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VISIONS OF GRANDEUR:
PLANNING FOR THE CANADIAN POST-WAR ARMY
1944 - 1947

by

Bryan Brulotte, B.A.

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Department of History
Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario
December, 1991

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"VISIONS OF GRANDEUR: PLANNING FOR THE CANADIAN POST-WAR ARMY 1944 - 1947"

submitted by

Bryan R.J. Brulotte, B.A. Honours,

in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Thesis Supervisor

Thesis Co-Supervisor

Chair, Department of History

Carleton University

11 May 1992
ABSTRACT

During the latter part of the Second World War, senior army commanders within the General Staff initiated a planning process which called for the establishment of a large and powerful post-war army. The Liberal government of Prime Minister Mackenzie King, however, concluded that there was no strategic necessity for a large standing army and that the peacetime conscription recommended by the military to maintain such a force would be political suicide. This thesis demonstrates how the Canadian Army, with its visions of grandeur, attempted to justify its post-war force structure and why the Liberal government ultimately made the army settle for much less.
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### ABBREVIATIONS

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<tr>
<td>AA ARTY</td>
<td>Anti Aircraft Artillery</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACCOM</td>
<td>Accommodations</td>
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<td>AF</td>
<td>Armoured Fighting</td>
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<td>AHQ</td>
<td>Army Headquarters</td>
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<td>AMN</td>
<td>Ammunition</td>
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<td>ARMD</td>
<td>Armoured</td>
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<td>BDE</td>
<td>Brigade</td>
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<td>C&amp;AA</td>
<td>Coastal and Anti-Aircraft Artillery</td>
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<td>CDC</td>
<td>Cabinet Defence Committee</td>
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<td>CGS</td>
<td>Chief of the General Staff</td>
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<td>CSC</td>
<td>Chiefs of Staff Committee</td>
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<td>DCGS (A)</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of the General Staff, 'A' Branch</td>
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<td>DHIST</td>
<td>Directorate of History</td>
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<td>DIST</td>
<td>District</td>
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<td>DIVS</td>
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<td>DMOP</td>
<td>Director Military Operations and Plans</td>
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<td>Directorate Staff Duties</td>
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<td>EQPT</td>
<td>Equipment</td>
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<td>FA SVY COY</td>
<td>Field Artillery Survey Company</td>
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<td>GPS</td>
<td>Groups</td>
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<td>HOW</td>
<td>Howitzer</td>
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<td>Miscellaneous</td>
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<td>Military Training</td>
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<td>NCO</td>
<td>Non-commissioned officer</td>
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<td>NRMA</td>
<td>National Resources Mobilization Act</td>
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<td>Non-Recurring</td>
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<td>Officers</td>
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<td>ORS</td>
<td>Other Ranks</td>
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<td>PHP</td>
<td>Post Hostilities Problems (committee)</td>
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<td>PJBD</td>
<td>Permanent Joint Board on Defence</td>
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<td>RCAF</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Air Force</td>
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<td>RCN</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Navy</td>
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<td>Regiment</td>
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<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<td>WE</td>
<td>War Establishment</td>
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the General Staff, with their collective vision of a large post-war army, demonstrated an extraordinary lack of political understanding. The General Staff overestimated the size of the force necessary for Canada in the post-war world. They also failed to grasp the fact that conscription, which was a very controversial option even in wartime, would be impossible to establish in peacetime. This study represents the first attempt to describe these events.

The thesis relies principally on the official files of the Canadian government. The most important documents are from the Directorate of History at National Defence Headquarters. These documents, although helpful, are poorly catalogued and require much patience to examine. Several files at the Directorate of History were not available for this thesis since they apparently remain sensitive for reasons of national security. It is important to note that the files at the Directorate of History frequently duplicate documents which exist in other sets of papers; namely, in the Department of External Affairs Files and the King papers. The DND collection, however, is the most comprehensive collection of material.

Secondary sources which address policy and planning in the immediate post-war period do not deal extensively with the army's planning process or the post-war force structure. In fact, in C.P. Stacey's official history, *Six Years of War: The Army in Canada,*
generally regarded as unlikely. A small regular force was in existence and numbered roughly 4 000. Its purpose had been mainly to act as a training cadre for the Non-Permanent Active Militia, to administer itself and to conduct aid to the civil power as required. After the First World War, successive Chiefs of the General Staff (CGS) had attempted to improve the lot of the militia and have it taken seriously, but most of these efforts failed and the army was rarely in a position to achieve its aspirations. One example very pertinent to this thesis was the attempt of the CGS, Lieutenant-General Sir Willoughby Gwatkin, to have his post-war plans accepted. Calling for a peacetime militia force of fifteen divisions and peacetime conscription, Gwatkin's proposals were judged to be strategically unnecessary and politically controversial. With regard to the creation of a large standing army, members of Parliament questioned its purpose: what was the direct threat to Canada that called for such a force? As for conscription, the political crisis which had erupted in Quebec during the war made any argument supporting its adoption unacceptable. The militia could expect no real financial support from Parliament, and none was forthcoming until the late 1930's.

For most of the interwar period, National Defence found that its interests conflicted with those of the Cabinet and the Department of External Affairs. In Cabinet, defence was not a serious policy issue and was viewed as a drain on public funds. At External Affairs, the Department of National Defence was seen as
a competitor for influence within the government bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{14} And with O.D. Skelton as the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, this department had the ear of the Prime Minister. Thus, apart from a modest rearmament programme which was initiated in the late 1930's for home defence and to satisfy the Americans, the armed forces lacked support in Ottawa.\textsuperscript{15}

During the Second World War, the armed forces in general and the army in particular increased exponentially in size. As the war began to wind down, senior commanders at National Defence Headquarters actively pursued studies which examined the possible composition of a post-war army which included universal military service.\textsuperscript{16} As we shall see, these studies initially had serious conceptual flaws and were repeatedly modified by army planners; until the end of the war, members of Cabinet paid little attention to them. Once hostilities had ceased, Cabinet assumed the initiative and dictated the post-war army's structure through authorized manpower ceilings.\textsuperscript{17} The Prime Minister and Cabinet were determined to satisfy the nation's defence needs with a military machine 'bought on the cheap'. The Prime Minister realized that the nation's strategic position required armed forces, but this grudging admission was tempered by his view that public opinion would not support conscription or the cost of a large post-war force.
In this peacetime setting, the Canadian government exerted tight control over its military establishment. The King government was resolved to demobilize the military as quickly as possible.\(^\text{18}\) This desire reflected public opinion but also Cabinet’s intention to reduce the influence which the services had exercised over national policy during the Second World War. The military Chiefs of Staff were never highly regarded by the Prime Minister or by most of Cabinet, an unfavourable opinion reinforced by the army’s mismanagement of the conscription crisis of 1944.\(^\text{19}\) At that time, senior army commanders had attempted to cover up shortfalls in infantry troop reinforcements and conceded their mistake when it was literally too late. The army recommended and insisted upon overseas conscription to remedy the situation. Mackenzie King managed to overcome this controversy but only with great political risk. This incident was to confirm his belief that senior military commanders did not understand domestic politics or foreign policy.\(^\text{20}\)

The military, however, had gained an unexpected ally. External Affairs was in the midst of expansion and sought a more active role for Canada in world affairs.\(^\text{21}\) Cabinet recognized the need to study post-war issues involving Canada and called for the creation of a interdepartmental body. External Affairs assumed the leadership of this important Post-Hostilities Problems Committee, established in the summer of 1943, and had the greatest influence of any department in its decision making.\(^\text{22}\) The members of the
committee considered various topics related to Canada's post-war situation and, in particular, issued warnings about the possible threat that the United States posed to Canadian sovereignty. They also pointed out how Canada's new middle power status signalled an era of greater international responsibilities for the nation. The arguments presented by External Affairs implicitly and at times openly supported the armed forces' request for a sizeable post-war structure.

At the planning level, the Chiefs of Staff argued for a post-war military force which could support Canadian foreign policy objectives and ensure national security. Initially, army planners were very active in setting out the post-war structure. Their vision, however, was rejected by Cabinet. As peacetime considerations replaced the wartime emergency, army planning became reactive in its attempts to adapt to the decision-making process of the nation's political masters. Ultimately, the Prime Minister decided that Canada would maintain a larger armed force than in the pre-war period, but below the levels recommended by National Defence. This post-war defence structure was politically acceptable to Mackenzie King because it did not involve conscription and could be maintained at relatively low cost.

The object of this thesis is to describe and analyze post-war Canadian army planning from 1944 to 1947, and to set this planning in its political and bureaucratic context. It will be shown that
the General Staff, with their collective vision of a large post-war army, demonstrated an extraordinary lack of political understanding. The General Staff overestimated the size of the force necessary for Canada in the post-war world. They also failed to grasp the fact that conscription, which was a very controversial option even in war time, would be impossible to establish in peacetime. This study represents the first attempt to describe these events.

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Britain and the Pacific, less that a page of text examines the issue of post-war army force structure. Desmond Morton's Canada and War is another example of the phenomenon: we are given only a brief explanation of the form the post-war army assumed.

The most relevant publication for this thesis is a book by Stephen Harris, Canadian Brass: The Making of a Professional Army 1860-1939. The arguments put forward by Harris suggest that the senior officers who were responsible for post-war planning after the First World War lacked political sophistication. They recommended a large post-war force of fifteen divisions and peacetime conscription. The government of the day could not or would not support this proposal and settled for a much smaller force. As the thesis will point out, the military's experience after the Second World War was not unlike that which had taken place after the First. The problems related to military planning, noted by Harris, reappear. Again we seem to be dealing with senior officers who lacked political instinct and were basing their plans on visions of grandeur of their and Canada's place in the post-war world. Harris' work, taken together with the present study, shows a continuity in army thinking and underlines consistent themes and problems in civil-military relations in Canada. This takes several forms, such as the different perceptions of what the government and senior military commanders define as national security, the civilian government's supremacy over the military's and the inability of commanders to grasp
political issues.

The only major work on defence policy which covers some of the material in this thesis is James Eatys' *In Defence of Canada*, Volume III, *Peacemaking and Deterrence*. In this book, Eatys describes the interaction between senior military commanders and the government, and attempts to trace the development of Canadian defence policy from the immediate post-war period to the 1960's. The important decision makers from Cabinet, External Affairs and National Defence are presented and the outcome of their decisions is discussed. In this examination of the defence of Canada, the author briefly touches upon defence and then shifts the focus of his book to foreign policy and how this influenced security issues. The work provides some of the historical context in which army planning took place, but it does not fully address the defence issues of this period or examine the army's post-war force structure.

The thesis is divided into three chapters. The first chapter deals with post-war army planning in 1944. The planners at army headquarters had anticipated the need to prepare plans for a post-war army structure and formulated a series of plans. After consultation with the Committee on Post-Hostilities Problems, the General Staff presented these plans to the Cabinet War Committee in October of 1944. Cabinet did not consider the issue of post-war forces at this time since the war was still in progress and the
country was in the grips of the conscription crisis.

The second chapter discusses the accelerated evolution of post-war army planning as hostilities came to an end. In the summer of 1945, Cabinet became more interested in the army's post-war planning and imposed greater control on this process, although it failed to provide the guidance of a defence policy. The three services of the armed forces created a joint study on Canada's post-war strategic position in an effort to justify their view of a credible post-war force structure proposal to Cabinet. But at this stage, Mackenzie King was mainly interested in bringing the troops back from overseas as soon as possible. Eventually, the armed forces were to be assigned somewhat arbitrary manpower ceilings from which to formulate their plans.

In chapter three we discover that, although Cabinet had authorized an army structure committed to an immediately available combat capability, this could not be developed. Because of economic considerations, the government imposed a manpower freeze and refused to allocate sufficient resources for the army to train adequately. The chapter briefly describes the Canadian Army's organization and shows that defence policy, finally (if tenuously) defined in 1947, bore little relationship to that organization.

Through close study, it becomes increasingly clear that the planning of the post-war army between 1944 and 1947 did not take
place in isolation. It was an exercise which involved not only the military, but also External Affairs and the Cabinet. The creation of the post-war army was a process in which both military and political factors were critical to its outcome. Each of the three parts of government involved stressed different factors which directly corresponded to their interests. In the end, it was the politicians who had the final say.
NOTES

1. Canada's Defence, Department of National Defence (Ottawa, 1947).


4. Ibid.

5. This information is extracted from a report on establishment strength of the Active Force, dated August 1949, Department of National Defence, Directorate of History, (DHIST), 113.003 (D10).


8. Ibid.

9. Harris, Canadian Brass, pp. 142-166.

10. Ibid., p. 211.

11. Ibid., pp. 142-152.


13. Harris, Canadian Brass, pp. 164-166.


16. Memorandum BDF SD4-40, (GS-SD4-37), dated 10 August 1944, DHIST files 112.352049 (D9).

17. Memorandum HQS 20-1 FD 416, dated 30 August 1945, DHIST 112.3M2 (D286)

18. Report on Demobilization, not dated, DHIST 113.003 (D10).


23. Ibid., pp. 406-412. See also Memorandum OPRS 200-P, dated 6 July 1945, DHIST 112.3M2 (D286)


CHAPTER ONE

POST WAR ARMY PLANNING 1944

The Canadian Army initiated planning for a post-Second World War Canadian Army as early as July of 1941. A draft document, prepared for the Army General Staff, outlined a structure that would permit the army to remobilize rapidly if necessary. For almost two years this proposal was to remain dormant: the General Staff was much too preoccupied with fighting the current war to pay close attention to the idea.

In 1943, the tide of war had turned in favour of the Allies: on two continents, the Axis powers had been checked and had begun to be pushed back. In January of that year, the Soviet Red Army broke the siege of Leningrad. In May, a combined Italian and German force in North Africa collapsed. Later that summer, a joint American-British invasion of Sicily had been launched with Canadian participation; the Commander of the First Canadian Army, General McNaughton, strongly protested what he considered the break up of his command and was later dismissed. The Canadian Army eventually provided a full corps to the Mediterranean theatre, while a second, along with Army Headquarters, remained in Britain. The Canadians took part in some of the fiercest fighting in Italy and suffered many casualties. By the summer of 1944 the manning of
infantry units was quickly reaching a crisis point. This was to have serious political ramifications, and was adversely to affect the Canadian military, as will be shown later.

At the Directorate of Military Operations and Plans (DMOP, see Annex A) in Ottawa, the focus of planning gradually shifted. Having previously concentrated on the expansion and maintenance of Canada's army, senior officers now gradually began seriously to envisage the structure of a post-war army. In August 1943, DMOP prepared "Notes on Post-War Army Organization for the General Staff". One of the major functions of DMOP was to anticipate the needs of the army and prepare for them. The paper was based on the draft that had been prepared on 21 July 1941. It called for a post-war army of six infantry divisions and four armoured brigades, of which two infantry divisions and one armoured brigade would be full-time professional formations. The remainder of the force would be made up of trained reserves. The officers of the General Staff believed these forces reflected what they vaguely termed the military potential of Canada. This plan, among others, would soon be proposed to the Minister of National Defence.

In 1944, the Allies opened the Second Front, and on 6 June, Operation Overlord signalled a new phase in the war. Canadian troops took part in the initial amphibious landings at Normandy under command of a British corps and army commander. The Canadian Army had corps size units conducting combat operations in Italy and
France. The administrative and logistical burden which this entailed was soon to aggravate the problem of casualty replacements. Meanwhile, as the Allies advanced towards Germany, it became more and more clear that victory was simply a matter of time.\textsuperscript{12}

In May of 1944, General Murchie officially replaced Lieutenant-General Stuart as Chief of the General Staff, the latter having been transferred to London to assume overall command of the Canadian Army overseas as Chief of Staff in December of 1943.\textsuperscript{14} At Army Headquarters in Ottawa, the new CGS authorized DMOP to prepare a series of plans on the post-war army structure.\textsuperscript{13} There were five plans in this initial series: A, B, C, D, and E. (See Annex D)

In these plans, General Murchie retained the six infantry divisions and four armoured brigades format that was called for in the earlier study. However, he appeared to be of the opinion that several different plans would be required to explore all the options which could be discussed, and he raised the possibility of compulsory military service. At this time in the war, senior commanders had concluded that it was virtually impossible to plan Canada's next major war without taking conscription into account. Based upon the military experience of World War I and World War II, the simple truth, in their view, was that large scale Canadian participation in major wars required compulsory service.
The process by which the army plans were prepared and eventually presented to Cabinet was well established. Initially, DMOP studied the strategic, tactical and foreign policy factors which affected the army structure and thus determined the forces required. Once these parameters had been decided, the Directorate of Staff Duties (DSD, see Annex A) considered detailed information related to the plans, such as the organization of the army, orders of battle, allocation of units to theatres, and the costs of army programmes. These two directorates, DMOP and DSD, collaborated closely under the guidance of the Deputy Chief of the General Staff 'A' Branch (DCGS A, see Annex A) who forwarded their work to the Chief of the General Staff (CGS) for his approval. In collaboration with the Minister of National Defence, the CGS then presented the plan to the Committee on Post-Hostilities Problems (PHP), established under the Department of External Affairs, for further study. (See Annex B) Once the plan had been considered by the PHP, it was either returned to the CGS for modification or was sent to Cabinet. Within the Cabinet, it was the Cabinet War Committee that considered the plans.

On 11 August 1944, the Directorate of Staff Duties (DSD), in collaboration with DMOP, presented a memorandum outlining plans A, B, C, D, and E to General Murchie. In comparison to the peacetime army of 1939, the army proposed to General Murchie was ambitious and large in scale. At the outbreak of the war the regular army totalled some 4 000 men and served mainly as an
"instructional corps in the guise of a regular army". The non-
permanent militia consisted of one cavalry division, six infantry
divisions and auxiliary troops. The peace establishment for the
militia was 90 000 men, but its actual strength was about half of
that number.

Each of Brigadier L.M. Chesley's (DCGS A) 1944 plans
envisioned a combined regular and reserve force of six infantry
divisions, four armoured brigades, a proportion of Corps Troops
with Coastal Artillery and anti-aircraft units. Even in their most
modest form, these proposals represented an army almost five times
larger than that which had existed in 1939. This organization was
determined in light of the likely employment of such forces outside
of Canada and the requirement to mobilize and train
reinforcements. The plan stated that this total military effort
was approximately equal to the military potential of the country,
as signified by its population at the time: 11 000 000 people. But
the term 'military potential' was not clearly defined. Rather it
was a series of loose assumptions about how many men the Canadian
economy could make available based on demographic calculations. This large army could be defended in terms of its ability to thwart
aggression, but it was not. It is tempting to conclude that the
proposals to create a large army reflected the generals' collective
vision of grandeur. Having raised a war time army of over 700 000
men, it was undoubtedly difficult for senior commanders to embrace
the thought of returning to a small peacetime force. Having
commanded men or been part of the Canadian Army under extreme circumstances, most senior officers were not enthusiastic about returning to peacetime soldiering. The heady stimulation of power and achievement was hard to give up. This situation paralleled that of senior Canadian military commanders who had faced a similar situation at the end of the First World War.23

Because hostilities were still underway, no attempt was made to set out a detailed organization, making it impossible to determine the allocation of units or the composition of active and reserve proportions within units.24 Indeed, this was not the intention of Brigadier Chesley.25 At this stage, he simply wanted to have a significant and concrete force structure that could be proposed to the Cabinet War Committee. Once that had been agreed to, he could then set the detailed planning mechanisms in motion.26

The five plans were divided into three main groups: plans A and B, plans C and D, and plan E. (See Annex D) The first group’s plans were similar, except with regard to the size of the mobilized active portion, as both assumed that a portion of the Active Army would consist of unit cadres completed by trainees serving a compulsory period of service. Plans C and D did not envisage compulsory military service, and differed only with regard to the size and composition of the standing army. Plan E provided that the major portion of the military organization would consist of the Reserve Army, from which would be subtracted two brigade
groups as an active portion. Additional trainees under a compulsory military training scheme would be prepared for service at training centres and sent to the Reserve Army.  

The real difference between the first and third group of plans, as compared to the second, was that they required compulsory military training. In the First World War, the issue of compulsory service sent the country into national crisis and divided French from English. At this point in the Second World War, conscription was a politically sensitive subject which had been raised in a federal plebiscite of 1942. At that time, the national Conservative party openly called for the enactment of overseas conscription and was quick to criticize the Liberal government of Mackenzie King at every opportunity. Mackenzie King, indeed, sponsored the plebiscite as a response to a Tory party challenge. King called upon the electorate to accept the position of 'conscription only if necessary', and won despite a substantial no vote in Quebec. Privately, the Prime Minister was prepared to do almost anything to avoid the necessity of overseas conscription. Within the Cabinet, he had several Ministers who had staked their credibility on the promise that conscripted troops would not be required for overseas service. The Prime Minister, however, also had to accommodate those Ministers who believed in overseas conscription if it was necessary. Thus he adopted a platform which promised no overseas service for conscripts but reserved the right to do so if and when it became unavoidable.
In October of 1944, 59,876 men were serving under the compulsory service system established by the National Resources Mobilization Act (NRMA) of 1940. This act permitted the government to place individuals in civilian as well as military positions essential to the national war effort. Initially, the men fulfilling their military obligation served only at home for Canada's defence, since to send them overseas would once again inflame the troubled issue of conscription. However, with the lack of reinforcements for infantry units in Europe, these NRMA troops represented the only trained body of men immediately available for overseas service. Finally, conscription for overseas service was imposed in November 1944. The issue did not divide the nation as it had in World War One, but the Minister of Defence was forced to resign and there was important opposition to the measure, part in Quebec, where it was a least appreciated that the Prime Minister had done all he could to avoid compulsory service.

We are ahead of our story, but Chesley clearly knew that he would have to justify the army's advocacy of compulsory service in plans A, B and E. He noted that the value of the Reserve Army was in direct proportion to the speed with which it could mobilize and take part in operations. Only with compulsory military training would a rapid mobilization of trained reserve troops prove possible. Furthermore, he argued that compulsory military training would ease the unemployment situation for returning
soldiers, and would greatly contribute to the physical and moral health of the youth of the country. Perhaps not surprisingly, Brigadier Chesley’s plan for post-war mobilization was an amended version of the post-war plans for a large army which had been proposed in 1917.

Threats to the country were not even mentioned in the initial series of plans. With no thorough study of the country’s strategic position, senior commanders were presenting force structure models in a way sure to arouse the suspicion of those who mistrusted the military.

Brigadier Chesley admitted that it was difficult to decide on an exact post-war force structure, because of a “lack of clarification about Canada’s post-war international obligations”. In the summer of 1944, it was clearly too early to form reasonable impressions of the nature of the post-war international scene. However, it was argued that, as a consequence of the inability to predict what lay ahead, it was desirable “to plan our permanent post-war Army structure in such a way that our basic plans for the organization of the military potential of the country will be disturbed as little as possible by variations in the operational requirements for quickly available troops.”

What this meant was that the General Staff preferred to have a peace-time military force structure which would be the same as that
which would exist in time of war. The army would have a training organization in peacetime which would be exactly the same as that for war time. In terms of the operational forces themselves, the organizations which existed in peacetime would again be those used in the event of hostilities. Senior commanders wanted to avoid the situation which had existed prior to the First and Second World Wars when the Canadian Army had to build from scratch and organized according to doctrines which had been untested.

The argument which Brigadier Chesley put forth justified the nation's need for a large force structure and universal military training on purely military grounds. Although his reasoning was logical in a narrow sense, it failed to provide a comprehensive and detailed justification for the various plans. To further his argument that peacetime conscription was necessary, Chesley pressed the advantages of imposing one-year compulsory service, as compared with a shorter period. He pointed out that one year was the minimum length of service required to train an individual soldier and expose him to combined arms operations. The soldier had to be psychologically inoculated to withstand the extreme horrors of war and to operate increasingly complex equipment within a very fluid environment. In short, modern warfare now required that troops acquire a large number of skills simply to survive on the battlefield.

So committed was Chesley to compulsory service that it was
originally - and perhaps dishonestly - suggested that the two plans (C and D) providing for only voluntary service should not even be presented to the government. They ought to be retained as contingency plans in the event the government rejected the idea of compulsory service.  

Brigadier Chesley's report recommended to the CGS that plan E be adopted. With this plan costs would not be increased greatly. Plan E also offered more flexibility in coordinating activities for the army, and the training structure was separated from the military operational organization for war. This meant that units could devote their collective training to specific tasks and would not have to train recruits. It also meant that units could immediately be available to conduct operations and not have to 'work-up' over a series of months in order to mobilize. The argument also applied to the training centres, which would already be established and easily expanded in time of war.

With plan E Chesley and the General Staff thus envisioned a large post-war Reserve Army, trained by a small regular force, capable of rapid mobilization, reflecting the country's "military potential" and manned mainly by conscripts. This force structure numbered over 200,000 men. The purpose of this force had not as yet been considered and the security threat to the nation remained undefined. Quite simply, the officers in the General Staff wished to avoid the inadequacies that had plagued the Permanent Force and
Militia prior to the war. These officers wanted a military force which was adequately equipped, large enough to be viable and funded at a sufficient level so that realistic training could be carried out. The reasoning which had been used to support this structure was to underline all post-war army planning well into 1946.

Senior army commanders at NDHQ had been planning in a vacuum both in terms of knowing what Canadian foreign policy would be after the war and in terms of what the navy and air force might want. Perhaps the army believed that their plans would be accepted without serious scrutiny or questioning by the politicians, by the navy, and by the air force, or by anyone else interested in the country's post-war national security. In fact, as they should have known, their plans would be scrutinised from a series of not altogether friendly angles. This was more likely because, when the first series of army plans were sent to the Working Committee on Post-Hostilities Problems, they lacked a strategic 'raison d'être'.

In December 1943, the Cabinet War Committee had sanctioned the creation of two committees which were to become the allies of the army's post-war plans. The senior group, "The Post-Hostilities Advisory Committee" under Norman Robertson, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, was responsible for policy. The Working Committee on Post-Hostilities Problems, led by Hume Wrong, the
Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs was to produce detailed studies.\textsuperscript{51} The composition of the senior body included the Secretary to the Cabinet, the Chiefs of Staff, the Deputy Minister of Finance and the Vice-Chairman of the National Harbours Board. The members of the Working Committee came from the same departments as that of the Advisory Committee, but more junior officers sat on this panel.\textsuperscript{52}

The real power houses on the committees were from External Affairs, which was developing a global perspective of the role Canada should seek in international affairs.\textsuperscript{47} The "middle power" status in economic and military terms which Canada had attained meant that the country was in a position to follow a foreign policy different from that of the prewar period. Perhaps large post-war armed forces would prove necessary to support Canada's new international status. There was now, in other words, a distinct possibility that External Affairs would support a larger post-war army.\textsuperscript{48} This notion, however, had not yet been grasped by the senior commanders at NDHQ: not surprisingly because, during the interwar years, External Affairs had battled with the CGS for influence within the government bureaucracy and had consistently argued for a small regular force.\textsuperscript{49}

Throughout 1944 and into 1945, the committees studied a variety of issues related to Canada's post-war position. These included post-war defence arrangements with the United States, Canada's military interests in Greenland, Canada's position in the event of strained
relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, Canada's role in the defence of the North Pacific, the defence of Newfoundland and the circumstances surrounding a regional security organization.\textsuperscript{53} By the spring of 1945, the two groups began to wind down their activities.

The responsibilities of Hume Wrongs' Working Committee on Post-Hostilities Problems made it essential that the Committee review the army's proposed post-war structure before it was recommended to the Cabinet War Committee (later the Cabinet Defence Committee).\textsuperscript{54} On 25 August 1944, this Working Committee considered the third draft of its position paper on future collaboration between Canada and the United States on defence policy.\textsuperscript{55} On this same day, the Committee also reflected on the series of army plans that were proposed for the post-war period.

The civilians on the committee were unimpressed by the army's plans. In particular, dissatisfaction was expressed with the army's lack of a strategic justification for large forces after the war. Planners had not clearly identified a threat to Canada which required military forces. The committee reported:
The paper really says nothing more than that there will be an unsettled condition and that although no major threats of attack can be foreseen, it is nevertheless a good idea to maintain large forces just in case. The feeling of the Committee was that an argument could be made for forces larger than those before the present war, but that the Army had not made it.56

In response to the comments of the Working Committee, the Minister of National Defence, J.L. Ralston, demanded that DMOP study the strategic validity of a large post-war structure.57 Within two weeks he received a document that outlined the army's strategic assessment of the post-war world. On 7 September 1944, General Murchie presented the army's case and thus its justification of the need for a large post-war army and for universal military training.58

Murchie argued that Canada could not afford to demobilize its military machine into the minuscule, ineffective defence establishment that had existed before the war.59 Technological advances had left Canada vulnerable to sudden and unprovoked attacks. In particular, the extended range of aircraft had opened Canada to air attack. It was now possible for an enemy to threaten the North American continent in a manner which had not been possible prior to 1939. Before the Second World War, Canada could count on its geographical position as well as the protection of Royal Navy to assure its defence. This situation had now
drastically changed and a defence policy which reflected this was required. Canada had fought in the First and Second World Wars, large wars which demanded a maximum military and industrial effort, and for which the country was not ready. Canada ought to prepare adequately for hostilities in peacetime. Murchie warned against the fallacious belief in the citizen soldier, ever able to respond to a call to arms: previous reliance upon the militia had delayed the formation of a true fighting force.\textsuperscript{60} Canada's pre-1939 military policy did not provide the means to rapidly mobilize, organize, train, and equip men for modern war. The militia organization of the past could not hope to offer the number of soldiers sufficient to ensure successful participation in future conflicts and adequate defence of the country.\textsuperscript{61} Future wars would require a regular army, with little or no time to prepare.

Murchie stated that the nation's new involvement in foreign affairs required the support of a "realistic military policy". Indeed, Canada's international responsibilities could not be discharged without such a policy.\textsuperscript{62} On this last point, the thrust of Murchie's statement harmonized with the planning of senior administrators at External Affairs.\textsuperscript{63}

Murchie then explained the need for compulsory military training.\textsuperscript{64} His rationale was that this was the only system that would permit a military organization to be developed at relatively low cost (due to conscripts' low pay) and that would make adequate
numbers of trained reserves available in an emergency. He presented a series of loose arguments which attempted to lend a degree of political legitimacy to conscription. The CGS stated that, in peacetime, a system of training would have a stimulating and beneficial effect on the young men of the nation; this would be achieved by building up mental and physical health through the military’s challenging way of life. Military training could also develop leadership and inculcate a sense of the responsibilities of citizenship. Training of this nature would, therefore, help to maintain and consolidate a unified national outlook in the country. From an economic point of view, vocational training would offer career opportunities for a number of men who might otherwise not have the chance to acquire a trade skill. The armed forces would provide jobs to many young men who would possibly become victims of any economic recession which might follow the war. Furthermore, it was suggested that, after a year of such service, the graduate of military training would be required to enroll in the Reserve Army for an additional three years, further adding to the advantages of the measure.

The flaw in this argument for compulsory service was that, apart from token militia service prior to Confederation, no tradition of peacetime conscription had existed in post ancien-regime Canada. It was certain that the Prime Minister, Mackenzie King, would not accept the proposal. Even as Murchie wrote, the issue of conscription was dividing English and French Canada and
seriously threatening national unity. It would appear that Murchie raised the issue because conscription was the only way in which a large post-war army could be raised economically. In short, the CGS and many senior commanders were intent upon establishing a large force, and one of the few options available to contain the financial cost of this force was conscription. Their "realistic military policy", however, was unrealistic in the extreme.

Murchie summed up the army's perspective with a suggestion for the composition of this force based on a field force, a training group, various static defence forces and a headquarters. In a follow-up to the army's position paper on the post-war land force, the CGS further pressed his request to the Minister. He apparently wanted to underline the necessity for the Cabinet to consider defence policy seriously. Eliminating the planning options of A, B, C and D, just as Chesley had wished earlier, Murchie recommended on 12 September 1944 that plan E be adopted for a post-war army structure.

Plan E was short-lived. Within the month, army planners at DSD and DMOP refined their plans and developed a new plan F (See Annex D) in response to what was believed would be a more active foreign policy for Canada in the future. At this time it should be pointed out that the evolution of planning to this point was influenced by decisions made entirely within the Department of
National Defence. The army planners were setting their own agenda, since their plans had not, as yet, been seriously considered by the Cabinet War Committee.

In addition to the CGS, the Working Committee on Post-Hostilities Problems was also urging the Cabinet to provide guidance on defence policy. In a memorandum to the Cabinet War Committee, the Advisory Committee stated that it was important for the government to consider the issue in a timely manner and that “Canada will be expected to maintain military establishments large enough to make a proportionate contribution.” The Advisory Committee saw Canada playing an international role in the post-war world equivalent to the status it had gained in the Second World War.

This argument was in line with what the government was saying about Canada’s post-war foreign policy. In an address to the House of Commons in August of 1944, Mackenzie King had outlined Canada’s new commitment to collective security: “We have made it clear that Canada will do its full share in carrying out agreed security schemes, whether they involve the creation of an international police force or, alternatively, other measures for seeing that there will always be an overwhelming preponderance of power to protect the peace.”

This statement encountered no significant opposition in
Parliament. The Prime Minister was not clearly aware of what form or within what organization this commitment would take place, but he had accepted Canada's position as no longer being one of 'no commitments'. The Prime Minister had made an important and decisive change in Canada's foreign policy and was apparently willing to accept greater international obligations.

Members of External Affairs clearly expected Canada to play a more significant role in world affairs. This view was put forward by Hume Wrong, the Assistant Under Secretary of State, in his explanation of the 'functional theory': In short, each nation would participate in diplomatic discussions in areas where they had provided a significant contribution. It thus made sense that Canada would participate in the post-war world according to her wartime contribution of materiel and men. Functionalism, after all, had been embraced by the Prime Minister himself.

King's willingness to accept greater international commitments initially appeared favourable for the army's post-war plans. The Prime Minister was prepared to consider collective security arrangements, but would do so hesitantly. He did not consider the armed forces as central to a foreign policy embracing collective security. This was not initially known to the army and would only become apparent at a later date. As part of a future United Nations Organization, the Prime Minister believed that Canada could help maintain peace, but essentially through diplomacy and possibly
trade sanctions. Canada's willingness to assume responsibility for world peace would be on its own terms and would probably not involve traditional military operations.

On 6 October 1944, the CGS requested that a new document be prepared to present three plans: A, E and F. This document, entitled "Definition of Plans", was prepared by Colonel G.S. Pullen, head of the Directorate of Staff Duties (DSD). Plans A and E were the original plans which had been retained from past documents, but were no longer seriously considered and were included to demonstrate previous options. On 17 October 1944, Colonel Pullen's plan was presented to the CGS by Brigadier Chesley, but it was to be revised before it went before the Minister of National Defence.

In one section of his paper, Pullen outlined the manpower and cost estimates for plan F. The strength of the Active Army in plan F amounted to an estimated total of 11 264, all ranks. The requirement for full-time personnel under the training system provided an additional 10 950 instructors, who would train 47 750 conscripts on an annual basis. Once their training was completed, the Reserve Army of 168 534 men would be manned by these conscripts who would serve for a three year period. The plan stated that any additional requirements and functions imposed on the army would involve increased manpower and cost. Examples of this included the possible stationing of troops for the maintenance of the Alaska Highway and the necessity for occupational duties in Germany and
Estimates were based on a series of cost-conscious assumptions. No new purchases were to be made since most of the equipment that had been used in the war would be returned to Canada. This materiel would be used to provide the reserve with twenty-five percent of its wartime establishment of equipment and the regular force with one hundred percent. As for capital construction, no new training centres or infrastructure would be necessary. In these respects, the start-up costs of the post-war army were to be minimal.

The basic differences between plans E and F were significant: although the overall totals for manpower and annual cost were similar, the structure of the Active Army had evolved. It is unclear what brought about the force structure changes in plan F, but it would appear that the planners at army headquarters had decided that the structure of the Active Army needed to change. Instead of two active infantry brigades, as suggested in plan E, the army now preferred to activate two armoured regiments and retain one infantry brigade. General Murchie was probably attempting to create a balanced Active Army of all combat arms units instead of the unbalanced force (lacking active armour units) proposed in plan E.

As the various plans for the post-war army evolved, the CGS sponsored a corresponding series of documents which provided the
strategic rationale for a post-war force. On 20 October 1944, a paper entitled "Post-War Strategic Situation Affecting Army Organization" was presented to the Cabinet War Committee.\textsuperscript{82} Its contents were essentially a condensed version of the position paper that Murchie presented to Ralston on 7 September 1944.\textsuperscript{83} In this document the Minister covered three main themes: first, Canada's post-war strategic position and its consequent military requirements; second, the Chief of the General Staff's recommendations regarding the form of the post-war army (plan F); and third, the justification for a universal military training plan.

The impact of this document on Cabinet was small.\textsuperscript{84} Although the report emphasized the rapid need to establish a post-war defence policy, the Cabinet War Committee did not heed the call. No guidance was offered regarding military manpower levels, post-war estimated costs or universal military training. In fact, no decision on these matters would be made for another eleven months.\textsuperscript{85} The issue may have appeared important to the military but it was just one of many concerns for Cabinet. Thus, plan F was maintained as a planning option until further direction could be received from Cabinet. At this time Canadian troops were still conducting large scale combat operations in Europe. For the government, and understandably enough, post-war planning was simply not a priority issue.
On October 19, 1944 J.L. Ralston informed the Cabinet War Committee that conscription was now necessary to maintain the combat efficiency of the army. The combined impact of Canadian offensive operations in Normandy and Italy brought on the need for the massive troop reinforcements which the Prime Minister had wanted at all costs to avoid. The situation at the front had become critical; infantry reinforcements were not large enough to keep the army's fighting units up to strength. General Kenneth Stuart, now in command of the Canadian Military Headquarters in London, had initially suppressed warnings concerning the shortage of trained infantry troops. He had hoped for lighter casualties and an early end to the war, but the situation now demanded urgent action. Senior commanders mismanaged the issue. With hindsight, it is clear that the manpower shortfall could have been avoided if the army had better anticipated the casualty rates and had not pressed for a six division force overseas. General Murchie recommended that the most appropriate response was to send the National Resources Mobilization Act (NRMA) troops overseas immediately. But in the Prime Minister's view the threat to national unity posed by conscription was a greater danger to Canada than the Axis Powers. He now faced a Cabinet that was divided over the need to enact legislation authorizing overseas conscription.

As the situation unfolded, Mackenzie King began to believe that the conscription crisis had precipitated a conspiracy within his own cabinet. King's response was to force Ralston's resignation
and to replace him with General McNaughton, a man who opposed conscription and certainly detested the former Minister.\textsuperscript{91} As Minister of National Defence, McNaughton was convinced that by the force of his reputation he could persuade the NRMA men to volunteer in sufficient numbers. Experience was to prove that he could not. Having considered the various options, King decided to seek Parliament’s approval for overseas conscription. He understood the threat to national unity that this issue posed, but nevertheless reluctantly sought approval for overseas conscription with the hope of not alienating Quebec.

On 22 November, after much debate in Cabinet, and faced with the resignation of several senior military officers, McNaughton announced to the House of Commons the government’s proposal to send conscripted men overseas.\textsuperscript{92} Because of McNaughton’s credibility and through clever political manoeuvring, the Prime Minister managed to carry the vote.\textsuperscript{93}

The conscription crisis had an influence upon the army planning process. Although Cabinet took no concrete action to influence plan F, several signs boded ill for planners. The role (or King’s perception of the role) of senior officers during the conscription crisis had strengthened the Prime Minister’s views about his senior officers. He became convinced that he had to lessen their clout and not accept their advice at face value.\textsuperscript{94} In parts of Western Canada, several ranking officers had resigned in
protest over the initial lack of action on the part of the Prime Minister to impose conscription immediately. Once the order to send NRMA troops overseas was issued, a few NRMA units rebelled and refused to follow their officers' orders. This only aggravated King more. The impressions left on the Prime Minister about the ability, leadership qualities and loyalty of senior military commanders are clearly stated in his diary. On 24 October 1944, he noted: "Really the more I see of it all, the more I am convinced that the Department of Defence has made a terrible mess of our whole war effort. The army has been far too large; the planning has been anything but sound. The judgement, far from good." 

Of course, Mackenzie King had never been particularly sympathetic to or understanding of the army. It was now assured that he was going to weigh the soldiers' advice even more carefully. The army had also forfeited, however, to some extent at least, the sympathy and support of senior bureaucrats at the Department of External Affairs who, even if they tended to look at the post-war world in the same light as the general staff, now began to doubt whether senior officers were competent to make policy.

As early as 1941, the planners at army headquarters had anticipated the need to prepare plans for a post-war army structure. In 1943 and 1944, as the tide of war turned in favour of the Allies, the Directorate of Military Operations and Plans began serious efforts in the direction of planning for the future. This resulted
in a series of plans and strategic assessments that were presented to the Cabinet War Committee in October 1944. At that time, Cabinet decided not to make a firm decision and wait for future developments.

The officers of the General Staff envisioned a large post-war Army, justifying it on military and later (when prompted) on strategic grounds. The position adopted by External Affairs on post-war international affairs appeared to support the army's plans. This shared view between the two departments was not fully exploited by General Murchie, or by Robertson for that matter. The Prime Minister, who appeared to accept the need for new commitments in Canadian foreign policy, was unlikely to look to a sizeable peacetime army after having witnessed the errors committed by senior commanders in the conscription crisis. The situation was not favourable for the army planners' grand vision of a big post-war force.
NOTES


3. Ibid.


8. See annex A of this thesis. An organization chart clearly presents the responsibilities and duties of the main sections of army headquarters.

9. Memo BDF SD4-40 (GS-SD4-40), dated 10 August 1944, Department of National Defence, Directorate of History, (DHIST), 112.3S2049 (D9).

10. Memorandum BDF SD4-40 (GS-SD4-37), dated 11 August 1944, DHIST 112.3S2049 (D9).


14. See annex 'A' of the thesis for more information.

15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
20. Memo BDF SD4-40 (GS-SD4-37), dated 11 August 1944, DHIST 112.3S2049 (D9).
22. Memo BDF SD4-40 (GS-SD4-37), dated 11 August 1944, DHIST 112.3S2049 (D9).
24. Note dated October 1944, DHIST 112.3S2049 (D3).
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
31. Ibid., p. 233.
32. Memorandum BDF SD4-40 (GS-SD4-37), dated 11 August 1944, DHIST 112.3S2049 (D9).
33. Ibid.
34. Harris, Canadian Brass, p. 211.
35. Memorandum BDF SD4-40 (GS-SD4-37), dated 11 August 1944, DHIST 112.3S2049 (D9).

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. Memorandum HQS 24-1 (DSD), dated 7 September 1944, DHIST 112.3S2049 (D9).

43. Memorandum BDF SD4-40 (GS-SD4-37), dated 11 August 1944, DHIST 112.3S2049 (D9).


52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.


57. Memorandum HQS 24-1 (DSD), dated 7 September 1944, DHIST 112.3S2049 (D9).

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.

60. Harris, Canadian Brass, pp. 5-6.

61. Memorandum HQS 24-1 (DSD), dated 7 September 1944, DHIST 112.3S2049 (D9).

62. Ibid.


64. Ibid.

65. Ibid.


68. Memorandum BDF SD4-40 (GS-SD4-37B), dated 12 September 1944, DHIST 112.3S2049 (D9).

69. Memorandum HQS 24-1 (DSD), dated 7 September 1944, DHIST 112.3S2049 (D9).
70. Memorandum BDF SD4-40 (GS-SD4-53), dated 14 October 1944, DHIST 112.3S2049 (D9).


73. Ibid.

74. Ibid.

75. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, p. 333.

76. Granatstein, A Man of Influence, pp. 144-147.


79. Memorandum BDF SD4-40 (GS-SD4-53), dated 14 October 1944, DHIST 112.3S2049 (D9).

80. Ibid.

81. Memorandum BDF SD4-40 (GS-SD4-37B), dated 12 September 1944, DHIST 112.3S2049 (D9).

82. Memorandum HQS 24-1 (BDF SD4-18C), dated 20 October 1944, DHIST 112.3S2049 (D9).

83. Memorandum HQS 24-1 (DSD), dated 7 September 1944, DHIST 112.3S2049 (D9).

84. Ibid. The recommendations in the document were not acted upon by Cabinet.

85. Memorandum to the Chief of the General Staff from the Minister of National Defence, "Post War Establishments", dated 27 September 1945, DHIST 112.3M2 (D286).


88. Ibid., pp. 111-113.


93. Ibid.


95. Ibid., p. 66.

96. Ibid., p. 164. See also Mackenzie King Papers, King Diary, National Archives, MG, Series G, Microfiche T-207, pp. 1021-1030.

97. Ibid.


CHAPTER TWO

THE EVOLUTION OF PLANS, 1945

On 8 May 1945, victory was officially proclaimed in Europe, while the war in the Pacific was formally ended on 15 August. During the war, 630,052 Canadians, including 25,251 women, served in the Active Army, in addition to the 100,573 called up under the NRMA. Approximately 370,000, all ranks, served in the European theatre, while 2,800 served in the Pacific. The army's casualties numbered 22,917 fatalities. Within the year, the process of demobilization and rehabilitation began. The government, as well as individuals, made the adjustments that peace required.

At the Department of National Defence, the reduction of forces allowed by the end of hostilities meant addressing several major issues immediately. Three were paramount. First, the demobilization of almost one million troops and the repatriation from Europe of almost 400,000 men had to be accomplished. Secondly, Canada's defence relationship with its partners, the United States perhaps in particular, had to be considered. Lastly, the three branches of the military had to plan their post-war structure. While the process for demobilization was straightforward enough, the state of Canada-US defence relations remained
ambiguous and the post-war army structure had yet to be resolved.

In September 1944, planners at DMOP had provided a strategic rationale for the post-war army which was incorporated into the document outlining plan F. This plan was to remain a working model for DMOP planners well into May 1945. During the initial months of 1945, the Canadian Army's attempts to establish and justify a post-war structure were hampered by the lack of a unified joint services strategic assessment. The services, however, would soon co-operate in establishing a common strategic outlook for Cabinet. In June of that year, plan G was developed, soon to be followed by plan H in August. (See Annex D) The rapid turnover of plans which occurred in 1945 appears to have been the partial result of several influences such as evolving force structures, financial considerations, and inter-service rivalry. In the following section, the development of plans G and H is discussed, as well as the factors that affected their evolution.

In the summer of 1945, a number of separate strategic assessments of the post-war world were to support the force structure proposed by army planners. These documents were prepared by different organizations and each reflected the outlook of its author. All three documents defined elements of a possible post-war national defence policy and included several recommendations. The positions staked out by the Canadian Army, the Chief of Staffs' Joint Planning Sub-Committee and External
Affairs were complementary, and few significant differences of opinion arose. The officials at External Affairs presented a case involving issues of sovereignty which supported the establishment of a credible post-war force. The armed forces, on the other hand, relied upon a more strategic approach to justify their position. What is of significance is that both External Affairs and National Defence had agreed upon the value of a substantial post-war force.

...the two departments had a strong common postwar interest. Both, for their own reasons, were firmly opposed to a return to Canada's prewar isolationism. The soldiers appropriately saw military unpreparedness as the primary cause of the war and advocated the logical prescription for Canada— a substantial postwar force. The diplomats, equally appropriately, saw diplomatic timidity and the weakness of the old League of Nations as the primary causes. They therefore pursued with equal diligence an activist and internationalist postwar diplomatic posture.¹⁰

The two departments shared the view that the post-war army could not be as small as it had been in 1939 and that it could not be just a training cadre for the militia. This peacetime army had to have equipment to be able to train effectively. In short, it was understood that a standing army had to be maintained and that it might have to be used. This cooperative attitude was markedly different than that of 1919.¹¹
The army's position was stated in a document prepared by the Directorate of Military Operations and Plans. It was titled "Army Proposals for Submission to Advisory Committee on PHP Concerning the Post War Army". Outlining the army's views on the post-war force and harmonized to some extent to take into account the views of the other two branches of the service, the document was nevertheless an exercise in maximization, aimed at producing the largest possible army.

The DMOP document, drafted by Colonel J.H. Jenkins, was presented to the Chiefs of Staff Committee meeting by Brigadier L.M. Chesley on 11 July 1945. It discussed Canada's post-war strategic position and summarized the consequent army requirements. The force structure outlined was essentially plan G. The strategic rationale of the paper was a condensed version of the one presented to the former Minister of National Defence, J.L. Ralston, by General Murchie in September 1944.

At the Chief of Staff Committee meeting, General Murchie's staff stated that future wars would probably involve Canadian participation alongside the forces of one or more of the great powers. In the army's view, this environment required that the armed forces be able to mobilize a substantial proportion of the country's military potential quickly. General Murchie explained that "Canada's increasing world stature augmented her share of responsibility in the common defence." If Canada was to fulfill
its obligations to support collective security within the UN, it had to be militarily prepared to do so. The size of this force, however, had to be taken into account the 'military potential' of the country. Because Canada could not accept a large standing regular army with all its corresponding cost, "a citizen army manned by active volunteers, reservists and conscripts would be necessary."

General Murchie's position was consistent with the past strategic assessments the army had presented. Apart from providing justifications for the army's plan G, he attempted to gain the support of his sister services. He pointed out the interdependent nature of modern combined operations and the importance of co-operation among the three services. The document which outlined his argument was passed to the two other service chiefs for review and comments. Thus, it had been seen by the Navy and Air Force.18

A second important Department of National Defence document, prepared for the Committee on Post-Hostilities Problems and the Cabinet Defence Committee, was titled "Considerations Affecting Military Organization in the Post War Period as Defined by Chiefs of Staff Committee".19 This paper was developed by the Joint Planning Sub-Committee and established a common strategic outlook from which all three services could coordinate their planning. It would appear that the Chiefs of the three services had realized
that they could better secure their collective future as a credible force in the post-war period if they presented a 'common front'. Their arguments might appear more legitimate to Cabinet if the three services did not bicker among themselves.\textsuperscript{20}

The documents prepared for the Chiefs of Staff Committee therefore offered a joint services outlook.\textsuperscript{21} During June and July 1945, a Joint Planning Sub-Committee, with representatives of the Canadian Army, Navy and Air Force, met to discuss the strategic factors affecting Canada's post-war military requirements.\textsuperscript{22} The appreciation which originated at the meeting was prepared for use as a common position for any joint service planning of post-war defence forces.\textsuperscript{23} The individuals responsible for the document's preparation were Colonel J.H. Jenkins (Army), Captain H.S. Rayner (RCN), and Wing Commander G.S. Austin (RCAF).\textsuperscript{24} As members of the Joint Planning Sub-Committee, these three officers also held posts with the PHP Working Committee. They recognized that the joint services paper had been prepared giving "consideration to the strictly service point of view".\textsuperscript{25} They stated in a covering note that it was possible that some of the paper's conclusions and statements would not be entirely in line with the ideas that might be held by representatives of External Affairs (and, by extension, the PHP Committee); nevertheless, they agreed that the paper represented a sound analysis of the strategic requirements from the military point of view.\textsuperscript{26}
There was, of course, a fundamental difference between this type of military operational planning and the diplomat’s policy planning. The former could be based on clear assumptions as to the nature of the military threat being planned for and the militarily defined objectives being pursued. The latter could rely on few if any givens and few if any obvious objectives. This difference in approach to planning between the soldiers and the diplomats in fact surfaced time and again during their interdepartmental post-hostilities work.27

The Chiefs of Staff believed that Canada had to continue "defensive measures", whether or not an effective world security organization became reality. It was considered unwise to completely dismantle the armed forces which then existed. There was also the possibility that, if Canada were again involved in a war, it would probably entail the dispatch of an expeditionary force overseas. Because of the strategic realities which Canada faced and the fact that her two closest allies were the United States and Great Britain, any military force that was dispatched would probably have to coordinate its operations with these two countries.28

Apart from Canada's cooperation with its allies, the document pointed out that the government's acceptance of 'collective security' dictated that armed forces be prepared to support
international military action anywhere in the world. The world security organization which would emerge after the cessation of hostilities would probably require Canada to have the ability to support its mandate for the maintenance of world peace. Initial discussions among the members of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD, see Annex B) coincided with the outlook of the Chiefs of Staff and suggested that, in the post-war period, the United States would expect Canadian military preparations to be carried out at a high level in order to ensure continental defence. If Canada did participate in a war, it would most likely involve great powers as had the First World War and the Second World War. This type of conflict would demand a total national effort. Recognizing this possibility, an extended timeframe would probably not be again available to Canada for military preparations after the outbreak of war. The state of readiness of Canada's potential enemies and the advances in technology which had accelerated the conduct of war made it necessary to have the capacity to mobilize rapidly. For these varied reasons, the Chiefs of Staff agreed that it was logical and reasonable to recommend to the Cabinet that a policy of military preparedness would be essential in peacetime.29

At this time, the strategic ramifications of the atomic bomb had not yet been considered. Yet, even after the explosion of the atomic bomb over Hiroshima in August of 1945, Canadian authorities did not fully comprehend or agree upon its effects on Canada's
geostrategic position. From a military perspective, the atomic bomb would not have a profound effect upon army planning.

The Committee on Post-Hostilities Problems weighed in with its own assessment. Prepared by the Post-Hostilities Problems Joint Drafting Group, the document was titled "Post-War Canadian Defence Interests in United States Defence Projects in NorthWest Canada". This paper dealt with political issues such as sovereignty and how the post-war army could secure Canada's interests in the North.

Under the leadership of Hume Wrong, the mandate of the group was to "examine what defence interests, if any, Canada had in the Northwest Staging Route, the Alaska Highway and other United States defence installations in the Northwest...and put forward certain recommendations regarding the action that might be taken."

Politically, the report underlined the importance of safeguarding Canada's sovereignty in the Northern regions through use of the armed forces. As the committee pointed out, there was not so much a threat from an enemy, but rather a need to convince the United States that Canada was willing to maintain a credible military force capable of thwarting aggression.

The Joint Drafting Group stated that the vulnerability of the northern approaches was not due alone to air power and noted that,
as a result of technological developments, attacks involving land operations on a large scale had now become possible in the region. One possible form of threat was identified as invasion. This threat, however, was considered highly improbable as long as the US and UK retained command of the seas. Another threat was the possibility of diversionary operations such as amphibious or airborne assaults. The group considered this form of attack as strategically desirable for an enemy because it would tie down forces and draw strength away from other directly threatened regions in Europe or Asia. Minor threats like raids or incursions by saboteurs were also studied, but these were deemed less important.

The group determined that, because of these threats, it was likely that the United States would concentrate its interest in continental defence largely on Alaska. American defence efforts in the Canadian North-West were still ongoing at this time and fresh in the thinking of Canadian officials. Any emphasis on Alaskan defence could lead to United States' pressure on Canada to undertake defence measures within the Canadian portion of this strategic sector. Thus, if Canada, with its limited military resources, was to accept full responsibility for defence measures in Canadian territory, steps had to be taken to ensure that any such pressure did not lead her to neglect the defence of strategic sectors which lay within Canadian territory. Otherwise, the Canada's claim to her northern territories would be seriously threatened both politically and militarily. The implications of this were that the armed forces
would have to maintain a capability to deploy military units to all parts of Canada including the most remote northerly regions. This would require troops and materiel available at short notice.

The Joint Drafting Group of the PHP Working Committee outlined not only specific threats to the nation's security, but also a major issue that could lead to the erosion of its sovereignty. Specifically, there was the need to defend against help from the United States. Canada had to protect itself from an ambiguous, yet possible, menace in the North and had to have the ability to defend itself lest the U.S. would move in and do the job. The Prime Minister was later to agree with this position, but he was not prepared to accept the large military force structure judged necessary by External Affairs and National Defence to support sovereignty. King was concerned about the issue of sovereignty but was only prepared to pay lip service to the military implications of its maintenance. The reason for this was primarily one of financial restraint, as will be explained in Chapter 3.

Prior to the end of the Second World War, the two leading Departments involved in post-hostilities politico-military planning had managed to agree upon the necessity for a post-war military force. Or so it seemed, the united front was to be plagued by what each Department viewed as:
...appropriate levels for the postwar armed forces. The military, motivated by conviction and organizational interests, consistently pursued a substantial commitment; External Affairs, motivated by their own as well as the Prime Minister's convictions and by their organizational interests, consistently demurred. The result was a stalemate. The planners' inability to provide Cabinet with a consensus recommendation persisted to the very end of the last meeting of the Advisory Committee in July 1945.45

The two Departments had agreed that a sizeable post-war army was necessary for Canada, however, they could not reach an understanding as to what level this should be. Instead of submitting two separate recommendations concerning establishment levels to Cabinet, External Affairs quietly avoided the issue. The Department of National Defence, with its interests at stake, put forward its series of plans and included the manning levels viewed as essential.

In early August of 1945, army planners at DMOP presented the last post-war structure plan to be uniquely based on strategic and military considerations. With the support of McNaughton and General Murchie, plan G was submitted to the Advisory Committee on PHP. The submission was a combined strategic rationale justifying the need for a post-war army along with the actual plan itself.46

The difference between plan F and plan G was essentially one
of manpower. In plan F, the manpower levels were: active 22 214, training 47 750, and reserves 168 534. The corresponding plan G figures were: 55 788, 48 500, and 177 396. The costs were $129 011 629 for plan F and $120 000 000 for plan G. It would appear that the most likely explanation for the higher Active Army manpower figures in plan G was Murchie's desire to secure the largest possible army establishment level. The Defence Minister, McNaughton, fully supported this proposal. The Prime Minister did not have the same enthusiasm and, as we will see, realized he would have to limit the plans put forward not only by the Canadian Army but also the Navy and Air Force.

In plan G, the detailed explanations went beyond the simple descriptions of force structure that characterized previous plans. The plan provided guidance on several key issues including Canada's military requirements, size and type of forces, training, equipment, cost and research and development. In particular, General Murchie ensured that the plan outlined the role of the army in peacetime and in war as follows:
The Role of the Army in peacetime:

(a) To train itself for war.

(b) To provide the machinery and resources for its rapid mobilization.

(c) To provide a striking force to execute any policing or punitive role that may be assigned to it as a result of commitments assumed by Canada...

(d) Aid to the Civil Power:

The Role of the Army in War:

(a) Defence of North America.

(b) Immediate provision of a striking force.

(c) Provision of an expeditionary force.\textsuperscript{52}

This represented the first time that any official army document had attempted to define the roles which the Canadian Army would assume in the post-war period.

Dramatic events were soon to eclipse the proposal which McNaughton had put forward and change the direction of army post-war planning. On 15 August 1945 the Japanese surrendered.\textsuperscript{53} Two days later, the Minister of National Defence, referring to a memorandum from General Murchie regarding the retention of units in Canada, stated that "he was most anxious to ensure that sufficient force was maintained in Canada at all times in order to give adequate aid to
the Civil Power". This responsibility had been one which the armed forces, and especially the army, had taken up in the past on numerous occasions. It was, in the view of the government, one of the few useful purposes the army served in peacetime.

The end of the war signalled the departure of McNaughton as Minister. He had attempted to become an elected member of Parliament, was involved in two bitterly contested by-elections and had not succeeded in winning a seat in Parliament. With the end of hostilities, King found that the retention of McNaughton as Defence Minister no longer served his purposes. In a post-war world, a Minister, keen on supporting the creation of a large post-war army, could become a political liability. Of paramount importance to Mackenzie King was that the armed forces be reduced in size. Commenting on McNaughton, the Prime Minister noted in his diary:

I spoke of his making a review of affairs of the Defence Department with a view to accounting for all the forces, equipment, etc., and the means of reducing the size of our military forces. The danger there is that McNaughton himself has big ideas and might present a report that might be embarrassing. St.Laurent feels that the one question of the unwisdom of having him stay on is that we might never get the armed forces to the proportions they should be at. [C.D.] Howe [Minister of Reconstruction] feels this very strongly. We talked of other posts. I agreed that I would see McNaughton later this afternoon.
Thus King wanted the forces reduced and knew that he would have to find a new Minister of National Defence to execute this intention. The Prime Minister felt that McNaughton, as a former general, identified himself too closely with the armed forces and would actively support their plans for post-war forces. Nor had the Minister demonstrated the political prowess which was essential for the survival of a Cabinet Minister. With the end of hostilities, Mackenzie King had decided that the mandate for military reductions would fall upon the smooth and able Douglas Abbott. McNaughton handled his dismissal with dignity and later accepted his fate with the belief that he had helped 'save the country'.

On 20 August 1945, a new Minister of National Defence and Chief of the General Staff were appointed. The mandate of the Minister was to proceed with the demobilization of the armed forces as quickly as possible. Demobilization policies and contingency plans had been in place since March, and by the end of August, the army was demobilizing 50,000 soldiers per month.

Within the Canadian Army, two senior officers were to change positions. Newly arrived from Europe, Lieutenant-General Charles Foulkes was called upon to become CGS, thus replacing Murchie. General Foulkes had developed a solid reputation as commander of the 1st Canadian Corps in Italy and North-West Europe. Although young for a CGS, at 42 years of age, he was
admired as an outstanding field commander and a gentleman of tact and diplomacy. It was most likely the latter qualities which made him the clear choice of the Prime Minister.\textsuperscript{62}

After Japan's defeat, army planning intensified. This was to prove somewhat ironic since military planners were also about to lose the freedom they had had in formulating plans. Under the previous CGS, plans were created in a virtual vacuum and were very much a hypothetical exercise. With the end of hostilities, the government was prepared to consider post-war plans and become directly involved. Senior officers preparing the post-war structure would now have to adapt to the will of Cabinet and take into consideration influences other than the strategic and military.

The end of hostilities and the heightened interest of the Cabinet meant that Brigadier Chesley, the DCGS A, now had several pressing tasks to accomplish simultaneously. His staff had to plan a post-war force while demobilizing troops and maintaining an interim army.\textsuperscript{63} To compound this problem, General Foulkes wanted to announce the latest proposal for an army post-war plan very soon. The result of this was mild confusion, due in part to the lack of guidance by the Cabinet Defence Committee, as to the structure of the post-war army.\textsuperscript{64} In a memorandum dated 30 August 1945, General Foulkes informed members of his staff of the "...authority, which it is hoped may be secured almost immediately from Cabinet, to continue to employ a total amounting to perhaps 20,000 all ranks until the
Permanent Force is reconstituted. It is not known when the Permanent Force as such will be reconstituted nor is it known yet what the form and shape of the Post War Army will be."

The next day, a committee composed of senior officers from Brigadier Chesley's staff discussed the problem of proceeding with demobilization, maintaining this interim army and planning the post-war army. These officers decided to initiate an immediate staff study to determine "the minimum requirements of the post-war army". Thus, plan H was born.

The initial concept of plan H was a continuation of plan G. The reserve forces were to be raised by means of conscription, and large training establishments would be maintained. The major difference between plan G and H lay in the size of the active army, which was to be limited to between 20 000 to 25 000 soldiers compared to 55 788 in plan G. The core of the active army was to be concentrated in one brigade group. Although Foulkes was one of the most politically adroit officers in General Staff history, he supported peacetime military training as Murchie had done. Given the crisis of 1944, the insistence of the General Staff on conscription surely demonstrated a lack of political 'savoir faire' and sensitivity.

As planning continued, the organization of the post-war army became increasingly clear. Issues such as the selection of soldiers
for the interim army were decided. On 6 September 1945, a study by Colonel G.S. Pullen outlined the 'home stations' or locations where regular force units would be assigned. No operational requirements or considerations had been followed regarding the location of units. Instead, there were three main factors taken into account: training facilities, the effect of recruiting, and aid to the Civil Power. Politically, the units had to be dispersed across the country in an effort to 'show the flag' and to have an economic impact on local regions. It has ever been thus.

From the strictly military point of view, this was not an ideal solution. To prepare the units for combined operations, it was much more advantageous to train the Brigade Group in one location. However, for the reasons mentioned, it was decided to disperse army units to all regions of Canada.

In mid-1945, the planning of the General Staff, "regardless of how well intentioned, was conducted apart from political policy, and was then presented in component form as recommendations for implementation programmes for political approval." With the war over, the influence the generals had in the formulation and execution of government policy fell dramatically. Military activities were no longer the focus of the nation's attention.

On 24 September 1945, a special Cabinet meeting was held to consider post-war establishments. There, a maximum strength of 20
000 to 25 000 was authorized for planning purposes, and the question of compulsory military training was considered and deferred until a later date. The Prime Minister's ultimate decision, reached in late 1945, concerning compulsory military service was negative. One of the key domestic concerns of the Prime Minister was to maintain the unity of Canada. Politically, he judged that peacetime conscription could not be implemented without serious negative consequences to his government's position. King believed that the general population was not prepared to accept conscription now that the Axis powers had been defeated. He felt, with some reason, that the post-war plans proposed by senior military commanders were unrealistic and unnecessary.

Planning now proceeded rapidly. In the House of Commons, the Minister of National Defence gave his first statement on the current status of post-war planning. On 16 October 1945, Douglas Abbott announced in the House of Commons the future of the post-war army as detailed in plan H. He also indicated the time frame within which he anticipated that the Canadian Army would return to a full peacetime footing: "As an interim measure, therefore, and pending final determination of the detailed requirements of the post war active force, we have given an opportunity to a limited number of personnel to continue in the service for a period of up to two years terminating 30 September 1947." In essence, the Minister had explained that the full implementation of plan H and the demobilization of the Canadian Army would take until September
1947. The reason for this two year delay was mainly administrative, so that the armed forces could demobilize as rationally as possible.

Abbott described the current plans as an interim measure, to be taken until Canada's international obligations and position could be fully established. The Minister was probably correct in pointing out the present inability to determine post-war defence policy. Criticism of these plans, however, was to come from the opposition defence critic, Major-General G.R. Pearkes, a recently-elected Member of Parliament for the Conservative party. It must be remembered that General Pearkes had been the commander of Pacific Command who had resigned over the issue of conscription as recently as 1944. Pearkes stated "...that not sufficient foresight is being used at this time in preparing our future defence forces so that they may assure reasonable and adequate defence of this country...We should think twice before we go back to the time-worn policies...we had before this war..." The war had been over for less than two months, and General Pearkes expressed what many military officers were saying privately.

On 8 November 1945, the Planning Committee created to revise plan H and chaired by Colonel Pullen held the first of many meetings, this one in the office of DMOP. It became obvious that the plan had now entered the stage of specific analysis. The meeting considered various subjects and discussed future plans.
Several topics related to the peacetime operation of the post-war army were examined, and the detailed planning for distribution of reserve units by military districts was completed. A review of pay rates and allowances for military personnel was also begun, and the criteria for staff training and staff courses for promotion were reviewed. Furthermore, the implementation of a new territorial command structure for the army was studied. It would appear that the CGS wanted a professional post-war army that could train its officers fully and that would offer a competitive monetary package to attract quality recruits.

On 19 December 1945, subject to approval of financial estimates, the Cabinet authorized the Minister of National Defence to proceed with plan H for the post-war army organization. The approval Cabinet gave was essentially based on manpower levels. Although some consideration was given to the strategic necessity of a post-war army, the Cabinet's major concern at this point was financial. Having completed six years of war, the government wanted to rid itself as quickly as possible of a big army in an effort to adjust to the post-war world.

When the Cabinet approved plan H, one of the first changes involved nomenclature. From the moment Cabinet approved the plan H, the Canadian Army, a term which itself dated only from 1940, was to have three parts: the 'Active Force', employed on a full time basis; the 'Reserve Force', comprised of volunteers serving for
three years on a part-time basis; and the 'Supplementary Reserve', former trained personnel who would be required to serve in time of war.\textsuperscript{95}

The force envisioned in plan H was the minimum level considered adequate by army planners.\textsuperscript{96} An Active Force of 20,000 troops, would be maintained on war establishments, fully equipped and immediately available for service at home or abroad. This was to be supplemented by a Reserve Force of 180,000 troops that could be mobilized in war time.

In Cabinet, Minister of National Defence Abbott outlined the units which would comprise the Active Force and Reserve Force. The list was to include field units comprising a brigade group and coastal defence units. Headquarters staffs and personnel to assist the administration and training of the Reserve Force would also be required. Outside of this official structure, special units would maintain the Alaska Highway and operate the NorthWest Territories and Yukon Radio System. The structure of the Reserve Force would consist of six divisions, four armoured brigades and selected corps troops for an army of two corps. The establishments of this Reserve Force would total 180,000 all ranks.\textsuperscript{97}

A readjustment of national organization for military command would also prove necessary. In a message to various senior commanding officers, General Foulkes explained that the current
division of Canada into eleven Military Districts was an unsuitable arrangement for peace or war time. Operational responsibility was divided among too many small commands, each with a restricted operational outlook. The intention, therefore, was to have fewer commands with wider territorial responsibilities covering strategic areas of defence. While elements of the existing military district organization would remain, five geographic commands would be superimposed for administrative purposes and better efficiency.

The end of the war marked a rapid decrease in the influence military planners had on defence policy. Senior commanders offered a series of Army structure plans for consideration by Cabinet which were implicitly supported by External Affairs. The Committees on Post-Hostilities Problems, which was chaired by an official of External Affairs, had recommended a sizeable post-war armed forces. The senior commanders either were not sufficiently politically adroit or failed to cooperate closely with the officials at External Affairs. Having made recommendations, the officers of the General Staff watched their plans slashed for reasons of economic restraint, and because the government felt that a large army was unnecessary. The final structure of a post-war army and its future implementation would not reflect the wishes of the Chief of Staff or former defence ministers, but those of the Prime Minister. King had a dim view of the army's seemingly excessive post-war plans, but also his dislike for military commanders. In late 1945, plan H was approved. It was at this stage that the army prepared to implement its plans
for the post-war Canadian Army.
NOTES


5. Memorandum BDF SD4-40 (GS-SD4-53), dated 14 October 1944, Department of National Defence, Directorate of History, (DHIST), 112.352049 (D9).


14. Ibid.
15. Memorandum HQS 24-1 (DSD), dated 7 September 1944, DHIST 112.352049 (D9).
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
19. Memorandum HQS 24-1, dated 11 August 1945, DHIST 112.3M2 009 (D100).
21. Memorandum HQS 24-1, dated 11 August 1945, DHIST 112.3M2 009 (D100).
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Memorandum BDF MO.154, Temp. 9 (DMOP), dated 6 July 1945, DHIST 112.3M2 (D286).
28. Memorandum HQS 24-1 (DSD), dated 7 September 1944, DHIST 112.3S2049 (D9).
29. Ibid.
32. Memorandum OPRS 200-P, dated 6 July 1945, DHIST 112.3M2 (D286).
33. Memorandum OPRS 200-P, dated 6 July 1945, DHIST 112.3M2 (D286).
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Harris, *Canadian Brass*, p. 164-165.
46. Memorandum OPRS 200-P, dated 6 July 1945, DHIST 112.3M2 (D286).
47. Memorandum GS-SD3-B7, dated 15 June 1945, DHIST 112.3M2 (D286).
48. Ibid.
51. Memorandum GS-SD3-B7, dated 15 June 1945, DHIST 112.3M2 (D286).
52. Memorandum HQS 9072-5 (DMOP), dated 30 June 1945, 112.3M2 (D286).
56. Ibid.


59. Report on Demobilization, not dated, DHIST 113.003 (D10).

60. Ibid.


62. Ibid., pp. 152-156.

63. Memorandum, HQS 20-1 FD 416, dated 30 August 1945, DHIST 112.3M2 (D286).

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid.

67. Memorandum OPRS 204, dated 6 September 1945, DHIST 112.3M2 (D286).

68. Memorandum GS-SD3-B7, dated 15 June 1945, DHIST 112.3M2 (D286).

69. Memorandum OPRS 204, dated 6 September 1945, DHIST 112.3M2 (D286).

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid.


75. Report on Demobilization, date unknown, DHIST 113.003 (D10), see also "The Cabinet Defence Committee and its Antecedents" Privy Council Office, October, 1953. This document points out who were the members of the committee. Available upon request at DHIST.
76. Memorandum to the Chief of the General Staff from the office of the Minister of National Defence, dated 27 September 1945, DHIST 112.3M2 (D286).

77. Ibid.

78. Ibid.

79. Morton, Canada and War, p. 154.

80. Ibid.


82. Extract from speech of Honourable Douglas Abbott, Minister of National Defence, 16 October 1945, DHIST 112.3M2 (D286).

83. Ibid.

84. Ibid.


86. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 2nd Session, dated 16 October 1945, p. 1181, 1185.

87. Memorandum HQS 24-1 FD24, dated 8 November 1945, DHIST 112.3M2 (D286).

88. Memorandum HQS 24-4-6, dated 15 November 1945, DHIST 112.3M2 (D287).

89. For more information see; "Report of the Advisory Committee on Post-War Pay and Allowances for the Armed Forces", National Archives, RG 2-18, Volume 72, File D-19-P-1946, dated March 19, 1946.

90. Memorandum HQS 24-4-6, dated 15 November 1945, DHIST 112.3M2 (D287).

91. Ibid.

92. Memorandum HQS S199-W-1 FD79 (DMOP), dated 2 January 1946, DHIST 112.3M2 (D287).


95. See "Report on Army Structure", dated August 1949, DHIST 113.003 (D10).

96. Memorandum HQS S199-W-1 FD79 (DMOP), the military at this point were inclined to believe that a larger force was the minimum level necessary to defend Canada and its interests. However, senior commanders at DMOP created the structure given in Plan H based upon the restrictions imposed by Cabinet for a 20,000-25,000 manpower ceiling. DHIST 112.3M2 (D287).

97. Memorandum to Cabinet from the Minister of National Defence, HQS 24-1 FD46, dated 3 December 1945, DHIST 112.3M2 (D287).

98. Publication to various senior officers from the CGS, Memorandum HQS 24-1 FD46, dated January 1946. DHIST 112.3M2 (D287).

99. Ibid.

100. Ibid.

CHAPTER THREE
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ARMY PLANS
1946-1947

The world which Canada now faced was much changed from that of
1939. The Axis Powers had been swept away. Britain, even though
victorious, had been weakened. The tremendous effort against Hitler
had brought that country into debt and effectively removed any
possibility of retaining her former international status.1 Two
great powers: the Soviet Union and the United States would dominate
what was starting to be called a bipolar world.

In 1945, the geostrategic position of Canada had begun to
alter considerably from that of 1939. On the political map, Canada
found herself physically between the two new powers which were soon
to compete for world predominance. The military potential of
these two powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, was such
that any future conflict between them would inevitably involve
Canada.2 Due to technological advances in weaponry, such as the
atomic bomb, the nation could now only reminisce about the pre-war
era when vast oceans and friendly navies protected her. In
addition, while the colonial was still in the future, there was
nevertheless a growing concern abroad that somehow the Soviet Union was a potential threat to which a response had to be found. A policy of no commitments held no relevance for this new geostrategic reality. Canada would have to choose sides; it would have to choose a policy of collective security. Members of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD) and the Committee on Post-Hostilities Problems laboured to define a defence policy that would achieve a degree of collaboration with the United States not previously attained. This meant that Canada could not be neutral and would surely require a military force that would credibly respond to this new reality.

The implementation of the army’s post-war plans took place in 1946 and 1947 against this background. It was a process marked by confusion and uncertainty on the part of army planners. DMOP lacked guidance concerning the exact substance of defence policy and the type of post-war forces the government wanted. What eventually emerged was an army force structure which could not effectively support the government’s stated role for the army. Officially, the government had approved plan H, which provided for a small regular force capable of supporting the Reserves while retaining a combat capability immediately available in or outside Canada. In reality, plan H was not fully implemented and the army’s combat capability was minimal.

In terms of foreign policy, it appeared that Canada would not
revert to a policy of isolationalism but would seek out responsibilities within the Commonwealth and the United Nations.⁹ The situation, however, remained fluid. Prior to the end of hostilities, several members of the British government believed that the United Kingdom could only maintain her pre-war status if she molded the Commonwealth into a more unified force.¹⁰ Canada, however, resisted these attempts and continued to assert an autonomous stance vis-à-vis the United Kingdom.¹¹ Initial successes at the United Nations made some optimistic that Canada could make the UN a cornerstone of its foreign policy.¹² It was suggested that the principle of collective security which UN membership offered appeared to replace the defence guarantee that Great Britain had traditionally provided.¹³ Canadian foreign policy was focused on the need to stimulate trade and to define its position on the world stage.¹⁴ Defence policy followed along, sometimes as an afterthought.

The net effect of this approach was essentially one of confusion and indecision for defence planners. Despite criticism in the House of Commons by members of the Opposition, the government did not officially present to the House a clear strategic rationale, nor a force structure for the military, until the summer of 1947 -- two years after the end of the war.¹⁵ In the following section, the implementation of plan H is discussed, as well as the evolution of defence policy in 1946 and 1947.
On 19 December 1945, the Cabinet agreed that, subject to the approval of financial estimates, the Minister of National Defence was authorized to proceed with plans for the post-war army.\textsuperscript{16} The announcement permitted General Foulkes to implement the elements of plan H, which had been agreed upon by the Cabinet.

Since 8 November 1945, a planning committee chaired by Colonel E.G. Pullen had been drafting various details concerning plan H.\textsuperscript{17} The plan, however, had not been fully completed and several major questions were still unanswered.\textsuperscript{18} Two issues in particular remained to be sketched out by Colonel Pullen's staff: the Reserve Force structure and the new territorial commands.\textsuperscript{19} Although both had been studied in general, they still required a more detailed look and the authority of Cabinet to implement. Financial procedures existing within the Canadian government meant that post-war army plan could not be taken as one decision, but as a series of decisions by Cabinet to approve the various components of the army's plan. The result of this cumbersome procedure was that each major element of plan H had to be agreed to individually.

In early January 1946, Brigadier L.M. Chesley, Deputy Chief of the General Staff (A Branch), pointed out the necessity of more detailed planning for the post-war Reserve Force structure.\textsuperscript{20} The Cabinet had approved the dividing of the Canadian Army into an Active Force, a Reserve Force, and a Supplementary Reserve. What remained was the determination of the exact composition and terms of
service for each part of the army and of the reserves in particular. Pullen at the Directorate of Staff Duties took up this latter point. According to him, the composition of the Reserve Force, with a projected establishment of almost 180,000 men, was unrealistic. He concluded that the Reserve Force of six divisions and four armoured brigades could not be fully manned because it was to be trained on a volunteer basis.

General Foulkes, however, held to the original Reserve Force structure. It would appear that he believed it better to have an understrength Reserve Force which could be expanded quickly in time of war than a minuscule Reserve Force structure based on actual enlistments which would take considerable time to mobilize. To Foulkes, it was more beneficial to have a large organization, even if it could only be staffed by a relatively small but trained cadre. The drawback of the latter option was that if hostilities occurred, time would be lost re-establishing the army structure of six divisions and four armoured brigades. Another factor which the CGS had to consider was politics. Each Reserve Force unit was supported by local political establishments in the locality where it was situated. These political interest groups had much influence and the CGS feared that if he retired any particular unit, he risked alienating political support for the army's cause. The result was that the original Reserve Force structure remained unchanged, but the manpower did not materialize to make it effective in peacetime.
Plan H, as we have seen, was not accepted as a whole by Cabinet and had to be implemented by stages. On 11 January 1946, having received authorization from Cabinet, army headquarters initiated a major command reorganization. The eleven military districts, dating back before Confederation, were changed into an organization of five commands with headquarters located in Halifax, Montreal, Oakville, Winnipeg, and Edmonton. The rationale behind this move was to provide commanding officers with more authority to direct training and, if necessary, operations in their area.

In late February, the first major transfer of power between the Active Force and the Interim Force took place. In two separate memoranda dated 21 and 22 February, the units of the Active Force were designated as authorized to assume the role of aid to the civil power. Thereafter, the units of the Interim Force would no longer carry out duties associated with that role and would demobilize.

In 1946, defence negotiations between Canada and the United States proceeded at a rapid pace. The policy position adopted by Canadian officials had been mapped out earlier by External Affairs. The Post Hostilities Problems Committee, chaired by Hume Wrong had busied itself with preparing a document which would outline the post-war defence relationship between the Canada and the United States. The document was titled "Post-War Canadian Defence Relationships with the United States: General Considerations."
document took almost a year to produce because of the debates within the policy community. Wrong presented his report to the Cabinet War Committee in February of 1945, but it was not accepted until July of that same year.

The Wrong report warned the government about the political pressures it must soon expect from the United States in matters relating to defence. In December of 1945, the Cabinet Defence Committee met to consider a proposal put forth by the PJBD. This proposal recommended that both countries continue defence collaboration in peacetime and that an appropriate agency be established to prepare joint plans.

The United States attempted to clarify the measures which would be taken by Canada for continental defence. In June 1946, the Basic Security Plan was presented to the Canadian government. It detailed the division of responsibilities between Canadian and American forces for the defence of the continent. The plans were intended to provide for the coordinated or joint action of Canadian and United States armed forces in the defence of the North American continent and for the protection of the vital sea and air communications routes. Within the government, several members suggested that the American threat assessment was exaggerated and that the resulting defence plan was too expensive. The Secretary to the Cabinet, A.D.P. Heeney, commented that "...in these circumstances, the government will probably have to accept the US
thesis in general terms, though we may be able to moderate the pace at which plans are to be implemented and to some extent the nature of the projects which are to be taken."

After a series of meetings in Washington as well as Ottawa, the plans for joint defence tasks were modified to suit the Canadian government's threat assessment. In essence, this meant that the Americans agreed that they had perhaps exaggerated the gravity of the Soviet threat to North America. The plans were accepted in secrecy in December of 1946 and announced to the House of Commons in February of 1947. The Prime Minister had managed to placate the United States in defence matters and not with the loss of national sovereignty. He had maintained the nation's right to control the deployment of armed forces on Canadian territory. King did not want Canada to participate in an overpowering bilateral defence agreement with any larger power.

One result of the recent defence agreement between the United States and Canada was that senior officers had to begin planning a basic security plan. In February and March 1946, the focus of army planning shifted to joint Canadian-US defence planning. At the political level, analysts at External Affairs, the PHP and the PJBD negotiated the parameters of defence cooperation between the United States and Canada. These negotiations were to conclude only in December of 1946. The Prime Minister took a special interest in these negotiations since he wanted to limit American defence
activities on Canadian territory. At the operational level, Canadian and American military staffs discussed the division of responsibilities for a basic security plan.

In February 1946, the Cabinet designated the Chiefs of Staff Committee as the agency responsible for joint Canadian-US defence planning and ordered that any new plans for joint defence be submitted to the Cabinet for decision. Moreover, the Chiefs of Staff would present proposed implementation programmes. These would be forwarded to Cabinet in a consolidated form to permit consideration of them by the government prior to the preparation of estimates for the ensuing fiscal year.

The Cabinet directive was precise as to the difference between "plans" and "implementation programmes". The definitions stated:

Plans: A defence plan which the two governments could place in operation in time of emergency. The organization, manpower and facilities set forth in the plan were not related to present available resources and acceptance of the plan by either country was not to be construed as a commitment to provide such resources.

Implementation programmes: dealt with preparatory measures which should be undertaken in peacetime if the plan itself was to be capable of operation when required. These covered specific undertakings involving, in some cases, a commitment in manpower and money.
The Cabinet Defence Committee realized that it was necessary to plan defence cooperation, but did not want to commit Canada to any expenditures and wanted to avoid any expansion of the armed forces. In light of the directive by Cabinet, the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General Foulkes, authorized Colonel J.H. Jenkins at DMOP to consider the issue. On 1 March 1946, Jenkins circulated a memorandum indicating the type of planning that would be necessary by the General Staff in the course of the next six to twelve months. The plans were to be based on the possible commitments in relation to joint Canada-United States plans for defence and those relating to the Commonwealth or the United Nations. As such, the plans would have to address the possibility of operations in Canada or outside North America. Jenkins concluded that the planning at DMOP would include a host of details pertaining to the day to day administration of contingency plans.

During the first three months of 1946, army headquarters witnessed the hesitant 'birth' of the post-war army. Implementation of Plan H was hampered by a lack of clear direction from the Cabinet and the internal demobilization of the war-time army. As the establishment of the post-war structure took place, army planners began to focus their attention on "plans" and "implementation programmes" as directed by Cabinet.

The organization of the Canadian Army that came into being
between 1946 and 1947 resembled only superficially that which had been proposed in plan H. The authorized manpower levels were not maintained. Equipment and funds for combined training were not sufficient. Manpower establishment levels were below that authorized. This was partly because few men were volunteering to join the army. Having experienced war and the difficult living conditions which existed in the army, few non-commissioned officers were willing to return. Another contributing factor was the effect of wartime expansion and peacetime contraction, where most individuals who did return to the service had to accept a rank level inferior to that which they had possessed during the war.

The regular part of the Canadian Army, the 'Active Force', was formed in October 1946 by a selection of applicants from the post-war Interim Force and by subsequent recruiting. In 1947, the authorized maximum strength of the Active Force was decreased from 25,000 to 18,750 by the government. This reduction was inspired by a desire to reduce expenditures. The organization of the Active Force provided for a force structure which incorporated the elements of Plan H, but often only on paper. The Active Force could not field the 25,000 men called for in plan H.
STRENGTH - ACTIVE FORCE

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<tr>
<td>Aug 47</td>
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<td>12199</td>
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The post-war Reserve Force also came into being in October 1946. While the Active Force formed the nucleus for expansion of training establishments, administration and staffs in an emergency, the Reserve Force provided the bulk of units and men for an expeditionary force and for the territorial defence of Canada in the event of war. Under plan H, it was estimated that six months would be necessary to send units of the Reserve Force overseas for active duty. In reality, the fact that no equipment was available and that conscription had not been accepted meant that it would take twelve to eighteen months to prepare the Reserve Force fully for operational duty.

The authorized establishment strength for the Reserve Force was 187,865, all ranks. Because of the government’s desire to limit expenditures, recruiting was limited to a maximum of 90,000, all ranks. The number of volunteers on strength was much lower: in August 1947, volunteers totalled 33,053.
<table>
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The third component of the Canadian Army was the Supplementary Reserve, made up of individuals who, by reason of special civilian training or professional skills, would be required to enter the army in the event of mobilization. These people had agreed to report their addresses once each year to the command in which they resided. The number of individuals serving in the Supplementary Reserve in 1947 was approximately 12,000 officers. The trades within the service which relied heavily upon this component of the Canadian Army were those demanding highly trained technicians and the medical support system.

Overall, the army of 1946 and 1947 lacked the ability to provide immediate operational forces. Its current tasks dealt largely with instruction, planning, staff work, care of materials and training of the reserves. The army structure was essentially a hollow shell that could be brought up to operational readiness if required and if time was available. The manpower establishments
for the Active Force and the Reserve Force had not been filled. This was attributable not only to slow recruitment, but also a manpower freeze by Cabinet. In terms of appropriations, the army received roughly half the amount projected in plan H. The Minister of National Defence, now Brooke Claxton, managed to convince the Cabinet to approve an appropriation of 240 million dollars for 1947-1948, but this figure was 125 million short of the amount he considered necessary. This meant that there was little equipment for the Reserve Force and no funds to train the brigade group as a whole. Thus, the Canadian Army was not prepared for intensive operations at brigade level.

**A P P R O P R I A T I O N   F O R   1 9 4 7 - 4 8**

**D E P A R T M E N T   O F   N A T I O N A L   D E F E N C E**

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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
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2. All figures in millions.

Defence policy meanwhile limped along beside its ailing partner, plan H. In August 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended to Cabinet a defence policy based on a strategic
rationale they had developed. This recommendation was addressed purely from a military perspective, and failed to take into account such issues as the national economy, public opinion and domestic political realities. The first statement made by a Minister of National Defence on post-war defence issues was by Abbott, who refused to commit the government to specifics. On 16 October 1945, he stated that since the international situation had not yet been clarified, it was impossible to state a clear defence policy. However, it was possible to provide a general outline of the force structure:

The initial reorganization of our military forces will proceed on the basis of a plan which contemplates that an organized citizens' part-time reserve army will form the source from which a Field Force would be found in the event of war, with a supporting permanently employed Force immediately available to meet minimum peacetime obligations and to provide the staffs and administrative and training assistance for the reserve army.

The Minister was criticized by the Opposition for the lack of concrete policy but Abbott defended his position by stating that; "Only six weeks after the end of the Japanese war is a little too early to lay down hard and fast rules..."

Nevertheless, defence policy was not openly addressed over the next twelve months. Other issues such as the economy and foreign policy held the government's attention. When outlining the
services' estimates for 1946-1947 in Parliament, the Minister was again pressed by a member of the Opposition, Colonel C.C. Merritt, to"... say for what purpose Canada's post-war defence forces are being designed?" The Minister's response was curt and did not mention a capacity for an immediately available force of any real size. "Yes... This relatively small force is to provide a small but highly trained and skilled professional Force which can be expanded in time of war, primarily to train the citizen soldiers who would have to fight the war."  

Colonel Merritt held Abbott's attention by pointing out that "...the permanent Force is designed for training purposes only and not for the defence of Canada or for an overseas commitment...we should not consider that these forces are in any way adequate or even designed to defend Canada in case her borders were attacked..." Merritt's comment clearly underlined how plan H had not been developed according its original design. The Canadian Army had not retained the capacity to send "immediately available" forces as Abbott had stated in October of 1945.  

The Minister admitted that the Active Force was designed for training and not for the defence of Canada or other commitments. He justified this inadequate force because, in his opinion, a few thousand troops would have..."little perceptible effect". Regular units would be located "wherever the permanent stations happen to be, without any need to group them together. But it is proposed
that this brigade will undergo periods of training as a group." These statements generally reflected Mackenzie King's view of the military in light of recent technological innovations, notably the detonation of the atomic bomb. King adhered to the school of thought which declared that conventional armed forces no longer retained their strategic necessity as a result of the destructive power of the nuclear weapon. His Chief of the General Staff, General Foulkes, did not share this opinion, but could not change the Prime Minister's mind.

In November 1946, Mackenzie King had decided that the Department of Defence needed to be reorganized in an effort to minimize costs. The following month, he named Brooke Claxton as Minister of National Defence to replace Douglas Abbott. The mandate of the new Minister was explained by King. "I think your task should be to see that the utmost economy consistent with security should be effected in the Department and I look to you for that."

Upon assuming office, Claxton immediately took upon himself the task of unifying the higher command headquarters and of developing a defence policy. Conferring with his senior officers, he agreed with their strategic appreciation of the post-war world and with the necessity for military forces. However, Claxton's analysis led to the conclusion that no good purpose would be served by maintaining a sizeable military force in being, or by stockpiling
military equipment on a grand scale. The armed forces needed training, not numbers. This reasoning was born out of the Prime Minister's desire to provide only minimal financial support to the armed forces.

On 9 July 1947, Brooke Claxton outlined Canadian defence policy in the House of Commons. This was the first rationale for military expenditures to be announced since the end of the Second World War. He said that the three defence needs for which the defence forces may be required were:

(a) To defend Canada.
(b) To assist the civil power.
(c) To carry out any undertakings... we may assume...with friendly nations... or under the United Nations.

The Minister also admitted that 1947 was still a year of reorganization for the Department and that the activities with the highest priority were: reorganization, the training of officers, Reserve Army training, research and industrial reorganization. The absence of "immediately available forces" from the list of priority activities revealed the degree to which the Canadian Army had not developed according to plan H. The reason the Canadian Army had not established these was based on a lack of manpower and funds, a situation resulting from a muted official policy that saw no need for such forces. Contradictions existed between the Minister's
stated needs and his activities. The most glaring of these was that all three needs pertained to some form of active defence, yet in terms of activities, no collective training was taking place to prepare for these needs.

The evolution of post-war defence policy was largely dominated by the government's efforts to save public money. Within the arena of international relations, the armed forces were not considered necessary to bolster Canada's foreign policy. Plan H was initially conceived as the minimum requirement necessary to meet Canada's post-war defence policy. In 1947, the Canadian Army, organized along the lines of plan H, was in fact a skeleton force that lacked any true operational effectiveness.
NOTES


6. Ibid.


8. Memorandum HQS 24-1 FD46, dated 26 December, 1945, DHIST 112.3M2 (287).


11. Ibid.


13. Ibid.


16. Memorandum HQS 24-1 FD46, dated 26 December 1945, DHIST 112.3M2 (D287).

17. Memorandum GS-SD4-152, dated 8 November 1945, DHIST 112.3M2009 (D100).


19. Publication to various senior officers from the CGS, Memorandum HQS 24-1 FD46, dated January 1946, DHIST 112 3M2 (D287).

20. Memorandum HQS 24-1-6 FD4, dated 4 January 1946, DHIST 112.3M2 (D287).


22. Memorandum HQS 24-1-6 FD4, dated 4 January 1946, DHIST. 112 2M2 (D287). See also Report on Army structure, dated August 1949, DHIST 113.003 (D10). From the two documents it is apparent that the army could not attract sufficient recruits to fully man the post-war Reserve Force structure.

23. Ibid.


26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.


29. Memorandum HQS 5603 Vol. 7 (DMOP), Oprs 208-0, dated 22 February 1946, DHIST 112.3M2 (D287).

31. Ibid.


33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.


36. Ibid.


40. Extract from minutes of the 28th meeting of the Cabinet Defence Committee, dated 11 February 1947, DHIST 112.3M2 (D125).

41. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, p. 363.

42. Extract from minutes of the 28th meeting of the Cabinet Defence committee, dated 11 February 1947, DHIST 112.3M2 (D125).

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. Memorandum HQTS 5199-R-B (DMOP), dated 1 March 1946, DHIST 112.3M2 (D287).
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. Report on Army Structure, dated August 1949, DHIST 113.003 (D10). In comparison to the structure which had been proposed in the original plan H, the army did not fulfill its manpower or equipment objectives.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid. See also Claxton Papers, Statement dated 14 February 1947, National Archives, MG 32, B 5, Volume 100.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid. See also Report on Army Structure, dated August 1949, DHIST 113.003 (D10).
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
66. Canada's Defence, Department of National Defence, p. 27.

68. Report on Army Structure, dated August 1949, DHIST 113.003 (D10)


72. Memorandum HQS 24-1, dated 11 August, 1945, DHIST 112.3M2009 (D100), "Considerations Affecting Military Organization in the Post-War Period as Defined by the Chiefs of Staff Committee".

73. Extract from a speech of the Honourable Douglas Abbott, dated 16 October 1945, DHIST 112.3M2 (D286).

74. Ibid.


77. Ibid.

78. Ibid.


80. Ibid.


83. Ibid.

84. Ibid.

86. Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, pp. 91-2.

87. Ibid.

89. Canada’s Defence, Department of National Defence, p. 7.

90. Ibid.

91. Ibid.

92. Ibid.
CONCLUSION

This thesis has demonstrated how the General Staff, with its visions of grandeur, attempted to establish a large post-war structure and why the Liberal government of Mackenzie King made the army settle for much less. To do so, the narrative has described, in some detail, the army's post-war force planning as it was carried out by the General Staff and the political-bureaucratic response to these efforts. The most striking conclusion that can be drawn from this study is that senior Canadian military officers demonstrated an extraordinary lack of political sophistication. Even as they claimed to be aiming for a "realistic defence policy", they were insisting upon a large post-war force and peacetime conscription.

Post-war army planning was initiated before the end of hostilities. In 1941, initial studies by DMOP considered the issue of post-war forces from a structural point of view without much of a concern for strategy. This trend was carried on in later plans. The planning process, solely directed by NDHQ, could therefore be described as one-dimensional. In 1943 and 1944, as the allies' war effort progressed, DMOP revived the army's interest in post-war planning. The Chief of the General Staff reviewed several options
which outlined different possible army force structures. These plans did not define or take into account defence policy issues. They were initially formulated according to a loose rationale based on the country’s economic, demographic and military potential. As in 1941, these plans also failed to explain adequately defence policy issues as they related to Canada. According to the staff at DMOP, the nation could support an army of six infantry divisions and four armoured brigades. The most serious problems challenging this proposed force structure were cost and the stated necessity of conscription.

As the end of hostilities approached, the planning process was seriously accelerated, and by the summer of 1945 it had produced a post-war plan which the Chief of the General Staff recommended to Cabinet. This plan requested an Active Force of 55,788 men, a training system of 47,750 men, a Reserve Force of 168,534 men and peacetime universal military training. This plan was supported by a strategic assessment that had been prepared by DMOP, but which held little relevance for the members of Cabinet.

From the government’s perspective, the recommendations put forward by army headquarters were unrealistic. The plans had been formulated in a vacuum where army commanders appeared interested in maintaining a large standing army for its own sake. This fact was underlined by the planners themselves, who presented the first series of plans to the Committee on Post-Hostilities Problems
without a fully developed strategic rationale to support their force structure proposals. The army's apparent visions of grandeur did not sit well with the Prime Minister. The attitude in Cabinet was that the war was over and it was essential that the armed forces demobilize as quickly as possible. Although many Canadians had actively supported and participated in the war effort, most simply wanted to return to their civilian lifestyle and the Cabinet was anxious to oblige.

Support for the army's position was offered by External Affairs, but this opportunity was not adequately exploited by the General Staff. A committee led by External Affairs pointed out that a credible military force was necessary for Canada. This opinion was formulated on the understanding that Canada would assume a more influential role in international affairs, in keeping with its enhanced status during and following the war, and would secure its sovereignty vis-a-vis the United States. The Prime Minister was conscious of Canada's new importance in world affairs as well as the threat to Canadian independence. Mackenzie King did not, however, believe in the necessity for a large military force to maintain middle power status or to enforce sovereignty. Nor was he prepared to accept the enormous political costs of imposing peacetime conscription, as was recommended by the military staffs.

The issues which directly affected Cabinet's approach to post-war plans were domestic politics and the economy. It should also be
mentioned that the conscription crisis had seriously shaken the Prime Minister's confidence -- never particularly strong-- in the military. The government essentially wanted a post-war structure which represented the absolute minimum in an effort to reduce 'unnecessary' expenditures. On the domestic front, the issue of conscription was not one which the Canadian public, especially in Quebec, were ready to face again. Public interest, understandably enough, in the military was weak and this was partly reflected in the low recruitment intake after the war.

The international scene remained fluid. The policy makers at External Affairs were attempting to define Canada's place within the post-war world. Canada had to ponder its relations vis-a-vis the United States, the Commonwealth and the United Nations. The Canadian government had to redefine its approach to 'collective security' and decide how this would relate to its international position. Perhaps surprisingly, members of Cabinet in general and Mackenzie King in particular did not consider the armed forces essential in relation to these issues or to the overall execution of Canadian foreign policy.

The evolution of post-war plans after August of 1945 could be described as hesitant at best. Army planning at this later stage essentially meant developing a force structure which would fit within the authorized troop ceilings. Part of the army's failure can perhaps be attributed to its inability to collaborate more
closely with External Affairs. Certainly it did not help to have Mackenzie King as Prime Minister. Most importantly, however, the army’s ambitions and its way of looking at the world were completely different from those of the government intent on tranquillity and military retrenchment. And, in a country where the civil authority has always been superior to that of the military, the army was bound to lose any struggle of wills.
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ANNEX A

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART, GENERAL STAFF BRANCH, ARMY HEADQUARTERS, 1947
ANNEX B

COMMITTEES RELATED TO DEFENCE MATTERS
ANNEX B

COMMITTEES RELATED TO DEFENCE MATTERS

TITLE:

INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEES

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON POST HOSTILITIES PROBLEMS

COMPOSITION:

The Under Secretary of State for External Affairs (Chairman).
The Associate Under Secretary of State for External Affairs.
The Chief of the Naval Staff.
The Chief of the General Staff.
The Secretary Cabinet War Committee.
Deputy Minister of Finance.
Vice-Chairman of National Harbours Board.
Secretary to the Cabinet War Committee - Military.
Secretary - Privy Council Office.
Assistant Secretary - Department of External Affairs.

FUNCTIONS

(a) To submit to the Cabinet War Committee recommendations on
Post Hostilities Problems as occasion may arise.

(b) To give direction and guidance to a Working Committee and to
refer to it matters requiring detailed study.
WORKING COMMITTEE ON POST HOSTILITIES PROBLEMS

COMPOSITION

The Chairman—Associate Under Secretary of State for External Affairs.
Director of Plans (Navy).
Director of Military Operations and Planning (Army).
Director of Requirements and Plans (RCAF).
Secretary—Department of External Affairs—local 5498.

FUNCTIONS

(a) Constituted as a Sub-Committee of the Advisory Committee on Post Hostilities Problems, to keep the latter currently informed on post-hostilities matters.

(b) To prepare studies, or arrange for the preparation of studies, which it considers necessary or which have been assigned to it by the Post-Hostilities Advisory Committee.

NOTE:
Extracted from a text of the Canadian War Staff Course, dated unknown, [DHIST 112.2M2 (D255)].

PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENCE

This body was set up at the meeting of the Prime Minister and Mr. Roosevelt at Ogdensburg on 17th August, 1940, at which was discussed mutual problems of defence in relation to the safety of Canada and the United States.

The function of the board is to consider in the broad sense the defense of the north half of the western hemisphere, sea, land and air problems and personnel and material.

The board consists of a small number of representatives from each country (5 or 6) chiefly military. It is divided into two sections—Cdn and U.S. The Chairman of each section is a civilian (chairman of the U.S. section is Mayor La Guardia) and a high ranking officer of Navy, Army and Air of each country are on the board. In addition to the chairman the civilian side is represented by a member from the Department of External Affairs and the State Department.
ANNEX B (CONTINUED)

TITLE:

THE DEFENCE COUNCIL

COMPOSITION:

The Minister of National Defence (Chairman).
The Associate Minister of National Defence.
The Minister of National Defence for Naval Services.
The Minister for National Defence for Air.
The Chief of the Naval Staff.
The Chief of the General Staff.
The Chief of the Air Staff.
The Deputy Minister of National Defence (Navy).
The Deputy Ministers of National Defence (Army).
The Deputy Minister of National Defence (Air).

DUTIES:

To advise the Ministers on all matters relating to the Naval, Military and Air Services of Canada, and on all matters referred to it by the Minister of National Defence.

TITLE:

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

COMPOSITION:

The Chief of the Naval Staff.
The Chief of the General Staff.
The Chief of the Air Staff.

DUTIES:

To co-ordinate efforts in pursuit of a common policy, and especially to ensure co-operation of Sea, Land, and Air Forces; to advise on questions relating to combined training, preparation for defence, procedure on mobilization, and on such other questions as may be referred to it by the Naval, Military or Air Services and to refer matters when necessary to the Defence Council and the Cabinet War Committee.
TITLE:

INTER-SERVICE COMMITTEE

JOINT PLANNING SUB-COMMITTEE

COMPOSITION:

Air Member for Air Staff/Directorate of Plans (Air) —
(Chairman).
Director of Military Operations and Plans (Army).
Director of Plans (Navy).

FUNCTIONS:

To inquire into and report on all questions which may be referred to it by the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

TITLE:

ARMY COUNCIL

COMPOSITION:

The Minister of National Defence.
The Deputy Ministers of National Defence (Army).
The Chief of the General Staff.
The Adjutant-General.
The Quartermaster-General
The Master-General of the Ordnance
A Secretary.

DUTIES:

To advise the Minister on matters of policy affecting the Army, and to consider matters of administration and procedure which may affect more than one Branch, with a view to integrating and improving the Army Service and to making recommendations thereon to the Minister.
ANNEX C

PERSONS HOLDING PRINCIPAL APPOINTMENTS
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE (ARMY)
PERSONS HOLDING PRINCIPAL APPOINTMENTS
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE ARMY

Minister of National Defence

Col. the Hon. J.L. Ralston,
C.M.G., D.S.O., E.D.  5 Jul. 40 - 2 Nov. 44
Col. the Hon. A.G.L. McNaughton,
C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.  2 Nov. 44 - 21 Aug. 45
Hon. D.C. Abbott  21 Aug. 45 - 12 Dec. 46

Deputy Minister (Army)

Lt.-Col. G.S. Currie, D.S.O., M.C.  1 Sep. 42 - 30 Sep. 44
Mr. A. Ross, C.M.G.  22 Apr. 44 - 12 Mar. 47

Chief of the General Staff

D.S.O., C.D.
ANNEX D

ORGANIZATIONAL CHARTS
POST-WAR ARMY PLANS
## DEFINITION OF PLANS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan</th>
<th>Active</th>
<th>Cadres &amp; Trainees</th>
<th>Reserve</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A</strong> (with mil trng)</td>
<td>(a) Two Bde Gps</td>
<td>(a) Two Inf Divs</td>
<td>(a) Four Inf Divs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) One Armd Regt</td>
<td>less two Bde Gps</td>
<td>(b) Three Armd Bdes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(c) Nucleus of</td>
<td>(b) One Armd Bde</td>
<td>(c) Corps Tps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C &amp; AA Defs</td>
<td>less one Armd Regt</td>
<td>(d) Remainder of C &amp; AA Defs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B</strong> (with mil trng)</td>
<td>(a) One Bde Gp</td>
<td>(a) Two Inf Divs</td>
<td>As in Plan &quot;A&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) One Armd Regt</td>
<td>less one Bde Gp</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(c) Nucleus of</td>
<td>(b) One Armd Bde</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C &amp; AA Defs</td>
<td>less one Armd Regt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C</strong> (no mil trng) Gps</td>
<td>(a) Two Bde Gps</td>
<td>(a) Six Inf Divs, less two Bde Gp</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) Two Armd Regts</td>
<td>NIL</td>
<td>(b) Four Armd Bdes, less two Armd Regts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(c) Nucleus of</td>
<td></td>
<td>(c) Corps Tps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C &amp; AA Defs</td>
<td></td>
<td>(d) Remainder of C &amp; AA Defs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>D</strong> (no mil trng)</td>
<td>As in Plan &quot;C&quot;</td>
<td>NIL</td>
<td>As in Plan &quot;C&quot; plus one Bde Gp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>less one Bde Gp</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>E</strong> (with mil trng) Gps</td>
<td>(a) Two Bde Gps</td>
<td>Training Centres for 47,750</td>
<td>(a) Six Inf Divs, less two Bde Gp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) Nucleus of</td>
<td>(b) Four Armd Bdes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C &amp; AA Defs</td>
<td>trainees</td>
<td>(c) Corps Tps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(d) Remainder of C &amp; AA Defs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** Extracted from memorandum BDF SD4-40, (GS-SD4-37) dated 10 August 1944, DHIST files 112.352049 (D9).
# SUMMARY OF MANPOWER AND COST

## ALL PLANS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan</th>
<th>Manpower</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Offrs</td>
<td>ORs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>2,861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reserve</td>
<td>5,498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>2,869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reserve</td>
<td>5,498,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reserve</td>
<td>7,132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reserve</td>
<td>7,375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>3,057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reserve</td>
<td>7,240</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** Extracted from memorandum BDF SD4-40, (GS-SD4-37) dated 10 August 1944, DHIST files 112.352049 (D9).
### Active Army

#### Manpower

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trainees</th>
<th>Offrs</th>
<th>ORs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WEas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two Inf Bde Gps - Active</td>
<td>1,950</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 4,500</td>
<td>673</td>
<td>2,252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Centres</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDHQ, Dist HQs, Depots C &amp; AA, etc</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>3,097</td>
<td>21,458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 4,500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average Trainees: 47,750

#### Estimated Cost

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Breakdown</th>
<th>NR</th>
<th>Annual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pay &amp; Allowances, Active A</td>
<td>774,250</td>
<td>29,037,237,237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pay &amp; Allowances, Trainees</td>
<td></td>
<td>8,735,663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing &amp; Eqpt.</td>
<td>11,494,080</td>
<td>6,705,480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>2,358,808</td>
<td>1,014,990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accom, Food, Maint,</td>
<td>216,915</td>
<td>20,317,705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>14,844,053</td>
<td>65,811,275,275</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Weapons

| Small Arms, Mgs, Misc                          | 1,891,853| 1,342,773       | 3,234,626    |
| Guns, How, Mortar                              | 2,597,748| 1,300,737       | 3,898,485    |
| Small Arms Ammunition                          | 297,926  | 4,231,645       | 4,439,571    |
| Gun Ammunition                                 | 446,394  | 2,687,371       | 3,133,765    |
| TOTAL                                          | 5,143,921| 9,562,526       | 14,706,447   |

#### Transport

| MT Vehicles                                    | 5,461,508| 5,694,262       | 11,155,770   |
| AF Vehicles                                    | 6,853,922| 7,049,934       | 13,903,856   |
| TOTAL                                          | 12,315,430| 12,744,196      | 25,059,626   |
| GRAND TOTAL                                    | 32,303,404| 88,117,997      | 120,421,401  |

**NOTE:** Extracted from memorandum BDF SD4-40 (GS-SD4-37) dated 10 August 1944, DHIST files 112.352049 (D9).
**RESERVE ARMY**

(PLAN "E")

**MANPOWER**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formation</th>
<th>Officers (Offs)</th>
<th>Reserve Officers (ORs)</th>
<th>Total Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corps Tps</td>
<td>1,243</td>
<td>27,523</td>
<td>28,766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Six Inf Divs (less two Bde Gps)</td>
<td>4,518</td>
<td>91,486</td>
<td>96,004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four Armd Bdes</td>
<td>852</td>
<td>18,740</td>
<td>19,592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C &amp; AA</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>15,191</td>
<td>15,826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>7,248</td>
<td>152,940</td>
<td>160,188</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ESTIMATED COST**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Breakdown</th>
<th>NR</th>
<th>Annual</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PERSONNEL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pay &amp; Allowances</td>
<td>9,328,608</td>
<td>10,664,400</td>
<td>10,664,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing &amp; Eqpt</td>
<td>2,443,848</td>
<td>11,772,456</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>1,842,162</td>
<td>1,842,162</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accom, Food, Maint</td>
<td>3,377,777</td>
<td>3,413,598</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>9,364,429</td>
<td>18,328,187</td>
<td>27,692,616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEAPONS (25% of WE)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Arms, MGs &amp; Misc</td>
<td>2,707,214</td>
<td>2,850,556</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guns, How, Mortar</td>
<td>6,805,042</td>
<td>7,145,193</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Arms Amn</td>
<td>673,889</td>
<td>1,347,778</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun Amn</td>
<td>1,219,909</td>
<td>2,439,818</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>11,406,054</td>
<td>2,377,291</td>
<td>13,783,345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRANSPORT (25% of WE)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MT Vehicles</td>
<td>17,764,790</td>
<td>22,885,882</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF Vehicles</td>
<td>29,439,952</td>
<td>39,821,681</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>47,204,742</td>
<td>62,707,563</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>67,975,225</td>
<td>104,183,524</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** Extracted from memorandum BDF SD4-40 (GS-SD4-37) dated 10 August 1944, DHIST files 112.352049 (D9).
### Training System (Plan "F")

#### Manpower

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Active Strength</th>
<th>Trainee WEs</th>
<th>Wastage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administrative &amp; Training Staff</td>
<td>1,950 Offrs 9,000 ORs</td>
<td>45,500 WEs 4,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Trainees</td>
<td></td>
<td>47,750</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Estimated Cost

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Annual Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Breakdown</td>
<td>A&amp;I Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pay &amp; Allowances</td>
<td>15,094,815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>169,725</td>
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<tr>
<td>Clothing &amp; Eqpt</td>
<td>1,676,784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accom, Food, Maint.</td>
<td>3,068,190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>20,009,514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Arms, MGs, Misc</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guns, How, Mortar</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Arms Ammunition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun Ammunition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MT Vehicles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF Vehicles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Extracted from memorandum BDF SD4-40 (GS-SD4-53), dated 14 October 1944, DHIST files 112.352049 (D9).
ACTIVE ARMY
(PLAN "F")

MANPOWER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formation</th>
<th>Offrs</th>
<th>ORs</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One Inf Bde Gp</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>5,011</td>
<td>5,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cne Armd Regt</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>766</td>
<td>804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cne Armd C Regt</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>765</td>
<td>823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDMQ, Dist HQs, Depots, C &amp; AA Defs</td>
<td>1,009</td>
<td>3,378</td>
<td>4,387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>1,344</td>
<td>9,920</td>
<td>11,264</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ESTIMATED COST

Breakdown                               | Annual Cost |
----------------------------------------|-------------|
PERSONNEL                               |             |
Pay & Allowances                        | 12,630,733  |
Transportation                          | 174,592     |
Clothing & Eqpt                         | 1,798,644   |
Accom, Food, Maint, Sunds               | 3,156,173   |
**TOTAL**                               | 17,760,142  |

WEAPONS                                 |             |
Small Arms, MGs & Misc                  | 114,513     |
Guns, How, Mortar                       | 273,668     |
Small Arms Amn                          | 133,910     |
Gun Amn                                 | 223,197     |
**TOTAL**                               | 745,288     |

TRANSPORT                               |             |
MT Vehicles                             | 1,211,045   |
AF Vehicles                             | 4,696,996   |
**TOTAL**                               | 5,908,041   |

**GRAND TOTAL**                         | 24,413,471  |

If a contingency reserve of 5,000 is added to the above strength figures, the cost would be increased by $10,000,000.

NOTE: Extracted from memorandum BDF SD4-40 (GS-SD4-53), dated 14 October 1944, DHIST Files 112.352049 (D9)
RESERVE ARMY

(PLANNING "F")

MANPOWER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formation</th>
<th>WE</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Offs</td>
<td>ORs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corps Tps (Incl one Armd Recce Regt)</td>
<td>1,149</td>
<td>25,473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Inf Divs</td>
<td>4,884</td>
<td>99,738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Armd Bdes (less one Armd Regt Active)</td>
<td>806</td>
<td>17,561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C&amp; AA Defs</td>
<td>777</td>
<td>18,146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>7,616</td>
<td>160,918</td>
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</table>

ESTIMATED COST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Breakdown</th>
<th>Annual Cost</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PERSONNEL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pay</td>
<td>9,379,242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>1,937,451</td>
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<tr>
<td>Clothing &amp; Eqpt</td>
<td>826,720</td>
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<tr>
<td>Accom, Food, Maint, Sunds</td>
<td>3,725,915</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>15,869,328</td>
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<tr>
<td>WEAPONS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Arms, MGs &amp; Misc</td>
<td>799,048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guns, How, Mortar</td>
<td>3,175,753</td>
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<tr>
<td>Small Arms Amn</td>
<td>740,139</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gun Amn</td>
<td>3,102,183</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>7,817,123</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRANSPORT</td>
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<tr>
<td>MT Vehicles</td>
<td>6,185,238</td>
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<tr>
<td>AF Vehicles</td>
<td>10,765,910</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>16,951,148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRAND TOTAL</td>
<td>40,637,599</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

If a contingency reserve of 10,000 is added to the above strength figures, the cost would be increased by $2,400,000.

NOTE: Extracted from memorandum BDF SD4-40 (GS-SD4-53), dated 14 October 1944, DHIST Files 112.352049 (D9)
### PLAN G
#### SUMMARY OF MANPOWER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Regular Force</th>
<th>Militia</th>
<th>In Training</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Offrs</td>
<td>OR</td>
<td>Offrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>REGULAR FORCES</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bde Gp</td>
<td>245</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,125</td>
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<tr>
<td>Misc Units</td>
<td>143</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,373</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coast Arty Units</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>602</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AA Arty Units</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>700</td>
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<tr>
<td>Misc C &amp; AA Services</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>2,248</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDMQ</td>
<td>664</td>
<td>1,586</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dist HQ</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>606</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dist-Camp Services</td>
<td>2,011</td>
<td>17,936</td>
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<tr>
<td>Research &amp; Develop.</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>1,090</td>
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<tr>
<td>Misc Signal Ests</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2,018</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>CWAC</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>A &amp; T Staff</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>126</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Training</td>
<td></td>
<td>750</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>FIELD FORCES</strong> (Militia)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Six Inf Divs</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>5,412</td>
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<tr>
<td>Four Armd Bdes</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>833</td>
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<tr>
<td>Corps &amp; Misc Tps</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>3,263</td>
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<tr>
<td>University Trg Regts</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MT Personnel</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1,650</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TRAINING FORCES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase I</td>
<td>1,666</td>
<td>4,987</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phase II</td>
<td>797</td>
<td>5,746</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phase III</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>2,073</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>7,406</td>
<td>48,382</td>
<td>10,438</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** Extracted from memorandum GS-SD3-B7, dated 15 June 1945, DHIST 112.3M2 (D286).
## PLAN E
### ACTIVE FORCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Establishments</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>OR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. FIELD FORCE AND COAST DEFENCE UNITS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters Brigade Group</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>7,851</td>
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<tr>
<td>Two Armoured Regiments</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Regiment</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Battery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Tank Battery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Anti-Aircraft Battery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Anti-Aircraft Battery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two Coast Batteries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Company RCE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Survey Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;E&quot; Section Divisional Signals</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Brigade Group Signals</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two &quot;X&quot; Troops Armoured Divisional Signals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three Infantry Battalions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Infantry Brigade Group Company RCASC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Field Ambulance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Field Dressing Station</td>
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<tr>
<td>Independent Brigade Group Field Park</td>
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<tr>
<td>Infantry Brigade Workshop</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brigade Group Workshop</td>
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<tr>
<td>Light Aid Detachment Type &quot;A&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Light Aid Detachment Type &quot;B&quot;</td>
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<td>Two Light Aid Detachments Type &quot;C&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Light Aid Detachment Type &quot;D&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>B. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ESTABLISHMENTS</strong></td>
<td>258</td>
<td>1,242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Armament Research &amp; Development Establishment</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle Design &amp; Development Establishment</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Signals &amp; Radar Development Establishment</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Canadian Engineers Research &amp; Development Establishment</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Arms Design &amp; Development Section</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Chemical Warfare Laboratories</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Experimental Station, Suffield</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inter-Service Research &amp; Development Establishment</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airborne Research &amp; Development Centre</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
C. HEADQUARTERS ESTABLISHMENTS FOR NDHQ, COMMAND AND DISTRICTS 746

National Defence and Command Headquarters
Eleven District Headquarters

D. SERVICES 626

Fixed Defences Staff
Headquarters Signals Company
Eleven District Signals Establishments
Signals Maintenance Company
Eleven Engineers Service & Works Companies
Eleven District Companies RCASC
Transport Company
Eleven Medical Companies
Eleven Dental Detachments
Five Central Ordnance Depots
One Central Mechanization Depot
Eleven District Ordnance Depots
Seven Ordnance Ammunition Depots
Eleven District Electrical & Mechanical Engineers Workshop
Eleven Provost Sections

E. SCHOOLS AND TRAINING DEPOTS 348

Royal Military College
Royal Canadian Armoured Corps School
Royal Canadian School or Artillery
Royal Canadian School of Military Engineering
Royal Canadian School of Signals
Canadian School of Infantry
Royal Canadian Army Service Corps School
Royal Canadian Army Medical School
Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps School
Royal Canadian Electrical & Mechanical Engineers School

F. ASSISTANCE TO THE RESERVE FORCE 239

Reserve Force Training Staffs
Canadian Officers Training Corps Staffs
Motor Transport Maintenance Personnel

G. SPECIAL COMMITMENTS 71

ACTIVE FORCE (CONTINUED)
North West Territories & Yukon Radio System
Three Special Wireless Stations
Discrimination Unit
Northwest (Alaska) Highway Maintenance Units

TOTAL 2,672 27,328

NOTE: Extracted from DHIST files 112.3M2 (287), dated 6 December 1945. The establishment was later lowered to between 20,000 to 25,000 by Cabinet in 1946. 'Special Commitments' were considered as separate establishments by Cabinet.
END
21·12·92
FIN