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POLITICAL MODERNIZATION AND STABILITY

IN

A DEVELOPING STATE:

THE GUYANA EXAMPLE

By

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Readers: Prof. Kenneth D. McRae
Prof. John Sigler

A Thesis submitted to Carleton University in
partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the Doctor of Philosophy Degree
in Political Science

Political Science Department
Carleton University
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The undersigned recommend to the Faculty
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ABSTRACT

A major problem facing developing states in the process of modernization and change is the accompanying tendency toward increasing conflict, political violence, and general instability. In terms of its impact on the overall stability of the political system, political violence differs in its application to the less developed as compared to the more developed states. Firstly the usually high degree of sensitivity and interaction pitch of the less developed political systems makes political violence events relatively more far reaching in their impact on the political process. Secondly the higher probability of external interference in the political process of the less developed states makes political violence usually dependent on factors outside the control of the domestic political elite.

This study is specifically concerned with the nature of political violence as an indicator of political instability. It evaluates the general patterns and trends of political violence in Guyana over time with a view toward developing an adequate causal explanation for the phenomenon particularly as it affects developing states. On the basis of the Guyana data gleaned from newspaper reports between 1947 and 1970, it was found that as the political system becomes more modern (i.e. more open to mass participation), political violence tends to be more frequent but usually of the lower extreme of magnitude. The reason for both the increased volume and the concentration on the lower extremes of political violence is to be found in the development and growth of the more organized political movements as occasioned by the process of political modernization.

Other relevant factors such as socio-economic modernization were found to be of less importance than organized movements in producing political violence. However some socio-economic variables such as communications media, per capita income and educational enrollment were found to have some direct relevance to political participation and mass mobilization, and to that extent are thought to have an indirect effect on the generation of political violence. Yet other variables such as ethnicity and regime intervention were found to have little direct relevance to the volume of political violence, although of great importance with regards to the escalation of political violence to the higher extremes of magnitude.

The approach to the explanation of political violence in this study is basically historical in the belief that a more in-depth longitudinal study would make for a more dynamic analysis of events compared to cross-national comparative research which utilizes a more restricted time dimension in the analysis of events. Wherever appropriate modest statistical formulations and tests based on empirical evidences have been utilized in support of the main historical and rational propositions which qualify this study.

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The object of this inquiry is to devise a meaningful approach to the explanation of political violence in the small developing state with particular reference to Guyana. It is hoped, also, that the method adopted for this study would facilitate the generation of meaningful hypotheses and relevant data. Further, an investigation will be made into the extent to which known characteristics peculiar to the Guyana political experience can suggest modification in the more generalized causal models available in the literature on political violence.

Since the greater proportion of empirical studies on political violence focus on cross-national comparative research and are confined within rather narrow time dimensions, it is believed that a more in-depth historical analysis of a single country, the approach to be adopted in this inquiry, would complement these comparative studies and shed some light on contending theories in the field. Further, it is expected that the examination of a much longer time dimension would facilitate the analysis of changes or variations in the patterns and configurations of political violence events and movements relative to the particular conditions operating within different historical periods. Such an in-depth historical analysis of changing patterns and trends would, no doubt, make the study of political violence a more dynamic one.

To the extent that this work succeeds in illuminating or enhancing greater understanding of the process of political instability and violence much credit is due to other interested persons who were kindly disposed to offer valuable advice and assistance. Special thanks are due to my thesis supervisor,

ii

Professor Harold Von Riekhoff, whose patience and understanding are matched only by his insightful and instructive guidance throughout this work. In similar light Professor Charles Tilly of Michigan University was very instrumental in aiding the thought processes involved in this study, through his willing and energetic correspondences full of insightful and rigorous comments crowned by kindly and encouraging advice.

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CONTENTS

	Page
PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	i
CHAPTER I	
INTRODUCTION	1
The Model, 6	
Conceptualization and Operationalization of Terms, 11	
Relevant Hypotheses, 16	
The Approach and Method, 20	
The Relevance of other Variables, 27	
Specific Contribution to Theory and Research, 31	
Conclusion, 38	
CHAPTER II	
THE NATURE OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE	44
The Conceptual Problem, 48	
The Analytic Problem, 54	
Problems of Definition, 63	
Application of the Concept, 73	
Conclusion, 82	
CHAPTER III	
THE GUYANA POLITICAL SYSTEM IN	
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE	87
Historical Background, 92	
Political Systems of the Four Periods, 100	
Conclusion, 115	

CHAPTER IV

POLITICAL VIOLENCE DURING THE PRE-MODERN
ERA IN GUYANA: 1763-1946: SOME

GENERALIZED TRENDS 118

Period I: Slavery, 1763-1833, 118

Patterns of Political Violence

During the Slave Era, 121

Period II: Immigration 1833-1892, 130

Patterns of Political Violence

During Immigration Period, 132

Period III: The Transition Period,
1893-1946, 137Patterns of Political Violence During
the Transition Period, 139

Conclusion, 145

CHAPTER V

POLITICAL VIOLENCE DURING THE MODERN ERA 152

Patterns of Political Violence

During the Modern Period, 154

Historical Description of
Political Violence, 166

Conclusion, 179

CHAPTER VI

THE ORGANIZATIONAL DIMENSION IN

POLITICAL VIOLENCE 184

The Analysis, 187

The Role of Political Parties
in Political Violence, 195The Role of Trade Unions in
Political Violence, 208The Role of other Voluntary Organi-
zations, 214Foreign Intervention and Organizational
Complicity, 223

Conclusion, 228

CHAPTER VII

MODERNIZATION, SOCIAL CHANGE AND

POLITICAL VIOLENCE 232

- Theoretical Perspectives, 235
- The Guyana Experience, 243
- Social Change and Political Violence, 258
- Socio-economic Modernization and mass participation, 264
- Conclusion, 277

CHAPTER VIII

REGIME RESPONSE TO POLITICAL

VIOLENCE 280

- The Approach, 286
- The Role of the Military Forces, 310
- Conclusion, 320

CHAPTER IX

POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND ETHNIC

POLARIZATION 324

- Ethnic Conflict and Violence During the Pre-modern period, 331
- Ethnic Conflict and Violence During the Modern period, 335
- Regional Concentration of Ethnic Communities, 350
- Conclusion, 357

CHAPTER X

RELEVANCE FOR THEORY 363

- The Dynamics of Political Instability, 372

The Prospects for Political	
Stability, 385	
Conclusion, 395	

CHAPTER XI

CONCLUSION	401
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APPENDICES

A: Some Methodological Considerations.....	419
B(i): Map of Guyana (showing population concentration).....	429
B(ii) Map of Guyana Coastland (showing plantations	430
C(i) Title and Description of Political Parties in Guyana: 1946-1973	431
C(ii) List of Trade Unions in Guyana.....	434
C(iii) Major Cultural, Ethnic and other Voluntary Associations in Guyana	438
D: Extracts from Local Press Containing Anti-Government Propaganda	440
E: Vital Statistics for British Guiana: 1931-1961	443

NOTES	444
-------------	-----

BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	482
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LIST OF TABLES

	Page
1.1 Number of Contract Immigrants Arriving in British Guiana.....	89
1.2 Population by Ethnic Origin.....	90
1.3 Increases in the Guyana Electorate between 1850 and 1892	106
1.4 Disparities in Racial Composition of Legislature Before and After 1892	109
2.1 Statistical Description of Political Violence During Slavery in Guyana: 1763-1832.....	124
2.2 Estimated No. of Participants in Political Violence Events During the Slavery Period: 1763-1832.....	126
2.3 Estimated Duration of Political Violence During the Slavery period: 1763-1832.....	127
2.4 Political Violence Events During the Immigration Period: 1833-1892	133
2.5 Estimated Participation in Political Violence During the Immigration Period: 1833-1892.....	134
2.6 Estimated Duration of Political Violence Events During the Immigration Period: 1833-1892.....	135
2.7 Statistical Description of Political Violence During the Transition Period: 1893-1946.....	139
2.8 Estimated Participation Rate in Political Violence During the Transition Period: 1893-1946.....	142
2.9 Estimated Duration of Political Violence During the Transition Period: 1893-1946.....	144

3.1	Statistical Description of Political Violence During the Modern Period.....	156
3.2	Comparative View of Relative Frequency of Different Types of Political Violence Events.....	157
3.3	Estimated Participation Rate in Political Violence Events During the Modern Period: 1947-1970.....	161
3.4	Comparative View of Participation Rates in Political Violence Events.....	163
3.5	Estimated Duration of Political Violence Events During the Modern Period: 1947-1970.....	164
3.6	Comparative View of Duration of Political Violence Events.....	165
4.1	No. of Competing Parties and Percentage Polling at Elections between 1947 and 1968 Inclusive.....	189
4.2	Extent of Organisational Involvement in Political Violence Events During the Modern Period.....	192
4.3	Proportion of Major Strikes to Total Number of Strikes: Average per Year.....	194
5.1	Aggregate Modernisation Trends in Guyana: 1947-1970.....	245
5.2	Average No. of Field and Factory Workers on Sugar Plantations in Guyana: 1947-1966.....	248
5.3	Industrial Disputes Resulting in Stoppage of Work by Industry Groups.....	250
5.4	Proportion of Rural to Urban Involvement in Political Violence Events in Guyana: 1947-1970.....	253
5.5	Inter-Censal Annual Rates of Increase, by Race 1911-1960 (per cent per year).....	257

5.6	Total Racial Percentages in the Security Forces, the Civil Service, Government Agencies and Undertakings and Areas of Governmental Responsibility in Guyana:	262
5.7	Racially Biased Consumption of Political Party Newspapers.....	274
6.1	Types and Distribution of Regime Response to Political Violence Over Different Periods: 1763-1970	292
6.2	Types and Distribution of Regime Response to Political Violence During the Modern Period: 1947-1970	303
6.3	Regime Response and Levels of Political Violence During the Modern Period: 1947-1970.....	306
6.4	Variations in Military Strength and Expenditure During the Modern Period	313
7.1	Organized Political Representation of Ethnic Groups in Guyana	338
7.2	Political Party Membership and Voting Intentions of Africans and East Indians.....	340
7.3	Proportion of Ethnic Support for Various Parties.....	341
7.4	Ethnic Polarization of Party Representation in Legislature.....	346
7.5	Proportion of Electoral Support for Various Parties in Guyana Elections: 1953-1968.....	349
8.1	Degree of Correlation between Crucial Variables and Volume of Political Violence.....	366
8.2	Coups and Coup Attempts in Modernizing Countries since Independence.....	367
8.3	Degree of Correlation Between Socio-economic Modernization Variables and Political Participation	392

LIST OF FIGURES

	Page
I The Resource Control Model of Political Violence for the Study of Developing States.....	10
II An Indication of the Range of Specificity or Generality between The Concepts <u>Political Instability</u> and <u>Political Violence</u>	48
III Nesvold Scaling of Political Violence Intensity.....	71
IV Muller's Scale: Hypothetical Trace Lines for Items that Discriminate Perfectly at Various Levels of Potential for Political Violence..	73
V Ranking of Violence Events by University of Guyana Students.....	80
VI A Typology Reflecting Levels of Extremity of Political Violence Events.....	81
VII Characteristics of the Political System of Four Historical Periods in Guyana.....	96
VIIa Classification of Various Regime Types.....	99
VIII Cleavages between Political Parties and Social Movements: 1953-68	217
IX Types of Governmental Response to Political Violence.....	288

Chapter 1

Introduction

The central concern of this study is about the problem of political stability particularly as it affects the small developing state. Within this broad perspective the primary focus is on political violence as a critical variable affecting the level of stability in the political system. Our specific goal is to investigate the extent to which various political and environmental factors affect the volume and extent of political violence with particular reference to the Guyana experience.

The principal task before us is to develop a causal analysis of political violence in Guyana which would have relevance for understanding the same process in other less developed states. Our interest is to examine the impact of various independently operative factors on the variations in both volume and level of political violence. More specifically we are interested primarily in the relationship between political participation and mass mobilization as independent variables on the one hand, and the various configurations of political violence as a dependent variable on the other. The extent to which one set of political factors affects another aspect of political behaviour is therefore the primary interest of this study.

A secondary but not unimportant consideration is the extent to which different levels of political violence can affect the overall stability or integration of the political system. In this sense political violence could be viewed as an intervening variable between mass mobilization on the one hand and general political instability (or disintegration) on the other.

The relevance of this approach to what could be termed "Modernization" studies is obvious. The more prominent theorists of modernization in relation to political stability and political change have suggested some degree of correlation between certain modernization variables such as political participation, social mobilization or class or national consciousness on the one hand, and the overall process of political stability, and national integration involving such factors as alienation, anomie and collective political violence on the other.¹

It is therefore intended that the variety of hypotheses suggested in the modernization studies predicting either positive, negative, or curvilinear relationships between these two distinct processes would be evaluated in this study based on the historical experience of Guyana.

One important premise of this study is that there are distinct variations in the process of modernization observable in the small developing countries, and distinguishable from that observable in the larger and more developed states. It is assumed that the difference between the two strands of modernization relates to the relative pace or rapidity of the developmental process. One would expect that the pace of modernization in the more developed states where resources are more readily available would tend to be more rapid and sustained than in the less developed states where the relative scarcity of developmental resources would make for a relative slower and probably a more oscillating pace of development. As such it is believed that this elementary difference in the pace of modernization would have different consequences for the overall stability of the political system.

The object of this observation, however, is not to dramatize or overemphasise the difference between the modernized and the modernizing nations - this exercise would no doubt require another thesis - but to suggest that the conditions operative in the less developed countries in terms of the process of modernization and

less developed countries in terms of the process of modernization and change might require special consideration. This study, then is one attempt to examine within the specific framework of the less developed world, the impact of modernization on political stability which is often problematic in these areas.

The Guyana experience in particular seems to raise the important question as to why political violence tends to be endemic in less developed states even though the pace of large scale structural changes such as industrialization and urbanization is relatively slow. The Guyana experience has shown that only some of the socio-economic variables of modernization seem to have some positive relevance to political violence, and even here the tendency seemed to have involved more of an indirect than a direct relevance.

Another school of thought stresses the more direct relevance of psycho-social factors such as anomie, alienation and the like in producing political violence.² An extension of the logic of the psycho-social propositions would seem to make political violence and instability largely dependent on the more subjective or individualistic perspectives and behaviour.

Close study of political trends in the less developed "third world" states however, seems to have sustained the conclusion that organized group activity overrides individualistic considerations in the political interaction process.³

Thus, the central hypothesis of this study suggests that consciously organized political movements are sufficient, if not always necessary, factors determining the volume and level of political violence and instability in the political system particularly of the ex-colonial developing states. What might be necessary for organized movements to be a more reliable predictor of political violence is the existence of conditions which facilitate increased popular participation and mass mobilization in the political process. Otherwise -- in the absence of these "liberal" conditions -- organized movements will be stultified and the more manifest aspects of political instability such as political violence will be driven underground to emerge again only infrequently but with greater degrees of intensity and destructiveness.

The Model

The model which seems most appropriate for this study derives much from Huntington's thesis that political modernization in the sense of mass participation and mobilization often leads to political decay observable in terms of incidents of political instability such as political violence.⁴ In similar vein, Charles Tilly conceptualized the problem more generally in his contention that collective or political violence is usually the result of organized efforts of competing groups for the control of political power.⁵ In this sense Tilly stresses the primacy of the political content of activity as the source of collective violence, in contrast to the psycho-social approaches which tend to locate the source of collective violence mainly in the more peripheral or environmental relations of political activity.⁶

Tilly contends that collective political violence stems from structural changes which produce a multiplicity of organized groups contending for political power through the necessary process of mobilization of resources for collective action. It is in the wake of mobilization and contention for power that collective action tends to produce political violence. The distinction between Tilly's approach and that suggested by the more psycho-

social schools of thought is obvious. Whereas, for example the latter approach views political violence as resulting from a condition of disorganization, the former emphasizes the role of conscious organized activity as central to the explanation of political violence.⁶ The emphasis on organized movement as the principal factor determining political violence further suggests that the phenomenon is an aspect of rational political behaviour. It suggests further that political violence can become a feature of political life at any time in the political system.

It is therefore for the reason that Tilly's model attributes to the participants themselves the ability as independent agents to create and direct the process of political violence that the model becomes highly relevant for the study of the small and slowly developing state where conditions and consequences of rapid modernization and large scale structural changes are not easily apparent. Further, in the small developing particularly ex-colonial states political violence is often deliberately organized and employed as an independent goad to desired social and political changes.⁷ It is in this context, that political violence could be usefully viewed as an intervening variable between the impact of modernization on the one hand and the overall stability or integration

of the political system on the other.

One significant implication of extending Tilly's model to make it strictly applicable to what are regarded as "plural societies" exemplified by many ex-colonial territories including Guyana,⁸ is that the group interaction process becomes emphasized in the workings of the political process. Since large scale modernization processes such as rapid urbanization and industrialization are relatively insignificant in the less developed states, the activities of organized interest groups become crucial to the explanation of political movements and trends in political violence. Secondly, experience in the colonial and ex-colonial countries in particular suggest that one cannot easily ignore the impact of external influences on the group interaction process in the political system. In a way one can consider these outside influences as providing a kind of conceptual substitute for the process of large scale modernization and social change as determinants of political violence activities.

A second dimension of the modernization process peculiar to the ex-colonial state or plural societies is the degree of fusion which usually exists between communal and associational groups or organizations. One of the consequences of this fusion is that the struggle between

groups becomes transformed from a contention for political power into a contention for total dominance within the political system. This contention for dominance becomes a mutually exclusive struggle for the control of all resources associated with power, that is, political, economic, and social status resources. In short the struggle represents a kind of zero-sum game in which the success of one group is premised on the prior ability to ensure the other's permanent loss. In such a situation of organisational control of natural groups, contention for power is transformed into a struggle for the very survival of the group. It is this latter consideration which makes violent confrontation so much more probable and usually so much more extreme in the ethnic-plural societies such as Guyana, Trinidad, and Malaya.

The model which would be appropriate for the study of political violence in Guyana and other ethnic-plural societies should emphasise the fact that each competing group aims at the complete control of total available power resources, an important one of which is ethnic population, rather than simply the management of whatever resources are within its immediate possession. Figure 1 outlines this model, which for easy reference could be termed The Resource Control Model.

FIGURE I

The Resource Control Model of Political Violence
for the Study of Developing States

The Resource Control Model suggests that systemic conditions which allow for mass participation, tend to encourage the growth of politically relevant organizations which in turn initiate the actual process of mobilization of power resources in a mutually exclusive contest for dominance of the one group over the others, and often leading ultimately to overt political conflict and violence utilized in attempts to challenge or assert the political legitimacy of the ruling group. In addition the model suggests that the nature of regime response to political violence can have significant negative or positive, impact on the overall stability and integration of the political system.

Conceptualization and Operationalization of terms

It is necessary at this stage to clearly spell out the concepts utilized in the construction of this model. Secondly in order to facilitate empirical evaluation, several operational indicators of the various concepts are suggested. The key concepts which require clarification and operationalization in the model would seem to be (a) mass participation, (b) organized movements, (c) political mobilization and (d) contention for dominance. Definitions of the other key concepts,

political violence, "regime response" and "ethnic polarization" are to be treated more fully in later chapters.

(a) Mass participation: this concept refers to the conditions which facilitate the active participation of increasing numbers of people in the political process. Such conditions are themselves usually determined, particularly in the ex-colonial developing states, by the deliberate policies of the political elite reflected in constitutional changes and the tolerance of foreign interference in the domestic political processes. Lucian Pye's concept of "political equality" suggests the precise implication of the term in so far as it relates to the increasing participation of larger proportions of the population in the political process.¹¹

The specific empirical referents of the concept of mass participation are usually evidenced in extensions of the popular electoral franchise, the relative ease of access to the decision making centres, the actual participation in the legislature which is open to a large proportion of the population, and the existence of constitutional guarantees of

basic freedoms such as of expression, association, assembly and the like.

(a) Organized Movements: this concept refers to the existence and proliferation of organized interest groups which are actively engaged in some form of political struggle. The more politically oriented of these organized movements would be primarily interested in the pursuit of political power. The less politically oriented, on the other hand, although not directly involved in the struggle for political power are nevertheless indirectly involved to the extent that they seek some form of alignment or association with the more direct political contenders for power.

Growth of organized movements is usually reflected in the number of political parties, trade unions and other cultural (ethnic religious and related) organizations which are at least indirectly involved in political struggle and which are themselves interested in influencing the policy outcomes of the more political interest groups or of the governing regime. In the developing countries these organized movements are more appropriately viewed in terms of degrees of political interest rather than in a dichotomous manner of "political" versus "non-political" organizations.

(c) Political Mobilization: The definition of this concept relates to the deliberate efforts made by organized interests to recruit or directly involve a large percentage of the population in the process of political struggle for desired objectives. According to Peter Lettl, political mobilization refers to "a process which is induced, not a mere state or level which can be worked out either from "hard" objective indicies, or simply abstracted from subjective notions like participation, levels of cognition etc."¹³ In short mobilization represents a means of translating an attitude or commitment into action or observed behaviour.¹⁴ The idea of positive "action" and commitment seems to distinguish the basically "political" from "social" mobilization which refers primarily to the uprooting of persons from one area of attachment for resettlement elsewhere.¹⁵

The operational indicators of political mobilization in terms of both induced commitment and action would seem to be observable in the actual proportion of the population that actually involve themselves in active participation as reflected say in the percentage voting turnout at the polls. Secondly, the impact of political mobilization could be discerned

in the relative strength of the various political groups interested in the recruitment of a large proportion of the population for the successful contention for political power. It is assumed that the greater the active supportive base of the party the greater is the success of political mobilization.

(d) Contention for Dominance: The process whereby organized groups directly challenge each other for the control of the maximum of power resources in the political system is termed "contention for dominance". This process differs very little from what Tilly calls "contention for power". According to Tilly, "contenders for power" are those groups which "during some specified span of time collectively apply resources to the influence of a particular government".¹⁶ The concept of contention for "dominance" however is thought to characterize most competing groups in the developing states to the extent that each group seeks political power mainly as a means towards the acquisition of other forms of resources, (e.g. economic and social), in the system.

The operational measures for the concept of "dominance" relates to the actual control of the various types of power resources in the political system.

The most strategic resources in this respect are (a) economic possessions such as ownership of land and capital, (b) control of political offices such as having a larger proportion of popular support or influence in the legislature, or a greater proportion of control of other strategic institutions such as the military and security forces, and (c) social status or positions of high influence and privilege in the social system.

It is assumed that contenders who control the greatest proportion of all of these basic types of power resources are dominant in the political system. It is therefore expected in keeping with the model that the most dominant groups in the political system would tend to be most aggressive and involved in the greater proportion of political violence events.

Relevant Hypotheses

Although the Resource Control Model might be suggestive of many hypotheses in relation to political violence and its antecedent conditions this study is concerned principally with the assessment of one basic hypothesis which might provide relevant insights for

the development of further theory in the field. The main hypothesis to be examined states that political modernization tends to increase the volume of political violence. In other words conditions which facilitate the development of organized popular participation and mass mobilization in the political process tend to produce an increase in the volume (or frequency) of political violence events. To be even more specific a closely derived hypothesis suggests further that political modernization would tend to produce increases in the lower extremes, (turmoil dimension) of political violence and hence to decrease reliance on the more extreme levels (internal war dimension) of political violence in the political system. One could therefore expect that the greater the amount and level of competitiveness of political and allied organizations, the greater would be the volume of political violence activity, (especially turmoil) in the political system.

If this is so then one would also expect that the greater proportion of political violence events in a given system or period would involve the more organized, as opposed to the less organized groups in the participation process. Secondly, it is also

reasonable to expect that conditions which allow for greater mass participation in the political process as a whole would also tend to produce an increase in the rate of participation in political violence events in particular.

In terms of regime response to political violence one can hypothesize that governing regimes would tend to respond with greater coercive measures to control the more extreme levels of political violence. With similar logic there would be a greater tendency to use more consensual measures to control the lesser extremes of political violence. Thus as both political modernization and the volume of the turmoil increase, the response of the governing regime would tend to become increasingly consensual rather than coercive in efforts to contain or settle violent conflicts in the political system.

Because of the availability of more adequate institutions for the processing of political grievances and demands as political modernization advances there would be a greater tendency for political conflict and violence to become more quickly or easily terminated. Thus one can expect that the relative duration of

of political violence events would tend to be shorter during the Modern as compared with the earlier periods in Guyana's political history.

In sum, then, this study on political violence should reveal that the Modern period in particular, characterized by a relatively more open political system, allowing for greater opportunities for both organized mass participation in the political process and the processing of political grievances through available institutional channels, reflect the following trends:

- (a) an increase in the volume (or frequency) of political violence activities, especially "turmoil" events; (Hence a relative decrease in the "internal war" type of events.)
- (b) an increase in the proportion of organized participation in political violence activities.
- (c) a relative increase in the use of the more consensual means of conflict settlement on the part of the governing regime.
- (d) a relative decrease in the duration of political violence events.

In addition, further trends relating to the extremity of political violence events should also be observed during particular sub-periods when organized political activity, such as party competitiveness at elections, is on the upsurge.

The Approach and Method

The intended approach to the assessment of the major and subsidiary hypotheses of this study would involve the utilization of aggregate data and other documentary information based on the Guyana experience of political violence. The treatment of the data and information would be basically descriptive and historical with appropriate illustrations by statistical tables gleaned from a variety of authoritative sources wherever appropriate. The primary objective of this descriptive approach is to uncover and illuminate significant patterns and trends in the nature of political violence in Guyana over the years. A more detailed exposition of the organization and the treatment of the relevant data is given in Appendix A.

Although the Modern period - 1947-1970 - would be in focus the background historical experience of Guyana beginning as early as 1763 would be assessed and analysed in comparison with the Modern period. It is hoped to show in the analysis that of the various broad historical periods discerned for this study, the Modern period representing a greater degree of opportunity for the development of political organizations and mass

participation also witnessed the greater volume of political violence activity. Contrariwise the earlier periods representing relatively less opportunity for overt participation were also less voluminous in the production of political violence events. By the same token the various sub-periods within the Modern Period which demonstrate greater incidents of mass participation and organized activity are also expected to be productive of greater volumes of political violence.

The various sub-periods representing aggregate of years within the broad Modern period will be evaluated in terms of the amount and extent of the various political parties and interest groups which existed then and were actively involved in the competition for political power. The fact also that each sub-period overlapped a year of national elections should aid in the understanding of the nature and extent of the competition for political power relative to each sub-period. What is intended to be demonstrated here is the close coincidence between times when a great amount of parties competed for power or when political participation was high and times when political violence was also at its highest.

Of greater relevance to assessing the role of organizations in political violence activities is the attempt to identify the extent to which different types of organizations were involved in each political violence event during the Modern period in particular. Distinctions would be made between events with organizational involvement or support and those which are relatively more unorganized. Again, of those events which involved organizational support distinctions would be made between organizations which are primarily political or labour oriented, on the one hand, and those which are racial, religious or otherwise on the other hand. The intention here is to show that the greater proportion of political violence events would involve organizational support and that political organizations as opposed to other interest groups would tend to dominate such events.

The procedure to be adopted for the identification of organizational involvement in political violence events would relate basically to three criteria. Firstly, there is direct involvement of organizations in the sense that the event was initiated and directed by the particular organization in its entirety.

Secondly, there is indirect involvement in the sense of propaganda or ideological support given to the event by the particular organization. Thirdly, there is clandestine infiltration, in the sense that recognized personnel of some particular organization becomes involved at some stage in the course of the event, even though the organization itself might disclaim responsibility for the event. This procedure would facilitate comparison of the different historical periods. Such comparative analysis should reveal that the Modern period which allowed for the conditions encouraging the growth of political and related organizations would demonstrate a greater proportion of organizational involvement in political violence.

Special consideration would be given to the assessment of the role of the Trade Union as an organization which not only dominated the avenues of political demand articulation in the early periods since the turn of the century, but which in the Modern period became highly influential both in defining the character of political parties and determining the outcome of political conflict and contention for power.

In the absence of political parties during the earlier periods, trade unions became the vanguard of political protest and agitation. The strike weapon, usually a form of political protest, often led to serious outbreaks of political violence. Again, political parties often involved a strategy of seeking alliance with trade union organizations in order to buttress their popular support and to obtain other resources necessary for the struggle for political power. The struggle of the various political parties to control trade union movements often gives rise to serious rivalry among trade unions for control of the same labour population - a tendency which often escalates into open political conflict and violence.

Since a comparative analysis of different historical periods is an important aspect of this study it is intended to utilize various statistical methods to assess the relative degrees of association between the variables to be examined. The observation that the relative frequency and levels of political violence tend to vary with respect to the different historical eras could be best assessed by estimating

the degrees of probability and significance which obtain between the two sets of variables. Within the modern period, also, comparisons of various sub-periods could be analysed statistically with a view to evaluate more precisely the relationship between the level of political competitiveness and participation on the one hand and the relative frequency and levels of political violence on the other.

The statistical approach to the comparative study would be basically descriptive in the sense that the relative frequencies of events within the different historical periods and also the proportion of one type of political violence events relative to other types of such events would provide the bases upon which further statistical evaluations would be made. Simple percentages would be used to project and compare different frequencies of different types of political violence events.¹⁷ In this way one would be better able to assess the feasibility of the hypotheses of central concern of this study which predict a specified type of variation in both the frequency and level of intensity of events over the various periods, as well as a specified scaled relationship among the various types of events themselves.

Although it is not intended to ascertain precise degrees of correlation and significance in the comparative relationships discerned, it is nevertheless desirable to utilize some modest types of statistical tests primarily with a view to buttress the main arguments and findings based on the frequencies and percentages evaluations. In this respect both the Spearman's rank test (Rho) and Chi Square (χ^2) techniques are thought to be appropriate and adequate. The central arguments of this study, however, are not intended to stand or fall on the basis of these more precise statistical tests. Both the historical and rational bases of the arguments are thought to be more important, and the data are analysed mainly with a view to provide empirical evidence for the essentially theoretical (deductive) arguments.

The use of Spearman's Rho and Chi Square techniques would be reserved for evaluating only those hypotheses which aim at predicting a high degree of association between two of the more crucial variables. Of particular importance in this respect are the relationships between the critical modernization and participation variables on the one hand, and the

relative volume and level of political violence on the other, during the Modern period in particular.

The Relevance of Other Variables

The extent to which political participation and mobilization are more relevant to the understanding of the political violence process, could be better conceived if it is also observed that other relevant variables are less significant in their causative impact on political violence, despite theoretical arguments to the contrary. These other relevant or "critical" variables relate to (a) socio-economic modernization, (b) regime intervention and (c) ethnic cleavage and polarization.

(a) Socio-economic Modernization

It would be observed from the Guyana experience that socio-economic variables such as urbanization, industrialization, economic growth and communications media, among others, have at best an indirect relationship with political violence. What moreover seems to be significant is the fact that the more formalistic or technical media of communication have been superceded by the more

of communication has been superseded by the more informal face to face communication channels of which rumour is the most significant in terms of affecting the levels of both organization and participation in political violence activities. Rumour has been responsible for the outbreak of some major violence events in Guyana and for the degeneration of political into ethnic forms of violence during the Modern period.

(b) Regime Intervention

Another complicating factor affecting the variation of both organization and political violence is the nature of the response of governing authorities to particular events. Usually governing regimes react to political violence events in the negative sense of attempting to stem or undermine the behaviour of the participants. Such responses could take variable forms ranging from the consensual on the one hand, to the coercive means of conflict termination on the other.

The expectation that more coercive means of terminating violent conflict would be employed during periods manifesting the higher extremity levels

of political violence should be borne out by the historical evidence in Guyana. It should also be expected that the Modern period compared to the earlier periods would reveal a greater tendency to utilize the more consensual measures since the lower extremes of political violence (turmoil) would be most in evidence during this period. In this connection it is further expected that both the strength of and expenditure on the military would vary with the level and intensity of political violence over the years.

(c) Ethnic Polarization

The thrust of this aspect of the study would be merely to suggest that increasing levels of political violence tend to jeopardize the attainment of national political integration to the extent that ethnic polarization of the population is exacerbated in the process. In terms of a multi-ethnic society such as Guyana ethnic polarization along political lines tends to undermine national consciousness and integration. This trend is evidenced by the prevalence of both ethnic patterns of voting for ethnic-based political parties

Further evaluation of the factors which undermine national integration would be buttressed by an analysis of the campaign slogans and other forms of communication by the various parties during elections. During crucial elections when competition for political power is most intense (and also the probability of extreme political violence is greater), election campaigning tends to reflect more negative racist slogans or a reinforcement of ethnic loyalties or prejudice.¹⁸ The concept of "apanjaht" (vote for your own kind) was invoked soon after the split in the P.P.P. in 1955 and has become a rallying cry for racial voting since then.¹⁹ Secondly, the concept of "pan tap" politics (the idea that the one ethnic group must dominate the political machinery of the nation) was most prevalent during the 1960's when, also, political violence was at its most extreme.

Regime response to political violence can also contribute to the processes destructive of national integration particularly in the multi-racial developing state. While M.G. Smith argues that the coercive approach by a dominant cultural section tends toward stabilizing the forces which make for disintegration of the plural society, it is to be contended here that reliance on coercion as a

technique of maintaining the stability of the political system can have disintegrating consequences.²⁰ This is so because the coercive forces are usually dominated by a single minority ethnic section of the society. Thus when attempts are made by the security forces comprised mainly of one ethnic group to control protest movements and political violence activities on the part of other ethnic groups in the community a racial "civil war" situation seems to develop to the detriment of national political integration.

Specific Contribution to Theory and Research

This study differs from other relevant works primarily from the standpoint of the methodological approach and secondly in terms of the direct relevance of the approach to the experience of the small developing multi-racial state such as Guyana. The study could also be usefully viewed as an extension of current research in related fields of interest in the Caribbean and in Guyana in particular.

The theoretical context from which this study is derived emphasizes the central role of organized movement in determining the dynamic processes,

involving political violence in the political system.

At the same time the study de emphasizes the importance of other theories which stress the role of psycho-social factors as being central to the explanation of these dynamic political processes. In our view the psycho-social phenomena such as the frustration-deprivation syndrome, anomie and the like provide merely the environmental pre-conditions and to that extent peripheral to the workings of the political process. Our view suggests further that political, rather than social or economic, factors are crucial to the explanation of other important events in the political process particularly of the small developing state.

The emphasis on organizational centrality in explaining political conflict and violence has passed from the works of Boulding and Tilly on the more theoretical level to the more empirical or area studies of Anthony Russo on Vietnam and Ruth Ann Wilner on Indonesia.²¹ In this way the dominant role of organized movement in political violence would seem to hold constant for both the more developed states such as France and other Western Europe which engage Tilly's research interest and the less developed ex-colonial

states which engage the interests of Russo and Wilner among others.

Similarly, Leo Despres, who is much closer to home, discerned the very strategic role of a wide variety of organizations in affecting the level of political stability and national integration in Guyana.²²

Ralph Prendas too, seems to have derived much from Despres in suggesting that the nature of the party system in co-opting other voluntary associations and trade unions on a racial basis tends to produce a characteristically unstable political state in Guyana.²³

With slight variations the contributions of Neville Layne, Joseph Landis, and J. E. Greene seem to be interested in the same line of reasoning but more specifically in terms of the significant impact of the racial factor in determining both the organizational dimension and political conflict in the political process in Guyana.²⁴

The fundamental agreement among most of these works on Guyana is that race is a basic explanatory variable in producing political conflict and general instability. Thus the primary motivating factor would seem to represent basically sociological rather than

political phenomena. Another foremost dimension of these works is the central interest placed on the problem of political and national integration. Thus their interest in political conflict and violence is only important in an indirect sense or to the extent that the latter process affects the main dependent variable, national integration.

Perhaps because the specific process of political conflict and violence was a secondary consideration of these earlier works little attempt had been made to systematically conceptualize and define the political violence process. Very often the concept of political conflict and violence remained only as an assumption or latent considerations in the process of political integration or disintegration. Conflict and violence as manifest phenomena had little specificity and clarification in these studies. Even J. E. Greene's work which comes closest to dealing with manifest or observable indicators of inter-ethnic violence failed nevertheless to distinguish between "political" and here ad hoc or anomic violence incidents such as homicide.²⁵

The dominant theme of these studies on Guyana would seem to be that the nature of the socialization process has created the conditions which make for a destabilizing political system. Since therefore socialization becomes the central concern of these studies the methods of research depended almost exclusively on survey data. Because, also, survey techniques are practicable only within a limited time context, much of the dynamism in analysis and explanation of political trends is lost. At most, survey data can tell us about how attitudes affect a predisposition to behave in a certain way. They cannot tell us how actual structural relationships and activities affect actual observable behaviour patterns. What is therefore needed is the type of study which not only makes explicit the underlying conflict dimension to be studied but which also utilizes the methods or techniques more amenable to assessing the dynamic patterns and changes in trends in the historical and political experiences of the nation.

This particular study of political violence is an attempt to be more systematic in delineating the particular manifestations and configurations of the concept.

Secondly, this study differs from the others to the extent that it attempts to combine a basically historical approach with modern techniques of scientific research. It discerns the concept of political violence as basically an observable phenomenon and specifically as the manifest dimension of the concept of political conflict. The research method depends on the systematic treatment of both aggregate and events data - the type of approach which is seriously lacking in studies of this kind particularly with respect to the developing countries including Guyana.

It is believed that reliance on aggregate and events data - difficult though the latter may be in terms of extracting and coding - would give more scope, to the analysis of dynamic trends based on long historical experiences of the nation. Aggregate and events data would seem to be more capable of facilitating understanding of patterns and trends over time - a task which would seem to be beyond the scope of the survey method. Thus it is believed that the much overused survey methods for conflict studies in Guyana and the Caribbean could be enhanced by extensions toward the use of methods based on the more observable patterns of

behaviour such as are made possible by aggregate and events data.

At the same time with the shift from survey to aggregate and events data emphasis would naturally shift from preoccupation with subjective states of feelings and perceptions to the more objective and manifest aspects of political behaviour. Thus greater control and management of research is facilitated by this shift from the more unpredictable subjective conditions to the more reliable and predictable patterns of observable behaviour. Further, this method based on aggregate and events data facilitates understanding of the essentially

"political" process which is much more observable than environmental and peripheral considerations of the psychological or sociological variety.

Another contribution which this study is expected to make is in the application of the model of political violence to a small developing country such as Guyana. The greater proportion of the empirical studies based on aggregate and events data on political violence so far has been confined either to the politics of the large developed states or to studies of a cross-national comparative nature. The peculiar experience of the small countries, most often relating to the high

sensitivity of the impact of relatively small scale movements and incidents of political conflict and violence, can hopefully shed some illuminating light of the contending models in the field. Of relevance also is the fact that the particular country in focus, here, Guyana, is both an ex-colonial territory and a plural society in which case it is expected to reveal some interesting insights for the generation of challenging hypotheses which could have greater relevance for the understanding of political processes in the so called "Third World" developing states.

Generally, however, the study would be concerned as far as possible with the generation of appropriate data which can be treated in such a way as to suggest interesting and fruitful hypotheses.

In this way it is hoped that this study contributes toward filling the present needs for systematic research on political conflict and related processes which have significant bearing on the attainment of political integration, particularly in the developing countries of which Guyana is a notable inclusion.

CONCLUSION

The theoretical importance of the intended research on Guyana lies in the possibility of generating

insights for the development and pursuit of several related hypotheses. The primary hypothesis to be investigated relates to the probability that increases in opportunities for popular participation and the attendant growth of organized political movements give rise to an increase in the volume (or frequency) of the lower extremes of political violence. At the same time a relative decrease in reliance on the higher extremes of political violence as a means of expressing political demands becomes probable. It would also seem logical to expect that an increase in active popular participation in the political process would also tend to increase the level of participation in political violence events in particular.

The probable explanation for this trend would seem to be that such increase in organized popular activity would lead to increased competition for the scarce resources connected with political power with the effect that a mutually exclusive struggle for dominance of the one group over the others ensues leading ultimately to violent conflict between groups.

With regards the nature of regime response to political violence the hypothesis suggests itself that greater reliance on coercive measures would be displayed in attempts to control the more extreme types of political violence. Thus the regime would tend to use the full

right of the armed forces to suppress an armed rebellion, while it would most probably utilize more consensual strategies such as negotiation or mediation to quell a major strike or to appease participants in a protest-demonstration. The probable explanation for this trend is that governments are expected to react more strongly to events which most severely threaten their established position of dominance.

One probable consequence of the growth of institutionalized procedures allowing for the more consensual means of conflict termination is that political violence events would tend to be terminated at a faster rate than would obtain under conditions where these consensual institutions were either non-existent or underdeveloped. Thus one would expect that the relative duration of political violence events would tend to become increasingly shorter as the political system becomes more modern.

But perhaps the more important contribution is the prospect that the historical experience of Guyana in relation to political violence will pose some challenge to current theories which purport to demonstrate strong positive links between the more impersonal factors of modernization on the one hand, and political violence on the other. The contention here is that socio-economic

modernization as usually defined has at best an indirect and weak connection with political violence compared to the more political factors such as the involvement of popular forces, or independent organized movements in the political process.

The chapters to follow will investigate the various aspects of this study in keeping with the relevant hypotheses discerned. Chapter II will outline the nature of the concept of political violence in so far as it relates firstly to the concepts of political instability and conflict, and secondly in so far as the concept is applicable to the study of the political processes in the developing areas with particular reference to Guyana.

Chapter III outlines the nature and historical development of the political system of Guyana and also gives a brief outline of the demographic and sociological features particularly the racial contours of the country. Chapter IV surveys the historical development of political

violence in Guyana during the pre-modern period, that is, between 1763 and 1946. In addition an attempt will be made to analyse the various types and frequencies of political violence events as well as the estimated duration and number of participants involved in the events.

Chapter V assesses the nature and extent of political violence during the Modern period in particular. Statistical techniques will also be used to assess the various levels, frequencies, duration and numbers involved in the various types of political violence events. Both Chapters IV and V will demonstrate support for the hypotheses that the volume (frequency), and number of participants involved in political violence events will tend to increase as the political system becomes more modern and open to mass participation.

Chapter VI will attempt to test the main hypothesis that the increasing level of contention for political power among the various organized movements and interest groups has a direct bearing on both the volume and level of political violence. The relative lack of significance of the other variables

in determining the process of political violence in Guyana would be dealt with in Chapter VII.

Chapter VIII would investigate the extent to which regime intervention could affect the probability of the outbreak or both the frequency and level of political violence in the political system. Another control factor, ethnic polarization, would be dealt with in Chapter IX, which would investigate the nature of the causal impact of ethnicity on the process of political violence and the overall stability of the political system.

Chapter X will attempt to outline the theoretical ramifications of the study as a whole and to discern significant trends for the future of both political stability and national integration in the political system. Finally Chapter XI will conclude the study with both a summary of the findings and a projection as to the prospects for future research on political violence, conflict and instability in the Caribbean and Guyana.

CHAPTER II

THE NATURE OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Political violence is a subset of the concept of collective violence which in turn presupposes the existence of some particular level of conflict or instability in the political system. Thus a full understanding of the process of political violence could be obtained by first clarifying the relationship between conflict and violence. Similarly a clarification of the distinction between political violence and political instability could be instructive in the development of further theories in relation to the particular processes which tend to disrupt the smooth workings of the political system.

Conflict has been variously defined by political theorists to suit a variety of theoretical purposes. In various parts of this study the term conflict is adopted in so far as it relates to expressly violent interchanges between groups or collectivities in the political process. In this case, therefore, stress is given to the rather narrower aspect of the concept which reflects mainly the manifest as opposed to the latent dimension of conflict.¹ According to Mack and Snyder

conflict involves the type of behaviour which is designed to destroy, injure, thwart or otherwise control another party or parties".² That such a process is indicative of violent behaviour is rather obvious.

Dahrendorf was more specific about the relationship between conflict and violence. He concludes as follows:

"The violence of conflict relates rather to its manifestations than to its causes. It is a matter of the weapons that are chosen by conflict groups to express their hostilities. Again, a continuum can be constructed ranging from peaceful discussions to militant struggles such as strikes and civil wars".³

In this way violence becomes a specialized means of expressing inherent conflict and hostilities between groups. Secondly Dahrendorf's concept implies the existence of a scale by which one can assess relative degrees of conflict in terms of the existence of high or low extremes of collective violence activities within the political system.

The relationship between conflict and collective violence has been more definitely expressed by Jessie Bernard who included among the manifest dimension of the concept such factors as "schism, secession, civil war,

sect formation, splinter parties, resistance movements, revolutions and reform movements".⁴ Stated in this way the concept becomes more directly relevant for dealing with the wide range of political phenomena involved in the process of political or collective violence.

Conflict defined in terms of the manifestation of collective violence also becomes relevant for understanding the concept of political instability on the more general level of analysis. While collective violence represents one dimension -- the manifest as opposed to the latent dimension -- of conflict, the latter concept in turn indicates one important dimension of political instability, which includes among its indicators the fact of too frequent or sudden large scale political changes apart from the manifestations of conflict and violence in the political system.⁵ The concept of collective violence, therefore, seems to be indicative of both conflict and instability in the political system. The strategic importance of violence as an indication of political instability is suggested by Duff and McCamant who contend that instability may be reflected in "increased repression by the authorities, by violent and non-violent demonstrations, runaway inflation, coup d'état, civil war and social

revolution" among others.⁶ Indeed it is because of the destabilizing effect of collective violence that most political theorists discern political stability primarily in terms of the relative absence of violence.⁷

Collective violence then is so far the more discrete of the concepts which are subsumed under the general concept of political instability. But even more specific is the concept of "political violence" which is a special case of collective violence, on the more general level. Figure II diagrammatically illustrates the different levels of specificity or generality of the relevant related concepts.

The study of political violence then is the study of the most specific and specialized of the concepts relating to the overall phenomena of conflict and instability in the political system. Thus it is necessary to clarify this particular concept which is the pivotal concern of this study and to show its intrinsic relevance to the political process under examination.

FIGURE II

An Indication of the Range of Specificity or Generality between the
Concepts POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE

(1) The Conceptual Problem

There is a general lack of consensus among political theorists about the precise nature of political violence. Varying perspectives and approaches usually accompany attempts to define the term. The resulting differences of viewpoints are not easily reconciled in view of the very elastic and often elusive nature of the concept.

A major difficulty with the concept apart from its general vagueness is that it is usually inclusive of too wide a range of disparate factors. A further difficulty is encountered in attempts to identify violence that is specifically "political" as distinct from other types of violence. Such a distinction would make necessary the prior identification of the specific political nature of action which itself is problematic and about which also little consensus exists.

In addition the variety of terminology used to identify the same range and types of factors characterized as political violence also contributes to the increasing diffuseness of the term and testifies to the existing lack of consensus about the subject. Each relevant term or phrase utilized in the study of political violence also serves to emphasize some particular dimension of the concept often expressing particular subjective preferences whether favourable or unfavourable.⁸

In a favourable light, for example, the term "national liberation" has been used by Frantz Fanon to represent political violence events which are thought to be both necessary and beneficial in the sense of having liberating effects for the initiators of the process.⁹ Similarly Georges Sorel glorifies violence and saw in every relevant act of violence the seeds of the necessary revolutionary transformation of human society.¹⁰

More often, however, the variety of terms which are used to characterize political violence episodes suggests the more unfavourable dimension of the phenomenon. The term "internal war" for instance is used by Harry Eckstein to denote "a breakdown of some dimension in legitimate political order" with the effect that societies become "deeply scarred" and the formation of a consensus is prevented indefinitely.¹¹ A similar unfavourable perspective is suggested in the term "civil strife" as conceived by Ted R. Gurr. According to Gurr "civil Strife" implies not only a breach of the legitimacy of governmental authority but also a breakdown in the stable equilibrium of the political system as a whole.¹²

Attempts, however, have been and are still being made to neutralize the concept of political violence by the use of terms such as "domestic conflict" and "political instability" among others. Rummel and Tanter use the term "domestic conflict" to

refer to a set of objective indicators thought to represent acts and events appropriate for the study of political violence.¹³

Statistical sets of indicators are used by Bwy and Midlarsky and Tanter as relevant for the study of "political instability".¹⁴

The various approaches outlined above differ primarily on two basic levels, both reflecting differing philosophical or ideological perspectives. The first area of difference relates to the perspective of whether political violence tends towards equilibrium or disequilibrium in the social order. The second approach relates to the perspective of whether political violence is legitimate or illegitimate as a means of expressing political demands. Each of these varied approaches involves also certain biased implications for policy considerations. The attempts towards a more objective approach on the other hand reflect the desire to rid the subject of inherent biases.

The more "favourable" approach to the concept emphasizes both the legitimacy and the equilibrating aspects of political violence. In other words the proponents of this view contend that political violence is usually a needed response to an already disequibrated social system and is usually desirable and acceptable by a large number of people under the particular conditions at the time.¹⁵

The "unfavourable" approach on the other hand tends to stress the view that political violence is usually disequilibrating

and illegitimate in the social system as a whole. According to this view not only is violence destructive of existing social order and stability but its occurrence is usually outside the legal norms and disapproved of by a large majority of people.¹⁶ This view is usually influenced by the narrow concept of violence which confines the activities to the more extreme cases such as guerilla warfare and rebellion.

In addition both orientations toward political violence tend to impute blame to one particular source or the other. Violence is perceived as emanating either from the source of governmental authority (the incumbents) or from popular movements (the insurgents) against the government. Some who view political violence in a favourable light tend to support the perception that the source of violence is to be found in the governing authority,¹⁷ while others who view the concept unfavourably tend to blame the misguided or subversive elements of the population for disrupting the status quo.¹⁸

The policy implications suggested in these contrary perspectives relate to the particular solutions which are thought to be appropriate. In short each perspective tends to determine different approaches to conflict resolution. The favourable perspective tends to hold that since the governing authorities through force, coercion or exploitation initiate violence in the

society, the inevitable solution to this problem is "counter violence" on the part of the oppressed population, accompanied by far reaching systemic changes. Violence in this sense is viewed as purposive and determined by systemic conditions.¹⁹

If viewed in an unfavourable light political violence initiated by subversive movements against the governing authority could more appropriately find solution through the deliberate strengthening of the governing regime by the employment of greater force or coercion. Violence in this sense is usually viewed as voluntaristic or idiosyncratic in the sense of being produced through the particular whims or caprice of the individual or group. In this way violence is thought to represent abnormal tendency which ought to be eliminated by effective action by the authorities concerned.²⁰

The more objective approach, however, has an advantage over the other approaches in that it avoids imputing blame to any particular source since it cites the locus of violence within the overall system itself. In other words the objective approach suggests that political violence is usually the result of interaction and interdependence between individuals and between groups, and as such solutions to the problem can only be found within the political system as a whole and in particular by making the necessary systemic changes.²¹

(2) The Analytic Problem

Lack of consensus is also prevalent with respect to the analytic scope allowable for the study of political violence.

Perspectives differ on three fundamental areas: (a) the factual basis, (b) level of analysis, and (c) level of theory or epistemology.

(a) The Factual Basis

The first problem on the factual level relates to the range of factors allowable as indicators of political violence events. Authorities are not agreed on what factors to include or what to exclude when analyzing the phenomenon. Differences of interest among theorists often give rise to different emphases on one or other extreme forms of violent behaviour.

Whereas, also, some theorists prefer to stress only the manifest or overt types of activity such as riots and strikes,²² others prefer to include the more covert or "potentially" violent attitudes such as non-co-operation, passive resistance, or threat of force as necessarily involved in politically violent behaviour.²³ Some stress only the more extreme forms of violence such as armed struggle (guerilla war, rebellion, revolution) and other such activities involving actual physical damage to property and injuries to persons.²⁴ Some again, extend the range of behaviour to include less extreme types of activities, such as protests, demonstrations, strikes and the like.²⁵

Equally disputed with regard to their relevance for the study of political violence are those marginal cases between popular activity on the one hand, and what are usually considered as governmental control measures on the other. Such factors include the imposition of martial law, the suspension or elimination of fundamental civil rights, purges or deliberate attempts to eliminate opposition forces and repression involving mass arrests and imprisonment. Whereas, for example, Rummel and Tanter would allow these factors as appropriate indices of domestic conflict behaviour,²⁶ Tilly and Rude on the other hand suggest a more cautious approach towards accepting these factors as part of the political violence process.²⁷

The differences on the factual level would seem to reflect a concept of political violence that is either too broad on the one extreme, or too narrow on the other. Theorists who insist on the entire range of factors - from the "potentially" to the "actually" violent events - tend to increase the difficulties of analysis by expanding the implications of the concept to include those factors not yet within the manageable grasp of the social scientist.

Galtung's definition of violence, for example, as "the cause of the difference between the potential and the actual, between what could have been and what is"²⁸ would seem to be too broad and therefore unmanageable since the "potential" could represent almost anything imaginable. Similarly Johnson's conception of violence as ranging "from gratuitous insults to lunatic acts"²⁹ tends to further complicate understanding of the phenomenon

by including too many psychological considerations.

Others, again, who tend to limit political violence only to these events which involve actual physical damage or injury³⁰ might indeed be restricting the scope of the political theorist who might wish to think in terms of the more far-reaching and non-tangible effects of the phenomenon. Some factors such as protests, demonstrations, strikes and other "crises" events might not involve actual physical injuries, but might nevertheless have much significance for the understanding of the overall phenomenon of political violence and the stability of the political system as a whole.

(b). Level of Analysis

The focal interests of different theorists have also reflected a variety of analytic perspectives on the nature of political violence. There are three basic levels of analysis: (1) the reductionist (psychological) approach, (2) the collectivity (group) approach and (3) the systemic (holistic) approach to the study.

The tendency to reduce the study of political violence to psychological concerns has been emphasized mainly by Ted Gurr, I.K. Feierabend and Frantz Fanon

among others. To a large extent violence for these theorists is identified with the private motivations and expectations of the individual. For Gurr and Feierabend political violence is to be understood essentially in terms of the psychological variables, "relative deprivation" and "frustration".³¹ Fanon sees violence as bound up with the psychological needs of the colonized man in the sense that participation in the violence event transforms a dependent personality into an independent and liberated individual.³²

Galtung, however, distinguishes between "psychological" and "physical" violence on the one hand, and "personal" and "structural violence" on the other with the implication that violence is sufficiently broad-based to account for both the subjective and personal as well as the objective and collective aspects of the phenomenon.³³

The view that political violence is oriented more in terms of a collective rather than an individualistic phenomenon has been stressed mainly by Charles Tilly and Neil Smelser among others. Violence, according to Tilly, "is rarely a solo performance", since it usually grows out of the interaction of opponents contending for power

within the political system. Thus political violence most often finds expression through relatively organized groups challenging or testing the legitimacy of the governing regime.³⁴

Neil Smelser's concept of what he termed "The Hostile Outburst" represents also a specifically collective or group approach to the study of political violence. Group mobilization, according to Smelser, is essential to the formation of cleavages, a necessary condition for inter-group hostility and violence. But although the group is central to the process, Smelser nevertheless locates this concept within a wider systemic framework which must also be understood if the entire process of hostile behaviour is to be adequately explained.³⁵

Greater emphasis on the more systemic approach to the study of political violence has been given by Chalmers Johnson and Harry Eckstein. The explanation for revolutionary violence, according to Johnson, is rooted in the nature of the social system as a whole. In order to understand the violent process of revolutionary change it would be necessary firstly to investigate the extent to which the social system is equilibrated or disequilibrated.³⁶

Harry Eckstein suggests that there is need for the development of a predictive model which can take account of the balance between all positive and negative factors aiding or inhibiting the occurrence and growth of political violence. Eckstein believes that the discovery of some particular ratio of imbalance which can predict the probability of internal war would be facilitated by this model.³⁷

The differences in focal interest between the various levels of analysis reflect particular theoretical concerns about specific problem areas of inquiry. The particular problem with the reductionist approach surrounds the identification and delineation of the particular motivation of the individuals involved in political violence activities. The theoretical problem about the collectivity approach would seem to involve the precise definition and operationalization of the objective factors relating to the mobilization and organization of collective movements. The systems approach involves the theoretical problem of recognizing and explaining the nature of societal equilibrium which affects or is affected by political violence either positively or negatively.

Also of theoretical interest is the tendency whereby violence configurations shift from the more voluntaristic type of performance at the reductionist level to a somewhat more deterministic type of performance at the systemic level of operation. The reductionist approach tends to support the view that the individual participant is the independent variable determining the time and course of political violence. The systemic approach seems to suggest that the violence activities of the individuals are dependent on or determined by objective conditions within the social system as a whole. The collectivity approach on the other hand tends to assume that both voluntaristic and systemic processes are important in determining the outbreak of collective action which includes political violence.

(c) The Epistemological Level

Differences in theoretical or epistemological perspectives are also apparent among theorists of political violence. Debate is centered on whether the variety of factors that constitute political violence is amenable to systematic or scientific inquiry facilitating reliable and predictive knowledge. Also,

Much controversy surrounds the prospects of the extent to which there is any close identification or association among the apparently disparate incidents that characterize political violence.³⁸

Whereas Feierabend and Morrison and Stephenson, to name a few, treat the study of political violence as a discipline amenable to empirical and objective inquiry aiming at explanatory theory, Alastair MacIntyre and Sheldon Wolin, on the other hand, reject such claims to predictive insights as "pseudoscientific" posturing. According to MacIntyre claims to objectivity by the social scientist are untenable since, as he put it, "the stance of the social scientist (is) essentially ideological".³⁹

Wolin suggested, further, that social science formulations are usually antagonistic toward revolutionary processes. He argues that the social scientist is often "drawn into a political contest with revolutionary ideology" in the sense that "the methods, concepts, and theories become weapons to blunt and defeat revolution symbolically".⁴⁰ In addition, the problem of objectivity in the study of political violence is further compounded by the fact, as Wolin believes, that "no neutral language exists for theorizing about revolution" despite the pretensions of social science.⁴¹

Wolin further contends that social scientists need to correct a usual defect in the analysis of political violence: that is the tendency to separate thought or meaning on the one hand from action or activity on the other. Since revolution, according to Wolin, is purposeful activity of a high order, such a separation robs the phenomenon of its essential meaningfulness and impedes full understanding of the process.⁴²

The basic difference between the two theoretical perspectives would seem to be primarily a matter of emphasis. Whereas the one stresses the importance of the unique and the particular about political violence, the other stresses the common and general elements of the phenomenon. For this reason, the former and rather older approach tends to attribute greater importance to the study of chance elements while the latter or more scientific approach strives to enhance the scope for explanation of universal trends.

Whereas also the older approach tends to become preoccupied with non-observable phenomena in social research, the more scientific approach emphasizes study mainly of the observable trends. One of the advantages of the latter approach is to facilitate more manageable research since the more observable elements of social

inquiry are relatively more amenable to identification and control. The more empirical of the theorists who champion the scientific approach often suggest the possibility that investigation of the more observable processes can indeed facilitate both quantitative measurement and scientific prediction. If this argument is correct then it is reasonable to suggest that the study of political violence as a manifest or observable phenomenon would give rise to more reliable insights and fruitful discoveries.

(3) PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION

(a) Substantive Definition

The utility of the scientific approach to political analysis would, however, depend on whether a consensus is reached about what constitutes political violence in particular as distinguished from violence episodes in general. Violence in general is usually characterized by its wide variability in terms of both its application and objectives.

Again, violence in general has usually been defined in such a way that little distinction has been made between its implicit and explicit content, or rather, between the potential and the manifest or observable action. This confusion is reflected in E.V. Walter's

definition of violence as "destructive harm" or "destructive force", which includes "not only physical assaults that cause damage to the person, but also magic, sorcery, and the many techniques of inflicting harm by mental or emotional means".⁴³

The distinction between violence in general and "political" violence in particular has also been fuzzy. A fundamental conception of political violence common to many theorists is that its utility is invariably discerned in attempts to test the legitimacy of political power.

Greater clarification of the concept was advanced by H. L. Nieburg who distinguishes between, what he termed, "frictional violence" on the one hand and "political violence" on the other. Frictional violence, according to Nieburg, involves isolated outbreaks of private acts which are manageable merely by police power and entail limited or "acceptable" risk and cost.

Political violence on the other hand tends to increase the risk and cost to society "beyond acceptable levels" since it possesses the capability for "infinite escalation". The application of normal police methods of control becomes counter productive since political violence "addresses itself to changing the very system of social norms which police power is

designed to protect". And in the process the population becomes "increasingly polarized and alienated".⁴⁴

Elsewhere, Wieburg advanced a more comprehensive definition of political violence to stress the more systemic effects of the phenomenon. Thus political violence is thought to involve:

"acts of disruption, destruction, injury whose purpose, choice of targets or victims, surrounding circumstances implementation, and/or effects have political significance, that is, tend to modify the behaviour of others in a bargaining situation that has consequences for the social system".⁴⁵

This definition, however, lacks specificity not only in the sense of being too inclusive (even individual criminal acts have wider systemic consequences), but it also fails to differentiate between violence utilized by the state apparatus or the governing regime on the one hand, and violent activities on the part of the governed population on the other.

A more specific approach indicating both the source and target of political violence is suggested by Edward N. Muller. Political violence, for Muller, represents "violence directed against the regime (the structure of political authority) and/or against particular authorities occupying positions in the regime".⁴⁶ Yet, although Muller's definition is specific, it nevertheless seems too limited in that it tends to rule out violence

initiated by the regime and its officials as an appropriate or relevant aspect of political violence in general.

The fact also that violence against the regime is invariably met by governmental resistance often in the form of deliberate coercive acts of retaliation would make the inclusion of governmental activities as part of the concept indispensable for the full understanding of the overall process of the phenomenon.⁴⁷

It would seem then that the concept of political violence as distinct from violence in general has come to represent a combination of all or most of the following elements:

- (a) Activities carried out by aggregates of individuals such as a group or collective movement.
- (b) Activities which tend to be more or less organized for some specific purpose.
- (c) Activities which tend to challenge the legitimacy of the governing regime, thus threatening the stability of the political system as a whole.
- (d) Activities directed toward changes either of the governing regime itself, or of aspects of the political system as a whole.

- (e) Activities involving a high probability of resistance and coercive reaction by the governing regime.
- (f) Activities involving a high degree of risk of injury and economic cost to both the participants and the opponents in the political violence process.

If then a consensus is to be reached on the substantive nature of the concept, the definition of the term should embrace each of the above elements as a minimum requirement to further theoretical inquiry on political violence.

In summary therefore, the comprehensive definition of political violence should relate to all activities involving force and resistance more or less organized in an attempt to bring about changes either within the political system, or of the system as a whole, and involving a high level of cost in terms of damage to property and/or injury to persons.

The importance of this definition is that it emphasizes the concept of political legitimacy which governing regimes strive to protect in the sense that the incidence of political violence in the system suggests the existence of a crisis of the legitimacy of political authority. In addition the definition accommodates the

idea that governing forces are often involved in political violence activities at least in the minimal sense of resistance to attacks upon the foundations of its authority.

(b). Operational Definition and Measurement Problem

Empirical theorists usually insist on finding observable indicators of political violence activities in order to facilitate precision and measurement which are important requirements for scientific analysis. In keeping with this view several empirical indications of political violence were advanced by R. J. Rummel and Raymond Tanter.⁴⁸ These indicators of what they term "Domestic Conflict Behaviour" include

- (a) General Strike: aimed against governmental authority or policy and involving at least 1,000 workers.
- (b) Guerilla War: armed activity of irregular forces aimed at overthrow of the existing government. Includes sporadic attacks on police posts etc., sporadic bombings, sabotage or terrorism.
- (c) Major Government Crisis: situation threatening the downfall of the regime; evidenced by declaration of martial law, suspension or abrogation of the Constitution etc. (A new crisis is not counted unless at least three months of stability intervened).
- (d) Purge: The systematic elimination of opposition by the political elite - jailing or execution, arrests etc. (The "three months" criterion applies to new purge events).

- (e) Riot: violent demonstration or clash of citizens involving at least 100 people.
- (f) Anti-Government Demonstration: Unorganized, peaceful, public gathering involving at least 100 people for the purpose of displaying or voicing opposition to government policies or authority.
- (g) Revolution: Armed successful or unsuccessful attempt to form an independent government (excluding colonial rebellions) involving pitched battles between opposing forces on a grand scale.

Rummel and Tanter's indices are not only specific and capable of facilitating empirical inquiry, but (with the inclusion of purge and government crisis) they embrace the activities of both the governing regime and the rest of the "governed" population. Such a comprehensive scheme enhances understanding of political violence more as an interaction process between opposite forces than as unilateral action on the part only of insurgent forces against an incumbent regime.

Other theorists have adopted these indices in their theory constructions with a large measure of success.⁴⁹ Further categorical distinctions have however been made to suit the different approaches of the different theorists. Feierabend and Nesvold for instance distinguished between domestic violence involving riots, revolutions, guerilla war, strike, and demonstrations on the one hand,

and governmental coercion involving purges; and the indices of major governmental crises on the other. The objective for these theorists is to account for the effect of the one type upon the other.⁵⁰

Douglas Bwy further distinguished between political violence that is relatively "organized" such as guerrilla war, government crises events, and revolution on the one hand, and that which is relatively "anomic" such as riot, strike, demonstrations and the like on the other. Bwy's objective was to investigate the extent to which these two basic types of political violence were determined by other systemic factors such as political legitimacy and regime coerciveness.⁵¹

Compared with purely verbal formulations of the concept, the empirical or operational indicators of political violence can more readily facilitate measurement of magnitude such that comparative judgements could be made with respect to either different countries or different historical periods within a single country.

Problems of consensus, however, exist about what particular event or combination of events constitutes high or low magnitude of political violence. Secondly, it is not generally agreed whether volume (frequency) of events alone should represent magnitude, or whether other

criteria should be used to evaluate levels of extremity of violence events.

The problem is often compounded by attempts to devise a single measure of magnitude out of a combination of several related factors. Pitirim Sorokin, for example, proposed a measure involving not only the demographic spread of each event but also the duration, the scale of popular involvement, and also the extent of the effects on the social system.⁵² On the other extreme of simplification Richardson used a single indicator of magnitude, i.e. the total number of casualties (deaths and injuries) resulting from violent conflict.⁵³

A somewhat more comprehensive design for measurement of magnitude of political violence is suggested by Betty A. Nesvold who utilized Guttman scaling techniques to arrive at greater precision in differentiating the extremity levels of the various indicators of political violence.⁵⁴ Four positions are discerned and ordered according to greater degrees of intensity of events. Thus events under position I represent the lowest level of violence while those under position IV represent the highest level and so forth as Figure III shows:

FIGURE III

NESVOLD'S SCALING OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE INTENSITY

POSITION I	POSITION II	POSITION III	POSITION IV
Riots and Demonstra- tions.	Martial Law Coups d'etat	Guerilla Warfare	Politically motivated executions
Protests against Govt.	Revolt	Politically motivated assassina- tions	Civil War.
Politically motivated arrests.			
Govt. action against spec- ific groups			
Sabotage			

Another model which parallels that of Nesvold is developed by Edward N. Muller whose conceptual scheme is based more on logical than on empirical lines.⁵⁵ Muller's model, Figure IV, suggests a rank order of intensity of political violence which, he believes, reflects a perfect Guttman scale.

FIGURE IV

MULLER'S SCALE: HYPOTHETICAL TRACE LINES FOR ITEMS THAT
DISCRIMINATE PERFECTLY AT VARIOUS LEVELS OF POTENTIAL FOR
POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Conformity Behaviour	Strikes Demon- strat- ion Protest Marches etc.	Disobey Law Encour- age Dissent etc.	Sit-ins Squat- ting etc.	Riot Mob- hosti- lity etc.	Revolution Guerilla War Civil War etc.
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	

Low	0	1	2	3	4	5	High
No Devia- nce Customary Regime Norms	Non- Custom Legal Non- Violent	Non- Custom illegal Non- violent Unorgan- ized	Non Cus- tom illegal Non vio- lent Organi- zed	Non- Custom Illegal Violent Unorgan- ized	Non Custom Illegal Violent Organized		

Both models seem to be extremely useful in the sense that they represent hypothetical constructs of ideal types which can facilitate meaningful classification of the various types of political violence activities. As such both models are adequate for comparative analysis of both the cross-national and historical varieties.

Application of the Concept

The study of political violence is relevant for an understanding of the workings of the political process particularly of the developing states. Further, understanding the nature of the political violence process would seem to be helpful toward arriving at rational solutions to some of the perplexing problems of political stability, development and integration which seem to plague these less developed parts of the world. However the ready applicability of the concept of political violence to the developing world tends to become problematic in the absence of a prior understanding of some of the peculiarities observable in these parts.

Political violence defined in terms of relatively organized collective activity could seem to be easily applicable to the kind of situation obtaining in the less developed world where group consciousness seems to supercede individualistic or atomistic tendencies in the pursuit of political objectives. It is also observable in Guyana and most developing states that the greater proportion of collective violence is not only deliberately organized but involves also a conscious political content most often expressed in terms of demands for far reaching

political changes. Hence the more extreme forms of political violence such as coups, rebellion and guerilla warfare which seek fundamental changes or transformations of the political system tend to be more prevalent in the developing rather than the more developed world.⁵⁶

The usually more extreme nature of violence events in the less developed states tends to highlight the crisis of political legitimacy which is the basic target of political violence.⁵⁷ In addition the usually high level of sensitivity of the political system of the small developing state, especially those with a high degree of ethnic fragmentation, tends to transform even small scale political violence events into serious threats to regime stability. Thus the probability of regime intervention which is an essential consideration in the nature of the political violence process becomes greater.

On the more empirical level the various indicators of political violence need to be specifically tailored to suit the peculiar circumstances to be observed in the developing states. Modifications of the various empirical referents thought to be appropriate for estimating magnitude of political violence become necessary to allow for the relatively high degree of sensitivity and interaction

pitch of the less developed political systems. The necessity for modifications becomes further obvious in the application of the concept to the relatively smaller sized states which are also characterized by a high degree of segmentation or ethnic fragmentation as in the case of Guyana.

It is quite possible, for example, that the peculiar cultural or socio-economic factors of a particular country such as Guyana can make some types or levels of political violence more probable than other types or levels. Further, the factors which might make some events highly effective or significant in the one case might require different ranges or combinations in the other case to have similar effects, depending on the peculiar circumstances of each.

The fact, for example, that Guyana comprises a very small population (about 700,000 inhabitants) might require a revision of Rummel and Tanter's criteria of minimum participation in general strikes and riots. It would seem reasonable to suggest that events involving relatively fewer people would have a very sizeable impact in a small country. For example, a strike involving about 500 participants might have as much significance in terms of its impact on a small sized political system as a strike involving 1,000 workers would have in a more

populated country, such as the U.S.A. For similar reasons, riots and demonstrations should be considered significant in a country like Guyana if about 50 participants are involved instead of as much as 100 which Rumel and Tanter suggest as the minimum requirement.

Again, largely because of the small size and the coastal concentration of the Guyana population, strikes are considered "major" if they are directed against any single major employer such as the Government or Bookers Sugar Estates Ltd., a foreign firm with a virtual monopoly on sugar. Also, some measure of intervention by government into industrial or other strikes either in the form of police operations or ministerial investigation and involvement should be adequate to qualify the strike event as having a significant impact on the political process.

One important feature in the nature of strikes in Guyana is that strike demands which appear to be primarily industrial or otherwise restricted often reflect some tacit political demands. Demands, say, for increased pay or improved conditions of work are usually indirect attacks upon the policies of government which is blamed for the undesirable conditions such as poverty, economic hardship and the like which the workers have to face. 58

Thus, at a minimum, a strike should be considered "major" in Guyana and other similarly less developed states if it involves at least 500 workers directed against the policies of a major employer or the government and involving the intervention of government personnel either in the form of police operations or the active participation of a government ministry (usually the Ministry responsible for labour).

Another factor of importance to the study of political violence in Guyana should be considered. Because of Guyana's long history of colonial dependence and a vibrant tradition of anti-colonial agitation of various forms, the category "rebellion" should be included in the scheme of evaluation. Colonial rebellions are indeed important features of domestic political violence since the attacks are usually directed against a localized elite. The fact that this elite might be largely educated in the institutions of the colonizing country and might be directly responsible to the latter does not make them any less local nationals nor make attacks against them any less domestic.

It would seem then that Rummel's category of "revolution" includes all that would be pertinent for an understanding of "rebellion", except that a possible

distinction between the two arises in terms of the extent or deep-seatedness of the changes brought about by each type of violence. The changes brought about by a "revolution" would be more far reaching in consequences for the social system as a whole. A rebellion on the other hand qualifies as such even if only a change in the personnel of the governing regime is envisaged.⁵⁹

The inclusion of government crisis as an instance of political violence might appear to be controversial in that some crisis factors such as high inflation or economic catastrophe and ministerial cabinet resignation are not obvious indicators of actual physical damage to person or property. But government crisis also involves incidents such as "plots" aimed at the overthrow of the existing governing regime. Although such plots might not have materialized by the time they are discovered the governmental reaction toward suppressing the groups or movements concerned might be just as extreme involving acts of physical injury as if the violence event had taken place.

This category of government crisis is thought to be particularly useful for understanding political violence in the developing areas where a high reaction potential on the part of governing regimes tends to make

of even suspected plots a serious threat to the legitimacy and stability at least of the regime if not the political system as a whole. In Guyana, for example, the mere suspicion that the major anti-colonial movement under the banner of the People's Progressive Party was involved in a plot to burn the city of Georgetown in 1953 seemed to have provided the colonial authorities with adequate grounds for suspending the Guyana Constitution, declaring a state of emergency, and imprisoning or restricting many of the nationalist leaders.

One therefore cannot easily exclude such political crises which threaten regime stability from the evaluation of political violence without doing injury to the full relevance and meaning of the latter concept, particularly as it applies to the less developed countries where relatively minor incidents have a more dynamic impact on the political process compared to similar events in the more developed countries with better equipped institutions to deal with these problems.

The adoption of the appropriate scales of measurement of political violence magnitude to the Guyana context follows closely the lines of the models developed for the purpose of more universal comparisons. Guyanese estimation and impression of the magnitude levels of the various types of political violence events do not seem to

differ much from the rankings of such events derived from the more universal scales of Nesvold and Muller. Figure V gives an indication of the ranking of political violence events according to increasing levels of magnitude as Guyanese university students see them. The close parallel of the resulting scale to those of Nesvold and Muller is obvious.

FIGURE V

Ranking of Political Violence Events by
University of Guyana Students:

Low		Medium			High	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Anti-Govt. Protest, Demonstra- tion.	Major Strike	Purge	Riot	Govt. Crisis	Guerila War	Rebell- ion Revolu- tion
Level I	Level II		Level III		Level IV	

The results of the ranking experiment undertaken by twenty University of Guyana students chosen at random from a class of about eighty first year political science students reveal a coefficient of reproducibility of .82 which reflects a fairly ^{high} positive correlation among the

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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
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17

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FIGURE VI

A Typology reflecting levels of extremity of political violence events.

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The consensus at this stage would seem to be that the higher extremes of political violence such as rebellion and guerilla warfare are usually those considered to be both illegitimate and disequilibrating while on the other hand those of the lower extremes such as anti-government demonstrations tend to be both legitimate and equilibrating events in the political system. The medium range activities such as major strikes and purges tend to be either legitimate but disequilibrating or illegitimate but equilibrating types of activities.

With a combination of both the substantive and empirical definition of political violence embodied in a single typology expressing differing extremity levels of the events, the basis for comparative analysis of the political processes relative to different political systems or historical periods is enhanced. Secondly a comparison of different types of events within the same system or period is facilitated by such a scale or typology.

CONCLUSION

The study of political violence seems today to have evolved from a once taboo ridden field to a somewhat more respectable subject for academic pursuit. Once there was a tendency to dismiss all forms of violence as always

destructive and harmful; now some theorists claim that some forms of violence, and political violence in particular, are often instrumental in bringing about needed social changes.

This new orientation toward the role of political violence might be a reflection of the tendency to replace Thomas Hobbes by Karl Marx as the foremost spokesman on political philosophy. Whereas Hobbes thought that all resistance to authority was anathema to the ultimate social good of peace and stability, Marxists, on the other hand, espouse the cause of political resistance and revolution as both necessary and desirable as a means of change.

Again, the study of political violence seems to have shifted from a primary concern with the psychological make-up of the individual to an interest in group perspectives and the collective expression of political demands. The extent or extremity of political demands in conjunction with the probable intransigence of the governing regime gives to acts of political violence the potential for challenging the legitimacy of the governing authority.

The shift of forms from the individualistic to the more general approach to the study of political violence encourages a more systemic framework for

analysis which facilitates scientific explanation. But the eventual success of scientific theory would to a large extent depend on the prior development of an adequate typology for the classification and study of the different types of political violence activities. One of the advantages of such a typology is that it makes a complex study such as political violence more manageable.

This study represents an attempt to champion the collectivity and to some extent the systemic approach to the study of political violence. The intention is born of the belief that a scientific study of political violence is possible and that such an approach is capable of yielding greater results in terms of reliable knowledge and greater confidence in prediction or explanation of events. Thus the adoption of a scale or typology for the measurement of political violence magnitude is thought to facilitate the use of more empirical rather than normative or impressionistic factors and to make the study a more systematic one. Such a systematic approach is thought to enhance the scientific basis of the study.

A systematic study of political violence in Guyana should break new ground in that such a subject has long been regarded with extreme caution if not outright inhibition

in the entire Caribbean region. The concept of political violence has direct relevance to the political process of Guyana and the Caribbean in as much as latent conflict between groups and collectivities in these parts, often manifests itself in overt forms of violence with significant destabilizing and disintegrating effects on the political system as a whole. A full understanding of the workings of the political violence process particularly in the context of an ethnically fragmented society such as Guyana, Trinidad and Malaya might indeed contribute toward the more effective control of destructive conflict and finally quicken the pace toward the ultimate attainment of political stability and development.

CHAPTER III

The Guyana Political System in Historical Perspective

The character of the Guyana political system is to a large extent determined by both environmental and historical conditions. That both the accident of its geographic location and size on the one hand and its highly chequered historical evolution on the other could be productive of a dynamic social and political structure is a factor of considerable importance to understanding the overall workings of the Guyana political system.

In terms of its basic physical features Guyana must be regarded as a relatively small state. In the context of its location within the geographic zone of the very large Latin American states, Guyana, situated on the north-eastern corner of South America occupies a comparatively miniscule territory. Its approximately 83,000 square miles contrast sharply with that of its immediate neighbours, Brazil to the South (3,286,470 square miles) and Venezuela to the West (352,143 square miles).

In addition its very small population of less than a million people tends to magnify Guyana's miniscule status within a vast continent which contains millions of people. The fact too that over 90% of its small

population of about 750,000 people is highly concentrated on the sea coast representing less than 5% of Guyana's geographic area² tends to further compound the problem of insularity and contributes to the highly sensitive nature of the interaction process among its various peoples. (See Map, Appendix B (i)). This concentration of peoples on the coastland naturally followed the specialization pattern of the plantations which are better located on the coast where the soil is regarded as more fertile and suitable for sugar cultivation.³ (See Map. Appendix B(ii)).

The origins of the various ethnic groups of Guyana are disparate and followed upon a deliberate attempt on the part of European colonial authorities since the slavery era to transplant large amounts of people from different continents for the sake of developing their overseas industries or plantations. After the abolition of slavery in Guyana in 1834 the British Government through the instigation of the local planters implemented a policy of immigration of peoples from China, India, Madeira and also Africa to continue the work abandoned by the ex-slaves on the various fledging plantations. Table 1.1 gives an indication of the numbers and the approximate dates of arrival of the various ethnic groups in Guyana:

TABLE 1.1

Number of Contract Immigrants Arriving in British Guiana

Country of Origin	No.	Dates of Main Immigration
India	238,960	1838 - 1917
Madeira, Azores and Cape Verde	31,628	1835 - 1882
Malta	208	1839
West Indies	42,562	1835 - 1928
Africa	13,255	1838 - 1865
China	14,189	1853 - 1912
United States of America	70	1840
Total	340,972	

Source: R. T. Smith, British Guiana, London 1962, p 44.

Because of the disparate background of its various peoples Guyana could be described as a pluralistic society. The existence of many ethnic and cultural groups each occupying in the main different geographic regions, each to a large extent holding to its own separate ways and institutional patterns while at the same time tending to maintain a somewhat strict division of labour in the economic sphere is indeed conducive to a society with a high potential for inter group conflict.

The various ethnic groups referred to, and their respective proportion of Guyana population over the years, are reflected in Table 1.2.

Table 1.2 POPULATION BY ETHNIC ORIGIN

RACE	POPULATION							
	1891		1921		1946		1950	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
African	115,588	41	117,169	39	143,385	39	183,950	33
East Indian	105,463	38	124,938	42	163,434	44	267,797	48
Chinese	3,714	1	2,722	1	3,567	1	4,074	1
Amerindian	7,463	3	6,901	3	10,299	3	25,453	4
European	16,724	6	14,021	5	11,023	3	11,563	2
Mixed & Other	29,476	11	30,494	10	37,969	10	67,493	12
Total	278,328	100	297,691	100	369,678	100	560,330	100

Source: Annual Statistical Abstract, Georgetown 1970.

Table 1.2 reflects the various ethnic groups many of which were brought to Guyana after the abolition of slavery in 1834 to provide the necessary labour force for the various sugar plantations. A tendency for occupational specialization among the ethnic groups is reflected in the fact for example that the bulk of the East Indian population work mainly on the sugar plantations while the Africans

are mainly urban based service employees and to a lesser extent rural subsistence farmers. The European (particularly the Portuguese) and Chinese elements of the population tend to specialize in the business and commercial sectors of the economy. The Amerindians on the other hand reside mainly in the hinterlands of Guyana and are either self-sufficient farmers and hunters or employed in special governmental agencies such as logging and sawmilling.

Yet despite these differences most groups (with the possible exception of the Amerindians) tend to share common values especially with respect to social status and political norms. Socially, for example, R. T. Smith contends that all groups strive to imitate the values and norms instituted by white European (particularly British) culture.⁴ But even more important is the general adherence to western political values and norms. For example, the liberal democratic norm of organized competition for political power, value positions such as the desire for political equality in the sense of unrestricted participation in the political process, and the general preference for majority rule, are values which all groups share and even zealously strive to protect against detractors of such political orientation.

Historical Background

The early history of Guyana is in effect the history of three separate counties, Berbice, Demerara and Essequibo. Each of these counties had been separate colonies although managed simultaneously by one or other of three different European colonial authorities. For all practical purposes the three separate counties were regarded as a single political unit since the same policies and directives were administered to them by the then controlling colonial power.

Because of this fact each of the different colonial administrations left its imprint on each of the three counties. Thus evidence of both Dutch and later British control still permeates the three counties of Berbice, Demerara and Essequibo. It would appear that for greater efficiency and rationalization of administration the separate colonies of Demerara and Essequibo were united in 1812, and finally in 1831 Berbice joined the ranks to form the single political unit of British Guiana.

Dutch rule in Guyana was basically authoritarian. The Court of Policy which was the supreme legislative body of the Dutch administration combined both legislative and executive functions. The extreme authoritarian quality of Dutch rule was, however, reflected more in the character of the charter which had set up the Dutch West

India Company under which command Guyana was administered.

Under the directives of the Company the Dutch commandeurs or Governors were directed to maintain strong discipline among their administrative servants. For example all servants of the company were required to take an oath to "Their High Mightinesses the States-General, The Prince of Orange and The West India Company".⁵ Further the Governor was directed:

"to keep all his subordinates in good order and under discipline, and exact from them the punctual fulfillment of the contents of the Charter and punish all those who disobey the Articled Letter, and other orders, instructions and ordinances, made or yet to be made".⁶

The requirements demanded by the Company's Articled Letter confirmed by the States-General in April 1675 were extremely severe. Even though the Articled Letter was to be compared more to the ship's articles than to codes of laws, the provision which had to be adhered to included the following:

- (a) that no servant of the company was to carry on his own private business.
- (b) that no servant was to claim increased salary even if he rendered extra services
- (c) No person was allowed to use cards or dice
- (d) A fine was imposed for curses, oaths, blasphemy or mockery
- (e) Anyone absent from morning and evening prayers without sufficient cause was also liable to a fine. 7

The power of punishment given by the Dutch colonial governors through the Articles extended far beyond the imposition of fines. In many ways it was intended that the "punishment should fit the crime". Thus for example, it was provided that "whoever shall draw a knife with intent to stab another shall be fastened by the knife through his hand to a mast and left to free himself".⁸

Yet in spite of these authoritarian powers Dutch governors and administrators were still to be found who possessed some very human qualities and who ruled mainly as benevolent despots rather than arbitrary dictators. Notable among these benevolent rulers during the Dutch period of administration were governors Laurens Storm Van Gravesande (1742-1772) in Demerara and Van Hoogenheim (1763) in Berbice.

The French control of the colonies was very brief and also ineffective. The capture of the colonies from the Dutch was in 1709. This French capture, however represented only a temporary transfer since after 1713, with the Peace of Utrecht which ceased hostilities among the European colonial powers, the colonies were resold to the Dutch.⁹ Nor did French control involve much administrative responsibilities since the capture was by French privateers whose only interests had seemed to be plunder and profit.

According to Rodway "it was utterly impossible to establish a French government in a Dutch colony".¹⁰ Presumably, the effective administrative form of Dutch rule was beyond the capacities of disinterested privateers.¹¹ Having burnt many of the larger plantations, the privateers attempted to sell back the colonies to the Dutch government in Amsterdam.¹² Finally they succeeded in amassing a huge profit from the resale of the three colonies to Dutch authorities.

The British finally gained full control of the colonies in 1803 following a successful invasion in that year. However early British rule was by and large a continuation of the policies of the Dutch administration. Smith wrote as follows:

"the assumption of British control marked no great change in the life of the colonies. Existing constitutional arrangements were continued and the supreme control that had been exercised by the States-General through the Governor passed to the British Crown and British Governor. The Court of Policy remained the legislative and executive body controlled by the official majority through the Governor's casting vote."¹³

The stringent British approach to the early administration of the colonies continued until after emancipation (1838) when a series of constitutional changes gradually extended the basis of popular involvement in the political process. Figure VII gives an indication of the contrast between the Slavery period which is identified

FIGURE VII

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF FOUR HISTORICAL PERIODS
IN GUYANA

PERIODS	Franchise qualification range	Mean No. of electorate	GENERAL DESCRIPTION
SLAVERY 1763-1833	Ownership of slaves	500	Closed system. Denial of mass participation and organization. Lack of political mobility. Dominance of white planter elite. Rule through military and coercive force.
IMMIGRATION 1834-1891	Ownership of Property	2,000	Abolition of slavery 1834. Relatively closed system. Relaxation of military rule; emergence of administrative rule. Slow and restrictive political mobility. Emergence of political organization.
TRANSITION 1892-1946	Income (From \$480 to \$210 annual income)	6,000	Significant extension of Franchise 1892. Emergence of labour unions and entrance of political organizations for electoral competition. Relatively open political system allowing for mobility. The subordination of military and executive rule to legislative rule.
MODERN 1947-1970	Universal Adult Suffrage	250,000	Further extensions in Franchise 1947. Universal suffrage 1953. Significant increase in number of political parties and mass-based organizations. Political mobility open. Further constitutional guarantees of freedom: association, assembly, speech etc.

Sources: Compiled from a variety of sources including (a) Sir Cecil Clementi, op. cit., (b) R.T. Smith, op. cit., (c) Annual Reports of British Guiana, 1884 through 1946. (d) Elections Reports, 1947 through 1968; Georgetown.

basically with Dutch rule and the several categoric periods of the post emancipation era which are identified with the policy changes initiated by the British colonial government.

Figure VII reflects four broad historical periods namely, (a) the Slavery period ending 1833 when the Abolition Act was passed; (b) the Immigration period, 1834-1891, when a variety of ethnic groups was brought in to maintain the plantations abandoned by the freed slaves; (c) the Transition period (1892-1946) which represented the beginnings of local political participation in the sense of the development of popular organizations; and (d) the Modern period commencing 1947 which witnessed the proliferation of expressly political parties which for the first time entered the arena of competition for political power. It was a period which also allowed for greater mass participation in the political process.

The distinction between the four periods is based on the implementation of significant constitutional changes which positively affected the growth of mass participation and the encouragement of group competition in the political process. Thus the terminal years of each period (1833, 1891, 1946) witnessed the initiation of policies which were to increase the political franchise primarily by lowering the qualifications for voting and legislative participation, and

at the same time to relax the more authoritarian types of governing apparatus. The sequence from Slavery to Modern politics represents in effect a transition from the more authoritarian and oligarchic types of rule to the more permissive and "democratic" forms of government.

The progression of the four broad historical periods from lower to higher degrees of inclusiveness of popular forces in the political process seems to closely correspond to the typology of Feierbend and Walton who attempted to compare political systems in terms of lesser or greater degrees of permissiveness.¹⁴ Figure VII(a) illustrates the nature of the different types of political systems along the coercive-permissive continuum.

It would appear that the nature of the four historical periods discerned for Guyana corresponds to the four basic types of political processes suggested in the typology outlined in Figure VII(a). Thus regimes during the Slavery period would seem to correspond to type 4, the Immigration period to type 3, the Transition period to type 2, and finally the Modern period to type 1 representing the most permissive or inclusive type of political system.

FIGURE VII(a) CLASSIFICATION OF VARIOUS REGIME TYPES

MORE OLIGARCHIC		MORE PERMISSIVE	
Type 4	Type 3	Type 2	Type 1
<p>(a) Civil rights non-existent.</p> <p>(b) Political opposition impossible.</p> <p>(c) Govt. perpetual elections serve only show-case function.</p> <p>(d) Public opinion disregarded in policy formation.</p> <p>(e) Legislative bodies reiterate executive decisions.</p> <p>(f) Judicial bodies completely dependent.</p> <p>(g) No intermediary structures exist between the individual and the central government.</p> <p>(h) Constitution completely disregarded in practice, impossible to amend.</p>	<p>(a) Regular infringement of civil rights e.g. press regularly censored</p> <p>(b) Political opposition severely limited or harassed e.g. occasional suspension of all parties.</p> <p>(c) Govt. changes at arbitrary intervals set by party in power. Elections often manipulated.</p> <p>(d) Alternation civilian and military govt.</p> <p>(e) Judicial bodies often interfered with by executive of legislation.</p> <p>(f) Few and very weak structures mediate between individual and central govt.</p> <p>(g) Constitution unrepresentative of Society, Occasionally suspended or disregarded.</p>	<p>(a) Intermittent interference with protection of civil rights; e.g. press occasionally censored.</p> <p>(b) Political opposition tolerated but generally ineffective.</p> <p>(c) Govt. elected in more or less periodic intervals: usually free elections.</p> <p>(d) Public opinion occasionally effective.</p> <p>(e) Legislative bodies occasionally participate in decision process.</p> <p>(f) Judicial bodies adequately independent but may not have entirely fixed procedures.</p> <p>(g) Structures mediating between individual and central govt. relatively weak.</p> <p>(h) Constitution rather easily altered or, the converse, is rather difficult to amend.</p>	<p>(a) Civil rights protected by law</p> <p>(b) Rights of Political opposition protected.</p> <p>(c) Govt. elected at periodic intervals in usually fair, free elections</p> <p>(d) Public Opinion usually effective policy formation.</p> <p>(e) Legislative bodies usually participate in decision process.</p> <p>(f) Judicial bodies adequately independent and regularized.</p> <p>(g) Structure mediating between individual and central govt. moderately strong</p>

POLITICAL SYSTEMS OF THE FOUR PERIODS

(a) The Slavery System

The nature of the political system during the Slavery period in Guyana had already been described as extremely authoritarian especially under the direction of Dutch administration. But even more than the existence of an authoritarian oligarchy was the extreme brutality involved in the approach of the political elite toward the regulation of the slave system. The slave system was brutal and oppressive because of necessity. Force was necessary for the very survival of the system. The heavy dependence on coercion and force which characterized the slave system was necessary because an unwilling and restless labour force forming the overwhelming bulk of the population had to be kept in check. The slave population outnumbered that of the white masters by more than ten to one and in some extreme cases about fifty to one.¹⁵ Punishment for the slave who resisted authority had to be sufficiently severe in order to set the example which would discourage the rest.¹⁶

Some examples of extreme brutality to slaves by white masters are revealed by Rodway. As punishment for the attempted stealing of a bag of coffee a Negro slave named Cato was publicly flogged to the point of bleeding,

branded, had both of his ears cut off, and finally had to work in chains for the rest of his life.¹⁷ Another slave, a house woman called Mashy was cruelly flogged by her white mistress Elizabeth deLever who later poured melted sealing wax into the wounds of the bleeding slave.¹⁸

Apart from coercive means of governing the slave population the planters adopted a very skilful tactic of separating the different tribes over wide territory and also separating individuals from their particular tribe. The intention was to prevent effective communication and the possibility of developing strong organization among them. Linguistic barriers between tribes coupled with some traditional intertribal hostilities prevented the formation of cross-cutting organizations which were necessary for concerted efforts in resisting an oppressive regime.

In addition slaves were denied the rights of speech or association which were specially reserved for the white masters. The evidence of the Negro against the white master was not admissible in the law courts of the day.¹⁹ Express legislation and effective police operations prevented the slaves from forming associations even of a religious or social nature. For example, a proclamation issued by the Court of Policy on May 25th, 1811 "placed

restrictions on the assembling of slaves at night, which operated against their attending schools and chapels of the missionaries".²⁰

Reliance on military rule also characterized governments of the period. Often the legislative bodies comprised mainly of military men. The local College of Kaisers during the Dutch administration for example, consisted of a majority of handpicked military officers. Also, the military-dominated government was often buttressed by auxiliaries comprised of both Negro and Indian "volunteers." On 10th June 1795 the free coloured men were ordered to register themselves within twenty-four hours for a military expedition against the run-away bush Negroes.²¹ In addition a large body of native Indians was recruited for similar operations against run-away slaves.²²

Again, during the same year the Dutch government formed a corps comprising specifically of Negro slaves "with a promise of freedom for good conduct".²³ Incentives in the form of attractive financial rewards were usually offered for these "volunteer" services. For example the price of up to 400 guilders was offered "for every bush Negro captured alive and half the amount for a severed right hand".²⁴ The effect of this was not only to strengthen the

existing military power, but also to weaken the unified efforts of both the slave and non-white population.

(b) The Indenture System

The abolition of Slavery in 1833 freed the slaves from the control of the white planters. Following a temporary period of apprenticeship which lasted until emancipation in 1838, the ex-slaves entered an open labour market to work for wages. But at the same time most slaves interpreted emancipation as the abolition of all connection with plantation labour itself. A great majority banded themselves together and bought large tracts of land from bankrupted planters in order to create a village system within which they could work and live in close community.²⁵

This trend towards village-settlements, however, created problems for the remaining planters who still needed the labour of the ex-slaves. The solution to this problem was found in the immigration of indentured servants from Madeira, China and India among other countries. The period of immigration represented not only a transformation of forced labour conditions into a wage earning system of free labour, but also an era when significant advances were made politically such that different forms of protest behaviour were facilitated.

Much, also, has been written about the near-slavery conditions under which the indentured immigrants

worked.²⁶ Harsh conditions of labour drove the Portuguese and Chinese immigrants from the sugar estates to seek commercial opportunities in the city. The East Indian immigrants who alone remained on the sugar plantations were in fact bound to do so by a contract which they entered into with the plantation owners and the Colonial government. The fact, however, that the contract was only temporarily binding on the East Indian immigrants who were at the same time promised return passages to their homeland at the end of the contract, might to a large extent have alleviated the severe burdens which plantation toil imposed on them during the period.²⁷

But while social conditions remained depressing for the immigrant, political conditions during this period had improved considerably compared to the peculiar conditions under the slavery system. Firstly, one of the important political improvements of the Immigration period was the relaxation of military and arbitrary rule. Now greater emphasis was placed on rule by administrators. Smith wrote:

"The transition from a slave system to a free society involved far reaching changes in the structure of Guyanese society.....The growth of central government activity and services to replace the paternalistic rule of the planters necessitated an increase in the size of the administration, and reforms in the methods of taxation were now necessary".²⁸

Greater political freedom became probable with the abolition of slavery. The coming of emancipation meant that the individual planter was replaced by the law courts as the source of justice or punishment for alleged offenders against authority. Both ex-slave and immigrant occupied a position of some importance during the Immigration period because of the scarcity condition of the labour market. Often the labourers had to be cajoled by the planters if the desired production were to be achieved. 29

Compared to the Slavery period, the Immigration period was characterized by more open avenues of political mobility in that a hitherto neglected population was hence forth brought closer to the centers of political participation within the society. A variety of shifts in the qualification for voting after 1834; from the possession of a number of slaves to the payment of direct taxes resulted in the enfranchisement of a larger percentage of the population. Table 1.3 gives an indication of the absolute increase in the electorate between 1850 and 1892.

The political changes witnessed during the Immigration period might indeed represent only small gains compared to what is now desired in terms of popular participation and representation; but they would seem significant enough to allow for possible variations in

TABLE 1.3 INCREASES IN THE GUYANA ELECTORATE
BETWEEN 1850 AND 1892

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>REGISTERED ELECTORS</u>
1850	916
1884	1306
1885	1233
1888	1413
1889	1599
1890	1973
1891	2044
1892	2375

Sources: (a) Annual Report of British Guiana, H.M.S.O.
1884 through 1892.

(b) Sir Cecil Clementi, A Constitutional History
of British Guiana, London 1937, pp 365-368.

the character and level of political activity. In short the particular differences in the political systems between the Slavery and Immigration periods should be able to explain certain variations in both the type and level of political violence activities operative in the respective periods.

(c) The Transitional System

The period 1892-1946 could be said to represent a transition from a period of incipient political organization on the one hand, to a period of mass political mobilization on the other. The Transition period saw the beginnings of the trade union movement which was to have a decisive impact on Guyanese politics, in later years. Further, this period witnessed the introduction of mass politics through the many constitutional changes which allowed for increasingly wider extensions of the popular franchise. Yet there were only small variations in the Transitional compared to the Immigration period particularly in relation to the structure of political power.

The first major constitutional change allowing for increased popular participation and representation came in 1891 when qualifications for voting were reduced from ownership of property to income valued at \$480 per annum. In 1909, also, this sum was further reduced to \$300, bringing in many more participants into the electoral process. The relative openness of political representation brought about by these changes allowed, for the first time, for Negro representatives in the legislature. These extensions in the franchise had the effect of increasing the voting population from 1,973 in 1891 to 4,312 by 1915. ³⁰

The relatively permissive political atmosphere during this period encouraged the creation of trade union movements and expressly political organizations. By the end of the period no less than forty one trade unions of various types were registered. During the 1920's the emergence of a new political party, The Popular Party, contributed toward the increase in political participation.³¹ By 1946 two political organizations, the British Guiana Labour Party, and the Political Affairs Committee which became the nucleus of the later People's Progressive Party, entered the struggle for political power.

Yet the nature of the power structure remained one dominated by a white elite who controlled the legislature. Despite the significant constitutional advances of this period the old structure of the legislative organs of government was left intact. The Negro representatives elected by a predominantly Negro electorate constituted a small minority in contrast to the predominance of whites and Portuguese in the legislature. Disparities in the racial composition of the legislature before and after the general elections held in 1892 are indicated in Table 1.4.

TABLE 1.4

DISPARITIES IN RACIAL COMPOSITION OF LEGISLATURE

BEFORE AND AFTER 1892

RACE	% of Representatives before 1892	% of Representatives after elections 1892	% of Total electorate (1915)
White	72	86	28.4
Mulattoes	22	14	
Negro	6	0	62.7
East Indian	0	0	6.4
Other	0	0	2.4
Total %	100	100	99.9
n	18	14	4,312

Source: Compiled from Clementi, op. cit., pp 313; 367.

There was a further buttress for the colonial nature of the legislature when in 1928 a constitutional change imposed a system of Crown Colony Government. "The effect of the reforms", wrote Raymond Smith, "was to remove all power from the elected representatives and to invest it in the Governor and the Colonial Office".³² In fact, the elected representatives were now made to constitute only a minority in the Legislative assembly.

The constitutional reverse of 1928 had the effect of stifling the development of mass based political parties. The constitutional provisions then catered only for individuals rather than groups or parties in the legislature, a factor which further inhibited the growth of organized political movements during this Transition period. 33

(d) The Modern Political System

The year 1947 ushered in a period of mass participation in the political process such as has never before been realized in Guyana. The period, in short, could be described as representing modern politics to the extent that it reflected a considerable potential for mass mobilization occasioned by the growth of a variety of major political organizations. Constitutional changes guaranteeing greater extensions in the popular franchise and opportunities for direct participation in the political process were endemic. Both universal suffrage and political independence from British colonialism were realized during this period.

Yet this modern era displayed features which tended to detract from the apparent potential for further political development. The integration of the political system soon became perilous as a result of the identification of political commitment with racial loyalties. The result

was a tendency for an ever-increasing polarization of political forces along the divisive lines of the two major racial groups in Guyana. The confrontation which ensued between two polarized communities in the struggle for the control of political power gave rise to political conflict of major proportions manifested at times in the highest levels of political violence.

Political participation during the period prior to 1947 was restricted by stringent financial and property qualifications. Then, the qualification for membership in the legislature was either (a) the receipt of income to the value of \$2400.00 per annum, or (b) the possession of property to the value of \$5,000.00 per annum. The constitutional reforms of 1947, however, extended the bases of qualification for membership by reducing income requirements to \$1200.00 per annum, and property requirement to \$1,000.00 per annum. At the same time the income qualification for voters was reduced from \$200.00 to \$120.00 per annum, while property qualification for voters was reduced from property valued \$350.00 to \$150.00 per annum.³⁴

Further, the Franchise Commission of 1947 also recommended that membership to the legislature be open to women on the same basis as men, and that machinery be set up to investigate the possibility of introducing universal suffrage at an early date. This last measure was widely

supported by many cultural and other organizations representing the various elements of the Guyanese population.³⁵

The failure to abolish completely the financial and property restrictions on political participation was not the only shortcoming of the 1947 constitutional reform. A further restriction in the form of a literacy test for membership to the legislature was left intact. But despite these limitations the popular franchise was extended from 13,000 in the old register to some 60,000 voters by 1947.³⁶

It was not until 1953 that a further constitutional reform abolished the literacy test and for the first time instituted the recommendations of the 1947 Commission for full and unrestricted participation in the form of universal adult suffrage.³⁷ At the same time the electoral register almost quadrupled. The extent of the voting population now amounted to some 209,000 citizens; and for the first time, also, as a result of the abolition of the literacy test, the native Amerindian, a hitherto neglected population was brought into the main stream of the political life of the country.³⁸

The post-1947 era was also a period with relatively more open channels of political mobility and communication. With no restrictions placed on membership in the legislature, access to political decisionmaking

was within reach of the ordinary citizen. Such an atmosphere facilitating active political participation quickly produced a multitude of expressly political and related organizations. This period saw the growth as well as the fluctuating fortunes, of no less than fifteen political parties and more than eighty trade union organizations of various sorts and orientation. In addition several cultural associations with direct political relevance and interest were created and soon became allied to one political party or the other. A list of these various parties and trade unions are to be viewed in Appendices C(i) to C(iii).

It seemed inevitable during this Modern period that very close links would have developed between political parties on the one hand, and trade unions and other voluntary associations on the other. In the first place the trade unions provided ready recruits for political mobilization and many political parties grew automatically out of labour movements.³⁹ Secondly, the bulk of the leadership of the existing political parties occupied similar leadership positions in trade unions.⁴⁰ In addition many prominent trade union leaders were themselves aspiring politicians. In the same way cultural and ethnic associations provided convenient bases for fostering party identification.⁴¹

The Modern period was also characterized by a more conscious effort to politically educate and activate the entire population, with special emphasis being placed upon mobilizing the hitherto uninvolved masses. The growth of the People's Progressive Party (created in 1950) for instance resulted from this type of mobilization since this party was in the fortuitous position at the time to capitalize on the spirit of anti-colonial nationalism which was prevalent in the international scene.

The P.P.P. managed at the time to combine a philosophy of nationalism with a commitment to Marxist strategy - a combination which had positive and dynamic effects on the total mobilization and activation of the Guyanese masses. In short a strategy of political protest⁴² was consciously adopted by the leadership of the P.P.P., a circumstance which was to have tremendous repercussions both at home and on the international scene. The politics of protest though instrumental for the political activation of the masses was nevertheless anathema to the political style of the British colonial rulers who were determined to stem the rising nationalist tide.⁴³

But arresting nationalism in its strides was not sufficient to curtail the increasing trend of political activation. The racial and ideological

divisions which resulted from a split in the P.P.P. in 1955 gave rise to a serious confrontation and conflict in the country. Thenceforward political competition took the form of an inter-ethnic struggle for political dominance. In this way conflict tended to become zero-sum in the sense that the success of the one party was seen to be dependent on the elimination of the other as a significant political force. And in the wake of this zero-sum conflict political violence inevitably reached its highest proportions.

CONCLUSION

It would seem that its historical and geographic environment contributed to the very dynamic political development of Guyana. Once the colonial possession of the Dutch, the three counties which comprise Guyana changed the hands of its colonial masters several times before they finally shifted to the British Government under whose authority the three counties became united in 1831 as the single colony of British Guiana.

Secondly the relatively small size of both its geographic territory and population contributes to the dynamism in the level of interaction among the multitude of different peoples who conglomerate on the

coastlands to form a single political unit of Guyana.

Its varieties of shift into the control of different colonial authorities also represented a shift from the more oppressive and authoritarian types of rule characterized by the Dutch administration to the relatively more permissive type of rule initiated by the British.

In effect the political development of Guyana is characterized by the movement away from the more oligarchic to the more democratic forms of political system.

The development of political participation in Guyana is conveniently described within four different and broad historical periods, each characterized by graduated degrees of openness or permissiveness of the relevant political system. While for example the Slavery period (ending 1833), the earliest of the periods, was characterized by the most oligarchic or authoritarian pattern of rule, the following periods of Immigration (1834-1891), Transition (1892-1946) and Modern (beginning 1947) could be described as representing sequentially greater degrees of permissiveness or openness to mass participation in the political process.

Differentiating the various historical periods in terms of their relative degrees of political inclusiveness of popular participation facilitates comparison of a variety of different political variables in relation to different historical conditions. Thus it becomes possible to formulate hypotheses which relate the different types of historical and political conditions with other variable factors in the political process. Along these lines the succeeding chapters will be expressly concerned with relating the different levels of political permissiveness or openness to mass participation on the one hand, to the varying levels of articulating political demand on the other. More specifically it is the interest of the following chapters to examine the extent to which increases in popular political participation determine increases in both volume and level of political violence.

CHAPTER IV

POLITICAL VIOLENCE DURING THE PRE-MODERN ERA
IN GUYANA: 1763 - 1946: SOME GENERALIZED TRENDS

1. Period I: Slavery 1763 - 1833

Guyanese history is replete with events of politically violent proportions. In this light Guyanese historians and statesmen often boast of the strong revolutionary tradition from whence they came. Notwithstanding the very chequered career of the evolution of Guyana as a political state - now the colonial possession of the Dutch, now the French and finally the British - the foundation stone of Guyana's struggle for political independence is conceived to be the near-successful rebellion of the Berbice slaves against Dutch masters in 1763.¹

The significance of the Berbice Rebellion is that it was one of the earliest attempts in this hemisphere to wrest political independence from colonial masters by violent means. It preceded the American rebellion by about thirteen years and the Haitian revolution by about thirty. It takes second place only to the revolutionary experiment of Palmares of Brazil which predates the Berbice attempt by over a hundred years.²

It differed from Palmares, however, in a very important way -- in that it represented the first attempt in this hemisphere by a most disadvantaged group to directly face the most powerful enemy in pitched battles in the field. In short whereas Palmares was basically a defensive operation of "government in hiding", the Berbice operations were offensive from its very inception and, in the actions of some of its leaders, defiant to the end.³ The Berbice slaves attempted initially to overthrow and supercede an already established government; the people of Palmares merely ignored the existing Dutch and, later, Portuguese regimes. Whatever the Berbice slaves accomplished in the six months of their revolutionary achievements was done in spite of the tremendous odds against them.

Political agitation on the part of the slave population was indeed very infrequent and sporadic. But when eventually the slaves decided to take political action the resulting activity was usually the most extreme form of political violence. Another rebellion which was patterned on the Berbice insurrection of 1763 in terms of its severity and extremes was the Demerara uprising of 1823 not long before the close of the Slavery period. In both the Berbice Rebellion of 1763 and the

Denagara rebellion some sixty years later, the overwhelming bulk of slave uprisings took the most extreme form and often combining both guerilla warfare and rebellion.

The motivation which seemed to have inspired slave uprisings was the desire to resist the oppressive control of the white planter class. The struggles against oppressive rule was also in effect a struggle for freedom and the right of political self-determination of all slaves. In particular the most effective factor which served to provide ready recruits to slave uprisings was the extreme brutality meted out to the slaves by the planters almost without exception. Writing about the Berbice rebellion Netscher concluded that "bad treatment of the slaves were said to have been the prime cause of the rising."⁴

The desire for freedom and political self-determination on the part of the rebellious slaves is reflected in a letter sent to the Dutch Governor by Cuffy, leader of the Berbice rebels, on 3rd April 1763. Cuffy declared:

"that the Negroes sought no war but only broke into rebellion owing to the bad treatment of some of the masters: that they were prepared to give half the colony to the whites, if they would leave them the other half, but that in no case would they be slaves again."⁵

The Demerara rebellion of 1823 was similarly inspired by the desire for freedom and emancipation. The slaves had indeed reacted to the rumour that emancipation had already been granted them by the British Crown but that the local planters were withholding the policy from them. Thus they took matters into their own hands and demanded of the governor "unqualified freedom". The governor in turn used this demand as an excuse for declaring a state of martial law and proceeded to suppress the rebellion at tremendous cost to the slaves in terms of loss of lives and limbs.⁶ The military on the other hand was rewarded for their part in the suppression of the revolt by having their allowances doubled during the martial law period.⁷

PATTERNS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE DURING THE SLAVE ERA

It would appear that extremity was the order of the day during the Slavery period, in terms of both oppressive military rule and the response of the oppressed slave population⁸. Not only did political violence tend to be extreme but the peculiar nature of the slave system tended to preclude the occurrence of certain less extreme types of activities such as demonstrations, strikes and purges.

The reason for these exclusions would seem to be the obvious one that such activities would require the type of overt organization which was either impossible or suicidal under the vigilant administration of the slave system.

Further, it would seem plausible to suggest that the resistance of the slave to an oppressive master class would naturally tend to take extreme forms since the punishment meted out to him had always been extremely harsh regardless of the seriousness of his offences against authority. In other words since death was the most likely form of punishment for any form of slave resistance, it was natural for the slave to choose those forms of resistance which could enable the highest chances of success or effectiveness.

Although political protest was not confined exclusively to the slaves, they nevertheless dominated the activities which were most effective as political opposition. The planters, indeed, issued petitions from time to time against particular policy measures of the government, but there is hardly any indication in the available historical literature of the period which suggests that the planters reverted to activities higher in extremity than the level of active demonstration.⁸

With the possible exception of a mutiny in the military forces in 1803, no attempt was made by the dominant white group to seriously challenge the legitimacy of the governing régime. There would seem also to be no account in the available historical records of the slavery era which suggests that any group of independent planters made express demands for revolutionary changes in the political system as a whole.⁹

The slaves on the other hand had very little room for flexible manoeuvre in their approach to articulating political demands. The only outlet to active political participation inevitably took the form of violent opposition often expressing the desire for the revolutionary transformation of the political system.

Table 2.1 gives a statistical account of all the political violence events gleaned from the available historical sources of the slavery period. For an evaluation of the adequacy and reliability of these sources see Appendix A(i).

Of the sixteen instances of political violence observed for the slavery period, eleven (or 66%) of the instances involved activities at the very extreme level of rebellion or revolution. Thirteen per cent (13%) of the instances recorded took the form of guerilla warfare. Thus, together, rebellion and guerilla warfare account for

TABLE 2.1

STATISTICAL DESCRIPTION OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE DURING SLAVERY IN GUYANA: 1763-1832.

PERIOD	1 Anti- Govt. Protest Demon- str.	2 Major Strike	3 Purge	4 Riot	5 Govt. Crisis	6 Guer. War	7 Rebel/ Rev.	Total
1763-72	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	4
1773-82	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2
1783-92	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	2
1793- 1802	-	-	-	1	-	-	3	4
1803-12	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2
1813-22	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1
1823-32	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
Total	-	-	-	1	2	2	11	16
Percent	-	-	-	6	13	13	68	100

Sources: The data were gleaned from a variety of sources including (a) P.M. Netscher, History of the Colonies, Essequibo, Demerary and Berbice, from Dutch Establishment to Present Day, Translated by W.E. Roth, Georgetown 1888. (b) James Rodway, History of British Guyana Vols. I, II, and III, Georgetown, 1891. (c) A.F.R. Weber, Centenary History and Handbook of British Guiana, Georgetown 1931. (d) Sir-Cecil Clementi, A Constitutional History of British Guiana, London, 1937.

79% of political violence events during the Slavery period.¹⁰ There were also on record two instances of government crisis (13%) and one instance of riot (7%). Table 2.1 also reflects the conspicuous absence of the lower level political violence such as demonstrations, strikes and purges.

The participation of the slave population in political violence was more extensive compared to that of the planters in similar activities. The two instances of political violence which did not include the slave population - i.e. the riot of independent planters in 1795 and the mutiny of the military in 1803 - involved only about 300 and 100 participants each respectively. By contrast at least two slave uprisings - the 1763 revolution and the 1823 rebellion - involved the direct participation of more than 2,000 slaves each.

Table 2.2 reflects the estimated number of participants in each type of violent activity during the slavery period.

The major part (58%) of the political violence events of this period involved a participation rate of between 100 and 500 participants in each event. A much smaller proportion (14%) of events involved more than a thousand participants each. A similar 14% of events is

TABLE 2.2

Estimated No. of Participants in Political Violence Events
During the Slavery Period: 1763-1832

No. of Partici- pants.	4 Riot	5 Guerilla War	7 Rebellion/ Revolution	Total n.	%
50-100	-	1	1	2	14
101-500	1	1	5	8	58
501-1000	-	-	2	2	14
1001+	-	-	2	2	14
Total	1	2	10	14	100

reflected for the other categories of participation, under 100 and between 501 and 1,000 participants. One general conclusion from these figures is that the volume and extent of participation in slave uprisings tended to be small (i.e. below 500 participants).

The duration of slave uprisings, however, tended to be reasonably long compared to the duration of political violence events in the later history of Guyana. Table 2.3 illustrates this trend:

TABLE 2.3

Estimated Duration of Political Violence During
the Slavery Period 1753-1832

Duration (# days)	4 Riot	5 Govt. Crisis	6 Guer. War	7 Rebel/ Rev	Total n	%
1 - 7	1	-	1	3	5	31
8 - 30	-	-	1	5	6	38
31 - 90	-	2	-	1	3	19
91+	-	-	-	2	2	12
Total	1	2	2	11	16	100

It appears from Table 2.3 that only 31% of political violence events during the slavery period lasted for less than seven days. Similarly about 31% of events lasted longer than 30 days each. A great proportion of events (38%), however, fell within the duration period of between 8 to 30 days. Twelve per cent (12%) of all cases involved rebellions which lasted for more than three months each.

While the low participation rate in slave uprisings could be explained in the relative isolation of and lack of communication between slave communities,¹¹

the relatively long duration of most events might be explained in the complete absence of any institutional means of conflict resolution short of coercive submission or extermination of the participants involved. Thus slaves would prefer to fight to the death in battle rather than surrender - a course of action which itself leads to automatic death in execution. The slaves in short had very little alternative but to prolong the struggle indefinitely.

Yet inspite of the determined efforts towards liberation on the part of the slaves, the slave uprisings failed to gain their objectives. Some of the reasons for their failure were not far to seek. Because of the isolation and lack of communication among slave movements the uprisings were easily contained and destroyed by the military forces before they could spread.

Secondly the military had the advantage of superior weapons. The weapons with which the bulk of the slaves fought were usually primitive. The rebels of the 1823 insurrection on the East Coast of Demerara, for example, were equipped with such weapons as cutlasses, bayonets fixed on poles, pointed sticks and the like. Of the more than two thousand slaves who participated in this insurrection only about one hundred had guns and pistols.¹²

Apart from the typical isolation and the military weakness of each uprising there were also serious rivalries within the leadership among the slave rebels themselves. Very often slave rebellions failed to progress because of the betrayal of important leaders. Such a fate befell both the partially successful Berbice revolution of 1763 when the supreme leader Cuffy was betrayed by Atta, and the Demerara rebellion of 1823 when the entire plot of the movement was betrayed to the planters by a house slave.¹³

Another factor which helped in the defeat of slave rebellions was the use of auxiliary troops comprising of both slave and Indian elements of the population. The specialized knowledge possessed by the slave¹⁴ and the Indian was highly instrumental in the tracking and discovery of guerilla forces retreating in the dense forested regions of the country.

This policy of using slaves to suppress other slaves also contributed to the divisiveness and lack of co-operation among the slave population and prevented the development of effective organization with a capacity to mobilize the rebellious population on a large scale. This failure to organize effectively would seem to be a

crucial factor in explaining the difference between success and failure to reach the intended goal of freedom and self determination sought by the slaves.

Period II: Immigration 1833-1892

The Immigration period which followed Slavery witnessed an increase in the medium levels of political violence. It was a period when riots particularly in the form of inter-ethnic conflict and labour disturbances increased to the extent that it threatened the very survival of the plantation system. The colonial governor had to frequently intervene by issuing proclamations and declaring states of emergency in order to restore order and save the plantations.

Ethnic conflict mainly between the Negroes and Portuguese often led to serious riots and, in at least one instance, to the extreme forms of guerilla activities. Negro-Portuguese disturbances in 1847, 1856 and 1889 were sufficiently extreme to invite severe repressive military measures by the then governor. Following the 1856 riots for instance the Ordinance which was passed by the Court of Policy to repress the disturbances prohibited the "assemblage of more than five persons".¹⁵ The 1889

Negro-Portuguese disturbances which were said to involve "guerilla tactics on the part of the crowd",¹⁶ also ended by a proclamation issued by the governor empowering magistrates "to order the police to fire upon any person found breaking into, damaging or pillaging houses".¹⁷

Labour disturbances were also serious and often involved the intervention of government troops. At times also the governor himself had to personally intervene to pacify the rebellious estate labourers. In 1869, for example, at both plantation La Jalousie and plantation Leonora in Demerara serious labour disturbances provoked the intervention not only of the military troops and the governor but also the immigration agent and the Attorney General after which the disturbances cooled off and the ringleaders arrested and later imprisoned.¹⁸

The mainly East Indian labourers on the sugar estates were often in revolt against unsatisfactory working conditions and poor administration of the plantations. One major grievance of the immigrant labourers was that "the magistrates without exception were said to be entirely under the thumbs of the planters, so that it was impossible for coolies to obtain justice".¹⁹

Patterns of Political Violence During
Immigration Period

Perhaps because of the wide ranging grievances coupled with the emergence of legitimate channels to process grievances particularly in the form of appeal to the governor and the Immigration agent general, political violence events during this period tended to become more frequent although of less degrees of extremity compared to the Slavery period. The most notable observation about political violence during the Immigration period was the peculiar shift toward the medium and lower levels of extremity. Table 2.4 reveals that about 83% of political violence events was confined to activities which did not go beyond the extremity level of the riot.

Riots account for the greatest proportion (52%) of political violence events during this period. Both demonstrations and strikes account for 17% of events each. The higher levels of political violence, guerilla war and rebellion were relatively unrepresented during this period. Events of a higher level of extremity than riots account for only 12% of violence activities: Only a single case each (4%) of govt-crisis, guerilla war, and rebellion was reported for this period.

TABLE 2.4

POLITICAL VIOLENCE EVENTS DURING THE

EMIGRATION PERIOD: 1833-1892

PERIOD	1 Anti- Govt. Protest Demon.	2 Major Strike	3 Purge	4 Riot	5 Govt. Crisis	6 Guerr. War	7 Rebel/ Rev.	Total
1833-42	3	2	-	1	-	-	1	7
1843-52	-	1	-	3	-	-	-	4
1853-62	1	-	-	3	1	-	-	5
1863-72	-	1	-	5	-	-	-	5
1873-82	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
1883-92	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
Total	4	4	-	12	1	1	1	23
%	13	13	-	52	4	4	4	100

Sources: (1) James Rodway, History of British Guiana, Vol. III, Georgetown 1931; (2) A.F.R. Weber, Centenary History and Handbook of British Guiana, Georgetown, 1931. (3) Sir Cecil Clementi, A Constitutional History of British Guiana, London, 1937.

The level of popular participation in political violence, however, showed a tendency to increase during this period relative to the Slavery period. Table 2.5 suggests that the greater proportion of events (32%) involved a participation rate of more than a thousand participants each. This trend represents about 17% increase over similar events during the Slavery period. Further 51% of events during the Immigration period a participation rate of over five hundred participants each compared with only 23% of similar events during the Slavery period.

TABLE 2.5

Estimated Participation in Political Violence

During the Immigration Period: 1833 - 1892

No. Partici- pants.	1 Protest Demonstr.	2 Major Strike	4 Riot	6 Guerilla war	7 Rebel/ Rev.	Total n	%
50-100	3	-	2	-	-	5	22
101-500	-	-	6	-	-	6	27
501-1000	-	1	2	-	1	4	19
1001+	1	3	2	1	-	7	32
Total	4	4	12	1	1	22	100

The duration of events during this period also suggests interesting comparisons with the Slavery period. The overwhelming majority of the events were of much shorter duration compared to that observed during Slavery. Table 2.6 reveals this trend.

TABLE 2.6

Estimated Duration of Political Violence Events During
the Immigration Period: 1833-1892

Duration (# Days)	1 Protest Denons.	2 Major Strike	4 Riot	5 Govt. Crisis	6 Guer. War	7 Rebel/ Rev.	Total n.	%
1 - 7	3	2	10	-	1	1	17	75
8 - 30	1	-	2	1	-	-	4	17
31 - 90	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	4
91+	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	4
Total	4	4	12	1	1	1	23	100

It could be observed that about 75% of events lasted for less than 7 days compared to 31% for the same category during slavery. Only 8% of events lasted for more than 30 days compared to 31% for the same duration category during the slavery period. Again,

While only 4% of events were longer than 90 days in duration during the Immigration period, 12% of events during slavery fell in this duration category.

The differences in the observed trends in political violence between the Slavery and Immigration periods could most probably be explained in the differences in the political systems and processes of each. The tendency for political violence to be of a lower level of intensity during the Immigration period, for example, was no doubt due to the relative openness of the political system in that greater opportunities became available for the articulation of political interests and demands.

In other words popular demonstrations, strikes and riots became more probable since the severe penalties attendant upon these activities were to a large extent removed during this period. Thus the more overt activities involving the identification and commitment of the individual were encouraged, while the need for the more extreme types of political agitation such as rebellion and guerilla war consequently diminished.

At the same time, while the severe barriers to political protest were removed during this period, the opportunity was afforded for increased participation in

political violence activities: hence the increased participation rates observed during this period. Political organizations, however, were not sufficiently developed to encourage sustained mobilization of popular forces. Mobilization at this time centred around particular issues which were transient. Popular movements disappeared as soon as the end of the issue was in sight. There seemed, indeed, to be an aura of spontaneity about the development of political movements during this period.²⁰

The shorter duration of events witnessed in this period might therefore have been a function of both the very transient nature of the popular movements, and the peculiar nature of the events which became more frequent. Protest demonstrations, and riots in particular have always seemed to be dispatched in very short spans of time.

3. PERIOD III: The Transition Period: 1893-1946

The period designated as "transitional" spans the years 1892 to 1946. During this period political violence shifted more towards the lower extremity levels, particularly of anti-government demonstrations

and major strikes. The rise of both political and labour movements during this period led to the increase in the volume of political demands which were often reflected in open protest activities involving acts of political violence. The existence of legitimate channels for the resolution of popular grievances further encouraged a low level of protest activities.

Expressly political objectives became more marked as an important part of the motivation of the agitators. Organized struggle became more apparent during this period often reflecting a basic anti-colonialist stand. Both the Reform Association during the 1890's and the Popular Party of the 1920's agitated for constitutional reforms.²¹ The Political Affairs Committee of 1946 maintained a militant anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist posture and also embraced the then alien ideology of socialism.²²

Trade Unions too were often involved in expressly political protest. In fact the organization of labour not only in Guyana but throughout the Caribbean was conceived in protest against unsatisfactory social and political conditions at the time. Francis X. Mark wrote:

"the historical tradition of organized labour in the area is that of a social protest movement, in which demand for welfare legislation, social equality and political rights are joined,

with and often indistinguishable from purely economic concern with wages and conditions of service".²³

For example, the British Guiana Labour Union's struggle in the early 1930's for a Trade Union Law which would legalize the existence of the union, the struggle against the Seditious Publications Bill and also for Rent Restriction Laws were expressly political forms of pressures.²⁴

Patterns of Political Violence During the Transition Period

The further increase in the proportion of the lower extremes of political violence during the Transition period is reflected in Table 2.7.

TABLE 2.7

Statistical Description of Political Violence

During the Transition Period 1839 1946

PERIOD	1 Protest Demonstr.	2 Major Strike	3 Purge	4 Riot	5 Govt. Crisis	6 Gur. War	7 Rebel/ Rev.	Total
1893-1902	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
1903-12	6	4	-	5	-	-	-	15
1913-22	-	2	-	1	-	-	-	3
1923-32	1	1	-	1	1	1	-	4
1933-40	-	1	-	2	-	-	-	3
1941-46	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
Total	7	9	-	9	1	-	-	26
Percentage	27	34	-	34	4	-	-	99

- Sources: (1) A.F.R. Weber, Centenary History and Handbook of British Guiana, Georgetown 1931.
- (2) Ashton Chase, A History of Trade Unionism in Guyana, Georgetown, 1964.
- (3) Annual Reports of British Guiana, London, (from 1893 - 1946).

Major strikes for example account for 34% of violence activities compared to 18% during the Immigration period. Similarly protests and demonstrations account for 27% of the events compared to 18% during the last period. Together, all events below the magnitude level of the "Riot" account for 61% during the Transition period compared to 36% during the last period.

There was also a conspicuous absence of the more extreme types of political violence during this period. Events above the magnitude level of riots accounted for only 4% of all political violence activities as compared with 12% during the Immigration period. The total absence of either guerilla war or rebellion during the transition period contrasts markedly with the last period when these extreme levels of violence accounted for 8% of all events.

Riots as a means of expressing either political or social grievances tended to decrease in frequency during the Transition period. Riots during this period represent only 34% of political violence events in contrast with 52% during the Immigration period.

The explanation for both the greater increase in the frequency of the less extreme forms of political violence, and the relative absence of the more extreme forms might be sought in the nature of the political system which allowed for much greater facilities for the expression of political demands. Opportunities for open political expression were non-existent during slavery, and existed in a highly restrictive sense during the Immigration period.

Popular participation in political violence, however, remained on a level almost similar to that of the previous period. In fact there was a tendency for a slight decrease in both the high and the low extremes of participation rate during the Transition period. The bulk of the events (60%) seemed to have clustered around the medium ranges of participation (i.e. between 100 and 1,000 participants). The proportion of events in the lower category of participation (16%) represents

a decrease compared with proportion of events (22%) in the similar category during the Immigration period. Similarly, the proportion of events in the higher extremes of participation (24%) during the Transition period represents a decrease over similar events (32%) during the Immigration period. Table 2.8 illustrates these findings:

TABLE 2.8

Estimated Participation rate in Political Violence During the Transition Period; 1839-1946

No. of Participants	1 Protest/ Demonstr.	2 Major Strike	4 Riot	Total n.	%
50 - 100	2	-	2	4	16
101 - 500	4	2	2	8	32
501 - 1000	-	5	2	7	28
1001 +	1	2	3	6	24
Total	7	9	9	25	100

The fact that overall participation did not significantly differ from what obtained during the previous period might be explained in the similar restrictions on competition for political power pertaining to both parties. The channels of political mobility were still relatively closed to the majority of the population.

Meaningful and fruitful participation was confined to a small elite. As such there was little incentive to more involvement in the political process.

The tendency for the greater proportion of the events to cluster around the medium ranges of participation during the Transition period might have resulted from the rise of a multiplicity of limited sized labour organizations. The growth of small scale industries tended to limit the size of each trade union representing workers in the different industries. For the first time the city became the centre of trade union activities.²⁵ This tendency contrasts with the previous period when labour organizations were confined mainly to workers in the sugar plantations which by their nature tended to be large both in physical size and in the size of the labour force.

Thus individual strike events and political demonstrations which often centered around trade union demands tended to be limited in terms of the volume of popular participation during this period. The increase in the proportion of both strikes and protest demonstrations during this period would therefore be a natural contribution to this trend whereby the majority of political violence events were confined within the medium ranges of participation.

Like the previous period, the duration of events during the Transition period remained on a similarly low level. In fact the Transition period witnessed a slight decrease in the duration of political violence as suggested in Table 2.9.

TABLE 2.9

Estimated Duration of Political Violence During The
Transition Period: 1893 - 1946

Duration (Days)	1 Protest/ Demonstr.	2 Major Strike	4 Riot	5 Govt. Crisis	Total	%
1 - 7	7	5	6	1	21	81
8 - 30	-	4	1	-	5	19
31 - 90	-	-	-	-	0	0
91 +	-	-	-	-	0	0
	7	9	9	1	26	100

The slight decrease in duration during this period is reflected in the fact that about 81% of events lasted less than 7 days as compared with 75% during the Immigration period. At the same time no event lasted longer than 30 days during the Transition period as compared with 8% of events for the same duration category during the previous period. Again

the increase in the frequency of the lower levels of political violence during this period should help to explain the relatively short duration of the events since demonstrations, strikes and riots are much easier to terminate than government crises, guerilla war and rebellion, and revolution.

4. CONCLUSION

It would appear from the foregoing analysis of political violence in Guyana over the years, that there has been a consistent reduction of the magnitude level from the more extreme toward the less extreme types of events. The peculiar conditions of the Slavery period seemed to have allowed only the more extreme forms of violence to flourish. Thus guerilla warfare and rebellion became the dominant forms of political expression during this era. At the same time slavery conditions tended to preclude the occurrence of the less extreme types of political violence such as demonstrations, strikes and purges.

The period of immigration which followed slavery, witnessed an increase in the less extreme forms of activity such as demonstrations and strikes, and a significant decrease in the extreme types, rebellions

and guerilla warfare. At the same time there seemed to have been a significant increase in one particular event, the riot. As such there was a tendency during this period for the medium levels of violence extremity to be in marked evidence.

The following "Transition" period showed a marked increase in the lower extremes of violence and a conspicuous absence of events beyond the extremity of riots. Rebellion and guerilla war seemed to have disappeared during this period. The increase in the volume of strikes and demonstrations, relative to the volume of similar events during the Immigration period seemed extremely sizeable.

The level of participation in political violence also seemed to have fluctuated over the several periods. Whereas the volume of participation was generally low during slavery, there was a marked increase in volume during both the Immigration and the Transition periods. There seemed however to be little difference between the latter two periods in the relative levels of participation in violence activities in general.

The duration of political violence events seemed to have decreased over the years; the duration

of events tended to be much longer during slavery compared to what obtained during both the Immigration and Transition periods. The Transition period in particular produced the types of political violence events the greatest proportion of which tended to be of extremely short duration. In addition there was a conspicuous absence of any event which could be regarded as having long duration during the Transitional period.

Fluctuations in the extremity of events over the different periods might be explained by both the relative openness of the political system and the nature of political movements encouraged by the conditions peculiar to each period. The high degree of closedness of the political system during slavery which made active and overt political participation impossible for the slaves led inevitably to the most extreme and violent forms of expression of political demand. Protests, demonstrations and strikes were not only outlawed for slaves, but participation in these activities were usually met with the most extreme forms of punishment, including death, for the slave participant. It was to be expected, therefore, that the volume of participation in political violence activities during this period would tend to be

restricted mainly because the opportunity for such participation was itself restricted while the probability of obtaining one's objectives through popular agitation was indeed very low.

The severe restrictions on popular participation had the impact of driving slave movements underground. In the meantime the difficulties of communication across regions, and even among members within the same locality, further impeded the development of large scale movements which could have mobilized greater popular forces against the regime. Thus slave uprisings were often isolated events restricted to a particular locality and thus easier to put down by the greater mobilizing abilities of the government forces.

Although political participation was restricted to the elite during the Immigration period, this period was nevertheless characterized by a relatively more open political system in the sense that overt political activities and organization were allowed. This tolerance of overt and organized political activities might well explain the shift from the more extreme types towards the more legitimate or less extreme types of violence during this period. Also, the relative increase in

opportunity to participate in the political process during the Immigration period might be responsible for the tendency toward an increase in the participation rate in political violence activities.

The additional increase in the opportunities for active participation during the Transition period, gave birth to a multiplicity of small scale trade union organizations and might well explain the further shift in this frequency of political violence events, away from riots (and rebellion) toward the lower extremes represented by protests, demonstrations and strikes. Yet probably because the nature of political organization was relatively more fragmentary during the Transition period, the volume of participation in political violence events tended to remain on a level slightly lower than or little different from that of the previous period.

The duration of political violence would also seem to be explainable in terms of both the relative openness of the political system and the nature of the political movements of the various periods. During Slavery, political violence events tended to last a longer time compared to both Immigration and Transition

periods. Much of the explanation for this trend ought to be found in the fact that the Slavery period tended to exclude the types of political violence, such as strikes, demonstrations, and riots, which by their nature tend to be more quickly terminated. The consistent increase of these relatively "short-term" events during the following periods would similarly explain the tendency for political violence to be of shorter duration during these latter periods.

Where also institutional channels for the processing of political grievances exist, as in the Immigration and Transition periods, it is reasonable to expect that there would be a greater tendency to resolve conflicts earlier than under conditions such as Slavery, where no means of conflict resolution short of the annihilation of the opponent exist. Finally, it could be argued that since the interests and motivations of the various political movements during the latter periods tended to be more immediate and transient compared to the relatively more longterm and far reaching commitment of slave movements, (Slave rebels usually demanded nothing less than victory ~~and~~ freedom for all slaves) the nature of the struggle would naturally tend to be shorter during the Immigration and Transition periods,

and longer during the Slavery period.

It would seem then, from the foregoing analysis that the variations in political violence phenomena have some bearing on the variations in the nature and the character of political organizations and movements in particular. An important hypothesis which seems to be suggested by the findings is that under conditions where the nature of collective activity tends to be clandestine and the numbers of political movements are few but committed to more long term interests and objectives (e.g. the control of political power), political violence events tend to be more extreme, less frequent and of long duration. Similarly where collective activity tends to be overt and channelled through a multiplicity of fragmentary movements committed only to short-term and transient interests or objectives (e.g. improvement in general working conditions), political violence tends to be less extreme, more frequent, and of shorter duration.

CHAPTER V

POLITICAL VIOLENCE DURING THE MODERN PERIOD

The far reaching constitutional changes of 1947 and again in 1953 which revolutionized the nature of political participation in Guyana seemed to have set in motion a massive train of protest activities. Participation during the Modern period was as extensive as it was inclusive of all groups and adult individuals in the political system. Henceforth the consequent filip in the volume of popular demands upon the political system seemed to have created the sufficient conditions allowing for a proportionate rise in the volume or frequency of political violence events.

But the level of political violence, as should be expected, was confined to the events of the lower extremes. Such an outcome of low-level events, particularly Anti-government demonstrations and Major strikes, would seem to be natural enough since these events now became legitimized as means of popular protest against government policies or actions. The sudden realization that both legal and political restrictions were removed from these lower level events as necessary means of expressing political demands, no doubt encouraged the active participation of a larger proportion of the population in political violence.

The fact, however, that the more extreme events ranging from riots to guerilla activities and rebellion still remain illegal and largely regarded as illegitimate forms of protest, might indeed have proportionately decreased reliance on these forms of pressures to obtain desired political objectives. Also the growth of more institutional channels for the peaceful resolution of conflict during the Modern period tended to make extreme anti-systemic forms of political violence avoidable, and at the same time served to reinforce reliance on the more legitimate or intra-systemic forms of protest. Further, the more institutionalized framework of the Modern period tended to reduce the relative duration of political violence events since the means for the easily and more quickly terminated conflict were more apparent during this period.

Of particular significance during the Modern period is the relative disappearance of the more sporadic or spontaneous type of involvement which characterized political violence during the pre-modern period, and the emergence of the more consciously organized participation in political violence events. The rise of organized mass movements in the form of political parties, trade unions and a multitude of other political

interest groups served mainly as the vehicle for the launching of anti-government demonstrations, strikes and other forms of political violence activities.

Because of the highly organized nature of politics during the Modern period, political violence developed the mechanisms for its own regulation and control. It would seem that organizations more than any other factor were responsible for (a) the channelling of political violence toward the more legitimate and low level forms of expression, (b) the greater mobilizing efforts and extensiveness of participation in the events, and finally (c) the relatively shorter duration of events within the political process.

PATTERNS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE DURING THE MODERN PERIOD

(a) General Description

It is to be expected therefore, that the Modern period would be characterized by a significant increase in the amount of the lower levels of political violence especially anti-government demonstrations. This trend would seem to be natural since the nature of the constitutional changes during this period increasingly legitimized these lower level events. In

other words, the political authorities regarded these events as a normal part of the articulation and expression of political demand.

A second characteristic expected of this period is a relatively significant increase in the volume of popular participation in political violence events occasioned by the increased efforts at popular mobilization by well organized movements in the political process. Table 3.1 illustrates these trends. The Table divides the Modern period into six equal sub-periods, the justification for which could be reviewed in Appendix F.

The significant rise in the frequency of the lower level events -- demonstrations, strikes and purges -- is reflected in this table. About 80 percent of all events fall in the lower categories of violence, (events 1 to 4). This compares favourably with the previous three periods which reflect figures of 0%, 36% and 61% respectively for similar events. The largest proportion of events during the Modern period were Anti-government demonstrations which account for about 54% of all events as compared with 27% during the Transition period, and 18% during the Immigration period, (see Table 3.2).

TABLE 3.1

Statistical Description of Political Violence During

The Modern Period, 1947-1970

PERIOD	1 Anti-Govt. Demonstr.	2 Major Strike	3 Purge	4 Riot	5 Govt. Crisis	6 Guerilla Warfare	7 Rebel/ Rev.	Total n.	%
1947-50	17	8	-	3	-	-	-	28	18.0
1951-54	20	9	1	1	1	-	-	32	20.5
1955-58	10	-	-	1	-	-	-	11	6.4
1959-62	11	2	1	6	2	-	-	22	14.1
1963-66	22	9	1	12	1	1	-	46	30.0
1967-70	3	10	1	1	2	-	1	18	11.0
Total n.	83	38	4	24	6	1	1	157	
Percent	54	24.3	2.5	15	3	0.6	0.6		100

Sources: The data for this table were compiled from a variety of newspaper and official sources in Guyana including: (a) The Guyana Graphic, (1947-1970); (b) The Daily Chronicle, (1947-1970); (c) The Mirror, (1962-1965); (d) Thunder, (1954-1959); (e) Annual Report of the Commissioner of Police, (1947-1970); (f) Annual Report of the Ministry of Labour, (1947-1970).

TABLE 3.2
Comparative View of Relative Frequency of Different Types
of Political Violence Events

PERIOD	1 Anti-Govt Demonstr. %	2 Major Strike %	3 Purge %	4 Riot %	5 Govt. Crisis %	6 Guerilla Warfare %	7 Rebel/ Rev. %	TOTAL %
I Slavery	0	0	0	6	13	13	68	100
II Immgr.	18	18	0	52	4	4	4	100
III Trans.	27	34	0	34	4	0	0	100
IV Modern	54	24.3	2.5	15	3	0.6	0.6	100

The phenomenon of the Purge has emerged as a new instance of political violence during this period. Major strikes however seem to have decreased in proportion relative to the previous period. While Major strikes accounted for 24% of all events during this period, the Transition period demonstrated that 34% of all events fall in this category of political violence. The Modern period, however, represented a significant increase over the Immigration period when Major strikes accounted for only 18% of all events.

The higher levels of political violence, beginning with Riots seem, too, to have undergone a relative decrease in frequency compared to the previous periods. Riots in particular represented a significant decrease during this period. While Riots accounted for 15% of political violence during the Modern period, the Transition and Immigration periods reflected 34% and 52% for Riots respectively. Guerilla warfare and Rebellion seemed, during the Modern period, to have occupied a position similar to that reflected in the Transition period - that is, each accounting for less than one

percent of all events. But these events represented a significant decline compared to what obtained during both the Immigration and Slavery periods. It will be recalled that Guerilla warfare represented 13% of events during Slavery and 4% during the Immigration period. Rebellion at the same time accounted for 67% of events during Slavery and 4% during Immigration.

Government crises during this period represent about the same proportion of events relative to the other periods except Slavery. Whereas Government crises represented some 13% of events during Slavery, this phenomenon accounted for only between 3 to 4% during each of the other three periods.

One observation about political violence in general during the Modern period is that there is a tendency for the frequency of the events to decrease as the events themselves become more extreme. Thus it is observed that Rebellion and Guerilla warfare tend to be less frequent than Major strikes and demonstrations in that order, under conditions of open mass participation.

(b) Participation and Duration

The modern period has also witnessed a tendency toward an increase in the volume of participation in the various political violence events. For example, as Table 3.3 shows, about 40% of all events had a participation rate of more than a thousand participants each. This proportion compares favourably with that of the other periods, Transition, Immigration, and Slavery, which showed 24%, 32%, and 15% respectively. There is at the same time, however, an increase in the number of events demonstrating the lowest level of participation. Twenty-five percent of all events had a participation rate of less than 100 participants each during this period, while in the same category 16% was demonstrated during the Transitional period, 22% during the Immigration period, and 15% during the Slavery period.

It would appear from Table 3.3, however, that the bulk of the events with extensive participation, is confined to the lowest levels of political violence - that is, demonstrations and strikes - while the most extreme forms of violence - Guerilla

TABLE 3.3

Estimated Participation Rate in Political Violence Events

During the Modern Period, 1947 - 1970

Number of Participants	1 Anti-Govt. Demonstr.	2 Major Strike	4 Riots	6 Guerilla Warfare	7 Rebel/ Rev..	Total n. %
50 - 100	23	-	12	-	1	36 25
101 - 300	20	-	4	1	-	25 16
301 - 500	7	-	1	-	-	8 6
501 - 700	3	9	1	-	-	13 9
701 - 1000	1	4	1	-	-	6 4
1001 +	29	25	5	-	-	59 40
Total	83	38	24	1	1	147 100

warfare and Rebellion - demonstrated a decrease in participation rates relative to the Immigration periods. Table 3.3 further shows that both Guerilla warfare and Rebellion demonstrated a participation rate of less than 300 participants each. During the Immigration period, however, these events demonstrated a participation rate of more than 500 each.

Riot participation on the other hand has tended to decrease during this period. About 52% of Riots demonstrated a participation rate of less than 100 participants each. For this same category of participation, the Transition period demonstrated 16%, while the Immigration period demonstrated 22% of Riots. The fact that such a large percentage of Riots falls within the lowest category of participation, while demonstrations and strikes dominate the highest category, helps to explain the tendency for the period to be somewhat polarized between these two extreme levels of participation in political violence.

Comparing the different periods in terms of levels of participation in political violence

events, Table 3.4 demonstrates the tendency for participation rate to increase in each event as the political system becomes more Modern.

TABLE 3.4
Comparative View of Participation Rates
in Political Violence Events

PERIODS	PARTICIPATION RATES: % OF EVENTS				
	[50-100]	[101-500]	[501-1000]	[1000+]	Total
I Slavery	14	58	14	14	100
II Immgr.	22	27	19	32	100
III Trans.	16	32	28	24	100
IV Modern	25	22	13	40	100

While the Modern period, for example, demonstrated that 40% of events involved more than 1,000 participants, the earlier periods, Transition, Immigration and Slavery, demonstrated a participation rate in this category in only 24%, 32% and 14% of events respectively.

The duration of political violence during the Modern period tended to decrease relative to that of the other periods. As table 3.5 reveals, the greatest

TABLE 3.5

Estimated Duration of Political Violence Events During

The Modern Period, 1947-1970

DURATION No. of Days	1 Anti-Govt. Demonstr.	2 Major Strike	4 Riot	5 Govt. Crisis	6 Guerilla Warfare	7 Rebel/ Rev.	Total n. %
1 - 3	79	12	21	-	-	1	113 73.7
4 - 7	2	14	2	-	-	-	18 11.8
8 - 14	1	3	-	-	-	-	4 2.6
15 - 21	-	2	-	-	-	-	2 1.4
22 - 30	-	5	-	-	-	-	5 3.3
31+	1	2	1	6	1	-	11 7.2
Total	83	38	24	6	1	1	153 100

proportion of events (85.5%) tended to fall within the shortest time span of not more than seven days each. The proportion for the same category during the Transition and the Immigration periods was 81% and 75% respectively (see Table 3.6).

TABLE 3.6
Comparative View of Duration of
Political Violence Events

PERIODS	DURATION (DAYS):			% OF EVENTS Total
	[1-7]	[8-30]	[31+]	
I Slavery	31	38	31	100
II Immgr.	75	17	8	100
III Trans.	81	19	0	100
IV Modern	85.5	7.3	7.2	100

The Slavery period showed a tendency for political violence to be of much longer duration compared to the other periods. Only 31% of events fell within the shortest time category between one and seven days during the Slavery period. Again, while the Slavery period demonstrates that 31% of events

lasted for more than 30 days, the other periods, Immigration, Transition and Modern, demonstrate only 8%, 0% and 7.2% of events respectively in this category.

The events which account for the greatest proportion within the shorter duration category during the Modern period are those which by their nature tend to be short, that is, demonstrations and Riots. While, for example, 95% of Anti-government demonstrations fell within this category, 87% of Riots occupy the same position. Major strikes, however, tended to be of a slightly longer duration compared to other events during the Modern period.

HISTORICAL DESCRIPTION OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Each of the specific time dimensions or sub-periods within the Modern period as a whole, seems to be peculiar in terms of the conditions which facilitate particular levels of political violence activities. Each category also overlaps a time of national elections when political mobilization is supposed to be sufficient to affect the rate of involvement in political violence activities.

The first of these sub-periods, 1947-50, witnessed the early beginnings of inter-party rivalry and competition for political power. The P.P.P. was very instrumental in mobilizing the masses of the population primarily in opposition to the policies of the British colonial government. A high level of political consciousness inspired in the masses by this party led to a series of open protests and demonstrations with express demands being made for constitutional and other political changes.¹

At the same time attempts made by the P.P.P. to foster the development of trade union organization led to fierce union rivalries particularly on the sugar plantations. A general strike in 1948 by sugar workers, and later led by the P.P.P. sponsored union, the Guyana Industrial Workers Union (GIWU), soon developed into a major riot at Enmore resulting in the death or injury of several persons when police opened fire on a riotous crowd.²

This sub-period (1947-50) accounted for 18.4% of all political violence Events during the Modern period as demonstrated in Table 3.1. Further,

each of the events observed in this sub-period - demonstrations, Major strikes, and Riots - represented a significant proportion compared to similar events during the entire Modern period.

The second sub-period, 1951-54, witnessed an increase in the volume of mass protest and political violence. Table 3.1 demonstrates that political violence of this sub-period was greater than the former in both frequency and level of extremity. Not only did the events of this sub-period account for 20.5% of all political violence of the Modern period, but the magnitude of political violence increased to the level of government crisis.

This was indeed a time when political ideology began to take form, and nationalism in particular was on the upsurge. Party rivalry for the control of political power became more acute especially in the light of the first general elections held under universal adult suffrage in 1953. The volume of political protest naturally increased and took the form of both demonstrations and strikes, most of which were organized by the

P.P.P. For example, the P.P.P. was directly or indirectly involved in bringing about no less than eleven of the fourteen instances (78.5%) of Anti-government demonstrations and all of the eight major strikes between the years 1951 and 1954.

A P.P.P. landslide victory at the polls in 1953 was soon followed by a crisis of political authority. A few months after the party's assumption of office, the then governor of British Guiana recommended the suspension of the constitution under the pretext that the party was planning massive violence as part of a communist inspired programme. The suspension of the constitution was accompanied by a declaration of a state of emergency and a purge of influential leaders of the P.P.P., some being imprisoned while others were restricted in their movements and activities.³

One of the consequences of this atmosphere of emergency was the drastic curtailment of political activities, especially protest movements. Thus the following sub-period, 1955-58, represented a very low point in terms of both the volume and the

level of political violence. This sub-period accounts for only 6.4% of political violence events as shown in Table 3.1. After the suspension of the Guyana constitution in 1954 an interim, a care-taker government was set up comprising of some carefully selected members of the local elite who were at least not hostile to British policies.⁴ The interim government ruled by means of a coercive approach evidenced by the presence of British troops in the colony and the continuing purge of political opposition under the emergency regulations.⁵

The energy for open political protest against the interim regime seemed, however, to have been replaced by the occurrence of internal party strife. A major split in the ranks of the P.P.P. in 1955 led to further divisions and setback for the nationalist response among Guyanese people. The split was occasioned by a conflict over party leadership between Cheddi Jagan and Forbes Burnham, two founder members of the party.

Jagan, the original leader, contended that the recommendations of the Robertson Commission, sent by the British government to investigate the

circumstances surrounding the suspension of the Guyana constitution, influenced the moderates to attempt to take control of the party as a necessary prelude to the re-introduction of parliamentary democracy in Guyana. The further contention of Jagan and other notable political observers was that the ambitious Mr. Burnham saw himself as leader of this moderate section and therefore conspired to usurp the leadership from Jagan, thus engineering the split in the party in 1955.⁶

Burnham and his followers, on the other hand, contended that the reason for the break with Jagan was based on ideological differences coupled with the belief that Jagan himself was an incompetent blunderer. A second reservation of the Burnhamites about the Jagan leadership was the fear that Jagan was too intimately aligned to the international Communist line with its base in Moscow.⁷

But whether for one reason or the other, the important point of this observation is that the split occasioned a process of rebuilding two separate party apparatuses to the neglect of concerted action against the interim regime which was obviously an

unwanted imposition upon the majority of the Guyanese people.

The general elections in 1957 demonstrated a relatively low level of mobilization and involvement of the voting population, in spite of the fact that several parties, including the two factions of the original P.P.P. - the Jaganite and the Burnhamite factions - competed at the polls.⁸ This election, fought under close British supervision, saw the return to power of the Jagan faction of the P.P.P. under a reformed constitution which largely restricted the capacity for independent actions on the part of the new regime.⁹

The return of popular government to Guyana had the effect of gradually speeding up the rate of political agitation and activity during the 1959-62 sub-period which accounts for about 14% of political violence events. This sub-period also demonstrated a much higher level of magnitude (compared to the previous sub-period) in that two instances of government crisis were observed. The first crisis was evidenced by a threat of a parliamentary defeat

for the Jagan government in 1959 when a cabinet minister and a prominent P.P.P. parliamentarian were purged from the party.¹⁰ The second crisis which was much more severe was evidenced by the imposition of martial law in 1962 when mounting protests against the Jagan regime over budget proposals led to a major riot in the city of Georgetown.¹¹

The 1962 riot represented the high point of political violence of this sub-period, not only because of its threat to the stability of the governing regime after its recent victory at the polls, but also because it wrought much destruction in terms of the loss of lives, extensive damage to property mainly through arson, and widespread looting of business premises.¹² Further, this riot had the effect of increasing racial animosity following the polarization of the political struggle along racial lines.¹³

It would appear that the emphasis on race in Guyana politics was largely reflected in one of the fiercest rivalries manifested in the highest extremes of political violence during the 1963-66

sub-period. This sub-period accounts for some 30% of all political violence events during the Modern period. Political and racial strife expressed itself in the most violent forms reaching the extremes of guerilla warfare of which sporadic bombings, sniping, and underground military movements were the most prevalent.

Between 1963 and 1965 no less than 18 major bombing incidents, directed mainly at offices and other property belonging to the government, were reported. Several private homes were also dynamited or burnt. Secret plans outlining operations and training for guerilla warfare were discovered by the police.¹⁴ In addition guerilla tactics were combined with overt pressures by organized labour and political movements seeking to oust the regime in a wave of anti-government hostility provoked by the introduction in parliament of a much disliked Labour Relations Bill.¹⁵

Increased trade union rivalry in the sugar estates also precipitated a spate of violence in the

rural areas where racial divisions are more in evidence.¹⁶ The consequence of this rural conflict further aggravated the already existing racial and political polarization in the country. Again a state of emergency was declared in 1963 and policed mainly by military troops brought in from Britain.¹⁷ As a consequence of the state of emergency certain fundamental rights of individuals were suspended and important political leaders were jailed or restricted.¹⁸ The continuation of these restrictions no doubt led to the drastic curtailment of political agitation and protest activities which, as a consequence, inhibited the volume and level of political violence during the following sub-period.

The very high level of popular mobilization and involvement of the Guyanese people during this sub-period is reflected in the high percentage turnout at the polls in the latter part of 1964.¹⁹ The creation of a new political party, The United Force (UF), brought a new contender for political power during this election. The results of this election, fought under a new electoral system of

Proportional Representation, succeeded in ousting the Jagan regime and brought into government a coalition of forces between Burnham's new party, the People's National Congress (PNC), and the United Force.

The last sub-period investigated, 1967-70, witnessed a return to a state of relative calm in the political process of Guyana. The volume of political violence events dropped to about 11%. Yet it was during the latter part of this sub-period that a sudden and unexpected outbreak of rebellion took place in the Rupununi, a border region in the interior of Guyana, among the hitherto neglected Amerindian population. This event although relatively small in scale was equipped with very modern weapons of war, and represented a direct confrontation with government military forces. By the time the rebellion was suppressed by the government forces, several policemen and an unknown number of Amerindians were killed in the process. At the same time a number of the ringleaders sought refuge in the neighbouring country, Venezuela.²⁰

The attainment of political independence from the British in 1966, and the general elections of 1968 which replaced the coalition government by a single party (PNC) majority government, might indeed have contributed to a lessening of political discontent among the population. The previous coalition government was itself an unstable experiment between two parties which were ideologically at odds.²¹ The result was a destruction of the coalition after the purge of several U.F. ministers from the cabinet and the withdrawal of the other U.F. members from the government in 1968.²²

The year 1970, however, did not mark the end of political conflict and violence in Guyana. Trade union and political party rivalries still continue to aggravate the prevailing uneasy situation in Guyana already rent by racial polarization and seemingly inevitable strife. So far, however, the years 1962, 1963 and 1964 represented an unparalleled degree of political violence which had seriously threatened the stability of the political system at

the time and left a legacy of potential instability for the future.

But the particular incident of the Modern period which provokes the curiosity of the political scientist is the unexpected Rupununi uprising in 1969. This event represents a rebellion of a peculiar sort. Unlike most domestic rebellions which seek to replace the current regime or the central government by another, this was a rebellion more in the nature of a secession movement. It would seem as though the primary hope of the leaders of this rebellion was to be independent of the central government and to seek some accommodation with Venezuela, a foreign country at the border. It is claimed that the movement was itself financed and equipped by Venezuelan authorities. To the extent that this is true, the uprising represents more than a domestic rebellion and smacks to a large extent of external aggression.²³

Government crises during the Modern period seem to have been either precipitated or followed by purges of political opposition as in the years

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1953, 1963 and 1964. This observation suggests that one type of political violence event can indeed precipitate another.²⁴ A corresponding trend is observed in the cases where instances of strikes give rise to riots as was more notable during the Transition period, or in the special case witnessed during the Modern period where a major strike can also be accompanied by a series of other events ranging from demonstrations and riots on the lower extreme, to government crisis and guerilla warfare on the higher. A notable instance of this latter case was the 80-days general strike called by the Trade Union Congress (TUC) in 1963 in opposition to government policy.²⁵

CONCLUSION

The Modern period, as was expected, witnessed a significant increase in the volume of political violence particularly in the frequency of the lower level events ranging from Anti-government demonstrations to Riots. Yet, although the more extreme forms of violence were less frequent during this period, the overall proportion,

of these extreme events was not significantly different from that of similar events during the previous Transition period. In addition, it was in the Modern period that all categories of political violence were for the first time prevalent. Relatively rare events such as Purges were conspicuously absent during the pre-modern periods. Popular involvement in political violence also tended to increase, while on the other hand, the relative duration of the events tended to decrease as the political system became more modern.

The explanation for the increase in frequency of political violence could no doubt be attributed to the relative openness of the political system of the Modern period which removed through constitutional guarantees and the like, the legal restrictions placed on a wide variety of political activity.²⁶ Thus the lower levels of political violence came to be accepted as legitimate and even at times rewarding forms of political agitation and

articulation of popular demand. In the meantime legal restrictions and the possibility of serious punishment are still maintained on the higher forms of political violence ranging from riots to rebellion, with the effect, no doubt, of lessening the probability of the occurrence of these more extreme forms of expressing political demand.

The facility for overt political participation allowable in the Modern period had the effect of increasing the growth of political and related organizations, which in turn encouraged the mobilization of an increased number of participants in political violence activities. The emphasis on mass participation and involvement in the political process heightened the degree of competitiveness for political power, a process which gave rise to the polarization of the forces contending for power. Thus purges, as an instrument of eliminating opposition in competition, became prevalent in the relatively highly organized political process of the Modern period.

That the duration of political violence events tended to decrease during the Modern period

is no doubt attributable to the relatively circumscribed nature of the events such as demonstrations and strikes which had considerably increased in volume during this period. In addition, greater institutional means for conflict resolution existed during this period making it possible to terminate political conflict at a faster rate. The fact, for example, that a variety of capably organized interest groups existed in this period made it possible for grievances to be managed at the level of the particular organization itself, thereby terminating the dispute before it blossoms out into more unmanageable proportions.²⁷

One factor which seems to be of significance during this period compared to the previous periods is the relative decrease in the proportion of major strikes. This is no doubt attributable to the fact that the emergence of various political parties tended to displace the trade union as the recognized and legitimate avenue of political interest articulation. Demands of an expressly political nature are now monopolized by the political party and only delegated to trade unions

when the strike weapon is considered as a necessary strategy for political successes.

The Modern period, then, seems to have borne out more clearly the proposition that the nature of the political system and the character of political and related organizations affect both the volume and the level of political violence. The more open political system of the Modern period allowed for the formation of a variety of political and related organizations capable of mobilizing greater numbers of people in the political process, with the effect of increasing the volume of political protests and the lower levels of political violence events.

At the same time the relatively more open avenues for political communication and interest articulation tended to reduce reliance on the more extreme forms of political violence as means of resolving political demand, and also to reduce the duration of political violence events in the light of greater facilities and more effective machinery for conflict regulation.

CHAPTER VI

THE ORGANIZATIONAL DIMENSION IN POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Organizations play a crucial role in the process of political violence, particularly in developing countries where the pace of modernization is relatively slow. The principal effect of organizations interacting in the political process is the tendency to increase the volume (or frequency) of political violence events while at the same time limiting the extremity of any particular event in the political system. In Guyana, and perhaps in most developing states, political and labour organizations, as opposed to other voluntary associations, are dominant precipitating factors of political violence episodes.

Organizations represent self-conscious groupings of individuals for the pursuit of common interests or objectives.¹ Often the very existence of organizations creates favourable conditions for the occurrence of conflict, especially if the varying interests involve incompatible relationships among groups in the existing political system.²

When the purpose of the organization is to pursue

primarily political objectives such as the control of political power, inter-organizational conflict often takes on violent proportions. Thus organizations such as political parties are often the most significant precipitators of political violence. Also, the very close relationship between political parties and trade unions, particularly in developing countries, tends to predispose the latter to a high degree of involvement in political violence activities.

It is through organizations, too, that foreign intervention in domestic politics often plays a significant role in influencing the occurrence of political violence. Foreign influences often operate within either the political party or the trade union with the purpose of inducing political change or combating what might be considered an alien ideology. Organizations then are the central instruments of translating both domestic and foreign demand for political changes into the active motor, as it were, for the generation of political violence, especially in developing states.

In the Guyana context "organizations" would

be understood to represent groupings such as political parties, trade unions, cultural or ethnic associations, and other voluntary associations which are self-consciously organized for the pursuit of some particular interest for the general benefit of the members. A list of these political, labour and other voluntary associations in Guyana can be viewed in Appendices C(i) to C(iii).

The principal hypothesis to be examined within the context of the Resource Control Model outlined in Chapter I suggests that conditions which facilitate the increase in organized participation in the political process tend to produce an increase in the volume (or frequency) of the lower extremes of political violence, and at the same time to decrease reliance on the more extreme types of political violence in the political system. On the other hand, conditions which inhibit the activation of organized popular participation tend to increase the probability of the more extreme or revolutionary types of political violence.

If this is so then one would also expect that, under conditions allowing for increased popular participation, the greater proportion of political

Violence events would display some degree of organizational involvement. In other words some degree of organizational backing or leadership and instigation would accompany the major proportion of political violence events. The central hypothesis under examination seems to bear some resemblance to the view held by Frantz Fanon that the nature of the competition between political organizations for political power in the colonized world gives rise mainly to reformist agitations such as mass demonstrations, strikes and the like, which tend to inhibit the outbreak of the more violent revolution which Fanon believes is necessary for the independence and development of the colonized peoples.³

THE ANALYSIS

The analysis of the Guyana data on political violence has already revealed that the frequency of political violence events tended to increase as the political system became more modern or open to mass participation. The relative openness of the political system during the Modern period provides the explanation for the observed increase in the incidence of political violence.

It is also probable that the growth of organized political movements competing for political power during this period is a direct contributing factor to the increased volume of political violence.

A close examination of the Modern period suggests support for the main hypothesis, since a close positive correspondence is observed between the degree of organized political competitiveness and the volume of political violence relative to each sub-period. Such support would seem to be suggested in Table 4.1 if, for example, the level of political competitiveness and organized participation could be judged from both the rate of turnout at the polls and the amount of political parties contending for political power at each general election within the relevant sub-period.

Table 4.1 suggests that the 1964 elections demonstrate both the highest proportion of voting turnout (97%) and the highest number of political parties (8) competing for political power at a single election. On the other hand the 1957 elections represented

TABLE 4.1

No of Competing Parties and Percentage Polling at

Elections Between 1947 and 1968 Inclusive

Election Year	No. of Parties	% Polling	No. of Political Violence Events	Victorious Parties
1947	2	70	1	Nil
1953	5	75	13	P.P.P. (Jagan and Burnham)
1957	5	56	3	P.P.P. (Jaganite)
1961	5	89	11	P.P.P. (Jaganite)
1964	8	97	11	P.N.C./U.F. (coalition)
1968	4	85	2	P.N.C.

Sources: (a) Annual Report of British Guiana; (b) Elections Reports;

(c) R. T. Smith, British Guiana, London, 1962; (d) for Political Violence, see Table (11) Appendix F, (p 443c)

the lowest degree of polling (56%) during the Modern period.

When the rate of voting turnout is correlated with the volume of political violence relative to each election year, we obtain, on the basis of Spearman's Rho, a coefficient of .42. Although the correlation coefficient seems rather lower than should be expected, the fact that voting turnout is a rather insufficient measure for the general level of political competitiveness might still make the coefficient of .42 a reasonably adequate value suggesting a positive relationship with political violence.

When, however, the number of competing parties at the various elections is correlated with volume of political violence we obtain the rather high coefficient of $Rho = .73$ and $Tau = .75$.

Regarding .66 as an acceptable minimum correlation within significant limits for Rho with $n=6$, the coefficient of .73 is therefore significant for the prediction of a high positive relationship between the more organized events, in contrast to what Bwy termed "anomic" events,⁴ and the volume of political violence.

Perhaps the more appropriate approach to understanding the impact of organized movements on the proliferation of political violence activities is to examine the extent to which the different types of independent organizations in Guyana were involved in the various political violence events during the Modern period. That the greater proportion of events involved the active participation of independently established organizations is borne out in Table 4.2.

As Table 4.2 demonstrates, 82% of all events during the Modern period suggested some form of organizational involvement, the greater proportion of which (47%) involved political parties. Only 18% of all cases showed no obvious signs of organizational involvement. The central role of the trade union movement in the political process, especially during the earlier years of the Modern period, would seem to explain the relatively dominant position of labour organizations, accounting for 31% of involvement in political violence activities.

Each sub-period also demonstrates a higher proportion of organizational as opposed to non-organizational involvement in political violence events.

TABLE 4.2
Extent of Organizational Involvement in Political Violence Events

During The Modern Period

Extent and type of Organizational Involvement: % of Events

SUB-PERIODS	Political Party	Labour Union	Other (ethnic, religious)	No organiza- tion	Total %	Total n
1947-50	25	50	0	25	100	28
1951-54	66	17	0	17	100	30
1955-58	60	30	0	10	100	11
1959-62	53	27	10	10	100	19
1963-66	46	23	11	20	100	44
1967-70	40	53	0	7	100	15
Total n.	69	46	7	25	-	147
%	47	31	4	18	100	-

Also the majority of sub-periods witnessed a higher degree of political as opposed to non-political types of organizational involvement in these events.

Prior to the Modern period, political organizations tended to be transient in the sense that they easily disintegrated soon after the attainment of their particular, and often limited, objective. The restrictions on mass participation during the Immigration and Transition periods tended also to restrict the growth of organizations capable of competing for political power. Only small-scale trade union organizations tended to flourish to any significant degree during the Transition period.

One characteristic of this trend would seem to be the tendency for the relatively more transient types of organizations during the earlier periods to give way to the more permanent and autonomous types of organization during the Modern period. The significant point about this observation is that as conditions became more amenable to mass participation in the political process, political organizations tended to become more of an independent variable

capable of determining the outcome and extent of most political activities including political violence events.

As has been observed, one type of independent organization which played a dynamic role in the political process of Guyana is the trade union, especially during the earlier Modern period. The militant posture of the trade union movement is reflected in the relatively high proportion of major strikes during the earlier Modern period, that is, between 1947 and 1954. This trend is illustrated in Table 4.3.

TABLE 4.3

Proportion of Major Strikes to Total Number of Strikes:

Average Per Year

PERIOD	Mean No. of Strikes per Year.	Mean No. of Major Strikes per Year.	Proportion of Major to Total Strikes. %
1947-50	34	2	6
1951-54	26	2	8
1955-58	42	0	0
1959-62	46	1	.2
1963-66	130	2	2
1967-70	143	3	2

Source: Annual Report, Ministry of Labour, (1947-1970).

The years following 1954 seem to represent a significant decrease in the proportion of Major strikes to total number of all strikes. This trend is no doubt due to the fact that the emergence of specialized political parties created a division of labour with respect to political demand on the one hand, and labour industrial questions on the other. However it would appear that the total absolute volume of Major strikes was consistently on the increase since 1963. A similar pattern could be gleaned from Table 4.2 which indicates that the extent of involvement of labour organizations in political violence events increased from 23% to 53% of events between 1963 and 1970. This trend is no doubt indicative of an increased degree of coincidence between political and labour demands following the apparently most effective and lengthy political strike by the T.U.C. during the 1963-64 sub-period of extreme political violence.⁵

THE ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Among the various organizations which were active in episodes of political violence during the

Modern period political parties played the paramount role of both instigating and directing most of the events. The first mass based political party, the P.P.P., was conceived, from its inception in 1950, as a protest organization in opposition to British Colonial rule.⁶ As such, the very dawn of the Modern era in Guyana witnessed a burgeoning of anti-government protest and demonstrations. Protest activities also extended to major strikes and riots during this early Modern period. As the Modern period progressed, political parties were directly involved in the most extreme forms of political violence including guerilla warfare and rebellion.

Political parties are in effect a significant feature only of the Modern period in Guyana. It was during the Modern period also that political violence became a more regularized feature in the political process in Guyana. The fact also that the range of ideological orientation of the various parties extends from the very conservative on the one extreme, to the very progressive and revolutionary on the other extreme, contributes to the intensity of the interaction between parties, and

the aggravation of a currently tense conflict situation. Appendix C(i) gives an indication of the number and ideological orientation of the various parties created over the years since 1946 in Guyana.

Political party involvement in collective violence events is evidenced in Guyana as early as the Enmore riots of 1948. Although the spread of the disturbances then was a direct result of the intensive rivalry between two trade unions, the MPCA and GIWU, for control of the sugar workers, important political personalities and groupings were also deeply involved in the events. For example, popular politicians including Dr. and Mrs. Jagan who were both instrumental in the creation of the early political group, the Political Affairs Committee (P.A.C.), were said to have "addressed the strikers at different estates and at different times" during the Enmore disturbances.⁷ It was also observed that P.A.C. bulletins were circulated freely at these meetings.⁸

The Report of the Enmore Commission of Enquiry suggested that there was a tendency for "mis-statements and exaggerated comment" to be made by

these early politicians who were later to dominate the political life of the country for the next fifteen years. The Commission also revealed evidence to suggest that spokesmen closely associated with the P.A.C. were overheard to have advised the workers that "no strike can succeed without violence."⁹

Out of the P.A.C. which was so militant during the Enmore disturbances, was formed the People's Progressive Party (PPP) in 1950. By 1953 the P.P.P. had become highly instrumental in awakening national consciousness and mobilizing the greater proportion of the Guyanese masses for direct involvement in the political process. The Robertson Commission which enquired into the reasons for the suspension of the Guyana Constitution in 1953, reported that the rise of the P.P.P. to power had "greatly increased the awareness of the common man of his political environment".¹⁰ The Commissioners concluded that they were at the time "inclined to think that such a widespread political consciousness is a recent growth..."¹¹

Further, it was the opinion of the Robertson Commission that the P.P.P. and its leadership were

"irretrievably committed" to a policy of disruption of the existing political or constitutional process.¹² From the P.P.P. election manifesto of 1953 the Commissioners cited in support of their argument certain communications expressly urging the people "to fight for independence, striking blow after blow at the imperialist stronghold."¹³

The direct involvement of the political party in the trade union disputes was reflected in the attendance of a P.P.P. member of Parliament, Mr. Sydney King, at an executive committee meeting of the GIWU on the 30th August, 1953. It appeared that after the intervention of the party official, who was not a member or official of the GIWU, the union immediately called for a general strike in the sugar industry which was to commence the next day. No official reason was given for the strike until about a week later. But it was asserted by the Commission that the ultimate intention of the party leaders was to exploit the industrial conflict "for their own political purposes."¹⁴

During the course of the GIWU strike, which lasted for 25 days, P.P.P. ministers toured

the sugar estates and urged their followers to fully support the strike action. In the process, over-enthusiastic supporters attempted to intimidate non-strikers through selective acts of violence such as the killing or maiming of the latter's cattle, and the flooding or burning of their rice fields. Attacks upon the sugar industry took the form of extensive burning of canefields.¹⁵

The Commission also cited evidence of an alleged arson plot by the P.P.P. with the intention of burning down Georgetown.¹⁶ From these incidents the Robertson Commission drew the conclusion that the P.P.P. and its leadership were "relentless and unscrupulous in their determination to pervert the authority of Government to their own disruptive and undemocratic ends."¹⁷

The determination of the British Colonial authority to get rid of the P.P.P. government in 1953 was reflected in the largely unsubstantiated charges made against the new government in a White Paper published on the 30th October, 1953. As a means of justifying the intended suspension of the constitution, eleven charges were listed against the

P.P.P. ministers as follows: 18

- (1) Fomenting Strikes for political ends.
- (2) Attempting to oust established trade unions by legislative action.
- (3) Removal of the ban on entry of West Indian Communists.
- (4) Introduction of a bill to repeal the Undesirable Publications Ordinance and the flooding of the territory with Communist literature.
- (5) Misuse of rights of appointments to Boards and Committees.
- (6) Spreading of racial hatred.
- (7) Plan to secularize church schools and to rewrite text books to give them a political bias.
- (8) Neglect of their administrative duties.
- (9) Undermining the loyalty of the police.
- (10) Attempts to gain control of the public service.
- (11) Threats of violence.

The importance of these charges lies not so much in whether they were based on suspicion or on actual evidence, but in the extent of the reaction of the British Government which indeed saw the P.P.P. as a significant threat to colonial authority. The response of the British Government was not only

limited to the suspension of the constitution but extended to the imposition of a state of emergency throughout the colony, and the attempt to suppress the P.P.P. through the arrest and imprisonment or restriction of party leaders. Further the strategy for the destruction of the P.P.P. also involved the sowing of strife within the ranks of the party, the result of which was the split in the party in 1955.

The resulting Jaganite faction of the P.P.P. seemed, however, to have been sufficiently strong to continue the policy of infiltration of trade unions and fomenting political agitation especially among the sugar workers. After Jagan's return to power in 1957, political agitation among trade unions was kept alive through the instrumentality of party cells operating basically in the vicinity of the sugar estates.¹⁹ Despres suggests that the P.P.P. was prepared to go to the extreme of providing the required resources for strikers, including both the platform and the pickets. In one instance of a strike of the Sugar Estates' Clerks Association at Skeldon in 1960 the P.P.P. engineered the collection of food and

money for the Clerks who were encouraged to remain on strike.²⁰

The extent of party control over workers in protest is reflected in the ability of the P.P.P. to transfer its picket demonstrations over distances involving several miles. In May 1961, for example, the P.P.P. sent demonstrators from Port Mourant to Georgetown - a distance of nearly a hundred miles - to picket the office of the Man Power Citizens' Association (MPCA), a rival union, over a disagreement concerning workers' pension scheme.²¹

Direct party involvement in political violence events was witnessed in 1962 when a combined effort of the various opposition parties attempted to oust the P.P.P. government. The pretext for the disturbances then was a Budget proposal by the Government which imposed increased taxes on the business sector of the Guyanese society. It was not surprising that the principal antagonist against the government then was the United Force (U.F.), a party which is very closely identified with the wealthy business section of the community, and led by a very successful businessman.

Mr. Peter D'Aguiar. The P.N.C. also saw the opportunity to defeat the government and so closed ranks with the U.F. in opposition to the Budget.²²

In addition, these political parties were joined by various trade union organizations in their struggle against the P.P.P. government. The Commission of Inquiry into the disturbances in February 1962 observed as follows:

"..... in the beginning of February there were arrayed against the Government the political parties, the opposition and also a very large body of workers and civil servants, all carrying their respective grievances against the government. It was not long before these forces combined to form a veritable torrent of abuse, recrimination and vicious hostility directed against Dr. Jagan and his Government and each day gave fresh vigour to the agitation."²³

Meanwhile the P.P.P. government claimed that it possessed evidence of a plot engineered by opposition elements to assassinate the Premier and some of his ministers, and to actually carry through a plan of violence "on a general scale".²⁴ As if by way of justification for the continued agitation in Georgetown, the opposition party leader, Mr. Burnham, complained that Dr. Jagan had earlier incited his supporters in the country areas and urged them to

come to Georgetown "in order to provoke an outbreak of violence so that he could justifiably call in the British troops to help him".²⁵

The following year another proposed legislation, the Labour Relations Bill, provided the pretext for direct party involvement in political violence. Again a combined opposition of political parties and the trade union movement attempted to bring down the P.P.P. government. Handbills from opposing political groups indicated the violent mood of the anti-Jagan population in Georgetown at the time.²⁶ One handbill read in part:

Let us not be afraid to STRIKE
Let us not be afraid to BE STRUCK
Let us not be afraid to SHOOT
Let us not be afraid to BE SHOT
Let us not be afraid of ANYTHING BECAUSE
VICTORY is at hand.
If VIOLENCE becomes unavoidable, we must
be as RUTHLESS AND MORE DESTRUCTIVE than
CHEDDI'S Armed Forces.

Opposition to the Jagan government took the very extreme form of planning and operating guerilla activities against the regime. Evidence of a large scale insurrection plot, codenamed X-13, was discovered by the police at the headquarters of the P.N.C., the then major opposition

party.²⁷ Jagan has observed a disclosure from the X-13 plan that the leader of the guerilla operations was himself "responsible directly to Comrade L.F.S. Burnham" as leader of the P.N.C., for "projects, plans etc... he would be adviser, organizer and co-ordinator."²⁸

An indication of the extent of the threat to the Jagan regime is revealed in an open letter written by Jagan to the Colonial Secretary in the London Tribune. Jagan wrote:

Surely, you have not forgotten the two secret reports of August and September 1963 of the Security Branch of the Police which I handed to you in November 1964 headed "P.N.C. Terrorist Organization" outlining the activities of what the Commissioner of Police later called "an organized thuggery" which is centrally directed, in which leading members of the P.N.C. were cited for being responsible for the bombing of government and other buildings, arson and general intimidation and terror.²⁹

The violence of 1963 spilled over into another episode in the following year when a P.P.P. inspired strike in the sugar industry in opposition to the British imposition of a new electoral system based on Proportional Representation, engulfed the entire country in a spate of racial violence. It

was however, contended that violence against the P.P.P. regime continued until P.N.C. involvement was finally exposed on August 9th, 1964, when the police raided the hotel room of a P.N.C. activist and discovered a massive cache of arms, ammunition and explosives.³⁰

Extreme political violence was not again to have raised its head until 1969 when a group of ranchers and native Amerindians in the Rupununi area rebelled against the newly created P.N.C. regime. Although on the surface the Rupununi uprising seemed to have been rather spontaneous, evidence was disclosed by the regime suggesting at least the clandestine involvement of the U.F., one of the opposition parties which had widespread electoral support in the area.³¹

It would seem then that political party involvement in political violence has been rather commonplace in Guyana, and ranged from the low to the high extremes of events. There was however a tendency for party involvement to be more direct with respect to the lower levels of violence and relatively more

indirect when the level of violence became more extreme. More direct involvement of political parties was also witnessed in the earlier periods than in the later periods when violence began to assume greater racial configurations.

THE ROLE OF TRADE UNIONS IN POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Trade unions had an earlier career of political protest dating back to 1917 when formal political parties had not yet been conceived. The earlier involvement of trade unions had however been relatively sporadic. Yet the range of their earlier involvement covered both the lower and higher extremes of political violence in almost even proportion. Trade unions were instrumental in initiating demonstrations and strikes which in turn ^{often} gave rise to riots or rebellion on the higher extremes of political protest.

During the Modern period, however, with the emergence of political parties a specialization of function seemed to have taken place in which trade unions concentrated mainly on the lower extremes (turmoil events) while political parties

dominated the higher extremes (internal war events) of political violence. While also the earlier Modern period witnessed very close collaboration between political parties and trade unions, a tendency for trade unions to become more independent of parties was observed during the later Modern period, particularly after 1953. A list of the variety of trade unions operating in Guyana in 1961 is given in Appendix C(ii).

Perhaps the more tenacious problem which in the labour movement gives rise to serious episodes of political violence is rivalry among trade unions particularly in the sugar industry. As early as 1946 domestic dispute within the Man Power Citizens Association (MPCA), the recognized trade union for sugar workers, led to the establishment of a new rival union, The Guiana Industrial Workers Union (GIWU). This latter union soon became directly allied to the People's Progressive Party (P.P.P.). From its inception, the GIWU followed a "vigorous campaign for the enrollment of members of the new union and for

destroying the influence of the MPCA" in the sugar areas.³² The major strike and riot at Enmore in 1948 were largely the result of fierce rivalry between these two unions.

The GIWU's interest in the Enmore strike seemed to have been much more far-reaching than that of the MPCA. While the latter union was content to order a return to work on the basis of a slight increase in pay, the GIWU demanded much greater benefits for the workers, since they claimed that "the sugar estates were making huge profits" which should warrant the payment of proper wages, or else "the government would have to take over the estates, and transfer the land in sections to the workers who would profitably cultivate them."³³ Thus the GIWU attempted to make full propaganda of the issue in support of a more political or ideological struggle.

The Enmore commission further observed that before and during the strike the GIWU seemed to have been "urging the workers on to an aggravated sense of grievance in opposition to the

recognized, MPCA" which was described as "striving for the adjustment of all grievance by the established procedure which provides for negotiation with the employers before the strike."³⁴ The escalation of the strike into a general riot seemed to have been a direct result of the relatively extreme level of demands made by the GIWU which called for total mobilization of the sugar workers. The agitational activities of one GIWU activist, David Alfred, who sought work as a cane cutter during the week immediately before the outbreak of the strike, seemed to have been suggestive of a deliberate attempt on the part of the GIWU to foment political unrest among the sugar workers.³⁵

It would appear as though the strategy of the GIWU for obtaining its demand for recognition involved calling a strike every year until such demands were met.³⁶ In 1953, in particular, a colony-wide sugar strike was called for the same purpose, but also to give the newly elected P.P.P. Government a pretext for introducing a Labour Relations Bill to secure the

compulsory recognition of trade unions.³⁷ The Bill was however frustrated in light of the suspension of the Constitution and the dismissal of the P.P.P. Government from office by the end of 1953.

During the 1962 disturbances, trade unions worked hand in hand with political parties in opposition to the Jagan regime and the famous Kaldor budget.³⁸ The T.U.C., for example, on one occasion provided the cover and platform for the PNC to address hostile crowds when the latter party was in the first place denied police permission to hold a public meeting.³⁹ It was, however, in 1963 that the T.U.C. took extreme action in calling a general strike lasting for 80 days against the regime, this time in opposition to another proposed Labour Relations Bill which the T.U.C. described as an attempt by the regime to control the labour movement.⁴⁰

In another incident the T.U.C. was also joined by the P.N.C. in a demonstration in Georgetown against unemployment. The demonstration got out of hand when it encountered P.P.P. and P.Y.O. (youth arm of the P.P.P.) picketers against the

Colonial Government which was accused of delaying political independence for Guyana. It was reported at this stage that the T.U.C. demonstrators were shouting "we don't want independence."⁴¹

In the following year, 1964, the P.P.P. sponsored Guyana Agricultural Workers Union (GAWU) an offshoot of the GIWU, called a general strike in the sugar industry. The real motive of the leaders of the strike seemed to have been opposition to the plan, imposed by the colonial office, which instituted Proportional Representation as a new form of electoral system. Soon the strike extended into widespread racial violence when strikers who were mainly East Indians harassed and also shot strike breakers, many of whom were Africans on the West Coast of Demerara. By the time the GAWU strike was called off, a great number of people were killed or injured in the process.

The role of the trade unions in political violence seemed therefore to be basically a direct involvement, especially in the lower extremes of political violence such as Major strikes and

Anti-government demonstrations. When, however, political violence became more extreme in the form as demonstrated in Riots, Rebellion and the like, the involvement of trade unions tended to become more indirect or clandestine. At this stage the political parties became the intermediary between trade unions and political violence. Trade unions tended to develop closer alliance with political parties during events of the more extreme levels of political violence.

THE ROLE OF OTHER VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS

The involvement of other (non-political) organizations in political violence events in Guyana centered around three types of organized communities: (a) ethnic organizations, (b) business organizations and (c) the press. The role, however, of these organizations was negligible compared to that of the political and labour organizations in Guyana's political process. These voluntary organizations seem more to become like "pawns" for the manipulation of political interests by the more political organizations. As such, the

involvement of these non-political organizations has been basically indirect in the process of political violence.

During the Enmore riots, 1948, the British Guyana East Indian Association (BGEIA), an ethnic organization, was indirectly involved in the incidents. Since the majority of sugar workers were East Indians, many of whom belonged to the BGEIA, it was natural to expect that the ethnic organization would play some part at least of channelling the grievance of sugar workers. In addition two of the most prominent executive members of the GIWU which played a dominant role in the events were themselves top executive officers of the BGEIA.⁴²

It was, however, when political violence became more extreme that ethnic organizations became more prominent in their role of aggravating the existing popular grievances. The most extreme violent sub-period, 1962-64, witnessed significant levels of participation on the part of ethnic-cultural organizations such as the African Society for Cultural Relations with Independent Africa (ASCRIA), an African based organization, and the

East Indian based religious organization, the Hindu Maha Sabha. This latter organization in particular, along with other religious organizations, was instrumental in rendering voluntary assistance to the East Indian refugees who fled from Wismar following the extensive events of political violence in 1964.⁴³

To a large extent the involvement of ethnic organizations in political violence seems to be inevitably bound up with the close association between these organizations on the one hand, and political parties or trade unions on the other. Thus the close collaboration between the East Indians Association and the GIWU would seem to have automatically involved the former in trade union disputes and workers' grievances, in the same way as the later involvement of the GIWU with the P.P.P. enveloped ^{the} union in a volume of political protests often extending to political violence activities. The close association between these various organizations is illustrated in the diagram outlined in Figure VIII. A list of the relevant ethnic and cultural organizations is obtainable

FIGURE VIII

Cleavages Between Political Parties and Social Movements - 1953-68

Source: J.E. Greene, "Participation, Integration and Legitimacy as Indications of Developmental Change in the Politics of Guyana." Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 2 No. 3, Sept. 1972, p. 261.

in Appendix C(iii).

It was also during the sub-period witnessing the most extensive political violence episode that Business and Employers organizations became important as determining factors of the events. For example, the Chamber of Commerce representing what might be called "big business" in Georgetown contributed immensely to the strength of the anti-Jagan movement, in opposition to the infamous Kaldor budget in 1962. The Chamber issued an almost unanimous decision to encourage a general strike by closing the doors of business premises and even to pay their employees for the period they remained on strike.⁴⁴

On 6th of February, 1962 a meeting of the Chamber was called and passed the following resolution:

This Chamber in general meeting assembled, condemns many of the most significant items of the budget which are penal in their incidence, and considered not to be in the best interest of the country as a whole, and it is also resolved that a Select Committee be appointed to thoroughly investigate the impact of such sections on trade industry and Commerce generally, and to report back to the Chamber what action should be taken.⁴⁵

A few days after this resolution was passed, effective strike action was taken in conjunction with a "lock out" organized by the members of the hostile Chamber of Commerce. On February 10th, Thunder, the propaganda organ of the P.P.P., reported that "The Georgetown Chamber of Commerce has decided on a lock out." The paper continued, "there is now a formidable alliance between big business and the Workers Union."⁴⁶

The alliance between "big business" and the trade unions against the Jagan government was reinforced by the effective representation given the business and commercial community by the U.F. Mr. D'Aguiar, leader of the U.F. was also a prominent member of the Chamber of Commerce. It was however ironic to observe that Mr. D'Aguiar's own firm manufacturing aerated drinks did not go on strike.⁴⁷ The involvement of the business community in the boycott action against the Jagan regime had disastrous repercussions throughout the country in that many of the poorer elements of the population came close to the brink of

starvation.

Another organized community which was instrumental in the mobilization for political action, particularly of the elite section of the Guyanese society, was the press. The press however played an important role in influencing the trend of political violence during the 1962-64 sub-period more than at any other time during the Modern period in Guyana. At this time, also, the press had seemed to be closely allied with both the business sector of the society and the organized opposition movements against the Jagan regime.

The three most hostile newspapers were the Daily Chronicle, owned by Mr. P. S. D'Aguiar, leader of the U.F.; the Daily Argosy, edited by an Englishman who was extremely hostile to the P.P.P. regime; and the Guyana Graphic, owned by the Thompson's international enterprises in that order. The Wynn Parry Commission reported that during the 1962 disturbances, this particular section of the press "was strongly, almost viciously critical of the budget."⁴⁸ Some examples

of press hostility toward the Jagan regime and the Kaldor budget are indicated in the headlines and commentaries as revealed in Appendix D.

Further press hostility to the Jagan regime continued and even increased in momentum throughout the 1962-64 sub-period of political violence. A letter in the Daily Chronicle of June 20th, 1963 called on the Guyanese people to violently revolt against the regime "because where words have failed, force has prevailed." 49 The Evening Post on May 20th called for "more physical opposition" to counter the emergency measures imposed by the P.P.P. regime. 50

These press releases and exhortations might indeed appear to be mild compared to what usually obtains in some of the more developed countries where a wide variety and the more extreme forms of political opposition is tolerated. But the highly brittle structure upon which regime stability is built in the less developed and colonized world, as a result of a high degree of political sensitivity, transforms these apparently mild promptings into virtual powder

kegs preparing the ground for political unrest including disruptive forms of political violence.

It must be observed, however, that the impact of the press on political violence is most indirect since, firstly, its circulation is limited only to a small proportion of the population most of which represent a privileged section of the community and secondly, its function is useful mainly to the extent that it serves the purpose of political organization in the sense of awakening political interest and mobilizing the otherwise apathetic element of the population.

It would seem then that the other voluntary associations had less of an impact on political violence in Guyana compared to political parties or labour unions. The shift away from the former to the latter type of organizations seems also to represent a shift from the more indirect to the more direct type of involvement in political violence events. While also the more political organizations tended to be involved,

either directly or indirectly, in all levels of political violence, other types of organizations, including ethnic, cultural and business associations, seem to be confined in their indirect involvement mainly to the more extreme levels of political violence.

FOREIGN INTERVENTION AND ORGANIZATIONAL COMPLICITY

Being a colonized country for the greater part of its history, Guyana's political process has been, to a large extent, influenced by foreign forces. The type of foreign intervention, however, which has a rather more deliberate and calculated bearing on the process of political instability and violence would seem to be more a product of Modern times.

Although, of course, the Dutch utilized foreign auxiliaries to put down the Berbice and other slave insurrections, the nature of foreign intervention in the pre-modern periods was neither systematic nor sustained.⁵¹ During the Modern period, however, foreign intervention in domestic politics assumed ideological forms and became an

intrinsic part of the foreign policy and diplomacy of the colonial powers.

Another notable difference between the nature of foreign intervention in the past compared to that of the Modern period, is that whereas intervention in the past was basically defensive in the sense of preventing or stemming political violence activities, intervention during the Modern period took on the more aggressive overtone whereby foreign powers deliberately instigate political violence against particular regimes.

Foreign intervention during the Modern period differed from that of the earlier periods in yet another most important respect. While the earlier periods witnessed the more direct form of intervention in the form of the stationing or use of foreign troops or foreign auxiliaries, the approach during the Modern period was significantly more indirect and often clandestine. The objectives of such intervention were usually carried out expressly through local or domestic agents. It is of particular importance to this study that such local agents which were used as the vehicle for

foreign instigated political violence, were political and related organizations. In Guyana, the trade union movement in particular became the major instrument for the operations of foreign influence.

Perhaps the earliest incident of foreign intervention during the Modern period took place in 1953 when, as was noted before, the British Government, in an attempt to stem a suspected Communist tide in Guyana, imposed a state of martial law and suspended the Guyana Constitution. At this time therefore, the efforts on the part of foreign intervention were directed toward the destruction of a militant nationalist organization which was regarded as a threat to the established position of colonial authority. It has also been observed that British intervention in the form of the Robertson Commission was largely responsible for precipitating the split in the nationalist movement (the P.P.P.) in 1955.

The 1962-64 sub-period of extensive political violence, witnessed the massive efforts of a variety of foreign interests to direct the course of events in Guyana. This time the trade

union movement became the main instrument of national political disruption. Philip Reno contends that the United States was used as a base for the training of local trade union leaders, under the guise of AFL-CIO scholarships, to harass and disrupt the pro-communist P.P.P. regime.⁵² At the same time one of the major local trade unions, the MPCA, became the base for the operations of foreign organized interests.⁵³

Evidence of the involvement of foreign trade unionists in Guyana's politics after the 1961 elections is suggested by Dr. Jagan. He wrote:

The records show that there were far more visits of U.S. trade unionists to Guyana in the 18 months following the 1961 general elections than in the 18 years preceeding that election! The motive behind the sudden manifestation of interest was to organize opposition by trade unionists to our government.⁵⁴

The 80-day general strike ordered by the T.U.C. against the Jagan regime in 1963 seemed to have involved the direct intervention of both American and British intelligence agencies. Writing on the strike, the American columnist Drew Pearson concluded as follows:

The strike was secretly inspired by a combination of U.S. Central Intelligence Agency money and British Intelligence. It gave London the excuse it wanted. British

Guiana has not yet received its independence and another communist government at the bottom of the one-time American lake has been temporarily stopped.⁵⁵

In counter to this argument, however, official U.S. sources contend that the 1964 violence in Guyana was encouraged largely, by Cuban authorities who offered training to about 300 to 400 P.P.P. activists.⁵⁶

Foreign intervention from a much different source took place during the 1969 Rupununi uprising. It has been contended that the Rupununi movement against the Burnham regime had been inspired by Venezuelan sources which had earlier claimed that part of Guyana's territory. A New York Times report of January 5th, 1969 commented as follows:

Colin Melville, a 21 year old rebel who surrendered with a machine gun was said to have revealed that rebels were trained in Venezuela to use bazookas and machine guns and flown back to Guyana in Venezuelan planes. It was also reported that the modern equipment used by the rebels to capture Lethem and police outposts was supplied by Venezuelans.

Venezuelan complicity in the Rupununi uprising caused almost a diplomatic rift with Guyana when Venezuelan authorities returned a note

sent by the Guyana government accusing Venezuela of "arming, training and transporting ranchers currently staging a rebellion in the Rupununi district".⁵⁷ Efforts have also been made to implicate the United Force with the foreign instigated Rupununi rebellion. In fact some of the leaders of this uprising were themselves top officers in the U.F. party. Thus the link between foreign forces and domestic political organization became once again evident in this most extreme uprising in 1969.

CONCLUSION

The Guyana experience seems to have supported the hypothesis that the role of organizations is crucial to the explanation of political violence. Among the various organizations involved in the political process, political parties were the most instrumental in precipitating political violence events. At the same time, trade unions which were closely allied to political parties particularly during the early Modern period were also productive of a large proportion of political violence events. The other voluntary

associations such as ethnic and cultural organizations seemed, however, to be relatively less productive of political violence in the Guyana political system.

Political parties seemed to be more directly involved in producing political violence compared to the other types of organizations. Often deliberate plans and strategies were engineered by political parties with the express purpose of disrupting the regularized process of governmental authority. The P.P.P. in particular was conceived as a party of protest against British Colonial authority and became deeply involved in directing the course of mass agitation, protest demonstrations and the like, which often gave rise to the more extreme levels of political violence. Similarly, the P.N.C. and the U.F. carried out a campaign of both terror and overt attacks against the P.P.P. regime, especially during the 1962-64 sub-period.

Trade unions were relatively less directly involved in bringing about political violence beyond the extremity level of the Major

strike. The usual operations of the trade union movement in the more extreme levels of political violence involved the mutual assistance of the political parties which undertook the frontal assault upon the established authority. Thus, the T.U.C. concerted with the P.N.C. and the U.F. in its attacks upon the Jagan regime during the 1962-64 sub-period of extensive political violence.

Again, the GAWU often obtained similar assistance from the P.P.P. in carrying out its struggle for recognition in the sugar industry. In return, political parties often obtained similar assistance from trade unions in the struggle against major political and economic issues.

Ethnic, cultural and other voluntary associations played a most indirect and often clandestine role mainly in the more extreme levels of political violence. Both African and East Indian based associations were indirectly involved in the extreme incidents which extended to racial violence in 1964. Business and employers associations were also influential in support of the opposition struggle against the Jagan regime in 1962.

Between 1962 and 1964, the press too carried out a vicious propaganda campaign against the Jagan regime in opposition to some major political issues. It is noteworthy also, that there was a relative absence of any degree of involvement of these non-political organizations in the lower extremes of political violence.

Of particular importance also is the incidence of foreign involvement in the process of political violence in Guyana. The Modern period in particular witnessed the more aggressive but indirect type of foreign instigation of domestic conflict. The usual bases of operations of these foreign influences were organized movements such as political parties and the trade unions in particular. Often the combination of external and internal forces set in motion a train of events which were usually destructive of political stability and national integration.

CHAPTER VII

MODERNIZATION, SOCIAL CHANGE AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Theories purporting to show positive and significant relationships between the rapid pace of modernization and large scale social change on the one hand, and political instability and violence on the other, ought to be re-examined in the light of the seemingly recurrent episodes of collective violence in states where modernization and change are relatively slow and often insignificant. The wide variety of literature on this subject has contributed immensely to the understanding of the processes which make for stability or instability in the political system. But few theoretical works have attempted to separately assess the differentiated impact of the political, social or economic aspects of modernization.

This chapter therefore, attempts to evaluate in the light of the Guyana experience the extent to which the "socio-economic" aspects of modernization have a significantly different impact on the political violence process from

that of the more "political" aspects of modernization on the other have some significant bearing on the impetus for political violence and instability in the political system. A further interest of this chapter, therefore, is to investigate the extent to which these separate aspects of modernization co-vary, especially in the light of their relationship to the political violence process.

The distinction between the political and socio-economic aspects of modernization would seem to reflect a difference between popular and active movements on the one hand, and the more objective and impersonal process of events which are better understood as providing the environment within which popular movements operate, on the other. It has previously been asserted that the concept of "political" modernization refers to the process which encourages an increasing amount of popular participation and mass mobilization within the political system.¹ Such a process reflects basically conscious organized activity on the part of an ever

increasing number of participants in the political process. The ramifications of this "political" modernization process were examined in Chapters V and VI.

Socio-economic modernization, on the other hand, involves the growth of what might be termed the "critical variables" of development.² These "critical variables" responsible for sustaining the modernizing political system are usually assumed to be (a) economic development as reflected in such factors as high per-capita income or gross national product (GNP); (b) Industrialization in the sense that more people are employed in manufacturing concerns as opposed to agriculture; (c) educational advancement which is usually reflected in a high literacy rate and wider extensions in enrollment in educational institutions; (d) urbanization, in the sense of an increasing amount of people living in cities rather than in rural villages; and to a lesser extent (e) general population growth.

In the Guyana context it has already been demonstrated in the previous chapter, that

political modernization, involving popular participation and mass mobilization in the process of contention for political power, has a significantly positive impact on the process of political violence. This chapter will now attempt to demonstrate that the socio-economic aspects of modernization have relatively little significant impact on the generation of political violence in Guyana. It will be shown further that the relationship between political modernization and socio-economic modernization variables is not as significant as is often supposed,³ although in some instances a positive relationship between the two is apparent.

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

The various theories relating the process particularly of socio-economic modernization to political instability and violence in the political system require adequate empirical evidence in support of some of the bold propositions usually made. While some theorists seem confident in predicting a strongly positive relationship between modernization and instability,⁴ others contend that the relationship between the two is essentially

negative.⁵ Both propositions seem, however, to be similar in the sense that they assume a linear relationship between the two. However, others suggest either a curvilinear relationship⁶ or the absence of any significant relationship between modernization and political instability or violence.⁷

Theorists who suggest a strong positive relationship between socio-economic variables and political violence in particular contend that the rapid pace of economic and social change tends to impose strains on the relationship between groups in the political process and to undermine the capabilities of governing regimes to function effectively especially in the absence of adequate institutional arrangements.⁸ Eisenstadt, for example, contends that "industrialization and urbanization have of necessity increased the scope of conflict between different groups and classes" in the political system.⁹ Such a conflict, defined in terms of a "social problem", creates "social disorganization" giving rise to "major movements of protest and transformation" which in

turn produce "internal war" as a special instance of political violence.¹⁰ Huntington also, citing historical evidences in support of his arguments, concluded that "not only does social and economic modernization produce political instability, but the degree of instability is related to the rate of modernization."¹¹

Predictions of a negative relationship between a variety of modernization variables and political violence have often been given favourable support in many research findings. Flannigan and Fogelman, for instance, in their comparative study of a variety of Western countries in long historical perspective have discovered that "in every decade countries at low levels of development have experienced significantly greater political violence than countries with early high development."¹² The same trend of increased political violence holds throughout the spectrum as one moves away from low development (measured in terms of the ratio of industrial to agricultural types of employment) towards the highest levels of development.¹³

A similar perspective discerning a negative relationship between modernization and instability could be viewed in the attempt of Duff and McCamant to define the criteria of an unstable political system in terms of low material welfare and low rates of economic growth.¹⁴ An extensive comparative study of black African nations suggests strong evidence in support of the proposition that "increasing modernization, in contradiction to the hypothesis as it is normally stated, decreased the probability of political instability."¹⁵ This finding led the authors to conclude that modernization as a "consistent feature of national development over time", in fact inhibits political instability.¹⁶

These findings seem to have borne out the observations of Lipset and Dahrendorf that an affluent social system tends to minimize class conflict and to make for a more integrated polity or society.¹⁷ It was Huntington, however who interpreted this observation in the very telling conceptualization of the problem that even though "modernization" as a process tends to

be destabilizing, "modernity" as a condition on the other hand makes for a stable political system.¹⁸ Presumably, a highly modern political system could create and sustain the institutions necessary for a peaceful resolution of conflict and other indicators of political instability.

Yet other theorists fail to perceive any convincing type of relationship between economic modernization on the one hand and political instability and violence on the other. Claude Ake, for example, in his searching criticisms of the modernization theorists, suggests that popular discontent depends more on people's values than on the quantity or quality of available economic goods.¹⁹ Duff and McCamant also made the observation that among Latin American nations the more economically advanced nations such as Cuba, Argentina and Venezuela are not necessarily the most peaceful in the area.²⁰ Rummel also discerned separate and unconnected dimensions of both mass violence variables and economic development variables and concluded that they are causally unrelated.²¹

But perhaps a more influential thesis on the subject is the one which predicts a curvilinear relationship between socio-economic modernization and political violence. In other words, the thesis suggests that both very low and very high levels of modernization characterize the stable system, while medium levels of economic and social development are productive of highly unstable political systems. It is in these "transitional" states that political violence is said to be endemic. Douglas Hibbs summarized the concept of curvilinear relationship in his suggestion that in comparative studies "violence should increase across societies from low to middle ranges of economic development but then decline at the highest levels."²²

Explanations differ with respect to the various contradictory hypotheses relating modernization to political violence or instability. The usual explanation given by theorists who predict a significantly positive relationship between the two is that increasing modernization disrupts traditional and customary ways of life leading

people to become displaced or restless. Soon a state of either alienation or anomie steps in which predisposes many misguided individuals to extreme acts of political behaviour including political violence.²³

Those who discern a negative relationship between modernization and political violence claim that the process of economic development in particular leads to the satisfaction of wants, thereby disarming those individuals or groups who would wish to pressure and disrupt the political system by a flood of steep demands. The process of continuous development, it is claimed, tends further to strengthen the capacity of the political system to absorb the varieties of conflicting demands which would otherwise have emerged. In this way political institutions are strengthened, affluence makes for complacency and general apathy reigns.²⁴

The curvilinear relationship between modernization and political violence is usually explained in the observation that states with either very low or very high levels of development are usually not plagued by the problem of frustration

stemming from high expectations. In the very poor states expectations are usually assumed to be at a very low level and thus act to curtail popular frustrations. In the very rich state on the other hand the usually high expectations are adequately fulfilled by the capacity of the political system to satisfy popular demands for required goods and services. Transitional states, however, are usually plagued by soaring expectations coupled by the lack of capacity to fulfill these expectations since the states in this position are usually not sufficiently developed to provide needed goods and services to satisfy ever increasing demands.²⁵

The peculiarity about the Guyana situation is that while there was very little in terms of social and economic modernization trends there had been, since the commencement of the Modern period in 1947, a significant rise in the volume of political violence. With the relative absence of rapid modernization or large scale social changes Guyana's experience in terms of alienation, anomie and frustration born out of high expectations was extremely minimal. There is no intrinsic problem

of apathy, since "political" modernization encouraged the growth of extensive popular participation and mobilization of a variety of political groups and organizations in the political process. It was this latter factor of, "political" rather than "socio-economic" modernization that created the difference between an expected stable state and the observed unstable conditions in the political process.

THE GUYANA EXPERIENCE

The hypotheses which would seem to have greater relevance to the Guyana experience are:

- (a) That compared to political modernization variables, the socio-economic variables of modernization have a significantly less direct and positive impact on the process of political violence; that is, factors such as economic growth, industrialization, urbanization etc., are not significantly instrumental in producing an increase in the volume of political violence.
- (b) That some aspects of socio-economic modernization such as per capita income, education, communications etc., have a more positive and direct relationship with the political aspect of modernization involving political participation and mass mobilization.

Compared to the impact of political modernization which issued in organized mass

movements in the Guyana political process, the socio-economic aspect of modernization seemed less significant in explaining political violence. The theories which cite modernization factors such as urbanization, industrialization, extensions in the communications media, literacy, and rapid economic growth as central to the explanation of political violence phenomena, seem to be somewhat short sighted when applied to the Guyana context. It is to be observed from the Guyana experience that such modernization factors are far from being obvious indicators of political violence events in particular.

Table 5.1 suggests that at least three of the indices of modernization adopted for Guyana, per capita income, urbanization, and educational enrollment, only gradually increased over the years within the Modern period. The communications media however seem to have undergone a relatively more rapid but consistent increase over time. What is of interest though, is the observation that the years (1962-64) which witnessed the most significant rise in the volume of political violence also

TABLE 5.1

Aggregate Modernization Trends in Guyana 1947-1970

YEAR	(a) Per Capita Income (\$ Guy.)	(b) Urbanization % of population	(c) Educational Enrollment % of population	(d) News-papers & periodicals -s per 1,000 population	(e) Radios per 1,000 population	(f) Telephones per 1,000 population
1947	266	20	19	.05	10	7
1953	342	20	19	.04	30	8
1957	397	19	23	.06	60	9
1961	421	18	24	.05	100	10
1964	424	21	28	.04	100	10
1968	528	30	27	.02	200	20

Sources: (a) Annual Reports of British Guiana, 1947-1963.
 (b) Yearbook of the West Indies and the Caribbean, 1964-1968.
 (c) Annual Statistical Abstract, Ministry of Finance, Georgetown 1970.

demonstrated the most static rate of socio-economic modernization.

The relative lack of significance of these modernization variables in explaining political violence is reflected in the rather low correlation coefficient obtained. Using Spearman's Rho, per capita income (.01), educational enrollment (.10) and communications media: newspapers (-.30), and radios and telephones (-.10 each), reveal low correlations with the volume of political violence during the Modern period (N=6).

Similarly, in terms of the data revealed in Appendix F (p 443a), computations on a year to year basis reveal low correlations between these variables and political violence. Radios, for example, correlate to -.17 (N=15); telephones to .0 (N=22), and newspapers to -.28 (N=12). With regards to per-capita expenditure correlations on a year to year basis, using Tau to correct for ties in ranks, reveal almost zero correlation (.02) with political violence (N=24). Tau also reveals identical near zero correlations for the other socio-economic data in Appendix F which show a tendency to increase monotonically over the years between 1947 and 1970.

Rates of industrialization also seemed to have been relatively static if not in decline over time. To the extent that sugar plantations are regarded as industrial concerns it could be observed that Guyana witnessed at least a contraction if not an actual decline in the expansion of this industry over the years. R. T. Smith wrote:

"In 1829 there were 230 plantations, owned by

almost as many owners, producing about 50,000 tons of sugar per annum. In 1958 there were 18 plantations controlled by two companies and one small independent plantation. Many of the plantations that were operating in 1929 passed into the hands of small farmers who grow subsistence crops or rice, others were abandoned.²⁶

However, if industrialization is measured in terms of the ratio of population employed in manufacturing as against those employed in agriculture, then it seems more likely that the rate of industrialization has declined over the years at least with regards to sugar which is one of the two major industries in Guyana.²⁷

It was, however, on the sugar plantations that a sizable proportion of political violence events, particularly of the lower extremes, occurred in the country. Yet because of the peculiar nature of the plantation system which involves the largest percentage of its labour force in agricultural rather than manufacturing or factory types of employment, it becomes difficult to assume that the participants in these political violence events on the plantations were significantly affected by the special conditions of industrialization per se.

Employment statistics on sugar estates reveal in fact that a much greater proportion of the work force on sugar plantations represents field as opposed to factory workers. Table 5.2 reflects this trend.

TABLE 5.2
Average Number of Field and Factory Workers on Sugar Plantations in Guyana 1947-1966

PERIOD	Average Weekly Number of Field Workers	Average Weekly Number of Factory Workers	Average Total Number of Estate Workers
1947-50	21,500	7,000	28,500
1951-54	21,750	6,000	27,750
1955-58	19,750	5,250	25,000
1959-62	15,500	4,250	19,750
1963-66	13,250	4,000	17,250

Sources: (a) Edwin P. Reubens and Beatrice G. Reubens, The Sugar Industry of British Guyana, Mona, Jamaica 1962, pp. 23, 24.
(b) Report of a Commission of Inquiry into The Sugar Industry in Guyana, Georgetown, September, 1968, p. 71.

Table 5.2 reflects the average numbers of the various types of employees, whether in the fields

or in the factory, on the sugar plantations in Guyana.

A cursory look at the tables would reveal that the greater proportion of workers in the industry are engaged in field, which is mainly agricultural work.

Also significant is the observation that the number of workers in both field and factory was in constant decline over time since 1949 which reflects, to some extent, the increasing contraction of the industry.

But whether or not the sugar plantation represents industrial or agricultural types of life, it is important to observe that the major proportion of political violence on the plantation was confined to the low level activity of the strike. The plantation would seem to be important principally to the extent that it provides a favourable base for the development of strong labour organizations.

What is known also is that trade unionism is strongest among the agricultural or field workers rather than among the factory workers on the sugar plantations. The tendency for field workers on the sugar plantations to be extremely militant compared to workers in other industries in Guyana is borne out by the disproportionate

amount of strikes attributed to the sugar industry as indicated in Table 5.3.

TABLE 5.3

Industrial Disputes Resulting in Stoppage of Work
by Industry Groups

YEAR	I N D U S T R I E S				
	Sugar	Mining & Quarrying	Manufacturing	Other	Total
1958	43	2	-	6	51
1959	24	1	-	9	34
1960	21	-	2	5	28
1961	56	1	2	9	68
1962	42	1	1	11	55
1963	44	3	2	9	58
1964	18	5	4	10	37
1965	87	13	21	33	154
1966	94	13	20	47	174
1967	105	10	20	46	181
1968	86	7	10	39	142
1969	90	8	13	15	126
1970	99	18	12	29	158

Source: Annual Statistical Abstract, Ministry of Finance, Guyana, 1970, pp. 158, 159.

The other major industry in Guyana, the bauxite mining industry, seems to be even less significant as a fertile base for political violence activities. Although this industry has grown immensely since its inception in 1914,²⁸ very few incidents of political violence occurred in any of the two bauxite towns, McKenzie or Kwakwani. Although, of course, strikes were not infrequent in this industry, very few could be considered "major" in the strict sense of the term. The 1963-64 period, however, witnessed large scale ethnic violence in the McKenzie-Wismar area. But this violence took place at a time when the entire country was embroiled in a major political upheaval and extreme cases of political violence occurred in several parts of the country at the same time.

Although trade union leadership among the bauxite workers appears to be militant, the union representing the majority of the mine workers, the Guyana Mine Workers Union (GMWU), appears to lack widespread influence among the majority of workers. An opinion survey among bauxite workers at McKenzie in 1966 revealed that only about 38% of workers

think that the GMWU is "sometimes effective."²⁹

Similarly, urbanization does not seem to represent any significant independent variable capable of explaining political violence in Guyana. In the first place there seemed to have been an insignificant urbanization trend in Guyana since the turn of the century. If urbanization is determined by the conglomeration of a population over 10,000 in one locality, then Guyana has witnessed very little increase in the amount of urban centers. Up to 1970 only about two major urban centers existed, Georgetown and New Amsterdam.

The important point, however, is that there was not necessarily a greater proportion of political violence events in the urban as against the rural areas in general, even though there was a tendency for the greater proportion of Anti-government demonstrations to be centered in the city of Georgetown. Table 5.4 reveals this trend.

The concentration of Anti-government demonstrations in the city would seem to be related more to the fact that the seat of government, the usual object of political power struggle, is in

TABLE 5.4

PROPORTION OF RURAL TO URBAN INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICAL VIOLENCE EVENTS IN GUYANA: 1947-1970

DEGREE OF URBANIZATION	AREA	LEVEL OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE: % OF EVENTS				TOTAL
		LOW ANTI-GOVT. DEMONSTRATIONS	MEDIUM MAJOR STRIKES	RIOT	HIGH GUERRILLA WAR/ REBELLION	
LOW	RURAL (FARMING AREAS)	26	0	54	50	24
MEDIUM	GENERAL	8	8	0	50	7
	PLANTATIONS	11	82	8	0	28
HIGH	URBAN (INCLUDING INDUSTRIAL TOWNS)	55	10	38	0	41
TOTAL		100	100	100	100	100

253 a

TABLE 5.4 a

RURAL/URBAN INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICAL VIOLENCE EVENTS: NO. OF EVENTS

DEGREE OF
URBANIZATION

LEVEL OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE: NO. OF EVENTS

AREA

TOTAL

HIGH
RIOT, GUER. WAR/
REBELLIONMEDIUM
MAJOR STRIKESLOW
ANTI-GOVT.
DEMONSTRATIONS

LOW

RURAL &
GENERAL

28

3

15

46

MEDIUM

PLANTATIONS

9

31

2

42

HIGH

URBAN

46

4

9

59

TOTAL

83

38

26

147

 $\chi^2 = 78.73$ $p > 18.465 = .001$ $C = .59$

Georgetown, rather than to the particular conditions of urbanization itself. Of particular interest also is the observation that the more extreme types of political violence events are concentrated in the rural areas which account for the greater proportion of events extending beyond and including Riots in terms of extremity levels. The guerilla activities of the 1962-64 sub-period equally embraced both urban and rural areas.

When the degree of urbanization over the years is correlated with the relative frequency of political violence, a relatively low coefficient ($Rho=.30$) is revealed which suggests a weak association between the two. On the other hand, in terms of the relationship between urban-rural differences on the one hand and extremity of political violence on the other, a null hypothesis (predicting no significant relationship between the two) was rejected on the basis of a Chi-square test (3x3 contingency tables) at the extremely high significance level of .001. The contingency coefficient showing the strength of association between urban-rural differences and the extremity

levels of political violence is .59.

It would seem then that whereas the urban and industrial areas tend to be productive of the lower extremes of political violence, the rural areas are more productive of the higher levels of such violence events, extending from riots to rebellion.

Population growth too does not seem to be highly influential in affecting the trend in political violence in Guyana. While however, population growth might be able to explain the absolute increases in population in collective events over broad categories of time, say between the pre-modern and the Modern periods, it can hardly explain fluctuations in either the volume or the level of violence as evidenced in the smaller time categories (or sub-periods) within the Modern period in Guyana.

In general there seemed to have been relatively little appreciative increase in the rate of population growth since 1956 (see Appendix E). As suggested in Appendix E, the rate of natural increase in the population between 1952 and 1961, just prior to the outbreak of the most extensive sub-period of political

violence, has been relatively static. While, for example, the difference in the rate of natural increase between 1945 and 1951 was about 11%, the difference in the rate between 1956 and 1961 was only about 2%. In addition the sub-periods immediately prior to the extensive political violence period witnessed a significant outflow of a large amount of people, the greater proportion of whom comprised the dissatisfied or alienated element of the population. Net emigration in 1961 was nearly seventimes that of 1945.

If also we examine the annual rates of increase in the population of the various race groups in Guyana we observe that the element with the greatest rate of increase between the years 1946 and 1960 was the "mixed" group. (Table 5.5) The significance of this observation is that the racial elements which were more greatly involved in political violence in Guyana were the Africans and East Indians. It should be noted that these two groups were directly or indirectly involved in over 90% of political violence events during

the Modern period.

TABLE 5.5
Inter-Censal Annual Rates of Increase, by Race,
1911-1960 (per cent per year)

PERIOD	East Indians	Negroes	Mixed	All other races excluding Amerindians	Total Colony excluding Amerindians
1911-21	-0.4	+0.1	+0.1	-0.6	+0.0
1921-31	+0.4	+0.6	+1.0	-1.3	+0.5
1931-46	+1.4	+1.0	+0.8	-0.4	+1.1
1946-60	+3.6	+1.9	+4.2	.5	+2.9

Source: Peter Newman, British Guiana, London 1964 p. 41.

In general, the socio-economic modernization factors seem also to have had relatively little direct relevance to political violence in Guyana. In fact there was only a gradual but consistent increase in these factors since 1947. Since the relative volume and levels of political violence have fluctuated from time to time during the Modern period, it becomes difficult to explain how a constant increase in these modernization variables can explain both the times of

high and the times of low levels and frequency of political violence events. What again seems instructive is the fact that the most extreme Rupununi rebellion in 1959 among the Amerindian population occurred at a location in the interior region of Guyana which still remains far removed from the reaches of socio-economic modernization compared to the coastal region.

SOCIAL CHANGE AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Rapid and irregular social change is often thought to be destabilizing of the political system. The usually unsettled state of the social process during times of sudden transformations of existing social relationships creates the conditions which foster the incidence of collective and political violence. According to Pitirim Sorokin, "during the periods when existing culture, or the system of social relationships, or both, undergo rapid transformations, the internal disturbances in the respective societies increase."³⁰ Under such conditions of social disruptions individuals and groups are supposed to be uprooted and large numbers of

people become atomized in the process.³¹ Such a process in turn is thought to lead eventually to anomie in the state of the system or alienation on the part of individuals or groups, a condition which encourages the eventual outbreak of political violence.

Social change in Guyana is more appropriately discerned in terms of changes in the relative dominance or authority positions of different groups and strata in the society. It is to be observed that in this context relatively little changes took place in the structure of group relationships since the beginning of the Modern period in Guyana. Yet in terms of the existing relationships between groups and organizations meaningful hypotheses could be discerned in relation to the process of political violence.

The competition for political power in Guyana has usually taken the form of a struggle for dominance between exclusive groups which are primarily racially based. This type of interrelationship leads to a kind of zero-sum conflict in which contention for political power tends to be

transformed into overt political violence. The hypothesis which in this context seems more applicable to Guyana, is that the more politically dominant groups, compared to the more subordinate groups, in the political system tend to be more aggressive in the process of contention for political power.

The fact that the interaction between the better organized and more self-conscious groups tends more to explain or determine the process of political violence, seems to challenge the prevalent assumption that the more disorganized or atomized elements of society have the greater potential for political violence. Further, since political dominance is dependent primarily on the control of both socio-economic and political resources, this hypothesis would seem to suggest possible revisions in the assumptions that the relatively more deprived elements of the society are usually the most aggressive and therefore more violent.³²

Theories of "relative deprivation" as the explanation for political violence, would seem to

have less relevance to the Guyana political process, than theories which place emphasis on dominant group contention for political power. If the various ethnic groups in Guyana are assessed in terms of their relative dominance in the sense of the possession of social, economic and political resources, it could be demonstrated that the most dominant groups are usually the most conflictful and warlike. If also deprivation could be measured in terms of groups possessing the least amount of resources then it could be demonstrated also that the most deprived groups (that is, the least dominant groups) are not necessarily the most aggressive or violent in the political system.

According to Table 5.6, the most dominant groups in Guyana in terms of strategic political and social indicators are the Africans and East Indians. And these two groups are the most conflictful and have been involved in the greater proportion and the most extensive scale of political violence during the Modern period in Guyana. The Amerindian and "mixed" groups on the other hand seem to be relatively more deprived but are, contrary to the

TABLE 5:6

Total Racial Percentages in the Security Forces, the Civil Service, Government Agencies and Undertakings and Areas of Governmental Responsibility in Guyana (1964)

BODY	R A C E G R O U P S						
	Africans	East Indians	Mixed	Amerin- dians	Chinese	Portuguese and Europeans	Othe
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Security Forces	73.5	19.9	4.19	1.1	.16	.43	-
Civil Service	53.05	33.16	9.52	2.08	1.15	1.05	-
Govt. Agencies	62.49	27.17	8.02	.14	.91	1.44	-
Local Govt.	38.89	49.68	10.46	.11	.23	.63	-
Teachers in Primary Ed.	53.87	41.27	1.46	1.06	.58	1.72	.04
Land Deve- lopment	13.06	85.49	.66	.17	.11	.4	.11
% Total	50.64	39.97	6.35	1.16	.75	1.1	.03
% Popu- lation	32.83	47.79	11.99	4.59	0.73	2.06	-
% Urban	49.00	22.13	21.72	0.34	1.81	5	-
% Rural	26.2	58.3	8.0	6.3	.3	.3	.6

Source: Report of the British Guiana Commission of Inquiry: Racial Problems in the Public Service, Geneva, 1964, p. 33.

"relative deprivation" hypothesis, relatively less aggressive being involved in far fewer incidents of political violence. Among the most collectively deprived are the Chinese, who however, are the least aggressive or violent although, of course, their numbers are too few to warrant much consideration in terms of their impact on the Guyana political process.

Perhaps the most startling instance of relative deprivation in Guyana was to be found in the bauxite industry at McKenzie where a steep ethnic segregation is maintained between the white expatriate managers and the local African workers. Both economic and social disparities are compounded in this ethnic segregation.³³ Yet no noticeable incident of ethnic or racial violence between Whites and Africans took place in the Bauxite town. When finally racial violence broke out at Wismar it was between both underprivileged groups of Africans and East Indians rather than between the privileged Whites and the underprivileged or deprived non-whites.

Thus socio-economic change in so far as

it relates to deprivation or hardship among important segments of the population in the process of modernization does not seem to be highly influential in producing political violence. The fact that the most deprived groups, which are also the least aggressive or violent, tend also to represent the least organized in the Guyana society, lends support to the main contention that political violence is mainly a product of more organized group behaviour than of the more impersonal socio-economic processes.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION AND MASS PARTICIPATION

It appears then that the explanation of political violence in Guyana is more closely bound up with the conscious group interaction process than with the chance side effects of socio-economic modernization. It appears that the impact of socio-economic modernization on the process of popular participation and mass mobilization is at least indirect if not basically insignificant. In particular the educational system and the mass media of communications seemed to have been very effective instruments for maintaining high levels of political

mobilization principally in opposition to the Jaganite P.P.P. regime between 1953 and 1964.

When Table 5.1 (p 245) and Table 4.1 (p 189) are collated to reflect the relationships between some important socio-economic variables on the one hand and political participation as indicated by voting turn-out over the given election years on the other, the following results are obtained:

TABLE 5.6a

<u>Correlation of Socio-economic Variables with Participation Rates</u>		
<u>Socio-economic Variables</u> (Re. Table 5.1)	<u>Correlation with Participation</u> (Re. Table 4.1) Rho=	
	<u>Absolute Values</u>	<u>Delta Values</u>
(a) Per-capita Income	.66	-.45
(b) Urbanization	.30	-.07
(c) Educational Enrollment	.76	-.08
(d) Radios	.64	.20

From Table 5.6a it would seem that the absolute increases or decreases of the socio-economic variables over the election years produce relatively high degrees of correlation with absolute increases or decreases in participation rates. However when viewed in terms of delta values, or the relative increases between the respective years, the correlations seem to be either very low or negative. Thus in terms of the relative and specific increases from year to year many socio-economic modernization variables could be deemed to have no significant positive relationship with participation.

The negative results based on delta values might also suggest that the probable uncertainty attendant on varying increments in modernization trends, particularly with respect to per-capita income, is to some extent inhibiting to active popular participation. However, it would seem that the overall modernization process, as indicated by the absolute increases over time, provides the material bases for encouraging high degrees of active participation.

Perhaps of special relevance to participation is the strategic role of newspapers and other printed media of mass communication. But since the number of various newspapers should have less relevance to participation compared to the extent of their circulation among the public we should examine the probable significance of this latter factor. In the absence of relevant data on the circulation of newspapers in Guyana, we can assume the high probability that newspaper circulation increased absolutely in volume after every four years during the Modern period. If this assumption is correct then the correlation of news circulation with participation would be .66 (Rho), which is relatively high. This high correlation should suggest that increases in the extent of newspaper circulation tend to positively affect the rate of political participation. But, admittedly, this outcome is merely speculative until hard data on newspaper circulation is obtained.³⁴

Two of the modernization variables, education and communications, which on the basis of absolute values correlate highly with political participation need to be fully discussed in terms of their impact on the Guyana political process during the Modern period. Of importance also in terms of its impact on the political mobilization process, is face-to-face communication which will also be discussed.

(a) The Educational System

The role of education during the pre-modern period contrasts with

its role during the Modern period in terms of its general impact on the political system. Whereas the educational system during the pre-modern period was founded on the premise that schools and churches, as the main educational media, should be the instrument for the inculcation of unquestioning loyalty to the existing regime, during the Modern period, on the other hand, until the attainment of political independence in 1966, the system was utilized mainly as an important center of opposition, particularly to the Jagan regime, which was considered alien to the tradition of past colonial rule.

Writing about the nature of the educational system during the pre-modern era, R. T. Smith contends as follows:

From the beginning of the nineteenth century there was a slow development of the idea that the best way to control the slave population was not by physical force alone but by training the passion and channeling energies into constructive activities. Schools and churches were held to be the best instruments for the transformation of a rebellious slave population into a peaceful and obedient working class.³⁵

This conservative trend in education continued throughout the emancipation or Immigration

period up to the Modern period in Guyana.³⁶ M. K. Bacchus also observed that during the post-slavery period, education, which was usually controlled and dominated by religious bodies, continued to serve as "a major instrument in teaching ex-slaves and their children about their place in the society and their duties and responsibilities to the planter class". He concluded that the objective of educating the local population was "to internalize those norms and values which would provide 'moral' props for the plantation system after the legal support which slavery gave to that system was withdrawn."³⁷

The fact also that the population at large saw the available educational facilities as a source of "upward mobility within the European dominated sector of society",³⁸ helped to reinforce the negative impact of the education system on the masses and to ensure the success of colonial policy toward producing a peaceful and acquiescent Guyanese citizenry.

During the Modern period however, the churches in particular were relentless in their hostility against the development of the P.P.P. and

the success of the Jagan regime. Although of course, such a reaction was essentially part of the same pro-colonial tradition, the effect was now to actively mobilize the population on the basis of meaningful political issues and for the sake of instigating changes in the existing political system.

Perhaps the most important issue which aligned the churches and their schools against the Jagan regime was the question of the dual-control of schools - a system in which the major proportion of public schools in Guyana was controlled by one or other of the various religious denominations. By controlling the organization and educational content of the schools while the major part of financing the programmes was the responsibility of the government, the churches ensured that they controlled the minds of the population at the government's expense.³⁹

Jagan's attempt to discontinue this arrangement, and his insistence on full government control of all schools, met with fierce resistance from the churches.⁴⁰ Jagan wrote in connection with the churches' opposition as follows:

The churches, too played a big role in

opposition to us. In our colonial society, the hierarchy of the Anglican church was closely identified with the ruling class; the planters and their supporters and high Anglicanism were inseparable, with deep commitment to the preservation of the status quo. A similar role was played by the powerful Roman Catholic Church, controlled by a small but wealthy Portuguese group who, next to the ruling British-European group, dominated the social and economic life of the country. Its reactionary influence was demonstrated when the sword of the Spirit, its political arm in its representations before the Waddington Constitution Commission, opposed universal adult suffrage.⁴¹

In general the role of the educational system in conjunction with the influence of the church furnished the conditions in which the most negative kinds of antagonism between groups could flourish. The Christian influence on the educational system seemed to have antagonized the large Hindu and Muslim elements of the population, thereby fostering a serious religious cleavage in the Guyana society.⁴² The fact too that the Africans are mainly Christians and the East Indians are almost entirely Hindu or Muslim, transforms religious cleavage into ethnic cleavage and conflict as well.⁴³

(b) The Communications Media

It has already been observed in Chapter VI that ^{the} mass media of communications were very instrumental in encouraging anti-regime mobilization in Guyana, particularly during the 1962-64 sub-period when opposition to the Jagan regime reached the highest proportion, extending to very extreme levels of political violence. It must therefore be conceded that in an indirect sense mainly, the press had contributed to political violence in Guyana.

It was natural to expect this tendency of the media since, firstly, all of the major newspapers have until very recently (1974) been owned by expatriate concerns or by local big business interests which formed an important element of opposition to Jagan's pro-communist rule. It has been asserted that the Daily Argosy, the Daily Chronicle, the Guyana Graphic and the Evening Post, the four major papers in the country during the Modern period in Guyana, "have been predominantly owned and controlled by a combination of big business and sugar interests."⁴⁴ One of the two radio stations, too, Radio Demerara, is similarly owned and controlled by big business interests.

To this extent it was not difficult to foresee that the press and radio were destined to play a role very similar in its reaction to that of the educational institutions.

Despres summed up this reactionary role of the press as follows:

All four of the newspapers have been maintained by editorial and news staff which are comprised largely of educated middle-class Afro-Guyanese, who, for the most part have been willing to accept and to communicate the editorial policies of the owners. Needless to say, editorial policies have been mostly conservative with respect to economic and political issues. Reflecting both the general and the specific interests of their owners, these papers have emphasized the economic, social, and cultural values attached to British colonial ties. They have particularly emphasized the value of private enterprise and the threat which communism poses to Guiana's freedom and economic development. At one time or another, all of these papers have been extremely critical of most of Guiana's nationalist parties and their leaders.⁴⁵

The widespread circulation of both press and radio communication would seem to suggest that the usually conservative message of the media would have some significant impact on the Guyanese population. But the differential concentration of the spread seems to make for a discontinuous type of impact, especially between urban and rural population.

Newspaper circulation in particular is basically urban in concentration.⁴⁶ This urban concentration of anti-regime sentiment might no doubt explain to some extent, why political violence in urban areas has been more frequent and generally much less extreme than rural political violence.

The impact of the newspaper on the mass mobilization process could further be viewed from the developmental experience of the three major parties, each of which owned its own newspaper in Guyana. The P.P.P. owned first the Thunder and later the Mirror; the P.N.C. owned the New Nation while the organ of the U.F. was called the Sun. In spite of this modernized means of disseminating both information and party propaganda, the impact of party newspapers nevertheless seemed to foster mobilization principally along racial lines. Table 5.7 suggests the racial bias with respect to the consumption of the various party newspapers.

TABLE 5.7

Racially Biased Consumption of
Political Party Newspapers

Area of Party Control	Predominant Ethnic Group	NEWSPAPERS OF PARTIES: % CONSUMPTION		
		New Nation (P.N.C.)	Thunder (P.P.P.)	Sun. (U.F.)
Anns Grove & McKenzie	Africans	35	10	3
Skeldon	East Indians	0	24	2

Sources: Despres op. cit. p 136.

(c) Face-to-face Communication

But even more important than the modern techniques of mass communication for the successful mobilization of the Guyanese masses is the more traditional face-to-face contact. Such informal appeal succeeded in strengthening the mass base of both major parties, the P.P.P. and P.N.C., in Guyana. The early growth of the P.P.P. in particular was indicative of the influence of this less sophisticated technique of mass appeal. Jagan indicated that the first political campaign in 1953 was run on a shoe-string budget, a fact which denied the party the needed equipment for mass communication.

46

OF/DE

MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

He continued:

candidates had to carry out their work on a very limited budget; some conducted their campaign on foot or bicycles. We had neither enough cars nor public address systems. What we did have, however, were volunteers; people who believed in what they were doing and who were prepared to give free service. We have learnt from experience that this is the most reliable service.⁴⁷

If Jagan's organization succeeded in awakening mass consciousness among the Guyanese population it was due primarily to this informal type of appeal as well as the open-air public meeting where volunteers from the local communities would be provided with an immediate platform to air their political grievances. It is claimed also that the strength of the P.N.C. today depended on a similar type of informal face-to-face appeal occasioned by the famous "meet-the-people-tours" conducted throughout the country by the leader of the party, Forbes Burnham.⁴⁸

The importance of this informal communication for party mobilization and recruitment is reflected in the apparent success of the "apanjaht" appeal which gained for the P.P.P. a large proportion of its East Indian supporters and by the same

token gained a large percentage of African support for the P.N.C. Such a racially based appeal could best be communicated under the surface rather than through the more formal press and radio which would cater to the more universalistic type of appeal. In this way both the P.P.P. and the P.N.C. maintained a dual posture; the first was a universalistic posture which was communicated through the formal press, and secondly, the more particularistic and ascriptive posture which was communicated through individual organizers at the level of the local party cells.

The more formal approach created the ideological image of the party; the more informal approach was usually more successful in gaining the actual support for the party. It was asserted, for example, that the apanjaht appeal gained for the P.P.P. the support of the wealthy East Indian business community which comprised the urban backbone of its membership who might otherwise have shunned the party because of its marxist ideological position.⁴⁹

Thus it would seem that neither the educational institutions nor the mass media of

communications were sufficient to engineer political consciousness among the Guyanese population. Although both institutions played a positive role in fostering anti-regime sentiments during the major part of the Modern period under review, it was, however, the more informal face-to-face type of communication which was significantly influential in stimulating the more involved process of mass mobilization and encouraged the development of popular mass based political movements in Guyana.

CONCLUSION

The Guyana experience seems to have provided support for the view that a distinction should be made between the "political" and the "socio-economic" aspects of modernization in terms of their impact on the political system, although in some instances there appears to be some degree of positive correlation between the two.

The political aspects of modernization which involves popular participation and mass mobilization were seen to have been largely

independent of such socio-economic factors as per capita income, urbanization, industrialization and population growth. However it appears that the growth of educational facilities and the communications media suggests a positive relationship with political participation and mass mobilization.

The principal hypothesis which predicts an insignificant relationship between socio-economic modernization and political violence seems also to have been borne out by the Guyana experience. It was observed that while there was very little by way of urban and industrial growth in Guyana where political violence existed in extensive proportions during the Modern period, there was also little evidence to suggest that the areas which are either urban or industrial demonstrated significantly more political violence activities compared to the non-urban areas. The rural areas, which are also less industrial by contrast, witnessed a greater proportion of the more extreme types of political violence while the urban areas demonstrated a greater volume of the low extremity levels of political violence.

While socio-economic modernization especially in the form of extensions in education and communications subscribed somewhat to the growth of mass participation, other more informal processes were also at work to ensure the development of strong political organization. In particular, face-to-face communication was successfully utilized by both major parties to mobilize needed, although racially based, support for the respective parties.

But perhaps one major contribution of the overall process of modernization is that the process facilitates the institutionalization of important elements of the political system such that the level of political conflict and violence could be easily contained or minimized. One should, therefore, expect to see a greater degree of the more consensual or conflict reducing types of responses on the part of the governing regimes of the Modern period, in contrast to the more coercive or repressive measures undertaken by the regimes of the earlier periods in Guyana's history.

CHAPTER VIII

REGIME RESPONSE TO POLITICAL VIOLENCE

The relative openness of the political system to mass participation during the Modern period predisposes governing regimes to employ the more consensual or alleviative approaches to conflict termination or control. Increasing political modernization thus gives rise to an increasing relaxation of the more coercive tendencies on the part of governments in efforts to stem the tide of popular agitation and political violence.

The modern political system employs coercive force mainly as a last resort, since the system tends to be tolerant of a wider range of anti-regime activities compared to the less developed systems. Pre-modern systems on the other hand, tend to depend on force as the instrument of its survival, since any form of anti-government activity tends to negate the basis of political authority under such systems. Hence it is to be expected that a greater reliance on the use of coercive force as a first resort under the more

oligarchic or authoritarian political systems of the pre-modern era would be a natural outcome.

Also, intervention in political violence events would seem to be the natural response of governing regimes particularly at times when the level of threat to regime stability is high. The usual explanation for this invariable interference in the process of popular agitation is the frequent claim that governing regimes have the primary obligation to maintain what is often referred to as "law and order", and the overall stability of the political system.¹

The usually high sensitivity to challenges to its authority position often disposes the governing regime, as the embodiment of ultimate force in the political system, to utilize disproportionate violence to stem the tide of rising popular demands for political changes. Yet the reaction of governing regimes does not necessarily have to be restricted to the essentially negative outcome of suppressing or stemming popular movements. It is possible that responses can take variable forms ranging from the more

consensual means on one hand to the more coercive means of conflict termination on the other.

The purpose of this Chapter is firstly, to examine the nature of regime response to political violence events in Guyana in order to illustrate the importance of the central hypothesis in so far as it predicts the more consensual type of regime response during the Modern as opposed to earlier periods of political development. Secondly, an examination will be made into the extent to which the peculiarities of the Guyana historical experience can shed light on the more general theories hypothesizing various types of relationships between governing regimes on the one hand and popular movements on the other. Thirdly, as a specific approach to this analysis, an inquiry will be made into the role of particular institutions or organizations, primarily the military in controlling the ebb and flow of political violence events.

One generally influential hypothesis suggested in the literature on political violence,

is that the relationship between regime response and political violence events tends to be linear in the sense that the greater the extent and level of political violence, the greater would be the repressive force used by the governing regime against the participants in such events.² Also related to this hypothesis is the proposition that governing regimes tend always to use disproportionate force regardless of the level or magnitude of the political violence event.³ Another hypothesis emphasizes the nature and characteristics of the regime and suggests a curvilinear relationship between "coerciveness" of regime on the one hand, and level of political instability on the other. In other words coercive acts by the governing regime are viewed as independent variables which are capable of provoking further acts of political violence at a later time period in the political system.⁴

The high predisposition on the part of governing regimes to use force to control popular movements is usually rationalized in the view that the size of the military forces is often too small to contain the unpredictable behaviour of large

crowds. Thus conscious of being a minority in the face of hostile masses, the military forces often find it difficult to resist the temptation to use pre-emptive force.⁵ Also minority regimes sensitive to popular pressures often use similar means of justification for their use of coercive measures to buttress a fledgling position of authority. Such regimes according to Zolberg, "become afraid that any concessions might be interpreted as weakness." Thus they become "less adept at discriminating among danger signals and tend to deal with the smallest disturbance by expending a great deal of force" as a means of overcoming "deteriorating legitimacy."⁶ For the same reason colonial regimes tend to react to even the smallest scale of political violence as a serious threat to their legitimacy of authority. In this way the massive display of force is considered a highly valuable function of political control.⁷

An examination of the Guyana historical experience should shed light on the following:

(a) the extent to which different types of governing regimes use disproportionate force to control

various levels of political violence events. The hypothesis to be examined here is that regimes during the pre-modern period tend to be more coercive and as such rely more on the use of force than on the more consensual means of conflict termination to control political violence activities.

(b) Secondly, we are interested in the extent to which governing regimes in general tend to use different levels of force to control different levels of political violence. It would seem in this respect that greater levels of force would be employed by governing regimes to control the more extreme types of political violence.

Also to be examined is the extent to which in Guyana the demonstration or the use of military force has been adequate to control different levels or prevent different types of political violence. An important hypothesis which seems applicable to Guyana is that neither the numerical strength nor the frequent employment of military force has been sufficient to deter the frequent occurrence of political violence; however there seems to be a probability that the efficient

employment of force is effective in containing or minimizing the level of escalation of political violence events.

THE APPROACH

The problem with most approaches to the study of controls of political violence is that they are too often restricted to the view that coercive force is the exclusive means of violence control. Even when attempts are made to differentiate the various types of conflict control measures, the concept of coercion tends to dominate.⁸ This type of formulation tends to obscure the possibility that other non-coercive types of responses could be employed by governing regimes.

For the purposes of this study, therefore, it would be appropriate to attempt to differentiate the various types of regime responses to political violence in such a way that clear distinctions are made between the more consensual on the one hand, and the more coercive types of responses on the other.⁹ In keeping with this approach, the works of Kenneth Boulding, K. J. Holsti, and E. V. Walter provide adequate guidelines for the relevant

distinctions to be made between the various types of regime responses.¹⁰ The definitions of the various types of conflict settlement provided by these authors make it possible to construct a simple typology of regime responses such as is illustrated in Figure IX.¹¹

Three basic types of regime responses are discerned in Figure IX. Firstly, the "Consensual" or Type I responses refer to situations in which some degree of satisfactory agreement is reached between both parties in the conflict. The various sub-types in this category, Compromise, Passive Settlement, and Award (Mediation) are supposed to satisfy this requirement.

The "Alleviative" or Type II responses refer to the outcome whereby the conflict has ceased to be active or overt without any formal settlement attempt being made, or in which the outcome is still inconclusive. In effect, therefore, alleviative responses tend more to represent a postponement of the conflict to some indefinite future date. The concept of "stalemate" in military parlance is closely akin to this Type II outcome. "Avoidance"

FIGURE IX

Types of Governmental Response to Political Violence

TYPE I CONSENSUAL	TYPE II ALLEVIATIVE	TYPE III COERCIVE
1. Compromise	1. Avoidance/Withdrawal	1. Violent Conquest
2. Passive Settlement	2. Frozen Conflict	2. Forced Submission
3. Award (mediation)		

Definitions:

- (a) Compromise: any agreement which entails some sacrifice of objectives, interests, or position by both parties in the conflict.
- (b) Passive Settlement: situation in which conflict persists for a long period of time until the parties involved implicitly accept a new status quo as partially legitimate: objectives of both parties are reduced in the outcome.
- (c) Award (Mediation): the involvement of a third party invested with authority to announce the terms of settlement either through arbitration or adjudication on the basis of prescribed and agreed-upon rules.
- (d) Avoidance-Withdrawal: course of action in which one or both parties terminate the conflict by withdrawing from a physical or a bargaining position, or by ceasing the acts which originally caused the hostilities.
- (e) Frozen Conflict: situation in which manifest clashes or violence have ceased but the conflict has not been terminated in any recognizable way nor in a manner satisfying to both parties.

- (f) Violent Conquest: method of resolving an issue by physically overwhelming the opponent through the use of force involving the unconditional surrender of the opponent.
- (g) Forced Submission: a situation in which one party decides to submit to the other's demands or actions even though no violence has actually taken place in the settlement attempt. The criterion used to distinguish between submission and conquest is whether or not a threat to employ force is actually implemented.

The above definitions are drawn from the works of Kenneth Boulding and K. J. Holsti. See K. J. Holsti, "Resolving International Conflicts: A Taxonomy of Behaviour and Some Figures on Procedures", in Louis Kriesberg, Social Processes in International Relations, New York, 1968. Also Kenneth Boulding, Conflict and Defense, New York, 1962.

or "withdrawal" from conflict situations and what are regarded as "frozen conflicts" qualify as alleviative types of responses.

The "coercive" or Type III responses represent the customary case of the employment of force, usually in the form of military measures, to overcome or suppress situations of manifest conflict. Coercive acts range from violent conquest to the forced submission of opposition and include such events as the imposition of martial law, mass arrests, censureship, the banning of opposition

parties and the like.

The model outlined in Figure VIII involves the assumption that the three basic types of responses are mutually exclusive.¹² Preference for the one type of response tends to exclude the adoption of other basic types of responses to the same event. For example, it is assumed that a regime which chooses to compromise with a rebellious group would not at the same time attempt to forcefully suppress the movement or imprison its leadership. Similarly one cannot avoid or withdraw from a situation of overt or violent conflict and at the same time violently suppress or mediate in the same event.

The scheme outlined in Figure VIII would seem to be appropriate for examining the relevant hypotheses which aim at predicting the nature of regime response to political violence with particular reference to the Guyana experience. The first hypothesis concerns the nature of the regime and suggests that the more oligarchic or authoritative types of regime which characterize the pre-modern era would tend to use force more frequently

to suppress any level of political violence. The second concerns the nature of the response and suggests what seems to be the natural outcome that governing regimes in general would tend to respond with the greater use of force particularly to control the more extreme levels of political violence.

More specifically, and in keeping with the foregoing hypotheses, one should expect that as the political system becomes more modern, that is, more permissive and open to popular participation, there would be a greater tendency on the part of governing regimes to de-emphasize the use of force and to accentuate the more consensual or alleviative types of responses to political violence events.

The nature of regime response to political violence seems to have varied over the different historical periods in Guyana. Table 6.1 suggests support for the hypothesis that less reliance on the more coercive types of response would be observed during the Modern period which represents a more permissive and open type of political system. The Slavery period, for example, demonstrated greater

TABLE 6.1

DISTRIBUTION OF REGIME RESPONSE TO POLITICAL VIOLENCE FOR DIFFERENT PERIODS, 1763-1970

LEVEL OF COERCIVENESS	PERIODS	TYPES OF RESPONSE: % OF EVENTS.					TOTAL
		<u>LOW</u>	<u>MEDIUM</u>		HIGH		
		<u>CONSENSUAL</u> (COMP. PASS. AWD.)	<u>ALLEVIATE</u> (AVD. FRZN)	<u>COERCIVE</u> (FORCE/CONQ.)			
LOW	MODERN (1947-70)	8	15	6	36	16	100
	TRANSITION (1834-1891)	-	8	27	4	-	61
MEDIUM	IMMIGRATION (1834-1891)	-	11	-	6	11	72
	SLAVERY (1763-1833)	-	7	-	7	-	86
HIGH							100

INTERPRETATION

COMPR. = COMPROMISE
 PASS = PASSIVE
 AWD = AWARD
 AVD = AVOIDANCE
 FRZN = FROZEN CONFLICT
 CONQ = CONQUEST

TABLE 6.1 a.

DISTRIBUTION OF REGIME RESPONSE TO POLITICAL VIOLENCE : NO.OF EVENTS.

LEVEL OF COERCIVENESS	PERIODS	TYPES OFS RESPONSES; NO.OF EVENTS.			TOTAL
		LOW <u>CONSENSUAL</u>	MEDIUM <u>ALLEVIATE</u>	HIGH <u>COERCIVE</u>	
LOW	MODERN (1947-70)	43	76	28	147
MEDIUM	(TRANSITION (1892-1946)	9	1	16	28
	(IMMIGRATION (1834-1891)	3	4	16	23
HIGH	SLAVERY. (1763-1833.	1	1	12	14
TOTAL		56	82	72	210

$$\chi^2 = 56.9$$

$$p > 18.465 = .001$$

$$C = .46$$

reliance on violent conquest and forced submission of political ~~opposition~~ as a means of conflict termination. Whereas the Slavery period accounted for 86 percent of events being subjected to the coercive type of response, the Modern period by contrast accounts for only 19% of events falling within this category.

In the meantime there were significant increases in both the Consensual and the Alleviative types of response as the political system became more modern. Whereas the two earlier periods account for 7% and 11% of events respectively falling within the category of Consensual response, the Transition and Modern periods on the other hand account for 35% and 29% of events respectively within this category. Again the earlier periods (Slavery and Immigration) seemed to have demonstrated that the coercive approach was the dominant means of conflict termination utilized by the then regimes. By contrast, the Modern period seemed to have witnessed a significant increase in the Alleviative (52%) compared to other types of responses to political violence.

In this way the Guyana experience gives support to the hypothesis that the more oligarchic-authoritative types of regimes (as for example during the Slavery and Immigration periods) tend to rely more on the coercive compared to the other non-coercive means of conflict termination. Conversely, the more permissive or less coercive types of regime (as for example during the Transition and Modern periods) tend to rely more on the non-coercive types of conflict settlement.

When subjected to the Chi square (3x3) test the null hypothesis predicting no significant relationship between permissiveness of regime on the one hand and consensual types of responses on the other, was rejected at the .001 level of significance. The contingency coefficient showing the strength of the relationship between the two is .46 (n = 210). The high significance level of .001 suggests that chance plays a minimal role in the association between regime permissiveness and consensual responses.

A closer look at Guyana's historical experience would, no doubt, provide some explanation

for these observed trends. The more coercive means of suppressing violent challenges to the earlier regimes seemed to have been necessary for the very survival of the political system, especially during the slavery period. Force characterized the slave system of necessity since an unwilling and potentially hostile slave labour force, forming the overwhelming majority of the population at the time, had to be kept in check. In the event of even minor forms of disobedience to authority, slaves, and also indentured servants during Immigration, were severely punished, often in forms extending to inhuman brutality.¹³ The rationale for this brutal approach was to discourage the remaining slave or indentured population from committing similar acts of disobedience.

The Berbice slave uprising in 1763, in particular, was finally suppressed after a severe and concentrated military operation lasting for about six months, and attended by displays on both sides of extreme brutality to prisoners and victims. Torture of prisoners ranged from being broken on the wheel to roasting over slow fire as in the case

of the captured rebels at the end of the Berbice uprising.¹⁴ Execution of slave rebels was usually done in the public view as an object lesson of terror to all. It was also not uncommon to see during slave uprisings, bodies of victims on both sides quartered and hung or heads stuck on poles, in strategic locations to strike further terror in the enemy.

Extreme repressive measures were also prevalent during the Immigration period. A simple strike for increased wages among East Indian indentured servants at Devonshire Castle in 1872 led to an almost brutal suppression of the movement by the armed might of the then regime. According to Weber, the armed forces were "sent to the plantation without cause, save that the manager complained that he was going to be beaten..."¹⁵ Further, it was claimed that "an unauthorized discharge, of a volley into the seething crowd of immigrants" resulted in the death of five and the injury of eight unarmed participants. At this stage it was contended that "the coolies were thoroughly cowed and gave no further trouble."¹⁶

But perhaps the more striking factor dramatizing the identification of the regime with coercive force at the time was the findings of an official inquest which followed the Devonshire Castle massacre. The report of the inquest suggested, according to Weber, that "the police had fired in defence of their lives and that for the fortunate explosion of a rifle, the riot would have become a widespread rebellion, most disastrous in its consequences."¹⁷

Since emancipation in 1834, however, when slaves became freed of the control of white masters, the labouring population increasingly came to be regarded as indispensable for the survival of the plantation system. As such the ruling planters had to use a variety of conciliatory approaches to hold an increasingly reluctant ex-slave labour force on the sugar estate. Sometimes subtle and indirect force such as the cutting down of fruit trees on which many of the fleeting ex-slaves subsisted was employed by the more desperate planters.¹⁸ But more often the bulk of the planters employed the more positive incentives such as increased wages

and guaranteeing more attractive conditions of work to maintain their labour force.¹⁹ Thus reliance on brute force became no longer adequate for controlling an unwilling labouring population. The practice of offering incentives to the labouring population also continued among the East Indian indentured servants during the Immigration period.²⁰

The Transition period witnessed the emergence of organized movements among the labouring population.²¹ Such movements, although largely diversified and even fragmentary, were frequently involved in political protest from their inception. Later, however, these movements became increasingly capable of negotiating with governments for the attainment of their demands. One indication of a more relaxed atmosphere for labour movements during this period was that as early as 1917, imprisonment for labour offences was abolished. This achievement was occasioned by the replacement of criminal proceedings against indentured immigrants by more civil remedies, "the more extreme court order being repatriation."²²

It was the same period also which saw the

earliest beginnings of the principle of collective bargaining. A strike among waterfront workers, called in 1917 for increased pay and improved conditions of work led, for the first time, to negotiations between workers representatives and an association of employers, the Chamber of Commerce.²³ The institutionalization of this principle of collective bargaining was, however, not to have fully developed until a time much closer to the Modern period when trade union organizations became much stronger. Together with newly emerging political parties, trade unions during this period ~~pressed the struggle for both the institutionaliza-~~ tion of collective bargaining and the establishment of other institutional channels for the more peaceful resolution of political conflict.

Perhaps the earliest indication of official sanction given to the idea of conciliation and collective bargaining is to be found in the Royal Commission Report into the Leonora Disturbances of 1939. The Commission suggested that one of the major causes of the strike which preceded the riot at Leonora was "the absence of any effective means

whereby the trade union would have been enabled to make representations directly to the management on behalf of the labourers at the time when the grievances first arose, and to secure at that time adequate investigation of the matter in dispute."²⁴

The commission further suggested the need among estate labourers, for organized leadership which could facilitate peaceful settlement of dispute and possibly prevent individual and concerted acts of violence.²⁵

It was, however, during the Modern period that the attitude of the regimes to political violence events was much more tolerant and accommodating. The more accommodating attitude of the regime during the Modern period is reflected, for example, in the response of the P.P.P. regime to an anti-government mass demonstration in February 1962. The following abstract from a record of events during the 1962 disturbances bears out this tendency:²⁶

Wednesday, 7th February.

Meeting at Legislative Assembly. Premier met by hostile crowd on leaving Public Buildings. Large crowds demonstrate against Budget and Government with placards and posters outside Public Buildings.

Press reports that the T.U.C. have denounced the Budget.

Friday, 9th February.

Legislative Assembly meets and considers Constitution Committee. Opposition stage walk out. Large crowds in hostile demonstration around Public Buildings. Government announce further postponement of Budget debate to unspecified date to allow for numerous memoranda being studied and for further consultations. The Government invites the three Chambers of Commerce and T.U.C. to make representations on Budget.

The preponderance of events resulting in the alleviative types of response during the Modern period could be attributed to the phenomenal rise of the small scale types of political violence which often result in a mountain of unresolved issues and demands. The increasing volume of anti-government picket demonstrations, spontaneous political strikes in opposition to legislation already passed or decisions already taken, malicious disruption of political meetings resulting in small scale riots, tended to peter out leaving the original issues and demands still basically unresolved or completely abandoned by the interested parties involved in the incidents.

The second hypothesis that regime response

to the more extreme levels of political violence is usually more coercive than consensual, also finds some support in the Guyana historical experience. The foregoing analysis has already revealed that more coercive responses were displayed during the earlier periods when also the levels of political violence were more extreme. Closer examination of the Modern period also reveals that coercive responses tended to increase significantly during sub-periods which witnessed the highest levels of political violence.

Table 6.2 indicates that the 1963-66 sub-period when political violence was most extreme, also witnessed the greatest volume (34%) of relatively coercive response compared to other sub-periods. Conversely, the 1955-58 sub-period which witnessed the lowest level of political violence, also displayed the least volume (9%) of relatively coercive response. Again the 1951-54 sub-period which demonstrates the second highest volume of relatively coercive response (20%) was also a sub-period manifesting one of the highest levels of political violence during the Modern period.

TABLE 6.2

Types and Distribution of Regime Response to Political Violence

During The Modern Period: 1947-1970

SUB-PERIODS	TYPES OF RESPONSE: % OF EVENTS					TOTAL % n
	CONSENSUAL [Compr. Passive Award]	ALLEVIATIVE [Avoid Frozen]	COERCIVE [Force/Conquest]			
1947-50	18	29	3	18	18	100 28
1951-54	7	27	-	23	23	100 30
1955-58	-	18	-	27	46	100 11
1959-62	16	5	-	79	-	100 19
1963-66	2	10	5	38	11	100 44
1967-70	7	-	33	20	26	100 15

The years 1953-4 and 1962-4 were significant for the extreme degree of repressive response by the respective governing regimes. As has already been noted, the colonial authorities in 1953 responded to a suspected communist victory at the polls with the imposition of martial law, the suspension of the Guyana constitution, the imprisonment of political leaders and the employment of British troops on a massive scale to quell a "rebellion" that was possibly still to be conceived.²⁷ In 1962 a similar trend occurred when in response to a massive political riot and potential rebellion the Jagan government invoked the state of martial law and utilized the services of British troops.²⁸ The following years, 1963-65 witnessed the escalation of the conflict to racial violence and guerilla warfare, the response to which took the severe forms of imprisonment of political leaders (including government ministers), the assumption of arbitrary powers by the then colonial governor, curfew in many major areas, and the near institutionalization of a martial atmosphere in the form of a "national security" legislation which give widespread

powers to the police.²⁹

Further support for the second hypothesis suggesting high coercive response to the more extreme levels of political violence is to be gleaned from Table 6.3. Here, the greater proportion of coercive response seems to be confined to political violence events beyond and including the extremity level of Riots. The more consensual and alleviate types of response seem to be confined to the lower level of events such as Anti-government demonstrations and Major strikes.

The relative lack of events above the extremity level of Riots would seem to make any contingency test of the relationship between extreme levels of violence and coercive response rather problematic.³⁰ However, the null hypothesis was still rejected at the fairly high significance level of .001, while the strength of association appears to be fairly high level as reflected in the contingency coefficient of .46. This observation might well reflect the probability that the nature of the regime is not necessarily a better predictor of coercive response than the extremity level of political violence.

TABLE 6.3

REGIME RESPONSE AND LEVELS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE DURING THE MODERN PERIOD: 1947-1970

LEVEL OF COERCIVENESS	TYPES OF RESPONSE	LEVEL OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE : % OF EVENTS				TOTAL
		LOW ANTI-GOVT DEMONSTRATIONS	MEDIUM MAJOR STRIKES	HIGH RIOT	GUER./WAR REBELLION	
LOW	CONSENSUAL (a) COMPROMISE	2	28	-	-	24
	(b) PASSIVE	21	13	4	-	
	(c) AWARD	2	15	-	-	
MEDIUM	ALLEViate					57
	(a) AVD/WITHDR. (b) FROZEN CONF.	47 12	- 42	46 -	- -	
HIGH	COERCIVE FORCE/CONQUEST	16	2	50	100	19
TOTAL		100	100	100	100	100

TABLE 6.3 (a)

REGIME RESPONSE AND LEVELS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE: 1947-1970; NO.OF EVENTS:LEVEL OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE: NO.OF EVENTS

LEVEL OF COERCIVENESS	TYPES OF RESPONSE	LEVEL OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE: NO.OF EVENTS			TOTAL
		<u>LOW</u> ANTI. GOVT. DEMONSTRATIONS	<u>MEDIUM</u> MAJOR STRIKES	<u>HIGH</u> RIOTS/GUERILLA WARFARE/REBELLION	
LOW	CONSENSUAL	21	21	1	43
MEDIUM	ALLEVIATE	49	16	11	76
HIGH	COERCIVE	13	1	14	28
TOTAL		83	38	26	147

$$\chi^2 = 29.27$$

$$p > 18.465 = .001$$

$$C = .46$$

If however, Table 6.3 does not altogether appear to be conclusive in light of the relative scarcity of events beyond the extremity level of Riots, perhaps an investigation of a particular historical event would help to shed some more light on the nature of the escalation of regime response as the level of political violence itself escalates.

The setting is once again the 1962 disturbances. It has already been noted that in response to hostile mass demonstrations against Budget proposals the Jagan government offered to negotiate with the representative organizations, in particular the T.U.C. and the various Chambers of Commerce. In spite of this offer the T.U.C. decided to escalate the conflict by calling a general strike which took place on Wednesday 14th February. Immediately in response to the general shut down of services, and with a disclosure that a plan was afoot to "overthrow the government and to assassinate (the Premier) and others of his close supporters," the government began to mobilize the military forces and to embody a newly created British Guiana Volunteer Force. In addition, the

area around Public Buildings which house the Legislative Assembly was declared restricted by a Proclamation issued by the colonial Governor.

The General strike nevertheless continued. Mass demonstrations became more frequent and intense; political leaders led large crowds to break the Proclamation and march into the prohibited area. In response to this crowd movement, the military forces introduced a new weapon, tear-smoke, in order to control the crowd. When, in the final analysis, the demonstrations got out of hand resulting in a large scale riot (including arson and looting) in which several policemen were shot, and one fatally, the governing regime decided to proclaim a state of emergency and to call in British troops to aid the local military forces in the control of the spate of political violence.³¹

The use of extreme military measures was again demonstrated in another extreme incident of political violence, the Rupununi rebellion in 1969. This time the P.N.C. regime utilized a combined military operation comprising both the police

and the army (the Guyana Defence Force) to put down the uprising of the local population which demanded secession of the region from the control of the Guyana government.³² In addition, the area around Rupununi was proclaimed and deemed prohibited to specific groups and individuals.

From the evidence obtained in the Guyana historical experience, it would seem reasonable to entertain the hypothesis that the more oligarchic-authoritative types of regimes as evidenced during the pre-modern periods tend to rely more on force compared to the more consensual means of terminating political conflict and violence. In addition it would appear that governing regimes in general tend to rely more on force to control the more extreme levels of political violence. The third hypothesis, however, that the employment of military force is not sufficient to deter political violence, will be best evaluated by a specific examination of the role of the military forces in Guyana.

THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY FORCES

One striking characteristic of the military role in Guyana is the very small size of its numbers which makes the force seem inadequate to cope with either the larger movements of political protest or the more extensive events of political violence. As such the role of the military forces, particularly during the earlier historical periods, had been largely defensive - a factor which increases the probability that the force would rely more on the use of the more destructive or lethal weapons to quickly suppress hostile movements.

In addition, because of this size deficiency, much reliance had always been placed on the assistance of foreign auxiliaries particularly at times when political violence was most extreme.³³ In effect, the Guyana experience has shown that the function of the military forces in times of political violence is more often the ex-post facto attempt to contain the events already in motion, rather than being an effective deterrent to the outbreak of such events.

The inadequate strength of the military forces was demonstrated as early as 1763 when at the commencement of the Berbice slave rebellion, only about thirty soldiers and sailors were made to face hundreds of hostile slaves.³⁴ Even when foreign auxiliaries arrived much later in the course of the rebellion, the troops numbered less than one hundred in a field of battle against several thousands of slaves.³⁵

Similarly during the racial riots between Africans and Portuguese in New Amsterdam in 1847 only 8 policemen commanded the post against "an angry and violent mob of over 200 negroes armed with sticks."³⁶ During the Modern period, also, when large scale violence erupted in Georgetown in 1962 less than 300 policemen were available to control a widespread unrest involving several thousands of participants.³⁷ Again, at the outbreak of the Rupununt rebellion in 1969 only about 5 policemen were present at the post in the midst of hundreds of local rebels.³⁸

The expectation that the strength of the police force in particular would increase following

each serious or large-scale episode of political violence was not borne out by the Guyana experience. The Modern period reveals that increases in the strength of the military forces did not keep even pace with the volume and extent of political violence relative to each sub-period. Table 6.4 suggests that the sub-period which witnessed the more significant increases in the police force were not necessarily the sub-periods demonstrating the greater volume or level of political violence. As an indication of the relative lack of significance of military strength in relation to the volume of political violence, a very low negative correlation coefficient ($Rho = -.10$) is obtained.

Among the three sub-periods which displayed large increases in the police force, 1951-54, 1959-62, and 1967-70, only the first could be said to have witnessed any significantly high volume of political violence events. There is also very little indication that significant increases in military strength preceded in time the occurrence of large scale political violence. Such an outcome would have lent partial support to the

TABLE 6.4

Variations in Military Strength and Expenditure
During The Modern Period

PERIOD	Mean Strength of Military Forces	Mean Expenditure on Military Forces (\$,000 Guyana)	Per Capita Expenditure (\$,000 Guy.)
1947-50	1,100	n.a.	n.a.
1951-54	1,800	1,900	1.0
1955-58	2,000	3,200	1.6
1959-62	2,500	3,500	1.4
1963-66	2,700	5,200	2.0
1967-70	4,000	11,000	2.7

n.a. = not available

Sources: Annual Report of the Commissioner of Police, (1947-1970); General Estimates, Ministry of Finance, (1952-1970).

hypothesis which predicts a curvilinear relationship between regime coerciveness on the one hand, and political violence on the other.³⁹ Table 6.4, however, suggests that the first significant increase in the police force took place during a highly violent sub-period (1951-54), the second sizeable increase took place immediately prior to the most

violent sub-period (1963-66), and the final significant increase followed this most violent sub-period.

But an estimation of military strength alone is not sufficient to assess the overall effectiveness of the force in controlling political violence. The overall efficiency and mobility of the force is of paramount importance, particularly in containing levels of political violence and in controlling the escalation of each event.

A useful guide to estimating the efficiency of the armed forces is the amount of expenditure which is utilized for their regular operations. It is assumed that more money voted for the military forces would go mainly into acquiring the necessary equipment and training which could improve services and augment overall efficiency. Table 6.4 gives an indication of both the average and the per capita expenditure on the military forces for each sub-period during the Modern period in Guyana.

It might not be insignificant that both average and per capita expenditure on the military

forces increased significantly during the two sub-periods (1955-58 and 1967-70) which witnessed the lowest volumes of political violence. This observation seems to lend support to the hypothesis that the efficiency of the force is negatively related to high volume of political violence. Perhaps the explanation for this trend is that governments tend to become more sensitive about the weaknesses of the force after the outbreak of serious incidents of political violence, and as such, vote more supplies to the military so as to facilitate the future preservation of law and order.

The history of the military forces in Guyana, however, suggests that significant efforts were made to improve the overall efficiency of the police force after the more intensive sub-periods of political violence. Following the 1953-54 sub-period of political violence, for example, two significant developments relevant to the efficiency and mobility of the force took place. The first was the introduction of the walkie-talkie which improved the efficiency of communication among

members of the force.⁴⁰ Such an inclusion could prove to be a very effective means of crowd control particularly during incidents of political violence. The second development was the introduction of improved transportation services to facilitate the efficient manoeuvrability or mobility of the forces.⁴¹

Also, following the 1962 event of extreme political violence the efficiency of the force was augmented by the creation of an auxiliary force, the Special Service Unit.⁴² Later, following the extreme spate of violence between 1963 and 1965, a completely new military force (the Guyana Defence Force) was created with authority to control internal disorder, apart from containing possible external aggression, and equipped with the most advanced weapons of war and other technical devices for the maintenance of superior efficiency.⁴³

Efficiency in manoeuvre and mobility can also have significant impact on the outcome of political violence and adequately compensate for the usually inadequate strength of the military forces. This fact is borne out by a striking

example in 1948, a few days after the Enmore riots, when a small body of policemen prevented a possible large scale riot in the city of Georgetown. A massive funeral procession from Enmore to Georgetown, involving thousands of mourners of the Enmore victims,⁴⁴ was contained by the skillful manoeuvres of the police force. Captain W. A. Orett put it this way:

The march was met and stopped by the police at the entrance of the city.....The marchers were turbulent and in an angry mood. There was no reserve as the old Militia was disbanded during the 1939-45 war.....the police scheme to overcome this difficulty was to use motor transport and to embus a half-platoon in each lorry, each vehicle in turn blocking its first allotted point and then, after the marchers had passed, moving to the next alternate side street; the mounted troops... following immediately behind the crowd to ensure no turning back. The scheme worked most effectively, and at each cross street on route of some 3 miles, the marchers saw a body of uniformed steel-helmeted police on guard. Information received afterwards, disclosed that the members of the procession had formed the impression that there were hundreds of armed police ready to prevent any attempt to force a way into the city, and this was confirmed by the mood of the crowd changing and their readily obeying the orders to disperse after the funeral and making their way home individually or in small parties.⁴⁵

The result of the Enmore tragedy seemed to have set in motion a train of ethnic and political

antagonism which also has untoward consequences for the effectiveness of military response to political violence events in Guyana. Although the independent commission of inquiry into the Enmore disturbances concluded that the extreme action of the police was necessary to curtail possible large-scale political violence, the suspicion was nevertheless born that racism determined the behaviour of a predominantly African police force in firing at a predominantly East Indian labour force.

Often the governing regime, in order to augment the strength of the military forces would utilize the services of ethnic groups different from that of the population in uprising. During the Slavery period, for example, the Dutch military regime relied on the services of the native Amerindian population to help put down Negro slave insurrections, or to capture run-away slaves in hiding in the dense forested regions of Guyana.⁴⁶ At least in one instance during the Immigration period (the Angel Gabriel Riots of 1856), East Indians were used to police Africans.⁴⁷ Since the Transition period, however, Africans have been

predominant in the military and security forces, a position which they still enjoy and which has been a serious bone of contention among prominent political personalities ever since.

Complaints about this predominantly African composition of the police force, primarily from the P.P.P., led to the setting up of an independent commission of inquiry into the racial composition of the public and security services.⁴⁸ This line of argument also provided the rationale for the establishment in 1962 of the new and independent Special Service Unit, with a more racially mixed composition.

What is, however, important about the biased racial distribution in the military forces is that efforts at controlling hostile manifestations of popular discontent have often encountered bitter and negative criticism of racial implications, which tend to impair much of the effectiveness of police operations. Evidence and suspicion of possible partiality in the attitude of the police during the political disturbances in 1963 led to the resignation of the then Minister of

Home Affairs.⁴⁹ Often military action against popular movements has tended to be viewed as sufficient provocation for future racial violence in Guyana.⁵⁰ This is so despite the very serious efforts made by the police force to be as impartial as possible in dealing with local disturbances.

CONCLUSION

The Guyana experience, therefore, seems to have demonstrated strong support for the hypothesis that regime response to political violence would tend to be less reliant on coercion as the political process becomes more Modern or relatively more permissive and open to mass participation. Thus, also, it has been observed that relatively more oligarchic or authoritarian types of regimes as evidenced during the pre-modern periods tend to rely more on force, than on any other type of non-coercive responses, to suppress political violence events. In other words, whereas governing regimes during the earlier periods in Guyana's history utilized coercive force as a first resort, those during the Modern period tended to reserve the use of force only as a

last resort in the control of political violence.

The second hypothesis which predicted that more coercive responses would be applied to the more extreme levels of political violence has, also, been supported by the evidences in Guyana, although such evidences were indeed much less significant than those in support of the former hypothesis. The earlier periods, however, seem to have demonstrated stronger support for this hypothesis compared to the Modern period. Since the earlier periods experienced both extreme types of political violence and the more coercive types of regime responses, it is reasonable to suggest some close relationship between the two outcomes.

But more importantly, it would appear that the role of military force in particular, was not sufficiently effective to prevent the outbreak or curtail the relative frequency of political violence events. The inadequate strength of the military forces was far from being a deterrent to movements determined to demonstrate their particular grievances in the more hostile or violent manner. There is evidence, however, to suggest that the military

forces by combining efficiency and flexibility of manoeuvre has often been instrumental in containing the spread or the level of escalation of political violence events.

Yet, mere efficiency of small numbers does not seem to be sufficient to stem the more extreme types of political violence. An efficient small force seemed to be more relevant for controlling the relatively small scale types of political violence such as Anti-government demonstrations and Major strikes. Hence the need for auxiliaries, whether local or foreign, has always been felt during times of the more extreme levels of political violence such as large-scale riots, guerilla warfare and rebellion.

Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of the military approach is that it rarely proves to be conclusive as a means of conflict resolution. In Guyana, in particular, the military approach seems to sow the seeds of further conflict especially along racial lines since the military forces have always been comprised predominantly of one ethnic group. Thus the multi-ethnic nature of Guyanese

- 323 -

society tends to make any attempt at a military solution to political violence rather more destabilizing and further disintegrative.

CHAPTER IX

POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND ETHNIC POLARIZATION

Major episodes of political violence seem to adversely affect national integration in terms of increasing and aggravating already existing ethnic cleavages in the political system. In the Guyana context, the relationship between ethnicity and violent conflict seems to involve a mutual feedback effect in which ethnic polarization is more fundamentally a product than a cause of political conflict and violence. It is mainly to the extent that ethnicity is associated with organized political movement that it becomes an independent variable in producing political violence.

The concept of "polarization" is viewed as a variant of the concept of "cleavage" which refers to the existence, within the political system, of separate and distinct segments of the general population, each attributing greater loyalties to its own separate community than to the national state as a whole.¹ More specifically, "polarization" further connotes that the existing division revolves basically around two opposing sections of the general

population. In this context, also, the lesser or smaller groups within the system operate mainly as coalition partners for one or other of the two opposing sections. "Ethnic polarization", then, would refer to the existence of basically two separate ethnic communities each more self conscious of its own identity than about its role on the broader national level.²

The existence of separate ethnic communities could be observed in either the establishment of separate and distinct geographic regions, or the display of separate political or ideological loyalties on the part of each ethnic group. The degree of ethnic polarization is exacerbated to the extent that there is an overlap between the two - the geographic and political - bases of identification. What G. Bingham Powell refers to as a "fragmented society" could represent in effect an acute form of polarization brought about by the coincidence of ethnic and political interests. "In a fragmented society", according to Powell, "the lines dividing political groups are the same lines that divide social classes, secondary associations, and

major religious or ethnic groups."³

The degree of polarization is further aggravated by the coincidence of a division of labour along ethnic lines. J. S. Furnivall and M. G. Smith refer to the concept of the plural society characterized by political systems in which distinct cultural or ethnic sections engage in separate types of employment practices.⁴ A further characteristic of the plural society which tends to cement the polarized relationship between major (groups is the) existence of a dominant cultural section with power sufficient to control the other segments of the population.⁵

Such a basic division of ethnic groups along political power lines led however, to the development of the serious conflict situation which was to reach its height during the Modern periods. The consequent violent conflict seemed to have been initiated by the changes in the power relationship between groups over the various historical periods.

Prior to the Modern period, inter-ethnic violence was relatively minimal and confined mainly

to localized districts. During the Modern period, however, inter-ethnic rivalry took on national proportions and became identified with the political struggle for the exclusive dominance of the one group over the others.⁶ It was, indeed, in the wake of the contest for political power which emerged since 1953 in particular, that ethnic consciousness as a rallying point for political competition became manifest in overt racial violence.⁷

The Guyana experience has indeed provided some justification for modifications of the view that ethnic divisiveness or cleavage by itself is sufficient to produce overt collective violence.⁸ Instead, the Guyana experience seems to follow more closely the pattern cited for African and other developing nations in which political factors such as electoral competition and political change are very crucial independent variables in explaining ethnic polarization and conflict.⁹

This line of reasoning suggests three closely related hypotheses which are thought to be directly relevant to the Guyana experience:

- (a) That the existence of different ethnic

segments of the population is not sufficient to directly produce political violence.

- (b) That the involvement of political factors (issues and organization) is necessary before ethnic cleavage can generate overt inter-group conflict and violence.
- (c) That increases in the degree of ethnic polarization and cleavage are more often the result of serious episodes of collective and political violence, and less often the determinant of such violent episodes. In the Guyana context political violence tends to increase the intensity of ethnic polarization.

By way of explanations of these probable hypotheses one can suggest that firstly it is difficult to understand how a relatively constant condition such as ethnic differentiation could explain a variable process such as political violence without the intervention of some closely associated variable such as political mobilization and recruitment.¹⁰ Secondly, it would seem logical that only by actively participating in the political process can hitherto separated groups become involved in direct contact with each other such that clashes of interest can emerge and hitherto latent conflict become manifest in inter-group violence.

Further it would seem feasible to suppose

that the process of increasing polarization is more likely to be a defensive reaction to a prior process of political violence since the latter process tends to threaten the destruction of group identity. However, the argument is also defensible that ethnic polarization can in turn compound the conflict problem by precipitating further cleavages particularly along ideological, but usually non-violent, lines in the political system.¹¹

The examination of the foregoing hypotheses on the basis of the Guyana experience will take the following forms. Firstly, it is intended to show that relatively greater increases in ethnic polarization followed sub-periods witnessing greater volume and extent of political violence. Secondly, that extended and serious episodes of political violence immediately followed sub-periods when greater efforts were made toward increasing national integration. The government crisis of 1954, for example, followed upon a period of massive efforts to unite the many ethnic groups in Guyana under the banner of a single political party (the P.P.P.). Again the large scale Rupununi uprising in 1969 followed upon a similar

period of extended efforts toward national political integration and development. Thirdly, it is intended to demonstrate very close links and relationships between ethnic groups on the one hand, and political parties and related organizations on the other, especially during periods of extensive political violence.

More specifically, the operational indicators of increasing polarization would be shown in the Guyana context to be represented by: (a) increases in the pattern of ethnic voting during the various elections since 1953; (b) increases in the separate regional concentration of the different, particularly the two major, ethnic groups in the population; and (c) increases in the ethnic composition of political parties in terms of the nature of their representation in the Guyana legislature over the years. These increases which will be shown to follow upon sub-periods of extensive political violence would also be assumed to represent at least one dimension of disintegration of the political system.

ETHNIC CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE DURING
THE PRE-MODERN PERIOD

The historical experience of Guyana prior to the Modern period has shown that specifically ethnic conflict was minimal compared to the more politically oriented types of group violence. Even some conflicts which appeared to be overtly racial were often initially inspired by more fundamentally political or economic considerations. The majority of the violent episodes with racial configurations, particularly during the Immigration and Transition periods, was confined to clashes between Africans and Portuguese in the urban centers where competition for a scarce commercial market led to hostile and antagonistic rivalries between African and Portuguese traders. The basic problem underlying these open clashes had seemed to be economic and political rather than essentially racial factors.

The Angel Gabriel Riots of 1856, for example, seemed to have been the direct consequence of the mobilizing zeal of an African preacher, James Orr, (nicknamed the Angel Gabriel because he always carried a trumpet with him) who complained that the

Portuguese had taken "the bread out of the mouths of the African traders" by their monopoly of the commercial and business sectors of the national economy. The main targets of attack during the riot were the business premises belonging mainly to Portuguese nationals.¹² This pattern of inter-group violence with economic undertones was also repeated in 1889 and again in 1905 in Georgetown involving also Africans and the wealthy Portuguese or European elements of the population.¹³ It might not be insignificant politically, however, that both the victims and aggressors during each of these events represented different political and social class interests in the society, as it were.

Clashes between Africans and East Indians were occasional and sporadic, more resembling localized gang fights than organized group encounters. Most of these skirmishes took place during "Tadja" festivals when East Indian celebrants often become exuberant to the extent of provoking antagonism with outsiders of the immediate festive group. Often, as occurred in Mahaica in 1853,

African spectators were attacked by East Indian participants in these festivals.¹⁴ There were also incidents in which East Indian labourers attacked Africans (mainly Barbadians) who, they claimed, were encroaching on their labour market on the sugar estates.¹⁵

Incidents of violent encounters between the Chinese and other ethnic elements of the population were few and insignificant. One incident involving a gang fight of any notable proportion took place between Chinese and Africans in Wakenaam, an island in the Essequibo River, in 1863, when a group of Chinese decided to beat up a negro informer of the police. Other Africans, according to Rodway "seeing their 'mattie' in danger came up in great numbers and a free fight ensued."¹⁶ The result was the complete defeat of the Chinese by the superior numbers of the Africans, with a considerable number of injured on both sides.¹⁷

During the Slavery period insurrections, of course, took on racial forms in that an African slave population confronted a white planter elite. But in

the overwhelming majority, if not all, of the cases of confrontation the underlying causal factors had always been primarily political. Struggle between slaves and masters was directed essentially against the oppression instituted by the planter class. Also the antagonists in the struggle had not always represented clear cut racial divisions. Many instances have been recorded which indicated that white soldiers actually fought on the side of the African slaves in revolt.¹⁸ Again, many African slaves, on the promise of immediate freedom, acted as auxiliaries to the white militia in the suppression of slave rebellions.¹⁹

The use of other ethnic groups such as Amerindians, during Slavery, and East Indians, during Immigration, to police mainly the African element of the population might no doubt have sown the seeds of racial animosity for the future. But until the coming of the Modern period no evidences seem to be available to suggest the occurrence of any significant incident of political violence as a direct result of prior ethnic antagonism.

Most of the significant disturbances

during the Transition period stemmed from conditions of labour unrest. During the Immigration period it has been observed that both economic and political problems were central to the outbreak of the major disturbances, while during Slavery the problem had been basically political. The Modern period too saw the emergence of ~~basically~~ political issues as central to the outbreak of the greater proportion of episodes of collective violence. However it could be conceded that while basically ethnic and cultural factors played only a minor role in determining the events, these factors nevertheless seemed to have coloured the outcome of the more extreme events.

ETHNIC CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE DURING
THE MODERN PERIOD

The Modern period indeed witnessed a variety of efforts on the part of ethnic based organizations, often appealing to racial sentiments, to influence the outcome of the competition for political power. Even trade union organizations were characterized by ethnic based leadership.²⁰ However, the earlier part of the

Modern period saw the rise of a widespread nationalist movement, under the banner of the P.P.P., which was instrumental in cutting across racial divisions. The overwhelming success of the P.P.P. at the first elections fought under universal suffrage seemed like an indication that the nationalist sentiment took precedence over racial loyalties, at least in terms of political competition.²¹ Unfortunately, however, this encouraging attempt at national unity among the major race groups in Guyana was shortlived, following the dismissal of the P.P.P. government from office and the suspension of the Guyana Constitution in 1953.²²

Perhaps the most disastrous consequence of the political crisis of 1953 in Guyana was that the colonial authorities succeeded in destroying the nationalist movement by influencing the split in the leadership of the P.P.P. into two potentially racial sections. Despres wrote that the split in the P.P.P. "represented the culmination of the disintegrative pressures at work in the Guyanese political situation. It represented a complete rupture between the Marxists and the non-Marxists.

It also represented the conclusion of Guyana's comprehensive nationalist movement."²³

The split took on racial overtones although the two leaders that emerged, Cheddi Jagan and Forbes Burnham, might not have intended a racial outcome. The fact, however, that the former is East Indian and the latter African, both very capable leaders in their own right, suggested to the followers the possible ethnic lines of development of the two future political parties.²⁴

The racial bases of support for the two emerging parties, the Jaganite P.P.P., and the Burnhamite P.P.P. (now P.N.C.) are also to a large extent reinforced by their separate alignments to various cultural organizations and other voluntary associations. These alignments tend to take on racially divided forms with the Jaganite P.P.P. controlling the East Indian dominated organizations, and the P.N.C. controlling the African dominated organizations.²⁵ Table 7.1 gives an indication of the extent of ethnic control of the various voluntary organizations and the nature of their political alignments.²⁶ The polarized relationship is reflected

in the dominant pattern of control effected by the two major parties, the P.P.P. and the P.N.C., while the third party, the U.F., enjoys only minimal or insignificant control of voluntary organizations.

TABLE 7.1

Organized Political Representation of
Ethnic Groups in Guyana

ETHNIC GROUPS	% CONTROL OF ECON. AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATIONS	DOMINANT REPRESENTATIVE POLITICAL PARTY
Africans	47	P.N.C.
East Indians	30	P.P.P.
Chinese	03	(Dispersed)
Amerindian	00	U.F.
European	17	U.F.
Mixed & Other	03	(Dispersed)
Total	100	

Sources: The percentages were compiled from a list of Economic and Cultural Organizations taken from Ralph Premdas, Voluntary Associations and Political Parties in a Racially Fragmented State: The Case of Guyana, Occasional Papers No. 2, University of Guyana, February, 1972.

Yet it would appear that the initial stages of the split, viewed on the basis of leadership personnel, had not been a clear cut racial division. Several prominent African politicians remained with Jagan, while prominent East Indian leaders went over on the side of Burnham.²⁷ Later, however, through a series of mergers and other types of alignments between the Burnhamite P.P.P. and other notable African dominated parties such as the N.D.P., the predominantly African complexion of the resulting P.N.C. party (established 1958) became evident.²⁸ In the meantime the Jaganite faction of the P.P.P. had always remained assured of overwhelming support from the East Indian element of the population.²⁹

Empirical evidence as indicated in Table 7.2 supports this view. Leo Despres' survey of six Guyanese villages representing both East Indians and African areas revealed that the overwhelming majority of the population in African villages are either members of or intend to vote for the P.N.C., while a similar trend obtains among the East Indian villages in favour of the P.P.P.

TABLE 7.2

Political Party Membership and Voting Intentions of

Africans and East Indians

POLITICAL PARTY	EAST INDIANS		AFRICANS	
	% Membership	% Voting Intentions	% Membership	% Voting Intentions
Peoples Progressive Party (P.P.P.)	88.9	86.6	5.1	6.2
Peoples National Congress (P.N.C.)	2.2	2.1	88.7	81.3
United Force (U.F.)	8.9	7.2	6.2	10.4
Undecided	-	4.1	-	2.1
Total	100	100	100	100
n	45	194	97	241

Source: Léo Despres, Cultural Pluralism and Nationalist Politics in British Guiana, Chicago, 1967, pp 172, 173.

Perhaps an important observation in Table 7.2 is that third parties always tend to represent a larger percentage of membership or voting intentions in each of the separate ethnic areas, than is represented by the major ethnic opposition. This third party buffer between dominant and major opposition parties in each type of village is no doubt based on the negative image of the major opposing race group, that is, East Indians in African villages, and Africans in East Indian villages.

On the more dynamic level of analysis this same pattern of ethnic domination of party politics over the years is revealed in Table 7.3.

TABLE 7.3

Proportion of Ethnic Support for Various Parties

Year of Elections	PARTY SUPPORT IN ETHNIC BASED CONSTITUENCIES		
	PNC % of African Constituencies	PPP % of East Indian Constituencies	OTHER % Mixed Constituencies
1953	-	100	50
1957	50	100	16
1961	77	100	27
1964	100	100	15
1968	100	81	15

Sources: Elections Report, (1953-1968).

Table 7.3 gives an indication of the rapid development of African based ethnic support for the P.N.C. over the years, while the P.P.P. remained completely dominant in the East Indian constituencies until the 1968 elections when, as it appears, the P.P.P. lost support from some of the East Indian dominated areas.

The elections in 1957, soon after the split, suggested that the African basis of P.N.C. support was not yet notable. It was not until the 1961 elections that a very sizeable increase in the proportion of African support was demonstrated for the P.N.C. Since 1961, however, the P.N.C. seems to have superceded the P.P.P. in completely dominating its ethnic basis of support as reflected in the 100% success in African dominated constituencies.³⁰

Of significance, also, is the observation that the 1964 elections witnessed the greatest degree of ethnic polarization among the voting population. The complete control by both the P.P.P. and P.N.C. of their relevant ethnic based constituencies seems to have created a seriously polarized situation in Guyana. This observation is

significant since the extreme degree of polarization witnessed in 1964 followed a sub-period which demonstrated the greatest volume and extent of political violence during the Modern period.

Since also the 1964 elections were fought in anticipation of political independence from colonial rule, the competing political and ethnic organizations viewed the struggle in terms of the very survival of their respective ethnic groups. The elections of 1964 represented a heated struggle to maintain complete control of ethnic based support which was viewed as a necessary first step to electoral victory. Such a zero-sum approach was, no doubt, influenced by the fallacious assumption that in plural societies racial politics is often successful politics.³¹

It might also be significant in terms of dramatizing the serious impact of ethnic-political polarization that third party support from the "mixed" constituencies tended to increase during periods of relative calm (or just prior to the outbreak of serious political violence, e.g. 1953, (50%), and 1961 (27%)), and to decrease at times

immediately following periods of extensive political violence (e.g. 1957, [16%] and 1964, [15%]).

The explanation for this trend might be that voters tend to be persuaded more by a particularistic or ethnic oriented type of appeal during periods of extreme tension and conflict, and more by a universalistic or issue-oriented type of appeal during periods of greater political calm. It should be borne in mind however, that the currency of this explanation is premised on the assumption that the racially mixed constituencies are the better barometers of objective voting patterns than constituencies dominated by a single ethnic group.

When the varying degrees of ethnic constituency polarization are correlated with variations in political violence over the years, Rho reveals a coefficient of .76 with extremity levels of political violence, while only .11 is reflected with volume of political violence.³² Thus it would seem that there is a higher probability that ethnic polarization is more closely associated with the more extreme levels than with the relative frequency of political violence events.

Of importance, however, is the greater relevance of ethnicity to political participation rate ($Rho = .77$). The relatively high correlation between the two variables should lend support to the view that ethnicity is basically more relevant to political mobilization than to political violence in any direct sense.

The significant trend in ethnic polarization is also reflected at the elite level, in particular, among the various party representatives in the Guyana legislature. Both major political parties in the legislature (the P.P.P. and P.N.C.) are dominated by one or other of the two major ethnic groups, East Indians and Africans respectively. Table 7.4 suggests a relatively constant polarized situation in the legislature over the years.

It is noteworthy that the 1953 regime comprised an almost balanced racial slate. The tendency to deviate from this balanced racial composition began in 1957, soon after the split, with the P.N.C. reflecting a much stronger bias toward ethnic homogeneity.

The P.N.C. maintained the lead in ethnic

TABLE 7.4

Ethnic Polarization of Party Representation
in Legislature

PERIOD	Ethnic Alignments to Political Parties		
	P.N.C. % Africans	P.P.P. % East Indians	Mean % Overall Polarization
1953-56	-	50	50
1957-60	66	55	60
1961-63	64	60	62
1964-67	68	58	63
1968-73	60	79	69

Sources: Elections Report, (1953-68)

bias among its legislative representatives until 1968 when the P.P.P. surpassed the P.N.C. with a significant margin of difference. The high degree of ethnic homogeneity in P.P.P. representation in 1968 might, no doubt, reflect a strong reaction to their previous defeat at the hand of a combined opposition of P.N.C. and U.F. at the polls in the 1964 elections. Secondly, after the 1964 victory of the P.N.C., many African elements of the P.P.P. elite crossed the floor over to the side of the

P.N.C., thereby aggravating the extent of ethnic polarization in the legislature.

7 The alarming proportion of the ethnic-polarized state of the legislature is further reflected in the fact that the degree of ethnic divisions in the legislature far surpasses the relative proportion of ethnic groups in the population as a whole. For example, while the average degree of ethnic polarization with respect to each of the major parties in the legislature is well over 60%, the proportion of each of the major ethnic groups to the rest of the population is about 50% for East Indians and 30% for Africans.

The correlation between elite ethnic polarization (legislative representation) and extremity level of political violence is $Rho = .76$ which suggests a high probability of association between the two. However, the correlation of elite polarization with the relative frequency of political violence reveals a very low negative coefficient of $Rho = -.14$. Thus it is reasonable to suggest that, like mass ethnic polarization, elite ethnic polarization has a much more

significant relationship with the more extreme levels than with the relative frequency of political violence events.

The very close association between both mass ethnic polarization and elite ethnic polarization is reflected in the high correlation coefficient ($Rho = .97$) between the two. Thus it would appear that the two types of ethnic polarization are mutually reinforcing, in the Guyana political process at least. Again, the relatively high correlation ($Rho = .66$) between elite ethnic polarization and participation rate should suggest the more direct relevance of ethnicity with political mobilization than with political violence.

Further support for the view that Guyana's political process is becoming increasingly polarized, principally along ethnic lines, is suggested in Table 7.5 which reflects a consistent decline in popular support for third parties, especially since the 1961 elections.

According to Table 7.5 third parties which accounted for 28% of popular support in 1957 dropped to only 16% of such support in 1961. Further decline

TABLE 7.5

Proportion of Electoral Support for Various Parties
in Guyana Elections: 1953-1968

ELECTION YEARS	% ELECTORAL SUPPORT OF PARTIES				
	P.N.C.	P.P.P.	U.F.	OTHER	TOTAL
1953	-	51	-	49	100
1957	25	47	-	28	100
1961	41	43	16	-	100
1964	40	45	12	3	100
1968	56	36	7	1	100

Sources: Elections Report, (1953-1968)

in support for third parties is to be noted also for the years 1964 and 1968. In the meantime popular support for the two major parties consistently increased over the years.

This outcome seems to have defied major constitutional efforts to de-emphasize the persistent dominating role of the two ethnic based parties in the Guyana political process. The introduction of Proportional Representation as a new electoral form in 1964, for instance, did not automatically

create the type of party system which was to cut across the racially polarized lines as was thought.³³

REGIONAL CONCENTRATION OF ETHNIC COMMUNITIES

Perhaps the most disastrous form of ethnic polarization witnessed in Guyana is the tendency for hitherto existing multi-racial communities to disintegrate and give way to ethnic concentration into separate districts following the most protracted period of extensive political violence between 1962 and 1964. The three separate but related major political violence events during this period resulted from primarily political grievances, but soon degenerated into racial forms of expression.

As was already mentioned, the first major event of 1962 resulted from political opposition to certain Budget proposal of the then P.P.P. regime;³⁴ the second significant event of 1963 resulted from the opposition of both the labour movement and political parties to a proposed Labour Relations Bill;³⁵ the most devastating event of 1964 resulted from a massive sugar strike called by GAWU, a union linked to the P.P.P., for recognition but ostensibly in

opposition to changes in the electoral system and the introduction of Proportional Representation.³⁶

Indeed there were specific incidents which suggested that racial targets were selected for attack during both the 1962 and the 1963 episodes of political violence. During the 1963 events, for example, racial anger and desperation became manifest in physical terms. Although foreign newspaper reports of local events must be accepted with caution, the following report of Newsweek serves mainly to dramatize the serious nature of ethnic attacks and reprisals. Newsweek reported on July 15th as follows:

A Negro girl was raped by six Indian youths in the Indian village of Success, near Georgetown, and in the next 48 hours, two Negroes and two East Indians were beaten or shot to death, 60 persons were seriously injured, and more women and girls of both races were raped. Roving Negro mobs attacked Indians in the village of Plaisance. In retaliation, young Indians from the nearby village of Better Hope armed with machetes, sticks, stones and guns, marched on the Negroes.³⁷

But it was the 1964 events which gave rise to the more extensive proportions of racial violence and the consequent exodus of ethnic minorities from hostile areas into the more ethnically homogeneous and in some instances unpopulated regions. According

to an official report on the 1964 disturbances "about 2,668 families involving approximately 15,000 persons were forced to remove their houses to settle in communities of their particular ethnic identity, or to squat on lands owned by government and private individuals,"³⁸ in the course of the events.

This trend affected mainly the rural areas, although one industrial region, Mackenzie-Wismar-Christianburg, was significantly affected in this way. Displaced persons from this mining region amounted to about 744 families, or about 30% of the total displaced families in the country at the time.³⁹

The main target of the 1962-64 sub-period of political violence took the initial form of attacks upon business places in the city of Georgetown. Later the objective of the participants, still confined to the city, seemed to be government property and Parliament itself, although of course elements in the P.P.P. were trying to make a case for the view that East Indians were deliberately singled out for attacks by "hooligans" in the P.N.C. dominated city.⁴⁰ Even at the commencement of the more serious events in the rural areas in 1964, the initial signs did not

appear to be specifically racial in configurations. It also appeared that the later racial outcome of the 1964 events was unintended by those who initiated this spate of violence.

The racial dimension of the 1964 events emerged in an almost co-incidental way during the initial phase of the violence. It appeared as though the mainly East Indian supporters of the GAWU strike on the West Coast of Demerara, attacked and shot several strike breakers or "scabs", many of whom were Africans. Rumours soon became widespread that East Indians were killing Africans on the West Coast. Efforts on the part of the P.P.P. regime to show that such rumours were misconceived were to no avail. Janet Jagan, the P.P.P. senator in an address to the Guyana Senate, contended that "of the 14 people killed on the West Coast of Demerara 9 were East Indians and 5 were Africans; and of the 176 injured, 99 were East Indians and 77 Africans."⁴¹

Despite these efforts apparently to appease the African population reprisals nevertheless ensued. A violent clash between two neighbouring ethnic

communities on the West Coast, Stewartville and Meten-Meer-Zorg, resulted in five persons being shot and several wounded. Immediately an exodus of many families comprising minority ethnic elements in each village followed.⁴² Soon, a similar trend of attacks, reprisals, and counter attacks between the two major race groups engulfed the entire country.

The pattern of racial violence and displacement, after spreading first to the East Coast of Demerara, reached a climactic point in the upper reaches of the Demerara River, in the mining area of Mackenzie-Wismar. Events at Wismar, commencing Tate May, reached significantly high racial proportions. The Guiana Graphic reported at this initial point that at Wismar "racial violence flared up and forced a mass evacuation of some 1,600 people including many children from the villages where about 172 buildings had been razed to the ground."⁴³ It is to be noted that the overwhelming majority of the workers at the mining areas of Guyana are Africans, and the victims of this Wismar massacre were almost entirely East Indians.

There were many allusions to the view that

events at Wismar were instigated in retaliation for what was conceived to be East Indian instigated racial violence on the West Coast of Demerara. Senator, Mrs. Janet Jagan, quoted the leader of the opposition party in the legislature, Forbes Burnham, as saying to his Wismar supporters: "we did this in retaliation for what took place on the West Coast of Demerara."⁴⁴

What appears to be more evident, however, is that the opposition leader alluded to the apparently discriminatory action of the P.P.P. government in imposing a curfew at Wismar (a P.N.C. stronghold), when no such efforts were made on the West Coast of Demerara (a P.P.P. stronghold) even though, as he believed, similar events took place. The newspaper quoted Burnham as saying:

I am surprised and amazed that similar action has not been taken in certain areas on the West Coast of Demerara where murder, rape, arson and intimidation had been the order of the day for the last 14 weeks, and in spite of a declaration of emergency, still continues...
.....I am also surprised by the gargantuan efforts being made by government ministers, using public facilities to attend to the apparent need of persons fleeing Wismar, while nothing has been done for hundreds of all races who have been made destitute as a result of vandalism on the West Coast and East Coast of Demerara.⁴⁵

The great "see-saw", as senator Mrs. Jagan described the events, of racial violence and retaliation continued for several months following the Wismar events. In June several houses belonging to Africans were burnt in P.P.P. strongholds on the East Coast of Demerara and the West Coast of Berbice. The following month witnessed a major tragedy when a passenger launch travelling to the mining center of Mackenzie-Wismar was blown up in a bomb explosion. No less than 25 African passengers were killed. This incident was assumed to be the work of East Indians wishing to retaliate against the Wismar disaster which took place the month before. Further retaliation therefore ensued when at Wismar, once again, the few remaining East Indians were attacked, about 12 being killed, 17 hospitalized while about 100 fled the area.⁴⁶

It was not until this second disastrous Wismar event took place that the P.P.P. government responded with the imposition of curfew in other areas including the East Coast of Demerara. In addition, the P.P.P. government issued a call to the three representative parties in the legislature

to make a joint appeal to their respective supporters over the press and radio for an end to the tragic state of violence throughout the country.⁴⁷

CONCLUSION

It would seem then that the more important factors determining the outbreak of political violence in Guyana are not based on ethnic differences per se, but on the necessary involvement of other primarily political factors. The most significant observation, however, is that ethnic polarization tends to be aggravated in the process of political violence. In this way ethnic polarization would seem to represent more a dependent variable in the wake of the more extreme levels of political violence in particular.

The Guyana experience showed, further, that while the independent acts of political violence were instigated by basically political issues, the target of attacks in many cases involved opposing ethnic groups. To a large extent attacks upon other ethnic groups seemed to have been inevitable especially under conditions, such as in Guyana, where political

power often coincided with dominance of a particular ethnic group. It is important to recall, for example, that ethnic animosity is often exacerbated when, as in the case of the Enmore massacre of 1948, a predominantly African police force attempted to put down a disturbance among sugar estate workers comprising mainly of East Indians.

But in spite of these side effects, the important problem underlining most of these events were principally political issues such as an unwelcome piece of legislation (1962 and 1963), the struggle for recognition of a particular trade union (1964), or a demand for secession from the political system (1964). Thus the hypothesis which suggests that ethnic polarization is more a dependent than an independent variable in the process of political violence is given support by the Guyana experience.

The other closely related hypotheses also have direct relevance to the Guyana historical experience. Firstly, that ethnic differences per se are not sufficient to incite the process of political violence is supported by the contention

that while ethnic differences had been a constant condition in Guyana since the Immigration period, political violence on any extended or significant scale has been a major factor of political life only within the Modern period. Events within the Modern period further suggest that increasing co-operation between the various ethnic groups in political struggle, as in 1953, can itself become a condition of political instability and violence as occurred with the suspension of the constitution, the arrest of important political leaders, and finally the disintegration of the nationalist movement culminating in the split in the P.P.P. in 1955.

Secondly, that primarily political factors must intervene before ethnic cleavage can produce episodes of collective violence, tends to be supported by the observation that basically political issues instigated the majority of cases involving serious ethnic conflict in Guyana. Thus the violence of the 1962-64 sub-period, although to a great extent manifested in terms of racial attacks and reprisals, was instigated by a series of political acts on the part of the governing regime. The infamous Kaldor

Budget, the Labour Relations Bill, and the GAWU recognition issue were the principal bones of contention in the process of political violence during this sub-period.

Also, the observation of the very close connection between ethnic groups and political organizations in Guyana suggests the probability that ethnic groups are usually mobilized principally for political action in the pursuit of political power. It is in the pursuit of political power that overt conflict and violent clashes between opposing groups become endemic in the Guyana political system. Thus the clash between Africans and East Indians in Guyana, is primarily a reflection of the prior antagonism between the two opposing political parties, the P.N.C. and the P.P.P. respectively.

Of particular importance to this type of observation is the disintegrating effect of political violence on the major nationalist movement, the People's Progressive Party, as a reflection of the state of the national unity of the separate forces within the Guyanese society.

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Viewed from both the nature of its representation in the legislature and the popular bases of its support, the P.P.P. during the early 1950's seemed to have represented a wide cross-section of ethnic and other cultural elements of the population.

After the 1953 crisis there were racial divisions within the ranks of the party ending with the 1955 split. This split was also influenced by ideological considerations. Thus by the 1961 elections the nationalist movement had already been divided along both ideological and racial lines. By the 1964 elections, following the extremely violent period, the movement suffered further racial and ideological divisions which contributed to the technical defeat for the party at the polls. By 1970, the P.P.P. had become further depleted by the loss of some of its African leadership personnel to the predominantly African governing party, the P.N.C. Again, it was a trend not only of crystalizing racial polarization but also of separating those seriously committed ideologically from those not so seriously committed to the increasingly orthodox Marxist portion of the

People's Progressive Party.

But perhaps the more strikingly adverse aspect of ethnic polarization as a dependent variable in the process of political violence is the attendant disintegration of the hitherto existing "mixed" or multi-racial communities in the rural parts of Guyana. In this way the politics of retaliatory ethnic hostility succeeded to a large extent in cementing an increasingly acute polarized relationship between Africans and East Indians in Guyana.

In short, uncontrolled political violence seems to be leading in Guyana to a seriously fragmented society. Polarization at the elite level tends to reinforce polarization at the mass level thereby extending the degree of fragmentation to embrace the total society. The divisive impact of the "apanjaht" appeal upon the mass level in conjunction with floor crossing along racial lines among the political elite in the legislature seem to further crystalize the polarized nature of Guyana. Meanwhile the other ethnic elements of the population seem to be ever manipulated to suit the interests of one or other of these two major race groups in the highly competitive struggle for political power.

CHAPTER X

RELEVANCE FOR THEORY

Explaining political violence in the developing state would require a primary understanding of the group interaction process as a special instance of political modernization. The more self-conscious and organized popular movements would seem to be the principal determining factor in the political violence process relevant to the developing world, as the Guyana example shows. What also seems to be of intrinsic importance to the explanation of variations in the process of political violence is the nature of the contention for political power and dominance among the various organized groups in the system.

Other relevant variables especially relating to socio-economic modernization appear to be relatively less directly related to the process of political violence, although in some instances socio-economic modernization is positively related to the political modernization process. Ethnicity too, contrary to widespread assumptions, seems to have represented less of an independent variable determining political violence. It is discovered in the Guyana experience that it is only to the extent that

ethnicity is related to the political modernization process involving organized competition for political power and dominance that it becomes relevant to the explanation of a consequential process of political violence. Secondly, ethnic polarization as the manifestation of ethnic conflict in the society would appear to be more demonstrable as a process dependent on the prior process particularly of the extreme levels of political violence, rather than as a determining factor of such violence process.

The intervening social control variables such as regime coerciveness and reaction, far from representing significant constraints on political violence, seemed in effect to have been powerless in stemming the proliferation of political violence events. In addition, although the coercive reaction of the regime tends to inhibit the escalation of particular violence events - that is to contain each event within the lower limits of extremity - such reaction nevertheless tends to aggravate the conflict situation between groups in its usually selective and sometimes discriminatory approach to controlling the activities of specific groups. The Guyana example in particular, shows that the domination of the military and security forces by a particular ethnic group tends to alienate and antagonize other ethnic groups in the system.

especially during times when the military forces are involved in putting down violence in areas controlled by a different ethnic group.

Both regime coerciveness and ethnic polarization would seem to relate more to the extreme levels of political violence than to total volume of events. The distinction between volume and extremity level of political violence seems further to imply a particular relationship between them that is neither supportive nor mutually reinforcing. In fact the findings suggest the probability that a negative or inverse relationship exists between the two. The Guyana experience seems to suggest that the very conditions which inhibit the increasing frequency or proliferation of events tend in general to encourage the isolated but more extreme types of political violence. This observation would tend to undermine any assumption that small scale violence is a reliable predictor of major upheavals in the political system.¹

Thus the political modernization variables of participation, organization and mobilization play the dominant role in explaining the process of political violence particularly with respect to the developing area, and more specifically Guyana. Table 8.1 gives an indication of the varying degrees of correlation between

TABLE 8.1

Degree of Correlation Between Crucial Variables and Volume
Of Political Violence

VARIABLES	POLITICAL VIOLENCE (frequency) Rho. =
<u>A Political Modernization</u>	
1. Political Parties	.73
2. Voting turnout	.42
<u>B Socio-Economic Modernization</u>	
1. Educational Enrollment.	.10
2. Newspapers/Periodicals.	
(a) Variety	-.30
(b) Circulation	-.14
3. Per Capita Income.	.00
4. Radios and Telephones.	-.10
5. Urbanization.	.30
<u>C Social Control</u>	
1. Strength of Military forces.	-.03
2. Mean Expenditure on Military.	-.10
<u>D Ethnicity</u>	
1. Elite-Ethnic Polarization.	-.14
2. Mass-Ethnic Polarization.	.11

the different indicator variables on the one hand, and the relative volume of political violence on the other. The relatively higher degrees of correlation attributed to the political indicator "voting turnout" as an aspect of political participation and mass mobilization, bear out the dominant role of political modernization in explaining variations in the volume of political violence.

The central role of organized movements in political violence is also reflected in the comparative analysis of countries with varying types of party systems in relation to the numbers of coups in each. Table 8.2 illustrates this trend.

TABLE 8.2 Coups and Coup Attempts in Modernizing
Countries Since Independence

Type of Political System	No. of Countries	Countries with Coups	
		Number	Per Cent
Communist	3	0	0
One-Party	18	2	11
One-Party Dominant	12	4	33
Two-Party	11	5	45
Multi-Party	22	15	68
No Effective Parties	17	14	83

Source: Fred R. Von Der Mehden, Politics of the Developing Nations, Englewood Cliffs, 1964. Reproduced in Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven, 1968, p 408.

It would appear from Table 8.2 that countries tend to be more violent in terms of coups the more the political system encourages a multiplicity of political parties. This observation would no doubt lend support to the argument that the growth of organized movements tends to positively affect the process of political violence in the system.

That group contention for political power tends to be destabilizing is further suggested by recent experiences in both Trinidad and Malaya. Political violence in Trinidad, as in Guyana, tends to be more prevalent at election time when political competition is high. Thus both the 1956 and 1961 elections in Trinidad were followed by strong clashes particularly between the two major ethnic groups, Africans and East Indians.²

In response to primarily political issues, the more recent and more extreme political violence incidents in Trinidad in 1971 were inspired by an anti-government protest march organized by a new political group called the National Joint Action Committee (NJAC), demanding an end to foreign economic exploitation of the country's economic resources, and the establishment of "black power" as a form of political control.³ This "black power"

ideology was in fact a reaction to racial riots at Sir George Williams University in Canada in which Trinidadian and other West Indian students were directly involved. The Trinidad government's response to the NJAC protest activities was in the form of the declaration of a 30-day state of emergency and the suspension of fundamental political rights.⁴

In Malaya, too, ethnic group violence flared up as a result of opposition to primarily political issues. The Penang crisis of 1967, for instance, was largely inspired by the British devaluation of its currency in that year. As a consequence the Malaysian government was forced to devalue its own currency which was tied to that of Britain. This domestic devaluation, however, was thought to discriminate against certain ethnic elements of the population, particularly the urban Chinese, and to some extent the rural Malays.⁵

The resulting tense situation in Malaya soon led to overt clashes of interest between the opposition Labour Party (dominated by Chinese) and the governing Alliance Party (Malay dominated). The violent clashes which ensued involved also other left wing organizations and secret societies. In the end several persons were

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either killed or injured, and a 24-hour curfew imposed in conjunction with the employment of additional military forces brought in from Kuala Lumpur.⁶ Similarly in 1969 the electoral victory of the local national parties in eight constituencies "sparked off riots which resulted at once in withdrawal of the representatives of the Malaysian Chinese Association from the government."⁷ Again, a state of emergency was declared and, in addition, the Malay Parliament was suspended.⁷

These two foreign examples are instructive in many ways and supportive of the basic trends observed in Guyana. Firstly, they demonstrate that domestic conflict and violence can to a large extent depend on events stemming from the external environment as in the case of the impact of the British currency devaluation on Malaya and the Trinidad reaction to Canadian incidents involving students at Sir George Williams University. Secondly, the foreign examples demonstrate that organized political movements were at the forefront of instigating overt political violence as a means of dramatizing political demand. Thirdly, the reaction of the colonial regimes was usually the highly sensitive one of imposing extreme coercive sanction on the behaviour of the participants in the process, particularly the more

extreme levels of political violence. Fourthly it was observed that ethnic violence is more closely associated with the more extreme levels of political violence and often stems from basically non-ethnic issues.

These four basic outcomes imply that the more non-political factors are relatively less significant in determining inter-group or collective violence in the developing state. The lessons of the developing world further suggest that it is usually not the rapid pace of change, but rather the kind of change that is important in affecting the level of political stability in the system. Change basically of a political nature, rather than the pressures exerted by socio-economic advancement seem to be the critical variable affecting the dynamic development and stability of the political system.

What also seems highly significant in the developing (particularly colonial) world is the high reaction potential of the governing regimes. What seems to explain this trend is the high probability that the state would become directly involved as a party to the conflict particularly in multi-racial societies where the state is often identified with a particular ethnic group. In such societies the state is often viewed, and usually views itself, as one more organized

group in the interaction process of contention for political power. The relatively low level of institutionalization in these less developed states also tends to encourage this conflictful tendency.⁸

THE DYNAMICS OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY

The demonstration of the relative insignificance of both the socio-economic modernization and coercion variables in affecting the varying levels of political violence would seem to suggest that the nature of political participation remains the dominant explanatory factor. But since correlation is not sufficient for explanation it becomes necessary at this stage to supplement the foregoing analysis with a logical-deductive model if more fundamental insights are to be gained as to the causal relationship between the two different types of political variables.

The explanation offered for the relationship between participation and violence is thus derived from a logical-deductive framework involving a set of inter-related propositions which are themselves falsifiable. Such an explanation should adequately account for (a) the generation of overt conflict behaviour and political violence, (b) the escalation of latent into manifest

conflict and political violence, and (c) the escalation of the lower into the higher extremes of political violence.

The first proposition is that high levels of both participation and violence are most probable within the context of competition for scarce power, that is political and economic resources. We can further propose that the scarcer the resources relative to the amount of different groups participating in an attempt to control such resources, the fiercer the competition is expected to be. Within the political system particularly of the less developed countries, the control of scarce power resources is usually the dominant goal of political parties and allied interest groups which often compete in a mutually eliminating contest. The greater the amount of political and organized interest groups the greater would be the frequency of interaction and inevitable clashes of interest.⁹

These clashes of interest pass over into inter-group conflict. Conflict becomes more intense to the extent that each group's interests coincide with other particularistic interests within the system. For example, if, as in the Guyana case, political party interests were

to coincide with ethnic-group interest, then the intensity of inter-group conflict would be greater than if party interests were more universalistic and cut across ethnic interests. This is so because the increasing crystalization of interest accentuates incompatibilities between groups and makes for a mutually exclusive contest for scarce power.¹⁰ In this context group interests and values become mutually exclusive and conflict becomes zero-sum in the sense that one party's gain is premised on the other party's loss. Thus a struggle which aims at thwarting or destroying the opponent in order to ensure the latter's loss becomes inevitable and conflict easily passes over into overt violent activity.

Assuming that competition for scarce political resources does create high levels of participation and violence, the problem still remains as to the explanation of the fluctuations of participation and violence levels. Why, for example, are there higher volume and levels of participation and violence in some periods than in others? Why, in other words, do some periods involve less competition for scarce resources than others?

Perhaps a more satisfactory explanation is to be derived from the second proposition - that the greater

the degree of threat to the authority position of the dominant or incumbent group in the system, the greater the degree of political mobilization on the part of both the incumbent group and the opposing groups is likely to be in the process of political control.¹¹

The relationship between threat and mobilization involves a mutually reinforcing or positive feedback effect which can explain tendencies to both escalation and de-escalation in the context particularly of political participation and violence.

If, for example, the threat to the stability of the dominant or incumbent group is great, then the probability is that the perception of dominant group weakness by opposing groups enhances the latter's prospects of success in controlling political power and to that extent encourages the need for greater mobilization and effort to attain that goal. Similarly, the perception by the dominant groups of its own weakened position encourages the need for greater mobilization and effort to restore or buttress its status quo position.

The Malay example of May 1969 bears out this trend. An analysis of the election riots at the time

concluded as follows:

The riots of May, especially in Selangor, broke out at a time when the Malays felt that their historical paramountcy was fading, and when the Chinese sensed that equal rights were within their grasp. The general election was the firing pin that detonated their mutual distrust.¹²

Thus mobilization and counter-mobilization can escalate to the highest extremes of political violence, or contrari-wise in less threatening periods de-escalate to a position of political calm.

The further question could, however, be asked: why, then, is the threat to the stability of the political system greater in some periods than in others? Any answer to this question must first assert the sources of threat to the political system. Variations in the relative impact of these sources upon the system over time can account for variations in the level of threat and consequently of mobilization. Threat to system stability can stem from three main sources:¹³

(1) From the domestic environment. (e.g. level of popular demands for political changes).

(2) From among the domestic elite. (e.g. faction and/or disaffections).

(3) From the external (international) environment. (e.g. subversion, hostility and/or aggression).

If each source imposes its own level of strain upon the capacity of the system, we can therefore suppose that the degree of threat to system stability would depend on the combined impact of the various sources of strain. Strain from a single source, for example, would involve less threat than strain stemming from a combination of any two sources. Thus a combination involving all three sources would impose the highest level of threat and consequently encourage high levels of mobilization and violence.

A look at the Guyana experience during the Modern period would help to illustrate the implications of this analysis. During the first sub-period 1947-1950, the incumbent regime was a colonial one with a relatively high degree of stability. Strains were low from all sources principally because of three factors:

- (a) Organized political parties were not yet developed to articulate group demands which can impose strains upon the system. The then participating groups were principally two trade union movements, both not sufficiently mass based to offer serious challenges to the colonial system.
- (b) The great majority of the political elites were themselves committed to the colonial

policies and practice.

- (c) Since the regime was controlled principally by supporters of British Colonial policies, the external environment was largely supportive of this regime. The militant attack upon the colonial system in the United Nations for instance was still in its early stage in 1947, and Britain, strongly allied to the United States, still commanded a dominant influence on the United Nations and world events.

The second sub-period (1951-54) was much higher than the first in the extent of both participation and violence. The sub-period witnessed the introduction of adult suffrage in Guyana and the formation of a well-organized nationalist movement-- The People's Progressive Party (PPP). The P.P.P. initiated a very militant anti-colonial trend and was very strong on the identification of interests among its elite. Thus this period involved threat to stability on two basic levels:

- (a) The level of domestic demand and dissatisfaction in opposition to British colonial rule.
- (b) The hostility of the external environment in terms of a violent reaction from the British colonial office and allied interests. The British reaction to the behaviour of the victorious P.P.P. took the form of the suspension of the new Guyana Constitution and the imprisonment

or restriction of the party's leadership.

The third sub-period (1955-58) was one of exceptional calm implying very little threat to system stability because of basically three reasons:

- (a) It followed upon the return of full control by the British colonial government which had set up an interim government after the suspension of the constitution, which to a large extent contributed to the fragmentation of the nationalist movement and engineered a split in the ranks of the P.P.P. in 1955. Rule through coercion was more prevalent thereby preventing the development of organized protest and consequently inhibiting the growth of political violence.
- (b) Two factions of the P.P.P. - the Jaganites and the Burnhamites - competed for political office in the 1957 elections more on the basis of weakness than of strength of organization. Both factions were more involved in consolidating their positions following the initial split rather than concentrating on full mobilization of the population.
- (c) A third possibility is that the Jagan faction of the P.P.P. won a sizable victory in the 1957 elections which helped to resolve initial doubts as to which faction remained the authentic source of leadership for the population - a factor which no doubt contributed to the legitimacy of the Jagan - P.P.P. government.

The fourth sub-period (1959-62) witnessed a marked increase in the level of political violence.

As a reflection also of the very high level of threat

to the stability of the then governing regime the following factors are relevant as explanation:

- (a) Specific policies of the Jagan - P.P.P. government contributed to the alienation of the very influential trade union movement in Guyana and the consequent strengthening of the opposition forces.
- (b) There was, during this period, increasing disaffection within the ranks of the governing party. Several prominent members of the P.P.P. elite either resigned from the party or changed sides, further strengthening the opposition forces and contributing to weakness of the dominant party.
- (c) External pressures against the Jagan government increased as there was a fear - perhaps more exaggerated than justifiable - of communist domination of Guyana.

Thus the Jagan-led P.P.P. in this sub-period found itself increasingly isolated and with the combined opposition of internal and external forces coupled with the internal weakening of its elite position, a prospect of defeat for the government was envisaged by all groups, hence the increased impetus to mobilization by both government and opposition ensued.

The following sub-period (1963-66) demonstrated the highest degree of political violence in Guyana. Firstly the destabilizing conditions prevalent during the previous sub-period still remained during

this period. The succession of the new P.N.C.-U.F. coalition government in 1964 did not finally solve the problem of existing unrest among the population. In fact the volume of controversy over the assumption to office of the coalition government hindered much of the legitimacy of the succession. The process leading to the defeat of the P.P.P. in 1964 was extremely violent because of the following additional factors:

- (a) Foreign intervention and hostility increased against the Jagan regime. The opposition parties became more closely allied to foreign interests wishing to disrupt the prospects of a possible future communist government under Jagan especially within view of the impending attainment of political independence from Britain. Independence was finally granted in 1966 after the P.P.P. was safely removed from office.
- (b) There was still sufficient destruction wrought in the previous sub-period to make for continual popular discontent and agitation. The now opposition P.P.P., for example, felt itself "cheated and not defeated" in the elections and as such stepped up its mobilization campaign against what it believed to be an illegitimate governing coalition.
- (c) Even after the disappearance of Jagan's government, foreign intervention nevertheless continued particularly with a new perspective of buttressing the power

position of the new regime. Thus renewed efforts toward mobilizing large scale support away from the P.P.P. and in favour of the new regime.

Finally, the sub-period (1967-70) represented a considerable decline in the volume of political violence relative to the two previous periods, although it was during this sub-period that the more extreme Rupunni rebellion took place. Threat to regime stability was low because of:

- (a) It would also appear that the sizable victory of the P.N.C. in the 1968 elections contributed to its legitimacy - even though disputed by opposing forces.
- (b) The opposition groups (P.P.P. and U.F.) on the other hand believe that they can no longer win elections controlled by the P.N.C. government which is blamed for fraudulent elections tactics.¹⁴ Given this tendency to near resignation on the part of the opposing groups, maximum efforts at mobilization would be expected to decline, since the goal of mobilization - control of political power - seems unobtainable.¹⁵
- (c) Further, it would appear that any tendency to rising popular discontent with the P.N.C. government policies, and indications of elite dissensus during this latter period is somewhat counterbalanced by a strong supportive tendency from the Western external environment.

The same mutually reinforcing process of involving scarce power resources, threat, and reaction also explains the tendency for the more dominant groups to become

more violent or aggressive in the political system. The power struggle between the most dominant groups in the system usually contributes to the escalation of political violence to its highest extremes. In the context of a struggle for the scarce goal of political power, for example, the relatively higher mobilizing potential of the more dominant groups - given the greater proportion of strategic resources at their disposal - would tend to make dominant groups more threatening to each other and to the overall stability of the political system.¹⁶

Thus while the perceived hostility reaction of the most dominant group would tend to be highest, that of the less dominant groups in the system would naturally tend to be lower, since the more disadvantaged groups commanding too few resources to sustain violent conflict, would consequently be capable of less threat.¹⁷

The threat and reaction processes could also explain the relatively low frequency of political violence during the pre-modern period. The relatively low frequency of political violence events

during the pre-modern period also reflects the relatively low level of combined threat to the stability of the political system of the time. Firstly, the then domestic elites were strongly identified and united in their political interests. Secondly the domestic masses lacked cohesion since both the opportunities for mass communication and avenues for political protests and challenges to the political system were conspicuously absent. Thirdly, there was relatively little threat from the external environment especially after the British control of the colonies since 1812. The domestic elites were virtually an extension of the European colonial elite.

The relatively polarized nature of the pre-modern society along ethnic-political lines tends to further explain the low frequency of political violence during this time; but since polarization accentuates the prospects of a struggle mainly for survival between groups, political violence tends to be more extreme. The reason for this extremity is rooted in the

desperate need to eliminate the dominant or controlling group as a means of ensuring the survival of the other major groups in the system. A similar trend is to be observed during the Modern period which witnessed a marked increase in the degree of polarization after 1968 (see Table 7.4) at which time there occurred a drop in the volume or frequency of events and the incidence of perhaps the most extreme event of the period, the Rupunni rebellion in 1969..

Thus it would appear that three crucial factors, "scarcity", "threat", and "reaction" form the interlocking core of a dynamic syndrome which is capable of explaining the process of political violence particularly as it affects the smaller and less developed States. An extension of logic involved in this tripartite syndrome should also provide insights into the future prospects for political stability or conflict resolution.

THE PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL STABILITY

It should be pointed out that this section of the study is basically speculative even though the arguments grow out of logical deductions from the

foregoing explanation of political violence. the following claims are to be regarded as tentative, and the conclusiveness or final acceptance of the claims must await further empirical inquiry into the subject.

Since scarcity of power resources would seem to be, as it were, the pivot around which subsequent threat and reaction processes depend, and which can trigger the group conflict process to the extent of producing political violence, then the control or containment of the latter process. (assuming that such an outcome is desirable) should depend firstly on the mitigation of resource scarcity. An extension of this argument would also suggest that efforts to reduce scarcity of the relevant resources should contribute toward a reduction of threat, hostility reaction, and consequently political violence.

To the extent, however, that political violence is determined by the higher levels of political participation and inter-group interaction, the problem remains as to how to limit political

violence without necessarily having to limit participation rates as well. The reduction of the power resource scarcity should also allow for this outcome of maintaining high rates of participation while reducing the level of threat to political stability.⁸

In the political sphere, resource scarcity could be reduced by increasing the number of roles associated with power in the political system. One approach suggested by Lucian Pye and Fred Riggs as solution to this dilemma would take the form of an increase in structural differentiation. Both of these authors contend that increasing differentiation or specialization of roles tends to absorb strains upon the capacity of the political system occasioned by increased mass participation.¹⁸ Supposedly rising demands from parties, interest groups and individuals could^{be} handled on a more rational basis through the acute division of labour in the apparatus of government. The effect would be to lessen reliance on violent conflict activity as a means of resolving unfulfilled demands.

Samuel P. Huntington, on the other hand,

asserts that more effective institutionalization would have a similar impact in lessening political violence. If political institutions are more adaptable to the environment, more compatible or coherent in their internal relationships, more autonomous, and more complex, the greater would be the chances of success or survival of the political system.¹⁹

These recommendations, however, despite their theoretical merits, might indeed be difficult and costly to put into practical operations. How, for example, to differentiate the political from racial interests - perhaps a requirement for "autonomy" and specificity" - is the major problem confronting not only Guyana but also the great majority of developing countries characterized as ethnic-plural societies.²⁰

The literature on structural differentiation and institutionalization has provided little guidelines as to what particular steps could be taken to transform existing diffuseness of relationships into more specific ones, or how to deliberately create new roles and structures in the absence of

particular demands for them. In addition, the theories fail to specify what particular institutions and structures are necessary for what particular problem, under what particular conditions. The mere increase in whatever forms institutionalization or differentiation may take, cannot tell us which institutions or structures are strategic or crucial for the maintenance of a given system. ()

One probable avenue for the successful differentiation and proliferation of important political structures and roles is the establishment of a more decentralized political process in which more autonomous localized centers of political power are created. The major effect of such a policy of political decentralization would be to expand political resources in the form of the multiplicity of localized and autonomous centres of power competition.²¹

Another significant effect of political decentralization is a probable reduction of the intensity or impact of the dominance struggle. The

tendency under such a system would be to restrict party competitiveness within narrower limits which means in effect a curtailment of both the escalating potential and the geographic spread of political violence. In this way political violence will stop far short of extending toward large scale or wider national proportions. In addition the severity of the contention for dominance would be mitigated since the power goals sought by the contending parties and groups would now be deflected from a single national center and multiplied by the increased amount of localized centers created in the decentralization process.

The proliferation of new centers and goals of political control could also allow for more equal opportunities for all participating groups in that the possibilities of success in competition would now be determined less by the kind of conspiracy among those monopolizing the greater share of resources, and more by other considerations such as value orientations, and attractive programmes. Thus while violent conflict is minimized by localized restrictions, the more voluntary type of participation is at the same time guaranteed in the possibility of more universalistic

orientations and the elimination of structural limitations on the freedom of smaller groups to compete in the process.

As regards institutionalization, if the foregoing research findings are in any way instructive as to the requirements for a system which encourages high rates of participation and at the same time minimize the level of political violence, then it might be fruitful to further explore the possibilities of three modernization variables: (i) communication, (ii) education, (iii) economic growth. Both communication and education represent what Despres terms "broker institutions" which are advocated as necessary for the integration of plural societies, and to that extent capable of contributing toward the maintenance of the stability of the political system.²²

As was indicated in Chapter VII these socio-economic modernization variables are more highly correlated with political participation indicated by voting turn out than with violence. Table 8.3 illustrates the relative strength of association between the various socio-economic modernization

variables and voting turnout.

Table 8.3 Degree of Correlation Between Socio-economic Modernization Variables and Political Participation.

Socio-economic Variables	Correlation with Participation (Voting turnout) Rho=
1. Educational Enrollment	.76
2. Per Capita Income	.66
3. Radios and Telephones	.64
4. Urbanization	.30
5. Numbers of Newspapers	.49
6. (Circulation of Newspapers)	.71
7. Elite-ethnic Polarization	.66
8. Mass-ethnic Polarization	.77

The apparently close positive association of both communications and education with political participation and also the relatively low correlation of these variables with political violence should suggest that these variables are most appropriate as means toward encouraging adequate participation without necessarily contributing to an increase in political violence.

Perhaps, then, specific policy orientations

should be geared toward extending the communications and educational services to reach a greater percentage of the population. This approach, however would involve significant costs which are met only through the prior emphasis on economic growth. The problem then, would seem to be basically, although not exclusively, an economic one. The rational explanation is that a greater distribution of economic resources - if the latter could be available in adequate amounts - would have the effect of lessening some popular discontent thereby reducing further pressures and strains of demand upon the capacity of the system.

Extensions of communication and education might also have the effect of providing alternative avenues for the mitigation of popular grievances primarily through the proliferation of the press and other avenues of rationalization of grievances. The possibility of a stepped up utilization of a variety of communications media by participating groups in the political process might have the effect of assuaging grievances simply by dissipating energies away from the political center thus lessening the strain.

This increased use of the media would also lessen the effectiveness of rumour which has been shown to be most often disruptive in the political system.

The high degree of complementarity among these three modernization variables makes the hypothesis feasible that, assuming the availability of adequate economic resources, the more extensive and accessible the means of communication and the avenues of popular education, the greater the rates of participation are expected to be. This is so because communication and education tend to increase the level of political awareness and facilities for the articulation of popular demand.

One consequence of extensive education might well be to neutralize the tendency to identify the ethnic with the political interest. Education, in other words, could contribute to the transformation of the more "particularistic" into the more universalistic types of interest - a prospect which could considerably reduce the proportions of violent conflict since competition for political ends would less resemble a mutually

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exclusive struggle involving the very survival and preservation of the group.

CONCLUSION

The explanation of political violence would therefore seem to be rooted in the relative degree of the openness of the political system to mass participation. While the involvement of many competing groups in the political system determines the frequency of political violence events, the struggle for political dominance on the part of the major contending groups helps to explain the escalation toward the more extreme levels of political violence.

Central to the explanation of both the generation and escalation of political violence is the mutually reinforcing interaction process involving (a) the relative scarcity of power resources, (b) the relative degree of threat of both internal and external forces to the authority position of the ruling group, and (c) the reaction co-efficient of the major groups in the process of contention for dominance.

The relative scarcity of power resources, such as (a) level of popular support, (b) access to

political decision making centers and (c) possession of strategic economic goods, often accentuates the degree of threat posed by a major group challenging the authority bases of the political system. This threat in turn elicits a high reactive response from the ruling group which acts mainly to protect its authority position but also to eliminate or disarm the rival group. This mutually reinforcing threat and reaction process tends also to accentuate the relative scarcity of resources since the struggle is basically a mutually exclusive one in the sense that the controlling group tends to act in such a way as to prevent all other groups from gaining access to strategic resources.

Similarly, a decrease in the scarcity of strategic power resources would lead in turn to a decrease in the levels of both threat and reaction, thereby decreasing the potential for violent conflict in the political system.

Comparative studies of political violence particularly in less developed countries have borne out this trend. The central role of organized group interaction in the process of contention for political

power was demonstrated to be productive of political violence on many occasions in both Malaya (1967, 1969) and Trinidad (1956, 1961, 1971). The "power-reaction" syndrome of escalation was also evidenced in the experiences of these developing countries in as much as political violence was created when the ruling group's authority base was weakened or threatened by both domestic and external forces.

The major role of the organized group process in explaining political violence would also seem to beg explanation of the relative unimportance of the variables of (a) socio-economic modernization, (b) regime intervention, and (c) ethnicity, which are regarded by some theorists as crucial to the political-violence process.

In terms of the modernization variables the usual approach to the problem seemed to have involved a misplaced emphasis on the pace or rapidity of change rather than the kind of change relevant for an understanding of political violence. Emphasis on the kind of change would no doubt have inspired a distinction between the political and non-political variables of modernization. In such a case

the probability that the former represent the more crucial factors in the explanation of political violence would have been more readily observed.

The reason why regime intervention proved insufficient to inhibit the generation of political violence events might be sought in the probability that ruling groups, including the military forces, are themselves conscious of their role as a party to the group conflict processes particularly in the developing areas where the degree of institutionalization is relatively low.

Ethnicity per se, is not sufficient to explain political violence since in effect the mere existence of a variety of ethnic groups forms a major part of the given environment in which the organized movements operate. Thus ethnicity remains mainly a background variable rather than an independent variable, and as such a process of feedback operates between political violence on the one hand, and shifts in the pattern of ethnic alignment as a dependent variable, on the other hand.

An explanatory theory of political violence

should also provide guidelines for the development of insights into the reduction or control of political violence. This outcome might be desirable for those who wish to minimize the destructive impact of such a process. If the "power-reaction" syndrome is admissible as an approximation toward providing an adequate basis for such a theory, then conflict reduction could be approached mainly by increasing the resources which facilitate the equality of access to the centers of decision-making. This outcome would require the more equal distribution of resources to the various participating groups.

Such a process could be attained primarily through the decentralization of politics which would have the effect of creating additional centers of decision-making. Conflict in this context would be reduced because the competition for dominance and political control would be confined within narrower localized units and any resulting political violence would be prevented from escalating to national proportions.

In addition, the essential requirement of differentiating the ethnic from political interests

could be approximated through the encouragement of wider educational facilities and extensions of the mass media of communications. The effect of this latter process would ultimately reduce reliance on rumour which has often led to destructive consequences in the political system. The possible high costs involved in implementing these recommendations suggest the more basic need for high economic growth, and the willingness to utilize the economic gains to foster national development.

CHAPTER XI

CONCLUSION

The path to political modernization and development seems to be strewn with perplexing problems of recurrent conflict and strife. While the modernization process enhances the level of political consciousness and awareness among the popular masses, it at the same time diminishes the probability of attaining some of the most cherished goals of the political system, notably political stability and national integration. How to resolve this dilemma is the fundamental question which formed the basis of this inquiry.

The foregoing study has been based on the assumption that the resolution of this dilemma is dependent on the prior understanding of the underlying mechanisms of political conflict and violence which attend the modernization process. In particular, the systematic study of the configurations of political violence can provide insights into the nature of political stability which is usually considered a prerequisite for the further attainment of national developmental goals.

Within this perspective an attempt has been made in this study to provide feasible answers to the question: what is the particular nature of the relationship between mass participation as an aspect of political modernization on the one hand, and political violence as an indicator of political instability on the other, especially within the context of a developing state? It was further assumed that rational answers to this question would provide insights for the resolution of the second derived question: how can high levels of mass participation be made compatible with the maintenance of political stability, assuming an inverse relationship between the two?

The method of approach to discerning appropriate answers to these problems involved the utilization of relevant empirical evidences to buttress logical explanations in an analysis of the Guyana experience. The explanatory model which seems best fitting to the experience not only of Guyana, but also of other small developing states, is one derived from the theses of Samuel P. Huntington and Charles Tilly that political instability

and collective violence are usually determined by the nature of mass participation and organized group interaction in the political process. To make for a more systematic analysis the concept of political violence, as a special instance of collective violence, was characterized in terms of a typology embracing varying scales of magnitude ranging from the lower to the higher extremes of political violence events.

The causal analysis of political violence has been approached largely through the historical method although logical deductions and statistical inferences play a complimentary role. It should be pointed out, however, that the fundamental assumptions behind the causal explanations advanced on this study are derived less from the logic of the positivist school which emphasizes a flawless empiricism coupled with the establishment of both necessity and sufficient conditions as the sine qua non of causal explanation, and more from the rationality of the historicist tradition which asserts a

more flexible notion of causality. The argument attributed to Collingwood, emphasizes this historicist sense of causality as follows:

a cause, if it is to be called a necessary condition of an action in history is necessary not in the sense that without it the action could not have been performed: it is necessary only in the sense that without it there would not have been good reason to perform it. Similarly, if a cause is to be called a sufficient condition, it is to be called so, not in the sense that, given it, the action would necessarily be performed, but only in the sense that it renders the course of action in question "rationally required".²

In this sense, therefore, the minimal notion of causation adopted for this study is rather more probabilistic than deterministic.

Within this probabilistic explanatory framework several related hypotheses were examined and found support in the empirical evidences derived from the historical and political experiences of Guyana. The hypotheses could be summarized as follows:

1. That the greater the opportunities for mass participation allowed by the political system, the greater would tend to be the volume or frequency of political violence events: that is the frequency

of political violence tends to be positively related to the relative openness of the political system.

2. The greater the opportunities for mass participation allowed by the political system, the less would tend to be the reliance on the higher extremity levels of political violence and the greater the tendency to utilize the lower extremity events in the process: that is, extreme levels of political violence tend to be inversely related to the openness of the political system.
3. The greater the opportunities for mass participation allowed by the political system, the greater would tend to be the rate of popular involvement (or participation) in political violence events: that is, popular participation in political violence events is positively related to the relative openness of the political system.
4. The greater the opportunities for mass participation allowed by the political system, the greater would tend to be the involvement of organized movements in the competition for political power, which in turn tends to increase the volume of political violence events: that is, organized contention for political power (or dominance) tends to be positively related to the volume (or frequency) of political violence in the political system.
5. The greater the extent of organized movements involved in political violence, the less would tend to be the probability of the higher extremes of political violence and the greater the decrease in the relative duration of political violence events: that is, both the duration and extremity level of political violence tend to be

inversely related to the relative openness of the political system.

6. The greater the opportunities for mass participation allowed by the political system, the greater would tend to be the reliance on the more consensual or alleviative in contrast to the more coercive measures of controlling political violence by the regime: that is, consensual or alleviative regime responses to political violence tend to be positively related to the relative openness of the political system.
7. The higher the extremity levels of political violence in the political system, the greater would be the tendency on the part of the governing regime to use more coercive measures to control such extreme events: that is, coercive regime responses tend to be positively related to the more extreme levels of political violence.
8. Increases in the level of socio-economic modernization have very little direct relationship with increases in either the volume or extremity levels of political violence: that is, no significant relationship exists between socio-economic modernization and political violence.
9. The higher the extremity level of political violence, the greater would be the tendency toward ethnic polarization in the political process: that is, ethnic polarization is positively related to the high extremes of political violence.

The central theme of the foregoing hypotheses highlights the greater impact of one set of political variables upon other different sets of political variables in the political system. In

particular, the hypotheses suggest the more direct and relevant effect of active and organized political participation in generating political violence events in the political process.

The crucial role of consciously organized movements in determining political violence seems to have superceded in importance the role of the more subjective or psycho-social factors in determining the same process. This study had earlier been provoked by some doubts about the psycho-social explanation of political violence particularly in relation to developing countries where subjectivism or individualism is usually superceded by some form of group consciousness, whether racial, tribal, religious or associational.

Theoretically, also, the psycho-social explanation which places "frustration" at the very locus of the political violence process, seems to lack adequate tenability. Firstly, frustration is ubiquitous and can be found significantly in the most coercive political systems where relatively few overt evidences of conflict and violence activities exist - where, in other words, inter-group conflict is largely

suppressed. The frustration syndrome cannot explain why political violence does not occur all the time wherever frustration is to be found in significant measure.

Again, frustration which is generally common, cannot explain why the volume and levels of conflict and violence fluctuate, reflecting higher or lower levels at different times, even though nothing has been done to eliminate or alleviate frustration. Secondly, frustration can provoke a variety of different and even contradictory responses, ranging from complete acquiescence on the one hand, to what Kenneth Boulding terms "irrational aggression" on the other extreme.³ Which outcome a frustrated situation would provoke, is not adequately predicted by the psycho-social theories of political violence.

The explanation for the fluctuations in volume and level of political violence is rooted in the organized group interaction process in the context of the dynamic relationships among (a) : scarcity of power resources, (b) threat from both

the internal and external environment and (c) the reaction to such threat on the part of contending groups. It is assumed that the higher the scarcity of power resources such as popular support, control of public offices and so on, the higher would be the threat to the ruling group posed by a rival group. This threat in turn leads to a high reaction on the part of the ruling group in order to protect its authority base.

The feedback relationship among these variables affects positively or negatively the escalation of political violence depending on whether the magnitude of each variable is high or low. Thus if scarcity or threat is low, reaction would be low and therefore political violence would consequently be low. If on the other hand scarcity or threat is high, reaction would be high, hence provoking high levels of political violence. In this context the more dominant groups tend to be much more aggressive and violent than the less dominant groups since both the threat potential and the reaction potential would tend to be highest among the more dominant groups under given conditions

of resource scarcity.

The Guyana experience, like that of most other developing countries, reveals that a constant condition of resource scarcity makes the usually high threat to regime stability from either the domestic or external environment extremely disruptive of the political process, since the reaction on the part of controlling groups would naturally assume high proportions extending often to the more extreme cases of political violence.

The logic of this explanation points to important consequences for the overall stability of the political system. One useful insight to be derived from this explanatory model is that the reduction of scarcity might probably lead to a reduction of both threat and reaction; and ultimately to a minimization of political violence and instability as a prerequisite for national political integration. Appropriate in this context is the testable proposition that the proliferation of power resources through the creation of a multitude of autonomous and localized power centers in the process of political decentralization would

provide for the containment or minimization of conflict, or prevent violent conflict from extending toward national proportions.

But then the question of how to limit political violence without adversely affecting the rate of popular participation becomes crucial. It would seem that what is needed in addition to a policy of political decentralization is to foster the development of strategic institutions such as education and communications, and more fundamentally to encourage high economic growth as a prerequisite for further institutional development. Together, these social and economic variables can act to cut across localized and sectional cleavages sufficient to assuage or deflect popular grievances and consequently reduce both the volume and intensity of overt conflict in the political system.

These predictive propositions, however, are mainly of heuristic value and should not be considered as definitive or conclusive. However, certain normative implications derive from this approach to the explanation of political violence.

The findings in this study seem to champion the value position that the more open and permissive political system stands a better chance of survival than the more coercive and oligarchic system which harbours the probability of the more extreme and disruptive types of violent conflict.

While the more open political system might be more productive of a greater volume of the small scale conflict which are more amenable to management and control, the more coercive types of system not only encourages extreme violence but drives underground rather than eliminate other forms of conflict thereby shifting the conditions of instability outside the reaches of adequate management and control. If, on the other hand, a commitment to another value position demands drastic or revolutionary change then it could be conceived that the high degree of oppressiveness on the part of the coercive regime tends to create the basic conditions for its own destruction.

The relevance of this explanatory model for the study of the political process in the

relatively small developing state could be discerned from many points of view. Firstly, the relatively high degree of resource scarcity in less developed countries tends to easily transform competition among groups into conflict or a mutually exclusive struggle for complete control of strategic resources. Secondly, the relatively small effective size of area and population makes for a high sensitive interaction pitch among groups in the political process, thereby transforming otherwise small scale events or political demands into disproportionately significant events in terms of their impact on the political system. The fact also that political issues tend to take precedence over other competing issues reinforces the relatively high reaction coefficient among competing groups in the highly sensitive political process of the small developing state.

Of importance also to the political analysis of developing states is the tendency for external intervention to replace indigenous large scale structural changes in determining significant destabilizing outcomes in the political process. In

this context also borrowings of external institutions, despite their time tested utility elsewhere, have so far failed to prevent the frequent outbreaks or high levels of political violence in developing countries.

Indeed it is not for lack of institutionalization per se why political violence is usually endemic in many developing states. According to George Beckford, the plantation system in the West Indies represents institutionalization of a high order which has been largely responsible for much of the underdevelopment in these parts.⁴ Yet this long entrenched institution which, according to Beckford, dominates the entire life of the political system proved incapable of preventing or minimizing the high volume of political violence, a great proportion of which took place on the very sugar plantations. Thus it is not simply a matter of institutionalization per se, but rather the kind of institutions which are strategic or important for the reduction or containment of violent conflict.

The persistence of the plantation system in Guyana is undoubtedly an indication that the

political culture characteristic of the different historical periods is not necessarily a reflection of any significant differences in the variety of political or economic institutionalization. The fundamental differences in the political culture of the different periods would seem to be more a reflection of different patterns of authority or power relations within each corresponding political system.

The progression from the pre-modern to the Modern political system in Guyana reflects a movement away from the more "parochial" culture during the Slavery period, to the more "subject" culture during the Immigration and Transition periods, and finally toward the more "participant" culture during the Modern period.⁵ Such an observation might be instructive for theories based on cross-national comparative research. That each type of political culture reflects different configurations of political violence is a possible indication that such research on political violence must take account of the different levels

of political culture in the different nations aggregated for comparison if a more consistent and reliable predictive pattern is to be observed.⁶

To the extent that the explanatory model is relevant to the study of the Guyana political process, it is also relevant to the study of West Indian politics. Here in the West Indies, the dynamics of small size in the context of similar political-cultural patterns should operate to make this model most appropriate and fruitful. What, however, seems to be specifically characteristic of the West Indian political process, as the Guyana example shows, is the particular relationship between ethnic cleavage and political violence. The Guyana example provides grounds for entertaining the proposition that ethnic polarization tends to be associated with the more extreme levels of political violence, and often acts as a self-limiting device with respect to the lower extremes of political violence. Thus ethnic polarization can be indicative of a situation in which the more infrequent revolutionary type of violence

replaces the more frequent small scale violence in the political process.

Because this study focuses mainly on political violence and its antecedent conditions, much of the propositions about the resultant conditions, specifically related to ethnic polarization, systemic instability and national disintegration remain largely tentative. The full ramifications of the effects of political violence on the political system as a whole must await further empirical research. Such research is urgently needed particularly in the West Indies and other newly emerging states which display the more brittle political structures. The problems, however, confronting systematic or scientific research in these parts are vast. Problems of both data accumulation and sources combine with the lack of adequate resources to sustain the lengthy and extensive research which this type of inquiry entails.

But if research must always await the availability of adequate means and resources, then many of the burning social problems which are of

serious human concern will be left only to create further mischief while generations continue to fiddle with peripheral issues. If research on difficult social problems is important in the richly endowed countries, it would be much more necessary in the poorer yet most populated regions of the world where social and political problems often assume destructive proportions tending to defeat and wreck even the most inspired efforts towards national development.

APPENDIX A

Some Methodological Considerations

The difficulties attendant upon inquiry into causal phenomena relate not only to the problems of theory construction, but most importantly to efforts toward reconciling the theory itself with the relevant data in empirical research. When, in addition, the empirical base of the research is located in the less developed regions of the world, the problem of theory construction is further compounded by the usual lack of adequate and reliable sources of data in these parts.¹ Such are some of the critical problems facing empirical inquiry into political violence, systemic instability, and other related phenomena in the developing world.

Yet, difficult though these problems might be, the question of political instability is much too important in the developing areas to be neglected or abandoned as an impracticable field of research merely because of theoretical difficulties involved. It is believed that as long as the researcher is himself aware of the difficulties, understands their nature, and is consequently cautious, or rather self-conscious about making overgeneralizations or bold predictions on the basis of scanty evidences, the dangers of errors become controllable. In this way his efforts can still contribute to the general accumulation of knowledge.

The methodological problems encountered in this research on Guyana revolve mainly around four important issues: It would appear however, that the problems derived from these issues are indicative of the stage of development of theories of political instability and violence as a whole, rather than problems peculiar to inquiry within the Guyana context in particular. The problems relate to the following:

- (a) The inadequacy of the operational (or empirical) indicators and the status of non-observables of political phenomena.
- (b) The difficulties in the attainment of precision in coding events data.
- (c) The estimation of duration and numbers of

participants in political violence events in cases of missing data.

- (d) The reliability of data and information sources.

By recognising and delimiting these problems one can have a better basis for appreciating the extensiveness of the task facing researchers in the field. At the same time the identification of the problem areas in research of this nature would no doubt encourage greater efforts toward theory construction in the future.

(a) The Inadequacy of Operational Indicators and the Status of Non-observables

In chapter II an attempt was made to utilize operational indicators for some of the major concepts employed in the analysis of political violence. The empirical referents of some of these concepts are thought to be inadequate since the concepts themselves relate to more fundamental and dynamic attributes which are basically non-observable. The operational indicators used in this study could therefore be more usefully viewed as representing only the minimum bases for the empirical identification of the relevant concepts.

For example, concepts such as "mass participation" could be better understood by way of a prior understanding of the rather more slippery concepts such as "group consciousness", "level of cognition", "morale" and the like. Thus the more observable process of voting turnout employed in this study to represent mass participation would seem to have left unexplored the full implications of the concept.²

Similarly "political mobilization" cannot be adequately understood merely in terms of the number and extent of support of the various political and other interest groups in a situation of contention for political power and dominance. Better and more adequate understanding of political mobilization ought also to account for factors such as level of commitment to collective or ideological goals, the dynamics of interaction and feedback especially in relation to the success (positive feedback) or failure (negative feedback) to attain these goals, especially those relating to dominance or the control

of values and resources convenient for the exercise of political power.³

One of the mathematical assumptions underlying the selection of operational measures for participation and mobilization is that the impact of the varying degrees of participation and mobilization on the political system is simply additive. In other words each increment of the values of either variable is assumed to represent a proportionate incremental impact on other variables in the political process. But this notion of "additivity" is rather simplistic since the relationship between mobilization, power and dominance is a dynamic one and would seem to require non-additive assumptions such as are posited in the multiplicative models advocated by Blalock.⁴

Thus it would appear that one of the basic shortcomings of empirical research is the problem of finding suitable and adequate operational indicators for the key concepts used in the theory construction. The fact that most of the important concepts in political science involve non-observable factors makes it necessary to regard empirical tests of basic assumptions and propositions as being limited in utility, range of applicability, and tenability.

(b) Problems of Precision in Coding Events Data

There are basically two problems to be dealt with under this heading: (i) the problem of the sampling procedure for the identification and categorization of different types of events mainly from random verbal information; (ii) the problem of estimation of missing data with respect to the duration and the number of participants of each event.

The collection and coding of events data required for this study were based mainly on verbal information gleaned from historical, newspaper, and other archival documentary sources. The first problem facing the researcher in this regard is how to develop a consistent method for discriminating and distinguishing between very closely related and sometimes intertwining events. In this study difficulties existed in terms of discerning clear conceptual boundaries between scalable political violence events such as violent demonstrations, riots, rebellion

and so on, on the basis of rather fuzzy information which speaks in terms such as "upheaval", "uprising", "insurrection", "disorder", and the like.

The guidelines for the identification and differentiation of the relevant events were derived from the empirical referents in the operational definitions of domestic conflict behaviour suggested by Rummel and Tanter and reproduced in Chapter II. With the help of five well briefed research students, the three most popular newspapers - the Guyana Graphic, the Mirror, and the Daily Chronicle - between the years 1947 and 1970 (inclusive), in addition to historical and other documentary sources spanning the pre-modern period from 1763 to 1946, were scanned and all reports and information about collective events involving at least 50 persons were extracted. After this, with the help of three senior political science students of the University of Guyana, equipped with the relevant operational definitions, the bulk of the information was carefully coded on a consensual basis according to whether each reported event represented an Anti-government demonstration, a Major strike, Guerilla warfare and so on. Other events not directly relevant to categories in the scale model of political violence (Figure) outlined in Chapter II were ignored.

This approach follows closely the lines laid down by Charles Tilly and his associates in their research on similar problems in France.⁵ As Tilly's research experience on France revealed, several difficulties and the probability of error exists with respect to the coding of events data. The first source of error relates to the nature of the main source materials used - in this case newspapers which often reflect a bias in the form of reporting the more large-scale and newsworthy events to the neglect of the smaller-scale events which might nevertheless be important to the analysis. There is also usually a city bias of newspaper reporting whereby events in the cities have a greater probability of being reported than events in the rural areas.⁶

The second source of error is of lesser significance and relates to the range of inclusiveness of each category used for coding the different events. For example how are events which display simultaneously

a variety of the categories to be coded? One example of this problem is the case when a rebellion combines both guerilla and conventional tactics, or when a major strike quickly develops into a riot. Would such a coincidence of events represent one event or two? Again, if it represents only one event, which of the various types manifested should be coded?

Problems such as these usually reflect the arbitrary element involved in developing a-priori standards of measurements of social or human phenomena. But in this way also a correction to these problems could be best approached under similar rule of thumb measures. In the case of the two different examples of problems cited above, decisions had to be taken which are thought to be capable at least of not significantly increasing the risk of error. In coding the Guyana data, events which confuse more than one category were coded as one event and the category reflecting the highest degree of magnitude was selected to represent that type of event. Thus a rebellion that simultaneously involved guerilla tactics was coded "rebellion", and a strike immediately escalating to a riot was coded "riot". This tendency to code toward the highest category would no doubt shift any bias away from the prediction in this study in terms of increasing frequency of lower level events as the political system becomes more modern.

However, in cases where there was the intervention of a long peaceful spell between events (as in the case of the three-months criteria for Purges and Government crises [see pages 68, 69]), or where the location of each event was different and/or separated by large distances, then each event was coded separately as single events. Fortunately these anomalies were relatively few and represented less than 5% of all events. Thus the error effect on the conclusions drawn from the data should not be substantial.

If however, any lessons could be derived from the coding experience on the Guyana data for the future refinement of the scale model on political violence (Figure V), two modifications would be recommended: (i) a distinction should be made between "major" and "minor" riots. This distinction would

get around the anomaly which places a riot at a street corner political party meeting in a small neighbourhood such as occurred frequently during the Modern period, on the same scale as a massive riot involving thousands of people and military forces, such as occurred in 1962 when the city of Georgetown was almost burnt to the ground. (ii) The second modification would involve the collapsing of three categories - Govt. crisis, Guerilla warfare, Rebellion/Revolution - into one broad category, perhaps codenamed "insurrection", since the relatively few events in each of these categories creates too many missing data cells and as such tends to impede the employment of higher levels of statistical analysis.

The corrected version of the scale model would, as a consequence, display six categories as follows:

Modified Scale Model of Political Violence

LOW		MEDIUM		HIGH	
1	2	3	4	5	6
Anti-Govt. Demonstr.	Major Strike	Purge	Minor Riot	Major Riot	Insurrection
LEVEL I	LEVEL II		LEVEL III		LEVEL IV

(c) Estimation of Missing Data: Duration and Participation Rate in Political Violence Events

Between 5% and 10% events involved missing data with respect to both duration and participation rate. In these cases attempts were made to estimate the extent of the missing data on the basis of either logical inference or simple guesstimates.⁷

Missing data were more apparent in the historical sources especially on the Slavery period. It has however been observed that historians tend to be more eager to record the more extreme cases, while the average or less momentous type of events are taken for granted. Thus events in which a great amount of people were involved were usually more eagerly reported than those which involved much fewer people. In terms of the Guyana data, our historical sources were seemingly consistent in recording the estimated amount of participants in collective events involving

more than about 500 persons. Similarly, the duration of events lasting several days were more consistently recorded than those lasting for say less than three days.

In order to overcome this difficulty and to accomodate all events into the general analysis despite the lack of precise data on participation rate and duration of events, very broad categories were devised for the estimation of missing data for both variables as follows:

LEVELS	PARTICIPATION:	DURATION
	No. of participants	No. of days
LOW	50 - 200	1 - 7
MEDIUM	201 - 500	8 - 14
HIGH	500 +	14+

In estimating participation rates, if cross checks with other possible sources do not reveal the data required, logical inference was reverted to, which took into account the location within which the event occurred and the type of movement involved in the event. It is quite logical to expect that knowledge of the extent of the population of the region or location of the event could give an indication of the possible upper limit of participation rate in the particular event. For example, a slave uprising which took place on a rural plantation which possessed no more than 200 persons - slaves and planters inclusive - could not be expected to have a participation rate of 500 except the uprising spread to nearby plantations which was indeed a rare occurrence. Similarly knowledge of the various types of movements directly involved in the events could also suggest the estimated numbers of participants.

But this is an appropriate guide to what would happen if everyone participated in the event. Usually a smaller proportion of participants than the total population of the local area or of the movement would be directly involved in an uprising. Thus it would seem reasonable to code these events in a category

lower than the upper limit of the estimated population of the region. In this way whatever errors might be produced would not be biased in favour of the prediction of higher rates of participation over the years, (i.e. if this standard of coding is held consistently for all periods). Since however, missing data in this respect involved less than 10% of the events, the error produced through guesstimates would not be substantial.

(d) Data and Information Sources

The data and relevant information for this study were obtained from a variety of sources. Much reliance was placed on documentary evidence gleaned from historical writings, autobiographies, parliamentary debates and speeches, newspaper reports, annual official reports and the like.

Information about the specific incidents of political violence for the pre-modern period was obtained from available historical documents. Guyana, however, is not very rich in reputable historical writings. There are significant gaps in its chronological record especially after 1900. Thus it was necessary to supplement historical sources with information from newspaper reports for analysis of the more modern periods. Since the newspapers were used primarily for chronological purposes - merely to obtain a list of all violence events over time - the question of reliability would become less of an issue than if say the information obtained were used as the basis for assessing the motivation of the participants. Factors such as the frequency of violence events, the approximate number of casualties and arrests in each event, the number of persons involved, the number of armed forces used, etc., could be obtained from news reports without much injury to the reliability of the research.

Guyana has a variety of daily newspapers and some periodicals. Among the dailies are The Guyana Graphic, The Daily Chronicle, and up to recently (1973), The Daily Argosy and Evening Post. In addition there are several political party organs: The Mirror, Thunder, (P.P.P.), New Nation (P.N.C.),

and The Sun, (U.F.). The Guyana Graphic is considered the most independent and objective and was therefore used as the basic source of information in this respect. Whenever doubt arose, cross checks with the other newspapers were made.

Similar information on violence events in Guyana's history was obtained from the Annual Reports on British Guiana prepared by the British Colonial Office, and also from the Yearbook on the West Indies and the Caribbean produced by Barclays Bank International. These sources were also useful for obtaining information on some of the socio-economic pre-conditions relevant to the study of political violence. Data on a year to year basis were obtained in relation to economic growth, urbanization, communications media, literacy and other indices suggestive of the levels of socio-economic modernization in Guyana. Data relating to the armed forces over the years were also obtained from these sources. However, more reliable and current statistical information on the armed forces were obtained from The Annual Report of the Commissioner of Police, the Guyana Police Bulletin, the Guyana Police Magazine, and a very recent periodical, The Green Beret, produced by the Guyana Defence Force.

Parliamentary debates, autobiographical and biographical writings were useful for information relating to the motivation and orientation of the known participants in political violence in Guyana. This type of information was particularly useful for assessing the strength of both the ideological and ethnic variables involved in the various violence activities. In addition there were various official reports of Commissions of Inquiry into political and labour disturbances in Guyana which also shed light on the motivation and orientation of the participants involved in political violence.

With regard to the varying impact or effects of violence on the political system evidences gleaned from historical writings were supplemented by pertinent information derived from parliamentary debates in Guyana. Careful records of parliamentary proceedings are kept and published as The Parliamentary Debates: Official Reports. The extent to which political violence was a threat to the stability of the governing regime was to a large extent suggested

in the reaction of the members of parliament in their speeches and debates. A more important source of this type of information, especially in relation to the relative degrees of support given to the regime by the public, is the periodical report on the general elections in Guyana entitled Elections Reports of Guyana. These reports were first published in 1947 and are available consistently for the period of each succeeding election.

The relative increase or decrease in the percentage voting in favour of the governing regime at various elections could be viewed as an indicator of the support and, to that extent, the degree of legitimacy enjoyed by the particular regime. Also the elections reports were instrumental in giving a breakdown of the relative degrees of ethnic polarization over the years, not only with respect to the electorate during elections but also with respect to the parliamentary representatives between periods of elections.

It would seem then that research on political violence involves special problems which ought to be overcome if the discerned patterns and trends are to be regarded as totally realistic. In the meantime however, it would seem inadvisable to allow these difficulties to deter future research in this field, especially in the small developing states which place much emphasis on the creative use of militant organized action as a necessary means toward political change and national development.

APPENDIX A (1)

Inadequacy of Data Sources for Earlier Periods of Guyana's History

It must be admitted that the data used for Chapter IV which inquires into the historical background of political violence in Guyana are gleaned from apparently questionable sources especially in relation to the Slavery period. The problem of the reliability of data sources, however, is not only peculiar to the Guyana situation but indeed is a recurrent one particularly with respect to the developing areas as a whole.

The sources relied on for data and information on Guyana's early history are mainly secondary, although most are based on primary and official records of the period. Among the authors who rely on Dutch and/or British official records are Netscher, Rodway, and Clementi. Bronkhurst, in addition to official records, relied on his own observation of the labouring population in Guyana during the early periods.

To some extent primary and official sources were used especially for the Immigration and Transition periods; notably The British Guiana Directory, The Almanack and Local Guide of British Guiana, The Colonial Office Annual Reports of British Guiana, and Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Treatment of Immigrants, Parts I and II. All of these official sources are obtainable in the Guyana Archives and contain valuable historical and statistical information of the early periods. However these official sources were more appropriate for obtaining aggregate data on the conditions of political, social and economic development at the time rather than for events data reflecting political violence activities.

The most important secondary source used for obtaining information on political violence events was Rodway's three-volume work on History of British Guiana. Not only did Rodway rely on the actual records of Dutch planters (which he was capable of translating into English) but he was the most self-conscious among the authors of the early periods about the accuracy of the statistical information which he obtained (cf Vol. I, p 173). In addition Rodway was the most comprehensive of the authors and consequently reported more statistics and information on political violence during the earlier periods than any other source or combination of sources whether secondary or primary.

However because heavy reliance was placed on secondary sources for the purposes of this chapter the risk of errors resulting from particular biases of the authors becomes highly probable. One noticeable bias of these early historians is the tendency to be elitist in their orientation and their interpretation of history. Rodway for example seemed to be more concerned for the terrible plight of the white masters during a rebellion than for the cause of the oppressed population struggling

for freedom and other human values (cf. Rodway Vol. I p225, Vol. III p 113). Because of this elitist bias it is quite probable that movements and trends affecting the masses of the population were slighted or even ignored by these authors. In addition, the probability that the governing authorities at the time often suppressed reports of movements and events which were critical of such authorities would tend to aggravate this particular problem (Rodway Vol. II p 283). Thus the combination of a peculiar historical bias away from small scale events with a conscious policy of suppressing information could lead to the underestimation of the volume of these events by the authors concerned.

Since this thesis is primarily concerned with the activities of popular or mass movements over time such biases would no doubt seem to compromise some of the main conclusions of the study. The first type of problem to be derived from such biases is the high probability that the correct frequency of political violence events would be underrepresented for the earlier periods. Since also historians tend to have a preference for recording the larger-scale or more momentous events in contrast to the smaller and what is often regarded as the less important or significant ones, the further tendency of overrepresenting the more extreme forms of political violence becomes more probable. Thus what is discerned as a trend of a low frequency of the less extreme events during the earlier periods might well be the result of errors and misrepresentations in the data sources.

What are the probable consequences of this type of error for the thesis as a whole? At worst the possibility of this type of error could lend weight to the argument that more reliable data sources might reveal a greater frequency of demonstrations than rebellions during the Slavery period. In this way one of the conclusions of the thesis -- that political violence tends to be more extreme within the more coercive or oppressive political system such as is characterized by the Slavery period -- would seem to be challenged.

However, this argument would seem to be pertinent only if our interest is confined to a comparison of different types of events within a given political system or historical period. But the main import of the thesis suggests a comparison of different configurations of events between systems or periods. Thus the central hypothesis suggests that a greater frequency of extreme events is more probable within the more coercive systems compared to events in the more permissive political system. The latter in turn is expected to reveal a greater frequency of the small scale events compared to events in the more coercive system.

The contention here is this: that even if access to more reliable data sources reveals an increase in frequency of lower level events during the Slavery period, the assertion of the higher frequency of extreme events during the more coercive compared to the more permissive period cannot be reversed. The evidence is clear that there were overwhelmingly more rebellions during the Slavery period (for which data

were relatively unobtainable) than in all the subsequent periods combined, particularly the Modern period (for which data were more easily obtainable). If better sources reveal an increase in the frequency of rebellion during the Slavery period (it is improbable that they could reveal a decrease) such new information can only lend greater support to the main conclusion of the thesis.

As regards the possibility of modifying the assumption that extreme events tend to be more frequent than small scale events during the coercive Slavery period in the light of future findings to the contrary, it could be argued as follows: that such a modification would make very little difference to the overall import of the thesis since none of the hypotheses investigated (and concluded in Chapter XI) asserted any particular relationship between higher extreme types of violence on the one hand, and lower extreme types of violence on the other.

Indeed from the overall impression of the statistics presented on political violence over the years it would seem that an interesting hypothesis could be derived -- that an inverse relationship tends to exist between the two levels of extremes of political violence. The probable implication in this new hypothesis is that the one form of popular expression tends to either absorb or drive out the other form as means of articulating political demand. But such an argument is defensible on rational grounds which make it difficult to foresee a complete rejection of this hypothesis by future research based on primary data sources.

Firstly, under the more coercive or oppressive conditions such as existed during Slavery, any small scale protest among the slave population would quickly be escalated into a full fledged rebellion principally because of the invariably extreme response or reaction to such tactics by the political authorities. Similar extreme reaction on the part of the authorities existed during the Immigration period with almost identical extreme results (although the escalation was more frequently terminated in riots than in rebellions during the Immigration period).

Secondly it would be logical to expect a greater volume of the lower extreme compared to the higher extreme forms of protest during the Modern period since these lower forms were recognized as legitimate and non-punishable forms of demand articulation. It would therefore seem inevitable that within such a permissive context beginning with the Transition and including the Modern period, demonstrations and strikes would be utilized as a first resort in obtaining political demands. Rebellion on the other hand would become a last resort in such context if only because of the availability of other less punitive avenues of redress of grievances.

The more adequate primary records directly relevant for the study of political violence in Guyana during the early periods are located outside of Guyana, mainly in the Public Records Office in London and

the Official Record Archives in Holland. Among the relevant sources obtainable in these overseas institutions are diaries and records of the early planters, the official criminal records of the colony and more importantly the multitude of regular Despatches by the colonial governors to the home authorities. These Despatches are essentially reports of incidents which are regarded as being of an urgent or problematic nature in the colonies. It is expected that within such reports local disturbances of any significant level would gain a high order of prominence. These sources are unfortunately not yet obtainable in Guyana.

Yet, even if these primary sources become more accessible to the local researcher, it is difficult to perceive any automatic improvement on the work of the secondary authors, particularly Rodway's work. Firstly, these primary records would also tend to be elitist in their orientation since it is expected that planters and governors of the period would report with an interest in preserving the established political and economic order. Secondly, as Rodway himself observed, even these primary records are very often inaccurate in their statistical accounts (Rodway Vol. I p 173). Thirdly, these early primary records usually contain many and significant gaps and omissions in their accounts such that the researcher who wishes to be accurate is still left with the freedom to make shrewd guesses where significant data are missing.

One example of this last problem is observed in Allan H. Adamson's work, Sugar Without Slaves, (New Haven, 1972). Using colonial office records from the Public Records Office in London, Adamson listed the number of recorded strikes for each year between 1855 and 1903. Notable omissions were found for about 40% of all the years between this period. Terms such as "few", "several", "more than usual" and "not available" were frequently used to fill the gap in the years for which accurate statistical data were missing, (Adamson p 155). This problem of missing data would undoubtedly frustrate the work of any researcher wishing to use the more advanced or sophisticated methods of statistical analysis.

In the final analysis, however, it is recognized that because of the inadequacy of the sources on which this chapter is based and because also of the very important hypotheses relevant to Guyana's early historical conditions, more in-depth and detailed research on mass movements and popular events ought to be done especially in relation to the Slavery and Immigration periods. This chapter is not intended to be in any way conclusive or definitive about the process of political violence during the pre-modern periods. What was in fact intended was merely to illustrate the political trend which was to be more rigorously examined on the basis of more adequate data during the Modern period in Guyana (1947 - 1970) which is the focal period in this study.

TITLE AND DESCRIPTION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN GUYANA 1946-1973

Date of Formation	TITLE	DESCRIPTION
1946	British Guiana Labour Party (BGLP)	Political amalgam of various racial and other interest groups and trade unions. Contested elections 1947.
"	Political Affairs Committee (PAC)	Mainly a political discussion group for education of a political elite prior to the formation of a political party (PPP). Organized evening classes and issued monthly newsletter.
1950	People's Progressive Party (PPP)	Progressive left wing party. Interested in Marxist approach but more nationalist in policy orientation and political organization. Amalgam of major racial groups. Contested elections 1953, 1957, 1961, 1964, 1968, 1973.
1952	National Democratic Party (NDP)	Offshoot of predominantly African cultural organization, the "League of Coloured Peoples" (LCP). Anti-Jagan coalition but with policies not very dissimilar to early PPP. Contested elections 1953.
1953	People's National Party (PNP)	Offshoot of NDP similar to NDP in organization and policy orientation. Contested elections 1953.
1953	The United Guyana Party (UGP)	Anti-PPP, basically conservative, weak party. Contested election 1953.
"	United Farmers and Workers Party (UFWP)	Weak party elitist leadership, eclectic approach. Contested election 1953.

1955	People's Progressive Party (Burnhamite) PPP	Offshoot of original PPP due to leadership differences between Jagan and Burnham. Policies similar to original PPP: contested election 1957.
1957	United Democratic Party (UDP)	New name for old anti-PPP african based coalition. Direct descendant of LCP and NDP. Contested election 1957.
"	Guyana National Party (GNP)	Weak party; eclectic orientation. Contested election 1957.
1958	People's National Congress (PNC)	New name for Burnhamite PPP merged with UDP (1959). Democratic-socialist in ideological orientation. Anti-Jagan (PPP). Contested elections 1961, 1964, 1968, 1973.
1959 (?)	Guyana Independence Movement (GIM)	Offshoot of Burnhamite PPP. Pro-Venezuelan. Weak party. Contested election 1961.
1960	United Force (UF)	Coalition of European, Chinese and Amerindian groups. Militantly pro-British and capitalist in ideological orientation. Strongly anti-PPP. Contested elections 1961, 1964, 1968.
1963	Justice Party (JP)	Right wing, conservative, all-Indian party. Contested election 1964.
1964	Guyana United Muslim Party (GUMP)	Religious oriented Muslim party. Contested elections 1964, 1968.
"	Peace, Equality and Prosperity Party (PEP)	Weak party, eclectic in orientation. Contested election 1964.
1969	Working People's Vanguard Party (WPVP)	Offshoot of PPP. Extreme left-wing. Marxist-Leninist in ideological orientation. Does not believe in contesting elections under existing conditions.

1973

People's Democratic
Movement (PDM)

Offshoot of P.C. Described
itself as "democratic-
socialist". Contested elec-
tion 1973.

"

Liberator Party (LP)

Coalition of various conser-
vative, pro-British, anti-
PNC groups. Replaced the
UF in contesting 1973 elec-
tions.

Sources: (1) R.T. Smith, British Guiana, London 1962 pp 165-183;
(2) Elections Report (1953-1968).

Particulars given in the following list of Trade Unions reveal the financial membership at December 31, 1961.

NAME EMPLOYERS' ORGANIZATIONS	PAID UP MEMBER- SHIP	DESCRIPTION
1. British Guiana Commission Agents' Association	17	Specialised. Confined to Commission Agents.
2. The Forest Products Association of British Guiana	17	Specialised and confined to employers engaged in Timber Industry.
3. British Guiana Licensed Spirit Dealers' Association	12	Specialised and confined to employers engaged in the alcoholic trade.
4. British Guiana Bakery Proprietors Association	17	Specialised. Confined to proprietors of bakeries.
5. Public Works Department Contractors' Association	10	Confined to contractors of the Public Works Department.
6. British Guiana Hire Car Owners' Association	N.A.	Confined to owners of hire cars.
7. British Guiana Rice Millers' and Landlords' Association	N.A.	Confined to persons engaged in the rice milling trade.

NAME WORKERS' ORGANISATIONS	PAID UP MEMBER- SHIP	DESCRIPTION
1. The British Guiana Labour Union	3,231	General. Among the employees covered are wharf workers, watchmen.
2. Man-Power Citizens' Association	21,046	General. Among the employees covered are sugar workers, rice workers at the Mahaicony Abary Rice Development Scheme, and the employees of the B.G. Electricity Corporation.

3. The Transport Workers' Union of British Guiana	N.A.	Confined to employees of the Transport and Harbours Department
4. The British Guiana Post Office Workers' Union	549	Confined to employees of the Post Office Department.
5. The British Guiana Amalgamated Building Trade Workers' Union	681	Confined to employees in the building trade.
6. Government Employees' Union	N.A.	Caters for subordinate employees in Government Departments.
7. Cosmopolitan Workers' Union	N.A.	Activities unknown.
8. The British Guiana and West Indies Sugar Boilers' Union	130	Specialised. Confined to pan boilers on sugar estates in British Guiana and the West Indies.
9. The British Guiana Dental Assistants' and Mechanics' Association	N.A.	Confined to dental assistants and mechanics.
10. The British Guiana Headmen's Union	302	Confined to headmen employed on sugar estates.
11. The Municipal Labour Trade Union	880	Confined to employees of the Georgetown Municipality.
12. Sugar Estates Clerks' Association	980	Confined to Clerical workers on sugar estates.
13. Guiana Industrial Workers' Union	N.A.	Caters primarily for workers in the sugar industry.
14. Guianese Workers' Federation	323	Activities unknown.
15. The British Guiana Civil Service Association	1,515	Confined to Civil servants.

16. Public Works Pure Water Supply and Sea Defence Workers' Union	1,621	Confined to subordinate employees of the Public Works and Sea Defence Departments and the Drainage and Irrigation Department.
17. The British Guiana Land Surveyors' Association	N.A.	Specialised. Confined to Land Surveyors.
18. Clerical Workers' Union	1,005	Confined to Clerical Workers in Commercial establishments.
19. The British Guiana Mine Workers' Union	2,016	Caters for employees of the Demerara and Berbice Bauxite Companies and the African Manganese Company.
20. Federation of Unions of Government Employees	5 Unions	Confined to unions catering for subordinate Government employees.
21. Printers' Industrial Union	350	Confined to employees in the printing industry.
22. Sawmill and Forest Workers' Union	700	Confined to workers on saw-mills and timber grants.
23. British Guiana Trades Union Council	26 Unions	An Organisation representing the Trade Union Movement.
24. British Guiana Women's Social Union	N.A.	Caters for domestic helpers and washers.
25. British Guiana Postmasters' Union	31	Confined to Postmasters.
26. British Guiana Medical Employees' Union	881	Confined to subordinate employees of the Medical Department.
27. Local Government Officers' Association	135	Caters for administrative, professional, technical and clerical officers, Grade I and above, employed by the Mayor and Town Council of Georgetown and the Georgetown Sewerage and Water Commissioners.
28. British Guiana Seafarers' Union	300	Caters for men employed in local and foreign shipping.

29. General Workers' Union	N.A.	Caters for general workers.
30. British Guiana Rice Marketing Board Workers' Union	317	Caters for all subordinate employees of the B.G. Rice Marketing Board.
31. British Guiana Rice Workers' Union	N.A.	Caters for workers employed in the rice industry.
32. Guiana Air Transport Trade Union	121	Caters for workers engaged in transportation by air.
33. British Guiana Law Clerks' Association	N.A.	Confined to clerks employed in the legal profession.
34. Pilots' Association of British Guiana	19	Confined to Pilots of the Transport & Harbours Department.
35. The United Mineral and General Workers' Union	N.A.	Confined to employees in the mineral and other allied industries.
36. The British Guiana Teachers Association	1,581	Confined to teachers in primary schools.
37. The British Guiana Public Health Officers' Association	40	Confined to Public Health Officers.
38. United Guianese Miners' Association	N.A.	Confined to employees in the mining industries.
39. Guiana Sugar Workers' Union	8,000	Confined to workers in the sugar industry.
40. B.G. General Domestic Union	N.A.	Caters for workers employed as domestic servants.
41. B.G. Rural Local Authorities Officers Association	35	Confined to employees of rural local authorities.

N.A. - NOT AVAILABLE

Source: Annual Report of British Guiana, H.M.S.O., 1961, pp 41-44.

MAJOR CULTURAL ETHNIC AND OTHER VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS IN GUYANA.

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
1. African Society for Cultural Relations with Independent Africa	African cultural association (eclipsing League of Coloured Peoples). Predominantly african in racial composition.
2. Anjuman E - Islam	Orthodox Moslem Association. Predominantly Indian in racial composition.
3. Anglican Diocese of Guyana	Episcopal religious organization. Predominantly European leadership.
4. Chinese Association	Chinese cultural association. Chinese in leadership and membership composition.
5. Consultative Association of Guyanese Industry Ltd.	Employers' Association including major industries only. Predominantly Portuguese-European in leadership composition.
6. East Indian Association	Indian Cultural Association (eclipsed Maha Sabha). Predominantly Indian in racial composition.
7. Georgetown Chamber of Commerce	Employers' Association including owners and managers of wholesale and retail stores. Portuguese-European composition.
8. League of Coloured Peoples	African Cultural Association. African in racial composition.
9. Mahatma Gandhi Association	Association of Reform Hindus. Indian in racial composition.
10. Sanatan Dharma Maha Sabha	Orthodox Hindu Association. Indian in racial composition.
11. Sugar Producers' Association	Employers' Association of Sugar Producers. European in composition.
12. Sword of the Spirit	Activist arm of Roman Catholic Church. Portuguese directed.
13. The Roman Catholic Church of Guyana	Catholic religious organization. Led by Portuguese and Europeans.

Source: Ralph Premdas, Voluntary Associations and Political Parties in a Racially Fragmented State: The Case of Guyana, Occasional Papers No. 2, University of Guyana, Feb. 1972, pp 8-11.

APPL 1/2/52

EXTRACTS FROM LOCAL PRESS CONTAINING ANTI-GOVERNMENT PROPAGANDA

Thursday 1st February	Chronicle Headline	"Government to Squeeze Dollars from Workers".
	Post Headline Page 3 Article	"Budget - It's staggering". "Budget is in keeping with Govern- ment - Marxist. Bottle of Rum will now cost \$3.10".
	Town Talk	"Archangel Jacob Messenger of Death". "Malice, Meanness and Malevolence thrown in by Dr. Jacob".
Saturday 3rd February	Chronicle Front page	Letter to Burnham and D'Aguiar by E.S. Phillips "I suggest that you both appear on one platform ... a general uprising against this bud- get and will force Jagan's Govern- ment to either amend their ideas or resign".
Sunday 4th February	Chronicle Headline Story	"TAX Avalanche will Crush Working Class". The small working man to be soaked to the tune of some \$9 million.
	Inner Headline Leader	"Slave Whip Budget". "Budget is Marxist". A "vindic- tive and malicious spirit prowls through the budget".
	Graphic Article	"Keep that hand out of my pocket". Critical.
Monday 5th February	Graphic Sub- headline	"The Budget - First step Leftward". Taxation of Companies will make them cut down operations and so increase unemployment".
	Post Editorial	"Food Tax - It cannot help hitting the poor man too hard for him to bear".
	Page 3	Highly critical letters:
Tuesday 6th February	Chronicle Leader	The entire country has been thrown in crisis bordering on panic.

Wednesday
7th February

Chronicle
Letter

Defenders of Freedom Letter signed
by C.L. Sebastian and J. M.
Hutchinson calls for joint action
on part of P.N.C. and U.F. to
"build and preserve a way of life
such as we should be prepared to
live when we become independent".

"Iniquitous Budget" and "Stir your-
selves - down with this shameful
Budget. Down with the Government".

Open Letter
to Prince
Philip

Jagan Government is Communist, no
Independence etc...

Post
Page 3

Vindictive letters. Full page.

Friday
9th February

Chronicle
Letter

"Budget will bring misery to coun-
try". Ends - "This is trodden
Democracy - Let's unite and fight
for our rights".

Letter on
back
page

Open letter to Burnham and D'Aguiar
"all of us are agreed that we are
faced with an eventual dictatorship.
Dr. Jacob's Radical Budget bears
this out in no uncertain terms, etc.
etc. "Unite and save us all".

Post
Page
Article

"Distrust and suspicion mixed with
Hate" headline.

Saturday
10th February

Chronicle
Headline

"Unite and Fight" report on mass
meeting.

Centre
Page
Headline

"Budget will tax food from poor
man's mouth".

Post
Headline
Page 1
Page 2

"Jagan Government must resign".
Editorial: Tax on rum will result
in "more broken homes and delin-
quent children".

Page 3

Anti-Government letters...

Sunday
11th February

Chronicle
Headline
Page 2

"End-of-Election Liege".
"Independence will give them the power to finish with elections for good. - They are imperinently and avowedly communitist. If free elections are banned the constitution will be banned too". "If we could fight together at the barricade and hold back the gathering storm we should be able to make the country safe for our children".

Page 5

Commentary: "Dictatorship by Budget".
The dictatorial purpose of Jagan's Government is proved beyond doubt by several tax proposals in the 1962 Budget, the weight of about 90 per cent of which will fall on the working class etc., etc. Now more than ever before the red claws of Jagan's Communism are exposed naked for all to see. And this is only the smoke, the fire

Source: Report of a Commission of Enquiry into Disturbances in British Guiana in February 1962, H.M.S.O., 1962, pp 72,73.

VITAL STATISTICS FOR BRITISH GUIANA, 1931-1961

Period	Col. (1) Population at end of year	Col. (2) Number of registered live births	Col. (3) Number of registered deaths	Col. (4) Natural increase of popu- lation	Col. (5) Net immi- gration (+) or emigra- tion (-)	Col. (6) Crude birth rate per 1000 population	Col. (7) Crude death rate per 1000 population	Col. (8) Rate of natural increase per 1000	Col. (9) Infant mortality rate per 1000 live births
Average 1931-1935	320,816	10,340	7,226	3114	+509	32.2	22.5	9.7	141
" 1936-1940	339,135	10,922	7,199	3723	+30	32.2	21.2	11.0	119
" 1941-1945	364,294	12,525	7,087	5438	-115	34.4	19.4	15.0	112
" 1946-1951	395,018	15,835	5,560	10275	+13	40.5	14.3	26.2	81
" 1952-1956	460,692	19,737	5,644	14113	-1140	43.5	12.5	31.0	75
" 1957-1961	535,438	23,056	5,297	17759	-1857	45.5	10.0	33.5	60

Note: Data for 1931-45 includes the registered Amerindian population (about 8000-16,000 during this period), while post-war data do not.

Source: Peter Newman, British Guiana, London, 1964, p 35.

APPENDIX F.

JUSTIFICATION FOR THE DIVISION OF THE MODERN PERIOD

(1947 - 1970) INTO SIX SUB PERIODS

The choice of the particular six sub-periods as the basis of analysing the Modern period (1947 - 1970) in Guyana was to a large extent influenced by the nature of the information and data obtained. Firstly, it was thought that some aggregating of years was necessary both to facilitate analysis of trends and patterns whose configurations extended beyond a single year, and to relate the events data to other factors whose impact could be better understood over the more extended time span as well. Secondly, the fact that most of the relevant data needed for correlation with political violence were not available strictly for every year within the Modern period, made some form of aggregation or collapsing of years meaningful to facilitate further analysis.

While, for example the events data on political violence have been scrupulously gleaned for every year within the period, data relating to other political indicators such as "competitiveness" among organised groups in the political system could be best obtained only on a periodic basis-- particularly at election time once every four or five years. Also, data with respect to socio-economic indicators of change such as the communications media, economic growth and population, have not been forthcoming religiously for every year, although sufficient frequency of such data for continuous years exists to carry through a relatively more thorough statistical analysis than is allowable with only six sub-divisions.

The following Tables illustrate the distribution of some of the relevant data which are obtainable on a year to year basis during the Modern period. The blank spaces in the columns mean that data for that year were not available. The data for Tables (I) and (II) were compiled from a variety of original sources which are already mentioned under the relevant Tables in the main body of this thesis.

TABLE (i)
DATA ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION - 1947 - 1970

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>No. of Radios</u>	<u>No. of Telephones</u>	<u>No. of Newspapers/ Periodicals</u>	<u>Annual Govt. Expend. (\$\$ millions G)</u>	<u>Populati by (Thousan</u>
1947	5,403	2,902	-	17	376
1948	6,292	2,965	-	20	403
1949	6,924	3,163	-	21	414
1950	-	3,337	-	24	425
1951	11,081	3,481	-	25	436
1952	13,287	3,675	21	28	454
1953	14,833	3,908	19	31	465
1954	21,876	4,448	21	35	479
1955	27,449	4,632	28	38	493
1956	30,416	4,810	27	40	488
1957	32,679	4,970	29	44	508
1958	32,679	5,436	28	48	540
1959	30,416	5,346	30	49	558
1960	-	8,156	28	52	585
1961	-	9,066	30	56	591
1962	-	9,159	31	58	603
1963	-	9,385	25	68	621
1964	90,000	9,000	-	70	638
1965	-	-	-	82	654
1966	-	-	-	84	675
1967	-	10,400	-	88	-
1968	123,000	10,378	-	98	-
1969	123,000	12,070	14	107	721
1970	-	14,665	-	124	740

TABLE (ii)

DISTRIBUTION OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE EVENTS - 1947-1970

Year	(No. of Political Violence Events)							Total
	Demon- stration	Major Strike	Purge	Riot	Govt. Crisis	Guer. War	Rebel Rev.	
1947		1						1
1948	2	2		1				5
1949	7	2		1				10
1950	8	3		1				12
1951	4	2						6
1952	6							6
1953	4	6	1	1	1			13
1954	6	1						7
1955	1							1
1956	7							7
1957	2			1				3
1958								0
1959	2							2
1960								0
1961	6			5				11
1962	3	2		1	1			7
1963	4	2	1	7	1			15
1964	4	1		5		1		11
1965	11	4						15
1966	3	2						5
1967	2							2
1968		1		1				2
1969	1	1					1	3
1970		8						8
TOTAL	83	38	2	24	3	1	1	152

Although the aggregation of years into equal intervals was done primarily for the better management of the data (with easy-to-read tables for example) other reasons were also operative. Firstly the reason for the equal intervals was to facilitate comparison with the earlier historical periods which were also sub-divided into equal intervals, although, of course the time span of each sub-period within the Modern period represents four years while that for the earlier period were ten years as far as this was practicable. The relatively more minute divisions within the Modern period were facilitated by the better access to and availability of data on political events within this period. Secondly the reason for the six intervals was to coincide the data with the six election years during the Modern period. The desire to make the interval both equal and coinciding with elections resulted in some loss of complete accuracy in the interval position of the election dates. Ideally it was hoped that the election date would fall consistently at one point, preferably at the center of each interval, but since the elections themselves were not held at regular or consistent intervals (some after three, some after four and some after five years) it was rather difficult to sustain this ideal breakdown.

It is believed that since the main variables to be operationalised in this regard are political competitiveness and contention for dominance, the single election year would not sufficiently bear out all the ramifications of such inter-organisational activity which continues between elections. The year of election merely demonstrates the degree of an activity that had been going on for some time especially before the election date, and would also continue, although perhaps with declining momentum, after the elections.

Although admittedly, the collapsing of the individual years into sub-periods might result in the loss of some accuracy in the correlation of political violence events with other variables in the political process, it is still believed that the errors involved would not significantly affect the results or be sufficient to change the main arguments of the thesis. Examples of correlating some of the key socio-economic variables with political violence on a year to year basis yielded, as was expected, insignificantly low coefficients closely corresponding to what obtained in Chapter VII on the basis of the six sub-periods.

For example, correlating variables relating to the communications media with political violence yielded the following low (also negative) correlations.

TABLE (iii)

CORRELATIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS VARIABLES WITH POLITICAL VIOLENCE

INDEPENDENT	N =	CORRELATIONS (ANNUAL BASES)	ORIGINAL SUB-PERIOD CORRELATIONS: N = 6
RADIOS	15	-.17	-.10
TELEPHONES	22	0	-.10
NEWSPAPERS/ PERIODICALS	12	-.28	-.30

Also using Tau to correct for ties in the rankings, per capita expenditure reveals almost zero correlation (.02) with political violence. Since also like government expenditure (as a measure of economic welfare) most of the other socio-economic variables increase monotonically over the years (Table (i)) while political violence events fluctuate irregularly from year to year, it would seem obvious that a low and insignificant correlation (based on either Rho or Tau) would also be obtained in terms of these variables. The close correspondence in the results of the correlation of the annual with the periodic computations as shown in Table (iii) should suggest that the reduction of the several years within the Modern period into a smaller number of sub-periods does not impair the general conclusion of this thesis which asserts the existence of a relatively low and sometimes negative impact of socio-economic modernization on the volume of political violence.

NOTES

Chapter I: Introduction

1. Cf. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven, 1968. Karl Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," The American Political Science Review LV No. 3 Sept. 1961. Lucian Pye, Aspects of Political Development, Boston, 1966.
2. Cf. Ted Robert Gurr, "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence", World Politics, XX January, 1968, pp 245-78; Also Ivo K. Feierabend and Rosalind L. Feierabend, "Systemic Conditions of Political Aggression Theory", in Ivo K. Feierabend et al. (eds) Anger, Violence and Politics, Englewood Cliffs, 1972, pp 136-183. Also James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution", American Sociological Review, XXVII (1962), pp 5-18. Brian Crozier, The Rebels, Boston, 1960, p 15.
- 2a. C. E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization, New York, 1966, p 25; Fred Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries, Boston, 1964, pp 164-173; Dunkwart A. Ruston, A World of Nations, Problems of Political Modernization, Washington, 1967, p 221. Charles W. Anderson, et al, "Issues of Political Development", Englewood Cliffs, 1967, p 26 and passim; Cynthia Enloe, Ethnic Conflict and Political Development, Boston 1973, p 22 and passim.
3. See Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay", World Politics, 3, (1964), p 386. Also Charles Tilly, "Collective Action and Conflict in Large-Scale Social Change: Research Plans, 1974-1978", CRSO Working Paper, October 1973, p 5,6. Charles Tilly, "Revolutions and Collective Violence", CRSO Working Paper #83, May 1973, to appear in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, Handbook of Political Science, (Mass: Adison, Wolsey), forthcoming. See also Anthony Oberschall, Social Conflict and Social Movements, Englewood Cliffs, 1973.

49. Tilly, "Revolutions and Collective Violence", op. cit. p 33 ff.
5. Among the writings which tend to locate the source of collective political violence in the economic or social-psychological environment of human behaviour are: Ted Gurr, Why Man Rebel, Princeton, New Jersey, 1970. Ted Gurr, "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence" and "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis using New Indices", both articles in Ivo K. Feierabend, et al. (eds.) Anger, Violence and Politics, Englewood Cliffs, 1972. Also, Ivo Feierabend, Rosalind L. Feierabend, and Betty A. Nesvold, "Social Change and Political Violence: Cross National Patterns", in Feierabend et al. (eds). op cit., also James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution", American Sociological Review, XXVII (1962); Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Aggression", Journal of Peace Research, II, (1964); The above authors use some variant of the psychological notion of frustration-aggression syndrome given expression by John Dollard et al., Frustration and Aggression, New Haven, 1939.
6. William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society, New York, 1959. S. N. Eisenstadt, Modernization, Protest and Change, Englewood Cliffs, 1966. See also Murray Edelman, Politics as Symbolic Action, Chicago, 1971. George S. Peitee, The Process of Revolution, Michigan, 1938.
7. Tilly's model seems very much applicable to the experience of the small developing states especially colonial territories struggling for political independence. The course of action adopted by the leadership of these small states is a deliberate strategy of organized mass movements pitted against the power position of the colonial masters. Such an approach requires total mobilization of resources and popular agitation in order to match the strength of the rulers in an inevitable contention for the control of political power as a means toward further political and social changes. Cf. Anthony J. Russo,

"Economic and Social Correlates of Government Control in South Vietnam", in Feierabend et al. (eds) op. cit. p 322; ... "Public Protest in Indonesia", ... (eds) op. cit. p 355.

8. The concept of the Plural Society derives from the works of J. S. Furnivall and M. G. Smith. Furnivall holds that the plural society comprises "The strictest medley (of Peoples), for they mix but do not combine. Each group holds to its own religion, its own culture and language, its own ideas, its ways" He continues: "There is a society with different sections of the community living side by side, but separately, within the same political unit. Even in the economic sphere, there is a division of labour along racial lines". J. S. Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice, Cambridge U. P. London 1948, p ... M. G. Smith further describes the plural society as "that condition in which there is a racial diversity in the basic system of compulsory institutions"; M. G. Smith, "Social and Cultural Pluralism", in Vera Rubin (ed), Social and Cultural Pluralism in the Caribbean, New York, 1960, p 768. For an analysis of Guyana in terms of the plural society concept see Neville Layne, "The Plural Society in Guyana" (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, U.C.L.A., 1970).
9. See H. D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner (eds) World Revolutionary Elites: Studies in Coercive Ideological Movements, M.I.T. Press 1965, p 8. C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite, New York, 1959. Gerhard E. Lenski, Power and Privilege: A Theory of Social Stratification, New York, 1966, p 44 and passim. H. M. Blalock, Toward a Theory of Minority Group Relations, New York, 1967, p 110 and passim.
10. Evidence of the desire on the part of one ethnic element of the population to dominate the rest is reflected in slogans such as "Pan tap" in Guyana, meaning that one ethnic group must seek

to be "on top" of the other; the "Black Power" slogan in Trinidad during the upheaval of 1971 aimed at a similar advantage for the black elements of the population. Similarly the strife between the Chinese and Malays in Malaya bear out the contention of this struggle for dominance by one ethnic group. See Pierre L. Van den Berghe, "Ethnicity: The African Experience" in International Social Science Journal. Vol. XXIII #4, 1971, p 514.

11. Lucian Pye, Aspects of Political Development, op. cit. p 45.
12. Cf. F. X. Mark, "Organized Labour in British Guiana", in F. M. Andic (ed) The Caribbean in Transition, Rio Piedras, 1965; also Leo Despres, Cultural Pluralism and Nationalist Politics in British Guiana, Chicago, 1967, pp 152-158; 165-176.
13. Peter Nettle, Political Mobilization, London, 1967, p 32.
14. Ibid.
15. Karl Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development", The American Political Science Review, Vol. LV No. 3, Sept. 1961.
16. Charles Tilly, "Revolutions and Collective Violence", op. cit., p 34.
17. Cf. Johan Galtung, Theory and Methods of Social Research, London, 1970, p 189.
18. Cf. Michael Parenti, "Ethnic Politics and the Persistence of Ethnic Identification", The American Political Science Review, Vol LXI #3, Sept. 1967, p 717. - See also, V. O. Key Jr., "A Theory of Critical Elections", Journal of Politics, 17, Feb. 1955, pp 3-18. Also Raymond E. Wolfinger, "The Development and Persistence of Ethnic Voting", The American Political Science Review, 59, Dec. 1965.

19. Cf. Leo Despres, op. cit., pp. 228-229; also Cheddi Jagan, The West on Trial, London 1966, p. 114.
20. M. G. Smith, op. cit., p. 772.
21. Cf. Kenneth E. Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory, New York, 1962, p. 145 ff; also Charles Tilly, "Revolutions and Collective Violence", op. cit.; Anthony J. Russo Jr., "Economic and Social Correlates of Government Control in South Vietnam", in Feierabend et al. (eds) Anger, Violence and Politics, op. cit.; Ruth Ann Wilner, "Public Protest in Indonesia", in Feierabend et al. (eds) op. cit.
22. Despres, op. cit., p. 28.
23. Ralph Premdas, "Political Parties in a Bifurcated State: The Case of Guyana", (Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, University of Illinois, 1970).
24. Neville Layne, op. cit.; Joseph B. Landis, "Race Relations and Politics in Guyana", (Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, Yale University, 1971); also, Joseph B. Landis, "Racial Attitudes of Africans and Indians in Guyana", Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 22, No. 4, Dec. 1973; J. E. Greene, "Participation, Integration and Legitimacy as Indicators of Developmental Change in the Politics of Guyana", Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 21, No. 3, Sept. 1972.
25. J. E. Greene, op. cit., p. 258.

Chapter II: The Nature of Political Violence

1. Kenneth E. Boulding, op. cit., p. 323; Ralph Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society, Stanford, 1959, p. 212.
2. Cf. Clinton Fink, "Some Conceptual Difficulties in the Theory of Social Conflict", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. XII, No. 4, 1968,

p 432. See also Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict, New York, 1956, p 34 and passim.

3. Dahrendorf, op. cit., p 212.
4. Jessie Bernard, "The Sociological Study of Conflict", in The Nature of Conflict, UNESCO, 1957, p 38.
5. Cf. Donald G. Morrison and Hugh Michael Stevenson, "Integration and Instability: Patterns of African Political Development", in The American Political Science Review, Vol. LXVI, No. 3, Sept. 1972, p 908.
6. Ernest A. Duff and John F. McCamant, "Measuring Social and Political Requirements for System Stability in Latin America", The American Political Science Review, Vol. LXII, No. 4, Dec. 1968, p 1125.
7. Leon Hurwitz, "Democratic Political Stability", Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 4, No. 4, Jan. 1972, p 449.
8. Some of the terms used in relation to the concept of political violence are "Political Aggression", "Civil Disorder", "Internal war", "Civil Strife", "Political Instability" and "Domestic Conflict". Although these various terms differ with respect to the different perspectives and orientation of the authors, they nevertheless refer to the same range of observable factors characterized as "political violence". Cf. Ivo K. Feierabend and Rosalind L. Feierabend, "Systemic Conditions of Political Aggression", Harry Eckstein, "On The Etiology of Internal War", Ted R. Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife", Douglas Bwy, "Political Instability in Latin America", all in Ivo K. Feierabend et. al. (eds) Anger, Violence and Politics, op. cit. Also, Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, New York, 1968; Raymond Tanter, "Dimensions of Conflict Behaviour within and Between Nations, 1958-60", in Louis Kriesberg,

Social Processes in International Relations,
New York, 1968.

9. Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, Penguin Books, 1973.
10. Georges Sorel, Reflections on Violence, (Translated by T. E. Hulme and J. Roth), Glencoe, 1950.
11. Harry Eckstein, "On the Etiology of Internal War", op. cit., p. 10.
12. Ted Robert Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife", op. cit., p. 187.
13. Cf. Raymond Tanter, op. cit.; also R. J. Rummel, "Dimensions of Foreign and Domestic Conflict Behaviour", in Dean G. Pruitt and Richard C. Snyder, Theory and Research on the Causes of War, New Jersey, 1965.
14. Cf. Douglas Bwy, op. cit.; also Manus Midlarsky and Raymond Tanter, "Toward a Theory of Political Instability in Latin America", in Feierabend, et. al. (eds) op. cit.;
15. Cf. Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change, Boston, 1966.
16. Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife", op. cit.; Harry Eckstein, "On The Etiology of Internal War", op. cit.
17. Among those who tend to regard political violence favourably are Frantz Fanon and Georges Sorel. Cf. Fanon, op. cit.; Sorel, op. cit.
18. Cf. Murray Edelman, Politics as Symbolic Action, Chicago, 1971; and Stanley P. Wagner, The End of Revolution, Bombay, 1970.
19. This systemic-purposive view of violence is supported by Galtung. Cf. Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace and Peace Research", Journal

of Peace Research, Vol. 6, 1968; also by the same author, "A Structural Theory of Aggression", Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 11, 1964.

20. This is largely the Hobbesian view of violence which finds support in the works of some modern theorists. Cf. Gregory B. Markus and Betty A. Nesvold, "Governmental Coerciveness and Political Instability", Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2, July 1972.
21. Cf. Tilly, "Collective Violence in European Perspective", in Feierabend, et. al. (eds) op. cit., p 342.
22. Cf. Feierabend et. al. (eds) op. cit.; (articles by Gurr, Nesvold, and Bwy)
23. Cf. Galtung, "Violence, Peace and Peace Research", op. cit.; E. V. Walter, "Power and Violence", The American Political Science Review, Vol. LXIII, No. 2, June 1964.
24. Cf. David Snyder and Charles Tilly, "Hardship and Collective Violence in France, 1830-1960", American Sociological Review, Vol. 37 #5, Oct. 1972; also Peter K. Eisinger, "The Conditions of Protest Behaviour in American Cities", The American Political Science Review, Vol. LXVII, No. 1, May 1973.
25. Cf. Raymond Tanter, op. cit., R. J. Rummel, op. cit., Nesvold, op. cit.
26. Cf. Rummel op. cit.; Tanter, op. cit.
27. Cf. Charles Tilly and James Rule, Measuring Political Upheaval, New Jersey, 1965, p 4.
28. Galtung, "Violence, Peace and Peace Research", op. cit., p 169.
29. Chalmers Johnson, op. cit., p 9.
30. Cf. Snyder and Tilly, op. cit.; also Eisinger,

op. cit.

31. Cf. Gufr, op. cit., Feierabend, op. cit.
32. Frantz Fanon, op. cit.; Georges Sorel, op. cit.
33. Galtung, "Violence, Peace and Peace Research", op. cit.
34. Cf. Charles Tilly, "Revolutions and Collective Violence", unpublished working paper CRSO No. 83, to appear in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, Handbook of Political Science, (Reading, Mass); p 35 ff.
35. Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behaviour, New York, 1962, p 227 ff.
36. Chalmers Johnson, op. cit.; p 106.
37. Har... stein op. cit.; p 27 ff.
38. Whereas Rummel and Tanter, for example, contend that there exists a close relationship among the several factors which characterize political violence, Charles Tilly on the other hand, contends that probably the only factor common to these incidents is the fact that the authorities disapprove of them. Cf. Rummel and Tanter, op. cit.; David Snyder and Charles Tilly, "Hardship and Collective Violence", op. cit., p 520.
39. Alasdair MacIntyre, "Ideology, Social Science and Revolution", Comparative Politics, Vol. 5, No. 3, April 1973, p 340.
40. Cf. Sheldon S. Wolin, "The Politics of the Study of Revolution", Comparative Politics, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1973, p 349.
41. Ibid, p 352.
42. Ibid, p 347.
43. V. Walter, "Power and Violence", op. cit., p 354.

44. H. L. Nieburg, "Violence, Law, and the Informal Polity", in Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. XII, No. 2, June 1969, p 192.
45. H. L. Nieburg, Political Violence, New York, 1969, p 13.
46. Edward N. Muller, op. cit., p 928.
47. Cf. Carl Leiden and Karl M. Schmitt, The Politics of Violence: Revolution in the Modern World, New Jersey, 1968, p 19.
48. This classification is to be found in Feierabend, et. al. (eds) op. cit., p 412.
49. Such theorists include, Douglas Bwy, op. cit.; Feierabend op. cit.; Gurr, op. cit.
50. Cf. I. K. Feierabend and Rosalind L. Feierabend op. cit.; "Systemic Conditions of Political Aggression": also Markus and Nesvold, op. cit.
51. Douglas Bwy, op. cit.
52. Cf. Tilly and Rule, op. cit. p 33.
53. Lewis F. Richardson, Statistics of Deadly Quarrels, Chicago, 1960.
54. Betty A. Nesvold, "Scalogram Analysis of Political Violence", Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2, July 1969.
55. Edward Muller, "A Test of a Partial Theory of Potential for Political Violence", The American Political Science Review, Vol. LXVI, No. 2, Sept. 1972.
56. Cf. Aristide R. Zolberg, "The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Tropical Africa", The American Political Science Review, Vol. LXII, No. 1, March 1968.
57. Douglas Bwy, op. cit., p 240.

58. For example during 1962 the Civil Service of Guyana struck against the increased taxation imposed by the government through what is now famously known as the "Kaldor Budget". Soon the strike spread to a general shut down of work throughout the country and demands were made for the resignation or the express overthrow of the governing regime. Similarly, a series of strikes during the 1970's for improved conditions of work and increased pay reflected mainly the desire to give political recognition to some trade union movements. Cf. Cheddi Jagan, The West on Trial, op. cit.; Philip Reno, The Ordeal of British Guiana, New York, 1964; p 35 ff.

59. It is noteworthy that Eugene Kamenka draws a sharp distinction between Rebellion and Revolution, attributing to the former a somewhat reactionary or conservative character. He writes: "Part of the difference between a revolutionary uprising and a rebellion is the difference in the beliefs and expectations of those involved; rebels seek the redress of grievances, they return to the former state of comparative justice and prosperity....." "Revolutionaries, on the other hand, have great expectations; they think in terms of a new order of progress, of changing times that need changing systems of government...." Eugene Kamenka, "The Concept of Political Revolution", in Carl J. Friedrich (ed) Revolution Nomos VIII, New York, 1966, p 129.

60. C.R. = 1 - inconsistent Responses

Total Responses

Cf. Hayward R. Alker, Jr. Mathematics and Politics, New York, 1965, pp 24-26. For the Guyana data responses were coded along a trichotomized scheme involving Low, Medium and High levels of political violence as follows:

LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH
1 - 2	3 - 5	6 - 8
Anti-govt. Demonstrations	Police Riot	Guerrilla War
Major Strikes	Major Govt. Crises	Revolution

Of the 160 responses from the 20 students, the following represent the breakdown in terms of consistent and inconsistent responses.

Events	Number of Consistent Responses	Number of Inconsistent Responses	Total Responses
Anti-govt. Demonstr.	5	4	20
Major Strikes	14	6	20
Purge	15	4	20
Riot	16	4	20
Major Govt. Crisis	15	2	20
Guerilla Warfare	13	7	20
Rebellion	17	3	20
Revolution	20	0	20
Total	130	30	160

Although C.R. with respect to the Guyana responses is not significantly high (.82), the relatively close correspondence of these rankings to the Nesvold scale (Figure III) would seem to make the Guyana rankings appropriate for the evaluation of the "more or less" extremes of political violence. Since also the focus of the analysis in this study is based mainly on the frequency of events rather than the comparison of extremes of particular events within a given period or system, the gravity of possible errors would consequently be minimized.

Chapter III: The Guyana Political System in Historical Perspective

1. The population of the entire South American continent is given as 147, 090, 533; that of Brazil is 70, 967, 185 while Venezuela's population is 7, 523, 990. However, in contrast to the British West Indian islands, Guyana is relatively large. Britannica World Atlas, Chicago, 1938, p 189.
2. Allan Young, The Approaches to Local Self Government in British Guiana, Bristol, 1958, p 3.
3. Ibid.

4. R. T. Smith also contends that the traditional attachment to colour-based statuses in Guyana is gradually being broken down today. R. T. Smith, op. cit., p 101.
5. Cecil Clementi, A Constitutional History of British Guiana, London, 1937, p 22.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid, p 21.
8. Ibid.
9. Clementi, op. cit., p 68.
10. James A. Rodway, History of British Guiana, Vol. I, Georgetown, 1891, p 58.
11. Ibid, p 53.
12. Ibid, p 59.
13. R. T. Smith, op. cit., p 26.
14. Feierabend et. al. (eds) op. cit., p 154 ff. See also Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, New Haven, 1971, p 3.
15. Rodway, Vol. I, op. cit., p 174; Vol. II, p 173.
16. H. V. P. Bronkhorst, British Guiana and its Labouring Population, London, 1883, p 88.
17. Rodway, Vol. II, op. cit., p 22.
18. Ibid.
19. Rodway, Vol. I, op. cit., p 225.
20. Rodway, Vol. II, op. cit., p 198.
21. Ibid. p 77.
22. Ibid. p 78.

23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Allan Young, op. cit., p 9 ff.
26. Allan H. Adamson; Sugar Without Slaves, New Haven, 1972, pp 47, 48 ff.; Dwarka Nath, A History of the Indians in Guyana, London, 1950, p 41. Peter Ruhuman, Centenary History of the East Indians in British Guiana, Georgetown, 1946, p 37 ff. R. T. Smith, op. cit., p 43. Cf. Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Enquire Into The Treatment of Immigrants in British Guiana, HMSO, 1871.
27. R. T. Smith, op. cit., pp 42, 43 ff.
28. Ibid. p 38 ff.
29. Ibid. p 42.
30. Annual Report of British Guiana, HMSO, 1892, 1894; also R. T. Smith, op. cit., p 52.
31. R. T. Smith, op. cit., p 165.
32. Ibid. p 54.
33. Ibid. p 165.
34. Cf. The West Indies and Caribbean Yearbook, 1946-1947, p 429; Annual Report of British Guiana, HMSO, 1947, p 3.
35. The West Indies and Caribbean Yearbook, 1946-47, p 429.
36. The West Indies and Caribbean Yearbook, 1947-48, p 431.
37. The West Indies and Caribbean Yearbook, 1953-54, p 10.
38. By 1953 about half of the Amerindian population

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was still illiterate in the sense defined by the British (i.e. ability to read and speak the English language).

39. See Francis X. Mark, op. cit., p 223 ff.
40. Ralph R. Premdas, Voluntary Associations and Political Parties in a Racially Fragmented State: The Case of Guyana, University of Guyana, Occasional Papers, No. 2, Feb. 1972, p 5.
41. Ibid. p 17.
42. A conscious policy of protest was adopted by Jagan. See Cheddi Jagan, op. cit., p 73 and passim.
43. The suspension of the constitution was recommended by the then Governor of British Guiana, and later adopted by the British Government and a suspension order imposed soon after the assumption of power by the P.P.P. in 1953. See British Guiana: Suspension of the Constitution, 1953; Cf. Report of the British Guiana Constitutional Commission, HMSO, Sept. 1954.

Chapter IV: Political Violence During The Pre-Modern Era

1. The date 23rd February, being the date in 1763 when the Berbice slaves revolted, is now celebrated in Guyana as Republic Day. The date was chosen for national commemoration in memory of this slave insurrection, and the hero of the Berbice slave uprising, Cuffy, is adopted today as a national hero.
2. A community of run-away slaves (-quilombo) was founded in Os Palmares in Brazil as early as the year 1630. Organized efforts were made by the Dutch administration of Brazil to destroy Palmares in 1644 and 1645. These attempts failed. Following the Dutch, the Portuguese administration of

Brazil made no less than fourteen attempts against the "Republic" of Palmares which was headed first by King Ganga-Zumba and later by Zumbi. Palmares was finally destroyed by the Portuguese in 1697, but the inhabitants in a last act of defiance were said to have committed mass suicide rather than surrendering to the Portuguese Troops. See I. Diggs, "Zumbi and the Republic of Palmares", Phylon, March, 1953, pp 62-70.

3. An example of the defiance of the slave even in the face of execution is revealed in the following passage: "(the) most painful punishments which were inflicted on the rebel leaders displayed an ingenuity of cruelty and shows that in this respect the administration of criminal justice in 1764, since the terrible execution of Balthazar Gerards (almost two centuries before) had not become much milder ... Not Atta alone, who was tortured for some hours - (by means of roasting over slow fire), but almost all the other negroes without a scream or groan, suffered their punishment with courage and steadfastness, and really showed more dignity than some of the white spectators flocking to the execution". P. M. Netscher, History of the Colonies, Essequibo, Demerary and Berbice: From The Dutch Establishment to the Present Day, Translated by W. E. Roth, Georgetown, 1888.
4. Ibid. p 93.
5. Ibid. p 97.
6. Rodway, Vol. II, op. cit., p 237.
7. Ibid. p 248.
8. One possible exception was the event of 1795 when a riotous mob of white planters advanced to Stabroek, the city, paraded up and down Brickdam shouting "Liberty, Fraternity and Equality". An attempt was also made to rouse the negro slaves against the Dutch administration but this did not

succeed. Cf. Rodway, Vol. II, op. cit., p 77.

9. Popular demand for significant changes in social and political relations came only at about the end of the slavery period as a result of pressures from the Anti-Slavery Society with the aid of a few individual missionary priests. But by and large the bulk of the local planters were opposed to legislation against the slave system. Cf. Clementi, op. cit., p 101 ff.
10. It is to be noted however that most slave rebellions involved some form of guerilla warfare especially from the point of view of tactics. Organization had to be underground, and often slave insurgents operated from a concealed and difficult forested terrain. The Berbice revolution in part utilized this tactic although at the same time there was open confrontation between government and slave troops. Cf. Netscher, op. cit., passim. Rodway, op. cit., passim; Weber, op. cit., passim.
11. The observed low level of participation in slave uprisings might indeed be misleading since the total population of the colony, or region, was itself usually small. At the same time it would be difficult to arrive at a true estimate of slave participation rate since a large faction of support for political violence had necessarily to remain under cover for the very reason of survival. Each uprising was usually accompanied by a large proportion of run-away or hiding operations the extent of which usually remains unknown. Cf. Bronkhurst, op. cit., p 84; also Rodway, op. cit., p 225 and passim; Weber, Centenary History and Handbook of British Guiana, London, 1937, p 70 and passim.
12. See Rodway, Vol. II, op. cit., p 234.
13. Cf. Rodway, Vol. I, op. cit., p 206; Vol. II, p 288.
14. A negro corps, separate from an Indian corps,

was formed in 1795 with a view to capturing run-away slaves. It was also used in the suppression of a slave insurrection of that year. Usually the government made recruitment into both Indian and Negro corps sufficiently attractive to ensure the loyalty of the troops. Indians, for example, would be remunerated and slaves promised freedom after each expedition. See Rodway, Vol. II, op. cit., p 78.

15. Rodway, Vol. III, op. cit., p 118.
16. A. F. R. Weber, op. cit., p 301.
17. Ibid. p. 303.
18. Rodway, Vol. III, op. cit., pp 193, 194.
19. Ibid., p 197.
20. Both the Angel Gabriel Riots, 1856, and the attack of a riotous mob upon Governor Wedderburn in 1857 are examples of relatively spontaneous events reflecting emotional responses to temporary interests. Some major riots, for example, one in New Amsterdam in 1847 and another in Georgetown in 1889, were started as a result of false rumours but quickly spread. Cf. Rodway, Vol. III, op. cit.; pp 113, 114, 131; Weber, op. cit., p 301 ff.
21. See R. T. Smith, op. cit., p 165.
22. Cf. Jagan, The West on Trial, op. cit., p 64.
23. F. X. Mark, op. cit., p 223.
24. Ibid., p 226.
25. Cf. Ashton Chase, A History of Trade Unionism in Guyana, 1900-1961, Georgetown, 1964, p 46 and *passim*.

26. It is quite probable that the absolute increase in population over the four periods of this study can affect the relative increase in the participation rate in political violence events as one progresses from the Slavery to the Modern period. But it is believed that population growth alone is not sufficient to affect the variations in the volume of political violence at the higher participation levels. The following table reflects a comparison between population growth and volume of political violence events in the category of "1,000 or more" participants for various periods:

PERIODS	POPULATION (Average)	PARTICIPATION RATE above 1000 (% Events)
SLAVERY	4,000	14
IMMIGRATION	250,000	32
TRANSITION	300,000	24
MODERN	500,000	40

Although on observation there seems to be a close correlation between population growth and violence participation rate, it is certainly not a perfect one, as is to be expected if increase in population always produced increased participation rates. The fact for example that the Transition period witnessed a marked decrease in violence participation rate over the Immigration period while the former had a higher population increase has to be explained by factors other than population increase. Such explanation is believed to be rooted in the nature of organised political activity relative to each period. During the Immigration period political protest was centred almost exclusively in the rural plantation where the labour population was usually large. With the coming of the Transition period the more organised protest movements emerged in the form of trade unions, but the center of operation this time was shifted to the urban areas among such small labour population as water-front workers and small tradesmen. A simple illustration of the insufficiency of the population variable and the

461. b

strategic importance of the organisational variable is in order. In 1954 for example, at Whim, a rural village containing about 1,500 people at the time, a P.P.P. sponsored demonstration involved about 800 people in protest against the trial of P.P.P. supporters at the Whim Magistrates Court. (Thunder, May 8, 1954; p. 1). In 1949, a postmen's strike called in the city of Georgetown containing over 100,000 people at a time when the postal workers were relatively unorganised involved only 40 postmen. (Chronicle, June 21st, 1949). Examples of this type of discrepancy between the more popular organised involvement and the less popular unorganised involvement in spite of the relative increase in population, are numerous especially within the Modern period.

Chapter V: Political Violence During The Modern Period

1. Cf. Jagan, The West on Trial, op. cit., p 73.
2. On 16th June, 1948, police fired on a crowd of strikers at Enmore resulting in 5 persons killed and 14 injured. Colonial Annual Report, 1948, p 5; see also, Report of the Enmore Enquiry Commission, Georgetown, 1948.
3. Cf. Report of the British Guiana Constitutional Commission, op. cit., Ashton Chase, 133 Days Towards Freedom in Guiana, Georgetown, 1954.
4. The interim government was comprised largely of independent individuals and members of the parties which ran in opposition to the P.P.P. at the 1953 elections. Many of these individuals received very little electoral support in 1953.
5. The state of emergency in Guyana lasted for several months and British troops remained in the country for more than a year.
6. For an inside account of the split in the P.P.P. in 1955 see Jagan, The West on Trial, op. cit., p 161 ff. Also R. T. Smith, op. cit., p 179; Moreley Ayearst, The British West Indies, London, 1962, p 126; Leo Despres, op. cit., p 210 ff.
7. Cf. H. L. Payne, A History of The People's National Congress, mimeo, 1973; also Forbes Burnham, A Destiny to Mould, London, 1970, p 3.
8. The rate of turn out at the polls in the 1957 general elections was only 56% of the total voting population. This election reflects the lowest turnout at the polls for the six elections between 1947 and 1968 inclusive. See Report on The General Elections: British Guiana, 1957.
9. Jagan described this period of the P.P.P. regime as being "in office but not in power", see Jagan, op. cit., p 188.

10. See "Out Goes Beharry, Bowman to quit too", Graphic, Sunday May 10th, 1959, p 1; also "P.P.P. Cabinet Crisis", Graphic, Tuesday, May 12th, 1959.
11. See Report of a Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances in British Guiana in February, 1962, HMSO, 1962; also Philip Reno, The Ordeal of British Guiana, New York, 1964, p 35 ff.
12. Report of a Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances in British Guiana in February 1962, op. cit.
13. It is claimed that the cry of "apanjaht", meaning "vote for your own kind", was introduced as a campaign slogan by the East Indian supporters of the P.P.P. during the 1961 elections. The effect was to further the racial patterns of voting among both the P.P.P. and P.N.C. camps. See Leo A. Despres, Cultural Pluralism and Nationalist Politics in British Guiana, Chicago, 1967, pp 228, 229.
14. A secret plan, called X-13 outlining guerilla strategy against the P.P.P. regime was discovered by the Police at the headquarters of the P.N.C., the major opposition party. For a description of this plan as well as reports of other guerilla type of activities, see Mirror, May 6th, 1963; also Mirror, May 5th, 1963.
15. The ferocity of the debate on this Labour Relations Bill could be assessed from the following documents: (a) The Parliamentary Debates: Official Report, Vol. 2, 31st sitting Thursday April 18th, 19th, 1963. (b) Labour Relations Bill, 1963, Read and Judge for Yourself, This is the Bill, pamphlet issued by the P.P.P. See also Jagan op. cit., p 222 ff.
16. See Report of the British Guiana Commission of Inquiry (I.C.J.) Racial Problems in the Public Service, Geneva, Oct. 1965, p 29.

17. Ibid.,
18. "Deputy premier, GAWU president among 26 from P.P.P. imprisoned", Mirror, June 14th 1964.
19. The percentage turn out at the 1964 polls was 97% of the voting population. Cf. Report on the General Elections, British Guiana, 1964.
20. For an inside description of the Rupununi Uprising, see Supt. John Campbell, "Operation Secede", Guyana Police Force Magazine, p 21 ff. Also, "Amerindian Flight in Guyana", New Statesman, March 28th, 1969, p 434.
21. Cf. P. A. Reid, Address at Special Peoples' National Congress, mimeo, 3rd Sept. 1968, p 5.
22. "Three members of the U.F. (ministers) dismissed from the Cabinet", Graphic, Thursday, October 24th, 1968.
23. It is noteworthy that the Amerindian Uprising in 1969 closely resembles the nature of slave uprisings in terms of its extremity, its suddenness or spontaneity and the relatively small numbers involved. The fact also that at one stage of the Berbice rebellion the rebels claimed to have a separate state made secession a common factor between the 1763 and the 1969 uprising.
24. Cf. Harry Eckstein, "On the Etiology of Internal Wars", in Ivo K. Feierabend et. al. (eds) Anger, Violence and Politics, op. cit., p 10.
25. For a lengthy discussion of the 80-day general strike, see Jagan, op. cit., p 222 ff; Also Philip Reno, The Ordeal of British Guiana, op. cit., p 52.
26. Guarantees of "fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual" including "freedom of conscience, of expression and of assembly and association" are enshrined in the Guyana Constitution. These guarantees however are an expression of the political liberties Guyanese

have been enjoying since 1947. Cf. The Constitution of Guyana, Georgetown 1965.

27. Cf. Richard Hyman, Strikes, London, 1972, pp 75, 76.

Chapter VI: The Organizational Dimension

1. See Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge, Mass., 1965; p 5. Kenneth Boulding, Conflict and Defense, New York, 1962, p 145 ff. p 146. Leo A. Despres, Cultural Pluralism and Nationalist Politics in British Guiana, Chicago, 1967, p 28.
2. Boulding, op. cit., p 145.
3. Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of The Earth, Middlesex, 1963, p 52.
4. Douglas Bwy, "Political Instability in Latin America", in Feierabend et. al. (eds) op. cit., p 230.
5. Since 1973 trade unions are again becoming closely allied to one or other of the two major political parties in Guyana.
6. Cf. Cheddi Jagan, The West on Trial, op. cit., p 127.
7. Report of the Enmore Enquiry Commission, Georgetown, 1948, pp 9, 40.
8. Ibid., p 41.
9. Ibid.,
10. Report of the British Guiana Constitutional Commission, HMSO, 1954, p24.
11. Ibid.

12. Ibid., p 33.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., p 61.
15. Ibid., p 64.
16. Ibid., p 84.
17. Ibid., p 74.
18. Cf. R. T. Smith, British Guiana, op. cit., p 175 ff.
19. Leo Despres, op. cit., p 241.
20. Ibid., p 243.
21. Ibid.
22. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances in British Guiana in February 1962, HMSO, 1962, pp 17, 18.
23. Ibid., p 25.
24. Ibid., p 27.
25. Ibid., p 28.
26. Jagan, op. cit., p 231.
27. Ibid., p 233.
28. Ibid., p 232.
29. P.P.P. Pamphlet, "Dr. Jagan Answers Colonial Secretary's Allegations in the Tribune (London)", 1965, p 4.
30. Jagan, op. cit., p 311.
31. New York Times, January 4th, 1969.

32. Enmore Commission Report, op. cit., p 28.
33. Ibid., p 39.
34. Ibid., p 42.
35. Ibid., pp 37, 38.
36. Constitutional Commission Report, 1954, op. cit., p 60.
37. Ibid., p 22.
38. Report Commission of Inquiry Disturbances 1962, op. cit., p 23.
39. Ibid., p 24.
40. Jagan, op. cit., p 231.
41. Ibid., 223.
42. Enmore Commission Report, op. cit., p 27.
43. Guyana Graphic, May 10th, 1964.
44. Report Commissioner of Inquiry Disturbances 1962, op. cit., p 33.
45. Ibid., p 32.
46. Thunder, Feb. 10th, 1962.
47. Report, Commissioner of Inquiry Disturbances 1962, p 35.
48. Ibid., p 15.
49. Jagan, op. cit., p 228.
50. Ibid., p 229.
51. What is meant here is that involvement of the external military forces in local disturbances during the pre-modern period did not seem to

range beyond the express fact of suppressing an uprising. There were usually no political designs (or desire for political changes) on the part of these authorities responsible for the military intervention.

52. Philip Reno, op. cit., p 50.
53. Ibid., p 52.
54. Jagan, op. cit., p 251.
55. Ibid., p 249.
56. U. S. News and World Report, June 15, 1964, pp 60-61.
57. New York Times, January 4th, 1969.

Chapter VII: Socio-economic Modernization, Social Change and Political Violence

1. See Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven, 1968, pp 33, 34 and passim. Also by the same author, "Political Development and Political Decay", World Politics, Vol. 3, 1964, p 388; also David Apter, The Politics of Modernization, Chicago, 1965.
2. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, op. cit., p 32; Karl Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development", op. cit., p 495; D. G. Morrison and H. M. Stephenson, "Cultural Pluralism, Modernization and Conflict: An Empirical Analysis of Sources of Political Instability in African Nations", in Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. V, No. 1, March 1972, p 38.
3. Cf. Deutsch, op. cit., p 493.
4. S. N. Eisenstadt, Modernization, Protest and Change, New Jersey, 1966, p 22; Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, op. cit.

p. 5; cf. also Morrison and Stephenson,
op. cit., p 90.

5. Cf. Charles Tilly, "Does Modernization Breed Revolution?", Comparative Politics, April, 1973, p 425; William H. Flanigan and Edwin Fogelman, "Patterns of Political Violence in Comparative Historical Perspective", in Comparative Politics, Vol. 3, No. 1, October 1970, p 12.
6. Douglas Hibbs, Mass Political Violence, New York, 1973, p 22.
7. Cf. Claude Ake, "Modernization and Political Instability: A Theoretical Exploration", World Politics, Vol. XXVI, No. 4, July 1974, p 353.
8. See Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behaviour, New York, 1962, p 55; also, Lucian Pye, Aspects of Political Development, Boston, 1966, p 47; Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay", op. cit., p 386.
9. Eisenstadt, op. cit., p 22.
10. Ibid., p 31.
11. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, op. cit., p 45.
12. Flanigan and Fogelman, op. cit., p 12.
13. Ibid., p 14.
14. Ernest A. Duff and John F. McCamant, "Measuring Social and Political Requirements for System Stability in Latin America", American Political Science Review, December, 1968, p 1126.
15. Morrison and Stephenson, op. cit., p 100.
16. Ibid.

17. Hibbs, op. cit., p 22.
18. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, op. cit., p 41.
19. Ake, op. cit., p 353.
20. Duff and McCamant; op. cit., p 1127.
21. Hibbs, op. cit., p 24.
22. Ibid., p 22.
23. Cf. Sebastian de Grazia, The Political Community: A Study of Anomie, Chicago, 1948.
24. Cf. Douglas Hibbs, op. cit., p 22.
25. See Ivo K. Feierabend and Rosalind L. Feierabend, "Systemic Conditions of Political Aggression in Feierabend et. al. (eds) op. cit."; Ted Robert Gurr, "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence", in Feierabend et al. (eds) op. cit.; James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution", op. cit.
26. R. T. Smith, British Guiana, London, 1962, p 59.
27. George Beckford, Persistent Poverty, New York, 1972, pp 13, 22.
28. R. T. Smith, op. cit., p 68.
29. Ivor Oxaal, Report of the Demba Panel of Consultants on Community Attitudes and their Effect on Industrial Relations, Georgetown, 1966, p 76.
30. Hibbs, op. cit., p 31.
31. William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society, New York, 1959, p 75.
32. Gurr, op. cit., p 37. Feierabend and Feierabend op. cit., p 137.
33. Oxaal, op. cit., p 8.

34. Data on newspaper circulation for the different years since 1947 are so far unavailable in Guyana.
35. R. T. Smith, op. cit., p 145.
36. Leo Despres, op. cit., p 131.
37. M. K. Bacchus, Education and Socio-Cultural Integration in a "Plural" Society, Montreal, 1970, p 2.
38. Ibid.
39. Despres, op. cit., p 126.
40. Cheddi Jagan, op. cit., pp 113, 114.
41. Ibid.
42. Cf. Despres, op. cit., p 126.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid., p 132.
45. Ibid., p 133.
46. Ibid., p 132.
47. Jagan, op. cit., p 112.
48. P. A. Reid, Address at Special People's National Congress on Sunday 3rd November, 1978, p 7.
49. Despres, op. cit., p 31.

Chapter VIII: Regime Resistance to Political Violence

1. Both Easton and Parsons argue that the main function of political systems is to maintain social order. Easton's Analysis of Political Systems, New York, 1965.

Talcott Parsons, The Social System, New York, 1964.

2. Cf. Markus and Nesvold, op. cit., p 236; see also Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr. op. cit., pp 82, 83.
3. Cf. Boulding, op. cit., p 323.
4. Markus and Nesvold, op. cit., p 236.
5. Brian Chapman, Police State, London, 1970, p 87; See also Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behaviour, New York, 1962, pp 262, 265.
6. Aristide R. Zolberg, "The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Tropical Africa", The American Political Science Review, Vol. LXII, No. 1, March 1968, p77.
7. Lucian Pye, "The Roots of Insurgency and the Commencement of Rebellions", in Harry Eckstein, (ed) Internal War, New York, 1964, pp 169, 172.
8. Markus and Nesvold, op. cit., p 237.
9. One of the advantages of differentiating between the various types of regime responses is that such differentiation facilitates comparative analysis both in terms of the nature and preference of the different regimes and the varying impact of different types of responses.
10. Boulding, op. cit.; K. J. Holsti, "Resolving International Conflicts", in Louis Kriesberg, op. cit.; see also E. V. Walter, Terror and Resistance, New York, 1969, p 26.
11. It should be emphasized that Figure VIII (p 288) reflects basically intuitive judgement in the differentiation of the various types of regime responses.
12. Cf. Parsons, "Some Reflections on the Place of Force ... " op. cit., p 39.

13. Cf. James Rodway, Vol. II, op. cit., p 22.
14. Cf. Netscher, op. cit., p 111.
15. A. F. R. Weber, op. cit., p 281.
16. Rodway, Vol. III, op. cit., p 201.
17. Weber, op. cit., p 261.
18. R. T. Smith, op. cit., p 39.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ashton Chase, A History of Trade Unionism, op. cit.
22. Ibid., p 33.
23. Ibid., p 45.
24. Leonora Enquiry Commission Report, 1939.
25. Chase, A History of Trade Unionism, op. cit., p 89.
26. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances in British Guiana, February, 1962, p 77.
27. Cf. R. T. Smith, op. cit.; also Report of the British Guiana Constitutional Commission, 1954.
28. Report of Commission of Inquiry, 1962, op. cit., p 78.
29. Guyana Graphic, Sunday, June 14th, 1964.
30. The assumption that the differentiation of responses represents a scale from low to high between consensual and coercive responses is necessary for the applicability of Chi-square tests.

31. Report of Commission of Inquiry, 1962, op. cit., p 78.
32. Supt. John Campbell, op. cit., p 39.
33. Dependence on foreign auxiliaries during periods of popular disturbances in Guyana goes back in time and predates the Modern period. During the Immigration and Transition periods in particular, the West Indian Royal Regiment stationed in Barbados was often used to augment local forces in face of disturbances.
34. P. M. Netscher, op. cit., p 88.
35. Ibid., p 95.
36. Rodway Vol. III, op. cit., p 113.
37. Report of Commission of Inquiry, 1962, op. cit., p 57.
38. Campbell, op. cit.
39. Markus and Nesvold, op. cit., p 236.
40. Colonial Annual Report of British Guiana, 1954,
41. Ibid.
42. Annual Report of the Commissioner of Police, 1962.
43. Green Beret, No. 1, Dec. 1970, p 2.
44. For details of Enmore Riots see Report of the Enmore Enquiry Commission, Georgetown, 1948.
45. W. A. Orett, The History of British Guiana Police, Georgetown, 1951.
46. Cf. Rodway, Vol. I, op. cit., p 256.
47. Cf. Orett, op. cit., p 11.
48. Cf. Report: Racial Problems in Public Service, 1965,

op. cit.

49. "Resignation of Minister of Home Affairs", The Parliamentary Debates: Official Report, Vol. 3, 1st June, 1964.

50. Ibid., p 199.

Chapter IX: Political Violence and Ethnic Polarization.

1. G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Social Fragmentation and Political Hostility: An Austrian Case Study, Stanford U.P., 1970, p 29.
2. Cf. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, op. cit., p 415.
3. Powell, op. cit., p 1; also Fred Riggs, Public Administration in Developing Countries, op. cit.
4. Cf. J. S. Furnivall; op. cit., p 304. Also M. G. Smith, op. cit., p 763.
5. M. G. Smith, op. cit., p 772.
6. Despres, op. cit., p 177.
7. J. E. Greene, op. cit., p 257.
8. Pierre L. Van den Berghe, "Ethnicity: The African Experience", in International Social Science Journal, Vol. XXIII, No. 4, 1971, p 514. D. G. Morrison and H. M. Stephenson, "Cultural Pluralism, Modernization and Conflict", Canadian Journal of Politics, Vol. V, No. 1, March, 1972, p 103; M. G. Smith, op. cit., p 772.
9. Leo Kuper, "Political Change in Plural Societies: Problems in Racial Pluralism", in International Social Science Journal, Vol. XXIII, No. 4, 1971, pp 603, 604; Robert H. Bates, "Ethnic Competition and Modernization in Contemporary Africa", in

Comparative Political Studies, 1. 6, No. 4, January, 1974, p 470. Charles Anderson et. al., op. cit., p 65.

10. Cf. Despres, op. cit., p 28.
11. Ibid., p 27.
12. James Rodway, Vol III, op. cit., p 114 ff.
13. Rodway, op. cit., Vol. III, p 268; A. F. R. Weber, op. cit., pp 301 ff., 329.
14. Rodway, op. cit., Vol. III, pp 144, 145.
15. Ibid., p 193.
16. Ibid., p 145.
17. Ibid.
18. Rodway, op. cit., Vol. I, p 243; also A. F. R. Weber, op. cit., p 125; P. M. Netscher, op. cit., p 100.
19. Rodway, op. cit., Vol. II, pp 77, 78.
20. Cf. Ashton Chase, A History of Trade Unionism, op. cit.; Francis X. Mark, op. cit., p 223.
21. Cf. Report of the British Guiana Constitutional Commission, 1954, op. cit.; see also Reno, op. cit., p 16.
22. Cf. Report of the British Guiana Constitutional Commission, 1954; also R. T. Smith, op. cit., pp 175, 176; also, People's Progressive Party - 21 years, Georgetown, 1974, pp 22-27.
23. Despres, op. cit., p 210.
24. R. T. Smith, op. cit., p 179.
25. Cf. Ralph Premdas, Voluntary Associations and

Political Parties in a Racially Fragmented State,
op. cit.; also Despres, op. cit., p 166 and passim.

26. See also Figure IX (p 217).
27. R. T. Smith, op. cit., p 179 ff; Cheddi Jagan, op. cit., p 173 ff.
28. R. T. Smith, op. cit., p 181.
29. Cf. Paul Singh, Guyana: Socialism in a Plural Society, Fabian Research Series, 307, p 13.
30. This process toward total polarization has also been aggravated by the cry of "apanjaht" (vote for your own kind) in elections after 1957. Cf. Despres, op. cit., p 228 ff.
31. Cf. Donald Horowitz, "Three Dimensions of Ethnic Politics", World Politics, Vol. XXIII, No. 2, January, 1971, p 238..
32. The Spearman's rank order test was facilitated by the assumption that the 1947 - 1950 sub-period represents the lowest degree of ethnic polarization compared to the other sub-periods during the Modern period.
33. Cf. Burnham, A Destiny to Mould, op. cit., p 39.
34. Report: Commission of Inquiry ... Disturbances February, 1962, op. cit., p 60.
35. Cf. Philip Reno, op. cit., p 52; Cheddi Jagan, op. cit., p 222.
36. Jagan, op. cit., p 305.
37. Newsweek, July 15th, 1963.
38. Report of the National Rehabilitation Committee, Georgetown, Sept. 1965, pp 5, 6.
39. Ibid., pp 8, 9.

40. Mirror, June 14th, 1963.
41. Senator Janet Jagan's address to the senate 1st June, 1964, Parliamentary Debates, Official Report, Vol. 3, 13th sitting, 1.6.64., p 228.
42. Guyana Graphic, Monday, April 20th, 1964.
43. Guyana Graphic, Wednesday, May, 27th, 1964.
44. Janet Jagan, op. cit., p 228.
45. Guyana Graphic, May, 28th, 1964.
46. Guyana Graphic, July 7th, 8th, 1964.
47. Guyana Graphic, July 12th, 1964.

Chapter X: Relevance For Theory

1. C. J. Friedrich, Revolution (Nomos VIII), op. cit., p 4.
2. K. Bahadoorsingh, Trinidad Electoral Politics: The Persistence of the Race Factor. London, 1968, pp 13-17.
3. Deadline Data on World Affairs, 1970, pp 4-5 ff.
4. Ibid., April 21st, 1970.
5. N. Snider, "What Happened In Penang?" Asian Survey, December 1968, pp 960-961 ff.
6. Ibid.
7. H. Shepherd, "Malaya: Twelve Years of Independence", Contemporary Review, Vol. 215, Aug. 1969, p 62.
8. Cf. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, op. cit., p 194.
9. Cf. Charles E. Merriam, Political Power, New York 1964, p 31.

10. Cf. Donald L. Horowitz, "Three dimensions of Ethnic Politics", World Politics, Vol. XXIII, No. 2, January 1971, p 235.
11. Cf. Hubert M. Blalock, Toward a Theory of Minority Group Relations, op. cit., p 148.
12. "Three Races in Search of a Nation", Economist, July 26th, 1969, pp 31, 32.
13. Cf. Almond and Powell, op. cit., p 34.
14. See Janet Jagan, Army Intervention in The 1973 Elections in Guyana, Georgetown, 1973. p 1.
15. Although official figures on the 1973 elections are not yet available to the public, a general tendency for the percentage of voting to decline relative to that of the three previous elections was observed.
16. Blalock, Toward a Theory of Minority Group Relations, op. cit., pp 148, 179, 189, 199.
17. Boulding, op. cit., p 26.
18. Lucian Pye, op. cit.; Fred Riggs, "The Dialectics of Developmental Conflict", Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, July 1968.
19. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay", op. cit.
20. Cf. Furnivall, op. cit., p 304; M. G. Smith, op. cit., p 763.
21. This argument does not necessarily support a case for the federal type of political system as opposed to a strongly unitary one. Rather it advocates a system which combines both elements.
22. Leo Despres, op. cit., p 121 ff.

Chapter XI: Conclusion

1. See Talcott Parsons, The Social System, New York, 1951, p33 and passim; Gabriel A. Almond, and G. Bingham Powell Jr., op. cit., pp 14, 29 and passim.
2. William H. Dray, Philosophy of History, Englewood Cliffs, 1964, p 44.
3. Boulding, op. cit., p 169.
4. Beckford, op. cit., p XXII.
5. Cf. Gabriel A. Almond and Sydney Verba, The Civic Culture, Princeton, 1963.
6. Cf. Mark N. Cooper, "A Reinterpretation of the Cause of Turmoil. The Effect of Culture and Modernity", Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 7, No. 3, Oct. 1974, pp 267-291.
7. Joseph Scolnic Jr. "An Appraisal of Studies of The Linkage Between Domestic and International Conflict", Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4, Jan. 1974, p 488.

Appendix A: Some Methodological Considerations

1. Scolnic, op. cit., p 488; also Charles Tilly, "Methods for The Study of Collective Violence", in Ralph W. Conant and Molly Apple Levin, (eds) Problems in Research on Community Violence, New York.
2. Cf. James S. Coleman, "Properties of Collectivities", in James S. Coleman, Amitai Etzioni, and John Porter, Macrosociology: Research and Theory, Boston, 1970, p 9.
3. Karl Deutsch, "External Involvement in Internal War", in Eckstein, Internal War, op. cit., p 105; Boulding, op. cit., pp 19-40.

4. Hubert M. Blalock Jr., Causal Inference in Non-experimental Research, Chapel Hill, 1964, pp 91-92; also by the same author, Theory Construction, Englewood Cliffs, 1969, pp 155-65; see also H. M. Blalock, Theory of Minority Group Relations, op. cit., p 91.
5. Cf. Tilly, "Collective Violence in European Perspective", in Feierabend et. al. (eds) op. cit., p 345.
6. Ibid.
7. Cf. Ted Robert Gurr, Politimetrics: An Introduction to Quantitative Macropolitics, Englewood Cliffs, 1972, p 87.

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