**MEMORY, MILITARISM AND CITIZENSHIP:
TRACKING THE DOMINION INSTITUTE IN CANADA'S
MILITARY-CULTURAL MEMORY NETWORK**

by

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ABSTRACT

This study examines the recent cultural shift in the representation of the Canadian Forces from a peacekeeper to a warrior. It explains this transformation by applying Actor-Network Theory to discursive policy inquiry in order to uncover a network of actors engaged in the production and circulation of cultural memory. This network has its roots in a period of crisis over the representations of the military, citizenship and memory that occurred during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Employing a case study of the Dominion Institute, a history advocacy organization, this dissertation examines how a “military-cultural memory network” has emerged as a central node. The urgency and the resources for this network emerged after the 1995 Quebec referendum. Several actors are tied into the web of associations: historians, citizenship groups, veterans, teachers, policymakers, the media, the cultural industry, the corporate community, politicians, philanthropic foundations, the military and many others.

The core of this dissertation is an analysis of how the Dominion Institute has played a key role as both a practical network builder by drawing other actors together and as a purveyor of discourse guiding the content that results from these interactions. In sum, the creation of this network is a communicative act. Over the course of its development, the Institute has positioned Canada’s warrior tradition as the primary lens for the construction of citizenship and the transmission of cultural memory. This strategic shift occurred in the context of September 11, 2001 and it has allowed the group to expand its reaches into Canadian classrooms. Finally, official governmental representations of citizenship presented around Remembrance Day of 2009 mark the ascendance of the network and the normalization of its discourse.

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DEDICATION

To the memory of my grandmother's brother, Israel Herzwolf, and the rest of her family who perished well before their time at the hands of a deeply militaristic culture.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACS	Association for Canadian Studies
ANT	Actor-Network Theory
CBC	Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
CCS21	Canadian Council for Security in the 21 st Century
CCU	Council for Canadian Unity
CDFAI	Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute
CNHS	Canada's National History Society
CRA	Canada Revenue Agency
DCH	Department of Canadian Heritage
DND	Department of National Defence
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
NCC	National Capital Commission
NFB	National Film Board
SCONDVA	Sub-committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs
TIFF	Toronto International Film Festival
VAC	Veterans Affairs Canada

If my premises are correct, nationalism cannot provide the answer. Even if massive investments in flags, dignity, protectionism, and Canadian content of television managed to hold the country together a few more years, separatism would remain a recurrent phenomenon... In the world of tomorrow... the state—if it is not outdistanced by its rivals—will need political instruments which are sharper, stronger, and more finely controlled than anything based on mere emotionalism.

~ Pierre Trudeau, *Federalism, Nationalism and Reason*, 1964

INTRODUCTION: FROM PEACEKEEPING TO POLICING

Ever since the Pearson-Trudeau era of the 1960s and 1970s, Canadians have defined themselves as an “unmilitary people” and their country as a “peaceable kingdom.” The peacekeeper, whether represented as the iconic Mountie or the blue-bereted UN observer, serves as the main symbol in this national dream-work. Unlike other nations that are defined by their exploits on the battlefield, Canada perceives itself with a non-militaristic lens and its influence abroad as a nation builder. This mythology is supported by a wealth of cultural texts and practices. As communicated in the popular series of Molson “I Am [Canadian]” commercials that were aired in movie theatres and that garnered greater exposure on television at the turn of the twenty-first century, peacekeeping is on par with the celebration of beer, hockey and multiculturalism in terms of the discourse by which civic identity is both constructed and imagined.¹ However, this symbolic culture is not only brandished by marketers.

The peacekeeping myth is also a dominant theme in the writings of academics and public intellectuals. Eva Mackey (2002) and Daniel Francis (1997), in their cultural analyses of Canadian mythologies, reconsider the place of aboriginals and the RCMP in the peacekeeping myth. They contrast this sanitized representation with the reality of a contested and often violent history. For Mackey, in her study of the celebrations surrounding the 125th anniversary of Confederation, the image of the Mountie greeting an aboriginal chief is the launching point for a critique of the inherent contradictions that

¹ See Ira Wagman’s “Wheat, Barley, Hops, Citizenship: Molson’s ‘I am [Canadian]’” (2002) for a detailed study of these commercials.

mire official representations of the nation's "heritage of tolerance" (25). Examining the cultural influence of Pierre Berton's popular histories, Francis argues that the Mountie has been transformed into a symbol of a national predisposition to deference in the face of violence (30). In a similar vein, Michael Adams (2003) and John Ralston Saul (1997) counterpose Canada's amicable reputation against the militarism associated with the US. In his survey of national myths, Saul is quick to state that unlike Americans, Canadians have "shown no interest in classical representations of war" (143). For Adams (2003), based on his comparative demographic work, Americans tend to think of themselves in masculine terms as lone warriors who fight for peace and justice. Canadians, on the other hand, honour "feminine" attributes such as "compromise, harmony, and equality" (123).

This peacekeeping narrative is so deeply engrained into public discourse that it even comprises a main element of the scholarship on Canadian military history and strategic studies. In the first official history published by the Department of National Defence's Directorate of History, C.P. Stacey begins (1955) with the succinct yet enduring phrase: "Canada is an unmilitary community. Warlike her people have often been forced to be; military they have never been" (3). This discourse can be traced from as early as George Stanley's *Canada's Soldiers: The Military History of an Unmilitary People* (1954) to as recently as Col. Bernard Horn's edited books *The Canadian Way of War: Serving the National Interest* (2006) and *From the Outside Looking In: Media and Defence Analyst Perspectives on Canadian Leadership* (2005). In these works, a wave of scholars, public figures and military experts consider the effect that this dominant discourse has had upon the Canadian Forces. Horn and Major General Lewis Mackenzie argue that this myth obscures Canada's unsung reputation as a warrior. According to

Mackenzie (2006), “[f]or the past century we have defined ourselves as a culture and society largely by our efforts at peace rather than war. Nevertheless, although not warlike or militaristic people, Canadians have earned a reputation as brave and capable soldiers” (7). Horn supports this claim with a historical study that traces this warrior culture back to the military tradition of Canada’s aboriginal population. French colonists would in turn appropriate this approach in a strategy they labelled *la petite guerre*. At the root of this military strategy, which is said to continue to this day, is the belief that quick and violent attacks in small numbers and in conjunction with larger allies against enemy forces can be an effective strategy. Military historian Sean Maloney (2006) and CBC journalist Carol Off (2005) suggest that the peacekeeping symbolic culture has given Canadians a false perception of its military. Whereas Off blames this on the overemphasis of non-aggressive symbolism as epitomized by Ottawa’s National Peacekeeping Monument, Maloney is more conspiratorial in his critique: “The imprecise and opportunistic use of the term *peacekeeping* by a variety of interests, including academics, media commentators, emergent non-governmental organizations, and elements within the Canadian government, was indicative of their own fuzzy thinking and their incomplete (perhaps wilful) lack of comprehension of Canadian history” (317).

What is interesting about these works on Canada as a peacekeeper and Canadians as an unmilitary people is that, other than the studies by Adams and Saul, they all question the veracity of this dominant mythology. Nonetheless, there are two dramatically different interpretations of why this is the case. Whereas Francis and Mackey consider it as part of a hegemonic neo-liberal, progressivist discourse that attempts to unify a complex and unstable postmodern society, the military authors

suggest that it is rooted in the pervasive Trudeauian, humanistic viewpoint that does not consider English Canada's pre-1960s heritage. They suggest that it is within this earlier history that one can find stories of Canada as a nation with a unified population willing to send its soldiers to fight for Judeo-Christian values and Western causes. Ironically, this progressivist discourse is labelled inauthentic by both sides: either for using liberal language to regulate the politics of identity or for denying a conservatist vision. Despite this discrepancy in perspective, both view the peacekeeping myth as a constructed representation and the result of political expediencies.

Francis (1997) states that the myth of the peaceable kingdom "has been said so often that it has become 'true'" (30). Paralleling Mackey's analysis, he argues that it exists in order to obscure the coercive power of the state. Likewise, Col. Horn (2005) is also aware that if a discourse is "repeated often enough or pervasively enough, perception becomes reality" (1). According to Maloney (2005), "Canadians are ceaselessly inundated with the ideology that Canada doesn't fight wars, that Canadians are peacekeepers and that combat is something others do for crass economic motives" (245). Nonetheless, he suggests that this sentiment is not based on fact, but a result of a national psyche that has been carefully constructed around discourses of post-colonial insecurity and anti-Americanism. He is sure to note what he sees as the absurdity of this representation: its peak in the 1990s came at a time when peacekeeping as a strategy was deemed ineffective and the involvement of the Canadian Forces in UN missions was at its lowest point. With this in mind, one is reminded of Harold Innis' (1951) reference to Hegel's description of Minerva's Owl. Innis notes that the pinnacle of a cultural regime comes at the decline of a social order. In this case, the renaissance of the representation

of Canada as a peacekeeper came at the twilight of this approach to military and foreign policy—when the Canadian Forces did not have the personnel or equipment to fulfil its international commitments and when those UN operations in which it did participate were mired in controversy.

A SHIFT IN SYMBOLIC CULTURE

One key site for discovering this re-emergence of a warrior mythology is located in the way in which the Canadian Forces represents itself to the public. For the military, the 1990s marked what Major-General Rick Hillier labelled a “decade of darkness.” Although he was specifically referring to budgetary cuts, the 1990s witnessed major controversies as well as a defence policy led by Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy that repositioned the military as a “soft power.” In 1998, the effect of this decade of darkness on the morale of soldiers surfaced during an investigation by parliament’s Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs (SCONDVA) into the quality of life of Canadian Forces’ personnel. Although the primary focus was on issues of compensation, healthcare, housing and transition from military to civilian life, this committee’s report revealed an underlying emotional concern: “...the feeling among military personnel that they had somehow been forgotten by the nation they had sworn to serve” (SCONDVA 1998). The report laid some of the blame on the Department of National Defence (DND) for not effectively communicating stories of accomplishment to the public. It also came at a time when the military was

asked to review its communication strategy by the Somalia Inquiry, which expressed concern about a culture of secrecy that pervaded the ranks.²

This sense of abandonment began to wane in the late 1990s as the Canadian Forces took a more public role by helping out in the relief missions during the Saguenay River flood in 1996, the Red River flood in 1997, Eastern Canada's ice storm in 1998 and the infamous Toronto snowstorm in 1999. These events provided a convenient opportunity for the military to test its new approach to public relations. The 1998 ice storm, in particular, was a rare example of the military being depicted assisting Canadians in major urban centres around Ottawa and Montreal. Perhaps it was not a coincidence that the officer in charge of this mission, known as Operation Recuperation³, was Rick Hillier who was then a Brigadier-General. In contrast to the negative press still lingering from the Somalia Affair, he framed Operation Recuperation as a domestic example of all the good that the Canadian Forces contributes to foreign countries: "They've done it around the world these past years and now Canadians need assistance and (the soldiers) want to do it" (qtd. in Pugliese, *The Ottawa Citizen*, January 10, 1998, A3). The images of soldiers helping out were credited for a rapid upsurge in public opinion. In less than a year after the ice storm, Pollara opinion-research found that 88% of Canadians had a favourable impression of the Canadian Forces (Ward, *The Canadian Press*, December 7, 1998). However, it was only after the events of September 11, 2001 and the start of the

² The first step was the creation of a Chief of Public Affairs for DND in 1996 and the subsequent appointment of Larry Gordon to this position. With the perception that the military needed to appear more open and that the media would always focus on negative stories, Gordon designed a strategy, which was contained in a brief 1998 document entitled "Public Affairs Policy," that called for direct lines of communication with the public.

³ This was the largest domestic military operation in Canada since the FLQ crisis in 1970.

mission in Afghanistan's Kandahar province in February of 2006 when the representation of a warrior culture became a dominant lens for depicting the military.

Over the course of the war in Afghanistan, the military has made considerable steps to present itself as an important national institution that can not only contribute to humanitarian relief efforts but can also fight wars. Perhaps the most important figure in this effort was Rick Hillier—not just as a policymaker, but also as a symbol. After being appointed the Chief of the Defence Staff in 2005 by Prime Minister Paul Martin, Hillier took on a public persona as a fierce advocate for the military. He adeptly used the media to call on politicians to provide more funding and for Canada to be more aggressive in the global fight against terrorism. His crass language and bold demeanour made him an ideal spokesman in an era of media sound bites. In a press conference following the London subway bombings of July 2005, he set an early tone for his tenure as “Canada’s top soldier” with his famous remark that terrorists were “detestable murderers and scumbags.” However, his task was not just to inform Canadians about their enemy. Even more importantly, as he implied in this same media briefing, his task was to rebrand the military as a force that unabashedly uses violence to protect Canadians at home and abroad: “We’re not the public service of Canada, we’re not just another department. **We are the Canadian Forces, and our job is to be able to kill people**” (qtd. in Leblanc, *The Globe and Mail*, July 15, 2005, A1; emphasis added). Hillier’s importance was to reverse the trend from the decade of darkness when the military was mired in crisis and its only public image was that of a peacekeeper. He provided a representation of the Canadian Forces that was immodest and that emphasized a warrior tradition.

Although his direct approach garnered many political enemies, especially amongst those who triumphed the peacekeeping myth, and although his uncomplicated view of geopolitics made him a divisive public figure, at the end of his tenure one thing was certain: he was commended by the national and international media for rehabilitating the status of the military and making soldiers feel proud again to serve.⁴ In his farewell news conference, he summed up his legacy by gleefully boasting that the Canadian Forces were “one of the big boys now” (qtd in Martin, *National Post*, April 16, 2008, A1). While it may be too soon to state whether he was indeed successful in giving back the military its teeth and making it a legitimate police force in the global fight against terror, he certainly gave the impression that this was case. According to *The Economist*, Hillier’s most important legacy was not necessarily helping to secure more funding or administrating the Forces during a turbulent period, but for making “**Canadians comfortable with fighting wars**” (*The Economist*, July 26, 2008, p. 44; emphasis added). A society that once preferred only to speak about its military in an unmilitaristic way, if at all, had reconsidered its warrior culture.

A key element in Hillier’s repositioning of the Forces, which has gone unnoticed by journalists and academics, was the launch on February 6, 2006, appropriately timed to coincide with the beginning of the Kandahar mission, of Operation Connection. The objective of this public relations campaign was to increase the presence of the military within public spaces and at social gatherings. Perhaps influenced by his experience

⁴ His memoir, *A Soldier First: Bullets, Bureaucrats and the Politics of War* (2009), was a bestseller and was particularly popular amongst military personnel and their families. The book’s theme is that while soft power is an admirable military strategy, it hampered the Canadian Forces by not allowing it to retrieve the capacity to deploy effective, well-trained and well-led hard power that is necessary in contemporary conflicts.

during the 1998 ice storm, this initiative mobilized local regiments to play a prominent role in urban and rural community events: concerts, NHL games, charity dinners, fairs and even for no special reason, just as long as they are seen in public spaces. What made these displays of military personnel and equipment stand out from past efforts was that the intention was not simply to attract more recruits, but to achieve a symbolic objective of raising “the profile of the Canadian Forces in the minds of the Canadian public” (Brown, *Army News*, March 9, 2006). Drawing on Michael Billig’s (1995) concept of banal nationalism, this campaign can be viewed as a shift from the intermittent displays of militarism to a concerted effort to make military symbols an endemic condition of the everyday life experience of Canadians. However, it is not military symbols in general that have pervaded public space; rather, it is the presentation of more aggressive forms such as tanks and armoured vehicles that provide the public with reminders or, using Billig’s language, “continual flagging” that the military is no longer primarily engaged in peacemaking, but that it is now back in the profession of killing. What was once only seen on special occasions—soldiers in urban spaces aiding in disaster relief—is now an everyday feature of culture—vehicles parading in city squares and uniformed soldiers in public spaces.⁵

⁵ Although this may seem like a strange point, there is a rumour, which I have confirmed is not true in talks with Col. Horn, that there was a memo sent to soldiers during the 1990s asking them to avoid wearing their uniforms on buses, malls and other spaces.

Image 1 *Canadian Forces at Dundas Square, Toronto, ON (June 17, 2009)*

THE MILITARIZATION OF CULTURAL MEMORY

Hillier's emergence as a national icon is one of many recent examples in Canadian culture in which the military has become a more pervasive institution and represented by a hardened narrative. As noted, the context for this cultural shift is the escalation of Canada's role in Afghanistan with the start of the Kandahar mission in February of 2006. Other examples pointing to this transition include the "Fight Fear. Fight Distress. Fight Chaos. Fight with the Canadian Forces" recruitment commercials and a wave of programming about the military such as the CBC's *Afghanada* and Discovery Canada's *Combat School*. However, although one might expect a re-emergence of the warrior myth in representations produced and closely associated with the Forces at a time of an increased combat role, another site to locate this hardened and unabashed militarism is in the realm of cultural memory.

It is easy to chart a general shift from the 1990s to the present in official memorials from an emphasis on peacekeeping to reminders of Canada's history as a nation of warriors. Ottawa, the nation's capital, serves as an important site to track this cultural trend. The only major military memorial constructed in the 1990s was the National Peacekeeping Monument, which was unveiled as part of the CANADA 125 celebrations in 1992. Sponsored by DND and the National Capital Commission (NCC), this \$2.8 million monument entitled *Reconciliation*, was designed to commemorate the 90,000 Canadians who served on UN peacekeeping missions. As Prime Minister Brian Mulroney proudly boasted at the unveiling, it was meant to celebrate "the victory of a Canadian ideal: the creation of multi-national *peacekeeping* forces under the UN banner" (qtd. in *Ottawa Citizen*, October 9, 1992, B1; emphasis in the original). According to Paul Gough (2002), this monument was part of an attempt by the state not only to join, but also to "control the rhetoric of peace" that dominated public discourse at that time (221). However, the turn of the century brought forth a renaissance of a hardened view of Canadian military history with the construction of several sites in Ottawa dedicated to commemorating military sacrifice (See Table 1).

Table 1 *Ottawa's military memorial renaissance, 1999-2010*

1999	The Diefenbunker Museum was opened to the public to exhibit this former nuclear fallout shelter and to serve as Canada's Cold War Museum.
2000	The National War Memorial underwent renovations to extend its space and reinforce its public significance with the addition of the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier.
2001	The National Aboriginal Veterans Monument was installed at the front of Confederation Park. In the same year, the federal government designated Ottawa's Beachwood Cemetery as the National Military Cemetery.
2003	The Korean War Monument was erected beside the Mackenzie King Bridge.
2005	The opening of the new \$140 million building on Lebreton Flats to house the Canadian War Museum.
2006	The Valiants Memorial, which includes a number of statues of historical military heroes, was installed beside the National War Memorial
2009	The completion of the Battle of Hong Kong Monument located along Sussex Drive across from the Lester Pearson Building
2010	The announcement to mark the centennial of the Navy with a monument at Richmond's Landing by the Portage Bridge.

What is interesting to note about this trend in memorial culture is that it predates the increased news reports of Canadian casualties associated with the Kandahar mission. In addition, it also suggests that the roots of this trend are much deeper than the election of a new governing party. At first blush, this might simply be a coincidence: the emphasis on the warrior myth in the memorialization of military history came at a time of the rise of what Tim Cook (2006) labels "militarized grey power" when WWII veterans were starting to assert themselves in acts of memorialization to make sure that their legacy of fighting for freedom will be transmitted to future generations.⁶ This influence by veterans on memorial culture just so happened to occur a few years before a new

⁶ In 1995, the CBC's live broadcast of the 50th anniversary of VE Day provided a rare outpouring of public sentiment regarding Canada's military (Cook 2006: 235). The media, which was previously criticized for being indifferent to military history, rallied behind this memorial event. It was during this ceremony that Peter Mansbridge famously remarked, "there is no shortage of Canadian history. Our history is NOT dull. But we are dull-witted when it comes to learning about it" (qtd. in Miller 1997: 9).

generation of soldiers would also have to risk their lives on foreign soil. However, upon closer inspection there might be a connection between discourses about the contemporary role of the military and the way in which the military is memorialized. Perhaps a hardening of memorial military culture served as a forerunner to a more militaristic and aggressive representation of the contemporary Canadian Forces.

According to Zygmunt Bauman (1982), “Remembered history is the logic which the actors inject into their strivings and which they employ to invest credibility into their hopes. In its after-life, history reincarnates as Utopia which guides, and is guided by, the struggles of the present” (1). In this case, the view of a warrior tradition connects with the desire by certain actors to reintroduce this narrative into the contemporary context. As Maloney (2006) states in his critique of the perpetuation of the peacekeeping mythology, the narrative of this historic role of the military “has been deployed by utopian internationalist factions inside the Canadian government and their academic and cultural support structures” (297). This implies that a particular discourse does not emerge out of a vacuum, but from a group of actors who understand that the representation of the Canadian Forces in both the present and the past is as important as governmental policy, budgetary decisions and even success on the battlefield. If Maloney is correct in his claim that the peacekeeping myth existed because of the efforts of an organized faction that shared a liberal, “internationalist” ideology, then does this not also imply that the ascendance of a warrior tradition in Canadian cultural memory was the product of a competing group that holds a different worldview?

TRACKING THE MILITARY-CULTURAL MEMORY NETWORK

This dissertation examines the shift from the representation of Canada as a peacekeeper to a warrior by focusing on the network involved in the production and circulation of military cultural memory—the forms, texts and practices that sustain the country’s memory about its military past. The guiding hypothesis is that this change is paralleled by the rise of a community of actors engaged in the production and circulation of military memorial culture. This dissertation will answer four pertinent questions: 1) How has cultural memory been militarized? 2) Who is involved in this process? 3) What is the outcome of their efforts? 4) Why has cultural memory been militarized?

In the first three chapters, I address the question of how memory becomes militarized. Here I argue that an analysis of the militarization of cultural memory must be understood from the perspective of a web of actors that share certain narratives regarding memory, the military and citizenship. Chapter 1 includes a literature review of these three topics. This review will emphasize the idea of networks as an important theme in some studies. In Chapter 2, I discuss my theoretical lens that borrows from both Actor-Network Theory (ANT) and discursive policy inquiry. By noting the similarities of these two approaches, I propose that the cultural shift must be studied in terms of an emergence of a new policy regime whose development can be observed in light of Michel Callon’s four steps of translations. I use ANT to identify and examine the many actors engaged in altering the discourse that guides this emergent policy regime. After this theoretical discussion, I detail the method that allows me not only to observe, but also to analyze and explain the realization and workings of this policy network. The emergence of this web of associations, which I label the “military-cultural memory network,” does

not come out of nowhere. Instead, as I explain in Chapter 3, it must be viewed in the context of a period of crisis over the representation of memory, the military and citizenship. This period, which I position in the late 1980s and early 1990s, serves as a catalyst, bringing to the fore not only the actors that will comprise the network, but also the rationale for a public policy regime to rehabilitate the representation of the three entities. However, what is important to note is that during the period of crisis these remain distinct entities. It is only over time that they are patched together into a coherent discourse. In particular, while memory and citizenship converged in the immediate aftermath of this period of crisis, the military only enters the equation after the events of September 11, 2001 and the escalation of the war in Afghanistan.

The core of this dissertation, Chapters 4-7, addresses the questions of who is involved in this network and what is its outcome. Originally structured simply as a case study of the role of one of many nodes within the network, the Dominion Institute, what follows is an argument that this actor should not simply be viewed as one of many players. Instead, I argue that it has become one of only a few obligatory passage points. Stirred by the near dissolution of the country during the 1995 Quebec Referendum and a general dismay over Canada's socio-political direction, the Dominion Institute was launched in 1997 by three then-recent university graduates to address the lack of civic ties amongst English-speaking Canadians. It was initially designed as a citizenship and history education think tank—a Toronto version of the Fraser Institute but with less of focus on economics and finance—to position traditional values onto the public policy agenda. However, this group would soon gain a reputation for its controversial polls on the nation's lack of historical and civic literacy, especially amongst youth, as well as a

lobbying group promoting a facts-based, nationalist approach to history education. Only after it turned to the topic of military memory with the launch of its “signature product,” the Memory Project, did it emerge as a significant player within the school system and public culture. The pervasiveness of this group from its humble beginnings in 1996 to its celebrated merger with Historica in 2009 allows me to consider the role of several other actors. These include the military, veterans, historians, foundations, academics, policymakers, teachers, filmmakers, the cultural industry, corporate leaders and politicians. Although organized chronologically to chart the Institute’s activities over the period under examination, each chapter reflects one of Michel Callon’s four steps involved in the formation of networks: problematization (1996-1997), *interessment* (1997-2001), enrolment (2001-2008) and mobilization (2008).

In Chapter 4, I examine the Dominion Institute’s emergence within the context of the crisis over the representation of citizenship and memory. The interpretation of these problems by the cofounders helped them not only to convince a key financial backer, the Donner Canadian Foundation, but also to assemble an epistemic community that included important figures from the highest echelons of academic, cultural, media, corporate and political circles. These experts would help the young cofounders identify a clear and manageable problem that would be effectively communicated to the public and potential allies. Furthermore, a major part of the communication of problematization was the role played by Rudyard Griffiths, the Institute’s executive director, that Elizabeth Jelin (2003) labels a “memory entrepreneur.” Griffiths adeptly brandished his youth and social capital to position his organization alongside more powerful actors.

Chapter 5 examines the use of polling as a means for drawing the interest of several potential actors in the proposed cultural memory network: politicians, corporate leaders, veterans, education policymakers and history education scholars. In its first few years of operation, the Dominion Institute commissioned polls as part of its lobbying efforts to bridge the challenges associated with the construction of citizenship and the transmission of memory that were identified during the period of crisis by drawing these actors together into an organized and cohesive network. As Frank Fischer (2003) argues, the statistics garnered from polls are an effective tool for both defining a problem and establishing a narrative for its solution. What is important to note about this early period is that military history was only a small portion of a general focus on formulating a national history education regime to improve civic identity and cultural literacy, especially amongst Canadian youth.

As Chapter 6 reveals, the inability to reach Canadian youth due to the lack of interest by education policymakers and scholars led the Dominion Institute onto a new path. Moving away from a general concern over history and citizenship, military memory emerged as not only a new cause but also a convenient way to circumvent an obstruction in the cultural memory network. Simply put, the military became the primary lens for the construction of citizenship and the transmission of memory. After an important contribution by one member of its epistemic community, *Toronto Star* editor Richard Gwyn, and in the socio-political landscape following the events of September 11, 2001, the launch of the Memory Project marked the beginning of a coherent discourse that merged the narratives of memory, the military and citizenship. I examine this project that brought veterans into classrooms according to Callon's concept of enrolment in

which all actors perform their defined identities and roles. It is over this critical juncture that the Institute moved from being known simply as an advocate for history and citizenship to a legitimate public educator and an authority over citizenship, the military and memory. In turn, it, too, was enrolled in a burgeoning network of advocates, led by the historians David Bercuson and Jack Granatstein, who sought to reposition the military as a prominent national institution.

In Chapter 7, I consider the release of Paul Gross' \$20 million film *Passchendaele* in the fall of 2008 as an example of the mobilization of not only the Institute's network, but also its discourse. Although at first glance it appears to be a peripheral actor in the production and circulation of this prominent military cultural memory text, my research points to something much more significant. Rudyard Griffiths had called for a Canadian version of *Saving Private Ryan* since the release of that popular film in 1998. In less than ten years time, his organization, which once scratched and clawed for every penny of funding and every second of publicity, would become an obligatory passage point in the efforts to canonize an unsung moment of military bravery. This effort included a community of some of the wealthiest and most powerful representatives of the country's corporate, military, cultural, media, academic and political communities. A year after the film's release, the Institute's place within the network was secured after its "merger" with its once powerful competitor, Historica.

Finally, I conclude by taking a step back from this case study of the Dominion Institute's role in a military-cultural memory network and consider the broader question of why Canadian cultural memory has been militarized. Something very odd occurred during the period under investigation in this dissertation. A project that I initially

expected to focus on memory and militarism eventually became an investigation into a shift in the conceptualization of Canadian citizenship. To explore this phenomenon, I connect two events that both take place on Remembrance Day of 2009: the release of Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Jason Kenney's revised citizenship guide and the appearance of Governor General Michaëlle Jean in full military attire in front of Ottawa's National War Memorial. On the surface, they are not necessarily related to each other or the Dominion Institute. First, Jean's decision to wear a uniform that had not been adorned since Ray Hnatyshyn's tenure in the early 1990s was considered an expression of her respect for those who died in uniform while she served as Commander-in-Chief of the Canadian Forces. Second, the prominent place of the military in this robust education guide with its focus on not only rights but also the responsibilities of citizenship was viewed as part of the Conservative government's hardened stance towards immigration and acculturation. However, both seemingly distinct events mark the normalization of the Dominion Institute's view of citizenship through a militaristic lens and the ascendance of its network.

To return to the discussion about the peacekeeping myth at the beginning of this introduction, it is unlikely that a nationalistic cultural text such as the "I am Canadian" campaign would emphasize the same unmilitaristic discourse to express "Canadianness" if it was made today. Just as Rick Hillier has been credited by the national and international media for making Canadians "comfortable with fighting wars," this dissertation charts the vital role played by the Dominion Institute in a network that has made Canadians reconsider policing and a warrior narrative as components of their heritage and civic identity. Whether the population has taken on this new definition of

citizenship remains outside of my focus. However, by the end of this dissertation it is clear that official and even populist depictions of citizenship have changed by taking on a more militaristic discourse and thereby displacing the progressivist, postnationalist representations that arose in the Pearson-Trudeau era.

CHAPTER 1:

LITERATURE REVIEW: MEMORY, MILITARISM AND CITIZENSHIP

This dissertation is anchored by an interest in (a) the emergence of cultural memory, (b) the militarization of culture and (c) the inculcation of cultural citizenship. All three subjects stem from diverse bodies of literature that take various theoretical and methodological approaches to culture. In this literature review, I avoid those works analyzing culture as a result of a top-down process that is associated with Theodore Adorno and Max Horkheimer's (1972) "culture industry" or Hans Magnus Enzensberger's (1974) "consciousness industry." Instead, I consider the works that focus on the complex and contested way culture emerges through the interaction of cooperating and competing social actors. This sociological view has been most cogently explicated in Pierre Bourdieu's political economy of symbolic power. His work perceives culture as a sports field (*champ*) in which different symbols offered by players compete for their place within society's limited system of signs. However, the aim of what he labelled "symbolic violence" is not simply to displace the symbols of competing players; rather, its intentions are more pedagogical with the ultimate objective of turning one group's "vision of the social world, and the principles of the division upon which it is based, into the official vision" (Bourdieu 1987: 13). In other words, the outcome of "symbolic violence" is not the defeat of other players, but the loss of their symbolic culture. As I explore in this chapter, what draws some of the literature on citizenship, memory and militarism together is a concern over how one representation or symbolic culture comes to dominate others.

CULTURAL MEMORY

Nearly every scholarly work examining collective memory¹ begins by referencing Maurice Halbwachs. Generally, his work is credited for challenging the Freudian and Bergsonian view of memory as interiorized within the individual by describing memory as the result of social construction (Coser, 1992).² However, Halbwachs' work is limited due to its focus on oral communication as the primary conduit linking the past to the present. It was only in the 1980s that a new wave of scholars, led by Jan Assmann and Pierre Nora, began to consider the transmission of collective memory through material forms. Whereas Nora uses the term *lieux de memoire* (sites of memory) to differentiate from the traditional *milieux de memoire* (environment of memory) that Halbwachs studied, Assmann (2008) offers the term "cultural memory" to differentiate from Halbwachs' interest in communicative memory:

Cultural memory is a kind of institution. It is exteriorized, objectified, and stored away in symbolic forms that, unlike the sounds of words or the sights of gestures, are stable and situation-transcendent... On the social level, with respect to groups and societies, the role of external symbols becomes even more important, because groups which, of course, do not "have" a memory tend to "make" themselves one by means of things meant as reminders such as monuments, museums, libraries, archives, and other mnemonic institutions (110-111).

Aleida Assmann (2008), Jan's wife and colleague, extends this idea even further by noting that cultural memory can be categorized into two spheres: the canon and the

¹ Collective memory is also commonly referred to as group, social, national, community and public memory.

² Halbwachs' work on memory was published during the 1920s and 1930s. His life and promising academic career was prematurely ended during the events of the holocaust. Although he himself was not Jewish, he was arrested after he protested the murder of his Jewish mother and father-in-law. He was sent to Buchenwald concentration camp in 1944. His work only translated to English some thirty years after his death and has since formed the basis of the burgeoning field of memory studies.

archive. Whereas the canon refers to the way in which a limited number of memories are actively circulated, the archive suggests that some symbols and cultural forms may remain dormant but still need to be stored. The question remains as to how something becomes a part of either the canon or the archive. Aleida Assmann can only respond by acknowledging a larger political process: “the selection for what criteria is to be remembered and circulated in the active cultural memory and what is to be merely stored are neither clear nor are they uncontested” (104).

Understanding the politics of transmission is at the core of many studies into cultural memory (Appadurai 1981; Schudson 1992; Winter and Sivan 1999; Meyer 2008). The underlying assumption of these works is described in Erik Meyer’s (2008) suggestion to treat memory like any other political domain—a space that comprises “forces and counter-forces competing for hegemony of discourse and interpretative patterns” (176). Arjun Appadurai (1981) studies this hegemonic process by considering the past as a scarce cultural resource. In a case study of a dispute over the ownership of a Hindu temple, he observes how competing groups make claims as the legitimate carriers of cultural memory forms. In particular, he tries to understand why certain discourses seem to offer greater authority for social actors. Graham Carr (2005), despite not citing Appadurai, has a similar interest in his study of the public controversy surrounding *The Valour and the Horror*. Here he considers the rhetoric employed by competing groups who each claimed a stake in Canadian military memory. Carr identifies the key actors in this performance and evaluates the outcome of this debate based on each ones’ ability to define themselves as legitimate authorities. He concludes that the debate was tilted in favour of historians by privileging their credentials and the language of expertise.

Whereas Appadurai is interested in the rhetoric employed by competing groups, Michael Schudson (1992), in his study of the Watergate scandal in American memory, combines cultural analysis with political economy. Schudson argues that memories do not die out because better interpretations of the past emerge, but because proponents of memories pass on and new generations grow up with other accounts: “the preservation of a memory of Watergate has in many respects been motivated by people deeply moved or hurt by Watergate who feel a commitment to one or another version of it that they want to see others accept” (56). These people with a vested interest in Watergate are organized into a memory industry with memory professionals (historians, politicians and educators).

This analysis of the individuals who participate in the politics of memory forms the basis of Elizabeth Jelin’s (2003) study of memory as labour:

[M]eaning of the past is dynamic and is conveyed by social agents in confrontations with opposite interpretations, other meanings, or against oblivion and silence. Actors and activists “use” the past, bringing their understandings and interpretations about it into the public sphere of debate. Their intention is to establish/convince/transmit their narrative, so that other will accept it (26).

Borrowing from the sociological work of Howard Becker on “moral entrepreneurs,” she proposes the term “memory entrepreneurs” to describe individuals who seek recognition and legitimacy for a particular interpretation or discourse about the past. Although she focuses on memory entrepreneurs in Latin America, the suggestion that the production and circulation of memory requires energy and perseverance by a committed and competent individual can also apply to other contexts.

In their theorization of the collective memory of war, Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan (1999) argue that the persistence of memory cannot simply be explained by the will

of the state or powerful elites. Rather, military memory is “the outcome of agency, as the product of individuals and groups who come together, not at the behest of the state or any of its subsidiary organizations, but because they have to speak out” (9). Not only is the memory of war a scarce resource, but also a non-renewable one. Therefore, cultural products and practices are created as a way to extend the shelf life of particular memories. However, these aids are only effective if they are actively used or participated with by the public. They perceive this process according to what Roger Bastide labels “networks of complementarity.” Included in these networks are the state, elites, veterans, historians, businessmen, artists and descendants of those who have been affected by war. Although each may have their own motivation, no one group or, as they suggest by using the metaphor of the choir, “voice” is more important than another. What makes a group more prominent is not how close their voice is to the microphone (control over communication), but a result of their moral status as judged by others within the choir. In other words, similar to Appadurai and Carr’s approach, the politics of the collective memory of war is tied to the ability of a group or person to demonstrate to the public that they should be a legitimate carrier of memory.

This notion of a network is also a component of Peter Burke’s understanding of memory. In his analysis of how different ethno-national groups use social memory in order to construct identity, Burke (1989) observes how the Northern Irish and the Poles re-enact and commemorate certain events in order to distinguish the “in” group from the “out.” Drawing on Stanley Fish’s concept of interpretative communities, he suggests that interpretative conflict points to the need to consider memory in lieu of the existence of different memory communities: “It is important to ask the question, who wants whom to

remember what, and why whose version of the past is recorded and preserved?" (107).

Similar to Winter and Sivan, Burke envisions a scenario in which historians, politicians and citizens interact to rehearse the past and suppress inconvenient memories.

In sum, the studies of cultural memory examined above point to a connection between discourse and the networks engaged in the politics of memory. Power is not entirely rooted in wealth or status; instead, the politics of memory stems from a communicative process whereby actors rely upon discourse to assert authority. For Appadurai, Carr and Jelin, discursive power explains how one group or memory entrepreneur gains legitimacy for their interpretation of the past. Likewise, Burke along with Winter and Sivan, consider discourse as the glue holding different memory networks and communities together. In sum, the literature suggests that the alliances and conflicts involved in creating and maintaining cultural memory rest on the politics of discourse.

MILITARIZATION OF CULTURE

Scholarly investigation into the militarization of culture comes out of a larger academic project examining the military-industrial complex. This project has its roots in the sociological studies of the role of elites within American society (Mills 1956; Lasswell 1941). However, as a body of scholarship, it presents a dichotomous understanding of the military-cultural complex and the process by which culture becomes militarized. In some cases the complex is used to describe a feature of the "social mind." In others, it is used to explain a productive process involving a wide arrangement of social actors. On one hand, the complex refers to a psychological illness of modern democratic, capitalist societies that are entirely structured around the objectives of

expansionism and organized violence (Aufderheide 1990; Marvin and Ingle 1996; Sturken 1997; Stahl 2009). Culture is a space for the sublimation of a militaristic social psychology as well as a tool that entrenches the values and norms of a militarized society. On the other, the complex refers to a set of relations within society (Robin 2001; Lenoir and Lowood 2003; Andersen 2006). In this approach, the term military-cultural complex does not refer to a general state of being that reveals itself within a particular society's culture; rather, it refers to the intricate and "complex" ways in which those who benefit from militarism engage in the process of cultural production and circulation.

This specific view does not define the complex as a product of the social mind. Instead, it views the complex as the outcome of an elaborate web of associations that connect the military, the state, corporate elites and cultural institutions. For example, Tim Lenoir and Henry Lowood (2003) introduce the term "military-entertainment complex" in their account of the development of war game simulation technology. They investigate how changes to the US Department of Defense's research and development policy led to the spin off of many technologies for the video game industry. The military-entertainment complex is rooted in a shift of the military-industrial complex following the end of the Cold War so that "research not only served national defense but also that it ultimately benefited the commercial sector" (453). Therefore, it is necessary to view the militarization of culture not as a permanent social order emanating from the highest echelons of power, but as an amorphous set of mutually beneficial relations between a variety of actors that appear and disappear depending upon the context.

Ron Robin (2001) also examines the process involved in the militarization of culture. He uses the term "military-intellectual complex" to describe the emergence of

behavioural sciences as part of a larger project by policymakers and military strategists to conceptualize the Cold War enemy. He traces this complex back to the policies and programs instituted by the U.S. Air Force's Human Resources Research Institute during the Korean War.³ This institute initiated visiting scholar positions, organized conferences and funded publications. All of this served to mediate the interaction between academics engaged in the nascent field of behavioural sciences (including university professors and researchers employed by the Rand Corporation) and military intelligence officers. Each party benefited in their own way from this arrangement. On one hand, the behavioural scientists were given the necessary funds and the proper institutional channels to garner legitimacy within the academy. On the other, the military used their research not only to create psycho-warfare campaigns, but also to support a larger worldview that was critical of the effects of communism on the human psyche and thus supportive of American expansionism. However, over time a number of areas of disagreement arose that challenged the stability of this mutual beneficial relationship. By the end of the 1960s, with a wave of disastrous events including the Vietnam War and the apparent failure to democratize the Third World, behavioural scientists began to question the main discursive framework, which was broadly labelled "modernization theory," which connected them to the expansionist policies of the Cold War (Robin 2001: 220).

According to the approach interested in the process of the militarization of culture, power does not solely result from the effect that representations or cultural output

³ As an interesting side note, this institute is where Wilbur Schramm, one of the father's of communication studies, developed many of his theories on media that would be integrated into the widely circulated *Process and Effects of Mass* (1954). See Christopher Simpson's *Science of Coercion: Communication Research and Psychological Warfare, 1945-1960* (1994) for a thorough account of the military roots of communication studies.

have on society. Rather, this scholarship suggests that power rests with the ability for some interested parties to create alliances. Contrary to the social mind approach, these scholars contextualize the military-cultural complex within a specific moment of time and national setting. With that said, one of its weakness is that it can become so narrow in its analysis that it obscures any understanding of how the militarization of culture fits within a general picture of society: Is the interaction of software designers and the US Army in the development of a video game really a sign of a larger trend towards a militarized culture? Clearly these two approaches complement one another by exploring different sides of the militarization of culture. Whereas one approach explains the rhetorical effect of militaristic cultural forms, the other explains how these forms are produced and eventually circulate as legitimate components of a society's public culture. Nonetheless, a key difference between the two is that the specific approach never assumes the militarization of culture. Instead, it attempts to explain militarization within a hegemonic process that includes a diverse yet interrelated web of actors. Just as easily as a network can emerge, so too can it disintegrate once, as was the case with Robin's military-intellectual complex, the discourse loses its legitimacy. The militarization of culture may ultimately be about altering public discourse, but this first depends upon a discursive process of convincing cultural actors to join the military-cultural complex. In other words, it is a question of cultural policy before it is a concern for cultural study.

CULTURAL CITIZENSHIP

The notion that culture serves as the primary site for inculcating modes of behaviour, ways of seeing and systems of belief, lies at the core of scholarly

investigations into questions of cultural citizenship. According to Tony Bennett (1995), such work studies how cultural texts and practices serve as “strategies of governing aimed at producing a citizenry which, rather than needing to be externally and coercively directed, would increasingly monitor and regulate its own conduct” (8). Critical cultural policy scholars such as Toby Miller, Ian Hunter and Bennett have developed this field of research by drawing upon Michel Foucault’s theory of “governmentality.” This theory suggests that power is grounded in manifestations of truth and not in violence or legal authority (Gordon 1991: 7). Foucault’s “art of government” opened up new questions in the late 1980s and early 1990s for scholars interested in the relationship between culture and liberal government (Bennett et al 2007). Perhaps the most important question was why governments sponsored and fostered culture in capitalist, democratic societies. The guiding assumption was that the state and those aligned with its interests use culture to inculcate citizens with values, attitudes and norms.

Ian Hunter (1988) was the first to take this Foucaudian approach in his account of the emergence of literary education in England during the late nineteenth century. Although on the surface literary education seemed to have replaced a traditional, more coercive pedagogy in favour of one based on greater freedom and autonomy, its real intention was to provide a controlled space where the habits and dispositions of youth “could be moulded according to new social norms embodied in the ‘moral observation’ of the teacher” (41). Teaching youth how to value “good” literature and having educators supervise this process was a tactic to instill future generations of citizens with a sense of what he labels “ethical individualism.” This concept suggests that culture is a carrier of ethical norms which individuals are taught and encouraged to internalize through

participation with texts and practices. Moreover, in addition to Foucault's influence, cultural citizenship is grounded in Hegel's concept of *Sittlichkeit* (ethical life/substance), which describes the ethical norms embodied in the customs and institutions of society (Inwood 1992: 92). As opposed to Kantian universalism or theories based on natural law, this concept positions the meanings and practices that guide everyday life within a set of norms rooted in institutions such as the family, the market and, ultimately, the state. However, ethical life is not something that is imposed on the individual. Instead, Hegel defines it as a synthesis between the objectivist norms of the state or another institution and the subjectivist freedom of the individual (Carritt 1935/1936: 227). It is up to the individual to take on the responsibility of acting ethically; institutions may project norms, but the individual must act on his or her own volition. Hunter's key contribution was to stress that culture not only serves as a way to teach ethical norms, but also influences citizens to value and construct their identity in culture. Cultural citizenship involves a double movement whereby the self-policing function is dependent upon the inculcation of ethical individualism because this enables a process that is reproducible and congruent with the tenets of a liberal society—culture is not forced upon people, but actively sought out to fulfil deeply engrained needs and desires.

Building on this work was Bennett's study of museums and Miller's conceptualization of cultural citizenship in the popular culture of contemporary Australia. For Bennett (1995), it was not a coincidence that the rise of liberalism as a mode of government was accompanied by the emergence of the modern museum. He claimed that the aesthetics of this institution such as exhibit design and selection, which were based on a Darwinian view of social progress, were instruments for instantiating governmental

power. What is important to note about this interpretation is that the museum does not simply substantiate power and a particular set of social relations. Instead, it is the source of this power. For Miller (1993), culture nurtures a sense of belonging through educational and other cultural regimes that are predicated on what he labels “ethical incompleteness.” This concept describes a sense of inadequacy that “cultural subjects are encouraged to find in themselves and then remedy” (xii). Paralleling Hegel’s notion of ethical life and Hunter’s concept of ethical individualism, Miller claims that individuals are pulled towards culture through “determinate indeterminacy.” On one hand, “indeterminacy” refers to a sense of incompleteness that seems innately embedded into the human psyche. On the other, “determinate” refers to the rich historical tradition and sense of greatness of the nation, which provides these incomplete individuals with a location to remedy their “indeterminacy.”

In a country notorious for its anxiety over its sense of civic identity, Canadian scholars who have taken up the question of cultural citizenship have focused on the relationship between culture and government in terms of national identity and attempts to build a coherent definition of citizenship. Zoë Druick (2007) skilfully connects the epistemological frameworks used by the state and social scientists to categorize and measure populations with the aesthetics that have guided NFB documentary films. Despite changes to film techniques, cultural shifts and the continual threat to funding, the NFB manages to fulfil its mandate as a “citizen-building technology” by representing the country through what she labels “government realism.” This aesthetic depicts “typical yet anonymous people and places crafted into allegories of citizen and nation building” (Druick 2007: 98). In Gerald Kernerman’s (2005) study of multiculturalism in Canada,

the coercive power of governmentality does not lie in the ability for elites or the state to shape particular views of multiculturalism; rather, the process of constitutional politics as a public performance acts as a technology of government by signalling ways in which groups and individuals should join the “national conversation.” Ironically, the power of this process is not the ability to end the conversation by eventually leading to a final agreement on what it means to be Canadian in a multicultural state because he suggests that there is no overarching definition. This tendency marks a general trend in governmentality. According to Peter Miller and Nikolas Rose (1992), “[g]overnment is a congenitally failing operation: the sublime image of a perfect regulatory machine is internal to the mind of the programmers” (190). With this in mind, it is not surprising that in Kernerman’s study, power rests with the perpetuation of an ongoing multicultural discussion. Although this discussion never reaches a final understanding and even comes close to an ultimate collapse, its power rests with the shared desire to reach a consensus.

Foucault notes that power does not simply move in the direction from the top, with the sovereign or the head of the household displaying a proper way of living, down to his subjects or family; rather, it also includes the transmission of these displays from below with the subjects and family emulating the proper modes of behaviour. He states that the real power is found in this line of transmission stemming from below because it is in this space that the ruler must police the ruled and establish an economy—in the original Greek meaning of the word⁴—that assures the continuity of the ruling system (Foucault 1991: 92). However, in most critical cultural policy studies of governmentality, the attention is on this upwards line of power with detailed textual

⁴ Economy is derived from the Greek word *oekonomia*, which means “household management.”

readings of the manifestations and representations, yet with little attention paid to the system that ensures the emulation from below where governmentality also operates.

For example, Druick emphasizes the aesthetics and narratives of NFB films as tools for citizenship education in the age of liberal government. Nonetheless, she ignores the role of filmmakers as producers, community groups as distributors and the audiences that receive these texts. At the end of her study, she comes close to an analysis of this other layer of governmentality when she cites Elizabeth Anderson's question about the efficacy of the NFB's Studio D⁵: "Do images of diversity—what may be termed an aestheticized multiculturalism—substitute for the difficulties of actually working through and debating difference" (cited in Druick 2007: 177)? Although this claim is used to challenge the mobilization of feminist politics within the institutionalized aesthetics of government realism, it could also be read as a critique of the feminist filmmakers whose participation in this governmental project may have served to moderate and therefore abate their radical critique of patriarchy. Even the focus on the NFB as the primary site obscures the interesting and complex ways in which these films were distributed and displayed to the public through the involvement of community associations, schools and municipal governments. A broader approach would ascertain the rationale for these groups and artists to be involved and what they might have gained or lost. Perhaps this limited scope is a result of the interpretation of one of the most influential readings of Foucault's art of government: the work of Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller.

⁵ Established in 1974, this was the world's first state-funded film studio dedicated to female filmmakers. See Gail Vanstone's *D is For Daring: The Women Behind the Films of Studio D* (2007) for a detailed history including an account of its famous founder and long-time director, Kathleen Shannon.

Rose and Miller (1992) suggest that governmentality scholars focus on the various forms that comprise “technologies of government:”

We need to study the humble and mundane mechanisms by which authorities seek to instantiate government: techniques of notation, computation and calculation; procedures of examination and assessment; the invention of devices such as surveys and presentational forms such as tables; the standardisation of systems for training and the inculcation of habits; the inauguration of professional specialisms and vocabularies; building designs and architectural forms—the list is heterogeneous and in principle unlimited (200).

As a result of this reading, the emphasis on the power of the form of these technologies of government has trumped any detailed investigation into the process of production and circulation. It is in this stage, however, that one can observe the other direction of power coming from below. With this in mind, the questions of how and why these technologies of government emerge are just important as what effect they have on culture and citizens. Interestingly, Rose and Miller are not silent on this issue.

In the same section that they explain the power of technologies of government, they also consider the context in which these tools emerge. They do so by drawing upon Bruno Latour’s ANT to argue that technologies of government must be viewed in terms of the networks that develop and incorporate them into the art of governing. However, despite this mention of ANT, it has yet to be taken up in the literature. As noted in my review of the work, studies into the question of cultural citizenship seem more interested in technologies such as museums, popular culture and state-run institutions. One explanation for this blind spot may come from the reflexive understanding of networks as emphasized in Rose and Miller’s reading of ANT: “Rather than considering as the explanation of the success of authorities in composing a network of forces, Latour

proposes a view of power as an effect of such a composition” (201). Therefore, while providing useful insight into the context in which technologies of government emerge, they also allow an out for governmentality scholars since the product or “effect” is inherently tied to the arrangement and disposition of the network that it came from. Why study the network when it is just a reflection of the technology?

CHAPTER 2: CONCEPTUALIZING A MILITARY-CULTURAL MEMORY NETWORK

As identified in the previous chapter, networks have become a useful way for explaining the process involved in the creation of cultural memory and the militarization of culture. Nonetheless, although Rose and Miller have raised its potential, this approach has yet to be taken up by cultural citizenship and critical cultural policy scholars. I suggested that this is due to an overemphasis on analyzing technologies of government as citizenship education devices. As a result, this scholarship lacks an understanding of both the milieu in which these devices emerge as legitimate tools and the context in which they operate. It misses Foucault's claim that government operates in two directions. Tied to his governmentality thesis is another concept developed earlier in his scholarship. In *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1972), he uses the term "*le loi de rareté*" (scarcity principle) to explain that culture does not work in terms of plenitude (120). Even though anything can theoretically be said or written in liberal democracies, in practice this is not the case. According to Ann Rigney (2005), this principle should lie at the core of studies into cultural memory. She encourages scholars to develop tools that can explain how some interpretations or historical events become legitimate components of a society's cultural memory while others are forgotten or never mentioned.

This project does not set out to address the media effect question of whether a representation has been internalized by the public nor will it provide a deep reading of cultural memory texts. The aim is to avoid some of the uncomplicated views of culture identified in the literature review. This includes the assumption that a militarized culture

is simply the outcome of social sublimation (Marvin and Ingle 1996) and that cultural memory emerges to serve a larger socio-political purpose (Schwartz 1982). While these accounts provide theoretical rationales for why a symbolic culture exists, they do not offer empirical evidence of how one form or interpretation has come to dominate others. I do not discount the arguments that the militarization of Canadian culture and the rise of military memory are rooted in such phenomena as the emergence of Stephen Harper's Conservative government or the social effects of continual news reports on the public about military losses in Afghanistan. These assumptions may provide the logic for why this symbolic culture exists and what pedagogical purpose they serve. Nonetheless, they do not offer the evidence showing how a hardened view of the military has displaced the progressivist peacekeeping narrative. The challenge here is to construct a historical study that can explain this shift in symbolic culture. My focus then is not on media effects or political commentary, but on the act of representation. Drawing upon the lessons learned from my literature review, I consider what guides the act of representation through the concept of networks and the process of translation.

In this chapter, I first explain my theoretical approach that uses Michel Callon's understanding of Actor-Network Theory (ANT) to construct a cultural policy study grounded in discursive policy inquiry. Discursive policy inquiry, which is associated with the work Frank Fischer, Maarten Hajer, Peter Haas and Dvora Yanow, considers the way in which discourse guides the policy process. This scholarship seems to fit well with Foucault's scarcity principle. Coming out of research in the area of environmental policy, discursive policy inquiry suggests that a certain policy regime emerges not simply because it includes the best science behind it. Instead, what makes one policy option

more widely accepted is the coalition of reputable actors who shape the way in which problems are discussed and interpreted (Fischer and Hajer 1999). Although it too is interested in discourse, ANT contributes by examining how communication is not just important during policy formation but also throughout its development from conceptualization to implementation. I note how Callon's concept of an "obligatory passage point" and his four steps of translation provide both a key entry point by focusing on one actor, the Dominion Institute, and an organized narrative for explaining the development of a network. In addition, I raise Pierre Bourdieu's concept of translations to buttress ANT's use of this same term. The next section details my methodology. This includes an account of how I gathered and analyzed the necessary data to explain the role of discourse in forging a "military-cultural memory network." I conclude by noting how I organized this analysis into a coherent historical narrative.

THEORY

Networks have recently become a useful way for scholars to think about social action. According to Darin Barney (2004), this perspective has superseded the "industrial society" conceived in Max Weber's work. Manuel Castells (1996), the Spanish sociologist, considers networks as an emergent historical trend: "a new social morphology of our societies, and the diffusion of networking logic substantially modifies the operation and outcomes in processes of production, experience, power and culture" (469). At its core, a network society is one in which nodes (people, groups and even non-animate objects such as computers) are tied to others through a complex web of associations. While Castells has explored the extent of these ties in terms of global flows

regarding culture, the economy, politics and technology to explain how networks operate, Bruno Latour has led a community of sociologists interested in explaining how they form through what he labels Actor-Network Theory (ANT).

The conceptualization of ANT came about from a critique of sociology's ability to explain society and social action. It began by engaging questions regarding the social implications of science and technology. ANT has since expanded into a larger theoretical project. According to Latour (1986), the problem with the traditional sociological approach is that it overemphasizes the product of social action and assumes its existence as the inevitable consequence of social forces. However, while this may have once been appropriate, it fails to capture the radical transformation of society from a state of unity and cohesion to diversity and contradiction. Simply put, ANT is not convinced that society is stable: "We are no longer sure about what 'we' means" (Latour 2005: 6). In this changed environment, the role of the sociologist is to explain what connects social agents together so that we can even speak about society. As a result, he encourages scholars to take a performative approach that does not view power as a cause of a particular social action. Instead, society is a consequence of "an intense activity of enrolling, convincing and enlisting" (271). Power is the ability to forge associations.

Whereas the ostensive view focuses on the product as the key site for analysis, the performative view studies the process that leads to a social action or a product's emergence. In order to study this process, he suggests that a scholar begin by observing controversies. Although uncertainty and controversy tend to be passed over by traditional sociology as abnormalities, they are in fact significant social forces. Simply put, controversies provide the stimulus for the creation of social bonds. They produce the

problems that stimulate society into being by creating the need for associations. If you want to locate society, then begin by searching for controversy and uncertainty. If you want to explain the outcome or product of social action, then one must explain what connects social actors together.

Power is not defined by wealth, status or might. These traditional terms only make sense when used or, in Latour's language, "performed" to create connections:

What links us together? Is not answerable in principle, but in practice, every time someone raises it a new association is made that does indeed link us together. Society is not the referent of an ostensive definition discovered by social scientists... Rather it is performed through everyone's efforts to define it. Those who are powerful are not those who 'hold' power in principle, **but those who practically define or redefine what 'holds' everyone together** (Latour 1986: 273; emphasis added).

In other words, the basis of the network society rests upon discourse. Powerful actors are those that most effectively define the problems and solutions that form social arrangements with the end goal of mitigating controversy and uncertainty. While wealth, status and might may be tools, they are only worthy of attention when performed in a communicative process that draws one actor to another. This process is given the linguistic term of "translation." From this perspective, ANT is not all that different from Bourdieu's political economy of symbolic power since both are rooted in communicative interactions. Both consider how one actor or player wields various tools to try to convince others to take on a certain identity. Whereas Bourdieu views this process of converting various forms of economic, social, cultural and political capital into symbolic power as a contentious affair highlighted by his preference for sporting metaphors¹,

¹ Perhaps Bourdieu's most famous saying is "*la sociologie est un sport de combat*" (society is a blood sport).

Latour's concern over associations leads to a less combative view with the use of terms such as a web or matrix to speak about the social world. Nonetheless, the objective of both is the same: to control and ultimately stipulate the discourse of others.

Michel Callon (1986), a colleague of Latour's, further defines translation. He views it as a historical process occurring over four phases: (a) problematization, (b) *interessement*, (c) enrolment, and (d) mobilization.² He tests this model in his study of the efforts of three scientists to regenerate the scallop population of St. Brieuc Bay. These steps are used to explain how one actor, referred to as the *primum movens* (the first actor), becomes an obligatory passage point. This occurs by (a) establishing a problem to be solved, (b) embedding procedures to make a solution mutually beneficial, (c) stabilizing the roles and relationships of other actors and (d) ensuring that representatives appropriately relay the right messages to their constituencies. Similar to Foucault's scarcity principle, the process of translation works by limiting language and displacing the autonomy of participating actors. It does this by making actors feel hindered unless they participate in the network and pass through the obligatory passage point. Callon concludes by stating that the outcome of a network is "to express in one's own language what others say and want, why they act in the way they do and how they associate with each other: it is to establish oneself as a spokesman" (223). Therefore, network building is primarily an act of communication.

In the academic field of policy studies, networks and discourse have also become important ways for thinking about social action. Some scholars who broadly identify

² He uses the French words *problematization*, *interessement*, *enrolement*, and *mobilisation*. Three of these terms translate well to English. However, the English words for "*interessement*" do not seem as appropriate. The words "interest" or "incentive" have to many other connotations and do not capture Callon's meaning.

with what Frank Fischer (2003) labels “discursive policy inquiry” have challenged traditional approaches to policy studies for being overly empirical and avoiding questions of politics. Similar to Latour’s performative view of society and my analysis of some research in the literature review, these scholars do not take for granted the emergence of particular texts or social actions. They perceive the formation of policy as rooted in the discourses that come to dominate the way in which society views a problem and its solution. This approach comes out of the work of a group of political scientists (Haas 1989; Fischer 1991; Hajer 1993) interested in environmental policy. They argue that the failure of some recent measures, such as those proposed at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio, was not a reflection of a lack of political will or public apathy. Instead, this lack of progress stemmed from a problem of communication and an inability to frame problems and solutions. This failure was due to the rise of a “discourse coalition” who determined the language of the debate and “pre-defined the direction in which solutions are to be sought” (Fischer and Hajer 1999: 4).

Inspired by Murray Edelman’s (1964) prescient work on political communication that points to a connection between politics and culture, discursive policy inquiry assumes that discourse does not merely reflect a socio-political reality. Language constitutes reality: “discursive power can determine the very fields of actions, including the tracks along which political action travels” (Fischer 2003: viii). Therefore, public policy is primarily a communicative process. From this perspective, policy takes place within a discourse community whereby competing groups struggle for power by proposing different “storylines.” According to Martin Hajer (1995), a storyline acts as the engine behind policy communities because it generates:

[A] narrative that allows actors to draw upon various discursive categories to give meaning to specific social phenomena... The primary function of storylines is that they suggest unity in the bewildering variety of separate discursive component parts of a problem (56).

What is important to note about these narratives is that they do not remain stagnant.

Instead, as Fischer (2003) states in relating his understanding of policy to advertising within a post-industrial society, there is a free play of signifiers whereby symbols are in a constant state of flux making them difficult for citizens to master: "As symbols lose their moorings, marketers take advantage of this and manipulate them to other symbols" (59).

A discursive policy analyst must be able to identify these shifts or what the postmodernist thinker Jean-François Lyotard (1997) labels "language games" (127)

Those who dominate public policy are not necessarily those who offer the best solutions. Rather, policy results from the efforts of actors who offer the best stories and thereby suppress alternative ways of thinking. These stories emerge out of "epistemic communities." According to Peter Haas (1992), the complexity and uncertainty of the policy process requires the participation of policymakers and advocates in a knowledge-based network of experts. Communication amongst members within these communities (i.e. politicians, think tanks, media personalities and academics) causes a dynamic that results in "new patterns of behaviour" and the sharing of innovative solutions to policy problems (3). Moreover, discourse is constructed within a historical context. David Howarth (2002) states that discourse does not emerge out of a vacuum, but is grounded in "historically specific systems of meaning which form the identities of subjects and objects" (9). The task for a discursive policy scholar is then to show how stories are shaped by socio-political struggles that are historically grounded, how epistemic

communities socially construct them and how they provide meaning for social organization and interaction.

Under this framework, power, much like the view of ANT and Bourdieu's political economy, rests upon effective communicative strategies. According to Fischer (2003), rhetoric and proper use of media can be the difference in shifting the course of public policy. It can lead to the ascension of a hegemonic discourse so that competing epistemic communities are expected to "position their contribution in terms of established categories" (88). The most convincing stories are often those that condense large amounts of factual information within easily understood value orientations and normative assumptions. One significant way in which this occurs is through numerical measurements such as polls, censuses and surveys.

These statistical tools do not simply count something for the sake of knowledge. Instead, they also present a public policy issue and change the behavioural orientation of other actors. They are, as Bruce Curtis (2002) cogently argues, a way to create a population as means of "organizing social observation" (24). As part of the policy process, the statistics that they produce get tied into the storyline. Deborah Stone (1988) states that they crystallize the discursive context by presenting policy within a story of crisis or decline. In fact, the act of measuring is in itself powerful because it suggests something occurs often enough that it deserves being counted and taken seriously. Similar to Curtis' suspicious view of censuses in creating populations, she states that beyond describing the world, measurements are discursive artefacts: "just as poems and paintings are artefacts that people, collect, recite, display and respond to" (Stone 1998:

146). The objective then is to understand how they emerge and become important artefacts in the policy process.

Similar to ANT, discursive policy inquiry perceives of power as rooted in the ability for some social actors to control the language of others. Nonetheless, there is one key difference between these theories. As implied by the revolutionary and often hyperbolic ways in which Latour refers to his theory, ANT offers a totalizing view of the social world. It is a universalistic explanation about the complete workings of society. In fact, what is defined as social is not limited to human actors. ANT also lends agency to non-human actors, ideas and even inanimate objects. Discursive policy inquiry, on the other hand, is much more narrow in scope. Its concern is with policy formation and the influence of human policy actors. This is not to suggest that ideas and objects do not have roles to play since communicative tools such as statistics are an element for analyzing discourse.

In my conceptualization of a cultural shift in the representation of the Canadian Forces, the focus is on the act of representation. As suggested above, I will not assess the efficacy of certain cultural memory texts nor will I account for how the public is influenced by these representations. At the end of this research project, my goal is not to be able to answer whether Canadians have become militarized. Instead, I should be able to assess whether the country's cultural memory has become militarized and offer some explanation for how this has occurred. This discrepancy of objectives marks a key divide. A true ANT study of this cultural shift would have to account for the agency of memory forms as technologies of government and whether all actors anchor to the proposed network. Focusing on one area of military memory as the key site for inquiry

does not accurately reflect the totalizing view of ANT. It is because of this emphasis on the act of representation that I ground my study in discursive policy inquiry. However, as I will now explain, ANT can still be very useful. This project uses Callon's approach to ANT as a means of guiding and expanding my study of the policy behind the production and circulation of cultural memory forms that have marked a shift in Canada's symbolic culture.

The most useful part of Callon's study is that it provides a historical lens for examining the formation of networks. Although discursive policy inquiry also emphasizes a historical view as implied by Fischer's (2003) reference to David Howarth's claim that discourse does not emerge out of a vacuum, it takes for granted the existence of discourse coalitions. The context of a discourse is certainly important. As I explore in the next chapter, the context for the cultural shift in the representation of the military is rooted in the late 1980s and early 1990s. I consider this period by drawing upon ANT's concern over controversies and moments of crisis as the key starting point for network formation. Crisis provides the impetus for actors to seek out associations in the first place. However, this context then leads to a historical process of network building and the formation of associations. A discourse coalition or an epistemic community does not simply exist because it is contextualized in a specific system of meaning. Instead, such communities or networks are in themselves historical entities. Callon's approach to ANT allows me to chart this historical process. It expands on discursive policy inquiry by not simply allowing me to view the course of network formation, but also to consider its effect on symbolic culture.

Callon's study of the attempt to restock the scallop population of St. Brieuc Bay includes four key actors: fishermen, scallops, three research scientists and the wider scientific community. However, the most important of these four are the three scientists. They are the ones who first propose a solution to the problem facing the diminishing scallop stock. Callon offers a case study of how this one group positions itself as an obligatory passage point by drawing these other actors together. The scientists achieve this status by convincing others to perform certain roles. From this perspective, the most important tool they wield is communication. In order for the network to work, all actors must loyally replicate the discourse proposed by the obligatory passage point. Similar to the assumption guiding discursive policy inquiry, power does not rest with the ability to propose the best answer but with the ability to control discourse surrounding a problem and its solution. The remainder of his study tracks this process along four phases: problematization, *interessement*, enrolment and mobilization.

In my project on the shift in the representation of the Canadian Forces through a focus on cultural memory, I draw from Callon's case study approach and his four steps of translation. I was aware from the beginning that there would be a number of actors involved in the act of representing military cultural memory: filmmakers, cultural workers, veterans, the corporate community, the media, bureaucrats, politicians, teachers, and policymakers to name just a few. The extent of potential nodes on the network was intimidating. What initially attracted me to Callon's approach especially compared with other ANT scholars was his concept of an obligatory passage point. This provided a useful lens onto the network by allowing me to focus on the efforts of one instead of the multitude of nodes. It made for a feasible dissertation on a large and complex topic. The

challenge, however, was to ascertain the identity of this central intermediary.

Admittedly, my selection of the Dominion Institute emerged out of a hunch I had from reading the media coverage of Paul Gross' film *Passchendaele*.

The Dominion Institute seemed to have a mysterious role in this film. Although on the surface it was presented as playing the part of a public educator by designing the accompanying educational guide, this was only half of the story. Upon closer investigation, I realized it was not as simple as this arrangement. First, not only did it create this guide, but also it ensured its free distribution to schools across Canada by using a database of history teachers that it had collected over the course of its own educational activities. Second, it helped lay the groundwork for the film's reception and circulation with a letter writing contest that took place in schools and the release of two polls leading up to the film's box office opening. The more I delved into this organization, the more certain I was that it was not simply a history and civic education organization. It was also an advocacy group who drew coalitions together and found a role within these networks as a disseminator of discourse.

The problem with Callon's approach is that in his study the obligatory passage point is the *primum movens*. The actor that starts the process of network building is also the one who becomes the obligatory passage point. This idea that an obligatory passage point has to be the first actor is not only theoretically problematic, but normatively it is also a difficult proposition considering the difficulty of locating a beginning to a network. Latour (2005) asserts that there is "no established component that can be used as an incontrovertible starting point" (29). From this perspective, Callon's method of beginning his study by noting the participation of three scientists at an academic

conference in Japan is rather simplistic. If I had to pick a starting point, I would raise the controversy and subsequent public debate over *The Valour of the Horror*. As I argue in a previous study (Fremeth 2010), this series highlighted the need for a more cooperative approach to the production and circulation of military memory. However, this event is problematic considering it predates the emergence of the Dominion Institute. This raises two important critiques of Callon's study. First, he limits the understanding of networks by equating the obligatory passage point with the *primum movens*. Second, he assumes that there is only one obligatory passage point. These critiques point to some general problems pervading Callon's approach. Although a focus on a single obligatory passage point allows for a convenient and feasible means of studying a web of associations, this belies Latour's (2003) conceptualization of networks as complex, interrelated and overlapping. In other words, actors may be engaged in a variety of networks and social action may be the outcome of more than one network. Limiting a study to a particular area misses peripheral networks and actors that might also play a key role.

There is another key problem regarding both ANT and discursive policy inquiry. These theories do not consider the context in which actors emerge as legitimate social or policy forces. Although ANT describes how an actor can convince, enrol, enlist and mobilize other parts of the network, it neglects the political economic process by which such an actor must first garner authority as a legitimate player and the material resources necessary to create discourse. It is this blind spot that makes Pierre Bourdieu's concept of "symbolic power" a necessary counterweight. As discussed above, Bourdieu perceives the social world as a sports field in which different symbols offered by players compete for their place within society's limited system of signs. Once positioned upon this field,

players must translate their economic and political capital into cultural and symbolic capital in order to “legitimate [their] vision of the social world and of its divisions” (Bourdieu 1987: 13). At the same time, translation operates in many directions: cultural capital can translate into greater economic and political power thereby ensuring stability as a dominant player. Therefore, some consideration needs to be paid to questions of political economy: How is an actor able to garner the means to engage in the communicative process of forging associations?

Despite being a problematic mode of inquiry for evaluating the entirety of the militarization of Canadian culture and the political economy behind the shift in symbolic culture, there is a key benefit from drawing upon Callon’s approach. It offers a means to explain specific moments of militarization. In particular, I use it to track the historical process regarding the emergence of a discourse coalition engaged in public policy and to assess this network’s influence upon the production and circulation of military memory. Appropriating this approach into a discursive policy study allows me to detail how the Dominion Institute has helped to bring others together. As much as this group seeks to alter what is represented and how memory is transmitted, it must first convince, interest, enrol and mobilize allies: politicians, government departments, the corporate community, the news media, philanthropic foundations, historians, teachers, education scholars, policymakers and youth.

The construction of a network is achieved through the realm of discourse or what discursive policy inquiry label “storylines.” Although discourse might come out of a historical context, this context is meaningless unless something is done by someone(s) with this system of meaning. This is what ANT calls a translation which Callon

organizes into four phases. Therefore, the network building process begins in the moment of problematization when a storyline is constructed through the efforts of the obligatory passage point. Memory studies scholars refer to such actors as memory entrepreneurs (Jelin 2003). However, drawing upon discursive policy inquiry, it is necessary to consider the construction of discourse within the context of the contributions by an epistemic community. As I track in my study, the obligatory passage point does not act alone. Members of the Dominion Institute's advisory council influence the proposed storyline. Second, a storyline is only effective if it interests the necessary actors needed to implement or, in my case, produce and circulate cultural memory. Discursive policy inquiry scholars must pay attention to the artefacts that serve as carriers of a storyline. It is here that their interest in statistics points me to the role that polling plays in the construction of the Dominion Institute's network. Moreover, a scholar must assess whether the discourse provides meaning for these necessary nodes. Third, once actors are convinced about the worthiness of a particular discourse, one must observe how each actor performs their role. This is a key element of ANT's performative view of society. As noted above, this view considers the traces produced by social actions and events. In my study, a network can only be said to exist if I can show how actors help to realize a storyline. Finally, Callon's approach to ANT suggests that a network's maturation point comes when other actors are fully committed to the logic of the network and its discourse. Here the position of the obligatory passage point is not contested. In fact, other actors are so deeply enmeshed into the web of association and the storyline that they comply without necessarily realizing the broader context of their actions. Discourse becomes normalized and the logic of the network becomes the dominant mode.

This approach to discursive policy inquiry through the lens of ANT leads to five questions that guide my dissertation's narrative:

- 1) What is the historically grounded context of the Dominion Institute's network?
- 2) How does the Dominion Institute construct its guiding storyline?
- 3) How is discourse used to draw the interest of necessary allies?
- 4) How do actors perform their roles and contribute to the network's realization?
- 5) How does this dominate the process of memory production and circulation?

However, there is a final question that comes out of my consideration of Bourdieu's political economy of symbolic power. Not only is it necessary to track how discourse causes translations, a scholar must also consider how the ability to communicate discourse comes out of a wider social, political and economic context: How does the obligatory passage point garner the means to engage in this communicative process of forging associations? In the next section, I address the methods taken to observe the Dominion Institute's network and analyze the information to answer these key questions.

METHODOLOGY

This dissertation is grounded in a specific reading of discursive policy inquiry, Callon's approach to ANT and Bourdieu's political economy of symbolic power. To summarize, I view a shift in the representation of the Canadian Forces through a lens on cultural memory. This lens is calibrated by the assumption that a network of actors has influenced the act of representation. Power to represent operates by dominating the discourse guiding the formation and implementation of policy over Canada's symbolic

culture. From this perspective, discourse is viewed from two levels. Not only is discourse a key part of the process of network building and policy work, but this ultimately leads to the creation and circulation of discourse embedded in the representations of the military. The system of meaning behind this first level of discourse comes out of a historically grounded context of controversy and uncertainty. In turn, this period of crisis leads to a historical process with the development of a network engaged in altering the way in which symbolic culture is discussed and represented. All of this stems from the translations caused by an obligatory passage point: the Dominion Institute. These translations occur through four phases. However, the cultural capital necessary to cause a translation stems from the ability for this central node to translate economic, social and political forms of capital. The result of this network can then be gauged by looking at the second level of discourse—the ways and interpretations in which military memory is represented in symbolic culture.

Considering my theoretical lens, it is clear that this project's methodology must focus on issues and sites of discourse. Moreover, it must consider both levels of discourse: discourse within the process of network formation and discourse located within the country's symbolic culture. With this in mind, my project moved along two paths. First, I had a general interest in Canada's symbolic culture regarding the military and its history. This direction raised two key questions: What are the cultural forms that are produced and circulated during the period under examination? What discourse about the military do these forms project? Second, I had a more specific focus on the role of the Dominion Institute in helping to create some of these cultural forms. This study of the Dominion Institute as a networker and discursive actor led me to consider several

questions: What is the historical context providing the system of meaning that underscores the emergence of the Dominion Institute? How does the Dominion Institute use this context to construct a “storyline” and shape the way in which other actors view a particular policy problem? Who are the actors that the Dominion Institute sees as necessary for its network? How do actors initially respond to this problematic? What tools are used to communicate discourse? Are actors interested in the solution to a policy problem? Do actors fulfill the roles and identities laid out in the Dominion Institute’s proposed network? Finally, my last step was to draw these two directions together by assessing whether the paths met: Does the discourse of the Dominion Institute get reflected in popular and governmental representations of military memory?

Tracking the Shift in Symbolic Culture

My research project began with an analysis of the controversy surrounding *The Valour and the Horror*. This was based on a reading of both primary and secondary sources. First, I surveyed the academic literature on this topic produced by historians and communication scholars. In particular, the work of Graham Carr (2005; 2007) and David Taras (1995) helped me to conceptualize what lay at the root of this public debate. These scholars presented this controversy as the outcome of a series of disagreements over the act of transmitting cultural memory. This dispute included a number of actors: filmmakers, cultural workers, historians, veterans, politicians, government bureaucrats, the media and even enlisted military personnel. However, despite this accepted interpretation of the public debate and the Senate hearing, I wondered whether the discourse surrounding this disagreement revealed any points of consensus. I then

reviewed the report by the Senate's report, the CBC's ombudsman's report and newspaper coverage. In particular, I refined my media search with database queries that gathered the commentary of key actors: Cliff Chadderton from the War Amps, the McKenna brothers and historians David Bercuson and S.F. Wise. My review of this discourse revealed something rather interesting. As much as these actors took the opportunity to castigate the actions of the other side, they also expressed a shared sentiment over the urgency to remember and an awareness about the necessity to use popular forms to transmit military memory. In sum, these primary sources highlighted the potential for greater cooperation on future projects amongst historians, the media, the state, veterans, journalists and cultural workers. This led me to the hypothesis that guided the conceptualization of my project: What if the controversy over *The Valour and the Horror* led to a network approach to the production and circulation of military memory? In the view of ANT, this event may be the first trace of the emergence of a network to stabilize a crisis in the content and context of military memory.

With *The Valour and the Horror* 1992 as the starting point, I then charted the symbolic culture regarding the memorialization of the military that followed this public controversy. I conducted this research through newspaper database queries with search terms aimed at revealing films, shows, monuments and other memorializing texts. I then broadened this search to all military cultural texts about both contemporary and historical topics. This survey highlighted the dearth of such texts in Canadian culture.³ However, it revealed an interesting trend (See Appendix A). There appeared to be a shift in a focus on texts that emphasized a peacekeeping narrative to a focus on a hardened, warrior

³ This is an observation that Christopher Dornan (2010) has recently made in his own comparative survey of military texts in the US and Canada's entertainment industries.

symbolic culture. In addition, there also appeared to be less controversy and more cooperation amongst these one time competing groups.

Two texts stood out from this survey. Both the CBC's coverage of the 1995 VE-Day ceremony in France and Brian McKenna's 2007 CBC docudrama *The Great War* (2007) appeared to be apologies to veterans and military historians for their participation in *The Valour and the Horror*. However, what stood out from this survey was the observation that a shift in representation preceded political events such as the September 11, 2001 bombings and the escalation of Canada's role in Afghanistan in February of 2006. A major turning point in this cultural trend was the transfer of the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in 2000 from France to the steps of Ottawa's National War Memorial. Media coverage of this event reemphasized the narrative presented in the CBC's coverage of the 50th anniversary of VE-Day that Canada was not only a nation of peacekeepers, but also warriors. This event was also viewed as the result of the combined efforts of government, the military and the Royal Canadian Legion. Moreover, it sparked what appears to be a military memorial construction boon.

This portion of my research project was not intended to be an exhaustive survey of military cultural memory forms since 1992. My newspaper queries only focused on federally supported cultural forms and those that were circulated nationally through the media and cultural industry. Nonetheless, it served an important role by fulfilling two functions. First, it provided evidence for my claim about a perceived shift in the representation of military memory and the military in general. Second, the chronology also offered a convincing document expressing the immense rate of activity in cultural production that began at the turn of the twenty-first century. It was quite clear that

something was occurring under the surface. These memorials, televisual depictions and other texts could not simply be explained as rare occurrences or the product of chance. Instead, they were part of a noticeable trend with a renaissance in representations of the nation as a warrior. The core of my research project would then focus on some of these cultural memory forms with respect to the network of actors engaged in production and circulation. Drawing upon my unique theoretical position, I approached these texts through a case study of the Dominion Institute as a discursive actor and an obligatory passage point.

Tracking the Dominion Institute's Network

As with the entry into *The Valour and the Horror*, I began my study into the Dominion Institute by looking at secondary sources. After searching university databases, I found very little academic literature on this organization. Even an expanded query including other Canadian history groups such as Historica and Canada's National History Society (CNHS) turned up few sources. Most of the results were the writings of historians and media scholars on Historica's *Heritage Minutes*. This work analyzed these commercials from a governmentality or a historiographical perspective. The emphasis was on the texts and not the institution responsible for them or the context in which they emerged. As for the Dominion Institute, there was even less literature with nothing from the fields of communication or media studies. Historians (Wright 2000; Morton 2000; Beauchemin 2005) tended to focus on the Institute's history polls. This work is critical of the modernist view of history as a series of political events that these polls promote. Moreover, as Annie Beauchemin (2005) notes in a detailed analysis of the questions,

political history is often viewed as a series of military events: “plus de la moitié des questions d’histoire politique traitent des plus grandes contributions militaires canadiennes” (266). Despite the belief that these polls were having an effect on public policy over cultural memory, this literature does not provide any evidence. Nevertheless, they are rather convinced in this belief. According to Desmond Morton (2000), the message of these polls had been received by the Prime Minister’s Office. This is a claim that he does not support with anything more than anecdotal evidence. What I took from this literature review was an appreciation about the importance of the polls. These polls certainly struck a chord with progressivist historians who were concerned about their influence on cultural memory.

This lack of information and evidence meant that I would have to do most of the legwork if I wanted to answer the questions that I posed about the Dominion Institute. The first site I turned to was newspaper coverage of this organization. Specifically, I entered the query term “Dominion Institute” into ProQuest database and refined my search to four newspapers: *The Globe and Mail*, (285 results), *National Post* (584 results⁴), *The Toronto Star* (160 results), *The Ottawa Citizen* (314 results). I chose these newspapers in order to assess the coverage from three different media owners.⁵ In addition, I was interested in the coverage by a Toronto newspaper since this city is home to the Dominion Institute and by an Ottawa newspaper considering its more detailed

⁴ This number is ballooned by the *National Post*’s “On this day” series. This series is published once a week. It offers a brief synopsis of Canadian historical event and offers directions to learn at www.historica-dominion.ca. The series began after the merger between these two organizations in September of 2009.

⁵ Technically, I looked at newspapers from four owners considering CanWest’s purchase of the Southam chain (*National Post*) in 2000.

coverage of the federal government. With hundreds of printed articles in four piles, I read through this coverage one newspaper at a time.

The challenge at this point was to be very diligent and strategic in how I approached this dataset by reading for specific information to organize into categories.⁶ I noted what was being covered in the article: What are the events, objects, activities or actions? This information allowed me to put together a rough chronological account of the Dominion Institute. I entered this information into a chart (See Appendix B for a summary of this chart). Furthermore, it allowed me to establish a filing system with each event or action fitting into a specific category. With the more I read, I became more capable at categorizing this data into different topics: 1) polls; 2) newspaper series; 3) conferences; 4) televisual projects; 5) history controversies; 6) other actors referring to the Dominion Institute; 7) lecture series; 8) public education projects; 9) lobbying campaigns and government relations; 10) publications; 11) stories about the Dominion Institute's cofounders and institutional issues. I was then able to file these articles under a specific label such as "7th Annual LaFontaine-Baldwin Lecture (March 10, 2006)" and place them in the appropriate category.

At the same time that I focused on general topics, I charted the names of individuals involved in the various events and activities. In addition, I noted what they did and what role they played in the Dominion Institute's projects. I added this information into the general chronology that I began in the last phase. Moreover, I also created another chart of these individuals' names, their occupations (e.g. novelist, McGill University historian, editor at *The Toronto Star*, etc.), any titles to their names (e.g.

⁶ Admittedly, I did not know what these categories would be until I was well on my way through the reading.

Orders of Canada, military rank, etc.) and their connection to the Dominion Institute (e.g. wrote an essay for Great Canadian Questions series, member of the advisory council, delivered the 7th Annual LaFontaine-Baldwin Lecture, etc.). Much of this information was then used to create network maps that I refer to later on in this dissertation. This step allowed me to better appreciate the role of other actors and assess close allies of the Institute especially with some individuals who had multiple entries: Which politicians had close relations? Who was part of the epistemic community? What surprised me about the information gathered from this stage was the wide net of individuals who came up. It was not just people from one political party or sociopolitical philosophy who were represented in this network map. In addition, this focus on the names of individuals also highlighted the importance of Rudyard Griffiths, the first executive director, to an account of the Dominion Institute. Almost every newspaper story positioned Griffiths as the primary spokesperson.

My interest in the actors involved with the Dominion Institute also included associations, institutions and organizations. I noted the titles of these groups and the level of their involvement. For example, many of the polls and educational projects were co-sponsored by other organizations. As I did for my network mapping of individuals, I noted the name of the group, what it does and what its involvement is with a particular Dominion Institute activity. Some of this information was used to develop the diagrams found throughout this dissertation that provide visual evidence for the expansion of the network. However, what was really important from this stage was that much of this involvement from other organizations was financial. I was then able to keep track of the cost of the Institute's activities and key funding sources. It was clear that the money not

only came from the federal government, but also from philanthropic foundations, banks, newspapers, the cultural industry and other levels of government.

As I read through these articles, I began to develop an understanding of the themes in which different activities were discussed by the media and by the comments of those quoted in the articles. It was at this point that I considered my theoretical lens regarding the storyline presented by the Institute. I then highlighted and categorized passages based upon certain themes that were starting to emerge: 1) youth and memory; 2) Americanization of cultural memory; 3) the weaknesses of different actors; 4) the perceived roles of other actors; 5) the Dominion Institute as an interlocutor between actors; 6) the problems with progressivist, postmodernist approaches to education; 7) the importance of the military; 8) the link between history education and citizenship. This information was then added to the general chronology so that each activity included quotations and passages that highlighted key themes. For example, Griffiths presented the poor results of the Annual Remembrance Day Survey (November 11, 2005) as a failure of the social studies approach to history education and as a symptom of the lack of respect by the public for the military. Including full citation information in this chart allowed me to easily refer to articles in my expanding filing cabinet. However, I also noted the responses of other actors to the Dominion Institute's activities. This allowed me to gauge how the discourse and storyline resonated with different actors.

It turned out that looking at a number of media outlets was an important decision. Different outlets did not always cover the same activities. In particular, polls were released on an exclusive embargo basis thereby limiting the coverage by all newspapers. Therefore, as I made my way through each of the four piles, I was able to not only

confirm the information, but I was also able add new entries. Upon completion of this phase, I was left with an organized filing system and an extremely useful document—my chart of the Dominion Institute’s chronology. This document became a helpful reference throughout the rest of my project. Moreover, it provided a clearly laid out dataset that I could then analyze according to the Dominion Institute’s development, the expansion of its network and the formation of its storyline. My first step was to see if there were any obvious trends: How could I start to make sense of the Dominion Institute as a historical entity?

Although I would later expand on this analysis as my project developed, this initial step proved to be a critical juncture. It was clear that early on the Dominion Institute garnered minimal media coverage and was much more limited in its activities. However, by the early 2000s and increasing steadily throughout the decade, the Dominion Institute had a much more noticeable presence: media coverage expanded, more people were involved, financial contributions were coming in and more groups were helping out. I read my chronology to identify key events that seemed to be pivotal turning points with respect to other actors and the projected discourse. I plotted these developments onto two separate pages. It was at this point that I was able to perceive of a narrative regarding the Dominion Institute’s development.

In its first 3-4 years of operation, the Dominion Institute was primarily engaged in advocating for history education within schools and a concern over cultural literacy. The issue of national unity was on top of its agenda as the country had just come out of the crisis associated with the 1995 Quebec referendum. The emphasis was on using a facts-based, national approach to history education to instill a strong civic identity. Although

military memory was on the agenda as implied by the Remembrance Day polls, it had a general concern over Canadians' lack of knowledge of the people and events that have made the country a great nation. It also did not do all that much in this earlier stage other than produce 2-3 polls per year. This appeared to change by the end of 2000 with the announcement of the launch of the Memory Project on November 8. What stood out about this entry in my chronological chart was both the cost of this activity at \$1.5 million, which far exceeded any previous project, and the variety of assisting groups (Royal Canadian Legion, Ontario's Seniors' Secretariat, TD Bank and Historica). However, this event did not lead to a total shift towards military topics. Instead, it sparked a wave of activity in a number of different areas: the involvement in federal elections by promoting youth voting, the production of media events such as the retrial of Louis Riel, the publication of historical themed books, the launch of the LaFontaine-Baldwin lecture series and other noteworthy projects. Nonetheless, over the course of the decade, military-themed activities rapidly increased.

By the years 2006, 2007 and 2008, almost every other news story about the Dominion Institute was related to foreign policy, security or military issues. Not surprisingly, the discourse also shifted as the storyline now positioned military history as the primary concern. Events such as its participation in Paul Gross' *Passchendaele* and Citizenship and Immigration Minister Jason Kenney's revised citizenship education guide seemed to signal its expertise in the area of military memory. A key lesson from this initial attempt to build a narrative was the appreciation that the Dominion Institute's concern throughout its development rests upon its view of citizenship. It claimed to have

formed in order to rehabilitate the status of citizenship following the 1995 referendum and all subsequent activities funnel through this objective.

The next stages of my research project injected more primary sources into my dataset through interviews and gathering institutional documents. Accessing Canada's national catalogue AMICUS, I searched for texts produced by the Dominion Institute. I then ordered this material using interlibrary loans. This phase allowed me to retrieve a number of useful texts such as the Institute's many televisual projects, teacher education guides and governmental reports. The most important text was "Youth and History." This report was based upon the first national history quiz and included the data from this poll. Similar to my reading of the newspaper coverage, I picked out key themes emphasized in the discourse of this policy paper. Finding this report proved to be a critical step in how I thought of the Dominion Institute and its network. It made me aware that in addition to using forms of communication such as the news media and TV documentaries, the Institute engages in communication that occurs away from public scrutiny. In particular, as much as this group is interested in influencing the public, it is primarily concerned over how powerful actors such as the state respond to its message. On the Dominion Institute's website, I was able to locate more primary documents. The database of polling documents and press releases allowed me to fill in some missing information and add to my files. I read these documents to assess similarities and differences from the media's coverage. For the most part, journalists quoted passages word-for-word from the press release. Moreover, the storyline emphasized by the findings and the interpretation was reflected in media coverage. This appreciation of how discourse was not only constructed through tools such as polls but also reflected by the

news media was something I tried to observe in other actors. I searched the CBCA database and parliamentary proceedings to see if any references to the Dominion Institute turned up in the discourse of politicians, intellectuals, corporations and any other group. Although this returned a number of interesting responses such as a reference by Prime Minister Chrétien to the polls, it was clear that I would have to seek out another site to compile this evidence.

The most fruitful phase in my research project came during the interview process. Early on, I was aware that interviews would be necessary to construct a military-cultural memory network and assess the Dominion Institute's role. However, I needed to be strategic in my approach to this important phase. Interviews can be an endless process and securing meetings can be frustrating. I waited until after I put together a chronology so that I had a clear idea of the network and the Institute's development. Perhaps if there were more scholarly or even popular accounts of the organization, then I could have avoided this time consuming step. Nonetheless, in retrospect this primary research prepared me in a way that secondary sources could never have done: 1) I had detailed yet organized documents to reference; 2) I was aware of key events, people and developments in the organization's history; 3) I knew the discourse that was projected to other actors. My task then was to secure meetings with individuals who played an important role in the Institute's development and those involved in the effort to influence military memory. I interviewed, either in person or over the phone, fifteen individuals: two historians, the current executive VP of the Historica-Dominion Institute, two cofounders of the Dominion Institute, a representative of the Royal Canadian Legion, two members of the Institute's advisory council, two board members of military-minded

organizations that have strategic relations with the Institute, two filmmakers, a history teacher, the chair of a philanthropic foundation and a publicist.⁷ However, I was unable to interview governmental representatives or individuals from competing history education groups. Whereas government officials did not respond to my requests, representatives of Historica and CNHS were not willing to participate in a study that focused on another organization.

I designed interview questions depending upon the perspectives of different participants. Generally, I followed Dvora Yanow's (2000) advice for discursive policy scholars to conduct interviews that focus on the creation and interpretation of discourse by policy communities. She states, "transcripts themselves then become sources for further analysis" (31). However, at the same time, I used the interviews to confirm the information garnered in previous steps and to see if there were any nodes missing from my network map. For those directly connected to the Institute, I posed questions to assess the meaning they tried to embed into their discursive strategies and communicative tools. We discussed in detail the rationale behind the various themes in the discourse that I identified in my media analysis: What is the connection between citizenship and memory? Why is military memory more important than other forms? These and other questions did not usually lead to a larger philosophical discussion, but to specific examples and activities. For the cofounders who participated in my study, I questioned them about the context behind the Institute's emergence and the problem it sought to solve. This provided an interesting answer. The context emphasized in media coverage regarding the Quebec referendum was only a symptom of a larger sociopolitical malaise

⁷ For a list of interviews see Appendix D.

affecting the nation's political and symbolic culture. I also asked questions to assess how the Institute viewed the role and identities of other actors such as historians, filmmakers, politicians, veterans, the media and the corporate community. Finally, a third set of questions focused on political economy issues. I wanted to learn how the Institute secured financial resources, how polls were conducted, how they garnered media attention and how they participated in the production and circulation of cultural memory.

For those who were part of the Institute's network, my questions focused on how they were connected and how they interpreted the discourse of the Dominion Institute. I began by asking how they first learned about or were put in touch with the group. This revealed key social, political and economic links within the network that I could not have revealed through media analysis. All of these interviews focused on how they or their groups interpreted the meaning of the many polls. The remainder examined specific projects and the role of the Dominion Institute in helping to realize different activities. Since many participants were connected to Gross' *Passchendaele* project, this film's production and circulation was often a key topic. I was also interested in any points of disagreement amongst the actors. I found that many participants were rather candid and did not avoid controversial subjects. After each interview, I returned to my chronology to add or fix any important events. I also followed up on many leads. For example, some interviewees referred me to a newspaper or scholarly article they had written or read that influenced their thinking. However, I also double-checked information and comments. Whereas some participants exaggerated the truth, others offered insight to activities that did not appear in media coverage or in my newspaper search.

At the end of the interview process, I was left with (a) a more detailed chronology, (b) a better understanding of the logic behind the organization, (c) an appreciation for how it operates on a day-to-day basis and (d) the transcripts of conversations to assess how discourse is constructed and interpreted. I was also pointed in the direction of a number of additional primary sources. In particular, Jack Granatstein informed me that I could locate his files on the Dominion Institute in his fonds at York University's archive. This proved to be a valuable resource. It provided me a copy of the Institute's initial funding request that I was able to compare with a photocopy given to me by Rudyard Griffiths, his correspondence with Griffiths and a document of the strategic partnership between his military lobbying group and the Dominion Institute. Finally, the desire to track where the money behind the Institute's efforts led me to check the Canadian Revenue Agency's online records. Although these records did not contain details of who contributed, it provided a useful dataset to chart the organization's success in securing funding from government and through charitable donations.

Observing the Dominion Institute's Influence on Symbolic Culture

My project required one final phase of research. I still needed to address the question: Has the Dominion Institute's discourse been reflected in Canada's symbolic culture? Admittedly, a clue for answering this came to me earlier on in my project's development. While attending the Remembrance Day ceremony at the National War Memorial in 2009, I was struck by two of the day's events. First, the release of a revised citizenship guide, *Discover Canada: The Rights and Responsibilities of Citizenship*, emphasizing military memory was presented as the outcome of consultation that included

the Dominion Institute and actors within its network. Second, the unrestrained projection by government officials of military symbolism reflected much of what lay at the core of the Institute's discourse.

With respect to the revised guide, I was curious whether this edition did indeed offer a more militaristic tone than earlier ones. I went to the National Library and Archives to obtain copies of the previous Liberal authored guides produced under the Martin, Chrétien and Trudeau governments. I then performed a comparative study by noting the number of times the military was referred to and how it was depicted. There was certainly a marked difference between these two editions. Trudeau's guide, in particular, was noticeably different. It was a foldable map of Canada that included a pictorial history and brief summary of key facts. The Liberal guides also contextualized their account of the Canadian Forces within the discourse of peacekeeping. Although I was unable to meet with officials at Citizenship and Immigration Canada and Minister Kenney's office, I learned that the person behind the revised guide was Kenney's policy advisor Dr. Chris Champion. My efforts to reach Champion proved unsuccessful. However, I did read his dissertation and other academic publications to assess his view of Canadian citizenship and Canada's symbolic culture.

Complementing the release of Kenney's guide was what appeared to be a greater emphasis on evoking military symbols during the Remembrance Day ceremony. Although one might expect such representations in an event that includes the Canadian Forces and honours fallen soldiers, the image of Governor General Michaëlle Jean and Prince Charles in uniform sparked great public and media interest. This appearance resulted in a number of articles and opinion pieces written in newspapers and on the

Internet. People from across the political spectrum had much to say about Jean's decision to wear a military uniform. I tracked these articles and organized them into files based on the varying perspectives. I also did more research into the subject by compiling information about two earlier instances of Jean adorning her ceremonial military garb. In particular, I downloaded from the Governor General's website a speech she delivered at a naval ceremony in Halifax on June 27, 2009. As opposed to her Remembrance Day comments that were rather brief, at this Halifax event she was much more forthcoming about why she was wearing the uniform. This speech provided a level of discourse that was not mentioned in newspaper articles and opinion pieces.

Constructing the Historical Narrative

As I made my way through these many research phases, I was conscious of the fact that I would eventually need to communicate my evidence of a network and my analysis of its discourse in an effective and coherent manner. My intent for this dissertation was not simply to present an account of the Dominion Institute and the activities of its network. Instead, I wanted to offer an argument that the shift in the way military memory is represented in symbolic culture is related to the efforts of this organization and its participation as an obligatory passage point in a military-cultural memory network. With this in mind, I considered the Institute's chronology in relation to the information I gathered from primary sources and interviews. It was at this point that a narrative capable of cogently communicating my argument began to emerge. Since I conceived of this narrative during the latter part of the interview phase, I was able to present it to some of the research participants to gauge their thoughts.

I charted an outline with three sections. First, I considered Howarth's claim that discourse is rooted in a historically grounded system of meaning and Latour's argument about the traces generated in moments of controversy. I then plotted the historical and discursive context of the Dominion Institute during the late 1980s and early 1990s. It turned out that this period was rich in controversy and uncertainty over how Canadians discussed the nation's symbolic culture. I approached this period by looking at the crises over the representation of the military, citizenship and memory. Moreover, drawing upon my network map, I examined these crises by focusing on the connections to the three individuals who I know knew would later become key nodes: Richard Gwyn, David Bercuson and Jack Granatstein. Second, I incorporated Callon's four steps of translation to plot the development of the Dominion Institute's network. I selected key events, polls and documents to analyze these translations as historical periods: problematization (1996-1997), *interessement* (1997-2001), enrolment (2001-2008) and mobilization (2008). Finally, I decided to end my study by reflecting upon the connection between the Dominion Institute and the events of Remembrance Day 2009. I analyzed Jean's gesture and Kenney's guide in relation to the discourse and context of the military-cultural memory network.

CHAPTER 3: TRACES OF THE NETWORK: THE CRISES OVER THE REPRESENTATION OF THE MILITARY, HISTORY AND CITIZENSHIP, 1988-1995

No matter what their scale and intensity, controversies are part and parcel of the very definition of the social bond. The question: ‘What links us together?’ is not answerable in principle, but in practice, every time someone raises it a new association is made that does indeed link us together.

~Bruno Latour, “The Powers of Association”¹

Latour argues that traditional approaches to social science consider controversies as minor blips that do not accurately reflect a social order and can be eliminated with a better understanding of society. ANT, on the other hand, views such moments of crisis not as exceptions to the rule, but as a driving social force. These moments provide scholars with the traces of social action that are necessary to begin scholarly examination because they are what generate bonds and associations. Society is not something that exists to be discovered based on social aggregates such wealth, status, occupation, class, etc. Instead, Latour (1986) argues that society “is performed through everyone’s efforts to define it” (273). He states that the organizing feature of this network society is that all social action emerges out of efforts to stabilize controversies and contradictions. The politics of this society ultimately exists in the realm of discourse—the act of both defining the social world and how others should operate within it. It is through language and symbols that draw actors together in order to lead society out of crisis and uncertainty. This view is paralleled by discursive policy inquiry that also locates the formation of discourse communities and their guiding storylines within a historical

¹ Latour 1986: 273.

context. As Fischer (2003) notes, policy debates are often framed within a language rooted in crisis or decline. With this in mind, I launch into my study of the development of Canada's military-cultural memory network and the role of the Dominion Institute by beginning with the period that precedes this phenomenon and the emergence of this institution.

According to historian A.B. McKillop (2008), it was the 15 years between the mid 1960s and early 1980s that marks the emergence and flowering of Canadian nationalism. Labelled the "Canadian moment," it was then "the country sloughed off the last traces of colonial inferiority and came to believe that all things were possible, whether in politics, the economy, or the realm of arts and culture" (xiii). This context frames his biography of a personality he positions as one of the most significant players in making this moment possible: Pierre Berton. During this period, which also corresponds with the dominance of Pearson and Trudeau's Liberal governments, Canada earned its reputation as a progressive, pluralistic and postnationalist country that is different from the modernist, militaristic societies of the US and Europe. This postcolonial, humanist spirit was embedded into all aspects of cultural, political and economic life. However, its decline, which also comes during the rise of Mulroney's Conservative government, began in the 1980s with globalization, privatization and neoliberalization.

In this chapter, I elaborate on McKillop's thesis by arguing that the twilight of the "Canadian moment" leads to a crisis in the representation of Canada to Canadians during the late 1980s and early 1990s. This general state of uncertainty results in a number of controversies over what were once dominant modes of representation and accepted narratives. Although I only examine this period from the perspective of a crisis in

representing citizenship, memory and the military, I came across many examples regarding other realms such as sports, arts and the economy. However, I limit my analysis to the first three topics because they are the most relevant to my study of the Dominion Institute and the military-cultural memory network.² This context is helpful for identifying the problematic that provides the rationale behind this group and its network; in addition, it also offers clues into the solutions proposed and an introduction to the individuals who will later hold significant positions within the Dominion Institute's epistemic community. In each section, I discuss a particular crisis and focus on the role of one actor that will later become an important node within the military cultural-memory network: (1) Richard Gwyn and the crisis over the postnationalist view of Canadian citizenship; (2) Jack Granatstein and the crisis over social history as a tool for educating Canadians about their past; (3) David Bercuson and the crisis over the representation of the Canadian Forces as a peacekeeper.

The objective of this chapter is to set up the rest of the dissertation that presents the efforts of the Dominion Institute to patch together the tarnished discourse stemming from crises over citizenship, the military and memory. However, while these controversies allow for a discursive context and an introduction to actors that will later play a key role in the network, it was the biggest crisis of all, the near dissolution of the country with the 1995 Quebec referendum, which produces the emotional locus for the rehabilitation of the representation of the military, citizenship and public memory. In particular, I note how this political crisis influences Canada's corporate community and

² Nonetheless, I think a historian of this period may have a lot to add to my project. In particular, I suspect that the economic debate over free trade around the 1988 federal election and the recession of the early 1990s may contribute another level of discourse.

some federally minded associations to reconsider the dangers of a stagnant mode of representing Canada. Nonetheless, what is important to note about this historical context is that at the time these three particular crises were not directly connected. As I discuss in the rest of this dissertation, they are gradually patched together by individuals and groups such as the Dominion Institute who share the goal of presenting Canadians with a strong and coherent representation of their nation. Finally, I conclude by summarizing this period of crisis and considering it in relation to Louis Marin's theory of the double logic of the power of representation. The main argument here is that the attempt to rehabilitate the representation of Canada to Canadians is grounded in both a problem with content and institutional arrangements—what is represented and who is involved in the act of representation.

THE CRISIS OF REPRESENTING CITIZENSHIP

In her book *The House of Difference: Cultural Politics and National Identity in Canada* (2002), Eva Mackey examines the celebrations around Canada's 125th anniversary and the role of the CANADA 125 corporation that helped fund, publicize and organize commemorative events. She argues that this corporation, which she suggests represents the dominant forces within the country, was able to maintain a unified, hegemonic depiction despite offering representations of the nation as multicultural and diverse: "how 'tolerance' is mobilised to manage populations and also to create identities" (Mackey 2002: 5). According to Mackey, this narrative was a culmination of the official governmental ideology of multiculturalism. This ideology originated with the passage of Trudeau's Multiculturalism Act in 1971. Contrary to the modernist

conceptualization, this postmodernist view of citizenship celebrated difference and cultural pluralism.

The mantra of this Trudeauian consensus over citizenship was summed up in the pithy axiom: unity in diversity. Jean-François Lyotard's (1984) explained this understanding in his analysis of postmodern societies as being incredulous to the veracity and authority of metanarratives. According to the poet and scholar Robert Kroetsch (1989), Canada epitomizes such a society by eschewing the nostalgic longing for lost completeness: "In Canada we cannot for the world decide when we became a nation or what to call the day or days or, for that matter, years that might have been the originary moments. If we can't be united we can't be disunited. Our genealogy is postmodern" (27). However, despite the flowering of this postmodernist conception of citizenship with an event such as the Canada 125 celebrations in 1992, a wider lens on the late 1980s and early 1990s reveals cracks in this longstanding governmental policy that came to encompass a large part of the way in which the country perceived itself and was presented.

On December 14, 1993, the Canadian Council of Christians and Jews³ released a poll conducted by Decima Research that identified a significant shift in Canadian values. It found that nearly 75% of respondents rejected "the notion of cultural diversity and think ethnic minorities should try harder to fit into mainstream society" (Jeffs, *The Ottawa Citizen*, December 14, 1993, A3). Support for the cultural mosaic had given way to the American melting pot. At the root of this reaction was a concern over the disappearance of traditional Canadian symbols and values. Specifically, the concern was

³ Now known as the Canadian Centre for Diversity, this Toronto-based organization was founded in 1947 to help promote interfaith dialogue and inter-cultural discourse.

over how this loss will impact the country's future and the next generation. This poll emerged in the context of a series of controversial events that fuelled a burgeoning public debate over multiculturalism: (1) On November 29, 1993, a Longueuil municipal court judge, Justice Richard Alary, expelled a woman from his courtroom for wearing a hijab; (2) around the same time, a Scarborough mall instituted "Santas from Around the World" that upset many patrons who saw the traditional Christmas costume adorned by non-Caucasians; (3) in February of 1994, the House of Commons passed a law removing references to Jesus Christ in its daily prayer; (4) around the same time, a Toronto judge, Justice H.C. Whealy, banned religious headgear during the trial of black activist Dudley Laws. However, the most infamous of these events came during a commemorative ceremony on Remembrance Day of 1993 in Surrey. It was at this event that a Canadian WWII veteran, Pritam Jauhal, was refused entrance to the main hall of a Royal Canadian Legion for wearing a Sikh turban.

Although politicians and Legion officials at Dominion Command headquarters in Ottawa tried to mitigate the controversy by formally apologizing, the issue would not subside as other branches made similar stands. At stake was a by-law enacted in 1946 banning hats within Legion halls out of respect for fallen comrades. While this regulation was rarely enforced in the past, it became a symbolic gesture for some Legion members to counter what they thought were problems with liberalized immigration, multiculturalism and political correctness (Hale 1995: 248). The issue split not only the public but also the Legion as members openly debated one another in front of the national media. In addition, it was conflated with a concurrent controversy facing the RCMP of whether Sikh officers could wear turbans on the job. As was evident in the discourse of

delegates at the Legion's national convention that voted down a proposal to allow religious headdresses, there was a growing sentiment by traditionalists that multicultural practices and immigrants were robbing so-called "heritage Canadians" of their Judeo-Christian customs and values:

I honestly feel that everybody in Canada is getting sick and tired of this human rights [issue]. Where are our human rights? We fought for this country? (qtd. in Bissoondath 1994: 47).

They're trying to take the 'Christ' out of Christmas (qtd. in Hale 1995: 250).

This issue of religious headdresses, more than any other controversy of the time, provided the context for a series of best-selling books examining the state of multiculturalism in Canada. Neil Bissoondath, the award-winning novelist and short story author, wrote a bestselling non-fiction book entitled *Selling Illusions: The Cult of Multiculturalism* (1994). What made Bissoondath's critique of multiculturalism resonate with the public was the fact that he himself was an immigrant from Trinidad and Tobago. His problem was not with multiculturalism as a concept, but as it was practiced in Canada. He argued that this practice only entrenched social divisions by focusing on stereotypical ethnic groupings and thus diminishing the autonomy of the individual. He proposed a new vision of "Canadianness" that would fuse identity into a postmodernist conception where categories do not define individuals, but "where inherent differences and inherent similarities meld easily and where no one is alienated with hyphens" (224).

Richard Gwyn, the journalist, newspaper editor, biographer of Pierre Trudeau and civil servant, also wrote a bestselling critique of multiculturalism with his book *Nationalism Without Walls: The Unbearable Lightness of Being Canadian* (1995). He,

however, was less optimistic than Bissoondath over whether diversity and postnationalism could ever work. For Gwyn, multiculturalism was simply a piece of a larger trend towards what Robert Fulford (1993) labelled a “postmodern dominion.” At the root of this postmodernity lay (a) the end of a national economy with the dominance of globalization, (b) the demise of the Anglo-Franco biculturalism plus aboriginals consensus with the emergence of global immigration patterns and (c) the decentralization of a national character with the rise of “identity” communities. Whereas some Canadian intellectuals were celebrating this shift (Hutcheon 1988; Schechter 1993; Powe 1997; D’Haen 1998), Gwyn positioned himself in the camp of Fulford (1993) who, drawing on the nationalist arguments of the historians Innis, Creighton, Underhill and Lower, worried that this philosophy existed only in the realm of ideas. As a normative practice, such policies would prevent Canada from constructing a shared identity and common citizenship: “if the nation is there, then it must have a history, a set of symbols expressing nationhood, and a reason for existing. These items are, after all, standard equipment for nations” (109). In reality, Gwyn suggested that the diversity so deeply desired by postmodernist scholars was nothing more than “mono-culturalism” with different groups more interested in their own growth than in participating in a decentralized, flexible view of citizenship. Despite a difference in their prescriptive suggestions, both Gwyn and Bissoondath’s commentaries resonated with a large spectrum of the public who sensed that multiculturalism had gone too far and that Canada needed to return to representations of citizenship and the nation that were rooted in a unified identity and common heritage—a continuation of pluralist, postnationalist and postmodernist cultural policy would lead to national suicide.

This concern over the postnationalist mode of representing Canadian citizenship was not just taken up by writers and journalists, but also by the state and government officials. On June 27, 1991, the Citizens' Forum on Canada's Future⁴, chaired by CRTC commissioner Keith Spicer, tabled its analysis, which was commonly referred to as the Spicer Report, to Parliament. This forum was established a year earlier by Prime Minister Mulroney in the wake of the failed Meech Lake Accord. Spicer was asked to lead a group of 11 other eminent⁵ Canadians to establish a dialogue that would assess what the public thought about Canada and its future. The forum was unique because, unlike a traditional royal commission, the commissioners went to public spaces and even to people's homes with a toll-free telephone line. Part of this consultation process included discussion kits used by specially trained moderators who led focus groups. In addition, the Canadian Federation of Teachers helped to conduct a separate Students' Forum⁶ to sensitize youth to the country's identity crisis and to ascertain the concerns of young people. In the end, the forum claimed to have heard from 400,000 Canadians and over 300,000 elementary and high school students. The information was then coded according to a 2,000 word key list and analysts prepared this information into broad categories for the commissioners: (a) major issues facing Canada, (b) Canadian identity

⁴ There is very little scholarship written on the Spicer Report. Most of it was published in its immediate aftermath focusing on public policy issues (Abu-Laban and Stasiulus 1992), but it has seemed to be forgotten as other inquiries and commissions have since arose. However, Jane Jenson and Susan Phillips (2001) provide an interesting discussion in their history of the institutions responsible for representing Canadian citizenship.

⁵ Including Elsie Wayne, a Conservative politician from New Brunswick, Roger Tassé, an executive Vice President at Bell Canada, and other leaders from Canadian business, academics and politics.

⁶ This national Students' Forum did not occur in Quebec since that province's teachers' union decided not to participate.

and values, (c) Quebec's place within Canada, (d) Aboriginal grievances, (e) cultural diversity, (f) the economy, and (g) the state of Canada's democratic political system.

Although the motivation behind this forum was to better understand the challenge put forth by Quebec and Aboriginal leaders' unwillingness to cooperate over the Meech Lake Accord, Spicer suggested that the main finding was a growing scepticism by Canadians over the ability of their leaders and the state to steer the country in the right direction. In particular, the report questioned the failure of politicians to balance short-term pragmatic decisions that would cut federal spending and open up the economy to increased investment with the important long-term objective of government regarding the inculcation of a common citizenship and a sense of national unity:

We must also somehow reconcile two very different elements of nation-building: the power of shared mythology or symbols, with the effectiveness of genuine, pragmatic programs. These are inevitably intertwined... **We have to understand that the pragmatic demands of managing programs—closing a rural post office—can have symbolic consequences far more powerful than any effect on the bottom line. But we must also recognize that innovative, sensible programs that engage Canadians in accord with their values may be a key to effective nation-building...** we must ensure that fundamental Canadian values are not jeopardized. They must be considered in planning from the start. Our consultations have made it clear: Canadians will no longer take matters on trust. They want to be persuaded that government initiatives will not cut across the values they cherish. Otherwise, **we must wonder whether Canada will still be governable** (Citizens' Forum on Canada's Future 1991a: 118; emphasis added).

In other words, it acknowledged that the growing move towards political and economic liberalization was impacting the social and cultural spheres. Politicians did not appreciate the symbolic consequences of their actions. Closing federal institutions or the signing of the free trade agreement signalled a loss of state sovereignty and authority that revealed itself in the public's lack of faith in the political system. Despite having little immediate

impact and being criticized by some politicians and the public as a waste of taxpayers' money, the Spicer Report raised a number of discourses that would foreshadow arguments and approaches asserted by the Dominion Institute.

Most importantly, the report positioned youth as the primary causality of this crisis of government in the age of neoliberalism. Although discussions about youth emerged as a minor theme in similar commissions⁷ on culture and identity, a concern over the ability to inculcate young Canadians with citizenship values and national identity was one of the dominant discourses of the Spicer Report. According to the report co-released with the Canadian Teachers' Federation, youth were far more optimistic about the country's future than adults: "[Students] believe that Canada is a good place to live, safe, beautiful and peaceful" (Citizens' Forum on Canada's Future 1991b: 3). Nonetheless, despite this positive trend, the forum identified a growing ignorance on the part of youth with respect to their knowledge about their country and, in particular, its history. If left unchecked, future generations would not have the same cultural literacy needed to maintain the type of society that these young people so deeply cherished. In addition, it emphasized the need for immigrant youth to take specially designed heritage courses to learn Canadian history in order properly to "transition to their new land's culture and society" (Citizens' Forum on Canada's Future 1991a: 129). However, unlike the usual concerns over Canadian identity, concerns which are often tied to fears of Americanization, this report did not lay the blame on cultural imperialism. Instead, it was due to a lack of leadership by the federal government.

⁷ See Book II of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (1970) and the chapters on voluntary societies and the universities in the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences (1951).

One argument that the commission was particularly adamant over was the claim that Ottawa forgot that governing also entailed the production and circulation of symbols. Whether or not Canada was really undergoing a deep social, political and economic crisis was secondary to the report's view that the perception of this needed to be countered. The representation of the nation could not be ignored and one key site to engage this image was through history education. However, the forum was well aware of the inherent challenges of a national curriculum considering how carefully the provinces guarded their constitutional authority over education. With this in mind, it suggested a new innovative approach whereby "the federal government should work with the private sector, the educational sector and the voluntary sector" (Citizens' Forum on Canada's Future 1991a: 130). How exactly this association would operate was not explained. Nonetheless, what seemed clear was that the traditional approach to cultural intervention with the creation of state funded agencies, which marked the Massey and Aird Commissions, and a postmodernist discourse emphasizing diversity were no longer viable approaches and narratives for inculcating citizenship.

THE CRISIS OF REPRESENTING HISTORY

The release of the Spicer Report was the first in a series of events during the 1990s that raised the profile of history education as an important policy issue. It expressed a growing concern over the relationship between the lack of historical knowledge held by young Canadians and the future viability of the nation. The report was careful in how it framed this issue. Although it was evident that there was a problem with a regionalized approach having each province teach a different account of the past,

this early discussion was vague on questions of what content and methods should comprise a more robust, national curriculum. As Ken Osborne (2000) notes in his survey of past efforts to create a common national history curriculum, the process usually falls apart at the point of negotiation over what events, people and places should be taught and what should be left out. Likewise, it can be argued that consensus over the urgency of history also tends to diverge when the question of how to teach the past gets brought up at the negotiation table. From this perspective, the issue at stake was not whether historical knowledge was necessary to impart onto youth. All parties agreed that history was a necessary component in citizenship education. Instead, the problem surrounded conflicts over the type of identities and values that should guide the educational content. Is citizenship rooted in the nation or the province? Is citizenship about loyalty and continuing the traditions of the past or is it about active, critical-thinking agents who are willing to challenge the status quo? These questions marked a crisis over the discourse of the relationship between history and citizenship.

At the core of this crisis lay two distinct ways of thinking about the social world with modernism on the one side and postmodernism on the other. In his book *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* (1984), which was commissioned by Quebec's Conseil des Universités, Lyotard identified a clash between knowledge produced under a postmodern frame versus a modernist one. This conflict was observed in two areas: content and method. On one hand, the postmodernist era challenged the metanarratives of modernist thinking. It accomplished this by delegitimizing the credibility of an overarching, unifying grand narrative through the proliferation of *petit récits* (little narratives). Whereas a metanarrative claims universal authority with a

dominant idea forming the basis for a unified society, little narratives mark the contextualized and subjective nature of knowledge in a diverse and fragmented society. On the other, postmodernism offered a methodological critique of modernism's performative approach to science through what Lyotard labeled "paralogy". Whereas performativity refers to a view of knowledge as producing material results that make life more efficient and serves to buttress a society's underlying metanarrative, paralogy is not interested in efficiencies but in the anomalies and paradoxes of the social and physical world. In other words, it is not about finding ways to make knowledge fit into a single truth or worldview; rather, referring to fruitful, non-traditional modes of inquiry such as chaos theory and fractal mathematics, Lyotard (1984) states that the pursuit of knowledge under the postmodern condition is about locating the cracks or discontinuities in accepted truths and metanarratives (73). The crisis in representing Canada's past was thus both a problem of the content of what should make up history and the method of how it should be taught.

During the 1990s, university departments and academic journals served as battlegrounds for this crisis: Should history be depicted and taught under the auspices of modernism or postmodernism? The first salvo came in the form of a speech and subsequent journal publication with Michael Bliss' 1991 Creighton Centennial Lecture entitled "Privatizing the Mind: The Sundering of Canadian History, the Sundering of Canada." This lecture summed up an opinion held by many prominent historians including Jack Granatstein, David Bercuson and Robert Bothwell. In the context of the constitutional wrangling and national soul-searching of the early 1990s, these historians connected the growing sentiment of the disintegration of Canada with the fragmentation

of history as a discipline (141). Bliss (1991) argued that the reason for these crises was that historians have neglected their roles as national storytellers by selfishly taking up narrow topics that marked the field of social history:

[T]here has been a massive shift in historians' substantive interests, away from political and constitutional history and towards the exploration of the experiences of people in relationships flowing from such non-national connections as region, ethnicity, class, family, and gender. The situations of interest to historians now tend often towards the private and personal—states of mind, standards of living, conditions of health, family values, local hierarchies. This is so true it's become a cliché: political history has been out, social and personal history have been in (6).

For Bliss, the metanarrative of Canada's nation building project that comprised the writing of great historians, such as Innis, Creighton and Underhill, was undermined by a focus on many little narratives. From this perspective, the public memory crisis was a result of a fragmented and specialized approach that made historical writing unreadable for the average citizen and irrelevant to public discourse.

Jack Granatstein's *Who Killed Canadian History?* (1998), which sold over 20,000 copies in its first printing, moved this debate out of the pages of scholarly journals and onto the editorial sections and even front pages of newspapers. Although the substance of this book was a more detailed account of Bliss' lecture, its popularity was due to its straightforward writing style and its obvious connections to newsworthy issues regarding the military, Americanization, multiculturalism, national unity and the perverse influences of the media. He associated various contemporary problems with the dominance of a social, progressive history approach that failed to offer Canadians a pantheon of heroes and a unified metanarrative. This resulted in a series of polls that showed the poor state of historical and cultural literacy in Canada, especially amongst

youth. In a manner that would bother those on the other side of the debate, Granatstein uncompromisingly positioned the promotion of political and military history as the only solution for the knowledge deficit, even though it was not just this type of history that young Canadians did not know. Arguing against Granatstein would then be viewed as support for ignorance:

History is no panacea for our national ailments. But a nation cannot forget its past, obliterate it, **subdivide it into micro-histories**, alter it and bury it. Too often in the past half-century, Canadians seem to have done just that, and it is time to restore the past to its proper place in our national cultural consciousness, in our schools and universities, and in our public discourse (148; emphasis added).

As Brian McKillop (1999) notes in one of the most cogent critiques of the book, the problem was neither the lament for a lack of public memory, which all historians would agree with, nor the notion that citizens need a set of symbols to cultivate national pride, which only a cynic would denigrate. Instead, the problem was Granatstein's simplistic view of the historian that equated citizenship with being a mouthpiece for the state and the historical method that was so dismissive of the new techniques and modes of inquiry stemming from social history and postmodernism. McKillop was on the side of those historians—including Robert Wright (2000), Bryan Palmer (1999), Desmond Morton (1998), Ken Osborne (2000) and Timothy Stanley (2000)—who believed that greater complexity and nuance were necessary for a changing society. Nonetheless, while he may have won over many readers of the *Canadian Historical Review*, it was Granatstein's line of reasoning that resonated with elites and politicians. Not only would Charles Bronfman and Red Wilson cite his book as a reason why they funded *Historica*, but his message was also heeded by politicians such as Sheila Copps and Jean Chrétien

who soon asked Granatstein to serve as CEO of the Canadian War Museum. However, one group that was not as receptive was Canada's education community.

Granatstein was unequivocal in his assessment of who was to blame for the poor state of public memory: (1) federal politicians who did not have the gall to take on the provinces' grip on education; (2) liberal-minded government bureaucrats who favoured multiculturalism over the formation of a shared national identity; (3) popular culture for Americanizing youth; (4) publicly funded cultural agencies that preferred to denigrate instead of honouring national heroes with texts such as *The Valour and the Horror*; (5) social historians who made the field of history irrelevant; (6) educators, education policymakers and education scholars for placing trendy theories over the need to teach a common set of facts. It is this last group, who escaped previous indictments, that faced the brunt of his criticism. As suggested in McKillop's conclusion, Granatstein had a performative view of the pursuit of knowledge—one that emphasized a method that was tied to understanding and corroborating the past according to a larger nation building narrative. Similar to E.D. Hirsch's (1987) concept of cultural literacy⁸, Granatstein wanted every student to graduate with an awareness of the people, places and events that contributed to the making of Canada. Unfortunately, this modernist view had been abandoned by the policy that guided the teaching of history within the school system.

In the mid 1990s, two major policy documents were released that marked the ascension of a paralogical approach: Ontario's Royal Commission on Learning's *For the Love of Learning* (1995) led by NDP campaign coordinator Gerald Caplan and Quebec's

⁸ A cultural literate person has "the basic information needed to thrive in the modern world" (Hirsch 1987: xiii). The effectiveness of Hirsch's rhetorical strategy was tied to the way in which cultural literacy was said to be the only way for disadvantaged children could escape impoverishment and become successful adults.

Ministry of Education's *Learning from the Past: Report of the Task Force on the Teaching of History* (1996) led by historian Jacques Lacoursière. Both of these reports reflected the prevalent thinking of education scholars and policymakers that was grounded in Howard Gardner's cognitive theory.⁹ Along the lines of Lyotard's assessment of postmodern modes of inquiry, at the root of this pedagogy was a belief that economic and political life in the 21st century demanded a different skill set than that of the 20th century. To face the inevitable uncertainty and anxiety of a contemporary world in a constant state of flux, Gardener's research recommended that students must be equipped with critical-thinking skills and "multiple intelligences." With this in mind, education scholars and policymakers began to conceive of a learning style that would include self-directed study, collaborative research, content geared towards a pluralistic population and an emphasis on active thinking so that students could question the world around them instead of accepting the status quo.

Despite these recommendations both policy reports faced much public scrutiny, especially in the media and by politicians. In Ontario, those on the political right attacked the NDP commissioned report. The Coalition for Education Reform criticized the report for not providing any ways to measure students' achievement in core curriculum subjects (O'Sullivan 1999: 319). This concern was picked up in a provincial election campaign as

⁹ Gardner is a cognitive psychologist at Harvard's Graduate School of Education. His book *Frames of Mind: The Theory of Multiple Intelligences* (1983) had a significant impact on education scholarship and the development of curriculum across North America. He challenged the empirical IQ tests that guided education for much of the century by showing that they did not accurately assess the wide range of cognitive abilities necessary for education and social development.

Conservative leader Mike Harris positioned standardized testing on his platform.¹⁰ In Quebec, intellectual leaders of the sovereignty movement questioned the way in which cultural pluralism relegated “francophones to a secondary role in [Quebec’s] own history and [Quebec’s] own society” (Létourneau 2004: 7). The problem with these reports was that they failed to communicate (a) the usefulness of a constructivist approach, (b) a proscriptive solution to some of the problems they identified and (c) a grading system that parents could easily understand. It was in this reactionary climate with political and media scrutiny over progressive, postmodernist approaches to education that contextualized Granatstein’s critique.

Drawing on the argumentative style developed in his co-authored work *The Great Brain Robbery: Canada’s Universities on the Road to Ruin* (1984), Granatstein claimed that provincial ministries and regional boards of education have not simply neglected but, in fact, swindled a generation of students of their right to know Canadian history in favour of what he considered “holus-bolus” theories emanating from the ivory tower. It is here that his argument most clearly reflects Hirsch’s rhetorical strategy of laying the blame not on teachers themselves, but on the faulty pedagogies of their leaders within faculties and boards of education. Similar to Hirsch, Granatstein implied that policymakers and scholars within these departments were using classrooms as laboratories to test unproven and irrelevant theories as part of a leftist political agenda of social engineering:

The progressive theories of education they espouse are child-centred rather than knowledge-based. The aim is to teach problem solving and critical thinking, not content. Facts are unimportant and can always be looked up

¹⁰ See R.D. Gidney’s *From Hope to Harris: The Reshaping of Ontario’s Schools* (1999) for a detailed study of the emergence and effect of Mike Harris’ education policy.

on the Internet... The result is a generation of students who are totally ignorant of anything not beamed into their brains via TV, movies, comic books, and the Internet (Granatstein 1998: 14).

For Granatstein, the shift towards this paralogical approach was not viewed as a way to teach youth how to respond to a new social order; rather, it was considered in lieu of a larger political agenda that was the cause of much of this disorder and uncertainty by hiding Canada's British, European and Judeo-Christian roots. Under this postmodern, progressive framework, it was not surprising that history was relegated to being a minor and non-compulsory feature of social sciences. The problem was clearly defined: of course young Canadians do not know history, our schools are intentionally "teaching ignorance." If Canada wanted to avoid political fragmentation and social instability, it must return to a modernist pedagogy based around the objective of instilling a common cultural capital. Nonetheless, education officials could not be trusted as their methods were out of touch with social problems and tied to airy intellectual meandering. Despite the animosity with which some education specialists responded, it was undeniable that the book challenged their legitimacy in the face of not only the public but also teachers.

THE CRISIS OF REPRESENTING THE MILITARY

Just as the flowering of the postmodernist view of citizenship with the Canada 125 celebration had come in the midst of a crisis over cultural pluralism, so too was the ascendance of the peacekeeping representation contextualized by great challenges facing the Canadian Forces and its contributions to UN missions. The first event came in October of 1992 when Major-General Lewis Mackenzie was forced to resign his command of the peacekeeping operation in Sarajevo. He was reprimanded for making

the UN uncomfortable after he publicly criticized both the Bosnian Muslims and the Serbs for orchestrating acts to discredit and embarrass the other side. The second event came in the summer of 1993 when a video was leaked to the media showing the gruesome hazing rituals of the Canadian Airborne Regiment. The most horrific of these scenes was the image of a black soldier being paraded with a leash around his neck and the words “I Love KKK” written on his body. Third, from 1993 to 1996, a UN peacekeeping force, led by Canadian Major-General Romeo Dallaire, witnessed but could not stop the acts of genocide during Rwanda’s civil war. Dallaire’s international force was even rendered powerless after 10 Belgian peacekeepers were murdered. Fourth, in 1994, Canadian peacekeepers responsible for protecting a Bosnian mental health hospital were accused of abusing patients. There were also reports that Canadian peacekeepers were engaging in sexual relations with Bosnian nurses and interpreters. However, the most significant incident, as David Bercuson (1996) aptly labelled it, came out of Canada’s participation in the UN mission to Somalia from 1993 to 1994.

In November of 1994 after a publication ban was lifted and photos of the beating of Shidane Arone were released, the Canadian public was presented with shocking reports of the murder of Somali civilians and a prisoner at the hands of members of the Airborne Regiment. This news sparked a public investigation led by Federal Court Judge Gilles Lévesque. Commonly referred to as the “Somalia Inquiry,” this televised hearing and its subsequent report would lead to serious legal and political actions such as the resignations of Defence Minister David Collenette and Chief of the Defence Staff General Jean de Chastelain before the government prematurely shut it down as a federal

election was on the horizon.¹¹ However, a less discussed outcome of the inquiry is that it also led to a symbolic crisis over the image of the Canadian Forces as a peacekeeper. This cultural challenge converged with discourses emerging from the other military controversies of the time. The Somalia Inquiry crystallized what appeared to be a discrepancy between the mythology surrounding the Canadian Forces and its reality. According to the commission's report, "[j]ust as the Somalia mission has caused an examination of the relationship between military and civil authority, so too has it afforded a review of the relationship between the military and Canadian society at large" (Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia 1997: ES-45). The review emphasized a growing belief held by those close to the military that an institution trained to fight wars is not necessarily suited to aid in non-violent conflict resolution.

The central question focused on identity: Were Canadian soldiers humanitarians or warriors? In her interviews with soldiers, the anthropologist Donna Winslow (1995) found a contradiction between the missions of securing the region through aggressive tactics and the strategy of winning the "hearts and minds" of Somalis by providing aid and welfare:

Empathy and aggression are inversely proportionate according to some studies. Combat soldiers are usually encouraged to hate "the enemy." This is a technique used to motivate them in combat. Empathy for the enemy is actively discouraged (251).

¹¹ See Peter Desbarats' *Somalia Cover Up: A Commissioner's Journal* (1997) for a detailed analysis written by one of the commissioners of some of the political motivations behind this decision.

A review of newspaper headlines of the articles about the Somalia Affair emphasizes this binary.¹² For some academics, politicians and editorialists, the military needed to be recast as an organization exclusively designed for peacekeeping and nation building with its institutional culture reflecting this identity through better education, hiring practices and leadership.¹³ From this perspective, the decision to disband the Airborne Regiment in 1995 can be considered as a symbolic gesture to cleanse the military of its violent, warrior culture. However, for others, the problem was with peacekeeping as it was practiced through UN strategy. According to Major General Mackenzie, “[p]eacekeeping became an end unto itself and then we started to lose the warrior ethic. Soldiers became hesitant, asking themselves ‘Do I fire? Don’t I fire?’” (DePalma, Anthony, *The New York Times*, April 13, 1997). Mackenzie expressed a sentiment, which was evident in the submissions by military experts and foreign affairs strategists, that peacekeeping was not appropriate for the post-Cold War strategic environment. This new geopolitical climate was marked by ethnic conflicts, more aggressive warfare and increased terrorism. Therefore, the problem was not with the soldiers, but with the mission.

By no means did the Somalia Inquiry settle the question of whether the Canadian Forces should be peacekeepers, warriors or both. However, it provided the urgency for politicians, the media, the public and the military to carefully consider what type of force should defend Canada’s interests. As the inquiry stressed, “soldiers serve as a symbol of the national character” (Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces

¹² See Goddu, Jen, *The Hamilton Spectator*, August 12, 1997, B3; Simone, Ross, *The Kitchener Record*, February 28, 1995, D1.

¹³ See Janice Gross Stein’s Canada 21 Council and its influence on the 1994 White Paper on Defence that emphasized the importance of nation building, non-violent conflict resolution, foreign aid and other peaceful approaches to military and foreign policy

to Somalia 1997: ES-46). It concluded that the military let the country down when it failed to live up to its own values. Although the inquiry blamed this failure on a lack of professionalism throughout the ranks¹⁴, it was also due to a problem of political leadership and public communication. On one hand, politicians needed to provide a clear role for the Canadian Forces and pursue the appropriate measures to ensure that the military could accomplish this new mandate. On the other, considering that the inquiry was concerned with the cover up and the attempt to conceal documents by DND, the military needed to accept a more open relationship with the media and the public. However, there was an additional concern held by military supporters such as David Bercuson and military personnel such as Lewis Mackenzie. They believed that Canadian society was also to blame. As society changed in the era of the so-called “peace dividend” and as a result of the progressivist Trudeauian ideology that dominated the public’s perception of foreign policy, the military was left behind without sufficient financial and public support. Exemplifying this trend was the newly elected Liberal government’s decision in 1993 to cancel Prime Minister Mulroney’s \$5-billion purchase of EH-101 helicopters to replace the aging Sea King fleet. Although he would later receive much criticism for the expense the government was forced to pay as a result of this decision, at the time Chrétien received great public support for questioning the need to purchase a “Cadillac” when the rest of the world was demilitarizing with the fall of Soviet Union.¹⁵

¹⁴ This led to a number of subsequent commissions and reforms such as the Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Canadian Forces Reserves and a curriculum and governance review of the Royal Military College as well as general officer training.

¹⁵ Interestingly, in 2006, military officers who reviewed the recommendation to purchase the Joint Strike Fighter to replace the aging CF-18 fleet were careful to note that these

This historical context and the immense popularity of the image of Canada as a peacemaker, which was celebrated with cultural symbols such as the Mountie and political figures such as Trudeau, made it difficult for the public to consider the fact that the purpose of a military is to fight wars. According to military supporters such as historian David Bercuson (1996), **“unless Canadians begin to face this fact, they had better get used to the sort of thing they have been seeing from the military since the news of the Somalia murder first broke”** (242; emphasis added). Bercuson realized that the crisis of representation over the Canadian Forces was not just due to a problem with the military, politicians and the media, but also the public. Just as the Canadian Forces needed to undergo a series of reforms, so too must the Canadian public also change the way that it views the military. Specifically, the public should no longer limit its view of the military as a peacekeeper. The public must also acknowledge this institution as a warrior. With this in mind, there is an interesting paradox that comes out of the debate over the controversial Somalia mission. Although it was agreed that the first step should be to reform the military and cleanse any excessive violent behaviour in the Reserves, officer corps and military colleges, the long-term strategy included the launch of a more active public communication campaign to position the use of deadly force and the need to acquire more aggressive weaponry as legitimate components for governmental policy.

planes “should not be considered the ‘Cadillac’ solution for Canada” (qtd. in Pugliese, David, *The Ottawa Citizen*, June 21, 2010, A1).

THE 1995 QUEBEC REFERENDUM

During the fall of 1995, Canadian federalism came within approximately 54,000 votes of disintegration. This marginal victory by the “Non” campaign in Quebec’s second referendum on sovereignty has been thoroughly studied by scholars interested in political issues related to media coverage, constitutional law, economic effects and voting practices. Just as Michael Ornstein and H. Michael Stevenson (1981) noted about the previous 1980 referendum, the 1995 vote would set the Canadian political agenda for the remainder of the decade and well into the next with the news of the sponsorship scandal. From another angle, this event would also influence the national cultural agenda. As Lyle Dick (2009) argues, this traumatic national experience led to the loosening of the federal purse strings to fund cultural projects “to promote nationalistic or ‘pan-Canadian’ concerns” (9). However, while Dick is referring to its influence on the federal government, the referendum also marked a critical juncture for Canada’s corporate community and nationally minded associations to reconsider their place in the cultural landscape. From this perspective, the unity crisis provided the impetus for these groups to engage in the construction of citizenship and not simply leave this task up to the federal government and state-funded cultural institutions.

There was a sense during the referendum campaign that federal leaders were not capable of offering a clear message of why Quebec should remain within the federal system. As Robert Young (2006) notes, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien took much of the blame for the near defeat. Chrétien was attacked on all fronts by both the media and political opponents. Opposition leader Preston Manning castigated him for not taking a tougher stand against the province. Even figures within his own party questioned why he

was not trying to appease the demands for a distinct society. What seemed clear to all was that Chrétien waited too long to get involved. It was only after the release of a poll predicting a No defeat released¹⁶ with just over a week left that he was forced to take a more prominent and compromising position.

Although opinion differs on what ultimately turned the tide for the No side in the late stages of the campaign, it has become common to point to the large unity rally held at Place du Canada on October 27th (Conway 2006).¹⁷ The crowd of a reported 150,000¹⁸ from all across the country was described by the news media as an uncharacteristic emotional display of Canadian nationalism. Taking the credit for this symbolic gesture were not federal politicians, but the many private citizens who took the time and expense to travel to Montreal, the voluntary groups and local associations that helped organize the logistics and, most importantly, Canada's corporate community. These groups secured travel incentives and funding for this public outpouring of national pride.

In contrast to this perceived failure of federal politicians was a narrative regarding the essential role that corporate leaders and voluntary associations played in keeping the country together. The referendum campaign witnessed the creation of two organizations, Le Conseil du patronat du Quebec and the Quebec Business Council for Canada, by corporate leaders to support the long-standing efforts of the Council for Canadian Unity (CCU) that was started in the mid 1960s by Montreal lawyer T.R Anthony Malcom and mining tycoon Bruce Kippen to counter the nascent separatist movement. In 1995, the

¹⁶ News of this poll led to the Canadian dollar falling almost a full cent to just under 73 cents, which was the steepest single-day loss in three years, while stock prices suffered their biggest loss in six years (Beauchesne, *The Ottawa Citizen*, October 26, 1995, D7).

¹⁷ This site was formerly known as Dominion Square.

¹⁸ French media reported a much smaller number of 30,000.

CCU, which was then headed by Peter White¹⁹, played an important role funding polls including those that focused on the connections between separatism and problems with the economy. However, it was the Quebec Business Council, headed by Laurent Beaudoin of Bombardier, Raymond Cyr of Bell Canada and former UN ambassador Yves Fortier, who first proposed the idea of a unity rally (Johnston, *The Montreal Gazette*, October 26, 1995, A1). With the support of Liberal Party riding associations and key figures such as Newfoundland MP Brian Tobin, it was able to lobby the country's transportation industry to provide cheap "Canadian Unity Fares" for thousands of expected participants.²⁰ These fares and additional support from businesses allowed student associations, unions and community groups to quickly organize the massive wave of passengers. The necessity for this involvement by the corporate sector was not due to the unwillingness of the Liberal government; rather, federal politicians were weary of overstepping jurisdictional boundaries and even legal implications from violating Quebec's referendum laws. In fact, the Liberal Party's director of communication, Aurèle Gervais, who reserved buses to transport people from Ottawa, was among nine other individuals and companies charged with violating election spending restrictions. Nonetheless, this inability of the state served as a wakeup call for many corporate leaders who were starting to connect neoliberal economic policies to a growing political

¹⁹ The Chair of Hollinger Inc.. White has a deep involvement in the country's political and corporate communities: special assistant to Quebec Premier Daniel Johnson, a member of Mulroney's transition team, founding chair of the Public Policy Forum and VP of the Revelston Corp., Chair of UniMedia and VP of Argus Corp. as well as a director of the Fraser Institute.

²⁰ 1) Canadian Airlines offered round-trip flights under 800 km for \$99 and those over that limit for \$199; 2) VIA Rail offered return train passage to Montreal at 60% discount; 3) Greyhound Lines in Toronto and Voyageur in Ottawa increased the number of buses departing to Montreal.

challenge stemming from a weakened civic identity especially in Quebec. It is not a coincidence that many of the nationalistic projects that emerged after the referendum, such as *Historica* and the *National Post*, stem from businesses and corporate leaders with close ties to Quebec: Bell Canada, the Bronfmans and Hollinger.

In the aftermath of the referendum, many nationalistic associations lamented their own failure to engage in this important contest for the national soul. One of these organizations was the Royal Canadian Legion. Veterans were dismayed by the absence of the Legion in this important national unity campaign. During the constitutional debates of the early 1990s, the Legion took a prominent stance by organizing a special unity committee, publicly supporting the Yes side and even airing public service announcements. Not only was this political fight compared to the historic battles of Vimy and Normandy, but also, as Legion Dominion Command president Gaston Garceau implied in a letter to Prime Minister Mulroney, the success of the accord was tied to the future well being of the legacy of veterans: "Should the Canadian fabric be rent by regional considerations...it will be an affront to the memories of those gallant people who died, and to the hundreds of thousands of their comrades who have survived" (cited in Hale 1995: 219). However, the failures of Meech Lake and Charlottetown dampened the Legion's resolve and to some extent proved too divisive for its membership, which did not necessarily all support this direction. When it came time for the Quebec referendum, the fight was passed on to the provincial command, as it was considered a regional issue.

Following the near victory of the sovereigntists, there was growing pressure by veterans for the Legion to become more proactive. On Remembrance Day of 1997, it announced a new initiative entitled Guardians of Unity that made national unity an

integral component in the communication of remembrance. Legion Dominion Command president Joe Kobolak took a lead role in this campaign by converging the symbol of the poppy with the integrity of the nation: “When we wear a poppy we recall the spirit that first united our troops during the First World War and we reaffirm our own determination to stay together as Canadians” (qtd. in Ayed, *Canadian Press*, November 10, 1997). In addition to this discursive component, the Legion initiated local campaigns urging school boards and provincial departments of education to offer mandatory high school Canadian history courses as well as becoming a partner with the Canadian Unity Council in sponsoring Encounters with Canada²¹ to bring together youth from different regions.

The importance of raising the Quebec referendum as part of the rhetorical context for the emergence of the Dominion Institute is that it offers a reminder that its cultural memory network was rooted in a crisis over inculcating a common citizenship. The referendum was a case study of the Spicer Report’s finding regarding the limited capacity of the federal government to assert a message of national unity and common Canadian citizenship. Initially, this problem was perceived to be the result of a lack of public memory. As was the case for both the Legion and the corporate community, the transmission of memory, especially targeted at youth, became the dominant lens for rehabilitating this lack of civic identity and cultural literacy. Although military symbolic culture certainly played a role in this cultural memory project, such as the emergence of the double meaning of the poppy, it was a rather minor element compared to a larger concern over history education. However, as I discuss in the rest of this dissertation, the

²¹ This program would later be handed over to Historica when the federal government decided to cut funding to the Council for Canadian Unity in March of 2006.

military and Canada's military past gradually become more significant elements in the discourse regarding the representation of a common national citizenship.

SUMMARY

The late 1980s and early 1990s mark a period of crisis over the Trudeauian consensus guiding the representation of Canada to Canadians. This period of uncertainty led to a number of controversies regarding the representation of citizenship, memory and the military. These controversies resulted in a problem with both the content and the way in which these entities were represented. From this perspective, one is reminded of Louis Marin's (1988) theoretical analysis regarding the double logic of the power of representation. In his semiotic study of depictions of King Louis XIV, Marin argues that a representation is both an effect of institutional power arrangements and, at the same time, a cause of its authority by putting force into signs, legitimizing social relations and constructing subjects. Likewise, if a representation is going through a period of crisis and a loss of authority, then this is also a reflection of instability with respect to the institutional power arrangements that lead to its materialization. In each crisis examined above, there was both a question of what and how something was represented.

First, the crisis over the representation of citizenship stemmed from a perceived failure of the postmodernist view of the citizen. The multicultural and postnationalist depictions of citizenship hindered the development of a common civic bond. Trudeau's vision of a less tribal construction of the citizen as connected to others by the celebration of difference and pluralism was said to exist only in the realm of policy or airy academic theory. A breaking point was reached sometime in the late 1980s and early 1990s when

traditionalists turned on this dominant narrative and took a stand as witnessed by popular support behind the banning of religious headdresses in Legion halls. This critique of cultural pluralism was not just posed by extremists. Rather, it was also a part of the discourse of moderate Canadians. Richard Gwyn's analysis of multiculturalism in his bestselling book, *Nationalism Without Walls*, warned the public about the dangers of postnationalism as a socio-political normative practice. He argued this view of citizenship would lead the country on a slippery slope towards political suicide by failing to provide its citizens with the necessary tools and language to construct a coherent civil society. Keeping in mind Marin's double logic, this disintegration of the representation of citizenship through a postmodern, multicultural lens was paralleled by a growing criticism over the act of representation. The Spicer Report claimed that the lack of common knowledge and cultural literacy, especially amongst youth, was the result of the state's limited capacity to continue its role as cultural producer in the age of neoliberalist political and economic policies. If citizenship was to be rehabilitated, then a new institutional arrangement must emerge—whereby the state was only one of many actors engaged in citizenship education.

Second, the crisis over the representation of public memory was blamed on the inability of social historians to education to instill citizens with a shared past. According to this perspective, the political instability of the late 1980s and early 1990s was due to a generation of historians who neglected their responsibility as storytellers and chroniclers of a national metanarrative. The disintegration of a common account of the past into many *petit récits* made history irrelevant at a time when it was desperately needed to remind Canadians about the importance of the federalist project. More than any other

critic, Jack Granatstein emerged as a strong advocate for a return to a modernist view of Canada's past as a nation-building project. He drew upon E.D Hirsch's concept of cultural literacy to propose that every Canadian should be aware of the people, places and events that contributed to this project of the making of Canada. His critique of this postmodernist conception of the past was paralleled by a concern over how it was taught in school. In particular, he pointed to the grip by progressive minded scholars and policymakers over the education system as the cause of this lack of cultural literacy. These individuals were influencing educators to emphasize critical-thinking and multiple intelligences over the transmission of a common body of historical knowledge. If Canada wanted to escape the path towards political fragmentation and social instability, then educators must return to a modernist view of the past and approach to education.

Third, the crisis over the representation of the Canadian Forces was attributed to the inability to balance the role of peacekeeping with the traditional logic of a military as an institution designed to fight wars. Although it was certainly blamed on a larger cultural problem within the ranks that would lead to a restructuring of the Reserves and greater focus on officer training, I noted how some pundits and military personnel blamed the Somalia Affair on the unrealistic way in which the public and the state perceived its military. The overemphasis on the Trudeauian depiction of the military as a peacekeeper made it difficult for the Forces to adapt to a shift in geopolitics with a focus on policing. As a result, the Forces were unprepared and underfunded. With his book *Significant Incident* (1996), the historian David Bercuson emerged as a prominent advocate of the military by placing some of the blame for the Somalia Affair on a public so enamoured with the peacekeeping myth that it forgot the true purpose of a military. The problem

with the representation of the Canadian Forces was that this institution had far too much trust in politicians and the media to represent it to the public. If the military wanted to rehabilitate its image as an institution designed to fight, then it would have to implement an effective public relations campaign that would draw the media and public figures into its messaging.

As this study turns next to the Dominion Institute and the emergence of a military-cultural memory network, it should be noted that the Institute's efforts within its discourse community will be to alter both the content and method of representation. This organization does not fit into this historical context because of a desire to fix the methods and narratives associated with the Trudeauian consensus; instead, it proposes an alternative. Many of the key personalities who criticized the Trudeauian consensus and postmodernist viewpoint during this period of crisis will later be called upon by the Dominion Institute to join its epistemic community. What occurs in the aftermath of this period of crisis is a gradual and sometimes extemporaneous process that patches together the representations of the military, citizenship and memory. However, as I note in my discussion on the Quebec referendum, this process begins in the realms of cultural memory and citizenship education. It is only over time that the military and its discourse community emerge as significant components of both the Dominion Institute's discourse and its network.

From this perspective, my dissertation provides an interesting case study of Marin's thesis on the mutual relationship between the content of a representation and the institutional arrangement behind its creation. As Canada's military past becomes a necessary element in the cultural memory used to instil a common citizenship, members

of the military's discourse community are drawn into the Dominion Institute's network. Meanwhile, even though it might have a minor role in the Institute's general cultural project, since the representation of military history is always present in its modernist and traditionalist approach to memory and citizenship, an approach that emphasizes a civic literacy composed of key events and people that made Canada a great nation, it opens up the possibility for the network to include members of the military's discourse community. In other words, Marin's tautological yet prescient understanding of the power of representation as a reflection of both content and context provides much insight into the militarization of cultural memory in Canada.

Although this might seem like a tedious and even unnecessary theoretical observation, it is nonetheless a key premise of this dissertation. It will help to explain the link between the efforts to represent the Canadian Forces as a warrior with the observation that the problem of a lack of memory ultimately becomes viewed as a problem of a lack of military memory. At some point in the aftermath of the crisis over the representations that were associated with the "Canadian moment," the effort to rehabilitate a unified view of citizenship and a shared past converged with a campaign to reposition the military as a prominent national institution and as a warrior. The representation of citizenship, memory and the military will fuse as associations between some key actors within various discourse communities are drawn together into a network. What follows is an attempt to chart this process.

CHAPTER 4: PROBLEMATIZATION: THE LAUNCH OF THE DOMINION INSTITUTE, 1996-1997

Without a scintilla of experience or two sous to rub together, Michael Chong, Erik Penz and I, all in our mid-twenties and freshly out of university, set about the work of launching the Dominion Institute... the Institute would advance the idea that the foundations of our unity should rest, first and foremost, on a deep appreciation and knowledge of the country's past, its enduring civic traditions and struggles of previous generations.

~Rudyard Griffiths, *Who We Are: A Citizen's Manifesto*¹

Despite its stodgy sounding name, the drama associated with the emergence of the Dominion Institute and the eventual ascension of its network is worthy of a cinematic portrayal. Like other mythical accounts about dot.com start-ups, a film about this organization tells the story of how three young adults created something entirely new that would impact society in a way that exceeded any of their expectations. This "history NGO"² would surpass other wealthier and more experienced civic education and history advocacy groups such as Historica and Canada's National Historical Society (CNHS) to become the leading authority and spokesman for the country's public memory and civic traditions. One of the most fascinating parts of this story is how it emerged. Unlike its competitors, who were launched by the establishment of large multimillion-dollar grants from the Hudson's Bay Company and the personal wealth of businessmen like Charles Bronfman and Red Wilson, the Dominion Institute began with a relatively meagre sum of \$200,000. Not only did the cofounders not have any experience running a non-profit organization, they also had little authority as civic and history experts beyond a university

¹ Griffiths 2009: x.

² A term coined by historian Charlotte Gray (Gray, *The Globe and Mail*, April 23, 2002, R3).

education. As with any other start-up, the most gripping part of the story is that the Institute was just as likely to fail and be quickly forgotten as it was to succeed and have a long-term impact. However, its penurious yet ambitious beginnings may in fact explain its ascendancy. This persistent search for funding would force the cofounders to consider a network approach to advocacy and citizenship education.

At the root of Actor-Network Theory (ANT) is the assumption that networks only materialize once an actor realizes the necessity to work with others. According to Callon (1986), actors must first acknowledge that they are fettered and “cannot attain what they want by themselves” (206). This understanding of its limitations was engrained into the Institute from the beginning and carried on over time. Since it always maintained a dual role as a lobbyist and as an educator, which was not the case for CNHS and Historica, the Institute would eventually emerge as an important node within a burgeoning network by working to define (a) the discourse regarding the poor state of citizenship in Canada, (b) what should be done to solve this situation and (c) the roles that actors must play to achieve this solution. What sets this organization apart from its competitors and other nodes in the network was that its primary site of engagement and expertise was in the realm of discourse. While it would take time for it to gain the abilities of a public educator and garner the reputation as a civic authority, it had an immediate impact on the way in which citizenship was discussed by connecting it with the problem of public memory and suggesting innovative, yet simplistic solutions requiring the help of a variety of actors: historians, the media, the culture industry, the corporate community, educators, the state, policymakers, parents, citizenship associations and other groups claiming a stake in issues of memory or civics.

In this chapter, I explore the creation of the Dominion Institute and examine its initial efforts to establish a network from its conceptualization in the winter of 1996 to its official launch in the spring of 1997. I begin by discussing the cofounders and how they define the problem that their organization would try to solve. In particular, I focus on the personality of Rudyard Griffiths who will serve as executive director for nearly 12 years. While it is true that the national unity crisis sparked by the Quebec referendum provided a sense of urgency, my interviews revealed that this was something that they emphasized to the public, politicians and the media. Their deeper concern was, in fact, not over Quebec. Rather, their concern was a perceived problem with English Canada, which had neglected the transmission of its history and had allowed its civic identity to decay. Continuing along the chronology of its launch, I then look at the next stage of development with the attempt to draw other, more experienced and influential actors into an epistemic community. Although I present an overview of this group that is comprised of the top leaders from Canada's academic, corporate, media and cultural industry circles, I focus on the role of two critical contributors: public opinion researcher, John Wright and historian, Jack Granatstein. In keeping with the start-up theme, I then turn to one of the most critical stages with the efforts to convince the Donner Canadian Foundation to provide the seed funding. My interview with the foundation's chairman, Allan Gotlieb, and a copy of the funding proposal allows me to explore the initial storyline proposed by the Institute and how an important actor interpreted this discourse. This discussion leads to an analysis of the role that Griffiths played as a memory entrepreneur and a networker. Finally, I summarize this period of problematization and offer tables to succinctly display the inchoate network and the initial storyline. These tables serve as a useful frame of

reference for the rest of the dissertation by allowing a reader to follow the discursive language games and shifting arrangement of the network.

IN THE SHADOW OF THE CRISIS OF REPRESENTATION: FRAMING THE PROBLEM

If the story of the Dominion Institute were indeed a cinematic narrative, then its opening scene would take place in the summer of 1996 and would be set in the background of the bucolic countryside of Erin, Ontario. It was at this time and place that three former Trinity College³ classmates reunited at one of their parents' family farm. All three were in their mid-20s and on different career paths. This group included a budding lawyer, Erik Penz⁴, an information technology expert, Michael Chong⁵, and a Hegelian scholar, Rudyard Griffiths⁶. They had long been interested in issues of Canadian politics and society that dominated their conversations and sometimes led to heated debates in a way that is rather common for highly educated, idealistic young men. As the story goes⁷, these three friends developed the idea on a walk in this scenic rural setting. They brought up the usual topic of their conversations: the poor condition of

³ Founded in 1851 by Bishop John Strachan, Trinity College joined the University of Toronto in 1904 and has long been one of the country's elite education institutions. Its alumni list includes Edward Broadbent, Adrienne Clarkson, George Ignatieff, Michael Ignatieff and Michael Wilson.

⁴ Erik Penz, who is now a partner at Macleod Dixon law firm, was finishing law school at Queen's University

⁵ Michael Chong, who is now the Conservative MP for Wellington-Halton Hills, was working in the burgeoning information technology field for Deacon Capital

⁶ Rudyard Griffiths, who is now a bestselling author, National Post columnist, host of BNN's "SqueezePlay" and co-director of the Munk Debates, just returned from completing a MA in Philosophy from Cambridge University that focused on German philosophers and was working a contract position for the Department of Foreign Affairs.

⁷ Erik Penz gave this account in my interview with him. He challenged Griffiths' account found in an alumni piece in Trinity College's magazine (Webb, *Trinity Alumni Magazine*, Spring 2006, p. 17). In this piece, Griffiths points to conversations over beers while still in university.

Canada's civic culture. However, unbeknownst to one of the friends at the time, two of them were already discussing this topic in more concrete terms. Chong and Griffiths presented Penz with an idea they had about starting a think tank to contribute the ideas and approaches necessary to revive the state of civil culture. This poor condition was perceived as a problem of representation. Specifically, it was due to a failure by English Canada to provide a vision of the nation that could inspire citizens.

The Quebec referendum, although an emotional locus, was only symptomatic of the growing inability of the state and elites to provide a convincing argument about what Canada has to offer its citizens. While federalists proposed constitutional, economic and legal benefits, they did not communicate the names and events that summoned a national emotion. As result, they could not provide citizens with the ability "to imagine what it means to belong to a nation that is greater than the sum of its parts" (Griffiths, *The Globe and Mail*, February 18, 2008, A15). However, they were aware that the problem was more complex than this reluctance by political and corporate federalist leaders to assert a vision of Canada beyond material aspects such as keeping your passport, the state of the economy or maintaining welfare programs. This failure of representation comprised a double movement: a lack of civic literacy on the part of citizens prevented them from acknowledging their core values and traditions. They perceived this political crisis as a communication problem concerning both sender and receiver. On one hand, federalist leaders were either too reluctant or unwilling to draw on a symbolic culture to inspire citizens. On the other, even if they were more forthcoming, the prevailing public condition of historical amnesia and civic apathy would have made such pleas unintelligible to the average citizen who was believed to be far more interested in

American than Canadian culture. From this perspective, even though they were not necessarily engaged in the specific controversies, the emergence of the problem was set in the context of a crisis over the representation of public memory and citizenship.

According to Erik Penz, the decision to start a think tank stemmed from angst that all three recent graduates experienced while studying at the University of Toronto in the early 1990s. As opposed to many of their professors and the popular sentiment within the student body, these friends identified with a traditional view of the country—one that can be labelled nostalgic and in line with the country's Red Tory tradition that defends capitalism and free enterprise yet supports an interventionist state in order to contribute to the common good.⁸ The symbols they valued were not those associated with the pluralistic and postnationalist culture that were popular at that time. Instead, they thought of English Canada as a unified and modernist entity with a common heritage. This sentiment is revealed by their affinity for the term "Dominion"⁹ and the fact that Rudyard's family farm proudly flew the Red Ensign on its flagpole. As a result, they were upset by the way their peers and superiors downplayed any kind of shared national history. Although they were not deeply engaged in the controversies taking place within the scholarly history community that I discussed in Chapter 3, this conflict between modernist, traditional historiography and the ascendant postmodernist, social history approach filtered into their university education.

In a history course taught at Trinity College on Canada in the age of Macdonald and Laurier, Penz lamented the fact that what he read in the literature and heard at lecture

⁸ It is not a coincidence that the Dominion Institute would publish in 2006 the second edition of Charles Taylor's *Radical Tories: The Conservative Tradition in Canada*.

⁹ A term used as the country's official name from its reference in the British North America Act and evoked until it was quietly dropped following WWII (Rayburn 1994).

had very little to do with these great men and more to do with social and everyday life issues. When he handed in a term paper written from a political history angle comparing Macdonald's idea of a Canadian nation with Benjamin Disraeli's perception of Britain, his professor responded with a sense of amusement. It was not that his professor was mocking this approach, but he was surprised to see a student write about this topic and mentioned that it appeared anachronistic. The idea that people simply did not do that type of political history anymore was disappointing (Interview Penz). Therefore, a few years later when his friends mentioned that they were thinking about starting a think tank to engage civic culture and wanted him to join this ambitious venture, Penz immediately thought of that moment in history class. As foolhardily as this idea sounded to him at the time, it was an opportunity to change the way history education was perceived in Canada by bringing back an emphasis on the people and events that contributed to the making of this country.

This sense of a problem with Canadian history education was only a symptom of what Rudyard Griffiths believed was the most significant issue: the degradation of English-Canadian civic identity. In other words, he believed that Canadians no longer valued their citizenship and that the government did nothing to help this problem. He came to this conclusion from a philosophical perspective. Although at the time that these three friends met in the summer of 1996 he was completing a one-year contract as a consultant in Ottawa with the Department of Foreign Affairs' Office of Security and Policy Planning, his mind was still captivated by what he studied while completing a MA in philosophy at Cambridge University's Emmanuel College. There he focused on German philosophy with a particular interest in Hegel's political theory of

communitarianism. At the heart of this theory is the concept of *Sittlichkeit* (ethical life). As discussed in the section in Chapter 1 on critical cultural policy, this term is used to describe the vague yet normative way in which citizens are spiritually connected to the state. This concept guided how he interpreted the Quebec referendum. The problem was not with French Canada, but with English-Canadians who let their sense of ethical life lapse in an age of political correctness and legitimate shame over its colonial heritage. For Griffiths, Canadian citizenship had become debased to the point that all it represented was economic security and ease of travel, but without any deeper emotional or spiritual attachments. The failure to communicate to Quebecers why they should remain Canadian was simply a reflection of English Canada's inability to explain why they themselves should remain Canadian. From this perspective, the unity rally marked a reawakening of this nationalist spirit, yet it reappeared in a rather crude and clumsy manner. However, this spectacle signalled that the socio-political landscape was ripe for someone to take the lead in helping English Canada "reconstruct itself socially as citizens" (Interview Griffiths).

Griffiths and his fellow cofounders hoped that a think tank would lobby for the cause of bringing back ethical life to English Canada. However, unlike his two friends who were well on their way to building successful careers, Griffiths' governmental contract was about to expire and his future was uncertain. Although it would take the efforts of all three and, later, that of their friend Malcom Jolley to operate the Institute, Penz notes that it was always understood that Griffiths would have to take the lead (Interview Penz). Nonetheless, it turned out that he was the best man suited for the job. While working for the Department of Foreign Affairs, he learned a valuable lesson in

advocacy—one that would shape the direction of the Dominion Institute. At the time, Canada was directing the international movement to ban landmines. While I was unable to learn what, if any, part he played in this movement, Griffiths notes that this campaign exemplified how one might sway governments and the public by combining media-directed advocacy with research. In the case of the anti-landmine campaign, it incorporated a cultural component drawing on the celebrity appeal of Princess Diana with hard data showing the number of innocent civilians, especially youth, killed by landmines. The power of this campaign was the way in which it controlled the discourse over what should be done with landmines. For example, even though many powerful countries such as the US and Russia were opposed, it became inconceivable for their representatives to speak about the necessity of these weapons in a positive manner—reticence was the only possible response.¹⁰ However, this level of authority and cultural capital needed to dictate discourse and the actions of others do not simply emerge spontaneously. They require time and the involvement of influential allies.

Unlike the leaders of the anti-landmine campaign or, for that matter, the scientists in Callon's study whose credentials made their statements "uncontestable," none of the cofounders of the Dominion Institute were yet professionals in any field or had much expertise engaging the public over the pertinent issues of citizenship, history education or national unity.¹¹ They did, however, have their youth as well as the social capital accrued

¹⁰ See Andrew Latham's "Theorizing the Landmine Campaign: Ethics, Global Culture Scripts, and the Laws of War" (2001) for an interesting analysis of the discourse behind this movement.

¹¹ Admittedly, none of them were even actively engaged in campus life at Trinity College (Webb, *Trinity Alumni Magazine*, Spring 2006, p. 17).

by graduating from an elite educational institution, personal connections¹², coming of age during the rise of new media and, in the case of Griffiths, experience working as a government policy analyst. It was this capital that would help them not only to communicate what they thought was a problem, but also to do so in a way that made them look like legitimate experts who knew what was wrong and how to solve it. Just as importantly, it was their understanding that they could use these qualities and connections to operate within a network of other actors who had much more power and experience. Nonetheless, despite this discrepancy, they fashioned a strategy to remain an essential node. The next step in the move towards problematization was one of the most important steps in this strategy, since it laid the path to the formation of an epistemic community.

SUMMONING AN EPISTEMIC COMMUNITY: THE STORYLINE EMERGES

Although it may not have been as auspicious as an academic research trip to Japan, as was the case in Callon's study of the scallop industry of St. Brieuc Bay, the reunion on Rudyard Griffith's family farm marked a critical step in the creation of the Dominion Institute's network. It was there that a clearly defined problem was conceptualized: the poor state of Canadian civil culture was caused by (a) the reluctance to draw upon a common symbolic culture and (b) a lack of civic literacy amongst an apathetic citizenry. In other words, it was due to a perception of a scarcity of ethical life amongst English-Canadians—the state did not project an emotional connection and, even if it did, citizens lacked the ability to identify with a national consciousness. The Quebec

¹² It is important to note that one of their close friends and earliest supporters of the Dominion Institute, Duncan Jackman, was the son of Henry (Hal) Jackman. Jackman was then the Lieutenant Governor of Ontario and chairman of one of the country's largest financial and insurance corporations, E-L Financial Corporation Ltd..

referendum only reflected this diminishment that was related to the ascension of a postmodernist and postnationalist worldview. However, as Callon (1986) notes, defining a problem is only half of problematization. This step begins by posing a problem, but ends by identifying a solution that includes the efforts of others yet makes one actor indispensable to the process of achieving the objective. Not any solution will do; rather, what is needed is a solution that positions one actor as an obligatory passage point.

Unfortunately, my research found that while they may have been able to communicate a problem, the three cofounders were less clear about its solution. It is here that discursive policy inquiry provides a useful contribution to ANT. Whereas the latter conceives of social action emerging out of the efforts of a single *primum movens* (first mover), the former takes a more nuanced and complex view that seems better suited for my study. In particular, Peter Haas' argument that policymaking involves an "epistemic community," which refers to the experts who contribute the knowledge around policies, is reflected in how the Dominion Institute identifies its solution. From this perspective, while they might use different terms, there is some congruency between ANT's notion of problematization and discursive policy inquiry's concept of a storyline. Both are used to describe a discourse that guides how a problem is perceived and what should be done to solve it. However, discursive policy inquiry considers how this discourse comes out of interactions and negotiations between actors.

Following the decision to create a think tank to tackle a perceived lack of ethical life, the cofounders spent the next few months trying to gain allies and secure seed money. These attempts to construct an epistemic community and attract financial backers were not necessarily distinct efforts. Sometime between the summer and the fall of 1996,

Rudyard convinced Allan Gotlieb, the former Canadian ambassador to the US who had recently been elected as the chair of the Donner Canadian Foundation's board of governors, to take an interest in his idea. As I discuss in the next section, this contact would ensure the viability of the Dominion Institute by providing it with the financial means to sustain operations in its infancy. Nonetheless, Gotlieb would also start the process of recruiting influential Canadians into the Institute's epistemic community. At the first official meeting between Gotlieb and the cofounders in the fall of 1996, the historian Jack Granatstein was invited to participate in the talks at the foundation's Toronto office. Granatstein had just gained a reputation as one of the country's most publicly recognized historians from his appearances on the CBC alongside Peter Mansbridge during its extensive coverage of the 50th anniversaries of D-Day and VE-Day.¹³ As well, he recently retired from York University and was in the middle of completing his book on Canadian history education. The purpose of this introductory meeting was to help clarify what exactly this think tank would try to achieve and prepare the cofounders to submit an effective funding proposal to the Donner board. It was at this meeting that the rest of problematization or, using the language of discursive policy inquiry, the rest of the storyline was sketched out.

At that time, the focus on public memory as a site to rehabilitate English-Canadian citizenship was not yet affirmed. The cofounders perceived the problem in more general terms. Although he was intrigued by their exuberance and ambition, Granatstein highlighted two points of concern. First, he picked up on a monarchist tone presented in their arguments. At this initial meeting in 1996 at the Donner Foundation's

¹³ Granatstein was asked to participate by his former PhD student, Christopher Waddell, who was then the Executive Producer of News Specials for CBC Television.

office, Granatstein warned them that he had no interest in being part of a junior monarchist league. Second, he was not convinced that a general proposal for a conservative-minded think tank was the right course of action. He adamantly remarked that the country needed “another Fraser Institute like a hole in the head” (Interview Granatstein).¹⁴ Instead, considering their youthfulness and connection to this important demographic, he suggested that history education and civic literacy should be their main sites of engagement. This is a point that he emphasized in his continual discussions with the cofounders. In a letter to Griffiths, he noted that if the Dominion Institute wanted to receive financial resources from governments and foundations as well as the assistance of other organizations and individuals, then it needed to present “something achievable, worthwhile, and a project that is win/win for all players” (Jack Granatstein fonds, 2003-042/003(04), Letter from Granatstein to Griffiths, August 26, 1997). He then referred Griffiths to E.D. Hirsch’s book and suggested that framing the think tank around cultural literacy would help encourage governments, schools and the media to support their cause.

From here on, the Dominion Institute’s storyline converges with Granatstein’s argument: the ethical life of citizens could be revived if the media, schools and governments would help to inculcate a basic level of historical and civic knowledge of the names and events that contributed to the unfolding of a national story. Although history may have still become an important element of the Dominion Institute’s efforts without Granatstein’s contribution, it is undeniable that this early interaction with a member of a nascent epistemic community altered the pattern of behaviour of the Institute and the composition of the larger discursive community. In fact, Granatstein,

¹⁴ In my interview with Erik Penz, he confirmed hearing this line at the meeting.

who briefly sat on Historica's board of governors, would instead become a key Dominion Institute ally. By the time his controversial bestselling book was released in 1998, the two were complimenting each other on their efforts to promote a stronger, unified history curriculum, as well as their critique of the postmodernist, progressivist and social history approaches to studying and teaching the past. Whereas the Institute would call on the well-known historian as a consultant and spokesperson for its many polls and projects, Granatstein would gain much public notoriety as a main participant within the Institute's community and he would also cite the polls to support his own campaign for a more robust and relevant history paradigm in Canadian schools, universities and public culture.

With the storyline gradually coming together, the cofounders spent the rest of their time networking and working on the funding proposal. At some point during this period, Rudyard got in touch with Greg Pennoyer from the Centre for Renewal in Public Policy. Now known as the Cardus Centre for Cultural Renewal, this think tank was formed in 1994 by concerned Christians, who were once involved in the Public Service Christian Fellowship¹⁵, to advocate for policy issues pertaining to law, education, culture and politics through a well-researched conservative perspective (Page 2001: 304). Although the connection does not continue after this funding proposal and by no means would the Dominion Institute advocate for a Christian or any other religious position, the Centre for Renewal in Public Policy provided a useful model. In particular, the Dominion Institute borrowed the idea of having an advisory committee not only to help forge a direction, but also to attract allies within influential circles to further their message. With this in mind, Griffiths sent out letters of request to leaders within the

¹⁵ Formed in 1979, this organization promotes bible study, prayer and the teaching of Christian principles to individuals working in government and public service.

media, the cultural industry, the corporate community and academia asking them to attend a framing group meeting. As Penz notes, even though they had no confirmation that anyone planned to attend, Griffiths' letter included the names of other participants (Interview Penz). The purpose of this tactic was to give the impression that there was something exciting happening that involved a community of influential Canadians.

On May 5, 1997, the framing group met at the Walter & Duncan Gordon Foundation's offices in Toronto to acquaint the group with the Dominion Institute and to discuss the aims of a "'history-based' approach to encouraging civic responsibility and informed public debate" (Jack Granatstein fonds, 2003-042/003(06), Framing Group Meeting Agenda, May 5, 1997). However, the long-term goal was more significant. This meeting would hopefully initiate the process of building a network of allies within the professional historian community, the media, philanthropic foundations, the cultural industry and the country's corporate community. The list of attendees offers a clue into the type of network that it envisioned.

Table 2 *Attendees of the framing group meeting held on May 5, 1997*

Alister Campbell	Vice President of Zurich Canada (insurance company)
Dr. William Christian	Political science professor at the University of Guelph and biographer of George Parkin Grant
Dan Gardner	A former policy analyst with Ontario's Ministry of Education and current editorial writer with <i>The Ottawa Citizen</i>
Sondra Gottlieb	Columnist and the wife of Allan Gottlieb
Dr. Jack Granatstein	Historian and public commentator
Richard Gwyn	Editorial columnist for <i>The Toronto Star</i>
Patrick Luciani	Senior programme officer at the Donner Canadian Foundation
Ann Medina	Former CBC journalist and current chair of the Cultural Industries Council of Canada
Richard Nielsen	President of NorFlicks (an independent Canadian TV production company);
Dr. Thomas Pangle	Political scientist at the University of Toronto
Dr. Edward Spear	Founder of the Renaissance II Liberal Education Society (education group)
Peter White	Chairman of UniMedia Inc. and Conrad Black's business associate at Hollinger
Kenneth Whyte	Editor of Saturday Night Magazine and soon to be named editor of <i>National Post</i>

The names on this list and their areas of expertise suggest that the Dominion Institute was not simply creating an epistemic community to help advise its operations. Instead, it was patching together a network of actors within sectors that it thought it needed to forge alliances: the news media, the cultural industry, the financial community, philanthropic foundations, academics and educators. In addition, this framing group suggests that the cofounders were heeding Granatstein's advice to take a broad approach to public engagement. If they were going to alter the state of ethical life and influence governments to reconsider the notion of Canadian citizenship, then they needed help from these important allies. What is interesting to note is the difference between the framing

group and the names of those individuals who would eventually accept a seat on its advisory board. Although this group would attract new members such as publisher Mel Hurtig, pollster John Wright and historian Michael Bliss, it never included a representative from the secondary or primary school systems. The only youth educator at the meeting, Dr. Spear, came from the independent school system and would have no future dealings with the Institute.¹⁶ As I note in Chapter 5, this inability to include educators during the step of problematization would continue into the next stage of *interessement*. The facts-based approach to history, although grounded in the language of literacy, did not resonate with this particular section of the discourse community.

Just as crucial as this initiation of alliances with leaders from corporate, academic, cultural and media circles was the long-term relationship forged with the pollster and public affairs expert, John Wright of Angus Reid. This connection was made through Gotlieb and stemmed from Griffiths' awareness that effective advocacy needed to be backed by research. Although corporations and political parties had long been conducting public opinion research, it was only in the mid 1990s that it became the essential tool for advocacy groups that it is known as today (Interview Wright). As its use grew, so did the profits of public opinion research companies such as Angus Reid.¹⁷ According to Wright, what allowed for this lucrative development was a combination of the rise of 24-hour news networks along with the introduction of the Internet and other

¹⁶ In a conversation with Dr. Spear, he only vaguely remembered the meeting. He mentioned that at the time he was proposing a Canadian version of Pearson College and believed that this would have been the reason for his involvement. This college system brings foreign students to Canada to learn in different regional settings. He proposed such a system but for Canadian students to learn in other Canadian regions.

¹⁷ According to Wright's rough estimates, Angus Reid's revenue was \$4.5 million in the early 1990s and currently Ipsos Reid has revenue of approximately \$200 million in Canada alone with global revenue at over a billion US dollars.

information technologies (Interview Wright). Whereas computers and more efficient but less costly communication technologies made polls cheaper and allowed for quicker turnaround periods, news networks, such as the launch of CBC Newsworld in the summer of 1989, led to a rise in demand for information to stimulate talk and audience call-in segments.

At the time that he was contacted, Wright was already a regular guest at the CBC's Toronto studio on Jarvis Street and Angus Reid had just signed a partnership to become the agency of record with CTV and *The Globe and Mail*. From his experience on TV and as a radio commentator on CFRB, Wright recommended that the poll should be quiz oriented to engage the information hungry news media by generating controversial headlines and conversable topics (Interview Wright). Specifically, he recommended a communication strategy referred to as “bang boom” whereby a quiz would cause a media “bang” with its early evening release in time for radio drive home shows, to be aired on the 6PM TV news, and discussed over night-time radio and TV talk shows. The “boom” would come with the next day's newspaper that would then spark continuing coverage in radio and TV news' morning cycles.

Although Griffiths admitted that he was aware of the limitations of a quiz, he quickly realized that it was important for both quantifying something inherently difficult to measure and, if communicated properly, it could have the largest impact on public discourse. As a result, this tactic would be able to garner the interest of other key actors in his newly minted organization. Most importantly, a quiz-based survey could not only effectively raise the urgency of the problem of ethical life, but also frame the solution around the facts-based approach to history that guided his understanding of civic literacy.

The measurement itself could act as an implicit message regarding a solution (Stone 1988). It converges the problem of ethical life and the solution of cultural literacy into one simplistic, yet rhetorical storyline. While Griffiths' understanding of Hegel and Granatstein's emphasis on cultural literacy provided the narrative, Wright's contribution was the tool necessary to communicate this storyline to the public and to influential actors within different policy communities.

Just as the case with Granatstein and the Centre for Renewal in Public Policy, the relationship between the Dominion Institute and Wright was mutually beneficial. While Wright consulted *pro bono* and viewed the Dominion Institute as "a favoured child" of Angus Reid by offering polls at cost¹⁸, his company benefited from a branding standpoint with the enormous media coverage that these polls garnered. In addition, Wright was inspired by the quest of these three friends to wake up Canadians and improve the status of Canadian history.¹⁹ This feature would later come to characterize the relationship between the epistemic community and the Institute: influential Canadians would be willing to work and even volunteer their valuable time for this organization because they shared a similar nationalistic concern about the dismal state of civic culture and that this could be fixed by a facts-based history education.

¹⁸ Although the standard fee was approximately \$1,000 per question, the Dominion Institute would pay a reduced rate of \$800.

¹⁹ Wright is a self-declared political junkie and proud of the fact that he has met every prime minister since Diefenbaker. His office at Ipsos Reid includes a wall of pictures with him beside every prime minister since John Diefenbaker.

TRANSLATING SOCIAL INTO ECONOMIC CAPITAL: THE DONNER FORTUNE

If the formation of an advisory board was the most intelligent strategic step for leading allowing the cofounders to bring together an epistemic community, then the most important turn of fortune was their timing. While they were conceiving of an organization to fill the void caused by a lack of governmental leadership, the Donner Canadian Foundation had just expanded its philanthropic activity beyond social, educational, environmental and medical issues to neoliberal public policy topics. William H. Donner, an American steel magnate who had close ties to Canada through a connection with Montreal's medical centres, established this foundation in 1950.²⁰ Although early on much of Donner's philanthropy was devoted to medical research including Wilder Penfield's Montreal Neurological Institute, during the lead up to Canada's centennial celebration in the mid 1960s the foundation began its interest in public policy research (foreign policy, national unity, the environment, legal issues, Aboriginal affairs and cultural advancement). By 1993, as the foundation had grown to become the third largest in the country, some Donner family board members decided that Canada had become too liberal and wanted to use the foundation to support policy reforms. According to its executive director, Patrick Luciani, before this turn it had been a typical liberal-minded Canadian foundation, "[b]ut the Donner family saw the country going through a fiscal crisis and they wanted to fund projects that looked at more competition and less government" (qtd. in Walkom, *Toronto Star*, October 25, 1997, E1). At that time, Allan Gotlieb, the former ambassador to the US and current chair of

²⁰ These links to Canada have also been connected to Mr. Donner's dispute with the US government over income tax and his decision to leave that country (Walkom, *Toronto Star*, October 25, 1997, E1).

Burston-Marstellar's Canadian branch office, took over as chairman of the foundation's board of governors. In this context, it began to fund research groups working on neoliberal public policy initiatives such as the Fraser Institute, the Energy Probe Research Foundation's magazine *The Next City*, the Atlantic Institute for Market Studies, the Centre for the Study of State and Market and other likeminded organizations.

It was at this time when the country's third largest²¹ philanthropic organization was taking an interest in neoliberal endeavours that Griffiths, Penz and Chong submitted to the Donner Canadian Foundation a funding proposal for the seed money to launch their organization. The language of this proposal²² was carefully constructed in order to resonate with Gotlieb and the board's concern over the paradox that pervaded the neoliberal era. As noted in the previous chapter's discussion of the Spicer Report, this paradox was rooted in the challenge of maintaining a balance between economic liberalization and the state's necessary role to construct a unified citizenry with shared values, a sense of purpose and a common heritage. Before Gotlieb took on the role as chairman of the board and as chair of Burston-Marstellar, he was the ambassador to Washington during Mulroney's negotiations on the FTA and, interestingly, before that post he was the chair of the Canada Council. While it is overly speculative to suggest a conscious connection between these eminent positions, in terms of this underlying paradox there is arguably no better example of a person who might be aware of the

²¹ In 1997, it had \$134 million in assets and approximately \$3.5 million to distribute annually (Walkom, *Toronto Star*, October 25, 1997).

²² Griffiths kindly allowed me to photocopy the only remaining copy of the original funding proposal. However, I was able to later find a second version of this document in Jack Granatstein's fonds located at York University (Jack Grantstein fonds, 2003-042/003(04), A synopsis of the proposal approved by the Donner Canadian Foundation, May 5, 1997).

challenge facing the Canadian state to continue its role as a purveyor of culture in the age of globalization and spending-cuts.

Citing both a recent Statistics Canada survey that found that less than 23% of Canadians knew the name of their MP and an ever-declining voter turnout rate, the proposal went straight for the anxieties emanating from this paradox by drawing a link between the ignorance of the citizenry and the failure of citizens to fulfil their civic responsibilities. It proposed a multimedia strategy with websites, quarterly bulletins, polls and curriculum documents that would tackle this state of civic apathy and historical amnesia by making individual citizens more knowledgeable and responsible. On the organizational level, it conceived of a group that was specifically designed to solve the paradox that pervaded the Canadian government during the neoliberal era between the economic obligation to liberalize all aspects of society and the social need to maintain traditional values and a common identity for national unity:

The advent of fiscally responsible government presents Canadians with the challenge of rediscovering their [forbearers'] belief in the moral necessity of limited government and individual self-reliance... As much as **Canada's immediate prosperity depends upon the fiscal reform of government, its long term capacity for growth depends on addressing the historical and civic forgetfulness of contemporary Canada**" (The Dominion Institute 1997: 2; emphasis added).

It is necessary to emphasize that the proposal did not suggest an inherent problem with neoliberalism²³; rather, it called for a change in the way values and traditions should be transmitted under this era.

²³ In his history of the philosophy and normative practice, David Harvey (2007) defines neoliberalism as a situation in which the state favours "strong individual property rights, the rule of law, and the institutions of freely functioning markets and free trade" (64).

On one hand, it argued that the state cannot afford nor was it even capable of completing this task. The proposal insisted that a contributing factor to the troubling status quo was a dependency on government to promote Canadian history and identity. This is something that would later become a regular feature of the Institute's discourse: the state and governmental institutions or policies such as healthcare, multiculturalism or the Charter of Rights and Freedoms are not effective sites for building national identity—the only sufficient tools are historical heroes, important places, key events and big ideas. Ironically, considering the extent to which its future funding would depend on the public purse, the proposal was careful to only mention private foundations, voluntary associations and corporations as means to secure further funding.²⁴

On the other hand, not only were citizens no longer attracted to the traditional, governmental representations, but civic engagement was also hampered by a rising trend of “the acrimonious and divisive discourse of ‘identity politics’” (The Dominion Institute 1997: 2). Underlying the narrative of the proposal was a sense that progressive forces, which have been dominant since the late 1960s, have hijacked Canadian policy especially over history education. Specifically, it took aim at Ontario's NDP government of the early 1990s, which emphasized social history and discarded the national metanarrative as a story marked by injustice and oppression. As a result of this “anti-Canadian bias,” it claimed that this once essential subject has been reduced to “a subset of social studies that includes such various and **spurious fields as environmental awareness, multiculturalism and rudimentary civics**” (Dominion Institute 1997: 5; emphasis

²⁴ The proposal also mentioned the sale of memberships, which was never instituted.

added). From this perspective, the Institute would be committed to countering this progressive trend in education policy and, more broadly, in other areas of public culture.

In addition to communicating a problem, the proposal also defined an advocacy agenda that appeared innovative and appropriate for the neoliberal era by taking responsibility off the hands of government. First, the Institute would convene a “framing group” of prominent individuals who shared the sentiment that Canada’s future depends on an improvement in historical and civic literacy. This group would provide greater legitimacy to support the Dominion Institute’s communication with both the public and other influential actors. Second, using the technical expertise of Michael Chong, the Institute would launch a website to (a) publish history and civic aptitude tests, (b) provide electronically delivered videos and (c) post an online bulletin. This website would target teachers over SchoolNet²⁵ and reach out to parents who could use the online tests to compare their children’s knowledge with national averages. Third, to support the anecdotal claim that Canadians lack civic literacy, it would conduct a survey incorporating the same questions used by the Department of Citizenship and Immigration in the exam for new Canadians. This survey would provide the empirical evidence showing that the progressive and unproven approach to history education and social studies were the cause of the public’s condition of amnesia and apathy that pervaded Canadian civic society. Finally, the results of the survey would contextualize a policy paper offering a series of recommendations for how government and civic society could

²⁵ Launched in August of 1993 by the federal government, SchoolNet was designed to enhance educational opportunities in elementary and secondary schools across Canada by linking them over the Internet and providing resources to teachers and students.

move forward to alter the situation. This paper authored by Dan Gardner²⁶ highlighted the importance of civic literacy and historical knowledge to combat the national unity crisis and the challenge of ethnic fragmentation.

After some haggling over the term and value, the Donner Canadian Foundation offered the Dominion Institute a grant of \$200,000 for its first year of operation.²⁷ Moreover, it sparked the beginning of a long-term relationship with the country's third wealthiest funding agency and its well-respected chairman, Allan Gotlieb, who had close ties to some of the country's most influential leaders and wealthiest businessmen. According to Gotlieb, this proposal left a big impression on the board. It resonated with the Donners' philosophy of promoting the "responsibility of citizenship and the importance of the private individual" (Interview Gotlieb). The Donners were strong believers that government was not always the answer. With this proposal, they were presented with both an innovative approach to inculcating citizens with greater civic responsibility as well as a dynamic organization created by a group of concerned and committed citizens who realized the limits of government and took it upon their own initiative to steer Canada back to its traditional values. Nonetheless, it was not just the neoliberal language of the proposal that convinced them, but also the young man behind it.

What intrigued Gotlieb and Donner family members was that Griffiths displayed a remarkable sense of maturity for such a young man. As Gotlieb asserts, the foundation is

²⁶ Gardner was a former policy analyst with Ontario's Ministry of Education and he was just beginning his career as an editorial columnist with *The Ottawa Citizen*.

²⁷ There is some uncertainty over the term and value of this initial grant. It is sometimes reported that it received \$150,000 (Boswell, *National Post*, February 18, 2008, A2) and in other cases that it received \$125,000 for one year (Gray, *The Globe and Mail*, April 23 2002, R3). However, the value of \$200,000 was what Penz confirmed in my interview.

not a government research council that funds academic studies for the sake of the advancement of knowledge (Interview Gotlieb). Instead, it supports what it believes to be relevant research that contributes to national debate and provokes new ways of thinking that it considers to be important and relevant. Critical to achieving these tasks is the capability of a leader to project the voice of a think tank. Gotlieb notes that the most effective advocates are not necessarily the largest or wealthiest, but those who are the most dynamic and whose leaders generate public and media interest far beyond their organization's size: "with Rudyard at the helm [the board members] had a high degree of confidence that he would accomplish what he set out to accomplish" (Interview Gotlieb). Over the next few years, Griffiths' relationship with the Donners and Gotlieb would progress. When Griffiths launched the Grano Series²⁸ as a separate project from the Dominion Institute in 2004 and later when he started the Munk Debates, Gotlieb would connect him to other philanthropic businessmen and institutions as well as agreeing to serve on the advisory board of the Munk Debates.

As the story of the Dominion Institute unfolds from an idea proposed by three recent idealistic friends to a successful funding proposal, what starts to emerge is not only the creation of an organization designed to work with an epistemic community to alter the discourse around policy issues and operate within a network engaging schools, media and government. It was also clear that a key part of this story is the emergence of Griffiths as a memory entrepreneur who can impress other more powerful, experienced and wealthier actors. While it would be misleading to focus on the Dominion Institute by looking at

²⁸ This series was held at a Toronto restaurant, Grano, and included keynote addresses by leading intellectuals who spoke without notes to a small select group of prominent Canadians that paid \$500.00 per ticket fee. Sponsorship came from the Peter Munk Foundation, BMO Financial Group and the Donner Canadian Foundation.

just one figure considering Penz and Chong's continuous involvement, explaining the Dominion Institute's ability to convince, enrol and mobilize other actors is incomplete without understanding Griffiths' role as executive director from 1997 to 2008. In my interviews with members of the epistemic community, everyone emphasized how impressed they were with Griffiths as an advocate: for Granatstein, it was his acumen in public relations; for Wright, it was his understanding of the media; for Gotlieb, it was his maturity. However, it was more than these entrepreneurial skills, it was also his abilities as a networker—both practically and symbolically.

In addition to the creation of an epistemic community by setting up an advisory board, Griffiths reached out to politicians, educators, historians, publishers, cultural workers, businessmen and the media. Whether he was on Bay Street, in the halls of the University of Toronto or at broadcast studios, he was comfortable in all spaces and dealing within different circles. He had an innate talent for networking. Through his participation in a conservative book club dedicated to war literature, his leadership in organizing social events and, later, the launch of the Grano Series, he served as a key node connecting influential leaders within Toronto's political, intellectual, cultural and corporate communities. This did not go unnoticed as others, especially observers of Toronto's social scene, recognized him as a networker:

He acquired his passion for the past from a particularly inspiring high school history teacher (the usual story), but you'd be forgiven for thinking he gets as much enjoyment out of having the opportunity to schmooze with the country's elite. He is the classic Gladwellian connector, friendly with historian Margaret MacMillan and Maclean's rabble-rouser Ken Whyte alike (both on the Institute's board), and almost single-handedly fundraises the organization's annual \$1.6-million revenue (Pupo, *Toronto Life*, May 2007, p. 24).

[Griffiths] and his institute do Canadian history, but when they do it, it turns up as a poll and an op-ed in the major newspapers, and hot young fiction writers lend a hand, and Moses Znaimer puts it on television, and the hippest young publishers do the book, and there's simultaneous streaming video. The launch party...mixes moneyed investors with young writers and younger media types (Moore, *The Beaver*, December 2001/January 2002, p. 54)

In the Orient building at Bathurst and Queen West, the site of the institute's informal cocktail gatherings, Toronto's young and impassioned mix with their counterparts from more seasoned generations. Mr. Griffiths blends well with powerbrokers nearly twice his age, his board stocked with guys with long honorifics such as Right Honourable John Turner and the Honourable Hal Jackman. (Delap, *The Globe and Mail*, March 6, 2004, M5).

By the end of his tenure as director, Griffiths gained a reputation as a person who connected established leaders with promising young talents, and political powerbrokers with captains of industry. However, not only did he realize the importance of making practical connections with other actors to provide greater legitimacy, a more powerful voice and the necessary material conditions for his organization's existence. In addition, he positioned himself as a symbolic networker.

Through his language and personal appearance, Griffiths represented himself as a symbol that could serve as an effective interlocutor between youth and more powerful actors: he is young, yet mature; he is cool, yet preppy; he is technologically savvy and a fervent believer in the power of new media, yet committed to books, lectures and newspapers as the main conduit for communicating big ideas; he is understanding of the good intentions behind postmodernism and progressivism, yet cares deeply about modernist traditions and Judeo-Christian values. In meetings with journalists and historians, his interviewers note how they were struck by his ability to display disparate characteristics. He dresses in business attire, yet meets in casual and trendy locations.

He uses lofty metaphors, speaks with an academic droll and quotes Hegel, yet his next sentence might use contemporary marketing buzzwords or teenage colloquialisms.

Interestingly, even his name plays a symbolic role in this multilayered representation. For the historian Christopher Moore, the Welsh etymology of “Griffiths” evinces a “thoroughly Canadian pedigree,” yet his actions indicate an impresario who understands global communication trends and displays an entrepreneurial spirit that matches any dotcom start-up. According to Irshad Manji, the controversial writer and broadcaster, Griffiths’ stodgy name and his preppy attire are misleading because “his values are those of a 21st-century, fusion-loving Canadian... impassioned about [Canada’s] history and alive to its many players, from immigrants to native people to soldiers to a new generation of hybrids” (qtd. in Delap, *The Globe and Mail*, March 6, 2004, M5). Over his tenure, he received almost as much ink in city life pages as the news section. His biggest promoter was the arts and life section of the *National Post* where gossip columnist Shinan Govani²⁹ helped boost his image with aggrandizing photographs and descriptors: “beau Rudyard Griffiths,” “smart, charming, ambitious Rudyard Griffiths,” “photo-friendly young buck,” “a people connector par excellence,” “boyish wonder,” “politically astute guy,” “best dressed (and well-versed) Rudyard Griffiths,” “dashing opinion-spreader Rudyard Griffiths” and “cool Canadian history-maker.”³⁰

For leaders within political, social, economic and cultural circles, Griffiths was a useful actor who could attract young people to history and traditional values. He

²⁹ Shinan Govani, the *National Post*’s gossip columnist, refers to Rudyard Griffiths as a friend, which might help to explain his extensive coverage of Griffiths in his columns (Govani, *National Post*, May 31, 2006, AL3).

³⁰ These quotations are taken from a number of Govani’s articles in the *National Post*’s lifestyle section from 2002 to 2006.

achieved this status by drawing upon a retro style, his knowledge of contemporary technologies and the language of youth. At the same time, he served as an important symbol for his organization that was trying to make history cool for youth. This carefully constructed image of himself and his organization demonstrates an early awareness that the field of representation should be as much a part of the advocacy agenda as lobbying for a national history curriculum or producing educational content. At the root of this strategy was the fact that the Institute never had an endowment. It had to always work on a project-to-project basis. From this perspective, it operated in a manner similar to, as Griffiths' successor Marc Chalifoux suggests, a film production company who had a number of projects that it was pitching at any given time (Interview Chalifoux). Unlike Historica and CNHS, the Dominion Institute only engaged in the projects that it could find donors and grants to fund—not necessarily the best projects, but the ones that were cost effective and attractive to sponsors. According to Griffiths, this “market sensitivity” gave it an advantage over others because it was always aware of the importance of advocacy and public visibility for the sake of its own sustainability. To return to Callon, the financial situation of a start-up helped it to realize the necessity of networks. However, as I will examine later on in this dissertation, “market sensitivity” would also lead it along the path of military memory in its quest to secure resources and allies for the cause of strengthening civic ties and defining Canadian citizenship.

SUMMARY

Callon (1986) defines problematization as a double movement. Whereas the first move involves the identification of a problem, the second includes the process by which an actor determines the roles of others in order to establish itself as an obligatory passage

point. The research scientists in his study did not limit themselves to the observation of a problem and the suggestion of a solution; rather, their proposition was done in a way that made their involvement a necessary component in the efforts of others towards the solution of the problem. However, in my study the stages of defining a problem and proposing a solution were more complex than what Callon examined. The key difference is the incommensurability between the authority of the established research scientists and the inexperience of the youthful cofounders. Moreover, not only did they not have the credentials to convince others to join their network, but also they were far less certain about the solution. Unlike the scenario with the scientists who travelled to Japan on a research grant, there was no clear-cut example for the cofounders to point to. Instead, their understanding of a problem and its solution began with a general sentiment about the state of Canadian civic culture and only gradually developed thanks to the help of others who shared their concerns.

In sum, the period that entails its conceptualization from the summer of 1996 to its launch in the spring of 1997 marks a key moment in the formation of the Dominion Institute's network because it encompasses the stage of problematization. Something that begins with a vaguely defined sentiment about a problem with the country's civic culture eventually becomes more concrete: (1) the formation of an epistemic community to provide a clear idea of the storyline that will guide its solution; (2) the backing of an important financial actor; (3) a framework of the necessary allies needed to help lead to the proposed solution; and (4) the communicative tools to convince these actors about the storyline and their roles in a network. Nonetheless, a weakness in this critical first step of network building is the inability to attract an education representative into the network

(see Diagram 1). In the next chapter, I move on to the second step of translation:

interessement. It is at this step when the Dominion Institute will test (a) its storyline, (b) the main tool used to communicate this discourse and (c) Griffiths' ability as a memory entrepreneur. However, before I move on, it is important to reiterate that at this juncture the storyline (See Table 3) only emphasizes the link between memory and citizenship—the military component had yet to emerge in both discourse and the network.

Diagram 1 *The Dominion Institute's network at the time of its launch circa 1997* **Table 3** *Dominion Institute's storyline at the time of its launch circa 1997*

The Quebec referendum reflected a culmination of the misguided and problematic approach to representing English-Canadian citizenship that uses a progressive, postnational and postmodern lens.

This Trudeauian consensus over the representation of Canada has resulted in a lack of ethical life amongst English-Canadians, especially youth, and has debased the value of citizenship.

In order to revive ethical life and the value of citizenship, the country must return to a facts-based, modernist approach to history education and inculcating civic bonds to construct a common national memory.

The rehabilitation of citizenship and memory cannot rely upon the effort of the state alone as it may have in the past, but it now requires the coordination of a variety of actors: the media, the school system, private business and the cultural industry.

CHAPTER 5: ***INTERESSEMENT: POLLING, ADVOCACY AND SOLICITING A CULTURAL MEMORY NETWORK, 1997-2001***

Statistics are frequently used to tell a story... For this reason, the selection of the measures is a strategic component of problem definition, especially as the outcomes of measures take on political character only when dressed up in a policy narration. As artefacts of political life, the numbers thus become symbols and metaphors themselves.

~ Frank Fischer, *Reframing Public Policy*¹

On April 1, 1997, the Dominion Institute was officially launched after approval from the Donner Canadian Foundation. In keeping with its anachronistic name, the cofounders opened up an office in the well-known Toronto landmark and appropriately antiquated Gooderham Flatiron Building—a symbol not lost on many journalists and writers who would meet with Griffiths and his fellow cofounders. This office², reminiscent of many dot.com start-ups emerging during the same period, was little more than a broom closet; albeit, a closet with a nice view of the historic Front Street district to house a desk, a computer, fax machine and a corkboard that served as the think tank's filing cabinet.

Interestingly, the first step for the cofounders, after they set up their office, was not to create a cultural memory form such as a monument, a historical movie or a lesson guide. From its official launch date until the spring of 1999, the Institute's first two years of operations was spent gathering public opinion research to support its advocacy efforts. After convincing the Donners to provide the initial financial resources and summoning an epistemic community, it was now time for engagement and the difficult task of

¹ Fischer 2003: 171-172.

² According to the budget in the funding proposal, the fee for the rent was donated.

convincing a wider web of actors about the worthiness and necessity of following the proposed storyline.

According to Callon (1986), *interessement* refers to the communicative tools used to anchor actors to a network and define their roles within the complex web of associations: “the groups of actions by which an entity (here the three researchers) attempts to impose and stabilize the identity of the other actors it defines through its problematization” (207-208). In his study, these tools and their content vary depending on the actor who is being engaged. Whereas one imposition includes the towline immersed by fishermen in St. Brieuc Bay to attract the scallops, others are the conversations and texts used by the scientists to convince the fishermen to participate in the proposed solution. In my study, at least at this early stage in the Dominion Institute’s development as exclusively a think tank, the tools for communicating interest include policy papers, participation at conferences and media campaigns. However, the Institute’s primary tool was the commissioning of polls that mix knowledge-based with attitudinal questions to contextualize these other communicative efforts. Polls, as Fischer (2003) notes, not only communicate the storyline, but they also become artefacts and metaphors that guide the discourse of other actors.

In this chapter, I focus on the stage of *interessement* that I position in the period from the Institute’s launch in the spring of 1997 until the fall of 2001. Over this time, its primary focus was on advocacy and it had yet to engage history or citizenship education on a practical level. Rather, it commissioned and released ten surveys to complement a number of its multimedia campaigns and lobbying efforts. This chapter is divided into sections based on different actors targeted by the Institute: politicians, the corporate

community, educators and veterans. The objective here is to assess what messages are communicated and how actors respond. First, I examine the initial two polls, the Canada Day History Quiz and the National Citizenship Exam, as artefacts of *interessement* with the attempt to reach out to politicians and the corporate community. Connecting with these actors was necessary if the Institute wanted to parlay the seed money provided by the Donners into a financially viable organization that not just advocates, but also engages in history and citizenship education. Second, I turn to the polls released around the 1999 and 2001 “Giving the Past a Future” conferences. These conferences offered the Institute an opportunity to test out its storyline on history education scholars and education policymakers—the two main gatekeepers over the country’s regionalized schools systems. Third, I consider the fourth poll, the Remembrance Day Survey, as an attempt to garner the interest of veterans. Although military memory had always been an element in the storyline, the release of this poll and its interpretation by veterans as well as a key member of its epistemic community, Richard Gwyn, would steer the Institute towards this topic as a key site for future engagement and to advance its network. Finally, I conclude by summarizing this early attempt to build interest in these four important actors and briefly note the burgeoning associations with the media, the cultural industry and public intellectuals.

THE LINK BETWEEN HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE AND CITIZENSHIP: BUILDING INTEREST IN POLITICIANS AND THE CORPORATE COMMUNITY

Although it was not the first time someone measured the ignorance of Canadians³, the Dominion Institute turned this into a coordinated campaign that was consistently repeated and strategically used to contextualize policy recommendations. It was not necessarily the polls themselves that were important, but how they were presented through the media and used to frame the discourse that it projected onto other actors. The Canada Day Youth History Survey, which was released on July 30, 1997, and the National Citizenship Exam, which was released on November 10, 1998, influenced subsequent polls regarding timing, theme, sampling and interpretation.⁴ On the surface, they were blunt instruments intended to measure things that were inherently difficult to ascertain: historical consciousness and civic awareness. Many critics responded by challenging their pedagogical basis and even the veracity of some answers.⁵ However, if you take the view that they were not just meant to gauge cultural literacy levels but were crucial components in the construction of a storyline and the communication of

³ Desmond Morton (1988) mentions that on slow news days it was common for a newspaper editor to furnish stories by sending reporters to university campuses in order to quiz youth about basic questions such as whether they could identify Prime Minister Macdonald or explain a simple scientific theory. In addition, the funding proposal itself notes a similar survey conducted by Statistics Canada.

⁴ Whereas the first survey focused on youth aged 18 to 24 by asking them questions about Canadian political history, military history, cultural diversity, arts and Canada-US relations, the second used questions from the Canadian Citizenship exam administered by Citizenship and Immigration Canada to grant citizenship to immigrants but posed them to a representative cross-section of 1,356 Canadian-born citizens.

⁵ The first survey led to some debate over a number of answers: (1) whether it was correct to consider the poet Robert Service as a Canadian; (2) whether it was fair to state that women won the vote in 1918 if Chinese and East Asian women did not get until 1947 and Aboriginal women until 1960.

interessement, then they should be assessed not as social scientific texts but as discursive artefacts in a campaign designed to resonate with other actors.

Politicians

As a think tank with the objective of changing the way in which government inculcates national identity and the narratives that make up the content defining citizenship, it is clear that the primary audience of the Institute's first two polls were politicians. In fact, arguably the very purpose of the first poll was to provide evidence and the rhetorical basis for a policy paper that made its way into the hands of politicians and policy analysts within governmental agencies. The questions of the Canada Day Youth History Survey were intentionally designed to produce findings that provided empirical evidence supporting a storyline focusing the attention of these individuals on the discourses of regionalization and Americanization.

With respect to regionalization, this poll emphasized the finding that young Canadians knew a great deal about their province's history, yet very little about the country as a whole or other regions. Quebecers showed the greatest disparity with high scores on questions related to the first francophone prime minister and the Lower Canada Rebellion, but the worst score at only 28% of respondents able to identify Canada's first prime minister. With respect to Americanization, the multiple-choice aspect contrasted the awareness by young Canadians of the names of famous Americans with their ignorance of Canadian figures. It is perhaps not a coincidence that the findings provided much of the content for *The Globe and Mail's* series "Off Guard." This series focused on the cultural, economic and even political encroachment by the US on Canada. Although the poll only reported the contemporary state of historical and cultural literacy, the article

suggested without providing evidence that the results showed an increase in civic ignorance from previous generations (Campbell, *The Globe and Mail*, July 1, 1997, A1).

For the Institute, the quiz contextualized a policy paper, written by Dan Gardner, which was forwarded to the media, provincial ministries of education, politicians and relevant federal departments. This paper, labelled “Youth and History,” emphasized the connection between memory and civic values. Drawing a straight line to the 1995 Quebec referendum, Gardner (1997) notes that the reason why federal leaders did not draw upon national memory as part of their defence of Canada was because they “knew of their audiences’ ignorance” (6). The only discourse that they could muster was to appeal “to economic self-interest and the United Nations’ agreement that Canada is a really swell place” (5-6). This paper suggests that the survey was only a means for relaying a larger story to government. The message was not just that Canadian youth do not know enough history, but that their historical awareness is becoming increasingly tied to their region and under the influence of American popular culture.

It was a few months later with the release of the citizenship exam that this historical deficit was presented as a problem pertaining to all Canadians and as threat to the country’s future viability. If the first poll was meant to embarrass teachers and youth, then this mock exam was a clear shot at government who seemed to expect more from immigrants than Canadian-born citizens. Although the exam also included questions relating to contemporary topics, culture and geography, it was interpreted through the media as a failure of history and civics education since respondents were particularly ignorant in the areas of Canada’s political process and history: only 22% correctly labelled the first four provinces to join Confederation and 8% knew that the Queen was

the head of state. However, this poll went a step farther from the last by grouping the results not only into regions, but also gender, nationality, age and level of education.

The more detailed demographic analysis helped to produce the narrative echoed by the national media that those who were older and better educated had higher levels of civic literacy than younger, less educated respondents. It also emphasized the finding that Canadian-born citizens did not score all that much better than naturalized immigrants. In other words, the problem was larger than the issue of integrating and acculturating new Canadians. According to Griffiths, the findings suggested that a majority of citizens, especially youth, lacked the cultural capital necessary to participate in public life (Campbell, *The Globe and Mail*, November 10, 1997, A1). The cause of this problem was placed at the feet of the federal government who had failed to promote citizenship as something more than a passport and had been too reluctant in its dealings with the provinces over education to establish a common national curriculum. It is at this point that one can identify the communication of *interessement*.

Interessement appears in two forms: as recommendations with a series of policy changes as well as a reminder to the federal government of its limitations. “Youth and History” and the summary of the mock exam pointed to some viable areas in which governments could fix a few problems: (1) provinces should make history courses mandatory just as they do for math, science and English; (2) these courses should be autonomous from civic and social studies; (3) the pedagogy guiding these courses should be based around a fact-based approach and reintroduce political history along with the current emphasis on social history; (4) the content of these courses should fit into a national history framework so that youth learn the same story no matter where they go to

school; (5) just as Israel has a mandatory moment of silence to commemorate the Holocaust, governments should legislate a mandatory two-minutes of silence in public spaces to mark Remembrance Day; (6) the attitudinal questions communicated to the federal government that half of Canadians supported projects engaging history and civic traditions as part of the millennial celebrations. At the same time, Griffiths' interpretation emphasized that the federal government was hindered by its lack of constitutional authority: "officials in Ottawa have been reluctant to act because education is a provincial authority" (Campbell, *The Globe and Mail*, November 10, 1997, A1).

Historian Desmond Morton (2000) suggests that the message of the Dominion Institute's initial polls and policy papers had been "received, studied and filed for action" by the country's corporate and political communities. Although he makes this claim by pointing to Prime Minister Chrétien's turn towards history and public memory projects in the late 1990s as an indirect influence, I have found evidence that its message was directly incorporated into governmental language and rhetoric. Specifically, as Marc Chalifoux, the current executive VP of the Historica-Dominion Institute, was quick to note, Chrétien's 1997 Speech from the Throne made direct reference to the first poll. According to Chalifoux, this helped draw attention and legitimacy to the Institute as a player in the field of cultural memory (Interview Chalifoux). After I followed up on this claim, I learned that the reality was less prestigious considering that the body of the Throne Speech delivered by Governor General Ray Hnatyshyn did touch on Canadian history education, but the poll was only mentioned in the subsequent response during the House of Commons Debates. This observation is not meant to embarrass Chalifoux considering it was still an impressive feat; rather, it is telling of the necessity for the

Institute to both track and brandish how other powerful actors have incorporated its discourse. In this case, the proceedings record Chrétien's statement that he was emotionally troubled by the survey. He then used the findings to emphasize a major initiative of his recently re-elected government to help provide Canadian youth with the necessary skills and opportunities to succeed in the future.⁶ While youth may understand technology, their lack of historical knowledge was disconcerting because he believed that it is a nation's history that gives it a soul. It is here that the Institute's institutional discourse gets infused with Chrétien's language.

In Gardner's policy paper, a nation's sense of history is compared to the roots of a tree that deliver the necessary life force into a healthy and vibrant body politic. For Chrétien, history is the soul that keeps Canada united. In the House of Commons, he acknowledged that, in addition to traditional sites of cultural engagement such as museums and cultural institutions, the government needed to work "with voluntary groups to develop ways to increase Canadians' knowledge of what we have done together" (House of Commons Debates 1997: 42). This was exactly the scenario proposed by the Institute's storyline: government could no longer venture on its own in the pursuit to construct civic identity and inculcate public memory. Moreover, this line of communication went two ways. Chrétien's allusion to Louis Hippolyte Lafontaine and Robert Baldwin as examples of important Canadians would later become key pieces in the Institute's language.⁷

⁶ It was in this same speech that he introduced the Millennium Scholarship Endowment Fund that would give the federal government some authority in the provincially dominated area of education.

⁷ It is not a coincidence that when the Institute would co-launch with John Ralston Saul a lecture series in 2000, they would name it after these two nineteenth-century politicians.

In my interview with cofounder Erik Penz, I learned that the Institute was just as surprised as any one else when Chrétien referred to the poll:

We didn't have any contacts in the Prime Minister's Office (PMO). That was just picked by the PMO and we were kind of tickled by it but it also made us realize that, in terms of getting our message out, it wasn't as hard as we thought... The other thing we learned that is you build a story for the press... If you commission a poll and you build a narrative around that poll and you go out and you get the quotation from eminent Canadians and you put that in a little press release package and you send it out a lot of journalists looking to meet their filing deadline and knock off for their evening will just quote from that maybe make a few call on their own and that's it and they got their story. They didn't have to get up from their desk in doing so. We realize actually building those stories can get us out in the media more than we initially thought (Interview Penz).

Chrétien's reference helped to reassure the cofounders about the worthiness of their project. It also instilled in them a confidence that they could shape the storyline over issues of history and citizenship. From a network building perspective, the success of this poll made them realize that the media could be a rather easy actor to draw into its discourse community. However, what seemed like an accident of chance, at least to the cofounders, may not have been a stroke of luck, but a result of the network in action. As I learned from going over the transcripts of my interviews, Chrétien's reference, contrary to Penz's belief that they had no contacts in the PMO, came out of a meeting that Jack Granatstein secured through fellow historian and current MP, John English, with Eddie Goldenberg.⁸ Interestingly, this points to the observation that networks operate even without everyone realizing all the minor yet crucial details. In this case, even though to this day the cofounders remain unaware of the connection, it was a member of their epistemic community and not chance that led to their first discursive victory and a sign to

⁸ Chrétien's Senior Policy Advisor throughout his tenure as prime minister (1993-2003).

donors of their relevance. As Granatstein boasts, “I had direct influence in getting into the Prime Minister’s day speech a reference to history” (Interview Granatstein).

As for the mock citizenship exam, the reference to the millennium celebrations marked a continuation in this dialogue over the connections between citizenship, youth and memory. The Institute had much to gain on both a discursive and political economic level by becoming a part of the discussion around the millennium. Whereas financially this governmental endeavour could provide crucial resources, on the discursive level this connection to the prime minister was brandished by the Institute as evidence to its growing community of financial backers and political supporters that its advocacy was reaching the highest echelons of power. In its 2002-2003 report, a section with media quotes about the Institute includes a passage from the “Rt. Hon. Jean Chrétien, ’97 Throne Speech.” However, clearly the intent of marking it within the context of this esteemed and well-known element of Canadian political procedure in a document such as an annual report that would be sent to donors suggests the extent to which the Institute was aware of the link between discourse and other forms of power.

When it came time to funding subsequent surveys and projects, the federal government became a willing donor. For example, the Millennium Bureau of Canada sponsored the 1999 Great Canadian Questions essay series and the Department of Canadian Heritage provided a majority of the funding for the 2000 Greatest Event in Canadian History Online Survey and newspaper series with a \$200,000 grant. In addition, Chrétien’s speech shows that the state was beginning to conceive of a role for groups like the Dominion Institute in helping it circumvent provincial jurisdiction over

education. Moreover, the discourse that had developed surrounding the polls could be cited to justify greater federal involvement and spending on culture.

The warnings about the future of Canada's democracy, which was supported by newly collected statistical evidence, was used to assert the urgency behind the many national unity, educational and cultural projects launched by Chrétien's Liberal government in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Interestingly, there are examples of how its funding of the Institute was brandished by the Liberals to defend these programs from critics. When Reform MP Ted White and Diane Francis, then at the *National Post*, criticized the Millennium Fund as a waste of taxpayer money for funding superfluous programs, Herb Gray, the minister responsible for this fund, was quick to raise the fact that it supported the Great Canadian Questions project. What is so telling about this example is how Gray notes the absurdness of Francis' decision to attack the fund considering that the *National Post*, her employer, was the other main partner on the Dominion Institute's newspaper series (Gray, *The National Post*, May 19, 2000, C19). All of this points to the entanglement of a network that the Institute was beginning to play a key role within on both a practical and symbolic level.

The Corporate Community

The Canada Day Youth History Survey and the mock Citizenship Exam were released ten years after the contentious debate over the Canada-US Free Trade Act (FTA) that led up to the 1988 federal election and comprised a key part of the context of the Spicer Report. In Chapter 3, I observed how the Spicer Report focused on issues of cultural sovereignty and asked the question: Will economic liberalization make future generations less Canadian and more American? The spectre of Americanization was a

dominant theme in the two polls. These polls claimed to provide empirical evidence for a trend that many feared in the late 1980s would come to fruition if Canada signed the FTA. The lead sentence in the first news report of the Canada Day Youth History Survey clearly emphasizes this trend: “More young people identified US astronaut Neil Armstrong as the first Canadian in space than were able to name Marc Garneau as Canada’s first space hero” (*The Globe and Mail*, June 25, 1997, A8). As well, this survey was used by *The Globe and Mail* to contextualize a series on an American cultural, economic and political invasion of Canada. Drawing on interviews with well-known economic nationalists including Maude Barlow and Mel Hurtig, these articles connected the sale of Canadian corporations such as Tim Hortons and the introduction of American chains such as Wal-Mart to the Canadian landscape with the belief that national identity and culture were waning. The survey provided empirical evidence of this link. Although it is not as easy to point to a direct link between these polls and a change in direction of the corporate community, there are a few clues pointing to some interesting connections.

First, it is evident that the Canadian Council for Unity (CCU), a government-funded organization whose board was comprised of many top corporate leaders, took immediate notice of the Dominion Institute. The two groups had a lot in common as national unity advocates. Nonetheless, exemplifying what Griffiths and his cofounders adamantly argued against, the CCU put forth economic arguments in its “Non” campaign during the Quebec referendum. One of the key messages of the Institute’s “Youth and History” policy paper was that facts-based history education and greater public memory were far better tools for evoking civic pride and national identity than economics. When it came time for the second annual Canada Day quiz in 1998, the CCU joined as an

official partner. For that matter, it is also necessary to note that Peter White, who was the chairman of the CCU at that time, was one of the original members of the Dominion Institute's advisory council. From this point on, the language of the CCU begins to converge with the Dominion Institute's narrative by making the solution to the national unity crisis something to be addressed with the inculcation of historical knowledge and not just "economic self-interest." For the remainder of its existence until Prime Minister Harper's Conservative government cut its funding in March of 2006, the CCU's operations were largely out of the public limelight with education projects such as Experience Canada and Encounters with Canada. However, through a partnership with the Dominion Institute over polling, this group, who was traditionally only heard from during moments of crisis, was able to get its name out in the public.

Second, the decision by Charles Bronfman and Red Wilson to launch Historica owes some credit to these initial Dominion Institute surveys. In addition to Jack Granatstein's *Who Killed Canadian History?*, both Wilson and Bronfman pointed to the 1997 Canada Day Youth History Survey as influential in the creation of Historica in October of 1999. However, not only was the alarming results part of the emotional catalyst behind the foundation, but also it provided the rhetorical framework for its launch. In an article published in *The Globe and Mail* that introduced the Historica Foundation and solicited fellow wealthy businessmen to contribute money, Bronfman began by citing the survey's key findings that only 54% of youth knew the name of the country's first prime minister and that 40% of respondents admitted that they did not know as much history as they should. The survey provided the evidence of a looming political crisis that could only be averted through greater historical knowledge and public

memory: “This is a tragedy in the making. Without an awareness of our collective past, an understanding of the struggles that have shaped our nation and an appreciation of the values that have enabled our bold experiment in nationhood, our destiny may be only a sidebar in world history” (Bronfman, *The Globe and Mail*, October 21, 1999, A23).

Finally, the Dominion Institute’s ability to attract new corporate sponsors following its initial polls is a testament to its new found reach. As previously suggested with respect to the conception of the Institute, its existence depended upon a willingness on behalf of private industry to provide financial support. Fortunately, by the time that the seed money from the Donners was spent, many corporations were willing sponsors. The first of which were History Television and IPL Energy⁹ who cosponsored the second annual Canada Day quiz. In addition to these companies, over the first few years of operation, the Institute patched together a corporate council to fund two-thirds of its annual \$250,000 operating costs (Dominion Institute 2002). This council included Bell Canada, Magna International, Random House, Operation Dialogue¹⁰ and the Historical Foundation.

THE END OF THE HISTORY WAR?: BUILDING INTEREST IN EDUCATION POLICYMAKERS AND HISTORY EDUCATION SCHOLARS

If politicians and businessmen were the main targets of *interessment* for the political and economic capital that these groups could offer, then the other community

⁹ Now known as Enbridge after it changed its name in 1998.

¹⁰ Operation Dialogue was a non-profit organization, which was launched by AGF Management co-founder Warren Goldring who was also a member of the CCU’s board of governors, to inspire dialogue about what it means to be Canadian.

approached at this early period were history education scholars and policymakers who had authority over Canadian classrooms. At the time of the Institute's launch, this community was trying to move on from the disciplinary battles of the late 1980s and early 1990s. It is within this context that McGill's Institute for the Study of Canada and later the Association for Canadian Studies organized the "Giving the Past a Future" conference series.¹¹ The first of which was held at Montreal's Centre Mont-Royal in 1999. As Desmond Morton, the conference's organizer, reveals, the creation of this series that still continues on a biennial basis owes a lot to the shift by the corporate community to fund history and Canadiana (Interview Morton). The patron of the Institute for the Study of Canada, Charles Bronfman, wanted to see his money used to affect public discourse especially in the wake of the Quebec referendum.

With this message passed down, Morton set out to organize a large conference with over 800 participants that included teachers, historians, Canadian studies scholars, history education experts, authors, filmmakers and policymakers. The aim was not only to discuss ways of teaching and learning history, but also to fulfil Bronfman's request by putting history back into the spotlight and raise the pedagogical value of popular forms of education including *Historica's Heritage Minutes*. A highlight of the conference was a talk by Mark Starowicz, the executive producer of the CBC's "Canadian History Project,"¹² who used the opportunity to preview his forthcoming documentary. At the

¹¹ This conference series now goes by the more descriptive name "Biennial Conference on the Teaching and Learning of History" and is organized by the Association for Canadian Studies.

¹² This CBC series would later be given the more inspiring title *Canada: A People's History* before its release in January of 2001.

same time, this conference gave Griffiths his first chance to engage the same actors that he blamed for causing the lack of ethical life.

Griffiths participated as a panellist in a plenary session entitled “Imposing Official Histories: Traps and Challenges.” This panel focused on the challenges of creating a standardized national history curriculum. Included in this session were progressivist scholars who took a cognitive approach to education such as Peter Lee and Peter Seixas, the panel’s chair. Since all of the other five panellists were eminent scholars in the field of curriculum studies and had policy experience as consultants to education boards, Griffiths was very cautious in his language. He prudently took a submissive tone by proclaiming that “the history war is over.” Continuing on with this militaristic motif, he pondered whether the disciplinary battle was in fact a phoney war:

The truth is the progressivists won. Critical thinking, historical relevancy and minority perspectives are the hallmarks of good curricula in every educational jurisdiction in Canada... The other truth is that long ago the traditionalists privately conceded victory to the progressive movement. The emerging cultural literacy movement of which the Dominion Institute is part is interested in discussing the role factual knowledge plays in providing a context for critical thinking, not returning Canada’s schools to an educational year zero... Present-day progressivists and traditionalists therefore share a continuum of pedagogical interests and concerns (Griffiths, *Policy Options*, March 1999, pp. 46-47).

The discourse in his presentation was a far cry from the language of “Youth and History.” In that policy paper, as in *Who Killed Canadian History?*, educators and the school system took the brunt of the blame for failing their responsibility to youth and society. Progressive history was attacked for teaching “historical relevance” that “pushes away subtler forms and uses of knowledge in favour of the obvious, the superficial, the

immediately useful” and emphasizing the acquisition of self-confidence in spite of historical facts (Gardner 1997: 8).

Although he conceded defeat at the conference and suggested that power was in the hands of the progressivists, outside the confines of the Centre Mont-Royal, in a terrain that Griffiths was more comfortable, the media, he offered a different discourse. He shifted the power onto the traditionalist side in a *National Post* opinion column published a day before the conference. Framing the discussion around the mock citizenship exam that reported 88% of Canadians supported national standards, he claimed that this newfound public interest was the primary rationale for the conference. Moreover, whereas at the conference he placed the next step in the conciliatory process on the side of progressivists by admitting the ascension of cultural pluralism and historical relevancy, in this opinion article it was the understanding of a shared set of facts that should precede more progressive and cognitive pedagogies.

Two years later at the follow-up meeting in Winnipeg, Griffiths took this media tactic one step farther by commissioning a \$100,000 survey of high-school history department heads. Sponsored by the Donner Canadian Foundation, the poll was strategically released on the first day of the conference through an exclusive agreement with *The Globe and Mail*. It found that 91% of respondents wanted a national facts-based curriculum and 48% considered “Canada at War” as the most important topic. According to Griffiths, this clearly showed that contrary to the claim by progressive social historians, “teachers find the deeds of dead white politicians and Canada’s military to be enduring topics” (Griffiths, *The Globe and Mail*, October 19, 2001, A19). Even more so than the Montreal conference, here we see a specifically designed poll to impose and stabilize the

identities of the conference participants. It achieved this by brandishing a representation of an apparent popular will of those on the ground, history teachers, to return to a facts-based curriculum with politics and war on top of the agenda. It is at this point that the effectiveness of the polls as a network-building tactic comes to the fore.

According to Callon (1986), to translate is to not only define roles, but also to “express in one’s own language what others say and want, why they act in the way they do and how they associate with each other: it is to establish oneself as a spokesman” (223). Translation results in displacement. In this case, departmental heads displaced history teachers. It is interesting to highlight a slight yet critical shift in discourse between the press release noting that the respondents were “766 heads of high school history departments from across Canada” and the subsequent newspaper article reporting a “survey of 750 history teachers across the country.” Although it is easy to brush this off as an innocent journalistic error, it might also be an intentional example of what the philosopher Gilbert Ryle (1949) labels a “category mistake.”¹³

Ryle uses this term to critique Cartesian thought for fusing mind and matter thereby causing a series of incongruent categorization. Likewise, when reading the *Globe*’s account of the poll, a reader rightfully assumes that it is measuring the opinion of history teachers. This is a point that is supported in Griffiths’ column published a few pages after the article. In this piece, which is telling of the type of discourse he used in his interview with the journalist, he frames the poll as groundbreaking for revealing “the opinions of rank-and-file history teachers” who he claims would not be at the conference which will be dominated by “an elite group” of bureaucrats and academics (Griffiths, *The*

¹³ This term is sometimes labelled as a “categorical mistake” or “category error.”

Globe and Mail, October 19, 2001, A19). The argument has two layers: (1) teachers want national standards and a return to traditional history education; (2) the voices of teachers are silenced by their superiors who place the well-being of the history education reform movement ahead of the best interests of youth. All of this may be an important finding if it was not for the fact that the poll was drawn from responses by departmental heads and not, as Griffiths and the journalist report, “rank-and-file history teachers.”

Unlike the discourse of the other polls that resonated with politicians and corporate leaders, in this case the Institute’s discourse did not, to use Callon’s language, “anchor.” On the contrary, key representatives of the progressivist education movement, Peter Seixas and Penny Clark, directly challenged its basis. Whereas Clark takes a neutral position¹⁴, Seixas is much more biting in his critique. Seixas criticized Griffiths for using his media connections and even implying that he may have been aware of the fact that *The Globe and Mail* would be delivered to the hotel rooms of all the participants at the Winnipeg conference. At first glance, this seems like a harsh, unwarranted accusation. However, it might not be far-fetched if you consider that the first part of this survey released a month earlier was published in the *National Post*. Although only Griffiths can confirm whether *The Globe and Mail* was selected as an official partner on this version of the teachers’ poll because it was delivered to participants’ rooms, this case is illustrative of the Institute’s media strategy of working with both nationally circulated newspapers as well as its close connections with Southam chains. If indeed he knew which paper would be delivered, he had the power to make the poll appear within it. Regardless of this

¹⁴ She likens Griffiths’ call for a national curriculum to the Loch Ness monster that disappears as quickly as it emerges: “It emerges every 10 years or so; we see the head and tail; and then it disappears... we shouldn’t worry, however, because we will never see the entire monster” (Clark 1999: 68).

speculation, the strategy, according to Seixas, worked: Griffiths managed to frame the conference through a media generated news story making his arguments and discourse “major topics of corridor discussion on the first morning” (Seixas 2002: 380).

From an ANT perspective, Seixas’ response exemplifies what Callon labels “dissidence.” If the cohesiveness of a network depends upon the obligatory passage point speaking for all other actors, then its viability comes into question when any node rejects “the representativity of the spokesman” (Callon 1986: 219). With that said, it is important to note the difference in the spaces where Griffiths and his critics are able to communicate. Whereas Griffiths gets national news coverage and can reach multiple audiences, Clark and Seixas are relegated to having their voices heard by those already within their education community. This, however, is still a sign of social capital. Education and academic journals enable Clark and Seixas to maintain their status as representatives of the teacher and education policy communities. Just as they might not have the power to get their voice heard by *The Globe and Mail* and the *National Post*, Griffiths is hindered by his inability to reach the readers of *The Canadian Historical Review* and *Canadian Social Studies*. Nonetheless, the question remains whether the Dominion Institute necessarily needed these representatives.

In Callon’s study, the network established by the three research scientists falls apart after one actor, the fishermen, break with their defined identities and roles.¹⁵ The result is a domino effect with all other actors failing to attach themselves to the network. However, what is missing from this view is the possibility that a network could survive in

¹⁵ This story is rather humorous. One Christmas Eve as the larvae appear to be successfully anchoring to the bottom of the bay, the fisherman cannot withhold themselves from the temptation of scoring an easy catch: “They preferred... to satisfy their immediate desires rather than a hypothetical future reward” (Callon 1986: 220).

spite of the failure of some actors to take on roles and concede to the discourse of others. In my study, the failure of the progressivist education community to agree with the discourse does not spell the end for the emerging discursive community and cultural memory network. Rather, it appears that Griffiths is more than willing to move on from this experience without worrying about convincing the main representatives of the history education policy community. The 2001 meeting in Winnipeg was the last time Griffiths would attend the biennial conference. Interestingly but perhaps not coincidentally, it was also the last time this conference series drew the attention of a national newspaper. What is clear by the end of this early period is that education policymakers and scholars were two actors who did not anchor. However, considering Griffiths' willingness to continue without their help, this raises the question: Did their participation even or ever matter to the Dominion Institute?

Considering this inability to interest these actors in the Institute's discourse, it is not surprising that there were no material changes to the institutional relations between the Dominion Institute and key representatives of the history education system and scholarly movement. Instead, Seixas and his associates, who were then developing the "historical consciousness" model of teaching, turn to Historica, a proponent of social history and the Trudeauian consensus, to fund some of their projects¹⁶ and employ them as consultants¹⁷. On a related note, according to J.D.M. Stewart¹⁸, Griffiths gave little

¹⁶ Historica funded the Benchmarks of Historical Thinking project. In direction oppositon to the cultural literacy model, Benchmarks aims to provide social studies departments, local boards, provincial ministries of education, publishers and public history agencies with models of more meaningful history assessment.

¹⁷ For example, Stephane Levesque, an education professor at the University of Ottawa, worked on teaching guides for Historica until the organization ran out of money.

attention to history teachers during this period. Even a supporter such as Stewart was frustrated by this disregard:

It has always been about what do we know or what don't we know, but it has never really been about well how do we get people to know more. It has always been problem, no solution, problem, no solution so that's sort of the thing that bothers me... But I would like to see more focus, you know take all the stuff the Dominion Institute does and then try to find solutions for it. They don't think that's their mandate. They're content providers and they are media players to keep the good name of Canadian history going in the news (Interview Stewart).

In a letter to the editor published on October 3, 2000 in *The Globe and Mail*, he lamented the fact that, despite all the recent interest in the state of history, the voices of the people whose vocation and passion is to teach the subject are rarely heard. Here he raises a simple yet perceptive question: “isn't it ironic that the Dominion Institute has no school teachers on its advisory board?” (Stewart, *The Globe and Mail*, October 3, 2000, A18). There might be something deeper to this claim beyond the possibility that one teacher simply wants to be a part of an institution who was starting to become a major force in Canada's history education field. Although one reason may be that experiences with teachers and their community at conferences such as “Giving the Past a Future” pushed Griffiths away and made him realize the difficulty of convincing this group, another stems from evidence that he may not have needed to bring teachers and their representatives, at least at this stage in development, into the network.

At the same time that Griffiths was engaging policymakers and education scholars, the Dominion Institute was circumventing these actors by finding a way to overstep their authority and reach officials at the top levels of ministries of education. For

¹⁸ Stewart is a history teacher at Toronto's Bishop Strachan School who would later consult for the Dominion Institute on their Canadian History Report Card Project.

example, there is evidence that Ontario Premier Mike Harris' Minister of Education, Dave Johnson, invited the Institute as a consultant for the history component of the reforms introduced during the 1998-1999 school year. This new curriculum included a mandatory Grade 10 history course, which was a key recommendation of Gardner's policy paper, and emphasized the teaching of military and political history through a facts-based approach. According to Griffiths, this change was "correcting an imbalance" by returning history to its original focus on "the seminal events, the seminal figures, the clash of cultures that makes history come alive" (qtd. in Ibbitson, *National Post*, March 5, 1998, A16).

Officials in the ministry rallied behind the Institute's discourse. They were firmly grounded in the argument that the facts of military and political history inspire students to learn more about the country's past. In Harris' new curriculum, the social history approach of the progressivists, which Griffiths claimed had won the history war and should be the basis for future changes, would be left behind in favour of the events comprising the real drama of history: "Kids aren't interested in the social history of the role of the spinning wheel in Belleville in 1902.¹⁹ Now D-Day—witness Saving Private Ryan—that's drama, that's human struggle that must captivate anyone" (qtd. in Ibbitson, *National Post*, March 5, 1998, A16).

It is this perceived ability for war to inspire students to learn more about the national metanarrative that over time led to a shift in the Institute's storyline. A discourse that was once primarily about the important link between citizenship and memory would later emphasize a strong, more robust view of the military. The aim to make Canadians—

¹⁹ Griffiths' remark about "the spinning wheel in Belleville is a reference to Granatstein's lampooning of social history as only interested in the history of the "Housemaid's Knee in Belleville in the 1890s."

both the public as well as the influential actors that fund, create and circulate culture—less reluctant in celebrating the greatness of their nation’s political and military past will merge with the call to be less bashful in representing the military’s victories on the battlefield. As the next section examines, this shift begins by gradually inserting the importance of commemorating Canada’s military past into the developing storyline regarding the urgency for more national memory to strengthen the value of citizenship.

THE URGENCY TO REMEMBER: BUILDING INTEREST IN VETERANS

After the first two Canada Day surveys and the mock citizenship exam, the next poll was the Remembrance Day Survey. This survey was released on an embargo agreement to Southam News. It was published across the chain on November 10, 1998. Although military memory was an element of previous surveys and one of the recommendations in “Youth and History,” this survey brought the issue front and centre. It also launched a long-term polling project held on subsequent Remembrance Days and other military anniversaries to track historical military knowledge. This initial poll was co-commissioned by History Television.²⁰ Drawing on the contribution of experts from the Canadian War Museum²¹, it posed 15 questions on Canada’s war experience to a

²⁰ This channel was launched a year earlier by Alliance Atlantis with some ownership by CTV after the CRTC’s approval on September 4, 1996 for a “History and Entertainment Network” (See CRTC decision 96-599, 4 September, 1996). It should also be noted that Phyllis Yaffe, who was an original member of the Dominion Institute’s advisory board, was the CEO of Alliance Atlantis at the time and Ann Medina, also on the board, was one of the first broadcasters hired by the new station.

²¹ Jack Granatstein led this museum at that time and he would have a significant role in the hiring of its staff historians including its director of research and exhibition, Dean Oliver, who was one of his doctoral students. An interesting research project that might build on this dissertation would trace the placement of the network of historians directly connected to Granatstein while he was a professor at York University history department.

“proportionately representative cross-section of 1,500 Canadian adults” (The Dominion Institute 1998: 2). By categorizing the results into different age, education, income and regional demographics, it produced the following storyline: (1) Canadians do not know their nation’s military history with 59% failing the quiz and only 36% able to identify the battle of Vimy Ridge; (2) Canadians know more about American military history with 25% thinking General MacArthur was a Canadian hero; (3) the future of military memory is grim with 74% of young adults aged 18 to 34 failing the exam.

Underlying these findings was a message to veterans that their experiences fighting for the country’s freedom were being lost on the public. Moreover, if gone unchecked, their legacy would be forgotten altogether. The traditional approach to memory transmission was not working. While the Legion’s effort to sell poppies was commendable and resonated with the public²², it may not be an effective transmission technique. As rather poetically summed up in a sentence by *The Globe and Mail*’s editorial team, “[w]e need to do more to honour the past, as this survey makes clear, than to wear a poppy once a year” (*The Globe and Mail*, November 11, 1998, A20). The proposed solution was to find a way into classrooms. It was the school system that was to blame for this situation: “You’d have look into every classroom... before you could know what’s going wrong there” (Cobb, *The Ottawa Citizen*, November 10, 1998, A3). However, Griffiths was sure to identify a number of roadblocks.

The poll’s press release concludes with statistics and recommendations that communicate the limitations of veterans and government. Whereas the federal government was reminded that they have a role to play in developing a national strategy

²² This trend was supported by the survey that showed that 79% recognized this item as a symbol of Remembrance Day.

through the departments of Veterans Affairs and Canadian Heritage, provinces were called upon to use their jurisdictional authority to make military history mandatory and the experiences of veterans a key component in the curriculum. However, at the same time, Griffiths' message through the news media was designed to communicate hindrances. He noted that the provincial ministries of education and municipal school boards were infiltrated by a progressive, postnationalist and humanistic viewpoint. These ideologies had caused them to become naïve of the harsh realities that periodically arose in the country's history drawing an otherwise peaceful nation into battle. Griffiths blamed the Vietnam War for skewing the public's perception of the military. As a result, "[w]ar in schools became something you really didn't talk about. It was not thought to be appropriate subject matter for children" (qtd. in Carey, *Toronto Star*, November 11, 1998, A1). The federal government was also another untrustworthy actor considering. This lack of military memory was symptomatic of an inevitable state of amnesia caused by a regionalized education system. It may have had a role, but it had very little power beyond the Council of Ministers of Education²³ to steer the provincially run school systems.

Veterans were also hindered. The press release reminded them that they represented "a dwindling heritage" considering the average age of WWII veterans was 76 at that time. Moreover, rather morbidly, it reported that while there were 415,199 WWII veterans still alive, they were passing away at a rate 24,599 per year. This was a narrative that was picked up in every media report. Griffiths was also sure to emphasize this

²³ This intergovernmental body was formed in 1967 to serve as (1) a forum to discuss policy issues; (2) a mechanism through which to undertake activities, projects, and initiatives in areas of mutual interest; (3) a means by which to consult and cooperate with national education organizations and the federal government; (4) an instrument to represent the education interests of the provinces and territories internationally.

observation in his interviews with journalists: “As a society, we’re beginning to realize there’s a window of opportunity for inter-generational dialogue that will quickly close. We have 10 to 15 years for those conversations to take place” (Carey, *Toronto Star*, November 11, 1998, A1). It was after the communication of hindrances that it defined identities and roles. The overall message for veterans was that (a) the provinces have shown little interest in making history a prominent subject, (b) the school system is warped by a post-Vietnam War era view of the military, (c) the federal government has the ability but not the jurisdictional authority and (d) veterans themselves have the experiences to pass down, yet their time is running out. Nonetheless, Bob Butt, the Legions’ director of communications, relayed a general sentiment that veterans were “eager to share their knowledge with young people” (Carey, *Toronto Star*, November 11, 1998, A1). Griffiths shared the view that veterans were a rich source of living history. However, if this resource was to be tapped, then what was needed was a new “program or strategy to bring [veterans] together with our young people” (Cobb, *The Ottawa Citizen*, November 10, 1998, A3).

The unresolved question, at least at this juncture, was who would work with the Legion, veterans, Ottawa and the provinces to design and implement such a program or strategy. It was here the communication of *interessement* moves from a discussion of the identities of other actors to the proposed role of the Dominion Institute. In addition to pointing to the limitations of schools, veterans and governments, the poll raised the problem of intergenerational communication. At the same time, the poll provided an introduction to the Dominion Institute who was described as a young and innovative

group led by a charismatic director. A report by Elaine Carey of the *Toronto Star* exemplifies Griffiths' ability to wield his symbolic power as an interlocutor:

"We are on record saying we would not forget, but younger Canadians know far less about this country than they used to," said 26-year-old Rudyard Griffiths, the executive director of the institute, formed a year ago by a group of generation X-ers who want to change that (Carey, *Toronto Star*, November 11, 1998, A1).

This excerpt points to the way in which the media coverage of the poll helped to imply that the Dominion Institute could be the missing link connecting youth to veterans.

Before this poll, there are very few reports that describe Griffiths as a symbolic intermediary between young and old. After this Remembrance Day experience, which centred on a very clear-cut case of the need for intergenerational communication, the Dominion Institute was more eager to emphasize this symbolic capital. Not only did news reports put greater emphasis on mentioning Griffith's age, but also they described his youthful approach and demeanour. Moreover, it was also at this point when the Institute shifted from its initial conceptualization as an advocacy group who operated primarily in the realm of discourse to becoming an educator. While it never claimed a stake in public education in discussions around previous polls, the Remembrance Day survey alluded to this potential. However, the final push in this direction would only arise with help from its epistemic community.

On November 13, 1998, Richard Gwyn, who sat on the Institute's advisory board, wrote an editorial in the *Toronto Star* with the McLuhanesque headline, "Poppies Symbol of New Tribal Holiday." This article begins by noting a contradiction between the findings of the Dominion Institute's poll that 6 out of 10 Canadians failed a basic military history quiz and the observation that Remembrance Day crowds in front of Ottawa's

National War Memorial were the largest they have been in a generation. At the root of this short, yet perceptive piece was a paradox: What explains this surge in memory at a time of such great historical ignorance? He responded by suggesting that what was occurring was a transition from authentic memory of war to the “memory of memory.” Canadians were not necessarily using this day to remember war. Instead, they were participating in a civic practice to remember and rehearse a time when it was impossible not to remember and know about military sacrifice. To return briefly to my literature review, what occurred was the transformation of Halbwachs’ communicative memory into Assmann’s cultural memory and Nora’s *lieux des memoires*. Driving Gwyn’s argument, however, was not a scholarly interest in memory transmission, but the same concern found in his book, *The Unbearable Lightness of Being Canadian*. Since the country had so dramatically changed from the one that fought horrific wars to now only supporting the military when it was doing unmilitary things like peacekeeping and humanitarian relief, remembrance of this bygone age became a nostalgic act.²⁴ Unlike the nature of remembrance in Jonathan Vance’s (1997) study of WWI commemorations that appeased a sense of public loss and guilt, this new form was based less upon trauma and more upon what Gwyn claims was the last “tribal day of celebration for English-Canadians” (Gwyn, *Toronto Star*, November 13, 1998, A1).

When Gwyn refers to English Canada he is not making an ethnic claim. Instead, he uses this term to refer to a linguistic group. Most English-Canadians are not Anglo-Saxon just English speaking. The challenge for this heterogeneous group is that while it is not ethnically “English,” British roots comprise its symbolic culture. With this in mind,

²⁴ See Chapter 2 of Peter Hodgins’ (2003) dissertation for a detailed discussion of nostalgia as a trend within Canadian cultural memory.

Remembrance Day has become a rare yet necessary opportunity for this heterogeneous group to celebrate a tribal holiday. This new Canadian, who is English in language only, can wear a poppy even if she does not have any family who fought in the military or can attend a ceremony even if her grandfather fought on the other side of Vimy. The reason for this phenomenon is that Remembrance Day is no longer just about honouring those that died in service. As implied by the claim “memory of memory,” it is about communing with a time in the country’s history that has passed, yet still serves as the foundation for the nation’s symbolic culture. The Dominion Institute’s survey pointing to the poor state of historical knowledge suggests that the military memory boon is not due to a greater public interest in a military history or a preference for an institution that fights wars. Rather, since he notes that Canadians still prefer the peacekeeper myth, the rise in crowds at Remembrance Day ceremonies suggests that military memory has become a medium for the public to connect to a time when the country was more homogenous and had a shared sense of purpose. English-Canadians gravitated to these ceremonies not just to honour fallen soldiers, but also because they wanted to participate in a common civic practice.

Gwyn’s piece was probably read by thousands of *Toronto Star* readers on that day. Like many editorials, these readers would have nodded in agreement, dismissed him as an airy intellectual or passed over the article entirely. However, what makes this editorial stand out from the thousands that Gwyn has written over his long career is the effect it had on the Dominion Institute. According to cofounder Erik Penz, Gwyn’s thesis made the Institute realize that not only was there an opportunity to engage military memory to

both fulfil its mandate and ride a rising wave of popular sentiment. In addition, they realized that there was money and resources to be had in this endeavour:

I would date the moment at the Institute where we said “aha” there’s an upswing in interest here was actually from [reading] that article. That was definitely an “aha” moment for us internally that something was shifting the public consciousness and I’m fairly certain that that predated September 11th... What I can say is that we start to get a sense that there is something going on there of interest. It fits within our mandate in the sense that it is a lens that you can export national narratives and then what happens is that government money starts coming in. As we discovered with the Institute, you have to be very opportunistic in your programming depending on where you can get money. As we found, the single biggest source for funding for our projects came from government both federal and provincial levels (Interview Penz).

What made Gwyn’s article such an influential and momentous event in the Institute’s evolution was that it planted the idea that military memory does not just have to be a part of a wider national project, but it can be the primary²⁵ lens into citizenship and memory.

With this article posted on the office’s corkboard and the idea implanted into the minds of the cofounders, the move to military memory as site of engagement was aided by a turn of fortune. Sometime after the release of the 1998 Remembrance Day Survey and Gwyn’s article, Grant McCrae, a WWII air force veteran, got in touch with Griffiths. McCrae was part of the Canadian Living History Speakers’ Bureau that was launched by another veteran, John Kilpatrick, in 1996. This group had a problem. On one hand, they were having trouble attracting new members. On the other, they needed help connecting with schools to organize visits. Griffiths’ response to this request was immediate:

²⁵ I use “primary” to be careful to not imply that all the Dominion Institute does is military memory. They also engage civic practices especially during elections, promote Aboriginal arts and disseminate stories about successful immigrants. Nonetheless, if you trace the money and the media coverage, the overwhelming emphasis is on military memory.

I looked up and said... there's fantastic potential here to scale this thing way, way up... in 1995 there was a change about kind of sensibilities around veterans and that only began to grow with the Remembrance Day so for us again the project was kind of a no-brainer and if no one else was going to do it then we were going to do it. (Interview Griffiths).

The advocacy think tank that garnered a reputation for lamenting the lack of civic literacy and the failure of the educational system to instill youth with a shared memory was now presented with an excellent opportunity. Military memory could be a means of entering classrooms and directly engage with students.

With a majority of the funding coming from Ontario's Ministry of Citizenship, Culture and Recreation's Seniors' Secretariat, the Institute partnered with Gwyn's *Toronto Star* and its associate on the last military memory poll, History TV. The result was what would later be known as Phase I of the Memory Project, which was then labelled Grant's War. In time for Remembrance Day of 1999, this multimedia venture included (a) an in-class visit tour with McCrae, (b) a four-part newspaper series about his experience that was published in the *Toronto Star*, (c) a television documentary entitled *Crew of Seven: Grant's McCrae's Story* that was produced by History Television and (d) the launch of an interactive website to allow students to chat online with McCrae. As I explore in the next chapter, although this move would begin with a small step within the Toronto-area, it ultimately led to a nation-wide initiative. This project would sustain the Institute financially and position the organization's agenda into the public limelight. Most importantly, it would allow it to circumvent the only blockage in its network—the refusal by education scholars and policymakers to anchor—and thereby forge associations with the missing nodes—teachers and youth.

SUMMARY

Although all stages of translation play an important role, it is what occurs during *interessement* that separates a potential web of associations from the materialization of a network. It is here that the obligatory passage point, “attempts to interrupt all potential competing associations and to construct a system of alliances” (Callon 1986: 211). This occurs through the use of devices that communicate a favourable arrangement to both potential nodes and the soliciting actor. Whereas these devices vary in Callon’s study, in my study polling is the primary means by which the Dominion Institute builds interest. Nonetheless, the content and accompanying interpretation of polling changes depending on the target audience. These polls are designed to communicate on two levels. First, they are designed to emphasize key points that contextualize policy recommendations and highlight actions for others to follow. Second, they remind actors about their inherent limitations. Therefore, they act as ideal networking tools by communicating mutual interests, yet also signalling hindrances.

The first few years of the Dominion Institute, from its launch in 1997 until the fall of 2001, serves as an interesting case for testing Callon’s concept of *interessement*. During this period it commissioned a series of polls to draw the interest of potential nodes for its proposed network. As discussed in the last chapter, this think tank emerged with the aim of altering the way the past was represented and transmitted in order to construct a strong, unified definition of citizenship. Early on it realized that this effort needed the involvement of a variety of actors. In this chapter, I observed how polling and the use of this tool in its advocacy efforts helped to anchor several actors. Not only was I able to observe the anchoring of politicians, the corporate community and veterans, I also noted

the ways in which key representatives from the media and the cultural industry became entangled into the web of associations. For example, journalists were more than willing to relay messages embedded in the polls, newspapers were eager to pat the Institute for the exclusive rights to publish polls and new speciality channels, such as History TV, were suitable partners. In addition, there were a number of influential Canadians and public intellectuals who were brought in to speak about and write articles on many topics related to history, civics and democracy (See Diagram 2). What all these examples share is the fact they were framed by the polls. Therefore, as emphasized by discursive policy scholars, the power of polling as a measurement rests with its ability to control discourse. With that said, they are not perfect devices. In this case, they could not sway education scholars and policymakers to take on the storyline. This failure led to the emergence of a roadblock and a critical threat to the viability of the proposed network.

Despite the election of Mike Harris' Conservative government that allowed the Institute to score a major policy victory, the future of its network remained uncertain. While the Institute was able to anchor key nodes from the country's historian, governmental, corporate, philanthropic, media and cultural communities, schools and thus youth were out of reach. That is until after a key contribution from its epistemic community and a turn of fortune. Richard Gwyn's editorial, which was written in response to one of the polls, proposed that Remembrance Day was the last great tribal holiday for English Canada. Ceremonies and practises on this day allowed a heterogeneous population to connect to a shared past and a time when the nation had a common identity. Although the military was always a component of the Institute's storyline as found in the "Youth and History" policy paper that called for a mandatory

two-minutes of silence on November 11, Gwyn raised the possibility that the military can be the primary lens to construct a shared memory and unified definition of citizenship. This contribution came at time when the Institute was struggling to convince the education community about the worthiness of a facts-based, national history curriculum. In addition, its seed money was coming to an end and this “market sensitive” think tank desperately needed projects to maintain its financial well-being. It was in this context that Grant McCrae, who heard about the Institute through its controversial and highly publicized polls, came to Griffiths with a problem facing his small veterans’ speaking bureau. Although I was unable to meet with McCrae to confirm the details of why he first went to the Dominion Institute, this decision to get in touch with Griffiths must be considered in light of the message of the 1998 Remembrance Day Survey. Media coverage of this poll positioned Griffiths and his organization as an interlocutor between youth and veterans.

Regardless of why it occurred, this meeting would alter the future of the Dominion Institute and its network by leading to the launch of the Memory Project. This venture allowed it to move on from its role as an advocate by securing funding from governments and corporations that would otherwise not support lobbyists. At the same time, it opened up the one node that the Institute was not able to access due to a lack of interest by its representatives: Canadian classrooms. As a result, it was a key step leading to a fully enrolled network and the convergence of its storyline with discourses around the military and a warrior culture. However, before I move on, it is necessary to consider what occurred in this period in relation to Marin’s theory on representation. In this case, it is interesting how the representation comes back to alter the institutional framework.

According to Erik Penz, the fact that military memory became the dominant lens was never the original goal at the time of problematization and the launch of the Institute:

It could have just easily seen us doing something on the founding of the country like 1867 if there had been some kind of hook into the school system or government funding. But two streams we ended up in our first decade of our history were on one hand military history and the other hand the immigrant story, Passage to Canada²⁶ (Interview Penz).

He implies that his organization's move to military memory was the result of chance. On one hand, as I have learned from my interviews with the leaders of the Institute, he is correct considering the "market sensitive" and "production company" conceptualization of the operation. The cofounders were looking for something to keep them afloat and help them carve out a niche within public education. They were fortunate when Grant McCrae provided them with a good idea to, in Griffiths' words, "scale things way, way up" (Interview Griffiths). On the other, this move towards an emphasis on military projects would not have happened if it did not initially inject the military into its polls and policy papers. Whether it was airman McCrae seeking out Griffiths from reading the coverage of the polls or Gwyn interpreting a paradox between the poll's findings and a surge in remembrance, the Institute had always marked its discourse with an element of militarism. As I will explore in the next chapter, the prominent position of the military in the representation of memory and civic identity will lead to greater enrolment by military-minded actors. In turn, the Institute would be enrolled in other military networks. It is at

²⁶ Passages to Canada, which was co-sponsored by Westwood Creative Artists, *The Globe and Mail*, and the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, was created to reflect upon and celebrate the unique experience of being an immigrant. Continuing to this day, it brings successful immigrants to Canadian classrooms. However, despite many similarities with the Memory Project, it receives less funding and far less media attention. It is not by accident that Marc Chalifoux refers to the Memory Project and not Passages to Canada as the "signature product."

this point that a cultural memory network transitions into a military-cultural memory network—the representation and the institutional framework behind it begin to converge.

Diagram 2 *The Dominion Institute's cultural memory network circa fall of 2001*

Diagram 3 *The Dominion Institute's epistemic community circa fall of 2001*

CHAPTER 6: ENROLMENT: CONVERGING MEMORY, CITIZENSHIP AND THE MILITARY, 2001-2008

The air war and the ground war are different things. In the ground war, you need troops. The polls are great but they're blunt instruments. They're not great at patching back together this tenuous narrative.

~ Rudyard Griffiths, "How historians got hitched"¹

The story continues in the setting of the CBC headquarters located a few blocks west of the Dominion Institute's office in the Flatiron Building. It was early in the morning and Rudyard Griffiths was taping a radio interview for a show hosted by Shelagh Rogers to be aired at 8:30AM. The topic was a controversial poll released a day earlier on an exclusive embargo basis to the *National Post*. This poll was intended to resonate with the topical discussions over education marking the back to school season. It found that most Canadians were embarrassed by their lack of historical knowledge. Respondents suggested that history should not only be a mandatory course, but many agreed that students must have to pass a history exam before graduating. As Griffiths returned to his office in time to listen to the interview, a colleague informed him that a plane had just crashed into a building in Manhattan. Assuming it had been a minor accident, he continued to listen to the interview until the CBC broke with a live news update. As the coverage shifted away from his poll to reports that a second jetliner had just hit the south tower of the World Exchange Center, Rudyard, the executive director of a think tank who so deeply understood the fragility of garnering media attention, was left with the inconsiderate, yet brutally honest thought: "oh no that's \$100,000 worth of polling up in smoke" (Interview Griffiths).

¹ qtd. in McDowell, *National Post*, November 6, 2009.

After following the media coverage and considering the way that this event had gripped the world, the next thought he had was that the history game was over. He was certain there would be no interest in the national metanarrative as the war on terror galvanized a globalized worldview and hardened public opinion. At that time, the Institute was still riding off the wave of Canadiana surrounding Chrétien's millennium projects and the nationalistic cultural moment that followed the Quebec referendum. He knew then that an entirely new set of priorities was needed. From his experience gained over the first four years as executive director, he realized that much of the media and the public's interest in civic and history was superficial as epitomized by the popularity of Molson's "I am Canadian" commercials (Interview Griffiths). With the stock market in turmoil, Canadians rather unexpectedly learning² that their country's Special Forces were knee-deep in the war in Afghanistan and the Americans gearing up to invade Iraq, he pondered Juvenal's famous saying about bread and circuses. He concluded that there might no longer be the interest and, just as importantly, funds for circuses that he admits took up a majority of the Institute's efforts. Due to this perceived cultural shift, he set out to make a tactical move by pushing the topics of the responsibilities of citizenship and the role of the military higher up on the agenda.

To use Griffiths' language, it was after the events of September 11, 2001 that the Dominion Institute's operations transitioned from the air war—polls and public relations campaigns—to the grittiness of the ground war—in-class education and public engagement. However, as in all great battles, the air war never subsides until victory is achieved. In this chapter I turn to the core of the Institute's development from September

² See Eugene Lang & Janice Gross Stein's *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar* (2007) for a detailed account of Canada's escalating role in Afghanistan.

11, 2001 to the day Griffiths resigns on February 17, 2008. Over this period, it will fuse the discourse of the urgency for greater memory with narratives regarding a more robust definition of citizenship and a hardened view of the military's role. It will also carve out a niche within the field of cultural memory as a player who can enrol other actors into a cohesive network.

According to Callon (1986), enrolment refers to the fulfilment of *interessement* as actors take on their defined identities. In his study, there are a variety of “different possible ways in which the actors are enrolled: physical violence (against the predators), seduction, transaction and consent with discussion” (214). However, in my study, I found that the Institute's power to enrol stems from its ability to network, in the colloquial use of the word, and serve as an intermediary. The Dominion Institute becomes valued as an organization that can make things happen and bring actors together. This process of enrolment operates in two directions. In the first section, I examine how the Memory Project allows the Institute to enrol two key actors who have up to this point eluded its network: teachers and youth. Although I limit my analysis to the enrolment of these two actors as well as veterans, government, politicians and the Canadian Forces, the supportive role of the media will also be evident in this discussion. In the second section, I examine how this shift after September 11, 2001 leads another think tank, the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI), to enrol the Dominion Institute in its burgeoning network. The artefacts produced by this partnership (i.e. polls, programs, publications and media coverage) signal the convergence of discourses regarding the military, memory and citizenship. Finally, I conclude with a summary and a discussion

about the transformation of Griffiths as a young rabble-rouser into a legitimate memory networker and entrepreneur by the time he steps down.

ENROLMENT: THE MEMORY PROJECT AND THE MILITARIZATION OF THE CULTURAL MEMORY NETWORK

The Memory Project marks the first advance in the “ground war.” It is with this endeavour that the Institute stepped onto the battlefield of history and civic education as a producer, circulator and facilitator of cultural memory intended to construct a more robust and unified definition of citizenship. This program expanded upon Grant’s War with a coordinated in-class veteran visiting tour that is backed up by multimedia texts, public relations campaigns and educational material. Although, as Chapter 5 notes, this venture fortuitously fell onto its lap, the Memory Project became the tool that finally completed the network by sidestepping history education scholars and policymakers. In the end, the Institute will learn that they did not necessarily need these representatives. They could now bring national history directly into classrooms through another route: military memory. Not only would this help improve its legitimacy, but also the feat of drawing actors together bestowed it with the most valuable commodity of all—the network itself. This power to raise a web of actors would then interest other players in the field of military cultural memory and thus further entrenching the Dominion Institute as an obligatory passage point. In this section, I consider the practical network that allows the Memory Project to operate by focusing on the enrolment of six key actors: veterans, teachers, students, government, politicians and the military.

Table 4 *The eleven phases of the Memory Project, 1999-2009*

Phase 1: November 11, 1999: The Launch of Grant's War

A weeklong campaign focused on Toronto including a History TV documentary, a newspaper series, website and speaking tour. Funding came from the Ontario government.

Phase 2: May 8, 2001: The Ontario Launch of the Memory Project

Funded by Ontario's Ministry of Citizenship with an \$800,000 grant and the remainder from TD Bank, the Royal Canadian Legion and Historica. This phase included a website to record personal histories of veterans, a speakers bureau, resource kit for the Legion to prepare veterans, and teacher guide.

Phase 3: November 11, 2002: The National Launch of the Memory Project

At a gala dinner at the National Art Gallery, (Ret.) Lt-General Dallaire gave the keynote launching the Memory Project beyond just Ontario and now including Quebec, Alberta and British Columbia.

Phase 4: June 6, 2003: The Launch of the Memory Project Digital Archive

An archival Internet portal to record the stories of 3,000 veterans by year's end with a \$212,000 grant from DCH's Canadian Culture Online Program.

Phase 5: July 27, 2003: Canadian Forces Join the Memory Project

With the first wave of combat troops coming back from Afghanistan, a grant from DND of \$50,000 allows it to record the stories of serving Canadian Forces personnel and transfer over archival material.

Phase 6: May 8, 2005: Memory Project Digital Archive Road Shows

On the 60th anniversary of VE Day, the first of 8 Antique Road Show style events was held at Toronto's CNE fair grounds. With funding from Ontario Seniors' Secretariat, these shows sought to bring together Ontario veterans with youth, archivists, historians and community members.

Phase 7: May 19, 2005: Memory Project is the Recipient of Gift to the Queen

During the Queen's visit, she received the gift of a donation of \$250,000 to the Memory Project in her name.

Phase 8: March 5, 2006: Training Conferences and Funding Boost

VAC announced a 3-year \$450,000 grant that would help maintain the project over consecutive school years and pay for training conferences.

Phase 9: September 3, 2008: Continuation of Funding

DCH's Canadian Studies Program joins VAC's Community Engagement Partnership Fund in providing \$450,000 over another 3 years.

Phase 10: November 6, 2008: Start of Ontario Veterans' Community Archive

With a \$150,000 grant from the Ontario Trillium Foundation and additional funding from the Government of Ontario and the J.P. Bickell Foundation, this project builds upon the Memory Project Digital Archive.

Phase 11: June 4, 2009: Memory Project: Stories of the Second World War

This expansion of the Memory Project allows it to archive WWII artefacts including photos, medals, badges and audio files. These files are then uploaded to a website and supported with teaching guides. The funding grant of \$2.6 million came from DCH's Celebrate Canada Fund.

Veterans

The role of the veteran is simple: the content provider. They are the living history whose memories must be transmitted to youth. Without them, as is the case for all actors, the entire network falls apart. Fortunately, the veteran is one of the most eager to enrol. It was a group of a dozen veterans who, to use Callon's language, were the *primum movens* of the entire initiative. In media coverage, the veteran is often reported to be thankful for the opportunity provided by the Dominion Institute. This gratitude is not only evident in news reports about the speaking tours, but it also can be found in obituary sections that note how important it was for many veterans to have the opportunity to tell their story.³ Over the course of the speakers' bureau, it has enrolled over 1,300 veterans. The veteran's motivation is to transmit heritage and inform youth about the futility of war. While they have the "content," veterans are informed that the Institute have the tools for their message to resonate with youth. Conferences are held and preparation kits are distributed to assure that they fulfil their role as content providers.

Aiding in the enrolment of veterans is the part played by their main representative body—the Royal Canadian Legion. According to Callon (1986), enrolment happens through contacts made with representatives. This involves both the question of dissidence and communication: whether actors follow their representatives and how the *primum movens* ensures the loyalty of representatives who then transmit messages to their followers. In Callon's study, "[i]t is not the fishermen but their official representatives who give the green light to the experiments and support the project of restocking the Bay" (215). While in my study the support of veterans may not be as inherently tied to their

³ See Tate, *The Globe and Mail*, March 29, 2004, A16; Shapter and Lang, *The Globe and Mail*, December 6, 2005, A24

representatives, it is fair to say that the enrolment of so many on a national scale depends upon the consent of the Legion's Dominion Command and its network of local halls. As I learned in an interview with Bob Butt, the Legion's director of communications, its main role is to maintain the lines of communication with the content providers: "This is where the Dominion Institute comes in they are not for profit as well but they don't have the same membership that we do, they don't have the same community involvement that we do" (Interview Butt). The problem, however, with representatives is that they do not always follow orders. While I have found very little animosity between the Institute and the Legion, they do not agree on all issues. For example, they disagreed over whether the flag should be flown at half-mast on the anniversary of the battle of Vimy Ridge. Whereas the Legion supported this measure as a commemoration of those who gave their lives, the Dominion Institute thought it was inappropriate for marking an event that should be celebrated and not mourned (Wattie, *National Post*, March 5, 2004, A5).

This balance between commemoration and celebration is the most fragile aspect of the enrolment of veterans. It is evident through their comments to the media that many veterans turn to the Memory Project as a way to condemn war. Although the Dominion Institute does not see this initiative as a glorification of military violence, they are trapped in the paradox that Harold Laswell (1941) astutely described almost seventy years ago: "Even those who deny the fear of death to themselves may reveal the depth of their unconscious by their interest in ritual and ceremony... It does not occur to the ceremonialist that in the spider web of ceremony he has found a moral equivalent of war—an unacknowledged substitute for personal danger" (466). In other words, rituals that do not emphasize the brutal reality of combat and highlight war as a great national

achievement have the potential of perpetuating the very thing that they wish to stop. One key site for identifying this gap between the two actors is over their interpretation of Steven Spielberg's *Saving Private Ryan*. Whereas veterans praise this film for portraying the futility and the horror of combat, Griffiths, as expressed in his support of Ontario's history education reform, viewed it as a way to inspire and captivate. The following comments by John Kilpatrick, who was one of the first veterans to join the Memory Project, and Rudyard Griffiths clearly signal a difference of opinion:

Kids aren't interested in the social history of the role of the spinning wheel in Belleville in 1902. Now, D-Day—witness *Saving Private Ryan*—that's drama, that's human struggle that must captivate anyone (qtd. in Ibbitson, *National Post*, March 5, 1998, A16).

Thousands and thousands of Canadians drowned in dark, murky slimy mud. Beside them were horses that had died in the same condition. World War II was almost clean by comparison. There's only one war picture that I have seen in the last 10 years that comes close to the real thing and it was the first half hour of *Saving Private Ryan*" (qtd. in Galloway, *The Globe and Mail*, November 11, 2002, A4).

Nonetheless, although they might not agree on all matters, the urgency to transmit and archive is far too strong for dissonance to turn into dissidence. Not only is the Legion a partner on the most recent phase, Memory Project: Stories of the Second World War, but also its legally protected trademark, the poppy, is featured on the logo. This inclusion should not be underplayed. The poppy is a symbol that the Legion guards as closely as any corporation handles a registered trademark or brand.⁴

⁴ The Legion threatened a lawsuit after Ontario's Highway of Heroes incorporated the poppy on the signage without its consent. The case of white "peace" poppies periodically (Edmonton in 2008 and PEI in 2010) sparks media coverage and public attention when groups try to promote this alternative to the Legion's "militaristic" red poppy.

Teachers

If veterans are content providers, then teachers are, as Chalifoux states, “service providers” (Interview Griffiths). The Dominion Institute boasts a database of over six thousand teachers. Considering the inability to interest education scholars and policymakers discussed in the previous chapter, I argue that this database represents the Memory Project’s greatest achievement. It has given the Institute a foothold into classrooms across the county by directly connecting it to youth and teachers—a feat that was not possible when it was launched in 1997:

[A]ll of our programs are really focused on the grassroots teacher in the classroom who through the internet, and that’s when the cost structure of everything collapses in terms of distributing information, in terms of organizing events, so suddenly you can market directly to the teacher and forego the bureaucracy (Interview Griffiths).

Part of the story of the Dominion Institute, a narrative that admittedly is not emphasized enough in this dissertation, is the link between the existence of this organization and the rise of media and technological advancements in terms of convergence and also the onset of specialty channels like History TV. In this case, the advancement of the Internet and the tools associated with Web 2.0 allowed the Institute to turn the Memory Project’s website into a pedagogical and archival portal. Lesson plans are specifically designed for veterans that have interesting stories and whose account of the war connects to topics covered by the provinces’ curriculum. In addition to a sleek website, educational guides are sent to teachers on its database to prepare them for in-class visits or offer other ways to use the Memory Project. Teachers are all too willing to participate. As a result of these technological advancements, the Institute has a presence in the school system that it could have only dreamed of a few years earlier.

In the media coverage of visits by veterans and accounts in history education periodicals such as *The Beaver*⁵, teachers applaud the Dominion Institute for connecting their classrooms to “living history.” Not only are they given ready-made lesson plans. In addition, the free educational material and in-class visits help to make learning attractive to media savvy youth. At a time when schools are starting to receive interactive whiteboards such as SMART and Promethean boards⁶, content such as the WWII interactive timeline help to further the allure of these high tech devices over traditional pedagogical tools. At the same time, bringing in veterans makes the content of books and other media come alive for students. Comments by one teacher, Jennifer Goldsmith of Ottawa’s St. Pius High School, whose class participated in a re-enactment of a VE-Day party in the Chateau Laurier’s ballroom, epitomize the general sentiment expressed by teachers: “For [me and my colleagues] it was a chance to get our students to experience history for real in a personal way and to talk to veterans” (VE-Day Victory Ball 2010).

To aid in the enrolment of the content providers, the Dominion Institute launched the National Memory Project Achievement Awards in 2007. These awards honour outstanding history teachers. Furthermore, although it might not have been able to enrol eminent history education scholars at OISE or UBC’s Department of Education, it has certainly found many willing curriculum experts. For instance, one key actor that the

⁵ This magazine has changed its name to *Canada’s History Magazine* in January of 2010. It is published by the CNHS and has a circulation of approximately 50,000 subscribers.

⁶ Although these interactive whiteboards are a rather steep cost for school boards at a minimum \$1,500 per unit, they are increasingly becoming a necessary classroom tool as observed with their rate of purchase: Canada’s largest and North America fourth largest school board, the Toronto District School Board, has purchased 68 Promethean boards and 1,627 SMART boards since 2000.

Institute has enrolled is Nick Brune⁷ who has co-authored two history textbooks and helped write many of the Dominion Institute's education guides.

Government/Politicians

If the initial interest by the Donners was rooted in their neoliberal belief that “government is not always the answer,” then the Memory Project marks the culmination of everything they could have hoped the Dominion Institute would accomplish. It is necessary to note that this project was not the first initiative to record and archive the stories of veterans. For that matter, as Bob Butt reminded me, it was not the first attempt to connect teachers with veterans. Beginning in the early 1990s, VAC videotaped veterans' stories in what was labelled the “Oral Histories Project.” In 2003, this program was given a financial boost from the Canadian Culture Online Program's Canadian Memory Fund that helps federal institutions digitize their collections. The result was the launch of Heroes Remember—an online portal to veterans' stories. However, whereas a media search for “The Memory Project” garners nearly 500 news stories, a search for “Heroes Remember” draws only a handful of stories with mostly obituaries noting the participation of deceased veterans.

One look at both websites provides the answer of why the Dominion Institute has attracted so many teachers and so much media coverage leaving VAC's website floating aimlessly in the expanse of the Internet's many unvisited sites. In this case, the governmental mode of representation simply did not work. According to Bob Butt, “[VAC] passed it on to the Dominion Institute and let the Dominion Institute do the

⁷ Brune is a recipient of both the Marshall McLuhan Distinguished Teacher Award (1992) and the Governor General's Award for Excellence in Teaching Canadian History (2002).

Memory Project” (Interview Butt). When I tried to confirm this and meet with someone in the department, my request was passed along. However, after over 6 months, I have yet to secure an interview. Although this might seem like a minor story that may not warrant mention in this dissertation, it should not be passed over as irrelevant to my project. The inability to meet with officials is telling of why this shift away from the governmental mode has occurred. Nonetheless, this does not mean that the role of government no longer matters.

To suggest that the Dominion Institute is a neoliberal organization, as may be implied in my analysis in Chapter 4, misses the mark. Although it is neoliberal in the sense that they do things that government used to do such as archiving heritage, producing TV specials and educating youth, it does not advocate for a diminishment of government as is the connotation with the political use of “neoliberal,” especially within the United States. On the contrary and rather ironically when considering its initial funding proposal, the Dominion Institute and Griffiths have long been advocates of more government. Whether it was the proposal for a Portrait Gallery or rumours of a Canadian History Museum, Griffiths took a public stand in support of these government initiatives. This approval stems from the role that it foresees for government as a financial resource to pay for its citizenship education and cultural memory projects.

For the most part, government has been more than willing to help out. It was Ontario’s Seniors’ Secretariat that was the first patron enabling the Institute to turn Grant’s War into the province-wide Memory Project in 2000. This department, under both Liberal and Conservative governments, has boasted about its participation as a sign

of its commitment to seniors and veterans.⁸ As for the federal government, the main sources for funding have been VAC, DCH and DND. In particular, the Memory Project has been a favoured child of DCH since 2003 when it funded the digital archival portion through its Canadian Culture Online Program. When it came time in the Summer of 2009 for Prime Minister Harper's Conservative government to put its stamp on changes to the Celebrate Canada fund, the press conference for this announcement also disclosed a \$2.6 million grant to the Memory Project.⁹ In addition, it was through DCH that the Institute received \$250,000 on behalf of the Queen during her royal visit in 2005.¹⁰ However, its relationship with government has not always been so cordial.

There is a fascinating example of dissidence that occurred in June of 2008. Sometime leading up to the 2005-2006 school year, VAC granted the Memory Project with \$450,000 to provide the core of its budget over the next three years. When this period ended, the Institute was not able to secure more funding from Veterans Affairs Minister Greg Thompson. The response to this reluctance was swift and loud. On one hand, the Institute was joined by the editorial team of *The Globe and Mail*, whose article reads as if it was penned by Griffiths himself, in criticizing Prime Minister Harper for spending \$2.4 million on grants to accompany the apology to Sikhs for the Komagata Maru incident, yet failing to support veterans: "Canada's veterans of war and Canada's young both deserve better from the federal government. The aging veterans represent a

⁸ See Premier Dalton McGuinty's 2003 Ontario Speech from Throne.

⁹ Harper's government claimed the Liberals disproportionately used this program on Quebec as part of the sponsorship "slush fund."

¹⁰ This gift was secured with the help of Kevin Macleod—an Ottawa mandarin who worked for 22 years at the DCH and at the time was responsible for royal visits as the government's Chief of Protocol. He is currently the Usher of the Black Rod and appears to be an important figure in the military-cultural memory network.

livening memory of Canada at its best... By its indifference, the federal government has told [veterans] that it would be better if they were a minority cultural group with a grievance" (*The Globe and Mail*, June 19, 2008, A16). On the other, it turned to its faithful tool, polling, to show the urgency behind the Memory Project. In short notice, it released a poll measuring the opinions of participating veterans. Media coverage emphasized how meaningful this experience was for veterans and how dismayed they were about the government's lack of concern for military memory. Days before the start of school, Minister Thompson acquiesced. He announced that DCH's Canadian Studies Program was joining his department's Community Engagement Partnership Fund in providing \$450,000 over another 3 years.

As for politicians, their role is largely symbolic: to attend ceremonies and offer their approval. Over the years, the Memory Project would reach many top politicians from all parties. This is a key feature of the Dominion Institute's advocacy efforts and one that Granatstein credits to Griffiths' political acumen:

[H]e worked briefly in government so he had some minor connections but he managed to get them and he managed to get them whether the government was Liberal or Tory. So he could cross over and then he started working on the provinces and it didn't matter what the governments were he could get them because he looked good, he sounded good and he was pushing something that people instinctively knew he was right, kids don't know anything about their country (Interview Granatstein).

Therefore, when it came time to promoting the Memory Project, it was not a surprise that no matter which party was in power, they all wanted face time alongside this program. Whether it was the celebration of 500,000 students reached with Prime Minister Martin in attendance or Defence Minister Peter MacKay helping to publicize the program to Canadian Forces personnel at a special outreach event held at CFB Halifax, the Institute

never showed party favouritism—a point that many critics often overlook in their attempt to characterize it as neoconservative or a pawn in Harper’s governmental agenda.¹¹ The role then of politicians of all stripes is to provide legitimacy and visibility. This is something that runs through all of the Institute’s efforts and has been effectively transmitted by Griffiths to his successor Marc Chalifoux: “We also got Jean Chretien and Brian Mulroney to each write an op-ed. How do you get them together. Who else gets a full page in the National Post when it launches a project? Too many NGOs, miss that piece. The visibility and getting your name out there and preparing the story, matters” (Interview Chalifoux). As implied in this quotation, the role of politicians is to prepare the story of remembrance and highlight the Dominion Institute as a key cultural player in making the country a better place.

The Canadian Forces

The role of the military is less clear than other actors. On one hand, the Canadian Forces and its representatives such as former generals and defence ministers help to recruit serving personnel to record and tell their stories to youth. On the other hand, I found evidence that the military uses this opportunity for public relations and even recruitment. The enrolment of (Ret.) Lt.-General Romeo Dallaire exemplifies this dual role. In his keynote addresses at the launch of a series of new initiatives in 2002, 2003 and 2006, he used this platform to draw a link between military memory and the urgency of supporting the Canadian Forces now fighting in Afghanistan. At the national launch of the Memory Project, he emphasized that the effort to project humanitarianism abroad

¹¹ See Donald Gutstein’s *Not a Conspiracy Theory: How Business Propaganda Hijacks News* (2009) for an analysis of the Dominion Institute as a mouthpiece for Stephen Harper and a growing neoconservative movement in Canada.

depends upon the nation's military strength: "The new role of conflict resolution needs a basis of combat capability" (qtd. in Greenaway, *The Ottawa Citizen*, November 12, 2002, A5.). However, it was at the conference held at Ottawa's Sir Wilfrid Laurier High School that exemplifies this overt recruitment call. This event brought veterans, teachers and youth together so that Memory Project speakers could develop their presentation skills and get immediate feedback from their prospective audience. It was at this event when Dallaire made a direct plea about the importance for Canadian youth to join the military: "We have a duty to expand the resources, the tears, the sweat, the blood to assist others" (Jarosz, *The Ottawa Citizen*, May 6, 2006, E4).

Whether this was a message that the Dominion Institute intended to communicate or whether the Memory Project has influenced recruitment remains beyond the scope of my research. Nevertheless, judging by the media coverage of comments by students, it is clear that this recruitment message resonated for some. According to a report by Patricia Jarosz, one student she interviewed was deeply touched by Dallaire's words:

Ben Curry, 16, dreams of fighting for his country and think dying for it would be "a good way to go."... "For me, it's really something, said Ben, whose father and grandfather are both military men. "There's so much you can get from [the Memory Project] that you can't get from a textbook" (Jarosz, *The Ottawa Citizen*, May 6, 2006, E4).

Although this student may just as likely join the Forces without a visit from Dallaire and the Dominion Institute, an underlying feature of this program is the simple act of bringing soldiers to schools—something that would have been unlikely during the 1990s when the Vietnam War had coloured the perception of the military.

The rationale for the partnership with DND was to further converge Canada's military past with the present. As Defence Minister John McCallum stated in his

announcement committing \$50,000 to the program, “[i]t is important that all Canadians, especially our youth, are aware of the contribution Canadian Forces personnel have made and continue to make at home and abroad” (DND 2003). This partnership served to blur the discursive line between the duties to remember and acknowledging the military’s contemporary role. When the war in Afghanistan was becoming more costly with the start of the Kandahar mission in February of 2006, the Memory Project was no longer just about bringing aging, grey-haired veterans to tell stories of a time long ago. At that point it was also about communicating with youth the important and dangerous role being played by the country’s soldiers right now in a location far from home. When Prime Minister Harper visited Forest Hills School in St. John to address an assembly that connected soldiers from CFB Gagetown with students, news of the deaths of two soldiers contextualized his message about military memory (Dominion Institute 2008). He claimed that the freedom of all Canadians ultimately rests upon victories at war—in the past and in the present.

While I cannot say whether the role of the Canadian Forces within the Memory Project was to actively recruit, it is undeniable that it considered its participation as an opportunity to connect soldiers with students and communicate why the country must be willing to fight. From this perspective, the Memory Project has to be viewed in light of the military’s recent efforts to make itself a part of the everyday experience of Canadians. The Memory Project is a perfect example of the banal militarism behind Operation Connection that brings the military into public spaces not only on solemn events like Remembrance Day or during disasters, but throughout the year. With this in mind, it is necessary to note that Harper’s visit was on December 15th, a normal school day, and not

a military anniversary. It is rather fitting that Rick Hillier, who was behind the military's resurgence in public life, was recently named honorary patron of the Memory Project.

Youth

With Callon's study in mind, it is easy to ascertain the role that youth play in the network: the scallops. In my study, the concern is not over a diminishing population, but the ever-decreasing historical knowledge and civic literacy of students. Admittedly, I am being intentionally provocative in comparing youth to molluscs. Considering the terms given to veterans and teachers, a more apt label is "client." Their role is to be inspired by the content providers. In the media, the voices of youth are supportive and come at the end of news articles. Students with family members who fought in war are often the representatives that journalists interview. These students appreciate the opportunity to hear from veterans because it connects them to their family history. While these youth may be aware of this history, many do not hear the stories because of the reluctance of some veterans to open up. In general, all youth are the receptacles for the content provided by veterans and facilitated by teachers. Their role is similar to the one described by Graham Carr (2007) in his analysis of intergenerational discourse during the *Valour and the Horror* controversy: "Although participants in the controversy regularly invoked the image of young people whose interests were most at stake, students... were essentially an absent presence in the debate, conspicuous by their silence, or perhaps inability to intervene" (60).

Here lies an interesting element of applying ANT to a study of the Dominion Institute and its network. According to Latour (2005), the ANT scholar must treat any social force as potential nodes even if they are not human. With this in mind, youth may

be human, but in the network that I study they seem more like scallops than fishermen or scientists. Like the scallop their role only matters at the end: Do they anchor to the towlines and increase in population on the seabed? Do they learn from living history and become literate as well as emotionally attached to the body politic? The answer to these questions can only come from basic math—there is an increase, decrease or no change. However, while Callon can analyze anchorage and population growth, in my study civic literacy and ethical life are not as easily measureable. What can be measured and what is publicized is the amount of students reached by the Memory Project. This is a major theme in the Institute's discourse. In my interview with Chalifoux he was quick to cite the numbers: "At the moment we're reaching about 175,000 students a year through hundreds of classroom visits and school assemblies. It's such an amazing project" (Interview Chalifoux). When it came time for the Memory Project to reach its one-millionth student, conveniently around Remembrance Day of 2009, the Institute was sure to celebrate with a visit from its top patron, Minister of Veterans Affairs Thompson, and an appearance by one of the original content providers, Grant McRae. Although a press release went out and the media picked up the story, this measurement does not answer the question: Do students become culturally literate, civically engaged citizens?

Tracking this think tank over the course of its development places me in an ideal position to answer. If one approaches this question from the modernist epistemological frame set out by the Institute, then it is evident that students do not anchor. A fact that the national media often passes over is that students' scores on the quizzes have steadily decreased since 1997. On one key question it certainly succeeded. The ten-year benchmark study released in 2007 on military memory reported a 10% increase from 23%

to 33% in the ability of youth to recognize Vimy, but even this was still considered a low percentage. On every other question, scores decreased: (1) 46% to 44% in the ability to recognize John McCrae as the author of “In Flanders Field”; (2) 39% to 32% in the ability to identify two famous Canadian military heroes; (3) 52% to 38% in those youth who would have passed a citizenship exam. In fact, perhaps the most embarrassing number is not found in the scores of youth taking these quizzes. Tracking the drop in youth voter turnout points to a more disconcerting failure. For example, a poll it commissioned in the lead up to the 2006 election, as part of a youth democracy program, found that 64% of youth planned to vote—in that election, only 44% of voters aged 18-24 actually voted.

This decline in cultural literacy and civic participation does not necessarily suggest that the network failed. On one hand, it supports the claim by Seixas and the progressivists that historical consciousness and citizenship cannot be equated to the knowledge of key facts. This assumption has recently been disproven with statistical evidence. A survey by the Association for Canadian Studies (ACS) conducted by Léger Marketing in October of 2008 suggests that the Dominion Institute’s educational philosophy is misguided. This poll found that highly educated Canadian who claimed to know more about history were less patriotic. According to ACS executive director Jack Jedwab, “[m]ore awareness of Canada’s history may reduce pride in the country rather than augment it” (Boswell, *The Ottawa Citizen*, October 20, 2008, A3). On the other hand, if you take the assumption that what matters is not the transmission of memory or knowledge but a shift in representing citizenship and cultural memory, then youth should not even be included in the network. Although they matter as a statistic in terms of showing how many clients were reached, they have no bearing in terms of the act of

representation besides the symbolic role described in Carr's work. With this in mind, it is helpful to consider Griffiths' comments at the time he stepped down as executive director. After lamenting the fact that the Institute "lost a percentage point per year" in terms of the historical knowledge of youth on simple questions such as recognizing Riel or Macdonald, he states that "the Trudeauian vision of one Canada seems more remote in 2008 than it did in 1997" (Hampson, *The Globe and Mail*, February 18, 2008, L3).

While on the surface this comment suggests a failure of the Institute to promote national unity, a deeper understanding of Griffiths and his compatriots' objectives to revive the representation of English Canada that stretches beyond the Trudeau era provides another layer of interpretation. The decline of Trudeau's vision of Canada also marks the decline of representations emphasizing pluralism, progressivism, postnationalism and peacekeeping—all narratives that were said to undermine the integrity of an English-Canadian civic identity. Whether this is something that Griffiths should take all the credit for is not the point. What is clear is that he and the Institute were not only along for the ride, but a key passage point in discourse and the network that made this all possible. This understanding gives added meaning to the following comment by Griffiths on the day he resigned: "I have a sense of accomplishment and satisfaction, but also a sense that we don't have the resources to deal with the increasing historical amnesia" (Boswell, *National Post*, February 18, 2008, A2).

Another way to interpret this decrease in literacy and knowledge is to consider the possibility that they were never supposed to anchor. From a governmentality perspective, this failure to achieve results is explained by Miller and Rose's comment that government is by nature a failing operation and Kernerman's assessment of the logic behind the

inability for Canada's multicultural debate to reach a consensus. If the network that I am studying is organized around the objective of discarding the Trudeauian representation of the nation and convincing government and other actors to replace it with a more robust and hardened vision, then the continual state of amnesia of youth only strengthens the network by pushing it further in the direction of reaching, to use Miller and Rose's words, the "sublime image." This "congenitally failing" logic is supported by a comment from the current president¹², Andrew Cohen, in his testimony to a VAC parliamentary committee.

In a rather candid response to the question of how the government can help his organization raise the civic and historical literacy of the country, Cohen stated: "I think we wouldn't exist if we lived in a country in which everybody knew everything there was to know about this country and its past. We would not have a reason for being here. We would not have a *raison d'être*" (SCOVA, October 22, 2009). To return to the role of youth in the network, they can never anchor because once they do, if even possible, the problem ceases to exist and the sense of urgency diminishes. Unlike Callon's study, the inability to anchor is, ironically, what perpetuates the network. The question of youth anchoring is closer to the issue of *interesement* than enrollment. This is not to imply that its *raison d'être* is to promote ignorance. Rather, it is clear is that the reason that the Dominion Institute, and now the Historica-Dominion Institute, exists is not primarily related to public education, but to altering the content and way that Canada represents

¹² On November 26, 2010, Cohen was succeeded by entertainment lawyer Michael Levine. Levine is chairman of Westwood Creative Artists, Canada's largest literary agency representing some of the nation's most prestigious authors including Yann Martel, Don Gilmour and Jan Urquhart. He has long been a supporter of the Institute by helping them publish many of its book. In addition, his connections to the nation's cultural industry and artistic community will certainly help to further the reaches of its network.

citizenship and cultural memory. The irony underscoring an examination of this organization is that its efforts seem to be in vein. However, governmentality scholars would state that this inability is not ironic but the logic behind the Dominion Institute.

ENROLLED: THE CDFAI AND THE MILITARIZATION OF THE STORYLINE

One problem with Callon's approach to ANT is that while it offers a useful model for studying the activity of a single network, it obscures a key feature of networks. Both Latour (2005) and Castells (1996) posit that a network is not a single, autonomous arrangement, but the amalgam of overlapping and intersecting networks. The more I learned about the Dominion Institute, the more I became aware of its participation in a larger web of associations. Although the Memory Project and other multimedia advocacy campaigns drawing together leading Canadians in support of different civic and historical issues certainly signals the culmination of the Dominion Institute's efforts at enrolment, it too was enrolled in networks that were not of its own creation. In turn, this enrolment would alter both the arrangement of its own network and help to entrench the discourse over the need for more support of the military into its storyline connecting memory to citizenship. With the shift to issues regarding responsibilities of citizenship and Canada's place in the world, the Dominion Institute opened itself up to a partnership, most likely through Jack Granatstein¹³, with the CDFAI.

¹³ Granatstein's lobby group, the Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century (CCS21), must be viewed as the advocacy arm of the CDFAI. This group, which mostly consisted of a website with the publication of articles in national newspapers, put together a policy document calling on Ottawa to reinvest in the military, rallied a network of prominent Canadians together and there is evidence that it even considered influencing the 2003 Liberal leadership campaign (See Granatstein fonds). At its peak, it had more than 400 members including former Alberta premier Peter Lougheed, corporate leaders

In 2001, the CDFAI was created to advocate for of a stronger, more robust, and well-funded Canadian Forces. It was conceived in the months following the election of George W. Bush. Underscoring its emergence was a growing concern by many within political, academic and corporate circles that the US was shifting its continental interests southwardly to Mexico. However, Al-Qaeda's strike on the centres of American power served to push its concerns further into the public eye and thrust its agenda to the highest echelons of power. The initial funding came mostly from a single patron, Robert J.S. Gibson, who had a deep personal connection to the military including being named an honorary colonel of the 10th Battalion Calgary Highlanders¹⁴ and made his fortune as managing director of the Calgary-based Alsten Holdings Ltd. In the mid-1990s, when the military was in a state of flux, he was brought into a burgeoning network of academics and military personnel trying to revive the Forces as a national institution. After helping to secure funding for Bercuson's Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary, he began discussions to create a think tank that could better fulfil this objective, but not have to deal with "the impediments resident in academia" (Jack Granatstein fonds, 2003-042/002(08), CDFAI Advisory Committee Meeting, April 29, 2002). The CDFAI would tackle a perceived lack of understanding of national security by Canadians and by academic, business, media and political leaders. This institute continues to this day with 35 fellows and a senior research team that includes eminent leaders from different fields.

Gwyn Morgan, CEO of EnCana, John Cleghorn, RBC CEO, and Thomas d'Aquino, president of the Canadian Council of Chief Executives, ex-military men Major-General (Ret.) Lewis Mackenzie and Cliff Chadderton and historians Michael Bliss, David Bercuson and Desmond Morton as well as leading Canadian public intellectuals Tom Flanagan, Michael Ignatieff and Gwyn Dyer.

¹⁴ The same battalion that fought at the battle of Passchendaele in WWI.

Early on in its development, it forged a relationship with the Dominion Institute in time for the second anniversary of September 11, 2001. They partnered on polling, media productions, organizing conferences and coordinating a newspaper series. As noted in a copy of the strategic alliance between the Dominion Institute and the CDFAI, this partnership would (a) further the goals of both institutes, (b) place a representative from each in the other's office, (c) consider fundraising initiatives, (d) share resources, and (e) work on joint publications. Whereas the CDFAI would focus on contemporary issues regarding defence, foreign affairs and security, the Dominion Institute would do historical projects on these subjects (Jack Granatstein fonds, 2005-011/010(07), Note to File regarding a Strategic Alliance between the Dominion Institute and CDFAI, April 12, 2004). In my interview with Granatstein, he confirmed this reciprocal arrangement: "[Since] the CDFAI didn't have interest in history per se really didn't... whatever reasons we [CDFAI] were working with the Dominion Institute it must be because it served both our purposes" (Interview Granatstein). However, although I will soon explore what Granatstein meant by "per se," Bercuson is more forthcoming about the reasons both were interested in working together:

Let me just point out one other thing, there was also a parallel need amongst both organizations to fundraise... in general in this country are few and far between and they find it very difficult to raise funds. I mean this is totally unlike the situation in the United States. So you find out early that fundraising is going to depend very much on your ability to impress people that you can have an impact, and you know what's measurable, how do you impress people that you're having an impact. I mean one way is if you can actually show a connection between the adoption of a particular policy and your advocacy of it, but that's almost impossible to do... So you really need to basically make yourself known in those circles that consider this sort of work important and that you could then go to help generate funds, sort of a self perpetuating kind of situation (Interview Bercuson).

Therefore, the two organizations were in the same predicament. They both had to show the ambiguous but undeniable way that their work was influencing policy. Such evidence was necessary in order to satisfy and attract what little money was available for Canadian-based think tanks. The implications of the bombings on September 11, 2001 regarding a shift in media focus and public sentiment pushed the Dominion Institute away from exclusively Canadian issues and nostalgia to the pressing concerns of security and the economy in a globalized era. This partnership was a welcomed addition for an organization that wanted to remain relevant in this age of national security and global concerns.

For the CDFAI, it was just starting out and needed the promotional flare that made the Institute a well-known name in the public and within policy circles. While it was comprised of prominent scholars and leading voices in the areas of security and strategic studies that would make it such a force as a think tank¹⁵, it had little experience as a public educator and even less as a player in the advocacy game. At that time, the Dominion Institute was already developing a unique public communication strategy. This strategy was based on multilayered campaigns using polling to contextualize a multimedia project with TV documentaries, newspaper series penned by eminent Canadians and public education programs. In addition, judging by the statements sent to Canada's Revenue Agency (CRA) for the fiscal period ending in 2002, the CDFAI was in a rather desperate financial situation. Whereas the Institute was already established garnering

¹⁵ This dissertation does not get into the influence of the CDFAI on military and foreign policy. A political scientist or strategic studies scholar would best suited to conduct such a study. Two areas that might be of interest include: 1) compare the language of CDFAI policy papers with defence policy document of DND; 2) compare defence spending with the recommendations regarding the CDFAI of types and quantity of arms.

\$287,447 from tax-receipted gifts and \$431,757 in government grants, the CDFAI only had \$40,200 in tax-receipted gifts and a net loss of \$384,284. Although within a few months the CDFAI will significantly boost its financial standing by attracting \$490,000 in tax-receipted gifts, Bercuson's comments about the urgency to partner over funding are certainly understandable during its first few months of getting off the ground.

The association with the CDFAI lasted from September of 2003 to November of 2005. Over this period they partnered on two Ottawa-based conferences aimed at the defence policy community, a TV documentary, a variety of multimedia campaigns and a newspaper essay series that were all contextualized by polls. On the surface, as their strategic agreement states, these polls and their complementary programs presented parallel messages serving the mutual interest of both institutes (Jack Granatstein fonds, 2005-011/010(07), Note to File regarding a Strategic Alliance between the Dominion Institute and CDFAI, April 12, 2004). Although the public and leaders within various fields were the expressed audience of their efforts, the primary recipient was the state. For the Dominion Institute, the message they were sending was that while Canadians say they want to honour their country's military past, they have very little knowledge about the people, events and places that comprise this history. Government was blamed for taking the value of citizenship for granted and not providing an inspiring representation of Canada's national story. The implication was that government needed to do more to define citizenship and spend more on cultural memory projects. For the CDFAI, the message they were projecting was that while Canadians say they want to be a global force for good and transmit their unmilitaristic values to less peaceful parts of the globe, they have very little knowledge about how the real world operates in this age of instability and

terrorism. Government was blamed for letting the Canadian Forces go through the “decade of darkness” and for not providing Canadians with a clear image of a military that could instil public pride. The implication for government was that they needed to redefine the military’s role and maintain it with substantial long-term funding. However, these discourses regarding military history and the contemporary role of the Canadian Forces eventually intersect to create a storyline that fuses the military, memory and citizenship.

In time for the second anniversary of September 11, 2001, the CDFAI and the Dominion Institute partnered on the “Foreign Fields” multimedia publicity campaign. The highlight of which was a Global TV documentary that included interviews with pundits from across the ideological spectrum such as Conrad Black, Romeo Dallaire, Michael Ignatieff and Stephen Lewis as well as James Baker III and Douglas Hurd to speak from their respective American and British perspectives. It claimed that while Canada was once a great force using its military to improve the world, these efforts have steadily declined with the defence cuts under both Prime Minister Trudeau and Chrétien. As a result, the perception by Canadians of their country’s global standing as a humanitarian was largely based upon myth. The accompanying poll added to many of the findings that complemented a similar project done a year earlier. In that poll, a connection was made between cultural sovereignty and the military’s effectiveness. The finding that only 20% believe Canada has distinct a culture was counterposed with 13% saying that the military can protect the country: “How, frankly, can Canada call itself an independent country when its own citizens think the government is incapable of defending our territorial sovereignty? Ottawa needs to wake up to the fact that Canada’s

moribund military is inextricably linked to our declining sense of national identity, abroad and at home” (qtd. in Humphreys, *National Post*, September 10, 2002, A6).

It is here that the parallel objectives of the Dominion Institute and the CDFAI converge. The state of military memory and the public status of the Canadian Forces are all seen through the lens of a declining English-Canadian identity and common citizenship. As Griffiths suggests, “[t]his poll confirms the complete and utter extinction of a Canadian identity based upon British traditions and a British connection” (qtd. in Humphreys, *National Post*, September 9, 2002, A1). The failure for English Canada to assert a strong identity and the failure of the federal government to provide powerful, emotional representations are viewed as part of the failure by English-Canadians to convince their leaders to support a military that could make the country proud. This is a point that is further developed in David Bercuson and Barry Cooper’s interpretation of the poll accompanying the “Foreign Fields” project. Here the demographics explaining the public’s views over the military and foreign policy are categorized by province. The result is a finding pointing to a sharp discrepancy between Quebec and the rest of Canada. While it found that 58% believe strong countries must have an effective military and thus Canada should rebuild the Forces, they note that when Quebec is taken out of the equation this number increases to 64%. According to Cooper and Bercuson, this suggests that the Liberals who seem to be pandering to Quebecers are robbing English Canada of their identity and popular will:

Until last weekend’s polling figures were released, it was difficult to make sense of the seeming irrationality of the Chretien government... This public poll indicated what private Liberal polls must also have shown, that Chretien was reflecting the view of the distinct society from which he comes... Even though disdain for the military is normal in Quebec, it remains unclear how long the rest of the country will indulge that

increasingly insufferable and shameless parochialism (Cooper and Bercuson, *Calgary Herald*, September 10, 2003, A15).

It is at this point that it is necessary to remember the intent of these media campaigns was not so much about public education. Instead, the rationale for this partnership was to provide a media spectacle and public stir to contextualize a call on the Liberal government to review Canada's defence policy.

In Granatstein's contribution to the "Facing the Century" newspaper series, support for the Canadian Forces is presented through a historical lens. His argument is rather straightforward. He does not imply that projecting values and the good intentions of peacekeeping are antithetical to the Canadian warrior tradition. Instead, similar to Dallaire's view, the ability for Canada to be a global player and a force for good has always rested upon military strength—something that has been forgotten along the way. He takes on the progressivists who mythologize peacekeeping with a historically grounded argument:

What Canadians failed to understand was that their peacekeeping was possible only because Canada's military had war-fighting capabilities... But over time the Canadian Forces have melted away... Canada's peacekeeping capacities have waned. Does anyone realize that today Canada stands 31st among nations in the provision of troops for UN peacekeeping? Unfortunately, the real Canadian tradition of turning a blind eye and deaf ear to events around us continues (Granatstein, *National Post*, September 10, 2002, A18).

Therefore, the convergence between the discourse of the Dominion Institute and the CDFAI not only stems from the ability for the past to inform the present and vice versa. In addition, they also shared a view of what impairs each narrative—the Trudeauian consensus.

According to Bercuson, the two groups shared the same enemy. A historical argument was one way to expose the myth that was perceived to obfuscate the reality:

I know what our concept was, I remember very clearly what our concept was and that was to try to revive Canadian understanding of their military past in order to convince people to take a more, what we thought of as a more realistic view of the role of the military in foreign policy. In other words an instrument of Canadian foreign policy today maybe you know in the early 2000s because we thought that there was a very strong correlation between the growth of the peacekeeping myth and the decline of military funding and so on (Interview Bercuson).

For the Dominion Institute, peacekeeping and other progressivist representations associated with Trudeau obscured the great history of English Canada, which can be observed in the world wars. This history reveals a nation that (a) worked towards a common goal, (b) shared a view of the ideal citizen and (c) was entrenched in a set of Judeo-Christian, Western values. The military was used as a lens for reviving a national story and a common representation of citizenship. For the CDFAI, the peacekeeping myth was what allowed the government to continue its policy of drift and not properly arm or define the Canadian Forces as citizens were content to mythologize without being aware that the time of blue-berets had past. A return to the warrior view of the military as exemplified by the valour displayed at Vimy was seen as a way of reimagining a military capable of fighting wars by reminding Canadians and the government that it has been done before.¹⁶

Compounding this intricate storyline is another narrative that underlies much of their activity, but emerges in prominence in the media coverage of the “World in Canada”

¹⁶ Interestingly, the battle of Vimy Ridge is not just an important symbol for the public and politicians, but also for the military itself. Rick Hillier coined the term “Vimy Effect” to point to a growing philosophy within the ranks to achieve great success and complete victory on the battlefield (Caldwell, *National Post*, April 7, 2008).

poll that complemented a 2005 conference with the same name. It is this conference and the poll that converges the story of military history and the contemporary role of the Canadian Forces with citizenship. This poll considered the impact of ethno-cultural differences and cultural pluralism on security. Its sample contrasted the opinions of immigrants, first generation Canadians, Francophones and “established Anglophones.”¹⁷ Contrary to anecdotal assumptions, it found that the difference between the views of immigrants (67%) and “established Anglophone” Canadians (72%) regarding the need for a strong military was negligible: “Immigrants are just as likely to believe in a strong military and foreign policy for Canada” (qtd. Butler, *National Post*, October 31, 2005, A1). The problem was not with immigrants or first generation citizens. Instead, the discrepancy was with Francophones.

Just as Gwyn informed the Institute’s cofounders with respect to Remembrance Day as the last tribal holiday, the objective of this poll was to construct a discourse around the military as both a strong national institution and a unifying element of English Canada. What lay behind this objective was an underlying awareness that is evident in Granatstein’s contribution to the conference. His problem with cultural pluralism as a political practice is that it leads to a foreign policy framework based on many, sometimes contradicting, values and not a clear perspective of what is in the country’s self-interest:

Yes, Canadians want to be multicultural and to let all flourish here, but at the same time the government and people absolutely must stress that it is a requirement that immigrants come to accept the values of our society, the values of Western Civilization, the values of Canada, which surely are broad enough to accommodate a wide range of behaviours... Most Canadians recognize that, if we can make multiculturalism work, if our citizens from every origin can accept Canada’s values and add their own

¹⁷ This term seems to be used euphemistically for “English-Canadians” as opposed to other categories of Canadians such as immigrants and first born Canadians.

traditions to them—over time—and become integrated into the polity, then Canada can gain a huge advantage in trade, foreign policy, and even defence. But to make this work Canada needs its leaders to lead, to speak the truth, and to help integrate those who come to join our society. Among other things, that means not pandering for votes by twisting Canadian foreign policy (Granatstein 2008: 86).

With this in mind, the rationale for the partnership between the CDFAI and the Dominion Institute becomes evident: both advocacy campaigns centred on an attempt to convince the state to alter the representation of citizenship, memory and the military. All of these subjects were perceived to be mutually supportive. Nonetheless, considering Gwyn's comments on remembrance and Granatstein's statements on pluralism's effect on foreign policy, arguably the most important of the three is citizenship. Of course, all narratives run through each other. However, both the view of a hardened role for the military and the need for an inspiring national historical metanarrative are ultimately rooted in the desire to represent a common national identity, at least with respect to English Canada, and the plea for government to enshrine this account into a unified, clearly stipulated representation of citizenship.

SUMMARY

The period from September 11, 2001 until Griffiths stepped down in February of 2008 marked a critical juncture in the evolution of the Dominion Institute's network. It began as a think tank with the objective of bringing together actors around the project of transmitting a shared heritage and inculcating a common civic identity. This was eventually realized through the lens of military memory. The Memory Project allowed it to circumvent the blockage stemming from a lack of interest by education scholars and policymakers. It circumvented these key actors by finally connecting it with two nodes

that remained out of its reach: youth and teachers. To return to Granatstein's advice to Griffiths back in 1996, the Memory Project was the missing piece allowing the Institute to not simply complain about an issue, but put forth a solution that appeared to be a win-win for a variety of actors. It was then rewarded with financial stability and the network itself. Borrowing from Bourdieu's language, it received the social capital associated with drawing many actors together to put on a high quality program as well as the political and economic capital from becoming a worthy and a well-respected cultural memory player. As it improved its public standing, garnered extensive media coverage and drew private and public funding, another emerging think tank, the CDFAI, enrolled it into its burgeoning military network. It was at that point when not only the cultural memory network converged with the military network (See Diagram 4), but also the storyline of the two fused into a single narrative merging the discourses of memory, the military and citizenship (See Table 5). At the root of this convergence is the idea that the military, both in the past and present, is one of the few unifying institutions drawing English Canada together. The task for the Dominion Institute and the CDFAI was to make the state realize this potential and have it move on from the Trudeauian consensus regarding the representation of both memory and the military.

It is at this point that an important question must be asked: Is what I have just described a story about the Dominion Institute enrolling the CDFAI or vice versa? Despite the temptation to explain who has the most power in this relationship, the fact this question needs to be raised points to a weakness of Callon's approach to ANT. His investigation into the scallop industry of St. Brieuc Bay pushes the conceptualization of a network towards the notion of a *primum movens*. Ultimately, this actor becomes the

obligatory passage point rendering them “indispensable in the network” (Callon 1986: 204). As I learned in my interviews and even as I considered the partnership with the CDFAI, the problem with this approach of trying to provide evidence for this central position of the *primum movens* is that it underemphasizes the complexity of networks. In addition, it ignores the currents already in place that might not stem from the Dominion Institute’s “first movement.” Perhaps the focus of my study should have been Jack Granatstein who comes up in many different nodes of the network and at an early point. He was responsible for many of the Institute’s early achievements and his book had influenced corporate and political elites paving the landscape for a history NGO. However, second guessing my topic is just a result of the problem of Callon’s approach ANT for influencing a scholar to consider the way one actor enrolls a variety of others.

In this chapter, I considered enrolment as more diffuse and not as simple as one actor enrolling another, but many enrolling many and associations occurring in more than one direction. The question then should not focus on who enrolled whom, but on an understanding of what it means to be an obligatory passage point. While some interviewees critiqued the initial description of my project as an examination into the renaissance of a warrior memorial culture through a study on the Dominion Institute, as the discussion progressed it often led to a critical role played by Griffiths and his think tank. For example, in my interview with Christopher Sweeney, a board member of the Vimy Foundation¹⁸ and president of ZSA Legal Recruitment, he refuted the logic of my

¹⁸ The Vimy Foundation was created to preserve the memory of WWI especially in young Canadians. It has recently launched the Vimy Pin campaign and other efforts to preserve the memory of this great battle such as promoting April 9 as a commemorative date and campaigning for the construction of a monument located near the National War Museum

project: “I don’t necessarily agree with your thesis, I think the Dominion Institute played a small role in [the rise of the warrior] not a major role in it” (Interview Sweeney). He highlighted the war in Bosnia, the 50th anniversary of VE-Day and the work of his own foundation. In fact, he suggested that Historica was more influential in getting military history out into the public. However, when the conversation moved beyond the surface to what lay behind these representations and how they came to be, the Institute’s role seemed to rise in stature. The polls were important because they were the only ones doing them. Moreover, when I asked him how he came to the board of the Vimy Foundation, it was Griffiths, whom he worked with on the CBC’s retrial of Louis Riel, who put him in touch with the Vimy Foundation’s president, Andrew Powell.

This example was only one of many I found in my research where major cultural memory projects were launched or expanded because of Griffiths and his Institute. Another one was Jack Mitchell’s Plains of Abraham Epic Poetry Tour¹⁹ that was a minor project until he was put in touch with Griffiths. The Dominion Institute’s brand, its ability to garner media attention and its access to schools would help turn it into a major national tour. As *The Globe and Mail* claimed, “[l]uckily, the Dominion Institute, an organization devoted to promoting Canadian history, decided to sponsor Mitchell on a second tour” (Traves, *The Globe and Mail*, May 21, 2005, R10). All of my research was pointing to the observation that while it may not have been the *primum movens*, it was still an obligatory passage point within the network behind the production and circulation

based on the “Mother Canada” statue found on the memorial in France. The foundation has a partnership agreement with the Historica-Dominion Institute.

¹⁹ This was a cross Canada tour with an English graduate student Jack Mitchell reading his poetic retelling of the Battle of the Plains of Abraham. Mitchell is now an Assistant Professor of Classics at Stanford University.

of military cultural memory. Therefore, to return to the question that I was hesitant to answer, it does not matter who made the initial move or who had the upper hand in this relationship. What is important is that the act of enrolment occurred and the fact that the CDFAI was aware they needed the Institute to further their agenda. Whether it was accessing funding, getting a foot into a classroom, being put in touch with the right people, contacting government or garnering media coverage, it is this necessary feature of having the Institute involved that makes it an obligatory passage point.

Although the Institute is more than just one person, the basis for this achievement as an obligatory passage point is indebted to Griffiths' ability as networker and a memory entrepreneur. It is during this period from September 11, 2001 to when he steps down in February of 2008 that he earns his reputation as a networker. No longer is he someone who has to solicit others, but now others seek him out. When it came time for the first Team Canada mission to Afghanistan in October of 2005 with prominent Canadian civilians touring and meeting with the Canadian Forces' detachment and the American troops stationed in Kandahar, it was not a coincidence that the military turned to Griffiths. He was invited along with a group that included two representatives from the Legion, (Rtd.) Major-General Mackenzie, the mayor of Petawawa, Tim Page of the Canadian Defence Industries Association, John Eaton of the Canadian Forces' Liaison Council, the assistant commissioner of the RCMP, Rick Mercer, Catriona Le May Doan, Daniel Igali and Guy Lafleur. By the end of 2005, the CDFAI was not the only military-minded institution that realized the importance of enrolling Griffiths into its network. In articles published after this mission, this experience would help Griffiths to emphasize the connection between military history and the contemporary role of the Forces. All of

which was used to support the underlying cultural citizenship objective of convincing English-Canadians that they are a unified people and have common bond.

Image 2 *Team Canada mission to Kandahar, October 19, 2005 (From Left to Right: Griffiths, Le May Doan, Igali, Unidentified Person and Mercer)*

When the country was gearing up to send its largest contingent of combat troops into an active war zone for the first time since the Korean War in the early 1950s, Griffiths would help support this mission's discourse. In an article published in the *National Post*, he called on Canadians to support the military's involvement by appealing to the public's sense of militarism, memory and citizenship:

It's not about UN troops in blue helmets separating combatants any more or being ecumenical in our aid and foreign affairs policy; it's about choosing sides and winning. In Afghanistan, we have chosen the side of the Karzai government against the opium warlords and jihadists. But that we've taken a side doesn't mean we have to adopt American tactics for fighting counter-insurgents. From the Battle of Vimy Ridge in the First World War to the invention of peacekeeping during the Suez Crisis in the 1950s, **our troops have shown that there is also a Canadian way that**

can produce amazing results when our military has the right leadership, training and resources (Griffiths, *National Post*, January 17, 2006, A14)).

It is at this point that the logic behind the convergence of discourse becomes evident. The “Canadian way” of war stretches throughout Canadian history and runs through the DNA of this country’s regardless of ethnicity from Joseph Brant’s Mohawk warriors to the irregular forces of Vaudreuil to James Wolfe’s Highlanders to Isaac Brock’s York Volunteers to Arthur Currie’s Canadian Corps and into the future. For Griffiths and his colleagues, this pull towards the country’s warrior culture is not founded upon any hidden militaristic or pernicious reasons. Instead, a Canadian way of war, which does not seem to be grounded in one ethnicity, is one of the few symbols this country has that points to a common Canadian citizenship. If there is a Canadian way of war, then so too must there be a Canadian way. The celebration and transmission of a warrior tradition is not necessarily about the celebration and the transmission of a war culture. As the next chapter explores, war is only a medium for representing and defining citizenship.

Table 5 Dominion Institute's revised storyline circa 2008

The Quebec referendum reflected a culmination of the misguided and problematic approach to representing English-Canadian citizenship that uses a progressive, postnational and postmodern lens.

This Trudeauian consensus over the representation of Canada has resulted in a lack of ethical life amongst English-Canadians, especially youth, and has debased the value of citizenship.

In order to revive ethical life and the value of citizenship, the country must return to a facts-based, modernist approach to history education and inculcating civic bonds to construct a common national memory and metanarrative.

The rehabilitation of citizenship and memory cannot rely upon the effort of the state alone as it may have in the past, but it now requires the coordination of a variety of actors: the media, the school system and the cultural industry.

This decline in memory and citizenship associated with the Trudeauian Consensus is linked to the reluctance by the government to properly support a capable military that can make the country proud.

A more prominent representation of the military, both in the past and the present, can be on lens to help imagine and construct a unified, robust representation of Canadian citizenship. A military that can effectively protect national interests can act as a homogenising force for an otherwise diverse English speaking population.

Diagram 3 *The Dominion Institute's network circa 2008 (additions from previous)*

CHAPTER 7:
**MOBILIZATION: *PASSCHENDAELE*, THE MILITARY-
CULTURAL MEMORY NETWORK AND THE ASCENSION OF
THE DOMINION INSTITUTE'S STORYLINE, 2008**

To mobilize, as the word indicates, is to render entities mobile which were not so beforehand.

~ Michel Callon, "Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation"¹

The climax of a cinematic treatment of the Dominion Institute would follow the making and release of Paul Gross' *Passchendaele* in the fall of 2008. It is easy to imagine a number of scenes marking the culmination of the military-cultural memory network. It would likely begin with the conversations in the parlours of the country's elite corporate establishments or the homes of some of the wealthiest Canadians. The making of *Passchendaele* would depict soldiers returning from Afghanistan on their way to act on a mud-filled set located outside of Calgary on the Tsuu T'ina native reserve. From here, the scene would move to a classroom with eager students working at their desks on a WWI letter-writing contest. Next would be *National Post* assembly machines wrapping the October 17 edition with a special *Passchendaele* advertisement and newspaper deliveries being sent across the country. In the setting of a Royal Canadian Legion hall, veterans would be filmed as they gather to watch pre-sale DVDs. Another scene would present Canadian Forces' top brass in full regalia as they greet cultural industry insiders and film critics at the Toronto International Film Festival's military-themed opening night gala. Afterwards, the scene would shift to one of the country's many multiplex theatres to show history teachers ushering youth out of busses to catch a

¹ Callon 1986: 216.

matinee screening. Finally, all of these images would culminate in a scene set at Ottawa's Canada Aviation Museum with politicians, bureaucrats, filmmakers, the corporate community, journalists and cultural workers all in attendance to cheer on Paul Gross as he accepts six Genie Awards including Best Picture and the Golden Reel.² However, not only do these scenes around the film's production and circulation point to the marshalling of the many actors within the Dominion Institute's network, the film's content is also reflects its storyline converging memory, militarism and citizenship.

Mobilization is the final stage in Callon's sociology of translation. This is when actors fulfil their roles and work through the identities laid out by the obligatory passage point to solve the defined problem. According to Callon, mobilization leads to a formation of discourse. By this he means that the network does not simply result in a set of practical arrangements with actors accomplishing what was set out for them. Rather, the outcome is a complete social transformation in which those enrolled are so deeply integrated into the web of associations that they concede their voices to the obligatory passage point: "to translate is to express in one's own language what others say and want, why they act in the way they do and how they associate with each other: it is to establish oneself as a spokesman" (Callon 1986: 223). In other words, mobilization is about becoming not only the physical extension of this key actor, but also its mouthpiece. It is at this point that one begins to identify a convergence of the theoretical currents running through my dissertation.

As discussed in Chapter 2, discursive policy inquiry closely follows ANT. They are both interested in how some actors can determine social action by controlling

² This award is given to the highest grossing Canadian film of the year.

discourse or the storyline behind a policy regime. In addition, Marin's (1988) political economy of representation contributes to this understanding by pointing to the inherent connection between the content of a representation and the institutional power behind its emergence. For Marin, a representation is a reflection of institutional arrangements. Nonetheless, he states that these relations only exist because of a representation's ability to put force in signs. Callon's approach to ANT and discursive policy inquiry explain how a particular discourse emerges as the consensus guiding institutional arrangements behind the act of representation. All three share a view of power that is interested in content and context.

In this chapter, I analyze both the content and context of *Passchendaele*. The aim is to examine this film as a reflection of the Dominion Institute's storyline and as a result of the mobilization of its network. Although it may at first seem like a peripheral actor, when the layers are peeled away it is evident that it played a critical role in the film's production and circulation. At the same time, an analysis of the film's content reveals the core of the Institute's storyline that converges memory, citizenship and militarism. Therefore, *Passchendaele* is a useful example for identifying Marin's connection between discourse and political economy, Callon's argument about the discursive outcome of networks and Fischer's view of the policy process as discursive struggle.

This chapter is divided into two sections. First, I consider how the discourse around the film regarding the urgency to remember military history and to depict Canadian stories converges with the film's content and narrative. I provide a cultural reading of *Passchendaele* that identifies two levels of meaning: the film as a story about the importance of military service to prove one's civic identity and as a polemic about the

importance of military memory in order to assert one's citizenship. It is this dual reading that reveals the mobilization of the Institute's storyline—the argument that memory builds ethical life in citizens and that the military's warrior tradition is the primary site for accessing a shared past and a common English-Canadian identity. Second, I analyze the context to consider the role of the Dominion Institute in bringing Paul Gross' representation of an obscure, yet important battle back into public consciousness. Not only does the Institute help to construct the media discourse around the film and bring history teachers into the fold, but also I was surprised to learn that the film's financing and even box office success depended upon this group's involvement.

MOBILIZING THE STORYLINE: CONTENT

Passchendaele was released with a level of pomp and circumstance that is normally not associated with Canadian cinema. Opening the Toronto International Film Festival (TIFF) and produced with an estimated \$20 million budget, it is not surprising that it drew such significant media interest and general awareness. The film rose to number two on the national box office chart by grossing \$847,522 during its weekend release in mid-October.³ Nonetheless, just as quickly as it seemed to enter public consciousness, it soon left the spotlight. By the weekend of November 28, it grossed a meagre \$20,865 and became only a topic of conversation for history buffs and educators. Despite the temptation to brush this film off as a failed experiment in the making of a Canadian blockbuster, it requires a deeper reading as a reflection of an ascendant cultural

³ As an interesting comparison, *Passchendaele* was second to 20th Century Fox's *Max Payne* that drew \$1.5 million. *Max Payne*'s budget was \$35 million and it would go on to make over \$85 million in global box office sales.

trend converging discourses of citizenship, memory and militarism. As I explore in this section, *Passchendaele* is not only a product of the Dominion Institute's military-cultural memory network, but also the embodiment of its storyline.

On the surface, the story is rather banal. The film tells the fictional account of Sergeant Michael Dunne's experiences during WWI. After being wounded in a village by an artillery shell, Dunne, who is played by Gross, returns to Alberta. Nonetheless, Dunne must then change his name and reenlist in time for the battle of Passchendaele. He goes back to the front to look after David Mann, the younger brother of his girlfriend, who fights despite his asthma. Guiding Mann's actions is the desire to disassociate himself from his German heritage. He views his participation in the war as a way to display his loyalty to his country in front of his Canadian-born girlfriend and, more importantly, her wealthy father. However, what stands out about this film in the context of Canadian drama is the depiction of Sergeant Dunne.

Dunne as a protagonist challenges Margaret Atwood's (1971) claim that Canadian culture lacks artistic depictions of traditional heroes who die the great, dramatic deaths of American heroes: "Canadian history and the Canadian imagination, then, conspire to make a plausible historic death—a death that accomplishes something, means something in terms of its society—almost impossible" (170). Contrary to Atwood's generalized "hero," Dunne, albeit a reluctant warrior, exudes masculine characteristics and is a proficient soldier. Unlike Roch Carrier's protagonist in *La Guerre, Yes Sir!*, who dies from a comedic accident⁴ or Dennis Lee's description of the men participating in the Upper Canada Rebellion who turn tail as soon as rifles are fired, Dunne dies a

⁴ He steps on an explosive while relieving himself beside his encampment.

meaningful death in the successful attempt to rescue David from German capture. A heroic death that is supposedly anathematic to Canada's cultural and literary tradition. However, there is a deeper, overarching narrative running through the story—one that converges the internal discourse of the battles fought by Dunne with the external discourse surrounding the accounts of the battle by Gross and co-producer Niv Fichman in making the film.

With this double reading in mind, I interpret *Passchendaele* as a text that tells two stories, yet has one hero: Michael Dunne, played by Paul Gross the actor, and Paul Gross, the film's writer, star actor and producer. One story is about an aging soldier who dies rescuing the brother of the person he loved. The other is about an actor who returns to Canada on a mission to give his country its own version of the great American war epic—a Canadianized *Saving Private Ryan*. Considering this latter perspective, the narrative has a second meaning. Dunne, who is in his late 30s and is portrayed as much older than other soldiers, represents Gross, serving as an intermediary for veterans, who must return to the trauma that they once left behind in order to show youth, signified by David Mann, the brutality of war in a safe manner.

As the media emphasized in the accounts of “the war to make *Passchendaele*,”⁵ the real hero is Paul Gross, the filmmaker. It is Gross who raises over \$20 million to give Canada, albeit for a brief moment, its only war epic with Hollywood-like production value and visual effects that might interest an otherwise disaffected public. Interpreted in this way, *Passchendaele* is a story about cultural memory production and circulation. It is a story about a prodigal son who returns north to raise money for the country's most

⁵ See Brian Johnson's article in *Maclean's* (Johnson, *Maclean's*, August 27, 2008) as well as *Playback's* coverage of the film.

expensive domestically financed film. Inspired by his grandfather's account of WWI⁶, he uses this money to make a feature film that will draw a record number of box-office sales for the year and the admiration of the cultural industry. However, most importantly, it will also offer youth and the public a cultural memory form that they normally do not associate as a product of Canadian culture.

The heroism of the two protagonists, Gross as Dunne and Gross as the cultural producer, are both rooted in their ability to represent war to an innocent and naïve audience. On the first level of interpretation, David Mann, who is eager to prove himself in war, cannot be denied his wish yet he must be guided through the battle and brought back safely. While Dunne dies in a Christ-like act of heroism, Mann returns to Calgary with the respect of his fellow countrymen including his girlfriend's father. Mann's experience of war through the assistance of Dunne provides his successful initiation into Canadian society. On the second level, the narrative of Dunne bringing Mann to the war in order to allow him to prove his "Canadianness" and ensuring his safe return can also be read allegorically. Gross, as cultural producer, succeeds in his task of depicting this moment of military history for the public and, more importantly, youth. In representing Canada's military past through film, he fulfils the wishes of surviving veterans and those that died in battle. It is through Gross that they can transmit their experience and heritage to future generations as critical components of their identity and their awareness as citizens. Therefore, the deaths of both Dunne and veterans are made meaningful through the act of memory transfer and the inculcation of civic identity in future generations.

⁶ His grandfather never spoke about his experience in WWI. When Paul was a child, his grandfather took him on a fishing trip and opened up to him. His grandfather expressed guilt over killing a young German who was surrendering. This scene is reflected in the film's beginning.

It is at this point that the two levels of interpretation converge and the connection to the Dominion Institute's storyline becomes evident. David Mann's acceptance into Canadian society after seeing and experiencing war points to a connection between the representation of military memory and citizenship. From this perspective, Mann is emblematic of the Institute's guiding philosophy that citizenship is constructed primarily through experiencing and appreciating Canada's military past. He exemplifies what Richard Gwyn had identified following the 1998 Remembrance Day poll regarding English Canada's last tribal holiday. As someone who is ethnically German yet linguistically English and whose father had died on "the other side of Vimy Ridge," he strives desperately to become "Canadian." He achieves this feat by enlisting and experiencing the war with help from Sergeant Dunne. Moreover, following the second level of interpretation, Mann's transformation can be read as a metaphor for contemporary youth. This demographic may have very little or even no direct connections to English-Canadian heritage and identity, yet they must connect to this with the help of intermediaries: veterans and cultural memory providers such as Gross and the Dominion Institute. According to Gross, the film's message is that "our notion of what it means to be Canadian was forged in the crucible of the Western Front" (Gross 2008: 11).

Not only must Mann and the contemporary public experience this moment of military history to become Canadian, but they must also undergo the process of forgetting.⁷ As Jan Assmann (2008) notes, "[a]ssimilation, the transition of one group into another one, is usually accompanied by an imperative to forget the memories connected with the original identity" (114). Whereas Mann must forget his German

⁷ The relationship between memory and forgetting is a dominant theme in memory studies scholarship (Lowenthal 1985, Schudson 1992, Huyssen 1995, Ricoeur 2004).

heritage and ancestry, the contemporary public and youth must forget American cultural memory. This spectre of Americanization had long been a dominant motivation behind the Dominion Institute. As discussed in Chapter 4, the emergence of the Institute came out of the sentiment that Canadians lacked ethical life because they seemed to know more and even have greater interest in American history than their own country's past.

Military memory became one of the few sites for constructing an alternative. It was the one area in which Canada might be able to compete with American stories. Underlining the celebration of *Passchendaele* is a sentiment of national pride. Even in negative reviews, the film is still celebrated for offering a counterpoint to American texts that dominate the population's historical understanding. This sentiment is exemplified in Lia Grainger's (2008) blog for *The Walrus* that criticizes the film on artistic grounds and Nigel Hannaford's column in *The Calgary Herald* that questions the historical scope:

Yes, the movie is a bit heavy on the fromage. But what pilsner-drinking hockey fan wouldn't fall for the following line, said in passing from one young soldier to another during a lull in battle: "How can you say you don't like Peterborough? You've never even been there." You won't hear that in *Black Hawk Down* (Grianger, *The Walrus*, October 17, 2008)

But it's not all in the film—no U-boats of mutinies for instance, that would explain why it was so important so many Canadians should risk so much... On one thing there should be no disagreement, though. However he told it, he told an important Canadian story... For, on this kind of shared understanding of history is patriotism based. We need more like it. Go see it. And, teach kids about Canada (Hannaford, *The Calgary Herald*, October 18, 2008, A26).

Simply put, despite all of its faults, at least *Passchendaele* is a Canadian representation.

An immediate reaction to these positive reviews might be a sense of incredulity:

Why is a film considered a success if it failed financially and was criticized artistically?

Implied in the media coverage and the celebration by the cultural industry, *Passchendaele*

was not judged on its artistic merit or its financial earnings, but as a cultural feat. Despite only grossing \$4.4 million at the box office, which would otherwise be deemed a success⁸ if not for the \$20 million price tag, and being heavily criticized for its over-the-top melodramatic tone, the film was still heralded. In fact, when I began to question colleagues about the film and discuss the topic with friends and family, what astonished me was that very few people said that they actually saw the film, yet everyone had much to say about either its importance or its deficiency. What all of this alludes to is the possibility that the content of this representation is secondary to the simple fact of the existence of a representation. It is at this point that it is necessary to return to Louis Marin's argument about the political economy of representation.

As a faithful semiologist, Marin believes that nothing exists outside of a system of signs. Herein lies the rationale for the celebration of *Passchendaele* and the logic of its power as a cultural memory form. It did not matter whether the film made money, drew a large audience or even was any good as either art or entertainment. As Marin notes, the source of the political economic power of a representation is the act of making something appear out of nothing. In the case of *Passchendaele*, the film serves as a sign of the existence of not only military history but also Canadian history. If there is a Canadian past, then there must be a Canada. Even those who have not or will never see the film are

⁸ This box office return is by no means a failure in terms of Canadian numbers. It did win the Genie Award's Golden Reel for highest grossing domestic film of 2008. Nonetheless, its return was certainly much less than recent winners including popular Quebec films (*De Père en Flic* in 2009 at \$11 million, *Les Boys III* in 2002 at \$5.3 million and *C.R.A.Z.Y.* in 2005 at \$ 6.2 million), producer Don Carmody's "Americanized" films shot in Canada (*Resident Evil: Apocalypse* in 2004 at \$6 million and *The Art of War* in 2000 at \$4.5 million) and the unique bilingual film *Bon Cop, Bad Cop* (2006) which remains the highest grossing film at \$13 million. With that said, as a historical genre, the only other film to come close to *Passchendaele*'s numbers was *The Black Robe* at \$2.9 million in 1992.

aware of its existence. It is not an accident that the film had one of the most expensive marketing budgets for any domestically financed film at over \$2 million and was, rather controversially⁹, given top billing at TIFF (Strauss, *Playback*, October 20, 2008). This rationale is also what lies at the heart of the Dominion Institute.

The Institute emerged in the wake of the 1995 Quebec referendum out of a critique that federalist leaders had failed to provide representations of Canada that stir deeper emotional attachments and sentiments. Guiding this sentiment was the belief that a generation of the Trudeauian, postmodernist approach to the representation of citizenship had led to an absence of a common set of signs that can effectively communicate ethical life. Ever since its emergence, it has gradually risen as a prominent national institution that can position, at least for brief moments, Canadian history onto the national agenda, across the country through classrooms and into the media spotlight. Similar to *Passchendaele*, it accomplishes this basic, yet difficult task of representing English Canada through a militaristic lens. For some reason, as I explore in the next section, it is usually through the military that the discourse linking memory to citizenship can be represented and circulated. This is not a coincidence. I argue that it is due to the workings and logic of a wider network.

⁹ While the mainstream media such as *Toronto Star* film critic Peter Howell (Howell, *Toronto Star*, June 18, 2008, E1) applauded this selection, many industry insiders including Marise Straus of *Playback* noted that *Passchendaele* as a high budget film was an odd choice. She points out that this spotlight has traditionally been used to highlight “arty and less-accessible fare” (Straus, *Playback*, June 17, 2008). However, judging by the last two TIFF gala selections, it appears that this prominent slot has become a place to highlight more expensive and populist films such as *Score: A Hockey Musical* (2010) and the British film *Creation* (2009).

MOBILIZING THE NETWORK: CONTEXT

Passchendaele provides a good example to confirm my criticism of Callon's conceptualization of ANT that offers a single obligatory passage point and conflates this actor with the *primum movens*. Its emergence is a story about the audacity of Paul Gross and his co-producer Niv Fichman in trying to fundraise and then shoot Canada's most expensive domestically financed film. If *Passchendaele* is to be studied from an ANT perspective, then it is quite clear that these two men are the "first movers." Moreover, as the film's executive producers, certainly they are the obligatory passage point with every action and decision running through these men. Gross, in particular, was the force behind this film. He had long dreamt of telling this story as a tribute to his grandfather and all veterans who risked and those that lost their lives defending Canadian values and freedoms. The aim of his ambitious project was rather simple: to bring the word "Passchendaele" back into the lexicon of Canadian public culture (Interview Fichman). It was the act of representation that was the most important feature of the film. The reason why Canadians, especially youth, did not know this word was because there was no representation of it—Gross and Fichman would try to change this. However, the act of representation is more complex than Marin's claim about the desire to make something out of nothing. It involves an intricate web of actors engaged in the process of production and circulation. As I describe in this section, it is here that the network engaged in creating *Passchendaele* had to run through the Dominion Institute and its network.

In 2003, Fichman and Gross embarked on a financing campaign to make Gross' military and familial tribute come to fruition. From the very beginning, they were faced with a daunting task. While the intent was always to make a Canadian film about a

Canadian story, they did not want to depict it in typical Canadian fashion. With the awareness of what Steven Spielberg's *Saving Private Ryan* did to revive American interest in WWII and to bring the term "D-Day" back into popular lexicon, they imagined a similar gritty, Hollywood-like portrayal to capture the seemingly incommunicable mix of violence, fear and bravery that marks a soldier's experience at war. Paradoxically, they wanted to make a Canadian story that would not be recognized by audiences as a Canadian film. If they were to avoid the typical cheesy style where by the time a battle scene comes along all that can be depicted is a lot of smoke, sound effects and shots off scene, then they needed a Hollywood-like budget of at least \$20 million. However, this ambition led to a catch-22. On one hand, the traditional Canadian funding sources could only take them so far. Although securing significant resources from the cultural industry and government, this was capped at \$8 million (See Table 6). On the other, while they made headway securing a foreign coproduction agreement, all of these potential suitors (including Disney's Miramax and Universal's Focus) asked them to compromise the story's "Canadianness." Foreign financiers proposed that instead of the Canadian Expeditionary Force's 10th Battalion, perhaps the film could portray the actions of a mix of American and Canadian soldiers.¹⁰

Deciding to forgo the international coproduction route yet still acknowledging the limits of traditional Canadian sources, they had to be innovative in how they thought about the film's financing. This led them to rethink how they viewed their film as a cultural text. It was then that Fichman noticed that Alberta would soon be celebrating its centennial year in 2005. With this in mind, they approached Don Mazankowski, the one-

¹⁰ A film like Andrew McLaglen's *The Devil's Brigade* (1968) that grossed \$8 million.

time federal cabinet minister and a major player in Alberta's corporate and political scenes, who put them in touch with Ed Stelmach, the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, and Gary Mar, the Minister of Community Development. Just as the province might construct a physical memorial, they pitched their project as a cinematic monument. The film can stand as a memorial to the Calgary boys from the 10th Battalion who fought and died in the battle of Passchendaele. At a short meeting between Gross and Premier Ralph Klein, the premier was less concerned in the details of the project and more interested in how the province's contribution might compare with the federal government (Interview Fichman). It was agreed that Alberta would grant \$4 million on top of the \$1.5 million provincial development fund thereby exceeding Telefilm's allotment.

In addition to this case of excellent timing, another fortunate development came a few years later as the CRTC was reviewing the \$2.3 billion deal by CanWest and Goldman Sachs to purchase Alliance Atlantis. In its decision approving the transfer of Alliance's 13 specialty channels¹¹ to CanWest, one finds a rather odd stipulation in the section explaining CanWest's mandatory onscreen and programming benefits package.¹² If one reviews similar agreements and license reviews, it is evident that the CRTC usually uses broad terms to describe its demands upon broadcasters. In the CRTC transfer approval of CanWest, one finds broad categories such as "scripted drama" and "Aboriginal drama projects" or general terms such as "Canada in Focus" and "Celebrating Canada's Best." However, there is one program that is noticeably

¹¹ Alliance Atlantis Broadcasting Inc. owned History TV, Showcase, HGTV and other popular speciality channels.

¹² This is the section that explains the amount of money that the broadcaster must put into various social, on screen and programming endeavours (i.e. scripted drama, documentary, news and media literacy).

specific—"Passchendaele feature film." As part of the transfer approval, CanWest was required to spend \$1.5 million: "To complete [the] funding gap of the Rhombus Media-produced historical feature film *Passchendaele* (\$1 million), as well as to fund an educational component including a web- and video-based teaching package related to the film (\$500,000)" (CRTC 2007). This would mark the beginning of a major role for CanWest and its subsidiaries, Global TV¹³ and the *National Post*¹⁴, as partners in making the project a reality.

These decisions by the CRTC and the Alberta government point to an underlying story of the making of *Passchendaele*. Even before public reports about the project, conversations within top circles of Canada's corporate, political, governmental and cultural communities were occurring to help bring together a network. This network would ensure that Gross and Fichman received the resources to give the nation its own version of *Saving Private Ryan* and a text that can serve as a cinematic war memorial. In terms of Canada's cultural industry, it is difficult to find a major player other than CTV Globemedia who was not involved. According to Fichman, support for the film by these private companies¹⁵ was seen as part of their longstanding efforts to maintain positive government relations—a point that is logical in theory, but supported by the evidence of the CRTC's transfer approval. Another key governmental actor in helping to realize this project was the Canadian Forces.

¹³ Global TV purchased the TV broadcasting rights and agreed to show the film every November 11 similar to seasonal films like *Ben Hur* and *Ten Commandments*.

¹⁴ On the day of the box-office release, it would wrap its papers with a special promo section for the film.

¹⁵ Cineplex, Astral, CanWest, Alliance, HMV Canada, NFB and Corus.

On the final day of her tenure as governor general on September 21, 2005, Adrienne Clarkson, a friend of Fichman's, arranged a breakfast meeting between the producers and Minister of National Defence Bill Graham. After discussing the project, Graham mentioned that he would put them in touch with Chief of Defence Staff Major-General Rick Hillier to see whether the Canadian Forces could assist. While taking their seats to witness the pageantry of Clarkson's specially¹⁶ arranged farewell military salute, Hillier approached Gross. In typical military fashion, Hillier delivered a brief, yet affirmative message: "I understand the word today is Passchendaele. [Gross] said yes it is and [Hillier] said well you get the money for the film and I'll give you the troops" (Interview Fichman).

Liaising through Lieutenant General Andrew Leslie¹⁷, who was then Assistant Chief of the Land Staff, Gross and Fichman would call on the Canadian Forces to play a key role in staging the grand finale of the film—the epic battle scene. Although they would have to deal with many levels of red tape, it was quite clear that the military took to the project from the very beginning. A small battalion was sent to the film set at the Tsuu T'ina native reserve that doubled as the muddy, scorched earth of the Belgian battlefield. These soldiers served as extras in the battle scene and they were credited in media coverage for adding to the film's authenticity. In fact, one of these extras was Brigadier-General (Ret) Greg Gillespie, then Deputy Commander Land Force Western Area, who played the part of General Arthur Currie. Converging this discourse between

¹⁶ This military-style send-off is not the standard protocol, but was specially arranged by the military in tribute to Clarkson's longstanding support for the Canadian Forces.

¹⁷ Keeping in mind this new effort by the Forces to engage public opinion, it is interesting to note that one of Lt.-Gen. Leslie's first command's was leading the disaster relief mission during the 1997 Red River floods.

present and past were reports that the battalion's encampment beside the set was named after a fellow soldier¹⁸ who was recently killed in Afghanistan.

The connection between the Canadian Forces and the film did not end there. At TIFF's opening night gala, DND supplied armoured vehicles, troops, high-ranking officers and military pipers as part of the decorations for the event held at the Liberty Grand (See Image 3). The theme of the gala dinner mimicked a military mess hall with camouflage nets and soup kitchen décor. According to Cpt. Cat Haylock, the public relations officer who worked with party planner Barbara Hershenhorn to organize the event, "[i]t was an opportunity to show of our troops today" (qtd. in *Bizbash*, September 5, 2008). Gross and Fichman returned the favour by setting up a special screening of the film for troops stationed in Kandahar. All of which helped to emphasize in the media's coverage a parallel between Afghanistan and the events taking place on screen. This was a message that Gross was sure to reiterate: "There is an absolute direct line between the Canadian Expeditionary Force of 1914-1918 and our men and women serving in the sands of Afghanistan today. It seems fitting that the troops who today so valiantly serve our country are among the first to see it" (*National Post*, September 30, 2008, AL3).

¹⁸ Camp Hornberg was named after Cpl. Nathan Hornberg who was killed in a mortar attack on September 24, 2007.

Image 3 *Military themed TIFF gala at Liberty Grand, September 5, 2008*

Table 6 *Sources and amount by groups contributing to Passchendaele*

<i>Funding Source</i>	<i>Amount</i>
Private Investors Ltd. Partnership	\$8,000,000
Alberta Government Centennial Grant ¹⁹	\$4,000,000
Telefilm	\$4,000,000
Tax Credit ²⁰ (Department of Canadian Heritage)	\$2,000,000
Charitable Donations through the Dominion Institute	\$2,000,000
Alberta Film Development Program	\$1,500,000
CanWest (CRTC's Transfer Approval Decision)	\$1,500,000
Alliance Films (Domestic Distribution Rights)	\$1,000,000
The Movie Network (Astral)	\$500,000
Movie Central (Corus)	\$500,000
CIBC	\$250,000
The Harold Greenberg Fund (Astral)	\$200,000
Anonymous gift on behalf of the 10th Battalion Calgary Highlanders Association	\$250,000

¹⁹ This grant is based upon the amount of money a film spends in the province.

²⁰ The term "tax credit" is not precise. The name has its roots in the tax-shelter structures that once helped fund Canadian films when the Canadian Audio-visual Office (CAVCO) created the Capital Cost Allowance Program (CCA) in 1974. In 1995, this program was replaced with the Canadian Film or Video Production Tax Credit Program (CPTC). The CPTC offers films financial grants based on labour expenditures. While films must apply when they are in production, it is common to use expected grant as a lean on investment to borrow money. The maximum that this program, run by the DCH, offers is 12% of production suggesting that *Passchendaele* received the maximum.

Considering this deep financial and practical involvement by different levels of government, the military, politicians, corporate leaders and the country's cultural industry, Gross and Fichman seemed well on their way to constructing the necessary network. However, not everything was in place. There was still at least \$8 million required to fund the film. For the most part, other than the distributor Alliance Films whose substantial \$2 million investment in advertising would be insured by Telefilm's marketing assistance fund, none of the partners were concerned about a return on investment. They were able to convince some corporations and wealthy Canadians to invest in a limited partnership fund. For example, Gwyn Morgan, a former CEO of EnCana and member of Granatstein's CCS21, invested "partly because of emotion and nationalism, and partly it's an investment" (qtd. in Toneguzzi, *Calgary Herald*, October 27, 2007, C1). Nonetheless, since the film was essentially a goodwill endeavour, it was difficult to attract private investors to risk their own money. As a result, they were still short of the funding requirements. According to Fichman, they "realized very quickly that some people didn't want to participate financially as an equity investor, [they] didn't want to make an investment, they wanted to do it as a donation because of whatever their financial situation was and in order to do that we needed to find a partner" (Interview Fichman). It is at this point that the Dominion Institute entered the scene.

After unsuccessfully approaching other nonprofits with registered charitable status including Historica, Griffiths was contacted to gauge his organization's interest. Griffiths enthusiastically agreed realizing the convergence between the philosophy guiding his organization and that of the film. With a specially designed teaser trailer²¹

²¹ This trailer can be found on the film's DVD under special features.

using still photographs and animation set to an operatic soundtrack, Gross and Fichman arranged dinner meetings with some of the country's wealthiest individuals. These people, who other than David Asper I was unable to identify, were given a tax-refund for channelling money to the producers through the Dominion Institute. According to associate producer Sheila O'Gorman, these donors gave at least \$1.75 million because they were "patriotic Canadians who believed in what [Gross was] trying to accomplish" (qtd. in Toneguzzi, *Calgary Herald*, October 27, 2007, C1). O'Gorman emphasized that without the participation of the Dominion Institute to further the credibility and legitimacy of the project, the producers would not have been as successful in courting corporate Canada (Interview O'Gorman).²²

With the funding in place and filming already underway, the Dominion Institute wanted to expand its participation. It was then brought into conversations over how this film was going to draw an audience and attract wider public interest. As discussed in Chapter 1, not all films about history become memory-making texts. According to Astrid Erll (2008), multiple media channels, what she calls "pluri-medial network," enable films such as *Downfall* and *The Lives of Others* to enter public consciousness. Advertisements, novels based on the movie, controversies, didactic formats, "making of" specials, award ceremonies, political speeches and other forms "constitute the collective contexts which channel a movie's reception and potentially turn it into a medium of cultural memory"

²² O'Gorman added an interesting story about an invitation the producers had to sit in on one of Frank McKenna's, the former ambassador to the US and Liberal provincial premier, corporate networking dinners held annually at Herb's Resort in Tatamagouche, NB. These meetings that continue to this day bring some of the country's leading business, academic, cultural and political leaders together. Guests are treated to dinner and a keynote address by prominent leaders including George W. Bush in 2009, Bill Clinton in 2004 and 2006, John Edwards and Fred Thompson in 2008 (Sawler 2009: 66).

(396). The Dominion Institute played a major part in producing this “pluri-medial network” by both creating controversy to attract media coverage and turning this cultural memory form into an educational text. In order to complete these objectives, it drew upon its associations developed over many years with the news media through its polling and with history teachers through the Memory Project.

As for making it an educational text, the Dominion Institute found a way to incorporate the film into the curriculum of Canadian classrooms. Although part of the agreement with Alberta was that every school in the province would receive a free DVD, the challenge was to get schools in other regions aware and interested in the film. After contracting education consultant Nick Brune to create a lesson guide, it used its database of teachers collected through the Memory Project to send out these texts well before the film’s box-office release. This guide was specifically designed to match elements of the curriculum including, interestingly enough, social history components and cognitive thinking pedagogies such as media literacy. Not only did it provide clearly laid out lesson plans with discussion questions, but also it included a section informing teachers how to access the film’s content—whether that be the novel based on the screenplay, the illustrative history book, the film’s website or booking a film screening for the class. As well, the Institute encouraged teachers to use this guide and the text’s many different forms by offering a letter-writing contest for students. Appropriately timed to occur when many provincial curricula was examining WWI, this contest got students to write from the perspective of a soldier at the front or a loved one at home. Receiving over 3,000 submissions, the letters were then read by a panel of judges that included Adrienne Clarkson, the last remaining WWI veteran John Babcock and Paul Gross.

Although the extent to which these didactic components furthered circulation is still unknown considering the use of DVDs and websites, it had a direct influence on the film's box-office returns. Many high school teachers and even professors brought their students on field trips to see the film. Fichman notes that 15% of the film's ticket sales came from school groups (Interview Fichman).

In addition to getting those in education circles interested in the film, the producers wanted to get the public talking about it before the box office release date. Certainly, Alliance's strong commitment to the film by placing the trailer ahead of top Hollywood hits including *Indiana Jones* and *Burn After Reading* helped to raise the film's prominence. In addition, it secured TV spots for the film during popular American shows such as *Prison Break* and *Big Brother*. However, as Gross suggests, he did not simply want to market the film as a populist text as he did with his earlier box office hit, *Men with Brooms* (2002). Instead, he wanted audiences to view his film as a national cultural artefact (Dillon, *Playback*, October 13, 2008). With this goal in mind, the co-producers posed the question: "How to get [the film] into the front section of the newspaper as opposed to the entertainment section?" It is at this point that Griffiths' tried and tested media strategy kicked in as well as the mobilization of his media contacts.

Commissioning two polls to be released over the CanWest chain on consecutive days leading up to the opening, the Institute was able to stir media interest. These polls contextualized the film within concerns over education and Americanization. Whereas the focus of the first was on the lack of knowledge about the country's military past, the second was an attitudinal poll finding that 90% of respondents learned more about US history from movies, yet 82% thought Canada's past was just as worthy of the big screen.

The message was clear: if Canadians are to ever know their country's own military history, then what is needed is a Hollywood-like representation. This point was reiterated by Chalifoux: "We constantly hear stories about American valour and patriotism and heroism; everyone has seen *Saving Private Ryan*, *Platoon* and *Born on the Fourth of July*. So *Passchendaele* fills a hole, essentially, I find, or fill as a void that existed in Canadian cinema. It is the first of its genre" (qtd. in Covert, *The Ottawa Citizen*, October 17, 2008, A5). The logic of *Passchendaele*, paralleling Toby Miller's notion of ethical incompleteness, was to prepare the film in a way that made the public perceive it as fulfilling an imaginary desire. In his column that was run throughout the CanWest chain, Gross supports Chalifoux's argument from the vantage of a filmmaker:

There are too few opportunities for Canadians to learn about our proud history on the big and small screen. The answer to correcting this imbalance lies not in restricting American cultural imports, but in creating more Canadian stories. Our responsibility as filmmakers should be not only to entertain, but also to educate. Part of our responsibility as audiences should be to seek out stories in which we recognize its heroes as our own... We raised over \$20 million to make *Passchendaele*, all from Canadian investors. The film had the largest budget in Canadian history. Raising these funds at times seemed like a Herculean effort, but we succeeded. I hope this shows other Canadian filmmakers that films like *Passchendaele* not only should, but can be made (Gross, *CanWest News*, October 16, 2008).

With these comments in mind, it is difficult not to consider my analysis of the Dominion Institute. In many ways the Institute is a mirror image of Gross' project.²³ The problem for both does not rest with neoliberal policies and American influence, as was the case for the Trudeauian consensus over cultural representation with Canadian

²³ This may not be all that surprising considering Griffiths was calling for a Canadian *Saving Private Ryan* since 1999. See Ibbitson, *National Post*, March 5, 1999, A16

content laws and foreign ownership regulations. Instead, the problem was with those making the representations whether they are private or public institutions. Moreover, the Canadian public was also at fault for either not demanding or not having the knowledge to receive these national stories. The task then for both the Dominion Institute and *Passchendaele* was to be innovative and take on neoliberal strategies to offer something different and more palatable for audiences. American culture should not be shunned. Paradoxically, it should serve as the model to captivate Canadians and stir nationalistic sentiment. Nonetheless, the comparison between the film and the Institute goes much further. There is an underlying message embedded within Gross' plea. Although on the surface he seeks to instill the public with the belief that going to the film is a patriotic act and to convince other filmmakers to follow his lead, the primary message is aimed at the federal government.

Here lies the irony or, some may suggest, the logic behind the Dominion Institute and *Passchendaele*: it rests entirely on a governmental system that is willing to support this neoliberal approach through public grants as well as various institutional and legal arrangements. Therefore, to suggest that Gross and the Institute advocate for neoliberal cultural policies of cuts and less government misses the point. From this perspective, this contemporary cultural regime might not be all that different from the those examined by Eva Mackey or Zoë Druick since both depend on state involvement. However, an important finding from my research is that while government has a role, it must now be hidden and work through private individuals, such as Gross, corporate leaders, such as Morgan and the Aspers, or third party actors, such as the Dominion Institute. The model then is not the bureaucratic approach of the NFB and the CBC whereby the state is the

primary cultural agent. Instead, the model is that of a network with government only one of many actors. Nonetheless, the issue is not just about the act of representation. It is also about content. In my detailed reading of their discourse, I have observed an additional message that is not aimed at the general public, but rather at the state.

If these third parties and private individuals are to fulfil their role of creating cultural citizens and instilling the public with a sense of ethical life, then the representations must be more direct and less modest in their portrayal of Canadian history and a common citizenship. For this to occur, the state must be supportive and willing to incorporate this discourse into its own symbolic culture and pedagogical instruments. It is at this point that I turn to Gross' concluding comments:

This year marks the 90th anniversary of end of the First World War. In 10 short years, we will be recognizing its centennial. We will have celebrated the 150th anniversary of Canada the year before, but what kind of country will we be if we know virtually nothing about one of the defining events in our nation's history. Will we have become ever more disoriented as a nation—not knowing where we are going as we have so little sense of where we come from? Or, will we have used these 10 years wisely and found new ways to tell ourselves and our children about our history as a nation? (Gross, *CanWest News*, October 16, 2008).

In other words, the state must continue with the neoliberal, network model used to “tell ourselves and our children about our history” and reconsider content to emphasize “defining events.” What is interesting about Gross' film and the Dominion Institute, in general, is how “defining events” tend to be synonymous with military representations. Similar to Penz's comments that the Institute could have just likely been engaged in promoting knowledge about Confederation, Gross mentions that he could have depicted another worthy historical event such as the Winnipeg General Strike or the story of the “Famous Five.” However, this suggestion is rather naïve, since the network necessary to

fund and create these populist, expensive representations is not only tied by practical connections, but it is also linked by a shared discourse.

At the root of this discourse is the argument that while all events from Canadian history are important, it is through the country's historic and contemporary acts on the battlefield that defines Canada and its citizens. The problem with the Trudeauian approach was not simply a structural issue. Instead, by emphasizing peacekeeping and progressivist social history, it obscured this important part of Canada's past and thus underemphasized its place in the representation of citizenship. As Gross implies by noting the proximity between the upcoming centennial of the end of WWI and the country's 150th anniversary, the underlying message of this article and, for that matter, the film is that the state must make the military a dominant lens for constructing a shared past and common citizenship. Approaching the year 2017, it will be interesting to observe, especially considering it also marks the 100th anniversary of Vimy, if this trend continues. How the government celebrates Canada's 150th anniversary will tell a lot about whether the military-cultural memory network will continue to grow and whether its storyline will continue to dominate the cultural agenda. Nonetheless, as I examine in the conclusion, it might not be necessary to wait that long to gauge the state's response.

SUMMARY

In this chapter, I explored how the release of *Passchendaele* in the fall of 2008 marks the final stage of the Dominion Institute's efforts to create a network—mobilization. As Callon states, mobilization is a practical and a discursive outcome. With Paul Gross' film, it is possible to identify both the web of associations within the

military-cultural memory network and the core of the Dominion Institute's storyline that guides this network. The film's content tells the story about the importance of military memory as a site for constructing a shared English-Canadian civic identity. David Mann's successful initiation into Canadian society after experiencing war exemplifies the Dominion Institute's guiding assumption. It believes that a common, more robust definition of citizenship can be achieved through the representation of military memory. From this perspective, the film embodies the network that brought it into being. It is not simply an example of a neoliberal, network approach to cultural memory and citizenship education identified over ten years earlier by Griffiths and the other two cofounders. In addition, it reflects the discourse that should guide the representation of citizenship and cultural memory.

Although *Passchendaele*'s grip on the national agenda was rather brief, the coordinated effort using a pluri-medial strategy and the web of associations of an emergent military-cultural memory network helped to bring the name of this little-known battle back into the public's vocabulary. This achievement also marked the ascendance of the Dominion Institute as a player within the field of cultural memory and its network approach. Less than year after the film's release, on September 1, 2009, many actors involved in Canada's cultural memory game would be on hand at Toronto's historic Enoch Turner Schoolhouse. These individuals would toast what was labelled as a merger between the Dominion Institute and its long-time rival, Historica. On the surface, this celebration marked a cordial marriage. Since there is only so much private and public money to go around, it is only logical that these two groups join to share in the pie. However, there is a hidden reason that lies under the surface and remains known only to

the main parties involved. Although this story will still take many years to come out as all actors are rather tight-lipped beyond the usual platitudes, a look at the CRA tax returns (See Table 7) and off-the-record conversations with those that were once involved with Historica suggests the word “merger” may be a euphemism. The Dominion Institute’s production studio approach, startup mentality and promotional flare had won out over the bulky and cumbersome Historica Foundation. Historica, which began with much promise and wealth, was now financially sustained by the operations it inherited from the Council for Canadian Unity in 2006²⁴ and riding the popularity of its historical-themed commercials that were now considered to be in the realm of kitsch.²⁵

It was not just the organizational culture and “market sensitive” operational approach that won out. More importantly, this “merger,” may later come to mark one of the turning points in the passing of the Trudeauian consensus of representing Canada to Canadians and the rise of not only a new approach and iconography, but also a new popular and governmental definition of Canadian citizenship. From this perspective, Historica’s “Heritage Minutes” can be considered as a last gasp of the progressivist, humanist, Trudeauian perspective on cultural citizenship and its complementary social history view of the past that emphasizes pluralism, non-violence and the postmodernist

²⁴ It was then that DCH announced that it would pay Historica \$16.5 million over five years to manage Encounters with Canada. This decision was controversial considering the talks held earlier in the year about a merger between Historica, the Dominion Institute and Canada’s National History Society. Griffiths claimed, “[t]his large cash injection into one group alone threatens to unbalance a vibrant but fragile history sector” (qtd. in Ross, *The Globe and Mail*, August 7, 2006, R1).

²⁵ See Katarzyna Rukszo’s “The Other Heritage Minutes: Satirical Reactions to Canadian Nationalism” (2005) for a discussion about these commercials as kitsch.

motto “unity within diversity”.²⁶ The days of government realism and the “liberal nation-building project” that pervaded the post-WWII era may now be on the wane. In its place is the rise of the Dominion Institute and its storyline guiding cultural policy over citizenship and cultural memory. However, it is misleading to state that this alternative representation has replaced liberal values of peacekeeping, social justice, multiculturalism and tolerance. What has occurred, as reflected in the content of *Passchendaele*, is a displacement of this once dominant symbolic culture. This new symbolic culture emphasizes an iconography characterized by a hardened, more robust and less compromising definition of a Canadian citizen—a citizen who is rooted in the country’s British political traditions and Judeo-Christian values, whose past is defined by a proud warrior culture and who is not restrained in expressing nationalistic emotions. The peacekeeping iconography may still exist, but it has become depicted through the lens of a hardened, more aggressive view of the Canadian Forces as a warrior.

²⁶ See Richard Day’s *Multiculturalism and the History of Canadian Diversity* (2000) for a detailed discussion about this national motto.

Table 7 *Summary of registered charity returns, 2000-2009 (in CDN dollars)²⁷*

Year	Organization	Revenue from gifts receiving tax receipts	Revenue from federal government	Total Revenue	Total Expenses
2009	Historica	281,943	5,122,546	8,502,644	8,959,143
2009	Dominion Inst.	501,571	471,912	1,241,260	1,348,853
2008	Historica	1,502,275	5,132,165	10,330,191	9,522,001
2008	Dominion Inst.	1,101,246	314,004	2,069,768	1,973,687
2007	Historica	395,654	5,346,738	8,955,215	9,804,506
2007	Dominion Inst.	1,096,001	358,906	2,110,702	2,150,512
2006	Historica	778,370	1,974,209	5,589,030	5,841,951
2006	Dominion Inst.	241,841	1,009,851	1,600,097	1,580,585
2005	Historica	1,339,376	3,041,732	7,562,309	7,666,862
2005	Dominion Inst.	234,210	868,678	1,593,925	1,587,185
2004	Historica	956,311	1,912,969	6,341,522	6,050,791
2004	Dominion Inst.	34,600	488,206	1,027,908	1,039,662
2003	Historica	1,368,220	499,543	7,744,405	7,963,475
2003	Dominion Inst.	26,545	291,379	1,345,633	1,296,982
2002	Historica	2,126,039	411,820	9,126,230	7,044,221
2002	Dominion Inst.	287,447	431,757	1,008,761	994,859
2001	Historica	4,502,127	663,761	6,568,474	6,126,404
2001	Dominion Inst.	115,050	270,510	544,925	614,984
2000	Historica	3,733,500	111,287	3,877,832	2,734,633
2000	Dominion Inst.	173,091	69,502	600,546	475,369

²⁷ For more detailed information, see the Canadian Revenue Agency's website (<http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca>).

CONCLUSION:
THE MILITARIZATION OF CANADIAN CITIZENSHIP,
REMEMBRANCE DAY 2009

The winner of the discursive struggle defines what will be taken to be reality with categories that at the same time suppress alternative conceptions.

~ Frank Fischer, *Reframing Public Policy*¹

The dénouement of the story is set in Ottawa on an unusually mild mid-November morning. It is Remembrance Day 2009 and a buzz fills the air. A combination of clear, cloudless skies with the celebrity appeal of an appearance by Prince Charles helps to draw a record crowd to the National War Memorial. As an estimated 55,000² spectators hastily make their way to any vantage point they can find to catch a glimpse of the solemn ceremony, there is a sense that something is different about this Remembrance Day. Although the ratio is staggering as the same event in 1993 drew a mere 8,000, it is not only the size of the crowd that contributes to the sentiment of the day. The mood is also different. Those in attendance cannot but think of the 133 fellow Canadians who gave the ultimate sacrifice to the country on the distant battlefields of Afghanistan. However, it is more than just these developments that mark a change. There is something else that is different—something that I suggest signals the culmination of the Dominion Institute's advocacy efforts. On this day, the representation of military memory by the Canadian state will closely resemble the Dominion Institute's storyline converging memory and the military with citizenship. Not only is this a time for memorialization, it

¹ Fischer 2003: 87.

² Keep in mind that this number was recorded by the organizers of the ceremony (Adams, *The Legion Magazine*, January 15, 2010).

is also a day for the official display and performance of a new representation of “Canadianness.”

According to Bob Butt of the Legion, an event that was once repressed by a state and nation “[that] looked at commemorating veterans and their sacrifice as a celebration of war” was now reinvigorated and viewed as something worthy of an unrestrained outpouring of emotions (qtd. in Michael Valpy, *The Globe and Mail*, November 11, 2009, A1). The performances and displays presented on this day emphasized a new approach. Acknowledging a military that fights wars is no longer something that Canadians should be embarrassed about and understate as a part of the country’s symbolic culture. For the record-breaking crowd and the expected record-breaking TV audience³, there was one image that stood out and signaled a larger cultural transformation. As the dignitaries were exiting their motorcade and walking through a ceremonial procession towards the monument, the media and spectators focused in on one character—Governor General Michaëlle Jean.

It was her clothing that drew everyone’s attention (See Image 4). Dressed in an officer’s uniform with a beret, aiguillette and adorning medals, Jean was not the first of her position to wear military garb as is her right as commander-in-chief of the Canadian Forces. Instead, she was the first in recent memory. Designed for Edward Schreyer in the early 1980s, it had not been adorned by Jean’s two predecessors, Romeo LeBlanc and

³ While many media reports expected the televised coverage to reach record-breaking levels surpassing the CBC numbers in 2003 of 2 million viewers, it did not make it on BBM’s top 30 programs for the week. This suggests the number was certainly lower than expected considering that America’s Top Model was #30 at 1,253,000 viewers. One explanation for this finding is that perhaps the audience was split between 3 news outlets: CBC, CTV and CBC that all had live TV coverage and even online coverage. A future study might want to examine when all three networks start covering this commemoration.

Adrienne Clarkson, or even herself at the last four ceremonies she presided over.

Furthermore, it was not only the fact that she was wearing this uniform that caught everyone's attention, but how she wore it so well with noticeable pride and confidence.

Although she had adorned this uniform before in front of a military audience⁴, it was at this solemn televised ceremony that captured public attention. With the news leaked earlier in the day about a revised citizenship guide that would stress the contemporary and historic role of the military, Jean's gesture provided further evidence of the onset of a new governmental cultural paradigm. This message projected by the state was heard loud and clear.

Image 4 *Gov. Gen. Michaëlle Jean and Prince Charles, Ottawa, ON, Nov. 11, 2009*

In the days and even months that followed, the media and public intellectuals tried to make sense of these new ways of representing a hardened view of the military in

⁴ She first wore it at the Queen's Colour ceremony in Halifax on June 27, 2009. This naval ceremony marks the introduction of a new flag for the navy. The old one was replaced because it had faded and looked tired.

memorial culture and as a key element of citizenship. The general consensus was that November 11, 2009 marked a turning point in the way Canada was represented and projected to Canadians. However, what remained out of the media and public discourse was an understanding that this new paradigm was not simply a reaction to the sight of Canadian flags draped over the caskets of soldiers or the rise of Stephen Harper's Conservative Party as was the general assumption. Instead, I propose that it was the culmination of a gradual cultural shift coming out of the mid-1990s that can be credited to the efforts of the Dominion Institute and a burgeoning military-cultural memory network including historians, public intellectuals, government officials, educators, the media, the corporate community, veterans' associations and the cultural industry.

The idea to create a think tank and public educator to change how the cultural memory game was played and how the government represented citizenship emerged over 13 years earlier with three idealistic young men. At that time, they were considered to be rabble-rousers by some and wishful thinkers by others. However, they quickly made a name for themselves and their anachronistically named organization. This organization emerged at the right time within the context of a country that had just marginally overcome a unity crisis and had experienced a series of controversies over the representations that comprised its symbolic culture. In addition, the cofounders were put in touch with the right people within the country's corporate, academic, media, cultural and political circles. This would lead to the creation of an epistemic community that contributed to how they conceived of their think tank. These links also bestowed them with the tools to further the effectiveness of their advocacy. As a result, their message,

which was disseminated through simplistic yet highly rhetorical polls, resonated with the public and found its way into the discourse of many influential Canadians.

The cofounders' message expressed an urgent problem. Due to years of neglect and the ascension of a legitimate but misguided postmodernist, postcolonialist and postnationalist mode of representation, Canadians lacked the cultural forms needed to summon deep civic attachment and national pride. As a result, they proposed a modernist method and a hardened symbolic culture to inculcate a common English-Canadian identity and a shared cultural memory. Their method required a coordination of a variety of social actors—thereby replacing both the Keynesian model to cultural production and the progressivist language that marked A.B. McKillop's understanding of the "Canadian moment" with a neoliberal model in which government was only one of many and a traditionalist and unabashed patriotic language.

Although the Dominion Institute was able to interest several key actors within the media, politics, business, philanthropy and community associations, it was unable to convince education scholars and policymakers who were the gatekeepers of the country's regionalized school system. As identified in the Spicer Report and emphasized in the Institute's messaging, the federal government was hindered in its ability to instill civic values and identities. The problem was that one of the last bastions of cultural sovereignty, Canadian classrooms, were under provincial jurisdiction. This institutional space, however, was blocked by influential education community representatives who were not willing to compromise their progressivist discourse and postmodernist pedagogy. The Dominion Institute's network approach required these representatives to enlist teachers and youth in its cultural memory network. After being spurned by this

community and with the awareness that they needed to move on from a focus on just advocacy, Griffiths and his cofounders came to an important realization with help from a member of its epistemic community. Richard Gwyn's argument that Remembrance Day represented the last English-Canadian tribal holiday opened up the possibility that the military could be the primary lens onto a more unified and robust definition of citizenship.

With this in mind and with a growing sense of urgency to secure long-term funding, a fortuitous meeting between Rudyard Griffiths and veteran Grant McCrae helped to push the Dominion Institute farther down the path of military memory. I was able to trace the steady growth in its financial standing with the various phases of the Memory Project attracting corporate and government money. In addition, I learned that this endeavor helped it to enroll the missing nodes of its network—teachers and youth. As it was making a name for itself in education, corporate, cultural, political, military and media circles, it and its network garnered the attention of other like-minded groups. At the time, a community of influential Canadians was starting to form with the objective of altering the way the public and the state views the military. The aim was to rehabilitate the status of the military within public opinion and convincing the federal government to reinvest in this once proud national institution. This network, which included groups such as Jack Grantstein's CCS21 and David Bercuson's CDFAI, enrolled the Dominion Institute in its advocacy and lobbying campaigns. In turn, this would entrench the Institute's discourse even deeper into the language of a hardened view of the military as a warrior. Although the official partnership with the CDFAI ended in 2005, this association marks the first step in the convergence between a cultural memory and a

military network. While the former was interested in using the military as a lens onto a hardened and more robust representation of citizenship, the latter group employed military memory and citizenship education as lenses onto a hardened and more robust representation of the Forces.

The production and circulation of Paul Gross' *Passchendaele* must be viewed with respect to the Dominion Institute's ability to mobilize this consolidated military-cultural memory network. Mobilization can be observed from both the film's content and context. On one hand, the narrative embodies the network's storyline. The character development of David Mann, a German-Canadian who proves his Canadianness by being brought to the front and safely back with the help of Sergeant Dunne, can be allegorically read as a story about the path that all Canadians must take to become citizens.

Passchendaele is a polemic about the importance of military memory as site for constructing citizenship. On the other, this film, whose budget far exceeded any other domestically financed film, would not have been made nor have had the same reach if not for the associations forged through the military-cultural memory network. I always suspected the important role played by the Dominion Institute in terms of marshalling its legion of history teachers and raising public awareness through its connections with the national media. However, I was surprised to learn that the producers' ambitious fundraising efforts also depended upon this obligatory passage point. From this dual perspective, *Passchendaele* can be viewed as the culmination of the Dominion Institute's neo-liberal approach to representation and its hardened discourse.

At the finale of this ANT study of the Dominion Institute, a number of questions arise: Why does it matter if there are more cultural memory texts depicting the country's

military history as a warrior? Who cares if the warrior has displaced the representation of the military as a peacekeeper? Why should it matter if military history is becoming a larger component of the country's educational system and cultural landscape? What difference does a film make if it permeated public discourse for such a short period? In fact, as admitted by Griffiths himself, the impact of the Dominion Institute and its public education campaign has been marginal if you trace the steady decrease in its own polling of youth and the public's knowledge about the country's military and political history. Nonetheless, the events of Remembrance Day 2009 underscore the argument that the outcome of the military-cultural memory network should not be viewed in terms of its direct effect on the population as what a critical cultural citizenship scholar labels a "technology of government." Instead, what should be considered is its effectiveness as a policy advocate on how the federal government represents the military, memory and citizenship to the population.

When their think tank was launched in the spring of 1997, Rudyard Griffiths⁵, Erik Penz⁶ and Michael Chong⁷ were wide-eyed graduates looking to put their stamp on the country's civic culture. If you fast-forward a hypothetical cinematic portrayal of their organization to Remembrance Day 2009, you will find three men in their late 30s who now sit at the summit of Canada's corporate, political and cultural elite. They are now

⁵ Rudyard Griffiths is now a bestselling author, a major political pundit as a *National Post* columnist, co-organizer of the Munk Debates, advisor to the Woodrow Wilson Center, the Aurea Foundation and board member of the Stratford Festival, the Canadian Institute for Citizenship and the Nuclear Waste Management Organization

⁶ Erik Penz is now a partner at the Bay Street law firm, Macleod Dixon.

⁷ Michael Chong is now the Conservative MP for Wellington-Halton Hills and steadily gaining a reputation as one of Parliament's most virtuous politicians especially after resigning a cabinet position when Stephen Harper passed his motion that Quebec is a distinct nation in Canada.

perched alongside many of the same personalities that they once courted. However, it is not these personal achievements that are of interest to my dissertation. What this day marks with the release of Kenney's citizenship guide and Michaëlle Jean's appearance is the normalization and official acceptance of their definition of citizenship. Moreover, it also signals the ascendance of their organization, now named the Historica-Dominion Institute, as a dominant player in the fields of civic education and cultural memory.

Not everyone, however, agrees that this development is for the best. For Gerald Caplan, the same person who led Ontario's Royal Commission on Learning that proposed a progressivist pedagogical model and who opposed the Dominion Institute's influence on education through Mike Harris' government, Remembrance Day 2009 should be deplored for reversing the symbolic culture that he thought made the country so great:

My country seems to be slipping away in front of my very eyes. Our proud identity, our cherished core values—never mind the vast gap between aspiration and achievement—are being turned upside down. Gun control advocates are out, gun apologists are in. Peacekeeping is out, warriors are in. Preventing war is out, killing scumbags is in. Demonstrations of peace are out, demonstrations of a martial spirit are in. Thoughtful, restrained Canadianism is out, hand-on-heart Yankee-style patriotism is in. Take a gander at Michaëlle Jean. She herself, when appointed Governor-General, was the very embodiment of Canada's finest aspirations. But GG Jean suddenly has become GI Jean, all resplendent in military uniform (Caplan, *The Globe and Mail*, December 4, 2009; emphasis added)

What is fascinating about this lament is the way in which Caplan converges Jean as a person and as a symbol. He is disappointed that someone who had a long career in public broadcasting, was at the forefront of many charitable causes and involved herself in social justice campaigns would take on and embody the trappings of this hardened, more militaristic symbolic culture. From this perspective, her transformation into "GI Jean"

does not merely mark the ascendance of a discourse about the role of the military as a warrior. What this metamorphosis also represents is the ascendance⁸ of a new type of Canadian citizen—one in which the military serves as a primary element for national identity and civic attachment. To appreciate this more profound phenomenon, it is necessary to consider the day's other major event: the announcement by Citizenship and Immigration Minister Kenney of a revised citizenship education guide.

Although Kenney would wait until the next day to officially release his guide entitled *Discover Canada: The Rights and Responsibilities of Citizenship*, copies were leaked to the media to help frame this document within the coverage of Remembrance Day. Making the cover of many of the country's newspapers, the message was that the government was reshaping what it means to be Canadian. The guide offered a new more robust and detailed representation of the country, its people and its history. The noticeable difference was the emphasis on the role of the military and the hardened tone in which citizenship was viewed as a responsibility and not just a right. On the surface, this guide was reported as part of an ongoing trend by the Conservative government, with the passage of Kenney's citizenship bill a few months earlier, to take a harder line on immigration and multiculturalism. Just as applicants must be literate in one of the country's official languages, so too must they show a civic and historical literacy: "We want to ensure that newcomers appreciate that citizenship is not just obtaining legal status, that it confers certain privileges and rights. **It's joining the Canadian community and it's joining Canadian history**" (qtd. in Friesen, *The Globe and Mail*,

⁸ According to the political scientist Peter Russell, "[p]art of the role of the Governor General is to express as person [Canada's] feelings and sentiments" (Wherry, *Maclean's*, November 23, 2009).

November 11, 2009, A1; emphasis added). On a deeper level, when you start to examine the people behind this text, you immediately run into the network discussed in this dissertation. It is with this awareness that you can appreciate the guide in light of a larger shift in the conceptualization of citizenship.

Many of the consultants had close ties to the Dominion Institute and its epistemic community including Marc Chalifoux, Jack Granatstein, Rudyard Griffiths, Adrienne Clarkson, Margaret MacMillan, Andrew Cohen and John Ralston Saul. In fact, in media coverage of the guide, Griffiths, Cohen and Chalifoux are often quoted as spokespersons explaining why changes were made. Keeping in mind Callon's argument that to translate is "to establish oneself as a spokesman," this evidence goes a long way in providing support for my thesis. A point further emphasized with the news released on June 22, 2010 about the launch of the Canadian Citizenship Challenge—a \$525,171 investment by Citizenship and Immigration Canada into the Historica-Dominion Institute to bring the guide into classrooms. However, to understand the deeper level of meaning, it is necessary to look at the guide's author.

The media and the public associated the citizenship guide with Minister Kenney. However, it was Dr. Chris Champion, Kenney's senior policy advisor, who did most of the grunt work researching and writing the document. Unfortunately, I was unable to meet with Dr. Champion⁹, but throughout my research his name often came up by various nodes of the network. He was also a project researcher for the Centre for Cultural Renewal—the same organization that helped the Dominion Institute in its early days. In fact, the Donner Canadian Foundation funded his project, the Cultural Index Report,

⁹ Although I made many attempts contacting him through the minister's office to request an interview, I never received a response.

which looked into social trends that are undermining the well being of Canadians. What I could learn about this influential figure was found in his dissertation, *Nova Britannia Revisited: Canadianism, Anglo-Canadian Identities and the Crisis of Britishness, 1964-1968* (2007), completed at McGill University's Department of History. Here Champion cogently critiques the general assumption held by most historians¹⁰ that the rise of Canadian nationalism and its symbolic culture under Pearson marked a break from the country's British traditions.

He contextualizes the motivations of Pearson and his compatriots, who were all Anglo-Saxon Oxford educated men, within the liberal imperialist movement. This movement was rooted in a British colonial tradition of not imposing an "ethnic or political framework upon other peoples, but to encourage the emergence of local nationalisms and traditions—within the ambit, of course, of their own liberal assumptions" (Champion 2007: 26). A key element of his study is the critique of the view that the unification of the Canadian Forces under Defence Minister Hellyer was part of this break. By citing examples where British symbolic culture was continued and his analysis of Hellyer's motivations, he argues that unification was not intended "to destroy [British] tradition, but to build on it" (332). Tracing these symbols to the present day, the military is one of the best examples of the way this Canadianist national spirit appropriated the foundational British roots. It is important to note that his study concludes at the time of Trudeau's ascension to power. One of the implicit arguments of this dissertation, paralleling the view of Rudyard Griffiths, is that it was Trudeau and

¹⁰ Namely, Jose Igartua's *The Other Quiet Revolution: National Identities in English Canada, 1945-1971* (2006). This work is part of a trend that points to a cultural break between Pearson and Trudeau's new nationalism from the one rooted in Britain.

later Chrétien who corrupted Pearson's nationalist cultural agenda with unchecked postnationalist and progressivist symbolism—thereby overemphasizing the new Canada over the old British Dominion.

Returning to Kenney's citizenship guide, by no means does it overtly emphasize Britishness other than references to the Queen, the reminder that we were once the "Dominion of Canada" and exploring the country's colonial history. However, it displaces the historical view and iconography of the previous Liberal government authored guide, *A Look at Canada*. It emphasizes representations that position English-Canadian cultural and political traditions at the root of what it means to be a citizen. Again, the key word here is "displace" and not "replace" considering the many ways in which the guide reproduces the government realist project of depicting regional, linguistic and ethnic diversity. It should be noted that the section "Who We Are" reads much like the various NFB films described in Zoë Druick's work. As discussed in my analysis of Gwyn's explanation of the Remembrance Day boon, the intent is not to make Canadians ethnically Anglo-Saxon but to connect them to the country's roots, which just so happen to be British, as a way to construct a unified nationalistic spirit and to position the distinctively Canadian and cultural pluralistic symbolic culture within an ongoing national metanarrative.

The primary manner in which this displacement occurs is through the emphasis on the military and its past. It is through the military that the multicultural and pluralistic discourse gets infused with a homogenizing view of the citizen as rooted in the evolution of the national story. Exemplifying this tactic is page 9 of the guide (See Image 5). This page includes three sections that flow into one another: (1) in "The Equality of Women

and Men,” the message is that while Canada may be an open and tolerant country, this does not extend to “barbaric cultural practices that tolerate spousal abuse” such as honour killings and genital mutilation; (2) in “Citizenship Responsibilities,” the message is that while citizens have rights, this comes with great responsibility including maintaining the cultural heritage of the country for future generations; (3) in “Defending Canada,” the message is that while there may not be compulsory military service, serving in the Canadian Forces is not only a noble way to give back to the country but also an excellent career choice with the military’s recruitment website strategically included in parentheses. More than any other page, even those that describe military history or the section on Nunavut that mentions the important role of the Inuit Canadian Rangers, this one contains the core of the message for new and, for that matter, all Canadians:

(1) Canada’s tolerance has limits and it does not accept traditions that conflict with its Western (British) Judeo-Christian values → (2) Canadian citizens are responsible for incorporating these values and transmitting them to future generations → (3) The Canadian Forces is a key site to locate and absorb the traditions that enshrine these values

Supporting this narrative are the images depicted on the page. At the top one finds pictures that are not all that different from those in previous guides with a person of colour, women wearing hijabs, an elderly couple and an Asian Canadian. However, located below, under the section “Defending Canada,” are images of many of the same diverse populations, but here they are adorning military uniforms. Although despite the overt plea for recruitment, I think the message of this page and the guide in general is more metaphorical than literal. Just as wearing the military’s uniform is a noble way to contribute to Canada and finalize this process of becoming Canadian, so too is the awareness of the military and its traditions a way to fulfill one’s responsibility as a citizen

and fully become Canadian—adorning the trappings of the military represents the embodiment of the spirit of the military and acknowledging it as a formative part of one's citizenship. Similar to my allegorical reading of *Passchendaele*, it is through the military that one substantiates citizenship and loyalty to the nation. With this argument in mind, I return to Michaëlle Jean's appearance on Remembrance Day 2009.

Image 5 *Page 9 of revised citizenship education guide*

To appreciate Jean's symbolic gesture at the ceremony, it is necessary to consider this act in light of comments she made a few months earlier when she first adorned her uniform. At the Queen's Colour presentation ceremony in Halifax on June 27, Jean addressed a crowd of Canadian Forces' personnel. Here she acknowledged how proud she was in all of their accomplishments. She gave a rather candid speech in which she explained why she decided to adorn military fatigues:

I grew up under the yoke of a ruthless dictatorship, where the military uniform came to symbolize the brutal repression of the people, tyranny and massacres. Since becoming commander-in-chief of the Canadian Forces, I have had the opportunity to work alongside you — the women and men of this country who don the uniform... You can see how far I have come, from the child who saw her parents, her family, her friends grappling with the horrors of oppression, to the woman who stands before you today. And I can say before you now with absolute certainty that it is an honour and a source of great pride for me to wear your uniform (Jean, Speech, June 27, 2009).

Some might interpret this about-face as her simply coming to terms with the necessary duties of being the country's commander-in-chief especially at a time of war. However, I argue that this symbolic gesture was also about coming to terms with this revised representation of citizenship enshrined in Kenney's guide and part of a growing movement within the state. Like most Canadians, for so long the military not only played a very small role in her national identity, but it was also a source of shame and something to be repressed. The uniform was associated with all that was bad in the world and Canadians should be proud of their connotations with peacemaking and Trudeau's "reason over passion" nationalism. However, something happened over her tenure as governor general that made the military not only a source of pride, but also an element in which she could construct her sense of Canadianness and project it publicly.

Although media pundits and academics have interpreted Jean's transformation and the rise of this hardened symbolic culture as either an understandable response to troops being killed in Afghanistan or an achievement of Stephen Harper's government and the rise of a Canadian neoconservative movement, I take a different position. As this dissertation argues, while the Conservatives certainly entrench this representation into official governmental language and the reports of Canadian casualties might have acted as a catalyst, all of this stems from the formation of a military-cultural memory network that has its roots in the disintegration during the early 1990s of the Trudeauian consensus of representing Canada to Canadians. To miss this part of the story is to overlook the political economic and cultural changes that have made this representation possible. At the core of this network was the aim to convince the state that the military's warrior culture, and not just its anemic peacekeeping tradition, should be the central discourse in the representation of cultural memory and citizenship. On Remembrance Day 2009 with Kenney's guide and Michaëlle Jean's performance, we witness the culmination of a military-cultural memory network. Through the Dominion Institute, I chart its evolution. It is at this final juncture, as the network's organizational structure and influence on culture has become discernible, that I return to the five questions guiding this dissertation.

What was the historically grounded context of the Dominion Institute's network?

Following the tenets of Actor-Network Theory and discursive policy inquiry, my study into Canada's military-cultural memory network began by looking at moments of crisis and uncertainty. The most significant of which was the controversy surrounding the CBC's broadcast of the three-part TV series, *The Valour and the Horror*. This docudrama and the subsequent Senate inquiry set the ground for a larger dispute amongst

those that claimed a stake in military memory: politicians, historians, the cultural industry, the media, publicly-funded cultural institutions, educators, veterans and the military. Although it is misleading to suggest that this controversy had a direct impact on the emergence of the Dominion Institute and the formation of a military-cultural memory network, the miscommunication amongst key players and the animosity that underlay the public debate suggested the need for a facilitator and connector. The controversy over the TV series exemplified the problems that can arise when there is not an organized and coherent network. On the surface, this absence was located on a practical level such as a lack of military historians involved in a CBC production. However, on a deeper level, this absence of a network revealed itself in the communicative realm. Even though many actors claimed to want to preserve military memory for Canadian youth, there lacked a shared language over how to represent cultural memory and the mode of transmission.

While I raise this controversy that occurred during the early 1990s as a way to foreshadow the developments explored in this dissertation, it does not, in itself, explain the emergence of the Dominion Institute and its subsequent network. For this, one must explore a general state of crisis over the representations of public memory, the military and citizenship. I examined events such as the dispute within the history discipline with attacks on social history, the tarnishing of Canada's reputation as a peacekeeper with the Somalia Affair and debates over the limits of Trudeau's conceptualization of Canadian citizenship with controversies over multiculturalism. These trends of the late 1980s and early 1990s are important for two reasons. Not only do they highlight a general crisis over how Canada is represented to Canadians, but they also provide a platform for critics of the Trudeauian vision and the urgency behind new forms of representation. Some

individuals, who made a name as public intellectuals during this period including David Bercuson, Jack Granatstein and Richard Gwyn, would later become important actors in the Dominion Institute's network. However, this need to alter the representations of the military, memory and citizenship only became a priority for the government and the corporate community after the near dissolution of the country during the 1995 Quebec referendum. This event did not only provide a clear marker of a larger discursive crisis to those in power, but also it led to a new political economic framework. Similar to Lyle Dick's (2009) claim about the rationale behind the CBC's *Canada: A People's History*, a group such as the Dominion Institute may not have found funding if it was not for the urgency sparked by the sovereignty crisis. Interestingly, this event was more important in the framing of the discourse of the cofounders than in the formation of their ideology. Despite referring to this event in their literature and public appeals, my research found that the idea for the organization would have emerged with or without the referendum. This finding points to a key element that needs to be explored in future work: while I have explained the political economic context, I have not assessed the ideological roots.¹¹ It is clear that the rise of this organization was set in an ideological awakening taking shape within Canada's socio-political culture.

How has the Dominion Institute constructed its guiding storyline?

This dissertation argues that the Dominion Institute and the military-cultural memory network act within the communicative realm. First, the Dominion Institute's primary goal, as a think tank, is to influence the discourse that guides the content and

¹¹ Such a study would require a more detailed focus on the culture wars that occurred in Canada, and Ontario in particular, during the 1990s. While there has been many studies from an American perspective (see Todd Gitlin's *The Twilight of Common Dreams*), there is little attention on Canada beyond specific studies into areas such as museums or education.

mode by which cultural memory is constructed in Canada. Second, the network's goal is to alter the way in which Canadians, especially youth, imagine their country's military past in order to construct a certain view of public memory and civic identity. However, it is important to note that the Dominion Institute's emergence as a purveyor and facilitator of military memory was not necessarily a key element of its initial *raison d'être*. The Institute's discourse or, using the language of discursive policy inquiry, storyline must be viewed as a historical artefact. In other words, it developed over time. Its emergence was never set in stone. Instead, the storyline came out of a communicative process occurring within the network.

On one hand, the storyline was constructed to resonate with other key actors including financial supporters. As I learned in my interviews with Mark Chalifoux and Rudyard Griffiths, the Dominion Institute was organized around the principle that everything it does must rely upon whether others would be interested enough so that they provide funding. Unlike a foundation such as Historica or the CNHS who were both launched by large endowments, the Dominion Institute had to work on a project-to-project basis. The language that it used to present itself and its programs, as I explored in my study of the Donner proposal, was specifically constructed to connect with a neo-liberal, traditionalist view of Canada. On the other hand, the Institute was also organized in a manner that allowed it to incorporate the discourse of other allies and prominent Canadians. Its advisory council served as an important epistemic community leading to many important twists and turns in the story. Whereas Jack Granatstein was credited for influencing the focus on the cultural memory of youth, Richard Gwyn drew the attention of the cofounders to the link between Canada's warrior traditions and the construction of

a unified civic identity. However, as in the answer to the first question, missing from this exploration into the construction of its storyline is the issue of ideology.

Although the Institute emerged with the vague objective of strengthening the ethical life of English-Canada by constructing a common cultural literacy, it eventually emphasized Canada's warrior tradition as a key lens onto a shared citizenship. While I note the practical reasons for this shift as a means to enter the educational system and access funding, this does not explain why the military's warrior tradition had such great currency amongst those involved in the network. It is necessary to note that the Dominion Institute had also been involved in issues related to immigrants and Aboriginals. However, the question remains: Why was it through the military that the Dominion Institute was able to extend its reach and fund more expansive projects? To address this question, one might explore the hegemonic role of the military within the top circles of Canada's political¹², cultural, education and economic elite.

How was discourse used to draw the interest of necessary allies?

If the Dominion Institute's effort to build a network was a communicative act, then the most important rhetorical tool was the use of polling. I contend that the primary audience of these polls was not the general public; rather, polls were used to shape the language of other key actors and thus draw them into the network. My research found that the Dominion Institute and other actors within the network had a very specific idea of the groups and individuals they need to influence—success was not simply judged by

¹² One way of approaching such a study would be to examine Jean Chrétien's efforts following the 1995 referendum to construct Confederation Boulevard in Ottawa. Many of the museums and sites along this route emphasize Canada's warrior tradition. Understanding the decision and rationale to emphasize the military's symbolic culture in Ottawa at the turn of the 21st century might provide insight into the question: Why were the efforts to strengthen Canada's public memory and civic identity eventually infused with the attempt to revive the representation of the military.

attracting a mass audience, but by reaching out to key policymakers and individuals who can impact the state of public culture and education. Polls served many purposes: (1) they provided a sense of urgency; (2) they simplified complex issues; (3) they supported the arguments of policy initiatives. Most importantly, they turned the issue of cultural memory into a public policy problem that was discussed on the Dominion Institute's grounds. Moreover, they made this discussion worthy of national media coverage. In sum, polls were discursive devices meant to not only draw the interest of other key actors such as politicians, corporate leaders, historians, the cultural industry, educators and veterans, but they also were meant to shape the identities and roles of these actors. This process operated in two directions. First, the polls provided statistical evidence that others incorporated into their own discourse. Second, the polls were always supported by policy arguments that proposed viable solutions yet also communicated the limitations of other actors. As Callon (1986) notes, the formation of a network depends upon the realization by all actors that they cannot achieve what they want without acting within the network. He concludes that the ultimate realization of a network occurs when all actors incorporate the language of the obligatory passage point. The objective of network formation is ultimately communicative—to get others to use your language.

In this dissertation, I observed many instances in which key actors—politicians, the corporate community and veterans—have responded to the calls of the Dominion Institute by incorporating its language. However, not all have shown the same enthusiasm and level of interest. Education policymakers and curriculum scholars were never enticed by the Dominion Institute's storyline. As it turned out, the release of the 1998 Remembrance Day survey led to a fortuitous meeting between Griffiths and veteran

Grant McCrae. The meeting ultimately led to the launch of the Memory Project. Not only did this program allow the Institute to improve its financial standing, it also allowed it to circumvent the policymaking and scholarly community that restricted its access to teachers and youth. The lesson then is that networks are adaptable. Even though one important node was not interested in the discourse and approach of the obligatory passage point, the network found a way to expand and enter Canadian classrooms. Nonetheless, this failure to interest education scholars and policymaker raises the issue of a link between the discursive priorities of network building and the role of ideology. The gap between the Institute and the progressive, postmodernist education community has yet to be bridged. The question then is whether this is a result of one actor failing to realize the importance of a network or the boundaries set by conflicting ideologies.

How did actors perform their roles and contribute to the network's realization?

Whereas the realization of the network rests upon a discursive shift with other actors taking on the language of the obligatory passage point, its impact can only be observed in what Latour (1986) labels the performative view of sociology. A network cannot be studied as an isolated phenomenon that exists in the structural realm. Instead, a scholar must examine the actions of a network—the performances—in order to locate the traces of the ties that bind actors together. In my study, I focused on the Memory Project to isolate the performances of key actors: veterans, teachers, governmental institutions, politicians, the military and youth. This initiative, which brings veterans into the classroom and records the stories of veterans for future generations, exemplifies the logic of a network. The Dominion Institute's role is closer to that of a connector than a producer. As other actors perform the key actions, the Dominion Institute is the node that

connects these actors together. In this web of associations, most dutifully perform their roles as funders, content providers, service providers and supporters. From this perspective, the Memory Project marks a drastic shift from the state of military memory that underlay the early 1990s with the controversy over *The Valour and the Horror*. However, not all actors effectively perform their role.

Youth stand out from the rest as the one actor who does not anchor and dutifully perform its intended role. Despite the efforts of programs such as the Memory Project, the Dominion Institute's own polls find a continual lack of progress with respect to the cultural and civic literacy of Canadian youth. Although this might be interpreted as a failure of the network, I argue that it is symptomatic of its logic. Youth are absent from the workings of the military-cultural memory network beyond their inclusion in statistics and as an element for rhetoric. The network's primary objective is not to instill greater civic participation; instead, its aim is to alter the symbolic culture that underscores the representation of citizenship, cultural memory and the military. Whether youth actually incorporate this symbolic culture is less important than whether the symbolic culture shifts from a progressivist, postnationalist perspective to a hardened, unified and modernist worldview. This realization brings up the issue of ideology. Considering the continual failure of E.D. Hirsch's cultural literacy approach to civic education and yet the persistent support by the Dominion Institute, it is fair to question its ideology: Is the Dominion Institute misguided or is it intentionally proposing a mode of cultural transmission that does not improve civic participation? It is important to remember the Institute's initial rationale to challenge the Trudeauian, progressivist symbolic culture that had dominated the representation of Canada since the 1960s.

How did the Institute dominate the process of memory production and circulation?

I learned two important lessons in completing this dissertation. First, networks are ultimately discursive beings. They emerge out of a communicative process in which one or many nodes influence the language and identities of others and their objective is to alter the way in which something is discussed or represented—whether that is military memory, as in my study, or environmental policy, as in the work of discursive policy inquiry. Second, networks are historical beings. Networks not only emerge over a period of time, but they also tend to have a certain shelf life—what is here today may be different or even gone tomorrow. Therefore, it is necessary to incorporate Latour's performative view of society by focusing on specific events and moments in a network's development. In my study, I found that the ascendance of Canada's military-cultural memory network occurred around 2008-2009. Paul Gross' film *Passchendaele*, which was released in the fall of 2008, marks the mobilization of both the Institute's network and its discourse. Like the Memory Project, if the controversy over *The Valour and the Horror* signalled a lack of cooperation amongst those who staked a claim in military memory, then *Passchendaele* was a complete reversal: military historians were consulted, veterans were identified as an important audience, educators were given curriculum guides, the military played a direct role in the production, the cultural industry provided the necessary backings and the news media were cheerleaders. However, the presence of a group such as the Dominion Institute was also a marked difference from scene during the early 1990s. This group not only connected many of these actors together, but also it used polls to set the discursive context. It provided a shared language for why this film was necessary and why Canadians should support it.

The pinnacle of the Dominion Institute's arc occurred a year later during Remembrance Day of 2009. According to Callon (1986), a network is only truly successful when the obligatory passage point no longer needs to play a direct role. He suggests that this occurs when its discourse is so pervasive that others incorporate it without consciously being aware of this decision. The release of Minister Kenney's revised citizenship education guide and the appearance of Governor General Michaëlle Jean in a military uniform both mark this important development. Jean's performance, in particular, must be appropriately analyzed as not simply an insignificant act of a governor general in her final term. On the contrary, I argue that it signals a clear shift in the representation of Canada to Canadians. Jean's adornment of military trappings communicates a new view of civic identity—one that uses Canada's warrior tradition as a dominant lens in the construction of Canadianness.

Contrary to popular opinion such as Lawrence Martin's (2010) claim that Prime Minister Harper's focus on the military is an attempt to shift the nation's symbolic culture away from its association with the Liberal Party, I argue that the emphasis on a warrior tradition goes beyond the ideological boundaries between Liberals and Conservatives. I do not deny the significance of Harper's use of military symbolism within a larger project that includes the promotion of Conservative values such as being tough on crime and the symbolic revival of former Tory leaders such as Diefenbaker. However, there is something that separates the discourse over the military from these other efforts. What makes Jean's performance so significant is the awareness by many pundits of her progressivist, activist roots. If a person, who had once cherished Canada's unique place in the world as a nation that could shun military symbols, became wrapped up in this

representation, then this symbolic culture has truly become normalized. This leads to the final question that I leave for future study: Has Canada's warrior tradition reached hegemonic status within the nation's ideology?

The debate over Kenney's guide and critical reviews of Gross' film provide useful cases for answering this question. First, whereas Kenney's guide was criticized for not emphasizing Canada's achievements in gay rights, there was little discussion over the increased focus on the nation's warrior tradition. This criticism was largely pushed to the margins and can only be found in far-left media outlets such *The Tyee*. Second, whereas *Passchendaele* was criticized for either being overly melodramatic or not succeeding in the ambitious goal of making a Canadianized version of *Saving Private Ryan*, I have found no discussion over its attempt to reposition the nation's violent warrior past as a key site for the construction of civic identity. This situation may simply be explained by geopolitical circumstances with Canada's increased combat role in Afghanistan and the images of Canadian flags over the caskets of young men and women. However, it might also be explained by pointing to the efforts of groups such as the Dominion Institute and its network who have long been using the nation's warrior tradition as a dominant lens in the construction of Canada's cultural memory and civic identity. Regardless of whether one explanation is correct or if they both have merit, it is clear that at this point in time the nation's peacekeeping tradition is out and policing is back in vogue. How long this cultural trend lasts remains to be determined.

**Photo Essay:
Displacing the Peacekeeper**

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APPENDIX A: CHRONOLOGY OF MILITARY TEXTS IN CANADIAN CULTURE SINCE 1992

1992

- The Canadian branch of the International Institute for Peace through Tourism convinced CANADA 125 and the National Capital Commission (NCC) to organize the planting of peace parks across 400 cities and towns.
- The unveiling of the National Peacekeeping Monument in Ottawa across from the National Gallery of Canada.
- The CBC aired the controversial three-part television series *The Valour and the Horror*, which raised moral questions regarding Canada's participation in WWII.

1995

- The live broadcast of the 50th anniversary ceremony marking the end of WWII in which CBC newscaster Peter Mansbridge remarked: "there is no shortage of Canadian history. Our history is NOT dull. But we are dull-witted when it comes to learning about it" (qtd. in Miller 1997: 9).

1997

- The CBC aired the two-hour movie *Peacekeepers* about the attempt by a Canadian platoon to solve a web of disputes taking place in a Croatian village.

1998

- The Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs released its report on the quality of life within the Canadian Forces, which called on the Department of National Defence (DND) to better communicate the contributions of Canadian soldiers to the public.
- The Diefenbunker Museum was opened to the public to exhibit this former nuclear fallout shelter and to serve as Canada's Cold War Museum.
- The CBC aired two documentaries, *Dying to Tell the Story* and *The Unseen Scars*, which focused on the trauma experienced by soldiers and civilians who worked on UN missions.

2000

- The Tomb of the Unknown Soldier was moved from France to the newly renovated steps of the National War Memorial in Ottawa.

2001

- The National Aboriginal Veterans Monument was installed at the western entrance to Confederation Park in Ottawa.
- The completion of the \$30 million restoration of the Vimy Ridge monument in France.
- The Dominion Institute launched the Memory Project to record the experiences of war veterans and share these stories with Canadian youth.
- The establishment of the National Military Cemetery at Ottawa's Beachwood Cemetery.

- The Canadian Forces launched a new recruiting campaign, entitled “Strong. Proud. Today’s Canadian Forces,” which promoted the military as a place for youth to gain work experience.
- The Bank of Canada issued its new series of bank notes that included a \$10 bill depicting a female peacemaker and a Remembrance Day ceremony.

2003

- The Korean War Monument was erected beside the Mackenzie King bridge on the northern side of Confederation Park in Ottawa.
- The Juno Beach Centre was unveiled in Normandy, France to provide an interpretive history of the famous Canadian assault.

2005

- The opening of the new \$140 million building at the Lebreton Flats in Ottawa to house the Canadian War Museum.
- General Rick Hillier was appointed Chief of the Defence Staff and began a public campaign to communicate through the media in order to pressure politicians to provide more funding for the military and for Canada to be more aggressive in the global fight against terrorism.

2006

- Conceived by Hamilton Southam, The Valiants Memorial, which includes a number of statues of historical military heroes, was installed beside the National War Memorial.
- The reorganization and integration of the Military Museums in Calgary.
- The CBC launched the radio drama *Afghanada*, which follows a platoon of Canadian soldiers, 3-1 Bravo section, operating in Kandahar Province and led by a female officer, Sergeant Pat Kinsella.
- Canadian Forces introduced a new recruiting advertising campaign, entitled “Fight Fear. Fight Distress. Fight Chaos. Fight with the Canadian Forces,” which showcased aggressive weaponry and borrowed cinematic techniques from American war films and geopolitical thrillers.

2007

- The CBC aired Brian McKenna’s *The Great War* starring Justin Trudeau and a cast of descendants from WWI soldiers.
- Discovery Channel Canada aired the reality television show *Jeststream* about Canadian Air Force pilots learning to fly CF-18 Hornets.
- Ontario’s Ministry of Transportation renamed the stretch of Highway 401 (from Canadian Forces Base Trenton to the Centre of Forensic Science in Toronto) “Highway of Heroes” in response to a grassroots online petition campaign.

2008

- The release of Paul Gross’ \$20 million feature film *Passchendaele*, which drew funding and support from a wide range of private and government sources (the Government of Alberta, Telefilm, Alliance Films, the Dominion Institute, Canwest Global, Astral Media’s Harold Greenberg Fund and The Movie Network).

- Bill C-287 was unanimously passed by Parliament to mark August 9th as National Peacekeepers' Day.

2009

- The unveiling of the Chinatown Memorial Monument in Vancouver to honour the military contribution of Chinese Canadians.
- The completion of the Battle of Hong Kong Monument located along Sussex Drive in Ottawa.
- Discovery Channel Canada aired the reality television show *Combat School* that follows a group of Canadian Forces soldiers from basic training to combat missions in Afghanistan.
- Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism Minister Jason Kenney introduced the new study guide for Canadian citizenship, *Discover Canada: The Rights and Responsibilities of Citizenship*, which put an increased emphasis on military history.

2010

- The NCC announced the construction of the Canadian Navy Monument to celebrate the Navy's 100th anniversary.

APPENDIX B: A CHRONOLOGY OF THE DOMINION INSTITUTE

Date	Description
April 1, 1997	Official Launch of Dominion Institute
June 30, 1997	Canada Day Youth History Survey: Gauges historical knowledge of Canadians aged 18 to 24
September 23, 1997	Speech from Throne: Prime Minister Chrétien mentions the Youth History Survey
November 19, 1997	National Citizenship Exam: Uses similar questions to the citizenship exam offered to immigrants
July 1, 1998	2nd Annual Canada Day Survey: Gauges cultural literacy of Canadians
November 11, 1998	Remembrance Day Survey: Gauges military memory of Canadians
January 29-31, 1999	Giving the Past a Future Conference: Griffiths speaks on a panel with progressivist education scholars
May-June 1999	Our Heroes: A multimedia campaign including online poll and newspaper article series about historical heroes
June 1999	Great Canadian Questions: A 12-part newspaper essay series by famous Canadians on important issues
July 1, 1999	Canada Day Heroes Online Survey: Release of online poll of top 20 Canadian heroes
October 21, 1999	Launch of Historica: Charles Bronfman cites Dominion Institute polls as a reason for this new history foundation
November 11, 1999	Grant's War: Multimedia and in-class visit in Toronto-area schools about Grant McCrae's WWII experience
March 23, 2000	1st Lafontaine-Baldwin Lecture: John Ralston Saul speaks on why history matters for the present
July 1, 2000	Canada Day Quiz and Survey: Gauges knowledge of defining historical moments
August 2000	Great Events: Newspaper article series by famous authors about famous historical moments
September 18, 2000	Greatest Event in Canadian History Online Survey: Ranking what people think is greatest historical moment
November 8, 2000	Memory Project: Start of phase one focusing on Ontario veterans and launching the speakers' bureau
November 11, 2000	Memory Project Townhall: CBC Newsworld broadcasts a meeting between veterans and youth
March 9, 2001	2nd Lafontaine-Baldwin Lecture: Alain Dubuc speaks about dangers of nationalism
July 1, 2001	5th Annual Canada History Quiz: Counterposes knowledge about American and Canadian history
September 10, 2001	Part 1 Canadians' Views on History Education Survey: Gauges interest in a national history curriculum
September 15, 2001	Passages to Canada: In-class visits and multimedia program

	where successful immigrants tell their stories
October 19, 2001	Part 2 Canadians' Views on History Education Survey: History department heads' interest in a national curriculum
January 10, 2002	Prime Ministers Quiz and Poll: Gauges knowledge about prime ministers and interest in a Prime Minister holiday
January 2002	We need more heroes in Canada: Lets Start with John A: Media advocacy campaign for a Prime Minister holiday
January 23, 2002	Supermodels in Politics Committee: Cofounders help drag queen, Enza Anderson, in a Canadian Alliance candidacy
March 8, 2002	3rd Annual Lafontaine-Baldwin Symposium: George Erasmus speaks about contribution of aboriginal people
April 8, 2002	Vimy Ridge Quiz and Survey: Gauges knowledge about this famous battle
April 22, 2002	5 Year Anniversary: Exclusive guest list of 100 to celebrate
July 1, 2002	Canada Day Poll: Looks at attributes Canadians value
September 6, 2002	Facing the Century Project: Survey and multimedia project including
October 21-23, 2002	Louis Reil Retrial: CBC broadcasts retrial using famous Canadians but this time audience decides in favour of Riel
November 11, 2002	National Launch of the Memory Project: Romeo Dallaire gives keynote at the launch of next phase of this project
November 11, 2002	Remembrance Day Survey and Quiz: Gauges military memory and interest in more money for the Canadian Forces
January 3, 2003	Trial of Pierre Trudeau: News leaks of idea for the next TV trial about this famous leader but it doesn't lead anywhere
March 8, 2003	4th Annual Lafontaine-Baldwin Lecture: Beverly McLachlin speaks about language and human rights
June 6, 2003	Memory Project Digital Archive: Next phase focusing on D-Day and other WWII veterans
July 1, 2003	Annual Canada Day Quiz: Gauges knowledge of Canada's role in the world and international involvement
July 28, 2003	DND and Memory Project: Money injected to record stories of serving Canadian Forces personnel
August 23, 2003	The Globe and Mail's Memory Project: Solicits archival material from newspaper readers
September 10, 2003	Foreign Fields Project: Survey and multimedia project including TV documentary on Canada's declining global role
March 12, 2004	5th Annual Lafontaine-Baldwin Symposium: David Malouf talks about democracy and identity in Canada and Australia
April-June 2004	Youth Vote 2004 Survey: Gauges youth opinion of election issues
August 21, 2004	The Globe and Mail's Memory Project II: Joint program getting newspaper readers to send in artefacts
September 23, 2004	Grano Series: Rudyard Griffiths, separate from Dominion Institute, organizes this speaker series for Canadian elites

October 30, 2004	HMCS Chicoutimi Survey: Shortly after fire on the submarine, poll shows concerns about state of military
November 4-5, 2004	Defining the National Interest Conference: Policy meeting framed by national survey about military's future role
March 4, 2005	6th Annual Lafontaine-Baldwin Symposium: Louise Arbour speaks about legal rights and civic liberties
March 21, 2005	International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Survey: Looks at opinions on racism
April 7-9, 2005	Vimy Ridge Survey and Quiz: Gauges military memory and draws links between military past and present
April 12, 2005	Plains of Abraham Epic Poetry: Dominion Institute sponsors and aids Jack Mitchell's cross-Canada school visits
May 2-7, 2005	Stories of Remembrance: Newspaper articles series about military history written by famous Canadians
May 8, 2005	Memory Project Digital Archive Road Shows: Events to digitize oral histories and memorabilia
May 19, 2005	Queen's Gift: As part of a royal visit, a donation given to Memory Project in the name of Queen Elizabeth
June 30, 2005	Annual Canada Day History Quiz and Survey: Gauges knowledge of business and corporate history
July 26, 2005	Next Great Prime Minister: Announcement of a TV special to update the 10-year-old contest that normally uses essays
August 6, 2005	60th Anniversary of VJ Day: Newspaper series to lead up to this significant date
September 23, 2005	Canadian Values Study Survey: Gauges what values Canadian think make the country unique
October 10, 2005	Team Canada Mission: Rudyard Griffiths goes to Kandahar to meet Canadian troops as part of DND trip
October 19, 2005	Expansion of Passages to Canada: Launch of website to chronicle stories and effort to double number of speakers
October 31, 2005	The World in Canada: Demographics and Diversity in Canadian Foreign Policy Survey: Issues of foreign policy and national immigration issues
November 1, 2005	American Myths Survey and Media Project: Gauges public opinion on US in conjunction with newspaper series
November 11, 2005	Annual Remembrance Day Survey: Gauges military memory and blames poor state on social history
December 2005	Democracy Project: Youth election campaign to engage students in the election
December 6, 2005	Democracy Project Survey: Gauges youth opinion on election issues
January 14, 2006	Canada History Fund: News leaks about a fund to merge history groups but no follow-up after Liberals leave office
February 3, 2006	Prime Minister Survey and Quiz: Gauges knowledge of prime ministers and values Canadian look for in leaders
March 5, 2006	Memory Project Conference: A gathering of veterans, teachers

	and youth to sharpen speaking skills of veterans
March 10, 2006	Canadian Cities Survey: Gauges opinions of urban Canadian on major issues facing cities
March 10, 2006	7th Annual Lafontaine-Baldwin Lecture: George Elliot Clarke speaks about cities growing role in shaping the nation
June 13-15, 2006	Canada 2020: Griffiths part of a progressive, non-partisan centre created to provide policy options for decision makers
June 30, 2006	Canada in 2020 Survey: Asks Canadians to imagine what the nation will look like in 2020
July 1, 2006	Launch of Canada in 2020 Project: Newspaper articles by famous Canadians and multimedia dialogue campaign
August 24, 2006	Veterans Appreciation Days: Events to thank veterans instead of the solemn context of Remembrance Day
November 7, 2006	Last WWI Veteran Petition: Campaign to get Canadians to support a state funeral when last WWI vet passes away
March 2, 2007	Becoming Canadian Survey: Examines social engagement and attachment to Canada of immigrants
March 2, 2007	8th Annual Lafontaine-Baldwin Lecture: Adrienne Clarkson talks about the importance of immigration
March 16, 2007	Passages to Canada Grant: Federal money given to honour 60 th anniversary of UN Declaration of Human Rights
March 23, 2007	Red Ensign at Vimy Ridge Survey: Gauges opinion of whether the Red Ensign should be flown at Vimy
April 9, 2007	90th Anniversary of Vimy Ridge Survey and Quiz: Gauges military memory and knowledge of this famous battle
June 27, 2007	10th Anniversary of Dominion Institute: Party at Toronto's distillery district with prominent Canadians
July 1, 2007	Annual Canada Day Survey and Quiz: A 10-year benchmark showing declining historical knowledge
November 1, 2007	Dual Citizenship Survey: Finds that dual citizens are wealthier and more educated
November 10, 2007	Remembrance Day Quiz and Survey: Ten-year benchmark of military historical knowledge
February 17, 2008	Rudyard Griffiths Steps Down
June 6, 2008	D-Day Anniversary Survey: Shows importance of Memory Project in the life of veterans
July 1, 2008	101 Things About Canada Survey: Gauges what Canadians think best define their country
July 1, 2008	Canada-US Canada Day Quiz: Compares historical knowledge of Americans and Canadians
September 16, 2008	Youth Vote Survey: Gauges opinions of youth leading up to the election
October 10, 2008	Passchendaele in the Classroom: Campaign bringing educational guides and contests to raise profile of this film
October 17, 2008	Passchendaele Survey: Gauges military history knowledge and importance of cinema in building a nation's memory

November 6, 2008	Ontario Veterans Community Archive: Launch of program to focus on Ontario veterans
November 7, 2008	Remembrance Day Quiz: Gauges military history knowledge
November 20, 2008	Nation Builders Poll: Gauges knowledge of historical prime ministers
December 15, 2008	Constitutional Crisis Quiz: Gauges knowledge of Canada's constitutional process
March 2, 2009	Climate Change and Economic Crisis Survey: Explores the opinions by Canadians on these related topics
April 18, 2009	Who We Are: A Citizen's Manifesto: Griffiths publishes a book about his conceptualization of Canadian citizenship
June 4, 2009	Memory Project: Stories of the Second World War: The project expands to digitize artefacts and oral histories
June 15, 2009	Canadian History Report Card: Curriculum Analysis of High Schools in Canada: Evaluates provincial curriculum
June 29, 2009	Canadian Icons Canada Day Quiz: Uses style of Facebook to gauge youth's ability to recognize historical figures
September 8, 2009	Merger of Historica-Dominion Institute
November 2009	Take Two Minutes to Remember: Campaign to get offices and organizations to mark 2 minutes on November 11
November 2, 2009	American Myths Revisited Survey: Gauges opinions about the US especially with Obama now in power
November 11, 2009	Remembrance Day Survey: Gauges military historical knowledge and opinion of war in Afghanistan
November 12, 2009	Citizenship Guide: Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Kenney releases revised guide that drew on contributions from many associates of the Dominion Institute

APPENDIX C: LETTER OF INFORMATION

Date:

Dear _____,

My name is Howard Fremeth and I am a PhD candidate at Carleton University's School of Journalism and Communication. I am contacting you to request an interview to be used as information for my dissertation, which is entitled The Political Economy of the Memorialization of Military History: A Study of The Dominion Institute's Role in Canada's Military-Cultural Memory Network. My dissertation supervisor is Dr. Ira Wagman who is an Assistant Professor at Carleton University's School of Journalism and Communication.

The reason that I am contacting you is to conduct an interview to discuss the role of your organization in the creation and circulation of cultural forms about Canadian military history. Specifically, my dissertation traces the many groups and institutions involved in the creation of cultural forms about this history from the early 1980s to the present. Although you will receive no financial benefit for participating in the interview, the information you provide will help document an important part of Canadian media history and cultural policy. I anticipate that the interview will not present any risks to you. Although your name, position and organization will be identified, you retain the right to request that any comment or opinion not be attributed to you.

I request from you only one interview that will last for a minimum of one hour. The interview will take place at a location of your choosing and any time limits you stipulate will be respectfully followed. In the case that a location and time cannot be arranged, you can also accept to conduct a telephone interview. If you are not comfortable with some of the information discussed then you can request within 30 days after the interview for the record to be deleted. If you elect to withdraw your information, **this will be considered a complete withdrawal from the study**. Moreover, you can request to receive an electronic copy of the dissertation once my committee and Carleton University's Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research approve the document. Unless you request an additional session, there will be no follow-up interviews.

Attached to this letter are a series of sample questions that will help you decide whether you are comfortable to participate in the interview. Keep in mind that the interview will be recorded in a digital audio format and stored by the researcher in a specially arranged

external hard drive. In addition, the information you provide will be accredited to you and will only be used in this particular dissertation as well as any publications that result from this research project.

Please note that this project has already been reviewed and received clearance from the **Carleton University Research Ethics Board**. If you request further information from this board, then please contact the chair, Dr. Antonio Gualtieri, at ethics@carleton.ca or (613) 520-2517.

I, _____ have read the above letter and I understand that I am participating in a research project, which I voluntarily agree to participate.

Sincerely,

Howard Fremeth
PhD Candidate
School of Journalism and Communication
Carleton University
Ottawa, ON
Phone:
Email: hfrethem@connect.carleton.ca

APPENDIX D: LIST OF INTERVIEWS

In Person:

Desmond Morton. Past Director, McGill Institute for the Study of Canada. April 14, 2010. Montreal Quebec.

Marc Chalifoux. Executive Vice-President, Historica-Dominion Institute. March 19, 2010. Toronto, Ontario.

Jack Granatstein. Military Historian and Advisory Committee Member, Dominion Institute. May 5, 2010. Toronto, Ontario.

JDM Stewart. History Teacher, Bishop Strachan School. May 5, 2010. Toronto, Ontario.

John Wright. Senior Vice-President, Ipsos-Reid. May 6, 2010. Toronto, Ontario.

Rudyard Griffiths. Cofounder, Dominion Institute. May 12, 2010. Toronto, Ontario.

Bob Butt. Director of Communications, Royal Canadian Legion. May 25, 2010. Ottawa, Ontario.

Niv Fichman. Founder, Rhombus Media. June 16, 2010. Toronto, Ontario.

Over the Telephone:

Allan Gotlieb. Chairman, Donner Canadian Foundation. May 19, 2010.

Antony Anderson. Filmmaker, National Dream Productions Inc.. May 27, 2010.

Christopher Moore. Historian. July 30, 2010.

David Bercuson. Director of Programs, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute. August 15, 2010.

Christopher Sweeney. Board Member, Vimy Foundation. August 20, 2010.

Erik Penz. Cofounder, Dominion Institute. August 20, 2010.

Sheila O’Gorman. Associate Producer, *Passchendaele*. November 8, 2010.

APPENDIX E: RESEARCH INSTRUMENT (DRAFT INTERVIEW GUIDE)

Military and Cultural Historians:

1. What role has the military played in portraying itself to the Canadian public through cultural forms and products such as recruitment advertisements, involvement in military history representations and producing their own media products about military history?
2. What is the connection between the strategic environment facing the Canadian military and the way military history is created and circulated for the public?
3. How have the official histories produced by the Department of National Defence shaped the academic and popular approaches to Canadian military history?
4. What organizations and institutions do the government and the military work with to engage the Canadian public through the media and popular culture?

Representatives/Spokespersons of Media Companies:

1. What private and public institutions does your company work with when they produce a particular cultural product (film, TV, radio, and website) about Canadian military history?
2. How does creating and circulating cultural forms about Canadian military history affect the way in which your company receives government subsidies as well as private funding through philanthropic sources?
3. What marketing techniques does your company use to inform the Canadian public about these cultural forms?
4. How do audiences respond to cultural forms about Canadian military history?

Representatives/Spokespersons of Citizenship Groups:

1. What role does your group play in the creation and circulation of cultural forms about Canadian military history?
2. How does your organization engage Canadian citizens to learn more about the country's military history?
3. What is the relationship between a citizen's understanding of their country's military history and how they engage with contemporary military and strategic issues?
4. What challenges does your organization see as detrimental to the awareness of Canadians of their military history?

Representatives/Spokespersons Government Cultural Funding Departments and Organizations:

1. Does your organization actively encourage the creation and circulation of cultural forms about Canadian military history?
2. What are the main challenges to the creation and circulation of cultural forms about Canadian military history?
3. Is the Canadian military or any other government institutions involved in creation and circulation of these cultural forms?
4. How does your organization evaluate or prepare for cultural forms that it funds or supports which later lead to public controversies?

Representatives of Museums and Memorials:

1. What public and private organizations, endowments, and institutions does your museum/monument work with to portray Canada's military history?
2. What types of representations and portrayals of Canadian military history do visitors respond to?
3. How does the audiovisual material about your museum/monument get produced?
4. What is the relationship between your museum/monument and the Canadian military as well as other government departments such as Veterans Affairs and the Department of National Defence?

Representatives of Veterans Organizations:

1. How does your organization contribute to the creation and circulation of cultural forms about Canadian military history?
2. Is the promotion of Canadian military history important for your organization and for what reasons?
3. How does your organization respond to cultural forms produced about Canadian military history in which its members do not agree with?
4. How do members of your organization participate and react to your educational campaigns?

Representatives of Educational Associations

1. How does your association support the circulation of cultural texts and products such as films and audio recordings about Canadian military history?
2. What are the challenges to the promotion of Canadian military history within and outside of the classroom?
3. Are there other organizations that your association works with to promote Canadian military history?
4. How does your association respond to cultural forms about Canadian military history that are controversial?

Representatives of Crown Corporations Involved in Culture

1. How does your institution's mandate and administrative oversight affect the way in which it creates and circulates cultural forms about Canadian military history?
2. Does your institution work with other organizations to create and circulate cultural forms about Canadian military history?
3. How does your institution respond to controversies that result from the creation and circulation of contentious cultural forms about Canadian military history?
4. How does the creation and circulation of cultural forms about Canadian military history differ from other cultural texts and products?