

Thieves, *Kabadayıs*, and Revolutionaries on the Margin
A Social History of the Police in the Altındağ Slums
in Ankara, Turkey (1920s-1970s)

by

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Abstract

This thesis analyzes the historical marginalization of the Altındağ *gecekondu* (squatter) region in Ankara, Turkey from the 1920s to the 1970s in the context of capitalist urbanization. The analysis is developed through a critical exploration of the social history of the police that becomes pivotal for the materialization of state power on the urban margins. Deploying a dialectical analysis of the historical matrix of the police, class, and urban space, the thesis reveals the contradictory character of police power shaped by various forms of social, spatial, and political contestations. A tripartite, historically constituted, analytical framework is offered for a radical critique of police power comprised of distinct forms of struggle that reflect the fundamental concerns and foundational contradictions haunting modern police science in the management of capitalist modernity: (1) struggles over urban space; (2) struggles over forms of subsistence; and (3) struggles over a moral order. The thesis explores how these three forms of struggle historically condition the making of social criminality as a practice of subsistence and the production of popular illegality which manifests as an inarticulate and subversive form of moral order on the urban margin. The thesis further explores the cathartic association of social marginality with radical politics in the context of the *gecekondu* struggles in the 1970s. This reading of police power exposes a relational perspective that acknowledges the historical agency of subordinate classes in the formation and contestation of capitalist modernity. Finally, it is argued that a dialectical critique of police power provides a significant political and theoretical medium through which a radical critique of capitalist modernity from below can be formulated.

To the wretched of Altındağ

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AKP	<i>Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi / Justice and Development Party</i>
AP	<i>Adalet Partisi / Justice Party</i>
CHP/CHF	<i>Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Fırkası) / Republican People's Party</i>
DİSK	<i>Türkiye Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu / Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions of Turkey</i>
DP	<i>Demokrat Parti / Democratic Party</i>
DEV-GENÇ	<i>Devrimci Gençlik / Revolutionary Youth</i>
DEV-SOL	<i>Devrimci Sol / Revolutionary Left</i>
DEV-YOL	<i>Devrimci Yol / Revolutionary Path</i>
HTK	<i>Hür Teşebbüş Konseyi / Council of Free Enterprise</i>
IMF	International Monetary Fund
İTC	<i>İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti / Committee of Union and Progress</i>
MC	<i>Milliyetçi Cephe / Nationalist Front</i>
MHP	<i>Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi / Nationalist Movement Party</i>
MDD	<i>Milli Demokratik Devrim / National Democratic Revolution</i>
MSP	<i>Milli Selamet Partisi / National Salvation Party</i>
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ODTÜ	<i>Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi / Middle East Technical University</i>
POL-BİR	<i>Polis Birliği / Police Union</i>
POL-DER	<i>Polis Derneği / Police Association</i>
THKO	<i>Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu / People's Liberation Army of Turkey</i>
THKP	<i>Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Partisi / People's Liberation Party of Turkey</i>

THKP-C	<i>Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi / People's Liberation Party-Front of Turkey</i>
TİP	<i>Türkiye İşçi Partisi / Workers' Party of Turkey</i>
TKP	<i>Türkiye Komünist Partisi / Communist Party of Turkey</i>
TKP/ML	<i>Türkiye Komünist Partisi/Marksist-Lenininst / Communist Party of Turkey/Marxist-Lenininst</i>
TÜRK-İŞ	<i>Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu / Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions</i>
TÜSİAD	<i>Türk Sanayicileri ve İş İnsanları Derneği / Turkish Industry and Business Association</i>
US	United States

TURKISH ORTHOGRAPHY AND PRONUNCIATION

The characters and pronunciations that differ most significantly from those in English are as follows:

C, c	“j” as in “joy”
Ç, ç	“ch” as in “chair”
Ğ, ğ	lengthens the sound of the preceding vowel
J, j	“s” as in “measure”
I, I	“e” as in “open”
İ, I	“ee”, as in “keep”
Ö, ö	“eu”, same as unlauded “ö” in German, similar to “fur”
Ş, ş	“sh”, as in “show”
Ü, ü	“e”, as in “new”

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1. Altındağ: A narrative on the margin

[IN CHORUS]

*Konduları yıkılmaktan korudu
Su getirdi, alantrik kodurdu
Yol yaptırdı, dokuz çeşme açtırdı
Ele güne bizi adam saydırdı*

He saved the squatters from demolition
He brought water, turned on the electricity
He ensured street construction, opening of nine fountains
He made us respected in the eyes of everybody

...

*Beyler tuzağından kurtulamadı
Lüveri çalındı toplayamadı
Zilhayı doyarak koklayamadı
Namertçe vuruldu koç Ali*

He could not save himself from the trap of roughnecks
His glock [gun] was stolen, he could not recover
He could not smell Zilha [his beloved] as much as he wanted
The brave Ali was shot cowardly

(Taner 2015 [1964], pp. 103-104).

Written in 1964, *Keşanlı Ali Destanı* [*The Ballad of Ali from Keshan*] is a theatre play by the renowned Turkish author Haldun Taner. It represents the first and most famous piece of epic theatre in Turkey. *The Ballad of Ali from Keshan* gained widespread artistic and popular admiration both within and outside the country and has been performed by numerous national and international theatre companies since. In this regard, *The Ballad* also serves as a foundational reference point by which we may glean important social and historical contexts for the analysis of social marginalization and police formation in Ankara that is to follow in the remainder of this thesis.

The play was based on ethnographic research that the author undertook on the much debated murder of Kürt Cemali, a *kabadayı*, who was an historical figure and a neighborhood tough that enjoyed popular legitimacy while engaging in an illicit network of urban plunder in Ankara during the 1950s.¹ The murder of Kürt Cemali in 1962 at a coffee house in Ulus, Ankara's historic city center, triggered popular resentment by the Kurdish communities living in the Altındağ *gecekondu*² (squatter) neighborhoods at the time. The local newspapers reported that about five thousand people gathered in front of the Ankara Court House and demanded Kabadayı Mehmet, who killed Kürt Cemali, be handed over to the people (Yurdakul 2012, p. 112).

The murder was indeed a symptom of greater social rivalries among *kabadayıs* that turned Ulus into a “theatre of war” during the 1950s and 1960s (Özmen 2015, p. 49; Soyluer 1995, p. 45; Yurdakul 2012, pp. 52-53). The *kabadayıs* vied for an extensive network of illicit affairs involving the organization of gambling, the trading of weed, and the extraction of tribute from brothels, pavilions and other places of entertainment in Ankara (Kemal 1982, p. 8). The

¹ The notion of *kabadayı* is etymologically composed of two words: *kaba*, meaning vulgar, and *dayı* referring to maternal uncle. It is still used in popular culture as a representation of a historical figure that carries the characteristics of a “swashbuckler” and maybe a bully. It is reminiscent of the social actors of the urban underworld that can be found in other national contexts, for example *penose* in Dutch, *mob* in English, *le milieu* in French, and *ganoven* in German (Johnson 2001, p. 47; Yeşilgöz & Bovenkerk 2004, p. 203; see also Hatip-Karasulu 2005; Muhidine 2017; Övür 1995).

² The notion of *gecekondu* literarily means “built-overnight” denoting the spatio-temporal dynamics of the making of informal settlements in the capitalist urbanization trajectory of Turkish social formation. Originally emerged as part of the makeshift economy of the urban poor, the *gecekondu* phenomenon has been one of the most contested issues in Turkey's experience with capitalist modernity. There is, therefore, a distinct field of *gecekondu studies* in Turkey since the 1950s, which have in time received an extensive volume of contributions from numerous disciplines including urban studies, sociology, political science, anthropology, and economics. For a critical examination of the changing scholarly representations of the *gecekondu* phenomenon, see the rigorous survey by Erman (2001).

Ankara landscape, and especially Ulus as the center of the social and commercial life at the time, were demarcated into zones of plunder among different *kabadayı* figures.

As reflected in the stanzas above, and despite their illicit affairs, or as this thesis will contend, precisely because of these illicit affairs, the *kabadayis* seemed to enjoy considerable social agency within legitimate frontiers of what E.P. Thompson would call “the moral economy” (1971) of the urban poor. After all, as exemplified in the case of Kürt Cemali, they contributed to the provision of some basic social services like shelter, water, and electricity for the *gecekondu* poor living in the Altındağ region. They also ensured the safety of the neighbourhoods in their zones of influence with their role as “the relief valve” (Özmen 2015, p. 41) in overseeing public order and settling disputes. *The Ballad* thus provides us with a lyrical presentation of the social function of the *kabadayis* in the moral economy of the urban poor in Ankara, which seems to present a historical case of “social banditry” in a capitalist urban context, as Eric Hobsbawm would put it (1959; 1969; 1972). Performed in chorus at the end of the play, the second stanza resembles a popular requiem for the “righteous *kabadayı*” of Altındağ.³

The Ballad indeed represents a powerful exposition of a Brechtian critique of the *gecekondu* phenomenon that increasingly characterized the contested trajectory of capitalist modernity and urban life in Turkey by the 1960s. The making of *gecekondu* was the historical repercussion of the social and economic dislocations that radically transformed Turkish social

³ Taner was not alone in this regard. The local signing artist Nuri Sesigüzel composed and performed a requiem for Kürt Cemali, which echoed in the streets and coffee houses of the Altındağ neighbourhoods throughout the 1960s.

formation in the post-WWII period. Conditioned under the world-historical context of the integration of Turkey into the Western Bloc, a historical phenomenon reflecting the contested dynamics of Cold War geopolitics, Turkish society experienced massive processes of urbanization against a backdrop of dispossession for the Anatolian peasantry, their subsequent migration to urban centers, and the formation of squatter neighbourhoods at dramatic rates (see Balaban 2011; Demirtaş 2009; Şengül 2003; see also Danielson & Keleş 1985; Karpaz 1976; Kongar 1986). Exposing the social problems of poverty, deprivation and associated subaltern experiences on the urban margin, *The Ballad* thus presents a rich historical-anthropological insight into the daily lives of the *gecekondu* poor. Here is a striking description of the *gecekondu* living, which paints a colourful picture out of the irreducible complexity and heterogeneity of the social, cultural and spatial dynamics characterizing the urban margin of the national capital:

[IN CHORUS]

*Sineklidağ burası
Şehre tepeden bakar
Ama şehir irakta
Masallardaki kadar*

Here is Sineklidağ [*fly-filled mountain*]
It looks on the city from the hills
Yet the city is beyond reach
As the one in tales

*Her cins insan var burada
Çalışkanı tembeli
Dört bucaktan gelmişler
Hırlı hırsız serseri*

All kinds of people reside here
Hardworking and lazy
They've come from far and wide
Thief, vagrant, and the like

*Lazı Kürdü Pomağı
Maraşlısı Vanlısı
Erzincanlı Kemahlı
Hepsi kader yoldaşı*

Laz, Kurdish and Pomak
People from Maraş, from Van
From Erzincan, from Kemah
All are companions of destiny

(Taner 2015 [1964], p. 19).

These stanzas provide us with a deep sense of the socio-cultural dynamics of the *gecekond* living in Sineklidağ, the literary representation of the Altındağ region in Ankara. This literary reconstruction of Altındağ exposes its material and symbolic place in the national capital. A spatial distance characterizes the very existence of the region, which “looks on the city” with the tremulous consciousness that “it is beyond reach” as in the case of the stories on affluent lands narrated in tales. This fundamental spatial contradiction is juxtaposed to another characteristic of the region, which can be summed as the radical socio-cultural heterogeneity of the subaltern classes. “Coming from wide and far”, the Altındağ region was composed of various ethnic communities that characterized the heterogeneity of the Anatolian peoples, a socio-historical phenomenon that was fundamentally at odds with the monolithic project of identity-making that determined the trajectory of the Turkish nation-state building since the early twentieth century.⁴

The cultural heterogeneity of Altındağ is also compounded with an interesting exposition of the social composition of the region through the characterizations of the urban poor with reference to such expressions as “hardworking and lazy” and “thief, vagrant, and the like.” These expressions are not merely a literary choice in the author’s epic narrative. On the contrary, they expose important facets of the historical reality of social marginalization that conditioned the practices in which the Altındağ poor engaged on the urban margin. In this

⁴ This is reflected in the title of Taner’s epic piece as well. Whereas the author explicitly narrates the story of Kürt Cemali and the Altındağ region, he preferred to name his play “Ali from Keshan” referring to a district in the north-west part of the country. Representing an example of self-censorship, this attitude reinforces the historical eradication of the Kurdish presence from the public sphere at large. For, in an interview in 1984, Taner acknowledged that the play would not be performed “if [he] had used the name of Kürt Cemali”. This issue has indeed been an object of heated debates, and the demands for the recognition of the Kurdish origin of this art work have been recurrently raised (see Kaya 2011).

regard, the illicit affairs of *kabadayıs* seemed to be integrated into a much broader network of social relations characterized by what Michael Foucault might call “popular illegality” (1995, pp. 83-84). *The Ballad*, therefore, presents the Altındağ region as a dynamic “site of practice,” through which alternative forms of popular organization emerged on the basis of “the pressing needs of [the] populations to secure political and economic survival” (Das & Poole 2004, p. 8).

If we perceive the phenomenon of popular illegality as a dynamic and relational process conditioning the making of the urban margin, we need to raise the following fundamental question: where is the state amidst this complex social space of subaltern living and contestations? *The Ballad* provides us with some insight into encounters with state power in the context of the *gecekondu* living in Altındağ (Taner 2015 [1964], p. 19):

[IN CHORUS]:

Devlet bizlen uğraşır
Polis bizlen hırlaşır
Ağalar leş kargası
Sus parası sızdırır

The state fights against us
The police wrangle us
The landlords are carrion crows
Seizing hush money

With this stanza, the story of Altındağ becomes much more complicated as it exposes various forms of contestations on the urban margin that seem to condition the everyday lives of the subaltern classes. Whereas the state assumes an aggressive and intrusive role on the urban margin, its presence seems to be materialized through police power. Historically speaking, such a representation exposes the initial response of the state to the *gecekondu* phenomenon in the country, which was characterized by a politics of denial and demolition. Articulated into an exclusionary discourse that criminalized and marginalized

the *gecekondu* population as “the rural other”, this state strategy was mainly concerned with ensuring law and order in the city, conceived as the cradle of a civilized and modern social life. The *gecekondu* poor, therefore, were perceived as potential threats to an urban modernity in the making (Demirtaş 2009, p. 75; see also Bozdoğan & Kasaba 1997; Erman 2001).

The quoted verses above also expose a peculiar dynamic of urban plunder that contribute to the making of social relations of power on the margin. “Seizing hush money,” the landlords assumed a historically decisive, albeit socio-economically and politically contested roles in the capitalist urbanization of Turkey. Organizing themselves through informal and extra-legal networks of urban plunder, they exploited the characteristic informality of *gecekondu* settlements as an opportunity for the extraction of urban rent. Popularly known as “*gecekondu* mafia”, they played considerable roles in the process of the commodification of public lands throughout the 1960s and 1970s (Erman 2011, p. 77). This chorus, therefore, reveals the rather contested character of the *kabadayı* phenomenon in its relations to the urban poor in the context of popular illegality shaping social relations of power on the margin. The violence of urban plunder seemed to get reproduced through various forms with contradictory social function of the *kabadayıs*.

This thesis aims to develop a comprehensive historical analysis of the making of the Altındağ *gecekondu* region in order to reveal the complex articulation of contestations characterizing the urban margin of Ankara. I develop this analysis based on a critical exploration of the social history of the police, that I contend was decisive in the materialization of state power in the Turkish capital. The thesis problematizes police power as an essentially contradictory and contested form of political power that is materialized through everyday

forms of state formation (*à la* Sayer 1994). Exposed as a “concrete abstraction” (*à la* Lefebvre), police power is analyzed in the context of the historical matrix of the state, class and space (*à la* Wacquant 2008, p. 2) in the formation of the Altındağ *gecekondu* region in Ankara. *A critique of police power* provides us with a significant political and theoretical medium through which *a radical critique of capitalist modernity from below* might be articulated.

2. Ankara: The utopia of Turkish modernity

Altındağ emerged as one of the first *gecekondu* regions in Turkey from the 1920s onwards, immediately after the foundation of the Republic. Being the political, ideological, and spatial symbol of the capitalist modernization project in Turkey, Ankara was radically transformed from a small Anatolian town to the capital city of a peripheral country. The spatial construction of the national capital was symbolic in the eyes of the early Republican regime. It represented a historic claim to independence and modernization for a war-torn country. The early Republican imagination of nation-building engineered a radical process of creative destruction in the nascent capital, transforming it into a “social construction site” (Şenol-Cantek 2016, p. 21) for an assertive project of modernization via strategic deployment of urban planning in the 1920s and 1930s. Ankara was envisaged as a politico-spatial terrain through which a new, modern society would be born, with its new citizenry in tow. The politics of urban planning were thus organically linked to the political projects of space-making, nation-building, and the fabrication of a new and “civilized” citizenry (Bozdoğan 2001; Kezer 2015; Sarioğlu 2001; Şengül 1998; Şenol-Cantek 2016; Tankut 1990; Tekeli 1982). Ankara was envisaged as the utopia of Turkish modernity that reflected the foundational ambitions of the new regime

for attaining political independence and economic development. In fact, Ankara as an urban project represents one of the earliest examples of modern city planning by an independent state outside Western Europe or the US (Payne 1984, p. 210). This peripheral utopia was thus fundamentally *urban*, conceived as the cradle for a civilized and secular life, with its symbolic and material manifestations in the form of urban planning, architectural and spatial structures designed for the new Republican citizenry.

The making of Ankara as a peripheral utopia of capitalist modernity, however, has been haunted by the fundamental question of class, with its social, cultural, political, and spatial challenges. Structural transformations involved the dissolution of agrarian relations, rapid migration to urban centers, and unplanned and dramatic urbanization processes, which played decisive roles in the formation of Altındağ as one of the largest regions of squatter settlements in Turkey. By the mid-2000s, Altındağ was considered the twenty fifth largest mega-slum in the world (Davis 2006, p. 28), a phenomenon resembling the *favelas* of Brazil or *villa miserias* of Argentina. Some neighbourhoods in the Altındağ region such as Çiñin Bağları, Yenidoğan, and Aktaş have long been known as “dangerous places” due to the historical concentration of petty crime. For instance, in her monograph entitled *Hüznün Çoşkusu Altındağ [Altındağ: The Vigor of the Sorrow]*, feminist author and trade unionist Yaşar Seyman describes Çiñin Bağları as “the criminal record document of Ankara” (Seyman 1986, p. 82).

The very character of social marginality, however, has been especially transformed since the 1990s. Conditioned within the broader neoliberal processes of criminalization and marginalization, the region has been harbouring organized and para-militarized forms of crime involving street gangs, drug dealing, armed clashes, etc. We might argue, therefore, that the

Altındağ *gecekondu* neighbourhoods have been going through a much contested process of “advanced marginality” during the contradictory neoliberal transformation of Turkey, as Loïc Wacquant would put it (2008). Considering the *permanent* character of its marginalized social space, the Altındağ region might best be characterized as “the constitutive outside” (*à la* Butler 1993, p. 3) of the national capital, representing the material as well as imaginary (urban) *margins* of the social order fashioned since the early Republican period. In other words, what makes Altındağ an historically and politically significant social space is the fact that it arguably represents a paradigmatic repudiation of Turkey’s capitalist modernity project at its very heart, within its capital city. This thesis, therefore, builds its critical analysis against the backdrop of the historical formation of the national capital. Its narrative on Altındağ represents a historically grounded critique of the capitalist modernity project undertaken in Turkey’s political center.

Despite its historical significance and socio-spatial centrality in the national capital, the literature on Ankara has long been silent on the making of the Altındağ *gecekondu* neighborhoods especially concerning the issue of social marginalization, and associated problems of crime, policing, and urban order. Reflecting a resonance of the neoliberal processes of social marginalization in the sphere of academia, however, we see a resurgence of scholarly interest on the region in the last two decades. There are now plenty of studies, theses, and research projects covering the issues of crime and poverty in the Altındağ *gecekondu* region. The majority of them, however, are informed by policy-oriented perspectives, which do not question the social conditions and historical constitution of *criminality* and *urban poverty*, but uncritically accept the dominant state discourse, and in turn

attempt to provide functional solutions to the social problems in question largely within a moralistic and conservative-authoritarian jargon of “social explosion”. Such studies not only reproduce dominant ideological representations of the marginalized sectors of the urban poor, which are a part of neoliberal politics of criminalization, they also employ the *epistemic violence* (à la Spivak 1994) by a middle-class, Turkish academia on the *research subjects* perceived and indeed discursively re-constituted as something to be governed politically.⁵

3. The thesis problem: Police power on the margin

This thesis aims to develop a comprehensive analysis of the making of the Altındağ *gecekondu* region with reference to the social history of the police. I do not intend to produce *a monographic history of Altındağ* that documents its entire complexity on social, cultural, and spatial grounds. Considering the silence of the existing literature, such a research agenda would be highly interesting and productive in terms of contributing to the recently growing socio-spatial history of Ankara (see Şenol-Cantek 2006; 2016; 2017). However, I am instead particularly concerned herein with developing a critical analysis of the making of the Altındağ region in the context of the formation of capitalist modernity and urban order during the historical period from the 1920s to the 1970s.

Drawing extensively on the recently growing social history research on policing, crime, urban marginality and associated processes of state formation, I argue that a critique of police

⁵ Produced by a research team from Gazi University and financially supported by Ankara Development Agency, the report titled *Altındağ’ın Sosyo-Kültürel Dokusu (The Socio-Cultural Fabric of Altındağ)* provides a paradigmatic example in this regard (see Erdem 2011).

power provides us with an important analytical, theoretical and political medium through which we might engage in a radical critique of capitalist modernity from below. As revealed through an increasing volume of critical scholarly works, modern policing has assumed a central role in the political fabrication, as well as the contested reproduction of capitalist modernity in everyday life (Emsley 2005; Harring 1983; Hunt 1999; Monkkonen 1981; Neocleous 1996; 2000; Rigakos et al. 2009; Rigakos 2016; Storch 1976; 1981; Valverde 2008). This last assertion connotes a particular reading of police power that I depend on throughout the thesis, which needs to be understood at the outset.

Grounded in an historical materialist perspective, this thesis develops a dialectical analysis of the formation of the police in the context of its social, political, and spatial contestations. In this regard, the thesis distances itself from the reified conceptions of modern police that conceive police power either as a mere instrument of class rule, or a neutral organization charged with the universal enforcement of law. Reflecting the historical consolidation of bourgeois hegemony in capitalist modernity, the latter position has rested on a strategy of concealing the domination of capital reinforced through various policing forms and practices. As evidenced in the vast critical literature on the social history of policing and crime, police power cannot be subsumed under an ideological category of crime prevention and law enforcement (see Cohen 1981; Miller 1986; Reiner 2000; Silver 1967). It instead represents an administrative form of capitalist state power historically mobilized for the political fabrication of a particular social order based on the wage relation as the only means of subsistence (Neocleous 1996; 2000; Rigakos et al. 2009; Rigakos 2016).

The thesis is also distanced from an instrumentalist reading of police power. As I will analyze throughout the following chapters, the class problem has haunted modern police since its inception. That is why Patrick Colquhoun's "general police system" (Rigakos et al. 2009) has been an indispensable component of capitalist modernity tied to the geopolitically combined and socio-economically uneven formation of the global capitalist order. Modern policing has assumed a central role in the fabrication and reproduction of capitalist social relations through long and contested processes since the seventeenth century. Its consolidation, however, in a *bourgeois political form* in the long nineteenth century is of critical significance on political, theoretical, and methodological grounds. Modern police are oft characterized as an impersonal and impartial organization of political power. This form is rooted in the separation of *state power* and *class power* in modern capitalist societies. Fetishized in character, this separation implies an historically specific form of surplus extraction grounded in the *real-and-superficial* distinction between the economic and the political in capitalism (see Bonefeld 1992; Clarke 1991; Corrigan, Ramsay & Sayer 1980; Corrigan & Sayer 1985; E.M. Wood 1995; 2003; Gerstenberger 2007; Poulantzas 1978). That is why, as Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer argue, the historical formation of the capitalist state refers to:

a concerted attempt to disentangle 'the State' from interests, from clientage, from its previously more overt class and patriarchal register ... 'The State' comes to represent a neutral, natural, obvious set of institutionalized routine practices which successfully claim the legitimate monopoly of national means of administration (1985, p. 123).

The separation of class power from state power, therefore, reflects "nothing other than the capitalist form of the presence of the political in the constitution and reproduction of the relations of production" (Poulantzas 1978, pp. 28-19). In this regard, the problem of the

modern police pertains to a fundamental question about the bourgeois organization of political power. Modern police have historically assumed a “double-edged” (Tilly 1985, pp. 170-172) character in the political management of capitalist modernity. Policing is both a coercive state apparatus functioning on behalf of the politics of bourgeois order and at the very same time an impersonal and impartial form of rule in need of constant public support or popular consent. What is at stake here is the dialectical crystallization of the organic unity of coercion and consent in the modern police. This organic unity renders policing “an inherently conflict-ridden enterprise” (Reiner 2000, p. 49). In other words, the modern police assume a “precarious position” (J. C. Wood 2003, p. 9) or a “schizophrenic image” (Robinson & Scaglione 1987, p. 114) in their relations with social classes. The rather complex problem of popular consent is thus inherent to the modern organization of policing in the form of impartial and impersonal rule. “Policing by consent,” however, does not necessarily refer to the “universal love of police.” It instead implies the socio-historical phenomenon that “those at the sharp end of police practices do not extend their resentment at specific actions into a generalized withdrawal of legitimacy from the institution of policing *per se*” (Reiner 2000, p. 49).

This thesis problematizes this fundamental issue of the “generalized withdrawal of legitimacy” in the case of the making of the Altındağ *gecekondu* region in Ankara. Exposing a dialectical critique of police power, I argue that the form of political power assumed by the modern police has been historically open to popular struggles and contestations. That is, a relational reading of police power provides us with a dynamic perspective that acknowledges the historical agency of subordinate classes in the formations and contestations of capitalist modernity.

On the basis of a dialectical engagement with the critical historiography on policing, law, and crime, and in the light of the complex historical phenomenon presented by the case of the Altındağ *gecekondü* region, I propose a tripartite analytical framework for a radical critique of police power. I organize my framework accordingly, arguing that police power can be understood as historically constituted and transformed by *three forms of struggle* that reflect the fundamental struggles haunting modern police in the political administration of capitalist modernity. These are: 1) struggles over urban space, 2) struggles over subsistence, and 3) struggles over a moral order. These three forms of struggle represent distinct, albeit dialectically linked facets of political power inscribed into modern policing in its bourgeois political form.

3.1. Struggles over urban space

As I will analyze in Chapter II in the context of the making of capitalist modernity in Ottoman and Turkish social formations, the modern police have been fundamentally concerned with *the urban question*. In a way, the modern police project has always been a spatial project. As such, we need to develop a relational perspective on the historical role of the police in the production of space (Lefebvre 1992). Concerned with a critical analysis of recurrent state strategies to manage the crisis-tendencies of modern capitalism, Henri Lefebvre underlines the production of “abstract space,” which is at once produced and regulated by the modern state. This abstract space is the product of the state’s systematic strategy to homogenize the irreducible multiplicity of social relations and actors to subject them to the simultaneous projects of the production of state space and commodification of

the social conditions of labour power. This strategy rests on a foundational violence of the state in producing dominant spatial forms while simultaneously undermining or eliminating alternative spatial forms and practices.

Police power thus becomes a spatial problem in the processes of the production of state space. This thesis will problematize *the spatiality of police power* in the history of capitalist urbanization in Ankara. This enables us to analyze *the historical matrix of police-class-urban space* in the case of the Altındağ *gecekondu* region. This analytical theme also establishes the ground for a comprehensive historical analysis of the making of urban modernity and its contestations since the early Republican period. As I have underlined above, even though we can say that the *gecekondu* phenomenon has been extensively studied in the literature, there is still considerable silence on the historical role of the police in the making of urban modernity in Turkey. In short, I argue that *the history of gecekondu is at the same time the social history of the police*.

Within the concrete context of my case study, I argue that the spatiality of police power has been historically shaped by three distinct but incrementally overlapping layers of power (cf. Şengül 1998; 2003). Following Doreen Massey's geological metaphor of layer in analyzing the complex making of urban space in capitalist societies, Tarık Şengül explores the history of urbanization in modern Turkey with reference to three periods, which produced distinct layers of urban space organizing social relations with reference to peculiar spatial dynamics: 1) the urbanization of state power (1920s-1940s), 2) the urbanization of labour power (1950s-1970s), and 3) the urbanization of capital (1980s-present). These layers, of course, are not mutually

exclusive but reflect the dominant form of contradiction characterizing the spatial form assumed by capitalist social relations in the country in different historical periods.

This perspective is analytically productive in unpacking the spatiality of police power during the historical period from the 1920s to 1970s. In this regard, I suggest that policing on the margin has also been spatially conditioned by three layers, which are the reflections of distinct but dialectically articulated forms of power. The first spatial layer of police power was produced in the context of the urbanization of state power during the early Republican period. Following Şengül's exposition, I will contend in Chapter IV that the political geography of policing in Ankara was determined by the state's deliberate urban project. What can be depicted as *the formal-legal layer of state power*, this foundational layer was characterized by the forcible production and constant surveillance of the abstract spaces of the state and capital in the nascent bourgeois order. It was a decisive part of the making of the urban order in a contested juxtaposition of Yenışehir [literally the *New City*], the terrain for a modern, civilized life, and Altındağ, the city of mud-bricks. Policing as a spatial practice was thus organized in a form that reflected the segregated formation of urban space in early Republican Ankara.

As I will analyze in Chapter V, this historically foundational and dominant layer, however, would be redefined with *the illicit layer of kabadayı power* in the 1950s and 1960s. Reflecting a transformation of capitalist social relations and their spatial organization, the spatiality of police power was conditioned in the context of the formation of urban informalities in tandem with the illicit organization of urban plunder. Policing in the city was thus organized in and through the illicit power of *kabadayıs*. These two layers were mutually enforcing since the latter did not pose a substantial threat to the politics of bourgeois order,

while it dialectically resulted in the marginalization of the Altındağ poor. This process, therefore, produced substantial contradictions concerning the materialization of police power in everyday life.

The third layer conditioning the spatiality of police power would emerge in the 1970s in the context of the rather contested association of social marginality and radical politics. As I will explore in Chapter VI, the radicalization of the Altındağ region, a general phenomenon characterizing the *gecekondu* neighbourhoods at the time, produced a cathartic challenge against the previous two layers with the projected introduction of “a real state of emergency” in a Benjaminian sense. Whereas the region became a “liberated zone” through revolutionary spatial praxis, it posed a paralysis on the part of the police, and thereby the politics of the bourgeois order in Ankara. What might be depicted as *the collective-subversive power of the revolutionaries*, therefore, resembles the third layer of power conditioning the making of the police on the margin in the 1970s.

3.2. Struggles over subsistence

If police power is concerned with the fabrication of the wage form as the only medium of living, it then becomes a contested terrain on which subsistence struggles are carried out on a daily basis. In this regard, we need to understand the dialectical relationship between work-poverty-unemployment-crime (Hall et al. 1978, p. 189). To view these as essentially distinct phenomena means being trapped by the empiricist project of bourgeois social science, and thereby reproducing dominant marginalizing discourses grounded in the political delineation of the poor, the indigent, and the criminal. Devoid of its social and political context, the criminal

becomes a “suitable enemy” (Christie 1986) for the deployment of state violence in various forms. For a dialectical relationship between work, poverty, and crime, we need to view them *as moments of social relations of dispossession, as moments through which capital reasserts its power over labour while consolidating the regime of private property.*

Historically speaking, the advent of a regular and weekly/monthly wage is a quite novel and short-lived phenomenon given that precariousness is the general condition of working-class life in capitalism (Denning 2010; Jonna & Foster 2016; Munck 2013). Elaborating on the impersonal imperatives of the market radically reorganizing social relations of production, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels wrote in *The Communist Manifesto* that the sharpening competition among the bourgeoisie, coupled with the inherent crisis of capitalist accumulation, forces the livelihoods of the working class into “more and more precarious” conditions (1964 [1848], p. 72). This is because capitalist accumulation is characterized by an inherent and endless drive for the forcible creation of conditions of dispossession and the expropriation of the labourer. The notion of the proletariat thus assumes an ontological category of precarious labour under capitalism.

The recent rise of social history research has clearly demonstrated that the dispossessed masses have resorted to alternative means of subsistence that scholars have defined with numerous terms: “economy of makeshifts”, “mixed economy of welfare”, “economies of survival”, “adaptive family economy” or “survival strategy” (see Benson 1983; Bradbury 1984; Fontaine & Schlumbohm 2000; Shore 2003; Tomkins & King 2003; Winter 2004). The proletarian living, therefore, has been historically characterized by a constant search for generating alternative sources of income rooted in social practices that are morally,

politically and legally denounced by the ruling classes and the state, and thereby subjected to various forms of regulation, surveillance, containment, and repression. We thus need to have a critical understanding of the proletarian histories of subsistence, and their relation to various policing projects in different national settings. *The proletarian as a dialectical category necessitates its co-constitution with police power* at the moment it is consolidated into a wage form as the only means of subsistence.

It is this precise context that “social crime” becomes an experiential form of struggle between labour and capital in everyday social relations. Historically speaking, the dispossessed masses have always engaged in a constant struggle for generating alternative sources of income rooted in practices of pilferage such as coal and wood picking, poaching, workplace appropriation, and petty theft like pickpocketing, shoplifting, etc. Originally exposed by Eric Hobsbawm in his extensive analysis of “primitive rebels” and “social bandits” (1959; 1969; 1972), the notion of social crime denotes a complex relationship between everyday resistance, political protest, survival strategy, and crime/criminalization (Lea 1999, pp. 308-309). Whereas the notion itself has been an object of heated debates in critical circles (see Clement 2016, pp. 99-133; Emsley 2005, pp. 2-10; Lea, 1999; 2002), it has a significant explanatory potential to make sense of the contested subsistence struggles waged by the urban poor in Ankara from the 1920s to the 1970s.

Following Peter Linebaugh’s exposition of the “historic dialectic” between forms of criminal activity and capitalist exploitation (1991, p. xxii), it appears that the consolidation of the wage form through the Republican police project has been historically integrated into the making “social criminality” - a central form of subsistence on the part of the Altındağ labouring

classes. In other words, drawing from critical social historiography in crime and policing, I argue that the subsistence practices of the Altındağ poor included a diverse repertoire of pilferage conditioned in the context of struggles over subsistence in Ankara. A critical analysis of these struggles will also reveal that the political geography of policing in Ankara was historically formed in a strategic response to the social geography of pilferage, a phenomenon that reflected socio-spatial segregation of class relations in the city.

3.3. Struggles over a moral order

Critical historiographies on crime and policing have maintained that the fabrication of wage labour through police power has been compounded by a simultaneous project of moral regulation. With a strategic agenda of fabricating a new moral order, the police have been instrumental in transforming popular cultures and working class “manners” along the lines of the ethos of private property and associated regimes of gendered and racialized social inequality (see Corrigan 1981; Corrigan & Sayer 1985; Hunt 1999; McMullan 1998a; 1998b; 1998c; Neocleous 2000; Storch 1976; Valverde 2008).

The historical project of moral regulation nonetheless is much-contested terrain over which alternative quests for moral order from above and below characterize everyday forms of state formation. Conceiving it as one of the central aspects of the modern police formation, I propose to analyze the phenomenon of moral regulation in the relational context of its subaltern contestations on the urban margin. On the basis of a comprehensive analysis of the case of Altındağ, I contend that alternative historical projects were at play producing distinct and contradictory impacts. These projects were not always articulated into a political challenge

against the dominant order but reflected the layers of power as presented by the state, *kabadayıs* and revolutionaries in different historical periods.

As I will analyze in Chapter IV, the dominant form of moral order was crafted by the early Republican police in line with the bourgeois modernity project already underway. Its exclusionary logic, however, gave way to the formation of “popular illegality”, which was integrated into the illicit power of *kabadayıs*. The making of social criminality in the Altındağ region was thus dialectically intertwined with the formation of popular illegality, which historically conditioned the subaltern experiences of appropriation, and in turn produced alternative projects for moral order on the urban margin. Their cathartic articulation into the socialist movements in the 1970s, however, meant a substantial crisis for the politics of bourgeois order while challenging the very existence of the police on the ground. As I will explore in Chapter VI, the revolutionary praxis was marked by a *sublation* (*à la* Hegel 2018, p. 77) of popular illegality while engaging in an alternative moral order to establish its hegemony at the communal level. Whereas the socialist organizations did not embrace the political strategy of what might be called “socialist criminology” (*à la* McMullan 1986) on a programmatic level, their alternative order did sow the seeds of articulating the inherently subversive character of popular illegality into their revolutionary cause through the initiation of “a new ethico-political form” (Gramsci 1971, p. 367).

The aforementioned three forms of struggle thus provide us with a relational, historical framework to analyze the making of police power and its subaltern contestations. A critique of police power, therefore, presents a radical political medium through which a critique of capitalist modernity from below might be articulated. In this regard, in order to *mediate* the

irreducible complexity of historical processes and indispensable “violence of abstraction” (Sayer 1990), I propose the exploration of police power as a “concrete abstraction”. For Lefebvre, concrete abstraction is an abstraction that “concretizes and realizes itself socially, in the social practice,” and thus it is a “social abstraction” having “a real existence, that is to say practical and not conventional, in the social relationships linked to practices” (Lefebvre in Stanek 2008, p. 68). This methodological strategy provides us with an analytical tool *to unpack police power in relation to spatial practices, subsistence activities, and moral order projects that simultaneously come from above and below*. This strategy, therefore, enables us to have a more dynamic conception of the ordinary without denying the agency of the subordinate classes in everyday formations of the police/state power. On this basis, I argue that the aforementioned three forms of struggle are *social practices that mediate the materialization of police power* in different institutional forms. That is, the institutional materiality (*à la* Poulantzas 1978, p. 45) of police power is historically conditioned in the context of the dialectical articulation of the tripartite struggle over urban space, subsistence, and moral order. This is why I preserve the analytical distinction between police power and the police. Whereas the latter is conceived as an empirical object of analysis, the former refers to an abstraction developed on the basis of a dialectical exploration of the complex social dynamics and historical processes it embodies.

4. Field experience: On the track of the silenced past

As is the case with every capitalist modernization project, Turkey’s experience with state formation and capitalist development was fundamentally characterized by *silences* (see

Toprak 2017; cf. Trouillot 1995). That is, the dominant ideological and political narratives have long been instrumental in concealing the actual experiences of the labouring masses with everyday forms of state formation found in workplaces and living spaces in divergent forms. Such a concealment is an historical function of the class character of the modernization project. That is why narratives of *victories* or *great accomplishments* are characteristic of modernization in different national settings. Producing distorted images of historical reality, these dominant perspectives, in a way, presupposes dispossession on the part of the oppressed from their means of leaving alternative narratives. In an attempt to incorporate different kinds of historical material in order to achieve a more comprehensive and reflexive narrative, I conducted extensive, multi-method fieldwork from January to August 2016 in the Altındağ *gecekondu* region. The following describes the components of that fieldwork.

4.1. Pilot Fieldwork: February-June 2015

The historical and spatial parameters of this project were first conceived on the basis of a pilot fieldwork conducted in the Altındağ region between February and June 2015. The pilot work followed an incremental process by which I came to formulate my research agenda, research questions, and methods. I first scanned through the existing secondary literature on the issues of poverty, crime, policing within the context of the *gecekondu* regions in Turkey generally and Ankara in particular. Whereas there has been a recent rise in scholarly interest in such issues, Altındağ itself remains under-researched, especially from a critical historical perspective. As a second step, I conducted research on newspaper archives, which seemed to present a more practical strategy for obtaining some *empirical data* on the region. Indeed, two

of the national newspapers enable access to their online archives dating back to the 1920s (*Cumhuriyet* [The Republic]) and the 1950s (*Milliyet* [The Nationhood]).

This archival research provided a strategic orientation for the research process. For one thing, it enabled me to periodize, and thereby *historicize* my general research problem. Quite interestingly, for instance, the Altındağ *gecekondu* neighborhoods seemed to harbour the poorest sectors of the Ankara working classes since the early days of the Republic. In this regard, initial insights gained from the newspaper archives pointed to the fact that the Altındağ *gecekondu* neighborhoods experienced a marginalization of the Ankara working classes from the outset. Accordingly, the urban poor developed peculiar forms of survival, and a moral economy of their own. On the other hand, especially in the late 1970s, what is striking to observe from the news archives is that the people in Altındağ region seemed to develop organic links with the revolutionary movements. For instance, the Çiğir region, which has been stigmatized as a *no-go area* especially for the last couple of decades, experienced one of the most successful examples of Resistance Committees, which was a form of popular struggle embraced and practiced by DEV YOL (*Devrimci Yol*, Revolutionary Path), a socialist organization that had a large popular appeal in Turkey in the 1970s. That is why the Altındağ *gecekondu* region was among the places that experienced the severest forms of state violence and suppression during the military rule of the early 1980s, as evidenced in the news archives.

The archival research on newspapers thus enabled me to formulate core historical themes and processes, which in turn informed the second stage of the pilot work, i.e. field visits and in-depth interviews undertaken in the spring 2015. In this period, I conducted four in-depth interviews with people currently living in Altındağ, which were tape-recorded with the

permission of the respondents. Apart from these, I had the chance to spend many hours with a dozen of Altındağ residents but could only record such experiences as notes taken after the field encounters. The interviews were open-ended and informal and can best be characterized as intimate conversations along the themes of poverty, drugs, police violence, and general life with the respondents. I tried to structure my interviews in a flexible manner to tap into the personal life stories of the respondents. These interviews substantially contributed to my research process by highlighting the importance of petty crime historically prevalent in the region; the transformation of the socio-political fabric of the neighborhoods with the rise of radical/socialist organizations in the 1970s; the contradictory relationship between social marginality and radical politics; and the role of the September 12, 1980 coup on the marginalization process in the neighborhoods.

Overall, the experience of the pilot study further conditioned me to *historicize the field research* to include the formative processes and dynamics of social marginalization and corresponding forms of policing employed in Altındağ. Informed by the methodological discussions as developed within the fields of sociology and historical anthropology (see Burawoy 1998; Comaroff & Comaroff 2003; Fassin 2008; Wacquant 2008), I became concerned with analyzing the historical complexity of the marginalized social space of Altındağ by replacing the police, as the decisive form of the materialization of state power on the margin, in *“the diachronic sequence of historical transformations of which they are the material expression and which never find their source and principle in the neighborhood under examination (Wacquant 2008, p. 9; emphasis in the original). In this regard, the question of police power on the urban margin is analyzed in the context of “ ... an institutional analysis that*

brings out the monographic reality to the macro structural understanding, although ostensibly absent from the neighborhood, still govern the practices and representations of its residents” (Wacquant 2008, p. 10).

4.2. Main Fieldwork: January-August 2016

I tackled this monographic reality in my main fieldwork which included the following components aimed at producing a comprehensive understanding of the historical reality in question.

First and likely foremost, I conducted 25 in-depth, semi-structured interviews in an attempt to make sense of the different and conflicting dynamics of the historical formation of social marginality and associated strategies of policing in the region. My interviews were intended to produce reflexive, narrative knowledge of a social reality via an oral history of the region. Utilizing a snowball sampling technique in recruiting respondents for my fieldwork, I conducted interviews with first settlers (5), ex-convicts (3), neighborhood heads (3), former members of socialist organizations (12), as well as a crime reporter and a founding member of the left-leaning police organization POL DER (*Polis Derneği*, Police Association). These interviews proved to be a rich source of information that conditioned my intention to historicize the fieldwork providing a concrete basis to pursue major issues of discussion that had emerged. For instance, as I will analyze in Chapter VI, one original aspect of this thesis is my attention to the strange symbiosis of radical politics and social marginality of the 1970s, the impetus of which emerged from narratives shared by respondents.

A second significant component of my fieldwork was archival. I delved into the archives of newspapers and periodicals from the period. Using key incidents, terms and themes from the field interviews, I used country-wide newspapers such as *Hürriyet* [Freedom], *Cumhuriyet* [Republic], and *Milliyet* [The Nationhood], which have archives dating back to the early decades of the Republic. I also utilized the following Ankara-based newspapers: *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* [National Sovereignty]; *Ulus* [The Nation], *Barış* [Peace], *Halkçı* [Populist], *YeniHalkçı* [NewPopulist], *Zafer* [Victory], and *Demokrat Ankara* [Democratic Ankara]. These city papers proved quite important for making sense of the concrete issues that arose in different historical periods concerning the formation of the *gecekondu* neighborhoods in Altındağ and related problems of poverty, criminality, and the responses of different public institutions in different time periods. For instance, these archives have provided me with the opportunity to sketch the historical formation of *patterns of social criminality*, as I will discuss in Chapter V. In addition to the newspapers, I draw extensively on the archives of periodicals published by different state institutions, civil society associations, and political parties in different periods. In this regard, the periodicals of the General Directorate of Security (*Police Magazine*), Ministry of Internal Affairs (*Magazine of Administration*) and the Ministry of Justice (*Justice Magazine*) will be among main sources utilized for an exploration of the making of the Republican police in Turkey. The archival data from the periodicals of socialist organizations provide another important source for formulating an alternative historical narrative fundamentally different from the one fabricated in official discourses. I will make an extensive use of the magazines of *Devrimci Yol* (Revolutionary Path) and *Halkın Kurtuluşu* (People's Liberation), which were the two socialist organizations enjoying large popular support in the Altındağ region.

As a third component, I extensively utilized official documents produced by different state departments pertaining to such issues as *gecekondulular*, policing, crime, urban order, and poverty. These documents included legal texts, municipal ordinances, reports, visual materials, as well as parliamentary minutes. A systematic analysis of these documents provides us with an opportunity to gain insight into the dominant political imagination that contributed to the formation of the politics of police, *gecekondulular* policy, urbanization projects, and so forth. They are, therefore, an historical component affecting the making of “the monographic reality” in question.

Finally, I have engaged in a critical reading of literary and art works such as novels, poems, theatre plays, memoirs, etc. to gain a deeper understanding of the socio-cultural atmosphere of the *gecekondulular* living in Ankara. I utilized these sources throughout with an aim to produce a more grounded analysis of the issues as problematized in the thesis. These literary works became significant sources for feeding a subversive historical imagination by those historically silenced by dominant ideological and political narratives. A thematic reading of these literary sources will thus support the core theoretical and methodological pursuit of the thesis.

5. The structure of the argument

This thesis consists of five chapters excluding this introduction and the conclusion. These chapters represent historiographic themes that form a critique of capitalist modernity in the context of the social history of policing and crime in the Altındağ *gecekondulular* region of Ankara.

Chapter II problematizes the making of the Republican police in Turkey by revealing its historical roots in the Ottoman experience of capitalist modernity in the long nineteenth century. Making use of the more recent volume of social history research on the police, crime, law, and punishment in the late Ottoman and early Republican periods, this chapter analyzes how the Republican police project was historically connected to “European police science” (cf. Rigakos et al., 2009) in the contested making of urban modernity. After scrutinizing the nineteenth century Ottoman reforms of the police, I will contend that the 1908 Young Turk revolution was historically decisive in caging political, legal and institutional reforms into a bourgeois political form, which left a lasting legacy in early Republican Turkey. Given this legacy, the chapter also reveals the historical continuities and republican peculiarities in police formation.

Chapter III develops a critical analysis of the making of the Altındağ slums in the context of the social geography of labour in Ankara from the 1920s to 1970s. Ankara is analyzed with its spatial and socio-cultural contradictions in the context of the nation-state formation during the early Republican period. The consolidation of the *gecekondu regime* in Ankara from the mid-1940s onwards is considered as part of the structural transformations characterizing the fate of capitalist modernity in Turkey. This analysis reveals that social labour as historically concentrated in the Altındağ neighborhoods was decisive in the making of Ankara the capital city. It thus provides an historical ground for a critique of police power, a project to be developed in the following three chapters with reference to its dialectical association with urban space, class formation, and moral order.

Chapter IV develops a critique of the early Republican police project more concretely. I argue in this chapter that the political imagination of the early Republican police rested on a phantasmagorical framing of the lower classes as the filth of the city that needed to be remedied through various forms of political intervention. The daily administration of this social filth was organically linked to the policing of the Altındağ labouring classes. My goal is to reveal the historical nexus of urban space, class formation and policing within a relational understanding of how everyday forms of state formation were manifested in the national capital and, by extension, to reveal the inherent contradictions of policing in the city. I divide my analysis into three major themes of historiography: 1) the political geography of policing; 2) the political fabrication of wage labour; and 3) the moral regulation of daily life. Reflecting distinct, albeit organically intertwined processes of police science, these analytical themes will be articulated into a narrative on the social marginalization of labouring classes in Altındağ.

Chapter V contributes to the thesis' central concern of providing a critique of police power from a different angle. In this chapter, I analyze the historical making of social criminality and *kabadayı* vigilantism as facets of an alternative organization of justice from below. I then reveal how state violence exercised in different institutional forms was historically decisive for the social marginalization of the Altındağ poor. The chapter, therefore, contributes to the critique of police power on two fronts: first, it demonstrates how “the emergency situation” in the lives of the Altındağ poor was conditioned in the broader context of struggles over subsistence on the urban margin. Second, it analyzes how this emergency rule was characterized by the permanent deployment of state violence in the everyday lives of the Altındağ poor, paving the way for the reproduction of a contradictory network of vigilante

power in the broader carceral geography of Ankara. Such a critical exposition will ultimately reveal the contested materialization of police power in the tripartite subaltern struggles over urban space, subsistence, and moral order.

Chapter VI concentrates on the 1970s, a period of radicalization for the *gecekond* neighbourhoods. I analyze the rather contradictory, albeit politically transformative association between social marginality and socialist politics in the Altındağ region. Such an analysis can contribute to the thesis's general assertion of police power by laying bare the cathartic challenge presented by the socialist movement against the previous two layers of power on the urban margin. Exploring the *sublation* of popular illegality by revolutionary praxis, I will reveal how the historically normalized emergency rule in Altındağ was challenged through the cathartic moments of "the introduction of a real state of emergency" in the Benjaminian sense. Whereas the region became a "liberated zone" through revolutionary spatial praxis, it also became the site of a substantial paralysis on the part of the police, and thereby the politics of bourgeois order in Ankara.

CHAPTER II

THE MAKING OF THE REPUBLICAN POLICE IN TURKEY

The notion of security means civilization from the point of view of the public. As for civilization is to reach the perfection of the public order. In this respect, in its narrow sense, the notion of security means safeguarding the peace and order of the homeland, the life, property and honour of the people, and all sorts of rights as recorded by laws, as well as ensuring the universal harmony of the vitality of social intercourse. It is virtually impossible to measure and count the immensity of these duties. Whereas the contemporary Police [sic] are generally concerned with all the laws pertaining to legal and criminal, financial and economic, sanitary and municipal, disciplinary and administrative, military, civil and the other related [aspects of social intercourse]; they are also pertinent to laws and regulations on transport vehicles such as train, tramway, steamboat, automobile, and bus. It can thus be stated that the police engage in all the movements within the homeland (Polis Akademisi 2016 [1937], p. 55, emphasis added).

Security is the supreme social concept of civil society, the concept of the *police*.
(Marx 1975, p. 163; emphasis in the original)

The Director Nurettin Gökmen from the Ministry of Internal Affairs wrote an article on “the notion of security” which was published in the *Police School Brochure* in 1937 for distribution to the students of the Ankara Police Institute. An historical document produced for the celebration of the establishment of the Institute that same year, the Brochure provides an official narrative on the police project assertively embraced by the Kemalist regime in the 1930s. Containing historical, statistical and visual material from the Ottoman police tradition and its republican transformation, the brochure provides a rigorous formulation of the relevant public figures concerning the political mission and social function of the republican police as a fundamental aspect of the Kemalist state-making project. Gökmen’s interpretation of “the notion of security” and its organic association with civilization presents interesting clues about the centrality of the police for the formation of the new regime. As revealed in the quote itself,

the question of civilization is presented as a matter of security that is not restricted to some isolated issues of crime prevention and law enforcement. On the contrary, depicted as “the perfection of the public order,” civilization is conceived as something fundamentally related to security in order to ensure “the universal harmony of the vitality of social intercourse.” We are further informed that security is immensely and extensively inclusive of all aspects of life in a civilized social order. After all, “the police engage in all the movements within the homeland.”

Gökmen’s exposition of security as an all-encompassing issue, however, is by no means the discrete position of the director himself, but reflects a paradigmatic political perspective embraced by the early Republican regime. We can observe the manifestations of this paradigmatic position in numerous legal, administrative, and regulatory documents produced during the early Republican era, as exemplified in the discussions rigorously developed by relevant public figures in the *Police Magazine* of the General Directorate of Security or the *Justice Magazine* of the Ministry of Justice. These discussions are reflective of an historically grounded political imagination on the part of state functionaries for conceiving the central importance, as well as extensive character, of the police linked to the problem of state-making and nation-building in early Republican Turkey.

In this chapter, I argue that the paradigmatic position of the Republican police reflected a crystallization of a long period of historical transformation that characterized the contested process of Ottoman reformation in the long nineteenth century. Whereas the young Republican regime struggled hard to enforce a radical distance from Turkey’s imperial past⁶, it

⁶ The historiography on modern Turkey has long been haunted by a fundamental problem concerning the relationship between the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic (see Dinler 2003; N. Özbek 2009a). The main

rested heavily on this legacy in terms of institutional and administrative formation of the modern police, which in turn informed its political agendas on urban transformation, citizenship, people's education and many other aspects pertaining to the making of capitalist modernity in Turkey.

Drawing on the recently increasing volume of social history research on the police, crime, law, and punishment in the late Ottoman and early Republican periods⁷, this chapter

terms of the debate have been determined along the lines of a polarized discussion on *continuity vs. break* between the imperial and national forms of statehood. That is, founded in 1923 following a national independence war, the Republic's relationship with the Ottoman past has produced significant controversies that have recurrently determined the content of political, ideological and methodological debates on the making of capitalist modernity in Turkey in the twentieth century. The *political* terms of this polarized discussion were indeed rooted in the formation of an official historiographic position formulated with the deliberate attempts of the Kemalist regime in the 1920s and 1930s. The six-day speech of Mustafa Kemal, delivered at the Parliament in 1927, constituted the single most important and authoritative source for the formulation of this official historiography on modern Turkey (Zürcher 1992). As "the founding father" of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal reconstructed the country's recent history as a narrative on the hardship, courage and ultimate victory of the nationalist forces against the imperialist invasion of the West as well as the *backward* socio-political order of the Sultanate. This nationalist rhetoric was compounded with a radical denial of the Ottoman past in favor of a modernist political project of fabricating a new Turkish society that would embrace a secular and modern lifestyle to attain its *deserved* place in the *civilized* world. This narrative would be institutionalized throughout the 1930s and inform the political and ideological struggles over the past and the present conditioned in the context of the contested experience of capitalist modernity throughout the century. Exposing "the Turkish Republic as something entirely new and wonderful" (Zürcher 1992, p. 238), this official historiographic position is evidenced in the politics of police reform in the early Republican era too, as I will discuss throughout the chapter.

⁷ The issues of policing, crime, and punishment have been neglected topics in the historiographical studies on the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic until the last two decades. The literature over the issue has long been limited to the manuscripts and other works written by public officials within a worldview of a progressive history of yet another administrative organization of the modern state (Alyot 1947; Fazıl 1934; Tongur 1946). This lack is partly due to the decades-long hegemonic narrative produced on the basis of modernization theory and embraced by a variety of political and theoretical perspectives on the historiography of the Ottoman/Turkish modernity. This hegemonic position tends to present any historical development with reference to a theological understanding of "westernization" of the Ottoman polity amidst the deepening imperial crisis in the post-sixteenth century. This reading treats the last two centuries of the Ottoman transformation as a grand project of failed "westernization" (Quataert 2003, p. 1). Roughly speaking, the post-1980 period has witnessed a proliferation of critical research on the Ottoman modernity that increasingly incorporated the themes of crime, policing and punishment into its agenda. This growing body of literature has demonstrated that by the time of its dissolution, the Ottoman Empire had managed to establish a modern criminal justice system that was comparable with those in Europe, Asia, and the Americas. This literature has analyzed formations of modern police and gendarmerie forces (Ergut 1999; 2004; Fahmy 1999; Hanssen 2005; Ileri, 2014; Levy & Toumarkine, 2007; Levy, Özbek & Toumarkine 2009; N Özbek 2009b; Paz 2014; 2015a; 2015b; Yılmaz 2014), penal regime (Adak, 2017; Schull, 2014), criminal law (Rubin, 2016) and related political and institutional structures pertaining to the socio-legal sphere and the political management of capitalist modernity in the Ottoman context. This new set of scholarly research has thus contributed to our

will first trace the Ottoman roots of the republican police project. As underlined by many scholars, the Ottoman police reform was conditioned in the context of a global codification process that was mainly based on Western European (and especially French) influence, and thereby arguably represented a historical attempt at the incorporation of “European police science” (cf. Rigakos et al. 2009) into capitalist modernity in the making. While important to avoid reproducing a Euro-centric perspective of *westernization* and *modernization* we nonetheless need to stress the appropriation of these reforms in the making of Ottoman modernity. Turkey’s path was conditioned dialectally within the formation of global capitalism albeit geopolitically distinct and socio-economically uneven (see Allison & Anievas 2009; Düzgün 2018; Nişancıoğlu 2013). The institutional, legal and political transformations that characterized this era were reflective of ruling class responses to internal and external challenges brought on by the onset of capitalist modernity (Hanioğlu 2008, p. 3; Rubin 2016, p. 845).

The French Revolution and the subsequent historical conjuncture of bourgeois revolutions were decisive in uniting “the world into a single casually-integrated, but internally differentiated, ontological whole” (Allinson & Anievas in Düzgün 2018, p. 419). In the process, codification was envisaged by the intellectual and ruling elites in Europe and Asia as “a legal panacea for a wide range of social problems, and a necessary legal platform for capitalist activity” (Rubin 2016, p. 830). This global codification movement was based on “the positivist

understanding of the *perennial debate* on capitalist modernity in the Ottoman/Turkish context by way of underlining that the historical trajectory of the early Republican state formation was already conditioned in the context of the transformation of the Ottoman polity in the long nineteenth century.

zeitgeist” (Rubin 2016, p. 840) conditioning large-scale processes of rationalization, standardization and centralization of state power. The world-historical context of bourgeois revolutions was thus politically integrated through the global codification movement that involved complex inter-penetrations of various socio-legal responses to local and global challenges to accommodate the emerging paradigm of capitalism (Rubin 2016, p. 845). The Ottoman experience in police reform and penal change, therefore, was deeply rooted in the global transformations characterizing the contested making of capitalist modernity in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. For the development of the structures of the modern state in the Middle East and Southeast Europe was historically rooted in the transformations taking place in the late Ottoman period “as a result of the internally devised and implemented response to internal concerns and European imperialism” (Schull 2014, p. 4). The Ottoman reformation should thus be seen as an organic component of the world-historical making of capitalist modernity.

The historical period between 1798 and 1922 is depicted as the long nineteenth century of the Ottoman Empire. It was characterized by structural transformations pertaining to the social relations of production and the corresponding political form assumed by the state-society relations in the Ottoman Empire. These transformations were mainly conditioned under the increasingly contradictory pressures of European imperialism, which incorporated the Ottoman polity as a legitimate actor in the international order while consolidating its peripheral status on the margins of European capitalism. Especially after the Congress of Vienna in 1815, the Ottoman Empire became a full player in the international power struggle of Europe (Hanioglu 2008, p. 4). Conditioned under the increasingly tense geopolitical dynamics

of the making of the modern international order, a strategic politics of “blending” was at play in terms of the standardization, centralization and rationalization of the Ottoman socio-legal sphere (Quataert 2005, p. 63; Rubin 2016, p. 830; Schull 2014, p. 9). This strategic politics was designed especially through the increasing diplomatic involvement of the Ottoman Empire in newly formalized international channels.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire regularly participated in various international conferences pertaining to issues such as prison, police, anarchism, sanitary administration, and municipal organization. These conferences functioned as significant international forums through which the increasingly dominant paradigm of modern police science was transferred into the Ottoman Empire (Schull 2014, p. 11; see also Bulmuş 2012; Lafi 2008; Yılmaz 2014).⁸ It was thus the case that “the knowledge of the West became the key to service and mobility within the burgeoning bureaucracy” (Quataert 2005, p. 63). Rather than arising out of a mere external pressure, however, this reform agenda was embraced by an emerging ruling class that had been formed through a coalition among landed classes, commercial bourgeoisie and state bureaucracy (Uslu & Aytekin 2016, p. 42). Given all this, the making of the Ottoman reformation was a response to external, as well as internal, pressures and was based on “the blending of global practices, such as administrative centralization, rationalization, and standardization with Ottoman bureaucratic practices” (Rubin 2016, p. 830) that produced an entirely new dynamic culminating in the creation of a

⁸ For a critical and sophisticated analysis of “the role of the international” in police reform and state formation in Turkey, see Hülügü (2011; 2017).

modern Ottoman criminal justice system by the early twentieth century (Schull 2014, p. 6; see also Bulmuş 2012; Ergut 1999; 2004; Levy-Aksu 2014; 2018; N Özbek 2009).

On this basis, in the second part of the chapter I will take a closer look at the central dynamics and characteristics of Ottoman police reform in the long nineteenth century. I will contend that the 1908 Young Turk Revolution, conceived as a bourgeois revolution, was historically decisive in caging existing but fragmented political, legal and institutional reforms into a *bourgeois political form* characterized by an impersonal and impartial formation of state power (*à la* Gerstenberger 2007; cf. Hülügü 2011). This provided a lasting legacy of police reform into early Republican Turkey. The third part of the chapter will analyze the making of the Republican police in the 1920s and 1930s in the broader context of the formation of a hegemonic project for the creation of a national economy and associated processes of “organic society”. I aim to fold the historical articulation of a neo-Mercantilist project of state-making in Turkey into the broader paradigm of modern police science, which has been an indispensable aspect of the uneven and combined formation of a global capitalist order.

1. The Ottoman police reform in the long nineteenth century

The Ottoman Empire witnessed major challenges brought on by the onset of capitalist pressures and geo-political rivalry within the modern international order. Wars and their associated socio-political problems of imperial territorial losses, population movements on massive scales, inter-communal conflicts, and rural and urban violence increasingly determined the contested incorporation of the Ottoman social formation into the global capitalist order by the end of the nineteenth century (Quataert 2005). In the midst of such challenges, the

Ottoman social formation experienced major transformations that radically redefined state-society relations. The period is characterized by centralization and modernization of state power in its relation to society, a process that culminated in an intensified state penetration into social life (Quataert 2005, p. 54). Previously restricted to the tasks of war-making and tax collection, the Ottoman state created, expanded and multiplied various new departments that reflected its increasingly centralized and bureaucratized character (Quataert 2005, p. 62), which was dialectically conducive to the making of impersonal and impartial power.

Whereas Ottoman reformation efforts had a long legacy dating back to the eighteenth century, they gained a new impetus in the 1830s and 1840s with the introduction of the *Tanzimat* (reorganization) reforms, which began to transform the relations of ruler and subject in the Empire. Proclaimed in Istanbul in 1839, the Rose Garden Edict officially launched the *Tanzimat* reforms via a royal statement on the intention of the Ottoman Sultan to ensure equality among subject populations (Quataert 2005, p. 66). The royal declaration foresaw a political transformation of subjecthood by promising the universal applicability of laws to all the Ottoman subjects, and the operation of the imperial administration on the basis of universal laws. It was thus a significant step on the long road to a transformation of Muslim, Christian, and Jewish subjects into Ottoman citizens (Hanioğlu 2008, p. 74). Reflecting a clear influence from the *French Declaration des Droits de l'homme et du Citoyen* and the Virginia Bill of Rights in 1776, the Edict also promised universal legal guarantees for the protection of individual rights and properties, the prohibition of bribery, the regulation of the levying of taxes, and the conscription of soldiers (Hanioğlu 2008, p. 72). Designed “out of self-interest and an appeasing gesture directed at Europe” (Hanioğlu 2008, p. 73), the Edict was a ruling

class response to internal and external pressures, through which the form of the state was gradually transformed throughout the long nineteenth century (Uslu & Aytekin 2016, p. 62). The reform agenda, therefore, was not “the master plan of the state, it was rather a ‘strategy of survival’ on the part of the state” (Ergut 1999, p. 75).

The 1839 royal declaration was followed by an increasing number of other political innovations, which were decisive maneuvers that the ruling class undertook to cope with this double pressure coming from inside and outside. This process, however, found its ultimate political form in state power only through political struggles, contestations and bargaining among different social and political agencies in the Ottoman Empire. For instance, as the core characteristic of this entire process, the state’s determined move towards centralization was realized only on the basis of a violent battle against various sorts of social and political power groups such as guilds, janissaries, tribes, and religious communities to transform the relationship between itself and its subjects (Quataert 2005, p. 65; Ergut 1999; 2004). Acting as intermediaries between the central state and subject populations, these groups were either totally destroyed, or incorporated into nascent state structures. As we will see in the following discussion, the contested incorporation of various power groups was a significant facet of the making of the modern police in the long nineteenth century as well.

The *Tanzimat* reforms generally reflected an inclination towards a more secular conception of state power in the Ottoman social formation. It was, however, not always sustained, and incorporated a complex blending of historically established conceptions of the state and rulership with reference to sharia law with modern European conceptions of law, power and sovereignty. Whereas the increasingly dominant secular conceptions of state power

became more pronounced in the later decades of the Tanzimat era, they never came to the point of replacing Islamic conceptions of rulership and subjecthood (Hanioglu 2008, pp 74-75). It was thus a period of dualities characterized by a complex symbiosis of historically existing structures with modern innovations in such fields as economy, law, public administration, and policing (Ergut 1999, p. 77).

The political imagination of the Tanzimat reformers was thus based on a rather complex blending of historic conceptions of imperial order, conceived in traditional understandings of the Circle of Justice⁹, with new conceptions of modern statehood. Maurus Reinkowski provides an etymological analysis of the political imagination that characterized the Tanzimat reforms in relation to the issues of order, welfare, security, and the state. He argues that the Tanzimat political idiom rested on an ideology of *order-cum-security*, which established an organic relation between “public order and just rule as the condition for general welfare”:

At the heart of the Tanzimat political idiom is a state ideology of order *cum* prosperity. Central to it is the term *asayiş* (public order, public tranquility; repose, rest). Similar to it, but more narrowly referring to the technical production of security is *emniyyet* (safety, freedom of fear, security; confidence, belief; the police, the law). Security is granted by the state to its subjects, but the state is entitled in recompense to the subjects’ complete obedience. The immediate outcome and positive product of *asayiş* is prosperity, expressed by the terms *rahat* (ease, rest, comfort, tranquillity) or *istirahat* and *refah* (easy circumstances, comfort, luxury, affluence). The term *refah* is based on the general notion of *mülkün ma'murlugu* (flourishing condition, prosperity) which seems nothing else than the Roman *salus publica* (public wealth) in an Ottoman disguise. Prosperity, hand in hand with security, will be of maximum benefit to the state’s and society’s order. Although the relationship between the ruler and the ruled is principally reciprocal—balancing the giving (of security) and the taking (of prosperity)—emphasis is laid on the obedience of the ruled subject (Reinkowski 2005, p. 200).

⁹ In one of the studies on the historical importance of the notion of the Circle of Justice in the Middle East, Linda Darling underlines that the term comes from the sixteenth-century Ottoman writer Kinalizade, and represents a peculiar concept of politics: “No power without troops; No troops without money; No money without prosperity; No prosperity without justice and good administration” (Darling 2013, p. 2).

The organic association of public order, general welfare and just administration was rooted in the tradition of the Circle of Justice, which represents a historic concept delineating the relationship between the ruled and the ruler along the lines of mutual responsibilities in terms of wealth creation, public order, and just administration. In this regard, the principle of provisionism (*iaşecilik*) was a central element in the politico-economic policies followed by the Ottoman rulers especially until the late eighteenth century. It referred to tight state control over the production and distribution of commodities to ensure the maintenance of a steady supply so that all goods and services were cheap, plentiful and of good quality (Genç 2000, pp. 47-50). The guilds assumed a central role in this structure providing raw materials, the maintenance of conditions of commercial supply and the enforcement of general codes of conduct among the *esnaf*, the major category of urban labour in the empire (Yıldırım 2001; Yi 2004). The policy of *provisionism* was a core material expression of the organic association of public order, general welfare and just administration in the Ottoman polity.

Whereas it was based on the Ottoman tradition of imperial rule, this conception of the statehood was paradigmatic for the making of the early modern state along the lines of mercantilist and cameralist thought. Speaking in the context of early modern Europe, “the well-ordered *Polizeistaat*” was concerned with the promotion of secular and material welfare of the state and its population. It arose on the basis of an increasingly dominant understanding that “... only a state based upon internal discipline, rigorously controlled, and economically self-sufficient could provide a proper basis for survival” (Chapman 2007, p. 428). The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are commonly known as the time of the mercantilist state form, which was mobilized “to accumulate monetary reserves and to achieve self-sufficiency through state

subsidy, control, and protection” (Raeff 1975, p. 1224). In this period: “The subjects’ welfare and prosperity would increase productivity and foster their creative energies and industriousness, which in turn would rebound to the benefit of the state and the ruler’s power and provide the proper framework for a Christian way of life” (Raeff 1975, p. 1225). In other words, the aim was “the maximizing of all the creative energies and potential resources of a stable and harmonious society so as to further the spiritual and political ends set by God through natural law” (Raeff 1975, pp. 1226-7). It was during this period that the modern police emerged as a dynamic product of and constitutive element in the processes of the formation of the absolutist states in Europe (see also Axtmann 1992; Neocleous 2000; Rigakos et al. 2009). We can thus put forward that the early modern conception of the state in Europe had a quite strong resonance in the Ottoman Empire as well.¹⁰

The Circle of Justice, therefore, was a significant departure point in the formation of demands for modernizing Ottoman statehood during the *Tanzimat* era (Darling 2013, pp. 157-162; Reinkowski 2005, p. 204). The 1839 royal declaration introduced the political projects of modernization, conscription, and taxation, within the Circle’s formula of the intimate relationship between public justice, popular prosperity, good administration, military power, and the strength of the state (Darling 2013, p. 162). The 1856 Imperial Rescript too was reflective of this fundamental politics with the Sultan’s declaration for popular welfare: “Thanks to the Almighty, [my] unceasing efforts have already been productive of numerous

¹⁰ For discussions on the formation of early modern statehood in the Ottoman Empire, see Abou-El-Haj (2000; 2011), Barkey (2011), Salzmann (2011), Tezcan (2009a; 2009b).

useful results. From day to day the happiness of the nation and the wealth of my dominions go on augmenting” (Darling 2013, p. 163).

In the second half of the nineteenth century, however, a significant shift characterized the political idiom of Ottoman reformation culminating in a major political redefinition of this long-existing legacy. Conditioned by the ever-deepening social relations of capitalist production and associated processes of urban transformation, a new notion of order arose while both complementing and superseding the old one. Concerning the major significance of this transformation, it seems apt to resort to Reinkowski’s etymological assessment at length once again:

Representative of the complementary aspect of the new concept of order is the use of the terms *terbiye* and *te’dib*. Whereas in the early Tanzimat period *terbiye* was used synonymous with *gusmal* (punishing by twisting the ear; rebuke, reproof, reprimand) in the meaning of chastisement, *terbiye* and *te’dib* carried in the later decades the ambiguous meaning of disciplining (superseding the more straightforward notion of punishment) and education. The superimposition character of the new concept is more prominent than the complementary one: the cyclical image of order is completely replaced by a “one-way” concept—instead of being continuously obliged to restore the always-precarious order the Ottoman state and authorities are firmly resolved upon establishing a new and final order. Peoples now have been brought to their senses, once and for all the eternal cycle of order-disorder-order must be broken (Reinkowski 2005, p. 206).

Parallel to the historical consolidation of bourgeois conceptions of security, order, and the associated “general police system,” we see an historic shift from a conception of sovereignty, which guarantees prosperity and security in the circular functioning of imperial justice, to a new conception that emphasizes the active fabrication of productive subjects through numerous projects of civilization. This notion of civilization was mainly concerned with giving shape to the morals and manners of subject populations in line with requirements for capitalist accumulation, wealth creation, as well as prevailing conceptions of social and moral order (Levy-Aksu 2014, p. 5). In a way, the sovereign power of the state was redefined within

a civilizing mission for the grand project of fabricating a new social order characterized by the wage form. It is in this context that European police science was incorporated into the Ottoman socio-legal sphere through a long process of reformation and its simultaneous contestations.

The *Tanzimat* reforms were thus decisive in the transformation of relations of subjecthood in the Ottoman Empire. Most importantly, the political promise of the universal equality among the subjects was productive in triggering various popular uprisings and subaltern demands aimed at the emergent structures of the central state. For instance, throughout the nineteenth century, the Ottoman provinces experienced large and small peasant uprisings, which had been interpreted in the conventional Ottoman historiography as reactionary movements of the culturally conservative peasantry against the modernizing attempts of the *Tanzimat* era. A new generation of Ottoman social historians, however, have argued that these uprisings rather reflected an endorsement of the reform program aimed at the radicalization of universal claims of equal Ottoman citizenship and rule of law (Uslu & Aytekin 2016, p. 49; see also Aytekin 2012; 2013). This popular disposition, as we will discuss below, also played a role in the formation of the modern police in its impersonal and impartial form (see Ergut 1999; 2004; Fahmy 1999; Paz 2014; 2015a; 2015b). The universal claim on the provision of public security would come to haunt the modern police in its relations with the lower classes, whose morals and manners would increasingly become a subject of police power in the making.

1.1. The “new police” and the making of the urban order

The historical roots of the “new police” in the Ottoman Empire can be traced back to the reigns of Sultan Selim III (1789-1807) and Sultan Mahmut II (1808-1839), when Ottoman society was introduced to the first major reforms pertaining to the institutional structures of policing. These developments included early legal codification attempts, changes in policing and surveillance in the imperial capital, the destruction of the Janissary corps, and the weakening of the guild system in the empire (Schull 2014, p. 7). It was, therefore, the beginning of a rather gradual and complex transition from “indirect to direct rule” in the Ottoman Empire (Ergut 1999; 2004; Gingeras 2014; Yilmaz 2014). In order to understand the significance of this transition, we need to have general sense of the so-called *old structure* that had been at play in the maintenance of social order.

The old system of policing can be described as “collective responsibility” as an historical phenomenon characteristic of the pre-modern forms. Under conditions of state indifference, and indeed rooted in the state’s inability to ensure tight control and surveillance over subject populations given its under-developed “infrastructural power” (Mann 1988), the state delegated its policing functions locally (Ergut 1999, p. 82). This system, however, was not *democratic*, but organized along the lines of social relations of power. Policing was organized by local strongmen for ensuring daily order and security. It was overtly class-biased, functioning as a medium for the political accumulation of power and wealth by the local notables. It produced “draconian” social conditions for the lower classes while creating “entrepreneurial” opportunities for local strongmen (Ergut 1999, p. 79). Solely concerned with the extraction of resources for war-making, the state assumed a distanced position through the imposition of “a

certain amount of money as a fine when a criminal was not caught and returned to the security agents by the local population” (Ergut 1999, p. 80; Swanson 1972, p. 250). This form of policing went in tandem with the exercise of corporal punishment. For instance, torture was a common practice for punishing peasants before the nineteenth century (Ergut 1999, p. 83; Schull 2014). Of course, as was the case in Europe, the diffuse nature of the means of coercion defined within the social relations of property parcellized sovereignty in the feudal order (Anderson 1974, p. 148). This power ultimately resulted in an oligopolistic concentration of coercion by landlords. Dispossessed from the means of communal self-defence to a large extent, the peasantry was subjected to “policing as collective responsibility” that functioned on the basis of “aristocratic self-help” in both Europe (Axtmann 1992, p. 41), as well as in the Ottoman Empire (Ergut 1999; 2004).

The *janissaries*, the personal army of the Sultan, enjoyed a distinct role in this general system of collective responsibility. For it was historically the main actor in ensuring public order in urban centers (Ergut 1999, p. 78; Levy-Aksu 2018, p. 151). In Istanbul, for example, the *janissaries* performed many duties including patrolling the streets, overseeing the markets, punishing criminals, and executing decisions of the religious authorities (Swanson 1972, p. 246). The destruction of the janissaries in 1826 eliminated a significant social obstacle toward the centralization of Ottoman polity and the formation of the *new police*. A historical transformation in the social composition of the janissaries was the political reason for Sultan Mahmut II to violently smash this long-existing professional army. Contrary to the conventional historiographical narratives, which depict the janissaries as yet another reactionary force

mobilized against the modernizing projects of the Ottoman reformers¹¹, a new generation of social historians have demonstrated that the janissaries had already penetrated into the urban labour force, and were organized in the guild system.¹² For instance, with the consolidation of janissary involvement in urban production in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, it became almost impossible to ensure the full application of the *narh* system, a generalized practice fixing market prices for basic commodities. This is because the duty of policing the *narh* system was supposed to be undertaken by *muhtesib*, the same janissaries whose social composition were at fundamental odds with the task of policing they were ordered to undertake on behalf of the Sultan (Sunar 2006, pp. 77-81).

¹¹ The conventional historiography over the janissaries has mainly rested on a rather problematic narrative. Uncritically reproducing the official Ottoman perception of the janissaries fabricated by the state chroniclers during the times of janissary upheavals, the conventional wisdom has argued that they were once the core force within the Ottoman army with their exceptional training and discipline thanks to the *devşirme* system which was functional and effective in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The janissary corps, however, had gone through a systematic process of corruption, as a result of which they began engaging in extra-military activities, and thus failed to fulfill their military tasks. Furthermore, in a constant alliance with the *ulema*, they constituted the main locus of reactionary resistance to the modernization reforms undertaken by the Sultans especially throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. It becomes impossible through these conventional lenses to glean the material basis and political motivation of organized forms of dissent that the janissary upheavals represented. Those involved in janissary upheavals were depicted as irrational individuals, who descended into cycles of violence, terror, and disorder. This dominant narrative then praises the violent abolition of the janissary corps in 1826 under the reign of the Sultan Mahmud II. Recent scholarship on Ottoman social and economic history has posed a strong challenge to this rather problematic narrative (see Tezcan 2009a; 2009b; Sunar 2006; Kafadar 1981; 2007; 2009; Üstün 2002; Kırca 2010). Rather than conceiving the janissary corps exclusively as a military force, and labeling their involvement in extra-military activities as corrupt, recent scholarly studies have analyzed their socio-economic ties with the *esnaf*, a major category of urban labour in Ottoman cities. The increasing interpenetration of janissaries and *esnaf* from the late sixteenth century onwards seems to be consolidated in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Such an historical perspective has thus contributed to our understanding of the agency of social classes in the formations and contestations of political power in the early modern Ottoman polity.

¹² The involvement of the janissaries in urban labour was as extensive as to include the following professions: *pazaracı* (dealer or seller in a marketplace), *kutucu* (box maker/seller), *tacir* (merchant), *sabuncu* (soap maker), *kebabcı* (seller of roast meat), *fesci* (fez maker), *yemenici* (headkerchief maker), *kahveci* (coffeehouse owner), *yorgancı* (quilt maker), *külahçı* (conical hat maker), *kantaracı* (maker of weights), *dağramacı* (carpenter), *kasab* (butcher), *boyacı* (painter), *demirci* (blacksmith), *çizmeci* (boot maker), *tütüncü* (tobacco maker), *pastırmacı* (beef-bacon maker), *şişeci* (bottle maker) and *hammal* (porter), etc. (Üstün 2002, pp. 32-33).

With regard to the violent abolition of the janissary corps in 1826, the renowned Ottoman historian Donald Quataert argues that it was a radical move towards economic liberalism in the Ottoman polity. It disarmed the urban guildsmen and eliminated the most powerful and best-organized advocates of protectionism. It was only with the abolition of the janissaries that the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1838, which eliminated state monopolies and removed protectionist barriers in favor of European capital, could be signed and put into practice (Quataert 1994, p. 764; see also 2010, pp. 201-208). Even though the 1838 Convention did not mean a total destruction of the guild structures¹³, it introduced a regime of *laissez faire* for the export of raw materials without regard to the needs of local artisans.

The first major step for the centralized organization of policing was thus taken in 1826 with the abolishment of Janissaries by the Sultan Mahmut II (Ergut 1999, p. 98). Significant developments in police organization emerged after the proclamation of the *Tanzimat* Edict in 1839. The first institutional structure of the modern police in the empire was realized with the establishment of *Zaptiye Muşiriyeti* (Police Field Marshall) in 1846, through which policing and military functions of the state were demarcated, and the former was incorporated into the administrative structure (Ergut 1999, p. 100; Schull 2014, p. 8).

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the urban landscape experienced a major transformation with the creation of municipal administrations in the Ottoman Empire (Levy-Aksu 2018, p. 144; see also Lafi 2008). The Ottoman municipal reforms reflected the

¹³ The post-1826 period was not free from the resistance movements against the application of the measures imposed by this violent imperial order. The resistances against the abolition of janissaries continued well into the 1850s (Üstün 2002, p. 27).

articulation of the Ottoman social formation into “transnational municipalism” through intermunicipal circulatory regimes during the global making of capitalist modernity (Saunier 2008, p. 10-11). That is, while the modern conception and practice of urban regimes with their associated mechanisms of socio-political control emerged firstly in Europe and the North Atlantic, it quickly expanded toward Latin America, North Africa, Australia, and the Middle East as part of the geopolitical making of the modern capitalist order (Saunier 2008, p. 16). As the urban historian Nora Lafi argues with the thesis of “Mediterranean crossings,” these circulatory regimes were socio-politically, economically and spatially more complex than the scenario presented by the conventional wisdom, which relied on a mechanical donor (Western) – recipient (Eastern) relationship (2008, p. 37). Whereas the Ottoman reformers were fascinated by Haussmann’s Paris and the French system of *Prefecture de la ville* (Hanioglu 2008, p. 87; Lafi 2008, p. 41), these urban reforms were variably manifest in the making of capitalist order and urban modernity in the empire.

The making of the urban order was a problem pertaining to the formation of the police and their penetration into everyday social relations. As part of the broader reform agenda, an extensive network of institutions emerged dealing with specific functional spheres like education, security, health and public infrastructures, culminating in the intensification of state control in everyday life, making state power more visible in the eyes of the public. The transformation of the urban fabric was thus compounded with the process of the inscription of state power in various spatial forms in major urban centers, and especially Istanbul at the heart of the empire (Levy-Aksu 2018, p. 148).

With the paradigmatic shift in the political idiom of the Ottoman reformation in the second half of the nineteenth century, the making of urban order increasingly reflected the fundamental ambitions, and deep-rooted contradictions haunting modern police science. The despotic reign of the Sultan Abdulhamid II (1876-1908) was characterized by the most systematic and comprehensive innovations in making of the modern police of the empire. While the Sultan engineered an increasingly personalistic and despotic power, his period of tyranny (*istibdat*) represented not a reversal but rather a firm commitment to the modernization and centralization of state power in the late nineteenth century. Concerned with the creation of an efficient administration through an extensive organization of bureaucracy, the Sultan Abdulhamid II managed to reshape the Tanzimat reforms and political, legal and institutional innovation by broadening their use in the light of contemporary transformations in Europe (Hanioğlu 2008, pp. 125-126). The question of police reform, of course, was a central theme in this broader agenda.

The establishment of the Ministry of Police (*Zaptiye Nezareti*) in 1879 was a significant step in the political and institutional formation of the modern police in the late Ottoman era. This was the first step for the organization of the police as a civilian force (Ergut 1999, p. 142). Throughout the 1880s, police stations (*karakols*) began to be constructed in urban centers, and especially Istanbul as the imperial capital (Swanson 1972, p. 253). During the Sultan's reign, the police engaged in overt repression and surveillance of "dangerous" individuals and dissident political groups (Ergut 1999; 2004; Yılmaz: 2014). In fact, the Hamidian regime orchestrated an extensive network of spies against political elites, Young Turks, as well as non-Muslim communities and working classes (Levy-Aksu 2018, p. 156). The main characteristic of policing

was thus “elite surveillance”. Besides the official police organization, “an extensive system of espionage” was established to control the houses and private lives of some of the pashas, big merchants and diplomats (Timur in Ergut, 1999: 146).

The politics of the police, however, was not limited to mere suppression of the dissidents of various sorts. Quite parallel to the extensive character of the bourgeois police project underway in Europe, the Ottoman police were concerned with the moral regulation of everyday urban life with a quest to tackle with social and moral challenges to public order. Based on an analysis of police reports produced during the Hamidian era, Levy-Aksu makes the following assessment about how police work was closely related to the moral regulation of daily life while subjecting certain groups to police power:

In these laconic sources [police reports], various minor disorders are assimilated into the negation of moral values and codes. Negative expressions related to morality, such as the omnipresent *uygunsuz* (improper) or *uygunsuzluk* (impropriety), are used to stigmatize behaviors, events and individuals, ranging from drunkenness, prostitution, and indecent dress to state officials’ neglecting their duties. Many of the behaviors labeled as improper in the police reports did not constitute clear breaches of the law but were instead denounced as infringements of the social and moral order ... Alongside the concept of *uygunsuzluk*, negative forms of words such as *ahlâk* (morals), *adâb* (good manner) and *münasebet* (convenience) were also omnipresent in late 19th-century police reports. They clearly demonstrate that under the reign of Abdülhamid II, the police did not only focus on the surveillance and repression of political opponents but also (indeed mostly) on the prevention and repression of the violations of an ideal, though undefined, social and moral order (Levy-Aksu 2014, p. 5).

As part of the municipal reform process, the modernization of the urban fabric reflected the bureaucratic elites’ concerns with creating healthier and safer cities. In this regard, the lives and practices of the lower classes increasingly became a target of the policing project in the making. Places like brothels, drinking and gambling houses were subjected to increasingly tight systems of control (M Özbek 2010, p. 557). The regulation of prostitution reflected a political

strategy of reproducing the existing patterns of gender and class domination. In Ottoman Beirut, for example, the development of urban life and capitalist social relations in the second half of the nineteenth century produced similar concerns for urban lower classes and their incorporation into and containment within the emergent regimes of urban order. In this regard, Jens Hanssen argues that the “social thought in Beirut after 1860 was not dissimilar to that of British public moralists of the time, who identified London’s poor as a root problem to society, and were in the belief that there were ‘savage tribes “lurking at the bottom of our civilization” which if not tamed and disciplined would ultimately overthrow it” (Hanssen 2005, p. 185).

The 1884 Venereal Diseases Ordinance was formulated as a pragmatic response to the perceived threat of urban lower classes and associated problems of social order in the urban space (M Özbek 2010, p. 555). Prostitution was framed as a “necessary evil” reflecting the increasingly dominant ideology of presenting the lower classes as a threat to social hygiene and public order. It soon became an instrument in fabricating a gendered and racialized daily order in the urban order. The basic tenets of this policy were to legalize the brothels and regulate the sexual conduct of the prostitutes through regular, compulsory medical examinations. The sanitary control of the prostitutes was spatially organized as well, so as to contain the marginalized sectors of lower class women in particular spaces of the city. The main goal was to contain the issue of prostitution in clearly limited spaces under the constant surveillance of the police (M Özbek 2010, p. 559). As I will analyze in the context of Ankara, the early Republican regime would continue to opt for the sanitary control of prostitution in the rigorously designed spatial zones of containment, especially in the 1930s.

As the urban order became increasingly defined with reference to the structural discipline of capitalist accumulation, so was labour perceived “as a social and moral duty of every individual” (N Özbek 2009, p. 786). In this regard, urban order as a police project was mainly concerned with ensuring the productive capacities of the Ottoman subjects, and thereby raising the revenues of the state. For the Ottoman state’s law and order policy was deeply rooted in the modernist ideology of socio-spatial control “through licensing and opening regulations, as well as police and hygiene surveillance” (Hanssen 2005, pp. 204-205). The nascent police project, therefore, was increasingly concerned with putting unproductive elements of lower classes into work. Throughout Ottoman history, there has always been a distinction between moral categories of deserving and undeserving poor or deserving beggar and able-bodied beggar. Thus, a system of controlling these categories of the poor has always existed in urban centres. The novelty of the late nineteenth century reforms was that “idleness was considered as a source of vice, and more importantly, labour, the antidote of vice, was perceived as having correctional and disciplinary power” (N Özbek 2009, p. 784). The government, therefore, became more concerned with the fundamental political aim of putting the idle into work with an aim of mobilizing the productive capacities of the Ottoman subjects.

Quite similar to Victorian disgust and fear of the “rabble”, the Ottoman upper classes and Western-educated intellectuals were to develop political projects of containment of the rabble to mitigate their anxiety. In this regard, the *westernization* of the Empire was an explicitly spoken excuse for initiating such reforms. For instance, following the catastrophic events like economic crisis (Great Depression of the 1870s), wars (Ottoman-Russia War) and subsequent migration flows into the imperial capital, the Ottoman elites came to see the

question of vagrancy as a serious social problem. As Nadir Özbek underlines, “the Ottoman elite was especially concerned with the possibility that public spaces crowded with ‘ugly’ beggars and ‘idle’ vagrants could spoil the ‘modern’ image of the Empire” (2009b, p. 786).

The policing of urban social life thus was organically related to the fabrication of a new order based on the wage form in its spatio-temporal dynamics. In this regard, the question of time was at the center of the nascent police project and its ordering of urban affairs. As Hanssen emphasizes in the context of Beirut, “city-time was becoming an invisible cage fundamentally structuring Beirut’s everyday life” (2005, p. 189). The temporality of urban life was central in policing urban marginals as well. The nocturnal activities of poor Ottoman subjects became a central concern for the Ottoman police and local elite because of a close association with law and order (Hanssen 2005, p. 192). This is closely related to policing the recreational activities of the urban poor in the service for the fabrication of a moralized and disciplined wage labour. As in the case of Beirut, “prostitution did become a nocturnal vice, and as such a rallying point for urban discourses on morality, hygiene and state control” (2005, p. 195; see also İleri 2014; 2017a; 2017b; M. Özbek 2010).

In the late nineteenth century, the urban fabric of the Ottoman cities was also transformed through the dissemination of police stations (*karakol*) (Levy-Aksu 2018). The construction of police stations was reflective of the Ottoman state’s concern for public order and modern urban life because the spatial presence of the police was perceived as a sign of modernity and the sublime authority of the Sultan. The architectural design and spatial deployment of police stations, therefore, reflected the quest for the imperial legitimation of the Sultan’s power in everyday life. In this regard, Levy-Aksu makes the following assessment:

Most of the *karakols* built in the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries bore several distinctive features, which singled them out from their environment as public buildings. Their facade was adorned with the Ottoman coat of arms and the signature (*tuğrā*) of the sultan who reigned when they were inaugurated. Poems dedicated to the sultan could also be carved on the facade. Characterized by their neoclassical and eclectic styles, the police stations often included columns, pediments, and ornaments, as seen in the photographs from the Abdülhamid II collection. In this regard, beyond their functional role, they became one of the public symbols through which imperial authority became more visible in the urban fabric. Like the clock towers discussed earlier, they participated in the attempts to build a stronger relationship between the sultan, the state, and its subjects through new tools for the legitimization of power (Levy-Aksu 2018, p. 153).

The spectacle of police power was compounded with its spatial deployment in strategic places of urban social life through the proximity of the police stations to other important structures of everyday life such as mosque, foundation and commercial places. For instance, the seashore of Tophane-Galate in Istanbul was characterized by “the exceptional density of police stations” as it was one of the main entry-points to the capital, and hosted port infrastructures (Levy-Aksu 2018, p. 154). The strategic deployment of the police in the urban landscape was reminiscent of Colquhoun’s river police tasked with an aggressive campaign against the pilferers of London.

1.2. The 1908 Revolution and the police

The 1908 Young Turk Revolution was “the greatest turning point in the modern history of the Middle East” (Halliday 2005, p. 7). It had short- and long-term implications on the political and military conflicts that opened the way to the war-torn decade of the 1910s, and had a decisive impact on the trajectory of the modern state formation in the post-Ottoman geographies. Being a part of the historical waves of bourgeois revolutions between 1789 and 1917, it was decisive in not only challenging the reign of the Ottoman Sultan, but also

establishing the political and ideological parameters of state formation for the entire Middle East (Hanioğlu 2008, p. 151).

The Unionists, the members of the Committee of Union and Progress (*İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti*, hereafter İTC), was the most radical wing of the Young Turk movement that emerged in the 1890s as an underground organization against the oppressive regime of the Sultan Abdulhamid II. Strongly influenced by the political imagination of the Jacobin after the 1789 revolution, the İTC's political agenda was radical in terms of initiating a comprehensive transformation from above (Ahmad, 1988: 265). In this regard, to be sure, the so-called Young Turk Revolution did not arise on the basis of a large-scale popular uprising throughout the Ottoman territories, nor was it a liberal movement of reformation. It was rather “a well-planned military insurrection, conceived and executed in Macedonia by a conspiratorial organization whose leadership harbored a quintessentially conservative aim: to seize control of the empire and save it from collapse” (Hanioğlu 2008, p. 149). The Unionists, however, were able to articulate the socio-economically rooted discontent of the masses into their own agenda of constitutional reformation. It thus took the form of a pan-Ottoman popular revolution through which ordinary citizens took to the streets in various parts of the empire against the arbitrary rule of the imperial order. Still, the months following the 1908 revolution witnessed popular protests by multi-ethnic communities, as well as “the greatest wave of workers’ strikes, a wave that was to remain unequalled until the 1960s!” (Savran 2002, pp. 5-6), as we will discuss in the following chapters.

In the immediate aftermath of the revolution, the Unionists’ main concern was the forcible restoration of law and order (Hanioğlu 2008, p. 149). In this regard, İTC was the pioneer

of “Turkish Jacobinism,” with its anti-democratic, top-down and centralizing tendencies (Savran 2002, p. 5). They engaged in a consistent policy of the suppression of political opponents and organizations through martial laws that were normalized especially under the conditions of the 1910s. When the constitutional monarchy was reinstated, the parliament was reintroduced, yet kept under tight control by the Unionists, who were the main political force working behind the scenes through the existing institutions of the government as they firmly deployed their power in the bureaucracy as well as the military (Hanioglu 2008, p. 151).

The Unionist experience in state-making, aggressively pursued during the crisis-torn decade of the 1910s in the form of a “military dictatorship” (Quataert 2005, p. 65), resulted in “the gradual emergence of a radically new type of regime that was to become frighteningly familiar in the twentieth century: one-party rule” (Hanioglu 2008, p. 151). The period between 1908-1918 was characterized by political and economic crisis, imperial defeats in major wars, and inter-communal conflict that produced the mass deportation and genocide of the Armenian people. The imperial defeat during the Balkan Wars and WWI caused the rise of a populist movement that was inspired by the Russian Narodniks. Known as “To the People” (*Halka Doğru*), this movement emphasized a Turkish nationalism rooted in Anatolia, rather than the Balkans (Ahmad 1988, p. 269; Toprak 1995, p. 4). It was in this crisis context that Ottomanism, as an ideology for saving the Empire with a resort to the unity of subject communities, was transformed into a nationalist project that emphasized the Turkish and Islamic sentiments as the basis of new order. The notion of *hakimiyet-i milliye* (national sovereignty), therefore, was originally coined by the İTC as a paradigmatic shift in the politics of national salvation (Hanioglu 2008, p. 165).

The war-time policy of the Unionists was characterized by the political fabrication of a national economy, which was a highly contested project for creating a national (Turkish and Muslim) bourgeoisie as the basis for social and political change in the country. As Ahmad says: “the aspirations of comprador bourgeoisie were better served the more the authority of the Ottoman state was weakened. Thus if we consider a positive relationship between bourgeoisie and state to be a necessary component in defining such a class, we must conclude that a Turkish bourgeoisie did not exist until the Unionists set about creating one” (Ahmad in Ergut, 1999: 161). This project was based on a rather strategic blending of corporatism, protectionism and strict state control over the economy (Hanioglu 2008, p. 189; Toprak 1995, p. 6). This historic turn to Turkish nationalism as a political and economic strategy was only realized through wartime processes of dispossession of urban and rural labour, as well as the forcible appropriation of the abandoned lands of the Armenian and Greek peasants by the landlords (Ahmad 1988, p. 282). In short, the formation of the capitalist state in Turkey in its national and bourgeois political form was rooted in the historical context of imperial crisis, wars, massacres and an accompanying process of mass-scale dispossession of Anatolian peoples.

The police reform was an organic component of this deeply contradictory process, out of which the basic institutional structure and political form of police power took root. The Unionists were “centralizers and modernizers par excellence” (Ergut 2002, p. 149), and gave special attention to the formation of a modern police force in the service of the fabrication of the national economy and associated regimes of social and moral order. Embracing the long history of police reform in the Empire, and attempting at an ultimate incorporation of the European police science into the bourgeois order in the making, the İTC perceived the police

as fundamentally tasked with “the protection of the community of commerce” with the argument that “if commerce is an absolute right, prevention of any attack on capital and goods is an essential police duty” (Ergut 2002, p. 153). This community would be organized with a central concern for attracting the European capital so as to foster economic development and social progress. As one of the parliamentarians stated during the session on police budget: “If the aim is to attract European capital to the country, the maintenance of order [was] necessary. In the present conditions, economic development is impossible” (Ergut 2007, p. 186). Reminiscent of “the general police system” of Colquhoun, such an understanding was politically productive in providing the police with a vast array of powers and spheres of operation, which touched almost all aspects of social relations. With the introduction of various laws, regulations and other administrative instruments, the police gradually became involved in almost a limitless repertoire of social affairs that included:

Checking the personnel records of those to be admitted to the poorhouse; preventing the insane from physical assaults; keeping the streets open to traffic; protecting the trade-marks; helping the abandoned children and the injured; maintaining the dignity of the operations of religious ceremonies and sacred places; overseeing the organizations of lottery and charities; controlling and checking taverns, money-changers, sewers, prostitutes, weights and measures, bakeries and their bread, vendors, hotels and entertainment places, buildings and streets that could be harmful to life and property of people; checking doctors and pharmacists to see whether they adequately performed their jobs; giving license to porters, commissioners and advertisers and those who would work at hotels and entertainment places; guaranteeing the safety of abandoned property and animals; registering jewelers and their customers; protecting monuments and parks; performing extra duties which would be given during times of earthquakes and fire, contagious diseases and epidemics; enforcing health regulations that grocers, butchers, barbers and other tradesmen should follow (Yağar in Ergut 2007, pp. 181-182).

The rigorous codification of the extensive involvement of the police in social affairs represented the Committee’s historic achievement in the political and institutional crystallization of previously fragmented reforms in the long nineteenth century (Aksu-Levy

2014, p. 4). The question of labour was thus at the centre of the bourgeois police project. Disciplining labour through police power was an indispensable part of the fabrication of a national economy. Reflective of the functional division of labour within the police, this very question was dealt with using different institutional and legal instruments. That is, different sectors of labour became subjected to different policing strategies. On the one hand, the İTC government passed the Law on Strikes in August 1909, which banned strikes and dissolved labour unions (Hanioglu 2008, p. 155). This ban was grounded in the politics of denial of the class question on the part of the Unionists (Ergut 2007, pp. 187-188), which would become an influential legacy for the Kemalist regime, as we will discuss below.

This politics of denial was related to the fear of popular upheaval on the part of the Unionists. They were deeply influenced by French positivism and read extensively the writings of Durkheim and Le Bon. It was the latter, however, who attracted the Unionist attention most. As Eric Zürcher puts it: "Perhaps no European thinker had greater influence on the Young Turks than Gustave Le Bon, quite a few of whose works were translated by Abdullah Cevdet" (Zürcher 2005, p. 23). Le Bon's ideas on crowd psychology and the masses had reflected the bourgeois fear of the spectacle of the Paris Commune, and thus he insisted on a tight law-and-order policy to contain "the rabble". This was highly influential for the Unionists and informed their increasingly firm detachment from the promises of parliamentary democracy and civil liberties. In fact, as we will explore in Chapter IV, this ideological disposition against the masses became a productive instrument in spatial organization and actual performance of the police during the contested making of capitalist modernity in Turkey.

On the other hand, the unorganized sectors of labour were subjected to a simultaneous project of control, surveillance, and moral regulation. Within this context, the 1909 Law on Vagrants and Suspected Persons was the most important and foundational document reflecting the political projects by the İTC, as well as the early Republican regime. The political strategy of “preventive policing” was assertively embraced by the İTC government and the police. This was the basis for a project of constant surveillance of vagrancy in urban space “to prevent any behavior that might end in crime before any material loss occurred” (Ergut 2002, p. 151). Developing an in-depth analysis of the rationale behind the 1909 Law, Ergut provides the following assessment:

The spokesman justified the role of the police as follows: the police were essential for differentiating between the respectable employed classes and the casual poor divorced from the labour discipline." According to the proposal of the law, vagabonds were divided into three kinds. The first kind mainly referred to those who were unemployed. These were only consumers who did not contribute in any way to production and were thus detrimental to the economic development of the country. The second kind, on the other hand, consisted of those who were unemployed for the time being. As their status of vagabond was temporary, they needed the protection of the government. The most important and dangerous was the third kind of vagabond. They were accepted as being against work in principle. They were vagabonds 'by nature' (*fıtraten*). 'To control this last type, vigilance is indispensable to purge them by force', stated the spokesman. In order to take preventive measures, it was not necessary for them to commit crimes or harass anybody. As the spokesman asserted, these measures must be taken against them regardless, because these vagabonds 'disturb[ed] public order and security purely by their presence in a neighbourhood' (Ergut 2002, p. 151).

The classification of lower classes into different categories, a Colquhounian “passion for classification and statistics” (Colquhoun in Rigakos et al. 2009, p. 248; see also McMullan 1998a, p. 106), was politically productive in subjecting the urban poor to the nascent police power especially in the imperial capital and other urban centers (Ergut 2002; İleri 2014; N Özbek 2009). The 1909 Law on Vagrants was specifically concerned with disciplining unorganized urban labour, the unskilled workers, the underclass and newcomers to urban

centers. As wage labour was conceived as “a social and moral obligation,” any form of non-compliance with this obligation becomes “the mother of all moral and social ills” (N Özbek 2009, p. 793). The law, therefore, provided the police with a vast range of discretionary powers (Ergut 2007, p. 174). The law maintained that the same person might get three different kinds of punishment for the very same crime: “He would be beaten, then he would be exiled for a certain time, and then he would be put under the scrutiny of the Ministry of Police for another three years. In other words, as stated by a deputy, he would become a 'slave' of the Ministry of Police” (Ergut 2002, p. 157). The extensive discretionary character of the law was reflective of the blurring boundaries between illegality and immorality (Levy-Aksu 2014, p. 5), which was indeed the *modus operandi* of police power.

2. Police science and state formation in the early Republic

The Republic of Turkey was proclaimed in 1923 following a decade-long wars including the Balkan Wars (1912-1913), WWI (1914-1918) and the Independence War (1919-1923). While the Independence War was based on a massive mobilization of the Anatolian peasantry, it was politically organized via a loose coalition among landed classes, commercial bourgeoisie and bureaucratic and military elites, who were ex-members of the İTC (see Avcioğlu 1998; Keyder 1987; Köymen 2007; Sarvan 2016). The very character of the new regime, therefore, was already taking root during the war years and was only further strengthened with the establishment of the Turkish Republic in October 1923. In this regard, the Kemalist revolution represented an historical continuation of the bourgeois revolutionary attempt initiated in 1908. For it was the Kemalist regime that finished the unrealized political agenda engineered

by İTC for the destruction of the age-old structures of imperial power and the formation of a nation-state with its national economy (Savran 2002, p. 6).

Founded on the fresh memories of wars and associated socio-economic processes of dispossession and population catastrophe, the new republic embraced a core ideal: the creation of a new and independent nation-state from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire against the western imperialist powers. This anti-imperialist legacy, however, had its limits, and never attained an anti-capitalist character in the course of the formation of the new Republic. The quest for independence was strongly integrated into a project for radical or “high modernity,” which was depicted as “westernization” by the ruling cadres (Ahmad 1993; Şener 2016; Zürcher 1994). The Kemalist regime embraced a radical modernist agenda of fabricating a new, secular and “civilized” society, and for that cause, engaged in an assertive project of creating “a new type of Turk very different from the Ottoman, just as the revolutionaries in France had had to create the Frenchman and the Bolsheviks were in the process of creating the new Soviet or socialist man” (Ahmad 1993, p. 77). The creation of the new citizen, the modern Turk, was *sine qua non* of a broader political agenda of economic/industrial development, which was envisaged as synonymous with modernization.

The young Republican regime experienced substantial challenges brought by the catastrophic legacy of the wars as well as the historically established peripheral status of the country. The *problem* of the poor peasantry would soon become a major issue on the agenda of the Kemalist cadres. For it was directly related to the contested politics of mobilizing the productive capacity of the population under conditions of demographic crisis and socio-economic devastation brought by the war years. Given already fragile economic conditions, the

country also experienced the adverse consequences of the 1929 World Depression. The dramatic decline in the price of agricultural products at international markets meant a sharp decrease in export revenues for a predominantly agrarian economy. As a pioneering example of the time, Turkey opted for initiating a state-induced industrial development strategy throughout the 1930s. Politically crafted with reference to the Soviet experience in planned economy, the development plans were based on a protectionist, state-led industrial strategy to nurture the national economy in the midst of the international economic instability and political turmoil. While establishing publicly-owned economic enterprises [*Kamu İktisadi Teşekkülleri*] especially in manufactured goods, these plans functioned as a fundamental medium for developing a national bourgeoisie at the expense of the labouring masses in a predominantly agrarian economy. The plans were a mechanism to transfer social surplus from the peasants to industrial capitalists (Avcıoğlu 1998; Boratav 2008; Köymen 2007; Sarvan 2016). These plans were realized on the basis of an aggressive anti-class politics. Hence, the fabrication of the new citizenry would be integrated into a project for the political mobilization of productive capacity of the population in service of state-led industrial development. The question of police reform was a fundamental dimension of state-making and nation-building in this regard.

The reforms initiated throughout the 1920s and 1930s were historic and radical in the sense that they attempted to remove the existing political, legal and institutional legacies of the Ottoman Empire with a quest to pave the way toward the rapid development of capitalism in the country (Savran 2002, p. 8). The transformation of the legal sphere was ensured with the strategic and selective adoption of numerous laws and legal frameworks from different

European countries concerning the domains of commerce, civil and family relations, criminal law, etc . The most important aspect of these political and legal changes was the firm and ultimate introduction of the guarantee and inviolability of the modern bourgeois private property (Savran 2002, p. 8). The ideological and/or cultural sphere too was radically transformed with the abolition of the Caliphate and suppression of social and political organizations of religious orders. While religion was kept under tight state control with the establishment of the General Directorate of Religious Affairs, the French-influenced *laicite* became one of the fundamental principles of the new regime.

The Kemalist nation-building project gained a new speed and more comprehensive character with the introduction of a planned industrial development strategy designed under the conditions of the 1929 World Depression. Given the historical peripheralization of the country, “state capitalism, which was the historical product of a long period of maturation in the advanced countries, appears as the condition of the development of capitalism in the case of Turkey” (Savran 2002, pp. 8-9). With the ambivalent but close relationship with the Soviet Union, Turkey adopted the state-led development plans long before the historical examples in Europe as well as peripheral countries. It was clearly a neo-mercantilist development strategy (Yalman 2002, p. 26) adopted to cope with the crisis of world capitalism as well as challenges of capitalist development in a peripheral social context. The state assumed a “leadership role” in the coordination of investments in the service of the creation of a national bourgeoisie (Yalman 2002, p. 29). The creation of a national economy was no more than a means to catch up with the level of contemporary civilization. In this regard, the *etatist* industrial development strategy embraced “an instrumentalist conception of the state stemming from the

Enlightenment tradition” (Yalman 2002, p. 30). *Etatism* rested also on “an organic conception of society” (Yalman 2002, p. 30) that was to be oriented and regulated by the centralized state in the service for the creation of a national economy through planned development. The decisive aspect of the organic conception of society and instrumentalist role assigned to the state was “putting an end to class-based politics” (Yalman 2002, p. 30). In this regard, *etatism* was an attempt for hegemony to fabricate an organic society with the decisive role assumed by the state.

2.1. Crafting the Republican police

The Kemalist regime relied on the Ottoman legacy in policing throughout the 1920s yet transformed it into a major project of fabrication for a new citizenry towards the end of the decade. The project of police reform was put into practice in the 1930s, a period of consolidation for the Kemalist regime. The previous decade was characterized by political power struggles and cleavages among socio-political groupings that were former political and military leaders during the Independence War. The loose coalition among landed classes, commercial bourgeoisie, and bureaucratic and military elites was ideologically fragmented, creating a broad spectrum of perspectives and political agendas with conflicting claims on the future of the nascent state. For instance, in the first National Assembly of 1920, parliamentarians were comprised of republicans, Islamists, liberals, as well as a minority of left-leaning voices who had different political agendas about the future of the country. The Kemalist cadres consolidated their power only after the elimination of dissident groups through military courts and coercion in the second half of the 1920s. In the process, the parliament was

reduced to a mere consultative organ of the single-party, whereas the Kurds were suppressed *manu militari* in an attempted assimilation based on a powerful wave of Turkish nationalism (Savran 2002, p. 6). The working class was kept under tight control by means of a repressive industrial relations regime that was founded upon the ideological or discursive denial of the very question of class. The authoritarian formation of the Turkish state under a single-party rule represents the specific dynamics and contradictions of the development of capitalism in Turkey (Savran 2002, pp. 7-8).

Conditioned by a world-historical movement towards protectionist economic policies and fascist and/or authoritarian state formations in the 1930s, the Kemalist regime found a fertile socio-political and geopolitical context for the consolidation of the single-party regime. Beginning in the early 1930s, Kemalism became the official ideology of the state with its six “fundamental and unchanging principles” of Republicanism, Nationalism, Populism, Statism, Secularism, and Revolutionism/Reformism. In 1937 these principles were incorporated into the constitution creating the ultimate fusion of party with state (Ahmad 1993, p. 63).

A comprehensive strategy was undertaken to create the Republican police, which would be the representative of the new regime in the making. Consistent with the long legacy of Ottoman reformation, the police reform was strongly integrated into and influenced by European policing paradigms in the 1930s. The Ministry of Interior in 1935 noted that the law-making process of the early 1930s was designed with reference to a detailed examination of

the police organizations of such western countries as Germany, Austria, France, Belgium, and Italy (*Emniyet İşleri Umum Müdürlüğü* 1935, p. 17).¹⁴

The fabrication of *the modern Turk* was redefined along these fundamental principles and characterized by a delineation at the *margins* of the citizenship along the lines of gender, class and ethnicity/race. This fabrication required a political crafting and coercive reproduction of these margins on each and every occasion. In this regard, the Kemalist project of citizenry was politically based on a categorical distinction between “the citizen, the people, and the dissident” (Şenol-Cantek 2016). The first referred to the modern Turkish individual, who embraced the republican principles, and knew her rights and responsibilities so as to act within the established boundaries of the order in a productive manner. In a way, she was “the educated,” “the grown up” who is ready to devote herself to the cause of the republican transformation. This conception delineated *the republican subject*, which corresponded to modernizing elites, urban intellectuals, and social reformers, who actively took part in the Kemalist nation building project of fabricating a modern, secular Turkish society.

The republican subject was in a fundamental contradiction with the masses, i.e. the people. The latter was characterized by cultural and religious backwardness and irrationalism that was the perceived legacy of the Ottoman past. They were “the ignorant” experiencing “the childhood” of the nascent nation. Socio-economically speaking, they were the peasants composing the majority of the population that needed to be “rationalized” and by extension

¹⁴ As a matter of fact, a considerable number of detailed reports and research articles on political, legal and institutional organization of police forces in different European countries were published in the official journals of different state departments including *Magazine of Administration* by Ministry of Interior, *Magazine of Justice* by Ministry of Justice, *Police Magazine* by Ministry of Justice.

processed into industrial work discipline. They were, therefore, to be “educated” in line with republican principles so as to become citizens: physically and morally mature subjects able to contribute to the social progress of the Republic. They are the objects of “people’s education/discipline” [*halk terbiyesi*], a highly contested project for transforming morals and manners of the masses in line with republican ideals. As one of the influential ethnologists of the time asserts, such a project was related to almost all the aspects of social existence with the aim of ensuring “excessive production, the fight against alcohol, national salvation, social relief, decrease in murders, moral refinement, an increase in the population, [and] the fight against poverty” (Zübeyr 1931, pp. 11-12).¹⁵

A conflation of such disparate issues is indicative of the depth and scope of the republican project for the fabrication of a new citizenry. Given that the police played a central role in this process, it is significant to note the historical parallels between the Republican police project and the continental European tradition in police science in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. More specifically, the Republican project for “people’s education” was based on an ambitious agenda of creating a Colquhounian “police machine” with the fundamental concern for transforming the “morals and manners” of the peasantry in the service of industrial development and political modernization of the country (Colquhoun in Rigakos et al. 2009, pp. 243-276; McMullan 1998a, p. 105). Even the critical accounts of early

¹⁵ Known for his archeological and anthropological research on Anatolian cultures, though with the utterly positivist gaze of the modernizing social reformers, Hamit Zübeyr took various positions in different state departments including the Ministry of Education. His book entitled as *Halk Terbiyesi (People’s Education)* provides one of the most striking documents on the Kemalist ideology dedicated for the fabrication of a new citizenry. Having undertaken an intensive research on various western societies including Finland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Germany and United States, Zübeyr shared his views in Ankara through a series of party conferences.

Republican historiography have seemed to miss the central role and importance of the Republican police project in the contested fabrication of modern citizenry in Turkey.

As for the third category, the dissident was the outlaw, who could not be “educated” or transformed for the sake of Republican principles. Denied any political subjectivity, she was the socially and politically disposable being that should be neutralized by any means necessary. Based on the foundational violence of the 1910s, the ethno-secular margins of the new nation state would attempt a radical denial of the historic ethnic and religious diversity of the Anatolian peoples. While the subjects of this third category would remain fluid throughout the history of the modern Turkey, it nonetheless represented the ethno-secular margins of citizenship in the country. In this regard, the “usual suspects” would be delineated as communist, Kurdish, Armenian, Jewish, Greek as well as Islamist in the early Republican period. This political framing of the dissident would inform the ideological indoctrination of *the Republican police officer*, and thereby contribute to the formation of a police culture adhering to exclusionary conceptions of Turkish nationalism (see Berksoy 2009). For instance, by defining Turkey as a “homogeneous society,” Nazmi Serim, a police instructor working at the Ankara Police Institute, called for constant surveillance of these populations with a view to ensure the elimination of any potential threat to national salvation and racial refinement (1939, p. 18; see also Serim 1940a; 1940b).

Whereas these three categories were substantial for politically crafting the margins of citizenship, another significant category was already inscribed into the state-making project in the early Republican era. It was the category of “the criminal,” delineated as a fundamental, albeit ambiguous, margin against which the republican citizenship was crafted, and

corresponding state projects were performed. In this regard, the making of *the Republican police* was central as it articulated the foundational ambitions and inherent contradictions of the aforementioned three categories and subsumed them under the category of the criminal. This had fundamental implications for the formation of police power, which is analyzed in the remaining parts of the chapter with reference to the institutional materiality of the police, as well as the politics of crime it rested on.

With regard to the political and institutional organization of police power, it is significant to analyze the legal texts enacted throughout the 1930s including: *Law on Municipalities* (1930), *Law on the Central Organization and the Powers of the Ministry of Interior* (1930), *Law on Public Hygiene* (1930), *Law on Police Organization* (1932), *Law on Police Powers* (1934), and *the Law on Organization of the Directorate of Security* (1938). These laws represent constitutive legal documents for police organization in Turkey, which have remained in effect until the 2000s. They created the basis for the professional organization and modernization of the police. In other words, these legal documents represent a political codification, and thereby delineate the *margins* of citizenship through police power. A close reading of these texts will provide a basis for comprehending the character of the formative politics of the police in this regard (see Alyot 1947; Aslan, Akbulut & Önen 2002; Ergut 2004; Gönen et al. 2013; İmga 2017; Memiş 2008; Tongur 1946).

The Republican police were characterized by a functional integration of the municipality and the governorship within a single administrative body, which was a legacy from the Ottoman urban administrative tradition. Municipal affairs were directly incorporated into the institutional architecture of police power in a hierarchical chain of command controlled by the

Ministry of Interior. While already constituted with the 1924 *Law on Ankara Urban Administration*,¹⁶ it found its ultimate form with the 1930 *Law on Municipalities*. The policy was designed exclusively for Ankara as “the capital” and Istanbul as “the center of commerce” in the country. It was explicitly stated in the Preamble of the Law that the political and economic significance of these two cities created the need to design special police forces (Aslan, Akbulut & Önen 2002, p. 25; see also Memiş 2008).¹⁷

Such an institutional interlace was politically underpinned by the aforementioned laws crafting a vast range of police powers and their subsequent deployment in the social body. For instance, the *Law on the Central Organization and the Powers of the Ministry of Interior* (1930) created a functional separation between political policing and everyday policing with different institutional bodies for their respective organization. In fact, this very distinction was politically engineered to deepen processes of expertise on the part of the police *vis a vis* different social and political problems (cf. Bowden 1978; Miller 1986). It reflected the ideological character of the new order as well. As an influential Unionist legacy, the very existence of the (working) class was politically *denied* by the ruling cadres through the need to create “a united society free from any distinctions based on privilege or class” (Şener 2016). This politics of anti-class was important for denying social and political rights to the labouring masses in the early

¹⁶ This legal document was composed of 14 articles on administrative and institutional organization of governmental power for Ankara. Article 11 explicitly stated that the municipal affairs in the city would be undertaken by the police organization, and that the head of the police would be subjected to the directives of the Mayor-Governor (Aslan, Akbulut & Önen 2002, p. 25).

¹⁷ This law would be amended in 1949 under the conditions of the transition to multi-party politics in the country. The institutional incorporation of municipal affairs by the police was criticized by opposition groups in Parliament on the grounds that it caused totalitarian rule in the country. The chapters IV and V will analyze this point to reveal the transformation of the institutional materiality of police power with special reference to the case of Ankara.

Republican period. For instance, the *Labour Code* of 1936 was designed to discipline workers by legally banning them from undertaking a strike. The 1938 *Law on Associations* explicitly prohibited the establishment of any associations based on class representation or interest (Savran 2016). On this basis, throughout the 1930s and 1940s, the Republican police exercised close surveillance over and overt repression against any form of organized action by workers.

The fundamental denial of class was accompanied by political, administrative and legal measures concerned with the increasingly tense problem of poverty. As a war-torn peripheral country, Turkey's central problem was to mobilize the productive capacities of the population in the service of state-led development plans. In this regard, the politics of the police was morally and ideologically shaped with reference to the categorical distinctions between *deserving* and *undeserving poor* and *poverty* and *vagrancy*. These distinctions were politically productive in subjecting the poor to nascent police power without any fundamental alteration of the social structure itself. Reflecting the long legacy of the Ottoman reformation and quite similar to the preoccupations of European police science, the notion of vagrancy in this period was "a catch-all category for social undesirables, facilitating a policing of the poor" (cf. Rogers 1991, p. 131). We can thus contend that the police reform process in the early Republican period reflected similar contradictions and tendencies that had been haunting European police science since the eighteenth century (See Neocleous 1996; 2000; Rigakos et al. 2009).

These laws were also important in terms of the political consolidation of policing as a profession with improvements for the working conditions and social rights of officers, the professionalization of recruitment and training, and the technological and logistical empowerment of different branches of the police organization (Ergut 2004, pp. 315-350; see

also İmga 2017). In this regard, the professional training of police officers was given utmost priority as the Kemalist cadres perceived the Republican police officers as the personification of the ideals of a new social order in the making. The establishment of the Ankara Police Institute in 1937 was a significant development for the ideological indoctrination of police officers in accordance with Kemalist principles of republicanism and nationalism (see İmga 2017). Given what we have seen, it seems apt to underline that the Republican police assumed the role of a “domestic missionary” (Storch 1976) through a close surveillance of subsistence practices and recreational activities of the labouring classes, as we will analyze in the context of Ankara in the following chapters.

2.2. In search of *Homo criminalis*

The making of the Republican police was compounded with a politics of crime that established an organic relationship between criminality and lower classes in an intensely moralized discursive framework that reflected the civilizing mission of the police. To illustrate the character of this crime politics, it is apt to resort to the texts produced by police instructors who worked at the Ankara Police Institute. As one of them, Nazmi Serin makes the following association between crime and murders in urban context and “the criminal from the lower [social] strata” (Serim 1939, p. 42):

Rude and vulgar strata consist of the groups committing murders caused by immorality. Their actions are characterized by vulgarity and banality, [and] brutish behaviors. They commit crimes in a sudden manner. It is rare to find a pre-planned crime. The criminals that make these strata up are prostitutes and labourers [unskilled workers]. The majority of these criminals are alcoholics and bastards [sic].

Such an association of crime with lower classes was paradigmatic in a number of ways (see Erzen 1939; Fazıl 1934; Gölcüklü 1962; Malik 1932; Öget 1941; Sebük 1944; Taşkıran & Ağaoğlu 1943; Tokgöz 1937). First, it rests on an ideological framing of the lower classes as irrational and animalistic beings, whose actions are merely vulgar, banal and brutish. Such a political framing legitimates the Colquhounian “police machine” (Rigakos et al. 2009) in producing morally acceptable actions and subjects. Second, it fabricates a political agenda of “social purity” with the target of refining working class immorality (cf. Stallybrass & White 1986, p. 138). Third, it clearly shows how the political imagination of the early Republican police was strongly influenced by historical legacies of police reform that were haunting European police science since the late eighteenth century. This calls for a forcible production of conditions of wage labour by the “useful poor” through “the improvement of public morals” that would contribute to the creation of happiness and prosperity in the country (Rigakos 2016, p. 57).

As discussed above, the Kemalist nation-building project arose on the basis of the structural socio-demographic conditions characterized by human loss, deprivation, and dispossession on the part of the Anatolian peasantry. This was perceived as a substantial population crisis that was to be resolved to attain the twin projects of nation-building and mobilization of the productive capacities of the population. The establishment of *Sihhat ve İçtimai Mukavenet Vekaleti* (the Ministry of Health and Social Assistance) in 1920 was significant in this respect as it represented one of the initial and comprehensive moves for remedying the crisis in question (Evered & Evered 2011a, p. 266). Established with a projected political aim of creating an institutional framework devoted to the public health, the Ministry

orchestrated a socio-medical and political process of the production of information about the population in the early 1920s. The Ministry formed a group of health professionals and administrative practitioners on the conditions of public health in the country, and on this basis, prepared detailed reports about provinces. Containing “a fantastic amount of information,” these reports dealt with almost every aspect of socio-cultural life including cultural traditions, folklore, language, socio-economic data, physical geographies and health-related issues. Titled as *Türkiye'nin Sıhhi-İçtimai Coğrafyası (The Medical-Social Geography of Turkey)*, these reports were published in numerous volumes with the name of particular provinces as their subtitles. These data mostly reflected the perspectives and attitudes of their authors (state's provincial directors) towards the provinces. Therefore, they reflected the political framing of particular diseases and called for appropriate medical and political intervention in return. Reflecting a long legacy from the late Ottoman era in public health reform, the Ministry soon became a political instrument in formulating medicalized and professional forms of intervention into the social body with the fundamental aim of giving shape to society with a concern for producing healthy and productive Turkish generations in the upcoming decades. This document and its associated province-level reports do provide an important source for making sense of the moral politics haunting the early Republican project of police reform. This quest for gathering comprehensive information of the populace established the grounds for an assertive project of moral regulation that would inform the Republican police in addition to health professionals. The reports constituted the basis of public health politics in the early Republican period demonstrating “how particular diseases of concern were frame not just biologically but socio-

culturally and politically by the nascent republic's chief medical professionals and policy-makers" (Evered & Evered 2013, p. 270; see also Evered & Evered 2011a; 2011b; 2012).

The moral politics of crime were indeed determined within a broader agenda of eugenics especially in the 1930s. A eugenics discourse was powerfully embraced by the early Republican regime with a view of socially engineering productive Turkish generations with physical and moral strength. Hence, the regime envisaged eugenics as a fundamental medium for the creation of "a modern nation of fit, intelligent, moral and dutiful citizens out of the remnants of the Ottoman society," which was mainly composed of the peasantry (Alemdaroğlu 2005, p. 61). The margins of this project were so strategically, albeit vaguely, crafted that it subjected all the *non-productive elements* in society to nascent police power. For instance, an anonymous news article published in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* in 1930 presents the vagrants, beggars, those with mental and physical disability as social burdens:

...This means that with her taxes every individual carries the burden of a swindler, a criminal, a murderer, a purse-pincher, a thief, an insane, a fool, or a vagrant abstaining from the work. The rich, and the poor...give a certain share of their daily income to the state as a tax to ensure feeding of these derogatory creatures. It is required to enforce the rules of eugenics, i.e. improvement of the race, in order to prevent this burden on humankind from growing, and even ensure its gradual decrease and eventual elimination (July 8, 1930).

Accordingly, the margins of citizenship were politically delineated with reference to an intensely moralized and medicalized deployment of crime discourse for social hygiene. It was an all-encompassing political project concerning a repertoire of social reforms ranging from everyday sanitation to the refinement of the Turkish race including incarceration of urban marginals through prisons, beggar camps, poor house, etc. Reflecting on the social hygiene

policy of the Republican regime, the Minister of Interior makes the point more clear with a comparative assessment of the case in different countries:

With the aim of appealing to the public, some countries have undertaken tolerant policing [with regard to the problem of prostitution] such as finding an employment for the prostitutes, punishing those prostituting, and banning the brothels. America, England, Scandinavia and to a certain extent Germany have attempted to ban prostitution. Our doctors have realized the hazards of the implementation of this policy in our country [in the last two years], and they admitted that the best way is to police prostitution. The Ministry [of Health] is certainly in favor of policing prostitution and thereby limiting its spread (*Hakimiyet-I Milliye*, February 14, 1933).

Turkey would follow the path of continental European countries, and especially France, which established a political regime of publicly controlled brothels (Evered & Evered 2013, p. 277).

3. Conclusion

This chapter has mainly exposed that the early Republican police reform was historically conditioned in the context of the making of capitalist modernity on the margins of European capitalism. It is, therefore, that the foundational claims, as well as fundamental contradictions, of the modern police science were incorporated into the Ottoman/Turkish social formations especially from the late nineteenth century onwards. As crystallized in the 1930s as a fundamental part of the Kemalist nation building and state formation project, the making of the Republican police was directly related to the consolidation of the wage form as the sole means of subsistence. The Republican police, therefore, were envisaged as a central form of power that would fabricate the foundational ideals of the bourgeois modernity project while resorting to coercive means where necessary.

The fabrication of the social order through police power, however, was historically caged into a bourgeois political form, which referred to the formation of an allegedly impartial and impersonal form of power. Grounded in the *real-and-superficial* separation of class power and state power, this form of power presents the police as a *public* institution that is in a constant need of popular consent in its relations with lower classes. This universal claim regarding the provision of equitable public security would haunt the Republican police in its relations with the lower classes, whose morals and manners would increasingly become a subject of police power in the making. As a result, the form of political power assumed by the modern police has been historically open to popular struggles and contestations. That is, a relational reading of police power provides us with a dynamic perspective that acknowledges the historical agency of subordinate classes in the formations and contestations of capitalist modernity.

On the basis of a dialectical engagement with the critical historiography on policing, law, and crime, and in the light of the complex historical phenomenon presented by the case of the Altındağ *gecekondu* neighbourhoods, I aim to develop an historical analysis of the Republican police project in Ankara, the heart of Turkish modernity. I will problematize police power in the context of *three distinct forms of struggle* that reflect the fundamental concerns haunting modern police in the political administration of capitalist modernity: i) struggles over urban space, ii) struggles over subsistence, and iii) struggles over moral order. These three forms of struggle represent distinct, albeit dialectically articulated facets of political power inscribed into the modern police in its bourgeois political form. Before such an analysis, however, we need to develop a deeper understanding of the making of Ankara. This analysis

will provide the historical groundwork for making sense of the historical formation of the social geography of labour in Ankara from the 1920s to 1970s, a theme that becomes more relevant with reference to contestations of police power covered in chapters IV, V, and VI.

CHAPTER III

THE HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF LABOUR IN MODERN ANKARA

Ankara is the mind and the heart of this country. Ankara is also our ideal for [urban] planning and civilization. Ankara is becoming the model for all of our cities, and we see great and beautiful construction activities everywhere. Ankara will be among the most important monuments that we will present to the upcoming Turkish generations.

Şükrü Kaya, Minister of Interior (1934)

(Ergüven 1938, p. 131)

Just like you feel happiness from the heart when you look at Ankara from the Deliler Hill [towards Yenışehir, *the New City*], you would feel deep, and perhaps much deeper sorrow when you climb the underfeature of the hill behind our Ulus [Nation Square]. The Asian mud brick has been hailing down on this part of the city for many years ...The clock of life operates towards the future in Yenışehir, but it operates towards the past in this part ... We complain about violation of the urban plan due to illegal construction of apartment floors and shops in Yenışehir; however, there is an unprecedented thing in this part: an *illegal city!* ... Walk into the inlands of these masses of mud bricks: You will feel a deep pain in your heart in the name of *all the social ideals of the Republic*. You encounter with the streets where the Turkish language is the least heard after Beyođlu and Mersin. Today, you will establish a police station with a concern for discipline; tomorrow, you will construct a school due to your mercy for children; the day after, you will send pitcher stones to enable your police officers and teachers to walk on. These *deedless mountains*, however, will become established as cities of mud and tents as opposed to the modern [urban] planning technique of Ankara (emphasis added).

Falih Rifkı Atay, Director of Planning Commission of Ankara (1935)

(*Ulus*, April 26, 1935)

Ankara was proclaimed the capital city of the newly established Turkish Republic in October 1923. Being a small Anatolian town characterized by an agrarian economy, Ankara experienced a radical socio-spatial transformation from the second half of the 1920s onwards. The spatial construction of the national capital was symbolic in the eyes of the early Republican regime. It represented a historic claim to independence and modernization for a war-torn peripheral country. After all, as the Minister of Interior Şükrü Kaya proclaimed during a

parliamentary session in 1934, it was imagined as an “ideal for [urban] planning and civilization” that would be *the* archetype for the entire nation both then and into future.

The Kemalist imagination in nation-building would engineer a radical process of creative destruction in the nascent capital transforming it into a “social construction site” (Şenol-Cantek 2016, p. 21) for an assertive project of modernization through the strategic deployment of urban planning in the 1920s and 1930s.. For it was envisaged as a politico-spatial terrain on and through which a new, modern society would be born with its new citizenry. The politics of urban planning was thus organically linked to the political projects of space-making, nation-building and the fabrication of a new and “civilized” citizenry (Bozdoğan 2001; Kezer 2015; Sarioğlu 2001; Şengül 1998; 2003; Şenol-Cantek 2016; Tankut 1990; Tekeli 1982).

The making of Ankara the capital city and its radical socio-spatial transformation, however, was not free from contradictions of their historical constitution. The Director of Planning Commission Falih Rifki Atay provides a critique from within the establishment. As one of the organic intellectuals of the Kemalist regime, Atay’s assessment reveals the socio-spatial segregation that gave way to the formation of an “illegal city”, i.e. the Altındağ neighborhoods in the 1930s. His assessment also portrays the socio-cultural challenges that such a spatial segregation would pose to the new capital. Discursively framed as a “hailing down” of “the Asian mud bricks,” the making of this “illegal city” was at fundamental odds with not only “the modern planning technique of Ankara,” but also “all the social ideals of the Republic”. In a way, Altındağ referred to the *constitutive outside* (à la Butler 1993, p. xi) of the national capital, representing the material as well as imaginary (urban) *margins* of the bourgeois social order fashioned in early Republican Ankara.

The Altındağ region, therefore, emerged as one of the first *gecekondu* settlements as part of the makeshift economy of survival by the subordinate classes during the contested and deeply polarized historical trajectory of capitalist urbanization in Turkey. It gradually emerged with the influx of the dispossessed peasantry to the nascent capital under the conditions of a war-torn peripheral economy. The scale of this migratory flow, however, was limited given the low density of agrarian dissolution during the early Republican period, which was determined by the level of capitalist development in the country. It was with the post-WWII period that Turkish society began to experience radical transformations involving the agrarian dissolution, proletarianization, and accompanying processes of slum formation on the margins of the urban centers including Ankara. As we will see below, the post-war period of structural transformations transformed Ankara into a city of *gecekondus* in a time period from the 1940s to 1970s, alongside the other urban centers such as İstanbul and Izmir.

This chapter develops a critical analysis of the making of the Altındağ slums in the context of the historical formation of the social geography of labour in Ankara from the 1920s and 1970s. I will first analyze the making of Ankara the capital city with its spatial and socio-cultural contradictions in the broader context of the nation-state formation during the early Republican period. I will then discuss the consolidation of the *gecekondu regime* in Ankara from the mid-1940s onwards as part of the structural transformations characterizing the contested making of capitalist modernity in Turkey. This analysis would reveal that the social labour as historically concentrated in the Altındağ neighborhoods has been decisive in the making of Ankara the capital city. It thus provides a historical ground for a dialectical critique of police power, a project to be developed in the following three chapters with reference to the making

of Republican police amidst the everyday forms of state formation characterized by subaltern struggles over urban space, forms of subsistence, and alternative projects of moral order.

1. “Two Ankaras” in the making

The social morphology of Ankara in the early 1920s was characterized by an agrarian economy, which was fostered by its role as a commercial and administrative center in Anatolia. It was a small town harboring about 20 thousand people living around the historic Ankara Citadel. The Citadel was the central socio-spatial coordinate (See Figure 1 below), around which existed popular settlements, commercial bazaars and public spaces like mosques, churches, coffee houses and administrative buildings. The population was composed of multi-ethnic communities¹⁸ living primarily on agricultural commerce, small scale manufacturing, and artisanal production (Şenyapılı 2004, pp. 19-23). The central geographical position of the town had enabled its rise as an important political node in Anatolia from the second half of the nineteenth century. This local transformation was articulated into a process of the political and administrative centralization for the Ottoman polity. The construction of a railway in 1892 further strengthened this position by directly connecting Ankara to other provinces as well as the imperial capital İstanbul. Thus, by the early twentieth century, Ankara had already become

¹⁸ The historic city center experienced a major fire in 1916 devastating the neighborhoods mainly inhabited by the Armenian and Jewish communities. In fact, such fires were not uncommon at the time, and articulated into a politics of nation-building and population engineering undertaken by the İTC government, as discussed in the previous chapter. A contested politics of fire was thus part and parcel of the politics of nation-building based on the Turkish and Islamic parameters of identity formation. In this regard, the cultural and/or ethnic homogenization of Ankara had its roots in the war years, and continued well into the following decades of the nation-building (see Esin and Etöz 2015; Kezer 2012).

an important political center for the imperial exercise of power in Anatolia on administrative, legal, and fiscal grounds (Etöz 2006, pp. 14-16).




Figure 1: Ankara in 1924

Source: General Directorate of Mapping, Republic of Turkey

<https://www.harita.gov.tr/urun-252-ankara-sehir-plani---turkce--tarihi-.html>

(Accessed on April 12, 2018)

Ankara's geographical location and increasing political significance made it a strategic place during the long years of the Independence War between 1919-1923. Representing a geopolitical power struggle between the nationalist forces in Anatolia and the imperial Sultan in Istanbul, “a classical case of dual power in action” (Savran 2002, p. 6), Ankara became the locus of resistance during the war years. The defeat of the Ottoman Empire in WWI and the

subsequent occupation of the imperial capital by the Allied Powers created the historical compulsion, as well as opportunity, for the nationalist forces (*Kuvâ-yi Milliye*) led by the commander Mustafa Kemal to establish a parallel nationalist government in Ankara in 1920. Tied to other nodes of resistance through relatively advanced communication and transportation links, Ankara was the best alternative for the headquarters of the Independence War to unite disparate regional resistance movements and control the battle fronts in Anatolia (Akçura 1971, p. 27; Tekeli & Okyay 1982, p. 125).

On a geo-political level, the making of Ankara the capital city was a contested issue especially until the late 1920s. Concerned with the preservation of historically rooted political, economic and cultural relations, Britain and France put pressure on the Kemalist regime to relocate the Turkish capital to İstanbul. It was no surprise, therefore, that the newly established socialist regime in the north (the Soviet Union) embracing the principle of peoples' right to self-determination was among the first group of countries to recognize Ankara as the capital of the Turkish Republic (Kezer 2015, pp. 53-77). In the eyes of the ruling cadres, this geopolitical struggle was rooted in an historically established dependency relationship that tied the imperial capital to European capitalism and, in the process, the peripheralization of the Ottoman social formation in the nineteenth century. The Ankara decision, therefore, represented the manifestation of a political will attempting at a "transformation from a foreign-linked economy to a national one" (Tekeli & Okyay 1982, p. 123). The making of Ankara the capital city also represents a relocation of the capital city with a quest to establish a new social and political order in the service of a nation-building project as exemplified in other cases like Australia's Canberra (1908), Brazil's Brasilia (1956), and Pakistan's Islamabad (1960s). In

this regard, the formation of Ankara represents one of the earliest examples of modern city planning by an independent state outside Western Europe or the US (Payne 1984, p. 210). Given such legacies, Ankara developed into a symbolic assertion for the ruling cadres: the creation of a new and independent nation-state from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire against the western imperialist powers.

The quest for independence was strongly integrated into a project for radical or “high modernity,” which was depicted as “westernization” by the ruling cadres (Ahmad 1993; Bozdoğan 2001; Şenol-Cantek 2016; Şener 2016; Zürcher 1994). The national capital would be an archetype for the realization of such a project. In other words, Ankara represented a kind of a laboratory for a broad repertoire of radical transformations pertaining to each and every aspect of social life such as sanitation, public health, education, urban planning, as well as policing. Such an *experiment*, however, would be characterized by fundamental contradictions and impasses inscribed into the capitalist development and urbanization of Turkey as a peripheral social formation.

1.1. Yenişehir: The quest for bourgeois modernity

The making of Ankara the capital city was based on a particular nationalist rhetoric that reconstructed Anatolia as the mythical homeland of the ancient Turkish people who allegedly suffered from the centuries of Ottoman domination characterized by economic underdevelopment, cultural backwardness and political docility. Accordingly, on an ideological level, the Kemalist regime perceived the Ottoman Ankara as *tabula rasa* representing the

imperial indifference to the Anatolian people (Batuman 2013, p. 578). This was instrumental in politically imagining (*à la* Anderson 2006) the ethno-secular margins of a new order in the service of Kemalist modernization and social engineering. Among numerous others, Falih Rıfki Atay's memoirs are illustrative in this context:

... And whenever I see it [Ankara], I remember those times when I just became a deputy. The city was not only a small town, but it was among the most underdeveloped towns of Anatolia. *There was nothing [here]: no roads, no water, no trees, no construction ... Just like the entire Anatolia, Ankara would be re-build, re-created from the foundation to the roof* (Hakimiyet-i Milliye, October 29, 1933; emphasis added).

The negation of the historically existing social and political structures of the town was to characterize the political and spatial transformations that created a new capital city.¹⁹ For the gap between the Kemalist imagination and historical realities of Ankara would be a fundamental point of contestation on socio-spatial and cultural terms throughout the history of the nascent capital (Şengül 1998, p. 183; see also Şenol-Cantek 2016).

The political geography of urban planning in Ankara was already determined in early 1923, when Mustafa Kemal bought a vineyard house, which had formerly belonged to an Armenian artisan on what was called the Çankaya hill (Şenyapılı 2004, pp. 27-28). The political coordinates of urban planning were thus determined along the lines of Ulus [*The Nation*] Square, the center of the old town, and the Çankaya hill, the place where "the founder" of the

¹⁹ It is telling to resort to Holston's assessment on Brasilia in this context: "If the fundamental premise of Brasilia's foundation is that it should signal the dawn of a new Brazil, then it is precisely its exemplary uniqueness among Brazilian cities that defines it as a blueprint of development. This utopian difference between capital and nation meant that the planning of Brasilia had to negate Brazil as it existed. Thus, the Master Plan presents the founding of the city as if it had no history. Similarly, the government intended to unveil the built-city as if it were without a history of construction and occupation" (Holston in Şengül 1998, p. 171).

new Republic was located. While the Ulus Square acquired a foundational importance with the proclamation of the new nation-state, it would experience a historical process of material and symbolic displacement by a new city beyond the railway line determining the southern frontiers of the old town (See Figure 1 above). In fact, it was called as Yenışehir, which literally means *the New City*, representing the foundational claims of the Kemalist regime on socio-spatial and cultural terms. Embracing a radical modernist agenda of social engineering through space-making, the Kemalist regime conceived Yenışehir as a utopia for an urbanized, modernized, and civilized society that would be deliberately created through the deployment of urban planning (Bozdoğan 2001; Kezer 2015; Şenol-Cantek 2016). The spatial reconstruction of Ankara was thus the single most important issue on the agenda of the early Republican regime. The formative decade of the 1920s was characterized by chaotic developments determined on the basis of the intensification of struggles over urban rent among the new ruling elite, as well as between the inhabitants of the old town and the newcomers (Şengül 1998, p. 207).

The Kemalist regime embraced an ideology that established a symbiotic relationship between modernity and Europe. Conceived as the bearer of “the advanced civilization,” Europe would be the reference point for the spatial design and architectural construction for Ankara. Henceforth, beginning from the early 1920s, the old and new Ankara landscapes would see the imprints of various European - and especially German and Austrian - architects and urban planners. Among others, the most important ones were two German architects who crafted the first masterplans for Ankara, and thereby put their imprints on the political geography of the nascent national capital.

Ankara's first masterplan was crafted by the German architect Carl C. Lörcher in 1924-25.²⁰ This plan was a foundational manifestation of the spatial construction of a new city in the southern frontier of the old town. Figure 2 below illustrates Lörcher's original design in 1925 with a comparative visual presentation of the Ankara landscape with the old town. As can be inferred, the Ulus-Çankaya axis constituted a central line in Ankara's new landscape, and it was sketched as a long and sublime boulevard that structures everyday social relations in the city. It connects the old Ankara centered around the Citadel and the new one settling on the foothills of the Çankaya hill. The city would be constructed via residential houses, commercial and leisure places, as well as monumental structures deployed on the both sides of this foundational line. Ankara was thereby introduced to a radical modernist outlook that included grid street plans, public squares and sublime buildings, etc. Still, the most important aspect of the Lörcher Plan was that it projected Yenışehir as "the government quarter" revealing the foundational intentions of the Kemalist cadres to make it the political center of the nation. As an urban planner, however, Lörcher himself struggled for a middle ground between the landscape of the old town, and the vast and empty lands lying beyond its southern frontier. In his original plan, the Ankara Citadel occupied a central place while Yenışehir represented an addition to that core. Such a spatial design was immediately denounced by the ruling cadres,

²⁰ Lörcher was known by his authoritarian tendencies that reflected his spatial imagination as an urban planner. In 1931, he became a member of the paramilitary organization (*Sturmabteilung, SA*) of the Nazi Party. After Hitler's rise to power in 1933, he was appointed as the head of the Department of Planning mandated by the Ministry of Education. In the same year, he was elected as the head of the Association of German Architects. He put his imprints on the spatial trajectory of Berlin in the second half of the 1930s in line with the political imagination of the Nazi Party (Gürallar 2009).



Figure 2: The Lörcher Plan (1924-25)

Source: Archive of Department of City and Regional Planning
Middle East Technical University, Ankara-Turkey

who aimed to initiate a radical break from the Ottoman past by making Yenışehir the center of new nation-state, and the new urban, modern society it represents. Additionally, the structural problem of rent-seeking was already operative in the city, and caused immediate violation of the fragile masterplan crafted by Lörcher. While it defined the central political coordinates for Ankara's spatial construction, the Plan was denounced by the ruling cadres due to its inability

to respond to the demands of Yenişehir (see Cengizkan 2004; İmga 2006; Kezer 2015; Sarioğlu 2001; Şengül 1998; Tankut 1990; Tekeli 1982).

This period also witnessed a comprehensive reorganization of the institutional materiality of the state with a quest to exerting state power over the processes of urban transformation. The institutional architecture of the state was organized and mobilized for the sake of this foundational claim. For instance, a highly centralized urban planning agency, the Directorate of Ankara Urban Construction, was established under the political and legal mandate of the Ministry of Interior. The governorship and municipality, as two institutionally separate bodies of governmental power, were integrated into a centralized structure so as to strictly govern the processes of urban construction in Ankara. Such centralized institutional frameworks were empowered financially and legally with legislated dispossessions on behalf of the ruling cadres to spatially determine the frontiers of the new city (Sarioğlu 2001; Tankut 1990; Tekeli 1982).

Reflecting the centralization of state power in urban affairs, a much more comprehensive approach to urban planning in Ankara emerged in the late 1920s under the conditions of the transition to *etatist* policy of planned development (Şengül 1998, p. 208). Crafted by another German architect, Herman Jansen, the second masterplan would reflect the Kemalist tendency to shape the urban landscape in line with the priorities of planned development that was organically associated with the centralization of state power, as a core

strategy of state-making in the early Republican period. That is why the 1930s is depicted as “the most planned period” in the history of Ankara (Tankut 2001, p. 10).²¹

The Jansen Plan indeed followed the basic spatial trajectory as sketched by Lörcher. Prepared with a thirty-year projection for a city that would inhabit 300.000 people, the Jansen Plan was put into effect in 1932, and became the first officially implemented urban plan of Ankara in the 1930s. It consolidated the socio-spatial transformation of Ankara along the axis of Ulus-Çankaya, which would be soon named as the Atatürk Boulevard (See Figure 3 below). Henceforth, the Jansen Plan determined the main spatial forms to be constructed in Yenışehir. For instance, with the establishment of the government quarter, almost all the governmental institutions would be relocated from the Ulus Square to the Kızılay Square, which would become the center of Yenışehir in the subsequent decades, as we will discuss in the following parts of this chapter.

The spatial division of the Ankara landscape into functionally specialized zones was the single most important aspect of the Jansen Plan that was radically novel for the Turkish case and reflected Jansen’s modernist political imagination in tandem with the demands of the Kemalist urbanism (Kezer 1998, p. 13; Türkođlu-Önge 2007, p. 77). While the Ulus-Çankaya axis determined the development of the city from the north to the south, this foundational line was integrated into a zonal division of urban landscape into administrative, residential, industrial,

²¹ This second masterplan was created following an international competition by invitation among three famous European architects at the time, namely, Leon Jausseley, Herman Jansen and Joseph Brix. Jausseley was the chief architect for the French government who crafted the extension plans for Barcelona, and won 1919 Paris Planning Competition. Both Jansen and Brix were teaching at Berliner Technische. Jansen was the designer of the first comprehensive plan for the Greater Berlin Competition in 1910 (Kacar 2010, p. 46).

educational, and recreational structures (See Figure 4 below). The government quarter was positioned to the south of the Citadel while educational (to the east) and industrial zones (to the west) would be deployed in-between. The Jansen Plan was thus based on a projected deployment of the government quarter as a “symbolic and spatial counterpoint to the Citadel” (Türkoğlu-Önge 2007, p. 77).




Figure 3: The Jansen Plan (1932)
Source: Archive of Department of City and Regional Planning
 Middle East Technical University, Ankara-Turkey

In this regard, the making of Ankara the capital city was based on the formation of a segregated urban landscape that reflected the socio-cultural tensions and class-related cleavages of the new order. The railway line soon become a natural border between the old city and the new one (Batuman 2013, p. 579). In tandem with the nation-building project, such spatial zones reflected the tendency of Kemalist urbanism in creating a uniform and standardized urban space that was based on a radical dismantling of the Ottoman landscapes and associated social relations (Kezer 1998, p. 14; see Figure 4 below). It also reflected the projected political aim of “the spatial centralization of an emergent bureaucracy” (Evered 2008, p. 337). As we will explore in the following chapter, all these spatial strategies would have profound repercussions on the political geography of policing in the city.




Figure 4: The Jansen Plan Illustrated (1/5000)
Source: Altinsoy (2018, p. 33).

The residential areas were dispersed in the Jansen Plan reflecting socio-cultural and class-based segregation of the social relations in the city (Kezer 1998, p. 13; Şenyapılı 2004, p. 67; Türkoğlu-Önge 2007, p. 77). This political imagination was to create a special settlement zone for the propertied in the western part of the city. For instance, to meet the ever-increasing housing demands of the middle and upper classes, the Jansen Plan proposed the establishment of Saraçoğlu neighbourhood for the bureaucrats and Bahçelievler (“garden house”) district for the urban professionals (See Figure 5).

Constructed within a decade, these were among the most successful endeavors “in the hearts and the minds of the middle- and upper-class residents” (Evered 2008, p. 335). They were to harbour “canonical modern villas” designed for the taste and comfort of the high-ranking military officials, government bureaucrats, judges, doctors, engineers, professors, as well as the parliamentarians (Bozdoğan 2010, p. 409). They were to be an expression of “the modern house” that acquired a civilizational, and thereby pedagogical function in the early Republican political imagination. For the modern house would be characterized by “comfort, hygiene, economy, functionality, simplicity and the avoidance of ostentatious display of wealth and luxury” (Bozdoğan 2010, pp. 406-407) with a quest to serve as the terrain for the performance and education of the Republican citizenry.




Figure 5: The Bahçelievler District as projected in the Jansen Plan
Source: Archive of Department of City and Regional Planning
 Middle East Technical University, Ankara-Turkey

The architectural design of these residential zones also reflected that Kemalist urbanism was heavily influenced by the Garden City Movement. Characterized by “a low-density, low-rise settlement pattern within separately defined neighbourhood units,” this movement was quite popular in Europe during the inter-war period (Çalışkan 2009, p. 32). This kind of urban planning strategy was organically compounded with spatial structures of bourgeois leisure that increasingly determined everyday social relations in the city from the 1930s onwards. The construction of “green and modern Ankara” was symbolic as it was based on the Kemalist imaginary of transforming an “arid” and backward Ottoman town into the capital city of the modern Turkish Republic. In this regard, beginning from the 1930s, Ankara witnessed the construction of numerous recreational facilities like swimming pools, luxurious hotels, restaurants, cafes, bookstores, cinemas, a beer park, a public bath, and a zoo (Batuman 2013, p. 579; Kacar 2010, p. 51; Evered 2008, p. 336).

These spatial practices, therefore, were reflective of the class character of the Kemalist urbanism. For it took the middle classes as its social base, and embarked upon an assertive project of the mobilization of public resources to fabricate a new spatial terrain of bourgeois sociability. The production of space in early Republican Ankara was thus an organic part of the class formation processes. The Kemalist urbanism was thereby experienced as a process of the urbanization of middle classes culminating into a rather contested formation of bourgeois hegemony in the national capital (Şengül 1998, pp. 226-227). The early Republican regime embraced the firm belief that “ an emerging middle class could establish new standards and values which would serve as an example for the whole country”. That is why the success of the

Ankara's urban construction was intimately linked to the fate of the new political regime (Tekeli 2009a, p. 1).

The class-character of Kemalist urbanism can best be illustrated via the projected public housing plan for the working masses. In fact, the early Republican leaders, urban planners and architects eagerly embraced the idea of mass housing schemes in Western Europe such as *siedlungen* of Weimar Germany (Bozdoğan 2010, p. 410). Reflecting the increasing concern over the ever-deepening housing crisis in the city, the Jansen Plan thus included a plan for the establishment of the workers' district as a separate residential zone in the north-west of the city. While the ruling elite and associated middle and upper classes would live in Yenışehir, the working classes were relegated to the north-west of the city through the projected construction of workers' houses. As sketched in the Figure 6 below, the architectural design of the workers' houses is reflective of the spatial form embraced by Kemalist urbanism that aimed to govern everyday social relations through standardized and uniform structures that are functional for constant surveillance and spatial control. The project, however, would not be realized in the early Republican era due to the political impasse that arose in the midst of the ever-increasing pressures of the struggles over urban rent.




Figure 6: The Workers' District as projected in the Jansen Plan
Source: Archive of Department of City and Regional Planning
Middle East Technical University, Ankara-Turkey

Ankara's urban plans thus reflected a radical modernist outlook that would enable the symbolic and material exercise of state power through various spatial forms. Characterized by a long boulevard between the Ulus-Çankaya axis, the plans were based on a spatial imagination that mimicked Haussmann's Paris (cf. Berman 1983). For the sublime governmental buildings, public spaces and streets, and the use of symbolic monuments represented a quest for

expressing power in spatial form while subjecting public space to lines of surveillance by the state. The residential and functional segregation, recreational facilities, and rigorously fabricated public spaces were, therefore, instrumental in superimposing a bourgeois morality as a basic tenet of the Republican citizenry in the nascent capital. These spatial structures were the symbols of the nascent nation-state and the capitalist order in the making.

As we will discuss in Chapter IV, such spatial practices were reflective of a bourgeois fantasy for a civilized and orderly modern life while glossing over fundamental social contradictions that were relegated to the shadow spaces of the capital. The phantasmagorical character of the early Republican Ankara would determine the political geography of policing, and thereby the real and imaginary (urban) margins of the bourgeois order in the making. These shadow spaces, however, would haunt the Republican capital in the form of everyday contestations of the urban space and its associated moral order. Before this analysis, however, it seems indispensable to analyze the making of the Altındağ *gecekondu* neighbourhoods amidst the aforementioned processes of the formation of Ankara as the capital of the nascent Republic.

1.2. Altındağ: A specter haunting the capital

Ankara's capitalist urbanization unfolded in the historical context of a war-torn society. The Anatolian peasantry had already experienced the devastating impacts of proletarianization and impoverishment during the war years (see Akin 2018). That is, being an already peripheral region unevenly integrated into the capitalist world order, Anatolia's experience with the decade-long wars played a decisive role in the proletarianization of the peasantry. Alongside

such urban centers as İstanbul, İzmir and Bursa, Ankara had become a significant destination for the masses from rural regions. Memoirs by numerous writers, who migrated from İstanbul to play their roles as middle-class intellectuals or public servants in the formation of the new nation-state in Ankara, provide significant insights into the actual character of social misery experienced by the poor. For instance, Zekeriya Sertel, who was appointed as the General Director of the Public Press, describes living conditions of the newly migrated poor in the old city center in the early 1920s:

There were empty pieces of plot behind our house [located near the Ulus Square]. Some of those peasants who had come to Ankara used to live there in the open air with their animals and wives and children. They used to tie their animals somewhere, lay some shabby stuff out the ground, and stay on them for days and nights ... Their dressing was full of patchworks, and their [skin] colours were covered by dust and dirt. Their living conditions were even worse than being poorly. There is a saying of 'minimum subsistence level' in statistics; their living conditions were even below that level; if it is accurate to call it as to live... I sometimes visited them. They looked as if they had come from another planet. I had not seen such a misery that was so dark and actual (Sertel 2001, p. 101).

The oral history interviews too provide some testimonial evidence about this hidden history of migration conditioned in the context of wars, displacements and accompanied processes of dispossession. C. (male, 57) describes his family's migration story under the conditions of war:

My family had escaped from the war in 1913-14] and come here [Altındağ]. While they were escaping, some of them stayed in Merzifon, some were given land by the state in Elmadağ [a rural district of Ankara]. They stayed there. After a while they come to the triangle of Kayabaşı, Atıfbey and Yenidoğan [neighbourhoods in Altındağ]. As a matter of fact, these [neighborhoods] were filled with [the Kurdish] people coming from Bayburt ... Their homes were patchy, made by mud-bricks. Some used to construct their roof with muds.²²

²² Interview with C. (May 10, 2016; Kavaklıdere-Çankaya-Ankara).

The problem of the poor peasantry would soon become a major issue on the agenda of the Kemalist regime. For it was directly related to the contested politics of nation-building and the mobilization of the productive capacity of the population under conditions of demographic crisis and socio-economic devastation brought by the war years. Given the already fragile economic conditions, the country also experienced the adverse consequences of the 1929 World Depression, as discussed in the previous chapter. It was within this structural socio-political context that Ankara received a considerable volume of migration from neighboring cities as well as rural regions of the eastern Anatolia (See Figure 7 below). In addition to these “pushing factors,” the declaration of Ankara as the capital city, and the subsequent intensification of construction activities created a significant demand for labour, as a fundamental “pulling factor.” It was by the second half of the 1920s, therefore, that newly migrated peasants began to establish squatter settlements at the skirts of Altındağ as a response to deepening *housing crisis*.

The social problem of homelessness was so drastic that a peculiar notion was inscribed into the common parlance of the people in early Republican Ankara. The notion of “*yorganlılar*,” which refers to those people living/sleeping only with quilts in public spaces, emerged as a socio-political concept scarped into the memory of the country as a popular representation of social misery experienced in early Republican Ankara (Aslandaş & Bıçakçı 1995, p. 246).²³ The Altındağ shanties, therefore, emerged as slum areas established just a few

²³ The seminal novel *Ankara* (1934) by Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu describes scenes of encounters of those “*yorganlılar*” with the bourgeois public sphere reflecting the deeply-rooted socio-cultural and class-based cleavages characteristic of the new order in the making. *Ankara* is a utopic novel of, as well as a requiem for the foundational contradictions of the making of the Turkish national capital, and thereby modernity at large.

kilometers away from the Ulus Square, where the new nation-state was officially proclaimed and a new socio-political order was being fabricated. The “*yorganlılar*” would be the historical agents that opened the Altındağ hills into human settlement, and thereby left their marks on the capitalist urbanization of Ankara.

Figure 7: Population Change in Ankara

Years	Population
1927	74,553
1935	122,720
1940	157,242
1945	226,712
1950	288,536
1955	451,241
1960	650,067
1965	905,660
1970	1,236,152
1975	1,606,040
1980	1,800,587

Source: Batuman (2013, p. 581)

The projected establishment of a “workers’ district” in the north-west of the city was never realized in the 1930s due to “the strategic selectivity” of state projects ((à la Jessop 1999) that reflected prioritized policy ambitions of the Kemalist regime, which were under heavy

pressure by rent seekers and speculations over urban land conditioned in the broader political economic context of the making of bourgeois hegemony in the city. Within such a socio-political context, the Altındağ hills were opened to sheltering by the newly migrated poor through everyday strategies of “quiet encroachment” (*à la* Bayat 2010, pp. 33-55) into the empty public lands in the north-east of the city (See Figure 3 above). As I will analyze in the following parts, the formation of Altındağ as a slum region adjacent to the Ulus Square was a material and symbolic denial of the bourgeois modernity project undertaken in Ankara. In other words, this was a foundational step at the long history of “transgression” (*à la* Stallybrass & White 1986) undertaken by the Altındağ poor *against* the broader socio-political order in the making in Ankara.

The newspaper archives from the early Republican period provide significant insights into the processes of the making of Altındağ shanties. Being the media outlet of the Kemalist regime, *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* published numerous articles on the social conditions of living in Altındağ in the 1930s. For instance, in a news report published in 1933, Ankara was portrayed as a “rapidly developing city” thanks to numerous construction activities underway. This glorified presentation of urban construction is contradicted with the following description of Altındağ: “About 1500 *unauthorized* houses have been built by workers and those engaging in small-scale artisanal production. These houses are outside the city plan, and *occupy* the hills behind Bentderesi in neighborhoods named Atif Bey, Altındağ, and Yenidoğan. The workers’ houses as envisaged by the city plan [the Jansen Plan] have not been built yet” (1933, emphasis added). Such news reports reflected the political position of the ruling cadres *vis a vis the* squatter settlements in the early Republican period. For these settlements were perceived

within a political discourse of *the occupation of the public land by squatter dwellers*, and thereby constituted a public order problem. Such a policy was to be materialized through practices of demolition, which soon became a contested issue between the urban poor and the state forces.

By the late 1940s, however, the Altındağ region became the single most important labour pool for Ankara. The Ankara Municipality reported that there were “neighborhoods and areas that carry the names of Altındağ, Atıfbey, Aktaş, Yenidoğan and Yenihayat” in the Altındağ region, which were not incorporated into the official urban plan of the city (*Ankara Belediyesi* 1945, pp. 25-26). It further noted that about 40.000 people lived in Altındağ at the time. Figures 8 and 9 below provide a visual representation of the Altındağ outskirts in this regard. Taken in 1933-35 and 1952 respectively from almost the same photographic angle, these photos enable one to trace the historical proliferation of the Altındağ shanties over time.

The concentration of labouring masses in Altındağ was, of course, conditioned by the social geography of production in Ankara. Ulus was the historic city center, around which social, economic and cultural relations were spatially organized. This historic role made Ulus a spatial zone for small-scale manufacturing, artisanal production and commercial relations in the early Republican era while public factories would be established in Yenışehir in accordance with the Jansen Plan’s projected zonal organization of the urban landscape (Tekeli 2009b, p. 141). This role would later be consolidated with the establishment of small-scale industrial production zones around the Altındağ shanties from the 1950s onwards.



Figure 8: Altındağ shanties (1932-35)

Source: Archive of Koç University Vehbi Koç Ankara Studies Research Centre (VEKAM)



Figure 9: Altındağ shanties (1952)

Source: Archive of Koç University Vehbi Koç Ankara Studies Research Centre (VEKAM)

For instance, to the north-east of the Altındağ region, Siteler was established in the mid-1950s as a zone for small scale manufacturing shops to meet the city's growing demand for timber and associated furniture production. K. (male, 64), who has been a resident of Çiğirli Bağı, a stigmatized region in Altındağ, since the late 1950s and worked as a carpenter in Siteler, recalls the establishment of this manufacturing zone:

Siteler was established around [19]55. Let me describe to you how Siteler looked like at those times. There were timber manufacturing shops here. That is, they were processing and selling round timber. Because there was a high number of *gecekondus* at those times, timber was coming here.²⁴

On this basis, we can contend that the making of Altındağ did not represent the formation of “a traditional working class neighborhood” organized around industrial factories (see Topalov 2003); but it expressed a peculiar slum formation experience within a peripheral setting. In this regard, Behice Boran, a dissident sociology professor from Ankara University, reveals that Altındağ arose as “another *newcity*” harboring laboring masses who intended to seek shelter near Ulus at the lowest cost possible (1941, p. 15, emphasis added).

Within this context, it is important to understand that *the character of social labour* historically formed within the Altındağ region is depicted in the relevant literature as the intensification of the *marginal/informal sector* into wage relations in heterogeneous and complex ways. For the Altındağ laboring classes, the practices of subsistence included diverse activities ranging from street vending, portering, construction labour, maid service, etc. News

²⁴ Interview with K. (June 15, 2016 | Siteler-Altındağ, Ankara). As I will analyze in Chapter V, the timber-processing shops in Siteler were also important in terms of *wood picking*, a historical practice of pilferage the Altındağ poor engaged in within the broader moral economy of social criminality conditioning the subaltern struggles for subsistence in the city.

reports from that time period provide details on the character of subsistence activities by the Altındağ labourers. Adviye Fenik, a news reporter from *Zafer* offers the following description in 1949:²⁵

Let's erase it [Altındağ] from the map for a while. The great Ankara would stagnate as if the electricity was cut off, coal gas company did not work, bakeries did not receive flour ... You cannot eat your fresh simit [bagel] with your tea because the [street] seller from Altındağ would not work. You cannot carry your load because the young porter [*hamal*] would not work. Your dirty dishes would accumulate at your homes because the woman from Altındağ would not come any more ... There are workers, dyers, servants, errand-boys [in Altındağ] ... Early in the morning, even before the sun doesn't paint the bastions of the [Ankara] Citadel, an inflow begins from these places [Altındağ neighbourhoods]. Masses of people come down from each and every hollow of the neighbourhood[s]. These [people] go to ensure all the comfort, pleasure and happiness of Yenışehir. They are at markets, at bazaars; they are everywhere. They are in your service, at your disposal all the time (*Zafer*, May 13, 1949).

The social labour as concentrated in Altındağ was thus central to the national capital in the early Republican era. No matter how necessary, the Altındağ squatters also reflected *the gaze against the margin* by urban intellectuals who while acknowledging their economic utility within the nascent bourgeois order, nonetheless re-constructed them as a political problem that should be *resolved* through various policing strategies of regulation, surveillance, containment and repression. For the socio-culturally heterogenous character of labouring masses in Altındağ also challenged the ethno-secular *margins* of the Kemalist nation-building project. While there is no reliable statistical information on Altındağ's socio-cultural heterogeneity at the time, one can get some sense of this from a number of diverse sources. Various news reports published throughout the 1930s and 1940s in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, *Ulus*,

²⁵ In Chapter V, I will explore how the subsistence practices of the Altındağ poor incorporated the phenomenon of social crime through various acts of pilferage in the city. Contrary to the rather functionalist and modernist gaze at the *gecekondu* phenomenon, therefore, I will contend that the work on the margin has been not *marginal*, meaning that the formation of the wage form has been a contested issue from its inception.

Cumhuriyet, and *Zafer* provide information about the ethnic background of people living in Altındağ. Reports make reference to the presence of Kurds, Turks, Albanians, gypsies, and Armenians. These ethnic characterizations were often used as adjectives to present the background of individuals reported. For instance, reporting a murder incident at Atıfbey neighbourhood in 1933, *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* mentions two Kurdish individuals from Bayburt and Afyon provinces who were involved in the incident (1933).

The large-scale social dislocations and population transfers that emerged under the conditions of the decade-long wars between 1912-1923 resulted in migratory flows of Bulgarian, Albanian and Tatarian peasants into the inlands of Anatolia, including Ankara (Hatipoğlu-Eren 2004; Seyman 1986). This historical legacy of socio-cultural heterogeneity was further strengthened with the migration of Turkish, Kurdish and gipsy peoples during the early Republican period. As indicated by Boran, the Altındağ region was already spatially organized on the basis of kinship and ethnic groupings, and thus such expressions like “Kurdish neighbourhood” and “Tatarian neighbourhood” were already in use among the local population (Boran 1941, p. 16).

2. From “quiet encroachment” to radical challenge

The Turkish social formation experienced major changes in the aftermath of the Second World War in terms of relations of production and corresponding state-society relations (Yalman 2009, p. 198-233). Conditioned in the world-historical context of the making of an international economic order amidst the rise of the Cold War, Turkey experienced the

simultaneous processes of political and economic liberalization, dissolution of agrarian social structures, and massive influxes from rural regions to urban centers. This radically transformed urban landscapes and the composition of the working class, with dramatic social and political consequences in the following decades.

In the 1940s, the historic alliance among the military-bureaucratic elite, landed classes and bourgeoisie come to an end (Ahmad 1993, p. 102), culminating in a shift in the political structure from single-party rule to an era of multi-party politics (Timur 1994). The establishment of the DP (*Demokrat Parti*, Democratic Party) in 1946, and its rise to power in the 1950 elections was marked by the political challenge of the coalition of the landed and bourgeois classes, which incorporated the peasantry and other popular classes into its populist discourse of anti-statism and anti-secularism. The Democrats soon became the spokesmen for private enterprise and economic liberalism, and secured political support from the capital groups as well as the liberal intelligentsia (Ahmad 1993, p. 105). The transformation within the ruling class was conditioned in the broader political economic context of a shift in the dominant accumulation regime. As we analyzed in previous chapter, the state-led industrial development strategy, marked by the deliberate policy of five-year plans, was denounced in favour of an export-oriented economic strategy that prioritized agricultural production as the primary means for the integration of the Turkish economy into international capitalism.

This post-war ruling class strategy was designed in the context of early Cold War politics of containment of the Soviet influence in the Middle East, a deliberate US policy launched with the Truman Doctrine in 1947. Turkey was incorporated into the Marshall Plan, originally designed for the reconstruction of European and Japanese capitalist economies with massive

funding flowing from the US. In the process, Turkey's dependence on the US deepened on economic, political and military-strategic terms, whereas its new role in the international economic order began to transform the agrarian social structure and class relations in a substantial manner. This was a strategic response to meet the agricultural needs of war-torn European economies in the immediate aftermath of the WWII (Savran 2002, p. 10). With the projected aim of making Turkey "a little America," the Democrats played instrumental roles in ensuring the political rapprochement of Turkey in line with the interests of the US-led Western Bloc (Ahmad 1993, p. 109). As a matter of fact, with a radical shift in foreign policy orientation, Turkey came to be seen as "the West's surrogate" in the Middle East and the Balkans attempting to maintain the domination of the West through a new system of alliances (Ahmad 1993, p. 119).²⁶

The immediate outcome of Turkey's incorporation into Marshall Plan was the mechanization of agricultural production due to the US-imported aids and technologies that resulted in a massive scale of surplus agrarian labour (Ahmad 1993, p. 115). That is, the decades-long processes of dispossession on the part of the Anatolian peasantry gained a radically new speed with the political and economic shifts in the post-war period. With DP's strategic investment plans on transformation sector, Turkey experienced a rapid expansion of networks of roads throughout the 1950s. This was instrumental in establishing the

²⁶ Turkey became a member of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) in 1952, which would determine the structural contours of Turkish foreign policy orientation for decades. For it began "to champion the cause of the West wherever she could". In the Balkans, Turkey tried to link Yugoslavia to the West, and away from non-alignment, signing the Treaty of Ankara with Athens and Belgrade on 28 February 1953. In the Arab world engaged in national struggles against Western imperialism, Ankara sided with the imperialist powers. It supported the British in Egypt and the French in North Africa. In the struggle between Prime Minister Mossedeq and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Ankara's sympathies were with the oil company (Ahmad 1993, p. 119).

infrastructural grounds for the creation of a national market, while it facilitated the process of rural-to-urban migration throughout the 1950s (Ahmad 1993, p. 115).

The Anatolian peasantry had already suffered from the long years of WWII. Although the country did not enter the war as a belligerent party, it experienced the adverse socio-economic conditions of a war economy deepening the processes of dispossession. These structural transformations were to result in massive dislocations experienced in the form of migrations from the rural to the urban centers. During the 1950s, 1.5 million immigrants arrived into urban areas. The urban population, which was 16.4% in 1927 and had merely reached 18.5% in 1950, jumped to 25.9% in 1960 (Danielson & Keleş 1985, p. 28). It was under these structural transformations that Turkey encountered the problem of *gecekondu*, which would put its imprints on the making of capitalist modernity in the country in the second half of the century. *Gecekondu* became the principal form of informal housing by the urban poor under the conditions of the state's inability to provide public housing to the masses flowing to urban centers. It was, therefore, a fundamental reflection of the structural limits and impasses of capitalist development in Turkey.

From its inception, the phenomenon of *gecekondu* signified "the challenge of a new form of social space" characterized by use value as opposed to the identity value and the exchange value imposed by the state and the commodity logic of capital respectively. This was a challenge to "the abstract space of the state which were characterized by identity value and of private capital characterized by the exchange value in favor of a concrete space of the squatters" (Şengül 1998, pp. 151-152). This challenge, however, was politically inarticulate in character in the initial decades of the formation of the *gecekondu* settlements. That is, the

making of *gecekondu* was defined by its makeshift character referring to the survival strategies of the newly migrated rural poor amidst social and economic dislocations and disparities they were exposed to in a capitalist urban setting. Unfolded as “an unintended consequence of macro processes” (Şengül 1998, p. 152), the making of *gecekondu* settlements was experienced as “quiet encroachment” or “the silent, protracted, and pervasive advancement of the ordinary people on the propertied, powerful in a quest for survival or improvement of their lives” (Bayat 2010, p. 80). As a professor of planning and insightful observer of Ankara’s urban development in the early Republican era, Fehmi Yavuz noted that “they [the *gecekondu* dwellers in Ankara] learned to gauge the government’s actions so well that they often shrewdly chose to build their homes on national holidays when the limited police force would be busy keeping vigil on ideologically charged celebratory pageants” (cited in Kezer 1998, p. 17).

In this regard, representing a historical move towards the invasion of urban land by squatter dwellers, the formation of *gecekondu* neighborhoods in Altındağ refers to “nothing other than the annihilation of the state authority which guarantees private property and market exchange” (Şengül 1998, p. 151). The initial state response to the squatters, therefore, was defined with reference to an exclusionary logic that criminalized and marginalized the *gecekondu* population as “the rural other” (see Erman 2001) that was the negation of the bourgeois modernity project underway. Representing a fundamental violation of private property and state authority, *gecekondus* were demolished with a concern for reminding “the newcomers of the authority of the state and the primacy of exchange value over use value in the production of urban space” (Şengül 1998, p. 155).

Newspaper reports from the 1940s provide a rich set of examples to gain a deeper sense of this marginalizing discourse utilized in the service for the politics of law and order. Disseminating CHP's official rhetoric, the following news excerpt from *Ulus* presents the *gecekondu* phenomenon as "the invasion of Ankara" by the squatter dwellers:

We already know that grass and tree mushroom from the ground, but we have just learned that houses spring out with their doors, windows and tiled roofs ... In Ankara, 300 meters from the Ulus square, *gecekodus* are built in just 6 hours near the asphalt street ... Ankara has been invaded by the unlicensed [squatters].

The article itemizes the political challenge posed by the proliferation of *gecekondu* settlements in the national capital:

We are facing with a sorrowful scene. The issue has many dimensions:

- 1) The right of disposition, which is under strict protection of laws and regulations, is being encroached.
- 2) The citizens are accustomed to a feeling that is nothing more than the disrespect for the established order.
- 3) Because of this sauciness that is fast encroaching towards the center of the city from all quarters, [new] neighbourhoods emerge without adequate sanitary conditions and municipal services.

....

(*Ulus*, July 21, 1948; 2).

The initial state policy towards the *gecekondu* problem was thus defined with an historical strategy of criminalization, and thereby demolition of the squatter settlements with a concern for restoring law-and-order in the city. This policy reflected the political imagination on the part of the ruling classes to perceive the *gecekondu* poor as "rural other" that occupied the public lands and would return to their villages. As reflected in the quotes above, the initial class response in early Republican Ankara was "protecting their city and identity against the invasion of outsiders" (Şengül 1998, p. 237). The rapidly growing number of squatter

settlements, however, made it an impossible option to imprison the peasantry in their villages. Over time the representation of the *gecekondu* people were crystallized as “peasants in the cities” who were expected integrate into the modern urban life through the intervention of the state (Tekeli 2009a, p. 2). As we will see in Chapter IV, this kind of political rhetoric was based on a bourgeois disgust of the *gecekondu* poor, and informed the politics of the police through the formulation of various projects for the moral and sanitary regulation of the Altındağ labouring classes in the early Republican period.

Conditioned under the populist political atmosphere of the multi-party era, however, the increasing *gecekondu* population became a significant agent in the country’s electoral politics by the late 1940s. Amidst a shortage of affordable housing for low-income groups, a specific law for housing in Ankara was enacted in 1948 (Law No. 5218). The law pardoned the existing *gecekondu* settlements and allocated land with a ten-year payment plan for those willing to construct *gecekondu* housing. Although this legislation was partly successful in regularizing the existing *gecekondus*, it was still insufficient in preventing further informal or illegal construction due to the large influx of rural migrants. Legalizing Ankara’s existing informal housing set the precedent for subsequent amnesty laws nationwide. In 1948, the government passed Law No. 5228, which provided amnesty to all informal settlements in the country (see Demirtaş 2009; Karpat 1976; Kongar 1986; Şengül 1998). This ambivalent state strategy informed the everyday approach of the containment of the *gecekondu* problem throughout the 1950s. It was within this context that the Altındağ region was formally recognized as a district in 1954.

Whereas the problem of *gecekondu* became a growing concern for the state as well as middle-class residents of the city, it did not inform the policy paradigms initiated for crafting a new urban plan of Ankara in 1957. It was quite ironic to observe that the 1957 Yücel-Ubaydin Plan disregarded the rising problem of *gecekondu* while concentrating on the future development of the city. Produced following a competition, the plan represented a political and spatial expression of the deepening hegemony of the middle classed in the city. During the 1950s, Ankara's historic city center, Ulus, experienced a process of material and symbolic displacement, which ultimately made Kızılay as the center of social and commercial life in the city. As the central hub of Yenışehir, Kızılay was formally accepted as the Central Business District (Batuman 2013, p. 580). Henceforth, this area would witness a dramatic increase in construction of apartment blocks, bank branches, upper class hotels and restaurants, advertising, real estate, foreign and domestic travel agencies and insurance offices. These developments meant an ultimate shift of the center of the city from Ulus to Yenışehir (Batuman 2013, p. 580). This historical shift made the Ulus Square as the commercial and social space of the working masses. For it consolidated its role as a zone of small scale manufacturing, street vending and commercial exchange the urban poor.

The Figure 10 provides insight into the materialization of the aforementioned urban plans of Ankara. The red line shows the original frontiers of the old town in 1924 while the blue line corresponds to the 1924-25 projection by the Lörcher Plan. The spatial frontiers of the new capital as projected in the Jansen Plan is shown via the black line. As can be inferred from such a spatio-temporal comparison, Ankara's experience with these urban plans was characterized by *its immediate violation* due to contested processes of capitalist urbanization within a

peripheral setting. In this regard, the making of the Altındağ neighbourhoods represented the historical denial or *anti-thesis* of the bourgeois modernity project in Ankara. As sketched in yellow circles, the squatter settlements were never incorporated into the official urban plans of Ankara, even in the 1950s.

On this basis, we can contend that the historical transformation of the Ankara landscape along the axis of Ulus-Cankaya, a phenomenon expressing the making of the bourgeois hegemony in the city, established material or structural grounds for the historical concentration of urban poverty in the Altındağ region. As I will analyze in the following three chapters, this process was organically linked to contested processes of policing, which had repercussions for the concomitant formation and marginalization of the labouring classes. The structural character of Turkey's urban economies prevented the absorption of the massive influx from the rural regions into the formal economy. The country, therefore, experienced the formation of a large-scale "secondary" or "informal economy" that was characterized by service enterprises, labour-intensive employment and substantial excess labour (Keleş and Danielson 1985, p. 41; see also Akçura 1971; Karpaz 1976; Kongar 1986). The urbanization of labour power in this form, therefore, transformed the urban landscape in tandem with the needs and demands of the working masses (Batuman, 2013: 579; Şengül, 1998; 2003).

ANKARA İMAR PLÂNI




Figure 10: Ankara Maps (1920s-1950s): A Spatio-Temporal Comparison
Source: Archive of Department of City and Regional Planning
Middle East Technical University, Ankara-Turkey

The social geography of labour in Ankara reflected the socio-spatial segregation of the city from its inception. Whereas we see the consolidation of Ulus as the center of informal work for an increasing population group, the urban poor engaged in work practices in affluent parts of the city. In this regard, as a rapidly developing center of social and economic life in the city, Yenisehir, and especially the Kızılay square, became a strategic place for the labouring masses to seek temporary works. The case of maid service provide us with a representative case in this context. A news reporter from *Halkçı* reported that by the mid-1950s, the Kızılay square had already become a central place for job seekers (*amele pazarı*). His account also exposes how the social geography of labour was determined within the class-based segregation of the city (*Halkçı*, May 29, 1955).

They say that there are 20.000 maids in Ankara. Their special exchange market is the Kızılay park. The maid problem is the biggest problem in our Ankara. You will ask, why? This is because the number of women working in public offices are extremely high. They have their kids in their homes. These children require care. After all, the country's most wealthy, most luxurious class reside here [in Yenisehir, Ankara]. The high-level public personnel reside here. High-level Building Contractors, Engineers, Doctors reside here [sic].

...

The milkmen with their donkeys are the ones who set their feet on the Ankara asphalt streets from early morning. The second convoy is the army of maids coming from Altındağ. With pockets or boxes in their hands, and scarfs or mufflers on their heads, they sometimes walk for almost two hours. They rush from Telsizler, Kayabaşı, Dağ neibbhorhoud, [and] Tabakhane into Yenişehir, Kavaklıdere, Çankaya, Maltepe, Saraçoğlu neighbourhood, [Atatürk] Boulevard, Ministry of Health, [and] Kızılay. These packets and boxes go empty and come full back. They gather old clothes [and] residues that are bestowed upon by their mistresses.²⁷

The contradictory social space assumed by the Kızılay square was also conducive to the production of alternative social imaginaries on the capitalist development in the city. Among

²⁷ Whereas it is not exposed in this news report, I will contend in Chapter V that the maid service provided an important and distinctly gendered opportunity for pilferage on the part of the Altındağ poor.

numerous others, the socialist poet Hasan Huseyin Korkmazgil wrote a poem titled *İnsan Pazarı* (Human Bazaar) in the early 1960s. This poem was a response to a monument from the early Republic that depicts the Kemalist quest for the production of an orderly and submissive workforce. We will analyze the political significance of this monument in the next chapter while discussing the political geography of policing in the city. For the moment, however, it seems relevant to resort to Korkmazgil's satirical critique of the poem from the perspective of the Altındağ labouring classes, which also exposes the proletarian experiences of precarious living and working in the city.²⁸

Kondulardan gelmişik lo
Açlık yoksulluk çekmişik
Her sabahın seherinde
Güvenparkta birikmişik

...

Güvenparkta bir anıt var
Yamru yumru kara taştan
Yazıyor ki o anıtta
Öğün çalış güven ey Türk

...

Öğünsek de güvensek de
Çalışsak da olmuyor ki
'Türk'ük deyin övünüyök
Açlık 'Türk'ü bilmiyor ki

We have come from the squatters
We have suffered from hunger and poverty
In the dawn of every morning
We are amassed at Güvenpark [*Trust Park*]

There is a monument at Güvenpark
Which is lobate, and made by black stone
And it says on that monument
Türk! Be proud, work and trust

Even if we are proud, and trust
Even if we work, it runs into the ground
We boast about being 'Turk'
But hunger does not recognize the 'Turk'

Notwithstanding that it was initially subjected to a systemic policy of denial, it was the *gecekondu* phenomenon, therefore, that substantially challenged the bourgeois hegemony in

²⁸ In 1989, the socialist band Yorum would compose a song from this poem, which has now become a part of dissident popular imagination.

the city on socio-spatial, as well as political grounds in the subsequent decades. The recovery of European agriculture and the weakness of the Turkish economy produced a severe crisis of foreign payments in the mid-1950s. It was under this crisis-ridden economic atmosphere that the Turkish bourgeoisie turned to industry on mass scale. DP's fragile economic policy, coupled with increasingly authoritarian restoration of state power, led to the crisis of the political system as well. In fact, it was during this historical conjuncture that a new hegemonic coalition took root in the country. An "urban coalition" composing of the industrial wing of the bourgeoisie, the state bureaucracy, military and the intelligentsia became increasingly frustrated with the DP's increasingly arbitrary resort to state power and inability to recover from the crisis. Coupled with a wave of social unrest and mass student protests, this process led to a military coup in May 1960 (Savran 2002, pp. 10-11). The coup and the subsequent political economic atmosphere were determined by an attempt for hegemony on the part of the industrial bourgeoisie. This was a shift to import-substitution industrialization, which established the contours of a capital accumulation regime, as well as the form of Turkey's integration into the international capitalist order throughout the 1960s and 1970s. This hegemonic strategy was based on the consolidation of the Turkey's peripheral position in the international division of labour, while the industrial bourgeoisie gained the main share.

By the early 1960s, the state's policy towards the *gecekondus* began to change. Conditioned by the industrial bourgeois' attempt for hegemony, *the gecekondu* settlements began to be integrated into the existing order through a populist coalition. This process meant "an attempt on the part of the state to reassert its authority and control over these settlements and to reintegrate the squatters under the logic of capitalist urbanization in which exchange

value subdues use value". With this process, the squatters get integrated into the administrative and municipal frontiers of the state, and thereby commodified in the legal land markets (Şengül 1998, p. 156; see also Balaban 2011; Demirtaş 2009; Karpaz 1976; Kongar 1986).

During the 1970s, Turkey witnessed the rise of mass social movements centred on the housing question. With the political leadership assumed by socialist organizations, the *gecekondu* movements represented historical examples that went beyond resisting against the socio-spatial inequalities imposed upon them. It was rather the case that *gecekondu* movements assumed the political mission to create alternative (Ş. Aslan 2010, p. 793) or autonomous (Şen 2013) social spaces of collective organization. That is, the socialist movement in the country attempted to move beyond a struggle characterized by resisting against poverty and inequality, toward the creation of "*gecekondu* spaces" on the urban margins. This now signalled a transformation from *a struggle on the space* to *a struggle over the space* on a collective scale (Ş. Aslan 2010, p. 793; see also Batuman 2006; Şen 2013; Şengül 1998; 2003), as we will analyze in Chapter VI.

3. Conclusion

This chapter has analyzed the Altındağ *gecekondu* region in the broader context of the making of Ankara the capital city of Turkey. As evidenced in this analysis, the formation of Ankara was characterized by deep-rooted spatial and socio-cultural contradictions that characterized the urban modernity since the early Republic. The emergence of the *gecekondu*

settlements as part of the makeshift economy of the urban poor, and its consolidation in the historical process were decisive in the transformation of the urban landscape in the national capital. Whereas this process involved many facets, the chapter put a special emphasis on the centrality of social labour concentrated in the Altındağ region for the making of Ankara the capital city of Turkey.

The Altındağ region, therefore, emerged as one of the first *gecekondu* settlements as part of the makeshift economy of survival by the subordinate classes during the contested and deeply polarized historical trajectory of capitalist urbanization in Turkey. It gradually emerged with the influx of the dispossessed peasantry to the nascent capital under the conditions of a war-torn peripheral economy. The scale of this migratory flow, however, was limited given the low density of agrarian dissolution during the early Republican period, which was determined by the level of capitalist development in the country. It was with the post-WWII period that Turkish society began to experience radical transformations involving the agrarian dissolution, proletarianization, and accompanying processes of slum formation on the margins of the urban centers including Ankara. The post-war period of structural transformations, therefore, transformed Ankara into a city of *gecekondus* in a time period from the 1940s to 1970s.

This chapter's brief analysis provides a historical ground for a critique of police power, a project to be developed in the following three chapters. Exposing a dialectical perspective grounded in the social history of policing, the chapters IV, V and VI will attempt at critically analyzing the making of police power on the margin amidst the everyday forms of state formation characterized by subaltern struggles over urban space, forms of subsistence, and alternative projects of moral order.

CHAPTER IV

ANKARA THE CAPITAL BOURGEOIS FANTASIA AND THE FILTH OF THE CITY

We regret to see your grievance [because of the filth and disorder in the city]. We will make sure that we overcome the deficiencies you have pointed out not in a week, but twenty-four hours ... However, it will be realized that new [deficiencies] rear their ugly heads. The water fountain that was left open will be closed, but new ones will be left open at its elbow; the water pipe, which was destroyed under the guise of obtaining or drinking water, will be repaired; however, another pipe will be broken at its elbow; the wall edges, which are polluted with urine, will be cleaned, but other edges will be dirtied; the underneath of bridges will be cleaned off stool, but other edges will be dirtied, and it will continue like this. It is challenging to fight for people's education, against people's manners. As a response to these, [the Mayor-Governor Nevzat] Tandoğan said that we should not shake our sins out, we should not blame the people; fathers who do not educate their children are faulty. If we have failed to provide the people with proper education, to create good manners, this responsibility is on our shoulders. If we meet the needs of the people, we will then save them from these shames. If we undertake our daily duties on time and if we are not tired of repeating these duties, their shames will get [disappeared] (Bayman 1949, p. 85).

In his memoirs, written for “paying the debt of gratitude back to Tandoğan” (Bayman 1949, p. 5), the Deputy Mayor Mustafa Adli Bayman describes how urban administration was managed and how daily order was regulated during the time of Nevzat Tandoğan, the mayor-governor of Ankara between 1929-1946. Providing a personal account of the charismatic leadership exercised by the mayor-governor, Bayman exposes interesting details of how Tandoğan undertook rigorous control over urban affairs and held regular meetings with his personnel to instruct them through a long and detailed list of actions to be taken in the city. As evidenced in the quotation above, the everyday management of urban life seemed to have been concerned with a major political project: giving shape to the morals and manners of the lower classes in the nascent national capital.

Tandoğan was a famous political figure with an uncompromising adherence to the Kemalist regime's *Jacobin* quest for the fabrication of a new Turkish society that would be characterized by a modern, secular and enlightened citizenry.²⁹ He indeed left a peculiar legacy on the tradition of public administration in Turkey with his authoritarian and disciplined management of urban affairs. We can thus speak of *the cult of Tandoğan* in Ankara in the early Republican period. While acknowledging the historical *agency* of Tandoğan, it is essential to contextualize him in relation to the broader historical dynamics of nation-building and police reform. Perhaps Tandoğan might best be interpreted as the *personification* of the very form of political power determining the politics of the police in early Republican Ankara.

Ankara's symbolic place in the nation-building project made it a special case for the politics of the police as well. It represented a kind of a laboratory for a broad repertory of radical transformations pertaining to every aspect of social life from sanitation to public education. The corresponding state projects were in one way or another crafted as a component of police reform already underway. These projects were characterized by an assertive political agenda for the fabrication of a bourgeois morality that would flourish in Yenışehir, the terrain of a modern and orderly social life in the making.

²⁹ As a former İTC member, he was among the political cadres organizing resistance movements during the Independence War. He then joined CHF in the early 1920s and took an active part in the Kemalist state-building project throughout the early Republican era. He undertook different duties as police director in Istanbul, provincial governor in Malatya, provincial inspector in Bursa and Balıkesir, as well as parliamentarian for Konya province. He was indeed among the *militant* members of the ruling regime with his dedication to the cause of the Kemalist revolution. The following testimony by Bayman seems significant to illustrate the *militancy* of Tandoğan as a Kemalist cadre. Bayman claims that the mayor-governor described himself to Mustafa Kemal as "a loyal organ of the party [CHF]" (Bayman 1949, p. 78).

I argue in this chapter that the political imagination of the early Republican police rested on a phantasmagorical framing of the lower classes as the filth of the city that needed to be remedied through various forms of administrative intervention. The daily administration of this social filth was organically linked to the policing of the Altındağ labouring classes. Representing a process of slum formation within a peripheral setting, the making of the Altındağ *gecekondular* neighbourhoods was characterized by a concomitant formation and marginalization of the labouring classes. This chapter thus develops a critical analysis of the formation of the Altındağ slums with reference to a much-neglected issue in the early Republican historiography: the social history of the police. My goal is to reveal the historical nexus of urban space, class formation and policing within a relational understanding of how everyday forms of state formation were manifested in the national capital and, by extension, to reveal the inherent contradictions of policing in the city. I divide my analysis into three major themes of historiography: 1) the political geography of policing; 2) the political fabrication of wage labour; and 3) the moral regulation of daily life. Reflecting distinct, albeit organically intertwined processes of police science, these analytical themes will be articulated into a narrative on the social marginalization of labouring classes in Altındağ, a historical phenomenon dialectically inscribed into everyday forms of state formation in early Republican Ankara.

1. Political geography of policing

The quest for bourgeois modernity in Ankara was characterized by a radical process of creative destruction, which articulated space-making into everyday processes of state formation. These took the form of contested class relations and socio-political cleavages. The

spatial form of the police was determined within this context, producing constitutive impacts on the nascent bourgeois order. The production of space was thus dialectically intertwined with the production of social relations of power underlying the Republican police.

As the center of the new nation state, the Ulus Square was a major political node organizing the political geography of policing especially in the 1920s and 1930s. Positioned at the intersection of the İstasyon [Station] Avenue connecting the center to the Railway Station, and the Atatürk Boulevard marking the Ulus-Çankaya axis, it was surrounded by public buildings and important socio-economic and cultural structures. The architectural design of the sublime governmental buildings and other structures represented a deliberate attempt at spatially inscribing the nascent state power into everyday social relations (Bozdoğan 2001; Kezer 2015; Şenol-Cantek 2016). The material and symbolic significance of the Ulus Square was further strengthened with the construction of the Victory Monument [*Zafer Abidesi*] in 1927 (See Figure 11 below). Crafted by Austrian sculptor Heinrich Krippel, the spatial design of the Monument reflected the intention of the Kemalist regime to mark the foundational victory attained at the Independence War by the historic leadership of Mustafa Kemal. For the Monument was composed of “an equestrian statue of Atatürk on the top of a plinth, with two “Mehmetçik,” the Turkish soldier and the Turkish woman carrying ammunition to the battlefront” (Batuman 2005, p. 37).



Figure 11: Victory Monument at the Ulus Square (1934)

Source: Ankara Sosyal Bilimler Üniversitesi, 2018, *Müzeler Avlusu*, p. 22.

https://www.asbu.edu.tr/sites/anasayfa.asbu.edu.tr/files/inlinefiles/asb%C3%BC_m%C3%BCzeler_ok.pdf (Retrieved on March 12, 2019).

The politics of memory inscribed into the architectural design of the Monument was compounded with its strategic deployment at the Ulus Square holding a spatiotemporal claim on the political horizon of the nation. The figure of Mustafa Kemal inspects “the procession of the new buildings on Station Avenue, starting with the parliament and ending with the station building” (Çınar 2007, p. 161). Representing a paternalist politics of state-induced modernization, the Monument strategically deploys Mustafa Kemal’s gaze over the city as well as the nation at large, as if he carefully watched the making of the new city and the trajectory of the Turkish modernity under his feet (Çınar 2007, p. 161; see Figure 11 above).

Not surprisingly, the Ulus Square immediately became a site for the spectacular exercise of state power in early Republican Ankara. Among others, recurrent public ceremonies were held as ritualistic moments for fabricating an orderly public devoted to the cause of the Kemalist revolution (see Figure 12 below). Such moments attracted widespread attention in the print media, which published detailed accounts of ceremonies organized on such special occasions as the anniversary of the Republic. Reporting on the 12th anniversary, a news article from *Cumhuriyet* provides the reader with a detailed account of the massive campaign organized for the ceremony to be held at the Ulus Square on October 29, 1935. While describing the order of things on the day of the ceremony itself, it reports that the people would “pledge allegiance to the Republic” in front of the Victory Monument (*Cumhuriyet*, October 13, 1935).



Figure 12: Public Ceremony at the Ulus Square (1934)

Source: Archive of Koç University Vehbi Koç Ankara Studies Research Centre (VEKAM)

Such ceremonies should be read in conjunction with yet another form of spectacular power: public executions undertaken at what was called Samanpazarı Plaza, near the Ulus Square (See Figure 13 below). The Plaza hosted the Ankara Independence Tribunal, one of the eight revolutionary courts established in 1920 with the supreme authority to try cases of treason (Karpas 1959, p. 47). It later became a radical instrument orchestrated against all political opponents, mainly Kurdish nationalists, Islamists and underground organizations of the Communist Party of Turkey. The death warrants were executed in broad daylight at the garden of the Plaza, which hosted the Tribunal until 1927, the year of its abolishment. Attended by a crowd of local people, such executions functioned as spectacular moments fabricating the ethno-secular margins of the new regime (Çınar 2007, p. 160; see also Aytemiz 2013, p. 327).




Figure 13: An illustration of the execution of three alleged British spies in Ankara in the early 1920s
Source: *Cumhuriyet*, May 17, 1982, p. 8.

What is interesting to note is that these practices included homicide cases as well (see *Cumhuriyet*, December 13, 1931).³⁰ These seemingly *non-political* executions were part of a broader politics of crime being engineered in early Republican Turkey. Such public executions were based on a strategic discourse presenting the murderer as a monstrous/dangerous being representing a paradigmatic example of individual pathology for violent orientation. This dehumanizing strategy was instrumental in the consolidation of a moral politics of crime that emphasizes *raison d'être* of the state on each and every occasion (cf. Foucault 1995). These spatial practices thus functioned as a publicly orchestrated medium, through which the *margin* of criminality and thereby citizenship was politically crafted in early Republican Ankara.

Through such spectacular performances, the Ulus Square was transformed into a paternalist public sphere for the exercise of state power. It was thus a paradigmatic example of “a republic without public” [*kamusuz cumhuriyet*], which denotes the political alienation of people from the public sphere at large (see Toker & Tekin 2002). The inhabitants of the old town were already denounced on ideological and cultural grounds and relegated into the neighborhoods located within and around the Ankara Citadel. Founded upon an ideological break from the Ottoman past, the Kemalist political imagination regarded the inhabitants as cultural inferiors, who needed to be *civilized* by the westernizing elites of the new Republic. The Ankara Citadel thus became a place of confinement for the inhabitants, who were

³⁰ These public executions continued well into the early 1960s in Ankara (see *Cumhuriyet*, January 25, 1960) as well as other parts of the country. For instance, the national daily *Milliyet* reports about the execution of a serial killer called as “the Beşiktaş monster” with the attendance of one hundred thousand people at the Eminönü Plaza in İstanbul (*Milliyet*, December 25, 1960). With an amendment inserted into the Law on Execution in 1965, the executions were closed to the public and began to be undertaken at prisons yards before the sunset.

culturally and politically alienated from the socio-political order in the making (Kezer 2015, p. 36).

Whereas the Ulus Square continued to preserve its significance in the early Republican period, it would experience a material and symbolic displacement due to the formation of the Kızılay Square at the center of Yenışehir, as I discussed in the previous chapter. Yenışehir would increasingly become a central socio-spatial coordinate organizing the political geography of policing in the nascent national capital and the symbol of the emerging bourgeois life. The establishment of the government quarter gradually increased the political and strategic significance of Yenışehir. As the mayor-governor of the city for 17 years, Tandođan orchestrated an assertive law-and-order politics that reflected foundational ambitions as well as inherent contradictions of the emergent order.

Tandođan gave special attention to ensuring daily order and security in Yenışehir. For instance, the Atatürk Boulevard on the Ulus-Çankaya axis, the terrain of modernity, orderliness, and rationality (Bozdođan 2001, p. 64), was virtually closed off to the peasantry and urban poor. Wearing “peasant clothes” or “being drunk” was legally banned on the Boulevard as this contradicted the ideals of orderly urban life and civilized citizenry. The Boulevard was constantly kept clean and secure, and lit at nights (Karakuş 1977, pp. 12-14; Öymen 2002, pp. 81-84). This strategy was part and parcel of the broader politics of social hygiene that was orchestrated with a concern for the clearance of the social filth allegedly threatening the bourgeois sociability in Yenışehir. As evidenced in the opening quote to this chapter, it rested on a rigorous delineation of the moral and sanitary *margins* of the bourgeois order fashioned by the Republican police, an issue to be discussed in the following parts.

Tandoğan's preoccupation with such a law-and-order agenda might have also been determined by the strategic deployment of Mustafa Kemal's *gaze* at the Çankaya Palace. Being the "founding father" of the new Republic, Mustafa Kemal exercised strict control on every aspect of socio-political life in the city. The topographical location of the Çankaya hill functioned in the form of a symbolic exercise of panoptic power over the city at large. Both as the object and subject of this power, Tandoğan's historical agency can be interpreted as the personification of panoptic control over Ankara in the 1930s and 1940s (Kezer 2015, pp. 50-51; Şenol-Cantek 2016, pp. 181-198). Such an exercise of power was materially and symbolically productive in not only ensuring daily order but also in shaping popular representations of state power in early Republican Ankara.

In this regard, the dissident poet and novelist Hasan İzzettin Dinamo's autobiographical novels provide insight for making sense of the contested encounters with the police by subordinate classes and marginalized groups in early Republican Ankara.³¹ In these novels, Dinamo narrates stories about everyday practices of surveillance and violence by Tandoğan's police for the sake of fabricating an orderly city free from social undesirables depicted either as vagrants or "communists/anarchists." As a dissident literary figure himself engaging in a humanist critique of the new regime, Dinamo was personally trapped by the intelligence web orchestrated by Tandoğan in the city in 1934. He wrote a poem, *The Train*, about suffering by worker-soldiers who were forced to toil on the construction of a railway line between Sivas and

³¹ The most relevant ones are *Musa'nın Mapushanesi* (*Musa's Prison*, 1974), *Sübyan Koğuşu* (*Ward of the Youngster*, 1994), and *Adalet Sırtması* (*Malaria of Justice*, 1983), which were written between 1934-1939 when Dinamo was imprisoned at the Ankara State Prison, popularly known as the Ulucanlar Prison.

Erzurum provinces.³² He was then imprisoned for four years at the Ankara State Prison located adjacent to the Altındağ region. In his novel, *Musa's Prison*, Dinamo describes encounters with Tandoğan:

Governor Tandoğan is the third master of Ankara. All suspects are taken to his office before appearing in court or being imprisoned. They are introduced to the Governor in a definite manner. This introduction is mostly made with the medium of thick sticks. As I have said, Nevzat Tandoğan wants to show all those wrong-doing citizens that he is the third most important person after Atatürk and İnönü [the Prime Minister] ... In his office with full windows and crystal glass that has the sight of the city, he lies back the cloak that hides the heavysset policemen [who are ready to] beat (Dinamo 2007 [1974], p. 97).

As Dinamo's literary narration reveals, Tandoğan's preoccupation with the law-and-order politics in the city reflected the paternalist tendencies that characterized the Kemalist regime in the early Republican era. This paternalism was compounded with a kind of obsessive anti-communism perceived as a threat to the nascent regime, which produced a systematic politics of repression. The following sentence has become inscribed into popular memory as the single most important reference describing the political rationale embraced by Tandoğan: "If this country [Turkey] needs communism, we are the ones who would bring it to this country." While the exact historical context of such a sentence is not known, it has become a satirical reference for a critique of Tandoğan, as well as the early Republican regime, Melih Cevdet Anday underlines (*Cumhuriyet*, December 13, 1982). As a militant adherent of the Kemalist regime, therefore, Tandoğan became a symbolic figure to denote despotic state

³² It is important to note that "weaving an iron web across the land" was a crucial spatial strategy of state-making in the early Republican period, which would re-organize the Anatolian cities in line with the Kemalist spatial and political imagination (Kezer 2015, p. 160). Dinamo's poem, *The Train*, was openly challenging this foundational claim of the Republic to reveal human suffering by the Anatolian peasantry.

power given his legacy of an administration characterized by an “iron will” (Kocabaşoğlu in İmga 2006, p. 126).

Quite parallel to the spatial reorganization of the Ulus Square, Yenışehir would harbor symbolic spatial forms that would strongly inscribe the regime’s political imagination into everyday social relations. In this regard, the Güven [Trust] Monument represents a paradigmatic document about this politics of police written into the urban space of early Republican Ankara. Constructed in 1934 at the Kızılay Square, the Monument epitomizes the clear influence of Nazi art on the early Republican political imagination (Bozdoğan 2001, p. 284; see Figure 14 below). It was dedicated to gendarmerie and police forces for their “historic achievements” in restoring law-and-order in the country after the foundation of the new Republic (Kezer 2015, p. 43). The Monument narrates a story about the central significance of security for the nascent nation-state. As one nationalist reading of this narration states:

This is a monument erected in gratitude for the Turkish police and gendarmerie. The body has the shape of T. In the front side, there are two human sculptures made of bronze. The old man is handing over the duty of [ensuring] security of the society to the younger one. In the base, [a scenario for] a fire, a murder and a robbery, and the help of the Turkish police are inscribed. The backside portrays Atatürk and his friends licking the nation’s wounds. It also portrays *the citizens working under security: plowing peasants, working people, and artisans*. So Atatürk addresses the citizens with the following words: *Turk! Be proud, work and trust!* (Atatuğ 1963, p. 66, emphasis added).

The Trust Monument represents a significant example of the politics of the police in a nascent bourgeois order with its architectural design and strategic deployment at the center of the new city. The narrated story of fire, murder, and robbery illustrates a de-politicized presentation of social problems, which would be resolved through the deployment of “the help of the Turkish police.” Work becomes a fundamental duty of all the citizens with the paternalist

interpellation of “the founding father.” Within a peripheral context of state-induced capitalist development and social transformation, this Monument reminds one of Marx’s assertion in the *Jewish Question* that: “Security is the supreme social concept of civil society, the concept of the *police*.” (Marx 1975, p. 163, emphasis in the original).



Figure 14: Trust Monument at the Kızılay Square (1934)

Source: Archive of Koç University Vehbi Koç Ankara Studies Research Centre (VEKAM)

These spatial policing practices were historically at odds with those undertaken in the Altındağ neighbourhoods. As the topographical periphery, Altındağ was officially incorporated into the urban plan only in 1954 when it was made a district for the administrative organization of municipal affairs. It was nonetheless envisaged as a central political coordinate in the spatial organization of police power as early as the 1930s. The political geography of urban space in

Ankara was mapped with reference to distinct police spheres/precincts. In 1932, Ankara was demarcated into four precincts, and the Atıfbey neighbourhood in Altındağ was incorporated into what was called “Hacı Bayram Police Precinct” (Kandemir 1932, pp. 132-133). News reports provide interesting clues about the processes of incorporating the Altındağ region into the police precincts at the time. For instance, daily public order problems in the Atıfbey neighbourhood were discussed in the District Congress of CHF in 1931, and the Commissioner submitted the following justification for the establishment of a police post: “Given the excessively dispersed [settlements] in the Atıfbey neighbourhood, it is considered that the establishment of a police post would ensure a *disciplining service* in and around the area” (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, January 31, 1931; emphasis added).

We can trace the spatial formation of police power with reference to the 1941 *Ankara City Police Guide*. It is indeed a significant document for understanding the spatial imagination and organization of police power in early Republican Ankara. The guide was prepared by the Ankara Police Headquarters with the purpose of providing newly recruited police officers charged with patrolling in the city with information about population and spatial organization of the city. A police station and three police posts were deployed in Altındağ by the early 1940s (Ankara Emniyet Müdürlüğü 1941, p. 55). While the station was deployed within Altındağ, the posts were deployed on the margins of the region where it made spatial contact with the city (See Figure 15 below). This guide is also an expression of the uneven formation of the urban space through police power in early Republican Ankara. There was a higher police presence in other parts of the city while Altındağ seems to have been *under-policed*. The limited physical presence of Republican police officers, however, was fortified through alternative policing

strategies in Altındağ. Mounted police and neighbourhood watchmen were used in the region as well. Reflecting a spatial contradiction concerning the rural-urban dichotomy, the mounted police were formed in Ankara in 1932 with the strategic aim of ensuring “public order and preventive policing in densely populated and remote places, where there was a high possibility for criminal acts” (Şahin & Kul 2005, p. 113).




Figure 15: Altındağ Police Station
Source: Ankara Emniyet Müdürlüğü (1941)

Given the “success” of the Ankara mounted police, this policing strategy would later be deployed in other urban centers like İstanbul and İzmir in the 1930s (*Ulus*, July 5, 1935).³³ Of course, the Republican regime gave particular importance to reorganizing a neighborhood watch [*bekçi*] system as a disciplining body that would act as a support unit for police forces. Inherited from the Ottoman tradition of daily administration of urban affairs, neighborhood watchmen were the single most important medium for the state to penetrate living spaces of the urban poor in Altındağ (See Figure 16 below).



Figure 16: Neighbourhood Watchmen in Altındağ (no date)

Source: Archive of Koç University Vehbi Koç Ankara Studies Research Centre (VEKAM)

³³ The mounted police would be abolished in 1976 with the concern that it became dysfunctional amidst the rise of social and political events that included “violence” at urban centers (Şahin & Kul 2005, p. 114). The state would opt for motorized and armored vehicles (panzers) especially from the late 1960s onwards. This strategic shift in policing would have repercussions on police involvement in Altındağ neighbourhoods as well, an issue we will discuss in the Chapter VI with reference to the spatial contestations of police power throughout the 1970s.

Given the political geography of policing in early Republican Ankara, we can observe that the police followed differential spatial strategies that reflected nascent socio-political order-making, and observe the inherent contradictions this produced. Yenışehir was the central political coordinate organizing the entire political geography of policing in the city while the inhabitants of the old city were relegated to their neighbourhoods around the Ankara Citadel. On the other hand, the Altındağ neighborhoods were another defining coordinate of the political geography of policing even though it took an entirely distinct form. Whereas Altındağ residents seemed to have been *under-policed* compared to other parts of the city, we need to critically evaluate the somewhat uneven character of policing with reference to the social contradictions of everyday forms of state formation in early Republican Ankara. In this regard, we can say that the police did not develop a comprehensive strategy of incorporating the poor shanties into the emergent bourgeois order. It was instead the case that the police acted as *wardens of the margin*. Indeed, the newspapers *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* and *Ulus* provide interesting clues about this point. Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, numerous news reports were published on daily public order issues in Ankara. Issues such as interpersonal violence and petty theft were a significant daily problem for the Altındağ poor. What is striking to observe from the news reports is that the police seemed to be simply non-existent. To put it more clearly, at a time when Yenışehir was subjected to a strict policing strategy for ensuring daily order and security, Altındağ was characterized by the absence of the police.

This pattern of policing was rooted in the early Republican period and continued in the subsequent decades. The following case reported by a news reporter from *Ulus* is revealing in this context. Altan Öymen published a series of “Altındağ Interviews” in 1952 to publicly expose

social conditions of living in the region. The quote below is by an inhabitant complaining about the failure of the state to provide public security for the Altındağ poor. As a mundane exposition about the absence of the police, this quote refers to subaltern experiences with and demands for the provision of security as a public service:

If they [thieves] come here [Altındağ], they can take the shirt off our back, and no one can hear and see them. Just as there is no lighting here, the police don't come here. It is fortunate that we have neither property nor money [to be stolen]; and so we are at ease (*Ulus*, July 13, 1952, p. 4).

As I discussed in Chapter II, this subaltern demand for public security represents a world-historical contradiction underlying the social organization of the bourgeois police. For it exposes “the precarious position” (J. C. Wood 2003, p. 9) or “the schizophrenic image” (Robinson & Scaglion 1987, p. 114) assumed by the bourgeois police in everyday relations with the subordinate classes. I will explore the contradictory manifestation of this subaltern demand in the following two chapters while focusing on different aspects of class contestations. For the moment, however, what is significant to underline is that the political imagination of the Republican police was grounded in the uneven formation of urban space that reflected class-based segregation and socio-cultural cleavages in the city. This political imagination was thus haunted by a stigmatized representation of the Altındağ labouring classes. The following observation by Behice Boran, a dissident sociology professor at Ankara University at the time, provides a significant evidence for the *marginalizing gaze against Altındağ* that was already internalized by the Republican police officers. Representing a reflection on a rare sociological fieldwork conducted in the region in the early 1940s, the piece narrates the following story:

In a windy and rainy winter day, we are walking around different neighbourhoods of Ankara with my undercover police friend and colleagues from the Faculty [of Languages, History, and Geography at Ankara University]. We are climbing the slope that goes from the Ulus Square to the Court House. At the top of the slope, we are turning to the short, narrow street that goes down to Bendderesi. There are still shops here, coffee houses at the down, and the neighbourhood of “red light”. By using his long arm, my police friend crosses a circle in the air and points at the hills in front of us, and says: ‘Crimes and murders are committed in these neighbourhoods.’ Small, mud-bricked houses are amassed at these hills row after row (Boran 1941, p. 35).

On this basis, I contend that policing as a spatial practice was organized in a form that reflected the segregated formation of urban space in early Republican Ankara. It was a decisive part of the making of the bourgeois order in a dialectical juxtaposition of Yenışehir, the terrain for the modern, civilized life, and Altındağ, the city of mud-bricks. The spatial strategy of the police was thus concerned with the solidification of “the boundaries of perceived criminality” or the creation of “frozen zones” where crime and associated public order problems were contained (cf. Varga 2013, p. 90). That is why such problems as interpersonal violence and property crime *within* Altındağ, as reported by the Ankara-based newspapers throughout the early Republican period, were not perceived as threatening issues for the new social order fabricated in Yenışehir, the heart of the emergent bourgeois life and the nation-state. This *threat* would become a serious political matter only after it gained contested forms that challenged the bourgeois order either through subaltern acts of appropriation *via* social crime practices, or revolutionary praxis of the socialist movements in the subsequent decades, as I will explore in chapters V and VI respectively.

2. Political fabrication of wage labour

Acting as wardens of the margin for Altındağ, the police assumed a contested spatial form characterized by their physical absence with a political agenda of ensuring daily order and security in the nascent bourgeois city. This spatial form, however, was dialectically intertwined with their social and political function of giving shape to the practices of subsistence undertaken by the Altındağ labouring classes, precisely because they historically assumed an all-encompassing presence in everyday encounters of the Altındağ poor with the bourgeois order in the making. The historically established social function of the Altındağ region as the labour pool of Ankara conditioned a contradictory position for the police. As we will see in the following chapter, subsistence was experienced as a contradictory terrain that found its actual form only in and through the dialectical interplay between police projects and their simultaneous contestations.

The institutional incorporation of municipal affairs by police power was politically productive in fabricating a market under the crisis-ridden economic conditions of the early Republican period. As we discussed in Chapter II, mobilizing the productive capacity of the population and the national economy were two crucial agendas on the part of the ruling classes in the broader context of a neo-Mercantilist state-making project. This was reminiscent of the continental European tradition in police science, which was characterized by a project of policing that was tied to “national self-identity and wealth creation” (Rigakos et. al. 2009, p. 3). Incorporated into a repressive class politics reinforced through deep paternalist tendencies, these agendas were facilitated by policing projects in Ankara throughout the 1930s and 40s.

The 1937 *Ankara Municipal Police Manual* was an important document for comprehending how political projects conditioned wage labour. Prepared with the fundamental aim of “ensuring public health and peace” in the city (*Ankara Belediyesi* 1937, p. 3), the Manual was designed as an all-encompassing police ordinance concerned with each aspect of everyday social relations. Containing 256 detailed articles in 63 pages, the Manual reflects a state strategy of giving shape to the subsistence activities of the labouring masses in line with the rules of a modern, civilized urban life. It contained a strikingly detailed and long list of municipal ordinances, and determined the conditions of legal and economic sanctions for non-compliance. Activities such as street vending, portage, construction work, and maid service were deliberately subjected to strict control and regulations to ensure the smooth incorporation of labouring masses into wage relations. This is how portage work was regulated by the nascent police power (*Ankara Belediyesi* 1937, pp. 48-49):

Article 204: Those who will undertake the portage work shall be subjected to a medical check by the Municipality, which shall provide them with an identification badge. The identification badge shall be carried by them in a publicly visible manner. It is prohibited to undertake portage work without the identification badge.

Article 205: Those who do not have appropriate conditions in terms of age, bodily and mental health; who have been convicted due to fraud and embezzlement and similar crimes; who have not been validated through a certificate of good conduct by the Municipality; and who have been punished more than three times due to non-compliance with the conditions for portage work shall not undertake the job. If these people were provided identification badges beforehand, these badges shall be taken away.

...

Article 207: The porters shall be careful not to hit anybody in crowded places, and for this reason, they shall alert by-passers in a gentle and quiet manner, if necessary.

...

Article 209: Harmful and impolite behaviors by porters against the load owners are prohibited under any conditions.

Article 210: It is prohibited for porters to demand payments that are above the price list of the Municipality.

The 1937 *Ankara Municipal Police Manual* was indeed a peculiar reflection of a police strategy of civilizing the productive activities of the labouring masses within a much broader campaign of fabricating wage labour as the only means of subsistence. As the above articles overtly demonstrate, the market for portering labour was politically fabricated in line with the needs and ideals of the bourgeois order in the making. Given the historical fact that the Altındağ region was the single most important labour pool of Ankara in the early Republican period, one might contend that the 1937 *Ankara Municipal Police Manual* was created with an explicit concern for policing the subsistence activities of the labouring masses in Altındağ. News reports provide significant textual and visual examples in this regard. For instance, Figure 17 below is directly related to the political fabrication of portering work with a moral concern for civilizing the labourers. The associated news report narrates:



Figure 17: Porters at Ankara Streets
Source: *Ulus*, March 3, 1937

The porter in the photo had been humping a dirty basket till very recently. Now, he is carrying his load in a beautiful vehicle. With this tiny vehicle, the load becomes lighter like a child, and his appearance is put on the way. Such kinds of transport scenes, which we have begun to see on asphalt streets, are among the characteristics of Ankara.

As evidenced in the quote itself, we see once again a peculiar concern for *the dirt* that gains a phantasmagorical meaning in the quest to fabricate a civilized labour force. The fabrication of the wage labour assumed a contradictory spatial form mediated through police power, and thus was organically linked to the political administration of everyday class encounters in the city. Police power was envisaged as an everyday medium through which lower social strata would be regulated in their encounters with the new order in the making.

The case of maid service presents another interesting instance to make sense of how the political imagination in the early Republic was preoccupied with strict control of labour in daily social relations. Chapter 14 of the *Ankara Municipal Police Manual* is devoted to the regulation of maid service. A close reading of particular articles reveals that police power was imagined as a decisive medium through which *the margins of the class relations* were politically crafted with an agenda of subjecting the labouring classes to the ideals of economic productivity and bourgeois orderliness as submissive actors (Ankara Belediyesi 1937, pp. 157-163):

Article 256, clause 1: The Ankara Municipality has opened a bureau with the name of housework. The responsibilities of this bureau include determining the identities of the workers as described in Article 4, providing them with a [medical] check [and] health certificate.

Article 256, clause 3: Each registered worker will be provided with a token and file, and these files will contain information about workers and the registry of their identification. The male and female workers who provide housework service and conduct their craft properly (tutoress, foster-nurse, maid, cook, launderer, servant, gardener, and others) shall ensure their registration in the bureau of municipal workers ... and get their professional and sanitary check and receive different licenses and medical cards that show their ability for the work and get examination at particular times.

As we will see in the following part, the Manual was based on a political concern for sanitary regulation of the manners of lower classes, and thereby administration of the perceived social filth in the city. What is important to emphasize here is that it provided the police with an almost limitless repository of powers in delineating the margins of everyday class relations in the name of fabricating an orderly life in Yenişehir. For the discretionary powers of the police were enhanced in the process of the implementation of this Manual. At this point, it is interesting to read this document in conjunction with a significant legal reform undertaken by the Republican regime in the mid-1930s. Concerned with the allegedly rising levels of daily disorder in urban centers, the Republican regime enacted the law on flagrant crimes in 1936. The law was concerned with daily breaches of law that led to state power being questioned in the eyes of the broader public. Whereas its mandate was quite vast, it was mainly concerned with “rapid” conclusion of cases of common or petty crimes, which “cause public order problems and anxiety on the part of the public,” as noted in the minutes of the Parliamentary Commission on Judicial Affairs (1935, p. 2). The 1936 law, therefore, created a legal instrument in the form of the court on flagrant crimes with a basic concern for the political administration of public order problems emanating from the lower social strata that was perceived as a threat to the bourgeois order in the making.

Speaking in support of the draft law, and making comparisons with different examples from the British, French and Italian law traditions, Tahir Taner, the then professor of criminal law at the Faculty of Law in Istanbul University, argues that the law necessitates “some exceptional provisions and broadening of the powers of the police and judicial authorities that would be different from the rules of the legal procedures” (1936, p. 2). Taner further argues

that the 1936 law on flagrant crimes was historically rooted in and inspired by the examples in Europe, including police courts of England, and similar administrative and legal innovations in the French and Italian criminal laws. A close reading of the related parliamentary minutes reveals that Taner was among the legal professionals who contributed to the law-making process.

Baha Arıkan, Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor at the time, provides a news reporter from *Ulus* with a detailed account of the actual operations of the law on flagrant crimes in everyday life. In the following example he exposes a clear case for comprehending the political imagination of the early Republican regime in engineering a pacification project that was concerned with caging lower social orders into the wage form as their only means of subsistence (cf. Neocleous 2013, p. 8; Neocleus, Rigakos & Wall 2013, p. 2; Rigakos 2016, p. 39). Glossing over the social relations of dispossession that characterized the making of the spatial segregation in the nascent national capital, Arıkan describes a case of petty theft by a maid and how the case was handled through the instantaneous deployment of police power:

Cemile, who was a maid at the home of Sir B. Nusret, stole property from him on the third day of the month before 3pm and then fled. She was caught with the property she stolen at 5pm and taken to the office of the public prosecutor. Her trial was finalized at 7pm, and she was sentenced to two months and five days in prison. There are many incidents like this one, which show the characteristic points of the flagrant crime law. ... My point here is about the practical and admonitive consequences of the law on flagrant crimes for social life (*Ulus*, October 9, 1936).

The manner of handing the case of Cemile is of critical importance. The Chief Public Prosecutor narrates a mundane story and near instantaneous deployment of police power in everyday life. This was indeed not peculiar to Ankara but gained an extensive reach in the early Republic. The extensive deployment of police power through the law on flagrant crimes gave

impetus for literary critiques from the period. The novels by Suat Derviş and Orhan Kemal provide insights into the operation of the law with respect to urban marginals in İstanbul. Representing the first feminist literary piece in Turkey, the novel *Fosforlu Cevriye* by Suat Derviş narrates a life-story of Cevriye, a sex-worker in Istanbul. Through her individual story, Derviş exposes the lived experiences of the urban poor in the early Republican era. Orhan Kemal's novel, *Murtaza*, represents another literary attempt to understand the lives of the urban lower class in this regard. Narrating his story with reference to his literary figure of a neighbourhood watchman named Murtaza, Kemal describes the processes of criminalization as well as the social reality of crime that haunted the early Republican regime. What is interesting to note in these novels is that the marginalized sectors of the urban order experience justice delivered by the court on flagrant crimes as *instantaneous justice*, and they call these courts as "*şipşak mahkemeleri [bish bash bosh courts]*" (Derviş 2000, p. 176; Kemal 2007, p. 266). This subaltern representation of instantaneous justice as "bish bash bosh" reveals how the caging of their time into wage discipline was experienced as a contested terrain on the part of the urban poor. The social relations of *instantaneous injustice* materialized through police power in everyday life had little legitimacy among them.

The law on flagrant crimes was thus instrumental in a quest for the pacification of subsistence activities of the urban poor in early Republican Ankara. In the following chapter, I will analyze these practices of petty theft in the broader context of the making of social crime as a form of subsistence on the part of the Altındağ poor. For the moment, however, it is important to underline a number of significant points that contributed to the incorporation of labour into the wage form in and through police power. First, as evidenced in Arıkan's

assessment above, as well as the subaltern representation thereof, the law was mainly concerned with mastery over time in everyday life. In other words, it engineered the political and legal conditions for ensuring “rapid justice” concerning common acts and petty criminal activities by the urban poor. It was an instrument through which wage discipline could be re-asserted alongside capitalist discipline of time as expressed in the form of rationalization, routinization and acceleration of administrative affairs (cf. Thompson 1967; Atabaki 2007). The mundane operations of “rapid justice” through police power, therefore, were mobilized in the service of the wage form in everyday organization of social relations.

The law on flagrant crimes was also instrumental in empowering the police in terms of its discretionary powers, which were experienced in the form of actual violence or threats thereof. Taner’s defense of increased discretionary police powers resembles that of Edwin Chadwick in the English context one hundred years earlier (Neocleous 2000, p. 99). The rationale is quite similar in terms of the political imagination of police power in the daily management of capitalist social relations. Discretion represents one of the contested terrains through which police power is revealed in an utterly contradictory manner. As Brogden notes, there is a fundamental “irony” here because it is “the lowest of the low, the street constable, unlike in other ‘professional’ occupations, [that] is the one who can exercise the maximum discretion at work” (Brogden in Neocleous 2000, p. 99). That is why police power becomes a central issue in everyday contestations of the social and political order. It becomes a primary mediation through which the existing hierarchies of class, race, and gender are reinforced (Neocleous 2000, pp. 99-100).

The question of discretion also reveals the contradictory, albeit foundational, association of police power with violence. As Benjamin notes, the law-making and law-preserving functions of the state authority are dissolved in the police. It thus assumes a “ghostly appearance” in the lives of the dispossessed. The “formless” power of the police, this “nowhere-tangible, all-pervasive presence,” Benjamin continues, operates through intervention “in countless cases where no clear legal situation exists, when they are not merely, without slightest relation to legal ends, accompanying the citizen as a brutal encumbrance through a life regulated by ordinances” (1999, p. 287). As we have seen in the previous section, the stigmatized representation of Altındağ as a place of crime and murders already haunted the political imagination of the early Republican police. The Altındağ poor, therefore, became usual suspects for the operations of this formless power from the early decades of the Republic onwards.

Whereas such a civilizing project was underway for the sake of fabricating a modern labour force, a parallel process of the criminalization of poverty also characterized the police project in early Republican Ankara. The categories of vagrancy, idleness, and pauperism were deployed to sort out the urban poor and subject them to distinct policing practices. Grounded in the long legacy of the pacification of non-commodified practices of the urban poor and expressed as a moral panic over poverty, the policing of beggars bears particular attention. Reflecting deep-rooted socio-economic disparities that characterized post-war dispossession, the social problem of beggary was framed in a politicized discourse of “the plague of beggars” in the city. The following news report from *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* provides a paradigmatic representation of beggary in the dominant discourse:

Nowadays, the disturbing [acts and presence] of the beggars have come to the point that no one can stand. While the beggar groups were inside the old city, they have begun marching towards Çankırı Street and Yenişehir Street. Those occupying the pavements on the İstiklal Street prevent trespassers by putting their portative belongings on the pavements unceremoniously. When we look at it closely, it becomes clear that these [groups] have networks working uniformly. The younger ones, who are led by a boss, surround the man on whom they train their sights; just like flies rushing to sugar, they follow and disturb him till the end of their frontier. It is long overdue to save the city from these sickening persons who make it difficult to walk on as they occupy the already narrow streets. It is a need to find an ultimate solution to them by a comprehensive investigation (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, January 7, 1929).

This kind of representation of beggary informs the political imagination of the police regarding the contested presence of the urban poor and their pacification. The so-called “plague of beggars” had recurrent press attention throughout the period under investigation, situated as a fundamental threat to civilized and orderly urban life. This moralizing and criminalizing gaze at the urban poor was compounded by their discursive presentation as “gangs of beggars” in the city. With “sticks in their hands and swearwords in their mouths,” these “gangs” terrorize the streets of the nascent capital (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, February 21, 1929; April 12, 1929; February 23, 1929). The framing of the urban poor with reference to “the plague” and its moral association with savageness, violence, animality, and vulgarity frames the margins of the urban order on the basis of the absence of wage labour as the principle organizing social relation. The problem of beggary arises also because of “the inability to make a separation between poverty and beggary” (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, February 21, 1929).

This distinction would become a serious topic on the agenda of police reform by the mid-1930s. The Minister of Interior Şükrü Kaya delivered a long speech in 1934 at the Turkish Parliament on this “plague.” The following statement reflects strategies of pacification imposed on the urban poor:

One of the problems of the country is with beggars. This is a domestic *contusion*. Its root causes are economic. Anyways, what are the things whose root causes are not economic! In some countries, beggary has been prevented through humanitarian institutions. They have opened 'homes for the poor, for the diseased.' This is the best option. Beggars are taken into these [houses] on temporary basis, and they are examined to understand whether they will be able to work or not. If they will be able to work, they are released. If not, they are kept. Some of our municipalities have taken small measures. Istanbul Workhouse is a mere example of this. Similar things exist in Ankara and Izmir as well. The duty of the municipal police is to capture these [beggars] and to save the people from being harassed (Ergüven 1938, p. 131).

The establishment of a specific institutional confinement structure was always on the agenda of the police in early Republican Ankara. Formulated as a response to the deepening social misery during World War II, such a policy was ultimately put into effect with the establishment of a “Beggar Camp” in Ankara in 1947. In a newspaper interview, the Mayor-Governor of the city provided the following justification for the establishment of the Ankara Beggar Camp: “By way of establishing a beggar camp, we will differentiate those who are really disabled from those engaging in the business of beggary. We will tackle the disabled through civilized ways. We are in contact with our social assistance institutions. We will make sure to deter those beggars from [engaging in the business of beggary]” (*Ulus*, 1947). Given the historical concentration of poverty in the Altındağ region, the “beggar camps” would soon become highly contested places of confinement of the Altındağ poor in subsequent decades.³⁴

³⁴ İbrahim Yasa was one of the rare scholars who conducted sociological research on the Ankara Beggar Camp in 1977-1978 as part of a collaborative project by the Ankara Social Services Academy. Whereas the research is based on a positivist sociological lens and reproduces the marginalizing gaze of the middle-class intellectuals against the urban poor, it still provides significant information on the conditions of confinement in the Beggar Camp by the late 1970s. Titled as “The Problem of Beggary in Ankara,” the research report states that the majority of beggars (83%) were living in the *gecekondü* neighbourhoods located in the Altındağ region (Yasa, 1978: 40). Providing a detailed account of the lived experiences of the urban poor throughout the report, Yasa makes the following assessment: “According to the information obtained from the Ankara Municipal Police Directorate, the beggars apprehended by *the [municipal] beggary team* are imprisoned in a one-room beggary camp located in the basement of the Municipal Police in Sıhhiye. The period of imprisonment had been 15 days beforehand, but after the death of an elderly beggar at the camp, this period has been reduced to one day. This shows what kinds of impacts the punishment has on the resolution of the problem” (Yasa 1978, p. 4; emphasis added).

3. Moral regulation of everyday life

The project of policing the subsistence practices of the urban poor was intended to process the labouring classes of Altındağ into wage discipline. Conceived as a constitutive facet of the fabrication of the Republican citizenry, this project was compounded by an orchestrated campaign for the moral regulation of everyday life. In the eyes of Republican social reformers, the marginalized poor posed a substantial threat to ideals of social progress and civilized society. Their “unruly passions peculiar to vulgar life,” were reminiscent to the political and moral concerns haunting Colquhoun’s police machine in the early nineteenth-century London (Dodsworth 2008, p. 597).

As discussed in Chapter II, the Kemalist nation-building project arose, in part, on the basis of the structural socio-demographic conditions characterized by human loss, deprivation, and dispossession experienced by the Anatolian peasantry. This was perceived as a substantial crisis that was to be resolved in order to achieve the twin projects of nation-building and the mobilization of the productive capacities of the population. The establishment of *Sihhat ve İçtimai Mukavenet Vekaleti* (the Ministry of Health and Social Assistance) in 1920 was significant in this respect as it represented one of the initial and comprehensive moves for remedying the crisis in question (Evered & Evered 2011, p. 266). Established with a projected political aim of creating an institutional framework devoted to the public health, the Ministry orchestrated a socio-medical and political process of the production of information about the population in the early 1920s.

Parallel to other issues determining the radical modernist agenda of the Kemalist regime, Ankara was envisaged as an ideal space for fabricating the Republican morality that was informed by the concerns for the fabrication of a secular, modern and urban order and its associated citizenry. The deployment of medical knowledge and close association between social issues and scientific and professional treatment became a hallmark of the politics of moral ordering in this regard. In short, the politics of nation-building was organically compounded by a politics of social hygiene.

Dr. Muslihiddin Safvet, the provincial director of the Ministry of Health and Social Assistance for Ankara, initiated the Kemalist project of moral regulation in Ankara through professional and medicalized forms of power (Evered & Evered 2011 p. 268; Safvet 2009 [1925]). Complaining about a “moral crisis” caused by the turbulent decade of wars and their associated socio-economic devastations, Dr. Safvet describes the moral conditions in Ankara in the following way:

Until World War I began, morality was very good in the area. The hardship and poverty caused by the war altered public morality. Prostitution exists more in the villages than in the towns. Those who were involved in secret prostitution in the villages gradually did so openly, and thus, day-by-day, morality began to fall into disarray. As an evil consequence of the war, young women who became sole survivors [of their families] or who were widowed ended up working as maids for people here and there, [but they] later fell into a seductive trap and this led to their loss of chastity. These were the causes of the decline of morality. Sometimes the fiancés of young women were killed at war and nobody showed an interest in them anymore, they began to become spinsters, and they ended up being raped amid promises of marriage and [thus] lost their chastity (Safvet in Evered & Evered 2011, p. 279).

Accordingly, the early Republican regime attempted to contain prostitution in the nascent capital. The urban poor, and especially prostitutes, therefore, were framed as targets for surveillance and policing through compulsory medical examination and licencing (Evered &

Evered 2011, p. 267). Syphilis was framed as a distinct threat to public health and the national body at large. The corresponding police project was concerned with particularizing certain subgroups, women in general, and prostitutes in particular, for “epidemiological policing and medical intervention” (Evered & Evered 2011, p. 267).

Envisaged as a problem of social hygiene and politically framed as a threat to the society under conditions of perceived population crisis, syphilis became a central socio-medical mediation through which police power re-asserted itself over the marginalized while crafting a gendered regime of social inequality. The initial policy formulated for the issue was a total ban on prostitution and the closing down of existing brothels and other places of ill repute. This 1929 policy, however, would be changed in 1933 with the claim that cases of syphilis increased after the ban. Reporting on the issue for Ankara, the following news article represents a clear case to illustrate the issue:

The problem of prostitution is very important. With the banning of brothels, the infection from venereal diseases have increased. In our society, syphilis causing the decadence of a generation is regarded as a shame, and thus kept secret. Therefore, in terms of health, the most important issue is the following: it is necessary to gather the prostitutes together and take them under control (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye* February 3, 1931).

On this basis, with the active involvement of the Mayor-Governor Tandoğan, a publicly controlled and licensed brothel zone was spatially organized in the early 1930s at the foothills of the Ankara Citadel (Kemal 1982, p. 8; see Figure 18 below). A police post was deployed within the brothel to ensure constant surveillance and policing of prostitution in everyday life. Accordingly, the registered prostitutes were compelled to undergo regular medical examinations. Brothels were one medium through which the police shaped gendered relations,

sexual practices, and thereby a particular project of morality in everyday social relations. The everyday policing of prostitution in this form reflected the historical attempt for consolidating bourgeois morality in the city. For it stigmatized and criminalized prostitution as a lower-class phenomenon that was politically defined with reference to middle class morality that became increasingly hegemonic in everyday affairs of the city.




Figure 18: Bentderesi Brothels

Source: Ankara Emniyet Müdürlüğü, 1941, *Ankara City Police Guide*.

The formation of Bentderesi as a “neighbourhood of red light” (Boran 1941), therefore, overtly reflected the early Republican policy of delineating the moral and spatial margins of the nascent order by relegating sex workers, johns and their managers into the “shadow landscapes” of the old town (Kezer 1998, p. 18). In other words, the urban order in the early Republican Ankara was symbolically and materially crafted on the basis of the relegation of

perceived social filth, and pushing the marginalized into the shadow spaces. The spatial proximity of the Altındağ region to the Bentderesi brothels would be a peculiar spatial dynamic for the historical formation of networks of vigilante power exercised by *kabadayıs*, the historical figure of neighbourhood toughs who enjoyed popular legitimacy while engaging in an illicit network of urban plunder. As we will analyze in the following chapter, this was the dialectical outcome of the contested spatial practices characterizing the politics of the police in the early Republican era.

The 1937 *Ankara Municipal Police Manual* is a constitutive document in the fabrication of a moral order concerned with the daily administration of the social filth of the city. With its detailed list of urban affairs to be regulated, the Manual aimed to subject mundane practices of the urban poor to the politics of social hygiene. For instance, with the intent of banning the construction of shanties made of adobes, the Manual prohibited the transportation and drying of adobes in public spaces. The concern for adobe reflected the bourgeois gaze against filth, and the Altındağ poor who were the perceived producers of the filth of the city. A perspective reminiscent of the political agendas of the nineteenth-century European sanitary reformers, most notably Chadwick, who established a direct correlation between disease and crime in the lower orders (Stallybrass & White 1986, p. 131). Thus, each and every spectacle of filth was to be incorporated into the nascent police project. Coffee-houses around Ulus, as public spaces of everyday social interactions and job seeking, were strictly regulated in the Manual. A systematic analysis of the archives of *Ulus and Cumhuriyet* newspapers reveal that the police also exercised strict control over such practices as gambling, fortune telling, etc. For instance, according to the public announcement by the Ankara Municipality and Governorship, all kinds

of games were prohibited at casinos and coffeehouses, as of June 1, 1935 (*Ulus*, April 8, 1935). We can observe, therefore, that the police engaged in the banning of various leisure activities of the working people, including backgammon (*Ulus*, November 5, 1935) in early Republican Ankara. The materially grounded social practices of the lower classes, therefore, were moralized in accordance with the radical modernity project underway.

The establishment of the Ankara State Prison in 1925 was as an integral part of the politics of police that was geographically concerned with the carceral confinement of the urban marginals, as well as the political dissidents. The Lörcher Plan made an impression on the political landscape of Ankara as it provided the basic spatial form through which the nascent capital would be established in Yenışehir. The plan was also important for the carceral geography of Ankara with its proposed construction of a state prison on the wastelands lying adjacent to what was called the Ulucanlar neighbourhood near the Ankara Citadel (see Figure 19 below). The construction of a state prison in this area was justified with reference to the following:

It has been deemed suitable to [establish a prison] on this area primarily because there are lands and fields that can be plowed, and thereby prisoners can be pushed to work, and their rehabilitation, and re-integration into the society can be ensured.³⁵

Reflecting the general character of the police reform embraced throughout the 1930s, the political strategy of carceral confinement was based on the fabrication of the wage form as the only means of subsistence on the part of the inmates. It would be presented by the

³⁵ Cited from the website of Prison Museum:

<https://www.ulucanlarcezaevimuzesi.com/default.asp?page=icerik&id=27> (accessed on September 12, 2017).

Ministry with reference to economic cost calculations compounded with a peculiar designation of moral regulation:

The aim of these ventures operating with floating capital is made up of putting the inmates to work. That is why the most important point is to put the maximum number of men possible to work. The number of workers currently diverges between 123 and 150.

...

The aim of imprisonment is not torturing the individual but making him a beneficial component of the society. It is undeniable that work-life at the prison has a rehabilitative effect on the inmate. The working inmate does not think about evilness but is alone with his work and conscience (*Hapishane Matbaası* 1938: 7).




Figure 19: Ankara Public (Ulucanlar) in the 1920s

Source: Website of the Ulucanlar Museum

<https://www.ulucanlarcezaevimuzesi.com/default.asp?page=foto&sayfa=detay&id=1>

(Accessed on March 14, 2018).

Literary sources provide us with important insights for making sense of the historical role of the Ulucanlar Prison. The historically symbolic place of Ankara made Ulucanlar Prison a space where dissident political figures were imprisoned throughout the history of modern Turkey. These figures, in turn, produced important literary works as autobiographical reflections on their experiences of imprisonment in the Ulucanlar Prison. The dissident poet Hasan İzzettin Dinamo describes his encounters with the prison and the incarcerated poor (2007, p. 13).

I am a part of the world of criminals from now on. I could not believe this a few days ago. Here is the world of prisoners ... All of them are purely similar to the poorest Turkish [people] outside. This means that the poor are one who solely sit on the volcano of crime, which nobody wants to come to terms with. They are the prison people ... While I was outside, I used to see the miserable Turkish people as being caged. The imprisonment of the miserable is layered here still more.

Dinamo's novels are illustrative of the social composition of the poor incarcerated in Ankara State Prison in the 1930s. He informs his readers that the prison was predominantly populated by rural poor and a small population of urban poor. Deployed near the Altındağ neighbourhoods, Ankara Public Prison would be a deeper confinement zone for the Altındağ poor, contributing to the socio-spatial processes of the marginalization of the region, as we will discuss in the following chapter.

4. Conclusion

This chapter has analyzed how police power was politically imagined through which the margins of the nascent bourgeois order were crafted in early Republican Ankara. It has developed this analysis on the basis of a critique of the politics of the police with reference to the making of urban space, wage labour and moral order in the city. Representing organic

components of the Republican police project, these processes were reflective of the foundational social contradictions of a bourgeois fantasia which conceived the labouring masses as social filth, and thereby subjected them to nascent police power through different strategies of social purification.

Given what we have seen, it seems apt to remind ourselves that the Republican police assumed the role of a “domestic missionary” (Storch 1976) through a close surveillance of subsistence practices and recreational activities of the Altındağ poor. This mission, however, was contradictory and contested in its social constitution. It is characterized by the phantasmagorical quest for a secured and civilized urban order in the early Republic. Tasked with this domestic mission, therefore, the Republican police assume a “ghostly appearance” in the lives of the dispossessed. This kind of exposition of the police as a formless power of the nascent bourgeois order, however, remains partial and critically unsatisfying if not inclusive of narratives regarding the historical agency of the Altındağ poor. That is, a critique of police power must encompass a critical analysis of its everyday contestations on the urban margins. The following chapter, therefore, will attempt at formulating such an historical narrative with reference to the social and spatial contradictions that haunted the Republican police from the 1920s to the 1970s.

CHAPTER V

ALTINDAĞ THE MARGIN DIALECTICS OF SOCIAL CRIMINALITY

The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the ‘emergency situation’ in which we live is the rule. We must arrive at a concept of history which corresponds to this (Benjamin 1968 [1937], p. 257).

Juvenile wards, juvenile correction houses, [and] prisons are crowded with them [children from Çiçin Bağları in Altındağ]. And black-covered codes, black-cloaked judges, prosecutors, lawyers, police sticks, bastinadoes, electric [torture], prison directors, wardens with differing ranks, iron door, stone walls, dark and moist cells, cuffs, chains, shackles, and gallows wait for them. *Legality and illegality are the twins of the mother society*. The mother society tries to confront them with the laws she creates; with the justice that is the foundation of the state; with torture, guns, and hangmen she reproduces ... (Güney 1997 [1977], p. 33, emphasis added).

[Altındağ] is a synthesis of poverty; a place where people have come together due to poverty; they are *the captives of the state* (K. K. male, 57; emphasis added).³⁶

The previous chapter has analyzed how the making of the Altındağ slums was dialectically intertwined with the process of forming a bourgeois order through police power in the national capital. Whereas it was dismissed from the agenda of the state as far as the provision of public services was concerned, the Altındağ region was nonetheless symbolically central for fabricating the political and ideological *margins* of the nascent capital. It was *the margin against which the bourgeois order was crafted* in and through everyday forms of state formation. *The Altındağ margin* was therefore “a necessary entailment of the state” (Das & Poole 2004, p. 4) shaping the political and ideological projects determining the making of the Republican police in Ankara. As the *constitutive outside* of the national capital, it represented

³⁶ Interview with K. K. (August 1, 2016; Kızılay-Çankaya, Ankara).

a dynamic sphere “...where the state [was] constantly rebounding its modes of order and lawmaking” (Das & Poole 2004, p. 8).

To make critical sense of the historical politics of this constant rebounding, we need to understand Altındağ the margin as a dynamic “site of practice,” through which alternative forms of popular organization and regulation emerged on the basis of “the pressing needs of [the] populations to secure political and economic survival” (Das & Poole 2004, p. 8). Contrary to the rather modernist gaze at the *gecekondü* phenomenon in Turkey, which was a dominant scholarly and political perspective at the time (see Erman 2001), a critical examination would reveal that the subsistence activities of the Altındağ poor were conditioned by a “historic dialectic” between forms of criminal activity and capitalist exploitation. Elaborating on this historic dialectic in the context of the eighteenth-century London, Peter Linebaugh makes a two-fold argument in his seminal work, *London Hanged*: “first, that the forms of exploitation pertaining to capitalist relations caused or modified the forms of criminal activity, and, second, that the converse was true, namely, that the forms of crime caused major changes in capitalism” (1991, p. xxi). It was, therefore, almost always difficult to make a clear distinction between “a 'criminal' population of London and the poor population as a whole.” This is because “people became so poor that they stole to live, and their misappropriating led to manifold innovations in civil society” (1991, p. xxiii).

The historical making of the Altındağ slums provides a significant example to make sense of the dynamics of this historic dialectic in a peripheral urban context. The urbanization of the national capital arose on the basis of the concomitant formation and marginalization of laboring classes. This historic dialectic had been operating since the early Republican period

and assumed different social and political forms in the transformation of the Turkish social formation. Whereas it denotes a densely complex social phenomenon, the notion of social criminality provides us with a significant analytical category to critically examine how subsistence was experienced as a contested terrain, from which both alternative forms of popular organization, and actual forms of police power materialized in the historical process. The question of subsistence was integrated into a contested network of vigilante power exercised by *kabadayıs*, the historical figures of neighborhood toughs, who enjoyed popular legitimacy while engaging in an illicit network of urban plunder.

In this chapter, I analyze the making of social criminality and *kabadayı* vigilantism as facets of *an alternative organization of justice from below* that emerged during contested capitalist urbanization in Ankara from the 1920s to the 1970s. I then reveal how state violence, exercised in different institutional forms, played a prominent role in the social marginalization of the Altındağ poor. This chapter, therefore, contributes to a critique of police power on two fronts: First, it demonstrates how a so-called “emergency situation” in the lives of the Altındağ poor was conditioned in the broader context of struggles over subsistence on the urban margin. Second, it analyzes how this emergency rule was characterized by the permanent deployment of state violence in the everyday lives of the Altındağ poor, paving the way to the reproduction of a contradictory network of vigilante power in the broader carceral geography of Ankara. This critical exposition will ultimately reveal how police power was contested in struggles over urban space, forms of subsistence, and forms of moral regulation.

To make critical sense of the historical making of social criminality on the urban margin and its dialectical relation to strategies of policing, I first discuss the notion itself with reference

to the critical social historiography of crime and policing. This will provide a basis for exploring the contested dynamics of social crime and its marginalization in the consolidation of the bourgeois order. Such an exposition would thereby establish the ground for a dialectical analysis of the materialization of police power and the consolidation of the wage form as the only means of subsistence.

1. Excursus: Social Crime as Subsistence

Social crime as subsistence implies mundane and inarticulate forms of transgression against the bourgeois social order in opposition to the compulsion for work to be consolidated into the wage form as the only means of livelihood for the dispossessed masses. As a subaltern contestation, social crime needs further elaboration for us to have a critical sense of its rather common, albeit undervalued, character and enduring legacy in the historical trajectories of capitalist urbanization in the Global South and North alike.

Historically speaking, the advent of a regular and weekly/monthly wage is a quite novel and short-lived phenomenon given that precariousness is the general condition of working-class life in capitalism (Denning 2010; Jonna & Foster 2016; Munck 2013). Elaborating on the impersonal imperatives of the market radically reorganizing social relations of production, Marx and Engels wrote in *The Communist Manifesto* that the sharpening competition among the bourgeoisie, coupled with the inherent crisis of capitalist accumulation, forces the livelihoods of the working class into “more and more precarious” conditions (1964 [1848], p. 72). This is because capitalist accumulation is characterized by an inherent and endless drive for the forcible creation of conditions of dispossession and the expropriation of the labourer.

The notion of the proletariat thus assumes an ontological category of precarious labour under capitalism. Marx's discussion on the free labourer as "virtual pauper" in *Grundrisse* provides a sound basis for understanding this dialectic:

It is already contained in the concept of the free labourer, that he is a pauper: virtual pauper. According to his economic conditions he is merely a living labour capacity, hence equipped with the necessaries of life. Necessity on all sides, without the objectivities necessary to realize himself as labour capacity. If the capitalist has no use for his surplus labour, then the worker may not perform his necessary labour; not produce his necessaries. Then he cannot obtain them through exchange; rather, if he does obtain them, it is only because alms are thrown to him from revenue. He can live as a worker only in so far as he exchanges his labour capacity for that part of capital which forms the labour fund. This exchange is tied to conditions which are accidental for him, and indifferent to his organic presence. He is thus a virtual pauper. Since it is further the condition of production based on capital that he produces ever more surplus labour, it follows that ever more necessary labour is set free. Thus the chances of his pauperism increase. To the development of surplus labour corresponds that of the surplus population. In different modes of social production there are different laws of the increase of population and of overpopulation; the latter identical with pauperism (1973, pp. 604).

The surplus population and the virtual pauper represent dialectical categories in Marx's original exposition of the proletariat, conceived not as a synonym for wage labourer in its sociological sense; it instead implies dispossession, expropriation, and radical dependence on the market (Denning 2010, p. 81). Capitalism as a mode of production, therefore, is historically distinct in the sense that the impersonal imperatives of the market function as a structural discipline over entire social relations (E. M. Wood 2003, p. 9). Under the conditions of this structural discipline, the question of subsistence becomes a contested terrain for labour and capital; a terrain through which the fundamental contradiction characterizing capitalism unfolds itself in everyday life. That is why Engels describes the inherently chaotic nature of capital accumulation as "social war" rooted in this structural discipline in his seminal exposition of the condition of the English working classes in the mid-nineteenth century:

In this country [England], social war is under full headway, every one stands for himself, and fights for himself against all comers, and whether or not he shall injure all the others who are his declared foes, depends upon a cynical calculation as to what is most advantageous for himself. It no longer occurs to anyone to come to a peaceful understanding with his fellow-man; all differences are settled by threats, violence, or in a law court.... And this war grows from year to year, as the criminal tables show, more violent, passionate, irreconcilable..... This war of each against all, of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat, need cause us no surprise, for *it is only the logical sequel of the principle involved in free competition* (2008 [1892], p. 132, emphasis added).

Unfolding itself in the historical formation of the wage form under “the logical sequel of the principle involved in free competition,” this social war is founded upon the fundamental processes of dispossession that create the conditions of radical dependence of the proletariat on the impersonal imperatives of the market. Engels further elaborates on this point with reference to the social constitution of the poor and its associated political administration amidst this “social warfare”:

Since capital, the direct or indirect control of the means of subsistence and production, is the weapon with which this social warfare is carried on, it is clear that all the disadvantages of such a state must fall upon the poor ... If the worker can get no work he may steal, if he is not afraid of the police, or starve, in which case the police will take care that he does so in a quiet and inoffensive manner (2008 [1892], p. 25).

For Engels, however, this process is characterized by various forms of individual and collective contestations on the part of the dispossessed. For instance, in one of his most famous, albeit highly contested statements, he argues that theft assumes “the most primitive form of protest” (2008 [1892], p. 214) amidst the ongoing social war that feeds, reproduces, incorporates, and pacifies various contestations. This means that these contestations do not necessarily arise on the basis of an overtly political content in all circumstances, but that they are inherently contradictory and inarticulate in their everyday and mundane forms. In this

regard, we need to deepen our understanding of these *inarticulate forms of contestations of the wage form on the part of the dispossessed*.

Historically speaking, the dispossessed masses have engaged in a constant search for generating alternative sources of income rooted in social practices that are morally, politically and legally denounced by the ruling classes and the state, and thereby subjected to various forms of regulation, surveillance, containment, and repression. The recent rise of social history research has clearly demonstrated that the dispossessed masses have resorted to alternative means of subsistence that scholars have defined with numerous terms: “economy of makeshifts”, “mixed economy of welfare”, “economies of survival”, “adaptive family economy” or “survival strategy” (see Benson 1983; Bradbury 1984; Fontaine & Schlumbohm 2010; Shore 2003; Tomkins & King 2003; Winter 2004). For instance, exploring “the interweaving world of the poor and the criminal in early eighteenth century London”, Heather Shore argues for reading crime as a key element of the makeshift economy (2003, p. 156). This makeshift economy was not uniform, and included a broad range of activities involving prostitution, begging, vagrancy, petty theft, receiving, shoplifting and employee theft as particular strategies of supplementing a limited income especially in times of increased hardship (Shore 2003, p. 150).

In this sense, we need to understand the dialectical relationship between work-poverty-unemployment-crime (Hall et al. 1978, p. 189). To view these as distinct phenomena means being trapped by the empiricist project of bourgeois social science, and thereby reproducing dominant state discourses in fabricating political categories of the poor, the indigent, and the criminal. Devoid of its social and political context, the criminal becomes a “suitable enemy”

(Christie 1986) for the deployment of state violence in various forms. For a dialectical relationship between work, poverty and crime, we need to view them as moments of social relations of dispossession, as moments through which capital reasserts its power over labour while consolidating the regime of private property, albeit in many contested forms and practices.

It is within this context that social crime becomes an indispensable dimension of “the experiential reality” (*à la* Sayer 1979) of the dispossessed, reflecting a grounded struggle between labour and capital in everyday social relations. Originally coined by Eric Hobsbawm in his extensive analysis of “primitive rebels” and “social bandits” (1959; 1969; 1972), the notion of social crime denotes a complex relationship between everyday resistance, political protest, survival strategy and crime/criminalization (Clement 2016, pp. 103-133; Emsley 2005, pp. 2-10; Lea 1999, pp. 308-309; 2002, p. 37). In his original formulation, Hobsbawm defined social criminality as a proto-political form of protest that “expressed a conscious, almost a political, challenge to the prevailing social and political order and its values” (1972, p. 5). The social criminals, and more precisely the social bandits, are historical figures who enjoyed popular legitimacy on the margins of peasant societies despite their political denouncement by the state and landed classes. Their contradictory association with the established order made them assume the position of social “heroes, champions, avengers, fighters for justice, perhaps even leaders of liberation, and in any case men to be admired, helped and supported” (Hobsbawm 1969, p. 13). In response to Hobsbawm’s characterization of social criminality with proto-political unrest, many social historians argue that it is not the political element, but the collective legitimation or popular sanction that is the most important aspect of social crime

(Lea 1999, p. 309; 2002, pp. 27-28). Thus, the illegal practices of social crime as exemplified by pilferage and other activities such as distilling, pillaging shipwrecks for cargo, various types of smuggling, were historical examples of not social protest but older forms of “popular illegalities” (Lea 2002, p. 37). The subversive political character of social crime, therefore, has a rather complex, and often contradictory relation with the social sanction or legitimacy it enjoys. That is why it has always been difficult to delineate the boundaries between popular illegality and political unrest in the context of social crime practices (Lea 2002, p. 39).

The phenomenon of social criminality as a historical form of popular illegality has a long legacy in agrarian transitions to capitalism, as in the case of the enclosure movements that criminalized customary rights of the peasantry (Ditton 1977; Hay et al. 1976; Linebaugh 1991; 2014) that were “written in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire” (Marx 1983, p. 669). It also has a long and common history in the urban context in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Benson 1983; Humphries 1981; Lane 1997; Lea 1999; Linebaugh 1991; Shore 2003). The practices of social crime, therefore, reflect rational activities of pilferage rooted in the context of social relations of dispossession and associated strategies of survival, as in the case of the working-class families of the early twentieth-century London (Humphries 1981: 25). Such practices gained a more intense character in neighborhoods experiencing the most severe economic hardship, which “often increased dramatically during strikes in which the local community was involved” (Humphries 1981, pp. 26-27).

The characterization of social crime as a form of popular illegality, therefore, provides us with an important analytical tool to develop a radical critique of police power that would go beyond the conventional binary of legality vs. illegality. For social crime as a subaltern strategy

of survival might include various practices of pilferage that cannot be understood with reference to *the formalizing logic of the state* concerned with the political incorporation of non-wage forms of subsistence. Social crime practices might assume “monetary and non-monetary, personal and impersonal, formal and informal, legal and illegal” forms, as in the case of the dockland families of Liverpool in the 1930s (Ayers in Lane 1997, p. 86). We must underline the dialectics of illicit practices as part of the hidden economy of survival on the part of different sectors of the working classes. Social criminality incorporates non-wage activities undertaken by the dispossessed as a rational contestation of the wage relation. The critical social historiography on *work on the margin*, therefore, provides important clues for making sense of the centrality of the non-wage activities for a large number of dispossessed populations.

Writing in the context of the capitalist urbanization of Montreal in the nineteenth century, Bradbury underlines that “non-wage forms of survival were numerous and diverse” and assumed central importance in the lives of the Montreal working classes to complement wages or to allow to “slip in and out of waged labour”. It was only through such non-wage practices of subsistence that “ragpickers, peddlers, prostitutes, and people who sieved through discarded cinders for lumps of coal were able to supplement wages” (Bradbury 1984, p. 12). Likewise, elaborating on the development of alternative economies of survival in Great Britain and Canada, Benson puts forward that “few families were dependent simply upon a single, regular, weekly wage. Much employment was seasonal or casual in nature and most families derived their incomes from a whole cluster of different sources: from work done by the wife

and children, from begging and petty crime as well as from small-scale entrepreneurial activity” (Benson 1983, p. 146).

These sets of historical evidence are illustrative of the rather under-appreciated historical reality that “the work on the margin” is not *marginal* in the actual lives of the dispossessed; instead, it assumes a central role in different historical epochs (Lane 1997). We thus need to go beyond the simple equation of work with wage labour. As Bradbury reminds us:

Largely new to wage dependence, yet only too aware of its implications, working-class families [in Montreal] sought to retain some element of control over their means of subsistence: the one area of their life that could be kept autonomous to some extent from ‘the dictates of their relations with the ruling class in the sphere of production (1984, p. 12).

We can thus contend that *the history of these subsistence struggles reveals the social history of policing, law, and crime*. For this long-enduring legacy seems to have been pacified in the process of the consolidation of bourgeois rule through the institutionalization of the criminal justice system of the modern state based on the political delineation of boundaries between criminality and poverty (Lea 2002, p. 43). For instance, in his investigation of 1751, the famous English magistrate Henry Fielding did not see the criminal poor as a distinct category of population from the poor in general. Instead, crime was considered among the general problems as presented by the lower orders (Rule 1997, p. 154; see also Rigakos et al. 2009, pp. 140-150). The historical separation of “the criminal poor” from “the respectable poor” would be consolidated in the nineteenth century when the bourgeois social order based on the wage form adopted the Colquhounian “police machine.” It was Patrick Colquhoun, the London magistrate and government intelligence agent, who helped galvanize and articulate

the need for a comprehensive campaign for the criminalization of various subsistence practices of the dispossessed. His “general police system” (Rigakos et al., 2009) was characterized by a passionate quest for the classification and statistical categorization of the lower classes, and hence politically delineated the margins of criminality and poverty (Linebaugh 2014, p. 37; Neocleous 2000, p. 41; Rigakos et al. 2009, p. 248). This project reflected a consolidation and hegemonic advance of the wage form and its associated regimes of institutionalized policing and carceral confinement in capitalist modernity.

This consolidation notwithstanding, we should not conclude that social criminality has disappeared from the subaltern repertoire of subsistence once and for all. On the contrary, we can still speak of its remarkable endurance, albeit in new contested forms, especially for the poorest sectors of the working class communities (Lea 2002, p. 46). John Benson develops a balanced evaluation of the historical transformation of social criminality in the British context:

The evidence of working-class criminality remains elusive, difficult to interpret and impossible to quantify. Nevertheless some limited generalisation is possible. There seems little doubt that certain forms of popular crime declined in importance between 1850 and 1939. Poaching became less common towards the end of the nineteenth century.... On the other hand there seems little doubt that other, probably more common forms of popular crime persisted virtually unabated, with scavenging, pilfering and similar activities continuing to provide work and income for a large – though unknown – number of working-class families (Benson in Lea 2002, p. 46).

The analytical currency of social crime as a form of popular illegality gains even more central importance in the context of the capitalist urbanization in the Global South. The massive scale of slum formation on the urban margins have accompanied the rise of a political discourse of “the ‘informal sector’ [which] was coined in the early 1970s to reckon the mass of wageless life” (Denning 2010, p. 81). Indeed, it has been almost impossible to draw a clear line

between the employed and the unemployed in the shanties of Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. Far from being a temporary condition, a wageless life has been “the main mode of existence” for the laboring masses (Denning 2010, p. 86). The notion of the “informal sector” is thus a politically loaded and expedient bourgeois idea. It is intentionally myopic and historically based on a rhetoric exercised to delineate the margins of subsistence with reference to the legal and institutional frameworks imposed by the state. We ought to appreciate that it was not the character of subsistence, nor the labour process itself, but its relation to the state that was the defining characteristic of the informal sector (Denning 2010, p. 90).

Not surprisingly, this formalizing logic of the state-centric discourse of the informal sector glosses over the rather complex and diverse practices of subsistence undertaken by the urban poor on the margins of urban modernity in the Global South. The subsistence practices of the urban poor have had a quite diverse and complex character, ranging from street economy to petty theft, which is closely intertwined with acts of pilferage in one way or another. As the vast literature on “survival strategy” maintains, the urban poor in the Global South resort to practices such as picking, petty theft, begging and prostitution to counter the adverse consequences of unemployment or price increases especially during times of economic hardship (Bayat 2010, p. 48).

We need to have a critical understanding of the subaltern histories of subsistence, and their relation to various policing projects in different national settings. *The proletarian as a dialectical category necessitates its co-constitution with police power* at the moment it is consolidated into a wage form as the only available means of subsistence. So, while Rigakos

(2016, p. 59) has observed that “the key theorists and practitioners of the modern legal and police sciences were architects of capitalism itself” we must also appreciate that this police science has always been fraught with continued “resistance to pacification.” As I will contend in the rest of this chapter, the Altındağ poor, as I have shown the poor did in other parts of the world, relied on various practices of social crime as acts of popular illegality that reflected their particular subsistence struggles from the 1920s to 1970s. This kind of exposition is significant as it offers “a class-based alternative to the derogatory labels of delinquency and psychopathology” (Humphries 1981, p. 24), which had strong repercussions in the politics of the police in Ankara from the early Republican period onwards. It also calls for due attention to the methodological necessity of exploring property crime in its political and economic context (Scruton & South 1984). Lastly, regarding the critique of police power as an inherently contradictory and contested form of political power, the notion of social crime gains considerable analytical value as it raises a powerful reminder that laws, and for that matter police order, are far from universally accepted phenomena. They rather reflect fundamental contradictions underlying social relations of production, and thus some offences, though declared as illegal and subjected to various coercive interventions by the state, might enjoy collective legitimation within social groups and communities (Emsley 2005, p. 6). The practices of social crime by the Altındağ poor indeed represented *an everyday manifestation of the transgression of the bourgeois order fabricated by police power*. It thus represents a contradictory moment of the contestation of the wage form in everyday life.

Relying on a critical analysis of the case of Altındağ, I will gradually build the argument in the present and the following chapters that the element of political subversion is already

rooted in the illegal and illicit character of social crime, conceived as a subaltern transgression of the bourgeois social order based on the wage form. Its ultimate material manifestation, however, was made possible only through cathartic moments of revolutionary praxis that increasingly put its mark in the 1970s. We thus need to understand political subversion and popular illegality - two facets of social crime - as a dialectical process of contestation against the bourgeois social order. Such a critique provides us with a relational perspective on the critique of police power as well, the central contribution of this thesis. In what is to follow, I will explore the making of social criminality on the urban margin as a subaltern contestation of the bourgeois order in Ankara from the 1920s to 1970s. The transformation of social crime practices into professional crime networks reflected contested processes in the consolidation of the wage form on the one hand, and the historical marginalization of the Altındağ poor on the other.

2. The making of social criminality in Altındağ

Four thieves named Mehmet, Fikri, Ahmet [,and] Mustafa were apprehended *while stealing wood from the fuel warehouse* that belongs to Sir Mehmet in Halacmahmut neighborhood. (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, January 30, 1929; emphasis added)

An unknown person stole *a bag of coal from the woodhouse* at the Yağcızade Apartment House that belongs to the malaria expert, Sir İrfan. (*Ulus*, November 19, 1937; emphasis added)

Four friends named İsmail from Simav, Ekrem from İstanbul, Mehmet from Çankırı, and Bican from Çerkes were apprehended *while picking timber* that belongs to someone named Emin behind the state railways. (*Ulus*, January 30, 1939; emphasis added)

The Second Branch [of the Ankara Police] reported that a porter named Mehmet was caught red-handed while selling a tin of olive oil and some soap that worth 97 [Turkish] liras, which he was supposed to carry [for a customer]. According to the information [provided by the police], the porter Mehmet shouldered a tin of olive oil and the soap that belong to a woman named Ayşe; however,

he disappeared while following the woman. Looking for the porter for a while, the woman went to the police and told the story. Following the accusations, the police began searching for the porter, who was caught while selling the oil and soap. The suspect was brought to justice.
(*Halkçı*, August 3, 1954)

These are some news reports on incidents of petty theft in Ankara from 1929 to 1954. At first sight, the reports seem to provide us with a mere list of *unrelated* acts of theft in the city. The distinct historical periods from which these news excerpts are chosen might easily support such a characterization. A closer reading, however, would reveal that a fundamental issue is at stake concerning questions of class, poverty, and subsistence. After all, *someone in the city* was stealing such items as wood, coal, timber, and oil with an apparent purpose of immediate use or sale. On the basis of a systematic review of the Ankara-based newspapers and other sources including literary texts and oral history interviews, I contend that such mundane acts of petty theft were far from discrete cases. Quite the contrary, they were common and ultimately reflect a continued struggle to live in the city. Historically conditioned in the context of capitalist urbanization in Ankara, these acts represent the repertoire of social crime characterized by a range of pilferage from coal and wood picking to meet the need for family fuel; to petty theft like shoplifting, pickpocketing, and stealing of laundry, money; and minor property theft by domestic servants, porters and other sectors of the informally working masses. The form of policing that arose in Ankara in order to pacify these subaltern practices of subsistence produced dialectical repercussions for the marginalization of the urban poor and their consolidation into a regime of private property in the city.

2.1. The repertoire of pilferage

The practices of social crime by the Altındağ poor were conditioned in the broader context of *gecekondu* living characterized by “the quiet encroachment” (Bayat 2013, p. 46), as mentioned in Chapter III. The phenomenon of *gecekondu as informal housing* reflects the most explicit manifestation of this “quiet encroachment”. In the Turkish context, the formation of *gecekondu* neighborhoods, a historical move towards the invasion of urban land by squatter dwellers, refers to “nothing other than the annihilation of the state authority which guarantees private property and market exchange” (Şengül 1998, p. 151).

Given that the Altındağ region was historically marginalized in terms of the denial of the provision of basic public services such as shelter, electricity, clean water and sanitary sewerage, the moral economy of the urban poor was fundamentally shaped by a communal concern for the self-provision of these needs, and this mundane collective practice meant the violation of the legal order imposed by the state. The quiet encroachment, conditioned within the context of *gecekondu* living, included social crime practices as well, at least in the historical formation of the Altındağ region in Ankara. As a region of urban poverty in the national capital, *gecekondu* living in Altındağ was closely integrated into practices of pilferage including encroachment on public lands and services and middle-and-upper class settlements in order to make a living through *illicit* means. At the risk of missing some complexity, I will try to present patterns, thematically, that seem to have been crystallized in the process of the consolidation of the wage form.

To start, the practice of picking wood and coal enjoyed a widespread presence in the lives of the Altındağ poor. Writing in the context of the 1970s, Yılmaz Güney, a socialist artist,

director, and novelist, presents a striking description of wood picking on the part of the Altındağ children. Imprisoned at Ulucanlar Prison in 1975-76, Güney collected life stories of the convicted prisoners from Altındağ, and wrote a novel titled *Soba, Pencere Camı ve İki Ekmek İstiyoruz* [We demand stove, window pane and two bread]. The title of the novel reflected the demands of the incarcerated poor children from Altındağ who revolted against the inhumane conditions of the juvenile ward at the prison in 1974. The novel's title reflects how the survival struggle outside the prison was closely intertwined with the struggle inside. Embracing a socialist realist perspective in his artistic style both in literature and cinema, Güney narrates real-life stories from Altındağ. Here is a narration on wood picking located within the broader context of *gecekondu* living in Çiçin Bağları, a stigmatized region in Altındağ known as a place of crime and danger (1997 [1977], p. 19):

[The *gecekondu* people in Çiçin Bağları] do not have a place for the shower. All the family members take a shower in the basin. The fire is lit in the yard. The meal is cooked here; water is boiled here. On washdays, children go to Siteler [where small timber manufacturing shops exist] to pick wood. Sometimes they help to load trucks or horse-drawn carriage and get some wood in return. Sometimes they steal. The mom and the dad already know that the wood that their children bring is stolen, but they let it alone. On washdays, mom tells the children: 'tomorrow, I will wash the clothes, go for the wood.' This means: "go steal the wood."

Güney's socialist realist narrative reminds one of the assertions of social historians concerning a central aspect of social crime practices by the poor: community support or popular sanction is "the most important characteristic of 'social crimes'" (Lea 1999, p. 309). The family's tacit acceptance of the stealing of wood by their child provides insight on the dynamics of collective legitimation at play. The oral history interviews conducted for this thesis research provide further evidence of the generalized character of this communal legitimacy. K.

G. (64, male), who has been a resident of Çinçin Bağları since the late 1950s and had worked as a carpenter in Siteler, a small-scale manufacturing zone located adjacent to Altındağ, tells his story of wood picking:

Siteler was established around [19]55. Let me describe to you how Siteler looked like at those times. There were timber manufacturing shops here. That is, they were processing and selling round timber. Because there was a high number of *gecekondus* at those times, timber was coming here. We, as school children, used to come to pick wood here. You will ask, why? This is because of poverty, because of deprivation. We used to pick wood here with our tins on our shoulders. That is, with small amounts of wood picked weekly, we used to meet our need for wood for the winter.³⁷

Established in the mid-1950s to meet the city's growing demand for timber, Siteler did become a major place for picking for the Altındağ poor in the subsequent decades. As the quotation above reveals, picking wood was undertaken with the intention to supplement the family's fuel requirements and was part of a family and class-based strategy of economic survival. At this point, we can argue that Çinçin Bağları, and its population predominantly composed of the gypsy and Kurdish communities, seemed to be characterized by the historical concentration of such pilferage practices within Altındağ. As we discussed in Chapter III, however, Altındağ was not a homogeneous urban locality, but a highly differentiated region along the lines of social, cultural, and ethnic dynamics. Still, the historical evidence gathered from different sources do not lead to easy conclusions. On the contrary, the practices of social crime seemed to characterize the subsistence activities of the Altındağ region as a whole though with different levels and intensity. Here is an account of wood picking outside Çinçin Bağları. Muzaffer Evirgen, who was a resident in the Atıfbey neighborhood and worked as a

³⁷ Interview with K. G. (June 15, 2016; Siteler-Altındağ, Ankara).

crime reporter for many local and national newspapers in Ankara, tells us his story of wood picking from his childhood in the 1950s:

There was a warehouse for wood at Soğuk Kuyu [located at the north-west of the city] at those times. There were warehouses for wood [and] timber manufacturing shops. Some used to go there and fill their tins with poplar peels ... I did this as well. What did I do? I used to take some with the permission [of the owners of the manufacturing shops]. However, I used to steal some more. I used to bring those tins to my neighborhood [Atıfbey], and sell them to people in the neighborhood for 5 liras, 7.5 liras, 10 liras.³⁸

Representing the historically generalized character of picking in Altındağ, the autobiographical piece by Yaşar Seyman is also illustrative. Feminist author and trade unionist, Seyman was raised in Altındağ in the 1960s and 1970s, she wrote in *Hüznün Çoşkusunu Altındağ* [*Altındağ: The Vigor of the Sorrow*], of wood picking by Cici Bacı, an elderly, wise woman living in the region (1986, p. 15):

There was Cici Bacı in Altındağ. I became acquainted with her in 1968. We used to come across in the mornings when I was going to [primary] school. She too used to go for picking wood in Siteler. When I come back from school at noon, I used to see her selling the wood. She used to sell [the picked wood] with a bargain. She did not take the wood off her shoulders until the end of the bargain.

Given that the Altındağ *gecekondular* neighborhoods harbour the urban poor who migrated from rural regions, we can surmise that practices of wood picking meant a reproduction of customary habits on common rights transferred to a capitalist urban context. The practices of wood picking can be interpreted as an attempt for “the reappropriation of nature’s bounty” (Humphries 1981, p. 24) or an exercise of “the turbarry right” (Linebaugh

³⁸ Interview with Muzaffer Evirgen (April 9, 2016; Örnek Neighbourhood-Altındağ, Ankara).

2014, p. 32) to meet the need for a family's fuel in Ankara, which is known for its frosty weather in the winter months. As one of the respondents remembers from his childhood memoirs, "wood was as valuable as gold at those times"³⁹ because of the relatively underdeveloped timber and coal industry that could not meet the pressing demands of the rapidly urbanizing city.

Conceiving of the practices of picking with reference to the notion of social crime provides us with a significant critical stance to counter the hegemonic reading of the *gecekondü* phenomenon as "an integration problem". Such analyses were regularly developed by state officials as well as urban intellectuals and were the dominant political and scholarly perspective at the time. These social crimes, however, included a broad repertoire of pilferage that cannot be subsumed under a derogatory conception of rural migrants failing to integrate into the modern life they encounter in the city. Güney's socialist realist narrative in the context of the Çiçin poor represents a clear exposition of the extensive character of social crime. Narrating the spatio-temporal dynamics of juvenile experiences in picking, Güney describes how central the practices of pilferage were for the urban poor in their association with broader city life and the socio-economic disparities it constantly reproduced (1997 [1977], pp. 26-27):

When the boy grows enough, the mom gives a tin to his child; this is what he envied for. After all, he has his tin... when the child gets experience in coal picking, the dad makes him happy: he buys or makes a wheelbarrow from wood with wheels made of iron spools. This is called a 'tornet'.

...

Bag [for wood], tin [for coal] and tornet [for everything that can be picked]: these are the primary tools for the child's contribution to family income. At early hours of every morning, he goes picking for coal and goods with boys and girls together.

...

³⁹ Interview with Muzaffer Evirgen (April 9, 2016; Örnek Neighbourhood-Altındağ, Ankara).

Apart from coal; bread, newspapers, wastepaper, medicine bottles, aluminum cover and boxes, cans, broken pieces of glass and bottles, copper wire, lead crumbs, all kinds of metallic goods... these are part of his daily happiness, daily subsistence. This is because each residue has a buyer...

The repertoire of social crime went well beyond such examples of picking and incorporated practices of petty theft from the early decades of the Republic. The common practice of picking was important in the formation of a moral economy of pilferage. The repertoire of pilferage included shoplifting, pickpocketing, housebreaking, scams, employee theft, and the stealing of laundry, money, and small property by domestic servants, porters and other sectors of the informally working masses.

As we discussed in the previous chapter, the early Republican police followed a strict strategy of policing everyday life in Ankara with a view of bringing practices of petty theft by the urban poor under control. The formation of the court on flagrant crimes was a particular example of this strategy which included theft by domestic servants in Yenisehir. In this case, the class-based strategy of pilferage gains a distinctly gendered character reflecting the complex dynamics of processes of dispossession and their associated strategies of subaltern appropriation. The following examples of petty theft are illustrative in this context:

Meryem, *the domestic servant of Sir Ibrahim*, the tradesman living in Halacmahmut neighborhood, stole 100 [Turkish] liras and some property, and ran away. The thief was apprehended. (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, January 30, 1929; emphasis added)

After returning from her pleasure trip to her home in the Deliler hill, Miss Leman noticed that her five liras, three gold bracelets, two golden wristwatches, diamond and red-stone rings ... disappeared, and she called the police. Upon the investigation by the police, it was revealed that the theft was undertaken by Hatice *who worked as a maid in the house*, and [the stolen] goods were found where they were hidden away. The investigation continues. (*Ulus*, March 2, 1937; emphasis added)

Doctor Kadri Olca appealed to the police the previous day and complained that various types of goods in his house were stolen from time to time by Nuriye Sirin, *who worked as a maid in the house*. Nuriye Sirin has been apprehended, and an investigation has been launched. (*Ulus*, October 3, 1946; emphasis added)

A woman named Maide, *who was working as a maid in the house of Sirayer in Bahçelievler*, stole a brooch that worth 400 Turkish liras, and lied low. Upon the complaint to the police, Maide was apprehended in her house, and the brooch was found in the laundry package. (*Ulus*, September 20, 1946; emphasis added)

As clearly evidenced in these particular examples, the gendered character of petty theft operated on the basis of a spatial practice in the broader social geography of pilferage in the city. The maid service provides the poor woman with access to middle-and-upper class settlements like Maltepe and Bahçelievler, and thus a gendered opportunity at pilferage. Considering historical trajectories of capitalist urbanization in different social contexts, we can contend that petty theft by domestic servants was a common practice for survival on the urban margins. For instance, examining the case of interwar Egypt, Hammad demonstrates that various forms of petty theft like shoplifting, pickpocketing and laundry stealing were vital for the survival strategy of working-class women (2017, pp. 376-394). It seems that the urban poor in the early Republican Ankara reproduced similar patterns of pilferage as an organic component of making a living in the city.

On the basis of this historical evidence, we need to underline a number of important points to develop deeper sense of the complex and contradictory phenomena at hand. First, reminiscent of the historical cases as exposed by social historians including Thompson, Linebaugh, Humphries and Shore, it is almost impossible to draw a clear distinction between the informally working masses and what would be labelled the “criminal population” of Altındağ in the early Republican period. This is because practices of pilferage organically

interpenetrated with the practices of informal work. Indeed, informal work provided fertile ground for the urban poor to engage in various pilferage acts as well.

Second, as a dialectical repercussion of the capitalist urbanization in Ankara, the practices of pilferage reflected the socio-spatial segregation of the city. That is, the urban poor were engaging in picking mainly from the affluent parts of the city, the middle-class neighbourhoods around the Ulus Square, and increasingly in the middle-upper class neighbourhoods that were flourishing in Yenışehir. This does not mean that such incidents of petty theft were absent from with the region itself. As reflected in numerous cases reported by the local newspapers, petty theft was among the major concerns for the Altındağ poor especially in the early Republican period. That was indeed one of the fundamental reasons for the poor to raise the demand for public security by the police. In the historical process, however, we can observe the tendency that *petty theft within Altındağ* was deemed illegitimate within the broader moral economy of pilferage on the part of the Altındağ poor. Güney mentions this point by maintaining that “[t]heft does not happen in Çinçin. The gypsies too, who are called with different names as Teber, Aptal, Gelgel, Porsuk, regard working in [stealing from] the neighbourhood as a shame. This is among the traditions of Çinçin” (1997 [1977], p. 20). The respondents of the oral history interviews also provided similar assessments in this regard. Among many others, B. (57, male) recalls the following from his childhood memoirs: “[The thieves] never used to undertake theft in the neighbourhood. They used to go to Çankaya, Cebeci, Bahçelievler, [and] Yenimahalle...”⁴⁰ In this regard, we can contend that

⁴⁰ Interview with B. (July 24, 2016; Kızılay-Çankaya, Ankara).

this gradually crystalized the spatial practice of petty theft creating a geography of social crime that reflected the class-based segregation of the city. As we would expect, the historical practice of pilferage was also conditioned by the political geography of policing.

Pilferage, therefore, included almost a limitless repertoire of picking and enjoyed central importance for the survival strategies of the Altındağ poor from the early Republican period onwards. As noted, these practices enjoyed an almost universal acceptance and legitimacy on the part of the urban poor. This communal strategy was to include pilferage undertaken in accordance with the needs of survival in the city and corresponded to a mundane denial – a contestation – of the regime of private property in the making. At this point, we need to make sense of the historical marginalization of social crime practices, as well as the associated formation of “professional” criminal activities. This transformation is reflected in the articulation of criminal activity and capitalist development in the city.

2.2. The production of crime as “profession”

Whereas a myriad of social crime persisted until the 1970s, petty criminal networks increasingly engaged in more and more professionalized practices of pilferage in the city. This dynamic was compounded with an *informal economy of exchange* of stolen goods in the neighborhoods of Altındağ becoming ubiquitous over time. This is because, as Güney observes, “each residue has a buyer” in the Altındağ slums (1997 [1977], p. 27). The development of petty criminal networks unfolded during an historical process of the consolidation of private property and projects of policing and carceral confinement in Ankara. In other words, the transformation of social crime practices into petty criminal networks was conditioned in the context of an

“historic dialectic” (cf. Linebaugh 1991) between forms of criminal activity and capitalist exploitation that characterized the contested formation of urban order in Ankara from the 1920s to the 1970s.

Drawing on her collaborative sociological research on “juvenile delinquency” in Ankara in the early 1940s, Boran illustrates the historical roots of social crime in the formation of petty criminal networks in Altındağ. Reporting on in-depth interviews with apprehended children in a police station in Ulus, Boran details the practices of pilferage by the “delinquent boys” (1941, pp. 33-34):

The first one is a blonde, handsome boy who is 11 years old. He is afraid and crying. He tells how he was introduced to theft by V., who is older than him and one of his neighbours. V. is one of the children we have just seen. We summon V. too. He looks over us with suspicious eyes ... He is about 14 years old. The police officers describe V. by saying that ‘he is a candidate for becoming the top-ranked pickpocket of Ankara’ ... When we are left alone [without the presence of the police officers,] he opens himself slowly. He was acclimatized by his older friends into stealing tiny oil tins from grocery stores. Then, he became professional in nicking money from handbags, wallets. The third child is accused of stealing metal ware like lead pipes, plates, etc. The fourth, the fifth, and the sixth children are apprehended for the same crime. It seems that they work as a team.

After presenting details of her interviews with the children, Boran concludes:

The children were not stealing on their own or in a random manner. One of them acted as an implicit leader. The organization did not come to a conscious stage; it was still just a nucleus. However, it was possible that thief companies would be established should [such crimes] continue.

Quite parallel to Boran’s forecast, Altındağ would experience a similar formation of petty criminal networks. A systematic review of the local newspapers shows that the formation of “gangs of thieves” thought to have already taken root from the late 1940s and gaining a “professional’ character over time. Adnan Veli Kanık’s auto-biographical novel represents another significant source in this regard. A dissident journalist and caricaturist, Kanık was

imprisoned at the Ulucanlar Prison in the early 1950s, and like Dinamo and Güney, he wrote about prison conditions at the time:

There are two kinds of people who end up in prison. The first is inexperienced, and the second is habitual... This second group is previously convicted. The majority of them are thieves and pickpockets. However, they have their good parts as well. For instance, those who are accustomed to housebreaking at nights don't work during the day. The shoplifters don't undertake housebreaking. Those who steal blankets, towels, and mirrors from hotels can't work otherwise. Those who nick wallets at the buses can't do the same business on the streets ... All of them have their styles of working. This is exactly what makes their apprehension easier (Kanık 1973 [1952], p. 91).

From this seemingly disparate historical evidence, we can glean that practices of pilferage were transformed into petty criminal networks as part of a hidden economy of survival in the Altındağ slums. There are a number of theoretical and political issues that need further elaboration given this reality to make deeper sense of pilferage.

First, this transformation reflected an historical consolidation of the social geography of pilferage in Ankara from the 1940s to the 1970s. As mentioned above, petty theft increasingly became “a shame” within the broader moral economy of social crime in the Altındağ region, whereas it seemed to get concentrated in the other parts of the city where the middle and upper classes resided. The 1974 report by Ankara Police Headquarters provides clear evidence of this. The Director of the Headquarters, İsmail Hakkı Demirel, was quoted by the newspaper *Barış* as saying that “the theft incidents in Ankara happen in more affluent neighbourhoods like Çankaya and other places. The theft incidents are comparatively lower in the *gecekondu* neighbourhoods. The reason is clear: the thieves choose [to steal goods that are] light in weight but heavy in value” (*Barış*, September 30, 1974).

Second, as the historical examples suggest, the relationship between social crime and other forms of criminal activity was complex. The blurring boundaries between social crime and “anti-social crime” or “non-criminal activities” become an expression not of a conceptual confusion, but “the lived reality” itself (Lea 1999, p. 312; 2002, p. 39). In the words of Yılmaz Güney: “picking and stealing are jointly undertaken at initial phases” in Altındağ (1977 [1997], p. 29). This is grounded in the highly fluid character of the social organization of popular illegality especially as it manifests as *kabadayı* vigilantism, an issue to be discussed in the following section. In other words, historically rooted in the social practices of pilferage as subaltern appropriation, the social organization of popular illegality opened the terrain of moral regulation as contested with the rise in influential social authority of the neighbourhood *kabadays* in the 1950s and 1960s. The gradual formation of petty criminal networks and their contradictory relationship with *kabadayı* vigilantism, therefore, is reminiscent of E. P. Thompson’s assertion:

We may feel more sympathy for the food rioter than for the horse-stealer, but the records don't authorize us to see one rather than the other as more typical of the laboring people. There is not 'nice' social crime here and 'nasty' antisocial crime there. Crime - in the sense of being on the wrong side of the law – was, for vast numbers of undifferentiated working people, normal (1972, p. 10).

The apparent vagueness between “social criminal” and “criminal-criminal” (Linebaugh 1972, p. 11), therefore, needs to be understood in relation to the historical consolidation of the wage form and its associated regime of private property through police power in the city. *The transformation of social crime as a survival strategy into professional criminal networks was the outcome of the historical dialectic of policing in the city*, which manifested itself through the tripartite subaltern struggles waged over (1) urban space, (2) forms of subsistence, and (3)

forms of moral regulation. The social reality of crime and corresponding political strategies of criminalization should be understood as a dialectical process. That is, crime is to be understood “only as a relation between ... crime and control” (Hall et al. 1978, p. 185). As the following parts of this chapter will reveal, this dialectic was characterized by a permeant deployment of state violence in different and much-contested forms in the broader carceral geography of Ankara.

The historical consolidation of the wage form and the regime of private property are reflected in the institutional materiality of police power as well. The incorporation of municipal affairs into police power was a defining characteristic of the early Republican police project. As we have analyzed in the previous chapter, police power assumed an all-encompassing ether in the daily operations of the market. In 1949, however, the police and the municipality underwent an institutional separation. Whereas this separation was an immediate consequence of the pressures of the transition to multi-party politics on the state, it also reflected the consolidation of the wage form and bourgeois hegemony in everyday life. Based on a liberal discourse of a limited conception of the police, which need to be restricted to the issues of law enforcement and crime prevention, this shift was historically important for reconfiguring of the politics of social order in the country. On this basis, I argue that the gradual consolidation of the wage form was to have a dialectical end-result on police power as well as social criminality itself. Mark Neocleous’s summary of the advancing liberal narrative of policing in the nineteenth-century is relevant here:

It is within liberalism’s ideological recoding of the politics of order, the nature of property and the question of the state that its rethinking of the police concept must be placed. Historically, the trick was to make policing consistent with the rule of law and a liberal polity. Having painted an

ideological gloss on the tyranny of capital and having ignored the gradual assumption of increasing powers of domination of capital over labour, liberalism transformed the police idea by restricting it to 'law and order' in the narrowest sense – the prevention of crime and disorder via the enforcement of law by a professional body of public officials forming a single institution with a clearly defined and limited role and subject to the rule of law. This vision of police became the dominant one in political discourse and in the self-understanding of police ... (2000, pp. 41-42).

On the other hand, we need to make sense of the second fundamental characteristic of social crime: everyday resistance/protest. Social crime can be viewed as a contradictory manifestation of social protest or as a proto-political type of resistance, as per Hobsbawm's original formulation. Whereas this aspect of the issue has been highly contested, what I want to stress instead is that social crime reflected deeply rooted class hostility on the part of the Altındağ poor. This hostility was experienced as an organizing principle that reflected a sense of resentment against the inequalities and injustices that assumed contradictory spatial forms in the city. As Güney puts it: "[For the Çiçin poor] stealing is a kind of insurrection against abasement; revenge from the arrogant, the privileged. It is discharging; stealing is subsistence" (1997 [1977], p. 20). In this regard, social crime denotes a form of subaltern experience through which the Altındağ poor encounters the city and the level of class injustices to which they were exposed.

This does not mean, however, that there existed a direct correlation between class consciousness and resentment. As Humphries puts forward, the acts of social crime "clearly express the deeply felt but often inarticulate feelings of class resentment and hostility which formed the moral justification for poaching" (1981, p. 28). The practices of social crime thus reflect a fundamental medium of "the experiential reality" (Sayer 1979) of the fragmented and reified social life based on the wage form. It expresses the contradictory formation of the

subaltern common sense which “cannot be reduced to coherence within an individual consciousness, let alone collective consciousness” (Gramsci 1971, p. 326). The transformation of this class resentment into subversive political potential would be experienced in the 1970s when socialist movements asserted their hegemony in the region. The following chapter will discuss how these “inarticulate feelings of class resentment and hostility” were incorporated into a cathartic potential for revolutionary struggle in the 1970s, a potential that openly challenged the contested nature of police power.

2.3. The violence of a mundane battle

The making of social crime in Altındağ and its complex transformation into professional criminal networks needs further elaboration in the context of state violence in the broader carceral geography of Ankara. This enables us to understand how the historic dialectic between forms of criminal activity and capitalist exploitation materialized in the urban landscape from the early Republican period onwards.

Class resentment was deepened with violent encounters with the state within the broader carceral geography of Ankara. In other words, state violence organized through the political geography of policing in the city lay at the heart of the historical intensification of social crime acts and deeply rooted hostility against the existing order on the part of the Altındağ poor. As analyzed in the previous chapter, the spatial form of police power was characterized by its deployment as the warden of the margin. This role was mainly based on the violent reproduction of the existing order while consolidating the margin itself.

Social crimes like picking were subjected to a tight policing control throughout the capitalist urbanization of Ankara. Reminiscent of the criminalization of the rights of turbarry (see Linebaugh 2014), the Ankara police were in constant search for wood and coal thieves in the city. Here is an interesting case from the year 1955:

The police have finally managed to apprehend the coal thieves. The coal quantity at the coal wagons had been diminishing at the Ankara Train Station for a long time, and the reason could not be determined by the relevant authorities. Therefore, the coal wagons were closely surveilled, and today, two persons were seen while filling their sacks with coal. The police apprehended the persons named Durmuş and Kemal with the stolen coal of 70 kg and brought them to justice. (*Halkçı*, January 20: 1955)

As picking was extensive, so was the mundane battle between the thieves and the Ankara police:

A while ago, two persons named Mehmet and Veli were apprehended *while stealing lead pipes* that belonged to the General Directorate of PTT [Turkish Postal Services] in Telsizler [located adjacent to Altındağ]. They were apprehended in Çiğin Bağları by undercover police officers and brought into justice (*Zafer*, January 15, 1950; emphasis added).

A theft incident happened in our city yesterday. A person ... was apprehended at the graveyard [located adjacent to Altındağ] by the graveyard watchmen while stealing brass pipe, tap, etc., and he was brought to justice (*Halkçı*, July 23, 1955).

Although the Ankara police engaged in a constant battle against the petty criminals in the city, it seems that the technical powers and spatial imagination of the police were limited so as to ensure its projected aim. One of the respondents of the oral history interviews, Z. (74, male), describes the *infrastructural limits* of the police in terms of realizing constant surveillance in the city in the mid-1950s:

I stole many things from constructions sites ... like taps, lead pipes, doorknockers ... I was selling them to junk dealers. The police apprehended me, undercover police officers from the Second Branch of the Ankara Police. I was sent to prison for 50 days. It was my beginning. After that, it did not stop, it continued. Besides, I became well-known by the police. Well, this was because I became

a repeater. However, being convicted/repeater would not affect your life in those times because the police who apprehended me did not follow me regularly.⁴¹

A gradual formation of police knowledge, or the creation of “usual suspects” of petty criminality, reflected the marginalizing gaze aimed at the urban margins, often along the lines of ethnic differences.

Arif Gelen, a news reporter from *Ulus*, published a series on the conditions of imprisonment at the Ulucanlar Prison in 1969. This series was in response to a booklet published by the General Directorate of Prison and Detention Houses that presented the *modernization efforts* of Turkish prisons. Exposing a satirical critique against the glorification of prison conditions in the country, the author asserted that the Turkish prisons were much like the Tsarist prisons in the mid-nineteenth century Russia (as described by Dostoyevski in his novel *Notes from a Death House*). The author makes a direct comparison between the Siberian prison camps and the Ulucanlar Prison in Ankara (*Ulus*, July 24, 1969):

In the book published by the Ministry of Justice with a luxurious style, the prisons are presented as institutions of correction ... The prisons [however] have become places of not correction, but degeneration ... The Ankara *gecekondus*, the neighbourhoods of Altındağ, Bendderesi, Abidinpaşa, [and] Gülveren have become fertile ground for the candidates of imprisonment. Each day, a large number of children and adults are filling and evacuating the prison. They either get long terms of imprisonment, and are sent to other prisons, or after a few months of imprisonment, return to their neighbourhood to commit new crimes. The vast majority of these transiently imprisoned guests are children, and their crimes are solely theft ... [At the prison], they receive education from the prison wardens, and learn new types of crime from their friends, and leave [the prison!]

Describing the prison as a “school of criminals,” the news reporter Gelen quotes from the children he interviewed about their experiences:

⁴¹ Interview with Z. (July 26, 2016; Plevne Neighbourhood, Altındağ-Ankara).

Brother, I am learning theft. I stole a kilogram of soap in front of the eyes of a few people from a grocery store. I stole [the soap] manfully ... I would be selling the soap in another place for five liras, or to be sure for 3.5 liras. When I get out of prison, they won't be able to catch me for this time. From now on, I will steal much more...

Güney provides us with a similar testimony by a convicted thief from Altındağ (1977 [1997]), pp. 33-34):

The year was 1955. I was caught due to robbing two homes, and as you know, after seeing the bastinado, custody, courthouse ... we came to the prison. After body search, registration, and haircut, I was assigned to the Fourth Ward, the ward of the youngster. It was not a place of rehabilitation. They were putting the criminals in there not for rehabilitation, but to become professionals [at stealing], for feeding their grudge. The majority were being imprisoned due to a crime they did not commit. And all were teaching one another the tactics of theft ... what was important for the police was not to find the real perpetrator of such kinds of petty crimes ... The important thing for them was to have their work-load decreased.

As we have already mentioned, the Ulucanlar Prison, located adjacent to the Altındağ *gecekondu* neighbourhoods, assumed an historical function within the broader carceral geography of Ankara. It functioned as a contested place for state violence on the margin, through which petty criminal networks organized. Avni Bektaş, who was imprisoned in the mid-1970s and shared his prison life story with Güney, provides an illustrative assessment in this regard (2012, p. 72):

The vast majority of the prison population was composed of those who undertook theft. They were staying in the fifth ward, which was the largest ward at the prison. They were followed by the children, the majority of whom were imprisoned due to theft.

Almost all those imprisoned for this crime [theft] were people living in slums like Çiçin, Yenidoğan, Atıfbey and Aktaş [all of which are located in Altındağ]. We talked with them, they used to say they did not commit those crimes, they had to take the blame due to police coercion at the police station. Still, the number of those who acquired this [theft] as a profession was not low either. They used to lay their [theft stories] on with a trowel, they did not even hide those. They were the denizens of the prison. A major part of their lives has been spent at the prison. They knew their punishment, and thus sometimes they voluntarily took the blame for those crime that they did not commit. This was the reason for them to get over the investigation without getting beaten and tortured. Those inexperienced ones, however, used to get tortured and forced to take the blame for the crimes they did not commit. [The police at] stations used to look forward these kinds [of inexperienced thieves].

With them being caught, many unsolved theft incidents used to be blamed on them, and thereby the files were closed.

Social crime, therefore, lay at the center of the subsistence practices of the Altındağ poor, albeit in a rather ambiguous and sometimes contested manner. The transformation of these practices into petty criminal networks was historically conditioned by the deployment of state violence on the margin, which reflected the broader carceral geography of the national capital. Coupled with the precarious conditions of proletarian living in the city, this state violence delineated the political frontiers between crime and poverty while ensuring the consolidation of the regime of private property in the city.

3. *Kabadayı* vigilantism amidst urban plunder and popular illegality

The making of social crime in the Altındağ *gecekondu* neighborhoods can only be grasped by including consideration of the historical role of the neighborhood *kabadayı*s from the early decades of the Republic. Recent critical historiographies on Turkey have demonstrated that organized crime has a long history with strong cultural roots and an ethnically networked character. The historical figure of *kabadayı* is almost a universal referent to make sense of those roots in modern Turkish society (Bovenberk & Yeşilgoz 2004, p. 203; see also Galeotti 2012; Gingeras 2014; Hatip-Karasulu 2005). The *kabadayı* assumed significant socio-cultural and political roles on the urban margins shaping the making of the modern state and urban order in Turkey. They were an intermediary actors undertaking a policing function at local level, while engaging in an illicit network of urban plunder. In this regard, a critical analysis of this historical figure *vis a vis* the making of the Altındağ slums is significant in order

to make sense of “the historic dialectic” between forms of criminal activity, so-called primitive rebellion, and capitalist exploitation.

The *kabadayı* had a long history in the Ottoman Empire with their functional roles in upholding daily order in neighborhoods as zones over which they exercised control in an urban context. In his book titled *Babalar Senfonisi [Symphony of the Godfathers]*, the journalist Engin Bilginer provides an account on this aspect from late Ottoman Istanbul:

There were *kabadayıs* in Turkey once upon a time. They were men protecting a neighborhood or a district in Istanbul. They were brave men with a good heart; strong men with the ability to use a knife; experienced men imprisoned multiple times to pay their deeds. With their experience, they were able to prevent disputes from getting out of control. They preserved peace and ensured the safety of their zone (Bilginer in Yeşilgöz & Bovenkerk 2004, p. 203).

Ankara too had a long history of *kabadayıs* who assumed functional roles on the margins of the existing order. They had their roots in the long history of banditry dating back to the late Ottoman period (Uçak 1999). The neighborhood *kabadayıs* arguably represented the most organized form of social crime, and thereby a peculiar form of “social banditry” within an urban context of a peripheral country. For Hobsbawm, agrarian social banditry:

... consists essentially of relatively small groups of men living on the margins of peasant society, and whose activities are considered criminal by the prevailing official power structure and value-system, but not (or not without strong qualifications) by the peasantry. It is this special relation between peasant and bandit which makes banditry 'social' : the social bandit is a hero, a champion, a man whose enemies are the same as the peasants', whose activities correct injustice, control oppression and exploitation, and perhaps even maintain alive the ideal of emancipation and independence. Hence, in the extreme - and historically almost certainly exceptional- case of the genuine Robin Hood, the social bandit is the very opposite of a criminal, in the public mind (1974, p. 143).

We can argue that the “special relation” between the urban poor and the *kabadayı* enjoyed similar characteristics in Ankara as well. Almost all the respondents of the oral history interviews shared the perception that *kabadayıs* were social heroes. They acted as “the

protector of the neighborhood” and “the brave men taking from the rich and giving to the poor”. Muzaffer Evirgen makes the following assessment from his childhood memories:

The thing is that *kabadayi* is a matter of courage. The *kabadayis* were not the ones as we see today, who have money in their pocket. What did they do? For example, Ayşe does not have wood, right? They used to provide Ayşe with 250 kilograms of wood with the money they got from gambling. The wood was like gold at those times. Besides, there was coking coal that is used at iron foundry nowadays. When you fired that coal, it used to last for two days, it did not die down. *Kabadayis* used to give Ayşe 200 kilograms of coal as well...⁴²

The historical figure of the *neighbourhood kabadayi*, therefore, enjoyed significant social agency within the legitimate frontiers of what Thompson calls the “moral economy” of the urban poor. As discussed in the first chapter of the thesis, Taner’s epic piece also exposes a striking representation of this historically peculiar social figure.

Such historical evidence from literary and oral history sources provide us with an understanding of popular representations of the communal legitimacy enjoyed by *kabadayis*. There is, however, an inherent tendency to romanticize this historical figure. This tendency is not grounded on the misinterpretation of the social function and power of the *kabadayis*. On the contrary, the contradictory social position of the *kabadayis* reinforces a double-meaning; one reflecting social heroism assumed by this historical figure, and the other grounded in the urban plunder that was the basis for their actual power. The *kabadayis* were structurally positioned in a rather contradictory place on the margins of the nascent bourgeois order. This ambiguous position was rooted in the historical formation of illicit networks, through which they claimed their economic resources, political power, and social authority. Undertaking

⁴² Interview with Muzaffer Evirgen (April 9, 2016; Örnek Neighbourhood-Altındağ, Ankara).

extensive research on the historical formation of mafia networks in the country, the author Yurdakul (2012, pp. 46-47) underlines the contradictory social position of the *kabadayıs* in his interesting book titled *Abi: Kabadayılar, Mafya ve Derin Devlet [The Brother: Kabadayı, Mafia and the Deep State]*. He invites us to take a critical stance against the romanticized reading of this historical figure:

The *kabadayıs* created respect coupled with fear on the part of the people. Their swagger stories and great fights used to be narrated in a much-exaggerated manner. That is why those famous *kabadayıs* were perceived as heroes, as Robin Hoods 'taking from the rich and giving to the poor' ... However, when we elude ourselves from heroic stories and look at the realities, they were indicating quite different things. Apart from those concerned with 'ensuring public order in the neighborhood,' the majority of those fights, for which the people had much admiration, were conflicts arising on the basis of interpersonal rivalry over the partition of the rent and regions. What was taught to 'be taken from the rich' were the shares taken from the revenues of such spheres as prostitution, gambling, places of entertainment with alcohol, and usury. In other words, they were levying taxes from 'the sectors' that were left untaxed by the state, from the sphere from which the state would not levy taxes.

...

What was said to 'be given to the poor' was the partition of the rent [generated through illicit activities]. This partition was *sina qua non* of their affairs. A certain amount of the illicit revenue was to be shared. Initially, this share was to be given to the police officers and low-ranked public personnel. But later, in the process of [the formation of] mafia [networks], when the amount of rent gradually grew, the share would be given to high-ranking bureaucrats and politicians as well.

By these accounts, Ankara was also a contested terrain for the inter-*kabadayı* rivalry over the spoils of plunder from brothels, gambling, cannabis, and bar-pavilion bouncing to name a few (Kemal 1982, p. 8). They were in a state of relentless rivalry for preserving their zones of influence and ensuring their political accumulation of power and money accordingly. That was why *kabadayıs* engaged in violent fights among themselves, as exemplified by the case of Kürt Cemali.

The *kabadayıs*, in a sense, were providing forced protection (Yeşilgoz & Bovenkerk 2004, p. 203) conditioned in the broader context of urban plunder. Kanık's novel is illustrative

here as it demonstrates how this forced protection was based on a mutual interest between *kabadayıs* and brothel keepers in the mid-1950s:

The police cannot fight at length against the bullyboys, who bother the bawds, intend to prey on the revenue of the brothels, and thereby find a way to earn a living. Following the complaint to the police, the suspect is caught, imprisoned and after a few months, he comes back and bashes the most beautiful girls at the brothel with a knife. The complaint to the police means to force the bullyboy for a revanche, so none of the bawds resort to such kind of callowness. They have their ways of self-protection: harboring *kabadayı* at their brothels. This has been quite beneficial for a long time. The bawds, who live under the protection of *kabadayıs*, feel at ease. If someone appears to bother and intends to prey on them, then it is the business of their bouncers. That is why the racketeers do not edge in the brothels who harbor *kabadayıs* (Kanık 1973 [1952], p. 31).

As another form of urban plunder, gambling was a highly profitable business in the urban underworld of Ankara from the 1940s to 1960s. The *kabadayıs* were organizing gambling in places popularly called as *bitirimhane* or *batakhane* on the urban margins. Halil Soyluer (1995, p. 176), the famous crime reporter of Ankara, provides a comprehensive and detailed account of the organization of gambling in this regard:

Bitirimhane is the gambling house run by poor people in poor neighborhoods. It does not have luxury; those who come here do not know such upper-class games like poker or baccarat. They play craps [throw the dice], play cards. These kinds of *bitirimhane* are found in Altındağ, Cebeci, Yenidoğan and İsmet Paşa neighborhoods. The police raid only these kinds of places. Those peddlers, bazaar men, small tradespeople, waiters of restaurants, drivers who live in these neighborhoods often come to these kinds of *bitirimhane*.

The social organization of gambling by the *kabadayıs* reflected the class-based and spatial segregation of social relations in the city as well. The *kabadayıs* were organizing gambling as part of the daily lives of the Altındağ poor. This source of urban plunder, however, was the primary basis for *kabadayıs* rivalry as well. Yurdakul (2012, p. 74) provides the following assessment:

Gambling was under the control of *Kabadayı* Mehmet, Sari Veli, [and] Karagoz Kemal in Hacettepe zone while the [Kurdish] people from Bayburt, primarily Kürt Cemali and his family, assumed control

in the [neighborhoods] of Altındağ, Atıfbey and Yenidoğan... As is the case in every illicit sphere, it was a requirement to show one's strength, and prove one's courage during the fights and clashes.

The social power of the *kabadayıs* was reinforced through police power in an utterly contradictory manner. For one thing, the *kabadayıs* were undertaking public order in the neighborhoods under conditions of uneven police power. We can thus contend that the *under-policing* of the Altındağ region was historically conducive for the formation of alternative networks of communal power in the form of *kabadayı* vigilantism. The public order in Altındağ, therefore, was dependent on the mediation of the *kabadayıs*. This does not mean, however, that *kabadayıs* were immune from the surveillance and control of the Ankara police. On the contrary, the relationship between *kabadayı* vigilantism and the police order was complex and contradictory. Reflecting on his memoirs from the 1960s and 1970s, Z. G. (56. Male) provides the following assessment:

There was a police station at Dört Yol in Çiçin Bağları [which was centrally located in the region]. It is interesting now [to remember that] there was a gambling house on the access road from Dört Yol to Sıtel, and another gambling house right under the police station. So, the police station was positioned right at the top of it [the gambling house]. I do not forget this. That is, there was no sharp distinction between those owning the gambling houses and the police. There were not many problems that made them fall out with each other. The police would intervene only in cases of gunfight, but those keepers of gambling houses stayed in business without much trouble [with the police].⁴³

This aspect of the relationship was conducive for reproducing policing strategies of public order in the Altındağ region as well as Ankara. The other side of this relation was characterized by a kind of tacit acceptance of, if not submission to, official police rule in the city. The urban

⁴³ Interview with Z. G. (June 1, 2016; Çankaya-Ankara).

underworld of Ankara was based on the reproduction of these illicit networks in and through police power. Yurdakul provides an apt description at this point:

It was worth it to examine the relationship between the underworld and the police on its own. While it seemed contradictory in itself, it [the relation] was like “a well-functioning wheel.” It was a major issue in the *kabadayi racon* [swagger] to inform on somebody to the police. Still, they used to provide the police with information about murders and large-scale robberies that were outside of their zones of influence, and thus they escaped from bastinadoes. This is because it was a highly degrading issue for a *kabadayi* to have maltreatment from the police. On the other hand, that the *kabadayis* establish a kind of ‘public order’ in their neighborhoods, which clamped down thieves, vagrants, and those disturbing the people, made the police to shut their eyes to them. This tolerance was also beneficial [for the police] to take them [*kabadayis*] under control and know what they were doing (Yurdakul, 2012, p. 191).

The social power of the *kabadayis* was rooted in a fragile reproduction of feudal social bonds and relations of hierarchy within an urban context. What is particularly important to underline is that they did not pose a direct challenge to state power, nor did they object to an explicit policing project. On the contrary, they were instrumental for the politics of the police in Ankara because of their social function as *agents of public order* in the marginal city. This was politically productive for the politics of order engineered through police power. While they enjoyed popular legitimacy, they were functional social figures on the margins in terms of the reproduction of daily social relations. They also contributed to the formation of an illicit network, which was intertwined with the social practices of subsistence and the moral economy of the urban poor. In practice, therefore, they tended to be urban warlords engaging in a constant rivalry amongst themselves for plunder and power in the city. In other words, they arose on the basis of a rather contradictory, and uneven social and economic formation of capitalist modernity in Turkey (Gelaotti 2012, p. 50). The historical figure of *kabadayi* would be eventually be transformed into a critical agent for the formation of the Turkish mafia, which

had close ties to the state, and assumed a significant place in the international drug trade as well (Bovenberk & Yeşilgoz 2004; Yeşilgoz & Bovenberk 2004; Gingeras 2014).⁴⁴

4. Conclusion

This chapter has analyzed the historic dialectic between forms of criminal activity and capitalist exploitation in the context of the Altındağ slums. I have argued that this historic dialectic transformed social crime into professional criminal networks that reflected the consolidation of bourgeois hegemony and private property in the city. This process of consolidation was characterized by a permeant deployment of state violence in the everyday lives of the Altındağ poor in the broader carceral geography of Ankara from the 1920s to the 1970s.

Moreover, this chapter has contributed to the thesis's central narrative on the social history of the police by revealing two historically decisive phenomena. First, we can argue that the political geography of policing in Ankara was increasingly organized with reference to the social geography of pilferage, a phenomenon that reflected a socio-spatial segregation of class relations in the city. In the previous chapter, we analyzed how the making of the Altındağ shanties was foundational for the politics of the police in early Republican Ankara. This foundational politics was further crystallized in the process of the proliferation of *gecekondu* neighbourhoods in the post-war period. The consolidation of bourgeois hegemony in the city

⁴⁴ This thesis will not develop a systematic analysis of the post-1980 period of social marginalization in the Altındağ case. Still, it is important to underline that the transformation of social crime networks into organized crime, a phenomenon of the post-1980s in Altındağ, was the historical outcome of the transmutation of *kabadayı* vigilantism into mafia networks in the country.

was realized only through everyday formations of policing. This process, however, was substantially haunted by fundamental contradictions inscribed in the transformation of capitalist social relations in the city. The rise of the historical figure of *kabadayı* reflected a form of this contradiction. Police power was organically linked to *the illicit layer of kabadayı power* that put much contradictory social, economic and cultural imprints on the trajectory of capitalist urbanization in Ankara in the 1950s and 1960s. That is, the spatial form assumed by police power was conditioned in the context of the formation of an illicit network of urban plunder with the contradictory social role assumed by *kabadayıs*. Whereas policing in the city was dependent on the social power of *kabadayıs*, these two layers were mutually enforcing. This is because the latter did not pose a substantial threat to the politics of bourgeois order, while it dialectically resulted in the marginalization of the Altındağ poor. Popular illegality, therefore, characterized an alternative moral order representing a dialectical result of the historical experiences of subaltern contestations on the margins of the bourgeois order.

This critique of police power, however, only finds its full potential if it can provide insight on the radicalization of the Altındağ *gecekondu* neighborhoods in the 1970s. The social power and authority of the historical figure of *kabadayı* would be challenged by revolutionary cadres who asserted their own hegemony in the *gecekondu* neighborhoods of Altındağ. As we shall see in the following chapter, this development produced a highly contradictory association between the revolutionary cadres and the *kabadayıs* because radical politics and social marginality had co-constitutive effects on both groups. This would have substantial implications for challenging the politics of law-and-order, which was violently contrived by the state. The following chapter, therefore, aims to make sense of the contested association

between social marginality and radical politics, which had both cathartic potentials as well as subversive outcomes for challenging the politics of bourgeois order.

CHAPTER VI

RADICAL POLITICS ON THE MARGIN CATHARTIC MOMENTS, SUBVERSIVE ENCOUNTERS

Whereas it is a requirement for society composed of different classes to receive public (state) services on an equal share, we see that municipal, education, health and security services are unevenly delivered to different regions ... The state is principally located as an impartial [institution] with regard to the class-based and regional [urban] contradictions; however, in practice, it takes the side of the developed [regions], i.e. the side of the exploiters as opposed to the classes having lower living standards. This reality has led to frustrations against and loss of confidence over the state on the part of working classes and the people living in the underdeveloped regions ... The commonly held assertion that 'peace' and 'social peace' have deteriorated in the country arises on these class contradictions and conflicts ... Police forces, as the legal power of the state, are a part of the state mechanism; they have the first and foremost obligation of ensuring the safety of life and property in civilized societies. In our society, however, the intention of some irresponsible people to undertake police work, and their attempts to use police forces in line with their own class interests have put the duty and obligation of this organization in question.

Gürbüz Atabek, Director General of Public Affairs

(*Cumhuriyet*, January 27, 1976)

This assessment, at first sight, seems to belong to a scholarly perspective that tries to critique the position of the police *vis a vis* social classes. It presents the police as part of a social and political contradiction that characterized the capitalist urbanization processes in Turkey. What makes this tract particularly unique and interesting, however, is the author himself: Gürbüz Atabek. Atabek was Director General of Public Security between February 22 and June 6, 1978, penning a series of articles published in left-leaning newspapers such as *Cumhuriyet* in the mid-1970s. He was a member of what many today would consider an oxymoronic notion: a left-wing police organization named POL DER (*Polis Derneği*, Police Association). POL DER struggled against extra-legal practices such as political executions and torture undertaken by right-wing groups that were organized in different sectors of the state, including the police.

The titles of his articles are revealing in themselves: “The state, police and classes” (*Cumhuriyet*, January 27, 1976), “Exploiting the security forces” (*Cumhuriyet*, November 2, 1976), “Being the people’s police” (*Cumhuriyet*, November 17, 1975).⁴⁵

Turkey witnessed an interesting, radically disruptive, and transformative conjuncture in police militancy in the second half of the 1970s. It was a movement reflecting broader social and political tensions, contradictions, and struggles in society. The overtly class-based critique of the police by the Director General above provides us an exemplar of this radicalization. As we will discuss throughout the chapter, this peculiar experience of police militancy was conditioned by a deep-rooted crisis period marked by the intensification of class conflict, increased working class radicalism, and an associated upsurge of *gecekondu* struggles. This historical experience of police militancy was reminiscent of similar cases in countries such as the UK and the US in different periods of the twentieth century (Ray, 1977: 42; Reiner 1978a, p. 177; see also Reiner 1978b; 1980; Satter 2015).

In the Turkish case, this period was marked by a crisis of the hegemony assumed by the industrial bourgeoisie since the late 1950s. The dialectical outcome of this hegemonic strategy was the rise of organized labour as a major political agent in society. Conditioned in the context of a popular democratic state form instigated with the 1961 constitution⁴⁶, the working class

⁴⁵ It is also important note that such articles were reproduced in *Police Magazine* as well, making the way to the outreach of such assessments to broader cadres of the police organization. Founded by retired police officers in the early 1950s, the *Magazine* was one of the most widespread channels of the police organization to reach out to its rank-and-file, and thereby communicate the central message of the organization to the *police community* as a whole.

⁴⁶ The 1961 constitution was the political project engineered by the military cadres, who had taken control of the political power through a coup in May 1960. The constitution contained fundamental rights pertaining to the organization, freedom of expression and demonstration, etc., which were crucial for the organization of political dissent on the part of the working classes in the subsequent two decades. The 1961 Constitution, therefore,

radicalism had drastic impacts on the social and political life in the country. It produced organized forms of struggle especially with the foundation of TİP (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi*, Workers' Party of Turkey) in 1961 and DİSK (*Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu*, Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions) in 1967. Grounded in the massive and increasingly militant character of the working class movement, such developments manifested a political will to break with American style unionism⁴⁷ "to raise the distinct voice and demands of workers in the political arena through a separate political party" (Çulhaoğlu 2002, pp. 182-183), as well as a militant labour union embracing political unionism. This culminated in a substantial transformation of the working class from being a "young and inexperienced" social group into "a very militant and highly organized sector" (Margulies and Yıldızoğlu 1984, p. 16; Savran 2002, pp. 12-14).

The rise of the militant working class movement, coupled with the crisis in the prevalent regime of accumulation, led to a crisis of the state by the second half of the 1970s (Gülalp 1985; Ozan 2012; Yalman 2002; 2009). The state crisis, as Simon Clarke suggests (1992, p. 148), was grounded in the fact that "the working class challenge to the power of capital extends to a

presented for the first time in Turkey the historical possibility of a popular democratic state form by basically recognizing labour as the constitutive socio-political force in the country. This does not mean, however, that such a democratic form of state was the product of a voluntarist role played by the military. It was rather conditioned in the context of the development of class dynamics especially in the post-1945 history of Turkey (Yalman 2002, p. 34; 2009, p. 212; see also Gülalp 1985; Koçak 2008; Savran 2002).

⁴⁷ As we noted in Chapter III, with Turkey's integration into the Western Bloc in the late 1940s, the US involvement in the country's political, economic and social affairs gained an extensive charter. Among others was the establishment of TÜRK-İŞ (*Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu*, Confederation of Labour Unions of Turkey) in line with a political project that was not only modeled on, but also directly fabricated through the American style of containing industrial relations. It was, therefore, that DİSK explicitly criticized TÜRK-İŞ's organic ties with the US as a fundamental reason for the establishment of an independent confederation embracing political unionism for upholding the revolutionary consciousness of the working class (see Gürcan & Mete 2019; Mello 2010; Sylvest 2018).

challenge to the constitutional authority of the state in its relation to civil society". This challenge was experienced in Turkey in the form of dialectical reflection and reproduction of the political and ideological struggles at the very heart of the state apparatuses. The entire complex of "the political society" (Gramsci 1971, p. 263), including the parliament, trade unions, political parties and educational institutions, were divided along the lines of an ideological polarization. Even the police organization itself reflected the parcellization of the state by clashing ideological groups in the society. As reflected in the quote above, the left-leaning police officers were organized in POL DER and sided with the working class and the *gecekond* poor during strikes and demonstrations, whereas the right-wing ones established POL BİR (*Polis Birliği*, Police Union) to preserve *the integrity and unity of the state and the nation* against a perceived communist threat (see Gürel 2004; Öner 2003).

By the second half of the 1970s, therefore, the state was in a condition of constant "paralysis" (Gülalp 1985, p. 346), signifying its inability to reproduce itself in the context of the extended reproduction of capitalist social relations in the country. It thus resorted towards more and more violent means of crisis management through martial laws, which also engineered a para-military right-wing mobilization in the service of Cold War anti-communism.⁴⁸ Emerging as a counter-movement against the upsurge of the socialist left, the *ülkü* (literally idealists) movement arose as a para-military youth wing of the MHP (*Milliyetçi*

⁴⁸ Whereas the thesis will not develop a systematic analysis of the Cold War dynamics of the state crisis and the associated rise of the fascist movement in the country, it is important to note that this process was marked by the making of a "deep-state" that was closely integrated into the NATO strategy of countering the communist movements in the allied countries. Turkey was incorporated into the US-led "Operation Gladio" that deliberately engineered various extra-legal strategies of counter-guerrilla warfare.

Hareket Partisi, Nationalist Movement Party). Especially in the second half of the 1970s, they formed an effective social and political organization based on a fascistic power model that aimed to take political power through organizational activities at the levels of the state, the street, and the parliament (E. Aslan 2002, p. 153). Provoking and exploiting the religious and ethnic differences between Turks and Kurds, as well as Alawi and Sunni populations, the *ülküçü* groups employed a political strategy of creating a “state of effective civil war situation” to inspire a right-wing military coup that would be instrumental for the seizure of political power by the MHP (see Ağaoğulları 1987; E. Aslan 2002).

In this chapter, I aim to analyze this crisis period in the context of the historically peculiar, socially contradictory, and politically transformative experience of radical politics in the Altındağ slums. Whereas this phenomenon has a broad and multi-faceted character, I concentrate on a critical exploration of the association between social marginality and radical politics. The chapter, therefore, contributes to the critique of police power by revealing how the historically *permanent* emergency rule in Altındağ was challenged through cathartic moments of revolutionary praxis with the aim of “the introduction of a real state of emergency” in a Benjaminian sense. I explore three closely intertwined processes, through which revolutionary praxis embarked on building a distinct layer of power that confronted the pre-existing layers of the state and *kabadayı* power.

After providing a contextual analysis of the rise of socialist politics in the region, I explore the contested association between popular illegality and radical politics. I argue that revolutionary praxis was marked by a *sublation* (*à la* Hegel) of popular illegality while engaging in an alternative moral order project to establish its hegemony at the communal level. Whereas

socialist organizations did not embrace the political strategy of what might be called “socialist criminology” (McMullan 1986) on a programmatic level, their alternative order did sow the seeds of articulating an inherently subversive character of popular illegality into their revolutionary cause through the initiation of “a new ethico-political form” (Gramsci 1971, p. 367). My second point of contention will read this issue as a fundamental spatial praxis. Altındağ became a ‘liberated zone’ in terms of the organization of an alternative social and political order through the formation of “resistance committees” - part of a broader popular struggle against fascism. Grounded in the spontaneous and complex organization of the *gecekondu* topography, and intertwined with the moral economy of popular illegality, the organization of collective self-defence had subversive repercussions for the politics of the bourgeois order of the city. This is indeed related to my third and the last argument concerned with an exploration of the paralysis of the bourgeois police project amidst this period of organic crisis. As I will analyze in the last part of the chapter, the institutional materiality as well as ideological shell of the police were torn apart amidst this challenge on the ground. The rise of a radical demand for a “people’s police” was reflective of this moment of paralysis on the part of the police. In short, the chapter locates the police order and its actual contestations at the center of its analysis in order to explore how the cathartic potential in question was to deepen the organic crisis of the bourgeois order before the violent coup of September 12, 1980.

1. Radical politics on the margin

As one of the earliest *gecekondu* settlements in Ankara, the Altındağ region represents a particularly illustrative case for a critical exploration of the rise of radical politics in the 1970s. As we have analyzed in Chapter V, the historically marginalized character of the region presented densely contradictory, albeit politically subversive, backdrop for the rise of a socialist movement. The region still represents a microcosm of Turkey in terms of its social and political context and contradictions that contributed to the making of socialist politics in the 1970s. Altındağ was politically and symbolically central for any socialist faction engaged in a revolutionary cause in Ankara at the time. The radicalization of Altındağ, therefore, must be understood in the broader context of the social and political contestations that shook the very basis of the bourgeois order in Turkey from the 1960s to the late 1970s.

The rising militancy of the organized labor was coupled with the rise of student movements by the late 1960s. Emerging out of a lively intellectual and political debate among various factions on the left,⁴⁹ DEV GENÇ (*Türkiye Devrimci Gençlik Federasyonu*, Revolutionary

⁴⁹ The socialist left at the time, however, was haunted by ever-deepening ideological polarization within itself. The political discussions seemed to contain a rich and extensive repertoire of inspirations from different revolutionary struggles in the world, as exemplified with such concepts as Maoism, “the Sovietic path”, the “Ho Chi Minh line”, “urban guerrilla warfare”, “encirclement of urban centers by the rural movement”, “vanguard warfare”, “the people’s war”, national democratic *revolution versus* national democratic *movement*. It was, however, counter-productive in some respects as the socialist left was polarized through “revolutionary identity” rather than rigorous analytical formulation of political strategies (Çulhaoğlu 2002, p. 180). The main line of divergence was rooted in two fundamental issues. Developed out of an intense intellectual and political discussion on *the character* of Turkish capitalism, two main camps emerged: SD (*Sosyalist Devrim*, Socialist Revolution) and MDD (*Milli Demokratik Devrim*, National Democratic Revolution). Whereas the former advocated the working class vanguardism, the latter insisted on the formation of a “national front” that would bring different classes together for the common cause of a democratic revolution before the phase of the socialist one. The discussions articulated along the line of MDD, broadly conceived, prevailed in time and began to dominate the entire left spectrum with the formulation of new political positions. The second one was indeed concerned with these new formulations, the most important of which was concerned the fundamental question of the *form* of revolutionary struggle.

Youth Federation of Turkey) was established in 1965, and became the main locus of revolutionary action by the increasingly militant university students. Embracing the fundamental premises of the MDD line, DEV GENÇ assumed prominent roles in a variety of social struggles including land occupations by the peasantry, factory occupations by the industrial working class, and associated strikes and demonstrations (STMA 1988, p. 2136). It soon became a significant platform for the making of a new generation of revolutionary cadres, who increasingly detached themselves from the sphere of legal politics and embraced the idea of armed struggle to form a vanguard revolutionary action. Inspired from various revolutionary currents including the Latin American guerilla warfare, Cuban revolution, and Maoism, THKO (*Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu*, People's Liberation Army of Turkey), THKP-C (*Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi*, People's Liberation Party-Front of Turkey) and TKP/ML (*Türkiye Komünist Partisi/Marksist-Leninist*, Communist Party of Turkey/Marxist-Leninist) were established with the leadership of young revolutionary cadres including Mahir Çayan, Deniz Gezmiş, Hüseyin İnan, Yusuf Aslan, İbrahim Kaypakkaya, and their comrades.

The increasing militancy of the working class and the rise of armed struggle on the part of the youth movement were violently suppressed by the state with another military intervention on March 12, 1971. Indeed, the March 12 coup was a ruling class response to the challenge of radical politics and the crisis of the accumulation regime in the country. It was an historical irony, albeit predictable in a Marxist sense, that the political and legal framework

Especially during the debates between 1968-1971, the historical dichotomy between *classical party form versus movement form* crystallized, which would have decisive impacts on the revolutionary struggles throughout the 1970s, and indeed has continued to inform the socialist debates in the country until today (Çulhaoğlu 2002, p. 186; see also Aydınoğlu 2007; Bozkurt 2008; Ersan 2014; STMA 1988; Türkmen & Özger 2015).

developed under the leadership of the industrial bourgeoisie in the early 1960s had turned against its masters with the rise of radical politics in different legal and illegal forms by the late 1960s (Savran 2002, p. 12; Yalman 2002, p. 35). The March 12 military intervention, therefore, was “a reaction of the ruling classes in military garb to the upsurge in class struggle” (Savran 2002, p. 13). This military rule engineered an “interim regime” that ruled the country through martial laws until October 1973.⁵⁰ During that period, the state employed a systematic suppression tactic against revolutionary organizations, trade unions, and the left-wing intelligentsia. The leaders of THKP-C were assassinated in March 1972, and the leaders of THKO, Deniz Gezmiş, Hüseyin İnan and Yusuf Aslan, were executed on May 6, 1972 at the Ulucanlar Prison in Ankara. Subjected to a four-month torture period, İbrahim Kaypakkaya, the leader of TKP/ML, was killed in 1973. Whereas the early experience of revolutionary struggle in the form of guerrilla warfare seemed to be pacified by the violent coup, that generation succeeded in creating a radical tradition of revolutionary struggle in the country. This was indeed a period of “the most prolific dynamic of cadre-creation” for the socialist movement in Turkey (Çulhaoğlu 2002, p. 185; see also Aydınoğlu 2007; Ersan 2014; STMA 1988).⁵¹

⁵⁰ Whereas the military regime did not dissolve the parliament, it replaced the elected government in power (*Adalet Partisi*, Justice Party; AP) with an appointed one. During that period, the industrial wages were decreased, and the military regime attempted at engineering specific mechanisms for transferring resources to industrial bourgeoisie at the expense of the urban working populations, as well as the peasantry (Gülalp 1985, p. 340).

⁵¹ It is important to note that this generation and the political debates they developed put decisive impacts on the agendas and theoretical expositions of the entire socialist left in the 1970s. Among others, for the purposes of our discussion below, Mahir Çayan’s theoretical formulations were particularly important. Conceiving Turkey as a country where “colonial fascism” prevailed, Çayan formulated an original reading of Turkey’s underdevelopment that was characterized by an “artificial balance” between the oligarchy and the oppressed masses (Çulhaoğlu 2002, pp. 187-190). For Çayan, this balance could be disturbed only through “vanguard actions” of revolutionaries on the basis of a “politicized armed war strategy” to open the floodgates of a popular revolution. By the second half of the 1970s, with the rise of *gecekondu* struggles, this Çayanist argument informed the formulation of a “people’s war” against fascism especially by DEV YOL (*Devrimci Yol*, Revolutionary Path), which had the largest appeal in the second half of the 1970s. In fact, the idea and practice of “resistance committees”, as we will discuss

As an historical social space for the Ankara's working classes and the marginalized sectors of the urban poor, the political radicalization of Altındağ was heavily influenced by the defeat of this initial upsurge of the revolutionary movement and the death of its youth leaders, who became to be known as the 1968 generation. Renowned feminist author and trade unionist, for example, Yaşar Seyman was raised in Altındağ in the 1960s, and was actively involved in the socialist struggles at a communal level in the 1970s. She remembers how the revolutionary leaders of the youth movement had decisive impacts on both her life and the region:

When we became high-schoolers, they [the state] hanged Deniz [Gezmiş and his comrades], killed Mahir [Çayan and his comrades], and [İbrahim] Kaypakkaya. They were our revolutionary leaders. It was when they were killed that we began to understand what was going on in the country. We were introduced to that mourning, it was a torment ... For instance, one day when I went to school, I forgot Deniz's photo in one of my books. I was suspended from the school for three days ... It was as if we had inherited something from them when they were killed. They were the '68 generation, and we became the '78 generation.⁵²

K. (male, 57), a member of the socialist organization Liberation (*Kurtuluş*) at the time, provides a similar story from his childhood memory. This story is illustrative for the popular support enjoyed by the revolutionary youth movement at the time:

It was with the execution of Deniz Gezmiş [and his comrades] ... I saw my grandfather crying on that day [May 6, 1972]. We were just children, we were primary school students. We didn't know anything about [political developments in the country]. I asked my grandfather why he was crying. He was a stone master, a primary school graduate. He told me that: 'He [Deniz Gezmiş] was a good boy, these boys are struggling for us. They've hanged the boys'. It was a kind of rupture for me.⁵³

in the context of the Altındağ region below, were born amidst this dialectical process of political discussions and actual course of the events in the country. For a more comprehensive analysis of DEV YOL's revolutionary theory and praxis, see Bozkurt (2008).

⁵² Interview with Yaşar Seyman (August 5, 2016; Kavaklıdere-Çankaya, Ankara).

⁵³ Interview with K. (August 1, 2016; Kızılay-Çankaya, Ankara).

It was indeed a period when the labouring classes in *gecekondu* neighbourhoods tended to attach themselves to “illegal” radical groups rather than the legal parties of the left (Çulhaoğlu 2002, p. 183). Exposed to the structural pressures of the proletariat living under the conditions of “informal sector” and “casual jobs”, the foundational informality of the *gecekondu* regions was increasingly articulated into illegal forms of political organization. With its historically marginalized social space characterized by a moral economy of popular illegality, the Altındağ region was a central place for revolutionary politics not only symbolically, but also on practical grounds for the underground organization of the socialist movement. For the revolutionary cadres of the '68 generation were already involved in the region through various political projects and with the purpose of self-defence. K. A. (male, 56), a member of the socialist organization People's Liberation (*Halkın Kurtuluşu*), contextualizes the rise of the revolutionary movement in the region:

When we became revolutionary, almost all the cadres coming from the traditions of THKO and THKP-C resided in Altındağ with the purpose of ensuring either their self-defence or the transformation of the region. At the same time, there was a conducive environment here for the revolutionary movement; however, this atmosphere was an atmosphere of illicit [relations/affairs; *gayrimeşru*].⁵⁴

We will explore the contested association of radical politics with “the atmosphere of illicit affairs” in the following sections while focusing on its different social, political and spatial dynamics. The historical legacy of popular illegality, intertwined with the topography of the *gecekondu* neighbourhoods, presented a special spatial dynamic conducive to popular struggles for collective self-defence in Altındağ. For the moment, however, it is important to

⁵⁴ Interview with K. A. (May 14, 2016; Kızılay-Çankaya, Ankara).

discuss the complex dynamics for the upsurge of the socialist movement in the region. The radicalization process of the Altındağ region reflected the broader socio-political context of the country's contested urbanization. As an Altındağ resident whose family had migrated to the region in 1938, H. (male, 67) was among the pioneering socialist figures. He involved in the organization of the People's Houses and the initial stage of the organization of DEV YOL (*Devrimci Yol*, Revolutionary Path)⁵⁵, the socialist organization that enjoyed a large popular appeal in the late 1970s. Following a fierce internal discussion on the form of the revolutionary strategy suitable to countering the rising fascism in the country, a faction broke away and established DEV SOL (*Devrimci Sol*, Revolutionary Left) with an insistence on the Çayanist line of urban guerrilla warfare as a decisive form of vanguard revolutionary action. As a member of thus formed DEV SOL in the late 1970s, H. (male, 67) describes the making of “the leftist structure” of Altındağ:

With the repercussions of the students' movement in the *gecekondu* neighbourhoods in the early 1970s, the region became more dynamic. Almost each and every fraction [of the socialist left] began to come together in heaps, and Altındağ came to assume a revolutionary, leftist structure. Then, until 1977, almost all the fractions organized themselves in disproportionate numbers.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Embracing the tradition of THKP-C, DEV YOL first formed itself as a revolutionary youth organization under the name of DEV GENÇ (*Devrimci Gençlik*, Revolutionary Youth) in 1975, and was transformed into DEV YOL in 1977. It was a peculiar revolutionary experience on the part of the revolutionary movement at the time because of its success in establishing “organic links” with the masses for the purpose of creating an anti-fascist popular front. The “armed struggle” as a revolutionary vanguard action was reformulated in the context of a popular struggle on the ground. They had two types of armed organization: SDB (*Silahlı Direniş Birlikleri*, Armed Resistance Forces) that were organised through the Resistance Committees for the purposes of collective self-defence; and DSB (*Devrimci Savaş Birlikleri*, Revolutionary War Forces) that began to be established with the participation of professional revolutionary cadres in 1979. I do not intend to develop a political critique or analysis of such DEV YOL strategies in this thesis. I will, however, make relevant inferences so as to shed some light on the case of Altındağ. For an analysis of DEV YOL, see Bozkurt (2008) and Erdoğan (1998).

⁵⁶ Interview with H. (May 11, 2016; Örnek Neighbourhood-Altındağ, Ankara).

In this regard, we need to perceive the organic crisis in question as an *urban crisis*, reflecting the contradictions of the capitalist urbanization processes, as well as the subversive potential of revolutionary praxis in the country. As we have outlined in Chapter III, the housing question was increasingly politicized marking a transformation in its meaning from a problem of shelter to a complex constituent of urban politics. The social problems of the *gecekondu* people were increasingly articulated into political discourses of various socialist factions as a fundamental dimension of class conflict (Batuman 2006, pp. 66-73; see also Ş. Aslan 2010; Şen 2013; Şengül 1998). The political articulation of the *gecekondu* phenomenon into a project for collective social organization was significant for the rise of radical politics on a massive scale. The *gecekondu* phenomenon, therefore, was increasingly interpreted as the single most important repercussion of the spatial contradiction assumed by the ongoing class conflict in the country.

Altındağ was among the most politicized neighbourhoods in Ankara due to its marginalized social space and its segregated spatial status. H.'s (male, 67) following assessment is illustrative of how spatial relations of social inequality played a substantial role for the politicization of the Altındağ poor at the time:

At those times, I was trying to continue with my schoolwork, and working as an assistant at *dolmuş* (minibus) on the line between Cebeci-Bahçeli [neighbourhoods] ... I saw Deniz [Gezmiş] and Mahir [Çayan] at those places. The most important reason for me to lean towards the left was that I saw those houses in Bahçeli, and I was living a *gecekondu* life. That is, it was born as a great contradiction for me. We were going to Bahçeli and seeing those houses, those people living there. Sometimes I compared the life there [in Bahçeli], and my own in Altındağ. A great contradiction was to emerge for me. With my friends, we used to go to Çankaya, and tell each other that why it was the case that we had been made underdeveloped. We would be different should we had been born in Bahçeli or Çankaya. We had come here [Ankara], and resided in Yenidoğan, and had a totally different life. For

instance, many of my friends have been imprisoned due to weed or any other thing, and I was myself imprisoned for political reasons. In short, this was why I became politicized.⁵⁷

This assessment exposes how the historical geography of class relations in the city became a central dynamic for the making of the socialist movement at the time. We can, in a way, contend that the historical legacy of *class hostility*, a theme we have explored in Chapter V, was increasingly articulated into the socialist cause. That is why urban space is not a mere “container” of social relations and physical environment, but a fundamental form and medium of these relations and their associated struggles, as Lefebvre points out (1992). The political and historical legacy of this spatial contradiction was the underlying reason for the making of socialist hegemony in the *gecekondu* neighbourhoods.

This is closely related to the historically existing networks of subaltern solidarity in the region. As we have discussed in Chapter III, the *gecekondu* living was characterized by, among others, the moral economy of collective self-help that was grounded in the everyday subaltern strategies of coping with the structural pressures of the proletarian living in the city. Reinforced through kinship and ethnic networks, this historical legacy was important in the making of the subaltern common sense through practical experiences of communal living, collective work, sharing, as well as undertaking different forms of “quiet encroachments” against the state.

In this regard, this historical legacy of communal life was introduced to a political form through the establishment of a variety of associations in the 1970s. In a way, the socialist left pursued a political strategy of initiating collective solidarity to respond to the needs of the

⁵⁷ Interview with H. (May 11, 2016; Örnek Neighbourhood-Altındağ, Ankara).

gecekond poor both to enlarge its political base, as well as to create alternative channels for the provision of public goods and services. H. (male, 67) makes the following assessment in this regard:

The People's Houses was founded by the supporters of DEV GENÇ [Revolutionary Youth]. This affected our activities in Altındağ in a quite positive way. For instance, we brought doctors from Turkish Medical Association once or twice a week, and provided the people with medical examination free of charge ... And we received medicine from the Chamber of Pharmacists, and distributed them to the people. Our movement, therefore, gained a widespread sympathy on the part of the people in Altındağ.⁵⁸

The provision of basic social/public services to the *gecekond* population was indeed politically productive creating an urban collective power for transforming social and spatial relations in the region. It was, however, not unique to Altındağ. The socialist movement in the 1970s intervened into urban spaces with projects for creating alternative spaces of social and political organization. In a bitter war against the *gecekond* mafia as well as the state, they forcibly confiscated unsettled public lands, and engaged in an alternative politics of urban planning from a socialist vision of collective organization. With the involvement of the student movement and the *gecekond* poor, new neighbourhoods were built from scratch, as exemplified in the radical political experiences in 1 Mayıs (May Day), Güzeltepe, Gülsuyu and Çayan neighbourhoods in Istanbul. These experiments formed collective experiences for the production of alternative social housing and living spaces (Batuman 2006; Ş Aslan 2004; 2010; Şen 2013).

Whereas different socialist factions produced distinct, and sometimes clashing political strategies *vis a vis* the *gecekond* problem in the country (Houston 2017, p. 236), the general

⁵⁸ Interview with H. (May 11, 2016; Örnek Neighbourhood-Altındağ, Ankara).

political perspective embraced was that the *gecekondu* neighbourhoods were the fundamental “units of organization” for any socialist cause (Ş Aslan 2010, p. 796). The project of organizing the *gecekondu* neighbourhoods was thus essential “to appraise the political capacity of the working class and to establish a political base” (Şen 2013). The socialist movement, therefore, inclined towards “an activist push accelerating the perceived proto-revolutionary consciousness of shanty town dwellers and incipient-revolutionary conditions of society” (Houston 2017, p. 236). Through the organization of various solidarity initiatives, they also embarked upon a project for designing alternative channels for the provision of basic public goods and services to the *gecekondu* poor. On the basis of these collective experiences, the *gecekondu* neighbourhoods soon became alternative spaces for collective and autonomous organization by the socialist movement, which aimed to transform these spaces into the strongholds of revolutionary struggle against infiltration by a perceived fascist threat, as well as the violent incursions of the state. The analysis of this period with reference to “the structure of illicit affairs” in the Altındağ region provides us with a significant analytical and political framework for an exploration of the cathartic association between popular illegality and radical politics.

2. Cathartic Association: Popular illegality and radical politics

The term ‘catharsis’ can be employed to indicate the passage from the purely economic (or egoistic-passional) to the ethico-political moment, that is the superior elaboration of the structure into superstructure in the minds of men. This also means the passage from ‘objective to subjective’ and from ‘necessity to freedom’. Structure ceases to be an external force which crushes man, assimilates him to itself and makes him passive; and is transformed into a means of freedom, an instrument to create a new ethico-political form and a source of new initiatives. To establish the ‘cathartic’ moment becomes therefore, it seems to me, the starting-point for all the philosophy of praxis, and

the cathartic process coincides with the chain of syntheses which have resulted from the evolution of the dialectic (Gramsci 1971, pp. 366-367).

The rise of radical politics in Altındağ presented *cathartic potentials* in the wake of its rather contradictory association with the historically established moral economy of popular illegality. This potential was politically transformative for not only the marginalized sectors of the Altındağ poor, but also for the socialist movement itself. In Gramscian terms, “the [historical] structure” of social marginality arguably assumed a politically transformative potential that seemed to present popular illegality as “a source of new initiatives” for revolutionary praxis. The case of Altındağ seems to represent a significant historical experience in unfolding Franz Fanon’s famous, albeit highly contested, exposition of *lumpenproletariat* as “one of the most spontaneous and radically revolutionary forces” (1963, p. 129). Debates pertaining to the revolutionary potential of the lumpenproletariat notwithstanding (see Bussard 1987; Draper 1972; Hayes 1988; Sakai 2017), I will emphasize throughout this chapter that we ought to analyze this potential within specific social and political contexts and within broader political struggles that have the potential to initiate a cathartic intervention into the structures of social marginality.

As we have analyzed in the previous chapter, the element of political subversion is already rooted in the illegal and illicit character of social criminality, conceived as a subaltern transgression toward the bourgeois social order and the wage form. *Social crime assumed a politically transformative role through its association with socialist praxis in the 1970s.* That is, speaking from the other side of this dialectical synthesis, the case of Altındağ presents an historically peculiar social context for *the sublation of popular illegality by revolutionary praxis,*

which was politically transformative *as well as* socially contested. A critical account of the historical case of Altındağ, therefore, provides us with insight into the making of “a new ethico-political form” with the initiation of an alternative popular or collective power as the third socio-spatial layer characterizing the urban margin of the national capital.

2.1 Challenging the *kabadayı* power

The rise of the revolutionary movement in Altındağ was historically peculiar concerning its socio-spatial and political dynamics as compared to other *gecekondu* neighborhoods in Turkey. As should be obvious from what we have seen so far, the historically established social criminality and accompanying moral economy of popular illegality characterized the social relations of power on the margin. Embarking upon a radically new praxis of collective organization, the kind of power presented by socialist organizations was at a fundamental odds with the *kabadayıs* and their illicit network of urban plunder. Beginning from the late 1960s, therefore, Altındağ became a contested terrain for two forms of power claiming an alternative organization of popular justice from below.

Given that the illicit affairs in question were historically organized by the neighbourhood *kabadayıs*, this immediately posed obstacles for any socialist organization to engage in a popular struggle in the region. The process seemed to unfold through simultaneous strategies of bargaining, threatening, co-option, as well as collaboration on both sides. For one thing, the increasingly organized or popular character of the socialist challenge seemed to put the *kabadayıs* in jeopardy. E. (male, 57), a DEV SOL militant, provides an interesting assessment

of the rather uneasy situation in which the Altındağ *kabadayıs* found themselves when they first encountered the rise of socialist organizations claiming an alternative form of power:

When [socialist] politics were on the rise, they [*kabadayıs*] began to retire into their shells. This is because they didn't know the power they encounter. They thought that 'we know our foes, we might beat them. But if a revolutionary becomes our foe, we cannot know who our foes are'. This is because they knew that they [revolutionaries] would follow hard after them.⁵⁹

Given that *kabadayı* power had rested on an inter-personal rivalry and the reproduction of patriarchal codes and kinship networks in a capitalist urban context, the claim for an alternative order through collective power was *the historical unknown* for *kabadayıs*. This was initially perceived as a challenge to the *kabadayı racon* [swagger], which had been organizing their relations with the urban poor along the lines of masculine codes of bravery, strength, and manliness. A militant from DEV SOL, B. (male, 55) provides the following assessment with regard to the perceived challenge against the *kabadayı racon*:

[We] were visiting their places [coffee houses or *bitirimhanes*], and asking for money. They perceived this [levying tributes] as a threat to their swagger [*racon*], and thought that 'what the f*ck is this? A young boy comes and claims money' ... However, the [power] he was encountering was organized, and thus he was thinking that 'If I beat him, a thousand of men would come in a matter of an hour'.⁶⁰

This collective challenge was indeed conditioned in the broader context of the transforming dynamics of illicit network in Ankara, as well as in Turkey throughout the 1970s. Once serving as gambling houses for the Ankara working classes, and the marginalized sectors of the urban poor, the *bitirimhanes* seemed to lose their significance in the broader illicit network by the

⁵⁹ Interview with E. (June 28, 2016; Yenidoğan Neighbourhood-Altındağ, Ankara).

⁶⁰ Interview with B. (July 24, 2016; Kızılay-Çankaya, Ankara).

late 1960s. The underground economy of Ankara was changing both in terms of the accumulation of illicit money and its socio-spatial organization. As a consequence of the historical displacement of Ulus as the social and commercial center of the city, Yenışehir came to harbour a new wave of pavilions, clubs, casinos, etc. These socio-spatial dislocations seemed to contribute to the decline of *kabadayıs* as historical figures of neighbourhood toughs in Ankara⁶¹. The challenge of socialist organizations was thus conditioned in this broader socio-economic context. E. (male, 57) from DEV-SOL makes the following assessment in this regard:

During the process of the politicization [of Altındağ], we were visiting the coffee houses [or *bitirimhanes*] run by those *kabadayıs*. You don't want to offend them, but you began throwing it in their face that their business is not appropriate: 'Look, you have here organized gambling, but those [well-off] people no longer come here, they have begun to go to other places. They [*bitirimhanes*] have been transformed into clubs. İsender Çolak, Yusuf Koç and many others have left the neighbourhood. It is only the working people from the neighbourhood who gamble at your *bitirimhane*.' So, you become insolent against the respected man [in the neighbourhood]. The man becomes caught between a rock and a hard place. The foe is not singular in this case. They do not want to jeopardize their career So, what should this man do? Without gambling, he cannot live on revenue from beverages. He can say neither 'no' nor 'yes'. He does not want to be defeated [by the revolutionaries, by a superior power]. How would he save himself from this pressure? He then requests permission: 'Let me alone with gambling at nights at least'.⁶²

The rise of socialist politics, therefore, represented a political intervention into the social organization of the illicit network that had been under the control of the *kabadayıs* for decades. Practiced through various strategies, this intervention included a complex mixture of coercion and consent that underpinned the making of socialist hegemony at the communal level. B. (male, 55) from DEV SOL provides an apt description of the micro-political dynamics at play:

⁶¹ This was indeed a period of transformation of *kabadayı power* into mafia-life networks in Turkey (see Gingeras 2014). Whereas this thesis will not engage in a comprehensive analysis of this transformation, I will make relevant inferences throughout the present chapter.

⁶² Interview with E. (June 28, 2016; Yenidoğan-Altındağ, Ankara).

There was both admiration for and fear of [the revolutionaries]. This fear was from the organized power. All those [*kabadayıs*] including Kürt Ahmet and Iskender Çolak were giving money under the name of tribute or donation.⁶³

Given that the making of socialist hegemony was grounded in various forms of solidarity initiatives undertaken for and with the poor, we can speak of an historical replacement of the figure of *kabadayı* with the figure of *revolutionary* in the common sense of the people. Seyman provides a comprehensive assessment of the complex micro-dynamics of coercion and consent that contributed to socialist organizations assuming hegemony in the region:

The revolutionaries came to Altındağ after the *kabadayıs*. The *kabadayıs* did not disappear, but the revolutionaries came to the fore, they assumed the leadership, and the others were kept in the background.

...

This [the rise of socialist left in the region] was due to affection and respect. Of course, it was the case that a much more organized power came to the neighbourhood. It is important not to forget this aspect. Revolutionism is a much more organized power, and it is more sympathetic [to the people]. At one stroke, they [the revolutionaries] captured everywhere; they captured the streets, the squares, the fields. They won the hearts of the youth, the girls, the women. When those revolutionaries were painting the walls with slogans, they [the local people] began saying: 'You are tired, come and have a cup of tea'. What a wonderful thing this is! The *kabadayı* thought that 'I have been passing by these houses, there was nobody saying 'you are tired, come and have a cup of tea''. [It thus turned out that] these young people are working for us [the people].

...

This is a transformation. Otherwise, would it be possible to establish hegemony? The resistance committees assumed hegemony there ... and therefore Çiçin became a neighbourhood where the police could not enter, nobody could enter. What happened, then? Çiçin became a bastion [for the revolutionary movement]. That is why the September 12 [coup] struck the first great blow to Altındağ.⁶⁴

⁶³ Interview with B. (July 24, 2016; Kızılay-Çankaya, Ankara).

⁶⁴ Interview with Yaşar Seyman (August 5, 2016; Kavaklıdere-Çankaya, Ankara).

We will analyze the spatial dynamics of the micro-politics of hegemonic struggle on the margin in the following section. For now, we need to develop a deeper understanding of the historical affinity between *kabadayıs* and *revolutionaries* in terms of the social production of popular justice. In this respect, it seems significant to consider the consent-producing dynamics of the contradictory association of the *kabadayıs*. As we discussed in the previous chapter, the neighbourhood *kabadayıs* historically assumed a rather contradictory social function with their roles as “social bandits” in a capitalist urban context. To be sure, they acted as “the protector of the neighborhood” and “the brave men taking from the rich and giving to the poor.”⁶⁵ This seemed to have an impact on their forced acceptance of an alternative form of popular power as presented by socialist organizations. B. (male, 55), a DEV-SOL militant, provides a comprehensive account in this regard:

Ninety percent of the *kabadayıs* today are in collaboration with the state⁶⁶ ... However, the *kabadayıs* in the past were different; they trusted their fists ... especially Dündar Kılıç, İskender Çolak, and others... They never thought of collaborating with the state, and doing evil to the people. After all, the reason for them to develop intimacy with the leftists was that they were already opposed to the oppressor. The characteristic of a *kabadayı* is that he does not oppress the poor, he does not beat the oppressed; instead he protects them ... Therefore, of course, they had admiration for the revolutionaries [because their ideas and actions] overlapped with those of the *kabadayıs*: The revolutionaries do not oppress the poor, they stand by the oppressed.⁶⁷

Such an elucidation has an inherent tendency to produce a romanticized reading of the historical figure of *kabadayı*. As we analyzed in Chapter V, however, this tendency is grounded in the contradictory social position assumed by the *kabadayıs*. Grounded in an illicit network

⁶⁵ Interview with Muzaffer Evirgen (April 9, 2016; Örnek-Altındağ, Ankara).

⁶⁶ He refers to the relationship between the state and mafia that has deepened during post-1980 period of neoliberal transformation in the country (See Gingeras 2014).

⁶⁷ Interview with B. (July 24, 2016; Kızılay-Çankaya, Ankara).

of urban plunder, the *kabadayı* were instrumental in the making of popular illegality as an organizing principle of subaltern practices of appropriation. Notwithstanding its overtly contradictory social character, therefore, this presented an alternative form of justice claimed from below. Thus, the promise of an alternative collective organization offered by the socialist movement seemed to overlap with an historically established moral economy of popular illegality on the margin. A DEV YOL militant who engaged in the organization of the resistance committees in the neighbourhoods of Altındağ, F. (male, 58) provides the following assessment of this contradictory social association between these two claims of power from below:

There were indeed facilitating and challenging aspects. As for the challenging ones, they had their own justice mechanisms, their own bouncers. When the revolutionary movement arose, some problems emerged with them. Still I think that the *kabadays* at that time were more just, they were not mafia. They sided with us in situations when they had to choose a side between us and them [the fascists]. But this does not mean that we did not struggle against them. It was not an overt struggle, it was through keeping our guards up ... this is because they are taking benefits from the region. Still, they did not take us on, we even received logistical support in some issues.⁶⁸

At this point, we need to note that the Ulucanlar Prison provided a peculiar spatial terrain for such an association. The prison was a place of incarceration of *kabadays* as well as the Altındağ poor since the early Republican period. The prison, in a way, functioned as a microcosm for the reproduction of the moral economy of popular illegality with its role as “the school” of social criminality and *kabadayı racon* [swagger] (Yurdakul 2012). More importantly, however, the prison was an historically symbolic and politically significant place for the confinement of dissident groups since the early Republic (see Ünalın 2010). Throughout the politically-

⁶⁸ Interview with F. (June 31, 2016; Kızılay- Çankaya, Ankara).

contested decades of the 1960s and 1970s, many socialist figures were imprisoned at Ulucanlar. Irrespective of their political affiliation on the left, they struggled for the transformation of social relations of oppression through the organization of *communes* within the prison itself. The prison became an important spatial terrain for encounters between socialist cadres and *kabadayıs* as well as the marginalized sectors of the Altındağ region. It was through such encounters that sympathy toward the revolutionaries by the *kabadayıs* took root.

B. (male, 55) from DEV SOL makes the following assessment in this regard:

The majority of *kabadayıs* took sides with the leftists. When they ended up in prison, they stayed in the wards of the leftists. They always expressed [their pro-leftist stances] after they got out of the prison.⁶⁹

Yurdakul's rigorous biography of Dündar Kılıç perfectly illustrates this context. Kılıç was raised in Altındağ and engaged in the illicit network throughout the 1950s. He escaped to Istanbul due to his alleged involvement in the murder of Kürt Cemali. In fact, Kılıç's life-story represents an exemplar for the transformation of a historical figure of *kabadayı* into a leader of a mafia network especially in the post-1980 period. For the purpose of our discussion, however, what is more significant to mention is Kılıç's encounters with the leftist cadres and intellectuals at the Ulucanlar Prison in the 1970s. Among them was İlhan Selçuk, a left-Kemalist intellectual imprisoned during the military regime in the early 1970s, who describes the relations between *kabadayıs* and socialist cadres at the prison (cited in Yurdakul 2012, p. 12):

I and Dündar Kılıç stayed at different wards. He was in the largest ward, where the revolutionary students also stayed. Because he regarded himself as a Robin Hood being up in arms against injustice, and established his relation with Yılmaz Güney on the basis of this *racon* [swagger], he

⁶⁹ Interview with B. (July 24, 2016; Kızılay-Çankaya, Ankara).

developed quite close relations with the boys [revolutionary students] at the ward, and adopted himself to [the prison atmosphere]. The boys, of course, were pleased with this *kabadayı* behaviour, and accepted him to their group.

We have here the rise of “the leftist *kabadayı*” throughout the 1970s.⁷⁰ As a matter of fact, Dündar Kılıç struggled hard to preserve this self-proclaimed image, and put some distance between the *kabadayı* and mafia. This historical affinity between the revolutionary cadres and *kabadayıs*, characterized by its always fragile and contested nature, seemed to play some role in the organizational activities of the socialist movement as well. Whether collective threat or challenge to *kabadayı* power, a micro-politics of coexistence provided revolutionary organizations with a strategic ally in their everyday struggles for popular organization. Despite “keeping their guards up” against the *kabadayıs*, as our respondent mentioned above, socialist organizations seemed to benefit from the illicit network of *kabadayıs* in various ways. For example, given their gradual hegemony, the cadres began to levy tributes on coffee houses run by the *kabadayıs*.

This illicit network was also instrumental in meeting the needs and demands of the resistance committees for the provision of social goods and services. For instance, in the 1970s, the country experienced a severe shortage of basic consumer goods such as sugar, bread, bottled gas, oil, etc. in the midst of a deepened crisis in the import-substitution accumulation regime. This resulted in the rapid formation of a black market on almost all the fundamental

⁷⁰ As a matter of fact, the aforementioned ideological polarization was reflected in the *underworld* as well. Whereas such figures as Dündar Kılıç, Kürt İdris, Behçet Cantürk and Enis Karaduman embraced a self-proclaimed position of “leftist *kabadayı*”, there were “right-wing mafia” as well, as in the cases of Arap Nasri and Bozo Kemal (Övür 1996, p. 1474). On the basis of the oral history research, it is interesting, however, to note that the Altındağ region was characterized by its “leftist *kabadayıs*”.

consumer goods, leading to the intensification of popular frustration. In the Altındağ context, however, it seems that the existing illicit network was decisive in resolving such problems. İrfan Türkkolu, a DEV YOL militant and central committee member in charge of the organization of the Resistance Committees in Altındağ, provides significant insight in this regard (Cited in Akçam 2016, pp. 40-41):

Frankly speaking, we did not experience such a problem [of reaching the consumer goods] in either the Çalışkanlar neighbourhood where the resistance committee was operating, or the entire Altındağ region. We did not [have to] organize any activity concerned with the procurement and allocation of foodstuff. We had no problem [in this regard]. The relations rooted in the “illicit life [*gayrimesru hayat*]”, which was a part of the structure of Altındağ, was a facilitating element in meeting such kinds of needs; that is, it was the people themselves who were resolving [such problems] ... “The illicit life”, in a way, facilitated the work of the Resistance Committee. It was the case that one thing that should be undertaken by the Committee was automatically realized.

The historical practice of pilferage was, therefore, instrumental in meeting the needs of a socialist initiative. The moral economy of popular illegality, founded upon a fundamental transgression of the regime of private property overlapped with the radical political praxis that rested on the communal re-organization of social relations in everyday life. Türkkolu’s account provides further evidence in this regard (Cited in Akçam 2016, p. 47):

In this process, the people there [in Altındağ] were not of course transformed at a single stroke. There were still many people involved in illicit affairs such as theft, weed, gambling, con-trick, pickpocketing. [For instance,] I was not used to paying for a coat, pants or shoes. They used to ask ‘[Brother,] what shoe size do you wear?’ I was saying ‘it is forty-one, why did you ask?’ He was saying ‘no problem, I just wonder’, and at the end of that day, they used to bring the shoes.

The most controversial, albeit politically subversive, side of this association seems to be the question of providing weapons to socialist organizations through the very same illicit network.

Again, Türkkolu notes (Cited in Akçam 2016, p. 48):

As a result of our established relations, we were able to reach some opportunities other than creating a significant amount of financial contribution [to the budget of the Resistance Committee]. Because the region was the one where the illicit relations were densely experienced, there were plenty of arms in the region. We never forced the people [and said that] ‘you will give these guns to us’. On the contrary, we sat and talked in person with them. When we say ‘Look, this is your gun, but there is this kind of struggle here. In Gültepe [neighbourhood], there is a fight against the fascists. You have to be a part of this’, frankly speaking, many people did not want to be in the [armed] clashes; however, they were saying ‘Brother, take this gun’. Therefore, we transferred ten to fifteen guns into the movement [Revolutionary Path] in this way.

Conditioned in the context of the armed struggle between the socialist left and the fascist movement, the historically established popular illegality on the margin seemed to provide subversive political opportunities for the radical politics in the late 1970s.⁷¹ This was manifested especially in the spatial contestations of police power, which is a topic we will analyze in the following section. Before exploring this spatial dimension, however, we need to take stock of the alternative moral order project undertaken by socialist movement on the margin.

2.2. “The eclipse of the lumpen core”⁷²

The making of socialist hegemony in the region was realized through a contradictory association of *kabadayı* power with socialist cadres. This association also rested upon an

⁷¹ At this point, we need to note the broader historical context of the intensification of arms smuggling amidst this period of armed struggle. It became an important business due to the provision of arms to both left-wing and right-wing groups in this period (Övür 1996, p. 1474). Alongside other spheres of illicit money such as narcotics trafficking, it was through arms smuggling that the historical figure of *kabadayı* was transformed into a mafia leader from the 1970s onwards. Whereas it is important to underline this fundamental transformation, on the basis of the historical data as gathered from this field research, we ought not to make a bold conclusion about this historically important dynamic in the case of Altındağ. This issue needs further historical examination beyond the scope and purpose of this thesis.

⁷² I owe this formulation to Yaşar Seyman; Interview with Yaşar Seyman (August 3, 2016, Kavaklıdere-Çankaya, Ankara).

everyday politics of moral regulation engaged in by socialist organizations. Socialist groups presented the potential for an alternative “ethico-political form”, that seemed to find “a conducive atmosphere” in Altındağ. Yet, “this atmosphere was an atmosphere of illicit [relations/affairs; *gayrimeşru*]”.⁷³ This raises fundamental questions about the linkage between radical politics and the moral economy of popular illegality toward an alternative order. While socially contradictory, this linkage was also politically transformative, arguably representing a “cathartic process [that] coincides with the chain of syntheses which have resulted from the evolution of the dialectic” (Gramsci 1971, pp. 366-367). A dialectic that was rooted in the interplay of criminal activity and capitalist exploitation that unfolded throughout the historical urbanization of Ankara. *The socialist movement, in a sense, presented a cathartic intervention into this dialectics of social marginality.*

The confluence of popular illegality and revolutionary struggle entails political potentials as well as impasses that seem to have haunted socialist struggles in different socio-political contexts including, perhaps most famously, the struggles of the Black Panther Party (BPP) and their association with the so-called Black “lumpenproletariat” in the US in the 1960s (see Ogbar 2019; pp. 93-122; Sakai 2017). The case of Altındağ, therefore, sheds light on the potentials and limits of a Fanonian revolutionary dynamic within marginalized populations. I do not aim, however, to explore the possibilities for a socialist perspective on this issue, which seems to be a much larger project that is outside the scope of this thesis. Rather, I aim to portray the quest for an alternative moral order or an “ethico-political moment” through the

⁷³ Interview with K. A. (May 14, 2016; Kızılay-Çankaya, Ankara).

short-lived hegemony of socialist organizations in Altındağ to emphasize some fundamental contradictions experienced in the region. Such an exploration reveals that initiating a *collective-subversive power* as the third layer of power on the margin, the revolutionaries posed a substantial crisis dynamic for the politics of bourgeois order.

The clear context of social marginality in the region had created an “atmosphere of violence ... just under the skin” (Fanon 1963, p. 71) in the neighbourhoods. This subaltern consciousness was shaped by the permanent deployment of state violence since the early Republican period. Performed through different institutional forms in the carceral geography of Ankara, this foundational violence lay at the root of subaltern hostility towards the state and the police.

K. K. (male, 57) was raised in Altındağ, and became a member of the socialist organization Liberation (*Kurtuluş*) in the late 1970s. He provides the following assessment regarding these subaltern encounters with the police:

[Altındağ] is a synthesis of poverty; a place where people have come together due to poverty; they are *the captives of the state*. There is no road [construction], they don't blaze a trail. We used to see the shit coming out of the sewer system in the neighbourhood. The only thing that we saw was the police car; we were introduced to the state in this way. The beaten people [and the like] ...

For instance, one day, the police came [to the neighbourhood] with *tomsons* [tommy guns] in their hands. I was just a child, 9 years old [in 1968]. My friend was 11 years old ... there was a canvas banner with a bomb (emphasis added).

He then shares his personal encounter with the police. It is worth reproducing the conversation between the police officer and the respondent, a child at the time, as he remembers it:

The policeman: Boys, who did this?

K.: We don't know, uncle! Didn't you put this up?

The policeman: What? Why would we put this up? We are the state.

K.: No freaking idea, uncle! When we see the state, it always shoots at us.

The policeman: Son, who is the one that organizes [indoctrinates] you?

...

So, given our political consciousness at such an early age, we were already aware what side we were on.⁷⁴

This historically rooted subaltern common sense, therefore, was decisive in the making of the popular illegality, and associated hostility towards the state on the urban margin. In his socialist realist narrative we have analyzed in the previous chapter, Yılmaz Güney describes how this class hostility was inscribed in the collective experience of the subaltern classes (1997 [1977], p. 21).

Common feelings are developed, common fronts are established against the foreigner, against the police. A foreigner always means suspicion and distrust; a police [officer] always means fear and shiver. A police cannot get the guts to enter Çiçin on his own. Police are called 'zarbo' and the neighbourhood watchman is called 'cibek'. The one who first sees the police and the police jeep undertakes his/her first job: warning the neighbourhood: 'Hey, zarbo [is coming]!' And the signal spreads from *gecekodu* to *gecekodu*, from roof to roof. As the police take their first steps in the neighbourhood, their presence is known by even those far away. The majority of men hide themselves; this is because it is not certain who will be taken into custody, and to prison. Thus, everybody forms an alliance against the police. The women, especially those experienced ones, who know the right conduct, stand against the police ... The main reason for all this is to gain time; the one that has to escape, escapes; if there are some [stolen] goods to be relocated, they are relocated through back windows.

The social production of "common feelings against the foreigner", conditioned in the context of the foundational violence of the state, therefore, was conducive for producing "spontaneous impetuosity" (Fanon 1963, p. 134) against police power. We will turn to this crucial issue of "the spontaneous impetuosity" of the subaltern, and its cathartic association with revolutionary praxis in the following section. For now, it is important to highlight that the

⁷⁴ Interview with K. K. (August 1, 2016; Kızılay-Çankaya, Ankara)

foundational violence of the state, coupled with the precarious existence of the proletariat, led to the social reproduction of violence in everyday life. A militant from People's Liberation, K. A. (male, 56) engaged in socialist struggle in the region as a *foreigner* because he came from a different neighbourhood outside Altındağ. He describes his initial experience with the region in the following:

There was something like those who were strong enough survived. It was the case that the people drank heavily. For instance, when we visited the neighbourhood, we might see some drunk people destroying cars on the street with axes. There were groups of people like gypsy groups and other groups. When they fought against each other, we used to watch them with dismay ... That is why we went to the region faintheartedly, let me put in this way.⁷⁵

As we have analyzed in Chapter IV, the question of interpersonal violence had already been a major concern for the Altındağ poor since the early Republican era. Whereas incidents of interpersonal violence were reported by the Ankara-based newspapers throughout the period, this problem was not perceived to threaten the new social order. The 1974 report by the Ankara Police Headquarters provides clear evidence in this regard. Director Demirel was quoted in the newspaper *Barış* as saying that “the incidents of murder, battery, and injury happen more frequently in the *gecekondu* neighbourhoods” than the more affluent parts of the city but that this trend “reflects its relation to the general level of knowledge.” He goes on to say “as the cultural level increases, the rates of such crimes as murder, battery, injury, and robbery decrease” (*Barış*, September 30, 1974). This kind of ideological framing was a defining characteristic of the Republican politics of the police, which had embarked upon a civilizing mission since the early Republic. Glossing over the social relations of oppression and

⁷⁵ Interview with K. A. (May 14, 2016; Kızılay-Çankaya, Ankara).

exploitation, this political rhetoric had also been instrumental in normalizing a violent state presence on the margin. Scholars such as Christian Parenti (2000) have argued that crime has the function of social control by both justifying police presence, increased their powers and violence, as well as closing all possible political alternatives:

A look at the real impacts of street crime begins to reveal that crime and the fear of crime are forms of social control. Strong-arm robbery, rape, homicide, and general thuggery in poor communities leave people scared, divided, cynical, and politically confused; ultimately these acts drive the victims of capitalism, racism, and sexism into the arms of a racist, probusiness, sexist state. In short, crime justifies state violence and even creates popular demand for state repression. Thus, it helps to liquidate or at least neutralize a whole class of potential rebels. Crime also short-circuits the social cohesion necessary for radical mobilization.

Conceived in this way, the historically established social reality of crime in Altındağ also presented a similar challenge for the socialist cadres since “the atmosphere of violence” was central for their everyday encounters with the poor. Socialist organizations engaged in their own moral regulation project that included a complex mixture of consent and coercion in everyday life. Arguably representing a quest for building an alternative ethico-political form, this project was always contradictory in its social character but transformative in terms of its political potentials. Türkkolu’s testimony is illustrative here (Cited in Akçam 2016, p. 30):

I went to Yenidoğan [neighbourhood] at nightfall. It was my first time going there. In fact, it was the first time to visit the other side of Ulus ... I found out that the friends that I was searching for were near the primary school ... they were drinking beer. They said: ‘Welcome, brother! Drink beer!’ I said ‘Ok, let’s drink.’ At those times, let alone drinking beer, it was not appropriate for revolutionaries to smoke filter-tipped cigarettes. Yet, I went to the neighbourhood to organize, and what I was told was that it was a very lumpen place. It was a place which we could not organize in one way or another. Our friends used to go there, stay three months and return back [due to failure in organizing]. So in such a neighbourhood, I did not decline their offer for drinking beer. We drank beers with those friends at that night. And in the long run, I realized that I did something right. This is because we put a ban on drinking beers at the streets in Çiçin, and we enforced this ban in collaboration with those friends [whom I had drank beer beforehand].

Thus, the rise of the socialist hegemony in the region was coupled with a project for moral regulation in everyday life. This included bans on weed and gambling as well. As a militant of People's Liberation, K. A. (male, 56) provides the following in this regard:

With our revolutionary struggle, we told those people that drinking should not be on the streets, that gambling houses create harms against the people, that we aim to establish a just order, and that while ensuring justice, we have to have a policy for these activities. In fact, we received widespread support.⁷⁶

This moral regulation project seemed to be undertaken through a collation among the different factions of the socialist left in the region. H. (male, 67) from DEV SOL provides the following assessment on this alliance:

They [weed and narcotics] were rarely consumed before the 1980. This is because the revolutionaries were dominant at those times. The revolutionaries did not permit even beers at coffeehouses. It was such that drinking beer at the streets was forbidden. I know this well that all the leftist organizations formed an alliance on this issue, and gambling and alcohol were banned.

...

We tried to make this [ban] to be complied with. The ban was implemented in places like Çinçin and Yenidoğan [neighbourhoods], where we were strong. That is, the man was buying his drink, and taking it to his home and drinking there, not at the streets. The cannabis was already absent [at individual level]. Only those *kabadayıs* were using it in isolated places.⁷⁷

This regulation project, however, was contentious and required a certain level of coercion on the part of the socialist organizations. K. A. (male, 56) from People's Liberation (*Halkın Kurtuluşu*) provides the following testimony concerning the ban on weed-dealing:

In the past, only the elite ones [*kabadayıs*] were smoking weed, it was a sign of braveness [roughnecking]. After a while, weed began to spread at the neighbourhood. I don't know the reason. We noticed this, and when we noticed, problems emerged with those [dealers].

...

⁷⁶ Interview with K. A. (May 14, 2016; Kızılay-Çankaya, Ankara).

⁷⁷ Interview with H. (May 11, 2016; Örnek Neighbourhood-Altındağ, Ankara).

We had these kinds of problems. In fact, we had such incidents that included even armed clashes with the dealers. But they came to a position to give up. We had a meeting at a coffee house, and asked them to apologize from the people ... in time they had to leave the area.⁷⁸

The political fabrication of a new “ethico-political moment”, therefore, followed a twin strategy of consent building and coercion on the part of the socialist organizations conditioned in the historical structure of social marginality and state violence. That is, the new moral order was imposed within the broader context of “the atmosphere of violence” historically characteristic of living on the margin:

I never forget this. At one instance, those dealers asked us: ‘why are you putting pressure on us? We are against the police just like you.’ As a matter of fact, we had many such incidents when we had problems with the police, they were attacking too [against the police]. This indeed means that it is a reality of life. *It is sometimes that the contradiction of the revolutionaries with the system come together with their own contradiction at the streets* (emphasis added).⁷⁹

The historical overlap between these two forms of contradiction was politically conducive to the making of socialist hegemony in the region. Notwithstanding its deeply contradictory character, socialist organizations would leverage considerable social force from within the marginalized sectors of the Altındağ poor. A DEV YOL militant, F. (male, 58) describes this as “a real transformation [that] was achieved sometimes with stick, sometimes with [consent]”.⁸⁰

A militant from People’s Liberation, K.A’s (male, 56) assessment is also illustrative:

As a consequence, before the September 12 coup, Altındağ was a highly dynamic place with its dynamic youth. For instance, I always give this example: we manage to recruit many cadres from

⁷⁸ Interview with K. A. (May 14, 2016; Kızılay-Çankaya, Ankara).

⁷⁹ Interview with K. A. (May 14, 2016; Kızılay-Çankaya, Ankara).

⁸⁰ Interview with F. (June 31, 2016; Kızılay, Ankara).

those wine addicts, grain alcohol addicts. They adopted themselves in no time, they really internalized that moral thing [codes].⁸¹

The making of an alternative “ethico-political form”, therefore, was grounded in the socialist goal of an “intellectual and moral reformation” (in a Gramscian sense). This is, of course, a highly contradictory process that had its limits within the broader social and political structures of social marginality in the region. The short-lived hegemony of socialist organizations was conducive for “the eclipse of lumpen core”, as Seyman puts it. As the term suggests, however, we cannot speak of a substantial transformation. Instead, we have a rather contradictory, albeit politically transformative symbiosis of the moral economy of popular illegality and radical politics. The popular politics of the street provide insight into the repercussions of the association between radical politics and social marginality. For instance, the following was a commonly shared slogan that was reproduced countless times in banners, brochures and signage by various factions of the socialist left throughout the 1970s:

Fabrikalar, tarlalar, siyasi iktidar, her şey emeğin olacak!
Labour will seize factories, lands, political power, and all the rest!

This was reproduced with a peculiar reformulation of the Çiçin poor:

Meyhaneler, pavyonlar, herşey bizim olacak!
We will seize pothouses, pavilions, and all the rest!⁸²

⁸¹ Interview with K. A. (May 14, 2016; Kızılay-Çankaya, Ankara).

⁸² Interview with K. K. (August 1, 2016; Kızılay-Çankaya, Ankara).

This seemingly *humorous* reformulation reflects the manner through which subaltern common sense engages in its own contentious conception of politics. This is, in fact, directly related to “the spontaneous impetuosity” of the subaltern, which we now turn to in the context of the making of the Altındağ region a “liberated zone”.

3. Altındağ as “liberated zone”

The socialist imagination was based on a collectivist project that public land can be used for public good and that it is ultimately just to engage in direct confrontation with the existing order (Ş. Aslan 2010, p. 797). The politicized *gecekondu* neighborhoods under the hegemony of the socialist movement, therefore, were characterized by a radical challenge to the state, its bureaucracy, as well as all forms of power (Aslan & Şen 2011, p. 110) including “land mafia” and *kabadayı* power. In this sense, the socialist intervention into the urban space and the living spaces of the *gecekondu* people represented the production of space in not only its physical form, but also all forms of social relations.

The transformation of the *gecekondu* struggles into a quest for radical spaces in the form of “liberated” or “rescued” zones was determined in this context of the polarization of the entire political structure, the formation of the authoritarian and militarist state strategies, and the mobilization of the para-military right-wing groups in the service of crisis management. Organized through the political channel of the MHP, the rise of fascist movement was instrumental for the politics of crisis management fashioned especially during the period between 1974-1980. For they were perceived by different factions of the bourgeoisie as well

as the right wing AP (*Adalet Partisi*, Justice Party) as a decisive instrument for suppressing the working class militancy and socialist movements in the country (Ağaoğulları 1987, p. 213; see also E Aslan 2002). As a matter of fact, MHP strengthened its political position both at the parliament and different state institutions during the MC (*Milliyetçi Cephe*, Nationalist Front) governments that were formed under the leadership of AP in the second half of the 1970s. MC governments represented the coalition of the Turkish right, which incorporated the proto-fascist MHP and Islamist MSP (*Milli Selamet Partisi*, National Salvation Party), against the rising popular support for CHP⁸³, as well as the resurgence of the socialist politics in the country. Supported by the industrial bourgeois as a means for crisis management, the MC governments were mainly concerned with yet another moment of explosive growth of revolutionary organizations, as well as working class radicalism in the country.⁸⁴ The resurgence of the socialist movements after the interim military regime in the early 1970s, therefore, was met by the increasingly para-militarized sectors both from within the state, as well by extra-legal

⁸³ As the founding party, CHP experienced a considerable transformation throughout the 1960s and 1970s. With the political leadership of Bülent Ecevit, the party attempted at formulating a social democratic alternative to the socialist upsurge and the Turkish right. With the much debated slogan of “the left of the center”, the party began to articulate a left-populist political discourse to appeal to the urban poor, who have been alienated and frustrated from the economic crisis and the rising militarist strategies of crisis management. CHP’s transformation indeed reflected the increasingly hegemonic wave of the socialist movement that had dramatic impacts on Turkish society, from the parliamentary politics to the politics of the street (see Erdoğan 1998).

⁸⁴ As Haldun Gülalp underlines, the industrial bourgeoisie were waging a struggle on two fronts: “against the other factions of the bourgeoisie to establish its hegemony and against the working class to leave the latter devoid of its organisational means of resistance” (1985, p. 345). In fact, different factions of the bourgeoisie came together under the leadership of the large industrial bourgeoisie, temporarily leaving aside their particularistic interests. The establishment of TUSİAD (*Türk Sanayicileri ve İş İnsanları Derneği*, Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association) in 1971 and HTK (*Hür Teşebbüs Konseyi*, Free Enterprise Council) in 1976 was significant for the Turkish bourgeoisie to act as a class for itself. The latter was organized as “an anti-labour front” in response to “the intensification of anarchic events and illegal demonstrations, increasing attacks on property rights, liberty of free labour, lockout right, and other rights and freedoms, [and] resort to practices of illegal general strikes” (Ozan 2012, p. 137).

strategies of counter-guerrilla warfare. This period was therefore a period of escalated armed clashes between socialist organizations and state-backed para-military groups.⁸⁵

It was under these deeply tense political conditions that certain *gecekondu* neighbourhoods came to be declared “liberated zones”. These zones were predictably criminalized by the state as well the right-wing media (Ş. Aslan 2010, p. 798) yet they were historic in terms of a radical initiation of “the right to the city” (Harvey 2003). Notwithstanding the criminalizing discourse employed, the connotation of “rescued zones/regions” articulated a political discourse mobilizing the protection of collective living spaces against the urban plunder of organized *gecekondu* mafia, fascists, and violent state intervention (Şen 2013).

The making of Altındağ as a “liberated zone” was only realized through contestations with state power and paramilitary right-wing groups. A DEV YOL militant, Ş. (male, 55) provides the following assessment on the collaboration between state forces and para-military groups:

There were frequent fascist attacks here. The number of people keeping watch and ward till the early morning was not so high. It was us [revolutionary cadres] who kept watch and ward. Before the fascist attacks, the police used to patrol in the neighbourhood. It was the case that the police first come, and then the fascists attack the neighbourhood. We still resisted [against fascist attacks]. The people went a long way toward providing assistance to us.⁸⁶

According to this respondent, there seemed to have been a division of labour between the revolutionary cadres and the Altındağ poor for organizing collective self-defence. The following

⁸⁵ During the process, the increasingly para-militarized *ülkücü* groups engaged in assassinations against leftist politicians, journalists, trade unionists, and even police officials like Cevat Yurdakul, who aimed to end the *ülkücü* terror in the country (see Öner 2003, pp. 116-120). In the late 1970s, the *ülkücü* terror gained massive character with the political fabrication of ethnic tensions between Sunni and Alawi communities in Çorum, Maraş, Sivas and Malatya provinces. It was the case that with the tacit support from the state, MHP mobilized Sunni conservatives and ultranationalists to massacre hundreds of Alawi and leftist people (E. Aslan 2002, pp. 154-155).

⁸⁶ Interview with Ş. (June 5, 2016; Örnek Neighbourhood-Altındağ, Ankara).

testimony from a Altındağ carpenter who worked at Siteler is illustrative of the rationale behind the popular embrace of collective self-defence:

We had many people killed due to the political events. Among these, for instance, there was the Piyangotepe massacre. One of the people killed in that massacre was my wife's uncle, the others were his fellow village men. We were so sad due to death of these people. Actually you know what you come to a point of insurrection. We kept watch and ward here in Cincin in order to prevent similar events. People of all ages [involved in this]. They [revolutionaries] were arranging two persons of 15 to 20 years old in line with a man of 30-35 years old. They were also providing a gun. We used to keep watch and ward all night long. This was to prevent the fascists coming and killing us and our families while we were sleeping in our beds.⁸⁷

This collective duty, however, was organized in a flexible manner so as to respond to the needs and demands of the people. K. G. (male, 64) provides an important insight into this point:

As a matter of fact, while I was keeping watch and ward, I told the friends [revolutionaries] the following: 'Friends, I am sorry to say this, but let me be exempt from keeping watch and ward. If it is required, let me provide financial contribution through my salary. Why? Because I cannot work during the day after keeping ward [at nights]. They might sack me if I don't work. I have to earn a living. Otherwise, I can neither take care of my family, nor provide help to you'. They considered this reasonable, and said: 'Brother, you speak correctly!'⁸⁸

It was through such collective processes that the region became a "liberated zone" representing a radical contestation of state power with its associated para-military strategies.

A DEV YOL militant, K. C. (male, 56) provides the following assessment:

Nobody could prevent us [from doing our organizing activities] because the police could not enter here, nobody could enter here. At nights, we were keeping watch. The police were patrolling only on the main streets, with much fear. This is because they were shot in say Yenidoğan [neighbourhood] or at Babur street or Altındağ street. That is, they were unable to do their patrolling work. It was only with gendarmerie that they were patrolling, otherwise they did not have any chance.⁸⁹

⁸⁷ Interview with K. G. (June 5, 2016; Örnek Neighbourhood-Altındağ, Ankara).

⁸⁸ Interview with K. (June 15, 2016; Siteler-Altındağ, Ankara).

⁸⁹ Interview with K. (June 5, 2016; Örnek Neighbourhood-Altındağ, Ankara).

Under the conditions of martial law, public order was to be ensured by para-militarized policing strategies undertaken by the police and the gendarmerie. As another DEV YOL militant suggests, the police had a difficult time penetrating the liberated zone:

The police could not enter [Altındağ] because it was a *geceköndü* region. Because the side streets are very narrow, it was easy to protect these places ... It was thus not possible for the police to come here and patrol with one or two officers. If they came, they used to come with at least ten or fifteen officers. There was thus this kind of fear from the left as well. They were not at ease, they were unable to carry out an operation smoothly. If they were to undertake a large-scale operation, they used to do that with soldiers [gendarmerie].⁹⁰

Towards the late 1970s, Altındağ became a battleground between revolutionary organizations and state forces. The following revolutionary accounts provide insight into this spatial contestation. The first report is about a mass demonstration organized in the Çalışkanlar neighbourhood in the Çiçin region as part of a broader campaign of boycotting the national elections in 1979. The details of this demonstration are presented in the periodical of DEV YOL:

The demonstration was held in Çalışkanlar district in relation to the campaign for boycotting the elections as a political protest act raised by *Devrimci Hareket* (The Revolutionary Movement). On the evening of October 5, in Çalışkanlar, a mass demonstration was organized with the participation of more than 1500 revolutionaries, during which roads were closed with barricades. During this political demonstration, which continued for more than a half of hour, solid slogans regarding the election boycott were shouted and banners were carried. "Security" forces did not draw near to the barricades though they came during the meeting. The demonstration was successfully ended, without any losses, as it had been planned, with the enthusiastic support of the public. Similar demonstrations were held in many other places with the participation of hundreds of people such as İncirli, Ata District, Maltepe, Akdere, Mutlu District, Şirintepe, Tuzluçayır, Feridun Çelik, Yıldız, Nato, Tepecik, Bağaziçi, Aşıklar, Bahçelerüstü, and Demetevler (*Devrimci Yol* November 1, 1979).

⁹⁰ Interview with T. (June 5, 2016; Örnek Neighbourhood-Altındağ, Ankara).



Figure 20: Public demonstration in Altındağ
Source: *Devrimci Yol*, October 21, 1977, cover page

The following provides another significant example of the contestation with police power within Çiçin region. Giving details on the May Day preparations in different *gecekondu* neighbourhoods in Ankara, DEV YOL provides the following for Altındağ:

During the evening hours on April 29, a group of 50 people held a demonstration in front of the Çiçin police station and they hung banners. Protestors started to fire on police officers who attempted to intervene and police officers fled. The banner of Revolutionary Path stayed a long time hanged in front of the police station (*Devrimci Yol* 1980).

The spatial contestation of police power was conditioned by the spontaneous and complex organizations of the *gecekondu* topography in Altındağ. As we analyzed in Chapter VI, the urban plans of Ankara reflected a radical modernist outlook that included grid street plans, public

squares and sublime buildings. This was spatially instrumental in governing everyday social relations through standardized and uniform structures functional for constant surveillance and spatial control. This strategy was politically productive in the broader political geography of policing in the city because it enabled the police to engineer public order through the enactment of boundaries and the restriction of access to particular spatial zones. Police power, therefore, rested on the production of urban space through a particular delineation of political geography in the city.

In a stark contrast to these state spaces, the *gecekond* neighbourhoods were characterized by an interwoven network of shanty houses with randomly structured narrow side streets and blind alleys. This layout, therefore, becomes a medium of subaltern strategy against the intrusive involvement of the police in the Altındağ region. These subaltern practices were politically productive for socialist struggle. A DEV YOL militant, K. provides an apt assessment on this point by making a comparison between the regulated and un-regulated parts of the Altındağ region:

When we organized rallies, the activists were able to fade from the scene easily. This was because the people used to open their doors and windows to the activists after the rally. The police thus used to be unable to find anybody {who attended the rally}.

....

It was the case that the police could catch somebody only in the Örnek neighbourhood, not in other neighbourhoods. This was because this neighbourhood was a planned region, having its streets and roads [determined by the state]. That said, we had already bolt holes in this neighbourhood as well. It was still the case that police could catch persons [revolutionaries] only in this neighbourhood.⁹¹

⁹¹ Interview with K. (June 5, 2016; Örnek Neighbourhood-Altındağ, Ankara).

Grounded in the spontaneous and complex organization of the *gecekondu* topography, and intertwined with the moral economy of popular illegality, the organization of collective self-defence produced subversive consequences for the politics of bourgeois order in the city.

4. Epilogue: On the paralysis of police power

Under conditions of the deepening hegemonic crisis and the rise of organized struggle on the part of the working classes, Turkey witnessed an interesting, radically disruptive and transformative period of police militancy especially in the second half of the 1970s. It was a movement reflecting the broader social and political tensions, contradictions and struggles in society. The reproduction of broader social contradictions within the police organization itself represented a highly subversive political potential for deepening the crisis of the state. This seems to be of great significance for making sense of the contestations of the bourgeois order in the case of the Altındağ *gecekondu* region.

These social and political dynamics were decisive in terms of the political organization and militancy of the police in the midst of the crisis of the 1970s. Reminiscent of the historical examples from the US and the UK, the rank-and-file of the police began to organize with the primary aim of advancing their occupational interests. POL DER was established in 1975 in response to deteriorating social and economic rights and harsh working conditions among police officers (Öner 2003). A member of POL DER, and a dissident woman police officer, Nuran Varlı writes in her memoirs:

We were members of POL DER. My father was the president of POL DER for a certain period of time. He was active in the organization. We were among the first [police officers] to become members of

POL DER. We did not have any political ambitions or thoughts when becoming POL DER members. This was because POL DER was established with the aim of protecting the social rights of the police [officers]. [Therefore,] we became POL DER members because of a conviction that our rights could be defended (Varlı 1995, p. 41).

This primary dynamic was to enable the organization to enjoy a wide-spread support among the rank-and-file of the police. In fact, it was quite possible to see incidents of resistance on the part of police officers throughout the 1970s. In December 1974, for instance, about 3,000 members of the Ankara police undertook an influential protest with the following demands: overtime payment, weekend holiday, more secure working conditions, etc. In addition to these demands that reflected the police officers' concern with the protection of social and economic rights, they also demanded the dismissal of the Ankara Directorate of Security. One of the police officers said that they did not want "to be presented as an example of fascist [oppression] among the citizens" in the country (*Barış*, 1974: December 23; *Cumhuriyet*, 1974; December 23). The inter-penetration of economic demands with political ones was reflected in the memoirs of Varlı as well:

[A]fter a while, things started to go haywire. Its [POL DER] direction altered and it took on a political content. This was mainly because of to the attitude of the rightist structure within the police organization. Failing to capture POL DER, rights cops established POL BİR. By this development, the organization, which had been founded with the aim of protecting the social rights of the police [officers], took on a political character (Varlı 1995, p. 41).

In this regard, the rise of police militancy and its articulation into broader political struggles in society presents a substantial contradiction for the politics of bourgeois order. This contradiction becomes revealed under specific social and political conditions where the established order is threatened with the rise of organized struggle on the part of the working

classes. In this respect, we can contend that the institutional materiality of the state in general, and the police in particular, is open to social and political struggles and contradictions in society at large. In fact, this “political character” was best reflected in POL DER’s own exposition on the issue. With a claim of being the “people’s police,” POL DER expressed the central tension underlying the bourgeois police project in Turkey:

When words like ‘strike’, ‘boycott’ or ‘*gecekondus*’ are pronounced, ‘the police’ come to mind. The political groupings, therefore, taking their power from the upper classes use the police as a legal tool in favor of these classes; they use the people against the people. However, it is impossible to imagine the extra-legal conduct of the police ... against his brothers [and sisters] like students or workers who are their neighbors from *gecekondus* ... We believe that the police should be the guardian of the progressive and emancipatory forces rather than those of the reactionary and conservatives, and also it should be an institution that receives acceptance and respect from the people (Öner 2003, pp. 62-63).

This fundamental claim represents a crisis moment within the police organization as it exposes the class character of bourgeois policing. Sitkı Öner, who was among the founding members and the Secretary General of POL DER, describes how their strategy was incorporated into the cause of the socialist movement at the time:

After we received information [about a police raid into the neighborhood], we were informing the activists immediately. We did this without any consideration of political fractions; whether they were from Revolutionary Way or Revolutionary Left or TKP [*Türkiye Komünist Partisi*, Communist Party of Turkey], etc. We were engaging in a socialist struggle...⁹²

When articulated into broader political struggles, therefore, the radical demand for a “people’s police” presented a paralysis of the bourgeois police project in a period of organic crisis. In other words, the institutional materiality and ideological shell of the police was torn apart

⁹² Interview with Sitkı Öner (June 2, 2016; Ege Neighbourhood-Mamak, Ankara).

amidst this cathartic challenge on the ground. This was, however, deeply contradictory and politically limited because the police still represented an apparatus of the state. A militant from People's Liberation, K. A. (male, 56) provides the following assessment on the structural limits of the struggle waged by the police through POL DER:

Let me put in this way: the struggle is widescale ... our generation knows the police station as a place where you are beaten harshly, tortured, bastinadoed. Of course, those police officers from POL DER were making a difference. They were not useless during the clashes at neighborhoods. For instance, they closed their eyes to our slogans on walls, but the other [police from POL BIR] would fire a gun against you ... POL DER and POL BIR were a part of the broader disintegration in the society. Still, they acted as the police. We did not entirely rely on POL DER in our activities.⁹³

This last quote aptly summarizes a central theme of this chapter. Whereas the making of socialist hegemony presented a crisis dynamic within the institutional materiality of the police, it had its limits conditioned in the broader historical context of the class character of the bourgeois police project.

⁹³ Interview with K. A. (August 1, 2016; Kızılay-Çankaya, Ankara).

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

THE SILENCED PAST, DISPOSSESSED PRESENT

The narco police have employed an incredible tactic to bring a drug gang down in Çiçin and Hıdırlıktepe, which are known as crime-ridden neighbourhoods in [Altındağ,] Ankara. A movie set was built up in Ankara Citadel, which has a top view over the neighbourhoods, with the cover of 'shooting a documentary film'. The inhabitants got to know the police chief as director, and the policemen as the crew for three months. Shooting hundreds of scenes of drug dealing in the neighbourhoods, the police have brought the gang down (*Hürriyet*, December 30, 2010).

The "narcotic film" shot by the Ankara police in December 2010 seems to present an extraordinarily imaginative strategy of "crime fighting" in Altındağ. Fabricating a film set as part of a broader strategy of "pro-active policing", the Ankara police mobilized an extensive surveillance apparatus that put Jeremy Bentham's panopticon to shame. As the reader learns from the news report, a major police raid was undertaken by heavy-armed special operation teams against the drug gang on the basis of "the evidentiary scenes" gathered through the shooting of this bogus documentary. This story comes to an end with the arrest of twenty four people alongside the ringleader of the drug gang.

Notwithstanding its extraordinary character, this incident is not exceptional but reflects a striking example of the extensive repertoire of policing strategies formulated during the neoliberal transformation of the country. Similar police operations undertaken in age-old *gecekondu* neighbourhoods have become a routine practice in the last two decades. These operations are characterized by the involvement of special operations teams with police helicopters and armoured vehicles, reflecting the paramilitary and professionally reorganized

nature of the Turkish police. The spectacle of power and violence performed through such operations has received widespread media coverage broadcasting of each and every detail of the police raids. The dominant discourse embraced by the police as well as mainstream media tends to depict *gecekondu* neighbourhoods as “dangerous places” that pose constant threats to public order and security because of such problems of drug dealing, everyday violence, organized crime, and even “terrorism”.

Conditioned by the ever-deepening urban contradictions of Turkey’s integration into the neoliberal world order, these incidents are reflective of the transformed nature of the police in terms of the political power they exercise and their association with the subordinate classes. The police have assumed a central role in the making of the neoliberal authoritarian statism in the post-1980 period. An increasingly militant working class movement was pacified by a violent coup on September 12, 1980 with the coercive intervention of the Turkish army acting as the “*de facto* political party” of the bourgeoisie (Öngen 2002). Embarking upon a radical neoliberal project both in the mode of integration of the Turkish economy into the capitalist world system, and in the relation between state and society (Bedirhanoğlu & Yalman 2010, p. 111), the military coup and subsequent hegemonic struggles on the part of the ruling classes have been mainly concerned with “putting an end to class-based politics” in the country (Yalman 2009, p. 308).

The making of neoliberal authoritarianism has assumed an urban form with the mass-scale commodification of the city, gentrification, and associated dynamics of socio-spatial segregation. In the process, the *gecekondu* neighbourhoods have become the main object of neoliberal urban renewal projects largely engineered by TOKİ (*Toplu Konut İdaresi Başkanlığı*,

Mass Housing Administration). Framed as part of the neoliberal politics of crime and policing, these urban projects have increasingly normalized the criminalization and marginalization of the urban poor. Turkey has embraced the ideological and political paradigm of “revanchist urbanism” (see Smith 2001; Gündoğdu & Gough 2009) and its associated neoliberal strategy of “zero tolerance policing” (see Gönen 2016; Gönen & Yonucu 2011). As a result, the criminalization of urban poverty has become a core feature of the neoliberal politics of police reform in the country.

Instigated through *ad hoc* strategies in the 1990s, neoliberal police reform has become the single most important political innovation engineered during the rule of AKP (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, Justice and Development Party) since the early 2000s (See Bedirhanoglu, Dölek & Hülagü 2015; Berksoy 2010; Dölek & Rigakos 2018; Hülagü 2017; Gönen 2016; Gönen & Yonucu 2011). Large-scale police interventions into the *gecekondu* neighbourhoods using militarised means have accompanied the displacement of the urban poor. This violent strategy has been systematically implemented in almost all the poor neighbourhoods, such as Gazi, Gülsuyu, and Zeytinburnu in İstanbul, Kadifekale and Narlıdere in İzmir, and Altındağ in Ankara. In the case of Altındağ, for instance, it was ironic to observe that after the destruction of the age-old *gecekondu* neighbourhoods in the Çiğir area, middle-class urban professionals were deployed as new residents of the region. Signifying the final conquest of police power in the neighbourhood, the news headlines read: “three hundred police officers with their families” have begun living in the region on the heels of urban renewal projects. The reporting on this settlement was even more striking: “They [the police] have settled in the neighbourhood where they had not been able to enter” for decades (*Ntv.com*, September 27, 2011). The

neoliberal politics of crime and policing, therefore, have been quite instrumental in the displacement of the urban poor, and spatial re-structuring of class relations in the country. We can thus contend that neoliberal urbanism has involved a major police project.

1. Against the silenced past

Articulating the past historically does not mean recognizing it "the way it really was". It means appropriating a memory as it flashes up in a moment of danger. Historical materialism wishes to hold fast that image of the past which unexpectedly appears to the historical subject in a moment of danger. The danger threatens both the content of the tradition and those who inherit it. For both, it is one and the same thing: the danger of becoming a tool of the ruling classes. Every age must strive anew to wrest tradition away from the conformism that is working to overpower it. The Messiah comes not only as the redeemer; he comes as the victor over the Antichrist. The only historian capable of fanning the spark of hope in the past is the one who is firmly convinced that even the dead will not be safe from the enemy if he is victorious. And this enemy has never ceased to be victorious (Benjamin 2003, p. 391).

This thesis has mainly concerned itself with providing a radical critique of capitalist modernity in Ankara. I have developed this critique on the basis of a dialectical exploration of the social history of the police in Altındağ – the historical social space of the marginalized sectors of the Ankara working classes. This critique, however, does not represent a narrative on the past as it really was. As Benjamin notes in the quote above, "to articulate the past historically" is an indispensably political endeavour concerned with seizing "hold of a memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger". It is this "moment of danger" and the political possibility of "fanning the spark of hope in the past" that this thesis has been concerned with, and tried to make sense of. As the neoliberal experience of social marginalization both in Altındağ and other *gecekondü* neighbourhoods reveals, "even the dead" are not safe from "the enemy". As one of my respondents from Altındağ described during field encounters, the

emergency situation is *the rule* in the lives of the dispossessed. Elaborating on the state of emergency declared after the coup attempt on July 15, 2016 in Turkey, the respondent makes the following assessment recalling the historical memory of the region: “Altındağ has always experienced emergency rule. Now, it is time for Ankara to live through it.”⁹⁴

“The moment of danger” was actualized during the Gezi resistance in June 2013. With its dazzling multitude taking to the streets against the neoliberal-cum-Islamic authoritarian regime of the AKP, Gezi was peculiar in Ankara with the subversive participation of “300 Ankara boys”, a name ascribed to marginalized youth from Altındağ – a label inspired by the resistance of 300 Spartans during the war against the Persian invasion (Durak 2013). The “300 Ankara boys” were at the forefront of the barricades alongside revolutionary cadres from socialist organizations. This collaboration was decisive not only in challenging police strategies on the ground, but also *teaching* the anxious multitude the spontaneous manoeuvres of barricade building, dealing with tear gas bombings, self-defence, and many more tactics. Despite its seeming suppression through a decades-long process of marginalization, the moral economy of popular illegality seemed to flare up once again, expressing its subversive potential inherited from revolutionary catharsis, as “the spark of hope”.

The Altındağ experience seems today generalized to all the *gecekond* neighbourhoods as they undergo ever-deepening processes of marginalization. It is important, therefore, to articulate the past historically in a Benjaminian sense, to better understand the present. Narrating the historical marginalization of the Black poor in the American *ghettos*, *Menace II*

⁹⁴ Personal conversations with U. (Summer 2016; various localities in Ankara).

Society, a 'hood drama film by Allen and Albert Hughes (1993), starts with scenes from the urban riots of the 1960s, and offers the prologue: "When the riots stopped, the drugs started." Embarking upon a violent pacification project during the Nixon administration, the American police developed new strategies against the radicalized mobilization of the 'hoods, which produced a subversive political challenge with the organization of the Black Panthers. What would come to be known as the "war on drugs" in the 1980s was being formulated during this crisis period as a policing strategy to counter the organized power of the dispossessed. Articulated into a global paradigm of neoliberal police reform in the 1990s, the "war on drugs" became instrumental for the depoliticization of urban social problems and contradictions, subjecting marginalized populations to increasingly para-militarized police power.

As a close NATO ally since the early 1950s, Turkey has been incorporated into this neoliberal policing paradigm since the late 1990s. This has been evident especially during the time of AKP, when an assertive and comprehensive police reform was undertaken in line with the global paradigms of "zero-tolerance policing", "preventive and pro-active policing", and the criminalization of street crime, etc. (see Hülügü 2017; Gönen 2016; Gönen and Yonucu 2011; Yonucu 2008; 2013). The Altındağ region, with its historically marginalized social space, has represented a stereotypical presentation of a Black ghetto to the Turkish police. Not surprisingly, it has been through the historical pacification and marginalization of the Black ghetto that American policing has been restructured, fine-tuned, and legitimated its violent

involvement in the lives of the dispossessed.⁹⁵ In the Turkish case, the Alevi and Kurdish populated neighbourhoods in Istanbul, for instance, have been the main point of reference for the Turkish police to strategize tactics and formulate long-term policies concerning organizational restructuring as well as legal, political, and fiscal empowerment (See Yonucu 2013; 2018a; 2018b).

Altındağ has been strategically central for the Ankara police, both in the past as well as the present. On the basis of our historical analysis, we can contend that the police determined their policies on spatial and political grounds with a strategic response to the real or perceived dangers emanating from the region. As we have analyzed in chapters IV, V, and VI, different challenges arose from the region triggering divergent state responses within an extensive repertoire of policing strategies. The culmination of these strategies has been decisive for the crystallization of police power on the margin. For instance, as we have empirically sketched in chapters IV and V, the political geography of policing in Turkey's national capital was organized in response to the social geography of pilferage undertaken as a practice of subaltern appropriation since the early Republican period. This historical legacy, I contend, still informs the contemporary political geography of policing in Ankara. As one of my respondents stated during the field encounters: "Altındağ is a training bay/field for the Ankara police. They employ the young, newly-recruited officers during large-scale operations to develop experience. It is only after this period of training that they can begin their patrols in other parts of the city".⁹⁶

⁹⁵ Christian Parenti (1999) provides a rigorous historical survey of the restructuring of the American police as a strategic response to the Black resistance in the early 1970s, and demonstrates how this has gradually become a dominant paradigm of policing in the subsequent decades.

⁹⁶ Personal conversations with A. (Summer 2016; Yenidoğan-Altındağ, Ankara).

A historically normalized emergency rule in Altındağ has been politically productive for the making of police power, and for fabricating the urban order in line with transforming social relations of power.

2. Revisiting the historical narrative

This thesis has developed a comprehensive historical analysis of the making of the Altındağ *gecekond* region revealing the complex contestations characterizing the urban margin of the national capital. On the basis of a critical exploration of the social history of the police, I have engaged in a dialectical historical analysis of police power, with the following fundamental argument in mind: a *critique of police power* provides us with a significant political and theoretical medium through which a *radical critique of capitalist modernity from below* might be articulated. Grounded in an historical materialist perspective, the thesis has attempted to highlight moments of danger they flashed up during the contested capitalist urbanization of Ankara. The articulation of these moments provides us with a dynamic perspective that acknowledges the historical agency of subordinate classes in the formation and contestation of capitalist modernity.

Grounded in multi-method fieldwork focusing on the case of the Altındağ *gecekond* neighbourhoods, I have offered a tripartite analytical framework for a radical critique of police power in relation to subordinate classes. Police power is historically constituted and transformed in the context of *three distinct forms of struggle* that reflect the fundamental concerns haunting modern police in the political administration of capitalist modernity: 1) struggles over urban space, 2) struggles over subsistence, and 3) struggles over a moral order.

Representing *social practices that mediate the materialization of police power*, these three forms of struggle have played prominently in defining policing institutionally. The materiality of police power is historically conditioned through the dialectical articulation of the tripartite struggle over urban space, subsistence, and moral regulation.

A dialectical social history of the police, therefore, reveals the making of three distinct layers of power that have conditioned the making of the urban margin in Ankara: 1) the formal-legal power of the state, 2) the illicit power of *kabadayıs*, 3) the collective-subversive power of the revolutionaries. The first layer of power has been the dominant one in delineating spatial boundaries in accordance with a particular moral order in line with the fabrication of a Republican citizenry. The dialectical counter-part of this project was the pacification of the Altındağ labouring classes in the service of fabricating a modern workforce and “civilized” urban life. The police were part of a neo-mercantilist project of state-making, nation-building, and the fabrication of a national economy. Historically incorporated into modern police science through a long period of Ottoman reformation, the Republican police assumed an extended role in municipal affairs adopting a hierarchical chain of command controlled by the Ministry of Interior. As we have analyzed in Chapter IV, this police role was mobilized into an all-encompassing project concerned with each and every detail of the urban social life, including sanitary regulation, urban planning, education, public order, and “crime fighting”. The central political strategy that organized these seemingly diverse spheres through police power was the fabrication of the wage form as the only means of subsistence in the city. This inevitably meant that the Republican police engaged in an everyday battle against non-wage forms of subsistence undertaken by the Altındağ poor since the early Republic.

It was a phantasmagorical project, however, whose limits were defined by the social reality of class. This form of power was politically counter-productive because of the impossible project of ensuring bourgeois social order based on a politics of denial of the class question. The illicit layer of *kabadayis* took root as a simultaneous project on the margin, and put its social and political imprints in the 1950s and 1960s. Whereas this illicit power was instrumental for the politics of bourgeois order at the time, it was an important component for making popular illegality an alternative moral order on the margin. The historical marginalization of the Altındağ poor, therefore, has been the dialectical repercussion of a complex and contradictory interplay between these two forms of power, and their associated layers of spatial organization.

This was also a period of a transformation of the institutional materiality of the police. With the coming of Cold War dynamics and Turkey's integration into the Western Bloc, and the populist political atmosphere of the multi-party era, the extended reach of the police began to receive a fierce liberal critique especially from the Democrats. In 1949 a more limited and liberal political and legal framework was imposed on the police. In this way, the police and municipal affairs were dissolved and organized under different institutional structures. For the purposes of the thesis, what was most important to note here is that this institutional restructuring reflected the consolidation of the wage form and bourgeois hegemony in everyday life. Based on a liberal discourse of a limited conception of the police, this separation was made possible only through the pacification of the social crime practices by the Altındağ poor. By glossing over the social relations of dispossession and exploitation, this redefinition

was instrumental in delineating the boundaries of criminality and poverty, and caging police power into an ideological shell determined by liberal conceptions of law, order, and crime.

Whereas this shift was part of a general phenomenon in the country, the historical peculiarity of Altındağ was decisive in everyday formations of the police. As our analysis has revealed in Chapter V, police power was organically linked to *the illicit layer of kabadayı power* that put its much contradictory social, economic and cultural imprints on the trajectory of capitalist urbanization in Ankara in the 1950s and 1960s. That is, the spatial form assumed by police power was conditioned in the context of the formation of an illicit network of urban plunder with the contradictory social roles assumed by *kabadayıs*. Whereas policing in the city was organized in and through the social power of *kabadayıs*, these two layers were mutually enforcing. This is because the latter did not pose a substantial threat to the politics of bourgeois order, while it dialectically resulted in the marginalization of the Altındağ poor. Popular illegality, therefore, increasingly characterized an alternative moral order representing a dialectical outcome of subaltern contestations of the bourgeois order.

At this point, we need to note one of the original contributions of this thesis research to our understanding of the making of capitalist modernity in Turkey. Contrary to the general tendency to dismiss the police question from the scholarly agendas in the vast *gecekondu* literature, this thesis has intended to read *the history of gecekondu as a social history of the police*. Such a perspective enables us to conceive the historically indispensable and irreducible role assumed by the police in the formations and the contestations of the *gecekondu* phenomenon, as one of the core issues that have haunted the making of urban modernity in Turkey. In light of my historical case study, I contend that it was only in and through the

consolidation of police power that the once spontaneous and makeshift character of *gecekond* settlements became integrated into the existing order, though with much contradictory forms. The manner of Altındağ's integration was characterized by the deep-rooted social and spatial trajectory of marginalization and segregation, which were both the product of and the constitutive element in the making of the Republican police in Turkey's national capital. It is, therefore, that the phenomenon of *gecekond*, with its spatial, social, and cultural dynamics, is an organic component of the making of capitalist modernity through police power.

Grounded in this interdependent history, therefore, this thesis has revealed the complex social and political processes through which the wage form has been consolidated through policing. Problematizing the "historic dialectic" between forms of capitalist exploitation and criminal activity, this thesis has pointed out that the historical pacification of subaltern practices of appropriation has been decisive in the consolidation of bourgeois hegemony and the regime of private property in the city. This is why the political geography of policing in Ankara has been organized as a strategic response to the social geography of pilferage from the 1940s to the 1970s -- a phenomenon that reflected the crystallization of the socio-spatial segregation in the city. Thus, this thesis has revealed the historically contested matrix of police-class-urban space which is reflective of the significance of a dialectical social analysis. Without reproducing the methodological and theoretical fallacies of an instrumentalist account, we can develop a relational class analysis of the police question in the context of its historical contestations, and the specific social, political and spatial forms they assume.

An analysis of *the collective-subversive power of the revolutionaries* as the third layer of power has provided a politically significant opportunity to understand the historical potentials and impasses of the association between popular illegality and radical politics. As we have analyzed in Chapter VI, the cathartic moment of danger presented by revolutionary praxis represented a complex articulation of the pre-existing layers of power with a quest for their *sublation*. Notwithstanding their short-lived hegemony, socialist organizations embarked upon a project that produced a real state of emergency in a Benjaminian sense. They “rang an alarm bell” of history for the historically marginalized. The irreducible significance and longevity of such an attempt has been revealed in the post-1980 period of neoliberal transformation.

Given the ever-deepening processes of social marginalization in an age of “advanced marginality” (Wacquant 2008), critical scholars concerned with progressive social change need to develop our understanding of the complex interplay between social marginality and radical politics. From the Baltimore uprising to Arab Spring, from Ankara’s “300 Spartans” to the marginalized poor of Brazilian *favelas*, it has increasingly been the case that the dispossessed masses, who have also been subjected to various processes of marginalization, have engaged in contentious politics in quite diverse and complex forms. This haunts the radical political imagination in the midst of the deepening crisis of global capitalism. We need to go beyond the dichotomous and unproductive debates on the revolutionary potential of lumpenproletariat with a quest to make deeper sense of the fact that the phenomenon of marginalization has historically been a central component of proletarian living. Accordingly, we need to deepen our political and historical imagination on the rather complex ways through

which the marginalized sectors of the proletariat engage in contentious politics in different socio-political contexts.

Closely related to this point, we need to sharpen our analytical understandings and political perspectives concerning the issues of communal self-defence, and associated forms of popular “policing”. With its dialectical engagement with issues of policing, crime and the making of urban order, this thesis has tried to read the question of “security” as a *class relation*. That is, as the subaltern demands for “public security” imply, and the historical quests for alternative and collective “defence” projects expose, the subordinate classes have always searched for ways to counter the structures of violence in proletarian living. The historical figure of *kabadayi* enjoyed considerable social agency in the lives of the dispossessed precisely because they presented a form of alternative order and security. To avoid a romanticized reading of this role, however, we need to emphasize its social dynamics while engaging in a critique of its deeply contradictory nature. Even more importantly, therefore, the experience of revolutionary praxis, including “resistance committees”, is quite telling about the historical potentials for radicalizing proletarian demands for “collective self defence” or “communal security”.

Given the increasingly dominant wave of conservative authoritarianism, or even “the return of fascism in contemporary capitalism” (Amin 2014), such political and theoretical questions seem to be even more compelling. The critique of police power, therefore, should be compounded with a radical political agenda of exploring alternatives to the modern paradigm of policing to conceive how different communities and groups have sought alternatives (cf. Fernandez & Huey 2011). Given the historical experiences of social

marginalization, and contemporary up-and-downs of political discontent, the once popular quest for formulating a “socialist criminology” within critical circles seem to be a necessary but insufficient scholarly and political project. I believe that for such an endeavour, we need to deepen our historical and political imagination on the basis of a critical exploration of the tradition of the oppressed with a quest for seizing hold of a memory as it flashes up at moments of danger. If the history of the oppressed teaches us that the emergency situation is not the exception but the rule, it also provides a fertile terrain for feeding the subversive political imagination. This might well help us conceive the silenced but historically decisive struggles for alternative organization of security and order as fundamental dimensions of class relations. The historical experience of *La Commune de Paris*, and the proletarian defence of a collective social life behind barricades, represents not a mere historical point of reference, but an actual potential to be realized.

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