciplined and cohesive manner, supporting the policies and positions of their leaders. But policies are frequently the products of protracted intra-party debate between party sub-units espousing differing ideological and strategic perspectives, and party leaders often emerge from

a process of bargaining and log-rolling among groups supporting rival candidates for elite positions. These competing groups are often temporary and relatively unorganized, coalescing on an *ad hoc* basis around particular issues or candidates during party conferences or leadership conventions. Other sub-units within political parties, however, may be highly structured and relatively durable, maintaining their struggle for control of the party organization for a number of years.

Political parties, as collective organizations, may respond in a variety of ways to the appearance of organized sub-party conflict groups in their midst. Some parties have bestowed formal recognition on these groups by institutionalizing channels for the expression of leadership aspirations or for the representation of their dissenting views. Others, however, have sought to repress internal dissent, even to the point of expelling members who continue to organize opposition to the policies, tactics, or positions of the party leaders.

This study was inspired by the decision of a relatively small party then on the periphery of British electoral politics to adopt the repressive response to intra-party conflict. In September 1982, the Scottish National Party expelled seven members who had been officers of an organized dissenting minority which, for three years, had attempted to gain control of the party organization in order to change its

ideological and strategic orientation. This decision and the events leading up to it were naturally of interest to anyone who, like the author, has been a long-time observer of the Scottish National Party; but they also raised a number of broader questions about the emergence of intra-party conflict and, in particular, about the responses of political parties in liberal democracies to the development of organized internal opposition.

"OPEN WAR BREAKS OUT IN SNP"

In June 1982 at Ayr, Scotland, on the first day of the annual National Conference of the Scottish National Party, a lunchtime fringe meeting was held to announce the formal launch of the "Campaign for Nationalism in Scotland", a hard-line independentist group determined to bring the SNP back to the single-minded pursuit of independence and to rescue the cause of Scottish nationalism from the growing influence within the party of a left-wing faction known as the "SNP 79 Group". The meeting degenerated into an acrimonious slanging match between supporters of the rival groups which subsequently spilled over onto the floor of the Conference itself. Perceiving a danger of open warfare within his party, SNP Chairman, Gordon Wilson MP, introduced an emergency resolution to proscribe all formally organized groups within the SNP. Faction members were to be given three months to wind up their respective organizations or face expulsion from

the party. After bitter debate behind locked doors, the Conference supported the Chairman's resolution by 308 votes to 188. Having achieved one of their primary objectives - perhaps, even, the only one - the leaders of the Campaign for Nationalism announced the immediate dissolution of their organization. Three months later, however, it was decided that the rival '79 Group had failed to comply with the proscription order to the satisfaction of the party hierarchy. Seven of its leaders were expelled from the party and an eighth, former Nationalist MP Margo MacDonald, had already resigned her party membership, making much publicized allegations that the SNP was conducting a 'witch-hunt against left-wingers'.

These events marked the climax of a highly conflictual period in the life of the Scottish National Party which followed an abrupt change in the party's fortunes three years earlier. Only a decade before, in the early 1970s, the SNP had emerged from near obscurity to gain over 30 per cent of the Scottish vote in the general election of October 1974, returning eleven MPs to Westminster. The success of the Nationalists, and the balance of party forces in the House of Commons, persuaded the Labour government to implement an election pledge to devolve legislative power to an elected Scottish Assembly. But, in March 1979, the government's proposals failed to receive sufficient popular support in a referendum on devolution and, two months later, in the general

election that brought Mrs. Thatcher's Conservatives to power, the SNP vote declined drastically and all but two of the Nationalist MPs lost their seats.

Out of the post-mortems that followed these defeats, the SNP '79 Group emerged as an organized left-wing faction within the party which aimed to shift the ideological and strategic orientation of the SNP and to transform it into a socialist, yet distinctly Scottish, alternative to the British Labour Party. For a while the Group was successful. Its members were elected to a number of key positions in the party hierarchy, the SNP adopted a series of new policy documents with a pronounced "progressive" slant, and the party involved itself in a number of non-electoral activities designed to win support from "the left" and working class voters. At the same time, the rise of the '79 Group, and the challenge it posed to a number of entrenched interests within the party organization, provoked opposition from those nationalists who did not share its vision of the future orientation of the SNP. By the end of 1981, there had already been two unsuccessful attempts to outlaw the '79 Group and the party leadership moved to contain the escalating conflict by imposing certain limits on federal activity.

The struggle within the SNP came to a head when some of the more implacable opponents of the '79 Group decided to establish their own formal organization. Arguing that the activities of the Group had distracted the SNP from its true

cause of independence and alienated Nationalist voters, leaders of the new Campaign for Nationalism in Scotland were prepared to mobilize for an extended battle for control of the party - but their more immediate objective was clearly to provoke a confrontation at the upcoming Ayr National Conference. In this respect, the Campaign succeeded beyond the wildest hopes of its founders as the party voted to outlaw the '79 Group along with any other formally organized factions.

Perhaps none of this should be surprising, given the often stormy history of nationalist organizations in Scotland. From the founding of the SNP's predecessor, the National Party of Scotland in 1928, the history of the nationalist movement has been replete with outbreaks of internal conflict, factionalism, schisms, proscriptions and expulsions. Yet, prior to the events of 1979-82, it appeared that these internal problems had largely been resolved. Consequently, most observers were prepared to characterize them as unfortunate but necessary growing pains in the emergence of the seemingly mature, unified and modern political party which, by the late 1960s and early '70s, was ready to take advantage of a growing disillusionment among Scots voters with the major British parties.¹

For one observing the internal politics of the Scottish National Party in the years after 1979, however, it appeared that the party was regressing through a second childhood.

What had seemed in the mid-1970s to be a mature, cohesive and self-confident political party on the rise suddenly reverted to the faction-ridden and internally sectarian behaviour of its formative years. The obvious question is 'why?'. Why, after years of consolidation and maturation, having at last achieved a measure of electoral success, did the Scottish National Party lapse into factionalism? And why did a modern and apparently internally democratic party organization resort to the instruments of proscription and expulsion in an attempt to restore order? These are the major empirical questions that we seek to address in this thesis.

THE STUDY OF INTRA-PARTY CONFLICT

The SNP is by no means the only party in recent history to experience intra-party conflict or to resort to proscription and expulsion of dissenting members in an attempt to restore internal unity. Almost exactly ten years earlier, for example, the Canadian New Democratic Party ordered members of the nationalist "Waffle" group to wind up their organization or face expulsion from the party and, more recently, the British Labour Party took steps to purge itself of the left-wing "Militant Tendency". Hence, while the empirical focus of our study is to elucidate the emergence of the '79 Group and the SNP's response to the Group's activities, our approach is less an historical one than one derived from the methodology of comparative politics. Therefore, in addition

to reconstructing an accurate portrayal of events in the SNP between 1979 and 1983, our purpose here is to utilize the case of the Scottish National Party to develop and illustrate the application of a conceptual and explanatory framework which may be applied to the study of intra-party conflict and its resolution in a variety of partisan political contexts.

As an initial point of departure for the development of such a framework, the most useful concept having wide currency in political science is a term which has been used occasionally in the preceding discussion - the concept of faction. The term 'faction', however, is a troublesome one inasmuch as it has been applied to a multiplicity of political phenomena in a variety of historical and socio-cultural settings. Moreover, as a result of its historical usage in particular, the term has become imbued with negative connotations in everyday language and political rhetoric which further complicate the task of arriving at a precise definition.

In general usage, the word 'faction' and its dynamic corollary 'factionalism' have both been associated with subversive and conspiratorial behaviour, in the sense of a cabal plotting from within to overthrow a government or otherwise accepted political leadership, or with excessive and dysfunctional levels of conflict which threaten to undermine the cohesion of a political community or group and detract from the achievement of collective goals.' The

negative connotations of these terms are hardly new; over fifty years ago, for example, Harold Lasswell noted that "...faction has been employed as an opprobrious epithet in the political field since Roman days."³ However, these associations are constantly reinforced - a notable example being the widespread media usage of 'faction' in recent years as a convenient synonym for the armed ethno-religious sub-cultures embroiled in the Lebanese or Afghan civil wars. While the use of faction in such a context is quite consistent with standard dictionary definitions of the word (for example, The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines 'faction' as "a self-interested, turbulent, or unscrupulous party") it does pose problems for social scientists who tend to prefer more neutral, less-value laden words with which to label their central theoretical constructs.

Nonetheless, we may identify three conceptualizations of faction in the social science literature (all discussed in more detail in Chapter Two) which differ with respect to the historical and socio-cultural contexts in which they are applied and to the kinds of political association they describe.

First, the pejorative connotations of faction may be traced, if not back to Lasswell's "Roman days", at least to the historical usage of the term by eighteenth century political thinkers who equated factions with the nascent partisan groupings developing within the emerging

representative assemblies of that period. In this sense, therefore, 'faction' was used more or less interchangeably with 'party' and, although some writers such as Edmund Burke sought to distinguish the two in normative or analytical terms, many other historical figures such as James Madison or Lord Bolingbroke were equally critical of both. For some contemporary political scientists, faction is largely associated with this particular stage in the historical development of western liberal democracies, such that factions as embryo political parties are largely a feature of the past.'

Second, faction has been used by political and social anthropologists to denote patronage-based clientelist organizations mobilized by local notables in the communal politics of traditional or 'premodern' societies. As vertical networks of leaders and followers which often cut across primordial lineage, clan or caste lines, factional organizations are sometimes viewed as symptoms of strain or conflict in the community, thus strengthening the negative or pathological connotations of the term.⁵ Other anthropologists have argued, however, that patron-client factions are often the norm of political association, rather than aberrations, and that they may be found in stable social situations in a variety of cultural contexts.⁶ This latter usage of faction has subsequently been adopted by political

scientists observing the continuity of clientelist politics in contemporary, modernizing societies in Asia and elsewhere.'

But clientelism is not peculiar to the Third World. Thus, a third use of faction is to describe the often complex networks of patrons and clients supporting rival leadership aspirants in western political parties. For example, the Italian Christian Democratic Party contains, at any one time, between eight and twelve 'factions' organized, in most cases, around national leaders who mobilize the support of their respective clienteles in the competition for control of the party and the patronage resources that such control bestows. By extension, this use of "faction" to describe competing patron-client networks within political parties may have been applied more generally to other conflict groups which vie for power and position in intra-party politics,' including for example the various ideological groupings which seek control of social democratic parties, such as the French *Parti Socialiste* and the British Labour Party, or of nationalist parties like the SNP.

Clearly, our central concern is with this third variety of factionalism in the sense of competition between sub-units within modern, western political parties. One of our first tasks in the thesis therefore, is to differentiate factions operating within parties from those in other contexts, and this is the primary function of an extensive discussion of varieties of factionalism in Chapter Two. There, too, we

distinguish what we choose to call "sub-party" factions from other sub-units, such as ideological tendencies or temporary issue-groups, which play roles in the internal lives of parties.

In addition to the various meanings and connotations attached to the concept of faction, any attempt to develop a general model of sub-party factionalism must contend with the relative under-development of comparatively based theoretical perspectives on the study of intra-party conflict. As our review of the literature in Chapter Three demonstrates, the major problem is not that sub-party factions have been ignored by political scientists but rather that individual studies have largely failed to transcend the case-study method of analysis in which descriptions and explanations of intra-party conflict have often relied heavily upon idiosyncratic cultural and political variables.

As a result, little cumulative knowledge has been developed since different studies emphasize different variables. Moreover, even when attempts are made to replicate explanatory frameworks, they often meet with little success since propositions which are confirmed in the socio-cultural setting of one case study are frequently contradicted in the context of another.⁹ However, these seeming contradictions are often more apparent than real and are the consequence of two more fundamental weaknesses in the literature on party factions: first, a tendency to rely on bivariate analysis in

seeking explanations of intra-party conflict; and, second, the lack of an overarching theoretical or conceptual framework for the study of sub-party factionalism.

A further problem is the relative paucity of systematic analysis of the alternative outcomes of intra-party factional conflict. Some parties, such as the Italian Christian Democrats, have, in effect, institutionalized factional competition. In other cases, where the electoral system and other constraints do not militate strongly against such action, the typical outcome of intra-party conflict appears to be schismatic behaviour, with the dissident faction leaving the parent party to establish its own electoral organization. Thus, many of the minor parties in the multi-party systems of Finland, Israel or the Netherlands originated in splits from one or other of the major parties in these systems. The outcome of the factionalism in the SNP, the expulsion of dissidents from the party, may be a somewhat rarer consequence of intra-party conflict, but merits study nonetheless and raises interesting questions about the circumstances under which political parties will resort to such drastic action. However, there is little in the existing literature on intra-party conflict to suggest how we may account for this kind of outcome.

In developing a theoretical and conceptual framework for the analysis of events in the Scottish National Party, therefore, we require a definition of sub-party factions which

differentiates them from other types of factional activity and which also neutralizes many of the negative connotations associated with faction in everyday language and historical usage. In addition, we require a model of political or organizational behaviour which can be employed to explain both the emergence of sub-party factionalism and its outcome or resolution. For these purposes, we propose in Chapter Four of the thesis a framework of analysis derived from the concepts of "Exit" and "Voice" proposed by the American economist Albert O. Hirschman as alternative responses by members of an organization to a perceived decline in its performance.¹⁰ Our aim in developing a conceptual model based on Hirschman's categories of behaviour is to create a broad explanatory framework into which idiosyncratic, culturally specific variables may be incorporated to permit the study of sub-party factions in a variety of socio-political contexts and which will enable us to analyse, within the same frame of reference, both the emergence and the resolution of sub-party factional conflict.

THE EMPIRICAL FOCUS OF THE STUDY

The selection of the Scottish National Party as the empirical focus of the study may be justified from a number of perspectives. First, as we have suggested above, the outcome of intra-party conflict in the SNP was perhaps out of the ordinary, and the unusual tends to stimulate more interest

than the merely commonplace. More importantly, however, the study of factionalism in the SNP will help to counterbalance certain biases apparent in research priorities and the existing literature in three areas adjacent to our focus: first, the bias towards large or governing parties as subjects of empirical studies of factionalism; second, the relative underdevelopment of the study of factions in British politics; and, third, the paucity of empirical studies of the internal politics of the Scottish National Party.

The Bias Toward Large Parties

Empirical studies of intra-party factionalism display a strong tendency to focus on large parties, or at least on parties with governing potential. This bias is perhaps not surprising since the literature on political parties in general is more heavily weighted in favour of large parties rather than their smaller rivals. (Indeed, there may be a wider tendency still to study larger political phenomena, for example, larger countries rather than small ones, broad social movements rather than narrow interest groups, and so on.)

Of course, larger parties are more likely to be governing parties or governments-in-waiting. Therefore, factionalism in these parties often has broader implications, extending beyond 'mere' intra-party politics to affect governmental composition, the direction of public policy and, perhaps, even the stability of governments. For example, a number of

authors have examined the effects on cabinet formation and governmental duration in Italy of the balance of factions within the dominant Christian Democratic Party.¹¹ The major exceptions to this research emphasis on large parties are the studies of small parties whose strategic position in the party system makes them attractive partners in coalition building. Thus, students of Italian politics have also devoted attention to the effects of factionalism on the alliance strategies of the smaller Italian Socialist Party (PSI) which, since the early 1960s, has been courted by both the governing Christian Democrats and the major opposition Communist Party.¹² Since factionalism in smaller parties such as the PSI and the West German Free Democratic Party (FDP) may affect public policy and cabinet formation/stability, it is also a 'legitimate' research topic for those whose inquiries are guided by the criterion of broader political implications.

Finally, it may be the case that larger parties, by their very nature, are more prone to intra-party strife and factionalism than their smaller competitors (an hypothesis which is examined in more detail in Chapter Three, below). Large parties have usually achieved that status by successfully appealing to the support of a broad cross-section of society but not without certain costs; for example, a catch-all appeal often necessitates watering down ideological principles which otherwise serve as a force for internal cohesion and, as support for a party grows, so too does the

variety of interests which must be accommodated by the decision-making mechanisms of the party. Admittedly, electoral success also increases the resources that may be mobilized by party leaders to assuage or pre-empt internal discontent, but more pragmatic, more heterogeneous catch-all parties may still display a stronger tendency towards intra-party conflict than their smaller, more homogeneous and ideologically coherent rivals.

Whatever the reason may be, there is a marked bias in the research agenda on party factionalism to study large parties such as the Italian Christian Democrats and their counterparts in West Germany (the CDU/CSU), the West German Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the French Socialists, the Japanese Liberal Democrats, or the dominant American parties, with some attention paid to smaller parties only where they have governing potential.¹³ However, any attempt to develop a broad theoretical understanding of intra-party conflict must aspire to account for the emergence of sub-party factionalism, and its resolution, in small non-governing parties as well as in (potential) governing parties of whatever size. Our examination of the SNP will add a new dimension to the existing literature on factions.

Factions in British Politics

In one sense at least, it is particularly unusual in the British context to concentrate upon factions rather than parties as the basis for analysis. Many - though by no means all - scholars who have studied

British politics have stressed the stability of the two-party system and the strength of party discipline and unity.¹⁴

The study of factionalism has not traditionally been a central, nor even a major, focus for students of British politics. On the contrary, the conventional wisdom on British parties has stressed the high degree of internal cohesion (whether based on consensus or discipline) within the major parties, particularly in comparison to their American and most continental European counterparts. This prevailing view has, however, been challenged by some authors. In the past, McKenzie, Epstein and Jackson have all made notable contributions to our understanding of the internal dynamics of British parties, but without explicitly elaborating on the concept of factionalism.¹⁵ More recently, Bradley and Berrington, among others, have described divisions within the Labour Party, in the former case linking these conflicts to the emergence of the Social Democratic Party¹⁶: but these studies are, in the main, theoretically and conceptually weak. Only Rose, Seyd and Cyr have made serious attempts to develop and/or employ an analytical framework in which the concept of faction is clearly defined and explicitly differentiated from other forms of intra-party division.¹⁷ Of these, Seyd's study of the "Monday Club" faction within the Conservative Party alone avoids most of the general problems which may be ascribed by a student of factionalism to the literature on

British party politics. Four major shortcomings may be identified.

First, as Seyd concludes from his brief review of literature on divisions in the Conservative Party: "One major difficulty about these observations is that the terminology used in analysing intra-party conflict within British parties lacks conceptual rigour".¹⁹ Thus, various combinations of "cabal", "cadre", "faction", "group", "the left", "the right", "tendency" and "wing" are used more or less indiscriminately to refer to the competing sub-units of political parties. And even when a more rigorous terminology is adopted, usually Richard Rose's typology of "factions", "tendencies", "issue groups" and "non-aligned partisans", it is often misapplied to empirical cases.¹⁹

Second, the general bias in empirical research towards a focus on large subjects is particularly pronounced in studies of British political parties: analyses of intra-party conflict and/or party cohesion focus exclusively on the Conservative and Labour Parties. This is attributable in part to the nature of electoral competition or parliamentary representation in the period in which research was undertaken, or to a tendency to focus upon actual or potential governing parties; but, despite generalized referenced to "British Political Parties" or "British Politics" in the titles of works by, for example, Rose, Jackson or Cyr,²⁰ one could be forgiven for believing that the Liberal Party (not to mention

any other minor parties) did not exist. As we have argued above in relation to more general literature on factionalism, any broad explanation of the forces leading to conflict or cohesion within political parties must take into account minor parties as well as their larger rivals.

Given the under-representation of most minor parties in the House of Commons by virtue of the distortive effects of the British electoral system, the tendency to focus research on the major British parties may largely be a product of a third problem with studies of intra-party conflict and cohesion - namely, an excessive preoccupation with the behaviour of parliamentary parties rather than the broader conception of party in organizational or mass membership terms.²¹ This emphasis is perhaps understandable when the primary research focus is upon legislative behaviour" or public policy-making", rather than "parties" per se. However, we would argue that no analysis of intra-party conflict and cohesion is complete without some attention to the pressures placed on party leaders or parliamentary representatives by the diverse, and often organized, views of the rank-and-file members and other sub-units within the party. This is especially true in the case of the Labour Party, where affiliated trade unions, constituency organizations and the National Executive Committee all seek to influence the direction of party policy. As the Labour Party found to its cost in the late 1970s and early '80s, there may be

considerable incongruence between the ideological and strategic orientations of a majority of MPs and those of the extra-parliamentary mass membership," which may have important consequences for the future of the party but will be overlooked by researchers focussing exclusively on the parliamentary level. Since sub-party factionalism often entails ideological, strategic or generational challenges to the existing leadership, studies of intra-party conflict must adopt a broad view of the party organization which encompasses more than the relatively small number of party members who occupy benches in the House of Commons.

Finally, students of British political parties appear to subscribe to a more general tendency in political science to view parties as the primary (and legitimate) unit of political competition, and to regard factionalism and other forms of intra-party conflict as aberrant and pathological phenomena. There is, in effect, a proclivity to describe and analyse dissension from the perspective of the party and its leaders, as if unquestioning obedience and lack of debate were desirable attributes. Thus, while he seems to view disagreements as a normal part of intra-party politics, Jackson refers to dissidents from the party line as "rebels",²⁵ a term which is imbued in both common parlance and social science with connotations of illegitimate opposition to the status quo represented by legitimate leaders or symbols of authority.

There is a strong tendency, therefore, to view the major British parties as 'naturally' cohesive and for sub-party factionalism and other forms of intra-party conflict to be under-researched and poorly conceptualized. This is despite the fact that each party represents a broad spectrum of political attitudes and interests, and that, in most cases, party leaders and party policies emerge from the interplay of forces within the wider party organization. A more thorough understanding of the internal dynamics of British political parties requires further research on the factions and other sub-units of which they are comprised.

Research on Scottish Nationalism

The Scottish National Party first stimulated a significant degree of interest among political scientists when Winifred Ewing won a by-election in the Scottish constituency of Hamilton in 1967. But interest waned again after the party failed to capitalize on this breakthrough in the 1970 general election, only to be reawakened on a much larger scale by the SNP's startling success in the early 1970s. Given the balance of party forces at Westminster after the October 1974 general election, a substantial measure of self-government if not independence for Scotland, appeared to be just around the corner.

Over the next three or four years, a veritable industry grew up around Scottish nationalism: studies of electoral

and party system change which might explain the dramatic rise of the SNP²⁶; examinations of the historical origins and development of the nationalist movement²⁷; essentially polemical contributions to the debate on devolution²⁸; and future-oriented analyses of the economics of independence and of the nature of politics and society in the sovereign Scotland that must surely come²⁹. Furthermore, the success of the SNP and the apparent upsurge in Scottish (and Welsh) national identity were also interpreted as supportive evidence for more wide-ranging theories concerning the crisis of the British state and the impending break-up of the United Kingdom.³⁰ From a variety of analytical perspectives (most notably modernization theory, neo-Marxist and class analysis, and theories of electoral change and party identification), the major research focus was oriented towards explaining long-term changes within Scotland or in the United Kingdom as a whole which might account for the nationalist phenomenon.³¹ A corollary of this emphasis on long-term cultural or structural change was a more or less explicit assumption that the SNP, representing wide-spread nationalist disaffection, was here to stay.

The devolution referendum and the 1979 general election demonstrated the dangers of interpolating long term trends from short term events. As the fortunes of the SNP waned, so too did academic interest in Scottish nationalism. Instead, students of British politics now turned their attention to the

internal problems of the Labour Party, the prospects of the new Social Democratic Party, and to the neo-conservative politics of the Thatcher 'revolution'. The two Scottish Nationalist MPs at Westminster had no role to play in these events and the internal struggles of the SNP were apparently deemed to be insignificant.

With the exception of two articles," there have been no academic studies of the divisions within the nationalist party, although they attracted considerable media coverage, especially in 1982-83. In fact, very little research has been published about politics inside the party. As our earlier discussion has suggested, most studies of the SNP published after 1974 dealt with the wider perspective on relations between the SNP/Scottish nationalism and the Scottish electorate/society. The ideology of the SNP, the nature of its membership/activist base, the party's organization, and its inner workings all remain virtually uncharted territory." Consequently, in addition to exploring the dimensions of conflict and sub-party factionalism inside the SNP, and its eventual outcome, we believe that this thesis can help to shed new light on the internal politics of the Scottish National Party and the nature of the Scottish nationalist movement. Thus, it will fill a number of the gaps in our knowledge about a party which, by virtue of its electoral success, forced the 'National Question' onto the agenda of British politics in

the 1970s and which, if recent election results are any indication" may threaten to do so again in the near future.

A Note on Sources

In seeking to test our conceptual and explanatory framework, we shall draw upon a number of original sources in addition to reinterpreting existing studies of the Scottish National Party.

Much of our information about the backgrounds and attitudes of SNP members is derived from responses to our own SNP Activists Survey, a survey of party activists from all levels within the SNP organization undertaken in April 1982 (see Appendix A for details). To our knowledge, the responses to over fifty questions from 265 SNP activists (plus thirteen former or inactive members of the party) constitute the largest and most comprehensive data base available on the membership of the Scottish National Party.

However, since the number of '79 Group members in our sample was relatively small, we also make use of previously unpublished data from a survey of former Group members conducted in the Spring of 1983 and made available by the magazine Radical Scotland (see Appendix B).

In addition to the quantitative analysis of survey data, we shall draw upon more detailed interviews with central protagonists from the '79 Group and the Campaign and other leading members and officials of the SNP, and on a variety of

secondary and documentary sources including '79 Group publications; SNP documents and papers; articles and correspondence published in the nationalist monthly, the Scots Independent, and other newspapers; and private papers made available by members of the party.

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

The chapters which follow are organized into four major sections. In Part One of the study, we focus our attention on the development of a conceptual framework for the analysis of intra-party conflict and factionalism in political parties, and on the formulation of an explanatory model which may account for both the emergence of factionalism and its outcome in individual cases.

In Chapter Two, we examine the alternative usages of the term 'faction' in different historical and socio-cultural contexts, emphasizing in particular the concept of 'sub-party' which refers to relatively permanent, structured organizations of members which compete for control over decision-making and the allocation of resources within western political parties.

In Chapter Three, we survey the existing literature on party factionalism for explanations of the emergence of organized intra-party conflict. The problem here is not that there are no explanations; rather, there are too many, but they are often culturally specific and, in some cases, contradictory. Moreover, the existing literature offers

little guidance with respect to the organization of a multiplicity of variables and contending hypotheses into a hierarchy of explanation to account for the emergence of factionalism; nor is there any systematic attempt to identify and account for the alternative outcomes which may ensue from intra-party conflict.

In Chapter Four, we seek to overcome the deficiencies of the existing literature by developing a broader analytical framework which draws upon Hirschman's categories of "Exit" and "Voice" by defining sub-party factions as instances of organized collective Voice expressed by dissatisfied members who are unwilling or unable to Exit from the party. This reconceptualization suggests that variables and hypotheses associated with the emergence of factionalism may be grouped into two broad categories: those pertaining to the sources of dissatisfaction, and those which help to determine the choice between the options of Exit and Voice for dissatisfied members. These categories form the basis of our explanatory framework for the analysis of sub-party mobilization. Also in Chapter Four, we use the logic of the "Exit/Voice" model to develop a series of propositions relating to the outcomes of sub-party conflict, with particular emphasis on the alternative responses of party organizations to the expression of organized collective voice by their members.

Since the "Exit/Voice" approach to explaining intra-party conflict assumes that sub-parties emerge as a consequence of

dissatisfaction with an actual or perceived decline in the performance or product of an organization, in Part Two we examine the organization itself. First, we devote two chapters to the history of the Scottish National Party. Chapter Five covers the period from the foundation in 1928 of its predecessor, the National Party of Scotland, through the establishment of the SNP itself in 1934 and up to 1962, a year which we regard as the watershed in the transformation of the party into a modern mass-based electoral organization. Chapter Six examines the modernization of the party after 1962 and its development up to the devolution referendum and general election campaigns of 1979. In both chapters, emphasis will be placed on the organizational evolution of the SNP, including the many mergers and schisms which have characterized its development, as well as its electoral fortunes.

Also in Part Two, we explore selected aspects of the modern Scottish National Party in order to establish the context within which intra-party conflict emerged after 1979. In Chapter Seven, we discuss the major principles and orientation of party policy and ideology which form part of the SNP's appeal to the electorate and to its own members. The modern organizational structure of the party is outlined in Chapter Eight, together with the roles of the various organizational sub-units. And in Chapter Nine, we examine the members themselves, in particular the "activist" component

of the membership, through analysis of responses to our SNP Activists Survey conducted shortly before the 1982 Ayr National Conference.

In Part Three, our explanatory framework is applied to the emergence of sub-party conflict in the Scottish National Party. First, in Chapter Ten, we describe briefly the origin of the SNP 79 Group in a small circle of dissidents known initially as the Interim Committee for Political Discussion (ICPD). Following the logic of the Exit/Voice model, in this chapter we also attempt to identify the sources of dissatisfaction which gave rise to the Group.

In Chapter Eleven, we examine the Exit/Voice calculus of dissatisfied left-wing members of the party. If we assume that members of the '79 Group could express dissatisfaction with the SNP by leaving the party (through individual or collective "Exit") or by expressing their discontent through the Voice option, we must explain why they chose the latter course of action. Hence, we shall try to determine the opportunities for Exit, the opportunities for Voice, the potential for collective mobilization and the estimation by '79 Group members of their ability to influence or gain control of party decision-making.

Then, in Chapter Twelve, we explore the mobilization of organized collective Voice in the SNP 79 Group. We analyse the modal characteristics of members of the '79 Group, and the extent to which they constituted a relatively homogeneous

sub-set of respondents who differed from other activists. In this chapter we also describe and attempt to account for the influence of collective Voice on the party organization and party product between 1979 and 1981, when the '79 Group won notable victories in intra-party elections and policy votes at the SNP Annual Conference.

But the success of the Group aroused opposition both to its policies and to its very existence. In Chapter Thirteen, we analyse the dimensions of conflict between the '79 Group and what we have labelled the "Anti-Group" (or 'fundamentalist') tendency within the party. Drawing again on the SNP Activists Survey, we endeavour to isolate the dimensions of conflict within the party by describing the principal differences among the "Anti-Group" respondents, '79 Group members and other, "non-aligned" activists in the SNP. And in Chapter Fourteen we examine the emergence of the Campaign for Nationalism in Scotland, identifying both the sources of dissatisfaction and the Exit/Voice calculus involved in the mobilization of this second example of organized collective Voice within the party.

In the last chapter in Part Three, Chapter Fifteen, we attempt to explain the outcome of sub-party conflict within the SNP. We describe the response of the party leaders (or "managers") to the escalation in the volume of Voice resulting from the confrontation between the two rival sub-parties at the Ayr Conference which led eventually to the suppression of

organized collective Voice and the expulsion or "forced Exit" of seven former officers of the '79 Group.

Finally, Part Four of the thesis consists of one substantive Chapter and a short Epilogue. In Chapter Sixteen we review our findings and evaluate the utility of the Exit/Voice model in the light of our analysis of the Scottish National Party. The Epilogue provides a brief postscript to the events detailed in the thesis and serves to re-establish the relevance of studying the SNP.

NOTES - CHAPTER ONE

1. See, for example, Keith Webb's assertion that "the divisions, arguments, bitternesses and successions so common within the nationalist movement" in its early years "played a role in preparing the SNP to make the most of the opportunity when it arose" in the 1960s and 1970s. Keith Webb, The Growth of Nationalism in Scotland (Glasgow: Molendinar Press, 1977), p. 73.
2. See, for example, Bernard J. Siegel and Alan R. Beals, "Pervasive Factionalism", American Anthropologist, vol. 62, no. 3, 1960, pp. 394-417.
3. Harold D. Lasswell, "Faction" in Edwin R.A. Seligman et al., eds., Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Volume 5 (New York: Macmillan, 1931), p. 51.
4. See William Nisbet Chambers, Political Parties in a New Nation: The American Experience, 1776-1809 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963).
5. Siegel and Beals, "Pervasive Factionalism".
6. See, for example, Ralph Nicholas, "Factions: A Comparative Analysis" in Michael Banton, ed., Political Systems and the Distribution of Power, ASA Monograph No. 2 (London: Tavistock Publications, 1965) pp. 21-61.
7. For example, Rene Lemarchand and Keith Legg, "Political Clientelism and Development: A Preliminary Analysis", Comparative Politics, vol. 4, no. 2, 1972, pp. 149-178; and James C. Scott, "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia", American Political Science Review, vol. 66, no. 1, 1972, pp. 91-113.
8. See, in particular, Raphael Zariski, "Party Factions and Comparative Politics: Some Preliminary Observations", Midwest Journal of Political Science, vol. 4, no. 1, 1960, pp. 27-51.

9. See Raphael Zariski, "Party Factions and Comparative Politics: Some Empirical Findings" in F.P. Belloni and D.C. Beller, eds., Faction Politics: Political Parties and Factionalism in Comparative Perspective (Santa Barbara, Ca: ABC - Clio Press, 1978), pp. 19-38.

10. Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1970).

11. See Raphael Zariski, "Intra-Party Conflict within a Dominant Party: The Experience of Italian Christian Democracy", Journal of Politics, vol. 27, no. 1, 1965, pp. 3-34; Alan Zuckerman, Political Clienteles in Power: Party Factions and Cabinet Coalitions in Italy, Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics, No. 01-055 (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1975); and Zuckerman, The Politics of Faction: Christian Democratic Rule in Italy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979).

12. Raphael Zariski, "The Italian Socialist Party: A Case Study in Factional Conflict", American Political Science Review, vol. 56, no. 2, 1962, pp. 372-390; Alan J. Stern et al., "Factions and Opinion Groups in European Mass Parties: Some Evidence from a Study of Italian Socialist Activists", Comparative Politics, vol. 3, no. 4, 1971, pp. 529-559.

13. Further reading on factions in these and other parties may be found in the notes to Chapter 3.

14. Arthur Cyr, "Cleavages in British Politics" in Belloni and Beller, eds., Faction Politics, p. 288.

15. Robert T. McKenzie, British Political Parties: The Distribution of Power Within the Conservative and Labour Parties (London: Heinemann, 1955); Leon D. Epstein, "Cohesion of British Parliamentary Parties", American Political Science Review, vol. 50, no. 2, 1956, pp. 360-377; Robert J. Jackson, Rebels and Whips: Dissension, Discipline and Cohesion in British Political Parties Since 1945 (London: Macmillan, 1968).

16. Ian Bradley, Breaking the Mould? The Birth and Prospects of the Social Democratic Party (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1981); Hugh Berrington, "The Labour Left in Parliament: Maintenance, Erosion and Renewal" in Dennis Kavanagh, ed., The Politics of the Labour Party (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), pp. 69-94. An exception to this generally atheoretical perspective is the excellent study by Paul Whiteley, The Labour Party in Crisis (London: Methuen, 1983).

17. Richard Rose, "Parties, Factions and Tendencies in Britain", Political Studies, vol. 12, no. 1, 1964, pp. 33-46; Patrick Seyd, "Factionalism within the Conservative Party: The Monday Club", Government and Opposition, vol. 7, no. 4, 1972, pp. 464-487; Cyr, "Cleavages in British Politics", pp. 287-303.

18. Seyd, "Factionalism within the Conservative Party", p. 465.

19. Rose, "Parties, Factions and Tendencies", pp. 37-38. Rose's conceptual framework is discussed further in Chapter 2. It is misapplied by Cyr in his discussion of "Tendencies in the Conservative Party" in Cyr, "Cleavages in British Politics". Despite his adoption of Rose's distinction between factions, tendencies and issue-groups, most of the examples of 'tendencies' offered by Cyr refer to conflicts crystallizing around "very specific - at times quite technical - economic issues", and appear to bear the hallmarks of Rose's *ad hoc* issue-groups rather than ideological tendencies.

20. Rose, "Parties, Factions and Tendencies"; Jackson, Rebels and Whips; Cyr, "Cleavages in British Politics".

21. Mackenzie, British Political Parties, is one notable exception to this general tendency.

22. For example, Epstein, "Cohesion of British Parliamentary Parties"; Jackson, Rebels and Whips.

23. Rose, "Parties, Factions and Tendencies".

24. See Whiteley, The Labour Party in Crisis, especially Ch. 2.
25. Jackson, Rebels and Whips.
26. See, for example, Dean Jaensch, "The Scottish Vote 1974: A Realignment Party System?", Political Studies, vol. 24, no. 3, 1976, pp. 306-319.
27. Keith Webb, The Growth of Nationalism in Scotland (Glasgow: Molendinar Press, 1977); Christopher Harvie, Scotland and Nationalism: Scottish Society and Politics, 1707-1977 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1977).
28. For example, the book by anti-devolutionist Labour MP, Tam Dalyell, Devolution: The End of Britain? (London: Jonathan Cape, 1977).
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33. Studies of the ideology of the SNP include B.A. Farbey et al., "Change and Stability in the Ideology of Scottish Nationalism", International Political Science Review, vol. 1, no. 3, 1980, pp. 405-424; Sherri L. Grasmuck, Uneven Regional Development and Scottish Nationalism: Activists, Ideology and North Sea Oil, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Texas at Austin, 1978, and "Ideology of Ethnoregionalism: The Case of Scotland", Politics and Society, vol. 9, no. 4, 1980, pp. 471-494. SNP organization is discussed briefly by Richard W. Mansbach, "The Scottish National Party: A Revised Political Profile", Comparative Politics, vol. 5, no. 2, 1973, pp. 185-213; and W.A. Roger Mullin, "The Scottish National Party" in H.M. Drucker, ed., Multi-Party Britain (London: Macmillan, 1979), pp. 109-130.
34. See Epilogue.

PART ONE

Concepts, Explanations, and the Exit/Voice Model: Towards an Analytical Framework

Chapter Two

PARTIES, CLIENTELES AND SUB PARTIES:

THREE VARIETIES OF FACTIONALISM

The development of intra-party conflict in the Scottish National Party in the period between 1979 and 1982 is a clear example of the emergence of "factionalism" within a political organization. But, as we noted in Chapter One, the concept of faction has been applied to a variety of political phenomena in a number of different socio-cultural settings. Hence, if we label the SNP '79 Group or the Campaign for Nationalism in Scotland "a faction", what precisely do we mean?

In this chapter we review the literature dealing with three different applications of the concept of faction by social scientists: first, the historical equation of factions with embryo political parties developing in the early days of representative assemblies in eighteenth century Europe and North America; second, the anthropological use of the term to denote forms of political association, especially patron-client networks, which cross-cut traditional lineage, clan and caste ties in the politics of communal societies; and, third, the extension of the term to describe competing sub-units,

whether based on leadership or ideological conflict, which seek control of the policy-making machinery of modern party organizations.

Then, in the final section of the chapter, we develop the concept of a **sub-party faction** (or **sub-party** for short) which serves to differentiate factions found in the context of western political parties both from other forms of factional organization and from the other sub-units which may be active in the internal life of political parties.

FACTIONS AS (PRE-) PARTIES

In the early days of the emergence of partisan politics, in eighteenth century Europe and North America, 'faction' tended to be used more or less interchangeably with 'party' and both were viewed with some hostility by many contemporary writers and practising politicians.¹ Both party and faction were described as essentially divisive instruments which subverted the political community and threatened the common good.

Among the founding fathers of the United States, for example, James Madison and George Washington considered both parties and factions to be treasonable and subversive threats to liberty, "as sources of fanatical passions and violence: (thus) party spirit was viewed as the antithesis of public spirit."² In the famous *Federalist No. 10*, Madison argued that one of the potential advantages of the Union of the states was "its tendency to break and control the violence of

faction".³ But his conception of 'faction' was rather broad, in that it could be extended to any and all divisions within society:

By a faction I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.⁴

Despite the improvements wrought by the American constitution over other models of popular government, Madison argued, the new Union had failed in this respect, since: "Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties ..."⁵ Consequently, in his Farewell Address of 1796, based on a draft by another Federalist contributor, Alexander Hamilton, George Washington was moved to serve a solemn warning to his fellow Americans against indulging in the spirit of localism and factionalism:

Liberty ... is, indeed, little else than a name where the government is too feeble to withstand the enterprises of faction... . I have already intimated to you the danger of parties in the State, with particular reference to the founding of them on geographical discriminations. Let me now take a more comprehensive view, and warn you in the most solemn manner against the baneful effects of the spirit of party generally.⁶

Writers in eighteenth century England were no more favourably disposed towards the rise of party. In *The Art of Governing by Parties*, John Toland asserted that "... of all the Plagues which have infested this nation since the death

of Queen Elizabeth, none has spread the contagion wider, or brought us nearer to utter ruin, than the implacable animosity of contending Parties".⁷ The political party was, for Toland, "the most wicked masterpiece of tyranny purposely to divide the sentiments, affections, and interests of a people."⁸

The divisiveness of parties and the threat they posed to the unity of the nation also featured in the writings of Lord Bolingbroke. In *A Dissertation on Parties*, Bolingbroke drew an unfavourable comparison between the emerging parties of the eighteenth century and the great 'national' parties of the seventeenth. Whereas the national parties had demonstrated "a real difference of principles and designs", in the parties of his time national interests had been "sacrificed, and ... made subordinate to personal interests: and that, I think, is the true characteristic of faction."⁹ But even though he distinguished between parties of principle and factions of personal interest, Bolingbroke was in general opposed to all forms of partisanship. Thus he warned his idealized monarchical figure, the Patriot King, against allying himself with a party, since "governing by party ... must always end in the government of a faction.... For faction is to party what the superlative is to the positive: party is a political evil, and faction is the worst of all parties."¹⁰

David Hume, similarly anti-party in principle, also distinguished between degrees of antipathy in his essay *Of Parties in General*. Like Bolingbroke, he tended for the most

part to use the terms 'party' and 'faction' interchangeably and hence his condemnation of factions, which "subvert government, render laws impotent, and beget the fiercest animosities among men of the same nation",¹¹ applies equally to parties. But Hume, too, sought to separate parties/factions based on genuine differences of interest or principle from those which continued to exist even after such differences had long been forgotten. Thus parties based on "real" (i.e., economic) interests were "the most reasonable, and the most excusable" and those based on political principle were also "more easily explained".¹² In contrast, Hume noted that in the small republics of the past, where "(e)very domestic quarrel ... becomes an affair of state"¹³, factions based on personal friendship or animosity had often led to the ruination of governments and, rational philosopher that he was, he saw their contemporary equivalent in parties based on religious principle since "in modern times, parties of religion are more furious and enraged than the most cruel factions that ever rose from interest and ambition."¹⁴

Hume recognized parties as an inevitable, though unpleasant, consequence of constitutional government. However, like Bolingbroke (and in contrast to the American revolutionary leaders), there is some indication in his writings that certain types of partisan activity were less bad, or more excusable, than others. While party and faction were both undesirable, parties/factions based on genuine

political principle were preferable to those based on the personal interests or ambitions of their members.

This partial differentiation of types of party and faction was taken a step further by Edmund Burke, who may be credited with beginning the process of rehabilitating the concept of party. Burke's famous definition of party as "a body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed"¹⁵ is cast in clearly benevolent terms, since its activities may "easily be distinguished from the mean and interested struggle for place and emolument."¹⁶ Thus, according to one commentator, parties were assumed by Burke to be 'good' since they were motivated by principle and the national interest, whereas factions were deemed to be "motivated by personal ambition or avarice, and therefore to be 'bad'."¹⁷ In making this distinction, Burke followed in some degree the critical difference in general usage of 'party' and 'faction' noted by Voltaire a few years earlier. In his contribution to the Encyclopedie on "Faction", Voltaire suggested: "La principale acceptation de ce terme signifie un parti séditionnel dans un état. Le terme de parti par lui-même n'a rien d'odieux, celui de faction l'est toujours."¹⁸

From, let us say, the mid-nineteenth century onward, political parties have become more or less generally accepted as instrumental necessities for the pursuit and realization of collective goals. Admittedly, both individual writers and

broad social movements have on occasion expressed a mistrust of parties, espousing alternative, usually more direct, linkages between citizens and their governments;¹⁹ but, in both common parlance and political analysis, the concept of 'party' has largely been cleared of the accusations of divisiveness and subversion of the national interest levelled at it by the anti-party theorists. The same cannot be said, however, about the concept of 'faction' which, as our earlier discussion has suggested, is still subject to those same accusations. Indeed, the legitimacy of the term party may well have been enhanced by deliberate attempts to differentiate it clearly from the 'opprobrious epithet' of faction. For example, when introducing a major analytical study of political parties, Sartori defines his subjects partly in terms of what they are not: "Parties are not factions; that is, unless a party is different from a faction, it is not a party".²⁰

Today, the legitimate connotations of party contrast starkly with the residual illegitimacy of factional activity. This is clearly evidenced in Sartori's distinction between the two:

Parties are often criticized, but they are *not* an evil by definition. Faction is always, at least in common parlance, a bad name, and factions are an evil.... the term faction has not lost, in common use, its original connotation, namely, that factions are nothing but the expressions of *personal* conflicts, of ego-regarding and public-disregarding behavior.²¹

For Sartori, in most developed western democracies, factions are a thing of the past. Historically, factions were groups of self-interested individuals who put ego before principle and who abused their privileged positions at court or in parliament to advance their own ambitions and personal rivalries above and against the common good. Contemporary political parties, on the other hand, while they may still contain power-seeking and self-serving individuals, are constrained by the political systems in which they operate to pursue wider collective goals and to fulfil roles which are functional to the entire political community. According to Sartori, parties have replaced factions, to the benefit of the democratic process; but, he warns, there is a constant danger that competition between functional political parties may degenerate into dysfunctional factional conflict, thus precipitating the breakdown of a party system and, potentially, of the whole system of democratic government.²²

Quite clearly, for many analysts of partisan behaviour, there is a qualitative difference between parties and factions. But, for some authors, that qualitative distinction is based in part on an historical dimension. If the political thinkers and practising politicians of the eighteenth century appear to have had difficulty in separating parties from factions, and hence used the terms interchangeably, it may well have been because the so-called 'parties' of their time were indeed little more than 'factions' in the commonly

accepted sense of that word. Recruited from a narrow political class and responsible (if at all) to only a very restricted electorate, such groupings were cliques of notables linked by personal ties, shared animosities and narrow sectional interests. However, to these "pre-parties" or "proto-parties", as they have been labelled, may be traced the origins of modern political parties in western democracies.²¹ As the principles of representative government became established and accepted, and as the franchise was extended, factional cliques were forced to widen the basis of their appeal, to replace self-interest by ideology or broader principle, and to adopt more permanent and institutionalized organizational structures which were to outlast the life spans of founding members and leaders.²²

From this first perspective, therefore, 'factions' may be viewed as historically limited phenomena which emerged during the transition of western societies from pre-democratic to democratic politics, only to be replaced by institutionalized political parties in the modern age. By way of contrast, a second conceptualization of factions, "factions as clienteles", describes a form of political association which, in certain societies, has survived and adapted itself to the change from more traditional, pre-modern politics to the mass mobilization of the contemporary era.

FACTIONS AS CLIENTELES

A number of political scientists studying contemporary Third World politics have found that neither class analysis nor the "primordial model" of political behaviour based on pre-industrial social cleavages is adequate to explain fully the bases of political association and conflict in modernizing societies. Rather, in many countries of south and southeast Asia, for example, patron-client relationships constitute an important, and sometimes the dominant, structural principle of political activity.²⁵ Patron-client linkages have long been recognized by social anthropologists as the primary form of political association in small localized contexts such as villages and tribal units in traditional societies, where interpersonal relations are central determinants of the power structure. However, the same clientelist model has proven remarkably resistant to the forces of modernization and political development, and may now be observed within more structured national institutions such as bureaucracies and political parties in Asia and elsewhere in the non-Western world.

The use of the term "faction" by social anthropologists to describe clientelist groups or other forms of association which cut across traditional lineage, clan or caste lines in pre-modern societies dates back at least as far as the 1930s,²⁶ although it was not for another twenty years or so that the concept developed wide currency in anthropological writings.

While the pioneers of modern social anthropology such as Fortes and Evans-Pritchard had focused on the role of formal structures in maintaining order in traditional societies, and therefore paid little attention to informal or "non-corporate" groups, the emergence of structural-functional analysis as the dominant paradigm in anthropological inquiry in the 1950s led to a greater emphasis on the role of informal groups as expressions of conflict within the dynamic equilibrium model of social systems." Within this general movement towards the study of informal processes, however, lay two broad tendencies which conceptualized factions and factionalism in rather different ways.

One group adhered more strictly to the structural-functional framework in that researchers sought explanations for the emergence of conflict within societies and for the subsequent outcome of that conflict in either the restoration of the dynamic equilibrium of society or the breakdown of the social system. Factions, as informal groups which seemed to appear in times of social stress or strain, became a central focus for research inasmuch as they were aberrations from the normal patterns of political association, thus providing evidence of systemic disequilibrium or social decay. From this perspective, factions were often seen as "undesirable" social actors, although, in contrast to the Madisonian distrust of factions qua parties, they were viewed not so much as causes of divisiveness and disunity as symptoms of the

breakdown of social consensus and of the normal mechanisms of conflict resolution.²⁸ Given the historically established negative connotations of faction and factionalism, therefore, there was a marked tendency to apply these terms to any and all forms of supposedly dysfunctional conflict-group behaviour which did not conform to established societal norms. For example, according to Siegel and Beals:

Factionalism ... can be defined as overt, unregulated (unresolved) conflict ... between sub-units of a group in a manner which does not conform to expectations and which does not maintain but disrupts the co-operative enterprise."

The sheer generality of this approach to factionalism, the lack of precision in defining central concepts, and waning interest in the broad paradigm of functionalist analysis, all contributed to a decline in social anthropological research on factions per se in the 1970s. But some authors did attempt to keep the subject alive, either by combining analysis of factions with other approaches to small group behaviour³⁰ or by defining factions in more neutral and more rigorous terms, thereby moving closer to the second school of factional analysis.

The second stream of research, typified by the work of Ralph Nicholas, saw conflict as normal rather than the exception and viewed factions as one type of political association among many forms which conflicting groups could assume. In a seminal article on the comparative analysis of factions, Nicholas lamented the lack of objectivity displayed

by some of his colleagues: "Some observers of factional politics, though their interests are scholarly, seem to have permitted the emotional load of the term to influence their thinking about factions"." Basing his analysis on comparison of factions from five different socio-cultural contexts, Nicholas attempted a more comprehensive definition of faction comprising five "essential" characteristics, which we have summarized under the headings 'functional' and 'structural' elements. Functionally, for Nicholas, factions are both conflict groups and political groups in that they engage in "organized conflict about the use of public power". Structurally, Nicholas distinguished factions from "corporate" groups in that "(f)action members are recruited by a leader" on the basis of "diverse principles".

From a sociological perspective, the most important aspects of this definition are those concerning membership and recruitment. For Nicholas, the key characteristic of faction which distinguishes it from other forms of political association is that membership is not ascriptive as it is in a lineage, clan or caste; but neither is it entirely self-motivated, since members do not join a faction as they might a political party, on the basis of common interest or ideology. Instead, members are recruited on an individual basis by a faction leader. And, while kinship ties or caste-related factors may sometimes play a role in recruitment and allegiance, other relationships such as clientelism and

economic dependence are often more important characteristics of the recruitment process. Hence, factions tend to cross-cut existing "corporate" groupings in the community and members often have little in common except for their shared allegiance to the faction leader."

Given the emphasis on the role of the leader as the source of recruitment and focus on allegiance, the heterogeneous nature of faction membership and the description of factional organization primarily in terms of "leader-follower groups",¹³ the concept of faction proposed by Nicholas is closely allied to what other writers have labelled the "patron-client" or "clientelist" model of political association. According to Lemarchand and Legg:

Political clientelism ... may be viewed as a more or less personalized, affective, and reciprocal relationship between actors, or sets of actors, commanding unequal resources and involving mutually beneficial transactions that have political ramifications beyond the immediate sphere of dyadic relationships.¹⁴

The essence of the clientelist model of politics, like Nicholas' definition of factionalism, is therefore the personalized nature of political association based on the recruitment of members of the clientele by a leader or patron.¹⁵ Thus, the members have little sense of corporate identity as a group; rather, the cohesion of a clientele is founded exclusively on the clustering of dyadic (two-person) relationships between leader and follower.

However, an additional distinguishing trait of most conceptions of the patron-client relationship is "the conditional character of the loyalties involved."¹ The patron-client relationship is an exchange relationship in which the patron/leader has access to certain resources or services which may be dispensed to clients/followers in return for their support and assistance in maintaining or enhancing the status/power of the leader. Consequently, the allegiance of clients towards their leader is often contingent upon the patron's ongoing ability to fulfil his side of the exchange bargain - i.e., upon the leader's continued control of resources and his ability to dispense services to clients in return for their support. While the membership of patron-client clusters is often stable, changes in the distribution of power or resources among rival patrons may cause some fluidity; and, of course, clientelist clusters rarely survive intact the death of their leaders or their retirement from the offices which confer control over patronage resources.

While this simple model of clientelist politics is more typical of traditional societies in which the distribution of power and status is relatively stable and where face-to-face relationships are feasible given the localized context of small communities, patron-client relations in transitional or modernizing societies tend to be more complex and more fluid in nature. The nationalization of politics in developing nations often gives rise to multi-level patron-client pyramids

in which local patrons are themselves clients of regional and national leaders, performing a brokerage function between local clienteles and national political parties." Moreover, patron-client networks are often more fluid, or less persistent, in modernizing societies since the distribution of power and resources is less stable and because the bases of linkage between leaders and followers become more specialized and more pragmatic in nature instead of the broader, more comprehensive mix of affective and exchange relationships which characterize patron-client ties in the traditional communal setting."

Rather than undermining clientelist factionalism and replacing it with alternative forms of political association, therefore, economic and political modernization often merely broaden the scope of patron-client networks from the purely local level to the national arena. The development of national political parties in Africa and Southeast Asia has frequently been accomplished through the extension of patronage from the centre or by using local patron-client networks as basic building blocks in the integration of core and periphery."

In India, patron-client networks have also played a central role in the mobilization and integration of national party politics." But here, it has been argued, factionalism has sometimes been a disintegrative force as well, especially where more permanent ideological divisions have emerged within

parties. Thus, Paul Brass has suggested that conflict over alliance strategies and ideological principles was at least partially responsible for the splits in the Indian Socialist Movement in the early 1970s," while Mary Carras has challenged much of the conventional wisdom on factions in the Indian Congress Party by her assertion that economic interests and ideology are more important than either 'primordial' or 'clientelist' bases of organization in the emergence of factionalism in the state of Maharashtra." These exceptions aside, the dominant view of factions in Indian politics has been based on the clientelist model, emphasizing "their personalistic, non-ideological basis, fluidity of the conflicts and alignments, the combination of affective and instrumental ties between leader and follower, and the diversity of social and economic origins of faction supporters". Indian electoral politics, particularly at the state and local levels, is thus largely clientelist politics and party organizations tend to play a secondary role to patron-client factions in mobilizing the vote.

While the internal structures of the factions may differ somewhat from those in India according to prevailing cultural norms," clientelist factionalism is also the dominant mode of political association in Japan, once again relegating parties to secondary roles." The perennial governing party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), at any one time contains between ten and twelve factions which contend for status and

power within the party and act as clientelist support networks for rival aspirants to the party leadership, and hence to prime-ministerial office. The personalistic nature of these factions is indicated by their names, usually those of the leaders, and by the realignment of faction members which follows the death or retirement of a 'patron'. These, then, are "factions" by Ralph Nicholas' definition - indeed, he includes the context of Japanese political parties in his comparative survey of faction politics. As Nicholas describes them:

The (Japanese) factions are 'leader-follower groups' in which roles are well defined: followers give their support to the leader in parliament and in intra-party struggles; the leader has the primary responsibility to provide positions, funds and other necessities of a good life."

In the major opposition party, the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP), factional conflict once reflected mainly ideological tensions but "since about 1960, more pragmatic aspirations for control of the party apparatus have become at least as critical as ideology or policy considerations, if not more so." Thus, clientelist factionalism has become the norm in both major parties. In each case, the party organization is elitist and parliamentary-based, and grass-roots support is mobilized through the patron-client networks of the factions rather than by mass, extra-parliamentary party organizations. In contrast to the apparent weakness of party structures, the factions are highly organized and bureaucratized. Thus, a

number of authors have argued that factions, in particular patron-client clusters and networks, are the primary units of political association and action in Japanese politics and that the parties are little more than loose confederations of factions."

In the contexts discussed in this section, factions or patron-client clusters are the basic units of association and action in political life. These non-corporate groups, held together by personalistic ties between leaders and followers are usually rooted in prevailing cultural norms which legitimize hierarchical social relations and patronage based reward systems. To the extent that integrative party structures have developed, they have typically done so through capturing and mobilizing existing patron-client networks. In such contexts, it is the faction, and not the party, which is the primary unit of political behaviour and allegiance. Parties tend to be loose confederations of factions rather than parties with factions. In contrast, in the next section we examine the concept of faction as it has been applied to competing sub-units emerging within pre-existing political parties in the more modern liberal democracies of Western Europe and North America.

FACTIONS WITHIN PARTIES

The application of the term 'faction' to the competing sub-units within political parties can be dated from the

behavioural revolution of the 1950s. As the study of comparative government, with its emphasis on formal-legal institutions, gave way to the study of comparative politics, researchers began to focus on the less formal components of the political system, among them interest groups and political parties. Analyses of the internal politics of parties and their decision-making processes revealed that, while parties are sub-units of a wider political system, each party may itself be likened to a miniature political system, complete with its own environment, members, voters, elections to party offices, policy-making structures, executive organs and quasi-judicial procedures. As Raphael Zariski put it:

We thus find ourselves confronted with what constitutes, in effect, a governmental system in miniature, possessing many of the structural and functional characteristics of the legally-defined government structures whose policies and personnel it seeks to influence.⁵⁰

Writers analysing these 'governmental systems in miniature' of intra-party politics required a concept to describe the groupings of party activists which proposed alternative policies and strategies, nominated and supported candidates for party office, struggled for control of the party apparatus, and generally behaved within the party organization like the functional equivalents of the parties themselves in the wider political system. Noting that the term had already been employed by Key and Duverger,⁵¹ Zariski continued: "In order to avoid confusion and achieve greater precision in our

categories, it has appeared desirable to refer to this type of grouping by using the term 'faction'."

For Zariski, therefore, a faction is a sub-unit of a political party - but it is a particular kind of party sub-unit. As a number of studies have shown, political parties may be divided into several types of sub-units along different dimensions (see Figure 2.1). First, parties may be internally differentiated according to levels of activity and involvement. Each party typically consists of a number of levels of participation, including a national elite or leadership, a parliamentary wing of elected representatives, local elites and representatives, activists, paid-up members, habitual supporters and occasional voters." These levels may be portrayed as a kind of hierarchy or stratification of involvement arranged in pyramidal form (see Figure 2.1a). Alternatively, a typical mass party, such as the British Labour Party, may be broken down into a number of sub-units on an organizational dimension. From central bodies such as the National Executive Committee organizational links and communications channels spread out through regional and area councils to constituency associations down to the basic units of branch and ward parties (see Figure 2.1b)

In contrast to the dimensions of participation and organization, which both divide party sub-units into horizontal strata in a hierarchy, party factionalism may be portrayed as a form of vertical pillarization of the party

FIGURE 2.1**TYPES OF PARTY SUB-UNITS ON THREE DIMENSIONS****2.1a Sub-Units on the "Participation" Dimension**

National Elite
 National Representatives
 (Parliamentary Party)
 Local Elites
 and Representatives
 Activists
 Members
 Voters

2.1b Sub-Units on the "Organization" Dimension

National
 Regional
 Area
 Constituency
 Branch/Ward

2.1c Sub-Units on the "Factionalism" Dimension

	Elite				National
<u>"Participation"</u>					<u>"Organization"</u>
	Activists				Regional/Area
	Rank-and-file members				Local (Branch/Constituency)
		A	B	C	
		<u>"Factionalism"</u>			

(see figure 2.1c). Each faction usually contains representatives of the elite, activist and rank-and-file tiers of participation and will typically contend for power and position at all levels within the party's organizational structure. Thus factions, once formed (often around actual or would-be members of the party elite), will attempt to mobilize activists and rank-and-file participants. And the structural components of the party organization may be sites of factional mobilization, arenas of faction competition, or subject to control by members of a particular faction. But factions may be differentiated from these other sub-units of a political party in that they are vertical pillars of activity which cut across the horizontal strata of participatory and organizational sub-units."

But can all competing groups which cross-cut the dimensions of participation and organization within a political party be legitimately labelled "factions"? One writer who made an early attempt to distinguish among the sub-units of parties on the "factionalism" dimension was Richard Rose.⁵⁵ Noting the extent of internal divisions within the major British parties and the part played by schisms and realignments in the development of the British party system, Rose argued that in order to understand the role of parties in the policy process one must first have a framework for the analysis of different elements within the parliamentary parties.

Rose distinguished explicitly between four types of sub-units. **Factions** are self-consciously organized groups of parliamentarians which seek to further a broad range of policies and possess a measure of internal discipline and cohesion. Political **tendencies**, on the other hand, consist of "a stable set of attitudes, rather than a stable group of politicians" and are not normally organized as a group over time. **Non-aligned partisans** are those individuals or groups which, for various reasons, eschew identification with particular factions or tendencies but represent a "slack resource" which other groups attempt to mobilize in times of "intense differences in policy within an electoral party". And, finally, Rose distinguished factions from **issue-groups**, those "ad hoc combinations of politicians in agreement upon one particular issue or at one moment in time."⁵⁶ These are, to a degree, all analytical distinctions. Each category is an ideal type and Rose suggested that intra-party groupings will typically combine two or more of these elements - i.e., at any moment in time, a group espousing a given side of an issue may contain MPs who are members of a faction, others who follow a certain ideological tendency and more who have coalesced on an *ad hoc* basis around that issue. However, Rose does propose examples which closely approximate his first two categories - the Bevanite faction within the British Labour Party in the 1950s and the persistent but then unorganized right-wing tendency in the Conservative Party.⁵⁷

In our view, Rose's focus on parties in the policy process leads him to over-emphasize divisions within the parliamentary party as the basis of factionalism, whereas factions may take root in the lower echelons of a party organization, especially in minor parties with few MPs. However, Rose does provide a helpful basis for differentiating between factions and other types of party sub-unit, largely according to the degree of organization, duration, and scope of activity or interest of each group. David Hine expands upon these distinctions in a useful restatement of the basic differences between faction, tendency and issue-group: "*Tendency is ... distinguished from faction and normally also from issue-group by degree of organisation; issue-group is distinguished from faction and tendency by scope and duration.*" Moreover, the distinction between issue-group and faction, suggests Hine, is similar to that between an interest group and a party in that, in each case, "only the latter tries to exercise, or share in the exercise of, over-all power ... while the former merely tries to influence the way in which power is exercised (by others) on given questions."

In addition to the four types of party sub-unit or intra-party grouping proposed by Rose, Sartori adds a fifth element based on his concept of the "atomized party" which is "fragmented leader by leader, with very small groups revolving around each leader - generally members of parliament." In practice, a situation of 'pure atomization' would represent

a party of electoral convenience, whose members have virtually nothing in common save the label under which they contested elections or registered for the purposes of legislative recognition or government funding. Again, the atomized party should be regarded as an ideal or modal type. Empirically, parties may contain more or less atomized elements of 'mavericks' which, like the non-aligned partisans, may constitute a resource which other groups try to mobilize under certain conditions. While the American congressional parties may represent the best examples of partial atomization, almost every political party contains one or two mavericks who neither follow the party line nor belong to any faction, but whose support, and that of any followers they may have, can be sought or bargained on selected individual issues.

A political party may thus be divided internally on the basis of leadership, ideology and tactics, or issues into five kinds of sub-party unit: tendencies, non-aligned partisans, issue-groups, mavericks or atomized elements, and factions.

However, it should be noted that not all analysts of the internal life of political parties concur with the application of the term 'faction' to this context. For example, Giovanni Sartori, ever mindful of the dangers of "concept stretching" in comparative politics,⁴⁰ rejects this usage of faction on three grounds: that faction retains negative connotations in common parlance; that factions as 'pre-parties' based on personalistic interests are still to be found in many

developing countries, engendering the risk of overstretching the concept of faction to denote two very different forms of partisan activity or political association in widely disparate contexts; and that Sartori appears to wish to restrict the term to its traditional and negative sense, as a form of 'dysfunctional' politics, so that he may warn of the dangers of factional degeneration in contemporary party systems. Therefore, Sartori argues, in seeking a new term to describe the competing sub-units of political parties, "we need a broad, neutral label that has yet to be found; (by using faction) we have created unnecessary ambiguity; and we have lost, or weakened, a specification that we need."¹

Sartori's solution to this terminological problem is to introduce a new concept label, 'fraction', a somewhat ethnocentric derivation from the Italian word '*frazione*', given to groupings within the Italian Christian Democratic Party. As an exercise in precision, however, this appears to be no improvement on faction, since fraction is already applied to political phenomena in other contexts. First, as Sartori acknowledges, fraction has a special meaning in Marxist analysis, where it denotes the sub-interests of the capitalist class (the hegemonic fraction, the finance capital fraction, etc.). Moreover, in West German politics, 'Fraktion' is the particular term given to each parliamentary party in the Bundestag rather than to competing sub-units within the parties. Notwithstanding these "inconveniences"

as he puts it, Sartori perceives three advantages to the adoption of 'fraction': a new term means that 'faction' may be used unambiguously in its traditional sense; 'fraction' is "surely more neutral and uncommitted" than its discarded rival; and 'fraction' can also be easily linked to variables such as Douglas Rae's "Index of Fractionalization", which may henceforth be utilized to measure the degree of dispersion among sub-units within parties as well as among parties within the party system.⁶²

While having a certain sympathy with Sartori's objections, we feel that 'faction' is still preferable to his proposed alternative. 'Fraction' does have its own specialized connotations which might lead to some confusion, if only among Marxists, German parliamentarians, mathematicians, or any combination thereof. Furthermore, although this is not always a valid basis for acceptance or rejection of a particular term, the idea of 'fraction' has not been picked up by subsequent writers on the subject - the majority have continued to use 'faction' as their central unit of analysis.

Thus, rather than add to the terminological jungle of political science by coining a completely new term to differentiate competing party sub-units from *all* factions, we would argue that the necessary degree of specification can be achieved by distinguishing between *types* of factions. In part, this has been implicit in the way that this chapter has been organized - we have referred already to "pre-party

factions", in the historical context, and to "clientelist factions" in traditional or modernizing societies. Since our primary concern is with factions which compete for power and mobilize support within the limited context of the party organization, whereas the pre-party and clientelist varieties are rooted in wider socio-political contexts, this third type may be designated a "sub-party faction" or, for convenience, the *sub-party*.

THE CONCEPT OF "SUB-PARTY"

Perhaps the simplest and most 'common-sensical' way to define a *sub-party* as a type of faction operating exclusively within the context of party organizations is to describe it as "a party within a party", following the logic of 'sub-system', a system within a system, or 'sub-group', a group within a group. In this regard, our concept of *sub-party* is similar to Zariski's usage of 'faction', in that it refers to those organized groupings which propose alternative policies and strategies, nominate candidates for party office and compete for power within the party organization and generally behave within the party like political parties in the wider political system.⁶³

A more comprehensive conceptualization of *sub-party* factions based on the existing literature on intra-party factionalism is hampered in part by the extensive geo-cultural variation and tendency towards contextual definition in the

empirical studies available. As one author admits: "Cultural diversity has so far frustrated attempts to arrive at a single commonly agreed-upon definition. ... The definition of party faction is thus incomplete, but some progress has been made in clearing the ground."⁴ Among those who have studied party factions in the context of developed liberal democracies, there appears to be some basis for agreement that, in order to be labelled properly as party factions (or sub-parties), intra-party groups must possess most, if not all of the following characteristics:

- 1) an ideology, a set of shared values, or a broad commonality of interest which members seek to promote within, or through control of, the party organization and which provides a focus for self-conscious identification with the faction;
- 2) a degree of organization ranging from, at least, "the minimal characteristics of a rudimentary organization"⁵ to a high degree of institutionalization, with membership cards, subscriptions, elected officials, regularized procedures and meetings, etc.;
- 3) established networks of communication, both internal, to support the organizational structure and to facilitate cohesion in the pursuit of common goals, and external, to recruit new adherents and potential allies;
- 4) durability or continuity over time - for example, a faction "is a 'structured group' in that there are established patterns of behavior and interaction for faction members over time" or "normally ... factions will reveal a continuity which exceeds the time-span of an electoral campaign or a legislative session";⁶
- 5) "an incentive system to reward members and sympathisers", whether this be material (i.e., through patronage) or psychological in nature (e.g., fellowship, support, common pursuit of shared values);⁷
- 6) a degree of technical expertise to facilitate the mobilization of support and the pursuance of goals,

especially important "in so far as a faction is pressing detailed proposals";"

- 7) a formal structure of authority that includes leaders (elected or otherwise), cadres of activists, and rank-and-file members or followers;

and

- 8) most importantly, in that this sets sub-party factions apart from issue-groups and tendencies, a desire "at a minimum, to control authoritative decision-making positions of the party" or to gain control "over the principal institutions of intra-party government, over the formulation of party policy, and over the selection of party leaders and party nominees for public office"."

As an operational definition, this checklist of characteristics is both cumbersome and somewhat imprecise. Some criteria are expressed in terms of "degrees" of a property, which may lean too much towards the 'more-or-less' language of comparison rather than the 'either-or' distinctions required by the purists of classification.⁷⁰ As one commentator observes, for example: "Quite what level of organisational cohesion and continuity a group actually has to display before it can be known as a faction is of course problematic".⁷¹

In order to develop a more concise working definition, we must first establish how many of these characteristics are necessary and/or sufficient to differentiate sub-party factions from other action-groups within political parties. This task may be simplified if it is accepted that a number of the characteristics in the above list are in fact closely related to the attribute of "organization". Hence, "established networks of communication", "technical expertise

to facilitate ... mobilization" and "a formal structure of authority" are features common to most organizations, and particularly to those based to some degree on the Weberian bureaucratic model. Moreover, since organizations are generally designed to last, the attribute "durability or continuity over time" is also a corollary of organization. In addition, the existence of "an incentive system" is closely related to, and partially defined in terms of, the more general characteristic of the "shared values or a broad commonality of interest" which binds members of a sub-party faction together. Consequently, the eight attributes extracted from the literature may, in effect, be collapsed into three core defining characteristics: organization, shared values or common interests, and the pursuit of control over party decision-making. These three characteristics are incorporated into the following definition of a sub-party faction:

a sub-party faction is an organized group within a political party which seeks to exercise control over party decision-making to promote the shared values or common interests of its members.

But, for those who prefer their definitions "short and sweet", it is difficult to improve on the simplicity and clarity of the conceptualization of sub-party faction offered by a number of opponents of the '79 Group among SNP activists surveyed in the course of our research: their primary objection to the

Group was that it was attempting to set itself up as "a party within the party".

Types of Sub-Party Faction

In order to refine further our concept of sub-party, some discussion of the 'shared values' or 'common interests' of faction members is necessary. What divides factions within the same political party from one another? In a major cross-national survey of political parties, Kenneth Janda proposed four types of party factionalism: ideological, issue, leadership, and strategic or tactical factionalism." Quite clearly, these categories should be viewed as ideal or modal types, since the motivations of members within a single faction may vary and because the differences between factions in any one party may result from a cumulation of two or more of these sources of conflict - for example, factions which disagree over ultimate ideological objectives are also likely to differ with respect to tactical means to achieve their respective goals. Moreover, following Rose and Hine, it may be argued that disagreements over issues rarely give rise to the formation of durable sub-party factions as they have been defined above. Consequently, Janda's four categories may be reduced to two, in that sub-party factions tend to develop around either *leadership* conflicts or *policy* orientations, the latter class including both ideological and strategic or tactical differences."

Leadership sub-parties gather around rival members of the party elite, especially in catch-all or government-oriented parties of the centre and centre-right. Their organizational structures are similar to principle to the clientelist model of association, although they are far more institutionalized - often with established communications networks, regular meetings, their own offices and self-conscious labels or titles. However, the crucial distinction, in our view, between leadership sub-parties and the more general concept of clientelist factions lies in their respective relationship to political parties. This important difference is best illustrated with reference to the relationship between party and faction in the governing parties of Italy and Japan.

We have already cited the example of Japan as a case of clientelist politics adapting itself to the world of mass electoral democracy in that both the Liberal Democratic Party and, to a lesser extent, the Japanese Socialist Party consist of a number of competing clientelist factions or patron-client networks. Structurally, most of the factions in the Italian Christian Democratic Party (*Democrazia Cristiana*, or DC) are similar to their Japanese counterparts, but their relationships to their respective "host" parties are very different. Both major Japanese parties were formed by mergers of pre-existing parties and groups and are still, according to most observers, little more than "confederations" of

factions; thus, Scalapino and Masumi suggest that Japanese politics are marked by "the primacy of faction over party".⁴ While the Italian DC was also formed by a post-war merger of a number of centrist and christian democratic groups, prevailing political conditions have ensured that party, not faction, is the dominant unit of political, and especially electoral, competition: "The electoral party is cohesive, and the candidates do owe their election ... to the party slate. Hence ... for electoral purposes, the party is, in Italy, the real unit".⁵ In Japan, on the other hand, "elections are not fought by the local party branches but essentially by the local fractional associations. ... the electoral party is outflanked by the out-party organizations of the candidates".⁶ Although clientelism has long-established roots in Italian society,⁷ factional conflict is constrained by the predominance of party organization, while Japanese parties are just one of a number of arenas of competition among autonomous patron-client factions.

Although their internal structures may appear similar, our distinction between clientelist factions and leadership sub-party factions, therefore, depends upon the relative importance of the political party organization in each case. Where patron-client factions are the dominant modes of political association and electoral competition, as in the case of the Japanese JDP, we would categorize them as "clientelist factions", rather than "leadership sub-parties".

However, where patron-client networks support rival leaders contending for control of a party organization which remains the primary unit of electoral competition, as in the Italian DC, then these groupings may be labelled "leadership sub-parties".

Policy sub-parties are more typically found in mass electoral parties of the left and centre-left, although they may also appear in programmatic (ideological) parties of the right such as the British Conservative Party.⁷⁸ In structure, they usually resemble the parent party on a smaller scale, in that members enlisted voluntarily on the basis of common ideology or policy orientation (rather than being recruited by patrons or brokers into an exchange relationship), there is a formal hierarchy of leadership positions, usually filled by election, and the branches or mass membership share in the formulation of group goals and strategies. In contrast to leadership sub-parties, the membership of policy sub-parties is often formalized through subscriptions and sometimes the issue of membership cards. Thus, although individual leaders may play formative roles in the emergence of these factions, as in the Bevanite faction of the post-war British Labour Party,⁷⁹ policy sub-parties are corporate groups in that their existence and life-spans are not dependent upon either the recruiting ability or the longevity of individual leaders.

Policy sub-parties form around a particular ideological orientation or strategic focus which they wish the parent

party to adopt, and seek control of party offices and the policy-making machinery of the party in order to steer it in the desired direction. Apart from the Bevanites and the more recent "Militant Tendency" in the British Labour Party, other examples of policy sub-parties include the CERES group and other political clubs in the French *Parti Socialiste*,⁸⁰ the various ideological and strategic factions of the Italian Socialist Party,⁸¹ the youth factions within the West German SPD,⁸² and, of course, the SNP '79 Group.

The two types of sub-party faction tend to be associated with different forms of factional conflict. Leadership sub-parties are more typically found in multifactional conflict situations with a number of leaders competing for power and position within the party, each supported by his (or her) cluster of sub-patrons, brokers and clients. The pattern of policy sub-parties depends upon a number of variables, in particular the nature of the party system: in multi-party systems, which offer a variety of tactical and alliance strategies, multifactional competition may occur, as in the case of the Italian Socialist Party, while two-party systems are more commonly associated with bifactional patterns of intra-party conflict.⁸³ We shall argue later that the distinction between leadership and policy sub-parties, and the kind of intra-party competition typically associated with each type, may play a key role in determining the response of parent (or "host") parties to the emergence of factionalism.

However, while they differ in internal structure and patterns of factional competition, leadership and policy sub-parties have one crucial characteristic in common. Whether they seek to promote a new leader in order to gain access to patronage positions and resources or to change the ideological and/or strategic orientation of their party, sub-party members have chosen to remain members of their current party and attempt to attain their objectives within the structure of that party rather than establishing their own political or electoral organization. Motivated by a sense of dissatisfaction with the status quo or with the present performance of the policy-making mechanisms of the party, they organize collectively to seek control over the distribution of patronage resources or policy-making in order to remedy perceived deficiencies in the current outputs of the party. Both policy and leadership sub-parties, in other words, are mechanisms for the mobilization of collective action and dissent within party organizations.

CONCLUSIONS

The concept of 'faction' has at least three distinct meanings in social science, denoting in different contexts 'pre-parties', 'clientelist' modes of political association, or competing 'sub-units' within political parties. Our concern is with the third usage and, rather than coin a completely new term to replace 'faction' in this context, we have proposed

the adoption of the concept of sub-party faction (or "sub-party" for short). As organized groups within political parties which seek to control the mechanisms of party decision-making in order to promote the shared values or common interests of members, sub-party factions may be differentiated both from other varieties of faction and from alternative units of intra-party competition, such as issue groups and ideological tendencies.

Sub-party factions may be divided into two broad types according to the nature of the shared values or interests of their members which, in turn, is usually reflected in their organizational structures. Leadership sub-parties, which compete for control over patronage resources in the collective pursuit of individual aspirations for personal advancement, typically resemble the clientelist model of organization. Policy sub-parties, which seek to control party decision-making in order to promote broad ideological or strategic/tactical goals, are more like corporate groups in that their organizations resemble those of the host party in miniature form.

In both types of sub-party, a key defining characteristic of sub-party activity is that members have chosen to express dissatisfaction with the existing allocation of patronage resources or with the party's current ideological/strategic orientation through collective action within the party organization rather than by leaving the party. It is this

characteristic which leads us in Chapter Four to undertake a reconceptualization of this form of intra-party conflict from a broader perspective on organizational behaviour. But first, in the next chapter, we investigate attempts in the existing literature to account for the rise of intra-party conflict.

NOTES - CHAPTER TWO

1. Parts of this discussion are guided by the survey of attitudes toward party and faction in the eighteenth century by Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 3-13. On changing views of party in England at that time, see also Alan Beattie, ed., English Party Politics, Volume I 1600-1906 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970), Parts 1 & 2; and J.A.W. Gunn, Factions No More: Attitudes to Party in Government and Opposition in Eighteenth Century England (London: Frank Cass, 1972).
2. Dennis C. Beller & Frank P. Belloni, "The Study of Factions" in Belloni & Beller, eds., Faction Politics: Political Parties and Factions in Comparative Perspective (Santa Barbara, Ca: ABC-Clio Press, 1978), p. 4.
3. James Madison, "The Federalist No. 10" in Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, introduction by Clinton Rossiter (New York: New American Library, 1961), p. 77.
4. ibid., p. 78.
5. ibid., p. 77.
6. "Washington's Farewell Address, September 17, 1796" in Henry Steele Commager, ed., Documents of American History, Volume I: To 1898, seventh edition (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1963), p. 172.
7. Cited in Beattie, English Party Politics, Volume I, p. 19.
8. ibid., p. 20.
9. Lord Bolingbroke, "A Dissertation of Parties: Dedication" in The Works of ... Henry St. John, Lord Viscount Bolingbroke, edited by David Mallett (London: 1754/

Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1968), Volume II, p. 33.

10. Bolingbroke, "The Idea of a Patriot King" in The Works, Volume III, p. 83.
11. David Hume, "Of Parties in General", Essay VIII in David Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary (1742/London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 55.
12. ibid., pp. 58-59.
13. ibid., p. 56.
14. ibid., p. 61. Hume's critique of parties of religious principle is carried further in his essay "Of the Parties of Great Britain", Essay IX in Essays ..., pp. 63-74.
15. Edmund Burke, "Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents" in The Works of Edmund Burke (London: Oxford University Press, 1930), Volume II, p. 82.
16. ibid.
17. Avery Leiserson, Parties and Politics: An Institutional and Behavioral Approach (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958), p. 47.
18. Cited in Feliks Gross, The Revolutionary Party: Essays in the Sociology of Politics (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1974), fn. 8, p. 29. It should be noted, however, that Voltaire was not entirely consistent in maintaining this distinction between party and faction; see Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, p. 3 and fn. 1, p. 29.
19. The endurance of anti-party tendencies has been most marked in the United States where, according to one author, there has been a "widespread belief that political parties are, at best, unavoidable evils whose propensities for divisiveness, oligarchy, and corruption must be closely watched and sternly controlled." See Austin Ranney, Curing the Mischief of Faction: Party

Reform in America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), p. 22 and Chapter 2 passim. Elsewhere, see M.Y. Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Organisation of Political Parties, translated by F. Clarke, two volumes (London: Macmillan, 1902); and the analysis of the anti-party "ideology" of the Canadian farmers' movement of the 1920s in C.B. Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta: Social Credit and the Party System (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1958), Chapter 2.

20. Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, p. 25.
21. ibid. (Emphasis in original.)
22. ibid., pp. 26-26.
23. On the conceptualization of eighteenth century factions as "pre-parties" or "proto-parties", see William Nisbet Chambers, Political Parties in a New Nation: The American Experience, 1776-1809 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963); and Chambers, "Party Development and Party Action: The American Origins", Journal of History and Theory, vol. 3, no. 1, 1963, pp. 91-120.
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25. James C. Scott, "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia", American Political Science Review, vol. 66, no. 1, 1972, pp. 91-92.
26. See, for example, the discussion of "factions" in American Indian bands in Ralph Linton, The Study of Man: An Introduction (New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1936), p. 229.

27. Richard F. Salisbury and Marilyn Silverman, "An Introduction: Factions and the Dialectic" in Silverman & Salisbury, eds., A House Divided? Anthropological Studies of Factionalism, Memorial University of Newfoundland, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Social and Economic Papers No. 9 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press for Memorial University, 1977), esp. pp. 3-6.

28. See, for example, Bernard J. Siegel and Alan R. Beals, "Conflict and Factionalist Dispute", Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, vol. 90, 1960, pp. 107-117; and Siegel & Beals, "Pervasive Faction-alism", American Anthropologist, vol. 62, no. 3, 1960, pp. 394-417.

29. Siegel & Beals, "Conflict and Factionalist Dispute", p. 108.

30. See, for example, the discussion of alternative approaches in Salisbury & Silverman, "An Introduction: Factions and the Dialectic", pp. 7-16, and other papers in the same volume.

31. Ralph Nicholas, "Factions: A Comparative Analysis" in Michael Banton, ed., Political Systems and the Distribution of Power: ASA Monograph No. 2 (London: Tavistock Publications, 1965), p. 22.

32. ibid., pp. 27-29.

33. On this basis, Nicholas takes issue with Siegel & Beals ("Pervasive Factionalism", *op. cit.*) since they apply the term "factionalism" to divisions between corporate groups, such as lineage conflicts, thus "confus(ing) some non-factional kinds of social conflicts with factionalism". See Nicholas, "Factions: A Comparative Analysis", fn. 7, p. 59.

34. Ralph W. Nicholas, "Segmentary Factional Political Systems" in Marc J. Swartz, Victor W. Turner, and Arthur Tuden, eds., Political Anthropology (Chicago: Aldine, 1966), p. 56.

35. Rene Lemarchand and Keith Legg, "Political Clientelism and Development: A Preliminary Analysis", Comparative Politics, vol. 4, no. 2, 1972, pp. 151-152.
36. A similar view of clientelist factions is central to the analysis by Norman K. Nicholson, "The Factional Model and the Study of Politics", Comparative Political Studies, vol. 5, no. 3, 1972, pp. 291-314.
37. Lemarchand and Legg, "Political Clientelism and Development" p. 152.
38. Scott, "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change", p. 96.
39. ibid., pp. 105-107; Lemarchand & Legg, "Political Clientelism and Development", pp. 167-168.
40. See, among others, Carl H. Lande, Leaders, Factions, and Parties: The Structure of Philippine Politics, Monograph Series, no. 6 (New Haven: Yale University, Southeast Asia Studies, 1964); Rene Lemarchand, "Political Clientelism and Ethnicity in Tropical Africa" American Political Science Review, vol. 66, no. 1, 1972, pp. 68-90; K.G. Machado, "Continuity and Change in Philippine Factionalism" in Belloni & Beller, eds., Faction Politics, pp. 193-217.
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46. Haruhiro Fukui, "Japan: Factionalism in a Dominant Party System" in Belloni and Beller, eds., Faction Politics, pp. 43-72; Nobutaka Ike, Japanese Politics: Patron-Client Democracy, 2nd edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972) Ch. 8; Robert A. Scalapino and Junnosuke Masumi, Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962), esp. Ch. III.
47. Nicholas, "Factions: A Comparative Analysis", p. 26.
48. Fukui, "Japan: Factionalism in a Dominant Party System", p. 50.
49. See, for example, Scalapino and Masumi, Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan, pp. 18-19, 81; Bradley M. Richardson and Scott C. Flanagan, Politics in Japan (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1984), pp. 100-106.
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51. V.O. Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), pp. 15-18, 298-311; Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups, fourth edition (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1958), pp. 318-324; Duverger, Political Parties, pp. 120-121 and passim.

52. Zariski, "Party Factions ... Some Preliminary Observations", p. 32.
53. For comparison, see Duverger's concentric circles of "militants", "supporters" and "electors" in Duverger, Political Parties, p. 90, or Hennessy's four classes of "visible leaders", "activists", "supporters" and "voters" in Bernard Hennessy, "On the Study of Party Organization" in William J. Crotty, ed., Approaches to the Study of Party Organization (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1968), p. 17.
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58. David Hine, "Factionalism in West European Parties: A Framework for Analysis", West European Politics, vol. 5, no. 1, 1982, p. 39. (Emphasis in original).
59. Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, p. 75.
60. Giovanni Sartori, "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics", American Political Science Review, vol. 64, no. 4, 1970, pp. 1033-1053.
61. Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, p. 73.

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63. Zariski, "Party Factions ... Some Preliminary Observations", p. 28.
64. Raphael Zariski, "Party Factions and Comparative Politics: Some Empirical Findings" in Belloni and Beller, eds., Faction Politics, p. 20.
65. Thomas H. Roback and Judson L. James, "Party Factions in the United States" in Belloni and Beller, eds., Faction Politics, p. 340.
66. Alan Zuckerman, Political Clienteles in Power: Party Factions and Cabinet Coalitions in Italy, Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics, No. 01-055 (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1975), p. 20; Zariski, "Party Factions ... Some Preliminary Observations", p. 34.
67. Roback and James, "Party Factions in the United States", p. 340.
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 75. Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, p. 91. On the victory of party organization over the "anti-party" forces in DC, see Robert Leonardi, "Political Power Linkages in Italy: The Nature of the Christian Democratic Party Organization" in Kay Lawson, ed., Political Parties and Linkages: A Comparative Perspective (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), pp. 249-251.
 76. Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, p. 91.
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 79. Mark Jenkins, Bevanism: Labour's High Tide (Nottingham: Spokesman Books, 1979).
 80. On factionalism in the French Socialist Party, see David S. Bell, "Currents, Characters and Candidates" in David S. Bell and Eric Shaw, eds., The Left in France: Towards the Socialist Republic (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1983), pp. 45-62; or Bruce A. Campbell and Sue Ellen M. Charlton, "The Ambiguity of Faction: Fragmentation and Polarization in France" in Belloni and Beller, eds., Faction Politics, esp. pp. 147-150. On CERES in particular, see David Hanley, "CERES - An Open

Conspiracy?" in Bell and Shaw, eds., The Left in France, pp. 99-125.

81. See Samuel Barnes, Party Democracy: Politics in an Italian Socialist Federation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967); Frank P. Belloni, "Faction-alism, the Party System, and Italian Politics" in Belloni and Beller, eds., Faction Politics, esp. pp. 88-93; Raphael Zariski, "The Italian Socialist Party: A Case Study in Factional Conflict", American Political Science Review, vol. 56, no. 2, 1962, pp. 372-390.
82. Gerard Braunthal, "The West German Social Democrats: Factionalism at the Local Level", West European Politics, vol. 7, no. 1, 1984, pp. 47-64.
83. See the discussion of the effects of party competition on sub-party factionalism in Chapter 3.

Chapter Three

"EXPLAINING" SUB-PARTY FACTIONALISM:

A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Political scientists studying the incidence of factionalism within western political parties have produced a sizeable number of case studies which seek to describe and account for individual examples of intra-party conflict. As we noted in our introduction, however, the authors of many of these studies have couched their explanations of factionalism in terms of variables specific to a particular society or political system: consequently, attempts to replicate their propositions and explanatory frameworks in other settings have often failed, and in some cases produce directly contradictory findings. Nonetheless, some of the hypotheses and variables introduced by these studies may be capable of integration into a broader theoretical perspective on sub-party conflict. In this chapter, therefore, we undertake a review of empirical research on the emergence of sub-party factionalism, highlighting a number of plausible generalizations and key variables as well as some of the apparent contradictions arising from their application in diverse socio-political contexts.

Our first task is to devise some means of bringing order to the multiplicity of propositions and variables encountered in existing studies of sub-party factionalism. Other authors seeking to do so have categorized them according to one of two dimensions. The first is similar to the distinction between "structural conduciveness" and "structural strain" found in Neil Smelser's value-added model for the analysis of social movements and other forms of uninstitutionalized collective behaviour.¹ David Hine, for example, distinguishes between "'static' or 'structural' incentives to intra-party conflict" (conduciveness) and "trends and cycles in intra-party conflict" which are the products of the more dynamic forces (sources of strain or precipitating events) that serve as catalysts for the emergence of factional behaviour.²

A second mode of classification is the grouping of variables or propositions according to the level of analysis, or set of relationships, from which they are derived. Thus Zariski differentiates three levels of potential explanations based upon relations between "factions and the host party" "factions and the party system" and "factions and society".³ To simplify matters, however, Zariski's three categories may conveniently be reduced to two - namely, intra-party ("factions and the host party") and extra-party relationships.

For the immediate purpose of reviewing the literature on the emergence of party factionalism, both bases of classification may be usefully employed. By combining the

level of analysis dimension with Hine's dichotomy between static/structural incentives and more dynamic forces (or catalysts), we may identify four categories of variables and propositions offered by existing studies: a) extra-party structural incentives, b) intra-party structural incentives, c) extra-party catalysts and d) intra-party catalysts (see Figure 3.1 for illustrative examples).

EXTRA-PARTY STRUCTURAL INCENTIVES

Structural or static variables are rarely, in themselves, the "cause" of intra-party conflict. Rather, they constitute the nature of the environment which may facilitate, or retard, the emergence of factionalism. Thus, extra-party structural incentives are those characteristics of the wider socio-economic or political environment within which parties function that encourage, or at least do not actively inhibit, the development of intra-party conflict. Variables in this category include social and cultural norms governing political association and behaviour, and the spatial distribution of socio-economic characteristics among the electorate. However, of more immediate political significance are the structure of party competition and, especially, the electoral system.

**FIGURE 3.1 - FOUR CATEGORIES OF VARIABLES IN THE
EXPLANATION OF SUB-PARTY FACTIONALISM**

Categories	Variables
Structural Incentives	Extra-Party Electoral system; Party system; Cultural and socio-economic environments
	Intra-Party Party structure and organization; Procedural norms; Structural and social/ psychological controls
Catalysts	Extra-Party Electoral change; Changes in party competition; Economic and political events
	Intra-Party Changes in party membership; Generational conflict; Changes in party policy

Source: see text

Factions and the Electoral System

Certain varieties of electoral system may serve as structural incentives to factionalism. According to David Hine: "Any electoral system which places in the hands of the voters not just a choice between parties but also a choice between candidates of the same party, carries within it the seeds of intra-party conflict."⁴ For example, in Japan, the single non-transferable vote in multi-member constituencies forces candidates of the same party to compete for votes; hence, each of the contending factions in the LDP mobilizes resources to maximize its membership in the Diet (parliamentary) party.⁵ Opportunities for voters to express preferences for individual candidates in proportional representation systems may also serve to facilitate or institutionalize factional competition. This potential has been realized in Italy where, in the Christian Democratic and Socialist parties, "the struggle for preference votes is frequently the most organised and hard-fought part of the entire election" but not in other countries with preferential voting systems, such as Belgium, Denmark or the Republic of Ireland.⁶ Finally, among electoral systems which force candidates of the same party to compete for votes, the American primary system may also be conducive to factional activity. The primary system permits rival factions of the same party to engage in a contest of electoral strength without splitting the vote and possibly allowing the other

party to win. And, under certain conditions, the intra-party primary has often been of more significance than the official inter-party election in shaping political forces. Thus, according to Bradley Canon, in the one-party dominant systems of the American South: "There is no doubt that ... the impact of the primary structure is paramount over that of Republican strength in determining the extent of factionalism within the Democratic Party."

The primary system in the United States is probably less a cause of factionalism than a means of institutionalizing and giving electoral expression to factional conflicts within political parties, in a political system in which there are structural disincentives against forming 'third' parties. In contrast, "pure" forms of proportional representation, such as the national party list systems of Israel and the Netherlands are, it might be argued, least likely to be associated with durable sub-party factions because there are so few disincentives against party schisms. Low thresholds of representation in pure proportionality systems permit aspirants to party leadership or dissenters from the ideology of an existing party to establish their own party lists, secure in the knowledge that the electoral system will not discriminate against them. Thus both Israel and the Netherlands are examples of extreme multi-party systems, with numerous small parties which have split off from larger ones as a result of factional disputes.'

Few analysts of party factionalism discuss the effects of the first-past-the-post (or simple majority) system of election used in Britain and Canada on the emergence of intra-party conflict (in part, perhaps, because these countries have not been viewed as fertile ground for research on factions). However, we would suggest that the first-past-the-post system may indirectly favour sub-party factionalism since its tendency to discriminate against small parties would serve as a disincentive against dis-affected party members from breaking away to form their own electoral organizations.' Instead, it tends to encourage party mergers rather than schisms and to favour the emergence of broad coalitions of disparate interests which are more liable to intra-party factional dispute than the smaller, relatively more homogeneous parties found in many proportional systems. Moreover, the unsuccessful record of most breakaway 'third' parties in the English-speaking democracies may serve as an incentive for party dissidents to pursue factional activity within a host party rather than pursue their preferred policies or strategies under a separate banner.

Factions and the Party System

Insofar as it may be viewed as relatively permanent, and as being independent of the electoral system, the structure of party competition or the nature of the party system may contribute to the emergence of factionalism and, in addition,

may help to determine the nature of factional competition within political parties.

Evidence from one-party-dominant systems in the American south and in some Indian states suggests that, in the absence of effective external competition, dominant parties demonstrate a marked tendency towards intra-party conflict, especially among clientelist or leadership factions competing for patronage resources controlled by the party by virtue of its dominant position.¹⁰

A multi-party system, on the other hand, increases both the number of electoral opponents and the number of alliance strategies open to each party, and therefore increases the probability of factional competition among policy sub-parties. Thus, the multiple alliance possibilities confronting the Italian Socialist Party have resulted in a number of competing sub-parties which have differed with respect to ideology and their attitudes towards coalition formation.¹¹ And in the Christian Democratic Party (DC), policy sub-parties supporting alliances with left-wing rivals compete with the leadership sub-parties seeking control of patronage resources bestowed by the DC's near-dominant position in the party system.¹²

In a two-party system, however, there is a more limited range of strategic choice. Hence, conflict between policy sub-parties is likely to be bifactional in nature (rather than the multi-factional alignments of parties in multi-party systems) and "there is more pressure on factions to compromise

their differences rather than risk handing the next election to the opposition".¹³

Factions and Society

Certain characteristics of the wider society in which a party functions may also serve as structural incentives to the emergence of factional behaviour.

First, it has been suggested that particular cultural norms governing social relations may be conducive to the emergence of leadership sub-parties. As we have already noted, in traditional or agrarian societies, the highly personal nature of social relations may encourage the development of clientelist factions based on local patron-client linkages. Where these cultural norms have survived the transition to more modern democratic politics, clientelist factions often remain the primary basis of political association and allegiance and parties are frequently little more than loose coalitions or confederations of factions for the purpose of fighting elections. This is clearly the case in the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party, discussed in Chapter Two, and, for example, in both Colombia and Uruguay, where the apparent stability of two-party systems serves to disguise the true basis of political competition among multiple clientelist factions.¹⁴

Elsewhere, although parties have become the primary units of political and electoral competition, residual cultural

values supportive of patronage/clientelism, especially in agrarian regions, have contributed to the appearance of leadership sub-parties. In Italy, for example, the survival of clientelist values in the predominantly agricultural south may well provide a social basis for the emergence of leadership sub-parties in the Christian Democratic Party, and the persistence of clientelist factionalism in the Democratic Party politics of the southern United States has also been attributed to the maintenance of values supportive of patronage and personalist relations.¹⁵

The United States may also serve as an example of the effect on intra-party politics of the wider socio-economic environment. The emergence of policy sub-parties may be facilitated by uneven economic development and the uneven distribution on a spatial basis of socio-economic variables such as class, ethnicity or religious identification. In this context, vote-maximizing political parties are forced to adopt a very broad platform or to make a variety of appeals to different social groups or to different parts of the country; in either case, there will be a tendency towards increased debate over ideology and/or strategy within the party. Hence, policy differences within the American Congressional parties frequently revolve around the regional implications of government trade and industrial policies, while factionalism in state parties has frequently reflected divisions between rural interests and urban machines.¹⁶ In Belgium, the effect

of regionalism has been even more profound in that the regional-linguistic wings or factions within each of the three major parties have increasingly acted as if they were separate parties, especially in the process of governmental coalition-building.¹⁷

INTRA-PARTY STRUCTURAL INCENTIVES

The second major group of variables or hypotheses raised by the existing literature consists of the structural or static incentives to factionalism at the intra-party level which serve to encourage, or at least do not inhibit, the development of factional activity. This cluster includes propositions which incorporate variables relating to party structure and organization, internal procedural norms, and the role of leadership and ideology in imposing controls or constraints in the behaviour of party members.

Factions and Party Organization

First, it may be hypothesized that opportunities for factional activity will vary according to the nature of party structure. If we take as a basis for discussion Duverger's four-fold classification of ideal types,¹⁸ it might be expected that caucus parties would be most prone to competition among leadership sub-parties based on clientelist relations between party notables and their respective groups of supporters; ideological and strategic (policy) factionalism would be more

likely to occur in mass parties based on *branch* structure, e.g., social democratic or nationalist parties; and that sub-party factionalism is least likely to arise in the rigid hierarchical structures of Duverger's *cell* (communist parties) and *militia* types, where communication flows are controlled by the leadership and discipline is imposed through the doctrine of democratic centralism or via quasi-military command structures. Thus in the Italian party system, for example, "the only parties not significantly factionalized are those on the extremes of the political spectrum: the [neo-fascist] MSI and especially the [communist] PCI",¹⁹ while the policy sub-parties of the socialist PSI and the clientelist factions of the Christian Democrats may reflect their structures, based on the branch and the caucus respectively. However, as we shall see below, some of this variation may also be attributed to differences in ideology and other structural controls on the behaviour of party members.

Perhaps more important as a structural incentive to factionalism may be the degree of decentralization of power within the party organization. In highly decentralized parties, where local units (branches or constituency associations) enjoy substantial autonomy over internal affairs, finances and nominations for party and public office, the opportunities for factional activity are multiplied. This may be ascribed to the increased number of access points or arenas for sub-party conflict, and to the possibility of

winning control over local branches (even when in a minority position in the party as a whole) to provide organizational, financial and communications resources for use in the pursuit of goals within the party. The extreme decentralization of American party structures has been cited by a number of authors as contributing to factional conflict in the United States,²⁰ while reforms which strengthened the constituency branches of the British Labour Party (including the power to subject MPs to reselection) were associated with an intensification of factionalism in the early 1980s.²¹ And the effects of decentralization may be even more marked by affiliation to the party of semi-autonomous organizations such as trade unions, co-operative movements or religious associations. In parties such as the Labour Party or the Italian Christian Democrats, these organizations may pursue factional activity in their own right or be encouraged "to use financial power and activists to help politicians and factions sympathetic to their views."²²

Factions and Procedural Norms

Factional activity may be further facilitated by certain types of procedural norms with respect to the organization and management of intra-party affairs. Where there exists a commitment to internal party democracy and the equality of members, and especially where the leadership is formally subject to control by the mass party organization (as in most

social democratic parties), procedural norms serve to legitimize the discussion of policy, tactics and the performance of party leaders.

And procedural norms may sometimes be translated into formal mechanisms to ensure representation of minority views inside the party. Thus, the adoption of proportional representation for intra-party elections, or at least the existence of a "proportional mentality" within the party, may serve to institutionalize factional activity if not always to increase the number of sub-party factions.²³ In the French socialist party (SFIO/PS), for example, the suspension of proportional representation for elections to the party's leading organs from 1945 to 1971 ensured that factionalism was "denied any encouragement from internal electoral procedures."²⁴ The reintroduction of a modified form of proportionality in 1971 helped to institutionalize a number of factions representing different ideological and strategic perspectives; however, as we shall explain further below, this pattern of factionalism has shifted since the election of Mitterand to the Presidency. Similarly, in Australia, the emergence of "national" factions (displacing the old state machines) in the ruling Labour Party (ALP) has been attributed in part to "the imposition of proportional representation for election to important decision-making bodies" within the party.²⁵

In contrast, in parties which run their internal affairs according to majoritarian principles, we may expect bifactionalism to be more common than multifactional competition and that intra-party conflict will more frequently result in the secession (or perhaps the expulsion) of the minority. Thus factionalism within the British Labour Party has typically displayed a bipolar form with organized left and right wing factions vying for the support of a broad centrist "tendency". In recent years, "winner-take-all" majoritarianism has led to the secession of the Social Democrats and to the purge of the far-left Militant Tendency from the party.

In its most extreme form, majoritarianism may give way to democratic centralism, a set of procedural norms which effectively preclude any lasting or organized dissent from the official party line. In Italy, for example, the emergence of permanent factions in the socialist PSI coincided with the relaxation of democratic centralist norms within the party in the 1950s.²⁶ In contrast, the Italian Communist Party (PCI) has retained democratic centralism within the party while embracing Eurocommunism, in part, it has been suggested, because the party leaders fear that increased intra-party democracy will give rise to the disruption and paralysis often associated with factional activity in their Socialist and Christian Democratic rivals.²⁷ Although it has been argued that "would-be monolithic parties tend to be prone to

factionalism"" rarely are formally organized or enduring sub-parties found in western communist parties. Rather, it is usually the case that dissatisfied elements secede, or are expelled, from the host party and establish alternative left-wing movements and minor parties, although an exception to this general rule is found in the Finnish Communist Party where rival "majority" and "minority" factions have debated ideology and strategy since the mid-1960s.²⁹ And although intra-party conflict is endemic among the single parties of communist party states, democratic centralism ensure that this is largely restricted to competition among leadership sub-parties or clienteles rather than open debate among groups espousing alternative policy views.³⁰

Factions and the Absence of Structural Controls

Finally among static intra-party incentives, it has been argued that the absence of structural or social controls on the behaviour of members may facilitate the emergence of factional activity within a political party or movement. For example, in his analysis of the Social Credit movement in Quebec, Michael Stein suggests that in most political organizations,

differences over strategy and tactics are generally resolved through normal mechanisms of conflict resolution and control. For example, structural controls such as formal systems of rewards and punishments for loyal and disloyal behaviour are often applied. ... Social controls are also imposed through inculcation of attitudes of loyalty to the leadership and the organization. Psychological

controls are applied by invoking the authority of a charismatic leader or a doctrine ..."

According to Stein, the absence of these structural, social and psychological controls in the Social Credit movement was associated with severe internal factionalism, often resulting in schism. In parties and movements which are able to mobilize these controls, however, factional conflict can usually be contained within manageable limits, if not suppressed altogether. In particular, the leaders of governing parties can use political patronage to reward loyalty or withhold ministerial positions as a form of punishment for conflictual behaviour. In British-style parliamentary systems, governing parties may also fall back upon the doctrine of collective Cabinet responsibility to muzzle or unite the leaders of rival sub-parties. But the immediate potency of these controls is weakened or absent when a major party is in opposition. Thus, a recurring pattern may be observed in the British Labour Party whereby factional tensions which have been contained in government erupt into overt conflict when the party returns to opposition.³²

The recent problems of the Labour Party notwithstanding, it might also be expected that parties in the two-party systems may be less prone to factionalism, other things being equal, in that they can inculcate loyalty to the party and a sense of unity in the face of a powerful and easily identifiable common enemy. Hence, social control through peer

group pressure, rather than structural rewards and sanctions wielded by the party leader or officials, may be a source of group cohesion and a constraint on factional behaviour."

Other political parties and movements may be united by a social or psychological commitment to a particular leader or to a clearly articulated doctrine which brooks no argument or reinterpretation. Charismatic leaders or 'founding fathers' of parties may enjoy such legitimacy that challenges to their positions or policies earn little support within the party. On the other hand, as these leaders near retirement, sub-parties may emerge to support rival candidates struggling for the succession. Until the late 1950s, the West German Christian Democratic Union (CDU) appeared united behind the leadership of Konrad Adenauer, but once the task of building the party was completed, the *Fronde* faction began to work for the replacement of the octogenarian Chancellor by Ludwig Erhard. Erhard, however, was seen by many Christian Democrats as a temporary replacement and, once Adenauer had stepped down, a leadership struggle began among rival factions which has never been successfully resolved."

Finally, ideology may also play a role in constraining or facilitating factional competition. In doctrinaire parties where the primary *raison d'être* of party membership is adherence to the tenets of its ideology, dissidents from the party line are more likely to leave the organization than indulge in factional activity within it. Again, this factor

may help to account for the relative scarcity of sub-party activity in western communist parties. In pragmatic catch-all parties or movements with vaguely articulated objectives, however, the probability of conflict over both goals and strategy is increased in the absence of the psychological constraints imposed by a guiding ideology. Thus, the abandonment of even a theoretical commitment to orthodox Marxism by most West European social democratic parties in the 1950s has been associated with the subsequent emergence of intra-party conflict as rival sub-parties compete to influence the programs and alliance strategies these parties will pursue.

EXTRA-PARTY CATALYSTS

While the static or structural incentives discussed in the two previous sections help to determine the structure of opportunities for the mobilization of sub-party factions in western political parties, other variables may be derived from the literature which have been viewed as the catalysts which precipitate factional activity. Among changes in the extra-party environment which may lead to the emergence or intensification of factional conflict are changes in the political (especially electoral) fortunes of the host party and shifts in the relative strengths of other parties with which it is in competition. In addition, events in the wider

politico-economic environment may also serve as external stimuli to sub-party conflict.

Factions and Electoral Change

Perhaps the most normal expectation with respect to the relationship between political fortunes and intra-party conflict might be that the emergence or intensification of factionalism is most likely to be associated with a serious electoral decline (i.e., a significant loss of votes and/or seats) as party members seek to apportion blame for the defeat and to reorient the party towards recovery. Clearly, this is the case for the British Labour Party in that electoral defeats are frequently followed by a period of recrimination over the party's failings in office for which it has been 'punished' by the voters.⁵ While Labour's internal debates tend to revolve around policy (ideology or strategy) rather than leadership, the Canadian Progressive Conservative Party, for example, is often subjected to temporarily organized leadership factionalism as the party indulges in its well-known tendency to "eat its leaders" after another electoral defeat.⁶

In some cases, however, it may take more than one electoral disappointment for sub-party conflict to take root. A party in the electoral doldrums, making very little progress over a number of elections, may eventually develop internal tensions, especially if other dynamic factors come into play.

In the West German Social Democratic Party in the 1950s, electoral stagnation combined with the growing hegemony of the Christian Democratic Union to produce conflict over the party program, its statement of fundamental principles; and even after the adoption of the new, more moderate, Bad Godesberg program in 1959, a significant minority within the party continued to urge a return to 'more orthodox' socialist ideology.³⁷

Given the euphoria that usually overtakes members of a party that has just won a resounding electoral success, it might be expected that recently victorious parties would be least prone to factional strife. However, at least one study suggests that an electoral breakthrough may be a precursor to factionalism. Wellhofer and Hennessey found that, in the Argentine Socialist Party, electoral success raised expectations of advancement to national leadership positions among lower-level party members.³⁸ When these aspirations were not fulfilled, frustrated members then mobilized around current ideological disputes within the party to create factions and schisms.

In other cases, electoral success and proximity to power has led to a shift in the basis of factional behaviour. In the French *Parti Socialiste*, with the exception of the left-wing CERES group, the basis of factionalism has shifted in the 1980s from ideological and policy issues to leadership competition as clienteles cluster around rival aspirants

seeking to succeed Mitterand as President of the Republic." A similar phenomenon occurred in the Italian Socialist Party during Mr. Craxi's period as Prime Minister as the exigencies of being a "real" governing party (rather than merely a junior coalition partner) led to a diminution of ideological and strategic conflict and increased competition for patronage resources among the provincial federations of the party.⁴⁰

Depending on the circumstances, then, it would seem that factionalism may result from electoral defeat, electoral stagnation, or even from electoral success! Moreover, electoral change may also be associated with a shift in the basis of factional activity within a political party. Clearly, the effect of changes in electoral behaviour on the fortunes of the host party is not, in itself, a sound predictor of the likelihood of factional activity. Perhaps more than any other variable considered in this chapter, the impact of electoral change demonstrates the need for a broader perspective on the explanation of sub-party factionalism.

Factions and the Electoral Fortunes of Rival Parties

In addition to changes in the electoral fortunes of the host party itself, it has been suggested that the emergence and nature of factional competition in one party is associated with the relative strengths of other parties in the system. Once again, however, in the limited contexts in which hypothesized relationships have been tested, the empirical

evidence is mixed. In the British Labour Party in the 1960s, Berrington has reported, there was a higher propensity to nominate left-wing candidates (and, therefore, we may assume that left-wing factions or tendencies were stronger) in those parts of the country where the Conservative Party was dominant.⁴¹ In Italy, Zariski and Tarrow both found moderate positive relationships in some regions between polarizing (left-wing) tendencies in the Socialist Party (PSI) and the strength of competing parties. In other regions, however, this relationship was very weak or the strength of left-wing factions was inversely correlated to the hostility of the political environment defined in terms of the level of support for rival parties.⁴²

It would seem that the relative strengths of rival parties, and changes in their support, might plausibly influence the emergence and structure of factional activity in the host party in a number of ways, according to the nature of party competition. In the near two-party context of Berrington's study, we may hypothesize that, as the mainstream of the Labour Party shifted towards the centre of the political spectrum in accordance with Downsian rationality,⁴³ disaffected members of the left-wing found it easiest to organize and secure candidate nominations in regions where the host party was weakest, that is, where the rival Conservatives were strongest.

However, in multi-party situations, a number of possibilities emerge, especially where the host party faces competition on at least two fronts. In Figure 3.2, below, we assume that the host party (Party 'X') is adjacent on the party/ideological spectrum to two other parties - Party 'A', which is growing stronger, and Party 'B' which is in electoral decline. In these circumstances it might be hypothesized, first, that the increasing strength of Party 'A' will encourage the development of a policy sub-party on the "opposite" side of the host party, seeking to re-orient the strategy of Party X in such a way that it can take advantage of the weakness of Party 'B', and perhaps supplant it.

Alternatively, it is equally plausible that, sensing a trend in public opinion towards the position represented by Party 'A', a faction will emerge within Party 'X' seeking to shift it in the same direction to remain congruent with voters' attitudes. And a third possibility is that Party 'X' will divide on both fronts, with one faction espousing a shift towards Party 'B' in an attempt to capitalize on its weakness while a second sub-party seeks to ride the tide of political contagion towards Party 'A', resulting in factional polarization within the host party.

Given the strategic position of the Italian Socialist Party, located on the party spectrum between the Communist Party and the Christian Democrats, it is perhaps not

**FIGURE 3.2 - FACTIONALISM AND THE STRENGTH OF
COMPETING PARTIES: THREE MODELS**

Source: see text.

surprising that Zariski and Tarrow found no simple causal relationship between the strengths of rival parties and the strength of left-wing factions within the PSI! While it appears plausible that there may be a relationship between factional developments in one party and the electoral fortunes of its rivals, in the absence of a broader theoretical perspective on sub-party formation the nature of this relationship cannot be clearly specified on the basis of the existing literature.

Factions and Economic or Political Events

Last among extra-party catalysts to sub-party factionalism are those events or changes in the wider economic and political environment which may cause tensions to emerge or be exacerbated among party members. Such events may occur on a world-wide scale. The First World War, for example, created conflict or schisms in many social democratic parties which were "rent by the conflicting loyalties of patriotism on the one hand and anti-capitalism and pacifism on the other".⁴ This was particularly the case in the German SPD, where the party leadership's support for the war effort met growing resistance, resolved only by the expulsion in 1917 of the anti-war dissidents, many of whom subsequently constituted first the Independent Social Democratic Party (USPD) and, in 1918, the revolutionary Communist Party.⁴ The economic dislocations of the Great Depression "produced tensions in

bourgeois parties in societies as different as Norway, Germany and Spain"" and the threat of fascism in the 1930s created further crises in parties of both left and right.

More recently, the Cold War and the subsequent escalation of the nuclear arms race have led to the emergence of sub-party factions in a number of left-wing parties, resulting in further schisms in some cases - for example, the Dutch Pacifist Socialist Party split from the Labour Party in 1956 over the latter's support for Dutch membership of NATO" - while western communist parties have been rendered vulnerable to division and secession by the events of the 20th Congress of the CPSU and the Soviet-led invasions of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan."

Environmental catalysts may also be more national in scope. Most likely to cause intra-party conflict are constitutional problems, questions of national sovereignty or other issues which traditionally cut across party lines. In France, in the 1950s, the debate over the European Defence Community and the Algeria crisis provoked intra-party conflict in a number of parties, most notably in the socialist SFIO." In the early 1970s, the prospect of British accession to the European Communities, and especially the referendum on continued membership, led initially to the emergence of pro- and anti-European issue-groups, rather than factions, in both major parties, but the failure of many in the Labour Party to accept the resolution of the issue after 1975 was one of the

major factors underlying the growing factionalism in the late 1970s and the subsequent defection of the Social Democrats.⁵⁰ Norwegian parties were similarly beset by internal conflict over the issue of Community membership in the early 1970s and both the Labour Party and the Liberal Party suffered schisms as a consequence.⁵¹ And questions of domestic rather than external sovereignty led to a minor fission in the British Labour Party in 1975 when two MPs defected from the party over the Labour government's handling of the devolution issue to establish a separate Scottish Labour Party.⁵²

INTRA-PARTY CATALYSTS

Finally in our review of explanations of factionalism we come to those changes occurring within a political party organization which may provoke intra-party conflict and the emergence of sub-party factions. In this category, variables include changes in the party's membership base, the emergence of new generations of political activists and changes in party policy or leadership.

Factions and Changes in Party Membership

Some authors have pointed to the growing heterogeneity of the membership of a political party or social movement as a catalyst to factional activity.⁵³ This factor may help to explain the apparent paradox, noted earlier, of factional discontent emerging within party organizations after electoral

successes as well as failure. As a political party becomes more successful and grows in size, it does so partly by attracting new members and activists who may be drawn from socio-economic backgrounds or possess ideological orientations much more diverse in nature than those of the relatively small, relatively homogeneous, core of original founders and activists. As the membership base becomes increasingly diverse, pressure may be imposed upon party leaders to accommodate the interests of new members or to modify tactics and ideological principles; some, for example, may urge a radicalization of the party while others seek to capitalize on its success by moderating policies to attract even more potential voters and members. This tendency is particularly marked in protest parties and other movement-type parties, such as the Quebec Social Credit movement studied by Stein,⁵⁴ but may also be observed in the histories of more orthodox electoral parties such as Democrats '66 in the Netherlands.

In similar vein, it has been suggested that one factor commonly associated with factionalism is the establishment of a party by means of "a union or merger of several predecessor parties, which may continue to maintain some semblance of organization and identity within the newly formed party, as its factions."⁵⁵ When two or more parties or groups merge to form a new party, potential sub-party factions already possess leaders, formal or informal networks of communication and a sense of cohesion or common identity from their former

existence as distinct organizations. Moreover, recognition of their separate identities is often a precondition of agreement to the merger. Hence, the creation of the French *Parti Socialiste* in 1969 by a merger of the old SFIO and a number of socialist political clubs was partly conditional upon the adoption by the new party of procedures to ensure the representation of minority sub-party views.³⁶ The origins of leadership factionalism among Italian Christian Democrats can be traced to the formation of the party after World War Two from the remnants of a number of pre-fascist parties and interest groups whose leaders maintained networks of supporters and became faction heads in the new party.³⁷ Similarly, the structure of sub-party factional competition in the early years of the Israel Labor Party closely paralleled the relative strengths of the three formerly separate parties from which it was constituted in 1968.³⁸ In each of these cases, wholly new parties, created by mergers of previously independent entities, tended to develop sub-party factional systems which reflect their origins as formalized coalitions.

While this discussion of the effects of party origins may perhaps appear more appropriate to the category of "intra-party structural incentives", its relevance here becomes apparent when it is extended to consider the situation in which an existing party absorbs a second, or at least inherits many of its activists and voters. In part, tensions may arise

from the more general problem of the increased heterogeneity of party membership but, in addition, where a group of members or activists move *en bloc* from one party to another, they usually bring with them a commonality of interest or values and an informal communications network which may serve as the basis for factional organization inside their new party. Samuel Barnes, for example, has described how the entry into the Italian Socialist Party of many former members of the short-lived Action Party contributed to the emergence of factionalism in the Arezzo provincial federation of the PSI in the late 1940s.⁵⁹ A second possible example was the effective absorption by the West German CDU of the Refugee Party (*Bund der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten* - BHE) in the 1950s, in that refugee organizations have continued to contribute to intra-party debates on defence policy and relations with eastern Europe, although they have tended to act more as issue-groups than permanent and broadly-based sub-party factions.

A related phenomenon is the emergence of factionalism as a consequence of a deliberate strategy of "entryism", where members of a small organized group collectively infiltrate a political party in order to use its organizational and financial resources to pursue their own goals. The British Labour Party and other social democratic parties have frequently been the targets of entryist strategies by Trotskyite and other revolutionary social groups.⁶⁰

Factions and Generational Conflict

Among the dimensions of intra-party conflict, a common source of sub-party factionalism is conflict between political generations. According to David Hine:

Cyclical patterns of intra-party conflict may also arise in parties as a result of generational change in leadership. Conflict can arise either temporarily, through a succession struggle, or over a longer period if the habits of discipline and group loyalty of one generation are less strong than those of the preceding one, or if the style of leadership itself changes."⁶¹

Of course, it is not always easy to disentangle the dimensions of sub-party conflict in such a way that a pure "generational effect" can be identified. Most conflicts between young and old, or newer and long-established, members of a party will be based upon (or at least legitimated in terms of) ideological or tactical challenges to the existing leadership. However, the generational effect may certainly exacerbate other differences and may also exercise a degree of independent causality insofar as the younger/newer generation does not share the attitudes of deference or group loyalty displayed by the rest of the party.

Thus Paul Whiteley found in his study of the ideological crisis in the British Labour Party that both age and political experience were related to individual ideological leadings - younger, but especially less experienced Labour activists were more likely to adhere to left-wing attitudes and to be more critical of the policies of the parliamentary leadership

- and hypothesized that they were able to maintain radical attitudes because they were more insulated from the dominant value system of British politics.⁶² Many other West European social democratic parties faced generational challenges in the 1960s as a new type of socialist activist emerged; young, university-educated, often professionals and/or employed in the public sector, these members opposed the moderate reformist strategies of party leaders and advocated a return to socialist principles.

In the Dutch PvdA, for example, the *New Left* faction successfully penetrated the upper echelons of the party, resulting in greater internal democracy, more radical policy platforms and a new alliance strategy.⁶³ In this case, many of the older, more conservative members, who were angered by the direction the party was taking under *New Left* influence, seceded from the PvdA to establish their own party, the Democratic Socialists '70. In the West German SPD, however, "moderate" social democrats stayed to resist the challenge of the *Jusos* (Young Socialists), leading to a long period of factional infighting which severely weakened the party's organizational and membership base, especially in major cities such as Munich and Frankfurt, and left it ill-prepared to combat the rise of neo-conservatism and the Green movement in the 1980s.⁶⁴ Moreover, although the examples cited above refer to the formation of policy sub-parties (in that dispute centred primarily on ideological or strategic issues),

generational conflict may also manifest itself in the emergence or exacerbation of leadership factionalism as younger party activists seek a share of power or patronage resources controlled by an older generation of leaders.

Factions and Changes in Party Policy

Last among the intra-party catalysts to factionalism is the influence of shifts in party policy or changes in the party's internal procedures. While rarely a direct cause of tension or conflict within a party, these factors may serve as "the last straw" which prompts members dissatisfied with the direction of a party to organize themselves as a sub-party or, ultimately, to resort to schismatic behaviour - in other words, they may be the catalysts which lead to the transformation of an unorganized "tendency" into a formally organized "sub-party faction".

In the British Labour Party, for example, although there had long been an unorganized social democratic or 'right-wing' tendency, the emergence of the Campaign for Labour Victory as an organized social democratic faction in the mid-1970s has been attributed by Ian Bradley to shifts in Labour Party policy which marked an increasingly leftist orientation; and further policy changes, most notably the adoption of a new formula for electing the party leader which gave disproportionate influence to the trade unions, were the catalysts to the decision by the "Gang of Four" to break with

the party in 1981 to establish the Council for Social Democracy, later the Social Democratic Party." Similarly, the origin of the Monday Club as a right-wing faction within the British Conservative Party has been traced to a leftward (more properly "centrist") shift in party policy and especially to a rejection of the Conservative government's policies of decolonization."

In the United States, the choice of Barry Goldwater as the Republican presidential nominee in 1964 marked a shift in his party's policies and leadership style which led to the formation of the All-Republic Conference (later the Republican Coordinating Committee) to "develop issues and promote candidates that moderate Republicans could support" in the face of mass voter disenchantment with Goldwater's conservative republicanism." And in Europe, we have already seen that attempts by young socialists to radicalize and "democratize" social democratic parties provoked the formation of factions or schismatic behaviour by more conservative "old-guard" socialists. In all these cases, latent divisions already existed within the respective parties, but formally organized sub-party factions did not emerge until a critical change in party policy provided the necessary stimulus.

EXPLAINING SUB-PARTY FACTIONALISM

The list of variables and potential hypotheses generated by attempts in the existing literature to explain the emergence

of sub-party factionalism is impressive indeed - and our discussion here has certainly not exhausted all possibilities. But, in the absence of an overarching conceptual or theoretical framework, there are few indications to guide the researcher seeking to account for the incidence of sub-party conflict in any particular instance.

Many of the generalizations and propositions discussed in the preceding pages do appear to have some validity for individual cases. Hypothesized relationships between the various intra-party structural incentives such as the bases of party organization, procedural norms, and social, psychological and structural controls on the behaviour of party members, on the one hand, and the emergence of factions on the other appear to be both intuitively plausible and empirically valid in some cases. Electoral change (i.e., a change in a party's electoral performance, whether in absolute terms or relative to the fortunes of competing parties which serve as reference points) also seems to be related to the development of factionalism, although the nature of this relationship appears to vary from case to case, in that sub-party factions have emerged in some parties following electoral defeat, in others electoral success has preceded factional behaviour. Extra-party structural incentives such as the nature of the party and electoral systems may well help to determine, respectively, the pattern of sub-party competition and the probability of factional rather than

schismatic behaviour. And changes in the composition of a party's membership base, whether in purely generational or more general terms, may also lead to internal tensions which give rise to the formation of sub-party factions.

But many of these relationships provide partial explanations at best. Which of the static "structural incentives" or dynamic "catalysts" is a necessary prerequisite to the emergence of factionalism? Which combination of structural incentives and catalysts is both necessary and sufficient for sub-party conflict to arise? The existing literature on party factions offers no hierarchical ordering of variables to guide us in our search for an explanatory model of intra-party conflict. Too many studies have been largely descriptive in nature; or they have relied on bivariate analysis, seeking to explain factionalism in terms of propositions (derived from a single independent variable and formulated with a particular political/cultural context in mind) which in most cases have been subsequently contradicted by attempts to replicate their findings in other settings. Consequently, authors who have sought to integrate the findings of the existing literature have been reduced to submitting a list of propositions which appear "most tenable and agreed-upon" while acknowledging the exceptions that exist to almost every generalization which has been posited."

A further weakness of the literature on party factionalism is the lack of systematic analysis of the outcome

of sub-party conflict. Although our discussion of certain variables in the preceding pages might have suggested particular outcomes - for example, the institutionalization of factional competition as a consequence of the adoption of proportional procedures in allocating party offices or patronage resources - existing studies fail to explain why this response has sometimes been selected by parties rather than, say, the suppression of factionalism or the adoption of majoritarian procedures.

What is required, therefore, is a framework of analysis pitched at a higher level of abstraction - that is, one in which many of the hypotheses and variables already discussed may be incorporated into broader categories of explanation derived from a more general model of political behaviour and which may be applied to both the emergence and the outcome of sub-party factionalism.

Although the organization of our discussion of the literature in earlier sections of this chapter might suggest an implicit acceptance of at least some elements of Smelser's value-added model for the analysis of collective behaviour, we do not regard his approach to be the most appropriate framework on which to base this study. First, our conceptualization of sub-party factions as organized and relatively durable groups clearly distinguishes them from the unorganized, spontaneous and usually short-lived outbursts of protest activity which constitute Smelser's view of collective

behaviour. Second, and perhaps more importantly, while Smelser's conceptual framework might be modified to permit analysis of the emergence of sub-party factions, we do not believe that it can adequately be extended to encompass the outcomes of factional activity, especially those which are determined largely by the response of the host party organization. And, third, while the essentially functionalist social-psychological approach of Smelser and other theorists of collective behaviour view this form of activity as "deviant" and "irrational", we argue below that sub-party factionalism may be viewed as a rational and normal response by members of political parties to certain events or conditions. Consequently, it is an economic model of organizational behaviour that we shall use as a basis for the development of our analytical framework in the next chapter.

CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter we have begun our search for an explanatory framework which will enable us to analyse both the emergence and the eventual outcome of sub-party activity in the Scottish National Party. Our review of the literature on factionalism in western political parties reveals that a wide diversity of variables and hypotheses has been investigated by other scholars seeking to account for the incidence of sub-party factionalism. However, much of this literature consists of case studies of factionalism within individual parties or

among a number of competing parties in the same national political system. Consequently, explanations of the emergence of sub-party conflict are often tinged by factors specific to a particular socio-cultural or political setting and few propositions or findings have withstood the test of comparative application.

In addition to these problems, we also noted the absence in the existing literature of any systematic attempt to analyse the alternative outcomes of factional conflict in political parties. In Chapter Four, therefore, we shall turn our attention to the development of a broader conceptual and explanatory approach which will permit, within the same frame of reference, the analysis of both the emergence and the outcome of sub-party factionalism.

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Chapter Four

TOWARDS AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: "EXIT" AND "VOICE" IN SUB-PARTY POLITICS

Our objective in this chapter is to develop an analytical framework which will enable us not only to explore the rise of the '79 Group within the organizational structure of the Scottish National Party, but also to account for the reaction of the party leadership to the Group's activities and the eventual proscription of formally organized factions in the SNP. In more general terms, therefore, we require a broad framework of analysis within which can be integrated both a number of alternative explanations of the emergence of sub-party factions (discussed in Chapter Three) and a systematic examination of the outcomes, or modes of resolution, of factional conflict within political parties.

The most fruitful point of departure for the development of such an integrative approach, we believe, is a conceptual framework proposed by the American economist, Albert O. Hirschman. Hirschman's *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*,¹ published in 1970, has been widely acknowledged as an innovative attempt to bring together the disciplines of economics and political science. In the mid-1970s, his ideas were subjected to a

number of critical appraisals and reformulations,' and were applied to political problems as diverse as Britain's relationship with the European Community,' the response of states to the problem of mass emigration,' the historical experience of state formation and nation-building in Europe,' and the design of urban governments for the optimal delivery of municipal services.⁶ However, while Hirschman himself suggested that his model may be particularly appropriate for the study of political parties, few authors have followed his advice and we have found no systematic attempt to apply his concepts to the analysis of sub-party factionalism.⁷ Moreover, it is the author's impression that Hirschman's stimulating approach has been sadly neglected in recent years. In this thesis, and in this chapter in particular, we intend to remedy both deficiencies.

In the first section of this chapter, therefore, we outline briefly the basic elements of Hirschman's original model and review some of the criticisms and modifications suggested by others before proposing our own revised Exit/Voice model. Next, we apply the revised model to the study of sub-party factionalism: first, by reconceptualizing sub-party factional activity in terms of Hirschman's concepts; second, by developing a framework, based on the revised Exit/Voice model, for the analysis of the emergence of sub-party factions within political parties; and, finally, by

extending this framework to incorporate the alternative outcomes of sub-party conflict.

HIRSCHMAN'S "EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY"

Hirschman's work may be most conveniently classified under the broad heading of "liberal political economy", inasmuch as he seeks to apply to the political realm concepts and hypotheses derived originally from theories and observations of economic behaviour.¹ At the same time, he also draws upon political science (or from the realm of politics) in order to remedy what he sees as certain deficiencies in economic theory.

In the basic assumptions of his argument, Hirschman departs from the conventional wisdom of neo-classical liberal economics in two important respects. First, he suggests that the performance of a firm may deteriorate so that it becomes uncompetitive not only because of immutable changes in "objective demand and supply conditions" but also possibly as a result of "a random and more or less repairable lapse" in entrepreneurial spirit or strategy - an assertion which challenges the traditional axiom that economic actors consistently behave in a rational manner.² Second, since "the image of the economy as a fully competitive system ... is surely a defective representation of the real world", Hirschman argues, economists cannot rely exclusively on the laws of competition to ensure the optimal allocation of

resources.¹⁰ Hence, there is a need for alternative or additional adjustment mechanisms to correct a decline in performance, especially where that deterioration is the result of a 'repairable lapse' on behalf of management. It is the operation of these adjustment mechanisms that forms the core of Hirschman's "Exit/Voice" framework.

The Basic Model

Hirschman's central argument may be summarized fairly briefly. Conventional economic analysis of a competitive market assumes that, when the quality of a firm's product deteriorates, customers will express dissatisfaction with that decline by ceasing to buy the product or switching to another supplier. However, Hirschman suggests, some customers may also respond by complaining, directly or indirectly, to the management. Such behaviour may be functional to the firm in that it serves as a warning that all is not well and provides an opportunity for the firm to adjust quality before its clientele disappears altogether. Nevertheless, the "political" act of complaining, argues Hirschman, has been ignored by economic theorists.¹¹

While his initial arguments are based on the relationship between the firm, product and customers in the economic marketplace, Hirschman suggests that his model "will be found to be largely - and, at times, primarily - applicable to organizations (such as voluntary associations, trade unions,

or political parties) that provide services to their members without direct monetary counterpart".¹² Hence, when the performance of any organization declines, its managers or leaders may find out about the deterioration of their 'product' through feedback from one of two patterns of behaviour by customers or members:

- (1) Some customers stop buying the firm's products or some members leave the organization: this is the *exit option*. ...
- (2) The firm's customers or the organization's members express their dissatisfaction directly to management or to some other authority to which management is subordinate or through general protest addressed to anyone who cares to listen: this is the *voice option*.¹³

Dissatisfied customers or members therefore may express their discontent either through "Exit" or "Voice".¹⁴ Corporate managers or organizational leaders will in turn be impelled by falling revenues, declining membership, or the growing volume of complaints to search for the causes of dissatisfaction and for ways to correct the problem.

Of course, if the **Exit** option is exercised by too many customers or members at the same time, revenues or membership may decline to the point at which it is impossible for the firm/organization to recover its vitality. This problem is made more acute, according to Hirschman, because it will tend to be the most "quality-conscious" customers or members who are the first to notice the deterioration and, other things being equal, to abandon the declining organization.¹⁵

Moreover, since Exit will signal the existence of a problem without necessarily identifying its cause, it will take time for the managers/ leaders first to become aware of the defections, then to diagnose the problem and to begin the process of recovery. For Exit to work as the exclusive, or even primary, adjustment mechanism, therefore, a significant number of "inert" customers or members must be present to provide a cushion of sales or support while the organization seeks to adjust to the departure of those exercising the Exit option.

Under certain circumstances, however, the more quality-conscious customers may forgo the "certainty" of an improvement in quality which Exit will bring," and opt instead to stay with the product or organization in the "uncertain" hope that quality will improve, because they possess a sense of "Loyalty" to the firm or organization. Loyalty may result in passive behaviour or inertia, whereby customers/members choose to "suffer in silence, confident that things will soon get better."¹⁷ Although this passive Loyalty provides no feedback to managers or leaders, when combined with the continued support of "inert" customers/members it does assure them a cushion of demand or support to sustain the firm/organization during the process of recovery.

But Loyalty can be even more functional when it serves to ensure that potentially influential customers and members

not only stay with the product or organization but also work actively for an improvement in quality through the exercise of Voice.

To resort to Voice, for Hirschman, "is for the customer or member to make an attempt at changing the practices, policies, and outputs of the firm from which one buys or of the organization to which one belongs",¹⁸ whether by individual or collective appeal to managers or leaders, by attempting to force a change of management, or through other actions and protests designed to mobilize public opinion. Loyal quality-conscious customers or members will, therefore, tend to exercise the Voice option rather than Exit in order to help the firm or organization arrest the decline in quality or performance. However, Voice, like Exit, can be overdone: when the volume of discontent becomes too high, or when contradictory messages are expressed by dissatisfied customers or members, protest may at some point "hinder rather than help whatever efforts at recovery are undertaken."¹⁹

In summary, when a decline occurs in the performance of a firm or other organization and the quality of its product or service deteriorates, 'quality-conscious' customers or members (those who become aware of the decline) may respond in one of two main ways. First, as economists would predict, they may Exit from the firm's market or the organization, thus pointing to the existence of dissatisfaction without

identifying its cause and, if they leave in sufficient numbers, possibly accelerating the process of decline. However, the natural tendency to Exit may be counterbalanced by an individual's Loyalty to the product, firm or organization. Thus, second, although some loyalists may remain passive or silent, trusting in the ability of managers or leaders to diagnose and solve the problem, more active loyalists will seek to reverse the decline by using Voice to alert management to its failings.

Variations on a Theme

According to one of its reviewers, since "the theory can be stated in a few words but at the same time has unlimited range of application", *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty* bore the hallmarks of an "in" book in the social sciences in the early 1970s.²⁰ As such, it was subjected to academic scrutiny from a variety of disciplinary perspectives, leading to a number of theoretical critiques and proposed reformulations. Here we outline some of the criticisms of key assumptions and concepts in the model - in particular, Hirschman's view of "decline", the posited dichotomy between Exit and Voice, and the status of Loyalty as an explanatory variable in Hirschman's model.

The Cause of Dissatisfaction:

First, Hirschman clearly places too much emphasis on the *absolute* quality of the product as the primary criterion of organizational performance. A customer who is dissatisfied with a product may simply have overestimated its quality when purchasing it, the price of a good or service may have risen without a commensurate increase in quality, or it may be observed that a rival organization is now producing a superior product. In each case, dissatisfaction does not derive from a decline in the *absolute* quality of the good, which has remained constant, but rather from a *relative* decline in its quality or value vis-a-vis the purchaser's expectations, the price, or the available alternatives. Hence, the true source of discontent, suggests Brian Barry, is "the belief that the firm or other organization *could do better*", and this is particularly important, Barry argues, for the rational use of the Voice response since "there is no point ... in exercising voice where it is not believed possible that some improvement could occur."²¹

The Range of Response:

Second, we would agree with other critics who argue that, in posing Exit and Voice as dichotomous responses to decline, Hirschman conflates two separate dimensions of choice into one. According to Barry, "One choice is between exit (leaving) and non-exit (staying), the other is between

voice (activity, participation) and silence (inactivity, non-participation."²² Thus, there are in fact four conceivable forms of response (see Figure 4.1): in addition to silent Exit (Exit - Voice) and non-Exiting Voice ("stay" + Voice), there are also the alternatives of silent non-Exit ("stay" - Voice) and "noisy" Exit (Exit + Voice). But, while Hirschman does admit briefly to the possibility of the last two in the mention of "passive loyalists" and the case of public officials (e.g., cabinet ministers) who may resign from office to free themselves to criticise government policy,²³ the main thrust of his argument is clearly predicated upon a dichotomy between (silent) Exit and (non-exiting) Voice as the primary responses to organizational decline.

But even this slightly more complex range of options is an oversimplification. Hence, while there is clearly a qualitative, as well as quantitative, distinction between silence and Voice,²⁴ it may be argued that selection of the Voice option must involve also a choice of the volume or level of intensity with which Voice is to be expressed. Michael Laver, for example, suggests that

Voice really makes sense only if we specify its volume. People can shout loudly or softly, while the louder they shout, the more likely they are to be heard and the hoarser they get. Each extra 'unit' of Voice used should add to the chance of improvement, but each will consume (more) resources.²⁵

**FIGURE 4.1 - ALTERNATIVE RESPONSES TO DECLINE:
HIRSCHMAN VS. BARRY/BIRCH**

Hirschman's Original Model

Barry/Birch Revised Model

Source: A.H. Birch, "Economic Models in Political Science: The Case of 'Exit, Voice, and Loyalty'", British Journal of Political Science, vol. 5, no. 1, 1975, Fig. I, p. 73 and Fig. II, p. 74.

In choosing between Exit (or silence) and Voice, therefore, Laver argues that dissatisfied customers/members must calculate the probable costs and benefits associated with using different volumes of Voice and compare each of these with the expected costs and benefits of Exit.²⁶

But, while we accept the view that Voice may be expressed in varying degrees, we reject the proposal by Samuel Finer that the same is true of Exit. In his application of the Exit/Voice model to the relationship between citizens and the state, Finer suggests that Exit may take a *strong* or *weak* form, whereby "strong" Exit implies full withdrawal from the boundaries of the state (individually through emigration, collectively through secession) while "weak" Exit involves the "selective withholding of functions and/or duties" such as a refusal to do military service.²⁷ In our view, Finer's distinction between 'levels' of Exit is an unnecessary complication since the selective refusal to obey certain laws or to fulfil certain obligations of citizenship is really a form of Voice rather than Exit, in that it constitutes a mechanism of protest against the policies of the state without actually leaving its boundaries. Moreover, just as there is a clear distinction between Voice and silence, one either Exits from a market, organization or activity, or one does not; hence, the concept of "weak" or partial Exit seems to somewhat akin to positing that there are gradations of virginity.

Nor do we accept the revised model of response proposed by Juliet Lodge who takes the conceptualization of Voice as a continuum a stage further in her analysis of Britain's relationship with the European Community in the 1970s. Rather than viewing Exit, Voice and silent non-Exit as discrete alternatives, Lodge portrays them as points on a continuum of protest which ranges from "passivity" through "soft Voice", "Voice" and "loud Voice" to "Exit".²⁹ Thus Exit is seen as a last resort, which is usually employed only after Voice has failed.

However, since Lodge rejects the validity of Hirschman's concept of Loyalty, there is no logical reason within her argument to explain why "we should expect a member to resort to voice prior to exit."²⁹ Since Britain's entry involved lengthy and difficult negotiations, the European Community may be an example of an organization in which severe initiation and high penalties for Exit, rather than Loyalty, modify the usual patterns of Exit and Voice,³⁰ but such organizations are the exception, not the norm. In fact, if it can be demonstrated that, in international organizations, Exit normally occurs only after Voice has been used, this can be accommodated within Hirschman's model if it can be shown that actors who initially opt for Voice (on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis of alternatives or because of Loyalty) subsequently Exit after they have learned that they have

overestimated their influence or the effectiveness of Voice within the organization.

The Role of Loyalty:

The third main area of criticism of the Exit/Voice model focuses on Hirschman's concept of Loyalty, defined as "considerable affection for" or "strong attachment to" a product or organization, and in particular his assertion that "as a rule ... loyalty holds exit at bay and activates voice."¹¹ For Hirschman, the probability of resort to Voice (or, perhaps more accurately, of non-Exit) is determined by the interaction of two factors: first, a cost-benefit analysis in which the individual trades off the costs and 'certain' benefits of Exit against the costs and the "uncertainties of an improvement in the deteriorated product" associated with Voice; and, second, the degree of Loyalty to the product or organization.¹²

The central problem with the use of Loyalty in this way stems in part from Hirschman's conceptualization of Exit and Voice, and also reflects, despite his own ambitions to the contrary, Hirschman's predominantly economic perspective. "Exit", for Hirschman, is relatively cost-free and brings the 'certainty' of an improvement in quality - that is, his view of Exit is clearly derived from the assumption of a competitive market in which information is widely available on all brands and where, if the quality of one previously

'competitive' brand declines, there are bound to be others whose quality can now be readily identified as relatively 'better'. Resort to "Voice", on the other hand, will incur numerous costs (time, effort, money, possibly even the risk of ridicule or retaliation") and the chances of bringing about an improvement in quality are uncertain - i.e., there is no guarantee that managers or leaders will either listen or be able to find a way to alleviate discontent. This being the case, why should any rational actor resort to Voice when Exit is also available?

The only explanation for Hirschman can be the influence of some "extra-rational" or subjective factor which counterbalances the objective net benefits of Exit - and this is the concept of Loyalty which serves as a kind of "internalized tax" on the Exit option." But what degree of Loyalty is required to overcome how much net benefit of Exit if Voice is to be expressed? Are Loyalty and the outcome of the cost-benefit analysis of co-equal importance in determining the selection of Voice or, what is more probable given the essentially economic nature of Hirschman's argument, is the "extra-rational" element of Loyalty merely a tie-breaker which comes into effect only when more "rational" objective processes (i.e., cost-benefit calculations) fail to yield a clear-cut decision between Exit and Voice? Exactly how much Loyalty contributes to the choice of eventual

outcomes is difficult to ascertain from Hirschman's discussion of the concept.

Moreover, given the vagueness of Hirschman's definition of Loyalty, neither the value of this "internalized tax" nor, therefore, the probability of Exit (or Voice) can be specified in advance. This has led some critics to allege that Loyalty is little more than a *post hoc* equation-filler, a 'fudge factor' which is used to save the hypothesis: for example, Brian Barry argues that,

Since loyalty is recognized only by its effects, the equation can always be made to fit the facts *ex post*, by imputing loyalty in sufficient quantity to a person who, on the basis of the ... cost-benefit calculation, should have switched but in fact has not done so."

Finally, the nature of the relationship posited by Hirschman between Loyalty and Voice may also be questioned. Anthony Birch, for example argues that, far from being a determinant of Voice, Loyalty is more commonly associated with silence. For Birch,

'loyalty' belongs to a family of concepts which also includes 'allegiance' and 'fidelity'. The description 'a loyal party member' is normally applied to the man who accepts what his leaders decide, not to the constant critic. ... If this is so, it follows that loyalty and voice are correlated inversely rather than positively."

Birch's leader-centric view of "loyalty" - which amounts in effect, to 'my leader, right or wrong' - is clearly different from Hirschman's use of the term which presupposes an allegiance to an organization, or its purpose, or its

clientele, or even to a particular brand of product ('brand loyalty'), which will increase the propensity to resort to Voice in order to alert managers or leaders to a deterioration in performance.

Barry, on the other hand, agrees with Hirschman that Loyalty and Voice may be positively correlated, but considers it a rather spurious relationship. Loyalty, for Barry, is more than just the reluctance to leave an organization or community that is inherent in Hirschman's 'Exit tax' formulation; rather, it is exemplified by "a positive commitment to further its welfare by working for it, fighting for it and - where one thinks it has gone astray - seeking to change it. Thus, voice ... is already built into the concept of loyalty."³⁷ Hence, Barry argues, Hirschman has the relationship between Loyalty and Voice in the wrong logical order (see Figure 4.2); instead of Loyalty militating against Exit, and non-Exit in turn stimulating Voice, "Loyalty is manifested ... by voice, and may also require non-exit as a means to the exercise of voice, or some other activity aimed at the welfare of the collectivity."³⁸

If Barry is correct in asserting that Voice and Loyalty are inextricably entwined, it then become difficult to account for Hirschman's category of 'silent' or 'passive' loyalists, those who "simply refuse to exit and suffer in silence, confident that things will soon get better."³⁹

**FIGURE 4.2 - ALTERNATIVE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN
LOYALTY AND VOICE: HIRSCHMAN AND BARRY**

The Role of Loyalty (Hirschman)

The Role of Loyalty (Barry)

⇒ More probable outcomes --→ Less probable outcomes

Source: Adapted from discussion by Brian Barry, "Review Article: 'Exit, Voice, and Loyalty'", British Journal of Political Science, vol. 4, no.1, 1974, esp. p. 98.

Are they, perhaps, Birch's brand of loyalists, whose Loyalty to the managers or leaders forces them to refrain from criticism or protest even if they are aware of a decline in performance? Or are they individuals who are loyal to the organization but whose sense of efficacy is such that they believe that nothing they can do will bring about a change even if an improvement is technically possible?

The theoretical status of Loyalty is clearly problematic in Hirschman's model. It is ill-defined; as a separate "extra-rational" or subjective variable in the explanation of Exit and Voice it co-exists uneasily with more "rational" or objective calculations of the costs and benefits of various responses and, moreover, it lacks predictive power. Ultimately, however, it may be argued that the conceptualization of Loyalty as a variable separate from the analysis of costs and benefits is mistaken and, indeed, that Loyalty may be redundant to the model.

First, Loyalty may not be required for the model to work because there is really nothing for it to explain. Hirschman looks to Loyalty as the reason why some customers/ members are willing to forgo the 'certainty' of Exit (which is also relatively cost-free) for the 'uncertainty' and costs of Voice. Michael Laver, however, suggests that in many cases the benefits of Exit are less obvious than Hirschman assumes. The consumer/member contemplating Exit may well be aware that "he is moving to a new organization where his influence is

likely to be less than at present; what if that one deteriorates too?" Thus, if he decides to stay and resort to Voice, it may be for "the perfectly rational reason that the 'certainty' of Exit is by no means certain after all."⁴⁰ In other words, Hirschman cannot have it both ways at once - he cannot assume the existence of perfect information ('certainty') on the Exit side of the calculation and, at the same time, insist on the 'uncertainty' of the Voice option. Having dismissed one of the natural advantages of the Exit option, Laver then feels able to exclude Loyalty (the counterweight to those advantages) altogether, and proceeds from a strict Rational Choice perspective to build a series of formal-logical statements to demonstrate how benefits and costs (both discounted over time) of Exit and Voice may be calculated and eventually compared to arrive at an objective decision between Exit and Voice without reference to any messy "extra-rational" concepts such as Loyalty."

Although we agree with Laver that the 'certainty' of Exit is seldom so certain (especially in the political realm, where organizations such as political parties are, at best, imperfect substitutes for one another), we would go further in seeking to redress the apparent imbalance between Exit and Voice by arguing that the costs of Voice may not always be as high as Hirschman originally assumed. As Hirschman himself has admitted in later writings, under certain circumstances, the individual may derive from popular protest activities a

sense of personal fulfilment which makes Voice a desired end in itself - in other words, the exercise of Voice is no longer a cost but a benefit.⁴²

In addition, we would argue that the costs of Voice may often be reduced through its collective expression.⁴³ The use of Voice does normally incur costs, and these costs will rise as the volume of Voice is increased. But, while a single individual is likely to get hoarse fairly quickly by shouting loudly enough to be heard, a number of voices in unison (or in alternating parts) can achieve more volume, or maintain a particular level longer, at lower cost to each individual.⁴⁴ Collective Voice, in other words, increases the probability that dissatisfied customers/members will be heard (reducing one source of 'uncertainty' associated with voice) and reduces the costs of the Voice option.

Therefore, since Exit yields less certain benefits and Voice may be both less costly and, perhaps, less uncertain in its effects than Hirschman assumes, the inherent advantages postulated for Exit over Voice are significantly reduced, if not nullified altogether. Hence, the independent explanatory role assigned to Loyalty by Hirschman is rendered unnecessary since (silent) Exit and (Non-Exiting) Voice are, in principle, equally viable options (as are the other alternatives, silent non-Exit and noisy Exit) and the selection of one of these responses will be determined by the individual's perception

of the costs, benefits and availability of each option in any particular case.

Where does this leave the concept of Loyalty? Quite clearly it has no independent explanatory role that is separate from the analysis of costs and benefits. Rather, if we regard Loyalty as an umbrella term for a set of emotional and customary attachments to a particular product or organization and of prejudices against its competitors, then Loyalty (where it exists) will act as a mediating variable *within* the cost-benefit analysis in that it will help to shape the individual's perceptions of the costs and benefits of the alternative responses.

A REVISED EXIT/VOICE MODEL

Thus far in this section, we have outlined Hirschman's original model based on the concepts of Exit, Voice and Loyalty, reviewed a number of criticisms and reformulations proposed by others, and suggested some further modifications of our own. It is now appropriate to consolidate this discussion by presenting a revised Exit/Voice model which will provide a basis for analysis in this thesis.

The model starts from the assumption that an absolute or relative decline in quality has occurred in the product of a firm or organization (see Figure 4.3). We also assume that those customers/members who perceive the decline as a deterioration in the performance of the firm or organization

will be dissatisfied; however if, despite their discontent, they believe that nothing they can do will bring about a change in the situation, they will suffer in silence. On the other hand, those dissatisfied members/customers who believe that some improvement is possible will begin to consider the availability, the benefits and the costs of the Exit and Voice options - a stage in the model which we have labelled the "Exit/Voice calculus".

In its most simplified form, the Exit/Voice calculus may be reduced to two matched pairs of questions - 'is Exit available?' and 'will Exit help?', 'is Voice available?' and 'will Voice help?' - to which 'Yes' and 'No' answers may be applied. Within each pair, if the answer to the first question is 'No' (i.e., Exit/Voice is not available) then the second question becomes redundant.⁴⁵ However, if Exit and/or Voice is available, then the emphasis shifts to the question of estimating whether that option can "help" the situation; in other words, does the projected benefit, in terms of an improvement in the product that will be consumed, exceed the estimated costs of pursuing that option?" For example, if Exit and Voice are both available, but neither option promises a level of improvement in the product that outweighs the cost of resorting to it, then silent non-Exit will be the expected outcome. On the other hand, when Exit and Voice are both available and the potential benefits of Voice outweigh its costs, but the estimated benefits of Exit are less than its

FIGURE 4.3 - A REVISED EXIT/VOICE MODEL

projected costs, we may expect resort to non-Exiting Voice, and so on.

In Figure 4.4, we present the eight possible permutations arising from "Yes"/"No" answers to the "availability"/"help" criteria and the expected response associated with each. The only case of the eight in which the response may be difficult to forecast is the situation in which Exit and Voice are both available and can both help; normally, we would expect "noisy" Exit (Exit + Voice) to ensue, but, if for example the net benefits offered by Exit (though positive) were considerably less than those promised by Voice for the same cost, then non-Exiting voice may result and, likewise, we might expect silent Exit to be a viable response if the net benefits of Exit were much greater than those of Voice.

Finally in this section, we must emphasize that most of the costs and benefits referred to here are intangibles - that is, they do not lend themselves readily to measurement in monetary terms nor, in many cases, to any other common basis of quantification. Moreover, all costs and benefits entered into the Exit/Voice calculus will be those *perceived* by the individual seeking to alleviate the cause of dissatisfaction. And here Loyalty may be expected to come into play in that, as we suggested earlier, it will tend to shape the individual's perceptions of the various costs and benefits and the weights attached to them in the calculus; for example, Loyalty, where it exists, may be expected to lead the

**FIGURE 4.4 - REVISED EXIT/VOICE MODEL:
THE EXIT/VOICE CALCULUS**

	IS EXIT AVAILABLE?	WILL EXIT HELP?	IS VOICE AVAILABLE?	WILL VOICE HELP?	RESPONSE
1	No	(-)	No	(-)	SILENT NON-EXIT
2	No	(-)	Yes	No	SILENT NON-EXIT
3	No	(-)	Yes	Yes	NON-EXITING VOICE
4	Yes	No	No	(-)	SILENT NON-EXIT
5	Yes	Yes	No	(-)	SILENT EXIT
6	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	SILENT EXIT
7	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	NON-EXITING VOICE
8	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	NOISY EXIT (EXIT + VOICE)

Notes: (-) = Not applicable or irrelevant

individual to exaggerate the benefits of staying (non-Exit), and possibly to overestimate the probability that Voice will be effective, while underestimating or dismissing both the costs of Voice and the net benefits offered by the Exit option. These tentative hypotheses will be explored further in later chapters of the thesis.

Clearly, our simple revised model may require some further refinement at a later point in this study, but we propose it here as a basis for the development of a conceptual framework for the analysis of sub-party politics which is to be elaborated in the next section.

SUB-PARTY FACTIONS AND THE EXIT/VOICE MODEL

The analogy between the business firm, which was the initial inspiration for Hirschman's model, and a political party may be pursued on two different levels. First, in the wider electoral marketplace, the product of a party organization is its policy platform (although the 'packaging' might stress candidates, ideology, image, or leaders), inasmuch as the parties attempt to sell themselves and their candidates to the electorate in the hope that voters will buy their product using their votes as a medium of exchange. When they perceive a deterioration in the product (for example, a change of image or policy of which they disapprove), individual voters may continue quietly to support the party (silent non-Exit), they may vote for it but express their dissatisfaction by demanding

changes in return for their continued support (non-Exiting Voice), or they may Exit (silently or with Voice) from its clientele by either abstaining or voting for another party.

Our primary interest, however, is the intra-party level of analysis and in this context the market is smaller, consisting only of those citizens who are sufficiently politically motivated to become members or activists in political parties rather than the entire electorate. Here, the clientele of the party is its membership and at this level of analysis the product of the party may be defined as its capacity to realize the individual or collective goals or aspirations of its members. Whether party members seek ideological or policy goals, or aspire to leadership or access to patronage resources, they will purchase the party 'product', using money (membership fees) or time as a medium of exchange, as long as the party has the potential to realize those objectives.

Frequently, the first level of analysis, the party's competitiveness in the electoral marketplace, will come to bear on the second, since a party's capacity to satisfy the goals and aspirations of its members will often depend on its electoral performance. Hence electoral defeat (perhaps the consequence of a decline in the performance of party from the perspective of Exiting voters) may in turn be a source of dissatisfaction for members of the party because the product for them, the capacity to attain their objectives through the

party, may have deteriorated. Depending upon the availability and perceived costs and benefits of alternative responses, dissatisfied members may remain silent within the party, stay but Voice their discontent with the decline in performance, or Exit from the party.

The Sub-Party as Organized Collective Voice

Among the crucial defining characteristics of sub-party factions discussed in the conclusion to Chapter Two, we emphasized that members of sub-parties have chosen to express their dissatisfaction with the performance of the party by acting collectively within the party rather than departing individually or collectively from the organization. Restating this central property in terms of the Exit/Voice approach, we may reconceptualize sub-party factions as expressions of organized collective Voice - in other words, a sub-party is the organized and collective expression of (non-Exiting) Voice on behalf of a dissatisfied portion of the party's membership which perceives a decline (whether absolute or relative) in organizational performance and which, rather than Exiting from the party, seeks to gain control of the policy-making mechanisms of the organization in an attempt to improve the deteriorated product.

The definition of sub-party factions in these terms permits the concept of intra-party factionalism to be viewed, and analysed, in a more neutral light. First, popular

conceptions tend to portray factionalism always as a form of self-serving and subversive, even "treasonable", behaviour. But, since resort to non-Exiting Voice will be the outcome of an Exit/Voice calculus in which Loyalty is often an influential mediating variable, application of the Exit/Voice model suggests that, in some cases, concern for the well-being of the party or its product will be a motivation for the emergence of sub-parties.

Second, in contrast to the critique of factional activity, that it "disrupts the co-operative enterprise" and detracts from the achievement of collective goals,⁴ the reconceptualization of sub-party behaviour in terms of the Exit/Voice model suggests that intra-party conflict may be either functional or dysfunctional for the host party. Where dissatisfaction with the decline of organizational performance is expressed through organized collective Voice in such a way that party leaders (new or old) can identify the causes of the discontent and act to remedy them, then sub-party factionalism may be more informative and functional to the party than either silent non-Exit or the silent Exit of dissatisfied members. In recognition of the functional potential of intra-party conflict (especially in comparison to the possible effects of mass Exit) some political parties have institutionalized opportunities for the expression of Voice by formalizing the activities of sub-parties. On the other hand, if the expression of Voice overloads the decision-making

capacity of the party, it will hinder efforts to restore the party's competitiveness and may even accelerate its decline if open factionalism adversely affects the voters' perception of the party 'product', thereby further reducing the party's capacity to meet the aspirations of its members. Consequently, party leaders may sometimes resort to the suppression of Voice (for example, by banning organized group activity) and even to the forced Exit (or expulsion) of dissenting members in order to preempt further dysfunctional behaviour.

However, while the redefinition of sub-party factions as expressions of organized collective Voice serves to remove some of the negative connotations associated with factional behaviour, the real measure of the utility of the Exit/Voice model is the extent to which it may be used to develop an integrated framework for the analysis of sub-party politics. In the next two sections of this chapter, therefore, we examine the emergence of sub-party factions and the outcome of sub-party conflict within the context of the model.

THE EMERGENCE OF ORGANIZED COLLECTIVE VOICE

In the previous section, we offered a reconceptualization of sub-party factionalism as the expression of "organized collective Voice" on behalf of a portion of a party's membership expressing dissatisfaction with a perceived decline in the performance or product of the party organization.

Redefinition of sub-party conflict in these terms suggests that the many propositions and variables related to the emergence of factionalism be reclassified into two basic categories: first, the causes of dissatisfaction which lead party members to seek a response to the deterioration in organizational performance; and, second, factors pertaining to the selection of the Voice option in preference to other potential responses, a process which we have already labelled the Exit/Voice calculus.

The Causes of Dissatisfaction

We suggested earlier in this chapter that the product of a political party from the perspective of its members is its capacity to realize their collective goals and aspirations. These objectives may vary - some members may join a particular party because it best represents, and offers the best possibility of attaining and operationalizing, certain values or ideological principles; others may see in a particular party the best opportunity for personal advancement and access to patronage resources. In either case, the most immediate cause of dissatisfaction among members, who have previously made a commitment to a particular party by investing membership fees and their time, is a perceived deterioration in the party product, that is, a perceived decline in the party's capacity to attain their respective goals.

It must be reiterated that the decline in quality or performance may be perceived in either absolute or relative terms. Hence, in addition to comparing a party's outputs or record with its own performance in the past, members may also experience dissatisfaction as a consequence of evaluating the party product in relation to the products of other parties or with respect to their own expectations or aspirations. But, whether it is absolute or relative in nature, we may expect that a perceived decline in organizational performance is most likely to be associated with some of the changes discussed in Chapter Three under the headings of "Extra-Party" and "Intra-Party Catalysts".

When changes in extra-party conditions or intra-party politics appear to reduce the capacity of the party to attain members' goals - in other words, when some or all members perceive a deterioration in the quality of the product - then, we hypothesize, dissatisfaction creates the potential for sub-party development. While other factors (i.e., the Exit/Voice calculus) will determine how this dissatisfaction is actually expressed, we must first identify some causes.

First among the possible sources of dissatisfaction within a party organization are the electoral fortunes of the party. No-one likes losing, least of all in politics, but what is important about an electoral defeat is that it reduces the prospect of goal attainment for party members. For members who view the party as a vehicle for the achievement

of certain policy or ideological objectives, electoral decline, especially where a party loses its place in government, makes goal attainment more remote, while for members who seek to use the party as an avenue to upward mobility or material rewards electoral defeat will reduce the party's ability to control patronage positions and resources. Dissatisfaction may also result from electoral stagnation if the expectations of party members have been raised by successes in by-elections or elections to a different level of government, by the promises of party leaders or by pre-election predictions and public opinion polls. But even electoral victories may lead indirectly to discontent among party members if expectations heightened by success are frustrated by subsequent events. Where, for example, a new government fails to act immediately on the policy or ideological goals advocated by some members, they may become disenchanted with the leadership or direction of the party. Alternatively, party members whose expectations of upward mobility, patronage appointments or other rewards have been strengthened by electoral success may soon become dissatisfied when those aspirations are not met.

Hence the apparent contradiction, noted earlier, whereby sub-party factionalism seems to be a consequence of electoral decline, stagnation or success, may be reconciled when electoral performance is related to members' expectations as a determinant of the dissatisfaction from which intra-party

conflict may develop. Even a severe electoral defeat may be viewed by members as a victory of sorts if their expectations were of annihilation at the polls, but a resounding victory may lead to dissatisfaction if the hopes of some members for policy change or personal advancement fail to materialize.

A second important source of dissatisfaction among members of political parties is a change in party policy, strategy, or leadership, in a direction contrary to the wishes and aspirations of certain members. For activists whose ideological or policy goals place them on "the left" of a particular party, a shift in party policy to "the right" may well be perceived as a decline in the quality of the party product, since the potential for realizing their personal values through the party is reduced. Naturally, dissatisfaction is equally likely to arise among "right wing" members of a party whose policies have lurched to "the left". In either case, dissatisfaction will be strengthened if it appears that the shift in party policy might alienate traditional bases of electoral support, since a future decline in votes will make prospects for goal attainment even more remote.

Similarly, for those convinced that personal or collective goals are most likely to be achieved through electoral and parliamentary activity, a change in party strategy to embrace non-electoral tactics may also be perceived as a deterioration in performance, especially if

there is a possibility that voters might be alarmed or that the party's activities might be branded as illegitimate by the government or the mass media.

Finally, for those members whose attachment to a party is based on access to patronage resources, a change in party leadership or in internal procedures which reduces the prospect of personal advancement may also be perceived as a decline in organizational performance which lessens the quality of the product. In all of these situations, changes occurring within the party organization may create discontent and the potential for conflict if they lead some party members to seek responses to a perceived reduction in the usefulness of the party as a mechanism for personal goal attainment.

While the intra-party changes described above are more often associated with perceptions of **absolute** decline in organizational performance, other sources of dissatisfaction are more likely to result from a **relative** shortcoming in the party product when compared to the expectations of certain members. Hence, we may hypothesize that intra-party conflict ensuing from major economic and political events such as depression or war results from dissatisfaction among some members with their party's response to the crisis. When parties fail to act in accordance with members' expectations or hopes (for example, the failure, in the eyes of pacifist socialists, of social democratic parties to oppose the war efforts of their respective nations), there will be a

perceived decline in party performance. Similarly, when new generations of political activists find that their opportunities to influence party policy or to rise within the ranks are blocked by older, more established members, youthful idealism may be frustrated and turn to dissatisfaction with the organization.

Perceptions of the party product may also vary with the fortunes of other competing parties, especially where they are close substitutes. Members of Party 'A', for whom Party 'B' is a close substitute as a potential vehicle for goal attainment, may perceive a relative deterioration in the performance of their party if 'B' makes greater advances at the polls than 'A' or, in multi-party systems, if 'B' joins a coalition government from which 'A' is excluded. Dissatisfaction with 'A' may lead some members to consider leaving the party in order to pursue policy goals or aspirations for personal advancement via membership of 'B'; others may stay in 'A' and resort to Voice in an attempt to improve the performance of their party.

Dissatisfaction with the party product may derive from a number of sources. Some changes in the extra-party environment or in intra-party politics may have little effect on perceptions of organizational performance. Others may actually enhance the satisfaction of the vast majority of party members - in most cases, electoral success, for example, will be perceived as an improvement in the party product

inasmuch as it increases the potential for individual goal attainment, as long as the party can fulfil the heightened expectations of its members. But when extra-or intra-party catalysts lead to a perception of organizational decline among some party members, the resulting discontent will, according to our model, lead them to consider ways in which the quality of the product which they consume might be improved.

The Exit/Voice Calculus

Which factors are likely to influence the choice among the various responses to perceptions of organizational decline? First, as Figures 4.3 and 4.4 suggest, much depends upon the availability of Exit and/or Voice. Where one or both are available in some form, and we might expect the latter to be the case in most western political parties, the selection of a response to decline in the Exit/Voice calculus will be based largely on the perceived costs and benefits of each option. But both the availability of Exit and Voice and their respective costs and benefits are likely to be determined by those which we discussed in Chapter Three under the headings "Extra-Party" and "Intra-Party Structural Incentives".

Within the context of political parties, Exit from membership may take one of three forms: first, **schism**, which is a collective Exit from one party in order to establish a new party or organization; second, **defection**, individual or collective departure from one party to join another; and

third, **resignation**, leaving the market altogether on an individual basis by allowing membership to lapse. While, strictly speaking, all three varieties of Exit are always available, at least in competitive party systems, in practice the opportunities for Exit by schism and Exit by defection may be severely circumscribed by structural variables such as the nature of the electoral system and the structure of party competition.

The most important structural determinant of Exit by schism is the electoral system. While some types of electoral system clearly tend to discriminate against small parties, others may serve as structural incentives to schism. Thus we may hypothesize that collective Exit in order to form a new party will appear most attractive under conditions of proportional representation, especially in the absence of thresholds of vote-shares which minor parties must surmount in order to gain representation in elected bodies.⁴⁸ Since they lessen the dangers of "wasting one's vote", preferential voting systems (such as the Australian alternative vote) or multiple ballot formulae are also likely to provide weak disincentives against schism. Other things being equal, the simple majority or first-past-the-post system, on the other hand, is usually considered to be a strong deterrent against schism because it discriminates against small parties unless their support is concentrated in certain constituencies. Hence the expected net benefit of schism may increase where

socio-economic or attitudinal characteristics among voters are unevenly distributed on a spatial basis if this may provide a regional concentration of support for the splinter party.

However, the net benefit of schism may also vary with the nature of party competition. For members acting collectively to pursue particular goals, Exit from one party to form another will be most attractive where the new party can achieve influence over public policy or access to patronage resources - in other words, schism is more probable if dissatisfied members consider that the new party can occupy a strategic position in the party system and that the balance of party competition is such that it can play a role in coalition formation.

The expected net benefit of Exit by defection (leaving one party to form another) is likely to be positive only if close substitutes are available. Hence, the probability of defection will depend primarily on the nature of party competition. Other things being equal, members dissatisfied with the performance of Party 'A' will defect to Party 'B' only if the latter offers similar or greater potential for goal attainment. For those motivated by policy or ideological objectives, this will require the presence of another party adjacent to their own position on the ideological spectrum. In ideologically polarized party systems, therefore, we may hypothesize that defection is less likely than in party systems in which parties are crowded close together, or

perhaps even overlap, on the spectrum. But, in either case, opportunities for Exit by defection are severely constrained for "extremists" within "extreme" parties - for example, left-wing dissidents from the most left-wing party on a "left-right" ideological continuum have no adjacent party (or no close substitute) to which they can defect. On the other hand, for those whose objectives for party membership are related to personal advancement or access to patronage, the probability of defection will depend upon the existence of other parties with similar internal procedures for patronage allocation and either actual or potential control over a similar or greater level of patronage resources. Thus, while Exit by defection is always an available option in theory as long as there are at least two parties, in practice resort to this response may be limited by the nature of the party system.

The strategy of Exit by resignation, however, is always available. Following Olson's arguments concerning the logic of collective action," we would expect that this option is most likely to be followed by those who conclude, after the Exit/Voice calculus, that the costs associated with membership of any party now outweigh the potential benefits to be derived.

To the extent that Exit and Voice may be residuals of, as well as substitutes for, one another, the expression of Voice will depend in part upon the opportunities for Exit and

on the availability of close substitutes for the deteriorated product. But we may also hypothesize that the likelihood of Exit will decline as perceived opportunities for the effective expression of Voice increase. Therefore, we now turn our attention to the incentives and constraints which will affect "the estimate customer-members have of their ability to influence the organization."⁵⁰

Individual members' estimates of their ability to influence the party through the expression of Voice will depend partly on their sense of personal political efficacy and partly on intra-party organizational and procedural variables which will help to determine the costs and benefits of the Voice option. However, we have also suggested that the perceived benefits (the likelihood that product quality will be restored or improved) may be increased and the costs of Voice reduced when it is exercised collectively. Hence our primary concern here is with the variables which may be expected to increase the net benefits of resorting to organized collective Voice - i.e., of establishing or joining a sub-party faction - although some of those considered below will also pertain to the expression of Voice in general.

Following our earlier discussion of intra-party structural incentives to factionalism, we may hypothesize that these characteristics are conducive to the expression of organized collective Voice in that they will tend to increase

the perceived benefits and/or reduce the perceived costs of the Voice option in the Exit/Voice calculus:

- 1) caucus and branch structures rather than cell or militia types;
- 2) a high degree of decentralization in party affairs;
- 3) a strong commitment to intra-party democracy, especially where it is institutionalized in the formal sovereignty of party conference, a system of proportional representation for intra-party elections, or a proportional mentality in allocating positions or patronage resources;
- 4) an absence of structural controls (most typically in Westminster-style systems when a party is in opposition, since leaders are deprived of the weapon of collective responsibility);
- 5) a loosely articulated ideology or a broad-based programmatic (catch-all) appeal; and
- 6) leadership based on rational-bureaucratic rather than charismatic authority.

In addition, sub-party factions may be able to enhance the volume of collective Voice by mobilizing outside support, particularly where the system for inter-party elections permits voters to choose between candidates of the same party of where clientelist networks extend beyond the party membership. Conversely, we may hypothesize that the expression of Voice will be structurally constrained in highly centralized parties of any kind in which Michels' "Iron Law of Oligarchy" can be expected to prevail.⁵¹

However, we would also suggest that the structure of opportunities inside the party will yield a net benefit for the organized, collective expression of Voice only if dissatisfied members are able to mobilize the support required to take advantage of these incentives. Hence, ability to

influence the organization will depend also on the existence of a sufficient number of members perceiving a remediable decline in organizational performance (or, at least, an estimation of being able to convince others that the product has deteriorated and must be improved); access to organizational resources in addition to those which may be provided by the host party, such as communications networks, either formal or informal, to aid the process of mobilization; the ability to develop a coherent critique of the existing direction of the party; and an alternative strategy or platform to demonstrate how the deterioration can be reversed. In the absence of these attributes, the logic of collective action would suggest that individual dissatisfied members will be more likely to abstain from factional activity or Exit from the party, since the costs of collective action within the party will outweigh the potential benefits to be derived from the exercise of Voice.

An additional consideration for dissatisfied members contemplating collective action is the potential response of other members of the party, and especially the party leaders, to the exercise of Voice. First, as Laver suggests, the power of the Voice option may lie in its ability to publicize the deterioration of the product to those members who have not yet noticed the decline but who would have Exited had they done so.²² However, this may make Voice a two-edged sword: where it has these effects, leaders should be more willing to listen

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and more anxious to alleviate the dissatisfaction of those expressing Voice; but, at the same time, the fact that some presently "inert" members, or voters, might be awakened and subsequently Exit may threaten a further deterioration in the party product.

A similar risk is carried by Hirschman's suggestion that the effectiveness of Voice may be increased if dissidents can make a credible "threat of Exit" in the event that their collective Voice is unheeded.⁵³ Thus those resorting to Voice must take into account in their Exit/Voice calculus the probable response to such a threat. If their projected Exit is likely to result in further deterioration of the party product, and thus discontent for some presently satisfied members, the threat of Exit will enhance the effectiveness of Voice. On the other hand, if the Exit of dissatisfied members is likely to increase the satisfaction of other members happy to get rid of the dissident minority, or if their departure is unlikely to affect others' perceptions of the party product, then both the credibility of the threat of Exit and the effectiveness of Voice will be weakened.

Loyalty Revisited

Thus far, our conception of party membership and of the analysis of responses to decline has been almost exclusively instrumental in nature - that is, we have argued that joining a political party (or 'purchasing its product') serves most

members as a means to a particular end, whether that end be the attainment of individual and collective policy/ideological goals or a route toward personal advancement and access to patronage resources. For the purely instrumental individual, were such to exist, 'any old party will do' as long as it may be used as a vehicle for personal goal attainment. However, some people become members or, perhaps more often, remain members of a political party for reasons of affect, that is, a strong emotional or customary attachment to one particular party which could not be fulfilled by affiliation to any other organization.⁵⁴

In reality these two kinds of members, instrumental and affective, are ideal types in that neither orientation is likely to be found in pure unadulterated form - people with a strong commitment to the party may have particular policy goals, while people wishing to pursue personal goals or ambitions do not necessarily lack ideals or emotions. Hence, the two orientations are best viewed as the opposite poles of a continuum, with most party members located somewhere between the two extremes; and this continuum, of course, may also be portrayed as a scale of Loyalty to the organization and its product (see Figure 4.5).

For those members whose orientations are primarily affective, (in other words, whose Loyalty is strong) the act of joining the party and supporting it through thick and thin brings its own form of gratification or satisfaction.

Therefore, we might expect that these members are least likely to perceive a deterioration in organizational performance or to experience a level of dissatisfaction with the party product sufficient to motivate them to consider the various Exit/Voice alternatives. They are the true partisans, the unconditional loyalists who remain committed to the party, no matter how poorly it might fare because, for them, the perceived costs of Exit will always be too high; and only if the fundamental nature of the party itself is threatened will they contemplate resort to Voice. For the most part we would expect them to be 'passive' or 'silent' loyalists who behave in accordance with Birch's view of 'Loyalty'.

Primarily instrumental members, however, who view the party almost exclusively as a means to an end, will be most sensitive to any change in the quality of the product and most likely to look first towards the Exit option when they become dissatisfied, resorting to Voice only when opportunities for Exit are limited or when Voice offers a quick return at low cost.

The most complex Exit/Voice calculus will be that of party members whose reasons for joining are more or less equally divided between affective and instrumental orientations. Their analyses of the costs and benefits of the various responses will be complicated by the mediating influence of 'affect' or Loyalty and we may expect that they are most likely to resort, at least initially, to Voice.

FIGURE 4.5 - INSTRUMENTAL VS. AFFECTIVE ORIENTATIONS TO
PARTY MEMBERSHIP AND THE CONCEPT OF LOYALTY

The Expression of Voice: An Overview

The emergence of sub-party factions, or the organization of collective Voice, cannot be attributed to any single independent variable. While dissatisfaction with the party product as a consequence of a perceived decline in organizational performance is the crucial prerequisite to Voice, dissatisfied members will only resort to the option of organized collective Voice if the combined weight of the structural incentives to Voice, the potential for collective action, and the prospective benefits of Voice (mediated by Loyalty) outweigh the costs of collective action and the net incentives favouring various forms of Exit.

Although dissatisfaction may be attributable to a number of different causes and the Exit/Voice calculus may be influenced by a further series of variables (including the degree of Loyalty), we believe that the Exit/Voice model serves as a useful heuristic device to bring order to the multiplicity of variables and explanations of the emergence of sub-party factions or organized collective Voice. But before the model can be claimed to provide the broader theoretical and conceptual framework required for the analysis of sub-party politics, we must first demonstrate its capacity to deal with the other side of the problem - that is, the resolution of intra-party conflict as well as the emergence of sub-party factionalism. In the next section, therefore,

we consider the alternative outcomes of factional activity and reconceptualize them in terms of the Exit/Voice framework.

THE RESPONSE TO VOICE

As we have noted already in the thesis, systematic analysis of the alternative outcomes of factional conflict has been sadly neglected in the existing comparative literature on party factions. However, by combining selected generalizations concerning the resolution of factional conflict in communal contexts with elements of the Exit/Voice model, we may begin to piece together a conceptual framework and some tentative hypotheses for the analysis of various outcomes to sub-party competition.

In her reassessment of anthropological perspectives on factionalism, Janet Bujra suggests that there are "three typical developments of factional activity within a community".⁵⁵ First, *fission or generalization of conflict* may occur where external environmental conditions permit the physical separation of the rival groups. However, in addition to the collective secession of dissatisfied villagers to establish their own village elsewhere, Bujra also includes in this category the boycotting or expulsion of individual dissidents. Second, *resolution of the conflict* may occur where an external threat or a convincing victory for one faction leads to a cessation of factional activity and a period of unity, however temporary. Although she does not

elaborate, Bujra appears to include the 'suppression' of factionalism as one means to achieve unity in the community.⁵⁶ The third development is the '*specialization of conflicts*' or the '*institutionalization of political activity*' whereby factionalism becomes a recognized and legitimate form of activity as long as it is played within certain rules, confined to 'political' issues and does not threaten the general well-being of the community, or where relatively impermanent and uninstitutionalized clientelist factions become transformed into more formal and permanent political parties.⁵⁷

Using Bujra's categories as a point of departure, we propose the following classification of alternative outcomes of sub-party factionalism or, in our present terms, the expression or organized collective Voice. The generalization of conflict may result in either Exit by schism (Bujra's 'fission') where a sub-party faction voluntarily secedes from the party, or in the expulsion or forced Exit of dissenting members. The specialization of conflict may be accomplished by institutionalizing collective Voice within the organization. However, we would argue that a clear distinction should be made between the suppression of Voice (for example, through the proscription of organized group activity) and the resolution of conflict which presupposes the emergence of consensus among competing factions as a

prerequisite for the voluntary cessation of organized collective Voice.

Thus, five alternative outcomes to sub-party factional conflict may be posited. Three are responses of the party organization, or its leaders, to the expression of Voice: these are the institutionalization of Voice, the suppression of Voice and the expulsion or forced Exit of sub-party members. The other two constitute responses by the members of a particular sub-party: these are Exit by schism and the voluntary cessation of Voice or the dissolution of the sub-party organization. How might we account for the selection of particular outcomes in individual cases?

The Institutionalization of Voice

First, we may hypothesize that the institutionalization of Voice is most likely in situations where the barriers to Exit are low and where the Exit of dissatisfied members may lead to a (further) deterioration in the party product for other members of the party. In these circumstances, the threat of Exit in the event that Voice is unheeded is highly credible, and parties will seek to institutionalize opportunities for the expression of Voice rather than risk organizational decline ensuing from schism or defection. Thus, parties may bestow formal recognition on sub-parties in the allocation of offices or benefits, in the system used for intra-party elections, or in other internal procedures.

To the extent that sub-parties may be likened to a form of pillarization within the party (see Chapter Two, above), and following the observations of students of pillarized societies, we may also expect that the institutionalization or accommodation of sub-party factions is more probable in multi-factional situations where there is a multiple balance of power among competing sub-parties than in parties where one faction is capable of wielding majority power."

In this respect, the distinction between leadership sub-parties and policy sub-parties may have a bearing on the outcome of factional conflict. Leadership sub-parties tend to be all-inclusive in their combined membership, inasmuch as each member of a party is likely to be associated with one of the patron-client networks, but competition between leadership sub-parties is generally more specialized inasmuch as conflict is restricted to the allocation of patronage resources rather than the overall direction of the party. Moreover, leadership sub-party competition is usually multi-factional in nature. Conflict between policy sub-parties, on the other hand, is usually more general in scope, involving the overall direction of the party, and it often takes the form of bifactional conflict or, because it is less inclusive of the membership, it permits the mobilization of "non-aligned partisans" to create a situation in which one faction can exercise majority rule. Thus, we may suggest that, in general, leadership sub-

party factionalism may be more easily institutionalized or accommodated than competition between policy sub-parties.

The Suppression of Voice

The suppression of Voice is most likely to occur where the continued activities of a minority of dissatisfied members threaten the quality of the product for other members of the party. Like Exit, Voice can be overdone such that it hinders rather than aids the process of recovery. Thus, if perceptions of decline lead to the emergence of a number of sub-party factions urging widely disparate solutions to the problem, the party decision-making process may become paralysed and unable to respond effectively to the cacophony of Voice. Moreover, if intra-party conflict becomes public, there may be a loss of voter confidence and, as the party slides in the polls, a further deterioration of the product may be perceived. Therefore, if Voice is to be effective as a mechanism for adjustment, those expressing it must "give the management, old or new, some time to respond to the pressures that have been brought to bear on it".⁹ Where dissatisfied members are impatient, leaders may buy time for recuperation by suppressing opportunities for Voice.

Of course, party leaders must consider the possibility that members deprived of Voice may Exit from the party. Thus, leaders may have to resort to their own Exit/Voice calculus to estimate whether the departure of dissatisfied members will

do more harm to the party than their continued expression of Voice. In part, this will depend on the size of the subparties involved, their influence within the party and among its voters, and the opportunities for Exit. If barriers to Exit are high (that is, if there is no place to defect and structural constraints militate against the creation of a splinter party), then the suppression of Voice may be accomplished with little loss of membership. However, if Exit is cheap and offers a net benefit, the defection of members deprived of Voice to other parties or a schism creating a new party which attracts support from the host party may lead to further organizational decline. Consequently, the suppression of Voice is not normally a decision taken lightly by the leaders or the collective membership of a party, but we may hypothesize that it is more likely to occur where the barriers to Exit are moderately high, where the continued expression of Voice threatens to retard the recuperation of the party and where a dominant faction already in control of the organizational resources of the party is capable of mobilizing a majority against the expression of Voice by its rivals.

Expulsion/Forced Exit

The expulsion of dissident individuals from the party is, perhaps, the ultimate weapon available to party leaders to restrict resort to Voice. According to Hirschman, in

primordial human groupings as family, tribe, church,
and state ... with exit either impossible or

unthinkable, provision is generally made ... for expelling or excommunicating the individual member in certain circumstances.⁶⁰

While expulsion may be used against those presently violating a ban on organized Voice, the threat of forced Exit may also serve as a deterrent against future Voice by other members. However, to be effective as a deterrent, expulsion requires that the costs of Exit be high - i.e., the threat will be most potent where there are few or no opportunities outside the party for the pursuit of instrumental goals and/or where members have strong affective orientations toward the organization. Thus, expulsion is a particularly powerful weapon in single party regimes, especially where, as in the Communist party states, party membership is a source of high status and, often, material advantage.

However, leaders may also resort to forced Exit, even if the costs of Exit are relatively low, where the expulsion of one group is the price for the continued support of another, larger, group. Under conditions of polarized factional conflict, if sub-party 'A' threatens to secede from the party unless the members of a smaller sub-party 'B' are expelled or otherwise silenced, party leaders must estimate the respective costs likely to be incurred by the party from the loss of each group. If the party stands to lose more members, or more voters (thus endangering the quality of the product for all members), by not expelling sub-party 'B', then logic would

dictate that the members of 'B' will be expelled. Much depends in such cases, therefore, on the relative strengths of rival sub-parties, on their willingness to generalize conflicts and on the potency of the threat of Exit by one side or the other. As with the suppression of Voice, expulsion or forced Exit is most likely to occur in bifactional situations where the minority refuses to accept the authority of the majority and where the Exit (albeit an involuntary one) of expellees is calculated to do less damage to the party product than their continued presence within the party.

Voluntary Secession or Collective Exit

A period of factional conflict may be brought to an end by the voluntary secession or collective Exit of one of the contending sub-parties as a result of a change in its original Exit/Voice calculus. Thus, events within the party may persuade sub-party members that they had previously overestimated their ability to influence the organization. Failure to mobilize sufficient support, defeats in intra-party elections or on key conference resolutions, or a hardening of opposing attitudes in the rest of the party may convince dissatisfied members that collective goal attainment is more probable elsewhere. Alternatively, changes in the extra-party environment may lower the barriers (costs) against collective Exit (for example, a change in electoral law or in the structure of party competition). Or, again, collective

defection may be encouraged by the emergence of a close substitute in the form of a new party or a change in the policies of an existing one. In short, a negative change in the incentives favouring Voice or an increase in the net benefits promised by Exit may lead to a reconsideration of the Exit/Voice calculus and a change in the goal attainment strategies of dissatisfied members.

Voluntary Cessation of Voice

Finally, overt factional conflict may be resolved either by the voluntary cessation of factional activity among all contending sub-parties or by the voluntary dissolution of one or more sub-party organizations. The voluntary cessation or suspension of factional activity is most likely when all sub-parties perceive the existence of a common external threat. To the extent that the expression of Voice presumes at least a minimal commitment to attaining goals within the party organization, a threat to the party will affect the interests of all sub-parties. In most cases, however, "threats" such as the proximity of a general election or other critical events will lead only to a temporary suspension of conflict, rather than its resolution, in that factional activity is resumed after the threat has passed.

The dissolution of a sub-party organization is most likely to occur either when it has been notably unsuccessful - that is, when any actual or potential benefits of collective

Voice are clearly outweighed by the costs and there are few opportunities for individual or collective Exit - or when the sub-party has attained its goals, in that the deterioration in organizational performance has been reversed to the satisfaction of sub-party members. In most cases, the successful restoration of the party product is achieved by sub-party members gaining control of party decision-making structures; once in control of the organizational resources of the host party, however, they have little need for a separate sub-party structure.

The Response to Voice: An Overview

Among the alternative developments of factional conflict within political parties, the institutionalization of Voice serves to perpetuate conflict, albeit at a lower more specialized level, through the accommodation of sub-party competition within the procedural and organizational norms of the party. The suppression of Voice proscribes the activities of organized sub-parties without addressing the sources of dissatisfaction. The expulsion or voluntary secession (forced or voluntary Exit) of dissatisfied members represents, in Bujra's terms, a generalization of conflict; although the parent party may be more cohesive as a result, again the sources of dissatisfaction which initially led some members to express Voice have not been addressed. Of the five, the dissolution of sub-party organizations (i.e., the cessation

of Voice), either because collective action in pursuit of goals is no longer worthwhile or because goals have been attained, is the only outcome with which we would associate the term "conflict resolution". Of course, in the medium term at least, none of these outcomes may occur and sub-party conflict and organized collective Voice may persist until some change takes place in the intra-party or extra-party conditions which determine the Exit/Voice calculus.

CONCLUSIONS

The fact that members of a sub-party faction have opted to stay, at least for the time being, within a particular political party to attempt to change its policies or practices, when they might have left to join another party or to form a new one, was the crucial characteristic of sub-party factionalism which led us to investigate Hirschman's work on Exit and Voice in our search for a theoretical and conceptual framework for the analysis of events within the Scottish National Party. Hirschman's original model has been subjected to a number of criticisms, however, and in the first part of the chapter we reviewed these problems before presenting our proposals for a revised Exit/Voice model.

The application of the Exit/Voice approach to sub-party factions, now conceptualized as "organized, collective expressions of Voice" by some party members who experience dissatisfaction with a perceived decline in the product or

organizational performance of the party, suggests a number of key elements which must be incorporated into any satisfactory explanation of sub-party conflict:

1. The sources of dissatisfaction - in particular, the nature of the perceived decline in organizational performance, whether this decline in absolute or relative, the distribution of perceptions of decline/dissatisfaction among the members of the party, and whether the deterioration is regarded as remediable;
2. the selection of a response to dissatisfaction or, as we have labelled it, the Exit/Voice calculus - key variables here include the availability of Exit and Voice, the perceived costs and benefits associated with each option, and the role of Loyalty (affect) in mediating these perceptions;
3. the response of the party leaders or the party as an organization to the organized, collective expression of Voice - key variables here include the number of people resorting to Voice, the volume and range of Voice, its effects on other members and on the party's voters, and the opportunities/costs of Exit.

In our view, therefore, the Exit/Voice approach appears to fulfil our requirement for a more general model of organizational behaviour which can be applied to both the emergence of sub-party factions and the resolution or other outcomes of sub-party conflict; and it will be this model that we use in later chapters of the thesis to analyse the emergence and eventual proscription/expulsion of the SNP 79 Group. But first, we need to know more about the organization itself - its history, its place in the market, its product, its structure and its membership clientele - and these aspects of the Scottish National Party are the focus of Part II of the thesis.

NOTES - CHAPTER FOUR

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3. Juliet Lodge, "Britain and the EEC: Exit, Voice or Loyalty?", Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 4, no.2, 1975, pp. 199-216.
4. Albert O. Hirschman, "Exit, Voice, and the State", World Politics, vol. 31, no. 1, 1978, pp. 90-107.
5. Stein Rokkan, "Dimensions of State Formation and Nation-Building: A Possible Paradigm for Research on Variations within Europe" in Charles Tilley, ed., The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 562-600; Samuel E. Finer, "State-building, state boundaries and border control: An essay on certain aspects of the first phase of state-building in Western Europe considered in the light of the Rokkan-Hirschman model", Social Science Information, vol. 13, nos. 4-5, 1974, pp. 79-126.

6. Dennis R. Young, "Consolidation or Diversity: Choices in the Structure of Urban Governance", American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, vol. 66, 1976, pp. 378-385. See also, Young, "Exit and voice in the organization of public services", Social Science Information, vol. 13, no. 3, 1974, pp. 49-65.

7. One partial exception to this finding is E. Spencer Wellhofer and Timothy M. Hennessey, "Models of Party Organisation and Strategy: Some Analytic Approaches to Oligarchy" in Ivor Crewe, ed., British Political Sociology Yearbook, Volume 1, Elites in Western Democracy (London: Croom Helm, 1974), esp. pp. 292-302, in which one paragraph (p. 302) links Hirschman's concepts to "extreme disputes" and "intra-elite struggle" within socialist working class party organizations. Elsewhere, without specifically referring to Hirschman, the same authors have used somewhat similar concepts ("dissent" rather than "voice", "leave" instead of "exit") in their analysis of schisms in the Argentine Socialist Party - see Wellhofer and Hennessey, "Political Party Development: Institutionalization, Leadership Recruitment, and Behavior", American Journal of Political Science, vol. 18, no. 1, 1974, p. 144.

8. Barry, "Review Article", pp. 85-87.

9. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, p. 2.

10. ibid.

11. ibid., p. 17.

12. ibid., p. 3.

13. ibid., p. 4. (Emphases in original.)

14. Throughout, the specific theoretical constructs "Exit", "Voice" and "Loyalty" will be written as proper nouns to distinguish them from everyday usage.

15. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, pp. 24-25.

16. ibid., pp. 39, 77.
17. ibid., p. 38.
18. ibid., p. 30.
19. ibid., p. 31.
20. Barry, "Review Article", p. 82.
21. ibid., p. 90 (Emphasis added.)
22. Barry, "Review Article", p. 91. See also Birch, "Economic Models in Political Science", p. 74; and Laver, "'Exit, Voice, and Loyalty' Revisited", pp. 471-473.
23. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, pp. 38, 114-119.
24. Here we disagree with Brian Barry who argues that silence and voice of varying degrees are located on a single continuum - i.e., "the choice is not normally between voice and no voice but between larger and smaller amounts of voice (including zero)"; Barry, "Review Article", p. 89.
25. Laver, "'Exit, Voice, and Loyalty' Revisited", p. 476.
26. ibid., pp. 476-477.
27. Finer, "State-building, state boundaries and border control", pp. 81-82.
28. Lodge, "Britain and the EEC: Exit, Voice or Loyalty?", p. 204.
29. ibid., p.210.

30. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, pp. 92-98 and Appendix E.
31. ibid., pp. 77-78.
32. ibid., p. 77.
33. On "retaliation" as a cost of Voice (often a prohibitive one), see Birch, "Economic Models in Political Science", pp. 75-79.
34. See Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, p. 80. The phrase "internalized tax" we have borrowed from Barry, "Review Article", p. 96.
35. Barry, ibid. See also Laver, "'Exit, Voice, and Loyalty' Revisited", pp. 477-478.
36. Birch, "Economic Models in Political Science", pp. 74-75.
37. Barry, "Review Article", p. 98.
38. ibid.
39. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, p. 38.
40. Laver, "'Exit, Voice, and Loyalty' Revisited", p. 474.
41. ibid., pp. 474-477.
42. Hirschman's reconsideration of the costs of Voice was prompted in part by the wave of popular activities in the US following the invasion of Cambodia and the Kent State massacre. Especially in pursuit of the 'public interest', Hirschman suggests, "the activities connected with voice can on occasion become a highly desired end in itself. ... (since) ... participation in a movement to bring about a desirable policy is ... the next best

thing to having that policy." See Hirschman, "'Exit, voice, and loyalty': Further reflections", pp. 8-9.

43. The possibility of "collective Voice" is raised indirectly by Laver in his consideration of consumer organizations and 'ginger groups' in "'Exit, Voice, and Loyalty' Revisited", pp. 470-471, and more explicitly in the concepts of "group action" and "party voice" discussed by Bernard B. Schaffer and Geoff B. Lamb, "Exit, voice, and access", Social Science Information, vol. 13, no. 6, 1974, esp. p. 86.
44. However, the concept of collective Voice does raise questions concerning Olson's observations about the rationality of collective action; see Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and a Theory of Groups (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1965). These problems are addressed later in this chapter.
45. While it is possible that Exit may be unavailable in both the economic and political realms (for example, where a firm enjoys a monopoly in the supply of an essential good or service, or where a state refuses to permit emigration from its borders), it may be argued that Voice is always available, even if the punishment for exercising it is apparently prohibitive. Our concept of the availability of Voice here refers to the existence of some kind of recognized channels for the communication of dissent or protest.
46. We might go further by suggesting that Exit and Voice can only "help" if they promise a net benefit at a cost which the individual is willing or able to pay. For example, since Voice may be exercised at different volumes each associated with a particular level of cost, if Voice is likely to yield results only at a very high volume, but that volume incurs costs that the individual cannot pay, then the individual will not use Voice because it cannot "help" at a level of cost which is bearable.
47. Bernard J. Siegel and Alan R. Beals, "Conflict and Factionalist Dispute", Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, vol. 90, 1960, p. 108.

48. Thus, pure proportional representation by national list, as in Israel or the Netherlands, will serve as the strongest incentive to schism since minor parties require less than one per cent of the national vote to secure parliamentary representation. However, thresholds of representation which require parties to gain a certain percentage of the vote before participating in the allocation of seats (for example, five per cent in West Germany or four per cent in Sweden) may serve as a disincentive to schism. The potential for schism may also vary with the effective thresholds of representation imposed by "district magnitude" (the number of members returned per constituency); see Douglas W. Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), Ch. 7.

49. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action.

50. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, p. 61.

51. Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy, first published 1911 (New York: The Free Press, 1962). See also Hirschman's discussion of Michels in Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, pp. 83-84.

52. Laver, "'Exit, Voice, and Loyalty' Revisited", p. 467-470.

53. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, pp. 82-85.

54. Our distinction between "instrumental" and "affective" motivations is similar to that between "instrumental" and "expressive" orientations towards political and social objects, most commonly associated with the writings of Talcott Parsons, in particular, see Parsons, The Social System (New York: The Free Press, 1951, 1964), p. 49 and pp. 79-88. See also Whiteley's discussion of "expressive" and "instrumental" motivations for joining the British Labour Party in Paul Whiteley, The Labour Party in Crisis (London: Methuen, 1983), pp. 57-61.

55. Janet M. Bujra, "The Dynamics of Political Action: A New Look at Factionalism", American Anthropologist, vol. 75, no. 1, 1973, esp. pp. 141-149.
56. ibid., p. 146.
57. It should be emphasized that Bujra's conception of faction is clearly rooted in the anthropological perspective, in that factions are defined in clientelist terms and are explicitly distinguished from political parties; see ibid., pp. 133-136.
58. For example, Arend Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy" in Kenneth D. McRae, ed., Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974), p. 81.
59. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, p. 33.
60. ibid., p. 76.

PART TWO

The Scottish National Party History, Ideology, Organization and Activists

Chapter Five

A HISTORY OF THE ORGANIZATION AND ITS PRODUCT:

PART I - THE EVOLUTION OF THE SNP TO 1961

Before we analyse the emergence of dissatisfaction and organized collective voice within the Scottish National Party, our first task is to introduce the reader to the nature of the organization itself. In this part of the thesis, therefore, we shall examine the origins and historical development of the SNP and selected aspects of the modern party - in particular, its ideology and policies, its organizational structure and the nature of its activist component.

The Scottish National Party is, at one and the same time, a fairly conventional electoral party, seeking to widen its popular appeal in the interests of vote maximization, and the organized political expression of a much broader social/political movement articulating a single basic issue, i.e., increased autonomy or independence for Scotland. There is a natural tension between these two often-contradictory roles and the history of the SNP contains many examples of conflict and division between electoralist and movement-oriented elements and between hardline independentists and

those who would accept a degree of self-government that falls short of full sovereignty. However, these conflicts have never been successfully resolved and, as we shall attempt to demonstrate at later points in the thesis, they are reflected still in the present organizational structure of the party and in the strife of 1979-1982.

As is often the case, therefore, one requires some knowledge of the past in order to understand more contemporary events. Hence, in this chapter, we describe and analyse the origins and evolution of the Scottish National Party from its foundation in 1934 to 1961, the year preceding what we regard as the watershed in its transformation from fringe political movement to modern electoralist party. Particular emphasis will be placed on the organizational development of the SNP, including the sequence of mergers, expulsions and schisms which characterized its early years. However, attention is also paid to the SNP's electoral record since, as we argued earlier, this is often an important indicator of the organizational performance of political parties. Then, in Chapter Six, we shall examine its more recent development from 1962 to the referendum campaign and general election of 1979.

THE ORIGINS OF THE SCOTTISH NATIONAL PARTY

The Scottish National Party was created in 1934 by a controversial merger between two existing parties, the independentist National Party of Scotland (founded 1928) and

the aristocratic, home-rule oriented Scottish Party (1932). The merger was a somewhat uneasy marriage of convenience which brought together two distinct strands of the nationalist tradition in Scotland and laid the basis for future tensions within the party. At the same time it alienated, and even deliberately excluded, other elements of the broader nationalist movement. To understand why, we need to go back a few more years to the circumstances surrounding the formation of the SNP's predecessor, the National Party of Scotland.

The National Party of Scotland

The National Party of Scotland (NPS), the first distinct nationalist party in Scotland, was itself the product of an alliance of elements from a number of nationalist groups. Prior to its foundation in June 1928, a assortment of nationalist organizations, many of them predominantly cultural in inspiration, had relied largely on pressure group activity to promote Scottish interests, seeking to influence the existing (British) parties, especially the Liberals and, later, the Labour Party.

Chief among these organizations was the **Scottish Home Rule Association (SHRA)**, founded as an all-party group to mobilize public opinion and lobby parliamentarians to win support for a measure of Scottish self-government within the United Kingdom.¹ From 1889 to 1928, a series of Home Rule

Bills and Motions (either relating to Scotland alone or seeking home rule "all round" for the peripheral nations of the United Kingdom) were introduced in Parliament and either defeated or "talked out". Minor political victories could be claimed in the creation of a Scottish Grand Committee of the House of Commons in 1894 to discuss legislation relating exclusively to Scotland and the elevation of the Secretary of State for Scotland to Cabinet rank in 1926.² But these were largely cosmetic changes which failed to satisfy demands for restoration of the Scottish Parliament which had been dissolved under the Treaty of Union with England in 1707. By the mid-1920s, with home rule already granted to Ireland, with the collapse of the traditionally sympathetic Liberal Party and the seduction of the Scottish Labour movement by the prospect of power at Westminster, some members of the SHRA were becoming increasingly disenchanted with pressure group politics in pursuit of a quasi-federal constitutional arrangement. Instead, they began to embrace a more independentist position and to contemplate setting up a separate political party to this end.

This tendency brought the leadership of the SHRA closer to a second participant in the formation of the NPS, the Scots National League (SNL), founded in 1920.³ Unlike the Home Rule Association, which was rooted in the Liberal/Labour tradition of political reformism, the League was initially inspired by the Irish experience of Gaelic cultural nationalism. It was

more fundamentalist in its attitude to separation, believing that Scots should determine their own constitutional future rather than relying on Westminster to "grant" home rule. But, in the early years the cultural and linguistic concerns of many of its members (for example, advocating the revival of the Gaelic language) took precedence over the development of practical political strategies for their attainment. By the mid-1920s, however, the SNL had grown more sensitive to economic concerns and, like the SHRA, had decided to pursue electoral activity in support of National candidates independent of other political parties.

A third group, the **Scottish National Movement (SNM)** was even more cultural in orientation than the SNL.⁴ Formed by the poet Lewis Spence after a split in the ranks of the League, the SNM advocated restoration of the Scots (not the Gaelic) language, the revival of Scottish culture (including art, literature and music) and a degree of political independence that fell short of outright separation.

By late 1927, after yet another Home Rule Bill had been talked out in Parliament, these three organizations were in fairly regular contact as discussions took place on the proposed formation of a separate Scottish political party. But little progress was made until the intervention of a fourth group, the **Glasgow University Student Nationalist Association (GUSNA)**. This body was really the personal creation of a young law student by the name of John MacCormick

who was destined to become perhaps the central figure in the nationalist movement for the next quarter century or more. Agreement was now quickly achieved and the SNL, SNM and GUSNA all voted to wind up their respective organizations and merge into the new party. There was some opposition to the merger in the SHRA, but the subsequent defection of many members to the National Party so debilitated the Association that it too was dissolved a year later in September 1929.

Thus, the National Party of Scotland was formally inaugurated in Stirling on June 23, 1928. Its first Chairman, R.E. (Roland) Muirhead, was the former leader of the Home Rule Association, while John MacCormick, the student catalyst, became Secretary of the party, a position he held in the NPS (and later the SNP) until 1942. Like its leadership, the new party's platform represented in admixture of the principles of its constituent parts. It followed the National League in demanding full independence for Scotland, but rejected the League's anti-imperialism and occasional republicanism - Scotland was to be 'independent under the Crown'. The NPS also played down cultural and romanticist principles in favour of economic arguments for sovereignty. Admittedly, no single economic theory predominated; some NPS members, most notably Christopher Grieve (alias Hugh MacDiarmid), flirted with the Social Credit doctrine of Major Douglas', while others (including MacCormick) argued in favour of small-scale economic enterprise, a harbinger of the "Small is Beautiful"

ethic embraced by many Nationalists in more recent years.⁶ The majority of the party, including Muirhead and MacCormick, came originally from Independent Labour Party backgrounds or from other socialist and radical groupings but, perhaps wisely, the NPS did not seek to compete directly with the trade-union backed (British) Labour Party and ILP. Instead, it made an appeal to national sentiment and to all those desiring the establishment of an independent Scotland as a sovereign state within the empire on an equal footing with England.

The National Party was committed to an electoralist strategy and almost immediately found itself involved in a by-election in North Midlothian - despite the fact that, as MacCormick admitted, "Not one of us had ever taken part in a Parliamentary election and we had nothing but the vaguest ideas of organisation or even of the legal preliminaries of nominating a candidate." Not surprisingly, the nationalist candidate Lewis Spence (formerly of the SNM) received little more than four per cent of the votes. From this unpromising start, however, the party's electoral performance improved over the next few years, with three deposits saved in the five seats contested in the 1931 general election. Meanwhile, new branches were created and by May 1931 the NPS could claim 8000 paid-up members.⁸ But this steady progress was soon to be threatened by the emergence of a rival nationalist party.

Enter the Scottish Party

In June 1932, the Unionist (Conservative) Association in the Cathcart constituency of Glasgow broke with Tory principles by declaring itself in favour of Scottish Home Rule within an Imperial Federation. Three months later, the breakaway group became the largest contingent of members of the newly formed **Scottish Self-Government Party** (usually known as the Scottish Party). The new party included a number of important figures in Scottish politics, including the Duke of Montrose, a Conservative peer with known sympathies for the Home Rule movement; Sir Alexander McEwen, the Liberal Provost of Inverness; and, perhaps the driving force behind the party's formation, Andrew Dewar Gibb, Professor of Scots Law at Glasgow University. It was, from the beginning, a party of notables with little in the way of mass membership and no formal organizational structure. But the prominence of its leaders threatened to divert the spotlight from the NPS as chief flagwaver for the Nationalist cause. Moreover, the Scottish Party possessed money and men with vast experience in public affairs, both qualities somewhat lacking in the NPS at that time. Not surprisingly, MacCormick, the supreme pragmatist, immediately made overtures to Scottish Party concerning a possible merger.

Following a disastrous by-election in East Fife in February 1933 in which the Scottish Party remained steadfastly neutral and the NPS polled only 3.6 per cent of the vote, its

worst result so far, MacCormick and others in the National Party concluded that they "could not afford to allow the Scottish Party to continue in its separate existence."⁹ But support for a merger was by no means certain. Although the Scottish Party had by now committed itself to a Scottish Parliament with autonomy over internal affairs, this did not go far enough for the independentists in the NPS, especially in the London Branch and the Edinburgh region where the Scots National League component remained strong. Moreover, while the members of the Scottish Party had come largely from Conservative or Liberal backgrounds, most members of the NPS retained the radicalism of their Labour and Independent Labour Party roots. Opposition to a merger crystallized at the National Party Conference of May 1933. Although delegates approved a resolution modifying the aims of the NPS to a position closer to that taken by the Scottish Party, they also rejected a supplementary resolution to authorize official talks with the other party. After a "long day of heated recrimination and violent abuse",¹⁰ much of it directed against MacCormick, the Conference was adjourned.

Within hours, MacCormick and his inner circle in the NPS had decided upon a course of action that was to become something of an habitual recourse for Nationalist party leaders in the future. They determined to seek the expulsion of their opponents, in particular Angus Clark and Dougal McColl of the London Branch, who had published articles

critical of MacCormick,¹¹ and the Edinburgh Regional Council of the NPS which had led the opposition against the merger with the Scottish Party. In view of more recent events in the SNP, it is worth citing MacCormick's justification for seeking the expulsions:

while they still remained among us they would be a constant thorn in our flesh and an endless source of dissension. Already for nearly twelve months we had dissipated our energies on internal disputes and our failure in East Fife was largely due to that dissipation.¹²

When the adjourned Conference was reconvened in October 1933, the expulsion order was passed by 72 votes to 57, and the way was clear for MacCormick to seek his goal of unifying the two nationalist parties. After further negotiations and votes by special conferences of both parties, a joint meeting on April 7, 1934, inaugurated the Scottish National Party.

The events leading up to the creation of the SNP can be summarized fairly simply in terms of our Exit/Voice model. The National Party of Scotland was created by a merger among a number of older organizations whose members saw the new party as the best way to restore or improve the quality of their own products. But, as might be expected from our discussion of variables associated with the emergence of sub-party conflict, the merging of groups with dissimilar aims and ideas laid the basis for divisions within the new party, although these remained manageable while the NPS continued to grow and retained an effective monopoly on its product as the

only distinctly nationalist party in Scotland. However, the emergence of a new, better-financed and better-managed competitor (the Scottish Party) appeared to challenge the National Party's position in the electoral marketplace, and the NPS management (i.e., MacCormick) moved to take over or merge with the rival organization as a means of restoring quality. When this strategy was blocked by the expression of Voice by some members dissatisfied with his policies, MacCormick successfully suppressed their use of Voice within the party by securing the forced Exit (expulsion) of the dissidents.

THE SCOTTISH NATIONAL PARTY, 1934-1942

In its early years, the Scottish National Party continued to be beset by the disputes and problems of its predecessor. It has been estimated, for example, that approximately one-fifth of the NPS membership left the party in 1933-34 as a consequence of dissatisfaction with the merger.¹³ However these losses were not offset by new recruits, in that many members of the Scottish Party failed to transfer their allegiance to the SNP and others who did so, such as Kevan McDowall (leader of the Cathcart group), left again within a few years. Moreover, by the mid-1930s, most of the cultural nationalists, the literary and Gaelic revivalists, had either departed or been expelled.¹⁴ Apart from Angus Clark, who had been one of the Scots National League representatives at

meetings which founded the NPS, perhaps the most controversial of the expellees was C.M. Grieve (better known as the poet Hugh MacDiarmid), characterized by MacCormick as one of the "wild men" who scared off some of the Scottish Party notables:

C.M. Grieve has been politically one of the greatest handicaps with which any national movement have been burdened. His love of bitter controversy, his extravagant and self-assertive criticism of the English, and his woolly thinking, which could encompass within one mind the doctrines both of Major Douglas and Karl Marx, were taken by many of the more sober-minded of the Scots as sufficient excuse to condemn the whole case for Home Rule out of hand.¹⁵

But MacDiarmid is no more generous in his assessment of the leaders of the nationalist party! In his view, the determination of the SNP to play the electoral game precluded any toleration of individualistic thinking or dissent.

That is one of the reasons why the Scottish National Party has such a record of expulsions and internecine quarrelling ... its leading personnel are all just Poujadists and Philistines, any member with an independent reputation, national or international, having been got rid of, and the "mind" of the party having been purged of ideas until it represents only a revolt of the primitives against intelligence¹⁶

Certainly, there remains something of an anti-intellectual bent among many members of the SNP even today¹⁷ which may be traced back to the experience of the party's formative years. As one observer has suggested, "an overexposure to poets seems to have made the SNP almost hostile to modern Scottish culture".¹⁸

Having purged itself of cultural nationalists, and with most, though not all, of the fundamentalist (or independentist) members of the former Scots National League having departed over the watering down of the NPS platform as a prerequisite to the merger with the Scottish Party, the SNP was now established as a pragmatic, gradualist Home Rule party, moulded very much in the image of MacCormick. Thus, a majority of members, largely from the old SHRA or the Scottish Party, sought some form of devolution from Westminster or the establishment of Scottish self-government within a United Kingdom federation. But there remained within the party a minority whose Voice continued to advocate either dominion status within the empire or full independence with complete separation from the UK.¹⁹

In addition to these differing attitudes to the aims of the nationalist struggle, other issues were also to prove divisive in the 1930s; indeed, some have not been fully resolved fifty years later. Disagreements arose over whether the SNP should be a single-issue party or campaign on a more comprehensive policy platform; over dual membership (i.e., whether members of the SNP could also be members of, or active in, other parties); over relations with other political parties; and, last but not least, over the domination of party policy and strategy by MacCormick and his circle of friends on the party's governing National Council. Many of these

divisions were to crystallize in the late 1930s as the war approached.

In electoral terms, the SNP made little headway. In the 1935 general election, in seven seats contested only two deposits were saved, in Inverness and the Western Isles, while the party's vote collapsed alarmingly in the west of Scotland (see Table 5.1). In part, this may have been a reflection of events elsewhere: the rise of Hitler, suggests MacCormick, "gave the very word 'nationalism' a new and highly distasteful meaning. It was in vain for us to point out that nationalism in Scotland had a very different meaning from the nationalism of the Nazi Party."²⁰ However, it was also symptomatic of the organizational decline of the party and of a shift in nationalist strategy in the years following the merger. Thus, according to one estimate, between November 1934 and July 1936, the number of SNP branches shrank from 90 to 59, while another suggests that party membership had fallen to 2000 by the end of the decade.²¹ Whereas the NPS had focussed on mass mobilization, the influence of the alliance with the Scottish Party was manifested in a return to a more traditional style of politics. The appeals of notables to the voters at election time was moderately successful in the rural north but failed in the urban industrial centres in the central belt of Scotland where the NPS had previously concentrated its electoral and organizational activity. As electoral support failed to materialize, MacCormick began to make overtures to

**TABLE 5.1 - NATIONAL PARTY (NPS/SNP) ELECTORAL
PERFORMANCE: VOTE SHARES IN GENERAL
ELECTIONS AND BY-ELECTIONS, 1928-1939**

Year	Constituency	Vote Share	(Previous Vote Share)
1929	North Midlothian & Peebles	(B) 4.5	
	West Renfrewshire	(G) 5.4	
	Glasgow Camlachie	(G) 4.9	
1930	Glasgow Shettleston	(B) 10.1	
	East Renfrewshire	(B) 13.1	
1931	Glasgow St. Rollox	(B) 15.8	
	Inverness	(G) 14.0	
	East Renfrewshire	(G) 13.9	(13.1)
	Glasgow St. Rollox	(G) 13.3	(15.8)
	West Renfrewshire	(G) 11.0	(5.4)
	Edinburgh East	(G) 9.4	
1932	Dunbartonshire	(B) 13.4	
	Montrose Burghs	(B) 11.7	
1933	East Fife	(B) 3.6	
	Kilmarnock	(B) 16.9	
1935	Western Isles	(G) 28.1	
	Inverness	(G) 16.1	(14.0)
	West Renfrewshire	(G) 11.3	(11.0)
	East Renfrewshire	(G) 10.4	(13.9)
	Dunbartonshire	(G) 7.8	(13.4)
	Kilmarnock	(G) 6.2	(16.9)
	Greenock	(G) 3.3	
1936	Dunbartonshire	(B) 6.2	(7.8)
	Glasgow Hillhead	(B) 9.0	

(B) = By-election

(G) = General election

(N.B. Table excludes university constituencies)

Source: Adapted from F.W.S. Craig, Minor Parties at British Parliamentary Elections 1885-1974 (London: Macmillan, 1975), pp. 89-90.

other political parties, especially the Liberals who were still sympathetic to Home Rule." Coincidentally or not, the late 1930s witnessed a decline in SNP electoral activity - between 1936 and 1939, the SNP failed to contest seven Scottish by-elections."

The approach of the Second World War created a new basis for division within the Scottish National Party. At its Annual Conference of 1937, the party resolved that "... all male members of the Scottish National Party of military age hereby pledge themselves to refuse to serve with any section of the Crown Forces until the programme of the Scottish National Party has been fulfilled." However, despite the collective Voice of the Scots Neutrality League, a group of hard-line nationalists founded in 1938 by Arthur Donaldson," by May 1939 the SNP had moderated its anti-conscription stance to legitimize the service of Scots in defence of Britain and, when war broke out four months later, MacCormick gave a pledge of full support for the war effort." This aroused the ire of both pacifists and those who argued that the Treaty of Union did not give the "English" government the right to conscript Scots in an imperialist war. But, for a while at least, the MacCormick faction appeared to be in control of the party; and this was confirmed in proscription of the United Scotsmen, a small organization of militant nationalists, membership of which was deemed to be incompatible with remaining in the SNP.

THE 1942 SCHISM AND THE SCOTTISH COVENANT

The various dimensions of conflict within the SNP crystallized at the party's 1942 Annual Conference. First, the delegates rejected MacCormick's motion that the party cease contesting elections and concentrate instead on propagandist activity to persuade other political parties to support home rule at the end of the war.²⁷ But the catalyst for schism was the election of office-bearers. MacCormick had nominated a close friend, William Power, as SNP Chairman; his opponents gathered behind a rival candidate, Douglas Young, an Assistant to the Professor of Greek at Aberdeen University, whose main claim to fame in nationalist circles was that he was currently on bail pending an appeal against imprisonment for ignoring a conscription summons. When, after a day of heated deliberations, Young defeated Power for the Chairmanship by 33 votes to 29, MacCormick immediately announced his resignation from the party and called upon his allies to follow him to the nearby Rutland Hotel to consider further action.²⁸

Although Young's opposition to war service made him a convenient symbol for the dissidents within the party, the war issue was really only a catalyst in a process of transformation of a number of issue-groups and tendencies into two major sub-party factions. The hard-liners on the conscription issue tended to be fundamentalists with respect to independence, and they also favoured an electoral strategy

pursued by the SNP acting alone. MacCormick's group supported the war effort, saw devolution as the most they could hope for, and increasingly had embraced an all-party approach or alliances with parties sympathetic to Home Rule in order to achieve that end. But the crucial link among most of those who supported Young was common opposition to

the control of the movement ... falling more and more into the hands of a small Glasgow group under the leadership of Mr. MacCormick ... resulting in a gradual freezing of enterprise, bewildering opportunism and a lack of courage in facing national issues fair and square.²⁹

Following their collective Exit from the SNP, MacCormick and his supporters founded a new organization, initially called the Scottish Union, later Scottish Convention, and eventually the Scottish Covenant Association. The goals and strategies of the new body were essentially little different from those of the old Scottish Home Rule Association - namely, to work for a measure of self-government within the United Kingdom by pursuing all-party propagandist activity. While a handful of SNP branches went over to the Convention, many of its members came from other parties and, indeed, MacCormick himself joined the Liberals and ran unsuccessfully for that party in the 1945 general election.

For the first few years, Convention members worked to lobby and 'infiltrate' political parties, especially the Conservatives and Liberals, but in March 1947 they organized the first Scottish National Assembly in Glasgow. The Assembly

was attended by about 600 representatives drawn from all the major Scottish institutions - local authorities, chambers of commerce and other business organizations, the Church of Scotland, labour associations and political parties - although the number of Labour Party and trade union delegates was small, leading one commentator to label it "largely a middle class affair".³⁰ The Assembly adopted by an overwhelming majority a resolution supporting the re-establishment of a Scottish Parliament and calling upon the Westminster government to introduce legislation to give effect to the "large measure of self-government" favoured by "a substantial majority of the Scottish people".³¹ A committee of the Assembly was charged with preparing a detailed scheme for self-government and its "Blue-Print for Scotland" was duly adopted in March 1948 by the second National Assembly.³²

However, the Assembly demands fell on deaf ears at Westminster, and the Convention leaders turned their attention to demonstrating the extent of popular support for Scottish self-government by launching the Scottish Covenant, a kind of petition which bound the signatories in a collective undertaking to work together for the attainment of a Scottish Parliament.³³ The Covenant was formally opened for signature in Edinburgh in October 1949 at the third Scottish National Assembly, attended by 1200 delegates from all walks of life. Public support for the idea was such that 50,000 signatures were added in the first week and MacCormick's ill-organized

Convention branches struggled to keep up with the demand for new forms. Nonetheless, within six months, the number of signatures approached one million and by 1951 the two million mark was reached. Although there were certainly some forgeries and duplications, there was undoubtedly widespread popular support for the admittedly vague aspirations expressed in the Covenant.

Despite its apparent appeal to the Scots, however, the Covenant was no more successful than the earlier National Assembly resolutions in moving the Westminster government to action. In part, this may be ascribed to unfortunate timing since the 1950 and 1951 general election campaigns had demonstrated that Scots aspirations for self-government were not, at this time, to be translated into votes. Moreover, the number of evidently bogus signatures appended to the petition was sufficient for the government to cast doubts upon its entire legitimacy. Neither the Prime Minister nor the Leader of the Opposition would officially accept the Covenant and, although the Conservative government established a Royal Commission on Scottish Affairs (the Balfour Commission) in 1952, it recommended no major constitutional changes. In an attempt to keep the momentum going, MacCormick combined the organizations of the Scottish Convention and the Scottish Covenant Committee into the Scottish Covenant Association in 1951, and some consideration was given to nominating candidates to oppose MPs who would not sign a pledge to

support home rule, but internal dissension precluded further action. The Covenant movement was already in decline and it disappeared with MacCormick's death in 1961.

The Convention/Covenant Association, aided by MacCormick's election as Lord Rector of Glasgow University in 1950 and the removal of the Stone of Scone (the Stone of Destiny) from Westminster Abbey to Scotland in the same year,³⁴ kept Scottish nationalism in the public eye in the post-war years when the SNP was in the doldrums. It was also responsible for drawing into the broad nationalist movement a number of activists who were later to play leading roles in the rise of the SNP, including William Wolfe, Chairman of the party in the 1970s. But perhaps the greatest legacy of the Convention was that it demonstrated, largely by omission, the importance of organization and sustained effort if nationalist sentiment was to be translated into genuine political clout and that nationalist goals could be achieved, if at all, only through winning elections.

THE SNP IN THE SHADOWS, 1942-1961

The departure of MacCormick and his allies from the party at the 1942 Annual Conference left the Scottish National Party smaller but more cohesive than before. Those who remained were largely the hard-line independentists who favoured electoral activity by the SNP acting alone rather than the all-party propagandist approach to be taken by the Convention,

and this 'fundamentalist' line was strengthened by the return of a number of former members who had left or been expelled from the party in the 1930s.

While the Convention attracted little publicity in the years prior to 1945, the SNP was able to take advantage of a wartime moratorium on electoral competition among the major British parties to achieve some notable by-election results. Earlier, in 1940, William Power had secured 37 per cent of the votes in the Conservative constituency of Argyll. Then in 1944, Douglas Young, the man whose victory over Power for the Chairmanship of the party had signalled MacCormick's secession, was defeated by only 1600 votes by Labour in Kirkcaldy Burghs. Finally, in April 1945, Dr. Robert McIntyre, who had succeeded MacCormick as party secretary, won the vacant seat in Motherwell from Labour to become the SNP's first elected Member of Parliament. The success was short-lived, however, as normal party competition was restored at the end of the war, and McIntyre was defeated three months later at the 1945 general election in which the SNP gained just over one per cent of the total Scottish vote (a mean of 7.6 per cent in seats contested) with only McIntyre and Young saving their deposits (see Table 5.2).

The poor performance of the SNP in the 1945 general election reawakened discussion of the party's future strategy. Some members, including party president Roland Muirhead, believed that non-electoral activity, including some form of

**TABLE 5.2 - SNP PERFORMANCE IN GENERAL ELECTIONS
AND BY-ELECTIONS, 1940-1959**

Year	Constituency		Vote Share	(Previous Vote Share)
1940	Argyll	(B)	37.2	
1944	Kirkcaldy Burghs	(B)	41.3	
1945	Motherwell	(B)	51.4	
	Motherwell	(G)	26.7	(51.4)
	Kirkcaldy Burghs	(G)	17.0	(41.3)
	Edinburgh East	(G)	6.3	
	Renfrewshire West	(G)	6.3	(11.3)
	Aberdeen North	(G)	5.3	
	Glasgow Kelvingrove	(G)	4.9	
	Dundee	(G)	4.6	
	Perth & East Perthshire	(G)	4.3	
1946	Glasgow Cathcart	(B)	10.4	
	Ayrshire Kilmarnock	(B)	7.8	
1947	Edinburgh East	(B)	5.0	(6.3)
1948	Stirling & Falkirk	(B)	8.2	
1950	Motherwell	(G)	9.3	(26.7)
	Perth & East Perthshire	(G)	9.3	(4.3)
	Stirling & Falkirk	(G)	3.7	(8.2)
1951	Perth & East Perthshire	(G)	14.9	(9.3)
	Western Isles	(G)	5.0	
1952	Dundee East	(B)	7.4	
1955	Perth & East Perthshire	(G)	22.8	(14.9)
	Stirling & Falkirk	(G)	6.7	
1959	Perth & East Perthshire	(G)	23.1	(22.8)
	Kinross & West Perthshire	(G)	15.0	
	Stirling & Falkirk	(G)	6.6	(6.7)
	Hamilton	(G)	6.2	
	Aberdeen North	(G)	5.8	

(B) = By-Election

(G) = General Election

Source: Adapted from F.W.S. Craig, Minor Parties at British Parliamentary Elections 1885-1974 (London, Macmillan, 1975), p. 90.

"direct action", was necessary to win attention to and support for the Nationalist cause. However, McIntyre and others among the post-MacCormick generation of party leaders remained firmly committed to an electoral strategy. To this end, they introduced at a special party conference in December 1946 a comprehensive policy statement detailing the constitutional, economic and social policies to be pursued in a future independent Scotland.³⁵

Now that the party had a clear policy platform which advocated something more than just self-government, the next step in the modernization of the SNP and the rejection of the all-party approach was the clear differentiation of its organization and membership. Prior to 1948, it was possible for individuals to be members of both the SNP and another party, a situation which was clearly untenable for a party committed to fighting elections since it could not even rely on the electoral allegiance of its own members. Motions to ban dual membership had been defeated at the 1935 and 1936 Annual Conferences, but the 1948 Conference adopted a National Council resolution which stated, *inter alia*, that

Members may not at the same time be members of any other political party. In all cases the National Council shall decide which bodies are to be considered as political parties."

The ending of dual membership led to the expulsion of some members and the voluntary departure of others including former party Chairman Douglas Young, who had remained a member of the

Labour Party throughout his involvement with the SNP, but was now forced to Exit from one organization or the other.

Even now, the process of fission and expulsion was not complete. In 1950, Roland Muirhead, formerly of the Scottish Home Rule Association and one of the founding members of the NPS, launched the Scottish National Congress, an independentist organization modelled on Gandhi's movement in India. It was intended to be a broad alliance of constituent groups which would conduct political education and propaganda and, because Muirhead had lost confidence in the electoral strategy of the SNP, it also advocated non-violent disruption and civil disobedience. Although relations between Congress and the SNP were initially cordial, they deteriorated as the decade progressed and, in 1958, after Congress had requested the Soviet Union to plead Scotland's case for independence to the United Nations, it was declared a prohibited organization by the party.

A further challenge was posed in the mid 1950s by a number of younger nationalists in Glasgow and Edinburgh who formed themselves into a loose alliance known as "The 1955 Group". (It would appear that factions within the SNP are hardly innovative in their choice of titles!) Dissatisfied with the apparent stagnation and inactivity of the party and with the firm control exercised over the SNP by McIntyre and the group of leaders who had taken over after MacCormick's departure more than a decade earlier, their collective Voice

made their position clear: according to its own information sheet,

The 1955 Group is those members of the SNP who are dissatisfied with the conduct of the 1955 Conference, the administration and incompetence of Party HQ, the failure of the Party to show results after twenty-seven years ... and the dictatorial methods used by office-bearers to stifle free disagreement and criticism of any kind."

Like the '79 Group a generation later, the 1955 Group members sought to change the party leadership by contesting Annual Conference elections, but they were defeated amid allegations of unfair practice on behalf of the established leaders.

Young dissidents were also responsible for establishing the "Nationalist Party of Scotland" which was declared a proscribed organization by the SNP after it published support for the efforts of President Nasser of Egypt to resist "English Imperialism" during the Suez Crisis. Some of the dissatisfied members were subsequently expelled from the SNP, while others left of their own accord after Voice had failed to secure their goals. The threat to the party leadership was averted, but its willingness to resort to proscription (the repression of Voice) and expulsion (forced Exit) reflected in part, at least, its determination to present the SNP as a respectable and moderate electoral organization.

Under the leadership of McIntyre, Chairman of the party from 1947 to 1956, the SNP was firmly set on the path towards its later emergence as a modern mass party, committed to electoral activity in pursuit of nothing less than complete

independence for Scotland. But, although the party had decided in the late 1940s to participate in local government elections, and scored some minor successes at this level, it made little headway in the contests that really mattered, i.e., in parliamentary campaigns. MacCormick's Convention and Covenant Association had siphoned off much of the financial support which might otherwise have gone to the SNP, and the party was careful to husband its limited resources by fighting parliamentary elections only in constituencies where it was already well-established. Nevertheless, all three SNP candidates in the 1950 general election lost their deposits, only two candidates were nominated in both 1951 and 1955 and the party ceased to contest by-elections for almost a decade after its poor showing in Dundee East in 1952 (see Table 5.2).

By the late 1950s, however, there were small signs of an improvement in party fortunes. In 1958, the SNP National Council launched an intensive membership drive which met with some success, particularly after the imminent demise of the Covenant Association led some of its members to cross over to the Party. In the 1959 general election, two of the five SNP candidates saved their deposits and the party polled an average of 10.7 per cent of the votes in the seats contested. But the emergence of the SNP from the shadows of the post-war period was most marked by its performance at the Glasgow Bridgeton by-election in November 1961. The SNP candidate, Ian MacDonald, was aided by the organizational decay of the

Labour Party, Labour's selection of a "pedestrian Glasgow councillor" to succeed the highly charismatic former MP," and incompetent canvassing by the Conservatives who distributed in a constituency "with among the worst housing in Britain ... a Central Office leaflet stressing the 'home comforts' brought about by Tory prosperity"." In addition, MacDonald proved to be an excellent organizer of his canvassers' efforts and he was rewarded with 18.7 per cent of the poll, the party's best by-election performance since McIntyre's victory in 1945 and its highest ever vote in Scotland's most populous city.

From 1942 to 1961, it may be argued, "The greatest achievement of the SNP ... was simply to have survived."⁴⁰ It had survived the secession of MacCormick, its founding inspiration, and his establishment of a rival organization which captured the nationalist agenda in the immediate post-war years. It had survived the subsequent battle over dual membership and the new wave of departures which followed that decision. And it had survived a number of other minor splits and schisms in the 1950s which had further depleted the party's membership base. What remained was a party of around 2000 members headed by a small cadre of leaders, unified in goals and strategies, who managed it "like a modest family business".⁴¹ But, within a few years, the small family firm was to face the challenges of becoming a major player in the marketplace.

CONCLUSIONS

From the foundation of its predecessor the NPS in 1928, the first thirty years of the Scottish National Party were marked by fierce internal debates over means and ends, by personality clashes, by repeated schisms, proscriptions and expulsions. In the words of one author, writing in the early 1960s, "The history of Scottish Nationalism ... is the story of the inability of people with similar goals to work together in harmony."² Apart from isolated by-elections, most notably during the Second World War, the party made little impression in the electoral arena, and in the early post-war period the SNP was clearly overshadowed by the lobbying and propagandist activity of John MacCormick's breakaway Scottish Convention. But, for one analyst at least, the years of internal strife were to be functional for the party in the future. According to Keith Webb:

The history of the SNP from 1928 to 1961 can be seen as one of "purification", the development of a small ideologically-united activist group. Throughout this time it had been resolving divisive party issues by sloughing off dissident elements It is difficult to imagine the SNP being successful ... (in the 1960s and 1970s) ... had they still been the quarrelsome and divided party of the 1930s and 1940s."

Thus, in terms of the Exit-Voice model, the early history of the party may be seen as one in which the management/leadership of the organization tried a variety of methods of improving the quality of its product against a background of mergers, repeated expression (and occasional

suppression) of Voice, collective and individual Exits (some forced, some voluntary), and the emergence of a number of competitors which diverted attention, however temporarily, from its product. What remained in 1961 was a small modestly-run 'family firm', with an effective monopoly on its product, but requiring an infusion of new managerial blood if it were to take advantage of the opportunities for expansion that would be presented by changes in the electoral marketplace in the future. In this respect, according to one observer, "What happened after [the by-election at] Bridgeton was at least as important as what happened at the poll." "The delegated SNP candidate, Ian MacDonald, was so encouraged by the experience of the by-election campaign that he offered to work full-time for the party as National Organiser. The transition from 'modest family business' to modern political party had begun.

NOTES - CHAPTER FIVE

1. On the history of the home rule movement, see H.J. Hanham, Scottish Nationalism (London: Faber & Faber, 1969), Chapter 5.
2. On the roles of the Scottish Grand Committee and the Secretary of State for Scotland, see James G. Kellas, The Scottish Political System, second edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 81-83 and Chapter 3.
3. A more detailed discussion of the Scots National League may be found in Jack Brand, The National Movement in Scotland (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), pp. 182-188.
4. On the Scottish National Movement, see ibid., pp. 189-191.
5. See ibid., pp. 204-208 on the influence of the Social Credit doctrine on the early development of the National Party.
6. The "Small is Beautiful" principle is discussed further in Chapter Seven, below.
7. John MacCormick, The Flag in the Wind: The Story of the National Movement in Scotland (London: Victor Gollancz, 1955), p. 38.
8. Hanham, Scottish Nationalism, p. 157.
9. MacCormick, The Flag in the Wind, p. 79.
10. ibid., p. 81.

11. Arthur Donaldson, "History of the SNP", Scots Independent, no. 126, September 1981, p. 8.
12. MacCormick, The Flag in the Wind, p. 81.
13. Hanham, Scottish Nationalism, p. 160.
14. Ian McAllister, "Party Organization and Minority Nationalism: A Comparative Study in the United Kingdom", European Journal of Political Research, vol. 9, no. 2, 1981, p. 242.
15. MacCormick, The Flag in the Wind, p. 35.
16. Hugh MacDiarmid, "Scotland: Full Circle" in Duncan Glen, ed., Whither Scotland? A Prejudiced Look at the Future of a Nation (London: Victor Gollancz, 1971), pp. 235-236.
17. An example of this anti-intellectual sentiment in the modern SNP was a routine condemnation of the leaders of the '79 Group by their critics as "that bunch of armchair socialist intellectuals from Edinburgh" (Interviews, March-April 1982).
18. Hanham, Scottish Nationalism, p. 209.
19. Keith Webb, The Growth of Nationalism in Scotland (Glasgow: Molendinar Press, 1977), pp. 48-49.
20. MacCormick, The Flag in the Wind, p. 88.
21. Brand, The National Movement in Scotland, p. 235; Arthur Donaldson, "Slide into War", Scots Independent, no. 131, February 1982, p. 5.
22. MacCormick, The Flag in the Wind, pp. 90-94.

23. Arthur Donaldson, "History of the SNP", Scots Independent, no. 129, December 1981, p. 4.
24. Cited in Hanham, Scottish Nationalism, p. 166.
25. Arthur Donaldson, "History of the SNP", Scots Independent, no. 132, March 1982, p. 4, and no. 133, April 1982, p. 8.
26. MacCormick, The Flag in the Wind, pp. 96-97.
27. Christopher Harvie, Scotland and Nationalism: Scottish Society and Politics, 1707-1977 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1977), p. 53.
28. MacCormick, The Flag in the Wind, pp. 106-107.
29. Unidentified member of the SNP quoted in The Scotsman, Edinburgh, June 2, 1942, cited in Hanham, Scottish Nationalism, pp. 167-168.
30. Brand, The National Movement in Scotland, p. 244.
31. The full text of the resolution is cited in Webb, The Growth of Nationalism in Scotland, p. 63.
32. The "Blue-Print for Scotland" is reproduced in MacCormick, The Flag in the Wind, Appendix A, pp. 199-206.
33. For full text of the Covenant, see ibid., p. 128.
34. See MacCormick, Chapters 23-25.
35. See "Statement of Aim and Policy of the Scottish National Party", reprinted in Hanham, Scottish Nationalism, Appendix, pp. 213-230.

36. Cited in Brand, The National Movement in Scotland, p. 250.
37. Cited in ibid., pp. 255-256.
38. Harvie, Scotland and Nationalism, p. 238.
39. Iain McLean, "The Rise and Fall of Scottish Nationalism", Political Studies, vol. 18, no. 3, 1970, p. 360.
40. Hanham, Scottish Nationalism, p. 179.
41. Harvie, Scotland and Nationalism, p. 237.
42. George Thayer, The British Political Fringe: A Profile (London: Anthony Blond, 1965), p. 189.
43. Webb, The Growth of Nationalism in Scotland, p. 99.
44. Brand, The National Movement in Scotland, p. 259.

Chapter Six

A HISTORY OF THE ORGANIZATION AND ITS PRODUCT:

PART II - THE MODERNIZATION OF THE SNP,

1962-1979

While the early history of the Scottish National Party to 1961 is largely a story of mergers, internal conflict and schisms, the next two decades were to be equally eventful, but for different reasons. In the 1960s, the party modernized its organizational structure and enlarged its share of the electoral market, at first modestly but then a major breakthrough in 1967-68 was followed by a disappointing decline in the 1970 general election. Nevertheless, four years later, the SNP made its biggest gains ever and emerged as a major player both in the Scottish electoral marketplace and at Westminster where, along with other minor parties, it held the balance of power for much of the Labour government's term in office. Again, however, Nationalists were to be disappointed; in the first few months of 1979, the prize of a separate Scottish Assembly was snatched from their grasp by a mixture of political manouvering and voter apathy, and then

their electoral gains of 1974 were all but eradicated in the 1979 general election.

In this chapter, we trace the major events of SNP history in the period 1962-1979. The chapter is divided into three main sections. We begin by examining the first electoral 'rise and fall' of the SNP from 1962 to 1970 and review some of the explanations advanced at the time for the party's electoral performance. Second, we describe the major organizational changes that occurred in the 1960s. Then, we outline the second 'rise and fall' from the early 1970s to the referendum and general election campaigns of 1979.

THE FIRST RISE AND FALL OF THE SNP, 1962-1970

It is often tempting to isolate particular events, or a particular year, as a watershed in the unfolding of political developments. Yielding to such temptation may lead to a charge of reductionism or oversimplification. But 1962 was clearly a turning point in Scottish National Party fortunes, even if its significance was not immediately apparent. In May of that year, Ian MacDonald sold his dairy farm and, living off the proceeds plus the princely sum of five pounds a week from the party, he became the SNP's first full-time National Organiser, thus beginning a process of organizational restructuring and expansion that was to continue for the rest of the decade. And, in June 1962, a by-election in West Lothian not only presaged a future electoral breakthrough for

the SNP but also saw the emergence of the first of a new generation of Nationalist party leaders.

Electoral Developments

Ian MacDonald's first task as National Organiser was to help co-ordinate the by-election campaign in West Lothian, a mixed agricultural and mining seat to the west of Edinburgh. The SNP candidate there was William (Billy) Wolfe, a chartered accountant and businessman, who had joined the party only three years before, although he had previously been active in the Covenant Association and other nationalist organizations.² A major issue of the campaign was, even in 1962, oil - in this case the Conservative government's withdrawal of tax concessions on domestic hydrocarbons which killed the local shale oil industry. Capitalizing on this issue and MacDonald's organizational skills, Wolfe secured 23.3 per cent of the votes, a result which so encouraged SNP Chairman Arthur Donaldson and the National Executive Committee that he announced that the party would mount "the biggest campaign we have ever attempted" at the next general election.³

The SNP fared less well in four other by-elections in 1962-1963, losing its deposit in each case and averaging less than nine per cent of the poll (see Table 6.1). Nonetheless, in the 1964 general election, as promised, fifteen SNP candidates were nominated,⁴ almost twice the number which had contested the 1945 election. Apart from West Lothian,

TABLE 6.1 - SNP BY-ELECTION PERFORMANCE, 1961-1970

Year	Constituency	SNP	Cons.	Lab.	Lib.	Other
1961	Glasgow Bridgeton	18.7 (--)	20.7 (36.6)	57.5 (63.4)	- (-)	3.1 (-)
1962	West Lothian	23.3 (--)	11.4 (39.7)	50.8 (60.3)	10.9 (--)	3.6 (-)
	Glasgow Woodside	11.1 (--)	30.1 (49.3)	36.1 (43.0)	21.7 (7.7)	1.0 (-)
1963	Kinross & West Perth	7.3 (15.0)	57.4 (68.2)	15.2 (16.8)	19.5 (--)	0.6 (-)
	Dundee West	7.4 (-)	39.4 (48.2)	50.6 (49.7)	- (-)	2.6 (-)
	Dumfriesshire	9.8 (-)	40.8 (58.4)	38.5 (41.6)	10.9 (--)	- (-)
1967	Glasgow Pollok	28.2 (--)	36.9 (47.6)	31.2 (52.4)	1.9 (-)	1.8 (-)
	Hamilton	46.0 (--)	12.5 (28.8)	41.5 (71.2)	- (-)	- (-)
1969	Glasgow Gorbals	25.0 (--)	18.6 (22.8)	53.4 (73.0)	- (-)	3.0 (4.2)
1970	Ayrshire South	20.3 (--)	25.6 (32.8)	54.1 (67.2)	- (-)	(-) (-)

(Figures in parentheses refer to shares of the vote gained by each party in the constituency in the preceding general election.)

SOURCE: Adapted from D.E. Butler and Anthony King, The British General Election of 1964 (London: Macmillan, 1965), Appendix I, pp. 332-335; David Butler and Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, The British General Election of 1970, London: Macmillan, 1971), Appendix I, pp. 383-385.

however, where Wolfe increased his share of the vote to over 30 per cent, the results were generally disappointing: twelve of the fifteen candidates lost their deposits and in the two remaining constituencies, both of which had been fought in 1959, SNP support declined. Although the party increased its share of the total Scottish vote to 2.4 per cent, the share of the poll in contested seats increased only marginally, to 10.9 per cent from 10.7 per cent in 1959.

Based on aggregate vote shifts, it appears that SNP gains in the period between 1961 and 1964 were largely at the expense of the Conservatives, but the major beneficiaries of anti-government protest, in Scotland as well as England, appear to have been the Liberals who had high expectations of a resurgence following their breakthrough in the 1961 Orpington by-election.' Since the Scottish Liberal Party also claimed to favour self-government for Scotland, William Wolfe suggested a device intended to force the Liberals to "put up or shut up" on the self-government issue. In 1964 an approach was made by the SNP seeking an electoral pact to avoid splitting the "third-party" vote, on condition that the Liberals placed self-government at the head of their manifesto priorities and required all their candidates to emphasize the issue in their campaigns.' These conditions the Liberals could not formally accept although in both 1964 and 1966 it appeared that "both parties were on the whole careful not to contest the same seats." However, the absence of an

official SNP candidate in the only Scottish by-election of the 1964-66 Parliament in Roxburgh, Selkirk & Peebles (won for the Liberals by David Steel) may be attributed largely to the Nationalists' disastrous performance in the constituency in 1964, when they received a mere 2.5 per cent of the votes.

In the 1966 general election, the SNP again contested a record number of seats, 23 in all, mostly in the central belt (whereas the Liberals focussed their efforts on the Highlands and the north-east). In the 13 seats that had been fought by the SNP in 1964, the Nationalists improved their share of the vote in twelve, and in all seats contested the party's mean share of the poll rose from 10.9 per cent to 14.3 (equivalent to five per cent of the total Scottish vote). But support was concentrated largely in the seven counties of the Forth-Tay region of east-central Scotland.' Here, the SNP contested all eleven seats, saving every deposit and averaging 18.7 per cent of the popular vote, with Wolfe again the leading vote-getter, raising his share in West Lothian to over 35 per cent. Outside this region, however, the party fought only twelve of 61 seats and lost deposits in ten of them, faring particularly poorly in Glasgow and the rest of the industrial heartland of the west of Scotland. This was soon to change.

In March 1967, a by-election was held in the Pollok division of Glasgow, a highly marginal constituency won by Labour in both 1964 and 1966. The SNP candidate, Glasgow

veterinarian George Leslie, was supported by crowds of helpers from neighbouring constituencies and elsewhere in Scotland. Moreover, the party used the Pollok by-election to experiment with a number of new campaign techniques which were to become a hallmark of SNP electioneering in future years; "it deliberately imported American-style motorcades, drum-majorettes, jazzy literature and an all-pervasive fly-posting."² These efforts were rewarded by nearly 11000 votes (28.1 per cent of the poll). In contrast to by-elections earlier in the decade, however, the Nationalists seemed to have drawn disproportionately upon former Labour voters (as well as previous non-voters), and the intervention of the SNP appeared to be instrumental in the Conservatives' capture of the seat.

Eight months after Pollok, the SNP had another opportunity to mobilize its new campaign style. The appointment of former Labour Cabinet Minister Tom Fraser to the chairmanship of the North of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board created a vacancy in Hamilton, an industrial constituency to the south of Glasgow. Under pressure from the National Union of Mineworkers, Labour nominated Alex Wilson, an elderly local councillor, to succeed Fraser in what was then the second most safe Labour seat in Scotland. In contrast, the SNP candidate was a woman - Mrs. Winifred Ewing, a Glasgow solicitor with an Independent Labour Party background, who was "attractive, articulate and, when circumstances required it, appropriately

emotional."¹⁰ Using many of the same people and the same "razzamatazz" techniques that had enlivened the Pollok by-election, the Nationalists mounted a strong campaign which was duly rewarded on November 2 when Mrs. Ewing overturned a Labour majority of 16000, taking 46 per cent of the vote to become the Nationalists' first peacetime MP. When the time came for her to take her seat, a special train was hired to take hundreds of SNP supporters to London along with the new Member.

While Hamilton was undoubtedly the centrepiece of the nationalist advance, the SNP was also making notable gains in Scottish local elections. The party improved its share of the partisan vote¹¹ from 4.4 per cent in 1966 to 18.4 per cent in 1967, winning 23 seats and gaining control in the burgh of Stirling where Dr. Robert McIntyre was elected Provost (mayor). In May 1968, the SNP vote almost doubled to 34.1 per cent and the party won over 100 seats on local councils, including 13 on Glasgow Corporation where the Nationalist contingent, led by George Leslie, held the balance of power in Scotland's largest local authority.

The Labour government was at last forced to take some action in recognition of the threat to its electoral hegemony in Scotland. In December 1968, the Royal Commission on the Constitution (the Crowther, later Kilbrandon, Commission) was established to review 'the relationships between the various parts of the United Kingdom'. Meanwhile, the Scottish

Conservative Party, prompted by Leader of the Opposition Edward Heath, was also considering the inclusion of some kind of consultative Scottish assembly among its policy objectives; this was adopted by its annual conference in May 1970, a month before the next general election.

But, after the drama of Hamilton and the municipal elections, "the SNP entered the election as a party in decline."¹² In two more by-elections in safe Labour areas, the Nationalists polled 25 per cent at Glasgow Gorbals in October 1969 and 20.5 per cent in South Ayrshire in March 1970 (when the Labour victor was Jim Sillars, later to become a prominent member of the SNP in the 1980s). While these were respectable results for an intervening third party under normal circumstances, they were disappointing for the Nationalists after the heady days of 1967-68, especially when viewed in tandem with declining support in local elections where the SNP vote fell to 25.8 per cent in 1969 and 14.5 per cent in May 1970. Nonetheless, the SNP was already committed to fighting a "national" campaign, contesting 65 of the 71 Scottish constituencies. Its share of the total Scottish vote rose from 5.0 per cent in 1966 to 11.4 per cent, but its share in contested seats fell from 14.3 per cent to 12.2, and 43 SNP candidates lost their deposits. The seat at Hamilton returned to its normal Labour Party allegiance, but partial compensation came for the SNP in the Western Isles where

Donald Stewart, the Provost of Stornaway, became the first Nationalist MP ever to be returned in a general election.

Although the SNP had more than doubled its share of the Scottish vote between 1966 and 1970 and had secured its first general election success, the election result intensified the post mortems on the "rise and fall" of the Nationalist phenomenon in Scotland.

"Explaining" the First Rise and Fall

Analyses of the electoral performance of the SNP in the 1960s tend to fall into one of two camps.¹³ First, those who wrote shortly after the apparent collapse of the SNP vote in the 1970 general election, and who were therefore endowed with a limited amount of hindsight, dismissed the rise of the SNP as little more than a temporary manifestation of mid-term protest voting against an unpopular Labour government; the 'decline' of the SNP was thus simply a consequence of supporters of the two major parties returning to their traditional allegiances.¹⁴ However, some observers who studied SNP support at its peak in 1968 saw in the nationalist rise the potential for a *realignment* of the Scottish party system;¹⁵ and this view was echoed, with some reservations, by others writing from the vantage point of the mid-1970s, by which time it appeared that the rise of the SNP in 1967-68 was part of a longer term shift in electoral behaviour in Scotland, while

the temporary decline in 1970 was due largely to short-term contextual factors.¹⁶

The "Protest" View:

Advocates of the protest explanation could point to the fact that SNP gains in by-elections before 1964 were largely at the expense of the ruling Conservatives, whereas after 1966 it was the governing Labour Party which appeared to suffer the greatest losses in by-elections and municipal polls (see Table 6.1). Moreover in Council elections, the SNP failed to make significant inroads in areas where the Liberals or local Ratepayers Associations were already established as municipal reform movements and were therefore available as vehicles for protest.¹⁷

Survey analysis of the Scottish electorate at this time also served to augment the protest vote argument. According to Webb and Hall,

A key aspect of the protest vote is that it is primarily directed against rather than for something; the voter votes for a third party not because he is positively disposed towards it, but because he is temporarily negatively disposed towards his own party.¹⁸

Thus, survey evidence suggested that only half of the respondents intending to vote SNP actually thought of themselves as Nationalists.¹⁹ And there was a marked discrepancy between electoral support for the SNP and attitudes towards the main plank of the Nationalist platform, i.e., the pursuit

of independence. Survey data in Glasgow revealed that a mere 13 per cent of SNP supporters concurred with party policy on the independence issue, while a survey of Dundee voters discovered that two-thirds of Nationalist voters were unaware that outright independence was, in fact, the SNP's declared goal.²²

Given the disastrous record of the British economy during the first half of the Labour government's term - the Hamilton by-election, for example, was held within days of the first devaluation of the pound - the simplest explanation of the increase in Nationalist support up to 1968, therefore, was that the SNP had provided a protest vehicle for disaffected supporters of the Labour Party in Scotland.

Similarly, the decline of the SNP in 1969-70 can also be incorporated into the conventional view of protest behaviour. According to Webb and Hall, there is an assumption that "it is welfare and economic conditions that elicit protest voting, and that a favourable change in the economic climate will induce defectors to return." Thus, the improvement of economic conditions, both in the UK in general and in Scotland in particular, served to alleviate the profound discontent of Labour voters with the government and, as the general election neared, they returned to their traditional voting patterns. The protest explanation is neatly summed up by Bochel and Denver in their critique of the "potential realignment" thesis:

The SNP failed to make nationality a more important factor in electoral behaviour than class; it failed to detach large numbers of voters from their old party loyalties. ... Most people who voted for the SNP were not 'nationalists'; they were Scots it is true, but they were still 'Conservatives' or 'Labour'. It is as simple as that."

The "Realignment" Thesis:

The realignment thesis was first proposed by analysts studying SNP support at its peak in 1968 and before the first evidence of decline in the 1969 local elections. Thus Cornford and Brand, for example, argued that the basis of Nationalist support might suggest that

we are confronted with the beginnings of one of those rare but fundamental electoral realignments in which large numbers of voters desert former party loyalties for good and the party system is reorganised around a different set of basic divisions in society.²¹

Hence, their analysis of SNP support attempted to discern whether it came from "a heterogeneous collection of the temporarily disgruntled" (i.e., protest voters) or from "people whose social situation and political attitudes have hitherto excluded them from active participation and identification with the present party system".²²

The realignment thesis appeared to be upheld both by the increase in turn-out in municipal elections where the SNP intervened for the first time and by analysis of small urban surveys which revealed that the SNP had managed to attract not only former Labour (and some Conservative) voters but also "an extraordinary proportion of previous non-voters", both those

who had been too young to vote in the 1966 general elections and "electors who previously could not be sufficiently attracted by any of the other parties to be mobilised to support them."²⁵

If it were true, therefore, that the Nationalists had successfully mobilized those not previously involved in the electoral process, it might be argued that the SNP had been tapping a reservoir of political support not represented by the major "class-based" parties and, further, if that support could be maintained, it would serve as a basis for a realigned Scottish party system in which the SNP would be a permanent force.

However, in the short term at least, the Nationalists did not maintain the level of support they enjoyed in 1967-68. For advocates of the realignment thesis, the subsequent decline of the SNP was due in part to the inexperience of the Nationalist councillors elected in 1968 and to the low level of political sophistication of these newly mobilized voters and party activists. One survey of 81 local SNP candidates revealed that 38 per cent had joined the party in the last twelve months and, of eleven who had been members of other political parties, only five had been actively involved in these organizations.²⁶ This lack of experience was particularly apparent among the SNP councillors on Glasgow Corporation, many of whom "were not prepared for the demands of being a member of a major local authority and

the press soon began to write about their difficulties."² Thus, according to McLean, the failure of SNP councillors elected in 1968 to effect radical changes in the output of local government and the disillusionment of new, inexperienced voters and party workers when they found "that victory had to be organised afresh every year" led to renewed abstention which adversely affected the Nationalists more than any other party."

After the scare that they had given the government, the Nationalists discovered in the 1970 general election campaign that they, not the Conservatives, were on the receiving end of much of Labour's electioneering effort and rhetoric, but the lack of media access (especially to television) limited the SNP's ability to respond.³ Thus, in the face of such pressures, Webb and Hall have argued,

The 'decline' of the SNP perceived by some analysts after the 1970 General Election was a decline only relative to wholly unrealistic expectations derived from the previous by-election and local results. ... Given the sort of pressures it was exposed to, the survival of the National Party in 1970 was its success.⁴

The First 'Rise and Fall': Overview

In our view, a full explanation of the electoral fortunes of the Scottish National Party in the 1960s must take into account both the phenomenon of protest voting and the potential realignment thesis. But it must also include a third element which is missing from analyses based primarily

on the study of patterns of electoral behaviour, and this is the role of organization.

Clearly, the Scottish National Party *did* benefit in 1967 and 1968 from mid-term protest by disaffected Labour Party identifiers who subsequently returned to their normal party allegiance; and its electoral support appeared to be boosted further by tactical voting by Conservative voters in seats in which their own party had little chance of defeating the unpopular government.³¹ But it is also evident that the SNP had been successful in attracting new voters who had not yet formed a lasting attachment to either major party and who, even if they did not all vote for the Nationalists in 1970, might be induced to return if the SNP could mobilize sufficient resources in a general election to rediscover the vitality of its campaigns in Pollok and Hamilton. There, organization and activist commitment had been at least as important as voter dissatisfaction with the major parties in creating the opportunity for the SNP - after all, protest voters can register their discontent almost as effectively (and with fewer costs in terms of time and effort) by abstaining as by voting for another party. In the 1970 general election, however, it may be argued that the SNP overextended itself by attempting to campaign on a Scotland-wide basis for the first time. Contesting so many seats at once "stretched their resources in terms of both finance and electioneering personnel to the limit"³² and it was impossible

to replicate on such a scale the campaign techniques which had proven so effective at the earlier by-elections.

Although it is often neglected by proponents of both the "protest vote" and the "realignment" explanations of the performance of the SNP in the 1960s, in our view **organization** was a crucial variable. Without the work undertaken by MacDonald, Wolfe and others to build up the party organization and to develop effective symbols and campaign slogans, the SNP would not have been in a position to mobilize either disaffected protestors or new voters when the opportunity presented itself.

ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1962-1970

While the electoral successes of the 1960s helped to establish a degree of credibility for the Scottish National Party, organizational changes within the SNP were no less important in preparing the way for the major electoral break-through of the next decade. As we suggested earlier, the modernization of the party organization - its transformation from a 'modest family business' to a more modern mass party - occurred largely in the 1960s, and especially during Ian MacDonald's tenure as National Organiser.

After joining the SNP on a full-time basis in May 1962, MacDonald devoted most of his attention to building up the branch structure of the party. When he started, there were about twenty branches, of which no more than half-a-dozen were

active, and the majority of the 2000 or so members of the party were affiliated to the "Headquarters Branch".¹ MacDonald's strategy was to persuade these 'headquarters members' to try, with his help, to set up branches in their own localities. Where at least twenty members could be signed up, a branch was established; if fewer attended the first meeting, they would be organized as a "group" (an embryo-branch) and helped to seek out the additional members required for full branch status. Furthermore, well-established branches were encouraged to set up other branches in neighbouring areas or to divide themselves in two. Thus, branches were deliberately kept fairly small so that as many members as possible could be actively involved. For example, William Wolfe notes that in West Lothian the party did not initially seek to maximize membership, since subscriptions were so low that "their payment did not really make people active propagandists for self-government. ... We were more concerned with the recruitment of people who were prepared to work, rather than with building up a huge list of members who were mostly inactive."²

In his first year as National Organiser, MacDonald established twenty new functioning branches and the party continued to double in size for a number of years thereafter (see Table 6.2). By the middle of 1968, when SNP electoral support was at its height, the party headquarters claimed a total membership of 120,000. However, this figure was almost

TABLE 6.2 - SNP BRANCHES AND MEMBERSHIP,
1962-1974

Year	Branches	Members	Year	Branches	Members
1962	21	2000	1967	263	80000
1963	c.40	4000	1968	472	120000
1964		8000	1969	501	100000
1965(June)		16000	1971		70000
(Nov.)		20000	1974		85000
1966	110	42000			

Sources: Membership, all years except 1969, James G. Kellas, The Scottish Political System, second edition (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975), Table 21(b), p. 128; 1969 branches and membership, Richard W. Mansbach, "The Scottish National Party: A Revised Political Profile", Comparative Politics, vol. 5, no. 2, January 1973, p. 186; other branch figures, John E. Schwarz, "The Scottish National Party: Nonviolent Separatism and Theories of Violence", World Politics, vol. 22, no. 4, July 1970, Table 1, p. 497.

certainly exaggerated, in that it was based on the number of membership cards sent out by headquarters to the branches rather than the number of members who had actually paid their subscriptions"; moreover, it also included a significant number of youth members who were below the voting age. Nevertheless, there was a real and dramatic rise in party membership and in the number of branches, although this expansion was uneven. In the period between 1962 and 1964, according to Wolfe, the party grew fastest in East Central Scotland and there was also "encouraging growth in the Glasgow region" but, apart from outposts in Aberdeen and the Western Isles, there was no organization in the Highlands and North East of Scotland.³⁶ But by 1969, while the East Central region still contained the highest concentration of branches, Richard Mansbach's data suggests that the party was better organized in the rural North East and in the Highlands than in the major cities and the more urbanized counties of the West of Scotland.³⁷

Organizational Differentiation

The growth of Scottish National Party membership in the 1960s was accompanied by a gradual process of differentiation and professionalization of the party organization. For example, after forming an *ad hoc* constituency association to co-ordinate the activities of local branches and members in the 1962 West Lothian by-election campaign, William Wolfe

discovered that the SNP had no other constituency associations and, indeed, the party constitution made no provision for them.¹⁰ Previously, branches had been so few and far between that there was rarely more than one in a constituency and election campaigns were therefore usually run by the single branch in the area. The first permanent constituency association was formed in West Lothian in March 1963, sixteen more had been established by the end of 1966, and by the end of the following year all but two Scottish constituencies had their own associations.¹¹

In February 1964, the SNP National Council adopted a report on party reorganization drawn up by then Assistant National Secretary Gordon Wilson. One of the most important of Wilson's recommendations was the vesting of executive responsibility for aspects of party activity in the hands of elected office-bearers to be designated "Executive Vice-Chairmen". Initially, two were appointed, one for Organisation and one for Policy and Publicity; in 1966, the specialization of duties was taken further with the creation of four such positions, for Finance, Organisation, Policy, and Publicity.

A third organizational change resulted from the increased attention accorded to the SNP in the 1960s. In 1962, Wolfe's campaign in West Lothian was based on the SNP policy document adopted in 1947 but, as the party became more successful, both voters and the media wanted to know where the SNP stood on

policy issues other than self-government." The National Executive Committee, which was expected to cope with policy development as well as administrative and strategic matters, found the burden too great and policy tended to be neglected." Consequently, the 1967 Annual Conference adopted a constitutional amendment to establish a separate body, the National Assembly, to debate and recommend policy changes to Annual Conference or the National Council. The Assembly, in turn, created a system of specialist committees to produce draft policy documents for discussion by the leading decision-making organs of the party.

Apart from structural change, a further prerequisite for policy development was the acquisition of a research capability. In 1963, William Wolfe was instrumental in the founding of the "Social and Economic Inquiry Society of Scotland" (SEISS), a non-party organization to conduct research into various aspects of Scottish society. Although SEISS did some useful work, it was wound up in 1966 - by which time Wolfe was urging the party to appoint a full-time Research Officer. The need became more pressing after Winifred Ewing's victory at Hamilton and, in August 1968, the SNP hired Donald Bain as its first Research Officer." One of his first tasks was to compile a statistical handbook, *Scotland: Facts and Comparisons*, which detailed many aspects of social and economic life in Scotland in comparison with regions within the United Kingdom or with selected Western

European nations." And, in 1969, the professionalization of the SNP organization, which had begun with MacDonald's appointment in 1962, was taken a step further when the journalist Douglas Crawford became full-time Director of Communications.

The transformation of the SNP from a modest family business to a modern electoral machine was also aided by an innovative approach to shaping the party's appeal to the voters. We have already mentioned the introduction of "American-style" campaign techniques in the by-elections at Pollok and Hamilton, but one of the most simple, yet undoubtedly one of the most effective, innovations was the design of a party symbol or motif. It was initially the idea of a student nationalist who suggested to William Wolfe in 1963 that the SNP ought to have a sign that was as instantly recognizable as that of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, which was to be seen everywhere at that time." Wolfe, in collaboration with a graphic artist, came up with a stylized combination of the Cross of St. Andrew and a thistle. Since the 1964 general election, this symbol ( ), printed on posters, lapel badges, car transfers and key rings, has become inextricably associated with support for the Scottish National Party.

A number of other changes and activities also helped in the mobilization of support for the SNP in the 1960s. First, although it was denied regular access to the broadcasting

media, the SNP benefitted from a pirate radio station, "Radio Free Scotland", run by Gordon Wilson, which transmitted a half-hour news and current affairs program with a nationalist slant every Monday evening on the ITV and BBC TV channels after they had closed down for the night." Second, in 1964, the party finally adopted a new policy document/ manifesto, "*SNP and You*", which was still in use in the 1970 general election and beyond. And third, in 1965 the SNP reduced its financial dependence on membership fees and branch fund-raising activities when it launched a weekly sweepstake called Alba Pools. The proceeds of the Pools were shared between the branches which sold the tickets and SNP headquarters which, according to one estimate, received over £60000 in the first seven years of operation, a great boost for the perennially cash-starved party."

Problems - Old and New

While the SNP generally prospered in organizational, as well as electoral, terms in the 1960s, the end of the decade saw the emergence of two problems, one swiftly resolved, the other more lasting in nature. First, the party was embarrassed by the emergence of "The 1320 Club", a group founded in 1967 which took its name from the date of the Declaration of Arbroath (see Chapter Seven). Membership of the Club was by invitation of its executive and included a number of veteran nationalists such as Douglas Young, Wendy

Wood and Christopher Grieve (alias Hugh MacDiarmid) who had all drifted in and out of, and in some cases had been expelled from, the SNP over the years. Its stated objective was to recreate a broader-based nationalist movement with strong cultural leanings, much like the National Party of Scotland had been. However, there were suspicions, in the SNP and without, that some members of the Club were not averse to violence and, indeed, rumour linked it to an alleged "Scottish Liberation Army".⁴ The SNP, riding high in the polls after the Hamilton by-election, could not afford to be associated in any way with a non-democratic and potentially violent nationalist organization, and in March 1968 the party's National Council declared the 1320 Club a proscribed group, membership of which was incompatible with remaining in the SNP. According to Christopher Harvie, "The ban turned out to be justified: the Club's conspiratorial and authoritarian tendencies came to the surface and in 1975 landed its secretary, Major F.A.C. Boothby, in prison on a conviction for terrorist conspiracy."

The second problem faced by the SNP in the late 1960s was less easily resolved because it was rooted in the party's organizational structure and, moreover, linked to the successes of 1967-68. Despite the creation of constituency associations to co-ordinate electoral activity, the branch retained its power as the dominant unit of local organization in the SNP. Some branches, however, were virtually personal

fiefdoms, with members of one family holding all the offices, even though a large "paper membership" was reported to party headquarters in order to increase the number of representatives sent to Annual Conferences and constituency meetings. Other branches provided a power base for the sizeable number of "careerists" attracted into the rapidly growing party by the opportunities for personal political advancement which seemed greater in the SNP than in other parties. However, many of these newcomers deserted the SNP again when its fortunes waned as the 1970 election neared.⁴ More generally, branch activists were frequently more concerned with local issues and results than with the SNP's national fortunes, and jealously guarded their autonomy and funds from both the constituency association and party headquarters.

This parochialism may in fact have been advantageous to the SNP in local government elections and by-elections, since the party could make diverse appeals in different parts of the country and, thereby, appear responsive to local problems. But these same characteristics, according to Richard Mansbach, were detrimental when the party attempted to mount a national campaign on the scale undertaken in the 1970 general election.⁵ Branches refused to co-operate with, or place funds at the disposal of, the constituency associations and the diversity of appeals made by locally-directed campaigns undermined the SNP's national campaign effort.

MacDonald's strategy of encouraging local autonomy and initiative to develop new branches and build up mass membership was not counterbalanced by constitutional changes to give the party leadership or headquarters increased influence or control over the branches. Thus, while the SNP organization was its strength in the party's electoral rise through to 1968, it was clear that, when it came to fighting general elections, there were structural weaknesses in that organization which had not been resolved by the modernization of the party in the 1960s nor indeed, as we shall suggest in Chapter Eight, since that time.

THE SECOND RISE AND FALL, 1971-1979

Both during and after the 1970 general election, it appeared that the two major British parties subscribed to the "protest vote" explanation of the SNP's rise and fall. The Conservatives and Labour played down the devolution issue in the 1970 campaign, referring voters to the deliberations of the Royal Commission on the Constitution. And, despite Mr. Heath's efforts to persuade the Scottish wing of his party to accept some form of devolution before the election, his newly elected government paid little attention to the constitutional issue, at least in relation to Scotland. Its energies were devoted more to supranational integration, in negotiating Britain's entry into the European Community, than to the possibility of subnational disintegration; and when devolution

did become an issue, it was with respect to Northern Ireland where renewed violence led to the suspension of the Stormont parliament and its replacement by direct rule from Westminster. In any case, the Conservatives pre-empted the Royal Commission findings by proceeding to implement a sweeping reorganization of local government in Scotland in 1973. Thus, when a majority of the Kilbrandon Commission reported in favour of directly-elected Scottish and Welsh assemblies at the end of October 1973, the report was rapidly shelved; as one commentator noted, "no unanimity (of the Commission) was required because no action would be taken."

The government's attitude appeared to be vindicated by the 1971 municipal election results in which the last of the SNP's sweeping gains from 1968 were wiped out and every sitting Nationalist councillor in Glasgow was defeated. Moreover, the Conservatives were not unduly alarmed by signs of an SNP revival in by-elections, since it seemed that Labour seats were most vulnerable. In September 1971, Dr. Robert McIntyre increased the SNP share of the vote in Stirling, Falkirk and Grangemouth from 14.5 per cent in 1970 to 34.6 per cent (see Table 6.3). Eighteen months later in Dundee East, where the SNP based its campaign for the first time on the issue of North Sea Oil, Gordon Wilson came within 1200 votes of winning a once-safe Labour seat.

But signs of another major advance came in November 1973, when by-elections were held in the two major cities of

**TABLE 6.3 - SNP PERFORMANCE IN BY-ELECTIONS,
1971-1978**

Year	Constituency	SNP	Cons.	Lab.	Lib.	Other
1971	Stirling, Falkirk and Grangemouth	34.6 (14.5)	18.9 (34.8)	46.5 (50.7)	- (-)	- (-)
1973	Dundee East	30.1 (8.9)	25.2 (42.4)	32.7 (48.3)	8.3 (-)	3.6 (0.4)
	Edinburgh North	18.9 (--)	38.7 (52.8)	24.0 (37.1)	18.4 (10.1)	- (-)
	Glasgow, Govan	41.9 (10.3)	11.7 (28.2)	38.2 (60.0)	8.2 (-)	- (1.5)
1978	Glasgow, Garscadden	32.9 (31.2)	18.5 (12.9)	45.4 (50.9)	- (5.0)	3.2 (-)
	Hamilton	33.4 (39.0)	13.0 (9.5)	51.0 (47.5)	2.6 (4.0)	- (-)
	Berwick and East Lothian	8.8 (13.2)	40.2 (37.6)	47.4 (43.3)	3.6 (5.9)	- (-)

(Figures in parentheses refer to shares of the vote gained by each party in the constituency in the preceding general election)

SOURCE: Adapted from David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh, The British General Election of February 1974 (London: Macmillan, 1974), Appendix 1, pp. 310-312; and David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh, The British General Election of 1979 (London: Macmillan, 1980), Appendix 1, pp. 388-389.

Scotland a few days after the publication of the Kilbrandon Report. In the traditionally safe Conservative seat of Edinburgh North, one of the few constituencies not contested by the SNP in 1970, William Wolfe (transplanted temporarily from the more familiar territory of West Lothian) secured 18.9 per cent of the vote to squeeze into third place. This was a respectable result in a city which had long been barren ground for the Nationalists, and any disappointment there might have been was overshadowed by the result of the by-election in Glasgow Govan on the same day. Govan was one of a number of inner-city constituencies where perennially huge majorities had made the Labour Party complacent and Labour's run-down organization was no match for a revitalized SNP campaign. Margo MacDonald received 41.9 per cent of a relatively low poll to record the Nationalists' first parliamentary victory in Scotland's largest city.

Despite growing support for the SNP, the Scottish Conservative Conference in May 1973 decisively defeated a motion calling for the speedy establishment of an elected Scottish Assembly. More surprisingly, perhaps, the Labour Party in Scotland remained as implacably opposed to any form of legislative devolution as the Conservatives. In a Policy document published one day before the Kilbrandon Report, and only a week before the Govan by-election, the Labour Party's Scottish Council announced its support for a strengthened Scottish Grand Committee (of the Westminster Parliament) and

claimed that "we are of the opinion that an Assembly other than a Committee of the UK Parliament would be a mere talking shop." As the major parties reneged on earlier commitments, the SNP could once again claim to be the only party offering self-government for Scotland.

But the Nationalists also had another issue which they made their own in the early 1970s as a consequence of the discovery of oil on the continental shelf off the North East coast of Scotland at the end of 1970. For the Conservative and Labour Parties, rapid extraction of this "British" oil seemed to offer a solution to Britain's chronic economic problems. For the SNP, however, the promise of revenues from "Scottish" oil resources, wisely husbanded, offered unlimited economic development prospects and a ready answer to those who doubted the economic viability of an independent Scotland. In March 1973, the SNP launched its national oil campaign, declaring "IT'S SCOTLAND'S OIL"; and the salience of the oil issue grew with the Yom Kippur War and subsequent OPEC price-shocks later in the year which made the recovery of North Sea reserves more desirable still. The party had already prepared a massive poster campaign to mark "National Oil Month" in February 1974 when Mr. Heath, in the midst of a confrontation with striking coalminers, chose that month for a general election to decide if he or the unions were to run the country.

1974 - The Great Breakthrough?

Linking the themes of independence and oil, perhaps best expressed in the choice offered to the voters in one campaign slogan between being "Rich Scots or Poor British", the SNP mounted a strong campaign in February 1974, contesting 70 of the 71 Scottish seats (the exception being that of former Liberal leader and devolution sympathiser Jo Grimond in Orkney and Shetland), and rediscovering the vitality of the by-election campaigns of the late 1960s.¹⁴ This effort was rewarded with 21.9 per cent of the Scottish vote and seven seats (see Table 6.4). Although Glasgow Govan was lost back to the Labour Party, Donald Stewart held the Western Isles with a huge personal vote (over 67 per cent), four seats were gained from the Conservatives (three of them in the rural north-east, by now known as "the oil coast") and two from Labour, including Dundee East which the Nationalists had narrowly failed to win in 1973. In addition, the SNP came second in another 17 seats, although only two would require a swing of less than 5 per cent for a Nationalist victory. On an aggregate basis, it appeared that Labour had lost more votes to the SNP than the Conservatives - Labour's share of the vote declined from 44.5 per cent in 1970 to 36.6, while the Conservative share fell from 38 per cent to 32.9 per cent in 1974 - and the fact that this tendency was most marked in the north-east and highland areas suggested that Labour voters

TABLE 6.4 - SNP PERFORMANCE IN GENERAL ELECTIONS,
1945-1979

Election Year	Number of Candidates	Share of Scottish Vote	Share of Votes in Contested Seats	Seats Won	Deposits Lost
1945	8	1.2	7.6	-	6
1950	3	0.4	7.4	-	3
1951	2	0.3	12.2	-	1
1955	2	0.5	14.5	-	1
1959	5	0.8	10.7	-	3
1964	15	2.4	10.9	-	12
1966	23	5.0	14.3	-	10
1970	65	11.4	12.2	1	43
1974 (Feb)	70	21.9	22.1	7	7
1974 (Oct)	71	30.4	30.4	11	0
1979	71	17.3	17.3	2	30

SOURCE: Calculated from newspaper returns.

were indulging in tactical voting for the SNP to displace sitting Conservative MPs."

In the UK as a whole, the February 1974 election produced a 'hung' parliament and, with Labour forming a minority government, it appeared that a new election would not be far away. The two major parties may have taken some heart from SNP performance in May 1974 in elections to the new regional and district councils established by the Conservatives' local government reform. The Nationalists polled 12.6 per cent of the vote in the regional elections and 13.4 per cent in the districts, although their share in contested seats was nearly 30 per cent.⁶⁶ Nevertheless, the central bodies of both parties managed to convince their respective Scottish sections to revise their attitudes to devolution. The Scottish Conservatives adopted the compromise position of an indirectly elected Scottish Assembly or Council, responsible to the UK Parliament and consisting of representatives selected by regional authorities, while a special conference of the Labour Party in Scotland advocated a directly elected Assembly with legislative powers. The Labour government went further in September 1974 with the publication of a White Paper proposing a Scottish legislative assembly with powers over a wide range of functions, but lacking the capacity to raise revenues and subject to the veto of the Secretary of State for Scotland."

These reverses in policy failed to halt (but, for Labour, may have diverted) the Nationalist advance in the general

election of October 1974. According to one observer, "Labour's rapid conversion to Scottish devolution lacked credibility, and Tory distaste for the whole idea greatly assisted a wholesale desertion to the Scottish National Party".¹⁰ The SNP had, in effect, been in a continuous state of electoral mobilization since February, and now had the additional advantage of newly elected MPs to play leading roles in a much more carefully orchestrated campaign." The Nationalists received 30.4 per cent of the Scottish vote and gained an additional four seats, making eleven in all. This time, it was the Conservative vote which collapsed (from 32.9 per cent to 24.7) and the SNP was now the second largest party in Scotland in terms of electoral support.

However, with the exception of Margaret Bain's narrow victory in a tight three-cornered contest in Dunbartonshire East, the new seats were all won in the rural peripheries and the SNP failed to make significant inroads in Labour-dominated areas as the Labour Party maintained its share of the popular vote. Although Labour gained an absolute majority in the House of Commons, the narrowness of its margin, the strategic position of the SNP (with 42 second places, 16 of which required a maximum swing of 5 per cent for a Nationalist victory in the next election), and the promises made by Labour in the campaign, all obliged the government to bring forward legislation to establish elected Scottish and Welsh assemblies.

But first, primarily to appease its own left wing, the government had to live up to another election promise, to renegotiate and subject to a referendum the terms of Britain's membership of the European Community. Although the SNP campaigned against continued membership on the slogan "Common Market NO On Anybody Else's Terms", while using the opportunity to mount its own membership drive to mobilize new supporters, in June 1975 Scotland voted in favour of the renegotiated terms proposed by the Labour government by a margin of 58 to 42 per cent (with only the Shetland and Western Isles voting against), compared with a 67 per cent "Yes" vote in the United Kingdom as a whole.¹² With the EC issue effectively removed from the political agenda, and with the SNP recording some spectacular victories in local authority by-elections, the government was now free to turn its attention, cautiously, to its promised devolution legislation.

The Road to Devolution

The government introduced its White Paper, *Our Changing Democracy: Devolution to Scotland and Wales*, in November 1975, but certain provisions, including the wide veto powers granted to the Secretary of State and the lack of a defined economic role for the proposed Assemblies, aroused such criticism that a *Supplementary Statement*, "virtually another White Paper", followed in August 1976,¹³ and it was not until

November 1976 that the *Scotland and Wales Bill* was introduced in the House of Commons. The legislative powers to be devolved to the Scottish and Welsh Assemblies did not include control over economic or industrial policy, nor were there powers to tax; instead, the Assemblies' activities were to be financed by block grant from Westminster. The lack of fiscal and economic planning competence aroused strong criticism from the Scottish (and Welsh) Nationalists, and also from the new Scottish Labour Party, founded in January 1976 by pro-devolution former Labour MPs Jim Sillars and John Robertson who broke with the Labour Party after the publication of *Our Changing Democracy*.¹² However, the Bill also met with fierce opposition from "unionists" within the Labour Party as well as the Conservatives and, in February 1977, the devolution proposals were suspended after Labour dissidents joined the Conservatives in defeating a guillotine motion to end debate on the Committee Stage of the Bill.

In April 1977, SNP support in the opinion polls, which had been down to 24 per cent in September 1975, reached 36 per cent, well ahead of the two major parties.¹³ But the expected backlash to the defeat of the *Scotland and Wales Bill* failed to materialize in the district council elections of May 1977. Although the Nationalists gained over 100 seats and raised their share of the votes to 25.4 per cent from 13.4 in 1974, much of the increase in voting support may be attributed to the fact that the number of SNP candidates, and hence the

number of seats contested, had risen by about 70 per cent." Nonetheless, the party was sufficiently heartened by the results (and, perhaps, sufficiently disgusted by the defeat of the devolution proposals) to reaffirm its commitment to independence at its 1977 Annual Conference and to declare that the SNP would campaign for "independence - nothing less" in the next general election."

By the summer of 1977, the Labour government was in a minority position in the House of Commons and dependent on a pact with the Liberals to keep it in power. Mindful of a potential SNP surge if a general election were necessitated, the government set about trying to salvage its devolution policy. In the belief that opposition to devolution to Wales was greater than that to Scotland (not least among its own backbenchers), the administration this time introduced two separate bills. *The Scotland Act*, which received Royal Assent on July 31, 1978, provided for the establishment of an elected Scottish Assembly with powers similar to those detailed in the earlier White Paper and Bill. Like the earlier Bill, the *Scotland Act* would be implemented only after approval by a referendum - but on January 25, 1979 (Burns Night!), an amendment introduced by anti-devolution Labour back-benchers was forced through which required that any majority favouring the Assembly must constitute not less than 40 per cent of the Scottish electorate, the infamous "Forty Per Cent Clause". The date of the referendum was fixed for March 1, 1979.

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MICRO

Meanwhile, there was renewed electoral activity in Scotland. It was, perhaps, a great misfortune for the SNP that, after the sweeping gains of 1974, it had to wait for three and a half years for a Scottish seat to become vacant at Westminster. Local by-elections, even the district council elections were no substitute for a parliamentary by-election to keep the momentum going. Thus, although Keith Bovey slightly increased his share of the vote at Glasgow Garscadden in April 1978, he still finished 7000 votes behind the new Labour member. In early May, the Nationalists increased their share of the vote at the Regional Council elections to 20.9 per cent (from 12.6 per cent in 1974), but they failed to win any more seats and, according to one study, "the increase in their votes is entirely due to the increased number of candidates put forward." But greater disappointment was in store. At the end of the month there were high hopes for the by-election at Hamilton, scene of Winnie Ewing's famous victory in 1967, where the SNP candidate was another former by-election winner, Margo MacDonald. However, Mrs. MacDonald received a smaller share of the vote (33.4 per cent) than the Nationalist candidate in October 1974 and was soundly beaten. Finally, in October 1978, the Labour Party won its third Scottish by-election in succession in the marginal constituency of Berwick and East Lothian, where the SNP National Executive had deposed the candidate selected by the local constituency association and parachuted in party vice-

chairman Isobel Lindsay.⁶⁷ After a series of resignations from the local party, the SNP vote dropped to 8.8 per cent, the first deposit lost since February 1974.

The Referendum and After

The Scottish referendum campaign was launched in Glasgow on November 30, 1978, in the form of a press conference by the "Scotland Says No" organization, an umbrella group of Conservatives, the Confederation of British Industry, local chambers of commerce and some individual Labour Party members. In contrast to the EC referendum, where the campaign was conducted by two broad umbrella groups, the devolution referendum campaign was highly fragmented, especially on the "Yes" or pro-Assembly side.⁶⁸ The two groups against devolution, "Scotland Says No" and "Labour Vote No", did not formally co-operate, but remained on friendly terms and avoided duplication of effort.

However, there were at least half-a-dozen different groups campaigning in favour of the *Scotland Act*. The Labour government initially adopted a low profile on the assumption that the anti-devolution campaign would peak too early; it was also confident that the recent by-election successes represented a vindication of its Scottish policy and would be repeated in the referendum. But when the "Labour Movement Yes Campaign" was mobilized, it refused to co-operate with either the Scottish National Party or, in consequence, the supposedly

all-party "Scotland Says Yes" group, led by Lord Kilbrandon, which included the Nationalists, Jim Sillars' Scottish Labour Party, the Liberals and the Communists. Others who refused to campaign with the Nationalists formed a separate cross-party group, the "Alliance for an Assembly" and, to complicate the matter further, the Liberals, the Communists and the SNP often ran independent campaigns as well in some areas. Moreover, the SNP was internally divided over the *Scotland Act*, with some members concerned that devolution was distracting attention from the true goal of independence - hence, they campaigned half-heartedly at best.⁶⁹

Not surprisingly, the fragmentation of the "Yes" campaign confused many voters and, contrary to the government's expectations, the well-organized anti-devolution campaign did not run out of steam. Perhaps more importantly, the declining popularity of the government in a period of great industrial unrest turned the referendum campaign into a dry-run for the inevitable general election to follow in an atmosphere of increasing polarization between the two major parties. As Peter Hetherington noted in The Guardian,

A vote for the Scotland Act was often interpreted as a vote for Mr. Callaghan's government - a vote against was a repudiation of the government's record - and even the most committed Conservative devolvers began to have serious doubts.⁷⁰

On March 1, 1979, Scotland voted in favour of the devolution proposals by a narrow margin of 51.6 per cent to 48.4 per cent. However, because of a relatively low turn-out (62.9

per cent), the majority vote amounted to only 32.5 per cent of the total Scottish electorate, well short of the required two-fifths (see Table 6.5)

After the referendum, the SNP was quick to criticise the Labour government for its lack of effort in the campaign and the Nationalist MPs presented an ultimatum to Prime Minister Callaghan; he could either push through the *Scotland Act* according to the expressed wishes of a majority of Scots voters (i.e., notwithstanding the 40 per cent clause) or face the withdrawal of vital SNP support in the House. When the SNP demands were not met (Callaghan would have faced rebellion from within his own party had he persisted with devolution), the Nationalist MPs attempted to force the issue by introducing a motion of no-confidence in the government. On March 28, the government was defeated by an alliance of the SNP, Conservatives, Liberals and Ulster Unionists.

Despite having available its largest headquarters staff ever, and with fewer financial constraints after receiving a bequest of £250000 for election purposes, the SNP mounted a lacklustre campaign for the May general election. As one journalist put it, "It was almost as if the SNP knew it was in for a thrashing."⁷¹ The Nationalists appeared to rely on the indignation of the Scottish voters at the denial of their expressed will in the referendum, but, with most SNP MPs in trouble in their own constituencies, they also clearly lacked

**TABLE 6.5 - RESULTS OF THE DEVOLUTION
REFERENDUM IN SCOTLAND**

Region	Percentage of <u>Voters</u> in favour	Percentage of <u>Electorate</u>		
		"Yes"	"No"	Abstained
Western Isles	55.8	27.8	22.1	50.1
Central	54.7	36.1	29.9	34.1
Strathclyde	54.0	33.7	28.7	37.5
Fife	53.7	35.1	30.3	34.7
Highland	51.0	33.0	31.7	35.3
Lothian	50.1	33.0	32.9	34.1
Tayside	49.5	31.2	31.8	37.0
Grampian	48.3	27.6	29.5	48.4
Borders	40.3	26.7	39.7	33.6
Dumfries and Galloway	40.3	25.8	38.3	35.9
Orkney	27.9	15.1	39.0	45.9
Shetland	27.0	13.6	36.7	49.7
 SCOTLAND	 51.6	 32.6	 30.4	 37.1

SOURCE: Adapted from "How Wales and Scotland voted",
Manchester Guardian Weekly, March 11, 1979, p.4.

the leaders or the policies to intervene effectively in the quasi-presidential struggle between Callaghan and Thatcher.

On May 3, 1979, the Scottish National Party share of the popular vote fell from 30.4 per cent to 17.3 per cent and nine of its eleven seats were lost, seven to the Conservatives and two to Labour (see Table 6.4). Yet the election served to remind Westminster of the existence of a distinctly Scottish dimension of British electoral politics; whereas Mrs. Thatcher was borne to victory by a UK average swing of 5.2 per cent to the Conservatives, Scotland registered a far smaller swing of 0.5 per cent and Labour won 44 of the 71 Scottish seats. As William Wolfe, retiring Chairman of the SNP, commented, "we were not seen as relevant, but there is still a Scottish dimension in terms of votes, although it means that Labour - not the SNP - will represent that mood."⁷¹

Overview, 1971-1979

Having recovered from the relative disappointment of 1970, by the end of 1974 the Scottish National Party appeared to be on the verge of the kind of electoral break-through that would create a major crisis in British politics. In response, the Labour government of 1974-79, cognisant of its traditional dependence on seats in Scotland (and Wales) for its parliamentary majorities, devoted an extraordinary proportion of its legislative timetable and effort to attempts to accommodate the aspirations of Scotland within the existing

fabric of the United Kingdom. In this endeavour, it was not aided by many of its backbenchers from England, nor indeed some from Scotland," who placed every conceivable obstacle in the path of the devolution legislation. However, if any party appeared to be punished by Scots voters in the 1979 election for the failure of devolution it was not Labour, but rather the SNP. Indeed, Labour's new-found support for devolution was probably now closer to the aspirations of most Scots than the SNP's renewed commitment to "Independence - Nothing Less", which may well have made the party 'irrelevant' to most voters in 1979 in the midst of an ideologically-polarized contest between the two major British parties. But we do not intend at this point to explore further the reasons for the collapse in Nationalist support - the decline of the SNP appeal to the electoral marketplace will be analysed in Chapter Ten among the potential sources of dissatisfaction giving rise to the expression of Voice and to sub-party conflict in the years following 1979.

CONCLUSIONS

The arrival of Ian MacDonald and William Wolfe heralded the process of modernization of the SNP in the 1960s. MacDonald's organizing abilities and Wolfe's instinct for appealing symbols and slogans, combined with a hard core of committed activists, provided the basis for growth in membership and electoral support. After a series of encouraging local and

by-election results, culminating in the victory at Hamilton, the major British parties were forced to make some response to the Nationalist threat. Although in 1970 the SNP failed to maintain the gains of 1967-68, the party was now sufficiently confident to attempt a nation-wide campaign in which it polled respectably despite a concerted attack on its credibility by the Labour Party.

In the early 1970s, the viability of self-government was given a considerable boost by the discovery of North Sea Oil. Successfully linking the issues of oil and autonomy, the SNP again advanced electorally until, by October 1974, it held eleven seats in the House of Commons and was the second largest party in Scotland in terms of electoral support. But, from this point on, events conspired against the Nationalists. The delay in the passage of the Labour government's devolution legislation, the lack of by-elections in Scotland until 1978, growing ideological polarization between the two major British parties resulting in part from worsening economic conditions, and, finally, the defeat of the Scottish Assembly in the referendum, all contributed to a loss of momentum for the SNP between 1974 and 1979. Moreover, as we shall suggest in Chapter Ten, the SNP itself made strategic errors in this period. The net effect of these problems was that, in May 1979, the SNP lost most of its seats and over 40 per cent of its 1974 votes. With the strongly unionist Mrs. Thatcher in power, intent on pursuing her own neo-conservative policy

agenda, both the SNP and "the Scottish dimension" were reduced to the periphery of British political life.

It was this wider political context that provided part of the stimulus for the emergence of dissatisfaction with the direction of the Scottish National Party, and in Chapter Ten we shall explore some of the explanations of the decline in organizational performance which gave rise to internal discontent. But, first, it is necessary to examine the intra-party context within which sub-party conflict occurred. In the next three chapters, we analyse three central elements of the internal politics of the SNP in the late 1970s and early 1980s - its ideology, organizational structure, and the nature of its activist component.

NOTES - CHAPTER SIX

1. Christopher Harvie, Scotland and Nationalism: Scottish Society and Politics, 1707-1977 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1977), p. 239.
2. Billy Wolfe, Scotland Lives: The Quest for Independence (Edinburgh: Reprographia, 1973), pp. 7-8.
3. ibid., p. 16.
4. The SNP contested 15 seats in 1964 largely to ensure that the party could take part in all-party election discussion programs on television and radio. Participation in such programs in Scotland was limited to parties contesting at least one-fifth of the 71 Scottish seats. See Wolfe, Scotland Lives, p. 54.
5. James G. Kellas, The Scottish Political System, second edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 123-124.
6. Wolfe, Scotland Lives, pp. 38-39.
7. Harvie, Scotland and Nationalism, p. 243.
8. The counties of Clackmannan, Fife, Kinross, Midlothian, Perthshire, Stirlingshire and West Lothian; see Michael Steed, "An Analysis of the Results", Appendix to D.E. Butler and Anthony King, The British General Election of 1966 (London: Macmillan, 1966), pp. 290-291.
9. James G. Kellas, "Scottish Nationalism", Appendix V to David Butler and Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, The British General Election of 1970 (London: Macmillan, 1971), p. 450. On the continuing importance of these techniques in 1974, see Victor J. Hanby, "The Renaissance of the Scottish National Party: From Eccentric to Campaigning Crusader" in Louis Meisel, ed., Changing Campaign Techniques: Elections and Values in Contemporary

Democracies (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976), especially pp. 225-232.

10. Harvie, Scotland and Nationalism, p. 246.
11. In some parts of Scotland at this time, local elections were primarily non-partisan affairs. Vote shares here refer to percentages of the total votes gained by candidates with formal party affiliations.
12. Kellas, "Scottish Nationalism", p. 459.
13. For a more detailed discussion of the first 'rise and fall', see Nick Baxter-Moore, "The Rise and Fall of the Scottish National Party: Revisited", paper presented to the European Politics Group Workshop, London, Ontario, December 1979, pp. 7-13.
14. See, for example, J.M. Bochel and D.T. Denver, "The Decline of the SNP: An Alternative View", Political Studies, vol. 20, no. 3, September 1972, pp. 311-316.
15. For example, J.P. Cornford and J.A. Brand, "Scottish Voting Behaviour" in J.N. Wolfe, ed., Government and Nationalism in Scotland, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1969), pp. 17-40.
16. For example, Jack Brand, The National Movement in Scotland (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978); Keith Webb, The Growth of Nationalism in Scotland (Glasgow: Molendinar Press, 1977), Chapter 6.
17. Iain McLean, "The Rise and Fall of Scottish Nationalism", Political Studies, vol. 18, no. 3, 1970, p. 367.
18. Keith Webb and Eric Hall, "Explanations of Political Nationalism in Scotland", paper presented to the ECPR Workshop on Political Behaviour, Dissatisfaction and Protest, ECPR Joint Sessions, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium, April 1976, p. 2.

19. Cornford and Brand, "Scottish Voting Behaviour", p. 26.
20. However, the ignorance of SNP policy among Nationalist voters may also be symptomatic of the lack of political knowledge of many first-time voters mobilized by the party.
21. Webb and Hall, "Explanations of Political Nationalism in Scotland", p. 2.
22. Bochel and Denver, "The Decline of the SNP: An Alternative View", pp. 315-316.
23. Cornford and Brand, "Scottish Voting Behaviour", p. 21.
24. ibid., p. 24.
25. McLean, "The Rise and Fall of Scottish Nationalism", p. 364.
26. ibid., p. 365.
27. Brand, The National Movement in Scotland, p. 263.
28. McLean, "The Rise and Fall of Scottish Nationalism", p. 372.
29. Wolfe, Scotland Lives, pp. 141-142.
30. Webb and Hall, "Explanations of Political Nationalism in Scotland", pp. 4-5.
31. For example, Kellas argues that, in Hamilton, "to the prevailing Labour discontent ... was here added the argument that a Conservative vote was a 'wasted' vote"; Kellas, "Scottish Nationalism", p. 450.

32. Webb and Hall, "Explanations of Political Nationalism in Scotland", p. 4.
33. Brand, The National Movement in Scotland, p. 259.
34. Wolfe, Scotland Lives, p. 46.
35. Webb, The Growth of Nationalism in Scotland, p. 78.
36. Wolfe, Scotland Lives, p. 49.
37. Richard W. Mansbach, "The Scottish National Party: A Revised Political Profile", Comparative Politics, vol. 5, no. 2, January 1973, pp. 190-193.
38. Wolfe, Scotland Lives, p.15.
39. Branc, The National Movement in Scotland, p. 270.
40. Wolfe, Scotland Lives, p. 28.
41. Brand, The National Movement in Scotland, p. 274.
42. Wolfe, Scotland Lives, pp. 28-89, 110.
43. SNP Research Department, Scotland: Facts and Comparisons (West Calder: SNP Publications, 1969, 1977).
44. Wolfe, Scotland Lives, pp. 46-47.
45. George Thayer, The British Political Fringe: A Profile (London: Anthony Blond, 1965), pp. 195-196.
46. Brand, The National Movement in Scotland, p. 282.
47. Wolfe, Scotland Lives, pp. 115-117.

48. Harvie, Scotland and Nationalism, pp. 249-250.
49. Mansbach, for example, reports the case of one local SNP official from the West of Scotland who "candidly admitted ... that he had joined the SNP when it appeared to him that there were comparatively fewer opportunities for upward mobility in the Labour party, but that he would return to it if the SNP failed to sustain its electoral inroads. ... This official ... subsequently returned to the Labour party." Mansbach, "The Scottish National Party: A Revised Political Profile", p. 195 and fn. 20.
50. ibid., pp. 189, 210.
51. Harvie, Scotland and Nationalism, p. 261.
52. Chris Cook, "The Challengers to the Two-Party System" in Chris Cook and John Ramsden, eds., Trends in British Politics Since 1945 (London: Macmillan, 1978), p. 143.
53. Cited in Brand, The National Movement in Scotland, p. 58. For a detailed analysis of the Labour Party's attitude to devolution, see Michael Keating and David Bleiman, Labour and Scottish Nationalism (London: Macmillan, 1979).
54. See Hanby, "The Renaissance of the Scottish National Party", pp. 225-229.
55. On tactical voting for the SNP in 1974, see Baxter-Moore, "The Rise and Fall of the Scottish National Party: Revisited", pp. 37-40.
56. SNP Research Department, Facts and Comparisons, second edition, p. 120; J.M. Bochel and D.T. Denver, "The District Council Elections of May 1977" in H.M. Drucker and M.G. Clarke, eds., The Scottish Government Yearbook 1978 (Edinburgh: Paul Harris Publishing, 1977), Table 2, p. 136.
57. Keating and Bleiman, Labour and Scottish Nationalism, pp. 173-174.

58. Alan Butcher Philip, "Devolution and Regionalism" in Cook and Ramsden, eds., Trends in British Politics Since 1945, p.164.
59. Hanby, "The Renaissance of the Scottish National Party", pp. 229-232.
60. For a discussion of the EC referendum in Scotland, see Byron Criddle, "Scotland, the EEC and devolution" in Martin Kolinsky, ed., Divided Loyalties: British regional assertion and European Integration (Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1978), pp. 44-69.
61. Keating and Bleiman, Labour and Scottish Nationalism, p. 176.
62. See H.M. Drucker, Breakaway: The Scottish Labour Party (Edinburgh: EUSPB, 1978) and Chapter Eleven, below.
63. Systems Three Scotland Polls, reported by Cook, "The Challengers to the Two-Party System", p. 146.
64. Bochel and Denver, "The District Council Elections of May 1977", pp. 136, 139.
65. Roger Levy, "The Search for a Rational Strategy: The Scottish National Party and Devolution 1974-79", Political Studies, vol. 34, no. 2, 1986, pp. 245-246.
66. J.M. Bochel and D.T. Denver, "The Regional Council Elections of May 1978" in H.M. Drucker and N.L. Drucker, eds., The Scottish Government Yearbook 1979 (Edinburgh: Paul Harris Publishing, 1978), p. 147.
67. William Miller, "The Scottish Dimension" in David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh, The British General Election of 1979 (London: Macmillan, 1980), p. 117.
68. For a detailed analysis of the devolution referendum in Scotland, see W.J.A. Macartney, D.T. Denver and J.M. Bochel, eds., The Referendum Experience: Scotland 1979 (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1982). Also Ray

Perlman, "The Devolution Referendum Campaign" in H.M. Drucker and N.L. Drucker, eds., The Scottish Government Yearbook 1980 (Edinburgh: Paul Harris Publishing, 1979), pp. 54-63.

69. On divisions within the SNP over the devolution - sue, see Chapter Ten, below.
70. Peter Hetherington, "Scots Were Confused If Not Indifferent" Manchester Guardian Weekly, March 11, 1979, p. 4.
71. Anthony Finlay, "Tale of Brave Soldiers Who Brought Down Their Own Castle", Glasgow Herald, May 5, 1979.
72. Cited in The Guardian, Manchester, May 5, 1979.
73. One of the leading opponents of devolution among Labour MPs was Billy Wolfe's long-time adversary in West Lothian, Tam Dalyell; see Dalyell, Devolution: The End of Britain? (London: Jonathan Cape, 1977).

Chapter Seven

SHAPING THE PARTY'S APPEAL:

THE IDEOLOGY AND POLICIES OF THE MODERN SNP

The ideology of the SNP is important for our analysis for three reasons. First, we have argued that, for most members of a political party, the product of the organization is its capacity to attain their individual and collective goals, whether these be policy-oriented objectives (e.g., relating to economic and social policy or, as is more likely here, constitutional change) or more personal aspirations to office, status or access to patronage resources. We may expect therefore that policy-oriented members will tend, for the most part, to join a political party whose ideology is most congruent with their own objectives.

Second, and more generally, the party's capacity to attain the goals of any of its members will often depend on its ability to sell a different product in the wider electoral marketplace - that is, on its ability to win votes for its candidates and, especially, to gain seats in representative institutions. To satisfy its members, therefore, the party has to market its ideology and policies to non-members. However, an attempt to broaden its electoral appeal often necessitates

a dilution or respecification of a party's ideology and goals which may meet with opposition from within the organization.

Third, among the many variables associated with the incidence of sub-party factionalism in our discussion in Chapter Three was the extent to which a party's ideology provides a unifying focus, or a system of social control, for its members. Hence, we may argue that, in doctrinaire parties which adhere rigidly to a complex ideology defining both the goals of the organization and the means for their attainment, opportunities for Voice tend to be extremely limited and dissidents from the ideological orthodoxy are more likely to Exit from the organization than to resort to Voice within it. However, in more pragmatic, catch-all parties with loosely articulated objectives and policies, the probability of debate or conflict over ideology or strategy is increased. Moreover, as we also suggested in Chapter Three, nationalist parties or movements which emphasize the single overriding goal of national self-determination may be particularly susceptible to internal conflict among rival sub-parties espousing alternative strategies for the attainment of self-government or different visions of what the post-independence society will look like.

Our discussion of the ideology of the SNP, therefore, focuses on the formal goals of the party, the relationship between means and ends in the party's program, the degree of continuity of central themes and objectives and the extent to

which SNP ideology and policies lend themselves to the reinterpretation of goals and/or strategies by party members.

The Components of Ideology

An ideology, suggest Christenson et al., is "a system of beliefs that explains and justifies a preferred political order ... and offers a strategy (institutions, processes, programs) for its attainment. ... An ideology offers an interpretation of the past, an explanation of the present, and a vision of the future."¹

From this definition, four key elements of ideology may be identified for further study. First, ideologies offer often-simplified, sometimes heroic, visions of the past through the dissemination of historical myth, the "pattern of basic political symbols current in a society."² Second, ideologies provide an analysis and rationalization of the present, "explaining" and apportioning blame for the ills or problems of contemporary society. Third, ideologies attempt to prescribe solutions for existing problems by counterposing a preferred alternative economic, social and/or political order - these solutions are the goals or 'moral prescriptions' of the ideological movement. And fourth, since ideologies are "action-related systems of ideas",³ they also offer 'technical prescriptions', the strategies or means by which ideological goals are to be attained.

In the following discussion, we use these four elements as a framework for a brief portrait of the formal ideology of the Scottish National Party. Our emphasis here is on the general principles enunciated in policy documents, other publications and official statements of the party as a whole; the beliefs and attitudes of individual activists and groups within the party will be analysed in later portions of the thesis dealing with the emergence and dimensions of sub-party conflict.

THE INTERPRETATION OF THE PAST

Scotland was the only part of Britain not conquered by the Romans. This fact is recalled by some contemporary Nationalists to underline Scotland's historic claim to independence, but the inhabitants of Scotland at that time cannot be said to have constituted a 'nation' - nor, indeed, was there a Scottish 'state', although periodic attempts were made to unite the Scots under a single king. It was not until the fourteenth century that Scotland emerged as a relatively unified cultural and politico-territorial entity.

Among the historical myths of nationalist movements in particular, "some of the most important ... concern the founding of the polity. The founding myth often refers to heroic figures, real or imaginary, who created the political order." In the case of Scotland, Nationalists revere the exploits of Sir William Wallace and King Robert Bruce in

uniting the Scots kingdom and defending it from English dynastic claims. The SNP holds annual rallies at Elderslie (Wallace's birthplace) and at Bannockburn where "the Bruce" defeated the army of Edward II in 1314. Six years later, the Second and Third Estates of the Scottish Parliament issued the famous *Declaration of Arbroath* which is still a rallying cry for Nationalists and portions of which are reprinted in contemporary SNP manifestos and other publicity material. The assembled nobles and commons vowed in 1320 that

... for so long as a hundred of us are left alive, we will yield in no least way to English domination. We will fight not for glory nor for wealth nor honours: but only and alone we fight for freedom, which no good man surrenders but with his life.'

This celebration of the founding fathers of a sovereign Scottish state in the nationalist ideology attempts, according to one observer, "to tie the past to the present in such a way as to make it appear that Scotland has forever been struggling against English domination".⁶

But, like most mythologies, Scottish nationalist ideology also has its anti-heroes. Chief among these are the Commissioners of the Scottish Parliament who voted, in 1707, for the Act of Union between Scotland and England, thus completing a two-stage process of integration between the two formerly separate sovereign states which began over a century earlier with the Union of the Crown, when James VI of Scotland succeeded Elizabeth, "the Virgin Queen", to become James I of England. In nationalist mythology, ratification of the Union

has come to be viewed as an act of treachery by the 110 Commissioners who voted for it and who, according to the myth, were bribed by the English to sell out their country's independence:

Scotland was committed to the Union by the 110 men intimidated, bought by promise of preferment or by direct bribe, who had least claim to represent the independent spirit of the nation. The Union had a shameful birth.⁷

Yet the Act of Union was quite clearly intended to be a treaty of merger between two equal sovereign partners. Under its terms, the Scots retained many of the institutional trappings of an independent nation: a separate system of local government, their own educational system, the distinctive system of Scots law and the established Church of Scotland. Moreover, the parliaments of both nations were dissolved to make way for the creation of a new Parliament of Great Britain. Hence, Scottish Nationalists argue, "It was not the case that the Scottish Parliament was simply to be swallowed in the English one", nor do legal-minded Nationalists accept the principle that the sovereignty of "the Crown-in-Parliament" gives the British government the right to determine the constitutional status of Scotland; rather, Scotland's future can only be determined by the Scottish people or their own elected representatives.'

The Scots' retention of their own education system and established Church may also have helped to perpetuate a further historical myth, the Nationalists' portrayal of the

Scots as a democratic and egalitarian people.' The Scottish education system was long held to be one of the best in the world but, in contrast to the more elitist models in England and continental Europe, it was also considered to be an extremely open system in which all Scots children could receive the finest education irrespective of their origins.¹⁰ Secondly, the essentially decentralized and participatory system of presbyterian government in the Church of Scotland, in contrast to the more hierarchical organizations of other major churches, further supports the image of Scottish democracy which is clearly reflected in the prescriptive elements of contemporary nationalist ideology.

THE ANALYSIS OF THE PRESENT

The explanation of current problems in Scotland from the perspective of SNP ideology rests, first and foremost, on the loss of Scottish sovereignty at the Treaty of Union. But this situation has been exacerbated for Nationalists by the increasing centralization of political and economic power. First, the expansion of the scope of state activity, especially after World War I, ensured that more and more areas of economic, social and cultural life in Scotland were subject to political decision-making in Westminster, where Scottish MPs are a small minority. Second, it is argued that economic developments since World War II, especially the nationalization of key sectors of the economy (coal, iron and steel,

transportation, etc.), combined with takeovers of Scottish businesses and factories by 'foreign' investors (whether English or multinational concerns), have made Scotland into a branch-plant economy in which vital decisions affecting Scottish jobs and economic prospects are taken elsewhere.¹¹ Moreover, Britain's entry into the European Community, in which the Scots have no separate voice, threatened to move the locus of decision-making even further away from Scotland, increasing the nation's economic and political marginalization.¹²

The effects of political centralization and loss of control over the Scottish economy have been compounded in the Nationalist view by the neglect of Scotland by a succession of London governments, both Conservative and Labour; and this neglect, in turn, has contributed to serious social and economic problems. For example, SNP election literature cites census data showing that, in 1971, 97 per cent of the areas of worst urban deprivation in the UK were to be found in Scotland and other studies suggesting that at least 10 per cent of Scottish children are "seriously disadvantaged through adverse social and economic circumstances".¹³ The extent of multiple deprivation in Scotland has been catalogued by the party's Research Department which, though unwilling to blame everything on rule from London, nonetheless argues that "the extent of deprivation in Scotland is in large part the direct result of economic mismanagement of the United Kingdom as a

whole ... and Scotland has suffered more severely from such mismanagement than almost any other part of the British state."¹⁴

It must be emphasized that the SNP is careful to apportion blame for Scotland's problems equally to the two major British parties, either by explicit mention of both parties by name or by reference to the consequences of the policies of "successive London Governments". For example, SNP election literature claims that:

Scotland today is in a state of crisis, with our economy decimated by the policies of successive London Governments. .. The British political system offers Scotland no hope of improvement. ... The widespread poverty and multiple deprivation still evident in Scotland bears witness to the failure of all British Governments to solve Scotland's economic and social problems. .. The failure of Westminster Government is plain to see.¹⁵

However, the party does not, in formal pronouncements at least, usually allege that the neglect of Scotland's interests has necessarily been wilful or malicious in intent. The formal ideology of the SNP is not racial or anti-English in content; and, as we noted in Chapter Five, when elements within the party have resorted to anglophobia, they have quickly been disowned. Rather, the SNP relies on structural explanations; economic and social deprivation is attributed largely to the fact that Scotland is a particularly vulnerable periphery of a declining and mismanaged UK economy over which the Scots have little control.

According to SNP analysis, economic weakness is also due to the fact that Scotland has long been subsidizing England. The conventional unionist wisdom naturally held that the reverse was true - that Scotland was economically dependent on the Union and that independence was therefore an unviable option. In the late 1960s, this view was moderated somewhat with the acceptance by "unionist" economists that Scotland could survive as an independent state, but only if the Scots were willing to pay the price. Gavin McCrone, for example, acknowledged that Scotland is "among the more advanced nations of the world economically ... clearly much wealthier than the Republic of Ireland and a thousand times more able to look after herself than Basutoland, which nonetheless manages to be independent."¹⁶ But, McCrone argued, independence would necessitate some "drastic and painful" adjustments to the Scottish economy: tax rates would have to be increased if the same services were to be maintained; the Scots would lose access to the benefits of British regional policy and would have less input into the conduct of British economic policy which would undoubtedly continue to affect Scotland; and, overall, independence would likely result in "a substantial drop in Scottish living standards."¹⁷

The counter-argument that Scotland subsidized England was developed in the 1960s to overcome a perceived 'mentality of dependency' among Scots voters and to establish the credibility of self-government.¹⁸ The SNP claimed that

"Scotland was poor because of, not in spite of, the Union with England and ... that Scotland was actually making a budgetary contribution to the Union above its return from government expenditure."¹⁹ This required some creative accounting which went beyond the simple aggregation of tax revenues collected and public expenditures disbursed in Scotland. For example, given an average net out-migration of 20000 people per year from Scotland to the rest of the United Kingdom, it was argued that the costs of providing education, health and housing services to Scots who subsequently migrated to join the English labour force was "equivalent to a continuing capital transfer of more than £50 million every year from Scotland to England."²⁰

The Impact of North Sea Oil

Whatever the merits of respective arguments concerning the economics of independence, the debate was cast in an entirely new light by the discovery of North Sea oil. Calling oil "the ultimate ideological pawn", Sherri Grasmuck, for example, argues that "Knowledge of the existence of vast sums of convertible wealth off Scottish shores did wonders for breaking down defeatist and traditional outlooks in Scotland",²¹ while economist Donald MacKay and his co-authors found it "difficult to deny the proposition that the revenues from oil must fundamentally alter the economic prospects that would be faced by an independent Scotland."²²

For the SNP, the question of ownership of the offshore resources is quite clear. Under the terms of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf and the British government's own *Continental Shelf (Jurisdiction) Order* of 1968, approximately two-thirds of Britain's oil-patch, including almost all the most productive fields, would come under the jurisdiction of an independent Scotland." In the 1970s, however, the British government granted licenses to multinational corporations, on extremely favourable terms, to extract North Sea oil as fast as possible to increase government revenues and to ease Britain's balance of payments problems. For the Nationalists, here was a new source of grievance, as "the exploitation of North Sea oil by the United Kingdom rather than Scotland becomes one more example of the economic rape of Scotland."²⁴ Scotland's "patrimony" was fast being depleted to bail out a declining British economy but, with the exception of some of the coastal towns and cities in the north-east, Scotland secured little advantage. According to the SNP Research Department, therefore, "The simple truth is that Scotland ... has not benefited from the oil discoveries in the way an independent country would have expected to benefit."²⁵

The potential wealth to be derived from oil revenues permitted the SNP to contrast the current deprivation of Scotland with the prospect of relative affluence in an independent state, but only if the rate of extraction were

slowed down. Hence, SNP literature quoted approvingly from a BBC TV "Panorama" program: "Scottish Oil can make an independent Scotland the most stable and prosperous country in Europe ... or it can give temporary assistance to the U.K. balance of payments. It can not do both!"²⁶

In the SNP analysis, Scotland's current economic and social problems - the neglect of Scottish interests at Westminster, the exploitation of Scotland's natural resources for the benefit of others, lack of control over the domestic economy, and multiple urban deprivation - are attributed, first, to the dissolution of the Scottish Parliament under the Treaty of Union and, second, to the subsequent centralization of economic and political decision-making in institutions in which the Scots have little influence. However, all of these problems could be resolved, according to the SNP, if the Scottish electorate put its faith in the prescriptions offered by the party.

MORAL PRESCRIPTIONS

In SNP ideology the obvious prescription for Scotland's ills is the restoration of the nation's sovereignty surrendered in 1707. Since the 1940s, when the various schisms appeared to resolve the "home rule vs. independence" debate, the primary goal of the Scottish National Party has been the creation of an independent Scottish state governed by a sovereign

Parliament. Article 2 of the party constitution states that the aims of the SNP shall be:

- a) Self-Government for Scotland - that is, the restoration of Scottish National Sovereignty by the establishment of a democratic Scottish Parliament within the Commonwealth, freely elected by the Scottish people, whose authority will be limited only by such agreements as may be freely entered into by it with other nations or states or international organizations ...
- b) The furtherance of all Scottish interests.²⁷

At times, the emphasis on independence has led to the exclusion of other prescriptions. Thus, despite the wide-ranging policy document drawn up in 1946, the SNP was effectively a single-issue party prior to the 1960s. Nationalist campaigns detailed the ills of Scotland, attributing them to the Union, and few alternative policies were offered since it was assumed that "the presence of a Parliament in Edinburgh was a panacea for all Scotland's troubles".²⁸

In the 1960s, however, the importance of developing other policy positions was recognized. First, it became apparent that, if the party were to make electoral inroads, the voters could not be expected to sign the political equivalent of a blank cheque. Second, and more important, the process of institutionalization of the SNP described in the previous chapter was accompanied by a fundamental respecification of goals relating to the future orientation of the party. Whereas in the past the SNP had seen its task

exclusively as the achievement of independence, after which it would disperse, the party now portrays itself as the future government of an independent Scotland. But what sort of Scotland is it to be?

Decentralization: "Small is Beautiful"

One enduring theme running through many SNP policies, including the demand for independence, is the desire for decentralization. As the pursuit of independence is a response to the centralization of political power under the Act of Union, so the demand for a more general decentralization of political and economic decision-making follows naturally from the SNP analysis of Scotland's current economic and social problems.

In the past, the Nationalists' rejection of centralized bureaucratic authority was close to an ideology of retreat from the complexities of modern society. For example, according to one commentator, the SNP policy document of 1946 appeared to draw upon a wide range of philosophical perspectives including social credit, Christian socialism, rural populism, indeed "everything except a frank acceptance of the modern state and of bureaucratized industrial, political, trade union, and commercial empires."²⁹ This apparent aversion to modern bureaucratic institutions, combined with the party's rural petit-bourgeois leadership,

led in the 1960s to the SNP being labelled, unfairly, by its opponents as "poujadist" in inspiration."⁹

But today the Nationalist emphasis on decentralization owes less to the anti-modernism and latent authoritarianism of the poujadist movement than to the "Small is Beautiful" philosophy popular among many environmentalists and other radical non-Marxist groups."¹ Decentralization is posed as a viable alternative to the policies of the major British parties and the economic arrangements which they advocate. Hence, the editor of *The Radical Approach*, a collection of essays by Nationalist writers published in the mid-1970s, claimed that:

One of the problems of both the so-called free market and the social democratic state is the tendency to form even-larger units. Bureaucratic centralism is the inevitable result of corporate mergers and the acquisition of functions by government. The two most dominant trends of the last century have been the concentration of competitive industry ... and the extension and deepening of the functions of the State. The radical solution is to reverse the process."²

Symptoms of this commitment are found, for example, in the SNP's promise to reduce the number of levels of bureaucracy by abolishing the Scottish regional councils, sharing their functions between the Scottish Parliament and strengthened district councils, because "decision-making must be brought back to local communities";³ in its proposals for industrial democracy and worker participation, with Employee Councils in all enterprises with more than fifty employees, workers'

representatives on the Board of Directors, and the institution of profit-sharing schemes;" in its advocacy of co-operative enterprise as an alternative to private corporations and state ownership;" in its support for the development of renewable energy resources and waste recycling technology, while opposing the further expansion of nuclear power facilities;" and in the proposed decentralization of social services, with a strong emphasis on the deinstitutionalization of care and on the role of self-help, voluntary and community agencies."

Paradoxically, however, SNP policies for an independent Scotland also call for a substantial degree of government ownership and regulation. Among other institutions, the Nationalists advocate the creation of a Scottish National Oil Company, an Agricultural Finance Bank, a National Forest Enterprise Board, a number of state holding companies under the control of an interventionist Ministry of Development and Industry, and a variety of regulatory agencies and councils, including a Tripartite Economic Council to formulate incomes policy." This apparent contradiction between the desire for decentralization and a strengthened role for an independent Scottish state is reconciled in SNP ideology by the conviction that public enterprises and regulatory authorities can be made both more responsive to local needs through decentralized organization and popular participation and more responsible to democratic institutions. In this sense, the "radical alternative" of decentralization

is closely linked to the SNP prescription of creating a more democratic Scottish society.

Towards an Egalitarian Democracy

The SNP views the centralization of economic and political power as fundamentally undemocratic, a process which enhances bureaucratic control and leads to the alienation of individual citizens from their own economic and political institutions. The purpose of decentralization for the Nationalists' ideological goals, therefore, is to contribute to the creation of a more democratic society in the post-independence Scottish state. This strategy is clearly based on assumptions drawn from a Weberian, rather than a Marxist, view of power and the sources of inequality.³⁹ Citing the work of Ralf Dahrendorf, the SNP Vice-Chairman for Policy wrote in 1976,

if you feel that in working towards a more egalitarian society the distribution of power and status must stand along with the distribution of goods as of central importance in political policy, then the solutions must be decentralising ones. Whatever the large state can achieve in terms of redistribution of wealth ... it is almost impossible by definition that it can fulfill any major power and status redistribution unless it destroys itself. ... To achieve this more fundamental egalitarianism you must radically disperse the points of power and initiative and communication in society.⁴⁰

The objective of decentralization, therefore, is to decrease the alienation of individuals from the centres of decision-making and, by "redistributing power", to remove one of the

sources of inequality in Scottish society.

However, to the extent that the SNP is committed to equality, it is to the old liberal standby "equality of opportunity" rather than "equality of condition".⁴ Thus, while it stands opposed to "undue concentration of wealth" and, especially, of land in the hands of a few,⁵ the SNP does not propose a radical redistribution of income or wealth among social classes.⁶ Indeed, the term "class" itself is conspicuous by its absence from SNP policy statements.

There are several potential explanations of this rejection of the language of class in SNP ideology.⁷ In part, the suppression of class imagery may be a strategic device, both to avoid internal conflict in a party whose members collectively represent a diversity of ideological perspectives and to maximize potential electoral support, in that some voters may be alienated by an overt appeal to either working class or middle class interests. Moreover, the SNP seeks to emphasize regional inequality, the communal deprivation of Scotland vis-a-vis England, and to stress the commonality of Scottish interests rather than reinforce perceptions of inequality among Scots of different social classes. A sovereign Scottish government with the wealth of oil revenues at its disposal will, in the SNP view, raise the standard of living and the quality of life for *all* Scots.

But for many Nationalists, class imagery is also to be avoided because it is associated with the ideologically

polarized debate between the two major British parties - a debate from which the SNP has traditionally been determined to distance itself. As Grasmuck argues

The SNP is promoting ... a line of argument that reverses the traditional association between radical, progressive, or revolutionary politics and a stress on the inequality of classes. ... The SNP recasts this symbolic association and thereby makes class references appear altogether reactionary and atavistic."

Some SNP members go further by resurrecting the historical myth of Scottish democracy, insisting that class-based politics is alien to the Scottish democratic tradition, that it was, in effect, imported from England in order to divide and rule the Scots, and that it will have no place in a self-governed Scotland. Thus, the interpretation of the past is transformed into the vision of the future. While economic inequalities may continue to exist in the future sovereign Scotland (as they surely existed before the Union), the redistribution of power and status as a consequence of independence and decentralization will create a renewed egalitarianism as the basis for a participatory and democratic society.

The (Missing) Cultural Dimension

If the absence of class rhetoric from Nationalist ideology is noteworthy, so too is the lack of emphasis on cultural goals in Nationalist policy. Unlike some nationalist parties, the SNP does not seek to turn back the clock to some

mythical Scottish 'golden age'. Apart from promises to foster the Gaelic language and to establish a Gaelic university in its policy on the crofting counties," the SNP has made no attempt since the purge of the cultural nationalists in the 1930s to appeal to a distinct Celtic or Scots cultural tradition.

In part, this reflects the realities of contemporary Scotland; never a distinct homogeneous culture in any case, even before the Union," the Scots have been largely "deculturized" in the past two centuries. Gaelic is spoken by no more than two per cent of the population and Hugh MacDiarmid's attempt to promote *Lallans* as the distinctive language of Scotland found favour only among other poets. Although the Presbyterian tradition is strong, there are significant minorities affiliated to other churches, most notably a large Catholic population concentrated especially in Glasgow and the west of Scotland. Given the various influxes of Celts, Danes, Angles and Normans, the Scots cannot even claim a distinctive racial heritage. There are, in other words, none of usual bases for the mobilization of cultural nationalism. Hence, while the SNP is willing to invoke the memories of Wallace, Bruce and other historical symbols when the occasion demands, its primary appeal is to economic aspirations, contrasting the decline of the Scottish economy since the Union with the relative affluence that independence and control of oil resources will bring.

Overview

The decentralization of decision-making aside, it would appear that the economic and social structures of an independent Scotland governed by the SNP would be little different from present Scottish society. If the SNP has a model for the future Scotland, it is patterned on an idealized view of the prosperity and stability of certain small European democracies, especially Norway, that other beneficiary of the North Sea oil boom with which, according to SNP literature, Scotland has much in common."

But the most important change envisaged by the SNP is a change in the style of decision-making rather than its substance. If SNP policies are guided by one single founding principle, it is not a particular ideological paradigm, despite the moderately social-democratic timbre of many of its proposals; instead, it is the belief that there is a uniquely "Scottish way" to resolve problems. This "Scottish way" is characterized by democratic participation in decentralized decision-making arenas and a pragmatic commitment to the "furtherance of all Scottish interests", i.e., to the selection of policies which are "best for Scotland" rather than those which are consistent with particular ideologies or narrow sectional interests. Thus, a self-congratulatory editorial in the nationalist newspaper, the Scots Independent, claimed in 1974 that:

The SNP, unlike any of the other major parties, has broken the conformist barrier of being essentially

left-wing, right-wing or centre The Scottish National Party is a Party of 'New Politics' and the key to the SNP's New Politics is the manner in which policy is formed. The test is ... are they the best policies for each issue in Scotland."

Paradoxically, one consequence of such apparent pragmatism is that it leaves the way open for other parties to attach ideological labels to the SNP in order to suit their own political ends; hence the Nationalists are decried as "Socialists" by the Conservatives and as "Tartan Tories" by the Labour Party. But, more importantly for our purposes, in the absence of a clearer philosophy of the nature of the post-independence society, "the manner in which policy is formed" within the party (of which more in Chapter Eight) and the guiding principle of deciding "what is best for Scotland" combine to create a degree of ambiguity about the goals of the SNP which is conducive to policy debate, and potential conflict, between members espousing different ideological positions within the party.

TECHNICAL PRESCRIPTIONS

There is naturally some overlap between the moral prescriptions, the goals, of an ideology and its technical prescriptions, or the means by which these goals are to be attained. For example, the SNP's adherence to democratic principles is reflected not only in its vision of the future Scotland, and its own internal procedures (discussed in Chapter Eight), but also in its strategies for the pursuit of

independence. Since the departure of MacCormick in 1942 put an end to serious discussion of an all-party approach, the Scottish National Party has been committed exclusively to an electoral, parliamentary route to achieving sovereignty.³⁰ Thus, the SNP contests parliamentary elections in order to demonstrate to the British government the extent of popular support for independence. In its view, a majority of Scottish seats (or, better still, a majority of Scottish votes) will constitute a sufficient mandate for self-government "which the Westminster Parliament will have to recognise".³¹

For much of its history, the SNP was committed to withdrawal of its MPs from Westminster on reaching this majority in order to establish a separate constitutional assembly, a strategy which appeared to be modelled on the actions of the Irish Sinn Fein after the UK general election of 1918. In 1976, however, the SNP President announced that, even after winning a majority of Scottish seats in a general election, Nationalist MPs would remain at Westminster to argue the case for an orderly transfer of power to an independent Scottish Parliament.³² In part, this change may have reflected a declining militancy within the SNP in the 1970s. It is also an indication of the respect accorded by the party to the principle of parliamentary sovereignty (even that of the Westminster Parliament). But it most clearly illustrates the determination of the SNP to present itself as a responsible political party and, at the same time, to dissociate itself

from the symbols and strategies of the Irish nationalist movement.

Given the broader context of United Kingdom politics, especially in the 1970s, these two factors are naturally inter-related. The escalation of violence in Ulster made any association with the claims and methods of Irish nationalism anathema to the majority of Scottish Nationalists, for reasons of both strategy and principle. First, there is a large population of Irish descent (both Protestant and Catholic) in Scotland, especially in Glasgow and the Strathclyde region, for whom the Northern Ireland conflict is still of immediate significance. Hence, the SNP is sensitive to the fact that its opponents may arouse suspicions among Protestants that its demands for sovereignty are inspired by Republicanism, while those of Irish Catholic descent may be led to fear that the anti-Catholic discrimination of the Orange state in Northern Ireland will be replicated in a self-governing Scotland. More importantly, however, the SNP is strongly committed to constitutional politics and has consistently dissociated itself from any hint of violence in pursuit of nationalist goals.⁵³ While convinced that Westminster would recognize the democratically expressed will of Scots voters in a general election under normal circumstances,⁵⁴ the party is anxious not to be linked in any way with unconstitutional behaviour that might undermine the legitimacy of its case for independence.

Moreover, the rejection of violence is also based on conviction. The SNP has always contained a strong pacifist element, derived originally from the Independent Labour Party background of many of its founders. This was reflected in the activities of the Scots Neutrality League in the 1930s and draft resisters such as Douglas Young in the Second World War. Later, the influx of new members in the 1960s included many who had been active in the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. That the rejection of violence does flow from principle, argues Keith Webb, can be seen also from "the style of argument adopted by SNP leadership, especially their repudiation of scapegoating methods on an ethnic basis. ... the leadership has been at pains to damp down any active hostility towards the English".⁵⁵

The image projected by the SNP is thus one of responsibility and fundamental decency, an image which is often personified by the party leaders. For example, William Wolfe, Chairman of the SNP from 1969 to 1979, was a former Scout leader, an active churchman and, perhaps even more respectable in Scottish eyes, a chartered accountant; Robert McIntyre, the party's first MP and SNP leader in the post-MacCormick era, was a country doctor; and Gordon Wilson, who succeeded Wolfe as Chairman, is a lawyer by profession. None of these individuals could be described as particularly charismatic, but the air of moderation and respectability which they have projected is in keeping with the SNP's

determination to portray itself as a responsible political party, despite the radical nature of the changes it seeks to impose on the constitutional fabric of the United Kingdom.

SNP IDEOLOGY - STABILITY AND CHANGE

Most of the core elements of Nationalist ideology have remained virtually unchanged since the 1940s, but they have been supplemented over time by the development of policies on a wide range of issues. The modernization and institutionalization of the SNP in the 1960s and '70s, the participation of eleven Nationalist MPs at Westminster and the party's constitutional commitment to "the furtherance of all Scottish interests" led to an increasing complexity of policy positions. Independence, by itself was no longer the panacea. Since Scotland's problems were now attributed to *mismanagement by London governments* rather than just government from London, the SNP was forced to explain in more detail how it would better manage Scotland's affairs. Building on the work already under way in the policy committees of the party's National Assembly, the SNP published a comprehensive package of policy documents. But these often served to create a degree of ambiguity about party ideology; as in the example already cited, demands for decentralization of political and economic decision-making rest uneasily alongside proposals which would represent a significant increase in the degree of state intervention.

In part, this ideological inconsistency may be attributed to the need to appeal to a more diverse voting public as the party attempted to make electoral inroads into the urbanized, industrial areas of central Scotland while maintaining existing strength in rural regions. It may also be ascribed to the fact that oil, rather than independence, had become the new panacea. Given the prospect of virtually unlimited revenues from control over oil resources, the SNP no longer had to make tough redistributive choices - every segment of society could benefit from the new largesse. Hence, the SNP could apparently afford to make promises to everyone and, in 1974, it presented itself as a moderately social democratic party, eager to appeal to the industrial working class as well as urban middle class and rural voters.

Moreover, enhanced credibility ensuing from its electoral advances in the early 1970s attracted into the SNP an increasingly heterogeneous collection of members and activists which made it more difficult to develop consensus on policies of a radical nature. This, and an apparent sense of complacency brought about by the imminent prospect of achieving self-government after 1974, resulted in an air of caution about SNP policy statements later in the decade.

Thus, in their comparison of SNP policy documents in the 1970s with those of the 1940s, Farbey et al. find that SNP ideology had become far more complex while losing much of its earlier militancy. At the same time, they identify an

increasingly 'oppositional' tone, in that "the SNP is more clearly aware of what it opposes than what it favors".⁵⁶ In seeking to unite the Scots against the iniquities of London government, and especially against the machinations of the major parties in the debate over devolution, the prescriptive elements of Nationalist ideology were played down and much of the earlier radicalism of the SNP was lost.

Moreover, as Roger Levy has demonstrated, even the fundamentalist commitment to independence was moderated somewhat in the 1970s as official statements of the party showed a willingness to accept a degree of autonomy short of full sovereignty, if only as a stepping-stone to self-government. For example, in 1975, the SNP Annual Conference lent overwhelming support to a National Council resolution declaring that "the SNP will participate fully in any Scottish Assembly that is democratically elected ... (while working) ... to extend the Assembly's powers until it becomes a true Scottish Parliament."⁵⁷ The apparent ease with which the party was tempted by the prospect of power in the new Assembly to risk compromising its primary goal is suggestive of a further decline in ideological coherence and militancy. But worse was yet to come. As devolution encountered one obstacle after another, the SNP shifted back to an independentist position (see Chapter Six, above); nevertheless, its National Council voted in June 1978 to campaign in favour of the government's legislation in the forthcoming referendum, "thereby putting

the party in the absurd position of supporting a 'Yes' vote for an assembly which it rejected on the principle of 'Independence - nothing less'." As we shall demonstrate later in the thesis, this inconsistency in the party's official attitude to the devolution/independence issue was to become an important theme in the sub-party conflict of 1979-82.

CONCLUSIONS

The SNP bases its claim for Scottish sovereignty on the moral justification of national self-determination, arguing that Scotland's historic national independence, cemented by Wallace and Bruce, symbolically enshrined in the Declaration of Arbroath, was brought to a premature end by the treachery and greed of the Commissioners of the Scottish Parliament in 1707, contrary to the wishes of the majority of Scottish people. Alleging the neglect of Scotland's interests by a succession of London governments, resulting in multiple economic and social deprivation, the SNP claims that it would be best for this ill-struck bargain to be reversed and for Scotland to regain the sovereignty enjoyed by the other historic nations of Europe, not to mention the host of former British colonies which have been granted independence since the Second World War.

But, in contrast to many anti-colonial movements, Scottish nationalism, according to Tom Nairn, is bourgeois

nationalism - a movement which "will create no new, national heaven-on-earth Its task is the anti-climactic one of administering more efficiently and humanely what was created in the past." An SNP government of a sovereign Scotland would not use its new powers to effect sweeping changes in economic and social structures, nor to redistribute wealth in Scottish society.

Rather, its self-conscious claim to radicalism lies in its affirmation that power and status may be redistributed through the decentralization of political and economic decision-making via the creation of smaller political units, stronger local communities, and the encouragement of industrial democracy and co-operative enterprise. In this way, a revitalized Scottish democracy will emerge - building on the myth of the traditional egalitarianism of the Scottish people - in which public policy is determined not by ideological *fiat* but by "what is best for Scotland" on each issue. As Nairn suggests, SNP ideology has presented no threat to capitalism; rather it may be seen as a prescription for 'administering more efficiently and humanely' the existing structures of Scottish society.

However, our discussion has revealed that, by the late 1970s, certain ambiguities had appeared in the ideology and policies of the SNP and that its earlier radicalism had become somewhat diluted. In part, these changes may have resulted from the exigencies of the party's strategy of vote

maximization in the electoral marketplace. But they may also have reflected the peculiarities of nationalism as an ideology and as a socio-political movement. For some nationalists, the acquisition of national sovereignty or increased autonomy is a means to an end - self-government bestows the political power to effect desired changes in the economic, social or political fabric of society. For others, however, independence is an end in itself; they view national sovereignty as an inalienable collective right of the nation, as a matter of fundamental principle which is pursued with almost religious fervour and without concern for the economic or political structure of the post-independence society.

The tension between these two forms of nationalism had long been evident within the SNP but, after 1979, in the atmosphere of critical self-examination which affects most political parties in the wake of a severe electoral defeat, lack of ideological/policy consistency and disagreement over the fundamental objectives of the SNP as a "nationalist" party helped to create an environment conducive to the emergence of conflict between rival sub-party factions espousing alternative goals for the future development of Scotland and different means by which these goals were to be attained.

NOTES - CHAPTER SEVEN

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3. Carl J. Friedrich, Man and His Government: An Empirical Theory of Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), p. 89.
4. Willard A. Mullins, "On the Concept of Ideology in Political Science", American Political Science Review, vol. 66, no. 2, 1972, p. 505.
5. Extract from the Declaration of Arbroath (1320) reprinted in Scottish National Party, Return to Nationhood (West Calder, SNP Publications, 1978).
6. Keith Webb, The Growth of Nationalism in Scotland (Glasgow: Molendinar Press, 1977), p. 115.
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8. ibid. See also the excerpt from the Opinion by Lord Cooper, Lord President of the Court of Session in the case of MacCormick v. Lord Advocate (1953), reproduced in John MacCormick, The Flag in the Wind: The Story of the National Movement in Scotland (London: Victor Gollancz, 1955), Appendix Three, esp. pp. 216-217.
9. The roots of "fraternal democracy" have been traced to Celtic civilization - see Scottish National Party, Return to Nationhood, p. 11; or to the social structure of the clan system, see H.J. Hanham, Scottish Nationalism (London: Faber and Faber, 1969), p. 25. Others,

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10. Hanham, Scottish Nationalism, p. 26.
11. Scottish National Party, Return to Nationhood, p. 12.
12. As noted in Chapter Six, the SNP campaigned against continued membership of the European Community in the 1975 referendum on the slogan "Common Market NO On Anybody Else's Terms". Members of the SNP are divided on whether an independent Scotland should remain in the Community, but advocates of staying argue that Scotland must have full and independent representation on the Council of Ministers and other bodies if its voice is to be heard.
13. Scottish National Party, SNP Manifesto 1983: Choose Scotland - the Challenge of Independence (Edinburgh: Scottish National Party, 1983), p. 14.
14. SNP Research Department, "Multiple Deprivation in Scotland", (SNP) Research Bulletin, vol. 5, no. 4, 1979, p. 2.
15. SNP Manifesto 1983, pp. 1, 14.
16. Gavin McCrone, Scotland's Future: The Economics of Nationalism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969), p. 52.
17. ibid., p. 52, Chapter 4 *passim.*, and p. 104. See also K.J.W. Alexander, "The Economic Case against Independence" in MacCormick, ed., The Scottish Debate, pp. 132-142.
18. See Billy Wolfe, Scotland Lives: The Quest for Independence (Edinburgh: Reprographia, 1973), pp. 62-63.

19. Gavin Kennedy, "Scotland's Economy" in Kennedy, ed., The Radical Approach: Papers on an independent Scotland (Edinburgh: Palingenesis Press, 1976), p. 47.
20. David Simpson, Scottish Independence: An Economic Analysis (West Calder: SNP Publications, 1969), p. 2.
21. Sherri Grasmuck, "Ideology of Ethnoregionalism: The Case of Scotland", Politics and Society, vol. 9, no. 4, 1980, p. 485.
22. D.I. Mackay and G.A. Mackay, The Political Economy of North Sea Oil (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1975), p. 178; and Donald Mackay, ed., Scotland 1980: the economics of self-government (Edinburgh: Q Press, 1977).
23. SNP Research Department, "A Scottish Government and Oil Revenues", (SNP) Research Bulletin, vol. 5, no. 3, 1978, p. 3. But see also the problems of securing control over oil resources raised by Tony Carty, "Oil" in Carty and Alexander McCall Smith, eds., Power and Manoeuvrability: The international implications of an independent Scotland (Edinburgh: Q Press, 1978), pp. 100-124.
24. Webb, The Growth of Nationalism in Scotland, p. 116.
25. SNP Research Department, "A Scottish Government and Oil Revenues", p. 12.
26. Cited in Arthur Donaldson, Whys of Scottish Nationalism (West Calder: SNP Publications, 1976), Question No. 33.
27. Constitution and Rules of the Scottish National Party (Edinburgh: Scottish National Party, mimeo), p. 1.
28. Webb, The Growth of Nationalism in Scotland, p. 104.
29. Hanham, Scottish Nationalism, p. 175.

30. See, for example, Hugh MacDiarmid, "Scotland: Full Circle" in Duncan Glen, ed., Whither Scotland? A Prejudiced Look at the Future of a Nation (London: Victor Gollancz, 1971), pp. 233-250; and the discussions of the nature of the SNP in J.P. Cornford and J.A. Brand, "Scottish Voting Behaviour" in J.N. Wolfe, ed., Government and Nationalism in Scotland (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1969), pp. 17-40, and W.P. Grant and R.J.C. Preece, "Welsh and Scottish Nationalism", Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 21, no. 3, 1968, pp. 255-262.

31. For the classic statement of this philosophy, often cited in SNP literature, see E.F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful: A Study of Economics as if People Mattered (London: Blond and Briggs, 1973). See, also, the book by former SNP candidate, Malcolm Slesser, The Politics of Environment: A guide to Scottish thought and action (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1972).

32. Kennedy, "Scotland's Economy", p. 55.

33. Scottish National Party, Policy Document - Local Government (West Calder: SNP Publications, 1977).

34. Scottish National Party, Policy Document - Manpower and Industrial Relations (West Calder: SNP Publications, 1976).

35. Scottish National Party, Policy Document - Industry (West Calder: SNP Publications, 1976).

36. Scottish National Party, Policy Document - Environment (West Calder: SNP Publications, 1976).

37. Scottish National Party, Return to Nationhood, p. 25.

38. See Return to Nationhood, and various policy documents.

39. For a brief introduction to the different perspectives on class, see Rosemary Crompton and John Gubbay, Economy and Class Structure (London: Macmillan, 1977), Chapter 1. For a classic restatement of the Weberian perspective, see Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class

Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford, Ca: Stanford University Press, 1959).

40. Isobel Lindsay, "Nationalism, Community and Democracy" in Kennedy, ed., The Radical Approach, p. 25.
41. See, for example, the sections on "The Right to Work" and "Education" in The Scotland We Seek (Edinburgh: Scottish National Party, 1973), pp. 12-13.
42. Wolfe, Scotland Lives, p. 133; and Scottish National Party, SNP & You: Aims & Policy of the Scottish National Party, fifth edition (Edinburgh: Scottish National Party, 1977), p. 19.
43. In fact, the SNP's proposal to enshrine private property rights in the constitution of an independent Scotland may, if implemented, preclude any such redistribution. See Scottish National Party, Policy Document - Constitution (West Calder: SNP Publications, n.d.), Article V.14, and the critique of SNP policy in Ray Burnett, "Socialists and the SNP" in Gordon Brown, ed., The Red Paper on Scotland (Edinburgh: EUSPB, 1975), pp. 108-124.
44. The attitudes of individual SNP activists toward class are explored in Chapters Nine, Twelve and Thirteen, below.
45. Grasmuck, "Ideology of Ethnoregionalism", p. 480.
46. Scottish National Party, Policy Document - the Crofting Counties (West Calder: SNP Publications, n.d.), Section 9.1. However, Return to Nationhood, the main SNP election manifesto in 1979, promised only "particular encouragement of the Gaelic language in communities in which a majority of people use it." (p. 22) Such communities are shrinking in number and are concentrated largely in the Outer Hebrides and scattered coastal areas of the west Highlands; see John Agnew, "Political Regionalism and Scottish Nationalism in Gaelic Scotland", Canadian Review of Ethnic Studies, vol. 8, no. 1, 1981, pp. 115-129.

47. Keith Webb, for example, refers to a constant "struggle ... for the soul of Scotland" between the Gaelic-speaking Highlands and the English-speaking Lowlands which continued until "the virtual extinction of the Celtic form of social organisation" following the second Jacobite rebellion in 1745. Webb, The Growth of Nationalism in Scotland, p. 12.
48. Scottish National Party, Policy Document - Foreign Policy Part 1: Europe and North America (West Calder: SNP Publications, n.d.), Sections 8, 9 and 18. Comparisons between Scotland and Norway are not new to Nationalist propaganda; see Archie Lamont, Scotland - The Wealthy Nation (Glasgow: The Scottish Secretariat, 1952), Chapter 2.
49. Scots Independent, October 1974, cited in Burnett, "Socialists and the SNP", p. 119.
50. "The SNP is totally committed to the democratic political and non-violent road to self-government, through persuasion of the people of Scotland to vote for it." The Scotland We Seek, p. 14.
51. ibid., p. 4.
52. Jack Brand, "The Ideology of Scottish Nationalism", paper presented to the ECPR Workshop in Political Behaviour, Dissatisfaction and Protest, ECPR Joint Sessions, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium, April 1976, p. 40.
53. See John E. Schwarz, "The Scottish National Party: Non-violent Separatism and Theories of Violence", World Politics, vol. 22, no. 4, 1970, pp. 496-517.
54. Donaldson, Whys of Scottish Nationalism, Question 25.
55. Webb, The Growth of Nationalism in Scotland, p. 113.
56. B.A. Farbey, C.R. Mitchell and K. Webb, "Change and Stability in the Ideology of Scottish Nationalism", International Political Science Review, vol. 1, no. 3, 1980, p. 414.

57. Cited in Roger Levy, "The Search for a Rational Strategy: The Scottish National Party and Devolution 1974-79", Political Studies, vol. 34, no. 2, 1986, p. 242.
58. ibid., p. 246.
59. Tom Nairn, "The Three Dreams of Scottish Nationalism" in Karl Miller, ed., Memoirs of a Modern Scotland (London: Faber and Faber, 1970), p. 47.

Chapter Eight

RESISTING THE 'IRON LAW':

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE MODERN SNP

The literature on party factionalism suggests that there may be a close relationship between the emergence of sub-party factions and certain characteristics of party organization. In particular, we suggested in Chapters Three and Four that branch-type structures, a high degree of organizational decentralization and a strong commitment to intra-party democracy in procedural norms were all associated with increased potential for the expression of organized collective Voice and sub-party conflict.

Certain aspects of the organizational structure of the Scottish National Party have already been alluded to, especially in Chapter Six where, inter alia, it was suggested that the nature of its organization in the 1960s was both a strength and a weakness for the SNP in its relations with the electoral marketplace. In this chapter, we undertake a more detailed examination of SNP organization in the late 1970s and early '80s in order to establish the extent to which its structure and internal procedural norms may facilitate, or

constrain, the expression of collective Voice. Our discussion begins with a brief review of some seminal writings on the organization of political parties, then turns to a description of the local and national components of SNP organizational structure, before concluding with an analysis of the power relationships within the organization of the modern party.

THE STUDY OF PARTY ORGANIZATION

The concept of party organization may be defined as "the structure of [organizational] units and their articulation inside the party."¹ Since political parties, like wider political systems, may display similar formal institutional structures yet differ markedly with respect to internal power relationships, the analysis of party organization must seek to describe both the arrangement of constituent units in the organizational structure and the mechanisms and procedural norms through which party policy is formulated and executed.

The usual point of departure for the discussion of the structural components of party organization is Duverger's classification of 'basic building blocks', the lowest level of the organizational hierarchy in which most members of the party are directly enrolled. Duverger distinguished four ideal-types of party structure according to the nature of their smallest constituent units - the caucus, the branch, the cell, and the militia - each associated with particular ideologies and a particular type of party.² The cell and

militia structures are both the creations of revolutionary or "anti-system" parties (respectively of communist and paramilitary fascist movements), and hence may be excluded from further consideration when analysing the SNP which is, despite its pursuit of radical constitutional change, clearly parliamentary, electoral and essentially reformist in strategy and orientation.

The distinction between Duverger's two remaining types, the "caucus" and the "branch", is closely related to two other dichotomies proposed in his analysis, those between the "intra-parliamentary" and "extra-parliamentary" origins of parties and between "cadre" and "mass" orientations toward the recruitment and involvement of members.³

The constituent unit known as the caucus is a loose collection of local notables drawn from a particular electoral district whose primary task is to secure the (re-)election of one of their number to parliament. Its political activity is intermittent, functioning usually only at election time, and it does not seek to maximize membership; new members of the caucus are normally recruited by co-optation or by personal invitation of existing members. Hence, the party based on the caucus is not a mass party; rather, it relies on a cadre of individuals selected for their influence or skill in mobilizing non-members to vote for its candidates. As an organizational form, the caucus was traditionally associated with parties originating *inside parliament*, which were usually

conservative or liberal in inspiration, and these origins were reflected in the distribution of power within the party. Although the local caucus enjoyed some autonomy in its electoral activities, party policy was dominated by the leader and the parliamentary group since the extra-parliamentary organization, such as it was, was designed exclusively to campaign for the re-election of sitting members.

In contrast to the caucus, the **branch** is a unit of relatively continuous political activity based on an area of residence typically smaller than the electoral district. It is geared towards political education of the electorate and to the recruitment and involvement of *mass* membership. According to Duverger, the branch is "a Socialist invention", although it was also adopted as the basic unit of organization by christian democratic and nationalist parties which, like the socialists, originated as the electoral wings of broad *extra-parliamentary* social movements seeking to secure parliamentary representation. Reflecting these origins, branch or mass-based parties have typically made their parliamentary representatives formally subordinate to the policies of the extra-parliamentary party expressed through national conference or other mechanisms representing the rank-and-file membership. At the same time, the branches have usually been subjected to more centralized control in their educational and electoral activities than the relatively more autonomous caucuses of the cadre party.

The success of socialist parties in mobilizing the electorate as the franchise was expanded in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries induced other parties, both old and new, to copy the branch form of organization - a process of adaptation which is often referred to as organizational "contagion from the left".⁵ Hence, the old parties of intra-parliamentary origin grafted elements of the branch structure onto the cadre party organization.

However, as Duverger suggests, "the effects of this contagion are limited. In most of the Conservative and Centre parties that have adopted it the branch system exists more in theory than in practice."⁶ Although the branch replaced the caucus at the local level, with more regular political activity and a broader basis of recruitment to rival the grass-roots organization of the socialist parties, it tended to be based still on the electoral district. More significantly, in the non-socialist parties, power over party policy remained concentrated in the hands of the elected members, in particular the party leader and his immediate circle of advisors. Thus, while they have appealed to a mass membership and modified the structural components of their organizations by borrowing the constituent unit associated with more internally democratic mass parties, the old cadre parties have not, according to Duverger, redistributed power to the same extent.

Other authors have argued, however, that neither the formal structure of a party organization nor its ideology have much bearing on the distribution of power within the party. For Robert Michels, elites emerge in all organizations, no matter how open their structures or democratic their ideologies. Having studied what were, in theory, among the most egalitarian and internally democratic organizations of his time - the German Social Democratic Party and trade union movement - Michels concluded that the technical and psychological consequences of the organization of collective action inevitably lead to the emergence of elites, and he formulated his 'Iron Law' ("Who says organization says oligarchy") to explain why, even in these self-consciously democratic and egalitarian movements, power became concentrated in the hands of a small number of party officials or party leaders.⁷

Michels' findings were confirmed in part by Robert McKenzie's pioneering study of power relations within the two major British parties.⁸ Despite the differences between the Conservative and Labour Parties in organizational structure, ideology and self-image, McKenzie argued that the tendencies observed by Michels combined with the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy to create a situation in which

in reality the distribution of power within the two parties is overwhelmingly similar ... [since] ... the two mass parties are primarily the servants of their respective parliamentary parties ... their principal function is to sustain teams of

parliamentary leaders between whom the electorate is periodically invited to choose.'

Party organizations, it would appear, have become more similar over time. Conservative, liberal and other non-socialist parties have adopted the branch as their basic structural unit and seek mass membership. On the other hand, power has been redistributed in socialist and social democratic parties from the extra-parliamentary organizations to the parliamentary wings, such that their policy-making processes more closely resemble those of the old cadre parties.

But the Scottish National Party prides itself on being different from other British parties, not only with respect to its ideology and policies for a future Scotland, but also with regard to the democratic nature of its internal organization. While the structure of its organization appears to be that of a typical branch-based mass party, the SNP claims to have resisted the pressures toward the centralization and concentration of decision-making in the hands of either national leaders or party officials, thereby preserving its commitment to intra-party democracy. We shall attempt to assess the validity of these claims below, but first it is necessary to introduce the various constituent units which together comprise the structural components of SNP organization.

LOCAL ELEMENTS OF SNP ORGANIZATION

The basic building block of the SNP organization structure is the branch. The branch is based on a territorial area but, unlike the most important local units in other electorally-oriented parties, this rarely corresponds with parliamentary divisions or other electoral districts.¹⁰ Instead, branches were initially established wherever a sufficient number of members happened to be concentrated, whether this was a small village or an entire city. Later, as we saw in Chapter Six, part of Ian MacDonald's strategy for building up membership and organization in the 1960s was to persuade large branches to split into two or more smaller branches. In this way, branch membership would be sufficiently small for almost every member to be given a job and thus kept mobilized, new recruits could become quickly involved in the life of the party, and a sense of social cohesion and common purpose could be more easily developed.

Each branch must have a minimum of twenty members¹¹, but the average size is much larger, probably around fifty or sixty.¹² Since the early 1970s, when there were over 500, the number of branches has declined, partly as a result of some local mergers and rationalization but also reflecting a more general decline in party membership. By 1980, there were 433 recognized branches, while in December 1981 only 385 were deemed by SNP headquarters to be fully functioning.¹³

The SNP has always used the number of branches as an indicator of the organizational vitality of the party. On this basis, it would appear that its strength is unevenly distributed among the various regions of Scotland. The data presented in Table 8.1 compare the percentage of all SNP branches which are located in each region with that region's share of the total Scottish electorate. They suggest that SNP organization is relatively more healthy in the Highland, Tayside, Lothian, Grampian, Dumfries & Galloway, and Central regions (i.e., those in which the regional share of SNP branches is higher than the regional proportion of the total Scottish electorate), while it is weakest on this dimension in the most populous region, Strathclyde, and especially in Glasgow where the city's share of SNP branches is less than half its share of the total electorate. Comparison with an earlier analysis undertaken by Mansbach reveals similar patterns, but Strathclyde is even more under-represented than it was in 1969, while branch representation appears to have improved most noticeably in the Lothian and Tayside regions.¹⁴

The branch is the locus of party membership - all SNP members must be affiliated to a local branch (or group) of the party.¹⁵ Thus, when potential sympathisers respond to the Business Reply Cards distributed during campaigns and membership drives or contact SNP headquarters following a party political broadcast, their particulars are passed on to the nearest branch which then seeks to recruit them.

TABLE 8.1 - SNP BRANCHES BY REGION, 1981

Region	Number of Branches in Region	% Total SNP Branches in Region	% Total Scottish Electorate in Region
STRATHCLYDE (Glasgow)	126 * (23) +	32.7 (6.0)	46.7 (14.1)
LOTHIAN	66	17.1	15.0
TAYSIDE	45	11.7	7.7
GRAMPIAN	41	10.6	9.1
FIFE	27	7.0	6.5
HIGHLAND	27	7.0	3.6
CENTRAL	25	6.5	5.2
DUMFRIES & GALLOWAY	16	4.2	2.8
BORDER	8	2.1	2.1
WESTERN ISLES	2	0.5	0.6
ORKNEY	1	0.3	0.4
SHETLAND	1	0.3	0.4
	<hr/> 385 *		

NB - percentages may not add to 100.0 due to rounding

* Figures include 10 constituency branches

+ Figure includes 9 constituency branches

SOURCE: Calculated from list of SNP branches extant in December 1981, provided by the party, and from regional and constituency electorates, 1979.

The SNP has been extremely reluctant to issue total membership figures since the late 1960s when claims to a membership of 120,000 were found to be inflated.¹⁶ Hence, the SNP National Organiser refused to disclose party membership in an interview with the author in March 1982. However, an admittedly unsystematic survey of branches conducted by the author at that time suggested that the average branch membership was between fifty and sixty. Allowing for some underestimation of this average since our sample did not include branches in the organizationally "more developed" Highland and Grampian regions, our estimation of total SNP membership in 1982 based upon the number of branches then functioning would be around 25,000 - a figure supported by the 'guesstimates' of party activists in personal interviews.¹⁷

Each branch of the SNP has its own constitution, usually modelled on the constitution and rules of the parent party, and elects its own officers and branch executive. Branches also elect delegates to other organs of the party, to constituency and district associations, to National Council and party Conferences (see Figure 5.1) and, through their representatives, thereby play an important role in party policy-making. They also have a propaganda function, in that they are instructed "to continue to advance the argument for independence, particularly in (the) local community through personal contact, literature distribution, public gatherings, and use of press and media."¹⁸ And, finally, the branches are

FIGURE 8.1 - THE STRUCTURE OF THE SCOTTISH NATIONAL PARTY

NB - To simplify the diagram, some delegate linkages are omitted. For full details of representation to each body, see text or Constitution and Rules of the Scottish National Party (Edinburgh: Scottish National Party, mimeo)

important sources of party funds, both through the collection of membership dues and other fund-raising activities, including social events, bake sales and the selling of Alba Pools tickets. (Further discussion of these functions will follow in a later section.)

During election campaigns, the most important local unit of party organization, in theory, is the constituency association (CA). As we noted in Chapter Six, this was a neglected aspect of SNP organization until the 1960s. Prior to that time *ad hoc* organizations based on local branches (where they existed) had managed electoral activities, but, after the first permanent constituency association was formed in West Lothian in 1963, the idea spread rapidly. Each constituency association consists of an agreed number of representatives (usually three or four) from each branch in the constituency. In 1981, there were as many as sixteen branches in a constituency,¹⁹ but in ten parliamentary divisions, nine of them in Glasgow, the constituency and branch organizations were fused in a hybrid unit, the "constituency branch". These were largely the consequence of mergers among formerly separate branches as membership declined.

The primary function of constituency associations is the selection and promotion of candidates for parliamentary elections but they are also responsible for co-ordinating branch activities (including the recognition of new branches)

and they play a role in policy-making through the election of delegates and submission of motions to National Council, Conference and, especially, the National Assembly. However, except for the constituency branches, they are not directly involved in enrolling members or in fund-raising activities; and although, in theory, branches are supposed to place funds and activists at the disposal of constituency associations, especially during election campaigns, in practice, as we shall see, the CAs have often been dependent upon the goodwill and co-operation of the branches which comprise them.

The SNP has long recognized the importance of promoting its self-image in local government elections and activities. Success in municipal elections in the late 1960s helped to put the SNP on the map; at the same time, the behaviour of some of its councillors may have contributed to the party's decline leading up to the 1970 general election. Therefore, following the reform of Scottish local government in 1973, the SNP amended its constitution to permit the creation of district associations and regional associations to co-ordinate the party's efforts in the local government arena. The district associations, composed of branch delegates, are seen as the more important by the party, since they are "smaller and more manageable."²⁰ They are responsible for approving candidates for local elections, for co-ordinating local election campaigns and for providing a forum for discussion of local government issues, especially in districts where

there are SNP councillors. The regional associations, which consist of representatives from the districts, are significant only if the party has a sizeable number of regional councillors, where they monitor and support the activities of the council group; otherwise they come into play only every four years to co-ordinate regional election campaigns.

A number of affiliated organizations also send delegates to the national deliberative organs of the party. The most important of these is Young Scottish Nationalists/ Clann Alba (YSN/CA), representing the youth wing of the party, which was established as a formal organization in 1981 in response to concerns that the SNP was losing its traditional appeal to young voters (see Chapter Twelve, below). YSN/CA is the only affiliated organization represented on the party's National Executive Committee and the National Organisation Committee. The Federation of Student Nationalists is an umbrella group of nationalist groups in most universities and colleges in Scotland, some of which permit non-members of the SNP to join. The Scottish National Party Association serves to co-ordinate the activities of groups and individual members living abroad. Although there were thriving groups in the United States and the dominions in the 1970s, by 1982 only the Canadian branch of the SNPA was still active.²¹ Finally, for a number of years, the SNP attempted to appeal to industrial workers through the activities of another affiliated organization, the Association of Scottish Nationalist Trade Unionists (ASNTU).

Established in 1965, its role was to encourage branch members who were also trade unionists to play a propaganda role by becoming more active in their unions. However, this strategy failed to produce many new members and in 1975 the party established a system of Industrial Organisers at the national, constituency and, sometimes, branch levels to integrate industrial activities more closely with its existing structure.²² The ASNTU now had little role to play and was finally dissolved in 1980.

NATIONAL DELIBERATIVE AND EXECUTIVE BODIES

According to the SNP constitution, the **Annual National Conference** is "the supreme governing body of the Party."²³ The Annual Conference is the body most representative of the grass-roots organization of the party, primarily because of the number of branch delegates who may attend; each branch is entitled to between two and ten delegates according to the number of paid-up members enrolled. Other delegates to Conference include one delegate from each constituency association and district association, delegates from affiliated organizations, the 13 national office-bearers and the 30 delegates to National Council elected by the previous Conference, and sitting Members of Parliament (if not already included under one of the other categories).

Apart from its importance as a social gathering, the chief functions of Annual Conference are the election of

office-bearers and members of the National Council (below) and deliberating and voting on resolutions proposed by branches, CAs and other organs of the party. The Conference agenda is drawn up by a twelve-member Standing Orders and Agenda Committee, chaired by the party's National Secretary, which also receives nominations for elections to office. The bulk of the Committee's time, however, is spent selecting and consolidating the resolutions received from around 300 to arrive at a final figure of around 50 which can be crammed into the three days of sessions."²⁴

Between Annual Conferences, the National Council is the chief policy-making organ of the SNP - its decisions are "binding on the Party and all members unless and until rescinded or modified by a National Conference."²⁵ It usually meets every three months and consists of one delegate from each branch, constituency association, district association and affiliated organization, thirty members elected by Conference, the national office-bearers, and any MPs not already accounted for. Council is empowered to amend Part Two of the party constitution (Part One may be amended only by Conference) and to instruct the office-bearers and the National Executive Committee. It also "delegates powers to the executive vice-chairmen ... appoints all standing and ad hoc committees, controls central party funds, determines subscription rates for members, and recognises new branches."²⁶ In addition, at its June meeting, held two weeks after Annual

Conference, the Council elects ten ordinary members to the National Executive Committee.

As we noted in Chapter Six, pressure on existing organs of the party led to the creation of the **National Assembly** in 1968 as a forum for the discussion of party policy. The Assembly must be convened twice a year, but usually meets more frequently, and consists of three delegates from each constituency association (one of whom is the sitting MP or the prospective parliamentary candidate), one delegate from each district association, delegates from affiliated organizations, the national office-bearers and the 30 elected members of National Council. It has no executive powers but provides an opportunity to debate policy proposals drawn up by its numerous policy committees. These proposals may then be passed on to Conference or Council for further discussion and possible ratification.

The **National Executive Committee** (NEC) is responsible for the "everyday" management of party affairs. It normally meets once a month and consists of 10 ordinary members elected by National Council, the 13 national office-bearers, one representative of the Young Scottish Nationalists and up to three Members of Parliament, plus a number of non-voting members - the Assistant National Secretary, the Assistant National Treasurer, and the principal officials from party headquarters. The NEC receives reports from and directs the office-bearers and a number of important committees chaired

by Executive Vice-Chairmen of the party, it reviews party policy, it is broadly responsible for the administration of the party and it is the command centre for party strategy and tactics. Subject to ratification by Council, the NEC is further responsible for maintaining party discipline and for the suspension or expulsion of any member, branch or association found to be in contravention of the policies or rules of the SNP. In short, according to Jack Brand, "There is no doubt that this is an extremely important committee."²⁷ However, as we shall discuss further below, there is some ambiguity about how much power the NEC really wields, especially with respect to its relationship with the parliamentary wing of the party.

Since 1979, the majority of voting members of the NEC are the **national office-bearers** elected each year by Conference. These are the party President and three Vice-Presidents, the Chairman and Senior Vice-Chairman, five Executive Vice-Chairmen, and the National Secretary and National Treasurer. The President and Vice-Presidents are largely honorific positions filled by senior members of the party, although they may be allocated specific responsibilities from time to time. The true chief executive officer of the party is clearly the Chairman: he chairs the NEC and the most important sessions of Conference and is the only member of the NEC whose decision is final between meetings of the Committee. The Senior Vice-Chairman naturally

deputises for the Chairman on occasion, but his/her primary responsibility is to convene and chair the party's Strategy Committee.

The five Executive Vice-Chairmen exercise duties assigned to them by the National Council. The Vice-Chairman for Administration is responsible for the management of party headquarters and also chairs the important General Business Committee. The Vice-Chairman for Organisation chairs the National Organisation Committee and oversees and co-ordinates the functioning of constituency associations and branches. The Vice-Chairman for Policy convenes and chairs meetings of the National Assembly and co-ordinates the various official policy spokespersons of the party. The Vice-Chairman for Publicity chairs the National Publicity Committee and is responsible for all aspects of public relations - the production of posters and pamphlets, party political broadcasts and press conferences. And the Vice-Chairman for Local Government, a new position created in 1981, oversees the activities of regional and district associations and liaises with SNP councillors on local authorities.

The National Secretary chairs the Standing Orders and Agenda Committee which prepares the agenda for Annual Conference and he is also responsible for initiating action, such as disciplinary measures, in accordance with the decisions of Conference, National Council and the NEC. He is aided by an Assistant National Secretary, appointed by the

NEC, who is a non-voting member of the Committee. Finally, the National Treasurer (aided by an appointed Assistant National Treasurer) is the chief financial officer of the party, responsible for authorizing and paying accounts and preparing the annual balance sheet.

One additional point about the national office-bearers is very important for an understanding of the organization and internal politics of the SNP; that is, unlike their counterparts in most other parties, none of these officers is a full-time employee of the party. Although William Wolfe, for example, advocated in the 1960s that the Chairman should be employed on a full-time basis, others in the SNP feared the potential for empire-building if the Chairman or other office-bearers were to become professional party bureaucrats.²⁹

As a result, the only full-time employees of the SNP are the senior officials at party headquarters - the National Organiser, the Research Officer and the Press Officer. As we reported in Chapter Six, these three positions were created in the late 1960s as part of the process of organizational modernization which accompanied the SNP's early electoral advances. (Although Ian MacDonald devoted himself full-time to the SNP in 1962, the position of National Organiser was not recognised as a permanent salaried post until 1968.) The election of eleven Nationalist MPs in October 1974 placed a further burden on organizational resources and a number of new posts were created at headquarters - a National Industrial

Organiser, Assistant Research and Press Officers and a full-time Organisation Secretary. However, these positions (together with one secretarial assistant) were cut in the summer of 1979, reportedly as an economy measure since the party's finances had been severely depleted by the costs of fighting a referendum campaign, a general election and elections to the European Parliament, all within the space of six months.²⁹

In the early 1980s, therefore, the national organization of the SNP was being run on a shoestring by a number of elected officers who were strictly "amateurs", in that they all had jobs outside the party, and three full-time officials supported by secretarial staff, part-time assistants and volunteers. Although the financial strains of fighting elections tell on all minor parties, the particular weakness of central party organs in the Scottish National Party has much to do with the distribution of power inside the party.

INSIDE THE SNP: THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER

In many respects, the organization of the Scottish National Party is a self-conscious reflection of its ideology. The SNP's formal commitment to democratic procedures and the decentralization of decision-making in its prescriptions for the future Scotland are already being put into practice in the internal life of the party. Consequently, while the formal structures of SNP organization closely resemble those

of a typical branch-based mass party, the articulation of structural units and the distribution of power inside the party display a number of deviations from the mass/branch party model. These variations are seen most clearly in the financial structure of the party, in the management of electoral activities and, particularly in the 1970s, in the relationship between the National Executive Committee and the Parliamentary Party.

SNP Finances: The Power of the Purse

According to Giovanni Sartori, a party's internal financial arrangements are one of the most important determinants of the "structure of opportunities" for the emergence of sub-party factions; the more decentralized the purse-strings, the more opportunity there is for sub-parties to gain control of resources essential for successful mobilization.¹⁶

Control of finance in the Scottish National Party is highly decentralized. The party as a whole has no outside sources of income other than the occasional bequest or endowment. In fact, the SNP prides itself on its financial self-sufficiency since it thereby "owes allegiance to no interest other than that of the Scottish people",¹⁷ in contrast to the alleged dependence of the Conservative Party on donations from big business and of the Labour Party on trade union support. Indeed, to protect its financial independence,

in the mid-1970s the SNP went so far as to oppose the provision of public (state) funding in its evidence to the Houghton Committee on Financial Aid to Political Parties." As a consequence, however, the party has to rely heavily on its branches for funding.

Branches raise money in a variety of ways - most importantly from the collection of membership dues, social events such as jumble sales and dances, and through the sale of the monthly Alba Pools sweepstake tickets from which the branches retain 40 per cent of the proceeds with the remainder (after prize money is deducted) going to party headquarters and to the SNP Publications Department for printing and other overhead costs. In turn, branches pay regular dues to three bodies: to party headquarters for salaries and operating costs; to the local constituency association for running expenses and to build election funds; and a small amount to the local district association. Occasionally, an additional levy has been imposed on the branches to support a particular project, for example, to finance the 'National Oil Campaign' of 1973. But such levies can be decided only by the National Council, the majority of whose delegates come from the branches. Thus it is virtually impossible for the party leadership to raise additional funds for "national" activities without the co-operation of the branches.

The extent of financial decentralization in the SNP, combined with parochial attitudes in many local organizational

units, has resulted in the perennial underfunding of party headquarters. In the late 1960s, for example, according to Mansbach,

since headquarters had to rely upon the branches for membership figures, it could not be certain that it was receiving all it was owed. Indeed, certain branches actually deflated membership figures in order to be able to retain a greater share of membership fees."³

Moreover, when party headquarters requested a loan from one constituency association with surplus funds, the loan was granted only after the party agreed to pay a higher rate of interest than the association was receiving from its bank.⁴ A decade later little had changed. After staff cuts and other economies were necessitated by a 30,000 annual deficit, the Executive Vice-Chairman for Administration reminded the 1979 Annual Conference that

at Headquarters we can only give the Party what the Party pays for, and up to now we have been trying to give a Rolls Royce service on a Ford income. Now, alas ... the Party is providing only a Mini income, and can afford only a Mini service from H.Q. ... Times are going to be hard at Headquarters, until you in the Branches find enough cash to make it easier."⁵

The branches have jealously protected their financial autonomy from encroachment by other units of the party as well as headquarters. In 1964, when constituency associations were first established, there was an unsuccessful attempt to make them the major fund-raising units instead of the branches. Then in 1969 the branch-dominated National Council defeated a move to force branches to transfer funds to constituency

associations during general election campaigns." While many branches began to do this anyway on a purely voluntary basis, repeated complaints from constituency associations about the lack of co-operation from a minority of branches (especially in the 1979 election campaign) finally led to a change in the party constitution at the 1980 National Conference. By a 3 to 1 majority, Conference approved a ruling that "immediately a general election is called, all funds held by branches shall become the property of the Constituency Association for the purpose of contesting at the General Election." Even then, despite the size of the majority in favour some delegates officially recorded their dissent from the decision while other branch activists continued to express their displeasure with the change in correspondence to the Nationalist press."

The unwillingness of some branches to commit funds to the constituencies in what is essentially an electoral organization is indicative of the degree of parochialism among many local-level activists. In the late 1970s and early '80s, disputes between branches or between branches and constituency associations were common and SNP headquarters was frequently required to hold full-scale inquiries which brought bad publicity to the party." Thus as Jack Brand, himself a member of party, has admitted, "one has to say that the small scale of most branches leads to a kind of introspection which can be unhealthy."

The decentralization of financial control in the SNP is quite in keeping with the party's more general political philosophy, but it bears attendant costs. It is difficult for central organs of the party, and especially for SNP headquarters, to obtain sufficient funds to support an adequate full-time staff, maintain a research capability and undertake other activities (such as publicity) normally associated with a 'national' political party. At the same time, it also makes it easier for sub-party factions, merely by gaining control of a handful of branches, to acquire access to the financial resources required for the mobilization of collective Voice within the party.

Election Management

Since parliamentary candidates, and especially elected representatives, are highly visible and often influential members of a political party, the locus of control over election nominations may also be related to the incidence of sub-party factionalism. In parties where all nominations are controlled by the leaders or by the central party bureaucracy (especially in party list systems of proportional representation), factionalism at the electoral/ parliamentary level may be eliminated or, at least, contained within a manageable bounds, since dissidents from the party line may be excluded from candidacy or nominated in such a position

(low on the party list or in "unwinnable" constituencies) as to make electoral success improbable.

In contrast, where nominations are controlled primarily by constituency associations or branches, sub-party factions with sufficiently concentrated support can more easily place their members among the party's candidates for local or national office. Where they are successful, the expression of dissenting Voice within the party often becomes a matter of public record, since divisions among candidates or elected representatives are usually considered newsworthy events. At the same time, lack of control over nominations deprives party leaders of a powerful disciplinary measure.

As might be expected from our discussion of SNP organization so far, control over both the nomination process and the management of election campaigns has traditionally been decentralized in the SNP. The party's Election Committee screens all applicants wishing to become parliamentary candidates and makes recommendations regarding their suitability to the National Executive Committee, which then circulates a list of acceptable members to all branches and constituency associations. At one time this screening process was relatively lax and the SNP has occasionally been embarrassed by candidates or local councillors who have proven either to be incompetent or to hold views unsympathetic to the party's goals and policies.

In the case of parliamentary elections, each branch within a constituency may nominate candidates for selection. If necessary, the constituency association then compiles a short list and the potential candidates often travel round to address branch meetings before each branch makes its final choice, mandating its delegates to the constituency association accordingly. The constituency association, composed of branch delegates, then makes the final selection of the parliamentary candidate.

Despite the apparent openness of this process, it has still been criticized by some party members as "too secretive", in that only branch delegates to the constituency association make the final decision on candidate selection, which can lead "to the acceptance of inadequate and worse still of disloyal candidates".⁴¹ Nonetheless, it would appear that the candidate selection process in the SNP is more decentralized and more open to grass-roots participation than in many other parties, including both the Conservative and Labour Party organizations.

Only in the case of by-elections, where swift action may be necessary, does the National Executive Committee have the power to name a candidate for a particular constituency, although it rarely acts unilaterally for fear of upsetting delicate local sensibilities. In 1978, the NEC exercised this prerogative for the by-election in Berwick and East Lothian, where the local constituency association had already closed

a prospective parliamentary candidate in anticipation of the forthcoming general election. The NEC's decision to parachute in a 'higher profile' candidate, party vice-chairman Isobel Lindsay, met with strong opposition from local activists, a few of whom resigned while others refused to work for her in the campaign.⁴²

Given the growing number of seats contested, and won, by the SNP in regional and district council elections in the 1970s, it is perhaps not surprising that some "loose cannons" appeared in the ranks of party candidates. For local elections, the primary responsibility for screening and selecting candidates rests with the district associations and, until the establishment of an Executive Vice-Chairman for Local Government in 1981, the party had no machinery for co-ordinating local electioneering procedures. Thus, a number of "instant Nationalists" were able to secure nominations, and sometimes election, on behalf of the SNP and then proceeded to disregard party policy in their council activities.

After 1979, there was widespread debate in the party on the wisdom of continuing to fight local elections on a large scale: some members argued, for example, that "A great deal of damage has been done by councillors under the 'Party label' making irresponsible statements",⁴³ while others, including former party chairman Billy Wolfe, insisted that "the party must be involved in local politics" to keep it in the public eye between parliamentary elections and give an opportunity

to the Scottish people (as opposed to the English parties) to control the whole fabric of government in Scotland." However, in response to the concerns of many members, the party has now instituted firmer control over the selection of local government nominees, it mounts training courses for all candidates (local and parliamentary) and, as noted earlier, now has a vice-chairman in charge of local government affairs.

If the selection of candidates has traditionally been a decentralized process in the SNP, so too is the conduct of the election campaign. This was particularly evident in the 1979 General election, when the SNP "hardly campaigned on a Scottish basis at all. Instead it ran a small campaign in each Scottish constituency."⁶ The fragmented nature of the Nationalist campaign may be attributable to a number of factors - lack of resources for party headquarters, the fact that most of the party's leaders were desperately trying to hang on to seats won in 1974, a general mood of resignation or demoralization after the referendum - but in many respects it was not that untypical of SNP campaigns. Each constituency association tends to structure its appeal according to its perceptions of the local electorate and according to the nature of party competition in the constituency. Hence, the party often portrays a different image of itself and its candidate in constituencies where the Conservatives are perceived as the main opponents (as in the rural north east) from that presented in traditional Labour strongholds. Local

autonomy was, however, carried to an extreme in 1979 in the northern constituency of Caithness and Sutherland where, in deference to a major source of employment in the area, the local party directly contradicted SNP policy by declaring its support for nuclear power."

SNP headquarters did try to mount a more cohesive campaign in 1979, but as Alan McKinney, the party's National Organiser, acknowledged, "It is difficult for the centre to influence local electioneering because of the decentralized nature of the party." Thus, while the party was "better equipped than ever before" for the 1979 campaign, "certain people with expertise and knowledge in a particular area made it difficult to run a cohesive campaign. They thought that their local expertise was sufficient." Moreover, parochialism and lack of co-operation among local units also hampered the campaign effort: for example, to aid Nationalist MP George Reid, who was struggling to hold on to his seat in Clackmannan and East Stirlingshire, McKinney phoned every neighbouring constituency but could not get one car or one person to help out. "Nothing's changed", commented McKinney later.⁴⁸

The lack of strong central control over party nominations and campaign management allows numerous access points for sub-party factions which, by gaining influence over local branches and hence over constituency or district associations, can secure the selection of their own members as party candidates

or shape local campaigns to substitute their collective Voice for that of the party in the electoral marketplace. At the same time, the persistence of a degree of parochialism among local units of the party and the activities of some local candidates and councillors may have contributed to the perceived decline in party performance in the late 1970s, a point to which we shall return in Chapter Ten.

Who's in Charge? The NEC vs. the MPs

We suggested in Chapter Three that one source of social control over the behaviour of party members, and hence an inhibition against factionalism, is the existence of a strong leader whose authority is accepted by all members of the party. This kind of leadership, however, appears to be antithetical to SNP philosophy with its emphasis on decentralization, egalitarianism and intra-party democracy." Thus, as we indicated in Chapter Seven, the SNP has tended to select as its leaders a succession of essentially uncharismatic, but fundamentally decent and respectable men who, as chairmen of the party, have tended to regard themselves, and behave, as first (but only just!) among equals. They in turn have tended to share the functions of leadership, and the media spotlight, with other senior members of the party, the vice-chairmen, the official policy spokespersons and the Members of Parliament (if any).

Thus, while it would be untrue to speak of a vacuum of leadership in the Scottish National Party, leadership functions are certainly widely dispersed and it has not always been clear who is directing the party on its course. This was particularly apparent in the period between 1974 and 1979 when there was something of a power struggle between members of the National Executive Committee in Edinburgh and the parliamentary group at Westminster.

Constitutionally, as befits a party structured after the mass/branch model and which originated as the electoral wing of a broader political movement, the MPs are formally subordinate to the sovereign decision-making bodies of the SNP, to Conference, National Council and the NEC. Before 1974, when the party had at most two MPs at any one time, this did not present a problem, but once there was a parliamentary group of eleven the MPs demanded a more independent role. It was not the case that individual MPs wanted to be free to vote as they chose; for the most part, they displayed a high level of legislative cohesion in the House of Commons.⁵⁶ But their disciplined behaviour as a group within the House did not always reflect the views of the NEC or the wider party in Scotland.

On a number of important issues the parliamentary group either failed to consult, or disregarded instructions from, the NEC, but two incidents in particular illustrate the depth of the division. One involved the MPs' opposition to Labour

legislation to increase government control over the aircraft and shipbuilding industries which would have the effect of saving a number of businesses and thousands of jobs in Scotland. To the dismay of the NEC, certain Nationalist MPs "publicly tore up telegrams from the Scottish Trade Union Congress which had implored the SNP to support the initiatives",⁵¹ an act which Labour politicians exploited to the full in the 1979 election. As the then Chairman of the party (and hence of the NEC) commented later,

The parliamentary party must consult more frequently with the party in Scotland. If the wider party had been consulted on the aircraft and shipbuilding bill, the result of the 1979 election might have been totally different.⁵²

A second case in point was the behaviour of the parliamentary party following the Speech from the Throne in November 1978. Before the new session of Parliament began, the NEC specifically instructed the MPs not to do anything which might bring down the government until after the devolution referendum the following March. But, when a non-confidence motion was moved after the Queen's Speech, nine SNP Members voted against the government while the two that did not "were then disciplined by the group for what was, in effect, their obedience to the NEC."⁵³ After the NEC had chastised the parliamentary group and appointed two of its members to act as a permanent liaison with the MPs, the latter fell into line and supported the government in most major divisions until the motion of no-confidence which brought it

down at the end of March 1979 - and on that issue both the NEC and the wider party were deeply divided."

The often-troubled relationship between the National Executive and the Parliamentary Party in the late 1970s is open to a number of interpretations. One former MP that we interviewed argued that there really was no conflict because several of the parliamentary group were also members of the NEC, so how could there be a problem? Another admitted that there were "some personality disputes", but claimed that the MPs had consulted regularly with the NEC - hence, "we might not always have made the right decisions but they were correctly taken". Moreover, argued a third, the MPs were in the thick of the fray at Westminster and were therefore "in a much better position than the NEC" to decide how they should vote on particular issues." But this last view was labelled "elitist" by some members of the NEC." As one author (himself an SNP activist) has explained, "The NEC and the branches had hoped for more direct democratic accountability of the MPs in their party than they saw in the other parties."

But others within the party have interpreted the conflict in largely ideological terms. Despite the moderately social democratic image portrayed by the party in its manifesto and campaign rhetoric in 1974, in the early sessions of the 1974-79 parliament in particular, the Nationalist MPs voted more often with the Conservative opposition on major divisions than with the Labour government." As one SNP member who witnessed

the activities of the MPs at close quarters observed, their parliamentary performance was "essentially right-wing", while a senior member of the NEC suggested that, because most of the Nationalist MPs elected in 1974 won seats in traditionally Conservative rural areas, "MPs from the north-east and east made the very large mistake of thinking that they had to present a Tory image to hold onto their seats."⁵⁵ In contrast, the members of the NEC represented a broad spectrum of political opinion with, perhaps, a slight majority for the social democrats and socialists over the 'small c' conservatives. Hence, the basis of the conflict between the NEC and the MPs may well be explained by the senior party member who observed, "In general, the political spectrum of the parliamentary party was to the right of that of the NEC, the party as a whole and of the people who voted for them."⁶⁰

But whatever the cause of the dispute, it clearly illustrated two fundamental weaknesses in SNP organization at this time. First, it raised again the unresolved issue of the nature of the SNP - was it a party or a movement? If the SNP were to be seen primarily as an electoralist, parliamentary-centred party, then the parliamentary group should naturally assert its supremacy over the extra-parliamentary organization. If, on the other hand, the SNP were to be viewed as the political, electoral wing of a broader social or political movement, then the MPs should see themselves as

delegates of, and responsible to, the wider organization and the National Executive.

Secondly, the struggle between the parliamentary party and the NEC further confused the question of party leadership and direction. To the traditional diffusion of organizational, policy and leadership functions among the office-holders and other members of the NEC in Scotland was now added a second power structure based in the parliamentary group in the House of Commons. Who really spoke for the party - William Wolfe, SNP Chairman and chair of the NEC (but not an MP), or Donald Stewart, leader of the parliamentary group in the House of Commons? What was the true ideological centre of gravity in the SNP - the moderate social democracy of Wolfe, or the apparent conservatism evidenced by the voting behaviour of the parliamentary group?

For some SNP members, the lack of clear policy direction and the absence of a single locus of authority within the party helped to legitimate dissenting views which later were expressed in organized collective Voice. For the electorate, the same traits may have contributed to a loss of credibility for the party which was manifested in the reverses of 1979. Thus, for some Nationalists at least, the diagnosis and treatment of the problems of the SNP were simple - as an editorial column in the Nationalist newspaper, the Scots Independent, proclaimed in July 1979:

Throughout history this reluctance to accept the very principle of leadership has handicapped

Scotland. Today it is nowhere more apparent than in the SNP. Anxious to maintain the basic principle of equality, eager to avoid the cult of the personality, determined to put no-one on a pedestal, we have surrounded our potential leaders with so many fellow-leaders that we have constantly presented the electorate with that confusing SNP party game "Spot the leader". ...

We are not urging the appointment of a Fuhrer; but we do say that in getting over the message of an independent Scotland to the people who can make it possible we need to have a face, a voice, a personality which will be associated with that message.

Many will be horrified by that suggestion. To them we have a simple answer. Show us the nation that has gained independence by committee.⁶¹

However, the diffusion of leadership roles persisted in the SNP after 1979, despite the election of one of the MPs, Gordon Wilson, as party Chairman. With the exception of his handling of the polarization of factional conflict at the Ayr Conference (see Chapter Fifteen), Mr. Wilson continued the low-key management style of his predecessor, William Wolfe.

The Distribution of Power: An Overview

As Ian McAllister has observed, "the structure of the SNP fails to fall easily into the cadre/mass party schema."⁶² Although the formal structure of SNP organization is similar to that of a typical branch-based party and the mass membership is constitutionally empowered to set party policy through the National Conference, unlike most mass parties the organization of the SNP is highly decentralized. However, unlike the conventional cadre or caucus-based party, the extra-parliamentary party is clearly much more than a support

organization designed to secure the (re-)election of a parliamentary elite.

The SNP is, in many respects, a *branch-centric* organization. The branch is the locus of membership and is the centre of activity, both political and social, for most party members. The branches also control the purse strings of the party, both directly through their role as chief fund raisers and indirectly through the number of delegates they send to Annual Conference and National Council, which are the only bodies empowered to change the financial structure. Moreover, through their delegates to constituency and regional associations, branches are also influential in the nomination of candidates for national and local elections.

The national organs of the SNP appear relatively weak in comparison. Party headquarters, where the party's only full-time workers are employed,⁶³ has been persistently underfunded and, although its staff grew in the 1970s, financial conditions necessitated staff cuts and other economies after the 1979 election. Leadership functions are widely dispersed among the various elected office-holders, policy spokespersons and other senior members, and conflict between the NEC and the parliamentary group further diffused power and authority at the centre between 1974 and 1979. Moreover, both SNP ideology and historical experience (a legacy of the MacCormick era) tend to militate against strong central control or leadership

and in favour of decentralization and grass-roots participation.

According to Richard Mansbach, in the 1960s local autonomy was encouraged further by the lack of effective communication between the various organizational levels:

Vertical communication within the party was sporadic at best. Local leaders declared that rarely was there any contact between their organizations and headquarters By and large ... branch leaders were left to their own devices and felt a certain detachment from events taking place in the central organs of the party."

While Mullin, for example, disagrees with Mansbach on this point, our interviews with both headquarters staff and local branch activists largely confirm the often poor standard of communication between the two levels (and horizontally among branches or constituency associations) and the disinterest, sometimes even antipathy, of many branch workers toward central organs of the party."

The organization of the SNP, therefore, is highly decentralized, with power widely dispersed among or within the different levels of the party. There are centres of power or influence in the branches, the constituencies, the NEC, and the parliamentary party; moreover, considerable influence may be wielded independently by certain individuals, irrespective of their formal positions in the party, by virtue of their experience or association with past glories. So what kind of

party organization is this, if it does not fit conventional models?

According to Mansbach, the SNP is "fundamentally *polyarchical* in organization, as opposed to hierarchical, pyramidal or egalitarian",¹⁰ but in our view this term is too closely allied to the pluralist model which suggests that competition for power occurs among competing elites at the same level of an organization. Thus, we would argue that a more appropriate label for the structure of power relations in the SNP is the term "*stratarchy*", defined by Samuel Eldersveld as a model of organization in which,

although authority to speak for the organization may remain in the hands of the top elite nucleus, there is great autonomy in operations at the lower "strata" or echelons of the hierarchy and ... control from the top is minimal and formal.¹¹

Although the concept of stratarchy was developed initially to describe the decentralized local caucus structures of American political parties, it is equally applicable to parties based on the principles of branch/mass organization which, like the SNP, have managed to resist the imperatives of Michels' "Iron Law of Oligarchy". Hence, while the national leadership of the SNP (whether MPs or N.C. members) is vested with the authority to speak for the organization and attempts to co-ordinate the activities of the party, the lower strata (the branches and constituency associations) nonetheless retain a considerable degree of autonomy in financial and electioneering operations. And this decentralization or

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diffusion of power, we argue, makes parties such as the SNP particularly vulnerable to the emergence of sub-party factionalism.

CONCLUSIONS

The formal structure of the Scottish Nationalist Party is similar to that of a typical mass/branch party. Branches and constituency associations at the local level elect delegates to national deliberative and decision-making bodies; the party conference, representative of the mass membership, is the supreme policy-making organ of the party; and other national bodies such as the National Council and the NEC are responsible for the direction and administration of the party between conferences. Moreover, the parliamentary group is *formally* subordinate and responsible to the will of the mass party expressed through conference and its representatives on the NEC.

However, the true structure of power relations inside the SNP departs from the conventional mass/branch model in a number of significant ways. The branches effectively control the finances of the party (and keep the centre starved of funds!), the nomination of election candidates is largely a local affair, as is the conduct of election campaigns. The degree of organizational and financial decentralization makes it difficult for "the centre" to influence or control the local units; and, in any case, in the 1970s, the centre was

itself divided by a power struggle between the NEC and the parliamentary group of MPs.

Thus, in defiance of Michel's "Iron Law of Oligarchy", power in the SNP has not been centralized in the hands of either party bureaucrats and the NEC or the leaders of the parliamentary party. Although there were tendencies towards oligarchy in the days of MacCormick and in the 1950s when the party was very small, the growth of the SNP in the 1960s and '70s has resulted in the creation of a "stratarchic" form of organization in which power and influence are widely dispersed. It was precisely this dispersion or decentralization of power which, as we shall argue in later chapters, reduced the costs and provided multiple access points for the mobilization of organized collective Voice in the sub-party conflict which emerged in the SNP after 1979.

NOTES - CHAPTER EIGHT

1. Bernard Hennessy, "On the Study of Party Organization" in William J. Crotty, ed., Approaches to the Study of Party Organization (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1968), p. 12.
2. Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organisation and Activity in the Modern State, translated by Barbara and Robert North, third edition (London: Methuen, 1964), pp. 4-60.
3. ibid., pp. xxiv-xxxvii and 63-70.
4. ibid., p. 24.
5. The term is derived from Duverger although he did not use the precise form of words. Duverger refers only to "contagion" or "contagious organisation"; see Political Parties, p. 25.
6. ibid.
7. Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy, first published 1911 (New York: The Free Press, 1962).
8. R.T. McKenzie, British Political Parties: The Distribution of Power Within the Conservative and Labour Parties (London: William Heinemann, 1955), especially Chapter 10.
9. ibid., pp. 582, 590.
10. There are, however, some "constituency branches", discussed further under "constituency associations", below.

11. Where fewer than twenty members are located in a particular area not served by a branch, they may be recognised as a party group. Groups perform many of the functions of branches and are entitled to representation at meetings of constituency and district associations, but not at National Conference or National Council.
12. Our estimate of an average branch membership of between 50 and 60, is based on membership figures for 38 branches (about one-tenth of all branches) reported by branch or constituency officials in the constituencies of Edinburgh East, East Kilbride, Edinburgh Pentlands, Dunbartonshire East, Galloway, Glasgow Hillhead Constituency Branch and West Lothian.
13. Interview with Allan McKinney, SNP National Organiser, March 1982.
14. Richard W. Mansbach, "The Scottish National Party: A Revised Political Profile", Comparative Politics, vol. 5, no. 2, 1973, Table 2, p. 192.
15. A small number of SNP members are affiliated to Headquarters Branch. They are largely members residing outside Scotland or living in one of the few areas where no local branch exists.
16. See Chapter Six.
17. Interviews with SNP activists, March/April 1982 and May/June 1983.
18. Inside the SNP (Edinburgh: Scottish National Party, mimeo, n.d.), p. 2. This booklet, produced by the party's Director of Internal Training was a valuable source for our discussion of SNP organization.
19. In 1981-82 the two largest constituency associations in terms of affiliated branches were Kinross & West Perthshire with 16 and Midlothian with 15.
20. Inside the SNP, p. 13.

21. Report from the National Secretary to the 47th Annual National Conference of the Scottish National Party, Aberdeen, May 1981.
22. On the role of industrial organisers, see Jack Brand, The National Movement in Scotland (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), pp. 285-287.
23. Constitution and Rules of the Scottish National Party (Edinburgh: Scottish National Party, n.d.), Article 14(a), p. 3.
24. Inside the SNP, p. 7.
25. Constitution and Rules, Article 15(a), p. 4.
26. Mansbach, "The Scottish National Party: A Revised Political Profile", p. 205.
27. Brand, The National Movement in Scotland, p. 275.
28. Wolfe, Scotland Lives, p. 77.
29. As a further economy measure, the SNP also rented out one floor of its two-story headquarters building; see Report from the Executive Vice-Chairman for Administration to the 45th Annual Conference, Dundee, September 1979. However, it should be noted that the staff cuts of 1979 were also subject to other interpretations - see Chapter Ten.
30. Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 93-95.
31. Inside the SNP, p. 10.
32. Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, British Political Finance, 1830-1980 (Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981), p. 2.

33. Mansbach, "The Scottish National Party: A Revised Political Profile", p. 207.
34. ibid.
35. Report from the Executive Vice-Chairman for Administration, 1979, op.cit.
36. Brand, The National Movement in Scotland, p. 283.
37. Constitution and Rules, Article 55, p. 11.
38. Report by the Party Secretary on Annual Conference 1980 - Outcome of Business on the Agenda (SNP Headquarters, June 1980), and correspondence in Scots Independent, no. 1010, August 1980, pp. 6-7.
39. Report from the Executive Vice-Chairman for Organisation to the 45th Annual National Conference, Dundee, September 1979.
40. Brand, The National Movement in Scotland, p. 271.
41. A.J.C. Kerr, Correspondence, Scots Independent, no. 104, November 1979, p. 7. However, some SNP members who advocate nomination meetings open to all party members might reconsider were they to witness the conflict and embitterment that frequently results from this process in, for example, the Liberal Party of Canada.
42. Interviews with local activists, May-June 1983.
43. A.J.C. Kerr, Correspondence, Scots Independent, no. 99, June 1979, p. 6.
44. Interview, April 1982.
45. W.A. Roger Mullin, "The Scottish National Party" in H.M. Drucker, ed., Multi-Party Britain (London: Macmillan, 1979), p. 130.

46. Mark V. Kauppi, "The decline of the Scottish National Party, 1977-81: political and organizational factors", Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 5, no. 3, 1982, p. 333.
47. Alan McKinney, SNP National Organiser, Interview, March 1982.
48. ibid.
49. Indeed, it may be argued that powerful leaders, vested with centralized control and authority, are alien to the cultural tradition of Scots in general, or at least to the presbyterian tradition reflected in the organization of the Church of Scotland and other Protestant denominations.
50. See Anthony Fusaro, "Two Faces of British Nationalism: The Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru Compared", Polity, vol. 11, no. 3, 1979, p. 377 ff. While it is true that the Nationalist MPs did behave cohesively for the first four years of the 1974-79 Parliament, for the last six months or so two of their number had virtually ceased taking the party whip - Interviews, March-April 1982.
51. Kauppi, "The decline of the Scottish National Party, 1977-81", p. 332.
52. William Wolfe, Interview, April 1982.
53. Roger Levy, "The Search for a Rational Strategy: the Scottish National Party and Devolution 1974-79", Political Studies, vol. 34, no. 2, 1986, p. 247.
54. Interviews, March-April 1982 and May-June 1983.
55. ibid. See also Kauppi, "The decline of the Scottish National Party 1977-81", p. 332.

56. Interviews, March-April 1982.
57. Mullin, "The Scottish National Party", p. 129.
58. Fusaro, "Two Faces of British Nationalism", pp. -383; SNP Parliamentary Group, Record of the Vote, mimeo, April 1979. The voting record of SNP MPs is discussed in more detail in Chapter Ten, below.
59. Interviews March-April 1982.
60. William Wolfe, Interview, April 1982.
61. "The Way Ahead", Scots Independent, no. 100, July 1979, p. 3.
62. Ian McAllister, "Party Organization and Minority Nationalism: A Comparative Study in the United Kingdom", European Journal of Political Research, vol. 9, no. 3, 1981, p. 243.
63. Between 1974 and 1979, there were enough Nationalist MPs to qualify for Treasury subventions for recognised parliamentary parties and the parliamentary group could therefore afford to hire its own research staff. These, too, were lost after the 1979 election.
64. Mansbach, "The Scottish National Party: A Revised Political Profile", p. 207.
65. Mullin, "The Scottish National Party", pp. 115-116; Interviews, March-April 1982, May-June 1983. The difference between Mullin's conclusions and our own may be partly attributable to time, in that both the size of HQ staff/resources and the internal politics of the SNP had changed significantly between 1979 (his article was published in 1980) and 1982-83.
66. Mansbach, "The Scottish National Party: A Revised Political Profile", p. 201. (Emphasis in original.)

67. Samuel J. Eldersveld, Political Parties: A Behavioural Analysis (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1964), pp. 99-100.

Chapter Nine

"WHO ARE THE SCOTNATS?":

THE ACTIVIST COMPONENT OF THE SNP

In this chapter, the last in Part Two of the study, we complete the process of establishing the context for the emergence of organized collective Voice within the Scottish National Party by examining the party's activist component. In Chapter Three, it was suggested that the potential for sub-party factionalism increases with the degree of heterogeneity in the backgrounds and attitudes of party members or activists, especially where distinct groups such as new generations of activists or the influx of members from pre-existing parties provide a basis for mobilization. Therefore, as a prelude to the analysis of responses by different groups within the party to the conditions which gave rise to factional conflict, in this chapter we identify some of the characteristics of SNP activists in general.

The chapter begins with a discussion of the study of party activists and a rationale for focusing on the activist component rather than the wider membership of the party. This is followed by a brief description of the SNP Activists Survey

which provided much of the raw material for our analysis in this chapter. In subsequent sections, we explore the socio-economic backgrounds of Nationalist activists (e.g., age, occupation, education), their political backgrounds (e.g., when they joined/became active in the SNP, previous membership of other parties), and some of their political attitudes and values. Our primary focus throughout this chapter, however, is on the extent to which the activist component of the SNP had changed in the years leading up to the emergence of organized collective Voice.

THE STUDY OF PARTY ACTIVISTS

Our focus in this chapter is on SNP activists - broadly conceived to include both the footsoldiers of the party, those who "devote their time and energy to its advancement", and the "visible leaders", the candidates, office-holders and party spokespersons.¹ Given the stratarchic nature of the SNP organization (see Chapter Eight) and the democratic, egalitarian values that prevail within it, everyone who in other parties might be viewed as a leader, a member of the elite, is also an activist, a worker for the cause, while local activists in branches and constituency associations can often wield considerable influence in various facets of party life. Thus, while much of our analysis in the following sections will categorize activists according to the level of

activity, in general we consider all those who give time and effort to party affairs to be activists.

However, we focus on activists rather than the wider membership of the party for four main reasons. The first is the purely pragmatic consideration that activists are more readily accessible to the researcher, especially for the purposes of survey analysis. In a party organization as decentralized as that of the SNP, central membership records are incomplete at best, but the party does have full and up-to-date listings of those who are active in its deliberative and decision-making bodies and of those who hold office at various levels within the organization.

Second, membership alone in the SNP requires relatively little commitment to the party or its objectives. A member of the Scottish National Party is anyone who has paid the required annual membership fee to, and has been accepted by, a branch of the organization (and has not subsequently been expelled from the party). A prospective member must endorse the basic aims of the party ("self government" and "the furtherance of all Scottish interests"), agree to abide by its policy, accept its Constitution and Rules, be a permanent resident of Scotland over the age of sixteen (younger supporters may become associate members) and must not be a member of any other political party.⁷ These are not particularly stringent qualifications, nor is membership expensive (annual dues in 1982 were £5). There is no

intimidating rite of initiation. Hence, the costs of becoming a member of the SNP are small.

This is not to argue that members are unimportant to the party, especially given its financial dependence on membership fees as a source of income. Moreover, as we noted in Chapter Six, in the 1960s the party set great store by the growth of its membership as an indicator of the vitality of the organization. But even then, as now, the recruitment of activists was deemed more important by some SNP leaders than the maximization of "paper" membership; as William Wolfe has argued, membership dues were then, and have remained, so low that

their payment did not really make people active propagandists for self-government. ... We were more concerned with the recruitment of people who were prepared to work, rather than with building up a huge list of members who were mostly inactive.'

Therefore, especially in a party which does not generally receive a lot of media coverage, whose leaders are not "charismatic" figures, and whose electoral fortunes have often been linked to its ability to mount "razzamatazz" campaigns, activists - rather than passive members - may be seen as a crucial ingredient for success.

Third, as Paul Whiteley has argued in relation to the Labour Party, activists have four important roles to play in a political party.⁴ They are involved in political recruitment, in particular, in the selection of parliamentary candidates, a role which is important because, if the

activists are not representative of the party's broader membership or its electorate, they will tend to select candidates who are equally unrepresentative of these voters. They are involved in a policy-making role in that, in parties where policy is decided by annual conference, party activists *qua* delegates can define the agenda of policy debate. They have a significant role to play in elections, positively because they are responsible for mobilizing the vote and negatively because the party's electoral credibility may be damaged by visible in-fighting within the activist ranks. And party activists have a key role to play in political education by transmitting and initiating discussion of political ideas in the workplace and in local communities. All party activists in other words, not just parliamentary candidates and national office-bearers, have an important influence on both the internal life of the party and the image it projects into the wider electoral marketplace.

Finally, given our primary concern in this study with the conditions which give rise to the expression of Voice, we may expect that, because of their level of involvement with the party and the time and energy they devote to it, activists are likely to be the more "quality-conscious" customers/members of the organization. Hence they, rather than inactive members, will generally be the first to notice, and to seek solutions to, a perceived decline in organizational performance. Moreover, because of the

importance of the roles performed by activists within the organization, it may also be expected that (*ceteris paribus*) party leaders will generally be more concerned to alleviate their dissatisfaction than that expressed through Exit and/or Voice by inactive members.

For all these reasons, our focus here is on the activist component of the party membership rather than the membership as a whole. But this having been said, what do we want to know about SNP activists? In general terms, the study of party activists is concerned with three main questions - 'who are they?', 'why do they become involved?' and 'what do they do?'.⁵ The first question is directed at the socio-economic backgrounds of party activists and the extent to which they are representative of the wider membership or the traditional electorate of the party.⁶ The second attempts to ascertain the motivations for party activism; here, much of the North American literature in particular has drawn upon James Q. Wilson's differentiation of "purposive", "material" and "solidary" motivations for membership or activity in an organization.⁷ The third question, 'what do activists do?', obviously examines the roles played by activists in their respective organizations; but it is often tied to a further question, 'what do activists believe?', inasmuch as the ideological values or belief systems of activists will frequently shape the way they perform tasks associated with

policy-making, candidate selection, election campaigning and so on.'

In subsequent sections of this chapter, we shall examine the socio-economic backgrounds of SNP activists, their political backgrounds, including an attempt to discern motivations for joining the party, and certain of their values and attitudes. But first, we provide a brief introduction to the source of our data for these analyses.

The SNP Activists Survey

In April 1982, we mailed questionnaires from Edinburgh to 493 of the 498 members, or former members, of the Scottish National Party who collectively constituted the sample for our SNP Activists Survey (the five omissions were all former parliamentary candidates who were no longer active in the party and whose current addresses could not be traced).

Our original mailing list included all national office-bearers and other members of the National Executive Committee, the 30 members of National Council elected by Conference, the convenors of the policy committees of the National Assembly, Nationalist MPs and other individuals who could be classified as "national leaders" of the party or its affiliated organizations. It also included all SNP parliamentary candidates from both 1974 elections, the 1979 general election, plus candidates in parliamentary by-elections (1978-82), the 1979 election to the European Parliament, and all

approved or prospective candidates selected before April 1, 1982. (N.B. - a sizeable number of individuals fell into two or more of these categories.) To represent the local units of the party, we selected two officer/activists from each constituency association, the branch secretaries or other activists from two branches in each constituency (only one each for the ten in which the constituency and branch organizations are fused), and all district and regional councillors then sitting for the SNP. Full details of sample selection procedures, where relevant, are given in Appendix A.

The questionnaire consisted of 50 primary questions (some with multiple parts) and 12 follow-up questions. These questions were divided into six major groups, as follows:

- a) demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the respondent;
- b) past and present political activity (for other parties as well as the SNP);
- c) attitudes toward other parties and the nature of party competition in Scotland;
- d) attitudes toward Scotland and its relationship to the United Kingdom;
- e) attitudes toward and perceptions of political events (especially the devolution referendum and the 1979 election); and
- f) considerations on future strategy and prospects for the SNP and the Nationalist cause.

Also included in the questionnaire at various points were questions which we suspected (quite rightly in some cases)

would be of a particularly sensitive nature to certain activists. These dealt with class, ideology, internal party democracy and the apportionment of blame for the electoral decline of the SNP. The construction of the questionnaire is discussed more fully in Appendix A and a copy is also appended.

Since we were aware of the problem that mail questionnaires usually elicit low response rates, we employed a number of techniques to maximize the size of the final data base (see Appendix A). Whether these techniques worked or, perhaps, we were fortunate enough to be dealing with a co-operative and politicized subject group, the response rate was 55.8 per cent - well above the rate usually expected of postal surveys. From our original sample of 498 (five of whom were never contacted), we received 278 usable responses (see Appendix A, Table A.1).

Of these 278, seven, all former parliamentary candidates had left the SNP and another six respondents declared themselves to be no longer active within the party although they were still members of it. Thus, while these thirteen responses will be used in later chapters of the thesis (especially in the case of those who explained why they left, or were no longer active in, the party), our analysis of SNP activists in this chapter draws upon the 265 responses from members who were still active in 1982.

In order to provide some basis for comparison among activists at various levels within the party organization, we have broken these 265 cases down into the following categories:

- I **National Leaders** - national office-bearers and members
of the NEC, MPs, elected members of National Council,
policy convenors and spokespersons, etc. (N = 26);
- II **National Candidates** - past (1974-82) and approved/
prospective candidates for parliamentary general and by-
elections and candidates for European
elections (N = 44);
- III **Councillors** - SNP members serving on regional and
district (local government) councils (N = 32);
- IV **Constituency Activists** - constituency organisers,
constituency association chairmen, other CA officials
and activists (N = 81);
- V **Branch Activists** - branch secretaries, chairmen,
delegates, or other activists (N = 82).

Where an individual respondent is qualified for two or more of these groups, he/she has usually been placed in the higher/highest appropriate category; hence, former or prospective parliamentary candidates who are also members of the National Executive Committee, for example, are assigned to the "National Leader" category. The major exception to this rule is in the distinction between constituency and branch activists; where individuals are involved at both levels, they have been assigned to the category at which most of their activities or responsibilities are carried out.

Table 9.1 shows the number and percentage of respondents in each category who are active in each region of Scotland

and, for the purposes of comparison, the percentage of SNP branches in each region. When compared with branch strength (or even with regional percentages of the electorate) some regions appear to be over- or under-represented within particular categories of respondents - but in some cases, this is merely a reflection of the fact that they were over- or under-represented in that category anyway.' For example, of the 60 people in the original sample who would be classified as "National Leaders", 19 or 31.7 per cent were active, and over one-third lived, in Lothian Region (the region around Edinburgh, which is the location of SNP headquarters) although that region possessed only 17 per cent of all SNP branches.

Overall, however, the percentage of respondents from each region approximated fairly closely the organizational strength of the party in that region, especially since the use of the amalgamated Constituency Branch in some parts of Glasgow may well lead to underestimation of SNP strength as measured by the numbers of branches in the Strathclyde Region.¹⁰

THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUNDS OF SNP ACTIVISTS

As we have noted already in our introductory chapter, few detailed analyses of SNP activists, or of the party membership in general, have been undertaken, we suspect because, in the late 1960s and early '70s when the Nationalists were increasingly successful at the polls, researchers were more concerned to find out who was voting for the SNP than who was

TABLE 9.1 - SNP ACTIVIST RESPONSES BY LEVEL AND REGION

Region Where Active	National Leaders		National Candidates		Councillors		Constituency Activists		Branch Activists		All Activists		(% SNP Branches)
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	
STRATHCLYDE	4	15.4	20	45.5	10	31.3	37	45.7	36	43.9	107	40.4	(32.7)
LOTHIAN	10	38.4	10	22.7	5	15.6	17	21.0	10	12.2	52	19.6	(17.1)
TAYSIDE	5	19.2	3	6.8	2	6.3	8	9.9	10	12.2	28	10.6	(11.7)
GRAMPIAN	3	11.5	3	6.8	4	12.5	5	6.2	11	13.4	26	9.8	(10.6)
FIFE	-	-	2	4.5	3	9.4	4	4.9	5	6.1	14	5.3	(7.0)
HIGHLAND	3	11.5	2	4.5	1	3.1	4	4.9	4	4.9	14	5.3	(7.0)
CENTRAL	1	3.8	2	4.5	6	18.8	2	2.5	3	3.7	14	5.3	(6.5)
DUMFRIES & GALLOWAY	-	-	1	2.3	1	3.1	3	3.7	1	1.2	6	2.3	(4.2)
BORDERS	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1.2	2	2.4	3	1.1	(2.1)
ORKNEY & SHETLAND)	-	-	1	2.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0.4	(0.5)
WESTERN ISLES	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	(0.5)
	<u>26</u>		<u>44</u>		<u>32</u>		<u>81</u>		<u>82</u>		<u>265</u>		

NB - Some percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

All respondents are categorized according to the region in which they are currently active.

SOURCE: SNP Activists Survey, Q. 10, and Table 8.1 (Branches)

a member of the party.¹¹ Some fairly impressionistic conclusions were formulated about the party membership based on inferences drawn from its voters or its candidates for local and national elections,¹² but these were inevitably somewhat misleading.

Even those authors who have undertaken interviews or surveys of Nationalist activists have tended to focus on one particular level of activity within the party. John Schwarz, for example, interviewed 40 "local leaders" (constituency association chairmen or secretaries) for his analysis of the non-violent nature of Scottish nationalism in the late 1960s.¹³ Sherri Grasmuck also interviewed or surveyed largely constituency activists (51 National Assembly delegates) for her doctoral research in 1976-77.¹⁴ And, while Richard Mansbach reported no socio-economic data on the local leaders and branch activists interviewed for his study of SNP organization, he did cite some statistics and a few impressionistic observations for candidates competing for high party office in the late 1960s.¹⁵ Nonetheless, despite the more limited scope of these studies, they may provide some bases for comparison with our survey of a later generation of activists.

With respect to socio-economic background, earlier studies have characterized SNP activists as being relatively young, predominantly male, well-educated and employed largely

in professional, administrative or other white-collar occupations. For example, Grasmuck concluded that

The profile which emerges of the SNP activist is that of a young male in his early thirties, occupying a non-manual, rather prestigious position, probably in the professional or scientific sector of the economy. ... Though he is well placed in the occupational hierarchy, he does not share in the ownership of his place of employment. ... He is highly educated.¹⁶

In the following pages, we examine the extent to which Grasmuck's profile of National Assembly delegates in the 1970s and other earlier findings or impressions are true of the socio-economic backgrounds of SNP activists in the 1980s.

Gender

Grasmuck's finding that National Assembly delegates were predominantly (88.5 per cent) male is true of most other levels of activity in the SNP. For example, of the twenty-six respondents to our survey in the "National Leader" category, only five (19.2 per cent) were women (See Table 9.2): by way of comparison, women contributed 16.7 per cent (N = 10) of the 60 "National Leaders" on our original mailing list. Similar comparisons can be made for the percentages of women in the "National Candidates" category (4.5 per cent of respondents¹⁷, 8.6 per cent of those on the mailing list), among regional and district councillors (9.4 per cent, 11.3 per cent), constituency activists (17.3 per cent, 15.3 per cent) and branch activists (37.8 per cent, 45.4 per cent).

TABLE 9.2 - WOMEN ACTIVISTS IN THE SNP, BY LEVEL

	National Leaders	National Candidates	Councillors	Constit. Activists	Branch Activists	All Activists
N. of Women	5	2	3	14	31	55
% of Women	19.2	4.5	9.4	17.3	37.8	20.8
(N)	(26)	(44)	(32)	(81)	(82)	(265)

Source: SNP Activists Survey, Q. 3.

In sum, women constitute 20.8 per cent of our active respondents and 21.5 per cent of our original sample, suggesting that there may be a slight gender effect in response rates, although this works in different directions at different levels of the party organization.

Overall, therefore, women make up about one-fifth of active respondents to the survey. Although they have made some advance at the constituency level since Grasmuck's study, they are most likely to be active or hold official positions at the branch level and, even there, women are often confined to the "traditional female" role of Branch Secretary." Nevertheless, it should be noted that a number of women have been extremely influential within the SNP and some, such as Margaret Bain, Winifred Ewing and Margo MacDonald, have risen to "leadership" positions within the party.

Age Distribution

Several authors have commented on the relative youth of Nationalist activists. Schwarz, for example, found that 57 per cent of the local SNP leaders in his sample were below 37 years of age, compared with 21 per cent of Conservative and Labour constituency activists interviewed at the same time." In Mansbach's informal survey of candidates for high party office in the late 1960s, over 50 per cent were under forty," while 44 per cent of Grasmuck's sample of delegates were younger than 35.

Our findings with respect to the age of Nationalist activists suggest that, if these previous samples were indeed representative of the wider party, then the SNP is aging collectively as an organization (see Table 9.3). In comparison with Schwarz's data, for example, only 43.8 per cent of our constituency activists and 33.2 per cent of all active respondents were under 37."

Not surprisingly, perhaps, the mean/median ages of branch and constituency activists are lower than those of the "National" categories and the elected councillors. The SNP is clearly recruiting some young activists at the grass roots, and electing a few of them to high party office, but perhaps not fast enough to counterbalance the aging process of those already in the party nor to offset the influx into the party of many older new members since the election successes of 1974 - of 94 active respondents who reported joining the party between 1974 and 1982, 51 (or 54.3 per cent) were aged 35 years or older in 1982. However, as we shall seek to demonstrate later, there were among the younger generation of party activists (including some of the new recruits) many who did not share the belief-system of the more senior members of the party.

Education

As Table 9.4 suggests, SNP activists, especially among the "National" categories, are still highly educated.

TABLE 9.3 - AGE DISTRIBUTION OF SNP ACTIVISTS, BY LEVEL

Age Group	National Leaders		National Candidates		Councillors		Constit. Activists		Branch Activists		All Activists	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
65 and over	2	7.7	1	2.3	6*	19.4	2	2.5	8+	9.9	19	7.3
55-64	4	15.4	4	9.1	4	12.9	7	8.3	10	12.3	29	11.1
45-54	5	19.2	17	38.6	8	25.8	19	23.8	11	13.6	60	22.9
35-44	9	34.6	17	38.6	9	29.0	25	31.3	21	25.9	81	30.9
25-34	5	19.2	5	11.4	4	12.9	21	26.3	25	30.9	60	22.9
Under 25	1	3.8	-	-	-	-	6	7.5	6	7.4	13	5.0
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
(Missing)	-	-	-	-	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(3)	(3)
Mean	44.3		45.3		48.5		40.1		41.7		42.9	
Median	44		44.5		47		38		40		42	

* Includes one retired male coded as nominal '65'

+ Includes two retired males coded as nominal '65'

NB - percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding

SOURCE: SNP Activists Survey, v. 2.

Grasmuck's study of National Assembly delegates found that 65 per cent had at least some post-secondary education (more than twelve years of school) and that 43 per cent had gone beyond a first university degree. While there are fewer former postgraduates among our respondents as a whole, again 65 per cent have undergone some form of post-secondary education. University graduates constitute over 60 per cent of both the "National Leaders" and the "National Candidates", a characteristic which has sometimes been criticised by rank-and-file members who would like to see parliamentary candidates more representative of the electorate."

But even among constituency and branch activists, approximately 30 per cent of respondents have attended university, compared with an estimated seven per cent of the adult population in Scotland. The elected councillors, however, are the odd category in our sample (as they are on a number of other variables), with a far smaller percentage of university, or even college, educated respondents than in any other group.

In general, therefore, Nationalist activists appear to be much more highly educated than the Scottish electorate, although it must be acknowledged that the use of a lengthy questionnaire administered by mail as our survey instrument may have biased response rates somewhat in favour of those with higher levels of education.

TABLE 9.4 - EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUNDS OF SNP ACTIVISTS, BY LEVEL

Highest Education Institution Attended	National Leaders		National Candidates		Councillors		Constit. Activists		Branch Activists		All Activists	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
(University, Postgraduate)	(11)	(42.3)	(15)	(34.1)	(1)	(3.1)	(5)	(6.2)	(13)	(15.9)	(45)	(17.0)
(University, Undergraduate)	(7)	(26.9)	(13)	(29.5)	(5)	(15.6)	(18)	(22.2)	(13)	(15.9)	(56)	(21.1)
All University	18	69.2	28	63.6	6	18.8	23	28.4	26	31.7	101	38.1
Polytechnic/ ¹ College	6	23.1	10	22.7	6	18.8	28	34.6	23	28.0	73	27.5
Secondary Institutions ²	2	7.7	6	13.6	19	59.4	28	34.6	31	37.8	86	32.5
Primary/Elementary	-	-	-	-	1	3.1	2	1.5	2	1.4	5	1.9
	26		44		32		81		82		265	

NB - percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding

¹ Includes full-time attendance at College of Education, Art College, College of Technology, etc.

² Includes Grammar/High Schools, Secondary, Comprehensive, public and other fee-paying schools.

SOURCE: SNP Activists Survey, Q. 4.

Occupation

In the 1960s, studies of the occupational backgrounds of SNP parliamentary candidates and candidates for party office concluded that most Nationalist activists held secure economic and social positions. There were few of the small farmers, shopkeepers and self-employed persons who had given support to the *Poujadistes* in France, for example. Rather, school-teachers formed the leading occupational group, while other professionals such as doctors and lawyers were also well-represented, along with a few businessmen." Grasmuck also reported that SNP activists in the 1970s were well-located in the economy. Nearly 70 per cent of her sample came from the five "most prestigious" job categories, and again the largest single group (29 per cent) consisted of members of the education and welfare professions."

In the early 1980s, as Table 9.5 illustrates, SNP activists were still concentrated largely in the managerial, professional and administrative sectors of the job market. Professional employees formed by far the largest single occupational group, comprising over one-third of all active respondents to our Survey and more than half of the "National Leader" and "National Candidate" categories. Of the 86 professional employees who indicated their specific jobs, 47 (or 54.7 per cent) were teachers or lecturers, with scientific employees, civil servants, "business" professionals (accoun-

TABLE 9.5 - SNP ACTIVISTS BY LEVEL AND OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY

Occupational Category	National Leaders N	National Leaders %	National Candidates N	National Candidates %	Councillors N	Councillors %	Constit. Activists N	Constit. Activists %	Branch Activists N	Branch Activists %	All Activists N	All Activists %
Employers & Company Directors	3	11.5	3	6.8	3	13.3	2	2.5	2	2.6	14	5.4
Managers & Executives	1	3.8	5	11.4	3	10.0	6	7.6	2	2.6	17	6.6
Self-Employed Professionals	3	11.5	6	13.6	-	-	2	2.5	3	3.8	14	5.4
Other Self-Employed & Small Business	-	-	1	2.3	4	13.3	4	5.1	4	5.1	13	5.1
Professional Employees	15	57.7	23	52.3	5	16.7	27	34.2	26	33.3	96	37.4
Supervisory Employees	-	-	2	4.5	5	16.7	10	12.7	7	9.0	24	9.3
Clerical & White-Collar	-	-	-	-	2	6.7	8	10.1	13	16.7	23	8.9
Manual Workers	-	-	4	9.1	2	6.7	13	16.5	7	9.0	26	10.1
Full-time Politicians	1	3.8	-	-	3	10.0	-	-	-	-	4	1.5
Students	3	11.5	-	-	-	-	3	3.8	3	3.8	9	3.5
Homemakers	-	-	-	-	2	6.7	4	5.1	11	14.1	17	6.6
	26		44		30		79		78		257	
(Missing) ¹	-	-	-	-	(2)		(2)		(4)		(8) ¹	

Note: ¹Whenever possible retired or unemployed respondents have been categorized according to their previous/usual occupation. Five unemployed and three retired respondents could not be classified and are assigned as "missing" cases in this table.

NB - percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding

SOURCE: SNP Activists Survey, QQ. 5 and 6.

tants, personnel managers, etc.), journalists and the medical professions making up most of the remainder.

There were still relatively few employers, self-employed individuals (excluding professionals) or small business proprietors among the activists, and manual and white-collar employees were concentrated largely in the local (constituency and branch) levels. Activists in the SNP, in other words, tend to be drawn largely from the professional, administrative and supervisory ranks, from jobs which are secure, carry some supervisory responsibilities, but are not involved directly in the ownership or strategic management of the enterprise. Once again, however, we should acknowledge that the method used to administer this survey may have produced some slight bias in response rates in favour of those occupations in which writing and form-filling are parts of the job. Hence, our data may underestimate the number of manual workers, for example, among SNP activists, although our own impressions, interviews with party members and the findings of previous studies would suggest that any such mis-estimation would be relatively small.

Socio-Economic Background: An Overview

Our analysis of the socio-economic backgrounds of SNP activists tends to confirm some of the general conclusions of earlier studies. They are predominantly male, although less overwhelmingly than Grasmuck suggests. The mean age of

activists is relatively young although the party appears to be aging collectively, perhaps due to its failure to mobilize or retain a sufficient number of young members. Activists are generally more highly educated than the wider population and they are also drawn disproportionately from professional and administrative/supervisory occupations, but again these tendencies are less extreme than some earlier studies have suggested.

Some of these differences may be attributable to the broader scope of our survey which includes branch activists, for example, as well as more "elite" groups such as parliamentary candidates and office-holders. However, it may also be argued that the activist component of the SNP has become more heterogeneous as a result of the more diverse backgrounds of those attracted to the party after its electoral success in 1974. For example, in Table 9.6 we present the occupational backgrounds of SNP activists divided into those who joined the party before 1974 and those who became members between 1974 and 1982. Although professional employees are still the largest single group in the post-1974 cohort, this sub-sample also includes significantly higher percentages of manual workers and clerical/white-collar employees, but fewer employers, managers and self-employed or small business people. Likewise, there was a moderate, but statistically significant, shift in the educational attainment of the 1974-82 cohort which contained a higher percentage of

**TABLE 9.6 - SNP ACTIVISTS BY OCCUPATION AND
BY DATE OF JOINING THE PARTY**

Occupational Category	Joined SNP Before 1974		Joined SNP 1974-82		All Activists	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Employers & Company Directors	11	6.5	3	3.4	14	5.4
Managers & Executives	14	8.3	3	3.4	17	6.6
Self Employed Professionals	10	6.0	4	4.5	14	5.4
Other Self-Employed & Small Business	10	6.0	3	3.4	13	5.1
Professional Employees	67	39.9	29	32.6	96	37.4
Supervisory Employees	15	8.9	9	10.1	24	9.3
Clerical & White- Collar	12	7.1	11	12.4	23	8.9
Manual Workers	14	8.3	12	13.5	26	10.1
Full-time Politicians	3	1.8	1	1.1	4	1.5
Students	2	1.2	7	7.9	9	3.5
Homemakers	10	6.0	7	7.9	17	6.6
	<hr/> 168		<hr/> 89		<hr/> 257	
(Missing)	(3)		(5)		(8)	

NB - percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding

SOURCE: SNP Activists Survey, QQ 5, 6 and 13(b).

members with secondary-level education and a much lower proportion of postgraduates than the pre-1974 cohort of activists (see Table 9.7). The socio-economic characteristics of SNP activists have clearly changed over time.

THE POLITICAL BACKGROUNDS OF SNP ACTIVISTS

In the 1960s, the conventional wisdom on the political background of SNP activists was that they were "new men in politics, rather than converts from other parties."²⁵ Schwarz, for example, found that only ten per cent of the local SNP leaders that he interviewed had been members of other parties, while an additional seven per cent had actively supported other parties without being members. Moreover, forty per cent of his sample had been members of the SNP for less than three years (i.e., they had joined between 1965 and 1968) and less than one-third had been members of the party for more than five years. And among local government election candidates in the same period, only 8 per cent recalled any previous party-political activity and 62 per cent had been members of the SNP for three years or less.²⁶ Mansbach's interviews with branch leaders in the same period support the view that most SNP activists were new to politics but also pointed to the existence of some individuals with instrumental or careerist motivations who had been attracted to the SNP by its potential for electoral growth and personal political advancement.²⁷

**TABLE 9.7 - EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND OF SNP ACTIVISTS,
BY DATE OF JOINING THE PARTY**

Highest Educational Institution Attended	Joined SNP Before 1974		Joined SNP 1974-82		All Activists	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
(University Post-graduate)	(33)	(19.3)	(12)	(12.8)	(45)	(17.0)
(University, Under-graduate)	(36)	(21.1)	(20)	(21.3)	(56)	(21.1)
All University	69	40.4	32	34.0	101	38.1
Polytechnic/College	47	27.5	26	27.7	73	27.5
Secondary Institutions	51	29.8	35	37.2	86	32.5
Elementary/Primary	4	2.3	1	1.1	5	1.9
	171		94		265	

NB - percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding

SOURCE: SNP Activists Survey, QQ 4 and 13 (b).

Given the rapid growth of SNP membership in the late 1960s, it is perhaps not surprising that studies of activists at this time should show that many were relative newcomers to the party. By contrast, Grasmuck's survey of National Assembly delegates in the mid 1970s found that only about one-third of her sample had joined the party in the late 1960s, another one-third had joined the SNP since 1972 (i.e., in the five years before her study) and around 30 per cent had been members since before 1964. However, her study confirmed previous findings that most Nationalist activists were political novices when they joined the SNP. Thus, 82 per cent of her sample had never been a member of any other political party; of those who had, just over half had come from the Labour Party with the remainder divided equally between the Conservatives and Liberals.²⁸

In the following pages, we examine the activists of the early 1980s to discover how long they have been members of the SNP, their previous party affiliations if any, and the reasons that they gave for joining the party.

Length of Membership

As Table 9.8 illustrates, a majority of SNP activists responding to our survey joined the party in two waves corresponding to its periods of greatest electoral success, that is, between 1965 and 1969 (27.3 per cent) and between 1974 and 1978 (28 per cent). The first of these waves would

appear to confirm the findings of analysts in the late 1960s, who emphasized the number of new members among party activists at that time. The second consists of all those attracted to the SNP by its electoral successes of 1974 and the subsequent campaign for devolution. These were by no means all young people entering the electorate in this period; in fact, of the 74 activists who joined the party between 1974 and 1978, three quarters (N=55) were aged 23 or older when they became members.

There are relatively few "old-timers" among party activists in the 1980s. Less than 13 per cent of our respondents had been members of the party for longer than 20 years - i.e., they had joined the party before the West Lothian by-election of 1962. At the other extreme, approximately 8 per cent of the 1982 activists had joined the SNP in the last 3 1/2 years, that is, since the referendum and the election defeat of 1979, and again three-quarters of this newest cohort of activists were older than 23 when they joined the party.

Overall, more than one-third of our activist respondents had joined the SNP in the eight years prior to 1982. We shall argue later that this group of new activists helped to change the ideological composition of the party to the extent that it may be viewed as a contributing factor in the emergence of sub-party conflict within the SNP.

TABLE 9.8 - WHEN ACTIVISTS JOINED THE SNP, BY LEVEL

Member of SNP Since	National Leaders N %	National Candidates N %	Councillors N %	Constit. Activists N %	Branch Activists N %	All Activists N %
1979-82	1 3.8	2 4.5	2 6.5	4 4.9	11 13.4	20 7.6
1974-78	4 15.4	6 13.6	7 22.6	29 35.8	28 34.1	74 28.0
1970-73	5 19.2	5 11.3	5 16.1	15 18.5	13 15.9	43 16.3
1965-69	10 38.5	16 36.4	11 35.5	18 22.2	17 20.7	72 27.3
1960-64	- -	9 20.5	2 6.5	9 11.1	5 6.1	25 9.5
1950-59	3 11.5	5 11.3	3 9.7	4 4.9	5 6.1	20 7.6
1940-49	2 7.7	1 2.3	1 3.2	2 2.5	2 2.4	8 3.0
1928-39	1 3.8	- -	- -	- -	1 1.2	2 0.8
	—	—	—	—	—	—
	26	44	31	81	82	264
(Missing)	-	-	(1)			(1)

NB - percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding

SOURCE: SNP Activists Survey, Q. 13(b)

Previous Political Affiliation

In the 1960s and 1970s, studies of SNP activists indicated that most had been political novices when they first joined the party." Our data suggest that this was still the case in the early 1980s, in that over 80 per cent of respondents had been neither members of nor active workers for any other political party (see Table 9.9). Of those who had previously been involved in party politics (N=52), just over two-fifths had been members of or active on behalf of the Labour Party, one-quarter for the Conservatives, 15 per cent for the Liberals, and the remainder had been members of an assortment of other political parties in Britain or abroad. Overall, about 60 per cent of those with previous political experience had been active in "left-wing" parties (Communist, Labour and Social Democratic parties). But all of these details should not be allowed to overshadow the most important figure, the 80.4 per cent of respondents who reported no party activity prior to becoming members of the SNP.

Members and Motives

Why do individuals become members of organizations such as political parties? We noted earlier in this chapter the work of James Q. Wilson, who distinguished between "amateur" members who are motivated by purposive incentives, the pursuit of specific (policy) goals, and "professionals" who are more likely to be motivated by material incentives (personal gain)

TABLE 9.9 - PREVIOUS POLITICAL AFFILIATION OF SNP ACTIVISTS, BY LEVEL

Previously Member/Active in	National Leaders N	National Candidates N	Councillors N	Constit. Activists N	Branch Activists N	All Activists N						
Labour Party	3	11.5	6	13.6	4	12.5	2	2.5	6	7.3	21	7.9
Labour/SLP ¹	1	3.8	-	-	-	-	1	1.2	-	-	2	0.8
Conservative Party	3	11.5	2	4.5	-	-	3	3.7	5	6.1	13	4.9
Liberal Party	1	3.8	2	4.	2	6.3	1	1.2	2	2.4	8	3.0
Other British Parties ²	-	-	-	-	2	6.3	1	1.2	1	1.2	4	1.5
Overseas Parties ³	1	3.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	3.7	4	1.5
	9	34.6	10	22.7	8	25.0	8	9.9	17	20.7	52	19.6
None	17	65.4	34	77.3	24	75.0	73	90.1	65	79.3	213	80.4
	26	44	32	81	82	265						

Notes 1 Previously members of the (British) Labour Party and the Scottish Labour Party
2 2 Communist Party, 1 Independent Labour Party, 1 Revolutionary Socialist Party
3 2 New Democratic Party (Canada), 1 Australian Labor Party, 1 Rhodesian Front

NB - Some percentages may not add up to sub-totals due to rounding

SOURCE: SNP Activists Survey, Qs. 14 and 15.

or solidary (social) rewards."¹⁰ But one of our aims in this thesis is to discern why (dissatisfied) members resort to Voice rather than Exit from the party, a decision which will be influenced by their level of commitment (or Loyalty) to the organization; and Wilson's classification is not particularly informative in this regard.

For the purposes of our analysis, we consider more useful the distinction introduced in Chapter Four between "instrumental" and "affective" motivations for party membership, whereby primarily instrumental members join a party to pursue specific public (policy) goals or private (personal) advancement, while primarily affective members join the party which best represents or exemplifies a particular ideal. Affective members, we suggested, are likely to be more committed ("loyal") to the party organization than members who seek to use the party as an instrument (among competing alternatives) for the attainment of specific goals.

In the SNP Activists Survey, we asked respondents to indicate, in a fairly open-ended question, why they had become members of the SNP. Their answers were then coded and regrouped into a small number of categories (see Table 9.10).

Affective respondents include those who joined the party because they were brought up to support the SNP or because their parents, or other relatives, did (i.e., who joined the SNP as a consequence of family socialization) and those who expressed their motivations in terms of broad nationalism,

TABLE 9.10 - ACTIVISTS' MOTIVATIONS FOR JOINING THE SNP, BY LEVEL

Motivation Category	National Leaders N %	National Candidates N %	Councillors N %	Constit. Activists N %	Branch Activists N %	All Activists N %
Primarily Affective						
Socialization	(3) (11.5)	(6) (13.6)	(-) (-)	(9) (11.1)	(6) (7.4)	(24) (9.1)
Other Affect	(11) (42.3)	(8) (18.2)	(16) (50.0)	(33) (40.7)	(21) (25.9)	(89) (33.7)
All Affective	14 53.8	14 31.8	16 50.0	42 51.9	27 33.3	113 42.8
Primarily Instrumental	10 38.5	18 40.9	7 21.9	23 28.4	32 39.5	90 34.1
"No Special Reason/ Couldn't Say"	2 7.7	12 27.3	9 28.1	16 19.8	22 27.2	61 23.1
	26	44	32	81	81	264
(Missing)	-	-	-	-	(1)	(1)

NB - Percentages may not add up to sub-totals due to rounding

SOURCE: SNP Activists Survey, Q. 20.

idealism or basic principle. Examples of responses coded as affective motivations include:

- "Because of basic principle." (Respondent #55)
- "My reading of history." (#269)
- "Because I am Scottish." (#308)
- "I AM A SCOT!" (#352)
- "Injustice to Scotland from Westminster Parliament." (#543)
- "Because the Scottish people have a right to self-determination." (#564)

Instrumental motivations on the other hand are those which focus on achieving particular benefits for the individual or social group, whether these be in the form of collective goods (public policies) or personal rewards." Moreover, we have also labelled "instrumental" those respondents who cited disillusionment or dissatisfaction with another party (in which they were active or for which they usually voted) as their primary reason for joining the SNP, since their membership of the SNP has replaced affiliation with Labour or the Conservatives, for example, as the means (or instrument) by which they strive to attain individual or collective goals. Hence, examples of instrumental motivations from our respondents include:

- "I was looking for something to do." (Respondent #369)
- "Rising rate demands in the early '70s. Lack of community amenities. Disgust with the then Council" (#096)
- "Lack of central government support for Scottish heritage and environmental projects." (#007)
- "Disillusionment with the Labour Government of 1964/66" (#005)
- "Disillusionment with Labour Party on: 1) issue of land ownership in Scotland; 2) Nuclear weapons; 3) Home Rule." (#442)
- "Collapse of the Scottish Labour Party" (#211)

"In post-79 Scotland, only the SNP was left to advance the Scottish cause." (#151, who had already been an MP for two different parties)

Our third major category in Table 9.10 consists of those respondents who merely ticked the alternative offered them on the questionnaire that there was "No Special Reason" for their membership of the party. While the author acknowledges that this alternative perhaps provided a convenient escape route for respondents who were pressed for time, the proportion of answers in third category (23.1 per cent) was surprisingly large, especially since other respondents went to great lengths to explain "why" they were Nationalists."

However, among those who provided reasons for joining the party, around 56 per cent (42.8 per cent of all respondents) gave answers which we have categorized as primarily "affective" motivations. But, the balance between affective and instrumental members is by no means evenly distributed among the various levels of activity within the party. Affective motivations are clearly in the majority over instrumental orientations among Councillors and constituency activists (and to a lesser extent in the "National Leaders" category), while among branch activists and "National Candidates" instrumental members outnumber the affective. The simplest explanation for this pattern is that, if we assume that affective members are more committed to the party and hence less susceptible to the logic of collective action," they will be more willing to devote their time and energy to

the burdens of constituency activity, council work or the national organs of the party (in addition to branch activity in most cases) and will therefore be more heavily represented at these levels. Instrumental members, on the other hand, are more likely to appear at the branch level (where responsibilities are less time-consuming) and among parliamentary candidates for whom the prospect of electoral success may offer personal rewards.

However, the pattern of motivation for membership may also be changing over time (see Table 9.11). Among new members who had joined the party between 1979 and 1982, 65 per cent expressed instrumental motivations, compared with 25 per cent affective. There is also a slight majority for instrumental motivations over affective orientations among those activists who had joined the party between 1974 and 1978, but among those who had been members since before 1974 affective responses outnumber instrumental ones by almost 2 to 1. This may be indicative of a genuine change in patterns of recruitment into the activist ranks of the party, but the possibility should not be discounted that for members of longer standing the specific events or issues which initially motivated them as individuals to join the party are now less salient than the collective pursuit of independence or the expression of other, more general, nationalist aspirations.

**TABLE 9.11 - DATE OF JOINING THE SNP BY
MOTIVATION FOR MEMBERSHIP**

Motivation Category	Joined SNP 1979-82		Joined SNP 1974-78		Joined SNP Pre-1974		All Activists	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Primarily Affective	5	25.0	27	37.0	81	47.4	113	42.8
Primarily Instrumental	13	65.0	30	41.1	47	27.5	90	34.1
"No Special Reason/ Couldn't Say"	2	10.0	16	21.9	43	25.1	61	23.1
	20		73		171		264	
(Missing)	-		(1)		-		(1)	

SOURCE: SNP Activists Survey, Qs. 13(b) and 20.

Overview

In this section of the chapter we have examined the political backgrounds of SNP activists. We found that a majority of them, not surprisingly, became members of the party during the periods of Nationalist electoral or political ascendancy, i.e., in the late 1960s and the mid-1970s. Like earlier generations of Nationalists studied by other researchers, the great majority of our respondents reported no previous partisan activity prior to joining the SNP. Hence, we investigated why our respondents had been attracted to the party and found that the largest group of activists were motivated by what we have labelled "affective" orientations - in other words, they joined the party because it represented a principle or an ideal rather than a means to attain specific policy or personal goals. However, this may be changing over time since the proportion of respondents reporting instrumental motivations for party membership increases significantly in more recent cohorts.

THE IDEOLOGY OF SNP ACTIVISTS

In Chapter Seven, we described the main components of the collective ideology of the Scottish National Party as laid down by the party's constitution, election manifestos and policy documents. But to what extent do the attitudes and beliefs of individual activists correspond to the collective or formal world-view of the party?

In this section we examine the distribution of activists' responses to selected questions in the SNP Activists Survey which were designed to tap individual beliefs and attitudes on a number of dimensions of ideology, including attitudes towards class, activists' self-perceptions of their position on a left-right ideological scale, a "more objective" measure of individual ideological placement, and a measure of their degree of commitment to the SNP. Again, where possible, we will compare our findings with those of previous studies of SNP activists, but our primary concern is to examine the extent to which responses to our own survey suggest changes in the ideological composition of the activist component of the party in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

SNP Activists and Class

We suggested in Chapter Seven that the formal ideology of the SNP has tended to downplay the language of social class in favour of emphasizing the regional or "inter-nation" disparities between Scotland and England. Grasmuck's survey of National Assembly delegates in the mid-1970s found that a sizeable proportion (46.1 per cent) of SNP activists "disavowed any class identification: ...[they] ... described themselves as belonging to no class or at most to a 'Scottish class', or they denied the meaningfulness of the term 'class' altogether."³⁴ Approximately one-third of her subjects identified themselves as "middle-class" (or some variation

thereon, such as "professional" or "self-employed") but usually did so "with great reluctance", while the remainder (21.2 per cent) "described themselves unequivocally as members of the working class."³

In the SNP Activists Survey respondents were asked first if they generally thought of themselves as belonging to a particular social class, and if so, to which class. Approximately two-fifths of respondents indicated that they did generally think of themselves in class terms, and this proportion was fairly consistent across all levels of activity, with "National Candidates" appearing to be somewhat less class conscious than other activists and the Councillors somewhat more so (see Table 9.12). Those who did not generally think of themselves in class terms were then asked to which class they would assign themselves "if pressed to do so" and just under half of all activists were able to be pressed in this manner, although five indicated that they responded unwillingly or under protest.

In contrast to Grasmuck's findings, only 11.4 per cent of our respondents refused to indicate any form of class identification. Some merely ignored the question altogether or struck it out; some answered "No" to the first part of the question with respect to generally thinking of oneself in class terms and then left the "if pressed to do so" part unanswered or responded "Scottish class", "oppressed Scot",

TABLE 9.12 - ATTITUDES TO CLASS AMONG SNP ACTIVISTS, BY LEVEL

Attitude to Class	National Leaders N %	National Candidates N %	Councillors N %	Constit. Activists N %	Branch Activists N %	All Activists N %
Usually thinks of self in class terms	11 42.3	15 34.9	15 46.9	32 39.5	33 40.2	106 40.2
If pressed will express class identification	13 50.0	23 53.5	11 34.4	38 46.9	43 52.4	128 48.5
Rejects concept of class/ No Answer/ Refused	2 7.7	5 11.6	6 18.8	11 13.6	6 7.3	30 11.4
	26	43	32	81	82	264
(Missing)	-	(1)	-	-	-	(1)

N.B. - percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

SOURCE: SNP Activists Survey, Q. 8.

"human class" or "classless". Others, however, wrote additional comments to explain their positions, for example:

"I do not believe in class." (Respondents #257 and #564)

"Don't accept the 'class' concept at all. My folk were peasant and fisher working folk but proud as any aristo!" (#055)

"... these are British terms which we should ignore". (#216)

"... class specifications are an unnatural tag to place on any human and ... only serve to keep a people divided." (#276)

(If pressed to do so ...) "I should invite my interrogator to get lost!" (#391)

We should reiterate, however, that those who reject the concept of class altogether are a small minority of all activist respondents and that they are outnumbered, by almost 4 to 1, by those who do generally think in class terms. And this disparity appears to be growing. As Table 9.13 indicates, class consciousness is much higher among new activists than among members of longer standing; among activists who had joined the party after 1974, 52.1 per cent generally thought of themselves in class terms while only 7.4 per cent of new activists rejected the concept of class altogether.

Among those respondents who were willing to identify themselves as belonging to a particular social class (with or without being "pressed to do so"), a slight majority, 52.1 per cent, associated themselves with the working class, most of the others with the middle class and five identified themselves as members of the "professional", "academic" or "self-employed" class, responses which we have treated as

TABLE 9.13 - ATTITUDES TO CLASS BY DATE OF JOINING SNP

Attitude to Class	Joined SNP 1979-82		Joined SNP 1974-78		Joined SNP Pre-1974		All Activists	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Usually thinks of self in class terms	11	55.0	38	51.4	57	33.5	106	40.2
If pressed, will express class identification	7	35.0	31	41.9	90	52.9	128	48.5
Rejects concept of class/No Answer/Refused	2	10.0	5	6.8	23	13.5	30	11.4
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	20		74		170		264	
(Missing)	-		-		(1)		(1)	

NB - percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding

SOURCE: SNP Activists Survey, QQ. 8 and 13(b)

euphemisms for, and have included with, "middle class" (see Table 9.14). Despite the apparently middle-class bias in the occupational backgrounds of SNP activists, therefore, a sizeable proportion of our respondents identified themselves with the working class, and this proportion is larger still among new activists, with 51.4 per cent of those joining the party between 1974 and 1978 and 60 per cent of all those who became members after 1979 viewing themselves as members of the working class.

By 1982, therefore, the SNP was not a party of exclusively middle-class activists; there were significant numbers of activists who associated themselves with the working class and these members also tended to be more "class conscious" in that they generally thought of themselves in class terms. Moreover, only a small minority of activists reflected the traditional tendency of the formal ideology of the party to reject the concept of class and to eschew class imagery in its analysis of Scottish society and politics.

Activists' Ideological Placement

In the 1960s and 1970s, the Scottish National Party generally portrayed itself in its election manifestos, policy documents and other formal pronouncements as a moderately social democratic, slightly left-of-centre, political party. But is this how activists view the party and, perhaps more importantly, is this how they see themselves? And to what

TABLE 9.14 - CLASS IDENTIFICATION AMONG SNP ACTIVISTS, BY LEVEL

Class Identification	National Leaders		National Candidates		Councillors		Constit. Activists		Branch Activists		All Activists	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Working Class (Immediate) ¹	6		6		13		21		24		70	
Working Class (Prompt) ²	-		7		6		19		21		53	
All Working Class	6	23.1	13	31.0	19	59.4	40	50.0	45	55.6	123	47.1
Middle Class (Immediate) ³	5		9		2		11		9		36	
Middle Class (Prompt)	13		15		5		18		21		72	
All Middle Class	18	69.2	24	57.1	7	21.9	29	36.3	30	37.0	108	41.4
No Class Identification	2	7.7	5	11.9	6	18.8	11	13.8	6	7.4	30	11.5
(Missing/Don't Know)	26		42		32		80		81		261	
			(2)				(1)		(1)		(4)	

Notes

1. "Immediate" refers to those respondents who generally think of themselves in class terms
2. "Prompt" refers to those respondents offering a class identification, "if pressed to do so"
3. "Middle class" includes those referring to themselves as members of the "professional" or "self-employed" class.

NB - percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding

SOURCE: SNP Activists Survey, Q. 8.

extent do activists' perceptions of their own ideological positions correspond to their attitudes or beliefs about key political questions or issues?

In the SNP Activists Survey, respondents were posed two questions intended to measure individual placement on a left-right ideological scale. The first (Q. 26) consisted of a pictorial representation of a left-right axis numbered from 0 ("Extreme Left") through 5 ("Centre") to 10 ("Extreme Right") on which activists were asked to place the five main political parties in Scotland and to indicate where they thought they stood themselves, as a measure of "subjective" ideological placement. Around 7 per cent of respondents failed or refused to answer this question in any fashion. Some left it blank or scored through it, some wrote comments explicitly rejecting the utility of a left-right dimension especially in the Scottish context,³⁶ one admitted "I just can't think in these terms", another wrote "Do me a favour!" Others were reticent about placing themselves on the scale although they did indicate where they thought the various parties were situated.

However 219 respondents (82.6 per cent) did locate themselves on the left-right axis and in Table 9.15 we compare the responses of activists at various levels within the party with respect to self-placement and their perceptions of the positions of the SNP, the Labour Party and the Conservatives on the continuum. The placing of the Labour and Conservative

TABLE 9.15 - ACTIVISTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE LOCATION OF MAJOR PARTIES AND "SELF" ON THE LEFT-RIGHT DIMENSION, BY LEVEL

Location of objects on Left-Right Axis	National Leaders	National Candidates	Councillors	Constit. Activists	Branch Activists	All Activists
Labour Party Mean	2.64* (N=21)	1.84 (N=38)	1.43* (N=29)	1.86 (N=77)	1.62 (N=76)	1.80 (N=241)
Respondent ("Self") Mean	3.69 (N=20)	3.74 (N=37)	4.09 (N=27)	3.73 (N=66)	3.72 (N=69)	3.78 (N=219)
SNP Mean	3.71 (N=21)	3.92* (N=38)	3.72 (N=27)	3.66 (N=77)	3.73 (N=75)	3.72 (N=236)
Conservative Mean	8.40 (N=21)	8.26* (N=38)	9.00 (N=29)	9.02 (N=77)	9.12 (N=76)	8.88 (N=241)

* Difference of means significant at .05

NB - Figures refer to mean scores derived from respondents' placing of objects on a continuum ranging from 0 = Extreme Left, through 5 = Centre, to 10 = Extreme Right.

SOURCE: SNP Activists Survey, Q. 26.

Parties suggests that, in general, SNP activists were capable of thinking in terms of "left" and "right" although "nationally" active respondents tended to situate those two parties in less extreme positions than did local activists. The mean placement of self on the continuum is remarkably consistent among all groups of activists, except for the Councillors who tended to position themselves closer to the centre than other groups. Moreover, the table suggests that, on the whole, SNP activists thought of themselves as being close to their party in ideological terms: although "National Candidates" see themselves as more "left" than the party, while Councillors locate themselves to the "right" of it, in both cases their mean scores are much closer to the SNP than to any other party (including the Liberals and the Social Democratic Party⁷).

On average, therefore, SNP activists think of themselves and their party as moderately left-of-centre. On a scale in which 0 represents "extreme left" and 5 represents "the centre", they place themselves at a mean position of 3.78 and their party a little further left at a mean score of 3.72. But does their subjective placement of "self" on the ideological scale correspond with their views on major political issues and debates?

A second question in the SNP Activists Survey attempted to devise a more "objective" measure of the attitudes and beliefs of individual respondents. Question 40 consisted of

a series of Likert scales in which activists were asked to indicate their reactions (agree, strongly or moderately; neutral; disagree, moderately or strongly) to fourteen normative statements (see Questionnaire, Appendix A.3). Four of these statements which mostly related specifically to Scotland (e.g. "North Sea Oil revenues should be invested primarily in Scotland") invited strong agreement, but were all essentially "red herrings" introduced to break up the pattern of the other items. The remaining ten statements were designed to gauge respondents' reactions to political issues on which "the left" and "the right" in Britain were taking clearly contradictory positions at that time. These included such issues as the ownership of industry, the effects of taxation on incentives to work and invest, the curtailment of trade union powers, law and order, and the sale of council (public) housing by local authorities.

Statements were phrased in such a way that a respondent taking a consistently "leftist" position (or a consistently "rightist" stance) would be expected to "agree" with five and "disagree" with the other five. The responses were then coded according to model "left" and "right" positions and aggregated to produce a single scale which ranged from -1 (consistently "left") to +1 (consistently "right")."

In Table 9.16 we summarize our findings for the mean scores on this "objective" left-right scale for activists at the various levels within the party. Again, the data suggest

TABLE 9.16 - "SUBJECTIVE" AND "OBJECTIVE" MEASURES OF THE
IDEOLOGY OF SNP ACTIVISTS BY LEVEL

	National Leaders	National Candidates	Councillors	Constit. Activists	Branch Activists	All Activists
Mean Placement of Self on 0-10 scale (Q. 26)	3.69	3.74	4.09	3.73	3.72	3.78
Mean Score on Objective (-1 to +1) scale (Q. 40)	-0.32* (N=25)	-0.12 (N=44)	-0.08* (N=32)	-0.20 (N=81)	-0.17 (N=82)	-0.19 (N=264)
Correlation between Individual Subjective and Objective Scores (Pearson's r)	.73+ (N=20)	.58+ (N=37)	.65+ (N=27)	.63+ (N=66)	.57+ (N=69)	.61+ (N=219)

* Difference of means significant at .05

+ Significant at all levels

SOURCE: SNP Activists Survey, Qs. 26 and 40.

that the SNP, as represented by the opinions of its activists, is a slightly left-of-centre party. The Councillors as a group were again the least "left-wing" on the objective scale, while the mean score for the "National Leaders" category is the most "left". The "National Leaders" were also the most ideologically consistent of any group, displaying the least variation around the mean score on the objective scale" and displaying the strongest association between individual scores on the "subjective" self-placement scale and the "objective" measure ($r = .73$); however, the statistically significant and moderately strong correlations between individual scores on the two measures in all other groups suggest a fairly strong degree of ideological self-awareness among all SNP activists.

The mean scores of the "National Leaders" category on both measures might suggest that, in 1982, the leaders and policy-makers of the SNP were somewhat more "left-wing" than the majority of party activists. As we shall argue in a later chapter, this was partly due to the success of the '79 Group in placing its members in leadership positions in intra-party elections. But there are also indications that the ideological composition of the activist component in general was changing. Compared to the activists who had joined the party before 1974, Table 9.17 suggests that successive cohorts of new activists, those who had become members between 1974 and 1978 and between 1979 and 1982, were on average increasingly more "leftist", both in their subjective self-

TABLE 9.17 - "SUBJECTIVE" AND "OBJECTIVE" IDEOLOGY OF
SNP ACTIVISTS, BY DATE OF JOINING THE PARTY

	Joined SNP 1979-82	Joined SNP 1974-78	Joined SNP Pre-1974	All Activists
Mean Placement of Self on 0-10 Scale (Q. 26)	3.09 (N=17)	3.29* (N=62)	4.09* (N=140)	3.78 (N=219)
Mean Score on Objective (-1 to +1) Scale (Q. 40)	-0.38* (N=20)	-0.24* (N=73)	-0.14* (N=171)	-0.19 (N=264)
Correlation between Subjective and Objective Scores (Pearson's r)	.62+ (N=17)	.72° (N=62)	.53° (N=140)	.61° (N=219)

- * Difference of means significant at .05
- + Pearson's r significant at .05
- ° Pearson's r significant at all levels

SOURCE: SNP Activists Survey, QQ. 13(b), 26 and 40.

placement on the ideological scale and in their responses to Q. 40. Moreover, as the correlation coefficients indicate, the new activists were also more ideologically self-aware in that there was a stronger degree of association between their "subjective" and "objective" placing on the left-right continuum. However, the 1974-78 cohort displays a greater degree of heterogeneity than the most recent group of activists and, with respect to the self-placement measure, it also displays more variation than the pre-1974 generation of respondents."

What conclusions can we draw from this analysis? Our data would suggest that SNP activists, on the whole, are moderately left-of-centre on the left-right ideological spectrum and that they see their party in similar terms. However, the ideological composition of the party's activist component has been changing since 1974. Compared to the activists already in the party in 1974, those who joined the party between 1974 and 1978 (during, or just after, its greatest electoral rise) were somewhat more heterogeneous in ideological terms but, on balance, somewhat more "left-wing". This trend to the left continued among activists who joined the SNP between 1979 and 1982 (i.e., after the failure of devolution and the party's electoral defeat of 1979), but this group displays less internal variation than previous cohorts of activists, i.e., its members are both more "left" on

average and more consistently "left" than the activists who had joined before 1979.

As in the case of a number of other variables, the analysis of the individual ideological positions of activists suggests that, in the 1970s, there was a change in patterns of recruitment which led to a growing heterogeneity of the activist component of the SNP.

Activists' Commitment to their Party

Finally, in this discussion of the attitudes and beliefs of SNP activists, some mention should be made of their commitment to their party. We suggested in an earlier section of this chapter that one indicator of commitment or Loyalty to the party might be the motivations given for joining it; thus it was argued that those with "affective" motivations for membership may be expected to be more strongly committed to the party than those whose reasons for joining it are largely "instrumental". But an alternative measure of commitment may be devised by asking party members/activists under what circumstances, if any, they might consider leaving the party.

In Table 9.18 we report the responses of SNP activists to the question "would you remain a member of the Party under the following conditions?" (Q. 48). The vast majority of activists claimed that they would remain members of the party if SNP support declined again at the next general election (99.6 per cent) or even if the party suffered defeats in a

number of disastrous campaigns (95.8 per cent). A slightly smaller percentage (93.9 per cent) would remain members if the SNP campaigned as a single-issue party, i.e., if it campaigned solely on the issue of independence and discarded the rest of its policy commitments. Activists were somewhat less willing to stay in the party if it campaigned actively in favour of devolution rather than independence.

The circumstances which would lead sizeable numbers of our respondents to leave the SNP would be a significant shift in the party's ideological position and the association of the SNP with political violence in any form. Among those who indicated that they would definitely leave the party if it changed its ideological stance, 45 (17.4 per cent of all respondents) would cease to be members if the party moved significantly to left or right, eleven (4.2 per cent) would quit if the party moved left, and 61 (23.5 per cent) would leave if the party shifted to the right. Several other respondents suggested in comments appended to their answers that, in the event of significant shifts in the party's ideological position, they would stay within the party but, in the words of one respondent, "would fight until common sense had been restored." From the answers provided by our respondents, therefore, changes in the party's ideological stance may lead to the exercise of both Exit and Voice by party activists.

TABLE 9.18 - DEGREES OF COMMITMENT OF SNP ACTIVISTS TO THEIR PARTY, BY LEVEL

Would you remain a member of the SNP if ...	Percentage in each category responding "Yes"				
	National Leaders	National Candidates	Councillors	Constit. Activists	Branch Activists
a) If SNP support declined again at the next election?	100	100	96.9	100	99.6 (N=265)
b) If there were a number of disastrous elections?	100	100	96.9	93.8	95.8 (N=265)
c) If the SNP shifted signi- ficantly to "the left"?	75	71.4	62.5	81.0	75.3 (N=259)
d) If the SNP shifted signi- ficantly to "the right"?	48	51.2	37.5	66.7	55.3 (N=260)
e) If the SNP campaigns solely on Independence?	92	90.7	90.6	96.2	93.9 (N=261)
f) If the SNP campaigns in favour of Devolution?	92	86	96.8	86.3	88.5 (N=261)
g) If the SNP were associated with Political violence ..?	45.8	40.5	28.1	48.1	44.2 (N=258)
All Conditions a-f	38.5	43.2	37.5	56.8	45.8 (N=265)
All Conditions a-g	19.2	20.5	15.6	32.1	24.5 (N=258)

SOURCE: SNP Activists Survey, Q. 48.

However, the condition which is most likely to lead to Exit from the SNP is the possible association of the party with political violence. This should not be surprising given our analysis of SNP ideology and strategy in Chapter Seven, where it was emphasized that the party has always eschewed violence and has consistently striven to portray itself as a peaceful, electoral, parliamentary-oriented organization. Moreover, John Schwarz found in his analysis of Scottish nationalism as "nonviolent separatism" that 90 per cent of local constituency activists in the late 1960s argued that "any member [of the SNP] who used violence ought to be immediately expelled from the Party, regardless of circumstances."¹ We were therefore more surprised to discover that 44.2 per cent of our respondents (a few activists refused to respond to this part of the question) would stay in the party if it were associated with political violence. And this was not merely a case of respondents ticking off all conditions automatically, since almost half of those who would stay if the party were associated with violence indicated that they would leave the SNP under other conditions. Once again, it would appear that the belief-systems of SNP activists have changed over time, perhaps as a consequence (as appended comments from some respondents suggested) of mounting frustration with the perceived denial of Scottish aspirations and, more particularly, with the rejection of the expressed

will of the "majority" of Scots voters in the devolution referendum."

Overall, 24.5 per cent of respondents indicated that they would remain members of the SNP under all seven conditions listed in Q. 48. However, since the collective ideology of the party is opposed to any association with political violence, a more appropriate measure of "unconditional" support for, or Loyalty to, the SNP is the percentage of respondents who would remain active in the party under all of the first six conditions (a to f). As Table 9.18 shows, 46.8 per cent of SNP activists responding to our survey may be labelled "unconditional Loyalists" by this criterion.

But are these "unconditional Loyalists" the same people that we hypothesized earlier would be more committed or more loyal to the party because their motivations for joining were affective rather than instrumental? One method of comparison reveals that activists with "affective" motivations for joining the SNP responded to the first six questions of Q. 48 with a mean of 5.23 "Yes" answers, while the mean score on our "Loyalty index" of those with "instrumental" motivations and those who gave "no special reason" for joining the party were both 4.90 out of 6.

However, as Table 9.19 illustrates, there is only a weak-to-moderate relationship between reasons given by activists for initially joining the party and their level of commitment to it in 1982. While we might expect "affective" members to

**TABLE 9.19 - ORIGINAL MOTIVATIONS FOR JOINING THE SNP
BY PRESENT DEGREE OF COMMITMENT TO THE PARTY**

		Original motivation for Joining SNP		
		Affective	Instrumental	
Present Commitment to the Party	Unconditional(1)	64 (56.6%)	35 (38.9%)	99 (48.8%)
	Conditional(2)	49 (43.4%)	55 (61.1%)	104 (51.4%)
		113	90	N=203

Q = .35

$\chi^2 = 6.32$ (significant at .05)

Notes

- 1 "Unconditional" refers to respondents indicating that they would retain members under all six conditions outlined in Q. 48 a-f.
- 2 "Conditional" refers to respondents indicating that they would not definitely remain in the party under all six conditions.

SOURCE: SNP Activists Survey, QQ. 20 and 48.

give unconditional support to the party while "instrumental" members would likely be more conditional supporters, these expectations are upheld only for a relatively small majority in each case (although the relationship is nonetheless statistically significant). Of course, individual attitudes may have changed; some people who initially joined the party for instrumental reasons may now have become socialized into "affective" members. Alternatively, some "instrumental" members may have been strongly committed to the SNP in 1982 because, given prevailing political conditions, no other party could be seen as a potentially better prospect for achieving instrumental goals. Whatever, the reason might be, it is clear that the party could not depend on unconditional support from its members in 1982.

Overview

In this section of the chapter, we have examined selected aspects of the belief-systems of individual activists through analysis of their responses to the SNP Activists Survey.

First, while earlier observations and the party's formal ideology suggest that the SNP plays down class imagery and class divisions, we found that a sizeable proportion of SNP activists generally think of themselves in class terms and that most others were willing to identify themselves with a particular class if pressed to do so; less than one-eighth of all respondents rejected the concept of class altogether.

Moreover, the percentage of "class conscious" activists increased among new members who had joined the party since 1974; and this group also contained a higher proportion of individuals who identified themselves with the "working class" than the pre-1974 cohort of activists.

Second, the image of the SNP as a slightly left-of-centre, moderately social democratic party, as revealed by analysis of its manifestos and policy documents, was confirmed by the mean responses of its activists. Not only did they place the party in this position on the ideological spectrum but they also located themselves close to it on the subjective scale of Q. 26 of the Survey. Moreover, our attempt to devise an objective measure of ideological placement (based on answers to Q. 40 of the Survey) confirmed that most activists were indeed "left-of-centre" and that there was a moderately strong and statistically significant correlation between individual activists' "subjective" self-placement on the left-right axis and their scores on the "objective" scale. Again, however, the attitudes of SNP activists had changed over time. The cohort of activists who had joined the party between 1974 and 1978 contained a wider diversity of ideological positions and its centre of gravity was further "left" than the pre-1974 cohort. The cohort which had become members between 1979 and 1982 was still further "left" but much less diverse internally than its predecessors. These findings suggest that there was decreasing agreement over issues within the party and

increasing potential for ideological conflict between different cohorts or generations among the activist component of the SNP.

Third, we examined the degree of commitment to the party among activists and the conditions which might lead them to Exit from the SNP. Even if we exclude the members who would leave the party only if it were associated with political violence (and a surprisingly large number indicated that they would stay in the party in that event), less than half of our respondents could be labelled "unconditional Loyalists" to the SNP. Apart from the question of violence, the event that would cause the greatest resort to Exit (and also to Voice) among activists would be a significant shift in the SNP's ideological position on the left-right axis, and particularly if that shift were to the right, which perhaps confirms once again the left-of-centre sympathies of a majority of activists.

CONCLUSIONS

The most important conclusion to emerge from this chapter is that the activist component of the SNP appears to have become increasingly less homogeneous over time, whether comparisons are made between our findings and those of earlier studies of SNP activists or between different cohorts or membership-generations within our own group of respondents.

With respect to the socio-economic characteristics of SNP activists, the age structure has changed, the number of women active in the party appears to have increased, and the predominance of university-educated (especially post-graduates) and professionally employed activists is clearly less marked in our sample than in earlier studies. In part this may be due to the broader scope of our survey; while earlier studies tended to focus on one particular level of activity within the party, respondents to the SNP Activists Survey are drawn from all levels of the party organization. However, comparisons among different cohorts of activists (defined in terms of when they joined the party) reveal that the socio-economic backgrounds of activists have become increasingly heterogeneous since 1974.

However, the political backgrounds of SNP activists have not changed. Like earlier studies, our analysis confirms that most activists have been recruited to the party in times of electoral advancement and the majority have had little involvement with partisan or electoral politics prior to becoming members of the SNP. This lack of previous political experience may be significant in determining how individuals respond to the emergence of sub-party conflict and the expression of organized collective voice within the party. So, too, may be the fact that a majority of respondents who gave reasons for joining the SNP could be classified as "affective" members who identify with the party because it

represents a particular principle or ideal rather than joining it to pursue particular public (policy) or private goals. For affective members, we may suggest, any change in the party which alters their perception or idealized version of it, will be resisted.

In the final section of the chapter we suggested that change was occurring in the SNP in the 1970s. Despite the traditional non-class (or even "anti-class") collective position of the party, a greater percentage of class-conscious individuals were becoming active in the SNP and new cohorts of members were increasingly working class in their identification. Moreover, the ideological composition of the party was changing. The mean ideological positions of new activists joining the party after 1974 were more "left-wing" than those of their predecessors although the 1974-78 cohort of members was ideologically more diverse in its "subjective" perceptions than either the pre-1974 or the 1979-82 cohort. Thus, the degree of consensus on issues and policies within the party was gradually breaking down. When this increasing ideological heterogeneity combined with the fact that, for a majority of activists, their commitment or Loyalty to the party was not unconditional, the stage was set for the potential emergence of sub-party conflict.

NOTES - CHAPTER NINE

1. Bernard Hennessy, "On the Study of Party Organization" in William J. Crotty, ed., Approaches to the Study of Party Organization (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1968), p. 17. Our category of "activists", therefore, combines Hennessy's "activists" and "visible leaders" and is similar to Duverger's broad category of "militants"; see Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organisation and Activity in the Modern State, translated by Barbara and Robert North, third edition (London: Methuen, 1964), pp. 90-91.
2. Constitution and Rules of the Scottish National Party (Edinburgh: Scottish National Party, n.d.), Articles 1, 4 and 5.
3. Billy Wolfe, Scotland Lives: The Quest for Independence (Edinburgh: Reprographia, 1973), p. 40.
4. Paul Whiteley, The Labour Party in Crisis (London: Methuen, 1983), pp. 8-10.
5. See Samuel J. Eldersveld and Dwaine Marvick, "Work on the Origins, Activities, and Attitudes of Party Members" and other articles in the special issue on 'Party Activists in Comparative Perspective', International Political Science Review, vol. 4, no. 1, 1983.
6. For example, Dennis Kavanagh, "Still the Workers' Party? Changing Social Trends in Elite Recruitment and Electoral Support" in Kavanagh, ed., The Politics of the Labour Party (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), pp. 95-110.
7. See Peter B. Clark and James Q. Wilson, "Incentive systems: a theory of organization", Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 6, no. 2, 1961, pp. 129-166; and James Q. Wilson, The Amateur Democrat (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1962). For the application of Wilson's typology see, among others, Marshall W. Conley and Patrick J. Smith, "Political Recruitment and Party Activists: British and Canadian Comparisons", and Samuel J. Eldersveld, "Motivations for Party Activism: Multi-

National Uniformities and Differences", International Political Science Review, vol. 4, no. 1, 1983, pp. 48-56 and pp. 57-70. For a slightly different approach to motivations for membership and activism, see Whiteley, The Labour Party in Crisis, pp. 57-61.

8. See, for example, Dwaine Marvick, "Political Linkage Functions of Rival Party Activists in the United States: Los Angeles, 1969-1974" in Kay Lawson, ed., Political Parties and Linkage: A Comparative Perspective (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), pp. 100-128.
9. Since no "sample" was selected from a wider population of members in the first three categories - i.e., National Leaders, National Candidates and Councillors - even had there been no differential rate of response, Table 9.1 would appear to show certain "regional biases" in these categories.
10. Our proportion of respondents from the Strathclyde Region (40.4%) is approximately halfway between the Region's percentage of all SNP branches (32.7%) and its share of the total Scottish electorate (46.7%).
11. See the various analyses of Scottish voting behaviour referred to in Chapter Six.
12. See, for example, Jack Brand, "These are the Scotnats", New Statesman, vol. 75, no. 1940, May 17, 1968, p. 648; W.P. Grant and R.J.C. Preece, "Welsh and Scottish Nationalism", Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 21, no. 3, 1968, pp. 255-263.
13. John E. Schwarz, "The Scottish National Party: Nonviolent Separatism and Theories of Violence", World Politics, vol. 22, no. 4, 1970, pp. 496-517.
14. Sherri Grasmuck, "Ideology of Ethnoregionalism: The Case of Scotland", Politics and Society, vol. 9, no. 4, 1980, pp. 471-494; and Grasmuck, "Uneven Regional Development and Scottish Nationalism: Activists, Ideology and North Sea Oil", unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Texas at Austin, 1978, Chapter Four.

15. Richard W. Mansbach, "The Scottish National Party: A Revised Political Profile", Comparative Politics, vol. 5, no. 2, 1973, p. 196.
16. Grasmuck, "Uneven Regional Development and Scottish Nationalism", pp. 161-162. The data to support this profile, and her data cited in the following pages, are to be found in ibid., Chapter Four, passim.
17. However, among ten former "National Candidates" no longer members/active in the SNP, two were women. Thus 7.4 per cent of all respondents (active and inactive) in this category were women.
18. Among branch activists holding official positions (Chair, Treasurer, Secretary, etc.) women constituted over 50 per cent of the branch Secretaries but less than 20 per cent of the other branch officials in our sample.
19. Schwarz, "The Scottish National Party: Nonviolent Separatism and Theories of Violence", p. 496.
20. Mansbach, "The Scottish National Party: A Revised Political Profile", p. 196.
21. A similar comparison with Grasmuck's findings shows 33.8 per cent of constituency activists and 27.9 per cent of all respondents under the age of 35, compared with 44 per cent of her National Assembly delegates.
22. For example, a letter to the Scots Independent alleging a pro-university bias in the selection of the candidates for the European Parliament elections in 1979: "Is there a filtering system whereby the manual workers are weeded out before the final selection procedure, or is it that only graduates bother to offer themselves for these positions?"; Scots Independent, no. 101, August 1979.
23. Grant and Preece, "Welsh and Scottish Nationalism", p. 259; Mansbach, "The Scottish National Party: A Revised Political Profile", p. 196.

24. Grasmuck, "Uneven Regional Development and Scottish Nationalism", p. 143 and Table 1, p. 144.
25. James G. Kellas, The Scottish Political System, second edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 127.
26. Schwarz, "The Scottish National Party: Nonviolent Separatism ...", p. 496.
27. Mansbach, "The Scottish National Party: A Revised Political Profile", p. 195. One example has been cited earlier in this thesis; see Chapter Six, fn. 49, p. 297.
28. Grasmuck, "Uneven Development and Scottish Nationalism", pp. 156-160.
29. John Schwarz notes however that, while few local leaders had been previously active in political parties, the majority (84 per cent) has been members of intermediary groups (unions, professional associations, interest groups, etc.) and over half had held elected or appointive offices in these groups; see Schwarz, "The Scottish National Party: Nonviolent Separatism", p. 504.
30. Wilson, The Amateur Democrat.
31. A similar distinction between "affective" (or as he refers to them, "expressive") motivations and "instrumental" orientations is made by Whiteley, The Labour Party in Crisis, pp. 58-61.
32. One respondent, for example, appended a four-page essay on his family and political background to explain why he had joined the SNP.
33. See Whiteley, The Labour Party in Crisis, p. 58.
34. Grasmuck, "Uneven Development and Scottish Nationalism", p. 156.

35. ibid.

36. One respondent, for example, appended a detailed discussion, complete with illustrations, of a two-dimension portrayal of ideological positions in which the "economic ownership" dimension was intersected by a "Militarist" or "imperialist" dimension (Respondent #055).

37. The Liberal and Social Democratic Parties are excluded from Table 9.15 because of some understandable confusion among many respondents whether to treat them as two separate parties or as a single alliance.

38. Responses to Q. 40 were coded as follows:

	Agree Strongly	Agree Mod.	Neutral/ No Opinion	Disagree Mod.	Disagree Strongly
Items a, c,e,j,l	+1	+ .5	0	- .5	-1
Items b, q,h,k,n	-1	- .5	0	+ .5	+1
Items d, f,i,m	----- Not Applicable -----				

For each individual respondent, scores for all applicable items were then aggregated and divided by 10 to produce a single score within the range -1 to +1 which is interpreted on the following basis.

-1	- .5	0	+ .5	+1
Consist- ently "Left"	Inconsist- ent or "Soft" Left	Centre/ Neutral	Inconsist- ent or "Soft" Right	Consist- ently "Right"

39. The Coefficients of Variation (a standardized measure of dispersion derived by dividing the standard deviation by the mean) for each group on the "objective" scale, Q. 40 were

National Leaders	1.19
Constituency Activists	1.39
Branch Activists	1.85
National Candidates	2.85
Councillors	3.98

The higher the Coefficient of Variation, the greater the tendency for individual scores within the group to depart from the group mean.

40. Coefficients of Variation for each cohort on the two measures were as follows

	"Subjective" Self-placement (Q. 26)	"Objective" Measure (Q. 40)
Joined 1979-82	0.44	0.56
Joined 1974-78	0.53	1.29
Joined pre-1974	0.33	2.21
All activists	0.41	1.66

41. Schwarz, "The Scottish National Party: Nonviolent Separatism ...", fn. 6, p. 498.
42. As one respondent commented, "Where the democratic process is used against the majority of Scots who bother to use their vote then actions outwith the norm would be justifiable." Another argued more forcefully that "Urban terrorism within centres in England seems to be the only language understood at Westminster".

**EXIT, VOICE AND SUB-PARTY POLITICS: IDEOLOGY,
STRATEGY AND FACTIONALISM IN THE SCOTTISH NATIONAL PARTY**

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PART THREE

THE EXPRESSION AND SUPPRESSION OF VOICE

Chapter Ten

THE SOURCES OF DISSATISFACTION AND THE ORIGINS OF THE SNP 79 GROUP

Having established much of the broader historical and organizational context within which sub-party conflict was to occur within the Scottish National Party after 1979, in Part Three of the thesis we now turn our attention to the expression and subsequent suppression of organized collective Voice. As the logic of the Exit/Voice approach suggests, we begin our analysis by examining the sources of dissatisfaction - i.e., the perceptions of absolute or relative deterioration in the performance of the organization - which led some members to look for ways of restoring or improving the quality of the product provided for them by the party.

This chapter begins with a brief description of the origins of the SNP 79 Group in an informal caucus known initially as the Interim Committee for Political Discussion (ICPD). This group, which began to meet after the devolution referendum but before the SNP's electoral decline in the 1979 general election, aired a number of grievances which were subsequently fuelled by the election outcome and ensuing events. In later sections of the chapter, therefore, we shall examine some of the sources of dissatisfaction expressed by

the ICPD (and by its successor, the '79 Group) in an attempt to ascertain whether any significant differences can be identified between ICPD/'79 Group members and other SNP activists with respect to their perceptions of organizational performance and the quality of the party product.

Material for this chapter is based largely on personal interviews with members of the ICPD/'79 Group, further analysis of the SNP Activists Survey (introduced in Chapter Nine) and on additional data drawn from a survey of former members of the SNP 79 Group conducted by the magazine Radical Scotland after the proscription of the Group and the expulsion of its former leaders from the party (see Appendix B). While our sample was drawn from a broad cross-section of SNP activists and yielded responses from only 25 members of the '79 Group (at 9.4 per cent of all responses, this is probably a fair indication of the proportion of '79 Group members among all **generally active** members of the party), the 82 usable responses to the Radical Scotland survey provide us with a somewhat larger data set for the purposes of analysing the Group.

THE GENESIS OF THE SNP 79 GROUP

The origins of the '79 Group actually predate the Scottish National Party's defeat in the 1979 general election in that the first stirrings of dissatisfaction on which it was founded began to be manifested amid the wreckage of the devolution

referendum. The referendum campaign had brought together on pro-Assembly "Yes for Scotland" platforms, and especially in grass-roots canvassing and fly-posting activities, many of the younger, more socialist-oriented SNP activists with pro-Assembly supporters of the Labour Party and members of other left-wing organizations, especially the Scottish Labour Party, the pro-devolution and nationalist splinter party founded by ex-Labour MP, Jim Sillars.

In contrast to those working actively for the Assembly, other elements of the SNP were conspicuous by their silence during the referendum campaign. Many of the hard-line independentists in the SNP, otherwise known as "traditionalists" or "fundamentalists", were opposed to devolution since they feared that the Assembly might distract attention from, or diffuse support for, the pursuit of outright independence. It is impossible to estimate the numbers involved, but it is clear that many SNP activists were equivocal about devolution and some may have actually voted against it on referendum day. As one of the Vice-Presidents of the SNP later admitted, "People like myself were not enthusiastic because I didn't really believe in the bloody Assembly. I know that some people in the party even voted 'No'."

Other senior members of the party, including many of the MPs, were concerned that, by campaigning alongside other parties in favour of the Labour government's devolution

proposals, the SNP might be perceived as taking sides in "English" party politics and thus jeopardize its self-ascribed status as "a party unlike the others" which could draw support from Scots of all political persuasions.

For whatever reason, the SNP did not put its full organizational weight behind the Scottish Assembly campaign. Many leading Nationalists played no active role in the campaign; staff at SNP headquarters were forbidden to work for the "Yes for Scotland" group, as were the parliamentary assistants to the MPs who were kept in London until the last minute because, as the parliamentary leadership *reportedly* argued, "the referendum is not important to the SNP."

Many of the younger SNP activists who had campaigned strenuously for the Assembly were bitterly disappointed by the outcome of the referendum.³ Some, too, were angered by what they saw as the lukewarm support (at best) and cynical disregard (at worst) displayed towards the Assembly by the parliamentary leadership and the 'fundamentalist' wing of the party. They viewed devolution as at least a step in the right direction which, even if it did not lead straight to independence, would give Scotland a measure of autonomy and an opportunity to tackle some of the serious economic and social ills of Scottish society. Furthermore, their contact with SNP activists, in particular, during the referendum campaign heightened their awareness of the lack of clearly-articulated SNP policies to tackle these problems.

On the Saturday after the referendum, the SNP National Council met in Edinburgh to discuss the party's response to the referendum outcome. The Council resolved, in what one former Nationalist MP described as "an emotional, hysterical decision",⁴ that the SNP parliamentary group should seek to bring the government down if it failed to implement devolution, notwithstanding the so-called "forty per cent clause". However, one of the speeches in particular, by Senior Vice-Chairman Margo MacDonald, caught the attention of some young activists who were present. Ms. MacDonald's analysis of the referendum concluded that the working class in Scotland had voted for the Assembly while middle class voters had opposed devolution and that the future of the SNP must therefore lie in cultivating a more "leftist" image.⁵

On the Sunday after the National Council meeting (Sunday, March 10, 1979), a group of seven activists, mostly young and from the Edinburgh area, held a referendum wake at the home of Strathclyde University economics lecturer Gavin Kennedy, the SNP candidate for Edinburgh Centre and then a vice-chairman of the party. The group accepted, by and large, the logic of Ms. MacDonald's analysis, that the natural constituency for a nationalist party was among the working people of Scotland and that the SNP must therefore adopt an image and policies designed to appeal to left-oriented voters.⁶ Since most of the individuals involved were active either at SNP headquarters or in the Edinburgh Centre

constituency, they continued to gather for informal discussions during the general election campaign, precipitated at the end of March by the SNP parliamentarians' motion of no-confidence in the government when it refused to implement the *Scotland Act*.

The first formal meeting of what was initially styled the **Interim Committee for Political Discussion (ICPD)** attracted around 35 people to Edinburgh's Belford Hotel on May 31, 1979. By then, the disastrous election defeat had added to the grievances left over from the referendum, and many SNP activists were seeking a new orientation for the party. For the members of ICPD, that fresh approach lay in creating a socialist image for the SNP. As one founding member described the Belford gathering, "It was like a revivalist meeting, a kind of mass catharsis, as one by one people stood up and publicly admitted to being socialists as well as nationalists."

A second meeting at the same venue on June 8, 1979, attended by over fifty people, saw the adoption of a statement of three main political principles, "Independence", "Socialism" and "Republicanism", although the last goal was approved only after a lengthy debate and was subsequently to be used by opponents within the party as a stick to belabour the '79 Group.'

At this time some support for the basic strategic thrust of the ICPD arrived from a perhaps unexpected quarter. In a

memorandum to his West Lothian Constituency Association after the election, William Wolfe announced that he intended to step down as party Chairman, a post he had held for ten years. However, the Wolfe memorandum, which was speedily leaked to The Scotsman newspaper, went much further. In it, Wolfe argued that the party's defeat in the recent election was due to its having lost the social democratic image which had proven so successful in 1974. Part of the blame he attached to the SNP parliamentary group:

... the MPs did not continue to project the image of the party which had won us support throughout Scotland. ... What I believe the Parliamentary Group has wittingly or unwittingly reduced us to, is a fundamental nationalist image. We have lost the social democratic middle ground.'

Wolfe cited the Nationalist MPs' behaviour over the Aircraft and Shipbuilding Industries Bill (discussed in Chapter Eight, above), the anti-English speech made by MP Douglas Henderson at the 1976 Annual Conference, the attacks made by MPs on Margo MacDonald and on one of their own group, the self-confessed "social democrat", George Reid, and their failure to consult with and accept the guidance of the National Executive Committee.

But Wolfe also accepted part of the blame for himself. As Chairman of the party, admitted Wolfe, he should have intervened to defend Reid and MacDonald, "I ought to have disowned the MPs who tore up the trade unionists' telegrams ... I ought to have joined publicly and led the criticism of

our anti-social democrats."¹⁰ But Nationalists (himself included) refrained from speaking out in the interests of party unity. As a result, suggested Wolfe elsewhere,

there has been an erosion of the Scottish social-democratic image and philosophy which I believe we portrayed throughout the 1960s and up until 1974 at least. ... Four years ago we started to lose that, when social democracy was publicly criticised within the Party as being irrelevant to our cause, and I said nothing in defence of it. ... I now regret my silences.¹¹

While Wolfe's vision of a vaguely-expressed "social democratic image" or "Scottish social democracy" was clearly different from the kind of socialism discussed at ICPD meetings, his criticisms of the behaviour of the parliamentary group and of the increasingly fundamentalist, "Independence - Nothing Less", almost "anti-political" tendency adopted by many senior members of the party served to legitimize both the grievances of the ICPD members and their desire to open up debate on policy and strategy within the SNP.

The ICPD "went public" at the June meeting of the SNP National Council in Stirling. At the same session, the Council voted to reduce the party's headquarters staff, citing the need to cut expenses after the budgetary strain induced by the referendum and general election campaigns.¹² However, there was strong suspicion among ICPD members that the decision to abolish certain positions was motivated as much by the political leanings of their incumbents as by financial considerations, since two of the staff let go were founder

members of the Committee.¹³ If the battle lines were not yet drawn up within the party, the seeds of mutual distrust were being sown, even at this early date.

Two further meetings of the ICPD were held in late June and early August, before its first conference planned for August 18, 1979 in Glasgow. These sessions were largely concerned with organizational matters. It was decided to restrict membership only to individuals who were already members of the Scottish National Party and to formalize the organization by charging dues and issuing membership cards. At the conference, elective offices were established, chief among them being three official spokespersons, Andrew Currie, Margo MacDonald and Alex Salmond. And last, but not least, the name of the organization was changed. The rather cumbersome ICPD had already been abbreviated informally by some members to "Icepick", but the Stalinist connotations of this term worried some (while attracting others) and opponents of the left had gleefully taken the opportunity to nickname them the "Ice Piccaninnies".¹⁴ Consequently, at a meeting held at Strathclyde University Staff Club in early August, the title of the ICPD was changed to the **SNP 79 Group**.

Hence, by the time that the SNP held its Annual National Conference in Dundee in September 1979, what had started out as an informal Sunday discussion group in a private Edinburgh home had been transformed into an organized sub-party faction expressing the collective Voice of its members.

However, the '79 Group's debut at the Dundee Conference was hardly an auspicious beginning. That there was trouble in the offing was evident even when the conference agenda was published. Caithness and Sutherland Constituency Association had submitted a motion to the Agenda Committee to express opposition to the formation of the Group. After consultation with the CA, the motion (slightly reworded) was included as an amendment to another resolution; hence, under SNP rules, it could not itself be subject to amendment.¹⁵ Conference subsequently supported the motion by 329 votes to 278, declaring that

This conference further deplores any attempts to form any official group within the party which identifies itself with either Right- or Left-wing policies.¹⁶

The SNP also turned its back on devolution when Conference reaffirmed its commitment to "Independence - Nothing Less."

The position of the '79 Group was expressed by, among others, Margo MacDonald in her report to Conference as Senior Vice-Chairman of the party. Noting that the past year had been "a very bad one for the SNP", she urged the party to learn from past mistakes:

Our first mistake was that we did not join the great debate on economic strategy in a way which linked Independence to better, and fairer, economic and industrial policies. ... It was not enough to have voters believe that the SNP thought that Independence would solve these huge political problems. We required to say *how* Independence would help to solve them.

... We *might* have re-established the relevance of the constitutional question if we had thrown ourselves wholeheartedly into the Assembly

Referendum. We did not, and I believe that this was a huge mistake. ... the Referendum should have been our first campaigning priority because a poor Referendum result would practically ensure a poor showing in a General Election.

If I am re-elected Senior Vice-Chairman, I will seek to promote discussion of SNP strategy and tactics at every level in the Party¹

Widespread discussion of strategy and tactics was apparently the last thing that the assembled delegates wanted to take place, for Ms. MacDonald lost the election for Senior Vice-Chairman by a 3:1 majority to Douglas Henderson, a former MP who was generally regarded to be on the fundamentalist "right" of the party. And other '79 Group members fared little better in elections to senior positions, although the Group had drawn up a slate of recognized candidates for which its supporters were urged to vote *en bloc*. Stephen Maxwell lost the party chairmanship to MP Gordon Wilson by a margin of more than 4 to 1; this contest revived many of the conflicts that had emerged between the parliamentary group and the NEC between 1974 and 1979 with Wilson arguing that party unity would be served best by having an MP as Chairman while Maxwell believed that the NEC should reassert its authority over the party and doubted that "the job could be done by someone with heavy duties outside Scotland".² Andrew Currie was defeated in the election for Executive Vice-Chairman for Organisation, and despite (or perhaps because of) the endorsement of the '79 Group, Billy Wolfe was beaten by the incumbent, Dr. Robert McIntyre, for party President. Thus,

although a handful of '79 Group adherents were among the 30 members of National Council elected by Conference, all of the senior office-holders of the SNP selected in 1979 could fairly be described as representatives of the 'fundamentalist' or 'traditionalist' wing of the party.

Certain of the Scottish newspapers had a field-day with the conference. Under the headline "SNP the loser in Left-Right war", the Scottish Daily Express declared,

they tore themselves apart, savaging the leaders who carried them to such remarkable victories in 1974. ... Now [the SNP] attracts the added disadvantage of regaining the title of Tartan Tories by the way in which it has wiped out the Left. This puts an end to all hope of winning seats in industrial areas, especially in the west of Scotland.¹⁹

Neal Ascherson, in The Scotsman, also viewed the events as a major change in the orientation of the party:

The Scottish National Party have changed course, and with ruthless determination they have changed command as well. With this great massacre of policies and personalities, the leadership of recent years paid the price for the SNP's electoral disaster in May.²⁰

But the journalists misread the nature of the change to some extent. There was no wholesale purge of 'the leadership of recent years': Robert McIntyre stayed on as party President and five of the nine other most senior positions in the SNP hierarchy were filled by members of the 1974-79 parliamentary group.

The 1979 Conference did mark a reorientation of the SNP (albeit, as we shall see later, a temporary one) but it was

a move to dump *politics*, not leaders. The SNP returned to fundamentals, to an emphasis on independence above all else. Devolution was rejected, Margo MacDonald's promise of internal debate on strategy and tactics was rejected, and "the left" was rejected, whether it took the form of the mild "Scottish social democracy" advocated by Billy Wolfe or the more orthodox socialism espoused by the '79 Group. But the Conference was not so much a victory for "the right" as it was for what might be called "extremists of the centre", that is, those members of the party who wanted to play down the development of policies and rely on the promotion of independence as the panacea for all of Scotland's ills.

Finally, the Conference also rejected factions," but it may be argued that the manner in which it did so, and the new direction of the party which ensued, merely heightened the sense of dissatisfaction which had given rise to the ICPD/'79 Group earlier in the year.

The logic of the Exit/Voice model outlined in Chapter Four suggests that the analysis of responses to perceptions of organizational decline falls into two distinct stages: first, the identification of the sources of dissatisfaction with the organization or its product; second, the examination of the availability and perceived costs and benefits of the alternative responses in order to understand the Exit/Voice calculus. In this chapter, therefore, we examine the origin, nature and extent of some of the discontents expressed by

members of the ICPD/'79 Group in both public statements and personal interviews. In Chapter Eleven, we shall examine how that dissatisfaction was mobilized for some activists into membership of the '79 Group, but we first turn our attention below to a further exploration of the sources of discontent within the SNP.

Already in this chapter a number of potential sources of dissatisfaction have been mentioned. First, there was the alleged failure of some SNP activists, and especially certain members of the parliamentary group, to lend wholehearted support for the Scottish Assembly in the referendum campaign. Second, the Wolfe memorandum raised the question of the behaviour of the parliamentary group at Westminster between 1974 and 1979, and a further potential source of discontent was the MPs' part in bringing down the Labour government. Third, we might expect that the outcome of the 1979 general election, in which the SNP lost nine of its eleven seats, to be a prime source of discontent among party activists. Finally, a fourth potential source of dissatisfaction for some members of the SNP was the general shift in the party's mood or image away from the broad social democracy of the early and mid-1970s and towards a more strident 'fundamentalist' or independentist position. Although this shift was not made explicit until the Dundee Annual Conference, it had been occurring gradually for a year or more before September 1979.

THE DEVOLUTION REFERENDUM

We have described already in this chapter how the ICPD had its origins in the small discussion group which met at Gavin Kennedy's home to hold a wake for the Scottish Assembly and suggested that part of the frustration of these young activists derived from what they saw as a betrayal of the effort which they had put into the referendum campaign by the lack of wholehearted support from the parliamentary group and some other SNP activists. This is not to suggest that all ICPD/'79 Group members would have been satisfied by devolution, although that criticism was often to be levelled at the Group later by its opponents." Rather, a majority of '79 Group members responding to the Radical Scotland survey agreed that their view could best be represented as supporting devolution as a means to achieve independence (see Table 10.1)

In reporting these data, we have deliberately sub-divided the respondents into those Group members who were already in the SNP in 1979 and those who joined the party after 1979, since it is possible that the existence of the '79 Group (whose membership was restricted to members of the SNP) attracted into the party a number of new activists whose "nationalist" credentials might be open to question." However, the imposition of this control makes little difference to the pattern of responses. In both categories, just under a quarter of Group members favour the "Independence - Nothing Less" position and a clear majority in each case

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**TABLE 10.1 - VIEWS OF FORMER '79 GROUP MEMBERS ON
THE INDEPENDENCE/DEVOLUTION QUESTION**

Q: "Which of the following best re- presents your view on independence/ devolution"	Member of SNP in 1979		Joined SNP After 1979		All '79 Group Respondents	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Support indepen- dence, nothing less	15	23.4	4	23.5	19	23.5
Devolution as a means to indepen- dence	48	75.0	11	64.7	59	72.8
Support a devolved Scottish Assembly	1	1.6	2	11.8	3	3.7
	—		—		—	
	64		17		81	
(Missing)	(1)				(1)	

SOURCE: "Radical Scotland" Survey, QQ. 5 and 21.

supports the pursuit of devolution as a step towards, or a means of acquiring, full independence.

A very similar pattern of preference is demonstrated by '79 Group members responding to a slightly differently worded question in the SNP Activists Survey. There we asked party activists to indicate "Which of the following options is your ideal of the future political and constitutional status of Scotland?" and respondents were asked to indicate their order of preference among a number of alternatives (see Questionnaire, Q. 32). Just over one-quarter of all respondents and one-fifth of the '79 Group members marked "fully independent state" as their first and only choice;" these we have labelled as the "Independence - Nothing Less" category (see Table 10.2). Those who indicated that independence was their first preference and either a strong devolved Scottish Assembly or a federal United Kingdom as their second amounted to 76 per cent of the '79 Group respondents and nearly 70 per cent of non-Group members. The percentage of respondents preferring devolution or some other arrangement over full independence was extremely small among both '79 Group members and other activists.

As a further test of attitudes to devolution/independence, we also asked SNP activists if they thought that the SNP "should seek the establishment of a Scottish Assembly with powers devolved from Westminster - either as an end in itself or as a first step to Independence?" (SNP Activists

**TABLE 10.2 - SNP ACTIVISTS' PREFERENCES FOR THE
FUTURE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF SCOTLAND**

Constitutional Options and Preferences	'79 Group Members		Non-'79 Group Activists		All Activists	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Independence - Nothing Less	5	20.0	68	28.3	73	27.5
1st Choice, Independence 2nd Choice, Strong Assembly or Federalism	19	76.0	165	68.8	184	69.4
Devolution/Assembly 1st Choice	1	4.0	5	2.1	6	2.2
Other*	-		2	0.8	2	0.8
	—		—		—	
	25		240		265	

* Two respondents gave first preference to a "write-in" option, both favouring a confederation of British states over all other alternatives.

NB - percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

SOURCE: SNP Activists Survey, QQ. 32 and 43.

Survey, Q. 45). Fifteen of the twenty-four Group members (62.5 per cent) who answered the question thought that the SNP should seek an Assembly, compared with 52.7 per cent of non-Group activists (the relationship is weak and statistically insignificant, $\chi^2 = 0.838$).

Clearly, then, there is little difference in attitudes toward the desirability of devolution per se between those who joined the ICPD/'79 Group and other SNP activists. But if the discontent of Group members did not derive in particular from the loss of the Assembly, perhaps it was based on the way in which the referendum was lost; as we indicated earlier, a number of ICPD/'79 Group members that we interviewed complained of lack of support for their efforts in the devolution campaign, especially from senior members of the party.

In the SNP Activists Survey, we asked respondents to react, using Likert scales, to a number of statements about the referendum and then to list up to three reasons which they felt were most influential in accounting for the referendum outcome (see Questionnaire, QQ. 36 and 36a). Respondents put much of the blame on the Labour Party, with 100 per cent of '79 Group members and 98.3 per cent of non-Group activists agreeing that "The Labour Party failed to support its own legislation" and 84 per cent and 76.3 per cent respectively listed that as one of the three most important reasons for the

referendum outcome (see Table 10.3). Other statements commonly cited among the three most important factors by both categories were "The voters did not understand the issues involved" and "The press did not give devolution enough coverage/support"; in fact, these two points were often linked together in the comments appended by some respondents." But there is relatively little difference between the '79 Group members and non-Group activists with respect to the statement "The SNP itself did not work hard enough for the Assembly." While it might be expected that ICPD/'79 Group members would be far more in agreement with this explanation than other activists, less than half of the respondents in each category agreed, and for both categories it was the sixth most frequently referred to (out of twelve options) among the three factors most important in influencing the referendum outcome.

We must acknowledge that the statement "The SNP itself did not work hard enough for the Assembly" was imperfect for our purpose of gauging the extent of dissatisfaction with the behaviour of some senior party members with respect to the devolution issue. In earlier versions of the questionnaire, we had sought agreement/disagreement with the proposition that "The SNP itself was deeply divided on the devolution issue." However, this one of a handful of questions or parts of questions which we were "advised" to change if we were to secure the co-operation of the party's National Executive in administering the survey. As it was, even the watered-down

**TABLE 10.3 - SNP ACTIVISTS' EXPLANATIONS OF THE
REFERENDUM OUTCOME - SELECTED VARIABLES**

Explanations of Outcome of Devo- lution Referendum	'79 Group Activists	Non-'79 Group Activists	All Activists
Percent agreeing that "The Labour Party failed to support its own legislation"	100	98.3	98.4
Percent citing Labour Party failure as one of the three most important factors	84.0	76.3	77.0
Percent agreeing that "The voters did not under- stand the issues involved"	72.0	74.3	74.1
Percent citing voter confusion as one of the three most important factors	32.0	35.2	34.9
Percent agreeing that "The press did not give devolution enough support/coverage"	54.2 (N=24)	63.3	62.5 (N=264)
Percent citing press coverage as one of the three most important factors	29.2 (N=24)	37.1	36.4 (N=264)
Percent agreeing that "The SNP itself did not work hard enough for the Assembly"	48.0	41.0 (N=234)	41.7 (N=259)
Percent citing SNP failure as one of the three most important factors	20.0	13.2 (N=234)	13.9 (N=259)
Note - except where otherwise indicated, '79 Group Activists, n=25; Non-'79 Group Activists, N=240; All Activists, N=265.			

SOURCE: SNP Activists Survey, QQ. 36, 36a and 43.

statement was labelled "tendentious" and "simplistic" by two of the six non-'79 Group members who refused to answer it.

The problem with the revised statement is that its wording made it possible for activists to take it personally (e.g., "I certainly worked hard") rather than applying it to the effort of the party as a whole. In this respect, the most significant difference in responses to this question was not between '79 Group members and other activists but between activists at the "National" level and local activists (i.e., councillors, constituency and branch activists). Thus 55.2 per cent of "National" level activists (who were perhaps more aware of divisions in the senior ranks) agreed that the SNP did not work hard enough for the Assembly, while only 37 per cent of all local level activists agreed with the proposition."

Clearly there was some dissatisfaction among SNP activists with the performance of the party, and perhaps especially with portions of the leadership, in the referendum campaign. Some respondents to the SNP Activists Survey volunteered additional information: for example, one cited as the most important reason for the referendum outcome the fact that "The SNP split badly on the issue and voters did not know where we stood. Therefore we could not give a proper lead" (Respondent #006). But it is equally clear, from responses to our survey at least, that this source of

dissatisfaction was not confined to, nor was it universal among, the members of the ICPD/'79 Group.

For some members of the party, however, the SNP's vacillation over, and eventual repudiation of, devolution led not only to profound dissatisfaction but also to Exit from the party. One respondent to our survey, a former SNP candidate, wrote that he had left the party on March 1, 1979, the day of the referendum (Respondent #105). In this former member's view, one important explanation of the referendum outcome was the fact that "the SNP was split and politically naive" (response to Q. 36a). So disillusioned was he that he did not even vote for the SNP in the 1979 election. Subsequently, he became involved in the Campaign for a Scottish Assembly, a new all-party organization founded on the first anniversary of the referendum (March 1, 1980) to persuade Scots of the need for self-government and to lobby for the creation of a directly elected legislative Assembly for Scotland."

Two other respondents also cited the party's tactics on devolution among their reasons for leaving the SNP to join other parties." One, a former Nationalist MP who had jumped to the new Social Democratic Party (SDP) in 1981, explained his decision largely in terms of "The SNP's official repudiation of devolution", "The birth of the SDP - committed to devolution" and "The 'Independence - Nothing Less Philosophy" of the SNP (Respondent #030). The other, a former SNP candidate who had moved to the Liberal Party, listed the

SNP's failure to work hard enough for the Assembly among the principal reasons for the referendum outcome and appended the following among his reasons for leaving the SNP:

It [the SNP] decided that Devolution was irrelevant and that the goal must be Independence or nothing, whereas the bulk of the Scottish electorate wished Devolution in the form of a Scottish Assembly rather than Independence.

After its success in 1974, it lost touch with the electorate and believed mistakenly that all who voted for it wished complete Independence.

(Respondent #101)

In all three cases, dissatisfaction with the product of the SNP, and in particular its potential for achieving the desired goal of a Scottish Assembly, led these individuals to Exit from the party in order to join other organizations which they perceived to be more capable of attaining their objectives.

THE BEHAVIOUR OF THE NATIONALIST MPs

We have referred already in Chapter Eight to the friction that arose between the SNP parliamentary group at Westminster and the National Executive Committee in Edinburgh between 1974 and 1979. In part this was due to the MPs' disregard for, or failure to elicit, the views of the NEC on specific divisions in the House; but many SNP members, especially those on the left of the party or those active in urban industrial areas, were also disturbed by the general pattern of legislative behaviour displayed by the parliamentary group.

Although the SNP had campaigned in 1974 on a moderately "social democratic" platform and had apparently won a number of its seats through the support of former Labour Party identifiers," in the early sessions of the 1974-79 Parliament, the Nationalist MPs voted more often with the Conservative opposition than with the Labour government (see Table 10.4). This pattern changed in the last two sessions, first because a sizeable proportion of the divisions in 1977-78 concerned the passage of the *Scotland Act* and, second, because the MPs had been instructed in 1978-79 to keep the minority government alive until the devolution referendum.¹⁰ But by then, the damage may have already been done.

The Nationalist MPs claimed that many of their votes against the governments were based on opposition to measures that would lead to greater political or economic centralization." But the fact that this caused them to side with the Conservatives on a number of key issues made it increasingly difficult for the party to shake off the "Tartan Tory" image painted of it by Labour politicians, especially in west central Scotland, a region which had then the highest percentage of publicly-owned housing in the western world (including vast slums), which suffered from high unemployment and where one-third of those employed worked for government-owned or state-subsidized industries.

Nevertheless, in the early sessions of the Parliament, the Nationalist MPs voted with the Conservatives against the

**TABLE 10.4 - VOTING RECORD OF SNP MEMBERS IN
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 1974-79**

	Parliamentary Session					Overall
	1974- 75	1975- 76	1976- 77	1977- 78	1978- 79	1974- 79
‡ SNP Votes:						
with Government	37.7	35.4	37.0	63.2	46.7	43.8
with Conserva- tives	49.0	45.6	43.0	17.3	20.0	37.8
with other parties only	10.9	7.7	10.9	11.7	18.3	10.7
free vote	2.3	11.2	9.1	7.9	15.0	7.8
(Number of Votes)*	(302)	(285)	(165)	(266)	(60)	(1078)

* Overall total and annual totals exclude divisions in which the entire SNP contingent abstained (427 in all).

SOURCE: SNP Parliamentary Group, Record of the Vote, mimeo, April 1979.

Community Land Bill, which proposed increased powers of land acquisition for the government, for housing and other purposes, and against several other housing initiatives; against the creation of the National Enterprise Board, a state holding company responsible for promoting new public sector investments and for bailing out private sector firms, especially in "hi-tech" industries, and again to oppose new powers for the NEB once it had been established despite their objections; in favour of a Conservative motion to forbid the Scottish Development Agency from entering into subsidized competition with the private sector, even if it meant the creation of new jobs in Scotland; and, as we reported earlier, the parliamentary group also voted against increased government intervention in the aircraft and shipbuilding industries on which many jobs depended in the west of Scotland.

Even in the final session of the Parliament, after the NEC had instructed the parliamentary group to try to keep the government in place at least until the devolution referendum, nine of the eleven MPs voted against the government following the Throne Speech in November 1978. Then, in December, SNP votes helped to defeat the government's pay sanction legislation (to allow the government to impose sanctions on companies which awarded pay increases in excess of its wage guidelines), thus depriving the Labour cabinet of a valuable weapon in the fight against inflation and rising industrial

unrest. These two divisions, perhaps more than any other, sufficiently alienated the Labour Party in Scotland that many of its officials and senior members refused to appear alongside the SNP on pro-levolution platforms in the referendum campaign.

Finally, with the support of a majority of a deeply divided National Council behind them, the Nationalist MPs introduced their motion of no-confidence in the government after it refused to implement the Scotland Act immediately after the referendum. Although the SNP motion was supplanted by one introduced by the official opposition, it was relatively easy for the Labour Party in Scotland to affix blame to the SNP for bringing down the government and, subsequently, for causing the election which brought Mrs. Thatcher to power.

In interviews, some members of the ICPD/'79 Group were strongly critical of the performance of the parliamentary group, not only for their voting behaviour in the Commons but also for their failure to provide leadership on Scottish issues. As one leader of the Group claimed

The MPs were not seen as the equivalent of a Scottish government; they failed to prove themselves authoritative. Admittedly, they couldn't win the votes [in Parliament], but they didn't even win the arguments. ... Their performance in the House and their catastrophic decision to bring down the government were major factors with regard to the performance of the SNP in the 1979 election."

Once again, however, not all ICPD/'79 Group members appear to have supported this interpretation. When asked in the SNP Activists Survey to indicate agreement or disagreement with a series of statements about factors which may have influenced the election outcome in 1979, 68 per cent of Group members and 43.8 per cent of other activists agreed that "SNP Members of Parliament failed to impress the voters."³ However, when respondents were asked to list the three most important factors contributing to the SNP election reversal, the proportions of '79 Group members and other activists citing the MPs' performance were almost identical, 12 per cent and 12.3 per cent, respectively. Hence, while members of ICPD/'79 Group may generally have been more willing to be critical of the parliamentary group, the performance of the MPs did not have a high degree of salience for them as a direct cause of the election outcome (although, as we shall suggest below, it may have played an indirect role).

In the SNP Activists Survey, respondents were also asked if they thought that the MPs "did the right thing" by helping to bring the Labour government down after the referendum (see Questionnaire, Q. 37). Although some ICPD/ '79 Group members were extremely critical of the MPs for voting against the government at this point - one, for example, echoed the words of former Prime Minister Callaghan, saying that it was "like turkeys voting for an early Christmas"⁴ - there is only a weak and statistically insignificant relationship between responses

to this question and membership/non-membership of the '79 Group (see Table 10.5). Twelve of the 25 Group members in the survey supported the MPs' actions (48 per cent as compared with 59.2 per cent of non-Group members) and even among the thirteen members who considered the no-confidence motion to be misguided, four acknowledged that their responses were influenced by hindsight.

The performance of the Nationalist MPs between 1974 and 1979 was a source of dissatisfaction for many activists in the Scottish National Party, but it appears to have little salience for most respondents and discontent on this issue was by no means restricted to, nor universal among, those who became members of the ICPD or the '79 Group.

THE ELECTORAL DECLINE OF THE SNP

In Chapters Three and Four it was argued that one common source of dissatisfaction leading to the formation of sub-parties and the organization of collective Voice is a change in the electoral fortunes of a political party. In particular, in this case, we may expect that a serious electoral defeat for a party will lead to discontent among party activists for whom the prospects for individual or collective goal attainment are made more remote.

In October 1974, the Scottish National Party had gained over 30 per cent of the Scottish vote and won eleven seats in the House of Commons. However, the party fared poorly in all

TABLE 10.5 - ATTITUDES TOWARD THE SNP NO-CONFIDENCE MOTION, BY "GROUP" MEMBERSHIP

		79 Group Members	Non-'79 Group Activists	
MPs "did the right thing"*	Yes	12 (48.0%)	141 (59.2%)	153 (58.2%)
	No	13 (52.0%)	97 (40.8%)	110 (41.8%)
		25	238	N=263

$Q = -.22$

$\chi^2 = 1.17$ (insignificant at .05)

- * The full question put to respondents was as follows:
 "In the aftermath of the referendum, SNP Members of Parliament introduced the motion of no-confidence which brought down the Labour Government. Do you think that they did the right thing?"

SOURCE: SNP Activists Survey, QQ. 37 and 43.

three Scottish by-elections in the 1974-79 Parliament and in May 1979 its share of the Scottish vote fell to 17.3 per cent and all but two of its eleven MPs were defeated.

However, it was emphasized in Chapter Four that it is often a perception of relative, rather than absolute, decline which leads to dissatisfaction and the search for remediation. Hence, discontent may occur among party members even if their party does not lose seats in an election if most members expected an electoral advance; on the other hand, most members of a party may be reasonably satisfied after an adverse election result if there was a widespread expectation beforehand that their party would do even worse.

How did SNP activists feel about their party's performance in the 1979 general election? In the SNP Activists Survey, respondents were asked to indicate their reactions (using Likert scales) to a series of propositions relating to the decline of the SNP vote (see Questionnaire, Q. 38). The last of these statements suggested that "All things considered, the SNP did not really do too badly." The responses of '79 Group members and other activists are summarized in Table 10.6. Overall 34.1 per cent of respondents agreed that the SNP did not do too badly in the 1979 election, in the circumstances. The 57.8 per cent of all activists who disagreed with the statement may be considered those who were dissatisfied with the election outcome but, although the percentage of '79 Group members

TABLE 10.6 - ACTIVISTS' PERCEPTIONS OF SNP ELECTORAL
PERFORMANCE IN 1979, BY "GROUP" MEMBERSHIP

Strength of Agreement/ Disagreement with proposition that "... the SNP didn't do too badly"	'79 Group Members		Non-'79 Group Activists		All Activists	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Strong Agreement	0		12		12	
Moderate Agreement	<u>5</u>		<u>71</u>		<u>76</u>	
Total Agreeing	5	21.7	83	35.3	88	34.1
Neutral	3	13.0	18	7.7	21	8.1
Moderate Disagreement	11		97		108	
Strong Disagreement	<u>4</u>		<u>37</u>		<u>41</u>	
Total Disagreeing	15	65.2	134	57.0	149	57.8
	<u>23</u>		<u>235</u>		<u>258</u>	
(Missing/No Answer)	(2)		(5)		(7)	

* In full, the proposition read as follows: "All things considered, the SNP did not really do too badly."

NB - percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

SOURCE: SNP Activists Survey, QQ. 38 and 43.

disagreeing was higher at 65.2 per cent, this difference is not statistically significant.

As in the case of attitudes toward the outcome of the devolution referendum, we also asked respondents (in Q. 38a) to list up to three statements from Q. 38 which in their view best accounted for the performance of the SNP in the 1979 general election. The five most frequently mentioned responses for both the '79 Group members and other activists are listed in Table 10.7. Most frequently cited, by almost two-thirds of the respondents in each category, was the view that Scottish voters voted for Labour in order to keep out the Conservatives and in particular, according to many activists, to attempt to stop Mrs. Thatcher from becoming Prime Minister.

The second most frequent response among non-'79 Group activists (45.8 per cent) and third most popular among Group members (56 per cent) was the belief that the SNP was "caught in the middle as class politics were re-established"; and a similar explanation, that the SNP was seen as irrelevant in a campaign based largely on economic issues, was advanced by approximately one-third of respondents in each category.

It is perhaps paradoxical that members of a party which has consciously shunned the "cult of the personality" should agree in such numbers (24.6 per cent of all respondents) with the assertion that the lack of personalities in the SNP

**TABLE 10.7 - ACTIVISTS' EXPLANATIONS OF SNP ELECTORAL
DECLINE IN 1979, BY "GROUP" MEMBERSHIP**

(Statements reported most frequently by respondents among the three most important reasons for the SNP's electoral decline in 1979)

Statement	'79 Group Members		Non-'79 Group Activists	
	N	%	N	%
d. "Voters wanted to keep the Conservatives out of office."	16	64.0	150	63.0
e. "The SNP was caught in the middle as class politics were re-established."	14	56.0	109	45.8
f. "The SNP had no personalities to match Thatcher and Callaghan."	4	16.0	60	25.2
i. "In a campaign on economic issues, the SNP was seen as irrelevant."	9	36.0	74	31.1
l. "The SNP failed to keep its working class support."	15	60.0	53	22.3
Five most frequent responses as percentage of all responses.	78.7		64.3	
	(N=75)		(N=694)	

SOURCE: SNP Activists Survey, QQ. 38, 38a and 43.

contributed to its electoral decline. However, in appended comments several respondents managed to reconcile the apparent paradox by blaming it all on the perennial SNP scapegoat, the media. Some complained that the election had been transformed by the press into a quasi-presidential contest, where personalities counted for more than policies; some argued that SNP personalities were not given equal coverage by the "English-controlled" media. In all, although no direct reference was made to the influence of the media in our list of propositions, seven per cent of non-Group activists (but none of the '79 Group members) included media-related explanations among their three most important factors. And this theme of blaming the media for the SNP's misfortunes surfaced again at the Dundee National Conference in September 1979."

Although almost all the statements in Q. 38 were supported by different percentages of '79 Group members and non-Group activists, in only one case was such a variation statistically significant. Sixty per cent of '79 Group members responding to the survey listed the proposition "The SNP failed to keep its working class support" among the three most important determinants of the 1979 election outcome, compared with less than a quarter of other activists (see Table 10.8).

This difference cannot be explained in terms of widespread lack of agreement with the proposition itself; 74.7 percent of non-Group activists agreed that the SNP had lost

TABLE 10.8 - ACTIVISTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF WORKING CLASS SUPPORT FOR THE SNP IN 1979, BY "GROUP" MEMBERSHIP

	'79 Group Members	Non-'79 Group Activists	
SNP loss of working class support one of three most important factors in influencing 1979 election result	15 (60.0%)	53 (22.3%)	68 (25.9%)
Loss of working class support not cited as an important factor	10 (40.0%)	185 (77.7%)	195 (74.1%)
	25	238	N = 263

$\chi^2 = 16.82$ (significant at .05)

SOURCE: SNP Activists Survey, QQ. 38a and 43.

working class support ("And a good thing too!" commented one respondent, #130), a proportion which is not significantly different from the 88 per cent of '79 Group members who agreed. Rather, the variation clearly results from the greater importance attached to working class support for the SNP by members of the ICPD/'79 Group. The ICPD began, in part, as a response to Margo MacDonald's analysis of voting patterns in the referendum and the implications she drew for future SNP strategy. The need to address class issues and to win back working class support was taken up again by Andrew Currie in a paper discussed at the first formal meeting of the ICPD in May 1979:

Over the last two years, there has been a substantial erosion of SNP support amongst young voters and amongst skilled manual workers. ... Social class is a major factor in Scottish political allegiances; we ignore this fact at our peril. ... To deny the relevance of social class as a determinant of voting behaviour ... makes the SNP at best look out of touch with reality and at worst look like an alternative version of the Conservative Party."

Currie's arguments (incidentally, written before the general election") assume greater significance in the light of the two explanations of SNP decline mentioned most frequently by non-'79 Group activists in response to Q. 38a of our survey (see Table 10.7): first, that to keep out the Conservatives Scottish voters had turned to the Labour Party rather than the SNP; and, second, that the SNP had been caught in the middle of an ideologically-polarized, class-based campaign.

But to resort to such explanations is, to a certain extent, to beg the question: why did the voters turn to Labour and not to the SNP to keep the Conservatives out, and why was the SNP apparently irrelevant in a campaign that was fought on class lines and economic issues? Members of the ICPD/'79 Group, more than other activists, attempted to make a connection between the SNP's seeming irrelevance and its failure to appeal, in particular, to the working class. In interviews, several also cited the activities of the parliamentary group (especially its role in bringing down the Labour government and the MPs' behaviour over the Aircraft and Shipbuilding Industries Bill) as contributing to the decline of working class support. Others noted specifically that their discontent with the election outcome was rooted in a deeper source of dissatisfaction, namely the loss of the SNP's leftist image.

THE IDEOLOGICAL IMAGE OF THE SNP

For much of its history, the Scottish National Party shunned ideological labelling, preferring to portray itself as a "broad church" within which all supporters of independence, irrespective of social and economic beliefs, could work together for constitutional change. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, increased electoral activity and media exposure forced the SNP to develop a more comprehensive policy platform. By 1974, according to Stephen Maxwell, the SNP had

explicitly rejected an umbrella role. .. Following the February 1974 General Election some SNP spokesmen for the first time publicly identified SNP as a social democratic party and the Party's October 1974 Election Manifesto claimed to outline a comprehensive programme of 'social democracy'."

Although for some members of the party (including Maxwell) the moderate "Scottish social democracy" of Billy Wolfe, for example, did not go far enough to address seriously the inequalities of power and wealth in Scottish society, at least the SNP was now committed to the debate of a wide range of policy issues in which socialists, as well as social democrats and others, could participate.

Nonetheless, many on "the left" in Scotland remained sceptical about the potential of the SNP as a force for social and economic change. Ray Burnett, for example, argued in The Red Paper on Scotland that, despite its pretensions of radicalism, the policies and manifestos of the SNP "simply reiterate the operant ideology of orthodox, capitalist political economy. ... the SNP has no commitment whatsoever to the construction of an alternative social order in Scotland or even to a radically reformed one." The Nationalist party, Burnett concluded, "is no haven for a socialist ... (since) as a movement, the SNP has much more in common with the Right than with the Left."¹⁰

But even after the establishment of the Scottish Labour Party as an avowedly socialist competitor to the SNP for nationalist votes, most left-wing Nationalists felt

sufficiently at home to remain within the SNP." In *The Radical Approach*, a collection of essays edited by Gavin Kennedy which in effect constituted the SNP's reply to *The Red Paper*, Owen Dudley Edwards argued in 1976 that

it is not the SLP ... but the SNP which offers the real promise of socialism in Scotland. There are many members of the SNP who call themselves socialists in public; there are more who call themselves socialists in private; there are many so-called social democrats who seem possessed of an acceptable down payment on intellectual commitment to socialism; and there are many members who do not call themselves socialists but who hold more socialist ideas than many professed votaries of the faith."

As the 1970s progressed, however, the SNP became increasingly less hospitable as a party in which socialist principles could be advanced, debated or even publicly admitted. For example, George Reid MP was admonished by his own parliamentary leader, Donald Stewart, for linking the SNP with social democracy in a speech to the House of Commons. The actions, speeches and voting behaviour of most of the MPs placed the public image of the SNP as a "left-of-centre" party at risk, but those who criticized the MPs were labelled "Labour Party hacks" and accused of "divisiveness" by fellow Nationalists." The parliamentary leadership refused to campaign for devolution alongside any of the left-wing parties which gave their support to the Scottish Assembly. Margo MacDonald was attacked for advancing leftist views; and, in a move inspired partly by ideological differences and partly by widespread jealousy of her personal popularity, she was

forbidden to appear on television during the 1979 election campaign."

After the election, as the mood of the party began to swing toward renewed 'fundamentalism', the prospects for serious debate of socialist principles and strategies (or, indeed, of any other policy orientations) began to wane. The party's senior MP, Donald Stewart, expressed the new "anti-political" mood when he wrote in The Scotsman: "There are too many members who are 'Social Democrats' (or Socialists, or Tories, or Liberals) who happen to be nationalists." The implications were clear: the party was to turn its back on internal debates over policy, whether inspired by the beliefs of "left" or "right", and return to its traditional pursuit of independence as its primary, if not exclusive, goal. Coming so soon after the staff cut-backs at SNP headquarters, which many ICPD/'79 Group members believed to have been motivated more by politics than economics, Stewart's words appeared to serve a warning, to the left in particular, to toe the official party line and abstain from discussing issues and tactics in any manner that could be construed as "ideological".

Given the changing mood of the party, away from even moderate social democracy to a kind of "apolitical" politics, it is hardly surprising that the first public session of the ICPD turned into a kind of "revivalist" meeting. As one young activist explained,

People like me weren't sure if there was a future for us in the SNP. We were nationalists, but we were also socialists ... but we were wary of admitting to being socialists given the way the party was going The ICPD gave us hope and made us realise that other people felt the same way."

For the one thing that clearly sets ICPD/'79 Group members apart, as a group, from most other activists in their responses to the SNP Activists Survey is their position on the ideological spectrum, whether that position is determined "subjectively" by the respondents themselves or "objectively" by their answers to Q.40 of the survey (see Table 10.9). The mean placement of "self" by '79 Group respondents on the 0-10 left-right scale, at 2.15, is well to the left of the mean self-placement of non-'79 Group activists (3.96). Similarly, the mean score of '79 Group members on the "objective" measure (Q.40) is -0.59, compared with -0.19 for other activists.

This does not mean that all members of the ICPD/'79 Group were necessarily "more left" than all other activists in the party. As Tables 10.10 and 10.11 demonstrate, there were among activists who did not join the Group some individuals who considered themselves to be (Q.26), or whose views on issues revealed them to be (Q.40), "more left" than a minority of Group members. But on both the "subjective" and "objective" dimensions of ideology, membership of the '79 Group is strongly and significantly related to a left-wing stance.

**TABLE 10.9 - "SUBJECTIVE" AND "OBJECTIVE" MEASURES OF
THE IDEOLOGY OF '79 GROUP MEMBERS AND OTHER
ACTIVISTS**

	'79 Group Members	Non-'79 Group Activists	All Activists
Mean Placement of Self on 0-10 Scale (Q. 26)	2.15* (N=22)	3.96* (N=197)	3.78 (N=219)
Mean Score on Objective (-1 to + 1) Scale (Q. 40)	-0.59* (N=25)	-0.15* (N=239)	-0.19 (N=264)
Correlation between individual scores on "subjective" and "objective" measures (Pearson's r)	.87° (N=22)	.55° (N=197)	.61° (N=219)

* Difference of means significant at .05.

° Pearson's r significant at all levels.

SOURCE: SNP Activists Survey, QQ. 26, 40 and 43.

**TABLE 10.10 - "SUBJECTIVE" SELF-PLACEMENT ON THE LEFT-RIGHT
AXIS, BY "GROUP" MEMBERSHIP**

Placement of Self on "Subjective" 0-10 Scale (Q.26)	'79 Group		Non-'79 Group	
	Members		Activists	
Less than or equal to 2	13 (59.1%)		30 (15.2%)	43 (19.6%)
Greater than 2	9 (40.9%)		167 (84.8%)	176 (80.4%)
	22		197	N=219

Q = 0.78
 $\chi^2 = 24.13$ (Significant at all levels)

SOURCE: SNP Activists Survey, QQ. 26 and 43.

TABLE 10.11 - "OBJECTIVE" PLACEMENT ON THE LEFT-RIGHT
 AXIS, BY "GROUP" MEMBERSHIP

	'79 Group Members	Non-'79 Group Activists	
Individual Scores on "Objective" -1 to +1 Scale (Q. 40)			
Less than or equal to -0.5	18 (72.0%)	29 (12.1%)	47 (17.8%)
Greater than -0.5	7 (28.0%)	210 (87.9%)	217 (82.2%)
	25	239	N=264

$\chi^2 = 0.90$
 $\chi^2 = 55.20$ (Significant at all levels)

SOURCE: SNP Activists Survey, QQ. 40 and 43.

Given their positions on the left of the party and their general propensity to consider that working class support was crucial to the electoral fortunes of the SNP, in combination with the views expressed in interviews, it may be argued that an important source of dissatisfaction for members of the ICPD/'79 Group was a perceived decline in the quality of the party product as the SNP rejected "progressive" economic and social policies by returning to a more traditional 'fundamentalist' strategy.

By way of contrast, the thirteen respondents whose dissatisfaction with the SNP led them either to leave or to become inactive members were generally located on the right of the party as a whole. Their mean self-placement on the left-right scale was 4.33, compared with a mean for all activists of 3.78, and their mean score on the "objective" (-1 to +1) scale was -0.12, compared with -0.19 for all respondents. Their dissatisfaction, therefore, was largely derived from causes other than the ideological shift of the party (as we have seen, in some cases devolution was a crucial factor) and the ICPD/'79 Group was not the appropriate vehicle for expressing their discontent."

CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter we have endeavoured to identify some of the sources of dissatisfaction among activists of the Scottish National Party which gave rise to the formation of the Interim

Committee for Political Discussion (ICPD) and to the expression of organized collective Voice by the ICPD and its successor, the SNP '79 Group.

Clearly, the timing of the emergence of the ICPD indicates that the electoral defeat suffered by the SNP in May 1979 was not the sole, nor even the primary, cause of dissatisfaction for those who joined it. The small group which constituted the nucleus of the ICPD began meeting initially in response to the referendum outcome, although interviews with individual members confirm that there was also a deep-seated discontent with the general orientation of the party (and with some of its leaders) in the late 1970s.

The defeat of the Labour government in late March and the subsequent general election campaign, however, delayed the first public meeting of the ICPD until the end of May. By this time, the election result and the party's dominant reaction to it (i.e., a return to 'fundamentalism') further increased the dissatisfaction of those activists who were both self-declared socialists and nationalists.

Of the various indicators of dissatisfaction introduced in this chapter, however, none was successful in differentiating all ICPD/'79 Group members collectively from the remainder of the activist component. '79 Group respondents were somewhat more likely than other activists to support devolution as an option rather than "Independence - Nothing Less" and to agree that the SNP "did not work hard

enough for the Assembly" in the referendum campaign. They were more likely to be critical of the Nationalist Members of Parliament, both in their general performance between 1974 and 1979 and for their role in helping to bring down the Labour government. They were less likely to be satisfied with the SNP performance in the 1979 general election. But in all these cases, ICPD/'79 Group members collectively differed from the other party activists only by degree and none of the variations was statistically significant. Dissatisfaction was evidently widespread within the SNP, but for the majority of members it was not channelled into overt, organized, factional activity, although for a small minority of our respondents it did contribute to their decisions to Exit from the party.

Only three measures discussed in this chapter were significantly and strongly related to respondents' membership of the ICPD/'79 Group. One was the identification of the SNP's failure to hold on to the electoral support of the working class as an important factor determining the outcome of the 1979 general election. The other two related to the left-wing ideological positions held individually and collectively by ICPD/'79 Group members (on both the "subjective" and "objective" left-right scales) which, we suggested, gave rise to dissatisfaction with the changing ideological mood of the party in the late 1970s. But if these characteristics were, indeed, indicative of the sources of discontent with the product of the party, they were by no

means restricted exclusively to activists who joined the ICPD/'79 Group as a means of Voicing their dissatisfaction.

The outcome of the devolution referendum and the SNP's failure to "work hard enough" in the referendum campaign, the performance of the parliamentary group between 1974 and 1979, the loss of working class support, the general election result, the rejection of "leftist" politics and the return to the fundamentals of "Independence - Nothing Less", each of these was perceived by some SNP activists as a deterioration in the product of the party or in its organizational performance and gave rise to a certain level of dissatisfaction. But only a minority of dissatisfied members were destined to resort to the expression of organized collective Voice in an attempt to remedy the situation. An even smaller percentage (of our respondents, at least) sought to alleviate their discontent with the SNP by leaving the party in order to pursue objectives via membership of another party or organization. Clearly, dissatisfaction does not lead automatically to (or even to consideration of) either Exit or Voice. In the next chapter we examine the intervening stages of the Exit/Voice model as they applied to dissatisfied members of the Scottish National Party in the years following 1979.

NOTES - CHAPTER TEN

1. Interviews, May-June 1983. See also the letter, "Devo Had Its Day", by John MacGregor, Scots Independent, no. 133, April 1982, p. 6.
2. This statement may be apocryphal - although it was cited word-for-word by two different sources interviewed a year apart, neither of them had heard it uttered first-hand. Interviews, March-April 1982, May-June 1983.
3. For details of the referendum result, see Chapter Six, especially Table 6.5.
4. Interviews, May-June 1983.
5. This analysis of voting behaviour in the referendum has been treated with a degree of scepticism by some Scottish academics; see, for example, H.M. Drucker, "Crying Wolfe: Recent Divisions in the SNP", Political Quarterly, vol. 50, no. 4, 1979, p. 504. Ms. MacDonald's conclusions appear to have been derived from aggregate data (socio-economic characteristics of constituencies) rather than opinion polls or surveys of individual voters.
6. See for example, Andrew Currie, "Which Way Forward?", SNP 79 Group Papers No. 1, (mimeo), p. 3. This paper was one of three which formed the basis for discussion at the first formal meeting of the ICPD in May 1979.
7. Interviews, March-April 1982.
8. The basic principles of the ICPD/'79 Group are reproduced in SNP 79 Group Papers No. 1, pp. 7-8.
9. Cited in Drucker, "Crying Wolfe", pp. 505-506.
10. Cited in ibid., p. 507.

11. Billy Wolfe, "Unbroken Spirit", Scots Independent, no. 99, June 1979, p. 3.
12. Discussed earlier in Chapter Eight, above.
13. Interviews, March-April 1982. Two of the headquarters staff released had been among the original seven "founding" members of ICPD who had gathered at Kennedy's home.
14. Robert Silver, "Ice Piccaninnies", Scots Independent, no. 101, August 1979, p. 3.
15. Drucker, "Crying Wolfe", p. 508.
16. Report by the Party Secretary on Annual Conference 1979 - Outcome of Business on the Agenda (SNP Headquarters, mimeo, September 1979).
17. Report from the Senior Vice-Chairman to the 45th Annual National Conference, Dundee, September 1979. (All emphases in original.)
18. Cited by Mark V. Kauppi, "The decline of the Scottish National Party, 1977-81: political and organization factors", Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 5, no. 3, 1982, fn. 30, p. 345.
19. Scottish Daily Express, September 17, 1979.
20. The Scotsman, September 17, 1979.
21. According to one participant at the 1979 Conference, "delegates, perhaps unconsciously, made the '79 Group the scapegoats.... But the reaction was one against faction-forming ... rather than a 'swing to the right'." A'llan Macartney, "The Turning Point Where Nothing Changed", Scots Independent, no. 103, October 1979, p. 12.

22. Discussed further in Chapter Fourteen.
23. Also discussed further in Chapter Fourteen.
24. We have also included in the "Independence - Nothing Less" group, respondents who indicated that "No Change" was preferable to all other options except independence and those who marked independence as the first preference and all other options as fifth, sixth, tenth, or whatever.
25. Blaming the media for party problems or defeats is a long-established tradition in the SNP - see, for example, the complaints advanced by the National Party of Scotland in the early 1930s against media bias, cited in Arthur Donaldson, "Press Ganged up to Fight SNP", Scots Independent, no. 126, September 1981, p. 8.
26. $\chi^2 = 6.81$, significant at .05.
27. See "Organisations - Campaign for a Scottish Assembly", The Bulletin of Scottish Politics, vol. 1, no. 1, 1980, pp. 91-93.
28. However, both also indicated dissatisfaction with the ideological conflict within the party after 1979; for example, "I left the SNP because it was disintegrating into a party split by left and right political dogma" (Respondent #101).
29. See Nicolas Baxter-Moore, "The Rise and Fall of the Scottish National Party: Revisited", paper presented to the European Politics Group Workshop, London, Ontario, December 1979, pp. 28-45; Jack Brand, Duncan McLean and William Miller, "The Birth and Death of a Three-Party System", British Journal of Political Science, vol. 13, no. 4, 1983, pp. 463-488.
30. See Chapter Eight, above.
31. Interviews, March-April 1982, May-June 1983.

32. Interviews, March-April 1982.
33. See Questionnaire, Q.38, proposition g. This rather innocuous statement was again the consequence of revisions to the original questionnaire, but was still considered "offensive" and "tendentious" by some activists who otherwise refused to respond - it is assumed that they disagreed!
34. SNP 79 Group activist, Interviews, March-April 1982.
35. See, for example, the report by William Hunter of the Glasgow Herald on the Dundee Conference debates about the election outcome. "The delegates had a simple formula. It was all the fault of the media who had destroyed the self-confidence of the Scottish people." Glasgow Herald, September 17, 1979.
36. Currie, "Which Way Forward?", p. 2.
37. See the introduction to Currie's paper in SNP 79 Group Papers No. 1, p. 1.
38. Stephen Maxwell, "Beyond Social Democracy" in Gavin Kennedy, ed., The Radical Approach: Papers on an independent Scotland (Edinburgh: Palingenesis Press, 1976), p. 7.
39. Ray Burnett, "Socialists and the SNP" in Gordon Brown, ed., The Red Paper on Scotland (Edinburgh: EUSPB, 1975), pp. 113, 118.
40. ibid., pp. 108, 119.
41. One who did not, however, was Bob Tait who left the SNP for the SLP only a year after publishing a spirited reply to Burnett in defence of the SNP's potential for socialist change; see Bob Tait, "The Left, The SNP And Oil" in Brown, ed., The Red Paper on Scotland, pp. 125-133.

42. Owen Dudley Edwards, "Socialism or Nationalism?" in Kennedy, ed., The Radical Approach, pp. 100-101.
43. See letters to the Scots Independent, no. 94, January 1979, pp. 6-7.
44. David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh, The British General Election of 1979 (London: Macmillan, 1980), p. 310.
45. Donald Stewart, "Only One Road Ahead for the SNP", The Scotsman, July 17, 1979, p. 8.
46. Although the SNP was undoubtedly in severe financial difficulties, what is important here is that the perception of political victimization of left-wing activists reinforced the view among ICPD/'79 Group members that "the right" was taking over the party.
47. Interviews, May-June 1983.
48. The response of these members will be discussed further in Chapters Eleven and Fourteen, below.

Chapter Eleven

FROM DISSATISFACTION TO PROTEST: THE EXIT/VOICE CALCULUS

The logic of the Exit/Voice model outlined in Chapter Four suggests that dissatisfaction with an absolute or relative decline in the quality of a party product, or in organizational performance, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for resort to Exit or Voice.

First, we argued that a crucial prerequisite for any kind of activity that imposes costs on the individual is a belief in the possibility of improvement, i.e., a rational actor will resort to Exit or Voice only if he/she believes that the chosen course of action will result in an improvement or restoration of the quality of the product.

Second, the selection of one of the Exit/Voice options will depend upon the Exit/Voice calculus, i.e., upon the perceived availability of each alternative and on a comparison of the perceived costs and benefits associated with each one. For example, if Exit is perceived to be unavailable, then the choice is effectively between Voice (or varying levels or "volumes" of Voice) and silence; and, if the perceived costs of Voice outweigh the expected benefits to be derived from its expression, we would expect that silence will be maintained.

Alternatively, if Exit and Voice are both available and offer similar expected net benefits, but the individual cannot "afford" the costs associated with a volume of Voice required to achieve those benefits, then we may expect Exit to result.

For dissatisfaction with the party product to be expressed through organized collective Voice by the members of the Interim Committee for Political Discussion and the SNP 79 Group, therefore, we would expect the following conditions to be present. First, members must believe that the product of the party, or its organizational performance, can be improved. Second, Exit is either unavailable or the expected net benefits of Voice (perhaps mediated by Loyalty, see Chapter Four) outweigh the perceived net benefits of Exit. Third, given the costs associated with the "logic of collective action", members must believe that only through organization and collective expression can they maintain a sufficient volume of Voice to bring about the desired improvement in the quality of the party product.

In this chapter we examine each of these conditions as it pertained to the mobilization of organized collective Voice within the Scottish National Party by the ICPD/'79 Group. In the first section we examine the availability of the Exit option. In the second, we explore the strategy advocated by the ICPD/'79 Group as a means of improving the quality of the product from within the SNP. In the final section, we investigate Group members' perceptions of the opportunities

for the expression of Voice and the possible influence of Loyalty on their decisions to remain within the party; here, too, consideration will be given to the estimation of the costs and benefits of different volumes of Voice which led the members to pursue an organized collective approach to its expression.

EXIT vs. VOICE: THE EXIT OPTION

As we suggested in Chapter Four, members of a political party may Exit in a number of ways. First, they may cease to be members of the party, indeed of any party - this we referred to earlier as "Exit by resignation". Second, they may leave, individually or collectively, to become members of an existing rival party - "Exit by defection". Third, they may secede collectively to establish a separate political party or organization - "Exit by schism". In addition, party activists, as opposed to ordinary party members, also have a fourth option available in that they may cease to play an active role in the party while remaining paid-up members of the organization - this response may be conveniently labelled "Exit by dropping-out".

Although we can make no estimate of the total number of party activists who resorted to Exit in one form or another after 1979, thirteen respondents to the SNP Activists Survey (4.7 per cent of all responses) indicated that they had either left the SNP altogether or had ceased to be actively involved

in the party organization.¹ Two former candidates who had left the party had been effectively forced to do so by changes in their occupations. One, who had been active in the SNP as a student, was now a minister of religion in which capacity, he wrote, "it is ill-advised to be an open member of a party" (Respondent #125). Another, who declined to respond to the survey, explained "As a holder of judicial office I cannot express political views." In these cases, we assume, Exit from the party was not related directly to dissatisfaction with the party product but, rather, was a function of an increase in the costs of continued membership.

For some respondents, however, Exit from the SNP was clearly a consequence of dissatisfaction with the quality of the party product or a decline in its organizational performance. Two former candidates (already mentioned in the previous chapter) had departed to join rival parties, one to the Liberals, one to the Social Democrats. In both cases, they indicated that their new parties offered a superior product, in part because the Liberal/SDP stands on devolution were closer to their own views than the 'Independence - Nothing Less' position reaffirmed by the SNP in 1979.

The others who had left the party gave no reasons for their Exit; neither did they indicate membership or activity in any other political organization (one exception is noted below). We can only assume that the costs of party membership

now outweighed the immediate personal benefit to be derived from this particular form of collective action.

Similarly, for most of the inactive "drop-outs", while they remained members of the party, the costs of activism (in terms of time, energy, emotional commitment, etc.) appear to have exceeded the perceived benefits. One respondent, for example, remarked that he was "not sufficiently motivated at the moment" to be actively involved in party affairs (Respondent #011); however, this former candidate must have rediscovered his enthusiasm because he ran again for the party in 1983! Another former candidate's appended comments suggested that she may always have been a somewhat reluctant activist: "All I wish for is an independent Scotland. When that happens I shall hope to forget politics forever" (Respondent #095).

One "drop-out" did admit that it was doubtful if she would renew her membership of the SNP "due to total disaffection at the leadership of the party and the pathetic performance of major figures in it" (Respondent #303). For the most part, however, the dissatisfaction of former activists with the party product appears to have been insufficient to overcome their residual Loyalty to the party or to the Nationalist cause, nor was it sufficiently strong to induce them to incur the costs associated with resort to Voice; hence they remained passive members of the party, while Exiting from activist roles.

But these may be the exceptions. Most party activists, we would suggest, are essentially political beings who derive certain benefits from the act of political participation in addition to those which may be attained as a consequence of active involvement. Exit by dropping-out or resignation, therefore, are not viable options, unless their political energies can be channelled in new or different directions such as pressure group activity, which often serves as a substitute for Exit by defection to another political party. One example may be cited from the SNP Activists Survey in the form of Respondent #105 who left the SNP on the day of the devolution referendum, subsequently voted for (but did not join) the Labour Party and then became actively involved in the new Campaign for a Scottish Assembly. Further support for this generalization is provided by the Radical Scotland survey of former members of the '79 Group. Among 35 respondents who indicated that they had left (or been expelled from) the SNP after 1982, only one had joined another political party but twenty-seven (77.1 per cent) were now active in other organizations, in particular, the anti-nuclear and peace movements (especially Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament), the union movement or in the new Scottish Socialist Society.²

For most disaffected "left-wingers" in the SNP in 1979, therefore, we would suggest that neither resignation nor dropping-out would have constituted immediately attractive responses to their dissatisfaction. However, as we shall

explain below, neither Exit by defection nor Exit by schism was a particularly attractive option either.

Exit by Defection - The Labour Party Alternative

Since they were self-proclaimed socialists, had any disaffected SNP activists contemplated defection to another political party prior to joining the ICPD or the '79 Group, the Labour Party would appear to have been the most obvious candidate.

In simple "left versus right" ideological terms, members of the '79 Group who responded to the SNP Activists Survey placed themselves closer to the Labour Party than to the SNP (or to any other political party). In their responses to Q. 26, the '79 Group members' mean placement of "self" on the Left(=0)/Right(=10) scale was 2.15, much closer to the mean position in which they placed the Labour Party (2.31) than that to which they assigned the SNP (3.44 - see Table 11.1a). And a majority (54.5 per cent) of '79 Group respondents situated themselves on the scale closer to Labour than to the SNP, twice the percentage who positioned themselves closer to the SNP than to Labour (see Table 11.1b).

However, none of the ICPD/'79 Group members that we interviewed admitted giving serious consideration to the possibility of leaving the SNP to join Labour in 1979.³ One reason may well have been their reluctance to Exit from a party in which many of them had worked their way up to achieve

**TABLE 11.1 - "SUBJECTIVE" IDEOLOGICAL SELF-PLACEMENT
OF '79 GROUP MEMBERS RELATIVE TO LABOUR
AND THE SNP**

a) Mean placement of "Self", Labour Party and SNP on the 0-10 Left-Right Scale (Q. 26) by '79 Group members

Mean placement of "Self"	2.15 (N=22)
Mean placement of Labour Party	2.31 (N=24)
Mean placement of SNP	3.44 (N=24)

b) Individual placement of "Self" relative to placement of the Labour Party and the SNP by '79 Group members (Q. 26)

	N	%
Placed "Self" closer to Labour	12	54.5
Placed Labour and SNP equidistant from "Self"	4	18.2
Placed "Self" closer to SNP	<u>6</u>	27.3
	22	
(Missing)	(3)	

SOURCE: SNP Activists Survey, QQ. 26 and 43.

some degree of influence in order to start all over again within a new organization. But two other factors were also cited.

First, the kind of socialism advocated for an independent Scotland by the ICPD/'79 Group was somewhat different from the mainstream ideology and policies of the Labour Party. In a paper entitled "Labourism or Socialism?" discussed at one of the early ICPD meetings, Stephen Maxwell argued that "Labourism ... has always had as its aim the general betterment of the working class rather than the creation of a socialist society."⁴ In other words, 'Labourism' (the term was borrowed from Keir Hardie) attempted to ameliorate conditions for the working class (especially the organized, or unionized, segment of that class) within the existing structures of capitalist society, largely through increased centralization and state control. Thus, the Group declared, "We see ourselves on the left of the political spectrum but we totally reject the state-controlled paternalism of today's centralist Labour Party."⁵

Nor was the variety of socialism advocated by Labour's "Bennite" left-wing any more attractive to socialists in the SNP since that, too, sought to extend centralized state control. Furthermore, in Maxwell's view, Scotland's natural resources (especially oil) would be pillaged to help to pay for increased public spending and to compensate for the inevitable loss of international confidence if a "Bennite"

Labour government carried out its plans to nationalize the financial institutions.'

Because of the weakness of the Scottish private sector, Maxwell believed, the burden of Scotland's economic reconstruction "must lie on the public sector in one form or another." But in contrast to the policies and past record of the Labour Party, in order to prevent further centralization, the redistribution of income and wealth must be accompanied by a diffusion of power to permit tenants' control, workers' control and democratic community control over both the public and private sectors.' In essence, Maxwell has concluded, "the struggle for democratic socialism cannot be restricted to economic institutions; it must be waged on political, social and cultural fronts at the same time" if Scotland were to emerge as an independent socialist democracy.'

The second obstacle to defection to Labour was that, as Nationalists, members of the '79 Group were generally suspicious of the true extent of the Labour Party's commitment to Scottish self-government. Although a Labour government had been responsible for the passage of the *Scotland Act* and the party had reaffirmed its commitment to a Scottish Assembly in the 1979 election campaign, this was viewed by most Nationalists (members of the ICPD/'79 Group included) as a desperate ploy to forestall a further advance by the SNP.' Moreover, the vast majority of '79 Group respondents to the SNP Activists Survey blamed the Labour Party's failure to

support the devolution legislation for the referendum outcome (see Table 10.3, above). Hence, when asked which party they saw as "closest to the SNP" in a number of policy areas (Q. 22), large majorities of '79 Group members considered Labour to be closest to the SNP in the areas of economic and social policy, but less than one-fifth considered Labour to be close on the issues of independence, devolution or the management of North Sea oil revenues (see Table 11.2).

The larger sample of former '79 Group members who responded to the Radical Scotland survey also demonstrated little faith collectively in the Labour Party's willingness or ability to bring about constitutional change. Less than one-third (25 out of 78) respondents thought that a future Labour government would implement its manifesto commitment to a Scottish Assembly (RSS, Q. 27a). In answer to the question "which of the following organizations do you see as most likely to bring about Scottish independence?" (RSS, Q. 22) 42.5 per cent opted for the SNP and only 17.5 per cent for Labour (see Table 11.3). Other organizations mentioned included the new Scottish Socialist Society¹⁰ or a new "Socialist Independence Party", and the Campaign for a Scottish Assembly. Seven respondents replied "None" or "It will never happen", including one who suggested that independence would most likely be brought about by "God, but I'm an atheist".

**TABLE 11.2 - '79 GROUP MEMBERS' PERCEPTIONS OF PROXIMITY OF OTHER
PARTIES TO SNP ON SELECTED ISSUES/POLICY AREAS**

Issue/Policy Area	Percentage of '79 Group Respondents naming Party as Closest to SNP on each issue					(N)
	CONS	LAB	LIB	SDP	NONE	
Independence	0	15.5	8.3	0	79.2	100.0 (24)
Devolution	0	17.4	60.9	0	21.7	100.0 (23)
Economic Policy	0	74.0	4.3	4.3	17.4	100.0 (23)
Social Policy	0	95.8	4.2	0	0	100.0 (24)
North Sea Oil Revenues	0	13.6	18.2	0	68.2	100.0 (22)

SOURCE: SNP Activists Survey, Qs. 22 and 43.

**TABLE 11.3 - '79 GROUP MEMBERS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE
ORGANIZATION MOST LIKELY TO BRING ABOUT
SCOTTISH INDEPENDENCE**

Organization	N	%
SNP	34	42.5
Labour Party	14	17.5
Scottish Socialist Society/A New Socialist Independence Party	10	12.5
Campaign for a Scottish Assembly	7	8.8
SNP/Labour Coalition	4	5.0
Other organizations	4	5.0
None/"It will never happen"	<u>7</u>	8.8
	80	
(Missing - No Answer/ Don't Know)	(2)	

N.B. - percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

SOURCE: Radical Scotland Survey, Q. 22.

As socialists, therefore, those who joined the ICPD/'79 Group may have been closer ideologically to the Labour Party than to the SNP, although the kind of socialism advocated, at least by some of the Group leaders, with its emphasis on decentralization and the diffusion of power at all levels, was in some respects more similar to SNP orthodoxy than to the state-centred "Labourism" of the Labour Party. However it is also clear that, as Nationalists, disaffected Left-wing activists in the SNP were mistrustful of the Labour Party's commitment to devolution and few saw it as a potential vehicle for Scottish independence. Hence, while the Labour Party was available as an Exit option, it promised little improvement in the quality of the product consumed by left-wing Nationalists.

Exit by Schism - The Example of the SLP

For a brief time in the mid-1970s, left-wing Nationalists who were disaffected with the SNP had another party to which defection was a viable option; this was the short-lived Scottish Labour Party (SLP). But by May 1979, the SLP was in total disarray. Not only was it no longer available as an Exit option, its brief history was also a warning of the dangers of Exit by schism. As one '79 Group member told the author, "Any thoughts we may have had about forming a separate political party were quickly put aside when somebody pointed out 'Look what happened to the SLP'."¹¹

The Scottish Labour Party was established in December 1975, less than a month after the publication of the Labour government's White Paper on devolution, *Our Changing Democracy*.¹² Jim Sillars, Labour MP for South Ayrshire, was the key figure behind the breakaway. For the previous four years, he had been a member of a so-called "mini-cadre" of Labour MPs and party activists which had been urging reform of the Labour Party and for it to adopt as party policy the proposals for devolution contained in the 1971 Kilbrandon Report.

Sillars and his colleagues were bitterly disappointed by the provisions of the White Paper, especially by the lack of "economic teeth" among the powers to be assigned to the new Scottish Assembly. The day after the release of the proposals, Sillars and two other members of the "mini-cadre" met to discuss their options. They agreed that staying within the Labour Party to express opposition was not a serious possibility, since the party would not permit the organized expression of collective Voice on a crucial item of government policy. Sillars argued strongly against collective defection to the SNP because "the SNP was not Socialist and he couldn't stomach the leaders of that party."¹³ None of the three could accept the idea of abandoning political life altogether. The only option left was that of Exit by schism to create a new party.

The "mini-cadre" and a few invited supporters met on December 23, 1975, to elect temporary office-holders and a steering committee responsible for organizing the Inaugural Meeting of the Scottish Labour Party in mid-January 1976. Sillars was conspicuously absent from this first meeting so that he could subsequently be invited to join the SLP leadership, in an attempt to demonstrate that the party was not merely a one-man band. He was duly acclaimed as Chairman at the Inaugural Meeting. There, too, the SLP adopted an organizational structure which was similar in many respects to that of the SNP (and therefore possessed many of the same weaknesses) and approved the party platform.

The SLP was, first, to be a socialist party which would inherit the tradition of Scottish socialism long abandoned by the Labour Party. This served also to distinguish it from the SNP which, the SLP leaders argued, was a bourgeois nationalist party. Second, it took a hard line on devolution, demanding the establishment of an elected Scottish Assembly exercising significant powers - although it was subsequently forced to move closer to the SNP's independentist position in order to distance itself from the later devolution proposals of the Labour government. In brief, the SLP was intended to "put a socialist dimension into Scottish politics and a Scottish dimension into socialist politics."¹⁴ Moreover, unlike the Labour Party, Sillars promised, the new party would be a

democratic organization (a claim which many members came to doubt later on).

Aided by extensive, and largely sympathetic, press coverage (a number of influential journalists such as Neal Ascherson, Scottish Political Correspondent for The Scotsman newspaper, were members of the SLP) and by the defection of a second Labour MP, John Robertson, the new party grew rapidly. In the first nine months, 41 branches were established and around 900 members were signed up (although the party frequently inflated the latter figure to two or three thousand for publicity purposes).

Members were recruited from a variety of sources. The excitement of a new "anti-establishment" party, the charisma of Sillars and the blend of nationalism and socialism offered by the SLP attracted many young former Labour activists and also some disaffected left-wingers from the SNP. Several journalists (such as Ascherson), intellectuals (such as Tom Nairn) and students, who had been involved in socialist or nationalist politics or fringe leftist organizations without being members of a major party, were also drawn by the prospect of a distinct Scottish socialist party.

However the SLP failed to gain the support of the sectors that its leaders, especially Sillars, wanted most - the working class and, in particular, the trade unions.¹⁵ Except for some working class support in Sillars' home base of Ayrshire, it was largely a party of intellectuals, students

and the professional middle-class. As one SLP activist, a postgraduate student, admitted to Henry Drucker, "Sillars' problem was that he wanted my father - who's a railwayman - to join; what he got was me."¹⁶ Hence, the SLP was, from the beginning, a truncated socialist party: "it seemed like an army of officers looking for a rank-and-file."¹⁷

But the SLP also attracted some unwanted elements, in particular, the Scottish section of the International Marxist Group (IMG) and other, smaller, Trotskyist groups which saw in the emerging SLP an opportunity to practise "entryism" in order to transform it into a vehicle for their own particular brands of socialism.¹⁸ A further problem for the party leadership was that the largely middle-class membership took Sillars at his word when he promised that the SLP would be a democratic party. A number of branches demonstrated their independence from, and willingness to criticise, the leadership in the summer of 1976. In the belief that these branches might already have been controlled by the IMG, Sillars and his immediate circle took steps to counter the threat at the first Annual Congress of the SLP in October 1976.

On the first day of the Stirling Congress, the delegates voted to suspend seven named members of the IMG and the entire Leith branch. Rather than silence the rebels, this action seemed only to intensify the criticism directed at the leadership and its policies. On the third day of the

Congress, with Sillars threatening to resign if the motion were not passed, a majority of the delegates voted to disband four more branches and to expel their office-holders and delegates from the party. Enraged by the strongarm tactics of the leadership, delegates from eighteen other branches joined the expellees in a nearby hotel to convene their own "alternative Congress". The 'breakaway party' had suffered its own schism.

The schismatic minority, claiming to be the "true" SLP, established itself as the SLP (DW-Democratic Wing). But, although they were initially outnumbered in the new organization, the commitment and solidarity of the IMG members allowed them to dominate the SLP (DW), and in early 1977 it was transformed into the openly Trotskyist Scottish Socialist League.

For the rump of the SLP which had stayed with Sillars, the challenge became one of mere survival. In the months following the Stirling Congress, many members and activists either resigned or dropped out and a large proportion of the branches disappeared. Drucker has estimated that, of the 41 branches which existed in October 1976, only sixteen appeared still to be active a year later.¹⁹ The party ran into serious financial difficulties. Most importantly, perhaps, for the party whose growth had been aided so much by media support, the SLP was no longer of much interest to the press once the events of the Stirling Congress had been picked over.

The SLP did win three seats in the 1977 District Council elections, polling an average of 21 per cent of the votes in the 35 seats contested - largely in Ayrshire and other areas where it had initially been strong. However, it won no seats in the 1978 Regional elections and in the only parliamentary by-election contested, Glasgow Garscadden, the SLP candidate received 1.6 per cent of the votes.

As we have already noted, SLP members played an active role in the referendum campaign, frequently working alongside the young SNP activists who were to become involved in the ICPD and the '79 Group; and Sillars was one of the most articulate voices in favour of the Scottish Assembly, often sharing a platform with Margo MacDonald and other leftist or pro-devolution members of the SNP National Executive. Nonetheless, it has been argued that Sillars' and the SLP's break with the Labour Party contributed to the failure of the devolution initiative: according to Christopher Harvie, "The SLP episode was a disaster for devolution: it isolated its most eloquent left-winger [Sillars], and gravely weakened its cause within Labour."²⁰

The end came for the SLP with the 1979 general election. One SLP MP, John Robertson, did not seek re-election and Sillars lost his South Ayrshire seat to Labour by a margin of 1500 votes. The only other SLP candidates, in Edinburgh Central and Robertson's old seat of Paisley, received 0.7 per cent and 1.4 per cent of the votes respectively. With no MPs,

no popular base of support among the working class or trade unions and only a handful of its former activists still committed, the "magic party", as it was once labelled by its supporters and the media, simply disappeared.

The demise of the SLP effectively closed off two potential Exit options for dissatisfied members of the SNP. First, the SLP experience showed how difficult it was for a small new party to break into an established party system, particularly under the first-past-the-post electoral formula. Of course, things might have been different for the SLP, as for the SNP, had there been a general election, or even a parliamentary by-election, in 1976. Indeed, Sillars acknowledged later that he had broken too early with the Labour Party in part because he had believed at the time that the minority Labour government could not survive another year in office. Moreover, he admitted, the leaders of the SLP had "failed to do the basic ground work" that was necessary to establish local cadres of activists and particularly to ensure the support of trade unionists before establishing the new party.²¹

For disaffected members of the SNP in 1979, who lacked Sillars' contacts with the trade unions and with sympathetic journalists, and who might be no more immune to the disruptive effects of entryism by the extreme left, the example of the SLP served as a warning of the dangers of attempting to form a new party. Even with adequate organization and preparation,

the benefits of Exit by schism were by no means certain and the potential costs (time, effort, the dangers of political isolation and the probability of failure) were high.

Second, as Sherri Grasmuck has suggested, in the mid-1970s the SLP acted as an outlet for discontent among left-wing members of the SNP. Some actually did defect to the new party. Others, who disagreed with SNP policy but considered it still the most effective instrument for achieving independence, or at least an Assembly, could set aside their ideological differences with the party in the short term and work within it for constitutional change secure in the belief that, once this had been achieved, the SLP would provide a more congenial home for their beliefs. Hence, Grasmuck argued, the emergence of a socialist rival to the SNP "may have, paradoxically, strengthened the coherence of the nationalist party by providing a symbolic, if not real, safety valve."²²

By May 1979, however, there was no such safety valve to maintain the cohesion of the SNP: there was no Scottish socialist alternative to which left-wing Nationalists could defect physically in the present or, mentally, in the future. And with membership of the Labour Party offering little prospect for improvement in the quality of the product they consumed, dissatisfied members of the SNP had little choice, if they wished to remain active, but to continue to work within the SNP.

THE '79 GROUP STRATEGY FOR IMPROVEMENT

In the absence of any available Exit option which offered the possibility of an improvement in their prospects of goal attainment, disaffected left-wing Nationalists still had the Voice option available if they wished to alert the "management" of the SNP to the decline in organizational performance. However, as we noted in Chapter Four, since the Voice option generally incurs costs for those resorting to it, it will be used only where dissatisfied members believe strongly that the organization can be turned around. Hence, before we investigate the perceptions of ICPD/'79 Group members of the opportunities for Voice and their approach to reducing the costs of its expression, we must first examine their strategy for improving the quality of the party product.

Strategies for Improvement

Widespread dissatisfaction with the outcome of the devolution referendum and with the confirmation of the party's electoral decline in May 1979 led many members of the SNP to search for ways in which the deterioration of the party product could be reversed.

For some, the solution lay in a return to "fundamentals", to the outright rejection of devolution in favour of "Independence - Nothing Less" as the party's sole constitutional demand and to a de-emphasis of social democratic policies in favour of the more traditional, non-

ideological, catch-all appeal to all Scots who desired self-government." This group carried the majority with it at the Dundee Conference in September 1979. But this "solution" only served to heighten the dissatisfaction of other activists within the party.

A few, as we have reported earlier, viewed this change of orientation as a further decline of such a magnitude that continued membership or activity in the party was not worthwhile. Hence, they either dropped out or resigned and, in some cases, sought an improvement in their party product by joining other parties such as the Liberals or, later, the new Social Democratic Party.

Others, such as William Wolfe, stayed within the SNP to advocate a restoration of the explicit, but moderate, social democratic image that had proven so successful in 1974 but which, in their view, had been lost by 1979 (in part as a consequence of the behaviour of the parliamentary group). Although they constituted a distinct tendency within the SNP, the social democrats did not organize themselves, but continued to lobby (express Voice) on an individual basis for acceptance of their views.

Finally, there was a relatively small minority of activists who believed strongly that only an overtly socialist appeal could wean away from the Labour Party the working class support that was vital if the SNP were to win a majority of the seats in Scotland in order to press its claims for

independence. Most of these activists either joined the ICPD/'79 Group or at least demonstrated their sympathy (through their votes at Conference or by subscribing to '79 Group publications) with its strategy for improving the party product.

The Aims and Strategy of the '79 Group

The Interim Committee for Political Discussion formally committed itself to three basic principles at its second public meeting in June 1979 and the same long-term goals were subsequently retained as the official aims of the SNP 79 Group:"

- Independence - "Full independence is a pre-requisite for the fundamental change in society which would lead to the social and economic restructuring of Scotland"
- Socialism - "Power, income and wealth must be re-distributed to create an egalitarian society"
- Republicanism - "The principle of democracy ...should be recognised in the structures and constitution of an independent Scotland by the principle of election to all state offices."

As a fringe group/faction within the Scottish National Party, the ICPD/'79 Group's more immediate aim was to promote debate, and eventual adoption, of these principles by the SNP because, according to the Group's chief strategist Stephen Maxwell, "The SNP's target should be to establish itself as the radical Scottish alternative to the Labour Party."²⁵

This strategy for improving the product or the organizational performance of the SNP by pushing the party into an avowedly and self-consciously left-wing position was based in part on the ideological predispositions of the members of the ICPD/'79 Group. As we demonstrated in the previous chapter, most adherents to the Group considered themselves to be socialists or, at least, to be on "the left" of the ideological spectrum. They shared a common conviction that, by itself, independence or self-government would prove no solution to the serious economic and social problems confronting Scotland; rather, constitutional change must be accompanied by a radical restructuring of economic, social and political institutions. As Robert Crawford put it, in a paper discussed at the first ICPD meeting:

Scotland needs socialism. It needs direct and sustained intervention, a massive distribution of income and wealth, not to mention power, and only in committing ourselves to such a programme will we convince the Scottish people that Independence is not only just the beginning of true change in our society but something which will have direct benefits for them²⁶

Thus, unlike many SNP activists who tended to view sovereignty as an end in itself, members of the ICPD/'79 Group saw a self-governing Scotland as a society in which their socialist principles could be put into practice. Hence, according to Andrew Currie, a founding member of the ICPD and the Group: "The 79 Group views independence as a means by which an egalitarian and emancipated democratic society can be achieved

within a Scottish state."⁷

As socialists, therefore, members of the ICPD/'79 Group sought to transform the SNP into a more explicitly left-wing party in order that they might feel more at home within it and to create an instrument to give effect to their vision of an independent Scotland. But as nationalists, their desire to reshape the party's image, so that it could appeal directly to the Scottish working class and to voters who had traditionally supported the Labour Party, was also founded upon a strategic analysis of the political and electoral situation in Scotland and, more generally, in the United Kingdom as a whole.

First, the ICPD/'79 Group position argued that the 'fundamentalist' strategy was based on the mistaken belief that SNP support could be rebuilt by "appealing to the basic 'Scottishness' of the Scottish people and that this appeal must not be diluted ... by any specific class or interest group appeal."⁸ This strategy rested in turn on the assumption that "inside every Scot there is a fully armed Nationalist struggling to get out" and that all the SNP had to do therefore was find "the slogan, the issue, which will transform the sentimental nationalism of the Scots into militant political nationalism."⁹

This simple formula was doomed to failure, argued '79 Group strategist Stephen Maxwell, because there was little

cultural or psychological basis for political nationalism in Scotland: according to Maxwell,

'Scottishness' is evident only at Burnsnight suppers and Hampden Park [Scotland's national soccer stadium] - it has no political relevance. Hence nationalism has to be based on material social and economic conditions."

But, with the possible exception of the Oil Campaign of the early 1970s, when it adopted slogans such as "IT'S SCOTLAND'S OIL!" and "RICH SCOTS OR POOR BRITISH?", the SNP had never successfully linked independence to an improvement in the material conditions of the Scottish people. Nor, in its efforts to appeal to members of all classes, had it specified whose interests would best be served by independence. According to Robert Crawford, "the SNP never seriously posed the question; what was its economic purpose in life, on what part of the economic divide did it fall?" The traditional retreat of the SNP in the face of such questions was the claim that it represented the "National Interest" of all Scots; but, argued Crawford, "there is no 'national interest'" and, in "one of Europe's most class conscious societies", the SNP's failure to take a firm stand on economic issues meant that "sooner or later [it] was bound to antagonize one class or another." In the ideologically and class polarized election of 1979, according to ICPC/'79 Group members, it was largely the more numerous working class voters who had demonstrated their disaffection with the SNP by deserting it for the Labour Party (see Chapter Ten, Tables 10.7 and 10.8).

But, if the SNP were to "take sides" on class-based issues, did it inevitably have to align itself with the interests of the working class? According to Stephen Maxwell, it did, because the working class would be more receptive to the case for independence. Even at the height of bourgeois nationalism elsewhere in Europe in the nineteenth century, the Scottish middle class had consistently displayed its lack of interest in exercising national political leadership; and in the twentieth century it had been progressively weakened and/or assimilated by the forces of economic, political and cultural centralization. Thus, while the middle class would "continue to supply activists and intellectual champions to the Nationalist movement", Maxwell argued, "as a collective interest it will be hostile or apathetic."³

The Scottish working class, on the other hand, had developed "a keen sense of its own identity" even though, according to Maxwell, "culturally it is so pickled in tartan sentimentality that it exists today only as a caricature" of the strong class consciousness that had produced the image of 'Red Clydeside' in the early days of the labour movement.³⁴ Nevertheless, members of the ICPD/'79 Group accepted collectively the analysis of voting patterns in the devolution referendum, proposed by Margo MacDonald and others, that most of the votes in favour of the Scottish Assembly had come from the urban working class while the middle class had largely voted against. Robert Crawford, for example, argued that "The

Referendum proved that the most constitutionally ambitious section of the country was the working class of the central industrial belt".⁵ Taking all these factors into account, Maxwell concluded, "in an old industrial country with a weak middle class, the working class offers the only possible base for popular nationalism."⁶

Therefore, if the SNP were to develop a stable basis of mass support, rather than being a convenient depository for protest and tactical votes in certain electoral climates, it must build a "coalition for independence" based on the urban working class. But this was precisely the segment of the population which, in the Group's collective view, had abandoned the SNP between 1974 and 1979. Although Scottish voters, and working class voters in particular, had attempted to keep the Conservatives from office, they had opted for the Labour Party, not the SNP, as their defence against Thatcherism.⁷ And, as guest speaker Tom Nairn told the first public meeting of the ICPD, "That Scottish workers see no other alternative ... [to voting Labour] ... is a devastating comment on the SNP."⁸

However, given the wider political situation in Britain, ICPD/'79 Group members came to believe that the working class and the substantial proportion of the middle class employed in the public sector could be detached from their traditional allegiance to the Labour Party, since that party was itself in a state of crisis. Although Labour had won a majority of

seats in Scotland in 1979, its Scottish MPs were, as usual, "The NCOs of Labour Parliamentary politics, seldom officers."³ In a minority within their own party at Westminster, they were in no position to commit the Labour Party to the defence of Scottish interests in the midst of its own internal factional disputes between right and left. Thus, despite increased support in the Scottish opinion polls in the months after the election, Stephen Maxwell argued, the Labour Party in Scotland was powerless to prevent public expenditure cuts, public sector plant closures and layoffs, rising unemployment, cutbacks in social services and the effects of other Conservative policies injurious to Scotland's already embattled working class.

Unable to play its 'Scottish' card, with a bad Labour record to defend, with the worth of its Election boasts under direct challenge by the policies of the Tory government ... and with few intellectual resources on which to call, the Labour Party in Scotland is far more vulnerable to a radical Nationalist offensive than the bare figures of the opinion polls suggest.⁴⁰

If the Labour Party, despite its traditional electoral strength in Scotland, were powerless to defend the Scots against the "Friedmanite" policies of the "English" Conservative government, then the Scottish National Party must demonstrate its ability to do so. But to supplant Labour as the "defence mechanism" of the working class, Group members believed that the SNP must make itself more relevant to the concerns of voters by linking the political goal of

independence/self-government to concrete solutions to Scotland's economic and social problems. And this required a drastic reorientation of party strategy and ideology.

Remoulding SNP Ideology

The primary strategy of the SNP up to 1979 had been to portray itself as a party for all Scots, or at least for all Scots who desired independence or self-government. Even during its experiment with a self-proclaimed "social democratic" image in the early 1970s, the SNP had deliberately played down class divisions in Scottish society lest it alienate any potential source of electoral support.

The need for a change in this traditional strategy had been publicly advocated even before the referendum, the election and the first public meetings of the ICPD by Robert Crawford, then the party's Research Officer. Writing in the Nationalist monthly, Scots Independent, Crawford argued that by refusing to identify itself with class-based politics and the ideologies of left and right the SNP had placed itself "outside the usual context of political debate." As a result, "large groups in our society have been unable to identify with us on socio-economic issues ... for large numbers of the electorate the SNP is seen as being a single-issue party with no social or economic interests."¹

To the extent that the SNP had an 'ideology', Crawford suggested, it was perceived as an "environmentalist" party

concerned with the "new politics" of community control and government access. But these were issues which tended to appeal to the post-materialist values of the middle class in societies which have already achieved "levels of affluence well beyond anything attained here in Scotland." Most Scots, on the other hand, "have to conquer the basic problems of life before they can go on to concern themselves with 'open government'."42

The solution for Crawford was for the SNP to transform itself into a "truly radical party - one committed to substantial transfers of power and a far greater distribution of income and wealth. Our identity should be that of the party of the underprivileged, of the 'have nots'." Since, he argued, the majority of the electorate makes voting decisions based on generalized images of what the parties stand for, it was vital for the SNP to develop a distinct identity and clear ideological position. Rather than attempting to persuade voters to sign over a blank cheque to the SNP, Crawford concluded,

the road to Independence lies in convincing the majority of the Scottish people that as a party we have a quite definite view of what a sovereign Scotland will look like, and that their interests, before and after Independence, are best served by a party committed to an irrevocable change in the structure of power and wealth in this society."

The party as a whole failed to heed its Research Officer's advice in 1979, which may well have hastened his resignation from the headquarters staff after the election. But Crawford

became a founding member of the ICPD and, later, the '79 Group where he contributed, along with Maxwell and others, to the development of the Group's strategy for improvement of the SNP product.

For members of the ICPD/'79 Group, therefore, popular support for independence, and for the SNP as an independentist party, could be won over and retained only if the goal of self-government were linked to a credible promise of real improvement in material economic and social conditions for a majority of the Scottish people - for the urban working class in particular, but also for others that they hoped to include in the coalition supporting the SNP, the public sector middle class, the rural working class (agricultural labourers, crofters and fishermen), women, senior citizens and other underprivileged groups." But to appeal to all these voters, the SNP would have to adopt a socialist platform and an explicitly leftist image since, as Stephen Maxwell argued, "a clear ideological commitment to the Left would signal to working class voters a new readiness to stand with them on the socially divisive issues of the day."

By projecting itself as a party that was both socialist and nationalist, the SNP could detach the working class from its traditional allegiance to the Labour Party, present itself as the only effective alternative to the policies of the Conservative government and, in a future election, win a sufficient number of votes and/or seats to force the British

authorities to recognise the Scottish case for independence. At the very least, it could re-establish the 'Scottish dimension' in British electoral politics and, as after 1974, exert pressure for the creation of a Scottish Assembly which could then undertake some of the necessary economic and social reforms and, thereby, become the focal point for the development of a relevant, politicized, national identity."

Overview

In place of the classless, catch-all appeal to a vague sense of 'Scottishness' that had been the traditional strategy of the SNP and which was being reimposed in 1979 by the 'fundamentalist' wing of the party, the ICPD/'79 Group advocated a reorientation of the party's ideology and strategy to attract the urban working class and other 'have not' groups away from the Labour Party which, in the Group's analysis, was in a state of electoral and organizational crisis. For the dissatisfied members of the SNP who joined the ICPD or, later, the '79 Group, this strategy offered the prospect of the improvement in the party product on two levels.

First, if the SNP could be persuaded to move to an explicitly left-wing or socialist orientation, the dissonance between their own ideological position and that of the party would be reduced (see Chapter Ten). They would therefore feel more at home within the party and, for those with aspirations

to personal political advancement, they might also be in a position to control the party organization.

Second, given their collective analysis of the cultural, electoral and political situation in Scotland, Group members believed that, by adopting a socialist platform which made independence more relevant by linking it to an improvement in material economic and social conditions for a majority of the Scottish people, the SNP could build a permanent base of support and thereby enhance its potential for the achievement of independence and the realization of other individual or collective goals.

But first they had to try to persuade the party, or its managers, of the virtues of this strategy for improvement. What were the chances that Voice would be heard and that the benefits to be derived from attempting to shift the party in a leftward direction would exceed the costs of exercising the Voice option?

EXIT vs. VOICE: THE VOICE OPTION

As we noted in Chapter Four, following Hirschman, resort to Voice will usually depend on "the estimate customer-members have of their ability to influence the organization."⁷ Individual members' estimates of their ability to influence the party through the expression of Voice will, in turn, depend partly on their sense of personal political efficacy and partly on intra-party organizational and procedural

variables which will help to determine the availability, costs and benefits of the Voice option. However, we suggested also that the perception of costs and benefits of Voice may be mediated by a sense of Loyalty to the party. Moreover, it may be possible to increase the perceived benefits (the probability that product quality will be restored or improved) and to reduce the costs of Voice by exercising it collectively. In this section of the chapter, we examine various factors which may help to account for the selection of the Voice option, exercised in organised collective fashion, by the members of the ICPD/'79 Group.

Personal Political Efficacy and Opportunities for Voice

The analysis in Chapter Eight of the organizational structure of the Scottish National Party suggests that it is a highly decentralized party in which power is widely dispersed among a number of different organs, both national and local. Moreover, the internal procedures of the party reflect a firm commitment to intra-party democracy and afford ample opportunity for individual members or activists to participate in the discussion of policy and strategy at all levels within the party organization.

These characteristics are reflected in the attitudes of activists towards their party. In the late 1960s, for example, John Schwarz asked local activists which factor, apart from the pursuit of independence, most distinguished

the SNP from other parties; although it was an open-ended question, 63 per cent of his sample volunteered similar answers to the effect that the SNP was "more democratically organized" than its rivals."

Consequently, most SNP activists have a strong sense of political efficacy with respect to their activities within the party. In the SNP Activists Survey, respondents were asked "Do you feel that you personally have an adequate opportunity to influence the policies or the direction of the SNP?" (Q. 39) Responses to this question are summarized in Table 11.4 for both '79 Group members and other active respondents. Among the '79 Group respondents, 88 per cent (22 out of 25) felt that they did have the opportunity to influence SNP affairs, compared with 77.9 per cent of other activists; this difference is not statistically significant.

Among the 56 activists (21.1 per cent of all respondents) who answered "No" to Q. 39, what might be called "party-based" reasons were cited by 32 (including all three '79 Group members answering "No"), while 19 respondents cited "personal" reasons for their lack of influence in the party (see Table 11.5). Examples of "party-based" reasons included the following:

- "Party is becoming less democratic" (Respondent # 370)
- "Too much squabbling" (# 026)
- "Majority of policy documents are based on the needs of the Central Belt" (# 128)
- "Total lack of communication between HQ and branches" (# 121)
- "The SNP hierarchy are quite prepared to flaunt Conference decisions ..." (# 211)

TABLE 11.4 - PERSONAL POLITICAL EFFICACY OF SNP
ACTIVISTS IN INTRA-PARTY AFFAIRS

		'79 Group		
		Members	Non-'79 Group Activists	
"Do you ... have an adequate opportunity to influence ... the SNP?"	Yes	22 (88.0%)	187 (77.9%)	209 (78.9%)
	No	3 (12.0%)	53 (22.1%)	56 (21.2%)
		25	240	265

$\chi^2 = .32$
 $\chi^2 = 1.38$ (not significant at .05)

SOURCE: SNP Activists Survey, Qs. 39 and 43.

**TABLE 11.5 - REASONS CITED BY SNP ACTIVISTS FOR PERSONAL
LACK OF INFLUENCE OVER PARTY POLICY OR
DIRECTION**

	N	%
Organizational problems	12	21.4
Domination of debates/party affairs by a small minority	8	14.3
Leadership problems	5	8.9
Ideological differences	5	8.9
Domination of party/policy by Central Belt	2	3.6
	—	—
All party-based reasons	32	57.1
Lack of time	7	12.5
Live too far away	6	10.7
Other personal reasons	6	10.7
	—	—
All personal reasons	19	33.9
No answer/unclassifiable	5	8.9
	—	—
	56	

NB - percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding

SOURCE: SNP Activists Survey, Q. 39.

- "Once the National Office-Bearers are elected they tend to forget about the grass-roots of the party" (# 374)
- "Same old faces saying the same old things" (# 504)
- "Not enough time at National Council and Conference for everyone to have their say" (# 404)
- "The present policy-making forums are too cumbersome" (# 263)

Examples of "personal" reasons given by respondents included:

- "Too busy trying to earn a living" (Respondent # 015)
- "Rather too old now to fight some of the absurdities in the party strongly enough" (# 055)
- "Distance/cost/time" to get to meetings (# 129)
- "Job restrictions" (# 352)
- "We are geographically distant from venues of meetings of Exec., Council ... [etc.] ... and CA and Branch cannot afford to send us" (# 360)
- "Not in a position to do so" (# 430)

However, these complaints should not obscure the fact that close to 80 per cent of all respondents felt that they did indeed have adequate opportunity to influence the policy and direction of the party.

Members of the ICPD/'79 Group generally shared the sense of political efficacy demonstrated by the great majority of SNP activists. All of the '79 Group members that we interviewed in 1982 (i.e., before the Ayr Conference) agreed that the SNP was fundamentally democratic in its internal operations. As one Group official told the author,

The SNP is essentially a democratic party. We believed that we could persuade the party by sheer force of argument to pass Conference resolutions and policy proposals and to move in the direction we desired. So far, we've made pretty good progress."

However, the operative word in this activist's explanation is "we".

The Logic of Collective Action

The widely shared perception of the SNP as a democratic organization which permitted individual members an opportunity to influence the direction of the party may well have contributed to the decision of some activists to resort to Voice in an attempt to reverse the decline in party fortunes. Nevertheless, the '79 Group was more than just a loose collection of individuals expressing their discontent with the party's performance. Rather, it was a formally organized faction which charged membership fees, elected officers and spokespersons, nominated slates of candidates for intra-party elections and mounted concerted collective action to make sure that its Voice was heard.

The adoption of a formal organization was necessitated, according to Group members that we interviewed, by their relatively small numbers - about 50 or 60 at most in the summer of 1979 out of a total activist component of between 1500 and 2000 - and by the fact that the opposing 'fundamentalist' tendency was already well-entrenched within the party hierarchy." Consequently, only through organized collective activity, they argued, could they ensure that their proposed strategy for improvement would even be discussed. Stephen Maxwell, for example, informed the author,

Unless our point of view was focussed through an organized group, the party would just ignore it. We adopted the Group deliberately as a way of dramatizing the need for debate and to make sure our views could be heard."

Moreover, the leaders of the ICPD/'79 Group decided, if their collective Voice was to make an impression on the party managers, they must have funds available to educate, and win support from, the wider party membership by sponsoring conferences and public meetings and by publishing pamphlets and, eventually, a monthly broadsheet, the 79 Group News. Hence, Maxwell argued, "Funds were required for any chance of operating as a serious pressure group, and fees mean membership."² In August 1979, therefore, the newly renamed SNP 79 Group institutionalized itself by introducing a system of formal membership. Although this was open only to individuals who were already members of the SNP, it was criticized by many senior activists including some who were otherwise sympathetic to the aims of the Group. William Wolfe, for example, told the author,

I regretted the formation of the '79 Group. I advised them not to become too structured and not to charge subscriptions. [In the circumstances] it was understandable perhaps, but regrettable."

Notwithstanding the advice of Wolfe and other senior party members, however, from the summer of 1979 the SNP '79 Group became an organized sub-party within the SNP.

From the perspective of the Exit/Voice model the organized nature of the Group is quite, as Wolfe put it,

"understandable". The number of dissatisfied left-wing activists within the SNP was relatively small, they were generally young and most did not hold influential positions within the party hierarchy. Hence, the collective expression of Voice through the Group was a means to raise, and sustain, a sufficient volume that they would be heard by the party (thereby increasing their estimate of their collective ability to influence the organization) without incurring individual costs that would exceed the potential benefits to be derived.

Moreover, the nature of the collectivity was such that the structure of benefits and costs traditionally associated with collective action was modified. First, the fact that most members of the Group shared similar ideological positions and aims meant that there was little cost to collective action in terms of having to compromise individual goals or subordinating them to the collective will. Second, as one '79 Group member's analogy between the atmosphere of the first "public" session of the ICPD and that of the "revivalist" meeting suggests,⁵⁴ many members of the Group derived a benefit from the very act of participating in an organization in which other people shared their aims and aspirations for the establishment of a socialist SNP and a socialist Scotland.

The mobilization of organized collective Voice through the activities of the '79 Group, therefore, may be interpreted as a means to increase the volume that could be maintained by its members while reducing the costs of Voice to a manageable

level, and thereby to increase the probability that the Voice option would be successful in restoring the quality of the party product.

The Role of Loyalty?

In the original formulation of Hirschman's Exit/Voice model, Loyalty was a crucial variable. "As a rule", he suggested, "Loyalty holds exit at bay and activates voice" because, as a kind of 'internalized tax' on Exit, Loyalty raises the cost of leaving an organization.⁵⁵ However, we argued in Chapter Four that Hirschman perhaps attributed too much significance to the role of Loyalty and that, rather than constituting an independent variable in its own right, Loyalty is at most an intervening or mediating variable which might influence individual members' perceptions of the costs and benefits associated with the Exit and Voice options.

Whether it is defined in our terms or those of Hirschman, because Loyalty is a 'perceptual' or 'internalized' variable, its effects are extremely difficult to measure. Nonetheless, we attempt here to discern whether Loyalty, or commitment to the party organization, had any significant influence on the Exit/Voice calculus of those who formed or joined the ICPD/'79 Group.

It was proposed in Chapter Nine that two variables in the SNP Activists Survey might serve as surrogate indicators of Loyalty or the degree of commitment to the party. These were,

first, the original motivation reported by activists for joining the SNP and, second, the reported willingness of respondents to remain members of the party under various conditions.

First, with respect to reasons for joining the party, we suggested that those activists whose motivations were categorized as "affective" may be expected to be more strongly committed to the SNP than those whose reasons for joining it are largely "instrumental", i.e., for whom the party represents a means to an end rather than representing some ideal or generalized principle. Table 11.6 compares the reasons given by '79 Group respondents and other activists for joining the SNP. The data suggest that a somewhat higher percentage of '79 Group activists displayed broadly "instrumental" motives, but the variation is not statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 1.55$).

Table 11.7 summarizes the responses to a different question on motives for joining the SNP from the Radical Scotland Survey. Overall, 66 per cent of former '79 Group members indicated that they had joined the SNP because they "supported Scottish independence" (a broadly "affective" response), whereas nearly 27 per cent viewed the SNP and independence as instruments for the achievement of socialism in Scotland. However, the latter, more purely "instrumental", motivation is prevalent among '79 Group members who had joined the SNP after the 1979 General election, while the majority

**TABLE 11.6 - MOTIVATIONS FOR JOINING THE SNP: '79
GROUP MEMBERS AND OTHER ACTIVISTS (SNP
ACTIVISTS SURVEY)**

Motivations for joining the SNP	Non-'79 Group Activists		'79 Group Activists	
	N	%	N	%
Primarily Affective	105	43.9	8	32.0
Primarily Instrumental	79	33.1	11	44.0
"No Special Reason"/ "Couldn't Say"	<u>55</u>	23.0	<u>6</u>	24.0
	239		25	
(Missing)	(1)		(-)	

SOURCE: SNP Activists Survey, QQ. 20 and 43.

TABLE 11.7 - MOTIVATIONS FOR JOINING SNP BY DATE
OF MEMBERSHIP (RADICAL SCOTLAND SURVEY)

Reason for Joining SNP	Date of Joining SNP	
	1979-82	Before 1979
Supported Scottish independence	6 (30.0%)	48 (77.4%)
Supported independence as a means to a socialist Scotland	14 (70.0%)	8 (12.9%)
Felt SNP was "good for Scotland"	0	3 (4.8%)
Other / Mixed	0	3 (3.7%)
	20	62
	N = 82	

$\lambda = .28$
 $\chi^2 = 25.44$ (significant at all levels)

SOURCE: Radical Scotland Survey, QQ. 5 and 6.

of members of longer standing reported the more "affective" reason. Although the closed nature of the Radical Scotland survey question (Q. 6), in contrast to the relatively open-ended question of the SNP Activists Survey (Q. 20), may lead to underestimation of the number of members with instrumental motives, it is clear nonetheless that not all members of the '79 Group were "affective" ("loyal") members of the party.

A second measure of Loyalty or commitment is the response of Group members to Q. 48 of the SNP Activists Survey which asked activists "would you remain a member of the Party under the following conditions?" As Table 11.8 suggests, less than one-third of '79 Group respondents (32 per cent) could be labelled "unconditional loyalists" in that they indicated that they would definitely remain members of the party under all the hypothesized conditions except the possible association of the SNP with political violence.

Not surprisingly, given their ideological outlooks, all those who indicated that they would leave under certain conditions would do so if the SNP moved significantly to "the right"; indeed, the strength of their ideological commitment may be gauged from the fact that more would Exit from the party if it thus shifted its ideological stance than if it were associated with political violence. Some members also indicated that they would leave if the party followed the 'fundamentalist' bottom line by campaigning exclusively on the issue of independence.

**TABLE 11.8 - DEGREES OF COMMITMENT TO THE SNP: '79
GROUP MEMBERS AND OTHER ACTIVISTS**

Percentage in each Sub-sample responding "Yes"

Would you remain a member of the SNP if ...		Non-'79 Group Activists	'79 Group Activists
a)	If SNP support declined again at the next election?	99.6 (N=240)	100 (N=25)
b)	If there were a number of disastrous elections?	95.8 (N=240)	96.0 (N=25)
c)	If the SNP shifted significantly to "the left"?	72.6 (N=234)	100 (N=25)
d)	If the SNP shifted significantly to "the right"?	57.9 (N=235)	32.0 (N=25)
e)	If the SNP campaigned solely on Independence?	95.8 (N=236)	76.0 (N=25)
f)	If the SNP campaigned in favour of Devolution?	87.7 (N=236)	96.0 (N=25)
g)	If the SNP were associated with political violence ...?	43.8 (N=235)	47.8 (N=23)
All Conditions a-f		47.1 (N=240)	32.0 (N=25)
All Conditions a-g		25.5 (N=235)	13.0 (N=23)

SOURCE: SNP Activists Survey, QQ. 48 and 43.

On both measures from the SNP Activists Survey, therefore, approximately one-third of '79 Group respondents may be considered "loyal" members of the SNP. However, the two variables are not significantly correlated" - i.e., those with "affective" motivations for membership are not necessarily "unconditional loyalists" in response to Q. 48, and vice-versa. Moreover, neither measure of "Loyalty" is significantly related to membership of the '79 Group. In the absence of a sizeable sub-sample of former activists (i.e., of dissatisfied members who had opted for Exit), it is not possible to establish, from the SNP Activists Survey data, whether Loyalty influenced the decision to resort to Voice.

However, we do have access to a further indicator of Loyalty for '79 Group members. Table 11.9 shows the percentage of loyalist members of the '79 Group based on their responses to two key questions in the Radical Scotland survey.

The first, Q. 12, asked former members of the '79 Group if they were still members of the SNP at the time of the survey (early 1983). In all, 34 of the 82 respondents (41.5 per cent) indicated that they were no longer in the party.⁵⁷ The second question, Q. 15, requested those still in the SNP to indicate if they would leave or remain in the party if the expulsions of former '79 Group leaders were not withdrawn. Sixteen of the 48 respondents suggested that they would "definitely" or "probably" leave the party if the expellees were not reinstated. Excluding the "Don't Know" responses to

**TABLE 11.9 - '79 GROUP MEMBERS "LOYAL" TO THE SNP,
BY DATE OF JOINING AND MOTIVE FOR JOINING**

(Percent "loyal" to the party in each category¹)

Reason for Joining SNP	Date of Joining SNP				All
	1979-82	1974-78	1970-73	Pre-1970	
Support Scottish Independence ("Affective")	33.3	27.8	40.0	56.3	40.0 (N=50)
Feel "SNP good for Scotland ("Affective?")	N/A	33.3	100.0	N/A	60.0 (N= 5)
See independence as means to socialist Scotland ("Instrumental")	14.3	20.0	0	50.0	18.2 (N=22)
All	20.0 (N=20)	26.9 (N=26)	46.2 (N=13)	55.6 (N=18)	35.1 (N=77)

N/A = no cases in the cell.

- 1) **"Loyal"** members of the SNP are those who were still members of the party in early 1983 and who would "definitely" or "probably" stay in the SNP even if the expulsions of September 1982 were not withdrawn by the party.

SOURCE: Radical Scotland Survey, QQ. 5, 6, 12 and 15.

Q. 15, 27 of the 77 respondents (35.1 per cent) might be categorized as "loyal" members of the SNP, in that they were still members of the party and would "probably" (at least) remain members even if the expulsions were not lifted.

However, as Table 11.9 also indicates, the proportion of "loyal" respondents varies according to the date of joining the party and the motivation for becoming a member of the SNP. In general, we might expect that the longer one has been a member of a political party, the more one is committed or loyal to the organization, and this is supported by the data, with Loyalty being demonstrated by more than half the respondents who had joined the SNP before 1970 but by only one-fifth of those who joined after the 1979 election. Similarly, the incidence of Loyalty is higher among those who joined the party because they supported the "affective" ideal of independence (40 per cent) than among those with more "instrumental" motives, i.e., they viewed the SNP and independence as means to attain the objective of a socialist Scotland (18.2 per cent).

Again, approximately one-third of the former '79 Group members may be categorized as "loyal" members of the SNP. Even if we exclude those who joined the party after 1979, and who were therefore not (directly) involved in the Exit/Voice calculus of dissatisfied SNP activists in the spring and summer of 1979, the proportion of loyalists increases to 42.1

per cent, still less than half of those who were in a position to influence the choice of the Voice option.

None of the measures of "Loyalty" employed in this discussion has strong predictive power in "explaining" the mobilization of Voice by members of the ICPD/'79 Group. (Even the data in Table 11.9, which do report actual or intended behaviour do so after the fact, in that the commitment of some respondents to the SNP may have been lessened by the events of 1982.) By any of the indicators, if Loyalty played a role in influencing the decision to resort to Voice, it did so only for a minority of sub-party members. But, for at least the majority of those who opted for the collective Voice of the '79 Group, it would appear that Loyalty did not play a role and that their decisions were based almost exclusively on the availability and calculated costs and benefits of the various responses to decline.

CONCLUSIONS

For dissatisfied members of an organization to incur the costs of responding to an absolute or relative decline in performance, they must first believe in the possibility of improvement, i.e., they must believe that the quality of the "party membership product" can be restored, at least to its former standard, by their resort to Exit or Voice. For dissatisfied left-wing activists in the SNP in 1979, the most obvious party to which "Exit by defection" was possible, the

Labour Party, did not offer the prospect of improved quality largely because they were suspicious of its new-found commitment to Scottish self-government and because the model of socialism (or, more accurately, "Labourism") advocated by the Labour Party was different from their own. Furthermore, the demise of the Scottish Labour Party (which, had it survived, might have offered an improvement in the party product) underlined the uncertainties and potential costs of "Exit by schism" to create a separate left-wing nationalist party in an already crowded Scottish party system.

However, those who joined the ICPD and, later, the SNP '79 Group did believe that the quality of the party membership product could be improved by remaining within the SNP and expressing Voice in an attempt to persuade the management of the party to adopt an explicitly socialist program which would appeal, in particular, to the urban working class. Such a strategy, if successful, would serve to alleviate their discontent with party performance in two ways. First, it would reduce the dissonance between their own views and the then-prevailing ideological direction of the party. Second, they believed, if the SNP were successful in linking the goal of independence to improvements in the material economic and social conditions of a majority of Scots, the party would attract a broader and more permanent base of electoral support which would in turn improve the potential for the attainment of independence and other individual and collective goals.

But resort to Voice also depended upon a number of other factors. For a minority of members, Loyalty or commitment to the party may have influenced their decision to stay within the SNP to seek improvement of its electoral fortunes, although none of the measures of Loyalty derived from the available survey data was significantly related to selection of the Voice option. Hence, for a majority of ICPD/'79 Group members, we believe, the lack of viable Exit options and their belief in their ability to influence the SNP (based on personal political efficacy and the decentralized structure of the party organization) were the primary determinants of the outcome of the Exit/Voice calculus.

Those who joined the '79 Group, like most other SNP activists, were generally satisfied with the opportunities afforded to them as individuals to influence the policy and direction of the party. However, given their relatively small numbers and the ascendancy of the 'fundamentalist' tendency within the party in 1979, they elected to pursue the organized collective expression of Voice via the formally structured '79 Group as a means of ensuring that a sufficient volume of Voice could be maintained that they would be heard by the party. In the next chapter, we examine how successful they were in this endeavour.

NOTES - CHAPTER ELEVEN

1. This is almost certainly an underestimation of the true proportion of activists from the 1970s who had left the SNP or ceased to be active by 1982: first, because our sample was largely based on individuals who were still actively involved in 1981-82 (the only exception being the former parliamentary candidates); second, we suspect that former members and former activists would have been less likely to respond to the survey than those still actively involved.
2. Responses to Radical Scotland survey, QQ. 12, 16 and 17. However, almost two-thirds of the respondents (22 out of 35) indicated that their overall level of political activity had declined to some extent since the demise of the '79 Group.
3. Interviews, March-April 1982, May-June 1983.
4. Stephen Maxwell, "Labourism or Socialism?", SNP 79 Group Papers No. 1 (mimeo) p. 10.
5. "What is the 79 Group?", SNP 79 Group Papers No. 1, back cover.
6. Stephen Maxwell, "Scotland and the British Crisis", The Bulletin of Scottish Politics, vol. 1, no. 1, 1980, pp. 66-67.
7. Maxwell, "Labourism or Socialism?", p. 11.
8. Stephen Maxwell, "Market Socialism" in "Has the Scottish Private Sector a Future?", SNP 79 Group Papers No. 5, 1980, p. 21.
9. Interviews, March-April 1982, May-June 1983.
10. Discussed in Chapter Fifteen, below.
11. Interviews, March-April 1982.

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12. This discussion of the origins of the SLP is based in part on Henry M. Drucker, Breakaway: The Scottish Labour Party (Edinburgh: EUSPB, 1978), Chapters 1-3.
13. ibid., p. 48.
14. Cited in Sherri Grasmuck, "Uneven Regional Development and Scottish Nationalism: Activists, Ideology and North Sea Oil", unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Texas at Austin, 1978, p. 218.
15. According to Sillars, the major problem was the strong influence of the Communist Party in some of Scotland's largest unions such as the National Union of Mineworkers. He told the author "The CP reacts strongly to anything which might threaten its traditional position as the left alternative to the Labour Party. The CP came out strongly against the SLP and exerted intense pressure against the SLP within the trade union movement." Interview, April 1982.
16. Cited in Drucker, Breakaway, p. 143.
17. Christopher Harvie, Scotland and Nationalism: Scottish Society and Politics, 1707-1977 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1977), p. 267.
18. For a more detailed analysis of the ideology of the IMG and its strategy with respect to the SLP, see Drucker, Breakaway, Chapter 5.
19. ibid., p. 125.
20. Christopher Harvie, No Gods and Precious Few Heroes: Scotland 1914-1980 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), p. 162.
21. Jim Sillars, Interview, April 1982.
22. Grasmuck, "Uneven Regional Development and Scottish Nationalism", p. 224.

23. For a more extensive discussion of the 'fundamentalist' line, see Chapter Thirteen, below.
24. "The Basic Principles of the 79 Group", SNP 79 Group Papers No. 1, pp. 7-8.
25. Stephen Maxwell, "The Case for Left-Wing Nationalism", SNP 79 Group Paper No. 6, 1981, p. 24.
26. Robert Crawford, "In Pursuit of a Consensus", SNP 79 Group Papers No. 1, p. 5.
27. Andrew Currie, "Independence", SNP 79 Group Papers No. 1, p. 9.
28. "Political Report of the '79 Group Committee, August 1980" in The Bulletin of Scottish Politics, vol. 1, no. 1, 1980, p. 93.
29. ibid., pp. 93-94.
30. Interview with Stephen Maxwell, June 1983. Elsewhere, Maxwell has argued, "Nationalist strategy must start by acknowledging that for easily understood reasons of history the sense of nationalism exists in most Scots today only at a sentimental level remote from public affairs and political debate." See "The Case for Left-Wing Nationalism", p. 6.
31. Crawford, "In Pursuit of a Consensus", p. 4.
32. ibid.
33. Maxwell, "The Case for Left-Wing Nationalism", p. 21. See also "The Scottish Bourgeoisie" in "Has the Scottish Private Sector a Future?", SNP 79 Group Papers No. 5, 1980, pp. 4-10.
34. "The Case for Left-Wing Nationalism", p. 21.

35. Crawford, "In Pursuit of a Consensus", p. 5. See also Andrew Currie, "Which Way Forward?" SNP 79 Group Papers No. 1, p. 3.
36. Maxwell, "The Case for Left-Wing Nationalism", p. 21.
37. See our analysis of responses to the SNP Activists Survey in Chapter Ten, above, and Stephen Maxwell, "Smothered in their own landslide", Scots Independent, no. 101, August 1979, p. 4.
38. Tom Nairn, "Scotland After the Elections", SNP 79 Group Papers No. 1, p. 6.
39. Maxwell, "The Case for Left-Wing Nationalism", p. 23.
40. Maxwell, "Smothered in their own landslide", p. 4.
41. Robert Crawford, "Ideology and the SNP", Scots Independent, no. 95, February 1979, p. 3.
42. ibid.
43. ibid.
44. Stephen Maxwell, Interview, June 1983.
45. Maxwell, "The Case for Left-Wing Nationalism", p. 17.
46. The members of ICPD/'79 Group were not alone in believing that the creation of an Assembly would be helpful in the struggle for outright independence. William Wolfe, for example, told the author, "I've always taken the view that any Assembly would be good for Scotland ... to focus the Scottish identity. If we had some sort of Parliament, then the Nationalist case for independence would be greatly strengthened." Interview, April 1982.

47. Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 77.
48. John E. Schwarz, "The Scottish National Party: Non-violent Separatism and Theories of Violence", World Politics, vol. 22, no. 4, 1970, p. 498 (fn. 6).
49. Interviews, March-April 1982.
50. Interviews, March-April 1982.
51. Stephen Maxwell, Interview, April 1982.
52. ibid.
53. William Wolfe, Interview, April 1982.
54. See Chapter Ten, above.
55. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty, p. 78.
56. Crosstabulation of original motivations for joining the SNP and the present level of commitment to the party in 1982 for '79 Group respondents shows a moderate ($Q=.45$) but statistically insignificant ($\chi^2=1.02$) relationship between the two variables.
57. However, we have no way of knowing if this figure included any of the former '79 Group leaders expelled by the party in September 1982. We suspect, from their answers to other questions, that at least two respondents to the Radical Scotland survey were expellees who were subsequently reinstated and may therefore be considered "loyal" by the definition employed here - if this is the case our number of "loyalists" may be slightly underestimated.

Chapter Twelve

THE MOBILIZATION OF COLLECTIVE VOICE: THE RISE OF THE SNP 79 GROUP, 1979-1981

Although its debut at the Dundee National Conference in September 1979 was a somewhat disappointing start (see Chapter Ten), over the next two years the SNP 79 Group became the pre-eminent faction or tendency within the Scottish National Party. While its formal membership was never more than about 220 out of a total party membership of around 25000, the Group was able to reap the benefits of organization, activist commitment and internal cohesion to exercise a degree of influence on party affairs quite out of proportion to its small size. Moreover, on many issues, it was able to mobilize the support of others in the party who, while not formally members of Group, sympathized with many of its goals and its strategic analysis.

Gradually, the "management" of the party (which, by 1981, included some Group representatives) responded to the collective Voice of the Group. The party adopted a series of new policy resolutions with a clearly "progressive" slant and involved itself in a number of non-electoral activities designed to win support from "the left" and working class voters. Thus, the SNP provided legal and financial aid to

workers protesting factory shut-downs, sought stronger ties with trade unionists, organized and participated in anti-nuclear and environmentalist demonstrations, and even in 1981 committed itself to a campaign of mild civil disobedience against the Westminster government.

The high point for the '79 Group occurred at the 1981 National Conference in Aberdeen. There, two members of the Group were elected Executive Vice Chairmen of the party, another eleven were elected to the party's National Council and the Conference passed a number of Group-sponsored policy resolutions. Then, at the National Council meeting following the Conference, five '79 Group nominees were among the ten members elected to the party's National Executive Committee. In the summer of 1981, therefore, it appeared that the Voice of the Group had succeeded not just in influencing the management but in bringing about a change of management in the party: as the 79 Group News claimed, "The ruling body of the party [the NEC] now has a predominantly left-wing outlook with eleven of its twenty-three members being known socialists."¹ The merits of organized collective Voice were becoming apparent.

In this chapter we examine the mobilization of the SNP 79 Group from its foundation in the summer of 1979 to the zenith of its fortunes in 1981. First, we analyse the membership of the Group, using many of the same variables employed to describe SNP activists in general in Chapter Nine,

in an attempt to establish the differences and similarities between those who joined the Group and the wider activist component of the party. Then we examine the activities undertaken by the '79 Group to make its collective Voice heard by the party and its growing influence within the SNP in the years from 1979-1981.

THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE '79 GROUP

The first informal sessions of what was to become the Interim Committee for Political Discussion, later the '79 Group, had involved a central core of seven Nationalist activists, mostly young and from the Edinburgh area, and perhaps half-a-dozen other individuals who came into contact with these members at SNP headquarters or in the Edinburgh Central Constituency Association during the 1979 election campaign. The first two formal meetings of the ICPD at the Belford Hotel attracted 35 and 50-60 people respectively and around fifty people attended the official launch of the SNP 79 Group at its first conference in Glasgow in August 1979.

Our estimates of the growth of '79 membership suggest that there were around 75 members by the end of 1979, doubling to 150 by December 1980, increasing further to 185 by the end of 1981 and approximately 210 by the time of the SNP National Conference at Ayr in June 1982.² But who were these members? Where did they come from and to what extent, if any, did the

people who joined the '79 Group differ from the wider activist component of the SNP?

In order to identify the general characteristics of the membership of the '79 Group, we employ the same basic categories below that were used earlier to describe the activist component of the SNP as a whole - i.e., socio-economic background, political background and selected attitudinal variables.

The Socio-Economic Background of '79 Group Members

The socio-economic backgrounds of members of the '79 Group differ markedly in certain respects from those of other SNP activists. First, the '79 Group members who responded to the SNP Activists Survey were drawn disproportionately from the Strathclyde Region and, in particular, from the Lothian Region of Scotland. (see Table 12.1) While only 60 per cent of all SNP activist respondents were active in these two regions, fully 88 per cent (i.e., all but three out of twenty-five) of the '79 Group respondents were from the two most populous regions of the central industrial belt.

Second, '79 Group members tended generally to be younger than other SNP activists. In Table 12.2 we compare the age distribution of non-'79 Group activists with that of '79 Group respondents to both the SNP Activists Survey and the Radical Scotland survey. Only 27.2 per cent of non-Group activists were aged 35 or less in 1982, compared to 56.5 per cent of '79

TABLE 12.1 - REGIONAL BREAKDOWN OF '79 GROUP ACTIVISTS

**Percentage of '79 Group respondents and other
SNP activist respondents from selected regions**

Region Where Active	Non-'79 Group Activists	'79 Group Members
Strathclyde	39.6	48.0
Lothian	15.4	40.0
Grampian	10.4	4.0
Fife	5.4	4.0
Highland	5.4	4.0
Other	21.7	-
	(N=240)	(N=25)

NB - percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding

SOURCE: SNP Activists Survey, QQ. 10 and 43.

**TABLE 12.7 - AGE DISTRIBUTION OF '79 GROUP MEMBERS
AND NON-'79 GROUP SNP ACTIVISTS**

Percentage of (Sub) Sample in each Age Category

Age Category	Non-'79 Group Activists¹	'79 Group Activists¹	'79 Group Members²
Over 55	16.7	8.7	
51-55	10.9	4.3	
46-50	12.1	-	23.2
41-45	18.8	13.0	
36-40	14.2	17.4	12.2
31-35	12.6	17.4	24.4
26-30	7.9	30.4	18.3
18-25	6.7	8.7	22.0
	(N=239)	(N=23)	(N=82)
Percentage 35 or under	27.2	56.5	64.6
Median Age/Category	43	34	31-35

NB - percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding

SOURCE: 1) SNP Activists Survey, QQ. 2 and 43
2) Radical Scotland Survey, Q. 1

Group activists and almost two-thirds of the former '79 Group members who responded to the Radical Scotland survey.' Similarly, the median age of '79 Group activists, at 34, was almost 10 years younger than that of non-Group SNP activists. Combined with the frequent references to the need to "get rid of the old guard" or to "rejuvenate the leadership" among the future strategies recommended for the SNP by '79 Group members,' the difference in the age profiles of '79 Group members and other SNP activists suggests that the rise of the Group may be viewed in part as an expression of inter-generational conflict within the party.

The membership of the '79 Group was also somewhat more highly educated than party activists in general. Sixty per cent of '79 Group respondents to the SNP Activists Survey had attended university, compared with just over one-third of other activists; and four-fifths of both our sample and the Radical Scotland respondents had undergone some form of full-time post-secondary education (see Table 12.3).

The educational backgrounds of '79 Group respondents are reflected in the kinds of jobs they held. Approximately two-thirds of '79 Group members in both the SNP Activists Survey and the Radical Scotland sample were professionals or students, compared to 44 per cent of other SNP activists (see Table 12.4). In certain respects, therefore, the composition of the '79 Group was similar to that of another organization which attempted to blend socialism with

**TABLE 12.3 - EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUNDS OF '79 GROUP
MEMBERS AND OTHER SNP ACTIVISTS**

Percentage of each (Sub-) Sample Attaining each Level of Education			
Highest level of Full-time Education	Non-'79 Group Activists ¹	'79 Group Activists ¹	'79 Group Members ²
University, Postgraduate	16.7	20.0	N/A
All University	35.8	60.0	N/A
All Post-Secondary	64.1	80.0	78.0
Elementary and/or Secondary Only	35.9	20.0	22.0
	(N=240)	(N=25)	(N=82)

N/A = Not Available

SOURCE: 1) SNP Activists Survey, QQ. 4 and 43.
2) Radical Scotland Survey, Q. 2.

**TABLE 12.4 - OCCUPATIONAL BACKGROUNDS OF '79 GROUP
MEMBERS AND OTHER SNP ACTIVISTS**

Occupational Category	Percentage of each (Sub-) Sample in each Occupational Category		
	Non-'79 Group Activists ¹	'79 Group Activists ¹	'79 Group Members ²
Employers, Company Directors, Managers & Executives*	17.6	13.0	8.2
Professionals and Students	44.0	69.6	65.8
Other Non-Manual ⁺	18.8	13.0	16.4
Manual	10.7	4.3	5.5
Others	9.0	-	4.1
	(N=234)	(N=23)	(N=73)

* Includes self-employed business people

+ Includes supervisory employees and white-collar/clerical
workers

NB - percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding

SOURCE: 1 SNP Activists Survey, QQ. 5, 6 and 43.

2 Radical Scotland Survey, Q. 3.

nationalism, the Scottish Labour Party. Like the SLP, the membership of the '79 Group was predominantly professional and middle class, with very few manual workers.' Hence opponents of both the SLP and the SNP '79 Group often criticized them as consisting largely of "middle class" or "armchair" socialists who did not really understand the working class.'

The only socio-economic characteristic for which there was little variation between '79 Group members and SNP activists in general was gender, with women constituting 16 per cent of our '79 Group respondents and 21.3 per cent of other activists responding to the SNP Activists Survey.' But other variables considered here suggest that there were some significant differences between those who joined the SNP 79 Group and other activists in the party.

Political Backgrounds of '79 Group Members

In contrast to their distinctiveness with respect to modal socio-economic characteristics, the political backgrounds of '79 Group members do not differ markedly from those of other SNP activists.

First, although opponents of the '79 Group branded its members with the "Johnny-come-lately" tag,⁸ those who joined the Group were by no means all recent adherents to the Scottish National Party. As Table 12.5 shows, among respondents to the SNP Activists Survey, there are few major

**TABLE 12.5 - DATE OF JOINING THE SNP - '79
GROUP MEMBERS AND OTHER ACTIVISTS**

Member of SNP Since	Non-'79 Group Activists ¹		'79 Group Activists ¹		'79 Group Members ²	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
1979-82	18	7.5	2	8.0	20	24.4
1974-78	65	27.2	9	36.0	26	31.7
1970-73	37	15.5	6	24.0	15	18.3
1965-69	66	27.6	6	24.0	15	18.3
1960-64	23	9.6	2	8.0	3	3.7
1950-59	20	8.4	-	-	2	2.4
1940-49	8	3.3	-	-	1	1.2
1928-39	2	0.8	-	-	-	-
	<hr/>		<hr/>		<hr/>	
	239		25		82	
(Missing)	(1)					
Mean length of membership in years	13.33		10.88		8.77*	
Percentage joining since 1974		34.7		44.0		56.1

* Difference of means significant at .05.

NB - percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding

SOURCES: 1 SNP Activists Survey, QQ. 13(6) and 43.
2 Radical Scotland Survey, Q. 5.

differences between the distributions of dates of joining the SNP for '79 Group members and other activists. The mean length of party membership for '79 Group members was 10.88 years in April 1982 and, while this was less than the mean for all other activists, the variation is not statistically significant and can be explained largely with reference to the youth of many '79 Group activists.

Among the former '79 Group members who responded to the Radical Scotland Survey, however, a somewhat larger proportion of the sample had joined the SNP in the years between 1979 and 1982, although nearly half had been in the party for at least eight years. While a majority of the newcomers were young (eleven of the twenty who joined the SNP after 1978 were under 30), it is also clear that many joined the party only because it had now become a more attractive organization for left-wing nationalists; hence, 16 of the 19 who had become members of the SNP after the 1979 election acknowledged that the existence of the ICPD/ '79 Group had been "a significant factor" in their decision to join (responses to Radical Scotland survey, Q. 7).

Second, like other SNP activists, very few members of the '79 Group had previously been members of, or active in, any other political party (see Table 12.6). Not surprisingly, all those who declared a previous partisan affiliation had been involved in left-wing parties - the Labour Party, the SLP or, in one case, the Australian Labour Party. However, less

**TABLE 12.6 - PREVIOUS POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS OF '79
GROUP MEMBERS AND OTHER ACTIVISTS**

Previously Member/ Active in	Non-'79 Group Activists ¹		'79 Group Activists ¹		'79 Group Members ²	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Labour Party	20	8.3	1	4.0	5	6.3
Scottish Labour Party	-	-	2	8.0	4	5.1
Conservative Party	13	5.4	-	-	-	-
Liberal Party	8	3.3	-	-	-	-
Other British Parties	4	1.7	-	-	-	-
Overseas Parties	3	1.3	1	4.0	N/A	N/A
	— 48	— 20.0	— 4	— 16.0	— 9	— 11.4
None	192	80.0	21	84.0	70	88.6
	—		—		—	
	240		25		79	
(Missing)	(1)		(1)		(3)	

SOURCES: 1 SNP Activists Survey, QQ. 14, 15 and 43.
2 Radical Scotland Survey, Q. 8.

than 20 per cent of Group respondents to either survey had previously belonged to any political party prior to joining the SNP.

Hence, while some former members of the Scottish Labour Party, including its leader Jim Sillars, joined the SNP and the '79 Group after the collapse of the "breakaway" party, and other new members who had been active in generally "leftist" groups such as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament or the environmentalist movement were also attracted to join the SNP by the existence of the '79 Group, there is no evidence to suggest that the emergence of factionalism in the party can be attributed to the kind of "entryism" which helped to destroy the SLP. On the other hand, given their youth and lack of previous political experience, few members of the '79 Group had been exposed to the tactics of factional infighting (with which they might have been acquainted had they been in the Labour Party, for example) and this inexperience was to prove costly when their opponents mobilized against the Group in 1982.

The Beliefs of '79 Group Members

Selected dimensions of the belief systems of '79 Group members have already been explored in previous chapters. In Chapter Eleven, for example, we examined their motivations for joining their SNP and the degree of ongoing commitment to

the party. '79 Group members were more likely than other activists to cite instrumental motives for having joined the SNP, particularly if they were newcomers to the party (see Tables 11.6 and 11.7). And there was a smaller percentage of "unconditional loyalists" among Group members than among other activists (see Table 11.8). In particular, over two-thirds of '79 Group members indicated that they would not stay in the SNP if the party were to shift significantly to the right.

This characteristic reflects our findings in Chapter Ten that members of the '79 Group differed significantly from other SNP activists with respect to personal ideology, in that both the "subjective" and "objective" measures of ideological placement situated them well to the left of the party as a whole (see Table 10.9). Moreover, their diagnoses of the devolution referendum outcome and, particularly, the electoral decline of the SNP in the 1979 election also distinguished them from other activists, especially with respect to the significance they attached to the loss of working class support.

Not surprisingly, given their collective commitment to pursue class-based politics, '79 Group members were more likely than other activists to be class conscious to the extent that they generally thought of themselves as belonging to a particular social class. 68 per cent of '79 Group respondents to the SNP Activists Survey usually thought of themselves in class terms, compared to 37.2 per cent of other

activists (see Table 12.7). Moreover, no '79 Group members were among the 30 respondents to this question who indicated in some fashion that they rejected class imagery altogether.

The distinct modal attitudinal characteristics of '79 Group respondents also led them to different prescriptions for the future strategy of the SNP. In the SNP Activists Survey we asked respondents to indicate their reactions to a series of propositions relating to possible strategies which the party might adopt before the next general election (Q. 46) and then to list up to three strategies which they considered to be the most important (Q. 46a). As Table 12.8 suggests, there were marked variations between the tactics favoured most by '79 Group members and those advocated by other (non-Group) activists.

The '79 Group's strategy for improvement in the performance of the SNP proposed that the party adopt a socialist policy platform and image in an attempt to win support from the urban working class and from traditional Labour Party voters. These three items (d, g and j in Table 12.8) were mentioned respectively by 54.2, 45.8 and 66.7 per cent of '79 Group respondents and together constituted 56.3 per cent of all responses given to Q. 46a by Group members.' In contrast, none of the three was deemed important by more than about one-fifth of non-Group activists and collectively the three proposals constituted only one-seventh of all their responses to the question.

TABLE 12.7 - CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG '79 GROUP MEMBERS AND OTHER SNP ACTIVISTS

	Non-		
	'79 Group Members	'79 Group Activists	
Do you generally think of yourself as belonging to a particular social class?			
Yes	17 (68.0%)	89 (37.2%)	106 (40.2%)
No	8 (32.0%)	*150 (59.8%)	*158 (59.8%)
	25	239	N=264

$Q = .56$
 $\chi^2 = 8.90$ (significant at .05)

* Figures include 30 respondents who reject class imagery altogether

SOURCE: SNP Activists Survey, Qs. 8 and 13.

Among non-'79 Group activists no one item was rated among the three most important strategies by more than half the respondents. However substantial numbers included among their three proposals the traditional (or 'fundamentalist') tenets of an exclusive emphasis on independence and attempting to win support from all classes and all parties. These items (a, i and n in Table 12.8) together constituted 35.7 per cent of the most important strategies favoured by non-Group activists, but only 2.8 per cent of the items selected by '79 Group respondents.

Among both '79 Group members and non-Group activists the need to appeal to new or young voters was something of a "motherhood" issue. In part this stems from analysis of past Nationalist successes; in its electoral growth periods in both the late 1960s and the years leading up to 1974, the SNP appeared to benefit particularly from its ability to mobilize younger voters, but it failed to retain these voters in 1979.¹⁰ However, the '79 Group placed additional emphasis on appealing to the 'radicalism' of youth, in the hope that more young voters and, especially, new young members would help to bolster the party's fortunes and, perhaps, also strengthen its own position inside the SNP. Hence, the Group pressed strongly for the creation of a separate youth wing of the party; this was finally set up by the 1981 Annual Conference at which the '79 Group appeared to have established itself as the leading faction or tendency within the party.¹¹

**TABLE 12.8 - PREFERRED STRATEGIES FOR THE SNP AMONG
'79 GROUP MEMBERS AND OTHER SNP ACTIVISTS**

Percentage of respondents in each
sub-sample citing strategy among the
three most important for the SNP in
the future

Strategy: "The SNP should ..."	'79 Group Members	Non-'79 Group Activists
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"Left" strategies

d. adopt radical "left wing" policies	54.2	6.0
g. concentrate on working class	45.8	17.2
j. concentrate on Labour voters	66.7	20.7
d, g, j as percentage of all answers	56.3 (N=71)	14.7 (N=694)

"Traditional" strategies

a. campaign solely on independence	8.3	44.8
i. appeal to all classes	0	33.6
n. win support from all parties	0	28.4
a, i, n as percentage of all answers	2.8 (N=71)	35.7 (N=694)

Other "popular" strategies*

m. concentrate on ... new/young voters	58.3	37.9
c. develop a comprehensive policy program	29.2	30.2
f. adopt "middle of the road" policies	0	19.8
b. campaign mainly on devolution	8.3	16.4

* All other strategies supported by at least 10 per cent of
either sub-sample.

SOURCE: SNP Activists Survey, QQ. 46a and 43.

Overview

In summary, the modal characteristics of '79 Group members differed from those of other party activists in a number of important respects. They tended to be younger and more highly educated than other activists and approximately two-thirds of them were occupied as professionals (especially in the public sector) or as full-time students. They were drawn disproportionately from the central industrial belt of Scotland, especially from the Strathclyde and Lothian regions, and the majority lived and/or worked in either Glasgow or Edinburgh.

Group members were significantly more "left-wing" in ideology than other activists, both in their own self-perceptions and in their attitudes toward key political issues, and this led them to espouse different strategies for the recovery of the SNP. While the strategies advocated most frequently by non-Group activists included an emphasis on the pursuit of independence, a pan-class or classless appeal and an attempt to appeal to supporters of all other parties, '79 Group members sought to focus the SNP's efforts on winning support from the working class and current Labour Party voters by adopting a radical left-wing policy platform and image. In the next two sections we examine the tactics adopted by the Group to bring about a reorientation of party strategy and ideology and its growing influence within the SNP after 1979.

THE EXPRESSION OF COLLECTIVE VOICE

The '79 Group pursued a variety of strategies within the SNP in order to make its collective Voice audible to the party. In the short term, it attempted to influence the existing management of the party by sponsoring resolutions in keeping with its objectives for debate and adoption by Annual Conference and other deliberative and decision-making bodies. In the longer term, it tried to change the management by nominating slates of candidates for election to high party office. Given the importance of local organizational units within the decentralized structure of the SNP, its members also sought to win office in the branches and constituency associations or to be selected by these units as delegates to Conference and other national organs. And, in order to secure new converts or sympathetic support, the Group sponsored public meetings and conferences, published a series of pamphlets and, in 1981, launched its own newsletter, the 79 Group News. These activities, too, were part of a longer term strategy, designed in part to convince existing Nationalists of the need to follow the direction signposted by the Group, but also to persuade the electorate in general, and the working class in particular, that a revitalized and explicitly left-wing SNP was *their* party.

After its unpromising start at the Dundee National Conference in September 1979, however, the first task for the Group was to consolidate its membership in the nine months

before the next Annual Conference.¹³ Although membership of the '79 Group was open to all members of the SNP, the Group was not permitted to advertise its activities through regular party channels¹³; hence news of its activities was originally spread by word of mouth. It was not surprising, therefore, that membership was originally concentrated largely in the Edinburgh area, where the ICPD had been born, and in certain branches in Glasgow, especially the Govan Constituency Branch to which the party's former National Industrial Organiser, Steve Butler, had returned after his job at headquarters disappeared in the staff cuts following the general election. Other early adherents to the Group from outside these areas were generally linked in some direct fashion (e.g., through party committee memberships) to the Edinburgh or Glasgow cadres.

Later, however, word of the Group's aims and activities was spread through distribution of its own SNP 79 Group Papers¹⁴ and through press coverage by sympathetic journalists (including some, such as Chris Baur of The Scotsman, who had formerly been members of the Scottish Labour Party). Thus, the geographical basis of recruitment to the Group spread to some extent although, as we suggested in the previous section, the bulk of the membership continued to be drawn from the central industrial belt.

Among its activities in 1979-80, the Group organized two open conferences. The first, held in Edinburgh in February

1980, addressed the theme "Scotland and the British Crisis" and included Robert Crawford, Tom Nairn and Jim Sillars among the speakers.¹⁵ A second conference, on the role and future of the private sector in Scotland, took place in Glasgow in mid-May, and also featured speakers from within and outside the SNP.¹⁶ In early May, '79 Group members were also active in the 1980 District Council elections in which the SNP generally fared poorly. The campaign highlighted the extent to which party organization had deteriorated since the mid-1970s, there was no common policy platform, and many wards were not contested even in areas where the branch structure remained relatively healthy.¹⁷ As a result, most of the gains made in 1977, shortly after the Labour government's first devolution bill had been defeated, were wiped out; overall, the SNP won 59 seats, compared with over 170 in 1977. As usual, some senior members of the party attempted to place the blame on the SNP's habitual scapegoat, the media. But, clearly, the 'fundamentalist' orientation adopted by the party in 1979 was making little impression on the voters, who again turned to the Labour Party to defend them against the Conservatives' public expenditure cuts - a point which the '79 Group sought to hammer home in the lead-up to the Annual Conference.¹⁸

The 1980 Annual Conference, held at Rothesay on the Isle of Bute on the last three days of May, marked the beginning of the SNP's shift to "the left" in response to the collective

Voice of the '79 Group. Conference passed a number of resolutions supported by the Group or sponsored by Group-controlled branches and constituency associations: these included condemnation of the government's public spending and education cutbacks; a commitment to campaign actively, and to use civil disobedience where necessary, to oppose nuclear dumping and the construction of new nuclear power facilities in Scotland; a pledge to campaign for the removal of all nuclear weapons from Scottish territory and for a reallocation of resources from defence spending to social policy expenditures; and an affirmation of the party's support for "the equitable redistribution of power, income and wealth in Scottish society".¹⁹

In elections for party office Billy Wolfe, who was backed by the Group, narrowly defeated the 'fundamentalist' Dr. Robert McIntyre for the party presidency; and, although a number of relatively inexperienced Group members contesting senior positions were defeated, Margo MacDonald, Stephen Maxwell, Andrew Currie and six other '79ers were among the thirty elected members returned by Conference to the SNP National Council.

The press generally interpreted the outcome of the Conference as a victory for "the left" if not specifically for the '79 Group. But an additional focus of interest was the appearance of the party's, and the Group's, new star.

The Leadership of the '79 Group

Like any group or movement attempting to challenge the status quo, the SNP 79 Group required more than supporters and organization to make its collective Voice heard by the SNP. To mobilize members, it needed a strategy, and to formulate and articulate this program required capable leadership. Although the members of the Group were generally young and relatively inexperienced, there were among its founders and leaders a number of individuals who were, or had been, well-placed in the party organization.

For example, Margo MacDonald, one of the three official spokespersons selected by the Group at its first general meeting in 1979, had been acclaimed the "golden girl" of the Nationalist movement when she won the Glasgow Govan by-election in 1973. Although she had lost the seat back to Labour in 1974, she remained highly influential in the party, serving as Senior Vice-Chairman of the SNP until her defeat at the 1979 Annual Conference. As a radio journalist, MacDonald also maintained a high profile outside the party. A second spokesperson, Andrew Currie, a training officer with the Citizens' Advice Bureau, was already an elected member of the party's National Council and had been an SNP candidate in the 1979 general election. The third, Alex Salmond, an economist with the Royal Bank of Scotland, had been vice-president of the Federation of Student Nationalists (FSN) in

his university days and was now one of the rising young stars in the party.

Among other founding or senior members of the Group, Stephen Maxwell, the former Press Officer at SNP headquarters, now worked for an international development education agency, lectured part-time in Politics at the University of Edinburgh and was a former Lothian regional councillor and parliamentary candidate. Rob Gibson, a schoolteacher in the Highlands and hence one of the few members of the inner circle from outside the central belt, was a former president of FSN and a parliamentary candidate in Inverness in 1974. Roseanna Cunningham (former Assistant Research Officer) and Steve Butler (former National Industrial Organiser) had both worked for party headquarters until the staff cutbacks in 1979, as had Robert Crawford before his resignation as SNP Research Officer. But Gavin Kennedy, the economics lecturer and former candidate for both the Labour Party and the SNP, and in whose home the first informal meetings of dissatisfied members had taken place, increasingly distanced himself from the Group that he had helped to found.

All of these individuals were well-known in Nationalist circles in 1979-80, but only Margo MacDonald was widely known outside the SNP. None of the other former Nationalist MPs was a member of the '79 Group, nor was any other "high profile" member of the party or senior office-holder.

In the spring of 1980, however, the '79 Group recruited for itself, and for the party, a second leader of national prominence. The Rothesay Conference marked the official debut as an SNP member of Jim Sillars, former Labour MP, founder and chairman of the now-defunct Scottish Labour Party.

For casual observers of Scottish politics in the 1970s, Sillars' entry into the SNP was the consequence either of the most blatant political opportunism or of a conversion equivalent in its magnitude to that of St. Paul. Once Sillars had been known as a fierce opponent of the SNP, labelled "the hammer of the ScotNats" after he co-authored an anti-SNP and anti-independence pamphlet ("Don't Butcher Scotland's Future") in 1968 and described by one observer as "Labour's aggressively unionist candidate" when he beat off the SNP challenge to win the South Ayrshire by-election in 1970.²⁰ But, from 1971 on, Sillars gradually came to accept the need for a Scottish assembly; this was the cause of his break with the Labour Party in 1975-76 and, by 1979, Sillars and the SLP were calling for the creation of a Scottish Parliament with powers that stopped only just short of the SNP demand for outright independence.

With the collapse of the SLP, however, and with little chance of returning to the Labour Party²¹, Sillars had few other options if he wished to remain politically active but to join the SNP. Nonetheless, Sillars maintained that he would not have done so had it not been for the emergence of

the '79 Group and its acceptance (albeit reluctantly) by the SNP." On the other hand, his relationship with, and eventual marriage to, Margo MacDonald may also have had some influence on his decision to link up with both the SNP and the '79 Group.

For members of the '79 Group, the capture of Sillars was an important boost. In him, the Group gained a second figure of national stature, an experienced politician skilled in the mechanics of intra-party politics; moreover, Sillars was followed into the Group and the SNP by a number of other former Scottish Labour Party members. Admittedly, some members were initially concerned that he and MacDonald would attempt to dominate the Group, in which "leadership" had hitherto been a collective enterprise. The '79 Group Committee and the system of "official spokespersons" had been created for the purposes of administrative convenience (and to deal with the media), not to establish a leadership hierarchy, and decisions on policy and strategy were taken at regular plenary meetings of the Group by as many members as could attend. But, if there were fears that this pattern would be disturbed by the arrival of Sillars, who had clearly assumed the mantle of "leader" for himself in the SLP, they proved to be unfounded according to most Group members that we interviewed."

For other members of the SNP, and especially for the 'fundamentalist' wing, however, Sillars' entry into the party

was, at best, a mixed blessing. In his speech to the Rothesay Conference, the party's senior MP Donald Stewart greeted the new arrival with a thinly-disguised warning:

I welcome Jim Sillars to the ranks of the Scottish National Party. I have sat in Parliament with him and have great respect for his abilities and integrity. He can make a substantial contribution to this party but I hope he will pursue the way of the mainstream of the party."

This advice went unheeded as Sillars placed himself quite clearly outside what Stewart would regard as 'the mainstream' of the party when he addressed a '79 Group fringe meeting at the Conference:

... unless the SNP can place itself squarely on the side of those with most to gain from independence, and that is the Scottish working people, the road to the ultimate goal will be far longer and more traumatic than it need be. In Scotland today there is a clamant need for radical leadership. ... the Labour Party has all but abdicated, leaving only the Left in the national movement offering hope to Scottish workers. ... The Left in the national movement has to speak bluntly, if in friendly fashion, to the rest of the party."

Sillars' speech infuriated some senior members of the party, including James Fairlie, then Executive Vice-Chairman for Policy, who argued that "It is difficult to determine what Jim Sillars is hoping to achieve within the SNP by attacking the party's fundamental principles". Sillars, claimed Fairlie, "displays a level of political insensitivity ... (which) ... has alienated him from the vast majority of party members" and his call for the party to take a firm stand on

the side of the working people "shows a remarkable ignorance of what the SNP has been saying for years on policy issues"."

As Sillars commented later to the author, "The SNP wants my (political) ability as long as I don't voice my real opinions." The '79 Group, however, welcomed both his ability and his opinions, and Sillars' arrival greatly strengthened the Group's ability to influence the rest of the party.

The '79 Group and the SNP, 1980-81

In the immediate aftermath of the Conference, party activists were mobilized, not to support or oppose the '79 Group but in the common cause of fighting a parliamentary by-election campaign in the safe Labour seat of Glasgow Central. The task was made more difficult by the fact that there was no real SNP organization in the constituency; the '79 Group stepped into the vacuum and "effectively ran the Central campaign" according to one member." In the poll at the end of June, Labour easily held the seat, but the SNP more than doubled its share of the vote over 1979, from 11.1 per cent to 26.3 per cent, prompting speculation in the press that "the SNP is on the road back".' The Group claimed credit for the improved SNP performance, but it was clear that the party was still a long way from the Group's goal of detaching voters in the west of Scotland from their traditional allegiance to Labour.

Despite the views expressed by the press that the SNP had moved to "the left" at Rothesay, it is probably more accurate to suggest that the outcome of the 1980 Conference was close to a stalemate. While the Conference had adopted a number of "left-wing" policy resolutions, the leadership positions of the party remained largely in the hands of the "old guard". Thus, apart from the party presidency, won by Wolfe with '79 Group backing, the other elective positions on the National Executive were all retained by incumbents elected in the 'fundamentalist' sweep at the Dundee Conference the previous year; these included five present or former MPs and four other hard-line independentists who had declared their opposition to the ICPD/'79 Group from its foundation. Hence, little action was taken by the National Executive to implement many of the resolutions passed at Rothesay, a failure which was condemned by a number of party activists, not all of them members of the '79 Group; for example, John MacCallum, Secretary of the Isle of Bute Branch, wrote to the Scots Independent "to express the disgust and frustration we feel at the total lack of direction and leadership that is rippling through the party from the Executive level."³⁰

For most of 1980-81, both the '79 Group and its opponents sought to consolidate their respective positions before the next annual conference. Membership of the Group continued to grow and in April 1981 it launched its own newsletter, the 79 Group News. It continued to sponsor meetings and seminars on

a variety of topics - in February 1981, for example, academic and Labour Party activist Dr. Michael Keating addressed the Group on the implications of the Social Democratic breakaway for the future of the Labour Party." The Group also organized a number of demonstrations, protesting against Conservative government policies and plant closures, for example, the shutdown of the Talbot car factory at Linwood in the West of Scotland; as the new broadsheet announced, "This was the SNP where it should be - proclaiming its relevance now rather than promising the moon in an independent tomorrow"."

In the midst of the "phony war" between the '79 Group and its critics, two events in particular served to increase the tension within party ranks. The first, in the fall of 1980, was the election for a new Rector of Glasgow University. Glasgow University Student Nationalist Association (GUSNA), which through John MacCormick had played an instrumental role in the foundation of the National Party of Scotland over fifty years earlier", nominated "King" John's son Iain, citing "his work for Scottish freedom and for the people of Argyll" whom he had represented as Nationalist MP from 1974 to 1979." However, student members of the '79 Group who considered MacCormick insufficiently radical to represent the new mood of the SNP, nominated Margo MacDonald as their candidate for the election. GUSNA published an open letter to Ms. MacDonald, requesting that she withdraw her candidacy, arguing that "you appear to put your personal views and interests

above those of Scottish Nationalism". When MacDonald stayed in the race, opponents of the Group bitterly condemned her for "divisiveness"; one, for example, wrote in the Scots Independent,

... those involved have apparently decided to throw in their lot with the Westminster Government in its policy of "divide and rule". ... The action of the 79 Group is particularly traitorous at a time when Scotland desperately needs a united SNP."

Given the split in the Nationalist vote, it was not surprising that neither candidate was elected. On the other hand, the 'fundamentalists', in particular, who had labelled MacDonald a traitor to the Nationalist cause must have felt rather silly when MacCormick defected to the Social Democratic Party only a few months later, citing, among other reasons for his departure, his lack of sympathy with the SNP's demand for independence!

A second warning of the potential for future conflict was the gradual mobilization of opponents of the '79 Group in the months leading up to the 1981 Conference. In March 1981, a number of "centre-right" activists met in Stirling to plan strategy for the Conference. With tongue-in-cheek, they referred to themselves as the "Non-Group". Announcing their intention to campaign for a revitalization of the leadership of the SNP (perhaps a strange cause, since the "Non-Group" included several current office-bearers), they also developed a "non-slate" of candidates to be circulated among like-minded members of the party. At this stage, however, despite the

arguments of some of those who were present, they decided not to organize themselves formally."

News of the "non-meeting" of the "Non-Group" induced a fit of self-righteous indignation among members of the '79 Group, whose newspaper fulminated against the closed nature of the Stirling (non-)meeting at which attendance was by invitation only:

Secrecy is the main enemy of democracy, which is why the '79 Group has always been open about its intentions. If Group members are elected into office, Conference and the Party at large will know what they stand for. ... If this group was serious in their [sic] dedication to democratic ideals it would have mirrored the '79 Group and announced its intentions to support certain ideas within the SNP ... and then held meetings open to every SNP member. Instead of this they skulk around in the political undergrowth ... compiling secret strategies to promote their non-ideas."

As the Aberdeen Conference drew near, the Voice of the '79 Group became increasingly strident in its condemnation of the failure of the existing management. The incumbent office-bearers, on the other hand, had started to mobilize support for their efforts to beat off the Group challenge. Already, the party's National Council had twice debated the role of organized groups within the party and the possibility of curtailing their activities. The battle-lines were being drawn up in the struggle for control over the future of the Scottish National Party.

THE TRIUMPH OF COLLECTIVE VOICE? ABERDEEN, 1981

The events of the forty-seventh Annual National Conference of the Scottish National Party in Aberdeen at the end of May, 1981, seemed to indicate that the '79 Group was winning control of the party from the 'fundamentalist' wing; and this impression was strengthened by the results of balloting for elected offices at the Stirling and Kilmarnock meetings of the National Council which followed the Conference.

At the Conference itself, by far the most divisive resolution was one sponsored by two Group-controlled branches which, if adopted, would commit the SNP to a campaign of civil disobedience to protest government economic policies which had resulted in "the destruction of Scotland's industrial base ... the massive rise in unemployment, the lack of hope among our young and the mood of black despair now overwhelming our people." The resolution continued

Conference recognises that a real Scottish resistance and defence of jobs demands direct action up to and including political strikes and civil disobedience on a mass scale; declares that the time has come to end British misrule; and calls upon the NEC to organise a campaign of effective civil disobedience and a timetable for its implementation as a matter of urgency."

Jim Sillars, supporting the motion, warned the delegates that they must be prepared "for the jails to be filled with Nationalists" if the campaign were to be successful in mobilizing opposition against the Westminster government." Finally, after long and often heated debate, and after an

unsuccessful attempt to remit the resolution back for further study, the assembled delegates committed the party to a campaign of civil disobedience and resistance by a "substantial" majority.

The "leftward" shift presaged by this decision, taken in the first session of the Conference, was confirmed by the passage of a number of other resolutions proposed or supported by the '79 Group. Conference embraced civil disobedience again to protect and further the use of the Gaelic language; it committed an SNP government of an independent Scotland to withdrawal from NATO and to "a policy of nuclear-free armed neutrality as the most effective Scottish contribution to easing East/West conflict"; and it required SNP Members of Parliament to subject themselves to the guidance and direction of Conference and the National Council."

Moreover, Conference failed to accept two resolutions which clearly originated among opponents of the Group. One, from Donald Stewart's home base in the Western Isles, requested Conference to "deplore the emergence of publicity-seeking factions within the ranks of the Party" and appealed to "adherents of these factions to exercise self-discipline in the interests of Party unity", while an amendment to the motion sought to instruct the officers of the party to discipline those who failed to obey this stricture. The second "anti-Group" resolution attempted to reassert the catch-all appeal of the SNP by seeking affirmation that "SNP

policy will continue to be based on what is best for Scotland as a whole and not by any dogmatic ideology."

Although neither of these resolutions came to a vote, their appearance on the agenda made it clear that the strategy, even the very existence, of the '79 Group was still a matter of contention within the SNP. This was underlined further by speeches to the Conference by certain office-holders and senior party members. For example, the report of the outgoing Vice Chairman for Publicity, Michael Grieve, was strongly critical of the expression of collective (and, perhaps, individual) Voice within the party:

I hope that various individuals and groupings, within this most democratically-elected of Parties, would realise that they are playing the English game of 'divide and conquer' if they pursue short term objectives. ... We are not in the business of trying to sell "left-wing" or "right-wing" politics. And those who think there must be some kind of God-guided short-cut for their own ambitions ... will be sharply disillusioned!"

The party's senior MP, Donald Stewart, was even more direct in his speech to the Conference:

The 79 Group has won some victories here today at our Conference but I say to them to be careful that the party is not reduced to the constituency of the urban working class. There are other people in this country of ours. ... This is not a Socialist party, a Conservative party or any other kind of party. It is a NATIONAL Party."

To the extent that these comments were addressed explicitly to the '79 Group, and to some of its individual members in particular - and all delegates to Conference would have been aware of Grieve's personal antagonism to both the Group and

some of its leading members, despite his generalized reference to "left wing or right wing" - they failed to deter the party from supporting "leftist" policies and candidates.

Hence, in elections for party office, the '79 Group in particular and "left" candidates in general reversed the 'fundamentalist' trend of the last two conferences. Jim Sillars, a member of the SNP for only a year, was elected Executive Vice Chairman for Policy, outpolling his 'fundamentalist' opponent Gordon Murray by 2 to 1. Andrew Currie enjoyed a similarly wide margin of victory in the election for Vice Chairman for Organisation. Billy Wolfe, again supported by the Group, beat off the challenge of Donald Stewart for the party presidency, and Group support also helped another 'social democrat', Isabel Lindsay, to defeat hard-line independentists Colin Bell and Douglas Crawford for the post of Vice-Chairman for Publicity. Still, some inveterate critics of the Group retained their positions on the National Executive; in particular, Euro-MP Winifred Ewing, re-elected as one of the three SNP Vice Presidents, and Jim Fairlie, who defeated the Group's Stephen Maxwell in the election for Senior Vice Chairman of the party. But the Group secured its best representation to date on the SNP National Council, with eleven nominees, including Maxwell, among the thirty members elected to that body by Conference.

The swing to "the left" was confirmed at the meeting of the National Council at Stirling two weeks after the

Conference. Five '79 Group members were among the ten ordinary members elected to the National Executive Committee: Maxwell, Rob Gibson, Alex Salmond, Ron Wyllie (a former member of the Scottish Labour Party who had followed Sillars into the SNP) and Jeff Lockhart, representing the newly-formed Young Scottish Nationalists/Clann Alba (YSN/CA).⁴⁵ The Stirling meeting also gave effect to one of the Group's major organizational demands for the SNP when it passed the constitutional amendments required to establish YSN/CA as the official youth wing of the party.

Finally, at the next meeting of the SNP National Council at Kilmarnock, Ayrshire, in September 1981, Stephen Maxwell at last won high party office when he was elected to the new post of Executive Vice Chairman for Local Government.⁴⁶ At the same meeting, '79 Group members also won a number of places on the Agenda Committee which was responsible for selecting motions and drawing up the agenda for the next Conference. These successes, claimed the Group newspaper, would ensure that "the 1982 Annual Conference will be one of the most open and democratic in years."⁴⁷ But in the months before that Conference, the Group had to persuade the party that its influence, and the policies adopted at Aberdeen, were earning dividends for the SNP.

A "Disobedient" SNP

The decision taken at Aberdeen to embrace extra-parliamentary activity was greeted by the press with a mixture of hostility and scorn. The traditionally sympathetic Scotsman newspaper claimed that the initials "SNP" now stood for "Silly Notion Party", while The Economist questioned whether the party's members were "Nats or Nuts?"⁵⁰ Even the Nationalist monthly, Scots Independent, expressed its editorial displeasure, calling the outcome of the Conference "a diversion on the road to independence".⁵¹

Several senior members of the SNP expressed their reservations. Donald Stewart, for example, argued that, while civil disobedience might be justified on specific issues where governments have acted illegally or unjustly to frustrate the democratically expressed will of the majority, "we still do not have the numbers to assume a mandate for blanket civil disobedience."⁵⁰ Margaret Bain, elected a Vice President of the party at Aberdeen, argued subsequently that "civil disobedience is not a policy - it's a tactic, which should not be disclosed as party policy."⁵¹ Like Stewart, Bain admitted that disobedience might be justified as one means among many to oppose government policies on which the general public has taken a strong stand (such as the dumping of nuclear waste), but its adoption as official party policy "made the SNP look like a party that has given up hope of winning democratically." Moreover, she argued, it placed some party

members employed in professional positions (teachers, lawyers, etc.) in awkward personal situations.

The party's new strategy did lead some members to leave the SNP. In a letter to the Scots Independent, one Nationalist explained his decision to resign on the grounds that "I cannot in conscience remain a member of a political party resolved upon 'a campaign of effective civil disobedience'." Other members used the same outlet to give Voice to their dissatisfaction with what they saw as a deterioration in their party's product. For example, Anthony J. Kerr wrote to express his disagreement with the resolution favouring "armed neutrality" and future withdrawal from NATO; but, since the decision would be subject to review and could not yet be implemented, he continued "I am not going to resign because I disagree with it, and do not expect to be expelled for dissenting publicly on this issue." Mr. Kerr, it should be noted, had previously been expelled from the SNP in the mid-1960s for standing as an Independent candidate in a parliamentary by-election which the party had decided not to contest. Although he was subsequently re-admitted, he remained something of a "loose cannon" within the party and an indefatigable correspondent with the Scots Independent and other newspapers.

At the same time, the successes of the '79 Group in intra-party elections and the commitment to the interests of the working class embodied in the SNP's willingness to embrace

civil disobedience in defence of jobs attracted a number of new members into the party. Ken McAskill, for example, a young Edinburgh solicitor who had worked closely with trade unionists in the Lothian Region, had been a member of the Scottish Labour Party but was not sufficiently convinced of the SNP's socialist potential to follow Jim Sillars immediately into the party in 1980. He joined the SNP in June 1981, however, because "the Aberdeen Conference appeared to demonstrate that there was a future for the left in the SNP."⁴

The adoption of a more "leftist" stance, and particularly the civil disobedience strategy, appeared to mark a major departure for the SNP from its traditional image of a mildly left-of-centre party, eminently responsible and respectable, with a firm commitment to peaceful parliamentary and electoral politics (see Chapter Seven).⁵ But what did the civil disobedience policy really amount to?

The disobedience campaign adopted the slogan "The Scottish Resistance", coined initially by the '79 Group in late 1980 to encapsulate its opposition to the policies of the Conservative government, and was co-ordinated by a specially created sub-committee of the party's Strategy Committee. Under its direction, the SNP held a series of demonstrations at government "Job Centres" (*newspeak* for 'unemployment offices') in major industrial towns to protest against rising unemployment. Party activists marched and picketed with employees of Lee Jeans in Greenock in the West

of Scotland to support workers who had occupied the plant and staged a "work-in" to prevent the closing of the factory by its American owners.⁵⁶ Then, when the Plessey electronics firm took legal action to end a similar occupation by its employees in Bathgate, West Lothian, it was the SNP which provided legal and financial assistance to the workers. And SNP activists and trade unionists also figured prominently in the month-long strike against redundancies at the British Leyland plant in Bathgate.⁵⁷

But, while the SNP undoubtedly aided particular groups of workers involved in local disputes with employers, the promise of civil disobedience and direct action "on a mass scale" never materialized. The closest that the SNP came to 'filling the jails of Scotland' occurred with the break-in at the Scottish Assembly building on Calton Hill in Edinburgh in October 1981. On the assumption that the *Scotland Act* would be implemented after the devolution referendum, in 1978 the Labour government had converted the old Edinburgh Royal High School into a legislative assembly building; after the referendum, however, the building was abandoned and surrounded by barbed wire. The SNP had requested the government to allow the Assembly chamber to be used on October 24, 1981, for a nationwide representative debate on unemployment: the government refused.

On October 16, Jim Sillars and four other members of the SNP 79 Group, aided and abetted by the SNP Headquarters

Director, Iain More, attempted to break into the building. Despite the intervention of security guards, three of the party gained access to the Assembly chamber where Sillars read the "Calton Hill Declaration" from the Speaker's Chair: it began

This occupation is a demonstration of the Scottish National Party's determination to provide the kind of vigorous leadership which we Scots must have if we are to resist effectively and then banish the presence and policies of an English Tory Government without mandate or legitimacy in our country. In taking occupation of this chamber, we are engaging in a symbolic assertion of Scotland's right to full self-government and the right of the Scottish people to full employment."

All six individuals involved were arrested and subsequently charged with 'vandalism', an offence for which they were later fined and 'bound over to keep the peace' after a court case which brought further publicity to the SNP resistance campaign."

A week after the occupation, the SNP returned in force to Calton Hill as 2000 Nationalists demonstrated outside the Assembly building (and three chained themselves to the locked gates). SNP President William Wolfe joined Sillars and other leading members of the '79 Group on the platform, and personally delivered the Calton Hill Declaration to the assembled crowd, but a number of other senior office-bearers were conspicuous by their absence, including both MPs (Donald Stewart and party Chairman, Gordon Wilson) and Vice Presidents Winifred Ewing and Margaret Bain. Some leading Nationalists

were still unwilling to associate themselves with the civil disobedience campaign or, perhaps more particularly, with the '79 Group which was the primary inspiration behind it. Donald Stewart, for example, publicly disowned the Gaelic language supporters who painted over English-only road signs in the Highlands, although this kind of activity had also been approved by the Aberdeen Conference.⁶⁰

Notwithstanding the lack of support, and often outright hostility, from many senior members of the party, the civil disobedience campaign and other elements of the '79 Group strategy seemed to be having their desired effect. In November 1981, SNP support in the opinion polls rose to 22 per cent, the best returns for the party since early in 1978. But, although the organized collective Voice of the Group appeared to have arrested the party's decline, the '79 Group was still not fully accepted by the SNP.

CONCLUSIONS

Our analysis of data from the SNP Activists and Radical Scotland surveys suggests that, on a number of dimensions, the modal characteristics of '79 Group members differed significantly from those of other SNP activists. Group members were generally younger and more highly educated than non-Group activists and they were also more heavily concentrated in professional occupations. And, while their political backgrounds differed little from other activists in

that few had previously been involved with any other political party, Group members were more inclined to see membership of the SNP in instrumental terms, viewing independence as a means to an end ("a socialist Scotland") rather than an end in itself.

As we had demonstrated in the previous chapter, '79 Group members were significantly more "left-wing" in ideology than SNP activists in general and this was reflected in the strategies they prescribed for the recovery of the SNP. In particular, they favoured the adoption of an explicitly socialist policy platform and image by the party and considered it important that the SNP attempt to appeal especially to the working class and others who had traditionally voted for the Labour Party.

Although relatively few in number, members of the '79 Group were able to take advantage of youthful activism, their ideological coherence, organization and the fact that "the rest of the party went to sleep after 1979", as one SNP office-bearer put it⁶¹, to exercise considerable influence over the management and direction of the party. Their collective Voice resulted in numerous changes in party policy and in its strategies for mobilizing support as the SNP moved to the left and to the streets and factory gates. Moreover, by the summer of 1981, Group members filled three of the six Vice Chairs of the party, four other seats on the National Executive,⁶² and eleven of the thirty elected positions on the SNP National

Council. In addition, the Group was well-represented on a number of national committees, including the party's Strategy Committee and the Agenda Committee, responsible for preparing the schedule for the 1982 Annual Conference. At the local level, the Group controlled a handful of branches and constituency associations, mostly in the major cities and other industrial areas, although its Voice tended to be directed more toward national organs of the SNP than at the grass roots structures of the party.

Between 1979 and 1981, collective Voice was mobilized within the SNP as the '79 Group grew from the fifty or so original adherents, largely from the central industrial belt, who had attended its founding meeting to nearly two hundred members. Although the membership was still drawn disproportionately from the Lothian and Strathclyde Regions, the single-tier organization of the Group became unwieldy as numbers increased and, at its Annual General Meeting in September 1981, the Group decided to set up a regional structure of 'mini-Groups' to allow members from outside the central belt, in particular, "to meet and act together so that their work within the SNP could be the more effective."

This sign of further institutionalization of collective Voice disturbed many of the Group's critics who became more determined than ever to undermine its growing influence over party affairs. In the next two chapters, we focus our attention on the opponents of the Group and their decision to

mobilize to create a second "organized collective Voice"
within the Scottish National Party.

NOTES - CHAPTER TWELVE

1. "Continued Swing To The Left", 79 Group News, July-August 1981, p. 3.
2. Our estimates are based on the dates of joining the '79 Group given by respondents to the Radical Scotland Survey (Q. 10). It is necessarily assumed that the respondents to this survey were more-or-less representative of the Group membership as a whole and that almost all individuals who had joined the Group were still on its mailing list in 1982-83.
3. If the age variable is reduced to a dichotomy between "Over 35" and "35 and under", the relationship between age and membership/non-membership of the '79 Group for SNP Activists Survey respondents is moderately strong ($Q=.55$) and statistically significant ($\chi^2=8.62$, significant at .05).
4. Responses to Radical Scotland survey, Question 25, by respondents #7 and #56. Although the question, "Which one action ... could most improve the SNP's election prospects?", was open-ended, 22.9 per cent of respondents suggested that changing the party leadership was the most important step required by the SNP in 1983.
5. However, the proportion of manual workers may be underestimated, first because they may have been less likely to respond to surveys administered by mail questionnaire and, second, because unemployed (and retired) respondents whose usual or former occupations are not known have been excluded from the data in Table 12.4.
6. For further discussion of these criticisms, see Chapter Fourteen.
7. There was no question regarding gender in the Radical Scotland Survey.
8. See Chapter Fourteen.

9. These three propositions also secured strong agreement from '79 Group members in their responses to Q. 46. The percentage of Group respondents agreeing strongly or moderately with each proposition (with corresponding percentages for non-Group activists in parentheses) were:

Statement: "The SN. should ..."	% Strong Agreement	% Moderate Agreement	% Agreeing
d. adopt radical "left wing"	54.2 (5.2)	37.5 (7.7)	91.7 N=24 (12.9)(N=233)
g. concentrate on ... working class	60 (10.2)	36 (26.0)	96 N=25 (36.2)(N=235)
j. concentrate on	64 (16.2)	32 (20.9)	96 N=25 (37.1)(N=235)

The only proposition supported more strongly by '79 Group respondents was the strategy of appealing particularly to new or young voters (68 per cent strong agreement, 32 per cent moderate agreement).

10. See, among others, Iain McLean, "The Rise and Fall of Scottish Nationalism", Political Studies, vol. 18, no. 3, 1970, pp. 357-372; and Nicolas Baxter-Moore, "The Rise and Fall of the Scottish National Party: Revisited", paper presented to the European Politics Group Workshop, London, Ontario, December 1979, esp. pp. 24-28.
11. See, "What are they doing to the Youth Wing?", 79 Group News, May 1981, p. 3; and "A Youth Wing at Last!", 79 Group News, July-August 1981, p. 3.
12. SNP Annual National Conferences are normally held on the last weekend in May or the first weekend in June each year. The 1979 Conference, however, was delayed until September because the first direct elections to the European Parliament took place on June 7.
13. See "What is the 79 Group?", SNP 79 Group Papers No. 1, (mimeo), back cover.
14. The SNP 79 Group Papers were published on an irregular basis from late 1979 to spring 1981 when they were replaced by the (usually) monthly 79 Group News.

15. See the report on the conference in SNP 79 Group Papers No. 3, 1980.
16. A report and some papers from the conference, "Has the Scottish Private Sector A Future?", were published in SNP 79 Group Papers No. 5, 1980.
17. In Edinburgh, for example, where there were 30 branches in 1980, the SNP contested only about half the wards and lost three of the five seats won in 1977; see Chris Cunningham, "The District Elections in Edinburgh" in SNP 79 Group Papers No. 4, 1980, pp. 3-5.
18. See Alex Salmond, "The Campaign in West Lothian", SNP 79 Group Papers No. 4, 1980, pp. 2-3.
19. Report by the National Secretary, Annual National Conference 1980 - Outcome of Business on the Agenda (SNP Headquarters, mimeo, June 1980).
20. Christopher Harvie, No Gods and Precious Few Heroes: Scotland 1914-1980 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), p. 149. See also, H.M. Drucker, Breakaway: The Scottish Labour Party (Edinburgh: EUSPB, 1978), pp.13-14.
21. However, John Robertson, the other former Labour MP who joined the SLP, did seek readmission to the Labour Party in order to condemn Sillars for joining the SNP, arguing that the SNP could never be a socialist party; see letter to Scots Independent, no. 1010, August 1980, p. 6.
22. Jim Sillars, Interview, April 1982.
23. Interviews, March-April 1982, May-June 1983.
24. Cited in Scots Independent, no. 100, July 1980, p. 2.
25. ibid., p. 4.

26. ibid.
27. Jim Sillars, Interview, April 1982.
28. Interviews, March-April 1982.
29. Report in the Glasgow Herald, cited in Scots Independent, no. 1010, August 1980, p. 1.
30. Scots Independent, no. 120, March 1981, p. 7.
31. 79 Group News, vol. 1, no. 1, (April 1981), p. 2.
32. ibid., p. 3.
33. John MacCormick himself had been elected Rector of the university in 1950; see John MacCormick, The Flag in the Wind: The Story of the National Movement in Scotland (London: Victor Gollancz, 1955), Chapter 23.
34. Cited in an open letter to Margo MacDonald from GUSNA in Scots Independent, no. 115, October 1980, p. 6.
35. ibid.
36. Letter from G. Cochrane, Scots Independent, no. 116, November 1980, p. 6.
37. Interviews, May-June 1983.
38. "The Non-Group Group", 79 Group News, vol. 1, no. 1, (April 1981), p. 2.
39. Report by the National Secretary, Annual National Conference 1981 - Outcome of Business on the Agenda (SNP Headquarters, mimeo, June 1981).

40. Scots Independent, no. 124, July 1981, p. 12.
41. Outcome of Business on the Agenda, op.cit.
42. Ibid.
43. Report from Executive Vice Chairman for Publicity to the 47th Annual National Conference, Aberdeen, May 1981.
44. Cited in Scots Independent, no. 124, July 1981, p. 2.
45. "Stirling National Council: Continued Swing to the Left", 79 Group News, July-August 1981, p. 3.
46. Although national office-bearers are usually elected by Conference, the National Council has the power to fill vacancies caused by death or resignation of an incumbent. This power was extended to fill the vacant (new) post of Vice Chairman for Local Government to provide for the direction and co-ordination of SNP campaigns in the 1982 Regional Council elections, scheduled to take place a month before the next Annual Conference.
47. "Kilmarnock National Council", 79 Group News, September 1981, p. 8.
48. The Scotsman, May 29, 1981; The Economist, June 6, 1981, p. 65.
49. Scots Independent, no. 124, July 1981, p. 1.
50. Donald Stewart, "An Obedient SNP", Crann Tara, no. 15, Autumn 1981, p. 6.
51. Margaret Bain, recapitaluting her arguments from 1981, Interview, June 1983.
52. Letter to Scots Independent, no. 124, July 1981, p. 6.

53. Ibid.
54. Kenneth McAskill, Interview, June 1983.
55. In October 1981, the '79 Group sponsored an open conference, on alternatives, or complementary strategies, to parliamentarism: see Alex Salmond, "Westminster - Or What?", Scots Independent, no. 129, December 1981, p. 4.
56. See "Lee Jeans Rally", 79 Group News, July-August 1981, p. 1; and Alan Clayton, "Lee Jeans: lessons to be learned?", 79 Group News, September 1981, p. 3.
57. "The Plessey Example" and "The Leyland Lesson", 79 Group News, April 1982, p. 6.
58. The full text of the Declaration is reprinted in 79 Group News, October 1981, p. 3.
59. Interviews, March-April 1982.
60. See Steve Butler, "A Disobedient SNP", Crann Tara, no. 15, Autumn 1981, p. 7.
61. Margaret Bain, Interview, June 1983.
62. Stephen Maxwell was already an elected member of the National Executive when he won the post of Vice Chairman for Local Government. This created a vacancy on the NEC which was filled by the runner-up in the National Council balloting for ordinary members of the Executive - Colin Bell, a vehement critic of the Group. There had earlier been some discussion at the Group's plenary meeting in August 1981 whether Maxwell should stand for the Vice Chairmanship, since this would create a vacancy on the NEC for Bell, or if the Group should nominate someone else for the Vice Chair position. It was decided that, since Maxwell stood the best chance of being elected, his nomination should go forward because "seats on the NEC (were) less important than possession of principal offices." Minutes of the Plenary Meeting of the '79 Group, Edinburgh, August 15, 1981, Item 8.

63. "Group AGM", 79 Group News, October 1981, p. 7.

Chapter Thirteen

DIMENSIONS OF INTRA-PARTY CONFLICT: THE "ANTI-GROUP" TENDENCY

In his analysis of the decline of the Scottish National Party from 1977 to 1981, Mark Kauppi has suggested that there were, at that time, four distinct tendencies or "discernible strands of thought" within the party, each with its own diagnosis of the party's problems and its own prescription for future recovery.¹ First, the 'social democrats' were those members who concurred with William Wolfe's analysis, that between 1974 and 1979 the party had lost the moderate social democratic image portrayed by its 1974 manifesto, to which it must now return. Second, the 'fundamentalists', led by Dr. Robert McIntyre, Donald Stewart, Winifred Ewing and Douglas Henderson, maintained that the decline of the SNP was due to its diversion from the party's fundamental commitment to self-government and sought to re-establish the demand for "Independence - Nothing Less" as the principal, overriding goal of the party. A third approach, that of the 'separatists', shared the 'fundamentalist' emphasis on independence, but argued that the SNP had become excessively preoccupied with respectability in its determination to play

the Westminster parliamentary game and proposed that, in the event of the party winning a majority of Scottish seats, it should immediately issue a unilateral declaration of independence. Finally, Kauppi's fourth strand, the 'radicals', were those who supported the aims and strategy of the '79 Group.'

For the first two years after the 1979 election, only one of these "strands of thought", the 'radical' or '79 Group approach, found expression in collective Voice exercised by a formally organized sub-party faction. The 'social democratic', 'fundamentalist' and 'separatist' views were articulated by individuals and informal groups who exploited the various channels of communication and influence afforded to them by the decentralized and internally democratic organizational structure of the party.

But, after the policy and electoral successes of the '79 Group at the 1981 Aberdeen Conference, the central substance of debate within the party began to change, from the discussion of alternative strategies for recovery to the question of the legitimacy, and even the very existence, of the formally organized Group. Under these circumstances, the distinction between the 'separatists' and the 'fundamentalists' effectively disappeared as 'separatists' such as former Vice-Chairman for Organization Colin Bell allied themselves with the 'fundamentalist' opposition to the Group. Hence, by the end of 1981, the internal politics of the Scottish

National Party was polarized by the conflict between the '79 Group sub-party faction and the 'fundamentalist' tendency (supported by most of the 'separatists'), with the remainder of the active membership, consisting largely of the 'social democratic' tendency and a large number of "non-aligned partisans", caught between the two extremes.

Finally, in April 1982, the 'fundamentalists' decided to fight fire with fire by establishing their own formally organized sub-party faction, the Campaign for Nationalism in Scotland. In our next chapter (Chapter Fourteen) we shall examine the sources of dissatisfaction and the Exit/Voice calculus which gave rise to this second expression of organized collective Voice within the SNP, basing our analysis largely on interviews and discussions with many of its founding members. Our purpose in this chapter, however, is to analyse what we refer to initially as the "Anti-Group" tendency - i.e., those members of the SNP who came to oppose the legitimate existence of the '79 Group - in order to identify the dimensions of the emerging conflict between the Group and its opponents.

THE "ANTI-GROUP" TENDENCY

Since the final decision to organize the Campaign on a formal basis had not yet been taken when our survey of SNP activists was being prepared, there was no explicit reference to the Campaign in our questionnaire. In contrast to the '79 Group

members among our respondents, therefore, it is not possible to identify directly all activists who joined the new faction, although some did identify themselves. One, for example, appended the following information to explain his responses to some of the questions about future SNP strategy and orientation: "I am about to become a member of the Secretariat of the Campaign for Nationalism, dedicated to restoring the former, successful strategies of the SNP" (Respondent #130).

However, we were able to isolate a separate sub-sample of respondents to the SNP Activists Survey who were potential members or supporters of the Campaign, in that they indicated their opposition to the existence and/or activities of the '79 Group. In response to Q. 44 of the Survey, seventy or 26.4 per cent of the 265 active respondents indicated that they did not believe that "groups like the '79 Group ... have a legitimate role to play within the Party" (see Table 13.1)' These respondents constitute the sub-sample referred to here as the "Anti-Group" tendency within the SNP. Twenty-five other respondents have already been analysed in earlier chapters as members of the '79 Group. The remainder of the active respondents (N=170), who were not members of the '79 Group but nevertheless considered that such groups had a legitimate role to play, may be loosely described as "Pro-Group" activists; these were largely the 'social democrats' and the "non-aligned" partisans who represented a slack

**TABLE 13.1 - SNP ACTIVISTS' VIEWS OF THE LEGITIMACY
OF THE ROLE OF "GROUPS" WITHIN THE PARTY**

	All Activists		Non-'79 Group Activists Only	
	N	%	N	%
Do you think that groups like the '79 Group ... have a legitimate role to play within the Party?				
Yes	195	73.6	170	70.8
No	70	26.4	70	29.2
	265		240	

SOURCE: SNP Activists Survey, QQ. 43 and 44.

resource awaiting mobilization by one or other of the two contending factions.

We must reiterate that, unless they indicated otherwise, the seventy "Anti-Group" respondents were only *potential* members of the Campaign for Nationalism.⁴ But, given their declared opposition to the activities or legitimacy of the '79 Group (the *only* organized group functioning within the SNP at the time that the survey was undertaken⁵), they were representative of a growing "Anti-Group" tendency within the party to which the new faction appealed and which, as we shall argue later, had much in common with the 'fundamentalist' tendency or wing of the SNP which supplied many of the leading figures in the Campaign. The use of the term "tendency" here refers to a stable set of attitudes, rather than individuals, which persists over time but is not organized as a formal group.⁶ However, tendencies may, on occasion, serve as the attitudinal or ideological basis for the mobilization of sub-party factions (as evidenced, for example, by Patrick Seyd's study of the Monday Club faction in the British Conservative Party⁷) as persistent but unorganized discontent is transformed into the expression of organized collective Voice.

Our analysis of the "Anti-Group" tendency, therefore, is based upon the premise (made more explicit later in this chapter) that it provided the raw material for the mobilization of the Campaign for Nationalism. This assumption is lent some support by the distribution by region of "Anti-

Group" respondents to the SNP Activists Survey (see Table 13.2). "Anti-Group" respondents were drawn disproportionately from predominantly rural regions in the north, north-east and south-west of Scotland, the same regions in which the SNP won a majority of its seats in October 1974,⁸ and these regions were also the areas in which support for the Campaign was strongest according to members of the Campaign Secretariat whom we interviewed.⁹ On the other hand, while 88 per cent of '79 Group members and 60 per cent of all respondents were active in the Strathclyde and Lothian Regions, only 44.3 per cent of "Anti-Group" activists were from the two most populous regions of the central industrial belt.

In the next three sections of this chapter we explore further characteristics of members of the "Anti-Group" tendency, and compare them to the other two sub-samples, by investigating their responses to the same sets of variables (respectively, socio-economic background, political background and selected attitudinal traits) used earlier to analyse both the members of the '79 Group and SNP activists in general.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS

The socio-economic backgrounds of "Anti-Group" respondents differed in a number of important respects from those of '79 Group members and, to a lesser extent, from other "Pro-Group" activists. Table 13.3 summarizes selected socio-economic

**TABLE 13.2 - REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF SNP ACTIVISTS,
BY ATTITUDE TO LEGITIMACY OF "GROUPS"**

Percentage of each sub-sample active in each Region

Region	'79 Group Members	"Pro-Group" Activists	"Anti-Group" Tendency
STRATHCLYDE	48.0	43.5	30.0
LOTHIAN	40.0	18.8	14.3
TAYSIDE	-	10.6	14.3
GRAMPIAN	4.0	9.4	12.9
FIFE	4.0	4.7	7.1
HIGHLAND	4.0	4.7	7.1
CENTRAL	-	4.1	10.0
DUMFRIES & GALLOWAY	-	1.8	4.3
BORDERS	-	1.8	-
ORKNEY } SHETLAND }	-	0.6	-
WESTERN ISLES	-	-	-
	(N=25)	(N=170)	(N=70)
Percentage from Strathclyde and Lothian	88.0	62.3	44.3

SOURCE: SNP Activists Survey, QQ. 10, 43 and 44.

characteristics for the "Anti-Group" tendency and the other two sub-samples in the SNP Activists Survey.

First, there was a sizeable and statistically significant difference between the number of women in the "Anti-Group" tendency and the other two sub-samples. 38.2 per cent of female respondents denied legitimacy to groups "like the '79 Group" within the SNP, while 23.3 per cent of male respondents were opposed to group activity ($Q=.34$; $\chi^2=4.93$, significant at .05), and women constituted 30 per cent of "Anti-Group" activists compared with an average of 17.4 per cent in the other two sub-samples.

This "gender effect" is not easily explained. While there are some slight differences, for example, between male and female respondents with respect to subjective and objective measures of ideology and attitudes toward class, all of which might be expected to be associated with support for or opposition to the '79 Group, these variations are not statistically significant.¹⁰ None of the other attitudinal or socio-economic characteristics which distinguish the "Anti-Group" tendency in general from the other sub-samples is particularly marked among women activists; nor do the reasons given for denying legitimacy to groups (discussed in Chapter Fourteen, below) by male and female respondents reveal any distinct patterns which might account for the relative over-representation of women in the "Anti-Group" sub-sample. At the risk of being accused of gender stereotyping, we might

**TABLE 13.3 - SELECTED SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF
SNP ACTIVISTS, BY ATTITUDE TO LEGITIMACY
OF "GROUPS"**

Percentage of each Sub-sample reporting each characteristic

	'79 Group Members	Other "Pro-Group" Activists	"Anti-Group" Tendency
Gender:			
Male	84.0	82.4	70.0
Female	16.0	17.6	30.0
	(N=25)	(N=170)	(N=70)
Age:			
Over 50	13.0	25.3	33.3
35-50	39.2	44.7	50.8
Under 35	47.8	30.0	15.9
(Mean Age)	(36.9)	(41.5)	(46.9)
	(N=23)	(N=170)	(N=69)
Education:			
University	60.0	38.8	28.6
College	20.0	25.3	35.7
Elementary/ Secondary	20.0	35.9	35.7
	(N=25)	(N=170)	(N=70)
Occupation:			
Employers, Managers and Self-Employed	13.0	24.3	23.1
Professional Employees	52.2	35.5	36.9
Other Non- Manual	13.0	17.8	21.5
Manual	4.3	13.0	4.6
Students	17.4	3.0	-
Others	-	6.5	13.8
	(N=23)	(N=169)	(N=65)

NB - percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding

SOURCE: SNP Activists Survey, QQ. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 43 and 44.

suggest that women were more likely to be concerned by the breakdown in consensus within the party following the emergence of the '79 Group, but this cannot be confirmed by the available survey data.

Second, members of the "Anti-Group" tendency were, on average, significantly older than other SNP activists. In particular, their mean age of 46.9 was ten years higher than that of the '79 Group members in our sample,¹¹ and less than one-sixth of "Anti-Group" respondents were under 35 years of age, compared with nearly half of the '79 Group members (see Table 13.3). These findings appear to lend support to the view, suggested in the previous chapter, that conflict within the SNP was, at least in part, a conflict between generations. Furthermore, since the Campaign counted among its "patrons" many of the prominent older and long-time members of the SNP, the proportion of "Anti-Group" respondents in upper age categories (for example, 13 per cent were over 65) again suggests some degree of congruence between our "Anti-Group" sub-sample and the membership of the Campaign for Nationalism.

Third, the "Anti-Group" respondents were somewhat less highly educated than members of the '79 Group. Only 28.6 per cent of the "Anti-Group" tendency had attended university, less than half the proportion of '79 Group members. However, there was a smaller difference in the pattern of educational attainment between "Anti-Group" respondents and "Pro-Group" activists.

Similarly, the structure of occupational backgrounds of the "Anti-Group" tendency and "Pro-Group" activists tend to approximate each other more closely than either resembles that of the '79 Group (See Table 13.3). Whereas nearly 70 per cent of '79 Group members were either professional employees or full-time students, professionals were less dominant in the other two sub-samples (while still constituting the largest single occupational category in both) and there were no students at all among the "Anti-Group" respondents. Manual workers were under-represented in the "Anti-Group" tendency, as in the '79 Group. However, the "Anti-Group" respondents included somewhat larger proportions of clerical/white-collar workers and homemakers, reflecting again that interesting "gender gap" between the tendency and the other two sub-samples.

Overall, the general pattern of gender and age characteristics for members of the "Anti-Group" tendency is substantially different from both the '79 Group and the "Pro-Group" activists. However, while the educational and occupational backgrounds of "Anti-Group" respondents also differ markedly from those of '79 Group members, they do not serve to distinguish them significantly from other SNP activists in the "Pro-Group" sub-sample.

POLITICAL BACKGROUNDS OF "ANTI-GROUP" RESPONDENTS

Table 13.4 summarizes the responses of members of the "Anti-Group" tendency and of the other two sub-samples to three variables relating to the political backgrounds of SNP activists - namely, previous party affiliation, length of membership of the SNP and motivations for joining the party.

As in the other two sub-samples, a large majority of "Anti-Group" respondents had not been members of, or active in, any other political party prior to joining the SNP. Among the small number who had previous party affiliations, "Anti-Group" activists appear somewhat less likely than other respondents to have been involved with the Labour Party and/or the SLP and more likely to have been Conservatives, but these differences are not statistically significant.

"Anti-Group" respondents do differ significantly from the other sub-samples, however, with respect to length of membership in the SNP. Twenty per cent of the "Anti-Group" sub-sample had been in the party for 25 years or more in 1982 and the mean length of membership for all respondents in the tendency was 16.6 years, compared with means for '79 Group members and other "Pro-Group" activists of 10.9 and 12.0 years respectively.¹² A sizeable proportion of the "Anti-Group" sub-sample, in other words, had been in the SNP long before the electoral advances of the late 1960s and 1974 - indeed, two had originally joined the old National Party of Scotland in 1929, a year after its formation - and would, perhaps, be

**TABLE 13.4 - POLITICAL BACKGROUNDS OF SNP ACTIVISTS,
BY ATTITUDE TO LEGITIMACY OF "GROUPS"**

Percentage of each Sub-sample reporting each characteristic

	'79 Group Members	Other "Pro-Group" Activists	"Anti-Group" Tendency
Previous Party Affiliation:			
Labour and/or SLP	12.0	9.4	5.7
Conservative	-	4.7	4.3
Other	4.0	7.1	4.3
None	84.0	78.8	82.9
	(N=25)	(N=170)	(N=70)
Member of SNP Since:			
1974-82	44.0	37.9	27.1
1960-73	56.0	53.2	51.5
1928-59	-	8.9	21.4
	(N=25)	(N=169)	(N=70)
(Mean Length of Membership)	(10.88)	(11.99)	(16.57)
Motivation for Joining SNP:			
Primarily Affective	32.0	42.0	48.6
Primarily Instrumental	44.0	35.5	27.1
No Special Reason/ Couldn't Say	24.0	22.5	24.3
	(N=25)	(N=169)	(N=70)

SOURCE: SNP Activists Survey, QQ. 136, 14, 15, 20, 43 and 44.

expected to be more sympathetic to the traditional, catch-all "independence first" view of the 'fundamentalist' wing of the party than to the left-wing policies and strategies advanced by the brash young socialists of the '79 Group.

Finally, "Anti-Group" respondents were more likely than members of the other two sub-samples to indicate "affective", rather than "instrumental", motivations for joining the SNP. Almost half of them gave responses categorized as "affective", compared with 32 per cent of '79 Group members and 42 per cent of other "Pro-Group" activists (see Table 13.4); however, these variations are not statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 3.15$).

The political backgrounds of "Anti-Group" respondents, therefore, do not differ significantly from those of other SNP activists with respect to either previous political affiliation or motivations for joining the party. However, the members of the "Anti-Group" tendency were distinguished from the other two sub-samples by the average length of time that they had been in the SNP. In comparison with many of the long-time Nationalists in the "Anti-Group" tendency, members of the '79 Group were relative newcomers, and the ascendancy of the Group threatened to change the nature of the SNP - to overturn the policies, strategies and image with which many of the old-timers were most comfortable. Again, our findings in this section further support the proposition that conflict within the SNP was at least in part a dispute

between the new/young and long-time/older generations of party activists. However, there were also clear differences in belief systems of the competing sub-party groups within the SNP.

THE BELIEFS OF "ANTI-GROUP" RESPONDENTS

The characteristics which distinguished "Anti-Group" respondents most clearly from the "Pro-Group" activists as well as '79 Group members were their positions on the subjective and objective dimensions of ideology and their attitudes toward future strategies for the SNP and the future constitutional status of Scotland.

Independence (Nothing Less?)

First, there is a moderately strong and statistically significant relationship between attitudes to the legitimacy of groups within the SNP and preferences for the future constitutional status of Scotland.¹³ Almost half of the "Anti-Group" tendency, but only 20 per cent of both "Pro-Group" activists and '79 Group members, supported the position of "Independence - Nothing Less", i.e., they indicated that a "fully independent state" was their first and only preference among the various options listed in Q. 32 of the SNP Activists Survey questionnaire (see Table 13.5). In contrast, a clear majority of both the '79 Group respondents and other "Pro-Group" activists also made independence their first priority,

**TABLE 13.5 - ACTIVISTS' PREFERENCES FOR THE FUTURE
CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF SCOTLAND, BY
ATTITUDE TO LEGITIMACY OF "GROUPS".**

Constitutional Options and Preferences	Percentage of each Sub-sample preferring each option		
	'79 Group Members	Other "Pro-Group" Activists	"Anti-Group" Tendency
Independence - Nothing Less	20.0	20.0	48.6
1st Choice, Independence; 2nd Choice, Strong Assembly or Federalism	76.0	77.1	48.6
Assembly/Devolution 1st Choice	4.0	2.4	1.4
Other *	-	0.6	1.4
	(N=25)	(N=170)	(N=70)

* Two respondents gave first preference to a "write-in" option, both favouring a confederation of British states over all other alternatives.

NB - percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

SOURCE: SNP Activists Survey, QQ. 32, 43 and 44.

but were willing to accept at least a strong Assembly or some kind of federal arrangement as a second preference.

The rejection of devolution by many in the "Anti-Group" tendency is underlined further by their responses to Q. 45 of the SNP Activists Survey, which asked respondents if the SNP should seek the establishment of a Scottish Assembly "either as an end in itself or as a first step to Independence". While 58.5 per cent of all those who considered sub-party groups legitimate (including '79 Group members) thought that the SNP *should* continue to seek an Assembly, just over 60 per cent of "Anti-Group" respondents answered in the direct negative (see Table 13.6). Indeed, the '79 Group's willingness to campaign for devolution, at least as a step towards independence, in order that a Scottish Assembly could begin to tackle Scotland's economic and social problems, was cited by many former Campaign members as one of the key factors contributing to their opposition to the Group."

Left-Right Orientation

It is also apparent that opposition to the '79 Group was based on ideological conflict, in that members of the "Anti-Group" tendency were significantly differentiated from the other two sub-samples by their mean locations on the left-right ideological spectrum. On both dimensions of ideology tapped by the SNP Activists Survey, "Anti-Group" respondents were generally less "left-wing" than other activists (see

**TABLE 13.6 - THE SNP AND DEVOLUTION. BY
ATTITUDE TO LEGITIMACY OF "GROUPS"**

Should the SNP seek the establishment of a Scottish Assembly...?	"Pro-Group" Respondents ¹	"Anti-Group" Tendency	
Yes	113 (58.5%)	27 (39.7%)	140 (53.6%)
No	80 (41.5%)	41 (60.3%)	121 (46.4%)
	193	68	N=261

$Q = .36$

$\chi^2 = 7.19$ (significant at .05)

Note:

¹ Includes '79 Group members and all others who thought that groups had a legitimate role to play in the SNP.

SOURCE: SNP Activists Survey, QQ. 45, 43 and 44.

Table 13.7). Their mean scores of 4.71 on the "subjective" (0-10) scale and -0.06 on the "objective" (-1 to +1) scale both depart significantly from the mean scores of the entire sample (3.78 and -0.19 respectively) and place the "Anti-Group" respondents, as a group, firmly in "the centre" of the ideological spectrum and to "the right" of the SNP as a whole. However, "Anti-Group" activists are somewhat less consistent in their responses than members of the '79 Group in that there is less congruence between their self-perceived ideological positions on the "subjective" scale and their individual scores on the "objective" measure: hence, the coefficient of correlation between individual respondents' scores on the two scales is considerably lower for the "Anti-Group" tendency ($r = .43$) than for the '79 Group ($r = .87$).

Our conclusion that the "Anti-Group" tendency represented, in relative terms, the "right wing" of the SNP is confirmed by the respondents themselves. In Table 13.8 we compare each respondent's placement of 'self' on the "subjective" ideological scale with the position in which he or she situated the SNP on the continuum (responses to Question 26). A clear majority (over 80 per cent) of '79 Group members, not surprisingly, placed themselves to "the left" of the SNP, while "Pro-Group" activists were more-or-less evenly divided among those who situated themselves to "the left", "the right" or in the same position as their party. In contrast, a majority of respondents in the

**TABLE 13.7 - IDEOLOGY OF SNP ACTIVISTS, BY
ATTITUDE TO LEGITIMACY OF "GROUPS"**

	'79 Group Members	Other "Pro-Group" Activists	"Anti-Group" Tendency
Mean Placement of Self on Subjective 0-10 Scale (Q. 26)	2.15* (N=22)	3.68 (N=144)	4.71* (N=53)
Mean Score on Objective (-1 to +1) Scale (Q. 40)	-0.59* (N=25)	-0.19 (N=170)	-0.06* (N=69)
Correlation between "Subjective" and "Objective" Measures (Pearson's r)	.87* (N=22)	.50* (N=144)	.43* (N=53)

* Difference of means from sample mean significant at .05

+ Correlation coefficient (Pearson's r) significant at all levels

o Correlation coefficient (Pearson's r) significant at .05.

SOURCE: SNP Activists Survey, QQ. 26, 40, 43 and 44

**TABLE 13.8 - ACTIVISTS' PERCEPTIONS OF "SELF" AND THE
SNP, BY ATTITUDE TO LEGITIMACY OF "GROUPS"**

Respondents' Placement of "Self" Relative to SNP on Subjective Ideological Scale (Q. 26)	Percentage of each Sub-sample in each Category		
	'79 Group Members	Other "Pro-Group" Activists	"Anti-Group" Tendency
Placed Self to Left of SNP	81.8	39.1	12.0
Placed Self and SNP same	13.6	29.0	22.0
Placed Self to Right of SNP	4.5	31.9	66.0
	(N=22)	(N=138)	(N=50)

$$\lambda = .17$$

$$\chi^2 = 41.44 \text{ (significant at all levels)}$$

NB - percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding

SOURCE: SNP Activists Survey, QQ. 26, 43 and 44.

"Anti-Group" tendency (66 per cent) placed themselves to "the right" of the SNP on the scale, despite the fact that they generally situated the party itself a little further to "the right" than did other activists."

Strategies for Recovery

As was the case with the '79 Group, the ideological differences between the "Anti-Group" respondents and the rest of the party led them to prescribe particular strategies for the SNP to follow in order to improve its electoral performance. Table 13.9 shows the percentages of respondents in each sub-sample who listed among their three most important strategies for the SNP selected options which we have categorized as "Left" or "Traditional" strategies. The three "Left Strategies" were all considered important by at least 45 per cent of '79 Group respondents and together constituted 56.3 per cent of all options listed by Group members; in contrast, they comprised 18.5 per cent of the important strategies proposed by "Pro-Group" activists and less than 6 per cent of all those mentioned by members of the "Anti-Group" tendency.

At the other extreme, the three strategies most closely associated with the "traditional" appeal of the SNP, often referred to as the 'fundamentalist' line - i.e., that the SNP should base its campaign exclusively on the demand for independence and should attempt to win support from all

**TABLE 13.9 - PREFERRED FUTURE STRATEGIES FOR THE SNP.
BY ATTITUDE TO LEGITIMACY OF "GROUPS"**

Percentage of each Sub-sample citing
strategy among the three most important
for the SNP

Strategy: "The SNP should ..."	'79 Group Members	Other "Pro-Group" Activists	"Anti-Group Tendency
"Left" strategies			
d. adopt radical "left" wing" policies	54.2	7.9	0.1
g. concentrate on working class	45.8	22.0	5.7
j. concentrate on Labour voters	66.7	25.1	10.0
d,g,j as percentage of all answers	56.3 (N=71)	18.5 (N=487)	5.8 (N=207)
"Traditional" strategies:			
a. campaign solely on independence	8.3	42.6	50.0
i. appeal to all classes	0	26.0	51.4
n. win support from	0	19.6	47.1
a,i,n as percentage of all answers	2.8 (N=71)	29.6 (N=487)	50.2 (N=207)

NB - "N" here refers to the total number of strategies
listed as important by members of each sub-sample
(maximum 3 per respondent)

SOURCE: SNP Activists Survey, QQ. 46a, 43 and 44.

classes and all parties - constituted just over 50 per cent of all strategies considered most important by "Anti-Group" respondents, compared with 29.6 per cent of "Pro-Group" activists and only 2.8 per cent of '79 Group members.

Among other strategies which received substantial support (i.e., which were mentioned by at least 10 per cent of one of the sub-samples), two serve to underline further the differences between the "Anti-Group" tendency and the '79 Group. First, a focus on winning support from young voters was considered important by 58 per cent of '79 Group members but slightly less than one-third of the "Anti-Group" respondents. Second, the adoption of "middle-of-the-road economic and social policy", which was not mentioned by a single '79 Group respondent, was considered important by 17.3 per cent of "Pro-Group" activists and 25.7 per cent of the "Anti-Group" tendency.

These variations in the strategies proposed for the SNF by the three sub-samples are statistically significant. In Table 13.10, we present a summary of the frequency with which respondents from each sub-sample included among their "three most important strategies" options which are classified according to broad strategic orientation, i.e., "Left Strategies" (options d, g and j), "Traditional Strategies" (options a, i and n) and "Other". Thus, for example, '79 Group members listed 71 "most important" strategies in all, of which 40 are categorized as "Left" strategies, 2 are

**TABLE 13.10 - SUPPORT FOR BROAD STRATEGIC ORIENTATION
OF THE SNP, BY ATTITUDE TO LEGITIMACY
OF "GROUPS"**

Strategic Orientation	Sub-sample			
	'79 Group Members	Other "Pro-Group" Activists	"Anti-Group" Tendency	
"Left"	40 (56.3%)	90 (18.5%)	12 (5.8%)	142 (18.6%)
Other	29 (40.8%)	253 (52.0%)	91 (44.0%)	373 (48.8%)
"Traditional"	2 (2.8%)	144 (29.6%)	104 (50.2%)	250 (32.7%)
	71	487	207	N=765

$$\lambda = .07$$

$$\chi^2 = 116.0 \text{ (significant at all levels)}$$

NB - percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding

SOURCE: SNP Activists Survey, QQ. 46a, 43 ad 44

classified as "Traditional" appeals, and 29 were "Other" options. Although the measure of association Lambda (λ) suggests a weak relationship, its value is somewhat depressed by the disproportionate size of the column marginals (71, 487, 207) and therefore underestimates the strength of the association. However, the χ^2 value of 116.0 indicates that the relationship between attitude to the legitimacy of "groups" and the future strategies advocated for the party is clearly a significant one.

The "Loyalty" of "Anti-Group" Respondents

Finally, in the event that their prescriptions for the future strategic orientation of the SNP were not adopted, how committed were "Anti-Group" respondents to their party? Table 13.11 shows the percentage of respondents in each subsample who indicated that they would definitely stay in the SNP under the various scenarios posed by Q. 48 of the SNP Activists Survey.¹⁶ The summary percentages at the foot of the table suggest that relatively few "Anti-Group" respondents were "unconditional loyalists"; only 13.2 per cent indicated that they would stay in the party under all seven conditions - almost exactly the same proportion registered by '79 Group members. Even if the possibility of the SNP being associated with political violence (condition g) is excluded, only one-third of "Anti-Group" respondents may be considered "unconditional loyalists"; again, this is very similar to the

**TABLE 13.11 - ACTIVISTS' COMMITMENT TO THE SNP,
BY ATTITUDE TO LEGITIMACY OF "GROUPS"**

Would you remain a member of the SNP if ...	Percentage in each Sub-sample responding "Yes"		
	79 Group Members	Other "Pro-Group" Activists	"Anti-Group" Tendency
a) SNP support declined again at the next election?	100 (N=25)	99.4 (N=170)	100 (N=70)
b) there were a number of disastrous elections?	96.0 (N=25)	95.9 (N=170)	95.7 (N=70)
c) the SNP shifted significantly to "the left"?	100 (N=25)	82.5 (N=166)	48.5 (N=68)
d) the SNP shifted significantly to "the right"?	32.0 (N=25)	58.7 (N=167)	55.9 (N=68)
e) the SNP campaigned solely on Inde- pendence?	76.0 (N=25)	97.0 (N=167)	92.8 (N=69)
f) the SNP campaigned in favour of Devolution?	96.0 (N=25)	91.0 (N=167)	80.9 (N=68)
g) the SNP were associated with political violence?	47.8 (N=23)	48.8 (N=166)	31.9 (N=69)
All conditions a-f	32.0 (N=25)	54.2 (N=167)	33.8 (N=68)
All conditions a-g	13.0 (N=23)	30.7 (N=166)	13.2 (N=68)

SOURCE: SNP Activists Survey, QQ. 48, 43 and 44

percentage of "loyalists" among '79 Group members. And, in both cases, the residual sub-sample of "Pro-Group" activists contained the highest proportion of unconditionally loyal members of the party.

There are some differences among the three sub-samples with respect to the conditions most likely to lead activists to reconsider their commitment to the SNP. Not surprisingly, the prospect of a significant shift to "the right" in the party's ideological stance was the scenario most likely to challenge the loyalty of '79 Group members (less than one-third would stay in the SNP under such circumstances), and less than half of Group members indicated that they would stay if the party were associated with violence. Among the "Pro-Group" activists, political violence was the major challenge to loyalty, but the fact that over 40 per cent of the largest sub-sample were troubled also by the prospect of an ideological shift to "the right" perhaps serves to confirm the moderately left-of-centre sympathies of most SNP activists.

Among "Anti-Group" respondents, again a possible association of the SNP with political violence was mostly likely to lead to Exit from the party. But perhaps the most telling responses from this sub-sample were those relating to ideology. Although the proportion of "Anti-Group" respondents who would oppose a shift to "the left" was slightly larger than the percentage opposing a shift to "the right", 32.4 per

cent of the tendency indicated that they would definitely leave the party if it altered its ideological position significantly in *either* direction, whether to "left" or "right".¹⁷ This finding is quite congruent with the strategies prescribed for the SNP by the "Anti-Group" respondents, in that they generally favoured a return to the SNP's traditional catch-all or umbrella appeal to all classes and to voters of all political persuasions in order to mobilize support for independence: a significant ideological shift to either "left" or "right", in their view, would undermine this catch-all strategy by alienating potential Nationalist voters at the other end of the political spectrum.

CONCLUSIONS

Our analysis of the "Anti-Group" sub-sample reveals a number of significant differences between these respondents and other SNP activists and, in particular, between the "Anti-Group" tendency and the '79 Group. A majority of "Anti-Group" respondents were from primarily rural constituencies outside the central industrial belt dominated by Strathclyde and Lothian Regions, in which a large majority of '79 Group activists lived and worked. The "Anti-Group" tendency included a significantly higher proportion of women activists than either of the other two sub-samples. The "Anti-Group" respondents in general were significantly older than other activists, were less highly educated than members of the '79

Group and were also less likely to be occupied as professional employees or students.

There were fewer differences, however, with respect to political background variables. Although "Anti-Group" respondents were more likely to have been active in the Conservative Party (and '79 Group members to have been affiliated with Labour and/or Scottish Labour) prior to becoming members of the SNP and were also more likely than other sub-samples of activists to report "affective" motivations for joining the party, these variations were not statistically significant. The only variable for which significant differences were recorded was mean length of membership of the SNP, in that "Anti-Group" respondents averaged 16.6 years in the party, compared with 12.0 years for the "Pro-Group" activists and 10.9 years for the '79 Group.

But the characteristics which most clearly distinguished members of the "Anti-Group" tendency from the other two sub-samples were their attitudes and ideological positions. "Anti-Group" respondents were, on average, significantly less "left-wing" than other activists on both the "subjective" and "objective" ideological scales and most also perceived themselves to be less "left-wing", or more centrist, than their party. "Anti-Group" respondents were more likely than other activists to support the "Independence - Nothing Less" option for the future constitutional status

of Scotland and to reject any suggestion that the SNP seek the creation of a Scottish Assembly exercising powers devolved from Westminster. Furthermore, while a clear majority of '79 Group members indicated that they would leave the party if it shifted significantly to "the right", a sizeable proportion of "Anti-Group" respondents was opposed to *any* ideological shift, whether to "left" or "right".

Among the modal characteristics of the "Anti-Group" respondents, their age, their length of service in the party, their rejection of devolution in favour of "Independence - Nothing Less", their ideological "centrism" and their determination to keep their party at the centre of the political spectrum all suggest a strong degree of congruence between what we have labelled the "Anti-Group" tendency or sub-sample and the so-called 'fundamentalist' wing of the SNP from which the Campaign for Nationalism emerged.

Nowhere is this congruence more apparent than in the future strategies presented for the SNP by a majority of "Anti-Group" respondents, which were diametrically opposed to the orientation prescribed by the '79 Group. On the one hand, the '79 Group advocated the adoption of left-wing economic and social policies and a more particularistic appeal to working class and Labour voters. On the other, both the "Anti-Group" respondents and the 'fundamentalists' sought to re-emphasize the political/constitutional issue of independence, to restore the SNP's traditional catch-all appeal to members of all

classes and supporters of all parties, and, to the extent that economic and social policies were deemed important, to steer a centrist, middle-of-the-road course.

Our findings in this chapter therefore suggest that there was a significant degree of correspondence, or congruence, between the socio-economic, political and attitudinal traits displayed by our "Anti-Group" tendency and the known modal characteristics of members of the 'fundamentalist' wing of the SNP. Thus, despite the caveats expressed at the beginning of the chapter, we conclude that our sub-sample of "Anti-Group" respondents is (more or less) representative of the 'fundamentalist' tendency within the party from which the leaders and many of the supporters of the Campaign for Nationalism were recruited. We now turn our attention to the process whereby this "Anti-Group" or 'fundamentalist' tendency became mobilized as a sub-party faction to express organized collective voice in protest at the direction and management of the SNP.

NOTES - CHAPTER THIRTEEN

1. Mark V. Kauppi, "The decline of the Scottish National Party, 1977-81: political and organizational factors", Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 5, no. 3, 1982, p. 338.
2. ibid., pp. 338-341.
3. In addition, five inactive or former members of the party among our respondents also indicated their opposition to group activity.
4. Apart from Respondent #130, already cited, a handful of other "Anti-Group" respondents who signed their questionnaires (such as Winifred Ewing) can be definitively identified as members of the Campaign.
5. All "Anti-Group" respondents who complied with our request to fill in the date of completing the questionnaire indicated that they had finished it before the formation of the Campaign at the end of April.
6. See Chapter Two, above.
7. Patrick Seyd, "Factionalism Within the Conservative Party: The Monday Club", Government and Opposition, vol. 7, no. 4, 1972, pp. 464-487.
8. Eight of the eleven seats won by the SNP in October 1974 were located in the Highland, Grampian, Tayside, Central and Dumfries and Galloway Regions, all regions in which "Anti-Group" respondents were relatively over-represented in our sample.
9. According to Kenneth Fee, Vice-convenor and Secretary of the Campaign, support for the new faction and for the 'fundamentalist' cause was strongest in the Glasgow area, where many of the founders of the Campaign were active, "plus rural areas in Central Region, the north-east and the south-west, and especially in Perthshire [Tayside] and Dumfries & Galloway." Interview, June 1983.

10. In each case, men were generally more "left" or more "class conscious" than women. Mean scores for men and women on the "subjective" (Left=0, Right=10) ideological scale were 3.77 and 3.82 respectively. On the "objective" (Left= -1, Right= +1) scale, men scored a mean of -0.20, women a mean of -0.15. But, neither of these variations was significant at .05; nor was the fact that 42.6 per cent of males usually thought of themselves in class terms compared with only 31 per cent of female respondents.
11. The test for difference of means (Z test) shows that the differences between the mean age of the whole sample and the mean ages of both the "Anti-Group" and the '79 Group sub-samples is statistically significant at .05.
12. The differences between the mean length of party membership for the whole sample (13.10) and the means for both the "Anti-Group" tendency and '79 Group members are significant at .05.
13. When both variables are reduced to dichotomies (i.e., "Anti-Group"/"All Pro-Group" and "Independence - Nothing Less"/"Other"), Yule's Q= .58 and $\chi^2= 21.08$ (significant at all levels).
14. Interviews, May-June 1983.
15. The mean placement of the SNP on the "subjective" (0-10) ideological scale by members of the three sub-samples was as follows: '79 Group, 3.44; "Pro-Group" Activists, 3.74; "Anti-Group" Tendency, 3.78. However only the '79 Group mean deviates significantly (at .05) from the mean placement of the SNP by the whole sample (3.72).
16. Figures in Table 13.11 include only those respondents who indicated unequivocally that they would stay in the SNP under each scenario - "don't knows" and ticks accompanied by question marks (✓?) are not categorized as "unconditional loyalty" for the purposes of this Table.
17. Of the 68 "Anti-Group" respondents who answered Q. 48c and Q. 48d, seven would definitely leave if the SNP were to shift to "the left" (but not if it moved to "the

right"), five would leave if the party moved to "the right" (but not if it shifted "left") and 22 would Exit if it shifted significantly in either direction.

Chapter Fourteen

THE COUNTER-MOBILIZATION OF COLLECTIVE VOICE: THE CAMPAIGN FOR NATIONALISM IN SCOTLAND

In April 1982, representatives of the 'fundamentalist' tendency announced the formation of a second organized sub-party faction within the Scottish National Party. The Campaign for Nationalism in Scotland was headed by a number of prominent "patrons", long-time Nationalists who lent their names and faces to its appeals for support, including the party's senior MP, Donald Stewart, former party President Dr. Robert McIntyre, former MP and now Member of the European Parliament, Winifred ("Winnie") Ewing, and one-time party Chairman, James Halliday. These notables of the Campaign were supported by a seven-person Secretariat, or organizing committee, whose members were recruited largely from the 'fundamentalist' dominated Glasgow District Association of the party.

The Campaign for Nationalism (or simply the Campaign) was established, according to its founders, to persuade members of the SNP that the role of the party should be

to campaign for nationalism, not for other people's ideologies (because) while self-government may or may not lead to conservatism, liberalism, social democracy or socialism, none of these will lead to self-government.¹

The formal rhetoric of the Campaign therefore appeared to reject even-handedly any and all appeals to the Scottish electorate that were based on particularistic ideological perspectives. In this respect, it may be seen as a mouthpiece for the 'fundamentalist' wing of the party, that component of the SNP which sought to restore the non-ideological, classless, catch-all appeal, with a near-exclusive focus on independence, that had traditionally been the basis of the party's platform.

But the more immediate objective of the Campaign was clearly to counter the growing influence within the SNP of one particular ideological perspective - namely, the self-proclaimed socialism of the '79 Group. For this reason, the new organization also attracted sympathy from members of the 'separatist' tendency and from other SNP activists whose discontent with the new "management" of the party was more specific, in that it was based on opposition (for ideological, strategic or personal reasons) to the Group *per se* rather than support for the 'fundamentalist' line or for particular 'fundamentalist' leaders.

Nonetheless, the Campaign was largely a 'fundamentalist' creation and its primary role was to serve as a medium for the organized expression of collective Voice for those 'fundamentalist' members of the SNP who had become increasingly dissatisfied with the direction or 'product' of

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the party as the influence of the '79 Group became more pronounced.

Following the logic of the Exit/Voice model, this chapter is devoted to an exploration of the sources of dissatisfaction among 'fundamentalist' activists and their selection of the response of non-Exiting, organized collective Voice. In the first section of the chapter, therefore, we examine the nature of the perceived decline in the quality of the party 'product' which gave rise to discontent with the performance of the organization. Then, in the second section, we explore the availability of the various Exit and Voice alternatives and, where possible, the estimation of costs and benefits associated with each option before tracing the course of events leading up to the foundation of the Campaign.

THE SOURCES OF DISSATISFACTION

The formation of a sub-party faction to express organized collective Voice is, according to our Exit/Voice model, a particular response by certain members of a political party to a sense of dissatisfaction with the party's 'product'. In order to account for the emergence of the Campaign for Nationalism as a full-blown faction, therefore, it is necessary first to identify the sources of discontent with the organizational performance of the SNP among those members and activists who helped to establish, or subsequently supported, the new sub-party.

As an initial point of departure, one clear indication of a sense of dissatisfaction with the direction of the Scottish National Party prior to the emergence of the Campaign is the opposition expressed by a member of activists to the existence or influence of "groups like the '79 Group ... within the Party" in their responses to the SNP Activists Survey. In Table 14.1, we summarize the reasons given by the "Anti-Group" respondents for their denial of legitimacy to the role of the '79 Group.

By far the most frequent category of responses (43.5 per cent) were those which labelled intra-party groups as "divisive" or "disruptive" or, on the other side of the coin, which emphasized the need for party "unity" or "solidarity".² Examples of this type of response included the following:

- "Disruptive" (Respondent #017)
- "People in them [groups] end up with a divided loyalty and the thing that makes them form a common group becomes more important than the SNP" (#185)
- "The SNP stands for a united Scotland and the 79 Group are a threat to unity within the party" (#216)
- "Unity is strength" (#350 and #402)
- "Divide and rule" (#373)
- "To date 79 Group has only caused division in the party" (#502)
- "They are both divisive and conspiratorial" (#525)
- "The main weakness in Scottish politics is faction and disunity. The SNP needs unity and stability" (#562)

The second most frequent type of response (13 per cent) came from those who argued that the activities of sub-party groups distracted the party and/or the attention of the electorate

**TABLE 14.1 - "ANTI-GROUP" RESPONDENTS' REASONS FOR DENYING
THE LEGITIMACY OF "GROUPS" WITHIN THE SNP**

Reasons for denying legitimacy to role of "groups" within the party	N	%
Divisiveness / threat to unity	30	43.5
Distraction from independence	9	13.0
Ideological opposition	8	11.6
Groups unnecessary in a democratic organization	6	8.7
Threat to electoral support/ loss of members	6	8.7
"Party within a party"	4	5.8
Other	6	8.7
	—	
	69	
(Missing/No Answer)	(1)	

SOURCE: SNP Activists Survey, Q. 44a.

from the SNP's primary goal, the attainment of independence.

Examples included:

- "We must keep our 'grab bag' of support firmly fixed on independence and not on splinter groups" (Respondent #121)
- "They [groups] are likely only to lead us away from our only goal, INDEPENDENCE" (#198)

Next, a number of respondents (11.6 per cent) rejected the role of groups like the '79 Group because they were opposed for ideological or strategic reasons to the adoption of left-wing policies, to the pursuance of class-based politics, or to the politics of left versus right. This type of response included the following examples:

- "We should not fall into the trap of left-right politics" (Respondent #189)
- "The people are fed up with class struggles ..." (#409)
- "They [the '79 Group?] only serve to create trouble and strife and promote left-wing ideals" (#144)

Another set of respondents argued that groups were unnecessary in a party like the SNP because the party organization was sufficiently democratic that individual members could make their voices heard and have an influence on party policy without resorting to organized collective action: for example,

- "The Party's Council and National Conference give adequate forum for debate" (Respondent #055)
- "The SNP has adequate democratic system to make '79 Groups' unnecessary" (#322)
- "Individuals can and do influence policy - no place for a caucus" (#363)

Other "Anti-Group" respondents were opposed to groups in general, or to the '79 Group in particular, because they considered that the conflict within the party or specific activities of the '79 Group had driven potential members or voters away from the SNP. Examples of these responses included the following:

"It tends to fragment the party and stop potential members joining" (Respondent #278)

"... the '79 Group has lost SNP many supporters, e.g., through 'civil disobedience' resolution" (#399)

"They present a bad image to the public and therefore cost votes" (#406)

Four respondents based their objections to group activity on our simple bottom-line definition of "sub-party faction" (see Chapter Two, above) in that they labelled the '79 Group a "party within a party". For example, Respondent #130 suggested that he was opposed to the Group because it was "not just a group, but a conspiratorial party-within-a-party". And this respondent was not the only one to label the '79 Group "conspiratorial", perhaps a somewhat unfair claim given the fact that both the membership of the '79 Group and many of its meetings were open to all members of the SNP.

Finally, among the "other" reasons given for opposing the activities of groups were those based on personal antipathy towards particular individuals or the leaders of the '79 Group in general. One respondent, for example, justified his denial of legitimacy to groups by labelling them

"only glory seekers" (Respondent #366), while another, in a barb presumably directed at Jim Sillars, argued that

"Conspiracies of people whose careers have foundered in the Labour Party are no use to Nationalism" (Respondent #005).

Ironically this respondent was himself a former Labour Party member!

Among the sixty-nine "Anti-Group" respondents who provided reasons for their opposition to groups within the SNP, only eight specifically mentioned the '79 Group by name. Many more, however, worded their responses to Q. 44a of the SNP Activists Survey in such a way that it was clear that their antipathy was directed primarily toward this particular group rather than at the concept of intra-party groups in general - especially since, as we noted earlier, the '79 Group was the only clearly identifiable group functioning within the Scottish National Party at the time that the survey was undertaken.

It is no exaggeration to suggest, therefore, that the major source of dissatisfaction for members of the "Anti-Group" or 'fundamentalist' tendency was the growing influence of the '79 Group over the direction of the SNP, especially after the Group's successes in policy votes and intra-party elections at the 1981 Annual Conference and at the next two meetings of the SNP National Council (see Chapter Twelve). This opposition to the '79 Group was based on a number of dimensions of disagreement or conflict: first, ideological

opposition to the socialist policies espoused by the Group or, more generally, to any shift away from the "centrist" ground traditionally occupied by the SNP; second, criticism of the strategies advocated by the Group; third, personal antipathy toward individual members of the Group; and, fourth, inter-generational and inter-regional conflicts within the party organization. Although these dimensions of conflict are not always easy to disentangle from one another (for example, when we asked one former member of the Campaign Secretariat if his opposition to the '79 Group was ideological, strategic or personal, he replied immediately "All three"!'), in the following sub-sections we explore each of these sources of dissatisfaction, drawing upon writings by and interviews with founding members of the Campaign for Nationalism.

Ideological Opposition to the '79 Group

A slight majority (51.5 per cent) of activists in the "Anti-Group" tendency reported in their responses to the SNP Activists Survey that they would be unlikely to maintain their commitment to the SNP if the party were to shift significantly to "the left" (see Table 13.11, above). Some activists were clearly hostile to the socialist principles advocated by the '79 Group and to its attempt to turn the SNP into an explicitly left-wing party. Numerous letters to the Scots Independent (which itself took a consistently anti-'79 Group stand in its editorials) criticized the ideological

orientation of the Group, referring for example to its "infantile Leftism", its "dogmatic socialism [which] is an anathema to all Scots" and to its members' persistence "in hawking their thread-worn theories ... despite the world-wide exposure of Marxist Socialism for the fraud that it is."⁴ Other critics were somewhat less extreme in their condemnation: for example, one former Campaign official suggested that "the '79 Group was too socialist, although there is a strong case to be made for the SNP being moderately social democratic."⁵

However, the data in Table 13.11 also suggested that almost half of the respondents in our "Anti-Group"/ 'fundamentalist' sub-sample indicated that their Loyalty to the SNP would also be challenged by a significant shift of the party to "the right". For these activists, therefore, ideological opposition to the '79 Group was not necessarily anti-socialist in nature; rather, it represented an aversion to any attempt to shift the SNP away from its traditional "centrist" position, whence it could establish a catch-all or umbrella appeal to all Scots who supported the principle of independence.

In part, this rejection of the ideologies of both left and right was a strategic decision, in that a pronounced move by the SNP in either direction might serve to alienate potential voters at the other end of the political spectrum. But it was also commonly held among 'fundamentalists' that

traditional ideologies such as conservatism and socialism had no relevance for Scotland since they were the programs of particular class interests and because the class-based politics which gave rise to these ideologies was itself an alien concept.

Those in the 'fundamentalist' tendency accepted by-and-large the historical myth of the existence of an egalitarian and classless Scottish society before the Union with England (see Chapter Seven) and consequently denied the relevance of the language and imagery of what was often referred to as "the class war" for the present.' Indeed, some former Campaign members whom we interviewed went so far as to claim that 'class' was a peculiarly English concept which had been foisted upon their country in order "to divide and rule the Scots".⁷ Others laid the blame at the door of the "English-controlled" media, the perennial scapegoat of the 'fundamentalist' cause: for example, former Nationalist MP and Senior Vice Chairman of the party, Douglas Henderson, declared in 1980 that "the class war is largely synthetic and a creation of the media."⁸ But whoever was responsible, the general effect of class politics for the 'fundamentalists' was to divide the Scottish people and undermine the quest for national identity: as Henderson warned,

'Divide and Rule' has been Whitehall's response to nationalist movements throughout the world for generations. ... It would be a sad irony if ... some people in the party played into their hands.'

The rejection of the concept of class-based politics in the 'fundamentalist' belief system led in turn to a rejection of the ideologies traditionally associated with the opposing sides in the 'class war'. The SNP was to be neither of "the left" nor "the right" but rather of "the radical centre", a party committed to Scottish independence but opposed to the centralizing forces of state-centred socialism on the one hand and imperialistic conservatism on the other. Hence, according to Robert Silver, a retired professor of engineering who had been an SNP candidate in 1979 and was later to become one of the "patrons" of the Campaign: "It is the responsibility of the SNP to eschew the hackneyed dogmas of Left and Right."¹⁰

For many 'fundamentalists', therefore, the socialist policies advocated by the Interim Committee for Political Discussion and the '79 Group threatened to drag the SNP into the class-bound, 'left versus right' politics of the English-based parties and away from its self-conscious position in the "non-ideological" centre of Scottish politics. Thus, in a harsh critique of the ICPD, published just before its transformation into the '79 Group, Robert Silver wrote:

The IC group exemplifies the ... evil of those who will not seek to free their country unless they are promised in advance the kind of government they think they want. That they happen to want a Leftward lurch is secondary; they would be just as wrong if they wanted to lurch to the Right.¹¹

Silver's remarks raised another concern of the 'fundamentalists', that the task of the SNP was to achieve

independence and that members should not attempt to prejudge the ideological composition of a future Scottish government. Thus, as the party prepared for its 1980 Annual Conference, an editorial in the Scots Independent warned the '79 Group and the wider membership that "We cannot afford the luxury of trying to impose our own particular personal nostrums on the National Party or the people of Scotland before we have achieved responsible government" And some activists, albeit a minority even in the 'fundamentalist' wing of the party, took this argument a stage further still when they complained that the SNP had no business formulating policies for an independent Scotland; instead, the party should campaign on one issue - that of self-government - and one issue only."

To the extent that they acknowledged the validity of a left-right continuum at all, the 'fundamentalists' tended to view the rightful position of the SNP as straddling the centre of Scottish politics, from which point it could appeal to nationalists of all ideological persuasions. Consequently, they resisted any attempt within the party to pin an ideological label on the SNP, whether this came from the moderate 'social democratic' tendency associated with William Wolfe or from the more radically socialist '79 Group. Thus, the growing influence of the '79 Group within the party and the resulting shift in the ideological stance of the SNP to the left represented a deterioration in the party product for

the 'fundamentalist' activists and was one source of the dissatisfaction which led to the foundation of the Campaign for Nationalism.

The Critique of the '79 Group Strategy

The '79 Group strategy for mobilizing majority support for independence from the Scottish voters involved offering socialist policies and an explicitly left-wing image for the party in an attempt to win over to the Nationalist cause the working class and others who had traditionally supported the Labour Party, especially in the central industrial belt. But, according to Kenneth Fee, Vice-Convenor of the Campaign, "the '79 Group strategy was basically unintelligent" while one of the Campaign's patrons labelled it "unsound, divisive and counter-productive."¹⁴ In the 'fundamentalist' view, the '79 Group program was founded upon a number of false assumptions and, moreover, it ignored some basic facts of Scottish political life.

First, Fee suggested, "Strategically, there is no evidence to support the '79 Group claim that the working class supported devolution in the 1979 referendum while the middle class opposed it."¹⁵ The Group's claim, as we noted earlier, was based on a comparison of aggregate votes cast in favour of devolution by region and the modal socio-economic characteristics of each region: such an analysis was obviously subject to the fallacies of ecological inference.

But even if it were the case that working class or Labour voters had generally voted "Yes" in the referendum, did this necessarily suggest, as the '79 Group believed, that these voters were more sympathetic to the cause of self-government? For at least one persistent critic of the Group, it did not: according to Robert Silver, working class and/or Labour voters supported the devolution legislation "because it was a Labour enactment, and such supporters would have voted for any other Labour enactment to the same or perhaps greater extent."¹⁶

Second, a number of former Campaign members from the Glasgow area suggested in interviews that the '79 Group strategy ignored the religious dimension in the west of Scotland, where the Ulster experience perhaps has more influence on political attitudes than in any other part of mainland Britain. Both working class and middle class Catholics, especially those of Irish background, tend to vote for the Labour Party, in large measure to oppose the Conservatives who are perceived to support Protestant hegemony in Northern Ireland (indeed, the Conservative Party in Scotland only dropped the word "Unionist" from its title in 1964). Nonetheless, local activists in Glasgow suggested that many Catholics voted against the Assembly proposals in the referendum because they were frightened by anti-devolution propaganda that self-government in Protestant-dominated Scotland would result in the same kind of discrimination against Catholics (for jobs, housing, etc.) that had long been

the norm in Northern Ireland.¹⁷ Consequently, the 'fundamentalists' argued, it was extremely unlikely that the SNP could detach either working class or middle class Catholics from their traditional allegiance to the Labour Party.

On the other side of the religious cleavage, many Protestant voters in the west of Scotland, including members of the Protestant working class, sympathized with the "Loyalist" or "Unionist" cause in Northern Ireland: consequently, they tended to associate "republicanism" with the violence of the IRA. Moreover, according to Gordon Murray, another founding member of the Campaign, these voters often possessed a strong allegiance to the Crown. Hence, while they were willing to support the SNP as long as the party maintained its commitment to secure independence within the context of the British Commonwealth, Murray argued, Protestant voters were alarmed by the republican slogans of the '79 Group."

When confronted with the 'fundamentalist' assertion that the '79 Group had underestimated the importance of the religious cleavage, Group strategist Stephen Maxwell acknowledged that "personally, I have to admit that I'm completely insensitive to religion." But, continued Maxwell,

The '79 Group strategy did ignore the religious dimension or, rather, it refused to play up to it. Our strategy is built on the assumption that religion is a declining factor, even in the west of Scotland. Anyway, you've got to make opinion, not just reflect it."

For the Glasgow area 'fundamentalists', however, religion was perceived to be of continuing importance in shaping voting behaviour in the west of Scotland and the '79 Group's neglect of the religious dimension was an obvious lacuna in its strategy. The degree of attachment of Catholic voters to the Labour Party and their fears of Ulster-style discrimination in a self-governing Scotland made it unlikely that they would shift their allegiance to the SNP, no matter how left-wing its image, while the republicanism of the '79 Group threatened to alienate actual or potential voters in the Protestant community. For members of the Campaign, therefore, the Group strategy was more likely to lead to net loss of votes and members in the west of Scotland, rather than to increased support.

Third, many 'fundamentalists' questioned the '79 Group assumption that the SNP must offer "socialist" policies to win the support of working class voters. According to Gordon Murray, for example, "the Scottish people may vote Labour, but they are not socialists".²⁰ This view has been supported by Henry Drucker, in his analysis of the '79 Group's program:

There has long been a lacuna in this strategy which may prevent it from winning many votes. Labour votes are not the same as socialist votes. Britain's working people have voted for a respectable Labour Party. They are not perhaps as keen on socialism. ... The '79 Group's hope that ex-Labour voters will remain socialist voters and vote for a socialist nationalist party thus runs considerable dangers: that ex-Labour voters might either stay at home or vote for a right wing party.²¹

Other Campaign members emphasized the strength of the commitment of the working class to the Labour Party, especially in Strathclyde Region. Hence, Kenneth Fee claimed that

the whole working class is difficult to detach from Labour, not because they are socialist or because they vote Labour but because they identify themselves with Labour. They will tell you on the doorstep "I am Labour" rather than "I vote Labour".

While the 'fundamentalists' therefore doubted that the adoption of socialist policies would win the allegiance of the working class to the Nationalist cause, they argued that the drift of the SNP to the left had alienated, or threatened to drive away, existing supporters and members. One former Campaign activist suggested:

A lot of SNP supporters in the west of Scotland have "Conservative Unionist" backgrounds. They will accept progressive policies as long as they are not called "socialist" policies. Otherwise they will reject the SNP. A "socialist" label would have devastated support in the west of Scotland and lost us many loyal party workers."

Similarly, Kenneth Fee argued that "the SNP is a lower middle class party, but many of these voters have been driven out by the views of the left." Hence, according to Fee, some 25 per cent of nationalists "who are very clearly on the right" were outside the SNP because they could not accept left-wing policies or civil disobedience, because "they don't want to join a 'scruffy' party. [They] want an urbane 'responsible'

party, not one shouting foul-mouthed imprecations at Maggie Thatcher."²⁴

By the spring of 1982, the critique of the '79 Group strategy appeared to have been proven, at least to the satisfaction of the 'fundamentalists'. Although SNP support in the opinion polls had risen after the Aberdeen Conference, in October 1981 reaching over 20 per cent for the first time since 1978, this improvement was overshadowed by the dramatic emergence of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), formed in March 1981 after a schism within the Labour Party. Although the SDP, later the SDP/Liberal Alliance, did less well in Scotland than in England, its candidate Roy Jenkins still managed to win the Glasgow Hillhead by-election in March 1982, where the SNP candidate George Leslie lost his deposit despite an energetic Nationalist campaign. Then, in the Regional Council elections of May 1982, the SNP was again pushed into fourth place, gaining 13.4 per cent of the votes (down from 21 per cent in 1978).

Both at Hillhead and in the Regional elections, the Alliance appeared to take votes directly from the SNP; but, more damagingly for the '79 Group, the Alliance also seemed to have won the support of the former Labour voters that the SNP left had hoped to mobilize." For the 'fundamentalist' Nationalists, the rapid emergence of the Alliance was positive proof of the need for a centrist party in Scottish politics, a need that had been filled by the SNP before its shift to the

left in response to the prompting of the '79 Group. But, the 'fundamentalists' argued, the '79 Group strategy was not working; the working class had not been converted to the cause of independence and, as SNP support apparently declined, 'fundamentalist' dissatisfaction with the party product intensified.

Personal Rivalries

Although, one 'fundamentalist' complained, "All this party ever fights about is bloody strategy",²⁶ interviews with former members of the Campaign for Nationalism revealed that their opposition to the '79 Group was based on more than just ideological and strategic disagreement. Personal antipathy toward individual members of the Group and inter-generational and inter-regional rivalries also played their part in fuelling the escalation of conflict within the SNP.

On the personal level, Jim Sillars was subjected to numerous verbal attacks by 'fundamentalist' activists after he joined both the SNP and the '79 Group in 1980. His opponents frequently questioned his degree of commitment to the party, suggesting that he had joined the SNP as a last resort and that he was exploiting the party in a desperate attempt to save his political career.²⁷ Some, moreover, accused Sillars of trying to use the '79 Group to turn the SNP into a bigger version of the failed Scottish Labour Party; although it should be pointed out that Sillars never held

elected office in the '79 Group and, in fact, on several occasions openly dissented from tactical decisions taken by the Group."

But the primary motivation for attacks on Sillars appeared to be jealousy, both of his rapid elevation to the position of Vice Chairman for Policy only a year after joining the SNP and of his personal popularity with the public and, especially, with the news media. As we noted in Chapter Seven, the SNP has traditionally eschewed the 'cult of the personality' and Sillars' charisma therefore made him suspect to many party activists, while others such as former Policy Vice Chairman Jim Fairlie (who had assumed the role of the party's authority on trade union affairs) no doubt viewed Sillars as an obstacle to their own political ambitions within the SNP.

Other leading figures in the '79 Group such as Stephen Maxwell and Andrew Currie also came in for their share of personal attacks. For example, in a column in Scots Independent soon after the creation of the ICPD, Colin Bell satirized their left-wing politics by nicknaming them "Stephen Menschevik" and "Andreas Currishvili" while labelling the ICPD the "Infiltrating Clique for Proletarian Disruption" and the "Interminable Conspiracy for Promoting Devolution".

But undoubtedly the most maligned among the '79 Group leaders was Margo MacDonald (whose work as a broadcaster led Bell to nickname her "Rosa Radioclyde"). Again, jealousy was

the primary motivation for these attacks since Ms. MacDonald's personal popularity with the voting public made her the subject of much resentment. Hence, as Henry Drucker noted in 1979, "Jealousy of Margo MacDonald is common in SNP circles: only three months in Parliament gave her a base and a position which others have not been able to touch even after years of office."¹⁰

The extent of this animosity was illustrated by two interviewees. One, Gordon Murray of the Campaign Secretariat, claimed that he had been a supporter of Ms. MacDonald at one time, but "once she got elected, she got too big for her boots. ... Now, Margo has become perhaps the single most hated person in the party", although he admitted that "Winnie Ewing and myself come pretty close behind."¹¹ A second founding member of the Campaign, who had otherwise best remain anonymous, surprised this author by acknowledging that he had a certain amount of sympathy for Jim Sillars, but then explained that this was because "marrying Margo was above and beyond the call of duty - it was penance enough for his career ambitions."¹² But, like Murray, this interviewee was no more positive about Mrs. Ewing, stating that "Winnie and Margo are as bad as each other. They both think that the party belongs to them ... they're a pair of *prima donnas*."

In many respects, the conflict between the '79 Group and the 'fundamentalists' was personified in the long-standing rivalry between Mrs. Ewing and Ms. MacDonald. Each had once

been the "golden girl" of the Nationalist movement, Mrs. Ewing after her victory at Hamilton in 1967, Ms. MacDonald after winning Glasgow Govan in 1973. However, after 1974, the two women increasingly came to represent two very different views of the future direction of the party.

Despite her Independent Labour Party (ILP) background and left-of-centre stand on many issues, Winifred Ewing was strongly identified with the more conservative 'fundamentalist' tendency and with the "old guard" of SNP leaders who became patrons of the Campaign for Nationalism. She had originally joined the SNP as a student in the late 1940s and, like other long-time activists, had stuck with the party through the bleak 1950s when it was overshadowed by John MacCormick's Covenant Association and made little electoral headway. She had therefore been in the SNP for almost twenty years before her victory at Hamilton, after which her personal political fortunes closely followed those of the party: having lost Hamilton in 1970, she was elected again in February 1974, this time for a rural, formerly Conservative constituency in the north of Scotland. Between 1974 and 1979, she was a member of the 'fundamentalist' majority in the parliamentary group whose activities at Westminster so distressed left-of-centre Nationalists.

Although she lost her parliamentary seat again in the Conservative sweep of rural Scotland in May 1979, a month later Mrs. Ewing returned to elected office when she became

the only SNP member of the European Parliament, representing the Highlands and Islands. Once there, she further alienated "the left" by joining the European Progressive Democrats, an umbrella group consisting largely of French Gaullists who were not known for their sympathies either to socialism or to the aspirations of ethno-regional movements in their own country. She was, from its foundation, an outspoken critic of the ICPD/'79 Group and, with her connections in both the rural north of Scotland and Glasgow (where her family maintained its home), she played a central role in linking together the coalition of 'fundamentalist' interests which constituted the Campaign for Nationalism.

In contrast to her rival, Margo MacDonald had been a member of the SNP for less than five years when she won the Glasgow Govan by-election to displace Mrs. Ewing as the favourite daughter of the Nationalist movement. Although she lost the seat again in February 1974, she was soon elected Senior Vice Chairman of the party, with special responsibility for strategy, in which capacity she was a central figure in the struggle between the National Executive Committee and the parliamentary group for control over the direction of the SNP in the late 1970s - a struggle which earned her the enmity of Mrs. Ewing and other 'fundamentalist' MPs such as Donald Stewart and Douglas Crawford, who targeted her for defeat at the Dundee National Conference. Moreover, as Senior Vice Chairman, Ms. MacDonald worked alongside, and in some

instances originally recruited, many of the young left-wing members of Headquarters staff who were to play a formative role in establishing the Interim Committee for Political Discussion.

Although she was allied with the 'social democratic' tendency within the SNP in the mid-1970s (as were other '79 Group notables such as Stephen Maxwell), Ms. MacDonald moved to the left as the decade continued and she was one of the principal proponents, even before 1979, of a platform appealing to working class and left-wing voters. She was therefore one of the many Edinburgh-based activists who helped to found the ICPD and, when the '79 Group was established, she became one of its three elected spokespersons. As the best known of the three - and, as we have indicated, perhaps the least liked among 'fundamentalists' - she came to personify everything that was wrong with the '79 Group for its opponents; and, in the same way, Mrs. Ewing represented for the young activists in the '79 Group, all that was reactionary in the position of the 'fundamentalists'.

The importance of the personal rivalry between Ms. MacDonald and Mrs. Ewing should not be over-exaggerated; although both women played important roles in their respective factions, and became prime targets for opponents' attacks, in both groups the decision to mobilize was clearly a collective one. But because each came to personify a particular image or direction for the SNP, their rivalry does serve to

symbolize other dimensions of conflict within the party. Not only did the two women disagree profoundly with respect to future strategy for the SNP, they were also associated with different generations of party activists and with particular regional interests within the party organization.

Inter-Generational and Inter-Regional Strain

At the risk of oversimplification, the factional struggle within the SNP may be portrayed as one in which two generations of political activists were pitted against a third. The first cohort included most of the elder statesmen of the party, such as Dr. Robert McIntyre, Arthur Donaldson, James Halliday, Donald Stewart and, on the basis of years of party membership if not age, Winifred Ewing. Many of this group had been the managers of the "modest family business" in the 1950s and had continued to play an influential role in the 'sixties and 'seventies; and they had a proprietary, almost paternal, interest in "their" party which they were not willing to relinquish to the "young Turks" and "Johnnys-come-lately" in the '79 Group.

The second generation consisted largely of activists in their late forties and fifties who were already influential at the local and regional level but, by the late 1970s, aspired to higher party office. It was this cohort whose political ambitions appeared most likely to be thwarted by the rapid emergence of the third generation, the predominantly

young leaders of the '79 Group who, by 1981, seemed to have leapfrogged over them to occupy a number of key positions in the party organization. Hence, it may be suggested that the relatively high proportion of "Anti-Group" respondents among SNP local councillors (one-third) was due in part to their fears that they would be passed over as parliamentary candidates in favour of '79 Group members, as well as to their generally more centrist or "conservative" positions on both ideological scales. As one respondent explained, to justify his opposition to the Group, "They promote their own on the basis of politics not on the value of contribution to the party" (Respondent #043).

Thus, while the most senior generation provided many of the "patrons" of the Campaign for Nationalism, it was a group of middle-aged and middle-ranking activists, largely from Glasgow and the west of Scotland, who provided the impetus to mobilize and who constituted the Campaign "Secretariat", the central organizing committee of the new faction."

This inter-generational struggle for power in the party was compounded by inter-regional rivalries within the SNP organization. From the mid-1960s, SNP organization had generally been stronger in the predominantly rural regions outside the central industrial belt. It was in these regions that most of the Nationalist MPs were elected in 1974 and most of the seats considered vulnerable to further SNP gains were also in rural areas. Consequently, activists and candidates

from rural regions had carried many of the hopes of the party in the 1970s. However, the primary target of the '79 Group strategy was the urban working class of the central industrial belt and, as the Group became more influential in shaping the direction of the SNP, many rural activists felt that they were becoming marginalized as party policy apparently focused on the concerns of central Scotland." Their concerns were expressed by Winifred Ewing in her speech to the launch meeting of the Campaign:

I deplore constant references to the prime importance of concentrating efforts to win votes in the West of Scotland. ... This is a premise deeply insulting to all other parts of Scotland. ... Votes have gone away and members all over Scotland have left the party."

But even within the central industrial belt there was friction, especially between the 'fundamentalist' dominated Glasgow District Association and the Edinburgh-based activists who constituted the core of the '79 Group. In part, this conflict mirrored the historic rivalry between Scotland's two largest cities - between Glasgow, the industrial and commercial centre with a large working class and a high incidence of urban deprivation, and Edinburgh, the prosperous political and cultural capital. "The '79 Group", one Glasgow area Campaign activist argued, "is essentially an Edinburgh-based creation, and its members do not understand the psychology of the people whose support they are trying to get, especially in the west of Scotland." Another proclaimed that

"the '79 Group is nothing but a lot of Edinburgh armchair socialists", a criticism which reflected both his antipathy towards the capital city and the mood of anti-intellectualism which has been prevalent in the SNP since the expulsion of the cultural Nationalists in the early 1930s." And once again, these sentiments were expressed most forcefully by middle-ranking (i.e., branch, constituency and district association) activists who appeared to perceive the '79 Group not only as an obstacle to their personal advancement within the party but also as a threat to their authority at the local level in the west of Scotland.

Overview

In the immediate aftermath of the referendum and election setbacks of 1979, the 'fundamentalist' tendency within the SNP had mobilized before the Dundee Annual Conference and its representatives were successful in securing control of most of the senior offices in the party. But, as the SNP failed to make any appreciable gains in the public opinion polls, and as the '79 Group reaped the benefits of organization and collective Voice, by the 1981 Annual Conference at Aberdeen the balance of power within the party was quite clearly moving to the left.

For 'fundamentalist' activists, this shift represented a marked deterioration in the quality of the party product. Opposition to the ideological and strategic position advocated

by the '79 Group was reinforced by personal animosities, inter-regional rivalries and the fear that personal political advancement within the party would be blocked by the rapid promotion of younger left-wing activists. Moreover, many 'fundamentalists' blamed the activities of the Group for the continuing loss of members and voters which made the prospects for a speedy recovery at the polls, and hence of future goal attainment, more remote. In the year following the Aberdeen Conference, these various sources of dissatisfaction led the 'fundamentalists' to consider various alternatives by which the quality of their party product might be improved.

EXIT, VOICE AND THE CAMPAIGN FOR NATIONALISM

Once again, the logic of the Exit/Voice model suggests that dissatisfaction with the party product is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the mobilization of organized collective Voice by a sub-party faction. Individual and/or collective responses to discontent with organizational performance will depend on the perceived opportunities for, and the expected costs and benefits associated with, the options of Exit and Voice. In this section, therefore, we investigate the Exit/Voice calculus of the 'fundamentalist' tendency by examining briefly the availability and perceived costs and benefits of the Exit and Voice options and the belief in the possibility of an improvement in the party

product which led to the decision to pursue organized collective Voice in the Campaign for Nationalism.

The "Exit" Option

For dissatisfied 'fundamentalists' in the SNP in 1982, the range of Exit options was at least as restricted as it had been for discontented left-wing activists three years earlier. The British electoral system and, possibly, the experience of the Scottish Labour Party provided a powerful disincentive against "Exit by schism" to create a separate nationalist party. Moreover the competition for the electorate had become even keener with the intrusion of the new Social Democratic Party into an already-crowded Scottish party system.

Opportunities for individual or collective "Exit by defection" were also extremely limited. Some activists, like two of our survey respondents, who were opposed to the growing influence of the '79 Group, and at the same time favoured devolution over independence, could transfer their allegiance to another party." But, for the majority of 'fundamentalists', for whom the dream of independence was the *sine qua non* of political activity, no other party offered a product to match that of the SNP. Hence, when respondents were asked in the SNP Activists Survey to indicate which party, if any, was closest to the SNP on the independence question, 87.1 per cent of "Anti-Group"/'fundamentalist'

activists replied "None".⁴⁰ Exit by defection would also incur other costs. Many of the 'fundamentalist' leaders held high party office or otherwise enjoyed a degree of influence, seniority or respect in the SNP which would have to be forfeited, and would take time to regain, if they became members of a different party.

The only other forms of Exit available to disaffected 'fundamentalists' were those of "dropping out" or "resignation", i.e., they could become inactive members of the SNP or cease to be members of any political party. Among the thirteen former or inactive members of the SNP responding to our survey, three of those who had not defected to another organization indicated that their Exit from active membership was due directly or indirectly to the emergence of the '79 Group. All three registered their opposition to the legitimacy of "groups" within the party (Q. 44), supported the constitutional demand of "Independence - Nothing Less" (Q. 32) and endorsed only the options associated with the 'fundamentalist' position in their selection of preferred future strategies for the SNP (QQ. 46 and 46a).⁴¹ Moreover, one former parliamentary candidate indicated that she would not even vote for the party (Q. 29) if the SNP candidate were one of the "new breed of trendy lefty" (Respondent #124).

According to many 'fundamentalist' Nationalists that we interviewed, however, these three former activists were representative of a much more widespread trend, in that it

was alleged that the emergence of the '79 Group had resulted in a large number of resignations or non-renewals of party membership; although other activists maintained that the decline in SNP membership and activity levels was due to a more general disillusionment with the referendum result and the party's electoral defeat of 1979 or with the escalation of conflict between the '79 Group and the 'fundamentalists', rather than with the influence of the '79 Group *per se*." Certainly, SNP membership did decline after 1979, and some of those who left the party may have been opposed to the leftward shift in ideology and strategy under the influence of the '79 Group. But it is also clear that, for many 'fundamentalists' who were long-time members of the party, Exit by "resignation" or by "dropping out" were not viable responses to the perceived deterioration in the party product: after all, they had already stuck with the SNP through many other crises and electoral disappointments. Instead, they began to explore the prospects of using the Voice option to arrest the decline in the performance of their organization.

The 'Fundamentalist' Strategy for Improvement

Since the use of Voice inevitably incurs some costs for those who resort to it, we have argued that a belief in the possibility of improving the party product is a prerequisite to its expression. For dissatisfied 'fundamentalists' in the SNP in 1981-82, the route to improving the party's

organizational performance was straightforward: the influence of the '79 Group must be countered, the leftward drift of the party reversed and the SNP must return to the traditional strategies which, in their view, had proven successful in the past.

The 'fundamentalist' analysis of the SNP's electoral defeat in 1979 was relatively simple; according to Douglas Henderson, for example, the decline was due to "the Party's deviation from its own fundamental position."⁴ By attempting to portray itself as a 'social democratic' party and by campaigning (however half-heartedly) for the Labour government's devolution legislation, the SNP had either alienated or confused voters who had previously identified it as a "non-ideological" *independentist* party. To recapture its lost support, therefore, the SNP had to return to "fundamentals", i.e., to a constitutional demand of "Independence - Nothing Less" and to positions on other issues which were dictated neither by the ideologies of the left nor by those of the right, which represented the sectional interests of neither the working class nor the middle class. Rather, party policy was to be determined by the pragmatic consideration of what was best for Scotland and all its people on an issue-by-issue basis.

This strategy was clearly threatened by the growing influence within the party of the '79 Group, especially after the Aberdeen Conference. First, the Group's apparent

willingness to flirt with devolution, if only as a first step to full sovereignty, was regarded by 'fundamentalists' as a dangerous dilution of constitutional aims. Second, while the '79 Group advocated the adoption of socialist policies to appeal to working class and traditional Labour votes, a majority of 'fundamentalists' favoured the adoption of middle-of-the-road policies to appeal to all classes and voters from all other parties (see Table 13.11, above). Hence, as one 'fundamentalist' activist informed the author, "The '79 Group argues that we have to divide the people of Scotland to get independence; we have always believed that we have to unite the Scottish people."

To restore the electoral fortunes of their party, 'fundamentalist' Nationalists therefore believed that the SNP must return to its traditional catch-all or umbrella strategy. But their more immediate objective, whether their opposition to the '79 Group was based on ideological, strategic, or more personal disagreements, was to restore the quality of the party product by making the SNP a more hospitable community for "their sort of Nationalists", and that meant ridding the party of the influence of the '79 Group.

The "Voice" Option

From 1979 to 1981, leading figures at least within the 'fundamentalist' wing of the SNP had no need to resort to Voice in order to influence the managers of the party since,

for the most part, they were the management. For example, among senior office-bearers elected at the Dundee National Conference, the party President (Dr. Robert McIntyre) and all three vice presidents (W. Ewing, J. Halliday, D. Stewart) later became patrons of the Campaign for Nationalism, four of the five executive vice-chairmen were allied with the 'fundamentalist' cause, and even the new party Chairman, Gordon Wilson, was more closely associated with the 'fundamentalists' than with either the '79 Group or the more moderate 'social democratic' tendency. In addition, anti-'79 Group activists constituted the largest single tendencies/groups among the elected members of both the National Council and the National Executive Committee.

For most of this period, therefore, little consideration was given by 'fundamentalists' to the establishment of a formal organization. Indeed, we may suggest as a general rule that, in cases of factional conflict between policy sub-parties (but not where factionalism is clientelist or leadership-oriented), the faction which controls the party's national decision-making organs has no need of a separate formal organizational structure. Steve Wolinetz, for example, has described the dissolution of the "New Left" organization in the Dutch Labour Party once that faction gained control of the party in the early 1970s.⁴ Likewise, 'fundamentalist' notables argued against the creation of a formal organization to rival the '79 Group because, until after the 1981 Aberdeen

Conference at least, they had no need of one. As long-time members of the party, they already shared an informal communications network and they came into personal contact on a frequent basis at meetings of the various national executive organs and their respective committees. Moreover, their seniority within the party and access to resources bestowed by occupation of national office ensured that their Voices would be heard.

For the most part, therefore, the initial response by 'fundamentalists' to a sense of dissatisfaction occasioned by the growth of the '79 Group was the expression of Voice on an individual basis. Letters and articles in the Scots Independent, resolutions submitted through branches to Conference and National Council, and informal lobbying in branches, constituency associations and other party units all provided means for the 'fundamentalists' to express their opposition to the challenge posed by the Groups and, in particular, to undermine both the arguments and legitimacy of the Group among rank-and-file activists.

The individual nature of the response should not be surprising since, even in 1982, a large majority (78.6 per cent) of the "Anti-Group" or 'fundamentalist' respondents to the SNP Activists Survey considered that, as individuals, they had adequate opportunity to influence the direction of their party⁶; in other words, they had the sense of personal political efficacy that is usually associated with resort to

Voice. Similarly, a number of "Anti-Group" respondents justified their opposition to the existence of the '79 Group or any other group within the party on the grounds that such organizations were superfluous, since the means already existed within the structure of the SNP for individuals to influence party policy."

Sometimes, however, the efforts of individual 'fundamentalists' to affect the course of events took an unusual form.

The "Blue Mole" and the "Irish Connection"

One of the most outspoken critics of the '79 Group was Kenneth Fee, a Glasgow school teacher and owner of a small printing business who had once been a member of the Conservative Party before joining the SNP in 1974, and who later became Vice-Convenor and Secretary of the new Campaign for Nationalism. However, from 1979 to early 1982, Mr. Fee was also a fully paid-up member of the SNP 79 Group! Fee's role within the Group was to act as an observer and occasional *agent provocateur* on behalf of the 'fundamentalist' cause, a role which (when combined with his previous party affiliation) earned him the nickname of "The Wee Blue Mole" among Scottish journalists." Hence, when asked why he had joined the Group, Fee admitted quite candidly that

I have to say I joined them in order to destroy them. ... I regard a number of people in the '79 Group as members of the "destructive left". ... I

joined them to persuade them of the error of their ways from within."

Members of the Group were quite aware of where Fee's true sympathies lay - as one young activist complained, "Fee wants us out of the party"⁵⁰ - but could not exclude him since, to avoid action being taken against them under the party's ban on dual membership of partisan organizations, they had declared the Group open to all SNP members and only to members of the party.

Mr. Fee was a regular participant in meetings of the '79 Group, often arguing against policies and tactics advocated by the majority; but perhaps more importantly, as a Group member, he received copies of Group minutes which were then circulated to other 'fundamentalist' activists who combed them for any evidence which could later be used against the rival faction. Thus he was probably responsible, at least in part, for leaking to the Scottish press a set of unratified draft minutes of the August 1981 plenary meeting of the Group, at which the party's senior MP Donald Stewart was criticized for his support of the monarchy and the Vice Chairman for Publicity, Isobel Lindsay, was accused of undermining the Group-inspired "Scottish Resistance" campaign.

More damaging still to the Group was the all nation published in a Glasgow Herald article, based on the same set of leaked minutes, that the "Left-wing republican '79 Group" was linked to Provisional Sinn Fein (PSF),⁵¹ although the

minutes made it clear that the meeting had in fact voted down two motions concerning PSF, including one to invite a PSF speaker to address a future meeting which was proposed by Group member Alan Clayton." (Like Kenneth Fee, Clayton came subsequently to be regarded by many Group members as an *agent provocateur*, especially after his role, described in the next chapter, at the 1982 Ayr Conference.)

The Response to Unorganized Voice

In the fall of 1981, there was still no vehicle for the organized collective expression of 'fundamentalist' Voice. As we noted in Chapter Twelve, "Anti-Group" activists had met regularly in the run-up to the Aberdeen National Conference to discuss the creation of a separate organization but eventually decided not to proceed, although there were rumours within the party that a "non-group" of 'fundamentalists' had adopted a "non-slate" of candidates to oppose '79 Group nominees in elections for party office." If such a slate existed, however, it was manifestly unsuccessful, because the '79 Group scored decisive victories both in intra-party elections and in voting on resolutions on the Conference floor. 'Fundamentalist' representation among senior office-bearers and on the National Executive Committee was correspondingly depleted, although "Anti-Group" activists now constituted a slight majority among the elected members of a polarized National Council."

Nevertheless, in the decentralized organizational structure of the SNP, the 'fundamentalists' did retain a power-base in the Glasgow District Association and in a number of branches in and around the city, in particular Glasgow Craigton Constituency Branch, whose past or present members included Winifred Ewing, Kenneth Fee, William Houston (Coordinator of the Campaign Secretariat) and Dr. Robert Silver, SNP candidate in the constituency in 1979. These two organizational units led the backlash against the '79 Group after the minutes of the August Group meeting were leaked. In September 1981, the Craigton Branch sponsored a motion to have the '79 Group declared "a proscribed organization" which was passed by the Glasgow District Association and referred on to the next meeting of the party's National Council in December at Johnstone, Ayrshire.

The '79 Group was not the only organization under threat at this time. At its previous quarterly meeting, the National Council had voted to place limits on the activity of Siol nan Gaedheal (SnG - Seed of the Gael), a militant nationalist fringe organization with a penchant for quasi-military apparel and vehement anti-English rhetoric. Since it had not responded to the conditions imposed on it, the Johnstone meeting first passed a proscription order against the SnG - membership of SnG was therefore declared incompatible with continued membership of the party - before it turned its attention to the '79 Group.

Faced by the Craigton resolution, the Group was possibly saved from a similar fate by the introduction of an alternative motion proposed by the National Executive Committee after some intense behind-the-scenes manouvering by Jim Sillars, Stephen Maxwell and other '79 Group members on the Executive. After an extremely heated debate, during which the '79 Group was accused of being a leftist conspiracy to take over the party, the Craigton resolution was defeated by a 2 to 1 majority. However, by a 4 to 1 majority the Council approved the NEC motion which, while "recognising that the '79 Group has a useful role as a discussion body", directed the Group to "respect the internal democracy of the SNP [and] to refrain from interfering with the internal affairs of the party".

The principal effects of the passage of the NEC resolution were, first, to bar the '79 Group from publishing a slate of candidates for elections to party office; second, to prevent the Group from using branch organizations to promote its own resolutions to Conference; and, third, to forbid any attempt by the Group to instruct branch or other delegates how to vote in the decision-making arenas of the party. In other words, while the Group was allowed to continue as a forum for debate, it was no longer permitted to act on the basis of conclusions reached by its discussions. For many '79 Group activists, therefore, the NEC motion was merely an attempt at "proscription-by-the-back-door".

Nonetheless, the Group agreed to respect the Council's decision and gave a public undertaking that it would not come between the delegate and his/her Branch or Constituency mandate, while insisting that, since it had never done so in the past, this changed very little."

According to SNP Chairman, Gordon Wilson, the NEC resolution put the Group on notice of good behaviour:

In short, the National Council has told the '79 Group it must behave itself. It has been given a reprieve but its actions will be monitored.

I very much believe that everyone in the party wants us to be more united to enable us to go forward as a cohesive political force."

But, for many members of the party, the real battle was only just beginning.

THE ORGANIZATION OF COLLECTIVE VOICE

While most observers agreed that the National Council decision had imposed genuine limitations on the '79 Group's ability to influence the party, for many 'fundamentalists' it did not go nearly far enough. Indeed, for some, the failure of the Craigton proscription motion was (almost) the last straw. According to Gordon Murray, the success of the '79 Group in avoiding proscription showed that

A small organised group is always successful against the disorganised mass. Therefore, to oppose the '79 Group, we had to organise as well. We got together to attempt to build a nationalist philosophy to rival the Marxist ideology of the left. If there were to be a battle for the soul of the country, we would have an alternative to offer."

In February and March 1982, fifty or sixty activists representing a "broad spectrum of 'fundamentalist' opinion" met "on several occasions" in Stirling.⁶⁰ Those present included Robert McIntyre, Winifred Ewing, Helen Davidson and James Halliday (all future "patrons" of the Campaign), Glasgow area representatives William Lindsay, Kenneth Fee, Norman McLeod, Gordon Murray, Bill Houston and Gerry Fisher (all later members of the Secretariat), former MPs Margaret Bain and Andrew Welsh, George Leslie (the SNP candidate in the Hillhead by-election), the party's Senior Vice Chairman Jim Fairlie and NEC members Colin Bell and Janette Jones. But initially, according to Kenneth Fee, the outcome was the same as in 1981: "We discussed for hours and hours, but the consensus seemed to be that we should not counter-organise."⁶¹

Two events perhaps conspired to change the minds of 'fundamentalist' activists. The first was the result of the Glasgow Hillhead by-election at the end of March, in which the SNP candidate George Leslie came fourth, with Roy Jenkins winning what should have been an unpromising constituency for the Social Democrats. Moreover, opinion polls published during the campaign indicated that Scotland-wide support for the SNP had fallen to 15 per cent of decided voters and, while there was still strong support in the predominantly rural Highland, Grampian and Tayside Regions, the party's potential vote had collapsed in west-central Scotland, the primary target of the '79 Group strategy. The second catalyst was a

rumour within the party that, in defiance of the National Council ruling, a minority of Group activists had selected and was privately circulating an unofficial slate of "left" candidates for the forthcoming Ayr Conference."

When members of the 'fundamentalist' tendency met again in Stirling in late April, 1982, a majority of participants were persuaded by former Glasgow Corporation Councillor William Lindsay that they had no alternative but to organize themselves in opposition to the '79 Group. Lindsay himself was chosen to be Convenor of the Campaign Secretariat with Kenneth Fee as Secretary and Vice-Convenor and other Glasgow area activists comprising the remainder of the Secretariat in order to facilitate communication. The first "patrons" of the Campaign, however, were drawn largely from the rural areas where the SNP had traditionally had its strongest base: thus, while some participants at the meetings, including Margaret Bain, Janette Jones and George Leslie refused to become involved on the grounds that they were "opposed to the formation of all organisations within the SNP", Winifred Ewing, Robert McIntyre, Donald Stewart and other leading 'fundamentalists' were more than willing to lead the charge. According to McIntyre,

The times make it essential for us to restate the basic philosophy of our cause, and to put the heart back into the many who feel that some of the fundamental principles of the Party have been betrayed"

Representatives of the Campaign informed the press at the end of April that the organization would be officially launched at the Ayr National Conference in June. According to one founder, "When he heard about the formal organization, [SNP Chairman] Gordon Wilson went mad. He announced that he was going to ban all 'groups' by fiat."⁵ For the time being, however, cooler heads prevailed as Jim Sillars, party vice president Margaret Bain and other senior members of the NEC counselled against immediate action; but they served only to delay what was perhaps an inevitable confrontation.

CONCLUSIONS

As the influence of the '79 Group within the Scottish National Party grew after 1979 so, too, did the dissatisfaction of those who, for a variety of reasons, were opposed to the new direction in which their party was moving. In this chapter, we have endeavoured to identify, first, the sources of this discontent and, second, the variables informing the Exit/Voice calculus of 'fundamentalist' activists which led to the creation in April 1982 of the Campaign for Nationalism in Scotland as a second formally organized faction within the SNP.

In 1979, the 'fundamentalist' tendency had gained control of the senior echelons of the party organization at the Dundee National Conference with a view to restoring the party to its "fundamental" commitment to a constitutional demand of

"Independence - Nothing Less" and a catch-all appeal to Scots of all classes and all political persuasions. But, by 1981, the balance of power within the party had clearly swung in favour of the '79 Group which was viewed by its opponents as "soft" on the independence issue, "divisive" in its effects on both the party and the Scottish people, and a threat to future prospects for both individual and collective goal attainment. In short, the growing influence of the '79 Group reduced the quality of the product of party membership for many 'fundamentalist' activists, but the particular sources of dissatisfaction may have varied from one individual to another.

First, for those 'fundamentalists' whose orientations to party membership were primarily "affective", the '79 Group's commitment to civil disobedience and confrontation with the authorities and its deliberate attempt to "politicize" the party on issues other than independence may well have represented an undesirable change in the SNP, from an "urbane, responsible" party, sometimes even largely a social club in some areas, to a more vigorous, more radical, social movement orientation. The response of the 'fundamentalists' in establishing the Campaign was described by one '79 Group member as "purely expressive, rather than instrumental, politics"; in other words, he saw the Campaign as an attempt to restore the kind of party in which "long-time members would

feel comfortable" rather than to create a vehicle for the more effective attainment of self-government."

Second, for some individual activists, the emergence of the '79 Group presented a challenge to personal political ambitions, since the rapid ascendancy of Group members within the party organization, aided and abetted by their system of candidate slates and block voting, threatened to deprive existing office-holders of their positions and to impose obstacles to the career aspirations of middle-ranking and rural 'fundamentalist' activists who had viewed themselves as heirs apparent to their more senior colleagues. Hence, although the Campaign was not a leadership sub-party, in our view the motivations of some of its founders were very similar to those which inspire clientelist politics.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, for a majority of 'fundamentalists' the '79 Group strategy of concentrating on winning seats in the central industrial belt by offering socialist policies to working class and former Labour voters was misguided if not actually harmful. Rather than winning new support for the SNP, some argued, this strategy was actually driving away voters and members in other regions of Scotland, thus making the prospect of goal attainment, and especially the achievement of independence, even more remote. In direct contrast to the '79 Group strategy, many fundamentalists concurred with Winifred Ewing's belief that independence would be won by gaining seats first in the rural

regions, not in the central belt: "I believe Glasgow and Edinburgh will be last", predicted Mrs. Ewing, but "When Glasgow follows the lead of other parts of Scotland, I believe it will fall like a pack of cards." And in this respect, the Campaign was clearly a policy sub-party, in that it marked an attempt to re-orient the image and strategy of the SNP in order to alleviate the dissatisfaction of 'fundamentalist' members with the prospects for goal attainment given the current direction and management of the party.

Growing dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in the SNP led 'fundamentalist' activists to investigate alternative responses by which an improvement in the party product might be effected. But the range of options available was somewhat limited. Given the state of Scottish electoral politics and the absence of any other party committed to Scottish independence, neither "Exit by schism" nor "Exit by defection" was a viable option. Nor, for long-time party activists who had already withstood adversity in many forms, was much serious consideration given to "Exit by resignation" or "by dropping out" of active membership of the SNP."

Consequently, since they believed that the party product could be improved - in the short term by ridding the SNP of the '79 Group, in the long run by restoring the traditional appeal which had previously proven successful - and because they had confidence in their ability to influence the organization, many 'fundamentalists' resorted initially to

individual or unorganized Voice. However, as articles, letters, Conference resolutions "to deplore" and other tactics failed to slow the advance of the organized '79 Group, they began to contemplate counter-organization. Although talks held before the 1981 Aberdeen Conference came to nothing, the combined weight of further '79 Group victories at that Conference, the outcry over the leaked Group minutes, the failure of the Craigton proscription motion and the Group's apparent rejection of the limitations imposed by National Council, finally convinced a majority of 'fundamentalists' that they had no alternative but to resort to organized collective Voice. Although some members of the new Campaign for Nationalism in Scotland were uneasy about the personal costs and the collective effect of overt factional conflict on the party and its supporters," the potential benefits to be derived by wresting control of the SNP from the '79 Group appear to have outweighed their concerns.

Members of the Campaign were prepared for an extended struggle for the heart and soul of the party, beginning with the formal launch of their organization at the Ayr National Conference in June 1982. In many respects, however, the battle was over almost as soon as it began.

NOTES - CHAPTER FOURTEEN

1. Announcement of the formation of the Campaign for Nationalism in Scotland, Scots Independent, no. 135, June 1982, p. 11.
2. In fact, the overall percentage of respondents who alleged that groups were "divisive" or a threat to "unity" was higher still, at 62.3 per cent (N=43). However, responses have been categorized for the purposes of this analysis according to the most specific complaint levelled at intra-party groups in general or the '79 Group in particular. Thus, for example, a response which included the broad concept of "divisiveness" and the more specific allegation that group activity had resulted in a loss of electoral support would be included in the category "threat to electoral support/loss of members".
3. Kenneth Fee, Interview, June 1983.
4. Letters from R.S. Silver, R.D. Don and David Reckord, Scots Independent, various issues in 1981.
5. Kenneth Fee, Interview, June 1983.
6. See, for example, Ron Halliday, "The SNP must rise above 'class war'", Scots Independent, no. 115, October 1980, p. 8; Robert Silver, "Beating the Doctrine of the Class war", Scots Independent, no. 120, March 1981, p. 4. See also the rebuttal by William Wolfe, "Class War - Fact of Life", letter to Scots Independent, no. 121, April 1981, p. 11.
7. Interviews, May-June 1983.
8. Douglas Henderson, "The Future of the SNP", Scots Independent, no. 111, June 1980, p. 2.
9. ibid.
10. Robert Silver, "Ice Piccaninnies", Scots Independent, no. 101, August 1979, p. 3.

11. Ibid.
12. Editorial, Scots Independent, no. 110, May 1980, p. 1.
13. Interviews, March-April 1982, May-June 1983. See also Sam Coull, "When Policies Let the Party Down", letter to Scots Independent, no. 115, October 1980, p. 6.
14. Kenneth Fee, Interview, June 1983; Robert Silver, "Left, Right, Wrong", letter to Scots Independent, no. 129, December 1981, p. 6.
15. Interview, June 1983.
16. Silver, "Left, Right, Wrong".
17. Interviews, March-April 1982, May-June 1983.
18. Gordon Murray, Interview, June 1983. Murray continued by admitting, "Probably ninety per cent of SNP members are republicans but we are not so stupid that we proclaim it in advance."
19. Stephen Maxwell, Interview, June 1983.
20. Interview, June 1983.
21. Henry Drucker, "The Curious Incident: Scottish Party Competition since 1979" in David McCrone, ed., The Scottish Government Yearbook 1983 (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, Unit for the Study of Government in Scotland, 1982), p. 27.
22. Interview, June 1983.
23. Gordon Murray, Interview, June 1983.
24. Interview, June 1983.

25. Drucker, "The Curious Incident", p. 29. See also John Bochel and David Denver, "Towards a Four Party System? The Regional Elections of May 1982" in McCrone, ed., The Scottish Government Yearbook 1983, pp. 69-82.
26. Kenneth Fee, Interview, June 1983.
27. Interviews, March-April 1982, May-June 1983.
28. Jim Sillars, Interview, June 1983.
29. Colin Bell, "C.B.", Scots Independent, no. 100, July 1979, p. 12.
30. H.M. Drucker, "Crying Wolfe: Recent Divisions in the SNP", Political Quarterly, vol. 50, no. 4, 1979, p. 507.
31. Gordon Murray, Interview, June 1983.
32. Interviews, May-June 1983.
33. Interviews, May-June 1983, Campaign for Nationalism literature and personal papers of Kenneth Fee, Vice-Convenor and Secretary of the Campaign Secretariat.
34. For example, Respondent #128 to the SNP Activists Survey complained, with reference to his lack of opportunity to influence the direction of the party, "Majority of policy documents are based on the needs of the Central Belt".
35. Notes for a speech by Winifred Ewing to a public meeting of the Campaign for Nationalism in Scotland, Ayr, June 3, 1982, (mimeo), p. 2.
36. Gordon Murray, Interview, June 1983.
37. William Houston, Interview, June 1983.

38. See Chapter Five, above.
39. SNP Activists Survey Respondent #030, who had joined the Social Democrats by April 1982, and Respondent #101, who had defected to the Liberal Party, were both opposed to the existence of groups "like the '79 Group" inside the SNP and both cited the leftward ideological shift of the party, as well as support for devolution rather than "Independence - Nothing Less", among their reasons for leaving the SNP.
40. Responses to Survey Question 22. 11.4 per cent of "Anti-Group" respondents considered the Liberal Party to be closest to the SNP on the independence issue and 1.4 per cent (one respondent out of seventy) opted for the Labour Party. Sizeable proportions of "Anti-Group" respondents also thought that no other party was close to the SNP on economic policy (47.8 per cent), social policy (33.3 per cent) or the distribution of North Sea oil revenues (75.4 per cent). See Table 11.2, above, for responses of '79 Group members to the same question.
41. The 'fundamentalist' or "traditional" strategies are identified in Chapter 13, above, especially Table 13.9.
42. Interviews, March-April 1982, May-June 1983.
43. Henderson, "The future of the SNP".
44. Peter Mallan, Interview, June 1983.
45. Steven B. Wolinetz, "New Left and the Transformation of the Dutch Socialist Party", paper presented to the Annual Convention of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 1975.
46. The 78.6 per cent of "Anti-Group" respondents who considered themselves to have adequate opportunity to influence intra-party affairs may be compared with similar proportions among "Pro-Group" activists (77.6 per cent) and '79 Group members (88 per cent); any variation among the three sub-samples is not statistically significant.

47. Interviews March-April 1982, and Table 14.1, above.
48. Interviews, March 1982.
49. Kenneth Fee, Interview, June 1983.
50. Chris Cunningham, Treasurer of the '79 Group, Interview, April 1982.
51. "SNP in uproar over 79 Group's Sinn Fein links", Glasgow Herald, October 2, 1981, p. 2.
52. Minutes of Plenary Meeting of the SNP 79 Group, Edinburgh, August 15, 1981. See also "Who said what at '79 Group", Scots Independent, no. 128, November 1981, p. 3.
53. "The Non-Group Group", 79 Group News, vol. 1, no. 1, (April 1981), p. 2.
54. Of the 31 "permanent" members of National Council in 1981-82 (30 elected members plus ex-officio MP Donald Stewart), by our count 16 were associated with the 'fundamentalist' cause, 10 were members of the '79 Group and five members were "non-aligned".
55. Text of the NEC motion cited in "Crackdown on SNP factions", The Scotsman, Edinburgh, December 7, 1981, p. 3.
56. See, for example, "Editorial", 79 Group News, December 1981, p. 2, and "Group Report", 79 Group News, February 1982, p. 7.
57. Draft Minutes of Ordinary Meeting of the '79 Group, Edinburgh, December 12, 1981; and report of the January 1982 plenary meeting of the Group in "Group Report", 79 Group News, February 1982, p. 7.
58. Cited in "Crackdown on SNP factions", op. cit.

59. Interview, June 1983.
60. Kenneth Fee, Interview, June 1983.
61. ibid.
62. Interviews, May-June 1983, and Alan Clayton, "No Regrets", Scots Independent, no. 136, July 1982, p. 7.
63. "Campaign for Nationalism Launched", Scots Independent, no. 135, June 1982, p. 1. Mrs. Bain, however, denied that she had ever been approached to join the Campaign (Interview, June 1983), although several other interviewees named her as a participant in at least some of the meetings leading up to the formation of the new faction.
64. Cited in "Campaign for Nationalism Launched", op. cit.
65. Interviews, May-June 1983.
66. Stephen Maxwell, Interview, June 1983.
67. Speech to the Campaign for Nationalism, Ayr, June 3, 1982, op. cit.
68. Interviews, May-June 1983.
69. For example, one former member of the Campaign explained "I wasn't sure if I had the time or the energy left to go on fighting - but we had to give it one last try." Interviews, May-June 1983. However, other activists who were basically sympathetic to certain objectives of the Campaign indicated that they did not join it because they feared, quite correctly, that its formation would lead to open factional warfare within the party: Margaret Bain, Interview, June 1983.

Chapter Fifteen

THE SUPPRESSION OF VOICE AND FORCED EXIT: THE 1982 AYR CONFERENCE AND ITS AFTERMATH

In this chapter, we enter virtually uncharted territory as far as the study of sub-party factionalism is concerned, in that we attempt to explain the outcome of the increasingly polarized conflict within the Scottish National Party in the early 1980s. As we noted earlier in this thesis, while there is a plentiful literature on the emergence of factions in the partisan arena, little systematic theoretical or comparative analysis has been undertaken on the alternative outcomes of factional conflict in political parties. In Chapter Four, however, we suggested that sub-party factionalism, or in our terms "organized collective Voice", may result in one of five different outcomes. Three of the five outcomes are determined by the response of the host party to the expression of collective Voice; the other two are responses by the sub-parties themselves.

First, a political party may attempt to accommodate sub-party factions by institutionalizing opportunities for the expression of collective Voice, usually by modifying its internal rules or procedures to bestow recognition on sub-

parties and their role within the organization. This party-based response is most likely to occur in situations of multi-factional competition, especially where conflict is highly specialized and where there are low barriers to Exit: hence, it has been a common response to factionalism among leadership sub-parties in multi-party systems under proportional representation electoral formulae.

Second, a party may respond by suppressing collective Voice, for example, by amending its rules or procedures to deny legitimacy to organized groups within the party or to permit the mobilization of sanctions against party members expressing dissent through individual or collective Voice. The suppression of Voice is most likely to occur where the majority of party members, or members of the party elite, consider that the continued expression of Voice by a minority will reduce the quality of the party product for others or hinder attempts at recovery. It was also suggested in Chapter Four, that moderate to high barriers to Exit are necessary if suppression of Voice is to be effective, in order to deter dissatisfied members from resorting to "noisy" Exit whereby they leave the party and criticize it from the outside.

Third, a party may seek to silence Voice by resorting to the expulsion or forced Exit of dissenting members. Furthermore, the threat of expulsion may often be invoked as the ultimate sanction in support of the suppression of Voice. Once again, expulsion or the threat of forced Exit is most

likely to prove effective where barriers to Exit are high, and particularly where the party offers the only realistic vehicle for the attainment of individual or collective goals. However, we suggested that expulsion may also be used where barriers to Exit are relatively low if the forced Exit of one group is the price for the continued support of a larger, or more influential, group of members or voters.

Fourth, sub-party conflict may be brought to an end by the voluntary departure or collective Exit of one of the sub-parties, either to defect *en bloc* to another organization or, more usually, to set up a separate new political party. Such a response by a sub-party would usually be expected to ensue from a re-evaluation of its Exit/Voice calculus, resulting either from the realization of its members that they had initially overestimated their collective ability to influence the organization through Voice, or from a change in the extra-party environment which lowers the perceived barriers to (costs of) Exit.

Fifth, factional conflict may be brought to an end by the voluntary cessation of organized collective Voice by one or more sub-party organizations. A multilateral cessation of Voice is likely to occur only in the face of a powerful external threat (although temporary unity may be imposed by an approaching election). A single sub-party, however, may cease organized collective expression where lack of success in influencing the organization or changes in intra-party

conditions result in a change in its Exit/Voice calculus, whereby the expected benefits of collective activity no longer exceed the perceived costs. Alternatively, as we suggested in the previous chapter, members of a sub-party will no longer need to exercise collective Voice to influence the management once they have gained control of the principal decision-making organs of the party since, at this point, they are the management.

Finally, it should of course be reiterated that, in the short or medium term, none of these outcomes may occur: rather sub-party conflict, or the organized collective expression of Voice, may persist until some change in intra-party or external conditions alters the Exit/Voice calculus of one or more of the actors.

In this chapter, we investigate a number of these alternative outcomes in greater detail as we trace the course of events within the Scottish National Party following the emergence of the Campaign for Nationalism as a second formally organized faction in opposition to the '79 Group. The first section of the chapter details events at the 1982 Annual Conference of the SNP in Ayr, where the assembled delegates voted to ban all organized groups within the party in response to the escalation of conflict following the launch of the Campaign, thereby suppressing organized collective Voice expressed by sub-party factions.

In the second section, we examine the differing responses of the two sub-parties to the Conference decision and, in particular, the debate within the '79 Group as its members re-evaluated their collective Exit/Voice calculus in the light of changing conditions within the party. But, since the option eventually selected by the Group was deemed not to have complied with the Conference ruling, the party subsequently resorted to selective expulsion (or forced Exit) in order to enforce the suppression of collective Voice. In the third section, therefore, we endeavour to explain the use of the expulsion weapon by the SNP and to describe its effectiveness in reducing the volume of Voice within the party. Finally, in the fourth section of the chapter, we analyse the process of conflict resolution which led to the readmission (or "Re-Entry") of the expellees as the party attempted to close ranks before the 1983 general election.

AYR, 1982: THE SUPPRESSION OF VOICE

When we interviewed a number of '79 Group activists in March and early April 1982, some senior members appeared to consider that the Group had been, if not institutionalized, at least accepted or partially accommodated by the Scottish National Party. For example, according to Jim Sillars, "The '79 Group has been excellently handled by the party, although there will always be a minority who will attack the existence of the Group rather than our ideas." Stephen Maxwell, who had

claimed at an open meeting of the Group in October 1981 that it was then "wholly accepted in the party" was now somewhat less optimistic; but, even after the bitter National Council debate, he suggested "The party had not reacted to the '79 Group too badly. Much of the excitement at Johnstone was transferred from the proscription of SnG. ... I don't believe that the party will want to discuss the Group again for a year or so."¹

However, some of the younger activists were less sanguine about the Group's reception: said one, "The '79 Group has been very badly handled by the rest of the party ... the right wants us out altogether ... [while] Wilson and Fairlie want an end to the Group as an organized entity but think they can keep the people."² Nonetheless, like their more senior colleagues, they shared the belief that the Group was making progress and expected further victories in both intra-party elections and voting on policy resolutions at the forthcoming Ayr Conference in June.

But these interviews were conducted before the announcement, at the end of April, of the formation of the Campaign for Nationalism. That open hostilities did not break out immediately may be attributed in part to the fact neither side wanted to prejudge the mood of the Conference and also to the beginning of a by-election campaign in the Scottish constituency of Coatbridge and Airdrie, where the SNP candidate was '79 Group member Ron Wyllie: the by-election

was scheduled for June 24, three weeks after the Conference. Nevertheless, there was a war of words as each side sought to stake out its position in the lead-up to the Ayr Conference in the first week of June.'

"Open War Breaks Out in SNP"

The 48th Annual National Conference of the Scottish National Party began badly for the '79 Group. On the first morning (Thursday), delegates debated a resolution to reaffirm the party's commitment to civil disobedience in support of workers protesting plant closures and redundancies under the banner of "The Scottish Resistance".' The tone was set by SNP Chairman Gordon Wilson in his opening speech. According to Wilson,

The adoption of the aggressive Scottish Resistance and civil disobedience policies, in my opinion, lost us political support, members and credibility. Our positive message of self-government was drowned out by the negative voice of disobedience.

SNP vice president and former MP Margaret Bain echoed Wilson's views, arguing that civil disobedience was in danger of making the party look like "rent-a-mob" and, applied indiscriminately, was losing the SNP credibility and votes. Other speakers criticized Jim Sillars, architect of the Resistance strategy, in his capacity of Vice Chairman for Policy. According to Gordon Murray, "Jim Sillars has been chairman of the Strategy Committee for the last year. But what strategy has he produced?" And another former MP, Andrew Welsh, proclaimed,

"After twenty-five years in the party, I don't need Jim Sillars to tell me what its fundamental aims are." Moreover, argued Welsh, civil disobedience was "the stuff of pressure groups", not a tactic for a serious political party.

In reply, Jim Sillars made a spirited defence of the Resistance strategy. Praising achievements so far, including the party's support for workers at Linwood and Bathgate and the occupation of the Scottish Assembly building on Calton Hill, Sillars claimed that "We demonstrated ability and self-discipline and telegraphed to the Establishment that when we say something we mean it." Moreover, Sillars argued

We are not an ordinary political party. Our objective is to break the power and unity of the British state. We have to show that we have iron in our soul, steel in our character and a record of action.

However, Sillars impassioned speech and the arguments of other '79 Group spokespersons such as Stephen Maxwell failed to carry the debate. Although Conference voted overwhelmingly to express its sympathy for Scottish workers in their struggle, by a majority of 192 to 162 delegates also approved an amendment to delete the party's commitment to use civil disobedience as a means of active support, thus reversing the decision taken at the Aberdeen Conference.

While the morning debate illustrated the depth of the division in the party, the pending crisis was brought to a head at lunchtime on the first day when a fringe meeting was convened to announce the formal launch of the 'fundamentalist'

(or self-described "mainstream") Campaign for Nationalism in Scotland. Approximately 150 people crowded into the meeting, including a sizeable number of '79 Group members. The Scots Independent later described the scene in a tone of masterful understatement:

The fringe meeting was stormy - having come eventually to the conclusion that they must stop the '79 Group, Winnie Ewing, Jimmy Halliday and Dr. McIntyre were explicit in their criticism. And the '79 Group hecklers, having equally decided that the new Group endangered all their hopes and plans, felt no comradely restraint.'

Other journalists were less reticent in their reports. Stewart MacLachlan of The Daily Record claimed that he had never seen "such scenes of acrimony and vicious personal attacks. It made the internal battling of the Labour Party seem like a nursery bunfight," And, under a headline proclaiming "open war" within the party, Chris Baur of The Scotsman observed:

The air was pungent with accusations of "plotting", of "conspiracy" and of "slander". The floor was awash with political bile. Rarely, if ever before, have the SNP permitted themselves to spew so much of it out in public.'

The central point of contention was an emotional keynote speech to the launch meeting by Winifred Ewing, the 'fundamentalist' whom '79 Group activists, especially the younger ones, most loved to hate. According to Mrs. Ewing, the '79 Group was "a naked and open conspiracy, a plot ... to take over the party". She proceeded to list examples of the "criminal irresponsibility" of the SNP 'left', often

criticizing the actions of individual personalities: the "madness" of emphasizing republicanism in a year when the populace was "glued to the television" for the Royal Wedding; the publication of a letter by William Wolfe (supported by the Group slate in the election for party President in 1981) which was critical of the Vatican prior to the Pope's visit to Scotland, thus alienating Catholic voters; the Group's rethinking of "the Westminster connection" in promoting non-electoral strategies such as civil disobedience; and its alleged neglect of party activists and voters outside the central industrial belt.' As a result of the '79 Group's influence within the party, she argued, the SNP was losing members and voters, and many seats which might have been won in the May Regional elections had been lost. In conclusion, Mrs. Ewing shouted above the hecklers:

I am fighting for the survival of my [sic] party. ... I have come here in despair because of the naivety and absurdity of those [presumably '79 Group members] whom the party elected to high office.... For the triumph of evil, it just takes good men to do nothing. ... I believe it to be my moral duty to speak out before it is too late.

Mrs. Ewing's speech was an example, one '79 Group member later said, "of Winnie at her most proprietary and most insufferable. She kept referring to 'my party', as if she were the only one there with a stake in its future." Not surprisingly, her tirade provoked outrage among '79 Group activists at the meeting. Group Treasurer Chris Cunningham, for example, accused her of exploiting the religious conflict,

and Mr. Wolfe's letter, in a blatant attempt to discredit the Group through guilt by association. But Mrs. Ewing later dismissed her critics:

I am glad that it all came out in public like this so that people can see what [the '79 Group] is like. They were a boil that needed to be lanced. Most of the attacks were led by the Marxists in the '79 Group secretariat.

In a vain attempt to defuse the conflict, Vice President Margaret Bain (who had earlier refused to become a "patron" of the Campaign) intervened to ask if the Campaign would be willing to dissolve immediately if the '79 Group were to give a similar undertaking. But Dr. Robert McIntyre, speaking for the Campaign, claimed that he could not trust the "conspiratorial element" in the Group to cease its activities since "they would operate underground instead". '79 group members also doubted if Mrs. Bain's proposition was viable and one was quoted by the press as responding "There's not a snowball's chance in hell of us winding up." As Stephen Maxwell later told the author, "The seniority of many of the 'fundamentalists' gave them a power base with or without a formal organisation. In contrast, we had to be organised to be able to influence the party."¹⁰ However, Gordon Murray, who chaired the Campaign meeting, made it clear that voluntary dissolution of the '79 Group was not the aim of his organisation: rather, Murray argued, "The party as a whole should proscribe all groups, including this group!"

The bitterness aroused by the lunchtime meeting subsequently spilled over onto the Conference floor itself in the afternoon session. First, when the annual reports of the office bearers were presented to the delegates, a formal division was called on the report from the Vice Chairman for Policy, Jim Sillars. Although it was subsequently approved by 243 votes to 40,¹¹ the mere fact that a vote was considered necessary, when acceptance is usually a formality, was a further indication of the depth of feeling against the '79 Group in general and against Sillars in particular.

There was then another stormy debate over a resolution from the party's youth wing, Young Scottish Nationalists/Clann Alba, to require prospective parliamentary candidates to sign a declaration affirming that, if elected, they would abide by a parliamentary strategy laid down by the party, such strategy to include the "non-violent disruption of Parliamentary proceedings".¹² This resolution was clearly aimed at forcing the parliamentary group to abide by the instructions of the wider party in Scotland and its passage would have signalled a victory for those who had supported the NEC in its power struggle with the MPs in the 1974-79 Parliament, and for the '79 Group in particular, which had advocated the extension of its civil disobedience strategy to the party's activities in the House of Commons. However, among several amendments passed, one secured the deletion of references to "non-violent disruption" at Westminster (by a

majority of 129 to 90) and, finally, a "substantial majority" voted to remit the amended resolution back for further study."

So long did this debate last that all other motions on the afternoon agenda fell through lack of time, including one resolution from the '79 Group-dominated Glasgow Govan Branch which sought to bar any member of the Westminster or European Parliaments (i.e., Gordon Wilson, Donald Stewart or Winifred Ewing) from standing for the post of party Chairman. This, too, would no doubt have resulted in rancorous debate, since it was effectively a motion of non-confidence in Wilson's leadership. On the other hand, an amendment to the same motion showed that humour was not yet dead in the SNP: it proposed that the Chairman instead be forced to live in Govan (not one of Glasgow's more elegant suburbs) until "he/she can prove to the satisfaction of Conference that he/she can stop the Govan Constituency Branch from submitting silly resolutions."¹⁴ However, the party Chairman had more important things on his mind than the prospect of moving from Dundee to Glasgow.

The Party Responds to Voice

Given the bitterness of the Campaign launch meeting and aware of the unwelcome publicity that would undoubtedly be accorded to the divisions within the party by the news media, Gordon Wilson felt bound to respond on behalf of the wider organization. Contrary to the advice of senior headquarters

staff, Wilson gave notice on the second morning of the Conference (Friday morning) that he would introduce an emergency motion the following day to ask the party to ban all organized groups within the SNP." Mr. Wilson explained his decision to the stunned delegates:

In the last year, National Council ... took tough action in September and December to curb the activities of groups. I had hoped that action would have been sufficient to heal the wounds.

After yesterday's events, I am now convinced that the Party will not recover its unity until all organised groups are banned. I therefore give notice as your Chairman that I will place a resolution to that effect before Conference tomorrow.

Those of us who put Scotland and Party above narrow personal or political obsessions cannot and will not tolerate behaviour which is divisive and harmful. If I did not take action, I would be betraying not only the aims and ideals of our Party but the very future of our nation itself.

I therefore ask you to give me the authority to put our house in order.

While Wilson's announcement earned "a tumultuous response" from a majority of delegates, party vice chairman Andrew Currie and NEC member Rob Gibson abandoned the platform and, followed by more than forty other '79 Group members, left the Conference hall in protest at what one member called "the Nuremberg Rally atmosphere" inside. Once outside, they were joined by Jim Sillars who had deliberately absented himself from the morning's proceedings in anticipation of Wilson's speech and the ensuing protest. It was an extremely warm weekend in Ayr and, according to some who were present, even hotter inside the Conference hall. Sillars therefore

suggested that "all the delegates should take a dip in the River Ayr to cool down and we should pray for rain to cool tempers" and advised '79 Group members "Everyone should make every possible endeavour not to heighten the tension." However, many of the young Group activists were angry and embittered by what they saw as the Chairman's over-reaction which appeared to play into the hands of the 'fundamentalists'.

Members of the Campaign, on the other hand, were delighted by Wilson's intervention. Even before the text of the emergency resolution was known, Winifred Ewing proclaimed victory for her organization as she left the Friday morning session:

My campaign has been so successful, it is beyond my wildest dreams. These people showed they are not nationalists by walking out in the middle of the Chairman's excellent speech. ... If the '79 Group is ended tomorrow, the Campaign for Nationalism need never meet again.

Not surprisingly, the remainder of Friday's proceedings inside the Conference hall were overshadowed by the lobbying and politicking taking place elsewhere. Gordon Wilson let it be known that he was putting his own future as party Chairman on the line in the next day's vote: "I will make it clear I expect Conference to support me wholeheartedly and, if I don't get support, I will reconsider my position." This ultimatum was criticized by '79 Group member Ron Wyllie, who hinted in return that he might be forced to consider standing down as

SNP candidate for the Coatbridge and Airdrie by-election if Conference voted to ban the Group. Meanwhile, Mr. Wilson met again with senior party officials and with members of the Conference agenda committee to discuss the form and the constitutional validity of his resolution. And, by way of a trade-off, the agenda committee accepted a rival motion, proposed by a hastily convened meeting of the West Lothian Constituency Association, to delay any discussion of the future of groups until after the forthcoming by-election.

The Suppression of Voice

After a late night for most delegates who were up until the small hours discussing events thus far and attempting to lobby support for the next day's emergency vote, the first item of business on the Saturday morning was the election of national office-bearers. Again the signs were not promising for the '79 Group. Although Jim Sillars was narrowly re-elected Executive Vice Chairman for Policy and Andrew Currie won rather more easily against perennial party "maverick" A.J.C. Kerr for the Vice Chair for Organisation,¹⁶ Stephen Maxwell was defeated by Campaign member Gordon Murray for the Vice Chair of Local Government and all other '79 Group candidates were defeated by substantial margins.

As soon as the elections were over, members of the press and the public were invited to leave and the debate commenced behind closed doors of the two "Topical", or emergency,

resolutions. Wilson's resolution asked delegates to affirm that

This Conference demands the immediate disbandment of all organised political groups within the Party; and declares that membership of the Party is incompatible with membership of any group which has not fulfilled the direction of this Conference within three months; and instructs the Chairman, National Secretary and National Executive Committee to then immediately take the necessary action under ... the Party Constitution.¹⁷

In direct contrast, the West Lothian resolution proposed simply "That the issue of groups within the Scottish National Party be discussed at a special National Council after the Coatbridge and Airdrie by-election."

Speaking in support of his own motion, Mr. Wilson dismissed any suggestion of delaying the decision as "the kind of fudging of the issue that has led to the destruction of the Labour Party." He told the Conference that the party was "bleeding to death" as a result of self-inflicted wounds, that he had been "sickened" by the launch of the Campaign for Nationalism, and that it was time to put an end to the atmosphere of suspicion and fear engendered by the existence of organized factions within the party. To the dismay and disgust of most '79 Group activists, Wilson's motion was seconded by Alan Clayton, himself a member of the Group and of its executive committee, who now appealed to all delegates to put party unity above personal political or ideological preference.

All other Group members, however, spoke against Wilson's call for an immediate ban. Stephen Maxwell, for example, criticized Wilson for "putting a pistol to the heads of delegates" by threatening to resign as Chairman if his motion failed and urged the party to wait until after the by-election in accordance with the counter-resolution from West Lothian. Others questioned the constitutional propriety of requiring delegates to make an immediate decision without having the opportunity to consult their branches on such an important matter.

But, in the end, Wilson (and hence the Campaign for Nationalism) was victorious. Asked to choose first between the two resolutions on the floor, delegates rejected the West Lothian motion by 413 votes to 189, then approved Wilson's motion against the direct negative by 308 votes to 188." The Conference had therefore voted to proscribe all organized groups within the SNP: members of the Campaign and the '79 Group each had three months in which to wind up their respective organizations or face expulsion from the party as members of a "proscribed group". Organized collective Voice was to be silenced.

The immediate responses of the two sub-parties were quite different. Members of the Campaign were delighted by the outcome, and a rapidly-convened session of the Campaign Secretariat in Glasgow on the Sunday night following the Conference (June 6) decided to recommend dissolution of the

formal Campaign organization to a meeting of patrons to be held in Stirling three weeks later. In contrast, members of the '79 Group were in apparent despair and spokespersons for the Group indicated that they would not be meeting to discuss the future of their organization until after the Coatbridge and Airdrie by-election.

Overview: Interpretations of the Ayr Conference

What a difference a year makes - or even a couple of months. After the 1981 Aberdeen Conference, the '79 Group seemed to have been accepted by a majority of SNP activists and, indeed, to be on the verge of taking control of the national decision-making organs of the party (an appearance that was lent further substance by the subsequent election of ordinary members to the National Executive Committee and for the new position of Vice Chairman for Local Government). Twelve months later, its members were facing the prospect of being forced to wind up their organization or of leaving the party altogether (voluntarily or otherwise). It had, admittedly, been an eventful year in British and Scottish politics. A Royal Wedding, the Papal visit, the rise of the Social Democratic Party and the Anglo-Argentine war over the Falklands/Malvinas²⁰ had all had some effect on politics within the SNP, inasmuch as they added to the strain between the republican, secular, left-wing, anti-imperialist '79 Group and its pro-Commonwealth (if not pro-Monarchist), religion-

conscious, centrist or right-of-centre and determinedly "respectable" opponents. Moreover, the SNP's poor showing at the Hillhead by-election and at the Regional Council elections in May 1982 also added to the general level of frustration or dissatisfaction within the party.

But even when the SNP Activists Survey was undertaken in early April 1982, a clear majority (73.6 per cent) of active respondents considered that "groups like the '79 Group, whether formally or informally constituted, have a legitimate role to play within the Party" (see Table 13.1, above). Yet, two months later, among delegates to the Ayr Conference who participated in the final division on Wilson's proscription motion, 62.1 per cent voted to ban all intra-party groups forthwith. Since both our sample of respondents and the delegates to the Ayr Conference may be taken to have been representative of SNP activists as a whole, how can one account for such a dramatic reversal in a relatively short time?

First, and perhaps most importantly, our survey was undertaken before the announcement of the formation of the Campaign for Nationalism as the organized expression of collective Voice for the 'fundamentalists' at the end of April 1982. While the '79 Group remained the only organized sub-party within the SNP, it was possible for the 'social democrats' and the large number of "non-aligned partisans" to play a moderating role in intra-party debate; but, once the

Campaign was established, even before it had been formally launched, it was clear to many SNP activists that the tenor of intra-party debate was bound to change, to become more polarized. Hence, party vice president Margaret Bain claimed that "my heart sank to my boots when I heard about the formation of the Campaign."²¹

It quickly became evident that the primary purpose of the Campaign was to engineer a crisis within the party, to provoke the party leadership (or, rather, the non-aligned members of the leadership) to proscribe all groups, including its principal target, the '79 Group. Having failed to secure proscription through normal channels (by resolutions to National Council or Conference), the 'fundamentalists' decided, as Chris Baur of The Scotsman put it, "with an icy resolve to demonstrate to the party at large just how disruptive such factions could be."²² However, few members of the Campaign expected to achieve success so quickly: as one member of the Campaign Secretariat later admitted, "We estimated that it would take us eighteen months to two years to get to the general proscription stage: we in fact did it in one short hot morning."²³

That the Campaign attained its primary goal so rapidly owed much to the bitterness of the launch meeting on the first morning of the Conference. Certainly the 'fundamentalist' speakers set out to be provocative: again according to Chris Baur,

Their own counter-campaign was launched on a wave of vituperation which stunned the conference delegates. ... With varying and often quite wicked degrees of poetic licence, the Group were condemned for saddling the party with their own aims and tactics - republicanism, land nationalisation, anti-Popery, civil disobedience, support for the IRA, absence from the Hillhead campaign. No holds were barred.²⁴

But some of the responsibility must also be attached to the '79 Group and especially to the many young Group activists who had ignored the advice of their elders and played into the hands of the Campaign by attending the launch meeting and acting as hecklers and spoilers. Jim Sillars, for example, had advised the Group to ignore the Campaign launch. According to Sillars,

I welcomed the formation of the Campaign because it brought the right-wing out into the open. I counselled our Group against attending the meeting since the Campaign was looking for confrontation. Unfortunately, many of younger members showed their political inexperience.²⁵

And other senior members of the '79 Group, who had echoed Sillar's warning against being drawn into confrontation by the Campaign, also cited the inexperience of their more junior colleagues as one of the key determinants of the course of subsequent events.²⁶

If both the Campaign speakers and some members of the '79 Group played their parts in escalating conflict on the first day of the Conference, a further crucial ingredient of the eventual outcome was the reaction of party Chairman, Gordon Wilson. He, too, could have ignored the situation or,

at least, acceded to the '79 Group's proposal that the future of groups be discussed after the Coatbridge and Airdrie by-election, thereby allowing tempers to cool after the Conference.

But Wilson was determined to settle the issue at Ayr, to the extent that he was willing to put his chairmanship on the line in order to secure support for his resolution. According to one commentator, this "oldest trick in the game" may well have helped to determine the Conference decision:

In an agony of conflicting loyalties, many speakers ... appealed to [Wilson] to withdraw his threat, so that they might concentrate on deciding the issue of principle. But the deed had been done. It meant that delegates were forced to vote not just for or against proscription but also for or against a chairman they deeply respect."

Nevertheless, almost forty per cent of voting delegates did vote against Wilson's resolution in the final division and, as Wilson himself recognized,

a substantial body of opinion within the party took the view that they didn't particularly like the action I was proposing.... Many of the people who voted against my resolution were not members of the '79 Group ... because the membership of the '79 Group is not that substantial."

Could members of the Campaign have known how Wilson would react? According to two members of the '79 Group who had served with him on the National Executive Committee, "Wilson was the fall-guy, but he went with his natural inclinations. Wilson is an impulsive politician - his instincts are mainly conservative and reactive. He was, in effect, 'used' by the

Campaign."⁹ Wilson, however, rationalized his intervention in terms of the need to salvage the Conference and, indeed, to rescue the SNP from the kind of internal factionalism which beset the British Labour Party in the early 1980s:

It was my judgement that the conference ... was in danger of becoming a disaster because of the denigration and public argument. I think that as a result of the action that was taken by the conference on Saturday, the party has benefitted. I think that ... the SNP conference was willing to shape up to a solution in the way that the Labour Party had not.¹⁰

And, finally, what of the role of Alan Clayton, the '79 Group executive member who seconded Wilson's motion and whose intervention may therefore have swung enough votes to give the resolution a comfortable if not overwhelming majority? Clayton was villified after the Conference vote by some members of the Group who handed him thirty five-pence pieces in an envelope marked "Judas" and asked him "How much did Winnie [Mrs. Ewing] pay you?" Was he, as some Group members later alleged, another "mole" like Kenneth Fee, an *agent provocateur* who pretended to share the Group's aims but who was actually serving the 'fundamentalist' cause by undermining and discrediting the left-wing faction (for example, by proposing that the Group establish links with Provisional Sinn Fein)?¹¹ Alternatively, it was suggested by some that he had betrayed the Group because its members had supported Ron Wyllie, and not Clayton, for the Coatbridge and Airdrie by-election nomination.

According to Clayton, however, he had made his decision to support Wilson in the high school classroom where he was teaching on the Friday morning, having failed to convince his employers to allow him time off to attend the entire Conference." Clayton's 'Modern Studies' class was watching the Conference on television and, when the '79 Group members walked out in protest at Wilson's notice of intent to introduce the proscription motion,

There was a spontaneous outburst of laughter from the pupils. ... Here were the voters in the next General Election but one - the Independence Election - viewing the whole affair as funny, perplexing, and wholly irrelevant."

The reaction of his pupils and the mood of the Conference when he finally arrived on the Friday evening convinced Clayton that "a dreadful disease had taken hold" and that the SNP was "on the verge of splitting into a mutant Scottish Labour Party and a right-of-centre Nationalist Party". Clayton therefore approached Wilson and, after a lengthy discussion which further strengthened his conviction that "the Party was facing a total collapse of credibility and a disastrous split", he offered to second the motion "to save the Party" and to show delegates that "we on the left were capable of listening to reason, and not simply a bunch of fanatics who walked out in fits of pique when things were against us."

According to both Gordon Wilson and Alan Clayton, therefore, their intervention to suppress organized collective Voice by banning groups within the party was designed to

prevent a further deterioration of the party product and, possibly, to forestall the total collapse of the organization. Both argued, moreover, that they had secured a future for the left within the party: Wilson, for example, suggested later that left-wing Nationalists would receive "a much more sympathetic hearing" now that groups were abolished." But would 'the left' in fact stay in the SNP now that organized collective Voice had been suppressed? Wilson clearly recognized the possibility that the SNP might lose some able leaders and younger members whose level of activism and energy were important to the party organization since, only a week after the Conference, he was already making gestures of reconciliation including, for example, the suggestion that the ban on groups might not be permanent." However, it also appears probable that, in Wilson's estimation, what we have called the "Exit/Voice calculus" of left-wing Nationalists would lead them to stay in the party. First, opportunities for Voice (although not organized, collective expression) were still present: as Wilson admitted, proscription "would have been a dangerous move if the SNP did not have a very open system of debating policy." Moreover, for those who were active Nationalists and socialists, external opportunities for improving the product of party membership were no better in 1982 than they had been in 1979: as Keith Aitken of The Scotsman pointed out in article on Wilson's gamble,

since the failure of the Scottish Labour Party, it is hard to see where Mr. Sillars and his colleagues

could go were they to decide that they could no longer remain within the SNP."

Resort to the suppression of organized collective Voice at the Ayr Conference therefore seems to fit the conditions that we hypothesized in Chapter Four and in the introduction to this chapter. First, leaders/managers of the SNP (including Margaret Bain, for example, as well as Gordon Wilson) and a majority of delegates appear to have believed that the cacophony of Voice emanating from the conflict between the '79 Group and the newly-formed Campaign for Nationalism at best was a hindrance to restoring the quality of the party product and at worst threatened further to reduce that quality. Second, although the Campaign was proscribed along with the '79 Group, the suppression of organized collective Voice actually reduced the level of dissatisfaction of the 'fundamentalists' (at least in the short term) and lessened the likelihood that they would Exit from the party or from active membership therein. Third, since barriers to Exit remained high for dissatisfied left-wing members of the SNP, it was unlikely that the party's organizational or electoral position would be significantly weakened by either mass defection or Exit by schism on the part of '79 Group activists.

Therefore, while the debate at Ayr had undoubtedly been traumatic for many members of the SNP, it may be argued that the suppression of organized collective Voice, backed up by

the threat of expulsion or suspension for those who failed to comply, was the logical response by the SNP as an organization to the escalation of intra-party conflict in the months and days leading up to the Conference. But how would the sub-party factions respond?

SUB-PARTY RESPONSES TO THE SUPPRESSION OF VOICE

On the weekend after the Ayr Conference, spokespersons for both the Campaign and the '79 Group announced that their respective organizations would meet formally to discuss their futures on the last weekend in June, following the Coatbridge and Airdrie by-election. Meanwhile most SNP activists in the central belt temporarily set aside their differences in order to work in the by-election - although a number of leading 'fundamentalists' were conspicuous by their absence from Ron Wyllie's campaign."

But the shadow of the Ayr Conference hung heavily over the proceedings when the SNP National Council met in Airdrie on the weekend before the by-election for its regular post-Conference session. Although Council was forbidden to discuss the question of factions, in an attempt to display a united front to the electorate, the Conference vote clearly influenced the most important item on the agenda - the election of ten ordinary members to the party's National Executive Committee.

Again, the results indicated that the tide had turned against "the left". At the corresponding meeting after the Aberdeen Conference, the '79 Group had placed five elected members on the NEC: a year later, the Group won only two seats and, in both cases, special circumstances applied. The fact that Ron Wyllie, the candidate at Coatbridge, came second in the balloting (behind the party's previous by-election candidate, George Leslie) may well be attributed to the delegates' appreciation of "the electoral danger of rejecting Mr. Wyllie from their governing body in the week they were commending him to the voters as a worthy Member of Parliament."⁴⁰ And Stephen Maxwell's re-election to the NEC, having been defeated as Vice Chairman for Local Government at the Annual Conference, was explained by many delegates as a consolation prize for his long and distinguished work for the party.

However, all other '79 Group candidates were defeated as the remaining seven elective seats on the NEC were taken by hard-line 'fundamentalists', including James Halliday, Dr. Robert McIntyre, Arthur Donaldson and Helen Davidson, all founding patrons of the Campaign for Nationalism. Moreover, the pattern of votes received by the 'fundamentalist' victors - the seven were separated by only 11 votes - appeared to confirm suspicions voiced by '79 Group members that their opponents "had organized a block vote to ensure the annihilation of the Left."⁴¹ The balance of power on the new

Executive now lay clearly with the 'fundamentalists' and their allies, and this point was not lost on '79 Group members as they considered their future: if the Group were to challenge the party to back up the threat of expulsion, said one, "This Executive would not only throw us out, they would relish the chance to do so."²

On the Thursday after the National Council meeting, the voters at Coatbridge and Airdrie demonstrated that attempting to put one's house in order did not necessarily yield immediate electoral benefits. The Labour Party, still beset by its own internal factionalism, won the seat easily, while SNP candidate Ron Wyllie came third with 10.5 per cent of the votes, losing his deposit, amid accusations that the 'fundamentalists' had done everything possible to sabotage his campaign. Now, with the by-election out of the way, attention turned back to the response by the two sub-parties to the suppression of collective Voice.

The Dissolution of the Campaign

Members of the Campaign for Nationalism in Scotland met at Stirling on Sunday June 27, 1982, and, in accordance with the recommendation of the Campaign Secretariat, voted unanimously to wind up their organization in response to the Ayr Conference decision. According to Kenneth Fee, Vice Convenor of the Campaign,

There was no real argument at our meeting that we should do anything but comply with the Party's

overwhelming vote. Our Secretariat has been instructed to wind up our affairs, settle our bills, and be ready to close down the Campaign at least a month before the deadline expires."

The formal organization of the Campaign was thereby dissolved. Given the results of elections to high party office at the Ayr Conference and the Airdrie National Council, which gave the Campaign ten seats on the 24-seat National Executive (compared with four '79 Group members and ten other "traditionalists" who had opposed the Group but had not joined the Campaign), the dissolution of the Campaign was congruent with the generalization proposed in the previous chapter that a policy sub-party which has secured control of the key decision-making organs of the party has no need for a separate organization.

However, while the Campaign was officially disbanded as the organized expression of collective 'fundamentalist' Voice, its former members continued to exercise individual Voice on an informal basis to persuade the party leadership to enforce the proscription of the '79 Group. The principal targets of this pressure were the members of the NEC and other senior activists who had declared their opposition to the '79 Group but had not joined the Campaign; these individuals were branded as "marshmallows" by both the Campaign and the Group. Hence, one former member of the Campaign Secretariat issued an explicit threat in a letter to a senior office-bearer written a month after the Conference:

The personnel of the Campaign hereby give notice to you marshmallows that we are [deleted] fed up with doing the dirty work all of the time. What really

bugs us is the way you all rationalise the situation. ... you pretend to all and sundry and perhaps even to yourselves that there is no real crisis, and that what we should be doing is closing ranks and "getting on with it". ... It would help [the Chairman] a great deal if you ... got your hands just a little soiled in the most important battle the Party has fought in recent times. ... If you don't do that, and the '79 Group survives as an organised force, the Campaign will of course be correspondingly resurrected."

Moreover, it would appear that resurrecting the Campaign would not have been a difficult task. While the formal organization of the Campaign had been dissolved, there remained a number of mechanisms through which 'fundamentalists' could continue to pursue collective action, if not organized collective Voice. They still controlled the Glasgow District Association, together with many branches and constituency associations in various parts of Scotland. Moreover, from the middle of 1982, an informal discussion group known as "The Glasgow Symposium" began meeting on a regular basis (usually one Saturday evening each month), generally at the home of Kenneth Fee, to hear invited speakers and to address matters of common concern. Although the functions of the Symposium were ostensibly social and educational, it is our impression, based on the composition of its "membership" and the tenor of discussion,⁴⁵ that it was little more than a device intended to maintain a communications network among 'fundamentalist' Nationalists and to serve as a basis for remobilization of the Campaign were such a move deemed to be necessary.

The '79 Group Response

On June 27, while the Campaign was voting for its own dissolution in Stirling, over 150 members of the '79 Group met in Glasgow to debate their response to the Conference ruling. They considered four alternatives: first, refusal to comply with the Conference decision; second, reconstituting the Group as a "79 College" to play a more limited educational role; third, throwing the Group open to members of other political parties to create an all-party, left-wing nationalist pressure group; and, fourth, complete dissolution of the Group." Some participants also raised the possibility of leaving the SNP, either to create a new party or to join the Labour Party, but neither proposal received much support. Moreover, neither the second nor the third option (reconstituting the Group as a "college" or an all-party pressure group) appeared likely to succeed given the party Chairman's avowed determination that there would be no compromise on the Conference decision. On the Friday before the Group meeting, Mr. Wilson announced to the press:

There is no way round the Conference decision. I am utterly determined to ensure that these groups are disbanded ... I have to insist on the implementation of the Conference decision to have all organised political groups disbanded within three months."

After four hours of debate, members of the '79 group voted unanimously to uphold their "democratic right to organise within the party ... (and) ... to argue the Socialist

case within the SNP."" They therefore instructed their Executive Committee to investigate means by which they could either fight the proscription resolution on constitutional grounds or circumvent the terms of the ban by reconstituting the Group in another form. The Executive was further instructed to report back to a Plenary Meeting of the Group later in the summer.

The Executive Committee first attempted to gain support among the branches to convene a special National Conference to consider the constitutionality of the proscription resolution, arguing that Wilson's motion had been treated erroneously as a policy resolution when it was, in effect, a change to the party constitution, and therefore had required prior notice to branches and passage by a two-thirds majority of voting delegates. However, this interpretation was challenged by the Group's opponents who insisted that, since there had been no provision in the party constitution to permit the formation of organized groups, no amendment was required to abolish them. It was merely a question, one former Campaign member argued, "of the Party's right to decide policy, and to oblige members of the Party to abide by policy."" Moreover, senior party officials emphasized that Mr. Wilson's resolution was "quite deliberately framed to ensure that it did not affect the Party's constitution."⁵⁰ As a result, by the end of August, as the three-month deadline for compliance with the Conference resolution neared, the

Group was able to gain the support of only 65 branches, about half the number required for a special Conference to be convened.

When members of the '79 Group met again on August 28, a week before the deadline for action imposed by Conference, about a quarter of the one hundred-or-so participants wanted to stand and fight, to keep the Group intact as a formally organized faction within the SNP. The Group's Executive Committee, however, recommended that the membership comply with the Conference ruling, at least to a certain extent. As Alex Salmond explained later, the Committee considered that the "stand and fight" option was not viable, first, because the Group simply was not tough enough - the resistance would eventually have collapsed - and, second, because most members were reluctant to go against a decision of Conference, "however undemocratic or unconstitutional it may have been."⁵¹

Instead the meeting voted for what most members saw as a compromise solution: to disband the SNP 79 Group as a formal group within the Scottish National Party and to establish in its place an all-party pressure group, provisionally to be known as "The 79 Group Socialist Society", to continue the struggle for a left-wing nationalist agenda. The meeting also elected an "Interim Organising Committee" responsible for drawing up a draft constitution for an all-party group (and ensuring that nothing in this constitution would involve SNP members in a breach of the Ayr Conference

resolution), consulting with a wide range of socialist opinion in Scotland and organizing and convening an open meeting to consider establishing an all-party '79 Group Socialist Society." It was to prove significant, however, that the membership of the nine-person Interim Committee (Brenda Carson, Chris and Roseanna Cunningham, Andrew Doig, Margo MacDonald, Stephen Maxwell, Kenneth McAskill, Douglas Robertson and Alex Salmond) was identical to that of the now-defunct Executive Committee of the just-disbanded SNP '79 Group!

Overview

In the immediate aftermath of the Ayr Conference, the 'fundamentalist' wing of the SNP and its "traditionalist" allies further strengthened their hold on the party. Having won all but two of the senior party offices at Ayr, after the Airdrie National Council meeting they also dominated the National Executive and its committees. Moreover, the SNP's poor performance at the Coatbridge and Airdrie by-election, where '79 Group member Ron Wyllie was the Nationalist candidate in the kind of urban industrial constituency at which the Group's strategy had been directed, was an additional blow to the fortunes of "the left" within the party.

Therefore, when members of the Campaign for Nationalism met in Stirling at the end of June to consider the future of

their sub-party, they were sufficiently confident of their renewed influence within the party that they voted to comply with the Ayr Conference resolution by winding up the formal Campaign organization. Nonetheless, we have suggested that there remained in place two important informal communications networks through which 'fundamentalist' activists could continue to pursue collective action. First, regular meetings of party organs brought together the many former Campaign patrons and sympathizers who had been elected or appointed to the National Executive, the National Council and their respective committees. Second, all members of the Campaign Secretariat, its organizing committee, continued to meet at the monthly gatherings of the Glasgow Symposium, an "educational" and "social" study-group founded by Kenneth Fee shortly after the dissolution of the Campaign. Thus, the Campaign may have been formally disbanded but elements of a 'fundamentalist' organization persisted long after the deadline for compliance with the Conference decision.

For most members of the SNP 79 Group, committed Nationalists despite accusations to the contrary by their opponents, the Ayr Conference ruling created a serious crisis of conscience. Were they to bow to the Conference order to disband in the interests of party unity, and thereby place in jeopardy the fruits of their hard work over the past three years to make the SNP more relevant and more attractive to the voters? Or were they to maintain an open commitment to

socialism as well as nationalism, even if that involved leaving or risking expulsion from the party? At their first post-Ayr meeting, in Glasgow at the end of June, Loyalty to the party organization and the lack of viable Exit options persuaded the majority to seek an accommodation with the SNP. Having failed in an attempt to convene a special Conference to reconsider the proscription ruling, Group members voted at the end of August to disband the SNP 79 Group and established in its stead an Interim Organising Committee to prepare the way for the creation of a new all-party pressure group (provisionally, the "79 Group Socialist Society") to maintain a forum for the promotion of a left-wing nationalist agenda.

However, this compromise was rejected by both the 'fundamentalists' and the party leadership. The Group's claim to have complied with the Conference resolution by dissolving the old '79 Group while creating a new organization which was different in form and function from the banned faction was undermined, as members of the Interim Committee later acknowledged, by serious strategic errors.⁵¹ First, the retention of the words "79 Group" in the provisional title of the proposed new organization made it more difficult to argue that the Group had really been dissolved, indeed, one Scottish newspaper reported the Group's decision under the headline "79 Group disbands to form a 79 Group".⁵² Second, the declared intention to create an all-party pressure group was obscured by the fact that all members of the Interim Committee

responsible for its foundation were members of the SNP and, further, by the fact that the membership of the Interim Committee was identical to that of the Executive Committee of the old '79 Group. Third, even the use of the term "Interim Organising Committee" aroused suspicion since it was strongly reminiscent of the Interim Committee for Political Discussion, forerunner to the '79 Group.

Hence the response of the 'fundamentalists' to the dissolution of the '79 Group was predictable. One member of the party's National Executive complained publicly that the Group was "attempting to make a mockery of the Party's National Conference",⁵ while the Scots Independent observed "the '79 Group seem to have decided to comply with the letter, if not the spirit, of the Conference decision."⁶ For SNP Chairman, Gordon Wilson, the dissolution of the Group was little more than "a ploy" to circumvent the will of Conference and he warned its former members that they were "following a high-risk policy which could place in jeopardy their continued membership of the SNP."⁷ Now, with the proscription deadline only a few days away, the party had to decide what action to take, if any, against members of the proposed 79 Group Socialist Society.

FROM "SUPPRESSION OF VOICE" TO "FORCED EXIT"

The SNP 79 Group had voted to disband on Saturday, August 28, 1982, one week before the expiration of the three-month

deadline for the dissolution of organized groups imposed by the Ayr Conference. For the next three weeks, confusion reigned in the SNP as the party leadership sought to determine whether the Group had complied with the Conference resolution and, if not, to decide upon appropriate action.

The first official response by the party came on August 31 in the form of a letter to members of the new Interim Committee from Neil MacCallum who, as SNP National Secretary, was the officer responsible for initiating action in matters pertaining to internal party discipline. MacCallum informed the Committee members that, since the proposed new Socialist Society "will effectively be the same body as that dealt with by the Annual Conference, this action does not meet the terms of the resolution requiring disbandment of organised political groups" and further warned that continued membership of the Interim Committee "would be considered a direct challenge to the authority of the National Executive Committee" which could lead to disciplinary action "ultimately placing in jeopardy continued membership of the Party."

MacCallum's letter provoked strong criticism from former members of the '79 Group. Stephen Maxwell, for example, publicly deplored the fact that the party's Chairman and National Secretary were "playing the game of the hardline elements in the party who are determined on confrontation at any price." Maxwell continued,

Having bulldozed the Annual Conference by making it all a matter of confidence in his chairmanship,

Gordon Wilson is now trying to pre-empt party discussion about whether the Group's decision to disband constitutes a genuine attempt to ease the SNP's internal problems."

Further condemnation of the "sour reaction" of his colleagues on the National Executive to the dissolution of the '79 Group was expressed by SNP Vice Chairman for Policy, Jim Sillars, in a letter published in The Scotsman newspaper. According to Sillars, "once the SNP 79 Group disbanded, the NEC ceased to have any rights in the matter" since the new Socialist Society, like the Campaign for a Scottish Assembly, would have "no formal or organic links with the SNP."⁴⁰ Therefore, Sillars warned, "If the NEC sets out in pursuit of a group outside the party, then we shall witness the tragedy of the party expending its energies in a destructive witch-hunt."

On Saturday, September 4, the day before the proscription deadline expired, the SNP National Council met in Dunfermline. After widespread expectation in the press of further acrimonious dispute, the Council meeting was something of an anti-climax. Although two attempts were made to reject the National Secretary's report which made mention of his letter to former '79 Group members, they were both defeated by a comfortable majority, and a further move to convene a special National Conference to reconsider the matter of groups was ruled out of order by the chair.⁴¹ Instead, Council referred to the National Executive, due to meet the following weekend, the task of deciding whether membership of the proposed

Socialist Society and its Interim Organising Committee would be incompatible with membership of the SNP."

Although former Group members, such as Maxwell, Sillars and Douglas Robertson, continued to insist that the party had no legitimate grounds for taking selective action against the organizing committee of a society which did not yet exist, Gordon Wilson announced to the press after the National Council meeting that he and his National Committee were fully prepared "to take action against those who have singled themselves out for action."

The NEC Gives Notice

The National Executive Committee of the SNP met in Edinburgh on Saturday, September 11, to make final determination of the status of the Interim Organising Committee of the 79 Group Socialist Society. Having reviewed reports of the last meeting of the SNP 79 Group and considered the composition of the Interim Committee, by a majority of 15 votes to 3 (the three dissenters being former '79 Group members Andrew Currie, Stephen Maxwell and Ron Wyllie) the NEC resolved

... that the 79 Group Socialist Society Committee as a body and as representing the 79 Group Socialist Society is a device intended to maintain an organised faction within the Party ... that the 79 Group Socialist Society Committee is an organised political group within the Party that has not disbanded by 5 September 1982 ... (and) ... that membership of the Party is incompatible with membership of the 79 Group Socialist Society and its Interim Committee."

Since the 79 Group Socialist Society itself had not yet been established, the immediate targets of the NEC ruling were therefore the nine members of the Interim Committee who were given one week to disband the Committee - or to declare, in writing, that they were no longer members of the Committee - or face expulsion from the party.

In an attempt to appear even-handed, the NEC also served the same ultimatum to members of the right-wing, militaristic *Siol nan Gaedheal*,⁶ but it was the threatened expulsion of the Interim Committee members which excited controversy in the party and the press. Even so, it did not satisfy many of the 'fundamentalists'. For example, former MP Douglas Crawford accused the NEC of having "funked the issue" by not carrying out the expulsions immediately.⁶

The National Secretary wrote to the members of the Interim Committee on Monday, September 13, to inform them of the terms of the NEC ultimatum, but it soon became evident that most members were not going to give in easily. One, Roseanna Cunningham, did however resign from the Committee citing "pressure of work" and complied with the NEC directive, writing that she was "not a member of any '79 Group socialist society or committee thereof, or of the interim committee set up after the disbanding of the SNP 79 Group."⁶⁷

In contrast, on the Thursday, having received the final warning from the party, Margo MacDonald held a press conference at which she publicly announced her resignation

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from the Scottish National Party. Accusing the NEC of abusing the party constitution in order to conduct a "witch-hunt" against left-wing members, and against herself in particular, Ms. MacDonald acknowledged for the first time that, since 1979, she had been banned by the National Executive from representing the party on television because, it had been alleged, her "Left Wing image ... lost the party votes." However, while she had remained silent for three years in the interests of the party, the latest actions of the party had forced her to speak out. She had been forced to choose between, on the one hand, giving up her position as a radio journalist (in which capacity she was not permitted to indulge in political debate) in order to continue the struggle for socialism within the party and, on the other, keeping the job and resigning from the party. Despairing for the future of the party ("When I look at the SNP today I ask, who in their right mind would vote for it?") she had opted to make a "noisy" Exit from the SNP.

The remaining seven members of the Interim Committee met twice in the days after the ultimatum was delivered to consider their response to the NEC decision. After Ms. MacDonald's resignation from the party, they made a final offer of a compromise which Executive Vice Chairmen Andrew Currie and Jim Sillars, acting as intermediaries, presented to the Chairman. They offered to disband the Interim Committee on condition that the National Executive agreed to

suspend judgement on the proposed Socialist Society until it had been established, when the party would be in a better position to ascertain whether the new organization really did violate the ban on intra-party groups. However, Mr. Wilson rejected the terms of the appeal even before he had received Mr. Sillars' two-page letter. "It is intolerable", he said, "that a tiny elite can cause so much distress to SNP members in general. Their eleventh-hour tactics will not be successful."⁷⁰ The "abusive tone" of the Chairman's reply was condemned in turn by Sillars who accused the National Executive of attempting to create "a Stalinist party" in which no deviation from the official line was to be permitted, while Maxwell suggested that banning membership of the Socialist Society before it had been formed amounted to "thought proscription."⁷¹

As the September 20 deadline neared, Currie and Sillars worked through the weekend to work out a compromise, but Wilson refused to bend. Even former SNP President, William Wolfe, became involved, appealing over the heads of the party Executive for branch members to demand a special National Conference to resolve the issue of freedom of association within the party.

Expulsion of 'The SNP Seven'

By the time that the NEC ultimatum expired on Monday, September 20, all seven members who had not resigned either

from the party or the Interim Committee had written to the National Secretary to deny that they were members of the (non-existent) Socialist Society, but making no reference to the Interim Committee. Stephen Maxwell further informed the Executive that he wished to remain in the SNP but also to enjoy the basic democratic right to associate freely with other party members.⁷² To the last minute, both Maxwell and Salmond (and perhaps others) continued to believe that the party would not actually carry out the expulsions because the planned Socialist Society "was so different from the SNP 79 Group".⁷³ However, on September 20, National Secretary Neil MacCallum informed the press that letters had been sent to all seven members confirming their expulsion from the SNP.⁷⁴

The expulsion of 'the SNP Seven' created an uproar within the party, especially among former members of the '79 Group. Jim Sillars challenged the Executive to expel him as well since, although he had not been elected to the Interim Committee, he had moved the formation of the proposed Socialist Society at the dissolution meeting of the SNP 79 Group.⁷⁵ A similar challenge was thrown down by Owen Dudley Edwards, Edinburgh University historian and long an articulate spokesman for a nationalist left-wing within the SNP.⁷⁶ Writing in The Scotsman, he accused the 'fundamentalist' dominated Executive of indulging in the justice of Culloden - a reference to the infamous massacre in 1746 of the defeated army of the Young Pretender (Bonnie Prince Charlie) by the

victorious "English" troops of the Duke of Cumberland which ended the second Jacobite Rebellion. Thus, suggested Edwards, "Blood must be shed, whether the defeated have surrendered or not."⁷ However, the primary purpose of his article was to inform Mr. Wilson that he and a fellow party activist had booked and paid for the room in which the expelled members of the Interim Committee had held their last meeting as members of the SNP: consequently, Edwards wrote,

I advise him [Mr. Wilson] that if Mr. Maxwell, Mr. Salmond and the others merit expulsion, so do we, and he will kindly expel us immediately."⁸

However, the party took no immediate action against either Sillars or Edwards, nor against the many SNP members who attended the meeting to establish the Scottish Socialist Society (all reference to the "79 Group" was abandoned at the founding meeting) on October 30, 1982. The participants at this event demonstrated that the new organization was, indeed, an all-party (or, at least, cross-party) grouping, representing a broad spectrum of left and centre-left opinion: and this was further emphasized by the composition of its Executive Committee which consisted of one "Independent", four Labour Party members and four present or former members of the SNP (Stewart Stevenson plus expellees Stephen Maxwell, Kenneth McAskill and Alex Salmond).⁹

That the party failed to react immediately to the participation of Nationalists in the new Scottish Socialist Society may be attributed to the diversion offered by a

parliamentary by-election in the Glasgow constituency of Queen's Park, scheduled for December 2, two days before the next meeting of the SNP National Council. In an attempt to preserve some semblance of party unity during the campaign, Mr. Wilson announced that he would wait until the National Council meeting to seek a mandate to expel SNP members who had joined the Socialist Society.¹⁰ Meanwhile, the expellees and surviving members of the party's beleaguered left-wing continued to lobby the branches to support the call for a special National Conference and/or to back an appeal against the expulsions before National Council.

In the by-election on December 2, SNP candidate Peter Mallan captured 20 per cent of the votes to place second behind the Labour Party victor (widow of the former MP) to mark a clear improvement in the party's fortunes in the constituency since 1979, when the SNP took 9.7 per cent. Mallan's performance probably owed as much to his stand against abortion, a key issue in a constituency with a large Catholic population, and his endorsement by SPUC (Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child) as it did to the largely 'fundamentalist' campaign orchestrated by the Glasgow District Association of the party.¹¹ Nonetheless, the 'fundamentalists' were buoyed by this success and approached the National Council meeting with high hopes of completing the rout of the left wing.

When the National Council met in Glasgow on December 4, 1982, the proceedings were, as one newspaper reported, even "more acrimonious than the party's heated annual conference in June." The least contentious debate was on the motion to approve the National Executive's recommendation to proscribe Siol nan Gaedheal, passed by 185 votes to 30. But, when ratification was sought for the decision to expel 'the SNP Seven', the margin was much closer than the Executive had expected - 140 votes to 116. Supporters of the expellees then sought to have appeals against the expulsions heard immediately by National Council; the seven had gathered in Glasgow in the hope that this move would be successful. After prolonged and heated debate, the motion was approved by 126 votes to 124, but was then ruled out of order by the Chair since, Mr. Wilson declared, it had not received the two-thirds majority required to bypass the normal appeals procedure. (The constitutional basis for this ruling is unclear and it was widely speculated that the Chairman devised it on the spot.") Consequently, the appeals were referred to the National Council Appeals Committee, a body stacked with former members of the Campaign for Nationalism and other 'fundamentalists' who jointly comprised two-thirds of its membership."

Heated arguments also ensued over the reports to Council of Executive Vice-Chairmen (and former '79 Group members) Andrew Currie and Jim Sillars. Sillars' report in particular

was strongly critical of his colleagues on the National Executive Committee. He condemned the Executive for having "made fools of the party" in its handling of the expulsions and for exercising double standards in its attacks on the seven expelled members "and, by implication, those who are members of the Scottish Socialist Society"." 'Fundamentalist' members of the Executive and their supporters among the Council delegates refused to accept either report in its entirety and both Currie and Sillars were required to withdraw certain sections before the reports were approved.

At the end of the stormy six-hour meeting, there was little agreement as to what the delegates had decided. According to Mr. Wilson, by approving the expulsion of 'the SNP Seven', National Council had clearly indicated that the Scottish Socialist Society was a faction or organized political group as proscribed by the Ayr Conference and that membership of the Society was therefore incompatible with continued membership of the party. Hence, for the Chairman, the National Executive had received a mandate from the delegates to expel from the party those Nationalists who had joined the Socialist Society." Sillars, on the other hand, argued that the National Council had not proscribed the Society by name (that was "just the Chairman's ruling") while NEC member Ron Wyllie was apparently astonished by Mr. Wilson's interpretation of events: "to have presented it the way Gordon did was quite atrocious. Very few people in the

hall thought that they were voting to proscribe the new Society.""

Consequently, the final interpretation of the Council's decisions and the determination of any course of action, if necessary, rested once again with the National Executive Committee, due to meet in Edinburgh on the following weekend.

Overview

The compromise solution adopted by the SNP 79 Group at its final meeting at the end of August 1982 did not satisfy either the 'fundamentalist' opponents of 'the left' or the party Chairman. Although the Group formally disbanded, its decision to establish an Interim Organising Committee (with membership identical to that of the Group's former Executive Committee) to prepare the way for the creation of a cross-party "79 Group Socialist Society" was deemed by the party's National Executive to be "a device intended to maintain an organised faction within the Party". The NEC therefore determined that membership of the Interim Committee was incompatible with continued membership of the party and gave the nine Committee members one week to renounce their association with the proposed Socialist Society.

One of the nine, Roseanna Cunningham, complied with the NEC directive by resigning from the Interim Committee. A second, Margo MacDonald made a "noisy Exit" from the SNP by publicly announcing her resignation from the party before the

ultimatum expired. But, despite numerous attempts by Jim Sillars, Andrew Currie and others to mediate on their behalf, the other members of the Interim Committee, 'the SNP Seven', were all expelled from the party on September 20, 1982.

However, the selective expulsion of the Interim Committee members failed to lower the volume of Voice expressed inside the SNP or to ameliorate fully the dissatisfaction of the 'fundamentalist' tendency. The "managers" of the SNP - in particular, party Chairman Gordon Wilson and National Secretary Neil MacCallum - continued to be subjected to a barrage of criticism from Sillars, Currie, Owen Dudley Edwards and other senior activists for giving in to 'fundamentalist' pressure. Moreover, the forced Exit of 'the SNP Seven' did not serve to deter many SNP members from participating in the foundation of the new Scottish Socialist Society at the end of October.

At the same time, it became clear that the expulsions had not appeased the hard-line 'fundamentalists'. They had succeeded in ridding the SNP of the '79 Group as an organized faction within the party and in forcing the expulsion of a number of leading left-wing members, especially the *bête-noir*, Margo MacDonald. But many others remained - including their new prime target, Sillars - and it appeared that the 'fundamentalists' would not perceive the party product to be fully restored until they had completed their victory by

purging the SNP of all socialists who refused to accept the "Independence - Nothing Less" orthodoxy.

In the belief that the organized 'left' had been the principal cause of the party's internal conflict (in which he was encouraged by the 'fundamentalist'/'traditionalist' majority on the NEC), Mr. Wilson sought approval from the December National Council for the expulsion of 'the SNP Seven' and for a mandate to take further action against the Socialist Society, although it was clear by now that the new organization was, indeed, a cross-party body and not merely an organized faction within the SNP. However, the outcome of the Council meeting was far from clear and, as in September, it was the task of the National Executive Committee to determine the fate of the Society's Nationalist members.

EXIT, COMPROMISE AND RE-ENTRY

Once again, the onus had fallen on the National Executive Committee of the SNP to decide what action to take against left-wing members of the party. Given the hard-line stance adopted by the Chairman and the likelihood that a majority of the 'traditionalist' dominated Executive would support him, it seemed only a matter of time before Jim Sillars and other members of the SNP who had joined the new Scottish Socialist Society would be forced to choose between membership of the new organization and that of the party, or face the prospect of a further round of expulsions."

Certain factors, however, militated against the hard-line approach. First, by December 1982, at least one hundred SNP members had joined the new Socialist Society. The blanket expulsion of more than a hundred members, many of them extremely active at various levels within the party organization, required somewhat more careful deliberation and carried greater potential dangers than the selective expulsion of seven individuals.

Second, the rationale for proscription of the Scottish Socialist Society was obviously more tenuous than in the case of the Interim Committee. As an editorial in The Scotsman suggested: "It appears to be stretching the authority of the SNP leadership too far to forbid members to join an outside organisation."" As it was, many members of the NEC had already been surprised by the extent of opposition and the closeness of the vote in the National Council debate on its handling of 'the SNP Seven'."

Third, it was becoming apparent that many moderate activists, or "non-aligned partisans", were by now placing as much (if not more) blame for the disruption within the party on the 'fundamentalist' or 'traditionalist' wing as on 'the left'. For example, in a letter published in The Scotsman two days before the meeting of the National Executive, an SNP member of nineteen years standing who had "never been a member of any organised group within the party" expressed his growing disillusionment with the "desperate and tenacious group [of]

staunch traditionalists" on the National Executive "who do not wish any of their number to be displaced, any other point of view to be aired or accepted, and are trying to hold on to power at all costs". This writer continued,

Groups within the party are supposed to be banned, but the most vehement and tenacious group within the SNP not disbanded is the traditionalist clique on the national executive, the former members of the "Campaign for Nationalism in Scotland" and their associates. Their increasing intransigence and proprietary attitude are ruining our party."

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, confidential reports delivered to the December National Council meeting on the state of the party organization indicated a continuing fall in party membership and income. A small part of the decline in membership may be attributed to the sizeable proportion (approximately 40 per cent) of former members of the SNP 79 Group who left the party after the Group was disbanded and, particularly, in protest at the expulsion of 'the SNP Seven'." But many other members, who had not been directly involved in the factional struggle, were also reported to be leaving the party." Even former activists, disheartened by the ongoing conflict within the SNP, were pursuing Exit by resignation or by "dropping out" of active roles.

For these members, the suppression of organized collective Voice through the proscription of groups and the expulsion of 'the SNP Seven' had not improved the quality of the party product. Rather, we may conclude that the continued

unrest within the party had fuelled a sense of dissatisfaction to which many responded by Exiting from the organization. And, given the financial dependence of the SNP on income from membership dues and its organizational reliance on the activist commitment of its members, these trends were particularly disturbing since it was widely predicted that the Conservative government would seek a new mandate from the electorate in the spring or summer of 1983.

Towards a Compromise

In the week before the National Executive Committee was due to meet on Saturday, December 11, Mr. Wilson faced intense pressure to soften his stance in favour of some sort of compromise with 'the left'. But when a peace plan emerged, it originated from an unlikely source - not Jim Sillars or Andrew Currie, but from 'traditionalist' NEC member Colin Bell who, despite his Labour Party background, had been a persistent, often malicious, sometimes humorous, critic of the '79 Group and the 'organized left' within the SNP. After discussions with Mr. Bell, the Chairman announced on the Thursday before the NEC meeting that he intended to lay before the Executive a motion that would have the effect of granting at least a temporary reprieve to members of the Scottish Socialist Society. Declaring that the time had come for the Executive "to take up a conciliatory attitude" notwithstanding the mandate for further expulsions given to it by the National

Council, Mr. Wilson noted that "the General Election is close and the party must devote all its energies to re-organising for the boundary changes, adoption of candidates and campaigning". Consequently, he was prepared to back Bell's compromise formula which proposed that the NEC defer any decision on the status of the Socialist Society, at least until its next scheduled meeting in February, at which time the National Secretary would report back to the Executive on the activities of the Society.

The Chairman's announcement was welcomed by Jim Sillars who suggested that it would "calm the mind and warm the heart of the party" while pointing out that, if no action were to be taken against members of the Socialist Society, the expulsion of its organizing committee now appeared even less justified." Some 'fundamentalist' members of the Executive, on the other hand, warned that they would oppose the peace plan at the meeting.

When the National Executive Committee met on Saturday, December 11, the compromise formula proposed by Mr. Bell narrowly defeated a 'fundamentalist' inspired counter-motion to implement the National Council's mandate by taking immediate disciplinary action against the Socialist Society's Nationalist members. Winifred Ewing was among those who supported the defeated counter-motion. Afterwards, Mrs. Ewing publicly regretted the NEC's failure to carry out the wishes of National Council and, while she accepted the democratic

decision of the Executive, she clearly remained in an unforgiving mood towards 'the left':

We will continue to practise eternal vigilance for the party's sake. The party is not in a mood to have any more nonsense. [We] have had enough of their behaviour."

Others were more satisfied with the outcome. Both Wilson and Sillars saw it as a gesture of reconciliation which would permit the process of healing the wounds of the past year to begin and "allow the party to move forward into 1983 with a unified position." Moreover, for Sillars and the other left-wing NEC members, the Executive's decision would, they hoped, convey a message to the Appeals Committee which was due to begin its hearings in the New Year.

The Appeal of 'The SNP Seven'

The seven former Interim Committee members who had been expelled from the SNP cited three grounds for appeal against their forced Exit from the party: first, that "the decision to expel the seven appellants was ... contrary to natural justice" since the seven were not heard in their own defence at the NEC; second, that "there was no evidence whatsoever" to justify the NEC decision that the Interim Organising Committee constituted "a device intended to maintain an organised faction within the Party"; and, third, that "if the NEC had ascertained the facts" (that is, if the Executive had waited until the Socialist Society had been formed), it could

not have come to the conclusion that membership of the proposed society would be incompatible with membership of the SNP."

The National Council Appeals Committee met for over forty hours, spread over seven weekends from late December to March, and heard evidence from six of the appellants (the seventh, Brenda Carson, was unable to appear because of work commitments) as well as National Secretary Neil MacCallum and Jonathan Mitchell, counsel for the appellants, who had earlier worked with Kenneth McAskill to represent workers fighting against the closure of the Plessey factory in Bathgate, West Lothian (see Chapter Twelve, above). Although the Committee had been instructed to report back to the next meeting of National Council, the formalization of hearings (in response to legal advice) and the extensive arguments offered by the appellants meant that it was unable to complete its work in time for the Council meeting at Lanark on March 5.

Two days before the Lanark meeting, a new row broke out when members of the Appeals Committee complained that the appellants were responsible for delaying the proceedings, and hence the report. These claims provoked Kenneth McAskill to respond that there was little prospect of 'the SNP Seven' receiving a fair hearing from a committee packed with their opponents. McAskill told the press,

Far from holding a pistol at the heads of the committee, we are the ones being denied justice by a rigged star chamber consisting of people from the Campaign for Scottish Nationalism."

Appeals Committee convenor, Frank Hannigan, described McAskill's allegations as "utterly ridiculous". According to Mr. Hannigan, "I have done some homework and found that the committee's membership includes two former 79 Group members, two former Campaign members, and one who has been in both."¹⁰⁰ However, Hannigan's "homework" received low marks since the fifteen member Appeals Committee, elected by National Council shortly after the Ayr Conference, in fact included five of the seven members of the Campaign Secretariat, one of its leading patrons and at least four others who had been active supporters of the Campaign for Nationalism.¹⁰¹ It was perhaps not surprising that the appellants challenged its objectivity.

This latest controversy set the scene for a bitter debate at the March National Council meeting. When it was announced that the Appeals Committee had not yet reached a decision, a motion from the floor proposed that the appeals be heard immediately by Council. Once again, the delegates voted in favour (by 97 to 91) and, again, the vote was overruled from the chair by Senior Vice Chairman Jim Fairlie because the motion had not been supported by a two-thirds majority.¹⁰² To prevent further conflict from undermining the fragile unity of the SNP, and to forestall a threat of legal action against the party by the expelledes, Gordon Wilson ordered the Appeals Committee to complete its work by the end of March and proposed that a special session of National Council be

convened to receive its report on April 30.

For Jim Sillars, the March National Council was the last straw. Finally tiring of the endless vilification heaped on him and his wife (Margo MacDonald) by his opponents, he announced a week after the meeting that he would not seek re-election as Vice Chairman for Policy at the next Annual Conference and, indeed, would no longer be actively involved in the party.¹⁰³ While this news delighted the 'fundamentalists', it was a sad blow for other left-wingers in the SNP, including Andrew Currie, who threatened to follow Sillars' example if the special National Council failed to overturn the expulsions.¹⁰⁴

The Appeals Committee completed its report on March 31. With only two members dissenting, the Committee voted to recommend confirmation of the expulsions, finding that the NEC "had sufficient reason" to believe that the Interim Committee was a device intended to maintain "an organised political force within the Party", that the Executive therefore had "the right and duty" to require party members to resign from the Interim Committee and, once the seven had failed to comply, that the National Secretary "had no other course of action but to carry out the decisions of the NEC" by expelling them from the party.¹⁰⁵ However, the general tone of the report was anything but that of a sober, neutral, investigatory body. As one member of the Appeals Committee acknowledged later, with some sense of satisfaction, the final

document consisted of "twelve pages of unmitigated vitriol" in which few opportunities were foregone to portray the appellants, their supporters and the various incarnations of the '79 Group in the worst possible light.¹⁰⁶ The primary purpose of the 'fundamentalist' majority on the Committee was admitted by another member, on condition of anonymity:

We realised that the seven would be readmitted sooner or later. However, we wanted to make that process as difficult as possible so that there was no chance they would be able to stand for office at the next Annual Conference or be nominated as parliamentary candidates in time for the election.¹⁰⁷

The Appeals Committee's findings were made public in mid-April, after they had first been studied by the National Executive Committee but more than two weeks before the special meeting of National Council. The first reports were leaked to the press after the NEC, at its meeting of April 11, had split down the middle with eight members voting to maintain the expulsions and eight favouring temporary suspensions instead. The expulsions were reconfirmed only after the Chairman, Gordon Wilson, had used his casting vote to decide the issue.¹⁰⁸

On the following Wednesday, Senior Vice Chairman James Fairlie formally announced the Appeals Committee findings to a press conference at which he launched a blistering attack on the expellees and their supporters:

The 79 Group was simply a faction. It was an attempt to take over the leading positions of the Party and having lost they [sic] simply set out on a campaign of vilification against individuals. ... since their expulsion the appellants and their

supporters have aimed at influencing delegates to the National Council by means of an unscrupulous and despicable campaign to discredit the Appeals Committee.¹⁰⁹

Fairlie, in his turn, was accused by the appellants of attempting to pre-empt the outcome of the National Council's deliberations. According to Stephen Maxwell

It is outrageous and irresponsible for the National Executive to give a news conference before the National Council meeting. The Appeals Committee is a committee of the National Council and not the Executive. ...

This is clearly an improper attempt to prejudice the discussions of the National Council in Larbert.¹¹⁰

However, while it seemed probable that endorsement by the Executive of the Appeals Committee report would ensure its approval by the National Council, Mr. Wilson was sufficiently alarmed both by the extent of division within the NEC and by the prospect of renewed acrimony at the National Council session that he called upon Neil MacCormick, an Edinburgh University law professor and senior member of the Council, to act as a mediator and to propose a compromise formula which would put an end to intra-party conflict before a general election was called.

Compromise and Re-Entry

Delegates to the special session of the SNP National Council meeting in Larbert, Stirlingshire, on April 30 voted by a narrow majority to approve the report of the Appeals Committee, indicating that, given the information then at its

disposal, the NEC had acted correctly in expelling the seven members of the Interim Committee. With both the NEC and the Appeals Committee thus vindicated, the party could now afford to be magnanimous. By a majority of almost 6 to 1, the Council voted against maintaining the expulsions and for Neil MacCormick's compromise plan whereby 'the SNP Seven' would be reinstated into the party if they wrote to the NEC accepting the National Council's decision to approve the Appeals Committee report, thereby "acknowledging their guilt".¹¹¹

All seven subsequently wrote to the National Secretary to request reinstatement, although none made any apologies for his/her involvement in the Interim Committee.¹¹² But by this time, the party had been overtaken by wider events. On Monday May 9, Mrs. Thatcher called a general election scheduled for June 9, 1983. When the National Executive met later the same week to finalize the party's election strategy, it also approved the reinstatement of 'the SNP Seven'.

CONCLUSIONS

Thus ended one of the most trouble-filled chapters in the history of the Scottish National Party. Not since the great schism of 1942, when John MacCormick led his supporters out of the party conference, had the unity of the SNP been threatened on such a scale. From the founding of the Campaign for Nationalism in Scotland at the end of April 1982 to the acceptance by the Larbert National Council a year later of the

compromise resolution proposed by another MacCormick, "King" John's son Neil, the party had been in a near-constant state of internal turmoil and disruption.

While the expression of organized collective Voice had begun in 1979 with the creation of the ICPD (later the SNP 79 Group), it was not until the formal launch of the Campaign, and the '79 Group's ill-judged reaction to it, at the Ayr Conference that the management of the party decided that the volume of Voice had risen to a pitch that would further reduce (or, at least, hinder efforts to improve) the quality of the party product. In an attempt to restore order to his bitterly divided party, SNP Chairman Gordon Wilson sought and won permission from Conference delegates to suppress collective Voice by banning all organized political groups. In so doing, Wilson acted alone, ignoring the advice of senior party officials, such as National Organiser Allan McKinney and Headquarters Director Iain More, and failing to consult members of his own National Executive.¹¹³ "For the first time in his life he demonstrated some degree of political leadership", one (anonymous) leader of the '79 Group later commented, "but it was a tragic time for him to do so - the effect on the entire party was a tragedy."¹¹⁴

The Conference resolution gave the banned groups three months in which to wind up their organizations. The Campaign for Nationalism wasted very little time. The Campaign had been, from the outset, primarily a device to provoke a crisis

within the party, to raise the volume of Voice to an intolerable level. Thus, while the Conference ruling applied equally to the Campaign and the '79 Group, it was far more damaging in its effects on the left-wing faction, especially after a series of 'fundamentalist' victories in intra-party elections at Conference and the subsequent National Council. As one member of the Campaign Secretariat wrote to a senior party activist: "What Gordon has done is not even-handed at all, as I know you well know, although he had to use the words. He is on the side of right."¹¹⁵ By the end of June, therefore, having achieved its founders' principal objective of destroying the organized basis of left-wing opposition in the party, the Campaign was dissolved, although the 'fundamentalist' tendency continued to maintain a number of informal networks of communication on which a resurrected Campaign organization could be founded, if and when it proved necessary.

Members of the SNP 79 Group, for their part, held a series of meetings throughout the summer before finally deciding at the end of August on what they viewed as a compromise solution to the Conference decision. They voted to disband the '79 Group as a sub-party faction within the SNP and to establish in its place an Interim Organising Committee to prepare the way for the creation of a new Socialist Society which would serve as a forum for debate of

left-nationalist issues and which would be open to members from inside the SNP and without.

However, this compromise proved unacceptable to the party Chairman, a majority of the National Executive and the 'fundamentalist' tendency. After three weeks of bitter intra-party debate, the party leadership declared the Interim Committee and the proposed Socialist Society to be proscribed organizations and, in late September, expelled seven of the members of the Interim Committee. But the selective forced Exit of 'the SNP Seven', as they came to be known, did little to deter many SNP members from joining the new Scottish Socialist Society; nor did it serve to reduce polarization within the party, with the result that the Exit of members and activists disheartened by the ongoing conflict continued unabated.

Once the December National Council had approved the expulsion of 'the SNP Seven', Mr. Wilson at last adopted a more conciliatory position. He realized that the party could ill afford to expel the hundred or more activists who had joined the new Socialist Society (although he claimed to have been given a mandate from National Council to do so), especially since that organization was clearly, as its founders had intended, a cross-party body. However, 'fundamentalists' continued to press for the proscription of the Socialist Society. Most were motivated by the desire to rid the party of Jim Sillars and other leading left-wing

members. Others rationalized their opposition in different terms. For example, the Executive Vice Chairman for Local Government, Gordon Murray, suggested that allowing dual membership of the SNP and the Socialist Society could create a dangerous precedent: "because, hypothetically, fascists in the party could do the same thing. If they forged links outside the party with other fascists, but were allowed to remain members, it would do untold damage to the SNP."¹⁶ Notwithstanding these concerns, speculation that a general election was forthcoming militated in favour of a compromise. Mr. Wilson announced after the February meeting of the National Executive that action against the Socialist Society was to be suspended indefinitely.

This left the party with the problem of what to do with the seven expellees. Given the preponderance of former Campaign members on the National Council Appeals Committee, to which the appeals of the seven had been referred, it was hardly surprising that its report upheld the expulsions. But once the party had declined to take action against its members who had joined the new Socialist Society, the case for maintaining the expulsions of those who had planned its formation became increasingly difficult to sustain. Hence the compromise formula adopted by the specially convened National Council at the end of April saved face all round. The Appeals Committee report was approved, the National Executive's actions were vindicated and, at the same time,

the MacCormick resolution made it possible for the seven to be readmitted before the June general election.

But the damage incurred over the last year was not easily undone. The SNP had been without the services of such experienced and capable activists as Stephen Maxwell and Alex Salmond for almost a year and, although they had been readmitted, they played little role in the election except to campaign for fellow expellee Kenneth McAskill, who was reinstated in time to be adopted as parliamentary candidate in the Livingston, West Lothian, constituency.¹¹⁷ Margo MacDonald, still immensely popular with the voters, had been lost permanently, eventually forced out of the party by the constant attacks of her opponents. Many active young members, especially on 'the left' but also many "non-aligned partisans", had left the party. Others such as McAskill had remained "only out of personal loyalty to Jim Sillars",¹¹⁸ but Sillars himself had lost heart and also played little active part in the election campaign. In addition, the SNP had also lost the ability of Iain More who had resigned as Research Officer and Headquarters Director in July 1982, partly because of the party's unwillingness to commit more resources to its headquarters organization but also in response to what he considered to be the "inept and unfair" handling of the confrontation at the Ayr Conference.¹¹⁹

Even during the election campaign, the SNP remained a deeply divided party. Indeed, as Jim Sillars acknowledged,

"Perhaps for the first time in the party's history, some members on each side are hoping that certain SNP candidates lose."¹²⁰ Many 'fundamentalists', for example, were angered by the reinstatement of the seven expellees and, especially, by McAskill's adoption as a parliamentary candidate. The party's Senior Vice Chairman, James Fairlie, was so incensed by the readmissions that he resigned as SNP candidate in Dundee West, although he was subsequently readopted in another constituency. Some former Campaign members whom we interviewed near the election talked openly about establishing a cross-party "Scottish Nationalist Society", which would appeal to nationalists "from outside the party who are very clearly on the right", as a counterweight to the Scottish Socialist Society.¹²¹ Others were concerned that such a move would merely start the whole process of polarization all over again. But, in any case, as one former Campaign official acknowledged, and as our own observations confirmed, "The Campaign organisation is *de facto* still in existence."¹²²

Given the extent of these continuing internal divisions and the enervating effects of the past year's conflicts, it was not surprising that the SNP ran a lacklustre campaign. On Thursday June 9, 1983, the party's share of the total Scottish vote fell to 11.8 per cent (its poorest performance overall since 1970) and, although Gordon Wilson and Donald Stewart held their seats largely on the strength of personal incumbency votes, no other seats were won and 54 of the 72

SNP candidates lost their deposits. Clearly for the voters at least - and presumably, therefore, for most members of the party - the upheavals engendered by the expression and suppression of organized collective voice had done little to improve the quality of the party product of the SNP.

NOTES - CHAPTER FIFTEEN

1. Interviews with Jim Sillars and Stephen Maxwell, April 1982.
2. Chris Cunningham, Roseanna Cunningham and Graeme Purves, Interviews, April 1982. The last of these comments was particularly perceptive: in an interview with The Scotsman a week after the Ayr Conference, SNP Chairman Gordon Wilson acknowledged, "My aim is to remove the groups but to keep the people"; cited in "Wilson calm after storm at Ayr", The Scotsman, Edinburgh, June 14, 1982, p. 9.
3. See, for example, "Resistance grows within the SNP", The Scotsman, Edinburgh, June 1, 1982, p. 9.
4. Unless otherwise noted, quotations from speeches on the first day of the Ayr Conference are taken from newspaper accounts of the proceedings; in particular, "Bitter scenes leave SNP unity in tatters", Glasgow Herald, June 4, 1982, p. 1; "Hot News, Hot Views", Scots Independent, no. 136, July 1982, p. 6; "Open war breaks out in SNP", The Scotsman, Edinburgh, June 4, 1982, p. 1; "SNP Left defeated over civil disobedience tactic", The Guardian, London, June 4, 1982, p. 3; "SNP Left suffer major defeat", The Scotsman, Edinburgh, June 4, 1982, p. 9; and "Split in the Ranks", The Daily Record, Glasgow, June 4, 1982, p. 5.
5. "Hot News, Hot Views", op.cit.
6. "Split in the Ranks", op.cit.
7. "Open war breaks out in SNP", op.cit.
8. See also, "Notes for a speech by Winifred Ewing to a public meeting of the Campaign for Nationalism in Scotland, June 3, 1982" (mimeo).
9. Alex Salmond, Interview, June 1983.

10. Stephen Maxwell, Interview, June 1983.
11. SNP National Secretary, "Annual National Conference 1982 - Outcome of Business on the Agenda" (SNP Headquarters; mimeo, June 1982).
12. Scottish National Party, Agenda for the 48th Annual National Conference, Ayr, June 3-5, 1982 (Edinburgh: Scottish National Party, 1982), Resolution 30.
13. SNP National Secretary, "Outcome of Business on the Agenda".
14. Scottish National Party, Agenda, Resolution 14, Amendments.
15. Unless otherwise noted, quotations from speeches on the second day of the Conference are taken from: "Hot News, Hot Views", op.cit.; "Decision-day for SNP's future", The Scotsman, Edinburgh, June 5, 1982, p. 1; "Gordon Wilson gambles his SNP future", Glasgow Herald, June 5, 1982, p. 1; and "SNP storm as Left faces ultimatum from chair", The Guardian, London, June 5, 1982, p. 4.
16. Anthony J.C. Kerr, an inveterate writer of letters to the Scots Independent on a wide variety of issues, had been expelled from the party in the 1960s for running as an Independent Nationalist in a parliamentary by-election which the party had decided not to contest, but was readmitted in 1973.
17. SNP National Secretary, "Outcome of Business on the Agenda".
18. Quotations from speeches in the proscription debate are taken from newspaper accounts which are themselves second-hand since the press was excluded from the debate: see "Death knell for '79 Group", Sunday Standard, Glasgow, June 6, 1982, pp. 1, 3; "79 Group delay decision on future", The Scotsman, Edinburgh, June 7, 1982, p. 1; "SNP gives fringe groups three months to quit", The Guardian, London, June 7, 1982, p. 4.

19. Of the 100 votes that went missing between the two divisions, the Scots Independent suggested that "The mystery ... can best be explained by the temperature, and the presence of a refreshment tent next door to the hall - once it was clear the way things were going, the temptation was too great!"; "Hot News, Hot Views", op.cit.
20. According to Stephen Maxwell, he and others had tried to introduce an emergency resolution at the Ayr Conference calling for a cease fire in the Falklands, but the party refused to debate the issue. Labelling the Falklands war "one of the final episodes of British Imperialism", Maxwell argued that "the SNP's failure to take up the issue is a sign of how unsophisticated nationalism is here. Most people in the SNP have no historical or theoretical conception of nationalism." Interview, June 1983.
21. Margaret Bain, Interview, June 1983.
22. "Battle of Ayr leaves SNP in tatters", The Scotsman, Edinburgh, June 7, 1982, p. 7.
23. Kenneth Fee, Interview, June 1983.
24. "Battle of Ayr ...", op.cit.
25. Jim Sillars, Interview, June 1983.
26. Stephen Maxwell, Alex Salmond, Interviews, June 1983.
27. "Battle of Ayr ...", op.cit.
28. Cited in "Wilson calm after storm at Ayr", op.cit.
29. Interviews, May-June 1983.
30. Cited in "Wilson calm after storm at Ayr".

31. Interviews, May-June 1983. On Clayton's part in the row over Provisional Sinn Fein, see Chapter Fourteen, above.
32. Alan Clayton, "No Regrets", Scots Independent, no. 136, July 1982, p. 7.
33. ibid.
34. ibid.
35. "Wilson calm after storm at Ayr", op.cit.
36. "Virtually what I have done", Wilson told Keith Aitken of The Scotsman, "is to put groups like these into a freezer for a period of time. It doesn't have to be a sentence for the rest of time." ibid.
37. ibid.
38. ibid.
39. See, for example, the letter by Brian Nugent decrying the absence from the by-election campaign of many in the party who preferred to "sit at home, scoring points off the '79 Group", Scots Independent, no. 137, August 1982, p. 7.
40. "Move for 79 Group to declare independence", The Scotsman, Edinburgh, June 21, 1982, p. 1.
41. ibid.
42. Cited in ibid.
43. Cited in "Groups: 'Campaign' quits but Left dig in", Scots Independent, no. 136, July 1982, p. 1.

44. Private correspondence between former Campaign for Nationalism official and a member of the SNP Executive, late June, 1982.
45. This author was invited to speak to the Symposium, on the Saturday preceding the June 1983 general election, to give our "expert" impression of the conduct of the campaign and the SNP's prospects in the election. It must be admitted that our prognosis, based in part on interviews with SNP candidates and campaign workers, turned out to be somewhat optimistic, although it was more accurate than the forecasts then being issued by party officials!
46. Interviews with Stephen Maxwell and Alex Salmond, June 1983.
47. Cited in "No compromise on 79 Group ban", The Scotsman, Edinburgh, June 26, 1982, p. 1.
48. "79 Group to wage campaign against ban", The Scotsman, Edinburgh, June 28, 1982, p. 1.
49. Cited in "Groups: 'Campaign' quits but Left digs in", op.cit.
50. ibid.
51. Alex Salmond, Interview, June 1983.
52. Scottish National Party National Council Appeals Committee, Report on Organised Political Groups within the Party: Seven Appeals Against Expulsion, March 31, 1983, (mimeo), p. 1.
53. Stephen Maxwell and Alex Salmond, Interviews, June 1983.
54. Sunday Standard, Glasgow, August 29, 1982, p. 1.

55. Cited in "Warning over 79 Group 'ploy'", The Scotsman, Edinburgh, August 30, 1982, pp. 2.
56. "Status Quo", Scots Independent, no. 138, September 1982, p. 1.
57. Cited in "Warning over 79 Group 'ploy'", op.cit., p. 1.
58. Letter from Neil MacCallum, SNP National Secretary, to members of the 79 Group Socialist Society Interim Committee, August 31, 1982; personal papers of a former member of the Interim Committee.
59. Cited in "Remuster is out for 79 Group", The Scotsman, Edinburgh, September 1, 1982, p. 9.
60. Letter to The Scotsman, September 1, 1982.
61. Alex Salmond, Interview, June 1983.
62. See "SNP avoid decision on socialist society", The Scotsman, Edinburgh, September 6, 1982, p. 5; "SNP executive warned over 'picking off' Left", The Guardian, London, September 7, 1982, p. 5; "Left-wingers bridge the political divide", The Scotsman, Edinburgh, September 10, 1982, p. 10.
63. Cited in "Left at risk in SNP drive", The Guardian, London, September 6, 1982, p. 4.
64. Scottish National Party, Minutes of the Meeting of the National Executive Committee, SNP Headquarters, Edinburgh, 11 September, 1982 (mimeo).
65. Leaders of SnG refused to reply to the ultimatum, and were subsequently expelled from the party on September 20.
66. Cited in "Leading SNP members get ultimatum", The Scotsman, Edinburgh, September 13, 1982, p. 1.

67. Scottish National Party, National Council Appeals Committee, Report, pp. 2-3.
68. Cited in "Margo quits SNP over 'witch-hunt'", The Scotsman, Edinburgh, September 17, 1982, pp. 1-2.
69. ibid.
70. Cited in "SNP Left fail in appeal to Wilson", The Scotsman, Edinburgh, September 18, 1982, p. 1.
71. ibid., p. 2.
72. Chris Cunningham, Stephen Maxwell, Kenneth McAskill, Alex Salmond, Interviews, May-June 1983.
73. Alex Salmond, Interview, June 1983.
74. "SNP socialists are expelled", The Scotsman, Edinburgh, September 21, 1982, p. 9.
75. Jim Sillars, Interview, June 1983.
76. See, for example, Owen Dudley Edwards, "Socialism or Nationalism?" in Gavin Kennedy, ed., The Radical Approach: Papers on an independent Scotland (Edinburgh: Palingenesis Press, 1976), pp. 98-109.
77. Owen Dudley Edwards, "SNP indulge in justice of Culloden", The Scotsman, Edinburgh, September 27, 1982, p. 7.
78. ibid.
79. Alex Salmond, Interview, June 1983.
80. Jim Sillars, Interview, June 1983.

81. As the candidate himself later admitted; Peter Mallan, Interview, June 1983.
82. "SNP hopes for compromise with Left Wing are dashed", The Guardian, London, December 6, 1982, p. 2.
83. Interviews, May-June 1983 and "Wilson's 66 per cent rule", Sunday Standard, Glasgow, December 5, 1982, p. 5.
84. According to Appeals Committee member, Kenneth Fee, ten of the fifteen members of the Committee had been patrons or supporters of the Campaign; Interview, June 1983.
85. Draft Report of the Executive Vice Chairman for Policy to the SNP National Council, Glasgow, December 1982.
86. "SNP hopes for compromise ...", op.cit.
87. Cited in "Hard line by Wilson over SNP Left wing", The Scotsman, Edinburgh, December 6, 1982, p. 4.
88. The Scotsman newspaper, for example, reported that the position of Sillars and other socialists in the SNP "appears to have become untenable" after the National Council meeting. See "Hard line by Wilson over SNP Left Wing", op.cit.
89. "SNP disruption" (Editorial), The Scotsman, Edinburgh, December 6, 1982, p. 8.
90. Interviews, May-June, 1983.
91. David A. Forrest, "SNP group that deserves blame", The Scotsman, Edinburgh, December 9, 1982, p. 8. (Emphasis in original.)
92. Thirty four of the 82 respondents to the Radical Scotland Survey indicated that they were no longer members of the SNP in early 1983. However, based on their answers to other questions, we estimate that, for three of the 34, Exit from the party was not entirely voluntary - i.e.,

they were among the seven who were expelled in September 1982 and subsequently offered readmission to the SNP in May 1983.

93. Draft report of the Executive Vice Chairman for Organisation to the National Council, Glasgow, December 1982, and Interviews, May-June 1983.
94. Cited in "Reprieve on cards for SNP Left-wingers", The Scotsman, Edinburgh, December 10, 1982, p. 1.
95. "Sillars pleased by peace move", The Scotsman, Edinburgh, December 11, 1982, p. 5.
96. Cited in "Compromise could end SNP feud", The Scotsman, Edinburgh, December 13, 1982, p. 1.
97. Sillars, paraphrased in ibid.
98. National Council Appeals Committee, Report, pp. 3-4.
99. "'Star chamber' claim in SNP expulsion appeal", Glasgow Herald, March 4, 1983, p. 3.
100. ibid.
101. Kenneth Fee, Interview, June 1983.
102. "Scot Nats in New Row", Sunday Post, Glasgow, March 6, 1983, p. 2.
103. Jim Sillars, Interview, June 1983.
104. "SNP under more pressure for truce", Glasgow Herald, March 30, 1982, p. 5.
105. National Council Appeals Committee, Report, pp. 4-5.
106. Kenneth Fee, Interview, June 1983.

107. Interviews, May-June 1983.
108. NEC member Gordon Murray, Interview, June 1983.
109. Cited in "Banned SNP Left-wingers fail to have expulsions overturned", Glasgow Herald, April 14, 1983.
110. ibid.
111. Stephen Maxwell, Alex Salmond, Interviews, June 1983. The "acknowledgement of guilt" was a crucial element in the compromise formula demanded by the 'fundamentalists' on the NEC and the Appeals Committee (Kenneth Fee, Interview, June 1983).
112. Alex Salmond, Interview, June 1983.
113. Iain More, Jim Sillars, Interviews, May-June 1983.
114. Interviews, May-June 1983.
115. Private correspondence.
116. Gordon Murray, Interview, June 1983.
117. Apart from Allan Clayton and Kenneth Fee, the alleged "agents provocateurs" who had each in his own way contributed to the downfall of the '79 Group, McAskill was one of only four former Group members to secure an SNP nomination in the 1983 election. In contrast, four of the seven members of the Campaign Secretariat (including Fee) were candidates along with such leading 'fundamentalists' as Winifred Ewing, James Fairlie, Douglas Henderson, Iain Smith and Donald Stewart.
118. Kenneth McAskill, Interview, June 1983.
119. Iain More, Interview, May 1983.

120. Jim Sillars, Interview, June 1983.

121. Interviews, May-June 1983.

122. Kenneth Fee, Interview, June 1983.

PART FOUR

**Exit, Voice and Sub-Party Politics:
Conclusions and Future Directions**

Chapter Sixteen

EXIT, VOICE AND SUB-PARTY POLITICS CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The primary empirical focus of this study has been on the emergence and eventual outcome of intra-party conflict within the Scottish National Party in the period between 1979 and 1983. One purpose of this concluding chapter, therefore, is to summarize the findings of our research on the rise of the SNP 79 Group and the Campaign for Nationalism in Scotland and on the party's response to the polarization of sub-party conflict between these two organized groups.

As our theoretical point of departure, in the absence of a satisfactory explanatory framework in the existing literature on party factionalism which could account for both the occurrence and consequences of sub-party conflict, we developed a more general model of organizational behaviour based on concepts and propositions originally suggested by the American economist, Albert O. Hirschman. This "Exit/Voice" model, in which sub-party factions or "organized expressions of collective Voice" represent one response by dissatisfied members of a political party to a perceived deterioration in the quality of its product, served as an heuristic device to

structure our analysis of events in the SNP. We shall also use this concluding chapter to evaluate the usefulness of the Exit/Voice model as a guide to understanding the emergence and outcome of factional conflict in political parties and, perhaps, in other contexts.

In the first section of the Chapter, we re-establish the rationale for our analytical framework and restate the central features of the revised Exit/Voice model. In the second, we summarize the principal characteristics of the organization of the Scottish National Party and the evolution of its product. In the third and fourth sections, we review our findings with respect to the emergence and mobilization of organized collective Voice within the SNP and the central elements of our analysis of the party's response to Voice. Finally, we subject the Exit/Voice model to critical evaluation and propose some directions for future research on factionalism.

THE EXIT/VOICE MODEL REVISITED

Among theoretical constructs having common currency in social science literature, the one which appeared initially to be most useful for the analysis of events within the Scottish National Party was the concept of faction, together with its dynamic corollary, factionalism. However, our reviews of the literature in Chapters Two and Three revealed three major conceptual and theoretical problems confronting the researcher

who wishes to employ these terms in the study of intra-party conflict.

First, the terms "faction" and "factionalism" have been applied to a number of models of social and political association in three distinct historical and cultural contexts.¹ Moreover, both terms have frequently been associated in social scientific and everyday language with dysfunctional, conspiratorial and self-interested forms of behaviour. Hence, our analysis required a central concept which was both more specific in its application to the context of political parties and more neutral in connotation.

Rather than coining an entirely new term to describe factions within political parties (our primary concern in this study), we proposed in Chapter Two a threefold classification of faction types, in which "sub-party factions" were distinguished from the "pre-party factions" of historical usage and from "clientelist factions" found in the communal or village politics of traditional and developing societies.

A sub-party faction, defined as "an organized group within a political party which seeks to exercise control over party decision-making to promote the shared values or common interests of its members"² or, more simply, as "a party within a party"³, was thus differentiated not only from factions in other settings but also from other groupings of members or activists (tendencies, issue-groups, non-aligned partisans and mavericks) which may play roles in the internal politics of

party organizations.' Then, to refine our central concept further, we also proposed two principal types of sub-party faction, which are distinguished largely by the 'shared values or common interests' which they promote: "leadership sub-parties", which compete for leadership positions and access to patronage resources controlled by the party; and "policy sub-parties", which seek to promote a particular ideological or strategic orientation within the party.'

The second problem emerged from our review of the literature on factionalism in western political parties in Chapter Three which revealed that, although researchers have generated a multiplicity of variables and hypotheses to account for the emergence of intra-party conflict, much of this literature consists of case studies of factionalism within individual parties or a number of parties competing in the same national system. Consequently, explanations of the emergence of party-based factions are often contingent upon variables specific to a particular socio-cultural or political context and, as our review demonstrated, few propositions or findings have withstood the test of comparative application since generalizations supported in one national setting are often contradicted in another.'

Although our study, too, focuses on factions within a single political party, we aspired to develop a conceptual and explanatory framework which might be employed in the future as a basis for broader comparative analysis.

Therefore, in order to transcend the case study mode of analysis which had hitherto prevailed in the literature on sub-party factions, it was clear that we required a conceptual framework pitched at what Giovanni Sartori has called "a higher level of abstraction".⁷ In other words, we needed a framework in which many of the variables and hypotheses proposed by existing case studies of factionalism might be incorporated into the logic of a more general model of political or organizational behaviour.

The third problem encountered in our reviews of the literature was the apparent lack of any attempt to analyse systematically the alternative outcomes or results of factional conflict in political parties. The SNP had resorted to the suppression of internal factions and, subsequently, to the selective expulsion of faction leaders, but why had it chosen these responses and, indeed, what other alternatives were there? For a clearer understanding of events in the Scottish National Party, and of sub-party politics in general, we required a broad conceptual and explanatory framework which could be applied to the analysis of both the emergence of factions within political parties and the alternative outcomes of sub-party conflict.

In the end, the choice of analytical framework was guided largely by our conceptualization of sub-party factions. As we noted in the conclusion to Chapter Two, whether sub-parties exist to secure access for their members to leadership

positions and patronage resources or to seek control of a party's decision-making machinery in order to effect a change in its ideological and strategic orientation, a crucial defining characteristic of sub-party activity is that members have opted to organize collectively *within* the party rather than leaving it to pursue their goals and aspirations elsewhere. Consideration of this basic dichotomy between leaving and staying (or between "Exit" and "non-Exit") led us initially to investigate the potential of Hirschman's "Exit/Voice" model as a point of departure from which to develop a framework for the analysis of sub-party factionalism.

The Revised Exit/Voice Model

In his 1970 monograph, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*¹, Albert O. Hirschman attempted to generalize from his observations of the responses of customers of a firm to a decline in the quality of its product in order to develop a broader model of behaviour which could be applied to a wide diversity of organizational contexts. In the years immediately following its publication, the book was widely heralded as an innovative contribution to the re-emerging field of political economy and stimulated a number of debates, criticisms and applications.²

More recently, Hirschman's model has been sadly neglected. Nevertheless, we judged it to be particularly well-suited as a conceptual and theoretical point of departure for this study. In Chapter Four, therefore, we proposed a

revised Exit/Voice model of organizational behaviour, based on concepts and generalizations originally posited by Hirschman, but incorporating a number of modifications suggested by criticisms of his model which had been discussed earlier in the same chapter.¹⁰

Our revised model consists of four main steps leading up to a particular response to a perceived decline in organizational performance (see Figure 4.3). First, the model started from the assumption that an absolute or relative decline in quality has occurred in the product of a firm or organization. Second, it was assumed also that some customers or members, who perceive this decline, will experience dissatisfaction with the deterioration in quality and will search for ways to alleviate their discontent.¹¹ Third, however, it was argued that customers/members will be unlikely to take any action which incurs personal costs unless they believe in the possibility of some improvement in organizational performance or in the quality of the product which they consume.¹² Fourth, those who believe that such an improvement is possible will investigate the availability and the prospective costs and benefits associated with the options of Exit and Voice as mechanisms for restoring the quality of the product.

In contrast to Hirschman, who posited Exit and Voice as dichotomous options, we suggested that this fourth stage, the Exit/Voice calculus, will result in customers/members

selecting one of four alternative responses: silent voice (Exit - Voice), noisy Exit (Exit + Voice), non-Exiting Voice (Voice - Exit) or silent non-Exit (see Figures 4.3 and 4.4).

Our model also departs from Hirschman's original formulation in that we downgrade the status conferred upon the concept of "Loyalty". Hirschman viewed Loyalty as a crucially important independent variable, so much so that it receives equal billing with "Exit" and "Voice" in the title of his book. We suggest however, following arguments outlined in Chapter Four, that there is much less for Loyalty to "explain" than Hirschman believed, although it may play a "mediating" role in the Exit/Voice calculus, acting as a kind of lens which filters or distorts perceptions of the costs and benefits associated with Exit and Voice.¹³

Finally, while Hirschman originally assumed that Exit is always relatively cost-free in comparison to Voice, we suggested that the costs of resorting to Voice may be greatly reduced, and the probability of influencing the firm/organization or its managers/leaders increased, when Voice is expressed by customers/members acting collectively, and especially where such collective expression is organized in some way.

Exit, Voice and Sub-Party Politics

Hirschman's original model was based on the options available to customers of a firm in a competitive marketplace

in response to a decline in the quality of the firm's product. But what is the "product" of a political party and who are its "customers"? We suggested in Chapter Four that both the product and the clientele of a party will vary according to the market in question.

First, in the wider electoral marketplace, a party organization attempts to sell its policies to the voters who buy the product using their ballots as a medium of exchange. Therefore, if voters perceive a decline in the quality of the ("electoral") product of a particular party, they may, for example, Exit from its clientele by ceasing to vote for it or they may express their dissatisfaction to party leaders or campaign workers while continuing to support it at the polls (non-Exiting Voice).

Second, and more importantly in the context of this study, parties also compete in the smaller marketplace of politically involved citizens (potential members and activists) where the party ("membership") product is defined as "its capacity to realize the individual or collective goals and aspirations of its members". Whether party members and activists seek ideological or policy goals, aspire to leadership positions or access to patronage resources, or join a party for solidaristic or social reasons, they will purchase the party product (using their money, time or voluntary activity as a medium of exchange) as long as the party has the potential to realize those objectives. However, if the

party's product is perceived to deteriorate, in that it appears less useful to members as a vehicle for goal attainment, then members and activists may resort to the various forms of Exit and/or Voice in an attempt to improve organizational performance or to restore the quality of the product which they consume.

It was this second conceptualization of the party product (i.e., the "membership product") that served as the nexus between the Exit/Voice model and sub-party factionalism. We noted earlier in this section that a defining characteristic of sub-party activity was that members of a party sought to realize objectives (with respect to policy, ideology, leadership aspirations or access to patronage resources) by acting collectively within the party organization rather than pursuing these goals or aspirations elsewhere. Restating this central property in terms of the Exit/Voice model, we redefined a sub-party faction as the organized and collective expression of (non-Exiting) Voice by dissatisfied members of a party who perceive a decline in organizational performance and who, rather than Exit from the party, seek control of the policy-making machinery of the organization in order to improve the quality of the party's membership product. In simple terms, therefore, both the SNP 79 Group and the Campaign for Nationalism in Scotland were "expressions of organized collective Voice" within the Scottish National Party.

The Mobilization of Collective Voice

Once sub-party factions were reconceptualized as a particular response to a deterioration in organizational performance, their emergence could be analysed using the stages of our revised Exit/Voice model. This model suggested that the prerequisites for organized collective Voice were, first, a sense of dissatisfaction among some members of a party with a perceived decline in the quality of the party product; second, a belief in the possibility of improving organizational performance; and, third, a calculation that organized collective Voice would be the most efficient and effective method to bring about that improvement.

In discussing the causes of dissatisfaction, three key points should be emphasized. First, perception is all-important, because decline may be viewed in relative, as well as absolute, terms. Thus members of a party may be dissatisfied by an absolute downturn in its electoral fortunes, since the loss of electoral support and seats in representative bodies frequently reduces the party's capacity to act as a vehicle for individual or collective goal attainment.¹⁴ However, even if the party is holding its own at the polls, members may become dissatisfied if they observe that its performance has declined relative to that of a close rival which has improved its standing.

Second, analysis of the causes of dissatisfaction focuses attention not only on the nature of the perceived decline in

organizational performance, but also on the particular groups of members or activists who feel that there has been a deterioration in the quality of the product which they consume. Hence, while some changes in the intra-or extra-party environment, such as a serious electoral defeat, may be perceived as a decline in organizational performance for most (if not all) members, others may have differential effects on various groups of members. For example, a marked shift in the party's ideological position to "the right" may be perceived as a deterioration for left-wing members but welcomed as an improvement in the quality of the product for those on the right wing of the party.

Third, where the dissatisfaction of a large number of party members leads them to pursue collective Voice, it is unlikely that the origin of a sub-party faction will be attributable to any single source of dissatisfaction. Rather, the members of a sub-party are more likely to be united by their common search for a particular solution, or way of improving the quality of the party product, than by a single shared cause for discontent.

Whatever the source of dissatisfaction, and we discussed a number of potential variables and hypotheses in Chapter Four¹⁵, we maintained that it would be unlikely to lead to any form of response which imposed costs on the individual unless the member believed that the quality of the membership product could be improved or restored. This belief in the possibility

of improvement is especially important in the case of resort to Voice, because dissatisfied members choosing to use Voice in a constructive manner, either individually or collectively, must be capable of diagnosing the reasons for decline of the party product and offering a strategy for its improvement if they hope to influence or control the decision-making organs of the party. Thus, for policy sub-parties in particular, an essential prerequisite for the successful mobilization of organized collective Voice is the development of a coherent ideological or strategic program for the improvement of the party product.

Ultimately, however, a decision by dissatisfied members of a party to resort to organized collective Voice will depend upon the various influences and perceptions which come into play in the Exit/Voice calculus. Hence the choice of a response to decline will be shaped, first, by the perceived availability of Exit and Voice and, second, by the estimated costs and benefits associated with each option.

We suggested in Chapter Four that members may Exit voluntarily from a party in three ways: first, by schism or collective Exit from the party in order to establish a new organization; second, by defection or individual Exit from one party to join another; and, third, by resignation or leaving the membership market altogether. In addition, in Chapter Eleven, it was argued that party activists may also Exit by dropping-out, that is, by no longer playing an active

role in the organization while maintaining membership of the party. In competitive party systems, all four forms of Exit are always theoretically available. In practice, however, opportunities for Exit by defection or by schism may be constrained by such factors as the structure of party competition and the electoral system, while many party activists may be psychologically incapable of removing themselves from active politics through resignation or dropping-out.¹⁶

Like Exit, Voice is always theoretically available in the context of western political parties, but practical opportunities for the expression of Voice and the costs associated with it will vary according to such factors as the organizational structure of the party, its internal procedures (a longstanding commitment to intra-party democracy, for example, may increase the probability that Voice will be heard) and the type of authority and control wielded by party leaders.¹⁷ Hence, the decision to resort to Voice will be preceded by a process of weighing the projected costs and benefits of Voice against each other and against the perceived availability, costs and benefits of the various Exit options. And, for a sub-party faction to emerge, a group of dissatisfied party members must further decide that the costs of Voice may be reduced, and the prospective benefits (the probability of improving the product) increased, if Voice is

expressed collectively by an organized group rather than by individuals acting alone.

In some respects, the whole process may sound rather mechanical or economistic; but, as we reported in Chapters Ten through Fourteen, the way in which members of both the SNP 79 Group and the Campaign for Nationalism described their respective decisions to mobilize collectively suggests that they followed (explicitly or implicitly) many of the steps outlined in our Exit/Voice model of sub-party emergence.

The Outcome of Collective Voice

Finally in Chapter Four, we turned our attention to an extension of the revised Exit/Voice model to encompass the outcomes of sub-party activity. Drawing in part upon Janet Bujra's anthropological study of the resolution of factional conflict," we proposed five alternative outcomes to the expression of organized collective Voice in political parties.

Two of these posited outcomes - collective Exit or schism and the voluntary cessation of organized collective Voice - constitute responses by the sub-parties themselves." The other three represent responses to Voice by the party leaders, managers or the organization as a whole. These are the institutionalization of Voice, the suppression of Voice and forced Exit or expulsion.²⁰ Our primary concern in this study has been with the conditions associated with the last two

outcomes which constituted the responses to sub-party conflict selected by the SNP in 1982.

First, party leaders may resort to the suppression of organized Voice by banning sub-party activity. This, we hypothesized, was most likely to occur where barriers to Exit were moderately high and where, in the leaders' opinion, the continued expression of Voice by a minority of members threatens either to hinder the process of organizational recovery or to lead to further deterioration in the quality of the party product for other members and/or voters.

Second, party leaders may also resort to the expulsion or forced Exit of dissident members expressing Voice. We suggested that this response was most likely to occur where the barriers or costs of Exit were high (thus increasing the severity of the sanction of forced Exit), where dissident members had refused to obey measures to suppress Voice and, in particular, where the expulsion of a minority sub-party is the price paid for the continued support of a larger group of activists, of influential blocs of voters, or of those who help to finance the party organization.

In our conclusions on the outcome of collective Voice later in this chapter, we shall attempt to ascertain whether these conditions were present in the Scottish National Party in 1982 and to explain further why the SNP responded as it did to the mobilization of organized collective Voice.

Overview

Part One of the thesis was devoted to the development of a conceptual and explanatory framework for the analysis of sub-party factionalism in general and of events in the Scottish National Party in particular. Having reviewed the existing literature on factionalism in political parties and in other contexts (and found it wanting), we proposed the revised Exit/Voice model as an appropriate tool for analysis. In Part Three of the study, we applied this model to the case of the SNP and tested our hypotheses relating to both the emergence and outcome of sub-party activity or the expression of organized collective Voice. But, since our model assumes that Voice is a response to a perceived decline in organizational performance or in the quality of the party product, we first turned our attention in Part Two to an examination of the nature and evolution of the organization prior to the emergence of sub-party conflict.

THE ORGANIZATION AND ITS PRODUCT

In establishing the rationale for the empirical focus of this study in Chapter One we noted that, although a veritable scholarly industry grew up around the analysis of Scottish Nationalism in the 1970s, very little research was published on the internal political life of the Scottish National Party. Consequently, Part Two of the thesis not only provided an historical and organizational context for our analysis of the

emergence of sub-party factionalism within the SNP after 1979, but also serves to fill some of the gaps in the existing literature with respect to the ideology and policies of the party, its organization and the composition of its activist component.

In this section, therefore, we highlight some of the conclusions and observations from Part Two which contributed either to our explanation of the emergence and outcome of collective Voice or to a more general understanding of the nature of the Scottish National Party.

Lessons from History

Three central themes emerged from our discussion of the historical evolution of the SNP in Chapters Five and Six. The first was that factional infighting and the use of expulsion as a weapon to quell dissent are not new to the SNP. Indeed, with the possible exception of Robert McIntyre's by-election victory at Motherwell in 1945, the first three decades in the life of the National Party were noteworthy more for a succession of mergers, schisms, expulsions and intra-party conflicts than for its electoral exploits.

In part, this extended process of resolving divisive internal issues may be attributable to the growing pains undergone by any new organization. But it may also have its roots in a more pervasive cultural phenomenon. Both political and religious life in Scotland have been marked by frequent

outbreaks of sectarianism and schism. Hence, an editorial in The Scotsman newspaper commented at the time of the SNP National Council meeting in December 1982, "In politics, as in religion, a schismatic tendency has been the curse of Scotland."²¹ And the noted Scottish raconteur and wit, Oliver Brown, may have been referring to this general cultural trait as much as to his own experience in the Nationalist movement when he coined the aphorism, "I bitterly regret the day when I compromised the unity of my party by admitting a second member."²²

By the late 1950s, however, it appeared that the SNP had purged itself of most of its divisive elements. From that point on, despite minor incidents such as the proscription of the 1320 Club and the expulsion of individual members for conduct inimicable to the party, the SNP appeared capable of containing a variety of political viewpoints and, until 1979, was much more newsworthy for its electoral fortunes than for any internal squabbling. Nevertheless, based on its historical experience and notwithstanding its formal commitment to intra-party democracy, we might suggest that the "organizational culture" of the SNP displays a low degree of tolerance for internal dissent and, moreover, has tended to legitimize the use of proscription and expulsion to suppress unwelcome Voice.

Second, our discussion of the evolution of the SNP and of its ideology laid strong emphasis on the importance

attached to organization, rather than individual leadership, in the Scottish National movement. In the 1930s, for example, the guiding hand of John MacCormick and the presence of a number of notables inherited from the merger with the Scottish Party could not disguise an underlying organizational weakness which was reflected in the SNP's lack of electoral impact. After the party rebelled against "King" John's personal faction, prompting the schism of 1942, MacCormick's lack of grass-roots organizing skills was revealed again in the ultimate failure of the Scottish Convention/Covenant Association. Moreover, the experience of the MacCormick era, combined with an egalitarian strand which suffuses both SNP ideology and wider Scottish culture, appears to have left the SNP with a lasting distrust of charismatic or otherwise strong leadership.

The rump of the SNP that was left after the departure of MacCormick and his followers was run like a "modest family business" until the early 1960s." While it may be true that the mere survival of the party in this period was a success of sorts, the small family firm made little headway at the polls. Hence, it was not until Ian MacDonald's organizing skills and an aggressive "marketing strategy" transformed the party in the 1960s that it was able to "sell" its product to a larger proportion of the electorate. We argued in Chapter Six that the modernization of the party organization and the effective use of symbols and slogans to advertise its product

were necessary prerequisites for the electoral advances of the late 1960s and early 1970s. In contrast, the loss of organizational vitality and a certain sense of complacency in marketing the product in the late 1970s, especially in the context of the organizational recovery of the SNP's major competition", may well have contributed to its electoral decline in 1979.

Third, however, the modern electoral history of the SNP, discussed in Chapter Six, demonstrated that demand for the "electoral product" of the party has been highly volatile, in part because voters have often supported the SNP to express their dissatisfaction with the products of other parties. Thus, according to the "protest vote" explanation of the Nationalists' first rise and fall in the late 1960s, SNP support in by-elections and municipal elections appears to have been swelled by disgruntled Labour voters who Exited temporarily to the SNP to express their dissatisfaction with the performance of their party in government." And in the 1974 elections, William Miller et.al. have suggested that SNP support was lowest among those Scottish voters with a strong party identification (in our terms, perhaps, "Loyalty") for either the Conservatives or Labour, while the highest levels of Nationalist support came from those who displayed a low level of trust in both Conservative and Labour governments, i.e., from voters who supported the SNP to express

dissatisfaction with the performance of both major parties in office.²⁶

As a result, it may be the case that Nationalist electoral fortunes are determined less by the performance of the SNP itself than by the organizational performance, and voters' perceptions of the electoral products, of other parties. For example, following Labour's conversion to the idea of devolution, for many Scottish voters in 1979 there may have been little to choose between a large, social democratic, pro-Assembly Labour Party and a smaller, social democratic, pro-Assembly(?) Nationalist Party, except that the size of the Labour Party made it a more effective vehicle for individual and collective goal attainment.²⁷

From this perspective, the decline in the quality of the SNP's electoral product was a relative one when compared to the recently improved product of the Labour Party in Scotland. Nevertheless, as we shall argue further below, the electoral decline of the SNP caused by that relative deterioration in its voter-oriented product represented an absolute deterioration in the quality of the membership product for many SNP members and activists.

SNP Ideology and Policy

The analysis of SNP ideology in Chapter Seven focused upon the formal ideology of the party organization as revealed by its election manifestos, policy documents and other

official publications. (The beliefs and attitudes of individual activists were examined separately in later chapters of the thesis.") Our primary concern in this analysis was to identify possible changes in the party's ideological position which might have contributed, directly or indirectly, to the mobilization of collective Voice. In this respect, three observations are particularly worthy of note.

First, while for much of its history the SNP was effectively a single-issue party, campaigning almost exclusively on the self-government issue, it began to formulate a more comprehensive policy platform in response to organizational and electoral developments in the 1960s. Especially after the discovery of North Sea oil in 1970, with the attendant promise of abundant revenues for an independent Scottish government, the SNP adopted a moderately social democratic policy position, which reflected in part the egalitarian myth enshrined in SNP ideology, but was also designed to appeal to a broad spectrum of the Scottish electorate, i.e., to the industrial working class as well as to voters in its traditional strongholds in the rural areas.

Second, however, the growing complexity of SNP ideology was accompanied by a certain loss of radicalism." The SNP increasingly began to sound like other parties, blaming Scotland's problems on mismanagement by London-based governments rather than the simple fact that Scotland was (but

should not be) governed from London. Moreover, the adoption of a social democratic image made it more difficult for the SNP to distance itself from the traditional class-based, left vs. right discourse of electoral competition in Britain. And the degree of state intervention envisaged in its election manifestos and policy documents appeared to run counter to its commitment to a radical decentralization of political and economic power in an independent Scotland.

Third, perhaps the most significant indicator of this loss of radicalism was the SNP's apparent willingness to support the Labour government's devolution proposals. After the departure of MacCormick and the other "home-rulers" in the 1940s, the SNP position on the constitutional issue had consistently been that which is now referred to as "Independence - Nothing Less". In the late 1970s, however, the party flip-flopped on its attitude to devolution, at one point embracing simultaneously a hard-line independentist position and a commitment to campaign in favour of the Labour government's proposed Scottish Assembly."

These changes and ambiguities in SNP ideology and policy, we suggest, helped to create a climate conducive to the emergence of organized collective Voice after 1979. For many long-time members of the SNP who equated the party with an exclusively independentist position, the adoption of a specific ideological image ("moderate social democracy") and the flirtation with devolution, even as a stepping-stone to

independence, represented an absolute decline in the quality of the party product. Hence, dissatisfied 'fundamentalists' refused to campaign for the Assembly and subsequently mobilized at the 1979 Annual Conference to reconfirm "Independence - Nothing Less" as the SNP's exclusive constitutional aim. But their victory at Dundee merely fuelled the discontent of many younger and left-wing activists who had worked hard in the referendum campaign.

Moreover, as we suggested earlier in this section, the temporary moderation of its stand on the constitutional question and its formal commitment to a social democratic policy platform may have made it more difficult for the SNP to differentiate its product from that of the Labour Party in the 1979 election. Although that election demonstrated that there was still a "Scottish dimension" to British electoral politics, it was to the Labour Party and not the SNP that a majority of Scottish voters turned to defend them from the policies of the 'English' Conservative Party. Hence, to the extent that electoral decline was one source of dissatisfaction with the party's membership product among SNP activists after 1979 (an assumption which will be discussed further below), changes in party ideology and policy may have contributed indirectly to the expression of collective Voice.

Finally, the ambiguity of the SNP's stand on devolution and other issues (such as state intervention vs. decentralization) in the 1970s may in part account for the

greater ideological heterogeneity of new members joining the party at this time (see Chapter Nine and "SNP Activists", below) and, further, may have served to legitimize debate, especially on the constitutional question, among contending points of view within the party after 1979.

SNP Organization

Our findings on the organizational structure of the Scottish National Party may be summarized very briefly. The formal structure of the SNP is very similar to that of other branch-based mass membership parties. But the SNP appears to have resisted the imperatives associated with Michels' Iron Law of Oligarchy, in that the distribution of power inside the party is highly decentralized.

Hence, financial control rests largely in the branches, with the effect that the party headquarters is small and permanently underfunded. Control over candidate selection and electioneering has also been decentralized in the past although, since 1979, some attempts have been made to increase central supervision especially over the choice of parliamentary and local government candidates. And leadership roles within the party are widely diffused. In particular, as we demonstrated in Chapter Eight, the experience of the 1970s highlighted the SNP's failure to resolve the question of whether the National Executive Committee (representing the extra-parliamentary organization) or the parliamentary group

of MPs was to be ultimately responsible for determining the party's overall direction and strategy.

This decentralized or "stratarchic" form of organization," combined with the SNP's commitment to intra-party democracy, facilitates the individual expression of Voice by members seeking to influence party policy or strategy in order to improve the quality of the membership product. However, we also suggested at various points in our analysis that it is conducive to the mobilization of collective Voice as well, since the extent of financial decentralization in particular allows ready access to organizational resources for any group which can control a handful of branches.

Moreover, we suggested in Chapter Eight that parochial attitudes, engendered or legitimized by this decentralized structure, displayed by many local activists seriously impair the SNP's ability to campaign effectively on a national basis." Hence, the 1979 campaign was marked by a lack of co-operation among certain branches and constituency associations, by local resistance to attempts by party headquarters to co-ordinate efforts and to redistribute campaign resources, and by individual candidates and constituency parties who tailored their "product" to suit local conditions even if, in some cases, this meant directly contradicting stated party policy. Again, to the extent that the 1979 election result was one source of dissatisfaction which led, directly or indirectly, to the expression of Voice,

organizational decentralization may be cited among the factors contributing to the emergence of sub-party conflict.

Finally, the diffusion of leadership roles may also be conducive to the emergence of factionalism. Failure to resolve the power struggle between the largely 'fundamentalist' parliamentary group and the left-leaning National Executive Committee" meant that, in 1979, members adopting either ideological/strategic position could legitimately claim to be following party policy. And, given the SNP's traditional distrust of charismatic or authoritarian leadership, there was no one individual who could either dictate a party line to be followed by all members or, until it was almost too late, make a personal appeal for loyalty to the leader in the interests of party unity.

SNP Activists

Our analysis of the socio-economic backgrounds, political experience, and attitudes and beliefs of SNP activists in Chapter Nine served two purposes. First, it enabled us to fill a major gap in the literature on the SNP, since very few studies have been published on the activist component of the party and none of them has been based on a sample as large or as wide-ranging as that constituted by the respondents to the SNP Activists Survey." Second, as in other chapters in Part Two, we were interested in investigating whether the composition of the activist component of the SNP had changed

over time, and particularly in the years immediately preceding the mobilization of sub-party conflict.

A number of interesting findings emerged from this analysis, particularly with regard to the attitudes and beliefs of SNP activists. First, while the SNP has tended to play down class divisions and class imagery in its policies and formal ideology, we found that a sizeable proportion of individual activists were "class conscious" in the sense that they usually thought of themselves as belonging to a particular social class." In a second departure from the official position of the party, we also found that, while the SNP has always been firmly committed to the pursuit of independence through peaceful parliamentary means, many of its activists would remain loyal to the party even if it became associated with the use of political violence." Third, in contrast, there is a strong congruence between the more general ideological positions of the party and its activists. The image of the SNP as a slightly left-of-centre, moderately social democratic party, as revealed by our analysis in Chapter Seven, was confirmed by most respondents who generally placed their party in such a position on the left-right axis. Moreover, both the "subjective" and "objective" measures of individual ideological placement situated a majority of activists in roughly the same position."

However, there were some variations among the modal patterns of response from activists at different levels within

the party organization. In particular, the group of SNP Councillors (elected representatives on regional and district local government authorities) diverged markedly from other activists on a number of dimensions. As a group they tended to be older, less well educated and less likely to be professionally employed than other activists. More importantly, perhaps, they were also significantly less "left-wing" than either their party or any other group of activists." Although the number of former Nationalist MPs who responded to our survey (6 out of 13) was too small to draw any similar significant conclusions about them, comments by one senior party activist (cited above, p. 368) suggested that "the political spectrum of the [1974-79] parliamentary party was to the right of that of the NEC, the party as a whole and of the people who voted for them." When the fact that the mean position of SNP parliamentary candidates was also to "the right" of other activists on the "objective" ideological measure is added to these earlier observations, it is tempting to speculate whether the moderately left-of-centre image which the SNP sought to portray in the 1970s was not obscured or negated by the kind of candidates selected by the party and, in particular, by the kind of representatives it elected to public office."

However, the most important conclusion to emerge from our analysis in Chapter Nine was that the activist component of the SNP appeared to have become less homogeneous over time,

whether comparisons were made between our sample and the results of earlier studies or between different cohorts or membership-generations within our own group of respondents. Some of the differences between our findings and those of previous studies may be attributable to the respective scope of the surveys. While our sample included activists from all levels within the SNP organization (branch, constituency, district/regional and national levels), earlier researchers had tended to focus on a particular level of activity (usually either constituency or national). But, given the results of our inter-cohort analysis, it is also apparent that the modal characteristics of SNP activists had altered in the 1970s.

These changes were particularly marked in the attitudes of SNP activists toward class, their positions on the left-right ideological spectrum, and their motivations for joining the party. Hence, respondents who had joined the SNP during or after the electoral advances of 1974 were, on average, both more class conscious and more likely to identify themselves with the working class, significantly more left-wing (on both "subjective" and "objective" measures of ideological placement) and more likely to cite "instrumental" rather than "affective" reasons for party membership than those who had joined before 1974.

After 1974, therefore, a new generation of activists was attracted into the SNP, in part by the increased credibility of the party as a vehicle for individual and collective goal

attainment following its electoral successes. These new activists tended to differ from members of longer standing in a number of important respects and their entry into the SNP made its activist core more diverse, a condition that has often been associated with the emergence of sub-party conflict in other political parties.⁴⁰ In particular, their modal attitudes and beliefs made them a natural constituency for the mobilization of a left-wing faction within the party. Consequently, following the setbacks of the referendum campaign and the 1979 general election, the stage was set for the emergence of sub-party conflict over the ideological and strategic orientation of the party which was also in part a conflict between different generations of SNP activists.

THE EMERGENCE OF SUB-PARTY VOICE

In Chapters Ten through Fourteen of this study, we described and analysed the process whereby collective Voice was organized and mobilized within the Scottish National Party, first by the SNP 79 Group and, second, by the Campaign for Nationalism in Scotland. In this section of the conclusion we summarize our findings on the mobilization of Voice by comparing the two sub-parties directly, rather than following the essentially chronological ordering of events that was the basis for our discussion in the earlier chapters, since a direct comparison serves to highlight the dimensions of conflict between the two groups of activists.

Again, following the logic of the Exit/Voice model, we summarize our findings with respect to the sources of dissatisfaction experienced by members of the two sub-parties, the strategies they proposed for improving the party product, and their respective perceptions of the availability, costs and benefits of Exit and Voice in the Exit/Voice calculus.

Sources of Dissatisfaction

Our analysis of the sources of dissatisfaction which prompted members of the SNP to investigate ways to improve the quality of their party's product suggests that the obvious reasons are not always the right ones. It would be only too simple to attribute the emergence of sub-party conflict within the Scottish National Party after 1979 to its disastrous defeat in the May general election. Indeed, nearly sixty per cent of respondents to our SNP Activists Survey indicated that they were dissatisfied with their party's performance in the election," and there was certainly a marked reduction in party membership in the following year, although this merely continued a trend that had begun well before the election.

But for most activists in our survey, dissatisfaction with the election result alone was not sufficient to move them to resort to organized collective Voice. Moreover, the timing of the emergence of sub-party factions was all wrong. The Interim Committee for Political Discussion, precursor to the '79 Group, had already begun to meet informally two months

before the election, while the Campaign for Nationalism did not organize itself on a formal basis until nearly three years later.

We would argue, instead, that dissatisfaction with the party membership product for members of both factions was based on the accumulation of contributory sources, although in both cases the principal cause was a change in the ideological and strategic orientation of the party.

Thus, members of the '79 Group expressed discontent, in interviews and/or survey responses, with the performance of the Nationalist MPs in the 1974-79 Parliament, with the party's performance in the devolution referendum campaign and with the result of the 1979 election; but, in all cases, their views were not significantly different from those of many other activists." What really set '79 Group members apart from other respondents in our analysis in Chapter Ten was their ideological stance, in that they were significantly more left-wing than other activists and generally perceived themselves to be "more left" than their party.

In the mid-1970s, Nationalists who were also socialists could feel "at home" within the moderately social democratic SNP." But, as the decade progressed, many left-wing Nationalists became increasingly disillusioned by the party's abandonment of social democracy and by its gradual drift to what they saw as "right-wing fundamentalism". They were disappointed by the activities of the Nationalist MPs, by the

apparently cynical behaviour of many leading figures in the party during the devolution referendum campaign, and by the return to the traditional constitutional position of "Independence - Nothing Less". Hence, as the party appeared to swing back towards a 'fundamentalist' or 'traditionalist' position, many left-wing Nationalists perceived an absolute decline in the quality of the party product, even before the 1979 general election.

For the 'fundamentalist' wing of the party, on the other hand, and especially for the founding members of the Campaign for Nationalism, the very success of '79 Group in alleviating its members' discontent through the effective use of organized collective Voice represented a decline in the quality of their own membership product. Especially after the 1981 Aberdeen Conference, when the '79 Group appeared on the verge of taking control of the party, the dissatisfaction of 'fundamentalist' activists intensified since they strongly opposed the new ideological and strategic orientation of the SNP.

As we demonstrated in Chapter Thirteen, 'fundamentalist' activists were, on average, significantly less "left-wing" than other activists and most also perceived themselves to be to "the right" of their party." Moreover, they generally favoured the constitutional position of "Independence - Nothing Less", while they perceived the '79 Group to be "soft" on the independence issue, and they were also opposed to any attempt to involve the SNP in the class-based, left vs. right,

discourse of "English" party politics which they considered alien to Scotland. Hence the roots of 'fundamentalist' dissatisfaction can be traced back to the early and mid-1970s when, as we noted earlier, the growing complexity of SNP ideology and, particularly, the adoption of a moderately social democratic image, was associated with a certain loss of radicalism, especially on the independence issue.

Therefore, the sources of dissatisfaction which eventually gave rise to the mobilization of organized collective Voice within the Scottish National Party cannot be attributed to any single cause or event. Undoubtedly the outcome of the devolution referendum and the decline of the SNP in the 1979 election led to dissatisfaction among party activists, but this was by no means restricted to those members who resorted to sub-party activity (although for many former members it may have resulted in Exit of one form or another). Rather, the principal source of discontent for members of both the ICPD/'79 Group and the Campaign for Nationalism was a change in the internal power structure, policy and direction of the party, although for both groups this was compounded by the effects of electoral decline and, as we suggested in Chapter Fourteen, by personal antipathies, inter-regional rivalry and inter-generational conflicts."

Strategies for Improvement

Many of the former members of the SNP who left the party in the late 1970s and early 1980s may have resorted to the Exit option because they foresaw no possibility of improvement either in the party's electoral product or in the product of SNP membership. In contrast, those who resorted to organized collective Voice within the party did so in order to promote particular strategies for recovery. However, the ideological differences between members of the '79 Group and the 'fundamentalist' activists who later joined or supported the Campaign for Nationalism led them to very different diagnoses of the decline of the SNP and to contradictory prescriptions for improvement.

For the 'fundamentalists', the explanation of the SNP's defeat in 1979 was simple; in the 1970s the party had deserted its traditional or 'fundamental' position as a primary (if not single) issue party. It had been drawn into the British electoral game by campaigning on a broad policy platform, it had flirted with social democracy and devolution: hence, the electorate no longer knew what the SNP stood for, especially since it received scant, and usually distorted, coverage from the English-controlled news media."

The 'fundamentalist' prescription for improving the party's electoral product, and thereby also the quality of the membership product, was equally simple; the SNP must return to 'fundamentals', to its traditional platform which

had been successful in the past. Hence, the party should have no more to do with devolution proposals, reverting instead to a constitutional demand for "Independence - Nothing Less."⁴⁷ Even the moderately social democratic platform of 1974 should be jettisoned and the SNP should return to its traditional role as a broad umbrella party, with middle-of-the-road economic and social policies designed to appeal to people of all classes and all political persuasions." In short, the SNP should appeal to all Scots who desired independence for their country.

For the left-wing Nationalists who founded or later joined the ICPD/'79 Group, diagnosis of the electoral decline of the SNP was also fairly straightforward. According to their analysis, the SNP had benefitted in 1974 from a large number of working class votes and the working class had also showed strong support for the Assembly in the devolution referendum. But working class voters, the natural constituency for a Nationalist party, had been alienated from the SNP by the betrayal of their interests by the Nationalist MPs, by the party's drift to the right, and by its inability to make itself relevant in the ideologically and class polarized election of 1979. Thus, the decline of the SNP was in large measure due to its failure to hold on to its working class supporters who had turned to the Labour Party to defend them against Thatcherism."

The 'left' strategy for improving the quality of the SNP product (both for a majority of voters and for left-wing members) was for the party to adopt an explicitly left-wing platform designed to appeal to working class voters and those who had traditionally supported the Labour Party.⁵⁰ Hence the SNP was to become a socialist party, competing directly with the Labour Party and eventually supplanting it as the party of the working class and all other underprivileged groups in Scotland.

This strategy was based in part on the ideological predisposition of its advocates, left-wing activists who would feel "more at home" in a socialist SNP. It was also based on an analysis of British electoral politics which suggested that Labour, beset by its own internal factional struggles and seemingly impotent to defend Scots interests against a majority Conservative government, would be vulnerable to such a challenge. And it was further predicated on the assumption that, in contrast to the 'fundamentalist' view, there was only a very weak basis for political nationalism in Scotland. Therefore, independence had to be made more relevant to the aspirations of a majority of the Scottish people by linking it to the promise of a concrete improvement in their material and social conditions: and, for the ICPD/'79 Group, that required socialism.⁵¹

Both sets of activists who would resort, sooner or later, to organized collective Voice therefore believed that some

improvement was possible in the performance of the SNP and had developed long-term strategies to restore the quality of the party's electoral product which would also improve their respective perceptions of the membership product. However, as the influence of the '79 Group increased within the party, leading to a renewed decline in the quality of the membership product for many of its opponents, 'fundamentalist' activists devised a strategy for more immediate improvement. Hence, their decision to express organized collective Voice in the Campaign for Nationalism was based, in part, on the belief that the quality of the party product to which they subscribed could be greatly improved in the short term by ridding the SNP of its organized left wing.

Exit vs. Voice: The Exit/Voice Calculus

Even for those dissatisfied members of a political party who can conceive of the possibility of some improvement in the quality of the party membership product, our model suggests that the decision to resort to Voice, and especially to organized collective Voice, will not be taken until some consideration has been given to the availability, and the associated costs and benefits, of both the Exit and Voice options. Hence, in Chapters Eleven and Fourteen, respectively, we examined the Exit/Voice calculus for members of the ICPD/'79 Group and the Campaign for Nationalism in Scotland.

We found that, for both 'fundamentalists' and dissatisfied left-wing members of the SNP after 1979, opportunities to pursue individual and collective goals by resorting to the Exit option were severely constrained. First, while in theory either set of activists could merely have resigned from party membership or "dropped out" of active roles within the party, we argued that party activists (as opposed to inactive members) are generally unlikely to do so - in part, we suggested, because party activists are essentially political animals who derive certain "psychic" rewards from the very act of political participation in addition to any material or policy goals which they hope to achieve through active involvement in party politics."

Second, neither side could conceivably have improved the quality of its membership product by defecting to another party." For the 'fundamentalists', most of whom were hard-line independentists, no party other than the SNP was committed to any degree of self-government approaching full sovereignty." For their part, future members of the ICPD/'79 Group were, on many issues, closer to the Labour Party than to the SNP, but they were suspicious of Labour's commitment to devolution/independence and, moreover, their vision of a socialist Scotland was very different from the centralized "Labourism" of the Labour Party." In the mid-1970s, the breakaway Scottish Labour Party had offered a home for disaffected left-wing Nationalists, but the demise of the SLP

in 1979 closed off that potential avenue for Exit by defection: indeed, after the foundation of the '79 Group, a number of former SLP members, led by Jim Sillars, joined the SNP."

Third, both 'fundamentalists' and left-wing Nationalists could have broken away from the SNP to form their own versions of the Nationalist party. This would have allowed them to follow their respective strategies for the pursuit of independence and to insulate themselves from their critics within the SNP. But the fate of the Scottish Labour Party served as a deterrent to Exit by schism and, for dissatisfied 'fundamentalists' in 1981-82, the entry of the new Social Democratic Party into an already crowded Scottish party system made the prospects for goal attainment via a new breakaway party even more remote."

Therefore, opportunities to improve the quality of the party membership product through Exit were extremely limited for both 'fundamentalists' and left-wing activists in the SNP. On the other hand, we have already suggested in this conclusion that the decentralized structure and internal procedures of the SNP were conducive to the expression of Voice within the party.

The SNP, as an organization, prides itself on the extent of internal democracy within the party and on the opportunities afforded to individual members to participate in the making of party policy. SNP activists appear to share

this view: nearly 80 per cent of respondents to the SNP Activists Survey indicated that they personally had adequate opportunity to influence the direction of the party." Hence, most SNP activists had the strong sense of political efficacy, or the belief in their ability to influence the organization, that we would expect to be a prerequisite to Voice.

Nonetheless, in 1979, dissatisfied left-wing Nationalists doubted their ability to sustain sufficient volume through individual, unorganized Voice to be heard by the party or to persuade it to undertake the radical changes they prescribe for its recovery, especially given their relatively small number and the fact that their 'fundamentalist' opponents were clearly well entrenched in the party hierarchy. Consequently, they opted to organize themselves formally in the SNP 79 Group in order to exercise collective Voice, a decision which we suggested was relatively costless since they enjoyed a high degree of ideological cohesion and since many members clearly derived a benefit from the very act of participating in an organization in which others shared their aims and aspirations."

The subsequent mobilization of the collective Voice of the 'fundamentalist' tendency in the Campaign for Nationalism was, in effect, analogous to Duverger's concept of organizational "contagion from the left."⁶ While 'the left' remained unorganized within the SNP, the 'fundamentalist' tendency was able to exercise significant influence over party

policy and strategy through individual Voice expressed, in particular, by its 'notables', including such senior members of the SNP as Winifred Ewing, Robert McIntyre and Donald Stewart. The establishment of the '79 Group as a formally organized sub-party faction, however, greatly increased the effectiveness of the collective Voice of socialists within the SNP, and, after the 1981 Aberdeen Conference, they appeared to be close to winning control of the key decision-making organs of the party."

The 'fundamentalist' opposition to the '79 Group grew more vociferous after Aberdeen, but its failure to have the Group proscribed as the Johnstone National Council in December 1981 demonstrated the limits to the effectiveness of unorganized Voice. Hence, like the 'bourgeois', caucus-based parties of late nineteenth century Europe confronted by the rise of mass-based socialist and workers' parties, perceiving the benefits that organization had conferred upon their opponents, the 'fundamentalist' decided to follow suit." In April 1982, the Campaign for Nationalism in Scotland was founded to organize the collective Voice of 'fundamentalists' and to express their dissatisfaction with the new direction of the party.

Overview

As the Scottish National Party prepared for its Annual National Conference at Ayr in June 1982, two rival sub-parties

were mobilizing to turn up the volume of organized collective Voice in their respective attempts to influence the party organization and its managers/leaders.

The electoral decline of SNP in the late 1970s created a generalized mood of dissatisfaction among a majority of activists within the party. Indirectly, this contributed to the emergence of sub-party conflict since it led to a mood of critical self-examination as the party collectively sought for a way to improve the quality of its electoral product. But the immediate causes of discontent which precipitated the establishment of the '79 Group and, later, the Campaign for Nationalism were more specific. In particular, we suggested that each sub-party had been organized to express its members' dissatisfaction with a perceived decline in the party's membership product which ensued largely from changes in the SNP's ideological and strategic orientation, although personality conflicts and inter-generational and inter-regional rivalries also played a part.

In the absence of viable Exit options and possessing a belief in their respective abilities to influence the organization, 'fundamentalists' and socialists in the SNP both took advantage of the decentralized structure of the party to express organized collective Voice to promote their own particular strategies for recovery. But, as the volume and intensity of Voice increased, the leaders/managers of the party were forced to respond.

THE OUTCOME OF SUB-PARTY VOICE

In Chapter Four of this study, we proposed five possible alternative outcomes to sub-party conflict. These were described in the language of the Exit/Voice model as the institutionalization of Voice, the suppression of Voice, forced Exit (or expulsion), collective Exit (or schism) and the voluntary cessation of Voice. In Chapter Fifteen, we examined the outcomes that actually transpired in the case of the SNP, in particular, the suppression of organized collective Voice followed by the forced Exit (expulsion) of members who failed to comply with the terms of the ban on Voice. Here, we review our findings from Chapter Fifteen and attempt to explain further why the SNP responded as it did to conflict between rival sub-parties expressing organized collective Voice.

A Cacophony of Voice: Ayr, 1982

We have already described at some length the course of events at the SNP's National Conference at Ayr in June 1982, when "open war" broke out between the SNP 79 Group and the new Campaign for Nationalism.⁶³ Following stormy scenes at the official launch meeting of the Campaign, conflict between the two sub-parties subsequently spilled over into the Conference itself, prompting SNP Chairman Gordon Wilson to introduce an emergency resolution to ban all organized political groups within the party. A majority of Conference

delegates subsequently supported Wilson's motion to suppress the organized expression of collective Voice, and both the Campaign and the '79 Group were given three months to wind up their respective organizations.

Approximately two months before the Conference, however, nearly three-quarters of the respondents to the SNP Activists Survey indicated that they thought that "groups like the '79 Group, whether formally or informally constituted, have a legitimate role to play within the Party."⁴⁴ Many of these same activists subsequently attended the Ayr Conference as delegates where 62 per cent of the votes cast on Mr. Wilson's motion supported the proscription of "groups like the '79 Group". How can one account for such a dramatic reversal in the attitudes of SNP activists towards the legitimacy of organized collective Voice within the party?

The solution to this problem was derived from the logic of the Exit/Voice model. Following Hirschman, it was suggested in Chapter Four that Voice, like Exit, can be overdone as a mechanism for adjustment to organizational decline: thus, when the volume becomes too high or when contradictory messages (diagnoses and strategies for improvement) are expressed by dissatisfied members, Voice may "hinder rather than help ... efforts at recovery".⁴⁵

Hence, while the '79 Group was the only formally organized sub-party within the SNP, the volume of Voice and the extent of intra-party conflict could be kept to a

manageable level. Except for the odd occasion, such as the Johnstone National Council meeting, the internal politics of the SNP did not excite much media attention, and in any case the '79 Group was viewed quite sympathetically by a number of leading journalists in Scotland. Consequently, the debate on the ideological and strategic orientation of the party generally received favourable coverage and did not appear to threaten the SNP's public image or the quality of its electoral product; indeed, by late 1981, the SNP was showing signs of recovery in the polls. Thus, while conflict remained relatively low-level and was confined mainly to strategic issues, the volume of Voice was not harmful to the party; and, if the SNP had not exactly "institutionalized" the Voice of the '79 Group, in the spring of 1982 some leading activists in the Group felt that at least a partial accommodation had been reached.⁶⁶

Clearly, therefore, it was the organization and mobilization of the Campaign for Nationalism (which occurred after our survey was undertaken) which precipitated the crisis within the SNP. In fact, we suggested in Chapter Fifteen that this was precisely what its founders had intended.⁶⁷ The immediate objective of the Campaign, in other words, was to raise the volume and intensity of Voice within the party to an unmanageable level and to force the leadership to suppress organized collective Voice in order to prevent renewed

deterioration in either the membership product or the SNP's electoral product.

In this respect, the Campaign was successful beyond the initial expectations of its founders. They had estimated that it would take up to two years to persuade the party that it could not live with sub-party factionalism. However, they were aided in attaining their goal, ironically, by the younger, less politically experienced members of the '79 Group who sought confrontation at the first public meeting of the Campaign and thereby helped to escalate the volume of Voice. Less than forty eight hours after the Campaign was officially launched, the Conference voted to suppress organized collective Voice by proscribing both rival sub-parties.

With the foundation of the Campaign, therefore, intra-party politics within the SNP were transformed into a zero-sum game in which it became almost impossible for 'non-aligned partisans' to remain neutral. Any move by the SNP to embrace the ideological or strategic position advanced by one sub-party would heighten the dissatisfaction of members of the other. On the other hand, it appeared that the status quo was no longer in option since, if Voice were permitted to increase in volume and stridency, there was the danger that 'non-aligned partisans' would become discouraged and Exit from the party and, with a general election on the horizon, that the credibility of the party's electoral product would suffer.

Resort by the SNP to the suppression of Voice therefore met the conditions hypothesized earlier in the thesis." First, the leaders/managers of the organization and a majority of Conference delegates appear to have been persuaded that the volume and intensity of Voice resulting from the confrontation between the '79 Group and the newly-launched Campaign would harm the prospects for an improvement in perceptions of the party's electoral product and would reduce the quality of its membership product for many 'non-aligned partisans'. Second, barriers to Exit remained high for members of the '79 Group (the principal opponents of a general proscription) and it was therefore unlikely that the party's organizational or electoral position would be significantly weakened by either the mass defection or schism of dissatisfied left-wing activists. Third, since the Campaign had accomplished what it had set out to do, at least in the short term, the dissatisfaction of its members was in fact partially alleviated by the suppression of the organized Voice of the '79 Group, although it soon became clear that the 'fundamentalists' were not yet finished with their opponents.

From Suppression of Voice to Forced Exit

After elections to party offices and committees at the Ayr Conference and the subsequent meeting of National Council, the 'fundamentalists' and their 'traditionalist' allies dominated the key decision-making organs of the party.

Therefore, little sacrifice was involved when the Campaign announced the dissolution of its organization at the end of June since, as we argued in Chapter Four, once members of a sub-party faction have won control of the party they have no need for a separate organizational structure."

Members of the '79 group, however, were forced to re-evaluate their Exit/Voice calculus. In certain respects they were now back in the same position that they had occupied in 1979, that of a small minority of left-wing Nationalists in a party dominated by their 'fundamentalist' opponents. Opportunities for individual or collective goal attainment through resort to the Exit option were still severely limited. The maintenance of effective Voice within the party still required organized collective activity, although the probability of influencing the organization had declined, at least in the short term, and the costs of exercising organized collective Voice (i.e., the possibility of expulsion from the party) were likely to become prohibitive if the proscription order stayed in force. Hence, much of the three-month period between the Conference and the deadline for the dissolution of "groups" was spent discussing ways in which the Conference ruling might be overturned or circumvented.⁷⁰

Finally, at the end of August, 1982, a week before the Conference deadline expired, members of the '79 Group voted to comply with the Wilson resolution by disbanding the Group as an organized sub-party *within* the SNP. In its place, they

elected an Interim Organising Committee to prepare the way for the establishment of a cross-party tendency," provisionally known as "the 79 Group Socialist Society", which would act as a forum for the discussion of Scottish issues and problems from a socialist perspective and which would attempt to influence all parties likely to be receptive to its aims and ideas.

There may be some question whether the proposed Socialist Society should be labelled "a tendency" (as we have categorized it, above) or, given its relatively structured organizational form, a cross-party "issue-group". What is clear, however, is that it was not, and was never intended to be, a sub-party faction within the Scottish National Party. Nevertheless, for a number of reasons, not the least of which was the degree of correspondence between the membership of the new Interim Committee and that of the Executive Committee of the disbanded '79 Group," the party refused to accept that the Group had, indeed, been dissolved. Instead, the SNP National Executive concluded that the Interim Committee and the proposed Socialist Society constituted "a device intended to maintain an organised faction within the Party" and, after seven members of the Interim Committee failed to obey a second ultimatum to resign from the Committee or face losing their party membership, they were expelled from the SNP, while an eighth, former MP Margo MacDonald, made a "noisy Exit" from the party.

We suggested in Chapter Four that party leaders will generally turn to forced Exit or expulsion only as a last resort, although it was also hypothesized earlier in this conclusion that the SNP had used this weapon so frequently in the past that it may have become accepted as a legitimate tool within the organizational culture of the party. Nonetheless, it also appears that, in this instance, the selective expulsion of 'the SNP Seven' may have been a relatively cheap price for the party Chairman to pay for the continued support of a majority of his National Executive Committee and for the quiescence of the more numerous and more influential 'fundamentalists,' who were no longer content merely with the dissolution of the '79 Group. Rather, by the fall of 1982, hard-line 'fundamentalists' saw the opportunity for further improvement in the quality of the party product which they consumed by completing the rout of 'the left' within the SNP, first by securing the expulsion of some of their principal opponents and, second, by making membership of the SNP so unattractive for others, such as Jim Sillars, that they would Exit of their own accord. Hence, the 'fundamentalists' continued to press Mr. Wilson to implement the proscription and expulsion of members of the SNP who had joined the new Scottish Socialist Society, although it became clear after the Society's founding meeting in October 1982 that it was indeed a cross-party tendency.

By the end of 1982, however, the leadership of the SNP was forced to re-evaluate its stand on the Socialist Society. More than one hundred party members had joined the new body, despite the threat of further disciplinary action, and to undertake expulsions on this scale would deprive the SNP of a large number of activists, as well as undermining the credibility of its electoral product which had been bolstered by the result of the Queen's Park by-election. Moreover, both the wisdom and legitimacy of continued harassment of 'the left' was now being questioned by the press and by many 'non-aligned' grass-roots activists and members who expressed, through Voice or Exit, their dissatisfaction with the antics of the 'fundamentalists' and with the years of upheaval within the party.⁷⁴ Hence, while they claimed to have a mandate to do so, Mr. Wilson and a majority of the NEC decided in December 1982 not to take immediate action against the Scottish Socialist Society or its Nationalist members.

Finally, as the general election approached, this mood of reconciliation was extended to 'the SNP Seven' who had been expelled from the party in September 1982. The December meeting of National Council had confirmed their expulsions and referred their appeals to the National Council Appeals Committee on which a majority of members were closely allied with the 'fundamentalist' cause. It was not surprising, therefore, that the Committee's Report confirmed the expulsions in no uncertain terms. But at the end of April

1983, with the leadership determined to heal wounds before the election, a specially convened National Council approved a peace plan which would allow the seven expellees to be reinstated after making the appropriate acts of contrition, even though this led to further protest by some of the hard-line 'fundamentalists'.

Despite the leadership's attempt to close ranks in order to improve the credibility of the party's electoral product, the SNP fared poorly in the June 1983 general election. Although it held on to its two seats, largely on the strength of incumbency voting, the party's share of the popular vote fell to 11.8 per cent, its worst performance since 1970, and the SNP was reduced to fourth place behind Labour, the Conservatives and the Social Democratic/Liberal Alliance.

Overview

The response of the Scottish National Party to internal conflict between rival sub-parties expressing organized collective Voice fulfilled many of the expectations established in our discussion of the outcomes of factional competition in Chapter Four.

First, as long as the SNP 79 Group was the only organized sub-party and while conflict remained relatively specialized, collective Voice was accommodated, if not formally institutionalized, within the party. But the generalization of conflict and an increase in the volume and intensity of

Voice which followed the launch of a second sub-party, the Campaign for Nationalism, threatened a further deterioration in the quality of the membership product for most members and in the electoral performance of the party. Since Voice was now perceived to be more of a hindrance than a help in restoring the party product, the party moved to suppress organized collective Voice at the Ayr Conference by banning sub-party activity.

Second, although the formal organization of the Campaign for Nationalism was dissolved after the Ayr Conference, in accordance with our hypothesis that a faction which has established a measure of control over party decision-making does not require a separate organizational structure, its former members continued to express Voice in pursuit of their respecified aim to complete the rout of the Nationalist 'left'. Therefore, while the '79 Group eventually complied with the Conference resolution, the 'fundamentalists' sought further improvement in their own version of the party product by securing the expulsion of seven leading left-wing activists and the proscription by the party of the new Scottish Socialist Society, which many left-wing Nationalists had joined.

Third, the Chairman of the SNP and many non-aligned activists finally sought compromise in order to prevent further deterioration in the party's electoral product and, therefore, also in the quality of the membership product for

a majority of members. But the attempted reconciliation came too late for the organization to recover. Thus, the SNP was still deeply divided as it entered the 1983 election campaign. Many members and activists had already resorted to Exit, others had dropped out of active roles (including, for example, Jim Sillars, although he would subsequently return - see Chapter Seventeen). Among those who remained, moreover, there was general agreement that four years of sub-party conflict had consumed resources and energy that might have been better spent fighting external opponents.⁷⁵ Nevertheless, representatives of both sub-parties were unrepentant, with each side insisting that its particular strategy for improvement was the only course for the SNP to follow if the quality of its electoral and membership products were to be restored.

THE EXIT/VOICE MODEL AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The organization of case analysis of events in the Scottish National Party in the years between 1979 and 1983 has been strongly influenced by the adoption of the Exit/Voice model as a broad conceptual and explanatory framework. But how much did this model really contribute to our understanding of the emergence and outcome of sub-party conflict in the SNP? In this final section of the chapter, we evaluate the utility of this model and propose a brief agenda for future research on sub-party factionalism.

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MELOD

The Exit/Voice Model: An Evaluation

Our review of the existing literature on factionalism within political parties in Chapters Two and Three of this study raised a number of problems confronting the researcher embarking upon a study of factional conflict: the multiple uses of the term 'faction'; the negative and dysfunctional connotations often associated with the term; the absence of an overarching framework to organize the multiplicity of variables and hypotheses generated by previous case studies of party factions; and the lack of systematic analysis of the outcomes of factional conflict within political parties.

The first of these problems was overcome by our development of a classification of faction types and by the differentiation of the concept of "sub-party factions" from factions occurring in other contexts. But this did not, by itself, resolve the second problem, that of the frequent association of the term 'factionalism' (whether "sub-party" or otherwise) with conspiratorial, self-interested and dysfunctional behaviour. However, when sub-party factions were redefined as "organized expressions of collective Voice" by members seeking to improve the quality of the party product, our central concept assumed a more neutral tone, in that the motives of members of a sub-party may be self-interested or altruistic and sub-party activity may be either functional or dysfunctional for the host organization.

In the case of the SNP, we would suggest, first, that many members of both the '79 Group and the Campaign for Nationalism genuinely believed that their respective strategies would bring about an improvement in the quality of the party membership product for a majority of members and restore or improve the electoral performance of the party, although some sub-party activists were undoubtedly motivated by personal career ambitions, as our analysis of the "sources of dissatisfaction" demonstrates." Nonetheless, sub-party conflict was dysfunctional for the SNP, at least in the short term. Again, the Exit/Voice approach allows us to understand why this was the case, since the intensity and volume of Voice expressed by rival sub-parties in a bipolar structure of factional competition effectively paralysed the party and hindered rather than helped its recovery. But in other examples, such as the rise of the New Left in the Dutch Labour Party", the emergence of a sub-party faction with a clearly articulated strategy for improvement has resulted in the restoration of the party product, thus demonstrating the positive effect of Voice as a mechanism for organization adjustment.

However, the Exit/Voice model made a far more important contribution, in our view, by serving as an heuristic device to organize the multiplicity of often-contradictory variables and hypotheses which have been proposed by previous case studies of the emergence of factionalism within political

parties. We selected the model because it is pitched at a higher level of abstraction than the explanatory frameworks usually applied to the analysis of sub-party factions. Consequently, rather than contributing to a further proliferation of variables and hypotheses, the Exit/Voice model generated three broad categories of explanation within which existing variables could be subsumed: these were, first, the causes of dissatisfaction with the party product which give rise to the search for improvement; second, strategies for improvement; and, third, the availability and perceived costs and benefits of the various Exit and Voice options.

Moreover, the internal logic of the Exit/Voice model also suggested a hierarchy of explanation for the emergence of sub-party factions (diagrammed in Figures 4.3 and 4.4). Hence, we suggested that the prerequisites for the expression of organized collective Voice were, first, a sense of dissatisfaction with the quality of the party membership product which is shared by a number of members or, especially, party activists (since they will tend to be more "quality conscious" than inactive members); second, a common belief in the possibility of improving the quality of the membership product; and, third, a calculation by those members that organized collective Voice, rather than any other Exit/Voice option, is both available and offers the best possible balance

of benefits (prospects for recovery or improvement) over costs.

The primary criterion of the usefulness of any conceptual or explanatory framework, it may be argued, is the extent to which it helps the researcher to "make sense" of a complex series of events. The Exit/Voice model did help us to "make sense" of the origin of sub-party factions in the SNP; in particular, because it forced us to look at the specific sources of dissatisfaction which motivated members resorting to Voice (or Exit), rather than the generalized mood of discontent which afflicted most members of the party following its decline in the 1979 election, and because it focused attention on a belief in the possibility of improvement and the lack of viable Exit options, as well as the structure of opportunities for Voice, in the determination of a response to that dissatisfaction. In other words, the Exit/Voice model led us beyond the simple classifications of variables proposed by Zariski and Hine, or our own categorization in Chapter Three", to a more complex multivariate analysis of the development of sub-party factionalism.

Finally, the Exit/Voice model also helped us to "make sense" of the outcome of sub-party conflict within the SNP. Although the lack of systematic analysis of the outcomes of factionalism is a serious omission in the existing literature on party factions, by combining Bujra's observations of the results of factional conflict in communal societies with

elements gleaned from Hirschman's formulation of the model, we were able to formulate a typology of alternative outcomes to organized collective Voice and a series of hypothesized conditions for each outcome which were derived from the logic of the Exit/Voice approach. Hence, a single broad conceptual framework was established which could be used to analyse both the emergence and outcome of sub-party politics.

The logic of the Exit/Voice model, applied to the Ayr Conference and its aftermath, suggested that the SNP's resort to the suppression of Voice and to the expulsion of 'the SNP Seven' was less remarkable than it appeared at first glance. Rather, given the balance of sub-party forces, these seemingly draconian measures were a "rational" response by the party leadership and grass-roots delegates to a perceived threat to the quality of their membership and electoral prospects when a cacophony of organized collective Voice arose after the mobilization of the Campaign for Nationalism. Likewise, given the approach of the election and the increased information at the party's disposal concerning the nature of the Scottish Socialist Society, the subsequent compromise leading to the readmission of the expellees was also consistent with the logic of the Exit/Voice model, even if these manouvers failed to restore the performance of the organization in time for the 1983 election.

We must conclude this evaluation of the Exit/Voice model with a note of caution, however. There are inherent dangers,

akin to "ecological fallacies"', in attempting to move from the individual level of analysis which characterizes Hirschman's original model to the collective level of behaviour at which sub-party activity occurs.

We have attempted to combat these potential problems in two ways. First, we incorporated elements of Olson's "logic of collective action" (based initially on essentially economic assumptions of individual rationality similar to those underpinning Hirschman's model) into our conceptualization of organized collective Voice.¹⁰ Second, our analysis of the mobilization of collective Voice draws upon and explicitly links together individual level data (from surveys and interviews) and collective statements of dissatisfaction and purpose (in the diagnoses and strategies proposed by sub-parties).

We were able to "make sense" of, and have a reasonable degree of confidence in, our findings in the case of the SNP because we had access to the wide variety of data sources necessary to resolve the possible "level of analysis" problem. Nonetheless, even where such resources are lacking, the Exit/Voice model may still serve as a useful tool for suggesting new interpretations of sub-party conflict.

An Agenda for Future Research

We have argued in the preceding pages that the Exit/Voice model was an extremely useful aid to "making sense" of events

in the Scottish National Party between 1979 and 1983. But our original intention in formulating the model was also to develop a framework for the comparative analysis of factional conflict in other political parties. If, as we have suggested, the Exit/Voice model is pitched at a relatively high level of abstraction, at least at what might be referred to as the level of "middle-range theorizing", it should be applicable to other instances of sub-party factionalism. If this is so, the framework might then serve as a basis for comparative (and more cumulative) research on factions in political parties. Here, we present a modest research strategy to test further the validity of the conceptual and theoretical framework used in this study.

As a preliminary test of the model, we propose the adoption of a "similar systems design", whereby the Exit/Voice framework is applied to examples of sub-party conflict in parties operating in an environment broadly similar to that of the SNP. Appropriate test-cases in this first group might include the British Social Democratic Party, the British Labour Party, the Australian Labor Party and the Canadian New Democratic Party. All four parties are, like the SNP, moderately left-of-centre parties competing in two-party-dominant systems under single-member constituency electoral formulae in essentially British-style parliamentary democracies, and each has experienced the emergence of at least one policy sub-party in the last twenty years. Moreover, in

at least two of the cases, there are available survey data and factionalism has occurred sufficiently recently to be able to replicate, more-or-less, the kind of analysis undertaken of the SNP.

For example, the recent schism within the British Social Democratic Party (itself the product of collective Exit by a breakaway faction) is an appropriate test-case since events will be fresh enough in activists' minds to permit individual-level survey analysis and interviews and because, like our study of the SNP, it would help to counterbalance two biases in the existing literature on sub-party factions, namely, the neglect of minor (non-governing) parties and the paucity of systematic analysis of factionalism in British parties." Moreover, the fact that schism occurred when all members of the SDP had the opportunity to pursue individual and collective goals in a larger party (the Social and Liberal Democrats) may raise further questions about the perceived viability of certain Exit options within the British party system.

An attempt to look at the special problems faced by small parties in coping with organized collective Voice also prompts the inclusion of the Canadian New Democratic Party (NDP) among our first group of test-cases, despite the vintage of its experience with sub-party factionalism. Moreover, the case of the NDP shows some interesting parallels to that of the SNP. Almost exactly ten years before the emergence of the

socialist '79 Group within the nationalist SNP, a radical-nationalist faction, the "Waffle", was formed within the moderately social democratic NDP. Like the '79 Group, the Waffle was eventually proscribed, although most of its members resorted to collective Exit before they could be expelled."

Apart from the fact that a small organized group may be relatively more influential in a small party than in a large one, is there something else about small, non-governing, parties which makes them resort to the suppression of Voice, backed up by the forced Exit of dissenting members? We might suggest that, in parties which have little prospect of governing, the absence of structural controls makes them more susceptible to sub-party conflict and deprives leaders of resources to institutionalize or otherwise resolve sub-party activity." Comparative analysis of the SNP, the NDP and other minor parties may suggest some answers.

The relative paucity of systematic analysis of British party factions justifies the proposed application of the Exit/Voice model to the British Labour Party where, in recent years, sub-party factionalism has resulted in both the collective Exit or schism of the Social Democrats and the proscription and expulsion of Militant Tendency (which was, by our definition, a sub-party faction, not a tendency). Analysis of Militant Tendency might provide an opportunity to extend the Exit/Voice model to encompass the concept of "entryism", or the collective Entry of members of one

organization into a larger, more influential one in order to use the latter as a vehicle for the attainment of collective ideological goals.

However, we also propose inclusion of the Labour Party because recent survey data may permit individual-level analysis," and because its mass expulsion of Militant Tendency activists may shed further light on the SNP's use of the weapon of forced Exit. Indeed, the SNP's reluctance to take action against over one hundred members who joined the Scottish Socialist Society in the fall of 1982 suggests that expulsion may be double-edged sword. Used selectively, it can mute Voice by culling particularly troublesome dissidents; but its deterrent effect is limited when dissatisfaction within the organization is so widespread that a large number of members are willing to defy the threat of expulsion, since forced Exit on a mass scale may signal a sense of crisis which will reduce its electoral credibility. Further research, through comparative analysis, is required to clarify the conditions under which parties resort to forced Exit to impose silence.

Finally, the study of factionalism has been neglected in research on Australian federal politics, as in Britain." Nevertheless, the emergence of national factions within the Australian Labor Party since 1984 offers an opportunity to apply the Exit/Voice model to a governing party within the "similar systems design". Moreover, the fact that these sub-

parties have been organized so recently should permit, once again, the kind of multi-level analysis used to study the SNP, while a comparison between the ALP and the Canadian NDP may determine whether a federally-organized party system increases opportunities for the mobilization of collective Voice.

If the Exit/Voice model helps to "make sense" of the emergence and outcome of sub-party conflict/organized collective Voice in these "most similar" cases, it might then be appropriate to attempt to extend the application of the model in at least three directions: first, to the emergence of policy sub-parties in parties of the centre-right, such as the Monday Club faction in the British Conservative Party; second, to the emergence of policy sub-parties in the context of proportional representation and multi-partism, where barriers to Exit are lower, such as the case of factions in the Dutch Labour Party; and third, perhaps the most telling test of the model, to the incidence of leadership sub-parties in parties like the Italian Christian Democratic Party, where sub-party activity is often institutionalized. In all of these cases, the age of the factions is such that a replication of the kind of analysis undertaken on the SNP is unlikely to be feasible: rather, such applications would probably have to be based on a reinterpretation of previous literature and research, and due attention would have to be paid to the caveats noted earlier.

However, while we do not rule out the possibility that the Exit/Voice model may prove to be applicable to diverse forms of factional behaviour in a wide variety of contexts, we consider it wise to proceed cautiously in testing the model to avoid the dangers of "Concept Stretching". It may be discovered, for example, that the SNP is a unique case, or that the model may only be appropriate for the analysis of competition between policy sub-parties, or that its application may be restricted to factional conflict within movement-based political parties. Therefore, we propose in the first instance a comparative analysis of the emergence and outcome of ideological and/or strategic (policy sub-party) conflict in the SNP and four other movement-based parties which operate in similar political and socio-cultural environments. Such a strategy, it is hoped, will help to clarify some of the findings of this study, suggest refinements to the Exit/Voice model and serve as a preliminary test of the validity and applicability of the model as a conceptual and explanatory framework for the analysis of sub-party factionalism.

NOTES - CHAPTER SIXTEEN

1. See Chapter Two, above, pp. 39-67.
2. ibid., p. 70.
3. See Chapter Fourteen, p. 668 and Table 14.1.
4. Chapter Two, pp. 61-64.
5. ibid., pp. 71-77.
6. See also, Raphael Zariski, "Party Factions and Comparative Politics: Some Empirical Findings" in Frank P. Belloni and Dennis C. Beller, eds., Faction Politics: Political Parties and Factionalism in Comparative Perspective (Santa Barbara, Ca: ABC-Clio Press, 1978), pp. 19-38.
7. Giovanni Sartori, "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics", American Political Science Review, vol. 64, no. 4, 1970, esp. pp. 1040-1046.
8. Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1970).
9. See, among others, the references cited in Chapter Four, footnotes 2-6.
10. Hirschman's original model is outlined in Chapter Four, above, pp. 138-143; criticisms are discussed in pp. 143-157; and our basic revised model is presented in pp. 157-162.
11. Conversely, we assume that there will be no cause for dissatisfaction, or for subsequent ameliorative action, for those customers/members who do not perceive a change in the organization or its product to constitute a decline in performance or quality. Other things being equal, such individuals will continue to purchase the

product or to remain members of the organization, that is, they will maintain a strategy of "silent non-Exit".

12. Where neither Exit nor Voice offers any prospect of improvement in quality and where costs would be incurred by resorting to these options, dissatisfied customers/members are likely to continue (albeit grudgingly) to purchase the product/remain members.
13. See Chapter Four, pp. 154-157.
14. Here, there may be a linkage between the two "markets" for the party's products discussed earlier, since the party's "membership product", its capacity to realize the goals and aspirations of members, often depends on its ability to sell its "voter product" in the wider electoral marketplace. If voters become dissatisfied with the party's policies or performance, and subsequently Exit from its electoral clientele, members also may become dissatisfied with a perceived decline in the product which they consume.
15. See Chapter Four, pp. 167-173.
16. See Chapter Four, pp. 173-176, and Chapter Eleven, pp. 512 and pp. 514-515.
17. See Chapter Four, p. 177-178, and the earlier discussion of "intra-party incentives" in Chapter Three, pp. 98-106.
18. Janet M. Bujra, "The Dynamics of Political Action: A New Look at Factionalism", American Anthropologist, vol. 75, no. 1, 1973, esp. pp. 141-149.
19. See Chapter Four, pp. 192-194 and Chapter Fifteen, *passim*.
20. See Chapter Four, pp. 187-192 and Chapter Fifteen, *passim*.
21. The Scotsman, Edinburgh, December 6, 1982, p. 8.

22. W. Oliver Brown, Witdom (Glasgow: Maclellan, 1969).
23. Christopher Harvie, Scotland and Nationalism: Scottish Society and Politics, 1707-1977 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1977), p. 237.
24. See Mark V. Kauppi, "The decline of the Scottish National Party, 1977-81: political and organizational factors", Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 5, no. 3, 1982, esp. pp. 334-338.
25. See the alternative explanations of the first rise and fall of the SNP in Chapter Six, above.
26. William Miller, Bo Sarlvik, Ivor Crewe and Jim Alt, "The Connection between SNP Voting and the Demand for Scottish Self-Government", European Journal of Political Research, vol. 5, no. 1, 1977, pp. 83-102.
27. Nicolas Baxter-Moore, "The Rise and Fall of the Scottish National Party: Revisited", paper presented to the European Politics Group Workshop, London, Ontario, December 1979, pp. 36-37.
28. See, especially, Chapters Nine, Ten and Thirteen.
29. See Chapter Seven, pp. 320-321, and B.A. Farbey, C.R. Mitchell and K. Webb, "Change and Stability in the Ideology of Scottish Nationalism", International Political Science Review, vol. 1, no. 3, 1980, pp. 405-424.
30. See Chapter Seven, pp. 321-322.
31. See Chapter Eight, above, p. 373.
32. ibid., pp. 358-364.
33. ibid., pp. 364-370.

34. For an introduction to the SNP Activists Survey, see Chapter Nine, pp. 389-393 and Appendix A. For references to previous analyses of SNP activists, see Chapter Nine, footnotes 12-15.
35. See Chapter Seven, pp. 311-312 and Chapter Nine, pp. 422-427.
36. See Chapter Seven, pp. 317-318 and Chapter Nine, pp. 438-441.
37. On the two measures ("subjective" and "objective") of individual ideological placement used in this analysis, see Chapter Nine, pp. 429, 431-432.
38. Chapter Nine, *passim*.
39. As we noted in Chapter Eight, there has long been concern expressed by some SNP activists about the potential damage to the party's fortunes ensuing from inadequate screening of local government candidates, in particular; see pp. 360-361.
40. See Chapter Three, pp. 115-118.
41. See Table 10.6, above.
42. See Chapter Ten, *passim*.
43. See, for example, Owen Dudley Edwards, "Socialism or Nationalism?" in Gavin Kennedy, ed., The Radical Approach: Papers on an independent Scotland (Edinburgh: Palingogenesis Press, 1976), pp. 98-109.
44. See, especially, Tables 13.7 and 13.8, above.
45. "The Causes of Dissatisfaction" in Chapter Fourteen.

46. Douglas Henderson, "The Future of the SNP", Scots Independent, no. 111, June 1980, p. 2.
47. See Chapter Thirteen, pp. 641-644.
48. ibid., pp. 647, 649-652, and Chapter Fourteen, pp. 694-696.
49. See Chapter Ten, pp. 490-493.
50. See Chapter Twelve, pp. 586, 588-589.
51. Stephen Maxwell, "The Case for Left-Wing Nationalism", SNP 79 group Paper No. 6, 1981.
52. See Chapter Eleven, pp. 514-515.
53. However, two former members of the SNP who responded to the SNP Activists Survey had defected. In each case, they supported devolution rather than independence and were opposed to the strategic orientation advocated by both the '79 Group and the 'fundamentalists'. Hence, they were able to improve the quality of their membership product by joining parties which shared their own aspirations and beliefs, i.e., the "centrist", mildly devolutionist, Liberal and Social Democratic Parties. See pp. 477-478 and 513.
54. See Chapter Fourteen, pp. 692-693 and fn. 40, p. 715.
55. See Chapter Eleven, pp. 516-522.
56. ibid., pp. 530-531.
57. See Chapter Fourteen, p. 692.
58. See Chapter Eleven, pp. 546-550, and Chapter Fourteen, pp. 698-699.

59. Chapter Eleven, especially pp. 551-554.
60. See Chapter Eight, above, pp. 335-336, and Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organisation and Activity in the Modern State, translated by Barbara and Robert North, third edition (London: Methuen, 1964), pp. 24-27.
61. See Chapter Twelve, pp. 605-615.
62. See Chapter Fourteen, pp. 704-707.
63. See Chapter Fifteen, pp. 722-745.
64. Chapter Fifteen, p. 737 ff, and Table 13.1, above.
65. Chapter Four, p. 142, and Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, p. 31.
66. See the comments of Jim Sillars and Stephen Maxwell cited in Chapter Fifteen, above, pp. 722-723.
67. ibid., pp. 738-739.
68. See Chapter Four, pp. 189-190.
69. Chapter Four, pp. 193-194.
70. Chapter Fifteen, pp. 750-753.
71. On the concept of "cross-party tendencies", see the discussion of the "Reform" tendency in British politics in Richard Rose, "Parties, Factions and Tendencies in Britain", Political Studies, vol. 12, no. 1, 1964, p. 41.

72. "Tendencies" and "issue-groups" are defined and distinguished in Chapter Two, above, pp. 61-62.
73. Chapter Fifteen, pp. 755-756.
74. ibid., pp. 771-773.
75. Interviews, May-June 1983.
76. See, for example, Chapter Fourteen, pp. 687-690.
77. Steven B. Wolinetz, "New Left and the Transformation of the Dutch Labour Party", paper presented to the Annual Convention of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, September 1975.
78. See Chapter Three, pp. 89-90, Figure 3.1 and footnotes 2 and 3, p. 128.
79. See Hayward R. Alker, Jr., "A Typology of Ecological Fallacies" in Mattei Dogan and Stein Rokkan, eds., Social Ecology (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1969), pp. 69-86, and the editors' discussion of the "individualist fallacy" in ibid., pp. 87-89.
80. See Chapter Four, above, pp. 177-180, and Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and a Theory of Groups (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1965).
81. Joseph LaPalombara, "Parsimony and Empiricism in Comparative Politics" in R.T. Holt and J.E. Turner, eds., The Methodology of Comparative Research (New York: The Free Press, 1970), pp. 125-149; Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, revised edition (New York: The Free Press, 1957).
82. Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry (New York: John Wiley, and Sons, 1970), pp. 32-34.

83. See Chapter One, above, pp. 15-17 and 17-22.
84. See Robert Hackett, "Pie in the Sky: a History of the Ontario Waffle", Canadian Dimension, vol. 15, nos. 1-2, 1980, pp. 1-72; and John Bullen, "The Ontario Waffle and the Struggle for an Independent Socialist Canada: Conflict within the NDP", Canadian Historical Review, vol. 64, no. 2, 1983, pp. 188-215.
85. See Chapter Three, above, pp. 103-105.
86. For example, surveys reported by Paul Whiteley, The Labour Party in Crisis (London: Methuen, 1983) and Patrick Seyd, The Rise and Fall of the Labour Left (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987).
87. Clem Lloyd and Wayne Swan, "National Factions and the ALP", Politics, vol. 22, no. 1, 1987, p. 100 ff.; and Dean Jaensch, The Australian Party System (Sydney: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), p. 128.
88. Sartori, "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics".

Chapter Seventeen

EPILOGUE

Recent election results in Scotland suggest not only that most of the wounds of factional infighting have healed since 1983 but that the Scottish National Party *may* be on the verge of a new electoral breakthrough. In the June 1987 general election, the SNP enjoyed a modest increase in its share of the Scottish vote, from 11.8 per cent in 1983 to 14.05 per cent, and made a net gain of one seat in the House of Commons, from two to three. Admittedly, Gordon Wilson lost the Dundee East seat he had held since 1974 and in the Western Isles, where Donald Stewart stepped down after seventeen years in the House of Commons, his successor Iain Smith failed to retain the seat for the Nationalists. But the SNP regained three seats in the north-east which had been held by the party between 1974 and 1979. These victories were significant for three reasons.

First, the three Nationalist MPs elected in 1987 represented all sides of the sub-party conflict earlier in the decade. In the Grampian constituency of Moray, held by Ms. Winifred Ewing from 1974 to 1979, the new MP is another Mrs. Ewing - Winnie's daughter-in-law Margaret who, as Margaret Bain, was also a member of the SNP parliamentary group from

1974 to 1979 and who had remained more-or-less neutral in the factional dispute of 1979-83. In the Tayside constituency of Angus East, Andrew Welsh was re-elected to the seat which he had represented in the 1974-79 Parliament. Although we have no evidence that he actually joined the Campaign for Nationalism, its organizers claimed that Welsh was a supporter of their cause and he was firmly identified with the 'fundamentalist' wing of the party. Finally, in Banff and Buchan, another seat in the Grampian region which contains most of the constituency held for the SNP between 1974 and 1979 by Hamish Watt, the new MP is Alex Salmond, a former officer of the '79 Group who was one of 'the SNP Seven' expelled from the party in September 1982.

Second, in November 1988, these three were joined in the House of Commons by another former MP, albeit one who had never previously represented the SNP at Westminster, when Jim Sillars achieved an astonishing upset in the by-election at Glasgow Govan. Govan had been held in 1987 by Labour MP Bruce Millan, a former Secretary of State for Scotland, by a margin of over 19000 votes, the fourth largest majority in Scotland's 72 seats. But, after Millan had been appointed as one of Britain's representatives on the European Commission, Sillars and the SNP capitalized on a weak Labour candidate, widespread opposition in Scotland to the Thatcher government and, especially, the Labour Party's vacillation in its attitude to the Conservative government's proposed poll tax which many

Scots, backed by a new SNP campaign of civil disobedience, have vowed not to pay. Sillars' victory by over 3500 votes thus rivalled his wife Margo MacDonald's own win in Govan almost exactly fifteen years earlier and Mrs. Ewing's victory at Hamilton in 1967, each of which preceded a major electoral advance for the Nationalists.

Third, public opinion polls in late 1988 demonstrated strong support for both the SNP and self-government. Support for the party had risen to over 30 per cent of decided voters, its highest rating since 1977, and it trailed the Labour Party by only four per cent. Meanwhile, on the constitutional question, over forty per cent of Scots now favoured a completely separate Scottish parliament and a further forty per cent indicated support for a strong Scottish Assembly within the framework of the United Kingdom.

Since Mrs. Thatcher is unlikely to go to the country before the summer of 1991, it might be premature to suggest that the SNP will sweep Scotland in the next general election. Rising Nationalist hopes have been dashed before, in both the late 1960s and the 1970s. But, if recent trends are any indication, it may at least be expected that after the next election the SNP will be better represented at Westminster than at any time in the last decade and, possibly, that it will once again hold the balance of power in the House of Commons. This thesis, we believe, will contribute to a greater understanding of the ideology, organization and

activists of the Scottish National Party and of the ideological and strategic issues involved in the party's search for an improved electoral product. After 1991, it may also prove to have increased our understanding of a major player in British politics.

APPENDICES

Appendix A

THE SNP ACTIVISTS SURVEY

In the Scottish National Party, as in most political parties, a hard core of activists carries most of the organizational burden and makes most policy decisions on behalf of the less active membership. (Estimates of the size of this activist core in the SNP given in interviews ranged from 1000 to 2500, with "about 1500 true activists" as the most frequent answer.) In the SNP Activists Survey, we attempted to develop a data base which would provide an opportunity to improve upon the existing state of knowledge about the socio-economic and political backgrounds of these activists, their general political attitudes and ideological orientations, and their more immediate perceptions of SNP strategy and tactics. While such a survey may be employed to develop a modal picture of SNP activists as a whole for the purpose of comparison with activists in other parties, it can also be used to illustrate the nature and extent of differences within the one party. In the sections which follow, we outline some of the major elements in the construction of the survey.

Sample Size

In selecting a sample size, we had to seek a balance between practical considerations such as cost and time available for administration, and academic viability, in particular, the achievement of a sufficiently large data base to permit some degree of confidence in the findings of statistical analysis based upon it. A sample of approximately 500 potential respondents was deemed desirable in that: a) administration and costs could be kept to manageable levels; and b), since the average response rate for postal surveys is usually considered to be around 30%, a sample of 500 should yield approximately 150 replies, constituting about 10% of the total number of activists (in fact, our response rate turned out to be much higher).

Sample Construction

In an attempt to gain a comprehensive picture of SNP activists, we included within the sample activists at all levels within the party organization. The sample was constructed one step at a time according to the stages set out below. Since a number of potential respondents hold multiple positions within the party, each was included in the sub-category in which he/she first appeared. Thus a parliamentary candidate who was also a member of the National

Executive was listed under candidates; a constituency organiser who was also a local councillor was listed under the former group, and so on. (N.B. It should be noted, however, that our categorization of respondents for the purpose of analysis, as opposed to sample construction, follows different procedures - See Chapter Nine.)

1) Since parliamentary candidates, and especially MPs, present the most public image of the party, and usually gain nominations for candidacy as a reward for hard work or as a consequence of high status among the membership, we included all of the SNP's parliamentary candidates in the 1979 general election, together with, in turn, the by-election candidates from 1978 (when the first by-election was held for the 1974-79 parliament) to 1982, candidates from both general elections in 1974, and candidates for the first direct elections to the European Parliament in June 1979. It was recognized that some candidates from 1974 might no longer be members of, or active in, the party - but this information was not always available in advance and, anyway, their change of status might in itself provide valuable information.

2) On the assumption that candidacy was a reward or a sign of high status, and that these individuals would have an important stake in the debates over policy and strategy within

the party, we also included the prospective and approved parliamentary candidates who had been officially adopted by their constituency parties as of April 1, 1982. It is perhaps a symptom of the turmoil within the SNP that only about one-third of constituency parties had indeed adopted candidates at that time, that some were subsequently replaced (mainly '79 Group members who were dropped after the Ayr Conference) and that some constituencies still did not have an adopted candidate when the general election was called in May 1983.

3) The major decision-making organs of the SNP are the National Executive Committee, the National Council and the National Assembly (the role played by these bodies is described in Chapter Eight of the thesis). Consequently, we included next in the sample the members of the National Executive and the members of Council/Assembly elected by the Annual Conference. (The bulk of Council/ Assembly members are delegates from branches and/or constituencies; delegate status was a subsidiary factor in the selection of branch/constituency activists for inclusion in the sample, see below.)

Having put together a list of what might be called the "national" political figures (parliamentary representatives and candidates, members of national decision-making bodies), for which no sampling was involved since all of those who

qualified under these categories were regarded as potential respondents, we then turned our attention to the local level. This may be justified on two grounds: first, the decentralised nature of the SNP organization and the active part played by constituency and branch delegates in the National Council/Assembly made it important to tap the attitudes of local activists; second, because the constituencies and branches are the sites of, and provide the personnel for, election campaigning and there might therefore be important variations revealed at this level in considerations of ideology and strategy according to local conditions and the nature of party competition.

4) We added first the constituency organisers (who are responsible for the conduct of local campaigns) and then the chairmen of the 71 constituency associations. In a number of cases, however, these individuals already appeared in the sample: so, in order to maintain comprehensive geographical coverage, we substituted other constituency officers and activists. For constituency organisers, we substituted industrial organisers where that office was filled (usually only in industrialized urban areas). Otherwise, we included the most senior constituency officer (usually the vice-chairman or treasurer) who was also a delegate to the National Council, National Assembly or District/Regional

Association. Thus we hoped to combine active participation at both the local and the regional/national level.

5) We next turned our attention to the branch level of organization. On the assumption that they would be among the most actively involved members of each branch, we opted to select the branch secretaries of two branches in each constituency (except for those ten constituencies, largely in densely populated urban areas, where the constituency-wide branch is in effect). In each constituency, we selected branches first from among those which had reported their 1982 officers to SNP Headquarters by March 25, 1982 (on the assumption that these branches were likely to be more active than those which had not yet reported). Where there were more than two such branches in any constituency, we selected two more or less at random - the major qualification being that, having selected one, we discounted from the list of alternatives those which were most proximate geographically to the first (i.e., wherever possible, we tried to avoid selecting two neighbouring branches or two from the same town). Where only one branch in a constituency had "reported in", that was automatically included. For multi-branch constituencies which still had one or no branches in the sample, we were forced to select one or two at random from the 1981 Headquarters returns, using the same criterion of non-

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proximity referred to above. Having selected our 132 branches (the ten constituency branches and two from all other constituencies), we then included in the sample the secretary of each branch or, where the secretary already appeared elsewhere in the sample, the highest ranking office-holder in the branch who was also listed as a delegate to another party organ (as for constituency officers, above).

With 432 individuals already in the sample, we were some way from our initial goal of 500, partly as a result of the unexpected extent of multiple office-holding within the "national" activist sub-categories - i.e., between candidates and National Executive or National Council/Assembly members. We might have opted for a third representative from either the constituency or branch level, but did not want to have too many individuals within any one local organization for fear of collusion in responses or an adverse effect on response rate ("if he's already got two people in this constituency association, then it won't matter if I don't send mine in").

6) Instead, working on a similar assumption to that which prompted the selection of all parliamentary candidates, we decided to include all SNP councillors, i.e., those members who had been elected under the party label to the District

and Regional Councils which run local government affairs in Scotland. Once again, they represent the public image of the SNP, they are often local notables (in both the party and the wider community), and a number progress to become parliamentary candidates. One might ask, why not include all local government candidates (as with parliamentary candidates)? The simple answer is that there are too many of them, and that it would have cost too much time and money to find addresses for all: the names and addresses of all local councillors, however, were easily accessible, the numbers were manageable, and we proceeded on the assumption/knowledge that they play an active role in the life of the party.

7) Finally, we added to the sample four individuals who surely warranted inclusion, but had somehow not yet been selected. The policy committees of the National Assembly play an important role in drafting party policy documents for deliberation, and perhaps adoption, by the other policy-making organs of the party. In addition, their convenors are recognized by the party as official spokespersons on their particular policy fields. Thus, we drew in those convenors of policy committees who had not yet found their way into the sample in one of the other categories.

In all, therefore, our sample consisted of 498 members of the Scottish National Party who could be classified as "activists" at one or more levels within the party organization. Of these, no reliable recent address could be established for five former SNP candidates (all were known to have moved away from the area in which they had previously been active). Consequently, only 493 questionnaires were actually mailed out. However, in the Table which appears later in this Appendix, response rates by sub-category and overall are given as percentages of the total sample.

The Questionnaire

A copy of the questionnaire is included as part of this Appendix (Appendix A.3). It consists of 50 major questions (many containing multiple variables or sub-questions) plus 12 follow-up questions. The questions are divided into six major sections dealing in turn with: the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of respondents; their past and present political activity (for other parties as well as for the SNP); attitudes towards other parties and perceptions of the nature of party competition in Scotland; attitudes towards Scotland and its relationship with the United Kingdom (to tap national sentiment, perceptions of relative deprivation, etc.); attitudes and perceptions towards recent political events (especially the referendum and the 1979 election); and

considerations on future strategy and prospects for the SNP and the nationalist movement.

That, at least, is how the respondents were supposed to see it! None too discretely hidden within these general categories were a number of sensitive questions (some of which produced telling responses) relating to ideology (especially QQ. 26 and 40), internal party democracy (QQ. 39 and 44), opportunities to apportion blame for the decline of the SNP (QQ. 36-38), and orientations to future strategy, both electoral (QQ. 41, 42, 45 and 46) and otherwise (QQ. 48 and 49). It should be noted that some respondents refused to answer some of these questions (and that on class identification) but, in many cases, those refusals were as informative as any answer that might have been given!

Techniques and Processes of Survey Administration

Before the final version of the questionnaire was typed up and prepared for printing, it had already been tested on a number of occasions. The questionnaire (in whole or in part) was pre-tested on a group of graduate student colleagues at Carleton University, on a group of friends and neighbours, and finally on three people who were associated with the SNP but who were not in our sample. After each test, certain revisions were made to clarify questions and directions and to remove, as far as possible, any ambiguities.

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Given the low rate of response usually associated with surveys administered by mail, we also took a number of steps to maximize the size of our final data base. In so doing, we drew upon the advice, and sought the co-operation, of a number of individuals mentioned in the acknowledgements, below. The major "techniques" of survey administration included the following:

- 1) We attempted to make the questionnaire as attractive and easy to complete as possible. Hence, as many questions as appropriate were organised in box form, with arrows signposting the routes to follow-up questions. The questionnaire was also printed on matt "coloured" paper - however, since most colours have political or religious connotations in Scotland, the "colour" turned out to be grey!
- 2) We sought and gained - although not without a certain degree of suspicion - formal approval of the project from the SNP, in the form of the party's National Executive Committee. Thus, the questionnaire was accompanied by a covering letter from the President of the party, William Wolfe, to demonstrate endorsement by the party and to ask for co-operation from potential respondents. This letter is reproduced as Appendix A.1.
- 3) In order to demonstrate further the semi-official nature of the survey and the blessing of the party, all

questionnaires were accompanied by a first-class stamped addressed envelope for return to SNP Headquarters. There, they were collected unopened and then packaged for dispatch to Canada. This "deal" was made in return for a promise to provide the SNP with an edited copy of the data set upon completion of the thesis.

Response to the Survey

It is difficult to judge the individual or collective effect of the various devices described above - and perhaps we were fortunate to be dealing with a highly politicized and most co-operative target group - but the rate of response to the survey was almost beyond our wildest expectations. At 55.8 per cent, the response is nearly twice the rate normally associated with postal surveys.

In Table A.1, below, we list the various sub-categories of the sample, generally in the order in which the sample was compiled, and the response rate for each group. The highest response rate (100 per cent) came from the smallest sub-category (the four convenors of the National Assembly policy committee), the next highest from the prospective or approved parliamentary candidates (83.3 per cent). Higher than average response rates were also registered by the officials/activists at the constituency and branch levels. In contrast, response rates of less than 50 per cent were registered by the

"national" sub-categories (including former parliamentary candidates, members of the NEC and elected members of National Council) and by the Councillors, although this category's response rate was quite good given the fact that many Councillors were involved in regional election campaigns at the time of the survey.

In Chapter Nine of the thesis, which focuses on the "activist component" of the SNP, we have recategorized our respondents into five broad groups according to their primary level of activity within the party organization. In Table A.2, below, we have divided our original sample into the same five categories - "National Leaders", "National Candidates", "Councillors", "Constituency Activists" and "Branch Activists" - in order to show the response rates for these groups.

Among the 278 "usable" responses, thirteen came from individuals who had either left the SNP or, while still SNP members, no longer regarded themselves as "active" in the party organization. (Twelve of these replies came from former parliamentary candidates, including two former MPs, and one from a former constituency activist.) A number of these respondents indicated why they had left or were no longer active in the party. Hence, while their data are excluded from the analysis of the "activist" component of the SNP in Chapter Nine, their replies have been referred to at various points in Part Three of the thesis.

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In addition to the 278 "usable" responses to the survey, we received ten other replies of some form. Six questionnaires were returned unfilled by the new occupants of addresses formerly ascribed to SNP activists. One member of the sample, whose current address had been verified but is now known to have left the party before 1982, returned the questionnaire marked "Not known at this address as an SNP member". One potential respondent (a 1974 candidate) considerately wrote to explain that he could not participate in the survey, having left partisan politics upon appointment to a senior judicial position. One branch activist returned the questionnaire unfilled but enclosed a three-page letter explaining his/her position on some of the questions posed; however, it was felt that, given the potential inaccuracies that might result from attempting to infer answers from this form of reply, this response should be excluded from the data set. And one questionnaire (fortunately the only one) was returned deliberately "spoiled".

Acknowledgements

Finally, no description of the SNP Activists Survey can be complete without acknowledging the contributions made by many other individuals and organizations whose help, advice or co-operation eased the task of mounting a study of this

magnitude. Grateful appreciation is expressed to the following:

Professor R.J. Jackson and the Department of Political Science and Dean D. Forcese and the Faculty of Social Science at Carleton University for financial assistance to defray printing and postage costs of the survey;

Professor N. Allen, Professor R.J. Jackson, Professor K.D. McRae, Iain More, Professor E.L. Tepper, and, especially, Dan Butler for their advice on the construction of the sample and the design of the questionnaire;

the National Executive Committee of the Scottish National Party for bestowing their blessing on the project (admittedly, only after some initial reluctance);

William Wolfe, then President of the SNP, for providing a covering letter, on behalf of the party organization, to be distributed with the questionnaire and to demonstrate the NEC's approval of the project;

the staff at SNP Headquarters, and especially Headquarters Director Iain More, for their assistance and co-operation in making available branch and constituency association records and lists of names and addresses of potential respondents;

the many SNP members whose address books and/or prodigious memories helped to trace the whereabouts of some members of the sample;

Alexander Graham of Dupliquik Ltd., Edinburgh, for advice on the layout and printing of the questionnaire (and for keeping printing costs to a manageable level);

the British Post Office for managing to deliver at least 288 of the questionnaires to their destined addresses;

and last, but most important of all, to the 278 respondents who took the time and, in the vast majority of cases, great care to complete the questionnaire - notwithstanding the contribution of all the others listed above, without their co-operation the survey would have failed.

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But to one of those mentioned above (however unfair it may be to all the others) must go the largest bouquet of all. Iain More, then Research Officer and Headquarters Director of the SNP, put my case to the National Executive Committee (when it had once refused to endorse the survey), ensured the full co-operation of the HQ staff in putting together the sample, collected the returned questionnaires and dispatched them to Canada, and provided a bed for a stranger from a foreign land. To Iain, my deepest thanks.

TABLE A.1

SNP ACTIVISTS SURVEY
Composition of Sample and Responses
by Sub-Category of Sample

Sub-Category	(1) N. in Sample	(2) N. Actually Mailed	(3) N. of Responses	(4) Response Rate (3 - 1) %
Parl. Candidates, 1979	71	70 ¹	34	47.9 ⁴
Parl. Candidates, 1974	49	45 ²	22	44.9 ⁴
By-Election and European Candidates 1978-82	7	7	2	28.6
Prospective Parl. Candidate	12	12	10	83.3
NEC Members	9	9	4	44.4
Nat. Council Members	10	10	4	40.0
Constit. Organisers	71	71	43	60.6
Constit. Officer/Activists	71	71	41	57.7
Branch Officers/Activists	132 ³	132	75	56.8
District & Regional Councillors	62	62	29	46.6
Policy Convenors	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>100.0</u>
	498	493	278	55.8 ⁴

Notes to Table A.1

1. One 1979 candidate not traceable
2. Four 1974 candidates not traceable
3. Ten of the 71 Scottish Constituencies, mainly in Glasgow, contain only one "constituency branch". In these ten, therefore, there was only one branch officer/activist included in the sample for each constituency.
4. We have indicated in this column the response rates calculated as a percentage of the numbers in the original sample. For information, response rates as a percentage of the number of questionnaires actually mailed in these sub-categories were: Candidates 1979, 48.6%; Candidates 1974, 48.9%; Overall, 56.4%.

TABLE A.2

SNP ACTIVISTS SURVEY
Composition of Sample and Responses
by Primary Level of Activity

Level of Activity*	(1) N. in Sample	(2) N. Actually Mailed	(3) N. of Active Respondents	(4) N. of Total Responses	(5) Response Rate (4 - 1) %
National Leaders	60	60	26	26	43.3
National Candidates	105	100	44	56	53.3
Councillors	67	67	32	32	47.8
Constit. Activists	137	137	81	82	59.9
Branch Activists	129	129	82	82	63.6
Totals	<u>498</u>	<u>493</u>	<u>265</u>	<u>278</u>	<u>55.8</u>

* For the definition of each "level of activity" see Chapter Nine.

Scottish National Party

5 North Charlotte Street
Edinburgh EH2 4JH
Tel 031-226 3661

Your ref
Our ref

Dear *fellow-member,*
Baxter-Moore Opinion Survey

Enclosed is a Questionnaire prepared by Mr Nick Baxter-Moore, a student at Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada and a member of the SNP Association in Canada. He prepared this in the hope that the SNP would allow him to circulate it for completion and return to him. He proposes to analyse the returns and write a thesis on the basis of them, for submission as part of his degree studies.

The Questionnaire as circulated has the approval of the NEC, and the NEC has also approved a procedure for ensuring anonymity of your completed forms. You will not be contacted direct by Mr Baxter-Moore, unless you are one of a handful of people whom he will contact with a request for an interview.

Mr Baxter-Moore has undertaken to let us have a copy of his analysis of the forms completed (at no stage will we or Mr Baxter-Moore have an opportunity to identify you or any other respondent) and in due course we will receive a copy of his thesis based on the returns.

You are at liberty, of course, not to respond to this request, but I hope that you will, and I hope that you will do it as soon as you possible can - I reckon you can do it in less than an hour.

Yours sincerely

William Wolfe

President

Carleton University
Ottawa, Canada K1S 5B6

March 1982

Dear SNP Member,

It would be much appreciated if you could spare the time to complete the enclosed questionnaire and return it to me, c/o the Research Office at SNP Headquarters in the s.a.e. provided.

The questionnaire forms the basis of a survey of SNP activists and candidates conducted as part of my doctoral research at Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada. As you will see from the enclosed letter from SNP President, William Wolfe, the questionnaire has been scrutinised by representatives of the Party's National Executive Committee and the Party has given me full co-operation in the conduct of the survey.

Let me assure you that your replies will be regarded as totally confidential. The code number appearing on the questionnaire itself is a precaution against pages becoming separated at a later date, and that on the return envelope is purely for the purpose of checking replies against the mailing list, so that you will not be bothered by an unnecessary follow-up letter. Although your replies will initially be sent to SNP Headquarters, they will be forwarded to me in Canada unopened and therefore will not be read by any member at Headquarters. To further the cause of confidentiality, the mailing list will remain in Edinburgh - therefore, I shall have no means of associating names with code numbers. Consequently, no answers appearing on the returned questionnaires will be attributable to any individual respondent.

With your anonymity guaranteed, please give serious consideration to answering the questionnaire openly and fully. It will not take up too much of your time - but the more answers I receive the more reliable and useful the results will be, both for my research and for the Scottish National Party, which will be given a copy of my findings in return for its kind co-operation.

Since I will not be able to acknowledge every reply individually, let me thank you in advance for your participation.

Yours sincerely

Department of Political Science c Room B640 c Lobb Building c (613) 231-2697

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No ____

SURVEY OF SCOTTISH
NATIONAL PARTY ACTIVISTS

Guide to the Questionnaire

1. Please try to complete the whole questionnaire at one sitting. Please enter below the date upon which the questionnaire was completed - and the date on which it was started, if different.
DATE OF COMPLETING QUESTIONNAIRE _____ 1982
2. The majority of questions require a single tick (✓), or if you prefer a cross (X), in one of the boxes provided. In order to avoid ambiguity, please try to make sure that the tick or cross is placed clearly within a single box and does not overlap the lines separating the boxes.
3. Where questions ask for dates or years (e.g. Q13, Q14, Q15), please try to be as accurate as possible and list all years or dates that apply.
4. Where questions ask for additional information or explanation (e.g. Q20a, Q28a, Q37a), please try to be as specific as possible.
5. IF THERE IS INSUFFICIENT ROOM FOR YOUR ANSWER TO ANY QUESTION, PLEASE USE THE SPACE PROVIDED ON THE LAST PAGE. Any such information should be accompanied by the number of the question concerned.
6. Some follow-up questions (e.g. Q36a, Q38a, Q46a) ask you to select certain statements from a preceding list and to place them in order of importance. These statements may be referred to by the letters identifying them on the list. HOWEVER, please feel free to add factors not on the list if you wish.
7. If, with regard to any particular question, you genuinely have no opinion at all or do not know the answer, please indicate by marking "D/K" in the margin opposite that question or sub-question. Please give the question some thought before marking "D/K" but, on the other hand, please do not mark a box at random merely for the sake of providing an 'answer'.
8. Please return completed questionnaires to N.J. Baxter-Moore, c/o SNP Research Office in the a.a.c. provided.
9. THANK YOU IN ADVANCE FOR YOUR CO-OPERATION.

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SURVEY OF
SNP ACTIVISTS

SECTION A - DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

Q1. Place of Birth

Scotland		Republic of Ireland	
England		Other (Please Specify)	
Wales			
N. Ireland			

Q2. Age _____

Q3. Sex

Male	
Female	

Q4. Education
(Please tick all that apply)

Elementary		College of Education	
Secondary		Other College	
Grammar/High		Polytechnic	
Comprehensive		University	
Public/Private		Postgraduate	

Q5. Occupation _____

Q6. Please place yourself in ONE of the following occupational groups.

Employer		Skilled Manual	
Manager		Semi-Skilled Manual	
Professional, Self-Employed		Unskilled Manual	
Professional, Employee		Farmer	
Foreman/Supervisor, Non-Manual		Full-time Student	
Foreman/Supervisor, Manual		Full-time Politician	
		Homemaker	
		Unemployed	
Clerical/White-Collar		Other (Please Specify)	
Self-Employed Manual		_____	

Q7. Please indicate your gross annual income and that of the principal income-earner in your household, if not yourself.

Gross Annual Income	Your Own Income	Income of Principal Earner
Less than £3000		
£3000 - 5999		
£6000 - 8999		
£9000 - 11999		
£12000 - 14999		
£15000 or more		

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No _____

- Q8. Do you generally think of yourself as belonging to a particular social class, (e.g. working class, middle class, etc.)?

Yes	☐	If "Yes" ⇒	Q8a. Which Class?	
No	☐		Middle Class	
		If "No" ⇒	Working Class	
			Other (Please Specify)	
			Q8b. If pressed to do so, which class would you say that you belonged to?	
			Middle Class	
			Working Class	
			Other (Please Specify)	

- Q9. Constituency in which you live _____
- Q10. Constituency in which you are politically active _____
- Q11. SNP Branch to which you belong _____

SECTION E - POLITICAL ACTIVITY

- Q12. What positions or offices do you currently hold in the SNP organisation? Which other positions have you held in the past? (Please tick all that apply.)

	Currently Hold	Held in Past
National Office-Holder		
Member of National Executive Committee		
Elected Member of National Council		
Regional/District Office-Holder		
Constituency Organiser		
Other Constituency Officer		
Branch Organiser		
Branch Secretary		
Other Branch Officer		
Parliamentary Candidate		
Local Government Candidate		
Delegate to National Conference		
Delegate to National Council/Assembly		
Other (Please Specify) _____		

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Q13. How many years have you been

a. An official in the SNP organisation?	Years
b. A member of the SNP?	Years
c. An "active" supporter of the SNP, i.e. canvassing, attending meetings, or otherwise working for the Party?	Years

Q14. Had you previously been active in or worked for any other party?

Yes	☐	If "Yes" →	Q14a. For which party?	<input type="text"/>
No	☐		Q14b. When?	19 -19

Q15. Were you previously a member of any other political party?

Yes	☐	If "Yes" →	Q15a. For which party?	<input type="text"/>
No	☐		Q15b. When?	19 -19

Q16. Have you ever stood as a candidate for the SNP in any of the following types of election? Or, have you been adopted as a prospective candidate for an election in the future?

	Candidate in past	Years?	Prospective Candidate
a. Election to European Parliament?			
b. General Election?			
c. Parliamentary By-Election?			
d. Regional/County Council Election?			
e. District/City/Burgh Election?			

Q17. Have you ever been an election candidate for any other political party or stood for office as an independent candidate?

Yes	☐	If "Yes" →	Q17a. Please indicate relevant dates and the name of the party which you represented, or Independent, beside the appropriate type of election.
No	☐		

Election Type	Other Party/Indep.	Years
European Parliament		
General Election		
Parliamentary By-Election		
Regional/County Election		
District/Burgh/City Election		

Page 5

No _____

Q18. Have you ever held public office, e.g. M.P., Regional Councillor, District Councillor, as a formal representative of the SNP?

Yes	
No	

→ If "Yes" →

Q18a. Please give names of elected public bodies on which you have served as an SNP member and the years during which you served.

Name of Public Body e.g. House of Commons, Glasgow Corporation, Fife Reg'l Council	Years
1.	
2.	
3.	

Q19. Have you ever held public office as a representative of a party other than the SNP or as an independent member?

Yes	
No	

→ If "Yes" →

Q19a. Please give names of public bodies on which you served, the party which you represented and the relevant dates.

Name of Public Body	Other Party/Indep.	Years
1.		
2.		
3.		

Q20. A number of people became members or activists in the SNP only after previously supporting another political party for some years, or after taking no active interest in politics at all. In your case, did you decide to join or actively support the SNP

a. Because you were brought up to do so or because your parents did?	
b. Because of one or two particular, or critical events?	
c. No special reason/couldn't say?	

→ If "b" →

Q20a. Which particular events?

--

SECTION C - ATTITUDES TOWARDS OTHER PARTIES

Q21. Which of the other parties do you see as the major opponent of the SNP, firstly in your own constituency and secondly with respect to elections in Scotland as a whole?

	In your own Constituency	In Scotland as a whole
Conservative (CON)		
Labour (LAB)		
Liberals (LIB)		
Social Democrats (SDP)		

Q22. Which of the other parties do you see as being closest to the SNP in each of the following policy areas?

	CON	LAB	LIB	SDP	NONE
a. Independence					
b. Devolution					
c. Economic Policy					
d. Social Policy					
e. North Sea Oil Revenues					

Q23. Please award each of the parties, including the SNP, a mark out of five for their stand on each of the following policy areas, (where 5=excellent, 4=good, 3=fair, 2=poor, 1=very poor.)

	CON	LAB	LIB	SDP	SNP
a. Independence					
b. Devolution					
c. Economic Policy					
d. Social Policy					
e. North Sea Oil Revenues					
f. "Scottish Policy" in general					

Q24. Please rank the parties in a personal order of merit for "being good for Scotland" or being "most sympathetic to Scotland".

First		"Most sympathetic"/"Best for Scotland"
Second		
Third		
Fourth		
Fifth		"Least sympathetic"/"Worst for Scotland"

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No ____

- Q25. Political parties are often referred to as being either "right wing" or "left wing". How would you rank the major parties, (CON, LAB, LIB, SDP, SNP), from "left" to "right".

a. "Furthest Left"	
b.	
c.	
d.	
e. "Furthest Right"	

- Q26. On a left-right scale of nought to ten, (where 0="extreme left", 5="centre" and 10="extreme right"), how would you characterise each of the major parties in Scotland AND your own politics? Please place each of the parties at the appropriate point on the scale below and, using "X" to mark the spot, also place yourself on the scale, based on your own political beliefs.

- Q27. How do you think that the new Social Democratic Party, and its alliance with the Liberals, will affect the electoral fortunes of the SNP, firstly in your own constituency and, secondly, in Scotland as a whole?

Impact of SDP will ...	In your own Constituency	In Scotland as a whole
Greatly improve SNP fortunes		
Slightly improve SNP fortunes		
Will have no effect		
Slightly worsen SNP fortunes		
Greatly worsen SNP fortunes		

- Q28. Have you ever voted, in a parliamentary general or by-election, for a party other than the SNP?

Yes	
No	

→ If "Yes" →

Q28a. For Which Party?	Q28b. When?

- Q29. If, in a general election or parliamentary by-election,
 a) there were no SNP candidate in your constituency, or
 b) the SNP candidate appeared to have no possible chance
 of winning,
 for which party would you vote?

	CON	LAB	LIB	SDP	SNP	Other	Would Not Vote
a. If no SNP candidate					N/A		
b. If SNP candidate had no chance of winning							

SECTION D - SCOTLAND OR BRITAIN?

- Q30. Many people think of themselves in local, regional, or national terms. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as

(Please
place in
order of
strength
or
identity)

a. Local/regional identity. (e.g. Glaswegian, Highlander)?	
b. Scottish/Scots?	
c. English?	
d. British?	
e. European?	
f. Some other identity. (e.g. Irish, Welsh)?	

Please
specify

Please
specify

- Q31. How "Scottish" do you feel, as opposed to "British" or some other identity?

a. Very strongly		d. Slightly/not at all	
b. Strongly		e. "I don't usually think in those terms"	
c. Moderately			

- Q32. Which of the following options is your ideal of the future political and constitutional status of Scotland? (Please place in order of priority, e.g. 1=most ideal situation, 2=second best, etc.)

a. Fully independent state	
b. Strong devolved Assembly, with economic and tax powers	
c. Weak devolved Assembly, without economic and tax power	
d. Keep as now, but with more Scottish MPs at Westminster	
e. No change	
f. Some other arrangement (e.g.	

- Q32a. Which of the above options appears to be the wish of a majority

- Q33. If/when Scotland becomes an independent state, would you personally be in favour of Scotland joining any of the following international organisations?

	Yes	No
a. The British Commonwealth		
b. The European Community		
c. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)		
d. The Association of Nordic States/The Nordic Bloc		
e. A future Association of States of the British Isles		

- Q34. How do you feel about Scotland's economic situation?

- a. Do you think that Scotland is better or worse off economically than it was, say, ten years ago?
- b. Do you think that, by the next election in about two years time, Scotland will be better or worse off economically than it is now?

	a. Now, opposed to 10 yrs ago	b. In 2 yrs time
Scotland much better off		
Scotland slightly better off		
Scotland about the same		
Scotland slightly worse off		
Scotland much worse off		

- Q35. The following statements refer to the general well-being of people living in Scotland compared to those living in England. Please indicate how you feel about each statement by marking the appropriate box. (1=strongly agree, 2=moderately agree, 3=neutral/no strong feeling, 4=moderately disagree, 5=strongly disagree.)

	Agree		Neutral	Disagree	
	1	2	3	4	5
a. Scotland, in general, is worse off economically than England.					
b. On average, Scots have less opportunity to influence politics than the English.					
c. I am better off economically than people of similar age and experience in England.					
d. I, personally, have more opportunity to influence politics than most people in England.					
e. In general, social conditions in Scotland are much worse than they are in England.					

SECTION E - THE REFERENDUM AND THE 1979 ELECTION

Q36. In the referendum of 1979, given the imposition of the 'forty per cent clause', an insufficient number of Scottish voters supported the implementation of the Scotland Act. Please indicate your feelings about each of the following statements concerning the referendum. (KEY TO BOXES: 1=strongly agree, 2=moderately agree, 3=neutral/no strong feelings, 4=moderately disagree, 5=strongly disagree.)

	Agree		Neutral	Disagree	
	1	2	3	4	5
a. People were voting against the record of the Labour Government					
b. The Labour Party failed to support its own legislation.					
c. The whole campaign was treated as a dry-run for the election.					
d. People just could not be bothered to get out to vote.					
e. Obviously, a majority of people were opposed to devolution.					
f. Voters feared that devolution was the first step to independence.					
g. The voters did not understand the issues involved.					
h. The press did not give devolution enough support/coverage.					
i. The SNP did not have the resources to match the anti-devolutionists.					
j. Some voters thought that the legislation did not go far enough.					
k. SNP support was in decline anyway.					
l. The SNP itself did not work hard enough for the Assembly.					

Q36a. Please select up to THREE statements from Q36. which you think best account for the outcome of the referendum. Place them in order of importance in determining the final result. (Statements from the list may be identified by their letters, but please feel free to include factors not already on the list.)

1. Most important factor	_____
2. Second most important	_____
3. Third most important	_____

Q37. In the aftermath of the referendum, SNP Members of Parliament introduced the motion of no-confidence which brought down the Labour Government. Do you think that they did the right thing?

Yes	☐
No	☐

If "No" → Q37a. Why Not?

--

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No _____

Q38. What happened to SNP voters between 1974 and 1979?

Please indicate your feelings - strongly agree, moderately disagree, etc. - about each of the following statements with regard to the decline of SNP support in the 1979 General Election. (KEY TO BOXES: see Q37, above.)

	Agree		Neutral	Disagree	
	1	2	3	4	5
a. Support for independence declined.					
b. Support for devolution declined.					
c. Voters in Scotland wanted to get the Labour Government out.					
d. Voters wanted to keep the Conservatives out of office.					
e. The SNP was caught in the middle as class politics were re-established.					
f. The SNP had no personalities to match Thatcher and Callaghan.					
g. SNP Members of Parliament failed to impress the voters.					
h. The SNP failed to offer genuine alternative policies.					
i. In a campaign on economic issues, the SNP was seen as irrelevant.					
j. The SNP lost heart/we did not work as hard as we should.					
k. The SNP failed to hold on to its young supporters.					
l. The SNP failed to keep its working class support.					
m. The SNP failed to keep its middle class support.					
n. Many people voting SNP in 1974 were just protest and tactical voters.					
o. Local/regional factors played a major part in the overall result.					
p. All things considered, The SNP did not really do too badly.					

Q38a. Now, please select up to THREE statements from Q38. which you think best account for the performance of the SNP in the 1979 election, firstly with regard to the result in your own constituency and, secondly, with regard to the result in Scotland as a whole. (Again please feel free to include factors not on the list.)

Most Important Factors In Constituency	Most Important Factors In Scotland
1. _____	1. _____
2. _____	2. _____
3. _____	3. _____

SECTION F - THE SNP AND THE FUTURE

Q39. Do you feel that you personally have an adequate opportunity to influence the policies or the direction of the SNP?

Yes	☐
No	☐

If "No" →

Q41a. Why Not?/How Might the Situation be Improved?

--

Q40. With regard to policies, the following statements reflect some ideas or debates recently advanced in British or Scottish politics. Please indicate your feelings about each of the statements by marking the appropriate box. (KEY TO BOXES: 1=strongly agree, 2=moderately agree, 3=neutral/no strong feelings, 4=moderately disagree, 5=strongly disagree.)

	Agree		Neutral	Disagree	
	1	2	3	4	5
a. All industry should be in private hands, free enterprise works best					
b. Governments have a responsibility to maintain full employment.					
c. Government has grown too large, it is time to start cutting back.					
d. Scotland's economy will recover once it is in Scottish hands.					
e. High taxes reduce the incentive to work hard and to invest.					
f. Nuclear power is unnecessary - we have other sources of energy.					
g. Planning and some state control of the economy are necessary.					
h. Redistribution of income is necessary in the interests of equality.					
i. North Sea Oil revenues should be invested primarily in Scotland.					
j. Trade Unions are too strong, their power should be curtailed.					
k. Government should increase spending especially on Social Services.					
l. The police require much stronger powers to enforce law and order.					
m. There should be no nuclear weapons based on Scottish territory.					
n. Council houses should not be sold off by local authorities.					

Q41. What type of strategy should the SNP pursue with regard to the new Liberal/Social Democratic Alliance? Should the SNP

	Yes	No
a. Seek an election pact with LIB/SDF?		
b. Support a LIB/SDP minority government in return for certain concessions?		
c. View the Alliance as the SNP's main rival for the non-class-party vote and therefore attack it strenuously?		

Q42. Do you personally think that, in the next general election, the SNP should contest every seat in Scotland, or concentrate its efforts in certain constituencies or regions?

Should the SNP contest all 71 Scottish seats?

Yes	
No

If "No" →

Q42a. Which of the following should the SNP focus on?

Constituencies where it has done well in the past?	
Regions in which it has done well in the past?	
Constituencies which it has a real chance of winning?	
Other _____?	

Q43. Are you a member of the '79 Group?

Yes	
No	

Q44. Do you think that groups like the '79 Group, whether formally or informally constituted, have a legitimate role to play within the Party?

Yes	
No

If "No" →

Q44a. Why Not?

--

Q45. Do you think that the SNP should seek the establishment of a Scottish Assembly with powers devolved from Westminster - either as an end in itself or as a first step to Independence?

Yes	
No	

Q46. What direction do you personally think that the SNP should take between now and the next general election? Please indicate your feelings about each of the following statements on possible party strategies. (KEY TO BOXES: 1=strongly agree, 2=moderately agree, 3=neutral/no strong feelings, 4=moderately disagree, 5=strongly disagree.)

	Agree		Neutral	Disagree	
	1	2	3	4	5
a. The SNP should campaign solely on the issue of Independence.					
b. The SNP should campaign mainly on the issue of devolution.					
c. The SNP should develop a comprehensive policy programme dealing with all issues.					
d. The SNP should adopt radical "left wing" economic and social policy.					
e. The SNP should adopt conservative economic and social policies.					
f. The SNP should adopt middle-of-the-road economic and social policy.					
g. The SNP should concentrate on winning working class support.					
h. The SNP should concentrate on winning middle class support.					
i. The SNP should try to appeal to all classes.					
j. The SNP should concentrate on winning support from present Labour voters.					
k. The SNP should concentrate on winning support from present Conservative voters.					
l. The SNP should concentrate on winning support from present Liberal and SDP voters.					
m. The SNP should concentrate on attracting new/young voters.					
n. The SNP should attempt to win support from all parties.					
o. The SNP should vary its appeal and campaign strategy from one region to another.					

Q46a. Which strategies would you like to see the SNP follow between now and the next general election, firstly with regard to Scotland as a whole and, secondly, within your own region or constituency? Please list up to THREE strategies from Q46, or substitute your own thoughts, in order of priority/importance in each box below.

Strategies for Scotland	Local Strategies
1. _____	1. _____
2. _____	2. _____
3. _____	3. _____

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No _____

Q47. In general terms, would you say that the SNP has been successful over the last ten years?

a. Very successful	
b. Moderately successful	
c. Neither one nor the other	
d. Moderately unsuccessful	
e. Highly unsuccessful	

→ If "a" or "b" →

Q47a. Successful
in what way?

Q48. As a currently active member of the SNP, would you remain a member of the Party under the following conditions?

	Yes	No
a. If SNP support declined again at the next election?		
b. If there were a number of disastrous elections?		
c. If the SNP shifted significantly to "the left"?		
d. If the SNP shifted significantly to "the right"?		
e. If the SNP campaigned solely on Independence?		
f. If the SNP campaigned in favour of devolution?		
g. If the SNP were associated with political violence in any form?		

Q49. As an active nationalist, do you believe that the cause of Scottish independence is so important that any activity in its pursuit is justifiable? Which of the following activities, in support of a goal of Scottish independence, do you personally consider to be justified?

	Yes	No	Only under certain conditions (e.g.?)
a. Disruption of parliament by Nationalist MPs?			
b. Strikes, Economic Disruption?			
c. Mass Marches, Demonstrations?			
d. Civil Disobedience?			
e. Other (Please Specify) _____?			

Q50. For the last question, we turn to your view of Scotland's future political status. Realistically speaking, how soon do you think that the following events might occur:

- a. the creation of an elected Scottish Assembly with significant powers;
- b. the establishment of a fully independent Scottish state?

	a. Assembly	b. Independence
Within the next 5 years		
Within the next 10 years		
Within the next 20 years		
Within the next 50 years		
Never/not in the foreseeable future		

Appendix B

THE "RADICAL SCOTLAND" SURVEY

In its June/July 1983 issue, the Edinburgh-based magazine Radical Scotland published an article entitled "79 Group: Where Are They Now?" based upon an 'exclusive' survey of former members of the Group. According to the magazine, "Questionnaires were sent to the 217 individuals on the SNP 79 Group membership list at the time of the Group's dissolution. The results are based on the 79 returns received by the copy date (36% return rate)."

Since the SNP Activists Survey data base contained only 25 respondents who claimed membership of the '79 Group, the Radical Scotland survey promised the opportunity to gain further insight into the composition and attitudes of the '79 Group membership. Upon request, the editorial collective of the magazine kindly made available all 83 completed questionnaires that had been returned by June 1, 1983 (the 79 upon which the article was based plus four more received after it went to press - an overall response rate of 38.2 percent).^{*} These responses have now been coded as a separate data set on the '79 Group. Because the Radical Scotland article drew upon

* N.B. - Since one of the respondents acknowledged having left the Group in 1981 (having been a member for

less than a year), this case was excluded from most of our Tables based on the Radical Scotland data set.

answers to only 10 of the 29 questions in the survey, much of the material may be regarded as previously unpublished, although not as primary research conducted by this author.

In Appendix B.1, below, we append a reproduction of the questionnaire distributed by Radical Scotland to members of the former '79 Group.

Appendix B.1

Reproduction of Questionnaire for the "Radical
Scotland" Survey of Members of Former '79 Group

- Q1. Age 18-25 _____
 26-30 _____
 31-35 _____
 36-40 _____
 Over 40 _____
- Q2. Have you undergone full time, post school education YES/NO
- Q3. Occupation _____
- Q4. Are you a member of a Trade Union YES/NO
and if so, which one _____
- Q5. When did you join the SNP? _____
- Q6. Which of the following best represents your reason for joining:-

Supported Scottish independence

Supported independence as a means
to a socialist Scotland

felt SNP was 'good for Scotland'
- Q7. If you joined after the 1979 General Election was the existence of the SNP '79 Group a significant factor YES/NO
- Q8. Had you previously been a member of any other political party active in Scotland YES/NO
and if so, which _____

Q9. Which of the following positions have you held within the SNP: -

Branch Officebearer	YES/NO
Constituency Officebearer	YES/NO
Nat. Ass. delegate	YES/NO
Nat. Council delegate	YES/NO
Annual Conf. "	YES/NO
Local Govt. candidate	YES/NO
Parliamentary "	YES/NO

Q10. When did you join the SNP '79 Group _____

Q11. Which of the following best represents your reason for joining:-

felt need for discussion forum

need for SNP to be seen to have organized leftwing

need to organise to win internal (SNP) debates and elections

attempt to create socialist SNP

Q12. Are you still a member of the SNP YES/NO

If the answer to that question is 'NO' please move to Question 16.

Q13. Compared with one year ago would you say that your involvement in, and work for, the SNP had:-

Increased
Remained Constant
Decreased

Q14. Compared with one year ago would you say that your involvement in, and work for, other organizations had:-

Increased
Remained Constant
Decreased

Could you specify those organizations, if any _____

Q15. If the SNP does not withdraw the expulsions of the members of the interim committee of the '79 Group Socialist Society, will you

Definitely stay in the SNP

Probably " " " "

" leave the SNP

Definitely " " "

Please move on to Question 18.

Q16. Have you joined any other political party YES/NO
and if so, which one _____

Q17. Compared with one year ago would you say that your general level of political activity had:-

Increased

Remained Constant

Decreased

Could you specify which organizations you are now active in, if any _____

Q18. Do you believe that the SNP is a democratic organization YES/NO

Q19. In order of priority please list what you regard as the three most important political issues at the moment.

1 _____
2 _____
3 _____

Q20. On the following 10 issues please indicate which party you believe to have the best policies:-

Civil Liberties

Energy

Economy

Environment

Education

Health Service

EEC

Housing

Employment

Peace and Disarmament

- Q21. Which of the following best represents your view on independence/devolution:-
 support independence, nothing less
 devolution as a means to independence
 support a devolved Scottish Assembly
- Q22. Which of the following organizations do you see as most likely to bring about Scottish independence:-
 Campaign for a Scottish Assembly
 Labour Party
 Lib/SDP Alliance
 Scottish Socialist Society
 SNP
 STUC
 Other (please specify)
- Q23. Which of the following do you believe is the most likely outcome of the next UK General Election:-
 Conservative Government
 Labour "
 Lib/SDP "
 No overall majority
- Q24. Could you please express the number of seats which you believe each party will have in Scotland after the next election (total = 72).
 Conservative
 Labour
 Lib/SDP
 SNP
- Q25. Which one action do you think could most improve the SNP's election prospects. _____
- Q26. What do you think will be the SNP's role after the next election. _____
- Q27. Do you believe that a Labour Government would implement their manifesto commitments in favour of
 1. A Scottish Assembly YES/NO
 2. Unilateral nuclear disarmament YES/NO

Q28. Have you joined the Scottish Socialist
Society

YES/NO

Q29. Which of the following periodicals do you
read regularly:-

Cencrastus
New Socialist
New Statesman

Radical Scotland
Scots Independent
Tribune

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