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FOR CLUB OR COUNTRY?
HOCKEY IN WARTIME CANADA, 1939-1945

By
Gabriel Stephen Panunto, B.A.
A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts
Department of History

Carleton University
Ottawa Ontario
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The undersigned recommend to the Faculty of Graduate

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

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ABSTRACT

Sports reflect the societies that support them, and hockey in Canada during World War Two is no exception. Popular hockey history has defined the era as one of great sacrifices by the National Hockey League, largely because academic research is non-existent. A closer examination reveals no great sacrifices in players or profit by NHL clubs. Most players who enlisted continued to play hockey on military teams, without seeing combat. This occurred with the tacit approval of the public, and with the help of the federal government's flexible manpower policies. While this flexibility allowed players to escape combat, it was a side effect of an effort to appease pro- and anti-conscription factions. Morale-boosting was the catch-all justification for the continuation of professional and military hockey, as it tied overseas servicemen to home and reminded civilians of a better, peaceful time. More than that, it was an "acceptable" form of distraction, as it encouraged social cohesion and promoted nationalism.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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And a Special Thanks to **Maurice Richard** (1921-2000), for showing that sports do transcend society - and for simply being 'The Rocket'.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION
HOCKEY AND WORLD WAR TWO

War came to Canada on September 10, 1939, a week after the outbreak of the Second World War in Europe. Many citizens immediately volunteered for military service; the realities of war, like rationing, soon became a regular part of life for Canadians. The National Hockey League, with 95% of its players Canadian citizens, managed to avoid the sting of war until the fall of 1941. That autumn, American-based NHL and minor-professional leagues faced problems – and public attention – for the first time due to Canadian players having trouble obtaining exit visas from Ottawa in order to work south of the border. In order to obtain these permits, the players had to first receive permission to leave the country from their respective branches of the Labour War Service Board. Since each province, along with Toronto and Montreal, had its own branch, a controversy broke out when a number of boards announced they would not grant permission for any hockey players to leave for the U.S. under any circumstances. Several hockey leaders worked to change these decisions, but to no avail. However, this did not cuase a mass exodus of players from the NHL, as most teams were still able to ice competitive clubs. The significance of the passport crisis, as it was dubbed, was that it put the issue of wartime hockey in the consciousness of the average Canadian for the first time.

After the 1941/42 season the NHL felt the first real attrition of players to the armed forces. Every team lost players, many of whom choose to volunteer for military service rather than be coerced into uniform under the National Resources Mobilization Act. Still, the NHL continued to carry on through the war at the behest of the federal government, because, according to league President Frank Calder, hockey was believed

to be essential to the morale of both citizens and troops. Clubs became increasingly dependant on militarily-exempt players to fill out their rosters. The three main groups considered for exemptions were those who fell outside the age limits of selective service, those who were deemed medically unfit for military service, and those who had essential jobs in war industries.

Some hockey promoters quickly tried to do their part in the war effort. Conn Smythe, Toronto Maple Leafs' owner, signed up and created his own military unit, the 'Sportsman's Battery.' Of the players who did enter military service, an overwhelming majority did not actively fight overseas. Furthermore, many players actually continued to play hockey, either domestically or overseas, for *military* teams. These military teams became so strong that one captured the Allan Cup in 1943, symbolic of the senior league championship of Canada. National attention returned to the issue of wartime hockey in 1944, centered around Maple Leafs goaltender Walter 'Turk' Broda. The all-star netminder was arrested en route to Montreal and accused of leaving his military base without permission in order to play for a Montreal-area military base. Soon after, all three branches of the military separately stated that military teams would no longer be eligible to play for the Allan Cup.

By the end of the war, not one front-line NHL player had been killed in defence of his country and only a handful of established NHLers saw frontline combat. The NHL thus emerged from the war in a condition of unprecedented stability and economic success. The hockey world, which included players and management in military, senior and professional leagues, emerged into a golden era with very little stigma attached to its wartime actions. To this day, any coverage of the wartime period in hockey history

uncritically accepts the NHL's assertion that hockey served as a morale booster and distraction for the public. This is, in part, due to the NHL's adherence to all manpower regulations, and a significant lack of sustained public criticism of professional players or leagues. While the world of professional hockey gained much and sacrificed little in the war effort, this merely reflected the legal and social expectations of wartime Canada. This thesis seeks to explain the reasons behind this phenomenon.

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CANADA: A NATION ON SKATES

> Hockey has the capacity to induce recollection of familiar experiences and to subtly connect this recollection to a seemingly less complicated image of Canadian society.[1]
>
> It is our game. It is our passion. It is the only sport that truly fills our souls and matters to us, not just as fans, but as people. In the same way baseball defines an American, or association football defines an Italian, hockey defines a Canadian. It is our one true love. It is, disgusted academics aside, the only truly binding force from sea to sea.[2]
>
> Hockey makes Canada feel more Canadian.[3]

However the idea is expressed, hockey is an integral part of Canadian society. While various forms of a winter game played with a stick and a disk or ball have been played on nearly all ice and snow covered areas for hundreds of years, the modern game of hockey developed in Canada. Its origins are still disputed, with Windsor, Nova Scotia, Kingston and Montreal among those with reasonable claims on the honour, but hockey's uniquely Canadian development is not in dispute. Our game is almost as old as our

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[1] Richard Gruneau and David Whitson, Hockey Night in Canada, [hereafter Gruneau and Whitson] (Toronto, 1993): 7.
[2] Malcolm G. Kelly, "Hockey: Our Game," in The Complete Idiots Guide to Canadian Sports History and Trivia, (Scarborough, Ont., 1999): 31.
[3] Ken Dryden and Roy MacGregor, Home Game, [hereafter Dryden and MacGregor] (Toronto, 1989): 15.

country. Sociologists Richard Gruneau and David Whitson call hockey "quintessentially Canadian."[4] A Canadian may have invented basketball, but it was first played in the U.S. with American players. The first modern football game may have involved a Canadian team (from McGill University), but even though there is still a Canadian version, it is hardly Canada's game. Our other 'official' national sport, lacrosse, can boast only a fringe following. Participation in hockey may not be universal but it is far reaching: "young and old, boys and girls, urban and rural, French and English, East and West, able and disabled."[5] Some of these varied groups may not have always participated in hockey, like women and the disabled, but it has always been, and is still, the broadest ranging sport in Canada.

Ken Dryden, Hall of Fame goaltender for the Montreal Canadiens and current president of the Toronto Maple Leafs, has written a pair of well-received books about hockey. The second, Home Game, written with popular sports writer Roy MacGregor, is very close to a philosophical treatise on hockey. He begins with his description of how prevalent hockey is in Canadian society: the thrust of his argument suggests that even those who do not care for hockey cannot get away from it. It controls CBC's prime-time schedule from April through early June. It dominates sports coverage in Canada during the season and especially the playoffs, but is prominent even during the off-season. It has caused numerous riots (notably in Montreal), and the 1972 summit series is considered a defining moment in Canadian nationalism – perhaps not on the level of nation-building as the Battle of Vimy Ridge, but far more Canadians today would recognize the former over the latter.

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[4] Gruneau and Whitson, 3.
[5] Ibid., 3.

Many academics, especially some prominent historians like Jack Granatstein and Desmond Morton, would consider this a fact to lament. This serves to indicate that sport is considered marginal, if not trivial, by most academics. S. F. Wise even remembers A.M. Lower perceiving sport as evidence of the "degeneration of North American society."[6] As Wise pointed out, though, this opinion still gave some recognition to the importance of sport. This disregard for sport on the part of many academics is true even though the most recognizable Canadian is more likely to be Wayne Gretzky than Jean Chretien.

The importance of hockey to Canada is not unique: sport is important to every human civilization in history. From ancient Greek Olympics, to Roman Chariot races, to Mayan soccer-like games, sports were often synonymous with a society and its values. These sports reflect the societies in which they were played. However, we are here concerned with modern, western, organized sport. In this thesis, the term 'sport' is meant to represent structured, competitive, bureaucratic games, as opposed to 'play,' which is informal, recreational, often folk entertainment.[7] One particular form of game, hockey, emerged in Canada during the late nineteenth century, at a time when the nation itself was in its formative stages, trying to solidify social and cultural cohesion. Eventually, its participants codified rules and later organized structured leagues, and this game became a sport – and a cornerstone of professional sports entertainment and contemporary capitalist society. How did this "game" become so important?

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[6] S. F. Wise, "Sport and Class Values in Old Ontario and Quebec," in Morris Mott, ed., Sports in Canada [hereafter Mott] (Toronto, 1989): 109.

[7] Several books discuss this issue; for the most thorough investigation of this, please see Alan Guttman, From Ritual to Record, (New York, 1978).

Sociologists Jean Harvey and Hart Cantelon argue that "sport is neither an idle flexing of muscles without cause or consequence, nor merely a series of motor gestures devoid of social significance."[8] This "social significance" is developed within every society – even if the same game is played in two societies. Baseball, for example, is played, and even approached, differently in America and Japan.[9] In modern western society, sport has become not only a billion-dollar industry, but another social program expected of the welfare state; governments are expected to support elite athletes and provide infrastructure (such as arenas) and sports programs for citizens. Sport has become so important in contemporary society that it has even reached the level of international politics, as the boycotting of the 1980 Moscow and 1984 Los Angeles Olympics demonstrated. The respective political leaders involved would only use a boycott as a weapon if they believed it would have some sort of an impact; in the Cold War, sport often served as a sort of surrogate warfare, as the East German Olympic program indicated. In this context, sport served a positive productive purpose, as these leaders chose to express their dissatisfaction without the threat of nuclear warfare. In another context, the 1936 Berlin Olympics have, for instance, become one of the great symbols of sports' emblematic value: Hitler and Jesse Owens each taking their own meaning from the event.

This social and political significance is realized in both the individual and society. Individually, "(f)or those engaged in a sport, it can signify self-actualization, freedom

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[8] Jean Harvey and Hart Cantelon, "General Introduction," [hereafter Harvey and Cantelon, "General Introduction"] in Harvey and Canton, eds., Not Just A Game, [hereafter Harvey and Cantelon, Not Just A Game] (Ottawa, 1988):1.

[9] Barry D. McPherson, James Curtis and John W. Loy, The Social Significance of Sport. [hereafter MacPherson *et. al.*] (Champaign, Illinois, 1989): 21.

from the constraints of daily existence."[10] University of Toronto professor Bruce Kidd argues that sports encourage and reflect identity in a myriad series of ways, even if that identity comes from an exclusion from sports. Spectators experience not only artistic brilliance but a vicarious adrenaline rush from a closely-contested game. At the best (and sometimes the worst) of times, sport can tap into deep mythological and symbolic narratives.[11] Canada, Dryden argues, "has never worked seriously at developing...the icons of nationhood... the myths, legendary figures, events and commemorative dates."[12] Hockey, on the other hand, can provide all of these to an entire nation. It is seemingly our only national common denominator. Legends about the Stanley Cup are almost mythical: the Cup being kicked into the Rideau Canal, or being left on the side of a Montreal road. At the same time, legendary figures abound, like Georges Vezina, Howie Morenz or Bobby Baun, and at least one, Maurice "Rocket" Richard, has achieved the status of national icon. There are a plethora of memorable events and dates, like the 1972 Summit Series and 1987 Canada Cup (for better) or the 1998 Winter Olympics (for worse). The Stanley Cup itself is not only a symbol of hockey supremacy, but of the country itself. No other championship trophy is as recognizable as the Cup, and in Canada it can be argued it is the strongest unifying symbol in a country almost devoid of unifying symbols, its silhouette just as recognizable as a maple leaf. Sport also provides other metaphors and identities, like "rivalries of place and political tradition."[13] Rivalries are expressed through sport, be it USA versus USSR at the Olympics, Britain-Scotland in soccer or Edmonton-Calgary in hockey. In a modern society, sports can thus act as a bonding agent

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[10] Harvey and Cantelon, "General Introduction," 3
[11] Bruce Kidd, The Struggle For Canadian Sport, [hereafter Kidd] (Toronto, 1996): 5.
[12] Dryden and MacGregor, 18.
[13] Kidd, 6.

that transcends class, race or regionalism, and can conversely accentuate these same values within a social group as it vies with another group.

Another explanation for the significance of sport is that it "offers an oasis of stability in a world that increasingly seems in limbo."[14] No matter what happens in politics, economics, or in personal life, the games will go on. Through the dips and peaks of the stock market, the Knicks continue to play blocks away from Wall Street; the day after a referendum on separation, the Canadiens will still play a home game. No matter that the speed of change in life seems to be approaching the speed of light, the hockey (or baseball, or soccer or football) season opens, games are played, championships won and lost, and the cycle repeated – every year. Marxists have carried this argument to suggest that sports are consciously built into a culture so as to etherize class consciousness and to facilitate bourgeois domination of society.

The role of sport in society is not entirely positive. Kidd argues that "[a]s an institution, sport reproduces the dominant ideas and goals of Canadian society...at the same time this does not exclude challenging doctrines...."[15] It is usually the dominant group in the society that determines what sport is acceptable: often it is the aristocracy. Early Canada lacked the aristocracy of the British situation, so Alan Metcalfe argues it was the urban, Anglophone middle class that shaped the development of sport.[16] Since "every social system tends to reproduce itself," this class attempted to shape the development of Canadian sport in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to suit

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[14] Philip While, "Sports: Why do we care so Much?" in Peter Donnelly, ed., Taking Sports Seriously, [hereafter Donnely] (Toronto, 1997): 20.
[15] Harvey and Cantelon, "General Introduction," 3.
[16] Alan Metcalfe, Canada Learns to Play: The Emergence of Organized Sport, 1807-1914, [hereafter Metcalfe] (Toronto, 1987): 10.

their values and ideologies.[17] Given that, there is also a constant struggle for change, to which the dominant group must adjust in order to continue and increase its dominance.[18] Otherwise, another competing value system may overwhelm the older mentality; for that reason, social systems are never static. There is always a balancing act going on, a give and take between the dominant and dominated classes. It is through this struggle that sport developed in Canada; or, as Harvey and Cantelon state, "simply put, the patterns of Canadian sports development are the result of historical circumstances."[19] Does, for instance, Canadian sport reflect the dominant ethos of Canadian society: a capitalist, competitive character with the state providing an umpiring function?

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Hockey is as rich and symbolic in Canadian history as anything else, and is a lens through which society can be analyzed, yet little attention has been paid to it by academics. Every academic author consulted on sports in Canada has made a similar observation: "Few Canadian historians," Metcalfe has typically pointed out, "have regarded sport as an integral part of the social history of Canada."[20] "Despite the cultural, economic, and political importance of sports, Canadian historians have generally neglected them," echoes Kidd.[21] Two sociologists have similarly argued "Historians, sociologists, [among other academics] have established subspecialties on sports, but their work hovers at the margins of their disciplines."[22] The reasons for this are straightforward: while many academics may be fans of various sports, they believe their

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[17] Harvey and Cantelon, "The Historical Determinants of Contemporary Sport," [hereafter Harvey and Cantelon, "The Historical Determinants of Contemporary Sport,"] in Harvey and Cantelon, Not Just a Game, 5.
[18] Ibid., 5.
[19] Ibid., "General Introduction," 3.
[20] Metcalfe, 9.
[21] Kidd, 8.
[22] Elliott J. Gorn and Michael Oriard, "Taking Sport Seriously," in Donnelly, 22.

work must focus on "serious" concerns.[23] However, as Kidd points out, "though often trivialized as 'just entertainment' or the 'playpen of society,' these activities have considerable social impact."[24] Metcalfe suggests that using sport as a window to society has an added advantage: since it is a free time activity, an individual expresses the attitudes and values they believe in, not those they are expected to express.[25]

Any "serious" look at sports is overwhelmingly a journalist's perspective, which, while useful for raw data, is often flawed. Few such first drafts of history provide references for their research, which make verification difficult. Furthermore, they tend to use modernization frameworks, implicitly treating the outcome as inevitable and desirable, while ignoring alternatives, anomalies and failures.[26] Or, more blatantly, they have an agenda, a plan to create controversy in order to sell books. Academic sport history has by and large been written within physical education and kinesiology departments. Serious academic study of sport in Canada started with Max Howell at the University of Alberta in the 1960s; since then, there has been a slow but steady expansion.[27] Several leading sports academics have emerged from this small but growing discipline, including Kidd, Metcalfe, Richard Gruneau, Frank Consantino, Morris Mott, and Colin Howell. There are now several academic journals on sport, including one specifically devoted to Canadian sports history: the Journal of History of Canadian Sport. Even if the past thirty years have brought a relative explosion of sport study, there remain large gaps to fill. There are two main periods that have received the lion's share of attention. The first is the turn-of-the-century period, specifically centered around the

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[23] Gruneau and Whitson, 3-4.
[24] Kidd, 5.
[25] Metcalfe, 14.
[26] Kidd, 9.
[27] Ibid., 9.

amateur-professional conflict. The second is the post-1961 period, and the increased role of business, government and state sponsorship of sport. The gaps in the record most notably concern women and minorities, although work currently being published as articles may soon lead to more comprehensive studies. Most coverage has been devoted to modern professional sport or the modern Olympics (if one accepts the fallacy that the Olympics are amateur). Since the study of sport is relatively recent, there is an openness toward academic subjects as class, gender and region. Significantly, little of this academic work is taking place in a department of history.

Another of the gaps in the historiography of Canadian sport concerns the sports and war. Metcalfe and Gruneau, among others, have studied the early development of hockey, until the point when professionalism dominated. This period - roughly from the 1880s through the end of the First World War - has received the most attention, probably since it includes the origins of the game itself, as well as the amateur-professional debate. This debate has proved to be a fertile ground for analysis, since it emerges out of that great watershed period when North America became "modern" and therefore lends itself to many methods of study. Kidd has written the most respected work about sport in the inter-war period, including the growth and developing hegemony of the NHL. Most work on hockey then skips to the fifties and beyond. Hockey in the seventies is covered by a section of Canadian Sport: Sociological Perspectives, a book co-edited by Gruneau. This leaves the years of the Second World War virtually untouched, besides the occasional aside in more general works on the history of twentieth-century sport.

Hockey during the war has been covered in one book: War Games. However, the author, Douglas Hunter, does not go into depth about hockey's social role during the war.

More time is spent examining the relationship between Prime Minister Mackenzie King and his political underlings, as well as ample coverage of Toronto Maple Leafs owner Conn Smythe's role in the war effort – especially in the 1944 Conscription Crisis. Left largely ignored is the reason why professional hockey was allowed to continue in a time of war. While the country groped to find the manpower to fulfill both its economic and military obligations, a group of prime recruits was left virtually untapped with little opposition. The 'common-sense', accepted answer is that it was a morale booster during the war. Undoubtedly this was a significant factor, but no one has critically examined this view. No one has provided qualitative evidence of how many players joined the call to arms, and how many stayed away, either. The Second World War brought about sacrifices on the part of all Canadians, regardless of class, age and region. The continuation of hockey drew precious resources from the war effort. The fact that there was little criticism of this was also significant - not every Canadian watched or played hockey. There were only two professional clubs in Canada, so the vast majority of Canadians would not have had the opportunity to see the teams in person, or form a personal affiliation with a team, but only to follow the game on the radio - once a week for five months a year. No one outside Montreal or Toronto would have been able to attend a game; even Canadian fans of the nearby Detroit Red Wings were not allowed to cross the border for pleasure trips. Finally, if hockey was so important to the national psyche, why were professional hockey players not officially exempted from conscription?

*****

Many factors contributed to public and state sanction of the continuation of professional hockey during the war. Many of these factors are not unique to the wartime period; in fact they are only accentuated during this period. For this reason, examining hockey during the war can provide several insights into Canadian society. This thesis proposed to examine the special status of hockey in wartime Canada, and why hockey was afforded such leniency by the government, military and public. The social significance of sport has already been mentioned, but it is even more pronounced in periods of war. During the total war effort of Second World War, society was controlled to an unheard of degree by government. At the same time, the government was acutely aware of the need to make concessions to its citizens – a fact perhaps best illustrated by the birth of the welfare state late in the war. Many sacrifices had to be made on both sides. It must be significant, then, that hockey continued uninterrupted during the war when so much else impinged on the lives of Canadians. It is through the lens of wartime actions that we can see not only the importance of hockey to Canadian society, but also the interaction between the elite and the general citizenry; between government and citizens; business leaders and consumers; elite athletes and armchair jocks; management and workers.

Even though many of the histories of hockey are flawed and limited in their coverage of the wartime period, they are an important starting point. They present the commonly held views of the role of hockey, not only in the wartime context, but in Canadian society. A significant drawback is that they focus exclusively on the National Hockey League (NHL), thereby generally ignoring other, mostly American, minor leagues, and especially the senior amateur leagues in Canada. With the overwhelming

amount of evidence available for the NHL, the emphasis here will inevitably be on professional hockey, and especially the NHL, but without ignoring these other elite competitive forms of hockey. NHL sources will be considered as well, especially contemporary records from Board of Governors meetings and records from the hockey Hall of Fame. Players' service records fall into this category, since some NHL records show which players missed time to join the war effort. In total, the career paths of all 590 players eligible for military service will be examined, to gain a perspective on the sacrifices made by both players and the NHL. This thesis does not seek to rewrite the history of the NHL and its place in the World War II effort; it does seek to broaden understanding of this experience and to identify these social, cultural and political factors which made wartime hockey special. As part of this effort, a secondary aim of this thesis is to provide a more quantitative and comprehensive view of the actions of professional hockey players during the war than is currently available.

Along with modern popular and academic histories, several newspaper sources will be examined to get first-hand insight into what was being written about hockey. A broad geographical range of newspapers will be consulted. Attention will fall on several Montreal (including French-language) papers and Toronto based-papers, since both cities had professional clubs, but also Winnipeg and Vancouver newspapers. Finally, one national newspaper, the Globe and Mail, will be consulted, though it is admittedly Toronto-centric. It is through these sources that the broadest picture of public reaction can be garnered. This is in an era before popularity polls were broadly used, and public reaction was filtered through the eyes of editors and columnists. Unfortunately, with so

little attention paid to such issue until quite recently, the daily press seems to offer the closest insight available to gauge public reaction to wartime hockey's role.

Attention to the public's reaction is not the only concern: the rhetoric and actions of the federal government and its military arm are also important. Neither of these institutions was impervious to public pressure, even while they enjoyed possibly their most powerful positions in Canadian history. Government attitudes can be detected in the debates of the House of Commons, as well as in the archival records of members of the House, such as Defence Minister James Ralston. Similarly, various military files survive that shed light on the value of hockey in the military. Again, newspaper sources will be important to contextualize all of these archival sources.

Another aspect of this inquiry is to set situation of Canadian hockey in contrast with what was happening in other sporting contexts during the war. Baseball, horse-racing and football in America, association football (soccer) in Britain, and even spectator sports in Germany offer an element of international comparison. Was Canada's experience in war with hockey markedly different in terms of socio-cultural and political context to that of other combatant nations? America and Britain were the most important influences on Canada, and this extended to sport. All of the allies followed a similar path where sports are concerned; Germany was another story altogether. These all help to show how other governments – and their citizens – dealt with similar issues, and therefore what alternatives existed.

Sport and its history cannot be considered trivial; it is becoming increasingly difficult to even consider it as marginal, given its prominence in contemporary society. While there is an ever-expanding collection of work on the importance of sport, little is

written from an historical perspective. Only recently has there been a recognition that sport offers an opportunity to look at a subject that has until now been ignored by most academics. Sports show the promise of offering an insight into the collective psyche of a warring nation, through a period in its history when its leaders and citizens had to make difficult choices as to what was and was not important, and which sacrifices were and were not acceptable.

CHAPTER ONE
GAP IN THE RECORD: HOCKEY HISTORY WITHOUT WORLD WAR II

Every year in Canada, two of the most popular subjects for mainstream books are hockey and war. There are perennially dozens of books written about hockey, focusing almost exclusively on players and teams in the National Hockey League. During the 1999 Christmas season, for instance, 14 books about hockey were released, including several devoted to its history: One-hundred Years of Hockey edited by Al Strachen; Mike Leonetti's Hockey in the Seventies; and Portraits of The Game, by Andrew Podnicks.[1] Another popular subject was military history, and especially the Second World War: 1939: The Alliance That Never Was and the Coming of World War Two, by Michael Carley; Leo Marks' Between Silk and Cyanide; Too Young to Fight; and Robert Ballard's Return to Midway. Not surprisingly, none of these books concerning war even mentions hockey; somewhat more surprising was that all these books on the history of hockey only pay fleeting attention to the wartime period, a pivotal moment in the history of the NHL.

Within the realm of hockey history, three types of publication exist: popular histories, quasi-academic work, and academic treatises, with the vast majority of literature falling into the first category. This partly explains the ignorance of wartime hockey as it is considered a marginal issue: simply a time when the NHL lost personnel, and the quality of play dropped dramatically. Differentiating between the three types is often simple: for the most part, if it is held in large quantities at the local bookstore, it is a popular, or perhaps a quasi-academic, history. If it is more academic in focus, it is likely

[1] Hockey books published for the hockey season, please see: Stu Hackel, "Pages Of Greatness," The Hockey News, 53 no.14 (10 December 1999): 34-35.

to be found in a university library. Of course, this is just a general rule, but this reflects the importance of the audience in defining such criteria. Popular histories are aimed at the largest possible audience, meaning that no prior specialist knowledge of the subject, in this case hockey history, is required. Popular authors produce well-written, interesting pieces, yet offer little depth or historigraphical context and seldom provide footnotes or documentation. These books can almost all be described as "whiggish" in their perspective: writing the past to fit the present, accepting the present-day status as inevitable and good. Usually the context is restricted to replaying the major events of each season, combined with a strong emphasis on great players and teams. Brian McFarlane is the most prolific of the current popular hockey history writers, producing at least one new book a year for the last few years. Quasi-academic writers are often journalists, whose books contain thorough research with some footnotes, but who aim their product at a popular audience, and often lack historiographical context as well. There are fewer general histories produced by such authors; more often, they chose a controversial issue to investigate – but often do not present a balanced view of whatever issue they are investigating. These authors are usually trying to prove a specific point, and, not being professionally-trained historians, are used to arguing vigourously for one position without presenting opposing views. Examples of this genre include Alison Griffiths and David Cruise's ground-breaking work on player-owner relations, Net Worth, or Theresa Tedesco's Offside, the story of the 1991 sale of the Toronto Maple Leafs.[2] These books also tend to concentrate on the economic and political side of sports. In many cases academic histories do the same, but the better academic works tend to

[2] David Cruise and Alison Griffiths, Net Worth: Exploding the Myths of Pro Hockey, [hereafter Cruise and Griffiths] (Toronto, 1991); Theresa Tedesco, Offside: The Battle for Control of Maple Leaf Gardens, (Toronto, 1996).

focus more on social history. There are not many academic works on hockey specifically, though, and professional historians have written few of these. Academics trained in sociology and physical education are the leaders in sport history, while only a handful of historians work in the field.[3] An ironic benefit of this is that the works produced tend to be more accessible to the average reader with an interest in hockey history, as there is not much historiographical background to consider.

Among the aforementioned approaches to hockey history there are many intriguing questions. Unfortunately, most existing analysis concentrates on a few select questions, like the clash between amateurism and professionalism around the turn-of-the-century. Little attention, on the other hand, has been paid to hockey during the Second World War. Popular hockey books generally cover NHL history on a year-by-year basis, devoting coverage mainly to wins and losses without examining how hockey was changing or looking at its place in history and in broader society. Popular historians have simply accepted the NHL's wartime actions, refusing to question how or why the hockey world benefited from the war. There is one book, by prolific hockey writer Douglas Hunter, which covers wartime hockey in any degree of depth: War Games: Conn Smythe and Hockey's Fighting Men. This can be considered quasi-academic work, as Hunter consulted archival sources and provided a handful of footnotes – though at times the book lacks consistent and thorough documentation.[4] War Games acts as a bridge between hockey history and war history, as it is as much about Canadian politics as about hockey. Hunter chooses Maple Leafs' owner Conn Smythe to focus on, especially Smythe's central role in the 1944 conscription crisis. In reality, this book is more about the

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[3] Bruce Kidd, The Struggle For Canadian Sport, [hereafter Kidd] (Toronto, 1996): 9-10.
[4] Douglas Hunter, War Games: Conn Smythe and Hockey's Fighting Men, [hereafter Hunter] (Toronto, 1997): 414 - 418.

conscription policies of the Mackenzie King government than wartime hockey, adding a new perspective to a political subject that has already been tackled by several authors.[5] Hunter delves into the relationship between Smythe, Defence Minister James Ralston, and King, using hockey as the social backdrop against which the effects of the federal government's conscription policy – or lack thereof – is projected. It offers a different, more social, viewpoint that differs from the usual political analysis.

The real focus of War Games is Smythe's wartime career, culminating in the conscription crisis of 1944. This unique angle of analysis gives a different perspective of the causes of the crisis. Hunter illustrates Smythe's role in re-igniting the conscription crisis in the fall of 1944. This issue had been pushed to the background of public consciousness following a 1942 plebiscite which released the governing Liberal Party from its pledge not to conscript men for overseas service. Smythe charged that soldiers in Europe had been rushed to the front and as a consequence, they were undertrained; he blamed the government for this because it did not conscript sufficient reinforcements.[6] Others picked up on this accusation, and soon the media (especially the Conservative press) was demanding conscription for the sake of Canada's soldiers.[7] Hunter defends Smythe's actions, as they proved pivotal in gaining popular support for conscription.[8] Smythe's national profile and personal knowledge of the front (he made the accusations while convalescing from a war-wound) were crucial in giving the conscriptionist side

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[5] Please see: R. MacGregor Dawson, The Conscription Crisis of 1944, (Toronto, 1961); J. L. Granatstein, and J. M. Hitsmen, Broken Promises: A History of Conscription in Canada, [hereafter Granatstein and Hitsmen] (Toronto, 1977); J. L. Granatstein, Conscription in the Second World War, 1939-45, (Toronto, 1969).

[6] "Major Smythe's Grave Charge," Globe and Mail [hereafter GM] (20 September 1944): 6.

[7] Toronto's Globe and Mail played a leadership role in attacking the government's conscription policies., which other conservative papers, like Montreal's The Gazette, were only too glad to follow. The liberal Montreal Star, on the other hand, virtually ignored the issue. Please see Globe and Mail, Montreal Star and The Gazette, September through November, 1944.

[8] Hunter, 136-144.

demonstrative evidence of the folly of the government's ways. Only a few other analyses of the crisis acknowledge the contribution of Smythe, like W. R. Feasby's The Official History of the Canadian Medical Services, 1939-45, but none demonstrate the importance of *Smythe* making such a statement.[9] Hunter sifted through both Ralston's and King's records to sort out how the issue developed, and to analyze the personal relationship between the two men. As well, Hunter delves into how Ralston came to quit the cabinet.

This discussion of Smythe and federal politics leaves hockey in the background through most of the book. Instead of presenting a quantitative, comprehensive analysis of the entire NHL to establish patterns, Hunter follows a handful of NHL players through the war years, in an attempt to cover all the special experiences of wartime players. Ted Kennedy was Hunter's example of an underage NHLer, a teenager who Hunter impresses as only reaching the big leagues because of a player shortage.[10] Syl Apps was an elite team player who joined the war effort because it was expected.[11] Turk Broda, a mentally slow but good-natured goalie, joined the military even though he was not required to.[12] Maurice Richard provided the prototype of a physically-unfit-for-military-service player.[13] Bob Carse was representative of players who actively fought overseas. Carse became a POW and after escaping, not only returned home, but eventually played again in the NHL.[14] Dudley "Red" Garrett was the designated sacrificial lamb, a young man who lost his life while serving his country.[15] While this approach might provide interesting reading, it also suggests a skewed view of what actually happened to hockey

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[9] W. R. Feasby, ed., Official History of the Canadian Medical Services, 1939-1945, (Ottawa: 1953): 440.
[10] Hunter, 115.
[11] Ibid., 190-192.
[12] Ibid., 103-105.
[13] Ibid., 90.
[14] Ibid., 244-45.
[15] Ibid., 347.

players during the war. This approach focuses on great men rather than looking at players as a collective. By simply taking a representative of each group, Hunter does not give weight to which groups were more prominent. The attention given to Carse is especially misleading: only a handful of NHL players actively fought overseas, and only one other, Terry Reardon, was even wounded.[16] Furthermore, choosing even one hockey player like Garrett who died in the war effort is even more misleading, as no established NHL player lost his life in the war effort; only three players under contract to NHL teams were sacrificed during the course of the war.[17] Hunter's tendency to favour the Maple Leafs occasionally comes through, a tendency that puts into question his objectivity when discussing the importance of hockey to the rest of Canada. Hockey's impact was different across the country, yet in some ways he treats Toronto as Canada writ large. The Maple Leafs may have been English Canada's team, but this did not mean they were the most important team in every community. Often it was the local senior league team that enjoyed more popularity and resonance with members of the community. In War Games, it often seems as if Toronto is the root of all that happens in the hockey world, as Hunter's writing often lacks a broad view of the hockey landscape.

Hunter falls into several of the same traps as many quasi-academic works: mainly, he does not put events into historical context, and occasionally lingers on superficial events, and thus fails to offer meaningful conclusions on the role of hockey in wartime Canadian society. There is no discussion of the importance of sport to society, except to fall back on the claim that sport is vital to morale, though this claim is never clearly and forcefully articulated or justified. Still, Hunter does examines hockey during the war in

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[16] National Archives of Canada. [hereafter NAC] Charles Mayer Papers. MG30 C76 v15 f A-2 Communiqués Hebdomadaires 1941-46 "Reardon Porte Des Marques Du Combat." 2.

[17] Garrett. Albert "Red" Tilson and Joe Turner are the three. They will be discussed further in chapter five.

much more depth than any other hockey historian, and therefore offers by far the most thorough examination of the subject currently available. This book also offers insights beyond the realm of hockey history, exploring new facets of political history that have previously been overlooked by investigations of professional historians.

While Hunter has produced the only full-length book devoted exclusively to wartime hockey, two articles have also been written: one clearly popular, the other based on an undergraduate history thesis. Bill Twaito wrote "Wartime Wonders", an article that appeared in Queen's Quarterly, which espoused the virtue of continuing professional hockey during wartime. While this work is provocative, Twatio unfortunately provides absolutely no proof to support his claims.[18] Twatio begins by describing the importance of hockey to overseas Canadian troops, concentrating especially on Foster Hewitt's broadcasts. He goes on to discuss Conn Smythe's efforts to organize a 'sportsmen's battery.' After a year of pestering military officials for command of his own unit, Major Smythe gathered a number of the top Canadian athletes into an artillery unit of the 41st Toronto Regiment. Meanwhile, Twatio carefully ignores the fact that not one of Smythe's Maple Leafs joined his battery. Like other popular accounts, "Wartime Wonders" describes how NHL rosters were decimated by the war, and the many other adjustments the NHL was forced to make due to wartime circumstances. However, he does not compare these "sacrifices" to the ones being made across the country. Perhaps the most significant issue Twatio raises is what has been labeled as the 'Broda incident,' in which Maple Leafs goaltender Turk Broda was arrested for leaving his military district. Broda left because he was attempting to join a Montreal garrison rather than a Toronto unit, as they offered him a better deal to play. In fact, Broda was one of the few players to enlist

[18] Bill Twatio, "Wartime Wonders," Queen's Quarterly, [hereafter Twatio] 100 (Winter 1993), 833-840.

of his own accord – married and older, he was exempt from the draft. This incident, however, was not received well by the public, and as a result attention was brought on players who played hockey in the military with garrison teams. According to Twatio, "the incident caused a national scandal, the service teams were disbanded, and the players thankfully proceeded overseas."[19] This statement is rife not only with half-truths, but complete fallacies. The incident may have drawn national attention, but it resulted in only minor changes in military service teams. These teams were no longer allowed to compete in leagues in contention for the Allan Cup (the senior amateur leagues' equivalent of the Stanley Cup). This resulted in teams pulling out of senior leagues and forming their own military leagues. Even this directive was not universal within the military, as several navy teams in the Maritimes continued to compete in their senior leagues, only to excuse themselves from the playoffs.[20] Broda was in fact eligible for military service, as he just fell under the call-up age.[21] Twatio's most questionable claim is alluded to in the last segment of his case: that players who wanted to go overseas could not.[22] Twatio provides no evidence that this was the prevailing attitude, or questions why such players did not push their superiors into moving them overseas. Nor does he pursue this issue, probably because few players ever went overseas. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the number of former professional players who went overseas saw any fighting – most, like Broda, continued to play hockey in England and Europe. The reason hockey players on military bases would claim to wish to move overseas was because no one would admit to wanting to avoid military service, especially a young man in a profession where

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[19] Ibid., 837.
[20] Please refer to Chapter Four for a more detailed examination of the fallout from the Broda incident.
[21] Charles Stacey, Arms Men and Government: The War Policies of Canada 1939-1945, (Ottawa, 1970): 586.
[22] Twatio, 839.

masculinity was so highly valued. Hockey players also wanted to uphold the appearance that they were receiving no special treatment. The Broda incident highlighted how untrue this appearance was: just as in the U.S., where base commanders were fighting over baseball players, military leaders in Canada were fighting over the best hockey players.[23] Twatio may introduce interesting angles for analysis, but provides few reliable conclusions as he presents selective evidence and virtually no context.

Bruce MacIntyre's article in the Canadian Journal of History of Sport was based on his undergraduate thesis at Sir Wilfrid Laurier University. His work further supported the conduct of professional hockey players, as he focused on the September 1941 visa debate. MacIntyre argued that hockey players were singled out unfairly by Canadian governmental officials and made examples of in an attempt to boost volunteerism and to hide the drawbacks of government's own recruiting system. MacIntyre portrayed the conscription policy of the Mackenzie government as an attempt to "allow individuals to define their own role in the Canadian war effort."[24] This is directly at odds with the conclusions of historian Jack Granatstein, who claimed that the government "controlled individuals' lives to an unheard of degree."[25] McIntyre does not question why these players who were exactly the age and physical condition that many in the country expected to volunteer did not enlist. Furthermore, because the players were not forced to join up does not mean they should have completely avoided military service. Many young Canadians with good jobs and bright futures still enlisted, while hockey players often avoided fighting positions if not military service altogether.

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[23] Bill Gilbert, They Also Served: Baseball and the Home Front, 1941-45, [hereafter Gilbert] (New York, 1992): 55.
[24] Bruce MacIntyre, "Which Uniform to Serve," [hereafter McIntyre] Canadian Journal of History of Sport 24 (1 December 1993): 88.
[25] Granatstein and Hitsman, 146.

MacIntyre's conclusions can be put into question because of inaccuracies and misrepresentation of evidence. One example is his claim that senior amateur "players received no revenue for their participation," which is inaccurate.[26] Many such players were handsomely compensated for their employment, to the point where a few, like Canadiens great Jean Beliveau, put off joining the NHL to continue in the senior leagues. Furthermore, in an attempt to prove the international acceptance of professional wartime sport, MacIntyre claimed "American football and baseball...carried on as usual with little criticism."[27] This overlooks the national debate covered on the front pages of the New York Post in 1945 over the perceived leniency in medical deferments accorded to baseball players.[28] MacIntyre also suggests that soldiers supported the continuation of wartime hockey. To backup this claim, he used a quote taken from a Lieutenant Johnson of the Winnipeg Rifles.[29] The problem is MacIntyre takes this quote completely out of context: it was clearly meant sarcastically. In reality, Lieutenant Johnson was staunchly critical of the favouritism he believed had been accorded to hockey players, noting specifically that Smythe's Battalion "seem[ed] to place more importance on the winning of the Stanley Cup than on the winning of the war."[30] Finally, MacIntyre claimed "numerous hockey players enlisted in the services prior to 1944 and were engaged in combat."[31] All of his examples, however, were from one team - the Maple Leafs - and included players who, while posted overseas, never once saw a battle.[32]

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[26] McIntyre, 80.
[27] Ibid., 82.
[28] This "4-F" debate, as it was dubbed, will be described in more detail in chapter five.
[29] McIntyre, 80.
[30] Ralph Allen, "Mostly Incidental," GM (24 September 1944): 14.
[31] McIntyre, 82.
[32] Ibid., fn 62, p90.

The gist of MacIntyre's main argument revolved around the tension between hockey's support by the citizenry versus government officials' desire to "make an example" out of these icons. Hockey players were unfairly made examples of, in his view, because of their standing in the community as "the ideal of the able-bodied representative required by the armed forces."[33] However, this argument can be reduced to a subjective judgment on the part of the author – he believed that judges had no right to try to make examples of hockey players. Furthermore, even if Canadian officials indeed tried to "coerce" hockey players into enlisting, they met with little success – something McIntyre fails to emphasize. The issue simmered for a couple of months, but then disappeared from public consciousness for the rest of the war when loopholes were found before the outset of the next season. The major flaws revealed in a close examination of his argument weakened it considerably.

Each of these three sources failed to present a balanced, comprehensive view of the wartime hockey world. None of them attempted to establish any patterns in the wartime contributions of the players. Generally, they do question what they report or at least try to provide evidence for their conclusions; the problem lies in the fact they merely report a few selective facts around which they mould their argument. The lack of historical context, which includes both hockey history and the political history of wartime Canada, contributes to the overall lack of historiographical framework. While Hunter and McIntyre concentrate on the political aspect to the detriment of any social analysis, Twatio has looked only at the social impact of hockey, without considering the politics that established and responded to Canadian society's view of wartime hockey. While all

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[33] Ibid., 83.

raise significant questions, the answers they provide are either incomplete or unconvincing.

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The only way to gather information about wartime hockey is to examine popular hockey literature. Popular histories tend to gloss over the wartime period, most devoting mere paragraphs to the most devastating war of the twentieth century. At no time is there any attempt to relate the history of hockey to world events, and the war years are no exception. Although World War Two provided the backdrop for two fantastic episodes – the miracle comeback of the 1940 Maple Leafs and Rocket Richard's 50 goals-in-50 games - overall the quality of play was perceived to be weak. Examined collectively, a survey of this literature reveals a remarkable consensus about how hockey during the war has been presented to later generations of hockey fans: as a period of 'great sacrifices' on the part of players and owners. It is this consensus that this thesis will attempt to correct.

Charles Coleman's two-volume work, The Trail of the Stanley Cup, is one of the earliest, but one of the most definitive, examinations of the history of the NHL. Perhaps it was Coleman who set the tone for subsequent NHL histories by emphasizing the usefulness of NHL hockey to the war effort. "Despite the war, the interest in hockey was high and the attendance at games was much improved," suggests Coleman, and "it seemed generally recognized that professional hockey was a morale booster for the country suffering under the stress of four years of war."[34] There is no mention, however, that this was a rebound effect from the dark days of the depression, when the NHL was forced to abandon several franchises, including one in Montreal. Furthermore, Coleman makes no attempt to describe why hockey, as opposed to other forms of entertainment,

[34] Charles Coleman, The Trail of the Stanley Cup, [hereafter Coleman] (Sherbrooke, 1969): 399, 474.

was necessary for the relief of such stress. Why hockey itself was able to last through six wartime seasons despite all the hardships the sport faced during the war was left unexplained. Coleman tries to highlight the "sacrifices" made by the NHL: many players left the NHL to join the military, and he even claims that some made the ultimate sacrifice. Coleman is only able to supply one name for the list of players killed in action; even the most fervent hockey fan would know nothing of Dudley "Red" Garrett if he had not lost his life while in military service. Nor does Coleman explain that most of the players who left the NHL experienced less hostility than they would have in the slot area in front of the goal. Many continued to shoot a puck, not a rifle, in the military.

Neil Isaacs is a professor of English by profession, and his academic background comes out as he begins his book, Checking Back, with a more academic tone, by seeking the origin of the word "hockey." Isaacs can hardly be called uncritical of the NHL, as he attacks the "careless conservatism of official hockey, the commitment to maintain the status quo whatever and however it came to be."[35] Still, this is a criticism of modern NHL leadership, not a condemnation of wartime leadership. Isaacs also draws attention to the fact that during the period 1943-67 the NHL was the "most successful operation in the history of professional sports," filling arenas to over 90% capacity and raking in huge profits for owners – something NHL leaders may not want to emphasize.[36] Unfortunately, he does not go into any great depth on this subject, nor does he look at how the NHL came to establish this "hegemony".[37] He thereby manages to avoid facing the possibility that it was as a result of the war that the NHL gained this position. Similar to Coleman's analysis, in Checking Back the NHL miraculously jumps from the depression and

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[35] Neil Isaacs. Checking Back. [hereafter Isaacs] (New York, 1977): 7.
[36] Ibid., 129.
[37] Ibid., 130.

hardship of the thirties to the "Golden Era" of the fifties, with no explanation of how this plateau was reached during the intervening decade. Isaacs does have some insights into wartime hockey, however, mentioning how lawyer Charles Dwyer argued on behalf of American-based NHL clubs in Ottawa for the continuation of the NHL; however, this information is undocumented, and cannot be substantiated.[38] Isaacs does not explain what "Ottawa" means: the parliament, cabinet, or perhaps the media? No record of Charles Sawyer exists in government records; it is likely that this meeting was simply another routine meeting for government officials. There is no evidence that Sawyer held any sway over the government's attitude towards hockey; the fact that the NHL continued does not mean it was as a result of the work of this one lawyer. Coleman reiterated what many other authors state when he wrote "hockey had degenerated throughout the league, due as much to the style of play as to the loss of personnel."[39] He was the only author, however, who attributed the "degeneration" of play to anything other than the loss of personnel into the military.

Darcy Jenish, while not a sports writer, is the author of several books on different subjects in Canadian history. His account of the history of hockey in The Stanley Cup makes him one of the leading apologist for NHL's wartime actions. There is little mention of the war itself, most of what is written refers simply to the loss of players to the war effort. While he claimed that Detroit lost the fewest players to the military, and the Maple Leafs the most, he provides no evidence for this, and other sources make contradictory claims.[40] Jenish tries to emphasis the sacrifices teams made by pointing out that following Montreal's 1944 Stanley Cup victory, management provided "a low key

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[38] Ibid., 131.
[39] Ibid., 132.
[40] Darcy Jenish, The Stanley Cup, [hereafter Jenish] (Toronto, 1992): 154.

buffet luncheon, rather than a sit-down banquet."[41] A cynic might point out that, besides the obvious financial savings, Montreal officials were putting on a public-relations exercise, trying to prove they were being hurt just as much as their fans by the war effort. Jenish also attempts to defend players who did not join the military, by emphasizing the war industry jobs some of them held.[42]

Brian McFarlane is one of the most prolific hockey writers ever, with over two dozen hockey books to his credit, dealing both with hockey trivia and the history of the game. In both 60 Years of Hockey and Stanley Cup Fever, McFarlane traces the progression of the game year by year, including the war years. However, in Stanley Cup Fever, reference to the war between 1939 and 1941 and the 1944/45 season appears in a sentence or less.[43] The 1941/42 and 1943/44 season are given a paragraph each. Thus, it appears to McFarlane that the effect of the war on the NHL through five of six wartime seasons is only worthy of less than three paragraphs.

When McFarlane does mention the war, his interpretations of the facts are expressed in such a manner as to put the most positive spin on the NHL's actions. He emphasizes the effect of Pearl Harbor, therby suggesting it had some significant impact on hockey. In fact, Canadians made up the vast majority of NHL rosters, and the entrance of the U.S. into the war made no difference to their military eligibility.[44] Furthermore, as this attack occurred in December, well into the season, few players would be expected to leave immediately – many would wait until after the season to enlist, if ever.[45] By

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[41] Ibid., 157.
[42] Ibid., 157.
[43] Brian McFarlane, Stanley Cup Fever: 100 Years of Hockey Greatness, [hereafter McFarlane, Stanley Cup Fever] (Toronto, 1992): 90-93.
[44] Ibid., 93.
[45] Ibid., 99-101.

1943/44, McFarlane claimed "(a)ll sports were considered to be a morale booster during difficult times, and NHL hockey with its service rejects, young kids and over-the-hill veterans, continued to attract widespread interest."[46] This statement is replete with inaccuracies and misrepresentations. Not all sports were considered morale-boosters: horse racing was shut down in 1944.[47] Overall, this statement attempts to show that hockey received no special treatment. However, it fails to point out that, of all the professional sports, hockey was by far the biggest drain on the pool of potential recruits in Canada; few baseball players were Canadian, and professional football and basketball did not yet exist in Canada. This statement also leaves the impression that no hockey players avoided war service by playing hockey. This is misleading too, as the term 'service rejects' is left vague. McFarlane gives no explanation of how or why players were rejected, nor does he say how many rejections were granted. He also completely ignores the number of players exempted from military service due to war work. What casts further doubt on the statement is the fact that many of the players who joined the military ended up playing hockey on military bases. In one statement, McFarlane has completely misrepresented hockey's contribution to Canada's Second World War effort.

McFarlane also distorted the impact of the war on hockey. He claims that "a few stick handlers" were paid off or returned to the minors, after the end of the war, yet a half-a-dozen Maple Leafs were demobilized.[48] This analysis carefully avoids discussion of the lot of returning players, many of whom did not return to the NHL upon their demobilization. This could lead to further questioning of claims surrounding the so-called "scab" or wartime replacement NHLers. Earlier he stated that they would not have had a

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[46] Ibid., 97.
[47] Russ Harris, American Racing During World War II," The Blood Horse, 117 (28 December 1991): 6219.
[48] McFarlane, Stanley Cup Fever, 102.

chance to crack an NHL lineup without the war, but now he states that some were indeed good enough to stay in the NHL after the cessation of hostilities. A closer examination of his claims indicates that NHL teams had not been as badly hurt by the war as he would lead us to believe. Generally, McFarlane avoids any discussion of increased profits or power going to NHL owners, something that, as will be discussed, is an important aspect of the war's impact on the NHL.

In one of McFarlane's other works, 60 Years of Hockey, there are a few different anecdotes as compared to Stanley Cup Fever, but the reader is left with the same impressions; McFarlane reiterates that both the Canadian and American governments considered hockey essential to national morale. The 'great sacrifices' that the NHL teams and players made, especially the overwhelming loss of personnel, are heavily emphasized. For example: "By now (the 1943/44 season) the war had ravaged the NHL teams until some of them were mere ghosts of what they had been."[49] He mentions that Montreal practiced at night – another example of the 'great sacrifices' made by NHL teams. This is further exemplified by the attention he paid to Glen Harmon – the first hockey player to play hockey and work in a war industry plant. McFarlane does bring more attention to the existence of military hockey, but this seems inadvertent. In an attempt to show how many players fought overseas, he points out that one base in England housed 15 players. However, these players were likely *playing* overseas, not fighting. Similar to the other authors, McFarlane chooses his evidence selectively and thereby presents a skewed view of the NHL's contribution to Canada's war effort.

Several themes emerge collectively from these works: first, they downplay the significance of the war years, and their effect on the development of the NHL as the

[49] Brian McFarlane, 60 Years Of Hockey, [hereafter McFarlane, 60 Years of Hockey] (Toronto, 1970): 87.

major professional hockey league in North America. Secondly, all emphasize the sacrifices made by NHL teams and players, but only tell half the story. They select certain positive anecdotes and ignore any negative characterizations when it comes to the league's or the players' war record. They also avoid any discussion of the political impact of hockey during the war. Beyond these specific drawbacks, the major flaws evident in these histories are similar to those that generally apply to popular histories: no depth of insight, no social or historical context, and no mention of contradicting viewpoints. This last point is the most understandable, as there are few differences in view between these popular writers. This leaves any academic examiner with the challenge of trying to squeeze some valuable information from these deficient sources. Still, there are few outright fallacies, merely some questionable conclusions, and they present a solid base of raw data from which to start.

Sociological Views Of Sport

The inadequate historical documentation of wartime hockey reflects the lack in academic inspection into that area of history. The numerous inaccuracies and biases that have crept into the popular literature have thus far gone unchecked. This lack of academic attention reflects not only the general lack of sport literature in Canada, but also the thinness of social history in general concerning Canada during the Second World War. Very little has been written concerning the Canadian home front through a meaningful social approach; the vast majority of work concerning Canada's war effort is political in nature.[50] This is partly a result of a catch-22 situation: since there has been so much written on Canada's war years from a political angle, many historians with a fresh

[50] With the notable exception of Ruth Pierson. They're Women After All: The Second World War and Canadian Womanhood. (Toronto, 1986).

approach and who are interested in social history look to areas of history less dominated by political matters. As a result, there has been much attention directed towards the important military, economic, and political issues of the war, and not enough on social aspects. This is not to argue this attention is undeserved, however there seems to be an imbalance. While there are several detailed books devoted to one specific event, like the conscription crisis, there is not one major work on general social issues, such as wartime socio-cultural life, or, more specifically, hockey.

This lack of attention is even more surprising considering the recent recognition of the importance of sport to social culture. The sociology of sport is a relatively small, but rapidly expanding, genre that has begun to identify the importance of hockey to Canadian society. However, even here there is no one work devoting its entire attention to the wartime area, even though enough literature exists to give an indication of sports' importance in wartime society. The broadest consensus among sport sociologists about the importance of sport to society is simple: sport reflects the values of the society that supports it. Don Morrow argues that sport:

> Is an exacting metaphor, symbol, reinforcer, mirror of the central myth of western culture. What we project onto sport, especially its heroes, are the same values of superiority, hierarchy, man-power and worship of the marketplace and even romance.[51]

Morrow asserts that sports embody the values of modern Canadian society. One of the best ways of analyzing organized sports is to look how they evolved. Organized sports developed in Canada during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, following a similar emergence in Britain and the United States. At this same time, Canada itself was

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[51] Don Morrow, "The Myth of the Hero in Canadian Sport History," [hereafter Morrow, "Myth of the Hero"] Canadian Journal of History of Sport, 23 (1 December 1992): 75.

undergoing fundamental changes. Dominant influences on changes in Canadian society during this great transformation included: dramatic demographic shifts due to changes in ethnic composition and population distribution, Canada's relationship with the U.S. and Great Britain, the emerging dominance of the Anglophone urban middle class, the physical growth of Canada, and the growth of cities and industrial capitalism.[52] In the words of Robert Brown and Ramsey Cook, Canada was a "nation transformed" in these years.[53] Not only did these changes affect the development of organized sport in Canada, but sports reflected these changes.

Many sports writers, especially journalists, tend to take a "rational" view when approaching the development of modern sport; this can be called the "theory of industrial society" or the "functionalist theory".[54] Promoters of this view tend to think of modern sport as more "developed" or "mature" than pre-modern, folk sports and recreational activities. Similarly, they portray modern, technologically-advanced western society to be more developed than non-western or historical societies. In their model, technology, urbanization and industrialization are the only factors needed to explain the emergence of "modern" sport. "Modern" sport is almost diametrically opposed to "traditional" games, as rational, structured ways of playing sport replaced the irrational, chaotic and backward. In general, "modern" sport is viewed as socially positive, open to broader segments of the population (like women). The organization of sport was a voluntary

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[52] Alan Metcalfe, Canada Learns to Play, [hereafter Metcalfe] (Toronto, 1987): 10.
[53] Please see Robert C. Brown and Ramsey Cook, Canada 1886-1921: A Nation Transformed, (Toronto: 1974): 1.
[54] Anthony Giddens, Sociology: A Brief but Critical Introduction, (New York, 1982): 31-42; as cited in Richard Gruneau and David Whitson, Hockey Night in Canada, [hereafter Gruneau and Whitson] (Toronto, 1993): 49; Richard Gruneau, "Modernization or Hegemony: Two Views on Sport and Social Development." [hereafter Gruneau, "Modernization or Hegemony"] in Jean Harvey and Hart Canton, Not Just A Game, [hereafter Harvey and Cantelon] (Ottawa, 1988): 10-18; Stanley Eitzen and George Sage, Sociology of North American Sport, [hereafter Eitzen and Sage] (Dubuque, Iowa, 1986): 102.

process, where organized activities arose due to crowded urban centers with limited athletic opportunities. Any conflicts that arose in this development were merely growing pains, not signs of underlying conflicts.[55] Sport was used to promote common values and maintain the social order, any, like many developments in western civilization, this was presumed to be "good."[56] Many authors, like McFarlane and Jenish, tend to characterize the change from "traditional" to "modern" sport as evolutionary, and good, if not desirable in terms of social control and cohesion.

Many sport sociologists and historians have pointed out the flaws in this theory, which can be described as presentist history at the very least. It tends to be judgmental, yet at the same time uncritical. Still, these critics would agree with the importance of some of the ideas of the rationalists, like the significant impact of urbanization and industrialization on social behavior. However, many would point to these instead as conditions for professionalization, not the inexorable result.[57] Academics like Alan Metcalfe emphasize the role of the elite - in this case the urban middle class. It was the elite who took the lead in controlling the development of "modern", or, to use a less value-laden term, organized sport.

On the other extreme from functionalism is the Marxist view of the development of sport. Marxists would argue that the bourgeoisie control sports like other areas of life, most notably through its commercialization. They agree with most sociologists in that sport serves a socialization function, but would argue that it is one that molds workers, enforcing what the bourgeoisie would deem the "acceptable" use of their leisure time,

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[55] Harvey and Canton, 12-16.
[56] Eitzen and Sage, 102.
[57] Richard Gruneau, Alan Metcalfe and Bruce Kidd have all argued for this; the most in depth critique appears by Gruneau, "Modernization or Hegemony" in Harvey and Canton, 9-32.

thereby creating a false consciousness. Sport reproduces capitalist society, reinforcing its ideals. It encourages competition and rewards victory, and is materialistic, bureaucratic, and results in unequal distribution.[58] Finally, Marxists would argue that sports are another form of alienation, since players (the proletariat) have their individuality suppressed for the goals of the "team" – the team being the possession of the management or coach (the bourgeoisie).[59]

Most Canadian sport sociologists do not accept the entire Marxist view, but fall somewhere in the middle, sharing in some Marxist approaches, while agreeing with the importance of industrialization and urbanization stressed in the functionalist theories. The discussion of the development of sport in this paper will therefore reflect the consensus view of several of the leading academics in sport research. Their approach can be called the "hegemonic model", one that owes much to the Marxist model, with some significant exceptions. Marxist writing tends to emphasis economic motivations, and is often too one-sided and deterministic in its conclusions.[60] It is the approach of the hegemonic model that resembles Marxism: the emphasis on concepts of power and ideology, and of the hegemony of the middle class in establishing the forms of professional sport.

In the Canadian situation, two of the most important developments in the late nineteenth century were demographic (growing urbanization) and economic (the second industrial revolution). Sporting clubs of the late nineteenth century were formed partly as a reaction to increased urbanization. As the amount of free space in populated areas became more and more limited, people were forced to play in fewer and fewer places,

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[58] Eitzen and Sage, 14.
[59] Ibid., 23.
[60] Gruneau, "Modernization or Hegemony," 26.

and these like-minded people eventually organized more formally.[61] Over decades, this led to inter-city, inter-provincal, and finally national competition, which required the formalization and codification of rules.[62] In hockey, this process started in 1885, when The Gazette published rules of ice hockey as established by McGill University. In 1893, the Stanley Cup was donated by Governor General Lord Stanley of Preston, thereby creating one unifying national championship. The next step was the formation of the National Hockey Association in 1910, which is recognized as the forerunner of the NHL, which was founded seven years later. The NHL became the only major professional league in North America in 1926, and therefore inherited the Stanley Cup by default. In 1929, the NHL accepted the Western Canadian rules which allowed forward passes in all three zones.[63] Since then, the National Hockey League has possessed hegemony over all major rule changes.[64]

The highest levels of modern professional sports are played in urban settings, and are played in massive structures owing their existence to steel and industrial design. This is true today, but it was just as true a century ago, although the scale has changed slightly. As the power and sophistication of industry has improved, hockey clubs have moved from outdoor to indoor facilities, from natural to artificial ice and lighting, from seating capacities in the hundreds to the tens of thousands. All of this also reflects the reality that organized professional sport was and is profit-driven, and the most modern facilities with

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[61] Ian F. Jobling, "Urbanization and Sport in Canada, 1867-1900," in Gruneau and John Albinson, Canadian Sport: Sociological Perspectives [hereafter Gruneau and Albinson] (Don Mills, Ont., 1976): 74-75; Metcalfe, William Humber and Lynne Marks, "Organized Sport" in Historical Atlas of Canada vIII plate 35.
[62] Metcalfe, 48.
[63] Gruneau and Whitson, 15; Isaacs, 73.
[64] Isaacs, 51; Jenish, 113; McFarlane, 60 Years of Hockey, 45.

the largest populations produce the largest profit margins - and controllable facilities guarantee the playing of games.

The emergence of standardized hockey occurred gradually; the first teams grew out of the clubs and associations of the Anglophone urban middle class, especially the Montreal Amateur Athletic Association (MAAA) and Toronto Athletic Club. Before the 1860s, those of British heritage dominated the Canadian sports scene, at this point mostly congregated around upper class sports, in yacht, golf, or tennis clubs, or playing imported British sports like cricket, curling, horseracing and rowing.[65] These clubs were very exclusive, with systems of nomination and annual fees. This exclusivity was not just based on wealth, but on religion and education, both serving to integrate and reinforce the ideology and values of these elites.[66] It was after the 1860s that the characteristics of organized sport began to appear, like inter-club competition and, significantly, the attendance of spectators. The new sports tended to be inclusive, and as sports became a source of entertainment, perhaps it was inevitable that some athletes would make their living by performing before spectators. Thus originated the tension between amateurism and professionalism in Canada, a tension that would have ramifications even into the Second World War.

The concept of amateurism was rooted in the "lifestyle of the leisured aristocracy of eighteenth century England."[67] Sport was a venue by which one proved one was a gentlemen (at this point, sport was a domain almost exclusively for men), by conforming to the spirit and letter of the law of each sport, but more importantly, the code of conduct

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[65] Allen E. Cox, Barbara N. Noonkester, Maxwell Howell and Reet Howell, "Sport in Canada, 1868-1900," in Maxwell Howell and Reet Howell, History of Sport in Canada, (Champaign, Ill., 1985): 108-112.
[66] Morrow, A Concise History of Sport in Canada, [hereafter Morrow, History of Sport] (Toronto, 1987): 32-33.
[67] Metcalfe, 119.

expected of a gentleman. To follow these rules was proof that one was a gentleman; the goal was to win, but also to accomplish that goal with honour. Basing expectations of 'gentlemanliness' in an informal unwritten set of social expectations, sport thereby guaranteed an exclusivity that "practically guaranteed" the exclusion of those outside the elite.[68] The only way to acquire knowledge of these rules would be to grow up in this system, and thus have these ideas become second nature. These ideas were passed on from Victorian England to Canada through British military bases, educational institutions, and immigration. Of course, amateurism was imported with one significant exception: a landed aristocracy. At first, this difficulty was obviated by the fact that only a select social class could afford to be involved in sport in Canada. As sport opened up during the 1860s and 1870s, it became necessary to establish a written and formal code of amateurism, to guarantee the purity of amateur competition against the "cancer" of emerging professionalism, or the inclusion of the 'wrong' classes in sport.[69]

What explains the "harsh, vitriolic and apparently paranoiac condemnations" of professionalism?[70] Alan Metcalfe speculated that this went back to one of the fundamental ideas of western civilization: the belief not only in the division of body and mind, but of the superiority of mind over body. Therefore, any activity perceived as solely geared to the body, like athletic endeavors, would be brutish and evil. This was amplified by Victorian ideas of hard work, where "play was unimportant, a distraction from the real meaning of life."[71] To make a living out of an activity that was supposed to only be inwardly and socially virtuous was unacceptable to the middle class. However,

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[68] Ibid., 120.
[69] Ibid., 117.
[70] Ibid., 124.
[71] Ibid., 124.

there were factors that weakened this ideology from almost the beginning. The adherence to this mind/body relationship was not universal in Canada; indeed, to most residents in a cold, hostile environment, body was at least as important as mind.

The real challenge to the ideological basis of amateurism came from the change from an industrializing, yet still rural, society to fully industrialized, "modern" society. The simplest illustration of this was the increasing emphasis on victory, which began to erode the principle of means being more important than ends. Organized leagues replaced challenge series, monetary rewards increased, and, most importantly for the demise of the amateur ideal, administrative structures became larger, and detached themselves from the athletes they were supposed to represent. This led to administrators and athletes having different ideologies – even within the same organizations.[72]

The distance between athlete and administrator grew further around the turn of the century. This led to heated amateur-professional debates, especially during the first decade of the new century. Before that occurred, though, the formation of most modern sports was well under way. Hockey's rules were formalized only in 1885, but a scant eight years later, there was a dominion championship trophy. The old class elite established both of these, even though all classes played hockey-like games; quite simply, only the gentlemanly elite was able to entrench its version of the future of the game. It was the social elite, the urban middle class -- which had the "resources, time and management skills" to organize tournaments and formalize rules that would establish their method of play as the only acceptable method of play on a national level.[73] This was the only social segment that possessed the power to institutionalize its rules, establish its

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[72] Ibid., 126-127.
[73] Gruneau and Whitson, 45.

version as the traditional standard, and legitimate its practices to make it appear to be the dominant mode of play.[74] Again, the Anglophone, central-Canadian middle class domination is illustrated here, as its version of hockey was dominant very early on. Montreal hockey rules produced a slow, deliberate game, stemming most significantly from the ban of the forward pass. This version of the game followed closely the rules and style of play of rugby. Halifax play, on the other hand, owed more to lacrosse than rugby, and thus was a much more up-tempo game: this version allowed and encouraged forward passes. Montreal rules were formalized and published though, and they endured and became dominant, even though the Halifax game was much more esthetically pleasing. This latter version would eventually return and become dominant four decades later, long after the professional game in the Maritimes had disappeared.[75]

The elite imprinted its own values and judged the 'acceptability' of certain sports. This elite determined which games represented "ideas of moral usefulness of games, middle-class respectability, and gentlemanly propriety."[76] In many cases, social pressure was not enough to banish 'unacceptable' games from the mainstream of lower-class lives. This limitation was overcome by outlawing many popular working-class sports, like cock fighting and dog racing, and making illegal associated social activities, like gambling and drinking. All of this was part of the effort to enforce elite ideology on the mass citizenry.

Yet another example of this middle class dominance was the struggle over labour discipline in the creation of modern industrial society. Whereas in a mercantile mode of production, there were no factories, no assembly lines that needed constant supervision of the labour force, work became more and more structured throughout the nineteenth

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[74] Harvey and Canton, 22.
[75] Gruneau and Whitson, 46.
[76] Harvey and Canton, 21.

century. Due mostly to technological changes and growing competition, the new economy required more per capita productivity from workers. In an effort to gain maximum productivity from workers and technology, work became more structured: specific arrival times, shift lengths and work places became not only the norm, but also a necessity. Eventually, this also extended to leisure time: while workers clamoured for a recreational diversion from an urban, regimented life, owners wanted to encourage healthy living and boost morale, which would in turn boost efficiency.[77] Capitalists set up and controlled a recreational system that benefited their economic stake in the new industrial society. At the same time, it also benefited the workers, who gained some immediate release from a dreary existence in factory life. This is the perfect illustration of the hegemonic theory espoused by Gruneau and others, none of whom would argue that the dominant class had *complete* hegemony over the development of modern sport. While the elite, or later team owners, may have been able to establish their vision of sport, it was not unaffected by the athletes that actually played the game, and later the spectators who demanded better entertainment value. Modern sport was therefore an amalgamation of class interest, hedonism and artisanal quality of play.

Eventually leadership in the development of sport passed from the middle class elite to the urban business class. This occurred gradually, as professional sport began to take hold, and eventually gain not only broad acceptance, but also began to become dominant. The amateur ideal, and the ensuing debate around it, may have existed well into the new century, but increasingly only a select social group adhered to these amateur ideals. The death-knell for amateur sport, and the leadership of the elite middle class, was the development of industrial society. Professional spectator sport developed partly out of

[77] Eitzen and Sage, 40.

urban living requirements, where leisure needs had to be fulfilled in the market place due to space and time restrictions. This led to capital accumulation and leisure spending, making sports another form of market capitalism, as it was geared to attract spectators and turn a profit. Reflecting the modern Canadian economy, owners, not the employees (the players), controlled modern sport. League structures, like the NHL, are perfect profit-maximizing organizations. To maximize profits for each participant team, like the Ottawa Senators, leagues must maximize joint profits, exemplified through the NHL. This was done in professional hockey by creating a cartel (again the NHL), which controlled competition for players and markets.[78] The entry draft ensured that only one team could negotiate with a young player for four years, prior to which teams had exclusive negotiating rights in perpetuity by simply adding them to their negotiating list. The NHL Board of Governors closely controlled expansion throughout its history, partly so that no city was over-represented, partly, some argue, to keep from sharing the ample profits.[79]

As mass sport began to grow, it came into the mainstream of popular culture. An important, perhaps the most important, instrument in this development, was the media. In the early days of organized sport, newspaper and telegraph coverage were vital in promoting sport as part of the social life of Canadians. By the 1880s most large newspapers reported on sporting events, and some devoted regular columns to sports.[80] Even popular authors like D'Arcy Jenish note the importance of the media, and especially the news-carrying capabilities of the telegraph around the turn-of-the-century, in making

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[78] Gruneau, Albinson and Rob Beamish, "The Formal Organization of Sport: Introduction," in Gruneau and Albinson, 219.
[79] Cruise and Griffiths, 131-133
[80] Jobling, 70; Minko Sotiron, From Politics to Profit (Toronto, 1987): 117.

hockey a truly national sport. When the Winnipeg Victorias challenged the Montreal Wanderers for the Stanley Cup in 1896, games were "broadcast" to the offices of the Winnipeg Free Press, and to hotels with telegraph machines, via local telegraphs. Thus, the 1896 Stanley Cup finals "laid the foundation for an enduring Canadian cultural phenomenon known as the hockey broadcast." [81] The power of media only grew, to the point where Sidney Cook believed that "whoever controls the microphones and printing presses can make or unmake belief over night."[82] In the late nineteen-twenties, a young man from Toronto would begin broadcasting Maple Leaf games from the Mutual Street arena, and would later become one of the most recognizable voices in Canadian history. Foster Hewitt is a legend not only in sports circles, but also to Canadians at large over the four decades that he covered Toronto Maple Leafs' games.

Thus professional sport installed itself at the center of Canadian values. Sport emerged from its beginning as an expression of the values of a small class of elites and transformed itself into a broad cultural phenomenon, almost pervasive in its reach throughout Canadian society. At the same time, sports continued to reflect the values of that society. There is ample evidence of this, and many ways to look at the value of sport in a society. Morrow examines this phenomenon by analyzing Canadian sporting heroes. He argued that "anyone set up on the heroic pedestal is emblematic of that culture and culture values that placed the hero there." Part of the reason for creating heroes, according to Morrow, is that our society is "addicted to science and devoid, for the most

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[81] Jenish, 17, 21.
[82] Sidney Cook, The Hero in History: A Study in Limitation and Possibility, (Boston, 1943): 10; as quoted in Morrow, "Myth of the Hero," 72.

part, of a sense of mystery and symbols."[83] Ken Dryden may have the most insight into the cultural role of hockey in Home Game. As Tod Hoffman suggests,

> Dryden is concerned with hockey's contribution to the creation of community, its role as something which speaks to all Canadians across the myriad barriers inserted to establish ever more narrow categories of people. Hockey serves as a communal source of memory and ritual, of joy and sorrow.[84]

Bruce Kidd used the 1972 Summit Series between Canada and the Soviet Union as an example of a sporting event becoming a cultural symbol, of our "nationally affirming accomplishments."[85] Paul Henderson became a national icon overnight because of one goal: his professional career may be above average, but certainly not deserving of a place even in the Hockey Hall of Fame. Yet, at one point or another, young hockey players of an entire generation, skating on ponds across the country, dreamed of being Paul Henderson.

Another aspect of the attraction of sport is that it provides a distraction from the routine of modern life. Jobling describes this partly as a response to industrialization. Building sporting venues was a concession made to workers clamouring for better working conditions.[86] Distraction may even be an understatement: Metcalfe argues that sport ceased being "simply a diversion" in the lives of factory workers, and began to be "central to life itself" for citizens, whose jobs were boring and monotonous.[87] Kidd describes how "sports stir the passion and excite the imagination, often in unforgettable ways."[88] In part, sport provides an escape from the real world, yet at the same time is a

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[83] Morrow, "Myth of the Hero," 73.
[84] Tod Hoffman, "Games of Our Lives," in Peter Donnelly, ed., Taking Sport Seriously: Social Issues in Canadian Sport, (Toronto, 1997): 31.
[85] Kidd, 5.
[86] Jobling, 71.
[87] Metcalfe, 128.
[88] Kidd, 6.

part of the real world. In going to a movie or a play, one knows that the end is scripted, already decided. At a sporting event, *anything* can happen, and nothing is decided until the game is ended – just like in life.

Sport is thus replete with symbolism, a symbolism that is significant in relation to the greater society. One of the strongest symbolic links is between hockey and war. Guns are replaced with hockey sticks; the object of the game is to penetrate the opponents' defense and score on their net -- their homeland, as it were. Teams have uniforms, just as in war – the Maple Leafs' uniform is even based on the maple leaf Canadian soldiers used to distinguish them from the rest of the British army in the Great War. Athletic sacrifice can be compared to that of a soldier. Just like a soldier, an athlete must follow the orders of his commander (coach) in order to reach an objective; and in team sports at least, the individual athlete is subordinate in importance to the team (or unit). This symbolism is not limited to war. Perhaps the strongest symbolic association of hockey and Canada is the domination of a cold environment: playing a game on a frozen surface symbolized Canadians' domination of our environment, of the frozen, seemingly barren wasteland. In hockey, "man has taken the elements of immobile winter / the frozen land, and suspended life / and fashioned them into a rapid, vigorous sport" thereby conquering it.[89]

Beyond symbolism, one can also make links between religion and sport. Many parallels exist between the worlds of organized religion and organized sport. Both share similar elements of structure: they take place at sacred times and places, around ceremonies. The athlete can even be linked to a priest, "insofar as others live through him: as he dons his uniform, he is in effect donning priestly vestments; in his athletic

[89] Roland Barthes, as quoted in Kidd, 5-6.

contest, he sacrifices himself, and thereby sacrifices for others, which is a priestly role."[90] Even the structures themselves in which the activities take place are linked: "Theologian Michael Novak calls [sports stadiums] 'the cathedrals of the modern world.'"[91] In Home Game, Dryden hints at the centrality of the hockey arena to the community, just as the cathedral or parish used to be in most Canadian towns.

Sports can assume many symbolic meanings. Perhaps the most important point is that sport is redolent with social and national meaning, meanings that many academics and popular authors tend to overlook. While popular authors may tend to state this symbolic power without really examining its work, at least they are acknowledging sports do have some social impact. In times of sacrifice and ordeal, the importance of this activity is highlighted, and offers some insight into the values and beliefs of the citizens of the society that must chose what is truly important to it. Hockey's continuation during the Second World War may be due to a number of factors, including economic, political and social, but there is no doubt that it is a reflection of Canadian society, of Canadians, that young men flocked to rinks as well as ranks.

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[90] Michael Novak, The Joy of Sports, [hereafter Novak] (New York, 1967): 132, as cited by Jan DeVeber Marlan, "Hockey and the Sacred: Sport as a bridge to the self in the Individualization process," in Psyche and Sports, Murray Stein and John Hollwitz, ed. (Toronto, 1995): 70.
[91] Novak, 126, as cited in Kidd, 4.

CHAPTER TWO
THE RISE OF PROFESSIONAL HOCKEY AND THE NHL

How can one seriously analyze hockey's contribution to Canada's Second World War effort? Today, many look at multi-national professional sport as just another form of entertainment, just another global industry, like television and the film industry, competing for the same limited dollars pleasure-seekers are willing to spend. This seems far removed from Canada's national pastime -- mythic hockey played on outdoor rinks by youngsters dreaming of nothing but the game itself. However, when sport first developed in an organized manner, it *was* dominated by amateurism and localism. The line between hockey as simple hedonism and big business, and hockey as the national pastime, was blurred for much of the sport's early existence, and arguably even into the Second World War. The worlds of amateur and professional hockey were not clear-cut; hockey was not even a full-time occupation for even the most elite of National Hockey League stars. This situation arose out of the keen tension between amateurism and professionalism of the turn-of-the-century.

To understand what happened in the world of elite-level hockey during the war, the evolution of the game must be understood. Choosing the word "elite" instead of simply "professional" in this context is deliberate: the war years marked the downfall of the delicate amateur-professional coexistence that had prevailed in hockey since the first decade of the century. After the war many of the so-called senior amateur leagues openly declared themselves to be "professional." At the same juncture, the NHL established its hegemony over the entire North American hockey structure, completing its ascendancy to the apex of hockey power and leadership. This ascendancy only hastened a trend that was

implicit since the NHL formed in 1917; however, this path was not inevitable, nor was it lacking in obstacles for the NHL.

When hockey's rules were systematized in Montreal in 1885, there was no distinction between an amateur and a professional. There were no coaches or managers, as players had total control over the game. Captains served as coaches, whose role was not that important since all players played the entire game without substitution, so that there was consequently little in the way of complex strategy. No owners, let alone leagues, yet existed. Within twenty years, however, hockey was at least a viable organized enterprise, if not yet big business. And as hockey became profitable, bureaucratic organization and team ownership became the norm, first as local amateur leagues, later as bi-national professional organizations. And as these owners began to focus more and more on profit, players lost control over the game and, even if they gained a salary for their talents and dedication, soon found themselves in a wage market in which they would sometimes win, but mostly lose, economic advantage.

The rise of professional leagues and the slow decline of amateur leagues in Canada can be traced back to the decision of the Canadian Amateur Hockey Association (CAHA) in 1899 to allow amateur players to compete with and against professional players without actually becoming professional players themselves.[1] The importance of such an incursion cannot be underestimated, since it was the first loophole that allowed professionals to play for the Stanley Cup. Since the Cup was supposed to be an amateur title, professionals could not participate in Stanley Cup matches, making professional teams ineligible for Cup competition. Both professional and amateur players were now

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[1] Alan Metcalfe, "The Growth of Organized Sport and the Development of Amateurism in Canada, 1867-1914," in Jean Harvey and Hart Cantelon, eds., Not Just A Game, (Ottawa, 1988): 45.

allowed to compete head-to-head, and this was the first step in the acceptance of professionalism. Still, there was a perception that associated professional players with moral laxity and lower athletic prowess, but this was slowly being overcome by the undeniably superior skills displayed by professional players.[2] This slow shift in opinion during the emerging debate between professionals and amateurs eventually led to contention over the actual status of players: Who was an amateur? Who could challenge for the Stanley Cup? No guidelines were ever set down, but as the century dawned, no openly professional teams could yet challenge for the Cup.[3]

While professional teams went on barnstorming tours throughout Canada and the Northeastern United States for years, the first truly professional league emerged only in 1905.[4] The International Professional Hockey League (IPHL) had member teams mostly in small American towns, but gained popularity due to its exiting brand of play.[5] While the first openly professional league in Canada was established in Manitoba (the Manitoba Professional Hockey League, or MPHL) in 1907, it was widely know that other leagues at this time were paying their best players, or at least supplying "comfortable" jobs. Among these was the Ottawa Valley Hockey League, which ignited the first salary war, and established the first employees' market for player services. However, owners quickly responded, and soon competition for players led to the first 'reserve clauses' in contracts that tied players to teams for longer periods and from a younger age.[6] This was done for several reasons. First, the owners of these teams and leagues, like M. J. O'Brien of

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[2] Wayne Simpson, "Hockey," [hereafter Simpson] in Don Morrow, ed., Concise History of Sport, (Toronto, 1989): 180, 182.
[3] Brian McFarlane, "Our Electrifying Game: Hockey in the Era of Gaslight," [hereafter McFarlane, "Our Electrifying Game,"] in Dan Diamond, ed., Total Hockey, [hereafter Diamond] (Toronto, 1998): 25.
[4] Neil Isaacs, Checking Backing, [hereafter Isaacs] (New York, 1977): 26, Simpson, 183.
[5] Isaacs, 30.
[6] Simpson, 185, 187.

Renfrew -- business men first and for-most -- did not want to allow salaries to outstrip revenues. Equally important, though, was the perception of fans: the owners wanted to protect their image, and not give opponents of professionalism fodder for more criticism. Casual fans were much more likely to be swayed by the ideals of amateurism if they perceived professional players to be making exorbitant amounts of money.

Hockey was quickly becoming part of popular culture in Canada during the heady years of the Laurier Boom. Even in these early years of Stanley Cup competition, attention was centered on hockey in the communities that were lucky enough to make it to the finals. In 1896, for instance, the Winnipeg Victorias, as champions of Manitoba and Northwest Hockey Association, earned the right to challenge the eastern champion Montreal Victorias for the Stanley Cup. Due to travel restrictions, and as the incumbent champions were from the east, all games were played in Montreal. During the course of the series, Winnipeg residents called local hotels and the newspaper offices of the Free Press for updates on the game. As Winnipeg came closer to winning the Cup, crowds formed outside arenas, hotel ballrooms, theatres and newspaper offices – anyplace with a telegraph machine.[7] As the Free Press reported: "No less than 2,000 cold 'plunkers' were passed over the Windsor Hotel counters tonight..." indicating the popularity of this young sport, and its even younger championship trophy.[8] Hockey was rooting itself in the modern, urban, hedonistic culture of the century. In 1903, Winnipeg again challenged a Montreal team for the Cup; this time Bell telephone was prepared, adding ten extra

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[7] Darcy Jenish, The Stanley Cup [hereafter Jenish] (Toronto, 1992): 16-21.
[8] McFarlane, "Our Electrifying game," 25.

operators, who answered over 30,000 calls - no fewer than fifty at a time. Each call asked the same question: "What's the score?"[9]

Hockey soon became linked to civic pride across the nation. Professional hockey teams became the symbol of prosperity for small mining towns.[10] Fueling this was the quest for the Stanley Cup. Within ten years, not only was the Cup a famous challenge trophy, but it "had become the most hotly pursued prize in hockey."[11] Leading community members, like O'Brien, established teams to challenge for the Cup – and to promote their town, as a form of civil pride and advertising.[12] Another indication of the linkage between the city and the team itself is how the team nickname became secondary to the city name; many city teams simply adopted the name "hockey club" behind their civil name.[13] The highest quality of hockey – both professional and amateur – was still played in small towns across the country and Northeastern U.S.; urban teams, however, were beginning to dominate. Of all these small town teams, only one, the Kenora Thistles in 1907, ever claimed hockey's most coveted trophy. This local team enjoyed only fleeting glory, at that: it won the Cup in a Challenge series in January, then lost it in March, to a club from one of the biggest cities in Canada, Montreal's Wanderers. Brian McFarlane claims 1907 "was a season of battle between amateurism and professionalism," but by 1908, "professionalism came into full bloom." [14] This may be an over-simplification, but it serves as an indicator of when professionalism really began to

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[9] Ibid., 26.
[10] Ibid., 24; Simpson, 185.
[11] Jenish, 35.
[12] Ibid., 65.
[13] For example, three of five teams in the Federal Amateur Hockey League used this moniker; even as late as 1909/10 Haileybury of the NHL used this name. Please see Ernie Fitzsimmons, "Early Professional, Early Senior, WHA and Modern Minor Professional League Standings," [hereafter Fitzsimmons, "Early League Standings,"] in Diamond, 384-385.
[14] McFarlane, Sixty Years of Hockey, [hereafter McFarlane, Sixty Years of Hockey] (Toronto, 1970): 18.

dominate, on the ice at least. In 1908, after Montreal Wanderers claimed their third Stanley Cup, they declared themselves professional – the first professional team to be Stanley Cup champions. They may not have won it as professionals, but nor were they stripped of the titles after the announcement. No one was naïve enough to believe Wanderer players had not been paid for their Stanley Cup run, either. One year later, they joined the openly professional National Hockey Association, the forerunner of the NHL. This, according to McFarlane and others, can be considered as the crucial turning point toward the dominance of professionalism and urbanization in hockey. In 1912, O'Brien moved his Renfrew Creamery Kings, or Millionaires, as they were better known, to Toronto. The 1912/13 season marked the last small town challenge for the Cup.[15] Since then only major metropolitan centers, including American cities, have played for the Cup. The hegemony of professionalism would seem to be complete at this point, but amateurism was still alive and well, still outnumbering professional clubs and leagues by a large margin. There is also evidence that many still questioned the morality of professionalism, as some athletes were reluctant to turn professional, and other leaders questioned the values of accepting money for sport.[16] Hockey had by the Great War set-up a two-tiered structure with a professional pinnacle and an amateur base.

Professional leagues established themselves at the cost of many quasi-amateur leagues by the end of the first decade of the new century. The Ontario Professional Hockey League (OPHL) and Canadian Hockey Association (CHA) were the two key

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[15] Jenish, 66.

[16] Metcalfe, Canada Learns to Play, (Toronto, 1987): 127. Bill Legs and C. H. Little would be two examples of amateur athletes who turned down professional contracts. See Ed Sweeny, "Senior Hockey and the Allan Cup," [hereafter Fitzsimmons, "Senior Hockey"] in Diamond, 401 and Peter Wilton, "The Oxford Canadians," in Diamond, 430.

leagues to accomplish this.[17] The OPHL, founded in 1907, and CHA, organized in 1909, established professional clubs in major central-Canadian cities like Toronto, Ottawa, Quebec and Montreal. Teams like Smith Falls, Brockville, and Calumet-Larium (Michigan) played in leagues such as the Federal Amateur Hockey League, the MPHL and even the IPHL could not compete for the best players against such well-supported (both by fans and deep-pocketed owners) organizations as the bigger city teams.[18] After the Wanderers victory in 1908, only professional clubs in urban centers hoisted the Cup in victory; however, amateur clubs were in the process of re-orientating themselves.

By 1910, the NHA had established itself as the preeminent professional hockey league, and used this position to introduce a salary cap of $5,000, as well as reducing the number of players on the ice from seven to six, eliminating the rover position -- and the salary that accompanied it.[19] This was an attempt to slow spiraling player salaries, a response to the mad competition for the best players among a handful of rival leagues from coast to coast. Unfortunately, the salary cap failed due to competition from a new league that opened in 1911/12, the Pacific Coast Hockey Association. Founded by the famous hockey family, the Patricks, the league went on to raid the NHA for its best players. The Patricks signed Fred "Cyclone" Taylor, the best player of the era, for $5,250 for a fourteen game season. By comparison, the best-paid baseball player, the legendary Ty Cobb, was being paid $6,500 for a 154 game season; a store clerk could expect $35 a month.[20] Some justified this expenditure by arguing that hockey was a violent contact sport, and players were on the ice for the entire sixty minutes. However, these salaries

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[17] Simpson, 186.
[18] Fitzsimmons, "Early League Standings," 394-385.
[19] McFarlane, Sixty Years of Hockey, 20; Simpson, 187.
[20] Jenish, 64.

were exceptionally high, even compared to a decade earlier: players were paid between $25 and $75 a week over a 12 game schedule by the IPHL in 1905.[21] This salary escalation was a direct result of the competition between major rivals, the NHA and PCHL. Lester Patrick, for example, also made a generous offer to all the Quebec team's players; only three accepted, but all the others received raises from Quebec.[22]

This short upswing for the players was interrupted by world politics. War broke out in Europe in August, 1914, and hockey was not spared its terrible price. As president James T. Sutherland of the CAHA explained:

> It takes nerves and gameness to play the game of hockey. The same qualities are necessary in the greater game that is now being played in France and on the other fighting fronts. The thousands of hockey players throughout the Dominion of Canada have all the necessary qualifications.[23]

Hockey, it seemed, was a metaphor and a training ground for the game of nationalism. Most prominently, one of early hockey's greatest stars, a member of Stanley Cup Champion Ottawa Silver Seven, "One-Eyed" Frank McGee, lost his life overseas. A relative of slain politician D'Arcy McGee, Frank enlisted in September 1914 at the age of 32 and, despite being blind in one eye, went overseas and was one of thousands of Canadian soldiers killed in the Battle of the Somme on September 16, 1916. American hockey stars were involved as well; the greatest in U.S. history to that point, Hobey Baker, enlisted in the army and was awarded the Croix de Guerre. Along with Allan "Scotty" Davidson who was also killed in action, three members of the Hockey Hall of Fame had distinguished military careers in the First World War.[24] In honour of these and

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[21] Simpson, 183.
[22] Eric Whitehead, The Patricks: Hockey's Royal Family, [hereafter Whitehead] (Toronto, 1980): 117.
[23] Peter Wilton, "Hockey in World War I," in Diamond, 42
[24] Jenish, 61; Wilton, "Hockey in World War I," 43.

the many other Canadian hockey players who gave their lives for their country, the OHA donated the Memorial Cup for the Canadian junior championship.[25]

During the war, some hockey players were able to wear two uniforms – one athletic and the other military. Unfortunately, they were soldiers first in a bloody war of attrition. Entire teams enlisted and entered various leagues as army clubs. By 1915/16, seventeen teams in the Ontario Hockey Association (OHA) were battalion teams. In 1916, the Winnipeg 61st Battalion claimed the Allan Cup, the senior amateur championship of Canada, and then shipped overseas. Fellow Winnipeg military team, the Falcons, enlisted in the army and were made part of the 223rd Battalion; three former Falcons lost their lives on the fields of France: Olie Turnbull, Buster Thorsteinson, and George Cumbers.[26] The OHA accepted the 40th Sportsman's Battery, organized by Gordon Southam (son of the founder of the print media empire), and coached by Conn Smythe. Halfway through the 1915/16 season, the 40th Battery was sent to France, were they too took part in the Battle of the Somme.[27] The NHA granted the 228th Battalion, or Northern Fusiliers, a franchise for the 1916/17 season; they, too, were unable to complete the season, as they were sent overseas in February 1917. This army club dominated the first half on the season, prompting complaints and accusations from fellow players: these soldiers received extra pay and special considerations, and the club seemed to benefit from transfers of exceptional stickhandlers to its ranks.[28] The war also cost the NHA/NHL two franchises, in Quebec and Montreal, the latter due to the destruction of its

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[25] Sweeny, "Junior Hockey and the Memorial Cup," in Diamond, 407.
[26] Wilton, "Hockey in World War I," 42.
[27] Conn Smythe with Scott Young, If You Can't Beat 'em in the Alley, [hereafter Smythe] (Toronto, 1982): 34-35.
[28] McFarlane, Stanley Cup Fever: 100 Years of Hockey Greatness, [hereafter McFarlane, Stanley Cup Fever] (Toronto, 1992): 43.

building. When guns fell silent over four bloody years later, hockey provided all it could, and paid a very steep price. Several of its star players did not return, and young men who should have been carrying sticks, not guns, gave their lives for King and country. This outstanding record of service would not be repeated in the next world war.

Professional hockey would, however, emerge from the war with a distinctly modern look. In November 1917, the National Hockey League emerged from the chaos of the Great War. The real impetus for the formation of the league was not for competitive, or even commercial purposes -- it was personal. Owners from Ottawa, Quebec and the two Montreal franchises wanted to oust unpopular Toronto owner Ed Livingstone. Ottawa manager Tommy Gorman afterward told the only journalist covering the meeting that "without him [Livingstone] we can get down to the business of making money."[29] This statement revealed more about the attitude of the NHL than Gorman could have possibly imagined. First, it illustrated how the league operated like a cartel -- the "old boys network" that would run the NHL for decades was established right from its origins.[30] Second, it left no doubt that the main goal of the new league was commercial: the goal to form a tight, comfortable cartel. There was no question of this league being organized with an amateur ideal in mind, with the goal of creating an elite league where the best players could play against one another at the highest level of competition; instead it was a cartel where the owners' sole goal was profit..

Between 1911 and 1926, only the NHA/NHL and PCHA and its western-successor leagues challenged each other for the Cup. This represented a major shift from earlier days, when seventeen leagues and fifty-four clubs competed for the Cup between

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[29] McFarlane, Sixty Years of Hockey, 26.
[30] David Cruise and Alison Griffiths, Net Worth: Exploding the Myths of Pro Hockey, [hereafter Cruise and Griffiths] (Toronto, 1991): 114.

1893 and 1911. When only the PCHL and NHL remained in 1917, their respective champions met to decide the Stanley Cup winners for almost a decade, setting up an east-west battle for hockey supremacy every spring. In order to make the finals more compatible for two leagues that still played with different rules that resulted in very different games, a number of rule changes were also introduced, including the allowance of the forward pass in the east (NHL).[31] The WHL folded in 1926, but not before Lester Patrick engineered a deal which sold the WHL players *en mass* to the NHL, and specifically the new teams in Chicago and Detroit, netting his league $17,000.[32]

As bigger leagues replaced smaller leagues, arenas became bigger, to accommodate the growing demand for tickets. Perhaps one of the best ways to examine the growing popularity of professional hockey, and the arenas that contained it, is to look at the history of the home rinks of the most successful team in NHL history: the Montreal Canadiens. On January 5th, 1910, the Canadiens played their first-ever home game at the Jubilee rink, which could accommodate only 3,200 fans. Then, the Habs moved to the Westmount home of their city neighbours, the Wanderers; this increased their attendance capacity to 6,000. After the Wanderers arena burned down in 1917 (forcing the Wanderers to fold out of the newly-formed NHL), the Canadiens moved into the Mount Royal Arena, with its slightly higher seating capacity.[33] It was later decided by a number of Montreal businessmen, including future Canadiens owner Donat Raymond, that Montreal required the "ideal" hockey arena.[34] On November 29th, 1929, the Forum

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[31] Jenish, 90.
[32] Whitehead, 159. This was especially lucrative for the Patricks: the player contracts were no longer valid since the league no longer existed.
[33] Claude Mouton, The Montreal Canadiens: An Illustrated Guide of a Hockey Dynasty, [hereafter Mouton] (Toronto, 1987): 109, 111-112.
[34] William Brown, The Montreal Maroons: The Forgotten Stanley Cup Champions, [hereafter Brown] (Montreal, 1999): 36-39.

opened its doors, after only 159 days of construction – and as home of a rival Montreal-based NHL club, the Maroons. It was also the first home of a professional hockey team in Montreal with artificial ice.[35] Though it was home to the Maroons, the Canadiens played the first hockey game in the Forum to a capacity crowd of 9,000 spectators due to scheduling conflicts with their own rink, while the Maroons opened their season on the road.[36] And this did not include standing-room capacity; two weeks later, at the first meeting between the Canadiens and Maroons, over 11,000 spectators crammed into the arena.[37] These two NHL clubs shared the Forum between 1926, when the Canadiens moved in permanently, and 1938, when the Maroons folded. In 1949, the Forum was expanded to seat 12,500, and in 1968 was renovated to fit 16,500.[38] None of these figures included standing room capacity. Other teams, however, also skated on the Forum's ice. The NHL clubs alternated Saturday and Thursday dates, senior teams played Wednesday nights and Sunday afternoons, while the junior leagues played Monday nights. Industrial and semi-professional leagues occupied the rest of the week, Tuesday and Friday nights.[39] In less than fifteen years, the seating capacity of the Forum tripled. Various groups used the new building seven days a week, making it a center for the community and attracting an array of hockey fans.

Increasing seating capacity was partly due to growing urbanization, but it is significant that owners of these teams felt confident they could fill these huge new arenas. Ken Dryden speaks of the community rink as the center of urban, secular life, and although he wrote his book in the 1980s, one can see how this phenomena stretches back

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[35] Ibid., 42.
[36] Ibid., 443. There is strong speculation that this "scheduling conflict" was arranged by the Canadiens.
[37] Ibid., 31.
[38] The Molson Center seats almost 22,000, with no standing room capacity.
[39] Mouton, 114.

in history. Dryden points out that many of these community arenas were constructed in the immediate post-World War Two economic boom; that is also why many were called 'Memorial' arenas.[40] At a time of post-war austerity in municipal affairs, it is significant that they chose to build hockey arenas. Stadiums would have served more purposes, allowing for the playing of football, soccer, baseball, even track and field. In some places, stadiums may not have been viable due to the weather, but even in areas with hospitable weather, like Vancouver, indoor rinks were built. Hockey arenas represented something more to a community: the same way professional leagues became a symbol of prosperity and growth, so did hockey arenas after the war become icons of national bonding.

Increased professionalization and the urbanization of the sport had a powerful centralizing effect. Cities and economies on the margins of the continent could not compete with increased Americanization. In the 1880s, there was no real commercial potential in hockey -- no big crowds, and therefore no market for professionals.[41] Competitive play, some argue, was a response to the market appeal in the United States.[42] Later, it was those big crowds, arenas and money, which "spelled the end of major league hockey in many parts of Canada."[43] The Maritimes had a professional league for five years, but never challenged for the Cup due largely to the inability to pay for top talent. Perhaps the most influential decision was made in 1916, when it was determined that American-based teams were allowed to compete for the Cup. Stanley Cup trustee William Foran put it this way: "The Stanley Cup represents more than the championship

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[40] Ken Dryden and Roy McGregor. Home Game, (Toronto, 1989): 22-23.
[41] Simpson, 180.
[42] Isaacs, 26-27.
[43] Jenish, 119.

of Canada. It's really the symbol of the championship of the world."[44] Major league hockey survived in the west for almost two decades, but eventually succumbed to the America-backed dollars of the NHL. After the demise of the last professional league to challenge the NHL in 1926, the WHL, the best players from all over Canada came to be paid to play for NHL clubs.[45] And more and more often, these clubs were based in American cities. The professional hockey landscape had shifted from east-west rivalries to north-south competition, and central Canadian teams would soon be a relatively minor player even in his setup.

In 1924, Boston became the first American team in the previously all-Canadian, four-team NHL. This was also when Montreal's English team, the Maroons, joined the league. The following year, the New York Americans and Pittsburgh Pirates were added. This brought league membership to seven – the Hamilton team had been "sold" to the New York Americans. In 1924/25, the league expanded the schedule from 24 to 30 games, and most teams increased their payrolls accordingly, except for Hamilton. Just before the finals, the regular-season champion Hamilton Tigers not surprisingly walked out on strike. The League took swift and decisive action: League president Frank Calder suspended the Tigers, and awarded the league championship (and opportunity to play for the Stanley Cup) to the Montreal Canadiens. Sanctions did not stop there, though: the team was sold for $75,000 to New York owner Tex Rickards, each player was fined $200 and forced to write an apology to Calder in order to have his suspension lifted.[46] This was a significant moment in NHL history. As one hockey writer has put it: "Thus the

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[44] McFarlane, Stanley Cup Fever, 43.
[45] Last, that is, until the birth of the World Hockey Association in 1971, which eventually "merged" with the NHL in 1979.
[46] Bob Duff, "Setting the Foundation: 1917-18 to 1925-26," in Diamond, 55; Isaacs, 62-63.

hardline management style of the National Hockey league had been established, with the teams' governors and owners in full control."[47] Big city arenas and big city salaries dictated that the league be run along big city lines.

It was this American expansion that bore the brunt of the blame for driving the WHL/PCHA out of business. Western Canadian leagues, with teams in small-market centers like Victoria, Calgary and Regina, could not hope to compete with the potential revenues of new arenas in major American cities like New York, Chicago, Detroit and Boston. With the absence of any real rival professional leagues, the NHL took sole possession, in some ways by default, of the Stanley Cup in 1927. Only a handful of minor professional leagues and senior amateur leagues remained to challenge for hockey talent. In most cases, the development of these leagues has been portrayed as complementary to the NHL: as vehicles through which players were developed for eventual NHL play, as the pinnacle of hockey success. However, these leagues were not founded by, or with the help of, the NHL; senior league play began before the NHL was even formed.[48]

When the Stanley Cup became a professional trophy with the post-championship declaration of the Montreal Wanderers in 1908, there was a concern that the remaining truly amateur teams would have no trophy to strive for. This situation was quickly addressed, when Montreal business magnate Sir Montagu Allan donated a new trophy in his own name in 1908.[49] In 1914 the CAHA was founded, with branches in all but the Maritime provinces. As professional hockey moved away from small towns, elite level hockey survived with senior league teams. Almost any community in Canada could ice a senior league team, and most at one point or another did. The senior leagues were

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[47] Simpson, 191.
[48] Sweeny, "Senior Hockey," 401.
[49] Ibid., 401.

important as source of civic pride, not only to the communities in which they belonged, but to the country as a whole. The sheer number of teams also showed how broadly hockey had established itself as Canada's game. Senior hockey was what tied these communities closely to elite level, competitive hockey. It was the Allan Cup champions that represented Canada at the Olympic games and world championships until 1963 as the epitome of our amateur culture.[50] So, until relatively recently, it was the senior amateur teams that should be considered as representative of Canadian hockey. They represented more towns than the NHL ever has, especially between 1934 and 1967 when only Montreal and Toronto represented Canada in the NHL. During the early inter-war years, professional and amateur hockey seems to carve out their own niches, and operate a working relationship.

The season after the WHL sold out to the NHL in 1927, several professional leagues cropped up across Ontario and the northeastern United States, in many cities replacing a lost NHL team. From the very beginning these leagues had affiliations with NHL clubs. In fact, the Canadian-American Hockey League (Can-Am) had more affiliated clubs than independents.[51] Slowly the minor league teams, and later entire leagues, became affiliated, if not owned outright, by NHL clubs. Through the 1930s, these clubs were used as farm teams, where NHL organizations could place their younger, more inexperienced players. This allowed the players time to develop their talents in a professional, competitive atmosphere, but without having the NHL club suffer through their growing pains. The Canadian Professional Hockey League and the Can-Am league are best examples of these 'feeder' leagues. The major reason so many NHL

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[50] The NHL could not claim to send representatives to the Olympics until 1998. Ibid., 404-405.
[51] Fitzsimmons, "Minor Pro Hockey in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s." [hereafter Fitzsimmons, "Minor Pro Hockey."] in Diamond, 377.

teams set up minor league systems was to control players' budding professional careers, sometimes even while they were still amateurs. This would insure that the sponsor NHL club could monitor their development, inculcate its style of play, and ensure another organization did not poach the player. It also served the added purpose of severely limiting players' ability to market themselves independently.[52] Reading NHL histories, one gets the impression that these teams owed their existence solely to the NHL. To some degree this was true, but there were also strong independent teams that would just as soon challenge the NHL for players as supply them. The American Hockey Association dreamed of producing an all-American team worthy of challenging the NHL for the Stanley Cup, though it never developed.[53] Future NHL owner James Norris asked the Stanley Cup trustees to allow his Chicago Shamrocks of the AHA to challenge for the Cup in 1932. Depending on the source, either the NHL declined to send a team to defend, or the trustees themselves rejected this idea, arguing that the "days of challenges had recessed past reclaiming."[54] Whatever the cause, the challenge was at least postponed a year, in which time the AHA Chicago franchise was conveniently folded, allowing Norris to buy the NHL Chicago organization. Within these minor leagues, there were nonetheless some unaffiliated teams that dreamed of one day challenging the NHL for hockey supremacy. One such team was the Cleveland Barons of the AHL.

Al Sutphin applied to the NHL in 1934 to bring a franchise to Cleveland, but was rejected. He then bought the Cleveland franchise of the IAHL, which amalgamated with the Can-Am league to form the American Hockey League (AHL) in 1936. By 1938, Sutphin was convinced that his new league could challenge the NHL as another major

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[52] Cruise and Griffiths, 40.
[53] Fitzsimmons, "Minor Pro Hockey," 377.
[54] Cruise and Griffiths, 33; Isaacs, 65; McFarlane, Stanley Cup Fever, 72.

professional hockey league. He believed that the only thing that stood in the way of his novice league was a lack of major-league facilities (only Cleveland, Hershey and Buffalo were large enough to compete with NHL arenas). Therefore, he built the 10,000 seat Cleveland Arena in 1937, during the depths of the depression, for $1.5 million.[55] With annual attendance figures over 200,000, Cleveland was definitely in the same league as NHL clubs, revenue-wise.[56] In 1938/39, Cleveland actually purchased players from an NHL team, the financially-strapped Montreal Maroons.[57] Perhaps the greatest step toward challenging the NHL was taken in 1940, when Sutphin hired six scouts and created Cleveland's own minor league development system – an unheard-of step for a minor professional franchise.[58] Not surprisingly, the NHL was angry, and felt threatened by a Cleveland team that was building its own team, without the benefit of an NHL affiliation. Usually the best teams in the AHL were NHL affiliates: in 1938/39, only one team, the Philadelphia Ramblers, was operated by an NHL team, and they finished first in the regular season and lost in the championship finals.[59] Indianapolis was owned and operated by the Detroit Red Wings in 1939/40, and they finished tied for first in the league. Having an agreement with an NHL club certainly helped a minor league club, yet Sutphin steadfastly rejected all affiliation overtures.

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[55] Gene Kiezck. Forgotten Glory: The Story of Cleveland Barons Hockey. (Ann Arbor. Mich.. 1994): 17. 37-38.

[56] In 1938/39. Cleveland admitted 196 940 patrons over 24 home games: Toronto saw 262 211: in 1940/41 Cleveland recorded 231 471 versus 290 970 for Toronto. This was not a huge difference. considering Toronto had the highest attendance in the NHL: the two teams were in the same league. attendance-wise. Kiezck. 31. 51: Public Archives of Ontario [hereafter PAO] Smythe Papers. MU5939. NHL – Summary of Box Office Receipts. "Professional Hockey – League Home Games: Gross Beneficial Gates & Paid Attendance." 1955.

[57] Kiezck. 34.

[58] Ibid.. 44.

[59] Ibid.. 40.

Besides being personally displeased with the NHL after they rejected his application for a franchise in 1934, Sutphin had hockey-related reasons for being unhappy with the big league. Under terms of an agreement between the AHL and NHL, Sutphin was forced to deal one of his star players, Phil Hergesheimer, to the Chicago Black Hawks or lose him for virtually nothing. This was because of the semi-annual "secondary" draft, whereby NHL clubs were allowed to pick one player off of any AHL team roster, with only $4,000 in compensation for the lost player.[60] Each team was only liable to lose one player, but this nonetheless limited the AHL's ability to compete for the best quality players. Still, the AHL was in a position to rival the NHL for dominance at the outbreak of the war in attendance, number of teams, and quality of play. And at least some of the owners were willing to entertain the possibility of challenging the NHL for hockey dominance.

The NHL thus did not have complete hegemony over hockey – 'hockey' in this context meaning both professional and amateur leagues and organizations, as well as the hockey players themselves. The CAHA first signed an agreement with the NHL in 1936, whereby no amateur club could lose more than one junior player per year, nor could any one branch lose more than seven. This deal did not give the NHL much control over amateur players in Canada, but it was the first step in that direction. When the war began, the NHL was severely limited in the number of players it could sign away from CAHA senior or junior league teams. Players themselves had some leverage, in that could choose to sign with an independent minor-league team, or keep playing with an amateur senior team, rather than join the NHL. However, it was rare that any player with enough talent would turn down the opportunity to play in the NHL and collect the salary and notoriety

[60] This was increased to $7500 in 1940/41. Ibid., 35.

that went with it. Occasionally, there are examples of this happening though: Bill "Legs" Fraser was reportedly offered professional contracts and turned each down.[61] This agreement hampered the NHL's ability to control the best players, since the best young Canadian players played in CAHA junior hockey leagues at some point. The manpower challenges that the war presented also gave the NHL the excuse it needed to reach further down the development ladder and control players careers from a younger age. When the war years put a further strain on the cost of running amateur teams after the difficult depression years, the NHL stepped in with cash through sponsorship deals. By the thirties, the NHL operated like a cartel, with strong umbilical relationships with minor professional and amateur leagues, but its dominance was not yet complete. The war would bring about the conditions for that to occur.

The thirties were the first full decade in which the NHL had no national professional league to compete with. Unfortunately, there was a greater and unexpected challenge: the Depression. The NHL became even more Americanized in this decade even though the U.S. felt the deepest and most protectionist economic downturn in its history. On the ice, a milestone was reached in 1934 with the first all-American Stanley Cup final.[62] In 1935-36, there were enough American-born players in the league to put together an all-American lineup; however, only two of these players were in fact American-trained.[63] In 1936/37, Chicago boasted that the Black Hawks carried five American players, despite the fact that none were good enough to stay with the club long-term.[64] In 1938, Chicago managed to claim the Cup with eight America-born players, a

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[61] Sweeny, "Senior Hockey," 404.
[62] Jenish, 124.
[63] McFarlane, 60 Years of Hockey, 57.
[64] Ibid., 61.

record for the era.[65] American players were slowly on the rise, but the league remained overwhelmingly Canadian, to the tune of 95% of its players through the fifties. Most league executives also remained Canadian – presidents Frank Calder, Red Dutton and Clarence Campbell were all Canadian. Even Detroit owner James Norris was born in Canada, although he made his fortune in the United States. Thus, the protectionist Depression saw the successful export of Canadian hockey to the U.S.

Despite its advance south of the border, the depression exacted its toll on the NHL – with some exceptions. Maple Leafs owner Conn Smythe, a veteran of the First World War, built Maple Leaf Gardens during the height of the depression, opening its doors November 12, 1931.[66] League membership contracted from a height of ten teams in 1930-31 to seven teams at the outbreak of war.[67] Even Montreal, the city that gave birth to modern ice hockey, and which supported the oldest active professional franchise, lost a team to the depression. The Maroons, Montreal's 'English' team, folded following the 1937-38 season; the Canadiens fared little better.[68] After claiming their second consecutive, and fourth overall, Stanley Cup in 1931, the Canadiens began a slow decent into also-ran status, which culminated in missing the post-season tournament in 1939 – the only one of seven teams failing to advance. This was at least partly due to the depression, which hurt Montreal's ability to sign the best young players. At one point, there was even talk of moving *Les Habitants*, the beloved symbol of French-Canada, to Cleveland.[69] Attendance was down all around the league, although there was another side

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[65] Isaacs, 114.
[66] Stan Fischler, "Depression Hockey," in Diamond, 84.
[67] "NHL Standings and Top Ten Scorers," in Diamond, 72.
[68] Brown, 133, 206.
[69] Ibid., 204.

effect that worked to the owners' benefit. As former Maple Leafs' and Canadiens' executive Frank Selke put it:

> There were bread lines and men on street corners selling apples and widespread unemployment for years, starting in 1930. For a young Canadian to have a job playing hockey and to get paid pretty well for it was quite an asset. It was the kind of employment every player wanted to keep....[70]

Economic conditions provided NHL owners with leverage they would not relinquish easily. In 1932, the Board of Governors voted to lower team payrolls to $70,000, and to cap individual salary at $7,500. Most players could expect a salary in the $2,000 range, with perhaps a $1,000 signing bonus if they were lucky. That would drop to $75 a week in the minors, still a hefty wage compared to fifteen cents an hour the average industrial worker commanded.[71] This time, there was no strike like the one led by the Hamilton Tigers in 1923, and no rival league to disregard the contracts signed by NHL clubs and drive up wages. Management even tried to cut the salaries of the best players in the game, but there were limits to the power of the managers. In 1934, Boston manager Art Ross wanted to cut defenseman Eddie Shore's salary by $3,000. Shore was by far the greatest defenseman of the era and one of the greatest in history. When Ross presented the contract to Shore and Shore refused, the league president suspended the defenceman indefinitely. Still, Shore was the best player in the league, and finally the Bruins knuckled under. Shore ended his holdout as the highest paid player in the league – almost doubling the "salary cap" by earning $13,000. Shore, however, was the exception that proved the rule. In his most lucrative season, Shore earned $13,500 in 1937; by comparison, 1930s

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[70] Frank Selke and Gordon Green, Behind the Cheering, (Toronto, 1962): 55.
[71] Jenish, 121.

Canadiens' great Howie Morenz only ever earned $6,000 in one season.[72] Milt Schmidt was also a star player for the Bruins. When he negotiated his first contract with the Bruins, Art Ross offered him $3,000, and Schmidt asked for $3,500. Ross responded that he would have to discuss that difference with Bruins owner Charles Adams. Ross left the room and returned a few minutes later, told Schmidt that Adams had refused, and Schmidt could "take it or leave it." Schmidt signed, but on his way out, he passed Adam's secretary, and asked if he could see the owner and discuss the reason for the $500 shortfall. Adams secretary then informed him that Mr. Adams was not in all day. Schmidt told an interviewer that "they [the Bruins organization] lied to me from day one and they've been lying to me ever since."[73]

By the end of the Depression, team managers and coaches wielded tremendous power over players. After the collapse of major professional rival leagues, the league operated almost as a cartel, and controlled players not just through salary, but also through the threat of demotion or trade. Detroit Red Wings' manager Jack Adams used to carry around one-way train tickets in his front pocket. And the reasons for a demotion could be as minor as missing a pass at a key moment, or seeing the wrong woman too often.[74] Smythe used fines to "encourage" players: in the 1960s, Smythe fined George Armstrong, the Leafs all-time leading scorer, $100 for "not using body enough". Gerry James was fined $50 for taking a minor penalty against Chicago, while Ron Stewart was fined $50 for being five pounds overweight.[75]

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[72] Cruise and Griffiths, 173-174.
[73] McFarlane, The Bruins: Brian McFarlane's Original Six, [hereafter McFarlane, The Bruins] (Toronto, 1999): 31-32.
[74] Cruise and Griffiths, 56-57.
[75] PAO, Smythe Papers, MU5975 box 40, Statements – General 1960-61, letter to Smythe from S. M. Hulbig, (20 March 1957).

Professional hockey club owners wielded tremendous power, not only over their employees, but in the business world. NHL owners tended to be rich and well-connected, with considerable government influence. Even neo-Marxist theorists recognize that the state must have some autonomy from the dominant class. At the same time, these elites are still working on behalf of this class, especially in Canada, argues Leo Panitch.[76] The principal owner of the Montreal Canadiens, Donat Raymond, was almost a prototypical capitalist bourgeoisie, as a wealthy director of several corporations.[77] Raymond was also a Senator, and although there is no evidence that he ever intervened on behalf of his club, it is reasonable to assume he at least had access to the government's highest administrators. Smythe, a very wealthy and well-know sportsmen, also had personal relationships with former Prime Minister and Conservative Party leader Arthur Meighen and Ontario Premier George Drew. Hockey's development has been aided by state sponsorship and patronage, and the hockey community has strong connections with Canada's political community. One of the country's earliest Governor-Generals, Lord Stanley of Preston, donated a challenge trophy, the Stanley Cup, so coveted today. Governor-General Lord Minto dropped the puck before the first game of the 1903 Stanley Cup finals.[78] The NHL award for "Most Gentlemanly" player is named after Lady Byng, wife of another Governor General, Lord Byng.[79] Even some former players have benefited from their notoriety by entered politics after their playing days, including Lionel Conacher, Syl Apps, and currently, Senator Frank Mahovolich.

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[76] Leo Panitch, "The Role and Nature of the Canadian State," in Leo Panitch, ed., The Canadian State: Political Economy and Political Power, (Toronto, 1977): 4

[77] "Senator Donat Raymond," Who's Who in Canada (Toronto, 1945): 689.

[78] Jenish, 40.

[79] National Hockey League Official Guide and Record Book 2000, Dan Diamond, ed., (Toronto, 1999): 198.

American owners may not have had the political clout their Canadian colleagues had, but they certainly had deep pockets. The most prominent, Canadian-born James Norris Sr., was the "virtual Dictator of U.S. indoor events."[80] By the end of the war he owned the Detroit Red Wings and Chicago Black Hawks outright, as well as a 'major' stake in the New York Rangers. This was all done behind various front men and corporations, since league bylaws outlawed multiple-ownership. One of the wealthiest men in America, Norris had a history of manipulating the U.S. court system.[81] Bruins owner Charles Adams owned one of the largest grocery chains in the U.S. His clout as a prominent member of the community was so strong that he was able to get Sunday baseball approved in the city of Boston.[82] New York Americans founder Bill Dwyer was a well-know gambler in the U.S., and bought an established team for the low price of $75,000 to fill Madison Square garden on a regular basis, to complement his main devotion, boxing.[83] Besides government influence, general managers have boasted they could control the media. Smythe himself said he could have any report he wanted printed "for $50 or less."[84] Detroit Red Wings' manager Jack Adams also gained the favour of reporters through free meals and alcohol, as well as the perpetual post-game quote.[85] This last point is important, for Adams' openness also led to a positive image in newspaper coverage – despite the odd tantrum or poor trade. Control of the media also ensured that management was able to operate in a virtually criticism-free environment, no matter what steps it took to secure control over competition and players.

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[80] Cruise and Griffiths, 35.
[81] Ibid., 29, 35.
[82] McFarlane, The Bruins, 3-4.
[83] McFarlane, Stanley Cup Fever, 61.
[84] Smythe, 115; Cruise and Griffiths, 56.
[85] Cruise and Griffiths, 60.

The NHL rose to success due to unbridled capitalism, and its ability to impose a cartel on the industry, although it was not yet an absolutely closed cartel. Still, the league managed to squeeze out its major competitor, the PCHL, and gain control over its input costs – player salaries. It did so by playing on the soft nationalism of hockey and by packaging the game as a commodity for the urban masses. Together with the manipulation of the media and the shared class-consciousness of the political elite, no one questioned the business practices of owners like Norris and Dwyer. In its quest to establish both a cartel on the highest level of hockey, with a pyramid-type feeder system beneath it, NHL owners did not need the explicit help of the governing elite. The economic system was already in place in both Canada and the U.S. for such a business plan to succeed.

Nonetheless, the NHL entered the war at something of a crossroads. Attendance was down, leading to unstable franchises in New York (the Americans) and Montreal, and an up-and-coming rival league in the American Hockey League. Since 1928, all of the best players had been playing in the NHL, but the AHL wanted to end this monopoly. AHL owners had a secret fund accumulating, a war chest built with the intention of one day challenging the NHL, but they had to bide their time while waiting for more suitable arenas to be built in their smaller markets.[86] In the first year of the war, the AHL had more franchises than the NHL – nine versus seven. It even sustained a franchise in Pittsburgh where the NHL had previously failed. And the AHL was not the only obstacle in the way of NHL hegemony. Senior amateur leagues across Canada contained many excellent young players, some of whom did not see the NHL as the goal of competitive hockey players. These senior leagues, while privately compensating many of their better

[86] Kiezck, 45.

players, also represented a way of life in amateurism that many people saw as "better" than professionalism. Although that view was diminishing, it still held sway if many of these senior teams were reluctant to announce the truth and declare themselves professional. The war, however, would change much of this. Minor leagues would be decimated even more than the NHL, as would senior leagues. And the NHL would emerge stronger than ever before, both economically and with respect to its competition.

CHAPTER 3
CONN, CONSCRIPTION, AND *LES CANADIENS*

> The [National Hockey] League, now approaching its fourth wartime season, is confronted with more difficulties of operation that have been present in the three preceding years. With the institution of National Selective Service, it at first seems that suspension of operations for 1942-43 must follow. However, the authorities have recognized the place which the operation of the league holds in the public interest and have, after lengthy deliberations, agreed that in the interest of public morale the league should carry on.
>
> NHL President Frank Calder, September 1942[1]

With this statement, the National Hockey League confirmed it would continue to operate, albeit on a year-to-year basis until the end of the war. A month after the fiasco at Dieppe, the argument of "public morale" had saved hockey's day. Despite the fact that thousands of young Canadian soldiers had died overseas, far from the place of their birth, many other young Canadian men remained at home and continued to engage in a spectator sport. This occurred, however, with official government sanction and the unofficial approval of the majority of Canadian citizens. The issue of wartime hockey only came under public scrutiny on a handful of short-lived occasions. Over the course of the war, players and leagues were, for the most part, able to operate without public criticism. In fact, most fans and media commentators were sympathetic to the 'sacrifices' made by professional leagues and their players.

Many factors influenced the course of wartime hockey history. To begin to understand this situation, this chapter will concentrate on four key groups affected by the existence of wartime hockey: the NHL itself, the federal government of Canada, the

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[1]National Hockey League. Board of Governors meetings, public statement to the media, (24 September 1942).

media and the public.[2] The NHL was the premier North American hockey league in 1939. Throughout the war, the NHL was motivated by a business-based notion of patriotism. By deciding to continue to operate, the league set the example for all other professional hockey leagues, as well as elite amateur (senior) hockey. It thus actively worked for the continued operation of professional hockey throughout the war, and had a hand in helping players avoid overseas military service. Toronto Maple Leafs' president and general manager Conn Smythe was the highest profile team owner at the time, and will consequently receive prominence. Hockey management, including general managers and coaches, had a direct hand in maintaining player availability within the system the government set up.[3] Professional hockey and its players thus emerged virtually unscathed from six years of war. The NHL not only survived, but also thrived in terms of profit and *vis-à-vis* its competition.

The attitude of the federal government was similarly crucial to the path of wartime hockey. Constantly in the background of any discussion of professional sports was the issue of military manpower, and specifically conscription. The government in Ottawa, led by Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King, was responsible for the deployment of manpower to an "unheard of degree" in Canadian history during the war.[4] If the federal government had decided that hockey was of marginal value to the war effort, it had the unquestioned power to regulate the primary input of professional hockey - the players. Military manpower was a continuous source of debate in the media, in parliament, and within the government. The decisions made on hockey reflected the

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[2] Chapter four will examine the role of the military, and chapter five will present a more comprehensive view of what happened to the players.
[3] For a complete chart of NHL teams and their management during the war years, see Appendix I.
[4] J. L. Granatstein and J. Hitsmen, Broken Promises: A History of Conscription in Canada, [Hereafter Granatstein and Hitsmen] (Toronto, 1977): 146.

political circumstances apparent in the country at the same time. Many were critical of the government for never presenting a clear policy on manpower. The problem was partly due to the fact several branches of the state oversaw different aspects of national manpower.[5] After the institution of the National Resources and Mobilization Act (NRMA) in June 1940, the National War Labour Board, through its Regional War Service Boards, was responsible for granting passport visas and postponements of military service. Both of these were crucial regulators in a sport that necessitated long road trips and where the majority of employers were based in the U.S., while the majority of employees were Canadian citizens. Established in October 1941, the National Selective Service (NSS) acquired almost complete control over national manpower by September 1942. It had the power to determine where one could work, and had the power to force almost anyone into a particular job or into military service.[6] These variable controls reflected the overriding political reality of the war: the King government's determination to avoid the painful divisiveness over wartime manpower policies of the Great War. In the absence of clear, categorical official regulation, the government's general manpower policies allowed enough flexibility for the NHL and its players to successfully avoid dangerous military service.

Hockey players could not have evaded military service, and the leagues could not have continued, without the tacit approval of the broader Canadian public. While the league primarily used public and military morale as justification for letting hockey

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[5] The term "government" will from now on represent the ruling federal government under the Liberal party and Prime Minister Mackenzie King. The "state" will encompass not just the federal government, but all other institutions that share government authority, like the judiciary and the military.

[6] "National Selective Service," in David J. Bercuson and J. l. Granatstein, Dictionary of Military History, (Toronto, 1992): 141.

continue, the validity of this argument will be explored later.[7] For the purposes of this chapter, the important point is that public reaction was muted except for a few high-profile incidents that garnered public attention. This situation has been confirmed by the available secondary sources and the selective review of contemporary newspapers undertaken in the course of this research.[8] For the most part, therefore, wartime hockey was played against the backdrop of public sympathy and general passivity. Finally, it was the media that both reflected and helped shape public opinion, and this in turn had an impact on the actions of the NHL and Canadian government.

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Unlike in Britain, hockey in Canada seemed virtually unaffected by the outbreak of war. The 'phony' war lasted the entirety of the first wartime hockey season, resulting in virtually no immediate pressure for players to enlist. Also, one of the lingering effects of the Depression - unemployment - initially created a large pool of volunteer soldiers and thereby alleviated any pressure on other able-bodied Canadians to enlist.[9] The only evidence of any change directly attributed to war in Montreal was McGill University's decision to withdraw their entry into the Quebec Senior Hockey League (QSHL). The McGill senate decided that "because the international crisis demands that students spend as much time as possible in preparation for this emergency" the McGill hockey team would withdraw from the league.[10] Still, this had little effect on the NHL, which continued with seven teams competing in the 1939/40 season in the same format as in the

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[7] This will be addressed in chapter five and the conclusion.
[8] The Globe and Mail, Montreal Gazette, Montreal Star, Toronto Star, Winnipeg Free Press, Winnipeg Tribune and Vancouver Sun were consulted around the time of the key events discussed within this paper.
[9] Granatstein, Conscription During the Second World War, 1939-1945, (Toronto, 1969): 30; E. M. L. Burns, Manpower in the Canadian Army1939-1945, (Toronto, 1956): 399.
[10] "McGill Withdraws From QSHL – Three Clubs Hold First Workouts," The Gazette [hereafter MG] (19 October 1939): 14.

past. Meanwhile in England, where a professional hockey league existed, a tournament replaced the six-team British hockey league based in London - made up mostly by Canadian players.[11] One unexpected side effect of war in Britain was that many players therefore returned to Canada after the outbreak of hostilities, improving the caliber of play in many amateur Canadian leagues like the QSHL.[12] This tournament was introduced following the pattern established in soccer, since the hockey season started later than the soccer season.[13] The response from hockey in Canada and soccer in Britain could not have been more different.

A direct military threat forced immediate changes to association football (soccer) in England.[14] At the outbreak of the war, the British government declared a ban on the assembly of crowds, for fear of disaster in the case of German bombing, therefore all professional soccer was suspended "until official notice to the contrary."[15] The ban also reflected lingering bitterness over soccer's decision to continue play between 1914 and 1915, and soccer leaders were eager to avoid a repeat performance. Professional play was slowly restored as the initial alarmism died down and reality of the 'phoney' war settled in. Local friendly matches were allowed to take place with the approval of local police, which enforced strict attendance restrictions, initially placed at 1/8 of capacity, then a quarter; it took until 14 April 1940 to rise to 50%.[16] On 2 October 1939, the English

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[11] "Cup Hockey in London Will Start October 31." MG (13 October 1939): 16.
[12] Harold McNamara, "Big Improvement in Strength of QSHL Noted for Coming Season." MG (7 October 1939): 16.
[13] "Modified Hockey league is Planned for England." MG (4 October 1939): 16.
[14] Jack Rollin, Soccer At War, 1939-45, [hereafter Rollin] (London, 1985): 1-6.
[15] Ibid., 5-6.
[16] James Walvin, The People's Game: A Social History of British Football, [hereafter Walvin] (London, 1975): 139.

Football Association (the FA[17]) announced a new set up for the continuation of the game during the war. The plan detailed eight regional groups organized by region, regardless of league level.[18] Teams were not to be made up of pre-war rosters, but players were to be assigned to clubs nearest their home towns so they could train with their local militia unit.[19] The FA also announced the suspension of the FA Cup, roughly equivalent to the Stanley Cup finals, and replaced it with the War Cup, in recognition of the vast changes forced upon soccer by the war. Thus, within 48 days of the outbreak of war, some form of competitive soccer was organized, although the changes recognized the fact that that the country was at war and domestic life would have to adjust. Still, it was important to restart the game, as a police chief argued because "if there is no football each week our cells [would] be full because the young men of the today [would] have nowhere to go and [would] fall into mischief."[20] While competitive soccer was restarted, the quality of play plummeted as young men were drafted into military service, entire teams enlisted and hundreds of professional footballers "rapidly established themselves as the backbone of physical training in the army."[21] Though the quality of play may have declined, the game "had a groundswell of morale boosting appeal for the war workers, servicemen and young people of the country."[22]

Meanwhile in North America, by the time leagues started up again the next season in November 1940, little had changed, even though Allied troops had been pushed

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[17] The FA can be considered the equivalent of the NHL, as it was "accepted as the arbiter of the rules and techniques of football...as ever more clubs came within its jurisdiction," although it was not a league in the image of the NHL. Please see Walvin, 70.
[18] In Britain, soccer teams were separated into divisions (i.e. division 1, division 2, ect.), based on their success, the best teams playing in the highest level (division 1).
[19] "Regional Soccer Competition in England and Scotland Open Tomorrow," MG (0 October 1930): 18.
[20] Rollin, 30.
[21] Walvin, 138.
[22] Rollin, 146.

off the continent and the Battle of Britain had begun. The growing number of men in uniform led to increased pressure to establish an outlet for athletic competition and spectatorship. The most important change for the 1940/41 season was the introduction of the National Resources Mobilization Act (NRMA). Introduced on 21 June 1940 after the disasters in Europe, it allowed for the conscription of men for home defense, leaving overseas service open on a volunteer basis.[23] At first, there was no problem recruiting men for overseas service, as almost 60,000 men volunteered for general (overseas) service after the institution of the NRMA; conscription was not a front-burner issue through the end of 1940.[24] This was the first time hockey players and management had to consider the possibility of players leaving their teams for military training. Two points gave professional hockey reason for hope, though. First, while the government introduced the NRMA as a manpower measure to encourage men to join the military, the National Labour Supply Council still complained about the "absence of an overall national manpower policy," which gave professional sports flexibility in dealing with the procurement of their own manpower.[25] Second, at this early point in the war, the number of men called up under the NRMA had not yet grown to include enough hockey players to concern teams.

However, clubs also realized that the NRMA could eventually pose a problem in filling out rosters, since most players were Canadian citizens. Some clubs had already anticipated this problem. In response to the passing of the NRMA, Conn Smythe – himself a war hero in the Great War -- sent out letters to all his Maple Leaf players in

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[23] Eventually, this conscription covered single men from eighteen and a half to forty, and from twenty-one to thirty years for men married as of June 1940. Charles Stacey, Arms, Men and Government: The War Policies of Canada, 1939-1945, [hereafter Stacey] (Ottawa, 1970): 399-400.
[24] Stacey, 398-399.
[25] Ibid., 403.

July 1940, urging them to join militia groups: "It is my advice, therefore, no matter what your age or your position as a family man is, that you sign up immediately with some Non-Permanent Militia [NPAM] unit and get your military training as soon as possible." Smythe pointed out the two-fold value of signing up for military training: not only would the players "be ready" if called for military training, but they would "be free to play hockey until called upon." Of course, Smythe also added a subtle hint for the players, pointing out that this training "should send you down here fit."[26] This revealed a fundamental attitude that Smythe retained throughout the war: an attempt to balance a hawkish adherence to the war effort as a Canadian nationalist with a self-centered agenda of making the most profit out of the situation as a hockey entrepreneur. However, the reasons for urging players to join up went beyond just business considerations for Smythe. In his memoirs, he stated it "was a matter of some pride to me that by September, 1940, the club had twenty-five men taking part in military training."[27] A decorated veteran of the First World War, Smythe quickly arranged his own participation in the next war against Germany. Eventually, he formed his own anti-aircraft battalion, was promoted to the rank of major and given command of the 30th Battery of the 7th Toronto Regiment, which came to be known as the "sportsmen's battery."[28] He felt strongly that Canada should have been more involved in a full-hearted war effort, and conscription was an important step in that direction. As a prominent member of the

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[26]Public Archives of Ontario (hereafter PAO). Conn Smythe papers. MU 5969 box 34. Military Training – Leafs 1939–41. "Letter to Maple Leafs' players." (17 July 1940).

[27] Conn Smythe with Scott Young, If You Can't Beat 'em in the Ally. [hereafter Smythe] (Markham, Ont., 1982): 140; this figure included coaches, broadcasters, even ushers and cleaning staff – anyone employed by the Maple Leafs. PAO. Smyth papers. MU5966 box 3. Government. "Maple Leaf Gardens' Employees Overseas Soldiers." (9 April 1941).

[28] PAO. Smythe Papers. MU5937 box 1. Personal File 1940-1945. Letter to Mr. G. R. Cottrelle. CIBC. (9 January 1941); Douglas Hunter, War Games: Conn Smythe and Hockey's Fighting Men, [hereafter Hunter. War Games] (Toronto, 1996): 76-77.

Conservative Party he disliked King to begin with, but as a military man and a patriot, he felt the government's initial wartime policies a disgrace.[29] He characterized the NRMA as "another typical Mackenzie King weaseling away from responsibility."[30] From King's point of view, Smythe typified the hawkish, Anglo Ontario tories who threatened his vision of national unity. It is ironic, given Smythe's views on Canada's responsibilities, that few of his Maple Leafs actually fought overseas and none joined his unit.

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Manpower policy was not the only intersection of hockey and government policy in the war. Just after the end of the second wartime season, financial viability became a prominent issue for the hockey community. A new corporate amusement tax was introduced as part of the government's effort to raise tax revenue and limit wartime profiteering under the Special War Revenue Act. It also provided an example of the conscription of wealth to complement the obvious conscription of manpower through the NRMA.[31] The public debate over this tax was not widespread, but the attitudes of Canadian leaders toward hockey during the war expressed during this debate are revealing. The debates in parliament also serve as focal point for examining the economic impact of the war on the NHL.

In May 1941, debate over the proposed new 20% excise tax on any place of amusement reached the House of Commons.[32] One major aspect of the debate was on

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[29] Hunter, War Games, 140-141.
[30] Ibid., 141.
[31] J. L. Granatstein, Canada's War, [hereafter Granatstein, Canada's War] (Toronto, 1975): 174-175.
[32] Canada, Statues of Canada, 1940-41, Tax on the Price of Admission to Certain Places of Amusement, part XV, chapter 27, section 13, "Special War Revenue Act," [hereafter "Special War Revenue Act] (in force 1 July 1941): 158.

how the new tax would hurt amateur sports organizations.[33] While the new tax did not apply to non-profit amateur clubs, many local amateur hockey teams were not non-profit. What made the situation contentious was that profit was not their sole goal either: in many cases, the revenue generated by community hockey teams subsidized other amateur sports in the area. Liberal Member of Parliament Alfred Bence believed that if the tax "should apply to the case of amateur sport, [it would] have a detrimental effect so far as character building, health building and morale building of Canada are concerned."[34] This illustrated the belief that sports, and especially hockey, was important to the social and psychological cohesion of the nation. Conservative MP John Blackmore agreed with the importance of sports, adding that "[t]he development of the body, the mind and the spirit of the young people who participate in athletics ... is of such great importance ... that it outweighs any possible tax revenue."[35] The importance of athletics, according to Blackmore, was that it kept youngsters out of "the dive and poolroom." His clear implication was that athletics built national moral fiber, whereas socialising in a poolroom was its undoing. This logic goes to the heart of the reason why hockey was allowed to continue, as perceived by the ruling class[36]: it was an "acceptable" use of leisure time that promoted precisely the values and characteristics that were conducive to social cohesion, especially in times of war.

There was also some discussion on the effect of the tax on professional sports clubs - specifically the Maple Leafs. Many MPs argued that such a tax should specifically

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[33] Most senior amateur hockey teams would be hurt by corporate taxes, since they were run as for-profit businesses. Also, the buildings in which they played would come under the tax, and if they were to run into financial problems due to a new tax, the team would be affected as well.

[34] Canada. House of Commons. Debates. [hereafter Debates] 30 May 1941, 3325.

[35] Ibid., 3328.

[36] Please see Leo Panitch, "The Role and Nature of the Canadian State," in Leo Panitch, ed., The Canadian State: Political Economy and Political Power, [hereafter Panitch] (Toronto: 1977): 3-27.

target professional sports. Several used this argument when fighting for a tax reduction on amateur activities, suggesting that "levying a reasonable tax on such things as professional hockey" would be more appropriate.[37] The only defence of professional hockey came from Conservative MP John MacNicol, who presented a letter from the Maple Leafs' star player, Sylvanus Apps. Apps requested a decrease in the proposed tax rate, based only on his view that this 20% tax would be "too severe." Since MacNicol referred to Apps as the Leafs' manager, it cannot be said that he was biased as a hockey fan, but neither did MacNicol press the matter. [38] Tory MP Douglas Ross, whose home riding happened to include Maple Leaf Gardens, argued that a lower rate of tax would be more beneficial, according to "the law of diminishing returns".[39] In his view, business would suffer from lower attendance as taxes were incorporated into, and so raised, ticket prices; another possibility was that the tax would bankrupt weaker enterprises. Tory backbencher T.L. Church, also from Toronto, argued that "so far as professional hockey [was] concerned the government [had] gone ... much too far," and defended the Maple Leafs as a "patriotic sporting enterprise."[40] Significantly, there is no defence of professional hockey *per se* from any of these MPs, illustrating the ongoing psychological gap between the perceived values of amateur and professional sport.

For all the debate, no reduction in tax was conceded, even on quasi-amateur athletic organisations.[41] NHL clubs had no reason to worry, however, as they would collect astronomical profits, especially when compared to the depression years. In the first year of the tax (1941), Maple Leafs Gardens Limited, the corporate entity that owned

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[37] Debates. 30 May 1941. 3327.
[38] Ibid., 3325.
[39] Ibid., 3325.
[40] Ibid., 3383.
[41] "Special War Revenue Act."

the Toronto Maple Leafs, showed a decline in net profit of about $12,000, to just over $48,000. However, from then until the end of the war, net profit almost doubled, to $90,783, despite the tax.[42] This came in part to an increase in gross gate revenue at Leafs' home games, totalling about $38,000 between 1941 and 1945.[43] Since the Leafs' net profit increased by $42,000, the different in net profit must have come from a different source. This source can be traced to increased revenue from senior hockey games – specifically, the Toronto area military teams that used the Gardens as their home ice.[44] Newspaper reports in Montreal confirmed that similar attendance increases were being recorded there, as well as elsewhere around the league.[45] Part of this increase was due to the recovery from the depression – full employment and a wartime economy meant most people had much more disposable income than in previous years. Compounding this, another benefit to the NHL was simply that there was little else to spend money on besides some form of entertainment. Rationing choked off other forms of consumer spending. Factories were too busy churning out tanks, planes and ammunition to be able to satisfy the growing commercial demands of an increasingly affluent populace. If the federal government partly imposed the tax to limit wartime 'profiteering' as well as raise revenue for itself, it did succeed - in the first post-war year, profits increased almost 50% from 1945 - but hockey was still very profitable for owners during the war.

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[42]PAO. Smythe papers. MU 5966 Box 31. Government. "Maple Leaf Gardens. Ltd., Schedule of Net Profits," meeting of 11 November 1955.
[43]Ibid., "Maple Leaf Gardens. Ltd., Professional Hockey - League Home Games. Gross Beneficial Gates & Paid Attendance," meeting of 11 November 1955.
[44]Hunter, "Hockey in World War II," in Dan Diamond, ed., Total Hockey [hereafter Diamond] (Toronto, 1998): 89.
[45]"Canadiens Blank Leafs 11-0; More Records to Fall as Habitants Hot," MG (16 March 1944): 16; "Turnstile Dizziest in Years Around NHL," Globe and Mail [hereafter GM] (15 November 1944): 15; "Attendance Figures Soar on All National Hockey League Fronts," Montreal Star [hereafter MS] (24 November 1944): 16.

While NHL clubs enjoyed soaring profits, their wartime altruism did not reflect this prosperity. Especially compared to its sporting cousins, neither the NHL nor its member clubs donated much monetarily to the war effort. Unlike the First World War, when the National Hockey Association (forerunner of the NHL) gave 5% of all gate receipts to the Red Cross, the NHL donated little of its record Second World War profits to war charities.[46] By contrast, the British Football Association donated over 200,000 pounds to various war charities, and "decided to forgo their interest on 32,400 (pounds) War stock investment."[47] Major League Baseball put on a number of charity games, and donated the proceeds from several World Series, raising over two million dollars in only two Series.[48] By comparison, Maple Leaf Gardens Ltd., purchased and promoted Victory bonds, but held only one charity game involving the Leafs - after the war was all but over.[49] The Canadiens played several exhibition games that supported the Chinese War Relief Fund, and there were several reports of charity games for the Red Cross. In these cases, Forum ice time was given for free, and servicemen were admitted at no charge, but the Canadiens organization did not make a monetary contribution.[50] Ironically, an American team, the Boston Bruins, raised $35,000 for war charities in Canada through 1944.[51] Bruins manager Art Ross even went so far as to say his team's "excuse for operating is that we will raise a considerable sum for war charity."[52] Whether the Bruins

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[46] Hunter War Games, 348. This does not include "Victory Bonds," which many NHL clubs both promoted and purchased, but were a form of investment and ultimately provided the clubs with a profit.
[47] Rollen, 182, 148.
[48] "Baseball Has Kicked Through for War Relief," Toronto Daily Star [TDS] (26 January 1944): 12
[49] PAO, Smythe papers, MU5998, Souvenir Program, 15 April 1945.
[50] National Archives of Canada [hereafter NAC], Tommy Gorman papers, MG 30 C129, vol. 1, file 13, Souvenir Programs, 20 October 1944 and 21 October 1945.
[51] Andy Lytle, "Ross Wants Wartime Tag on Those Hockey Records," TDS (17 March 1944): 13.
[52] "Ross Sets Charity Goal For Bruins at $75000," TDS (3 October 1943): 14; "Bruins to Play All-Star Charity Show," Winnipeg Free Press [hereafter WFP] (14 January 1942): 18; "Brions vs Krauts of RCAF Tonight," Vancouver Sun (17 February 1942): 21.

were successful is debatable, but clearly neither they nor their NHL counterparts suffered financially from the war. Hockey's stinginess in war would seem to indicate that its moguls felt sufficiently well protected by a sympathetic public mood to bother with currying additional public support through charitable activities.

This poor charitable record drew only one contemporary criticism. In late 1944, charges were leveled not at the NHL or even any individual club, but specifically at Conn Smythe. Clarey Settell, a sports writer for the CBC, attacked Smythe after the recently returned army major charged the Liberal government with sending undertrained troops to the front.[53] Settell wrote that "Maple Leaf Gardens in Toronto has shown probably the blackest record of co-operation in war charities of any comparable sports organisation in America." Smythe was specifically to blame, in Settell's view, since "all this (was) under the same Smythe, the managing Director of the institution," even though Smythe had been overseas since 1942. Documents in Smythe's archive lend support to this charge, though; a letter written by him upon his leave of absence in 1941 clearly instructed staff that there was to be "no reduction in [ticket] price," and "no passes: very important." Not even men in uniform received a discount on the price of admission, nor did ticket prices go down, even as the cost of paying players went down.[54] While Settell's accusations were undoubtedly politically motivated, they nonetheless had merit and demonstrated Smythe's attempt to play the war for both profit and patriotism.

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The fall of 1941 brought the first significant negative attention focused on the manpower implications of professional hockey, and specifically on the NHL. The issue

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[53]NAC. Ralston papers. vol. 62. Conscription Crisis - 1944 Letter from Settell. 26 September 1944.
[54] PAO. Smythe Papers. MU 5937 box 1. Personal file 1940-1945. "Duties at Garden." (January 1941).

arose out of the mobility of professional athletes in a wartime society. Since five of the seven teams in the NHL and all minor professional clubs were based in the United States, Canadian hockey players had to obtain permission to travel and work outside the country. Guidelines were set up under the National War Service Regulations for players to obtain the proper authorisation along with a passport for identification. In order to obtain these visas, a player had to apply to a judge in his respective Regional War Service Board. When a recruit received his call-up notice, he was instructed to report for medical examination, and given eight days to apply for a postponement from the divisional registrar. Before applying for a passport, he first had to get such a postponement from military training under the NRMA (joining a Non-permanent active militia unit, as Smythe suggested, would put the player in a better position to receive a postponement, since he would have already completed the required military training). These boards had the power to grant and cancel extensions and to issue passports.[55] Thirteen areas were set up, roughly corresponding to the military districts of Canada, with chairmen in each, responsible to Minister of National War Services. Significantly for the hockey community, their decisions were final.[56]

While the NRMA may have made it possible to call up a wide range of ages for domestic military service, only a handful were initially called up. In the fall of 1941, the call extended only to single men or childless widowers between 21 and 24 years of age as of July 15th, 1940.[57] Still, this new obstacle was prominent in the minds of hockey

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[55] Granatstein and Hitsmen, 146-147.

[56] These Administrative divisions were numbered by letter, and set up in the following cities: (a) London, (b) Toronto, (c) Kingston, (d) Port Arthur, (e) Montreal, (f) Quebec (g) Halifax, (h) St John, (i) Charlottown, (j) Winnipeg, (k) Vancouver, (m) Regina, (n) Edmonton.

[57] On June 27, 1941, the NRMA was extended to men between 21 and 24 inclusive, and upon reaching the age of 21 since July 15th 1940, under Order-In-Council 4644. For a full description of when men were called up by ages under the NRMA, see Stacey, 586.

managers across the continent, since they knew this was exactly the segment of Canada's male society from which the professional teams drew their manpower. Smythe mentioned the importance of obtaining passports in his letter to Leafs' players in July 1940, because without it they would be available only for games in Canada, or a little over half the schedule. For American-based teams, the problem was much more acute: to U.S.-based NHL teams, they could use such players only in the handful of games played in Montreal and Toronto. To minor leagues like the AHL, which had no Canadian-based teams, such players would be useless since all AHL games were played in the U.S. The biggest problem, from the point of view of not only professional hockey teams but also the government, was that these individual Regional War Service Boards set varying standards for obtaining passport permission. Even the minister responsible for the regulations, Minister of War Services Joseph Thorson, agreed that the "boards have dealt with this subject in a manner that is not altogether uniform."[58] Thorson defended the perceived subjectivity of the decisions by comparing the administrative boards to courts of law: "I do not know how one could get uniformity on questions of fact" from either of them, he argued.[59]

Quickly, the issue of player mobility came to public attention in late 1941 on the front pages of newspapers such as the Winnipeg Tribune, and was debated in both the House of Commons and editorial columns.[60] The problem centered on the perception that judges in Ontario, Quebec and Alberta were being more lenient in providing passport

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[58] Debates, 11 November 1941, 4282.
[59] Ibid., 4283.
[60] "Hockey Heads Can't Budge Judge," Winnipeg Tribune [hereafter WT] (16 October, 1941): 1,4;

authorisation than those in Manitoba and Saskatchewan.[61] In September 1941, judges in the latter two boards were consistently denying visas to hockey players, regardless of age or military status.[62] Evidence of this varying standard was presented in parliament by Thorson: through November 1941, of the sixty players who were granted visas, twenty-two came from Administrative Division "B" Toronto, which was responsible only for that city. The Winnipeg and Regina boards were responsible for their entire provinces respectively, and they had granted only a single such authorisation.[63] Toronto division Chief Justice J. G. Gillanders stated that hockey players under his jurisdiction would be granted authorisation with certain conditions:

> 1. [Applicants] [a]re not 22 or 23 years old and subject to immediate call.
> 2. Sign a declaration they will keep the board continuously informed of their address.
> 3. Undertake to return at their own expense if they are called up under the national war service act and
> 4. Indicate there is no evidence of intention or design to escape the provisions of this act.[64]

At the other end of the spectrum, Saskatchewan board Chief Justice J. F. L. Embury announced the day after Gillanders spoke that "no eligible young man" would be allowed to enter the U.S., regardless of his age and even if he had completed the required military training as a member of the reserve army (the NPAM).[65]

This wandering standard seemed so pronounced that even the Manitoba judge who ruled on the cases, Mr. Justice J. E. Adamson, pointed out that astute players could

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[61] Debates, 11 November 1941, 4281; "Alberta Will Let Hockey Players In Reserve Army Enter The States," MS (7 October 1941): 17.
[62] "Saskatchewan Will Refuse Passports," WT (16 September 1941): 16; "Regina's Divisional Registrar Refuses Passports," Kitchener Daily Record (20 September 1941): 8; both cited in McIntyre.
[63] Debates, 11 November 1941, 4282. Unfortunately, there are no figures given on how many applied for such a visa in the respective divisions.
[64] "Passport Rule May Bar Many Hockey Stars," WT (15 September 1941): 1, 10.
[65] "Saskatchewan to Check Passports," GM (16 September 1941): 14.

get themselves transferred to a more favourable board.[66] Major General L. R. LaFleche, however, tried to avert potential exploitation of this loophole when he remarked: "It would be subterfuge to be turned down by one and go before another. I'm convinced our hockey players wouldn't do that and also that league officials would not countenance it either."[67] However, he mentioned nothing of transferring *before* requesting an exemption.[68] LaFleche's faith in both players and management quickly appeared misplaced - several players, including Maple Leaf players' Wally Stanowski and Pete Langelle, transferred to the Toronto Scottish regiment from the Winnipeg Rifles, thereby switching regional boards, where they then applied for, and received, a temporary exemption in order to play for Toronto.[69] For its part, the NHL, through league president Calder, publicly stated it would respect all rulings: "ours is not to reason why, but to follow any and all decisions of the war services." However, this statement did not stop manager Lester Patrick and president John Kirkpatrick of the Rangers, and New York Americans' manager Mervin 'Red' Dutton from visiting Winnipeg and Regina to try to persuade the boards to change their minds.[70] Nor did it stop Calder himself from meeting Adamson in person to try and influence the judge, to no avail.[71]

There is no clear reason for this variation in attitude, although Canada's deep-rooted regionalism cannot be ruled out. Of the prairie provinces, only Alberta did not openly declare a policy of rejecting players - so long as they had completed the required

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[66] "Hockey Heads Can't Budge Judge to Lower Bars On Passport Rules," WT (16 October 1941): 1 [also cited in McIntyre]. "Transfer of Hockey Players May Solve Passport Authorization Problems," MS (17 October 1941): 17.
[67] "Border Ban Only on Hockey Players 21 to 25," GM (17 September 1941): 14.
[68] "Manitoba to Refuse All Passport Bids," WT (17 September 1941): 14.
[69] "Coach Day Confirms Transfer," WFP (21 October 1941): 15; PAO. Smythe Papers, MU 5969 Military Training - Leafs 1939-41, "N.H.L. Player Enlistments in N.P.A.M. Units," 7 September 1940.
[70] "Saskatchewan War Services Board maintains Stand," WFT (18 October 1941): 23.
[71] "Frank Calder Seeks Passport Settlement," WT (16 October 1941): 16.

military training they would have received if called up under the NRMA.[72] Alberta Chief Justice Horace Harvey may have expressed the most impartial stance in the country when he said "hockey players and trombone players are just the same if they are of military age."[73] For instance, Alberta native Alex Kaleta was allowed to join the Chicago Black Hawks when he provided a written guarantee of his return upon military recall.[74] Pat Egan was also granted permission, since he had completed the necessary military training; the fact that prominent hockey mogul 'Red' Dutton accompanied him to the U.S. probably helped his case.[75] Significantly, Ontario and Quebec, which were home to the only NHL franchises in Canada at the time, also had the most lenient judges in the country. Thorson made the only attempt at an explanation put forth by government officials for the judges' differing standards. The minister suggested that boards in Montreal and Toronto may have granted permission because of their closer geographic proximity to the border, thus making trips to (or, more importantly, back from) the United States less problematic.[76] Still, Prince Edward Island board chairman Judge H. L. Palmer declared that men "with the necessary physical qualifications for hockey would get scant consideration if they sought to leave the country."[77] Meanwhile, the Nova Scotia board simply said it would review cases individually, while a New Brunswick judge had allowed one short-term permit, and was open to reviewing each case

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[72] "Alberta Hockey Players Can Secure Passports." WFP (7 October 1941): 13; "Alberta Will Let Hockey Players in Reserve Army Enter the States." MS (7 October 1941) 17. At this point, men called up were only required to complete three months training.

[73] "Pat Egan Given Okay." GM (25 September 1941): 14.

[74] "Alberta Hockey Players Can Secure Passports." *op. cit.*

[75] "Alberta Grants Egan Passport." WT (25 September 1941): 16.

[76] "U.S. Puck Teams Lose Western Talent." WFP (13 September 1941): 22. There is evidence minor league players were recalled for military service, but not NHL players. "Players Recalled for Military Service." MG (4 December 1941): 16.

[77] "Passport Rule May Bar Hockey Stars." WT (15 September 1941): 10.

individually, as well.[78] These three provinces were all close to each other and to the U.S., yet failed to produce a uniform stance.

Reaction to this inconsistency in the judiciary by the government and public was mixed. CCF MP Thomas Douglas believed that the decision to reject the applications was "preferable", but gave no explanation for his stance, perhaps since he felt that it was obvious such potential recruits should be in the armed forces. The position of those opposed to letting players cross the border was best summarized in a front-page article in the Winnipeg Free Press. The article was based on an announcement made by Lieutenant-Colonel C. D. McPherson, divisional registrar for the Manitoba divisional board. It read:

> Lieut.-Col. McPherson summarized the reasons for the board's decision as follows:
> 1. Young men of athletic ability should be serving in Canada's army at this time, instead of playing hockey.
> 2. If Canadian hockey players were allowed to play in the United States it would cause criticism of Canada and would be used as pretext by men, such as Colonel [Charles] Lindbergh and Senator [Berton] Wheeler, who allege that Canada is not making an all-out war effort.[79]

Justice Embury reiterated and expanded on the first point when he stated:

> They [hockey players] are the class one would expect to rally to the colors. They are the class that the country needs. It is regretted that they have turned a deaf ear to their country's call for the purpose of carrying on in their occupation of professional hockey. It is astonishing that the public continues to patronize public exhibitions of professional athletics by young men who should be in the army.[80]

By making such statements, the players' opponents treated the players as an exceptional group. They categorized these men not by age, as the government had set out under the National War Services Act, but by their occupation as hockey players. Even though players outside the call-up age had the right to ask for a passport, some believed hockey

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[78] Ibid.
[79] "Ottawa Board Bars Hockeyists," WFT (17 September 1941): 1, 7.
[80] "Saskatchewan Board...." *op.cit.*

players should give up trying to pursue their careers, regardless of their legal rights. It may not have been enunciated, but the players' opponents clearly implied that these players should have been volunteering for overseas service. In the minds of these opponents hockey was closely linked to Canadian nationalism, so hockey players should have been the first to heed the call of the nation. This judgment was based on what the players represented: able-bodied young men, just the type the country required to become good soldiers. Further, they knew that, as national icons, the actions of hockey players would influence the decisions of many other young men who looked up to these men.

Echoing Lt-Col. MacPherson's second point, opponents charged that Canadian men playing in American cities would be "bad advertising for Canada's war effort" at a time when Canada alone on the continent was at war. Opponents like Justice Embry believed that allowing military-age men into the U.S. would give the impression that Canada was not serious about winning the war.[81] This desire to remain wholeheartedly belligerent in the eyes of Americans was reflected in the sports column of one American writer, Dave Egan of the Boston Sunday Advertiser, who argued:

> I'm not pointing a verbal pop-gun at the players. I'm pointing at the Canadian government...I'm saying something is phony when [American athletes such as] a Hank Greenberg, or a Hughie Mulchay or a Sam Lo Presti or a Harpo Walsh has to settle for $21 a month, while our Canadian cousins continue to ring the cash register.[82]

The article, reprinted in the Free Press, said this "misapprehension ... [was] widespread all over the United States and [was] no doubt shared by his readers."[83] There was no evidence many Americans shared his views, however. This argument was further

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[81] "One Man's Opinion," WT (23 October 1941): 14; as cited in McIntyre: "Saskatchewan Boards to Refuse Passport Rights," GM (20 September 1941): 14.
[82] "Hockey Players in Wartime," WFP (16 October 1941): 13.
[83] Ibid.

weakened by Egan's use of baseball player Hank Greenberg as a convenient example of an American athlete in the U.S. military. Greenberg was one of the first players to be inducted into the U.S. Army, and, he was the *only* high-profile baseball player in the military at the time. While Canadians may have been anxious to have the U.S. enter the war, the views of ardent isolationists like Senator Wheeler and Colonel Lindbergh were not likely to change even if every man in Canada had volunteered for overseas service.

One recent scholar has examined this debate, and has come out in support of the players.[84] Bruce McIntyre, along with other proponents of the players' position, relied on several arguments in their defence. Many pointed out that hockey was a profession, and that these men were pursuing their careers, which happened to take place in the U.S.[85] Several compared hockey players to other "more unobtrusively employed" healthy young men. One asked facetiously: "When is the board going to speak its mind to the soda jerkers?"[86] Letters to newspapers supporting the players tended to emphasise the limited number of men involved.[87] McIntyre's position echoes that of Globe and Mail columnist Ralph Allen (who later joined Smythe's battery overseas) and other proponents of the players' rights, believing that the government tried to make an example of these players, singling them out unfairly. Allen questions the "double-talking bureaucrats" in the government who drew up the manpower regulations in one of his columns and summarizes the gist of the proponents' argument by asking, "does this mean the

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[84] Bruce McIntyre, "Which Uniform to Serve?" Canadian Journal of History of Sport 24 (1 December 1993): McIntyre's interpretation was based on his undergraduate thesis of the same name at Sir Wilfrid Laurier University, a copy of which is held at the Department of National Defence, Ottawa. (Hereafter, the former will be referred to as: McIntyre [article] and the latter as McIntyre [thesis].)

[85] Ibid.

[86] "Thinks Passport Unfair," WT (24 September 1941): 7.

[87] Letter to the Editor, GM (24 September 1941): 16.

government wants total war? Or is the government using the humiliation of a small group in an effort to get more to volunteer and therefore avoid conscription."[88]

The players' supporters further responded by accusing their opponents of unfairly singling out hockey players for criticism. As Allen argued, these men should not be expected to join simply because they happened to be hockey players. Given the judgmental tone of Justice Embury's remarks, this accusation on the part of McIntyre and Allen has some validity. On the other hand, given the symbolic national value of these players, it may be fair to argue that players were already singled out. Their employment made them national icons, and compensated them financially on a much higher scale than the local soda-jerker. Players also invited being singled out by asking for an exemption; if they had chosen to enter the armed forces in larger numbers, it is likely that none of this criticism would have arisen. While they may not have been the only ones asking for passports, even Allen admits that most exemptions were given for very short business trips to the US, not six-month leaves potentially required of a hockey season.[89] Later, the same supporters of the players argued for the unfettered continuation of professional hockey as a morale booster, and by extension, hockey players were important as those individuals uniquely qualified to provide this distraction. However, the same proponents of keeping hockey alive, like Allen, also opposed singling out hockey players, which seems like a double standard in itself. Both sides of this issue had reasons for their positions that went beyond the realm of hockey.

Despite all the attention it garnered, this controversy turned out to be short-lived, and a bit of a tempest in a teapot. Players were not in fact forced into military service.

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[88] Ibid., (13 September 1941): 14.
[89] Ibid., (19 September 1941): 14; Ibid., (15 September 1941) 14.

They were just not allowed to play in the U.S., but instead returned to the amateur ranks to play senior hockey in Canada.[90] At no point would the number of players affected threaten the ability of NHL teams to ice a team; one report pegged the potential number of affected NHL players at a grand total of twenty-five - spread over seven teams.[91] Even in October, in the midst of the controversy, headlines assured hockey fans that there would be NHL hockey that season.[92] By the spring of 1942, criticism was muted, and hockey carried on.[93] Perhaps this had something to do with American entry into the war. By this time, too, the issue was out of the spotlight because the hockey season was well underway, and therefore too late for players to apply for passports. At the beginning of the next wartime season, both the players and management learned to circumvent the rules more adroitly - and therefore less publicly - when a new system for obtaining exit work permits was put in place by the government. The league and its players thus learned not to place hockey under intense public scrutiny - but they could not make the debate surrounding wartime hockey go away completely.

The importance of examining the 'passport crisis' as it was dubbed, is that it was the first example of an overt public debate over the value of hockey in wartime. This argument can be seen as a debate over what was more important to Canada's wartime society: opponents believed in the importance of hockey players themselves, while proponents saw the significance of hockey as a game. Both believed that hockey in some ways represented something special to Canadians. Opponents of the players gaining exemptions seemed to believe that the players themselves represented something

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[90] "Several Former Pros Given Back Cards," MG (20 November 1941): 16.
[91] "Six Hockey Players Refused Passport Permit," GM (13 September 1941): 14.
[92] "Passport or No, Life Goes On in the NHL," WT (17 October 1941): 15; "National Hockey League Clubs Shaping Up," WT (15 October 1941): 14.
[93] McIntyre, [article], 85.

important, that they were role models that should have set an example in a country desperately trying to avoid a conscription debate similar to the one that nearly tore the country apart in the First World War. In doing so, they believed that all players should be in the military, even if it meant coercing them into a military uniform. Meanwhile, proponents of the players, both historical and contemporary, supported the value of the game of hockey in and of itself, above the value of the individuals who took part. Their concentration was on criticizing the government for allowing such loopholes in calling up military manpower to exist, and so exonerated the players from military service until all young men were conscripted with them.[94] Furthermore, when it came to the game, they reserve special praise for its place in Canadian society. Sometimes they make it seem as if without it, Canadians would not be able to go on fighting the war. For example, McIntyre speaks as recently as 1993 of "the need to keep the league [the NHL] game going at all costs."[95] While this might yet prove to be an exaggerated conception of the value of any sport to a society, events of the spring following this crisis would show just how inspiring this game could potentially be.

During the early spring of 1942, the proponents of the continuation of hockey were given a propitious illustration of the power of hockey in Canada. The professional game provided an example of how sport is attractive to many people, and how it could have a galvanic impact on the collective Canadian psyche. During the 1941/42 playoffs, the Toronto Maple Leafs met the Detroit Red Wings in the Stanley Cup finals. What followed was one of the most exciting and amazing series in the history of hockey. In the Official National Hockey League Stanley Cup Centennial Book, a special section is

[94] McIntyre [article] 85.
[95] McIntyre [thesis], 56.

devoted to describing this unique series, occurring appropriately at the fiftieth anniversary of the Cup. The Toronto Maple Leafs had not claimed a Cup victory since 1932, and were cast in an underdog role in the first playoff round, against the regular-season champion New York Rangers. The Leafs defeated the high scoring and heavily favoured Rangers, four games to two in the best of seven series. The Leafs then went on to face the Detroit Red Wings in the best of seven final. They proceeded to flounder against the Wings, losing three straight games, and found themselves with the previously unheard-of task of winning four straight games in a playoff series.[96]

Desperate, Leafs coach Hap Day replaced two of his best players: solid but slow defenceman Bucko McDonald and slumping regular-season scoring leader Gordie Drillon were switched with a pair of untested rookies, Ernie Dickens and Don Metz. Halfway through the fourth, and potentially final, game, the Leafs were down 2-0 in Detroit, when the seemingly impossible occurred. Toronto mounted a comeback, and won the game 4-3. In the course of the game, referee Mel Harwood handed out several penalties and fines to the Red Wings, and this was more than enough to infuriate Detroit coach and manager Jack Adams. Adams jumped onto the ice after the game and attacked the referee, leading President Calder to suspend him indefinitely and bar him from the Wings' bench for the remainder of the series. Before game five, Day made another change, inserting eighteen year-old Gaye Stewart into the lineup. The Leafs won the next two games, and on April 18 1942, the seventh and deciding game of the Stanley Cup finals was held at Maple Leaf Gardens. Smythe, by this time on a leave of absence while training with his military unit, was barred from the dressing room by acting Leafs president Ed Bickle. Bickle believed Smythe would only distract the players and cause

[96] Stan Fischler, "The Comeback to end all Comebacks." [hereafter Fischler] in Diamond, 101-102.

the Leafs to lose their momentum.[97] Smythe entered the dressing room anyway, gave an impassioned speech, and the Leafs ended up winning the game, and the Cup. It remains the only time in any sport that a team has recovered from a three game deficit in a best of seven championship series to win, and has only been repeated twice more in any playoff series since.[98]

The impact of this series went beyond just the victory of one Canadian-based team. It represents all that sport can be: a foil of the real world, with the best outcome possible achieved. Nothing can inspire more than an underdog victory, especially when a group perceives itself as the underdogs. One can draw a parallel between this series and the position Canada found itself in during 1942. Suddenly, a group of heroic Canadians found themselves on the brink of defeat to a foreign opponent. The Allies began the war with no casualties on the western front, and the hope of avoiding another horrible war. Suddenly France was defeated, the Allies pushed off the continent, and England found itself fighting for its life in the Battle of Britain. In a metaphorically comparable situation, the Maple Leafs started the playoffs well, defeating the Rangers, but then quickly found themselves on the brink of defeat too. Just as new reinforcements helped the Leafs turn the series around, Canada found new allies in the United States and the Soviet Union, allies that turned the tide of the war. Canadians could only hope in 1942 that the happy ending that the Maple Leafs enjoyed would also occur for the Allies.

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1942 and 1943 were pivotal years for professional hockey, especially the NHL. Hockey managed to carry on after the first major public crisis of the war in the fall of

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[97] This was Smythe's opinion, expressed in his memoirs: Smythe, 146.
[98] Fischler, 103-107.

1941, but not without casualties of its own. With the demise of the Brooklyn Americans[99] at the outset of the 1942/43 season, the NHL was left with the six franchises that would constitute the league until 1967, marking an "Golden Era" referred to in hockey lore as that of the "Original Six." The Americans' franchise traced its demise to the depression more than the war, but the outbreak of hostilities accelerated the inevitable – inevitable since the league ran the organization since the late thirties, and because the Rangers were by far the more popular Madison Square Garden home club. Other changes were more directly a result of the war, however. A major rule marked the beginning of the NHL's modern era: the introduction of the center red line in 1943/44.[100] Partly due to a reluctance to introduce major rule changes, and partly as a result of the loss of elite players to enlistment, the speed and tempo of the game was upset. With fewer highly skilled players, the game slipped into a dump-and-chase contest, with defencemen shooting the puck into the opposition's zone followed by forwards' attempts to dig the puck out of the corners. The result was a slow game with more action along the boards than in open ice – where the exciting plays usually took place. Before the introduction of the red line, forward passes were not allowed to cross either blue line; the red line allowed forward passes between two zones, thus reducing the number of offside calls, encouraging more offense and speeding up the game.

Of course, the NHL was not alone in making adjustments. In 1942 the federal government introduced the rationing of many consumer goods that affected the lives of

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[99] Formerly called the New York Americans, team president and manager 'Red' Dutton changed their name to the Brooklyn Americans in order to play up the rivalry with the Rangers – even though both had always played their home games at Madison Square Garden.

[100] James Duplacey, "The Changing Rink," in Diamond, 352.

Canadian businesses and citizens.[101] In the long run, the rationing of materials like rubber and gasoline actually helped the NHL. The league had teams in major metropolitan centers with well-developed infrastructures, including public transit systems, which other smaller cities could not boast. While fans of the Canadiens or Red Wings could jump on a streetcar to get to the Montreal Forum or Detroit Arena, fans in smaller AHL or AHA markets like Hershey, New Haven or Providence had to weight their options.[102] Those fans had to judge the worth of using some of their gasoline rations in getting to the arena to watch a hockey game versus other more vital trips – like getting groceries. As a result, smaller crowds brought less revenue, and many minor league teams were forced to fold. The NHL recognized the importance of public transport when it abolished overtime so players and fans could catch the last train home. Due to the conservation of rubber, teams asked fans to return pucks that landed in the crowd.[103] Even the length of hockey sticks was shortened to reduce consumption of wood.[104] Other wartime needs worked in the NHL's favour: the Springfield Indians of the AHL, the NHL's main rival league at the outbreak of war, had their arena taken by the U.S. army for use as a supply warehouse.[105]

An equally important factor in labelling 1942/43 the first real war year for hockey was that after three years of war, the summer of 1942 witnessed the first mass enlistment of players – over 90 players under contract to NHL clubs were in the armed forces or reserves. Most joined the Non-permanent Active Militia - precisely the groups that Smythe suggested his players join in the summer of 1940. From 1942 on, the NHL, like

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[101] Granatstein, Canada's War, 186.
[102] Gene Kiczek, Forgotten Glory: The Story of The Cleveland Barons, [hereafter Kiczek] (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1994): 64.
[103] "Rubber Conservation in Hockey – Fans Are Asked to Return Pucks," MG (10 November 1941): 16. Also see an advertisement in the Chicago Black Hawks souvenir programme: Chicago Stadium Review (November 1941): 16.
[104] "Sports Chatter," Canadian Press News (London, England) [CPN] 19 (5 September 1942): 4.
[105] Kiczek, 64.

other professional sports, would be forced to fill its rosters with players who fell outside of the draft, the physically unfit for military service, and the occasional military discharge.[106] Recognizing this, the maximum number of players dressed to play was reduced from 15 to 14, while the minimum number needed to play, previously twelve, was eliminated.[107] The reason the summer of 1942 saw so many enlistments was not due to the encouragement of NHL owners like Smythe or the patriotism of the players. Players were forced into the armed forces when the government made changes to the NRMA act passed in 1940, which widened the scope of men eligible to be called up for military service. This was the summer of the so-called first conscription crisis of World War Two, the summer in which full conscription became a possibility "if necessary." Even this worked in the NHL's favour, relatively speaking. Compared with the minor leagues, NHL players were older and more likely to be married, meaning fewer players would be lost to military training. As a result, this exodus hit minor professional leagues much harder.[108]

Just as hockey was not immune from the economic and supply effects of the war, it was not immune from the political repercussions of the war, either. Conscription caused a major division along linguistic lines in the First World War, and was the major reason for the crushing defeat of the federal Liberal Party in the 1917 election. Not only did Sir Wilfrid Laurier lose the election, but a young Liberal MP and protégé of Laurier, William Lyon Mackenzie King, lost his own bid for election in Ontario. When the same

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[106] "Ball Moguls May Bank Heavily On 17-Year-Olds, Men Over 38." MS (25 January 1945): 25. This just emphasised a condition that had been apparent for years.

[107] NHL. Board of Governors meetings, (25 September 1942).

[108] "U.S. Puck Teams Lose Western Talent," WPF (13 September 1941): 22. Maurice Podiloff, AHL president, claimed the "effect of the war on hockey would not be appreciable... we have been assured they [western hockey players] will not be forbidden passage to the United States..." Podiloff, however, turned out to be wrong on both counts. "AHL Is Not Worried About Lack of Players," WFP (15 September 1941): 15.

problem arose in the next major war, King wanted to make sure not to repeat the mistakes of the previous war. At the onset of the Second World War, King declared there would be no overseas conscription, and this promise was incorporated into the NRMA. Pressure began to mount when the official opposition Conservative party elected ardent pro-conscriptionist, and King arch-nemesis, Arthur Meighen as leader.[109] Meighen's nomination marked a departure for the Conservatives; under Robert Manion, the Conservative party was officially against conscription, although there was a strong pro-consriptionist faction within the party.[110] Before being elected Conservative leader, Meighen "kept up a vast correspondence with like-minded men across the nation and with his old cronies" who supported conscription, among whom, undoubtedly, was Conn Smythe.[111] Meighen's appointment, in Jack Granatstein's estimation, "let loose the pro-conscriptionists."[112] In January 1942, a group of 200 prominent Conservatives met in Toronto. The 'Toronto 200,' as they were nicknamed, tried to bolster public support for conscription, partly through full-page advertisements in nearly all Ontario newspapers.[113] Their public campaign was successful as pressure mounted until finally, in April 1942, King's Liberal government held a plebiscite asking to be relieved of its promise not to implement overseas conscription. It was passed with a comfortable majority across the country, except in Quebec. French-Canadians, even those outside Quebec, voted overwhelmingly against the proposal, justifying King's fears. In July 1942, after months of debate in parliament, Bill 80 was passed amending section three of the NRMA that forbade the conscription of men for overseas service. In practice, the sphere of

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[109] Stacey, 400.
[110] Granatstein and Hitsmen, 137-138.
[111] Ibid., 159.
[112] Ibid., 162.
[113] Ibid., 162.

compulsory military service was only extended to include all of North America, including Newfoundland and Bermuda, but not into any active (or likely) theatre of war. King's government decided that men would only be forced overseas to maintain an effective war effort. King had successfully avoided instituting overseas conscription. The plebiscite and Bill 80 had successfully, if painfully, put military manpower questions on the backburner, where it would remain for over two years.

While the issue of conscription was settled for a time, manpower problems did not disappear. Pressures developed within King's own government, where different factions tore at the PM's priorities. The hawks in cabinet, like Defence Minister James L. Ralston, wanted an emphasis on getting more men into general service; others, like Minister of Supply C.D. Howe, wanted an increase in armament production; still others in his Quebec wing were vehemently opposed to conscription. When 1942 brought both military and civilian manpower shortages, King desperately wanted to avoid any form of compulsion to fill either need. The only acceptable solution was to curtail non-essential work, with the introduction of a long list of restricted occupations.[114] Hockey was not specifically listed in the Order-in-Council, but King promised in parliament that no physically fit men between 17 and 45 could work in entertainment related industries.[115] Military authorities, however, felt this insufficient. Estimating that the military needed about 50 000 recruits a month, they proposed drastic changes in Canadian society that would adversely affect the standard of living by cutting civilian production and exert

[114] Ibid., 186-192.
[115] Order in Council, PC 2250 (21 March 1941); Granatstein and Hitsmen, 190.

more control over the day-to-day lives of Canadians. King, however, opted for a more gradual approach, putting civilian concerns ahead of military needs.[116]

These political changes put the upcoming hockey season in question. The hockey world was unsure of the future following the announcements of May 1942, which vastly restricted the manpower available to non-essential industries. There remained the possibility the NHL would suspend operations, as Calder's quote at the beginning of the chapter suggests. As late as August of 1942, leading hockey figures like Lester Patrick were making very carefully worded public statements like, "[w]e will do just what they [the government] say, of course, but until they tell us the score we can only go ahead slowly."[117] Just after the passage of Bill 80, the director of the National Selective Service (N.S.S.), Elliot Little, asked for a list of all Canadians in the NHL, along with their age, marital and military status. [118] However, he had already hinted at his inclinations in December 1941, when he publicly announced: "It may be necessary to give consideration to maintaining the NHL in some force, or we would face the problem of what it means to hundreds of thousands of Canadians in entertainment morale."[119] Understanding from Little was now more important than ever, because in September 1942 the N.S.S. was given the power to move employees from non-essential to essential war industries, and from essential industry to military service. Little continued to emphasise that no men would be allowed to avoid military service to play hockey.[120] NHL executives finally

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[116] Stacey, 405-409.
[117] "Sports Chatter," CPN 15 (8 August 1942): 4.
[118] "Little Will Decide NHL Future," CPN 16 (15 August 1942): 4.
[119] "NSS Director Supports Hockey," GM (18 December 1941): 16.
[120] As we will see in the next chapter, government officials had professional, not senior, hockey on their minds.

received official notification in mid-September that hockey could continue: Calder recounted his meeting with government officials by saying,

> while neither [Canada or the U.S.] has any intention of granting exemption from military service to hockey players or other athletes, there is no objection to allowing any men who are not subject to military service to continue their professional athletic activities unless and until they are requested to engage in some non-military war duty.[121]

For hockey, as for the nation at large, it would be conscription if necessary, but not necessarily conscription. Still, for the first time the league had to deal with a major player shortage.

With more players enlisted than ever, teams had to ensure the availability of as many players as possible. Part of the way teams succeeded in doing this was by exploiting a new order-in-council restricting the movements of cross-border employees. The government introduced a new bureaucratic procedure that required all individuals wanting to work in the U.S. acquire an exit permit. This placed the system that led to the passport crisis of the previous fall, with some important differences. In September of 1942 responsibility for manpower in both the military and industry switched from the Department of National War Services to the Department of Labour. This meant that passport and postponement authorization had to be made through the N.S.S. instead of the National War Service Boards. The outcome of this switch for the world of hockey was that the new regulations granted exemptions of entire, but select, groups: Part four, section (d) exempted "Members of dramatic, artistic, athletic or spectacular organizations departing from Canada temporarily for the purpose of giving public performances or

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[121] "Professional Receive Official Green Light," CPN 22 (26 September 1942): 4.

exhibitions of an interesting or instructive character."[122] No longer did players need a labour exit permit to work in the U.S. An important question remained to be answered, however: was hockey considered "interesting or instructive"? This question soon received a *de facto* answer when the Winnipeg division of the N.S.S. Board granted exemption certificates to several hockey players.[123] This was in stark contrast to a year earlier, when the Winnipeg division of the National War Labour Board rejected hockey players in a similar situation.[124]

While many government officials, like Little and Minister of Labour Humphrey Mitchell, saw the use of hockey for morale building, they were only willing to go so far publicly in the delicate post-Bill 80 world of manpower politics.[125] While acknowledging its importance, even these supporters added that playing should in no way interfere with a players' primary duty - to fight if called upon.[126] This can perhaps be attributed to the state's role in legitimating the social order. Some political scientists have argued that the legitimation function in Canada is "underdeveloped."[127] In this situation, however, it would have been in the government's interest to maintain the appearance of equality of sacrifice among all military-aged men. At a time when the government was more intrusive than ever in the day-to-day lives of its citizens, any semblance of wartime favouritism would, at the very least, hurt the ruling party's reputation and its chances for re-election. The delicate manpower situation at home meant the government was acutely aware of having to ensure at least the perception of equality among all labourers and

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[122]Canada. Office of the Privy Council. "Labour Exit Permit Order," Order-in-Council, 9011 (1 October 1942).
[123]Hunter, War Games, 97.
[124] A reorganisation in bureaucracy in September 1942 gave the National Selective Service the powers of deferment previously held by the Regional War Labour Boards. See Granatstein and Hitsmen, 146.
[125] "Hockey in Wartime Favoured by Mitchell," MS (8 February 1944): 16.
[126]"NSS Director Supports Hockey," GM (18 December 1941): 16.
[127] Panitch, 19.

military personnel, not to mention balancing the increasingly vociferous calls for conscription.[128]

Paralleling the uncertainty surrounding the national conscription situation, from 1942 through the end of the war, hockey went from year-to-year in its operations, perennially unsure if it would be able to carry on. Like the military, the NHL had to eke out its manpower. After 1943 the tone of uncertainty surrounded the availability of players, not a question of a possible government-mandated shutdown. In fact, the NHL looked to the government to help it secure sufficient players to continue to fill rosters and 'boost morale'. Interim President Mervin 'Red' Dutton, who took over after the sudden death of Frank Calder, announced that the NHL would continue, and "read a statement from Labor Minister Mitchell that 'within certain limits' Selective Service will release hockey players to engage in the game during the upcoming campaign."[129] In mid-1943, league officials had discussed gaining "concessions" with Arthur McNamara, the new head of the N.S.S., in order to "keep their teams on the ice."[130] Little had resigned in November of 1942 for the same reason the NHL was able to gain concessions on manpower: he claimed he was given "no clear directive from government on manpower policy."[131] Meanwhile, Lester Patrick was informed that teams would be able to obtain players from essential industries - *if* they could get permission from employers and *if* the employers could guarantee that production would not be adversely affected.[132] This was a big step for the league, as it had gone from the brink of a government-mandated

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[128] Granatstein, Conscription, 35-37.
[129] "Ottawa Okays NHL But Players Scarce," CPN 74 (25 September 1943): 8.
[130] "Ice Bosses in Parley at Ottawa," CPN 68 (21 August 1943): 8.
[131] Stacey, 408.
[132] "Ice Bosses in Parley at Ottawa," *op. cit.*; "Ottawa Okays NHL But Players Scarce," *op. cit.*

shutdown to receiving some leniency in acquiring players, at a time when manpower was scarce, and the NHL employed the most precious of all manpower.

Even with this concession, hockey managers had to exploit all possible means to retain players' services. The first move the league itself made, in 1941, was to surrender authority in league manpower issues to Calder (later Dutton), who was given the last word in resolving player disputes between clubs.[133] This would remain only a footnote in NHL history if it applied solely to NHL clubs, but the AHA and AHL also agreed to abide by Calder's rulings. An NHL representative now had the power to arbitrate players' rights, which put that league in an enviable strategic position at a time when talented players were difficult to find, let alone keep. With the minor leagues under its control, the league moved to rearrange its agreement with the CAHA to allow for freer movement of players between the amateur and professional ranks. In 1940, the Ontario Hockey Association changed the definition of an amateur in response to the war's drain on hockey manpower. It was changed to read: "an amateur hockey player is one who *either* has not or is not managed in professional hockey [emphasis added]."[134] The NHL formalized it first wartime agreement in 1940, and renegotiated with the CAHA every year throughout the war.[135] An important concession was gained in 1942 when the CAHA agreed that junior age players no longer had to apply to the CAHA for permission to turn professional.[136] This was significant since junior age players were young enough to be exempted from the draft, and were increasingly becoming part of NHL team rosters.

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[133] "Calder Invested With Further Power: NHL Boss Given Sole Authority in Club Disputes." WFP (25 October 1941): 16.
[134] "OHA Meeting Saturday." MG (21 November 1940): 15.
[135] PAO. Smythe Papers. MU 5966 box 31. Government. "Report on Amateur Hockey in Canada by the Committee of the National Advisory Council on Fitness and Amateur Sport" [hereafter "Report on Amateur Hockey."] (January 1967): 9.
[136] "Hockey Juniors Free to Turn Pro: Game's Future not Discussed." CPN 18 (29 August 1942): 4.

Several players, like Ted Kennedy and Jack Hamilton of the Maple Leafs, took this path to the NHL. In 1943, the league gained another concession: NHL teams could "call-up" an amateur player for one game without that player losing his amateur status.[137] This way, an NHL team could see an amateur compete against NHL competition, and thereby judge if he had the talent to make the jump. Just as important, it would be much easier to persuade that player to turn professional since the NHL had much freer access to him. It was an ideal situation since the NHL clubs had no financial responsibility, but still had easier access to a plentiful source of young players to fill out their rosters on any given night. Montreal took full advantage of these new regulations. It used this new rule the first year to acquire defensemen Glen Harmon and Johnny Mahaffy. Harmon went on to play almost ten years, was a two-time post-war all-star, and was runner-up in rookie-of-the-year voting in 1943.[138] The NHL thus became the gatekeeper of Canadian hockey, and placed itself at the apex of the hockey world. The league had played the game of pragmatic wartime politics well.

Managers mostly relied upon players' war industry jobs and medical deferrals to keep them in the league. Hockey was deemed of "low labour priority" by the government, and therefore players could not have complete liberty to leave an essential war industry to move and play hockey. NHL managers responded by placing players (often those who had received a medical deferral from military service) in essential industries in the club's home city. Tommy Gorman, general manager of the Montreal Canadiens, built the foundation of a dynasty by following this path. All three members of the Canadiens' great "Punch Line" - Elmer Lach, Hector 'Toe' Blake and Maurice

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[137] "Irvin Wants Use of More C[A]HA's And No Wonder!" TDS (16 January 1943): 16.
[138] "Harmon, Glen" in "Pre-Expansion Player Index," of Diamond, 716.

'Rocket' Richard - worked in war industries. Lach worked in an aircraft factory, Blake in a shipyard, and Richard - along with four other Habs - in a munitions plant.[139] To accommodate players with war industry jobs, practices were held at night.[140] Other team managers did not take to kindly to this; Bruins manager Art Ross came to call the Canadiens (disparagingly) "the essential war workers."[141] The Maple Leafs employed several university age players, like Jack McLean, who were deferred from their military service requirements due to their studies.[142] This situation consequently produced a unique situation at the NHL level: part-time players. It was reported that the LeMay brothers, locked into in the civil service as munitions department workers, would play with the Canadiens during home games only.[143] An even more creative response followed the news that New York Rangers' forward Phil Watson would not be allowed to enter the U.S. Instead of just having him play for the Rangers when they visited Toronto and Montreal, or about ten games of the fifty game season, a trade was arranged. The talent-thin Rangers acquired the rights to five players in return for Watson, in the NHL's version of a lend-lease arrangement; Watson was back with New York the next year after gaining a medical deferral from military service.[144] Arrangements like these were necessary because of the scarcity of players following mounting military enlistments. Even in the midst of such a player shortage, NHL teams employed every trick to gain an advantage over their rivals. A new league rule went into effect in 1944 that allowed only those deferred as physically unfit, and not those deferred by essential war work, to play in

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[139] Darcy Jenish, The Stanley Cup, (Toronto, 1992): 157.
[140] "Canadiens to Open Drills Next Week," MG (15 October 1943): 16.
[141] Andy Lytle, "Ross Wants Wartime Tag on Those Hockey Records," TDS (18 March 1944): 12.
[142] Kevin Shea, "Jack McLean," www.lcshockey.com/history/jackmclean (3 July 2000).
[143] "Two Lemays to Play Home Games Only," MG (1 October 1943): 16.
[144] "Sands, Hiller Traded to Rangers for Watson," MG (20 October 1944): 16.

the league.[145] Part of this was likely public relations, but the Montreal media, at least, believed it to be an attack on the success of the defending Stanley Cup Champion Canadiens, even though Habs' president Donat Raymond seconded the motion.[146] The Canadiens did not lose any players to this rule, however: Bill Durnan, for example, conveniently acquired a medical deferral before the end of training camp in 1944.

The Canadiens were best able to use war-work and medical deferrals to their advantage. On the other hand, the biggest names on the Maple Leafs – Smythe, Apps and Broda – all joined the military. Again, sport had reflected the society that supported it, this time two solitudes within the same nation: the Canadiens, French-Canada's team, has chosen to carry on with players who were making a contribution to the war offer in a material way – by building tanks and ships, by adding to the ammunition stockpiles. This was the war contribution King wanted in the first place – a limited war, where Canada would help with supplies, but not with men. Toronto has chosen to contribute militarily, or at least display the illusion that they were. Following their hawkish conservative English-Canadian leader, Smythe, the Leafs organization tried to engage in an all-out war effort, in some ways instituting a conscription policy of its own. The value of that contribution is debatable, since no Maple Leafs could claim any front line experience – except for Smythe.

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By final wartime season, 1944-1945, the NHL felt secure enough to lobby the government to give the league more support, not just allow it to continue. The NHL,

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[145] NHL. Board of Governors meeting, (12 May 1944).
[146] Ibid.; "NHL Rivals to Probe Eligibility of Habs' Players." GM (19 October 1944): 17.

and specifically Smythe, began to demand that even more players be made available.[147] A proposal was made before the NHL Board of Governors that read:

> Major Connie Smythe moved that the league should place before the Government a request for its approval of the following policy:
> "For the duration of the war the following classes of men will be eligible for [NHL] competition:
> (1) Men discharged from the Armed Forces.
> (2) Men Rejected by the armed forces employed in essential industry
> (3) Bona fide students who have not reached their 20th birthday by November 1st of each season.
> (4) Men who are not in the callable age...."[148]

Smythe even when so far as to imply the league would be forced to shutdown if more players were not released.[149] This may partly have reflected a belief in the impending victory over Nazi Germany, but it also suggests that hockey had won over the public. Despite two major public incidents, one occurring as recently as the previous autumn (see chapter four), hockey was still considered important enough to Canadians that no public outcry arose. Even though demands for additional concessions were unthinkable only a few months earlier, hockey owners like Smyth felt secure enough in the attitude of the public to put pressure on the government. While the government made no official response to these public requests, the six NHL teams received nine players directly through discharges from the armed forces in 1944-45, while only one was gained from a discharge in all previous years combined.[150] This may have been partly due to the fact many had joined in 1942 and had already spent two years in the military, but many of these discharges never saw anything close to active service. Also, this number includes

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[147] "NHL May Seek 300 Players Now Ineligible For Services," MS (7 February 1945): 16; "Smythe Boosts Player Pool: Amplifies Statement in Federal Appeal," MS (5 February 1945): 24.
[148] NHL. Board of Governors Meeting. (2 February 1945).
[149] "Smythe Proposes 4 Classes Of Men to be Made Available to NHL," MS (5 February 1945).
[150] This is based on newspaper reports during 1944-45 compared to other seasons (i.e. "Report NHL Stars Will Get RCAF Discharge," MS (22 November 1944): 20; please see Appendix H: Turnover On NHL Teams, 1939-1946.

only those players who played the majority of the season for the team. Many players, like New York's Neil Colville, Montreal's Kenny Mosdell and Wilf Field or Toronto's Johnny McCreedy, joined the team late in the season after receiving their discharge. More interestingly, the fall of 1944 saw the explosion of an issue that had quietly simmered below the surface throughout the war. When the problem of overseas conscription finally broke into flames in September and October of 1944, it was a hockey mogul who supplied the spark.

In September of 1944, Conn Smythe accused the Canadian government of costing young Canadian lives in Europe with its policy of not conscripting troops for overseas service. In a statement reported on the front page of the Globe and Mail, Smythe claimed

> I was able to discuss the reinforcement situation with officers of units representing every section of Canada...They agreed that the reinforcements received now are green [,] inexperienced and poorly trained... These officers are unanimous in stating that large numbers of unnecessary casualties result from this greenness...[151]

Soon after, the government was embroiled in just the conscription crisis it was desperately trying to avoid. In the end, the government was forced to implement overseas conscription, and the reason why can in large part be traced back to Smythe's statement. To understand why this statement had such a forceful impact, Smythe's attitudes and actions, as well as his legitimacy in the eyes of the public, must be understood.[152] No less important was how Conservative politicians and the media trumpeted the charges.

Smythe was uniquely suited to play the catalyst in this renewed manpower crisis. As the principal owner of the most recognizable professional Canadian sports franchise of the time, he already possessed national recognition. To this was added the fact he was

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[151] "Untrained Troops a Hazard at Front, Smythe Complains," GM (19 September 1944): 1.
[152] Panitch, 19.

not only a decorated veteran of the First World War, but also by 1944 a veteran of the Second World War.[153] As commanding officer of the 30th 'sportsmen's battery,' Smythe was wounded overseas in July 1944, and returned home in time for the opening of the 1944/45 hockey season. However, hockey was not what he had on his mind when he returned from France. Enjoying a heightened national profile, along with public sympathy associated with having survived a serious war wound, Smythe was in a position to bring hawkish pressure on the government. On top of this, Smythe's charges were not just opinionated comments, but arose out of first-hand knowledge of the front. "Besides this general statement," reported Smythe, "specific charges are that many [recruits] have never thrown a hand grenade. Practically all have little or no knowledge of the Bren Gun and finally, most of them have never seen a Piat anti-tank gun, let alone fired one."[154] In Smythe's eyes, the only reason for this was the government's cowardice in not implementing overseas conscription. This only echoed pro-conscription sentiments that had been around since the beginning of the war, but this time, with the European invasion under way, the government could not stem the criticism. Conservative newspapers gave Smythe's charges blanket coverage, and political leaders, like newly-elected Premier George Drew of Ontario, bolstered Smythe's claims.[155] Drew, another World War One veteran, offered proof that recruits were practicing with six-pound guns, while .75mm canons were used in the field. He also charged that obsolete Ram tanks were used in training, while Shermans were used in the field.[156] All of this added fuel to Smythe's

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[153] Smythe earned the Military cross in Artillery during the First World War. PAO. Smythe Papers. Introduction.
[154] "Untrained Troops Hazard at Front, Smythe Complains." GM (19 September 1944): 1.
[155] The Globe and Mail led the way in publicising Smythe's charges, giving the issue front-page coverage on several occasions. By contrast, the Liberal Montreal Daily Star paid virtually no attention to the charges, except to publish the government's rebuttals.
[156] "New Troops Untrained, Drew Insists." GM (6 October 1944): 1.

charges. Defence Minister Ralston at first rebutted Smythe's claims, so Smythe released the names of the officers and the battalions with undertrained troops.[157] Ralston added weight to the pro-conscriptionist side when he reversed his anti-conscription stance after returning from a trip overseas on October 18, 1944.[158] King desperately wanted to avoid conscription, and eventually rid himself of Ralston in favour of General Andrew McNaughton (ironically just the man Smythe had advocated for Defence Minister earlier in the war[159]). However, when a last ditch effort to raise enough volunteers to fill avoid conscription, King was forced to extend the NRMA to include overseas service.

In the end, only 2,463 conscripts saw battlefield action and the country survived, but in a time when hockey was trying desperately to survive a shortage of players it was telling that the leading hockey mogul in Canada ignited a conscription debate that resulted in more men being forced into overseas service. This captures the paradox that surrounded hockey during the war. Smythe schemed to protect his profit-making players, yet decried the government for cowardice and inactivity. While many sports fans and writers supported the continuation of professional hockey, the very proponents of hockey, like Conn Smythe and Globe and Mail columnist Ralph Allen, also criticized the government for not forcing all available young men into active military service overseas.

Many of the issues that arose surrounding hockey during the war revolved, either blatantly or subtly, around concerns over national morale and military manpower. This only serves as further proof that sport cannot be separated from the society that supports it. Hockey players represented a small group numerically, but one that had political and

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[157] "Smythe Claims Officers in Eleven Units Protested Untrained Troops," GM (4 October 1944): 13.
[158] "Need Reinforcements Now, Col. Ralston Corrects King," GM (13 November 1944): 11.
[159] PAO. Smythe Papers, MU5941 box 5, Government Correspondence, 1940-41, Open letter by Smythe to Prime Minister King, (21 June 1940).

patriotic symbolism far outweighing its actual manpower value. Proponents like Smythe of the continuation of professional hockey also supported conscription, while those who wanted to see all eligible young hockey players overseas most often wanted to avoid instituting conscription, like Judge Embury of the Manitoba National War Services Board. To the latter, hockey players represented a group of men who might offer national inspiration, and a solution to the ever-daunting task of finding replacement recruits. The former saw no conflict between the all-out pursuit of the war effort and some semblance of normalcy at home. The fact that the former group, made up of prominent and wealthy men like Smythe, ended up having their way indicated the power of these capitalists to use the state to pursue their own interests – in this case, profit and patriotism.

Professional hockey, and specifically the NHL, prospered in war, even though the ever-present issue of conscription constantly hung over its players. This itself speaks volumes about hockey's place in Canadian society. Professional sport continued in both Britain and the United States, but neither of these countries faced the peculiar manpower problems that Canada had to face. Neither of these Allies had to face the vehement opposition to conscription from a large national minority that Canada had to deal with. Officials of both the government and the NHL claimed that they were acting in the best interests of the country in letting the game continue, in order to boost both civilian and troop morale. There is undoubtedly a great degree of truth to this, but there was also much for both of these organizations to gain from hockey's continuation. The benefits to the NHL of continuation were obvious: continued profitability and national attention on an even higher scale than in the past as a main source of entertainment in a very difficult time. Even more important, however, is what the NHL averted by carrying on. Had

hockey been shut down for the duration, the league would have found itself at par with at least one other rival league after the end of hostilities. The NHL used the war to extend its hegemony over the minor and amateur leagues along with increasing its profit margins substantially, and enhancing its strategic power over its players, thereby elevating itself to the apex of the hockey world in the process. The government, on the other hand, welcomed any and all distraction from the conscription crisis that loomed constantly in the background. Of course, players themselves provided an opportunity for more than distraction, they served as a two-edged example. First, young men who did not volunteer for general military service would be publicly ridiculed – as were the young men who applied to leave Canada to play hockey in 1941. And second, the star hockey players who were in the military provided a strong reminder for potential recruits that many young men with lucrative and popular jobs had given that up to volunteer. Hopefully this would encourage them to sign up for general service and avoid the need for conscription. The government and the NHL each had something to gain from the compromises that developed around this reality. In the next chapter, the position of the military itself, which needed such healthy young men to pursue the war effort, will be explored.

CHAPTER 4
MILITARY UNITS TAKE TO THE ICE

Over three hundred and fifty professional players left their teams and entered the military during the war.[1] While professional clubs attempted to cope with the resultant major personnel losses, the players themselves found a new place to play – in the military. Military uses for hockey were threefold. Boosting national moral was one aspect, as many elite military teams joined Canadian Amateur Hockey Association (CAHA)–affiliated senior leagues. Troop morale, overseas and in Canada, both as an attraction and through participation, was just as important. The third, and what military officials claimed was the most important reason, was hockey's efficacy in physical training, a fact to which the first two considerations were supposed to be subordinate. As more ex-professional players entered the armed forces, military hockey began to resemble professional sport more than a pleasant distraction or just another form of exercise. Eventually, this perceived shift toward professionalism threatened to tarnish the image of the military when it appeared as though former professional players were getting exceptional treatment due to their on-ice abilities. The role of hockey within the military thus reflected the general consensus toward hockey, and, considering the resources expended upon its continuation, shows how deeply Canadians felt about the game in both peace and war.

Military authorities established early in the war that sport would be an integral part of training and military life. The first evidence of competitive sports in the military was visible at least as early as 1940, when an RCAF hockey team based in Ottawa played

[1] Based on professional players who played at least one game in the NHL during their careers. Please see appendices D-G. Career records compiled from information in Dan Diamond, ed., Total Hockey [hereafter Diamond] (Toronto, 1998).

the Cornwall Flyers of the QSHL in a challenge game.[2] Sporting events of all kinds were popular overseas too, as soldiers stationed in England raised $500 for war charities by playing a benefit softball game in November 1940.[3] As the Canadian army grew rapidly, the military had to spend more time, energy and funds to support sports and athletics on a larger scale. Since the military was mostly engaged in training before the D-Day invasion of June 1944, sports was one way to occupy the troops' energy and attention during the seemingly endless routine of training. In early 1942 it became clear that the military was willing to support competitive athletics. As a headline in the Winnipeg Free Press announced: "Army Authorities Plan A Vast Sports Programme." Hockey was only one part of this program, with military organizers hoping "that military inter-area competitions [would] be held in almost every field of sport."[4] One army general stated that an "effort will be made to have every member of the armed forces in some sort of athletic competition."[5]

As soon as all-Canadian bases were established in Britain, Canadian officials made organizing sports for Canadian troops a priority. Captain E.D. Otter, Senior Officer of the YMCA Overseas, addressed a meeting of executives and supervisors of the Canadian military and YMCA in London, and summarized the upcoming challenge:

> Before us is a clear-cut job of providing out boys with opportunity to live strong normal and happy lives despite these disintegrating war conditions. We must accordingly face up to the real needs as individuals, as groups and help them to become better Canadian citizens. That will involve determining the most vital needs, including those in the areas of social, physical intellectual and moral needs.[6]

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[2] "Cornwall Flyers beat RCAF Team," Montreal Gazette [hereafter MG] (27 November 1940): 17.
[3] "Aid War Relief Fund, Canadian Soldiers Raise $500 from Softball," MG, (27 November 1940) 17.
[4] "Army Authorities Plan A Vast Sports Programme," Winnipeg Free Press [hereafter WFP] (23 January 1942): 14.
[5] "Sports Outlined," MG (23 September 1943): 16.
[6] Department of National Defence (hereafter DND). RG 24 V100771 file 222C1 (D274) Auxiliary Services, "Transcript of address by Captain E.D. Otter," (22 November 1942).

Commander Gene Tunney, a former heavyweight boxing champion, added that athletics should be encouraged "as morale builders for servicemen rather than smokes from the Yanks [or] the gentle ministrations of hostesses."[7] Clearly, military leaders felt organized sports, not just physical training, were important to the development and maintenance of happy, and by extension productive, soldiers. Underlining these public statements was the belief that sports promoted bonding between the men, a key attribute of military cohesiveness and effectiveness. Both these statements also reveal why this was believed: organized sport developed character and cohesion that neither simple exercise nor other leisure activities could provide. Hockey was widely seen to provide the proper character-developing traits.[8]

In an RCAF pamphlet entitled "A Guide to Organization and Administration of a Station Physical Fitness Program" the place of organized sports like hockey was explained.[9] According to the pamphlet, motivation was the main factor contributing to the success or failure of fitness activities, which was why competitive sports were determined to play a prominent role in physical training. Military administrators showed their unbounded enthusiasm for competitive sports when they suggested that "[it] is the competitive sports program which stimulated the greatest interest and effort on the part of the personnel participating." As a result, "the competitive sports portion of the program [should] consume the major portion of time on the schedule." If a proponent of military hockey had read this, he would undoubtedly conclude that hockey could play a prominent role in wartime physical training. However, the pamphlet also underlined some points

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[7] "Tunney Claims Athletics Are Needed in Army," WPF (13 January 1942): 16.
[8] "Sports Outlined," MG (23 September 1943): 16.
[9] DND 85/721 "A Guide to Organization and Administration of A Station Physical Fitness Program," (received by DND 1 January 1954).

that worked against hockey as a physical training device. The first point involved the number of participants: "sports in which two or four participate are of little use when the class may be as large as 100 people." A hockey game might involve up to thirty soldiers, falling far short of offering physical training to larger groups of recruits. Second, equipment needs were also a consideration, "as time [was] at a premium." Donning hockey gear requires a considerable amount of time, a further drawback for hockey proponents to consider. Compounding this shortcoming, the war office developed a "Physical and Recreational Training Manual" in 1941, which listed a number of sports and their benefit to military training; hockey was not among them.[10] There is no explicit reason for the exclusion, but only three of a dozen listed activities were team sports, with football, baseball and soccer also absent from the list. Ultimately, individual unit commanders had the final decisions on what they considered useful physical training. They generally agreed with the basic premise of both these pamphlets, that physical training was an integral part of creating a good soldier. As the latter pamphlet contended, "[w]ithout fitness, stamina and endurance, the battle may be lost before it is joined."[11] However, as purely a physical training instrument, hockey did not seem to be the most productive form of exercise. Other more tangible factors came into play, however, that ensured hockey would remain an important aspect of military life in the Canadian army. Part of this was hockey stimulated interest, and therefore boosted morale, more than any other sport for Canadian soldiers and elicited their strongest competitive desires. Another factor that would become increasingly important was that Canada's most popular and

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[10] DND 91/225 "Physical and Recreational Training. 1941." (5 March 1941).
[11] Ibid., 3.

high profile athletes were in fact hockey players, which drew attention to the sport even when these players joined the colours.

Given the physical strain recruits would have to endure in training and eventually in battle, the need for physical training was obvious. The importance of sports was not limited to their participatory potential, though. Sports could also provide a link between the soldier and the home front. From the outbreak of the war, soldiers were anxious to keep abreast of sporting events back home. The Canadian Press obliged, even going so far as to telegraph sports scores to troop transport trains. The importance of getting news on recent sporting events to soldiers was not lost on the military. Canadian Military Headquarters in London issued a report concerning "Shortwave Broadcast to Troops Overseas," specifically drawing attention to the need for the establishment of a new Canadian Broadcasting Corporation shortwave radio station. The report stated "[t]his service could be a most valuable contribution to the welfare of soldiers in theatres of operation." It went on to suggest that the programming should contain "frequent news summaries plus hockey...."[12] The Canadian Press News overseas devoted a quarter of its coverage to sports reporting – one of four pages at the start of printing, and later two of eight pages after it expanded.[13] The Crow's Nest, the official Royal Canadian Navy newspaper, also contained several articles on sports, as did Wings Abroad, the official RCAF newspaper.[14] As opposed to the Press News, these service papers primarily concentrated on sports within the military, and specifically to their respective branches'

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[12] National Archives of Canada. [hereafter NAC] James L. Ralston Papers. Vol. 62. Canadian Military Headquarters: Auxiliary Services Report. (2 May 1944).

[13] Issues of the Canadian Press News were consulted at the Department of National Defence (Ottawa). The record is incomplete, but over thirty issues were examined between May 1943 and March 1944.

[14] Both of these journals were consulted at DND (Ottawa); only a few copies of each survive, but what does exist showed that sports were regularly included in news coverage – especially hockey.

garrison leagues. Media outlets available to soldiers thus all devoted a large portion of their coverage to sports, both professional (like the NHL) and local military (i.e. overseas garrison leagues).

Canadian soldiers carried not only sports news coverage with them overseas, but they also took along their skates. Almost as soon as all-Canadian bases appeared in England, Canadian soldiers sought out places to play their favorite game. This fact is reflected in hockey being the first overseas sport to establish an area championship.[15] Hockey was not totally new to Britain, as there had been a professional league operating in London through the thirties.[16] Britain even won an Olympic gold metal in 1936 with all but one of the players British-born – although there were Canadian-trained.[17] Partly as a result of this triumph, London boasted three 10,000 seat hockey arenas. Canadian soldiers managed to secure ice time in a number of arenas scattered throughout the United Kingdom. The YMCA, a vital partner of the Canadian army overseas in providing sports programs to Canadian soldiers, pioneered the first overseas hockey league, the 1st Canadian Division.[18] In 1940/41, about 75 teams, up from ten the previous winter, formed various defence leagues and needed two rinks to fit in all the activity. All of these leagues were competitive, as they included playoffs leading to various championships. Several champions were crowned that first season: The Royal Canadian Artillery, made up of servicemen from New Brunswick and central Canada, defeated a field regiment from Ontario and Manitoba to win the 1st Canadian Division hockey title, in front of

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[15] DND. RG 24 v10771 file 222C1 (D276) Sports "Report of Operations Month of August 1942."
[16] This league was roughly equivalent in talent to the weaker Canadian Senior leagues.
[17] Phil Drackett, "The 1936 British Olympic Team," in Diamond, 459.
[18] "Canadians Play Favourite Game," WFP (7 January 1942): 15.

2,000 Canadian fans[19]; and a Quebec regiment won the inaugural Canadian Corps ice title, which garnered coverage in the Montreal Gazette, partly since a Montreal-native scored the winning goal.[20] For the 1941/42 season, ice time in another rink was secured, allowing an additional 50 teams to participate. The national sport was so popular that games and practices were held day and night to fit in all the action. Participation rose from 4,200 to over 11,000 servicemen, and attendance increased, topping 50,000 in 1941/42.[21] In March 1944, the Canadian Reinforcement Unit defeated the Camerons 9-2 in front of 6,000 Canadian soldier spectators, showing that the popularity of hockey had only increased over the course of the pre-D-Day build-up of Canadian forces in Britain.[22] The cost of supporting this level of sporting activity was steep: $17,880 for labor, rink rental and equipment. This cost did not deter military authorities from continually ordering supplies from Canada – over 2,600 pieces of equipment to supplement what remained from the previous seasons.[23] Not only was participation high, but games were popular attractions in themselves. This no doubt pleased the higher ranking officers, as it kept the boys busy when not training; one imagined that the alternatives – like drinking, women, and fighting – were seen as poor substitutes for a hearty game of hockey. Acting Canadian Corps commander Lieutenant-General H.D.G. Crerar requested twelve tickets for the final game of the 1942 championship, and a number of seats had to be allocated for personnel from the finalists' formations – suggesting tickets were not easy to come

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[19] "R.C.A. Team Wins Hockey Title; Art Lorime, Montreal, Tallies," MG (25 February 1941): 17.
[20] "Quebec Regiment Wins Canadian Corps Ice Title," MG (28 March 1941): 16.
[21] DND. RG 24 v10771 f 222C1 (D274) Auxiliary Services, "Summery of Facts on Canadian YMCA Operations During 1941."
[22] "C.R.U. Team Takes Army Hockey Title," Canadian Press News [hereafter CPN] 98 (11 March 1944): 8.
[23] DND. RG 24 v10771 file 222C1 (D276) Sports "Memorandum on Facts Concerning Hockey with Canadians," (no date, 1942).

by.[24] Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery, Commander-in-Chief of Southern Command, was in attendance at the final game as well, and personally presented the Overseas Canadian Ice Hockey Champions, the Queens Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada, with their championship metals.[25]

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Attendance at games like this showed that hockey was important for boosting the morale of troops overseas, just as it was claimed to be for fans on the home front. Many popular histories cite quotations from military servicemen, recounting how important the game was for them while they were serving overseas. Many veterans remember how it served as a link to their life at home in Canada. Bill Twatio, in his article "Wartime Wonders", writes of a Canadian soldier – one is unsure if he is real or fictional – who "damn near cried" when he overheard a hockey broadcast coming from a bar in England.[26] While there is much hyperbole in this account, there is also considerable evidence for the importance of hockey to overseas troops. Journalist Scott Young[27] called *Hockey Night in Canada*, first broadcast in 1936, "the greatest single national once-a-week get-together Canada had ever know;" this view, in many ways, was entrenched during the war years.[28] Foster Hewitt, the legendary *Hockey Night in Canada* broadcaster, often worked after each Saturday night game until four o'clock Sunday morning. In work that was unpaid and intended for the pleasure of overseas troops only, Hewitt compiled a continuous half-hour highlight package sent overseas to Canadian

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[24] DND. RG24 v10771 f222C1 (D276) Sports "Auxiliary Services: Canadian Forces Overseas Ice Hockey Championship." (25 February 1942).
[25] DND file 112.3P1 (D950) DPR Photos of Hockey Games of Canadian Forces at Purley #5765 R. "Camerons Of Canada Win Canadian Ice Hockey Title." (11 March 1942).
[26] Bill Twatio, "Wartime Wonders," Queen's Quarterly 100 (Winter 1993): 833.
[27] Young was also a war correspondent for MacLean's.
[28] Scott Young, Hello Canada! The Life and Times of Foster Hewitt, (Toronto, 1985): 88.

troops in England and, eventually, throughout the world.[29] In response, letters of thanks poured in from around the globe; as Hewitt recalled in his memoirs, he "received wartime letters from China, India, Australia, New Guinea, Gibraltar, Guadalcanal," even from Tobruk and the North Pole. Not only was *Hockey Night in Canada* a source of distraction and entertainment, but profit as well – and not only for advertisers. One overseas unit acquired a very powerful receiving set, powerful enough that they picked up Hewitt's original radio broadcast from Canada. Knowing the outcome before the game was officially broadcast overseas, the men in the unit would place bets on the game in a sort of Canadian version of Catch-22. Eventually, the victims eventually became suspicious of this group's luck, and, as Hewitt put it, "shortly there was a war within a war."[30] The German government exploited the popularity of hockey broadcasts through an even more ingenious form of hijacking. They picked up the original signal and re-broadcast it as an instrument of their own propaganda. A seductive woman's voice, nicknamed "Calamity Jane" by Hewitt, would suggest that Allied soldiers should give up the fight and watch the hockey games live at home.[31] In response, Hewitt adapted his trademark opening line, "Hello Canada and Hockey fans in the United States and Newfoundland," to include "an extra big hello to Calamity Jane!" Thus, even the Axis recognized the influence and importance of hockey for troops overseas.

In 1942, Imperial Oil, the major sponsor of *Hockey Night in Canada*, published a magazine promoting the importance of its broadcast. Much of the context must be interpreted carefully, as it was designed as a promotional vehicle for both *Hockey Night in Canada* and Imperial Oil; however, the articles reveal what the writers considered

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[29] Foster Hewitt, Foster Hewitt: His Own Story, (Toronto, 1967): 65.
[30] Ibid., 66.
[31] Ibid., 66.

important in convincing the public of the value of hockey broadcasts. When it was decided in 1942 that professional hockey would carry on, Imperial Oil quickly announced that its hockey broadcasts would carry on "in the national interest." The choice of this phrase was explained in a magazine published by Imperial Oil, in which three points were raised as justification: "entertainment for the folks at home; entertainment for the troops overseas, [and] the broadcasting of wartime announcements and appeals."[32] For civilians in Canada, not only did the broadcasts boost morale, but a federal government official was quoted as espousing the "influence of the broadcast in reducing absenteeism in war plants by holding many people at home on Saturday evenings, when they might otherwise be indulging in less innocuous forms of recreation."[33] *Hockey Night in Canada*, while only broadcast live in Canada, still had a major impact on life overseas. Many army officers believed that the entertainment of troops overseas was hockey's most important contribution to the war effort. Evidence of this is shown, in Imperial Oil's view, by "the [growth in] fan mail from overseas and in the more frequent references to hockey in letters to relatives."[34] Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur H. Fraser, Commander of the Royal Regiment of Canada, concurred, telling a Canadian audience that "[m]ore that anything else, the men in England want the hockey broadcasts – then cigarettes - then your parcels." Dr. J. S. Thomson, General Manager of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, echoed these views in testimony before a Parliamentary Committee on Broadcasting during the fall of 1942. Thomson explained how hockey broadcasts brought troops "the authentic voice of home," and described the "exciting and tonic affect of getting actual

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[32] Hockey Hall Of Fame. [hereafter HHOF] Foster Hewitt file. "In the National Service." Imperial Oil Presents Hockey Night In Canada, (Autumn 1942): 2.
[33] Ibid., 2: the name of the official or his office is not provided.
[34] Ibid., "Hockey Is Tops For The Boys Overseas." 4.

broadcasts from Canada". In what seems an understatement, he added, "[w]e are informed that this programme is very much appreciated by our men."[35]

While the morale-boosting effects of *Hockey Night in Canada* seem clear, Imperial Oil argued that "the most direct contribution of the hockey broadcast to the war effort has been in its third form," as an instrument by which "a wide variety of urgent official messages and war appeals [could] be conveyed to the biggest weekly audience in Canada." This last point not only helped various domestic services, appeals and charitable organizations, but directly supported the amenities of life for the troops overseas. For example, during the 1942/43 season, there were four appeals made for "books for the armed services" by the Imperial Order of Daughters of the Empire; two were made for "Magazines for the Navy"; another couple for cigarettes for overseas troops; and two for "bingos for sports equipment for troops."[36] This was not just idle promotion on the part of the CBC and Imperial Oil, as each received many official letters of thanks from various government departments and charitable organizations. The Department of National Defence (Air) wrote; "The hockey Broadcasts (sic) are uniquely Canadian in character and scope, reaching all parts of the Dominion and overseas as well, and constitute an invaluable means of reaching our people with messages in the national interest."[37] By far the strongest indication of the power of these broadcasts was illustrated in a 1941 appeal for binoculars. The RCAF was critically short of binoculars to aid in the defence of the west coast, an especially sensitive area after the bombing of Pearl Harbor in December 1941. The RCAF asked that very month for requests to be made during *Hockey Night in Canada* broadcasts; four were made between December 20 and January

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[35] Ibid., "Hockey is Tops For the Boys Overseas," 5.
[36] Ibid., "A Nation-wide Bulletin Board," 7.
[37] Ibid., 8.

10. After only these four requests, 1,116 pairs were received, of which 440 were found acceptable for use by the RCAF. As the RCAF Directorate of Public relations told Imperial Oil, the campaign "got results like a fire box does when you break the glass and pull the switch."[38] Imperial Oil liked to claim *Hockey Night in Canada* had "become, in a very literal sense, a nation-wide bulletin board for Canada's War effort." At the beginning of the 1942/43 season, five government departments were waiting "at the doorstep" to ensure airtime for their causes - the individual military services actually made their requests in August, two months before the beginning of the season.[39]

In the minds of average soldiers and military leaders, elite athletics thus had their place in the forces. However, this special view of elite sports also led to a privileged status for elite athletes who joined the military. When the army general quoted earlier stated that the military wanted every soldier involved in some kind of sport, he added that "outstanding athletes" would be used to "stimulate interest and be an inspiration."[40] This raised the possibility of exceptional treatment of elite athletes within the military. At the same time that the military was persistently asking for a larger fighting force, it was also establishing a ready escape from front-line service for NHL players, on the criteria that these men were certainly "outstanding athletes."[41] This left the door open for them to avoid military service with the justification that they were "stimulating interest". Throughout, the military reiterated that the purpose of military hockey was primarily training, and to provide wartime entertainment for the public and men in the armed

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[38] Ibid., "Hockey Fans Kick In," 13.
[39] Ibid., "A Nation-wide Bulletin Board," 7.
[40] "Sports Outlined," MG (23 September 1943): 16.
[41] J.L. Granatstein and J. Hitsmen, Broken Promises: The History of Conscription in Canada [hereafter Granatstein and Hitsmen] (Toronto, 1977): 156.

forces.[42] The addition of many "outstanding athletes" from the professional hockey ranks put these priorities to the test.

In September 1942, there was a large influx of professional players into the military, due primarily to the passage of Bill 80 in June 1942. It was reported that 74 hockey players, all belonging to NHL clubs, had joined the armed forces over the summer, and military hockey expanded correspondingly.[43] While military hockey teams entered into elite competition as early as 1940/41, quality of play rose quickly as the 1942/43 season marked the apex of military hockey. The dominance of military hockey clubs had been established in 1941/42, when the Ottawa RCAF Flyers were crowned the senior 'amateur' champions of Canada. 'Red' Burnett of the Toronto Daily Star argued that "it [was] doubtful if any amateur team ever boasted such manpower," since this powerhouse team included Woody Dumart and Bobby Bauer, and Milt Schmidt – the Boston Bruins' 'Kraut line' (or 'Kitchener Kids,' as they were renamed during the war).[44] Fellow Daily Star columnist Andy Lytle suggested that the Krauts were "so much superior" to their competition that "they [could] just about call their shots, sink home a puck whenever the urge attack[ed] them."[45] When former NHLer Polly Drouin joined the Flyers the next season, even the overseas Canadian Press News recognized the implication, "that outfit has more hockey stars that the national [hockey] league."[46] Following the 1942 victory, though, RCAF officials claimed there would be "no more packed hockey teams for the RCAF."[47] The 1942/43 RCAF Flyers team was not nearly as

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[42] "No packed Hockey Teams for RCAF," Toronto Daily Star [hereafter TDS] (3 October 1944): 14.
[43] "74 Hockey Players Join Armed Forces," MG (16 September 1942): 16. This article was carefully worded, as not all these players had actually played in the NHL.
[44] 'Red' Burnett, "Starry RCAF Team Favoured to Down Camp Borden Squad," TDS (3 March 1942): 12.
[45] Lytle, "Speaking on Sports," TDS (21 March 1942): 14.
[46] "Sports Chatter," CPN v1 no.14 (1 August 1942): 4.
[47] "No Packed Hockey Teams for RCAF," TDS (24 October 1942): 14.

strong as the previous season when, to appease critics, Squadron Leader Lionel Conacher promised to even out base teams.[48] The mantle of dominant military (and by extension, senior) team was passed on in 1942/43 to the army via the Ottawa Commandos, whose lineup read like a who's who of NHL stars. The club boasted eleven former NHLers, including stars Neil and Mac Colville, Ken Reardon, 'Sugar' Jim Henry, and Alex Shibicky.[49] Indeed, the Ottawa club was stripped of a couple of wins by the QSHL for icing too many former NHL players.[50] This nonetheless did not stop the club from claiming the Allan Cup at the end of the season, in what must have seemed more like a coronation than a competition to many observers.

Army authorities were open about creating a powerhouse military team to compete for Allan Cup honours. It was after the championship season of the RCAF's Flyers club that the army decided to form the Commandos, its own lineup of enlisted NHLers. The Gazette reported "[w]hether the army will pull in these soldier-players from across military establishments scattered across Canada to concentrate them at one center as a team, is a decision currently being considered by five men." These men included Defence Minister Ralston, his deputy, Chief of Staff Lieutenant-General Kenneth Stuart, and two other Majors-General, indicating that hockey was on the minds of even the highest-ranking military authorities.[51] This statement also showed that senior military decision-makers were willing to deploy men solely on the basis of their hockey playing abilities and not for strictly military reasons, establishing a precedent for future 'transfers.' Subsequent to this report, the army enlisted New York manager Frank

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[48] "RCAF Shifts Players: Is it De-emphasis Move?" TDS (24 October 1942): 14.
[49] "Ottawa Commandos Favoured For Allan Cup." CPN v1 no.49 (3 April 1943): 8.
[50] "Commandos Stripped of Another Victory." TDS (9 January 1943): 13.
[51] "Army May Sponsor Allan Cup Entry." MG (12 September 1942): 20.

Boucher to help form this military/NHL all-star team.[52] The Commandos took the place of the Ottawa Senators 1941/42 QSHL club, and combined the hockey manpower of two Ottawa-area military corps: the Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps and the Ottawa Army Service Corps.[53]

While these were the two most famous military teams by virtue of their NHL-laden rosters, there were teams with former professionals on many military bases across Canada. Sports coordinator and former professional athlete Conacher announced that for the 1942/43 season RCAF teams would enter Allan Cup competition with senior leagues in Halifax, Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto, Lethbridge, Winnipeg, Saskatoon, Calgary, Vancouver, Yorkton, and Victoria.[54] RCAF teams were not alone in joining the best senior amateur leagues right across Canada. Eight military teams joined the QSHL, perhaps the best non-professional league in the world at the time, over the course of the war. [55] During the 1942/43 season alone four of the seven clubs came from military bases, and armed forces teams occupied the first three positions in the league standings at the end of the season.[56] In fact, at least thirty military teams played in senior amateur leagues across Canada, all competing for the Allan Cup at some point.[57] During the 1942/43 playoffs, twenty of the thirty-two play-off teams, and all eight quarter-finalists, were

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[52] Hunter, "Hockey in World War II," Diamond, 88.
[53] "Strong Ottawa Team is Planned to Represent Army in QSHL," MG (30 September 1942): 16.
[54] "Air Force hockey Unit Right Across Canada," TDS (23 October 1942): 16.
[55] These eight teams were: the Montreal Army and RCAF, the Quebec Royal Rifles, the Ottawa Commandos, RCAF Flyers and Navy, the Cornwall Army and the Lachine RCAF. Based on the Gazette.
[56] "Hockey Ruling Hits Commando Club," CPN v1 no.26 (24 October 1942):4.
[57] Please see Appendix J "Military Leagues and Teams."

armed forces teams.[58] This represented a huge increase over the previous year, when only three of eighteen finalists hailed from military bases.[59]

Military hockey spread across the country. The Ontario Hockey Association (OHA) was a haven for professional hockey players during the war, boasting such nationally recognizable players as Syl Apps, Bryan Hextall, Gordie Drillion and Hal Laycoe. Some teams were made up *mostly* of professional players. The 1942/43 Toronto RCAF team was made up of solely of ex-NHL players; eight of eleven regulars on the Navy team played professionally, along with nine of eleven on the Army Daggers and half of the Research Colonels.[60] That year in Division 1, all four teams were military entries, and at the start of the following season, three of five teams were military clubs. Across the country, these stacked army, air force and navy teams dominated senior leagues with their rosters liberally sprinkled with ex-professional players. In Alberta, one columnist complained that the Calgary Currie Army team was so strong it "made for bad crowds" since the contests were so lopsided. Three of the four teams in the Alberta Senior Hockey league were military entries, and the one civilian team, the Lethbridge Bombers, took a beating – both on the ice and at the gate. Lethbridge crowds shrank from an average of 3,300 to fewer than 700 – due in no small part to the weakness of the team compared to its military league mates.[61] While the best military teams joined CAHA-sponsored senior leagues and could therefore compete for the Allan Cup, many other bases and units joined to form their own leagues. Military leagues cropped up across the

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[58] "Sports Chatter," CPN vl no. 46 (13 March 1943): 8; "West Scene Dominated by Bombers," CPN vl no.49 (3 April 1943): 8.
[59] "Just 18 Clubs Left For Allan Cup Hunt," TDS (18 March 1942): 15.
[60] James Duplacey and Ernie Fitzsimmons, "OHA Senior Hockey League 1942-43," http://www.hockeydb.com (15 October 1999).
[61] "Alberta Hockey Loop Suffering From Jitters," TDS (7 January 1943): 17.

country: like the National Defense League in Ottawa, the Toronto Garrison League, Winnipeg Senior Services League, the Active Services League in Montreal, and the Services Hockey League in Brandon, Manitoba, to name a handful.

Not everyone turned a blind (or sympathetic) eye towards the growth of military hockey. Not everyone was prepared to view military hockey simply as a morale-boosting activity; others measured it against the criteria of military efficiency and equality. Toronto Daily Star columnist Andy Lytle was a prominent critic of the military hockey set-up. On one occasion, Lytle commented that "we don't know what goes on behind the political scenes," but there seemed to be "more talent in the military leagues than in the NHL."[62] Lytle questioned the motivation behind the creation of such powerhouse teams in no uncertain terms when he stated:

> It is no secret that certain units in the armed forces are so adjusting matters that it is possible to assemble strong hockey...teams in spots where power at the gate is considerable...apparently none of [the military board chairmen] say... that it isn't cricket to shift soldier pawns around to liberally "pack" hockey clubs.[63]

Criticism even came from within the military, but for an entirely different reason. One columnist reported "there is considerable resentment over the fact that the RCAF [Flyers] team is in the Allan Cup sweepstakes. The troops have it figured as an 'unfair' competition."[64] Some military leaders did show concern over how military hockey teams were growing in number and influence. On 24 March 1943, Air Vice-Marshall J. A. Sully sent a memorandum to the army Adjunct General asking for its support in objecting "to Service personnel participating in long drawn out playoffs such as are now being

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[62] Lytle, "Speaking On Sport," TDS (5 October 1942): 14.
[63] Lytle, "Hockey's Problem Would Trip Up the Quiz Kids: Draft Rulings as inconsistent as Our Cheapest Selling Papers," TDS (17 October 1942): 16.
[64] Fred Jackson, " Strength in Ottawa Flyers Displeases Northern Folk," TDS (20 March 1942): 16.

conducted in Hockey on a best out of seven-game series in that these series interfere with training."[65] This statement is in direct contradiction to the stated aim of team sports within the military: hockey was not a *helpful* tool in training, but was now *interfering* with training. Despite these concerns, the ethos of military hockey held sway. By September 1943, the only announcement made concerning the future of military hockey appeared in the Gazette, which reported that service leagues would continue as long as the playoffs were not of undue length.[66]

As there was no overwhelming opposition from the public or from within the military, this situation probably could have lasted until the end of hostilities, when players would have returned to their professional teams. As a bonus to their professional clubs, their skills would have remained intact from years in elite competition, the majority never having left Canada. Instead the halcyon days of military hockey ended in the fall of 1943, due largely to one player, Maple Leafs' goalie Walter 'Turk' Broda. In what became a very public, and ultimately convoluted, controversy, Broda brought an end to Allan Cup competition for military teams. It began when Broda received his draft notice in October 1943, and formed the intention of enlisting near his Toronto home with the Royal Canadian Artillery. However, at 11:18 pm on October 14th 1943, the RCMP arrested him on a Montreal-bound train. Their justification was that Broda was attempting to evade the draft, even though he was accompanied on the train by a sergeant major in the Canadian army, and his call-up notice would not technically expire for another 42 minutes, at midnight.[67] At first, the military authorities claimed they had

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[65] NAC. RG24 v904 Recreation "Participation in Hockey Leagues ect.," (24 March 1943).
[66] "Service Teams to Participate in Hockey – With Restrictions," MG (23 September 1943): 16.
[67] In War Games. Hunter claims Broda was not eligible to be drafted because of his age and his marriage. However, on August 9, 1943, men born between 1925 and 1913 (Broda was born in 1914) single *and*

picked Broda up after midnight; only a few days later was it revealed it was actually *before* the deadline.[68] In reality it made little difference, since the RCMP had the authority, if instructed by the National Selective Service, to pick up men called to military service and detain them until they enlisted.[69] Military officials felt it necessary to inform the public that Broda was treated no differently that any other draft evader, but, especially to hockey fans in Montreal, the whole situation smelled of a Toronto conspiracy.[70] The Montreal Gazette reported the story as a case of a Toronto military base conspiring to ensure that it, not a Montreal military team, acquired an elite NHL goalie.[71] It was obvious, most observers concluded, that Broda received a better offer to play for a Montreal army team, since it was reported the sergeant major accompanying him turned out to be connected with the Montreal Army hockey team.[72]

In Broda's defence, it is easy to see why the goaltender found himself in such a confusing situation. First, according to all contemporary accounts, he had no intention of evading his call-up notice. Second, it seems improbable that he would have attempted to evade military service while in the company of a non-commissioned officer. Furthermore, his decision to go to Montreal is understandable given that army teams were being run in a similar manner to that of professional teams. It was clear to many observers that military hockey was motivated by the same entrepreneurial ethos as peacetime, professional hockey. For example, military players were effectively 'traded'

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married, were called up for military service by Order-in-Council #3131, under the NRMA. Hunter, War Games, (Toronto, 1996): 96; Charles Stacey, Arms Men and Government (Ottawa, 1970): 586.

[68] HHOF, Player Biographies: "Walter 'Turk' Broda" file, "Broda Taken From Train En Route to Montreal," MS (15 October 1943); "Feud Brews From Broda Incident," Halifax Herald (19 October 1943).

[69] "Feud Brews From Broda Incident," *op. cit.*

[70] "Official Explains Broda's Detention," MG (19 October 1943), HHOF, 'Turk' Broda file.

[71] "Chamberlain Said Bound for Army Team; Broda Detained," MG (16 October 1943): 16.

[72] "Broda Taken From Train En Route to Montreal," *op. cit.*

by being reassigned to other bases, as Lytle had revealed as early as 1942.[73] The CAHA by-laws, under which most elite military teams competed as members of CAHA-sanctioned senior leagues, recognized this practice in its wartime regulations. Section (a) stated:

> The residence rule will be entirely suspended for all players engaged in military service of any kind; and furthermore, such players may play for more than one club in he same season if they are moved by the military authorities during the course of the playing season.[74]

Base teams also apparently arranged for 'ringers' to come in for the playoffs[75], and civilians even played on these so-called armed forces teams.[76] The RCAF Flyers also provided evidence of this 'professional attitude' in their championship season. While training was supposed to be the main aim of army hockey, one particular incident suggests that this was not always so. After complaining about the quality of ice and practice time available at their home rink in Ottawa, the Flyers played their playoff 'home' games in Toronto.[77] Their complains may have been valid, but the move also necessitated a four-hour round-trip to Toronto for each game, which would have cut into training time considerably. It is no wonder Broda conceived of the military hockey system in a similar light to the professional game when he witnessed events like this. After his call-up, Broda naturally sought out the team that offered him the best deal, just as he would in professional hockey: it was revealed by a Toronto sports writer shortly

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[73] Lytle, "Hockey's Problem Would Trip Up the Quiz Kids," *op. cit.*
[74] HHOF, CAHA Constitution By Laws and Regulations, "1942 Wartime Regulations," 8.
[75] Former Maple Leaf Rudolf "Bing" Kampman played the regular season and a few playoff games for the Halifax army team, but also played thirteen playoff games for the Ottawa Commando the *same* season: Diamond, 734.
[76] One example of such a player is Gerry Couture, who played for HMCS *Unicorn* in the Saskatchewan Senior Hockey League. "Saskatoon Sailors Hit Tenth Straight," TDS (24 January 1944): 12.
[77] "Flyers Unhappy In Ottawa Rink," TDS (16 March 1942): 12.

after the goaltender's arrest that Broda had been offered $2,400 on top of his service pay to play for the Montreal army team.[78]

Public response to what came to be known as the 'Broda incident' was swift in the form of both editorials and sports columns. It became a lightening-rod for attacks on the military hockey structure as a whole. The Broda incident had the effect of shattering the façade of patriotic military preparation that had been constructed around military hockey. After it, few could justify military hockey by resorting to simple arguments of morale boosting and physical training, on their habit of conducting themselves like regular professional clubs. Criticism in particular centered around the procurement actions of the military teams, specifically on their habit of conducting themselves like professional clubs. Critics also focused on players being compensated or receiving "gifts" for playing. Many also questioned the length of time many of these soldier/players spent "training" in Canada, without being posted overseas. Military hockey now began to find itself measured against the simmering military conscription issue that hung over national political affairs. A letter to the Calgary Herald went straight to the heart of the issue: "[i]t seems funny to me that men who are supposed to be nearly perfect specimens of manhood are not nearly as brave as men who are just considered ordinary."[79] A Stratford (Ont.) columnist asked whether "certain Army hockey officials are more concerned over icing an Allan Cup championship team than they are over increasing Canada's Army personnel."[80] Little defence was made of the military hockey system, although some defended the beleaguered goalie by arguing that he never intended to default or evade

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[78] HHOF. Broda file. Charlie Edwards. "Ottawa Ponders Action in Broda Case." Halifax Herald (21 October 1943).
[79] HHOF. Broda file. "Are Canadian Athletes Given Special Deal?" Calgary Herald (20 October 1943).
[80] Chuck Appel, as quoted in Charlie Edwards. "Ottawa Ponders Actions in Broda Case." *op. cit.*

military service. The only difference between Broda and dozens of other NHL or otherwise elite players was that 'Turk' waited too long to make up his mind. This indecision cost him the chance to play hockey in Canada; instead, he was quickly shipped overseas, where he joined an artillery unit - as their hockey team's starting goaltender. Dink Carroll, senior Gazette sportswriter, stated matter-of-factly that "it was known far and wide that ex-professional hockey players identified with certain service teams last year were receiving money over and above their service pay."[81] Carroll seemed to accept the situation simply because these players did not try to hide this compensation, but he did not specifically address the issues raised by the critics. Lytle further absolved the players of any blame under the circumstances, suggesting that

> if you must heave [blame] at a set-up that has its nonsense angles, don't toss 'em at the [players] – aim these epithetic bricks as the C.[A.]H.A. They'll be doing a march-past any time now, heavily laden with money bags and they long ago learned the subtle art of ducking.[82]

Even though Lytle was writing in 1942, there is no question he would not have blamed the players for what led to the Broda mess.

Almost as soon as the crisis hit the papers, the military took steps to quell accusations of favouritism toward players. As a first response, the Department of National Defence sent a policy statement to all commanders instructing them to send athletes, and specifically hockey players, overseas as soon as possible. The statement plainly explained the reason for the instructions: "To avoid criticism being leveled at hockey players that they are deprived of the opportunity to service Overseas by being withheld for sport, such dispatch of those players up to Overseas standards will be made

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[81] HHOF. Broda File. Dink Carroll. "Playing the Field." MG (28 October 1940).
[82] Lytle. "Speaking on Sport." TDS (21 March 1942): 14.

as they are qualified."[83] The sudden turn in the public's mood over the issue of military hockey soon provoked other decisions. On 17 December 1943, the RCAF announced that Air Force teams were to withdraw from any leagues challenging for the Allan Cup.[84] This led to the withdrawl of six RCAF teams from various senior leagues across the country, resulting in the loss of twenty-three former professional NHLers from senior league play.[85] Several weeks later the army took action to stem the criticism.[86] An army telegram sent to all base commanders stated:

> REFERENCE HOCKEY stop EFFECTIVE TENTH INSTANT NO OFFICER OR SOLDIER OF THE ACTIVE ARMY MAY TAKE PART IN HOCKEY CONTESTS IN ANY ORGANIZED LEAGUES THE CHAMPIONSHIP OF WHICH WOULD QUALITY THE TEAM TO PLAY OFF FOR THE ALLAN CUP OR MEMORIAL stop ARMY HOCKEY TEAMS MAY PLAY IN INTERMURAL GAMES LOCAL GARRISON LEAGUES AND ALSO PLAY EXHIBITION GAMES AGAINST TEAMS BELONGING TO THE OTHER ARMED SERVICES WHOA RE LOCATED WITHIN THE SAME GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARIES AS THE COMMAND OR DISTRICT TO WHICH THE ARMY TEAM BELONGS...[87]

This was done in an effort to re-emphasise the importance of boosting troops morale and physical training, while trying to downplay the importance of spectator sport. When announcing the Montreal Army team was withdrawing from the QSHL, an army press release reasoned that "army training must come first," thereby suggesting that previously it had not.[88] An internal army memorandum, written by the Director of Auxiliary Services, Colonel E. A. Deacon, explained the reason for the withdrawl of military teams from Allan Cup competition. Deacon reiterated that the idea behind encouraging sports in

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[83] DND file 006.066 (D8) Policy – Hockey Players, "Policy Concerning Hockey Players in the Army," (22 October 1943).
[84] "Curtain Drops For Air Force Trophy Teams," TDS (7 January 1943): 14.
[85] "R.C.A.F. Bans Major Hockey," CPN 87 (25 December 1943): 8.
[86] "Army Blotted Out of CHA Setup," TDS (11 January 1944): 10.
[87] NAC. Ralston papers. MG 27 III B11 v79 Hockey, Ice "Telegram," (8 January 1944).
[88] "QSHL to Carry On – Curtailed Participation of Army Hockey Teams Seen," MG (10 November 1943): 16.

the military was for "the maintenance of morale and the creation of an 'esprit de corps'." Problems had cropped up, he suggested, when competition was "found to be in danger of coming under the domination of civilian organizations," and "there [arose the] possibility of their becoming revenue earning units of commercial corporations."[89] As the profit of Maple Leafs Gardens, Ltd., illustrated, it was already too late to avoid this; the real problem from the military's point of view was now the issue had been brought to public attention, and that military hockey now tended to undermine the military's credibility in the public's eyes.

The Broda incident was thus the impetus for changes brought about by military authorities, which resulted in military teams being barred from entering Allan Cup playoffs.[90] The loss of RCAF and Army teams from senior leagues across Canada forced many of those leagues to either fold or withdraw from the CAHA. The CAHA quickly announced that it would continue with the Allan Cup playoffs, despite the decrease in contending teams. As Alberta was left with no senior league, the CAHA tried to line up civilian challengers in Edmonton and Calgary to produce a provincial champion and representative for the Allan Cup playoffs. There was also some anxiety for a time whether there would be representatives for Manitoba or the Maritimes in the playoffs (later arrangements were made for the Maritimes).[91] In Halifax, the city senior league was forced to disband, as two of three clubs were from military bases.[92] Meanwhile, other military teams across the country made arrangements of their own. Following the lead of

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[89] NAC. Ralston papers. MG 27 III B11 v79 Hockey, Ice "Subject: Participation of Army Personnel in Organized Ice Hockey." (29 January 1944).
[90] Dink Carrol. "Playing the Field," MG (10 November 1943): 16.
[91] "Carry On." CPN 92 (29 January 1944): 8.
[92] "Army Bans Cups." CPN 90 (15 January 1944): 8.

the Alberta Services league, both the Cape Breton and Winnipeg senior leagues declared themselves garrison leagues, since they were all made up entirely of armed forces teams.

Hardest hit were the soldiers themselves, not all former professionals, many of whom were in line to win league, provincial, or even national championships. They had their one-in-a-lifetime opportunity taken away in mid-season by a political ruling. The Calgary Navy-Air Force Combines club of the Alberta league had been the favourites to be the third straight military club to capture the Allan Cup. According to one observer, the Combines "were the strongest and most powerful amateur hockey club that we have ever seen." In fact, they were almost strong enough to produce "a line-up capable of beating [the eventual Alan Cup Champion] Quebec Aces and extending the [Stanley Cup Champion Montreal] Canadiens in a play-off of seven games."[93] While it may be difficult to sympathize with a group of ex-NHLers turned soldiers who evaded military service by playing hockey for their military base, other soldiers-turned-hockey players had their hopes dashed. Pentti Lund, a member of the HMCS Griffon club based in Port Arthur Ontario, joined the Thunder Bay Junior Hockey League. As he recalled,

> even if the team won the right to do so – as it did – to advance to represent the TBAHA in Western Canada Memorial Cup playdowns the team was prohibited from doing so. It was not prohibited from doing so by the TBAHA but by Canada's defence department... military team couldn't, even if eligible, according to league rules, play in inter-branch playdowns.[94]

Lund and two of his teammates went on to play in the NHL; one, Allan Stanley, played 21 years and was later inducted into the Hall Of Fame. However, Lund and Stanley only made it to the NHL in 1948, and were not professionals when they played for their navy

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[93] Harry Scott, "As the Onlooker Sees," CPN 113 (24 June 1944): 8.
[94] Pennti Lund, letter to the author (16 January 2000).

base. They were not the reason for the change in military directives, but they had to pay the price nonetheless.

While the RCAF took the lead in withdrawing its air force teams from leagues challenging for the Allan Cup, a stance that was quickly followed by the army, the navy did not feel it necessary to do the same. The navy announced that, while sailors could not engage in inter-provincial playoffs (i.e. the Allan Cup), they could compete in provincial and district playoffs.[95] In the east, this meant that the second place civilian team entered the Allan Cup playoffs as the Maritimes representative, even though the HMCS Cornwallis club won the league championship.[96] On the west coast, the Esquimalt (navy) Tars dropped out of the Pacific Coast Senior Hockey League when the Nanaimo Army joined the Vancouver RCAF Seahawks in leaving the league.[97] The reason the navy gave for withdrawing from the league was revealing: "We cannot give the public the quality of hockey which we have been giving them, due to he drafting of our players to other ports," according to Sub-Lieutenant Andy Anton, himself a former hockey player.[98] There was no mention of 'training coming first' or any other military reason for the withdrawl. Instead, the explanation sounded like one that would be given by a professional team, whose primary priority as a business venture would be entertaining fans in order to turn a profit. Military officials never denied that entertainment was part of the reason for military teams, but it was only supposed to be a by-product, not the main concern. The navy's statement did not suggest entertainment value was a secondary consideration.

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[95] "Navy Teams 'Out' of Playoff Action," TDS (18 January 1944): 8.
[96] "Maritimes Will Have Allan Cup Contender," TDS (8 March 1944): 10.
[97] "Army Bans Cups," CPN 90 (15 January 1944): 8.
[98] "Esquimalt Tars to Quit Coat Loop, Now There's 2," TDS (29 January 1944): 13; Charles Edwards, "Sports Chatter," CPN 90 (15 January 1944): 8.

Even with the public scrutiny and criticism, and subsequent posturing by the military, armed forces hockey teams, both overseas and domestic, continued to be a haven for enlisted NHLers. What was not evident was that military decision-makers were conscious of the delicacy of public support for their leagues. After January 1944, hockey continued to operate within the military, in many respects, as a bit of a surrogate professional sport. Support for hockey was still high, as Major Ian Kisenhardt, sports officer at defence headquarters, exemplified when he promised, "the army is going to see that everything possible is done to maintain interest in the game."[99] Most military clubs left CAHA-organized senior leagues to form garrison leagues, or enlarged already existing military loops. Some found alternate arrangements that circumvented the letter of the law. In 1943/44, the OHA was comprised of only two civilian teams and three military teams – which all complied that year with the new regulations and withdrew by the 10th of January 1944.[100] However, the following year the Toronto Army Daggers were included on the OHA schedule, though their games did not count in the standings – thus adhering to the directive that they not compete for the Allan Cup.[101]

Many players, like Broda, moved overseas and continued to play in England and, later, on the continent. It was reported that Broda was playing for a Canadian Army team against a London All-Star team in Brighton, England.[102] "Artillery Gunner Turk Broda" was even featured in a 1945 Canadian Army Newsreel. He was the goaltender for an Artillery team which played an Infantry squad, when both were part of the 4th Canadian

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[99] "Army Insists on Hockey for Troops," TDS (19 January 1944): 13.
[100] James Duplacey and Ernie Fitzsimmons. "Ontario Senior Hockey League. 1943-44" http//:www.hockeydb.com (15 October 1999).
[101] Ibid., "Ontario Senior Hockey League. 1944-45."
[102] "Geography Department." GM (11 November 1944): HHOF. 'Turk' Broda file.

Division in Czechoslovakia; he helped the gunners crush the infantry, 14-0.[103] As the war drew to a close, there were even requests for players on the continent. In 1945/46, 20 to 25 teams competed in Amsterdam, at the Appollo Ice center, two or three times a week. Douglas MacLennan answered a request for hockey players while stationed in Amsterdam, and joined the Royal Canadian Engineers in December 1945. Even as late as March 1946, Canadian teams competed against American and European club teams – MacLennan's team was declared European champions of 1946.[104] What was important after January 1944 was the presentation of military players as "fighting" players, closer to the front – but still carrying their skates on their shoulders in place of a rifle.

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Until the Broda incident, there were two faces to hockey within the military: the public and the private. They reflected closely the two sides of the major turn-of-the-century debate between amateurism and professionalism. Publicly, the armed forces' justification for supporting military hockey paralleled many of the long-held goals of amateurism, claiming that hockey was primarily a vehicle for physical training and building character.[105] This ethic was as true in war as it had been in peace. Many officials declared the value of athletics was not in the goal (winning), but in the activity itself (physical fitness, character-building). Statements by military officers like Commander Tunney and Captain Otters show evidence of this view. In wartime, hockey by soldiers was publicly supported by appeals to the virtues of amateurism, while a contrary, almost hypocritical rationale lurked underneath the surface. The military succumbed to the ethos

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[103] NAC. Canadian Army Newsreel #104 (VI 8607-0039 13-0156 ISN33319 NFTSA 1461) "Czechs See Canuck Hockey," 1945.
[104] Doug MacLennan, letter to the author (2 January 2000). MacLennan remembered playing the former European champion club team Davos of Switzerland in March 1946.
[105] Alan Metcalfe, Canada Learns to Play, (Toronto, 1987): 45.

of professionalism, and sports were considered a business, spectator-driven and competitive. This contrary view could be interpreted through the actions of those military leaders who caused armed forces hockey to resemble professional hockey. For some in the military, winning became more important that training. This was illustrated several times: in the creation of the Commandos, a team deliberately assembled by the army through military transfers specifically to challenging the reigning Allan Cup-champion RCAF Flyers. Those same Flyers were also allowed to move their home games to Toronto because practice time and ice quality was not satisfactory. On the broadest level, the military addiction to professional sports was illustrated by the number of military clubs that joined CAHA leagues and engaged in the transfer of players solely in an attempt to challenge for the Allan Cup. Once the Broda incident revealed to the public just how much the professional attitude pervaded military hockey, amateur ideals had to be re-entrenched in some tangible way. The military tried to de-emphasize competition by removing the quest for a national championship. Despite such modifications, not much changed for many professional players, save perhaps for a different venue in which to continue their stickhandling. Thus, the essential paradox between amateurism and professionalism continued to exist within the military.

Hockey's role in the wartime military originated with the idea that it would "stimulate interest" and would help mould and encourage the training of recruits. However, hockey's own broad-ranging cultural popularity was its own undoing. The military quickly succumbed to the market-driven exigencies of Canadian hockey writ large. Soldiers in hockey uniforms soon became players in a hockey structure like any other in Canada. In the same way *Hockey Night in Canada* broadcasts were used by the

Nazis contrary to the intentions of the military, so was the creation of star-studded military hockey teams. Created originally as a vehicle for physical training with a strong emphasis on morale-boosting, military hockey quickly became a source of inter-branch rivalry and private profit. Competition at least, and profit at worst, surpassed training as the main aims of hockey on bases, and professional hockey players, like Broda, were once again caught in the middle, responding to market forces. Undoubtedly many wanted to make a real military contribution to Canada's war effort. Many probably were quite content to serve their country, as physical recreation instructors on domestic military bases, while picking up some extra salary in the process. Once again, it was the NHL that benefited most by the creation of what was, in affect, a shadow professional league. The vast majority of its players were safely hidden in Canada, far away from the danger of European or Pacific battlefields. As an added bonus, players were able to maintain the quality of their play in competition against quality opposition. The King government's hands-off approach, evident in so many manpower issues, was evident here as well. Even after the negative reaction the Broda incident elicited from media and the public, it was left up to the individual branches of the military to shut NHL-laden lineups out of Allan Cup competition. Whenever the public's tolerance of these arrangements was tested, it was the players who were left to carry the brunt of the blame. A sort of symbiosis of patriotism and profit existed in the military's attitude to wartime hockey. It was perhaps a case of fortuity that hockey never got caught offside on the blueline of profit and patriotism.

CHAPTER FIVE
PLAYERS IN A SOLDIER'S WAR

> [When it concerns hockey's role in military manpower] there is, of course, a larger principle involved. A call to arms is a call to arms. Once certain classes and categories are unofficially exempted...then society is playing a wink-and-nod game over worthiness, which devolves into a question not of valour and honour, but of expendability. Some must die for a freedom other have the reserved right to enjoy. A Red Tilson is considered expendable, and is expended. A Billy Taylor must be harboured.[1]

The military structure developed by a society is often considered to be a reflection of its culture and value systems.[2] During wartime, nations must face a most difficult, if not divisive, issue – marshalling its military manpower. Not all members of a society can be direct participants on the battlefield, even in so-called 'total wars' such as the Second World War, so it must be decided who will fight and who will remain at home. In total wars, however, manpower is required not only on the battlefield but on the home front. To win a total war, nations must apportion their resources between these two fronts. In democratic nations like Canada, these decisions are brokered by the government, but are usually reflective of the majority. The government must carefully weigh the opinions of the highest percentage of citizens if it wishes to maintain social cohesion – and remain in power. Citizens also form a set of social expectations that are just as powerful, and just as strong a compulsion as any government regulation. Most societies see their young male population as the main source of soldiers, but even within this wide group, many classes and categories often come to expect exemptions. These decisions are significant, and reflect how a society orders its manpower priorities: clergy are often exempted from active military service, for example, indicating the importance of religion. Farmers in

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[1] Douglas Hunter, War Games: Conn Smythe and Hockey's Fighting Men, [hereafter Hunter] (Toronto, 1996): 283.
[2] John Keegan, A History of Warfare, (New York, 1976): 223.

Canada were given preferential treatment during the Second World War; though not officially exempted, their importance was acknowledged and postponement of military service was easily obtainable. During the First World War, the case of farmers illustrated the importance of making important manpower decisions and the impact on social cohesion if the wrong decision is made. Farmers were at first exempt from conscription and then included under its blanket – with serious consequences for national unity.[3] In the Second World War, other classes of young men found it much easier than average to avoid front line action, if not military service altogether, even though they were never granted official exemptions. This is the situation which hockey players found themselves in despite the fact that many expected them to be the first to join.

The fact that so few NHL players fought actively would not be an issue today if hockey players had been officially exempted, or if their morale-boosting value had been recognized in some concrete way. Instead, wartime hockey instead existed in a gray area, dependant on the flexibility of the government's manpower policies. Those officially exempted in Canada included the clergy, judges, RCMP, provincial and municipal police, firemen, asylum and prison workers.[4] Unlike the First World War, other individuals could not obtain "exemptions," only "postponements" of military service. Of the 746, 000 who applied for these postponements, 664, 000 were granted, indicating that they were not difficult to obtain. While postponements were not indefinite, it was possible to legally avoid a call up order for a significant period of time; one man in fact managed to extend it to almost eighteen months.[5] However, as high-profile members of the

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[3] Robert Brown and Ramsey Cook, Canada 1896-1921: A Nation Transformed, (Toronto, 1974): 315-316.
[4] J.L. Granatstein and J. M. Hitsmen, Broken Promises: A History f Conscription in Canada, [hereafter Granatstein and Hitsmen] (Toronto, 1977): 146.
[5] E. L. M. Burns, Manpower in the Canadian Army, 1939-1945, (Toronto, 1956): 414-415.

community, it should have been much more difficult for an NHL player to subvert the system in such a manner without feeling any opprobrium – either legally from the state or socially through the media or fans. Not only were hockey players in Canada never officially exempted, many state officials expected them to be the first to join the ranks. They were exactly the virile class the armed forces were trying to recruit: fit young men. Nonetheless only a handful of NHL players saw military combat.

A declaration clearly outlining the government's policy towards hockey players would have established the requirements and expectations of the hockey-playing community, and such a statement could have served as a focal point for a public debate. There is evidence of some public displeasure aimed at hockey players, but there was no widespread public discussion over their value in a wartime society. This is partly because the government's public position was that no players would avoid military service – an attitude that has since proved false. The NHL continued to operate on the basis of vague and qualified statements of support from bureaucrats, like National Selective Service Director Elliott Little. Meanwhile the public never knew the true terms of many players' military service, at least until the Broda incident. This government policy was in contrast to the positions of the American and British governments towards baseball and soccer, respectively. In the U.S., President Franklin D. Roosevelt publicly supported baseball's continuation.[6] In Britain, soccer was boosted by the personal and regular attendance of both Prime Minister Winston Churchill and King George VI.[7] No major Canadian political official came out in support of hockey in such an emphatic way. Foreign

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[6]Russ Harris, "American Horse Racing During World War II," The Blood Horse [hereafter Harris] 117 (28 December 1991): 6222.

[7]James Walvin, The People's Game: A Social History of British Football, [hereafter Walvin] (London, 1975): 140.

governments' clear support for the continuation of their respective national sports made it much easier for their citizens to accept the role of their sporting heroes within the wartime system. It was widely known and accepted by Americans that many great baseball players, such as Joe DiMaggio, entered the military and 'served' by playing exhibition baseball games.[8] Similarly, it was equally recognized and accepted by Britons that many of their soccer heroes were physical-training instructors at domestic military camps.[9] The more ambiguous, convoluted hockey manpower situation in Canada reflected the nation's manpower issues throughout the war. As the Prime Minister might have said, it would be hockey if necessary, but not necessarily hockey.

Two major differences separated the American and British situation from Canada's. First, both baseball and soccer saw a much higher proportion of their professional players fighting and dying in active theatres of war.[10] Second, the maintenance of regional and ethnic equality in military manpower required hypersensitive management in Canada. This was less important in Britain and the U.S. because universal drafts appeared early in both countries' wars, and thus there was relatively little flexibility in questions of recruiting soldiers. The Canadian government tried to avoid regulating military manpower in order to balance divisions within the electorate. This balance depended on negative, rather than positive, compulsion: in other words, the government specified what certain classes and categories *could not* do, but were reluctant to force citizens *into* certain duties. This lack of decisive policy was a

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[8] Geoffrey C. Ward and Ken Burns, Baseball: An Illustrated History, [hereafter Ward and Burns] (New York: 1994): 279.

[9] James Rollin, Soccer at War, 1939-1945 [hereafter Rollin] (London, 1985): 33-34. Rollin is quick to add that the number was negligible and was "far outweighed" those in active service.

[10] The English club Arsenal, for example, saw 7 players killed in action (Rollin, 163-164); Bill Gilbert, They Also Served: Baseball and the Homefront, 1941-1945, (New York, 1992): 7.

decision in itself; the government wanted to avoid compulsion in any form for the benefit of social cohesion. This approach was not designed for the benefit of hockey, but for the benefit of the governing party and its philosophy of governance. Canadian military manpower was an issue that threatened to tear the country apart, unlike in Britain and the U.S., and as a side effect of this pragmatism, Canadian professional athletes were able to exploit the resulting regulatory latitude.

Within Canada, patriotic and societal expectations supporting hockey's continuation were potentially just as important and powerful as legal requirements in forcing hockey players into military service. These athletes were often considered to be the embodiment of the characteristics and spirit that the country believed its soldiers and civilians needed to win the war.[11] Hockey players were sensitive to such social expectations, as evidenced by their decision to avoid being forced to enlist under the NRMA – not one NHL player was forced into military training directly through the NRMA. This group of home conscripts was perceived to be made up of the 'the living dead': those who were neither civilians nor available for overseas fighting, hence the derogatory nickname 'Zombies.' Hockey men thus opted for the reserve militia, called in Canada the non-permanent active militia (NPAM). After the government announced the terms of the NRMA, the number of enlistments in NPAM units jumped dramatically.[12] Historian J.L. Granatstein stated that "a substantial part of the increase must have occurred when young men joined the NPAM to avoid any stigma arising from their being made to undergo compulsory training,"[13] a judgment which applies equally to the

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[11] Bruce Kidd, The Struggle for Canadian Sport, (Toronto, 1996): 46.
[12] Granatstein and Hitsmen, 29-30.
[13] Ibid., 145-146.

upwards of 61 NHL players who joined NPAM units.[14] Thus these players shrewdly avoided being lumped in with the men who (symbolically, at least) had neither the courage nor desire to fight. In a sport where masculinity was valued above all else, to be perceived as shirking military duty would have been unthinkable. However, by joining reserve units, these players did not have to go overseas right away either. Players who entered the NPMA were technically training for overseas duty, thereby giving the impression they were giving their all for the war effort. In actuality they were ensuring that they avoided going into active service and enhanced their hockey potential.

This strategy was perfectly legal and it protected the image of hockey players as strong symbols of national courage and determination. This was a vision the professional hockey community did its best to perpetuate. While in the armed forces, players interviewed on domestic bases repeatedly stated their desire to fight overseas. As former Canadiens player John Quilty put it: "I did not join up to play right wing for my country."[15] This is a clever quip, but what else would one expect a young man in his position to say? Certainly not that he was scared for his life, though that would have been reasonable given early Canadian battle tragedies like Dieppe. While Quilty's sentiment is understandable, one cannot extrapolate from it. One author has suggested, fifty years later, that Quilty "expressed what many [NHL players] felt," without providing any evidence.[16] The idea that NHL players wanted to do all they could militarily for the war effort is too easily accepted, given that most research on the conscription issues in

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[14] This is prior to 7 September 1940, according to Smythe's statements. There is no evidence of any players lost during the season to military training in Smythe's files, either. Public Archives of Ontario. Major Conn Smythe Papers. MU5969 Military Training: Leafs. "N.H.L. Player Enlistments in N.P.A.M. Units"; this figure does not include managers and broadcasters, nor does it include Canadiens' players, who reportedly enlisted in the 17th Duke of York's Royal Canadian Hussars.

[15] Bill Twatio, "Wartime Wonders," Queen's Quarterly 100 (Winter 1993): 839.

[16] Ibid., 839.

Canada found that many young Canadians were willing to go overseas only if the government forced them to.[17] Somehow, many hockey writers have difficulty accepting that hockey players may have felt the same way, but were unable to express this apprehension publicly without having their masculinity questioned. There is ample evidence of this attitude, however, in the actions of the vast majority of NHL players. The NHL only began to lose a significant number of players in 1942, *after* legislation passed in the summer forced many more young Canadians into the military. Somehow, hockey players' reputation as courageous community icons seemed to insulate them from the belief that they would try to avoid the battlefields of Europe, while they continued to collect above average salaries in hockey arenas.

Not only was hockey able to garner enough support to stave off a government-imposed shutdown, it was able to secure manpower from the shallowest pool of workers in Canada. Manpower within the wartime hockey community has never been examined in an academic fashion, as this class was too insignificant for most military historians to consider. While the absolute number of potential soldiers the hockey-playing community represented may have been small, the importance of examining hockey during the war lies not in its purely military impact, but on how it reflected Canadian society's overall social values. Such an academic pursuit has, not surprisingly, received only fleeting attention in hockey historiography as well. Popular histories of hockey tend to marginalize wartime manpower issues, and when they are addressed, authors make unsubstantiated generalizations and overemphasize a few exceptional individuals – a symptom of a whiggish, great-man oriented approach. No one has taken the time to examine the collective records of wartime players closely. In most cases this is because

[17] Granatstein and Hitsmen, 354.

the six wartime seasons represent a very thin slice of the history of the NHL, even smaller in the history of the game itself. Douglas Hunter's War Games, the one book that looks at the wartime period specifically in an at least quasi-academic way, also leaves much to the imagination in quantifying the numbers of players touched by the war. Indicative of the lack of attention paid to the players as a whole, the number of players actually killed in action was relegated by Hunter to a footnote in the seventeenth chapter.[18] War Games is far superior to most general hockey chronologies in many ways, but it is still guilty of concentrating on a few select individuals, skewing the perception of the general pattern of the players' contribution to the war effort. It can be argued that Hunter is an apologist for the NHL's wartime record, often vastly oversimplifying the issue of hockey player's military manpower contribution to war effort; the quote at the beginning of this chapter is just one example. This quote shows how he underemphasizes the extent of the "wink-and-nod" game by implying some sort of acceptable balance between the expended and harboured. No such balance existed in professional hockey: only a few NHL players actively fought overseas, and only two players with any NHL experience died.

Compared to Canada's overall military manpower needs, the number of hockey players at the professional level may only be a drop in the bucket. Part of the reason for the passive attitude towards the enlistment of hockey players was their small place in relation to the huge conscription issue facing the country. If every single professional hockey player had actively fought overseas, they could not have filled a regiment.[19] At the onset of war, there were five openly professional leagues including the NHL, with a

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[18] Hunter, 412fn.

[19] D. Morton, A Military History of Canada, (Edmonton: 1990): 285. The approximate size of a regiment was between 600 and 1000 – the third smallest military grouping.

total of 31 clubs.[20] At this time, teams usually only dressed 14 players, which translated into approximately 465 players playing professional hockey at the outbreak of the war. By the end of the war this had dropped to 18 clubs in three leagues, for a total of 252 players – although much of this drop can be attributed to players 'serving' on military teams in senior amateur leagues. Nonetheless, this group represented an interesting segment of the military-aged male population of Canada, since it was exactly the group many expected to be the first to rally to the colours. A closer examination of the players' careers through the war bears historical importance. If one reads the available historical hockey literature, one comes away with the impression that NHL players contributed more than their share to the war effort. This claim has not yet been tested or substantiated. All general hockey chronologies invariably describe the NHL's "sacrifices" during the war, but none provide quantifiable evidence for the claims. This thesis aims to reveal the extent of misrepresentation this approach breeds.

The first and most important claim concerns how many players the league lost to military service. Popular hockey historians have played a rather reckless numbers game. Brian McFarlane claimed "more than 90 players were in the armed forces or reserves" during the 1942/43 season.[21] Each of the six NHL teams regularly dressed 14 players, so the league as a whole needed only 74 players. Thus, according to McFarlane, each team would have lost more players than were on its playing roster the previous season. McFarlane arrived at his numbers by calculating players who left before 1942 – all four

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[20] This total does not reflect the reality that most senior "amateur" teams, even outside the military and prior to the war, paid their best players.

[21] Brian McFarlane, Stanley Cup Fever, (Toronto, 1992): 96; Brian McFarlane, 60 Years of Hockey, [hereafter McFarlane, 60 Years of Hockey] (Toronto, 1960): 84.

of them[22] – and all players under contract to NHL teams. This included many who were not *bona fide* NHL players, but were in fact career minor-professional leaguers who played for NHL farm teams.[23] An examination of NHL clubs' protected players lists reveals that each team could have had upwards of fifty players under contract or on negotiating lists at any given time. Most of the 90 players lost from the NHL should therefore be considered career minor-league players, not *quality* players whose loss would not have greatly affected the NHL.

Many established NHL players did leave for military service at some point, allowing otherwise minor-league caliber players to receive an opportunity to play in the NHL – players who could be called 'war scabs'. There are many examples of such players whose careers were limited to a couple of wartime seasons but never reached the NHL once former stars returned from service. Clifford "Fido" Purpur of Chicago, for example, reached the NHL at the advanced age of 28, lasted just two wartime seasons, and was gone by 1945. Each team employed a handful of such players, but the league did not have the same level of turnover, for example, as baseball. Major league baseball called upon, among others, a fifteen-year-old, a one-armed outfielder and a one-legged pitcher – Bert Shepard, who lost his leg while fighting in Europe.[24] While the quality of play deteriorated somewhat, the NHL did not employ a cadre solely of third-rate players, instead employing only a few such 'war scabs' to fill holes. Hockey writers have tended to present worst case-scenarios, thereby exaggerating the true situation. An example of this was the goaltending situation of the New York Rangers. Several sources, including

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[22] Bobby Bauer, Woody Dumart, Milt Schmidt and Muzz Patrick.
[23] The standard for determining who was an NHL player and who was a minor league player is described in the introduction to the appendices.
[24] Ward and Burns, 279.

Hunter and McFarlane, lament the quality of wartime goalies employed by the Rangers, citing Steve "The Puck Goes Inski" Businski and "Tubby" Ken McAuley. McAuley had a goals-against average of 6.23 in 1943/44, while Canadiens goaltender Bill Durnan averaged a mere 2.18 goals against per game. However, the major reason for the lack in quality goaltending was not wartime "sacrifices," but the premature retirement of all-star goaltender Dave Kerr due to a hockey-related injury in 1940. Across the league, play declined because previously second-line players were regularly thrust into first-line roles, not because the NHL lost all of its quality players to military service.

To understand how and why players ended up in the military, one has only to look at the changing Canadian military service requirements. Before the implementation of the NRMA in June 1940, no players joined the forces. Eventually, two factors influenced the number of players lost to the military: the ever-widening sphere of ages called up and the expanding time requirement for military service. Six regular NHL players left after the 1940/41 season, the first season played under the shadow of the NRMA, but it was at the beginning of the 1942 season when NHL teams felt the real sting of war. Every NHL team lost at least one player to military service, when a total of twenty-one regular players from the previous year put on a military uniform instead of a hockey jersey.[25] Despite the claims of NHL sources, even more regular NHL players left the following year, when twenty-six joined up prior to the beginning of the 1943/44 season. At least sixty-one players left the minor leagues in 1942, but before that, these clubs lost many more players to the war effort than did the NHL: twelve minor-leaguers left prior to the expansion of the NRMA, as opposed to four from the NHL. This may have been due in

[25] The numbers break down as follows: Montreal lost five, Toronto three, Chicago five, Detroit one, New York Rangers three, and Boston seven. 'Regular' players are considered to have played 33 of 50 games (or two-thirds) of the NHL schedule.

part to the fact minor-professional players tended to be younger, and younger age classes were called up before 1942. As we will see, however, the NHL consistently supplied fewer players to the military than the minor leagues.

In an effort to increase the size of the armed forces, the government introduced a major change to the call-up procedure on 15 December 1942. The government began to divide potential recruits into two distinct groups, categorized by age: the first made younger men, both single and married, eligible for call-up to domestic military service; the second – older - group, made only single men eligible for recall. Of the 162 NHL players eligible for military service in the younger age group by 1945, 72 players never entered the military, meaning that 44.4% of NHL players served in the armed forces at some point during the war. This is comparable to the 42.3% of Canadian men generally liable for military service in May 1945, suggesting that NHL players fit in perfectly with the general pattern of enlistments emerging in the country as a whole.[26] However, 34 players were discharged prior to 1945, meaning only 34.6% of players were in the armed forces in May 1945.[27] This is lower than the national average, in a group that many expected to be a prime source of recruits due to their youth and physical conditioning.[28]

While career statistics for minor-league players are limited, they do provide a comparison for the enlistment figures of the NHL. A total of 144 of 244 available minor league players spent some time in the military, while 100 never joined the armed forces. In other words, 59% of minor leaguers joined the colours at some point during the war:

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[26] Charles Stacey, Arms, Men and Government: The War Policies of Canada 1939-1945 [hereafter Stacey] (Ottawa, 1970): 587.

[27] This percentage is not precise since it is difficult to determine the actual dates of discharge. However any player in the military at any time during 1945 was considered to be in the military during May, though some may have been discharged prior to that time. As a result, the percentage is slightly skewed upwards.

[28] Put to a statistical t-test, with a level of significance of 0.025, one obtains a t-value of 2.04; this value is larger than the critical value of 1.980. Thus the percentage of hockey players enlisted in May 1945 is significantly below the national average.

17% higher than the national average and 15% higher than the NHL. Forty-one of these players were discharged from the military prior to 1945, making the minor-league average, 42.2%, virtually identical to that of the nation. What makes this comparison especially intriguing is that it brings into question a number of the excuses often used for the low enlistment figures of NHL players.

Establishing enlistment figures for the older group becomes much more difficult for two reasons. First, finding out which players were single and which were married was not a simple task. This is nonetheless important since many players were legally ineligible for a call to service simply because of their marital status. Secondly, many players' careers ended before the outbreak of, or during, the war. This makes determining if they served in the armed forces difficult unless they were otherwise famous, since their career hockey statistics do not include the reason for their retirement, and since military service records are only available twenty years after death. Hec Kilrea, a member of a prominent hockey family and a star for the Ottawa Senators from the late twenties through the mid-thirties[29], for instance, was wounded while overseas, prompting national coverage in the nation's sports pages.[30] While it may be difficult to accurately count the number of NHL veterans who joined the military, the government itself did not expect to gain many recruits from this class.[31] It did not gain many from the NHL: only two players enlisted out of twenty-one whose careers can be tracked throughout the war. Of course, it is possible that all the other nineteen were married, and thus would not have had any

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[29] Brothers Wally and Ken also played in the NHL, as did nephew Brian, current head coach of the Ottawa 67's (OHL).

[30] "Hec Kilrea Wounded," Montreal Star [hereafter MS] (8 January 1944): 15.

[31] Minister of National War Services Joseph Thorson reported in July 1942 that only 7 000 - 10 000 of 93 000 between 35 and 40 (7.5 to 10.8%) could be expected to enlist, and expected only 20 000 - 25 000 of 140 000 (14.3 to 17.9%) between 30 and 35.

obligation to join the military. Comparisons with minor leagues are not useful in this instance, as there were only ten examples of players whose careers spanned the entire war. What little evidence does exist does not reflect well on the NHL: five minor leaguers ended their careers in the military, and five did not join.

Other claims by popular hockey historians also fail to stand up to close scrutiny. One put forth by several authors was that teams deliberately depended on players too young to be eligible for military service at the time. The average age of NHL players over the course of the war years remains constant; about 26 years old. If one prorates the average age by games played, only 1943/44 shows a significant change; during this season players indeed tended to be younger, with an average of 27 years rather than 31.[32] However, throughout the NHL only six regular players below military age debuted during the war: Bud Poile (18 years old), Bep Guidolin (17), Jack Hamilton (17) Ken Mosdell (19), Ted Kennedy (17) and Harry Lumley (17). All but Poile and Guidolin went on to have successful careers in the NHL, suggesting that they would have made the NHL at a young age even without the help of war-torn rosters. McFarlane further suggested "many great or potentially great careers were at best interrupted or at most terminated as players enlisted in the armed forces and others were frozen in essential war work and forbidden to cross the border to play."[33] In truth, only two NHL players saw their professional hockey careers "terminated" while serving their country; and one of them was 36 years old at the end of the war – far past the end of most players' careers. Only three missed an entire season due to war work, and George Allan, Bryan Hextall and Doug Bentley each returned to the NHL after the end of hostilities. The reason they

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[32] John Heffron, "Average Age Statistics," correspondence with the author, 20 June 2000.
[33] McFarlane, 60 Years of Hockey, 75.

missed an entire season was because they applied as farmers to postpone their military service.[34] Some, like Phil Watson[35], were only allowed to play games in Canada, but the number of players who found themselves in such a situation was limited. Another fourteen players had their NHL careers end, though they continued playing post-war with minor league teams; some of these careers would even qualify as "potentially great" (as subjective a judgment as that must remain). Sam Lopresti was the starting goaltender for the Black Hawks at the age of 23, and had a couple of stellar years with Chicago before leaving to join the U.S. Navy. He was listed as missing in action while serving in the Pacific, but survived to make it home in 1945. However, he never played in the NHL again, finishing his professional career with three seasons in the AHL. It is reasonable to believe that Lopresti would have been the Black Hawks' starting goaltender for years since his replacement, Mike Karakas, was a journeyman NHL goaltender a half-dozen years past his prime.[36] Bob Carse, who Hunter talks about at length in War Games, provides another compelling story: a German P.O.W. for almost a year, he returned to Canada and resumed his career in the AHL, even playing a few games with the Canadiens in 1947.[37] It is easy to see why Hunter would chose such a wartime hero to concentrate on, but in doing so he overemphasized the unique experiences of a single individual who was unrepresentative of what happened to most players during the war.

Most popular histories tend to skirt the issue of how many players actually paid with their lives in order to ensure the democratic freedom that allows the NHL to operate

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[34] Brian McFarlane, 100 Years of Hockey, [hereafter 100 Years of Hockey] 2nd ed., rev. (Toronto, 1990): 47.
[35] Watson's unique situation was described in chapter three.
[36] Although Karakas was inducted into the Unites States Hockey Hall Of Fame, it was for his accomplishments with the Black Hawks in the late thirties and his success at the minor professional level.
[37] Hunter, 377-78, 388.

and reap in huge profits. This is because the true facts are difficult to romanticize. Of all the players who played even one NHL game ever, only two were killed in action. Detroit Red Wings goaltending prospect Joe Turner was killed in Holland while serving with the U.S. Marine Corps.[38] Dudley "Red" Garrett was killed in a U-boat attack while aboard the HMCS Shawinigan in the Strait of Belle Isle just of the coast of the Newfoundland. Another hockey player lost his life while in military service: Albert "Red" Tilson was killed during a barrage of artillery fire in Oostberg, Holland. He never reached the NHL, however, but was a star in the Ontario junior league. None of these young men could be considered established NHL players: Garrett managed 23 games in one NHL season; Turner, a single appearance before leaving for the Marines. Regardless of this, all three have major awards named in their honour – as if in an attempt to legitimize hockey's contribution to the war effort.[39] Either the military or the media recognized a handful of other players who survived the fighting for their active participation in the war effort. This includes Bob Carse's experience as a POW, which War Games chronicles in detail, and Jack Portland's survival of "some of the fiercest fighting of the war" in Holland.[40] Interestingly, it was two brothers who provided the NHL with some of its most noted military contributions to the war effort: Kenny Reardon received the Field Marshal Montgomery's Certificate of Merit, while brother Terry was shot through the elbow during the D-Day invasion.[41] The equality of sacrifice that War Games insinuates

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[38] Turner was a Canadian, but voluntarily joined the U.S. war effort in 1941, feeling a sense of commitment to his adopted community in Indianapolis. See Mike Ulmer, "Goalie Was No Average Joe," National Post (11 November 1998): B16.

[39] The International Hockey League's championship Trophy is named after Turner; the OHA rookie of the year award is named after Garrett, and the "Albert "Red" Tilson" award goes annually to the most outstanding player in the OHA.

[40] Lloyd McGowan, "Portland Once Defence Dandy," MS (28 November 1964).

[41] "Received Field Marshal Mongomery's Certificate of Merit," Globe and Mail [hereafter GM] (15 February 1945); "Terry Reardon a Des Marques de Combat," La Patrie, (18 November 1945): 74;

therefore did not exist; only a few players contributed in any tangible way to the military side of the war. Most were content to stay on domestic military bases, or work in war industry plants.[42] The manpower structure was set up in such a way as to allow most hockey players to avoid potentially life-threatening military service. This left only a handful of young players who either went out of their way to join an active unit, or were unlucky to be put in a position to make the ultimate sacrifice.

The popular historians of Canadian hockey have failed to carefully analyze the actual participation of professional hockey players. They provide little evidence for their claims and have painted an overly romanticized version of hockey's "sacrifices." This analysis suggests otherwise, showing that few players actively fought overseas, instead waiting to be forced into military service by government manpower regulations. This is not meant as an attack on the efforts of the many quality hockey writers who have produced many interesting and informative hockey books. There are few, if any, outright mistakes apparent in their work, only some misrepresentations that arise out of a lack of context. This criticism is meant simply to put into context the great man (or team) approach to hockey history that tends to lead to oversimplification and an overly positive view of the NHL and its players, not to argue this material is useless. Popular historians have produced books designed to entertain first and foremost, and were not meant to be historical in the professional sense. While they are clearly flawed from an academic standpoint, they serve the purpose they were intended for: to entertain NHL fans.

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[42] Hunter has argued convincingly of the tangible military contribution of hockey's industrial war workers, so that subject will not be broached here. Please see Hunter, 214-216.

The NHL persisted through the war using whatever players were available, with managers constantly adjusting their recruiting to conform to the prevailing manpower conditions. Before 1942, defections to military hockey leagues did not constitute a major drain on the NHL's talent supply. Even when the first major emigration of players occurred, there was still a major reserve of top quality replacements in the minor and amateur leagues, which, along with players locked in essential war services, sustained the NHL for a couple of seasons. By the time the outside talent supply was virtually drained in 1944, military discharges were already beginning to bolster NHL lineups. After the losses of personnel to the military in 1942, two key limits on military eligibility kept many NHL holdovers in the league: members of the older call-up group who were married, and players who received medical deferments. Most of the older NHL players did not join the military, accounting for almost a quarter of the league. Military deferments made up the bulk of players for most of the remaining four wartime seasons. Deferments were obtained both by those NHL players who never joined the military and 'war scabs' who replaced those who enlisted.

The high number of medical deferments accorded to hockey players may seem strange at first. One might assume that such athletes would represent the ideal healthy recruit, as they would be in better physical shape than the average man. Douglas Hunter examined this issue at length in War Games, and quotes Jim Coleman of the Globe and Mail who heartily defends the players on this count:

> again we say there is no point in tossing harpoons at individual hockey players. If deferments have been obtained they couldn't be obtained any more readily by a professional hockey player that they could be obtained by a bank clerk, a bellboy or a newspaperman. However, to question as to whether hockey clubs have exerted influence to have players deferred for

> medical reasons is a matter that we will leave to the conscience of the club owners.[43]

Neither Hunter nor Coleman clearly explain how club owners could have influenced the decisions of physical examination boards. There was a perception in the media at least that NHL owners did have the power to influence such decisions, as Coleman was not the only columnist to make this suggestion.[44] However, this would be difficult since the power of examination, and by extension the power to grant deferments, was shifted from local boards to government-appointed boards. These writers also fail to apply any moral responsibility of the citizen-player: to fight along side his equals if equally fit.

In response to Smythe's 1944 statements regarding the sending of untrained troops to the front, Defence Minister James L. Ralston received many letters from irate members of soldiers' families. Many refer to the perceived varying standards being applied to medical examinations and deferrals. Some of the men referred to in the letters were initially rejected in the past based on medical requirements, but nonetheless managed to enter the services. Mrs. E. Grant, of Brantford, Ontario, wrote to Ralston asking for "an explanation concerning [her] husband's death". He was accepted into the army when called up a second time, having initially been rejected by all three branches of the military due to a perforated eardrum.[45] Mrs. Ada Gorton wrote bitterly to Ralston that her son tried three times to enter the military, but was twice rejected for poor vision before being accepted.[46] In comparison, hockey players all too easily accepted their medical classification, even though some players obtained medical deferrals for similar

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[43] Jim Coleman in the Globe and Mail (3 November 1944), as cited in War Games, 271.
[44] Andy Lytle of the Toronto Daily Star (hereafter TDS) also made suggestions to this effect, referred to in chapter four. Lytle, "Speaking on Sport," TDS (5 October 1942) 14; "Hockey's Problem Would Trip Up Quiz Kids," TDS (17 October 1942): 16.
[45] National Archives of Canada [hereafter NAC]. Colonel James Layton Ralston papers, vol. 62, Conscription Crisis - 1944, undated letter from Mrs. E. Grant, (acknowledged 26 September 1944).
[46] Ibid., letter from Mrs. Ava Gordon, (24 September 1944).

reasons. Les Douglas was discharged from the military because he was colour-blind, just in time to join Detroit's minor league affiliate's playoff drive.[47] While his condition might have prevented Douglas from serving in the air force, it would not have affected his ability to serve as an infantryman, nor was it considered grounds for outright medical rejection.[48] If Mrs. Gordon's son was capable of getting into the army with a comparable, if not more serious, condition, why was Douglas found unacceptable? The difference, it can be argued, is that Mrs. Gordon's son wanted to serve his country, while Douglas took his rejection as an opportunity to escape military service. This judgment may be harsh, and Douglas may have been pressured by the Red Wings to play hockey if the opportunity arose, as Coleman suggested. However, it is still difficult to escape the conclusion that at least some of these 'medically unfit' players could have enlisted and served, if not actively fought, if they had pushed to fight.

Many defenders of the players, Hunter included, argue that while it may be simple to question the number of medical deferments granted to hockey players, there were two mitigating factors that must also be considered. First, many chronic injuries suffered by elite athletes would have ruled them out of many types of military service. A potential infantry recruit could not shoulder a rifle due to a worn rotator cuff, while worn knee ligaments would eliminate another as an RCAF recruit, since long flights would prove debilitating. Coupled with this is the general consensus that medical standards were too high for many types of recruits. During the war, though, opinions were mixed. Minister of Defence for Air Chubby Power suggested in 1944 that the physical standards for

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[47] "Ottawa Gives OK on Les Douglas Yet Royals Were Denied Mahaffy." MG (13 March 1945): 17.
[48] DND 83/544 "Physical Standards and Instructions." (1943): 178.

infantrymen be lowered.[49] Other suggested that standards were not too high, believing instead that youth had degenerated due to parenting, schools and other negative influences.[50] In October 1943 the government introduced a standard guide for grading the medical condition of recruits. PUHLEMS[51] was the acronym for the medical grading system of "seven general sub-divisions of bodily and mental function."[52] Each sub-division was rated from 1 to 5, one meaning available for full combat, five grounds for immediate rejection or discharge. The first sub-division, physique, would not seem to be grounds for the rejection of any hockey players, since it considered the overall appearance and "capacity to acquire physical stamina," clearly a requirement of any professional athlete.[53] The next category, upper extremities, could have posed problems for many NHL players. In this category, "disability w[ould] usually affect bones, joints, or muscular action...Examples are old sprains, fractures, or dislocations...."[54] A grade of "2" (Upper extremities grade 2 or U.2) was issued to recruits "unfit... for hand to hand fighting, but is such to allow heavy and prolonged work under considerable strain." U.3 was assigned if the disability made a recruit "unsuitable as a frontline combatant". U.4 was considered to be a disability that limited the affected joint to "not more than half the normal range of motion" and only allowed sedentary and routine work.[55] The guide became even more specific where it concerned shoulders; it advised that a recruit unable to lift his arm above the shoulder would at best receive a grade three, and that recurrent

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[49] Stacey, 451.
[50] "Too Many Unfit," Winnipeg Free Press, (7 October 1941): 9.
[51] PUHLEMS stood for: Physique, Upper Extremities, Hearing, Lower Extremities, Eyesight, Mental Capacity (Intelligence), and Stability (Emotional).
[52] "Physical Standards and Instructions," 3.
[53] Ibid., 5
[54] Ibid., 38.
[55] Ibid., 39.

dislocation, even if infrequent, would be grounds for a grade of four or five.[56] Shoulder dislocations were a familiar injury to hockey players, given the body contact and the poor equipment (by today's standards) of the era. A similar grading structure was applied to the third sub-section, lower extremities. The guide stated that outright rejection would only apply to those whose disabling injuries would not allow even sedentary or moderate work.[57] A specific clause in this sub-section concerning flat feet served as grounds for many rejections. However, the judgment was supposed to be made on function as much as on anatomy, suggesting that this would therefore apply to very few hockey players.[58] What would have ruled out more than a few players, however, were the guidelines pertaining to knee joints:

> Even mild disabilities of the knee are very disabling from the standpoint of army work. Any lesion of the joint that impairs its function in the direction of (a) moderate limitation of range of movement, (b) Instability of the joint (c) pain during function, is sufficient reason for grading a recruit so afflicted not higher than 4.[59]

It seems that similar guidelines applied to ankles, since Maurice Richard was rejected from the army in both 1941 and 1943 because of a broken ankle.[60] This was something for which the Rocket suffered verbal slings and arrows even after his recent death. The remaining sub-divisions, hearing, eyesight, mental capacity and stability, will be overlooked since they would not be disabilities suffered more or less frequently by hockey players.

Infantrymen were required to have a grade of "1" on each of the three categories examined; the lower the grade, the farther removed a recruit was from the battlefield.

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[56] Ibid., 40.
[57] Ibid., 42.
[58] Ibid., 43.
[59] Ibid., 46.
[60] Jean-Marie Pellerin, Maurice Richard: L'Idole D'Un Peuple, (Montreal: 1998): 24.

Within the grading guidelines of these three categories' there was, as in the government's manpower policy, much room for flexibility. The government attempted to enforce uniformity by shifting responsibility for pre-enlistment medicals from local doctors to regional medical boards, but this only had limited success. The PULHEMS "was itself a considerable advance in the efficient classification of personnel," according to Stacey.[61] However, the plausibility of a professional hockey player being rejected outright from the military should be questioned; a young man healthy enough to be employed as an athlete could have been placed in another position, where their injury would not be a liability.

Another problem within the Canadian armed forces was the inefficient delegation of surplus and available manpower. As late as 1945 discharges from the RCAF were still returning to civilian life, instead of being transferred to other military branches, specifically infantry.[62] This was significant because while the air force only accepted men from the highest PUHLEMS category, their "wash-outs" would still make respectable soldiers in other capacities. This may in part explain the inefficient use of professional hockey players, but it does not provide sufficient reason for the seemingly systematic medical rejection professional athletes received.

Over the course of the final wartime hockey season, the medical issue became a topic of major debate in the U.S. and, by extension, threatened the viability and image of the sport in Canada. On December 24th, 1944, the New York Times ran a feature describing how successfully professional sports had survived during the war.[63] Because the article was published while the Allied, and especially American, forces were involved

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[61] Stacey, 451.
[62] Ibid., 417-418.
[63] Interestingly, the Globe and Mail reported to Canadians as early as 1943 that "Big Time Commercial Sport Has Passed Its Crisis Signalling 'Business As Usual' For the Duration." (20 October 1943): 16.

in the Battle of the Bulge, public reaction was understandably harsh. In response James Byrnes, head of the American National Selective Service, ordered a re-evaluation of all 4-F (medically deferred) athletes.[64] A month later, James Forrestal, U.S. Secretary of the Navy, followed suit, ordering a crackdown on 1-C (medically discharged) athletes. In early 1945 it seemed as though baseball, the American national pastime, would come to a grinding halt - 281 of 400 players employed the previous year were reportedly classified as 4-F's.[65] The ensuing debate focused on the merits of continuing baseball; the President reiterated his position in favour of continuing the game.[66] Proponents of baseball put forward arguments similar to those made in defence of hockey: it would benefit morale, and the numbers concerned were relatively small.[67] Eventually, at nearly the eleventh hour, war manpower commissioner Paul McNutt allowed 4-F players to pursue baseball instead of forcing them into war work. McNutt admitted that his decision was due in "no small part" to the demands of American troops.[68] No repercussions from this scandal were felt in Canada, however. Perhaps Canadians felt hockey players suffered more debilitating injuries in a contact sport like hockey. Maybe Canadians were convinced that government officials would not allow such abuses to take place. Or perhaps they simply did not want to believe their heroes would circumvent military requirements in such a manner.

In theory, it seemed that all men would receive equal medical examination with the introduction of national medical standards through the PUHLEMS guide administered

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[64]"US Army 4-F's Must Be Approved By War Department Before Playing," MS, (22 January 1945): 16.
[65]"Sports Picture in US Still Hazy," MS (13 January 1945): 14; "Roosevelt Stand Seen as Blackout For Pro Sports," MG (8 January 1945): 15.
[66]"Baseball in US Gets Go-Ahead Sign," MS (17 January 1945): 14; Harris, 6221.
[67]"Baseball Worth Continuing In Wartime, Says US Senator," MS (26 January 1945): 14.
[68]Hunter, 367.

by government-appointed military boards. In practicality, it appears that medical deferrals offered a simple solution that benefited everyone. Hockey players who were rejected by the armed forces could not be accused of shirking from military duty. The government absolved itself of responsibility as clear guidelines were set out for the medical boards to enforce. The public seemed to have no problem accepting that every recruit was treated equally. In reality, the conclusion of the government and the public was that hockey players were more valuable using their unique skills on the rinks rather than wasting their talent in the ranks.

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As previously discussed, another important issue was not just how many players participated in the war, but how many in the armed forces remained on military bases playing hockey. Of the 149 players who served in the Canadian armed forces, 130 played with military teams at some point while in uniform.[69] Only four players who returned to the NHL after the war *did not* play hockey for one branch of the military or another. There are several examples of NHL players riding out the war in Canada, playing hockey in military leagues, and then returning to the NHL to continue their careers. These included Roy Conacher of the Bruins, Alex Shibicky of the Rangers and Alex Kaleta of the Black Hawks. All played hockey throughout their military careers, and their NHL careers continued well into the 1950s. Kaleta, for one, left his NHL club during the summer of 1942, and proceeded to play 70 games over the next three seasons for his military team, Calgary Currie Army.[70] At the end of hostilities, he returned to the NHL and continued to contribute until his retirement in 1951. On the other hand, many players

[69] See Appendix 4: NHL Players Born Between 1913 and 1926.
[70] "Kaleta, Alex," in "Pre-expansion Player Registry," Dan Diamond, ed., Total Hockey (Toronto, 1998): 734.

only spent a single season in the military before returning to the NHL – the vast majority of these spent that single season on military bases playing hockey. Almost 90% of NHL players thus played in military leagues as compared with the 73.6% of minor-leaguers who played while in military uniform. This is a significant difference between the NHL and minor leagues, one that is not easily explained. Both groups would have had a strong desire to play hockey, and both undoubtedly had above average ability. NHL players, however, had more ability and provided a strong gate attraction. As the Broda incident revealed, base commanders across the country were eager to boast the best available hockey talent. That talent resided in the NHL, not in the minor leagues.

Some of the letters to Minister Ralston provide insight into the feelings of individuals who questioned the length of time some "boys" spent in Canada without being sent overseas.[71] A Mrs. V. Wood, for instance, angrily wrote the defence minister attacking the government for allowing her "undertrained" son to die in Europe while athletes bragged about receiving permanent Canadian postings:

> There are other mothers around here, who, like myself, have given their all & try & imagine our feelings when we hear the young fellows boast they have a "position" & won't be sent over... we civilians in Petawawa know the situation in this military camp, there are a number of A-1 men wearing the active Service badge who have been here three and four years.[72]

While this may be a case of one upset mother trying to lay blame, it is significant that she lived in Petawawa, Ontario - home to the Petawawa Grenades, a Canadian army team. This reveals that hockey players' special treatment was not a total secret, though whether she knew because of her proximity to a base or through newspaper reports is impossible

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[71] Out of the dozen letters kept in Ralston's file about the conscription crisis, the three discussed had specific implications for hockey.

[72] NAC, Ralston papers, vol. 62, Conscription Crisis – 1944, letter from Mrs. V. Wood (received 20 September 1944).

to determine. Mrs. E. Grant wrote complaining that there had been "boys in the air force for four years, and general service men too, not Zombies," and that army men with two and a half years of training were still at home while her husband was sent overseas.[73] He had had only six months' training, then was sent to the front where he was killed. Mrs. Grant does not specifically refer to hockey players, but she has accurately described the service record of many players. Mrs. Ava Gorton suggested she had an answer to why there were still some healthy general service soldiers still hanging around domestic military bases: "I could make a good guess myself sir. Say they could be taking course after course, which would take time, *then they could be in sports which would help considerable* [emphasis added]."[74] Only one response to these letters survived in Ralston's records. Ralston's parliamentary assistant, W. C. Macdonald, wrote back to Mrs. Gorton to promise to investigate the claim that her son was rushed overseas, but suggested that her son probably received two years' training in England. Many letters mention how hard sons or husbands tried to get into the army. This enthusiasm might explain why they were sent to the front and not kept at home, but it does not explain why they were sent overseas before other better-trained soldiers.

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Hockey players were legally equal to any other young men either called up for or in military service. In reality, players had every advantage in avoiding military service through medical deferrals, or avoiding active fighting positions by remaining on military bases and playing hockey in garrison leagues. There is no proof of direct influence by NHL officials, although some in the contemporary media suggested it, and neither is

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[73] Ibid., letter from Mrs. E. Wood, (24 September 1944).
[74] Ibid., letter from Mrs. Ava Gorton, (22 September 1944).

there any documentary evidence the government or military gave hockey players favourable treatment. The fact remains that according to the above numbers, hockey players did generally receive favourable treatment. Not everyone turned a blind eye, but enough of the public and media were sympathetic enough that it was allowed to continue. Even in the midst of a divisive conscription crisis, the revelation that elite athletes were receiving money and 'safe' positions at home was not enough to raise a sustained public outcry. Hockey was important enough that many did not want to tarnish the image of their heroes by believing they would chose to circumvent legal requirements.

CONCLUSION
WARTIME HOCKEY: PRAGMATIC POLITICAL GAME

The Second World War was fought for the principles of democracy and equality, principles that one would expect to be uniformly upheld in the countries fighting to save them. In Canada, such principles often entailed a good deal of political deftness. There is no direct evidence that either NHL management or the players systematically attempted to subvert the military recruitment system, but the conclusion that players managed to avoid fighting positions has been demonstrated. The conscription crisis of 1944 illustrated how acute the need, or at least the perceived need was for overseas soldiers, and it seems unlikely that a major pool of recruits went virtually untapped through pure chance. The government may have allowed the situation to arise as a result of its flexible military manpower policies, policies that were put in place for reasons unrelated to hockey. It was hockey management and players who exploited this latitude, resulting in few NHL players having fighting roles. It was as if during a period in Canadian history when healthy young men were at a premium, there was a war being fought between the military and private enterprise for this scarce resource, a war won by business.

The value placed on hockey's symbolism and nationalism was evident in wartime Canada. The conscription crisis of 1942 demonstrated this: the desire for conscription was not about the need for recruits, as there was generally enough volunteers at the time. Instead, its domestic implementation was a symbol of Canada's engagement in a total war effort.[1] Many Canadians saw hockey as a Canadian institution, national symbol and cultural icon, which allowed the game to find a place for itself in the war effort. It was a

[1] J. L. Granatstein, Conscription in the Second World War 1939-1945: A Study in Political Management, (Toronto, 1969): 40.

morale builder, a symbol of Canada's fighting spirit and an indication of how Canadians would not allow Nazi warmongers the pleasure of disrupting one of their treasured pastimes. The passport crisis of September 1941 is the earliest example of the debate around the symbolic value of hockey and its players. Those who wished to bar hockey players from entering the U.S. to compete expected these players to join the *Canadian* military instead of joining *American* hockey clubs. As Justice Embury emphatically stated, hockey players were "the class one would expect to rally to the colors."[2] There were only two occasions when hockey surfaced outside the sports pages of Canadian newspapers: the passport crisis and the Broda incident, both of which turned out to be short-lived. Questions regarding the patriotic path most hockey players chose were marginal at best, relegated to a few published letters-to-the-editor or notes to their local MP.[3] Even public officials like Justice Embury failed to muster sufficient pressure to coerce hockey players into military service. The speed with which these two incidents slipped out of public discussion illustrated the predisposition Canadians had for seeing their hockey heroes on the rinks, rather than in the ranks.

By far the biggest winner at the end of the war was the NHL. At the outbreak of war, the American Hockey League (AHL) had set itself up to challenge the NHL for the best hockey talent. Fortunately for the NHL, it was positioned in the larger metropolitan markets and was the incumbent leader of the North American hockey community. In 1940, the NHL invited both Cleveland and Buffalo of the AHL to join the fold in order to

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[2] Saskatchewan Boards to Refuse Passport Rights." Globe and Mail [hereafter GM] (20 September 1941): 14.

[3] Hunter quotes Jim Coleman of the Globe and Mail as saying "this department is deluged by mail from indignant correspondents who enclose clipped pictures of professional hockey players, with bitter comment pencilled in the margin." However, examination of several newspapers across Canada throughout the war does not bear this out, suggesting it was either an exaggeration or newspapers chose not to publish them. Hunter, 271.

solidify a league that was about to lose at least one franchise (the Brooklyn Americans), and was still smarting from the effects of the depression in others. By the end of the war, the NHL was financially profitable and in 1952 rejected Cleveland's bid to join their old boys network.[4] The AHL, which was accumulating a war chest as late as 1940 in order to challenge the NHL for the best players, even adopted the very controversial rule change that introduced the red line in 1943/44.[5] In one hockey historian's opinion, "[i]f it had not been for World War II, in all probability there would have been two major hockey leagues."[6] As sports historian Alan Metcalfe argued, it was not inevitable that the NHL would become the apex of the hockey structure in North America, but its base in the largest urban centers and powerful, prominent and rich ownership set the ideal conditions for its ascendancy.[7]

After the end of hostilities, there was a hockey revival as several new leagues began operation. The United States Hockey League replaced the American Hockey Association (which folded due to the war in 1942), the International Hockey League debuted, and the Pacific Coast Hockey Association re-introduced professional hockey to the west coast.[8] By 1947/48, the AHL had expanded to include eleven franchises, most of which were now directly affiliated if not owned outright by NHL clubs. The influx of players from military leagues and after the end of the war meant the market was flooded with even more players who received the opportunity to play at higher levels during the lean war years. The NHL, however, chose not to expand. After losing the New

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[4] Gene Kiczek, Forgotten Glory: The Story of the Cleveland Barons, [hereafter Kiczek] (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1994): 64, 146-147.
[5] Ibid., 72.
[6] Ibid., 45.
[7] Alan Metcalfe, Canada Learns to Play, (Toronto, 1987): 179.
[8] The PCHL did not officially declare itself professional until 1947/48, although it was clear most of its players were paid from the outset. Ernie Fitzsimmons, "Minor Pro Hockey in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s," [hereafter Fitzsimmons] in Dan Diamond, ed., Total Hockey, (Toronto, 1998): 378.

York/Brooklyn Americans in 1942, the surviving owners chose to stay the course with six franchises for twenty-five years. The NHL operated as a powerful and profitable cartel until threats of legal action based on its position as an insulated cartel pushed NHL owners to expand to six new cities in 1967.[9]

The NHL vertically controlled the careers of all hockey players in North America in that twenty-five year span. NHL clubs would sign players as young as thirteen, through sponsorship deals with senior and junior amateur clubs, all the way down to Bantam age. NHL teams' affiliation deals with other professional leagues ensured that the best talent continued to reside in the NHL. The NHL even managed to control its employees, even though player shortages during the war would seem to give the players the advantage.[10] The problem was, player contracts included assignment clauses that forced players to play where his NHL club told him, and option clauses that gave the club, but not the player, the power to break a contract.[11] Even during the war, NHL teams had upwards of fifty players on their rosters, as well as five players on their negotiating lists.[12] It was "shortly after 1945 that the NHL achieved complete control over the careers of virtually all hockey aspirants in North America." This statement fails to recognize that this hegemony would not likely have occurred without the intervention of the war years.

The war also sounded the death knell for amateurism as an alternative to professional hockey. Soon after the war, several former so-called senior-amateur leagues

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[9] David Cruise and Alison Griffiths, Net Worth: Exploding the Myths of Pro Hockey, (Toronto, 1992): 136.
[10] Several players held out for better contracts during the war because teams were unwilling to meet their salary demands, including Busher Jackson and Connie Dahlstrom. "Busher Jackson Drills With Marlboro Club," Montreal Gazette [hereafter MG] (17 December 1941): 16; "Dahlstrom at Odds With Black Hawks," Winnipeg Free Press (21 October 1941): 15.
[11] J.C.H. Jones, "NHL Economics," [hereafter Jones] in Richard Gruneau and J. G. Albinson, eds., Canadian Sports: Sociological Perspectives (Don Mills, 1976): 235-240.
[12] Players on teams' negotiating lists were unsigned, but that team held the excusive right to sign that player to a contract.

finally ended the shame and announced that they were professional.[13] Senior amateur teams still had a measure of autonomy before the war intervened. Player shortages introduced the conditions in which the NHL could extend its reach further down the developmental ladder. Through its agreements with the Canadian Amateur Hockey Association (CAHA), the NHL obtained the right to recall senior age players without the players losing their amateur status. Furthermore, professional players could join senior teams without even applying for permission to return to amateur status, further blurring the line between professionals and amateurs.[14] In 1940, the NHL signed the first of several agreements during the war years with the CAHA that gave the NHL ever-widening access to junior age players through sponsorship deals. Once the NHL controlled junior players, senior teams were made obsolete because junior teams now aimed at producing players for the NHL.[15] If there had been any doubt before the war that the best senior players were paid for their services, the revelations surrounding the Broda incident would have quashed it. Many expressed shock and dismay that athletes within the military were receiving pay above and beyond service pay. However, the pubic reaction was based more on perceived favouritism towards hockey-playing soldiers and the profitability of senior military hockey rather than the idea of top 'amateur' players receiving compensation for their services. While senior amateur play was in decline since at least the First World War, the Second World War expedited the process and firmly placed the CAHA under the control of the NHL's hegemonic model.

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[13] These leagues include Pacific Coast Hockey Association, Quebec Senior Hockey League, and the Western Canada Senior Hockey League. Fitzsimmons, 378.
[14] "CAHA Likely to Reinstate Pros For Coming Season." MG (25 September 1941): 18.
[15] Richard Gruneau and David Whitson, Hockey Night in Canada, (Toronto, 1993): 104.

Every piece of literature covering the history of hockey during the war used the boosting of morale as the primary justification for allowing the NHL to continue to operate. There is clear evidence for how hockey made Canadians feel more positive during a time of duress. Clearly hockey was the foremost sport in the hearts of Canadians. For instance, the 1940 Grey Cup of football drew about 13,000 fans, while a regular mid-season game the same month between the Montreal Canadiens and Toronto Maple Leafs drew 13,439.[16] The *Hockey Night in Canada* promotional magazine may have been aimed at touting the importance and positive impact of radio broadcasts of NHL games, but there is no evidence that the NHL was a necessary ingredient. In communities like Winnipeg that could not boast an NHL franchise, local amateur leagues garnered as much attention as the NHL in city newspapers like the Free Press. Even in Europe, some armed forces' newspapers concentrated more on reporting the scores of overseas garrison leagues than on the NHL. Military clubs like the Ottawa Commandos garnered as much attention as NHL teams – but of course they boasted NHL talent. What most NHL histories fail to emphasis is that *hockey*, but not necessarily the *NHL*, was important to Canadians in order to connect them to the idealized pre-war days.

A Marxist interpretation of the issue could argue that the use of morale-building was a façade to hide the double standard that allowed hockey players to receive special treatment. This façade was designed by capitalists to justify the protection of their investments – in the arenas, players and teams. A more hegemonic approach would point out that there was a balance found that satisfied both the capitalist bourgeoisie (NHL owners) and the proletariat (soldiers, fans). In this situation, the government should be commended for finding a flexible plan that allowed for almost all concerned to emerge

[16] "Bombers Carry Dominion Grip Championship Home to Winnipeg." MG (11 December 1940): 18.

from the war satisfied. Owners not only had their investments protected, but the value and profitability of NHL franchises no doubt increased due to increased attendance. The players were given an opportunity to determine their own wartime contribution – to a much greater degree than other young men in a similar situation. A few chose to actively contribute to the military involvement of the Canadian armed forces overseas. Many more chose either to play hockey in the military or stay in Canada in a war industry job. Therefore almost everyone would want to perpetuate the belief that hockey was valuable as a morale-builder.

While ultimately hockey, baseball and soccer were allowed to continue in their respective countries based significantly on their value as morale-boosters, it was not a given that all sporting activities were considered worthy of continuing. At the same time that the American head of the National Selective Service, James Byrnes, was investigating charges that professional baseball players were given preferential treatment in gaining medical deferrals, he decided to shut down American horse racing. Byrnes announced:

> The operation of race tracks not only requires employment of manpower required for more essential operation, but also manpower, railroad transportation as well as tires and gasoline . . . The existing war situation demands the utmost effort that the people of the United States can give ... The operation of race tracks is not conducive to this all-out effort.[17]

If these points are true of horse-racing, are they not also true of baseball and hockey? Horse racing seemed to be just as popular a spectator sport, attracting 65 000 patrons to the 1942 Kentucky Derby. Yet despite the number of fans, there was not enough public support to reverse the shutdown.

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[17] Russ Harris. "American Horse Racing During World War II." The Blood Horse [hereafter Harris] 117 (28 December 1991): 6224.

It seems that the essential difference between racing and these other sports was racing's dependence on gambling.[18] Sports associated with gambling have long been considered "unacceptable" by the dominant culture, especially since the middle classes' rise to sporting prominence in Canada during the late 1800s.[19] A wartime example of the dominant class's value judgment is Conservative MP John Blackmore's statement about the acceptability of athletics as opposed to hanging around a poolroom.[20] Hockey and baseball were both considered to be representative of their country's national character, and were accepted as embodying values considered important by the dominant culture - physical, mental and social discipline that "honed the mind, cultivated leadership, taught sound morals and social idealism."[21] Though horse racing had a strong following, in terms of the dominant ideology its influence was seen as nefarious enough on the lower classes to make its shutdown acceptable.

Making this shutdown 'acceptable' to the majority was necessary before the state would act. While the state may have the legal power to stop sport, as in Canada and the U.S. through their respective N.S.S. boards, the agency of the citizenry limited the practical power of the state.[22] In Germany, "athletes were not given special privileges...many of the finest German athletes died in action during the war years."[23] The great German boxer and former world champion Max Schmeling was injured as a

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[18] Ibid., 6219.

[19] John Hargreaves argues this for Britain in Sport, Power and Culture. (Cambridge, 1986): 7, 22; Richard Gruneau makes a similar argument for the Canadian situation in "Modernization or Hegemony: Two Views on Sport and Social Order," in Jean Harvey and Hart Cantelon, eds., Not Just A Game. (Ottawa, 1988): 21-22.

[20] Canada. House of Commons. Debates. 30 May 1941, 3328. Please see chapter three.

[21] Bruce Kidd, The Struggle For Canadian Sport. (Toronto, 1996): 46-48.

[22] The concepts of 'agency' and 'hegemony' are taken from Antonio Gramsci, as described in Tom Bottomore, ed., A Dictionary of Marxist Thought. (Cambridge, Mass., 1983): 201-203.

[23] Arnd Kruger, "Germany and Sports in World War II," [hereafter Kruger] Canadian Journal of History of Sport, 24 n1 (1 May 1993): 58.

paratrooper during the Battle of Crete in 1942. Schmeling was called up for training in July 1940, just after the fall of France and probably in anticipation of the Russian offensive, and was even denied a request for leave in order to box in 1941.[24] Still, even the Nazi government would only go so far. While "it seem[ed] that the Nazis actually believed their ideology that good athletes make good soldiers . . . not even the ruling Nazi party dared to get into a fight with the German soccer federation about the league championship."[25] The tone of this statement indicated that a country's most popular sport is a cherished part of the national culture, one that not even a totalitarian regime can successfully challenge in the face of public opposition. That the national pastime in Germany was able to intimidate the Nazi party indicates by comparison the power of hockey in Canada - and sport in general. In all cases mentioned, these sports were not only generally popular but 'acceptable' to the ruling classes. Horse racing was shut down in the U.S. only because many within this dominant class considered horse racing 'unacceptable' due to its dependence on gambling, and they used their influence to convince others to support its suspension. Partly this power entailed media coverage and partly it was due to the fact there were no powerful figures to influence the government on behalf of horse racing like those for baseball or hockey.[26]

Dominant culture never has complete hegemony, so some forms of sport, like horse racing, continually challenge the dominant culture. This influence is not only immediate, but also something that has developed over time. With specific reference to gambling, this means that the dominant classes had tried to eliminate it (through both legal and social means) since the mid-19th century. Also, this class is not monolithic:

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[24] "Schmeling Said Finished in Ring," MG (9 September 1942): 14.
[25] Kruger, 58.
[26] William Mead, Baseball Goes to War, (New York, 1985): 12.

some, like Blackmore, adhered to the amateur ideals set forth in 19th century British athletic clubs. To others, like Smythe and other club owners, profit was usually paramount. Support for horse racing was split along these ideological lines within the elite class, just as support was split in the lower classes. While the elite did have enough influence to shut racing down during the war, the limits of their power are apparent. Even though some thought the war years an opportune time to shut down racing forever, there continued to be a significant number of racing fans who ensured its post-war resumption.[27] Horse racing thus revealed the balance within and between the dominant and lower classes. It also showed that for a sport to survive the war it had to have significant support in both classes. Hockey, baseball and football continued due neither exclusively to their 'acceptability,' nor their 'popularity.' A combination of the two allowed them to persist, and for players to avoid active service. This combination also effectively stopped the state from shutting these leagues down or forcing players into active military service. On the one hand, the state had close ties to the dominant classes, and on the other, the government was responsible to the majority through elections.

As it turned out, enough people in Canada found something valuable in letting some form of hockey continue. Some valued it as a distraction - not only fans who attended the games, but troops overseas who found a connection with the home country through the national sport. Others saw the merit of amateur ideals, that hockey instilled the very values and characteristics that the country needed so badly, not only to fight the war, but to rebuild after it was won. Players and owners managed to benefit from the experience, too. The former escaped front-line action, and the latter reaped cash profits and hegemony over the post-war hockey world. Hockey players and owners owe these to

[27] Harris, 6219.

the few men who did give their lives to the war effort. It may not have been the ideal situation, but almost everyone received something from the compromise - which may be as truly a Canadian product as hockey.

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APPENDICES

These appendices are designed to provide background information to the reader on the structure of wartime hockey in Canada. Appendices A through C describe wartime league structures, from professional minor leagues to city-based leagues. An attempt was also made to present a picture of senior amateur hockey in Canada (appendix A, J), as many military teams housed professional hockey players. Together, these show how prominent hockey was in the lives Canadians, and how many competitive players there were in the country – two factors that affected how the public perceived hockey players. The first list comes from Total Hockey, the others compiled using coverage from local newspapers. These newspapers represent only four cities in Canada, all of them large urban centers, two of which also had NHL clubs. However, it still provides a glimpse of how predominant hockey was in Canadians' lives.

Appendices D to H offer documentary evidence to support claims made in this thesis concerning the players' military contribution to Canada's war effort. Other sources have made similar claims without such evidence. These five appendices were specifically created to present a comprehensive and quantifiable overview of wartime hockey players' contribution to the war effort. They create a portrait of the population of Canadian professional hockey players liable for military service during World War Two. These lists illustrate the career paths of all 590 players born between 1902 and 1926 who played at least one game in the NHL. Hockey players born between these years were required to enlist for military service, at some point during the war, under the National Resources and Mobilizations Act (NRMA). These appendices demonstrate how many of these

players actually served in the military, how many continued to play in the military, and how many stayed in professional leagues.

The records are based on the "pre-expansion Player Registry" found in Dan Diamond, ed., Total Hockey, complimented by information from the "Player Registry" at The Internet Hockey Database. The Appendices have been divided based on two criteria. The first division is between NHL-caliber players, and 'minor-league' players. A player was considered to be NHL-caliber if he fit the following criteria: at least twice played 32 games in a season during a 48-game schedule or 33 games in a 50-game schedule. Players who fail to meet this requirement are considered career minor-leaguers. This separation was made to determine whether NHL players received preferential treatment from the military. The next division is based on the NRMA. The NRMA was slowly expanded during the course of the war, but in 1943 the call-up ages included a distinction between men under and over the age of 31. All men under 31 were required to enlist or have a valid reason for postponement, regardless of marital status, while married men over 31 were automatically exempted. Since Canadians made up the bulk of NHLers, Americans are listed separately for the sake of comparison. Players born in Europe are listed with Canadians, as most were naturalized citizens.

Of course, there are weaknesses in establishing such broad categories. It is impossible to trace individual reasons for avoiding service, let alone determine those who *intended* to avoid service. Having a military record does not prove anything either, as players may have received permanent, domestic, or non-fighting position arranged as a result of their status as hockey stars. Furthermore, it is impossible to trace military deferments, as the treasury department in 1964 destroyed these documents.

LEGEND

AHA	American Hockey Association
AHL	American Hockey League
Cmnds	Ottawa Commandos
City Junior	City and district junior amateur leagues
EHL	Eastern Hockey League
Fin	Finland
H.L.	Hockey League
Hlx	Halifax
gp	Games played
Ire	Ireland
Jr	Junior (amateur) hockey league
MJ/MJHL	Manitoba Junior Hockey League
MTL-Jr	Montreal and District Junior Hockey League
NBSHL	New Brunswick (senior) Hockey League
NHL	National Hockey League
NOHA	Northern Ontario Hockey Association
OHA	Ontario Hockey Association
Ott	Ottawa
PCHL	Pacific Coast Hockey League
QSHL/QS	Quebec Senior Hockey League
Que	Quebec
RCAF	Royal Canadian Air Force
RCJHL	Regina City Junior Hockey League
RCN	Royal Canadian Navy
Skt	Saskatoon
Sct	Scotland
Sr	Senior (amateur) hockey league
SSHL	Saskatchewan Senior Hockey League
SJHL	Saskatchewan Junior Hockey League
Swe	Sweden
TBJHL	Thunder Bay Junior Hockey League
Trn	Toronto
Vcr	Vancouver
Wls	Wales
*	member of the Hockey Hall of Fame
**	member of the United States Hockey Hall of Fame
^	one season played in the NHL
M	Medical deferral
E	Essential industry deferral

Players in **Bold** indicates they were Killed In Action

Italicized players indicate the likelihood that they were only a civilian fill-in on a military team.

<u>Underlined</u> names indicate they likely did have active military service, even though they did not miss an entire hockey season.

APPENDIX A:
Canadian Amateur Hockey Association
Senior Leagues in Contention for the Allan Cup

EAST	Years of Operation
Ottawa Branch	1939-45
Ottawa Valley Senior Hockey League	1939-45
Ottawa Senior City Hockey League	1942-45; only competed for Allan Cup in 1942/43
Ottawa Senior Services H.L.*	1939-45
Upper Ottawa Valley Senior H.L.	1942/43
St Lawrence Sr.	
Maritimes Branch	1939-45
Halifax City Senior	1939-45
Nova Scotia Senior Hockey League	1939-45
PEI Senior Hockey League	1939-45
New Bruswick Senior Hockey League	1939-45
Cape Breton Senior Hockey League	1942/43
Cape Breton Services Sr. H.L.	1939-45
Maritime Senior Hockey League	1939-45
Antigosh-Pictou Sr. Hockey League	
Quebec Branch	1939-45
Quebec Senior Hockey League	1939-45
Montreal and District Senior "B"	1939-45
Montreal Intermediate	1939/40
Quebec Provincial Senior Hockey L.	1939-45
Eastern Townships Senior H.L.	
Ontario Branch	1939-45
Ontario Hockey Assoc. Senior "A"	1939-45
Ontario Hockey Assoc. Senior "B"	1939-45
Toronto and District Senior "B"	1939-45
Northern Ontario Hockey League	1939-45
OHA Intermediate "A","B"	

WEST	Years of Operation
Thunder Bay Branch	
Thunder Bay Senior Hockey League	1939-45
Alberta Branch	
Saskatewan Senior Hockey League	1939-45
Calgary Senior City Hockey league	1939-45
Allberta Senior Hockey League	1939-45
Alberta Sr. Services H.L.*	1942-45
Regina Senior City Hockey League	1939-45
Alberta-BC Senior Hockey League	1941/42
(replaced BC and Alberta Sr Leagues)	
British Colombia Branch	1941/42
Pacific Coast Intermediate H.L.	1942/43
Mainland Sr Hockey League	1942-45
Pacific Coast Senior Hockey league	
Vancouver Senior City Hockey Leagu	1942/43
Vancouver Island Sr Hockey League	
Manitoba Branch	1939-45
Winnipeg Senior City Hockey League	1939-45
Manitoba Senior Hockey League	1939-45
Lakehead Sr. Hockey League*	1942-45
Winnipeg Sr. Services H.L.*	1942-45

*only competed for Allan Cup in 1942/43

Non-CAHA Amateur Leagues
Michigan-Ontario Hockey League
Easten Amateur Hockey League
Michigan-Ontario Hockey League

APPENDIX B:

Professional Leagues (1939-46)

League	1939-40 # Of Teams	1940/1	1941/2	1942/3	1943/4	1944/5	1945/6
American Hockey league	9	9	10	8	6	7	8
American Hockey Association	7	6	8	suspended operations/became USHL			
United States Hockey League	na	na	na	na	na	na	7
Pacific Coast Hockey League	3	4	suspended operations for duration				9
International Hockey League							4

APPENDIX C: Examples of City-Area Leagues

C.1 Monteal Area Leagues	Years of Operation Between 1939 and 1945
Manufacturers Hockey League	1939-45
Metropolitan Hockey League	1939-45
Services League/National Defense H.L.	1940-44
Montreal And District Senior "B" H.L.	1939-45
McGill Intra-company Hockey League	1942/43
Mount Royal Intermediate H.L.	1939-45
Mount Royal Junior H.L.	1939-45
Junior Amateur Hockey Association	1939-45
MTL Intermediate Hockey League	1939-45
MTL Junior Hockey League	1939-45
MTL City Senior Hockey League	1939-45
Mansfield Hockey League	1940-45
QSHL - Montreal Royals	1939-45
NHL - Montreal Canadiens	1939-45

C.2 Winnipeg Area Leagues	
Winnipeg Junior (North)	1939-45
Winnipeg Junior (South)	1939-45
Winnipeg Juvenile Hockey League	1939-45
Manitoba Junior Hockey League	1939-45
Manitoba Senior Hockey League	1939-45
Active Services League	1940-45
Wpg Senior Services	1943-45

C.3 Toronto Area Leagues	
OHA Senior "A", "B"	1939-45
OHA Intermediate H.L. "A", "B"	1939-45
OHA Junior "A", "B"	1939-45
Toronto Military Garrison H. L.	1942-45
Mercentile War Indusrties	1942-44
Porcupine Mines League	1943/44
Metropolitan Hockey League	1939-45
Big 7 Junior Hockey League	1943/44
Inter-provincial Intermedate H.L.	1941/42
Toronto RCAF Hockey League	1942-45
Toronto and District Senior "B"	1939-45
NHL - Toronto Maple Leafs	1939-45

APPENDIX D: NHL PLAYERS BORN BETWEEN 1913 AND 1926

D.1 Military Hockey Only

NAME	Birth/ death	NHL career	#	Military Hockey	# c seasons	TEAM
Sid Abel*	1918	1938-54	14	1943-45	2	Mtl RCAF (among others both years)
Murray Armstrong	1916	1939-46	6	1942/43	1	Regina Army
Max Bentley*	1920-84	1940-54	12	1943-45	2	Calgary Currie Army
Roy Conacher	1916-84	1938-52	11	1942-45	3	Saskatoon RCAF,'43-5 Dartmouth RCAF
Joe Cooper	1914-79	1936-47	9	1942-44	2	Ottawa Commandos (43/4-10 gp in NHL)
Pat Egan	1918	1940-51	10	1942/43	1	Montreal Army
Wilf Field	1915-79	1938-45	5	1942-44	2	Wpg/Cgy RCAF, Ott Commandos
Jack Gelineau	1924	1949-51	2	1944/45	1	Montreal RCAF (and Royals of QSHL)
Hank Goldup	1918	1940-45	4	1943/44	1	Toronto Army Shamrocks
Bep Guidolin	1925	1942-52	9	1944/45	1	Newmarket Navy
Jack Hamilton	1925/d	1942-46	3	1944/45	1	Cornwallis Navy
Jim Henry	1920	1941/42	8	1942-5	3	Ottawa Commandos RD Army,Cgy RCN
Bill Juzda	1920	1941-52	8	1942-45	3	Wpg,Dartmouth RCAF(42/3-17gp in AHL)
Alex Kaleta	1919-87	1941-51	7	1942-45	3	Cgy Currie Army
Gus Kyle	1923-96	1949-52	3	1942-44	2	Ottawa Postal Corps Fredrickton Army
Norman Larson	1920	1940-42	2	1932-44	2	Port Arthur Shipbuilders/Lakehead Army
Kilby MacDonald	1914-86	39-41,	2,5	1942-44	1,5	Montreal Army (1943/4 - 24 gms in NHL)
Don Metz	1916	PT39-49	P8	1942-44	2	Regina Rangers Vcr RCAF
Nick Metz	1914/d	1935-48	11	1942-44	2	Nanaimo Army
Kenny Mosdell	1922	1941-58	15	1942-44	2	Lachine RCAF Mtl RCAF
Alf Pike	1917	1939-47	6	1943-45	2	Winnipeg RCAF
Alex Shibicky	1914	1936-46	6,5	1942-45	3	Ottawa Engineers/Commandos
Wally Stanowski	1919	1940-51	9	1942-44	2,5	Winnipeg RCAF (1944-13gp in NHL)
Gaye Stewart	1923	1942-52	8	1943-45	2	Mtl Royals(QSHL)/RCN,Cornwallis RCN
John Stewart*	1917-83	1939-52	10	1942-44	2	Montreal, Winnipeg RCAF
Eddie Wares	1915	1941-47	4	1943-45	2	Cgy Combines Cgy/Halifax Navy
Harry Watson*	1923-?	1941-57	14	1943-45	2	Mtl RCAF Winnipeg RCAF

D.2 Both Military Service and Military Hockey

NAME	Birth/ death	# of Years NHL Career		# of Years Military Service		Military Hockey	# of seasons	TEAM
Bobby Bauer*	1915-64	1937-47	6	1943-45	2	1941-43	2	Ott, Hlfx RCAF
Joe Benoit	1916-81	1940-46	4	1943/44	1	1944/45	1	Calgary Army
Turk Broda*	1914-72	1936-51	13	1943-45	2			
Jack Church	1915-96	1939-46	4	1943-45	2	1942/43	1	Cornwall Army
Mac Colville	1916	1936-46	7	1944/45	1	1942/43	2	Ott Comnds/Army
Neil Colville*	1914-87			1943/44	1	1942/43	1,5	Ott Comnds/Army
						1944/45		Wpg RCAF/Ott/NHL
Woody Dumart*	1916	1937-54	14	1943-45	2	1941-43	2	Ottawa RCAF
Red Hamill	1917-85	1941-50	7	1944/45	1	1943/44	?	Kingson Frontenacs
Johnny Mowers	1916-95	1940-43	3	1944-46	2	1943/44	1	Toronto RCAF
Bud Poile*	1924	1942-50	7,5	1944/45	1	1943/44	,5	Tm/Toronto RCAF
John Quilty	1921-69	1940-42	2	1944/45	1	1942-44	2	Toronto, Vcr RCAF
Ken Reardon*	1921	1940-50	7	1944/45	1	1942/43	2	Ott Comnds/Army
Terry Reardon	1919-91	1940-47	5	1944/45	1	1942-44	2	Mtl(NHL)/Army
Milt Schmidt*	1918	1937-55	15	1942-45	3	1941/42	,5	Bst (NHL)/Ott RCAF
Billy Taylor	1919-90	1940-48	6	1943/44	1	1944/45	1	Newmarket Army
Chuck Raynor	1920	1941-52	8	1944/45	1	1942-44	2	Victoria Navy
AMERICANS								
Frank Brimsek*	1915	1938-50	10	1944/45	1	1943/44	1	Coast Guard Cutters
John Mariucci	1916-87	1941-48	4	1944/45	1	1942-44	2	Coast Guard Clippers

D.3 Military Service Only

NAME	Birth/ death	# of Years NHL Career		# of Years Military Service		Military Hockey # of seasons	TEAM
George Allen	1914-d	1939-47	7	1944/45	1		
Syl Apps*	1915	1936-48	10	1943-45	2		
Muzz Patrick	1915-98	1938-41	3	1941-45	4	(Played half of 1945/46 in NHL)	
Jack Shewchuk	1917-89	1942-45	3	1943/44	1	(Split 1940-42 btw AHL and NHL)	

D.4 NHL Careers ended in the Military

Name	Birth Death	NHL Career		Military Service		Military Hockey		Post-War Hockey (League)
Tom Anderson	1910	1934-42	8			1942-45	3	1945-47(Ahl,PCHL)
Bill Benson	1920	1940-42	2	1943-45	2	1942/43	1	1945-50 (AHL)
Bill Carse	1914	1939-42	3			1942-44	2	1945-50 (PCHL)
Gordie Drillon*	1914-86	1936-43	7	1943/44	1	1944-46	2	1949/50 (NBSHL)
Red Goupille	1915	1937-43	6	1943-45	2	1942/43	1	1945-51 (QSHL)
Rudolph Kampman	1914-87	1937-42	5			1942-45	3	1945-51 (AHL)
Pete Langelle	1917	1939-42	3	1945/46	1	1942-45	3	1945-51 (AHL)
Jimmy Orlando	1916	1939-43	4	1943-45	2			1945-51 (QSHL)
Jack Portland	1912-d	1933-43	10	1943-46	3			1946-48 (AHL)
Des Smith	1914	1937-42	5	coached	2	1944/45	1	1945/46 (QSHL)
				1942-44				
Americans								
Sam Lopresti**(USA)	1917-d	1940-42	2	1942-44	2			1944-51 (NAHL)
Alex Motter (USA)	1913-96	1937-43	6	1944/45	1	1943/44	1	1945-48 (AHL)

D.5 Careers ended in the Military

NAME	Birth/ death	NHL career	# of Years	Military Service	#	# of Years Military Hockey	seasons	
Bob Carse	1919	1939-43	4	1944/45	1	1943/44	1	
Art Coulter	1909-d	1931-42	11	?		1942-44	2	
Red Heron	1917	1939-41	2			1942-45	3	

D.6 Military Service and/or Military Hockey (Future NHLers)

NAME	Birth/ death	NHL career	# of Years	Military Service	#	# of Years Military Hockey	seasons	
Garth Boesch	1920	1946-50	4	1943/44	1	1944/45	1	
Jim Conacher (Sct)	1921	1947-51	4	1943-5	2	1942/43	1	
Floyd Curry	1925	1947-58	11	1944/45	1			
Ernie Dickens	1921	1947-51	4	1944/45	1	1942-44	2	
Frank Eddolls	1921-61	44/5,47-52				1942/43	1	(43/4 - 1 game)
Bob Fillion	1921	1943-50	7			1942/43	1	
Cal Gardner	1924	1946-57	11	1944/45	1	1943/44	1	
George Gee	1922-71	1945-54	11			1943-45	2	
Bob Goldham	1922-91	1945-56	11			1942-45	3	
Murray Henderson	1921	1945-52	7			1942-44	2	
Joe Klukay	1922	1946-54	8			1943-45	2	
Edgar Laprade*	1919	1945-55	10			1943/44	1	
Hal Laycoe	1922-97	1946-56	10			1943-45	2	(42/3 1 game)
Tony Leswick	1923	1945-56	11			1944/45	1	(42/3 2 games)
Pentii Lund (Fin)	1925	1948-53	5			1943-45	2	
Pat Lundy	1925	6/7,50/1	2	1944/45	1	1943/44	1	
Claire Martin	1922-d	1947-52	5			42/3,44/5		
Ken McAuley	1921-d	1943-45	2	1942/43	1			
Douglas McCraig	1919	1946-51	5			1944/45		
Frank McCool	1918-73	1943-45	2			1942/43	1	
Jim McFadden (Ire)	1920	1946-53	7			1942-5	3	
Max McNab	1924	1948-50	2	1943-45	2			
Howie Meeker	1924	1946-52	6	1943-45	2			
Elwyn Morris	1921	1943-46	3			1942/43	1	
Don Morrison	1923	47/8,50/1				1944/45	1	
Johnny Peirson	1925	1948-58	10	1944/45	1			
Jimmy Peters	1922	1945-54	9	1944/5	1	1942-44	2	
Don Raleigh	1926	1947-55	8			1944/45	1	
Leo Reise Jr	1922	1947-54	7	1942/43	1	1943/44	2	
Rip Riopelle	1922	1947-50	3	1944/45	1	1942-44	2	
Eddie Slowinski	1922	1947-52	5			42/3,44/5	2	
Rene Trudell	1919-72	1946-48	2			1942-45	3	

D.7 Military Service and/or Military Hockey (Former NHLers)

NAME	Birth/ death	NHL Career	# of Years	Military Service	# of Years	Military Hockey	# of seasons	
Joffre Desilets	1915-94	1935-40	5			1942-44	3	(44/5 2gp w/Trn Army)
Polly Drouin		PT35-41	6	1943-45	2	1942/43	1	
Gus Giesebrecht	1918	PT38-42	4	1944/45	1			
Phil Hergesheimer	1914	1939-42	3	1944/45	1	1943/44	1	
James Jarvis	1907	1929-31	2	1941-43	2			
Pete Kelly	1913	1935-37	2	1945/46	1	1942-45	1	
Gord Pettinger	1911	1932-40	8	1942-44	2			
Jack Riley (Ire)	1910	1933-35	2			1942/43	1	

D.8 Careers ended in the Military (Former NHL Players)

NAME	Birth/ death	NHL Career	# of Years	Military Service	# of Years	Military Hockey	# of seasons	
Oscar Asmundson	1908	1932-34	2			1943/44	1	
Bill Beveridge	1909-95	1932-38	6			1943-45	2	
Claude Bourque	1915-d	1938-40	2			1942/43	1	
Hap Emms	1905-88	1930-37	7	1943/44	1			
Bill MacKenzie	1911-90	1932-40	8	1943/44	1			
Ron Martin	1909-71	1932-34	2	1941-43	2			
Earl Robertson	1907-d	1928-39	11			1942/43	1	
Al Shields	1907-75	1928-38	10	1942-44	2			
Jack Shill	1913-26	1934-39	5	1942/43	1			
Tiny Thompson*	1905-81	1928-40	12			1942/43	1	

D.9 No Military Experience

Name	Birth/ death	NHL Career	1939-45 (NHL seasons/ other leagues)	Name	Birth/ Death	NHL Career	1939-45 (yrs in NHL /other)
Doug Bentley*	1916-72	1939-51	5/1 (sat out)	Regis Kelly	1914d	1934-40	2/4 (Pro)
Paul Bibeault	1919-70	1941-47	4/2 (Sr)	Ted Kennedy	1925	1942-57	2/1 (Sr)
Gus Bondar	1923	1943-55	2/3 (Jr)	Elmer Lach* E	1918	1940-54	5/1 (Sr)
Emile Bouchard	1920	1941-56	4/2 (Pro)	Leo Lamoureux	1916-61	1942-47	3/3 (Pro/Sr)
A. Brown (Sct)	1920	1941-52	1/5 (Jr/Pro)	Ted Lindsay*M	1925	1944-64	1/1 (Sr)
Ed Bruneteau	1919	1944-47	1/5 (Pro/Sr)	Carl Liscombe	1915	1937-46	6 NHL
M. Bruneteau E	1914-82	1935-46	6 NHL	Harry Lumley	1926	1943-60	1/2 (Sr/Pro)
Joe Carveth M	1918	1940-51	5/1 (Pro)	B. MacDonald	1914-91	1935-45	5/1 (Pro)
M. Chamberlain	1915-71	1937-48	6 NHL	Jack MacLean	1923	1942-45	3/3 (Sr)
Jack Crawford	1916-79	1937-50	6 NHL	Bill Mosienko*	1921-94	1943-55	2/4 (Pro)
Ab Demarco M	1916d	1943-47	.5/5.5 (Pro)	Buddy O'Conner	1916-77	1941-51	2/4 (Jr/Sr)
Bill Durnan*E	1916-72	1932-50	2/4 (Sr)	Babe Pratt	1916-98	1935-47	6 NHL
Fern Gauthier	1919-92	1943-49	2/4 (Sr/Pro)	BQuackenbush*	1922-99	1942-56	2.5/2(Sr/Pro)
Ray Getliffe	1914	1936-45	6 NHL	M. Richard* M	1918-00	1942-60	3/3 (Jr)
Don Grosso	1915-85	1939-46	6 NHL	Cully Simon	1918-80	1938-52	3//3
Reg Hamilton	1914-91	1936-47	6 NHL	Kenny Smith	1924	1944-51	1/4 (Jr/Sr)
Glen Harmon	1921	1942-51	3/3 (Jr/Sr)	G. Warwick M	1921	1941-50	4/2 (Jr)
Bryan Hextall Sr	1913-84	1937-48	5/1 (sat out)	Phil Watson M	1914-d	1935-48	6 NHL
Mel Hill	1914-96	1938-46	6 NHL				
Pete Horeck	1923	1944-52	1/3 (Pro)	Americans			
Art Jackson	1915-71	1937-45	6 NHL	Billy Moe**	1916	1944-49	.5/5.5 (Pro)
Harold Jackson	1918d	1942-47	3/3 (Pro)	Fido Purpur**	1914	1942-45	3.5/2.5 (Pro)

D.10 No Military Experience (Future NHL Players)

Name	Birth/ Death	NHL Career	1939-45 (NHL seasons/ other leagues)	Name	Birth/ Death	NHL Career	1939-45 (yrs in NHL /other)
Pete Babano	1925	1947-56	0/2 (Sr)	J. McCormack	1925	1949-55	0/2 (Sr)
Johnny Bower*	1924	1945-70	(25 yr Pro)	Ray Manson	1926	1947-57	no record
Gerry Couture	1925	1945-54	0/4 (Jr)	Gerry McNeil	1926	1950-54	no record
Al Dewsbury	1926	1950-54	0/2 (Sr)	Gus Mortson	1925	1946-60	0/2 (Sr)
Bill Ezinicki	1924	1945-51	.5/3 (Jr/Sr)	Ralph Natress	1925	1946-50	(0/2 Jr)
Lee Fogolino	1926	1948-56	0/3 (Jr/Sr)	Bert Olmstead*	1926	1948-62	0/1 (Jr)
Leo Graveile	1925	1946-51	0/1 (Sr)	Reg Sinclair	1925	1944-53	0/1 (Jr)
Ed Kryznowski	1925	1948-52	(no record)	Sid Smith	1925	1946-57	0/1 (Sr)
Eddie Kullman	1923-97	1950-54	0/4 (Jr)	Billy Reay	1921	1945-53	6(Sr)
Roger Leger	1925	1946-50	0/5 (Jr/Pro)	Al Rollins	1926-96	1950-57	0/3 (Jr/Pro)
Vic Lynn	1925	1946-51	0/3(Jr/Pro)	Americans			
				Norm Dussault	1925	1948-51	no record

D.11 No Military Experience (Former NHL Players)

Name	Birth/ D	NHL	Professional Career	
Rod Lorrain	1914-80	1936-40	1934-45	
Max Kaminsky	1913-61	1933-36	1933-45	
Clint Smith*	1913	1937-47	1936-52	

APPENDIX E: NHL PLAYERS BORN BETWEEN 1902 AND 1912

E.1 No Military Experience

Name	Birth/ Death	NHL Career	Pro Career	Name	Birth/ Death	NHL Career	Pro Career
Toe Blake*	1912-95	1936-48	1934-49	Mush Marsh	1908	1928-45	1928-45
Herb Cain	1912-82	1933-46	1933-50	George Patterson	1906-77	1928-33	1936-45
Lorne Carr	1910	1934-46	1931-46	Charlie Sands	1911-d	1933-43	1932-46
Dit Clapper*	1907-78	1927-46	1926-46	Earl Siebert	1911-90	1931-45	1929-46
Billl Cowley	1912-93	1934-47	6 NHL	John Sorrell	1906-84	1930-41	1927-45
Bob Davidson	1912d	1935-46	6 NHL	Bill Thoms	1910-64	1933-45	1932-45
Johnny Gagnon	1905-d	1930-40	1925-45				
Johnny Gottselig	1905-86	1928-46	1926-46				
Bob Gracie	1910-63	1931-39	1931-48	**Americans**			
Ott Heller	1910-d	1932-46	1929-55	Roger Jenkins	1911	1932-39	1930-48
Flash Hollett	1912-d	1933-46	1932-46	Mike Karakas**	1911-d	1935-46	1930-48
Syd Howe*	1911-76	1930-45	1929-46	Louis Trudel	1912-72	1933-40	1932-51
Jim Kilrea	1910-d	1933-36	1927-48	Carl Voss**	1907-73	1932-38	1926-38

E.2 Careers Which Ended During the War

Name	Birth/ Death	NHL Career	Pro Career	Name	Birth/ Death	NHL Career	Pro Career
A.Aikenhead(Sct)	1904-68	1932-34	1926-41	Hec Kilrea	1907-69	1925-39	1925-43
Larry Aurie	1905-52	1927-38	1926-44	Wally Kilrea	1909	1929-37	1929-44
Vern Ayres	1909-68	1930-36	1930-42	Joe Lamb	1906-d	1928-38	1928-40
Marty Barry	1905-69	1929-40	1929-42	Herbie Lewis*	1906-91	1928-39	1924-41
Cliff Barton	1907-69	1929-31	1929-44	Gerry Lowrey	1906-79	1928-32	1926-42
Frank Boll	1911-90	1933-44	1932-44	Georges Mantha	1908-90	1929-40	1928-43
Ralph Bowman	1911-90	1933-39	1933-43	Gus Marker	1907-d	1934-41	1928-43
Glenn Brydson	1910-d	1931-37	1931-43	Armand Mondou	1905-76	1928-39	1926-40
Waly Buswell	1907-91	1932-40	1931-41	Allan Murray	1908	1933-40	1928-40
Art Chapman	1906-63	1930-40	1927-44	Vic Ripley	1906-d	1928-35	1925-41
Charlie Conacher*	1910-67	1929-41	1929-41	Earl Robertson	1910-79	1937-41	1928-42
Hugh Conn	1904-d	1933-35	1933-41	Earl Roche	1910-66	1933-35	1930-42
Harry Conacher	1904-47	1927-30	1926-33	Harvey Rockburn	1908-77	1929-31	1927-41
Bun Cook*	1903-88	1926-37	1924-43	Paul Runge	1908-72	1925-38	1928-42
Wilf Cude	1910-68	1933-41	1930-41	Gerry Shannon	1910-83	1933-38	1933-41
Cecel Dillon	1908-69	1930-40	1928-42	Hooley Smith*	1903-63	1924-41	1924-41
Lorne Duguid	1910-81	1934-36	1930-41	Nels Stewart*	1902-57	1925-40	1925-40
Ebbie Goodfellow*	1907-65	1929-43	1928-43	Bill Touhey	1906	1928-34	1926-40
Paul Haynes	1910-d	1932-40	1930-42	Jimmy Ward	1906-90	1927-39	1927-40
Frank Ingram	1907	1929-31	1927-40	Nick Wasnie	1904-91	1929-34	1926-40
Harvey Jackson	1911-66	1929-44	1929-44	Cy Wentworth	1905-d	1927-40	1926-40
Joe Jerwa	1909-d	1935-39	1930-42	Art Wiebe	1912-71	1934-44	1932-44
Butch Keeling	1905-d	1926-38	1926-40	Doug Young	1908-90	1931-40	1927-41
Dave Kerr	1910-78	1933-41	1930-41				

Americans			
Alex Levinsky	1910-90	1931-39	1931-40
Doc Romnes**	1909-d	1932-39	1927-40

E.3 Careers Which Ended Before the War Began

Name	Birth/ Death	NHL Career	Pro Career	Name	Birth/ Death	NHL Career	Pro Career
Andy Blair	1908-77	1928-37	1928-37	Wilf Hart	1902-64	1926-28	1923-34
Russ Blinco	1908-d	1933-39	1932-39	W. Jackson (Eng)	1908	1932-34	1930-38
Leo Bourgeault	1903-d	1926-34	1926-36	Wildor Larochelle	1906-64	1925-37	1925-39
Doug Brennan	1905	1931-34	1927-36	Albert Leduc	1902-d	1925-34	1924-38
Marty Burke	1905-d	1927-38	1927-38	Sylvio Mantha*	1902-74	1923-36	1923-36
Frank Carson	1902-67	1926-34	1925-34	George Massecar	1904-57	1929-31	1926-36
Gerry Carson	1905-56	1928-37	1927-38	Jack McVicar	1904-d	1930-32	1926-34
King Clancey	1903-86	1921-37	1921-37	Hib Milks	1902-49	1925-33	1925-33
Alex Connell*	1902-58	1924-37	1924-37	Murray Murdoch	1904	1926-37	1925-38
Tom Cook	1907-61	1929-36	1928-38	Baldy Northcott	1908-86	1929-39	1929-39
Baldy Cotton	1902-d	1925-37	1925-37	Russell Oatman	1905-64	1927-29	1925-30
Rosie Couture	1905-86	1928-35	1927-36	Eric Pettinger	1904-68	1928-30	1928-37
Danny Cox	1903-82	1927-34	1926-40	Joe Primeau*	1906-89	1929-36	1929-36
Harold Darraugh	1902-93	1925-33	1925-36	Johnny Sheppard	1903-d	1926-24	1925-34
Chuck Dinsmore	1903-d	1924-27	1924-30	Alex Smith (Eng)	1902-63	1925-35	1924-35
Ken Doraty	1906-81	1932-34	1926-39	Art Smith	1906-62	1928-31	1926-32
Stewart Evans	1908-86	1930-39	1929-39	Art Somers	1902-d	1929-35	1925-35
Frank Finnigan	1903-d	1924-37	1924-37	Harold Starr	1906	1930-35	1929-36
Gord Fraser	1902-d	1926-30	1924-37	Ralph Taylor	1905-76	1928-30	1926-39
Norm Gainor	1904-62	1927-35	1925-37	Dave Trottier	1906-56	1928-39	1928-39
John Gallagher	1909-81	1937-39	1930-39	Cooney Weiland*	1904-85	1928-39	1925-39
Ted Graham	1906-d	1930-37	1926-38	Archie Wilcox	1904-93	1929-34	1926-35
Len Grosvenor	1905	1927-29	1927-33				

E.4 Military Service Only

Name	Birth/D	NHL	Service
Lynn Patrick*	1912-80	1934-46	1943-45

E.5 Military Hockey Only

Name	Birth/D	NHL	Hockey
Sweeny Schriner*	1911-97	1934-47	1943/44

APPENDIX F:
MINOR LEAGUE PLAYERS BORN BETWEEN 1913 AND 1926

F.1 Military Service Only

NAME	Birth/ Death	Career	Military Service	# of Years	
Douglas Adams	1923	1945-60	1942-45	3	
Bert Anslow	1926	1945-60	1944/45	1	
Andy Barbe	1923	1944-55	1943/44	1	
Baz Bastien	1919-83	1945-49	1943-45	2	
Dick Behling	1916	1936-51	1943-45	2	
Bob Blake	1916	1934-51	1943-45	2	
Conrad Bourcier	1915	1935-49	1942-44	2	
Gerry Brown	1917	1935-52	1943-45	2	
Leo Carbol	1910	1929-46	1943-45	2	
Chuck Corrigan	1916	1935-49	1944/45	1	
Harry Dick	1922	1938-55	1943-45	2	
Jim Drummond	1918	1937-49	1943/44	1	
Jack Forsey	1914-d	1933-50	1944/45	1	
Herb Foster	1913	1932-50	1944-46	2	
Archise Fraser	1914-d	1935-52	1944-46	2	
Harry Frost	1914	1934-52	1943-45	2	
Tony Grabowsi	1916	1935-46	1943-45	2	
Art Herchenratter	1917	1940-50	1942-45	3	(3 gp with Truro [NSSHL] in 43/44)
Hec Highton	1923	1942-51	1941/42	1	
Lou Holmes (Eng)	1911	1931-49	1942-45	3	
Steve Hrymnak	1926	1946-58	1944/45	1	
Ron Hudson	1911	1931-45	1942-44	2	
Doug Jackson	1924	1945-52	1943-45	2	
Rosario Joanette	1919	1939-57	1942-44	2	
John Keating	1916	1936-48	1943-45	2	
Bill Kendall	1910-d	1930-46	1942-44	2	
Johnny Ingoldsby	1924-82	1942-60	1944/45	1	
Max Labovitch	1924	1943-50	42/3,44/5	2	
Frank Mailley	1916	1938-46	1943-45	2	
Gus Mancuso	1914-d	1934-49	1943-45	2	
Ron Martin	1909-71	1926-44	1941-43	2	
Hazen McAndrew	1917-d	1937-50	1943-46	3	
Vic Myles	1915	1933-51	1944/45	1	
Paul Raymond	1913-95	1931-47	1943-45	2	
Ed Reigle	1924	1944-57	1943/44	1	
Bill Summerhill	1915-78	1937-51	1943-45	2	
Joe Turner	***1914-45***	***1941-42***	***1942-45***	***3***	
Aubrey Wester	1920	1930-46	1941-45	4	

Americans

Frank Beisler	1913	1933-46	1944/45	1	
Joe Papike	1915-67	1932-47	1942-45	3	(2 gp with Chi [NHL] only in 1944/45)
Bernie Ruelle	1920	1943-47	1944-46	2	
John Sherf	1913-d	1935-44	1942/43	1	
Aut Tuten^	1915	1934-49	1943-46	3	
Rudy Zunich	1910	1934-44	1942/43	1	

F.2 Both Military Service and Military Hockey Experience

F.2 Both Military Service and Military Hockey Experience

NAME	Birth/ Death	Career	Military Service	# of Years	Military leagues	# of seasons	
John Adams	1920	1937-49	41/2,44/5	2	1942-44	2	
Lloyd Ailsby	1917	1935-58	1942/43	1	1943/44	1	
Red Almas	1924	1942-55	1944/45	1	1943/44	1	
Harry Bell	1925	1945-53	1944/45	1	1943/44	1	
Joe Bell^	1923	1942-56	1944/45	1	1943/44	1	
Lin Bend	1922-78	1942-51	1943/44	1	1942-44	2	
Gordie Bruce	1919-d	1937-51	1944/45	1	42/3, 44/5	2	
Norm Burns	1918-95	1938-49	1944/45	1	1942-44	2	
Eddie Bush	1918	1938-52	1945/46	1	1942-44	2	
Les Colvin	1921	1939-53	1941-45	4	1942-45	3	
Bud Cook	1907	1928-46	1944/45	1	1942/43	1	1 game
Napoleon Dame^	1913-d	1933-50	1942-44	2	1943/44	1	
Buck Davies	1922	1946-61	1943-46	3	1944/45	1	
Marcel Dheere	1920	1940-53	1944/45	1	1942/43	1	
Lloyd Doran	1921	1940-51	1944/45	1	1943/44	1	
Les Douglas	1918	1938-56	1944/45	1	1942-44	2	
Lloyd Finkbeiner	1920	1940-56	41/2, 43/4	2	1943/44	1	3 playoff games
Joe Fisher	1916	1935-49	1943/44	1	1942/43	1	44/45 2 Games
Red Garrett	***1924-44***	***1942/43***	***1944***		1944/45	1	
Lloyd Gronsdahl	1921	1941-51	1944-46	2	***1943-44***	***1.5***	***(42/43 first 1/2 pro)***
Jim Haggerty	1914	1934-50	1943/44	1	1942-44	1.5	
Hec Highton	1923	1943-51	1941/42	1	42/3, 44/5	2	
John Holota	1921-51	1941-51	1944/45	1	1942/43	?	
Buck Jones	1918	1937-55	1944-46	2	1943/44	1.5	(joined late in 42/3)
Vern Kaiser^	1926	1945-54	1942-44	2	1943/44	1	
William Knott	1920-87	1940-50	1943-45	2	41/2, 44/5	2	
Alan Kuntz	1920-87	1938-56	1943/44	1	1942/43	1	
Larry Kwong	1923	1941-58	1944/45	1	1942/43	1	
Bill Kyle	1924-68	1945-60	1943-45	2	1942-44	2	
Bobby Lee	1911-74	1931-54	1944-46	2	1942/43	1	
Tony Licardi	1921	1941-55	1945/46	1	1943/44	1.5	(RCAF playoffs 42/3)
Hubert Macey	1921	1941-57	1944-46	2	1942-44	3	
Dave Mackay	1919	1940-54	1944-47	3	1943/44	1	(only 2 gp)
Frank Mario^	1921-d	1940-53	1943/44	1	1942/43	1	
Frank Mathers	1924	1945-62	1944/45	1	1943/44	1	
Shep Mayer	1923	1942-51	43/4,45/6	2	42/3, 44/5		
Norm McAtlee	1921	1941-54	1943-45	2	1942/43		
John McCreedy^	1911-79	1937-45	1943/44	1	1942/43	1	
Butch Mcdonald	1916	1936-50	1943/44	1	1942/43	1	
Irv McGibbon	1914-81	1934-49	1943-45	2	1942/43		
Art Michaluk	1923	1940-58	40-2,43/4	3	42/3,44/5	2	
John O'Flahrety	1918	1936-59	1944/45	1	1943/44	1	
Bert Peer	1910	1934-48	1943-45	2	1942/43	1	
Nels Podolsky	1925	1945-58	1944/45	1	1944/45	3 games	(listed as both)
George Poirer	1914	1932-48	1944/45	1	1942-44	2	
Jackie Schmidt	1924	1942-57	1945/46	1	1943-45	2	
Bill Shill^	1923	1942-53	1943/44	1	42/3, 44/5	2	

F.2 (Con'd) Both Military Service and Military Hockey Experience

NAME	Birth/ Death	Career	Military Service	# of Years	Military leagues	# of seasons	
Thain Simon	1922	1942-52	1943-45	2	1942/43	1	
Cliff Simpson	1923-87	1942-52	1943/44	1	1942/43	1	
Stan Smith	1917	1936-50	1944-46	2	1942-44	2	
Spence Tatchell	1924	1942-54	1944/45	1	1943/44	1	
Rhys Thompson	1918-d	1939-46	1944/45	1	1943/44	1	
Jack Tomson(Eng)	1918	1937-50	1944/45	1	1942-44	2	
Wes Trainor	1922-d	1945-54	1941-45	4	1940/41	1	
Marcel Trembley	1915	1936-42	1942-44	2	1944/45	1	
Norman Tustin	1919	1939-52	1944-46	2	1942-44	2	
John Webster	1920	1940-53	1943-45	2	1942/43	1	
Moe White	1919	1937-50	1944/45	1	1942-44	2	
Bob Whitelaw (Sct)	1916	1936-48	1943/44	1	1944/45	1	
Arch Wilder	1917	1939-51	1942-44	2	1944/45	1	
Ralph Wycherly	1920	1940-50	1944-46	2	1942-44	2	
Americans							
Ed Barry	1919	1940-50	1944/45	1	1942-44	2	

F.3 Careers Which Ended in the Military

NAME	Birth/ Death	Career	Military Service	# of Years	Military leagues	# of seasons	
Lex Chisholm	1915-81	1935-41	1942/43	1	1941/42	1	
Don Deacon	1913-d	1939-42	1942/43	1			
Bill Dickie	1916-d	1937-42			1942-45	3	
Joe Krol	1915-93	1935-42	1942-44	2	*(also a Canadian football star)*		
Hickey Nicholson	1914-56	1931-40	1940/41	1			
Phil Stein	1913	1933-42	1942/43	1			

F.4 Careers Which Ended During the War

NAME	Birth/ Death	Career	
Tony Ahlin	1914	1932-42	
Tom Dewar	1913-d	1934-43	
Maurice Croghen	1914-d	1933-41	
Bob McCulley	1914	1932-42	
Armand Raymond	1913-d	1935-42	
AMERICANS			
Al Suomi	1913	1934-37	(Ended before outbreak of war)

F.5 Military Hockey Only

NAME	Birth/ Death	Career		Military Hockey	# of seasons	
Kieth Allen	1923	1941-57		1943-45	2	
Viv Allen	1916	1936-50		1944/45	1	
Bill Allum	1916-92	1936-53		1943-45	2	
Reggie Bentley	1914	1935-52		1943-45	2	
Gordie Bell	1925-80	1942-60		1943-45	2	
Hank Blade	1920	1939-53		1941-45	4	
Andy Branigan	1922-95	1940-60		1942-45	3	
Connie Brown^	1917	1935-52		1943/44	gam	44/5 3 playoff games
Harold Brown	1920	1940-53		1942-44	2	44/5 4 games
Bucky Buchanen	1922	1945-58		1942-45	3	
Gord Buttery	1926	1943-56		1944/45	1	
Bob Copp^	1918	1940-55		1942-46	4	43/4 2 games
Tony Demers^	1917-97	1936-49		1942/43	1	
JP Denis	1924	1945-62		1944/45	1	
Frank Dunlap	1924-93	1943-48		1944/45	1	
Eddie Emberg	1921	1942-52		1942/43	1	43/4 4games
				1944/45	*'CAF, also 21 pro*	
George Fashoway	1926	1946-64		1944/45	1	
Ed Finnigan	1913-d	1931-47		1944/45	1	39/40 2 games
Tom Fowler	1924	1945-53		1944/45	1	
Paul Gauthier	1915	1935-49		1945/46	1	
Percy Jackson	*1907*	*1927-44*		*1944/45*	*gm.*	*(Played w/ 2 other*
George Johnston	1920	1938-55		1943-45	2	*teams)*
Bing Juckes	1926	1946-55		1944/45	1	
Jack Keating	1908-d	1925-46	1gm 45/46	1942-44	2	
Ken Kilrea	1919-90	1938-51		1942/43		
Bob Kirkpatrick^	1915	1934-49		1943-45	2	
Dick Kotanen	1925	1946-58		1943-45	2	
JP Lamirande	1924-d	1946-58		1943-45	2	
Joseph Levandoski	1921	1941-59		1943/44	games	
Douglas Lewis	1921	1941-52		1943/44	1	
Murdo Mackay	1917	1936-53		1942-45	3	
John Mahaffey	1919	1936-52		1942-44	2	
Cliff Malone	*1925*	*1945-54*		*1944/45*	*1*	*15 games w/RCAF in*
Ian MacIntosh	1927	1945-53		1944/45	1	City Junior
Norm Mann (Eng)	1914	1933-47		1943-45	2	
Robert McDonald	1923	1943-49		1942/43	1	
John McGill^	1921	1941-54		1942/43	1	
Sammy McManus	1911-d	1930-47		1944/45	1	
Pat McReavy	1918	1936-50		1942-44	2	
Hugh Miller	1921	1941-48		1942-45	3	43/4 1 game
Jack Miller	1925	1945-56		1942-44	2	
Lloyd Mohns	1927	1943-49		1942/43	1	
Pete Morin	1915-d	1936-50		1942-44	2	
Les Ramsey	1920	1939-51		1943-45	2	
Ron Rowe	1923	1946-57		1943-46	3	
Church Russell^	1923-d	1944-55		1943/44	1	

F.5 (Con't) Military Hockey Only

Name	Birth/ Death	Career	Military Hockey	seasons	
Fred Shero	1925-d	1943-58	1944/45	1	
Enio Sclisizzi	1925	1945-59	1944/45	1	
Joe Shack^	1915-87	1935-55	1943/44	1	
Peter Slobodian^	1919-86	1938-49	1942/43	1	
Mel Read	1924	1941-52	1942/43	1	
Stu Smith	1918	1934-54	40/1,43-5	3	
Ken Stewart	1913-d	1937-51	1942-45	3	
Art Strobel	1922	1943-53	1942/43	1	
Fred Thurier	1916-d	1936-52	1942-44	1	
Connie Tudin	1917-d	1937-54	1942-46	4	
Sherman White	1923-d	1939-64	1943-46	3	
John Wilkerson	1911-d	1931-44	1941-44	3	
Lefty Wilson	1919	1943-58	1944/45	1	
Wally Wilson	1921	1945-47	1942-44	2	
Steve Wojciechowski	1922	1944-55	1943/44	1	

AMERICANS

Bob Dill**	1920-81	1938-52	1942/43	.5	

APPENDIX G:
MINOR LEAGUE PLAYERS BORN BETWEEN 1902 & 1912

G.1 No Military Experience

Name	Birth/ Death	Pro Career
Bert Connelly^	1909-d	1934-46
Art Giroux	1908-82	1926-45
John Howard	1911	1935-45
Fred Robertson	1911-97	1931-46
Alex Wood (Sct)	1911	1930-45

Name	Birth/ Death	Pro Career
Americans		
Irwin Boyd^	1908	1929-45
Ron Moffat	1905-60	1925-50

G.2 Careers Which Ended in the Military

Name	Birth/ Death	Career	Military Service
John Doran	1911-75	1932-42	1942/43
Walter Harnott	1909-d	1928-42	1942-45
Bobby Kirk^ (Irl)	1909-70	1930-42	1942/43
Jean Pusie	1910-56	1928-43	1943/44
Ted Saunders	1911	1930-41	1942/43

G.3 Careers Which Ended During the War

Name	Birth/ Death	Pro Career	
Bill Anderson	1912-d	1933-43	*(last gp in*
Mickey Blake	1912-d	1932-43	*NHL)*
Jean Bourcier	1911	1933-41	
Gene Carrigan^	1907-44	1927-44	
Eddie Convey	1910-d	1930-41	
Roger Cormier	1905-71	1926-40	
Frank Daley	1909-68	1928-44	
Dave Downie	1909-d	1928-44	
Walt Farsant	1912	1935-44	
Yip Foster	1907-d	1927-44	
G.Forslund(Swe)	1908-d	1929-41	
Irv Frew (Sct)	1907-d	1927-41	
Farrand Gillie	1905-d	1927-42	
Sammy Godin^	1909-d	1927-43	
Paul Goodman	1905-59	1935-41	
Ben Grant	1908-91	1927-44	
Lloyd Gross	1905	1927-42	
Emil Hanson	1908-55	1928-42	
Oscar Hanson	1908	1932-42	
Orville Heximer^	1910	1929-42	
Al Huggins	1910	1930-42	
Bill Hutton^	1910-d	1929-44	
Lloyd Jackson	1912	1931-42	
Frank Jerwa	1909	1931-41	
Walter Kalbleish	1911-d	1933-43	
Ernest Kenny	1907-70	1929-40	

Name	Birth/ Death	Pro Career
Norm Locking^	1911-95	1931-44
Jack Markle	1907-56	1927-40
Charley Mason^	1912-71	1934-42
Joe Matte	1909-d	1929-43
S.McAdam (Sct)	1908-d	1928-44
Walt McCartney	1911-d	1932-41
Lloyd Molyneau^	1912	1932-41
Alfie Moore	1905	1926-42
John Newman	1910-67	1929-40
Eddie Ouelette^	1911	1929-42
Peter Palangio	1908	1926-43
Hal Picketts^	1909	1931-41
Jack Pratt^(Sct)	1906	1920-40
Yip Radley	1908-63	1930-42
Gord Reid	1912	1934-44
Rolly Roulston	1911-83	1930-42
Tony Savage^	1906-74	1926-40
Wilf Starr	1909	1930-40
Jacques Toupin	1910-87	1932-46
Burr Williams	1909-81	1927-41
Hub Wilson	1909	1931-42
AMERICANS		
Milt Brink	1910	1931-40
Art Lesieur	1907	1927-41
Pat Shea	1912-d	1931-42

G.4 Careers Which Ended Before the War

Name	Birth/ Death	Career		Name	Birth/ Death	Career
Rene Boileau	1904	1925-34		Stan McCabe^	1908-58	1927-37
Bernie Brophy^	1905-d	1925-36		Eddie McCalmon	1902-d	1927-31
Gord Brydson	1907-d	1926-33		Bill Miller^	1907	1934-37
Eddie Burke^	1907-d	1927-37		Earl Miller	1905-d	1926-36
Roy Burmeister^	1906-d	1926-39		Leo Murray	1906-d	1926-36
Bobby Burns	1905	1926-39		Mike Neville^	1904-d	1924-36
Bert Burry	1909-d	1931-37		Ernie Parkes	1904-48	1921-25
Chuck Cahill	1904-54	1925-31		Rollie Paulhus^	1902-d	1925-32
Patsy Callighen	1906	1926-36		Frank Peters	1905-d	1925-34
Gene Chouinard	1907-51	1926-36		Batt Phillips	1902-78	1925-34
Norm Collins	1910	1930-38		Hugh Plaxton	1904-d	1932-33
D'Arcy Coulson	1908	1926-36	*('34-36*	Elie Pringle	1911-d	1930-39
Abbie Cox	1904	1926-37	*w/RCAF)*	George Redding	1903-d	1924-32
Jimmy Creighton	1905-d	1929-33		Bill Regan^	1908-d	1929-34
Nels Crutchfield	1911-d	1928-35		Des Roach^	1909-d	1930-39
Bob Davie	1912-90	1932-38		Gus Rivers	1909-85	1929-37
Fred Elliot^	1903-d	1927-31		Werner Schwarr	1903-d	1924-31
Leo Gaudreault^	1905-d	1923-37		Ganton Scott	1903-d	1922-32
Art Gauthier	1904-d	1926-32		Frank Shepard	1907-d	1927-32
Milt Halliday	1906-89	1926-39		Don Smillie	1910	1933-36
Herb Hamel	1904-d	1926-31		Chris Speyer	1907-d	1923-32
Henry Harris	1906-d	1927-35		Frank Steale	1905-d	1928-36
Albert Holway^	1902-d	1923-37		Max Sutherland	1907-d	1926-39
Rolly Huard	1902	1926-34		Art Townsend	1905-71	1925-39
James Hughes^	1906	1925-36		Melville Vail	1906-d	1926-36
Ray Kinsella	1911-96	1930-38		Ed Voke	1904-d	1928-33
Hobie Kitchen	1904-d	1925-29		Frank Waite	1905-89	1925-34
Adie Lafrance	1912	1933-39		**AMERICANS**		
Leo Lafrance	1902	1925-36		Lelard Harrington	1904-59	1925-36
Martin Lauder	1907	1927-33		Ed Jeremiah	1905-67	1930-36
Fred Lowrey	1902-68	1924-32	*(1934-6 RCAF, 1936/7 coach of same)*			
Ron Lyons	1909	1929-38		Ike Klingbush	1908	1936/37
Rennison Manners	1904-d	1929-31		Myles Lane	1905-87	1928-34
Bud Maracle	1904-d	1926-37		Butch Schaeffer	1911	1936-39
Cliff McBride	1909	1928-38		Bob Taylor	1904-93	1926-36

APPENDIX H:
TURNOVER ON NHL TEAMS, 1939-1946

H.1 MONTREAL CANADIENS

	1939/40	1940/41	1941/42	1942/43	1943/44	1944/45	1945/46
regulars	11	15	14	11	15	12	15
part-time	4	3	5	4	0	3	1
fill-ins	8	6	5	8	2	3	7
Did Not Return		**7**	**7**	**7**	**5**	**9**	**3**
traded							1
retired		2					
demoted		1	1	1		2	1
loaned			1		2	1	
reduced		4	3	3		1	1
injured			1			2	
military			1	3	3		
New/Returned		**11**	**6**	**4**	**8**	**3**	**6**
trade		1		2			
loan			1		1	2	
promoted		9	4	1	6		2
increased		1	1		2		
back (inj)				1			2
back (mil)						1	2

H.2 TORONTO MAPLE LEAFS

	1939/40	1940/41	1941/42	1942/43	1943/44	1944/45	1945/46
regulars	11	12	12	11	10	13	14
part-time	9	6	5	6	6	4	6
fill-ins	1	1	1	5	4	2	5
Did Not Return		**3**	**4**	**6**	**7**	**3**	**6**
traded		2		2	1		1
retired							1
demoted						1	3
loaned							
reduced		1	2			1	
injured			1	1	1		1
military			1	3	5	1	
New/Returned		**4**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**6**	**7**
trade			1	2		1	
loan							
promoted			1	2	3	1	1
increased		4	2		2	1	1
back (inj)				1			
back (mil)					1	3	5

APPENDIX H (Continued)

H.3 CHICAGO BLACK HAWKS

	1939/40	1940/41	1941/42	1942/43	1943/44	1944/45	1945/46
regulars	13	12	15	13	10	13	15
part-time	6	6	0	1	6	4	1
fill-ins	0	2	6	6	5	4	6
Did Not Return		**4**	**2**	**6**	**7**	**6**	**7**
traded		1			1	1	
retired							2
demoted		1			1	1	5
loaned							
reduced		2	1	1	1	2	
injured							
military			1	5	4	1	
New/Returned		**3**	**5**	**4**	**4**	**9**	**9**
trade			1	1		4	1
loan							
promoted		1	1		2	4	
increased		2	3	3	2	1	
back (inj)							
back (mil)							7

H.4 DETROIT RED WINGS

	1939/40	1940/41	1941/42	1942/43	1943/44	1944/45	1945/46
regulars	14	11	11	13	11	14	13
part-time	5	6	7	2	2	0	5
fill-ins	3	5	7	6	6	5	7
Did Not Return		**6**	**3**	**2**	**7**	**4**	**5**
traded		1				3	
retired			1				
demoted				1		1	2
loaned		1					
reduced		4	1				3
injured			1				
military				1	7		
New/Returned		**3**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**7**	**4**
trade			1		1	1	
loan							
promoted			1	2	1	1	1
increased		3	1	1	3	4	
back (inj)				1			
back (mil)							3
Promo (mil)						1	

APPENDIX H (Continued)

H.5 NEW YORK RANGERS

	1939-40	1940/41	1941/42	1942/43	1943/44	1944/45	1945/46
regulars	15	15	14	12	12	14	13
part-time	0	0	2	6	8	2	7
fill-ins	1	4	2	4	9	5	4
Did Not Return		**0**	**4**	**7**	**10**	**7**	**9**
traded			1	1	1		
retired			1				
demoted			1		1	5	8
loaned					1		1
reduced					1	1	
injured					1		
military			1	6	5		
New/Returned		**0**	**3**	**5**	**10**	**9**	**8**
trade					5		
loan						1	
promoted			2	5	4	3	1
increased			1		1		
back (inj)						1	
back (mil)						2	7
Promo (mil)						2	

H.6 BOSTON BRUINS

	1939/40	1940/41	1941/42	1942/43	1943/44	1944/45	1945/46
regulars	15	15	13	14	11	13	14
part-time	3	2	5	1	6	4	4
fill-ins	2	3	7	4	6	3	2
Did Not Return		**1**	**3**	**7**	**6**	**6**	**9**
traded			1	1	2	1	
retired						1	1
demoted					1	3	5
loaned			1				
reduced		1	1			1	2
injured							
military				6	3		
New/Returned		**1**	**1**	**8**	**3**	**8**	**10**
trade			1		1		
loan							
promoted		1		6	1	7	
increased				2	1		
back (inj)							
back (mil)						1	9
Promo (mil)							1

APPENDIX H (Continued)

H.7 NEW YORK/BROOKLYN AMERICANS

	1939/40	1940/41	1941/42
regulars	13	12	13
part-time	1	7	5
fill-ins	5	5	7
Did Not Return		**4**	**6**
traded			2
retired		3	2
demoted			1
loaned			
reduced		1	1
injured			
military			
New/Returned		**3**	**7**
trade			2
loan			1
promoted		2	3
increased		1	1
back (inj)			
back (mil)			
Promo (mil)			

APPENDIX I:
STRUCTURE OF NHL MANAGEMENT, 1939-1945

National Hockey League
President Frank Calder
Mervin 'Red' Dutton

Team	BOSTON BRUINS	CHICAGO BLACK HAWKS	DETROIT RED WINGS
Owner	Charles Adams	Fred MacLaughlin	Detroit Olympia Corp.
		Bill Tobin (1944/45)	
President	Charles Adams	Fred MacLaughlin	James Norris, Sr.
		Bill Tobin (1944/45)	
Governor	Charles Adams (1940-45)	Fred MacLaughlin	James Norris, Sr.
	Wesley Adams (1939/40)	Bill Tobin (1944/45)	
General Manager	Art Ross	Fred MacLaughlin	Jack Adams
		Bill Tobin (1944/45)	
Coach	Art Ross (1941-45)	Paul Thompson (1939-44)	Jack Adams
	Cooney Weiland (1939-41)	Johnny Gotselig (1944/45)	

Team	MONTREAL CANADIENS	NEW YORK RANGERS	NY AMERICANS
Owner	Montreal Arena Co.	Madison Square Gardens	NHL - operated
		Corporation	
President	Donat Raymond	John Kilpatrick	Mervin 'Red' Dutton
Governor	Leo Dandurand	John Kilpatrick	Mervin 'Red' Dutton
	Tommy Gorman (Alternate)	Lester Patrick (Alternate)	
General Manager	Tommy Gorman (1940-45)	Lester Patrick	Mervin 'Red' Dutton
Coach	Alfred Lepine (1939/40)	Frank Boucher	Mervin 'Red' Dutton
	Dick Irvin, Sr. (1940-45)	-	

Team	TORONTO MAPLE LEAFS
Owner	Maple Leaf Gardens, Ltd.
President	Conn Smythe
	Ed Bickle
Governor	Smythe/Bickle
	Franke Selke (Alternate)
General Manager	Franke Selke
Coach	Hap Day

Appendix J: Military Leagues and Teams

J.1 Major CAHA Leagues with military teams that used Enlisted NHLers

Quebec Senior Hockey League
Montreal Army, RCAF
Quebec Royal Rifles
Ottawa Commandos, RCAF, Navy
Cornwall Army
Lachine RCAF

Ontario Hockey Association "A"
Toronto Army Daggers, Army Shamrocks
Toronto Army, RCAF, Navy
Toronto Research Colonels
Cornwall Army
Simcoe Army
Kingston Army
Brandford RCAF
Ottawa RCAF

Regina Senior Hockey League
Calgary Army, Currie Army
Calgary RCAF Mustangs
Nanaimo Army

Saskatchewan Senior Hockey League
Regina Army
Saskatoon RCAF

Pacific Coast Hockey League
Victoria Army, Navy
Vancouver RCAF

Manitoba Hockey League (Senior)
Winnipeg RCAF

Nova Scotia Senior Hockey League
Cornwallis Navy

P.E.I. Disrict Senior Hockey League
Summerside RCAF

J.2 Military Teams That Used Enlisted NHL Players

RCAF	Army	Navy	Miscellanous
Arnprior	Calgary (2)	Calgary	Montreal #4 Repairs
Calgary (2)	Halifax	Cornwallis	Montreal Services
Dartmouth	Montreal	Halifax	Ottawa Army Medics
Halifax	Naniamo	Naniamo	Ottawa Depot #17
Lachine	Newmarket	Newmarket	Petawawa
Moncton	Ottawa	Ottawa	St John Garrison
Montreal	Red Deer	Saskatoon	Victoria VMD
Ottawa	Regina	Sydney	Trn Research Colonels
Rockcliffe	Toronto	Toronto	
Saskatoon	Vancouver	Victoria	
Summerside	Vernon		
Toronto	Victoria		
Vancouver (2)	Winnipeg		
Winnipeg			