

**MULTICULTURALISM IN WESTERN EUROPE:
FROM IMPLEMENTATION TO FAILURE**

by

KONSTANTIN MANYAKIN

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Public Affairs in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

in

European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (EURUS)

**Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario**

**© 2015
Konstantin Manyakin**

To all my EURUS professors – thank you so much for all your help and for everything you taught me!

Especially, I express a big gratitude to my supervisor – it was wonderful to be your student and colleague. All achievements bring new goals and all failures show good lessons.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract.....	5
Introduction.....	6
Chapter 1: The Beginning of the Non-EU Migration and the Multiculturalist era.....	13
What is multiculturalism?.....	13
Why multiculturalism was adopted?.....	16
Do these countries practice multiculturalism?.....	19
<i>United Kingdom.....</i>	<i>19</i>
<i>France.....</i>	<i>21</i>
<i>Belgium.....</i>	<i>25</i>
The socio-economic context for the emergence of Multicultural Policies.....	28
Conclusion.....	34
Chapter 2: Ghettoization and Implementation of Anti-Discrimination Policies.....	36
How immigrant ghettos were formed and why social conditions were harmful?.....	36
Anti-discrimination policies.....	42
<i>United Kingdom.....</i>	<i>42</i>
<i>France.....</i>	<i>46</i>
<i>Belgium.....</i>	<i>50</i>
Conclusion.....	54
Chapter 3: Towards Integration or Alienation?.....	56
Multiculturalist policy – How is it shaped by economy?.....	57
Multinationalism and Transnationalism.....	62
Residential Segregation.....	68
Cultural Segregation.....	70
Is multiculturalism west-centric?.....	74
Conclusion.....	76
Chapter 4: Results of Integration.....	78
United Kingdom.....	79
<i>Social and political mobilization within the UK.....</i>	<i>80</i>
<i>Acceptance by White British.....</i>	<i>83</i>

<i>Education, employment and wage</i>	86
<i>Conclusion</i>	88
France.....	89
<i>Education</i>	91
<i>Employment</i>	95
<i>Women of non-EU origin</i>	98
<i>Conclusion</i>	101
Belgium.....	102
<i>Health and Mortality Risks</i>	103
<i>Co-habiting with natives (PART 1) - Moving to other areas of habitan</i> ce.....	105
<i>Co-habiting with natives (PART 2) - Intermarrying with the native population</i>	108
<i>Who gets better results – educated or participative?</i>	110
<i>Conclusion</i>	112
Conclusion.....	112
Chapter 5: Abolition of Multiculturalism	115
Is multiculturalism changing or retreating?.....	116
European Fiscal Compact and austerity measures in the UK.....	120
Tightening immigration and integration policies.....	123
<i>United Kingdom</i>	123
<i>France</i>	129
<i>Belgium</i>	131
Acceptance by native societies.....	133
Conclusion.....	139
Conclusion	141
Bibliography	143
<u>Primary Sources</u>	143
<u>Secondary Sources</u>	154

LIST OF TABLES

<i>Table 1</i>	28
----------------------	----

ABSTRACT

The thesis is focused on the implementation of multiculturalist policies in Europe in the second half of the 20th century until the present period. It takes as its starting point statements by prominent European politicians that multiculturalism has failed and seeks to explain why these statements were made and what their implications are for immigrants to Europe from non-EU countries and their descendants, with a particular focus on the United Kingdom, French Republic and the Kingdom of Belgium. The thesis includes examination of both qualitative and quantitative data about how civilians of non-EU origin were integrated in these three countries, each of which applied a differing approach to integration. The thesis first addresses how and why non-EU migrants moved to and settled in Western Europe. Then it examines how and to what extent these Western European governments implemented multiculturalist policies, including analysis of obstacles to their success and examination of available empirical evidence on outcomes for these groups. Finally, the study asks whether declarations about the failure of multiculturalism were followed by a toughening of policies that affect immigrants and their descendants. Findings of the study support the original hypothesis that multicultural societies were not properly established in these countries and that the policies resulted in keeping minority communities segregated from mainstream populations. The study finds similar outcomes in all three countries, despite their somewhat differing integration approaches, and supports the hypothesis that declarations about the 'failure of multiculturalism' served primarily to justify the fact that migrants from non-EU countries (especially the unskilled ones) and their descendants could not be integrated under current social conditions.

Keywords: non-EU immigrants; non-EU origin; multiculturalist policies; integration

INTRODUCTION

Multiculturalism has appeared to be one of the most obvious socio-political phenomena practiced across the Western world from the beginning of the 1970s. Initially implemented by then-Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau in Canada, multicultural advocacy quickly increased in popularity, and was eventually implemented by some European nations from the 1970s through the 1990s. Today, most European nations are considered to be multicultural societies not only because of demographics but due to the fact that they practice multiculturalist policies that embrace ethnic, racial, and religious diversity and encourage tolerance between cultures of both native and foreign origins. The main catalyst of multicultural policy and social practice in Western European nations was the massive immigration of people from different religious, ethnic, and racial identities mainly from the third world countries (non-EU states), known simply as people of non-EU origin or simply Third Country Nationals (TCNs).

It was impossible to assimilate all the immigrants, most of whom were unfamiliar with Western culture and values. Many immigrants were also uneducated and too poor to adapt into the societies of the First World. Therefore, multicultural policies were thought to create an easier avenue for non-white foreigners to settle in Western states and adapt to life and to work without facing racism, prejudice, and discrimination. Today, many praise this multicultural doctrine as an excellent means of achieving equality and tolerance for people of different cultural backgrounds who peacefully adopt the values of their Western European host nations. However, multicultural advocacy still remains a controversial topic even among traditional left-wing Marxists who blame this policy for establishing *de-facto* 'apartheid' systems within European cities. Similarly, many right-wing conservatives and racist far-right movements blame multicultural doctrine for destroying the traditional cultures of European nations and for Islamist attacks such as the Charlie Hebdo massacre in France on January 7th, 2015 and the London

terrorist attacks on July 7th, 2005. Despite the contradictory political orientations of right wing and left wing critics, there are usually five themes which arise in discussions of multiculturalism on both sides. The first is the clash between cultures, second is ethnic diversity and national identity, third is the socioeconomic position of immigrants with high unemployment and high welfare dependence, fourth are policies of immigration which are additional factors for the failure of integration, and fifth is debate on the nature of public discourse, which can breed controversy and demonize opponents (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010, p.12).

This thesis explores several questions related to the practice of multicultural advocacy in Western Europe. The first is whether or not these countries have engaged in multicultural policies and, if so, in what ways? Second is the question of whether or not extant multicultural policies aided non-EU immigrants and their descendants to better integrate to the societies of their host nations over time? Third is the question of whether or not there has been a rise in anti-multiculturalism and toughened immigration policies after European officials such as Belgian Prime Minister Yves Leterme, British Prime Minister David Cameron, and French President Nicolas Sarkozy declared multiculturalism to be a failure. Fourth is, what exactly are the policy implications? This paper hypothesizes that multicultural societies were not properly established and, instead, the policies of supporting multiculturalism resulted in keeping minority communities segregated from mainstream populations, similarly to apartheid. A second hypothesis that the declaration of the 'failure of multiculturalism' by several European politicians is nothing more than a justification that Third Country migrants (especially the unskilled ones) and their descendants cannot be integrated under current social conditions. On the other hand, regardless of the fact that foreign communities were recognized by local authorities under the influence of multicultural policy, native societies did not actually become more tolerant or less discriminatory toward the Third Country Nationals. In addition, most of these non-EU migrants remained in poorer

conditions, unadapted, and remained an easier target of tough socio-economic policies implemented in recent years.

Especially since the global recession hit in the late 2000s many Western European politicians, including David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy, have called for the revival of national identities as well as toughened integration and immigration policies (*Newstatesman*, 2011). While some analysts, such as Banting and Kymlicka, argue that talk about the retreat from multiculturalism has been mainly rhetorical and has generally not been reflected in actual policy changes in that direction, evidence in this thesis suggests another interpretation. While these indicators are at this point still inconclusive, they present strong warnings that multiculturalism policies could be under threat, with unknown future consequences, especially for immigrants (and their descendants) from non-EU countries.

The three countries which this thesis addresses are Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom. The primary reason why this paper explores cases specifically within those countries is that historically all of these states have experienced a large influx of non-EU migrants. In recent years, these Western European nations have included a large number of individuals and communities belonging to non-white minorities that were established there at the end of the 1940s and within the 1950s. Second, each state practices its own model of accepting and integrating new immigrants. Finally, leaders of these countries were openly criticizing multiculturalism in their nation states and opened the remarks about restricting both integration and immigration policies.

It is important to define the meaning of the term ‘multiculturalism’ as used in this thesis: “The term ‘multicultural’ has come to define a society that is particularly diverse, usually as a result of immigration. It has also come to define the policies necessary to manage such a society” (Malik, 2006). The three countries that this thesis focuses on are all characterized by a degree of diversity that warrants their classification as multicultural societies. More difficult is the question of whether they have pursued multicultural policies. However, the paper argues that, in one way or another, all three

countries have practiced multiculturalist policies regardless of the fact that its model varies state by state within the European Union. Their social models embrace tolerance, or at least prevention of discrimination, in relation to the different cultures and religions of these minorities by helping non-EU migrants to adapt into their new countries of habitation. Finally, leaders of these nations have declared 'multiculturalism a failure'. This declaration was made first by then Belgian Prime Minister Yves Leterme in November of 2010 (*LeVif*, 2010), followed by British Prime Minister David Cameron in January of 2011 (*Newstatesman*, 2011) and the following month, by then-President of the French Republic, Nicolas Sarkozy (Freour, 2011). Despite the fact that the first European leader to declare the failure in own country was German Chancellor Angela Merkel in October 2010 (Smee, 2010) and that Netherlands also repeated the same statement in 2011 (*Government of the Netherlands*, 2011), this MA thesis does not cover multiculturalism in Germany and Holland. The research scope is limited to three countries and without a personal knowledge of Dutch and German languages, the paper does not investigate the case in both of these other countries.

The United Kingdom is undoubtedly a nation that embraces 'hard multiculturalism'—a form of multiculturalism that openly recognizes all sorts of identities - ethnic, racial, or religious. In comparison with other EU countries, perhaps UK contains the most diverse population of the whole European continent, and includes numerous ethnic and religious groups who originated from various sets of countries (mainly from Africa, the Caribbean Basin and the South Asian region) and religions (mainly Christianity, Hinduism, and Islam). Furthermore, along with non-British whites, they make up approximately 1/5 of the population in the country and even compose the majority in cities such as the capital, London. According to 2011 Census, only 44.9% of Londoners are white British while non-whites make up 40.2% and other whites compose 12.6% of city's population (*Office for National Statistics*, 2012).

The Kingdom of Belgium is a very distinctive example as it is a state divided into many semi-

independent divisions (municipalities, regions, and provinces), with levels and type of multiculturalist and immigration policies that vary area by area. Nevertheless, for the Belgian case, this paper concentrates on conditions of immigrants and their descendants, and consequences of multiculturalist policies in the Brussels Capital Region. Brussels strictly follows the Belgian federal model of openly promoting universalism, tolerance, and diversity toward groups of any background. Second of all, while walking in the streets of the city, it is evident that large numbers of Congolese, Moroccan, and Turkish people along with white Belgians of foreign origin (mainly of Italian descent) makes local authorities recognize the capital as naturally multicultural.

In contrast, the French Republic continues to practice a republican and secular social model based on the assimilation of foreign born individuals into the customs and values of mainstream society. This practice violates the practice of multiculturalist policies that encourage recognition of specific groups. Nevertheless, it eventually adapted some of its criteria by softening its assimilationist approach toward the individuals who are non-white or from a non-Roman Catholic background by recognizing their distinctiveness from the traditional French people of Germanic, Celtic, and Latin descent. Regardless of the fact that the French Republic rejects any forms of social segregation labelled as “communitarianism” to respect its colourblind tradition of equality between French civilians, most of the large towns in the country include isolated 'Muslim ghettos'. These districts are almost exclusively composed of individuals of Arab or Berber Maghrebi origins and of Sub-Saharan descent who live in poorer conditions than the native population. Their isolation and segregation make mainstream society and some politicians like Front National's Marine Le Pen believe that there is an 'Islam in France' instead of 'Islam of France'. They believe this is a result of the fact that anti-discrimination laws failed to make Muslims of foreign origin and their descendants become more French.

The first chapter examines how the massive migration of Third Country Nationals began in Europe, explains what exactly multiculturalism is, what its ultimate goal is, and whether or not its policies were

actually implemented in Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom. In addition, the chapter explains the multiculturalist policies of each country and reviews the historical background of non-white immigration into Western Europe and outlines the reasons why non-European migrants were permitted to live and work there. Also, the chapter argues the fact that, without migration from outside of Europe and/or discrimination toward and exploitation of people of different skin colour, there would be no reason to implement multiculturalism.

The second chapter summarizes the socio-economic conditions and racial discrimination that led to the formation of immigrant ghettos and examines why policies of multiculturalism did not work properly to ease these conditions when large scale migration began. Later on, the chapter addresses what immigration and integrationist policies were implemented in each country since the 1960s to help foreigners and the next generation to adapt into their host societies and avoid discrimination and racism from the mainstream. At the same time, the chapter examines critiques of these laws on the basis of their being overdue, unhelpful, and fundamentally against the interests of Third Country Nationals. Finally, the chapter suggests another logical approach that explains the factors behind inevitable long-term segregation that continues in these countries today.

The third chapter presents arguments about general social, political, cultural, and economic factors that policies of multiculturalism have ignored. The chapter explains how this improperly implemented policy encouraged people of non-EU descent to become more alienated and unwilling to integrate into mainstream Western European society. The chapter will also reflect on how international issues such as the economic crisis have pushed heads of state to abandon the idea of multiculturalism.

To provide empirical evidence to assess the hypothesis, the fourth chapter explores current economic, education, health, and other social conditions of non-EU nationals and their descendants living in these three different countries. This chapter includes a comparative analysis of the performance between different ethnic groups and generations. The chapter demonstrates the distinctive

performance for each country. This evidence examined supports the conclusion that civilians of non-EU origin continue to live in worse and more segregated conditions than the mainstream and the EU populations in Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom.

Although some scholars disagree that there is a retreat from multiculturalism, their academic works of research projects, such as Multiculturalism Policy Index at Queen's University, mainly focus on integration policies and conditions of the non-EU diasporas only until 2010 (Queen's University, 2015). In comparison, the fifth chapter explores ongoing immigration and social policy changes that are currently being implemented by the governments of Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom, since speeches by the heads of state of each country that declared the failure of multiculturalism. The chapter examines whether or not new legislation and policies create increasingly difficult conditions for non-EU immigrants and their descendants seeking to integrate into mainstream society, and why these ongoing policies may in fact be reflect high levels of intolerance and a deviation from past multicultural approaches.

Finally, through this system of analysis, this paper attempts to provide an explanation as to why non-EU diasporas (excluding refugees) faced a serious problem of isolation upon settling in Western Europe, and why multiculturalist policies failed to mediate this issue. An examination of the factors behind the failure of multiculturalism, which was followed by the tightening of policies in the three selected countries, reveals why civilians of non-EU origin generally did not, do not, and likely will not achieve a standard of living equal to their native counterparts.

CHAPTER 1: THE BEGINNING OF THE NON-EU MIGRATION and THE MULTICULTURALIST ERA

This chapter explains the concept of multiculturalist policies. Furthermore, it discusses how and why the selected Western European nations began to experience the influx of Third Country Nationals after World War II and whether or not each nation practices policies that embrace cultural diversity. Previously, however, this chapter explains why the immigrants were allowed to come into these countries and why they would inevitably face difficult and discriminatory conditions, which multiculturalist policies were supposed to deal with. Furthermore, each country has differing degrees of actual multiculturalist policies.

WHAT IS MULTICULTURALISM?

Before giving a clear answer as to whether all three selected states—UK, France, and Belgium—practice policies of multiculturalism, it is mandatory to define what exactly this sort of integrationist system is. Multiculturalism “embodies, in other words, both a *description* of the lived experience of diversity and a *prescription* for the management of such diversity” (Malik, 2006). It requires public recognition of cultural beliefs, including the ones that appear to be very distinctive, “among foreign individuals to be treated as equally valid, and that all of them should be institutionalized in the public sphere” (Malik, 2006).

Many argue that a multiculturalist policy is beneficial as it “leads to better integration of migrant communities because acceptance and tolerance of new cultural elements by a national society population would enhance the sharing of values and the social and economic participation of all people” (Groenewold, G. *et al*, 2013, p.2129). Furthermore, it is believed that multiculturalism fulfills one of the main aspects of civic integration to help immigrants integrate more fully into the mainstream of society: “anti-discrimination laws and policies that are essential to better integration” (Banting and Kymlicka, 2013, p.587). It is considered that “more liberal and voluntary approaches to civic integration can be combined with a multicultural approach to form a potentially stable policy

equilibrium” regardless of its limits (Banting and Kymlicka, 2013, p.579). Otherwise, according to Kymlicka and Banting, illiberal versions of civic integration would not be “compatible with any meaningful conception of multicultural support for diversity” (Banting and Kymlicka, 2013, p.593). Thus, multiculturalism gives political concern to a respect for identities that are important to people, arguing that they should not be disregarded in the name of integration of citizenship. Such policies create a conflict between ‘us and them’, resulting in members of the minority groups uniting together to achieve more rights because of their sense of difference. Isajiw also argues that a truly successful multicultural approach should be compatible with guaranteeing equality between all individuals and classes that inhabit the country, no matter their origin (Isajiw, 1997, p.21). First, an individual who participates within the community of his/her minority group must be guaranteed any sort of support including moral and emotional. Second, he/she must have a sense of group solidarity that guarantees an activity for equal rights. Third, the culture of an individual must be recognized and accepted by mainstream society (Isajiw, 1991, p.22). Maleiha Malik also adds that one of the methods of effective multiculturalism should be based on financial redistribution to immigrant communities (Malik, 2010, p.32).

To define whether a specific country does or does not practice such policies, it is important to define its fundamental principles. Will Kymlicka states that multicultural policy and/or multicultural citizenship includes a combination of **eight criteria**. First is constitutional, legislative, or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism at the central and/or regional and municipal level. The second is the adoption of multiculturalism in school curricula. Third is the inclusion of ethnic representation/sensitivity in the mandate of public media. Fourth, is exemption from dress codes that allows young pupils belonging to religious minorities to wear symbols of their faith such as Muslim veils or Sikh turbans at school. Fifth is easing rules of acquiring citizenship. Sixth is the funding of ethnic group organizations to support cultural activities. Seventh is the funding of bilingual education

or mother-tongue instructions. Eighth is affirmative action for disadvantaged immigrant groups (Kymlicka, 2010, p.37). Countries following several criteria of these policies can be counted one way or another as the ones that practice some form of multiculturalism. The presence of several of Kymlicka's criteria in its integration system means that nation-states soften or abolish assimilationist processes, and recognize the distinctiveness of some religious, cultural or linguistic minorities inhabiting the country, no matter their size or significance. It is important to mention that assimilation is not entirely opposite towards multiculturalism but it is rather a parallel model that encourages other groups to resemble the mainstream and not to express their differences in public. For example, for centuries assimilationist France still did not erase the identities of its native minorities. In the private sphere, Italian-speaking Corsicans, Dutch-speaking Flemish French and German-speaking Alsatians, along with Celtic Bretons, Catalans and Basques preserved their languages, cultures and traditions despite behaving totally French in public. Emperor Napoleon I was raised in traditional Corsican household and despite speaking French with an accent, he served the military and ruled the country as a typical French person. In contrast, multiculturalism encourages preservation of the ethnic or religious identities of minorities, and allows a civilian to openly demonstrate him/herself as somebody else in public.

At the same time, there have been criticisms of multicultural policies which place blame on the practices they promote. Vertovec has mentioned that some arguments oppose the policy of fostering separateness by allowing people to settle without integrating and refuse common values by drawing cultural lines. Also, multiculturalism has been criticized for denying problems connected with immigrants and ethnic minorities, and finally for supporting reprehensible or 'backward' practices such as unequal treatment of women (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010, pp.8-9).

In order to achieve successful multiculturalism, the process of incorporation must be practiced properly throughout the whole process of immigrant integration, as the goal cannot be achieved

instantly. Isajiw adds that politicians and sociologists should monitor eight indicators—the first is the periodic improvement of economic conditions, the second is the territorial move of migrants from ghettoization to dispersion, the third is moving from ethnic social groups to relatively freely mixed intermingling, and fourth is inter-ethnic matching and marriages. The fifth indicator is based on properly integrating the ethnic cultures of minority groups into mainstream. Sixth one is founded on the recognition that diverse persons and groups to be treated with equal respect and concern. The seventh indicator is based on legality and provides special rights for disadvantaged groups. Eighth and final indicator, the political one is based on the participation of ethnic organizations in a country's political parties and media (Isajiw, 1997, pp.122-123).

Taken together, all these statements and criticisms articulate that multiculturalist policies are supposed to be periodically updated and based on input from both the immigrant community and the mainstream society. The whole process includes a complex set of social and economic practices that are supposed to permit both aboriginal and foreign cultures to adapt into one society. Finally, there should not be any serious gaps in equality and opportunity among all the groups and citizens, regardless of heritage or identity.

WHY MULTICULTURALISM WAS ADOPTED?

Definitely, the complex historical and social processes that followed World War II were the main reasons why multiculturalist policies were adopted. Most importantly of all, societies in all of the mentioned countries became, and continue to become, increasingly diverse as a result of massive immigration from other countries and continents in the second half of the 20th Century caused by the demand for additional labour and skilled force.

Multiculturalist policies were mandatory to adapt previously homogenous nation states into harmonious societies which were already becoming culturally, ethnically, religiously, and/or racially diverse over time. Will Kymlicka speculates that “multiculturalism is characterized as a feel-good

celebration of ethnocultural diversity, encouraging citizens to acknowledge and embrace the panoply of customs, traditions, music, and cuisine” (Kymlicka, 2010, pp.33-34). For example, Yasmin Alibhai-Brown calls this the “3S” model of multiculturalism in Britain—saris, samosas, and steel drums: “Multiculturalism takes these familiar cultural markers of ethnic groups—clothing, cuisine, and music—and treats them as authentic practices to be preserved by their members and safely consumed by others. Under the banner of multiculturalism they are taught in school, performed in festivals, displayed in media and museums, and so on” (Alibhai-Brown, 2000).

Another reason behind implementation of this integrationist policy is for humanist purposes. Vertovec states that multiculturalism became a big phenomenon after the end of World War II, as “the world recoiled against Hitler’s fanatical and murderous use of such ideologies, and the United Nations decisively repudiated them in favor of a new ideology of the equality of races and peoples” (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010, p.35). Eventually, this movement turned into the struggle for the equality of all races and identities, as well as a struggle against colonization, racial hierarchies, and segregation. As Europe was experiencing a massive influx of Third Country Nationals, migrants faced serious discrimination from the native population and that prevented them from finding proper jobs and reliable housing in order to adapt into their new social environments.

From another perspective, it is important to mention that policies of multiculturalism were not only implemented in the interest of equality and fairness. Regardless of the fact that Uberoi argues that a “policy of multiculturalism aims to reduce fear of cultural difference, as well as the inequality, exclusion and disadvantage” (Uberoi and Modood, 2013, p.130), Kymlicka criticized that this policy “ignores issues of economic and political inequality. Even if all (native) Britons come to enjoy Jamaican steel drum music or Indian samosas, this would do nothing to address the real problems facing Caribbean and South Asian communities in Britain—problems of unemployment, poor educational outcomes, residential segregation, poor English-language skills, and political issues cannot

be solved simply celebrating differences” (Kymlicka, 2010, p.33). Parekh believes that multiculturalism is a product of global capitalism, and states that “contemporary multicultural societies are integrally bound up with the immensely complex process of economic and cultural globalization” (Parekh, 2000, p.8). Yegenoglu states that it was nothing else but the goal of global corporations to absorb as many immigrants as possible into the West and then exploit them under policies of tolerance and integration: “Multiculturalism is the form of appearance of universality in its exact mirror opposite and is therefore the ideal form of the ideology of global capitalism” (Yegenoglu, 2012, p.54). Yegenoglu also noted Gayatri Spivak's suggestion that ““liberal multiculturalism is determined by the demands of contemporary transnational capitalism,” which secures the means of gaining the consent of developing nations in the financialization of the globe“ (Yenengolu, 2012, p.54).

Multiculturalism may also be attractive because, in contrast, attempts to assimilate immigrants did not bring any significant success as “cultures are extremely complex structures of beliefs and practices, and their nuances, unspoken assumptions and deepest sensibilities cannot be easily acquired unless one is born into them” (Parekh, 2000, p.198). Parekh also argues that total assimilation requires biological integration, and explains that even if some foreign individual completely assimilates into society, his/her background or slight cultural differences can make that person a target of distrust and discrimination. Furthermore, monocultural practice in education tends to “breed arrogance, insensitivity, and racism” (Parekh, 2000, p.226). Pupils raised in such environments judge other cultures around the world “by the norms and standards of their own” and treat other cultures and classmates of foreign origin as inferior (Parekh, 2000, p.226).

As a result, the historical processes of immigration in Europe following World War II left Western European governments with no other choice but to abandon cultural or civic homogeneity in their countries and recognize the identities of Third Country Nationals and their descendants. Adoption of multiculturalism appeared to be the most logical concession to fulfill the requirements of human rights

activists and minimize racism, while at the same time finding a softer method to exploit foreigners for capitalist means. This is perhaps what leaders of Western European countries and heads of private companies and corporations were aware of.

DO THESE COUNTRIES PRACTICE MULTICULTURALISM?

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom is the one country that undoubtedly practices the policy of multiculturalism that fulfills most of Kymlicka's eight criteria. These include parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism, practicing multiculturalism in school curricula, inclusion of ethnic representation in public media (including the BBC), affirmative action, allowing the wearing religious dress, easing naturalization rules in terms of allowing dual citizenship and giving British passports to children of immigrants born in the UK (Janoski, 2010, pp.81-84), and funding cultural activities, though not bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction (Table 1). However, the lack of bilingualism is not considered a violation against multiculturalism because the majority of immigrants came from anglophone countries or countries where English is a working language, such as India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. On the other hand, since 1965, the United Kingdom has begun to implement a series of laws that are called Race Relations Acts based on supporting disadvantaged immigrant groups. This legislation was implemented to reduce the level of discrimination on the grounds of colour, race, or ethnic or national origins. The Race Relations Act adopted in 1976 (*Race Relations Act 1976, c.74*) was especially revolutionary as it allowed religious minorities to not attend work religious holidays. For example, Jewish citizens were permitted to work on Sundays and not required to work on the Sabbath every Friday, and they were in some instances allowed more extensively than previously “to adjudicate private disputes through recourse to religious law and religious courts” as a separate ethnic group (Malik, 2010, p.50). Finally, the Race Relations Act of 2000 (*Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000, c.34.*) promotes political and community participation of immigrants and being diligent to ensure ethnic

minorities are not under-represented anywhere (Triandafyllidou, Modood and Meer, 2012, pp.184-185).

Furthermore, the United Kingdom has always been a multicultural society since its foundation, but active multiculturalist policies were not really practiced before the end of World War II. The minorities before the 1940s were mainly native communities—Irish people who live in the Northern Ireland, the Welsh in Wales, the Scottish in Scotland, the English in England, and a tiny number of Cornish people in the Cornwall Peninsula of South-Western England. The Act of Union which was adopted in 1706 (*Union with Scotland Act 1706*) and geographically linked England (with Wales) and Scotland, promoted a common national identity among native minorities rather than cultural diversity. Maleiha Malik states that the British nation was regarded as a sole 'mixed' culture which strictly can never exist without the elements of the mixed “Germanic genius, Celtic genius, and Norman genius” (Malik, 2010, pp.34-35). Of course, the United Kingdom had minorities of foreign origin before World War II, including Irish, Jews, Gypsies, Poles, and Italians. However, they were not recognized and instead of attempting to end hostility toward these minorities, the British government adopted restrictive immigration legislation such as the “Aliens Act in 1905, followed by a more expansive act passed in 1919” (Kivisto, 2002, p.138; *Aliens Act 1905*; *Aliens Restriction (Amendment) Act 1919*).

Nevertheless, the process of implementing multiculturalist policies was indeed revolutionary. The policies that enforced the tolerance of people belonging to different races switched to enforcement of tolerance of different ethnicities, and then to religions, as the migratory movement began after World War II. Eventually, all these people of foreign origin were no longer defining themselves by race but rather as ethnic and religious groups within their host nations. That factor further strengthened the positions of these nations as multicultural societies that embrace diversity. According to Tony Blair, “this is what multicultural, multi-faith Britain is about” (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010, p.54).

Regardless of the fact that it was openly embraced by mainstream politicians in the 1990s and

2000s, multiculturalism has never been a straightforward process and faced political obstacles in its implementation. Parekh states that there has always been conflict between political parties in regards to the true definition of multiculturalist society in the United Kingdom. Regardless of the fact that Britain is clearly a multicultural state, with at least 13% of the population belonging to visible minorities according to the 2011 Census, Conservatives stick to the traditional notion outlined in the Act of Union which states that “Britain in centuries has evolved a distinct culture which is integrally tied up with its national identity and should continue to enjoy a privileged status” (Parekh, 2000, p.6). In contrast, Liberals and left-wing politicians claim that British identity should not be ethnocentric and that minorities “should be respected and not disappear over time, and that ethnic minorities consist not of individuals but of organized communities entitled to make collective claims” (Parekh, 2000, p.6).

France

In comparison with the United Kingdom, France still strictly follows basic rules of an assimilationist republican model which prohibits the collection of census data based on race, ethnicity, or religion.

French values are believed to be not “peculiarly French but universal in their validity” (Parekh, 2000, p.7). Thus, for both local conservatives and liberals, France is not a multicultural society at all.

Collecting statistics on countries of origin for individual citizens is still not a multiculturalist approach, as many white and Roman Catholic French people were born in Africa and other continents before the colonial empire collapsed after World War II. For example, the *pieds noirs* (colonists and their descendants) who lived in Maghrebi regions prior to moving to France, have returned in millions and were more easily adapted as they were culturally French and were no different in physical appearance from civilians of the Metropolitan region (Kivisto, 2002, pp.174-175). It is one of the best explanations as to why many statisticians confuse the true percentage of the population practicing Islam, with some estimating between 3-4% and others between 8-10%. Official censuses in France do not reveal whether citizens of Muslim Maghreb heritage originate from Arab/Berber or from European ethnicity.

According to the social model of France, every single legal resident (native or foreign-born) is strictly considered to be a French subject from a legal standpoint.

However, it is inaccurate to say that in recent decades France followed a purely republican approach towards non-EU migrants and their descendants. First of all, former president Sarkozy stated that “multiculturalism has failed” during his speech in 2011 and added that democracies (including France) had been too preoccupied with the identities of the ones who were arriving (mainly Maghrebs and Sub-Saharan) instead of the society that was receiving them. He called for everyone, including Muslim co-patriots, to struggle for civic integration and to establish an Islam of France (French Islam) instead of Islam in France (foreign Islam within the country). Sarkozy situated the Muslim community as an exceptional case. There was no similar attention paid to the Jewish (largest community in Europe) and Calvinist communities who make up altogether between 3% and 4% of the total population. Perhaps the Islamic community merited special attention not because of its distinctiveness but because it is new. Unlike French Jews, people of Muslim origins have not lived in the country for many generations.

Nevertheless, French politicians were aware that immigrants arriving from outside Europe desired a different and softer assimilationist approach for integration. The citizenship law adopted in 1998, following the publication of Kymlicka's fundamental criteria of multiculturalism, permitted adolescent children of foreign descent to acquire French nationality. Immigrant legislation of 1981 (*Legifrance*, 1981) allowed foreigners to form associations such as cultural theatre groups and publishing newspaper in own languages (DeGroat, 2001, p.75). Thus, the French Republic began to follow other three Kymlicka's criteria of *funding the organizations* to support cultural activities, *funding bilingual writings* and *affirmative action* (Table 1). However, such measures were practiced only in localities where immigrants settled, and not on the national level. There is a possibility that this approach was used to eventually assimilate these individuals. In 1989, France implemented a soft multicultural policy called the “French model of integration” that encouraged the High Council for Integration to inform

and advise immigrants to integrate (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010, p.93). In comparison, Pasqua Laws adopted by French government in 1993 (*Legifrance*, 1993) were the last tough rules (at least before 2011) that aimed at providing non-EU immigrants a pathway towards naturalization process through social and political integration (Amiriaux, 2010, p.77). The softened approach recognizes cultural differences of newcomers who have arrived to these nations with a lack of knowledge about the cultural norms in their new homeland. Nevertheless, it is not considered to be a multiculturalist approach as it attempts to assimilate those individuals and this sort of integration is based on the individual becoming an active person in mainstream society rather than on a group level. The French Republican model opposes communitarianism, considering it to be a method which destroys the unity of a state. Furthermore, France implemented the rule to avoid discrimination on an individual level only, instead of on the basis of ethnic or racial origin. Nevertheless, the French Council of Muslim Faith in France was founded in 2003 and brought about recognition of Islam in France as a separate faith.

Moreover, there were several instances when racially and religiously diverse France was close to recognizing itself as a multicultural state. In 1999, some scholars proposed that French authorities collect direct statistical data on ethnicities and race in order to more directly detect discrimination toward foreigners in workplaces, education, or housing. However, this approach was rejected as it violates the *Informatique et libertes* law passed in 1978 (*Legifrance*, 1978), which prohibits individuals from revealing his/her racial or ethnic identity in public. Nevertheless, in 2004, the French government launched a program called HALDE (High Authority to Fight against Discrimination and for Equality) to combat discrimination in the private sector of French firms. Or, more precisely, since that program was launched a compromise was struck between diversity and homogeneous republicanism in France, as HALDE still did not encourage ethnic monitoring and maintaining multiple citizenships.

Nevertheless, HALDE embraces diversity, which is a fundamental concept of multiculturalism and

brings together “various grounds of discrimination” including 'diversity of origins' and conceives “contemporary colour consciousness as a vehicle for anti-discrimination” (Triandafyllidou, Modood and Meer, 2012, p.64). In this case, the French Republic cannot be considered a 'multicultural state', but it does follow some fundamental aspects of multiculturalism and encourages some awareness of different religious, ethnic, and racial origins. European policies such as the 2000 Council Directive (*COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2000/43/EC* and the Council) may also have encouraged equal treatment irrespective of racial or ethnic origin. The Council of Europe's Congress of Local and Regional Authorities in 2004 adopted a resolution which included “the use of cultural diversity as a resource by opening up an urban life and public services in an intercultural manner” (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010, p.19). Furthermore, in the 1970s, French authorities were permitted to create consultation bodies that nominated foreigners to address migration-related issues. These institutions including, the Conseil de la Citoyenneté des Parisiens non Communautaires (Council of the Citizenship of Parisian Third Country Nationals), which was founded in the city's suburbs in 2005, and Le Conseil représentatif des associations noirs de France (Representative Council for Black Associations) are both “non-colour blind” and publicly demonstrate racial and ethnic diversity in France (Triandafyllidou, Modood and Meer, 2012, p.181).

Furthermore, even younger generations of French people of non-European origins have begun to face the fact that they are different from the mainstream. The French school system, which requires all pupils to learn the same way of life and values that are considered to be French and universal, eventually adopted policies of recognition. Youth of immigrant descent participated in three weeks of riots after two young men of North African and Sub-Saharan origin electrocuted themselves. “Many issues were publicly discussed during and after the riots: the spatial segregation of specific populations (of migrant origin, young, male); the incapacity of central institutions such as schools to achieve equality and upward social mobility” (Amiriaux, 2010, p.75). To solve this problem, since January 1st

2007 (*Legifrance*, 2006B), French President Chirac extended the power of Contrat d'Accueil et de l'Integration (Contract and Home Integration), adopted in 2002, that serves as a “constant oscillation between assimilation and openness to multicultural influences” aimed at youth of non-EU origin (Amiriaux, 2010, p.77) and adopted an additional immigration and integrationist law in 2002 (*Legifrance*, 2002).

In conclusion, while France remains very assimilationist, because of a huge immigrant influx, which mainly included people whose cultures are distant from French civic values, French authorities were left with no choice but to soften the country’s republican model. Politicians implemented some degree of racial, linguistic, and religious recognition towards non-whites and France became a country that no longer recognizes itself as racially, ethnically, and religiously homogeneous. This strategy was supposed to resolve the serious problem of ghettoization that the country began to face since non-European migration began after World War II.

Belgium

In comparison with France and the United Kingdom, Belgium “is a complex multinational and federal country characterized by deep and far-reaching linguistic community divisions” (Triandafyllidou, Modood and Meer, 2012, p.74). Belgium is mainly divided into three linguistic communities: Flemish speakers (Dutch dialect), who are located in the northern region of Flanders, French speakers, and a tiny German speaking minority who live in the east of Wallonia beside the German border. At the national level, the Belgian government's action plan of 2005-2007 included a mandate for the development of diversity and for the fulfillment of “respecting differences in attitudes, values, cultural frameworks, lifestyles, skills and experiences of each member of a group” (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010, p.19).

There are instances where Belgian society has preferred an assimilationist approach and there have been circumstances in which Belgian society demanded that the diversity of all ethnic minorities

inhabiting the country be embraced. Thus, Belgium is somewhat divided; it is not purely multicultural nor is it purely assimilationist (Triandafyllidou, Modood and Meer, 2012, p 76). For example, like its northern neighbour, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Flanders recognizes the ethno-cultural diversity of minorities and supports all cultural organizations that are willing to co-operate with the country's actions and organizations. On the other hand, the Flemish government requires all individuals belonging to ethnic minorities to learn Dutch (it is not optional to live in Flanders and speak only French and/or German) and become familiar with the norms of Flemish culture and society. In contrast, francophone Wallonia behaves similarly to France in that it treats all foreigners as people of foreign origin or immigrants and does not consider them as distinctive ethno-cultural groups, but rather as one common category when they participate in Walloon society.

The capital city of Belgium may be considered the best example of how the country embraces its diversity. The Brussels-Capital region, follows the social policies of the Belgian government, takes a similar approach to the Flemish government by recognizing “the fact of migration-related diversity” and the city is also a significant “residential concentration of ethnic minorities” (Triandafyllidou, Modood and Meer, 2012, p.77). However, unlike the Dutch speaking province, the capital does not require foreign minorities to adapt into any traditional identity. Thus, this municipality, along with the federal government, fulfills three of Kymlicka’s eight criteria—funding cultural organizations by building mosques, and practicing multiculturalism and affirmative action by recognizing Islam as a national religion in 1973. Since 1981, the Belgian government has liberalized its approach toward the naturalization of foreigners, including Third Country Nationals (Table 1). The eventual result is that, by 2011, 44.5% of the migrant and foreign-born population has been naturalized, and through the EU directive from 1994, all legal non-naturalized residents can vote in local and municipal elections (*COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 94/80/EC*; Triandafyllidou, Modood and Meer, 2012, p.172). This fulfills an additional criteria of Kymlicka's, which is easing rules to obtain citizenship by foreigners.

As Belgium still traditionally portrays itself as a binational state of Dutch-speaking Flemish and French and German-speaking Walloons, it is still considered to be a country that practices policies of multiculturalism rather than an assimilationist approach. On a national level, Belgian authorities do not count these two core identities as ethnicities but rather as regional and/or linguistic communities (note that German- and French-speaking people are counted as Walloon). Therefore, no matter what kind of difference any minority group expresses in religion or culture, their identities are tolerated and do not cross any ethnic or traditional lines of a divided Belgian society. In this case, Francophone Congolese or Moroccans can be treated as Walloons. Alternatively, Turks who use Dutch as a working language can be considered as members of the Flemish community. Perhaps assimilationist Walloons do not encourage minority groups of immigrant descent to stick to their original identities, but Belgian fundamental principles allow individuals of foreign origin to preserve their heritage in the private sphere by engaging in activities such as attending mosques or socializing as cultural communities. In conclusion, no matter how Belgian, Wallonian, or Flemish a person of the non-EU descent considers him/herself to be, his/her identity is hyphenated. Africans can be counted as Afro-Belgians or Turks as Turkish-Belgians. For citizens of native or core origin, it would be more accurate to count them as White-Belgians. Considering linguistic/regional communities of Flemish or Walloons as distinctive and traditionally white European cultures or ethnicities like Scottish or German is very inaccurate.

TABLE 1 – KYMLICKA'S EIGHT CRITERIA OF MULTICULTURALISM¹

	<u>Constitutional, legislative or parliamentary affirmation</u>	<u>Minority representation at school curriculum</u>	<u>Ethnic representation in the media</u>	<u>Religious symbols at school</u>	<u>Minority representation at communities and clubs</u>	<u>Affirmative action</u>	<u>Public Funding of Bilingualism</u>	<u>Easing Rules of Acquiring Citizenship</u>
UK	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES
France	NO ²	NO	NO ²	NO ⁴	NO ²	YES	YES ³	YES
Belgium	YES (on municipal level)	Neutral ⁶	Neutral	Neutral ⁶	YES ^{6,7}	YES	NO ⁵	YES

¹The table summarizes the general tendency in the countries indicated; there may be particular exceptions in some cases

² In France, people of foreign origin and of non-white skin color are affirmed but are not represented as separate ethnic, racial or religious minority

³ Cultural centres and newspapers of immigrants and their descendants living in France usually write in language of origin

⁴ Some exceptions exist – for example, France does permit religious symbols in private schools where the teachers' salaries are paid by the Ministry of National Education

⁵ In Belgium, only official languages (French, Dutch and German) are funded

⁶ In Belgium, municipal governments implement their own rules about minority representation and wearing of religious symbols at school

⁷ Belgian statistics prohibit collecting any statistical and demographic data specifically on Afro-Belgians

THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT FOR THE EMERGENCE OF MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES

In order to explain about why immigration policies began to shift at the beginning of the 2010s, after multiculturalism was declared to be a failure, it is first important to review the historical context of the immigration as a whole since the middle of the 20th Century. Also, it is important to consider that multiculturalism would never have been implemented without the massive wave of non-European migration that began after the end of World War II. This section examines why the Third Country Nationals were allowed to come in, for what purpose multiculturalist policies were implemented, to what extent these policies were implemented. An important theme in this section is the economic roots of migration, and how migration is linked to the development of global capitalism. Many analysts see the globalization of economic processes as a key means of explaining the massive number of migrants that moved into Europe after the end of World War II.

Definitely, Western European countries have opened the borders for millions of people outside of Europe for reasons besides making their nations diverse. One of the major reasons which caused immigrants to flow into Western European countries is considered to be the horrible aftermath of World War II. Hitler's disastrous war campaign caused huge economic issues and civilian casualties in the industrial nations of Western Europe. Furthermore, the Soviet Union started to expand its socialist influence all over the continent after absorbing Eastern European countries into its sphere of influence. Western European nations adopted the Marshall Plan, a US support program, to industrialize their nations in order to recover from the aftermath of the war and to prevent Soviet socialist expansionism in order to protect capitalism.

The economy can be considered another huge factor behind migration. The expanding economy demanded an additional labor force classified by Panayi as labour commodities. These labour commodities primarily came from Southern Europe (Portugal, Spain, and Italy) and later from third world countries (outside of the EU), beginning with the arrival of 492 Jamaican passengers when the ship named *Empire Windrush* arrived at Tilbury Docks on June 22, 1948. Without the post-World War II capitalist boom, immigrants would never have migrated: "They arrived as part of a conscious recruiting process involving state and industry for the purpose of carrying out menial industrial tasks which members of the native population increasingly avoided as they (nationals) became ever more educated" (Panayi, 2000, p.79). Industrialization of Western European urban cities and the movement of nationals into high-skilled jobs created a high demand for additional workers. These workers were hired for the low-skilled jobs and were exploited as a cheap labour force. For example, it was legal to exploit immigrants with a salary of four francs per hour instead of the standard eight francs allotted to low-skilled or uneducated citizen.

Third Country Nationals were allowed to stay longer and come in larger numbers due to the fact that West European countries and markets found them to be an effective labour force for low-wage

jobs. For example, in Britain, West Indians could only afford the breakthrough by working as bus drivers, train guards, and booking office clerks. In France, most foreign workers were employed in building work, followed by textile work, motor-car work, steel production, and mining. Even after reconstruction during the post-World-War II economic boom, the descendants of these immigrants, worked in jobs which natural French people were ashamed to work at, such as bus or subway driving or garbage collection. Regardless of the fact that European colonial empires were on the verge of collapse and that, for example, the British still preserved supremacist attitudes towards migrants and did not demand that they assimilate into British society, local capitalists needed non-European immigrants. Furthermore, policies picked on immigrants who were mainly unskilled and illiterate young men who were expected to leave. According to the statement of the French Minister of the Interior, Algerians were not considered “as foreign workers, not as immigrants, and that consequently the children born in France should not get French citizenship automatically” (Shadid and Koningsveld, 1991, p.9). Furthermore, illiteracy was more beneficial for capitalists and governments, as it is easier to exploit Third Country Nationals through their absence of social mobility and to subject them to the worst conditions with the longest working hours and the lowest amount of pay. Those men were indeed “working with extreme work pressure and usually worked the long, unpleasant night shifts in factories and needed much of the day to sleep, if they had not taken on secondary employment“ (Nielsen, 1999, p.27). These illiterate foreigners were more willing to accept any sort of job and any condition of their housing, with the promise of economic improvement, rather than living in their home countries (Panayi, 2000, p.79). Another reason for the low-wage condition of these immigrants was that they sent part of their earnings to their families living abroad in their countries of origin.

Even adolescents faced tough conditions to grow up in. For example, in Belgium, parents could not spend their time with family as they were working for long hours in distant minefields. As these adolescents were more focused on obtaining the kind of low-skilled jobs which their parents were

working, and due to a lack of attention, many could not even obtain a primary school diploma in the 1960s and the 1970s. At the same time, these adolescents attended the most under-funded schools in the country. Especially during their first decades in Europe, many children faced humiliation from white British teachers “who were indifferent and even racist towards children as one survey in 1979 has revealed that only 0.15 percent of teachers in Britain are of Caribbean Origin” (Panayi, 2000, p.94).

With the conditions that these migrants faced, Europe was not an ideal destination for their success and economic improvement. Regardless of the fact that the Indian British community was the most successful among all other non-European ethnic groups (Pakistani, African, or West Indian) in terms of business, succeeding through trade and commerce (Gujaratis and Punjabis) and obtaining middle class jobs (teachers or doctors), the members of this community were still proportionally poorer than the white British population. Many Indians failed to establish businesses and ended up working for wage-based jobs. According to Barot, young Indians have limited opportunity and unemployment was 28% among all Indian men between the ages 16 and 24 (Panayi, 2000, p.95). This fact reflects that there is a reality of class relations, where wealthier people have more opportunities than others. One of the ways to escape poor conditions was to succeed in a sports career as many West Indians did since the 1970s or what French football players of Black-African or Arab-Berber (for example Zenidine Zidane) descent did in order to improve their life conditions.

Indeed, there was evident discrimination on the grounds of race that prevented Third Country Nationals from integrating properly. For example, based on the 1961 census, of the West Indians who arrived in the UK, 24 percent had professional/managerial experience and 46 per cent of them were skilled workers. But, in the UK, 54 per cent worked in semi-skilled or unskilled manual occupations, while 2 per cent worked in professional jobs (Panayi, 2000, p.80). Nevertheless, some youth employment officers have reported that they had little difficulty placing non-white dropouts in unskilled jobs, but there is a difficulty placing them in skilled occupation, including shop assistant

(Panayi, 2000, p.94). There is also a probability that those Western Indians who obtained professional jobs are not black, but rather white people of British descent who were born and/or lived in the region. The reality behind this disastrous result is that a high-percentage of these immigrants being employed in low skilled jobs demonstrates that they are being considered for low-sector jobs only. Only immigrants with work experience and skills could apply for immigration into the United Kingdom as low-educated and non-educated inhabitants of former British colonies were not suitable for hiring at all.

Furthermore, European migrants were more favourable for adaptation than non-white migrants. This is an especially obvious fact in Belgium, where immigrants were openly allowed to come into the country due to the lack of labour force and the fact that the nation's rural towns began to face serious industrialization. Unlike immigrants to France and Britain, the first wave of immigration in Belgium was predominantly European in the 1940s and the 1950s, where most of the Italian and, to a lesser extent, Spanish immigrants worked in the mining and heavy industrial sectors of cities such as Antwerp, Ghent, and Liege. Third Country Nationals, who were mainly Moroccans and Turks, were part of the second wave that began in the 1960s and the 1970s. These immigrants were employed largely as construction workers and "due to the later timing of their immigration, both Moroccan and Turkish immigrant workers were disproportionately affected by the post-industrial labor market transformation which pushed large numbers of the first generation out of work when their children were still young" (Fleischmann *et al*, 2011, p.392). This is one reason why school drop-out rates amongst Turkish and Moroccan children was on average 40 per cent in comparison with native Belgian pupils at about 10 per cent (Fleischmann *et al*, 2011, p.389). In comparison with more recent Turkish and Moroccan immigrants and their offspring, Italian Belgians, on average, performed better at school and in the labor market. Still, the second generation of Italians living in Belgium, whose parents were the low class workers who were theoretically lagging behind the middle-classed native Belgians, were

achieving approximately the same results as the native Belgians belonging to the working class. In comparison, the following migrations, high rates of unemployment, and economic inactivity, both old and young Muslim-faith Moroccans and Turks faced “less favorable context of reception as they were separated by coinciding and bright ethnic, religious and civic boundaries from the historically Catholic and White Belgian majority” (Fleischmann *et al*, 2011, p.392). In combination with ethnic discrimination in the Belgian labor market, younger generations faced a “less feasible classic route to upward mobility” (Fleischmann *et al*, 2011, p.392).

Similarly, immigrants of a different skin color, but with identical cultural, religious, or linguistic upbringing as white Europeans, could not expect to be treated equally. Such a statement is even true in regards to those immigrants more educated and more adaptable to the Belgian society due to a colonial past, such as the Sub-Saharan Congolese (or Zairian) community. This became evident after the late 1980s, when the Afro-Belgian (includes *Zairians* or *Congolese* with Rwandans and Burundians) community began to rapidly grow due to the economic crisis, civil wars, and Mobutu's dictatorial regime in Zaire. Indeed, when their numbers were very small and the influx of Moroccan and Turkish immigrants was massive, Congolese exchange students and business people were very mobile (Demart, 2013, p.3). They received very good scholarships that guaranteed a better future in their home country until the late 1980s. However, the world's last exhibition of the human zoo (exhibition of Black people) took place in Brussels less than half a century ago, in 1958. There has not been enough time to dispel the colonial mentality of the generation raised in the middle of the 20th Century. For example, modern liberal propaganda “had sensationalized Belgian colonialism by depicting it as the worst of modern Europe” (Demart, 2013, p.9). Belgium has also implemented a special policy to represent Congolese, Rwandans, and Burundians (former colonial subjects) as 'socially invisible' in the country—unlike people of Moroccan and Turkish origins. Belgian statistics prohibit to collect any statistical and demographic data on Afro-Belgians. Anyone can be convinced about their significant presence after

visiting Brussels, where most of Belgium's Congolese diaspora is concentrated. Nevertheless, racial boundaries and colonial views have persisted in regards to the Afro-Belgian community. Sub-Saharanans continued to be excluded from mainstream society, as well as experience discrimination, prejudice, and racism, such as being stereotyped as hosts of the "Congolese Virus," which is considered to be AIDS and HIV (Demart, 2013, p.11).

Regardless of the fact that the first generation of Congolese were more educated than Moroccans and Turks in general, the second generation faced worse conditions in social interactions, education, and employment which eventually led to their joining local street gangs. Instead of getting white collar jobs, Congolese immigrants were generally hired in low skilled sectors. Due to combating memories of colonial past, "attempts by the associations to represent Sub-Saharan Africans as a single group contrasted with the state's recognition of other ethnic associations on a national basis. Under the cover of "organization" and "transparency" requirements, the state effectively racializes access to funding" (Demart, 2013, p.11). Also, on a regional level, the assimilationist Wallonian model contradicts all forms of communitarianism. Thus, along with other diaspora groups, Congolese immigrants in Belgium face a discrimination in associative funding. Regardless of the fact that Flanders relies on a more liberal, multiculturalist model which seems to offer more possibilities for support and recognition, the Congolese diaspora still remains too unsupported to gain equality as native Belgians due to discrimination and exploitation.

CONCLUSION

This chapter reveals that, in recent years, the United Kingdom, France, and the Kingdom of Belgium have become more racially, ethnically, and religiously diverse than before the end of the World War II when the influx of Third Country Nationals began. Furthermore, all three countries, in one way or another, practices policies that recognize the cultural and racial differences of Third Country Nationals in order to help them to adapt into their host societies. The United Kingdom follows almost all of

Kymlicka's criteria. France uses a policy of accepting bilingualism in some cases, implementing affirmative action to select French people of different skin color and religious practices, and granting easier citizenship rules for foreigners. Universalistic Belgium, except for soft regulations for naturalization, is generally neutral about the presence of foreign minorities. Its multiculturalist policies include representation of minorities among communities and parliamentary affirmation on municipal level. Nevertheless, the materials provided in other sections of the MA thesis paper will argue that no matter how hardly or softly the multiculturalist policy was practiced in mentioned countries, the eventual results about the conditions of non-European migrants and their descendants remain similar. The following chapter explains how authorities tried to improve the social conditions of these discriminated immigrants who live in poor and ghettoized areas of large cities in Western Europe.

CHAPTER 2 – GHETTOIZATION and IMPLEMENTATION OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION POLICIES

This chapter seeks to explain how three factors, exploitation, racism, and discrimination, forced immigrants into ghettos beginning in the late 1940s. The analysis contained in this chapter seeks to answer the question of why a shift in the direction of the multiculturalist policies occurred, even in a country like France (albeit a weak shift), as governments sought to improve the living conditions of Third Country Nationals. The chapter then summarizes the anti-discrimination and recognition policies that were adopted and practiced in France, the United Kingdom, and Belgium throughout the decades since the 1960s. The chapter then provides an explanation as to why these anti-discrimination laws were an overdue and inadequate means of improving the social and economic positions of non-European migrants.

HOW IMMIGRANT GHETTOS WERE FORMED and WHY SOCIAL CONDITIONS WERE HARMFUL?

The large number of Third Country Nationals moving into poorer districts in their host nations resulted in increased ghettoization of these areas: “with the development of colour prejudice towards the migrants, non-European migrants were forced to move into the poorest parts of the cities such as Colville area of Notting Hill” (Panayi, 2000, p.45). In London, the migrants were also left with no other choice but to live in conditions that were, in many cases, deplorable. In France, since the state opened the door for the foreigners in 1945 (Tapinos, 1975, p.316), many immigrants could not even afford even the most basic shelter for themselves and their families. Many immigrants were forced to build makeshift homes for themselves in abandoned buildings in suburban areas. For example, “in an old chocolate factory owned by a private speculator at Ivry (suburban of Paris), 541 Black Africans were sharing 11 rooms in 1969” (Panayi, 2000, p.55). Some immigrants built their own shantytowns known as *bidonvilles* in France, using any materials they could obtain. Similarly, in the suburbs of Paris, Comorian people and North Africans were living in the decrepit houses in downtown of Marseille,

which is very vulnerable to damage from sea storms. According to the French census of 1968, 20% of immigrant workers lived in inadequate housing and 56.8% lived in overcrowded conditions, of which 26.8% were critically overcrowded (Panayi, 2000, p.56). In contrast, though Portuguese immigrants were also living in sub-par conditions in comparison with French citizens, their conditions were not nearly as overcrowded as that of non-Europeans. Nor were the conditions experienced by Caribbean black immigrants who came from French territories overseas, such as French Guiana and Martinique, and enjoyed the same rights as inhabitants of metropolitan areas and were treated better in continental France than in their home territories. Regardless of the fact that they arrived in smaller number and enjoyed more rights than foreigners, Caribbean immigrants were still not treated better than their African counterparts, as they could not easily find long-term residence and were often stuck staying in hotels for weeks (Panayi, 2000, p.56). Similar conditions plagued the South Asian population in the United Kingdom who, because of their estrangement from mainstream society, were living in old and decrepit houses in the inner cities areas. Likewise, Turkish, Moroccan, and Congolese immigrants were forced to live in the abandoned buildings of Brussels. At the same time, it was very the goal of many landlords to collect as much money as possible from impoverished, immigrant tenants. As Third Country Nationals had much more limited rights than the native population, they could rarely afford to move into better neighbourhoods. Furthermore, it was to the benefit of exploitative landlords to keep migrants in poor living conditions for which they could request unreasonably high rent.

This kind of exploitation of Third Country Nationals led directly to the formation of ethnic enclaves, and is sadly an issue that persists today in many large cities and towns in Western Europe due to the continuous arrival of new immigrants. Eventually, those temporary non-white migrants became more permanent fixtures. Due to the growing lack of labourers caused by further industrialization and development within Western European nations and the beginning of the Cold War, Western European states have begun to allow more and younger immigrants to replace the now-aging immigrant

population. Furthermore, understanding that these migrants would take up long-term residence in their new host nations, often new immigrants were permitted to bring their families, such as wives and children, in order to raise a new generation of low-skilled workers who would be less successful in terms of educational and skills standards. For example, by 1968 immigrants who were allowed to come to France as industrial workers were mainly males between 15 and 64 years old. These working-age immigrants made up approximately 2/3 of the entire immigrant population in comparison with 62.5 percent of the entire male French population. In addition, the number of female immigrants was also increasing while the number of male immigrants declined from 61.8 percent (in 1962) to 57.2 percent (in 1982) of all immigrants. Regardless of the fact that the fertility rates of foreign women dropped, reunions between immigrant couples within France resulted in (according to 1982 census) 70% of immigrant children under the age of 15 being born in the host country, rather than the immigrants' native home (Panayi, 2002, p.36). All other additional immigrants moving into the Western Europe preferred to inhabit the areas where their countrymen or other non-whites were living, as it allowed them to avoid discrimination from racist nationals that dominated other districts. On other hand, because of social exclusion, most urban areas with high concentrations of non-white migrants eventually turned into the 'ethnic or racial ghettos' where overcrowding and living conditions worsened year by year.

Indeed, multiculturalists were probably right that racism played a key role in producing the sub-standard living conditions of Third Country Nationals. The 1965 Political and Economic Planning (PEP) report interviewed three applicants, one of Black West Indian origin, one White Englishman, and one White Hungarian. There were interviews on three questions: employment, housing, and commercial services. Final results of this research illustrated that the individual of visible skin colour was most discriminated against (Malik, 2010, p.47). Nevertheless, racism was not a dominant cause of the isolation of foreigners. If it had been, it would be unlikely that non-Europeans would have been

allowed to live and work in Western European countries. It was beneficial to take advantage of their poor and humiliating conditions, which made them easier targets for exploitation and made it easier for directors and owners of their lodgings to take advantage of them financially. In addition, many native workers tried to discriminate against foreigners from outside of Europe not due to racial prejudice but due to the fear that their jobs would be taken away.

Furthermore, migrants were also extremely vulnerable to external factors, such as the oil crisis of the mid-1970s. Because of this economic crisis, there was a high level of unemployment and immigrant men additionally faced a high level of discrimination both in employment and in trade unions. In this case, as in other tough conditions, the local government favoured nationals instead of the foreigners for employment opportunities (Panayi, 2000, p.97). Also, after families were permitted to immigrate together, it became more difficult for males to provide for both their local family members and for those family members living abroad (Nielsen, 1999, p.27). It was difficult for men as women often maintained a traditional role, housekeeping, raising children and providing social and psychological support to their husbands rather than taking on their own paid employment.

Lack of literacy and education, and unequal treatment within immigrant families were also serious obstacles towards equality. For example, non-European immigrant women, many of whom came from the rural areas, had a high level of illiteracy. Thus, these women were unable to teach their children literacy skills in their native languages, and they also lacked any knowledge of the language of their host nations. Also, because of local customs, many women could not get help from doctors and teachers as their husbands had authority over them and often restricted their rights. In addition, for most of these newcomers, moving to Europe was like moving from a village to the city. That is why most of these people were left with no choice but to live in solidarity together, in order to provide support for each other (Nielsen, 1999, p.25). After their arrival, they were unfamiliar with their new urban homes in industrial countries, which is another factor why segregation or ghettoization occurred among these

immigrant communities.

Lack of familiarity with Western standards is one of the best explanations why certain, and especially non-white, ethnic groups could not proportionally improve their living standards in comparison with their white counterparts. For example, in France, people of Portuguese, Spanish, and Italian origin were not living far from their families and were more literate than non-Europeans. Therefore, it was easier for them to adapt. For example, regardless of the fact that 56.2 percent of French people were living in their own house or apartment, in comparison with 26.4 percent of foreigners, 55.9% of Italians owned their own homes (almost equivalent to French nationals) in comparison with Turks, of whom 8.4% lived in their own apartment or house in 1990 (Panayi, 2000, p.56).

In Belgium, people of Western background were more successful in moving to wealthier districts of the country, as the Third Country Nationals were left with no choice but to stick in ghettos where they could derive support from their co-ethnics. After World War II, immigrants were settling in houses in large cities and towns built in the 19th century, which were abandoned by Belgian nationals who were moving to suburban areas for better and newer housing. Regardless of the fact that ethnic groups have moved from place to place within the country throughout the past few decades, the final result is that currently “the geographical distribution of the migrant groups in the Brussels Capital Region continues to vary significantly. Native Belgians live predominantly in the richer districts of the outer city, near the border with Flanders. The Western group, on the other hand, is mainly concentrated in the South-Eastern and the most expensive parts of the city. Turks and Moroccans live spatially segregated in the low-quality 19th-century neighbourhoods, West and North of the historic city centre” (Valk and Willaert, 2012, p.24). In contrast, suburbs filled with the new houses are primarily inhabited by people of predominantly native descent who were more successful in obtaining better life and career opportunities. The majority of non-EU migrants and their descendants remain too poor and uneducated

to move to the areas where native Belgians live. Most of the younger Third Country Nationals continue to be stuck in the cultural communities of their co-ethnics, and ghettoization of the cities prevents them from familiarizing themselves with the native culture: “Except for the ‘happy few’ who successfully pursue an individual mobility strategy, we therefore conclude that, overall, the Moroccan or Turkish second generation is most exposed to the risk of downward assimilation” (Fleischmann *et al*, 2011, p.393). In contrast, “the native Belgians live more often in stable and high-quality municipalities relative to the three minority groups” (Fleischmann *et al*, 2011, p.393) and Italian Belgians demonstrate very similar results. At the same time, to avoid any form of prejudice and gain support, the “ethnic density” or “ethnic enclave” was also caused by the increasing level of spending of the capital coming from the ethnic community's funds. These ethnic minorities have begun to invest more in their neighbourhoods they inhabit in order to obtain more social stability and better quality of life.

Eventually, these exclusive conditions led to a series of protests and violent riots in the late 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s in response to lack of improvement in the employment, economic, and housing conditions of non-European immigrants (Panayi, 2000, p.155). Also, the situation made these migrants more politically active and forced the governments of their host nations to adopt the first laws that reflected multiculturalist principles. For example, in France, many immigrants protested against the demolitions of their *bidonvilles* in 1968. In the United Kingdom, many individuals belonging to a specific group began joining in the struggle together and joined organizations such as IWA (a Punjabi working-class group) which was struggling to improve employment and living conditions (Panayi, 2000, p.153). This also meant that short-term exploitation and disproportionately high unemployment did not prevent migrants from joining trade unions along with other workers. Furthermore, due to the violent demonstrations and riots over housing and working conditions, the governments eventually provided some concessions (Panayi, 2000, p.155). The slum houses known as *bidonvilles* where the migrants used to live disappeared by the 1980s and immigrants finally started to live in public houses

during the 1960s and the 1970s. Nevertheless, this led to further ghettoization of certain districts not only due to the cultural reasons, but also because of the difference of economic status between French nationals, for whom it was not traditional to live in public housing. In 1990, 24 per cent of immigrant families lived in public housing in comparison with 14 per cent of French families (Panayi, 2000, p.56).

ANTI-DISCRIMINATION POLICIES

Regardless of the fact that politicians were reacting to toughening conditions for migrants, recognition and anti-discrimination policies were not really helpful. They were not effective enough and came far too late to help immigrants to obtain social conditions equal to those of their native counterparts. Furthermore, these policies ignored some xenophobic attitudes from the native population such as rise of the far-right racist and nationalist parties (British National Party in the UK and Front National in France) which instigated racism towards these migrants and their descendants.

Furthermore, many politicians and political parties were competing against one another regarding issues of immigration policies and were not concerned about the needs of the foreigners themselves. This political struggle negatively impacted the effectiveness of multiculturalist policies from the very beginning of their implementation, an issue which led to long-term negative aftermath.

United Kingdom

In the United Kingdom, the Labour Party's programs were the first ones to ease the difficult conditions of foreign workers who were facing racist attacks and discrimination in the housing and workplaces. Regardless of the fact that fewer than 100,000 immigrants entered the country from 1948 to 1960, racial tensions were rapidly escalating toward the foreigners (Kivisto, 2002, p.142). Working-class youth were also attacking migrants, as they feared that, as a cheap labor, foreigners would easily steal their employment, bring about housing shortages, and increase prostitution in the country. Eventually, this resulted in the formation of extreme right-wing, supremacist organizations such as the White Defence League which were formed to attack people who are not white in skin colour.

It was necessary for the government to create an act to reduce hostility toward non-white immigrants, but its implementation was ineffective. The Labour government began to implement a special set of anti-discrimination laws, starting with the Race Relations Act of 1965 (*Race Relations Bill, c.(65) 77*) which “outlawed discrimination in public places and incitement to racial hatred verbally or in writing” (Panayi, 2000, p.202). However, these laws were not effective and only postponed the development of a tolerant society in the country. Under this Act, there was no way that immigrants could obtain proper access to basic needs, as the law did not prohibit discrimination in shops. Many immigrant customers could not buy products they needed, as they faced rejection and racist attitudes from sellers and white shoppers. Furthermore, this law was only applicable to 'places of public resort', such as hotels and restaurants, meaning that it only truly affected wealthy non-white visitors who came to the United Kingdom as tourists or businesspeople (*BBC, 1965*). The amendments that outlawed discrimination in employment and housing were not adopted until 1968 (*Race Relations Act 1968, c.71*). Nevertheless, tensions have remained and further anti-discriminatory legislation continued to be enacted. However, before this 1968 act was adopted, police continued to harass and humiliate non-white immigrants. It was only as a result of the United Nations Convention on Racial Discrimination, that the UK parliament and authorities were pressured to adopt a more extensive Race Relations Act, created in 1976 (*Race Relations Act 1976, c.74*), which recognizes cultural and religious differences among foreign-born citizens. This legislation outlawed direct and indirect racism in many areas, including police departments. Nevertheless, it is still considered to have been overdue and, in addition, did not put a stop to institutionalized discrimination. Tensions between Black youth, who were stereotyped as drug dealers or users, and police, caused many local community leaders to complain about false arrests, intimidation, and beatings. These complaints resulted in little or no response from police officers (Kivisto, 2002, p.146).

Another factor that caused multiple delays in the establishment of equality between nationals and

foreigners is political struggle. Views on immigration and integration policies between political parties were very polarized, especially between the Conservative and the Labour parties. The Labour Party was more supportive of immigrants who belonged to the working class and the Conservative Party was more interested in wealthy property owners (who were almost exclusively nationals). Initially, under the Labour government of Clement Attlee in the late 1940s, the first Third Country Nationals were allowed to enter into the country to relieve the labour shortage that the country faced during the period of industrialization following World War II. Eventually, ethnic minorities who mainly came from other Commonwealth countries were granted the right to vote, work, and participate in society immediately upon arrival in the UK due to the British Commonwealth Act in 1948 (*British Nationality Act 1948*). After this law took effect in 1949, people who originated from these states were considered 'British subjects'. Nevertheless, the Conservative Party maintained an anti-immigrant stance, and tried to preserve nationalist rhetoric. For example, during the elections of 1964, the Conservative Party campaigners promoted themselves using racist slogans used in the industrial area of Smedley electoral district such as “If you want a nigger to be your neighbour, vote for Labour” (Kivisto, 2002, p.5). Also, when the Race Relations Act of 1965 (*Race Relations Bill, c.(65) 77*) was on course toward adoption, “Conservative opponents of the law forced the change from a proposed criminal offence to a civil offence” for racism and discrimination (*BBC, 1965*). Tories avoided the principles of charging people accused in racism. In addition, the Labour-sponsored Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1968 (*Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968, c.9*), under the pressure of Conservative opposition, provided freer access to the Old Commonwealth citizens (aka White British people born abroad) only and restricted the movements of New Commonwealth citizens (Triandafyllidou, 2001, pp.64-65).

Regardless of the fact that conservatives eventually softened their racist attitudes, the right wing party was still considered to be anti-immigrant and was not willing to implement multiculturalist policies. After expelling Enoch Powell from the shadow cabinet for his controversial “River of Blood”

speech in 1968 (*Telegraph Reporter*, 2007), which warned about the UK being violently taken over by immigrants, Tories only promoted “good race relations” through “restrictive immigration” (Kivisto, 2002, p.144). These policies began with the Immigration Act of 1962 (*Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962*) (which Liberal and Labour parties failed to avert) and ended with the Nationality Act of 1981 (*British Nationality Act 1981, c. 61*). It is interesting to note that the restrictive Immigrants Act that was passed in 1971 (*Immigration Act 1971, c.77*) reflected that “Britain is no longer a Metropolitan Centre of the Commonwealth” (Evans, 1972, p.508), removing the special privilege of free acceptance of citizens of former colonies into its territory. Despite the fact that Margaret Thatcher’s campaign in 1983 officially dissociated itself from far-right and racist views by promoting Black males, using slogans such as “Labour says he is black, Tories say he is British” (Kivisto, 2002, p.144), this effort was still based on individualism rather on traditionally left, collective rights of minority groups. The man in Thatcher’s advertisement was dressed in a business suit and implied that a party of bankers and capitalists were willing to support the interests of wealthy people of non-European origin, instead of the poor ones, who made up the majority of the immigrant population. Nevertheless, restrictive policies and discrimination persisted towards immigrants. For example, the Nationality Act of 1981 (*British Nationality Act 1981, c. 61*) granted citizenship mostly to children born to at least one parent who is British or to a resident without a time limit to stay in the United Kingdom. Furthermore, this law created British Dependent Territories and British Overseas citizenships for the non-British (mainly non-white) people living in the remaining colonies of the UK, who according to the new jurisdiction cannot get automatic right of settlement in the UK (Triandafyllidou, 2001, p.64). The following 1988 Immigration Act (*Immigration Act 1988, c.14*) removed the rights of naturalized British citizens to be joined by foreign-born spouses (Triandafyllidou, 2001, p.64).

Nevertheless, pro-immigrant policies eventually returned, opening the borders for more non-European migrants. Since Tony Blair's government came into power in 1997, immigration restrictions

have been eased, and numerous legislative acts (*Human Rights Act 1998, c.42; Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, c.33; Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, c.41; Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006, c.13*) have been adopted which promote open immigration (open immigration significantly increased from 326,100 in 1997 to 582,100 in 2004 while the net inflow increased from 46,800 to 222,600 in the same years), especially after the adoption of the Nationality, Immigration, and Asylum Act in 2002 (*Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, c.41*). It is important to mention that some analysts claim that the New Labour program was implemented due to the “pressures of globalization” in the 1990s and the 2000s (Somerville, 2007). Regardless of the fact that Margaret Thatcher was an anti-immigrant Prime Minister, her radical socio-economic policies known as *neo-liberalism* eventually stimulated economic “globalization” that erased the borders and diminished the notion of a nation-state. Multiculturalism itself became a product of transnational communities which were established by economic transnationalism, where large private companies, through Adam Smith's 'invisible hand', become dominant players in the world economy. These firms also shaped policies that fulfilled their profit-making goals, whether within or outside the country's boundaries. An emergence of these global corporations “centred in the metropole, but active in the periphery in their ceaseless quest for cheap labour” (Kivisto, 2002, p.38) pushed Tony Blair's policy makers to allow a new, massive influx of immigrants to replace British workers as the 'New Laborers' (Somerville, 2007).

France

In a similar manner, the process of globalization has forced changes to immigration and integration policies in the French Republic: “the reduced capacity of the nation-state to control and protect society engendered a crisis of national identity as society became exposed to diverse cultures, commodities, lifestyles and values which, in turn, threatened to overwhelm and dissipate indigenous cultural reproduction” (Triandafyllidou, 2001, p.67). In this case, ethnic exclusion of immigrants was replaced by cultural differentiation as the French authorities began accepting some degrees of differences among

minorities during the process of adaptation into the mainstream society. For example, Muslim communities were pushed to become more mainstream and compatible with the notion of *laïcité* (secularity), and eventually turn foreign Islam in France into the native French Islam (Triandafyllidou, 2001, p.69).

This approach introduced the notion of multiculturalism, but the republican model still forced the concept of diversity to be minimized in the French social system. Furthermore, the pathway toward recognition of these minorities was relatively long and immigration policies were not always acceptable to each generation of immigrants. Until the 1970s, the French integration system did not soften its assimilationist approach, as the Constitution of 1791 requested immigrants to abandon their cultural identity before the naturalization process took place. In this scenario, foreigners were strictly expected to adopt the French culture and lifestyle in order to become “Frenchmen” (Triandafyllidou, 2001, p.66). Only in 1973 did the new Nationality Law (*Legifrance*, 1973) finally begin to recognize that France was a country of immigration. It was supposed to help the French government to actively integrate civilians of different cultural or ethnic background into French society. However, it faced a significant disapproval among the mainstream population, and that resulted a widespread debate about who could be considered an ideal French person. The conflict eventually led to the emergence of far-right nationalist parties such as the Front National party founded by former paratrooper Jean-Marie Le Pen, who was concerned about the “purity of French identity” and reducing unemployment amongst the French people (DeGroat, 2001, p.76). This problem became especially significant when French authorities adopted multicultural legislation against racial discrimination in 1971 (*Legifrance*, 1971) and Mitterand's multicultural legislation of recognition in 1981 (*Legifrance*, 1981), which allowed immigrants to freely form associations based on their background. This change in policy encouraged the immigrant population to create cultural theatre groups and publish language newspapers supported by the ministry of culture, which attempted to establish a less racist society in the French Republic

(DeGroat, 2001, p.75).

Similarly, in the 1970s, many politicians were not interested in integrating those immigrants, hoping that they would eventually leave France. The last president who tried to implement limitations on immigration and increased deportation of immigrants was French conservative (or *Gaullist*) Valery Giscard d'Estaing, during the 1974 Presidential campaign, in order to win the votes from the Front National party. Regardless of the fact that he soon became president, d'Estaing succeeded in permitting new migrants into the country only to reunite families, which was previously allowed only to European immigrants. His deportation and other restrictive proposals were not enacted as it violated European Union regulations (DeGroat, 2001, pp.82-83).

However, more recent Gaullist leaders such as Jacques Chirac implemented more immigrant-friendly policies, but still initially opposed the multiculturalist approach of directly recognizing minorities. For example, then-Prime Minister Chirac criticized Mitterand's socialist administration for not contributing enough to public recognition of the second generation of Maghrebi people as French citizens, who were still mocked as “Beurs” by mainstream French citizens. On June 22, 1987, he installed a commission to combat racism and among its members were heads of minority communities (DeGroat, 2001, p.78). As President, Jacques Chirac organized the establishment of the novel Ministry of National Identity and Immigration in 2007, headed by Nicolas Sarkozy. However, despite accepting some degree of recognition, the ultimate goal was not to establish a multicultural policy that embraced diversity. For example, according to Chirac's mandate, the French government created a law in 2004 prohibiting headscarves at schools and this action has met with great controversy from European institutions, human rights organizations, and Muslim minority groups.

Furthermore, policies that softened the nation's assimilationist approach and 'colour blindness' were implemented only due to pressure from other factors. One example is the rising popularity of the Front National party, which appeals to supporters who oppose immigration policies and which portrays

people of immigrant origin as ‘inferior’ to mainstream French society. Thus, in order to avoid the national divisions and “communitarianism”, the French government had to implement more anti-discrimination policies and organizations to ease discrimination against and isolation of foreigners. This struggle has been enacted over decades between politicians and citizens who sympathize with far-right views. Another reason why laws have softened in regards to the nation’s assimilationist approach, especially under the ministry of Nicolas Sarkozy, is because of the 2005 Paris Riots which were committed by people of non-EU descent protesting unemployment and inability to achieve acceptance as citizens. Because of this complex set of factors and additionally under the influence of the EU policies, the French government eventually passed three laws to provide special social support for non-white civilians. The first was the Anti-Discrimination Act, which came into law on November 16, 2001 (*Legifrance*, 2001). The second was the Social Modernization Act, which came into law on January 17, 2002 (*Legifrance*, 2002). Finally was the Anti-Discrimination Act, which was passed on May 27, 2008 (*Legifrance*, 2008). These policies even formed special ZEPs (Zones d'Education Prioritaires) located in immigrant areas to help pupils of foreign origin to obtain easier access to higher levels of education (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010, pp.96-97).

In addition, Nicolas Sarkozy implemented Immigration and Nationality Act 2006 (*Legifrance*, 2006A), for political reasons. The first reason is that Sarkozy wanted to present himself as an excellent candidate who possessed excellent leadership skills, and to address public concerns including immigration to win support from the French people for the 2007 Presidential election (Chou and Baygert, 2007). Nevertheless, “Sarkozy’s approach has been criticized as utilitarian because it qualifies migrants in terms of numbers and the specific usage they would serve to better the French economic situation” (Chou and Baygert, 2007). He stated that before moving to France, immigrants must be completely accepted by French authorities in their countries of origin. Also, after moving to France, immigrants are pressured to embody republican values as the law prolonged the number of years before

their spouses living abroad were permitted to join them in France and obtain citizenship. The immigration policy was focused on attracting more skilled workers. But, in reality, the number of immigrants who came to the country to study and work was much lower than family members who came to live with high-skilled workers and this proportion is higher in comparison with those who went to Germany and the UK (Chou and Baygert, 2007). This means that France failed in attracting additional high-skilled professionals from abroad (Chou and Baygert, 2007).

Belgium

Belgium is also a very interesting case to explore in terms of immigration, particularly in comparison with the United Kingdom and France. Belgium has been considered to be very open to immigration since its foundation in 1830. Also, the country is divided into four linguistic regions: Flemish, Francophone, bilingual Brussels, and German-speaking regions. This has resulted in three administrative regions: Wallonia, Flanders, and Brussels Capital region, which all practice their own educational and social policies (Panayi, 2000, p.188). Since the end of the 1940s, like most Western European states, the Kingdom of Belgium was lacking in labour force, especially in the mining sector and thus the country allowed open immigration. Eventually 69.7% of males who migrated into the country between 1950 and 1954 were employed. Therefore, Belgium allowed the immigration of Italians and Spaniards, and later Moroccans and Turks (both since 1964), and Congolese (since late 1980s) (Martinello and Rea, 2013, p.14). Furthermore, in comparison with its British and French counterparts, Belgium was the first country that began to implement policies of recognition (Panayi, 2000, p.84). In Belgium the opening of the Great Mosque in Brussels in 1978 may be interpreted as indicating a certain degree of recognition of Islam, practiced mainly by foreigners as a minority religion. However, as the oil crisis hit, like many other European states, Belgium became very restrictive towards accepting new migrants. Similar to France and the United Kingdom, by implementing restrictions in 1974, Belgium allowed immigration solely based on family reunification, as the

recession caused massive national unemployment. Therefore, through bilateral agreements with Turkey and the North African states, Belgium solely eased its immigration policy related to work, permitting new immigrants to enter the country mostly for the economic purposes, without helping them to adapt into the host society.

However, in the 1980s and later in the 1990s, the situation began to move toward opening the border for more newcomers. Belgium began to ease its naturalization and immigration policies for new immigrants and new asylum seekers after the adoption of several legislative acts. The first one was the ‘Law on Access to the Territory, Residence, Settlement and Expulsion of Foreigners’ (*Loi sur l'accès au territoire, le séjour, l'établissement et l'éloignement des étrangers – 1980*). It was adopted in 1980 and became the first law since the oil crisis in 1973 to reopen doors for the new massive flow of immigrants. Four years later, the country approved the new Code of Belgian Nationality (*Code de la Nationalité Belge – 1984*) that eased naturalization rules, such as giving citizenship to the Belgian children of the foreign-born parents. In this scenario, from the 1980s until the 2010s, Belgium experienced a massive flow of immigrants that radically changed the demographic face of the country, especially in large cities such as Brussels and Antwerp: “In Antwerp, nearly 38% of its population is of foreign origin, while approximately 18% have a foreign nationality; in Brussels, nearly 62 % are of foreign origin and approximately 31% have a foreign nationality. The Brussels-Capital Region is of course extremely diverse not just because of general immigration, but also due to the vast community of European nationals working for European institutions” (Petrovic, 2012) and, historically, migrants coming from former Belgian colonies in central Africa.

It should be noted that not only Belgians were bringing more people but implemented easier rules to express their differences and become the country's new citizens. A very liberal naturalization law was adopted in 1984, with further amendments in 2000 that allow the migrants to become 'new Belgians' by approximately 30,000 people annually (Vause, 2014, pp.116-117; Petrovic, 2012). Also, from 2005-

2007, the Belgian government developed an action plan to prioritize 'respecting differences in the attitudes, values, cultural frameworks, lifestyles, skills and experiences of each member of a group (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010, p.19). On the other hand, such a liberal process of naturalization was met with criticism from nationalist parties such as Vlaams Bloc, which does not want to allow these 'new Belgians' to maintain two native identities, instead defending a novel, distinctive Belgian identity which is more based on traditions and values brought by foreign ethnic groups. Today, 18% of Belgians are of foreign origin and 10% remain non-naturalized (Petrovic, 2012). Regardless of the fact that people of non-EU origin have a good chance to become part of Belgian society, their ethnic identities are completely ignored by statistical institutions. For example, current statistics say that the immigrant population from Italy, France, and the Netherlands constitutes more than 40% of Belgian's immigrant population, and Moroccans make up almost 8 % and Turkish nearly 4 %. The reason why the numbers of non-EU individuals are underestimated is because a lot of them are already naturalized (Petrovic, 2012). Furthermore, policies of ethnic recognition are still incomplete in similar manner to France. Belgium only collects data based on country of origin, rather than specific ethnic or religious backgrounds and Belgian civic code is aware of the prioritization of some groups over others (Triandafyllidou, Modood and Meer, 2012, pp.228-229). This means it is impossible to state who is Arab or Berber among Moroccans, or who is considered ethnically Turkish or Kurdish among those people whose originate from Turkey. Also, under the pressure of some anti-racist organizations, it is believed that collecting data based on ethnicity or religion may foster racism in the country. Nevertheless, this policy does not follow the criteria of anti-discrimination policies as it would be impossible to find out whether there is some specific ethnic or religious discrimination in the labour market.

However, the evidence of discrimination is more evident, when Belgians of foreign origin attempt to obtain better and more equal social conditions. About 50% of people of immigrant origin aged 15-64

are unemployed (Pina, Corluy and Verbist, 2015, p.7) and Belgium has a much higher unemployment rate than many other countries such as France, the United Kingdom, or Germany. In this scenario, non-EU foreigners still face the problem of getting stuck in an economic trap and further excluded from the mainstream population, regardless of becoming Belgian. Nevertheless, it is important to state that liberal policies have been heavily criticized and eventually started to bring more restrictions, such as language requirements. Belgium also requires proof of economic participation, including getting a permanent job, before an immigrant can acquire citizenship (*Loi modifiant le Code de la nationalité belge afin de rendre l'acquisition de la nationalité belge neutre du point de vue de l'immigration*, 2012), which has been the subject of much debate in recent years, as did the issue of family reunification as well.

Similarly, Belgium was not very successful in terms of educational success among non-EU communities. Both the Flemish- and French-speaking communities have attempted to pass reforms in order to facilitate higher educational success among foreigners. The French-speaking region of Walloon has succeeded in passing major school reform in 2006 which postponed the beginning of secondary education from age 12 to 14. This law made it easier for less literate and poorly-performing students of migrant origin to adapt and to catch up to their mainstream counterparts academically. In contrast, the Flemish community has attempted to implement similar reform since 2009 but has been met with much resistance, especially from right-wing parties such as Vlaams Bloc (Panayi, 2000, p.170).

In addition, there have been political movements and factors which have eroded the path toward multiculturalist policies for specific regions. Walloon was more concentrated on the social inclusion of every civilian. Furthermore, as Flanders is the more capitalist region, in comparison with the working-class and left-wing Walloon, the pressure of right-wing and nationalist parties caused a policy shift. The Social model of the less assimilationist region eventually switched “from a minority-recognition

policy in the 1990s and 2000s (similar to the Dutch example) to an overall inclusive policy regardless of origins in 2009” (Petrovic, 2012). This was supposed to encourage foreign-born individuals to assimilate into Flemish culture, without joining any religious or ethnic communities related to their countries of origin.

Similarly, the Brussels-Capital Region has not done enough to fulfill the criteria of multiculturalism fully. Regardless of the fact that ongoing policies of recognition in Belgium have helped non-EU migrants and their descendants to increase their participation in politics from 1994 to 2004, and even appoint a second-generation Turk from the Francophone Socialist Party to office, this happened only because it is impossible to ignore the city's actual diversity. Otherwise, appointing only native Belgians to the city's government would suggest that the country secretly practices supremacism toward minority groups. Furthermore, appointing *only* one person of non-EU origin for the Brussels government is still very disproportionate, as people of non-EU origin make up large proportion of the city's population.

CONCLUSION

Without discrimination, exploitation, and goal of the capitalist system to achieve profit through a cheaper labour force, these third-world nationals would never have arrived in these Western European states and struggled for survival in old, abandoned districts of their host nation’s urban centres, which eventually became the 'ethnic enclaves' of these immigrants and their descendants. Furthermore, pressure on politicians from these minority groups and left-wing activists eventually forced authorities to make some concessions in regard to anti-discrimination laws and multiculturalist policies. However, the ultimate goal has never been to establish equality between foreigners and the native population. Furthermore, the conflict of interest between politicians and political parties caused the process of social and economic improvement to take longer than it is supposed to even under the pressure of EU Racial Equality Directive of 2000 (*COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2000/43/EC*). On other hand, multiculturalist policies were successful to some degree in promoting a more inclusive approach to

people of non-EU origin and their cultures. Indeed, France became less assimilationist and more open towards differences of non-EU communities than it used to be half a century ago. Of course, modern-day Britishness does not require one to be born English, Welsh or Scottish. Certainly, Belgium openly accepts immigrants and cultures of any origin to become 'new Belgian'. However, the result in all three countries has remained the same that immigration and integration policies wasted a lot of time and did not contribute enough effort throughout decades to help members of non-EU diasporas to adapt more successfully. The following chapter summarizes serious factors that are preventing migrants and their children from integrating properly even today.

CHAPTER 3 - TOWARDS INTEGRATION OR ALIENATION?

Modood suggests that true “multiculturalism is not about cultural rights” (Modood, 2010, p.67).

Indeed, Western European societies have faced many other sorts of “structural barriers that are factors standing in the way of the emancipation and of equal opportunities for ethnic and religious minorities that therefore contribute to their economic, social and cultural marginalization” (Shadid and Koningsveld, 1991, p.5). The barriers against proper integration are present in economic system, in processes such as transnationalism and multinationalism, in residential and cultural segregation, and in value systems such as west-centrism. These factors are not primarily related to cultural rights of people of non-EU origin and have posed obstacles to the effectiveness of multiculturalist policies in the European countries, examined in this thesis. While these three societies, as noted in previous chapters, have adopted differing degrees of multiculturalist policy, the dynamics identified in this chapter may have relevance to each case, suggesting some general structural factors that explain the failure of successful integration policies.

This chapter provides an examination of several underlying economic, social, and cultural dynamics that various analysts have identified as obstructing effective integration of immigrants and their descendants into the United Kingdom, France, and Belgium. The written material may also explain why the shift toward more multiculturalist policies, to varying degrees in each of the three countries, as was discussed in Chapter 2, were not successful tools of integration. This chapter draws on critiques provided by a range of analysts that reflect a variety of theoretical and ideological perspectives. An examination of these critiques may help to elucidate the degree to which, and also why, Western European states have developed features similar to an apartheid system where race began shaping “an invisible border designating who and who does not belong to Europe” (Yegenoglu, 2012, p.150). The concepts examined herein may also provide a new perspective regarding what kind of dynamics may keep foreigners foreign and prevent the majority of individuals belonging to different racial or religious

backgrounds from becoming completely European.

MULTICULTURALIST POLICY – HOW IS IT SHAPED BY ECONOMY?

The evolution of multiculturalism was never separate from the economic processes in Western European countries, even on the global level, and it is one of the real issues that policies of multiculturalism have ignored. Economic factors caused the initial ghettoization of migrants and prevented multicultural policy from resulting in an improvement in living standards in the short-term and an avoidance of segregation in the long term, which impacted the following generations of people of non-EU descent. Left-wing critics often argue that multiculturalism has been nothing else but a “rhetoric which disguises inequality and 'ghettoization'” (Isajiw, 1997, p.21) and that these policies actually segregated these distinctive groups in order to control and manipulate them while cultural recognition can only become a marker of inequality. Multiculturalism is still determined by the demands of global capitalism historically, Gaytri Spivak has suggested (Yenengolu, 2012, p.54). According to this argumentation, the real debate is not about skin colour or identity of a foreigner.

Migration implies a rapid cultural change across time and across economic stages of development (Braun and Klooss, 1995, p.85) in France, the UK, and Belgium. From the viewpoint of this school of thought, all of these countries always “pursued their own economic interests and labour market capacity” and it has always been “class relationships between bourgeoisie and colonized workers form the basis of super-exploitation in situations of split labour markets producing exploitations of immigrant workers” (Isajiw, 1997, p.120). As mentioned before, they allowed immigrants to enter those countries in order to eliminate the labour shortage that these European states faced soon after the end of World War II. Furthermore, they were more easily exploited, as these Third Country Nationals provided cheap labor and were effective targets for social and economic discrimination who were more willing to work hard and for longer hours. Thus, they provided an effective stratum of workers who contributed greatly to the economic development of Western European countries and helped to

generate significant economic expansion: “Muslim immigrants in France built one out of two apartments, 90 percent of highways and 1 out 7 machines” (Ennaji, 2014, p.146).

The primary reason why the anti-discrimination policies, discussed in the previous chapter, were adopted is that the conditions of these migrants became too harsh, and they began protesting for the improvement in their lives and working conditions. So, the government authorities made some concessions to minimize the level of discrimination and to help the migrants to concentrate more on work. In a similar way, they adopted more direct multiculturalist policies which are “not just about ensuring the non-discriminatory application of laws, but about changing the laws and regulations themselves to better react the distinctive needs and aspirations of minorities” (Banting and Kymlicka, 2013, p.582). For example, in 1976, the French government decided to create a Secretariat of State for Immigrant Workers Affairs who was meant to work on the four following points. “The first was to control the “population movement”. The second was to continuously exchange views with the countries of origin of the immigrants. The third was to give immigrant workers the right to retain their cultural affiliation, and the last was to determine the necessary conditions for the creation of a real equality between immigrants and French citizens” (Shadid and Koningsveld, 1996, pp.24-25). However, the authorities did not predict that these “temporal” Islamic communities of foreign origin would remain in France for the long term. Indeed, in the 1970s, the Belgian, British, and French governments were temporarily restricting immigration as the oil shock crisis caused slow growth and high unemployment rates among nationals. However, economic conditions have again begun to change the rules related to bringing foreigners into these Western states.

Since the 1980s, the rules of immigration and multiculturalism have again changed toward opening the borders to a huge influx of migrants, because the world has entered in the next phase of economic process – globalization. Especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the transnational corporations have expanded across the borders and this provoked a massive wave of immigration as “globalization

means more immigration” (Leveau, Finan and Wenden, 2002, p.75). This time, countries were allowing more people from third world nations to immigrate in order to accumulate unlimited profits through exploitation of Third Country Nationals, who are a cheaper labour force. This strategy definitely fulfills the goal of neoliberalism. Also, the time frame coincides with the implementation of a set of immigration policies that liberalized immigration and even eased the regulations related to gaining citizenship. This is especially true of the Belgian case, which saw naturalization of large numbers of immigrants since the 1980s. This was a reflection of the fact that globalization had only diminished the importance and the role of a nation state, and caused the growing influence of 'cosmopolitan' third-world country nationals. The whole world has become one 'global village' where free migration was driven by transnational corporations. The open immigration policies of Tony Blair indeed included some identity checks of immigrating individuals, but it was done not for the sake of restriction. Rather, it was implemented to avoid any suspicious migrants who may be involved with crime or terrorist circles (Shadid and Koningsveld, 1996, p.210).

Eventually, neoliberal globalization adopted the left-wing rhetoric of embracing diversity and tolerance. Initially, neoliberal systems opposed this policy as a social liberal ideology that encourages welfare support for less advantaged immigrants and their children, and at the same time abuses the notion of individual freedom. Nevertheless, it eventually adapted parts of the multicultural doctrine for the sake of doing business with enterprises run by people of different cultural backgrounds and seeking a language of interaction with individuals of different skin colours (Kymlicka, 2012, pp.107-108). Neoliberal multiculturalism also served the purpose of promoting consumerism. White customers living in Western European states can buy commodities on a massive scale while they interact with and express tolerance or indifference toward a seller who is very likely non-white, wears some distinctive cultural dress, and/or speaks with accent (Tony Blair's “New Labour” class).

Throughout the stages of economic changes, civilians of non-EU origin continue to remain an

“underclass” who have less opportunities in employment, quality of life and education than the native population. For example, according to Enjah who personally interacted with the members of diasporas in Belgium, “the vast majority of Moroccans who obtained Belgian citizenship belong to the working class, they work for long hours doing difficult tasks for small salaries. Their situation is precarious. Many are unemployed and live on welfare and spend most of their time in cafes” (Ennaji, 2014, p.140). Instead, they were granted citizenship in order “to be more positively pictured by the host societies” (Ennaji, 2014, p.146). Furthermore, the second and third generation are less successful in education and employment than their native counterparts (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010, p.9).

Many economists look at multicultural societies as hierarchical rather than equal. They argue that economic agents are “differentiated by income class, differing tastes of products, work incentives, education attainment, job skills and the like (Braun and Klooss, 1995, p.74). This universal society is still racially hierarchical, where the richest Western European white ethnic groups have higher status over other minorities, including white British (English, Scottish, Welsh, and Irish), white others, black British and South Asian British in the UK. In France, white Roman Catholic French, sometimes labeled as Gauls, remain hierarchical toward the Maghreb, Sub-Saharan, and Vietnamese minorities; in Belgium, white Belgians (Walloon and Flemish) see themselves as superior to Congolese, Turkish, and Moroccan people in Belgium.

Furthermore, Third Country Nationals and their descendants are very vulnerable to any economic disaster, such as the global recession of 2008-2015. People of immigrant origin such as Moroccans were most heavily impacted by the economic recession, as they worked in the areas that were hit the hardest” (Ennaji, 2014, p.43). Other difficulties which Western European countries began to face are welfare cuts and reduced spending in order to boost their economies. This became particularly evident following December 2009 in dealing with the debt crisis in Greece and other PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain) states: “After European governments had been forced to bail out systemic banks, the

financial crisis was redefined as a crisis of fiscal profligacy, requiring tough and prolonged public austerity” (Hemerijck and Vandenbroucke, 2012) that eventually brought about the European Fiscal Compact that encourages austerity measures.

The most recent crisis once again changed the direction of immigrant policies, so that they may no longer sustain liberal conditions as in the early 2000s. Youth unemployment among nationals, an influx of EU migrants, and “the troubled economy and the intensified discussions leading towards the formation of the European Union also encouraged the growth of the far right movements such as French Front National” (DeGroat, 2001, p.77), which perhaps also played a role in turning politicians away from non-EU residents by declaring that multiculturalism 'has been a failure'. Indeed, the rising popularity of the far-right and the eurosceptic political parties that generally take anti-immigrant stances are one of the circumstances that affected the positions of politicians in power. As the global recession hit the European continent, toughening economic conditions related to finding jobs and the impact on welfare caused a growing percentage of nationals to agree with the argument that, overall, immigration must be reduced and managed well (Blinder, 2014). In this case, the political struggle has increased and many mainstream parties have begun to adopt anti-immigrant and even anti-multiculturalist approaches in order to avoid the far right and eurosceptic parties such as Front National or collecting votes. Through this method, local conservative parties could achieve a win during the UK general election in May 2015 and French local and by-elections in spring 2015, as they become more aware of their populist counterparts which gained most of seats in both countries during European elections in the previous year. Furthermore, economic conditions also shape the public opinion about what kind of immigrants are desired. Today, the ideal migrant is “young, highly qualified and skilled in a relevant field individual or alternatively, an investor with both financial and business capital who is able to create job positions and contribute to the stimulation of the economic growth” (Muchowiecka, 2013).

Aside from the global economic crisis, in the near future, immigration policies could be shaped by impact of modern and innovative technology on the economy. Some German journalists are aware that robots may become potential replacements for both white-collar and blue-collar workers, and can make themselves more effective tools to fulfill low-skilled jobs more quickly, more efficiently, and with no real price: “Some robots in industries like agriculture, such as a self-driven picking machine, take over jobs that would otherwise go to migrant workers” (Overdorf, 2015). According to one economic researcher, Bowles, “these new developments could also mitigate immigration by unskilled workers because machines will become cheaper than workers more quickly in rich countries than in poor ones” (Overdorf, 2015). This factor is becoming a reality in the near future not only in Germany, but also in Belgium, France and the UK as these are also industrialized states.

Marxists were correct that the immigration policies were run by the interests of capitalists who needed these non-European migrants to exploit for profit-making means. No matter how effective or socially inclusive multiculturalism really was, these immigrants and their descendants generally remained poorer than the native population. Finally, it is important to understand that rules and nature of immigration and multiculturalist policies changed throughout the economic stages in order to adapt to the system of exploitation. Finally, foreigners risk more chances of exclusion or deportation, whenever some condition shows that immigration brings more losses than benefits for the countries and/or companies that hire migrants.

MULTINATIONALISM and TRANSNATIONALISM

In one way or another, non-EU communities face very serious problems with adopting the identity of their host countries because of transnationalism and multinationalism. For the latter case, Kymlicka argues that Western European governments should “adapt familiar models of multinational citizenship to be more inclusive of immigrants. In short, if the citizenship agenda is to be effective, we need a more multinational conception of citizenship, and a more multicultural conception of multinationalism”

(Kymlicka, 2011, p.282), which the United Kingdom and Belgium still lack. The French system is strictly based on unitarianism and does not count its foreign or native minorities, including Bretons, Basques, or Catalans as “nations within nations”, unlike Scottish citizens within the UK or Walloon citizens within Belgium. Kymlicka also points to the problem of what it means to be British or Belgian. A post-national approach would imply that it is not necessary for a person of immigrant origin to identify as English, Welsh, Scottish, Northern Irish, or Cornish to be British or, in Belgium, to identify as Walloon or Flemish. A multinational approach would suggest that it is only possible to become British or Belgian through assimilating or adapting into one of these aboriginal ethnicities.

On the local level, in the UK, civilians of non-EU descent are forced to adopt some elements of Englishness (assimilation) or Scottishness (civic integration in Scotland's framework), in order to adapt. This causes confusion for members of non-EU diasporas about the concept of 'Britishness' on a unitary level. A similar scenario is observable within Belgium, especially in the Flemish region, which until recent years appealed to immigrants to integrate into a Flemish identity by learning the local dialect of Dutch only and abandoning the idea of becoming a Belgian person on a federal level. In contrast, Walloons demand a full cultural assimilation without being aware of the Dutch speaking community living in the north of the country.

In most of the UK, it may be preferable from the point of view of people of immigrant descent to identify themselves as ‘British’, which may appear to be a more open and civic identity compared to the more ethnic categories of English, Welsh, Scottish, or Irish. They can imagine themselves becoming British in a way that they have trouble seeing themselves as English or Welsh. Moreover, foreigners and their descendants often have no desire to be dragged into these old battles. Many of them left countries with destabilizing ethnic/sectarian conflicts, and they did not come to Britain to “become foot soldiers in someone else’s identity conflicts” (Kymlicka, 2011, p.291). According to the census, most of the ethnicities who belong to foreign minorities consider themselves to be British in

approximately the same percentage as white British (at the range of 87%). However, in Scotland, where 33% of Scottish people totally reject even partial British identity, there is a risk of alienating themselves for affiliation with a unitary state. During the 2003 General Elections, 47% of ethnic Pakistanis have voted for the separatist Scottish National Party and this is not only because this party opposed the British invasion of Iraq, which is a Muslim country. According to the poll, one-third of Pakistanis living in Scotland consciously support Scottish independence from the rest of Britain (Kymlicka, 2011, p.283). Another reason why the Scottish National Party maintains its popularity among the people of immigrant heritage is that, by the late 1980s, it abandoned the “fortress mentality” and encouraged all minorities, in comparison with the more nationalist England which is subject to the influence of assimilationist Conservatives (Kivisto, 2002, pp.125-126).

Devolution of accommodation of Welsh or Scottish nationalism may be oppressive to people of non-EU origin unless there is pressure to redefine Welshness and Scottishness to be ethnically inclusive. Moreover, “surveys suggest that conceptions of English nationhood remain deeply ethnic, even racist – an attitude that can persist in part because state policy assumes that immigrants in England will become British without becoming English” (Kymlicka, 2011, p.292). Also, a strong sense of English identity is associated with greater Islamophobia, as some English nationalists have dressed themselves as crusaders. In this case, if immigrants residing in England want to stay and adapt to the region, then British Muslims must assimilate or face exclusion and even racist attacks by English nationalists. Nevertheless, at the same time, Scottish identity is not associated with any form of xenophobia toward the foreigners. In contrast, conceptions of Scottish nationhood are becoming increasingly multicultural, and this is due, at least in part, to the fact that the Scottish government has committed itself to including immigrants within its conception of Scottishness, not just as British citizens living alongside members of the Scottish nation. Sub-state regional government in Scotland, often in the hands of nationalist parties, has adopted immigrant integration policies that encourage

immigrants to think of themselves not as post-nationals but as members of a Scottish community and as participants in projects of sub-state nation-building. The result is “a potential asymmetry or even contradiction in citizenship promotion policies” (Kymlicka, 2011, p.294) as the central government promotes a post-national form of citizenship. Scotland still encourages its civilians of foreign origin to reject the identity of the country the immigrants are actually residing in, which is truly British. This form is still publicly promoted so that immigrants can become British without becoming English, Scottish, Welsh, or Irish, while sub-state regional governments promote a multinational form of citizenship, telling them that they become citizens precisely by becoming Scottish or Welsh, whether it is civic or ethnic nationalism (Kymlicka, 2011, pp.293-294).

Alongside these issues, transnationalism also has diminished the significance of nation states and affected on the notion of citizenship of the Western European states through the agents of neoliberal globalization. It also brought about a conflict regarding the sense of belonging among non-European nationals within European states. Initially, countries like the United Kingdom had a more restrictive notion of citizenship, in the late 1940s and 1950s, when the civic principles or ethnic identity were strictly based on the nationhood. In later decades, “national belonging becomes increasingly dissociated from cultural belonging” (Amiriaux, 2010, p.94): “The 1980s and early 1990s allegedly saw a decreasing salience and material importance of the status of citizenship, for immigrants and receiving countries alike, particularly in the context of a north-western European experience with guest workers” (Triandafyllidou, Modood and Meer, 2012, p.88). The jurisdictions of these states eased the process for Third Country Nationals to acquire passports. Citizenship was no longer based on belonging to some racial, ethnic or civic identity and those immigrants were no longer required to get assimilated or abandon the citizenship of their country of birth. Even melting pot countries like France, give passports to the offspring of migrants, who are raised according to the traditional values of their parents at home. Naturalized immigrants along with their descendants “might be formally considered as citizens, but

they are not de facto citizens” (Yeegenoglu, 2012, p.72). At the same time, the problem of immigrant integration goes beyond the citizenship, as the process must also include a concept of identity and self-understanding of the country (Triantafyllidou, 2001, p.58).

At the same time, minority communities that inhabit Western European states have begun to create networks not only with people living in diasporas, but also with their co-ethnics living in their countries of origin: “The postwar changes in the organization and ideologies of the global system have increasingly shifted the institutional and normative basis of citizenship to a transnational level and have extended rights and privileges associated with it beyond national boundaries” (Isajiw, 1997, p.49).

Migrants were more likely to seek to maximize their opportunities through their cultural networks and “for some such transnational communities this incorporation, rather than a diasporic, became a dominant motive” (Rex, 1995, p.245). For example, when the Muslim religious minority did not receive enough state support from host nations such as Belgium and France to improve the infrastructure of their institutions and religious buildings, the community obtained money from other countries such as Saudi Arabia and Libya (Shadid and Koningsveld, 1991, p.16). Even representatives from these countries appointed teachers or mullahs by their choice (Shadid and Koningsveld, 1991, p.18). On the other hand, the Moroccan government encouraged co-ethnics returning to Morocco to invest in their own countries (Ennaji, 2014, p.45). It is important to mention that some religions, like Islam, possess a very strong post-national character and do not require practicing people to maintain loyalty to a particular nation state. This fact even raised a number of questions “concerning the primary commitments of Muslim citizens and how much they conflict with non-Islamic institutional norms” (Merry and Milligan, 2010, p.2) or to which society the majority of British Muslims feel they belong to. A good British example is the Punjab minority that established a strong community in order to improve their economic position in the UK. As a result, since 1981, the liberalization of the rights of foreign associations facilitated that evolution and offered an expansion of social, cultural, economic,

and political functions that accelerated the process of segregation.

Members of foreign communities have lost a sense of the necessity of interacting with the mainstream and feel more comfortable living amongst their co-ethnics (Shadid and Koningsveld, 1996, p.123). In this case, the integrationist policies of host countries did not account for how much people of migrant origin “should be allowed to enjoy full rights of citizens whether in doing so they should be required to give up their own culture” (Isajiw, 1997, p.17). Furthermore, the better-integrated younger generation faces difficulties in convincing the traditionalist members of their Muslim society to adopt more liberal values as they consider Western society too ignorant or morally corrupt (Merry and Milligan, 2010, p.2; Muchowiecka, 2013). Members of particular religious groups may have shared values or practices, directly or indirectly arising from their religion, which lead them to prioritize things like family responsibilities rather than paid employment. They were mobilized and negotiated collectively, so that even some younger members of society were assimilated into the local society (Isajiw, 1997, p.17).

Also, some supporters of multiculturalism were not aware that some of members of diasporas may have intended to return to their home countries and communities after settling temporarily in the host country (Isajiw, 1997, p.17). Therefore, those people would not be interested in becoming integrated and instead continue to keep cultural ties with their communities. Even recently, some naturalized migrants who have kept their 'transnational character' have begun to live and work in other countries related to their religious or ethnic heritage, especially in the face of discrimination, economic downturns, or toughening integration policies. As a result, immigrants and their descendants are already returning to their cultural homelands, such as British Indians coming back to India and starting successful business entrepreneurship or careers, like British born Indian actresses becoming Bollywood celebrities after moving to India in their adult life (Fernandes, 2011). Some European Turks (including the educated ones) have also followed a similar path by returning to Turkey, which is now experiencing

economic prosperity and has a high demand for a skilled labour force from Turkish diaspora. Many French Muslims prefer to move abroad. However, instead of moving to the African continent that in recent years has been filled with civil wars, revolutions, poverty, and epidemics, they move to wealthy Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (Randall, 2015).

RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION

The social and economic mobilization of non-EU communities along the internal structural barriers and lack of interaction with members of the mainstream have contributed to residential segregation of Third Country Nationals and their descendants from the native population. In theory, multiculturalism should help ethnic minorities of immigrant descent join altogether and fight for equality and form alliances due to some circumstances guaranteeing that “parties within the parties and unions within unions are formed and the interests are met by governments” (Isajiw, 1997, p.22). This approach should provide another means of achieving proper integration. However, often when individuals of foreign origin face problems within their host country, they join together with other co-ethnics. For example, when the Muslim minority faced cuts in public funding, they concentrated on collecting as many members of the same community as possible who were negatively impacted by these austerity policies (Braun and Klooss, 1995, p.42). The process of communitarianism or geographical deprivation within urban areas of all these ethnic groups may lead to “highly explosive, violent and escalating ethnic conflicts [that] tend to develop when the relations between territorially segregated groups are predominantly or exclusively those of nearly overlapping discrimination, oppression, exploitation or exclusion” (Isajiw, 1997, p.118).

Regardless of the fact that segregation does not necessarily mean less success for everyone, immigrants and their descendants joined together and formed ethnic sub-economies in order to avoid discrimination and economically adapt to the host country. That factor eventually brought about the emergence of ethnic enterprises (Isajiw, 1997, p.262). Thus, “a multicultural society becomes one

comprising different ethnocultural and linguistic groups – all bound together minimally in a common economic structure” (Braun and Klooss, 1995, p.81). In an ethnic sub-economy, some workers and employers may work for, or hire others, of their own group, whether by design or circumstance” (Isajiw, 1997, p.249). Those networks operate in real estate and other markets which link buyers, sellers, suppliers, lenders, workers, and employers. Regardless of the fact that these enterprises have also made contributions to the incorporation of local communities, they could not properly interact with the native customers because of racism. There were even circumstances in which some businesses, like restaurants and shops, did not want their co-ethnic customers to move outside of enclaves (Braun and Klooss, 1995, pp.97-98). In exceptional cases, “only the West Indian immigrants into France find themselves more comfortable than most immigrants in the country due to the linguistic command of French (as a result of attending a French based education system), and to their status of French cities” (Panayi, 2000, p.65). On the other hand, “religious institutions may foster social networks based on co-religionists and thus limit 'bridging' social capital which is expected to bring benefits in terms of access to job information and opportunities through 'mainstream' social networks” (Lucassen, p.133).

Another obstacle to avoiding residential segregation were internal structural barriers: “These barriers for Muslims in European countries also differ with the respect to the division of responsibilities between the national and local governments” (Shadid and Koningsveld, 1991, p.7). Except for assimilationist France, which has a very centralized system, the more multicultural and liberal Belgium and UK were not better cases for structural organization and funding. Belgium is very divided by regions and municipalities, and the federal government has very limited power to establish common policies and support for non-EU communities inhabiting the country. In the British case, cultural communities were as also decentralized and localized. Therefore, in both countries, many municipalities cannot obtain enough federal support for people of foreign origin who face poverty, especially when fiscally conservative right-wing parties or coalitions are in power. In the Belgian case,

a limit of the vote for unnaturalized migrants to express their concerns and problems caused their participation to be limited for advisory councils on a local level. As a result, “separate educational arrangements, community and voluntary bodies, employment, places of worship, language, social and cultural networks, means that many communities operate on the basis of a series of parallel lives. Those lives often do not seem to touch at any point, let alone overlap and promote any meaningful interchanges” (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010, p.5).

As a result, with such a lack of interaction with the native population or, mainstream society does not accept that they and the immigrants possess similar interests and instead prefer to keep them alienated. For example, in the UK, young men belonging to Pakistani heritage and Muslim communities were blamed for riots and considered to be a threat against the civic order. They were “portrayed as a monolithic and angry group, caught between two cultures and who were using violence as a means of empowerment” (Shadid and Koningsveld, 1996, p.144). Furthermore, this only increased the belief that, regardless of the fact that most British Muslims or other people belonging to a different group claim themselves as British (due to residence and political participation), they are still treated as responsible for the decline of traditional Britishness, due to their lack of understanding of the country's core customs and culture (*Commission for Racial Equality*, 2006, p.10).

CULTURAL SEGREGATION

Not only transnationalism, alongside economic and social pressures, forced those immigrants to gather into ethnic ghettos. One aspect of division within nation states is that multiculturalism strengthened the cultural (religious or ethnic) lines between third-world nationals and white citizens, instead of protecting non-EU individuals from discrimination based on race, ethnicity, or religion. Former British Prime Minister Gordon Brown once argued that “if for too long we overvalued what makes us different, it is time to also value what we have in common. Being British carries rights. It also carries duties. And those duties take clear precedence over any cultural or religious practice” (Vertovec

and Wessendorf, 2010, pp.54-55). Instead, the British integrationist system brought about a conflict between progressive and hard multiculturalism. The former concentrates on the individual, and the latter is more concerned with specific groups. The progressive variant was based on avoidance of discrimination toward individuals who belong to different cultural identities, and places less reliance on “groupness in favour”. Hard multiculturalism is based on the collective actions of immigrants and minorities. And, “British discourse on racialized minorities has mutated from colour in the 1950s and 1960s, to 'race' in the 1960s-1980s, ethnicity in the 1990s and religion in present period” (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010, p.58). The issue of “colour” is more based on individual traits, but the other three are based on group features. Thus, recognizing minority religions automatically provoked the recognition of distinctive and separate ethno-cultural communities within the country.

Discrimination against groups that express difference was not related so much to biological characteristics in countries such as France or Belgium but instead, it was “more based on the construction more of a cultural than a biological difference” (DeGroat, 2001, p.74). Amiraux once argued that “culture should be understood as a part of individual identity that cannot just be left behind when discussing political participation” (Amiraux, 2010, p.93). Many Maghrebs were not accepted by French society because they were not acting French enough, as they preserve their way of life, including wearing a hijab. In terms of employment, they are accepted in second place, as the selections are based on first or last name and theirs are not French. At the same time, the requirements of integration are unequal. Christian Delorme, a Catholic priest from Lyon, has criticized the assimilationist policies in France by saying that they do not work with people mainly of Maghreb origin, regardless of the fact that religious practices are permitted on a private level: “it is not good for the children of Maghreb families to erase all of their Maghreb culture and try to resemble the French more than the French. While immigrants are asked to give up their culture, French do not accept. So they remain marginalized” (DeGroat, 2001, p.84).

Indeed, religious institutions of most minorities tend to preserve their traditional way of upbringing and such actions caused a lot of controversy. When Tony Blair's 'New Labour' government accepted the argument of opening the religious schools, a small number of state-aided non-Christian, non-Jewish schools opened, including Hindu, Sikh, and Muslim schools. Some Christian groups have criticized those actions for being “agents of social division and social exclusion” (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010, p.60) and eventually contributing to religious extremism. Regardless of the fact that these religious schools promote pupil discipline and examination tests, all of those schools belong to different ethnicities. Upbringing based on different religious rituals and behavioural rules caused descendants to behave differently than their native counterparts. Such a situation caused the younger generation to practice more conservative norms, ideals, heritage, and identities than their liberal counterparts among the native population (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010, p.60).

Furthermore, multiculturalist and recognition policies formed the subcultures or new socio-ethnic identities in diverse cities in Western Europe such as London, which became a playground of cultural 'mixity', and where minorities do not identify themselves closer to traditional cultures. “Language, gestures and music of the street-wise Afro-Caribbean became powerful icons for many young white and Asian Britons who 'appropriate some of the blazonry of black youth style', using so-called 'Multicultural London English', combining elements from Afro-Caribbean Creole, African-American speech and the South London black vernacular” (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010, p.63). In France, second generation Maghrebi people known as 'beurs' are stereotyped as being only interested in their ethnic networking. Recognition of their Muslim religion which they practice only formally brought them to behave as 'others' from the mainstream. Their hybrid culture that include the elements of Maghrebi and Western cultures (such as singing rap songs) are not equivalent to the core French culture (Kivisto, 2002, p.184). Furthermore, multiculturalist and recognition policies formed subcultures or new socio-ethnic identities in diverse cities in Western Europe such as London, which

became a playground of cultural mixing, and where minorities do not identify themselves closely with traditional cultures: “Language, gestures and music of the street-wise Afro-Caribbean became powerful icons for many young white and Asian Britons who 'appropriate some of the blazonry of black youth style', using so-called 'Multicultural London English', combining elements from Afro-Caribbean Creole, African-American speech and the South London black vernacular” (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010, p.63). In France, second-generation Maghreb people known as 'beurs' are stereotyped as being only interested in own ethnic networking. Recognition of their Muslim religion, which they practice only formally, caused them to appear as 'others' to the mainstream. Their hybrid culture, which includes elements of both Maghreb and Western culture (such as singing rap songs) are not equivalent to the core French culture (Kivisto, 2002, p.184). Eventually, in assimilationist France, the process of *banlieusation* (or suburbanization) eventually brought about the ethnization or racialization of people of foreign origin living in assimilationist France (Costa-Lascoux, 2001, pp.123-124).

The lack of modernity of these non-European migrants also played a role in building lines between 'civilized and rich westerners' and 'barbaric and poor Third Country Nationals in multiculturalist policy: “Tourraine argued that in fact modernization had secularized the Christian world and can do the same to the Islamic world” (DeGroat, 2001, p.86). There was an existing gap of modernity between the countries that received immigrants and countries from which immigrants originated. That is why immigrants who were, for example, coming to the UK, were treated as colonial subjects with 'backward' cultures, soon after the collapse of British Empire, that were mainly coming from the Commonwealth nations which were part of British Empire - Caribbean nations, Pakistan, and India. Another factor that prevented immigrants from adapting more quickly is that many Third Country Nationals and their families were coming into these countries primarily from the agricultural or underdeveloped areas of their countries of origin. At the same time, they were very uneducated and illiterate, and most of the family members who were old and male held onto customs that prevented

women from achieving equality with men. In comparison, Greek Cypriots received better treatment as they were more westernized than Sikh people. Negative and prejudiced treatment toward the identities of non-European migrants has indeed brought about more obstacles to modernizing and integrating their identities.

Eventually all of this xenophobia and isolationism, and a lack of interaction with mainstream society, has brought about an apartheid-type situation in Europe. Furthermore, the concern persists that some “long-standing minorities were seen as carriers of illiberal political cultures and “backward minority culture” such as unequal treatment of women through forced marriages, and the organization of terrorist groups within British society (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010, pp.9-11). In addition, this fear persists in relation to some recent immigrant groups”, especially of the Muslim background (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010, pp.44-45). Multiculturalism is not directly responsible for the radicalization among the youth of immigrant descent. However, a lack of interaction between mainstream and immigrant communities brings more distrust, misunderstanding, and even hostility. Alienation increases the chances of the native population joining populist, far-right, and white-supremacist groups and parties, as, at the same time, civilians of immigrant background, who are treated as external others, are vulnerable to religious radicalization.

IS MULTICULTURALISM WEST-CENTRIC?

One of the major problems of multiculturalism is that it is still very western-centric. This integrationist policy was based on liberal ideas that originated from Western countries and European-Christian ideology. Thus, the countries that accepted third-world migrants still treat mainstream society as a core society that teaches other cultures to live in a very tolerant way. Regardless of the fact that liberals claim that they “accommodate rather than dominate other ways of life” (Crowder, pp.117-118), liberal values cannot do so because they are not sufficiently universal. British political theorist and Lord of Indian Descent and former spokesman of Asian communities in the United Kingdom, Bhikhu

Parekh, does not completely agree with the statement that 'human rights are not invalid simply because they were first formulated in the West' (Crowder, 2000, p.118) in the same way as paper was invented in China but was useful for everybody else. Parekh believes that “to regulate multicultural societies and relations within the states, everyone should look at a higher level of philosophical abstraction, in a dialogue between the cultures, but only on the same level of ideas from alternative cultural backgrounds” (Parekh, 2000, p. 267). Parekh means that all cultures should be seen on a more universal level and that no cultures should be hierarchal or peripheral during dialogue and exchange of values with one another.

Other critics of multiculturalism have explained that this industry or ideology was run predominantly by white liberal activists. Melanie Phillips, one of the critics of the doctrine and author of controversial *Londonistan* claimed that “multiculturalism has become the driving force of British life, ruthlessly policed by an army of bureaucrats enforcing a doctrine of state-mandated virtue to promote racial, ethnic and cultural balkanization” (Vertovec and Wessendorf , 2010, p.7). At the same time, James Slack and David Cameron even criticized this western-based 'Left-Wing doctrine' "for contributing to a 'deliberately weakening of our collective identity" (Vertovec and Wessendorf , 2010, p.7), while *solely* dictates how different communities should integrate and interact. He was also blamed for falsely labeling some critics of multiculturalism and immigration as racist in certain issues through the “tyranny of political correctness”. It was also discussed whether or not multicultural ideology was responsible for organizing “cultural apartheid” by provoking segregation and communitarianism within host nations (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010, p.8).

Regardless of the fact that multiculturalism in general failed to keep ethnic minorities from being marginalized, it also could not convince the mainstream that their culture was not a threat to the European cultural identity. Instead of accepting new cultures as part of the national identity, the religions and identities of non-EU migrants are kept in a secondary role instead of an equal one along

with mainstream society. As mentioned previously regarding ethnic minorities and immigrants of non-EU descent who have arrived and settled since after World War II, a “majority of them represents non-European traditions” (Muchowiecka, 2013). To make these people equal to native citizens, it is mandatory to “understand their claims” and to achieve this “it would be worth mentioning a non-European perspective” (Muchowiecka, 2013). At the same time, immigrants who settled into those states have faced racist remarks from Europeans who appear to be west-centric and argue “that democracy, humanism, scientific rationality, freedom and human rights are all uniquely belong to the West” (Muchowiecka, 2013). Instead, multiculturalism, which left minorities segregated, failed non-EU immigrants and their descendants, and prevented them from cultivating their own cultural and religious traditions to the enrichment of mainstream society. Aside from “ancient Greece and Rome, Christianity, Renaissance and the Enlightenment and finally as a fruit of industrial revolution and democratic movements” (Muchowiecka, 2013), multiculturalism has failed to repeat the success of foreign cultures enriching Western society, as they used to in medieval times. It is important to mention that European civilization, founded by Mesopotamia and Ancient Egypt, advanced mathematics through interaction with Islamic states and India, and adopted many inventions like compass, rockets, and printing techniques from the Chinese. Multiculturalism did not help Western society, and non-Western groups could not properly exchange knowledge and values between each other.

CONCLUSION

The policies of multiculturalism that were practiced in Europe were successful in recognizing the differences of non-EU minorities, but could not deal with several barriers that arose during the process. Socio-economic factors such as execution of economic goals by corporations and nation states, multinationalism and transnationalism, residential and cultural segregation, and elements of western-centrism have eroded the process of proper integration for the next generations of non-white civilians. As a result, most of the civilians of non-EU origin, even those born in Western Europe, are culturally

and socially alienated from mainstream society. Due to residential and cultural segregation, it would be difficult for members of minority communities to familiarize themselves with and exchange values with the host cultures. In such a condition, multiculturalist policies cannot fulfill the goal of making all ethnic groups have the same sense of belonging together. Furthermore, a serious gap persists between civilians of non-EU descent and white Europeans, where the latter group lives in much better conditions than the former. In the following chapter, this paper examines more direct evidence of how non-white groups lag behind the native European population in terms of education, employment, social acceptance, and many other factors.

CHAPTER 4 – RESULTS OF INTEGRATION

Chapter 4 evaluates the empirical reality of different ethnic groups and minorities living in France, Belgium and the United Kingdom, in terms of economy, culture, jobs, and other measures. This chapter reviews the actual social and economic conditions facing these groups in order to assess how well they have been integrated into their host societies. There are three concepts to measure: degree of economic integration, social acceptance, and social integration. The first concept analyzes employment opportunities for people of foreign descent, wages, life opportunities, and mobility. The second concept of social acceptance examines whether or not the native population is tolerant enough to accept people of different backgrounds as part of their nation. The last, social integration, measures whether or not people of non-EU origin are capable of living side by side with members of native communities.

For each state—UK, Belgium and France—the thesis analyzes three different indicators or cases, selected primarily because of the availability of materials. A second reason why we cannot compare the same indicators in all three countries is because each country has different practices of collecting data on minority groups. The UK openly reveals ethnic, religious, and racial demographics but the other two countries collect statistics on country of origin only. Belgian and French Nationality Laws prohibit collecting results based on religion, race, and ethnic identity. Furthermore, the nature of indicators which are explored in this MA thesis paper, are equivalent to the integrationist models of a state.

Great Britain openly demonstrates itself as a tolerant society, which accepts the cultural difference of each group and encourages them to become productive within society. Thus, research about the United Kingdom openly measures social and political mobility (social integration) among different racial and religious groups. The other two cases explore how much mainstream society accepts public and welfare support toward non-EU citizens (social acceptance) and whether or not Third Country Nationals obtain better careers and wages (economic integration) after improving academic achievements.

The French case explores whether the second generation obtains secondary and post-secondary education more than the first generation (social integration), whether they face discrimination in the workplace (economic integration), and finally whether young women of non-EU origin find social acceptance. The French Republic demonstrates itself strictly as a civic country so education, career, and gender equality are logical choices for analysis.

In comparison, the Belgian Kingdom demonstrates itself as a more universalist nation rather than assimilationist or diverse. Therefore, materials about Belgium should demonstrate how successfully members of non-EU origin move to regions inhabited by native Belgians and racially intermix with them (social acceptance). The research also measures health and mortality risks among younger people—healthier conditions reflect the fact that the person will be or is more economically active. The chapter also debates which groups perform better in Belgium—which are more educated or more participative (social integration).

Indeed, some groups perform better than the others in receiving education and achieving economic well-being throughout generations. However, the results still remain very similar that most of the individuals belonging to the Third Country National groups could not properly adapt and integrate into mainstream society, or their standard of living is not equal to the native population or EU minority groups overall.

UNITED KINGDOM

The British case is perhaps the most straightforward. As was previously mentioned, current multiculturalist policies recognize not only the ethnic and racial identities of people of immigrant descent, but also their religious heritage. This is in contrast to the Belgian and French cases, in which countries statistics are collected mainly on the basis of countries of origin. This provides a direct means of predicting whether prejudice is based on the racial or the religious or cultural background of non-EU citizens, or if they are discriminated against based on both conditions. Furthermore, these immigrant

groups were arrived in the UK at different times and for different reasons. For example, the Ghanaian community arrived in the UK as middle class civilians while Somalians came as refugees. In addition, each immigrant group was concentrated in different districts and administrative divisions, which may have affected their quality of life. The three indicators of integration in the British case are social mobilization of Third Country Nationals in community and politics, acceptance by the mainstream white British society for welfare or pension support, and performance in jobs and wages, taking account of educational level. The first case measures a degree of social integration—mobilization in politics and community can explain whether a group that openly expresses distinctiveness can achieve a sense of belonging to the British nation. The second case reflects whether British people socially accept foreign minorities as contributors to the nation, regardless of practicing a different way of life. The third one measures economic integration as it explains whether British society embraces educational success of various minorities and accepts them as employees and colleagues.

Social and political mobilization of immigrants within the UK

Social and political mobilization measures a degree of social integration which emphasizes how much the immigrants are willing to participate in British life and deal with the problems that the country faces. That is supposed to be a way to become socially closer with the white British population by expressing the fact that some domestic issues affect both immigrant and non-immigrant groups. This case focuses on Afro-British people, who are very interesting to investigate for several reasons that make them distinctive, compared to other racial minorities (mainly South Asians). First of all, they are perhaps the oldest non-white group that settled in the country, beginning with 491 Jamaican migrants from the *Empire Windrush* ship. Second, they are linguistically and religiously homogeneous as they practice Christianity and speak English at home. In comparison, South Asians have a mother tongue other than English (Urdu or Hindi) and practice different religions (primarily Hinduism and Islam). Black Africans use English as their mother tongue and most of them practice Christianity, which makes

them culturally much closer to white British people and this factor also pushed them to become part of political and social culture in the United Kingdom. These two factors suggest relatively more favourable conditions for integration compared to South Asians. Third, regardless of similarities, black British are more diverse than they appear to be. Their origins come from different countries and continents (Caribbean Basin in America and various countries in Africa) and each community has its own length and history.

Also, each of these groups have settled in the country for different purposes. For example, Eastern Africans in the United Kingdom settled into the country as refugees seeking protection during the 2000s and 2010s. On the other hand, communities such as Nigerians and Ghanaians came to the country seeking better standards of living and for professional improvement opportunities. Furthermore, the Afro-British community is mainly concentrated in London (78% of the Afro-British population lives in the city) and their size has increased in England and Wales by 104% from 2001 to 2011, meaning that members of these communities are very mobilized in their new home country (Galandini, 2013, pp. 38-39).

Galandini compares the conditions of the Ghanaians who were settling “in the middle class neighborhoods” (Galandini, 2013, p.37) and the lower class Somalians in her research case. The former are Christians, better educated and Anglophone, who have arrived to the United Kingdom for the sake of professional and education training, in comparison with the Somalis who are Muslims, Arab (or Somali) speaking and as mainly refugees (Galandini, 2013, p.132), they have arrived to achieve life protections.

Her analysis demonstrates that in order to improve the local problems and to expand personal connections with other co-ethnics, Somalians stick more closely with their own ethnic communities and are much more politically active compared to Ghanaians (Galandini, 2013, p.181). Somalis are also limited by their English language abilities (Galandini, 2013, p.134), as for example older individuals

rely on younger generations as translators or better experienced people in interacting with people outside of community. Furthermore, there is no proof that Somalians tend to become part of *co-national* Muslim minorities along with Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. The reason why approximately half of Somali people pray in mosques with people of other ethnicities is because African Muslim community is new, too small and the African-led mosques are much less spread, in comparison with *co-ethnic* Ghanaian churches (Galandini, 2013, p.152). Nevertheless, it is known that Somalians are very clan based. As they are heavily concentrated in Tower Hamlet and Newham districts of London (Hemmings, 2010, pp. 22-24), they find more difficult to get provisions from own community in the latter as this region is too cosmopolitan and local minorities avoid the social support based on specific ethnicity or nationality (Galandini, 2013, pp.130-131, p.164). Ghanaian people were not much concerned about founding own national community as they establish personal connections with co-ethnics by attending their own *co-ethnic* Christian churches that are spread across the country.

Both of these mentioned groups had a different nature in participating in politics. When Somali refugees have migrated, they were more concerned about foreign issues rather than on domestic issues in the UK; this suggests that they do not express an interest in belonging to the United Kingdom. They may only complain on federal politics if some domestic policy seriously affect ethnic-based issues (Galandini, 2013, p.185). Instead, aside of participating in local politics where their communities are located, Somalians are mostly concerned about foreign affairs such as events in Somalian state itself; they even organized a rally for the national government to question the independence of Somaliland from the rest of Somalia (Galandini, 2013, p.190). In comparison, Ghanaians do not participate activities regarding questions and concerns their co-ethnic community may face, as it is too small and scattered and unlike Somalians they prefer to take part in politics on individual choice, whether related to homeland's or British politics (Galandini, 2013, pp.187). Also, for the domestic issues, Ghanaians would less likely vote for the co-ethnic candidate and keep British issues separate from the homeland's

in comparison with Somalians (Galandini, 2013, p.190). Nevertheless, regardless of the fact that it is older than British-Somalian, British-Ghanaian minority is still not politically integrated enough as community members still meet and invite Ghanaian politicians to the UK for the election rally in their homeland (Galandini, 2013, p.185).

This case shows that whether some ethnic or cultural community is scattered or concentrated in the United Kingdom, the fact is they were not properly integrated and do not express strong interest towards domestic issues of British society. Concentrated Somali community are only interested in British affairs when the issue is related to their cultural homeland. Ghanaians, who live scattered across the country, perhaps do not care about diplomatic relations between the United Kingdom and Ghana; they individually still do not care much about British issues and their personal connections are more closely related to politics of Ghana.

Acceptance by White British

Another significant point of interest is the fact that, generally speaking, the White British population is unwilling to support people of different skin colour in terms of pension payments, or housing and welfare benefits. Social acceptance is an issue which joins immigrants and nationals together. A large number of the white British population believes that the proportion of people of immigrant descent and the large number of policies that support them erode the welfare system. However, Keith Banting, Will Kymlicka, Richard Johnston, and Stuart Soroka have proven that this is not the case. Their research has demonstrated that “there is no systematic pattern of countries practicing multiculturalist policies relative to countries that have resisted such programmes” (Banting *et al*, 2006, p.83). Nevertheless, such empirical evidence does not undermine the extant prejudice in terms of supporting people of different skin colour or cultural/religious upbringing. According to another study conducted by Simon Welsche, “the more heterogeneous a society is, the less support is expected from the richer people, who expect the poorer ones to be more like them and who understand the ethics of future life success in the

long-term plan” (Goerres and Weschle, 2012, p.14). This condition is not in favour of people of non-EU origin who are indeed poorer than the native population and less familiar with the customs of host nations. Robert Ford has conducted research mainly between three different groups within the United Kingdom—white British citizens, black British citizens, and Muslim British citizens. Results have shown that both black and Muslim citizens are treated worse than white citizens. Black citizens are still more sympathized than Muslim British citizens or, more accurately, people who originate from countries where Muslims make up the majority. Even though black British citizens are treated with more sympathy by white British citizens, racism and prejudice regarding skin colour does not play a dominant role, but the issue should not be ignored. Black British citizens were not treated any better regardless of their religious and linguistic similarities with mainstream society. As the results provided below evidence, black British citizens lag behind white British citizens. Also, some historical and economic factors also played a significant role in keeping immigrants and their descendants poorer than and segregated from the mainstream community.

Time of immigration may also be important to social acceptance, although this is hard to verify. It appears that the mainstream population is more willing to financially and socially support the people of foreign origin who have been living in the country for a longer term than those who are new to the country. Also, immigrants who were arriving to the United Kingdom from the late 1940s until immigration restrictions began in the 1980s were primarily black people. After the New Labour party's liberal, open policies were implemented, the majority of people who were moving to the country were civilians from Muslim countries.

The sharp rise in immigration under Tony Blair's leadership may also have contributed to reduced social acceptance of the immigrant population, although this is hard to verify. Non-European population increased from 5% in 1991 to 8% in 2001, and then to 13% in 2011 (*Office for National Statistics*, 2012). The primary reason behind this sharp rise during this time period is open and massive

immigration and lifting restrictive policies implemented in the 1970s and 1980s when the population of Third Country Nationals was growing due to family reunification and natural increase. Furthermore, massive influx and Tony Blair's shift in immigration policies were implemented too fast. Such policy would require a lot of time and effort to help these numerous immigrants to adapt into British society and many nationals were aware that these minorities would be overrepresented in terms of social support. This would lead to large tax expenditures incite discontent from white British citizens. This issue increased became increasingly problematic due to tragic events such as the London Bombing in July of 2005.

Indeed, there is an element of prejudice evident in the amount of money which is allotted to British citizens of different religions or skin colour. For instance, in terms of housing benefits provided to Muslims, one of those interviewed personally claimed that approximately 53% of white respondents stated that they have too much money provided to them from the government (Ford, 2015, p.8). In addition, white British citizens feel more favourably toward native-born Muslims—51% of white British citizens said that they receive too little in comparison with more alienable (or doubly disadvantaged) foreign-born Muslims, whose support is only at 37% (Ford, 2015, p.13). Therefore, racism aside, most senior Muslim and black British citizens should be able to rely on the financial support of younger generations, who appear to integrate better. A similar scenario exists in the conflict between 'native-born' and 'foreign-born' Muslim British citizens in regards to the issue of unemployment benefits. Foreign-born Muslims also face a “double disadvantage” - discrimination based on racial and religious ground at the same time - from the whites. Nevertheless, native-born Muslim Britons are much less discriminated against than foreign-born Muslims, and even foreign-born white citizens.

These cases support the notion that the more distinctive the culture or religion, the higher the probability that certain groups will face discrimination. This is especially so, under the current

multiculturalist policies that recognize and even praise religious diversity. It is important to mention that “some, but not all, ethnic groups contain members with different religious affiliations, and most religious groups have rather different ethnic compositions” (Martin, Heath and Bosveld, 2010). Indian people practice different religions such as Hinduism, Sikhism, Islam, to a much lesser extent, Christianity. Furthermore, there are some groups, like of Pakistani or Bangladeshi heritage, “where it is not practicable to disentangle the effects of their ethnicity from that of their religion which is Islam” (Martin, Heath and Bosveld, 2010). Therefore, recognizing religious identity of some individual indirectly reveals his/her cultural and ethnic background as well. For example, being recognized as a Muslim also means that a person may be of Bangladeshi or Pakistani, but never of native White British descent.

In the end, all religious minorities are more discriminated against and face higher levels of inactivity and unemployment than those who practice Christianity. Thus, the racial group which faces the least discrimination appears to be Black Caribbean and Black African groups, of whom the majority practice Christianity. Very little of the members of these racial groups are Muslims and none or very little are Hindu or Sikh. Black British citizens are less discriminated against because of their religion, which is closer to the Christian heritage of the white British people. Nevertheless, statistics indicate that Islamophobia is on the rise, as Muslim citizens are more discriminated against than Sikhs and Hindus among Indian Britons. This suggests mainstream society is mistrustful of certain religious groups. At the same time, it is important to mention that racism still persists. According to the same research, Black Caribbeans and Black Africans are still relatively more discriminated against, less employed, and more economically inactive than white British citizens (Martin, Heath and Bosveld, 2010).

Education, employment and wage

Economic integration that reflects the results of employment and wage is often related to

educational attainment. Education, employment, and wage, as indicators of initial successes in economic integration, are closely associated with one another for younger generations. Most people of foreign descent are concentrated in the capital and other large cities of the United Kingdom. People of immigrant descent (including white others, such as those from Poland and other growing numbers of Southern and Eastern European communities) make up a majority (55%) of the population of London according to the 2011 Census (*Office for National Statistics*, 2012). London, as a megacity, should be a cosmopolitan place of opportunity for all people, regardless of their background. At the same time, the second generation should experience better conditions than the first generation, as they adapt better and are more willing to seek opportunities to improve their life standards, and they are supposed to demonstrate better results in employment and education.

Without facing any forms of discrimination, individuals belonging to ethnic minorities are supposed to show significant improvement in regards to their contribution to the British economy, as they constitute a large and growing share of the UK population. They made up 7% of the British working age population in 2000, 10% in 2005, and 12% in 2009. Aside from recent immigrants, all of these groups are generally younger than the white British population. In this case scenario, because they are of younger age and more highly concentrated in large cities, the minorities of foreign origin are supposed to be more mobile than the native White British majority, who are more concentrated in rural and suburban areas of the country (Dustmann, Frattini and Theodoropoulos, 2011, p.1).

Second-generation immigrants and people of non-European origin who were born in Britain between the 1950s and 1990s experience a significant lack of improvement in terms of wage, education, and employment in comparison with their parents. This improvement gap is not evident among young native British people in comparison with older generations. Furthermore, except for Caribbean British citizens, despite the fact that each group demonstrates different results, all of these groups perform better at school. For example, Chinese and Indian pupils are overtaking their native

British counterparts in the most challenging math and English courses (Dustmann, Frattini and Theodoropoulos, 2011, pp.5-6). Results demonstrate the success of multiculturalist policies and urban mobility initiatives. However, aside from the Indian and Chinese population, minority groups perform worse in terms of obtaining professional employment than the native British population (Dustmann and Fabbri, 2005, pp.426-427). In terms of wage, all minority groups perform worse than the white British population as well (Dustmann, Frattini and Theodoropoulos, 2011, pp.6-7).

Despite improvements made over time, research shows that all of these ethnic groups continue to face discrimination which limits them from achieving better jobs and salaries in the United Kingdom. These factors cannot be accidental, as almost all ethnic minority groups demonstrate better outcomes in education, and as most of them live in mobile urban areas. Also, it is important to mention that the key to the high rate of success which Chinese and Indian Britons experience in terms of employment is that both of these groups are more entrepreneurial than others, and have been since initially beginning to arrive in the 1950s.

Conclusion

The United Kingdom openly embraces diversity, but most of the white British population do not accept that other racial and religious groups belong to the nation. Whether based on ethnic, linguistic, or religious differences, they discriminate more against the groups that are culturally distinct from native British citizens, especially Muslim minorities. It is still more difficult for civilians of non-EU origin to obtain welfare or social support from the mainstream population, and even the most mobile and educated immigrants cannot get the same access to employment as the white British population does. These include non-whites who interact more with the white British citizens. Finally, multicultural policies in Britain do not help established religious or ethnic communities integrate with the mainstream. Members interacting in their cultural groups usually become remain separate from the domestic issues that the country faces.

FRANCE

The French assimilationist social model limits in-depth analysis about the performance of various ethnic minorities inhabiting the country. Analysts cannot research ethnic groups distinctively as in the British cases. Instead, current 'soft multiculturalist' policy only permits social organizations to ask for information about *individuals* in regard to country of origin and religion of practice, and ask whether he/she faces any sort of discrimination in job and education. Collecting data based on country of origin makes it difficult to analyze the nature of social division within a society as it is assumed that, for example, a French person of Armenian origin identifies him/herself as Armenian. Also, unlike the Belgian case, we cannot guarantee that a person whose origin is from Africa can be Arab or Black, as millions of white colonists were born in the continent and later most of them moved to the country of their ancestors.

Some religious and demographic organizations collect surveys on religion but the questions that are asked are based on personal belief or how religion plays a role in his/her life or family background. However, we cannot classify Muslims or Buddhists in France as belonging to a different ethnic, racial, or national identities. For example, regardless of the fact that majority of Muslims in France are of Maghreb and Sub-Saharan origin, the Islamic minority also grows because of thousands native French citizens converting to the faith every year. They already number between 70,000 and 110,000 (Rhouma, 2011); however, these converts are strictly and solely French. In comparison with the United Kingdom and Belgium, French authorities never collect statistics on a group level, and asking questions based on what kind of biological identity (ethnicity or race) a specific person belongs to is prohibited by law.

Regardless of the fact that France adheres to the republican model, it is still considered to be a country of immigration. Since the 1920s it has accepted large numbers of immigrants from different countries (primarily European countries such as Belgium and Italy) and attempted to assimilate them

along with their offspring as French civilians. According to the census conducted in 1931, immigrants made up 6.6% of the whole population, around 2.7 million people (*Immigrés et descendants d'immigrés en France*, 2012, p.98). However, after World War II, like other European countries, the French Republic began to receive larger numbers of immigrants coming from different continents to fill the deficit in the labour force that was due to industrialization. As a result, both Maghreb and Portuguese constitute a higher proportion of skilled workers than French people. Such a factor heavily changed the demographic make-up of France, causing the total population of the country “to increase from 55 to 65 million from 1981 to 2011” (Beaumel and Breuil-Genier, 2011, pp.25-26) despite the sharp decline of the fertility rate after the baby boom in the 1950s.

Furthermore, immigration became much more ethnically and racially diverse than ever before in history of the Republic. Since the 1960s, the French Republic has started to receive waves of immigrants from Northern Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa (including Cameroon) and since the late 1970s it started to receive migrants from Eastern Asia. After the end of oil crisis in the 1970s, immigration accelerated because of family migrations. For example, from 1975 until 2008, the annual influx of Moroccans tripled (*Immigrés et descendants d'immigrés en France*, 2012, p.100). Today, most of the immigrants and their descendants reside in urban places with at least 100,000 inhabitants. These are generally are the most industrialized and urbanized regions (such as Paris), where there is a better possibility of finding employment. Furthermore, the immigrants were relatively young; approximately one half of Moroccans were between 14 and 28 years of age on the day of their arrival to the French territory (*Immigrés et descendants d'immigrés en France*, 2012, p.102). Since the 1998 Naturalization Law (*Legifrance*, 1998) was adopted, children born to foreign-born parents became eligible to acquire French nationality after turning 13 years old. This factor caused a rapid annual increase of French citizens after the year of implementation. For example, approximately 115,000 people were naturalized in 2011. French citizens who have at least one parent born abroad make up

approximately 2.2 million people (*Immigrés et descendants d'immigrés en France*, 2012, pp.104 and 110). Nevertheless, becoming a French citizen does not mean that people of immigrant heritage have greater success in their education and career, nor does it mean that they are not vulnerable to communitarianism or discrimination.

The best way to test this hypothesis about whether an individual is of non-EU origin is through comparative analysis of the performance of the second generation in terms of obtaining education and finding employment. Also, the materials provided will make comparisons with EU groups that are culturally closer to the French, and compare general performance between women and men among native and non-native origins. As mentioned above, they are more naturalized and are more familiar with the French social system and values than their parents. Also, people who are younger tend more to apply for French citizenship (Meurs, Pailhé and Simon, 2006, p.777).

Education

First of all, to become a successful French citizen, a person of immigrant descent must achieve better academic results to become a socially more integrated civilian that fulfills the French values, as education serves as “a symbol for integration” (Brinbaum and Kieffer, 2005, p.60). It is also clearly known that children of immigrants are pushed by their parents to perform better at school, to obtain better education, and take advantage of better opportunities, as it is considered to be the best way to guarantee more security and raise social status. It was a very important factor as the first generation of immigrants faced a serious level of discrimination in terms of wage and employment, and lived in proportionally worse and more isolated conditions than their native counterparts. Furthermore, most of them were far less educated and they could not familiarize themselves with French culture and customs. In this case, the primary difficulty that children of immigrants really face are the social conditions of their parents. Their parents are also very poorly educated - “only 12% of fathers and 14% of immigrants have mothers with at least the bachelor degree” in France. Also, “less than 9% among

mothers and 19% among fathers of immigrant children have jobs relevant to their skills in comparison with the French children whose both parents were born in the country, 17% among mothers and 29% among fathers” (Boumahdi and Giret, 2005, pp.629-630). Such conditions put these immigrant students at risk of facing more factors such as leaving school or repeating the school year again, except for Portuguese and Spanish students. Furthermore, among the second generation, more than 80% of children of immigrants wish to become graduates, and such attitudes are also supported by their parents who hope for a better future of their children (Caille, 2005, p.14; Vallet, 1996, p.18).

It is impossible to get a good education and rise as a more integrated individual when the school system does not provide proper assistance for people of non-EU origin. Regardless of the fact that children who begin the secondary education are more ambitious to improve their results and to enter into university, problems within school leads to loss of interest and ambition. Many students of non-EU descent complain about academic underachievement to their teachers and principals. For example “more than a third of them have confronted the refusal from teachers” (*Ministère d'éducation nationale enseignement supérieure recherche*, 2007, p.121) while raising their hands during class time, in comparison with a quarter among other students. Children of immigrants also proportionally more often demand guidance, more so than any other students and this situation “looms even more clearly observed among students in more disadvantaged study subjects” (*Ministère d'éducation nationale enseignement supérieure recherche*, 2007, p.122). Furthermore, such claims are disproportionate among people of different countries of origins. For example, young people whose parents are from Portugal or Spain who have shown a strong attitude for learning according to teachers and principals: 38 per cent of them reported having such a feeling, which shows little difference in comparison with young people who do not belong to an immigrant family (*Ministère d'éducation nationale enseignement supérieure recherche*, 2007, p.122). In contrast, the negative attitude “concerns 62 per cent of children of immigrant likings of Turkish origin, 59 per cent whose origins are from sub-Saharan Africa and 53

per cent of those whose parents born in North Africa” (*Ministère d'éducation national enseignement supérieure recherche*, 2007, p.122).

The higher level of school education, the higher the rate of complaints amongst students of immigrant descent that the level of injustice from teachers is very high. Among high school students studying at professional level or higher, between 33% and 42% of children of migrant origin believe that the class council has been unfair to them: “This sense of injustice also varies strongly with the geographical origin of parents: it reaches respectively 28% and 30% among children of North African and African immigrants in comparison with 15% whose parents from Portugal or Spain” (*Ministère d'éducation national enseignement supérieure recherche*, 2007, p.123).

Social segregation also plays an important role in the school reputation of the pupils. Children of immigrants of European or Asian origins are much more scattered across the country and often educated at schools with a greater mix of academic studies and social interaction in comparison with students of Maghreb, African, or Turkish origins. Also, young people whose parents were born North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Turkey complain more about the severity of their place of inhabitation than children of immigrant European or Asian origin. Only 51% of children of immigrant diasporas, against 75% of students born to non-immigrant families, find that their school has a good reputation. In contrast, young children of Portuguese or Spanish parents complain less than of children of African origins about issues of safety and discipline at schools (*Ministère d'éducation national enseignement supérieure recherche*, 2007, p.125).

Regardless of the fact that offspring of immigrants are more self-oriented, as African people live less in couples and Southern Europeans have fewer children than other groups, most individuals of non-EU descent are not favoured enough for integration. They are still proportionally less successful in completing secondary school and bachelor degrees than Southern Europeans and French. Only the brighter and academically more successful among them achieve better results, as they make up a larger

proportion of company employees with at least 1 year of university studies compared to individuals of native or European origin (*Premières Synthèses Informations*, 2010, p.2). This is especially true among African and Maghreb youth of less than 35 years of age. While education is generally associated with higher income for other population groups as well, for people of non-EU descent getting into university remains a key vehicle for gaining higher salaries (Aeberhardt *et al*, 2010, pp.41-42).

In conclusion, regardless of the fact that generally citizens of non-EU origin are more ambitious, spend more time on academics, and are more academically successful than their parents, they still face the problem of “academic apartheid” of ignorance and discrimination from teachers (Brinbaum and Guegnard, 2011, p.9; Brinbaum and Kieffer, 2009, p.563). Educational inequalities are formed as early as kindergarten. Young pupils of North African origin fail the academic year twice as often as their counterparts of Portuguese origin. Only 30% of pupils of immigrant descent achieve bachelor’s degrees or higher, in comparison with 41% of non-immigrant families. Such poor performance is definitely least favoured for non-EU civilians (Caille, 2005, p.14). More specifically, the proportion of “non-degree” is twice higher for students with parents born in France and Southern Europe, from 30 to 15 percent, respectively from 37 to 18 percent from one generation to another. This proportion decreases for youth of parents born outside of Europe, but less significant, since it goes from 47 to 34% for the ones born to parents from North Africa and from 44 to 38% to parents of Sub-Saharan origins (Cediey and Foroni, 2007, p.36). In terms of class divisions, native French people proportionally work much more in highly-skilled sectors than people of Maghrebi or Sub-Saharan origins, who are mainly employed in the low-skilled and low-wage jobs. These percentage differences are similar among both men and women, studied separately. It is important to mention that a higher success rate among ethnic Berber and Arab adolescents and the education level among their parents can be lower as people of North African descent can be also offspring of white European and Catholic colonists who returned to metropolitan France and more quickly adapted into French society, as they are not anthropologically

distinctive and do not practice non-Christian religion.

Employment

In terms of getting employment, people of both non-EU and the EU origin living in France have also made some progress throughout generations. They are also more ambitious and indeed improved their working standards and skills in comparison with their parents, thus making themselves more economically integrated. For example, French people of Turkish origins who are located in the border areas between France and Germany run businesses based on construction and planning design of the new houses (*Immigrés et descendants d'immigrés en France*, 2012, p.116). Also, the offspring of Sub-Saharan, Turkish and European descent are more qualified than their parents. Except for the Turks and Sub-Saharan Africans, the portion belonging to the middle class among all the ethnic groups has also increased (*Immigrés et descendants d'immigrés en France*, 2012, p.122).

Except for French people of native descent and relatively small community of East-Asians, people of immigrant origin are less concentrated in management jobs; most of them find better qualified professions in other sectors. The results in terms of employment between the non-French white and non-white civilians also significantly varies. For example, a group of Sub-Saharan Africans proportionally work and run business in commerce and services at a higher rate than Portuguese descendants. Also, Afro-French are the most successful in getting employment in businesses of over 1,000 employees (*Première Synthèses Informations*, 2010, p.3). Simultaneously, anti-discrimination organizations such as SOS Racisme are successful in combatting racial discrimination. For example, in March of 2000, the organization managed to get the Criminal Court in Grenoble to have an "entrepreneur convicted for racial discrimination in hiring, getting two months in prison sentence and 10,000 francs fine with additional 7,000 francs for the harm to the victim" (Cediey and Foroni, 2007, p.16).

According to the studies that surveyed large numbers of people of various backgrounds, the ones

who practice different religion and speak different languages generally are more subject to discrimination than the ones of the European or native origins (Versini, 2004, pp.19-20). Prejudice toward the people who speaks different languages at home is quite evident, as around “40% of children speak in French with parents at home (mainly Sub-Saharan and aboriginal French people born abroad), 26% another European language (primarily Portuguese and Spanish), 26% speak Arabic and 7% speak some other language” (Boumahdi and Giret, 2005, pp.629-630). Additional evidence that French natives did not become tolerant of individuals of different background is that newly arrived immigrants, especially of North and Central African descent, complain that they are discriminated based on their skin colour, an accent, and nationality even more than long-settled migrants and their offspring (*Département des statistiques, des études et de la documentation*, 2012, p.1). Also, there are still biases toward even French youth who were born to mixed families, as approximately 19% of people of Maghrebi descent have native French parents (Dupray and Moullet, 2004, p.10). They are still stereotyped as Magreb, even if this person is of Arab or Berber descent on their maternal side. The discrimination based on origin is “noticeable in all the large cities such as Marseille, Paris, Strasbourg, Lille, and Lyon” (Cediey and Foroni, 2007, p.51).

Regardless of the fact that these migrants and their offspring are located in the most vibrant cities and are, on average, more active than the natives and their European co-ethnics, most of non-EU co-ethnics face a higher level of unemployment and face more difficulties in finding the jobs. Another interesting fact is, in comparison with the French and European groups, the younger generation of non-EU descent face the problem of finding jobs more “frequently throughout the lifetime” regardless of the fact that they are more ambitious than their parents (Lambert and Peignard, 2002, p.78).

During the hiring process, many managers do not even meet the applied candidates after finding about the cultural backgrounds through names and/or photographs of applicants. Many employers are very picky regarding candidates according to the last names and sometimes the picture on Curriculum

Vitae of applicants. For example, among the two best candidates, companies usually select a person with a white French-sounding name and surname (Cediey and Foroni, 2007, pp.17-18). This is especially true in sectors such as trade, services, and transport. Services such as hotels and restaurants interview the candidates in two or three times more often than other job sectors (*Département des statistiques, des études et de la documentation*, 2013, p.3). Regardless of the fact that many people of non-EU origin try to apply low-skilled job in these sectors, restaurant and hotel business discriminate them more than in other commercial sectors (Cediey and Foroni, 2007, Tableau 10).

Also, hiring discrimination is based on exact location where the civilians of migrant background live. In comparison with the descendants of EU nationals and East-Asians, French people of Maghreb and Sub-Saharan origins are not sparsely distributed across the country and most of them continue to live in the poor suburbs of large cities. Like their parents, they do live in the quarters that cannot provide easier access to the labour because of the poor and disastrous conditions of the *banlieus* or suburbs. Furthermore, another reason why an employer may not hire an employee of non-EU origin is also because of the address where they live and located (Versini, 2004, pp.19-20). Thus, hiring managers are less hopeful about the skills and experience of those who live in such quarters. Other than that, even those who are hired into jobs outside of the *banlieus*, the Maghreb and Sub-Saharan Africans take a longer time and waste more money to get to their place of work. Most of them do not have cars and instead prefer to use public transport such as subways or buses. With such conditions it would be difficult for their offspring to escape from their impoverished status (Silberman and Fournier, 1999, p.36).

At the same time their average salaries is lower and level of unemployment is higher among the civilians of non-EU origin. Second generation of Third Country Nationals earn 14% less than native French in comparison with Southern Europeans who earn 7% less than aboriginal counterparts (*Première Synthèses Informations*, 2010, p.3). A quarter of the working population with no immigrant

parents are employed in the public sector, but only 16.5% of those with two immigrant parents - 16.3% whose their parents born in another country in Europe and 17.1% who were born in families of Maghreb origins (Pouget, 2005, p.158). In terms of having jobs, young people with one or both parents born in Southern Europe have almost the same unemployment rate as those where both parents were born in France. In comparison, young people whose one or both parents born in Maghreb and black Africa have unemployment rates almost twice as French people.

As a result, because of discrimination in workplace and search of employment, the immigrants – both naturalized and the foreign born - face more serious problems with health conditions. Such issues are related to a constant search for the employment, rejection, and discrimination. The longer immigrants wait for a job, the higher probability that they will live in worsening health conditions. The immigrants of the European descent are more favourable and face less risk of getting into health trouble. On average 26% of French residents face health problems. On average, 25 per cent of people of French native origin face health problems. In contrast, 37% of all foreign born French immigrants likelihood of experience health issues, which is higher than recent immigrants at 31% (Dourgnon *et al*, 2008, pp.2-3).

Women of non-EU origin

Successful acceptance among ethnic minorities also requires gender equality and professional freedom of women as successful “integration means encouraging the active participation in society as a whole of all the women and men who will be living long term” in the country (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2012, p.93). Women of immigrant origin along with native ones face more disadvantages based on gender. For example, women have higher chances than men to be unemployed for the long-term (Domergue and Jourdan, 2012, pp.32-23). Surprisingly, regardless of the fact that, in general, French women face disadvantages in the job sectors, wages and employment, women of immigrant origin overall perform better than men of foreign heritage and face less discrimination in the workplace

and in education than their male counterparts. Maghreb women face more equality, despite the fact of their patriarchal cultural background and that immigrant women started to arrive much later than migrant men. In terms of school education, the boys of immigrant background are twice more likely to repeat the school year and interrupt their studies than girls (Lambert and Peignard, 2002, p.77). Furthermore, the Maghreb girls more proportionally tend to go for the general and technological bachelor degrees than their male counterparts (*Ministere De L'Interieur*, 2013, p.4). At the same time, women of Maghreb descent have easy access to the employment and scholarships at approximately the same level as their French counterparts. Nevertheless, they get better access to the jobs and scholarships than men of the Maghreb descent as the employers “express more favoritism” toward them (Doupray and Moullet, 2004, p.15).

In comparison with their mothers, aside from obtaining easier access to career and education, the second generation of women of immigrant origin prefer a wider range of professions that are more highly-skilled and promise higher wages. Young girls generally do not prefer to work in low-skilled areas such as hotel services, catering and food, and personal services. Twice more than men of immigrant origin, young women of non-EU descent are more inclined to commercial and administrative occupations, such as business tourism, trade, and management services (*Ministère èducation national enseignement supèrieure recherche*, 2007, p.133). Girls of foreign heritage outnumber other groups in their desire to work in trade and management or administration (*Ministère èducation national enseignement supèrieure recherche*, 2007, p.132). However, they desire less often to work in highly-educated careers, as doctors or academic researchers. Regardless of the fact that women of non-EU origin proportionally prefer to work in pro-commercial and administrative occupations, jobs equivalent to a higher educational degree are selected by 22% among them, in comparison with 27% of women of native descent. In this case, it would be more difficult for women of non-EU origin to integrate, as higher education provides more chances for them to familiarize

themselves with native culture (*Ministère éducation national enseignement supérieure recherche*, 2007, p.133).

Nevertheless, it is important to mention that immigrant women face factors that prevent them from obtaining relevant jobs compared to native born French women. This this case is especially very true during difficult periods such as economic crisis that hit the France in the late 2000s. Many educated women of foreign descent, who obtained their education abroad face more risks to remain unemployed. Their diplomas are not recognized by the French educational institutions and standards (Domergue and Jourdan, 2012, p.37). Immigrant women also experience more difficulty than immigrant men in learning the French language (Domergue and Jourdan, 2012, p.40). Some degree of racial discrimination persists especially with the French speaking Sub-Saharan women, which is the only group that performs worse than men in terms of acquiring the jobs. Many natives do not welcome female newcomers as they were expected to arrive for the purpose of accompanying their working husbands only. However, such claim is considered to be an overstatement as approximately 31% of women migrated for family or personal reasons, while others arrived likely for professional goals. Thus, educated women are stuck in a longer wait for employment relevant to their skills (Domergue and Jourdan, 2012, p.35).

Usually it also happens because of the age discrimination among women of immigrant heritage as well as their native counterparts. Some companies do not tend to select young female candidates as “in France, women have the right to 112 days of maternity vacations with full pay that are mainly incurred by the Sécurité Sociale. In the financial sector, women have the right to 45 additional days of maternity vacations with full pay that is incurred by the employer. Women can replace it by 90 days of maternity vacations with a half-pay. The total cost therefore includes both the labor cost and the replacement cost of the employee on vacation” (Duguet and Petit, 2005, pp.82-83). Thus, in the private sector young women whose age is below 37 have less chances to be accepted into the highly-qualified jobs. As a

young woman plans to start a family, the private firms try usually reject such candidates as it would be very costly to lose time and money for the maternity leave. Therefore young men have higher chances to get employed. As women turn 37 or older, childless or with children, there is higher chance they will get the jobs and even have higher probability than men as older women have lower probability of starting a family or having more children (Duguet and Petit, 2005, p.91). This condition is considered to be more unfair for women of immigrant descent, as research shows that they tend less often to reduce their time to paid work while having children than women from the mainstream population. Furthermore, there is much less discrimination in public or government jobs such as postal services. Women have a higher probability than men to get such a job, at the same time as their maternity leave is directly paid by the government money and authorities (Audier, 2000, p.122).

As a result, regardless of the fact that women of non-EU origin are much less discriminated against than their male counterparts, along with native French women, their gender status does not allow them to obtain better social integration in the short-term. In this case, no matter how much multiculturalist policies are preoccupied with the identity of women with foreign origin, it appears to be useless to help them to escape poor conditions in their ghettos and become as equal as French men.

Conclusion

Indeed, anti-discrimination or 'soft multiculturalist' policies have made native French people less discriminatory toward the second generation of non-EU descent, especially women. In the high skilled or business sectors, and among university-level students, it is not hard to find a French person who has a non-white skin colour. However, research has demonstrated that only a small portion people of non-EU descent achieve such excellent results. Regardless of the fact that they are better employed and have more opportunities than their parents, most of the second generation cannot find enough educational support and/or obtain equal access to jobs as the native counterparts. Young women of non-EU origin also face some degree of gender discrimination, regardless of the fact they are more

motivated than their white counterparts. The results of improvement among the second generation of non-Europeans can be easily overstated. Many 'Maghrebs' or 'Africans' who are successful in education or workplace are actually of White French descent. Thus, it is no big surprise that the former head of the Socialist Party, “white Senegalese” Segolene Royale, or former Prime Minister, “white Moroccan” Dominique de Villepin, were high-ranking politicians and even French presidential candidates. French 'assimilationist' society is still not ready to accept a Muslim or black person as a head of state.

BELGIUM

The Kingdom of Belgium, in a similar way to France, does not collect statistical data on ethnicities or religious identity of minority groups. Nevertheless, classifying civilians of Moroccan or Congolese origins as Arab/Berber or Afro-Belgian/Congolese by ethnicity is not a mistake. Unlike the French Empire before its collapse in 1960, the Belgian Empire was not enormous and had colonies only in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi. Furthermore, these colonies had a relatively small white ethnic Belgian minority that later returned to their homeland (De Grande *et al*, 2013, p.125), in comparison with French Algeria that had over 1 million white French. As white Europeans born in French colonies, along with their offspring, are counted as 'Algerians' or 'Senegalese' by descent in France, white Belgians born in the Congo are automatically counted as “native Belgians” in Belgium. Therefore, we shall assume that all the people who are counted as Congolese or of Sub-Saharan African descent in Belgium are all black. Moroccans and Turkish people who were never colonized by Belgians can be counted as ethnically Arab/Berber or Turk/Kurd.

This chapter argues that, these classification problems notwithstanding, civilians of non-EU offspring still perform worse than native and EU citizens in Belgium. The three indicators that are covered in this section are health and mortality risks, cohabitation with the native-born population, and comparative analysis of the impact of education and civic participation on outcomes. The first, health and mortality rates reflects economic integration. Immigrants and their offspring living in healthy and

safe environments can have a higher guarantee of becoming employed or already holding down a job. Second, the acceptance of Belgian people of family members or neighbours of a different skin colour or identity measures social acceptance. The third case measures whether active and/or educated migrants and their offspring have a higher levels of social integration. In a similar way to the United Kingdom, Belgium indeed embraces diversity but it does not encourage non-EU immigrants to interact or socially exchange with others as separate communities and identities. Therefore, Belgian cases are more concentrated on how non-EU diasporas establish lives on a personal level and how individually they establish ties with the native population.

Health and Mortality Risks

Health and mortality are an indirect indicator of economic integration. Unemployment increases the probability of deteriorating health of an individual's lifetime. Conversely, those with better health are more likely to secure better education and employment (De Grande *et al*, 2014, pp.125-126). A focus on the Brussels-Capital Region is used for this indicator. As the largest city, access to health care should be easier; the city also has a large number of people foreign origin of diverse educational and national backgrounds.

In regards to health and mortality risks, the largest non-European groups that are compared are Turkish people, Moroccan (Maghreb) people, and Sub-Saharan Africans (mainly Congolese). The first two groups arrived in the country as cheap labourers beginning in the 1950s and their diasporas are older than those of Sub-Saharan Africans. Sub-Saharan Africans are more distinctive not only in terms of language and religion, but they also arrived as more educated and higher-skilled workers than their Muslim counterparts.

In reality, the health issues amongst the first generation of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants are worse than those of native Belgians. This factor is easily explained as being a result of their impoverished condition upon arrival in Belgium. Nevertheless, the mortality rate of both of these

groups is approximately the same as native Belgians. Both Turks and Moroccans are more religious, and their Muslim faith encourages them to limit their use of alcohol and tobacco, which diminishes their risk of contracting lethal diseases such as cancer, liver disease, and heart attack is far less than that of the native population, who generally smoke and drink more regularly. First generation Congolese immigrants are healthier and have a lower mortality rate than their Muslim and native counterparts. As previously mentioned, Sub-Saharan immigrants are relatively more literate and educated, except at the university level (De Grande *et al* 2013, p.127).

Nevertheless, the second generation, along with children born abroad but raised in Belgium, perform worse than their native counterparts. For example, as child mortality decreased by over 90% for the past 50 years, the mortality rate of people aged 18-24 years has increased by 50% and, in recent years, it has continued to increase (De Grande *et al*, 2013, pp.123-124). Offspring of Turkish and Moroccan migrants have high mortality rates and are susceptible to a larger variety of health conditions in comparison with more traditional and conservative first generation immigrants and with native Belgians, regardless of the fact that these offspring are more familiar with the Francophone and Christian environment in Belgium. The cultural differences of these Muslim people does not play a significant role amongst second-generation Congolese, whose parents were literate. They play more of a role amongst European and Christian citizens who do not perform better than the first generation. Both second-generation Congolese men and women achieve relatively better results than their Turkish and Moroccan counterparts but, unlike the first generation, they perform worse in regards to mortality rates and health conditions than native Belgian people. In such diminishing life conditions, it would be hard for the people of non-EU origin to adapt into Belgian society (De Grande *et al*, 2013, p.125).

The explanation behind these factors is that no matter who performs better in terms of educational level, health conditions or mortality rates are higher among these minority groups, including the ones who moved as children (labelled as 1.5 generation), and second generations. They continue to be

socially excluded by native Belgian society, regardless of the fact that Brussels is an immigrant-rich and cosmopolitan city. High rates of unemployment and social inactivity, especially amongst “the first generation of older Moroccan and Turkish workers, in combination with ethnic discrimination in the Belgian labor market, make the classic route to upward mobility less feasible for the Moroccan and Turkish second generation” (Fleischmann *et al*, 2011, p.392). Immigrants and their offspring face more obstacles “to social goods and resources, such as education, employment, and average income is limited compared with that of their native Belgian counterparts” (Anson, 2001, p.277). These circumstances lead to poor academic performance and later addiction to unhealthy lifestyles (such as alcohol and drug abuse) that increase the chances of murder, suicide, or contraction of lethal diseases such as cancer (De Grande *et al*, 2013, pp.126 and 138). This comparative analysis also explains that Brussels performs more like a parallel world and an enormous “ghetto” area for foreigners in comparison with the rest of the country, where its 'recognized' civilians (mainly of foreign origin) and their offspring face more discrimination, poor educational achievement, and less opportunity.

Co-habiting with natives (PART 1) - Moving to other areas of habitance

Another way to measure how well people of non-EU origin are cohabiting with people of native descent is through the examination of place of residence and geographical mobility. In general, the second generation of people of foreign descent after growing up as adults are supposed to be more mobile to move elsewhere than their parents. On the other hand, people who reside in areas with a high concentration of co-ethnics have a lower probability of making a move outside the Brussels Capital Region (Valk and Willaert, 2012, p.24) and which decreases their chances of interacting with native individuals who mostly live in the suburbs, small towns and villages. At the same time, Belgians move to and live in the areas where it is hard to find and communicate with the person of non-EU origin (Valk and Willaert, 2012, pp.14-15).

However, the individuals who are younger and single are usually more mobile and tend to move to

different neighbourhoods with much better housing, regardless of ethnic origin. According to the Belgian research, among non-natives those who have more chances to escape the economic ghettos and adapt into the normal way of life are considered to be the ones who do not keep their cultures strictly within their lifestyle, who are single, and better oriented to obtain higher education. Also, it is important to note that “longer-distance moves, on the other hand, are more associated with the occupational career (the search for a first job, job change, retirement) than with the housing or household career” (Valk and Willaert, 2012, p.15). That means a person of foreign descent who seeks and finds academic life, career and eventually retirement opportunities outside the district of birth or inhabitation does indeed achieve better results throughout their lifetime for his/her own well-being, like his/her native counterparts.

Throughout the decades, in search of jobs and opportunities, the population of foreign-origin Belgians were initially and predominantly living and settling in the inner core of other major towns. These are Mons, Charleroi, Liège and Ghent, where local metal and coal industries demanded new workers. Simultaneously, urban areas were expanding and younger generations attempted to move into the outer areas for better homes and apartments, a fact which is true of both native and foreign born individuals. According to the Census results of past decades, from 1996 until 2006 all the ethnic groups (Belgian native, EU migrants, and non-EU groups) have demonstrated that some of their members succeeded to move to the outskirts of the large cities and towns of Belgium (Valk and Willaert, 2012, p.16).

Despite the fact that some second-generation Turks and Moroccans successfully moved from the old downtown districts to the rich outer areas of the cities such as Brussels or Ghent, proportionally they are much less successful than native Belgians, Southern Europeans, and even new-coming Eastern Europeans in terms of changing their place of living. For example, the inner divisions of Liege city are composed 14.2% of Southern Europeans, 2.1% of Eastern Europeans, 5.1% of Moroccans, 2.6% of

Turkish, and 5.7% of mainly Sub-Saharan descent, its outskirts are proportionally composed 14% of Southern Europeans and 1.8% of Eastern Europeans, but disproportionate with Moroccans, Turks, and Sub-Saharans, whose compose 0.9%, 1.1% and 1.7% respectively (Valk and Willaert, 2012, Table 2.2). Congolese perform better than their Muslim counterparts, but it is only because they are better educated. On the other hand, the exodus and better standards of living made the inner cores of large cities such as Brussels and Antwerp drop in their proportion of native Belgians and Italians. First of all, as mentioned before, the streets they initially settled on were filled with old and dirty houses built in the 19th Century. Therefore, many individuals of foreign descent preferred to move into the outer districts because the physical conditions of original settlements were unsustainable. Also, in the 2000s, the downtown core of the cities continued to experience new influxes of migrants, and perhaps overcrowded conditions also played some role in the movement of long-settled migrants to new areas. In contrast, the native born population perhaps moved for different reasons, especially the young people, as the houses and apartments in the cities are too overpriced and, furthermore, this group prefers to study in universities that are located in the rural areas of the country. The final reason why everyone, including some people of non-European descent, moved to the outer areas is the economic industrialization that started in the 1950s, which eventually brought about suburbanization and “urban sprawl”.

Before World War II, Belgian cities were much smaller and immigrant ghettos within the Capital Region, including “Schaarbreek”, were urbanized and faced the construction of subways and streetcars, and eventually became part of Brussels in very recent decades. Those streets became overcrowded and loud, and such discomfort drove residents to quieter outer areas for more personal space. It is also important to mention that, regardless of the fact that the Brussels Capital Region has lower suicide rate than anywhere in the country, deaths caused by non-transport causes such as falls, poisoning, and

environmental accidents are proportionally higher in the capital (Renard, Tafforeau and Deboosere, 2014, p.15). The city has more pollution, which negatively affects the health of migrants and the younger generations who stay there. Furthermore, in Brussels there is a bigger possibility to be killed by improper infrastructure and bad housing, especially in the Schaarbreek area where a huge amount of people of non-EU origin are heavily concentrated in very old buildings.

Co-habiting with natives (PART 2) - Intermarrying with the native population

Interethnic marriage between immigrant origin groups and the native population of the country measures social acceptance rather than social integration. A native person who has a spouse of foreign origin should be aware of the racial, ethnic, or religious distinctiveness of their partner. During intermarriage between people of different backgrounds, individuals of non-white skin colour or foreign heritage usually no longer face serious limitations to integration. Certain conditions make intermarriage more likely. Ethnic segregation and alienation provides less opportunities to meet potential partners outside the cultural group: “When groups are on the contrary spatially dispersed, intermarriage tends to be higher. Marriage opportunities are also influenced by the degree of heterogeneity of any given population: the more different groups there are, the more likely it is that an ideal partner will be found outside the original ethnic group” (Fleischmann *et al*, 2011, p.392). That is also one of the explanations why a person who belongs to a small sized ethnic minority has a better chance of marrying a person of native background, as they rely less on co-ethnics and more on the mainstream ones as well (Koelet and Valk, 2013, p.8). This is particularly interesting given that the European Union provides free movement for people of both EU and non-EU origin to move right into the Belgian state. Furthermore, EU-27 migrants and their offspring are also considered to be major players in interethnic marriage, as the country now includes one of the largest proportion of EU migrants across the whole union (Koelet and Valk, 2013, pp.8-9).

The investigation reveals that people have a preference to marry a partner for two reasons: the first is

proper socioeconomic conditions and second, on the other “similar attitudes, backgrounds, lifestyles and to their own” (Koelet and Valk, 2013, p.6). In these marriages, both individuals properly exchange and sustain resources. In other marriages, when two individuals interact, their bonds are sustained by their similar cultural backgrounds, jokes, and humour relating to interpersonal relations. According to the 2001 Census results, “in Belgium, like in more or less all EU countries, EU immigrants are experienced as less problematic than non-European immigrants” (Koelet and Valk, 2013, p.7). That was happening not only because the EU citizens have a stronger social and symbolic status, but also because they are more culturally acceptable. In Flanders, for instance citizens have relatively moderate feelings about the migration of EU citizens to their country, except for the newly arrived immigration from the novel Eastern European member states. However, the cultural acceptance of the non-Europeans, for both old and new migrants, whether born in Belgium or abroad, faces rather more serious rejections from the mainstream society (Koelet and Valk, 2013, p.7).

Furthermore, a level of education and the age upon arrival the country can also prove as an excellent indicator about the interaction of people of immigrant origin with the native people. Higher education means that a person shares more core principles with the native population and the younger person of immigrant descent is the less conservative and more interactive with people outside of their ethnic belonging. This factor is supposed to increase the chance of a person of foreign descent marrying a partner who is of native Belgian descent, by interacting within the educated layer of a mainstream society (Koelet and Valk, 2013, pp.7-8).

In reality, on an individual level, Europeans marry more proportionally with the people of Belgian descent. The highest educated Europeans will also marry a person of any European background other than his/her own and native Belgian ones, despite the fact that intra-European nationality hierarchy continues to exist in Belgium. Native Europeans often perceive European nationals as “belonging to the same cultural community as oneself in contrast to non- Europeans, which is also facilitated by physical

appearance” (Koelet and Valk, 2013, p.7). Therefore, “Moroccan and Turkish Muslims face a less favourable reception, as they are separated by coinciding and visible ethnic, religious, and civic boundaries from the historically Catholic and White Belgian majority. Accordingly, intermarriage rates of Moroccan and Turkish Belgians with native Belgians are very low, particularly among Turkish Belgians who have the highest rates of co-ethnic marriages” (Fleischmann *et al*, 2011, p.392). This also reflects why the non-native Europeans who are closer with their own communities still have more chances to marry a person of native origin.

Who gets better results – educated or participative?

People of immigrant origin who are educated or who are participative in communities have more chances to become included in the host nation. Moreover, education and participation are distinctive elements from each other, but both are sometimes used to measure social integration. Ethnic groups may also differ on these indicators. For example, Turkish immigrants, over successive generations, tend to come from the "same geographical and social segments of Turkish society as previous ones” (Fleischmann *et al*, 2012, p.1517); they are generally less educated than Moroccan counterparts as the North Africans are more heterogeneous in terms of educational attainment. As mentioned before Moroccans are composed of two different ethnic groups, ethnic Arabs and ethnic Berbers, which come from very different regions. Higher educated and French-speaking Arab Moroccans originally came from the northern urban cities such as Casablanca and Rabat, and they are settled primarily in Brussels Capital Region. Berbers, who are primarily nomadic and semi-nomadic group from the Sahara Desert, have low levels of literacy and are more concentrated in Antwerp city. Furthermore, because of the lack of educational level between Arabs and Berbers, both groups do not prefer to unite together as one Moroccan community, in comparison with Turks and Kurds, who have same level of education but demonstrate themselves as one Turkish diaspora (Fleischmann *et al*, 2012, p.1517).

Nevertheless, a better educational level among Moroccans still has not helped the next generation

adapt properly into the Belgian society. Regardless of the fact that Moroccans were proportionally more successful individuals than ethnic Turks, on a general level their overall standards of living is not significantly better than Turkish minority, who in comparison with North Africans, are less educated. Moroccans “live in areas that combine extremely high rates of residential mobility with very high urban population density, large shares of single households and relatively low home ownership rates. These observations show that the Moroccan minority occupies the bottom of the Belgian housing market, which is strongly stratified along ethnic lines” (Fleischmann *et al*, 2011, p.415) among both Berbers and Arabs. Thus, the concentration of Moroccan Belgians in socio-economically disadvantaged inner-city areas is mainly a result of the lack of community networks that would give some voice against the discrimination in job employment. Nevertheless, the second generation generally have a low level of education, which has resulted in worsening socio-economic conditions, even among more educated Moroccans (mainly of Arab descent).

In comparison, the Turkish minority who also live in the same ghettoized areas as Moroccans could eventually establish themselves in more stable municipalities and provide improved education for their children. Through establishment of better professional and personal connections between members, they could establish a special system to make schools filled with Turkish children safer. These pupils could attend a special school program structured to improve their academic achievements. As these cultural networks of second-generation Turks continued to live isolated from Belgians, they nevertheless succeed at some degree of educational improvement. Also, young Turks were more successful in avoiding discrimination than their Moroccan counterparts as they relied more on community support (Fleischmann *et al*, 2012, p.1517).

However, the results of the Turkish diaspora does not evidence impressive results as Italian Belgians, whose second generation shows better achievements in educational and job attainment and live in much less densely populated areas (Fleischmann *et al*, 2012, p.1524; Fleischmann *et al*, 2011, p.

389). For example, former Prime Minister Elio Di Rupo was born in a family of poor workers; he eventually obtained a doctorate degree and was a head of government from 2011 to 2014. Because of the similar culture and same religions, Italians are more acceptable by Belgians than Morroccans or Turks. Therefore, Belgians of Italian origin are less concerned whether the co-ethnics work and live in the same job and neighborhood or not.

Conclusion

The Kingdom of Belgium indeed embraces diversity, but does not embrace universal equality and unity among all ethnic groups. People belonging to the native/European and to non-EU origin live apart from each other, so it is hard to find a native Belgian family whose neighbour or member is non-European by descent. Furthermore, most non-EU migrants live in districts with poor infrastructural conditions and their second generation performs worse in health than their parents or the native population, as young 'new Belgians' struggle to find jobs along with equal payment. Also, research shows that in order for a people of non-EU origin to improve their life conditions, he/she must stick with their own cultural community and forget about building professional and personal ties with natives.

CONCLUSION

In these thesis different indicators were examined in each of the three countries under study as some of these cannot be researched in other countries due to comparability and restrictions on data. For example, as French and Belgian systems give very limited information about ethnic groups, this thesis cannot provide an accurate indication of the social and political mobility of specific cultural groups. Also, the French and Belgian social models do not permit citizens to be asked whether or not they accept welfare and social aid specifically for people of different racial origins or religious upbringing.

In some countries, we cannot compare the results of some indicators because of inaccuracies. For example, in terms of increasing marriages between individuals of different origins throughout

generations, in the country that encourages 'mixing' of populations (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010, p.93), we must be aware about inaccuracies that the French Nationality System can provide to us. For example, if a white French person, born in Africa, marries a native French white person, this couple is counted as “inter-ethnic” (Collet, 2012, p.64). In this case scenario, a significant growth of biologically racially-mixed couples can be considered to be an overestimation as African-born Pieds Noirs quickly assimilated among native-born French.

Nevertheless, research of accurate identical indicators existing in other countries does not demonstrate better results. In terms of employment and wage rates, basic research confirms that educated non-Europeans living in Belgium and France face more difficulties in finding jobs, in the same way as non-EU minorities living in the UK. Second-generation and women of non-EU origin living in Belgium or the UK indeed perform better in terms of employment and education, but the overall results are far from the level of success among the native population or EU groups (Gathon, 2012; Algan *et al*, 2010, Table 5). Furthermore, in Belgium or France, participative or educated people of immigrant origin are not guaranteed a high probability of becoming accepted by their host society. In terms of health and mortality, results are quite dramatic for the second generation of French people of non-EU origin compared to their counterparts living in Belgium. In the UK, the situation is better—non-EU civilians or long-term immigrants do not face serious problems with health. However, new arrivals face health deterioration after settling into the country, which definitely increases mortality rates (Jayaweera, 2014, pp.3-4). In terms of interethnic marriage or cohabitation, the rate faces increases in the UK (Bingham, 2014A). However, in Britain, interracial marriages are more common between black citizens and white citizens, but not much between white citizens and other non-EU groups including Indian, Pakistani, or Bangladeshi. In terms of living as neighbours, regardless of the fact that non-whites move to other areas, cities like London and Birmingham experience white flight (Groves, 2013), which is one of the main factors why white British citizens are becoming minorities in

metropolitan areas. In French cities, it is only known that most of the second generation of non-EU migrants continue to live in ghettos.

Overall, the empirical results of research and statistical data conducted before the global recession, and before politicians declared multiculturalism to be a failure, demonstrate that overall outcomes were unfavourable for non-EU migrants and their offspring, including naturalized ones. No matter what group or which country is the most successful in obtaining better and more equal life standards as the native born population, it is hard to state that the policies of multiculturalism practiced for decades were successful in integrating civilians who are Third Country Nationals in origin. To become a truly integrated foreigner, the individual can be of any other ethnicity but it is still mandatory to be Christian and especially white. More distinctive racial and/or religious identity only increases the risks of mistreatment in education, workplaces, welfare, and social acceptance. Even individuals of different skin colour whose cultural, linguistic, or religious upbringing is very similar or identical to the native population continue to face some level of discrimination based on prejudice. In this scenario, multiculturalist policies were not successful and need to be revised if the true goal of Western European politicians is to establish a proper integration and social inclusion of every single civilian inhabiting the United Kingdom, France, and Belgium. Nevertheless, Chapter 5 argues that ongoing policies adopted after the failure of multiculturalism speeches rather worsen conditions for the people of non-EU origin, instead of developing a new, effective strategy to help them and their descendants to adapt.

CHAPTER 5 – ABOLITION OF MULTICULTURALISM

Chapter 5 examines whether or not all these selected states—the United Kingdom, French Republic, and the Kingdom of Belgium—are already repealing and tightening immigration and integrationist policies toward non-EU migrants, moving away from a multicultural model. To determine whether or not multiculturalism is retreating, this thesis examines the newest integration and immigration laws adopted after 2010, since political leaders officially declared multiculturalism to be a failure. Do these new rules generate more obstacles for non-EU migrants and their children to integrate in the future? Also, Chapter 5 examines how much mainstream society accepts civilians of non-EU origin today, and how well the current governments' actions reflect in opinion polls about immigration.

The immigration, integrationist, and naturalization policies that have been adopted since 2011 are related to indicators implied by Kymlicka's criteria and Isajiw's requirements of successful multiculturalism which were discussed in Chapter 1. New naturalization policies definitely affect the opportunities of non-EU migrants to become new citizens of a host nation. Regulations that dictate which values of mainstream and foreign cultures can/must be practiced have an effect on cultural representation in school curricula and the wearing a cultural symbols in classes. These rules may also indirectly affect Kymlicka's indicator of public support of cultural/religious organizations and Isajiw's requirements of fulfilling a process from ghettoization to dispersion and providing special rights for disadvantaged groups. Indicators of economic rules affect life improvements among the foreign-born citizens. It is important to mention that economic indicators such as minimum salary for citizens or legal residents to earn in order to keep a foreign-born family member in the country also relate to Isajiw's criteria of interethnic marriages and relationships. Newly established residency rules speak to Isajiw's requirement about how cultural groups are treated with equal respect and concern. Finally, ongoing social acceptance of non-EU migrants and their descendants reflect mixed intermingling between groups and properly integrating the ethnic cultures of minority groups into mainstream

cultures.

IS MULTICULTURALISM CHANGING OR RETREATING?

In recent years there have been a lot of debates and questions about what is really happening with policies of multiculturalism. Has this integrationist system begun to retreat due to the problems of economic recession, growing xenophobia, and a crisis of the welfare state? Or did it begin before? Such debates were more apparent in Britain than in France and Belgium. Some scholars believe that a multicultural retreat began with the events of 9/11 and the July 5th 2005 London Bombings. As Islamophobia was growing, societies were asking for “cultural cohesion” in Britain, and Tony Blair has implemented the more restrictive 'Immigration Asylum and Nationality Act' in 2006 (*Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006*) that forces radical Muslims to integrate or leave the country. Nevertheless, there was not really a retreat from multiculturalism, as in the 2000s Labour politicians used “cultural cohesion” to encourage communities to unite together and collectively negotiate between each other to create a new concept of British identity without any form of assimilation, but a sense of belonging to the country. This approach only revised and strengthened the multicultural identity of the UK. The *Immigration Asylum and Nationality Act* was implemented for security reasons, as it only focused on stripping the citizenship of specific individuals who threatened the safety of British residents.

Some scholars provide more direct evidence that there was no retreat before the 2010s. Will Kymlicka argues that in the 2000s there was no retreat from multiculturalism. According to his research, conducted from 2000 to 2010, the practice of multicultural policies has remained at the same level in both France, which is low, and the United Kingdom, which is high. Regardless of the fact that integration models are different in both countries, the level of practicing and embracing diversity in Belgium has significantly increased and become the same as in Britain. In comparison, France did not

even discuss any retreats because it still considered itself to be practicing an assimilationist model, regardless of the fact that some recognition policies toward people of different religion and skin colour already existed. Others claim that the retreat from multiculturalism “is premature, regrettable and likely counter-productive” (Banting and Kymlicka, 2013, p.578) as they may have not noticed any serious factor or policy to repeal this integrationist system. A third party of scholars argues that multiculturalism has neither failed nor retreated, but remains fully in place, albeit hidden by changing political rhetoric. Regardless of the fact that politicians no longer use the word ‘multiculturalism’, they use its fundamental criteria of ‘diversity policies’ in debates and speeches.

Nevertheless, claiming that ‘policies and programs once deemed “multicultural” continue everywhere’ (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010, p.21) is no longer accurate. The real action of 'retreat' by European leaders has really begun soon after they have declared the multiculturalism as a failure. As mentioned before, the research of scholars such as Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka would need to be extended into the more recent time period (since 2010) before one could conclude that diversity policies remain alive and well (Banting and Kymlicka, 2013, p.578). From 2011 to 2015, the United Kingdom, France and Belgium have already adopted the new policies that are not yet fully explored by in the academic literature. This MA Thesis provides original research that indicates that new laws, including *Immigration Act 2014* in the UK, are indicative of first direct steps that may turn multiculturalist policies backwards or at least not implement a liberal approach to civic integration for the civilians of non-EU origin.

It is important to mention that de-multiculturalization is a long process. Some scholars, like Uberoi, are still skeptical that a retreat from multiculturalism is taking place under David Cameron's government, as many of its policies and criteria are still in practice. Nevertheless, declaring the “failure of multiculturalism” does not deliver new policies or reforms too quickly or immediately. Cameron's speech only signals the beginning of a de-multiculturalization process that will go step by step for years

and possibly decades. For example, after David Cameron's speech, English schools continued to practice a multicultural curriculum and instructions in employment services were provided in different languages. Eventually, three years later, in June 2014, David Cameron and then-Secretary of State for Education Michael Gove also declared that all British schools must embrace “core British values” such as learning English literature, history, and traditions (Cameron, 2014). Also, regardless of the fact that David Cameron advocates the traditional 'national identity to everyone', it still does not mean that every community group and person belonging to non-EU origin is ready to fulfill the requirements of assimilation. Cameron's alternative approach is seen as being based on sharply different premises such as “the active integration of immigrants into the economic, social and political mainstream, a ‘muscular’ defence of liberal democratic principles and insistence that newcomers will learn about its history, norms and institutions, and the introduction of written citizenship tests and loyalty oaths” (Banting and Kymlicka, 2013, p.578).

Definitely, there were other proposals that could replace multiculturalism but still favour diversity and a non-assimilationist approach of integrating people of non-EU origin. At the same time, reforming multiculturalism has not been discussed yet, as currently “the term ‘interculturalism’ has been slowly replacing multiculturalism in many debates on cultural diversity” (Muchoweicka, 2013). Such an untested approach advocates for “neutrality between the cultures” by avoiding the tendency of treating non-Western cultures as totally separate from mainstream society through productive and non-hierarchical dialogue between communities that was not expressed much in multicultural process. In addition, interculturalism recognizes that all cultures “are historically and contemporarily connected” (Muchoweicka, 2013) and communities should openly embrace cultural exchange between each other. For example a Medieval Muslim influence could have contributed things to European civilization, such as math (using algebra and Arabic numbers), astronomy, and science. However, the fact remains that no politicians have yet discussed or proposed any program of interculturalism.

Nevertheless, to consider that there is a complete abolition of multiculturalism is still an overstatement. The retreat from an “immigrant form of multiculturalism” does not bring about the complete abolition of the rights of minorities (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010, pp.41-42). It is important to mention that there are native minorities inhabiting those states as well. The author mentions that current states tend to recognize linguistic and national minorities such as Celtic speaking Bretons in France, Walloons and the Flemish in Belgium, and Scottish people in the United Kingdom. Will Kymlicka, along with other researchers, “takes a global view on multiculturalism not only in relation to immigrants, but also regarding substate national groups and indigenous minorities” (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010, pp.22-23). For example, David Cameron has already introduced the first of the set of bills in the parliament that will increase political and economic sovereignties of Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland and England. These bills would also extend the recognition of native national identities across the UK, including English, Scottish, Welsh, Northern Irish and possibly Cornish people do (*Scottish Bill 2015*).

The recognition policies of national minorities do not bring much attention toward the people of non-EU descent. And it is not yet clear whether recognition of “English identity”, which is associated by many ethnic nationalists as combating Islamification, will bring even more complete exclusion of non-EU communities whose most members are living as the “racialized underclass” (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010, p.47). In parallel, many religious leaders of native citizenship within the UK are not ready to accept religious minorities of foreign origin. Some high-ranking Anglican bishops and even former British Chief Rabbi, Lord Sacks, also eventually recognized multiculturalism as a failure, blaming it for “segregation and inward looking minorities”. The former likened Britain to “a hotel where nobody is at home and does not belong to anyone”, where each culture has own 'room' and can do whatever it likes unless it does not disturb a 'neighbour' (*Huffington Post*, 2013). To avoid such circumstances, the government needs to inject an even more liberal form of multiculturalism. The new

policy in the European context must embrace “trans-cultural diffusion, where cultural items such as innovations, religions, values, social institutions are adopted from one culture to another”

(Muchoweicka, 2013). Results remain stagnant; like 50 years earlier, non-European migrants and their descendants continue “to grapple with discrimination racism and inequality in opportunities”

(Muchoweicka, 2013).

EUROPEAN FISCAL COMPACT AND AUSTERITY MEASURES IN THE UK

First of all, it is important to mention that EU policies have encouraged austerity measures that affected the welfare policies of nation states including Belgium and France, and that this appears to be harmful for people belonging to non-EU communities who depend on state support. Such a situation was provoked by the global recession and the eurozone crisis that began in Ireland and other Southern European nation states including Greece, Cyprus, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. Most EU member states were left with no other choice but to reduce spending on social programs in order to balance federal budgets and avoid any serious form of bankruptcies in the future.

These policies were implemented since the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (*European Commission, 2012*) better known as the European Fiscal Compact, which was signed and ratified by most European states (except for the United Kingdom and Czech Republic) on March 2012. It took effect on January 1, 2013 (in Belgium on April 1, 2014). This policy is based on toughening social support and increasing spending cuts for national budgets. Strict requirements include that a government deficit may not exceed 0.5% of the national GDP and government debt to gross domestic product must not exceed 60%, and must be annually reduced by one twentieth of the difference between 60% and the current level (if above). If the member state does not fulfill any of these measures, then the country would face the fine of up to 0.1% of the GDP that will be paid to the EU institutions and will also not get any financial support from other member states. To meet such requirements, EU member states have to reduce spending on many social programs, which

includes welfare support.

This is especially tough for countries such as the French Republic and the Kingdom of Belgium, which faces serious problems with debt and budget deficit. For example, even in recent years, the French government is struggling to meet its budget deficit target. Since 2009, European officials gave three special extensions of deadlines for France to meet its target by 2017, as its end of 2014 level is 4% and projected to drop to 3.8% by the end of the 2015 year (*Trading Economics*, 2015A). Nevertheless, its government to debt ratio is enormous and continues to increase, and is currently at 95%. The current left-wing French government must reduce spending and cannot afford to pay enough benefits or other forms of social support for the people living in ghettoized areas, especially when unemployment is relatively high among French citizens and the country is experiencing slow economic growth. The Kingdom of Belgium is progressing well with its current budget deficit which was at 3.2% at the end of 2014. Nevertheless, its 2008-2009 banking crisis caused serious changes to the debt-GDP-ratio which was at 106.5% at the end of the 2014 year. Therefore, authorities will continue to reduce the government spending on many social programs including welfare and will even impact much more on the most disadvantaged layer, including people belonging to foreign origin (*Trading Economics*, 2015B).

The European Fiscal Compact does not directly undermine the policies of ethnic recognition and tolerance, but its indirect effect may seriously diminish security and support for the poorer and the most disadvantaged layers of the European society (Malkin, 2013). Although those measures are not particularly directed at immigrants, some experts claim that the austerity policies are partly responsible for the social exclusion and increasing the poverty, especially for the most vulnerable members of society, among whom are considered to be people belonging to non-EU origin (*EU Observer*, 2015). Furthermore, it is also responsible for the cultural exclusion as well, as many left-wing parties claim that these austerity policies were somehow responsible for the radicalization of the youth of immigrant

descent. Even the least vulnerable citizens, among both EU and non-EU residents, must pay higher taxes to fulfill the European austerity program of balancing the budgets. This situation limits even the most successful non-EU civilians from providing better standards of living in the future.

Regardless of the fact that the United Kingdom did not ratify and join the European Fiscal Compact, the fiscally conservative government of David Cameron has adopted its own austerity measures. Since taking power in 2010, the British Prime Minister has undermined many principles of the New Labour policies, implemented by predecessors Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, by significantly reducing spending on welfare benefits and social housing. Such policies were partially responsible for the England Riots in August 2011. During this event, rioters were not only conducted by groups of mostly jobless and uneducated youth, but there was a high proportion of black and south Asian young people along with “whites who were experiencing the same deprived social and economic conditions” (Panayi, 2000, p.154). For example, among the population under the age of 40 in Birmingham (second-largest) city, 58% are white citizens, 9% are black citizens, and 30% are of Asian descent: among charged criminals, only 33% were white, 46% were black citizens (worst performing minority group), and 15% were of Asian descent (*BBC*, 2011B).

Aside from this, these austerity policies that brought about a higher unemployment level for nation states were consequently partially responsible for the growing popularity of the ultra-conservative and far-right parties, such as Front National headed by Marine Le Pen in France and Nigel Farage's United Kingdom Independence party. Their supporters are filled with mainstream protesters who hold anti-immigrant and even racist views regarding foreigners and their descendants, blaming them for stealing jobs and taking away the taxpayers' money for welfare and housing needs. Therefore, this factor led to the emergence of an anti-immigrant debate on the political levels of both the EU and its nation-states. Indeed, during elections of May 2014, in Britain and France, Front National and parties succeeded in winning majority seats in the European Parliament, and in winning a significant number of votes in the

French municipal and regional elections, and the UK general election in May 2015. Such popularity led to leaders Nigel Farage and Marine Le Pen becoming more mainstream, and openly criticizing multiculturalist policies of integrating ethnic and religious minorities within mainstream societies. They demand that jobs be created for native British and French citizens by removing foreign workers from the labour market (*L'Express*, 2013; *Guardian*, 2014).

TIGHTENING IMMIGRATION AND INTEGRATION POLICIES

After the declaration about the failure of multiculturalism, several Western European governments have begun to implement immigration policies which toughen conditions of immigrant communities, and make their integration process more difficult. This paper covers several laws and policies that were already adopted by the governments of the United Kingdom, French Republic, and the Kingdom of Belgium.

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom is perhaps the best example to analyze regarding ongoing current policies that are considered to be an anti-immigrant, after the declaration of the failure of multiculturalist doctrines. Also, after David Cameron asked citizens to embrace and promote British values as a core to the country: “The government’s efforts to bring down net migration, despite their limited success, have had significant impacts on migrants in the UK and those seeking to come here, in particular from outside the European Economic Area (EEA). The government has introduced a blistering series of rule changes across visa categories for non-EEA nationals, tightening the rule for those coming here to work, study or reunite with family members” (Grove-White, 2014). Regardless of the fact that David Cameron has failed to reduce his net migration target from hundreds of thousands to tens of thousands, including non-EU migrants, in 2015, nevertheless the predominant majority who moved there from outside of Europe are Chinese, Indian, Saudi Arabian, and Malaysian people went to the UK to study and to do business rather to live permanently (Blinder, 2015; Chorley, 2014).

When the current British Prime Minister came into power in May 2010 and promised to fulfill his campaign of reducing the numbers of people coming into the country from hundreds of thousands to tens of thousands, he began to deal with economic migration from outside of the European Union. Perhaps the first provocative policy is the establishment of minimum salary to earn for non-EU immigrants in order to settle in the country. It will be considered at least 35,000 British pounds starting from the beginning of fiscal year of April 6th, 2016, which was adopted on February 2012 by Home Secretary Theresa May (*BBC*, 2012A). Along with raising the National Qualifications Framework level from 4 to 6 (degree level) and requiring hiring employers to register as official sponsors at the Home Office, this policy was supposed to attract and keep “the brightest and the best” only in the country, such as scientists, doctors, and researchers at the PhD level (*Home Office*, 2012A, pp.4-5). This bill is considered to be discriminatory and even racist as it specifically targets non-EU settlers. Even, the anti-immigrant political party was not satisfied with this legislation by stating that the EU citizens will continue to flow the country and it pushed the United Kingdom to leave the European Union, in order to make those rules to impact European migrants. Regardless of the fact that in recent years Cameron tried to limit the EU migration, he only implemented policies that limit access to benefits for the welfare seekers. However, such measures would not impact them much, as most EU citizens contributed more to the British labour market and economy, and less often apply for the benefits than the non-EU counterparts (Travis, 2014B). In addition, after getting re-elected in May 2015, David Cameron abandoned the idea of putting in place new limits for the freer movement of European citizens. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the policy of minimum salaries to stay in the United Kingdom will negatively affect the majority of non-EU migrants. They may no longer apply for or obtain settlement, because most of them do not have such high salaries and are not able to apply such high-skilled jobs. The average salary overall is 26,500 British pounds per annum according to the 2014 statistics, and finally, according to a research conducted by a *Poverty Site*, “around 65% of

Bangladeshis, 50% of Pakistanis and 30% of Black Africans are in low income. These rates are much higher than those for White British (10%)” (Palmer, 2011, Graph 2).

Furthermore, in July 2012, the United Kingdom also implemented tough family reunification rules that were not practiced even under Thatcher's restrictive policies. Right now, British citizens and permanent immigrants require £18,600 per annum to bring their non-EU spouses to stay with them in the UK (*Home Office*, 2012B, p.6). According to researchers at Oxford University, this rule affects approximately 17,800 families and one of the reasons why it is considered to be tough is that 47 % of the British working population do not possess such a salary. Aside from the claims that multinational families are being torn apart from each other, the Home Office justifies such an action by saying that “new UK immigration laws were established to reduce the financial burden on social services and bring UK immigration rates down” (*Russia Today*, 2013). Furthermore, two years later, despite appeals regarding the violation of human rights, the British Court of Appeal dismissed the claims and refused to lower the threshold to 13,400 pounds (Travis, 2014A).

The most recent Immigration Policy that has taken force, on July 28, 2014, is the Immigration Bill 2014 (*Immigration Act 2014*). Its measures include limiting access to welfare, banking, and health services for both EU and non-EU migrants in future budgets (*HM Treasury*, 2015; Dodd, 2015), and may increase the chances of foreigners becoming disqualified from obtaining legal immigration status. Some speculate that such new measures are practically racist because it prohibits landlords from renting to disqualified immigrants and increases the chances of racial and ethnic profiling of renters. There are claims by some journalists that landlords should not be concerned about only giving a rent to a white-skinned person with a British surname. In the document itself, there is little evidence to support the UNHCR's claim that the new rules encourage 'racial profiling', after the immigration bill was passed in the first stage by House of Commons in October 2013 (Mason, 2013). However, warning penalties for renting a place to a disqualified immigrant can make landlords wary about renting to a

person of a different cultural background, and they may demand supplementary documents from renters to determine whether they are legitimate or not.

Finally, the *Immigration Act 2014* increases the powers of the Home Office to strip the citizenship of naturalized immigrants for the 'public good', especially participants and suspects in terrorist activity. This is strengthened by the *Counter Terrorism and Security Act (Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015)* issued on February 2015, due to radicalized Muslim Britons joining Muslim extremist organizations. Even some human rights activists have criticized Home Secretary Theresa May for making some naturalized immigrants and their descendants 'stateless.' Regardless of the fact that the legislation does not mention the ethnic and racial origins of immigrants, this *Immigration Bill* violates the fundamental criteria of multiculturalism. Perhaps such measures were implemented as security measures; however it should be noted that radicalized youth with allegiance to ISIS can potentially be native white British and non-EU people of Christian heritage. Also, ISIS is an international organization and is not recognized as a state. Muslim Britons who have taken part in its operations did not evidence allegiance to the country of their ethnic origin, whether it is Republic of Iraq or Pakistan. Therefore, instead of stripping citizenship, these religious extremists should be penalized as strictly British terrorists in the same way as local white supremacists are punished, who also take part in international racist organizations. Current legislation alienates the Muslim minority groups and does not permit a sense of belonging among moderate Islamic communities in the country. These new integrationist and immigration policies also provoked British nationals openly to present posters for the immigrants illegally staying the United Kingdom, saying "Go Home or Face Arrest" on trucks, in order to encourage them to leave the country without facing arrest and forceful deportation (Siddiq, 2012).

In parallel, several ministers have also already implemented or proposed measures that reverses the policies of recognition of people of immigrant descent. For example, when David Cameron has met Republican Presidential candidate, Mitt Romney on June 2012, they promised to revive the Anglo-

Saxon identity and ties between the United Kingdom and United States of America (Swaine, 2012). Furthermore, former Secretary of State for Communities and Local Governments, Eric Pickles, on February 21, 2012 has “heralded the end of state-sponsored multiculturalism by vowing to stand up for 'mainstream' values by strengthening national identity” (Walford, 2012). He openly criticized former Labour Ministers for Women and Equality Harriet Harman and Jack Straw under Tony Blair and Gordon Brown's governments for “taking the country down 'the wrong path' by encouraging different communities to live separate lives” (Walford, 2012). Aside from promoting British liberal values to preserve tolerance, Pickles declared that all ethnic communities must find a “common ground” between each other to unite instead of being divided and embrace the English language and Christian religions as core British values. Such measures perhaps encourage familiarity with core cultures but this approach does not address how 'alienated communities' would adapt into the values of the mainstream. It would rather psychologically push minority societies to be excluded even more, and disregard individuals who are willing to assimilate (Walford, 2012).

Nor has the opposition party of the United Kingdom, the Labour Party under the leadership of Ed Miliband, stopped the anti-multiculturalist and anti-immigration policies of the Conservatives at all. Regardless of the fact that Nick Clegg's coalition party criticized Cameron's motives, the oppositional Labour Party helped Conservatives to approve anti-immigrant legislation in the House of Commons. For example, Labour Shadow Secretary, Yvette Cooper, said that by establishing the 35, 000 pounds of minimum salary that "people should only be allowed to settle in this country under these rules if they can pay their way, live by our rules and contribute value to our country. We need strict controls, properly enforced, and all of the mainstream parties should agree on that” (BBC, 2012A). Furthermore, Ed Miliband was also concentrated on improving the economic conditions of the country, such as combating the unemployment rate. On June 22, 2012, the Labour Party leader gave a speech which was very contrary to Tony Blair's pro-immigrant New Labour policies, when he stated that British jobs

should be considered to the British workers first (Persson, 2013), as there was a high unemployment rate among the native, low-class population. Furthermore, Ed Miliband and other Labour Party officials apologized that the immigration policies under Tony Blair and Gordon Brown premierships were wrong as they brought an uncontrollable influx of migrants that began in 1997 (*BBC*, 2012B). Ed Miliband eventually mentioned that regardless of the fact that it remains a pro-immigrant party, the Labour Party would reduce non-EU immigration and would bring British jobs to British workers (*BBC*, 2013). Finally, when the UKIP won the most seats during the European elections in May 2014, Ed Miliband along with David Cameron has accepted the fact that British citizens no longer favour ongoing conditions on immigration and want to take back the jobs, as it was claimed by Nigel Farage (Bennett, 2014).

It should not be ignored that after David Cameron was elected for the second term and won the majority of seats in the UK parliament, he can easily be “ratchet[ed] up his eurosceptic and anti-immigrant rhetoric in an attempt to outgun Nigel Farage” (Hanska, 2014) and the party. The Labour Party is in minority and the Liberal Democratic Party, which conservatives accused of softening tough immigration policies on migrants (*BBC*, 2011A), is no longer in the coalition. Finally, current Prime Minister cannot ignore the demands because of gaining only one seat due to the first-past the post system. It collected over 4 million votes, which is the third largest number after Labour and Conservatives. Prior to his departure to the EU Riga Summit on May 21-22, 2015, the British Prime Minister has introduced new measures such as reducing government spending and adopting a tough immigration bill to tackle 'illegal workers', who migrated to the country legally but overstayed, and to speed up deportation policies (Wintour, 2015). Also, his future policies might also include removing the United Kingdom from the European Convention on Human Rights treaty that provides legitimacy for the European Court of Human Rights to accuse the country of violating the rights of immigrants (Watt, 2015). Indeed, this court remains the only strongest obstacle against Cameron's tough

immigration policies, and succeeded in allowing non-EU spouses to join families without requiring British visas on December 2014, and in April 2015, and forced the Home Secretary to bring back a deported Nigerian family (whose female family member moved to the UK in 1991), who faced persecution in their home country (Campbell, 2015).

According to Brigett Anderson, the UK is now experiencing the shift of labour which is not in favour of non-EU migrants. More jobless British people tend to take jobs in the low-paying sectors, such as restaurants or hotel businesses (*The Guardian*, 2014). This may be one effect of David Cameron's cuts in welfare systems, and many of these young Britons are left with no choice but to take any job in order to provide themselves with funds for food, shelter, and debt repayment. This means that the current policies now shift toward the 'migrant jobs for British workers' (Anderson, 2013).

France

The French Republic also began toughening naturalization laws and abandoning multiculturalist policies of acceptance and recognition as soon as former President Sarkozy declared its failure in February 2011. Nevertheless, even before Angela Merkel and David Cameron made similar statements on October 2010 and January 2011, the French President was already implementing the measures which are considered to be anti-multiculturalist. Under Nicolas Sarkozy's leadership, the banning of burqas in public (they can be worn only in the car or in the mosque) might be seen as an assault on multiculturalist principles (Jeudy, 2010; *Legifrance*, 2010). Regardless of the fact that he defended the requirement that every citizen must keep his/her face visible and that Sarkozy stated that such Islamic dress is a 'walking prison' for women, this ban nevertheless discriminates against religious rights of the Muslim minority by forcing them to comply instead of showing tolerance. Tougher naturalization laws have taken effect on January 2012 (*Legifrance*, 2011). Regardless of the fact that France still allows naturalized immigrants to keep their original citizenship, it nevertheless requires them to understand better the French values and makes it more difficult for them to become citizens. During his 2012

Presidential campaign, French interior minister Claude Gueant has demanded a reduction in annual migration from 200,000 to 180,000 people (*Le Monde*, 2011). Finally, President Sarkozy has also declared on his speech that France has too many immigrants on March 8, 2012 (Tassel, 2012).

Nevertheless, after left-wing socialist President, Francois Hollande took power, the policies of recognition and acceptance of immigrants and ethnic minorities have indeed returned. In comparison with Sarkozy's mandate, there was no debate about whether or not immigrants should culturally and/or economically integrate better. Also, Francois Hollande has even inaugurated a museum is dedicated to the contributions of immigrants to the French society (*France 24*, 2014).

At the same time, some violations persist against the multiculturalist policies under Hollande's mandate. For example, former Interior Minister and current Prime Minister Manuel Valls has defended the deportation of one Roma family back to the Republic of Kosovo at the end of 2013, and in February 2014, and the French Constitutional Court has denied the appeal of a 15-year-old Roma girl to be brought back to France (Nimani, 2014). Since May 2012, busy with the worsening economic conditions of the French Republic such as low GDP growth and rising national unemployment, President Hollande and both of his Prime Ministers, Manuel Valls and Jean-Marc Ayrault, did not approve any serious immigration and naturalization laws except for the Immigration Bill presented in parliament on July 2014 (*Le projet de loi relatif au droit des étrangers*, 2015). The former bill is supposed to provide easier access for asylum seekers, to fulfill the European criteria of providing shelter for refugees. The latter bill is meant to attract the talented and high-skilled immigrants – scientists, artists, sportspeople, investors, and people of other advanced fields. In case of approval, instead of constantly renewing a 1-year residence permit annually, the migrants who are willing to stay and who live in the country a minimum of five years can apply for a 10-year residence permit without renewals. Other eased rules include that the foreigner who has had a one-year card may obtain, as soon as it expires, a two-year card if the parent of a French child or spouse of French, and then directly

request a ten-year card. People who depend on family reunification may obtain a residence of four years after the stay of a year and then apply for a decade (*Le projet de loi relatif au droit des étrangers*, 2015).

On the other hand, the bill requests that immigrants who do not follow the criteria should leave the country within seven instead of thirty days and it strengthens supervision of arrest, deportation, and travel restrictions. Also, some critics say that the bill only favors 700,000 out of the five million foreigners who currently reside in France. The bill does not favor the rest who are unskilled and who are mainly of non-EU descent. In this case, after the approval of a bill, left-wing President Francois Hollande and Prime Minister Manuel Valls would contradict themselves as leaders who favour immigration as the new policy does not focus on the remaining 4,300,000 immigrants who are mainly low-skilled (Vincent, 2014). It appears that they are under the threat of exclusion and potential deportation (*Le projet de loi relatif au droit des étrangers*, 2015). Or rather, it appears that Francois Hollande fulfills a promise that he made during his second tour during a 2012 Presidential campaign by agreeing with his conservative counterpart Nicolas Sarkozy that France “has too many immigrants” (*La Liberation*, 2012). Currently, the asylum legislation is only approved by the lower house of parliament and parliamentary discussion about the new *Immigration Bill* was delayed until the end of the first half of 2015. Such long-term delays and a lack of attention from the federal government only leaves migrants facing worsening conditions.

Belgium

Regardless of the fact that Belgium demonstrated itself as one of the most liberal states in terms of the naturalization of immigrants and allowing large numbers to enter into the country, Belgium has also turned its back on multiculturalism. Following Angela Merkel's speech in October 2010, the next month outgoing Prime Minister Yves Leterme also agreed with the German Chancellor that multiculturalism had failed and the naturalization processes had been too easy for the immigrants

throughout past decades. He also agreed with the Flemish Nationalists that migrants coming to the region must learn the local language. For example, a migrant who lives in the Flemish region cannot become a citizen even if he/she knows only one official language of the area, French or German, but not the native Dutch (*LeVif*, 2010).

Furthermore, Belgium is becoming less tolerant toward customs and cultural upbringing of those who originated from outside of Europe. The first sign of reversing multiculturalism was considered to be banning of burqa (*LeVif*, 2012) and other sorts of full veils for women on July 2011 (*Cour Constitutionnelle*, 2013). Unlike France, Belgium did not practice any necessary rules of secularism, so it is considered to be backlash toward policies of recognition and tolerance toward the citizens who practice different religious customs and contradicts the European universality rules. The real changes in integration began under the left-wing government of Elio Di Rupo who, regardless of the fact that he continued to financially support non-EU civilians with welfare and cultural funding. Under the pressure of the right-wing parties, he has begun implementing tougher integration laws that took effect on January 1, 2013 (*Loi modifiant le Code de la nationalité belge afin de rendre l'acquisition de la nationalité belge neutre du point de vue de l'immigration*, 2012). Unlike the previous policies, the new rules require the immigrants to find employment and permanently enter the job sector, to become familiar with the local customs and to pass stricter language requirement tests all within five years. This legislation definitely has had a significant effect, as the number of people who applied for naturalization has dropped from around 19,000 in 2012 to around 2,500 the following year, when it took effect (Clevers, 2013). Furthermore, as previous liberal policies failed to familiarize them with the core cultures of Walloons and Flemish people, it would be very difficult for them to become more culturally integrated, as over decades they lived parallel lives and did not adapt to the local customs.

There are also new socio-economic measures that could worsen the conditions for migrants. The Belgian government has approved a new law in late 2012 that both EU and non-EU unemployed

immigrants must leave the country within six months or otherwise face deportation. These new requirements have increased the deportations even among the EU migrants, as well where today many unemployed youth from the debt-ridden Southern Europe come to Belgium and are unable to find any available jobs (*Daily Express*, 2012). Despite of the criticism of human rights abuses, Mina Andreeva, a spokeswoman for the European Commission's justice commissioner, said Belgium "had done nothing illegal, noting that European law allows any country to send home labourers from another EU member after six months if they lack 'sufficient means to support themselves and pay for their health insurance'" (Byrne, 2014). Nevertheless, it would more negatively affect migrants of non-EU origin and their descendants. According to the very recent OECD studies conducted in 2013 among non-EU civilians, the unemployment is 14% against 7% among the EU migrants and the inactivity level is 40% among non-EU immigrants (31% among the EU migrants) (Pina, Corluy and Verbist, 2015, pp.7-8). Furthermore, proportionally fewer of people of non-EU descent work in white-collar jobs and proportionally more of them earn a maximum 90 euros than EU migrants or native Belgians. Furthermore, unemployment remains the highest in the Brussels Capital Region which includes proportionally the largest numbers of non-EU migrants and their descendants than in both Flanders and Wallonia (Pina, Corluy and Verbist, 2015, p.11).

ACCEPTANCE BY NATIVE SOCIETIES

In order to determine whether the people of immigrant background have a chance to integrate in the future, it is important to find out how much they are accepted by the mainstream societies. In the United Kingdom, Anthony Heath says that multiculturalism has not failed and the London Summer Olympics in 2012 successfully embraced the diversity of the country. The 2010 Ethnic Minority British Elections Survey (funded by the Economic and Social Research Council) interviewed members of five main minority groups [Indian (Hindu, Sikh and Muslim), Pakistani, Bangladeshi, black Caribbean, and black African (Muslim and Christian)]. The findings suggested that, the "first generation minorities do

tend to marry and mix within their own ethnic communities, they are also willing to integrate while mixing within neighbourhoods and workplaces. In comparison, the second generation – those educated and raised here in Britain – show a further 27% shift toward integration, with greater social and workplace mixing, and a significant increase in marriages across community divides” (Heath, 2012). This finding is especially true for black groups that prefer to marry white people. After analysis of the 2007 England and Wales citizenship survey, Heath argues that the great majority of ethnic minorities and white British people feel "one can belong to Britain and maintain a separate/religious identity as 85% of white British people agreed to "fairly or very strongly feeling that they belong to Britain", where 89% of both Indian and Pakistani, 87% of Bangladeshi and 84% of both black African and black Caribbean agreed” (Heath, 2012).

However, such claims are considered to be inaccurate and other reports show rather opposite results. Regardless of the fact that a “majority of ethnics can be seen as engaged in a strategy of acculturation, wherein they are attempting to add a sense of being British”, the multiculturalist policy did not give them a sense about being English, Welsh or Scottish – native ethnicities (Kivisto, 2002, p.152). Also, statistics mentioned in previous paragraph were collected before David Cameron's speech about failed multiculturalism in February 2011. Furthermore, the London Summer Olympics 2012 that promoted diversity were already funded by Tony Blair's and Gordon Brown's policies, but not by David Cameron. Furthermore, newer statistics showed opposite results regarding acceptance of ethnic minorities by mainstream society. Aside from the fact that British society is becoming increasingly segregated according to *The Telegraph* as only 1 out of 10 citizens have a close friends outside of their ethnic background (Bingham, 2013). Furthermore, the BBC survey report showed that 95% of voters said that multiculturalism has failed to help people of different backgrounds to work and live together (Edmunds, 2014). Finally, among teenagers between the ages of 13 and 18, people have 30% fewer friends from people of other backgrounds than the most integrated age groups in their 20s and 30s, and

shows a similar level of segregation as the middle aged people. Also, in comparison with “pensioners who were the least integrated overall, while those aged 18 to 34 were the most, with an average of 65 per cent - age group of 17 and under had less than half (47%) the number of social interactions outside their own background as might be expected” (Bingham, 2014B) based on a sample of 4 269 people. Finally, Show Racism the Red Card (SRTRC), which interviewed 5,945 children aged 10 to 16, found that 84 percent “believe “racism against whites” is ignored, 60 percent say asylum seekers and immigrants are stealing jobs, and more than 30 percent say Muslims are taking over England” (Kershaw, 2015). Max Hanska also states that “the reason immigration and the EU hold sway in framing people’s grievances is because of rising inequality, the long-term failure to build more homes, and public under-investment in public services, housing and infrastructure”, which is an issue that has continued in recent years (Hanska, 2014).

Nevertheless, xenophobia toward immigrants is often based on class but not on racial, ethnic, or religious reasons. British citizens still do not completely oppose immigration, and prefer fewer numbers who are ready to work hard (Duffy, 2014). Furthermore, the natives feel much more racist toward the low skilled migrants who are least adaptable and who prefer to sit on benefits of the state. Such a statement does not rule in favour of the majority of non-EU immigrants that have caused the state to spend approximately 120 billion pounds on social support and welfare (Slack, 2014). In comparison, the EU migrants who rely much less on benefits, add up approximately 20 billion pounds (Travis, 2014B) annually to the country's GDP by contributing hard work ethic and willingness to adapt into the new working environment. EU migrants are more active in the labour market, while very few who are inactive because of the long-term diseases and disabilities. They are also more proportionally employed in construction and manufacturing jobs than the UK-born and non-EU civilians (Nash, 2013, p.10). This proportion has dramatically increased from 2004, since the Eastern European states joined the European Union and since 2007 when they joined Schengen Zone. It is an

interesting fact to mention that, regardless of a very recent wave of European immigration since the middle of 2000s, according to the 2011 Census, Eastern Europeans are more employed in financial, real estate, professional, and administrative activities than the UK-born citizens (Nash, 2013, pp.10-13).

Furthermore, white Britons have become more accepting towards the EU migrants. Some researchers say that significant number of European immigrants shifted to white British identity over time. According to the ONS Longitudinal Study, “the number of people who changed ethnicity to tick the white British box between 2001 and 2011, net of those going the other way, was 7 percent among the white Other (mainly European) group, higher even than among white Irish” (Kaufmann, 2014). Also, around thirty percent of those who said their parents were of non-British European descent identify themselves as white British, while the native British who claim themselves simply as European are only six percent. However, except for people of mixed race backgrounds, non-white British do not affiliate with those of the native white British descent.

In France, the situation is even tougher for immigrant and foreign minorities, especially after the Charlie Hebdo attack on January 7, 2015. It would be hard for Manuel Valls to deliver a promise of integrating and avoid the radicalization of the Muslim minority, and abolish the “apartheid”. French mainstream society has largely run out of patience and does not favour further attempts of integration as natives already began a very racist backlash toward Muslim people. The physical existence of the French Muslim minority is under threat as French police have already taken executive measures to protect mosques and Islamic community centers from potential attackers. Also, such controversial events and economic difficulties like slow economic growth and high youth unemployment caused a sharp drop of confidence in Hollande and his Socialist party. Instead, tensions about integrating the Muslim minority led to rising popularity of Marine Le Pen and her far-right Front National party, who won a significant number of votes during the French municipal and regional elections during 2014-2015 and most of the seats during the European elections on May 2015. Regardless of the fact that the

Front National still did not officially win French regional and local elections, the conservative party UMP are returning by attracting or rather stealing votes from Marine Le Pen through more moderate but still anti-immigrant and anti-multiculturalist stances. High ranking party officials such as Francois Fillon repeated that “France has too many immigrants” (*Le Figaro*, 2013) and Jean-François Copé admitted that “anti-white (mainstream) racism is on the rise” (Eychemne, 2012). Nicolas Sarkozy, who has significant potential to return as President after January 7, 2015, even has claimed that “immigration is not linked with terrorism but complicates things by creating communitarianism, where people identify with their own community” (Burrows and Allen, 2015) and instead of discussing the problems of integration, he admitted that the “war has been declared on civilization” (Mandonnet, 2015). Eventually during the latest regional elections on March 2015, Manuel Valls even criticized Sarkozy for appealing to racist voters and during a parliamentary by-election, Sarkozy was criticized for favouring the Front National candidate instead of a socialist one (Willsher, 2015).

Furthermore, even French-born Muslims say that they are still not treated as French by mainstream society and cannot feel loyal to the French Republic as a result. For example, according to the interview done with two French-born Muslim sisters, 17-year-old Sira and 22-year-old Hasfa, both indicated they do not feel integrated; they face “people always asking: ‘Where are you from?’, and only felt French until people” told them they were not. Furthermore, they criticized the French government, on the basis that, instead of teaching about the secularism, they should teach about the religions (Islam, Christianity, and Judaism) at French schools (*The Local*, 2015). According to the studies done in 2011, French Muslims of both Maghreb and West African descent living in the suburbs of Clichy-sous-Bois and Montfermeil have failed to become more “secular” throughout the generations as they “regularly attend mosque, fast during Ramadan and boycott school meals that are not ‘halal’” (*Al Arabiya*, 2011). The residents do not object to marrying a person of different ethnic background unless that person does not practice Islam. With such conditions of growing populism from far-right

and conservative parties and rising xenophobia from the mainstream, it would be hard for the alienated majority of French Muslims to become accepted as part of the whole French society (Alby and Beltrande, 2011, p.2).

It is difficult to predict with the case of Belgium to what degree the mainstream society is accepting towards immigrants and their descendants. Native citizens and societies of foreign origin are too isolated from each other so it is hard to give a clear answer whether native Belgians (both Flemish and Walloons) have become increasingly xenophobic towards minorities. As mentioned before, the Brussels Capital Region is very diverse, multicultural and internationalist, as the population of native origin do not make up a majority in the city (Petrovic, 2012). Also, from the native perspective, the city is bilingual and both Flemish and Walloons do not behave altogether as the nuclear identity toward others. The EU migrants may not be as critical of non-EU migrants as they are also immigrants and many of them live in Brussels temporarily as they work in the EU institutions.

The Wallonia region remains relatively tolerant towards people of immigrant descent. In comparison with its Flemish counterpart, the Francophone part of the country did not ever experience any serious rise in the popularity of the radical far-right parties such as Vlaams Belang. Perhaps the best explanation behind is that the region is poorer than the Flemish one, and because of assimilationist policies citizens of foreign and native origins behave like a common labor force in the country.

The Dutch-speaking Flemish region nevertheless experienced the popular increase of the nationalist and separatist New Flemish Alliance (N-VA) party that nevertheless succeeded in winning a majority of seats in the Belgian elections in May 2014 and became a part of conservative liberal (labelled as “Swedish” because of the colors of participative parties) coalition government headed by Charles Michel since October 2014. In comparison with the Vlaams Belang (previously known as Vlaams Bloc), N-VA does not encourage racism or xenophobia in the country. Nevertheless, along with other coalition political parties, it advocates for radical cuts in public services and demands tougher measures

to assure that immigrants embrace core values and become more integrated if they wish to become full-obliged citizens. In parallel, on the municipal level, there are claims in the city councils that minarets should not be allowed to be built and that women wearing headscarves should be banned from working in the public service (*RTBF*, 2014).

Nevertheless, in the whole country a majority of civilians of non-EU descent live separately from the native Belgians (with the EU citizens). For example, a sample made of the Flemish population between the ages of 18 and 85 indicated that “45% said that they prefer to live in a neighbourhood with people of Belgian descent only and a further 38% wanted to live in an area with a Belgian descent majority” (Clapson, 2013). It does not appear either that citizens of non-EU descent wish to co-habit with native citizens. For example, over 90% of Moroccans marry a partner from the same community (*Flandre Info*, 2014). Regardless of the fact that xenophobia is not a serious problem in comparison with France and the UK, non-EU civilians face much worse social and economic conditions than natives, and remain very vulnerable to toughening naturalization, immigration, and fiscal policies that are currently being discussed in the Belgian parliament.

CONCLUSION

After the failure of multiculturalism in these three selected states, it appears to be more likely that ongoing integration policies that began in the 2010s created more risks for non-EU migrants and their descendants to be excluded even further. The poor and low social and economic conditions that these groups faced throughout the decades do not protect them from worsening aftermath. All these new policies that are anti-multiculturalist create more difficult obstacles for Third Country Nationals in terms of social integration, social acceptance, and improvement in living standards. Declarations about the failure of multiculturalism means that Western European authorities no longer express extensive support to non-white civilians. Instead, they turn more attention to nationals and EU migrants who are more culturally adaptable and active enough to fulfill better economic outcomes in the face of global

recession and the eurozone crisis. If this hypothesis is correct, then it is still unknown what will happen to individuals of non-EU origin in the next 10 or 15 years. Nevertheless, there is no way they will face a better future in those countries. Furthermore, controversial alternatives such as stripping of citizenship and massively deporting them cannot be excluded as possibilities.

CONCLUSION

These three countries—France, Belgium and the United Kingdom—have experienced a massive influx of immigrants from Third World countries and practiced policies of multiculturalism, to varying degrees, to try to integrate these immigrants and their descendants into mainstream society. Initially, it was believed that such policies would create equality for them and provide them with more life opportunities in terms of education, employment, and the standard of living. Many non-EU immigrants could not avoid poverty if the authorities did not act. However, several factors and cases demonstrate that policies of multiculturalism were not properly practiced, as the process helped to keep these cultures isolated and alienated in ethnic ghettos or suburbs. In addition, even people of foreign origin who were naturalized through tolerant policies or born in these countries often suffered discrimination and were poorer than their native counterparts. In fact, after declaring the failure of multiculturalism, Western European politicians have already begun to implement policies that will toughen conditions on people of non-EU descent even more in the near future.

Any alternative approach to successful adaptation and disbanding the segregation of non-EU migrants and citizens of the non-European origins appears to be unlikely. Nationals are generally growing more xenophobic towards migrants and more mainstream politicians, such as Nicholas Sarkozy and David Cameron are taking anti-immigrant stances. As “white working class 'backlash' is often read as racism and certainly far-right groups exploit local tensions” (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010, p.57), past and present social, economic, and political factors cause many people of foreign origin to appear to be stuck in an 'apartheid-like system'. They are very vulnerable to worsening conditions caused by global recession and the euro currency crisis. Other social factors, also affect them, such as high unemployment among nationals and the massive inflow of EU migrants, who generally have a similar mentalities and lifestyles to the native population, and who also contribute

more to the GDP. The toughening socioeconomic and integrationist (*de-multiculturalist*) policies toward immigrants and their descendants appear likely to contribute to further isolation and rejection. Most likely, declarations about the failure of multiculturalism signals the inevitable end of an era when a large number of non-EU residents permanently settle and work in Europe. All these three selected states have reversed multiculturalist policy and are likely to embrace the values of a homogeneous society because of dramatic results brought on by multiculturalist policies and ongoing socio-economic conditions in Western Europe. The process of European leaders distancing their countries from multiculturalist policies is still ongoing. Speeches read by Leterme, Cameron, and Sarkozy marked the beginning of the end of a long era of cultural diversity not just in these three countries but possibly in the whole European Union as well. Even if multiculturalism and multicultural societies will persist, they will not do so in favour of non-EU minorities. Novel policies of recognition and diversity will embrace the identities and cultures of core (English or mainstream French) and national minorities – Flemish/Walloons in Belgium, Scots in the UK or Bretons in France. Finally, as long as these states remain the members of supranational EU, the novel multiculturalist policies would perhaps recognize the EU ethnic groups who migrated to the Western Europe, such as Polish community in Britain, Italian diaspora in Belgium or Portuguese minority in France, or historic foreign minorities such as Jews.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

Al Arabiya (2011). 'French suburbs turn away from state and towards Islam: scientist'. October 6. Available at: <http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/10/06/170484.html> (Accessed May 14, 2015).

Aliens Act, 1905 (5 Edw. 7. Ch. 13.). Government of the United Kingdom. *United Settlement*. Available at: <http://www.uniset.ca/naty/aliensact1905.pdf>

Aliens Restriction (Amendment) Act, 1919 (9 & 10 Geo. 5. Ch. 92.). Government of the United Kingdom. *Legislation – The National Archives*. Available at: <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Geo5/9-10/92/contents>

Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, c. 24. Government of the United Kingdom. Available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/24/pdfs/ukpga_20010024_en.pdf (Accessed May 14, 2015).

BBC (1965) 'New UK Race Law 'not tough enough''. 8 December. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/december/8/newsid_4457000/4457112.stm (Accessed May 14, 2015).

BBC (2011A) 'Nick Clegg sets out vision of multiculturalism'. 3 March. Available at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-12638017> (Accessed May 14, 2015).

BBC (2011B) 'English Rioters 'poorer, younger, less educated''. 24 October. Available at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-15426720> (Accessed May 14, 2015).

BBC (2012A) 'Immigrants have to earn at least 35 000 pounds to stay in the UK since 2016'. 29 February. Available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-17204297> (Accessed April 6, 2012)

BBC (2012B) 'Miliband shifts immigration policy, saying Labour 'got it wrong''. 22 June. Available at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-18539472> (Accessed March 16, 2014).

BBC (2013) 'Ed Miliband vows to reduce non-EU migration'. 22 September. Available at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-24193771> (Accessed May 23 2014).

Bennett, W. (2014) 'Put UK workers FIRST: Nigel Farage says British businesses should be able to discriminate', *Daily Express*, 24 June. Available at: <http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/513546/Nigel-Farage-British-businesses-put-UK-workers-first> (Accessed May 14, 2015).

Bingham, J. (2013) 'Multicultural Britain becoming more segregated – friendship study'. *The Telegraph*, 8 August. Available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/10228816/Multicultural-Britain-becoming-more-segregated-friendship-study.htm> (Accessed September 1, 2014).

Bingham, J. (2014A) 'Love across the divide: interracial relationships growing in Britain'. *The Telegraph*, 3 July. Available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/10943807/Love-across-the-divide-interracial-relationships-growing-in-Britain.html> (Accessed July 5, 2014).

Bingham, J. (2014B) 'Multiculturalism in reverse as teenagers buck the trend towards integration'. *The Telegraph*, 29 June. Available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/immigration/10931854/Multiculturalism-in-reverse-as-teenagers-buck-the-trend-towards-integration.html> (Accessed June 30, 2014).

British Nationality Act, 1948. (11 & 12 Geo. 6. Ch. 56.). Government of the United Kingdom. *Legislation – The National Archives*. London: UK. Available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1948/56/pdfs/ukpga_19480056_en.pdf

British Nationality Act 1981, c. 61. Government of the United Kingdom. Available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1981/61/pdfs/ukpga_19810061_en.pdf (Accessed May 14, 2015).

Burrows, T. and Allen, P. (2015) 'Former French president Nicolas Sarkozy says immigration 'is not linked to terrorism, but complicates things'. *Daily Mail*, 12 January. Available at: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2906456/Former-French-president-Nicolas-Sarkozy-says-immigration-not-linked-terrorism-complicates-things.html#ixzz3b50kb6tz> (Accessed January 12, 2015).

Byrne, A. (2014) 'Free flow of labour stemmed as Belgium cracks down on migrants'. *Financial Times*, 16 March. Available at: <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d736fe48-a912-11e3-bf0c-00144feab7de.html#ixzz3bGZWotMO> (Accessed May 23, 2015).

Cameron, D. (2014) 'British values aren't optional, they're vital. That's why I will promote them in EVERY school: As row rages over 'Trojan Horse' takeover of our classrooms, the Prime Minister delivers this uncompromising pledge...'. *Daily Mail*. 10 June. Available at: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2658171/DAVID-CAMERON-British-values-arent-optional-theyre-vital-Thats-I-promote-EVERY-school-As-row-rages-Trojan-Horse-takeover-classrooms-Prime-Minister-delivers-uncompromising-pledge.html#ixzz3eHfUJqi9> (Accessed June 10, 2014).

Campbell, S. (2015) 'Britain forced to let deported illegal immigrant family BACK IN after human rights ruling'. *Daily Express*, 22 April. Available at: <http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/572036/immigration-Britain-family-Nigeria-Home-Office-migration> (Accessed April 22, 2015).

Chorley, M. (2014) 'Cameron's pledge to cut immigration to the 'tens of thousands' lies in tatters after a record 228,000 people arrive from the EU'. *Daily Mail*. 27 November. Available at: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2851521/Cameron-s-pledge-cut-net-migration-lies-tatters-figure-soars-260-000.html> (Accessed May 14, 2015).

Circulaire concernant la loi sur du 1er mars 2000 modifiant certaines dispositions relatives a la nationalité belge – 2000. Belgian Government. Available at:

http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/change_lg.pl?language=fr&la=F&cn=2000042531&table_name=loi (Accessed May 14, 2015).

Clapson, C. (2013) 'Immigrants: "Flemings are in denial"'. *Flanders News*. 26 November. Available at: <http://deredactie.be/cm/vrtnieuws.english/News/1.1787655> (Accessed May 14, 2015).

Clevers, A. (2013) 'Pas une seule naturalisation en 2013 sous la nouvelle loi'. *La Libre*. 28 January. Available at:

<http://www.lalibre.be/actu/belgique/pas-une-seule-naturalisation-en-2013-sous-la-nouvelle-loi-52afd5ad3570105ef7d5dd30> (Accessed May 14, 2015).

Code de la Nationalité Belge – 1984. Federal Government of Belgium. Available at:

http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/change_lg.pl?language=fr&la=F&cn=1984062835&table_name=loi (Accessed May 14, 2015).

Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 (10 & 11 Eliz. 2. Ch. 21.). Government of the United Kingdom. *Internet Archive*. Available at:

<http://web.archive.org/web/20110927012831/http://www.britishcitizen.info/CIA1962.pdf>

Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968, c.9. Government of the United Kingdom. *International Legal Materials*. Vol. 7, No.2, pp.395-401.

COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 94/80/EC of 19 December 1994 laying down detailed arrangements for the exercise of the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in municipal elections by citizens of the Union residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals. Available at: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31994L0080&from=EN> (Accessed September 3, 2015).

COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin. Available at: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2000:180:0022:0026:EN:PDF> (Accessed May 14, 2015).

Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015. c.6. Government of the United Kingdom. Available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/6/pdfs/ukpga_20150006_en.pdf (Accessed May 14, 2015).

Cour Constitutionnelle (2013) n° 145/2012 du 6 décembre 2012. Federal Government of Belgium.

Available at: http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi/article_body.pl?language=fr&caller=summary&pub_date=13-01-25&numac=2012207521 (Accessed May 14, 2015).

Daily Express. (2012) 'Belgium boots out unemployed migrants'. 22 November. Available at: <http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/359725/Belgium-boots-out-unemployed-migrants> (Accessed May 14, 2015).

Département des statistiques, des études et de la documentation (2012) *Les Discriminations Ressenties Par les Nouveaux Migrants*. #32, pp.1-7. Available at: <http://www.immigration.interieur.gouv.fr/Info-ressources/Statistiques/Etudes-et-publications/Publications/Numeros-parus-en-2012/Les-discriminations-ressenties-par-les-nouveaux-migrants>

Département des statistiques, des études et de la documentation (2013) *L'insertion professionnelle des immigrés et de leurs descendants en 2011*. #48, pp.1-7. Available at: <http://www.immigration.interieur.gouv.fr/Info-ressources/Statistiques/Etudes-et-publications/Publications/Numeros-parus-en-2013/L-insertion-professionnelle-des-immigres-et-de-leurs-descendants-en-2011>

Dodd, V. (2015) 'Black and minority ethnic Britons 'worse off' after budget'. *The Guardian*, 26 July. Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/jul/26/black-minority-ethnic-britons-budget-george-osborne-benefit-cuts> (Accessed July 24, 2015).

Edmunds, J. (2014) 'POLL: 95 Percent of BBC Viewers Think Multiculturalism Has Failed'. *Breitbart*, 31 August. Available at: <http://www.breitbart.com/london/2014/08/31/95-percent-of-bbc-viewers-think-multiculturalism-has-failed/> (Accessed at September 1, 2014).

EU Observer (2015) 'Socialists blame austerity for radicalizing Europe's youth'. 21 April. Available at: <https://euobserver.com/tickers/128400> (Accessed April 21, 2015).

Eychenne, A. (2012) 'Racisme anti-blanc: Copé sur les terres du Front national'. *L'Express*, 26 September. Available at: http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/racisme-anti-blanc-jean-francois-cope-sur-les-terres-du-front-national_1166331.html#Gzik8JjeLGtDHRFu.99 (Accessed May 14, 2015).

Fernandes, E. (2011) 'Return of the British Rajas: It's 60 years since the end of the Empire, but thousands of British Indians are heading to the land of their ancestors'. *Daily Mail*, 9 October. Available at: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2046962/Thousands-British-Indians-heading-land-ancestors.html> (Accessed May 14, 2015).

Flandre Info (2014) '90% d'immigrés marocains se marient dans leur communauté'. 21 February. Available at: <http://deredactie.be/cm/vrtnieuws.francais/videotheque/1.1886121> (Accessed May 13, 2015).

François, A. (2013) 'La commune de Boom interdit les symboles religieux'. *Flandre Info*. 22 April. Available at: <http://deredactie.be/cm/vrtnieuws.francais/Politique/1.1610813> (Accessed May 14, 2015).

Freour, P. (2011) 'Sarkozy : le multiculturalisme est un «échec»'. *Le Figaro*, 10 February. Available at: <http://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/2011/02/10/01002-20110210ARTFIG00709-sarkozy-nouvelles-mesures-pour-les-mineurs-delinquants.php> (Accessed February 12, 2011).

Gathon, M. (2012) '*Seuls 45,8 % des immigrés ont un travail*'. *Le Vif*, 11 February. Available at: <http://www.levif.be/actualite/belgique/seuls-45-8-des-immigres-ont-un-travail/article-normal-126897.html> (Accessed April 30, 2015).

Government of the Netherlands (2011) *Integration policy based on Dutch values*. Available at: <http://www.government.nl/documents-and-publications/press-releases/2011/06/17/integration-policy-based-on-dutch-values.html> (Accessed April 30, 2015).

Groves, J. (2013) 'How rise of 'white flight' is creating a segregated UK: Study reveals white Britons are 'retreating' from areas dominated by ethnic minorities'. *Daily Mail*. 5 May, 2013. Available at: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2320002/How-rise-white-flight-areas-dominated-ethnic-minorities-creating-segregated-UK.html#ixzz3halfJ7ca> (Accessed May 14, 2015).

Heath, A. (2012) 'Has Multiculturalism Failed in the UK? Not Really!'. *The Guardian*. 10 August. Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/aug/10/multiculturalism-uk-research> (Accessed May 14, 2015).

HM Treasury (2015) *Summer Budget 2015, Treasury- Government of the United Kingdom*. Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/summer-budget-2015/summer-budget-2015> (Accessed: 8 July 2015).

Home Office (2012A) *Statement of Intent: Changes to Tier 1, Tier 2 and Tier 5 of the Points Based System; Overseas Domestic Workers; and Visitors*. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/117953/tiers125-pbs-overseas-soi.pdf (Accessed May 14, 2015).

Home Office (2012B) *Statement of Intent: Family Migration*. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/257359/soi-fam-mig.pdf (Accessed May 14, 2015).

Huffington Post (2013) 'Chief Rabbi Lord Sacks: Multiculturalism 'Has Had Its Day''. 19 August. Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2013/08/19/chief-rabbi-lord-sacks_n_3778110.html (Accessed May 14, 2015).

Human Rights Act 1998, c.42. Government of the United Kingdom. Available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/pdfs/ukpga_19980042_en.pdf (Accessed May 14, 2015).

Immigration Act 1971, c.77. Government of the United Kingdom. Available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1971/77/pdfs/ukpga_19710077_en.pdf (Accessed May 14, 2015).

Immigration Act 1988, c.14. Government of the United Kingdom. Available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/14/pdfs/ukpga_19880014_en.pdf (Accessed May 14, 2015).

Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. c.33. Government of the United Kingdom. Available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1999/33/pdfs/ukpga_19990033_en.pdf (Accessed May 14, 2015).

Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006. c.13. Government of the United Kingdom. Available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/13/pdfs/ukpga_20060013_en.pdf (Accessed May 14, 2015).

Jeudy, B. (2010). 'Le port de la burqa sera totalement interdit en France'. *Le Figaro*, 21 April. Available at: <http://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/2010/04/21/01002-20100421ARTFIG00252-le-port-de-la-burqa-sera-totalement-interdit-.php> (Accessed April 14, 2015).

Kershaw, A. (2015) 'Thirty five per cent of schoolchildren 'fear Muslims taking over England' says study'. *Mirror*, 19 May. Available at: <http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/thirty-five-per-cent-schoolchildren-5725061> (Accessed May 19, 2015).

La Liberation. (2012) 'Hollande souhaite limiter l'immigration économique'. 27 April. http://www.liberation.fr/politiques/2012/04/27/hollande-souhaite-limiter-l-immigration-economique_814757 (Accessed April 10, 2014).

L'Express (2013) 'Face au chômage "historique", Le Pen prône "l'embauche préférentielle des Français"'. 29 November. Available at: http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/fn/face-au-chomage-historique-marine-le-pen-prone-l-embauche-preferentielle-des-francais_1303781.html#YHUcRftFGAo3zOwm.99 (Accessed May 14, 2015).

Le Figaro (2013). 'Fillon: trop d'immigrés en France'. 6 June. Available at: <http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2013/06/06/97001-20130606FILWWW00773-fillon-trop-dimmigres-en-france.php> (Accessed April 10, 2014)

Le Monde (2011) 'Immigration légale : Guéant veut supprimer 20 000 autorisations par an'. 16 April. http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2011/04/16/immigration-legale-gueant-veut-supprimer-20-000-autorisations-par-an_1508589_3224.html (Accessed May 14, 2015).

Le Monde (2014) 'Paris exclut un retour en France de la famille de Leonarda Dibrani'. 21 May. Available at: http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2014/05/21/paris-exclut-un-retour-de-la-famille-dibrani_4422856_3224.html#zyVsC3xkpJOHwfWS.99 (Accessed May 14, 2015).

“Le projet de loi relatif au droit des étrangers.” *Ministère de L'Intérieur*. Published January 9 2015. Available at: <http://www.immigration.interieur.gouv.fr/Immigration/Le-projet-de-loi-relatif-au-droit-des-etrangers> (Accessed May 14, 2015).

Legifrance (1971) *Journal Officiel de La Republique Française*. (Loi #71-392 du 28 mai 1971 autorisant l'adhésion à la convention internationale sur l'élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale, ouverte à la signature le 07-03-1966, Page 5211). Available at: http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jopdf/common/jo_pdf.jsp?numJO=0&dateJO=19710529&numTexte=&pageDebut=05211&pageFin= (Accessed May 14, 2015).

Legifrance (1973) *Journal Officiel de La Republique Française*. (Loi #73-42 du 9 janvier 1973 complétant et modifiant le code de la nationalité française et relative à certaines dispositions concernant la nationalité française, Page 467). Available at: http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jopdf/common/jo_pdf.jsp?numJO=0&dateJO=19730110&numTexte=&pageDebut=00467&pageFin=00473 (Accessed May 14, 2015).

Legifrance (1978) *Journal Officiel de La Republique Française*. (Loi #78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative à l'informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertés, Page 227). Available at: <http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006068624&dateTexte=vig-%3E> (Accessed May 14, 2015).

Legifrance (1981) *Journal Officiel de La Republique Française*. (Loi n°81-973 du 29 octobre 1981 relative aux conditions d'entrée et de séjour des étrangères en France, Page 2970). Available at: http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jopdf/common/jo_pdf.jsp?numJO=0&dateJO=19811030&numTexte=&pageDebut=02970&pageFin= (Accessed May 14, 2015).

Legifrance (1993) *Journal Officiel de La Republique Française*. (Loi n°93-933 du 22 juillet 1993 réformant le droit de la nationalité (1), Page 10342). Available at: http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jopdf/common/jo_pdf.jsp?numJO=0&dateJO=19930723&numTexte=&pageDebut=10342&pageFin=10348 (Accessed May 14, 2015).

Legifrance (1998), *Journal Officiel de La Republique Française*. (Loi #98-170 du 16 mars 1998 relative à la nationalité, page 3935). <http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000754536&categorieLien=id> (Accessed May 14, 2015).

Legifrance (2001), *Journal Officiel de La Republique Française*. (Loi #2001-1066 du 16 novembre 2001 relative à la lutte contre les discriminations (1), page 18311). Available at: http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jopdf/common/jo_pdf.jsp?numJO=0&dateJO=20011117&numTexte=1&pageDebut=18311&pageFin=18313 (Accessed May 14, 2015).

Legifrance (2002), *Journal Officiel de La Republique Française*. (Loi #2002-73 du 17 janvier 2002 de modernisation sociale (1), page 1008). Available at: http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jopdf/common/jo_pdf.jsp?numJO=0&dateJO=20020118&numTexte=1&pageDebut=01008&pageFin=01052 (Accessed May 14, 2015)

Legifrance (2003), *Journal Officiel de La Republique Française*. (LOI n° 2003-1119 du 26 novembre 2003 relative à la maîtrise de l'immigration, au séjour des étrangers en France et à la nationalité (1)). Available at: <http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000795635&fastPos=1&fastReqId=750198239&categorieLien=id&oldAction=rechTexte>

Legifrance (2006A), *Journal Officiel de La Republique Française*. (Loi #2006-911 du 24 juillet 2006 relative à l'immigration et à l'intégration). Available at: <http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000266495&dateTexte=20150703> (Accessed May 14, 2015).

Legifrance (2006B), *Journal Officiel de La Republique Française*. (Loi #2006-1791 du 23 décembre 2006 relatif au contrat d'accueil et d'intégration et au contrôle des connaissances en français d'un étranger souhaitant durablement s'installer en France et modifiant le code de l'entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d'asile (partie réglementaire)). Available at: <http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000458704&categorieLien=id> (Accessed May 14, 2015).

Legifrance (2008), *Journal Officiel de La Republique Française*. (Loi #2008-496 du 27 mai 2008 portant diverses dispositions d'adaptation au droit communautaire dans le domaine de la lutte contre les discriminations). Available at: http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jopdf/common/jo_pdf.jsp?numJO=0&dateJO=20080528&numTexte=1&pageDebut=08801&pageFin=08803 (Accessed May 14, 2015).

Legifrance (2010), *Journal Officiel de La Republique Française*. (Loi #2010-1192 du 11 octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l'espace public (1)). Available at: <http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000022911670&categorieLien=id> (Accessed May 14, 2015).

Legifrance (2011), *Journal Officiel de La Republique Française*. (Loi #2011-672 du 16 juin 2011 relative à l'immigration, à l'intégration et à la nationalité (1)). Available at: <http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000024191380&fastPos=1&fastReqId=1853161001&categorieLien=id&oldAction=rechTexte> (Accessed May 14, 2015).

LeVif (2010) 'Leterme : la société multiculturelle est un échec'. 2 November. Available at: <http://www.levif.be/info/actualite/belgique/leterme-la-societe-multiculturelle-est-un-echec/article-1194858864678.htm> (Accessed February 16 2011).

LeVif (2012). 'La loi "anti-burqa" est conforme à la Constitution'. 6 December. Available at: <http://www.levif.be/actualite/belgique/la-loi-anti-burqa-est-conforme-a-la-constitution/article-normal-126057.html> (Accessed April 14, 2015).

Loi modifiant le Code de la nationalité belge afin de rendre l'acquisition de la nationalité belge neutre du point de vue de l'immigration – 2012, Federal Government of Belgium. Available at: http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/change_lg.pl?language=fr&la=F&cn=2012120404&table_name=loi (Accessed May 14, 2015).

Loi organisant un registre national des personnes physique - 1983, Federal Government of Belgium. Available at: http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/change_lg.pl?language=fr&la=F&cn=1983080836&table_name=loi (Accessed May 14, 2015).

Loi sur l'accès au territoire, le séjour, l'établissement et l'éloignement des étrangères – 1980, ART. 57,§1,7. *Service public federal Justice*. Federal Government of Belgium. Available at: http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/change_lg.pl?language=fr&la=F&cn=1980121530&table_name=loi (Accessed May 14, 2015).

Malkin, B. (2013) 'Millions more' Europeans at risk of poverty if austerity drags on'. *The Telegraph*, 12 September. Available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/10303621/Millions-more-Europeans-at-risk-of-poverty-if-austerity-drags-on.html> (Accessed May 14, 2015).

Mandonnet, E. (2015) 'Désaccord à l'UMP sur la "guerre contre notre civilisation" de Sarkozy'. *L'Express*, 27 January. Available at: http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/ump/desaccord-a-l-ump-sur-la-guerre-contre-notre-civilisation-de-sarkozy_1645017.html#jyRGx3hJE4kEhIhc.99 (Accessed January 28, 2015).

Mason, R. (2013) *UK immigration bill could create 'climate of ethnic profiling' – UNHCR*. *The Guardian*, 26 December. Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/dec/26/uk-immigration-bill-climate-ethnic-profiling-unhcr> (Accessed April 23, 2014)

Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, c.41. Government of the United Kingdom. Available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/41/pdfs/ukpga_20020041_en.pdf (Accessed May 14, 2015).

Newstatesman (2011) 'David Cameron Speech on Radicalization and Islamic Extremism'. 11 February. Available at: <http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/the-staggers/2011/02/terrorism-islam-ideology> (Accessed February 20 2014).

Nimani, A. (2014) 'Affaire Leonarda: la justice rejette les requêtes de la famille Dibrani'. *L'Express*. 28 January. Available at: http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/leonarda-la-justice-rejette-les-requetes-de-la-famille-dibrani_1317857.html#bCoh4tCo0h3WchVx.99 (Accessed April 14, 2014).

Office for National Statistics (2012) *Ethnicity and National Identity in England and Wales 2011*. Available at: http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171776_290558.pdf

Overdorf, J. (2015) 'Robots, not immigrants, could take half of German jobs'. *The Week*. February 10. Available at: <http://theweek.com/articles/534851/robots-immigrants-could-take-half-german-jobs> (Accessed February 10, 2015).

Parliament. House of Commons (2015) *Scotland Bill* (Bills 2015-2016, 3). Government of the United Kingdom. Available at: <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2015-2016/0048/16048.pdf>

Premières Synthèses Informations (2010) *Les Salariés Français Descendants D'immigrés : salaires et profil socio-professionnel dans les entreprises de 10 salariés ou plus en 2006*. N° 07, pp.1-7.

Race Relations Bill, c.(65) 77. Government of the United Kingdom. Available at <http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pdfs/small/cab-129-121-c-77.pdf> (Accessed May 14, 2015).

Race Relations Act 1968, c.71. Government of the United Kingdom. Available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1968/71/pdfs/ukpga_19680071_en.pdf (Accessed May 14, 2015).

Race Relations Act 1976, c.74. Government of the United Kingdom. Available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1976/74/pdfs/ukpga_19760074_en.pdf (Accessed May 14, 2015).

Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000, c.34. Government of the United Kingdom. Available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/34/pdfs/ukpga_20000034_en.pdf (Accessed May 14, 2015).

Randall, C. (2015) 'Muslims leave France for 'UAE dream''. *The National*, 29 March. Available at: <http://www.thenational.ae/world/europe/muslims-leave-france-for-uae-dream> (Accessed March 30, 2015).

Rhouma, H.B. (2011) 'Mosquées : à 2,1 ou 5 millions, les musulmans manquent toujours de places'. *Saphir News*. 21 March. Available at: http://www.saphirnews.com/Mosques-a-21-ou-5-millions-les-musulmans-manquent-toujours-de-places_a12337.html (Accessed May 14, 2015).

RTBF (2014) 'Justice, sécurité, immigration: ce qui est dans l'accord de la "suédoise"'. 8 October. Available at: http://www.rtbf.be/info/belgique/detail_justice-securite-immigration-ce-que-prevoit-la-suedoise?id=8373572 (Accessed October 9, 2014).

Russia Today (2013) 'Mixed families in UK 'separated from one another' due to migration rules'. 9 September. Available at: <http://www.rt.com/news/families-split-migration-rules-uk-613/> (Accessed September 10, 2013).

Slack, J. (2014) 'Migrants from outside the EU have taken £120billion more from the state than they paid in taxes over 17 years'. *Daily Mail*, 5 November. Available at: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2821151/Non-EU-migrants-State-costing-British-finances-120billion-1995.html#ixzz3hbedL3MP> (Accessed May 14, 2015).

Smee, J. (2010) 'The World from Berlin: Merkel's Rhetoric in Integration Debate is 'Inexcusable''. *Spiegel*, 18 October. Available at: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-world-from-berlin-merkel-s-rhetoric-in-integration-debate-is-inexcusable-a-723702.html> (Accessed April 23, 2014)

Swaine, J. (2012) 'Mitt Romney would restore 'Anglo-Saxon' relations between Britain and America'. *The Telegraph*, 24 July. Available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/mitt-romney/9424524/Mitt-Romney-would-restore-Anglo-Saxon-relations-between-Britain-and-America.html> (Accessed April 23, 2014).

Tassel, F. (2012) 'Sarkozy désintègre l'immigration'. *Liberation*, 8 March. Available at: http://www.liberation.fr/societe/2012/03/08/sarkozy-desintegre-l-immigration_801449 (Accessed April 23, 2014)

Telegraph Reporter. (2007) 'Enoch Powell's 'Rivers of Blood' speech'. 12 December. Available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/3643826/Enoch-Powells-Rivers-of-Blood-speech.html> (Accessed May 14, 2015).

The Guardian (2014) 'British workers filling majority of low-skilled job openings'. 19 February. Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/feb/19/british-workers-low-skilled-jobs> (Accessed February 21 2014).

The Local (2015) 'Muslims in France - 'They say we're not French''. 22 January. Available at: <http://www.thelocal.fr/20150122/muslims-in-france-weve-never-felt-integrated> (Accessed January 23, 2015).

Trading Economics (2015A) "Belgium Government Debt to GDP". <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/belgium/government-debt-to-gdp> (Accessed June 27, 2015).

Trading Economics (2015B) "France Government Debt to GDP". <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/france/government-debt-to-gdp> (Accessed June 27, 2015).

Travis, A. (2014A) 'Appeal court: if you earn £18,600 a year your foreign spouse can live in UK'. *The Guardian*, 11 July. Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/law/2014/jul/11/appeal-court-18600-foreign-spouse-uk> (Accessed July 11, 2014).

Travis, A. (2014B) 'UK gains £20bn from European migrants, UCL economists reveal'. *The Guardian*, 5 November. Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/nov/05/eu-migrants-uk-gains-20bn-ucl-study> (Accessed May 14, 2015).

Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union. Available at <http://www.european-council.europa.eu/media/579087/treaty.pdf> (Accessed March 16, 2014).

UK Borders Act 2007, c.30. Government of the United Kingdom. Available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2007/30/pdfs/ukpga_20070030_en.pdf (Accessed May 14, 2015).

UK Immigration Bill 2014, c.22. Government of the United Kingdom. Available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2014/22/pdfs/ukpga_20140022_en.pdf (Accessed July 14, 2015).

Union with Scotland Act 1706 (5 & 6 Ann. Ch. 8.). Government of the United Kingdom. *Legislation-The National Archives*. Available at: <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/aep/Ann/6/11>

Vincent, E. (2014) 'Immigration : création de titres de séjour de deux et quatre ans'. *Le Monde*, 23 July. Available at: http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2014/07/23/immigration-creation-d-un-titre-de-sejour-de-deux-ans_4461495_3224.html#rrGL5GkMOc5DhrdM.99 (Accessed July 23, 2014).

Walford, C. (2012) "We need community cohesion': Ministers' pledge to end era of multiculturalism by appealing to 'sense of British identity'. *Daily Mail*, 21 February. Available at: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2104049/Eric-Pickles-signals-end-multiculturalism-says-Tories-stand-majority.html#ixzz3auoxThYP> (Accessed March 16, 2014).

Watt, N. (2015) 'Cameron refuses to rule out leaving European convention on human rights'. *The Guardian*, 3 June. Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/law/2015/jun/03/cameron-refuses-to-rule-out-leaving-european-convention-on-human-rights> (Accessed June 3 2015).

Willsher, K. (2015) 'UMP should tell supporters to keep out Front National, says Valls'. *The Guardian*, 23 March. Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/23/ump-should-have-told-supporters-keep-out-front-national-manuel-valls> (Accessed March 24, 2015).

Wintour, P. (2015) 'Cameron's immigration bill to include crackdown on illegal workers'. *The Guardian*, 20 May. Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/may/20/immigration-bill-to-include-crackdown-on-illegal-foreign-workers> (Accessed May 21, 2015).

SECONDARY SOURCES

Aeberhardt, R., Fougère, D., Pouget, J. et Rathelot, R. (2010) "L'emploi et les salaires des enfants d'immigrés", *Économie et Statistique*, N° 433–434.

Alby, S. and Beltrande, B. (2011) "Le Regard des Européens sur l'islam". *Département Opinion et Stratégie d'Enterprise*. Available at: http://www.ifop.fr/media/pressdocument/410-1-document_file.pdf (Accessed: May 14 2015).

Algan, Y., Dustmann, C., Gritz, A. and Manning, A. (2010) 'The economic situation of first and second-generation immigrants in France, Germany and the United Kingdom'. *The Economic Journal*. 120 (February), F4-F30.

Alibhai-Brown, Y. (2000) *After Multiculturalism*, London: Foreign Policy Centre.

Amiriaux, V. (2010) "Revisiting the multiculturalist model: France" in Silj, A. (ed.) *European Multiculturalism Revisited*. London: Zed Books, pp.65-104.

Anderson, B. (2013) 'Rather than protecting the UK labour market, the clampdown on immigration may be compelling citizens to take on lower quality work', *The London School of Economics and Political Science*. 22 August. Available at: <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/immigration-and-employment-two-sides-of-the-same-coin/> (Accessed, 14 May, 2015).

Anson, O. (2001) "Inequality in the access to preventive health care: The case of immigrants in Belgium". *Arch Public Health*, 59, pp.265-279.

Audier, F. (2000) "La transmission du statut dans la Fonction publique". *ÉCONOMIE ET STATISTIQUE*, N° 337-338, pp.121-133.

Banting, K. and Kymlicka, W. (2013) "Is there really a retreat from multiculturalism policies? New evidence from the multiculturalism policy index", *Comparative European Politics*, Vol. 11, 5, pp.577–598.

Banting, K., Kymlicka, W., Johnston, R. and Soroka, S. (2006) "Do Multiculturalism Policies erode the welfare state? An empirical analysis" in Banting, K. and Kymlicka, W. (ed.) *Multiculturalism and the Welfare State: Recognition and Redistribution in Advanced Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.49-91.

Beaumel, C. and Breuil-Genier, P. (2011) "De 55 à 65 millions d'habitants : pourquoi la population a-t-elle augmenté plus vite en France que dans les pays voisins ?" *Insee - France, portrait social – Edition 2011*, pp.27-32.

Blinder, S. (2014) *UK Public Opinion toward Immigration: Overall Attitudes and Level of Concern*. Available at: <http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/migobs/Public%20Opinion-Overall%20Attitudes%20and%20Level%20of%20Concern.pdf>

Blinder, S. (2015) *Non-European Student Migration*. Available at: <http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/migobs/Briefing%20-%20Non%20European%20Student%20Migration%20to%20the%20UK.pdf>

Boumahdi, R. and Giret, J-F. (2005) "Une analyse économétrique des disparités d'accès à l'emploi et de rémunérations entre jeunes d'origine française et jeunes issus de l'immigration", *Revue économique*, Vol. 56, pp.625 – 636.

Braun, H. and Klooss, W. (1995) *Multiculturalism in North America and Europe*. Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Trier.

Brinbaum, Y. et Guégnard C. (2011) "Parcours de formation et insertion des jeunes issus de l'immigration, de l'orientation au sentiment de discrimination", *Céreq*, n° 78.

Brinbaum, Y. et Kieffer, A. (2005) "D'une génération à l'autre, les aspirations éducatives des familles immigrées: ambition et persévérance", *Éducation & formations*, n° 72, pp.53-75.

- Brinbaum, Y. et Kieffer A. (2009) "Les scolarités des enfants d'immigrés de la sixième au baccalauréat: différenciation et polarisation des parcours", *Population* n° 3 (64), pp.561 – 610.
- Caille, J-P. (2005) "Les projets d'avenir des enfants d'immigrés", *Les Immigrés en France, édition 2005*. pp.11-22.
- Cediey, E. et Foroni, F. (2007) *Les discriminations à raison de « l'origine » dans les embauches en France*. Available at: http://www.ismcorum.org/stock_images/actus/361/embauche-bit-ism-corum.pdf (Accessed May 14, 2015).
- Chou, M-C. and Baygert, N. (2007) "The 2006 French Immigration and Integration Law: Europeanisation or Nicolas Sarkozy's Presidential Keystone?", *Centre on Migration, Policy and Society*, #45.
- Collet, B. (2012) "Mixed couples in France. Statistical facts, definitions, and social reality", *Université Paris IV-Sorbonne. GEMASS*. 97 (1).
- Commission for Racial Equality (2006) *Decline of Britishness*, pp.1-38. Available at: http://www.ethnos.co.uk/pdfs/10_decline_of_britishness.pdf
- Costa-Lascoux, J. (2001) "L'ethnicization du lien social dans les banlieues française". *Persee*. Vol. 17 #2. pp.123-138.
- Crowder, G. (2013) *Theories of Multiculturalism: An Introduction*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- DeGroat, J. (2001) "To be French: Franco-Maghrebians and the Commission de la Nationalité" in Cornwell, G.H. and Stobard, E.W. (ed.) *Global Multiculturalism: Comparative Perspectives on Ethnicity, Race and Nation*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, pp.73-92.
- Demart, S. (2013) "Congolese Migration to Belgium and Postcolonial Perspectives", *African Diaspora* 6 pp.1-20.
- De Grande, H., Vandenneede, H., Gadeyne, S. and Deboosere, P. (2014) "Health status and mortality rates of adolescents and young adults in the Brussels-Capital Region: differences according to region of origin and migration history", *Ethnicity & Health*, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp.122-143.
- Domergue, F. and Jourdan, V. (2012) "L'intégration sur le marché du travail des signataires du Contrat d'accueil et d'intégration en France en 2009", *Immigrés et descendants d'immigrés en France, édition 2012*. pp.29-42.
- Dourgnon, P., Jusot, F., Sermet, C., and Silva, J. (2008) "La santé perçue des immigrés en France: Une exploitation de l'Enquête décennale santé 2002-2003", *Questions d'économie de la santé*. n° 133 pp. 1-6.

Duffy, B. (2014) 'Perceptions and reality: Ten things we should know about attitudes to immigration in the UK', *The London School of Economics and Political Science*, 26 November. Available at <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/perceptions-and-reality-ten-things-we-should-know-about-attitudes-to-immigration-in-the-uk/> (Accessed, 14 May, 2015).

Duguet, E. and Petit, P. (2005) "Hiring discrimination in the French financial sector: an econometric analysis on field experiment data", *Annale D'Économie et de Statistique*. N° 78, pp.79-102.

Dupray A. et Moullet S. (2004) "L'insertion des jeunes d'origine maghrébine en France : des différences plus marquées dans l'accès à l'emploi qu'en matière salariale", *Cereq*, n° 6.

Dustmann, C. and Fabbri, F. (2005) "Immigrants in the British Labour Market", *Fiscal Studies*, vol. 26, no. 4, pp.423–470.

Dustmann, C., Frattini, T., and Theodoropoulos, N. (2010) "Ethnicity and Second Generation Immigrants", *University College London*.

Ennaji, M. (2014) *Muslim Moroccan Migrants in Europe: Transnational Migration in its Multiplicity*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Evans, J. M. (1972), "Statutes: Immigration Act 1971", in *The Modern Law Review*, Vol 35, pp. 508-524

Fleischmann, F. Phaet, K. Deboosere, P. and Neels, K. (2011), "Contextualizing Ethnic Educational Inequality: The Role of Stability and Quality of Neighborhoods and Ethnic Density in Second-Generation Attainment", *International Migration Review*. Vol. 45, No. 2, pp.386-425.

Fleischmann, F. Phaet, K. Deboosere, P. and Neels, K. (2012), "Comparing Concepts of Ethnicity in Ethnic Composition Measures: Local Community Contexts and the Educational Attainment of the Second Generation in Belgium", *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*. Vol. 38, No. 10, pp.1513-1531.

Ford, R. (2015), "Who Should We Help? An Experimental Test of Discrimination in the British Welfare State", *Political Studies*. DOI: 10.1111/1467-9248.12194, pp.1-21.

Galandini, S. (2013) *Residential Concentration, Ethnic Social Networks and Political Participation: A mixed methods study of Black Africans in Britain*. PhD Thesis. The University of Manchester. Available at <https://www.escholar.manchester.ac.uk/api/datastream?publicationPid=uk-ac-man-scw:218910&datastreamId=FULL-TEXT.PDF> (Accessed: 23 July 2015).

Goerres, A. and Weschle, S. "Can Welfare States Manage Re-distributive Conflicts? The Determinants of the Gap in the Demand for Redistribution Between the Rich and the Poor across Advanced Industrial Democracies". Paper presented at the 2012 EPOP conference, 7- 9 September 2012, Oxford, UK. http://www.sociology.ox.ac.uk/materials/documents/epop/papers/Goerres_Weschle_2012_Governments_and_redistributive_conflicts.pdf (Accessed May 14, 2015).

Groenewold, G., de Valk, H.A.G. and Ginneken, J.v. (2013), "Acculturation Preferences of the Turkish Second Generation in 11 European Cities", *Urban Studies*. 51 (10), pp.2125-2142.

Grove-White, R. (2014) 'The increasingly hostile environment to immigration is unjust and short-sighted', *The London School of Economics and Political Science*. 20 August. Available at: <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/immigration/> (Accessed, 14 May, 2015).

Hanska, M. (2014) 'What explains the ascent of immigration and the EU as the foremost concerns of the British public?', *The London School of Economics and Political Science*. 27 November. Available at: <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/what-explains-the-ascent-of-immigration-and-the-eu-as-the-foremost-concerns-of-the-british-public/> (Accessed, 14 May, 2015).

Hemerijck, A.C. and Vandenbroucke, F. (2012) "The Welfare State After Great Recession". 2012 CEPS Conference Room. DOI: 10.1007/s10272-012-0422-y.

Hemmings, J. (2010) "Understanding East London's Somali Communities". *Options UK*.

Immigrés et descendants d'immigrés en France (2012), pp.96-135.

Isajiw, W.W. (1997) *Multiculturalism in North America and Europe: Comparative Perspectives on Interethnic Relations and Social Incorporation*. Toronto: Canadian Scholar's Press Inc.

Janoski, T. (2010) *The Ironies of Citizenship: Naturalization and Integration in Industrialized Countries*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Jayaweera, H. (2014) *Health of Migrants in the UK: What Do We Know?* Available at: http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/migobs/Briefing%20-%20Health%20of%20Migrants%20in%20the%20UK_0.pdf (Accessed May 14, 2015).

Kaufmann, E. (2014) 'Turning off the European migration tap may actually hasten ethnic change in Britain, ironically leading to an own-goal for ', *The London School of Economics and Political Science*. 30 April. Available at: <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/is-opposing-european-immigration-an-own-goal-for-/> (Accessed, 14 May, 2015).

Kivisto, P. (2002) *Multiculturalism in a Global Society*. Albany: Blackwell Publishing.

Koelet, S and de Valk, H.A.G. (2012) "Mixing and matching on the Marriage Market: partner choices of European and non-European migrants in Belgium compared", *Vrije Universiteit Brussel*. pp.1-27.

Kymlicka, W. (2010) "The rise and fall of multiculturalism?: new debates on inclusions and accomodation in diverse societies" in Vertovec, S. and Wessendorf, S. (ed.) *The Multiculturalist Backlash: European discourses, policies and practices*. New York: Routledge, pp.32-47.

Kymlicka, W. (2011) "Multicultural citizenship within multination states." *Ethnicities*, 11 (3), pp.281–302.

Kymlicka, W. (2013) "Neoliberal Multiculturalism?" in Hall, P.A. and Lamont, M. (ed.) *Social Resilience in the Neo-Liberal Era*. Cambridge University Press, pp.99-126.

Lambert, P.S. and Poignard, E. (2002) "Ambitions et réussites. scolaires et professionnelles. comparées des enfants. d'immigrés." *Revue française de pédagogie*. #140, pp.75-87.

Leveau, R., Mohsen-Finan, K. and de Wenden, C.W. (2002) *New European Identity and Citizenship*. Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Limited.

Lucassen, L. (2005) *The Immigrant Threat: The Integration of Old and New Migrants in Western Europe since 1850*. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.

Malik, K. (2006) 'The failures of multiculturalism in the secular state and Islam in Europe', *Kenan Malik blog*, 16 June. Available at: http://www.kenanmalik.com/papers/engelsberg_mc.html (Accessed, 14 May, 2015).

Malik, M. (2010) "Progressive Multiculturalism: The British Experience" in Silj, A. (ed.) *European Multiculturalism Revisited*. London: Zed Books, pp.11-64.

Martin, J., Heath, A. and Bosveld, K. (2010) *Is ethnicity or religion more important in explaining inequalities in the labour market?* Oxford: University of Oxford.

Martinello, M. and Rea, A. (2013) "Une brève histoire de l'immigration en Belgique", Federation Wallonie- Bruxelles.

Merry, M. S. and Milligan, J.A (2010) *Citizenship, Identity and Education in Muslim Communities: Essays on Attachment and Obligation*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan,

Meurs, D., Pailhé, A. and Simon, P. (2011) "Persistance des inégalités entre générations liées à l'immigration: l'accès à l'emploi des immigrés et de leurs descendants en France". Vol 61, *Populations*, pp.763-801.

Ministère d'éducation nationale enseignement supérieure recherche (2007) "Mesurer les inégalités sociales de scolarisation : méthodes et résultats. Projections à l'horizon 2015". # 74. *Éducation et Formations*, pp.1-209.

Modood, T. (2010) "Multiculturalism in the West and Muslim Identity" in Merry, M. S. and Milligan, J.A (ed.) *Citizenship, Identity and Education in Muslim Communities: Essays on Attachment and Obligation*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 63-84.

Muchowiecka, L. (2013) "The End of Multiculturalism? Immigration and Integration in Germany and the United Kingdom", *Student Pulse*, Vol. 5, # 6.

Nash, H. (2013) "The impact of the European Union on the UK labour market", *CEBR*. Available at: <http://www.harveynash.com/pdf/HarveyNashCebrEUMigration.pdf>

- Nielsen, J.S. (1999) *Towards a European Islam*. New York: Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations, University of Warwick.
- Palmer, G. (2011) 'Low Income and Ethnicity'. *The Poverty Site*. Available at: <http://www.poverty.org.uk/06/index.shtml#g2> (Accessed May 14, 2015).
- Panayi, P. (2000) *An Ethnic History of Europe since 1945: Nations, States and Minorities*. Harlow: Longman.
- Parekh, B. (2000) *Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Persson, M. (2013) *Does Labour want to change the EU treaties to guarantee 'British jobs for British workers'?* Available at: <http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/finance/matspersson/100025357/does-labour-want-to-change-the-eu-treaties-to-guarantee-british-jobs-for-british-workers/> (Accessed March 16, 2014).
- Petrovic, W. (2012) "Belgium: a Country of Permanent Immigration" *Migration Policy Institute*.
- Pina, A., Corluy, V. and Verbist, G. (2015) *Improving the Labour Market Integration of Immigrants in Belgium Economics Department Working Papers No. 1195*. Available at: [http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=ECO/WKP\(2015\)13&docLanguage=En](http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=ECO/WKP(2015)13&docLanguage=En) (Accessed May 14, 2015)
- Pouget J. (2006), "La Fonction publique : vers plus de diversité?", *Insee Références France, portrait social*, pp. 143-162.
- Queen's University (2015) *Related Research Using the MCP Index*. Available at: <http://www.queensu.ca/mcp/research/other-scholars-papers> (Accessed September 7, 2015).
- Renard, F., Tafforeau, J. and Deboosere, P. (2014), "Premature mortality in Belgium in 1993-2009: leading causes, regional disparities and 15 years of change". *Archives of Public Health*. Vol 72 #34.
- Rex, J. (1995), "Multiculturalism in Europe and America". *Nations and Nationalism*. 1 (2), pp.243-259.
- Shadid, W.A. and Koningsveld, P.S. (1991) *The Integration of Islam and Hinduism in Western Europe*. Kampen: Pharos.
- Shadid, W.A. and Koningsveld, P.S. (1996) *Political Participation and Identities of Muslims in Non-Muslim States*. Kampen: Pharos.
- Siddiq, H. (2013) 'Investigating British immigration policies: Greater fairness regarding immigration is in the interest of Britain', *The London School of Economic and Political Science*, 21 November. Available at <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/investigating-british-immigration-policies-underlying-trends-motivations-and-implications-for-south-asian-immigrants/> (Accessed 14 May, 2015).

Silberman, R. and Fournier, I. (1999), "Les enfants d'immigrés sur le marché du travail". *Formation Emploi*. # 65. pp.31-54.

Somerville, W. (2007) "The Immigration Legacy of Tony Blair." *Migration Policy Institute*.

Tapinos, G. (1975) "L'immigration étrangère en France de 1945 a 1973." *Population*. Vol 30 (2), pp.315-317.

Triandafyllidou, A. (2001) *Immigrants and National Identity in Europe*. London: Routledge.

Triandafyllidou, A., Modood, T. and Meer, N. (2012) *European Multiculturalisms: Cultural, Religious and Ethnic Challenges*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Uberoi, V and Modood, T. (2013) "Has multiculturalism in Britain retreated?", *Soundings: A journal of politics and culture*, Issue 53, pp. 129-142.

Valk, H. de. and Willaert, D., (2012) "Internal mobility of international migrants: the case of Belgium" in Finney, N and Catney, G (ed.) *Minority Internal Migration in Europe*. pp.13-38.

Vallet, P.S. (2006) "L'assimilation scolaire des enfants issus de l'immigration et son interprétation: un examen sur données françaises." *Revue française de pédagogie*. #117, pp.7-27.

Vause, S. (2009) "Migrations et populations issues de l'immigration en Belgique." *Université catholique de Louvain*

Versini, D. (2005) *Rapport sur la diversité dans la fonction publique*. Available at: <http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-publics/044000632.pdf> (Accessed March 14, 2015).

Vertovec, S. and Wessendorf, S. (2010) *The Multiculturalism Backlash: European discourses, policies and practices*. New York: Routledge.

Yegenoglu, M. (2012) *Islam, Migrancy and Hospitality in Europe*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

