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**The Legacy of Communist Political Culture in East-Central Europe: A Study
of the Post-Communist Mind.**

by

Jiri S. Melich

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and research
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Political Science

Carleton University

Ottawa, Ontario

October 12, 1999

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the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
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**THE LEGACY OF COMMUNIST POLITICAL CULTURE IN EAST-CENTRAL
EUROPE: A STUDY OF THE POST-COMMUNIST MIND**

Submitted by

Jiri S. Melich, M.A.

in partial fulfilment of the requirements

For the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Chair, Department of Political Science

Thesis Supervisor

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May 3, 2000

Abstract

This thesis considers the psychosocial legacy of communism and its implications. Its main hypothesis focuses on the conceptualization, analysis and interpretation of the evidence of the continuity of communist political culture, and on the temporal and logical (analytical) relationship between "communist" and post-communist political cultures under transitional conditions. Thus I am trying to investigate what kind of mindset the citizens of Eastern Europe have inherited from the communist period, and how this mindset affects the post-communist political and economic transformations. In devising the concept of the "Post-Communist Mind" (PCM) I have attempted to avoid certain conceptual and methodological trappings associated with the concept of political culture. The PCM may be viewed as a legacy or residue of "communist" rule in the sphere of values, orientations, mentalities and behavioral matrixes, i.e. as the internalized legacy of specific social, ideological and institutional features of the "communist" state; this residue is conceptualized as a set of specific socio-psychological symptoms.

The argument of the thesis recognizes that both the institutional (structural) and culturalist approaches may contain relevant leads in explaining the Eastern European transformations, as far as their methods are causally substantiated and respect the complex logic inherent in the transformations and empirical evidence of individual-country cases. The theory of socialization is applied to explain the link between communist structures and ideology on one hand, and communist and post-communist political culture on the other. After having separated and investigated the PCM symptoms as they have emerged in the post-communist transformation processes, I suggest that to a large extent they contradict the requirements of a modern *civic culture*

and democratic polity. (We may expect that the PCM will co-determine and limit the options available to the current processes of building a functioning market economy, and at the same time the consolidation or completion of democracy.)

The thesis builds on general approaches to politics and society as developed by Max Weber and T. Parsons, on comprehensive theories of communism, as well as on available theories of the post-communist transformation, as well as on analyses of public opinion surveys conducted in communist and post-communist Eastern Europe. Its focus is mainly, but not solely, on East/Central Europe.

The thesis combines the "soft" interpretive approach with causal explanation analysis; heuristically it combines the deductive and inductive approaches. Part of the project is a direct and self-administered Delphi opinion survey designed to obtain expert opinions on values and dispositions held in Eastern Europe from selected groups of professionals.

The analyses here, inevitably, are preliminary and tentative, but hopefully they will make a substantial contribution to the debate on the post-communist transformation.

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Motto:

"The whole of this letter is concerned, in fact, with what I really fear - the pointlessly harsh and long-lasting consequences which the present abuses will have for our nations. I fear the price we are all bound to pay for the drastic suppression of history, the cruel and needless banishment of life into underground of society and the depth of the human soul, the new compulsory 'deferment' of every opportunity for society to live in anything like a natural way. And perhaps it is apparent from what I wrote a little back that I am not only worried about our current payments in terms of everyday bitterness at the spoliation of society and human degradation, or about the heavy tax we shall have to pay in the shape of a long-lasting spiritual and moral decline of society. I am also concerned with the scarcely calculable surcharge which may be imposed on us when the moment next arrives for life and history to demand their due." (Václav Havel, in his "Letter to Dr. Gustáv Husák, 1975)¹

"The wasteland left behind by communism ... is one of ideas and values that make the smooth functioning of democracy problematical." (George Schöpflin)

¹ Václav Havel, Living in Truth (London: Faber and Faber, 1990), 33. Gustáv Husák was then the president of Czechoslovakia and Havel's chief jailer.

Introduction.

1. Introduction: The problem statement.

In the history of human civilizations there have been several relatively abrupt changes in the political and social orientations of society that marked a beginning not only of a completely different social and political order, but also of a distinctly new culture, indeed a new civilization. The transformation of society and its culture following the French Revolution or the Meiji Restoration in 19th-century Japan here come to mind. Although most of these transitions were characterized by uniquely national and historical features, they can be compared in their speed, complexity and broadness of their sweep to what we have witnessed in Eastern Europe in the last decade or so of the 20th century.²

Perhaps the only conclusion one can make with certainty about post-communist Eastern Europe, is that things have been more complex and difficult there than even the most cautious observers and analysts had expected.³ Explanations for such an underestimation of the difficulties of the transformation have varied: from the admission that scholars and practitioners have underestimated the challenges of

² As Erik P. Hoffmann rightly notes, it is much more difficult to create a liberalized society from totalitarian polity and *noncapitalist* economy than from "a rigid authoritarian polity and *capitalist* economy, such as fascist Spain or apartheid South Africa." Erik P. Hoffmann, "Democratic Theories and Authority Patterns," in Can Democracy Take Root in Post-Soviet Russia?, ed. Harry Eckstein et al. (Boulder, CO.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 1998), 122 (emphasis in the original).

³ Leslie Holmes has aptly noted that post-communism is "better understood as the rejection of the communist power system than as a clear-cut adoption of an alternative system." Leslie Holmes, Post-Communism (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1997), 13).

transition and transformation to their overestimation of the capacities of both societies and their new elites to cope with this challenge.⁴

For several decades in this century, variations on the theme of totalitarian or state-socialist rule in Eastern Europe had monopolized what was elsewhere called the public sphere and banished regular political life from the region. Then the collapse of the Soviet-type system of actually existing socialism in the late 1980s, and its aftermath, have resulted in a new constellation which did not often fit established classifications. To a degree, however, East European societies in transition have generally been like other historical transitional societies: characterized by continuities and discontinuities, trying to quickly assume some democratic principles, and facing the gap between an assumed democratic form and real substance.

This thesis is to be an elaboration of the argument that many of the current difficulties experienced by the post-communist countries have their roots in social psychology and political culture inherited from the communist period. The purpose of the thesis is to contribute towards both theoretical and practical improvements in understanding, among academicians and policy-makers, of specific features of the post-communist constellation in the region, through inquiring into, analyzing and interpreting the broader politico-cultural legacy of communist rule as it has persisted in, and influenced, the transformation processes in post-communist Eastern Europe.

⁴ And perhaps, that they overestimated the capacities of the liberal democratic (and capitalist) model itself. On this see, for instance, Hans Aage, "Transition and Transplantation of Economic Systems," in The Aftermath of 'Real Existing Socialism' in Eastern Europe, ed. Anne Lorentzen and Marianne Rostgaard (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1997) and Ha-Joon Chang and Peter Nolan, "Europe versus Asia: Contrasting Paths to the Reform of Centrally Planned Systems of Political Economy," in The Transformation of the Communist Economies: Against the Mainstream, ed. Ha-Joon Chang and Peter Nolan (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995).

In order to fulfil this objective, the thesis focuses on evidence of the continuity of communist political culture, and on the temporal and logical relationship between "communist" and "post-communist" political cultures under the transitional conditions.

My thesis has been informed by a tradition which includes Weber and Dahl (1971), of ascribing values, beliefs and ideas an important role in models of politics and change.⁵ In other words, it shares an understanding that specific historically-accumulated experience, not to be interpreted as teleology, linked to people's minds and behavior, plays an important role in shaping the future of a society. However, as Crawford and Lijphart have suggested, to "argue that the forces that have shaped current political choices and processes have deep roots in cultural, economic and social conditions inherited from the past, does not mean to strictly adopt the legacies of the past approach."⁶

In order to focus on this objective, a concept of the "Post-Communist Mind" (PCM) will be developed as an analytical tool that reflects a specific syndrome of "communist" political culture projected into the post-communist environment. This approach is based on the assumption that the mind-contents of the people (including the pertinent elite) and their propensity to act in a certain way, are at least as important as the nominal institutional and organizational structures. In the process I will, it is hoped, be able to identify a set of concrete characteristics (symptoms) of the PCM and,

⁵ Recognition of the relevance of broader cultural patterns for transitions to democracy, can also be found in Mainwaring (1992), Valerie Bunce, "Should Transitologists Be Grounded?," Slavic Review 54.1 (Spring 1995): 111-128, and Claus Offe, Varieties of Transition: The East European and East German Experience. (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1997), and elsewhere. Some of these authors and their approaches will be discussed in next chapters.

⁶ Beverly Crawford and Arend Lijphart, "Explaining Political and Economic Change in Post-Communist Eastern Europe," Comparative Political Studies 28.2 (July 1995): 171-199, 177.

in the final part, also to consider their effects on the process of political and economic transformation in Eastern Europe.

2. The issue: communist legacies and the problematic of transformation.

The post-communist transformation of society, economy and politics is a historically novel situation of dramatic and complex social change in the broadest sense. In addition to the difficulties created by the task of political transition and economic renewal alone, Eastern European societies have had to cope with the inherited political, social, and cultural problems originating in the communist and often also pre-communist periods.⁷ The process of transformation has also been marked by many historically inherent, as well as transitional, paradoxes.⁸

The significance of the legacy of the conditions of communist rule has been acknowledged by many analysts dealing with the region, but most of the attention has instead been focused on institutional-building in the narrower sense, and on purely economic aspects of the transition (transformation), rather than on the societal continuities and the inertia in political culture. If anything, the latter dimension has been treated as more or less marginal, and mostly in a non-systematic (and non-systemic) way. Part of the blame for insufficient comprehension of the unique psycho-social and psycho-political constellation should, perhaps, be put on misleading concepts that proliferated in Cold-War-era comparative communist studies, which

⁷ See Vladimir Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1992, 288; also Ken Jowitt, The World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); and Offe, Varieties of Transition.

⁸ See also Appendix I, "Paradoxes of Post-Communist Transition."

produced many reductionist models of the region's societies and politics. Also, opinions have ranged from the notion that post-communist societies are morally and psychologically devastated (not to mention their political and economic paralysis), to the thought that the inevitable "birth pains" are only secondary to an otherwise mostly successful political transition and marketization.

Increasing evidence seems to suggest that the legacy of old norms, values,⁹ perception, and thinking has found its way into transitional society, politics and economy, and, in many respects, shaped the post-communist development more significantly than the assumed or proclaimed goal of liberal democratic transition. In his insightful essay, Schöpflin, for instance, has insisted that "the political-cultural scene, as it began to emerge under post-communism, was marked by the shared experience of communism."¹⁰ Similarly, Vladimir Tismaneanu and Ken Jowitt have suggested that a phenomenon of "Leninist legacy", defined mostly in psycho-social terms, is something which must be seriously taken into account. Tismaneanu has argued:

"Because of the widespread disenchantment with Leninist ideology and practice, it was taken for granted, by political actors in the region and by many foreign analysts, that the long exposure of those nations to the hardships of dictatorship had made them immune to new authoritarian temptations. But. . . that belief was founded on wishful thinking. Leninism had left its imprint on

⁹ Following Kluckhohn (1951) and Rokeach (1953), the theory "defines values as desirable goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in people's lives. Different values express different motivational goals." I quote from Anat Bardi and Shalom H. Schwartz, "Relations among Sociopolitical Values in Eastern Europe: Effects of the Communist Experience?," Political Psychology 17,3 (1996): 525-550.

¹⁰ George Schöpflin, "Culture and Identity in Post-Communist Europe," Developments in East European Politics, ed. Stephen White, Judy Batt, and Paul G. Lewis (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1993), 25.

the collective psyche, generating behaviour patterns that, even if only in a residual way, would continue to affect the public sphere. This 'old rule' residue has been the main obstacle confronted by all the postcommunist societies."¹¹

Hence the demise of the communist regimes "did not mean the immediate collapse of the communist political cultures - [of] all the habits, mentalities, attitudes, symbols, and values that had permeated social life for decades."¹² According to Tismaneanu, the inertia of a one-party (Leninist) state "left its imprint on the collective psyche, sustaining behaviour patterns that, even if only in a residual way, would continue to influence the private and public spheres."¹³

2.1 Relevant testimonies.

Similarly, many other analysts and observers dealing with Eastern Europe, aware of historical continuities, have maintained that it is clear that the "'legacy of real socialism' and the culture of 'totalitarian socialism' have influenced everyone to a

¹¹ Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics, 242. See also Jowitt, New World Disorder. Naimark, in his Introduction to Maaz' book Behind the Wall, argued that the process of European integration had been slowed down by the difficulties unified Germany faced in integrating the former GDR; not only because of the latter's economic backwardness but (and more so) due to its population having had "a very hard time taking advantage of freedom of choice, social and geographical mobility, and the market economy." Norman M. Naimark, "Introduction," in Behind the Wall: The Inner Life of Communist Germany, by Joachim Maaz, trans. by Margot Bettauer Dembo (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1995), xviii.

¹² Tismaneanu, *ibid.*, 243.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 242.

much higher degree than they are willing to admit."¹⁴ These and other authors have often considered the post-communist state of affairs in terms of the national, cultural, and social consciousness; some of them have attempted a more complex typology of the problem.¹⁵ A long-time student of the region, Richard Pipes, for instance, has argued: "It can be argued that Russia's gravest problems are not economic. . . . Communism's most ruinous legacy lies in the moral and psychological sphere: economic problems appear as a consequence rather than a cause of Russia's current predicament."¹⁶ In this sense, a Romanian sociologist speaks of "post-totalitarian pathology" (Plesu) and Polish sociologist Piotr Sztompka identifies the specific "socialist mind."¹⁷ Similarly, when commenting on the post-communist constellation in Czechoslovakia, two prominent Czech political analysts, Jiří Pehe and Emanuel Mandler, have agreed that the "bolshevik mentality" has been part of a broader socio-psychological phenomenon in post-communism; Mandler has spoken of "degenerated society" and "degenerated politics" as a result of societies' having been exposed to communist rule. He has spoken about a mentality characterized "first of all by non-

¹⁴ Petr Mareš, Petr, Libor Musil, and Ladislav Rabusic, "Values and the welfare state in Czechoslovakia," The new great transformation?, ed. Christopher G.A. Bryant and Edmund Mokrzycky (New York: Routledge, 1994), 82.

¹⁵ Piotr Sztompka, "The Intangibles and Imponderables of the Transition to Democracy," Studies in Comparative Communism Vol. XXIV, No. 3 (September 1991): 295-311 and Sztompka, "Looking Back: The Year 1989 as a Cultural and Civilizational Break," Communist and Post-Communist Studies 29.2 (1996): 115-129. See also Emanuel Mandler, "Poznámky k selhání české pravice" Lidové noviny 13 December 1997 [příloha "Orientace"]: 1., Václav Havel, The Art of Impossible. Politics and Morality in Practice: Speeches and Writings, 1990-1996 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997); and others.

¹⁶ I quote from Svetlana P. Glinkina, "The Ominous Landscape of Russian Corruption," Transitions 5.3 (March 1998): 21.

¹⁷ Sztompka, "The Intangibles and Imponderables of the Transition to Democracy," 304.

tolerant thinking" which has returned "through a back door" into Czech political life.¹⁸

In even more radical terms, a German psychiatrist, Hans-Joachim Maaz, has argued that in socialist East Germany there was "a severely ill society" and that "severe deformation of character as a mass phenomenon" was prevalent. He suggested that East Germans have suffered from severe personal psychological problems caused by the nature of the society in which they had to live. In Maaz' explanation, the core of the illness and its symptoms was predicated on the exposure to the rigid inhuman regime, which for a long period of time, had been one of oppression and corruption. Consequently, under the surface lies "boiled fury, helpless anxiety, and paralysis."¹⁹

¹⁸ Emanuel Mandler, "Minulost sahá do současné politické krize," Lidové noviny 6 Jan. 1998: 1. In an earlier essay, Czech philosopher Emanuel Mandler noted that "[the] Czech national consciousness is very destitute; one half of a century of the rule of totalitarian regimes stuffed this consciousness with passions, utopian notions, narcissism, xenophobia, and abundance of envy." Emanuel Mandler, "Poznámky k selhání české pravice," Lidové noviny 13 December 1997 [příloha "Orientace"]: 1.

¹⁹ Maaz, Behind the Wall, esp. 69-82. To a certain extent, as Maaz has emphasized, we may talk of the population's traumatic experience with the experiment of communism. This experience was traumatic at least in the sense that the fuzzy border between normality and abnormality, freedom and oppression, human dignity and humiliation was also shifted to its negative end but, at the same time, was forced to preserve the appearance of the opposite. According to Maaz, not only politics and society at large were influenced by psychological defences against any version of Stalinism, but also "every branch of science, the economy, the legal and judicial system, the arts, culture and education, all the way into everyday personal relationships and especially deeply into the psychological structures of every single individual." Ibid., 5. Interesting criticism of Maaz's approach in the book (published in 1990 as Der Gefühlstau, i.e. "the backlog of emotions"), has been presented by Jonathan Osmond. Osmond has recognized that Maaz created an interesting "psychogram" of the GDR, a "harrowing dissection of the repressed society" in which he "subjects a whole people (or part people) to psychoanalytical probing of its sexual, familial, and religious complexes;" according to him, it reveals much about Germans' attitudes towards authority. However: "it has no comparative dimension. . . The societal pressures and unhealthy psychological responses of individuals are presented as though they existed only in the GDR." Jonathan Osmond, rev. of Behind the Wall: the inner life

Some have argued that the decades-long exposure to a unique constellation had led to the creation of a "new socialist man," an ironic reference to a Marxist ideal of a new future man, who in his ideal form, has never, of course, been realized. (See III.6.) Slovak poet and journalist, Ivan Strpka, has expressed the following opinion:

"Socialism has collapsed, but a socialist man had been created. Socialism is still at work, six years after its falsely declared demise, successfully developing its new mutants and mutations of the old slavish values." And further: "The Slovak society is still in the grip of the old bolshevik habits. Externally, these habits always prefer populist collectivism, 'the people,' 'the nation.' This consists in incessantly looking for an enemy - without as well as within. These are the bolshevik habits which have victoriously found a metaphysical perpetrator for their own failure."²⁰

Many other specific characteristics have been alleged to exist in the post-communist region that have been considered as contravening a possibility of completing the democratization process and attaining a higher standard of civic life. Charles Glenn, has found in the post-communist region specific "communist" mentalities, entrenched habits of resignation, and a lack of initiative from below and Charles Gati has testified that "the psychological legacy of communism is . . . an environment contaminated with guilt and suspicion."²¹ Others have identified apathy, lack of tolerance and corrupted business practices as widespread in the region (Bauman, Sztompka, Olson, Holý and others). According to Horvath and Szakolczai,

of communist Germany, by Hans-Joachim Maaz, International Affairs 4 (1995): 879.

²⁰ Ivan Strpka, "Šest rokov po - o změnách v nás," SME 14 Dec. 1995: 5.

²¹ See Charles Gati, "From Sarajevo to Sarajevo," Foreign Affairs (Fall 1992): esp. 64-78; see also Charles L. Glen, Educational Freedom in Eastern Europe (Washington: Cato Institute), 1995; and also David S. Mason et al., "Apathy and the Birth of Democracy: The Polish Struggle," East European Politics and Societies 5.2 (Spring 1991): 205-33.

"the two major legacies of communism are the impairing of thinking and of doing proper business."²²

Similarly, moral crusaders like Václav Havel have maintained that political life under post-communism has become saturated with unique and negative psychological and cultural symptoms:

"Rancor and suspicion between ethnic groups[,] racism or even signs of fascism[,] brazen demagoguery[,] deliberate scheming and lying[,] political chicanery[,] wild and shameless squabbling over purely particular interests[,] naked ambition and lust for power[,] every kind of fanaticism[,] new and surprising forms of swindling[,] Mafia-style machinations[,] and a general absence of tolerance, mutual understanding, good taste, and a sense of moderation and reflection."²³ People in the region have often been said to be apathetic, distrustful, jealous, cynical and selfish; and accused, among other things, of a lack of seriousness, fairness, and tolerance.²⁴

²² Agnes Horvath and Arpad Szakolczai, The dissolution of communist power: The case of Hungary (New York: Routledge, 1992), 219.

²³ I quote from Jacques Rupnik, "The Post-Totalitarian Blues," The Global Resurgence of Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 365.

²⁴ See Laurence H. McFalls, Communism's Collapse, Democracy's Demise?: The Cultural Context and Consequences of the East German Revolution (New York: New York University Press, 1995); see also Václav Havel, Living in Truth (London: Faber and Faber, 1990), and others. Judging from the amount of evidence and the sense of urgency with which it has been presented, one might assume that some of the characteristics are more widespread here than elsewhere. Sometimes, such observations may be contradictory. However, there have been, on one hand, observers who found relatively low self-esteem, while others, on the other hand, found exaggerated self-confidence and a lack of self-criticism present in the region. See also Sztompka, "The Intangibles and Imponderables of the Transition to Democracy." Although similarity to some practices known in Western societies is not accidental, Havel's assessment is not purely normative; he has consistently referred to the same problems as consequences of communist practices. For some of the "defining characteristics" of Russia/Soviet political culture, see Frederic J.

Similarly, Lomax has concluded that communism has "left behind an enormous burden in terms of build-in expectations, forms of behaviour and frames of mind."²⁵ And according to Jaroslaw Kaczynski: "The ghost of the Polish People's Republic will haunt Polish politics for years to come."²⁶ In fact, testimonies and evidence have indicated that such problems seem to haunt both societies at large and the new elites alike. Bill Lomax (1995, who has used an example of party behaviour to illustrate the state of Hungarian political culture), has written:

"[The] process [of party formation and disformation] has been marked by bitter debates and conflicts within the parties, and, in some cases, by internal rifts and occasional litigation. Far from democratic institutions fostering democratic political behaviour, the attitudes, values and behaviour patterns learned and acquired in the past appear to be undermining the functioning of the democratic process and of the new political institutions."²⁷ And later: "Thus the main constraint on the development and consolidation of democratic politics in Hungary today is the weakness, or lack, of a democratic political culture. .

"²⁸

The same "anti-civic" syndrome has also seemed to pervade new economic elites, whose behavior does not conform with expectations and standards as applied to economic elites in countries with an advanced market-economy system.

Fleron, "Congruence Theory Applied," Can Democracy Take Root in Post-Soviet Russia?, ed. Harry Eckstein et al. (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998), 36.

²⁵ Bill Lomax, "Obstacles to the Development of Democratic Politics," Hungary: The Politics of Transition, ed. Terry Cox and Andy Furlong (London: Frank Cass, 1995), 82.

²⁶ Quoted from Beata Pasek, "Poland's Contentious Communist Legacy," Transitions 3.1 (10 January 1997): 21.

²⁷ Lomax, "Obstacles to the Development of Democratic Politics," 82.

²⁸ Ibid., 84.

Observations made by Vitaly Vitaliev are, by and large, valid for the post-communist elites in most Eastern European countries:

"The Russian new rich are the flesh and bones of Soviet society, which in 75 years managed to infect most of its members with the notion that capitalism was about grabbing, cheating, and wheeling and dealing. That is exactly what they started doing when communism collapsed. Their fortunes have been gained by money laundering, tax frauds, speculation in Russia's dwindling natural resources, racketeering. . . Their code of business conduct includes everything from chicanery to murder. The plight of their poor mother Russia, whom they have shamelessly robbed, does not bother them in the least." And further: "The real issue is the "communist" mentality that is still affecting Russian businessmen and politicians alike."²⁹

What is evident from this short sample of testimonies is that the psycho-social and cultural legacies of communism have shown an extraordinary *inertia*. Thus, according to George Schopflin, one of the first scholars to have examined "obstacles to liberalism" in post-communist ECE/EE, the obstacles to the introduction of a truly liberal political and economic order are "both structural and attitudinal."³⁰ No doubt, the specific social, political, economic, and ideological structures of the period of "communist" rule had conditioned values, attitudes, norms, a way of thinking and behavioral patterns, which have persisted into the post-communist period, both in original and in modified forms.

²⁹ Vitaly Vitaliev, "Post-Marxist Syndrome," Transitions 5.10 (Oct. 1998): 36.

³⁰ Schopflin, "Obstacles to Liberalism in Post-Communist Polities," East European Politics and Societies 5.1 (Winter 1991): 189.

2.2 The issue and its concept.

Can such evidence of the legacies of the communist experience and its political-culture implications be specified and conceptualized, regardless of the fact that this experience is primarily carried by the individual and is of a subjective nature, and that it has varied from country to country? Although many of the suspected symptoms already mentioned could be explained as belonging to the pre-communist heritage or as a (mal)adjustment to transitional processes, the argument in this thesis is that most of these symptoms have been logically and significantly associated with the experience of communism. In my thesis, an attempt is made to account for such symptoms (i.e. to explain their causes), and also for the "mechanism" through which they influence political action in the transformation.

In his excellent analysis of the post-communist changes as a "civilizational" upheaval, Piotr Sztompka (1991) has stressed that at the level of *societal consciousness* there was much continuity regarding the remnants of the communist system. In his opinion, this clearly indicates that there must be "some other level of social reality, below the visible surface, where the vestiges of communism hide untouched and manage to survive in spite of institutional reforms and declarative rejection."³¹ According to Sztompka, these vestiges of communism may be found in two levels: at a level of *deeper personal commitment* (personal values, motivations, drives, thought patterns) and at a more hidden *level of cultural code* typical for a given society (shared and objectified patterns and blueprints for both acting and thinking). And importantly, at the individual level, it is both a socially constituted structure of

³¹ Sztompka, "The Intangibles and Imponderables of the Transition to Democracy," 296.

cognition and a motivating base.³² Also others, for instance Grigory Vainshtein, have tried to explore the phenomenon more systematically at this level. Vainshtein has conducted a comprehensive analysis of the typological structure of the totalitarian mentality in Russia and has found a linkage between different types of post-totalitarian consciousness and the socio-political attitudes, as well as similarities between socio-psychological trends in Russia and other countries in Central and Eastern Europe.³³

In fact, many (political) sociologists from the area, who have investigated the structures and features of post-communist societies, have agreed that a strategy of "depth social psychology" is necessary to penetrate the realm of complexities of communist and post-communist political behaviour. For example, Marody has employed a concept of "*social subconsciousness*" which she defines as "a system . . . which mediates between the structures of the outside world and active practice . . . between the level of institutions and the level of individual behaviour."³⁴ In the same

³² See Sztompka, *ibid.* It is evident that social and socio-political attitudes operate at different levels of human consciousness. In a notion similar to Sztompka's, Poznanski and Marody following Bourdieu's concept of *habitus*, have argued that the habitual level (identified with *habitus*) is the deepest and thus most viable of the consciousness' levels. *Habitus* is a "system of unconscious schemata of thought and perception or dispositions that act as mediation between the system of public institutions and the system of individual behavior." Quoted from Kazimierz, Z. Poznanski, ed., Constructing Capitalism: The Reemergence of Civil Society and Liberal Economy in the Post-Communist World (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992), 169. See also Mirosława Marody, "The Political Attitudes of Polish Society in the Period of Systemic Transitions," in The Polish Road from Socialism, ed. Walter D. Connor and Piotr Płoszajski (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1992), 263. See also Chapter III in this thesis.

³³ See Grigory Vainshtein, "Totalitarian Public Consciousness in a Post-Totalitarian Society: The Russian Case in the General Context of Post-Communist Developments," Communist and Post-Communist Studies 27.3 (1994): 247-259.

³⁴ Mirosława Marody, "Antynomie społecznej świadomości," Odra 1 (1987): 4-9.

vein, Jan Lutynski speaks of the "psychological and socio-moral infrastructure of collective life," which shapes the milieu for action or inaction in all spheres of broader social life.³⁵ In this thesis, the link between the individual, the psychological/behavioral and the political will be identified as pertaining to the legacies of communism in a modified variant of the concept of political culture, i.e. the "Post-Communist Mind" (PCM, see also II.5).

Although I am mostly interested in the PCM in a narrow sense (as it pertains to the communist legacies), the "PCM" in a broad sense (i.e. "post-communist political culture" as such), may also be a viable concept. Such a total post-communist culture would be defined as a mixture of traditional pre-communist mentalities, psycho-social patterns acquired during the rule of the one-party communist state (the PCM in the narrow sense), and of various adaptive mechanisms to the newly created conditions of post-communism. The nature of the phenomenon makes it difficult, if not impossible, to separate the narrowly defined PCM from the broad notion of post-communist political culture. This admission, however, should not preclude an attempt to analyze the former on its own merit.

In my argument I will consider the concept of the PCM as something more than a metaphorical expression, and will develop it to illuminate the psycho-social context typically existing in the post-communist period as a direct result of communist conditions.³⁶ The PCM (in the narrow sense) will be defined as a set of psycho-social

³⁵ Quoted from Sztompka, "The Intangibles and Imponderables of the Transition to Democracy," 297.

³⁶ The term "post-communist" (in the "Post-Communist Mind") is used here differently from the term "post-totalitarian" as coined by Jeffrey C. Goldfarb in his Beyond Glasnost: The Post-Totalitarian Mind (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989). Goldfarb's term refers, with rather positive connotations, to the practice of enclaves of autonomous culture within "totalitarian" society. From the perspective as suggested by Sztompka, the PCM - in the broad sense - i.e. the

and socio-political characteristics that may be considered as the legacy of the personal and collective experience of the "communist" rule. From this perspective, the PCM might be viewed as a major constituent of the current post-communist political culture in general. What the concepts of the PCM and that of post-communist political culture both have in common is that they emphasize the role of the socio-cultural and psychological dimension of political behaviour - perceptions, attitudes, values, dispositions to action (inaction), and evaluative orientations. The concept of the PCM will be elaborated and (quasi-) operationalized in Chapter IV, in which the individual characteristics and symptoms of the PCM will also be analyzed and interpreted.

Since a key part of the objective of this study is to look for the same phenomenon across many different countries, the focus inevitably remains more on similarities or commonalities rather than on differences within the communist and post-communist region. Nevertheless, differences and variants relevant to the logical consistency of my typology will certainly be mentioned, particularly in Chapter III. Thus, though both horizontal (territorial) differences and vertical differences (regarding political culture of different societal groups within one country) are expected to be significant, they can neither all be considered as variables in this multifactorial cross-country study nor have they all to be necessarily included to obtain results consistent with the purpose of the analysis. The problem of diversification includes, for instance, the role of the "intelligentsia," who have traditionally enjoyed a privileged position in the region. Also issues of nationalism and religion, which are

overall postcommunist psychosocial constellation, may be explained from three different sources: 1) traditional political culture; 2) the psycho-social legacy of communism; and 3) the psycho-social dimension of the transition itself. Here, I am mostly concerned with the second source, the legacy of communism (psycho-social aspects which have their roots in the conditions of communist rule), which may be split from the other two sources only for the purpose of this limited analytical inquiry.

closely related to the thesis' topic, are not treated here as they would deserve, since the complexity of these issues reaches beyond the scope of my analysis.³⁷

³⁷ See Leslie Holmes, Post-Communism (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1997).

I. Objectives of the Thesis, Approach, and Method.

*"The Leninist legacy is a conflicting, confusing, and, fortunately, an identifiable one. Otherwise we are left with two inadequate and unacceptable alternatives: the simplistic application/imposition of (a very theoretically thin) 'transition to democracy' literature to the East European/Soviet setting, or an acceptance of the Mock Turtle's designation of current events in Eastern Europe as Modern Mystery (not History)."*³⁸

I.1 The research question and the objective. The hypotheses.

As stated, I will attempt to explain the controversial characteristics of the political and economic developments in the post-communist constellation by focusing on crucial "hidden" factors in the political-cultural legacies of communism, and their role in the current transformation processes. To achieve this general objective requires a focus on structures and processes associated with the continuation and change in attitudes, values, patterns of behaviour and dispositions inherited from communist rule, as well as an investigation of their interactions with the post-communist political and economic environment. The emphasis of the thesis will be on the evidence of the continuity of, and the temporal and logical relationship between, the contents of "communist" and "post-communist" political cultures.

One of the main issues in the post-communist transformation in ECE/EE has been a choice of strategy on how to overcome the legacies of the previous period, how to create a democratic polity and a standard market economy in the absence of a culture tolerant of differences and the ability to both compromise and play by the

³⁸ Ken Jowitt, "The Leninist Legacy," in Eastern Europe in Revolution, ed. Ivo Banac (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 209.

rules.³⁹ No doubt the inertia in the sphere of (political) culture has complicated and hindered the striving of these societies towards modern democratic civic values and political practices. According to Almond and Verba, the development of a stable and effective democratic government depends upon "more than structures of government and politics;" it depends upon the orientations and relationships that people have to the political process and the institutions.⁴⁰ Initially, we may say that the patterns discernible within post-communist political culture seem to a large extent to contradict the requirements of a *civic culture* which are seen as being indispensable for a modern, routinely-functioning society and democratic polity.⁴¹ Consequently, one can expect that the inherited political culture legacies will affect (and co-determine) the transformation in the political and economic spheres, and do so mostly in the direction of limiting options available to the building of a standard market economy and an advanced polyarchy. One may also agree with the assumption that only when the institutional and cultural levels approximately fit together and mutually reinforce each other in a somewhat intended fashion, can we speak about a true *consolidation* or *completion* of (democratic) institutions and an *adequacy* of culture.⁴²

It is, of course, necessary to mention several limitations of this project. One must ask, to what extent are the transformation difficulties a product of the conditions

³⁹ Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics, 243.

⁴⁰ Almond, Gabriel A. and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989), 359-66.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² See Sztompka, "Looking Back: The Year 1989 as a Cultural and Civilizational Break," Communist and Post-Communist Studies 29.2 (1996): 119. The problems of orientation of society towards modern democratic, civic values, and political practices, prospects and possibilities for change will be evaluated, especially from the perspective of generational (cohort) turnover, in the final chapter.

of communist rule, to what extent are they the result of "pre-communist" political cultures, and/or to what extent are they necessary maladjustments to transitional changes. Such a complex question deserves a careful, analytical consideration which no amount of data can solve alone. In my thesis, I will attempt to logically and consistently explore this question, as well as to provide at least a partial and tentative solution to the problem.

I.1.1 Hypotheses.

The primary research objectives have been formulated into one hypothesis and two quasi-hypotheses. They conform to basic and accepted principles and the logic of continuities and discontinuities in social and political systems, as further specified in the corresponding chapters.

Hypothesis: Institutional structures and ideology that underlay the communist system had created a certain, identifiable "communist" political culture; many of its characteristics have survived the demise of the old regime and are traceable in the post-communist constellation.

(Quasi-) hypothesis (1): These characteristics, which may be defined in psycho-social and political-culture terms, constrain the choices of strategies and implementations available to the democratic political transition and transformation to a fair-market economy.

(Quasi-) hypothesis (2): Based on the available theories of political change, political socialization, and political culture, an inference could be made that these

characteristics (and their implications) may be only temporal and contingent on changes in other parameters involved in the transformation.

Several key assumptions included in my argument may be summarized as follows: *General assumption*: The mind-contents of subjects and agents of social and political action (and their potential to act in a certain way) are at least as important as the nominal institutional and organizational structures.

Assumption 1: There is a specific set of beliefs, attitudes, values and habits linked to politics (that are sometimes tentatively called "(pre-) dispositions," "characteristics," or "symptoms of political culture") which originated in the period of communist rule in most of the Soviet-bloc ("communist") countries.

Assumption 2: One may, at least analytically, isolate specific features of the communist political culture from the "pre-communist" and/or the post-communist (political) cultures.

Assumption 3: Given the association of the political-culture aspect with deeper psychological levels and hence with social continuity, one can assume that - notwithstanding the rapid changes in the organizational structures - many aspects of political culture survived the rupture of the political system. Some of these assumptions will be further scrutinized in the next chapters.

Unfortunately, considering the nature of the project, rigorous testing of the hypothesis as a whole will face several limitations. However, most of the hypotheses' parts will be assessed against the relevant empirical evidence. The main hypothesis will be subject to a comprehensive theoretical analysis and interpretation - the process which will be, at most stages, compared with empirical findings and other significant evidence, obtained both from the original research and the relevant literature.

I.1.2 Area Focus.

Area focus of the inquiry will be mainly, but not solely, on East Central Europe, particularly on Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and the former East Germany. This area specification seems to be appropriate, considering that these countries - though they may differ from each other in many respects - shared common, or certainly very similar, communist and pre-communist experiences and thus provided considerably solid ground for comparative analysis. Also, data from these four countries have been more available and accessible than from other post-communist countries. One reason for this choice was the assumption that if a more different country within the post-communist region (i.e., typically, a more backward one at the end of the communist period) is considered, it would be more difficult to account for some post-communist features as having been determined by the legacy of communism, since the greater difference should likely be seen as a result of variables associated with the pre-communist era (on this issue, see chapter IV).

The name "Eastern Europe" (EE) is often used in the text as a convenient label for all the countries linked by the common experiences of communist rule. The author acknowledges that there has recently been a clear (and justified) tendency to (1) differentiate among several regions in the European space of the former Soviet-bloc, and (2) use the term "East Europe" to distinguish the post-communist countries from the former communist states of Eastern Europe, and to use the term East-Central Europe to single out a group of countries in this geographical area (esp. the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Slovenia; i.e. countries belonging neither to the areas of Southern Europe nor to the former Soviet Union). Whenever there is a need to make a distinction among the regions either within the communist bloc or the post-communist spatial division, appropriate terms will be used explicitly to make

the point.

I.1.3 Terminology.

The terms "state socialism," "communism," and "actually existing socialism" are often used as synonyms, particularly in a context, where there is no need to distinguish among them. Following historical sequences, there is sometimes a need to refer to individual stages in the development of "communism" in Eastern Europe; whenever this is the case, the distinction will be clearly indicated. In practice, of course, none of the Soviet-bloc countries claimed to exemplify "communist" society. They were all governed by communist parties (or their equivalents under different names), they identified themselves as socialist states in different stages of development, inevitably marching along the path to true Communism.⁴³ However, by declaring their end goal (telos) to be a communist society, adopting an official ideology of Marxism-Leninism, organizing the whole political system according to the principle of democratic centralism with the central role played by a communist party, featuring a centrally planned and largely socialized economy, these states have generally been distinguished from others that claimed to be "only" socialist (Libya, for example).⁴⁴ Using the term "communism" as referring to the existing movement rather than a distant goal has been sanctified by Marx himself, when he wrote in *The German Ideology*:

⁴³ With regard to the usage of the term "communist" and "communism" in this study, it should be noted that none of the states here labelled "communist" ever claimed themselves to be communist. Rather, they emulated, to a lesser or greater degree, the Soviet-style system and most of them sooner or later followed the Soviet example of 1936 by declaring they had achieved the socialist stage.

⁴⁴ See also Holmes, Post-Communism, 12.

"Communism is for us not a *state of affairs* which is to be established, an *ideal* to which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism the *real* movement which abolishes the present state of things."⁴⁵ For the above reasons, it seems justified to use "communist" for the specified period in EE history.⁴⁶

II.2 The general approach.

Given the nature and complexity of the subject, the general approach applied in this thesis is eclectic and interpretive. More specifically, a partial causal analysis is

⁴⁵ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology - Part One* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1970), 56-7 (emphasis in the original). In the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, Marx called the movement - emphasizing its transitory character before it reached "full communism" - a "dictatorship of proletariat," but he was not specific enough about the nature of the system when it came to implementing its desired policies (this task was up for Lenin). Marx also seems to have tended to use the terms "socialism" and "communism" interchangeably (sometimes making a distinction, only when he wanted to point out his disagreement with other self-proclaimed "socialists" who were not Marxists). In one passage from *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, Marx however, referred briefly to the "first phase" and a "higher phase" of communism. This distinction was later elaborated by Lenin, who in *The State and Revolution* argued that the first phase should be called "socialism" and only the higher phase "communism." Similarly, Lenin took over Marx's slogan for communism - "from each according to his ability, to each according to his need" (which in turn Marx took from the French writer Etienne Cabet), but specified, that under socialism distribution of goods and services would be based on the principle of "from each according to his ability, to each according to his work." See, e.g., Marx and Engels, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. *Selected Works* [In One Volume] (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1968).

⁴⁶ The terms "post-communist" (and "postcommunist" or "post-Communist") are used with the same reference framework as "communist." The three different spellings have the same meaning; the actual spelling preserves the same form as it is in a text to which I refer or quote from). The same applies to the usage of "nomenklatura" and "*nomenclature*;" otherwise, the former variant is preferred by the author.

combined with a weak variant of the *interpretive approach* selected as the general framework.

Causal explanations, constituting "causal relevance claims,"⁴⁷ will be used especially with regard to the relationships between the conditions created by the institutional and ideological structure of the communist state and its political cultures. Because I do not expect to find strong types of regularities, and thus strong causality, and since one can assume that the occurrence of the phenomena will be unevenly dispersed across the units, it seems reasonable to consider alternative comparative strategies in addition to causal analysis. Another reason for an alternative strategy is, of course, the fact that the thesis deals with a complex web of human relations and collective patterns of action, and is also loaded with a large number of variables but only a limited number of cases. To find a methodological solution to causal relationships under such difficult conditions, I refer to Daniel Little's account of the *microfoundations*. According to the microfoundation approach, it is important to identify individual-level motivational structures and forms of consciousness (in the way I have already referred to).⁴⁸ Little had maintained that in such cases, when we find laws of tendency and exception-laden regularities rather than rigorous regularities and causal links, "analysis of the microfoundations of the aggregate activity is essential if we are to arrive at a description of the phenomena as law-governed at all."⁴⁹ This approach will be applied when considering the causal mechanism as suggested by the

⁴⁷ Daniel Little, Varieties of Social Explanation (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 13.

⁴⁸ See also *ibid.*, 197-8.

⁴⁹ Little has argued: "Social causation always and unavoidably works through structured individual action, and causal relations among social phenomena can only be established through analysis of the latter because of the common weakness of the causal regularities at the social level." *Ibid.*, 197-8.

hypothesis.

For all of the above, these reasons (and also due to the lack of data), a general framework of the *interpretive approach (IA)* has been selected as consistent with the nature of the subject matter and the conceptual framework generated by it.

In general, the IA claims that human societies are founded upon certain shared understandings, inherent in a society's culture (including language), its conventions and practices, which - however different they may be across space - are in a given context relatively determinate, stable, and possess a potential to be drawn out and converted into explicit principles.⁵⁰

According to Little, the IA to social phenomena (which he contrasts to the rational choice approach) makes the claim that all social action is framed by a meaningful social world and to understand, explain or predict patterns of human practices. One has first, at least partially, to penetrate the social world of individuals; one must discover the world of the meanings "they attribute to their environment. . . , the values and goals they possess, the choices they perceive, and the way they interpret other individuals' social action. Only then will we be able to analyze, interpret and explain their behaviour."⁵¹ This approach tends to put emphasis on more complex descriptions of human action and focuses on comprehensive accounts of norms and values, common and specific (cultural) assumptions, metaphors, religious and ideological beliefs, practices and meanings. Nevertheless, in its more structured (weak) form, the IA attempts to make a distinction between hermeneutically ungrounded

⁵⁰ See David Miller, "Political Theory," in The Social Science Encyclopedia, ed. Adam Kuper and Jessica Kuper (London: Routledge, 1996), 640.

⁵¹ Little, Varieties of Social Explanation, 154.

explanations and comprehensive understanding.⁵² The IA thus situates political culture (however defined), within the general culture that gives power relations and collective decision-making (or politics) its particular modalities. In other words, the understanding of political phenomena depends on the identification of the broader

⁵² A similar position has been defended by Charles Taylor: "A satisfactory explanation must also make sense of the agents." Taylor has argued that social science as such must be interpretive and hermeneutic and that social inquiry that depends exclusively on seemingly "objective" factors (such as causal relations, structures, and abstract rationality) will inevitably fail. See Charles Taylor, Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2, vol. 2 (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1985), esp. 116. Geertz has gone even further, suggesting that human identities across cultures are radically diverse; he maintains that there are a few, if any, transcultural universals in either society or individual. See Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973). Some versions of interpretation theory maintain that "cultural systems are autonomous from other social structures - in particular from economy and politics - and. . . that local cultural forms must be understood before it is possible to identify economic and political structures." Little, Varieties of Social Explanation, 82. The approach adopted in my thesis and the concept of political culture itself, it is hoped, comply with those variants of interpretive theory in which the autonomous position of culture is less than absolute. A serious difficulty that has hampered other approaches was that the boundaries between politics and other spheres were being taken for granted, whereas a flexible notion of (political) culture might meaningfully redefine them to fit the inquiry into more complex social issues. *This* is what authors of the following paragraph had in mind: "The type of behaviour or institution that is deemed political, or whether a boundary is even drawn at all, is itself a product of political culture. This suggests that the study of *political* culture (as distinct from culture generally) should pay special attention to the way in which the boundary between political and nonpolitical is socially negotiated. . . it also means that political scientists must give up the notion that the distinction between politics and other spheres (whether economic, social, or something else) is 'out there' in the world, ready-made to be picked up and used." Thompson, Ellis and Wildawsky (emphasis in the original); here quoted from Margaret, R. Somers, "Narrating and Naturalizing Civil Society and Citizenship. Theory: The Place of Political Culture and the Public Sphere," Sociological Theory 13.3 (November 1995): 234-5.

cultural patterns and values that motivate and modify political action.⁵³

Accordingly, I believe that communist conditions gave rise to a socio-cultural world diverse from, for instance, the Western socio-cultural world; it follows from this that one must be aware that unique meanings may be contained within each of these worlds. Hence certain cross-area comparisons can be done with qualification and only tentatively. This limitation and the fact that no comprehensive theory has been presented so far regarding the effects of specific social and political values on the political issues and the political process in societies undergoing transition from state socialism, have also led me to favor the use of the IA.⁵⁴

I.2.1 The "cultural" approach and political transition.

My thesis is informed by a type of political culture theory broadly derived

⁵³ Similarly, McFalls has noted that the patterns and values that can motivate and shape action "are as limitless as the human imagination, the challenge of interpretation consists in its ability to discern values, their origins, and their sources of change." Laurence H. McFalls, Communism's Collapse, Democracy's Demise?: The Cultural Context and Consequences of the East German Revolution (New York: New York University Press, 1995), 80. To this challenge, argues McFalls, the social sciences have tried to introduce various reductionist models of human behaviour, of which rational choice theory is one example. (For the whole argument, see McFalls, *ibid.*, esp. 82-4). According to Sztompka, we deal here with "intangibles and imponderables, hard to grasp in a precise way and even harder to pinpoint by empirical tools." Sztompka, "The Intangibles and Imponderables of the Transition to Democracy," 197.

⁵⁴ The common problem of the IA is one of verification and of its explanatory value. In my model, the problem is addressed as much as the nature of the inquiry has allowed. On the concept of "explanatory understanding" see Max Weber, Economy and Society, vol. 1. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 8. Weber acknowledged that there is no barrier between the interpretive understanding of social action and a causal explanation of its course and consequences. Weber, *ibid.*, 4; see also Little, Varieties of Social Explanation, 68-72.

from Max Weber's appreciation of the importance of cultural factors to social and political processes. According to Weber, the distinctive (but not sole) task of social science is *Verstehen*: trying to understand the meanings, values, motivations and norms that underlie actions, and grounding explanations, both particular and general, on meaning as a critical independent or explanatory variable.⁵⁵ In *The Methodology of Social Sciences*, Weber emphasizes the different character of a subject matter and investigatory method in social and natural sciences. He writes:

"We have designated as 'cultural sciences' those disciplines which analyze the phenomena of life in terms of their cultural significance. The *significance* of a configuration of cultural phenomena and the basis of this significance cannot however be derived and rendered intelligible by a system of analytical laws. . . The concept of culture is a *value-concept*."⁵⁶

For Weber, using 'interpretation' (*Deutung*) in explanations (or explanatory hypotheses) are tasks peculiar to social sciences; to reconstruct meaning enables us to seek for a deeper explanation of social and political processes and may be seen as staying within positive philosophy; and in this perspective, interpretations may effectively equal hypotheses.⁵⁷ Culture is not a one-way consequence of economic conditions only, but through its own autonomy can shape the basic nature of economic and political life. And also according to Inglehart, "the available evidence tends to confirm Weber's insight that culture is not just a consequence of economics but can

⁵⁵ See Weber, *Economy and Society*, 4-24.

⁵⁶ Max Weber, *The Methodology of the Social Sciences* (New York: The Free Press, 1949), 76.

⁵⁷ A comprehensive discussion can be found in Weber 1978, Vol. 1, esp. 4-24. See also Eckstein, "Culture as Foundation Concept for the Social Sciences," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 8.4 (Oct. 1996): 484.

shape the basic nature of economic and political life."⁵⁸

Following this tradition, many have advocated that the same general approach be used for the study of post-communist societies. For instance, McFalls has pointed out that "[d]espite the fact that political systems have their own immanent logic and incentive structures, the motivations for political behaviour also lie outside the political system in cultural, social and ideational values and goals."⁵⁹ The same argument has been used by Sztopka in his case for a "cultural-civilizational" approach to the study of postcommunist transformations (Sztopka 1995). Similarly, Nelson has noted that "the transformation of political life away from one-party authoritarianism and toward a plural, participatory democracy "is not a matter of procedure and institutional roles as much as it is an artifact of culture, comprised of attitudes, norms and expectations, molded by historical experiences."⁶⁰ This approach is well typified in the work of Harry Eckstein, who has attempted to strike a delicate balance between the absolute relativism of an "interpretativist", or "soft culturalist", approach and a hard positivist (Comtean) approach. Eckstein has insisted upon a synthesis of Weberian tradition (i. e. action-oriented, which avoids collective categories as postulates for theory) and Durkheimian tradition (i.e. interaction-oriented), and according to him, such a synthesis may prove useful, particularly when dealing with societies in transition. Eckstein believes that,

"from the bare-bones view that social science deals with actions that have meanings to actors, and that it must adapt theories and methods to that fact, it is a small step to 'collective consciousness', or to culture, in the minimal sense

⁵⁸ Ronald Inglehart, "The Renaissance of Political Culture," American Political Science Review 82.4 (1988): 1229.

⁵⁹ McFalls, Communism's Collapse, Democracy's Demise?, 80.

⁶⁰ Daniel N. Nelson, "Civil Society Endangered," Social Research 63.2 (Summer 1996): 352.

of *shared meanings*, as a condition of social life or indeed just mutually intelligible social behaviour."⁶¹

Talking of change in the communist system, Gabriel Almond insisted in 1983 that communism (and by implication, also post-communism one can say) may be seen as "a test of cultural theory." He wrote: "What the scholarship of comparative communism has been telling us is that political cultures are not easily transformed. A sophisticated political movement ready to manipulate, penetrate, organize, indoctrinate and coerce and given the opportunity to do so for a generation or longer ends up as much or more transformed than transforming." He warns at the same time that "we have to be clear about what kind of a case we are making for a political culture theory. We are not arguing at all that political structure, historical experience, and deliberate efforts to change attitudes have no effect on political culture."⁶²

In this thesis, the general "cultural" (or "culturalist") approach as advocated by the quoted authors is applied, together with a specific political-culture analysis. Such an analysis must be, since the phenomenon under investigation is followed across time and space, complemented with historical analysis - especially regarding the conditions under which the specific political culture(s) had developed and are transmitted. It will

⁶¹ Eckstein, "Culture as Foundation Concept for the Social Sciences," 485. In Eckstein's notion "meanings no doubt reside in individuals. There is no material repository of collective consciousness. So social facts are of necessity individual facts. But from where do individuals get their meanings?" In Eckstein's opinion, the meanings come from sources external to individuals, through learning, socialization. "Thus they come from 'collectivities' in some sense: from social networks. . . We are never free entirely to invent meanings for ourselves, because our meanings, as well as having external sources, must always be adapted to those of others to perform their functions. 'Reduction' from individual to society thus is also possible, and in fact required." Ibid., 486 (emphasis in the original).

⁶² See Gabriel Almond, "Communism and Political Culture Theory," Comparative Politics 15 (1983): 127-138.

enable the identification of values, attitudes, beliefs, and dispositions held and retained over longer periods of time and in varying contexts. Only in a comprehensive historical analysis can it become evident that when political institutions undergo profound changes or an outright rupture, political culture would serve as the most important carrier of a society's inner continuity.

A few words should be added on the use of psychological concepts in the thesis. Their inclusion is consistent with the principles of the microfoundation approach as well as with the broader notion which stresses that political behaviour is generally the result of the interaction of multiple factors, and one of them is a psychological one. However, a balanced approach to the latter factor is necessary to avoid *reductionism* in terms of *psychologizing* (e.g. reducing all political events to psychological explanations). An effective approach requires that efforts are made "to determine under what circumstances psychological variables may be relevant, and if relevant, how they 'fit' with other variables to explain the total picture."⁶³ Psychological factors like most concepts in social science, are often difficult to operationalize and interpret; however, if chosen carefully, they may wield strong explanatory and comparative potential.⁶⁴ This, however, does not mean that psychological variables are the overriding determinants of socio-political behaviour. They should rather be taken, as Yinger and Palmer have proposed, as "complex human acts such as political, social, and economic behaviour [that] are determined by the field in which the individual's cultural, environmental, personality, and biological forces

⁶³ Monte Palmer et al., eds., The Interdisciplinary Study of Politics (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), 169.

⁶⁴ See *ibid.*

interact."⁶⁵

The relevance of psychological and psycho-social factors for the outcome of transition has been acknowledged as being valid for other areas as well. For instance, in the "Introduction" to his excellent account of the transition to democracy in Spain and Portugal, Howard Wiarda (1988) has emphasized that - "however uncomfortable these facts may leave us - the democratic transitions [i.e. in Spain and Portugal] are still incomplete, democracy has not been fully consolidated and may not even now reach deeply into the society or its consciousness. . ."⁶⁶ With this hint in mind, I attempt to shed light on some mostly ignored "hidden variables" and "intangibles" of psycho-social and cultural character as they have persisted both in the lifeworld and the public sphere of the social agents in the post-communist region.

⁶⁵ See *ibid.*, 137. See also Milton Yinger, Toward a Field Theory of Behavior (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965). Among others, C. G. Jung also believed in a more direct link between psychological and political phenomena. According to him, political antagonisms and conflicts are, more often than not, a masked and projected expression of internal psychological struggles. See Carl G. Jung, "The Fight with the Shadow," in The Collected Works of C. G. Jung, vol. 10 (London: Routledge, 1964), esp. 224-225. Unfortunately, very little exploration has been done in this interdisciplinary area, in which the danger of reductionism or psychologizing remains high. A crucial goal would be to determine to what extent specific psychological variables are relevant to the political process, beyond mere assessing of their role in conditioning the actions of selected political leaders, and how the specific contents of politics are (more generally) psychologically determined. We may also safely assume that in times of upheaval and during transitory periods the influence of the socio-psychological factors is more immediate and direct. This appears as a kind of "perturbance" in a more stable and longer-term cultural environment.

⁶⁶ Howard J. Wiarda, The Transition to Democracy in Spain and Portugal (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1988), 1.

I.3 The argument, the research design, and methods used.

My position on "metatheoretical" principles guiding employed concepts and my argument may be defined by my understanding of the relationship between structural and cultural paradigms and explanations. While these two types of explanation may seem to be contradictory, in Parsonian and Weberian logic they are the two sides of the process of change. As Andrew Janos has put it, "far from being mutually exclusive, they are neatly complementary."⁶⁷

Also, my project is a variant of an interpretive and quasi-comparative general approach; consequently, its leaning is rather more qualitative than quantitative. In this sense, it is informed by those authors who insist that any social inquiry's methodology should be congenial with the purpose and the nature of the project itself.⁶⁸ In the context of the comparative approach, such methodology may be described as a variant

⁶⁷ Andrew C. Janos, Politics and Paradigms: Changing Theories of Change in Social Science (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986), 153.

⁶⁸ See, for example, Gary King et al., eds. Designing Social Inquiry. Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). King has argued that the "differences between the quantitative and qualitative traditions are only stylistic and are methodologically and substantively unimportant." King seems to be advocating an approach taken by me here: when he notes that "most research does not fit clearly into one category or the other. The best often combines features of each." Ibid., 4-5. On the problems of quantitative indicators. See also Eckstein, Division and Cohesion in Democracy; a study of Norway (Princeton, NJ: University of Princeton Press, 1966), 79-80. The comparative design of my project may be seen as a combination of several approaches. Since the emphasis is on analysis and interpretation of a single phenomenon (though a multifaceted and multidimensional one) that exists in spatial variants across a territorial unit with rather fuzzy boundaries (but the characteristics of the phenomenon are considered to be consequences of the previously existing cross-spatial and differentiated political system), the character of my method is close to what Charles Tilly defines as strategy of "encompassing." Tilly, Big Structures Large Processes Huge Comparisons (New York: Russel Sage Foundation, 1985), esp. 81-3.

of correlational design, since the emphasis is on explanations based on correlation or prediction rather than on rigorously defined causation.⁶⁹ However, a systematic attempt will be made to account for the causes of the phenomena under investigation as well as to construct a plausible causal mechanism. From the general heuristic perspective, both within individual sections and in the thesis as a whole, the deductive approach is being combined with the inductive approach.⁷⁰

I.3.1 *The design of the argument.*

The thesis - without assuming that cultural and/or psychological variables are the primary determinants of sociopolitical behaviour - follows the lead proposed, among others, by Yinger and Palmer, according to whom "complex human acts such as political, social and economic behaviour are determined by the field in which the individual's cultural, environmental, personality and biological forces interact."⁷¹ Since an explanation of political actions and behaviour is a key objective of this inquiry, the relevant concepts and main variables - in their appropriate relationships - need to be considered. From the overall perspective of the thesis, the phenomenon of *the PCM* (as a subtype of political culture), will be *the central conceptual variable*. This is in agreement with the suggestion by Almond and Verba that political culture constitutes the link between "micropolitics" (political attitudes and motivations), and

⁶⁹ Daniel Osabu-Kle, *Polimetrics* (Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 1997), esp. 65-73. See also Appendix, Fig. 1.

⁷⁰ As, for instance, suggested by J. S. Mill [1843]. See Henri M. Magid, "John Stuart Mill," in *History of Political Philosophy*, ed. Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey, 3rd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), esp. 785.

⁷¹ Yinger, *Toward a Field Theory of Behavior*, n. pag.

"macropolitics" (the structure and function of the political system and its institutions).⁷²

The causal-explanation part of my argument considers the communist institutional and ideological structures as an independent variable (in chapter III) and the "communist political culture" (the main source of the PCM) is here recognized as the dependent variable. This may pose several heuristic problems:

1. It is impossible to isolate a "pure communist" political culture (and, in reality, one must always consider a "mix" of various political cultures), from the pre-communist cultural patterns and influences.

2. One can expect that the "communist" (and thereby the "post-communist") political cultures will include certain traditional ("national", pre-communist) characteristics that had mixed with those generated by communism alone. In this regard - and considering the character of certain Eastern European traditional political cultures - one can expect some overdetermination in the case of certain characteristics and symptoms of the post-communist political culture, and thereby also of the PCM. One can also expect that these symptoms will be significantly affected by the specific post-communist environment.⁷³

⁷² Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1963), 32-3.

⁷³ Political culture is generally regarded here as both 'causing' and 'caused', i.e. as a variable that mediates between the political system and its broad environment, providing a socio-psychological framework within which patterns of political values, norms and behaviour can be located. It will be followed by both of these "directions" while assuming that, especially in the long run it may actually function as an "intervening" variable. Pye and Verba later included explicitly patterns of political behaviour within their definition of political culture. See Lucien Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 214. I will discuss the latter claim in the next chapter. The resulting model considers the complexity of the structures and the dynamics in observed systems/societies and is aware of the "circular" or mutually

To deal with these difficulties, a relatively transparent analytical model could be designed. Such an analytical model, assuming that the post-communist political cultures consist of several layers, would, at least analytically, separate the individual layers. The content of individual layers derives from three distinct sources: (1) traditional political culture, including national (and regional) heritage; (2) the socio-psychological (cultural) legacy of communist rule; and (3) various types of mental and socio-cultural adaptation to the transformation itself. In my model it would be possible to isolate within post-communist political culture a layer related to the second source - key politico-cultural and socio-psychological dispositions inherited from the communist era. This could be done only for analytical purposes and only tentatively, however. Particularly, as has been noted, at the "early stage in postcommunist history it is difficult to sort legacies of communism from pure aftermath."⁷⁴

In the last part of the thesis, the PCM is in turn viewed as a causal mechanism, and both as dependent and independent variable which, while linking the conditions of "actually existing socialism" with the post-communist conditions, co-determines the transformation outcomes in the region. Thus, in chapter V, the PCM is considered as

reinforcing causality of constituent parts of political culture among and between them and the institutional arrangements. It also considers the fact that the dynamics generated by the recent transformation processes might be to some extent associated with the "social general adaptation syndrome" - the mechanism corollary to social movings from one relatively steady state to another in which a mass sense of confusion and dissatisfaction are involved by definition.

⁷⁴ James R. Millar and Sharon L. Wolchik, eds., The Social Legacy of Communism (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994), 1. We may expect for instance, that "the life-strategies and life -styles that crystalized during the forty years of communism will overlap the strategies and life-styles growing from the new conditions, thus creating a peculiar mixture difficult to analyze and explain by traditional theories." Petr Matějů, "How Not to Make Historical Comparison Empirically," Czech Sociological Review III.2 (Fall 1995): 222. I will deal with these issues more comprehensively in Chapter IV.

an explaining variable vis-a-vis the dual process of building a market economy and democracy. Anticipation of the thesis is that the PCM will limit the options available to the process of transformation. Since I have defined the PCM essentially as a sui generis sub-type of political culture, the heuristic expectation is that it will affect the political and other transformation processes in a similar way that political culture is assumed to influence and co-determine the political and economic processes in a society. This relationship is explained in Chapter II.

As I must deal in each part of the argument with the problem of the "multiple causality" (i.e. what J. S. Mill referred to as the problem of "plurality of causes" or as "equifinality" in general systems theory)⁷⁵ or "overdetermination" caused by a combination of different-level independent variables, I attempt to deal with this problem on several levels. In the described model, I first isolate "communist" political culture characteristics from the pre-communist political culture and other pre-communist determinants (see esp. III.1). Second, by carefully analyzing a cluster of causes (conditions) pertaining to the communist system, I will be able to establish an independent causal field which may be sufficient to account for the characteristics of the PCM and leave, after application of the theory of socialization, the pre-communist experience as a weaker determinant. Although the latter procedure does not avoid the problem of mutual reinforcements of certain characteristics (an event which is highly probable), it sets the boundaries for further consideration of the role of individual (clusters of) variables in the dependent variable of the PCM.⁷⁶

⁷⁵ See also King et al., eds., Designing Social Inquiry. Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research, 87.

⁷⁶ In this sense, the problem of causal overdetermination cannot be completely avoided; one can of course argue, that certain conditions in the pre-communist political culture are separate from the communist conditions capable of bringing about the effect. See Little, Varieties of Social Explanation, 27.

In chapter III, I also elaborate more on the assumption that, though individual post-communist countries have differed in certain relevant aspects, they have in common certain general features, which enable us to consider the PCM phenomenon as distributed across the whole post-communist region.

I.3.2 The format.

My thesis proceeds through several logical and organizational stages. First, in Chapter II, after having explained the issue and the objectives of the project, as well as methods used in it, I will establish a theoretical foundation within which the thesis will proceed. Also, relevant theories of political culture theories regarding the area of ECE/EE will be examined. In chapter III, key features of communist political culture vis-avis the communist structures are reconstructed. In this part, the general ideological and institutional structures of the communist state are analyzed and interpreted as a causal field with regard to communist political culture and the PCM, using well-established and revised theories of communism, with necessary attention being paid to spatial and temporal specifics within the communist system. The general theory of socialization is used to explain the link between communist structures and communist political culture and the PCM. In chapter IV, the concept of the PCM is developed as: (a) a dependent variable vis-a-vis the "communist" political culture," and (b) an independent variable vis-a-vis the political and economic transformation in the post-communist period. In the final Chapter V, an attempt is made to assess and test the general assumption that the political-culture legacies of "communism" (the socio-psychological and habitual patterns associated with these legacies) affect, in a certain manner, the path of the post-communist political transformation. In this sense the thesis is forward-looking in its attempt to reflect on the potential effects of the

political-culture legacies on the future development of post-communist countries; and in the last part, prospects for change are assessed.

Following the tradition established in comparative politics and causal analysis, in the thesis the design of the argument is informed by Eckstein's notion which proposes to overcome the subjectivity of prevailing "culturalist" theories by including a requirement of testability.⁷⁷ The testing of the hypothesis and (quasi-) hypotheses is done in several stages and is summarized at the end of Chapter IV.

I.3.3 Sources of data and evidence.

Relevant evidence supporting and/or contradicting the hypothesis and quasi-hypotheses is being presented throughout the thesis, as obtained from four different basic sources. This multi-source approach has been chosen since a high degree of subjectivity is normally involved in individual methods of examining political-culture indicators. For instance, Brown has proposed the use of seven sources and their combinations.⁷⁸ He has believed - despite the fact that these methods were subjectivist and impressionistic - that if a wide range of methods and a variety of sources were used and were comparable, then a scholar might be in a position to start generalizing about the political culture of a given country. Here I follow Brown's advice in a scaled-down version. As the primary general source I use a logical-historical analysis of

⁷⁷ See Eckstein, "Culture as Foundation Concept for the Social Sciences."

⁷⁸ These are: survey data collected within communist states by citizens of those states; systematic interviewing of *émigrés*; creative literature; memoirs; accounts by long-term foreign residents; historiography (the writing of history); and literature within communist states on the problem of creating the "new socialist person" and a communist consciousness. See Archie Brown and Jack Gray, eds., Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States, 2nd edition (London: Macmillan, 1979).

communist institutions, which focuses on an analysis of the institutional and ideological structure of the communist system; and finally, through the logical construction of a socialization mechanism and the evidence of actual socialization, I will obtain indications and anticipations regarding communist, as well as post-communist political cultures.

These anticipations will be compared with three remaining sources:

a) archival evidence, both impressionistic and scientific, from leading intellectuals from the region on the character of communist political culture as well as on the persistence of some characteristics of the communist political culture (and to it related "phenomena") in the post-communist constellation. To a large degree, insights of "insiders," i.e. of knowledgeable people who have both intellectual and "lifeworld" experience (spending most of their lives in the region) with the communist and post-communist environment, are given a considerable weight in my argument because these witnesses are able - even though their evidence is often anecdotal, impressionistic and they may sometimes suffer from the "isolationist bias" - to identify many cultural and sociopsychological symptoms that may escape an outside observer;

b) the evidence demonstrated in public opinion surveys taken in the post-communist period, ie. from 1989-1998;

c) the results of the questionnaire taken by the Delphi method designed by the thesis' author.

Since public opinion surveys conducted during the communist period are often considered to be neither truly representative nor reliable, they are used only as a secondary source, usually in connection with the primary analytical and selective testimonial sources of evidence. Considering that any definitive conclusion (inference) based on any of these sources alone is not possible, the emphasis will be on attaining coherence among the sources, as well as on logical analytical comparability (or

coherence) of the combined evidence.

In the process of validating the hypotheses, all the collected evidence will be systematically evaluated against the hypotheses' premises. In the final chapter, while considering the validity of quasi-hypotheses, I will comparatively review the effects of the post-communist political culture on the processes of democratic and economic transition, which should provide us with a clearer picture of the prospects of possible and probable changes in political cultures, and thus of the transformation itself in the region.

I.3.4 Data collection approach.

A combined (eclectic) approach is used with regard to the data collection and source selection. Reliance here is mostly on an unobtrusive (archival) research and content analysis. To eliminate the potential bias of the former approach, several additional techniques and sources are used, including a survey using the Delphi Method.⁷⁹ Some surveys already published by other researchers are included into the project based on their relevance to the subject of inquiry, the respectability of the author and source (and verifiable parameters of the survey technique used). The specific problems regarding the conducting of public opinion surveys in communist and post-communist countries are discussed in the next section.

I.3.5 Use of opinion surveys.

Any research dealing with the problem of analyzing and interpreting a cultural

⁷⁹ See Osabu-Kle, Polimetrics, esp. 86-8.

phenomenon must consider the question of (analytical) "objectivization" of something that is largely subject-based (subjective). Values, attitudes, habits and cultural codes are said to be to a large extent resistant to direct observation and measurement. The standard solution to the problem of subjectivity in political-culture research has been to use special techniques that were designed to tap political values, orientations and attitudes in a direct way: namely those traditionally subsumed under survey research. In my project public opinion surveys (POSs) from varying sources, different periods and spatial units will be considered. Because of inherent difficulties in this method, certain clarification regarding the reliability and validity of both the sources and the data obtained are necessary. And since we are dealing with the post-communist countries, there are several additional reasons for cautiousness with regard to using POSs. The general problem with the traditional polling techniques has been well captured by Michael Shafir, who has warned:

"As is well known, public opinion polls are not an infallible instrument . . . Apart from problems arising from sampling techniques (and they may be major), opinion surveys, even if conducted most rigorously, merely reflect the views of the population, or of a segment thereof, at a certain moment in time and under the influence of certain circumstances. Change those circumstances, and opinions may shift, sometimes radically so. Consequently, not even when pollsters agree among themselves can one infer that their findings are more than a reflection of the prevailing time-and-space constrained opinions."⁸⁰

There are several additional reasons for cautiousness regarding the use of POSs in researching phenomena of a subjective nature, especially as it deals with the post-communist countries.

There have been controversies as to which extent political culture is

⁸⁰ Michael Shafir, "When Pollsters Agree: The Case of Romania," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline (July 1999), vol. 2, endnote, 28 July 1999, <<http://www.rferl.org>>.

"observable" through POS and under which conditions it may be effectively conceptualized and operationalized.⁸¹ Researchers have faced two outstanding problems: (1) Is an investigator able to solicit the respondent's true opinion? (2) What can such an opinion, even when true, mean vis-a-vis the respondent's (potential or actual) behaviour ?⁸² As I will further show, though actual behavior should be excluded from the concept of political culture, the psycho-social matrix for behavior should not.

David K. Hart reminds us that most people are unable to even articulate their basic political values, let alone discuss the ramification of such beliefs. For many of them, political values are held implicitly, rather than being made explicit. This "has been shown to be true so often that it requires little defense."⁸³ Similarly, Clyde Kluckhohn believes that ". . . some of the deepest and most pervasive of personal and cultural values are only partially and occasionally verbalized, and in some instances

⁸¹ See Harry Eckstein, Regarding Politics: Essays on Political Theory, Stability, and Change (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), esp. 286-300.

⁸² With regard to the second problem Thurstone has fittingly put it: "It seems to be rather generally assumed that the validity of an attitude scale, with its verbal statements, must be determined by its agreements with overt conduct. This is a mistaken notion. A man may find it expedient to act in a manner which is not indicative of how he feels. In other situations he may find it expedient to make statements which are inconsistent with his preferences. . . In practical life he may find it expedient to deviate from his own attitude in his public statements or his actions." Louis L. Thurstone, The Measurement of Values (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), 321. In addition, Eckstein has listed as one of the "insuperable" difficulties the "extreme cost" of a comprehensive survey into a political culture. Eckstein, Regarding Politics: Essays on Political Theory, Stability, and Change, 290.

⁸³ David Hart, "Political Philosophy and Political Values: An Introductory Essay," in Perspectives on Political Philosophy, volume II: Machiavelli Through Marx, ed. David K. Hart and Richard F. Downton, Jr. 2 vols. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1971), 20-1.

must be inferential constructs on the part of the observer to explain consistencies in behaviour." (Kluckhohn's scepticism is somewhat mitigated by his alternative assertion that even an implicit value is "almost always potentially expressible in rational language by the actor as well as by the observer." Thus, fortunately, communication about values is, within certain limitations, possible and must be included in research.)⁸⁴

All of the typical problems encountered in Western democratic societies are likely to be "multiplied" in communist and also in postcommunist societies.⁸⁵ In particular, we are faced with a complex problem of valid inference. One "must be wary of the possibility that respondents provide dishonest answers, that their recall may be faulty, that they may be providing answers they think the interviewer wants to hear, or that they simply do not care enough to provide thoughtful and accurate responses."⁸⁶ Let's keep in mind that in communist countries, more than elsewhere, public opinion research had, especially before 1989-90, a much more politicized nature, having had a primarily instrumental and manipulative function. According to Mason (who had first hand experience with collecting data in Poland in the early 1980s), this constituted a significant problem.⁸⁷ Moreover, as Mason has found, direct political questions as a rule could not be asked, or if they were, they might have been skewed in such a way

⁸⁴ Clyde Kluckhohn, "Values and Value-Orientations in the Theory of Action," in Toward a General Theory of Action, ed. Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1951), 397.

⁸⁵ See David S. Mason, Public Opinion and Political Change in Poland, 1980-1982 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

⁸⁶ Gitelman is here quoted from Mason, *ibid.*, 9.

⁸⁷ Especially since respondents were "more likely to be intimidated by interviewers, particularly those from governmental or other official research centers." *Ibid.*

as to elicit desirable responses. And finally, as far as the processing and analysis of collected data is concerned, controversial results were often unreported or misreported, and the analysis may have been manipulated, with only partial results (or none at all) might having been released.⁸⁸

Consequently, public opinion polling faced many constraints in communist countries before 1989. This was also due to the fact that these regimes notoriously underestimated the issue of public opinion *per se*. At the same time, they regarded private opinions as potentially subversive. In communist countries, the purpose of conducting opinion studies was not to independently survey the political culture constellation, but rather the ideology of a "socialist way of life" was applied in a manner similar to Western "quality of life" studies, and the political spin of some of the issues was mostly avoided. Another problem was that there are usually many variables involved in a fairly relevant concept of political culture to make use of a comprehensive technique with limited resources, and consequently surveys that were conducted suffered from a lack of consistency.⁸⁹ In reality, there had been little public

⁸⁸ See *ibid.*, 9-10.

⁸⁹ Methodology used in data collecting was dubbed at the time the "safari approach" for its unreliability and inconsistency, since data collecting in Eastern Europe did not meet Western standards of research on political culture. On this issue, see for instance Max Kaase, "Political Culture and Political Consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe," in Political Culture and Political Structure: Theoretical and Empirical Studies, ed. Frederick D. Weil, vol. II: Research on Democracy and Society (Greenwich: JAI Press, 1994), 233-274. Writing in 1979, Gray has expressed similar scepticism. See Brown and Gray, Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States, 254. Because of the difficulties of opinion testing in communist countries, Brown attempted in the 1970s to devise a method that would be feasible under the circumstances. Holmes, however, has pointed out that most of the methods used "are not without dangers" and that almost all of them contain smaller or larger bias. See Holmes, Politics in the Communist World, esp. 88-90. G. Skilling has cautioned that we may obtain a quite different picture of the political culture of a given country according to whether we use subjectivist

opinion surveying done in communist countries. Moreover, most of the official research studies on people's opinion remains either unpublished (and often still unavailable) and/or are restricted to lesser political arenas such as factories, the education system, etc. Notwithstanding these facts, survey-research was the first step to political culture studies in the late 1970s conducted by several Western scholars.

Based on partial survey results, Archie Brown and Stephen White published the first monographs on political culture in communist countries in the late 1970s. Because of the lack of reliable data, the results were only fragmentary.⁹⁰

With regard to theory of research done in communist countries, the most comprehensive treatment of both the methodology of surveys in the region and of the general problems of surveying was presented in the extensive study by Welsh published in 1981. Addressing the concern with *validity and reliability* of survey research in the region under communist rule, Welsh was quite sceptical about validity;

definitions and approaches or more explicitly behavioralist ones, the results of which may vary significantly. See Gordon H. Skilling, "Czechoslovak Political Culture: Pluralism in an International Context," in Political Culture and Communist Studies, ed. Archie Brown (New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1984), 118-19.

⁹⁰ See Brown and Gray, Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States; also Stephen White, Political Culture and Soviet Politics (London: The Macmillan Press, 1979); and also Eckstein, Regarding Politics: Essays on Political Theory, Stability, and Change. Eckstein has noted that "the absolute insuperable difficulty" posed by survey-research approach is "logical (and epistemological). . . Responses to survey instruments still are 'behaviour' that only supposedly represents orientations. They undoubtedly provide more data than mere 'raw observation'. . . But there is no getting around the fact that they are, in Bentleyan terms, 'speaking activities' or 'writing activities,' not the subjective thing itself. There is an ineluctable 'epistemic gap' (as Northrop called it) between objective behaviour and subjective dispositions." Ibid., 291. Some researchers focused on an analysis of ideology as a key to political culture inclinations (Brown 1989). Others however, tried to integrate organizational studies into political culture research to enhance analytical soundness of the concept. On the latter approach see also Jowitt, "An organizational approach to the study of political culture in Marxist-Leninist systems," American Political Science Review LXVII (1974): 1171-91.

the author has argued that validity problems

"may result from created, or artificial responses. It is well known that some respondents will express opinions even when they do not really have them, or at least did not have them until the question was asked. This is a difficulty in surveys everywhere, but especially in systems in which political information levels tend to be low, and in which people are accustomed to cue taking in formulating politically relevant responses."⁹¹

I.3.6 Problems of surveys in the post-communist period.

As recent evidence has demonstrated, many of these problems have persisted well after the collapse of the system that was far from even acknowledging them. Alexander, for instance, who has studied public opinion in postcommunist Russia has warned that both in Russia and "even in stable societies, the success of surveys for measuring deeply held attitudes has been quite spotty."⁹² Alexander, baffled particularly by some contradictory findings in Russia, has identified several difficulties

⁹¹ William A. Welsh, "Introduction" and "Summary and Conclusions," in Survey Research and Public Attitudes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, ed. William A. Welsh (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981), 10. As to the problem of reliability, which refers to the consistency or stability of survey responses, Welsh has observed that sampling in indigenous Eastern European and Soviet surveys "is often very casual. . . For the Western scholar, the problem is further complicated by the fact that sampling procedures often are not reported. . . Other characteristics of the sample (e.g., sociodemographic characteristics of respondents) are infrequently described. Thus we usually have inadequate bases for inferring reliability." He especially blamed applied methods of sampling. Ibid., 10-11.

⁹² James, Alexander, "Surveying Attitudes in Russia," Communist and Post-Communist Studies 30.2 (1997): 118; see also Phillip E. Converse, in The Dynamics of Party Support: Cohort-Analyzing Party Identification (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976); and also John Zaller and S. Feldman, "A simple theory of the survey response: answering questions versus revealing preferences," American Journal of Political Science 36.3 (1992): 579-616.

regarding the validity of survey approaches in the measurement of culture in the post-Soviet states "that face the researcher trying to pinpoint particular characteristics that capture the political society [in applying opinion surveys]."⁹³ One problem is often caused by the emotive appeal of certain terms or people's unfamiliarity with them. Thomas Remington has made this point well:

"The lack of first hand experience with the institutional features of capitalist democracies raises the danger that many survey findings represent 'capricious construction,' to use Philip Converse's term, for the sorts of opinion that, because they concern issues about which most individuals have few contextual cues, are easily changed or which coexist easily with quite contradictory beliefs."⁹⁴

⁹³ See Alexander, "Surveying Attitudes in Russia," 118. Similar opinion has been expressed by Olshanski (1998) and Jan Hartl, "Číslo v průzkumech volebních preferencí mohou klamat" *Lidové noviny* [32] February 1998: n. pag. The underlying problem seems to be succinctly summarized in a following remark by Alexander: "Ultimately, researchers must strive for a deeper understanding of a society that has only recently become accessible to Westerners, especially if we hope to understand Russian political culture as Russians are chaotically searching for their political identity." Alexander, *ibid.*, 125. Alexander proposes, as a way to overcome "methodological failings", to focus on building a "micro-theory" that would start from a more ethnographic approach which would "allow researchers to see politics in action, going beyond the extraordinarily difficult measurement of actual behaviour through surveys." A foundation laid in such a way would then enable researchers to "build up to the implementation of surveys." Alexander, *ibid.* According to Olshanski, opinion polls particularly conducted in the former Soviet Union often suffer from several major flaws in sampling techniques. [A. Olshanski, Open Media Research Institute, 1996, n. d.] As Večerník has pointed out, "... we should not underestimate attitudes and perceptions. However, they should be considered not so much according to their absolute levels as to their comparative national specificities and status-specific differentiations, reciprocal links and attachments robust as well as their short-term and long-term trends." Jiří Večerník, "Economic and Political Man. Hardship and Attitudes in the Czech Republic and Central Europe." *Czech Sociological Review* III.2 (Fall 1995): 173.

⁹⁴ Thomas F. Remington, "Afterword to Part Two: Agendas - Researching the Emerging Political Cultures," in *Public Opinion and Regime Change*, ed. Arthur H. Miller et al. (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993), 197. See also Richard Rose and Christian Harpfer, "Mass response to Transformation in Post-Communist

Miller et al. have, for example, argued that the validity and reliability of surveys in countries that have previously had authoritarian governments - where input from citizens was excluded in most of policy-making, or where citizens were restricted (either out of fear or by law) from speaking out critically of government performance and political leaders - have been highly controversial. This broad phenomenon (which is also called "attitude constraint") consists largely of the inability on the part of respondents to fully develop attitudes on most issues of relevance to politics and economics or to be willing to give direct (or any) responses to political survey questions since they may regard them as too sensitive or intrusive.⁹⁵

Recently, calls for more cautiousness in using POS for certain purposes have become part of the general debate on the status of the concept of political culture vis-a-vis traditional empirical research, with strong voices emerging that seriously question the value of survey research, especially under certain conditions, as a way of eliciting

Societies," Europe-Asia Studies 46.1 (1993), where the authors make the point that Western researchers in the region often reflect in their questionnaires their own interests, rather than the respondents' "own behavior and values." Ibid., 6. See also Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., "Post-Soviet Political Culture in Russia: An Assessment of Recent Empirical Investigations," Europe-Asia Studies 48.2 (1996): 225-260, esp. 234-245. As Fleron notes, there is no necessary causal connection, or even correlation between opinions/attitudes, and behavior. Ibid. 237. Similarly, Jan Hartl has argued that results of opinion surveys done in post-communist countries may often be seriously distorted; people respond untruthfully because of uncontrolled irrationality or personal antipathy toward the world that is associated with an interviewer. See Hartl, "Číslo v průzkumech volebních preferencí mohou klamat."

⁹⁵ Arthur H. Miller et al., "Comparing Citizen and Elite Belief Systems in Post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine," Public Opinion Quarterly 59.1 (1995): 3. This methodological problem has also been addressed by Eckstein who suggested that the "postulate of oriented action" might be at play here in which actors do not respond directly to "situations" but respond to them through mediating "orientations." From this perspective, East European subjects surveyed about democratic norms and attitudes may have been responding to the "situation" of the interview and not to real-life situations involving democratic practices. Eckstein, "Regarding Politics," 267. See also Fleron, "Post-Soviet Political Culture," 235-40.

and understanding particular political cultures.⁹⁶

Problems have also been recognized when studying political culture from political or other behavior. For instance, though some clues regarding tendencies in prevalent political culture may be found in voting behavior (particularly in regular

⁹⁶ Some of this criticism (drawing mostly on the insight of anthropology) have assessed survey research, at best, as of marginal value in interpreting particular political cultures, because of the superficial reach of the technique. See Stephen Welch, The Concept of Political Culture (London, Macmillan, 1993). Other scholars (from a rather sociological perspective) have emphasized the dangers presented in not-well-grounded surveys of the subjective and culturally biased views of the researcher being projected onto the social actors studied, with the result of a distorted picture of political cultures under investigation. See also Archie Brown, "Political Culture," in The Social Science Encyclopedia, ed. Adam and Jessica Kuper, 2nd edition (New York: Routledge, 1996), 626. See also Frey's extensive treatment of the nature and problems of cross-cultural surveys: Frederick W. Frey, "Cross-Cultural Survey Research in Political Science," in The Methodology of Comparative Research, ed. Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner (New York: The Free Press, 1970), esp. 176-260. It also appears that there is a conceptual problem posed by the degree to which a link between political and economic performance and that of political beliefs and values is incorporated into one's political-cultural analysis. See Stephen White, Political Culture and Soviet Politics, 19. Whenever these aspects are not taken sufficiently into account, as is often the case, the relevance of surveys is severely limited and they merely reflect temporary indications of public opinion detached from the "real" beliefs and values that may underline the expressed opinion. Similarly, there has been a long debate in the literature on comparative measurement over the relationship between employed variables and the requirement of measurement equivalence. It seems that ignoring or violating the assumption of measurement equivalence, dangerous of itself, is even more harmful when entering multidimensional models and analyses. Thus, unless a single and compact model is used for all measurements in the project, which for large-scale projects may be impossible, results are susceptible to ex-post explanations. "Using factor analysis to develop latent constructs from . . . variables (indicators) measured on different scales, not to mention different wording of survey questions may be especially problematic, since there is no evidence of how differences in measurement affect differences in factor solutions." Matějů, "How Not to Make Historical Comparison Empirically," 222; see also M. Kuechler, "The utility of surveys for cross-national research," Social Science Research 16 (1987): 239. For the comprehensive review of the problem see, for example, Duane F. Alwin, Information Transmissions in the Survey Interview, in Sociological Methodology, ed. Peter W. Mardsen (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1992).

national and local elections), it has been noted that these behavioral patterns may sometimes be misleading. No matter how much information from Eastern Europe researchers have on people's voting patterns and political opinions regarding their attitudes towards transitional changes, there is still little understanding about the many significant psycho-social (motivational) factors underlying these patterns, which, without having been properly explained, may sometimes appear inconsistent, arbitrary or even contradictory.

To alleviate some of these problems, McFalls has suggested that the most optimal method under the circumstances might be to use the "intensive survey" or personal interview method in which, without asking any direct questions about the specific values, the respondents - selected as a randomised sample - were given the opportunity to talk of their lives and "to reveal their principal value-orientations."⁹⁷ Also Brown has suggested that to counter the problem of obtaining relevant evidence regarding political culture in Eastern Europe, "it is essential *to use a variety of sources*."⁹⁸ From the heuristic standpoint as applied in my thesis, moreover, surveys conducted by traditional techniques are hardly indicative of which habits or value patterns (and to which extent) have their roots in the communist experience and which symptoms (and to what degree) have resulted from other conditions (factors). Therefore, given the lack of resources to obtain all the data in order to fully address the major concerns posed by the nature and scope of my argument, and considering the

⁹⁷ Laurence H. McFalls, Communism's Collapse, Democracy's Demise?: The Cultural Context and Consequences of the East German Revolution, esp. 11-18; and 84 and 89.

⁹⁸ Brown and Gray, Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States, 10; emphasis by J.M.. Similarly, Eckstein has advised to rely on the appropriately designed content-analysis technique. See Eckstein, Regarding Politics: Essays on Political Theory, Stability, and Change, 292.

problem of the comparability of surveys done in different communist countries, the use of public opinion surveys has been limited to the role of the alternate and correlative source.

I.3.7 *The Delphi Survey.*

One of the sources of information readily available was a direct and self-administered opinion survey, which I have designed on the basis of the Delphi Method. The Delphi Method, originally developed by the Rand Corporation in the late 1960s as a scientific forecasting tool, involves a panel of geographically dispersed knowledgeable experts who each respond separately to a specific enquiry via a series of questionnaires. The Delphi Method is properly used when the primary source of information sought is informed judgement, especially in cases where there is uncertainty on the nature of the problem, and where existing information on the problem is not readily available or is too costly to provide.⁹⁹ The Delphi Survey can serve well the purpose of obtaining qualified opinion on value perceptions and disposition regarding social and/or political behaviour prevalent in the post-communist countries and thus as a correlative source to other methods used in the project, its

⁹⁹ See Erio Ziglio, "The Delphi Method and its Contribution to Decision-Making," in Gazing into the Oracle: The Delphi Method and its Application to Social Policy and Public Health, ed. Adler Michael and Erio Ziglio (London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers Ltd., 1996), 9-21. It is a systematic, interactive method that typically utilizes repeated rounds of questioning, including feedback of earlier-round responses, enabling previous responses to be revised in subsequent rounds after reviewing new information submitted by other panelists. Their responses are anonymous in the sense that none of the others know who is included in the group or where each response originates from, allowing panelist to freely express their opinions. See also H. Sackman, Delphi Critique (The Rand Corporation: Lexington Books, 1975).

results will be compared with the results obtained from the historico-institutional analysis. In my questionnaire which is informed by the transformation approach to surveying,¹⁰⁰ the questions have been formulated to elicit opinion from selected groups of people (especially from people with an above-average education familiar with the region) on specific characteristics broadly associated with the post-communist political culture (the PCM) that might be typical for the population in ECE/EE as the result of the latter's experience with the communist system. Since only the "exploration phase" of inquiry was conducted, not all the advantages of the method could be obtained; in this sense, my method may be characterized as being "*quasi-Delphi*."

The questionnaire has been refined in such a way as to obtain opinion on values and dispositions which:

- a) might have been expected to emerge in the region as the consequence of communism;
- b) are perceived as present in the post-communist constellation;
- c) may affect the current political (transitional) processes.

The questions contained in the Questionnaire have been formulated as closed-ended (i.e. they were pre-coded) in a multi-answer format, though one of the open-ended questions has allowed for non-restricted comments.

Results, analysis and interpretation of the survey are presented in Chapters IV and V; for the Questionnaire, see Appendix 2.

Sampling technique: Since the Delphi method is dependent on the judgement of knowledgeable experts, it is the very essence of a Delphi survey to undertake the careful selection of expert respondents. The selection of experts for my Delphi survey was made primarily on the basis of their knowledge of the topic being surveyed (i.e.

¹⁰⁰ See Richard Rose et al., Democracy and its Alternatives," 84-5.

communist and post-communist affairs; all selected members of the panel were deeply knowledgeable and broadly experienced in the subject matter), their familiarity with certain basic political culture concepts, and on the basis of their affiliation with as broad a range of ways of life as possible, and their availability and willingness to take part in the panel. Respondents for the questionnaire were recruited from four broader groups: (1) Western academicians and students of the region, (2) Western businesspersons who have travelled to the region, (3) academicians and "intellectuals" from the ECE/EE region, and (4) respondents representing the average (though more educated) citizen of the ECE region. Also a preselection was made based on the personal profiles of potential respondents in an effort to eliminate as much as possible any bias that could be due to the respondents' excessive emotional attachment to the region or its problems. The general profiles of the 62 panel members, to whom the Questionnaires were sent or submitted were as follows: 18 Western academicians or Western students (either graduate students or people who had studied the region more intensively in the past), 10 Western business persons or other professionals familiar with the region through their first-hand experience, 19 academicians and other higher-profile intellectuals from the post-communist region (with permanent residency there), and 15 respondents representing the average (but more educated) citizen of the ECE region, with 12 of the latter group either from the Czech Republic, Slovakia or Poland.

II. Theory.

"We are witness to a 'gigantic natural experiment' that has at its core what was rightfully dubbed the 'awesome challenge' of simultaneously reorganizing the political, economic, and legal systems and redefining the national, ethnic, and cultural identities."¹

II.1 Competing Theories of Transformation.

Perhaps not surprisingly, there has not been (and maybe cannot be) any comprehensive and definite theory of transition from communism that would coherently explain the logic of the developments that have followed the end of communist rule in EE. Generally, we may distinguish two different categories of theories of the post-communist transformation. Firstly, there have been broadly conceived theories that relate themselves to factors that determine the direction of the transformation. Secondly, we may find theories that focus on the political process *per se*. Both categories may contain several types of dominating analysis which may fall within two clusters of theories: (a) institutional theories and (b) socio-historical theories. While the first type tends to emphasize (relative) importance of political organizations (structure), the second one is more concerned with the social and cultural

¹ Paul Aligica, "The Institutionalists' Take on Transition," Transition 3.4 (7 March 1997), 49.

dynamism of transforming societies.² From the perspective of the role of human agency, some have recognized two strands in the literature on the transition to democracy; one emphasizing the variables of context (or structure), the other stressing those of process (key actors).³

Particular approaches falling into the category with focus on political process and institution-building have been based on the assumption that the Eastern European transition can be treated within the general comparative framework of "transition to democracy" (as in so-called "transitology"). However, there has emerged sufficient evidence and convincing arguments that the processes of democratic transition and building a market economy in Eastern Europe have been, in many respects, unique enough to merit specific approaches and more sophisticated theory-building. The

² According to Offe, there have been three general approaches to post-communist studies: 1. "theory of modernization" (emphasis on Eastern Europe developing key capacities to attain a consolidated democracy and a market economy system); 2. "genesis environment" theory (tentatively formulated by Jowitt; according to whom there has been complete destructure of the system and any developmental path is possible); 3. "path dependency theory" (as advocated by Stark who has emphasized that the transformation trajectory is determined by both, an individual country's communist past and "its previous tradition over the last 500 years.") See David Stark, "Path Dependence and Privatization Strategies in East Central Europe," East European Politics and Societies 6.1 (Winter 1992): 17-54; also Claus Offe, Varieties of Transition: The East European and East German Experience, esp. 138; and also Jowitt, The World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction.

³ See Russel Bova, "Political Dynamics of the Post-Communist Transition: A Comparative Perspective," World Politics 44 (1991): 113-38, esp. 126-128. According to Bova, the tradition focused on context includes among variables the level of economic development, the character of the national political culture, etc., considering them the "preconditions" or "determinants" of democracy. In contrast, theories that stress process "adopt a less structuralist approach, preferring instead, to focus on the 'making' of the democratic transition and the choices and for strategies adopted by key actors. Still others have argued the need to draw upon and integrate the lessons of both approaches." Ibid, 127. The last approach identified by Bova is the general approach adopted in this thesis.

argument for the uniqueness of the Eastern European transition has been advocated by many scholars familiar with the area, such as Valerie Bunce, Claus Offe, Klaus von Beyme, Piotr Sztompka and others.⁴ They have mostly pointed out that certain conditions in post-communist EE have never been replicated elsewhere ever before (i.e. in other cases of democratic transition). Bunce, for instance, has convincingly described several such traits that singled out Eastern European transitions as essentially distinct from other areas' transitions. These would first include the nature of (communist) authoritarian rule. According to Bunce, the context and content of such

⁴ See Bunce, "Should Transitologists Be Grounded?," Offe, Varieties of Transition: The East European and East German Experience; Klaus von Beyme, Transition to Democracy in Eastern Europe (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996); and Sztompka, "The Intangibles and Imponderables of the Transition to Democracy" and "Looking Back: The Year 1989 as a Cultural and Civilizational Break." Many have argued that the term "transition" should not be used for the phenomenon of the complex processes in countries of ECE/EE and suggested that other terms, such as "transformation" (Stark) or "postcommunist constellation" (Bunce), are more appropriate, since they seem to imply the typical uncertainty and multifacetedness of the processes in the area (Bunce). A general and "agent-based definition of transformation has been suggested by Eckstein: "By transformation I mean the use of political power and artifice to engineer radically changed social and political structures. . . ." Eckstein, Regarding Politics: Essays on Political Theory, Stability, and Change, 278. Bunce has particularly attacked the transitologists' argument, as expressed by Karl and Schmitter, that democratization in Eastern Europe, Southern Europe and Latin America can and should be compared. See Terry A. Karl and Phillip Schmitter, "Modes of transition in South America, Southern Europe and Eastern Europe," International Social Science Journal 43 (1991): 269-284. Bunce has suggested that this notion is flawed on several counts. Most of all, she claims that the outstanding phenomena of change in the respective regions have very little in common; that is if we do not ground our comparisons in the sound methodological assumption that meaningful comparative study requires that differences should be complemented by similarities. (Or as Lijphart puts it, some important variable must be identical.) Otherwise we will not be able to arrest actual relationships and draw meaningful conclusions. A similar position has been taken by Offe, who has advised caution before Eastern European transitions are put into the same analytical framework as other transitional areas. Also von Beyme considers Eastern Europe "to be a deviant case for several reasons." Beyme, Transition to Democracy in Eastern Europe, 17.

a rule should be distinguished, for instance, from those known in Latin America and Southern Europe since Eastern European communism (state socialism) featured a different configuration of ideology, social structure, and economy than other transforming areas. Second, there have been significant differences in the mode of transition and other democratizing regions, both in terms of the role played by the international context and the association of "liberation" with the "national question", and the role-relationship between the elite and the masses. Third, historically recent instances of transitions from authoritarian or totalitarian systems, of which the case of Spain would have the closest resemblance to Eastern Europe, have been far less complex. (Spain's political transition, for example, could leave fundamental economic structures unaltered.) Bunce has effectively argued that in Eastern Europe we deal, contrary to other areas, with the complex intertwining of political, economic and other processes, and with building of the whole social order, which has its own unique characteristics and dynamics.⁵

Similarly, Offe has warned against grouping all transitional cases into one transitional framework. According to him, the uniqueness of the Eastern European case rests with the fact that three major transitional tasks have to be solved simultaneously: (a) creating a new economic order, (b) creating a new legal and constitutional order, and (c) solving the national question and social integration. Offe has also emphasized that in the Eastern European constellation, there has been one crucial variable missing compared to other areas: the class variable.⁶

⁵ See Bunce, "Should Transitologists Be Grounded?"

⁶ See Offe, Varieties of Transition: The East European and East German Experience. Also Geddes has argued that "the totalitarian reality in Eastern Europe was more completely destructive [i.e in contrast with the situation in Latin America]." See Barbara Geddes, "A Comparative Perspective on the Leninist Legacy in Eastern Europe," Comparative Political Studies 28.2 (July 1995): 239-

Another typology of theories of post-communism has been proposed by Crawford and Lijphart. In their opinion, most of the approaches focus "on the forces shaping the calculations and choices of the political and economic actors in the post-Communist environment." They have then suggested that these approaches be divided over whether the "imperative of the democratic institutions" or the "legacies of the past" is a privileged determinant of the transformational outcome.⁷ The former, a more optimistic approach, emphasizes the dynamics of democratic institution-building and seems to maintain that "new institutions can be crafted and new international pressures can be brought to bear that shut out the negative influences of the past." This perspective more or less assumes that "the head of Leninism has been lopped off, leaving space for the development of new forces to structure incentives according to the more or less universal rules of liberal capitalist democracy."⁸ Geddes has accordingly argued that since essentially all democratic institutions were initially constructed, a competitive political system and an increasingly standard political culture have emerged after communism.⁹ According to this approach, even a tentative presence of liberal democratic institutions is expected over time to reinforce the democratic institutions and inevitably lead to democratic values and structures.¹⁰

274; here quoted from Crawford and Lijphart, "Explaining Political and Economic Change in Post-Communist Eastern Europe," 175.

⁷ Crawford and Lijphart, "Explaining Political and Economic Change in Post-Communist Eastern Europe," 176.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 173.

⁹ See Geddes, "A Comparative Perspective on the Leninist Legacy in Eastern Europe."

¹⁰ One of the more sophisticated variants of this approach might be Huntington's theory of forced democratization in which the work of inexorable historical forces of democracy and external pressures, so that societies would be "forced to be free."

In the second approach identified by Crawford and Lijphart - the "legacies of the past" approach - the process of transformation is viewed as determined almost exclusively by elements persisting from the communist period. This approach attempts to explain the post-communist transformation as a kind of function of the social, cultural and institutional structures created under Soviet-type regimes in Eastern Europe which have persisted into the present. According to this perspective, "the past casts a long shadow on the present, shapes the environment in which the battle to define and defend new institutions takes place, and may ultimately undermine the liberalization process."¹¹

Although Crawford and Lijphart's typology somewhat artificially dichotomizes approaches to the problematic of ECE/EE transition, it contains crucial points of the current debate. For instance, one variant of the first, i.e. the democratic or "liberalization-imperative" approach has been presented by John Mueller in his argumentative essay "Democracy, Capitalism, and the End of Transition."¹²

Mueller has argued that most of the postcommunist countries of Central and Eastern Europe "have essentially completed their transition to democracy and capitalism" and that they do not differ substantially on points from "real Western countries."¹³ He has assumed that any possible legacies cannot be serious enough to

While this scenario may be in general terms plausible, it ignores the question of a timeframe for such a transformation.

¹¹ Crawford and Lijphart, "Explaining Political and Economic Change in Post-Communist Eastern Europe," 172. See also Jowitt's concept of the "Leninist legacy" in Jowitt, "The Leninist Legacy."

¹² John Mueller, "Democracy, Capitalism, and the End of Transition," in Postcommunism (Four Perspectives), ed. Michael Mandelbaum (New York: Council of Foreign Relations Book, 1996).

¹³ Ibid., esp. 102 and 140.

prevent democracy in taking a full hold in a relatively short time-span. According to him, "the transitional experience in many of the postcommunist countries and elsewhere suggests that democracy as a form of government and capitalism as an economic form are really quite simple, even natural, and unless obstructed by thugs with guns, they can emerge quite easily and quickly without any special development, prerequisites, or preparation."¹⁴

Mueller's argument deserves a closer look, if only because it, on the surface, vehemently advocates a seemingly common-sense position: the natural order of things (understand: Western capitalist and liberal democracy) will assume its place with "a little kick in the butt." However, at several places in his essay, Mueller has undermined his own position by comments contradicting his original position. He seems not to be so naive as to blindly believe that a one-time action on the part of the elites is sufficient to set off a country on the smooth path of democracy. Despite his convincing advocacy of the possibility of an almost instant democracy and capitalism, on several occasions he is forced to admit that he takes certain important value-assumptions for granted.

This is particularly evident when he considers the issue of building a market economy in EE. Mueller concedes here that what "seems to be missing is not so much formal institutions of control or incentives. . . as the realization that honest, fair, civil, and compassionate dealing furnishes a competitive advantage." Further, he adds: "Growth happens. It seems likely, then, that effective institutions are more the result of virtuous norms than the cause of them . . . what is mainly needed. . . is the development of a norm of honesty, integrity, fairness, reliability."¹⁵

Perhaps Mueller does not realize that some if not all values he has mentioned,

¹⁴ Ibid., 104.

¹⁵ Ibid., 133-4 and 146. Mueller claims that he is using "realistic" as opposed to "idealistic" standards of democracy and capitalism.

are not readily available to societies he has interpreted.¹⁶ Thus, Mueller's contribution to the debate may be seen in the fact that - even though he assumes that most beliefs necessary for democracy may be adopted by a single act of political will on the part of political elites - his reluctant mentioning of the role of "beliefs" and values points to recognition of the complexity of conditions under which democratic institutions, as well as desired values, may develop.

My thesis' argument draws on elements contained in both broad above-mentioned approaches. They have both elaborated relevant leads to explaining the ECE/EE transformations and can be useful, as long as the specific versions of these approaches are causally substantiated and respect the complex logic in their general conceptualization and empirical evidence of individual-country cases. My thesis, however, maintains that the important cultural and psychocultural aspects have been treated insufficiently in both prevalent approaches and that the "imperatives-of-liberalization" theory in particular has failed to explain many difficulties and anomalies that have been evident in the transformation process in the region. No doubt, emergent liberal institutions have given rise to their own dynamics; this has become a significant factor in the current constellation, being able to a large degree to counterbalance the forces/inertia of the past and create new political and economic cultures. Nonetheless, the new institutions do not promptly create a new mentality and new patterns of political and economic behaviour: a new societal culture and its adequate orientation to emergent political and economic objects needs much more time to create.

¹⁶ At one point, when considering preconditions for democracy, in contradiction to his general argument, Mueller insists that "it seems that democracy is essentially a state of mind, not a logical or empirical consequence of other factors." *Ibid.*, 120. See also Dahl, *Polyarchy*, 260.

II.2 Towards a "synthetic" theory.

One of the successful attempts to reconcile these two approaches has been made in the works of authors who were labelled as "institutionalists" (or "new institutionalists").¹⁷ The thrust of their work aimed at a comprehensive positioning of political and economic institutions among other social and historical factors. Even though the institutionalists have mainly emphasized the role of social and political structures and institutions in the process of political change and transition, they have also acknowledged the important role of historical events and of the constraints imposed by "path dependence." At the same time, this approach has rejected claims that post-communist reforms are a technical process with "inherent technical solutions that can be imposed everywhere." The central feature of institutionalist theories holds that economic and political development are closely interrelated and are not primarily determined by the availability of resources but rather by the success or failure of the institutional structure in enabling the efficient use of resources to tap the entrepreneurial energy of the population."¹⁸

New institutionalists' arguments have provided a general theoretical inspiration for my treatment of the relationship between institutions and historical and cultural

¹⁷ See especially Denzau T. Arthur and Douglass C. North, "Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions," *Kyklos* 47 (1994): n. pag. and Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

¹⁸ Aligica, "The Institutionalists' Take on Transition," esp. 46. Aligica has also pointed out that "the cultural and historical factors that determine the acceptance and observance of rules and the way the conflict between individual interests and rules is managed are of maximal importance for the reform process." Ibid., 47. See also Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

factors. In this thesis I have adopted their basic principles, including the emphasis on historical factors and their interconnection with institution-building. My approach here attempts to be a kind of synthesis of the cultural and institutional approaches and can be generally summarized by Jowitt, who wrote in response to the process in Eastern Europe that "[A]ny substantial analysis of the chances for democracy and market capitalism in Eastern Europe. . . must interpret the maelstrom itself [of today's reality], and that means coming to analytic grips with the cultural, political, and economic 'inheritance' of forty years of Leninist rule."¹⁹

Acknowledging the complexity and the "plurality" of the postcommunist processes in Eastern Europe, and following Eckstein (1992), Stark (1992) and Bunce (1995), I prefer to use the concept and term "transformation" for the unique set of processes that characterize post-communist Eastern Europe. Admittedly, the concept of "transformation" as opposed to "transition" seems to be better equipped in dealing with both the time indeterminacy, tentativeness and the multifacetedness of processes in the region.²⁰ From this position I treat the transformation of a Soviet-style socialist

¹⁹ Jowitt, The World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction, 209. Pertinently, Jowitt further writes: "For Western analysts to treat the Leninist legacy the way Leninists after 1948 treated their own East European inheritance - namely, as a collection of historically outmoded "survivals" bound to lose their cultural, social, and psychological significance - would be an intellectual mistake of the first order. All cultural and institutional legacies shape their successors. Peter Brown's creation of an age - Late Antiquity - rests on his rejection of a simplistic dichotomy of continuity versus discontinuity, on his appreciation of novel, not absolute, transformations of the Roman legacy." Ibid., 209.

²⁰ A good definition of such a perspective has been provided by Eckstein: "By transformation I mean the use of political power and artifice to engineer radically changed social and political structures, thus culture patterns and themes: to set society and polity on new courses toward unprecedented objectives." Eckstein, Regarding Politics: Essays on Political Theory, Stability, and Change, 278. However, unlike Eckstein, who wrote his essay in 1992, I would perceive the role of the political agency (the political elite?) in directing the change "toward

political and economic system into a Western-type democratic and market-economy model as a unique process to date without recourse to theoretical or practical precedents anywhere, though I do not rule out analogies and purposeful comparisons with other regions.

In general, it follows that my approach may be seen as seeking the "middle ground" between the "imperative of the democratic institutions" and the "legacies of the past" approaches in that it recognizes that forces which have shaped post-communist political choices and processes have deep roots in cultural, economic and social conditions inherited from the past; however, it also takes into account other factors, both internal and external, and their interdependence and interactions. All of these have co-determined the direction and character of the two main processes: the political and economic transformations. I have also taken not only a mere attainment of nominal (procedural) democracy, but also qualitative aspects of such a democracy, its relationship to justice, its inner tensions, possibilities and perspectives.

II.3 Political culture and change: continuities and discontinuities in EE.

II.3.1 *A "culturalist" approach considered.*

The problem of the relationship between continuity and change in larger-scale human affairs, including political ones, have intrigued scholars for generations. Although the subject matter of my inquiry tends to highlight the concern with continuity rather than discontinuity, several comments on the relationship between the

unprecedented objectives" with more cautiousness.

two basic time-sensitive categories are due. Both processes have to do with the (historical) accumulation of human activities and their interactions and effects in both time and space, with the ability of institutions available to cope with the changes as well as with the subjective underlying concerns of the people towards the change and their reflexion and reaction to their own practices.

On the level of the political process, the issue is one of the relationship between institutional (political) structure and societal culture. Here one must bear in mind that the two spheres may be separated for analytical purposes only. Political actions are determined both by the structural, i.e. "objective," situations in which political actors find themselves - for example, by the constraints and incentives drawn from the environment, including the structure of political institutions - and also by the predispositions citizens and their political leaders have acquired through prior experience. The latter will include their political goals, expectations about the rule of politics, conceptions of legitimacy, orientations toward authority, etc.²¹ Thus, the culture is at any given moment a co-product or the combined result of institutional pressure, inherited tradition, and diffusion from influential external cultures, as well as its shaping and permeating these institutions.²²

At the same time, in Parsonian logic of social stability, the continuity of a

²¹ See Fred I. Greenstein, "Socialization: Political Socialization," in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, ed. David L. Sills (The Macmillan Company & The Free Press, 1968), 551.

²² See Sztopka, "Looking Back: The Year 1989 as a Cultural and Civilizational Break," 119. In the broadest sense we may consider culture as an important element of action, and thus with both personalities and social systems. It can be distinguished from the other elements of action by the fact that "it is intrinsically transmittable from one action system to another - from personality to personality by learning and from social system to social system by diffusion." Talcott Parsons, in Toward a General Theory of Action, ed. Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962), 159.

system may be found at two levels: the level of cultural codes and the level of personal attitudes.²³ This is what many (political) sociologists from the area, who have investigated structures and features of post-communist societies had in mind when emphasizing the necessity of employment of "depth social psychology" in order to penetrate the realm of postcommunist social and political behaviour. This emphasis has derived from the realization that at the level of *societal consciousness* there was much continuity regarding the residue of the communist system. As Sztopka has pointed out, "there must be some other level of social reality, below the visible surface, where the vestiges of communism hide untouched and manage to survive in spite of institutional reforms and declarative rejection."²⁴ According to him, there exists a mechanism by which "lessons from individual instrumental learning become shared by societal members" and cultural demands become "social facts *sui generis*."²⁵ These social factors "become the seemingly given, external, and constraining rules of social life. . . a collective property of a whole society". At the same time, the internalized cultural codes, rules, and values serve as the pre-requisite for actions within the institutions; with the latter action having potential feedback effects on the institutional structure.²⁶

As indicated, any consideration of the role of political culture in the theoretical analysis of a socio-political process should always include political culture's relationship to the political structure or political system. This is the strategy Jowitt

²³ See Sztopka, "The Intangibles and Imponderables of the Transition to Democracy," 297.

²⁴ Ibid., 296.

²⁵ Ibid., 117-18.

²⁶ See *ibid.*

suggested in the 1970s, inspired by the study of organizations by Crozier.²⁷ In this regard Jowitt has emphasized that political culture "will be studied in conjunction with political structure; structure and culture will be viewed as establishing mutual, though not necessarily equal, limits for one another."²⁸ Crozier, who proposed that organizations should be analyzed in terms of the interaction of *formal structure and informal relationships* (in his opinion, these two elements should not be opposed), argued that formal and informal domains are in fact intimately interrelated. As he wrote, "they interpenetrate and complete each other." If one wants to understand them, one must study them together along with the system of power relationships that helps integrate them."²⁹ According to Jowitt, who also sees political culture as a kind of informal organization, this approach conforms to the study of "political culture in Marxist-Leninist systems."³⁰

In a similar fashion, Marody has suggested that the concept of *habits* should be used in this context in approximation to the concept of *habitus* as defined by Pierre Bourdieu (1977). In brief, *habitus* is conceived as the system of unconscious patterns of thoughts, perceptions and dispositions that mediate between the structures of the

²⁷ See Jowitt "An organizational approach to the study of political culture in Marxist-Leninist systems" and Michel Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), esp. Chapters 8 and 9.

²⁸ Jowitt, *ibid.*, 1172-3.

²⁹ Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon, 164 (emphasis by J.M.).

³⁰ Jowitt has put it: "It is the informal organization of the state that we shall refer to as political culture. More precisely, *political culture refers to the set of informal, adaptive postures - behavioral and attitudinal - that emerge in response to and interact with the set of formal definitions - ideological, policy, and institutional - that characterize a given level of society.*" Jowitt, "An organizational approach to the study of political culture in Marxist-Leninist systems," 1173 (emphasis in the original). A similar approach was also taken by Carole Pateman.

external world and practice, or between the level of systemic characteristics and the level of individual actions. So defined, *habitus* is a product of the broader environment and the conditions of life and is formed over time during the process of *socialization*. At the systemic level, it accounts for continuity and the meaningful working of the social world. At the individual level, it constitutes socially formed cognitive, affective, and motivational structures.³¹

Consequently, it is only reasonable to argue that the relationship between the institutional and cultural levels must be treated as reciprocal. Institutions provide the frame for the actions of participants and demand specific conduct; through their engagement in socialization, by distributing rewards and punishments for conformity and deviance, they are "one of the most important forces shaping prevailing culture."³² Similarly, as Pye and Verba have insisted, political beliefs "affect and are affected by the way in which the structures operate."³³

Several problems have been noted in this regard, however. It is for instance difficult, if not impossible, to establish the causal efficacy of political culture in relation to political behaviour in clear-cut terms. Analysts often find that there is a "close circle of relationships between culture and structure" and the relationship of

³¹ See Marody, "The Political Attitudes of Polish Society in the Period of Systemic Transitions," in The Polish Road from Socialism, ed. Walter D. Connor and Piotr Ploszajski (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1992), 263.

³² Sztompka, "Looking Back: The Year 1989 as a Cultural and Civilizational Break," 117.

³³ Lucien Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 514. On the relationship of congruence, especially with regard to authority patterns in democratizing polities, see Eckstein et al., Can Democracy Take Roots in Post-Soviet Russia, esp. contributions by H. Eckstein, F. Fleron, and W. M. Reisinger.

congruence between the two realms is still insufficiently studied.³⁴

But as Almond and Verba have assured, ". . . by examining the relationship between political cultural tendencies and political structural patterns, we can avoid the assumption of congruence between political culture and political structure. The relationship between political culture and political structure becomes one of the most significant researchable aspects of the problem of political stability and *change*."³⁵ From this perspective, the cultural or political-culture factors can be conceived as interdependent with the political structure (system), with the potential of both to maintain and to weaken the political system. The analytical efficacy of this relationship would depend on a level of sophistication with which individual causal links are investigated in their proper spatio-temporal perspectives.

II.3.2 The case against "culturalism."

In his analysis of the post-communism post-communist constellation, Stephen Holmes has asked the following question, "What are the necessary preconditions for the consolidation of a well-functioning market democracy?"³⁶ Around it he has built the case against the validity of "cultural theories" which he considers "by far the most widely diffused [theories]. . . about the yet unsuccessful or still incomplete

³⁴ Pye and Verba, *ibid.*, 514. See also Brown and Gray, Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States, 13.

³⁵ Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, 32-33 (emphasis in the original).

³⁶ Stephen Holmes, "Cultural Legacies or State Collapse? Probing the Postcommunist Dilemma," in Postcommunism, ed. Michael Mandelbaum (Council on Foreign Relations Books, 1996), 25.

liberalization of postcommunist states."³⁷ He has ascribed the alleged predominance of cultural theories to the fact that it is somehow assumed that habits acquired in the past are "difficult to shake, and mentalities change slowly". Holmes has further argued that:

"This cultural-legacy theory of abortive or half-baked liberalization comes in two distinct, and perhaps mutually inconsistent, versions. The first locates the main obstacle to reform in the revival, under conditions of extreme social stress, of nationalism or identity politics. The second emphasizes the subversive role of "learned helplessness" and psychological passivity inherited from totalitarian times. In both cases, inherited or resurrected values and attitudes, proclivity and norms, have purportedly derailed on otherwise natural process of Westernization."³⁸

It was Robert Dahl who has already warned us in his Polyarchy (1971) against this pitfall, i.e. that political culture studies have focused on "stable and persistent outlooks," and that consequently "investigation of political cultures may easily neglect sources of change," but Holmes has evidently gone even further. In his criticism, "cultural-legacy" theories have been guilty of confusing analogy with causality. According to Holmes, variants of the "cultural-legacy" theory "are flawed, methodically and empirically", as we "should look for answers not in the past but in the present."³⁹ In his opinion, instead of the inertia of past values and attitudes, the main culprit is to be seen in the fact that the "totalitarian state has been dismantled and most of the post-communist countries have found themselves at or even below the

³⁷ Ibid., 26.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid., 49. See also Dahl, Polyarchy, 166-167.

threshold of governability, or from the reverse perspective, of lawlessness."⁴⁰ Holmes has effectively argued that the reform-hampering "baggage that people carry with them is "more situational than psychological." For instance, the population of Eastern European countries "are perhaps prepared to obey the law, provided that the law is enforced."⁴¹

Although the latter point may appear to be sound to a degree, it does not however explain why there have been so many difficulties with legislating laws and enforcing them, even if this has become a priority. Not unlike John Mueller, however, Holmes has at one point admitted that one must be careful before discarding "cultural-legacy" theories completely; he has reluctantly recognized that. . . "what deserves careful thought. . . is the reform-hampering role of inherited attitudes and patterns of behaviour."⁴² To a large extent, Holmes has presented a contradictory but somewhat balanced treatment of the issue of the relevance of "intangible" cultural patterns. Regardless of his self-proclaimed goal of the refutation of cultural-legacy theories, he has implicitly (and on several occasions explicitly) admitted that the cultural legacies must be given their proper place. In my opinion, however, a more elaborate approach is needed to account for the difficulties encountered by transforming post-communist societies and theorizing about them.

⁴⁰ *"The universal problem of postcommunism which cut across the enormous variety of countries involved,"* suggests Holmes, *"is the crisis of governability."* Ibid, 50 (emphasis in the original).

⁴¹ Ibid., 48.

⁴² Ibid., 26. He has also admitted that "skills and expectations acquired in the past continue to influence events in the present. The question is. . . how much explanatory weight we can place on this truism. In my opinion, attempts to explain the shortcomings of liberalization have placed excessive emphasis on a *purported lack of receptivity to Western values*, ostensibly due to habit formation under communism." Ibid., 49 (emphasis in the original).

II.3.3 A chance for a "culturalist" theory?

Contrary to Holmes, Harry Eckstein in his accomplished study (of 1992) has maintained that "it is distinctly possible to construct pertinent explanations of political changes on a cultural basis."⁴³ Eckstein has considered political-cultural theory as one of two "still viable general approaches to political theory and explanation" (the other was political rational-choice theory).⁴⁴ In his study, Eckstein has adopted a difficult task in explaining how culturalist theory accounts for change, and can do so despite accusations that the defended approach somehow "accepts" *a priori* that political continuity, rather than discontinuity, is the "normal" state.

The touchstone of culturalist theory is, according to Eckstein, the *postulate of oriented action*." Actors do not respond directly to stimuli and situations but respond to them through mediating "orientations." In other words, cultural people process experience into action through certain general cognitive, affective, and evaluative predispositions; the patterns of such predispositions "vary from society to society, from social segment to social segment." In Eckstein's terminology, orientations are not the same as "attitudes"; they are only general dispositions, while "attitudes" denote specific dispositions. As such, attitudes "derive from and express orientations; though attitudes may, through their patterning, help us to find orientations."⁴⁵

A key principle identified by Eckstein is a "*postulate of cultural socialization*."

⁴³ Eckstein, Regarding Politics: Essays on Political Theory, Stability, and Change, 265.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 266.

⁴⁵ Ibid. (emphasis in the original).

It says that "orientations are learned through the agency of external 'socializers'. Cognitions, feelings, evaluative patterns "that process experience into action "must be imparted by the socialized carriers of culture."⁴⁶

Eckstein has also acknowledged that the assumptions of culturalist theory do in fact lead to an expectation of continuity, "even in cases of changes in the objective contexts of political actions."⁴⁷ "Continuity is the inherent expectation and so, therefore, is resistant to change of motion: exceptionally great forces are needed to induce great changes in direction. . ." The nature of socialization and its varying effects over time may contribute to accounting for political change, therefore: "the notion of continuity as inertia in motivations (the psychological counterpart of physical motion) thus opens the door to culturalist account of change."⁴⁸ Especially in modern societies, Eckstein has argued, "one should not expect culture to change as readily as situations and structures. *Situational and structural change tend to occur with great frequency and rapidity in modern societies, and the assumption of orientational inertia postulates resistance to frequent, swift reorientation.*"⁴⁹

According to Eckstein, for such a competitive (culturalist) theory to be really credible, it "should state, prior to explanations of specific changes, the characteristics of change that the political-culture approach can logically accommodate and those that

⁴⁶ Ibid., 268 (emphasis in the original). This rather narrow conception of political socialization will be compared to some other conceptions of socialization in chapter III.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 270.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 271. An analogy might be drawn between Eckstein's theory and Giddens' approach in his "structuration" theory. See Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration (Cambridge, Engl.: Polity Press, 1984).

⁴⁹ Ibid., 273. Emphasis added by J.M.

do not fit such constraints." In order to formulate such a theory, Eckstein has suggested considering two "broad types of cultural changes: those arising 'naturally' from *changes in situations and structural conditions* and those that result from 'artifice' - deliberate attempts to transform political cultures and behaviour." What can be accomplished, according to Eckstein, is "a cogent, potentially powerful theory of political change [which] can be derived from culturalist premises."⁵⁰

As I have suggested, most of these difficulties seem to find a solution in an eclectic variant of new institutionalists' theory. Eggertsson and Stark have made significant contributions in this direction, for example. It has been an accepted view that informal institutions, like norms and customs which embody national or community values change quite slowly, and therefore can often be, in studies involving routine changes in formal rules, taken for granted.⁵¹ Yet such changes in informal institutions must be taken into account in analyses involving a long time horizon or "studies of large-scale changes in economic systems, such as . . . the transitions to markets of the former Soviet-type economies."⁵² Eggertsson has suggested that a "reasonable degree" of commercial morality and related norms appear to be a

⁵⁰ Eckstein, *ibid.*, 281 (emphasis by J.M.). See also Ladislav Holy, The Little Czech and the Great Czech Nation: National identity and the post-communist transformation of society (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996), esp. 5. On Eckstein's elaboration of his theory, especially in relation to contextual changes such as modernization, and on some definitions of culture, see Eckstein, *ibid.*, esp. 280-283. Commenting on the ongoing controversy regarding the relevance of different types of theories to explanations of political change, Eckstein has concluded: "Political-culture theories, admittedly, have not heretofore met the challenge of developing a general theory of change; but neither have other types of theories." *Ibid.*, 282.

⁵¹ See Eggertsson, Thráinn, "A note on the economic institutions," in Empirical Studies in Institutional Change, ed. Lee J. Alston, Thráinn Eggertsson, and Douglas C. North (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

⁵² *Ibid.*, 13.

"necessary condition for the successful development of the centralized economy based on private investment in specific capital and far-flung networks of exchange among unrelated individuals."⁵³ In a way similar to Eggertsson, Stark has attempted to explain the logic of continuities and discontinuities in Eastern European transformations (esp. in its economic part) using his concept of "path dependence". To the question "Why should we expect continuities where departures are imperative?", Stark has answered that it is only the concept of path-dependence that possesses its "analytic power in explaining outcomes where strategic actors are deliberately searching for departures from long-established routines and attempting to restructure the rules of the game."⁵⁴ The essence of this concept may be viewed in the sense that "actors who seek to move in new directions find that their choices are constrained by existing institutional resources. Institutions limit the course of action, they preclude some directions and they constrain certain courses. But institutions also favour the perception and selection of some strategies over others."⁵⁵

In stressing this assumption of continuity, Stark has written: "Instead of institutional vacuum, we find routines and practices, organizational forms and social

⁵³ Ibid. Eggertsson has admitted that the study of informal institutions, however, "puts a formidable stress on the neoclassical paradigm and the rational choice model." Ibid., 13.

⁵⁴ Stark, "Path Dependence and Privatization Strategies in East Central Europe," 21.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 21. In this context one may also consider an argument made by Hirschman that a "large-scale social change typically occurs as the result of a unique constellation of highly disparate events and is therefore amenable to paradigmatic thinking only in a very special sense." Albert O. Hirschman, "The Search for Paradigms as a Hindrance to Understanding," World Politics 22 (April 1970): 339. Here quoted from Giuseppe Di Palma, "Legitimation from the Top to Civil Society: Politico-Cultural Change in Eastern Europe," World Politics 44 (Oct. 1991): 79.

ties, that can become assets, resources [and liabilities, one can add], and the basis for credible commitments and coordinated actions."⁵⁶ On the same general topic, another "new institutionalist" Douglass North has argued that "we are not yet able to explain precisely the forces that shape cultural evolution." However, he has also emphasized the importance of "path dependence," the notion whereby current processes in societies are "the results of forces set in motion long ago."⁵⁷

My approach here is close to a neo-institutionalist variant of "path dependency theory", in that it emphasizes the role of the complex heritage of the past without rejecting the effects of "purely" transformational processes.⁵⁸ I am aware that the broader structural environment defines the opportunities through which individuals and collectives may pursue their interests, as well as the constraints and powers defining various agents in pursuit of their interests. Consequently, I believe that the social environment consists of a large set of political, social and economic institutions that act as both stimulants and constraints of individual acts of collective choices. However, highlighting the cultural factor implies recognition of the important role the individual and collective psychological aspects have in social action. These aspects are obviously not isolated from other aspects of the post-communist constellation but rather they underlie the complexity of political, economic and social processes in

⁵⁶ Here quoted from Offe, Varieties of Transition: The East European and East German Experience, 138.

⁵⁷ Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 123-4.

⁵⁸ See also Stark (1992) and Offe (1997). According to Offe, this approach also makes us to expect "a constrained plurality of nationally specific transitional paths taken," the course of which will be determined by the economic, political and cultural preconditions in the individual countries during their respective histories, including their communist history over the last several decades. Offe, Varieties of Transition: The East European and East German Experience, 138.

Eastern European transitions.

From a broad historical perspective, the transition from communism can be conceptualized as the "civilizational" process of moving away from Soviet-type institutional design.⁵⁹ Even though emergent liberal institutions have begun to shape the civilizational landscape in ECE/EE (and have no doubt become a significant factor in the current constellation), the new institutions do not promptly and fully create a new mentality and new patterns of political and economic behaviour. As Daniel Nelson has noted, "the transformation of political life away from one-party authoritarianism and toward a plural, participatory democracy . . . is not a matter of procedure and institutional roles as much as it is an artifact of culture, comprised of attitudes, norms and expectations, molded by historical experiences."⁶⁰ Since culture is intimately associated with continuity (though it is not unchangeable), and continuity of relevant cultural phenomena is at the centre of my inquiry, the "culturalist" theory

⁵⁹ See Sztompka, "Looking Back: The Year 1989 as a Cultural and Civilizational Break," 115. He has approached the issue from the psycho-sociological perspective. According to him, transformations in East Central Europe after 1989 "proceed at two distinct levels: institutional and cultural." Ibid. I believe that this distinction is the first step in the right direction since it helps us to avoid the confusion of regarding the "necessary preconditions" which has been so characteristic of the recent discussion; in fact, this confusion implies that there are not two distinct (however interrelated) levels, but rather two conflicting perspectives. In my thesis I have selected a modified variant of the "culturalist" approach, particularly in contrast to "hard institutionalist" or the rational choice approaches, for which a formal and behavioral dimension of political development is the only one with cognitive relevance. While my argument treats institutions as important, it is conceptualized around the principle that the rational choice or "hard" institutional approaches tend to neglect important conditions of the institutional creation, evolution and functioning, i.e. that they have mostly underestimated other non-institutional factors in politics, such as the existence of specific locally and culturally determined values, individual and collective (non-institutionalized) behaviour patterns, and the sphere of implicit deontology.

⁶⁰ Daniel N. Nelson, "Civil Society Endangered," Social Research 63.2 (Summer 1996): 352.

seems to be justifiable, provided that it is pursued with a due attention to the relevant institutional arrangements.

II.4 Theories and concepts of political culture.

Adoption of a culture-based theory does not mean the necessity to apply an established concept of political culture as it has been discussed in the traditional comparative political science literature. Although political culture makes it possible to forge a logical connection between subjective, psychological and cultural aspects of society and continuity and change in the political system, it has its limitations when applied to large-scale analyses.⁶¹

The content and the analytical usefulness of the notion of political culture itself for comparative political science has been a subject of ongoing controversies. Some recognized scholars (e.g. Huntington) have criticized the concept for suffering from fuzzy conceptualization and thus from serious explanatory limitations; the notion has a considerable history in the political thinking however. Eckstein, for instance, traces its development to Durkheim's response to Comte's positivism and utilitarianism and regards Durkheim's collective consciousness as a sort of proto political culture, but origins of the concept go certainly much further back.⁶² Over time, advocates of the

⁶¹ See Stephen White, Political Culture and Soviet Politics (London: The Macmillan Press, 1979), 14. This issue will be further explained in II.5.

⁶² See Eckstein, "Culture as Foundation Concept for the Social Sciences," 482. Political culture was a new term for an old idea, origins of which may be traced back to ancient thought. The notion of cultural aspects, spirit, norms, or sets of values that shape the process of politics is as old as thinking about politics as such (since Plato). Aristotle in his writings considered a "state of mind" that contributed to political stability or to rebellion. In a similar fashion, Burke later appreciated "a cake of custom" which affected the workings of political institutions. Tocqueville

concept of political culture have attempted to make more systematic and explicit use of the notion that had used to be associated, at the beginning of modern political science, with such more or less established concepts such as political ideology, national character and ethos, and national political psychology.⁶³

II.4.1 *A rationale for the concept.*

The intellectual tradition which inspired political culture studies seems nevertheless to come directly from the studies of national character and the psychocultural analyses as employed in the 1930s and 1940s by Benedict, Mead, Fromm and Klineberg, who all sought to utilize the findings of psychoanalysis and cultural anthropology to contribute to a deeper understanding of national political behaviour and institutions.⁶⁴ Later Pye has viewed political culture as "the product of both the collective history of a political system and the life histories of the individuals who currently make up the system; and thus is rooted equally in public events and private experiences" (Pye 1965, 8). According to Pye, the concept of political culture assumes that the beliefs, attitudes, and cognitions that inform and govern political

and Bagehot put an explicit emphasis on political values and sentiments in their theories of political stability and change. The term "political culture" appears to have been used first by Herder and it seems that in English it was first used by Sidney and Beatrice Webb in the mid-1930s. On history of the modern usage of the term see, for instance, Brown and Gray, Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States, 2.

⁶³ See also Lucien Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).

⁶⁴ See Lucian Pye, "Political Culture," in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, ed. David Sills (New York: The Macmillan Company & The Free Press, 1968), esp. 219.

behaviour are not just "random congeries" but "fit together as a part of a meaningful whole . . . constitute an intelligible web of relations," and are "mutually reinforcing."⁶⁵ Analytical and comparative relevance and usefulness of the concept have been well defended by Hughes and Pinney (1966), who have defined political culture as "*that which accounts for the inter-systemic differences in responses of political systems to identical stimuli when all other variables have been accounted for.*"⁶⁶

According to Almond and Verba, political culture equals orientation to politics and constitutes the link between micropolitics' (political attitudes and motivations) and 'macropolitics' (the structure and function of the political system and its institutions).⁶⁷ They have identified three modes of political orientation: the cognitive (knowledge of the political system), affective (feelings about the political system), and evaluative orientation (judgements and opinions) about political objects. On this basis they have developed a typology of ideal political culture, i.e. participant, subject, and parochial.⁶⁸ In their opinion, political culture is to be treated as both an independent and a

⁶⁵ Pye and Verba, Political Culture and Political Development, 7. Pye's moderately functionalist approach seems to emphasize the determining role of political culture over political institutions; he maintains that "the political culture provides structure and meaning to the political sphere in the same manner as culture in general gives coherence and integration to social life." Ibid., 8.

⁶⁶ Delos D. Hughes and Edward L. Pinney, "Political Culture and the Idioms of Political Development," in Comparative Politics and Political Theory, ed. Edward L. Pinney (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1966), 73 (emphasis in the original). See also Gabriel Almond, "The Intellectual History of the Civic Culture Concept," In The Civic Culture Revisited, ed. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba (Boston: 1980), 1-36.

⁶⁷ Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture (1963), 32-3.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 13.

dependent variable, as causing and as being caused by it.⁶⁹

While the general justification of the concept has been widely recognized, particularly among students of communism, discussions on the content and its specific comparative application have continued. Several attempts have been made to give the concept a more rational footing.⁷⁰ Lane, for example, has defended treating political culture as something more comprehensible and more relevant than "a mere residual variable." Emphasizing its ultimate circular character, Lane has advocated that the theory of political culture ". . . would, ultimately, connect political cultural values to political attitudes, would connect political attitudes to individual political behaviour, would connect individual behaviour to social choices, would connect social choices to political policies and institutions, and would then connect policies and institutions to social changes, which in turn would affect cultural attitudes and create a new cultural cycle."⁷¹

According to Stephen White, the concept of political culture is also more

⁶⁹ See Also Almond, "The Intellectual History of the Civic Culture Concept," 29. Usefulness of the political culture approach was intensively advocated by some scholars in the 1970s. For instance, Stephen Holmes and Stephen White have successfully argued why this concept is a more discriminating instrument than its predecessor - the "national character approach". According to White, most variants of the concept of political culture allow for inner differentiation and subsume a variety of political sub-cultures which allows for more explanatory flexibility.

⁷⁰ See, for example, the notion of "cultural rationality" in Lane (1992) and elsewhere. Serious efforts to determine the domain of political culture have also been made by Lowell Dittmer: see his "Political culture and political symbolism: Toward a theoretical synthesis," World Politics 29 (1977): 552-583. See also David J. Elkins and Richard E.B. Simeon, "A cause in search of its effect, or what does political culture explain," Comparative Politics 11 (1979): 127-145 and Dennis Kavanagh, Political science and political behaviour (London: Allen & Unwin, 1983).

⁷¹ Ruth Lane, "Political Culture: Residual Category or General Theory?," Comparative Political Studies 25.3 (Oct. 1992): 381.

receptive to the notion of political change than the concepts of the national character, for example, that had preceded it. The political culture approach, he argued, "permits socio-economic change and patterns of previous political development to be considered as of at least a comparable importance in the explanation of political continuity and change." Although it cannot of itself explain the existence of particular political values and practices, it may "help to account at least in part for the existence of a particular set of political beliefs and behavioral patterns, insofar as these are the product of the distinctive historical experience. . . . , and it will mediate, and thus modify, the interaction between socioeconomic change and polity."⁷² Even though White has made a strong argument in favour of the analytical usefulness of the concept of political culture, he has admitted that it is necessary to consider its controversial character, as it appears in at least three areas. The first set of problems, according to White, relates to the defined scope of political culture. Should, let us say, behavior be included into the concept of political culture? For instance, Sidney Verba has originally argued that political culture should be regarded as "the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols and values which defines the situation in which political action takes place."⁷³ Alternatively, for Almond and Verba, political culture was "the particular distribution of patterns of orientations toward political objects among the members of a nation" and for Pye and Verba, the "set of meanings and purposes" in which any political system is embedded. It provides the "subjective orientation to politics."⁷⁴ Pye has later defined political culture more specifically as a "set of attitudes, beliefs and sentiments which provide the underlying assumptions and

⁷² Stephen White, Political Culture and Soviet Politics, 14-15.

⁷³ Verba, Political Culture and Political Development, 513-16.

⁷⁴ Pye and Verba, Political Culture and Political Development, esp. 513; see also Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture.

rules that govern behaviour in the political system" or the "manifestation in aggregate form of the psychological and subjective dimension of politics."⁷⁵ In his later work, Pye has warned against the inclusion of behaviour proper into the notion of political culture. Also Archie Brown has noted that the opportunity of explaining patterns of political behaviour, at least partly in terms of the beliefs, values and perceptions to which they appear to relate might be lost if behaviour itself is included into political culture.⁷⁶

Nonetheless, several authors (including some of the original opponents of the inclusion of the behavioral aspect) have conceded that political culture may have, at least indirectly, some behavioral features. Verba, for instance, has admitted that one of the ways in which it is possible to learn about political beliefs is to observe the modes in which political structures operate. Pye later on several occasions included patterns of political behaviour, as well as beliefs and sentiments, within his definition of political culture. Also Jowitt (1992), who has defined political culture as "informal, adaptive postures" has included behaviour as well as attitudes.⁷⁷

In my thesis' argument, I am informed by the notion of political culture which is close to Ivan Volgyes' understanding of the concept. According to Volgyes,

⁷⁵ Pye, "Political Culture," 218.

⁷⁶ Brown and Gray, Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States, esp. 10.

⁷⁷ Jowitt is quoted in McFalls, Communism's Collapse, Democracy's Demise?, 77. Jowitt has treated political culture as a "set of informal, adoptive postures - behavioral and attitudinal - that emerge in response to and interact with the set of formal definitions - ideological, policy, and institutional - that characterize a given level of society." Jowitt, "An organizational approach to the study of political culture in Marxist-Leninist systems," 1173. Also Fagen has included "patterns of behaviour" into his notion of political culture. See Richard Fagen, The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969).

"*political culture* refers to the totality of political knowledge and attitudes that the citizenry possesses and to the manner in which that knowledge is expressed in political practice."⁷⁸ In understanding "manner" as a general mode or matrix and not as action itself, I consider his definition close to my interpretation of political culture as a set of (pre-) dispositions or tendencies vis-a-vis the political sphere in the broadest sense, i.e. potentials rather than expressions, of concrete behaviour.⁷⁹ This position is somewhat in-between those who reject inclusion of the behavioral component and those who have argued that behaviour should be included into the concept of political culture. The latter position of broad inclusiveness also derives from recognized theories of culture, esp. in the sociological and anthropological literature in which culture is usually comprehended as the "total way of life" of a social group.⁸⁰ For instance, Kroeber and Kluckhohn, in their critical reviews of the concepts and definitions of culture, have stressed the importance of including behaviour in a definition, since

⁷⁸ Ivan Volgyes, Politics in Eastern Europe (Chicago: The Dorsey Press, 1986), 294 (emphasis in the original).

⁷⁹ Behavior, however, can be a good indicator of a society's political culture. Paul has argued that "behaviour patterns", when observed in historical perspective, "shed more light on a society's political culture than can the best attitudinal data." David, W. Paul, "Political culture and the socialist purpose," in Change and Adaptation in Soviet and East European Politics, ed. Jane P. Shapiro and Peter J. Potichnyj (New York: Praeger, 1976), 4. On the discussion regarding the relationship between "attitudes" and "behaviour," see Frederic J. Fleron Jr., "Post-Soviet Political Culture in Russia: An Assessment of Recent Empirical Investigations," Europe-Asia Studies 48.2 (1996): esp. 229-230. He has argued that "we can now observe and measure attitudes because we have an empirical referent for the concept 'attitude,'" defined as behavioral response consistency, "but we cannot then ask as an empirical question how attitudes affect behaviour because *attitudes have now been defined in terms of behaviour*. The same logic applies to the concept of 'political culture'." Ibid., 229 (emphasis by Fleron).

⁸⁰ See Robert C. Tucker, "Culture, Political Culture, and Communist Society," Political Science Quarterly LXXXVIII (June): esp. 176-9; see also White, Political Culture and Soviet Politics, 17.

"culture consists of patterns . . . of and for behaviour."⁸¹

**II.4.2 Political culture and change in communist and post-communist studies:
the issue of causality.**

For Stephen White and other scholars who were engaged in the study of communist countries, the issues of political culture and socialization were "a most important but also problematic area of comparative communism" (Brown 1977; Holmes 1986; see also White 1979). Others, however, have admitted that use of the concept "political culture" in the study of East European and Soviet/Russian politics has been plagued by the fact that "it has been used to explain almost anything and everything that otherwise cannot be explained."⁸²

It has been suggested that the "peculiar relevance of the study of 'political culture' in relation to change and continuity in Communist states lies in the fact that the goals of total political, economic and cultural transformation have been pursued by ruling Communist parties in societies with the most diverse historical and cultural

⁸¹ Alfred L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, Culture: a Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions (New York: Vintage Books, 1963), 357. Also others (namely those associated with the *Political Action* study) have put emphasis on combining both orientations and behaviour. See Samuel H. Barnes and Max Kaase, Political Action (London: Sage, 1979). This, in my opinion, would significantly weaken the position of political culture in causal analysis, though for other comparative purposes, it may be a valid notion.

⁸² Frederic J Fleron, Jr., "Post-Soviet Political Culture in Russia: An Assessment of Recent Empirical Investigations," Europe-Asia Studies 48.2 (1996): 225-260, esp. 225. Fleron has complained that particularly in Russian and Soviet studies, political culture has been used "in ways that violate some basic canons of concept formation and both logical and empirical requirements of explanation." Ibid.

traditions."⁸³ Similarly, in 1979 Brown argued that, as compared with studies of stable liberal regimes, "the possibilities of discussing sensibly the harmony or dissonance between values, on the one hand, and political structures on the other, are perhaps greater in the case of Communist societies where there have been (a) a radical break in the continuity of political institutions, and (b) an unusually overt and conscious attempt to create new political values and to supplant the old."⁸⁴ However, some scholars have pointed out that the approach based on the notion of political culture has its limitations; it is in the nature of political culture that it exhibits more perseverance (and continuity) than for it to be able to account for certain rapid changes in political systems "in excess of any conceivable change in the political culture which underlies them."⁸⁵ According to White, no matter how important a role political culture plays, it does not provide a necessary and sufficient explanation of the manner in which the political system operates.⁸⁶ A similar view has been expressed by Paul who has noted that "What we know about political cultures suggests that they are relatively resistant to large-scale changes except over long period evolution or in unusually disturbing

⁸³ Brown and Gray, Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States, 1.

⁸⁴ Here quoted from Brown, Political Culture and Communist Studies, 7. In communist studies, the relationship between change and *status quo* (both in reality and as models of these systems) was a topic of many controversies (for instance, could totalitarian systems change and develop? See Chalmers Johnson, "Comparing Communist Nations," in Change in Communist Systems, ed. Chalmers Johnson (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970), 1-32. Johnson has attempted to explain how a limited change is possible even under totalitarian regime by distinguishing (following Anthony Wallace) between "goal culture" and "transfer culture" associated with a regime's ideology. Ibid., esp. 6-7. An attempt to relate political culture to political change or continuity has also been made, for instance by Brown and Gray (1979).

⁸⁵ White, Political Culture and Soviet Politics, 19.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

circumstances."⁸⁷

Especially since the 1970s, the concept of political culture attracted the attention of scholars dealing with communist systems, having been seen as a key of both theoretical and practical importance to explanations of consonance or dissonance between the teachings and values promulgated by the state, and the beliefs and values to be found among the population at large. According to Jowitt (who has viewed political culture as a kind of informal organization), this approach is congenial with the study of "political culture in Marxist-Leninist systems."⁸⁸ Most of the writers who have applied the concept of political culture to the study of change in communist Eastern Europe adopted Almond and Verba's notion of political culture but others tended to accept a more inclusive approach along Pye's lines, considering features of explicit behavior in their concepts. In Jowitt's words, some of the latter writers were not too concerned with drawing a clear line between political culture aspects pertaining to values and beliefs and those pertaining to action.⁸⁹

⁸⁷ Paul, "Czechoslovakia's Political Culture Reconsidered," 142. See also Pye and Verba, Political Culture and Political Development.

⁸⁸ Jowitt, "An organizational approach to the study of political culture in Marxist-Leninist systems," 1172-3. See also Brown and Gray, Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States and Brown, Political Culture and Communist Studies. Writing (in 1974) on political culture in EE, Jowitt has commented on the issue of continuity between pre-communist political culture and communist socialization. He has argued that "through their organization and ethos [Leninist regimes] have stimulated a series of informal adaptive responses (behavioral and attitudinal) that are in many respects consistent with and supportive of certain basic elements of the traditional political culture in these societies. In turn, these elements are antithetical to the appearance of a regime and society with an ethos and structure predicated on a complementary relationship between the public and private realms, on the viability of impersonal rules and norms. . ." Quoted in Jowitt, "The Leninist Legacy," 210.

⁸⁹ See Jowitt, "An organizational approach to the study of political culture in Marxist-Leninist systems."

Unfortunately, the study of political cultures in the Soviet bloc had not been sufficient. As Moshe Lewin has succinctly complained, the interrelation of society and culture with the economy, the state and the party remained unexplored. Yet precisely such concepts had to be worked out if we wanted to speak intelligently about historical events."⁹⁰

This rationale seems also to be valid for studies in post-communist political culture and post-communism as such. According to Agh, "political culture as the 'software' has actually played a more important role in the East-Central European transformation than have the legal institutions as the 'hardware.'⁹¹ Nonetheless, to offset the tendency of the concept to be a "formless" and/or "residual" category, it

⁹⁰ Moshe Lewin, The Gorbachev Phenomenon: A Historical Interpretation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 4-5. At that time, the most systematic proposal for an analysis of political culture with regard to communist states was presented in the Brown and Gray's collection of essays that appeared in 1977 (another edition with minor amendments was published in 1979). In the introductory essay Brown elaborated a framework for the study of political culture in communist countries, in which political culture consists of four components, that might be researched in the field (i.e. to be researched by each of the contributors to the volume). Brown's intention was to provide his contributors with a guide to discovering as much as possible about political culture in each of the seven countries studied in the volume (China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, the USSR, and Yugoslavia) and thus to be able to deal with important questions of the relationships of respective political cultures to the goals of individual regimes and to social change in general. The components have been identified as: a) previous political experience (people's subjective interpretations of their country's pre-communist history), b) values and fundamental political beliefs (deeply held beliefs about concepts such as egalitarianism, paternalism, and liberty; these may be reflected in orientations toward current political issues), c) foci of identification and loyalty (e. g. ethnic group, social class, political party, nation, and symbols), d) political knowledge and expectations. See Brown, Political Culture and Communist Studies, esp. 96-100.

⁹¹ Attila Agh, "The Paradoxes of Transition: The External and Internal Overload of the Transition Process," in Hungary: The Politics of Transition, ed. Terry Cox and Andy Furlong (London: Frank Cass, 1995), 25.

should always be adjusted to the specific purpose of an inquiry. Apart from the problem of definition, another significant problem with political culture as seen by White and others is the one concerning the relationship between beliefs and attitudes on the one hand, and the behaviour and performance of a political system on the other. This question, White has suggested leads to another significant problem: the "extent to which a given set of political beliefs and values may be a reaction to, not an explanation of, the manner in which the political system operates."⁹² According to White, the latter problem is closely related to the problem of the "causal status of the political culture approach." Considering this subject from the perspective of communist studies, White has warned against treating political culture as being capable of completely explaining the political system:

"Clearly, we cannot argue, as some have been prepared to do, that a country's political culture provides a necessary and sufficient explanation of the manner in which its political system operates."⁹³

At the same time, White has realized that to explain political culture as solely derived from the system is also impossible:

"The reverse to this position, however, that the political culture is wholly capable of explanation in terms of the manner in which the political system actually operates, has equally little to recommend it. We should find it

⁹² White, Political Culture and Soviet Politics, 18.

⁹³ He adds: "We should then be unable to account for the fact that political systems, in a variety of cases, have changed with a rapidity greatly in excess of that of any conceivable change in the political culture which underlies them; nor should we be able to explain the fact that apparent similarities in political culture should give rise to political systems of a rather different character. We should equally be unable to account for any changes in the political culture itself; certainly, any reciprocal link between polity and culture would have to be excluded." *Ibid.*, 20.

extremely difficult, on this basis, to explain the marked differences in the manner in which Communist political systems have tended to operate, despite the great similarity among them in terms of formal institutional structures; and we should find it equally difficult to explain the sources of the development and change in a political system, explicable as they in many cases are only in terms of a country's previous political experience and attitudes and expectations which derive from the past experience."⁹⁴

Thus, according to White, "political culture, in fact, must be regarded as both 'causing' and 'caused', i.e. as a variable which mediates between the political system and its environment, providing a framework within which patterns of political beliefs and behaviour, historically considered, can be located, and a factor which will influence and constrain - though not determine - future patterns of development in a political system."⁹⁵

Another related problem, with implications for specific instances of causality, is that of homogeneity versus diversification within the political culture of a given society. Specific causality (for concrete indicators), as opposed to general causality, would require specification and diversification within the concept of political culture. "There need be no presumption of homogeneity or unity in the political culture under

⁹⁴ Ibid., 20.

⁹⁵ Ibid. White has proposed that for heuristic purposes, the political culture be regarded "as in some sense an approximation to the 'superstructure' of a political system, with the economic and institutional environment consisting its 'base'. As in Marxist theory, the base will ultimately determine the 'superstructure'; the political culture or superstructure, however, should not be seen as simply the reflection of that material base but as a complex of ideas and practices, relatively autonomous in their existence, which are in turn capable of influencing and modifying the base in a complex pattern of interaction over time." Ibid. Very similar argument has also been made by Eckstein and Paul, according to whom it is useful to consider political culture as an intervening variable. This "causality status" would be consistent with my above elaboration of the relationship between the "cultural" and "structural" explanations as pertaining to the general approach of my argument.

investigation," White has written.⁹⁶ In this regard, scholars have often distinguished at least two levels in the political culture: a "mass" political culture applying to the population at large and an "elite" political culture characteristic of the political decision-makers and with them associated groups, so that a political culture would subsume a variety of political sub-cultures. Although this problem cannot be addressed fully in my argument, some specific references and explanations will be made in this regard in chapters III and IV.

II.5 Limitations to the concept of political culture and the notion of the "Post-Communist Mind."

I have so far presented the justification for recognizing the distinct qualities of the "culturalist" approach as well as the reason for applying a specific version of the latter to my thesis. However, I have also presented a rather weaker case in defence of a systematic use (and analytical utility) of the concept of political culture *per se*. Since Almond and Verba introduced the concept of political culture in their seminal study,⁹⁷ the notions of a political and civic culture have been contentious, both conceptually and empirically. Many have objected that the notion has been so overstretched that it has become too vague and its analytical and comparative efficacy has been discredited. Since the concept has a multitude of meanings and referents, theories and studies using

⁹⁶ White, Political Culture and Soviet Politics, 14.

⁹⁷ Almond and verba, The Civic Culture, 1963.

it are in danger of differing widely instead of finding a common ground.⁹⁸

Yet many have maintained that the concept is irreplaceable in comparative analysis when it is properly understood and constructed.⁹⁹ The idea behind the original introduction of the concept, as we have seen, was that in order to understand and interpret various political systems and their performance it is necessary to understand not only the institutional (and constitutional) features of these systems, but also to recognize the relevance of the political values and orientations of the individuals who constitute the political system. At the same time, those who use the concept often do so in order to redirect prevailing empirical enquiry from an exclusive preoccupation with institution and structure, and use the concept of political culture to bridge the gap between the macro level politics with micro-politics.¹⁰⁰

In the above discussion on whether political behaviour (or action) is a part of political culture, I have argued that, however difficult the two may be to separate, political behaviour ought not be included in political culture as such, since this would lead to the confusion between what is being explained and its causes. Political behaviour is undoubtedly associated both with political culture and the structure (institutions). This is most of all the problem of conceptual boundaries: to set them meaningfully, it would be practicable to argue that while political behaviour is not part of political culture per se, individual and collective propensities toward a certain type

⁹⁸ This is the point made by Eckstein, in "Regarding Politics," 230. Also, for instance, S. Barnes and Max Kaase have ridiculed the term "political culture" as the "attempt to nail a pudding down to the wall." See Barnes and Kaase, Political Action (London: Sage, 1979).

⁹⁹ See, for example, Hughes and Pinney, "Political Culture and the Idioms of Political Development;" also White, Political Culture and Soviet Politics.

¹⁰⁰ See Loek Halman and Neil Nevitte, eds., Political Value Change in Western Democracies (Tilburg University Press, 1996).

of political action or inaction are. My understanding here draws on how Kluckhohn and Kelly define culture as "all those historically created designs for living, explicit and implicit, rational, irrational, which exist at any given time as *potential guides for the behaviour of men*."¹⁰¹ Eckstein (1996), for example, understands political culture as a subsystem of culture. The assumption here is that politics is "an aspect of the overall cultural system and every political action is thus embedded in a wider cultural context."¹⁰² If culture is defined in not overly explicit behavioral terms, i.e. if it is understood along the lines proposed by Kluckhohn and Kelly, it may become a basis for an analytically meaningful concept of political culture. Also Fleron has emphasized that cultural patterns outside the realm of political culture are relevant "within the framework of attitudinal analysis," the more so for behavior in the social and political spheres. Thus first, the study of political behavior as embedded in general culture is important for the study of political culture; second, concrete political behavior is only an expression of a political culture and not the political culture itself (though the two are dialectically interconnected).¹⁰³ It is within this general framework that I use the concept of the PCM as a kind of sub-category of post-communist political culture, with overlappings into the "general culture" of society.

¹⁰¹ Clyde Kluckhohn and William Kelly, "The Concept of Culture," in The Science of Man in the World Crisis, ed. Ralph Linton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945), 97 (emphasis by J.M.).

¹⁰² Holy, The Little Czech and the Great Czech Nation: National identity and the post-communist transformation of society, 3. See also Eckstein, "Culture as Foundation Concept for the Social Sciences."

¹⁰³ For a more detailed discussion on the issue, see Fleron, "Post-Soviet Political Culture," esp. 235-260. In this context, Fleron speaks of the need to "explore the relevance of the political ecology approach in assessing political culture and attitudes" that support a specific political behavior in post-communist societies. See *ibid.*, 249.

In my thesis, the PCM, in the same way as political culture, is generally regarded as both 'causing' and 'caused', i.e. as an intervening variable which mediates between the political system and its broad environment, providing a psychosocial framework within which patterns of political values, norms and behaviour can be located. Broadly speaking, it is a "manifestation in aggregate form of the psychological and subjective dimension of politics. . . A political culture is the product of both the collective history of a political system and the life histories of the members of that system, and thus it is rooted equally in public events and private experiences."¹⁰⁴

The analytical as well as partially empirical construct of the PCM is understood, without strictly distinguishing between "post-communist" and "communist" political culture, as a significant element within the post-communist political culture and as one of the key determinants of the current transitional processes. I understand the PCM as a reconceptualized variant of political culture for identifying specific individual and mass psycho-social and cultural characteristics inherited from the period of state socialism. In this sense, the PCM consists of "post-communist political culture" as it directly relates to persisting patterns of "communist political culture." In other words, the PCM establishes the non-institutional (informal) nexus between communism and post-communism. To a certain extent, the model of the PCM also serves as the link between the individual and the mass psychological (and behavioral) and, from the viewpoint of heuristics, serves in this function as the methodical bridging of the gap between the micro and macro-political.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁴ Pye, "Political Culture," 218.

¹⁰⁵ Almond and Verba have proposed this notion, following Rokkan and Campbell who refer to "micropolitics" as the realm of political attitudes and motivations by an individual or a group, whereas "macropolitics" is defined as the realm of the more traditional concern with the structure and functions of the political systems, institutions, and organizations, and their effect on public policy. See Stein

The PCM, as part of the psycho-social dimension of the political system, consists of attitudes, beliefs, values, habits and other broader social dispositions which may be potentially related to the two main transformations, i.e. in the political and economic spheres and which are found in the entire population rather than pertaining to separate parts of that population, as the result of their exposure to the communist system.¹⁰⁶ In chapter IV, the concept of the PCM will be partly operationalized as clusters of specific symptoms that can be observed and analyzed in the post-communist society. Although some of the identified characteristics and symptoms may exceed the scope of a traditional understanding of political culture, their relevance will be explained in terms of logical coherence within the concept of the PCM.

Rokkan, "Citizen Participation in Political Life," International Social Science Journal XII.1 (1960); entire issue: esp. 69ff. See also Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture (1989), 31.

¹⁰⁶ Perhaps with the same meaning Eckstein speaks of "the general 'political culture' of a society." Eckstein, "Russia and the Conditions of Democracy," in Can Democracy Take Root in Post-Soviet Russia?, 358.

Endnotes

1. This endnote note may serve as a "disclaimer" for not including the distinction among vertical types of political culture into my argument. Since the dissolution of state socialism, there have been, in terms of vertical differentiation of political culture, both circulation of the elites (i.e. the old political elite functioning as a new political or a new economic elite or both), as well as exchange of the elites. As a result of these new identifications, the situation has become difficult to survey with regard to the effect of the old "mass" political culture and the old "elite" political culture on the process of identification of the new "mass" and "elite" political cultures. For this reason, it would be too confusing to make a systematic distinction between dominant/elite and mass political culture. See also Jowitt (1974 and 1992), who defines political culture as the informal behaviour and attitudes by which individuals adapt to and permit the functioning of formal political structures, thus avoiding the distinction between official and dominant political cultures, since the ideological goal to which individuals are responding belong to the realm of formal organization (or structure). He has, nevertheless, distinguished between political cultures at different levels of society: elite culture referring to the adaptive postures leaders have developed as a reaction to their own historical experience (within it, he has also distinguished "regime" political culture) and community political culture referring to the adaptive responses of society at large to formal state structures. See also McFalls, Communism's Collapse, Democracy's Demise?, esp. 77. Not totally agreeing with Jowitt's inclusion of behaviour into his definition of political culture, I have found his treatment of the different levels within political culture compatible with my approach. In fact, most of my argument focus mainly on what Jowitt calls community political culture (or what Brown [1984] would refer to as "dominant culture"). Since I try to explain constraints imposed by the PCM on the post-communist political and economic spheres, "community culture" may be seen as both more determining than still not yet fully recognizable elite culture and both cultures may be viewed as having been shaped by the environment of the communist system. The reasons that I use the concept of the PCM instead that of political culture concept may be summarized as follows: (1) there are problems with its definition and conceptualization; (2) my focus is on explanation and interpretation rather than on rigorous manipulation of variables; (3) I am interest in only selected aspects of the overall post-communist political

culture; (4) the problems associated with the subdivision, esp. vertical, of political culture are beyond the scope of the thesis.

III. Communist Systems and the Sources of Their Effects on Political Culture.

"The post-Communist regimes are experiencing a broad, multi-dimensional transition from the enforced integration, artificial homogeneity, and stability of communism to the more open and pluralistic patterns of public discourse and behaviour associated with incipient democracy." (Steven Burg)¹

In Chapter I, I explained the issue, the objectives of the thesis as well as the general approach to examining the phenomenon under consideration - the PCM - and the specific methods of reaching my objectives. In Chapter II, I discussed and established the theoretical framework that would support the development of my argument. In the next part, I will examine (state-) organizational and ideological structures of the "communist" system, especially from the point of view of their psycho-social implications for the "communist political culture" and communist mind.

III.1 Similarities and differences among former communist countries.

Generally, when a phenomenon is being considered across several distinct units, while acknowledging that this phenomenon may vary in quality and intensity in individual units, the researcher is obliged to account for this variation and for real and potential similarities and dissimilarities (differences) the units show or may show in

¹ Steven L. Burg, "Nationalism Redux," Current History 92.573 (April 1993): 164.

respect to this phenomenon.²

On the one hand, the spatial diversity of the ECE/EE region had been one of the main reasons for cultural and historical distinctions within the region. On the other hand, there had also been the relative compactness of the region vis-a-vis the other regions (Europe proper, and Asia).³ This compactness had contributed to the relatively high degree of similarities within the region both in the pre-communist era, and particularly due to the inclusion of the same (Soviet) political and economic bloc, further similarities in many respects had developed during the communist period.

Accordingly, the fact that these countries had been part of the Soviet bloc ("empire"), is considered to be the main source of similarities with regard to my argument. To a large degree, my model of the PCM is derived from the assumption that there were many significant institutional and ideological patterns common to all communist ECE/EE countries. In my opinion, the homogenizing role of the empire, in this case one created and dominated by the Soviet Union, cannot be overstated. It had been at work for several decades and actively promoted the high level of political and economic nivelization within the bloc. Even though the countries within the Soviet bloc were nominally "sovereign", this was always a carefully limited sovereignty,

² Systems which are in different spatial locations are *ipso facto* different entities; when the time (historical) dimension is taken into account, the identity or similarity of systems is rather to be proven than assumed. A good and systematic breakdown of common traits and difference among (post-)communist states along several key categories/indicators (such as record of economic performance and reforms, level of repressiveness, elite continuity, religious structure, etc.) has been presented by Offe. See Offe, Varieties of Transition, 139, Table 7.1.

³ Illuminating is Schopflin's (1993) treatment of the issue, in which he has traced some of the typical features of cultural identity in ECE/EE to the pre-communist history of the region, especially to its national, imperial, and religion complexities. Schopflin, "Culture and Identity in Post-Communist Europe," in Developments in East European Politics, ed. Stephen White, Judy Batt and Paul G. Lewis (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1993), esp. 16-20.

where institutional, ideological, cultural and other patterns were superimposed over national ones - with a various degree of success - in an attempt to minimize differences and promote similarities and homogeneity, i.e. "unity" in the Soviet terminology. As a result (given the duration of such an arrangement), the assumption can be made that the region's countries had thus obtained somewhat similar as well as distinct mixtures of their traditional political cultures and the imported or imposed civilizational features of the Soviet system (communism). Regardless of the way we may expect societies in Eastern Europe to have developed different adaptive strategies to accommodate Soviet-type communism/state socialism, we may also expect that their adaptive mechanisms had to be consistent with the functioning of that system. It is worth mentioning that the goal of reducing the differences between the countries within the bloc was one of the major official goals of communist policy-planners and policy-makers. In the words of Tismaneanu, the "fulfilment of the Stalinist design for Eastern Europe included the pursuit of a singular strategy that could eventually transform the various national political cultures into carbon copies of the 'advanced' Soviet experience." Judging from the extent to which local communist parties "engaged in frantic attempts to imitate the Stalinist model, transplanting and sometimes enhancing. . . . the characteristics of the Soviet totalitarian system," we can expect that a high degree of nivelization in social life and political cultures had likely been achieved.⁴

No matter what terminology is used to describe the system established in the countries of the Soviet bloc and the USSR, i.e., whether one calls it "bureaucratic state

⁴ Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics, esp. 30.

collectivism" (Deacon),⁵ "totalitarian-in-principle" (Selucky),⁶ "welfare-state authoritarianism" (Breslauer), or "mono-organizational systems" (Rigby), what was fairly constant in this type of system was a common ideology and common institutions.⁷ More specifically, there has been an agreement in the literature on communism that ECE/EE countries under the Soviet domination shared - regardless of their national variations - several basic features; they (1) were led by a single Communist Party (under whatever name); (2) adhered to Marxist-Leninist ideology; (3) based their economy on total or almost-exclusive state ownership of all industry and of most agriculture; and, (4) did not tolerate any meaningful opposition against the

⁵ Bob Deacon, "East European Welfare: Past, Present and Future in Comparative Context," in The New Eastern Europe, ed. Bob Deacon et al. (London: SAGE Publications, 1992), 8.

⁶ Radoslav Selucky, "The Soviet-Type Political Systems as the Obstacle to Economic Reforms Needed for Economic Modernization," a paper delivered at Annual Conference of Canadian Political Science Association in Hamilton, Ontario, 7 June 1987. Selucky has justified the use of the term "totalitarian in principle" by the fact, that communist parties in all Soviet-bloc countries had insisted, both in theory and practice, including the entrenchment in their countries' constitution, on their total power and control. "As long as the system, through its ideology and constitution, maintains the principle of the leading role of the party," Selucky has argued, "it remains totalitarian in principle," even if the party does not exercise its right to dominate in an absolute way. *Ibid.*, 11. Regarding my understanding of the relevance of the totalitarian approach, see further.

⁷ See George Breslauer, "On the Adaptability of Soviet Welfare-State Authoritarianism," in Soviet Society and the Communist Party, ed. Karl W. Ryavec (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1978). See also Brown and Gray, Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States, esp. 253; and also Thomas H. Rigby, "Introduction: Political Legitimacy, Weber and Communist Mono-organizational Systems," in Political Legitimation in Communist States, ed. T. H. Rigby and F. Feher (London: Macmillan, 1982).

first two points.⁸ From the perspective of the extent of the state's involvement in the political and economic processes, one deals with what Schöpflin has called "the Communist-built 'hyper-state,'" i.e. one characterized by the centralized non-market economy and the monopoly control of political power by a single party.⁹ All the communist states officially shared a common purpose as engendered in the "universal" ideology of Marxist-Leninism. They also sought "to build a new society."¹⁰ In the literature on communist systems, numerous references have been made to the teleological or chiliastic dimension of communist ideology (Jowitt, Leslie Holmes, and Tismaneanu). Communist ideology has been said to serve, among other functions, as a guide to some distant but feasible end-goal of a society of widespread justice, abundance, and harmony.¹¹

Ideology of the communist regimes was quite unambiguous about its

⁸ See also Leslie Holmes, Politics in the Communist World and Jowitt, "An organizational approach to the study of political culture in Marxist-Leninist systems." Johnson has listed six "general methods" used by all ruling Communist parties, especially after coming to power. Johnson, "Comparing Communist Nations," 27-8. On the survey of "many concepts of communism as a system", see András Bozóki, "From Soft Communism to Post-Communism: Authoritarian Legacy and Democratic Transition in Hungary," in Transition to Capitalism, ed. János M. Kovács (London: Transaction Publishers, 1994), 144.

⁹ See George Schöpflin, "Obstacles to Liberalism in Post-Communist Politics," East European Politics and Societies 5.1 (Winter 1991): 189.

¹⁰ Johnson, "Comparing Communist Nations," 7.

¹¹ As such, ideology might act as a motivator of hard work and faith in a better future. To what extent it really had fulfilled this purpose in state-socialist countries is a difficult question to answer. It is of course true, that the most utopian part of ideology of communism as an end in itself was quietly forgotten in most of the "communist" countries by the end of the 1980s at the latest. "Simultaneously. . . [the Party] enforced its monopoly on political enfranchisement, social privilege, and ideological insight into what was historically and absolutely correct." Jowitt, The World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction, 227.

acceptance of, at least temporarily, the necessity of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" as one of its creative forces during the transitional stage of "socialism." This postulate of dictatorship was reformulated into a concept of democratic centralism (which is, in itself, from the perspective of the modern understanding of democracy, a contradiction of terms), by Lenin both for the purpose of imagery and as a practical organizational principle of the party and its role in society. The objective was to gain and maintain complete control by the leadership over the Communist party and to give the party elite control over all elements of society.¹²

To enforce and maintain this control, adequate institutions and their hierarchy had to be in place. There seems to be an agreement among students of communism that, especially in the first (i.e. the Stalinist or totalitarian), phase, the communist systems all displayed an almost identical set of institutional features. The prominent Czech political scientist Zdeněk Mlynář has identified several such characteristics in his analysis of Soviet-type regimes before 1953: *a) a total merger of political and economic power, b) substantial dependency of the social status (of groups and individuals) on the political power, c) the concentration of power in the hands of the Communist party apparatuses and the centralization of decision-making, d) system arrangements that do not guarantee important feedback between society and political power, e) mass political terror by security forces, and f) a kind of informational*

¹² In a communist rendition of the term, democratic centralism was "democratic" because it was based on formal elections by the people participating *en masse* and by the majority rule. It was centralist, since the decisions made at the top and at the higher levels of the party were always binding to the lower levels. But it was also centralist, in the sense that it was often misrepresented to the citizen, since mandatory nomination for political office was made from the higher levels to the lower levels, and the narrow party elite was free to select such people who would run the affairs of the party and the state in complete obedience to the group of people at the centre.

isolation of society. In addition, the system is typically considered by its promoters as being superior to other systems and attempts to institute a sort of "mandatory way of thinking."¹³ With regard to these features, the distinctions among individual communist countries were in terms of degree, rather than in substance.

A typology similar to Mlynář's has been elaborated by Dawisha and Brus. According to them, all state socialist countries in Eastern Europe experienced their own period of Stalinism, and in most of them at least some elements of the Stalinist model remained entrenched for decades. As Dawisha and Brus have elaborated, though Stalinism evolved in the USSR, "only with its uniform implantation throughout Eastern Europe it is possible to observe. . . the essential features of the common model." According to Dawisha, its "core and distinctive features as transmitted to Eastern Europe in the period of 1945-1953 were: 1) the cult of personality; 2) arbitrary rule by the leadership, with all organizations being mere transmission belts for this rule; 3) widespread use of terror and ritualistic purges as a means of controlling all sections of the populace; and 4) the subordination of all cultural, economic, and societal transactions to the needs of the state."¹⁴

Besides common institutional features, the ECE/EE countries also experienced the relatively rapid process of modernization and social transformation (though the rate of progress and the outcomes had varied). Since they had often faced the same challenges, they also typically shared the same or similar political strategies and

¹³ Zdeněk Mlynář, Krise v sovětských systémech (Koln: Index, 1983), 14-18.

¹⁴ Karen Dawisha, Eastern Europe, Gorbachev, and Reform: The Great Challenge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 70.

policies.¹⁵

Apart from the mentioned commonalities, the state-socialist societies of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union had differed from one another. They were different in the level of their economic development and many other significant respects, which would include both certain parameters of socialist/communist rule and their pre-communist past. Moreover, they differed in adaptations considered by the leadership of the day to be necessary, to the point that those adaptations have been acceptable to Moscow. These variations have been assessed by Goldfarb as follows:

" . . . it is crucial to remember that the social systems based on totalitarian culture vary significantly, and such variation presents changing opportunities for political action. Not only do the system's economic circumstances, national histories, and specific political experiences differ tremendously. . . , but the more basic relationship (from the point of view of political culture) between official truth, tolerated criticism, and autonomous culture have varied over time and space. This has led to changing opportunities for a variety of political strategies."¹⁶

Thus, when considering the diversity among communist countries, one must

¹⁵ The social mobilization and related processes regarding the peasant population which was in large numbers shifted to the working class, and industrialization were the most important social changes in the majority of Eastern European countries. See for instance Schopflin, "Culture and Identity in Post-Communist Europe," 21. Schopflin and Volgyes have pointed out some political culture implications of such a change. For instance, regarding the rise in the number of industrial labourers in Hungary: between 1946 and 1948 more than 150,000 peasants were recruited for the Hungarian machine industry alone; this also corresponds to the pattern established elsewhere in the region. See Volgyes, Politics in Eastern Europe, 243.

¹⁶ Jeffrey Goldfarb, Beyond Glasnost: The Post-Totalitarian Mind (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989), 183. In terms of applied strategies, communist regimes featured different intensity and effectiveness of central control, the varying degree of popular support or resistance, as well as the degree and the timing of attempts at reform. See also Katherine Verdery, What Was Socialism, And What Comes Next? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 19.

take into account: (1) the different level of socio-economic development (including that dating to the pre-communist era), and (2) a distinct type of "national" political culture (as the result of unique national history), as well as its mode of coming to power. To a large extent, diversity stems from the fact that Communist political systems existed as national states (albeit with a "limited sovereignty").¹⁷ With the exception of Czechoslovakia and partly the former East Germany, none of the communist states had had much pre-communist experience with liberal democracy, and very few had practised a matured industrialized market economy.¹⁸

In terms of variations in the economic system, one may find rather significant differences in the degree of marketization and liberalization of the economy at the end of the 1980s (as a result of the divergent development). The degree of marketization was the highest in Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia, and lowest in Czechoslovakia, Romania and Russia, with the GDR and Bulgaria somewhere in the middle of these two groups. Considering such diversity, several different "models" may be viewed to

¹⁷ See Johnson, "Comparing Communist Nations," 32.

¹⁸ Acknowledging these differences have led Gray to the "reasonable hypothesis that the divergences which have occurred in Communist states are due to national variables." Brown and Gray, Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States, 253. By the national variable Gray means most of all the political culture as it has shaped itself in the course of a nations' history. One objection to this, as Gray himself admits, may be that these divergences "might be more satisfactorily explained by differences in the socio-economic levels among these countries." However, Gray is reluctant to accept that this is the case. Referring to an international symposium on the communist studies held in 1976, he quotes that the participants found it impossible to accept "either that there was a simple correlation between political culture and socio-economic level, or that socio-economic development could be regarded as providing an independent and alternative explanation." Ibid. In my opinion, there is no conclusive solution to this issue, unless a specific model is elaborated which would sufficiently address the relationship between the historical and geographical profile of a country, its political culture and the level of its socio-economic development (respecting its individual stages).

have emerged later in the post-Stalinist period; in Janos' terminology, for instance, one was able to distinguish between the "liberal (or reformist) developmental" (Yugoslav, Polish, Hungarian), the "radical developmental" (Romanian), and the "neo-revolutionary" (Albanian) regimes.¹⁹ The standard of living also differed largely from one country to another, with the "richer" ones (Czechoslovakia, the GDR) comparable to poorer West European countries, and in many areas, especially within the Soviet Union, comparable to Third World countries.

As we know, similarities and commonalities make sense only in comparison to other units or sets of units; hence the commonalities within the post-communist area can be comparatively meaningful only vis-a-vis other regions or groups of countries. Such comparative relevance seems to be almost self-evident in this case: communist and early post-communist countries have been recognized as having systemic features that set them apart from other regions. L. Holmes, for example, has argued that - since this particular blend of characteristics is unique to post-communism - it is therefore "legitimate to identify post-communism as a phenomenon in its own right." Thus the relative coherence in similarity applies even though, as we have mentioned, traditional cultures had varied across the region and even though the individual transitional paths taken by individual ECE/EE countries have been relatively diverse as well as the way

¹⁹ See Andrew C. Janos, "What Was Communism: A Retrospective in Comparative Analysis," Communist and Post-Communist Studies 29.1 (1996): 14, and also 19-21. For instance, in Poland, the process of collectivization of land had been soon reversed, so that a large portion of agriculture remained under private ownership (this fact to a large extent prevented more intensive mechanization of the sector); in Hungary (under "Kadarism" after 1969 in particular) and in the GDR some small-scale private entrepreneurship was permitted (though not encouraged). Some political criticism was allowed in the former Yugoslavia (though not of Tito himself). The economic disparities between individual countries were significant (for example, the difference between Albania and Czechoslovakia was just as great as the economic disparity between Cuba and Canada).

they cope with the exigencies of transformation.²⁰ Widespread similarities across the region as prevailing over natural diversity has been recognized, for instance, by G. Vainshtein. He has believed that "there is a significant similarity between the current socio-psychological trends taking place in Russia and in other post-totalitarian nations in Central and Eastern Europe."²¹ According to Vainshtein, though socio-psychological divisions exist in post-totalitarian areas, "they are much more likely to occur within societies than between them", and this fact seems to be corroborated by empirical findings gathered in a number of post-communist countries.²²

Acknowledging these limitations, my analytical framework and interpretations apply to certain countries of the region more than to others. However, the underlying similarity and generic resemblance (due mostly to the strong integrating influence of

²⁰ Holmes, Post-Communism, 16. Generally speaking, according to Holmes, three general factors common and unique to post-communism may be distinguished: 1. the similar starting points defined by the communist legacies, 2. the comprehensive "dualism" of their attempts at transformation, and 3. the global context (space and time) in which these attempts have been made. *Ibid.*, 15.

²¹ Grigory Vainshtein, "Totalitarian Public Consciousness in a Post-Totalitarian Society: The Russian Case in the General Context of Post-Communist Developments," Communist and Post-Communist Studies 27.3 (1994): 247-259, esp. 257.

²² Vainshtein, *ibid.*, 247 and 256. See also Millar and Wolchik, The Social Legacy of Communism. One should not generalize too much when considering post-communist political culture since the historical experiences and transitional conditions often differ across the region and one can expect a great diversity in specific political-culture indicators. With regard to the internal (i.e. "national") differentiation within the PCM model, one should also assume that, given the complexity of the phenomenon, its constituent characteristics will have a strong tendency to a mutually-reinforcing causality (i.e. between the "national" and communist features), creating a specific dynamics of characteristics in individual countries. And since the original conditions differed from country to country, it is therefore obvious, that the resulting values of the PCM indicators would vary according to the starting conditions and specific transitional constellation in an individual country.

the region's hegemon - the Soviet Union) are being considered to have clear analytical significance. After all, they refer to the same historical experience of several generations. This is not to deny the reality that, as Offe has succinctly put it, in the final analysis, specific outcomes will be determined by the economic, political and cultural preconditions in individual countries during their respective histories, as well as by the constellation and strategies chosen in their transformations.²³

III.2 Institutional and ideological structures of communist countries (the causal field).

In a comparative analysis, the question that deserves attention is whether the countries showing roughly similar patterns of relationships between two variables have some attributes in common that possibly account for those similarities. Recognizing the argument that the study of political culture and its derivatives is most efficient in connection with the study of the political structure (system), this part of my thesis aims at analyzing the core conditions of the structure (system) that are believed to shape specific political-culture responses. Accordingly, I follow a suggestion by those who have maintained that we ought to see political culture largely as a response to a regime with a given organizational format.²⁴

Without committing myself to a specific theory of "communism", I will consider those institutional principles of the state-socialist system that have been

²³ See also Offe, Varieties of Transition, 138.

²⁴ See Leslie Holmes, Politics in the Communist World, and also Mlynar, Krize v sovětských systémech, and Karen Dawisha, Eastern Europe, Gorbachev, and Reform: The Great Challenge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

recognized in the literature on communism as essential and have an explanatory potential for my PCM argument. My analysis will thus evolve around Schopflin's "hyper-state" and its legacies.²⁵ In the process, I identify several formal organizational, social and ideological features, or rather clusters of features, that might have been instrumental in generating the PCM.

When dealing with the structure of the communist system, one should be aware that such a systemic structure is largely dependent on and inseparable from ideological principles (for example, the arrangement of party-based centralism directly corresponds to the tenet of the dictatorship of the proletariat). According to Jowitt, ideological "core tasks" had direct structural implications "for the organizational definition of the regime."²⁶ As Jowitt has specified: "Core task and central ideological tenets with their structural correlates provide the boundary conditions for the organizational definition of the regime and its relation with society."²⁷ It is then not surprising, that the following selected social and institutional features of communism /state socialism are closely interrelated and sometimes overlap in my model.

III.2.1 *The totalitarian aspect (and strong etatist authority patterns).*

Despite the fact that the concept of totalitarianism as the sole explanandum of "actually existing socialism" has been discarded by many scholars after the worst excesses of the Stalinist period (before 1953), many comparative analysts have been

²⁵ See Schopflin, "Obstacles to Liberalism in Post-Communist Polities," 189.

²⁶ Jowitt, "An organizational approach to the study of political culture in Marxist-Leninist systems," 1173-4.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 1174.

convinced that totalitarianism remains "the single most useful key to an understanding of politics in the communist world."²⁸ Recently, Hosking has "resurrected" (in his own words) the notion of totalitarianism. According to Hosking, one of the major distinct characteristics of the totalitarian system is its "unique pervasiveness." Hosking has maintained that "[T]he Communist Party not only leads and guides society, it penetrates it. It has its cells in every factory, farm, office, school, and block of flats."²⁹ Moreover, he has argued that "the first and perhaps most important feature of the totalitarian policy is that it produced a nation traumatized by its own past."³⁰ In a similar vein, Di Palma has made the case against discarding the term "totalitarianism" when describing post-Stalinist regimes in Eastern Europe.³¹

Totalitarian power, as contrasted to mere authoritarian power (to which it is

²⁸ Holmes, Politics in the Communist World, 384. See also William E. Odom, "A Dissenting View on the Group Approach to Soviet Politics," World Politics XXVIII.4 (1976), 542-67, and also Geoffrey Hosking, The Awakening of the Soviet Union (London: Heinemann, 1990). My argument is in part build upon the assumption that some of the important aspects of the "totalitarian model" employed previously in the communist studies described well the reality of the communist countries, not only in the "Stalinist" period but to a lesser degree well into the year 1989. To facilitate the acceptance of the totalitarian concept, a useful "ideal-type model" has been suggested by Holmes, based on Weber's notion of "ideal-types". In Holmes' flexible notion of totalitarianism, there is a continuum between the "totalitarian ideal-type" and "liberal-democratic ideal type". On this sliding continuum, it is possible for each of the characteristics of any regime to be evaluated in terms of "performance in time and space" (Holmes, *ibid.*, 388-9, esp. Fig. iii). I accept that a particular form of state socialism at various points in time and space could have been placed on the continuum of "Totalitarian-Democratic," relatively high toward the "totalitarian" end. "Totalitarianism in this respect is always a matter of degree." Johnson, "Comparing Communist Nations," 18.

²⁹ Hosking, The Awakening of the Soviet Union, 10.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 8 and 10.

³¹ Di Palma, "Legitimation from the Top to Civil Society: Politico-Cultural Change in Eastern Europe," World Politics 44 (Oct. 1991): 51.

generically related), aspires to maintain a permanent and deep-penetrating control over society and to adjust and mold all aspects of society to the unitary ideological goals.³² This notion acknowledges the fact that totalitarianism - though in principle nothing new in history - is in many respects a product of the twentieth century, when conditions created by modernization and especially technology have provided possibilities for a more comprehensive organization of the state around its centre, and a more penetrating and wide-scale involvement by the state and/or its dictatorial centre in the lives of the population, than in earlier periods.³³ According to standard definitions, totalitarianism is a form of government in which all societal resources are monopolized by the state in an effort to penetrate and control all aspects of public and

³² Here I accept that the general notion of totalitarianism which emphasizes the differences between totalitarian dictatorships and other forms of dictatorship or autocracy. See, for example, Carl Friedrich, "The Evolving Theory and Practice of Totalitarian Regimes," in Totalitarianism in Perspective, ed. C. Friedrich et al. (London: Pall Mall, 1969), 123-164; and Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (London: Andre Deutsch, 1984).

³³ The term *totalitario* was used by Mussolini in the early 1920s to describe his idea of the new (fascist) state, which was supposed to be hegemonistic and all-inclusive: "All within the state, none outside the state, none against the state." Quoted from Keith Crawford, East Central European politics today. From chaos to stability? (Manchester University Press, 1996), 44. Linz wrote of the distinction between totalitarian and authoritarian dictatorships stating that the "essential criterion is that of transformability and irreversibility of the regime." Quoted from Di Palma, "Legitimation from the Top to Civil Society: Politico-Cultural Change in Eastern Europe," 52. For a comparison between "some elements of absolutism and totalitarianism," see Horvath and Szakolczai, The dissolution of communist power: The case of Hungary, esp. 170-71. Some aspects of the "totalitarian concept" have been identified in the critique of mass democracy as found in the writings of, among others, Tocqueville, Lord Acton, or Ortega y Gasset, who seemed to anticipate totalitarianism understood as an extreme form of democracy (close to the old Greek notion, especially that of Plato). According to this notion, today we are witnessing the triumph of a "hyperdemocracy in which the mass acts directly, outside the law, imposing its aspirations and its desires." Benjamin R. Barber, "Conceptual Foundations of Totalitarianism," in Totalitarianism in Perspective: Three Views, ed. Carl J. Friedrich et al. (New York: Prager Publishers, 1969), 18.

private life. This control is facilitated by propaganda and by advances in technology. Totalitarian regimes mobilize and make use of mass political participation and seek the complete reconstruction of the individual and society; dictatorships attempt simply to rule over the individual and society, i.e. they seek to dominate all aspects of national life.³⁴ In this type of system, ideology at the same time served both to strengthen and to deflect attention from these totalitarian features. It provided justification to the fact that there was no room for independent interest groups in the Western sense of the term or other autonomous organizations of civil society; all organizations representing (nominally) special interests, including labor unions, functioned effectively as "transmission belts" of the party's goals and wishes, serving "the good" of society as defined by the party.³⁵

Although power in the totalitarian system may be generally defined in the same terms as power in other types of systems - i.e. as an unequal relationship obviating certain privileges for its holder - in the former system-type, power is distinct in its

³⁴ Mostafa Rejai, "Totalitarianism," in Grolier Academic Encyclopedia, 1993, CompuServe 5 April 1997, n. pag. In their influential analysis of totalitarianism, Friedrich and Brzezinski, in their 1956 book, identified the six principle features of the syndrome which constitutes totalitarianism: (i) an official ideology, doctrine which covers all vital aspects of man's existence and contains a chiliastic claim; (ii) a single mass party with a hard core passionately and unquestioningly dedicated to the ideology; (iii) a system of terrorist police control, with the secret police "systematically exploiting modern science and more especially scientific psychology"; (iv) a technologically conditioned near-complete monopoly of control of all means of mass communication; (v) monopoly of all means of armed combat; (vi) central control of the entire economy through the bureaucratic co-ordination. Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956), 9-10.

³⁵ . . . And ultimately by the leader or group of people in power. See Volgyes, Politics in Eastern Europe, 112-13. Some would argue that the state in the Soviet bloc had become a legal fiction, a mere extension of the 'polymorphous' Party. Jowitt, here adapted from Jacques Rupnik, The Other Europe (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988), 132.

"totality", in the way that it cannot and in fact must not be opposed. Because of its monopoly, totalitarian power is able, according to Mlynář, in all spheres of activity and in relation to all subjects (social and economic groups, citizens) "to impose the extrapolation of projection of its internal structure."³⁶ Thus the main characteristic of totalitarian rule is its ability to eliminate space for independent action, especially in the economic and political spheres. In this respect, the degree of violence or terror employed is almost irrelevant: what matters is that power "remains 'totalitarian' even when the forms of repression are less visible."³⁷

Even at the stage of "actually existing socialism" the communist regimes in ECE/EE would be placed somewhere on the scale between strongly authoritarian and totalitarian systems (they can be called "semi-totalitarian" systems). As Václav Havel has written about the nature of communist rule and its implications,

"... the fact [is] that communism was far from being simply the dictatorship of one group of people over another. It was a genuinely totalitarian system - that is, it penetrated every aspect of life and deformed everything it touched, including all the natural ways people had developed of living together. It profoundly affected all forms of human behavior. For years, a specific structure of values and models of behavior was deliberately fostered in the

³⁶ Here quoted from Rupnik, *ibid.*, 234. Deutsch's definition of power may serve as a good starting point for understanding totalitarian power: "By power we mean the ability of an individual or an organization to impose extrapolations or projections of their inner structure upon their environment. In simple language, to have power means not to give in, and to force the environment or the other person to do so. Power in this narrow sense is the priority of output over intake, the ability to talk instead of listen. In a sense, it is the ability not to learn." Quoted from Rupnik 1988, *ibid.*

³⁷ Rupnik, *ibid.* The difference between totalitarianism and post-totalitarianism has been well explained by Jan Sokol, a Czech dissident: "Under totalitarianism you still had people who believed in the communist utopia, under post-totalitarianism no one believed in it any more . . . but you still had to obey." Quoted from Crawford, East Central European politics today. From chaos to stability?, 50.

consciousness of society. It was a perverted structure, one that went against all the natural tendencies of life, but society nevertheless internalized it, or, rather, was compelled to internalize it."³⁸

In the context of this thesis' argument, one may assume that such a totalitarian-in-principle constellation not only paralyzed any civil society and more democratic life but had, over time, also left specific imprints on human minds and formed people's attitudes both to their own lifeworlds and to the public sphere and its artifacts.

III.2.2 Centrally-planned, state-owned economy, and social paternalism.

Economic activities in communist (state-socialist) countries were, by definition, based on state and collective ownership of the means of production and by an almost absolute centralization of major economic decision-making within the organs of the party-state. The state-planned economy was founded on the preponderance of state property rights, i.e. on the nationalization (and collectivization) of the principal means of production; in some countries, virtually all means of production had been nationalized. Under the conditions of the centrally-planned socialist market, there was virtually no competition between firms for market share, with the result of over-all excess demand for (especially consumer) goods. In principle, the system was characterized by almost a total merger of political and economic power.³⁹ By destroying the boundaries that in modern market societies set apart economy and polity, communist systems assigned to the party-state direct and supreme responsibility for provision of most if not all goods and services, as well as to function

³⁸ Václav Havel, The Art of Impossible. Politics and Morality in Practice: Speeches and Writings, 1990-1996 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997), 117.

³⁹ Mlynář, Krise v sovětských systémech, 14.

as an engine of economic growth. In the economic system, where central planning and state ownership were the key principles, the invisible hand of the market was supplanted by the omnipresent hand of the reglementing party-state apparatus, by administrative orders and allocations. As Kaminski has noted, "[T]he economy became fused with the party-state, and the latter displaced objective economic with subjective political criteria."⁴⁰

With private ownership of the majority of the means of production abolished (particularly in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union; in Czechoslovakia, 98 percent of GDP product was in the hands of the state), human resources were employed exclusively in the public sphere. Irrespective of the type of work and profession, the overwhelming majority of people had to earn their living from employment in state or collective enterprises. As a result, the division of life between the world of privately owned things and the world of publicly owned property was inevitably dichotomic. The existence of the boundary between the two worlds, as Holy describes the Czechoslovak situation, "affected morality, the value of time and property, modes of conduct, patterns of hospitality and socializing, etc. . . "⁴¹ For instance, different norms and attitudes applied to the dealings of private and of public or "socialist" (i.e. state or cooperative) property. This in part explains why widespread theft and pilfering of socialist property was in fact encouraged by society at large. (This was well epitomized in a popular Czech saying, "Anyone who does not steal is robbing his family.")⁴²

⁴⁰ Bartolomiej Kaminski, "The Legacy of Communism," in East-Central European Economies in Transition, ed. John P. Hardt and Richard F. Kaufman (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), 13.

⁴¹ Holy, The Little Czech and the Great Czech Nation, 19.

⁴² On lying and deceit in the public and private sphere, see Holy, *ibid.*, 24. Such arrangements may be seen as a sign that the popular priority was assigned to the satisfaction of private over public needs, i.e. contrary to the ideal of the "new man"

Overall, the communist system tended to discourage responsibility, initiative and the risk-taking mentality characteristic of entrepreneurial capitalism.

III.2.3 *The social contract.*

One may ask why then was there, for the most part, a sort of "silence of arms" or "truce" between society at large and the oppressive communist rulers, who, on top of their withdrawal of many political rights, were not even able to provide enough (often basic) consumer goods? The framework of the socialist economy with its paradoxical distortions as measured by the standard of the Western market economy had supported the relatively low standard of living on the one hand; on the other hand it had produced specific expectations of what the state was supposed to do.⁴³

Cook (1993), for instance, and others have argued that there existed between the state and the population a social contract: the citizens "adapted themselves" by giving up their individual rights (civil liberties) and collective rights (freedom of association), and received in exchange job security, non-interference by the state in

morally committed to the higher interests and goals of society. The misappropriation of socialist property and the attitude to work may be seen as manifestations of alienation from socialist ideals and from the structures which should ideally have been their realization. See Holy, *ibid.*, 26.

⁴³ The contrast between the two types of economy, the state-socialist and the market one, as seen through the prism of the everyday life, has been well captured by Claus Offe: "In the European capitalist democracies, queues form in front of the job offices, while in the countries of 'really existing socialism' they do in front of butcher shops. In the first, there is a 'reserve army' of workers waiting to be employed as well as a reserve army of commodities waiting for customers, while in the second the managers wait for workers and the workers wait for consumer goods." Claus Offe: "Ist der Sozialismus am Ende?," *Die Zeit* 8 Dec. 1989: 64. Quoted from Zygmunt Bauman, "The Polish Predicament," *TELOS* 92 (Summer 1992): 118.

their private lives and, as was hoped, the slowly rising standard of living in the future. In this notion, such a tacit contract committed each party to delivering broadly understood political or economic goods valued by the other. In exchange for the regime's provision of economic and social security, the society "consented to the party's extensive and monopolistic power, accepted state domination of the economy and complied with authoritarian political norms." In Cook's words, under the terms of such a contract, the political leadership "had to provide employment security, broad social welfare, and increasing income equality to fulfil popular expectations and to buy compliance and legitimacy."⁴⁴ Thus, as a trade-off for curtailing many freedoms, such a state provided "equalizing" services to its citizens which became taken for granted by them, especially as they seemingly came at no cost to anybody.

This kind of relationship between the population and the state led to what the Poles call *państwo opiekuńcze* (a tutelar state), which had nurtured the dependency of citizens on the state, one could say, "from the cradle to the grave." However, part of this relationship was also a (folklore) criticism (professed mostly in private) on the part of the populace against the state "powers that be." Monopoly, of course, also means sole responsibility. Thus, the tendency prevailed to hold the regime responsible not

⁴⁴ See Linda J. Cook, The Soviet Social Contract and Why It Failed (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), 2-3. According to Cook, the social contract thesis has three main empirical requirements: 1. that the regime consistently deliver to workers economic security and social welfare; 2. that the regime deliver these policy goods because it is constrained by its perception of worker's expectations or its fear of labor discontent if it fails to deliver them; 3. that workers give in exchange political compliance and quiescence. The social contract thesis assumes, however, that if the state failed to deliver such benefits, the people would withdraw their consent and compliance and turn to some forms of political challenge or discontent. That this did not always happen (though the events in Poland in 1970 and 1980 could be interpreted as the consequence of the breach of the social contract on the part of the communist regime), is one of the reason for caution before fully accepting the thesis. See Cook, *ibid.*

only for gross mismanagement and injustices but also for any regular problems of governing.⁴⁵

As a result, a specific, symbiotic mode of relationship between citizens and the communist regime had been created: on one hand, the state served as a milked cow; on the other, it could be reviled (in an innocuous rhetoric mostly) for every single failure in delivery. The paternalist state, in taking care of many people's basic needs, emaciated most people's sense of individual responsibility and partly succeeded in promoting the half-illusion of widespread egalitarianism. By providing some social goods at a fraction of their actual price or for free, the relationship between the consumption and the productivity of work required to maintain the level of social service became distorted and non-transparent.

What was said in this context by Rudolf Woderich about the state-citizens' relationship in Eastern Germany is largely valid for other post-communist countries: "The paternalistic largesse and discipline of the socialist welfare state infantilised citizens, making them both entirely dependent on state bureaucracies and socially irresponsible."⁴⁶ Such a contract seemed to work well especially in Hungary from the late 1960s, in the form of "goulash socialism," but to a large extent also in Husák's

⁴⁵ Interestingly, this fact was also often used to advantage by dissidents. Part of the general platform of dissident movements was the accusation that the system did not deliver what it had promised, hence dissidents wanted the state to bring its practice closer to its own proclaimed ideal. The impossibility of fulfilling this promise had often made the regime seem even more hypocritical and incompetent than in reality it might have been.

⁴⁶ Rudolf Woderich. Quoted from McFalls, Communism's Collapse, Democracy's Demise?, 92.

Czechoslovakia since the beginning of the 1970s.⁴⁷ That the conditions of the relationship had often tangible advantages for large segments of the population has been generally recognized.⁴⁸ No matter how the centralized, totalitarian-in-principle rule limited the choices of ordinary citizens, the social policies pursued by the socialist state should be assessed in a balanced way. As Offe has argued (as well as some others), the social policy performance of the socialist state "deserves a mixed but generally favourable evaluation." To illustrate this point, I quote key social achievements of state socialism as included in the list presented by Offe:

- a) State socialism has provided a free and universal system of health, education and vocational training to its citizens;
- b) It provided heavily subsidized housing (which, however, remained scarce and qualitatively deficient in some places);
- c) Formal unemployment was virtually unknown (an accomplishment on the other side of which were vast inefficiencies of production);
- d) Child care services were generously provided (perhaps also in order to free female labor for employment and to maximize children's exposure to state socialization);

⁴⁷ The data taken in Hungary in the late Kadar period show that on a long list of values for Hungarian citizens life without worries meant the most important social value. This may of course be both the result of the functional contract by the Kadar regime and the natural reaction of appreciating the peaceful break in the tumultuous national history. See Janos Simon, "Post-paternalist Political Culture in Hungary: Relationship Between Citizens and Politics During and After the 'Melancholic Revolution' (1989-1991)," Communist and Postcommunist Studies 26.2 (June 1993): 226-238.

⁴⁸ See also Claus Offe, "The Politics of Social Policy in East European Transitions: Antecedents, Agents, and Agenda of Reform," Social Research 60.4 (Winter 1993): 649-684; and Cook, The Soviet Social Contract and Why It Failed; and elsewhere.

e) Many mass consumption items, including basic food, were heavily subsidized;

f) Income inequality was significantly lower than in market societies - however, disposable income was also lower. (Czechoslovakia was, in this respect, the most egalitarian country in the region.)⁴⁹

Despite the apparent contractual character of such a relationship, in particular in the Soviet Union and the GDR, such a contract was supported by threat of force rather than based on symmetrical consent. As for instance White has testified, the Soviet citizen's ideal, it appeared, was a "paternalistic state with extremely wide powers which it would vigorously exercise to control the nation's destiny, but which yet served the interests of the citizens benignly. . . and left him with a certain amount of freedom of desire and a feeling of freedom from arbitrary interference and punishment."⁵⁰ Speaking of the former GDR, Maaz has said: "It was clear that the repressive power of the State was exercised in a tutelary solicitous manner, which cultivated the familiar 'welfare mentality' of the East German citizens and covered up the fact that the people had been incapacitated."⁵¹ Although the "social contract" thesis has its merits as well as flaws (especially when treated as a dominant thesis), it usefully highlights the dynamics of the confusing symbiotic relationship between communist regimes and their populations (i.e. especially in the post-Stalinist period when the

⁴⁹ For a complete account, see Offe, "The Politics of Social Policy in East European Transitions," 667.

⁵⁰ White, Political Culture and Soviet Politics, 104.

⁵¹ Maaz, Behind the Wall, 87. According to Maaz, "an important and peculiar feature of life in East Germany was the pronounced infantilism of the population. An entire people was kept in eternal 'childhood,' the same way children are tortured, made stupid, and subjugated in church schools. The State was the big, all-knowing, always-in-the-right, authoritarian, decision-making 'father'." Ibid., 86.

reliance on force had generally diminished). The effects of such a relationship over the decades on people's attitudes, habits, and their perception of the role of the state are expected to translate into similar attitudinal and behavioral patterns vis-a-vis the post-communist state and its emergent institutions.

III.2.4 The implications of ideology for language and thinking (communist indoctrination and "doublespeak").

Ideology is commonly understood as a set of (false) beliefs, as the secular religion of the modern age, and as having totalizing aspects in any of its embodiments. Marxist-Leninist ideology in claiming to be the only "true" ideology and in its aspirations to bring about a total reconstruction of society and its political system, necessarily emphasizes the need for a unitary and homogeneous action that must absorb elements of violence to achieve the desired goal of radical change in power-structures and retain control of the latter.⁵² According to the proclaimed ideal of "communism,"

"Communist society was to be the embodiment of all the fundamental ideals of humanity - equality, justice, freedom, abolishment of exploitation, respect for human dignity, and total fulfilment of social needs. The blueprint for such a *societas perfecta* was the ultimate goal, and the Communist party, holding all power in its hands, became the main executor and guardian of that Design."⁵³ In reality, there was a major contradiction between the optimist ideal and the reality of the practising communist regimes. In principle, to all variants of socialism or communism that are

⁵² See also Leslie Holmes, Politics in the Communist World, esp. 96-118.

⁵³ Mirosława Marody, "From Social Idea to Real World," in Constructing Capitalism, ed. Kazimierz Z. Poznanski (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 160.

"totalitarianism-in-principle" applies what Hannah Arendt has suggested as pertaining to ideologies in general:

"The claim to total explanation promises to explain all historical happenings, the total explanation of the past, the total knowledge of the present, and the reliable prediction of the future. . . . [In] this capacity ideological thinking becomes independent of all experience from which it cannot learn anything new."⁵⁴

Similarly, others have treated the usage of ideology by communist regimes as the "mass monologue" referring mostly to a process of self-legitimation, i.e. "a continual attempt on the part of the rulers to convince *themselves* of their legitimacy."⁵⁵ Meyer has suggested that this self-legitimation function of ideological activity leads to the systematic distortion of reality, implying that communist regimes' ideology is not only deceptive but also "self-deceptive." According to him, ideology was the language of politics in Soviet-bloc countries and "served as the code of

⁵⁴ Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 471. And she adds: "Ideological argumentation . . . does not spring from experience but is self-generated, . . . because it transforms the one and only point that is taken and accepted from experienced reality into an axiomatic premise, leaving from then on the subsequent argumentation process completely untouched from any further experience. Once it has established its premise, its point of departure, experiences no longer interfere with ideological thinking, nor can it be taught by reality." Ibid., 741. As Arendt has further argued, just as terror ruins basically all relationships between men, so do the effects of ideological thinking ruin relationships with reality and with the other people; "for together with these contacts, men lose the capacity of both experience and thought." [Arendt: "The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or the Convinced Communist, but people for who the distinction between fact and fiction (i.e., the reality of experience) and the distinction between true and false (i.e., the standards of thoughts) no longer exist." Ibid., 474.

⁵⁵ Alfred G. Meyer, "The Functions of Ideology in the Soviet Political System," in Comparative Communism: The Soviet, Chinese, and Yugoslav Models, ed. Gary K. Bertsch, and Thomas W. Ganschow (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1970), 134-143.

communications."⁵⁶ In this notion, the language of Marxism-Leninism as the official state ideology usurped and dominated the entire public sphere, and through the system of quasi-societal organizations and associations, permeated most people's lives outside strictly private domains. It was true "linguistic dictatorship."⁵⁷ As Urban has put it, "[the language of Marxism-Leninism] reverberated from party rostrums, through the lecture halls of academic institutions, at production conferences and voters' meeting, in newspapers and films, over television and radio and, iconographically, in the ubiquitous presence of propaganda billboards, wall posters and banners exhorting all to participate in its (literally) unquestionable 'truths'."⁵⁸

To help conceal the discrepancy between ideology and reality, power in this ideologized and totalized constellation tended to promote structures and communication channels in which secrecy is one of the main features of political communication. Zinoviev, for instance, has well described the workings and

⁵⁶ Ibid., 139 (emphasis in the original) and *ibid.*, esp. 136-137.

⁵⁷ Rupnik, The Other Europe, 232.

⁵⁸ Michael Urban et al., The rebirth of politics in Russia (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 17. Part of the propagandist language of communist ideology was not only embellishing one own's socialist reality but also promises that any difficulties, especially in the economic sphere, can be quickly eliminated. (However, we must not forget, that some of the original promises had been fulfilled, at least for certain strata.) Some terms (proletariat, internationalism, the Soviet Union, people's democracy) acquired exclusively positive connotations, while others (capitalist, imperialism, the United States, liberal democracy) were invariably perceived as negative. On this topic, see also Leslie Holmes, Politics in the Communist World, esp. 111, who quotes from Michael Waller's *Language of Communism*. See also Karen H. Dawisha, "The Roles of Ideology in the Decision-Making of the Soviet Union," International Relations IV.2 (Nov. 1972): 156-75. Holmes has also noted that, in terms of pure ideology, some communists believed in it more than others, most of the latter being just careerists and opportunists of the sort which could be found in the ranks of every communist party. See Holmes, *ibid.*, 117.

implications of such an arrangement:

"The system of secrecy is one of the essential features of Communist power. It penetrates the whole life of society. Closed sessions, meetings, directives, councils and deliberations, signed statements about non-disclosure, passes, rights of entry. The functions of secrecy are fairly transparent. The first aim is to hide what happens from strangers and from one's own people and to reduce to a minimum the extent to which people are informed. The badly-informed individual is easier to rule and manipulate. Further, secrecy renders demagoguery as well as disinformation and the lies of propaganda less open to attack. It confers more significance on the powers-that-be in the eyes of the uninformed mass . . . The system of secrecy is supplemented by a system of disinformation which is carried through so completely that even its instigators can no longer draw a line between fact and fiction."⁵⁹

The former GDR was, according to Maaz, a kind of "huge temple of a pseudoreligious cult." It had all the trappings of such a cult: godlike veneration of the leader, pictures of "saints" and quotations from their teachings, processions, mass rituals, vows, and strict moral demands and commandments administered by propagandists and Party secretaries who held priestly rank.⁶⁰ Similarly, the Czech writer and philosopher Milan Šimečka has described suggestively how one can become trapped in the devious world of lies. "Like Winston [the hero of Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four*], I had grown up in a totalitarian system, had never been elsewhere, lacked all knowledge of the past, the present. . . In a way too I was an employee of the Ministry of Truth and lived in the thrall of its ideology. Just like Winston, I knew only too well how lies were manufactured. . ."⁶¹

⁵⁹ Alexander Zinoviev, The Reality of Communism (New York: Schocken Books, 1984), 210-11.

⁶⁰ Maaz, Behind the Wall, 4.

⁶¹ Quoted from Rupnik, The Other Europe, 230.

In fact, as the main idea of Orwell's book indicates, while for the conquest of power the naked force of guns may be necessary, the maintenance of totalitarian power requires most of all a totalitarian language which is both convincing and backed up by power to the degree that it "corrects" the reality and also prevents "heretical" ideas from emerging and taking hold. In the words of Leszek Kolakowski, the "art" of manipulation of the truth had been perfected to the degree at which the boundaries between the reality and its fabrication disappeared. Leszek Kolakowski has explained this aspect of communist communication as follows:

"If . . . there is absolutely no way anybody can establish what is 'true' in the normal sense of the word, nothing remains but the generally imposed beliefs, which, of course, can be again cancelled the next day. There is no applicable criterion of truth except for what is proclaimed true at any given moment. And so, the lie really becomes truth, or at least, the distinction between true and false in their usual meaning has disappeared. This is the great cognitive triumph of totalitarianism; it cannot be accused of lying any longer since it has succeeded in abrogating the very idea of truth."⁶²

In this sense, the "institutionalized lie" has become a ritual as prophesied by George Orwell.⁶³

This has also been confirmed by other analysts, who have acknowledged that there had been a change in the function and internalization of the ruling ideology in

⁶² Leszek Kolakowski; here quoted from Di Palma, "Legitimation from the Top to Civil Society," 65.

⁶³ Translating into individual psychology, the inability to meaningfully establish the border between truth and lies has been captured in Milosz's concept of *Ketman*, a false "true believer" who is superior to non-believers. It is "self-realization against something" what lies in the core of his belief. Since no other correlations are necessary, Milosz concludes that he "who practices Ketman lies." Czeslaw Milosz, The Captive Mind (New York: A. Knopf, 1953), 80. See also Almond's book on associations between social and individual psychology and the communist party affiliation: Gabriel A. Almond, The Appeals of Communism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954).

communist countries - the ideology had increasingly become almost entirely ritualistic during the late 1950 and 1960s. Ideology in these "post-totalitarian" societies had become a "residual construct" (Tismaneanu) which, though it ceased to inspire the populace with any degree of genuine enthusiasm or loyalty and was being manipulated for the single purpose of holding on to power. As ideology became reduced to mere ritual, it contributed to the precipitation of the gap between the private and public spheres. The dichotomy of the private and public spheres led to the "normalization" of double-standard situations that referred both to actions and to speech. In verbal communication, which is the most utilized form of human communication, this phenomenon is often called "doublespeak" or "doubletalk," or even "structures of organized lying."⁶⁴ At its core, there was an evident dissociation between things told in public and messages exchanged in private. In public contexts, or roles, people "would routinely use specific language: specific syntax, vocabulary, and phraseology."⁶⁵ However, in public utterances, particularly in official public speeches associated more intimately with a regime's policy, speakers would make "dogmatic, uncritical, and ideologically flavoured claims. Not many listeners take them seriously and the speakers themselves turn to a completely different language and defend opposite claims as soon as they leave public situations."⁶⁶

⁶⁴ Timothy Garton Ash, "Eastern Europe: The Year of Truth., New York Review of Books 15 Feb. 1990: 17-22. See also Sztompka, "The Intangibles and Imponderables of the Transition to Democracy," 303.

⁶⁵ Sztompka, *ibid.*, 303.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 303. Accepting the argument that after Stalin, there had been "de-radicalization;" see Robert C. Tucker, The Soviet Political Mind: Stalinism and Post-Stalin Change (New York: Norton, 1971); or "rationalization" (Brzezinski) of Soviet ideology. This did not mean that the semantic coherence of the public language increased, quite the contrary, as is evident from its usage aimed to conceal the apparent gap between language and reality. See also Janos, "What Was

In Kaminski's view, problems in the constitution of the public realm are crucial here. The public sphere as he has defined it, is "the domain of the intermediate, in which various organizations and institutions communicate, negotiate, coordinate their actions, and compete." Only when this domain is sufficiently developed and diversified "can society control the state and keep its powers restrained."⁶⁷ Such societal

Communism: A Retrospective in Comparative Analysis," esp. 11. On the dynamics of "Marxism-Leninism as an artificially constructed language of public communication maintained by the coercive force of the state," see also Urban et al., The rebirth of politics in Russia, esp. 18-19. With regard to the broad semantic environment in communist states, see also Antoni Z. Kaminski, An Institutional Theory of Communist Regimes (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1992), esp. 244-6, and 252. Quite an elaborated formulation of the relationship between the regime and its power on the one hand and its language on the other, has been put forward by a Polish poet Alexander Wat, who has enumerated several characteristic features of Marxist-Leninist language as a "political instrument of the party leadership," imposed upon society by terror as a binding in all situations. Alexander Wat, Świat na haku i pod kluczem (London: Polonia, 1985). The described language situation and dysfunctions in communication have been reflected in the development of "semantically coded critical communication" among many societal strata. To this category of coded communication belonged political jokes, allegories, innuendos, emphases and mannerism of language, routinized hints, etc. These "horizontal voices" as Di Palma has labelled them, offered an alternative to the "vertical voice". According to Di Palma, coding created an emotional and cognitive bond among opponents of the regime, who came to recognize that they are not alone." Close to this category was a form of dissidence that was unique to communism: samizdat, i.e. the phenomenon of circulating clandestine publications among certain societal strata, mostly carrying material critical of the regime, production and distribution of which (and often even reading) constituted a serious criminal offence. See Di Palma, "Legitimation from the Top to Civil Society," esp. 71.

⁶⁷ In this way, the public domain is broader than civil society and includes the state. "The state becomes, then, only an element, albeit a crucial one, in the public domain." Kaminski, An Institutional Theory of Communist Regimes, 129. For the public domain to be able to function, as a medium of discourse, certain communicative preconditions have to be met. Kaminski has singled out the following ones: "the formal equality of parties, a commonly understood language, rules of the game that are accepted by all sides within the relationship, and a recognized obligation to honor agreements (or contracts)." Ibid.

conditions, however, were not attainable in the one-sided power relationship within the communist state; since, communist ideology (both theoretical and practical) was reflected in the "language of communism" and provided the terminology and the "rules of the game" structured by power through which reality and its adjusted images were expressed. As a result, virtually all public communicative situations - since they functioned largely as a one-way chain-of-command - became peculiarly distorted power relations. The fact was that the language and communicative patterns of the official sphere often dramatically differed from the language used within the private domain; this (as one may expect) led to a diminishing of people's ability to engage in a natural public discourse, and also to their resignation on its very significance.⁶⁸

For the communist regimes as "mythocratic dictatorships,"⁶⁹ their only reason to stay in power was the ideologically defined, predestined role of the working class and its vanguard party. Generations of citizens in countries of the Soviet-system had been, to a greater or lesser degree, indoctrinated by Marxist-Leninist ideology and at least subconsciously affected by the way ideology structures society's functions. Such conditions demanded a great deal of conformity on the part of the population, and this is obviously expected to have left severe imprints on the psychological matrix of the individual, and by extension, on society at large.

⁶⁸ It has also been argued that such closed communication systems seem to have "inherently pathological tendencies," particularly in critical situations. See Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1966), 184.

⁶⁹ Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics, 282.

III.2.5 The issue of political communication.

The pervasiveness of ideology in "an ideological society" and its regime's power structure (Zinoviev), as well as its general destructiveness, had negatively affected the circulation of information within society and for political communication as such. In this regard, Pye has suggested that all social processes may be analyzed in terms of structure, content, and flow of communication.⁷⁰ For Pye, the basic character of a political culture is determined in part by the relationship between communications and the processes through which political interests are expressed. In this notion, articulation and aggregation constitute two such processes of interests' expressions. First, every system while functioning contains articulations of interests, claims and demands for political action, which are usually expressed through pressure and/or interest groups. Second, in aggregation, various claims and interests are combined in the formulation of a policy or action.⁷¹

More specifically, there has been an increased unity among political scientists that politics, which is always a matter of exercising power, may be understood along two dimensions: communication and organization. In an ideal-type construct-model, as depicted in Fig. 3., both of these forms of action appear under different aspects of "meta-organizations" or systemic levels. In a system where the sphere of the state has hegemonized all other levels (and all forms of organization as such), authoritative

⁷⁰ Lucian W. Pye, Communication and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), esp. 226.

⁷¹ See Pye, *ibid.*

communication dominates societal life at the expense of other forms.⁷² According to Habermas, ideology (in contrast to democracy) "restricts or limits social processes of communication by the structure of domination or power." If this is the case, the language and communication of the dominated group remains inadequate or inarticulate, and results in distorted perceptions of both internal and external realities, on the part of both the dominated and dominating groups.⁷³

In a model of political communication elaborated by Easton and after him by Deutsch, it was implied that the capacity of a system to respond effectively to stress would focus on the process of feedback, which should ideally provide comprehensive information about the state of the system and its environment. Such information is then communicated in the form of input functions (particularly demands, or "interest articulation" in Almond's terminology) to the system's decision makers. Deutsch in his "cybernetic" notion has stressed the importance of the uninterrupted flow of information in the political system. According to him, a society or community "that is to steer itself must continue to receive a full flow of three kinds of information: first, information about the world outside; second, information from the past. . .; and third,

⁷² See Jurgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action [1978] (Boston: Beacon, 1984) and Andrew Arato, "Social Movements and Civil Society in the Soviet Union," in Perestroika from Below, ed. J. B. Sedaitis and J. Butterfield (Boulder: Westview, 1991), 197-214.

⁷³ Habermas is quoted here from James F. Bohman, "Communication, Ideology, and Democratic Theory," American Political Science Review 84.1 (March 1990): 102. Bohman has argued that in "socially distorted communication . . . participants *may not be aware* of the restrictions in communication in their societies." Ibid., 102-3 (emphasis by J.M.). Similarly, David Apter suggests that any regime using coercion to elicit compliance with its policies encounters difficulties in the information and communication sphere. "There is an inverse relationship between information and coercion in a system: that is, high coercion systems are low information systems." David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965), 40.

information about itself and its own parts. Let any of these streams be long interrupted, such as by oppression or secrecy, and the society becomes an automaton, a walking corpse."⁷⁴ Solid feedback is viewed as critical to system performance, for only "on the basis of knowledge about what has taken place or about the current state of affairs with respect to demand and support would the authorities be able to respond by adjusting, modifying or correcting previous decisions, including the failure to make a decision."⁷⁵

In a totalitarian or semi-totalitarian system, even the possibility of such feedback is greatly undermined, if not pre-empted. As Almond and Powell have argued, since in a totalitarian system the communicative structures tend to be closed, nonautonomous, and are subject to a high degree of control by the communist elites, they "are receptive to demands and information upward through the hierarchy only as permitted by those at the top," thus disseminating only that kind and scope of information permitted by the top narrow elite.⁷⁶ According to Di Palma (and others),

⁷⁴ Quoted from Rupnik, The Other Europe, 235. See also David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965). Easton speaks about a complex loop which "consists of the production of outputs by the authorities, a response on the part of the members of the society with respect to them, the communication of information about this response to the authorities. . ." Ibid., 28, also 372-80.

⁷⁵ Easton, *ibid.*, 129.

⁷⁶ Almond and Powell 1966, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach, 171. Moreover, as Almond and Powell have noted, such closed and nonautonomous communication structures are also dominated by fear that brings a paralysis to the whole system. Typically, the lower officers who staff the communication channels for the elite are confronted with a difficult dilemma: If they deliberately distort information from below, they may face costly consequences; but to report unpleasant facts may also be dangerous, since they may be suspected of exaggeration and deliberate spreading of panic. Hence the tendency of tyrants to surround themselves with "yes men" who sycophantically conform to the existing beliefs of the ruler. Ibid., esp. 184. The psychological dimension of this phenomenon has been well described by Boulding: "The case is somewhat analogous to that of the schizophrenic or the extreme paranoid. His sense receptors

top-down control in this type of system was based on the overpowering bureaucracy in every sphere of public life, which at the same time constituted a knowledge-restricting device, allowing only selected knowledge through restricted "official" communication channels, and forcing this knowledge into pre-defined compartments and schemes. If a limited amount of information flew in the opposite direction, it was based on outright lies, half-truths or misinformation since reporting bad news or dissenting opinion up the channel to the top was often risky or dangerous.⁷⁷ In fact, according to Di Palma, such systems cannot do without a monopoly on political communication. He has argued that by claiming a monopoly on political truth, Soviet-like bureaucracies did not allow their truth to be "falsified by reality, their commands are always correct. . . Strictly speaking, then, poor results do not reflect on the goals." This fits with Deutsch's definition of power as "the priority of output over intake, the ability to talk instead of listen . . . the ability to afford not to learn." Communist power "declared cognitive infallibility."⁷⁸

Not only did the state deny society a voice and possibilities for autonomous

are so much 'afraid' of him that they merely confirm the products of his heated imagination. The terrorized information sources of the tyrant likewise tell him only what they think will be pleasing to his ears. Organizations as well as individuals can suffer from hallucinations. It is the peculiar disease of authoritarian structures." Kenneth Boulding, The Image (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956), 185. However correct Barrington Moore's observation may be, that the totalitarian leaders often made the strenuous efforts to lessen their dependency on any single information source and may entrust several organs to collect information and check on one another, it is more likely, as Apter has suggested, that in times of stress or crisis "the multiple channels are apt to reinforce distorted information rather than to correct it." Barrington Moore, Terror and Progress U.S.S.R.: some sources of change and stability in the Soviet dictatorship (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), 176ff.

⁷⁷ See Di Palma, "Legitimation from the Top to Civil Society."

⁷⁸ Karl W. Deutsch; here quoted from Di Palma, *ibid.*, 57.

action, it proffered ready-made and decreed opinions and forms of action which became obligatory to respect.⁷⁹ Hence the communication circuit within the Soviet-type system had been effectively shortcut at the input side which left interest articulation paralyzed and often ignored. The whole mechanism of feedback, so important for the well-being of any system, was virtually eliminated, as well as people's capacity to use public channels.⁸⁰

*Figure 1 Ideal-typical forms of political communication and organization*⁸¹

Levels of system	Types of communication	Forms of organization
State	Authoritative	Hierarchical gov. bodies
Political society	Strategic	Parties and parliament
Civil Society	Normative	Voluntary organizations

III.2.6 The state of civil society (atomization of society and the opposition of the private and public spheres).

Many have argued (Sztompka and Antoni Kaminski, among others) that the institutional patterns in the Soviet-type system created an asymmetrical relationship

⁷⁹ Urban et al., The rebirth of politics in Russia, 17.

⁸⁰ According to Urban, the capacity and actions of the state in such direction can be formulated as the "active prohibition of social communication." Ibid. This prohibition signifies two types of systematic action on the part of the state: prevention in the usual sense of the term, i.e. censorship and various forms of surveillance and repression, and a specific state-sponsored substitution in the form of the official state ideology (Marxism-Leninism).

⁸¹ Adapted from Urban et al, *ibid.*, 4.

which inevitably led to an opposition of the public and private spheres. According to Kaminski, the relationship between the state and society in the Soviet type of order was "highly asymmetrical" and this asymmetry characterized every area in which members of society [got] into contact with the state.⁸² Kaminski has argued that

"the relationship among the party, the state, and society are those of the relationship among the actor, the tool, and the object, and the constitutive principle consists in the maximization of control by the party over the state and of the partisan state over society as the object to be transformed. This situation implies an inherent conflict between the partisan state and society . . . the Soviet type of political order is structurally based upon conflict between the party-state complex and the society. A strong partisan state implies a weak society, that is, a society denied the opportunity and, eventually, the ability to articulate itself, to organize, a collection of families at best, an aggregate of individuals at worst."⁸³

In fact, according to Kaminski, "the necessary condition for *an institutional stabilization of the Communist regime is a demobilization of the society as an autonomous social agent*; it is social apathy."⁸⁴ This forceful de-politization and "pacification" of society at large resembled what Jadwiga Staniszkis has referred to as the "indifferent variety." In her notion, repressed communication prevented the circulation of individual and collective representations of identity; since no one, under most circumstances dared to identify his or her faith openly, neither could they then encounter one another since the other would have to be identified. As a result, there was an interactional void among subjects qua subjects, and instead only a presence of

⁸² Kaminski, An Institutional Theory of Communist Regimes, 244.

⁸³ Kaminski, *ibid.*, 246.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 237 (emphasis in the original).

differences (variety) towards which each subject would remain `indifferent'.⁸⁵

Such a civic constellation brought about the impossibility of autonomous activity in the public sphere and resulted in society's dissolution toward the private sphere oriented individuals and small groups, thus preventing the self-organization of society that it is as crucial to, as it is typical of, pluralist systems. The hegemonist regime had its stake in creating "mono-organizational societies," in other words, in maintaining underdeveloped civil society. As George Schöpflin has noted, "[C]ivil society - in this context, the articulation of its interests by society independent of the state - was public enemy number one" for a tightly structured communist state that required social atomization as "a necessary condition for its survival and reproduction, and that did virtually everything in its power to prevent the types of social, political and economic interactions that could promote individual and group autonomy."⁸⁶

Hence, under communist rule society had virtually no relevant forms independent from those supplied by the state, with which its members might associate as in a free autonomous domain. People were prevented from entering the public sphere of their choice and on their own terms; instead they devoted much of their time and energy to building private micro-universes and limited networks of personal relations and their families. The purpose of the system was thus achieved: people

⁸⁵ Here quoted from Urban et al., The rebirth of politics in Russia, 18. Similarly, according to Korosenyi, writing in his analysis of Hungarian politics, communist rule ". . . destroyed the institutions of the sub-cultures and carried out the greatest homogenisation programme in human history. . . The institutions of the different social, residential, religious, professional groups, were banned and abolished. People were either atomised or forced into organisations strictly controlled by the communist party." Andras Korosenyi is quoted from Hannan Rose, "From Command to Free Politics," The Political Quarterly 64.2 (April-June 1993): 165.

⁸⁶ Schöpflin, "Post-communism: constructing new democracies in Central Europe," 241.

became isolated in their broader communities. "Isolated men," wrote Arendt, "are powerless by definition." "Isolation and impotence, that is the fundamental inability to act at all, have always been characteristic of tyrannies."⁸⁷ Such an almost total paralysis of society by the Soviet-type state rendered civil society "a meaningless term."⁸⁸

The adaptive mechanisms and strategies of the Eastern European societies to reclaim at least some social space included the attempts on the part of the population to make their private lives, or as Gauss described it, their *niches*, as attractive as possible. For instance, a majority of Germans (64 percent in McFalls' survey of December 1990-May 1991) recognized themselves as members of such *Nischengesellschaft*, normally consisting of family members and several close friends, which provided them with a private shelter from the public exigencies of state socialism, where "they felt safe, happy and economically secure."⁸⁹ In the same vein, the Polish sociologists Mira Marody, Piotr Sztompka, and Stefan Nowak have observed that under communism there was actually a strange duality between the public and the private (or personal) spheres for most of the population. As Nowak has put it: "The life of the average Pole is lived in the two overlapping worlds: the domain of private contacts and the institutional-official sphere."⁹⁰ According to the findings of

⁸⁷ Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 474.

⁸⁸ Urban et al., The rebirth of politics in Russia, 16.

⁸⁹ McFalls, Communism's Collapse, Democracy's Demise?, 86. According Gauss and McFalls, the *Nischengesellschaft* "was in fact much more than an anachronistic vestige of prewar culture; it perfectly reflected the historically unique social structure of the GDR, the functional requirements of real existing socialism, and the particular needs of East Germans." Ibid., 86 (Gauss is paraphrased by McFalls, *ibid.*).

⁹⁰ Sztompka, "The Intangibles and Imponderables of the Transition to Democracy," 299.

these Polish sociologists, the public sphere was characterized by mendacity, deception, laziness, cynicism, rudeness, mediocrity and social helplessness. The private sphere, by contrast, was characterized by much higher risk-taking, initiative, resourcefulness, self-fulfilment, considerateness and civility.⁹¹ In Kaminski's view, "individuals disappointed and apprehended in the public domain" focused instead on the values of private life within the circle of their families and friends.⁹²

The trend toward the retreat from citizen participation on the one hand and toward the ritualization of public life on the other, was particularly evident in political life starting in the 1970s and during the 1980s as part of the (tacit) social contract in which the regime encouraged citizens to pursue private interests in exchange for political complacency.⁹³ For instance, partial research data on the situation indicated a significant depolitization of the population at large occurred in Czechoslovakia at the beginning of the 1970s in the wake of the "normalization process" following the suppression of the "Prague Spring" reform movement.⁹⁴ The actual workings of such a combination of threat and social contract have been well described by the Czech dissident-publicist Milan Šimečka:

"The functioning of this contract was of course conditional on the changed image of the regime. In its post-totalitarian mutation, the regime no longer required that everyone be devoted to socialism, believe in the ideology, and be full of enthusiasm and ready to make sacrifices; it was enough for each

⁹¹ See especially, Marody, "In Search of Collective Sense," Polish Sociological Review (1994): 17-22; and Sztompka, "The Intangibles and Imponderables of the Transition to Democracy."

⁹² Kaminski, An Institutional Theory of Communist Regimes, 252.

⁹³ See also McFalls, Communism's Collapse, Democracy's Demise?, 88.

⁹⁴ Recognizing that political action against the "powers that be" was futile, especially when the domestic power is based on the brutal force of the empire, the society's resignation resulted in passivity.

individual simply to respect rules, even if with obvious cynicism. Two worlds thus emerged: the artificial world of politics and the real world of little human histories bounded by the fence of one's own garden. . . . An 'as if' state emerged from this contract. In this state, we 'as if' built communism, 'as if' scientifically guided society, 'as if' increased the standard of living, 'as if' elected state representatives with 99 percent of the vote, and 'as if' did not see that everyone worked only for himself. Real life was dominated by practical interests: where to pluck this and where to gather that, where to cheat, how to grasp an opportunity, how to drag oneself up the social ladder, how to provide for the children, how to manage to travel abroad, and most of all how to have anything when something is always in short supply."⁹⁵

Jowitt has called this phenomenon a "ghetto" political culture; characterized by "personalism" (not individualism) and dissimulation - as the major socio-cultural reality, with the absence of a "shared public identity."⁹⁶ According to him, the communist party's political monopoly on power and its "punitive relation" to the public produced and "sustained and heightened the population's psychological and political estrangement." According to Jowitt, this resulted in "dissimulation" - which served as a bridge between the domineering official and the societal supplicant. "For four decades dissimulation became the central feature of the population's (mis)representation of its public, or better, visible self. Dissimulation reflected the fear and avoidance of a subordinate population. . . ."⁹⁷

Three related points seem to be important here for my argument. First, the

⁹⁵ Šimečka is quoted from Holy, The Little Czech and the Great Czech Nation, 27.

⁹⁶ Jowitt, "The Leninist Legacy," esp. 211.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 211. Jowitt's reference to a "ghetto" political culture in Eastern Europe was mainly to mean that political activity was mostly regime-coerced, did not amount to real participation, and led to "psychological and political estrangement." Ibid., esp. 210.

success on the part of the regime in paralyzing civil society, and the adaptive mechanisms to the situation that the population gradually developed created long-term societal conditions in which the inability of social action became the norm. Second, as Sztopka has noted, regardless of the fact that "improved analysis" of the dynamics between the communist regimes and societies is needed, there has been the empirical corroboration of a hypothesis "documenting the presence of the 'private-public' opposition at the 'deep level'" of society. And third, this "private-public" dichotomy has continued (as documented by Sztopka) "in the period after the anti-communist revolutions."⁹⁸

III.2.7 Information isolation.

Linked to other already-mentioned institutional and power conditions of the communist system is the issue of information, the capabilities of individuals and the society at large in this type of system and the implications of it. Since knowledge can be treated as a faculty acquired over a longer period of time, one can assume that a lack of proper knowledge can cause serious disadvantage in the future. As we have seen, all the communist regimes suppressed by maintaining extreme or very tight media censorship (and also created autocensorship of a special kind), almost all alternative sources of information; nor did they tolerate any private media or distribution centers, resulting in impartial information as always being in short supply, or simply not available at all.

It has been noted that an ideology-driven system can be regarded, from the perspective of communication, "as a grossly disbalanced semantic structure whose

⁹⁸ Sztopka, "The Intangibles and Imponderables of the Transition to Democracy," 300.

mythic dimension had eclipsed its practical one."⁹⁹ Forms of closed sub-systems had been created, the capacity of which to make sense to participants depended to a large degree on the insulation from reports about the world and from an accurate picture of the outside world itself. Marxist-Leninist language and its "doublespeak" had formed a wall against surrounding communicative interactions that could engender social and political identities, and political organizations and projects.¹⁰⁰

These forms of information isolation had their internal (domestic) and external (international) dimensions. The latter, external dimension could be well illustrated in the model of the *Jordan-curve syndrome*. In this model, the boundary of a unit is so "severe" that it creates conditions of isolation from, and barriers to, communication with the broader environment. As in the Jordan's curve, insufficient interaction between the external and internal spheres of social and political systems stimulates aberrations in the functioning of the internal systems. Hence the specific conditions of such space-structuring (be it a prison or the Iron Curtain) leave, under the general conditions of isolation, an indelible mark on individuals, their perceptions, beliefs, and habits.¹⁰¹ In this sense, communist regimes "succeeded" in building up a special time-space at the cost of the spontaneous development of an open society, in which fragments of the independent public sphere were collapsing upon themselves by lack of contact with the outside world. In such ghetto-like isolation the absence of dialogue between the inner and outer world, both in terms of communication opportunities (censorship in the media, access to means of printing, communication interchange with

⁹⁹ Urban et al., Rebirth of politics in Russia, 18. See also Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics.

¹⁰⁰ Urban et al., *ibid.*, 18.

¹⁰¹ See James R. Smart, Modern Geometries (Monterey: Brooks-Cole Publishing Company, 1973).

the West) and physical restraints (especially on travelling to Western countries), severely limited the necessary exchange of information.¹⁰²

One may expect that, as a result of limitations and distortions in the social and communication systems (aimed at controlling all aspects of public life) certain communicative and psychosocial constraints, associated for instance with syndromes of unrealistic expectations, extreme privateness, and general anxiety from public communication, have been generated.¹⁰³

III.2.8 *The role of the secret police.*

All states make use of some enforcement apparatus, which serves to help ensure that citizens abide as fully as possible by the state's official code of conduct as spelled out in laws. In a Marxian conception of socialism, as specified by Engels, the state is only a "transitional institution" which is necessary to hold "down one's adversaries by force."¹⁰⁴ For many pragmatist Marxists, the question of coercion as the product of class antagonism is more than just a routine factor in politics, since they

¹⁰² The possibility of travel to capitalist countries had been out of reach for most of the population in the Soviet bloc countries, be it for economic reasons or due to a bureaucratic constraints to receive appropriate permissions and documents required to cross the Iron curtain.

¹⁰³ One example in point: As people used to view information provided by the state controlled media as *a priori* suspicious (and only few of them could have access to competing resources), they were inclined to take all the reports by the regime's media on the West as the evidence to the contrary - the perception that inevitably engendered in them idealization of capitalism in Western countries. Having been exposed to misinformation, or cut off from essential information, over a relatively long period of time, rectification will not take hold easily.

¹⁰⁴ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Selected Works [In One Volume] (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1968), 339.

have typically interpreted political power as "the organized power of one class for oppressing another."¹⁰⁵ Correspondingly, the state ought to have at its disposal all coercive means made available by contemporary technology and ought not to be hindered in using them against its class adversaries. Accordingly, as long as the dictatorship of the proletariat exists, no mechanism of checking on abuses of the use of organized coercion exists. In a historical perspective, the use of political terror has always been confined to regimes closer to the totalitarian end of the democratic-totalitarian spectrum. According to Dallin and Breslauer, who studied the issue of political terror in communist states, "political terror" is characterized by "the arbitrary use, by organs of political authority, of severe coercion against individuals or groups, the credible threat of such use, or the arbitrary extermination of such individuals or groups."¹⁰⁶

Most "communist" states, in which totalitarian or semi-totalitarian social control was the most prominent feature of the system, have employed terror to varying degrees at one time or another in their history. The extent and nature of such means varied from one regime to another and depended on varying historical contingencies. In general, the ideological underpinning of the "dictatorship of the proletariat," built upon the image of enemies both "within and "without", was critically required to respond in an uncompromising way to any real or suspected plot organized or fomented by the "enemies of the people." In such cases (even when they were clearly fabricated), terror "was sanctified and glorified as the antidote needed to conserve the socialist gains" and at the same time it served as a reminder of limitations on freedom

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 53.

¹⁰⁶ Alexander Dallin and George W. Breslauer, Political Terror in Communist Systems (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970), 1.

to others).¹⁰⁷ Hence in all communist countries the secret police represented an agency with the power, or at least potential, to subject the citizens to intensive and ubiquitous terror or psychological and existential pressure. These forces, usually organized under the umbrella of the interior ministry and modelled on (and also connected to) the Soviet KGB, kept files on everyone who dissented or was suspicious of doing so, who had contacts with Western foreigners, or who travelled to Western countries. For all of these purposes, a vast network of part-time informants to the secret police had been developed. Since the latter might have been virtually everywhere, all citizens had to be apprehensive about what they said and did in public. According to Horvath and Szakolczai, there "were intimate links between the party, the police and the secret police. . . Repressive organisations make possible the work of the party, and prevent other links being formed between the subjects."¹⁰⁸

In a relatively stabilized post-Stalinist society of actually existing socialism, outright police force, severe judicial repression and/or imprisonment were in fact directed only against numerically small groups and individuals and the use of physical force was replaced by more sophisticated and systematic police surveillance of society. The threat of violent actions on the part of suppressive forces against other potential

¹⁰⁷ See Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics, 35.

¹⁰⁸ Horvath and Szakolczai, The dissolution of communist power: The case of Hungary, 199). In their study, Horvath and Szakolczai have drawn comparison between "some elements of absolutism and totalitarianism." With regard to the overall role of the secret police in the communist-party states and the relationships within their power structure, they have rightly noted that "power within the [communist] system cannot be localised. It is rather the whole system that forms a complicated web, where the strongly asymmetrical power relations dominating the surface are counterpoised with networks of hidden checks and countercurrents. Each and every element in these networks needs the other, would be helpless without its support - the central party organs without the apparatus, the apparatus without the activists, the activists without the members, the whole party without the police and the secret police, and vice versa at each and every point." Ibid., 198-99.

dissenters was so strong and palpable, however, that it sufficed to keep many critical voices at bay.¹⁰⁹ Though in the post-totalitarian (post-Stalinist) period, terror of the secret police might have been more administrative and quite invisible, it was, as Crawford has noted "just as pervasive, in that people universally believed that the state would levy sanctions against anyone," i.e. for the slightest sign of dissent. Even in this period, "there was almost complete material dependence of the individual on the state and the 'politics of fear' were still everywhere."¹¹⁰

Even after the replacement of the use of explicit terror with a strategy of de-politicizing most segments of the population, various methods of coercion and existential punishment remained in place; also, the overall penetration of societies by the secret police remained deep. In some EE-an countries, especially in the former East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Albania, the penetration of secret police services and their agents into the structures of society at large has been well documented. For instance, after the mass revolt against Ceausescu's regime that ended Communist rule in Romania in December 1989 it has been revealed that the Securitate kept files on about 1 million people out of 23 million of Romania's citizens. But it is not known (and as it seems, never will be with accuracy) how many citizens of Romania cooperated with the secret police. Estimates based on the investigation of so far available files range from 10 to 25 percent of the population.¹¹¹ Also in other countries, large parts of the population had either participated in or been subjected to

¹⁰⁹ See, for example, Mlynář, "Prospects of Development of the Political System in the Soviet Bloc," in The Soviet Systems After Brezhnev, ed. W. Brus et al. (Munich: Index, 1984), esp. 36.

¹¹⁰ Keith Crawford, East Central European politics today, 50.

¹¹¹ Bianca Guruita, "The Shadow of Securitate," Transitions 5.9 (Sept. 1998): 37.

consistent or casual surveillance (often by people they trusted) and their personal lives, and lives of entire families were disrupted or destroyed in the process. In East Germany alone there were more than 90,000 official employees of the Stasi and up to half a million unofficial agents and collaborators throughout the country, and the number of people who were spied on were in the millions.¹¹²

Considering this omnipresence it is therefore necessary to treat police, and particularly secret police, as part and parcel of a totalitarian system in all its variants.¹¹³ It has also been argued that "people under Communism suffered such severe, unrelenting, and diabolic pressures that many . . . were forced into meaningless but seemingly compromising situations, which they could not resist or perhaps completely grasp," with all the consequences resulting from it.¹¹⁴

At the level pertaining to my argument, it is important to determine the mechanism through which this institution made the imprint on the social and politico-cultural sphere and the character of such an imprint on the society at large and its

¹¹² See Joachim Gauck, "Dealing with a Stasi Past," Daedalus 123.1 (Winter 1994), 277-284. A description used by Maaz for the Stasi activities is undoubtedly also valid for the Czechoslovak StB (Státní bezpečnost) or Romania's Securitate. According to Maaz, the secret service was not just an instrument of repression, but also . . . "a criminal police force, a technical surveillance service, an opinion research institute, and increasingly and advisory and supportive service for the entire national political economy. . . ." Its surreptitious tentacles were almost everywhere, even though often invisible. Maaz, Behind the Wall, 15.

¹¹³ See Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy and Carl Friedrich, "The Evolving Theory and Practice of Totalitarian Regimes."

¹¹⁴ Maaz, Behind the Wall. Quoted from William Phillips, "Communism and the Graying of Character," Partisan Review LX.2 (1993): 179. Phillips comments here on the article on a Czech dissident Jan Kavan in The New Yorker 2 Nov. 1992. He was of course correct, in saying that the pressures "appear to have been greater on dissidents than on ordinary citizens, whose daily lives lay largely outside politics." *Ibid.*, 179.

individual segments.¹¹⁵ According to Maaz, "the power of the Stasi was based mostly on fear - *Angst*," as well as on the manipulation of fear. Although methods involving the use of force changed over time, in most communist countries they included, to a lesser or larger degree, many methods falling into the category of direct overt force, such as political murders, tortures, shoot-to-kill orders, arbitrary arrests or expatriation.¹¹⁶ Indirect force which came to be applied increasingly especially due to an international image problem, included legal insecurity, the blackmail of individuals and family members, humiliation, loss of job, threat of reprisal or manipulation of fear. With a little literary licence, Maaz has seen the situation as having been traumatic enough to warrant serious implications for the future:

"Every single individual was worked over by the system until the psychological mechanism of self-enslavement and self-destruction was ensured. This process was particularly diabolical and sad because, in the end, the individual no longer realized his alienation."

According to Maaz, the effect of this experience sank "especially deeply into the psychological structures of every single individual."¹¹⁷

It could thus be expected that such conditions must have been imprinted into the minds of the citizenry, particularly in those countries where police penetration had

¹¹⁵ The strong link between the role of the secret police and the totalitarian systems as well as the limits of the totalitarian model is seen by some in the failure of the communist regimes to secure mass support once the open terror subsided (together with the erosion of their ideological foundations). See Tismaneanu, *Reinventing Politics*, esp. 172.

¹¹⁶ See Maaz, *Behind the Wall*, 14. Here we could also include the major instances of the deadly force used on June 17, 1953 in East Germany, in the fall of 1956 in Hungary, in August 1968 in Czechoslovakia, and in 1970 in Poland. No doubt, each of these events was able to send shock waves of "crippling fear" (Maaz) and resignation throughout the country.

¹¹⁷ Maaz, *ibid.*, 5-9.

been most pervasive.¹¹⁸ Repression in the psychological sense means the submission by people to the will of those who are more powerful, and the adaptation to rigid "fixed norms" (Maaz), and the consequences which such submission and repression carry may be complex and lasting. Very little research has been done in the field of victimology resulting from exposure to persecution or fear of persecution (this question is of course not limited to East European countries only), especially with regard to societies where mass terror has been just short of outright violence, applying just "subtle" psychological/existential methods, but over a long period of time.¹¹⁹ Despite scarce evidence, it seems to be clear that the scope of penetration of the secret police into society and thus the effects of this relationship on individual psychology and psycho-social relations (this had varied from country to country and from one societal group or generation to another, however), must have been substantial for many individuals and groups in the region.

¹¹⁸ Maaz, *ibid.*, esp. 13. The effects of this problem have often been underestimated or misunderstood by Western scholars as well as by East European politicians. As Joachim Gauck has testified, the reason for this persisting ignorance is both the inability to understand the different experience of the Easterners, and, on the part of Westerners, "to protect themselves from the suffering of others." See Gauck, "Dealing with a Stasi Past," esp. 283. The challenge of this legacy involves resolving the issue of files of the former secret police (the opportunity is not completely missed but many invaluable documents have already been lost or deliberately destroyed). The failure to do so may have long-term repercussions, for the decades to come, especially with regard to the national security, the insecurity of individuals, and the corruption of the political scene. See also Gauck, "The Gauck Commission," an interview with Joachim Gauck, *Deutschland* 4 (Aug. 1995): 38-41.

¹¹⁹ On the dynamics of oppression, including its political and psychological aspects, see also Issac Prilleltensky and Lev Gonick, "Politics Change, Oppression Remains: On the Psychology and Politics of Oppression," *Political Psychology* 17.1 (1996): esp. 129-145) on "non-violent oppression" or "civilized violence" (Šimečka).

III.3 The issue of "communist" socialization.

"The most important of all revolutions is a revolution in sentiments, manners and moral opinions." (Edmund Burke)

III.3.1 Concepts of political socialization.

It is an essential part of my argument that the "conditions of communism," in its institutional and social arrangements, had affected, through the process of socialization (in one of its forms or another), political-cultural values and other socio-psychological dispositions of the population in ECE/EE, and have done so to the extent that a rapid change seems unlikely. In order to inquire into the process or mechanism through which key values, attitudes or habits, had been acquired under communist rule, I will apply in this chapter a modified version of a general model of socialization. I will particularly focus on those dispositions resulting from the broadly conceived experience of being raised and living in a communist country.

Socialization (as a general notion) comprises the learning process through which members of a society receive their social knowledge, adopt beliefs and values, and learn behavior concerning social life and culture.¹²⁰ According to Easton, who

¹²⁰ See Christiane Lemke, "Political Socialization and the 'Micromilieu'. Toward a Political Sociology of GDR Society," The Quality of Life in the German Democratic Republic. Changes and Developments in a State Socialist Society, ed. Marilyn Rueschemayer and Christiane Lemke (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1989), 59. See also a definition by Chilcote who has emphasized the fact that socialization is the process whereby newer members of society, especially children and the youth, interact with the social environment and acquire social values and behavior. Ronald H. Chilcote, Theories of Comparative Politics: The Search for a Paradigm (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), 230.

viewed the process from the perspective of the workings of a political system, there are two distinctive features, "the allocation of values for a society and the relative frequency of compliance with them" that are essential variables of political life.¹²¹

The complexity of the process is underlined by the fact that what is "being socialized" are in fact complex and complicated cultural patterns. Culture itself may be regarded as the sum of the "cognitive-affective-evaluative maps" that guide action in a collectivity and the processes by which these maps are learned are called socialization. Cultures are 'internalized' and become "part and parcel of the individual personality."¹²²

¹²¹ David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, 24 (emphasis in the original). This generally follows Parsons' identification of culture (who incorporated anthropological and psychological orientations into his theory) as: a) transmitted social tradition, which is b) learned and c) shared. Talcott Parsons, The Social System (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1951), esp. 15. Concerns with the study of political socialization may be identified at the beginnings of political theory. Political philosophers from Plato and Aristotle to Thomas More, Bodin and Rousseau, have been occupied with the importance of education and the training of citizens. According to *The Oxford Dictionary of the English Language*, the term "socialization" itself may be dated back to 1828 when it carried a meaning of "to render social, to make fit for living in society." In the twentieth century, a more comprehensive debate has taken place with the goal to produce a generally-agreed upon framework for analyzing political socialization, for example in works by Merriam (1934), Pierce (1933), and later especially by Inkeles & Levinson (1954) and Greenstein 1965. See Fred I. Greenstein, "Socialization: Political Socialization," in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, ed. David L. Sills (The Macmillan Company & The Free Press, 1968), 551-55.

¹²² Eckstein, "Culture as Foundation Concept for the Social Sciences," 490. Socialization may be described as mainly involving processes of accommodation and assimilation (Piaget), i.e. as interaction between the broader environment and the people. In this sense, each culture can "represent a people's strategy for adaptation. . . Though cultures change in response to changes in the socioeconomic, political, and technological environment, they also shaped that environment in return." Ronald Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 3. See also, Handbook of Political Socialization 1977, 4

It appears that the process of socialization includes at least two analytically separate sets of processes. These have been distinguished as *formal and informal* socialization by some, or as *purposive (planned, deliberate) and latent (habitual)* socialization by others. For the purpose of my argument, I understand both typologies as being approximately analogical. The concept of *political* socialization may be viewed as qualitatively equal to but narrower in scope than socialization in general; it thus describes the process through which political knowledge is acquired and the values, beliefs, and behavioral patterns are learned. As part of the political system and process, political socialization constitutes the major link between the targeted individual, the state and society at large.¹²³ According to Volgyes, political socialization in all societies is generally accomplished through the use and effects of various agencies and structures which may be categorized in different ways. He has suggested distinguishing generally between primary (or informal) and secondary (or formal) agencies and structures of socialization, the primary being the family, church, peer groups, and secondary political organizations such as school, trade unions, the military, etc.¹²⁴ This distinction corresponds to that of Kavanagh (1972) and Holmes (1986) who have identified the two types as (2) *purposive* - in which a particular agency consciously and openly strives to instill particular values and orientations - and (2) *latent*; in the latter case there is no deliberate and organized attempt to inculcate values, but they are nevertheless transmitted through environmental influences.¹²⁵

¹²³ See Lemke, "Political Socialization and the 'Micromilieu'," 59.

¹²⁴ Volgyes, Politics in Eastern Europe, 262.

¹²⁵ See Dennis Kavanagh, Political Culture (London: Macmillan, 1972), esp. 30; and Holmes, Politics in the Communist World, esp. 81. This also corresponds to Eckstein's "two broad types of cultural changes," i.e. those arising naturally out of changing situations and structural conditions and those that result from deliberate attempts to transform political cultures and behaviour. See Eckstein, Regarding

In the case of the second (latent) type of socialization, the relevant question of the "socialization mechanism" seems to be addressed by those who believe in the relevance of "depth psychology" for cultural and behavioral patterns. I have found a useful notion employed by some Polish sociologists in this regard, that of the "*societal consciousness*" and/or, "*social subconsciousness*." The latter, defined as "a system of unconscious blueprints for thinking and perceiving, as well as dispositions which mediate between the structures of the outside world and active practice, or - to put it otherwise - between the level of institutions and the level of individual behavior," seems to correspond to the level of *habitus* (as discussed in Chapter II).¹²⁶ In the same vein, Sztompka has expressed his conviction that it is precisely at this deep level where cultural patterns became encoded and "where the unfortunate legacy of real socialism is still to be found," suggesting that "here resides the main mechanism through which communism is haunting post-communist societies from the grave."¹²⁷ According to Sztompka, through the process of "prolonged habituation, indoctrination, 'thought-control' and imposition of the fake 'super-reality' on human minds, this impress ultimately reaches the domain of unreflexive psychological and cultural codes."¹²⁸ Thus the mechanism of socialization involves psychological processes over which subjects do not always have control. In Sztompka's notion, these processes include all emerging adaptive reactions, or defence mechanisms, developed as ways of coping with socialist conditions. These adaptive arrangements and mechanisms paradoxically

Politics: Essays on Political Theory, Stability, and Change.

¹²⁶ Marody, "Dilematy postaw politycznych i oriejtacji swiatopogladowych," in Polska 1980-1990, ed. J. Wiatr (Warsaw: Warsaw University Press, 1990), 17.

¹²⁷ Sztompka, "The Intangibles and Imponderables of the Transition to Democracy," 298.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 299.

outlive their times, become petrified in social structures, cultural patterns and popular consciousness, and remain fully operative in post-communist society."¹²⁹

While some have considered certain periods of an individual's life, especially the period of early childhood, as to be determinant in the process of socialization, others, as Almond and Powell have emphasized that the "socialization process goes on continuously throughout the life of the individual."¹³⁰ In this regard, a very comprehensive conception of political socialization has been offered by Greenstein, in which he has included "all political learning, formal and informal, deliberate and unplanned, at every stage of the life cycle, including not only explicitly political learning but also nominally nonpolitical learning that affects political behavior, such as the learning of politically relevant social attitudes and the acquisition of politically relevant personality characteristics."¹³¹ This is especially valid for post-communist countries, in which most of the population had experienced the totality of communist conditions.

Following well grounded theories of socialization, the rationale for introducing the concept of (political) socialization into my argument is that one can assume that there existed processes of learning associated with individuals as constituent members of society who had been exposed to institutional, social and the overall broad environment of communism that had affected their mental contents; in such a way internalized values, habits, and attitudes had in turn significant consequences for the

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Almond and Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach, 65.

¹³¹ Greenstein, "Socialization: Political Socialization," 551.

performance of the political systems, both past and present.¹³² It is, for instance, also Greenstein's contention that "political learning has effects on the later political behavior of the individual exposed and by extension to the political system."¹³³ Thus there is prevailing agreement on the idea that the effects of political socialization on the political system can be seen in the implications of political socialization for political behavior in general and for role performance in particular.¹³⁴ From the perspective of the distribution of these effects across the region, Rose and Carnaghan have hypothesized that the "common experience of Sovietization [had] a homogenizing impact on political socialization."¹³⁵ Similarly, McFalls has suggested that "a particular culture, or a set of common subjective orientations, developed . . . not simply as a superstructure but as a creative historic, social and psychological

¹³² This point is not without controversy. Some have raised the objections that the linkages relating political learning to subsequent political behaviours present certain empirical difficulties, especially those of connecting early political learning with "either (or both) transtemporal or cross-domain behavior." . . . "The former would require demonstration that early learning persisted through time to influence adult political behavior. . . The latter requires demonstration of a linkage between political learning. . . and political behavior, even if the political learning has been fairly recent." The second linkage may be too complex to demonstrate under most circumstances. Stanley Renshon, "Assumptive Frameworks in Political Socialization Theory," in Handbook of Political Socialization, ed. Stanley A. Renshon (New York: The Free Press, 1977), 7. On the problem of the inclusion of the behavioral aspect, see Chapter II in this thesis.

¹³³ Greenstein, "Socialization: Political Socialization," 555.

¹³⁴ See also Renshon, Handbook of Political Socialization, 6.

¹³⁵ Richard Rose and Ellen Carnaghan, "Generational Effects on Attitudes to Communist Regimes: A Comparative Analysis," Post-Soviet Affairs 11.1 (1995): 31.

response to the structures of real existing socialism."¹³⁶

III.3.2 Socialization under "communism".

In his study of "Marxist-Leninist" political culture Jowitt has suggested that the notion of political culture and socialization should be treated in the context of certain key tasks characteristic for the regime and its relationship to society. According to him, these tasks included: (1) transformation, which also focuses on revolutionary attempts to destroy pre-revolutionary political culture, (2) consolidation, the creation of a new political community, and (3) modernization, the task which also includes habitual political culture values.¹³⁷ It is useful to realize that political socialization under the auspices of the communist state was in many respects distinct from those in other parts of the world. Typically, the communist regimes wielded much more control over political socialization, and also intended to put into practice more far-reaching plans in this respect than was the case with polyarchies or moderate dictatorships or autocracies. Moreover, beside the adult-to-child transmission of values from one generation to the next (this process obviously exists in other political systems as well), the communist regimes also engaged in an ongoing "resocialization" process, operating on both the adult-to-child level and on the adult-to-adult level. The purpose of both types of socialization, especially from the point of view of official goal-culture (as expressed in ideology) was to create a "new socialist man", whose "loyalty to and

¹³⁶ McFalls, Communism's Collapse, Democracy's Demise?, 140 (he talks about the GDR). Goldfarb has noted correctly that, to achieve its aim, a totalitarian regime has to devise a totalitarian culture. Goldfarb, Beyond Glasnost: The Post-Totalitarian Mind, x.

¹³⁷ Jowitt, "An organizational approach to the study of political culture in Marxist-Leninist systems," 1174.

usefulness for the system could be as successful as the process of socialization would be."¹³⁸ In communist states, by and large, the importance of the formal structures of political socialization was decisively greater than in non-communist states; and it was mainly the formal structures which under the directives of the communist party attempted to undertake the sweeping political socialization of both adults and children and the youth into the values and norms, into the goal and transfer cultures of the regime.¹³⁹ In the words of Rose et al., "socialization into undemocratic rule has been the dominant experience of Central and Eastern Europeans."¹⁴⁰

In my analysis of the workings and efficacy of this process, I first focus on the formal or purposive type of (political), i.e. "state-sponsored" socialization, both on its general aspect and on a specific aspect of ideological indoctrination; then I consider the extent to which the goal of socialization from the perspective of the state may have been achieved or not, i.e. a degree of success or failure in its intentions. There is no doubt that the Stalinist ideological (and, one may say, "civilizational") model consisted in the attempt to create a new human type, an ideologically correct individual, totally controllable by the party. Several Soviet dissident writers had referred to this "anthropological ambition" of Stalinism, aimed at completely reconstructing human

¹³⁸ See Volgyes, Politics in Eastern Europe, esp. 259-262.

¹³⁹ Ibid., 270. Volgyes has presented an elaborate account of the role and the focus of the formal agencies of socialization, i.e. the party, the youth groups, schools, trade unions, and the military. He has identified three basic forms of direct party control over the political socialization: formal education within the party, formal education outside the party, and agitprop (agitation-propaganda) of various intensities directed at the population at large. Ibid., 271-2.

¹⁴⁰ Rose et al., Democracy and its Alternatives, 183. On the correlation between this experience and support for the post-communist regime in individual EE countries, see *ibid.*, especially 182-3.

nature in the name of a universalistic ideology as *Homo Sovieticus*.¹⁴¹ As part and parcel of the ideological canon, it had been expected that the conditions, deliberately created in the aftermath of socialist revolution, would produce new "socialist" habits, indeed new socialist citizens devoid of bourgeois morality. It was projected that such a *new socialist man* would find no contradictions between individual fulfilment and collective commitment, would enthusiastically participate in building a new future for all humankind while experiencing a freedom of necessity. In many Soviet-type countries, practices such as "character-training" as well as a specifically political education that included inculcation of "socialist values," were officially recognized as the requirements of the state; this made "socialist socialization" a unique category of its own.¹⁴² In this context, it is worth mentioning, as Greenstein does, that in the communist system, formal socialization or attempts at the creation of the new socialist man was also "an economical tool of government."¹⁴³ According to Greenstein, a successful socialization enabled a government to rely upon the learned habitual responses of the citizens, thus precluding the necessity of further systemic and environmental constraints. This also bore on the stability of the regime: since authority was evidently more stable when obeyed automatically than when additional sanctions

¹⁴¹ Alexander Zinoviev, Gomo sovietikus. Moi dom - moia chuzhbina (Moskva: KOR-INF, 1991). See also Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics, esp. 32-3, 172.

¹⁴² See Greenstein, "Socialization: Political Socialization," 551. Johnson has realized that the process of "creating a new man" may involve a new social dynamics. According to him, the determination to create "new men" generates two interacting processes: an attempt to shape reality by ideology, and a modification of ideology by inertial and responding reality. See also Johnson, "Comparing Communist Nations," 18.

¹⁴³ Greenstein, *ibid.*, 551.

must be employed or at least threatened.¹⁴⁴

III.3.3 Values ideally associated with a "new socialist man".

Before I deal with the specific issue of indoctrination and evaluate the degree of efficacy of communist socialization, I will introduce some of the values associated with the *new man* that communist propagandists intended to create: this will help us to assess the discrepancies between the official values and the actual outcomes of socialization in the broadest sense.

Considering these official political values, comprising official goal and transfer cultures, one must be aware that they are always expressed within the message and language of the official ideology. Since there were many contradictions in the language of the official ideology, as discussed in III.4, there also exist inevitable discrepancies between the language in which the values are expressed and the actual meaning ascribed to them. This is also one of the reasons for which the values listed below cannot constitute a basis for my conceptualization of the "real communist political culture."

The following is an illustration of the desired values which are identified with the ideal of a "new socialist person." I quote them from a comprehensive "moral code

¹⁴⁴ Having said that, Greenstein has argued that it "is not necessarily the stable, secure government that attends consciously and explicitly to political socialization. Rather, civic training becomes a deliberate policy when elements of potential instability are perceived in a political system. . . ." Ibid., 551. However, as Greenstein has noted, since the insecure or authoritative change-oriented governments tend to increase their chances of surviving and reaching their goal, it is precisely the authoritative state-socialist and totalitarian governments which use the most extensive formal political education. In order to fulfil its "mission", such a state has to carry on many socialization functions normally performed by other institutions and informal environments (such as the church or the family).

of the builder of communism," contained in the 1961 CPSU Party Program. (The same or similar values were part of the moral code and were required to be emulated in all communist countries.)

Values:

- *Devotion to the communist cause; love of the socialist motherland and other socialist countries;*
- *Conscientious labour for the good of society - he who does not work, neither shall he eat;*
- *Concern on the part of everyone for the preservation and growth of public wealth;*
- *Honesty and truthfulness, moral purity, modesty, and unpretentiousness in social and private life;*
- *Mutual respect in the family, and concern for the upbringing of children;*
- *An uncompromising attitude to injustice, parasitism, dishonesty, careerism and money-grubbing;*
- *Friendship and brotherhood among all peoples of the USSR; intolerance of national and racial hatred;*
- *An uncompromising attitude to the enemies of communism, peace and the freedom of nations;*
- *Fraternal solidarity with the working people of all communist countries, and with all peoples.*¹⁴⁵

Significantly, some twenty years later, these "code-values" and their role in the

¹⁴⁵ CPSU, Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), 108-109.

overall goal did not change substantially, if at all. The June 1983 Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union took pains to emphasize that in the revolutionary transformation of society the Party "proceeds from the premise that the moulding of the new man is not only the most important aim but also an imperative condition of building communism."¹⁴⁶ From the perspective of this objective, the ideologue Yanovsky elaborated this ideal:

"The perfection of the cultural and ideological sphere at the original stage of developed socialism includes the shaping of a scientific Marxist-Leninist world outlook and communist morality in all members of society; the breeding of a communist attitude to work and to socialist property; enhancing the education, culture, political awareness and ideological maturity of the working masses; propaganda of the Soviet way of life and of the fundamental values of socialism; . . . uncompromising struggle against bourgeois ideology, the creation of a well-thought-out, cohesive, dynamic and effective system of counter-propaganda, the overcoming of survivals of the past in human consciousness and conduct; the expanding of real possibilities for the development and realisation of the workers' creative powers and abilities."¹⁴⁷

In his comparative analysis of communist values, Volgyes (1986) has divided desirable communist political values ("messages") into two groups, permanent values and transitory values. Specifically, the former group contains long-term political values-messages at the core of the official communist ideology, while in the latter group may be value-messages that are a temporary order-of-the-day and often lack the same intensity in all countries.¹⁴⁸ Volgyes has identified the following values as

¹⁴⁶ R. Yanovsky, "Scientific and Technical Progress and the Moulding of the New Man," in Soviet Society: Social and Economic Problems (Moscow: USSR Academy of Sciences, 1985), 30-54.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Some values which are considered by Volgyes as temporary - for some ECE/EE countries in the mid-1980s - might be seen as permanent in several other countries, for instance in Czechoslovakia. For hierarchical ordering of political

intensively promoted by communist regimes:

Permanent values:

socialist construction
leading role of the party
socialist patriotism
socialist internationalism
socialist morality

Transitory values:

anti-imperialism
antibourgeois values
anti-individualism
antireligious values

Source: Volgyes, Politics in Eastern Europe, 287. For detailed comments on individual values, see 287-292.¹⁴⁹

III.3.4 The issue of political propaganda and "indoctrination".

Indoctrination could be associated with "cognitive orientation" identified by Almond and Verba as being one of the three types of political orientation. "Cognitive orientation" is defined by them as "knowledge of and about the political system, its

value-messages by individual countries in the period 1982-84, see Appendix 5.

¹⁴⁹ Inevitably, the permanent values, as Volgyes defines them, were likely - since they had been promoted almost everywhere in the region for most of the time - to produce more lasting effects on people's mindsets than the transitory values. By the same logic, transitory values - defined by Volgyes as "temporary manifestations of certain policies" and promoted "not with the same intensity everywhere" - would not be likely to leave such significant effects. See Volgyes, *ibid*, 287. In reality, however, the line between the two groups of values was very fluid. Lemke, for instance, has argued that "the basic goal of political socialization in the GDR is the socialist personality. Such personality is expected to follow "the precepts of socialist morality, such as community spirit, feelings of duty and responsibility toward the state and society, and an optimistic outlook on life and aims of socialism." Lemke, "Political Socialization and the 'Micromilieu'," 60. The Youth Act, passed in 1974, was according to Lemke, designed to pursue a policy of early and continuous political socialization according to the 'developed socialist society'." *Ibid.*, 61.

roles and the incumbents of these roles, its inputs, and its outputs."¹⁵⁰ Indoctrination would then constitute a process of specific cognitive socialization, operating mainly through mechanisms of learning by which certain official concepts and information (often as misinformation) about the political system are being conveyed to the population. This information may be adopted by the targets of indoctrination only superficially, or it may take hold (be internalized) at the deeper levels of their psychology and become part of social and moral consciousness. In terms of its effects, indoctrination may include, particularly when assuming that the process was at least partially successful, belief in and psychological commitment or attachment to the content of what is being promoted in the process of indoctrination. In this sense, it is analytically useful to distinguish between purely *cognitive* and *evaluational* (or even affective) aspects of indoctrination. While *cognitive* indoctrination would consist mostly of verbal knowledge regarding the promoted self-image of the system, the *evaluational* and affective aspect of indoctrination would have more complex links to the social consciousness of the population. As with socialization in general, indoctrination may be both formal (purposive) and informal (latent), though the concept as it is largely understood puts more emphasis on the role of the formal process.¹⁵¹

The term and the process itself have a rather negative connotation for both its common association with communist ideology and the assumption that intrusive methods must be used by the state to achieve its goals. That there was virtually no way to completely escape the assault of indoctrination in communist societies, has been expressed by Zinoviev. According to him, in communist countries "everyone is

¹⁵⁰ Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture [1963], 15.

¹⁵¹ According to Maaz, "propaganda and demagoguery were part of the mechanisms of power." Maaz Behind the Wall, 12.

subjected to the influence of ideology from birth to death, systematically and with a strikingly pedantic consistency."¹⁵²

In most communist countries, almost all institutions as well as voluntary organizations were, in some way or other, involved in "ideological education" in the broadest sense. The role of the media and schools in indoctrinating citizens of every age and walk of life was considered as having particularly great importance. In most schools of the Soviet-bloc students had to undergo various courses of Marxism-Leninism.¹⁵³

Apart from individual institutions and the media, in many communist countries mass-agitational work at the local level was also widespread (often in a rather formal fashion), conducted by "agitators", "political informers" and "lecturers" who were active both at a local residential level and in factories and workshops. In the Soviet Union, there were 3.7 million agitators (*agitatory*) in 1976, who were supposed to be concerned with the affairs of the local community - especially with economic matters such as the fulfilment of production targets -but also with all sorts of other questions, "from the layout of the local 'red corner' to the personal affairs of members of the

¹⁵² And elsewhere, "Soviet citizens are in constant contact with the powerful magnetic field of ideological influence. . . There is physically no way they can escape from it." Alexander Zinoviev, The Reality of Communism (New York: Schocken Books, 1984), 217. See also Geoffrey Hosking, The Awakening of the Soviet Union (London: Heinemann, 1990), 10-11; and also White, Political Culture and Soviet Politics, esp. 75-83.

¹⁵³ At university, every student, whatever his/her subject of study, had to pass examination in Political Economy, Dialectical Materialism, Scientific Atheism, and the like; often, they were expected to quote passages from the "classics" (who, of course, were namely Marx, Lenin, and national Communist leaders). See Hosking, *ibid.*, esp. 10-11. Many such courses had been organized at factories' level as well.

workgroup."¹⁵⁴ The propaganda systems may have been less penetrating in other communist countries than they were in the Soviet Union; however, everywhere in the communist bloc, inculcating certain politically correct values, views and attitudes was one of the priorities of the incumbent regimes.

III.3.5 How successful was indoctrination?

As far as (cognitive) indoctrination into the communist ideology and values as it was applied in communist schools and other special agencies is concerned, there has been disagreement on the effects of such efforts; nevertheless, very few authors have declared them completely irrelevant. Reflecting on the efficacy of this kind of learning (of the Marx-Leninism) experience, Hosking, for instance, has noted:

"One might think that studies pursued in this way could hardly have a profound effect, but in fact I feel that the impact of all this ideological cramming is not altogether superficial. Rote-learning has a way of clinging to odd corners of the mind, and turning up unexpectedly, maybe years later. In any case, the effect is constantly being reinforced by the ever present slogans on street banners, wall-posters, in the newspapers, and on radio and television."¹⁵⁵

Hosking has rightly recognized that all that fuss could have had only superficial effects and that the all-pervading ideological radiation "does not necessarily make

¹⁵⁴ According to Zinoviev, the number of people who in one way or another were forced to carry out "bits of ideological work was innumerable." Zinoviev, The Reality of Communism, 216-17. The agitator "is always among his workmates," as a *Pravda* editorial wrote at that time, "[he is] connected with them by the same interests and problems, exercising constant ideological and moral influence upon those around him and closely relating the clarification of general political questions with the daily affairs of the workshop, section, link or brigade." Quoted in White, Political Culture and Soviet Politics, 79.

¹⁵⁵ Hosking, The Awakening of the Soviet Union, 10-11.

everyone a Marxist-Leninist zombie, since people had not completely lost the ability of independent concrete-problems-oriented thinking."¹⁵⁶ Despite that, Hosking believes that the ideological onslaught did inculcate "in the average Soviet citizen the habit of systematic, monological thinking on social, political and philosophical issues, an inclination which remains with him even if he disavows the official ideology."¹⁵⁷ Hosking then suggests, in my opinion correctly, that rather than having been influenced by the specific contents of Marxist-Leninist ideology, *the people had been much more affected by its tendency to uncritical posturing and by the fact that there had been no competition of ideas.*¹⁵⁸

In terms of the effects of communist indoctrination on the cognitive orientation level and the memory as such, surveys conducted in several communist states suggested that knowledge of the "basics" of Marxism-Leninism, communist history and hagiography and the political system was very shallow.¹⁵⁹ Mason and also Shlapentokh have acknowledged "how little real *knowledge* most people had of basic ideological principles."¹⁶⁰ Holmes who has studied the results of a 1976-77 survey of

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 11.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid. (emphasis by J.M.).

¹⁵⁹ See, for example, Vladimir Shlapentokh, Soviet Public Opinion and Ideology. Mythology and Pragmatism in Interaction (New York: Praeger, 1986); and also Mason, Public Opinion and Political Change in Poland, 1980-1982; and also Holmes, Politics in the Communist World.

¹⁶⁰ Quoted from Mason, "Justice, Socialism, and Participation in the Postcommunist States," in Social Justice and Political Change, ed. James R. Kluegel et al. (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1995), 73 (emphasis in the original). It is not without merit to point out, as Mason did, that political knowledge and ideological commitments are not strong in Western countries either, as shown, for example, by Kinder and Sears (1985) and Converse (1964). One may agree with Mason that in the communist states, where political socialization was much more

over 800 communist youth leaders in Hungary - whose knowledge was supposed to be well above the average - has found that some of those interviewed thought Josef Stalin was commander-in-chief of the German Army while others said the former Soviet leader was governor of Hungary during the 1950s. According to one of his findings: "Seventeen percent knew nothing about Lenin [and] only 13 percent of those questioned were able to go beyond the fact that he was a 'revolutionary and a famous statesman'. . . "¹⁶¹ Similarly, in Poland, several surveys have demonstrated that attitudes to politics had not been deeply affected by indoctrination. Another survey revealed that only 10 percent of those interviewed thought that other people joined the communist party for ideological reasons whereas 60 percent thought that careerism was the main reason for joining the party.¹⁶² Also Mason has concluded that "the formal ideology never took hold very well in any [communist] country, even after years of socialization."¹⁶³

intense, uniform, and centralized, it was rather surprising that ideological principles had taken hold so little. Mason, *ibid.*, 73. In a sense, the question may be asked to what extent did the state communist authorities expect the value-messages to be transmitted properly. As Volgyes has put it, "the crux matter of political socialization remains not the message-sending capacity of the socializer, but the recipient's comprehension of the message and his or her willingness to accept it." Volgyes, Politics in Eastern Europe, 277.

¹⁶¹ Holmes, Politics in the Communist World, 92. Holmes quotes from Mary McAuley, "Political Culture and Communist Politics: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back," in Political Culture and Communist Studies, ed. Archie Brown (New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1984), 38.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 114.

¹⁶³ Mason, "Justice, Socialism, and Participation in the Postcommunist States," 73. A similar survey, conducted among Belgrade secondary school students and published in 1972, revealed that some 70 percent of the respondents did not even know who the founders of Marxism were. See David A. Dyker, "Yugoslavia: Unity out of Diversity?," in Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States, ed. Archie Brown and Jack Gray (London: Macmillan, 1977), 81. See also White,

Considering the question to which extent anyone "actually believed" in Marxism-Leninism, i.e. accepted certain tenets as something which he or she could identify with, Urban et al. believe that the issue may be "largely beside the point." According to them, notwithstanding the fact that many individuals no doubt had accepted Marxism-Leninism at its face value, the important questions remained: "on what grounds? . . . and to what effect?"¹⁶⁴ The authors have concluded that "inasmuch as imposition rather than persuasion guaranteed the dominance of this public discourse, . . . Marxism-Leninism remained unable to develop the capacity to subjectify itself, to colonize the internal world of the subject *qua* subject."¹⁶⁵

However, the sheer amount and intensity of indoctrination could warrant that large segments of the population, if not the majority, were either forced to at least formally accept elements of communist ideology or to invent strategies on how to counteract its cognitive assault. The "compound effect" of multiple sources of exposure and sometimes also of peer pressure throughout ideologized societies must have been variable but significant. One must also take into account the fact that in the post-Stalinist period some ruling communist parties were gradually moving towards a broader mass base. For instance, the CPSU had some 6 million members at the time of Stalin's death, but around 18 million at the beginning of the 1980s. Although in some communist countries the trend had been reversed: in a majority of countries in the Soviet bloc the communist parties gathered within their ranks between 8-15% of

Political Culture and Soviet Politics, esp. 113-142 on detailed analysis of the impact of Marxism-Leninism in the Soviet Union in the 1970s. Interestingly, some surveys indicated that there was much stronger attachment to Marxism in Yugoslavia than in Poland during the post-Stalinist period. See Brown and Gray, *ibid.*, esp. 263.

¹⁶⁴ Urban et al., The Rebirth of politics in Russia, 19.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

the total adult population.¹⁶⁶ Even if one assumes that the success rate of indoctrination was minimal, one cannot ignore the accumulative effect of belonging to such a strictly obedience-oriented party on beliefs, opinions, dispositions, and the whole (conscious and unconscious) lifeworld of the participant population.¹⁶⁷

According to some, evidence indicates that in terms of internalization on the level of social consciousness, the results of indoctrination were poor. For instance, White, after considering comprehensive data available on internalizing Marxist-Leninist values in the Soviet Union, has concluded that it seems that the "Soviet authorities have failed to bring about that total transformation of socio-political values to which. . . they have for more than two generations been committed."¹⁶⁸ Others believe that indoctrination must have been, at least on a general evaluative level, somewhat successful. This may be illustrated by a survey done in Czechoslovakia in 1986: To a question "Which social system provides people with more personal

¹⁶⁶ See Mlynář, "Prospects of Development of the Political System in the Soviet Bloc," esp. 36.

¹⁶⁷ An intriguing question was asked by Holmes in The Politics in the Communist World: Did the people disseminating the ideology, especially those who were in fact paid as full or part-time propagandists and/or top-party functionaries - believe in it or not? According to Holmes, in terms of fundamental or *pure* ideology, "the most convincing answer is that some communists believed in it more than others." Ibid., 117 (emphasis in the original). It is believed, however, that particularly in the second generation of communists (or after the death of Stalin) more and more communist party members joined for reasons other than the belief in communist ideology. Their approach was taken by both non-communist commentators and even party members themselves as associated with political "pragmatism" and cynicism. In this context, Lewis has argued quite correctly that there are times when leadership élites lose faith in themselves for various reasons, which undermines their own legitimacy. See Lewis, Eastern Europe: Political Crisis and Legitimation, 1-41; and also Rigby, "Introduction: Political Legitimacy, Weber and Communist Mono-organizational Systems," 16.

¹⁶⁸ White, Political Culture and Soviet Politics, 142.

freedom, 33% of people questioned responded "the socialist system", while only 24% of respondents answered "the capitalist system".¹⁶⁹ In another, more complex survey also done in Czechoslovakia, respondents had been asked about their views on the "perspectives of socialism and capitalism, covering the years 1979, 1983, 1985 and 1986."¹⁷⁰ According to this survey, 14% of respondents were convinced that socialism had better perspectives in all investigated functions (while only a negligible percentage were of the same opinion regarding the perspectives of capitalism), and another 26% of respondents believed in socialism over capitalism in most functions (this number was 5% for capitalism). Altogether, when all kinds of preferences were added, almost three quarters of respondents expressed their faith in the perspectives of socialism over capitalism. However, conformist political opinion may be at play here and the results do not necessarily imply internalization of Marxist-Leninist values and norms precisely because in authoritarian and semi-totalitarian regimes the penalties for political nonconformity could be quite severe.

There has also been a subconscious and surreptitious side to indoctrination, viewed by some as analogical to the method of "brain-washing." It has been well described (in a rather metaphorical form) by Czeslaw Milosz's classic *The Captive Mind*, who believed that indoctrination must have had, through its links to subconsciousness, the effects on the personality itself:

"There is a species of insect which injects its venom into a caterpillar; thus inoculated, the caterpillar lives on though it is paralyzed. . . . Likewise (although Marx and Engels never foresaw this use for their doctrine), the

¹⁶⁹ In this survey, 16% of the respondents thought that both systems provide "the same" amount of personal freedom, while 19% responded that they "do not know". Quoted from Miroslav Vaněk, Veřejné mínění o socialismu před 17. listopadem 1989 (Praha: Maxdorf, Ustav pro soudobé dějiny AV 98 R, 1994), 53.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 54-55. The results are shown in the Appendix 6.

anesthetic of dialectical materialism was injected into the mind of an individual in the people's democracies. When the individual's brain was duly paralyzed, the eggs of Stalinism were laid in. 'As soon as you are a Marxist,' the party says to the patient, 'you *must* be a Stalinist, for there is no Marxism outside Stalinism'."¹⁷¹

A similar point has been made (and perhaps even more convincingly) by Horvath and Szakolczai. According to them,

"... it is perhaps at this level [of personal choices about existence] that the most lasting and dangerous impact of bolshevism will be with us the longest. This concerns the 'depth' of personality, the self, its - allegedly universal but definitely real - need to identify itself with its own activity. Communism not only forced individuals into choices about life where they did not have a decent choice to make, but, using very delicate, probably highly unconscious mechanism, it made them identify themselves with the results of their own decisions. It forced individuals to choose labels prepared by the system, made them stick them on their own foreheads and finally to behave accordingly. Communism involved a peculiar game of self-stigmatisation."¹⁷²

By and large, the issue of political indoctrination *per se* has not been adequately analyzed yet - neither in Western nor in Eastern European political science. Most evidence seems to point out that, in terms of a conscious (cognitive) adoption of communist ideology/doctrine, the effects on the articulated value system had not been too deep, although in several countries scores on some indicators of evaluative orientation might be higher.¹⁷³ The overall effects on all the associated levels of

¹⁷¹ Milosz, The Captive Mind. Quoted from Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics, 33 (emphasis in the original).

¹⁷² Horvath and Szakolczai, The dissolution of communist power: The case of Hungary, 217.

¹⁷³ The situation may have been rather different in Russia however, depending on the area and the type of question asked. Although scholars have generally been sceptical about the depth of Soviet ideological convictions, some have believed that

consciousness and personality may be evaluated only tentatively.

III.3.6 The overall effects of communist socialization.

One of the most difficult questions is exactly what kind of citizen had been created during several decades of communism. Had communist regimes succeeded in changing political culture and creating the "new socialist man," or had they created his caricature in the sense that dissidents had in mind when they talked about the new *Homo Sovieticus*?¹⁷⁴

From the standpoint of formal socialization as described, one can argue that - though the tension between officially proclaimed ideas and values on the one hand and reality on the other hand were perceived by each individual differently - for most of the population it was easier to accept the official interpretation, at least in public, rather than to challenge it, but otherwise to keep their own values.¹⁷⁵ Thus one may conclude

a significant change in mass political values had occurred (for instance A. Meyer or Samuel Huntington. See also White, Political Culture and Soviet Politics, 114.

¹⁷⁴ Holmes has added an interesting twist to the argument. He has asked his reader to suppose that most communist regimes were not "actually very anxious to create the 'new socialist person.' After all," he argues, "a society full of such people would mean that there was little justification any longer for a vanguard party and a coercive state - and hence a political elite. If socialization were to work too well, the political élite would lose its *raison d'être*." Holmes, Politics in the Communist World, 94.

¹⁷⁵ Volgyes has rightly noted: "How can a citizen of these states believe, for example, in the 'glowing successes of building socialism' when comparing his or her lot to that of the citizens of the Western European states? . . . How can one believe in socialist morality when one realizes the importance of *protekcija* (obtaining favours through unofficial channels). . . Or how can they really believe in a collectivist society of one for all and all for one, when one can only get ahead largely by one's own efforts and at the expense of collectivist ideals?" Volgyes, Politics in Eastern Europe, 308 (emphasis in the original).

that the effects of the obligatory ritual of the "institutionalized lie" and the habit of "wearing masks" on social behaviour and morality may have been only temporary for most: Once that ideological fallacy was exposed as a mere rationalization for the usurpation of power by the corrupt elite, there was no foundation for the survival of most of the tenets of communist teleology as such.

But one may ask whether it really is as simple as that. There is at least one problem with this position. In fact, the pretence of "normalcy" and democracy by the regime was part of the big lie about the "government of the people," which became so routinized that people stopped realizing their deeper ethical relationship to the regime and the political world. Could it then be that patterns of *hypocrisy* and the internal rejection and difficulties in using language in the public sphere in general were greater than the people themselves were willing to admit? As Havel has put it (with slight overstatement perhaps): "For years, . . . values and models of behavior were deliberately fostered in the consciousness of society. It was a perverted structure. . . . but society nevertheless internalized it, or, rather, was compelled to internalize it."¹⁷⁶

In analyzing social legacies of communism in Eastern Europe, Millar and Wolchik have suggested that some of the values, attitudes, and behavior "were inculcated during the years of communist rule, whereas others were not explicitly promulgated or even approved by the regime but developed as the result of living under a communist system."¹⁷⁷ Such a broad notion of socialization (in line with

¹⁷⁶ Havel, The Art of Impossible, 117.

¹⁷⁷ Millar and Wolchik, The Social Legacy of Communism, 10. Millar and Wolchik have proposed to consider, within their notion of socialization under communism, the broadly conceived social consequences of communism: (1) legacies that flow from the tacit social contract between the population and the state, and (2) legacies that represent values, attitudes, and behavior that the state attempted either to instill or extirpate in the subject population." *Ibid.*, 4.

Greenstein's definition) includes effects of *latent* and "*negative*" socialization, which had undoubtedly gone beyond the "wearing masks" syndrome. Both latent and negative socialization may consist of reactions and/or adaptive mechanisms to the "message" that was to be socialized, with results that run contrary to the original intentions of socializers. The concept of *negative* socialization may also help us understand the "non-learning" in some areas; i.e. why, for instance people in a state socialist regime did not learn certain political attitudes and skills needed for a democratic process.

Thus, from the standpoint of informal/latent socialization one can seriously consider that a "new person" could have been created, whom many dissidents and commentators from the region denoted as *homo sovieticus*.¹⁷⁸ Such a species has been defined in divergent ways by different authors - mostly as a type of person who used to live his/her life in limited freedom, and by and large in fear, who was in too many respects dependent on the mercy of the state that owned everything and could distribute benefits according to its "supreme" logic. Instead of a paradigm worker, socialist citizen and fighter for "justice and peace" all over the world, inside observers have found a different man - "angry, dispirited people whose initiative, self-reliance and character have been worn down by a corrupt communist system, who had learned how to consistently cheat the very state."¹⁷⁹ At the same time, some positive traits of this anthropological type have been pointed out: "shrewdness born out of hard life experience, elaborate skills in creating informal safety nets, ability to improvise, and

¹⁷⁸ Originally, the term was used, especially by post-Soviet journalists as a sort of witticism, an "exercise in traditional self-derision, but metaphorically ambiguous." Elena Chinyaeva, "The Fate of Soviet Mass Culture in Russia," *Transition* 2.6 (22 Mar. 1996): 23. Increasingly, and particularly when used by foreign commentators and scholars, it has acquired accusatory and pejorative connotation.

¹⁷⁹ Strpka, "Šest rokov po - o změnách v nás." Similar observations have been made by Havel, Sztompka, Holy, and others.

inventiveness when dealing with unexpected problems."¹⁸⁰

Such a picture has been partially tested by social scientists, namely by means of political-culture surveys and in tentative analyses of political behavior. Because such research had faced serious limitations, opinion among students of the region on how efficacious overall communist socialization was, has varied. These variations have often depended on whether distinctions between the purposive and latent types of socialization, and the effects of negative evaluation as well as a degree of internalization have been taken into account.

Some Western scholars have been convinced that a significant change in mass political values and orientations has occurred. Alfred Meyer, for instance has argued that "Soviet citizenship training has succeeded and the basic tenets of the ideology have been internalized." Also, Samuel Huntington seemed to be at one point so impressed by the results of Soviet socialization that he declared the Soviet Union was probably the "most dramatically successful case of planned political culture change."¹⁸¹ Similarly, Greenstein has argued that communist systems had been largely an "exception to a general rule that deliberate, mobilizational efforts to change political cultures have mostly fared poorly."¹⁸² This would be consistent with an argument made by other students of the region, that "many crucial tenets of socialism have been well

¹⁸⁰ Chinyaeva, "The Fate of Soviet Mass Culture in Russia," 23.

¹⁸¹ Samuel Huntington and Jorge I. Dominguez, "Political Development," in Handbook of Political Science, ed. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, vol. III: Macropolitical Theory (Reading, MA, Addison-Wesley, 1975). Quoted from White, Political Culture and Soviet Politics, 114.

¹⁸² Greenstein, Handbook of Political Science, vol. III: Macropolitical Theory, n. pag.

internalized."¹⁸³

Some, however, have defended a more cautious position, especially with regard to European communist countries outside the Soviet Union. The general cautiousness that has recently prevailed has mostly resulted from the inconclusiveness and ambiguity of the evidence available. With relevant survey data either scarce or unreliable, many observers have often based their argument on the assumption that overt political behaviour could be misleading and that conformist political actions did not necessarily imply internalization. When, for example, Holmes has considered evidence regarding the inconsistencies between the alleged goals of communist socialization and results in the form of actual social behavior of citizens, he has concluded that there is both evidence "that would suggest that socialization has not been a success," as well as data pointing to the fact "that socialization *might* have been successful."¹⁸⁴

¹⁸³ See McFalls, Communism's Collapse, Democracy's Demise?; and also Volgyes, Politics in Eastern Europe, 54. As an illustration of internalization of a specific "anti-capitalist" value, Holmes has argued: "If citizens were asked whether they would prefer an improved, less elitist socialist system or a full-blooded capitalist one (with its competition, insecurity, etc.), it is by no means clear that the majority would opt for the latter." Holmes, Politics in the Communist World, 94.

¹⁸⁴ Holmes, Politics in the Communist World, 91-2 (emphasis in the original). At the same time, as Holmes suggested, "the socialization process may have been *more successful than surveys reveal* because the question asked would in most cases give only a partial reflection of citizens orientations." Ibid., 93 (emphasis by J.M.). It seems that at least the television scored some points in succeeding to transmit certain desired values, particularly in rural areas. Volgyes has argued that "due probably to the lack of sophistication among much of the peasantry, television has conquered the traditional, shrewd mistrust of city folks and of the regime." Volgyes has hypothesized that the regimes' relative stability in Hungary and Bulgaria in the 1970s and the early 1980s "may be due largely to the passive support of the peasantry, who have been considerably influenced by the messages of political socialization relayed by television." Volgyes, Politics in Eastern Europe, 277.

Some have believed that the simple fact of "being forced" to live in a totalitarian-in-principle regime where certain values were mandatory must have left some real, but not easily classifiable effects. A useful concept in this respect is one suggested by Zaslavsky, that of "*embeddedness in the regime*," which refers to the "number and strength of social ties between an individual or a group and the existing political regime."¹⁸⁵ From the perspective of latent socialization in the broadest sense, perhaps a concept of "*situational and civilizational embeddedness*" would even better describe the complex (and inescapable) interactions between citizens and the total environment including desired goals, the elite culture, dominant (mass) culture environment, economic policies (and also more general processes of rapid industrialization and urbanization), and their mutual interactions. The scope of these effects, however, as Volgyes has argued, had to differ from one individual or group to another: "Theoretically, and to a lesser extent in reality, there existed in Eastern Europe a single scale of values, adherence to which was mandated by fear or conviction, conformism or ignorance of any alternative, depending, of course, on the individual system and subject. In highly dictatorial, isolated, and insular states, people profess regime-oriented values because they fear what might happen if they are not observed doing so."¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁵ Victor Zaslavsky, The Neo-Stalinist State. Class, Ethnicity, and Consensus in Soviet Society (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1994), 37.

¹⁸⁶ Volgyes, Politics in Eastern Europe, 291. Very little research on socialization has been done in the region on the relationship between the broader socio-psychological and family patterns. As Volgyes has pointed out, in communist state there were common "significant conflicts between the values inculcated by primary [i.e. particularly by the family and peers] and by secondary [formal political organizations] structures." Ibid., 262. Volgyes has correctly pointed out that socialization processes may also vary according to the type of family in which a child is raised. Depending on tendencies in a family to inculcate a certain set of values, Volgyes has distinguished four different types of families: the communist

Still others have argued that "certain groups and individuals were subjected to the effects more intensively than others." The latter observation can also be viewed as linked to that of the perception of legitimacy of a given regime, or to different personality types.¹⁸⁷ On balance, it is very difficult to decide conclusively how much had been internalized, and most importantly what longer-term effects the process of socialization had on the value-formation dynamics on the level of individual mindsets. However, one may agree with Volgyes, who has noted that "there can be no doubt that the system has had some successes in certain areas" as well with his conclusion that certain values in some countries "have been accepted and internalized by the population."¹⁸⁸

family, the apolitical or conformist family, and the dissident family. Ibid., 265. This is quite a powerful explanation of different socialization outcomes among populational groups in communist countries.

¹⁸⁷ See Horvath and Szakolczai, The dissolution of communist power: The case of Hungary, esp. 216. According to Holmes, no political system is either fully supported or totally rejected by the populace; but for analytical purposes one may distinguish several levels of acceptance of a regime, or its legitimation by the citizenry. Holmes has divided attitudes toward a regime into "four basic categories": a) positive support, b) positive acceptance (a citizen is not so enthusiastic about the political system as in the case a) and may be critical of some of the regime's aspects), c) negative acceptance (a citizen would prefer a different political system, but is not prepared to do anything to bring about such change), and d) active rejection (a citizen is prepared to take an active approach aimed at the end of a regime). Holmes, Politics in the Communist World, 117.

¹⁸⁸ Volgyes, Politics in Eastern Europe, 154 and 307.

A clue to understanding the "quality" and durability of values and habits held and displayed may be found, as Holt has suggested, in different personality types as proposed in the work of Vera French. She has indicated that, for instance, philosophic-religious values may be incorporated as part of the "super-ego" structure or as part of the "ego" structure. According to her, although individuals who displayed these different types of personality structure could not be distinguished on the basis of the content of their beliefs, the behavior manifestations of their beliefs were different. In Holt's view, "if this is a reasonable hypothesis, the students of socialization must look beyond the content of values

To summarize, the evidence seems to indicate that on the one hand the formal type of socialization, especially its part involving ideological indoctrination was not too efficient. On the other hand, informal socialization, including other adaptive processes associated with the experience of living in the specific social, political and economic conditions (of the socialist party-state), had left more recognizable and lasting effects. As I have already established, these effects were linked to the deep psycho-social level of the consciousness of the actors. To look for these symptoms as they have found their way into the post-communist constellation will be the task of Chapter V.¹⁸⁹

expressed by individuals into their personality structures and into the effect that the different socialization structures have on the relationships between individual values and personality structure. This would seem to be *particularly important with respect to politically relevant beliefs and values.*" Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner, eds., The Methodology of Comparative Research (New York: The Free Press, 1970), 49 (emphasis by J.M.). In his comprehensive study of political socialization (with the sub-title "A Study in the Psychology of Political Behavior"), Hyman has been interested in the psychological underpinnings of the socialization process. He has suggested, among other things, that the relationship between individual mental organization and the character of the socialization process may explain the paradox of stability and openness to novelty pertaining to political behavior. See Herbert, H. Hyman, Political Socialization (New York: The Free Press, 1959), esp. 12-14.

¹⁸⁹ In this respect, some have approached the issue from the standpoint of the distinction and relationship among various "subcultures." Given the scope of the thesis, I cannot deal with multi-group models as I have treated the problem in general terms only.

IV. **"The Post-Communist Mind": The Symptoms.**

"All the surveys and polling data show that public opinion in our region rejects dictatorship, but would like to see a strong man at the helm; favours popular government, but hates parliament, parties, and the press; likes social welfare legislation and equality, but not trade unions; wants to topple the present government, but disapproves of the idea of a regular opposition; supports the notion of the market (which is a code word for Western-style living standards), but wishes to punish and expropriate the rich and condemns banking for preying on simple working people; favours a guaranteed minimum income, but sees unemployment as a immoral state and wants to punish or possibly deport the unemployed."¹

"The first and perhaps most important feature of the totalitarian policy is that it produced a nation traumatized by its own past."²

IV.1 The post-communist political culture and the PCM.

By analyzing the social and institutional conditions of communism I have concluded that they might reasonably be expected to affect, through the process of socialization working most effectively in its informal/latent form, some aspects of individual and mass psychological orientations and dispositions of the population in the region. Although the degree of these effects no doubt varies from one individual to another and from one group to another (as well as from one country to another), it is also reasonable to anticipate that in general, at deeper levels of the people's

¹ A Hungarian analyst is quoted from Mueller, "Democracy, Capitalism, and the End of Transition," 116-117.

² Hosking, The Awakening of the Soviet Union, 8 and 10.

conscience, specific impresses in values, norms and habits had been generated (i.e. the PCM). The factor of long exposure to the complex communist environment, i.e. of "*embeddedness in the regime*" or "civilizational embeddedness," which refers to the number and strength of social ties "between an individual or a group and the existing political regime," can be considered the major source of significant habitual responses to the political and economic environment: such responses are the major constituent parts of the PCM.³

Thus, on the one hand, even though, as some have argued, the attempt to create a new socialist man, the end product of the official political culture, has been on the whole a relative failure, "especially when considering the enjoyment of all institutional powers which a Communist political system bestows," the experience of communism had produced lasting effects. On the other hand, communist socialization in its formal and deliberate forms could have succeeded only in a limited way, mostly because it was not congruent enough with existing mass political cultures.⁴

In my next step, I will focus on the PCM itself as defined in Section II.5, i.e. on the characteristics /"symptoms" of surviving communism-induced political culture as they had been internalized, and hopefully could be identified (identified as significant) in the post-communist constellation. Inferring from the logic of inertia normally at work in deep-seated values and dispositions (habits), it can be anticipated that these symptoms - because of their habitual character - have been carried at least

³ Zaslavsky, The Neo-Stalinist State. Class, Ethnicity, and Consensus in Soviet Society, 37. See also Leslie Holmes: ". . . many aspects of the communist era were deeply and often subconsciously internalized by both citizens and officials. Further, it is clear that current attitudes towards institutions and concepts such as 'political party', 'parliament', 'democracy' are being heavily influenced by memories of and associations with the communist past." Holmes, Post-Communism, 16.

⁴ Gray in Brown and Gray, Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States, 270-271.

in part through the revolutionary upheaval into the post-communist transitional constellation.

The logic of my model of the PCM (see II.5.) implies that the symptoms that have been identified as constituent parts of the PCM are those that had been most internalized and thereby "secured" their continuation in the transformation period. In this sense, many of the symptoms of post-communist psycho-social constellations may be understood as being *habitual* responses in nature (as described in II.3.1), rather than as mere attitudes or values. For such symptoms or habitual predispositions, what Marody has attributed to habits would apply: i.e. constituting socially formed cognitive and motivational structures which are, because of their embeddedness perceived as natural and "in consequence escape critical reflection, directing human activity as if without conscious control."⁵ Such a positioning of habits contributes to their longer term prospects of survival. A change in the objective structure that produced them cannot lead to an expeditious or spontaneous change of deep-seated patterns, and "by sheer force of inertia they may continue to determine individual behavior for a long time."⁶

As I have already suggested, the best way to test the occurrence of such symptoms is: (1) to make causal implications based on the analysis of communist institutions and communist socialization (Chapter III), and (2) to identify key characteristics within the post-communist political culture and assess them for their relationship with (1). A combination of these two procedures, or a comparison of the anticipated characteristics from the first analysis with the key features of the post-communist political cultures (in the broadest sense), and identification of those which

⁵ Marody, "The Political Attitudes of Polish Society in the Period of Systemic Transitions," 263.

⁶ Ibid.

are repeated in both sets, would lead to (approximate) identification of the most typical PCM symptoms.

While aware of this, it is not my task to analyze the post-communist political cultures in their complexity: I will make only a few points on the issue of "post-communist political culture." Such a construct, no matter how conceptually defined, is a "mixture" of pre-communist, communist, and "transitional" political cultures, as well as a mixture of their "vertical" components (i.e. sub-cultures) within individual national political cultures. In the literature dealing with post-communist political culture, there has been very little conceptual guidance about the nature of such a hypothetical construct called "post-communist political culture." This is understandable, since the rate of diversification in the politico-cultural sphere, compounded by asserting national identities and the general speed of change in other correlational factors (economy and politics), have prevented the formulation of any single coherent concept of post-communist political culture. Leslie Holmes, considering political culture one of the four determinants of an outcome of the current transformation, has argued that there has been an "enormous number of subvariables in this [political culture] category, including experiences under pre-communism, communism and post-communism; religious traditions; traditional attitudes towards both authority and democracy; level and type of external influences; ethnic diversity; proximity to the West or other models. Many more variables could be identified."⁷ Furthermore, evidence presented by researchers in the field has shown that many attitudes and values held or expressed by the population in the post-communist region have been ambiguous and often contradictory. In this sense, as a case in point, Schöpflin has pointed out conflicting and "competing political cultures" both from one

⁷ Holmes, Post-Communism, 345.

country to another and within individual countries in the region.⁸ Indeed, the post-communist political culture has been difficult to grasp: Eckstein, for instance, has appropriately referred to "*the formlessness of political culture*" as typical for transitory periods and societies.⁹ T. G. Ash has expressed a similar insight that "[perhaps] the beginning of wisdom is to recognize that what communism has left behind is an extraordinary mish-mash, a fragmentation and cacophony of interests, attitudes, views, ideals, traditions."¹⁰ Because of its specific heuristic character which ties it up to deep social and psychological structures, the PCM model has avoided some of this formlessness and is more suitable for a systematic analysis of certain psycho-social and politico-cultural traits in post-communist societies.

IV.2 The PCM - conceptualization /operationalization.

In order to identify the symptoms, I have, on a preliminary basis, compared the expectations from my institutional analysis of communism as well as further evidence (as presented in the previous sections) with the data from public opinion research conducted in the region during the post-communist period.¹¹ This comparison has

⁸ Schopflin, "Culture and Identity in Post-Communist Europe," 24-28.

⁹ See Eckstein, "A Culturalist Theory of Political Change" (emphasis by J.M.). According to Eckstein, "anomie and political extremism, not rapid developments of new cultural orientations such as democracy, are the expected outcomes of extreme social, political, and/or economic discontinuity." Eckstein, Regarding Politics, 274-5.

¹⁰ Quoted from Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics, 243.

¹¹ Crawford and Lijphart have singled out six "key legacies" that are to affect conditions in the post-communist transformation. They have, however, included institutional legacies into their set. They have distinguished these six legacies: a)

generated several typical characteristics/symptoms which are often clusters of several related characteristics that meet the established criteria. These identified (clusters of) symptoms are in this section treated as "dependent variables" vis-a-vis the communist system. They have "passed the test" of communist socialization and will be in my scheme subjected to partial operationalization to test them for the significance of their actual existence.¹²

Since it is difficult to isolate the PCM within the post-communist political culture, it is inevitable that the symptoms (and the PCM as such) are "filtered" from the communist political culture through the conditions of transformation. As I am not interested in a detailed account of specific modalities brought about by this "filter," I have proposed an analytical solution to the problem in order to obtain symptoms with a strong link to the legacy of communism (see Chapter II). The problem here is to which extent (the conditions of) the transition /transformation itself could be "held responsible" for the characteristics found in the post-communist political culture, and to what extent these characteristics resulted from the experience of communism. In fact, one can expect that the symptoms internalized under communism may be superimposed by various transitional syndromes, and both layers may interact in various ways. Sztompka, for instance, when characterizing one of these types of mental

the history of "backwardness", victimization, and intolerance; b) the absence of an established successor elite; c) weak party systems with shallow roots in society; d) interrupted process of nation building; e) the continued persistence of institutions established under the old regime; and f) the legacy of the centralized state and command economy. In describing their categorization they have also indicated how individual countries differ from each other in specific categories. Crawford and Lijphart, "Explaining Political and Economic Change in Post-Communist Eastern Europe," esp. 179.

¹² A more detailed operationalization is neither possible, given the scope of this study, nor required by its objectives.

legacies of communism in people's "social mind," has pointed out that such imprints may be seen as a superimposition of the imprints left by the experience with communism and "new" imprints pertaining to the post-communist era. He writes:

"Somewhat ironically, the anti-communist revolutionary upheavals and the associated experiences of elation, enthusiasm, mobilization, raised aspirations and hopes, and released activism and participation leave their own lasting imprint on post-revolutionary society. Under some circumstances the return to normality may breed disenchantment, frustration, relative deprivation and similar moods which effectively block further reforms and endanger the very fruits of the revolution."¹³

Hence the post-communist constellation in part refers to the contents of, and reactions to, the revolutionary and immediate post-revolutionary situation.¹⁴ In this sense, the dynamics generated by the post-communist transitional processes may be associated with the "social general adaptation syndrome." This mechanism is symptomatic for social movings from one relatively steady state to another, in which a mass sense of confusion and dissatisfaction is involved by definition; the complexity

¹³ Sztompka, "The Intangibles and Imponderables of the Transition to Democracy," 299.

¹⁴ Millar and Wolchik have proposed to consider "the social consequences of communism under three broad headings:" (1) legacies that flow from the tacit social contract between the population and the state; (2) legacies that represent values, attitudes, and behavior that the state attempted to either instill or extirpate in the subject population; and (3) "the aftermath - that is, the unintended consequences of communist rule." (Millar and Wolchik, The Social Legacy of Communism, 4. They have also, however, admitted that it is difficult to separate individual sources/legacies from each other.

of this adaptation process is, however, beyond the scope of my analysis.¹⁵ In general terms, the mechanism of specific adjustment to socio-psychological pressures have been analyzed by Erich Fromm. In his opinion, "the social character internalizes external necessities and thus harnesses human energy for the task of a given economic and social system."¹⁶

The PCM symptoms may thus be viewed as the legacy or residue of "communist" socialization in the broadest sense in the sphere of values, orientations, mentalities, and behavioral patterns, i.e. as the internalized legacy of specific ideological, institutional and social conditions of the state-socialist /"communist" state. Although the individual symptoms (or indicators of the PCM) can be more valid for

¹⁵ Sztompka has listed several "side-effects" or "dilemmas of the post-revolutionary period" which, as he believed, might (as a "boomerang") affect the process of consolidation of the post-communist reforms. He has found: 1. the *"dilemma of the morning after"* (a sort of hangover after the revolutionary excitement); 2. the *"dilemma of the brief honeymoon"* (the burden of reality starts to set/sink in); 3. the *"dilemma of abdicated power"* (after the upsurge in mobilization, demobilization and depolitization of masses is "the predictable reaction"); 4. the *"dilemma of innocence lost"* (it concerns especially the revolutionary/dissent leadership which by now must espouse Weberian "routinization of a charisma", with all its consequences, including the breakdown of the myth of original unity); 5. the *"dilemma of the delayed clock"* (the discrepancy between revolutionary changes and subsequent stagnation in some areas); 6. the *"dilemma of the recurring nightmare"* (could all this lead to another disaster?); 7. the *"dilemma of the bequeathed tenant"* (the "house of common affairs" had been neglected, but it has now become people's "own house:" Are they up to the task of cleaning it up?); 8. the *"dilemma of the opened cage"* (many of the old barriers and limitations had been destroyed; the found freedom has led to many pathologies, including a higher rate of criminality. See Sztompka, "The Intangibles and Imponderables of the Transition to Democracy," esp. 306-8 (emphasis in the original). Such and other transitional syndromes would be subject to the conditions in an individual country.

¹⁶ Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom [1941] (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), 284. The issues of adaptational and situational change will be dealt with at more length in the final Chapter.

some post-communist countries than for others, they can be mostly considered typical for post-communist Eastern European societies in general. Also, with regard to the differentiation between mass and elite political cultures, some of the symptoms identified may be more valid for one or the other of the two types of political culture.¹⁷

IV.3 The PCM: the symptoms.

"Every democracy that emerges from the darkness of dictatorship is like that: it is bound to contain the stigma of the old regime." (Adam Michnik)¹⁸

The proposed classification of the PCM symptoms as a set of interrelated (and sometimes overlapping) socio-psychological characteristics assumes that they are "the-past-in-the-present," i.e. they link the experience of communism and that of post-communism. As noted, these symptoms largely refer to deeply-seated mental patterns; i.e. structural mental commonalities found in post-communist political cultures. Using the previously described method, I have identified the following symptoms as the most widespread:

¹⁷ One possible option for classifying the symptoms would be according to those 1) relating to individual behavior and 2) the public sphere. Although this is generally useful, I do not use this classification explicitly, since part of my argument is that to identify the PCM symptoms which even when qualified as "private", may have implications for actors' attitudes to, and behavior in, the public sphere and thereby, if only indirectly, affect the outcome of the transformation.

¹⁸ Adam Michnik, "When the Majority Rejects Virtue," Transition 2.12 (14 June 1996): 34.

1. surviving paternalist values (dispositions);
2. an increased sensitivity to social justice issues (egalitarianism);
3. a (relatively) strong tendency to accept authoritarian patterns;
4. a (relatively) high degree of political apathy and distrust;
5. problems in congruence between the private and public spheres.

In addition, other characteristics or "sub-symptoms" have been identified within the "main" symptoms. Several others related and more complex symptoms (corruption, for example), are analyzed separately at the end of this Chapter.¹⁹ Also, some aspects of the relationships among individual symptoms will be discussed further.

For reasons stated in I.3.4-6, public opinion surveys are used as evidence but with caution. They have been selected, by and large, whenever they met the criteria of my theoretical approach, while possessing significant comparative potential, and they

¹⁹ The symptoms I have identified may be understood as "conceptual clusters," suggesting that they are an aggregation of several traits related to each other by virtue of sharing the same conceptual space. Since it is possible to categorize the symptoms of the PCM in multiple ways, one must be aware of difficulties linked with too many or too few categories. If one has too many categories (i.e. fragmentized into individual psychological traits), these categories could lose their potential from the perspective of describing their observable effect on the political and economic processes. If all symptoms are collapsed into very few categories, one would face the danger where a cluster of symptoms becomes too broad to be defensible as being "real" and comparatively significant. I would remind the reader here that the problem of the relationship between the pre-communist and 'communist' political cultures in terms of "overdetermination" cannot be satisfactorily resolved. One can only assume that whenever this is the case, certain inference may be made in the direction of believing that some of the identified predispositions (symptoms) might have been reinforced during the communist period and hence might have acquired a stronger resistance to change; such an assumption, however, can be hardly verified, though it has to be taken into account.

can also as a rule be considered fairly reliable.²⁰

IV.3.1 Surviving paternalist values (dispositions).

In one of his studies on post-communism Claus Offe has stated that people in these societies "are not used to coping with insecurity." In this section, I will argue, with reference to my previous analysis of the etatist (social-contractual) conditions of communism, that the prevailing political cultures in ECE/EE ,as they have emerged from the demise of communism, have been characterized by paternalist tendencies, i.e. that the population have become "habituated [to a large degree] to statist and authoritarian practices."²¹ The syndrome of "paternalist" tendencies has been both anticipated and empirically identified by several students of the post-communist region. A majority of them have agreed that the paternalist expectations have their roots in the social contract between society and the communist regime seems to be a valid hypothesis for most of the region's countries. As Millar and Wolchik have commented,

"It follows from these data that a major legacy of communism is the belief that the government is responsible not only for assuring general prosperity for the country, but also for guaranteeing employment and basic material needs of

²⁰ Often contradictory findings have led some students to considerable scepticism. In 1996 von Beyme despaired: "What do we know after knowing the results of survey studies on opinions and attitudes of East-European citizens? Rather little! New constellations changed the opinions quite quickly so that constant attitudes did not develop." Beyme, Transition to Democracy in Eastern Europe, 160. Von Beyme has quoted an example the case of Lithuania where in 1990 the surveys revealed "the most ardent anti-communist feelings." Two years later the Lithuanians approved in a popular vote the come-back of moderately reformed communists. Ibid.

²¹ Crawford, East Central European politics today. From chaos to stability?, 37.

individual citizens. These responsibilities have become enmeshed in the very definition of democracy for many Russians and Central and Eastern Europeans."²²

The syndrome generally refers to the relatively high dependency on the state for solutions of personal social situations and to the expectations that such solutions are the responsibility of the state. The modalities of this dependency and its actual degree have been an issue of discussion among the area specialists. Schopflin, for instance, has referred to some of the psycho-social responses characteristic for post-communist countries as the legacy of "infantilized society."²³ This metaphor of the state as the protective parent of a child-like immature society can be, as Holmes has suggested, interpreted as a sign of patronizing arrogance of the Western observer, but it can be useful. As Holmes has put it, "Schöpflin's term should therefore be read as a criticism of the political legacy of the communists rather than of the citizens of the post-communist world."²⁴ Almost the same point has been made by Kolankiewicz, who has succinctly summarized the situation:

" . . . the orientation towards state paternalism, the 'over protective state' in welfare provision affected all sections of society in a network of payments in kind or subsidies which it is difficult to call perks or privileges since they were part of the wage structure. These reinforced the learned incapacity to take risk-bearing decisions and made it difficult to anticipate what the rational reaction to marketization might be from any particular group and, hence, what political

²² Millar and Wolchik, The Social Legacy of Communism, 16.

²³ Schopflin, "Culture and Identity in Post-Communist Europe," esp. 26-7.

²⁴ Holmes, Post-Communism, 18. See also "We were living in a state of strange adolescence. . . prolonged childhood devoid of dignity." Jifina Siklova, "What Did We Lose After 1989?," Social Research 63.2 (Summer 1996): 539. Also Maaz has referred to "the pronounced infantility of the population" in the former East Germany. Maaz, Behind the Wall, 86.

forces it might release."²⁵

Forms of surviving paternalist expectations have been recognized as existing in varying degree in all post-communist countries. In the former GDR, for instance, this paternalist tendency or "temptation" has been embodied in the syndrome of *Geborgenheit*²⁶ and *Nischengesellschaft* (the tendency to retreat into a petty bourgeois private sphere, and into a kind of consumerism). Both concepts have been used to describe and explain both actual and idealized living conditions in the former East Germany, i.e. the safety and security of the known (as opposed to existential *Angst* from insecurity), as well as practical responses to actual conditions.²⁷

As many surveys have demonstrated, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, in a fashion similar to that of Germans, Poles seem to have favoured a sort of tutelar state, *państwo opiekuńcze*, in which the risks of facing existential reality are "taken care of" by the state authorities. In the 1980s (at the height of widespread dissatisfaction during the heyday of Solidarity), as well as in the years of its suppression that followed, several consecutive surveys identified this tendency as significant. According to Marody and Mason, a large majority of the population expressed their opinion that they expected the state to deliver more goods and that they preferred the model of a tutelar state as opposed to the model of a state in which everyone takes responsibility

²⁵ George Kolankiewicz, "Poland," in The New Institutional Architecture of Eastern Europe, ed. Stephen Whitefield (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1993), 104.

²⁶ A term difficult to translate, its meaning identifies a place of safety and warmth.

²⁷ See McFalls, Communism's Collapse, Democracy's Demise?, 78.

for his or her own fate.²⁸ In 1985, 62 percent of those questioned stated without reservation their preference for a "caring" patronage state, and only 29 percent preferred a society in which individuals themselves bear responsibility for their well-being. The same research had shown that some 50 percent (against 27 percent) considered capitalism to be a more unjust and exploitative system than their native form of socialism.²⁹ Although there has been an indication that the attachment of Poles to such a state was undergoing certain changes in the direction of the weakening of the paternalist bond by the end of the 1980s and the beginning of 1990s, the trend has not been radically reversed in the 1990s from that in the 1980s. Even after the collapse of communism, many opinion surveys have shown that significant segments of the population (sometimes the absolute majority) have expressed their preferences for at least some features of the old system. In this respect, many commentators have spoken of the "nostalgia for the communist past" as a syndrome typical for society at large rather than for particular groups.³⁰ As Sztompka has complained, "there is a belief [in Poland] that the government is obliged to provide for basic needs, free medical services, and free education, and to supply jobs, pensions, social security, and welfare

²⁸ According to a poll conducted in 1985, 62 percent of Poles agreed with the model of a tutelar state, and only 29 percent with the model of a state which requires taking responsibility for one's own fate. There have been some shifts in preferences since then, but the basic attitude has somewhat persisted. See Marody, "The Political Attitudes of Polish Society in the Period of Systemic Transitions," 279-87; and also Mason, "Justice, Socialism, and Participation in the Postcommunist States."

²⁹ See Marody, "Sens zbiorowy a stabilnosc i zmiana ladu spolecznego." Quoted from Bauman, "The Polish Predicament," 118.

³⁰ See Minton F. Goldman, Revolution and Change in Central and Eastern Europe (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 29-30.

benefits."³¹

Similar paternalist expectations have been documented for most other countries in the area. For example, in a survey which was conducted for USIA in 1992, 53 percent of respondents in Romania and 44 percent of those in Hungary responded that they preferred a "state guarantee" society rather than a society that stresses individual opportunities or one that combines features of both. In Russia a survey conducted in June 1992 found that 68 percent of Russians believed that the government should provide for the "basic material needs of citizens."³² In a comprehensive survey, done by Miller et al., the large majority of the population in five post-communist countries believed that the state is responsible for providing housing for its citizens and setting prices for basic goods (see Tab.1).³³

Table 1 State Responsibilities for Social Welfare (perceptions in five ECE/EE countries)

Service: / Country:	Health care	Jobs	Housing	Setting prices for basic goods
Czech R.	81%	56%	69%	73%

³¹ Sztompka, "The Intangibles and Imponderables of the Transition to Democracy," 305.

³² Millar and Wolchik, The Social Legacy of Communism, 7-8. Also Grey et. al. report that in a 1994 sample of Russian adults, there was a very significant support for state responsibility for the provision of employment, health care, and housing. Robert D. Grey et al., "The Structure of Russian Political Opinion," Coexistence 32 (1995): 183-215. Other surveys reported similar findings, see F.J. Fleron and Richard Ahl, "Does the Public Matter?: Public Opinion Surveys," in Can Democracy Take Root in Post-Soviet Russia?, ed. Harry Eckstein, et al. (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998), esp. 299.

³³ For a comparison with Great Britain, see Tables in Appendix 4.

Slovakia	97%	77%	85%	91%
Hungary	94%	84%	85%	78%
Ukraine	88%	89%	90%	88%
Russia	93%	89%	75%	93%

Source: Miller et al., Values and Political Change in Postcommunist Europe (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1998), Table 6.4, 114. (The POS were conducted between the end of 1993 and the beginning of 1996.)

In Russia, Vainshtein, based on a series of empirical studies conducted in Russia in the post-communist period, has concluded that many Russians have subscribed to paternalism. According to him, there exist "a compact group of Russians who are motivated not so much from ideology as from an emotional feeling and often nostalgic adherence to the old form of social guarantees and state paternalism. They strongly disapprove of the increase in social and economic inequalities inevitable under a market economy, and fear an alteration of habitual forms of life. They adhere to values of 'equal distribution' of wealth. Many dread risk and initiative; anti-market and anti-capitalist prejudices are widespread among them."³⁴

In terms of specific benefit claims, most surveys have indicated that what East Europeans are most interested in was guaranteed jobs. Mason, for instance, in his research conducted in 1991, found that "the preference for guaranteed jobs is overwhelming," with 56 percent of respondents in Estonia to 84 percent of respondents in the former GDR *strongly* agreeing that "the government should provide a job for

³⁴ Vainshtein, "Totalitarian Public Consciousness in a Post-Totalitarian Society." 251. Vainshtein, who has classified this set of attitudes as a "nostalgic-parasitic" type of *totalitarian consciousness*, has added: "In their mind private property is associated with an inevitable deterioration of social and economic conditions, intensification of exploitations, growth of unemployment, and the enrichment of a small stratum of businessmen at the expense of the masses. Ibid., esp. 251.

everyone who wants one."³⁵ This is not surprising, given both the factor of previous job security and rising unemployment under the new system. As Offe has noted, a guaranteed job and associated benefits used to be for most people a minimum expected from the state. According to Offe: "The fact that unemployment was to be excluded as a contingency to be reckoned with together with the fact that a job meant not only a source of income but also the locus of comprehensive need and satisfaction is bound to make the actual experience of joblessness much more painful to those affected than it would be in a market society in which people have been brought up with very different perspective of a job, unemployment, and positive rights."³⁶

There is enough evidence that the paternalist syndrome has problematized people's attitudes toward certain liberal values, and in extension affected voter preferences and party identification. In particular, attitudes toward democratic (liberal) political parties and their agendas have suffered, since those parties, having found themselves in a precarious position, could not always respond to expectations associated with this syndrome (see also IV.3.4).³⁷

³⁵ Mason, "Justice, Socialism, and Participation in the Postcommunist States," 58.

³⁶ Claus Offe, "The Politics of Social Policy in East European Transitions: Antecedents, Agents, and Agenda of Reform." Social Research 60.4 (Winter 1993): 667.

³⁷ Here, several electoral victories by "reformed" or "non-reformed" communist parties across the region in particular and rather fluid electoral patterns in general may be a case in point.

IV.3.1.1 The problem of the congruence of attitudes and behavior patterns with a market economy.

Evidence also seems to have confirmed (though not conclusively) that certain attitudes and habits found in post-communist ECE/EE are comparatively less consistent with the effective functioning of the markets than is the case in advanced Western countries. Hans-Hermann Höhmann, for example, who has systematically analyzed the issue, has argued that there is a set of attitudes and habits inherited from the past that run against what is required for solid job and economic performance. In his opinion, "[with regard to] the behavioral heritage, under the administrative planned economy, many behaviour patterns became ingrained which are anything but propitious to the transition to and the subsequent functioning of a market economy."

According to Höhmann,

"the paternalism of a state which kept the individual under tutelage but at the same time took care (however inadequately) at least of his basic needs had emaciated most people's sense of individual responsibility . . . induced so many performance-dampening and curtailing behaviour patterns that it will be a long time before they can all be eliminated again. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that there is adequate entrepreneurial potential lying fallow in the East of Europe, and that efforts must now be geared above all towards creating propitious conditions for developing that potential."³⁸

Work ethics and lagging "capitalist entrepreneur culture" have become a concern for analysts interested in economic performance in ECE/EE countries as well as for potential investors. Among those concerned, US Federal Reserve Chairman Alan

³⁸ Hans-Hermann Höhmann, "Political Upheaval, System Transformation and Stability Risks in the East of Europe," a paper presented at the NATO colloquium organised by the NATO Economics Directorate and Office of Information and Press, Brussels, 1993 (NATO Internet Documents) 10 August 1995, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/colloq/col93.htm>>.

Greenspan, for instance, has joined those who believe that deeply embedded socialist values and the lack of some basic underpinnings of a free-market economy will make Russia's (and other countries') evolution to capitalism very slow. According to him, "altering what a nation teaches its children is a profoundly difficult task, and clearly cannot be accomplished overnight. . . the dismantling of the central planning function in an economy, as some had supposed, does not automatically establish a free market entrepreneurial system."³⁹ In this context, Greenspan has suggested that countries with open economies have "mistakenly assumed" that many capitalist activities simply emanate from human nature. Instead, as he has argued, "it is cultural and will take time. It took generations for the vast amount of capitalist culture and infrastructure underpinning market economies to evolve - including laws, behaviors and business practices that had no role in communist societies."⁴⁰

Some have suggested that the origins of this concern might be in the absence of competitive conditions under state socialism. Since people had been used to a "soft" economic environment (without any real and fair incentives to work harder), and since the non-market economic system had protected them from the effects of market competition and provided relative job security and a high level of income equality,

³⁹ Alan Greenspan, "Russian Capitalism Lags," a speech given by Alan Greenspan in New York in June 1997, Johnson's Russia List 10 June 1997, <djohnson@cdi.org>.

⁴⁰ Ibid. The Hungarian case seems to be a rather different one. Here, relatively liberal "capitalist" activity by certain groups in the period of late Kadarism has led, according to Deacon, "to a dualized society in which one half is ready and able to become active subjects of a new welfare capitalism and the other half finds no solution to its problems in the new situation." Bob Deacon, "East European Welfare: Past, Present and Future in Comparative Context," in The New Eastern Europe, ed. Bob Deacon et al. (London: SAGE Publications, 1992), 12.

"now many are unable to take their own risks without waiting for orders from above."⁴¹

The problematic attitudes of the post-communist workforce to non-state employers have been corroborated in several surveys. For instance, Miller et al. have found that there were remarkably few people in the five ECE/EE countries who wished to work for a private company - only 13 percent on average. Another 20 percent wished to work for a foreign firm or joint venture (though the attraction of the latter was likely its "foreignness" implying higher wages, rather than its "privateness.")⁴²

Table 2 Preferred employers in five ECE/EE countries

Employer: / Country:	State	Coopera- tive	Private	Foreign	Self
Czech R.	30%	5%	15%	20%	30%
Slovakia	38%	6%	12%	24%	21%
Hungary	35%	7%	12%	14%	33%
Ukraine	40%	4%	15%	23%	19%
Russia	52%	4%	11%	17%	17%

Source: Miller et al., Values and Political Change in Postcommunist Europe, Table 6.3, 113. (The POS were conducted between the end of 1993 and the beginning of 1996.)

However, several other studies have indicated that when provided with

⁴¹ See Mason, "Justice, Socialism, and Participation in the Postcommunist States," 74. A notorious quip says that "people would like to see capitalist wages, as well as socialist benefits and security." Nevertheless, it seems that some people have accommodated very quickly to the competitive market conditions, and once they get proper incentives, they can work hard. See also Louisa Vinton, "Dissonance: Poland on the Eve of New Elections," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report 2.33 (20 Aug. 1993): 6.

⁴² See Miller et al., Values and Political Change in Postcommunist Europe, 112.

adequate motivation (e.g. in the case of those working for foreign companies or for themselves), people in the post-communist workforce can be as able to perform at Western standards and do not have to be pre-judged as less competitive.⁴³ Nevertheless, there has been a widespread belief that the state is the most acceptable employer in many industries; this has been reflected in attitudes toward the issue of ownership of the major means of production. In many Eastern European countries people have continued to believe that the state should be strongly involved in the ownership of assets in areas of large-scale production and common goods. For instance, in a survey conducted for USIA in Hungary (in June 1992), 81 percent of those surveyed favoured continued state ownership of large- and medium-scale enterprises, and more than 70 percent favoured state ownership of television and radio.⁴⁴ In Poland, at the beginning of the 1990s, 36.3 percent of workers preferred state ownership for their plants, 35.3 percent worker ownership and only 13.2 percent favoured privatization.⁴⁵ This has, of course, been a common belief in Russia: in the already mentioned survey conducted in June 1992, about 80% of respondents replied that heavy industry, healthcare, railroads and airlines should be owned "exclusively by the state" or "mainly by the state." Around 60% of respondents expressed their support for public ownership of

⁴³ See, for example, Mueller, "Democracy, Capitalism, and the End of Transition." One may ask, however, if those staying in less productive or non-productive state or semi-state companies are less productive and less competitive, are they then being so because of the lack of motivation, or are they working there precisely because of low demand on them?

⁴⁴ Perhaps to everybody's surprise, support for state ownership of large-scale industry increased to 85 percent in Hungary by October 1992 and also increased the number of those who supported state ownership of agriculture - from 50 percent to 57 percent. USIA, "Hungarians Voice Mixed Reviews," USIA Research Memorandum 19 June 1992: n. pag.

⁴⁵ Here quoted from Lawrence Weschler, "A Reporter at Large (Poland)," The New Yorker 10 Dec. 1990: 100.

enterprises that manufactured consumer goods, banking and the media. Only in the case of farming, smaller shops and restaurants, had support for private ownership and operation dominated over support for public ownership.⁴⁶ Also, as in the case of ownership, many people in post-communist countries have preferred that certain key industries be directly controlled by the state. For instance, in Hungary (of all the countries), more than 50 percent of the population expressed the opinion that both car factories and computer manufacturers should be controlled or run by the state; in Ukraine and Russia, the corresponding numbers were even higher (see Tab.3).

Table 3 Perception of desirability of state control of industry in five ECE/EE countries

Industry: / Country:	Farming	Car factories	Computer production	Newspapers	TV program
Czech R.	53%	39%	27%	34%	38%
Slovakia	72%	44%	32%	57%	53%
Hungary	44%	55%	55%	46%	57%
Ukraine	43%	73%	71%	72%	75%
Russia	60%	79%	68%	79%	83%

Source: Miller et al., Values and Political Change in Postcommunist Europe, Table 6.2, 112. (The POS were conducted between the end of 1993 and the beginning of 1996.)

Hence the overall picture indicates that certain attitudinal and behavioral patterns regarding perceptions of the private sector, the way business is being done and specific forms of working habits have persisted and may hinder attempts at consistent reforms, though as some findings have indicated, some changes have already occurred

⁴⁶ See Millar and Wolchik, The Social Legacy of Communism, 11.

in this area. In the next two sections I will analyze the related issues of perception of social justice and equality, and of authoritarian patterns present in the political system and then I will return to the issue of the acceptance of market values in general as related to the acceptance of values of a democratic political system.

IV.3.2 *The social justice syndrome: an increased sensitivity to social justice issues (egalitarianism).*

Socialism is undoubtedly associated with the idea of economic and social equality, and predictably, with the negative perception of social inequality (the tendency of egalitarianism). McFalls, for instance, has found equality among three key values in East German political culture.⁴⁷ He has identified "nostalgia for egalitarianism (albeit riddled with privilege), the social security (albeit paternalistic), and the stability (albeit 'a graveyard peace')" as the most symptomatic "positive cultural norms guiding individuals' behavior" both during the years of communism as well as after the demise of the system in many post-communist countries.⁴⁸ A similar point has been made by Hohmann and others. According to Hohmann, the paternalism and widespread egalitarianism fostered by the communist state "conditioned many people to such an extent that they now respond with jealousy and disapprobation to any, even performance-related, differentiation of incomes."⁴⁹

⁴⁷ The other two were modesty and solidarity.

⁴⁸ McFalls, *Communism's Collapse, Democracy's Demise?*, 165.

⁴⁹ Hohmann, "Systemic Change in Cooperation Partner Countries: Yardsticks for Assessment," a paper prepared for the NATO Economic Colloquium, 28-30 June 1995 (*NATO Internet Documents*) 10 August 1995, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/colloq/col95.htm>>. See also Bauman, "The Polish Predicament," 123.

There has been considerable empirical evidence from studies in sociology and social psychology that in modern developed societies, the concept of social justice and equality may often be critical to understanding social and political behavior in many situations. Several theoretical assumptions have been elaborated to support this claim (for instance Homans' "justice theory", etc.). The general theory of social justice assumes (among other things) that "perceptually based beliefs about inequality are significant features in the development of sentiments about the acceptability or justice of social inequality" and also that such beliefs are "in part rooted in referential structures activated in at least two domains, *microlevel* domains (such as the family and workplace) and *macrolevel* domains (based on cultural beliefs or structural contingencies)."⁵⁰ This issue has been particularly sensitive in post-communist countries, and it is relevant especially if one accepts the assumption that part of the communist inheritance has been precisely the perception and expectation of a high degree of social equality as a deserved value. Although communist countries had never experienced a radical egalitarianism (except the Soviet Union in its first stage), lower differentiation among wages and incomes in these countries than in the Western capitalist countries was one of the ideologically enforced norms. Consequently, surveys conducted in Eastern Europe before 1989 "showed a high degree of social and economic egalitarianism in the populations."⁵¹ When inequality occurs in most of the region's countries, it is often perceived as a failure on the part of the state, and too high

⁵⁰ See Duane F. Alwin et al., "Comparative Referential Structures, System Legitimacy, and Justice Sentiments: An International Comparison," in Social Justice and Political Change, ed. James R. Kluegel et al. (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1995), 111-12 (emphasis in the original).

⁵¹ Mason, "Justice, Socialism, and Participation in the Postcommunist States," and also Mason, Public Opinion and Political Change in Poland, 1980-1982, esp. 62-66.

incomes are perceived as undeserved.⁵²

Extensive research done by Mason in Poland in the 1980s and 1990s and also in other post-communist countries in the 1990s has focused on this issue. In a national survey conducted in the fall of 1980, Mason found widespread support for the "egalitarian model" in Polish society. This model included a proposition on limiting wages for the highest wage earners (90 percent support), realizing a policy of full employment (77 percent support), and insuring a more or less equal income to every citizen (70 percent support).⁵³ Such preferences were confirmed in the early 1990s when a comprehensive survey was done in several countries in the region. Mason found that the "overwhelming majority" of people in each country asserted that differences in incomes in their countries are large. The attitude was particularly strong in Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovenia, where 60 percent or more thought that income differences are *too* large.⁵⁴ According to a similar survey done by the prestigious STEM agency in Czechoslovakia in 1992 (even before more significant differences in incomes had begun to show), three quarters of the population of what was then Czechoslovakia expressed the opinion that differences in income were "too big." In the same survey

⁵² As Wojciech Jaruzelski has noted: "the rising disparities between rich and poor are offensive in a society where everyone once lived equally. In the West, people respect success. Here it arouses suspicion. The New York Times Oct. 7, 1994, A6. Here from Stephen Holmes, "Cultural Legacies or State Collapse? Probing the Postcommunist Dilemma," in Postcommunism (Four Perspectives), ed. Michael Mandelbaum (New York: Council of Foreign Relations Book, 1996), 55.

⁵³ Mason, "Public Opinion in Poland's Transition to Market Democracy," in Social Policy, Social Justice and Citizenship in Eastern Europe, ed. Bob Deacon (Brookfield, VT: Avebury, 1992), 198-9. See also Wladyslaw Adamski et al., Polacy '80: Wyniku Badan Ankietowych (Warsaw: Polish Academy of Sciences, 1981), 106-9.

⁵⁴ Mason, "Justice, Socialism, and Participation in the Postcommunist States," 58 (emphasis in the original). See Alwin et al., "Comparative Referential Structures, System Legitimacy, and Justice Sentiments," Tab. 5.5., 125.

about 50 percent of respondents stated that the government should decrease differences in incomes.⁵⁵

As is clear from the Table 5, preferred income differences were at much lower level in the post-communist states than in the selected advanced capitalist countries. On the whole, results have shown that what the population in the post-communist countries favor is a better (more equal) distribution of incomes, including ceilings on income, imposed by the government. In one of Mason's findings, a smaller but still sizable percentage in the studied countries agreed, either strongly or somewhat, that the "government should place an upper limit on the amount of money any person can make."⁵⁶ As Mason has noted, this solution is "not too different than that which prevailed under the communist regimes."⁵⁷ Even though, as Mason has pointed out, in some countries, especially in Poland, the support for egalitarianism "began to weaken," and he has acknowledged that at the beginning of the 1990s "the strand of egalitarianism" [in Polish society] was still continuing at a relatively high level.⁵⁸

⁵⁵ Jiří Večerník, "The Ideal Society," *Respekt* 45 (8-14 Nov. 1993): 3. It is worth noting that in a related survey, 80 percent of respondents expressed opinion that most of the people who are getting rich in Czechoslovakia are doing so in a dishonest way or by fraud. Ibid.

⁵⁶ Support for this latter position was strongest in Slovenia and the former GDR with 60% and Hungary with 58%. It was considerable in the other countries as well: Poland (47%), Bulgaria (42%), Russia (34%), Estonia (32%), and Czechoslovakia (30%). See Mason, "Justice, Socialism, and Participation in the Postcommunist States," 58.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 58. See also Miller et al., *Values and Political Change in Postcommunist Europe*; and also Pavlína Šťastnová, "Vnímání sociální nerovnosti a spravedlnosti," in *Česká společnost v transformaci*, ed. Pavel Machonin and Milan Tuček, et al. (Praha: Sociologické nakladatelství, 1996), 234-245.

⁵⁸ Mason, "Public Opinion in Poland's Transition to Market Democracy," 199 and 202. For a summary of surveys regarding mainly Russian attitudes toward growing disparities, see F.J. Fleron and Richard Ahl, "Does the Public Matter?: Public Opinion Surveys," esp. 300.

Similar results have been obtained by Miller et al., who have conducted fairly sophisticated research in five ECE/EE countries on the issue of how people perceive "winners and losers" of reform policies. Miller's team have found that the issue of social justice and economic equality is highly consistent with "socialist values" (see Tab.4).

Table 4 Perception of social equality: Attitudes to "winners and losers" in five ECE/EE countries

Attitude: / Country:	Restrict gap *) betw. rich+poor	Dislike **) new rich	Unemploym. unacceptable	Unempl. is necessary
Czech R.	53%	40%	19%	46%
Slovakia	63%	51%	41%	29%
Hungary	74%	41%	47%	8%
Ukraine	46%	42%	49%	21%
Russia	52%	44%	54%	14%

*) Specifically: "Restricting the gap between rich and poor is more important than the freedom to make money."

**) "Dislike new rich, or would even jail them."

Source: Miller et al., Values and Political Change in Postcommunist Europe, Table 6.6, 117. (The POS were conducted between the end of 1993 and the beginning of 1996.)

Results of another survey largely consistent with the above findings were also obtained by Alwin et al. in their comprehensive study which included some advanced Western countries. In their survey, people were asked about their opinion regarding the fairest way to distribute wealth and income. A relatively large percentage of the population (20-30 percent in each country, except Estonia) favoured giving an equal

share to everyone. On this issue, however, the level of support was quite similar to that found in some capitalist countries, especially (and not too surprisingly) to Great Britain, but much higher when compared to the U.S.⁵⁹ Based on a tentative comparison with selected Western countries, Mason has argued that *preferred* income differences in post-communist countries are "much less . . . than in the developed capitalist countries."⁶⁰

As Przeworski has emphasized, tolerance of inequality is "important in shaping attitudes towards reforms." He has warned, however, against simplifying views of the legacy of egalitarianism, since it presents a very "complicated" and relative issue.⁶¹ This was also indicated by Kolarska-Bobinska (1989) in her analysis of Polish survey data from the period between 1980-1988. She argued that Polish society was intolerant of inequalities, but this intolerance was mainly due to the fact that inequalities were seen as unjust.⁶² Likewise, McIntosh et al. have found that according to Hungarians,

⁵⁹ See Tab. 5.5. in Alwin et al., "Comparative Referential Structures, System Legitimacy, and Justice Sentiments," 125.

⁶⁰ Mason, "Justice, Socialism, and Participation in the Postcommunist States," esp. 57-58 (emphasis in the original). In Mason's findings, the median postulated income differential in the selected capitalist states was 4.0 (meaning that the higher income should be 4 times larger than smaller) compared to only 2.5 in the post-communist countries. Ibid., 58.

⁶¹ Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 178.

⁶² Kolarska-Bobinska has in fact argued that tolerance of inequalities (and of unemployment) has increased during the period. In 1980, 70.6 percent of respondents accepted "without reservation" the principle of limiting the highest incomes and by 1988 this proportion fell, according to the author to 27.5 percent. The research has also indicated that intergroup differences were substantial: Blue-collar workers, groups with low incomes and low education, and those in non-managerial positions were most intolerant of income differences. In 1981, 68.8 percent of specialists with higher education accepted the principle of limiting the highest incomes, against 71.6 percent of workers, while by 1988 only 37,0 percent

Poles, Romanians, and Bulgarians interviewed in a survey (in which they were asked whether various features were "essential for a society to be called a democracy"), equality under the law, i.e. "a system of justice that treats everyone equally" was a more essential feature than multi-party competition or the freedom to criticize government.⁶³ Although equality under the law as just defined is a different issue than social and economic equality, the priority given to this equality before any other feature of liberal democracy seems to be significant.

Hence it is clear that the issue of the effects of the tendency towards egalitarianism is a complex one. As Ekiert has noted, "the rhetoric of social justice... has been deeply engraved in people's minds in all state-socialist societies and therefore unemployment, decreasing living standards and new market-induced inequalities represent a potential source of conflict and division which may decisively modify the strength and capabilities of political actors and affect the extension of citizenship and the creation of truly democratic institutions."⁶⁴

of specialists supported limits on the highest incomes, against 63.0 percent of skilled and 70.0 percent of unskilled workers. Here adapted from Przeworski, Democracy and the Market, esp. 178). In this context, Przeworski has noted that it may be doubtful to consider Eastern European societies as having more egalitarian values than, for instance, Latin American societies. He quotes a survey in Brasil at the end of 1980, which demonstrated that 78% Brazilians agreed with the statement "Everything society produces should be divided among everyone in the most equal way possible." Ibid., 178.

⁶³ Mary E. McIntosh et al., "Publics meet market democracy in central and east Europe, 1991-93," Slavic Review 53.2 (1994): 483-512.

⁶⁴ Grzegorz Ekiert, "Democratization Processes in East Central Europe: A Theoretical Reconsideration," British Journal of Political Science 21 (1991): 313.

Table 5 "Beliefs About Economic Inequality" and "Support for an economic distributive system"

Question: / Country:	Income diff. too large	Minimum standard should be provided by the state	Upper limit on income should be set by the state
<i>Postcommunist:</i>	in %	in %	in %
Bulgaria	80.1	80.1	42.3
Czechoslovakia	34.7	69.9	29.8
Hungary	61.2	81.0	57.8
Poland	47.7	54.5	47.4
Russia	38.9	64.1	34.2
Slovenia	71.1	71.9	60.2
East Germany	22.6	80.2	60.0
Estonia	43.9	80.0	32.3
<i>Capitalist EU:</i>			
Germany (West)	32.5	57.1	32.2
Great Britain	41.2	50.2	36.6
Netherlands	33.4	43.6	31.8
<i>Non-EU:</i>			
Japan	39.4	60.6	35.9
U.S.	28.4	27.0	16.8

Source: Adapted and data quoted from Alwin et al. 1995, 121 and 124.)⁶⁵

⁶⁵ With regard to the first indicator, i.e. "income differences too large," the number represents percentage responding "much too large" to the question "What do you think about the differences in income people have in your country? Are the differences much too large, somewhat too large, about right, somewhat too small, or much too small?" With regard to the second indicator, i.e. "minimum standard

IV.3.2.1 A preferred society: Which economic system is better?

With regard to the overall perception of the workings of the market, several opinion polls have revealed much inconsistency in how East Europeans perceive the past and current economic systems, as well as proceeding economic reforms. Many respondents have subscribed, at least verbally, to a market system but not to its "capitalist methods." Paradoxically, many tended to agree with the free market principle in general but also wanted the state to manage and regulate major economic activities. For instance, in the Czech Republic in 1993, results of one of these polls have typically shown that while a majority of those surveyed have overwhelmingly favoured "complete freedom for private entrepreneurship", at the same time, they supported the strong role of the state in national economic management.

In the same vein, Gibson (1996) and Mason (1992) have argued that in fact there has been a certain ambivalence toward economic reform among almost all societies that have lived under a command economy.⁶⁶ Mason has summarized these conflicting views succinctly: "When respondents were asked more specific questions, they tended to support important policies and values associated with the state socialist

provided by the state", the number represents percentage responding "strongly agree" to the opinion on the following statement: "The government should guarantee everyone a minimum standard of living. Strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree or disagree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree." With regard to the third indicator, i.e. "upper limit", the number represents percentage responding "strongly agree" and somewhat agree" to the statement: The government should place an upper limit on the amount of money any person can make. Strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree or disagree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree" (Alwin et al. 1995, 121 and 124).

⁶⁶ See James L. Gibson, "Political and Economic Markets: Changes in the Connections Between Attitudes Toward Political Democracy and a Market Economy Within the Mass Culture of Russia and Ukraine," The Journal of Politics 58.4 (Nov. 1996): esp, 960.

regimes they had left behind. This is perhaps most evident in widespread egalitarianism, in the support for a strong role for the government in the economy."⁶⁷

Several studies (e.g. Miller et al. 1998 and Vanek 1997) have found that despite the sometimes relatively high levels of general acceptance of the principles of a market economy (or at least paying lip service to them), support has been by and large "neither unqualified nor enthusiastic."⁶⁸ Based on data collected in Russia in 1991, Mason has concluded that Russians were generally opposed to reforms aimed at creating a Western-style market economy.⁶⁹ In the early 1990s, a series of systematically designed and conducted surveys by the New Democracies Barometer asked people in several ECE/EE countries to compare the workings of the old centrally-planned economy with the economic system "as it is today (see Tab.6)." Judging from the results, a majority of Eastern Europeans well into the 1990s still gave a positive rating to the planned economy. The exceptions were the Czech Republic and the two more prosperous former Yugoslav republics, the only countries where less than half of the respondents rated the old economic system favourably.⁷⁰

⁶⁷ Quoted from Gibson, *ibid.*, 960.

⁶⁸ Miller et al., Values and Political Change in Postcommunist Europe, 109.

⁶⁹ Mason, "Attitudes toward the Market and the Political Participation in the Postcommunist States," 388. Also other researchers (for example Whitefield and Evans, Brym, and Kullberg and Zimmerman) have generally been sceptical about mass support for economic reform in Russia. But Wyman has argued that during the early 1990s, there was considerable support for gradual creation of a market economy. See Matthew Wyman, *Public Opinion in Postcommunist Russia* (London: Macmillan, 1997), 176-8. See also F.J. Fleron and Richard Ahl, "Does the Public Matter?: Public Opinion Surveys," Can Democracy Take Root in Post-Soviet Russia?, 298-300.

⁷⁰ In an interesting analysis, based on their research in the European part of USSR in the early 1990s, on the support for free market economic activity, Denisovsky et al. have concluded: "Because roughly two-thirds of the population have an economic consciousness closest to the group opposed to economic

Table 6 Comparing Economic Systems in Several ECE/EE Countries

System: / Country:	Socialist economy*	Current econ. system*
Bulgaria	59%	25%
Czech Republic	44%	55%
Slovakia	64%	34%
Hungary	74%	29%
Poland	57%	39%
Romania	57%	32%
Slovenia	46%	36%
Belarus	75%	15%
Ukraine	76%	4%
Croatia	28%	22%
Grand mean NDB	58%	29%

*) Percentage of rating positive.

Source: Adapted from the New Democracies Barometer (NDB) I and II, 1991, 1992.⁷¹

differentiation (i.e. greater differences in incomes and wealth), even the development of a more democratic form of government does not provide a guarantee against the maintenance or eventual return to a planned economy. There remains, instead, a considerable probability of such a development." Gennady M. Denisovsky et al., "Twelve Percent of Hope: Economic Consciousness and a Market Economy," in Public Opinion and Regime Change: The New Politics of Post-Soviet Societies, ed. Arthur H. Miller et al. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 233.

⁷¹ For details also see Richard Rose and Christian Haerpfer, New Democracies Barometer III: Learning from What Is Happening (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde Studies in Public Policy, No. 228, 1994), Table 5, 15.

Table 7 Preferred Society

	Cz.	Pol.	Bulg.	Slov.	Hung.	Rom.
Indiv. opportunities society	43%	34%	28%	28%	17%	16%
Middle-of-the-road	34%	36%	44%	37%	39%	32%
State guarantees society	24%	30%	29%	35%	44%	53%

Source: USIA 1993. Here quoted from Millar and Wolchik, The Social Legacy of Communism, 10.

Similarly, in the crumbling Soviet Union Zaslavskaya found in 1991 that only 8 percent of Soviet citizens favoured the abolition of "socialism" and more than 60 percent were in favour of either socialist welfare state or an "innovative socialist system."⁷² In the early 1990s, Denisovsky et al. identified in their investigations that "only about twelve percent of Soviets (Russians) had consistent, firmly crystallized attitudes favoring a market economy." They also found that "the alternative group - firm supporters of a planned economy - comprised 15 percent of the population."⁷³ According to Denisovsky et al., there was nearly three quarters of the population that placed themselves somewhere in between the two extremes. Nevertheless, as the authors predicted, since this latter group is not to be expected to be significantly active politically, people could passively accept "a rigid authoritarian introduction of a

⁷² See in Beyme, Transition to Democracy in Eastern Europe, 153.

⁷³ Gennady M. Denisovsky et al., "Twelve Percent of Hope: Economic Consciousness and a Market Economy," in Public Opinion and Regime Change: The New Politics of Post-Soviet Societies, ed. Arthur H. Miller et al. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 227.

market economy", for only a small percentage of the population was strongly opposed to the market.⁷⁴ However, as mentioned, the data obtained from many public opinion surveys have often shown inconsistencies when several related items have been compared. Alwin et al., for instance, when studying links between perceptions of social justice and the support for a certain type of economy, have found that while the main public in many post-communist countries expressed relatively strong support for free markets, they have also supported "economic socialism" (in particular such indicators as a minimum income standard, employment for everyone, and an upper limit on personal income). In Table 5, this support is shown in comparison with several long-time market societies.⁷⁵

As Mason has noted, there seems to be "the tendency of much of the postcommunist populations to favour *both* capitalism and socialism; to achieve the higher standard of living of the former without relinquishing the economic security of the latter".⁷⁶ Thus, the legacy of communist etatism is "a contradictory one": on the one

⁷⁴ Ibid., 232.

⁷⁵ See Alwin et al., "Comparative Referential Structures, System Legitimacy, and Justice Sentiments," 124.

⁷⁶ Mason, "Justice, Socialism, and Participation in the Postcommunist States," 74 (emphasis in the original). The results of a survey, done by the STEM institute in Prague, were published in Hartl 1993. Some other surveys considered in this essay may be found in Charles Gati, "The Mirage of Democracy," *Transition* [2.6] 22 March 1996: 6-12; and in Jirí Vecerník, "The Ideal Society," 3; and Marek Boguszak et al., "Kde jsou skutečná sociální rizika reformy," *Lidové noviny* 17 Sept. 1990: 4. See also the evidence in Richard Rose 1996, "Choosing Democracy as the Lesser Evil," *Transition* [2.9] 3 May 1996: esp. 42, confirming that Hungary was the only country in which more people expressed themselves in general terms more positively about the old regime than the new one. But as Rose has suggested, "to interpret this as evidence that Hungarians want the return of Soviet troops and a Marxist-Leninist regime is absurd." For a good selection of public opinion surveys relevant to this topic, see also Millar and Wolchik, *The Social Legacy of Communism*, esp. 4-24.

hand, the centralized, state-run-economy model is being rejected, as well as the monopoly of political power by a single party, but on the other hand there has been the sentiment of longing for the securities provided by the paternalist state: there is confusion about how far the systemic reversal should go and who should benefit from it.

IV.3.3 *A (relatively) high degree of acceptance of authoritarian patterns.*

Despite the fact that the oppressive elements of communist rule have been rejected by most of the population in ECE/EE during and after the collapse of the old regime, this rejection did not include the unequivocal psychological adoption of democratic values and institutions. The temptation to embrace a kind of authoritarian rule has emerged as one of the prominent features of the postcommunist political constellation.⁷⁷ This syndrome might have been caused (1) by entrenched not-too-democratic pre-communist cultures; (2) by misunderstanding of the nature and principles of democracy rooted in the communist period; or (3) by insecurities related to the transitional situation, or likely by a combination of all of the above. In many post-communist countries (e.g. in Belarus, Croatia, Ukraine during the 1990s) leaders with strong authoritarian proclivities have enjoyed considerably strong popular support, and did so for a prolonged period of time. As many public opinion surveys have indicated, at least under certain conditions rather non-democratic means of governing have been considered acceptable, especially if disguised in a nationalist rhetoric in many post-communist countries.

The popular tolerance of authoritarian styles of political behavior in many

⁷⁷ See Goldman, Revolution and Change in Central and Eastern Europe, 26-7.

countries may be partly attributed to the lack of familiarity with democratic institutions which dates back to the pre-communist period.⁷⁸ There seems to be a widespread agreement, however, that this tolerance had been strengthened during decades of communist rule when people were taught that politics "was solely the Communist Party's business, not theirs, and by punishing those who by criticizing or opposing the regime rejected this notion."⁷⁹ Jowitt (1992) has argued that exposure to Leninist rule has reinforced a historical tendency in the region to accept undemocratic leadership. Goldman has similarly pointed out: "By giving the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe the appearance but not the reality of self-government, communist rule . . . deprived them of a real understanding of how democracy works and ill prepared them for the liberal transformation to occur in the early 1990s."⁸⁰

The causes of authoritarian tendencies can also be found in the difficult transitional conditions. Evidence available suggests that citizens' commitment to democracy weakens in conditions of insecurity and crises. In the wake of the collapse of the communist power structure, people found themselves disoriented, face to face with a new societal and political reality. Due to the common failure of the new regimes to provide many expected goods and services, including political ones such as law and order, people's views of the new state has often been ambivalent and/or contradictory.

⁷⁸ As Stephen White and others have maintained, Soviet political culture "is rooted in the historical experience of centuries of autocracy." White, in Brown and Gray, Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States, 25. In fact, none of the region's countries, except for Czechoslovakia, have had substantial experience with democratic forms of government before.

⁷⁹ Goldman, Revolution and Change in Central and Eastern Europe, 27.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 27. Similarly, Marody has argued that the experience of state socialism fostered propensity to nationalism, authoritarianism and populism. Quoted from George Kolankiewicz, "Poland," in The New Institutional Architecture of Eastern Europe, ed. Stephen Whitefield (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1993), 102.

Even though they did refuse the old oppressive authority, many have tended to view the state almost in the same way as before; they were also not sure which part of its legacy they wished to retain.⁸¹ According to Wnuk-Lipinski (1992), for instance, there is the relationship between the uncertainty of freedom and the proclivity to accept authoritarian leadership; more freedom means greater individual responsibility for one's own life and more individualized choice of one's life career. "For some this may be an unbearable burden. This is a potential social foundation of the 'escape from freedom' syndrome which may result in some kind of populist movement under authoritarian leadership."⁸²

Nevertheless, many scholars have believed that the relatively high popular tolerance of authoritarian styles of political behavior in many ECE/EE countries could be, at least partly, attributable to the negative socialization under communism, particularly to the fact that the practice of the totalitarian-in-principle regimes had resulted in the lack of familiarity with, and understanding of, the procedures and challenges of democratic government. A convincing account of acceptance of authoritarian methods has been provided by Gerd Meyer (1989) who has identified a tension between the integrative and disintegrative effects in post-communist societies as a result of the communist regime's exchange of social security for citizen subordination. Meyer has linked up the tendency toward the paternalist legacy and the discipline of the socialist state's "infantilized" citizens, making them both entirely

⁸¹ In this sense, Tismaneanu has considered the "antistatist and antihierarchical dimensions of the upheaval" which has made "building up new principles of authority" very difficult. At the same time, Tismaneanu has claimed that "anarchy temptation that runs parallel to the search for state protection" is part of this contradictory legacy. Tismaneanu, *Reinventing Politics*, 283.

⁸² Quoted from Deacon, "East European Welfare: Past, Present and Future in Comparative Context," 11-12.

dependent on the state bureaucracies and socially irresponsible.⁸³ In this notion, large segments of the population simply accept any power, without questioning it too much (see also Section IV.3.1. and IV.3.6.1 on "conformity" later).

An illustration in this respect might be taken from a survey from Czechoslovakia examining opinions regarding the need for the leading role of the Communist Party shortly before the "Velvet Revolution." But it is also difficult in this case to determine to what extent the results of the poll were influenced by the fact that Husák's neo-Stalinist regime was still in power at that time, and to which extent the fact was involved that an increasing number of citizens either sensed the regime's disintegration or actually wished to bring it about.

Table 8 Opinion on the need of the leading role of the communist party (the data from June 1989)

	Very needed	Needed	Little needed	Not needed	Do not know
KSČ officials	60%	26%	8%	2%	4%
KSČ members and candidates	30%	42%	14%	4%	10%
Non-members	11%	34%	22%	15%	18%

Source: Slightly adapted from Miroslav Vaněk, Veřejné mínění o socialismu před 17. listopadem 1989 (Praha: Maxdorf, Ustav pro soudobé dějiny AV 98 R, 1994), 24.

⁸³ On Meyer's argument, see McFalls, Communism's Collapse, Democracy's Demise?, 92-3.

In this context, Stephen Heintz has been concerned with the problem of the "confusion about the role of power in society," particularly as it affects the relationship between the individual and the state. According to him, this "confusion" relates to the way that power is established, used and distributed in transforming societies of ECE and is generally associated with a more authoritarian, top-down decision-making process in which there are: (a) a commitment to conflict rather than a culture of compromise; (b) a very weak culture of competition (problems with tolerating opposition); (c) a very strong personalization of power; and (d) the lack of "politics of trust", which have not yet replaced the "politics of fear" (there is still the fear of doing something that someone in a position of authority might get to know about and possibly use against the person involved). Thus the entrenched structure of power and its perception in society have perpetuated this syndrome.⁸⁴

The confusion about the benefits of democracy and the perception that democracy is not the preferred system of government has been evident in many polls across the ECE/EE region in the post-communist period. Since comparability of various surveys conducted is often impaired by different times, conditions and non-uniform questions, I present here only several typical examples. (See also Appendix, Tab. 4.4.)

In Poland, for instance, a series of public opinion surveys done already during the 1980s showed a rather weak commitment to democracy and a strong degree of

⁸⁴ Heintz worked with the East-West Studies Institute in Prague/New York. Here adopted and quoted from Keith Crawford, East Central European politics today. From chaos to stability, 109-10. Authoritarianism has been defined in various terms and is certainly a matter of degree. In the post-communist context, a definition provided by Eckstein can be considered. According to him, authoritarianism "refers to the limited participation in decisions by the mass and to a high degree of autonomy and a low degree of formal precariousness of position on the part of the elite." Eckstein, "A Theory of Stable democracy." Here quoted from William Reisinger, "Congruence Theory as a Perspective," 156.

support for "law and order. The Polacy '88 survey found that almost 78 percent of respondents agreed that Poland needed a "strong leader who would bring order to the country." In this survey more respondents agreed with this latter statement than with the proposition that voters should be able to choose between candidates of various political views (73 percent support). According to Mason (who believes that the gap between Poland and the West in this respect will gradually diminish), there still exist, particularly in post-communist Poland, "the continuing strands of authoritarianism" as well as "conflicting attitudes held by the same people" with regard to their opinion on democracy.⁸⁵

In Russia, a survey by Princeton Survey Research Associates in May 1991 showed that 39 percent of Russians agreed with the opinion that "we should rely on a leader with a strong hand to solve our country's problems;" this number increased to 51 percent in November 1992. In March 1993, according to the Monitor-5 survey, 40 percent of respondents in Russia were in favor of establishing a regime of "strong power."⁸⁶ And in March 1995, only 8 percent of Russians in a national poll said they preferred democracy over order, while 79 percent preferred order. This approximately correlates with the overall notion of the population regarding democracy: in a June 1992 survey conducted for USIA, in which respondents were asked what characteristics they thought "essential" to democracy, only 39 percent of Russians

⁸⁵ See Andrzej Rychard and Antoni Sulek, eds., Legitymacja. Klasyczne teorie i polskie doświadczenia (Warsaw: Polskie Towarzystwo Socjologiczne, 1988), esp. 284; see also Mason, "Public Opinion in Poland's Transition to Market Democracy," 201-2. Quoted from Mason, "Public Opinion in Poland's Transition to Market Democracy," 202. These findings led Krzysztof Jasiewicz to characterize the Polish political culture as "sharply polarized" between "two contradictory syndromes of values: authoritarian populist and democratic-liberal." *Ibid.*, 203.

⁸⁶ Here quoted from Vainshtein, "Totalitarian Public Consciousness in a Post-Totalitarian Society," esp. 254. In the latter survey, however, 35 percent of respondents unambiguously rejected the idea. *Ibid.*

agreed that "at least two strong political parties competing in elections" were essential. In the same survey, only 52 percent of all respondents thought that "protection of the rights of minorities and 42 percent thought that "freedom to criticize the government" were essential.⁸⁷

Nevertheless, as Vainshtein has noted, what must be taken into consideration is the complex nature of this typological pattern which also carries evidence of "the considerable differences between the socio-political attitudes peculiar to some types of the totalitarian mentality." Vainshtein has illustrated his point in reference to the contradictory results found in several opinion polls. For instance, according to the Monitor-5 survey conducted in March 1993, 40 percent of Russian respondents were in favor of establishing a regime of "strong power," although 35 percent unambiguously rejected this idea.⁸⁸ According to Vainshtein, these contradictions between the different bearers of post-communist mentalities "essentially preclude the probability of their consolidation around a common platform."⁸⁹ Rather different

⁸⁷ Millar and Wolchik, The Social Legacy of Communism, 14.

⁸⁸ Vainshtein, "Public Consciousness and the Current Transformation of Russia." See also Vainshtein, "Totalitarian Public Consciousness in a Post-Totalitarian Society," esp. 254-5. According to an October 1997 poll in Russia, which questioned 1,500 people, "law and order" has been identified as the most commonly desired political value. When asked to choose out of 23 options the main principle they would like to underlie Russian society, 27 percent of respondents named law and order, the country's Public Opinion foundation said. Reported by Interfax 12 Nov. 1997.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 255. Vainshtein has argued that such mentalities exist, to varying degrees but qualitatively comparable, also to other EE countries. Ibid., 258. Also others have argued, for instance Szamuely (1974), that the Russians may be seen as a people who have willingly accepted and internalized the need for authoritarianism. The relative importance of subcultural variations notwithstanding, there is, according to Archie Brown, "no getting away from the predominantly authoritarian political nature of Soviet and Russian political experience." Archie Brown, "Ideology and Political Culture," in Politics, Society, and Nationality Inside

results have been obtained in an analysis by Jon Pammett, who has concluded that "Russians have a comprehensible structured idea of what principles constitute democracy in theory," and that they "clearly favour its introduction;" even he, however, has acknowledged that further associations with democracy in Russia would depend on "a combination of circumstances."⁹⁰

The results of the third New Democracies Barometer (of 1993-94) have indicated that the issue of alternatives to democracy elicited rather different responses both within individual societies and across the region. The table below shows responses to the question "What are the alternatives to democracy?" in nine post-communist countries (Tab.9).

Gorbachev's Russia, ed. Seweryn Bialer (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1989), 18. A similar historical experience and implications of this experience for society's authority patterns have been the case in most of Eastern European countries. From surveys done in post-communist Russia, it is evident that commitment to democracy as well as to particular democratic norms has been "conflicting" and "deeply mixed" (Wyman). For the quotation from Wyman and a summary of other surveys in Russia regarding the issue, see F.J. Fleron and Richard Ahl, "Does the Public Matter?: Public Opinion Surveys," 301-3. Nicolai Petro has recently argued that two, not one, political cultures existed side by side in Russia for many centuries - one autocratic, the other an "alternative culture" of democracy. Consequently, the support for democracy in Russia based on this tradition is not shallow and new but stems from the reemergence of a strain long and deeply ingrained in Russia's culture. See Nicolai Petro, The Rebirth of Russian Democracy: An Interpretation of Political Culture (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).

⁹⁰ Jon H. Pammett, "Elections and democracy in Russia," Communist and Post-Communist Studies 32 (1999), esp. 50 and 58. Pammett's conclusions are based on the data from a survey undertaken in 19 Russian regions immediately following the 1995 parliamentary elections. For details, see *ibid.*, esp. 46-8.

Table 9 Alternatives to Democracy

"Question: . . . Some people say that we would be better off if the country was governed differently. What do you think?"

a) We should return to communist rule.

b) The army should govern the country.

c) Best to get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader who can decide things quickly.

d) A return to a monarchy would be better."

/ Country:	a)	b)	c)	d)
Bulgaria	35%	15%	45%	19%
Czech R.	7%	2%	16%	3%
Slovakia	16%	4%	24%	1%
Hungary	18%	2%	18%	5%
Poland	18%	11%	35%	7%
Romania	12%	18%	31%	17%
Slovenia	12%	8%	41%	n.a.
Belarus	34%	15%	44%	8%
Ukraine	25%	11%	55%	7%
NDB mean	18%	10%	32%	8%

Source: Paul Lazarsfeld Society, Vienna, New democracies Barometer III. Quoted from Richard Rose et al., *Democracy and Its Alternatives*, 111.⁹¹

⁹¹ The respondents had one more option, which has been left out from the Table; this option ("the most important decisions about the economy should be made by experts and not the government and parliament"), however, elicited the highest approval in all countries (with the NDB mean of 72%). Number of percent indicated combines those who strongly agree or somewhat agree.

It is thus evident [from the survey samples and analyses done] that the relatively high tolerance of authoritarian politics can be viewed as an effect of multiple causes, some of them originating in the communist system and not easily separated from those brought about by the conditions of post-communist transition. From another perspective, that of the psychological mechanism behind the syndrome, it seems that several socio-psychological factors may be, in this case, viewed as mutually reinforcing each other. The psychological support for the authoritarian tendency argument may be found, for instance, in the conclusions reached by the authors of *The Authoritarian Personality* (1964). The authors expressed the opinion that the roots of authoritarian patterns are psychological and that individuals who tend toward extremism (in this case right-wing) and authoritarianism also manifest, on the psychological level, strong feelings of isolation, self-doubt, and inadequacy, and an exaggerated need for security, stability and reassurance. To gain the latter values, such individuals resort to a sort of behavior that includes authoritarian submission and authoritarian aggression, power polarization, and also cynicism.⁹² In this context, Goldman (1997) has noted that the present tolerance of authoritarian tendencies in the post-communist region (at least in some countries) may be a "by-product of apathy," mistrust and alienation.⁹³ It can be added to this psychological explanation that one of the general attractions of authoritarianism, especially in transitional or crisis situations, is that it is appealing through its simplicity and reassurance, highly contrary to the

⁹² See T. W. Adorno et al., eds., *The Authoritarian Personality*, Part One (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1964). Although *The Authoritarian Personality* was criticized on many grounds, it seem to have made the case for reconsidering psychological genealogies of specifically political phenomena. See also Palmer, et al., *The Interdisciplinary Study of Politics*, 142-45.

⁹³ Goldman, *Revolution and Change in Central and Eastern Europe*, 28.

complexity and vagueness of liberal democratic arrangements.⁹⁴

One must realize that the yearning for a "strong leader" and/or "legality, law and order" on the part of the citizenry does not simply equate the desire and demand for an authoritarian government. As was rightly noted, the desire for strong and effective (but not "too strong") leadership is not undemocratic per se; it can be heard in many U.S. presidential elections as well as in other countries.⁹⁵ According to Levada, "from all indications, public opinion does not identify the concepts of 'firm order' and an 'iron hand' with a dictatorship." As Reisinger has noted, the adjective "strong" seems "to mean competence in producing the outcomes necessary to fulfil state tasks" (which, above all, means public order and an improving economy). As it appears, not even relatively strong leader can deliver desired political and economic goods, without first building properly functioning institutions. Since the masses naturally demand that authority is used effectively so their needs and interests are adequately met, at the same time they cherish many democratic features, and seem to be able to distinguish between concepts of authoritarianism and effective authority.⁹⁶

⁹⁴ Ibid. See also James F. Brown, Hopes and Shadows: Eastern Europe After Communism, 8. On the link between psychological tendency to authoritarianism and manifested *distrust and suspicion*, see T. W. Adorno et al., The Authoritarian Personality, Part One, esp. 411-18.

⁹⁵ See, e.g., Rose et al., Democracy and Its Alternatives, 112.

⁹⁶ See Reisinger, "Survey Research and Authority Patterns," Can Democracy Take Root in Post-Soviet Russia?, 169-70. On "functionality" of authoritarian tendencies, see also Russel Bova, "Political Culture, Authority Patterns." Ibid., esp. 185. According to Bova, one way how to view authoritarianism is "not as a fundamental but as an instrumental value of the political culture, and nondemocratic, hierarchical patterns of authority might be said to be the empirical manifestation of the primary importance attached to order." Bova, *ibid.*, 185. In political science literature, authoritarian tendencies have also been associated with traditional society and less educated, often "blue-collar-job," persons (Lipset). Richard Rose et al. have formulated this syndrome in the following hypothesis: "If people are located in more traditional parts of the social structure, they are more

Similarly, some scholars (e.g. Miller et al. 1998) have put the tendency toward authoritarianism in direct relation to the level of insecurity and intolerance in a society. For instance, Miller et al., comparing the situation in ECE/EE and that in Great Britain have found certain similarities and certain differences, especially in the level of intolerance. They have argued that - in the five countries of ECE/EE which they surveyed - "on balance, there was more emphasis on the need for strong government, more fear of disorder, and less tolerance of extremist or offensive minorities than in Britain, though the differences were less clear-cut than might have been expected."⁹⁷ (See also IV.4.2. here on intolerance.) Such indications and inherent contradictions in the syndrome might in part account for the fact that while there has been "the partial but amazingly rapid spread of the value of pluralism" in the ECE/EE context, tendencies in opposition of the general liberal democratic model have also been significantly present.⁹⁸

Little comparative research has been done so far regarding the comparison of levels of authoritarian tendencies in ECE/EE with levels in Western democracies (where, however, the state-society relationship has undergone a rather different history). The actual strength of the "authoritarian" syndrome and its effects on politics is difficult to evaluate, since political scientists still rather speculate on the nature of authority patterns conducive to an optimal political process. Are authoritarian elements in post-communist politics something to worry about too much? According to

likely to support undemocratic alternatives." Rose et al., Democracy and Its Alternatives, 128.

⁹⁷ Miller et al., Values and Political Change in Postcommunist Europe, 412.

⁹⁸ See Andrei Y. Melville, "An Emerging Civic Culture? Ideology, Public Attitudes, and Political Culture in the 1990s," in Public Opinion and Regime Change: The New Politics of Post-Soviet Societies, ed. Arthur H. Miller et al. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 63.

Eckstein, "governments perform well to the extent that their authority patterns are congruent with the authority patterns of other units of society."⁹⁹ Also, despite all the longing for a providing state, a more orderly past and strong leaders, most students of post-communism have not believed that there was evidence of strong support for a return to authoritarian rule that would mean a real suspension of democracy and, "virtually none for a restoration of communism."¹⁰⁰ Rather, as some have argued, various and specific contradictions and inconsistencies in attitudes and values as pertaining to political and economic objects in post-communism themselves constitute one of the most significant aspects of the post-communist political culture, and indeed of the post-communist mind.¹⁰¹

IV.3.4 *Some contradictions in attitudes, values, and norms.*

To a degree, such inconsistencies and contradictions in attitudes and values are quite natural given the logic inherent in society's value-system formation. Humans as

⁹⁹ Eckstein, "Congruence Theory Explained," Can Democracy Take Root in Post-Soviet Russia?, 4. Eckstein defines later congruence as existing "if the authority patterns of a society exhibit a pattern of graduated resemblances." Ibid., 12. According to Eckstein's "special congruence theory of democratic stability," "mixed" authority relations are more likely to lead to democratic stability than "pure" ones. "Thus the stabilizing culture and structure of democracy is a mix of conflictual and consensual, obedient and participatory, passive and active components, and the like. The disparities help to explain how authoritative decision making can be reconciled with popular participation." Ibid., "Foreword," vii.

¹⁰⁰ See Andrea S. Sanjian, "The social construction of deviance and the transition from communist rule," in The social legacy of communism, 128.

¹⁰¹ See also, for example, Sztompka, "The Intangibles and Imponderables of the Transition to Democracy;" Jiřina Šiklová, "Backlash," Social Research 60.4 (Winter 1993): 737-750; Offe, Varieties of Transition; and Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics.

a rule desire a meaningful existence and expect that the chaotic world of multitudinal internal and external stimuli and experiences to which they are subjected to be somehow understood, controlled, and predicted. Although there is a continuous strain toward cultural consistency between the belief and value systems people create in order to comprehend and manage their environment, these are rarely completely logically consistent, especially if a part of that environment is in constant flux.¹⁰² In this section, several aspects of this issue are analyzed in their relation to Eastern Europeans' expectations and preferences.

IV.3.4.1 The "trap of illusion" - unrealistic expectations?

In his well-known book, *Reflections on the Revolution in Europe*, Ralf Dahrendorf emphasized three dimensions of the legacy of the past reigning in post-communist Eastern Europe: "alienation, Utopia, and dogmatism." To him alienation meant the rejection of the previous communist status quo by the people, but not quite yet accepting a new one. At the same time, as he assumed, people had a vision of a different reality, a dream-world in which the ills of reality are remedied (Utopia). Their dogmatism was predicated upon their conviction that there must be ready solutions waiting to be repossessed. According to Dahrendorf, this dogmatic faith in utopia should be perhaps specified: The utopianism of Eastern Europeans had often been nothing more than the utopia of an idealized version of Western society.¹⁰³

¹⁰² See Christen T. Jonassen, Value Systems and Personality in a Western Civilization: Norwegians in Europe and America (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1983), esp. 317.

¹⁰³ Dahrendorf, Reflections on the Revolution in Europe, 74. Although the situation has progressed in many ways since Dahrendorf's book was written, many of his observations are still generally valid.

But how much idealized and to what extent were people aware of the potentials in their own society? By and large, there have been contradictory findings from research in the region regarding how "realistic" their expectations were about the availability of a desired (or simply higher) standard of living and of the subjective satisfaction with their lives, or in other words, it was uncertain how much of the "residua of utopian thinking" has been present in society.¹⁰⁴

Lives of individuals and collectives (societies) are built around expectations they have of their deserved provisions, of other actors and of their own future. Only if such expectations are, by and large, relatively met can the orderly, day-to-day business of social interactions take place. As Eckstein has put it, "reliably fixed expectations are the nervous system of societies that bonds their parts and particles into a whole."¹⁰⁵ One can argue that in post-communist EE, paternalist tendencies and the relatively high sensitivity in the perception of social justice/injustice have combined into a relatively high level of expectation, exacerbated by the collapse of the old system that was deemed unsatisfactory in many respects.

Revolutions, whether they are hope or desperation-driven, or both, are no doubt predicated upon expectations, and at the same time generate expectations. These expectations could only very rarely be met sufficiently exposing in the process a gap between them and reality (or value capabilities). Under specific revolutionary and transitory conditions in ECE/EE, the syndrome of high expectations (in particular vis-

¹⁰⁴ See Poznanski, "Institutional Perspectives on Postcommunist Recession in Eastern Europe," in The Evolutionary Transition to Capitalism, ed. Kazimierz Z. Poznanski (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 13-14. Poznanski, however, has treated the issue of "utopian thinking" and "market utopia" as having several meanings. He has linked this syndrome to the notion of the "third road," which "presumes many communist premises." Ibid., 14.

¹⁰⁵ Eckstein, "Culture as Foundation Concept for the Social Sciences," 490.

a-vis the economic performance of the system) must have played, at least in some stages, a significant role. As Horvath and Szakolczai have argued, "communism left behind an enormous burden in terms of built-in expectations. . . ." ¹⁰⁶

In fact, in social-psychological terms there is always a gap between the expectations and capabilities of any individual or social group. This common condition, known as the relative deprivation syndrome, does not inevitably lead to unrest or serious difficulties, unless the gap becomes significantly wider. ¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁶ Horvath and Szakolczai, The dissolution of communist power: The case of Hungary, 162. One can also speculate about mid and long-term expectations held by the population in communist countries as generated by the promises of the former regimes. Soviet-type systems were increasingly consumer-oriented. But this type of consumer-oriented society was marked not by a surplus of consumer goods offered but rather by their shortage. Paradoxically, the want was often fuelled by the claim on the part of the communist regimes that a particular country was on its way to catch up with the Western living standard, etc. See also Mlynár, "Prospects of Development of the Political System in the Soviet Bloc," esp. 32. Some have attributed this phenomenon partially to the "strong materialist tendencies" on the part of the population in the post-communist countries. These tendencies were, for instance, found in one of the surveys by Mason & coll. in the early 1990s, in which respondents were asked about their "materialist" and "postmaterialist" goals and values. Mason, "Justice, Socialism, and Participation in the Postcommunist States," esp. 74-76.

¹⁰⁷ Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970). Gurr has identified three scenaria for this syndrome, taking into account the relationship between the population's expectations and the regime's capabilities. It seems that the type called "progressive deprivation" (in which, after both expectations and capabilities have been raising at the same rate over a period of time, there is a sudden drop in capabilities) could be the most relevant - especially for Russia and some other CIS countries. For some other countries - those recording some economic growth - a fourth type added by Hagopian seems to be more relevant. This type called "accelerated deprivation," in which both expectations and capabilities increase at a steady clip, but the former accelerates much faster than the latter, would fit most post-communist countries particularly in ECE. See Gurr, *ibid.*; and also Mark N. Hagopian, The Phenomenon of Revolution (New York: Harper & Row, 1974). Quoted from Patrick E. Kennon, The Twilight of Democracy (New York: Doubleday, 1992), 181-2. Using a very general framework, *deprivation* may be understood as subsuming: 1) the withdrawal of

Transitional societies almost by definition experience the type of deprivation called "accelerated deprivation." Factors accounting for this type of deprivation would in the case of most post-communist countries involve the experience of a relatively equal distribution of income under state socialism and current economic insecurity and income polarization. Another contributing factor may be the lack of objective information typical to communist societies about the actual workings of the capitalist system. This is perhaps what Mircea Mihaies had in mind when he suggested that the symptoms of deprivation, frustration, and distortion in perception could be viewed as "diseases that come from the absence of dialogue."¹⁰⁸ Under communist rule, with limited information available from the outside world, perceptions have become ingrained in many citizens which held that in a democracy and market system an ultimate satisfaction can be achieved. (Since the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, people have learned that freedom does not of itself lead to happiness.) According to Tismaneanu, the growing gap between the rising expectations of the population and

gratifying objects already possessed by the actor; 2) the obstruction of access to gratifying objects which the actor does not possess and for which he is striving; 3) the enforced relationship with objects which are not gratifying; 4) the threat of any of the foregoing. Especially the three latter types may be considered for the case of post-communist EE. The relationship between the relatively secured conditions of state socialism and uncertainties following its collapse may determine the type of deprivation. See also Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, eds., Toward a General Theory of Action (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962), esp. 9.

¹⁰⁸ Mircea Mihaies, "Intellectuals' Notes from the Underground," an interview. Partisan Review LIX.4 (1992): esp. 712. In his authoritative account of post-communism, L. Holmes has summarized the communist legacy in this respect quite unequivocally, arguing that ". . . many of the problems of the post-communism relate to unrealistic expectations and a poor misunderstanding of the ramifications of the concept such as market economics. This is largely because of the absence during the communist era of the total culture within which market value and competitive politics exist. The full meaning of many important concepts and practices cannot be learned from books alone." Leslie Holmes, Post-Communism, 15.

the limits of the existing system, together with the legacy of communism in EE "includes a yearning for immediate reward and compensation, and that impatience leaves the door open for oracular political movements rooted in hopelessness and insecurity."¹⁰⁹

Some have also pointed out that aspects of utopian thinking could be directly traced to some strains of "progressive" utopian thinking in communist and socialist movements. Poznanski has considered "the preference for utopian thinking" as a significant element in the "negative legacy of communism."¹¹⁰ He has noted that many commentators of post-communism have pointed out that communist utopian elements have been resurfacing in another form, "either that of the 'third road,' . . . or that of another utopia, the free market." According to Poznanski, the former utopia might be considered a communist legacy in the sense that the third road presumes many of the communist premises." The latter utopia (in a sense contradictory to the first one) "is a vision of society where free markets regulate almost everything;" both kinds of utopia can be equally destructive, however.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹ Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics, 244- 245. Observations like Vladimir Voinovitch's "everybody there wants to be rich, but no one wants to earn money," seem to be symptomatic of this phenomenon. See Bauman, "The Polish Predicament," 123.

¹¹⁰ Poznanski, "Institutional Perspectives on Postcommunist Recession in Eastern Europe," 13.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 14-15. Some have associated this issue with the "escape urge," a syndrome that "has assumed various forms throughout the region." James Brown, Hopes and Shadows: Eastern Europe After Communism. Brown has particularly referred to the statistics showing that in 1989-90 some 1.2 million East Europeans have left their homes for the West; the numbers for 1991-92 was even higher. In his reading of the statistics, "if anything, the general urge to emigrate was becoming stronger. To support such claim, Brown has cited a survey conducted by the Demoscop Public Opinion Research Institute in Warsaw which in 1992 found that 62 percent of those questioned between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four "wanted to leave Poland permanently." Such trends, Brown has argued, were

In terms of empirical and analytical research on this issue, surveys have regularly been conducted in most post-communist countries on the level of satisfaction with individual aspects of people's lives, particularly with their earnings and living standard. In one of more comprehensive studies on the topic, Kolarska-Bobinska has analyzed the issue of economic expectations in the context of the emerging change in class location.¹¹² While studying "broadly material aspirations observable in Poland," she has found (in the 1980s), that there was in Poland "a strong sense of the non-satisfaction" with one's own situation. While in 1973, 30 percent of respondents in Warsaw believed their earnings to be just and right, in 1987 only 6.6 percent of them were satisfied with their incomes and some 90 percent of respondents thought that their remuneration was below that which they deserved. According to scattered evidence, this trend has continued into the 1990s; here, of course, the regular underperformance of the post-communist economic systems must be taken into account.¹¹³

By and large, it seems, though certain expressions of high (unrealistic) expectations might be expected, there has been some evidence for a competing argument as well. Evidence to the contrary has been noticed, for instance by Richard Rose, according to whom quite a large number of people (apparently having learned how to show patience during communist rule) have expressed a relatively great deal

undoubtedly caused by economic conditions; however, "a sense of anticlimax and frustrated ambitions also played roles." *Ibid.*, 29-30.

¹¹² See Lena Kolarska-Bobinska, "Civil Society and Social Anomy in Poland," in Social Policy, Social Justice and Citizenship in Eastern Europe, ed. Bob Deacon (Brookfield, VT: Avebury, 1992), 56-70.

¹¹³ For comparison: some 60 percent of the Americans believed in the 1970s and 1980s their incomes to be satisfactory. See *ibid.*, 65-5.

of perseverance and patience (Rose 1995).¹¹⁴ Also, Mason has argued that Poland (and his conclusion may be valid for some other countries) has been in an "advantageous situation in that expectations have not traditionally been very high . . . [since] the post-communist government has tried to keep expectations under control with constant reminders of the difficult days ahead."¹¹⁵ Some have also noted that in many post-communist countries one of the reasons for the relative social stability was that expectations of the population have not been too high, or they also found alternative routes of compensation. It is thus possible to argue that the level of "unrealistic expectations" has differed from one country to another, as well as among individual groups in post-communist societies. Yet significant evidence has indicated that the distorted perception of the market's and democracy's workings gained under communism have persisted longer, especially among certain groups, both within the political elite and society at large.

IV.3.4.2 Contradictions in expressed values: an "ideal society."

The ambiguous and often contradictory opinion about the economic system (as shown in IV.3.2) and people's personal situation seems to be associated with much broader ambiguity about the overall system the people in ECE/EE imagine as fitting their needs. Such contradictions have been reflected in many public opinion surveys. For instance, in a summary of his analysis of opinion surveys conducted in the early

¹¹⁴ See Rose 1996. Rose has based his conclusion on a survey in which two-thirds of the respondents thought that it "will take many years for their government to deal with the problems inherited from the communists." Ibid., 42.

¹¹⁵ Mason, "Public Opinion in Poland's Transition to Market Democracy," 205. In this context, we may speak of a "survivalist" political culture as typical for the region.

1990s, Mason has discerned the tendency of much of the postcommunist populations to favor "*both* capitalism and socialism; to achieve the higher standard of living of the former without relinquishing the economic security of the latter." ¹¹⁶

The issue of contradictory findings, particularly from Russia (but also from other post-communist countries) has led to hypothesizing that "an alternative conception of democracy holds sway among many in the former Soviet Union" (Reisinger) and that the population of many former communist countries is willing to consider alternatives to a democratic system and a market economy (as they understand it). Reisinger et al. have pointed out one aspect of this issue: While arguing that the political culture continuity thesis does not fully explain [Russian] political attitudes, they have found that the "desire for strong leadership is positively associated with support for democratic values."¹¹⁷ Although support for strong leadership would normally be associated with authoritarian tendencies, Reisinger et al. have doubted that there was a clear link between the two (see also IV.3.3). (Such contradiction led some to suggesting that such an anomaly indicates to scholars that the popular conception of the political system that could develop within Russia "is unlike Western

¹¹⁶ Mason, "Justice, Socialism, and Participation in the Postcommunist States," (emphasis by Mason). A survey done by Mason & coll. asked respondents to identify themselves on a 10-point scale of left to right. While in the capitalist countries surveyed, this variable was predictably *negatively* correlated with the "socialism index", in the postcommunist countries, the correlation was substantially weaker. In Russia, the correlation was even *positive*, meaning that the respondents who identified themselves on the right were more likely to support the socialist principles than those on the left.. These results have led Mason to a conclusion that "the traditional notions of left and right have been thoroughly scrambled." Ibid., 74.

¹¹⁷ Reisinger et al., "Political values in Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania: sources and implications for democracy," British Journal of Political Science 24.2 (1994): 215 and 203.

conceptions.")¹¹⁸

Less contradictory but still ambiguous findings have been obtained by surveys in other post-communist countries, but even here the polarization has often been both between individual groups and within the value system of individuals. In their study on political values in five former communist countries, Miller et al. have focused on four kinds of broad political values: socialist, nationalist, liberal and democratic values.¹¹⁹ Their investigation, based on eleven surveys of public opinion, was carried between the end of 1993 and the beginning of 1996 and involved interviews with the public and members of parliaments. In general terms, they have found that "a large majority of the public. . . were, on balance, committed to socialist values, and an equally large majority were committed to liberal values."¹²⁰

When summarizing their finding on the role of "socialist values" in these countries, Miller et al. have found that overall (on average) 74 percent of the population "were committed to socialist values in general; 81 percent were committed to socialist welfare values," and about half were committed to equality (about the same percentage as those committed to state control of industry).¹²¹ Miller et al. have also found, similarly to predictions done in my argument, that in terms of bivariate correlation "socialist values" correlated quite strongly (at over 0.20) with class, age,

¹¹⁸ James Alexander, "Surveying Attitudes in Russia," Communist and Post-Communist Studies 30.2 (1997): 116. However, Alexander has added that this kind of anomalies may either reflect authoritarian patterns or they are "another manifestations of the complexity of Russian political attitudes in a chaotic period. Ibid.

¹¹⁹ On their definition of individual value clusters, see Miller et al., Values and Political Change in Postcommunist Europe, 2.

¹²⁰ Ibid., 4.

¹²¹ Ibid., 121.

sector, education, and country of residence. The older people, the workers and those who lived in Russia tended towards socialist values, while the young, those who worked in the private sector, the highly educated, those brought up in the cities and the Czechs all tended against socialist values.¹²²

Table 10 Commitment to "socialist values" in five ECE/EE countries

Value: / Country:	"socialism"	state industry	state welfare	equality
Czech R.	51%	29%	62%	40%
Slovakia	78%	44%	85%	59%
Hungary	79%	45%	84%	73%
Ukraine	76%	59%	84%	50%
Russia	81%	66%	85%	56%
All respondents	74%	52%	81%	56%

Source: Miller et al., Values and Political Change in Postcommunist Europe, Table 6.9, 121. (The POS were conducted between the end of 1993 and the beginning of 1996.)¹²³

¹²² Ibid., esp. 333. Multiple regression done by Miller et al. has shown that the strongest independent impact on the tendency towards socialist values had the age factor. Ibid., 333.

¹²³ The composite indicator of "Socialism" is the average of "Equality," "State industry" and "State welfare" indicators (as presented in the previous sections). Percentage relates to scoring above the mid-point (3.0) on composite measures of the respective "socialist values," as identified by Miller et al. Each of their scale run from 1 to 5, with 3 as the neutral point, so scores over 3 meant more pro-"socialist" attitudes/values than anti-"socialist." See Miller et al., Values and Political Change in Postcommunist Europe, 121.

There has been little comparative (and comparable) research done on the consistency of these values inter-regionally. Nevertheless, Miller et al. have attempted to compare perceptions of by them defined socialist values between Great Britain and their five ECE/EE countries.¹²⁴ They have found that on most indicators, British values were at least as "socialist" as those in ECE, though perhaps a little less "socialist" than those in Russia and Ukraine.¹²⁵ In a similar survey, but based on a differently conceptualized notion of "socialist values," Mason has found that Hungary has scored highest on his "Socialist Principles Index," followed by the former GDR, Slovenia, Japan, Poland, Russia, and Bulgaria (all these countries scored between 1.1 and 1.4 on the index). At the other end of the spectrum were Holland (with approx. 0.7) and especially the United States (with 0.5).¹²⁶

The specific question of the dynamics of the relationship between the support for democracy and support for a market has been comprehensively addressed by

¹²⁴ For the British study done in the mid-1990s, see Miller et al., *ibid.* One of the first major attempts to compare values in east and west at an earlier stage in the transition from communism. See "The Pulse of Europe, a Survey of Political and Social Values and Attitudes," Special Edition of the Los Angeles Times-Mirror. Los Angeles Times-Mirror 17 Sept. 1991: 165.

¹²⁵ Miller et al. *ibid.*, esp. 391-94. See also Tables in the Appendix here.

¹²⁶ Mason's index is based on the average of z-scores of responses on six questions about support for socialist principles (all 4- or 5-point Likert scales): 1. level of pay should be based on "the size of the family the employee support;" 2. "the government should guarantee everyone a minimum standard of living;" 3. "the government should place an upper limit on the amount of money any one person can make;" 4. "the government should provide a job for everyone who wants one;" 5. "the fairest way of distributing wealth and income would be to give everyone equal shares;" and, 6. "the most important thing is that people get what they need, even if this means allocating money from those who have earned more than they need." Mason, "Justice, Socialism, and Participation in the Postcommunist States," 61.

Gibson in the early 1990s in his study of Ukraine and Russia. Gibson has attempted a systematic examination of the attitudes of ordinary citizens towards democracy and a market economy in the two countries, particularly to find out to what degree are attitudes toward democracy and the marketization of an economy connected (and if and how their correlation factor has changed during the period of his research). He has considered the possibility that both support for democratic institutions and market-based economic institutions "stem from other values." He has hypothesized that attitudes toward reform in general, and resistance to social change in particular, may be closely connected to the acceptance of new economic and political institutions. Individuals differ in their ability to accommodate change and accept risks and these differences may well influence attitudes toward reforms."¹²⁷ Gibson has considered "the causal interconnections of the two sets of values" and particularly explored "the hypothesis that support for democracy is largely a function of the desire for a more productive economic system."¹²⁸ His rather inconclusive findings have been, in general, similar to those of Finifter and Mickiewicz who found in their survey that attitudes towards political and economic reforms were not "synonymous." According to Finifter and Mickiewicz, "being 'political democrat' or wanting rapid change does *not* necessarily mean that one is eager to abandon the socialist system."¹²⁹ Evidence to

¹²⁷ Gibson, "Political and Economic Markets: Changes in the Connections Between Attitudes Toward Political Democracy and a Market Economy Within the Mass Culture of Russia and Ukraine," The Journal of Politics 58.4 (Nov. 1996): 961. See also Finifter and Mickiewicz, "Redefining the Political System of the USSR: Mass Support for Political Change."

¹²⁸ Gibson, *ibid.*, 954.

¹²⁹ Finifter and Mickiewicz, "Redefining the Political System of the USSR," 860 (emphasis in the original). See also Gibson, "Political and Economic Markets." Specifically, Gibson has found that "attitudes toward the market and toward democracy are moderately interrelated," and this is true "even when I control for a

the same effect has also been found in other post-communist countries.¹³⁰ Typically, Mary McIntosh et al. have found in their comparative study that popular notions of democracy differ in East and West. According to them,

"[W]hile west Europeans tend to emphasize political rights, east Europeans equate democracy more with economic prosperity and social rights than with political rights. Majorities in eastern Europe select economic prosperity, security, or equality as more important in a democracy than the political rights of political pluralism, freedom to criticize the government, and a system of justice that treats everyone equally."¹³¹ Such a definition of democracy may "serve as a fundamental indicator of the expectations people have of their. . . society - whether it is a society based on 'economic and social rights' or one that emphasizes 'political rights.'"¹³²

One can hypothesize that how people compare old and new regimes influences support for the new regime and the rejection of undemocratic alternatives (Rose et al. 1998). In this respect, interesting results have been obtained from several surveys

host of determinants of the respective attitudes. For many, the economic and political markets are synonymous. . . But the interrelationship is not overwhelmingly strong - many democrats oppose market principles; many marketeers oppose full-fledged democracy." Gibson, *ibid.*, 980. According to findings obtained by Denisovsky et al. (from the research done in the European part of the USSR), over 68 percent of the supporters of a market economy considered freedom a major life value. Among the supporters of a planned economy, only 38.5 percent valued freedom. Denisovsky et al., "Twelve Percent of Hope: Economic Consciousness and a Market Economy," 232.

¹³⁰ See, for instance, Mason, "Justice, Socialism, and Participation in the Postcommunist States;" and others.

¹³¹ Mary E. McIntosh et al., *The Meaning of Democracy in a Redefined Europe*. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Association for Public Opinion Research, St. Charles, IL, 1993. Here quoted from F.J. Fleron and Richard Ahl, "Does the Public Matter?: Public Opinion Surveys." Can Democracy Take Root in Post-Soviet Russia?, 304.

¹³² *Ibid.*

investigating opinions about the old socialist (communist) and the new systems. Depending on the wording of a question asked (and, of course on a country and factors related to the current political and economic performance), people in post-communist ECE/EE, have expressed a surprisingly high or relatively high appreciation of the regime ancient as compared to the post-communist system. In a survey conducted in 1995 in several ECE/EE countries, for instance, half or more of the national samples from Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovakia considered the old communist regime as being preferable to the new political system.¹³³

Such results may be and have been interpreted in many different ways. One of the most credible interpretations has been made by Sztompka; in his opinion, people in the majority don't want to return to communism as such, but "they dream of some third way', of humanitarian capitalism, or, paraphrasing the old slogans about socialism, they would like to see 'capitalism with a human face', or 'the Polish road to capitalism'."¹³⁴ This may well be a natural desire; especially in the post-communist context, in which values have been redefined and reality has not matched expectations. In all post-communist countries, the decrease in the standard of living of large segments of the population has generated considerable resentment (particularly among salaried workers and occupational associations), as well as an antipathy towards governmental institutions and officials. Accordingly, many citizens have tended to

¹³³ New Democracies Barometer IV 1996. Here quoted from Nelson, "Civil Society Endangered," 346. See also Appendix 4 in my thesis.

¹³⁴ Sztompka, "The Intangibles and Imponderables of the Transition to Democracy," 305. As Gibson has concluded in his analysis of public opinion in Russia and Ukraine, many simply want the advantages of a market economy (availability of goods, etc.), while also preferring the advantages of the previous system (government social guarantees, limited inequality, etc.); in short, "many seem to want 'socialism that works'." Gibson, "Political and Economic Markets," 965-6.

blame democratic politicians and democratic and market institutions for the rising unemployment, bankruptcies, the dropping or stagnating standard of living, increased crime, and reduced social services. Thus reasonably, the mentioned contradictions in expectations and values are to be interpreted both as the implications of the surviving mentalities with roots in the old system and as the protective responses to the problems of transformation that often present irreconcilable challenges for the population.¹³⁵

It is also valid that the issue of studying values and attitudes in the radically changing conditions is, as Mason has pointed out, an extremely complex one that

¹³⁵ See also Schöpflin, "Obstacles to Liberalism in Post-Communist Polities," 189. In an article in *Argumenty i Fakty*, Yakov Tudorovsky has argued: "If some people think that the socialist idea is dead and buried, they are wrong. Citing a 1997 opinion survey held by the National Public Opinion Research Centre (VTsIOM) during summer of 1996, in which 1,890 people were polled, he has pointed out the findings that 48 percent of the population preferred socialism and only 29 percent claimed that the socialist system "cannot in principle create normal conditions for the development of the country and its citizens." As many as 60 percent of ordinary people say they lived better under socialism, and only 10 percent disagree. At the same time, 52 percent of Russians do not want to see Communists in power. See Yakov Tudorovsky, "Half of Russians Want Socialism without Communists," *Argumenty i Fakty* 44 (1997): n. pag. In a survey conducted in the late 1990s, 18 percent of Czech respondents would rather live in a socialist system. One-quarter of respondents could not decide whether they preferred the kind of life before or after November 1989's Velvet Revolution. However, the rest (57 percent) of the respondents were strongly for the current political system. The opinion poll was taken by the prestigious Factum agency. According to other opinion polls, socialism was gaining more support in the Czech Republic. A June 1998 opinion poll taken by the Institute for Public Opinion Research showed that 25 percent of respondents would rather return to the period before November 1989. *Carolina* [262] 16 November 1997, E-mail News from the Czech Republic (Prague: Charles University), <carolina@mbox.fsv.cuni.cz>. And according to a survey taken early in 1998, only 28 percent of those polled were convinced they "live better now than they lived under Communism." *Carolina* [281] 20 March 1998, E-mail News from the Czech Republic (Prague: Charles University), <carolina@mbox.fsv.cuni.cz>. No matter how much it is evident that these results were due to the poor political and economic performance in the Czech Republic after 1996, the rising nostalgia for the previous regime also demonstrates appreciation of the state socialism achievements and values.

cannot perhaps be adequately examined by prevalent polling methods (see also III.3.4-6). According to Alexander (1997), many research studies into political cultures in ECE/EE countries have been unfortunately "characterized by the purposeful search for signs of democratic and market culture (liberal-democratic) . . . or its dichotomous opposite, socialist authoritarianism." As Alexander has argued, such a focus often "clouds the fact that the vast majority of the population has a more complex attitudinal outlook."¹³⁶ The efforts to analyze and interpret the complexity and "formlessness" (Eckstein) of the post-communist constellation in terms of general trends in value formation and development have often suffered from an "attitude bias" due to which, as Alexander has noted, many negative findings which tended to problematize assumed shifts in the direction of accepting democratic values have been minimized for the presentation of positive findings, thus obfuscating the more complex and dynamic (and ambiguous) picture.¹³⁷

IV.3.5 A (relatively) high degree of political apathy and mistrust.

When analyzing the issue of political participation one must consider both the individual action (motivation, needs, goals) and the broadly conceived constraints of participation - i. e. its variable resources and contextual constraints.¹³⁸ Political participation normally includes many types of activities by private citizens in support

¹³⁶ Alexander, "Surveying Attitudes in Russia," 109.

¹³⁷ Ibid., 116.

¹³⁸ See John A. Booth and Seligson, Booth and Mitchell Seligson, "Images of political participation in Latin America," in Political Participation in Latin America: Citizen and State, papers of a conference held at University of Texas at San Antonio, Nov. 1976, vol. 1, ed. John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson et al. (New York: Holmes 1978), 2 vols.

of the regime, selecting government officials (esp. in elections) or "influencing the distribution of public goods."¹³⁹ In cases when the level of such involvement is low, political analysts may consider various degrees of political passivity, or apathy.¹⁴⁰

The presence of political apathy assumes low personal (psychological) involvement, detachment from civic obligation and political inactivity.¹⁴¹ In the notion of Verba (1978) such personal psychological involvement refers to measures such as awareness of politics, interest in politics, attention to media, etc. In this sense many of those studying the post-communist region have identified passivity and apathy (as well as alienation and distrust) either as the key characteristic of society there, or at least as a significant problem. For instance, Mason, based on his own systematic research in Poland and in other countries, has concluded that "the populations of the postcommunist states express a surprisingly high degree of frustration, futility, and alienation, especially from the political system." Moreover, Mason's recent findings have apparently confirmed that "the post-communist societies have even higher levels of political distrust and alienation than the established democratic ones."¹⁴² In the same vein, Schopflin has argued that "no strong sense of involvement of the population in political institutions," and "a political residue of apathy" have been present in the

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ According to Mason et al., the presence of political apathy "requires low psychological involvement, detachment from civic obligation, and political inactivity." Following Verba, Nie, and Kim (1978), psychological involvement refers to "measures such as awareness of politics, information, attention to the media, and so forth." Here quoted from Mason et. al., "Apathy and the Birth of Democracy: The Polish Struggle," 205.

¹⁴¹ See Mason et al., "Apathy and the Birth of Democracy: The Polish Struggle," East European Politics and Societies 5.2 (Spring 1991): 205.

¹⁴² Mason, "Justice, Socialism, and Participation in the Postcommunist States," 67-8.

region.¹⁴³

Some scholars have singled out the suppression of civil society by communist regimes and the consequences of this suppression as the main cause of the passivity found in post-communist countries. For instance, according to Jowitt (1991), Leninist regimes with their rather brutal exercise of power and enforced political participation, prevented the emergence of the public realm and instilled in their societies a deep distrust of government and general political passivity (Jowitt 1991). On the level of the individual, Brown (1994) has argued that "the insulation of the real self, to which many [under communism] resorted, also induced a multisided apathy."¹⁴⁴ Similarly, Mason has insisted that political apathy in Poland "is due in part to the many years of suffering authoritarianism," and is also linked to "a relatively weak sense of democracy . . . due in part to the lack of experience with democratic processes and institutions."¹⁴⁵ As Paul Lewis has argued, "[T]he effect of communism and forms of political organization and behavior it promoted probably tended. . . to reinforce existing perceptions of politics as a relatively elitist affair and to discourage spontaneous

¹⁴³ Here from Crawford, East Central European politics today. From chaos to stability?, 306-7.

¹⁴⁴ Brown, Hopes and Shadows: Eastern Europe After Communism, 45.

¹⁴⁵ Mason, "Public Opinion in Poland's Transition to Market Democracy," 201. Curry has directly linked "a learned cynicism about politics" in post-communist EE to the people's experience with the "worker's state" in which the citizenry learned early on that its voice mattered little. Jane L. Curry, "The Sociological Legacies of Communism," in The Legacies of Communism in Eastern Europe, ed. Zoltan Brarany and Ivan Volgyes (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1995), 68. McFalls, interpreting the data collected in the early 1990s in the former GDR, has contended that "the conflict between surviving East German values and the liberal values of the West has created the conditions for passive resignation" in East Germany. McFalls, Communism's Collapse, Democracy's Demise?;, 21.

participation."¹⁴⁶

Polish-Canadian sociologist Adam Podgorecki has employed for such "anomic relationship" between citizenry and authority his concept of "*społeczna wichrowatość*" (i.e. social disorganization), which includes lack of trust, apathy and negation of authority. Such an attitude, as Mason has suggested referring to Podgorecki's concept, "develops as a consequence of citizens' exposure to inconsistent, ad hoc, and conflicting stimuli that do not lead to the attainment of socially defined goals." The resulting forms of social disorganization may then be seen as a defensive reaction against the social mismanagement and manipulation typical of communist rule.¹⁴⁷

Goldman (1997), for instance, has noted that the present tolerance of authoritarian tendencies in some countries of the region was a "by-product of apathy," as generally seen in the low level of political interest in the participation in political life, including declining turnouts in elections.¹⁴⁸ Although precise data on extra-electoral participation are not available, it is evident, Goldman argued, that in most of the region's countries the number of citizens actively involved in the day-to-day participation in the building of new parties, associations and movements is still limited in proportion to the population, and is, according to tentative assessments, "well below the level of popular involvement in the political life of most of the societies of Western Europe."¹⁴⁹

This might be the case; one must acknowledge, however, that the level of

¹⁴⁶ Paul G. Lewis, "Democracy and its Future in Eastern Europe," in Prospects for Democracy, ed. David Held (Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press, 1993), 301.

¹⁴⁷ See Mason et al., "Justice, Socialism, and Participation in the Postcommunist States."

¹⁴⁸ Goldman, Revolution and Change in Central and Eastern Europe, 28.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 28.

political participation is always a relative matter, both compared to other societies and to other dimensions of a political system. In order to assess what is a "high" and "low" level of participation, a reliable cross-country comparison may be due. Even such comparisons often have, unfortunately, their limits, since one can not always obtain data on all relevant categories of political participation.¹⁵⁰ Also, it has not been empirically confirmed that widespread political participation is indispensable for democracy to prosper. In fact, at times political apathy and a low level of participation have also been a source of concern in mature Western democracies, where it has been known that large numbers of citizens do not even participate in routinized political life.¹⁵¹ As one commentator has noted, compared to a declining level of political participation in some Western countries, the 1994 parliamentary elections in Ukraine brought such participation and turnout levels that could be "a reason for envy" in many Western countries.¹⁵²

Even if such comparisons are technically accomplished, they may be misleading, however. This point has been made by Nelson (1996), who has noted that disaffection from politicians and political processes in many Western countries - he

¹⁵⁰ Although data regarding electoral turnouts would be the easiest to collect and compare, they usually do not seem to provide the whole picture of the multisided area of participation activities and potentials.

¹⁵¹ As it is known, in the United States, for example, only about one half of Americans vote in presidential elections, and only about a third vote in elections for the highest state offices (such as governor). Less than 10 percent are politically active to the point that they attend party meetings or work in political campaigns. See Mason, "Public Opinion in Poland's Transition to Market Democracy," 203. Also Americans seem quite ignorant about their political system: only about 40 percent can name their two Senators and less than one third know the term of a U.S. House member. As Mason has noted, "by these standards, Polish political awareness and participation is quite high." *Ibid.*, 203.

¹⁵² Lienesch is quoted in Mason, *ibid.*

has taken as an example the United States - "does not, on the whole extend to systemic rejection." But in a fledgling system "that [often] cannot be separated from the state's chief executive and specific organs of authority, such disinterests and alienation will almost certainly coexist with eroding legitimacy."¹⁵³ Having said that, I believe that some insight can be gained both from comparisons done within the context of ECE countries themselves and between post-communist countries and routinized democracies, even when inferences cannot make the strong case. To get a more accurate picture I will examine some general aspects of post-communist apathy and passivity in ECE/EE and then submit this phenomenon to a partial cross-regional comparison.

For this purpose it may be useful to distinguish, as Miller et al. have done in their comprehensive investigation of post-communist values, between *psychological* and *active* participation. Psychological participation would refer to the reception of political information and the willingness to take part or actually participate in verbal discussions about politics, but mostly within the private sphere. Active participation refers to politically significant actions within and affecting the public (political) sphere. In their specifically targeted survey on this issue, Miller et al. have found relatively high psychological participation in five countries they have researched, but relatively low active participation in the same countries.¹⁵⁴ (See Tab.11.)

¹⁵³ Daniel N. Nelson, "Civil Society Endangered," Social Research 63.2 (Summer 1996), 346. See also John Mueller, "Democracy, Capitalism, and the End of Transition," 108. In these elections, 5,833 candidates were registered in 450 electoral districts (i.e. 13 candidates competing for office in each district). Of these, only 11 percent were proposed by political parties, 27 percent were put forth by "workers' collectives" and the remaining 62 percent by simple groups of "workers". Turnout reached some 75 percent. Data from Mueller, *ibid.*, 108.

¹⁵⁴ Miller et al., Values and Political Change in Postcommunist Europe.

Table 11 Psychological participation in five ECE/EE countries

Partic.: / Country:	Follow politics in the newsp.	Follow politics on TV	Interested in politics	Discuss politics often
Czech R.	57%	72%	48%	41%
Slovakia	46%	64%	46%	43%
Hungary	59%	77%	26%	20%
Ukraine	46%	73%	33%	30%
Russia	44%	64%	31%	28%

Source: Miller et al., Values and Political Change in Postcommunist Europe, Table 5.3, 97. (The POS were conducted between the end of 1993 and the beginning of 1996.)

Compared to the levels of *passive* participation, results of the levels of *active* participation in the same five ECE/EE countries have provided a significantly different picture. Particularly with regard to participation in the broad category of events (demonstrations, marches, protests, etc.), the studied post-communist countries show a low level of involvement and seem to be lagging behind that in Western democracies. Having made an inference from the latter set of data, Miller et al. have concluded that "postcommunist societies did not have high levels of active participation."¹⁵⁵ (See Tables 12 and 13.)

¹⁵⁵ Miller et al., Values and Political Change in Postcommunist Europe, 97.

Table 12 Active participation in five ECE/EE countries ("In the last two years, have you. . . ?")

Partic.: / Country:	signed a petition	written to a newspaper	contacted an elected official	taken part in a demo, march, protest
Czech R.	13%	3%	5%	4%
Slovakia	16%	4%	8%	6%
Hungary	7%	2%	6%	4%
Ukraine	6%	3%	7%	5%
Russia	5%	2%	5%	5%

Source: Miller et al., Values and Political Change in Postcommunist Europe, Table 5.4, 98. (The POS were conducted between the end of 1993 and the beginning of 1996.)

Miller et al. have also found that despite the fact that relatively high numbers of respondents told them that they spent much time on various hobbies, sports or cultural activities, only few took part in organizations devoted to such matters. That would be consistent with Kaminski's (1992) impressions, according to whom research done in Poland revealed that individuals "tended to turn their attention from public issues, restricted their participation in secondary groups, and focused instead on the values of private life and the enhancement of their activities in primary groups made of families and friends."¹⁵⁶ Considering the implications of their findings for the development of civil society, Miller et al. have noted that after an outburst of interest and activity during the period of 1989 to 1991, there has been an "unmistakeable

¹⁵⁶ Kaminski, An Institutional Theory of Communist Regimes, 252.

demobilization."¹⁵⁷ According to them, whatever the cause, "the switch from the communist to postcommunist regime produced a *less participant* society. . . and one which gained *less satisfaction* from participation - a more 'uncivil' rather than a more 'civil' society."¹⁵⁸

A traditional indicator of the level of societal participation in the political process is voters' participation in elections. Voter turnout across the region, however, has been very inconsistent and more sophisticated comparative analyses would be needed to give this inconsistency a meaningful, albeit complex, pattern. Two general trends, however, have seemed to be apparent in the first several post-revolutionary years. First, in most countries in the region, voter turnout was consistently declining

¹⁵⁷ Miller et al., Values and Political Change in Postcommunist Europe, 98.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 100 (emphasis in the original). The extent of this withdrawal in Russia has been documented in a series of public opinion surveys. The New Russian Barometer, carried out from 1991 to 1996 under Richard Rose, director for the Center of Public Policy at Strathclyde University in Scotland. According to these polls (outlined in a book How Russia Votes), Russians are far more detached from their leaders, or "demobilized," than other citizens of post-communist states. For instance, asked if the post-communist system is better or worse in the chances it gives ordinary people to influence the government, only 8 percent of Russians said it was better. "We have no civil society," Masha Volkenstein, a Russian pollster and sociologist, has noted. "It's a feeling that things don't depend on you, that even though you vote, people in power will do what they want." David Hoffman, commenting on the polls in the Washington Post, has suggested that "the very foundations of civil society are weak because Russians, despite their new freedoms, have become extraordinarily passive. They are not in the mood to participate. They are puzzled, distrustful, uncertain and preoccupied with personal survival . . . [they] appear to be disappointed and looking inward, just at a time when a civil society is being born." David Hoffman, "Harsh History Stymies Civil Society: Russian Activists Strive to Be Heard as Democracy Takes Hold," Washington Post 26 December 1996. See also Stephen White et al., How Russia Votes (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1997); and also Stephen Whitefield and Geoffrey Evans, "The Russian Election of 1993: Public Opinion and the Transition Experience," Post-Soviet Affairs 10.1 (1994): 38-60. Although the problem of passivity has been recognized in most post-communist countries, it seems to be, for whatever reason, most pervasive in Russia.

(sometimes from a fairly high percentage in the first free elections). Second, in Poland and Hungary low voter turnout was noticeable from the very beginning. For instance, in Poland in the second presidential election round in December 1990, the vote was slightly above 53 percent and in the parliamentary elections in October 1991 it was just under 42 percent. Commenting on the Polish case in 1991, Sztompka has complained of the legacy of "*passivism and political apathy*" and has noted:

"... In the first democratic elections after half a century, 38 per cent of the population chose not to vote, and in the local elections (even closer to 'our own home') 58 per cent were absent. Almost every second Pole does not think it is worthwhile to cast a ballot for the first democratic president, and with a pluralistic spectrum of associations and political parties mushrooming . . . , more than 90 per cent of the population have decided not to belong to any of them."¹⁵⁹ In Hungary, some 65 percent of the electorate voted in the first round of the 1990 March-April parliamentary elections and only 45 percent cast ballots in the second round, a rather surprising number considering that these were the first free Hungarian elections since 1946. These were not the worst result, however; in subsequent by-elections, the numbers dropped as low as 10 percent in some places and rarely reached 25 percent.¹⁶⁰

The most comprehensive research regarding political passivity has been done in Poland (Mason 1983 and 1991; Staniszkis 1992; Kolarska-Bobinska 1992). In their inquiry, Mason, Nelson and Szklarski have documented that in Poland in the period 1980-91, there was a "low level of psychological involvement in the system".¹⁶¹ They have singled out the "detachment from civic obligations" as one of the typical features of post-communist societies. According to them, "citizens may still feel more like

¹⁵⁹ Sztompka, "The Intangibles and Imponderables of the Transition to Democracy," 304. Sztompka cited the data from Gazeta Wyborcza 25 Apr. 1991.

¹⁶⁰ See Brown, Hopes and Shadows: Eastern Europe After Communism, 30.

¹⁶¹ Mason et al., "Apathy and the Birth of Democracy: The Polish Struggle."

observers than insiders in the political process;" and also, "attitudes of social disintegration which undermine all kinds of authority, not only Communist," have been typical in the region.¹⁶² Similarly, Jadwiga Staniszkis in her study of the issue in Poland, has emphasized passivity and cynicism as being significant features of post-communist Polish society. In her opinion these tendencies carry in themselves both the stigma of the past, as well as responses to the new (disappointing) reality. According to Staniszkis,

"the strong impact of the new elite on the evolutionary character of change, followed by the very good adjustment of the old party nomenklatura, created a peculiar type of cynicism (both among the . . . public and the new elite itself). It also increase the passivity of society, leading to all the paradoxes of representative democracy in an apathetic society."¹⁶³

The problem of apathy and passivity in the case of Poland has also been

¹⁶² Ibid., 205. Although these findings mostly refer to Poland, they are often valid for other ECE/EE countries as well (see Mason, Nelson, and Szklarski 1991). Mason et al. have also presented an interesting hypothesis that emphasized an "active" side of political apathy. They have argued (with the Polish case in mind) that the environment of communist rule "may have been particularly 'apathy-producing' [but] it was that in which the norms for mass political behavior advocated and enforced by the authorities adhered rigidly to the model of a subject political culture," while popular sentiments had a potential to become participatory." In such condition, Mason et al. have suggested, "apathy becomes a behavioral manifestation of caring and evaluating, *but being unable to play a meaningful political role*. Apathy as a mass political behavior may, thus, begin in people who . . . are aware, care, and judge political objects - but who confront their own lack of efficacy and systemic sanctions. Apathy, in a sense, *protects* psyche when the regime is illegitimate, but there is no alternative to it or to its policies." Ibid., 222 (emphasis in the original). This aspect of political passivity cannot, however, explain the whole phenomenon of apathy in communist and post-communist ECE/EE.

¹⁶³ Jadwiga Staniszkis, "Main Paradoxes of Democratic Change," in Constructing Capitalism: The Reemergence of Civil Society and Liberal Economy in the Post-Communist World, ed. Kazimierz Z. Poznanski (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 181.

investigated consistently by Kolarska-Bobinska (1992). She has pointed out that the question of political participation and social apathy in Poland has been complicated by many contradictory sociological observations and the changing context. She has argued that on one hand, Poland has a system that has won an unprecedented degree of public support and mostly a government it can consider as "its own." On the other hand, however, people were "struck by a lack of their own enthusiasm, joy, and willingness to act and participate in undertakings which could considerably speed up [the] reconstruction. This is particularly felt by that generation which so actively. . . joined Solidarity in 1980." Not only that, she has added with a flair of scepticism, "the younger generation, which knows of the strikes events of August 1980 mainly from reports, is not active either, but does not feel surprised by the fact."¹⁶⁴

In this context, Kolarska-Bobinska has hypothesized the possible causes of the low level of social and political activity in Poland, as well as of the "slow emergence of civil society and deficiencies in grass-roots activity mainly in the social and political sphere."¹⁶⁵ According to her, general factors contributing to the phenomenon included the heritage of the past, particularly "the survival of the patterns of acting and thinking acquired under socialism."¹⁶⁶ Investigating this claim, Kolarska-Bobinska has pointed to two different analyses existing in the Polish sociological literature. From the perspective of the first analysis, the (social) system has not changed in principle and the basic "socialist" features of the functioning of economy and the state have survived the regime change. The change that has taken hold in Poland, according to this perspective, has been rather "superficial" and has hardly influenced people's values and

¹⁶⁴ Kolarska-Bobinska, "Civil Society and Social Anomy in Poland," 57.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 59.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 59.

behavior. These socialist principles would also include society's attitude to the protective and welfare distributive role of the state and the expectation that this would remain unchanged without society's being involved (ibid). The second type of analysis has emphasized the assumption - which is also part of my argument here - that the system of institutions has undergone certain changes, but human behavior and especially habits "are more persistent than the structures and institutions which determine them."¹⁶⁷

The Hungarian case (as well as some other countries' cases) has exhibited many similar trends with the Polish case, namely those pertaining to the legacy of the social contract between the communist state and society. In the case of Hungary, Simon has identified progressive "depolitization" in the attitudes of the population between 1985-1991.¹⁶⁸ As data from his surveys have demonstrated, for Hungarian citizens "life without worries meant the most important social value" both during the Kadar period (up to 1986) and in the following period of multi-party democracy in

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., 59-60. Kolarska-Bobinska has identified two other groups of factors. One group is linked to "the specific character of Polish transformation," especially the impact of the economic stabilization programme. Another group consists mainly of socio-psychological consequences of change as such. According to the author, the low participation is caused, among other things, by the way the change is affecting individual's cognitive and value structure and the relations between them. The past and the present are "constantly redefined, the definition of the current situation as well as prospects for the future are unclear. . . the rules of behavior are vague, changing and inadequate to new situations," society at large "experiences a state of anomy." Ibid., 61. She has further argued that "in spite of the disappearance of many factors conducive to anomy, other factors have emerged which strengthen this condition. Anomy now is not a derivative of the restrictions imposed by the non-accepted socio-political system." Ibid., 62.

¹⁶⁸ Janos Simon, "Post-Paternalist Political Culture in Hungary: Relationship Between Citizens & Politics During and After the 'Melancholic Revolution'(1989-91)," Communist & Post Communist Studies 26.2 (June 1993): esp. 232-5.

1991. In 1985, Simon found "freedom values," which stressed the state's non-interference in people's private lives, everyone's right to speak on public matters and the creation of interest groups at the bottom of the hierarchy of values.¹⁶⁹ This latter cluster of values was still at the bottom of the list in 1991, although its popularity increased (see Appendix). According to Simon "one of the basic elements of politics in the Kadar period was the depoliticization and isolation of citizens; grass roots initiatives were publicly ridiculed by the body politics and their participants were secretly threatened with various punitive actions." The consequences of this have not changed much during the Hungarian political transition in the late 1980s. In general, Simon has identified "two contradictory tendencies;" according to him, "both the traditional social values (life without worries; economic equality) and modern individual civic values of freedom (independence of the state; counteracting helplessness towards the authorities) have become stronger."¹⁷⁰ In part, a similar development has been observed also in the Czech Republic, where dynamics have been different mainly in the sense that the high peak in participatory activities in 1989-90 was followed by steadily declining participatory indicators.¹⁷¹

IV.3.5.1 The levels of political apathy: comparisons.

In their partial attempt at cross-regional comparison, Miller et al. have conducted an interesting survey of general interest in politics in several ECE/EE countries and Great Britain between 1993 and 1996. Their results indicated that

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 236.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 238.

¹⁷¹ See Miller et al., Values and Political Change in Postcommunist Europe and Jan Hartl, "Jací jsme a kam směřujeme," Respekt IV.36 (6-12 Sept. 1993): 6.

especially in terms of support for political parties, the level of activity was higher in Great Britain than in ECE/EE countries. (See Tab. 13.)

Table 13 Comparisons: Interest in politics

Country: / Interest in politics:	Britain	ECE	Russia and Ukraine
Interested /Politicians: in politics /People"	93% 40%	na 40%	na 32%
Party /Politicians: supporter /People:	85% 53%	na 33%	na 20%

Source: Miller et al., Values and Political Change in Postcommunist Europe, Table 20.19, 411. (The POS were conducted between the end of 1993 and the beginning of 1996.)

Apart from the efforts of Miller et al., some others have attempted to draw a broader comparative picture of the phenomenon. Mason in particular has consistently maintained that there has been enough empirical evidence to consider political apathy as the most typical feature of post-communism, suggesting that its occurrence in ECE/EE is significantly higher than in developed Western countries. In Mason's and his collaborators' early 1990s survey, respondents were asked if they had ever participated in any of ten variants of political action, ranging from signing a petition to joining a wildcat strike. Mason's team have found "wide variation" across countries but also common trends. According to their findings, the incidence of participation and/or protest were higher in those countries where governments were brought down by people power (East Germany, Czechoslovakia) and lower in those where the transition was more evolutionary (Poland) or conducted by the political elite (Hungary). Based on his data, Mason has argued that "on closer examination, it is clear

that political activity in the East European countries remained limited, even during the revolutionary ferment. Most people in all countries voted in the early elections, but were not otherwise active politically in even a minimal way."¹⁷² In his concluding remarks, Mason has commented:

"What is remarkable here is the lack of political activity of any kind in most of the countries: in the polled sample, 58 percent of those in the postcommunist states had participated in *none* of ten forms of political action, compared with just 25 percent reporting such low levels of political activity in the capitalist states. In all of the postcommunist states, most people (three quarters or more) voted in the first free or semifree parliamentary elections in 1989-91, but apart from that, there was very little political activity."¹⁷³

With regards to a cross-regional comparison regarding political participation, a careful interpretation is in place. For instance, political apathy in the United States as measured by the voters' turnout in elections may be numerically on par with that observed in postcommunist Eastern Europe, with in both regions often being (on average) lower than in Western Europe. In fact, some U.S. commentators may

¹⁷² Mason, "Justice, Socialism, and Participation in the Postcommunist States," 63.

¹⁷³ Mason, *ibid.*, 6 (emphasis in the original). Among other findings made by Mason et al. there were several that dealt with demographic differences between those who are politically active and those who are not. According to Mason, "those people who *were* more active. . . tended to be less supportive of socialist principles. In every East European country, the level of support for socialist principles declines as the level of political activity increases." Mason, *ibid.*, 66 (emphasis in the original). The comparison to other surveys done in the post-communist region has led Mason to the conclusion that "the vast majority of the population in the postcommunist states. . . were more concerned with economic issues and economic injustice than with politics. . ." *Ibid.*, 65. While many have considered this a clear disadvantage, John Mueller has argued, on the assumption that political "awareness and knowledge is not necessary for a smoothly functioning democracy, that the level of apathy in most post-communist countries might often not be higher than that in the United States. Mueller, "Democracy, Capitalism, and the End of Transition," 112.

welcome rather than fear the decline in turnout rates in the United States. As Wattenberg has put it, "if people do not vote, they [analysts] say, citizens must be satisfied with the government." There is a certain logic to this view, Wattenberg has reasoned, "because if nonvoters were extremely disgruntled with our leaders, they would undoubtedly take some political action. However, to argue that nonvoters are content with government just because they aren't actively opposing it stretches the logic too far."¹⁷⁴ Some others have argued, as Goldman did, rather to the contrary (Goldman 1997). Although he has used Western Europe instead of the USA as the reference point, he believed that the number of people actively involved in the "day-to-day building of new parties and movements in post-communist ECE/EE is still quite limited and well below the level of popular involvement in the political life in most of the societies of Western Europe. In Goldman's opinion, "political apathy comes from a popular mistrust of the political party form inspired by the simplicity of the monolithic communist experience, as well as by a traditional mistrust and rejection not just of formal organization but of power itself and by a long-held perception of politics derived from the long authoritarian past as a morally corrupt, dirty business to be shunned by respectable, decent people."¹⁷⁵ To Goldman, these characteristics have become entrenched because the communist system "played on and strengthened" them, but also because "postcommunist parliamentary systems did not seem to be doing much better" in terms of delivering on their promises.¹⁷⁶

However, some students of the region have argued that there is little difference in substance between political attitudes in most western countries and in post-

¹⁷⁴ Martin P. Wattenberg, "Should Election Day Be a Holiday?," The Atlantic Monthly (Oct. 1998): 44.

¹⁷⁵ Goldman, Revolution and Change in Central and Eastern Europe, 28-9.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

communist ones. In his study on Russian political culture, based on a survey in the city of Yaroslav in March 1990, Jeffrey Hahn, for instance, has concluded that "Russian political thinking comes closer to what is found in Western industrial democracies."¹⁷⁷ Although he has admitted that the results, when compared to patterns of political culture in the United States were sometimes contradictory and hardly conclusive, he believes that the findings have provided "little support for the argument that continuity rather than change is the chief characteristic of the Russian political culture."¹⁷⁸

From the perspective of overall dynamics and prospects, several trends seem to be significant here. First, as Mason has suggested, it has been evident that the more politically active segments of the population, i.e. those "who count," "are much more supportive of a free-market future than the inactive."¹⁷⁹ To support this claim, Mason et al. have referred to their findings indicating that across all of the postcommunist countries, a free-market option was favoured by 43 percent of the most politically active, compared to 25 percent of the large majority of respondents who reported no political action. Second, as has been clear from many surveys, the young-age group provided the substantial source of support for a free-market solution across the postcommunist region.¹⁸⁰ Thus, there has been an indication that the overall balance between passivity and participation may take forms and dynamics contributory to positive solutions irrespective of low scores in absolute terms on some passivity

¹⁷⁷ Hahn, "Continuity and Change in Russian Political Culture." 393.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., 416.

¹⁷⁹ Mason, "Justice, Socialism, and Participation in the Postcommunist States," 77.

¹⁸⁰ In this respect, according to Mason et al., support for a free-market declined steadily from 36 percent of those under 27 years of age to only 21 percent of those over 65; this relationship also held for each of the countries separately.

indicators.¹⁸¹

With regard to the phenomenon of political passivity in general, one may agree with Mason that - regardless of the field research done so far - a more sophisticated analysis, which would be "longitudinal in perspective," is required to assess more accurately the degree of apathy and its relationships with other societal and political factors across the post-communist region (Mason 1995). This also applies to a cross-regional comparison concerning the phenomenon.

IV.3.5.2 The issue of political trust and distrust.

Closely linked to the issue of political participation and apathy is the issue of political trust (distrust). As with apathy, political trust has been explained both as dependent on political culture and as an adaptive response to the system that is perceived as not performing satisfactorily. In fact, dissatisfaction with governmental performance has been identified as a major source of distrust in authorities, and in turn political apathy may be partially explained by the lack of trust in authorities.¹⁸² Lack

¹⁸¹ See Mason, "Justice, Socialism, and Participation in the Postcommunist States," 77. Mason et al. have also noted that within the constellation of communist and post-communist political culture, apathy may become "a behavioral manifestation of caring and evaluating, *but being unable to play a meaningful political role.*" See Mason et al., "Apathy and the Birth of Democracy: The Polish Struggle," 224 (emphasis in the original).

¹⁸² See Oscar Gabriel, "Distrust, Involvement, and Political Protest in Western Democracies," in Political Value Change in Western Democracies, ed. by Loek Halman and Neil Nevitte (Tilburg University Press, 1996), 200. According to Gabriel, political distrust have typically been associated with political anomia. Ibid., 195-6. However, as Gabriel has emphasized, empirical research has not proven distrust as being a potential source of political protest; according to him, there is "a need of a more detailed elaboration of the conceptual and empirical linkage between those variables remains." Ibid., 196.

of political trust, as the works of Inglehart (1988) and Hahn (1991) have shown, is also a problem for some Western democracies.¹⁸³

According to Easton (1975), trust is a subdimension of the diffuse support of a political regime or of the incumbent authorities.¹⁸⁴ It does not equate to mere satisfaction with the performance of authorities or the political regime, it relates to more general qualities of the respective objects, as well as subjective evaluations on the part of subjects (the electorate). Similarly, Hart (1978) has identified trust with such notions as fairness, honesty, responsiveness and obligation to the well-being of the whole community, and with the perception of the leaders' qualities by the

¹⁸³ "Trust" or "political trust" is understood here in rather general terms as one of the most important facilitator of social (and political) communication and cooperation. Since trust in fact involves both subjective and objective assessments of a person's (or a group's) trustworthiness, it is not only a response to a trustee's actual qualities and performance but it also reflects a trustor's emotional attitude to the trustee, the sphere the latter represents, and other factors. Trust is often said to exist when trustors/constituents evaluate, or are prepared to evaluate, their representatives favourably, regardless of whether they believe that a particular action of the representative is consistent with their interests. See William T. Bianco, Trust: Representatives and Constituents (The University of Michigan Press, 1994), 23. Especially in the 1990s, there has been an approach has been emphasized which grounds trust in *truster's*, rather than *trustee's*, self-interest (e.g. Orber and Dawes; Yamagishi and Yamagishi). According to Toshio Yamagishi, "trust in this approach can be defined as a cognitive bias in the assessment of trustee's intent based on imperfect information." This approach claims that such cognitive bias or heuristic may have a 'survival value' in particular social environments. Toshio Yamagishi, "Trust and cooperation," The Social Science Encyclopedia, ed. Adam Kuper and Jessica Kuper (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 884, and Toshio Yamagishi and M. Yamagishi, Trust and commitment on the United States and Japan," Motivation and Emotion, 1994.

¹⁸⁴ Here from Gabriel, "Distrust, Involvement, and Political Protest in Western Democracies," 195. Easton has distinguished between specific and diffuse support for a regime: specific support is based on the delivery of desired results (e.g. good economic conditions), while diffuse support lasts, regardless of the results and is much less conditional than the former. See David Easton, A System Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966), esp. part III.

electorate.¹⁸⁵ Thus political trust may be seen as consisting of two components: (1) "giving-a-leeway," the expectation that political representatives will act in an incorrupt way and in the voter's and/or society's interest and, (2) as a more or less direct reaction to specific action(s) by political leaders. If leaders and institutions are trusted in the first sense, their shortcomings and mistakes may be seen as honest representatives and organizations trying as best as they can to cope with difficult circumstances. If institutions do not enjoy this kind of trust, then problems in their performance will be regarded as evidence of incompetence or dishonesty.¹⁸⁶ In this sense, the political meaning of trust has often been expressed in the concept of *political efficacy*. The concept has been used to identify a citizen's feelings about the effect of his/her action on political outcomes: the efficacious person in his/her self-evaluation believes that in a given political system he/she is able, through his or her vote or other action, to make a difference.¹⁸⁷

Notions at the opposite of trust - distrust (or mistrust), as well as low efficacy - can in the same way entail conviction on the part of certain groups within the population that things in social, economic and political life do not proceed in the desired direction, as well as give the perception that leaders responsible for the

¹⁸⁵ Similarly, Gamson has conceived of political trust as "the probability that the political system (or some part of it) will produce preferred outcome even if left untended. In other words, it is the probability of getting produced outcomes without the group doing anything to bring them about." Oscar W. Gamson, Power and Discontent (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey, 1968), 54.

¹⁸⁶ See Rose et al., Democracy and its Alternatives, 153.

¹⁸⁷ See, for instance, Harold D. Lasswell, "The Selective Effect of Personality on Political Participation," in Studies in the Scope and Method of the Authoritarian Personality (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1954). See also Kenneth Prewitt, "Political Efficacy," in International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, 225-227. Prewitt has noted that there is "also some evidence that the authoritarian syndrome is related to low efficacy." Prewitt, *ibid.*, 227.

situation are not trustworthy no matter what they do. Distrusting people perceive a gap between the reality of their lives and the rewards they actually receive in their exchanges with the external social and political environment and their expectations, i.e. what they think they are entitled to.

It seems that in the post-communist context, the legitimacy of newly created political institutions has not been translated into trust on the part of the electorate towards their political institutions and politicians elected to them. A contributory factor to that might be the fact that the previous atomization and monopolization of the communist societal structure has hindered the development of adequate communication channels between the private and public domains; at the same time, the development of channels of communication and of a broader public sphere have often been deliberately ignored by the new ruling elites.

Surveys examining the issue of attitudes toward the government and the level of fairness and justice the government is perceived as providing have brought in some significant findings regarding low trust (mistrust) and low efficacy. Surveys conducted by Mason et al. have shown that populations of the postcommunist states have expressed "a surprisingly high degree of frustration, futility, and alienation, especially from the political system." The authors have found that in all of the surveyed post-communist countries "a third or more agree that there is no point arguing about social justice since it is impossible to change things."¹⁸⁸ (See Table 14.) While these attitudes may be understandable in Russia, Mason has argued that "it is quite astounding to see almost half of the population expressing this opinion in Poland, Hungary, and Slovenia, where they had just effected some of the most dramatic transformation in

¹⁸⁸ Mason, "Justice, Socialism, and Participation in the Postcommunist States," 68-71.

history."¹⁸⁹ The high levels in the expressed sense of futility have been closely reflected in high levels of political disaffection and distrust. As Mason et al. have concluded from their findings, the postcommunist countries had higher levels of political distrust than the established democratic ones.¹⁹⁰ Also, Simon (1993) has found a deep (and growing) mistrust of politics and politicians in a series of surveys between 1985-1991.¹⁹¹

Table 14 Attitudes Toward Government and Politics. Feelings of Futility (in %)

Country	Agree	Neither Agree or Disagree	Disagree
Bulgaria	47.0	11.2	41.8
E. Germany	37.7	10.9	51.4
Hungary	47.8	21.1	31.1
Poland	53.9	17.7	28.4
Russia	53.1	9.6	37.2
Slovenia	44.6	9.3	46.2
Czechoslovakia	38.9	17.3	43.8
Estonia	70.9	13.1	16.0
Average for Post- Communist States	49.1	13.6	37.3

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., 67.

¹⁹⁰ For detailed data and comments on their findings, see Mason, *ibid.*, 68-71.

¹⁹¹ See Simon, "Post-Paternalist Political Culture in Hungary," esp. 232.

Average for Capitalist States	28.7	15.5	55.8
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Source: Adopted from Mason, "Justice, Socialism, and Participation in the Postcommunist States," 68.

*) The questionnaire item was: "There is no point arguing about social justice since it is impossible to change things." Ibid.

In a series of surveys conducted in five post-communist countries, Miller et al. have likewise found that the new postcommunist society "was characterized by low levels of trust in the new political institutions of democracy" (Miller et al. 1998, 100). Their data have indicated that there were relatively high levels of trust in so-called "traditional institutions", i.e. the church, the courts, and the army, as compared to relatively low levels of trust in new democratic institutions (with new governments and parliaments scoring usually the lowest). They have found, as they put it, "the supreme irony" in the fact that that after the democratic revolutions of 1989-91, "people everywhere had much lower levels of trust in their new *democratically elected* parliaments than in the old organs of power."¹⁹²

As in the case of political apathy, comprehensive cross-regional comparison has posed difficulties, both methodological and contextual. Nevertheless, several attempts in this respect have been made, with mixed results. Millar and Wolchik, for instance, have compared the results of surveys done in Eastern Europe and in some Western countries in the early 1990s. They have admitted that the level of trust among Eastern Europeans in their political institutions was very low, but "do not differ very much from those found in more established European democracies, due to recent

¹⁹² Miller et al., Values and Political Change in Postcommunist Europe, 102 (emphasis in the original).

declines in public trust in institutions in the latter countries."¹⁹³ That this might be the case has also been argued by Inglehart (1988) and Hahn (1991). As evidence has indicated, in the United States, for example, in the early 1990s, less than 40 percent of people believed that government is run for the benefit of all, while 55 percent believed that government is run for a few big interests. At the same time, a majority of Americans also felt that you cannot trust government to do right most of the time.¹⁹⁴ However, it might not be too illuminating to compare this type of attitude in countries with developed participation, conflict-management, and communication systems and cultures with countries where many of these basic institutional mechanisms are not properly established. As McIntosh has noted, low levels of trust in political institutions are more threatening in Eastern Europe than in established democracies, since there is a much smaller "diffuse support" for democratic institutions in the former group of countries" (here quoted from Millar and Wolchik 1994, 21). Lack of trust toward new institutions has often assumed the form of scepticism or cynicism, which psychologically "protect an individual from becoming too frustrated by an institution not working as it ought."¹⁹⁵

¹⁹³ Millar and Wolchik, The Social Legacy of Communism, 21.

¹⁹⁴ In spite of all that, most Americans expressed feelings of pride in their country and its system of government. See Paul Johnson et al., American Government: People, Institutions, and Policies, 2nd edition (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990); and also Mason, "Public Opinion in Poland's Transition to Market Democracy," 203-4.

¹⁹⁵ However, such attitude may also result in withholding commitments from new institutions. See Mishler and Rose, "Trust, Distrust, and Scepticism," *Journal of Politics* (59.2 (1997) 418-451. Here quoted from Rose et al., Democracy and its Alternatives, 153. Some have argued that from a psychological perspective, among the causes of political distrust and withdrawal has also been a high level of stress, which "depress participatory predispositions and behavior among people." Steven A. Peterson, Political Behavior: Patterns in Everyday Life (London: Sage Publications, Ltd., 1990), 60. Findings have indicated that this occurs especially

At the same time it is possibly true that trust (distrust) in governmental institutions is one of the symptoms that can be more easily swayed toward more positive levels than others, particularly if the performance and responsiveness of the system and the political elite improve.¹⁹⁶ Unfortunately, as surveys have shown, also institutions that are part of civil society in established democracies have suffered from the legacy of popular distrust dating back to the communist regimes' efforts at mass mobilization.¹⁹⁷ Adding to that, the conditions of transformation itself, which include insufficient institutional structures and the increased social costs of economic reforms, there has not been an environment conducive to an overcoming of the mistrust of politics and politicians, nor to creating a rich civil society. To the contrary, they have inevitably contributed to the continuation of apathy, mistrust and cynicism associated with the low levels of involvement in politics.

when individuals see government as responsible for the occurrence of the problem (Sniderman and Brody). Quoted from Peterson, *ibid.*, 62.

¹⁹⁶ How controversial the comparison between the levels of mistrust and cynicism toward politicians may be, have recently been pointed out by Mueller. Mueller has compared several polls conducted in Russia in the mid-1990s with selected polls conducted in the United States and Great Britain. As he has pointed out, while only 6 percent of Russians in a 1994 poll said they trusted political parties and 12 percent said they trusted their parliament, a 1994 poll in the United States discovered only 10 percent of Americans willing to rate "honesty and ethical standards of congressmen as "very high" or "high" (justly slightly ahead of car salesmen on a list of 26 professions). Similarly, a poll in Great Britain conducted in the same year found that 73 percent of Britons think the ruling Conservative Party was "very sleazy and disreputable." See, "Democracy, Capitalism, and the End of Transition," 116.

¹⁹⁷ On the issue of trust - or rather mistrust - in civil society institutions in post-communist Eastern Europe, see New Democracies Barometer III. Quoted in Rose, Democracy and its Alternatives, 153-157 and 222. According to the results, e.g. in nine countries surveyed, on average only 9 percent of respondents expressed their trust in trade unions. *Ibid.*

IV.3.6 *The incongruence between the private and public spheres.*

Taking a closer look at certain problems of post-communist transformation from the perspective of the continuous dichotomy between the private and public spheres may help to illuminate some lingering syndromes inherited from communism.¹⁹⁸ As previously indicated, most post-communist states have suffered, due to both the legacies of decades of communist rule and the lack of experience with liberal democracy in the pre-communist era, from an insufficiently developed democratic culture. This followed the fact that illiberal (and totalitarian) regimes are by definition characterized by a top-down authoritarian, hegemonistic and /or arbitrary rule. For this reason there has been little internalized comprehension of the notions of adversarial political negotiations, consensuality and compromise among political actors, and between society and the state. The suppression of civil society and the "semantic occupation" of society resulting in communication distortions between the two spheres has aggravated the problem. Also related to the issue is the fact that different moral norms also applied to the treatment of private and public actions and property.¹⁹⁹

Sztompka, for instance, has made the dichotomy between the private and public spheres the cornerstone of his analysis of the post-communist social consciousness. He has argued that the dichotomy possesses a habitual character and is clearly traceable to the conditions of state socialism. According to him, the opposition of the two spheres of life, private (personal) and public (official), was the

¹⁹⁸ I have analyzed the causes of this problematic in Chapter III. 4-7.

¹⁹⁹ See Holy, *The Little Czech and the Great Czech Nation*, esp. 24-25. McFalls has derived this from the results of his surveys conducted in East Germany shortly after unification that many of the East Germans in his survey sample "described as schizophrenic their maintenance of prevaricating public and truthful private selves." McFalls, *Communism's Collapse, Democracy's Demise?*, 163.

"most fundamental and lasting cultural code organizing thought and action" under state socialism. In his analysis, he has attempted to "document . . . the continued, unfortunate viability" of the "private-public" opposition or dichotomy in the period after the anticommunist revolutions.²⁰⁰ In summoning evidence for his hypothesis, Sztompka has begun from the assumption that manifestations (or symptoms) of this dichotomy should be found both at the level of *social consciousness* (as in typical beliefs, judgments, motivations, attitudes, etc.) and at the level of *actual conduct*.²⁰¹ He has presented several antinomies which he believes well illustrate his case.

He has pointed out, among his antinomies, the disparate attitudes toward work: according to him, the negligence and inefficiency so typical of work in state-owned enterprises may be contrasted to the often surprising discipline and diligence exhibited by those employed in the private sector or working abroad (see also IV.2.3). Another antinomy, according to him, has regarded attitudes toward property. According to Sztompka, the neglect of, and disdain for, state-owned or publicly shared property is "sharply divergent from the almost excessive care and concern with private property."²⁰² Another of Sztompka's antinomies has to do with the different perception of aspirations, ambitions and hopes in the two spheres. For instance, while activity and emphasis on self-realization and individual achievement are being accepted as required in private life, passivism, conformism and often "fatalism" seem to be the norm in public roles. As Sztompka has argued, the latter approach leads to the wait-and-see

²⁰⁰ Sztompka, "The Intangibles and Imponderables of the Transition to Democracy," 299-304.

²⁰¹ See *ibid.*, 300 (emphasis in the original).

²⁰² One has only to "compare the dirt, disorder, and vandalism in the courtyards or staircases of big housing complexes with the tidy, neat, and meticulously cleaned interiors of the apartments. *Ibid.*, 301.

attitude and to the "free-rider-syndrome."²⁰³

According to Sztompka, this "pathological split in social consciousness must have become reflected in actual conduct."²⁰⁴ He has maintained that he has found evidence in the sociological literature (Lutynski, Marody) that, for instance, behavior in the political domain has been characterized by "a common pattern of verbal opportunism, hypocrisy and cynicism."²⁰⁵ A similar syndrome, as he has maintained, may be identified also in society at large, however. As he has argued, a significant behavioral pattern "entailed by the opposition of the private and public spheres is the constant attempt to outwit or beat the system."²⁰⁶ This is what sociologists called "parasitic innovativeness" (Marody 1990), which has been associated with the mechanism of "institutionalized evasions of rules" (this problem is, of course, at least partly due to intentionally loose or otherwise inefficient enforcement.²⁰⁷ Another related attitudinal and behavioral pattern identified by Sztompka following several Polish sociologists is the tendency to avoid instead of face responsibility and accountability of one's own actions. He has found "a wide reluctance to take decisions which may be accountable (or at least to take them in ways which assure unaccountability)" and a "tendency to delegate responsibility. . . while at the same time

²⁰³ "A fatalistic orientation . . . is thus a learned (and rational) response to a distant, capricious and unresponsive power imposed from without. . . . The Polish sociologist Stanislaw Ossowski called it 'the Liliput syndrome'." Ibid., 301.

²⁰⁴ Ibid., 301.

²⁰⁵ Ibid., 303.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., 303 (emphasis in the original).

²⁰⁷ Sztompka, *ibid.*, 303.

demanding care, social security, or other free benefits from the authorities."²⁰⁸

No matter how complex this cluster of dichotomies may be (and how overlapping it may be with some other identified symptoms), their implications for the creation of a meaningful civil and political society should be taken seriously. As Sztompka has put it: "By some irony of history, the core opposition of public and private sphere, together with most of its psychological and behavioral expressions, has outlived the communist system, and stands in the way of post-communist reforms."²⁰⁹

IV.3.6.1 The issue of conformity.

While studying political culture and behavior in the post-communist region in general, and in Russia in particular, several researchers have noticed that there existed (both before and after the beginning of the transition) a dichotomy between subjective orientations (attitudes and declared values) and actual behavior, displaying a certain common direction. Such a difference may be present in every culture, and for various reasons. In Soviet/Russian political culture this phenomenon has traditionally been known as the "duality in Russian life and consciousness" (Tucker 1971). Although this dualism has its origins in tsarist Russia, it can be argued, as White has done, that it is also the result of "the institutionalised hypocrisy which the Soviet system continued to demand of its citizens if they were to live a normal family and occupational

²⁰⁸ Ibid., 303. As Sztompka has noticed, such a syndrome "is normally typical of children, so that we may call it *prolonged infantilism*!" Ibid., 303-4 (emphasis in the original).

²⁰⁹ Sztompka, *ibid.*, 304. This may approximate what Leslie Holmes had in mind when he concluded: "There is still relatively little sense among the mass citizenry of the possibilities of self-empowerment in the political sphere." Holmes, *Post-Communism*, 17.

existence."²¹⁰ This issue relates to the discrepancy between verbal and non-verbal (overt) behavior (and the causes and implications of this discrepancy), as I have already mentioned in II.3.5-6. It has been suggested that this social phenomenon is somehow reflected in the dual personality of an individual citizen. According to Tucker,

"the line of division between the two Russias may run through the individual person. The image of a dual Russia becomes here an image of the Russian functionary as a dual personality. He has a role and self-identity in official Russia, but also a hidden unofficial existence and identity. He is 'two persons in one man', as a character of Dudintsev's expresses it."²¹¹

According to Colton, during the Brezhnev era there was "a seeping increase in 'double morality' (*dvoynaya moral*) and 'divided consciousness' (*razdvoënnoe soznanie*), in which individuals paid lip service to approved values while scoffing at them in action."²¹² Similar findings have been made both in Russia in the glasnost and post-glasnost era (esp. by Tucker), as well as in other post-communist countries.²¹³ According to Fleron, this phenomenon of the dual persona "poses difficult questions for the issues of continuity and change in Russian political culture."²¹⁴ Fleron has

²¹⁰ White, Political Culture and Soviet Politics, 11.

²¹¹ Robert C. Tucker, The Soviet Political Mind: Stalinism and Post-Stalin Change (New York: Norton, 1971), 140.

²¹² Timothy J. Colton, "Gorbachev and the Politics of System Renewal," in Gorbachev's Russia and American Foreign Policy, ed. Seweryn Bialer and Michael Mandelbaum (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1988), 154.

²¹³ See, for instance, Sztompka, "The Intangibles and Imponderables of the Transition to Democracy;" and Adam Podgorecki, Polish Society (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1994); and others.

²¹⁴ Frederic J. Fleron Jr., "Post-Soviet Political Culture in Russia: As Assessment of Recent Empirical Investigations," Europe-Asia Studies 48.2 (1996): 238.

hypothesized that this phenomenon can simply be explained as the issue of conformity. Following Eckstein he has distinguished three different types of conformity: ritualistic, self-serving and smart conformity. Ritualistic conformity is "compliance without commitment . . . Conformity of this sort may occur frequently in cases in which the former political cultures and sub-cultures prescribed high compliance." Self-serving conformity is opportunistic and "bends norms and rules for private advantage - including that of getting ahead in the competition for political power." Smart conformity, often a combination of the two former types and devoid of morality, is likely to be found in "cultures unsettled by upheaval."²¹⁵

The distribution and implications of this syndrome have so far been little investigated. What is clear is that practical democratic politics equals behavior and not just opinion about it.²¹⁶ The point here is that people may value democracy, or say so, but this does not remove obstacles brought about by their overt behavior in the process of creating a democratic society. The level of willingness to conform to the authority or official set of values and behavior while retaining one's own inner opinion very likely positively correlates with the analyzed willingness to accept authoritarian patterns in government and with other factors that may be correlated with the latter syndrome.²¹⁷ Also, there is not yet enough evidence to decide to what extent the

²¹⁵ Eckstein, Regarding Politics: Essays on Political Theory, Stability, and Change, 276. See also Fleron, "Post-Soviet Political Culture in Russia," 239; and also Kenneth J. Gergen and Matthew Ullman, "Socialization and the Characterological Basis of Political Activism," in Handbook of Political Socialization, ed. Stanley Allen Renshon (New York: The Free Press, 1977), esp. 422-3.

²¹⁶ See Fleron, "Post-Soviet Political Culture in Russia," 240.

²¹⁷ On the phenomenon of mass conformity and other effects of mass psychology, all the issues we still know little about, see, for instance, Wilhelm Reich, The Mass Psychology of Fascism (New York: The Noonday Press, 1970).

identified conformity limits itself to verbal behavior and to what extent it is manifested in non-verbal behavior.

IV.3.6.2 The problem of corruption.

Hannan Rose has emphasized in his essay on the transition from command polities, that "the most terrible legacy" of communism is "a stunned civil society, systematically and deliberately corrupted by the agencies of a totalitarian state."²¹⁸ The problem of corruption is a complex one and is beyond the scope of this thesis. In general, it can be viewed as both the issue of structure (institutions), as well as of culture.²¹⁹ More specifically, it is quite difficult to disentangle the two and determine

²¹⁸ Hannan Rose, "From Command to Free Polities." *The Political Quarterly* 64.2 (April-June 1993): 168. "Corruption" derives from the Latin verb *corumpere*: to destroy, to violate. Some scholars have argued that certain national cultures are more conducive and/or supportive of corruption. However, two facts should be taken into account here: 1. Evidence has shown that levels of corruption often change in particular countries, even while the overall culture remains essentially constant; 2. corrupt practices, though disguised in local customs, are remarkably similar across different national cultures. From this perspective, it seems that the problem is in the institutional and other incentives regarding public (bureaucratic, political) agents engaging in corruption. See Timothy Frye, "Corruption: The Polish and Russian Experiences," Nov. 1998 *USIA, Economic Perspectives* 17 Feb. 1999, <<http://www.usia.gov/journals/ites.htm>>. In the case of "deeply systemic corruption," the notorious problem is that of a vicious circle: there is no one left uncorrupted to break the circle (and sometimes nobody left or allowed to complain about it).

²¹⁹ I understand corruption broadly as the abuse of public trust for private gain. The most significant characteristics of this conception of corruption would be: 1. deliberate subordination of public or common interests to personal ones; 2. the presence of mutual obligations and benefits, in pecuniary or other forms; 3. the interaction of those who need certain decisions and those who can influence them in a mutually reciprocating framework; 4. illegality and the attempt to camouflage such behavior by some form of lawful justification; and 5) involvement in contradictory dual functions by those committing the act of corruption. See Syed

whether individuals (especially in their public functions) in the region are more prone to corruption as a result of surviving communist mentalities than elsewhere or whether insufficient institutional arrangements, including procedures and political controls are the main cause.

It is worth mentioning that Di Palma and Kaminski, following Olson and Jowitt, have treated corruption explicitly as the "political product of communism itself." According to Di Palma, "as normalization elevated the principle of communist cadres to an absolute principle, it became clear that the corruption of everyday life originated in the corruption and parasitism of communist parties: their abandonment of impersonal discipline. . . ." ²²⁰ The same point has been made by Kaminski in his concept of "collective corruption" in communist and post-communist societies linked to that stage in the development of the communist system when reliance on coercion has diminished and the collective acceptance of corruption increased. *"To the extent that coercion loses its paramount importance in keeping society in check, it is replaced by corruption."* ²²¹ In the former communist countries, one of the main contributory factors of corruption was the general scarcity of desired goods and

Hussein Alatas, "Corruption," in The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World, ed. Joel Krieger (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 198. The consequences of such behavior may be multiple, among others: 1. increased economic burden for the public; 2. negligence in all aspects of administration; 3. general loss of respect for the constituted authority, esp. with regard to observance of rules and regulations. Out of the three widely recognized types of corruption, extortive, manipulative, and nepotistic, the two latter were common in communist countries and all of the three have been widespread in post-communist societies. See *ibid.*, 198-9. See also Di Palma, "Legitimation from the Top to Civil Society;" and also Kaminski, An Institutional Theory of Communist Regimes.

²²⁰ Di Palma, "Legitimation from the Top to Civil Society," 77.

²²¹ Kaminski, An Institutional Theory of Communist Regimes, 258 (emphasis in the original).

services; the state that was supposed to provide them failed to do so, and corrupt compensatory practices became routine as part of the peculiar social contract (see III.2.3). Corruption on the level of governance mostly meant taking an opportunity to use public resources for personal benefit, in an environment where no opposition could check such an action.²²²

The issue of corruption has, of course, several dimensions which are typically strongly interrelated (and more so in countries where there is a fusion between the economic and political elites as in transitional societies). It has been noted that both for those on a lower business level and those on a higher level the line between "doing business" on one hand and speculation and outright fraud on the other is still very arbitrary in post-communist countries. In fact, the high officials (regularly the former *nomenklatura*) often almost openly speculate with what still is nominally state property. In some countries, particularly in Russia, corruption has penetrated business activities almost entirely. Observations made by Vitali Vitaliev are, by and large valid for the post-communist elites in most Eastern European countries:

"The Russian new rich are the flesh and bones of Soviet society, which in 75 years managed to infect most of its members with the notion that capitalism was about grabbing, cheating, and wheeling and dealing. That is exactly what they started doing when communism collapsed. Their fortunes have been gained by money laundering, tax frauds, speculation in Russia's dwindling natural resources, racketeering. . . Their code of business conduct includes everything from chicanery to murder. The plight of their poor mother Russia, whom they have shamelessly robbed, does not bother them in the least." And

²²² On genealogy of corruption in communist regimes see Mancur Olson Jr., "Why the Transition from Communism Is So Difficult," Eastern Economic Journal 21.4 (Fall 1995): 437-461. Using the terminology of incentives available in the system, Olson has suggested that the main reason for corruption in communist societies and government is "that they prescribe outcomes that all or almost all private parties have an incentive to avoid, and of which almost no one has an incentive to report violations to the authorities." Etc. Ibid., 454.

further: "The real issue is the "communist" mentality that is still affecting Russian businessmen and politicians alike."²²³

Society at large has often been viewed as being implicated in this kind of "uncivil economy."²²⁴ In a survey conducted by the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion in the fall of 1989 and the spring of 1990 regarding "legality" and illegality" of various types of earning, Soviet citizens expressed rather contradictory views on the issue. Although some 70 percent of respondents condemned bribes and "gifts" to officials, a majority of respondents did not condemn the petty theft of goods, illegal use of state transport and presents and payments to doctors, nurses, and teachers.²²⁵ In this sense, as some have argued, not only elites but often the population at large has been the obstacle on the road to a regular democracy. Czech sociologist Josef Novák has put it, "ultimately, it was the ordinary citizens themselves and what they had become during 40 years of communist rule - the values, habits, skills, and attitudes that were hopelessly maladapted to a time when they had become their own masters."²²⁶

Corruption, being both an institutional and cultural phenomenon, has distorted

²²³ Vitaly Vitaliev, "Post-Marxist Syndrome," 36.

²²⁴ Rose, who distinguishes between "civil" (legal) and "uncivil" (nonlegal) market economies, defines the former as a market that operates "within a framework in which public officials act according to the rule of law . . . and individual citizens and private enterprises obey the law, including obligations to pay taxes." Rose, "Origins and Destination Models for Civil and Uncivil Economies." Here quoted from Erik P. Hoffmann, "Democratic Theories and Authority Patterns," Can Democracy Take Root in Post-Soviet Russia?, 150.

²²⁵ Millar and Wolchik, The Social Legacy of Communism, 21.

²²⁶ Josef Novák, "On the Road to Democracy, The Enemy Is Us," Transition 2.17 (23 Aug. 1996): 60. On the level of corruption in Czechoslovakia in the 1980s, see, for instance, Millar and Wolchik, The Social Legacy of Communism, esp. 23.

the relationship between the required rules of the public sphere and private informal relations, and as such has become an habitual exercise that has negatively affected many aspects of public action.²²⁷ Considering my argument and the evidence presented in the thesis, it is reasonable to hypothesize that values, attitudes, and general psychological and ethical predispositions carried over from the previous period have made it more difficult to establish the necessary institutions in their proper functions, and have contributed to the level of occurrence of corruption. Instead one may expect that the phenomenon of corruption has often become engendered at the level of the long term normative, motivational and habitual predispositions (behavior), and that to reverse the trend by political and legal means will be a difficult task.²²⁸

²²⁷ According to Victor Sergeyev, the very concept of corruption in Eastern Europe may be problematic, because of the weakness of legal and ethical norms. See Victor Sergeyev, The Wild East: Crime and Lawlessness in Post-Communist Russia (Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 1998).

²²⁸ However, it is very difficult to determine whether specific predispositions originating in the communist environment, or pre-communist traditions, or current inadequate policies of addressing the problems of insecurity and inequality, have led to what Offe has called "spontaneous substitute practices" associated with corruption. According to Offe, such practices "are so widespread and common in today's postcommunist societies that one hesitates to term them 'illegal,' though most of them technically are and in spite of the fact that the respective laws cannot be enforced. Such practices include smuggling, stealing from state and private property, bribes and 'tips' paid for public services. . . tax evasion, large scale illegal exports, black market activities, civilian violence, extortion, and corruption of state officials and civil servants." Claus Offe, "The Politics of Social Policy in East European Transitions," 662.

IV.4. Some other problems.

"Eastern Europe needs a catharsis. The problem though, with some of these people is that once this catharsis was over they would start looking for another one. The post-communist revolution awaits not only its historian but its psychologist, too." (James F. Brown)

Based on the same technique used to identify the main symptoms of the PCM, several secondary characteristics (or "sub-symptoms") have also been identified and included into the model. They are treated as secondary, especially since they are more controversial than the already analyzed main symptoms (both in terms of their "strength" or validity and their association with "political factors"), or there has simply not been enough data available to treat them in a more comprehensive way in my analysis.

IV.4.1 Problems in lifeworld orientation.

One of the rather neglected issues relevant to the understanding of the "state of mind" of the people and their leaders in post-communist countries is that of the effects of, and response to, the change from one paradigm - i.e. from one system of social and political values - to another, particularly in light of the fact that the former (already habituated) system had been relatively more simple and less differentiated than the new one. To what extent were the people prepared to accept and adjust themselves psychologically to such far-reaching changes involved in the transformation? What resources and dispositions did they have to make use of them? What chances did they have to throw away the legacies of the past and to redirect

themselves toward the new tasks and challenges of "freedom" and adopt new ways of thinking and public behavior? This issue, especially in the intensively "privatized" lives of most of the region's citizens, may largely be seen as that of people's *lifeworld* (*lebenswelt*) orientation. The lifeworld realm comprises of everyday life which is viewed as the paramount reality (and as the main object of sociological inquiry dealing with the realm), and what is usually taken for granted by agents acting within it.²²⁹ In the context of the post-communist transition, two aspects in the development in the realm of lifeworld are significant: the first is associated with the unique characteristics of this realm as they had been formed within the social relations of communism; the second with the relatively rapid reorientation in the sphere outside people's lifeworlds after the collapse of communism. With regard to the latter aspect, any major upheaval in the outer world may disrupt their familiar and intimate world by a multitude of ways which are very likely to have deep valuational and psychological implications. Many scholars and observers (Tismaneanu, Havel, Pithart, Sztompka, Mandler and others) have repeatedly emphasized that there has been considerable confusion about the values, norms, and behavior patterns in the broadest sense in all post-communist countries as a result of the upheaval external to the lifeworld. Although the direct effects of such confusion on people's behavior in the economic and political spheres is difficult to assess, they seem nevertheless to be reflected in the often incoherent political actions of the latter sphere.

In particular, as many psychologists from the region have argued, the experience of communism must have been a traumatic one for many segments of the population and the resulting deep impresses could not be undone on asking. Alexandr Badkhen, a prominent St. Petersburg psychologist, has for instance insisted that many

²²⁹ See Wolfgang J. Koschnick, "Lebenswelt," in Standard Dictionary of the Social Sciences, vol. 2, part 1, German-English (Paris: K.G. Saur, 1992), 758.

Russians have been "psychologically repressing memories" of the Soviet repression. According to him, the mentality and habits of Russia's adult population have altered little over the past ten years, even though outwardly the country itself and many aspects of life have changed dramatically. In Badkhen's opinion, the whole country has been like a hostage to Soviet times when people were raised to be obedient, docile subjects. "Those who didn't conform were destroyed or broken. Now that people are free they find it difficult to cope with freedom and responsibility. They crave stability and are trying to maintain their bearings in an unpredictable world." ²³⁰

Similarly, Vladimir Druzhinin, the director of the Psychology Institute of the [Russian] Academy of Science, has argued that in the post-Soviet period, "Russians' behavior is rather disoriented and experimental." By "experimental" Druzhinin means particularly the renaissance of superstitions, which he has attributed to "the current quest for certainty and confidence." In his opinion, this kind of behavior is a result of the vacuum created by the collapse of the "old system of values imposed from above during the Soviet era." ²³¹

The experience of oppression and limited freedoms in communist-party-led regimes (see Sections III.2.1-8) was certainly associated, in socio-psychological terms,

²³⁰ Quoted from John Varoli, "Russia Prefers to Forget," Transitions 4.2 (July 1997): 41.

²³¹ Here quoted from Carol, J. Williams, "'Little religions' big in Russia," The Ottawa Citizen 9 Apr. 1997: A6. According to Grushin and Halperin, in Russia "[W]e are witnessing nothing less than the deconstruction of public political ideology In its wake, people cannot understand what is occurring. They have lost their basic orientation. As a consequence, extreme emotional agitation, unstable reactions and assessments and a tendency to rush from one extreme to the next characterize life in Russia today For some years to come, Russia is likely to consume even its most able political leaders, regardless of their platforms and positions" Boris Grushin and Jonathan J. Halperin, "Distrust, not apathy, rules in Russia: Most Russians have lost their basic orientation in wake in system's collapse," The Ottawa Citizen 4 Jan. 1996: A7.

with the submission by people to the will of those who are more powerful and willing, and able to exercise their power, sometimes in an arbitrary manner. It also meant the adaptation to certain fixed norms which tended to conform to the logic of the power or rigid ideology rather than to the logic of natural processes in society. According to Maaz, the result was one of "massive suppression of natural human needs and normal emotions and feelings."²³² In this context, one should acknowledge that the experience of totalitarianism (and perhaps also of totalitarianism-in-principle) had been, for many people, a confusing experience itself - something not fully comprehensible to those who did not go through the experience. As Joachim Gauck has testified:

"We find it difficult to comprehend fully the history of individuals who had different experiences of suffering and alienation. Many East Germans today have great difficulties in explaining their very different past lives to West German countrymen. The gap is too wide, the burdens borne over long decades are too unequal . . . [many Westerners] try to equate the injustice and shortage in Communist countries with what they themselves experienced under democracy."²³³

Similarly, Maaz has suggested that people still felt "guilty about the Stalin years, calling it a lifetime confusion;" in this sense he has also talked about "severe deformation of character as a mass phenomenon."²³⁴ According to Maaz, there was no doubt that the alienation [from the communist system] and feelings of guilt led to an

²³² Maaz, Behind the Wall, 55. Maaz has called the consequences of repression as a whole the "deficiency syndrome and damming up of the emotions." Ibid., 68. Although we cannot draw from Maaz' dramatization a general inference for other post-communist societies, many of his findings seem to have been at least anecdotally confirmed as existing also in other countries with totalitarian experience.

²³³ Gauck, "Dealing with a Stasi Past," 283.

²³⁴ Maaz, Behind the Wall, 55-82, esp. 64.

"appreciable loss of inner orientation."²³⁵ Maaz has specifically ascribed some of this disorientation to a latent fear, which was associated with the experience of communism in which people's lives were supervised by the secret police; such fear might have become "manifest and causes dangerous conditions, for example, panic, psychotic confusion, acute neuroses, and psychotic crises."²³⁶ According to Maaz, as a result "many [East German citizens] suffered from a chronic condition of deprivation which in its symptomatology, causes, and consequences may be described as a deficiency syndrome."²³⁷ Even if we allow for certain overstatement in Maaz' testimony, it is apparent that serious psychological impairment may have affected many people. Moreover (and sadly), Maaz has warned that one cannot expect such conditions to be short-lived. According to him, the consequences of these conditions will continue to be serious. "Conformity and subordination, dependency and resignation are ongoing active processes of [this] self-suppression. . . . I see the results of this as alienation from the natural human state, blocking of the emotions, and splitting of the personality. Eventually these consequences may appear as illnesses, but more often they are concealed in generally accepted norms and rules, which are treated as political, economic, religious, and moral obligations."²³⁸

In general, the experience of the revolution of the late 1980s caught Eastern Europeans in many respects unprepared and disoriented. The combination of the disintegration of the old authority centres of power, and the lack of guiding authority, together with the changes in the social structure brought about a new constellation

²³⁵ Ibid., 69. Maaz has argued that two or three generations have been affected, more or less, by this pathological experience.

²³⁶ Ibid., 13.

²³⁷ Ibid., 64.

²³⁸ Ibid., 68-72.

which confused many regarding their personal lives, and prospects for their future lives and their careers. Awakened to a world of seemingly unlimited freedom, some experienced a sort of dizziness of being thrown from a black-and-white and predictable world, in which relationships between the public and private spheres and people's *lifeworlds* were limited but predictable, friends and enemies all known - to an unknown, more confusing and much less predictable world.²³⁹ In a short period of time, "the totality of their lives has been affected."²⁴⁰ In political terms, the pretence of democracy by a totalitarian regime used to be part of the big lie about its government. This became so routinized that the people stopped thinking about its contents: it was "more amorphous and less comprehensible than the previous one, and lacked familiar road signs."²⁴¹ Confused by such a new world, in which freedom is to be insuperably connected to an increased pressure of responsibility, risk taking, and future uncertainty (and with many literally struggling to survive), some have succumbed to the pressure and have reacted by resorting to their private lives and immediate economic interests once again. No wonder that, as a result, the cynicism, apathy and fatalism that breed upon the frustrations and stress that had to find physical, mental, social and/or spiritual channels of expression have manifested themselves in identifiable forms.

Worth mentioning in this context is also the evidence provided by the region's psychologists and psychiatrists, as well as other observations and surveys, suggesting that the general level of severe forms of frustration and other psychopathologies has

²³⁹ Petr Pithart, "Na cestě zpátky do Evropy," a manuscript intended for a collection of essays on transformation in Eastern Europe (Prague, Feb. 1994), 24-25.

²⁴⁰ See Di Palma, "Legitimation from the Top to Civil Society," 76-7.

²⁴¹ Pithart, "Na cestě zpátky do Evropy," 25.

undoubtedly increased after the onset of the reforms. Even though it is not always possible to specify which of the psychological problems have been caused by hardship endured as a result of reform policies and which may be considered a trauma resulting from communist rule, it is possible to speculate that the psychosocial legacies of communism and especially the legacy of oppression and the spiritual vacuum left after it, have weakened the "immunity" of many people to withstand the existential shocks associated with transformation, making them more susceptible to various existential and mental problems.²⁴² No conclusive analysis has been provided, however, which would positively confirm the correlation between the lost orientation following the acquisition of freedom, and the occurrence of mental illness in ECE/EE, as well as between the latter and the trauma of the past.²⁴³ What seems to be evident is that people's "dislocated" lifeworlds have significant political implications. Also, the widening of choices has paradoxically also meant, at least for some, constraints on their ability to take full use of such choices.

²⁴² For obvious reasons, I cannot deal here with the issue of social deviance in the narrow sense (including that of criminality) and the issue of mental pathology, which are the borderline phenomena to this inquiry. But it is impossible not to mention them, if only for their severity, which certainly cannot be ignored by the political sphere. (Some issues in social deviation have had direct impact on the state of politics, esp. criminality and alcoholism, particularly in the former Soviet Union, but also elsewhere. See, for example, Sanjian, "The social construction of deviance and the transition from communist rule," esp. 111-16.)

²⁴³ But the circumstantial evidence has suggested that there has been at least a shift in the structure of mental problems afflicting the population. More comprehensive evidence has only now begun to appear. Among other things, in virtually all post-communist countries (recently, with the exception of Poland) consumption of alcohol has increased, while this indicator has decreased in most developed countries. The situation in this regard is much more serious in Russia and in some other countries of the former Soviet Union, as well as in the former Yugoslavia, as conditions for transformation in these areas are worse than in other Eastern European countries, particularly due the occurrence of wars and the higher social cost of economic transformation.

IV.4.2 *The problem of intolerance (the lingering "we-they syndrome;" xenophobia and nationalism).*

Problems in the sphere of the lifeworld can be one of the sources of intolerance. However, lack of tolerance and political rivalry, including hatred as much as social and political cleavages and conflict as such, are present in society and politics everywhere. As Robert Dahl has put it: "Because conflicts among ethnic and religious subcultures are so easily seen as threats to one's most fundamental self, opponents are easily transformed into a malign and inhuman 'they,' whose menace stimulates and justifies the violence and savagery that have been the common response of in-group to out-group among all mankind. The junction of ethnic group or religion with regional subcultures creates an incipient nation whose spokesmen clamor for autonomy, and even for independence."²⁴⁴

The old communist obsession with branding "those who are not with us" as those who hence must be "against us," to look for enemies, both within and without, had played on one tendency in human nature: to take sides, to be accepted by a powerful group, and under such conditions of intolerance, to feel threatened by reprisal when not conforming to the demands of his or her group. This predisposition, which under propitious circumstances, may become a habit and can be easily manipulated for narrow political gains. It can be overcome only when conditions have changed substantially and when an individual has become fully aware of his new choices. Even then, as Polish historian and journalist Adam Michnik has warned, potential change

²⁴⁴ Dahl, Polyarchy, 108.

in people seeking identity can be readily manipulated by the new elites.²⁴⁵

No doubt, the occurrences of nationalism, xenophobia and racism, i.e. phenomena that tend to be associated with intolerance, are the complex symptoms that cannot be explained simply as a consequence of the conditional setup under communism. Having said that, one cannot discard the important links between the integrating and homogenising role of communist ideology (supported by the institutional straitjacket) and the social conditions on the one hand, and many negative socio-psychological phenomena in post-communist countries, including the lack of tolerance, on the other. Some of these symptoms can inevitably be seen as resulting from the sudden collapse of communist ideology and its value-references, and also as the effects of this collapse on peoples' minds, affecting their social and political behavior as citizens. As for instance L. Holmes has argued, the resulting *ideological vacuum* "helps to explain the current appeal of nationalism in many post-communist states."²⁴⁶ According to Holmes nationalism, for one, "provides a framework for many who have lost their usual referents (after Marxism-Leninism having been discredited), and who fear losing their own identity as a consequence." Holmes sees one of the most

²⁴⁵ See Jurgen Habermas and Adam Michnik, "Overcoming the past," New Left Review 203 (Jan.-Feb. 1994): 3-16. According to Michnik, this is the point at which the old regimes and the new ones often converge. The post-communist regimes have frequently shown a tendency to impose a unitary identity on the whole of the nation. Before, it used to be a communist identity, now it is an anti-communist or a nationalist one. Overlooking the possibility that a nation's identity, though distinct and unique, can be pluralistic and heterogeneous, the new elites, according to Michnik, have often orchestrated a mere shift "from Communism with a Bolshevik face to anti-Communism with a Bolshevik face", or, one can add, a nationalism with a Bolshevik face. Here quoted from Fatos Tarifa and Jay Weinstein, "Overcoming the Past: De-Communization and Reconstruction of Post-Communist Societies," Studies in Comparative International Development 30.4 (1995/96): 69.

²⁴⁶ Holmes, Post-Communism, 18.

dangerous aspects of nationalism particularly in the "negative influence it can exert on the development of a democratic political culture," which includes an acceptable level of (in)tolerance.²⁴⁷

Some have argued from the psychological perspective (Maaz, Pfeiffer, Sanjian) that the occurrence of xenophobic violence is the result of communist socialization. According to Pfeiffer, who was director of the Criminology Research Institute of Lower Saxony in Germany, "the main cause is "the upbringing and the authoritarian education during the GDR. . . period, which has produced insecure individuals, readiness to adjust to groups and a distinct hatred against foreigners."²⁴⁸ In Sanjian's opinion, the lack of tolerance towards other groups has been the norm in most of the postcommunist countries, "entrenched by the old communist ostracization of enemies" and by the difficult transitional situation. According to Sanjian, the

"problem here is that the standards for behavior toward one's own group are different from those toward certain other groups. This stipulation not only makes it easier to condemn members of the out-group for behavior that would otherwise be more acceptable (as when Russians are more likely to denounce Jewish or Armenian entrepreneurs as "parasitic speculators" than fellow Russians), it even makes possible the victimization of others by committing acts against them that are normally deviant in the extreme."²⁴⁹

²⁴⁷ Ibid.

²⁴⁸ Quoted from Jasmin Fischer, "East German violence linked to socialism," National Post 8 Sept. 1999: A13.

²⁴⁹ Sanjian, "The social construction of deviance and the transition from communist rule," 127. It has also been hypothesized that political alienation first demonstrates itself as mere apathy, but that under certain circumstances, and as the individual's desperation increases, it will find expression in some form of political extremism. See also Kornhauser (1959); and also Kenneth J. Gergen and Matthew Ullman, "Socialization and the Characterological Basis of Political Activism," in Handbook of Political Socialization, 411-444. Such a potential source of extremism should not be underestimated and it often constitutes at least volatile potentiality in the case of ECE/EE. In the presence of all kinds of deprivations, the syndrome of

Similarly, other observers (e.g. Havel, Tismaneanu, Pithart, J.F. Brown, Bauman, Mandler) have elaborated on the "*us* and *them* syndrome" as being the tendency fostered by the conditions of communism and exacerbated by the conditions of post-communist transition.²⁵⁰ Bauman, for example, has considered the notorious "*us* vs. *them* outlook to be the most pernicious socio-psychological product of the communist patronage state."²⁵¹ The corresponding syndrome has been identified in East Germany by McFalls who has argued that the conflict between surviving East German values and the liberal values of the West has not only created conditions for passive resignation in the East, but also conditions for the "sometimes violent deflection of . . . antipathy on to foreigners in both East and West [Germany]."²⁵²

free-floating frustration and scapegoating as defined by Allport (1965) is of course high. See also Gurr, Why Men Rebel. With regard to certain negative social phenomena occurring with an increased rate in post-communist ECE/EE, one can observe the aggregate effect of several symptoms (some of the included in the PCM). For instance, to varying degrees, for almost all Eastern European countries there are valid findings summarized in a study by Sanjian: "[There have been] . . . this real threat of anomie. . . the quickly rising incidence of drug and alcohol abuse, prostitution, gang membership, and petty theft. . . The second very serious trend was an increase in what might be termed motiveless crimes: mindless, often impersonal assaults, sometimes featuring great cruelty and even torture, that netted the perpetrators nothing but perhaps the satisfaction of lashing out." Sanjian, *ibid.*, 114. On a genealogy of cynicism and related phenomena, see also Zoltan Barany and Ivan Volgyes, eds. The Legacy of Communism in Eastern Europe (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), esp. 68-70.

²⁵⁰ See Brown, Hopes and Shadows: Eastern Europe After Communism, esp. 6.

²⁵¹ Bauman, "The Polish Predicament," 127.

²⁵² McFalls, Communism's Collapse, Democracy's Demise?, 21. A Hungarian anthropologist Dork Zygotian, when commenting on Hungarians' reactions to the post-communist hardship, has written: "Many Hungarians react to this situation by feeling betrayed. By whom, they are not exactly sure. And this is where the voodoo of Hungarian politics takes advantage of the communicative gap in Hungarian society. Political groups will name your enemies for you. The bad witch doctor in District VII was the cause of the malaise! And then you will have some focus to

Some empirical evidence regarding the actual existence of the syndrome of intolerance has been obtained from field research. Miller et al. have measured the value (a composite indicator) of "tolerance" as part of their investigation of "liberal values in five ECE/EE countries (the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Ukraine and Russia).²⁵³ By their criteria, about two thirds of the population in these countries expressed essentially "liberal" values. They were most liberal in their attitude towards freedom of information followed by the value of "law-based government." In contrast to that they have demonstrated, according to Miller et al., a relatively strong tendency towards authoritarianism in values of "tolerance" and "order", suggesting that despite their embrace of liberal values, respondents' levels of intolerance were relatively high.²⁵⁴

complain about. Politicians, however, don't actually do anything about the problems. They just worry about re-election, about how many people they can alienate per day in order to use the numbers against the other guys who would dare try and protect their position within the new elite. It is politics, but it isn't governance of any sort." Dork Zygotian, "Hungarian Politics and Other Weird Discoveries," a contribution sent from <dork@isys.hu> to Johnson's Russia List 20 March 1997, <djohnson@cdi.org>. Viz also Hobsbawn: "And who are 'they'? Obviously, and virtually by definition, those who are not 'us' - the strangers who, by their very alienness, are enemies: present aliens, past aliens, even purely notional aliens as in Poland where anti-Semitism continues to explain Polish ills in the total absence of Jews." Eric J. Hobsbawn, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 174.

²⁵³ Their five composite indicators of liberal values were: 1. attitudes towards freedom of information (*Glasnost*); 2. attitudes towards order (*Anti-order*); 3. tolerance of minorities and extremists (*Tolerance*); 4. support for a right to protest and exercise criticism (*Protest*); and 5. commitment to the idea that the government should operate under the law (*Law-Based-Government*. See Miller et al., Values and Political Change in Postcommunist Europe, esp. 152-55 (emphasis in the original).

²⁵⁴ Miller et al., Values and Political Change in Postcommunist Europe, 155. See also the pertinent table in the Appendices. In their survey, Miller et al. have found relatively high commitment to order, which, in their explanation, was reflected in a

In the USSR, Gibson and Duch conducted two surveys on political tolerance in 1990 and demonstrated that "political intolerance is fairly widespread."²⁵⁵ According to their findings, "those more strongly committed to democratic values such as liberty . . . are more tolerant." As they have further argued, "the fit is far from perfect, however." According to them, their finding "parallels Western research in that people are more strongly committed to democratic values in the abstract rather than in application. Soviet citizens seem to be more likely to claim rights and liberties for themselves than they are to extend the same rights and liberties to their political opponents. From this point of view, the democratization of Soviet political culture is far from complete."²⁵⁶ Having compared their data from the Soviet surveys with data from surveys done in the United States and Great Britain, they have found that "both the Americans and the British are considerably more tolerant than are the Soviets." As their findings indicated, the percentage of respondents giving a tolerant response for each of the items in the survey was nearly twice as high in the United States and Great

high intolerance to extremism. According to their findings, about 88 percent of respondents in Russia and Ukraine and around 65 percent in Hungary and Slovakia would "ban speeches by people with extreme views," while in the Czech Republic the number was only 42 percent. Miller et al., *ibid.*, 146.

²⁵⁵ James L. Gibson and Raymond M. Duch, "Political Intolerance in the USSR: The Distribution and Etiology of Mass Opinion," Comparative Political Studies 26.3 (Oct. 1993): 286. From the heuristic perspective, they have found that many of the predictors of intolerance as used in the West were "also good predictors in the Soviet Union." *Ibid.*, 286. There might be some questions raised about the way the indicators of intolerance used in their surveys were designed, especially since most of the surveyed questions concerned "the most disliked groups." Regardless of this problem, the results and their inference have demonstrated well the basic differences between the political tolerance attitudes in the USSR/Russia and the United States and Great Britain.

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 30. Among other things, they have also found that the level of education played a significant role, contributing to the support of more general democratic values, "but not directly to political tolerance." *Ibid.*, 286.

Britain as it was in the USSR. Formulating their findings in terms of intolerance, they have concluded that "in both absolute and relative terms, the Soviets are considerably more intolerant than citizens in the West."²⁵⁷ In a related survey based on modernization theory, conducted in the Moscow *oblast* in Winter 1990, Gibson et al. examined seven subdimensions of basic democratic rights and liberties. Overall, they found relatively high support for both the individual liberties needed for democratic politics as well as for democratic values at an abstract level. The only clearly negative sign was a lack of political tolerance towards one's political adversaries. This, according to Gibson et al., may limit the prospects for democratization.²⁵⁸

²⁵⁷ Ibid., 300 and esp. Table 3, 301. On the issue of intolerance in Russia, see also Gibson, "The resilience of Mass Support for Democratic Institutions and Processes in the Nascent Russian and Ukrainian Democracies," in Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, ed. Vladimir Tismaneanu (Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 1995), esp. 964-5; and M. Wyman, "Russian Political Culture: Evidence from Public Opinion Surveys." Can Democracy Take Root in Post-Soviet Russia?, 287-327. See also Stephen Whitefield and Geoffrey Evans, "The Russian Election of 1993: Public Opinion and the Transition Experience," Post-Soviet Affairs 10(1): 38-60.

²⁵⁸ Gibson et al., "Democratic values and the transformation of the Soviet Union," Journal of Politics 54.2 (1992): 329-371.

Table 15 Subdimensions of Democratic Rights, Liberties, and Institutions²⁵⁹

Subdimension	Support
Political tolerance	-
Political liberty	++
Democratic norms	+
Rights consciousness	+++
Support for dissent	+
Independent media	+
Competitive elections	++

*) The number of symbols signifies relative degree of support.

Source: Gibson et al., "Democratic values and the transformation of the Soviet Union, 337-351.

Several less comprehensive surveys have been conducted in other ECE/EE countries. Although the results are not directly comparable with those obtained by Gibson and Duch, they have provided evidence that the political intolerance in many of these countries was rather closer to that in the USSR/Russia than to the levels found in most Western countries.²⁶⁰ Overall, one may argue that the traditional tendency to

²⁵⁹ In my opinion, the results of the survey in part reflected the fact that the survey was conducted in the Moscow *oblast* only, which may hardly be considered a typical sample of the Soviet or post-Soviet society. Given this bias, it is problematic to simply accept Gibson et al.'s conclusion that "further efforts to democratize the Soviet Union will not meet further resistance from Soviet political culture." Gibson et al., *ibid.*, 329.

²⁶⁰ See also Miller et al., Values and Political Change in Postcommunist Europe; and McFalls, Communism's Collapse, Democracy's Demise?

embrace the "we-and-they" dichotomy has continued to play an important role in many post-communist countries and it has been underscored by the existing ethnic intermixtures, territorial disputes and the worsening economic situation. Loosened state control, disintegrating societal power structures, ethnic resentments and increased social costs - all combined with feelings of insecurity, disorientation and growing alienation on the part of some groups - have produced the perception of being threatened by another ethnic group (no matter whether the threat is alleged or real). Groups and individuals, eager to compensate themselves for their perceived losses, have been looking, in the existing ideological and moral vacuum, instinctively for a "substitute enemy", for "them" - an enemy who may be blamed for all failures and frustrations.²⁶¹ However, this tendency may in part be universal, and its exposure during the post-communist "shaking off the mental blocks" has led to the specific dynamics and dangers.

IV.4.3 *Problems in individual and social ethics (denial, guilt, a high level of cynicism, etc.)*

Without reference to any specific theory of social ethics or normative theory and not pretending that a comparative agreement on this issue could be reached - in this section I follow the generally accepted assumption that ethical issues and norms play a (significant) role in the quality of political life. The political sphere that frames political action is always in need of commonly accepted principles of conduct seen as worth complying by a democratic (progressive) community; such a need is greater and the chances of its fulfilment lesser in polities which have not completed their

²⁶¹ See also Pithart, "Na ceste zpátky do Evropy," 24-25.

institutional regulatory building. In this context, Václav Havel, addressing his compatriots (in his former capacity as President of Czechoslovakia), has said:

*"As a president . . . I must bear in mind that society requires a public act in this respect, or it will deem the revolution unfinished. There are people whose lives and whose families' lives were destroyed by the old regime, who spent their youth in concentration camps and cannot reconcile themselves to glossing over the matter - especially when many of their persecutors now fare better than they do. . . "*²⁶²

Havel and others have repeatedly warned against the "moral pollution" that has pervaded post-communist society and politics (e.g. Mandler, Marody, Sztompka, Tismaneanu). According to Brown, the "severe moral, intellectual, and political deformation. . . had been inflicted on individuals and society as a whole," especially due to the contrast between "communist fiction" and actual life under communism.²⁶³ Brown has explicitly agreed with Havel's point that hypocrisy, pretence, evasiveness and "multisided apathy" had "became widespread under communism."²⁶⁴ Also, Millar and Wolchik (1994) have argued that under communism, distorted "standards of morality" were entrenched which often hold that it is impossible to solve a problem and meet your own rightful needs without using some sort of illegal means. As a

²⁶² Quoted from "A Conversation with President Havel: Sailing between justice and revenge in the 'unfinished revolution'," World Press Review (March 1992): 14-17." From a slightly different perspective, Joachim Gauck, the head of the commission for investigation of the Stasi material, has remarked: "As a result [of a communist attack against natural values], the realm of conscience of innumerable people who subscribed to communist ideology was severely undermined. I wouldn't say communism was successful in completely distorting the conscience, but its function was transformed enough so that many people came to serve the powers-that-were in an especially intensive way . . . " Joachim Gauck, "The Gauck Commission," an interview with Joachim Gauck, Deutschland 4 (Aug. 1995): 40.

²⁶³ Brown, Hopes and Shadows: Eastern Europe After Communism, 1.

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 45.

result, Millar and Wolchik have pointed out, the aftermath of communism "includes a collection of attitudes toward certain kinds of crime [corruption, for instance] and other forms of deviant behavior."²⁶⁵ Holmes and Marody have spoken in this context of the "moral" or "normative vacuum" and of chaos in "sources of ethical orientation" left after the years of communist rule.²⁶⁶ Similarly, Poznanski has maintained that one of the problems of post-communism has been in norms being applied without a logical pattern, and with different meanings attached to a single norm by various individuals, resulting in "little guidance for functional behavior. Commenting on the same problem, Poznanski has suggested that the implications can be serious both for political and economic markets which can hardly work "if people fail to meet their commitments, and if there is no sense of fairness."²⁶⁷ Others have found the devastating legacy in the sphere of interpersonal relationships and broader social relations. According to the Czech sociologist Jan Hartl, Director of the Centre of Empirical Research, the legacy of socialism in the sphere of human relations was worse than the economic damage. Having researched the issue, Hartl has found that "the web of interpersonal relations had been severely damaged and the valuable social glue lost." As a result," Hartl has argued, the "interest of one human being in another had almost disappeared." According to him, an "historically unprecedented devastation of basic societal functions has been manifested each day, on a smaller or larger scale: people approach each other with extreme distrust, they close themselves off to each other,

²⁶⁵ Millar and Wolchik have emphasized: "It was a well-established fact that participation in quasi-legal and even outright illegal economic activities (*na levo*) was inescapable . . . and winking at petty crime was part of the 'social contract' of that period." Millar and Wolchik, The Social Legacy of Communism, 21.

²⁶⁶ See Holmes, Post-Communism, 19.

²⁶⁷ Poznanski, "Epilogue," 212.

they are more for themselves and egoistic. They tunnel companies, because they don't mind that a long-term entrepreneurial attitude is much more beneficial for them and for society rather than fast financial profit."²⁶⁸ Similar problems have been observed in other countries of the region.²⁶⁹ The old legacies, memories, frustration, moral disorientation as well as a sense of guilt, have been straining interpersonal relationships - in many cases resulting among other things in the breakdown of friendships, marriages, and a rising criminality. They have projected into the new post-communist reality a confusion about an individual's own ethics, and confusion about his/her relationship toward public morale and morality.

To a degree, a positive sign may be found in this ordeal - as the Polish commentator Jakub Karpinski has noted: "Post-communism has proven to be more morally complicated, and among those complications are struggles with the past. But these are struggles necessary for the nation's health."²⁷⁰ Also true is the fact that communist legacies in this domain have problematized the prospects for what seems to be vital for a viable society and politics - a reclaiming of ethical space by people and society at large. I will elaborate on some of these issues in the next section.

²⁶⁸ Quoted from Petr Kočí, "Aktivní přístup občanů pomůže víc než složité zákony," Lidové noviny 12 Aug. 1998: 3.

²⁶⁹ See especially in the writings of Maaz, Sztompka, and Tismaneanu.

²⁷⁰ Jakub Karpinski, "True Confessions," Transitions 5.2 (Feb. 1998): 45.

IV.4.4 The problem of decommunization.

Motto:

"It is difficult to imagine how a society can return to some degree of functioning which would provide social and ideological support for political democracy without somehow coming to terms with the most painful elements of its own past."

(O'Donnell and Schmitter)

"Some accuse those who refuse to forget of being vengeful. They fail to see that there is a need to remember the times and those who restricted our right to freedom and personal expression, not least because these inalienable rights need to be defended now and in the future." (Joachim Gauck)²⁷¹

In this section I will briefly outline some of the issues that concern a "softer" part of the PCM. These issues are related to the "burden of the past," as for instance Maaz understands it: it is the implications of the compromising relationship with the communist regime; the legal and ethical effects of the trauma of oppression, of not completely overcoming the experience of the communist past, and some other related issues, partly mentioned in IV.4.3.²⁷²

Tarifa and Weinstein (1996) have distinguished two kinds of decommunization: one that regards de-communizing "the body of politics" (i.e.

²⁷¹ Gauck, "Dealing with a Stasi Past," 283.

²⁷² These issues have often been associated with the "problem of decommunization." See Brown, Hopes and Shadows: Eastern Europe After Communism, 3. The term has been used in at least three meanings: 1. breaking the Communist party and *nomenklatura* monopoly on power, 2. replacing the old communist-controlled institutions, and, 3. overcoming psychosocial and moral legacy of the communist regime.

dismantling the institutional structures of the one-party state model), the other focusing on the citizenry. De-communizing the citizenry is, according to the authors, in contrast to de-communizing the institutions, a "personal matter." It has to do with people's past associations with and memories of the horrors of communist rule; in practical terms the authors have identified the problem mostly with the process of lustration.²⁷³ Not completely disagreeing with this position, I believe that the complexity of the issue lies in the fact that it involves individual, political, legal and ethical aspects which are often enmeshed in a historically unique fashion. The process of decommunization (or "debolshevization") includes not only the establishment of a legal framework defining an accountability for past crimes and the abuse of power and injustices, but also other procedures, many which have not yet found their adequate forms. In this context, it has been noted (Valenzuela) that all transitions simulate collective memories of past political symbols, institutions, etc. and create "images of what must be restituted, newly created, avoided and eliminated." These memories invite intensive comparisons among the transitional democratic situation, the prior regime and the regime (or regimes) that preceded the latter. These comparisons correlate significantly with the legitimacy of the establishing regime. But also, the "collective memories of regimes. . . can be a source of significant division among different segments of the population."²⁷⁴

The nature and scope of the problem has succinctly been captured in an observation made by Timothy Garton Ash:

²⁷³ Tarifa and Weinstein, "Overcoming the Past: De-Communization and Reconstruction of Post-Communist Societies," 65-66.

²⁷⁴ J. Samuel Valenzuela, "Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings: Notion, Processes, and Facilitating Conditions," in Issues in Democratic Consolidation, ed. Scott Mainwaring et. al. (Notre Dame, Ind.: University Press, 1992), esp. 78-80.

"Former censors, former border guards, former apparatchiks, former secret policemen: what is to be done with them ? Or rather, what is to be done with Them - *Oni* - as the Communist power holders, great and small, were universally known. There is the question of justice. At the highest level, this is the Nuremberg question. Should the men at the top be brought to trial for the evil they did, or that was done under them ? If so, on what charges and by what laws ? At a lower level it becomes almost a question of social justice. Is it fair, people ask, that those who had comfortable office jobs under the communists should still hold them today, when ordinary people are having to tighten their belts yet more ? Is it fair that members of the *nomenklatura* are exploiting the unclear legal conditions of privatization to take over as capitalists the enterprises they had previously commanded as Communists ?"²⁷⁵

Genuine democratization arguably requires a certain "catharsis" or reconciliation with the past. Referring to democratic transitions in general, O'Donnell and Schmitter predicted: "It is difficult to imagine how a society can return to some degree of functioning which would provide a social and ideological support for political democracy without somehow coming to terms with the most painful elements of its own past."²⁷⁶ In the post-communist region the approach to the problem of coming to terms with their past, and the way to deal with those responsible for it, has

²⁷⁵ Here quoted from Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics, 248-9. The whole relationship to one's own past has been problematized, often to the extent, that it has "become popular to treat" the communist past as a 'hole in history'." See Kolarska-Bobinska, "Civil Society and Social Anomy in Poland," esp. 63. Unfortunately, not only legislative means to deal with the issues of decommunization as pertaining to moral and judicial aspects, but also attitudes and the split within society itself, have prevented more effective solutions. As Brown has put it, "in no country in Eastern Europe was the political culture developed enough for decommunization to be handled with the right blend of perspective, firmness, and fairness." Brown, Hopes and Shadows: Eastern Europe After Communism, 46.

²⁷⁶ Guillermo O'Donnell, et al., eds., Transitions from authoritarian rule: Tentative conclusions about uncertain democracies (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 30.

varied from country to country.²⁷⁷ If any pattern has emerged, it was - on the official level - rather one of inconsistency and political expedience. With the exception of the former East Germany, the issue has not been addressed systematically and with a sense of timing, especially with regards to dealing with the secret police files. Generally, three schools or theories on how to resolve (or dispose with) the problem of the past have emerged in the ECE countries (the countries of the former Soviet Union have mostly not even considered the issue). The first school has argued that there is an opportunity, or rather necessity, to make a "thick line" ("*gruba kreska*," the term popularized by Mazowiecki in Poland) behind the unsavoury communist past, and ignore the moral and legal questions it poses. This has in effect implied going as far as forgetting the past altogether as if nothing had happened, and starting with a clean slate. This approach has, of course, some merits and has seemed desirable to some; the perils however have also been obvious. The past cannot simply be discarded, especially when politically charged. The second, the "vigilante" group has mostly claimed that all those guilty of oppression, or simply of association with the former regime ought to be either purged from social life or punished, preferably both. Finally, the third, middle-of-the-road attitude has favoured a genuine reconciliation which can be achieved (with public morale restored) only when people face their own deeds, but

²⁷⁷ The East Germans have used the term *Vergangenheitsbewaeltigung* - i.e coping with one's past; which is also associated with the tendency to portray himself/herself as a victim. Molly Andrews, "Life review in the context of acute social transition: The case of East Germany," British Journal of Social Psychology 36 (1997): esp.275-7. It is common, as Hankiss has reminded us, that people viewed themselves as martyrs, a "delicious and gratifying" role that justified their tendency to focus "on the sacred cause and on their own sufferings. . . " For them, Western freedom and prosperity were invincible proof of the fact that, in spite of all their miserable experience, life was worth living." Elemer Hankiss, "Wailing Wall or Window of Hope," a speech given at Georgetown University, 23 March 1995, Johnson's Russia List 30 March 1995, <djohnson@cdi.org.org>.

which also recognizes that only those guilty of serious crimes ought to be judged by a court of law and punished. According to this approach, remembrance and a reflexive response to the past is more important than punishment itself.

The latter argument has been well formulated and defended by Joachim Gauck, the man in charge of the communist secret police files in unified Germany. As he has put it: "If we were not to accept the past, if we were to somehow artificially block our capacity to remember, were we not to use our ability to ask ourselves about responsibility and guilt, we would have left the real of the human."²⁷⁸ Such opinion is predicated on the logic that only when the new regime is able to hold accountable those involved in the immediate past has it a chance to establish its own system of honesty and accountability.²⁷⁹

Also rather complicating the issue has been the fact that in the post-Stalinist period, terror was more subtle and often latent, and injustice and deprivation had often been done without openly breaking any then existing laws. No matter how immoral communism was, the line separating perpetrators and their victims had often been a fuzzy one; in this sense, almost everyone in the late communist countries adapted themselves to the communist regimes, in one way or another. (Besides, individuals and collectives almost everywhere have difficulties in recognizing what or who is honest or dishonest, responsible or irresponsible, moral or immoral.) From this perspective,

²⁷⁸ See Gauck, "Dealing with a Stasi Past."

²⁷⁹ It is not necessary, perhaps, to emphasize that with the secret police files emerging from the darkness of the communist bureaucracy, often mysteriously tampered with and depleted, it has been difficult to identify those guilty as well as the extent of their alleged guilt.

clear-cut cases were rather few.²⁸⁰

Thus, the past casts a long shadow over all areas of social and political life. For instance, what to do with the many, particularly lower-level, judges who had administered Communist laws quite happily without any scruples? Should they be judged and/or fired? How to deal with thousands of secret police informants registered under whatever category - when many of them had been blackmailed into their activities, and often did not harm anyone? Or how to approach the notorious Hungarian dilemma: Should and can those responsible for the 1956 massacres in Hungary (and particularly in cases when personal participation cannot be proven before the court of law, which is often the case) be prosecuted and punished, or should they merely be identified and ostracized, or allowed to live in peace completely? The official approach to most of these concerns has reflected the uncertainty and ambivalence over the past itself, which has been underscored by changing policies, as political elites have been changing. For instance, in Poland Mazowiecki's original notion of a "forgive and forget" policy was strongly opposed by the subsequent Olszewski government, which unfortunately helped discredit the process because of the many irregularities - especially in its insensitive dealings with secret police files.

²⁸⁰ There had certainly been people who resisted the evil of the communist regime to some degree or who purposefully tried to alleviate the damage caused by its oppressiveness, but very few real "saints"; not even most dissidents were completely "heroic and clean", i.e. openly opposed the regime just for the sake of common good. Reversely, only a few people were totally corrupt or brutal torturers in the post-Stalinist countries. Jan Nowak-Jezioranski has argued that the Polish People's Republic compelled everyone to compromise, "but to condone all the different reasons for making those compromises is morally unacceptable. Coexistence with the Polish People's Republic, forced by the imperative of survival, did not necessarily mean acquiescence, and many Poles managed to preserve their values and spiritual independence. Thus, saying that both ordinary citizens and the authorities - the communist leadership - equally bear the burden of guilt for the past is dishonest." (Nowak-Jezioranski is quoted here from Pasek, "Poland's Contentious Communist Legacy," 21.

In the Czech Republic where the middle road between that of Germany and Poland has been taken, the provisions in the "screening law" of 1991 have been implemented only half-heartedly, and have resulted in a "draw"; few have been brought to be accountable for what they had done, most of them were not; in the process, many scandals have broken out and this has negatively affected the political process there.²⁸¹ Given the sensitivity and complexity of the issue, it is not surprising that, except for East Germany, no post-communist country has been able to conclusively resolve the problem.

Some have argued that for the sake of political stability, to do less in this respect has been better than stirring the old wounds. At the same time, what has certainly been a positive sign was that mob mentality and mob justice have not been revoked in this period in these countries that would have led to an explicitly violent revenge. For many reasons, the former *nomenklatura* have escaped in relative comfort. The latter should be grateful to their former subjects in this respect. As many opinion polls have shown, a majority of ordinary citizens are either so indifferent to the issue of "squaring with the past," or prefer policies on the part of the new regime, that neither do they condone the crimes and gross injustices, nor do they take revenge. At the same time, most people have been concerned (or angry) to witness those with "dirty hands" taking advantage of their privileged positions and once again occupying places that other citizens have little hope of ever holding. According to others,

²⁸¹ The "screening law" that was adopted by the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly in 1991 has provided for the dismissal (or not hiring) of government employees who had either worked for the communists' secret police or who had been high ranking communist officials. Though not perfect, it has provided a badly needed legal framework establishing some trust on the part of people in political officials and the new system itself. Nevertheless, the relatively benign proceedings under the Czech screening law have not been enough to placate Western criticism over assumed "human rights violations" resulting from the law. See, for instance, Tina Rosenberg, The Haunted Land (New York: Random House, 1995).

avoidance of the issue seems to have contributed to inviting the spectre of manipulation and abuse, of arbitrary power and distorted elitism, and banishing a clear vision of hope for a fair democratic rule (and rule of justice). As a Hungarian parliamentarian Zsolt Zetenyi has urged, "the prosecution and punishment of those guilty is not a political question but a moral and legal necessity."²⁸² To establish a shared positive justice, and achieve reconciliation in both legal and humane ways, will not be easy. The psychological process of casting off the legacies of, and coming to terms with, the past is complicated by definition, since psychological legacies are tied up to the dynamics of individual memories and conscience as well as to the inertia of social interrelations. Furthermore, in most countries solutions have been deliberately frustrated by the political manoeuvrings of the former elites, by conspiracies and legal uncertainties - the latter both in terms of different rules in the legal code during the communist period and now, as well as in terms of the incompleteness of a legislative and ethical code in the present that could serve as a basis for a legal framework to deal with the acts committed in the past. The implications of this issue have been well formulated in a question by Tismaneanu: "Can reconciliation work properly in the

²⁸² Edith Oltay, "Hungary Attempts to Deal With Its Past," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report 2.18 (30 Apr. 1993): 6-10. At the end of the day, one cannot condone "common" injustices and "small evils" in the hope that this might prevent perpetrators from turning greater evils against the society. There has been enough evidence that such avoidance might be, in the long run, politically short-sighted as well. Czech President Václav Havel - whose approach to his former jailors have been criticized as much too generous - has himself advised that "one must somehow manage to steer between Scylla and Charybdis. I think that both concepts, in their extreme form, are faulty. The history of our country shows that every time we took the approach of thinking that we should not be interested in whatever had happened in the past - that it was not important - the consequences were always severe. It meant that we did not remove an ulcer that was poisoning the whole system. The ulcer kept festering and producing new toxins. I think that the need to cut out this ulcer, to administer justice, is clearly justified and natural." Havel, "A Conversation with President Havel."

absence of atonement . . . especially on the part of those responsible for abuse of power persecution of their fellow citizens"?²⁸³ Thus for years to come, the suspicions, personal doubts, together with legal uncertainties, and psychological preoccupation with the unclosed past, will reverberate in post-communist societies and their "post-communist minds," as well as haunt politics in the region.

IV.5 The Delphi Survey - the assessment.

As explained in Chapter I, the questions in the Delphi Questionnaire, have been formulated to elicit opinion from selected groups of knowledgeable people on

²⁸³ Tismaneanu, Fantasies of Salvation. Democracy, Nationalism, and Myth in Post-Communist Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998. 122. Tamas Fricz put it in 1993: "We still do not know what to do with our communist past, we still cannot find the basic principles to determine our relationship with former Communists." In my opinion, most conclusive solution has been proposed by those who believe that this problem ought to be resolved on three levels: the individual, community, and institutional ones. The state, as it seems, as the final guarantor, ought to assume a great deal of accountability for retributive justice, and, in an ideal case, should put itself into the lead in evaluating the past and its implications for the present and future. It is this institution that possesses the necessary capacity to impose conclusive reconciliation in enlightened acts of political justice, both retributive and restorative. There seem to be three areas of concern here: first and second, a clear legal framework defining the accountability for past injustices and an adequate time-frame ought to be established (the problem should not drag on indefinitely) and, third, all ethical and political aspects surrounding the process of shedding the past should be more extensively, openly, and transparently discussed at multiple official and unofficial forums. Throughout the process, observance of the law and respect for the presumption of innocence must be preserved. As with all judgements regarding justice, the degree of individual wrongdoing has to be taken into account, and weighted on the basis of accountability for crimes and injustices committed. And perhaps only an individual country by itself can strike a fair balance, which is based both on the universal principles of elementary human rights and on the country's own historical and cultural contingencies.

specific characteristics broadly associated with the post-communist political culture, and mass socio-psychological dispositions (the PCM) that might have been internalized by the population in ECE/EE as the result of their experiences with the communist system. My Questionnaire has surveyed opinions on values and dispositions that had been tentatively anticipated at the time the project was designed, as held by the population in the region and reflected in the opinion of the panelists (see II.3.7).

Out of the 62 Questionnaires distributed, 39 have been returned of which two were incomplete; 37 were fully completed and have been used in the final calculation of results. Since the purpose of this part of the inquiry is rather the content of opinion than the distribution of opinion across professional groups, I have not found it necessary to work out an analytical breakdown of responses according to respondents' belonging to four individual groups, as indicated in Chapter I.

The first question asked regarded political-culture or socio-psychological predispositions (or beliefs or attitudes) *expected* to be held by the population as a result of the long-term experience with the communist system (first column). The second question inquired whether such a predisposition *can actually be identified* as typical (for groups or society at large) in post-communist countries (second column). The third question asked about a respondent's opinion regarding the *effects* of such a predisposition on the course of transition towards democracy and a market economy (third column).

Table 16 The Delphi Questionnaire: The Legacy of Communist Rule (the PCM)

Characteristic / Disposition	Expectation	Existence	Effects
a) Mistrust of politics / politicians	2.68	2.81	2.78

b) Authoritarian attitudes	2.74	2.74	2.85
c) "Utopian thinking" - unrealistic expectations (UE) about democracy	2.62	2.60	2.70
d) Political apathy	2.66	2.70	2.78
e) UE about capitalist economy	2.51	2.35	2.04
f) Tendency to anarchism	2.10	2.04	1.88
g) Preference of social equality	2.40	2.23	2.40
h) Expectation of social security	2.17	2.20	2.25
i) "Bad" work ethics/habits	2.31	2.20	2.12
j) Preference of social solidarity over individualism and competition	2.27	2.18	2.10
k) Feelings of guilt for not opposing the communist regime (enough)	1.91	1.85	1.42
l) Disregard for formal law	2.11	2.11	2.35
m) Avoidance of the public sphere for the private one	2.15	2.03	2.28
n) Modesty	1.75	1.81	1.45
o) Propensity to corruption /dishonesty in making deals	2.63	2.76	2.87
p) Inability to use language adequately within the public sphere	1.98	1.83	1.66
q) People suffer from "post-totalitarian pathology", namely, "inner confusion about their life goals"	2.30	2.39	2.27
r) Miscomprehension of the workings of a democratic system	2.48	2.47	2.71

s) Underestimation of "the art of compromise"	2.60	2.83	2.83
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The numbers in Table 16 are means that have been calculated from all returned Questionnaires (37 out of 62 sent) by applying the coefficients 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively to the four offered answers in the first two columns: "1" denoted "No;" "2" - "Applies to certain groups only;" "3" - "Yes;" "4" - "I don't know" (see Appendix 3).²⁸⁴ The higher the score is above 2.00, the more significantly the particular indicator /predisposition is being perceived as pertaining rather to society at large than to certain societal groups only. "I don't know" / "I am not sure" replies have been excluded from the calculation. (The latter replies represented only approximately 3.5 percent of the total of all replies.) In the third column, "1", again, denoted "No;" "2" - "Partially;" and "3" - "Significantly." In this case, the higher score above 2.00 reflects that a particular predisposition has affected more significantly the course of the transition /transformation toward democracy and a market economy.

Summary:

Indicators of the "post-communist mind," as included in my Delphi Questionnaire, approximately corresponded to the symptoms identified as key

²⁸⁴ Since the sample of respondents has been numerically limited and since there have been no extreme answers (for instance, that a significant number of respondents would completely reject the existence of a large number of symptoms), simple calculations of means have been considered as sufficient given the purpose of the survey and further analytical procedures have not been considered necessary.

components of the PCM.²⁸⁵

Scores were high on most indicators as associated with one or more of the identified (clusters of) symptoms. The results were essentially consistent with both the anticipation generated by the analysis of the communist institutional structure and its socialization effects, and with the other two secondary sources, i.e. the testimonies found in the "culturally-oriented literature on the post-communist region and the public opinion surveys (or at least, its samples) as presented in Chapter IV. The data obtained from the Questionnaire has been divided into three categories, according to one of the three issues investigated, i.e. questions asked regarding the individual indicator:

1. To the question of whether the particular characteristic was expected to result from conditions of communism, for many indicators the answers indicate that respondents consider the characteristic to be more prevalent than to be symptomatic for "certain groups only." On average, most of the respondents expected, for instance, that "authoritarian attitudes" (2.74), "mistrust of politics" (2.68), and "political apathy" (2.66) would result from the conditions of communism and pertain rather to the society at large than to be limited to a few groups. However, certain characteristics, as "feeling guilty about the past" (1.91), "modesty" (1.75), or "tendency to anarchism" (2.10)

²⁸⁵ There are, of course, some limitations on the concept of the *PCM*. I have already mentioned some of them. A more detailed and sophisticated analysis would be required to test precisely the relationships suggested in this discussion. Many problems discussed would ultimately come down to an interpretation of certain normative assumptions inherent in my approach, though I have either attempted to explain them or to preempt some of them. There are also many almost intractable issues in the realm of ethics and personal responsibility, which will always be stigmatized by objections of relativism. Here, it is important for a Westerner to realize the different nature of the Eastern European experience, where people have often faced different moral choices, and where the conflicts in the ethical sphere are both more intense and "sensitive" and less institutionalized than is the case in the West.

scored relatively low and were thus expected to occur as mostly pertaining to certain groups only (and were in several responses indicated as non-existent). Rather a surprise is the relatively low score for "expectation of social equality" (2.17); in this case most respondents assumed that this would regard mainly "losers" at most, i.e. one group only.

2. The question regarding actually identified characteristics of post-communist political cultures. In terms of the actual existence of individual symptoms in the post-communist constellation, the trend in response to this second question was very similar to that of the first question. On average, most respondents believed that, for instance, "mistrust of politics" (2.81), "authoritarian tendencies" (2.74), and "political apathy" (2.70) have actually been present in post-communist societies, being rather more typical for the society at large than for certain groups only. Again, certain characteristics, such as "feeling guilty about the past" (1.85), "modesty" (1.81), or the "tendency to anarchism" (2.04) scored relatively low and were thus considered as mostly pertaining to certain groups only (or in a few cases, non-existent). There was again a relatively low score for "expectations of social equality" (2.20) in this case, apparently for the same reason as mentioned above.

3. The question of the effects of the identified symptoms of the post-communist political and economic transformation. There was not much surprise in how respondents assessed the potential effect the individual symptoms may have had on the political and economic transformation. Most respondents believed that "mistrust of politics," "tendency to authoritarianism," and "political apathy" strongly affect the transformation (2.78, 2.85, and 2.78, respectively). Certain characteristics, especially "feelings of guilt about the past" or "modesty", though found as being relatively widespread, have not been considered as having too much of an effect.

Even from the partial assessment of the Delphi Questionnaire and the analysis of the PCM symptoms it is evident that there were no basic contradictions between the two analyses, including their respective sets of data.²⁸⁶ Indeed, the expectation that many symptoms of the aggregate communist experience had been internalized and observed as the PCM in the post-communist constellation has been corroborated.

In sum, in agreement with my purpose in this Chapter, I have analyzed the phenomenon of the PCM as a set of outcomes from the experience of "communist rule." As mentioned in Chapter I, there has been evidence that the socio-psychological and political-culture implications of the communist heritage have profoundly affected the post-communist political culture(s) and thus the capacity of successor societies and their leaders to create a new order. Accordingly, from the perspective of its effects we may see the PCM as an explanatory factor (explaining variable) vis-a-vis the dual process of building a market economy and democracy. One can assume that the PCM would significantly limit the options available to the process of transformation. Since I have defined the PCM essentially as a *sui generis* subtype of political culture, one can expect that it will affect the political and other transformation processes in the way political culture is assumed to influence (co-determine) the political and economic processes involved in the transformation. This is the topic of the next Chapter.

²⁸⁶ Because of heuristic differences between the approach selected for the institutional analysis and the survey data collection method, a more precise comparison of the two sources-arguments was not possible. The coherence of the overall framework, I believe, has made the joint inferences plausible.

V. Conclusions: The PCM and the Prospects of the Transformation.

"... a culture cannot be changed overnight. One may change the rulers and the laws, but changing basic aspects of the underlying culture will take many years. Even then, the long-run effects of revolutionary transformation are likely to diverge widely from revolutionary visions and to retain important elements of the old pattern of society." (R. Inglehart, 1990)

"Socialism is easy to sample but hard to spit out." (Andrei Sakharov, at the beginning of the Gorbachev era)

V.1 A summary of findings.

In the preceding chapters I have traced the evidence of the symptoms broadly defined as political-culture and socio-psychological characteristics that had their roots in the conditions of communism. I have also outlined their continuities and in part their discontinuities in the post-communist constellation. In this final part I will focus my attention on the implications these symptoms have had or might have (in the future) for the transformation in ECE/EE, and I will propose a framework of factors relevant to the process of overcoming these symptoms and their legacies.

Generally, this approach has been informed by those authors who have emphasized that there is a strong relationship as well as continuity between the communist and post-communist political culture. While some studies seem to have undermined the political culture continuity theories (Gibson; Hahn), the considerable amount of research carried systematically over a longer period of time has presented, as I will also argue, a more complex view of post-communist political cultures.

V.2 The PCM and the requirements of a democratic and civic society.

The symptoms of the PCM as identified in Chapter IV were expected to have certain political and economic implications for the transformation in ECE/EE. Intuitively and apparently, they seem to contravene certain requirements for the regular functioning of a democratic society and market. I will briefly elaborate on this expectation and on the mechanism of the effects itself.

The available evidence from research regarding the relationship between cultural factors on the one hand, and the political and economic factors on the other, tends to confirm Weber's insight that culture is not just a consequence of the pressure of economic institutions, but can itself shape the basic nature of economic and political life.¹ In this sense, attitudes, values, and norms (not to speak of habits) provide a lead for the development of a society. They provide, according to Weiner and Huntington, "the most efficient and reliable clues to understanding social action at both individual and collective levels," as well as the understanding that "many of the causes of underdevelopment lay in the values, world views, character traits, and cultural traditions" of the transitional societies.²

The evidence has also shown that democracy is more than simply having a democratic constitution providing for democratic institutions. To be able to build and maintain appropriate democratic and market institutions, the less tangible factors of attitudes and thinking that enter into procedures that can bring such institutions to

¹ See also Ronald Inglehart, "The Renaissance of Political Culture," American Political Science Review 82.4 (1988): 1219.

² Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington, Understanding Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1987), 286.

work akin to original intentions, are also required. A democratic reform presupposes a change in people's expectations and attitudes towards government and the economy. As Paul Aligica has pointed out: "[Consequently], reformers must focus on two key elements: incentive structures and existing mind-sets."³ A similar point has been made by Carl Schmitt: "It is entirely consistent to maintain that democracy can only be introduced for a people who really think democratically."⁴ Or, as Eckstein has argued, "*viable democracy requires an appropriate political and general culture, and this, in turn, a social structure appropriate for such a culture.*"⁵

Also, reference should be made to Almond and Verba's influential book, *The Civic Culture*, in which they have argued that "a democratic form of participatory political system requires. . . a political culture consistent with it."⁶ Dahl, in his five preconditions for democracy to flourish, has included "a political culture and a system of beliefs. . . that is favourable to the idea of democracy."⁷ According to Inglehart, different societies are characterized to very different degrees by a specific, relatively enduring (but not immutable), syndrome of political-culture values and attitudes. These political-culture qualities can have major political consequences and have proven to be closely linked to the viability of democratic institutions.⁸ Similarly Hahn has claimed that "successful democratisation is unlikely to take place in the absence

³ Aligica, "The Institutionalists' Take on Transition," 49.

⁴ Carl Schmitt, *The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1985), 27.

⁵ Eckstein, "Lessons for the 'Third Wave'," 268 (emphasis in the original).

⁶ Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture* [1963], 3.

⁷ Ronald Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 314.

⁸ Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*, esp. 15.

of a political culture which is supportive of democratic institutions."⁹

In this sense, it seems that the patterns discernible within post-communist political culture (and particularly the PCM symptoms) have to a large extent contradicted the assumption that culture should be somewhat congruent with the democratic institutions it is supposed to support. These patterns appear to contravene the requirements of a *civic culture* as originally conceived by Almond and Verba as being indispensable for a modern routinely-functioning society and democratic polity and market (Verba 1963 and 1986) and including namely concern with public issues, a readiness to participate, the rule of law, and discipline.¹⁰ According to this view, the development of a stable and effective democratic government depends "upon more than structures of government and politics", it depends upon the orientations and relationships that people have to the political process and to institutions; it also means

⁹ Here quoted from Miller, Values and Political Change in Postcommunist Europe, 3. See also Di Palma, who has argued that the basic condition for the democratic consolidation of post-communist societies is the "contemporaneous formation of both valid democratic institutions and a democratic political culture." Di Palma, "Parliaments, consolidation, institutionalization," 138. Also Fukuyama has suggested that prospects for democratic consolidation and stability, especially in third wave democracies, will rest primarily on considerations of culture. Francis Fukuyama, "The Primacy of Culture," Journal of Democracy 6 [1] (1995): 7-14.

¹⁰ See Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture. Also Putnam, for instance, has singled out four general categories of attitudes and behavior as being characteristic for civic citizens: civic engagement; political equality; solidarity, trust, and tolerance; and social structures of cooperation. Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). See also Tom W. Rice and Jan L. Feldman, "Civic Culture and Democracy from Europe to America," The Journal of Politics 59.4 (Nov. 1997): esp. 1145). Tismaneanu has spoken of communist societies as of societies "deprived of civic culture." Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics, 285.

embracing civil responsibility and civil behavioral patterns.¹¹ "Unless the political culture is able to support a democratic system, the chances for the success of that system are slim."¹²

Some have formulated the problem in terms of the requirements of citizenship. O'Donnell and Schmitter have argued that "the core principle of democracy [as opposed to authoritarianism] is citizenship." If one accepts their argument one must agree that democracy in its modern form can hardly exist without a significant popular engagement in public life and without a corresponding accountability of political leaders to the public. Especially in transforming systems, where vestiges of authoritarianism seem to be "at hand when not opposed, a passive and alienated public leaves the political sphere to a narrow elite, clique, or a single group or class."¹³ A parallel argument has been made for the requirements necessary for the emergence of

¹¹ They have emphasised that "the civic culture allows a balance between apparently contradictory demands through the mixture of a set of norms. . . and actual behavior. . . that are themselves in contradiction one with the other." Almond & Verba, The Civic Culture [1989], 359-66. At the same time, I recognize the problem with Almond and Verba's concept of civic culture as it has also been pointed out, for instance, by Bill and Hardgrave. The problem is a rather uncritical assumption that the "civic culture" is the only political-culture mix which is consistent with democratic society; in fact, what they have shown "is that the particular mix is associated with those societies identified as most democratic." James A. Bill and Robert L. Hardgrave Jr., Comparative Politics. The Quest for Theory (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1973), 209.

¹² Almond & Verba, The Civic Culture [1989], 359-66. According to Erik Hoffmann, "[D]emocratization can be viewed as the shift from a noncivil society, noncivil economy, and noncivil culture to a civil society, civil economy, and civic culture" (emphasis in the original). Hoffmann, "Democratic Theories and Authority Patterns," 112. "[T]he speed with which democratization can be carried out successfully," writes Eckstein, "varies directly with the extent to which preexisting culture and social structure are conducive to it." Eckstein, "Lessons for the 'Third Wave'," 271 (emphasis in the original).

¹³ Nelson, "Civil Society Endangered," 348.

a genuine economic market. Eggertsson, for instance, has argued that changes in informal institutions must be taken into account in analyses involving a long time horizon or "studies of large-scale changes in economic systems, such as . . . transitions to markets . . ." ¹⁴ Eggertsson has suggested that a "reasonable degree" of commercial morality and related norms appear to be a "necessary condition for the successful development of the decentralized economy based on a private investment in specific capital and far-flung networks of exchange among unrelated individuals." ¹⁵

Although most of the scholars have recognized the significance of the role of cultural factors in the democratization process, they have been less united on the issue of how critical the role of this factor might be. In his notion of "democratic consolidation," Valenzuela, for instance, has emphasized the aspect of institution-building and democratic "procedural minimum" as the most important task of transitional societies. ¹⁶ But even though he has not explicitly mentioned the cultural factor, as he has later pointed out, the establishment of key institutions is not enough to guarantee that they work properly. Therefore, Valenzuela has suggested, ". . . it is better to look at that which tends to undermine [democracy's] operation." In his opinion, democracy can be undermined by what he calls "perverse institutionalization," i.e., for instance, by *tutelary powers* (powers of non-elected elites, and *reserved domains* of authority, syndromes that seem to be, at least implicitly, both institutional

¹⁴ Thráinn Eggertsson, "A note on the economic institutions." In Empirical Studies in Institutional Change, ed. Alston, Lee J., Thráinn Eggertsson and Douglas C. North (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 13.

¹⁵ Ibid., 13.

¹⁶ Valenzuela, "Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings," esp. 58 and 61.

and cultural.¹⁷ Many others have explicitly considered the factor of incongruent culture of at least the same importance as the institutional framework, or even more important than the latter.¹⁸

Hence despite the disagreement over the effects of individual factors, the prevailing agreement seems to be that only when the institutional and cultural levels approximately fit together and mutually reinforce each other in an approximately intended fashion, may we speak about *adequacy* of culture" and a true *consolidation* of institutions."¹⁹

V.3 The effects of the PCM on the transformation.

Arguably, political systems can be seen as having two components: the structural (institutions and procedures) and the cultural. Very generally, whether there is a congruence or incongruence between the two components determines to a large

¹⁷ Ibid., 62-3 (emphasis in the original). However, by and large, Valenzuela's approaches generally does not take into account the issue of the psycho-social dynamics. In fact, he does not deal with the problem why it is difficult to get rid of those "perversities."

¹⁸ See, for instance, in the work of Sztopka, Tismaneanu (esp. Reinventing Politics), and Offe. See also Chapters I and II in my thesis.

¹⁹ Sztopka, "Looking Back: The Year 1989 as a Cultural and Civilizational Break," 119. My research, however, has not purported to demonstrate that civic culture attitudes cause an optimal level of sustainable democracy. For instance, Muller and Seligson have demonstrated the reverse: that civic culture attitudes are a by-product of democracy; 1994. Also, as Linz and Stepan have noted, "consolidation does not necessarily entail a high-quality democracy." Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 30.

extent the system's performance in the longer term.²⁰ As I claim in my secondary hypothesis (the quasi-hypothesis 1.), the characteristics of the PCM, which may be defined in psycho-social and political-culture terms, have constrained choices of strategies and implementations available to the democratic political transition and economic transformation. This is by now almost self-evident and requires only few comments. Since the PCM vis-a-vis the transformation is subject to the same casual rules as political culture vis-a-vis general political and economic development (as explained in Chapter I), the PCM is to be regarded as both 'causing' and 'caused' (an intervening variable): i.e. as a variable which mediates between the political system and its environment. As such, the PCM is part of the broader framework within which patterns of political attitudes and behavior, historically considered, can be located, and an important cluster factor which will influence and constrain - though perhaps not strictly determine - future patterns of development in a political system.²¹ Many of the components of the PCM, especially political apathy, suspicion of the public sphere and authoritarian tendencies, are in their effects rather exclusive with the characteristics required by a modern, regularly-functioning society and are not fully compatible with the requirements of democratic civic culture, and can therefore complicate the establishment of the latter.

Vladimir Tismaneanu, predicating on this dynamics, has warned: "Communism is dead in Eastern Europe, but its legacy . . . leaves the door open for oracular political

²⁰ See also discussion in Can Democracy Take Root in Post-Soviet Russia?, ed. Harry Eckstein et al. and the analysis in the preceding Chapter in my thesis.

²¹ See White, Political Culture and Soviet Politics, 20. As pointed out, in this respect, the PCM may be viewed as a causal mechanism linking the conditions of communism to the current difficulties in the transformation process. It is one of the most important contributory factors to some of the failures (rather than successes) of the transformation.

movements rooted in hopelessness and insecurity."²² Similar warning has been made by Crawford and Lijphart: "Illiberal democracies are (or may be) the likely result."²³ Such predictions have their basis in both the continuation of some of the communist mentalities and methods applied in the functioning of key institutions and in the underdeveloped political system itself in the region.

In the post-communist constellation, the symptoms of the PCM have been reflected both in the way of doing politics by the elites as well as in the building of a richer network of civil society. These symptoms have frequently become associated with the distorted perception of power and authority, weak democratic forces, the slow formation of political parties and social organizations, and the preponderance of personality over institutional factors in politics.²⁴ There has also been mounting evidence that corruption (as described in chapter IV) "has become so pervasive and deep-rooted in most post-communist countries that (particularly in Russia) it "is jeopardizing the development of a free market economy and souring many. . . on the idea of democracy."²⁵

Undoubtedly, it seems that one of the most persistent legacies of communism is the belief that the government is responsible for guaranteeing the basic social and material needs of individual citizens. The problem is that these responsibilities "have become enmeshed in the very definition of democracy" for many Eastern Europeans.²⁶

²² Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics, 245.

²³ Crawford and Lijphart, "Explaining Political and Economic Change in Post-Communist Eastern Europe," 188.

²⁴ See Hohmann, "Political Upheaval, System Transformation and Stability Risks in the East of Europe."

²⁵ Shapiro, "On the Take in the New Russia," 17.

²⁶ Millar and Wolchik, The Social Legacy of Communism, 16.

According to Podgorecki, Polish society, for instance, was not, in the early 1990s prepared, due to its attachment to paternalist values of security acquired under communism, "for entering into economic competition with advanced societies from the West."²⁷ Similarly, McFalls has argued that the "partially still-functional and surviving East German [communist] values. . . have poisoned the social and political climate in the reunited nation."²⁸ Also according to Ekiert, the perception of social justice "has been deeply engraved in people's minds in all state-socialist societies."²⁹

With regards to the role of political distrust (mistrust) and the associated syndrome of apathy, it seems that to assess negative effects on political action, a more detailed elaboration of the conceptual and empirical linkage between the variables is needed. For instance, Gabriel's analysis has demonstrated that distrust is a less important predictor of political protest behavior than is often supposed. According to him, the "efficacy distrust hypothesis" is not confirmed by the available empirical data.³⁰ He has suggested that the choice between protest and apathy is influenced by situational factors as the severity of a felt deprivation, the role of social organizations (working as protest mobilizing agencies), and "other personality traits of the actor, i.e.

²⁷ Podgorecki, Polish Society, 130.

²⁸ McFalls, Communism's Collapse, Democracy's Demise, 161.

²⁹ "Therefore unemployment, decreasing living standards and new market-induced inequalities represent a potential source of conflict and division which may decisively modify the strength and capabilities of political actors and affect the extension of citizenship and the creation of truly democratic institutions." Ekiert, "Democratization Processes in East Central Europe: A Theoretical Reconsideration," 313.

³⁰ See Gabriel, "Distrust, Involvement, and Political Protest in Western Democracies."

internal efficacy."³¹ From this argument a conclusion perhaps can be derived that political (and social) distrust do not generally motivate people to become active in protest politics. In fact, this may, when linked to apathy, favour a certain level of social and political stability on the one hand but continuing difficulties on the other hand, stemming from low societal activity in processes relating to a higher stage in democratization. As has been pointed out, it seems that alienation from the political system, when this alienation has reached a certain point, "presents the potential for instability in the system due to a lack of support."³²

In short, some fundamental underlying cultural premises viable for modern complex society, together with the *entrepreneurial culture* as a necessary ingredient/precondition of a modern market system (Sztompka calls these premises "civilizational competence"), have been missing in post-communist societies.³³ Many necessary democratic attitudes and skills have not fully developed due to the specific historical fortuity that culminated during the communist era. As we have seen, some PCM symptoms seem to outright run against standard democratic and market values, norms, and habits, thus making the effect of an aggregate internalized experience of

³¹ Ibid., 199. The main idea of the so-called efficacy distrust-hypothesis as proposed by Milbrath and Goel is that only among people thinking of themselves as efficacious, distrust will lead to protest action. They argue that "it may be hypothesized that when political distrust is combined with feeling of efficacy, the result is likely to be protest against the system; when, on the other hand, distrust is combined with feelings of inefficacy, the consequence is withdrawal from politics, The low efficacy-low trust combination likely leads to withdrawal from participation, for why get involved when one's actions have such a low probability of influence?" Lester W. Milbrath and M. L. Goel, Political Participation. How and why do people get involved in politics? (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1977), 69.

³² David, H. Everson and Joan Poparad Paine, An introduction to systematic political science (London: The Dorsey Press, 1973), 210.

³³ Sztompka, "Looking Back: The Year 1989 as a Cultural and Civilizational Break," 118.

communism an undisputedly negative one, especially in the sense of limiting space for reform action or choices of its implementation. In short, these negative effects have worked as the obstacle to completing reform in the direction of fully functioning democratic and market institutions. Or, as Bryant has put it, the communist legacy in ECE/EE, as "the structural and cultural 'overhang'. . . precludes quick establishment of a market economy, liberal capitalism, a civil society and a reformed state."³⁴

V.4 Actual changes/shifts in some values.

Some scholars have argued (Gibson, Večerník, and others), and evidence has partially shown, that, notwithstanding the assumption of continuity in psycho-social phenomena, as early as the beginning of the 1990s, there have been some changes in certain attitudes and values among the populations of post-communist countries. Particularly in terms of expressed values, researchers in many countries have demonstrated that in the 1990s some of these values have undergone shifts or even several stages in their development.³⁵

Such evidence, apart from the fact that it has sometimes been contradictory, has come mostly from attitudinal surveys (measurements) and should be treated with caution, if only because that the relevance and durability of such changes have not

³⁴ Christopher, G.A. Bryant and Edmund Mokrzycky, The new great transformation? Change and continuity in East-Central Europe (New York: Routledge, 1994), 74.

³⁵ See also Fleron, "Post-Soviet Political Culture in Russia: As Assessment of Recent Empirical Investigations;" and also Mikhail Gorshkov, "Economic and Psychological Crisis Erodes Russian Mentality," Nezavisimaya Gazeta-Scenarios 6 (1998).

been closely examined.³⁶

In this context, I agree with a general suggestion made by Kolarska-Bobinska that some values may be "situational;" i.e. held as necessary only during a period when certain conditions persist and are "ready" to be discarded when the situation changes.³⁷ But with values associated with deeper cultural codes and the matrix of subconsciousness, the change would likely be linked to long-term processes. Thus, despite the evidence that certain changes in attitudes and values have occurred, it is doubtful whether these changes occurred in deeply-seated (habitual) characteristics. Because of lingering uncertainty about the issue, and since a detailed account of the suspected changes is not within the objectives of my thesis, I will limit myself to several general remarks regarding the trend.

Most investigations into, and observations of, changes in values and attitudes in post-communist ECE/EE have focused on the changes that have been linked to the dynamics of support for the transformation. In this respect, for instance, Rose and Mishler have tentatively proposed two models/hypotheses regarding the level of

³⁶ Since I have defined values, following Kluckhohn (1951) and Rokeach (1973), very generally as desirable goals that serve as guiding principles in people's lives, I am not using the value-concept for the precise analysis of the change in the PCM. See esp. Clyde Kluckhohn, "Values and Value-Orientations in the Theory of Action," in Toward a General Theory of Action, ed. Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1951), 388-433. One would have to make a longitudinal differentiation of the value-concept in several categories and their relationship to the processes of socialization, esp. internalization (or habituation). Reisinger has defined values more narrowly as "abstract beliefs about the world" that "stem from an individual's most basic socialization and psychological orientation." Reisinger has also correctly noted that values "are the least malleable of the components of the public opinion" (and the most difficult to measure, one might add. Reisinger, "Conclusions: Mass Public Opinion and the Study of Post-Soviet Societies." 272.

³⁷ Kolarska-Bobinska, "Civil Society and Social Anomy in Poland." See also Di Palma, "Legitimation from the Top to Civil Society," 69.

support for a democratic change in ECE/EE. According to the first "polarization" model, societies have to a large degree split between adherents of different regimes and systems. According to the second hypothesis, the "lead/lag" model, reform leaders (supporters) favoured a new democratic system even before they experienced it; "laggards" are hesitant about making a commitment to an unfamiliar and untested regime, but they will gradually (in their majority) endorse it.³⁸ In this sense, it seems that the "conformity syndrome" (see IV.3.6.4) could be involved in several shifts in certain values in the region. It would be difficult to decide, however, to which extent such shifts are prone to genuine internalization and to which extent they may be only superficial (without a real commitment) and thus perhaps temporary.³⁹ This is also what Finifter and Mickiewicz have suggested; according to them, "being a 'political democrat' or wanting rapid change does not necessarily mean that one is eager to

³⁸ Richard Rose and William T.E. Mishler, "Mass Reaction to Regime Change in Eastern Europe: Polarization or Leaders and Laggards?" British Journal of Political Science 24 (April 1994): esp. 161-2. According to Rose and Mishler, the lead/lag model is consistent with the twentieth-century experience of Western Europe since 1945. They have argued: 'When pluralist systems were established in place of dictatorships in Germany, Austria and Italy only a fraction of the mass public supported the new regime. It took decades for doubters and opponents to catch up, and for the turnover generation to remove ageing diehard adherents of the old regime.' Ibid., 162. However, as the authors have argued, polarization seems to be "much more consistent with the twentieth-century experience of Eastern Europe." Ibid.

³⁹ For instance, Eckstein has argued that under conditions of cultural discontinuity, conformity with authority is "still likely to occur [and] will tend to have certain characteristics. In Merton's terminology, it will tend to be *ritualistic* or else *self-serving* (opportunistic and of dubious morality, as general culture defines morality). Ritualistic conformity is compliance without commitment. One does what the rules or rulers prescribe, not for any discernible reason but . . . 'because I behave myself. . . I just do what I'm told. . . .' Conformity of this sort may be supposed to occur frequently in cases in which the former political cultures and subcultures prescribed high compliance. . ." Eckstein, Regarding Politics: Essays on Political Theory, Stability, and Change, 276 (emphasis in the original).

abandon the socialist system" and "the data suggest that support for many aspects of change and political democracy is unrelated to the posture toward collective versus individual responsibility for the social welfare of citizens."⁴⁰

A rather different perspective has been taken by Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger, who, using data from 1992, have argued that "mass orientations toward economic and political reform are not independent of each other: they do not oppose but rather reinforce one another in the former Soviet Union."⁴¹ By and large, changing values have been found contingent on the results of economic transformation. For instance, Hough, and Whitefield and Evans have found a strong correlation between the decline in positive affect toward democracy and worsening economic conditions.⁴² According to Whitefield and Evans, "almost four times as many people whose family living standards are considered to have risen a lot over the past five years evaluate democracy positively compared with those whose living standards have fallen a lot."⁴³ At the same

⁴⁰ Ada W. Finifter and Ellen Mickiewicz, "Redefining the Political System of the USSR: Mass Support for Political Change," American Political Science Review 86 (1992): 860.

⁴¹ Arthur H. Miller et al., "Reassessing Mass Support for Political and Economic Change in the Former USSR," 409.

⁴² See Jerry F. Hough, "The Russian Election of 1993: Public Attitudes Toward Economic Reform and Democratization," Post-Soviet Affairs 10.1 (1994): 1-37. See also Stephen Whitefield and Geoffrey Evans, "The Russian Election of 1993: Public Opinion and the Transition Experience," Post-Soviet Affairs 10.1 (1994): 38-60.

⁴³ Whitefield and Evans, *ibid.* 57. See also Fleron, "Post-Soviet Political Culture in Russia," 251-52. Fleron has made several interesting suggestions regarding the future direction of research aiming at "more realistic appraisals of continuity and change" in post-communist political culture. He has argued: "Sensitivity to the emotive appeal of key terms such as 'democracy', 'elections', and 'tolerance' must be accompanied by awareness of the distinction between ideal and real cultural patterns, general and specific beliefs, abstract ideas and ideas embodied in social processes, as well as the relationship between political culture and more general

time, Whitefield and Evans have maintained that preferences for democratic institutions and processes have themselves been changing significantly over the transitional period: "[T]he transition experience itself has reoriented public opinion away from utopian expectations about the market and democracy, which were characteristic of the period when the old system was collapsing, toward a more informed and certainly more cautious outlook."⁴⁴ Some have identified the latter tendency of increased "realism," or "sobering," as the "Revolution of Falling Expectations." Goble, for instance, speaks of "a veritable revolution" of falling expectations and of a "new realism" as being counterpoints to unrealistic expectations of the preceding periods.⁴⁵ It has also been suggested that "declining expectations by leaders and people in the post-communist states not only represent a new form of realism on the part of both but also give elites in these countries new opportunities to

cultural patterns. Scholars must find ways to tap into these important distinctions in order to get at the more basic dimensions of political culture . . . and not be misled by those that are more ephemeral in nature." *Ibid.*, 252.

⁴⁴ Whitefield and Evans, "The Russian Election of 1993," 58. Simon identified three [other] "important tendencies of change" apart from the one already mentioned: 1. "the narrowing of the 'value margins.' In general, the importance of each value has become somewhat higher in such a way that the differences between them have considerably decreased;" 2. "The shift in values is strongly associated with actual processes in that the importance of values directly associated with the political and economic transition increased mostly in the hierarchy of values. An obvious consequence of the political transition is the fact that the importance of 'people not to be exposed to authoritarian power' is now ranked higher, while as a result of the economic transition, which brought about considerable income differences, the Hungarian people consider the notion of 'no great income differentials' as more important." Simon, "Post-Paternalist Political Culture in Hungary," 238.

⁴⁵ See Paul Goble, "A Revolution of Falling Expectations," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newslines [Prague] 6 Jan. 1999, vol. 2, endnote, <<http://www.rferl.org>>.

move toward democracy and the free market."⁴⁶

There is little doubt that some significant changes, especially in certain situational values, have already occurred and that the level of accepting change and the degree of success in coping with the challenge of the transition /transformation differ from one individual or collective actor to another.⁴⁷ The overall evidence of trends in value-changes in post-communist ECE/EE is still fragmentary and often contradictory; many shifts seem to be linked to shifts in the general mood contingent upon the momentary politico-economic situation, rather than demonstrating longer-term changes in deep-seated values and dispositions, as is the case of those pertaining to the PCM.

V.5 A framework for long-term change.

According to the logic of the rational approach, changing political institutions are expected to produce relatively fast changes in the behavior and values of individuals, since new institutions alter the incentives, rules and constraints that individuals use to calculate their behavior. Confronted with new situations and opportunities to advance their own interests, individuals are able to re-assess their previous actions and motivations and under new conditions act to maximize their

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ At a slightly different level, the mechanism of specific adjustment to socio-psychological pressures has been analyzed by Erich Fromm. See his already mentioned assertion regarding socio-psychological internalization of *external necessities* resulting in harnessing human energy *for the task of a given economic and social system*. Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom, 284 (emphasis in the original).

current net advantage and emerged future expectations.⁴⁸

Such a rational framework is generally applicable to most organizational changes and may be further advanced by insights into the psychosocial mechanism of change. In a broadly interpreted view of Talcott Parsons, every major structural change in society involves three phenomena: differentiation, integration, and strain. These processes do not necessarily occur in a particular sequence, but all three must in fact take place in order for genuine change to happen. The process of differentiation promotes the division of new patterns; these are integrated under a broad system of values and norms that serve to give the patterns integrity with continuously existing patterns in a society. Both processes of differentiation and integration are necessarily accompanied by tensions and conflicts. If strains (tensions) can be controlled and if there is a successful introduction and institutionalization of structural innovations, violent eruptions of conflicts may be precluded.⁴⁹ To control the strains (or to somewhat accommodate them), every change in the politico-economic order requires more or less substantial changes in the system of values in order that the new arrangements take hold or "consolidate."

According to Kolarska-Bobinska, this is even more so in the case of the passage from the socialist-state formation to one based on pluralism and a market

⁴⁸ See James G. March, Decisions and Organizations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988).

⁴⁹ Talcott Parsons, Sociological Theory and Modern Society (New York: The Free Press, 1967). See also Anthony M. Orum, Introduction to Political Sociology, 2nd edition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1983), esp. 96-98. The latter point coincides with what Tismaneanu had in mind when he wrote: "To avoid tensions arising from the legacies of communism "fledgling democratic institutions need to create a counterbalance at the level of social psychology." Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics, 288. To Tismaneanu this means a two-pronged attempt to restore political and personal integrity and accountability and the building of true democratic institutions. Ibid.

economy. In her opinion such a transition "must be based on a genuine revolution of values."⁵⁰ As Kolarska-Bobinska has maintained, such "revolution" is not impossible: "Many values change their positions in the hierarchy while others are replaced by their opposites."⁵¹

As is evident from my analysis, such a scenario may be likely to happen only to the extent and speed to which the particular nature of values, norms, and habits (and the nature of their relationship to other factors) "allows" these psycho-social contents to change, and in conformity with the outlined principles of psychological and social change. As I have argued, certain values and particularly habits, change relatively slowly and they remain rather stable once they have been socialized, even more so if genuinely internalized. A new "internalization" may be necessary. In this sense, Sztompka has also considered the internalization of certain key "cultural codes, rules, and values by societal members" as being the *"pre-requisite for their meaningful actions"* within institutions."⁵² Several theories/models have addressed the issue of how

⁵⁰ Kolarska-Bobinska, "Civil Society and Social Anomy in Poland," 65.

⁵¹ Ibid. In her scenario for post-communist ECE/EE, for instance: "[t]he idea of social equality and restraint in consumption is driven out by the eulogy of getting rich . . . orientation of being average is driven out by striving to get ahead and prove oneself better than others; norms of group solidarity are driven out by competition and struggle for better conditions for oneself; carefree attitudes towards one's job and one's future are replaced by self-reliance. . ." Ibid.

⁵² Sztompka, "Looking Back: The Year 1989 as a Cultural and Civilizational Break", 118 (emphasis in the original). Sztompka has proposed the concept of "civilizational competence" to describe such a set of cultural premises "indispensable for a modern society of the democratic and market type." Elaborating further, he has defined civilizational competence as "a complex set of rules, norms and values, habits and reflexes, codes and matrixes, blueprints and templates the skilful and semi-automatic mastering of which is a prerequisite for participation in modern civilization." Ibid. See also Sztompka, "Civilizational Incompetence: The Trap of Post-Communist Societies," *Zeitschrift fur Soziologie* 2 (1993): 85-95.

such a change can happen; next I will briefly mention the most relevant approaches.

V.5.1 The PCM and the generational turnover.

It might be reasonable to anticipate that the PCM, as a consequence of socialization processes under the communist system, has affected certain age groups more than others, and may thus be linked to the issue of generational sequence. One might expect that the symptoms of the PCM may be receding, as those most affected by communist socialization, especially those who had experienced communism in the most absorbing years (and whereby internalized more thoroughly its values and norms often in the forms of habits), will be gradually replaced, or lose their influence in social and political life. Thus, even if we allow for certain PCM elements to be transmitted from generation to generation, one can expect that eventually the PCM syndrome will fade away.

The logic of this expectation is based on the general idea that values and habits remain relatively stable once they have been socialized and internalized. Inglehart (1977 and 1990) have expressed the view that people's values remain stable especially during their adulthood and accordingly values are changing mainly as a result of the replacement of generations.⁵³ This idea is informed by many other classic and contemporary social theorists, including Comte, Mannheim, and Inglehart, who have assigned the mechanism of *cohort replacement* a central role in processes of socio-

⁵³ Also Huntington, among others, has confirmed that the process of deep commitment begins in the late adolescence. As the individual becomes more and more committed to the performance of certain functions, he finds it increasingly difficult to change these functions and to unlearn the responses which he has acquired to meet environmental changes. His/her personality has been formed; he has become 'set in his ways,' and, in other words, become part of a political generation. Weiner and Huntington, Understanding Political Development, 397.

cultural and political change. The principal notion here is that the diffusion in society of new attitudes and behavioral patterns is linked to the cyclical renewal of a society's population. "Old" attitudes and behavior are assumed to disappear as people associated with such attitudes and behavior die out; new attitudes and behavioral patterns grow as newly mature generations hegemonize the population. According to Mannheim, the continuous intake of new members into a society implies "fresh contacts" of young people getting acquainted with the cultural heritage. Yet this acquaintance does not take place under the same conditions: as they witness different historical events and developments during their formative years, they potentially constitute a generation ("Generationslagerung") with different historical and cultural experiences.⁵⁴

⁵⁴ Yet, as Mannheim pointed out, to what extent a generation emerges at all as distinct from a previous one and how soon, depends on the rate of socio-historical change. See Karl Mannheim, Essays on the sociology of knowledge (London: Routledge, 1952), 286-320. In his Cours de philosophie positive (1839) Comte observed that the mankind's "social progress depends essentially on death." Since he ascribed the inclination to innovation and change almost exclusively to the young, he could not see any progress without cohort replacement. But, according to Comte to secure a continuous change, the conservative instinct of the old generation must balance the innovativeness of the young one. August Comte, Cours de philosophie positive (Paris: Bachelier, 1969), esp. 635-6. See Andries van den Broek, "Cohort Replacement and Generation Formation in Western Politics," in Political Value Change in Western Democracies, ed. Loek Halman and Neil Nevitte (Tilburg University Press, 1996), 237-8. Mannheim, who is widely recognized as the founding father of the sociological theory of generations, presented in his key article on the topic Das Problem der Generationen (1928) the rhythm of life and death as his point of departure. Further, in his conception, those who mature in a given era witness the same historical events and developments during their formative years. Mannheim, Essays on the sociology of knowledge. Inglehart has assumed that a "silent" cultural revolution that has unfolded itself in advanced industrial societies has been brought about by cohort replacement. (He has focused especially on the extent to which the conditions of physical and economic safety affected the formation years of successive cohorts. Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society, 68-69. Inglehart has been a proponent of the view that people's values remain more or less stable during their adulthood. Ibid. On the relationship between the notion of (political) generation formation and

Another related important idea is that of a longitudinal experience, defined as a *postulate of "cumulative" socialization*. This postulate holds first that, though learning is viewed as continuous throughout life, early learning is regarded as a sort of filter for later learning; in this sense, imprints from early learning conditions are much harder to undo (since they are more deeply internalized). Second, in this postulate an assumption is made that varying elements pertaining to cognitive, affective, and evaluative learning constitute, from a certain relevant perspective, a coherent whole.⁵⁵ From the effects of cumulative socialization, one can make the prediction that continuity of certain orientations and predispositions, especially of an habitual character, is highly resistant to change, and rather on the contrary, may have their own potential to change institutional structure. As Eckstein has put it, "The expectation of continuity in aggregate (and individual) orientations follows most plainly from the assumption that orientations are not superstructural reflections of objective structures, but that they themselves invest structures and behavior with cognitive and normative meanings."⁵⁶ Hence, if socialization and learning are cumulative, older generations (in the post-communist case, perhaps at least two) should exhibit a high degree of orientational and habitual inertia, even when a sweeping political and/or socio-economic change occur.

To conceptualize the expectations of broad social change in its relationship to political life, some scholars have proposed as useful the concept of "political

the notion of cohort replacement, see also de Broek, *ibid.*, esp. 240-54.

⁵⁵ See Eckstein Regarding Politics: Essays on Political Theory, Stability, and Change, esp. 269.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 270.

generation."⁵⁷ A political generation is generally defined as a group of people whose political beliefs, values, and norms are formed by a significant historical event (or series of events) and by similar socio-political experience that occurs when these people are in their forming years (usually in their youth and early adulthood). Even though the events occurring in that age period as well as subsequent events may affect differently individual participants, these events have "so clearly formed the values of these persons that a generational community can clearly be observed."⁵⁸ However, despite the general agreement on the definition of the phenomenon, the theories of generational effects have differed on both the importance and the mechanism of a political generation and its exchange. Some have treated the distinctive experience of individual age cohorts as decisive in their effect for political and other developments, while others have treated these differences as more or less ephemeral or epiphenomenal to other factors.⁵⁹ Hough (1980) and some others have hypothesized that each generation is politically distinct because of cumulative changes in the political climate and social and educational conditions in which each cohort experienced political socialization. Accordingly, many studies done in Western countries have confirmed that generations differ.⁶⁰ Also, surveys done within ECE/EE prior to 1989-90 tended to support this assumption (Mason 1985; Shlapentokh 1987). An opposing hypothesis, however, has stated that people's values change over their

⁵⁷ Volgyes, Politics in Eastern Europe.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 261.

⁵⁹ See Rose and Carnaghan, "Generational Effects on Attitudes to Communist Regimes: A Comparative Analysis," 30.

⁶⁰ For instance, the mentioned works of Inglehart (esp. 1977), Converse (1976), and Ronald Inglehart and Paul R. Abramson, "Economic Security and Value Change," American Political Science Review 88.2 (June 1994): 336-354.

entire life cycle ("life-cycle theories"; Dalton; also Flanagan).⁶¹

Given the logic of communist socialization as I have explained it in III.3, one can expect that the homogenizing effects of communist socialization had created distinct cohorts according to the stage of communism they had experienced, and the cohorts raised under communism should differ from those coming of age after the fall of communist regimes.⁶² For instance, Breslauer has identified the so-called "Social Contract" generation coming of age in EE in the 1970s, whose experience he has called "welfare-state authoritarianism;" and this generation, having become used to promises of more consumer goods and social welfare benefits in return for political allegiance, could be expected to be quite distinct from the generation coming of age during a democratic and market economy era.⁶³ Also den Broek, who has investigated the cohort replacement in fifteen Western polities, has corroborated the view of Inglehart that cohort replacement is a major attribute of political value change (de Broek 1996).

⁶¹ And still others have emphasized the universality of observation that older people in general tend to take more conservative and less flexible views. (According to Miller et al., people also generally become more authoritarian in their view as they become older. See Miller et al., Values and Political Change in Postcommunist Europe, 241.

⁶² As Butler and Stokes have explained: "The years of adolescence and early adulthood are also ones in which the young are unusually open to the forces that are shaping a partisan realignment." D. E. Butler, and Donald E. Stokes, Political Change in Britain (London: Macmillan, 1969), 249.

Hough (1980), in his study on leadership, has assumed that leaders were most profoundly influenced by conditions when they were university students. Some have considered the age of 15 as "a realistic midpoint in a process of gradual socialization in political awareness. Rose and Carnaghan, "Generational Effects on Attitudes to Communist Regimes: A Comparative Analysis," 34. However, it is perhaps part of the logic of socialization that most youths are affected by events and experiences at a much younger age.

⁶³ See Rose and Carnaghan, *ibid.*, esp 35; and Breslauer, "On the Adaptability of Soviet Welfare-State Authoritarianism."

In 1995, Rose and Carnaghan have published the results of their investigation into the issue of the generational effects in ECE/EE. Having compared survey data about generations in eleven ECE/EE countries, they have problematized the assumption that we really understand to what extent and to what effect individual generations differ. They have started with the common-sense assertion that since "old citizens die and youths come of age [and replace them] with actuarial predictability, the turnover of generations has potentially profound implications for change" in post-communist countries.⁶⁴ Then they have hypothesized that "If the common historical experience of Sovietization has had a decisive influence, generational differences in attitudes should be similar from one former Communist country to another."⁶⁵ Rose and Carnaghan have found that on many counts, attitudes of individual generations differ from each other, sometimes quite substantially. For instance, "as one moves from the older to the younger generations, approval of the old regime goes down."⁶⁶

⁶⁴ Rose and Carnaghan, "Generational Effects on Attitudes to Communist Regimes: A Comparative Analysis," 29.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 36.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 40. See also tables in my Appendix. At the same time, Rose and Carnaghan have presented an opposite hypothesis: "If national context is decisive, differences in attitudes among generations should vary from one former Communist country to another." *Ibid.*, 36. The countries studied by Rose and Carnaghan, using mostly data from 1993-94, were: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Croatia, Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. The findings, however, did not confirm the exclusive validity of either of the hypotheses. According to Rose and Carnaghan, the greatest intergenerational difference was in Bulgaria: 31 percentage points between the "Wartime" and "Glasnost" generations. Hungary was the only one exception to the general pattern: the oldest generation is less approving of the Communist regime than is any other generation there. They have also found that an absolute majority have expressed favourable views of the old regime in five countries (Belarus, Bulgaria, Hungary, Ukraine, and Russia). *Ibid.*, 40. However, in terms of absolute percentage of those who would actually wish to see the old regime restored ("reactionaries"), Rose and Carnaghan have found that they are in clear minority. At the same time,

Using multivariate analysis, they have found, however, that differences in education levels were even more relevant than those in age; those with the most education showed the least approval of the communist regime and those with the least education showed the highest level of endorsement. (Since younger generations tended to have on average a higher education, Rose and Carnaghan have concluded that "it is possible that generational effects are spurious, accounted for by differences in education levels between generations."⁶⁷ The authors have reached the general conclusion that despite the consistency of patterns across the ECE/EE countries suggesting that Sovietization had produced similar intergenerational differences "regardless of national context . . . divisions *within* generations were greater than divisions between generations."⁶⁸ Having presented their case or a "weak" variant of the "generational" approach, Rose and Carnaghan have contemplated whether it could be assumed (as life-cycle theories maintain) that the most substantial changes are not between individuals but within each

generations strongly differentiated "reactionaries" from "anti-Communists"; in Russia, reactionaries were almost four times as numerous among the wartime generation as in the *Glasnost'* generation. Ibid., 50.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 45.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 48 (emphasis in the original). Other sample surveys undertaken since the fall of communist regimes have identified intragenerational differences in a variety of attitudes (Hahn 1991; Gibson and Duch 1993; Miller et al. 1994 and 1998). Hahn, for instance, has challenged the generational hypothesis, particularly on the basis of his findings that seem to suggest that in the early 1990s, the Russian political culture featured more change than continuities (Hahn 1991). Hahn has found, however, a rather strong correlation between (political) attitudes and education. According to him: "The data appear to support the following propositions. Those with high levels of education are significantly: (a) more politically efficacious; (b) more likely to support competitive elections; (c) more in favour of a multi-party system; (d) more interested in politics; (e) more knowledgeable about government; (f) less trusting of government; and (g) less likely to think the elections were fair." Hahn, "Continuity and Change in Russian Political Culture," 418.

individual as he or she comes through generational metamorphoses (for instance, as the Glasnost' generation grows older, its views might come to resemble those of the wartime/Stalinist generations); this tendency may have a stabilization function for society.⁶⁹ But since the life-cycle thesis does not take into account or explain specific types of attitudes and values, Rose and Carnaghan have rightly considered it as deficient for the purpose of explaining and predicting the evolution and change in specific values and attitudes. In terms of shifts in attitudes toward the communist past, they have predicted that with new cohorts having been introduced to the adult population, approval of the old regime is "likely to decline among future generations of middle-aged and older people, and thus in the population as a whole." And more significantly: "generational turnover will increase the proportion of the population for whom there is no returning to that [Communist] past."⁷⁰

Nevertheless, such suggestions seem to say rather little about the nature of regimes in the future. As Rose and Carnaghan have rightly noted, history, and not only that of ECE/EE, was a reminder that people do not necessarily get the government that they want and that the evidence regarding generational shifts in values and attitudes "does not guarantee inexorable democratization. Elites can change a political regime independent of popular preferences, and unanticipated events may shock public opinion," which of course makes any theory based solely on the effect of generational cohorts unfit to explain the complexity of post-communist change.⁷¹

⁶⁹ Rose and Carnaghan, *ibid.*, 50.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 51-2.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 52. For a slightly more sceptical assessment of the generational factor, see Rose et al., Democracy and its Alternatives, esp. 205.

V.5.2 The assessment of the perspective for change in the PCM.

*Culture is "always in the making" and is always a "work in progress."*⁷²

This thesis' analyses lead to no definite unitary predictions because they treat the PCM as a historical product, deeply subject to human agency. Although my argument acknowledges the role of tendencies toward historical continuity, it also recognizes that human agency can bring about change, if only by reflecting on accumulating continuities and/or changed external conditions.

One can argue that the continuity of both communist political cultures and the PCM in the post-communist constellation has been preserved from at least three perspectives: (1) as the continuity that has been engendered in "the recycled elites;"⁷³ (2) through institutions that have not been completely dismantled, and (3) as the continuity of individual and mass-psychological factors (the PCM), many of the latter having been well internalized during the communist period. Although all three perspectives are strongly interrelated, my interest has been mainly in the third one. One can thus expect that changes in the PCM, because of its largely internalized and habitualized character, are likely to take place in a long-range horizon even if other factors change relatively fast. That does not mean that certain symptoms of the PCM, especially certain values and attitudes not too deeply internalized, could not change faster than deeply internalized symptoms. It has been widely recognized that values, when differentiated from habits (and rather than habits), do change within people's

⁷² Fox and Hannerz (suggested separately). Here quoted from Holy, The Little Czech and the Great Czech Nation, 5.

⁷³ Stephen Holmes, "Cultural Legacies or State Collapse? Probing the Postcommunist Dilemma," 44.

lifetime, and their original function and meaning "may be altered as they are recycled to cope with new situations." According to Jonassen, the recycling of values for new functions "aids their survival because values cannot persist unless they maintain some function and are continuously practised in some form."⁷⁴

As mentioned, it would be rather simplistic to assume that the exchange of generations is the only one source of change in the mass psycho-social and cultural characteristics of society. Some scholars have argued (for instance Eckstein) that culture changes naturally without explicit reference to the generational effect. According to Eckstein (elaborating on a Parsonian theme), there exists a type of pattern-maintaining change, which while originating in an environment tends to maintain itself through the shaping of new influences and responses to fit into changing patterns. In fact, in modern society changes become part of the maintenance process of a political culture. Using the term "change toward flexibility," Eckstein has argued that technological advances and economic changes do not actually lead directly to a different cultural type; instead, a flexible culture can adapt these advances and changes into the existing culture. Thus, rather than change the underlying cultural base, new structural conditions are incorporated into that base.⁷⁵ On the individual level, as Hyman has noted, "the individual is not . . . fixed in his politics for life. He may show further changes with cumulative experience. . . "⁷⁶ In this respect, an interesting argument has been presented by Mueller, who believes that "it is not necessary for old

⁷⁴ Christen, T. Jonassen, Value Systems and Personality in a Western Civilization: Norwegians in Europe and America (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1983), 319. See also Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society.

⁷⁵ See Eckstein, "A Culturalist Theory of Political Change;" also see Alexander, "Surveying Attitudes in Russia," esp. 109.

⁷⁶ Hyman, Political Socialization, 118.

habits to be unlearned. He has argued that one preexisting set of habits and perspectives "may be gradually (or perhaps suddenly) eclipsed" by either the other preexisting set or a newly adopted set of orientations that has been proven elsewhere.⁷⁷ This argument also fits well in Kolarska-Bobinska's notion of situational values that are espoused as necessary only during the period when certain conditions persist, and are to be discarded when the situation changes.⁷⁸

With regards to a time-frame necessary to get rid of the vestiges of the post-communist cultural syndrome, Rose and Carnaghan have suggested: "Generational turnover, reinforced by changes in political socialization caused by the collapse of communist regimes, is eroding nostalgia for a Communist past."⁷⁹ Since psycho-cultural and psycho-social phenomena would take a longer time to change due to their complex (multi-layered) and long-term character, it is very likely that a generation coming of age now would be the first one able to get rid of the (post-) communist syndrome. In the same vein, in a discussion in 1992, Stephen Cohen concluded that "Any hope for real markets and real democracy in Russia is a matter of a generation".⁸⁰ This suggestion, with the mentioned qualifications, may be extended also to other post-communist countries.

As other reliable surveys have shown (Mason 1995; Miller et al. 1998), the

⁷⁷ Mueller, "Democracy, Capitalism, and the End of Transition," esp. 137.

⁷⁸ See also Di Palma, "Legitimation from the Top to Civil Society," 69.

⁷⁹ Rose and Carnaghan, "Generational Effects on Attitudes to Communist Regimes," 28.

⁸⁰ Here quoted from Mueller 1996, 103. On the factor of generational turnover in the duration of regimes, see Ted R. Gurr, "Persistence and Change in Political Systems," *American Political Science Review* 68 (1974): 1482-1504. Referring to Gurr, Eckstein has argued that "a plan to democratize fully should probably cover some twenty-five years - more or less, depending on local conditions. Eckstein, *Lessons for the 'Third Wave'*," 276. On the details of Eckstein's argument, see *ibid*.

shift in generations will play a significant role in at least two ways. On one hand one can expect that the young generation, more Westernized, risk-taking and entrepreneurial would be more attracted to a free-market system. On the other hand, one can also expect that older generations, more dependent on the state and more concerned about economic security than anything else, would be more reluctant to lose the system of guarantees and benefits provided by the state.⁸¹ This does not mean, however, that the generational replacement will automatically lead to a standard democratic life and smoothly functioning democratic and market institutions at all levels: As the experience of transitions/transformations in other areas has shown, external dynamics and other factors in the internal dynamics and their complex relationships will play, beside the issue of demographics, an important role.

According to a general culturalist theory, there are two broad types of cultural changes: those arising "naturally" from changes in situations and structural conditions and those that result from "artifice" - deliberate attempts to transform political structures and behavior. A third type could be added: that arising from interplay between two relatively autonomous dynamics: one of the external and structural conditions of the social and political environment, and the other of cultural development.⁸² Since the emergence of democratically acting subjects is rather the result, and not the precondition, of the democratic transition, the mass emergence of democrats can be observed only after a long process of democratization, when the democratic culture has been accepted as a criterion for all levels of political action. This "turning point" may have fuzzy borders. Nevertheless, it represents a qualitative

⁸¹ See Mason, "Justice, Socialism, and Participation in the Postcommunist States," 77.

⁸² See Eckstein, Regarding Politics: Essays on Political Theory, Stability, and Change.

change in the way society and its elites perceive themselves and their goals.⁸³ During this process, a significant role here will be played by the principle of adaptability and externally-induced change, or what Marody has referred to as "*adaptation to democracy*."⁸⁴

It has been noted that the subjective factor can change institutions very quickly, but itself changes very slowly, particularly if linked to the habitual sphere. There is no doubt that some of the old attitudes, convictions or even habits may be "shed off" under certain circumstances (either by choice or under the pressure of circumstances, over a time); but unless "powerful agencies" of change in the direction opposite to the original "imprints," are at work, many old dispositions and habits are likely to persist, or become entrenched, particularly where the new environment is perceived as not stimulative to change in the opposite direction. Since the PCM model has put emphasis on deep-seated (internalized) and habitual legacies of communism, one can anticipate that the process of change will take longer and that generational replacement will play rather a greater role than in the case of less internalized values. Consequently, of the discussed approaches and theories regarding the prospects of change in a post-communist political culture, the generational-turnover theory seems to be the most consistent with the logic of my PCM argument. Considering the fact that broadly conceived cultural change would rise from a complex interplay between two relatively autonomous dynamics: that of the external and structural conditions of the social and political environment, and that of the socio-psychological and cultural development

⁸³ As Agh has noted, this is what in the Spain's case was called "the invention of democratic tradition." See Ágh, "The Paradoxes of Transition: The External and Internal Overload of the Transition Process," 25.

⁸⁴ Marody, "The Political Attitudes of Polish Society in the Period of Systemic Transitions," 266 (emphasis in the original).

as such,⁸⁵ the specific nature of long-term change will be at the junction of these two dynamics.⁸⁶

V.6 Prospects: policies and choices.

Generally, completion of a genuine democracy is largely "a matter of political crafting, the design and maturation of political institutions, and the spread of democratic norms and values."⁸⁷ In most countries of the post-communist ECE/EE, several years after the beginning of democratic changes, many of the basic building blocks for a functioning democratic society and prosperity were in the late 1990s still missing, or were inadequate. Genuinely democratic procedures have been lacking, whether cultural, legal, economic or religious, the presence of which makes democracy

⁸⁵ See Eckstein, Regarding Politics: Essays on Political Theory, Stability, and Change.

⁸⁶ Apart from the basic distinction within a political culture of an "elite" and "mass," all citizenry can be differentiated on the basis of certain socio-demographic categories like age, gender, socioeconomic status, education, rural-urban residence, religion, and ethnicity. There has been in social science research a long tradition of seeking explanations in correlations between these categories and both political-culture systems and overt behavior. On the discussion on political cleavages as contingent on different sectors of society especially in Russia, see Fleron and Ahl, "Does the Public Matter?," 305-7. In my thesis, for reasons explained in Chapter I, I deal with these social categories only marginally.

⁸⁷ Larry Diamond, "Introduction: In Search of Consolidation," in Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies, ed. Larry Diamond et al. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), xxxii.

and a free market possible, and ensures prosperity and stability.⁸⁸ Still inadequate were the diverse interconnected and voluntary associations, and also public awareness of the mentioned deficiencies. To achieve decisively-positive qualitative change in these parameters is bound to be a prolonged task. In his "Reflections and Revolutions," Ralf Dahrendorf argued that while some region's more advanced countries, namely Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary might achieve an initial agreement on a democratic constitution and thus rudimentary democratic institutions in six months, they would need sixty years before both a democratic constitutional order and the social framework of a market economy were safely rooted in a robust civil society.⁸⁹

The experience of communist rule had left peoples in individual countries with a common past, but this does not imply a common future. While some post-communist countries have made considerable progress towards completion of the process of democratization, others have been distinctly lagging behind. The lead group includes Slovenia, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic (this group had better starting conditions than other groups, however), whereas most of the successor states of the former Soviet Union have either produced typical broken-backed democracies or

⁸⁸ See Schopflin, "Post-communism: constructing new democracies in Central Europe," esp. 236. Also, many countries still do not have the "luxury" of the free media. On the question of the situation in the media in post-communist ECE/EE, see special issues of Transition, "Media - How Free?", Transition 1.18 (6 Oct. 1995) and "Media Update: Still Struggling for Control," Transition 2.21 (18 Oct. 1996).

⁸⁹ He then backtracked on his rhetorical prediction of sixty years for civil society, but has still insisted on at least two generations. Symptomatically, Dahrendorf spoke only of the region's more advanced countries. Dahrendorf, Reflections on the Revolution in Europe; see also Bryant, The new great transformation? Change and continuity in East-Central Europe, 58.

promoted undemocratic regimes.⁹⁰

The development of civil society and citizenship have been recognized by many commentators on the region to be the key requirement.⁹¹ Sztopka has argued that, to secure a genuine civilized and democratic future, civil society must be achieved or restored and the chasm which had opened up under communist rule between the public and the private spheres must be closed. According to Sztopka, in order to create a viable civil society, the completion of three tasks is required. First, a "pluralistic network of voluntary associations, interests groups, political organizations, and local communities" must be developed which would intermediate between state and family. Second, an economic market and a representative democracy must be created that would serve as "institutional arrangements permanently asserting and demonstrating the links between individual interests and the public good." The third condition regards the formation of active and informed citizens able and willing to engage with the new institutions for their own and society's benefit.⁹² Similarly, Nelson

⁹⁰ See also, for instance, Rose et al., Democracy and its Alternatives, esp. 224-227, on different paths and outcomes of post-communist developments. A "broken-backed democracy" is in Rose et al.'s notion an incomplete democracy, in which free competitive elections continue "do make a difference" but good government is not produced; elections only ensure the 'circulation of rascals.' See Rose et al., *ibid.*, esp. 218-223. This may be seen as contravening to what Eckstein has called "viable democracy." Eckstein, "Lessons for the 'Third Wave'," esp. 284.

⁹¹ See, for instance, Nelson, "Civil Society Endangered;" Jiri Pehe, "Civil Society at Issue in the Czech Republic," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty East European Report [3.32] 19 August 1994; 1994; Dahrendorf, Reflections on the Revolution in Europe; and the quoted essay by Sztopka.

⁹² Sztopka, "The Intangibles and Imponderables of the Transition to Democracy," esp. 309-10. See also Bryant, The new great transformation?, 73-5. Eckstein has emphasized that "laying long-run foundations for democracy means to democratize, as much as possible, social life in general." Eckstein, "Congruence Theory Explained," 28. According to Putnam, pluralist societies contain numerous intermediary associations through which traditions of independent civic

has emphasized that "the corner will be turned" toward a stable and genuine democracy only to the degree that "an enlarged public political sphere is created" and the norms of a participatory democratic culture are "firmly and generally accepted."⁹³ According to Nelson, the transformation of political life away from authoritarianism and toward a genuine plural and participatory democracy "depends, ultimately, on citizenship." And citizenship in the broader sense is "not a matter of procedure and institutional roles as much as it is an artifact of culture, comprised of attitudes, norms, and expectations, molded by historical experiences. As the public realm expands. . . citizens become 'legitimizers' with expectations for responsive political institutions and leaders."⁹⁴

Unless the post-communist societies (re-) construct their respective public spheres, they will have to fear the *inertia of authoritarian, illiberal, and centralist tendencies*, and "tutelary powers", often accompanied by a distorted populism in the interpretation of politics, as well as the paralyzing effects of corruption.⁹⁵ It seems that for Eastern European societies, in order to overcome the postcommunist legacy it is inevitable - as they in some cases have only weak (or no) traditions of civil society -

engagement are established. Such associations are said to "instill in their members habits of cooperation, solidarity, and public-spiritedness." Robert D. Putnam, "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital," *Journal of Democracy* 6.1 (1995): 65 and Putnam, *Making Democracy Work* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 89-90. In the same vein, Fleron and Ahl have maintained that "[A]ccustomed as they were to 'passive reliance on the state,' the publics in former communist countries must learn the norms of reciprocity, public trust, and civic engagement." Fleron and Ahl, "Does the Public Matter?," 295.

⁹³ Nelson, "Civil Society Endangered," 351.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 352.

⁹⁵ See the mentioned work of Tismaneanu (1992), Hohmann (1995), and Crawford and Lijphart (1995).

that they undergo the process of identifying (or reidentifying) their broader interests first, and second design a feasible strategy which could be implemented within a reasonable time-frame. In the process, a new social consciousness should be created that would absorb both the plurality of interests and civil and democratic values. Only then consolidated democracy will be able to resist the threat of degenerating into authoritarian populism and to accommodate the new challenges and cleavages emerging in the process of transformation.

From the perspective of the political-culture requirements, until the typical (mass) societal culture is congruent with the *adequate* culture (i.e. fully supportive of the optimally construed democratic institutions), the continuing "disappointments and frustrations with the processes of post-communist transition" can be expected.⁹⁶ Within this context, the overcoming of *the postcommunist mind* is closely connected to the perspective of the creation of both the necessary democratic and market institutions and a civil society, as defined both in terms of the possibility of creating an autonomous space independent of the state and in terms of the accepted orientation of society towards modern democratic and civic political values and patterns.⁹⁷ Expectedly, hindering these tasks will also be the fact that strong links have persisted between the *ex-nomenklatura* economic elite and ex-communist politicians, which created a new semi-monopolist ruling class that holds power in most sectors of the public sphere, often with little room for real competition in political or economic processes.

⁹⁶ Sztompka, "Looking Back: The Year 1989 as a Cultural and Civilizational Break," 125.

⁹⁷ In this respect, a major shift seems also desirable in distribution of political skills, as recognized by Inglehart, e.g. from "elite-directed" activities to "elite-challenging" style of politics. Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society, 5.

The social and economic reforms will inevitably be painful and protracted. The problem of the new social and economic polarization has become particularly outstanding; the majority of the region's citizens have been taken off guard by its speed and scope. There have undoubtedly been winners and losers in the process.⁹⁸ So far, in these countries, little systematic research has been done on the conditions of those who have been losing, and adding to that, the large segments of the citizenry who do not believe that the new differences in economic status are fair and deserved. While under communism, people used to believe that honest, hard work should be rewarded and they detested the "career-seeking" communists who always found a roundabout way to get perks and to get into positions of power without much "real" work, now many ordinary citizens have been disenchanted in finding the continuing corrupt practices and often lost faith that honest work would be justly appreciated. Most of them, being denied access to ownership of the means of production and capital - which have been typically taken over by the new or old-new elite - feel helpless and betrayed.⁹⁹

In terms of prospects for the success or failure of the transformation, the democratic and market reforms should be considered as being highly interdependent.

⁹⁸ For example, in Poland, Jacek Kuroń estimated losers in 1993 at 30 percent and the winners at 70 percent. This may be rather misleading, since in his assessment "winners" are those who are not worse off than before the reform (thus "big" winners are only a small percentage of that). See Louisa Vinton, "Dissonance: Poland on the Eve of New Elections," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report 2.33 (20 Aug. 1993): 5.

⁹⁹ And, of course, with continuing differentiation, the concept of a "solidarity-type" civil society seems to have been abandoned in a new fragmentation through economic individualism and competition. As it has been noted, as a result of the differentiation process "solidarity [if any has been left] of the suppressed had to end, since democracy involves cleavages and conflicts. See Beyme, Transition to Democracy in Eastern Europe, 41.

One of the plausible perspectives indicates that once a solid economic performance translates into higher living standards for larger segments of the population, political apathy and languishing civil society may be overcome.¹⁰⁰ Moreover, it is evident that citizens' commitment to viable democratic participatory values suffers considerably in conditions of economic insecurity and social and economic polarization. Nonetheless, to create regularly working market institutions (as has become evident), will be difficult since it is perhaps impossible to simply transplant or create the institutions which would guarantee a well functioning market economy. The institutionalist approach to economic and social history as I have explained it in chapter II, calls for a complex system of legal, political and social structures supported by an appropriate culture, all of which took five centuries to establish in the West and a further 200-250 years "to civilize to a socially acceptable system."¹⁰¹ In this process, for some time to come the institutional system underlying the nominally established democratic political order will perhaps be only one of the weaker determinants of overall development. Very likely, the main causative role will be played by economic conditions (and the

¹⁰⁰ See Lipset, "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited," American Sociological Review 59 (Feb. 1994): 1-22.; Rueschemeyer et al., Capitalist Development and Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); and also Gibson, "Political and Economic Markets: Changes in the Connections Between Attitudes Toward Political Democracy and a Market Economy Within the Mass Culture of Russia and Ukraine," The Journal of Politics 58.4 (Nov. 1996): 954-84. Gibson, for instance, has found in several ECE/EE countries a "fairly strong relationship between support for democratic institutions and processes and support for market-based institutions and processes." Gibson, *ibid.*, 967.

¹⁰¹ Hans Aage, "Transition and Transplantation of Economic Systems," The Aftermath of "Real Existing Socialism" in Eastern Europe, ed. Anne Lorentzen and Marianne Rostgaard (London: Macmillan Press, Inc., 1997), 18. See also North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance.

social implications of them, such as, e.g. unemployment).¹⁰²

In the post-communist transformations, all levels of psycho-social and politico-cultural inheritance (including those pertaining to the PCM) have been involved and have interacted with transforming institutions. The prospects regarding both the future effects of PCM symptoms on the transformation process and the fate of this process itself are difficult to predict. For many years to come, the negative consequences of this inheritance will include tendencies identified within the PCM, as well as others, such as an authoritarian style of leadership, distrust of open dialogue and public process, excessive personalization of the political realm, fragmentation of the opposition, instability of political parties, etc.¹⁰³ The issue of decommunization, as described in section IV.4.5, will also reverberate in these societies and its resolution will be among the requirements of the successful transition. In terms of the individual ethical dimension of decommunization, one has to agree with Havel that there is perhaps little politics can do about individual ethics. The divide between "guilt and innocence passes through everybody's conscience, through the heart of each man and woman."¹⁰⁴ But certain important steps, as indicated, can be taken only by the state. Here, one should not forget that in many Eastern European countries, former communist parties play an important part (sometimes decisive) in political and economic institutions - which, of course, makes the task of the completion of decommunization of the respective

¹⁰² Having in mind this complexity of potential change, Marody has noted that "[I]n this situation, the attitudes and habits that are the result of . . . socialism may continue to form people's reactions to social reality, resulting in a particular version of *adaptation to democracy*." Marody, "The Political Attitudes of Polish Society in the Period of Systemic Transitions," 266 (emphasis in the original).

¹⁰³ We have seen, however, that in some countries, certain trends have partially been reversed.

¹⁰⁴ Here quoted from Tismaneanu, Fantasies of Salvation. Democracy, Nationalism, and Myth in Post-Communist Europe, 113.

societies impossible. As Anne Applebaum has warned, until this situation is reversed, "politics will not become 'normal' in any Western sense in Central Europe or elsewhere in the former Warsaw Pact."¹⁰⁵

Eventually, the problem of post-communist countries is double-sided: it lies both in the inertia of its society and in the incompleteness and corruption of state institutions. "*The universal problem of postcommunism* [which cuts across the enormous variety of countries involved]," Holmes has suggested, "*is the crisis of governability*." Most of the countries still lack a meritocratic, efficient, non-partisan and law-governed civil service with modern managerial skills and produces political elites with little experience with practical democracy. According to D. Rustow, there must first "be a conscious adaptation of democratic rules" and then "both politicians and electorate must be habituated to these rules."¹⁰⁶ Even if political-liberal and market institutions are formally imposed, one can expect difficulties in their implementation and functioning. Civic institutions and traditions cannot be imposed from above and below; these are usually the result of initiatives and responses from both the elites and the masses.¹⁰⁷

There is reason, however, according to Sztompka, for the long-range optimism that the "*consolidation of political and economic institutions with the requisite cultural foundations* is the feasible though distant prospect."¹⁰⁸ The post-communist political

¹⁰⁵ Anne Applebaum, "The Real Danger in Eastern Europe," The Globe and Mail 29 Nov. 1994: 13.

¹⁰⁶ Dankwart Rustow, "Transition to Democracy," Comparative Politics 2 (Apr. 1970): 344-5.

¹⁰⁷ See also Hoffmann, "Democratic Theories and Authority Patterns," 113.

¹⁰⁸ Sztompka, "Looking Back: The Year 1989 as a Cultural and Civilizational Break," 128 (emphasis in the original).

culture and the PCM are, of course, both emergent and adapting. They are also convergent in the direction required by the new ideological and institutional paradigm - which, though for some time incomplete, exercises its own attraction. As some have suggested, one can envisage prospects in which the "acceptance of a given set of constitutional rules becomes widespread, valued and routinized,"¹⁰⁹ or when "the ensemble of rules and institutions jells into regular, acceptable and predictable patterns that can reproduce themselves over time and command the allegiance of citizens."¹¹⁰ If this is the case, one could speak (as Sztopmka has suggested) of a true consolidation of institutions and *adequacy* of culture and completion of the transformation.¹¹¹

One must be aware that outcomes of the democratic process, especially those involving inherent contradictions and unstable factors, are uncertain and indeterminate *ex ante*. This uncertainty exacerbated by the dichotomy (I have pointed out in Chapter I) which at its most basic, is whether countries follow particular patterns of development as emanating from the forms of their institutions or whether democracy is (as, for instance, Di Palma has argued) rather contingent on the active choices of

¹⁰⁹ Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, "The Challenges of Consolidation," Journal of Democracy 5.4 (1994): 6.

¹¹⁰ Schmitter is quoted in Sztopmka, "Looking Back: The Year 1989 as a Cultural and Civilizational Break," 128. A modified, functionalist version of the former approach suggests that there is a necessary (if not yet specified) link between a given country's level of socio-economic development and democratization; i.e. once a certain level of development has been achieved, then democracy follows almost inevitably. See also Seymour Martin Lipset, "Reflections on Capitalism, Socialism & Democracy," Journal of Democracy 4.2 (April 1993); Mancur Olson, "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development," American Political Science Review 87.3 (Sept. 1993): 567-576; and Rueschemeyer et al., Capitalist Development and Democracy.

¹¹¹ Sztopmka, *ibid.*, 119.

citizens.¹¹² According to Przeworski, it is "'the people,' political forces competing to promote their interests and values," rather than lifeless institutions, who determine "what these outcomes will be."¹¹³ From this standpoint of political and economic subjects and agents, solutions will thus include the citizens having to "adjust personal goals and aspirations, reevaluate life plans, and find new ways to participate in the political life of their communities and nations."¹¹⁴ As Kolarska-Bobinska has pointed

¹¹² See Di Palma, "Parliaments, consolidation, institutionalization: a minimalist view;" also Miller et al., Values and Political Change in Postcommunist Europe.

¹¹³ Przeworski 1991, Democracy and the Market, 10. Some requirements mentioned in this section may be seen as pre-conditions for the gradual "fading away" of the vestiges of the PCM and the assertion of a new "cultural complex" (Sztompka), fitted appropriately to the demands of the new institutions of political democracy and an economic market. See Sztompka, "Looking Back: The Year 1989 as a Cultural and Civilizational Break," 128. Leslie Holmes has identified four factors that might be involved in determining "which path (scenario) will be taken by a given post-communist state in the future: political culture, quality of leadership, the international economic climate, and economic performance. Even if one disagrees with his choice of determinants (since he seems to have collapsed the institution and nation building under "quality of leadership"), his inclusions point rightly to the complexity of the issue. See Holmes, Post-Communism, 345.

¹¹⁴ Kovacs and Maggard, "The Human Face of Political, Economic, and Social Change in Eastern Europe," 339. For instance, according to a public opinion survey conducted by the Public Opinion sociological fund in Russia in early 1997, 59 percent of Russian citizens claim they have not yet adjusted to life in the post-Soviet era. According to a survey of 1,500 Russians in different parts of the country only 25 percent say they feel comfortable in the current setting. The remaining 16% were undecided. As expected, young and educated citizens "have had the best time of it." Whereas 38 percent of the respondents with a higher education and 33 percent of those aged under 30 consider themselves well adapted to new conditions, only 16% of the respondents over 55 with a higher education, and 16% with an incomplete general education feel the same (Interfax 1997). The prevailing "materialist" value-orientation will further complicate the situation, especially in the present state of cultural and participatory void. According to recent Mason's findings, people in all postcommunist countries ranked materialist values higher than postmaterialist values, with the predominance of materialist values over postmaterialist substantially higher than in a control group in Western countries. Mason, "Justice, Socialism, and Participation in the Postcommunist States," 74-76.

out, the task of being able to meaningfully enter the public sphere and influence politics, would also require "a reevaluation of people's attitudes toward the law and state institutions."¹¹⁵ One can only hope that there exist some by and large universal rationalities, both in public life and in individual private activities, which, as has been suggested, could be unified and operate together on one fundamental level. Only under this condition can "individuals become the rightful 'producers' of the social system rather than mere passive 'consumers' whose destiny and success depend each time on the good will . . . of those people holding power over them."¹¹⁶

In the final analysis, the positive disappearance of the PCM (and to a certain degree the fate of the transformation as such) will be determined by the hard-to-predict

Many people's concerns are based mostly on economic factors rather than ideological ones. This existential positioning is what Karl Mannheim had in mind when he noted that to the extent most people do have an ideology, it is bound up with their own existing life situation.

¹¹⁵ Kolarska-Bobinska, "Civil Society and Social Anomy in Poland," 66. These deficiencies may be, with a little bit of a cruel overstatement, characterized, along the lines suggested by Goldman, by limited ability to govern themselves. Goldman, Revolution and Change in Central and Eastern Europe, 27. Also at stake is what typology of state will emerge. For instance, Mares et al. 1994 have argued that in the case of the Czech Republic, it likely "won't be the liberal welfare state" based primarily on the principle of equality of opportunities. According to them, this type "would hardly be acceptable for the majority of the Czech population, who favour paternalism." Petr Mares et al., "Values and the welfare state in Czechoslovakia," in The new great transformation?, ed. Christopher G.A. Bryant and Edmund Mokrzycky (New York: Routledge, 1994), 86-7.

¹¹⁶ Poznanski, "Epilogue," in Constructing Capitalism, 175. According to Kolarska-Bobinska, the better future depends largely on improved articulation of the genuine interest-groups politics, which has been paralyzed by "the liquidity of the ever-changing situation." According to her, "one might advance the hypothesis that in the future the crystalization and representation of group interests will play a more essential role in the self-organization of society." Kolarska-Bobinska, "Civil Society and Social Anomy in Poland," 68. Mandler has emphasized the role of education and science, esp. rationalism in "overpowering degeneration and passions." Mandler, "Poznámky k selhání české praxe."

dynamics involving the relationship between the human capacity for adaptability and flexibility, and the continuing inertia of internalized (habitual) values and codes. This latter socio-psychological sphere will evolve into a dialectical interaction with the broad social environment in general, and with the developing political and economic institutions in particular. My findings are thus not to be interpreted in the sense that the surviving characteristics of the PCM block or revert democratization; they make it slower and more difficult and problematic. But since East Europeans, as consciously motivated actors, are capable of exercising their freedom of choice of human action, the direction of the transformation of their societies will eventually be determined by the way they individually and collectively rise to the occasion of making free and proper choices.¹¹⁷

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¹¹⁷ As Bronislaw Geremek, the veteran of Polish anti-communist opposition remarked in 1992, "The process [of building democracy] is one of gradual maturation, both of democracy itself and of people in the ways of democracy." Here quoted from Sztompka, "Looking Back: The Year 1989 as a Cultural and Civilizational Break," 128. Although post-communism has proven to be more psycho-socially and morally complicated than expected and had struggled with the past, some have even believed that these struggles, as much as they are inevitable, may also bring some invigoration for the region's health. See Karpinski, "True Confessions."

Appendix 1

Fig. A Continuity of the Political Culture Context

See also Koralewicz, et. al., "Changes in Polish Social Consciousness during the 1970s and 1980s," esp. Fig. "The social structure: discrepancies between ideology, social facts, and social perception," 7.

Fig. B Culture and socialization: Interaction in the Action Frame of Reference

Description:

(1) ego (an actor) is in a "situation," i.e. an objective context; (2) ego cognitively decodes that context and invests it with feeling (cathexis) and meaning; (3) the manner of investing situations with meaning is acquired through socialization, which consists mainly of early learning (which results may be in aggregate called a society's "culture"; (4) socialization leads to the internalization of meanings and their institutionalization; (5) cognitions and affective responses to them define goals and ways to pursue them; (6) cognitions, feelings, and goals are communicated to alter (another actor) through the use of symbolic expressions of culture; (7) alter responses, changing the situation in some respect, so that the process resumes. See Eckstein, Regarding Politics, esp. Fig.7-1, 281 and 283.

Appendix 2

Paradoxes of Inherent Conditions in Eastern European Transformation.

The objectives and the process of transformation have been marked by multiple paradoxes. They can be seen as inseparable from the starting conditions and as representing inherently contradictory requirements of the post-communist transformational project.

1. "The Paradox of the State."

The post-communist state declared as one of its main goals to give up its all-pervasive and omniscient role. At the same time, the state has an obligation to manage, at least temporarily, the transitional processes which are prohibitively complex in their nature. The debate about the proper role of the state in creating conditions for transformations has been inconclusive, and is reflected in the tentative status of reforms.

2. "The Paradox of Elites."

The "new" or "reform" elites often rose up from among the old communist cadres, since under the totalitarian regime others had been excluded from acquiring the necessary skills. This has perpetuated many old (non-democratic) attitudes and habits and prevented genuine democratization. The process of recruiting by communism untainted elites has been blocked by the old ones and has proven difficult for other reasons as well. This paradox is mirrored by

3. "the Paradox of Capitalism."

At the centre of it is the concept of de-nationalization (privatization) and the creation of a capitalist class (entrepreneurial elite). The outstanding issue here is how to reconcile requisites of legality, effectiveness, and fairness in the process of privatization in an environment in which virtually no one had (legally acquired) means to buy larger state-owned assets. At the same time, almost no one, except for the former nomenklatura, has the expertise necessary to manage the economy and individual companies. The ultimate question is whether a market can develop an appropriate normative order under conditions in which the ethics and practices of the old system (hardly consistent with those required by the workings of the markets) are perpetuated.

4. "The Paradox of the Standard of Living."

In many countries, the pressure that resulted in the collapse of old regimes had

been mostly economic, not ideological. While the old economic system has been in the process of being dismantled with a new one being created, the masses have suffered from a deterioration in their standard of living - the opposite of what their intention had been to achieve. Opinion on how to compensate for the social costs vary widely; not surprisingly they include demands for old securities - perhaps a "capitalism with a human face."

5. "The Paradox of Democracy."

According to standard theories, a certain level of economic development creates conditions for democracy to evolve and take root. If democracy precedes economic development, there is a danger that conflicts, which in the early phases of transformation inevitably arise, cannot be solved because of a lack of economic resources.

6. "The Paradox of Time."

The ad hoc timing, sequencing and "time-horizons" of individual transformational steps (and their synchronization) have negatively affected the fate of many reform policies, while these time-factors have generally been underestimated. From the point of view of reform support, it seems vital that relatively good economic performance and a better standard of living be reached as soon as possible. This is obviously virtually impossible; the realistic time horizon for comprehensive reforms to materialize and yield results would probably be in decades and generations. Meanwhile, the patience of the population at large may have its limits.

Such contradictory conditions and requirements have become part of the underlying paradox of post-communist transformation: that of "Worn-out Faith and Trust." On one hand, Eastern Europeans were asked to embrace values that had once been vigorously rejected by their communist elite. On the other, their hopes and efforts have often been in vain. They have also been deprived of the opportunity of having congenial models and "how-to-do" books that would guide them. Without seeing the results around the corner, less privileged groups and individuals, often comprising a majority of the population, have lost their faith that ultimate results will be worth all the sacrifice.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁸ See Jiri S. Melich, "The Crisis of Models: Capitalism and Democracy in Transition in Eastern Europe," a paper presented at the ASN Annual Convention at Columbia University, New York, 19 April 1998, 2-3.

Appendix 3

The DELPHI Questionnaire. [The Form.]

Issue: The legacy of communist rule: *Communist and post-communist political culture. The impact of the "post-communist mind" on the current transformation processes in Eastern Europe.*

Please answer the following questions by marking a number (1 to 4) into a table.

Questions:

1. Which political culture characteristics/dispositions would you *expect* (as individually or collectively typical) as a result of the long-term experience with the communist system?

2. Do you think that such a characteristic (disposition) *can actually be identified* (found) in one or more post-communist countries?

3. Do you think that such a characteristic *may affect* the course of transformation toward democracy and a market economy?

Please fill in:

- for the first two questions:

"1" - for NO /Not relevant

"2" - for Applies to certain groups only

"3" - for YES / I agree

"4" - for I don't know / I am not sure

- for the third question:

"1" - for NO

"2" - for Partially

"3" - for Significantly

"4" - for I don't know / I am not sure

Characteristic / Disposition	Expectation	Existence	Impact
a) Mistrust of politics / politicians			
b) Authoritarian attitudes			
c) "Utopian thinking" - unrealistic expectations (UE) about democracy			
d) Political apathy			
e) UE about capitalist economy			
f) Tendency to anarchism			
g) Preference of social equality			
h) Expectation of social security			
i) "Bad" work ethics/habits			
j) Preference of social solidarity over individualism and competition			
k) Feelings of guilt for not opposing the communist regime (enough)			
l) Disregard for formal law			
m) Avoidance of the public sphere for the private one			
n) Modesty			
o) Propensity to corruption /dishonesty in making deals			
p) Inability to use language adequately within the public sphere			
q) People suffer from "post-totalitarian pathology", namely, "inner confusion about their life goals"			

r) Miscomprehension of the workings of a democratic system			
s) Underestimation of "the art of compromise"			

Comments:

.....

Note:

A relatively high level of "subjectivity" in responses is assumed in this questionnaire. Suggestion: you may wish to compare the individual dispositions /values as supposedly occurring in post-communist Eastern Europe with the corresponding ones in an advanced Western society you are familiar with.

Appendix 4: Tables

Table 4.1 Free, Partly Free and Unfree Post-Communist Countries *)

Country:	Position on 7-point scale: 1 equals freest
Czech R.	1.5
Estonia	1.5
Hungary	1.5
Poland	1.5
Slovenia	1.5
Latvia	2.0
Bulgaria	2.5
Romania	2.5
Slovakia	3.0
Macedonia	3.5
Moldova	3.5
Russia	3.5
Ukraine	3.5
Albania	4.0
Croatia	4.0
Belarus	6.0

Source: Freedom House, 1997, 6. Here quoted from Richard Rose et al., Democracy and its Alternatives, 19.

*) A freedom index created by Freedom House evaluates regimes on twenty-one civil and political rights. On the details of individual indices and the scaling system, see Freedom House, 1997, and also Richard Rose et al., Democracy and its Alternatives, 17-20.

Table 4.2 Evaluation of the Regime Change after 1989. ("Is the current regime, compared to the pre-1989 regime, better or worse?"); in %

The current regime is:	Poland	Hungary	Slovakia	Czech R.
Much better	17.9	3.8	8.4	26.2
A little better	32.8	27.6	35.1	44.6
About the same	26.2	28.8	21.6	13.5
A little worse	11.5	30.7	19.9	11.3
Much worse	11.6	9.1	15.0	4.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Survey: Democracy and Societal Changes, 1991, in Machonin et al., *Česká společnost v transformaci*, 313.

Table 4.3 The Major Values of the Official Political Culture: Hierarchical Value-Ordering of Political Messages

a) East Central Europe

Value:*) / Country:	Czechosl.	GDR	Hungary	Poland
Leading role of party	H	H	M	H
Socialist construction	H	H	H	H
Socialist morality	M	H	M	M
Anti-imperialism	H	M	L	L
Antibourgeois values	M	M	L	L
Soc. internationalism	M	M	L	L
Anti-individualism	M	M	L	M
Socialist patriotism	M	L	M	H
Antireligious values	M	L	L	L

b) South-East Europe

Value: / Country:	Albania	Bulgaria	Romania	Yugoslavia
Leading role of party	H	H	H	M
Socialist construction	H	H	H	M
Socialist morality	H	L	H	M
Anti-imperialism	H	M	M	L
Antibourgeois values	H	M	H	L
Soc. internationalism	L	M	L	L
Anti-individualism	H	L	M	L
Socialist patriotism	H	M	H	M
Antireligious values	M	M	M	L

Source: The table is an amended and expanded version from Ivan Volgyes, Politics in Eastern Europe, 293.

*) H = High; L = Low; M = Medium

The ranking of values reflects the situation as it existed in the early 1980s.

In the case of Czechoslovakia there existed a distinct value-ordering variance in Slovakia, particularly regarding the emphasis by the Slovak political elite on Slovak patriotism.

Table 4.4 The Belief and Practice of Communism in five ECE/EE Countries

Question: / Country:	Were you ever a member of the CP?	Did you ever believe in communist ideals?	Do you believe in them now?
Czech R.	21%	29%	15%
Slovakia	16%	36%	23%
Hungary	12%	29%	21%
Ukraine	11%	52%	17%
Russia	12%	60%	19%

Source: W. L. Miller et al., Values and Political Change in Postcommunist Europe. Table 4.1, 85. (The POS were conducted between the end of 1993 and the beginning of 1996.)

Table 4.5 General Perception of Politics and Country's Readiness for Democracy in five ECE/EE Countries

Opinion: / Country:	Politics is too complicated *)	Country not yet ready for democracy
Czech R.	72%	53%
Slovakia	78%	64%
Hungary	84%	65%
Ukraine	83%	76%
Russia	83%	70%

Source: W. L. Miller et al., Values and Political Change in Postcommunist Europe. Table 8.1, 142. (The POS were conducted between the end of 1993 and the beginning of 1996.)

*) "Politics is so complicated that I often cannot understand what's going on."

Note: "I don't know" answers excluded from calculation.

Table 4.6 "Liberal Values" in five ECE/EE Countries¹¹⁹

Value: / Country:	Overall	Glasnost	Anti- order	Tole- rance	Protest	Law- based gov.
Czech R.	78%	70%	50%	29%	84%	70%
Slovakia	74%	65%	53%	19%	75%	71%
Hungary	62%	71%	14%	21%	75%	70%
Ukraine	67%	90%	18%	12%	70%	69%
Russia	64%	89%	19%	8%	71%	68%

Source: W. L. Miller et al., Values and Political Change in Postcommunist Europe. Table 8.11, 1555. (The POS were conducted between the end of 1993 and the beginning of 1996.)

¹¹⁹ Percentage has been taken above the mid-point (3.0) on composite measures of liberal values. The composite indicator of Overall Liberalism is the average of the scores on the five components. Each scale run from 1 to 5 with 3 as the neutral point - thus over 3 means more liberal than authoritarian. See Miller et al., 155.

Table 4.7 Comparisons: Socialist Values (socialist welfare)

Country: / Value:	Britain	Ukraine + Russia	ECE*)
Govt. responsible for health care:			
Politicians	99%	95%	81%
People	98%	91%	91%
Govt. responsible for full empl.:			
Politicians	65%	74%	30%
People	78%	89%	72%
Govt. resp. for adequate housing:			
Politicians	90%	62%	40%
People	91%	82%	80%
Govt. resp. for equalizing wealth:			
Politicians	52%	45%	51%
People	51%	49%	63%
Equality / welfare more important than freedom:			
People	64%	49%	63%

Source: W. L. Miller et al., Values and Political Change in Postcommunist Europe. Table 20.2, 392. (The POS were conducted between the end of 1993 and the beginning of 1996.)

*) ECE = the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary.

Table 4.8 Best Time This Century for Your Country: Generational Perspectives in five ECE/EE Countries

Generation: /Country*)/Period:	18-34 years	35-54 years	55 years and older
CR: Dubcek	4%	24%	20%
: Husak *)	(7%)	(7%)	(7%)
: Dem. CSR	21%	20%	17%
: Now	28%	22%	14%
Slo: Indep 39-45	8%	6%	17%
: Husak *)	(18%)	(18%)	(18%)
: Dem. CSR	36%	29%	13%
: Now	21%	18%	17%
Hung: Horthy	4%	3%	15%
: Kadar	14%	21%	13%
: Now	19%	12%	11%
Ukr: Brezhnev	77%	79%	75%
: Now	6%	8%	10%
Rus: Tsars	24%	18%	8%
: Stalin	5%	6%	18%
: Brezhnev	51%	62%	65%
: Now	13%	10 %	7%

Source: W. L. Miller et al., Values and Political Change in Postcommunist Europe. Table 13.12, 243. (The POS were conducted between the end of 1993 and the beginning of 1996.)

*) Average for all the population.

Note: "I don't know" answers excluded from calculation.

CR = the Czech Republic; Slo = Slovakia; Hung = Hungary; Ukr = Ukraine; Rus = Russia.

Appendix 5: The Media: Samples of Opinion

Economic and Psychological Crisis Erodes Russian Mentality

By Mikhail Gorshkov (Director-General of the Russian Independent Institute of Social and Ethnic Studies and First Vice-President of the Russian Academy of Sciences' Sociological Society).

Since 1993 the Russian Independent Institute of Social and Ethnic Studies has conducted the sociological monitoring of public consciousness in the conditions of social transformation. Eleven nationwide studies have been conducted within the framework of this project, which focused on the state and dynamics of Russians' value orientations and social sentiments and feelings.

In each case 2,000 to 2,200 respondents aged 18 and over and representing 11 large social and professional population groups (industrial workers, miners and construction workers; humanitarian and artistic intellectuals; engineers; trade, utilities and transport workers; civil servants; servicemen and law enforcement officers; small- and medium-size business managers; university students; pensioners; farmers; unemployed) were polled in 14 Russian regions.

All studies (the latest was conducted IN April 1997) were conducted on the basis of interviews of proportional numbers of people as to their sex, age, nationality, urbanisation of the environment, social status and occupation. The results of the research, conducted by similar methods and using a similar sampling structure, ensure the strict comparability of the data received and make it possible to determine not only the specific qualities of the state of mass consciousness in a particular situation, but also the dynamics and orientation of the changes that occur in it under the impact of the reforms in Russian society. [. . .]

The results of a sociological monitoring conducted for many years allow one to speak about the existence of two fundamentally different trends in the dynamics of the basic value orientations of the Russian population since 1993.

The first trend covers a 3-year period (1993-1995) and reflects the stability of Russians' main values. Despite numerous hardships and the collapse of many old ideals and living standards, the hierarchy of value orientations remained practically unchanged. The predominant values comprised the values connected with man's feeling comfortable in his inner world and microcosm: calm conscience, family, friends and interesting work. The least respected values were power, popularity and success; material values were well down the list. (A similar trend was noted in the representative studies made under the direction of N. I. Lapin, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, in 1990-1994. Therefore, a more accurate time-frame for the first trend is 1990-1995.)

The second trend began to manifest itself in the spring and summer of 1996 and it still continues, reflecting qualitative changes in the erosion of the once stable and traditional value systems in Russia. The moral values, which always prevailed in Russian mentality, are beginning to give way to purely material and pragmatic interests. Some basic values have simply changed into their opposite.

Thus, [at the end of 1995] 2/3 of the Russians preferred such values as freedom to those of material well-being, while now 2/3 of our fellow-countrymen value material well-being far more than freedom. About 30 percent of the Russians have entirely changed their minds about the importance of these two basic values.

In the same way a value such as an interesting and intellectually rewarding job has swapped places with a well-paid job and this change of values has affected almost the same one-third of the population.

There is yet another tendency that merits attention. The current standards of everyday life have brought about a major shift in attitude to such an important value for most Russian as clear conscience. During all the preceding years of sociological monitoring this value topped the list of the Russians' value preferences (almost 95 percent of the Russians emphasised the importance of having a clear conscience), whereas now two-thirds of Russia's population prefer a clear conscience to power, success and influence. Over the past year the share of people who value power more than a clear conscience has risen from 6 percent to 18 percent.

It should be noted that the number of people who previously valued equal opportunities for all has declined significantly, while the number of people with egalitarian tendencies, who value equal incomes more than equal opportunities, has increased.

Russia in a State of Mental Confusion.

The dramatic changes that have taken place in the Russians' system of values during the last year have affected the system of democratic values too. Russians have come to value far less the law and democratic institutions such as political pluralism, elected parliament, elections and referendums. At the same time, more people have come to favour the authoritarian methods of gov. and a strong leader capable of restoring law and order in this country. Most Russians increasingly come to believe that ordinary people mean nothing in this country and that it is ruled by those who have more wealth and power. More than half the country's population are convinced that there are no effective means of influencing the power structures in Russia. Hence the lowest level of public trust in all political institutions in Russia since the beginning of the reform.

There has been a significant increase (from 30 percent to 50 percent) in the number of people with so-called ambivalent consciousness, which is manifest in the

split personality syndrome, a simultaneous attraction to opposite values. One of the examples of this seemingly paradoxical combination is many Russians' attraction to both democracy and a strong leader. Many people in this country regard the elections, a free press and parliament as sheer decorations while attaching great importance to the direct methods of electing the head of state and refusing to support the dissolution of parliament or the restriction of free speech. [. . .]

The same data also explain the causes of growth of the aggression potential in society. In 1995 only 6 percent of Russians said they were prepared to resort to violence if their standard of living sharply deteriorated, whereas by the last spring this figure had risen to 13 percent (15 percent of servicemen).

It should be noted that psychological and emotional stress particularly affected the population groups which represented the traditional Russian mentality and the strong sense that "everything is going to the dogs" was compounded by the loss of the habitual means of subsistence and traditional standards and ways of life and confusion about "what's good and what's bad" today.

It is clear that the persistent hardships and psychological stress in this part of the population have led to a qualitative shift in the Russians' system of values, which represents an attempt to adapt to the new conditions of life. Since the old system of values failed to ensure effective survival in recent years and people could not influence things around them, their only adequate reaction was an attempt to change themselves and review their principles and system of values.

A Conflict of Values?

What is the overall situation then? Are the dramatic changes in the Russians' system of values temporary and will change back as the country's social and economic problems are resolved? Or are we witnessing a kind of revolution in the Russians' system of values, which will take a long time and have a great impact on the moral image of Russian society?

It's hard to give an absolute answer to these questions now. Further analysis of the dynamics of people's value orientations is needed. Yet, the results of the research conducted by the Russian Independent Institute of Social and Ethnic Studies allows one to draw some conclusions.

There are two different systems of values in Russia today. One is oriented towards the Western-type post-industrial individualist model and the other is connected with traditional Russian mentality and oriented to the patriarchal-collectivist model. Several years ago there was no clear borderline between these two models, whereas now there are two very distinct groups.

The results of our research make it possible to determine their approximate size. A year or a year and a half ago nearly 30 percent of Russia's population embraced the individualist system of values, whereas now the hardships brought by

the reforms have reduced their share to no more than 20-22 percent. The traditionalist system of values was embraced by 35-40 percent of the country's population in 1995, whereas now the hardships brought by the reforms have increased this share to 45-47 percent.

The rest of the population (30-35 percent) HAVE a contradictory system of values. People in this group are characterised by a split consciousness and may embrace mutually exclusive values. This group is growing at the expense of the group embracing the Western-type individualist system of values. At the same time, the group representing the traditionalist system of values is expanding at the former's expense.

So, the process of erosion of the traditional system of values proceeds by two ways, as it were: it is eroded from inside as people change some of their basic values and from outside as people without any established life orientations flow in. The data obtained by monitoring serve to show that all the groups are currently undergoing the process of rethinking and self-determination.

Will this process continue peacefully and without even people who are involved in it noticing it or will it at some point evolve into a major civil confrontation and struggle for the right to interpret and impose the values of the new Russia? Judging by the current logic of the reform conducted in this country and taking into consideration Russia's historical experience, I cannot preclude a confrontation between two different systems of values and models of development. Will the young Russian reformers be far-sighted and clever enough to avert such a confrontation? This is the question.

Source: Nezavisimaya Gazeta-Scenarios No. 6 (1998): n. pag. (slightly reduced and emphasis by J.M.).

"When Was Living in Russia Easy?"

By Leonid Sedov.

Interviewers from Russia's Public Opinion Studies Centre (VTsIOM) asked this question of 1,502 respondents. . . . Questions could embrace any period in the 20th century from Tsar Nicholas II to President Yeltsin.

The results of the poll were anything but sensational. The pollsters got the not-unusual impression that many people are cherishing the good memories of yesterday and very few people are trying to live good amidst today's realities.

Answers as percentage of the total number of those polled and in descending order:

Life was good:	%
Under Leonid Brezhnev	41
Don't know	17
After 1991	14
Under Yuri Andropov	7
Under Nicholas II	6
Under Josef Stalin	6
Under Nikita Khrushchev	4
Under Mikhail Gorbachev	3
Under Vladimir Lenin	1

The dominating feeling is that the period of "realistic socialism," with its endless queues and rampant deficits, was the time of easy living and the highest living standards. There are another 14 percent of those who are favouring life in different periods of socialist history. The absolute majority of respondents thus believe that socialism was the best time in this country's life.

But for the absolute majority in this group this feeling bespeaks of neither political affiliation nor a sensible choice of a social order. Simply, 70 percent of them were young and socially active in Brezhnev's epoch. They are finding it hard to adapt to the realities of today. [. . .]

The adherents of Stalin and Khrushchev are much more politicised: they are mostly people of advanced age and low educational levels whose incomes are in the

medium bracket. Interestingly, Stalin's fans are found relatively more often in the small towns in the environs of the Urals and the Urals proper, in particular among representatives of the local ethnic minorities, while Khrushchev's devotees are mostly rural dwellers in Russia's European South.

Close to 60 percent in both groups are ready to back the Communists and the Communist Party on the whole, but 14 percent of the former and 20 percent of the latter sympathise with the democrats. On the other hand, among those whose life was (presumably) easy under Khrushchev, some 50 percent just love Alexander Lebed and 20 percent have a sympathy for Vladimir Zhirinovsky.

The predominant nostalgia is opposed by the very few people who believe that life has now become easier or was easier in the period before the October 1917 revolution. This vision is shared by 40 percent of university graduates under forty, 50 percent of business people, 48 percent of all kinds of students and a third of respondents in Moscow and St. Petersburg.

Presumably, the fact that 20 percent of the polled are young, socially active, well educated and liberally-minded may guarantee this nation against a repetition of the past. But nearly half the Russians are strictly apolitical, less than a third of them fan for the democratic-orientation parties, and very few support Boris Yeltsin and the 'party of power'.

Many people are living for the day and feeling good. They have known of no other times and give but little thought to the specificities of life today.

Source: Interfax-Argumenty i Fakty Nos. 1-2 (Jan. 1998): n. pag. (slightly reduced by J.M.).

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