Keeping the Inter-Agency Peace? A Comparative Study of Swedish, German, and British Whole-of-Government Approaches in Afghanistan

by

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Abstract

This study seeks to improve understanding of whole-of-government (WOG) approaches, as applied by nations that contribute civilian personnel and military forces to multinational peace operations. How do national WOG models vary, at country capitals and in the mission area? Why do WOG approaches vary – in time, as well as within and across countries? Focusing on the ISAF mission, this study develops a measuring tool for levels of civil-military coordination, and compares the experiences of Sweden, Germany, and the United Kingdom in Afghanistan, between 2001 and 2014. It then tests theories of bureaucratic politics, strategic culture, and principal-agent models to tease out the reasons for variation across the three case studies.

The results indicate that the structure of the political institutions in each country was a key determinant of WOG coherence. The German and Swedish coalition governments required excessive collective bargaining over all aspects of the Afghanistan engagement. This resulted in low to medium-level WOG models. By contrast, in the British single party majority system, WOG advances hinged upon the priorities of a single individual - the incumbent Prime Minister. Despite bureaucratic resistance, focusing events and negotiations over side issues allowed for progress in civil-military coherence. In the mission area, the degree of control headquarters exercised over deployed staff affected cooperation dynamics. On average, Swedish and German civilian ministries granted personnel less discretion to engage with the military than British departments. Finally, cultural factors indirectly shaped WOG narratives in each country.
Acknowledgements

I extend my sincere gratitude to all the women and men who shared their thoughts and experiences with me as part of this research.

This dissertation would not have been completed without the steadfast and relentless support of my academic advisor, Dr. Stephen Saideman, and Patricia Lacroix, Ph.D. Administrator at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs.

The text is dedicated to our three children, Rumyana, Bistra and Damyan, who all came into this world at various stages of the writing process.

To Ruslan I just want to say, you were right - we won.
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<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>Auswärtiges Amt (German Federal Foreign Office)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACCP</td>
<td>Africa Conflict Prevention Pool</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACT</td>
<td>Afghan Communications Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACTED</td>
<td>Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARTF</td>
<td>Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>BINUB</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMI</td>
<td>Bundesministerium des Innern (German Federal Ministry of the Interior)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMVg</td>
<td>Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (German Federal Ministry of Defense)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMZ</td>
<td>Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BP</td>
<td>Bureaucratic politics</td>
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<td>BSOB</td>
<td>Building Stability Overseas Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSOS</td>
<td>Building Stability Overseas Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Christian Democratic Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>United States Central Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIG</td>
<td>Conflict Issues Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMMH</td>
<td>Combined Civil-Military Mission in Helmand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Military commander, head of PRT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COB</td>
<td>Commander’s update brief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>Conflict Pool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>Conflict Prevention Pool</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSG</td>
<td>Civilian Stabilization Group</td>
</tr>
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<td>CSU</td>
<td>Christian Social Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCSU</td>
<td>Defence Cultural Specialist Unit</td>
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<td>DDA</td>
<td>District Development Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDC</td>
<td>District Development Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEVAD</td>
<td>Development Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department of International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>DST</td>
<td>District Stabilization Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUPOL</td>
<td>European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan</td>
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<td>FBA</td>
<td>Folke Bernadotte Academy</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>Free Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOB</td>
<td>Forward Operating Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOI</td>
<td>Swedish Defence Research Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCPPP</td>
<td>Global Conflict Prevention Pool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDC</td>
<td>German development cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>GIZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German Society for International Cooperation)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>HCDC</td>
<td>House of Commons Defence Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>HRBP</td>
<td>Helmand River Basin Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRM</td>
<td>Helmand Road Map</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISG</td>
<td>Interministerial Steering Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIL</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JACS</td>
<td>Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPH</td>
<td>Joint Plan for Helmand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSA</td>
<td>Joint Stabilization Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KfW</td>
<td>Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW Development Bank)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOT</td>
<td>Mobile Observation Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Moderate Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSGG</td>
<td>Military Stabilization Support Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSST</td>
<td>Military Stabilization Support Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAO</td>
<td>National Audit Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSF</td>
<td>National Security Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSID</td>
<td>National Security, International Relations and Development Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEF</td>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPTAG</td>
<td>Operational Training and Advisory Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Principal-agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAT</td>
<td>Provincial Advisory Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCRU</td>
<td>Peace and Conflict Reconstruction Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDC</td>
<td>Provincial Development Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDF</td>
<td>Provincial Development Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PJHQ</td>
<td>Permanent Joint Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMSU</td>
<td>Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>POLAD</td>
<td>Political Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSA</td>
<td>Public Service Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>QIP</td>
<td>Quick impact project</td>
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<tr>
<td>QRF</td>
<td>Quick Reaction Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCN</td>
<td>Regional Command North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAF</td>
<td>Swedish Armed Forces</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAK</td>
<td>Swedish Afghanistan Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>Strategic culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCA</td>
<td>Strategic Conflict Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCR</td>
<td>Senior Civilian Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party (Swedish)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDSR</td>
<td>Strategic Defence and Security Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SF</td>
<td>Stabilization Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party (German)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPNA</td>
<td>Stabilization Program Northern Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRO</td>
<td>Senior Responsible Owner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STABAD</td>
<td>Stabilization Adviser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>START</td>
<td>Strategic Advisory Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SU</td>
<td>Stabilization Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWEDINT</td>
<td>Swedish Armed Forces International Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWP</td>
<td>Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (German Institute for International and Security Affairs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCAF</td>
<td>Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDC</td>
<td>Total Defense Concept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFH</td>
<td>Task Force Helmand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TST</td>
<td>Transition Support Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIOSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VTC</td>
<td>Video Teleconference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WOG</td>
<td>Whole-of-government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZIF</td>
<td>Centre for International Peace Operations</td>
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The Whole-of-Government Approach in Multinational Peace Operations

In 2008, the United States Marine forces initiated a gradual process of entry into Helmand province, Afghanistan, in support of NATO troops deployed there as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation. On the ground, the Americans came to share operational space with a British contingent of troops and civilian advisers who had been operating a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Lashkar Gah for two years. Within the UK team, there were serious concerns about whether the arrival of the US military would permit maintaining a British style, population-centric counterinsurgency campaign. In the American model, political and development objectives were subordinated to the priorities of the military operation. The Marines marshalled a large budget for reconstruction activities, which the military referred to as using “money as a weapon” (Stapleton 2014, 37).

In theory, both British and American commanders championed an integrated civil-military strategy in Helmand. However, it quickly became clear that the modus operandi of the US was incompatible with the UK model. The British forces did not directly handle a large budget for civilian activities. UK civilian advisers held an instrumental role in advising the military commander. By contrast, the US Marines arrived with the intention to get it all done without outside help, confident that the presence of American troops would speed up the political dialogue. To complicate matters further, any activity suggested by civilians could only be implemented within a very tight window, prior to the next military operation. This lack of timeline flexibility
caused friction between UK civilian advisers and the US military. Facilitating the transition after the arrival of the Americans took great efforts on behalf of the British-lead PRT. Staff reportedly spent up to 90% of their time resolving differences in ways of fostering local ownership, and the extent of civilian input into military planning (Stapleton 2014, 37–39).

In the years since, politicians from the UK, the US, and other nations have continuously referred to a whole-of-government (WOG) approach when planning new initiatives. In 2016 Prime Minister Justin Trudeau invoked WOG principles when discussing a strategy for addressing the ongoing crises in Iraq and Syria (Trudeau 2016). Just weeks later, US National Security Advisor Susan Rice outlined Washington’s WOG strategy against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (Garamone 2016). Given the differences in the general approach to foreign policy between US and Canada, it is not immediately apparent what each nation means by whole-of-government action, or how the strategies of Washington and Ottawa fit together.

The examples above show that countries contributing to multinational peace operations often vary significantly in the ways they integrate the civilian and military components of their national contingents. When not properly understood or taken into account, this variation in national approaches causes significant difficulties among countries that deploy to the same area of operation (Farrell 2016, 10; Powell et al. 2016, 12; Stapleton 2014, 39).

The need to coordinate between civilian and military elements was a natural consequence of the dramatic change in the nature of peace operations after the end of the Cold War. In a conflict environment, addressing political, security and development
issues simultaneously brought about the challenge of achieving coherence between a multitude of governments, non-governmental actors, civil society organizations, and military forces (Rietjens and Lucius 2016, 1). With the United Nations (UN) increasingly stretched for resources, member-states have augmented the number of civilian and military personnel that deploy to peace operations (Campbell, Kaspersen and Weir 2007, 5). More and more civilians are posted to work alongside the military. In the field, civilian staff provides specific guidance and expertise that military units generally do not have. Furthermore, lacking a uniform enables civilians to act as credible and valuable interlocutors with local authorities and civil society organizations (Seppen and Lucius 2016, 48). As the need for qualified civilian personnel in the field continued to expand, experts in academic and policy circles advanced various propositions about how soldiers and civilians should interact in the mission area so as to properly coordinate and minimize tensions (Cornish and Glad 2008, 1-28; Patrick and Brown 2007, 46-47; Stapleton 2014, 25-42). The problem is that these policy prescriptions are largely generic, thus perpetuating the untested assumption that all nations contributing to peace operations can realistically achieve similar levels of inter-agency coherence.

Consequently, a specific interest in national approaches to civil-military integration has emerged as part of a larger focus on comprehensive multinational peace operations (Campbell, Kaspersen, and Weir 2007, 4; De Coning 2007, 1; NATO 2006a, 1–6; NATO Parliamentary Assembly 2006, 1–3; OECD 2005, 17). International organizations began promoting a whole-of-government approach, urging nations to improve coherence between the military, political, and development lines of operation, within country capitals as well as in the mission area (Campbell 2008, 556-569;
Desrosiers and Lagassé 2009, 668; Patrick and Brown 2007, 1-156; UN 2006, 1-21). Vast differences in interpretation and application of whole-of-government principles has resulted in attempts to assess and compare progress in coherence across donor governments. One problem with these endeavours is that they largely fail to clarify how coherence can be measured. Without a standardized scale for levels of whole-of-government action, cross-country comparisons become meaningless.

A more important challenge in WOG studies is that little is known about how coherence comes about. The literature advances many propositions, but fails to clarify what combination of factors affects coordination outcomes, depending on specific national circumstances and the conditions in the mission area. These knowledge gaps do not allow for accurate policy prescriptions for countries interested in improving civil-military coherence. More importantly, poor understanding of the drivers of WOG variation leads to a failure to recognize that, in some cases, there are limits to inter-agency coherence that may not be easily amenable to policy solutions. This research seeks to contribute to current scholarship by clarifying what constitutes whole-of-government action, how it comes about, and in what conditions it is realistically feasible to advance inter-agency integration. First, I create a standardized measure for WOG variation, at country capitals and in the mission area. Using the literature on civil-military cooperation, I develop a comprehensive WOG scale that outlines four distinct levels of integration, from lowest to highest, with the corresponding activities and institutional commitment that each implies.

Second, I use the scale to assess progress in inter-agency integration in three countries, Sweden, Germany and the United Kingdom, during their involvement in the
ISAF mission in Afghanistan. Focusing on Afghanistan allows for making comparisons across nations that have all been engaged in the same conflict for at least a decade. In the future, this research method can be extended to other case studies, and the insights generated here can be tested on other nations and conflicts, thus filling an urgent need for more comprehensive empirical research on WOG (Patrick and Brown 2007, 1–3; Rintakoski and Autti 2007, 24). The findings reveal a spectrum of cross-government cooperation intensity. Sweden stands at the lowest end, followed by Germany with a moderately integrated model, and the UK at the highest step of the integration scale.

The next step is to illuminate the reasons why WOG models vary – in time, as well as within and across the three nations in question. The three case studies are interrogated in more depth to tease out the factors that affect cross-government coherence, among government offices in country capitals as well as in Afghanistan. The results suggest that the variation in national WOG approaches is best explained by differences in government structure, which lead to different decision-making processes, and ultimately, different WOG outcomes. In the Swedish and German coalition governments, policymaking required much negotiation and political concessions. Bringing on board the less enthusiastic coalition partners required toning down the overall ambition for WOG coherence, resulting in low and medium-level WOG models in Sweden and Germany, respectively. By contrast, the British single-party majority system eliminated the need for extensive political bargaining. Consequently, fluctuations in WOG progress were dependent largely on the personal vision of the individual who held the Prime Minister post. In the mission area, cooperation dynamics depended on the amount of oversight headquarters exerted over deployed staff. Civilian personnel at the Swedish PRT had
extremely limited discretion in engaging in joint projects, especially with the military. German ministries allowed deployed staff more leeway in seeking out joint ventures, while in Britain the amount of oversight depended on the attention and leadership style of the incumbent Prime Minister.

The rest of the chapter proceeds in two steps. First, I present a working definition of a whole-of-government approach, and outline its conceptual origins, in theory as well as in practice. Next, I discuss in detail the rationale for further studies of WOG action. I focus specifically on the benefits of clarifying the conceptual murkiness, and fleshing out the reasons why nations approach civil-military integration in different ways.

**Definition, Origins and Rationale for Studying Whole-of-Government Approaches**

In a seminal document, the OECD-DAC Fragile States Group defined WOG as “actively using formal and/or informal networks across the different agencies within that government to coordinate the design and implementation of the range of interventions that the government’s agencies will be making in order to increase the effectiveness of those interventions in achieving the desired objectives” (OECD 2006, 14).

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1 When referring to the process of achieving unity in policy, strategy, and action among government departments, the OECD document on Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States uses the terms “inter-agency coordination,” “integration,” and “coherence” interchangeably. For the sake of clarity, this dissertation follows the same example. Countries have their own terminology for whole-of-government. Sweden uses the term civil-military synergies, Germany - networked security, and the UK - a joined-up approach. The United Nations uses the term “integrated approach” more broadly, referring to horizontal coordination of civilian-military responses between UN agencies and military forces, as well as between the UN bodies, external NGOs and local civil society organizations (UN 2006, 3; UNSG 2006, 1; UN. 2010a, 62–68). NATO and the EU both talk about a “comprehensive approach,” but they interpret it differently (Gross 2008, 7; NATO 2010, 1–5). NATO’s concept of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) focuses primarily on coordination between military forces and external actors in the operational environment, who are perceived as subordinate, but helpful “enablers” of NATO’s military mission objectives (CCOE 2012, 3). The European Union refers mostly to horizontal integration amongst its internal agencies (Gross 2008, 30–35).
The novelty of WOG is not necessarily conceptual. Military establishments have recognized a value in integrating military and humanitarian instruments since the emergence of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) doctrine. From the United States in Vietnam, to the French Army in the Algerian War and the British in the Malaya conflict, countries have combined war fighting with civilian reconstruction projects of varying scale to “win the hearts and minds” of the local population (Brzoska and Ehrhart 2008, 2). CIMIC, however, is a purely military concept of limited scope, where civil-military cooperation is seen as subordinate to and an enabler of military objectives. By contrast, WOG is a broader approach that encompasses both military and civilian establishments. It is aimed at comprehensive objectives, many of which go beyond the particular military operation under way. In its more advanced stages, a WOG model is run by civilians as part of an overall, broad political strategy. What is new here is the attempt to systematize and institutionalize coordination among the key government departments that deploy staff to conflict zones.

In the theoretical literature, the push for cross-government coherence is rooted in public administration studies dating from the 1970s. In a seminal article, Rittel and Weber argued that complex policy issues, or “wicked problems,” are best addressed through collaborative strategies (1973, 155).\textsuperscript{2} Collaboration is the preferred choice, because the very nature of wicked problems is such that they cannot be sustainably resolved by any government agency alone (Australian Public Service Commission 2007, ________________

\textsuperscript{2} Wicked problems are defined as complex policy issues with multiple causes that are chronically resistant to resolution. These issues are difficult to define, go beyond the expertise of any single agency, and require an attitude adjustment on behalf of stakeholders to commit to a common course. By nature, wicked problems demand non-traditional solutions, which is why involving stakeholders from a variety of backgrounds and worldviews is critical (Australian Public Service Commission 2007, 3–5; Rittel and Weber 1973, 161–167).
10; O’Toole 1997, 46; Rogers 2010, 546–547). Moving away from stovepiped decision-making and towards integrated responses ensures that governments become a one-stop shop for public service delivery (United Nations 2012, 55).

This idea is rehashed in the more recent literature on integrated peace operations, which frames failed states as a “wicked problem,” and a WOG approach as its corresponding “integrated” solution (OECD 2005, 7; Rintakoski and Autti 2007, 11). The wicked problem model broadly outlines three areas along which to compare cross-government integration efforts: strategic management, financial resource management, and human resource management. As shown later on, this study borrows from wicked problem theory to derive specific WOG indicators in each of these three areas.

Ideally, a WOG approach is guided by a formal, overarching country strategy for engagement in failed states that makes explicit mention of WOG principles. All key government departments engaged in failed states are to endorse this strategy (De Coning 2007, 7; Rintakoski and Autti 2007, 30). The WOG country strategy clarifies who is in charge, and what every department should be doing. The emphasis falls on non-authoritative, facilitative civilian leadership of the overall effort (OECD 2005, 23; Patrick and Brown 2007, 129; Rintakoski and Autti 2007, 19). A WOG approach usually implies some kind of a joint institutional framework, such as permanent or ad hoc consultation forums, inter-agency decision-making committees, or fund-pooling mechanisms.

However, what matters more is the quality of the civil-military exchanges these institutional arrangements generate. A major characteristic of a genuine WOG approach is significantly expanding civilian input into the planning, execution, monitoring, and evaluation of all aspects of the operation. Civilian opinions are taken into account at
every step of the mission planning and implementation. The goals and objectives of
civilian ministries are deemed as important as those of the Armed Forces, and are not
subordinated to military processes and timelines. The perspectives of civilian staff on the
implications of all mission-related decisions are carefully considered (Rintakoski and
Autti 2007, 33).

De Coning argues that the increased interest in WOG is a symptom of a growing
consensus that civil-military interaction is not simply another variable to manage in a
conflict environment, but a key element to success in peace operations (2016, 11). Thus,
the motivation to study WOG is rooted in a realization that improved coordination
between the security, diplomacy and development streams of multinational peace
operations contributes at least in part to better outcomes (De Coning 2007, 1–2; UN
2008, 53). More specifically, better outcomes are expected on two fronts: the efficiency
and the effectiveness of multinational missions.

The efficiency side of the argument is much more precisely documented in the
literature, and widely corroborated by the participants who were interviewed for this
study. Efficiency refers to the management of scarce human and financial resources. By
and large, coordination mechanisms have evolved in an ad hoc manner, as staff in the
field joined forces to resolve spontaneously arising issues (Rietjens and Lucius 2016, 1).
Pragmatic approaches to cooperation are not without appeal, but there are several
limitations, such as enormous pressure on personnel in the field to resolve previously
unforeseen situations, and loss of knowledge in-between rotations (Rietjens and Lucius
2016, 2). Experiences with the UN integrated offices in the Democratic Republic of
Congo (MONUC), Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) and Burundi (BINUB) suggest that field
staff working in a fragmented environment, with stovepiped institutions and inflexible processes, spent significantly more time and effort in order to advance towards goal completion (Campbell, Kaspersen and Weir 2007, 10). Campbell, Kaspersen and Weir argue that inadequate coordination leads not only to waste of valuable resources, but also to missing valuable windows of opportunity (2007, 6).

In addition to bolstering efficiency, a WOG approach is said to contribute to the impact of peace operations. Several studies have posited a link between coherence and greater effectiveness, noting that inadequate inter-agency coordination contributed to suboptimal outcomes of post-Cold War peace operations (Paris 2009, 89). High-level policy documents and evaluations commissioned by international organizations have stressed that strategic coordination failures are at least in part responsible for unsustainable peacebuilding outcomes (Eide et al. 2005, 3; OECD 2006, 7; Patrick and Brown 2007, 2; Simon and Duzenli 2010, 17). Jones argues that poor strategic coordination among a multitude of involved actors jeopardized the implementation of peace agreements in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Burundi (2002, 89–90). The Joint Utstein study, which assessed 336 peacebuilding projects spearheaded by the Netherlands, Germany, and the United Kingdom, finds that lack of strategic coordination between the political, development, and military dimension was a major obstacle to sustainable outcomes (Smith 2004:16; 57).

In 1997, a UN report of the Secretary General to the General Assembly noted that poor coherence between the variety of UN departments reduces impact in the mission area (United Nations 1997). The UN responded by implementing a series of reforms informed by integration principles, aimed at improving the effectiveness of activities that
support transitions to peace. Thus, by creating the post of a Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), the UN achieved very positive early impact results with MINUSTAH in Haiti (Campbell, Kaspersen and Weir 2007, 5-6). The UN missions in Liberia (UNMIL) and Burundi (BINUB) are similarly cited as successes in this regard (Campbell and Kaspersen 2008, 476). The integrated mission pilot projects of the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC) were later adapted and tested on other missions (Campbell, Kaspersen and Weir 2007, 15).

Within the UN, the motivation to improve coherence stems partly from the realization that disjointed action may jeopardize the desired mission outcome because it enables local actors to exploit the differences between various third parties in the field (Campbell and Kaspersen 2008, 472). One illustrative example is the Canadian experience in Zaire in 1996, when the refugee camps set up and operated by the international community fell under the control of Hutu extremists. The genocidaires used the camps as a base to continue recruiting members, to launch raids into Rwanda and Zaire, and to gather supplies for their army by collecting a percentage of the relief supplies meant for the refugees. Rempel argues that this disaster occurred in large part due to the stove piped, highly centralized decision making processes within Canadian ministries, particularly at the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) (2006, 137).

In short, integration between the political, security and development streams of a peace operation has emerged as the antithesis of top-down third party interventions into failing states, which have received much criticism in the peacebuilding and development literature (Ottaway 2002, 1015–1016). Nevertheless, the effectiveness argument suffers
from one major setback that is not widely recognized in the integration literature. The ultimate, overarching purpose of multinational missions is to end conflict. But achieving durable peace is a slow and complex process - it is difficult to estimate exactly how much inter-agency coordination contributes towards this goal (Campbell and Kaspersen 2008, 477-478). Campbell calls for recognizing the limits of the effectiveness argument, and proposes an alternative approach. Rather than attempting to seek direct causal links between coordination and lasting peace, agencies should strive for incremental impact, or “selective, bottom-up coherence,” whereby two or more organizations on the grassroots level identify a shared goal and join forces to work towards its completion. Campbell notes that there are many positive examples of increasing impact through integrated efforts in the past two decades (2008, 566). This study’s findings support Campbell’s argument. However, who can benefit from the emanating prescriptions remains unclear: the selective coherence logic says little about the specific barriers to integration for specific countries or entities.

In this context, there is a specific rationale to begin by exploring civil-military integration on the domestic level, within countries that contribute civilian and military personnel to multinational peace operations. De Coning argues that a lack of alignment between short-term outcomes and long-term goals within a single agency, such as a national ministry, is the biggest roadblock to improving coherence overall (2016, 15). Cutillo notes that donor nations tend to prefer ad hoc mechanisms to internationally-established coherence guidelines, a situation that is often exacerbated by disjointed coordination policies at home (2006, 30–31). Abbaszadeh et al. note that domestic

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3 As shown in Chapter 6, the German Provincial Development Fund (PDF) is an example of successful bottom-up coherence.
constraints and priorities heavily shaped Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan, resulting in significant challenges in reconciling different civil-military approaches in the mission area (2008, 7). All these studies make the case for more research on civil-military interactions on the national level, with a view to reducing duplication of efforts, minimizing the waste of resources, and capitalizing on comparative advantages (Othieno and Sebek 2010, 19). While “improved coherence” does not necessarily mean more coordination, the general consensus is that it is best to avoid scenarios where government agencies work at cross-purposes, investing in initiatives that compete against one another.

Despite the general interest, WOG approaches still suffer from a considerable degree of conceptual murkiness. The OECD calls for synthetizing best practices that would inform future efforts to improve cross-government coherence in those nations that can benefit from it (2005, 14). If that is the goal, then the first hurdle along the way is insufficient knowledge about the extent of the problem. As Chapter 2 demonstrates, existing studies that attempt cross-country comparison largely fail to clarify how exactly a whole-of-government approach can be measured. Some outline levels of integration or make mention of policy and institutional structures. Yet there is no standard whole-of-government measuring scale with indicators for specific activities, institutional structure and political commitment, on the strategic as well as on the tactical level. Meanwhile, anecdotal evidence suggests not only significant variation between nations, but also disagreements among the ministries of the same country as to how much inter-agency
integration has been achieved. Critics note that civil-military coherence is embroiled in conceptual vagueness, and that diverging perceptions about what exactly coordination means to different actors renders the concept virtually meaningless (Woodward 2006, 3-6).

Thus, the first objective of this study is to develop a measuring instrument for whole-of-government coherence. As shown in chapter 2, the WOG scale has four separate levels, and permits ranking countries depending on their policies, institutional frameworks, joint activities, the degree of involvement of civilian and military actors, and the level of political commitment to the WOG concept. The scale is specifically tailored to measure integration on two fronts simultaneously: in country capitals, and in a mission area, simultaneously and over the entire span of the same multinational operation. The goal here is to probe to what extent cross-government integration in country capitals influences civil-military interactions in the mission area. If what happens at home has little bearing on cooperation dynamics in the field, then the impetus to create joint policies and institutions becomes devoid of meaning, and ministries should focus on more practical, ad hoc solutions on the tactical level.

By clearly illustrating different stages of coherence, this standardized measurement tool contributes to making WOG a practical policy instrument, instead of a vacuous policy slogan. It serves as a starting point to unifying WOG definitions across a variety of actors, nations as well as international organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and civil society. Clarifying what WOG models look like can

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4 For instance, interviews with Swedish government officials revealed that respondents from civilian agencies believed Sweden did not engage in a whole-of-government approach in Afghanistan, whereas officials from the military argued that Sweden had made great strides towards more comprehensive working (Personal Interviews MFA and SAF Officials, 2014).
potentially alleviate a significant amount of tension among practitioners in the field, who often feel that diverging perceptions of the concept hampers their daily work (Personal Interviews Swedish and German MFA Officials, 2014; 2015). The WOG scale can help clarify the state of affairs in each country, and is useful for WOG-informed policy design and planning. Countries can use it as a practical guideline, either to diagnose or to work on increasing coherence between their civilian ministries and the military. The scale can also be adapted to measure inter-agency coherence within international organizations, which is another salient issue in the literature on multinational operations. The second objective of this study is to shed light on why countries interpret and apply whole-of-government approaches in different ways. This motivation stems from a tendency to generalize policy prescriptions and call for yet more coherence, with little regard to what is realistically achievable in each country. For example, Patrick and Brown examine progress in civil-military integration in seven countries, and make a series of overarching recommendations, from standing inter-agency institutions to creating fund pooling mechanisms for joint programming in conflict zones (2007, 7–8). Similarly, the OECD universally recommends that nations adopt joint WOG-informed policies, and that politicians in the highest echelons of power genuinely commit to adopting WOG principles (2006, 9).

Such policy prescriptions carry an implicit assumption that coherence-enhancing measures are feasible across the board. More recent studies have warned that persistent calls for greater coherence stimulate unrealistic expectations, thus jeopardizing the credibility of comprehensive approaches altogether (De Coning and Friis 2011, 245). In fact, standardizing WOG approaches may not be possible. De Coning and Friis caution
that the overall ambition for inter-agency integration must be toned down. In some conditions, expectations to increase integration beyond a certain point are likely to fail. There may be limits to coherence that cannot be overcome by exhortations for more cooperation, and these limits must be given due attention (De Coning and Friis 2011, 2).

This study aims to contribute to current scholarship by shedding light on how much coherence is realistically feasible: what opportunities and roadblocks exist, to what extent each factor (or a combination of factors) matters in each country, at what stage in the process, and in what conditions. Establishing more realistic goals for comprehensive action can diminish the risk of disenchantment. Recognizing that some causes are less amenable to policy solutions should serve, at the very least, to readjust the expectations from certain countries. Specific national constraints and limits to coherence can inform negotiations on assigning responsibilities to nations participating in multinational peace operations. For example, countries that cannot realistically provide flexible, large-scale funding in support for counterinsurgency efforts should not deploy to areas where such operations are planned to take place. Clarifying the less manipulable conditions also helps produce more targeted recommendations for countries interested in improving coherence. For instance, a common policy prescription rehashed in the WOG literature is to establish a government agency with authority to coordinate among departments on the strategic level (Patrick and Brown 2007, 8). However, this study finds that decentralized coalition governments like Sweden and Germany can rarely agree on formally endowing a lead agency with coordination authority. Instead, some countries may achieve success on the grassroots level, as German experiences with the Provincial Development Fund (PDF) suggest. Alternatively, there might still be windows of opportunity to advance
inter-agency coherence: for instance, if new elections bring to power leaders who support WOG approaches, or if important side issues requiring intense political bargaining result in concessions in favour of increased WOG coherence. Overall, this study finds that there is no need to universally lower expectations for improved coherence. Some countries may be able to deliver more integrated WOG models than others, depending largely on the decision-making processes resulting from the type of government.

Some voices in the NGO community argue for abandoning WOG approaches altogether. The concern is that development workers working alongside the military in conflict zones jeopardize their impartiality, neutrality, independence, and physical security. Cooperating with the military and allowing soldiers to engage in reconstruction activities, civilians become targets for insurgents who begin to perceive them as enablers of the rival military force (Cornish and Glad 2008, 3–4). These concerns are shared by several nations involved in ISAF, as well as many political parties and leaders, particularly those of leftist orientation. While this study does not specifically test how foreign forces affect the work of NGOs, it makes the case for a more nuanced understanding of WOG as a spectrum of cooperation options, to include ventures short of full-scale joint action that may well suit the interests of humanitarian workers (De Coning 2016, 18).

Evidence from previous studies and personal interviews suggests there is a wide range of possibilities for beneficial exchanges, in which NGOs have voluntarily participated and continue to do so. For instance, humanitarian actors may keep an open line of communication with the military for deconflicting purposes, reporting on their areas of operation so as soldiers would know to keep away from these areas (De Coning 2016, 20). NGO staff can meet regularly with military and civilian officials to update them on their ongoing operations, seek help with logistical and project implementation difficulties, or use the technical expertise of military reservists posted in the area. Military patrols whose rules of engagement allow travelling to remote areas can help NGOs with monitoring of ongoing reconstruction projects (Personal Interviews Bundeswehr and SAF Officials, 2014; 2015). In cases when NGOs get caught in the middle of hostilities,
Some practitioners with experience in conflict zones question the utility of further studies on WOG approaches, arguing that PRTs, widely applied in Iraq and Afghanistan, turned out to be so problematic that it is unlikely nations will be using them in future conflicts (Personal Interview Swedish MFA Official, 2014). However, equating a WOG approach with the operation of a PRT is an overly restrictive definition. PRTs are certainly one of the most visible examples of a WOG effort, but the concept of whole-of-government extends well beyond PRTs. It covers a wide range of additional joint initiatives, both in country capitals and in a mission area. Even if the PRT framework proves obsolete, it appears likely that civilians and the military will continue deploying jointly to conflict environments in the future. Extrapolating conclusions to other situations is certainly problematic, but a WOG study that includes PRT experiences spanning over more than a decade in Afghanistan may generate important insight and help formulate more testable hypothesis about what drives civil-military interaction. These hypotheses can then be tested in other countries and conflicts.

By teasing out how WOGs vary, this research contributes to existing knowledge on whole-of-government approaches in at least two ways. On the one hand, a clear differentiation is made between root causes and permissive conditions. This allows for more relevant policy prescriptions, particularly in cases where the factors driving WOG development are less malleable to policy solutions. On the other hand, the findings bring clarity to a veritable soup of theoretical propositions currently being perpetuated in the
literature. Some of these alleged causes, such as bureaucratic resistance, are well-known, whereas others are poorly understood. One example of the latter is the alleged effect of personalities on inter-agency coherence. Existing work reiterates the idea that cooperation is all a matter of personalities (Patrick and Brown 2007, 1–87; Stapleton 2014, 25–42). What remains unclear is whose personalities matter more or less, in what circumstances, and what specific personal traits facilitate or obstruct inter-agency coherence. While this study is not designed to test a full range of hypotheses on individual psychological characteristics, it uses inductive research to develop some propositions as to what personality aspects are more likely to impact WOG developments, and under what conditions individual preferences can have a tangible effect on WOG developments.

The next sections outline the research questions, scope, and empirical design of the study. Chapter 2 addresses previous efforts to study the issue, and presents the testable theories, together with the corresponding hypotheses they generate. The rest of the dissertation analyses each one of the case studies, consecrating one chapter to WOG developments in the country capital and in the mission area, respectively. Chapters 3 and 4 deal with Swedish inter-agency coherence, chapters 5 and 6 – with the German approach, and chapters 7 and 8 present the UK case. The dissertation concludes by developing the implications for theory and policy.
Measuring and Comparing Whole-of-Government Approaches

This chapter unpacks the WOG concept, and outlines the steps forward in comparing the experiences of Sweden, Germany, and the United Kingdom in Afghanistan. I start with a discussion of existing studies on whole-of-government approaches, pointing out their contribution and deficiencies. I use this literature to derive WOG indicators, in country capitals as well as in the mission area. Next, I construct a WOG scale with four distinct levels of inter-agency coherence, specifying the activities and institutional commitment that each level entails. The scale guides the comparative analysis of WOG developments, over time and across the three nations in question.

The next task for this chapter is to advance some propositions as to why national WOG approaches vary. The existing literature is rich on potential explanations, but lacks clarity on which causes are more important than others, and under what circumstances. Hence, this study focuses on the three most frequently mentioned culprits: bureaucratic politics, strategic culture, and principal-agency (PA) theory. Based on the core assumptions of these theories, I develop hypotheses on WOG variation. Empirical research on WOG approaches to peace operations is still in its infancy. Existing studies paint a patchwork of WOGs that is difficult to navigate, because few studies are theoretically-informed and most use diverging indicators to measure WOG. At first glance, some states have created more sophisticated joint institutions than others, but exactly how much overall progress nations have made compared to one another remains unknown. What is clear is that the WOG integration process has been uneven and wrought with confusion (CSEDN 2010, 42; Keizer 2009, 3–7; Moss 2010, 1–3).
Some studies discuss the progress in integrating civilian and military components of multinational operations, particularly by UN, NATO and the EU. Overall, two opposing perspectives guide the analysis. On the one hand, there are those who are weary of WOG approaches, citing tensions between armed forces and development workers and compromising the work of NGOs (Asplund et al. 2003, 1–2; Cornish and Glad 2008, 1–28). In general, these studies do not frame coherence as a spectrum of cooperation options, and tend to argue the concept as a whole should be abandoned.

On the opposite side are studies that endorse further WOG integration. Some discuss the challenges international organizations face with integrated missions in general (Doss 2008, 570–581; Jakobsen and Studies 2008, 1–52; Eide et al. 2004, 1–52; Jennings and Kaspersen 2008, 582–587; Zanotti 2010, 17–31). Others focus on the scope and effectiveness of multilateral institutional reforms aimed at greater coordination (Campbell 2008, 556–569; Campbell and Kaspersen 2008, 470–485; De Coning 2007, 281–299; Gross 2008, 1–48; Menon 2009, 227–246). These debates attempt to evaluate progress towards integration within international organizations, and to provide prescriptions for the way forward. Overall, the purpose of this literature is to advocate for more integration in general, implying that increased cross-government coordination within national capitals will, by extension, benefit integration efforts within international organizations. These claims, however, have not been rigorously tested, largely because there is little clarity as to how WOG within countries can be measured in the first place.

A third major literature stream, currently underdeveloped, looks specifically at national WOG approaches. The goal here is twofold: to evaluate the overall progress in cross-
government coherence within specific countries, and to perform cross-country comparisons. The majority of these studies deal with a similar set of countries, offering little insight on how the cases were selected for comparison. The OECD-DAC Fragile States group report, “Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States,” which is based on self-reported data, provides a short analysis of WOG efforts in Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK (OECD 2005, 14). The International Peace Academy published a book on WOG in the UK, the US, France, Canada, Australia, Sweden, and Germany (Patrick and Brown 2007, 1–87). Similarly, the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) conducted a multilateral seminar on the comprehensive approach and published the findings (Rintakoski and Autti 2007, 1–34). Harriman, Weibull and Wicklund review WOG advances in Canada, the Netherlands, and the UK (2012, 1–44). In a more recent publication, Below and Belzile studied WOG in Canada, Australia, Denmark, and the UK (2013, 5–38). Some authors contrast WOG approaches in cases of natural disasters to those in peace operations (Heldt 2011, 1–55). Others choose to focus on WOG progress among EU member states (Hauck and Rocca 2014, 35–43). Yet others argue for a Nordic approach in whole-of-government (Mustonen et al. 2010).

These studies illustrate that different countries approach civil-military integration in different ways, and that there are wide variations in WOG models across countries, ranging from mere information exchange to full-scale joint action in COIN-type scenarios. Within countries, the level of inter-agency coherence fluctuated, usually improving over time but sometimes regressing in spite of developing new joint policies and institutions. Another helpful aspect of this literature is that it suggests some potential
explanatory variables for WOG variation, though in no clear order of importance: government type, history of decision-making within the country, political priorities, organizational interests, and the personalities of individuals involved in the cross-government cooperation process. More problematic is the often self-reported data used in many of the studies. As for those articles that do rely on independently collected data, the case studies selected for comparison appear to have been chosen largely on the basis of convenience, with little theoretical guidance or testing. A final problem is that the large majority of studies use different indicators for WOG advancement, with no clear scale that denotes progress.

A fourth research stream, largely normative in nature, is based on narrow, single case study evaluations of specific actors (either states or international organizations) who have headed integrated peace operations in specific conflicts. For example, Blume (2008, 1–18) evaluates the UN peace operation in Liberia. Lemay-Hebert is interested in the implementation and impact of the UN missions in East Timor (2009, 393–406) and Kosovo (2009, 1–22). Mockaitis (2004, 38–69) discusses NATO approaches in Kosovo in the dawn of the comprehensive approach doctrine. Hrychuk (2009, 825–842) draws attention to Canada’s experience with WOG in Afghanistan in 2003-2007. Several studies on the Swedish comprehensive approach have been published under the auspices of the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI). Hedmark, Tham, Och and Hill, and Lagerlöf broadly sketch out developments in Stockholm and at the Swedish-lead PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif (Hedmark 2009, 1–42; Lagerlöf 2011, 1–52; Tham, Och, and Hull 2011, 1–55). Roosberg finds that WOG definitions vary greatly among the main actors involved within Sweden, and undertakes a study of concept clarification (2011, 1–61). Many of
these authors see bureaucratic tensions as a major impediment to further WOG integration, and prescribe taking steps to overcome organizational resistance. This literature contributes to current knowledge in two ways. First, it identifies four major challenges with WOG: adopting a shared strategic vision, developing WOG-informed joint institutions, and overcoming intra- and inter-departmental frictions (Everts 2009, 91–93; Rietjens 2008, 42–70). Second, authors note that merely creating joint institutions is not necessarily enough to achieve *de facto* integration (Desrosiers and Lagassé 2009, 659; Hrychuk 2009, 841; Moens 1994, 569).

In sum, the literature on WOG offers more questions than answers. There is evidence of wide variation in national approaches, but understanding is limited on how integrated individual country WOGs really are, or how countries compare against one another. More importantly, the few studies that do attempt to make cross-country comparisons of WOG approaches are not rigorous enough, and generally do not employ a clear WOG scale along which country approaches can be compared.\(^8\) While recognizing that coherence is a sliding scale, the literature offers limited insight on the specific stages of this scale, or what kinds of activities each level entails. Country rankings are often based on the experiences of different nations in different conflicts, thus rendering the comparisons close to meaningless. Since there is no universal, theoretically informed baseline along which to structure further studies, several uncontested assumptions are perpetuated in the literature: that improving coherence is feasible in all countries regardless of specific circumstances; that integration in a country capital extends by

\(^8\) Patrick and Brown’s study (2007, 1-144) is an exception. The authors try to compare seven countries along a series of pre-established factors: existence of common vision, common inter-agency coordination institutions, and common financial coordination institutions. However, their framework is rudimentary, and omits other indicators used in other studies.
default to the same type of cooperation in a mission area, and that inter-agency integration on the national level increases coherence within international organizations. Furthermore, many existing studies rely mostly on self-reported information from governments (Rintakoski and Autti 2007, 117–200), and are presented in articles that are short and perfunctory (Mustonen et al. 2010, 11–39). For instance, Patrick and Brown’s study (2006, 9-116), the most comprehensive one to date, attempts ranking countries in terms of WOG progress, but stops short of proving an actual ranking. In addition, it is not clear how the respondents were selected. Other, even less detailed studies (Friis 2010, 1–30; Moss 2010, 1–3) argue that some WOG mechanisms do not work well in specific countries or conflicts, but the claims remain vague, and the conclusions largely rely on anecdotal evidence.

Another gap in the literature is that it fails to elaborate on how specific factors increase or obstruct coherence in different nations. Consequently, how much coherence is realistically feasible in each country remains a mystery. It is plausible to think that the coherence model that emerges is a function of a combination of factors. But there is a lack of systematic theory building efforts to suggest what these factors are. So far, scholars have pointed to a veritable soup of potential reasons: bureaucratic tensions, past experience with peace operations, political will, strategic culture, government structure, the permissiveness of the operational environment, incentives for government employees to cooperate, and the personal preferences of leaders in charge (Hrychuk 2009, 833–834; Mustonen et al. 2010, 41–45; Patrick and Brown 2007, 9–127). The winning mix of ingredients that produces highly integrated WOGs remains unknown. Moreover, it appears that all countries face the same challenges, so why some nations achieve a
higher-integrated WOG model than others is unclear. These questions must be addressed, if the goal is to improve cross-government coordination.

A third gap in the literature is that few studies focus systematically on WOG advancements both at home and in the mission area. The large majority deal with either one or the other. Existing studies that call for improved coordination on the home front often rest on an untested assumption that there is a linear, positive relationship between coherence in national capitals and in the mission area. However, anecdotal evidence from the field suggests the opposite: what happens at home rarely affects the work process in the field (Interviews with Canadian military officials, 2011-2012). Some argue that in the mission area, it is all dependent on the personalities of deployed staff, but whose personalities and what particular character traits catalyze or obstruct inter-agency cooperation is unclear. The relationship between strategic and tactical-level coherence needs to be clarified, if the goal is to produce more targeted policy prescriptions for improved civil-military efforts.

The fourth major problem with existing work is that it shows an evident selection bias in favour of research on international organizations. Studies on the comprehensive/integrated approach of the UN, NATO and the EU abound. By contrast, there is a dearth of comprehensive publications and comparative studies on national approaches. This is problematic for three reasons. On the one hand, the findings of studies on international organizations cannot readily be extrapolated to the national level. On the other hand, in a mission area, it is individual countries who assume responsibility to lead specific aspects of the multinational operation. Finally, the rhetoric promoting ever-greater coherence champions the largely untested assumption that improved inter-
agency integration within individual countries results in a more coordinated effort among nations within international organizations. A comparative study on national-level WOGs thus provides a good starting point to begin clarifying these relationships.

Finally, there is a notable prevalence of single case studies in the WOG literature, which limits a broader understanding of the phenomenon. Focusing on the WOG performance of only one agent in one particular conflict precludes generalizing the findings to other countries and conflict zones. Moreover, these single studies formulate prescriptions in the form of “best practices” and “lessons learned,” thus erroneously suggesting that the results apply to other countries and situations.

**Research Design**

**Research Questions and Scope of the Study**

This study addresses two inter-related research questions: 1) How do whole-of-government approaches vary among Sweden, Germany, and the UK, as applied in their country capitals as well as in their respective areas of operation, during the ISAF mission in Afghanistan? 2) Why do WOG approaches vary, in country capitals and in the mission area?

To test why WOGs vary, I conduct a structured, focused comparison of Sweden, Germany, and the United Kingdom, examining WOG evolution over time, within and across countries. In the words of Yin (2009, 59–60), this is a multiple, embedded case study design. The study makes both descriptive and causal inferences. The first and second questions are largely descriptive, as they seek to uncover how WOGs vary on the strategic, as well as on the tactical level. The third and fourth questions, which ask why WOGs vary, aim at causal inferences.
The research project is bound in time between 2001 and 2014. The 2001 start date is consistent with the establishment of NATO’s ISAF mission at the Bonn Conference. It also reflects the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, which triggered troop deployments to Afghanistan by the UK, and Sweden and Germany soon afterwards. The end date coincides with the decision of these three nations to permanently withdraw their troops from Afghanistan and to turn the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) over to the local population. Thus, the study covers the entire period of the ISAF operation during which soldiers from the respective countries were present in Afghanistan.

This study uses a narrow definition of a whole-of-government approach – one that only includes cooperation among the following major ministries and government agencies that are usually involved in peace operations: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence, the Armed Forces, and the Ministry (or agency) of International Development Cooperation, as well as its implementing agencies. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and other civil society actors are not included. The question of cooperation between the military, civilian government agencies, and NGOs is a valid field of research, and a wider definition of WOG would usually include these actors. However, NGOs are not addressed here due to time and budget constraints, as well as issues of access to NGO staff currently working in Afghanistan. While the findings only apply to the above-mentioned ministries in the selected countries, they provide a useful starting point for extending the investigation to other entities involved in WOG.

Second, the study focuses on WOG as applied to peace operations only, excluding other types of whole-of-government involvement in fragile states, such as natural disaster response. Third, to further control for confounding factors proper to the particular nature
of the failed state, the research is limited to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. This choice is theoretically informed, as scholars have argued that Afghanistan is the litmus test for the whole-of-government approach (Travers and Owen 2008, 701). Importantly, the findings only apply to the three countries studied, to the Afghanistan conflict, and to the specific regions of Afghanistan where the selected nations used to deploy. To check the generalizability of the results, the three theories tested here can be extended to other countries and conflicts.

Fourth, this research does not seek to answer why some nations choose to adopt some form of a WOG approach, while others refuse altogether. This question is interesting in its own regard. However, for reasons of parsimony, I have chosen to focus on three countries that have voiced a commitment to adopt at least some WOG principles.

Finally, the study does not seek out causal links between levels of WOG integration and success or failure of particular mission objectives. This is an important issue, and is ultimately what practitioners and policymakers want to know. Civil-military integration is not an end in itself, but a means to achieving a wide spectrum of short, medium and long-term goals related to the overall success of the peace operation. Paris argues that too much, too little, or the wrong kind of coordination can have detrimental consequences to peacebuilding objectives. Consequently, the correct approach to the coherence problem is not to constantly push for more, but to flesh out the right amount of coherence (Paris 2009). But in order to test what WOG type is most appropriate for different kinds of mission objectives, it is first necessary to have a standardized WOG measure. With the help of the WOG scale proposed here, future studies can conduct more precise empirical testing of the impact of different coherence models. Having determined
the appropriate level of coherence for a specific objective, the question becomes which
nations are realistically able to deliver it. Here, a comparative analysis on drivers and
limits to national WOG approaches can serve to clarify expectations, and to inform the
negotiations on distributing responsibilities among the countries contributing to
multinational operations.

Methodology and Empirical Design

I define the dependent variable as: level of whole-of-government integration. As a
first step in operationalizing the dependent variable, it is necessary to determine in which
areas of a nation’s ISAF contribution one should look for signs of inter-agency
integration. Borrowing from wicked problem theory, I identify three broad aspects:
strategic management, financial resource management, and human resource management
(Rittel and Weber, 1973). I then use the WOG literature to translate these areas into
WOG language. Strategic management refers to official government policies and
strategies adopted in relation to engagement in multinational operations in general or
Afghanistan in particular, as well as institutional innovations informed by WOG
principles. Financial resources management pertains to how ministries and government
agencies manage their financial contributions to ISAF, and whether there are signs of
joint ventures in budgeting for the Afghanistan mission. Finally, human resources
management means ensuring enough civilian and military personnel has been adequately
trained according to WOG principles, and is available to deploy swiftly as needed. In the
next section, the operationalization of these dimensions is discussed in greater detail.
Dimensions and Indicators of a Whole-of-Government Approach

Based on the broad categories suggested by wicked problem theory, this study develops a series of WOG indicators on two levels – strategic (pertaining to cross-government coherence in the nation’s capital), and tactical (at the PRTs in Afghanistan) (Rittel and Weber, 1973). WOG indicators on the strategic level include largely four elements: jointly signed WOG-endorsing policy documents, joint institutions, a shared financial pooling mechanism, and staff that is both well-trained in civil-military cooperation matters, and available for swift deployment to the field.

I thus begin by examining key government policy documents, focusing on those that, according to the literature, should be informed by WOG principles. Among the most prominent examples are national security strategies, documents outlining the engagement in failed states, policies concerning the nation’s participation in overseas missions (either jointly signed or issued by individual ministries), and strategies that deal with the ISAF mission in particular, including joint planning directives and yearly endorsements by parliament to renew the contribution to ISAF (where appropriate). I analyze these documents in terms of their interpretation of WOG, and the extent to which they offer specific guidance and examples of how ministries are expected to work together. I pay special attention to any caveats or limitations on the scope of inter-agency integration that might be stipulated in the text. An example of one such caveat is an explicit emphasis on strictly separating security and development activities.

Using Rittel and Weber’s wicked problem model (1973) as a guidance, I selected indicators for inter-agency coherence from previous studies. I expanded the list by adding new indicators that surfaced during the interviews. As a final step, I subdivided the indicators into two categories: coherence in the country capital, and at the PRTs in Afghanistan.
Next, I consider any existing institutional structures informed by WOG principles. The questions to ask here are: does the country have an inter-agency coordination body, either for all engagements abroad or for Afghanistan in particular? If so, is this a permanent entity with formalized, regular meetings, or is it *ad hoc*? Which ministries are represented, on what bureaucratic level, how frequently are meetings held, and what is their purpose and outcome? Does the coordination body have executive power to implement decisions, or is it merely a discussion forum? In what ways, if any, does the work of this inter-agency organ affect inter-agency coherence, both in the state capital and in Afghanistan?

To tease out whether the joint meetings really result in equal contribution and consideration of the viewpoints of all ministries, I take a closer look at how staff interacts during the meetings. Are people usually willing and able to attend the joint meetings, to contribute actively and to openly share information? Do civilians express reservations about the actions of the military, and vice versa? Is there evidence of frequent disagreements among employees of different ministries? If yes, at what particular times and for what reasons? Finally, have such frictions subsided over time? How are disagreements resolved or adjudicated?

The next step is to explore integration of financial resources as regards the contribution to ISAF. Has the country created a fund pooling mechanism, either for all engagements abroad and/or for Afghanistan in particular? If so, which ministries benefit from it, and how precisely is the pooling mechanism funded? What kind of initiatives in the field does the fund pool finance? Who is in charge of the fund, and how are funding decisions made? If no financial pooling is available, then is it possible for the military to
request funding of civilian ministries to conduct reconstruction, quick impact projects (QIPs), or other civilian activities? Finally, are there any indications of inefficiencies in fund management, such as excessively long processing times?

Finally, I develop indicators for the human resources component. Is there a formal inter-agency institution tasked with enhancing civilian capability for overseas missions? If so, what are its specific functions and responsibilities? Does this entity have its own budget? Furthermore, how much time does it take to deploy trained staff? Do the deployed professionals, civilian or military, match the specific expertise and training demands on the ground?

Joint pre-deployment training is an additional issue regarding WOG-style human resource management. I thus look for evidence of any joint training opportunities that soldiers and civilians go through prior to deployment. For example, are there joint orientation meetings for personnel about to deploy to Afghanistan? If so, who participates and on what level? What theoretical and practical joint training options exist, for example: lectures, exercises, role-playing? Is attendance mandatory for both civilians and the military, or is it voluntary? How long are the joint training sessions? At the end of the day, how much time do civilians and the military spend together prior to deployment?

Deriving indicators for WOG coherence on the tactical level is a similar process. In a mission area, there are largely three indicators of WOG coherence: the structure of the PRT (including the type of PRT leadership and the overall ratio of civilian and military staff within the military compound), the types of joint meetings held, and the kinds of jointly financed projects (or other type of cooperation on projects) carried out in the field.
I start by examining the PRT as the main institutional structure on the field level. The questions to ask here are: who is in charge of the PRT – a civilian official, a military commander, or is the leadership position shared? Has there been a change from military to civilian leadership at any point in time, and if so, when and for what reasons was the switch made? What is the ratio of military to civilian staff at the PRT, and how has that evolved over time? What, if any, are the implications of the PRT structure on the way civilians and the military cooperate?

Next, I examine forms of civil-military cooperation within the PRTs. Are there daily morning and evening briefs, weekly and/or monthly meetings among PRT staff? Who participates in these, and what topics are discussed? What, if any, joint decisions are made? Here, I pay special attention at whether all represented ministries contribute equally. Is there evidence of intense and regular civilian input during these meetings, especially in planning, design, and execution of military operations? Are civilians and the military alike willing and able to actively participate, contribute and share equally during the joint meetings? Is there friction among civilians and the military, why, and how has this tension evolved with time?

The next step is to ask if there is a fund pooling option on the tactical level. If so, among which ministries, and what type of activities does it finance? Who is in charge of the fund, and how are funding decisions made? If no shared fund is available, then is it possible for the military to request funding of civilian ministries to carry out reconstruction activities? If yes, under what conditions and for what kinds of projects? Short of joint financing, are there any other forms of collaboration on civilian activities? For example, does the military monitor or consult on civilian projects, and vice versa?
Finally, with regards to human resources on the tactical level, staffing is a major issue, with rotations among subsequent civilian and military contingents exerting a major effect on effective knowledge transfer and smooth civil-military cooperation. Are the PRTs adequately staffed with appropriately trained civilian and military personnel? Are there different rotational timelines for the civilian and the military, and if so how different are they? Is there sufficient overlap between outgoing and incoming contingents to ensure a smooth transition period? Better yet, are predecessor and successor already communicating prior to the deployment of the next contingent?

**Measuring Levels of Coherence**

Having identified these WOG indicators, the next step is to determine what mix of the above ingredients corresponds to what level of WOG integration. To do so, this study develops a scale of WOG coherence, adapted from Campbell and Hartnett’s cooperation spectrum model (2005, 21). The scale outlines four levels of integration, ranging from low to high, based on the types of activities and the level of institutional commitment, as follows:

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10 Campbell and Hartnett’s model is an adaptation of Andrea Strimling’s theory on cooperation between diplomats and private facilitators (Strimling 2006). Their model applies to international organizations, but this study modifies it by using more precise indicators geared towards measuring cross government coherence within a given country.
Table 1: Whole-of-Government Integration Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coordination Objective</th>
<th>Communication</th>
<th>Coexistence</th>
<th>Coordinated Action</th>
<th>Integrated Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Activities</strong></td>
<td>Ad hoc inter-agency meetings; limited information sharing; no fund sharing; no joint projects; staff not trained in civil-military issues.</td>
<td>Formal joint information-sharing forums; limited joint programming with some joint decisionmaking; limited fund sharing; few staff trained in civil-military issues.</td>
<td>Joint design, decisionmaking and implementation of small to medium-scale initiatives; active partnership on a sustained basis; fund pooling; most staff trained in civil-military issues.</td>
<td>Joint design, decisionmaking and implementation of large-scale initiatives; collaborative reporting and evaluation mechanisms; all staff fully trained in civil-military issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional Commitment</strong></td>
<td>Complete separation of security, diplomacy and development goals; lack of trust and/or knowledge about the operation of other ministries.</td>
<td>Limited overlap of security, diplomacy and development goals; evidence of some degree of trust and knowledge about the operation of other ministries.</td>
<td>Significant overlap of security, diplomacy and development goals; mid and senior-level buy in and support.</td>
<td>Subsuming all actors and approaches within an overall political-strategic framework; full transparency; mid and senior-level participation and support for achievement of a common policy objective, and the allocation of the necessary resources.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“Communication” represents the lowest form of integration on the spectrum, whereas “integrated action” is the highest. The higher a government agency moves along the cooperation spectrum, the more independence it must give up in view of a joint cause (Campbell and Hartnett 2005, 27). When translated into WOG terms, this scale means that nations on the lower end of the scale have highly decentralized ministries, with little to no unity among security, diplomacy and development goals. In other words, the cooperation between civilian ministries (particularly international development cooperation agencies) and the Armed Forces is severely limited. By contrast, countries on the high intensity end of the scale operate under a joint political-strategic framework, which usually includes joint financing initiatives and the participation of development cooperation agencies in “clear-hold-build” counterinsurgency operations alongside the military. In the next paragraphs, each level of cooperation is unpacked, clarifying what it means both in country capitals and in a mission area.

On the “communication” level, staff from across departments may interact sporadically or even regularly, but not with the purpose of working jointly on tasks. A certain level of coordination takes place, but the goal is to deconflict schedules and avoid encroaching on each other’s turf. There is no overarching strategic decision by the ministries to align their deployments in the same areas of Afghanistan. Instead, each ministry deploys its staff to different parts of the country, based on their own agenda. Moreover, the ministries have not jointly signed any strategic papers explicitly committing to WOG principles. There may be jointly signed policies, but the policy text falls far from a full endorsement of WOG. Some departments may individually commit to a limited degree of cooperation between civilians and the military, although the degree of
commitment will likely vary across ministries. At this stage, civilian ministries do not support the military in any way in COIN operations, and are critical of counterinsurgency efforts overall. In policy documents and official statements, concerns about politicizing development aid and compromising the neutrality and integrity of development workers are explicitly framed as one of WOG’s most significant challenges.

Some ad hoc inter-agency meetings may occur in country capitals, but there are no formal inter-agency cooperation bodies. Short of exchanging a limited amount of information, the ministries operate independently. Joint strategic planning and fund pooling are non-existent. Ministries maintain completely separate budgets for their Afghanistan contribution. Each decides in isolation how and in which regions of Afghanistan to invest their money. Civilians and the military train separately prior to deployment. If outgoing staff from across ministries happens to meet before leaving for Afghanistan, the meetings are accidental and brief. There is no government entity to develop a standing civilian capacity. Deploying civilians to the field is a cumbersome and time-consuming process. Finally, participants in any inter-agency meetings are generally unwilling to trust and share information with staff from other ministries. A lack of understanding and acceptance of other ministries’ goals, objectives, and ways of achieving them is evident.

In the mission area, countries on the “communication” level of the scale have military-lead PRTs, with civilians numbering no more than 1% of the total number of PRT staff. The civilians are subordinated to the military commander, and report to him directly. Besides the NATO guidelines, there are no other formalized tactical-level documents or agreements on civil-military cooperation. Formalized meetings within the
PRTs are rare, with no more than one formalized joint staff meeting per week where people exchange a limited amount of information, and do not provide tangible input into the activities of other departments. Civilians generally avoid the company of the military. Civilians prefer not to be seen in the company of soldiers. Staff of international development cooperation ministries in particular is instructed by superiors at home not to travel in military convoys, or attend public events together with the military. In order to maintain a visible distance from men in uniform, civilians usually live and work outside of the PRT compound. There are no opportunities for fund pooling or fund sharing. The military does not participate in monitoring of civilian projects, nor do civilians monitor or consult on military projects. During contingent rotations, predecessors and successors have limited to no prior contact, and overlap for no more than one week in the field. Consequently, there is evidence of constantly retraining newcomers on cooperation processes and practices.

“Coexistence” is the second step up the cooperation spectrum ladder. At this stage, the ministries have made the strategic decision to align their programmatic priorities by deploying civilian and military staff to the same areas of Afghanistan. There are some jointly signed policy papers with references to WOG, such as a joint strategy for the Afghanistan engagement. Strategic papers tend to focus on outlining the capacity and comparative advantage of each ministry, with much less (if any) specific guidance on how ministries should work together. Generally, the policy language on WOG remains guarded and vague, with a tendency to warn against the drawbacks of integrating civilian and military elements. In country capitals, there is a permanent inter-agency organ that holds regular meetings, but it is an information-exchange forum, rather than an executive
body. There is enough trust amongst the participants to allow for a tension-free, open information-sharing most of the time. The ministries also engage in joint context analysis on specific topics, together with discussions on each ministry’s individual capacity to respond. Some joint planning, and some decision-making on a limited number of issues occurs on occasion. A fund pooling mechanism is lacking, but there are limited possibilities for cross-funding or sharing small portions of their budgets for joint projects. In cases where a ministry applies for funding from another, decisions on if and how to allocate the funds remain exclusively with the ministry that is paying the bill. Mid-level staff remains poorly trained in civil-military issues, but persons in leadership positions are required to participate in brief “meet and greet” visits to get to know their counterparts from other departments before deployment. The total amount of time spent in joint training is no more than one week. There is no formal inter-agency body responsible for fostering a standing civilian capacity, and there are still significant challenges in staffing the PRTs with adequately trained personnel.

In the field, “coexistence” means that the PRT leadership is shared between a senior civilian representative and a military commander. At this level, civilians have more independence within the PRT structure, but muddled reporting lines often cause confusion as to who is in charge. PRT staff regularly holds at least one daily joint meeting, and at least one weekly meeting. Meetings with outside actors also occur, although these are neither formalized nor regular. A limited amount of decisions are made jointly by civilian and military staff. Civilians occasionally contribute to some aspects of military operations, but they are often brought in only in the aftermath of the operation. Representatives from the International Development Cooperation Ministry do
not regularly attend PRT meetings, and generally abstain from engaging with the military. Financial resources continue to be managed separately by each ministry.

Funding disbursement provisions allow for occasional cooperation on joint initiatives, although of very limited scope. For instance, civilian ministries may sometimes provide funds for the military to carry out short-term projects in the PRT area. Similarly, soldiers might monitor civilian projects, or identify possibilities for reconstruction in the area and bring suggestions to the civilian team. In terms of human resources, adequate staffing of civilians on the ground remains an issue. Rotational timeframes allow for a 1-2 weeks overlap between newly deployed and experienced staff. Newcomers have had some prior contact with their predecessors, either because they know one another from previous deployments, and/or via occasional phone/VTC contact. Overall, staff has developed a basic level of trust that permits genuine information sharing about the capacities, situational assessments, plans and activities of their respective ministries, although some remain reticent to openly sharing information with counterparts from other departments.

Next on the scale is “coordinated action.” At this stage, the ministries have endorsed an official joint WOG strategy for their engagements abroad. The strategy text provides guidelines on the role of each ministry, and on ways departments are expected to collaborate, at home and in the field. In addition, there are several other jointly signed, WOG-informed policy papers, such as a strategy on the Afghanistan involvement, and a PRT concept. The policy language becomes more permissive as regards the options of cooperation between civilian ministries and the military. A permanent inter-agency coordination body is operating on a regular basis; ad hoc inter-agency committees and task forces are also formed in response to specific events on the ground. Senior-level staff
from all ministries has established a number of areas in which decisions are taken jointly during the regular meetings. Ministerial provisions allow for small to medium-scale joint initiatives, as well as fund pooling options. Before deploying overseas, most civilians as well as the military have participated in a mandatory, joint pre-deployment training program, which includes theoretical as well as practical exercises. Soldiers and civilians spend anywhere between two and four weeks training together before they deploy. A formal inter-agency body, tasked with developing a standing civilian capacity, is usually in charge of the training curriculum. Finally, at this stage there is clear evidence of trust and understanding of each other’s goals, objectives, expertise, and modus operandi across departments.

In a mission area, “coordinated action” implies, first and foremost, a civilian-lead PRT, with at least a 10 to 20% civilian staff. There is intense daily collaboration in the form of both formalized and ad hoc meetings, including at least two daily briefs (morning and evening), one weekly meeting, as well as regular monthly meetings between civilian actors, the military, local representatives, NGOs and INGOs operating in the area. Some meetings, although not all, go beyond information exchange and into joint planning and decision-making on specific topics. Civilians are active contributors, not passive listeners. A fund-pooling framework, albeit with a limited scope and budget, is managed jointly by all ministries. All ministries, as well as local representatives, are represented on the selection committees. Decisions on funding allotment are made by consensus. Final approval and fund disbursement from the country capital is swift. In addition to this common fund, there are other opportunities for ad hoc cross-departmental funding and other kinds of collaboration on reconstruction and development projects, such as cross-
departmental consulting and project monitoring. There is evidence of enough adequately trained civilian personnel on the ground, deployed swiftly and with more than two weeks of overlap between rotations, allowing for adequate knowledge transfer.

The last and highest degree of integration is “integrated action.” At this stage, there is clear evidence of subsuming security, diplomacy and development instruments under an overarching, political-strategic framework, supported by collaborative decisionmaking and evaluation mechanisms (Campbell and Hartnett 2005, 27). Civilian ministries are fully incorporated into a politically-lead counterinsurgency strategy, and regularly support the military in COIN operations. At country capitals, this level of interaction requires a full array of jointly signed, WOG-informed strategic documents, such as: a national security strategy, an Afghanistan strategy, a national PRT concept, a joint planning directive, as well as individual ministerial strategies also based on WOG principles. The strategic papers clearly state the roles of all actors, designate leadership, and spell out the areas and processes of common decision-making. There is an official, permanent inter-agency cooperation body, where strategies and decisions are shaped. Clear and strong ties between this body and the staff deployed on the ground are evident. There are also strategic fund pooling, joint reporting, and joint evaluation mechanisms. All staff has been trained in theoretical and practical aspects of civil-military cooperation, and has spent at least 4 weeks together before deploying to the field. Development of a standing civilian capacity is the hands of a permanent body tasked with this purpose. Overall, there should be evidence of continuous buy-in and support from the highest-level functionaries, civil servants as well as politicians, especially the heads of each ministry.
On the tactical level, “integrated action” translates into largely five areas. First, the PRT is civilian-lead, with civilian staff of over 20%. Second, there are intensive formalized, as well as informal daily and monthly meetings whereby civilians contribute actively to the planning and decision-making process. Third, there is a pooled funding mechanism with local buy-in and participation, as well as other ad hoc cross-departmental funding possibilities, consultations, and project monitoring. Fourth, the PRT leader supports and ensures a genuine unity of effort: civilian as well as military perspectives are considered equally at all stages, from planning to completion of PRT projects. Finally, there are tools for joint evaluation of outcomes and impact that feed up to the country capital.

Based on the WOG integration scale above, this study evaluates the levels of inter-agency coherence in Sweden, Germany, and the UK, assigning each country a place on the cooperation spectrum accordingly. The scale captures subtle variations across WOG dimensions, allowing for comparisons within as well as across countries over time. Having illustrated the differences among the WOGs of these three nations, the next step is to shed light on why the variation occurs. The following section outlines the three theories tested, and the hypotheses that each of them generates.

**Explaining Variation in Whole-of-Government Approaches**

In the post-Cold War era, as soldiers and civilians struggled to make sense of their forced coexistence in a mission area, their experiences fed into theorizing on inter-agency coherence in the context of multinational peace operations. The research impetus was underpinned by the realization that conflict zones present complex challenges that went beyond the expertise of any one ministry. This section outlines three theoretical
propositions that are often cited as causes for variation in cross-government coordination. Bureaucratic politics deals with dynamics of protecting organizational interests, and the unwillingness of ministries to sacrifice part of their independence in cooperating with others. Strategic culture focuses on ingrained national behaviours and beliefs about the proper way to conduct cross-departmental cooperation. Finally, principal-agent models bring attention to the way organizations and persons of authority exercise control over their subordinates in attempting to implement a given policy. All three theories, as well as the hypotheses they generate for WOG models in Afghanistan, are outlined below.

**Bureaucratic Politics Theory**

Authors in the bureaucratic politics (BP) tradition usually argue that policy change is a product of the behaviour of national bureaucracies. Countries are patchworks of organizational units (ministries, government agencies) with diverging values, goals and agendas. These units fervently protect their autonomy and interests. This includes constantly seeking to preserve or expand the role of the organization, its budget, and the organizational influence overall, on the domestic front as well as in foreign policy (Allison and Halperin 1972, 40–79). The result is a constant competition among departments. Ministries manipulate information to their advantage, resist new ideas, and tend to subvert any new tasks assigned to them. More importantly, staff usually avoids consultations with colleagues from other ministries, and is unlikely to participate in projects that require cross-government cooperation (Allison and Halperin 1972, 48-49). In the end, policy outcomes are a direct product of this internal push and pull among narrow organizational interests (Allison and Halperin 1972, 42–43; 57).
Several studies point to bureaucratic politics as an explanation for deficient or failed WOG ventures in Afghanistan (Livingstone 2007; Patrick and Brown 2007; Rintakoski and Autti 2008; Hrychuk 2009). Less attention is given to the workings of BP both in country capitals and in the mission area. Even fewer authors analyse the conditions under which bureaucracies might cooperate, thus yielding more integrated WOG approaches. Overall, the consensus is that bureaucratic turf wars are particularly acute in countries with highly decentralized governments, where ministries are highly independent to make autonomous decisions on policy design and implementation.

Desrosiers and Lagasse (2009) research WOG on the strategic level only, focusing on the single case study of Canada. They argue that bureaucracies can agree to some level of inter-agency cooperation, but only if it is perceived to fall in line with the organizational essence, or when it can potentially advance the organizational interests in some area (Desrosiers and Lagasse 2009, 661). In Canada, the WOG rhetoric gave both DFAIT and the Armed Forces an opportunity to recycle their old agendas by dressing them in WOG terms. That is the main reason why some WOG institutions saw the light of day in Canada, the authors argue. In practice, however, the new WOG institutions existed mainly on paper. De facto coordination between the ministries in Ottawa did not tangibly improve.

Keane and Wood use BP logic to explain WOG developments on the tactical level. The authors develop an extended BP-role theory argument to analyse inter-agency coordination at US PRTs (2016).\textsuperscript{11} According to this model, WOG is heavily influenced by role conceptions - strategic and normative beliefs of what the organization’s role is

\textsuperscript{11} The authors argue that role theory is a recognized element of bureaucratic politics theory (Keane and Wood 2016, 101–2).
and how it should be achieved. These conceptions are rigid and resilient to change. At PRTs, the role conception of the military is naturally centered on kinetic operations. Since PRTs are overly militarized structures, the entire WOG effort becomes subjugated to the military goals of war fighting. The result is a disjointed WOG approach, and increased tension on all levels – between government agencies in Washington D.C., soldiers and civilians in the field, and even amongst representatives of different civilian agencies (Keane and Wood 2016, 103–7). The authors conclude that the main condition for closer inter-agency cooperation is a clear overarching authority with the ability to enforce coordination.

In sum, the logic of bureaucratic politics leaves little hope for WOG, on the strategic as well as on the tactical level. Overall, the theory predicts modest WOG integration, reaching the coexistence level in the best of cases. In country capitals, information sharing at joint meetings is predicted to be limited. Some inter-agency bodies may exist, but only to keep appearances. In the field, the situation is expected to be similar. Both on the home front and in a mission area, progress in inter-agency integration is expected to happen only if all ministries simultaneously decide that it fits with their diverging organizational goals, otherwise WOG developments will be stunted due to resistance of one or more agencies. Furthermore, the role conception logic predicts medium to high inter-departmental tensions, in country capitals as well as in the mission area. Overall, BP theory foresees low to moderate intensity of WOG integration across

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12 Keane and Wood argue specifically that the US PRTs are highly militarized. However, this is also true of the PRTs of other nations. By and large, military staff greatly outnumbered civilians at PRTs across the board.

13 In the case of the US, Keane and Wood argue, the Bush administration (namely, the President himself) did little to alleviate inter-departmental struggles (Keane and Wood 2016, 110).
the board, with relatively little variation within and across countries. Given the rigidity of role conceptions, BP expects persisting lack of trust between civilians and the military, even in countries that manage to achieve some WOG developments.

Bureaucratic politics theory permits generating the following specific hypotheses:

_Hypothesis 1:_ Government departments that perceive WOG as a tool serving their organizational purpose will support a WOG approach, while those that believe WOG runs counter to their organizational interests will resist inter-agency integration.

_Hypothesis 1a:_ Overall, a nation’s WOG model will move to a higher level on the WOG scale only when all ministries simultaneously decide that such developments advance their respective organizational interests.

_Hypothesis 2:_ Regardless of advancements in WOG integration, tensions between civilian and military ministries are unlikely to subside.

**Strategic Culture Theory**

The theory of strategic culture (SC) as an explanation of foreign policy decisions was first coined by Jack Snyder during the years of the Cold War (1977). Strategic culture refers to a shared set of deeply ingrained beliefs, practices and norms about how to act. These norms are widely accepted in society. They form the basis of social attitudes and condition the behavior of political elites, particularly in terms of the use of force.

Authors have unpacked the concept to outline three basic elements of strategic culture. “Foundational elements” are basic beliefs that form the crux of the strategic culture. Foundational elements are highly resistant to change. “Regulatory practices” are the visible manifestations and practices of a strategic culture. These are less resistant to change than foundational elements. Finally, the “security policy standpoints” are the contemporary, widely accepted interpretations about how best to apply the core values of
a strategic culture. In other words, security policy standpoints determine policy preferences (Longhurst 2005, 17).

While not static, strategic culture is highly resilient and persistent over time. Changes in strategic culture are usually rare, incremental, and considerably time-consuming (Longhurst 2005, 18). Fundamental change is a highly unusual phenomenon. It is abrupt, and occurs in response to a societal trauma so large as to obliterate the foundations of a strategic culture. Fine-tuning is the more common way a strategic culture changes. Whenever outside events challenge the foundational elements, political elites will have diverging interpretations (security policy standpoints) of the best course of action. In such cases, strategic culture is fine tuned to fit the new reality with the core values (which remain unchanged) (Longhurst 2005, 18).

Applied to the study of WOG approaches, the theory generates three main expectations. First, countries with a previously cultivated and well-established tradition of inter-ministerial cooperation will prefer collaborative strategies for their ISAF engagement. In these countries, WOG approaches in Afghanistan will be more integrated than in countries where ministries are used to working autonomously. Second, the variance across countries will be based on whether the nations in question share similar foundational values. In countries with similar strategic culture features, WOG patterns are expected to evolve in a more similar pattern than in countries with diverging strategic culture foundational values. Third, WOG developments are expected to occur largely as a result of external pressure: that is, changes in the operational environment in Afghanistan. As policymakers assimilate these changes, they are expected to fine tune the WOG model accordingly.
The following specific hypotheses emerge to be tested:

*Hypothesis 3*: Countries with a historical legacy of close cooperation between the military and civilian ministries will produce more integrated WOG models in Afghanistan than countries that lack such traditions.

*Hypothesis 3a*: Countries that share similar strategic culture traits will implement more similar WOG designs in Afghanistan than countries with diverging strategic cultures.

*Hypothesis 4*: WOG developments, on the strategic as well as on the tactical level, will occur in response to pressure from events in the mission area.

**Principal-Agent Theory**

Principal-agent (PA) theory centers around regulating the behavior of organizations or individuals within a hierarchical structure. Basic PA models, based on Terry Moe’s seminal research (1984, 739–777), posit that the authority in charge (a principal) is set on implementing a given policy, and must delegate it to a subordinate (an agent). But agents prefer to shirk responsibility, especially as they become more autonomous from the principal, a phenomenon known as “slippage” (Weaver 2007, 496–498). Thus, PA theory is concerned with the conditions under which slippage occurs. To address the problem of losing control over an agent, basic principal-agent models focus on introducing formal positive incentives (rewards for adopting the desired behavior), and sanctions (punitive actions in case of non-compliance) (Auerswald and Saideman 2016, 10).

Applied to this WOG study, PA theory helps understand why government agencies may shirk from adopting WOG practices, especially in a mission area where staff is physically removed from their direct superiors. Since direct supervision is impossible, ministerial employees in the field acquire greater autonomy to decide to what extent to cooperate with their colleagues from other departments. Thus, PA theory
predicts that, if a county lacks a formalized incentive and sanctions scheme to stimulate
civil-military cooperation, as well as adequate oversight to ensure compliance, WOG
practices in the field will be different from the aspirations communicated on the home
front. Direct incentives for cross-government cooperation may be salary raises,
promotion, and first picks on destinations for future postings. Indirect incentives include
a wide portfolio of non-mandatory civil-military training courses, as well as
administrative permission and active encouragement from superiors to take days off work
in order to attend these training opportunities. Formalized sanctions for failing to adopt
WOG practices can take the form of poor performance evaluations that affect
professional advancement, or in more extreme cases, demotion.

Scholars in the international relations tradition have refined basic PA logic to
reflect more complex situations where principals are collective, rather than single
entities. More recently, Auerswald and Saideman develop a theoretical model that
compares single versus collective principal dynamics to explain variation in the ways
countries control the behavior of their troops during the ISAF mission in Afghanistan
(2016, 62–63). The model’s basic premise is that variation in the structure of
government institutions leads to inherently different decision-making processes, and by
extension, different policy outcomes. Coalition governments are collective principals:
decisions must be made within a group, which requires heavy bargaining among
stakeholders with different opinions. Reaching a decision requires accommodating a wide

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15 Auerswald and Saideman’s theory is particularly useful to test, because it explores the combined effects
of government structure, political jostling, and the personal preferences of leaders: all factors that feature
prominently in the WOG literature as possible explanations for variation in WOG designs. The Auerswald
and Saideman model pertains to governments regulating the behaviour of the military in particular. Here,
the logic is extended to cover regulation of the behavior of civilian ministers, as well as the Armed Forces.
range of diverging interests, so coalition members must compromise. This leads to the adoption of a significant number of caveats, or restrictions on the scope of action of the military (Auerswald and Saideman 2016, 6). In the end, final policy outcomes follow the least common denominator. This is especially true if the coalition government is composed of parties with widely diverging ideologies (Auerswald and Saideman 2016, 63–64; 77).

By contrast, single-party majority parliamentary governments are individual principals: they empower single persons with the authority to make important foreign policy decisions. As a result, the decision-making process does not require wide-scale bargaining or significant political concessions. Consequently, there is significantly less pressure to adopt caveats on ministerial behaviour (Auerswald and Saideman 2016, 77). In theory, single-party majority governments have more leeway in designing, adopting, and implementing policies. In practice, this only holds if the policy in question serves the personal interests of the individual in charge (Auerswald and Saideman 2016, 15; 78). Here, the personal preferences of the leader, as dictated by background and previous experiences in military intervention, are the lead determinant of final policy outcomes (Auerswald and Saideman 2016, 66; 74).

In addition to recognizing the effect of formalized positive incentives and sanctions, Auerswald and Saideman spell out the types of oversight single and collective principals are likely to use in order to monitor the behaviour of the military. Oversight can be active and passive. Passive oversight refers to depending on others to report non-compliance, half-hearted or non-existent attempts to gather reports on agent behavior, or a failure to reform existing institutional arrangements so as to increase oversight over
agents (Auerswald and Saideman 2016, 74). By contrast, gathering information on agent behavior (for instance, through regular reports from the field, video conferences, or by requiring leaders to gain approval before engaging in particular activities), qualifies as active oversight. Another example is setting up new regulatory institutions, or reforming existing ones in order to improve compliance. Thus, in 2007 Canada created a new Afghanistan Task Force, with the specific purpose of ensuring that civilian departments and the military developed joint policies and objectives as regards Afghanistan. To underscore the strategic importance of the mission, the government appointed a high-profile official to head the new task force. David Mulroney, who had served as Foreign Affairs and Defence Policy Adviser to the Prime Minister in the Privy Council Office, became the active overseer of the overall joint effort (Schmitz and Phillips 2008, 4).

Coalition governments are likely to engage in active oversight over the military, particularly if the coalition is left-leaning (Auerswald and Saideman 2016, 78). By contrast, the degree to which single-party majority governments will exert active or passive oversight depends largely on the preferences of the Prime Minister in office (Auerswald and Saideman 2016, 79). Either way, in the absence of adequate oversight, military commanders deployed to a mission area are likely to act according to what they, rather than their superiors, believe is best (Auerswald and Saideman 2016, 9).

When applied to a WOG study, the model predicts that in countries with coalition governments, final WOG designs will be a product of collective negotiation. Some coalition members will likely worry about the inherent risks of integrating civilian and military efforts. Accommodating such concerns will require adopting various caveats, or restrictions on when and to what extent civilian ministries are allowed to cooperate with
the military. In country capitals, caveats may take the form of regulations to spend development cooperation funds strictly according to ODA guidelines, not allowing fund-pooling with the military or using civilian funding for political purposes. In a mission area, caveats refer to specific provisions that restrict the daily interactions of civilians with the military. For example, civilian staff may be instructed to avoid undertaking joint projects with the Armed Forces, to eschew the company of the military in public, to live and work outside of the PRT, and to refrain from sharing information with the military that might be used for military objectives (for instance, knowledge on insurgent movements). Limiting or discontinuing the deployment of civilian staff to the mission area due to security concerns is another example of a direct caveat. Caveats can also be indirect, such as providing the military with minimal funding for small-scale reconstruction projects, or denying administrative permission to be absent from work in order to attend joint civil-military training courses.

All this is to say that coalition governments are likely to adopt a variety of caveats that limit the discretion of ministries to work together, particularly if the coalition is ideologically diverse. On the one hand, all ministries are expected to actively monitor their deployed staff as closely as possible, through regular daily and weekly telephone contact, videoconferences, and reports. Tight oversight leaves little margin for people on the ground to sway from the WOG model established back home. In other words, in coalition governments the levels of WOG integration on the home front and in Afghanistan are expected to be similar.

On the other hand, the various caveats on cross-government cooperation spell out a restricted delegation contract that limits the scope of WOG development at the outset.
Thus, coalition governments are expected to yield at best moderately integrated WOG approaches. On average, the more ideologically diverse the coalition, the less integrated the WOG approach is expected to be.

By contrast, in single party majority systems, decisions on WOG design will be centralized around a single individual, the Prime Minister (PM). Other important persons, such as the PM’s inner circle, may also have some influence in the debate on WOG models of cooperation, but the final word will remain with the PM. This means there will likely be no lengthy negotiations or significant political concessions when determining what shape WOG should take. Single-party majority governments are not under as much pressure to place conditions on civil-military cooperation as are coalition governments. Here, the level of discretion granted to ministries when working with one another will depend largely on the preferences of the incumbent PM. PMs may have different perceptions of the appropriate purpose and formula for civil-military cooperation. This means that, as a new PM is elected, the way ministries cooperate on the home front will change, reflecting the degree of difference (or lack thereof) between the personal vision of the incumbent and that of his predecessor.

In addition, PMs might differ in their preferences as to the level of oversight they exercise, on the home front as well as in the mission area. In country capitals, PMs preferring active oversight will likely focus on creating new joint institutions (including fund pooling mechanisms), reforming existing ones to enhance their legitimacy and joint decision-making authority, chairing the joint meetings personally (or appointing a senior-level official to do so), ensuring active and regular participation of all ministries, and establishing an overarching, mandatory joint pre-deployment training programme for
staff at all levels. Active oversight over deployed staff may take the form of regular joint reporting on civil-military projects, mandatory requirements for civilians to reside within the PRT and to attend all joint meetings, and weekly VTC or phone conference contact with staff on the ground during their joint meetings.

By contrast, Prime Ministers who prefer passive oversight are unlikely to initiate or deepen cross-government coherence reforms. These leaders will prefer ad hoc meetings to a regular joint meeting agenda, allow ministries to selectively participate in joint meetings, and maintain a predominantly voluntary joint training curriculum. In a mission area, passive oversight may mean irregular reporting on joint activities, and infrequent or non-existent VTC contact with the PRT during the joint meetings in the field.

The implication here is that the tenures of premiers who prefer active oversight will likely yield similar levels of WOG integration at home and in Afghanistan. Conversely, leaders with a preference for lax oversight will allow commanders on the ground to interpret their orders as they see fit, likely resulting in diverging levels of WOG at home and abroad.

The above propositions generate the following testable hypotheses:

*Hypothesis 5:* On average, coalition governments will produce low to medium-level WOG integration models, reaching no higher than the “coordinated action” level of the WOG scale.

*Hypothesis 5a:* Coalitions of more ideologically diverse parties will result in less integrated WOG approaches than coalitions of more like-minded parties.

*Hypothesis 5b:* On average, coalition governments will prioritize measures that tighten the caveats on inter-ministerial cooperation over measures that stimulate joint working.

*Hypothesis 6:* In single party majority governments, the level of WOG integration will reflect the personal preferences of the individual occupying the Prime Minister post.
**Hypothesis 7:** Absent adequate oversight, the level of WOG integration in the field will reflect the personal preferences of the PRT leader(s).

**Case Selection**

The first step in the case selection process was to focus on nations with similar levels of commitment within the ISAF chain. Some countries only deployed a small military contingent and no civilians, which automatically made them unsuitable for a study on tactical WOG approaches. Others contributed both civilian and military personnel, but their staff joined Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) headed by other nations. Such cases were also deemed unsuitable, because it is difficult to argue for a national WOG approach in theatre when staff belongs to the chain command of another nation. In short, to ensure the case comparison was meaningful, the cases were selected from among countries that all served as PRT lead nations. These countries had exclusive rights in determining the PRT setup, the general framework of inter-agency cooperation, the specific tasks for civilians and the military, and the model of joint decision-making processes within the PRTs. All this makes PRT lead nations suitable candidates to study, if the goal is to explore tactical WOG designs and their causal factors.

The next step was to ensure the selected case studies were appropriate in view of the theories being tested. In the existing literature, there are several articles that compare WOG approaches across nations, but the case selections appear more ad hoc than theoretically informed. Here, the case selection was informed by the main points of variation proposed by the testable theories: coalition versus single-party parliamentary government, highly independent ministries versus a centralized executive authority, and

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16 The question why some nations chose to carry a larger burden than others within ISAF is interesting, and has been explored in detail elsewhere. The aim of this study is not to contribute to that line of scholarship.
political attitudes towards military intervention and the purpose of development cooperation.

Simultaneously, it was necessary to control for the varying levels of violence in different provinces of Afghanistan. According to the Institute for the Study of War, one reason for the variance in PRT models was the level of permissiveness of the operational environment (2009). Some countries deployed to much more dangerous places than others. For instance, fatality rates among nations that went to Helmand and Kandahar were consistently and significantly higher than those who deployed to other provinces. It is plausible to assume that the level of security in the deployment area had an effect on WOG practices in the field. To control for those effects, the case selection focused on countries that deployed to the same area – Regional Command North (RCN). Northern Afghanistan provides a good test for WOG, as it was the most peaceful region in Afghanistan and thus the easiest environment in which to carry out civil-military activities.

This narrowed down the universe of potential cases to five countries that headed PRTs in RCN: Sweden, Germany, Norway, Hungary, and the United Kingdom. Sweden and Germany emerged as most similar, as well as least likely to vary along the dependent variable (Bennett 2012, 29; 31). Both headed PRTs in Northern Afghanistan, in areas of comparable security levels. Having started off their engagement in a relatively peaceful environment, both experienced an increasing level of insurgent activity from 2007 onwards. From a strategic culture point of view, both Sweden and Germany have traditionally emphasized multilateralism and pacifism in their foreign policy approach, as

17 See http://icasualties.org/OEF/ByProvince.aspx
well as a reluctance to use the military abroad. Both have highly decentralized
governments, where ministries enjoy a significant degree of autonomy in policymaking
and implementation, thus suggesting a high degree of bureaucratic resistance to the WOG
concept. Finally, both countries have traditionally been ruled by coalition governments.
All this makes them least likely to adopt a whole-of-government approach. Nonetheless,
both had professed a WOG ambition at some point. More importantly, the preliminary
evidence suggested a variation in their WOG approaches. Thus, comparing Swedish and
German experiences permits shedding light on what factor, or combination of factors,
drove the differences in civil-military coherence between these two countries. As
suggested by Bennett, I used process tracing to uncover these causal mechanisms (2012,
35).

Next, I considered adding a third case that fits the most different case study logic,
providing variation along the main independent variables indicated by the three testable
theories. Suitable candidates were countries with a tradition of more centralized decision-
making, ruled by presidential or single party majority governments that were not averse
to using the military overseas. Within the universe of available cases in RCN, only the
United Kingdom fit the characteristics. In contrast to Sweden and Germany, the UK has a
long experience in policing an empire, and using civil-military techniques as well as
development aid for political purposes. In the British parliament, single-party majority
governments have traditionally been the norm. The decision-making authority is
centralized around the Prime Minister, and to a lesser extent the Cabinet Office.
As regards their deployments to Afghanistan, there are important overlaps in timing and
areas of operation between the three countries. In 2003, both the UK and Germany
deployed to Northern Afghanistan at roughly the same time, headed PRTs in adjacent provinces with similar levels insurgent activity, and remained in the area together until the British moved to Southern Afghanistan in 2006. This makes it possible to compare British and German WOG experiences in 2003-2006 while controlling for the level of insecurity of the operational environment.

In 2006, after three years as a lead nation of the Mazar-e-Sharif PRT, the UK transferred the responsibility to a Swedish team, who ran the PRT for the next eight years. This allows for comparing the British and Swedish WOG models in the same Northern province, while factoring in changes in the security situation over time.

From 2006 to 2014, Sweden and Germany remained in Northern Afghanistan, while the British relocated to the South to head a PRT in Lashkar Gah, Helmand province. All three countries experienced rising levels of insurgent activity, with Helmand being significantly more violent than the Northern provinces where Sweden and Germany continued operating. At this stage, this study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. On the one hand, it elucidates how Swedish and German WOG practices evolved against the backdrop of an increasingly violent operational environment. As shown later on, these countries developed different WOG models, even though they continued facing similar levels of pressure in the field. On the other hand, it is possible to zero in on British experiences alone, contrasting the UK experiences in Mazar-e-Sharif and in Helmand.\(^\text{18}\) The goal here is to tease out in what ways decreasing security in the field affects WOG practices. Finally, conducting an overall comparison between all three

\(^{18}\) Several studies have analyzed the difficulties the UK faced in Helmand, due to an ill-conceived overall strategy and inadequate support from London in terms of resources and capability. However, few explore in detail the implications for British WOG – over time, and as compared to the experiences in Northern Afghanistan.
countries over time lays the groundwork for a typology of WOG approaches, and the main causes of variation across countries.

**Data Collection Techniques**

The data was collected from both written and oral sources. Due to the nature of the research topic, the study is heavily interview-based. Written documents were helpful in determining what kinds of joint policies and institutions exist in the countries in question. However, the mere existence of such bodies says little about the genuine level of WOG integration. To probe deeper into the decision-making process, I conducted interviews with key government and NGO officers in Sweden and Germany, and triangulated between oral and written sources to increase the internal validity of the findings. By contrast, due to time and resource constraints, the UK chapters are based on secondary information only. The United Kingdom’s experience in Afghanistan is one of the most widely researched in the literature, so sufficient information was available for the purposes of conducting the study. Nonetheless, the lack of first-hand data limits the validity of the conclusions in the UK case. The next paragraphs describe in detail the written and oral sources used.

**Written Data Sources**

As a first step, data was collected from unclassified written sources published by the ministries, government agencies, and the parliaments of Sweden, Germany, and the UK. These sources included: policy and strategy statements, White Papers, strategic assessments and audits, reports, meeting minutes, guidelines, and public statements from government bureaucrats and official government bodies. Next, I used information from
independent sources: reports, evaluations and official statements from NGOs, think tanks and other civil society groups, the media, as well as books and peer-reviewed articles published in academic journals. Finally, I also used unpublished written sources, such as civil-military training manuals and other unclassified material used in joint training courses for staff about to deploy overseas. The vast majority of written sources in Sweden and Germany could be accessed in English. The help of a professional translator was used in the rare cases where no English version was available.

Oral Data Sources

Over the course of 2014-2015, I personally conducted a total of 47 semi-structured interviews, 17 in Sweden and 30 in Germany. All conversations were held in English. No language issues or difficulties with understanding arose, as all respondents were fluent English speakers. Only people with first-hand knowledge on WOG practices in Afghanistan were interviewed. Most respondents were current or former ministerial employees. Some were non-government officials affiliated with think tanks or NGOs. The timing of the interviews was particularly appropriate, because it coincided with the end of both the Swedish and the German military engagement in Afghanistan. This allowed for selecting from a pool of respondents who had been involved with the Afghanistan mission at different times, from the very beginning to the very last PRT rotations.

Of the Swedish respondents, 47% were civilians, either current or former employees of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), or the Swedish Afghanistan Committee (SAK). The remaining 53% were
employees of the Swedish Ministry of Defence or the Swedish Armed Forces. Of the total, 82% of respondents had deployed to Afghanistan at least once, while 18% had only been involved in managing various aspects of the Swedish contribution from home. Similarly, 47% of the German respondents were civilians from the Federal Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt, or AA), the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), the KfW Development Bank, or the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP); 53% were German soldiers. Of the total, 90% had completed at least one rotation in Afghanistan, while 10% had never been to the field.

The respondents were selected through snowball sampling (Biernacki and Waldorf 1981, 141–163). The snowball sampling technique was appropriate, because the goal was to reach only those ministerial officials with direct knowledge and first-hand experience in the management of the Afghanistan mission. To minimize selection bias, I initiated the snowballs in as many places as possible. First, I used referrals from personal contacts in Ottawa, mainly members of the Canadian Armed Forces who knew Swedish or German colleagues with field experience in Afghanistan. Second, I contacted the communications departments of the Swedish and German Embassies, both in Canada and in Bulgaria, and pursued leads provided by the Embassy staff. Third, I reached out to government officials, NGOs, and think tanks who had published articles, reports, or other material related to the whole-of-government approach. Fourth, I attended two international civil-military training courses in Germany, and requested interviews from those fellow participants who fit the interviewee profile. At the end of each interview, I asked respondents for suggestions of other persons who would be willing to be
interviewed. As a final step, I transcribed all interviews, coded the data, and analyzed the data with the help of Microsoft Excel. The coding scheme is provided in Appendix C. The interview questionnaire is provided in Appendix D.

In sum, comparing the whole-of-government approaches of Sweden, Germany, and the UK generates useful theoretical insights, as well as practical policy prescriptions for further study and applications of whole-of-government approaches. At the same time, this study begins building a typology of WOGs that can be further extended in the future. As seen in the following chapters, Sweden remains at the lowest end of the scale, followed by Germany with a moderately-integrated WOG, and the UK’s WOG model emerges as the most advanced of the three. The next chapter proceeds with a detailed examination of the Swedish WOG approach on the strategic level.

The Swedish term for whole-of-government is *allomfattande ansats*, which translates as “comprehensive approach.”¹⁹ A more frequently used buzzword in the Swedish media, academic and policy circles is “synergies.” This shorthand reference to WOG emerged in 2005, when the Swedish government started referring to “seeking synergies” between the SAF and civilian actors in Afghanistan (Regeringens Proposition 2005/06:34, 11).

In Stockholm, Swedish WOG developments proceeded in three steps. From 2001 to 2006, WOG stood at “communication,” the lowest end of the integration scale. During the second phase, 2006 to 2009, all WOG indicators except financial pooling shifted to “coexistence.” This period marked the peak of the Swedish ambition to create synergies between the Swedish Armed Forces (SAF), the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), and the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA). During the final phase, 2010 to 2014, the synergies rhetoric gradually faded away, and the WOG model regressed back to the “communication” level.

Swedish WOG developments were largely a result of the party politics and political negotiations in the minority and wide coalition governments that ruled Sweden during the period in question. Every aspect of Sweden’s presence in Afghanistan hinged upon a broad parliamentary consensus. Consequently, the issue of WOG was subject to the political concessions required to agree on the larger issue of Sweden’s overall

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¹⁹ This is not to be confused with the NATO definition of “comprehensive approach,” which refers to integration of efforts within international organizations.
engagement. From 2001 to 2006, the ruling centre-left, single party minority government was skeptical of WOG overall. The Cabinet Office thus avoided articulating clear goals for WOG advancement, focusing instead on establishing caveats that restricted the array of possible civil-military cooperation activities. After gaining majority in the elections of 2006, the centre-right Alliance coalition was more favourably inclined towards inter-agency coherence, and expressed an intention to adopt WOG principles. However, this ambition was modest and short-lived, as the Alliance lost parliamentary majority in 2010. In the ensuing political negotiations over the Swedish overall engagement in Afghanistan, the Alliance compromised with the opposition by specifically agreeing to a strict separation of civilian and military activities.

After a brief discussion of Sweden’s participation in peace operations, the chapter outlines the setup of the Swedish engagement in ISAF, as well as the political dynamics in Stockholm that lead to it. I then provide a detailed examination of WOG indicators, as per the integration scale. The chapter concludes with a short overview of the main findings.

**Sweden in Peace Operations**

Sweden upholds an international image based on neutrality, solidarity, humanitarianism and multilateralism: a model often characterized as the Nordic approach (Nohrstedt and Ottosen 2010, 2). Swedish development cooperation is need-driven, and is not subordinated to political or military objectives. The Swedish Armed Forces are specifically structured to engage in international peace missions, but there is an overall aversion to using the military in offensive operations (Angstrom and Honig 2012, 679;
Olsson and Jansson 2012, 7–8). Engagement in multinational peace operations is subject to parliamentary mandates that must be extended annually (Patrick and Brown 2007, 116).

Requests for Swedish participation in multinational peace operations trigger a broad domestic consensus building process. Within Cabinet, policies of more significant importance must be approved by at least five ministers, with no one opposing (Patrick and Brown 2007, 119). Swedish ministries also conduct independent internal evaluations of the proposed engagement. A proposal for a mission mandate is then presented to the Swedish Parliament (*Riksdag*) in the form of a government bill. Normally, the government wants to make certain the presented bill will pass (Personal Interview MFA Official, 2014). If there are disagreements or a need to accommodate particular political interests, the text is revised. The final version is adopted on the basis of consensus (Personal Interview FBA Official, 2014).

In the past two decades, the SAF have participated in a variety of peace operations, mostly under the auspices of the UN but also NATO and the EU (Olsson and Jansson 2012, 7–8). Sweden’s involvement on the Balkans, and its more recent participation in NATO-lead COIN operations in Afghanistan, suggested a reconceptualization of the core values of Swedish foreign policy (Osterdahl 2015, 56–57). Contrary to strategic culture logic, the traditional Swedish neutrality was evolving, largely due to domestic factors: power realignments and consensus-building between the main rivals on the Swedish political arena (Bassett 2012, 18).

Sweden’s consensus-based, multi-party system makes it difficult for one party to secure parliamentary majority. Minority governments and coalitions have thus been the
norm, with the Social Democratic Party (SDP), and the Moderate Party (MP) emerging as the two major opposing gravitational poles within the Riksdag (Bergman 2003, 192). The centre-left SDP has opposed NATO membership for decades, insisting on a firm stance for neutrality in Swedish foreign policy (Bassett 2012, 20–21). By contrast, the more liberal, centre-right MP has supported Swedish membership in NATO, and generally advocates for less rigid interpretations of neutrality (Bassett 2012, 21).

For Sweden, the engagement in Afghanistan was the first opportunity to apply a WOG approach in practice.²⁰ Hauck and Rocca argue that Sweden’s Total Defense Concept (TDC) established a long-standing tradition in domestic civil-military cooperation, which in turn paved the way for Swedish WOG in multinational operations. The TDC, a Cold War military defense concept, organized all civilian actors in assisting the SAF against Soviet aggression. By subordinating civilian action to military goals, the TDC focused on detailed civil-military planning, and involved practically the entire civilian population. After the end of the Cold War, the TDC was phased out, but some argue the experience served as a starting point for developing Swedish comprehensive approaches in fragile states (Hauck and Rocca 2014, 37). Since civilians and the military were already used to working together, inter-agency cooperation in the context of international missions became easier (Personal Interviews SAF officials, 2014).

Proponents of strategic culture might see in the TDC a set of commonly accepted norms of behaviour in inter-agency collaboration, which pre-determined the Swedish WOG approach in Afghanistan. This logic fails to convince for three reasons. First, it

²⁰ On previous occasions, most notably as part of UNMIL in Liberia, the Swedish military has deployed jointly with staff from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) (Patrick and Brown 2007, 124). However, there had been no organized attempts to achieve civil-military coherence.
predicts subordinating civilian actors to the military, as per the setup of the TDC. This stands in stark contrast to the structure of the Swedish engagement in Afghanistan. As seen in the next chapter, while the Swedish PRT was military-lead for the majority of time, civilian actors posted to the PRT were in fact not subordinated to the military commander, but operated separately and reported directly to the Swedish Embassy, or to their superiors in Stockholm.

Second, the SC argument predicts intensive joint planning between civilian ministries and the SAF, as was the case under the Total Defense Concept. In reality, inter-agency planning for the Afghanistan engagement was extremely limited, both in Stockholm and in the field. Third, the logic predicts a high level of trust and smooth interactions between government departments overall. This picture does not accurately reflect reality, particularly when it comes to Swedish WOG on the tactical level, as the next chapter demonstrates.

A more likely explanation is that the TDC was a domestic concept that bore little relevance to the challenges of inter-agency cooperation outside of the national boundaries (Grönberg 2010, 29). Evidence from this study suggests a limited contribution of TDC to Swedish WOG. The Total Defense Concept appears to have facilitated inter-agency interactions, but only on the strategic level, among institutions within Sweden (Personal Interview FBA Official, 2014). While the same logic does not hold in the field, it appears plausible that the TDC had partial benefits towards alleviating cross-organizational tensions in Stockholm.

Patrick and Brown argue that Sweden’s highly decentralized government structure impedes inter-agency coherence in overseas missions (2007, 122). Swedish
ministries and their implementing agencies (also called independent authorities) enjoy ample discretion in policy design and implementation. Cabinet provides broad outlines of the desired direction, but uses a hands-off approach toward the ministries as to executing their tasks (Egnell and Nilsson 2010, 12; Östberg, Johannisson, and Persson, n.d., 408). The implications of this argument are that decentralization breeds bureaucratic turf wars, lowers inter-agency trust, and stymies WOG developments overall. This study certainly unveils ample evidence of bureaucratic jostling. However, it was the nature of the collective decision-making within the Riksdag that ultimately shaped the Swedish WOG model.

**Sweden in Afghanistan, 2002-2014**

Sweden’s strategic narrative on Afghanistan has been described as a laundry list of motives, ranging from humanitarian assistance to safeguarding international order and even Swedish national security. The reason for such a grab-bag strategy, authors have argued, was the need to accommodate a variety of political target audiences (Noreen and Angstrom 2015, 283). In the Swedish consensus-seeking political system, endorsing the Afghanistan mission depended on multiple stakeholders with diverging interests. The final outcome was a catch-all narrative. Initially based on humanitarian aid, Sweden’s strategic discourse gradually expanded to include national self-interest, collective security, gender equality, and good governance, among others (Noreen and Angstrom 2015, 283-284).

This section illustrates how Swedish WOG was negotiated as one of the sub-issues within the larger framework of the overall Swedish engagement in Afghanistan. In
the first part, I briefly outline the strategic and operational setup of the Swedish mission. The second part demonstrates how shifts in the balance of power within the Riksdag, and the ensuing political bargaining over the Afghanistan issue, affected Swedish WOG developments.

**Strategic and Operational Setup of the Swedish Engagement**

In 2001, the Riksdag authorized a small mission of 45 soldiers under a UN mandate, limited to the capital of Kabul. The Swedish forces, consisting mainly of intelligence and reconnaissance units, arrived on the scene in 2002. In the same year, a government decision added a CIMIC unit to the Swedish contingent (Regeringens proposition 2002/03:21, 2). Over the years, Swedish troop contributions gradually expanded to approximately 500 soldiers.\(^\text{21}\)

In 2004, Swedish forces joined the British-lead PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif, formally assuming its leadership two years later (Tham, Och, and Hull 2011, 19). Thus, Sweden became responsible for the Northern provinces of Balkh, Jawzjan, Samangan, and Sar-e Pol. In addition to the military contingent, from 2009 onwards the PRT included a small civilian team: political advisers (POLADs) hired by the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA), development advisers (DEVADs) from SIDA, and police advisers from the Swedish National Police Board. Initially, the PRT was headed by a single military commander (CO). In 2010, the SAF spearheaded strategic negotiations to establish double-headed PRT leadership. The MFA never embraced the idea, but eventually agreed

\(^\text{21}\) Sweden also contributed to EUPOL, the EU-lead police mission in Afghanistan.
to post a Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) as an equal counterpart of the military commander (Personal Interviews FBA Official, 2014).

The opening of the SCR post coincided with a broader political decision to terminate the Swedish military engagement by 2014, and to shift from counterinsurgency to training and support of the Afghan National Security Forces (Höghammar 2013). The double-headed PRT model thus lasted for only two years. In 2012, the SCR officially assumed leadership, and the PRT was renamed Transition Support Team (TST). By 2014, control of the TST was transferred to the Afghan authorities (Tham, Och, and Hull 2011, 35).

Sweden lacks an overarching government body with executive authority over all ministries. Ministries and government agencies operate with a high degree of independence and under rules of strict division of labour. Formally, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) is in the lead of all Swedish engagements abroad. The ministry provides the broad political direction, but lacks direct authority to command the work of other ministries. Apart from maintaining an official embassy in Kabul, the MFA deployed staff to the PRT. Through civilian police advisers posted in Mazar-e-Sharif, the MFA also funded mentoring activities for the Afghan National Police. All civilian PRT personnel were officially part of the chain of command of the Kabul Embassy, although in practice all reported to their respective ministries directly.

The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), an independent authority under the jurisdiction of the Swedish MFA, is in charge of long-term development cooperation. Through an annual letter of appropriation, the government sets SIDA’s budget and outlines the guidelines according to which assistance
is to be disbursed. In Stockholm, the Afghanistan contribution is managed at the Department of Asia, Middle East, and Humanitarian Assistance. In the field, SIDA’s projects in Afghanistan were managed by DEVADs deployed at the PRT. While DEVADs were formally subordinated to the SCR through the Embassy in Kabul, in practice SIDA kept direct vertical reporting lines to their headquarters in Stockholm.

The Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) is the Swedish government agency for peace, security and development. It is an independent civilian authority tasked with contributing to a coordinated Swedish response to conflict management and crisis prevention around the world. In terms of civil-military cooperation in peace operations, the role of the FBA is limited to training and education. The FBA recruits and trains civilian personnel for the mission (particularly the political advisors for the PRT in Afghanistan), coordinates the responsibilities of civilian agencies (excluding the military), and prepares joint training courses in tandem with relevant Swedish ministries and authorities (Bandstein 2010, 11).

In this context of highly autonomous government departments, there is ample evidence of policy stovepiping, lack of incentives for inter-agency cooperation, bureaucratic turf wars, and fierce protection of organizational interests. While the decentralized government system certainly exacerbated bureaucratic practices, this study finds that party politics and consensus building within the Riksdag were the ultimate determinants of the end state of Swedish WOG. The next section illustrates this by carefully tracing evolution Swedish inter-agency cooperation in Stockholm.
The Makings of the Swedish Whole-Of-Government Approach

Two factors marked the development of Swedish WOG at the outset. One was the constant political bargaining over the nature and extent of the Swedish contribution to ISAF. For the negotiations to move forward, the interests of the WOG skeptics had to be accommodated, and this resulted in adopting a series of caveats, or restrictions on the scope of civil-military action. Another issue was the politicians’ general aversion to discussing Afghanistan-related issues during the parliamentary debates (Östberg, Johannisson, and Persson, n.d., 405). It was clear that concrete policies for increasing civil-military coherence would not garner broad political support, and might jeopardize the broad consensus necessary to maintain the Swedish presence in Afghanistan (Personal Interviews FBA and SAK Officials, 2014). Consequently, political parties never openly discussed the specifics of civil-military cooperation, or measures to develop civil-military capacity (Östberg, Johannisson, and Persson, n.d., 405). Cabinet purposefully opted for a vague WOG narrative, constantly emphasizing the need for strict separation between civilian and military activities, but otherwise providing no specific indication how soldiers and civilians were supposed to interact (Personal Interviews FBA and SAK Officials, 2014).

In 2001, during the tenure of the SDP minority government, parties across the board agreed on deploying a small mission of 45 troops under a UN mandate, limited to the capital of Kabul (Noreen and Angstrom 2015, 285). Approving this rather restrictive first mandate was not problematic, but more significant political disagreements emerged in time. In order to legitimize the ongoing Swedish participation in ISAF, the annual mandate extension bills repeatedly stressed that a UN mandate, as well as a broad
consensus within the Riksdag, were necessary conditions for Sweden to remain in Afghanistan (Noreen and Angstrom 2015, 293).

In the 2002 elections, the SDP was reelected but again failed to secure parliamentary majority. The Social Democrats obtained 144 seats in the Riksdag, with 47 more seats distributed amongst their two major allies, the Green Party and Left Party. The Moderate Party, which was generally supportive of a WOG approach, lost ground, yielding 25 seats to its opponents. All this is to say that, 54% of the Swedish parliament was in the hands of more like-minded parties that generally espoused stricter interpretations of neutrality in all aspects of foreign policy.22

Signs of an eroding political consensus on the overall nature of the Swedish mission were already showing in 2002. The Afghanistan mandate extension bill included provisions for extending beyond Kabul and into Mazar-e-Sharif, in addition to enhancing coordination with the US-lead Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). In the ensuing negotiations, voices of dissent opposed the mandate, raising concerns that Sweden’s collaboration with the US was inconsistent with Sweden’s overall approach to foreign policy. To bolster their argument, opponents brought up the issue of sending Swedish soldiers to the US Central Command (CENTCOM) as part of international counter-terrorism efforts (Noreen and Angstrom 2015, 286).23

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22. The SDP in particular, while not openly pacifist, has some strong anti-militaristic undercurrents. Over time, maintaining neutrality in defense matters has proven the only effective way to secure consensus within the SDP party (Åselius 2005, 26–27). Given that the Greens and the Left party did not always agree with the SDP on issues of overseas engagements, as seen later on, it is not surprising that the minority SDP government preferred to skirt the potentially controversial issue of adopting a WOG approach in Afghanistan.

23. In the language of Kingdon’s theory of policy streams, this is an example of using side issues as focusing events in order to extract political concessions during the negotiation process (Kingdon 2002, 197–99).
While the 2002 mandate was eventually extended, the issue of muddling the boundaries between the Swedish operation and OEF continued to plague the parliamentary negotiations. In 2003, the SDP faced opposition from two of its traditional allies: the Left Party and the Green Party. The Left opposed the mandate extension bill on the grounds of blurring the lines between the Swedish contribution and US counterinsurgency warfare. The Greens supported the bill, but criticized American COIN strategies in much the same way (Noreen and Angstrom 2015, 287). In sum, associating the Swedish operation with NATO or US strategies in Afghanistan was seen as problematic by left-wing parties, which jeopardized the overall consensus within the Riksdag. Given that integrating large-scale civilian funding into military operations is one of the primary features of American COIN tactics, it is not surprising that an open debate on WOG never materialized in the Swedish parliament.

In the elections of 2006, the Alliance, a centre-right coalition of the Moderate Party, the Centre Party, the Liberal People’s Party, and the Christian Democratic Party, gained 80% of the seats in the Riksdag. The victory of the Alliance represented a major opportunity for advancing inter-agency coherence (Personal Interview MFA Official, 2014). The new liberal-conservative coalition generally favoured a closer relationship with NATO, which moved the WOG concept up in the policy agenda (Personal Interview SAF Official, 2014).

While this was Sweden’s first majority government since the 1970s, it did not automatically imply consensus within the Alliance coalition on the way forward in Afghanistan. In an effort to ensure the continuing extension of the mandate for contribution to ISAF, the proposal text was tamed down, and did not include explicit
references to the more contentious issue of adopting a national WOG strategy (Personal Interview MFA Official, 2014). Instead, the bill focused on the more narrow issue of taking over the PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif, arguing that it could contribute to stabilizing the increasingly fragile security situation (Noreen and Angstrom 2015, 289).\(^{24}\)

Over the following three years, the Alliance coalition cultivated a carefully framed narrative of “seeking synergies” between civilian and military actors. The peak of the synergies rhetoric occurred in 2009, when Sweden’s Strategy for Development Cooperation hinted at possible joint action in the realm of stabilization (Government Offices of Sweden 2009, 8). Compared to the previous government, this was a more clearly articulated intention to proceed with WOG. Still, the ambition was modest: the references to “synergies” were kept vague, and did not treat contentious issues such as fund pooling or civil-military cooperation in the context of COIN initiatives.

2010 was a decisive year that marked the future of the Swedish contribution to ISAF in general, and Swedish WOG in particular. Debates on the Afghanistan issue intensified, largely because the opposition raised the issue during the election campaign. In September 2010, the Alliance was re-elected but lost its majority in the Riksdag. The ruling coalition now had to reckon with a more firmly positioned Red-Green block in charting a future course of action in Afghanistan.\(^{25}\)

Within the Riksdag, the voices of discord became more prominent. Once again, the major concern was that Sweden was effectively supporting US and NATO counterinsurgency strategies (Stavrou 2010). The ruling Alliance generally supported the

\(^{24}\) There is an implicit concession in this statement that a WOG approach is a part of an overall stabilization strategy. As seen later on, a full recognition to that effect never occurred in Sweden.

\(^{25}\) The Red-Greens is a catch-all name for the SDP, Greens, and Left Party.
military engagement, and believed the deteriorating security situation demanded an increased emphasis on both civilian and military instruments (Tham, Och, and Hull 2011, 20). By contrast, the Red-Green opposition was struggling to come up with a unified position (Radio Sweden 2010). SDP leader Mona Sahlin argued in favour of maintaining Swedish troops in Afghanistan until 2014, but the Left and Greens disagreed. Hans Linde, spokesperson for the Left Party, called for a complete overhaul of the Swedish strategy in Afghanistan, immediate troop withdrawal, and shifting the focus towards purely humanitarian assistance. The controversial Sweden Democrats, an ultra-right nationalist party that entered parliament for the first time, supported the Left (Radio Sweden 2010). The Greens took a more moderate stand: although they preferred a much quicker scaling down of the military effort, they were willing to compromise with the Alliance (Personal Interview MFA Official, 2014).

All this is to say that the Red-Greens were divided over the larger issue of Sweden’s future in Afghanistan, and thus lost advantage in the negotiations with the ruling Alliance. The opposition was forced to compromise, accepting a gradual reduction of troops that would begin in 2012 (Stavrou 2010). This was a much later permanent withdrawal date than the centre-left parties would have preferred. However, on one particular sub-issue, civil-military cooperation, the SDP and Greens saw eye to eye. The Red-Green block thus managed to organize effectively at the time of demanding concessions in turn. The opposition asked for a clear separation between the security, diplomacy, and development lines of operation, which effectively meant dropping the

26 While these two smaller parties were in agreement about the end state of the engagement, their rationales differed significantly. The Left supported a pacifist engagement in Afghanistan, while the Sweden Democrats called for redirecting resources away from international missions and towards protecting Sweden’s borders on the home front (Stavrou 2010).
synergies ambition. The Alliance agreed that WOG efforts would be limited to sharing information, but not working together in the field (Personal Interview SIDA Official, 2014).

Shortly afterwards, the “synergies” rhetoric was phased out of the policy agenda (Personal Interview SIDA Official, 2014). Given the political ambition for inter-agency integration was already somewhat modest, it became even more so from 2010 onwards (Personal Interviews MFA and SIDA Officials, 2014). Over the next four years, Sweden gradually increased civilian support for Afghanistan, although no part of this money was earmarked for a stabilization fund, or eligible to use in joint initiatives with the Armed Forces (Personal Interview MFA Official, 2014). At the same time, interest in WOG within the Armed Forces appeared to be waning. When Sweden adopted the NATO Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive of 2010, it introduced modifications that effectively downplayed the coherence rhetoric (Personal Interview FBA Official, 2014).27 This conceptual move away from WOG certainly coincided with SIDA’s views (Personal Interview MFA Official, 2014).

Three main points emerge from the above. First, the evidence is broadly consistent with the Auerswald and Saideman coalition politics logic. In Sweden, final WOG outcomes were a product of intensive political bargaining, especially the concessions made to the Red-Green opposition during the 2010-2014 Alliance coalition government.

27 The NATO Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive takes a more proactive stance on the comprehensive approach: it calls for marshalling military and non-military resources with a greater unity of purpose (NATO 2010, 1–2).
Second, while strategic culture theory correctly predicts a low-intensity WOG overall, it fails to properly account for the processes that lead to it. Scholars in the SC tradition argue that Swedish strategic culture is particularly susceptible to the spread of international norms (Angstrom and Honig 2012, 681). In the case of Swedish WOG, this premise does not hold, as shown by the restrictive modifications Sweden introduced prior to adopting the NATO Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive.

Furthermore, SC assumes a commonly accepted Swedish code of behavior, based on neutrality and depoliticized humanitarianism, which by default requires strict separation of civilian and military means. Certainly, many interviewees felt that Sweden had a long tradition of separating civil and military instruments - one of many reasons why COIN fit so poorly with Swedish concepts of foreign policy (Personal Interviews SAF and MFA Officials, 2014). Against this backdrop, SC logic predicts that the topic of WOG integration would be a non-issue in Sweden. In other words, strategic culture explains neither the military’s initial eagerness to promote WOG, nor the rise and subsequent demise of the synergies narrative. The fact that WOG rhetoric appeared in official government bills, whose text is adopted on the basis of broad parliamentary consensus, suggests that at least the parties in the centre-right Alliance approved of WOG integration measures. Otherwise, there would be no need for the Red-Greens to specifically negotiate the issue of civil-military separation in 2010. In contrast to SC predictions, the synergies narrative was phased out as a result of a domestic political consensus, rather than external factors.

In sum, strategic culture falls short in tracing the minutiae of WOG development. However, it is more useful when understood as a constraint on the maximum level to
which the Swedish WOG model could possibly progress. SC logic sheds light on why, despite their diverging views on neutrality, the one point around which Swedish parties could rally was the need to clearly disassociate the Swedish engagement from the COIN approach adopted by NATO and the United States. Fishstein and Wilder note that the Swedish counterinsurgency model was more restrictive than that of other PRT lead nations (2012, 27). US COIN tactics, especially using large injections of civilian funding in support of military objectives, fit poorly with Swedish views of foreign and defense policy (Personal Interviews FBA and SAF Officials, 2014). All this speaks of a particular Swedish political culture that generally accepts the separation of security and development objectives. In the end, sacrificing the ambition for civil-military integration was one way of disassociating from the American approach. The result, as shown at the end of this chapter, was that Swedish WOG was constrained to the coexistence level in the best of cases.

Finally, contrary to BP theory expectations, ministries continued opposing the concept in 2006-2010, and yet there was some progress towards a more integrated WOG model. Bureaucratic politics nonetheless accounts for much of the inter-ministerial dynamics in Stockholm. There is strong evidence of inter-ministerial jostling around the synergies concept, especially prior to 2010. At first, the military welcomed the synergies narrative, as it fit well with the recently issued NATO Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (Personal Interview FBA Official, 2014). Moreover, SAF headquarters was constantly receiving field reports of soldiers identifying possibilities for QIPs during their patrols (Personal Interview SAF official, 2014). Certainly, the
enthusiasm of the Armed Forces to get involved in reconstruction can be explained as an attempt to advance the purpose, budget, and overall influence of the organization.

By contrast, SIDA and the MFA rejected the synergies narrative for fear that it would enable the SAF to monitor and supervise development projects, cut ribbons and open schools in Afghanistan (Personal Interview SAK Official, 2014). Interview data with MFA and SIDA officials suggests that many civilians tended to perceive WOG not as a continuum of cooperation intensity, but as a euphemism for a COIN strategy. These reservations are also consistent with BP theory, which predicts that organizations will resist encroachments on their realm of operations. Even the reluctance of the MFA to establish the position of SCR fits with BP logic. As it was clear from the beginning that the SCR would exert no control over the military, it is plausible that the MFA did not perceive opening a SCR position as a useful move in advancing the organizational interests.

Much like SC theory, bureaucratic politics logic also correctly predicts low-intensity WOG integration overall, but cannot account for the rise of the synergies narrative or its subsequent demise – which, as evidence shows, occurred as a result of a specific realignment of political power, not ministerial consensus. The Riksdag played a much more prominent role in WOG developments than bureaucratic politics predicts. Phasing out the synergies ambition certainly fit well with the views of SIDA and the MFA, and to a lesser extent the disillusioned SAF. A more plausible explanation is that when the consensus-building process does not result in articulating a clear position on WOG, BP dynamics are exacerbated. As a next step, the chapter examines in detail the
progress in each one of the main WOG indicators, starting with policy and other official
government-issued documents.

**Whole-of-Government Policy**

In order to demonstrate the evolution of WOG-informed policy developments,
this section analyses the official government documents most relevant to inter-agency
coherence, in chronological order. Abrahamsson, Egnell and Nilsson argue that for
several years, Swedish policy papers expressed an ambition to deepen inter-agency
integration (Abrahamsson 2012, 73–74; Egnell and Nilsson 2010, 5; 21). However, the
intention never materialized, because Sweden’s decentralized government structure did
not permit coercing the ministries into working together (Abrahamsson 2012, 53–54).
Essentially, this evokes the logic of bureaucratic politics, assuming that the low-intensity
Swedish WOG model was a product of constant ministerial resistance to cooperation.

This study takes a different approach, arguing that Swedish policies in fact never
articulated a strong intent to adopt WOG principles in the first place. Political consensus-
building, rather than a tradition of ministerial pulling and hauling, was the main reason
for Sweden’s low-integration WOG model. A modest ambition to advance certain aspects
of WOG, mainly information sharing, emerged during the majority rule of the Alliance in
2006-2010. Some references to a national coordination mechanism and a possibility for
stabilization fund also surfaced. When the Alliance lost parliamentary majority in 2010,
the WOG rhetoric faded out of the policy agenda as per the agreement with the
opposition. By 2014, the synergies rhetoric was effectively no longer present in policy
documents.
Sweden has no overarching national strategy for inter-agency cooperation, and there was never an ambition to achieve that in Stockholm (Personal Interview FBA Official, 2014). In the early days of the Afghanistan engagement, ministries recycled old policy frameworks from previous peace operations (Personal Interview SAF official, 2014). Government-issued statements never clarified the exact meaning of “creating synergies,” and how or in what circumstances synergies should be sought (Personal Interviews FBA and SIDA Officials, 2014).

Between 2001 and 2013, Cabinet issued thirteen bills (mandates) for continued Swedish participation in the international force in Afghanistan (*Fortsatt svenskt deltagande i en internationell styrka i Afghanistan*). Civil-military cooperation received a brief mention in the first two documents. The Swedish Armed Forces were expected to contribute expertise in the area of civil-military cooperation, but exactly what this meant remained unclear. More importantly, the reference was restricted to CIMIC activities only, thereby focusing on short-term military QIPs and excluding broader collaboration efforts with civilian authorities (Regeringens proposition 2001/02:179, 7; Regeringens proposition 2002/03:21, 8).

From 2006 onwards, policy papers contained more explicit references to “synergies” among Swedish ministries.28 Sweden’s civilian and military efforts were framed as “complementary” and “interdependent,” although what this implied for “seeking synergies” was not explicitly spelled out (Regeringens Proposition 2006/07:83, 10; Regeringens Proposition 2008/09:69, 11). Some attention was given to the

28 The term “synergies” first appeared in the 2005 government bill, approved under the minority SDP government. However, in this text “synergies” took a different meaning, as it did not refer to national inter-agency integration, but to cooperation between ISAF-contributing nations (Regeringens Proposition 2005/06:34, 11).
responsibilities of civilian advisers within the PRT. However, the advisers’ main role was framed as creating synergies with Afghan authorities and international organizations, not necessarily with the Swedish military (Regeringens Proposition 2008/09:69, 11–12).

In 2008, the government published the National Strategy for Swedish Participation in International Peace-Support and Security-Building Operations (Regeringskansliet 2008). The text made careful references to “combined involvement” with “complementary roles” for civilians and the military (Regeringskansliet 2008, 3–4; 8). Development assistance had a part in this approach, but only if and when ‘synergies’ were created within the previously established boundaries of operation [emphasis added] (Regeringskansliet 2008, 6; 8). Once again, there was no clear definition of “synergies,” or how these related to “combined involvement” and “complementary action.” A premium was placed on effective civil-military coordination within international organizations, but coherence on the national level received less attention (Regeringskansliet 2008, 5; 10-12). 29 While the text called for a national strategy in international engagements, it quickly asserted that the different roles of civilians and the military must be respected in order to safeguard the neutrality and impartiality of development actors (Regeringskansliet 2008, 16). In short, the ambition for synergies existed, but it remained truncated by specific caveats on joint inter-agency action.

In 2009, the synergies rhetoric in policy documents became bolder and more concrete. The bill for extending the Swedish mandate in Afghanistan mentioned

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29 As for the specific role of the military, the National Strategy unequivocally states that its primary purpose is to fight a war, and the effectiveness of military operations may be increased partly by collaborating with civilian counterparts (Regeringskansliet 2008, 7; 18). Once again, in comparison with German policies, the Swedish strategy is much clearer on the role of the military in general, and the distinct responsibilities of soldiers and civilians in particular.
endowing the Government Offices with authority to coordinate civil-military efforts, in tandem with other relevant agencies (Regeringens Proposition 2009/10:38, 17). Another government bill named “A Functional Defense” (Ett användbart försvar) made a similar proposal (Egnell and Nilsson 2010, 10). More noteworthy were the synergies references in the Strategy for Development Cooperation with Afghanistan, July 2009 - December 2013 (Government Offices of Sweden 2009). As a token of seeking synergies, the strategy relaxed the caveats on inter-ministerial integration by earmarking 25% of overall Swedish funding for the Northern Afghan provinces where the Swedish army was also operating (Government Offices of Sweden 2009, 4). There was also an expressed preparedness to increase the volume of the small fund administered by the Kabul Embassy and the PRT, with the purpose of contributing to Sweden’s stabilization efforts (Government Offices of Sweden 2009, 7–8). This was the first and only concrete reference to possibly establishing a Swedish stabilization fund. How this was to be achieved was nonetheless unclear, because the text continued stressing a strict division between security-building and development efforts (Government Offices of Sweden 2009, 16). Finally, the text expressed reservations about the American WOG model, remarking that the dominance of the US in reconstruction activities created a disincentive for US staff to cooperate with other donors on the ground (Government Offices of Sweden 2009, 14–15).

In 2010, Sweden published its Afghanistan Strategy, the Swedish policy that most actively promoted WOG integration. Cabinet framed it as an important step towards a

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30 In practice however, the Government Offices never played a tangible role in inter-agency integration (Östberg, Johannisson, and Persson, n.d., 405).
31 This vague proposal for a stabilization fund never materialized, as shown later on in this chapter.
common strategic framework: finally a document that would outline how the different components of the Swedish engagement related to one another (Regeringens Proposition 2010/11:35, 19). A closer analysis of the Afghanistan Strategy puts this claim into question. The document certainly articulated a bold ambition: to provide strategic guidance for “united Swedish civil-military action” in crisis management (Regeringskansliet 2010, 3). This sweeping statement was quickly toned down by noting that longer-term development efforts should be conducted “in parallel to” (that is, not in tandem with) military operations (Regeringskansliet 2010, 12; 15). Civilian and military roles were to remain separate. By stating that humanitarian aid was not to be subordinated to political or security efforts, the Afghanistan strategy effectively discarded any previous hints at establishing a stabilization fund, or any other fund pooling mechanism (Regeringskansliet 2010, 18; 26). Opportunities for synergies were to be exploited, but “only when it is possible and appropriate” (Regeringskansliet 2010, 21; 23).

The question then becomes what specific activities were considered possible and appropriate for joint action. In terms of concrete examples, the Afghanistan Strategy offered little more than information exchange: an open and clear communication of goals, means, and work processes across Swedish ministries and authorities (Regeringskansliet 2010, 25). The document text claimed that creating the Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) position for the PRT was an important step towards enhancing inter-agency information exchange on the tactical level (Regeringskansliet 2010, 19). However, as shown in the next chapter, the personal interviews revealed that the decision to switch to civilian PRT leadership had little to do with a desire to improve cross-government
coherence. Little attention was paid to the contribution and role of the military in enhancing synergies. Grönberg argues this was a major reason for the limited practical impact of the Strategy on the tactical level (2010, 28). Interestingly, the Afghanistan Strategy argued that inter-agency cooperation should be possible even without direct guiding intervention from the Government Offices (Regeringskansliet 2010, 26). This kind of framing suggests a lack of political interest in creating an overarching inter-agency coordination body, as interview evidence also confirmed. Finally, the interviews also revealed a perception among civilian respondents that the Strategy did not reflect reality, neither in Sweden nor on the ground. It described an idealistic concept, but offered no tools to achieve the desired outcome (Personal Interview SIDA Official, 2014).

Another relevant document from 2010 is the Policy for Security and Development in Swedish Development Cooperation 2010-2014 (Regeringskansliet 2011). The explicit goal of the document was to clarify the links between security and development in Sweden’s missions abroad. In essence, the text reasserted the main points of the Afghanistan Strategy. Swedish WOG was to be perceived as information exchange among Swedish ministries, but civilian and military activities remained strictly separate (Regeringskansliet 2011, 14).

By 2011, the synergies rhetoric was noticeably disappearing from the policy arena (Personal Interview SIDA Official, 2014). In official documents, the language was evolving away from “synergies” and towards “multi-functional approach,” denoting a fading interest in inter-agency integration (Personal Interview FBA Official, 2014). Within the Government Offices, negotiations to put together a joint Afghanistan
Proposition (uniting the two separate strategies for security and development cooperation), did not come to fruition (Tham, Och, and Hull 2011, 52–53). The 2011 ISAF mandate extension bill further tightened the caveats on inter-agency integration: civil-military cooperation was to occur “if necessary.” Clear separation of civilian and military duties was explicitly mentioned on two occasions (Regeringens Proposition 2011/12:29, 20). 32

In the same year, an evaluation report of the Swedish National Audit Office (NAO) noted three major shortcomings of Swedish civil-military integration policies. First, policy documents lacked specific instructions on to how to cooperate. While Cabinet had been reporting “increased” civil-military cooperation for years, it was unclear what exactly was increasing or which cooperation areas could be further bolstered (Tham, Och, and Hull 2011, 12). Second, there were no institutions endowed with explicit authority and resources to steer inter-agency coherence. Third, the capacity of the SAF for civilian-military activities was severely limited, with no clear outline of how it would be developed or how activities would be conducted (Östberg, Johannisson, and Persson, n.d., 400). The 2011 NAO report was too late to make a tangible effect on WOG integration. It was released when the synergy impetus was already in decline, and too soon before the permanent Swedish troop withdrawal from Afghanistan.

In early 2012, Cabinet issued a revised Strategy for Development Cooperation, overhauling the previous document that was supposed to guide the Swedish efforts until 2013. In the updated version, the ambition for synergies was practically lacking (Personal Interview SIDA official, 2014). The text discussed information sharing, striving to

32. The two remaining mandate extension bills maintained the same position on civil-military cooperation.
maintain good relations, and strict separation between civilian and military tasks (Government Offices of Sweden 2012, 14). The rule of focusing 25% of total Swedish aid in the Northern provinces was maintained. However, the references to it were notably more reserved, with the language reverting to a purely humanitarian, depoliticized conception of development aid. The text stressed that, while there may be good reasons to focus development aid in Northern Afghanistan, the key issue was to provide assistance to those geographical areas where the likelihood for long-term development success was the greatest (Government Offices of Sweden 2012, 9).

Most interviewees agreed that Swedish policy documents failed to adequately address inter-agency integration. For the Armed Forces, a major point of concern was the lack of joint measurement and evaluation of the actual impact of coordination on the ground (Personal Interviews SAF Officials, 2014). As for the possible benefits of a national WOG strategy, interview data suggests a difference of opinion between civilian and the military. Soldiers appeared to believe that clear strategic guidelines would have pushed WOG integration further along (Personal Interviews SAF Officials, 2014). Respondents from the military also felt that, despite the lack of strategic guidance, soldiers were much more willing to cooperate with SIDA than vice versa (Personal Interview SAF Official, 2014). By contrast, civilians believed a national strategy would have finally reasserted the division of labour, thus eliminating false expectations on behalf of the Armed Forces (Personal Interview SIDA Official, 2014).

Two general conclusions follow from the above. First, policy documents in Sweden reflected at best a modest ambition for WOG integration, which was most notable during the majority rule of the Alliance in 2006-2010. Overall, even the boldest
policies identified information sharing as the only specific, acceptable example of inter-agency cooperation. More importantly, none of the annual ISAF contribution extension bills dealt explicitly with WOG. The Riksdag never issued any other provisions clearly endorsing a WOG approach, allowing for civilian funds to be used in stabilization activities, or outlining the steps to take in stimulating inter-agency synergies. The reason, as argued previously, was that the WOG issue was intentionally avoided during political debates, and eventually sacrificed in the name of reaching consensus on broader issues pertaining to the Afghanistan agenda. But in a political system where every aspect of the Afghanistan mission required annual approval by Parliament, lacking an explicit parliamentary authorization for WOG served as a direct caveat on civil-military action on the ground.

Second, even at the height of the synergies narrative, policy papers refrained from recommending specific steps for increasing WOG integration. Instead, the documents remained excessively focused on the separation of civilian and military means. This left personnel on the ground wondering how the overarching cross-government division of labour fit with the synergies rhetoric. One result of this, as shown in the next chapter, was that deployed staff spent time and effort developing joint initiatives that eventually failed to gain approval at Headquarters, and never saw the light of day.

In sum, Swedish policies were excessively vague and overly focused on imposing restrictions on civil-military cooperation. To further explore how policy translated into action, the next section focuses on the daily patterns of cross-government cooperation among the ministries in Stockholm.
Whole-of-Government Institutions and Inter-Ministerial Cooperation

Overall, the evidence suggests a lack of sufficient enthusiasm for establishing a joint cross-government cooperation body, among political parties as well as within Swedish ministries. The question was first raised in Stockholm around 2008 (Personal Interview MFA Official, 2014). Motivated by Canada’s experience with the Strategic Advisory Team (START), the Ministry of Defence spearheaded the strategic debate for a similar mechanism in Sweden (Patrick and Brown 2007, 124). However, the negotiations never progressed to the point of presenting a concrete proposal (Personal Interview MFA Official, 2014). Östberg, Johannisson, and Persson find some evidence of support for a joint PRT office in Stockholm, endowed with authority to coordinate all ministries, to which all deployed staff would report directly (n.d., 403-404). Lagerlöf claims that some ministries chose to participate in meetings selectively. SIDA in particular attended joint meetings for Afghanistan largely when staff perceived that the organizational interests were at stake (Lagerlöf 2011, 37; 39).

In lieu of an overarching coordination body, Sweden settled for a less ambitious model, based on information exchange in loose forums (Hull and Derblom 2011, 33). Ministries and independent authorities planned and executed their activities separately (Bandstein 2010, 7). Oversight, in the form of strict procedures for inter-agency cooperation (for example joint planning, or implementation and evaluation of specific activities), did not exist. Specific incentives to increase cross-government coherence were also lacking: staff were under no formal obligation to deepen exchanges with other ministries beyond information-sharing (Lagerlöf 2011, 37).

33 START was the most prominent inter-agency body for strategic coordination of the Canadian involvement in Afghanistan.
By 2009, an inter-agency group on Political Director General level between the MFA, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Justice was conducting monthly or bi-monthly meetings with SIDA, the FBA, and the National Police. One year later, this format was formally replaced by a forum on the State Secretary level (Personal Interview MFA Official, 2014). Here, officials met every two to three weeks, and their discussions provided strategic guidance to government agencies (Wittkowsky and Wittkampf 2013, 3). The chairmanship rotated between the MFA and the Ministry of Defense. Meeting agendas were prepared by the acting Chair, and were rotated a few days in advance in order to give participants a chance to add relevant issues (Personal Interview MFA Official, 2014). On occasion, the meetings included direct VTC connection with deployed personnel, although interview data suggests that this was not a regular occurrence (Personal Interviews SAF Officials, 2014).

The State Secretary Forum was the most relevant Swedish inter-agency mechanism as regards the Afghanistan engagement (Egnell and Nilsson 2010, 15). Lacking any executive authority, the State Secretary group served mainly as an information exchange platform (Egnell and Nilsson 2010, 16). Political developments on the ground, security assessments and joint training issues were also discussed (Personal Interview SIDA Official, 2014). Engaging in joint strategic planning was not feasible, mainly because the Swedish military effort followed orders from ISAF’s operational plan, which ran against SIDA’s regulations for allocation of civilian funds (Personal Interview FBA Official, 2014). Some respondents expressed doubt that the State Secretary Forum had any tangible effect on the work of personnel deployed to the PRT (Personal Interview SAF and MFA Officials, 2014).
Other ad hoc meetings and working groups on specific issues existed on the working level (Wittkowsky and Wittkampf 2013, 3). Within the Government Offices, a Task Force Afghanistan was formed with the participation of representatives from the MFA and the Ministry of Defense. Officials from relevant independent authorities, such as SIDA, also participated on occasion. This small group met once a month, and functioned primarily as a discussion forum on the principles of Swedish cooperation within the PRT (Bandstein 2010, 10). Hedmark finds that it had little impact on the field level (2009, 21).

Other meeting groups emerged after the decision to appoint a SCR at the PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif. The Afghanistan Liaison Group brought together representatives from the MFA, MOD and relevant independent authorities. It met every six weeks, mainly to exchange information and discuss staffing and recruitment issues within the PRT (Bandstein 2010, 10). Another format, meeting twice a month, was the *Myndighetssamverkansmöte Afghanistan/Mazar-e-Sharif*: a coordination meeting for ministries and agencies that deploy their own personnel in theatre (MFA, SAF, the National Police, SIDA, and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency). Hosted by either the MFA or the Ministry of Defense, these meetings had a direct connection with the Swedish Ambassador in theatre. Occasionally, the SCRs team members (POLADs and DEVADs), or other subject matter experts participated. The group focused on information sharing on preparations, policies, long-term planning, and current issues. No major operational decisions were made (Personal Interview SAF Official, 2014).

Interviews suggest that interactions during the joint meetings were largely smooth and tension-free (Personal Interviews SAF, FBA and SIDA Officials, 2014). Barring
occasional disagreements between SIDA and MFA on the issue of politicizing
development assistance, the atmosphere was collegial and friendly (Patrick and Brown
2007, 119-120). Proponents of strategic culture may interpret this as evidence of a
pervasive Swedish culture of cooperation that facilitated interactions across ministries.
But this argument fails to convince, given that no significant decisions were actually
made during the joint meetings. Since participants were under no obligation to negotiate
controversial issues, conflict rarely arose (Lagerlöf 2011, 36). Nonetheless, civilian
authorities maintained cautious reservations towards the military, fearing that the Armed
Forces were a little too eager to take on more responsibilities and tap into funding for
civilian reconstruction (Lagerlöf 2011, 36; Personal Interviews MFA and SIDA
Officials).

Most civilian and military interviewees believed that the main benefit of the joint
meetings was an improved understanding of the roles and responsibilities of their
counterparts. Creating a shared institutional awareness helped raise important issues up
the policy pipeline, even if the meeting forums had no direct impact on political decision-
making (Personal Interviews SAF and MFA Officials, 2014). A better understanding of
the jobs of colleagues from other ministries diffused some tensions and minimized
unreasonable expectations, but it did not lead to a more integrated WOG model. In fact,
respondents from SIDA as well as the SAF repeatedly stressed that a natural process of
trial and error occurred over time, whereby the military eventually learned not to
encroach on civilian reconstruction work or to expect SIDA to fund military QIPs
(Personal Interviews 2014). Even so, at the time of the interviews, some SAF members
expressed disappointment at SIDA’s refusal to cooperate more closely with the military (Personal Interview SAF Official, 2014).

In Stockholm, the WOG integration process fits poorly with strategic culture logic. For the most part, there were significant disagreements over the way of joint working, suggesting no firmly established and commonly accepted framework of civil-military cooperation. Towards the end of the Swedish military engagement in Afghanistan, it is possible to speak of a shared culture of cooperation based on a strict division of labour, but it emerged too late to be an explanatory factor for Sweden’s modest WOG developments.

Much of the inter-ministerial dynamics in Stockholm fits with BP theory: the lack of support within the ministries for a permanent inter-agency body, the suspicion of civilian ministries vis-à-vis the SAF, the selective participation in meetings, and the tendency to avoid controversial issues during meetings. However, bureaucratic politics cannot fully explain the end stage of Swedish WOG. In the words of one respondent, “nothing tilts the overarching political decisions” (Personal Interview SAF Official, 2014). Put differently, what determined how ministries cooperated was the nature of the political decisionmaking process. As seen later on, the same holds true as regards financial inter-agency collaboration. The next section analyses fund pooling and shared budgeting initiatives, and illustrates that Swedish government agencies avoided co-financing joint projects and programs.

**Integration of Financial Resources**

Sweden lacks a fund pooling mechanism for international missions. Ministerial budgets are independent, and approved separately by Cabinet on an annual basis. In
Afghanistan, a limited fund for small-scale QIPs was available for cooperation between the PRT and the Swedish Embassy in Kabul. However, final decisions regarding project funding were made at the Embassy alone, rather than in tandem with PRT staff.

The Swedish military had no budget for large-scale reconstruction activities in Afghanistan. COs disposed of a limited QIP fund to invest in projects in the vicinity of the PRT. The MFA had an operational budget for crisis management, but it could not be used for large-scale operations with the military (Personal Interview SAF Official, 2014). Through its Security Policy Division, the MFA had access to a limited amount of funds that could be used on projects for political ends (Personal Interviews MFA and SIDA Officials, 2014).

SIDA handles the bulk of Swedish development cooperation for Afghanistan. Funds are channeled through UN organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), and the Swedish Afghanistan Committee (SAK), a Swedish NGO that has been active in Afghanistan since 1982 (Regeringens Proposition 2003/04:71, 7). Formally, the MFA heads the annual negotiations for development cooperation allocations, but SIDA has significant influence in shaping decisions on specific partner countries.

The 2009 Strategy for Development Cooperation, which was published at the height of the synergies rhetoric, hinted at possibly enlarging the small fund at the Kabul Embassy so as to contribute to synergies in Swedish stabilization efforts (Government Offices of Sweden 2009, 8). That such intention should be expressed was notable, given
that the strategy text underwent a process of careful scrutiny prior to approval.\textsuperscript{34}

However, this brewing political consensus around the issue of a Swedish stabilization fund was stifled after the Alliance lost ground in the 2010 elections, and made a deal with the opposition not to channel civilian funds through the Armed Forces (Eronen 2008, 23; Personal Interviews SAF and MFA Officials, 2014). In the end, there was never a decision or even a proper debate on the Swedish political arena about earmarking civilian funding for stabilization purposes (Personal Interview SIDA Official, 2014).

Total Swedish development cooperation over the three-year period from 2006 to 2008 stood at SEK 973 million, averaging at just under SEK 325 million per year. For 2009 alone, the amounts rose to SEK 400 million, SEK 420 million in 2010, and eventually to around SEK 500 million per year for 2011-2013 (Government Offices of Sweden 2009, 8; 13). An additional USD1.4 million annually was earmarked for the Northern provinces (Fishstein and Wilder 2012, 27). The revised development cooperation strategy of 2012 argued that rising insecurity in Afghanistan demanded an increase in civilian assistance. Consequently, the amount of Swedish aid rose to SEK 560 million in 2010, 600 million in 2013 and 620 million in 2014 (Government Offices of Sweden 2012, 3). All this is to say that Swedish development aid increased gradually, rather than exponentially. The rising level of violence in Afghanistan was not treated with

\textsuperscript{34}The normal process here is that, once the Riksdag has agreed to grant development assistance to a particular country, the MFA calls further consultations with relevant actors in order to fine-tune the strategy. The final document must once again be approved by the Riksdag by unanimous consensus (Patrick and Brown 2007, 120–21).
large injections of additional civilian funding from Stockholm. Moreover, Sweden opted out of creating a stabilization fund, or any other kind of pooled funding mechanism.35

Interview data revealed an initial enthusiasm on behalf of the MFA and the SAF to tap into flexible civilian budgets. These expectations were based on past experiences during the Balkan crisis, when the Swedish military had received some funding for basic reconstruction activities. The strategic rhetoric for synergies, as well as the decision to earmark 25% of Swedish aid for the Northern provinces, further fueled the military’s hopes to co-fund development activities with SIDA (Personal Interviews SAF and FBA Officials, 2014). When these expectations failed to materialize, a tangible disillusionment with the WOG concept spread within the SAF (Personal Interviews FBA and SIDA Officials, 2014).

Interview data shows that in time, a consensus emerged among Swedish ministries that fund pooling was neither viable nor necessary. By mid-2014, civilian and military respondents across the board agreed that the strict division of funding was an efficient system, because it minimized the risk of overlap and wasting resources (Personal Interviews SAF and SIDA Officials, 2014). Within the military, the initial enthusiasm for pooled funding had faded. Most respondents from the SAF believed a separation of budgets was appropriate, given the specific regulations for disbursement of development cooperation assistance. SIDA remained highly skeptical of joint funding initiatives, emphasizing the military’s lack of experience in development overall, and the

35 The Swedish approach thus contrasts with events in Germany, where the Bundestag increased aid dramatically, and established a stabilization fund in 2009. The point is that, unlike in Sweden, the composition of the German parliament in 2010 facilitated the consensus on more concrete WOG integration measures.
potentially detrimental effects of short-term QIPs in particular (Personal Interviews SIDA Officials, 2014).

Strategic culture is useful in analyzing why Swedish ministries were originally set up with independent budgets. Nonetheless, SC cannot satisfactorily explain why Sweden approved a Development Cooperation Strategy that raised the idea of a stabilization fund in 2009. In a similar vein, bureaucratic politics offers only partial explanations. Inter-agency competition for resources certainly explains the military’s initial enthusiasm to tap into civilian funding. However, the adoption of the 2009 Development Cooperation Strategy runs against BP logic, given that the document clashes with previous SIDA policies of strict separation between development and military actors (Ödlund 2011, 30). In addition, the strict role conceptions of the BP model predict a lingering frustration within the military, and increased tensions with SIDA over the issue of pooled funding. Evidence from the interviews suggests the contrary. In a relatively short amount of time, the Armed Forces adapted and learned to respect SIDA’s modus operandi, thus significantly easing the friction between the two ministries. This process was spurred by grassroots trial and error exchanges at the PRT, rather than bureaucratic turf wars in Stockholm, as the next chapter illustrates.

The coalition politics logic offers a more plausible overall explanation. In 2009, the political climate was more favourable to contemplating some form of joint action in the realm of stabilization. The Alliance coalition still held a solid majority in the Riksdag, with the Moderate Party heading SIDA, the MFA, and the Ministry of Defence. Traditionally, the Moderate Party espoused less stern definitions of neutrality, and supported increasing both civilian and military contributions to Afghanistan. But the
advantage of the Alliance vanished when the coalition lost the parliamentary majority in 2010. Soon afterwards, a pressing need to compromise with the opposition on a larger issue – a final pullout date for the Swedish troops – stifled the initiative for a stabilization fund altogether. These developments fit perfectly with the organizational views of the MFA and SIDA, cementing ministerial resistance to pooled funding.

**Joint Pre-Deployment Training**

The issue of joint training is rarely addressed in official policy documents. Sweden lacks large-scale mandatory joint training initiatives. Civil-military training is loosely institutionalized, with ministries running parallel programs that vary in duration and activities. Each ministry’s own curriculum usually contains some mandatory joint exercises, although interview data suggests these are limited in scope. Some additional possibilities exist through national or international organizations, but the choice to attend is largely voluntary and subject to permission from superiors.

The majority of civilian and military interviewees believed that overall, the joint training programs remained inadequate, even towards the end of the Swedish mission. One of the major challenges when deploying to the PRT was insufficient knowledge on the structure and modus operandi of other ministries. Many respondents admitted to arriving in Afghanistan with a limited understanding of how their counterparts conducted business, their mission and scope of action. This resulted in increased frustration and unmet expectations, particularly in the initial years (Personal Interviews SAF, FBA and SIDA Officials, 2014).
By late 2009, mandatory joint training for outgoing SAF and SIDA staff consisted in attending a meeting with their counterparts from the respective ministry (Personal Interviews SAF and SIDA Officials, 2014). After the establishment of the SCR position in 2010, joint pre-deployment briefings between the civilian head and the CO were also introduced. The SAF strove to increase the presence of civilian lecturers as part of their general military training. Civilians from the MFA, SIDA, and the Ministry of Justice participated as role-players in practical military exercises. In order to create a teambuilding atmosphere and provide mentorship for the outgoing contingent, the SAF usually invited civilians with previous deployment experience in Afghanistan (Personal Interviews SAF Officials, 2014). By 2012, SIDA was participating every six months in role playing with the outgoing military contingent, as well as lecturing on the civilian aspects of military efforts and the rules and regulations of Swedish development cooperation (Personal Interview SIDA Official, 2014). In addition, for every military contingent returning from a field posting, the Armed Forces organized a lessons learned exercise. Staff from the Ministry of Defense, MFA, SIDA and SAK was also invited. The event served as a reflection on cooperation challenges on the operational-tactical level (Personal Interview MOD Official, 2014).

The Swedish Armed Forces International Centre (SWEDINT) is a military training institution that provides joint courses and practical exercises (Bandstein 2010, 9-12; Personal Interview SAF Official, 2014). Its counterpart, the civilian-lead FBA designs training programmes from a civilian perspective, although by 2009 the FBA courses still lacked a practical component (Hedmark 2009, 30). SWEDINT and the FBA jointly prepared exercises for staff about to deploy to Afghanistan. While there was no
official policy of collaboration between these two institutions, training was offered on an
ad hoc basis. On occasion, SIDA representatives served as guest lecturers on specific
Afghanistan-related topics (Bandstein 2010, 9-12).

The VIKING exercise is a two-week, multinational exercise hosted annually by
the Armed Forces and the FBA. Based on a fictitious peace operation scenario, the
exercise aims to introduce civilians and the military to joint solutions in crisis
management. Representatives from Swedish ministries, independent agencies, and the
military are invited. Attendance is not mandatory, and usually depends on whether staff
can find time and secure permission to step away from their offices to attend.

Interview data suggests an impetus to increase joint training opportunities after
2010. This motivation was linked to personal experiences in the field, rather than a
strategic push from Stockholm (Personal Interview SAF Official, 2014). Still,
respondents agreed that the training setup remained insufficient. In the best of cases,
soldiers and civilians spent no more than one week together before deployment (Personal
Interviews SAF and SIDA Officials, 2014). Prior to 2010, the training sessions did not
properly address the challenges of integrated missions, and entirely omitted the issue of
civilian planning under a WOG approach (Personal Interviews FBA Official, 2014).

As for the main obstacles to conducting effective joint training, civilian and
military perspectives diverge. SIDA representatives felt that they were proactive in
educating the SAF, but the military rarely took the time to return the favour by visiting
the SIDA headquarters and delivering training sessions (Personal Interview SIDA
Official, 2014). In turn, some SAF respondents felt that SIDA purposefully chose not to
participate actively in military exercises (Personal Interview SAF Official, 2014).
To both civilians and the military, the most tangible benefit of the training was getting to know one another in advance. Learning about the setup and modus operandi of other ministries corrected false expectations, increased mutual respect, and neutralized a significant amount of tension in the field (Personal Interview SAF Official, 2014). Importantly, these benefits became visible mostly in Afghanistan, while among the ministries in Stockholm the effects of joint training sessions were negligible (Personal Interviews SAF and SIDA Officials, 2014). It appears likely that the generally weak political impetus for WOG effectively removed the motivation to apply in practice the skills learned during the joint sessions.

In sum, the evidence suggests lax oversight with regard to joint training, as the vast majority of civil-military training opportunities were voluntary. Direct incentives to participate in joint training, as well as sanctions for failure to participate, were similarly lacking. Issues of lack of trust persisted among ministries with respect to the willingness of others to engage and participate in joint courses. All this resulted in difficulties in securing PRT personnel adequately trained in civil-military issues. Frustration arose among civilian staff, particularly SIDA, for having to constantly re-train each new military contingent upon arrival.
The Birth and Demise of Swedish Synergies

The table below summarizes Swedish WOG developments on the strategic level:

**Table 2: Inter-Agency Cooperation in Stockholm, 2001-2014**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>WOG Policy Developments</th>
<th>Institutions and Inter-Ministerial Cooperation</th>
<th>Financial Pooling</th>
<th>Joint Training</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2001-2006</strong></td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2006-2009</strong></td>
<td>Coexistence</td>
<td>Coexistence</td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Coexistence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2010-2014</strong></td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Coexistence</td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Coexistence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the first phase, 2002 to 2006, WOG indicators across the board remained on the lowest level of the scale. Apart from the condition to keep civilian reconstruction separate from military activities, official policies offered no clarification on how and when civilians and the military should interact. There was some limited inter-agency information-sharing and joint training, but no fund pooling. Mandatory joint pre-deployment training was largely in the form of short meet-and-greet encounters for persons in leadership positions only.

During the second phase, from 2006 to the end of 2009, there was a strategic approximation between the SAF and civilian ministries. WOG indicators thus shift to the “coexistence” level, with the exception of financial pooling which remains unchanged. This is the period of domination of the synergy narrative in policy, although the caveat of separating civilian and military means remains as a leitmotif in official statements. In terms of institutional commitment, the State Secretary forum is an example of a permanent inter-agency body with a facilitated participation process, where a limited amount of joint context and capacity analysis occurred. While more joint training
exercises were available through either military or civilian training bodies, the courses remained voluntary.

During the third and final phase, 2010 to 2014, as the synergy ambition waned, WOG policies regressed back to the “communication” level. The State Secretary Forum continued to operate, but it was already heavily oriented towards planning the permanent Swedish troop withdrawal. There were no significant new developments in terms of financial pooling and joint training. Civilian staff was regularly lecturing as part of the training of outgoing military contingents, and there was some evidence of jointly prepared exercises between SWEDINT and the FBA. Nonetheless, there were no signs of senior-level commitment to curriculum standardization or making training mandatory.

At first glance, both bureaucratic politics and strategic culture correctly predict the final low-intensity WOG outcome in Stockholm, but for different reasons. BP attributes it to bureaucratic turf wars in a highly decentralized government system. SC points to a widely accepted Swedish code of behaviour, based on a strict separation of civilian and military means in multinational operations.

The problem with BP and SC logic is that neither accommodates the rise of the synergies narrative, or the process that lead to its demise. Both theories fail to explain why the interest in inter-agency coherence increased during the Alliance coalition government, and why the 2009 Strategy for Development Cooperation mentioned a possibility for synergies in the stabilization sector. This fits poorly with a philosophy of strict neutrality of development aid, and it is safe to assume it ran counter to SIDA’s organizational interests. Furthermore, phasing out the ambition for synergies was a
product of a specific political consensus, not ministerial resistance alone or external environmental factors, as BP and SC respectively predict.

Auerswald and Saideman’s coalition politics logic provides a more satisfying explanation for Swedish WOG developments. From 2002 onwards, a discord emerged among Swedish parties regarding several aspects of the Swedish mission, including the most appropriate formula for conducting civil-military activities. The left-leaning, minority-ruling SDP government was skeptical towards WOG, and thus focused more on caveats than on incentives for inter-agency integration.

When the centre-right Alliance gained parliamentary majority, it relaxed some of the caveats on WOG, making it more propitious for the synergies narrative to thrive. Still, the Alliance was a broad coalition, so continuous consensus-building was required even within that like-minded group. The synergies rhetoric made modest progress, reaching a short-lived peak around 2009. Only one year later, the general elections produced a realignment of political power that took away the advantage of the Alliance within the Riksdag. The now minority-ruling coalition was forced into negotiations to redefine the overall character of the Swedish engagement in Afghanistan. Two permissive conditions, worsening security on the ground and NATO’s imminent permanent withdrawal, added pressure in the consensus-building process. In the end, the issue of WOG integration was sacrificed in the name of reaching consensus on larger issues, such as the deadline for a definitive Swedish troop withdrawal.

Bureaucratic politics illustrates how, as politicians failed to negotiate clear guidelines on civil-military cooperation, bureaucratic squabbles flourished. The overarching instructions to separate the security, diplomacy and development streams
were vague enough to allow for diverging interpretations, depending on the specific organizational interests of each department. Consequently, turf wars over the WOG concept were exacerbated. Without strategic clarification with concrete examples of possible joint activities, Swedish ministries lacked motivation to deepen cooperation, or to enforce proper incentives and sanctions (Abrahamsson 2012, 57; Wittkowsky and Wittkampf 2013, 3).

Strategic culture theory is more useful when understood as an indirect influence which partially shapes policymakers’ perceptions on a specific issue (Angstrom and Honig 2012, 671). It appears plausible that, regardless of ideological inclination, there existed among Swedish political parties a shared appreciation of the value of depoliticized, need-based development aid. Consequently, reiterating a separation between the security, diplomacy and development streams was a means of sustaining the broad political consensus needed to continue approving the annual ISAF contribution mandate. For similar reasons, it was important to disassociate the overall Swedish approach from that of NATO and the US. While it was not entirely clear what the separation of streams entailed in practice, keeping the slogan vague allowed parties to eschew negotiations on the more specific aspects, on which they might have disagreed and thus jeopardized the overall consensus on the Afghanistan engagement. Consequently, the possibility for achieving a higher-level WOG model, particularly one that included COIN-type collaboration between the SAF and civilian ministries, was ruled out at the outset.

Finally, the evidence from Sweden suggests that individual personalities mattered little in advancing the overall WOG model. In the face of a broad parliamentary
consensus to abandon ambitions for cross-government integration, individual leaders in Stockholm lacked discretion to single-handedly implement policies to the contrary. As shown in the next chapter, the same holds true for persons in leadership positions in the mission area.
Deploying Together, Working Apart: Sweden in Afghanistan

The previous chapter argued that Swedish coalition politics stymied overall progress in inter-agency integration, resulting in a low-level cross-government coherence model in Stockholm. This chapter illustrates the consequences for Swedish WOG on the ground. In Afghanistan, inter-agency cooperation progressed even more modestly. Individual ministries, particularly the MFA and SIDA, exercised strict oversight in order to make sure deployed staff followed the strategic instructions to separate civilian and military activities. In this context, personnel at the PRT reverted to bureaucratic practices, adopting a low-intensity cooperation model based on strict division of labour.

As a first step, the chapter outlines the Swedish PRT structure, and its implications for coherence in the field. Next, I focus on the civil-military interactions within the PRT. The data shows that joint meetings may have increased in quantity, but WOG outcomes remained restricted to information-sharing. After a brief discussion on the lack of fund pooling, the chapter concludes with a summary of the main findings.

The Swedish PRT Model

In 2006, after taking over from the UK as a lead nation of the PRT Mazar-e-Sharif, Sweden initially built on the pre-existing, military-centric British model (Eronen 2008, 20). In the first years, calls for establishing a civilian PRT leader failed to gain traction in Stockholm (Eronen 2008, 22). Until 2010, the Swedish PRT was headed by a military commander (CO). A small team of approximately ten civilians from the FBA, SIDA, and the National Police were embedded as advisors to the CO in non-military matters (Eronen 2008, 21). Although formally part of the chain of command of the Kabul
Embassy, the civilians were physically posted to the PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif (Personal Interview MFA Official, 2014). Political advisers (POLADs) from the FBA worked directly under the CO, while development advisers (DEVADs) from SIDA retained complete operational autonomy. This convoluted chain of command setup caused misunderstandings about the appropriate reporting lines, particularly in the early days of the PRT (Östberg, Johannisson, and Persson, n.d., 401).

In 2010, Sweden switched to double-headed PRT leadership. A Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) was appointed on the same level as the CO. An MFA employee with Ambassador rank, the SCR officially represented the Swedish engagement, particularly in issues of governance and development (Östberg, Johannisson, and Persson, n.d., 401). Although formally equal in rank, the CO and SCR commanded strictly separate areas of the Swedish mission. The SCR had no authority over the SAF, and no right to dictate military operations. His key functions were to liaise with local authorities, to steer coordination efforts with the Afghan government, NGOs, and civil society, and to enhance civil-military coherence within the PRT. As seen later on, the success in this last area was limited.

In support of the new civilian head, the PRT civilian advisory team was expanded to approximately 25 individuals (Personal Interviews SAF and SIDA Officials, 2014). This double-headed format lasted until March 2012, when the PRT leadership was entirely transferred to the SCR. The new, civilian-lead entity was symbolically renamed Transition Support Team (TST). In May 2014, Sweden handed over control of the TST to the Afghan authorities.
Tham, Och and Hull argue that bringing a senior-level civilian to the PRT was the most notable expression of a strategic ambition to translate the synergies rhetoric into action (2011, 14; 33). The evidence from this study points to the opposite conclusion. Certainly the debates on NATO’s comprehensive approach had propelled the idea for a SCR within the SAF (Personal Interview SAF Official, 2014). But outside of the military, and especially in political circles, support for joint PRT leadership was weak. The initial opening of the post in 2010 was a half-hearted attempt to respond to complaints from the field, particularly from soldiers who were frustrated by having to engage in civilian duties. Two years later, the transition to full civilian leadership was meant as a signal to Afghan authorities that the Swedish military presence was ending (Personal Interview SAK Official, 2014; Tham, Och, and Hull 2011, 8). Put differently, the SCR position had little to do with an ambition to increase inter-agency coherence on the tactical level (Personal Interview MFA Official, 2014).

The Swedish Army had long been advocating for civilian PRT leadership and for an enhanced civilian presence at the PRT in general (Personal Interview MFA Official, 2014). Interviewees from the SAF were particularly enthusiastic about the value and effect of the SCR position. Most argued that the SCR’s presence significantly facilitated civil-military cooperation in the field, and that the position should have been established from the very beginning of the PRT (Östberg, Johannisson, and Persson, n.d., 401; Personal Interviews SAF Officials, 2014).

From a military perspective, having a senior-level civilian at the PRT had at least two benefits. First, he represented a single, direct point of contact with all civilians, within and outside of the PRT (Personal Interviews SAF Officials, 2014). By taking over
the cumbersome responsibility to interact with provincial governors, local politicians and
civil society organizations, the SCR allowed the military commander to focus on the
military mission (Personal Interviews SAF Officials, 2014; Tham, Och, and Hull 2011,
39). Overall, COs considered that having a SCR significantly simplified the military’s job
of liaising with civilian counterparts. Interactions between the two PRT heads were
particularly productive if the two had already met prior to deployment, or if they had a
customary of working together (Personal Interview SAF Official, 2014).

Second, there was a perception within the military that the presence of the SCR
made the civilian team more willing to cooperate with the SAF. MFA and SIDA
representatives preferred to follow the instructions of a civilian representative, rather than
a military commander. Some respondents from the military argued that the SCR’s
personal background and past experiences were crucial for his success in the post.
Civilian leaders with previous experience in the military were more effective in
smoothing out inter-agency interactions (Personal Interview SAF Official, 2014). Even
if the SCR lacked previous military knowledge, his sole presence mitigated the ingrained
lack of trust between the civilians and the SAF (Personal Interviews SAF Officials,
2014).

Civilian respondents were notably less enthusiastic about the SCR than their
military colleagues (Personal Interviews FBA and SIDA Officials, 2014). The position
was viewed as a symbolic political token with little practical effect on the status quo.

36 For instance, one of the SCRs was a former member of the SAF, as well as a government minister. As
such, he commanded the respect of civilians, all the while understanding the military rationale and modus
operandi (Personal Interview SAF Official, 2014).
Civilians argued that their advisory team on the ground remained too small to make a tangible contribution to the joint effort (Tham, Och, and Hull 2011, 35-36).

To complicate matters further, the role of the SCR vis-à-vis the rest of the civilian staff remained murky. SCRs lacked the proper advisory function of POLADs, whose job was to monitor political developments and advise the military on possible outcomes. Consequently, POLADs felt increasingly isolated and unable to exert their advisory function, which limited their ability to make an impact on the military operation (Personal Interview FBA Official, 2014). Especially after the SCR formally assumed full PRT leadership in 2012, POLADs did not contribute as actively in joint planning as they had under a military commander (Personal Interview SAF Official, 2014). SCRs had a direct line of communication with the CO, so most issues were resolved directly between the two heads, without the involvement of the lower levels in the chain of command (Personal Interview SAF Official, 2014).

From a civilian perspective, the SCR may have diminished the frustrations within the Armed Forces, but only at the expense of straining SIDA’s relations with SAF and the MFA. The SCR arrived without clear instructions from Stockholm on the scope of his authority over civilian funding. Initially, MFA representatives interpreted this to mean that their ministry would be given authority over at least part of SIDA’s development cooperation budget, to use in stabilization operations (Personal Interview FBA Official, 2014). In a similar fashion, the SAF expected SIDA to support counterinsurgency efforts by providing large-scale injections of funding for the reconstruction of recently cleared areas (Personal Interview SAF Official, 2014).
Yet DEVADs had no discretion from Headquarters to engage in COIN operations, or to relinquish any funding for stabilization activities. SIDA insisted on maintaining the pre-existing chain of command, whereby the senior official in charge the overall SIDA budget in the field was the Ambassador in Kabul, rather than the SCR at the PRT Mazar-e-Sharif. These disagreements exacerbated tensions among the ministries, particularly in 2010-2011 (Personal Interviews FBA and SIDA Officials, 2014). In the end, the conflict was resolved by allowing SIDA to retain complete control over development funding, as well as operational independence in program implementation and supervision. DEVADs kept the SCR abreast of ongoing programmatic activities, but did not report to him directly (Personal Interviews SAF and SIDA Officials, 2014).

Despite their diverging assessments of the utility of the SCR, soldiers and civilians agreed that the most important outcome of establishing the SCR position was that it propelled a series of discussions that eventually cemented the division of labour. Ministries agreed on a clear separation of roles, not only between civilians and the military, but also between SIDA and the MFA (Personal Interviews SAF, MFA, SAK and SIDA Officials, 2014). Any expectations for “creating synergies,” expressed in strategic policy documents, were thus dissipated. By clarifying the separate functions and realms of operation of each ministry, the SCR effectively helped phase out the synergies rhetoric (Personal Interview SIDA Official, 2014).

In sum, the evolution of the Swedish PRT structure is largely consistent with bureaucratic politics theory. Strategic culture does not fit well with the evidence, because it predicts a more or less universally accepted code of behavior, whereby any disagreements between the ministries as to the role and functions of the SCR would be
marginal. But the data reveals significant discrepancies in the ministries’ expectations, understanding, and evaluations of the SCR position.

It is certainly possible that the SCR facilitated interactions with outside actors, although these claims remain to be empirically tested. With regard to coherence within the PRT, the SCR’s appointment had some unexpected negative effects, such as straining relations within the civilian team. Since the SCR position contributed to the separation of civilian and military tasks, switching to civilian leadership cannot be considered a step forward in WOG integration. To further explore the overall impact of the SCR on the Swedish WOG model, the next section delves into the dynamics of everyday interactions within, the PRT, before and after the SCR’s arrival.

**Civil-Military Cooperation within the PRT**

In 2006-2010, the period of military PRT leadership, formal cooperation among Swedish ministries in the field was virtually non-existent. A small team of civilian advisers was attached to the military contingent, but their status within the PRT was of little more than house guests (Personal Interview SAF Official, 2014). Until the spring of 2010, there was no formal joint meeting agenda. *Ad hoc* consultations between civilians and the CIMIC branch occurred whenever the military wished to ensure a planned operation would not interfere with SIDA’s ongoing projects. Most issues were resolved spontaneously, through informal interactions (Personal Interviews SAF and FBA Officials, 2014).

A command group meeting was held weekly, bi-weekly, or every other day, depending on the preference of the military commander during a particular rotation. Three Swedish DEVADs and two USAID representatives, as well as POLADs from the
FBA, were integrated into the command group. The civilian team was expected to contribute to three lines of operations: planning of military operations, development and governance, as well as to offer advice whenever the CO had questions. For the most part, the civilians participated as passive listeners. These meetings served for basic information exchange and deconflicting the schedule of visiting local authorities (Personal Interviews FBA Official, 2014).\(^37\)

From mid-2010 onwards, the arrival of the SCR generated new meeting formats. The two PRT commanders were expected to conduct regular one-on-one consultations on matters of security, development and governance. The CO used these opportunities to keep his civilian counterpart informed of upcoming military operations. No formal guideline documents existed on how to conduct these consultations. How often meetings were held depended on the personal preferences of the two PRT leaders (Personal Interview SAF Official, 2014; Tham, Och, and Hull 2011, 37).

Broader joint meetings were held under the chairmanship of the SCR. Staff met weekly or bi-weekly, as per the preferences of the acting PRT heads (Personal Interviews AF Officials, 2014). Participants exchanged information and provided basic reports on security developments and humanitarian issues (Personal Interviews SAF Officials, 2014).

Due to the sheer size of its budget, SIDA enjoyed a special status within the civilian team, and maintained a direct communication link with the PRT commanders.

\(^{37}\) Since the US managed a vast civilian budget for reconstruction and support of COIN operations, USAID representatives reported in detail on ongoing projects in order to avoid overlap with Swedish activities. SIDA representatives were critical of the sustainability and long-term effects of American initiatives. The considerable discrepancies between USAID and SIDA development cooperation policies and funding regulations fractured the cohesiveness of the civilian team (Personal Interviews FBA Official, 2014).
DEVADs met weekly with a small command group, composed of the CO, SCR, the Deputy military commander, and the military Chief of Staff (Personal Interview SIDA Official, 2014). These interactions were rudimentary and limited to exchange of unclassified information (Personal Interview MFA Official, 2014). The goal was to avoid overlap in the already independent operational areas of the two ministries. SIDA staff informed the military on ongoing projects in specific locations, so that soldiers could keep away from these areas (Personal Interview SAF Official, 2014). These meetings also served to dissipate the military’s initial expectations for closer cooperation with SIDA (Hedmark 2009, 29; Personal Interview AF Official, 2014). While DEVADs had an ample margin for independent action within SIDA’s regular programming, their discretion to interpret “creating synergies” with the military was severely limited by the insistence of Headquarters to keep development activities separate from military operations at all times (Personal Interview MFA and SIDA Officials, 2014).

On weekly or bi-weekly basis, SIDA held development board meetings with CIMIC staff to address more specific, hands-on development issues. DEVADs reported in detail on current and future projects, as well as on pending issues and implementation challenges. In turn, CIMIC soldiers shared information gleaned during their village patrols, particularly possibilities for small-scale reconstruction projects (schools, bridges or wells) in remote areas. SIDA had no flexible funding to spend on such initiatives, so DEVADs merely passed on the information to the local authorities or NGOs in hopes others would take on the task (Personal Interview SIDA Official, 2014).

The civilian office hosted ad hoc joint meetings with local and international NGOs operating in the PRT area, most notably the UNHCR and UNAMA. In practice,
the outcome of these meetings was more information exchange than coordination of activities (Personal Interview SAF Official, 2014). DEVADs, POLADs, and the military staff heads of the intelligence, operations, and CIMIC branches participated. Generally, the meetings started with an intelligence brief, much appreciated by the civilian team which often lacked the latest information on insurgent activity (Personal Interview SAF Official, 2014). Participants then took turns to report on current projects, potential implementation challenges, and issues where others could offer assistance. Most beneficial for the military was the information on what civilian agencies worked in the specific areas covered by CIMIC liaison teams (Personal Interview SAF Official, 2014). On separate occasions, DEVADs also met with NGOs and civil society organizations without the military present, and informed the SAF whenever they considered it appropriate (Personal Interview SIDA Officials, 2014).

From July 2011 to May 2014, preparations within the ISAF framework for the permanent withdrawal of Swedish troops were under way. Civilians and the military held monthly transition meetings, whereby each ministry filled out thematic questionnaires in accordance with its particular expertise. POLADs and DEVADs answered the questions on political and development issues respectively. The SAF reported on security developments and compiled the final report for RCN Headquarters. From SIDA’s viewpoint, the transition meetings were a waste of time, because they focused excessively on short-term security aspects, while long-term development issues received insufficient attention (Personal Interview SIDA Official, 2014).

An official joint planning directive was never established at the Swedish PRT. Unused to assuming an operational role, the MFA was unable to implement clear joint
planning procedures with SIDA. As for civilian input in planning military operations, how much voice civilians were given dependent entirely on the preferences of the acting CO. It was not unusual for the SAF to conduct operations without any prior discussions with the civilian team (Tham, Och, and Hull 2011, 40).

In 2009, PRT staff attempted establishing a formal joint planning procedure. Civilians and the military went through the motions together: analysis, identification of geographic areas of focus, and execution of a military operation. For the most part, the practical outcomes were negligible. The civilian team provided basic information to the military, such as which NGOs were active on the operation site, and which local leaders had been consulted (Tham, Och, and Hull 2011, 38). DEVADs also reported on the civilian situation in the districts where the military operation was to be conducted (Personal Interview SIDA Official, 2014). Importantly, SIDA representatives did not provide information or participate in any way in counterinsurgency efforts. Instead, DEVADs offered advice on the overall sustainability of military QIPs, and advised the SAF in case their projects ran counter to SIDA’s larger programmatic activities (Svensson 2011, 22). From SIDA’s viewpoint, these meetings reflected a perception on behalf of the military that the development and governance operation lines were subordinated to security objectives (Lackenbauer 2011, 15).

Political advisers faced particular challenges in their communication with the military. After the establishment of the SCR position, POLADs felt increasingly isolated from the military component they were supposed to be actively advising (Personal Interviews SAF and FBA Officials, 2014). With a senior official formally in charge of the civilian effort, the civilian team began working even more independently from the
military. From 2012 onwards, the main task of the civilians shifted definitively toward tasks outside of the PRT: liaising with local authorities, clarifying the Swedish position, and providing reports every three months in the framework of ISAF’s permanent withdrawal plan. Cohesion within the PRT itself became an ancillary issue at best (Personal Interview FBA Official, 2014).

In sum, the Swedish ministries remained responsible for separate lines of operation, without performing a comprehensive analysis of how each dimension affected the others (Lackenbauer 2011, 15). Incentives for inter-agency cooperation were not adequately embedded into the working guidelines of the ministries. Staff performance evaluations did not expressly reward cooperation, or sanction a failure to engage in cross-government teamwork. This was true both in recruiting personnel for the PRT, as well as for evaluating their performance record for promotions (Tham, Och, and Hull 2011, 57). During the joint meetings, there was no direct contact with Stockholm in the form of VTC or telephone conferencing (Personal Interviews SAF and SIDA Officials, 2014). However, SIDA staff held weekly conferences with their Headquarters as well as the Kabul Embassy, to which the military was not invited. All this suggests slack oversight from Stockholm in ensuring the adoption of WOG principles, but tight supervision from individual ministries, SIDA in particular, in enforcing the division of labour principle.

Overall, the military was more enthusiastic about seeking synergies with civilians than the MFA and SIDA. From a military standpoint, the SAF had more to gain from working with civilians than vice versa (Personal Interview SAF Official, 2014). Communicating regularly with DEVADs was particularly useful to CIMIC staff, as it increased awareness of the possible negative effects of QIPs managed by the military
unit. Moreover, the military appreciated civilians taking over the task of liaising with local authorities, and providing assessments on political developments (Personal Interview SAF Official, 2014).

SIDA was generally more skeptical of the utility of the joint meetings. DEVADs believed that most meetings were dominated by security-related issues, and civilian perspectives were not given sufficient consideration during the planning process (Personal Interviews FBA and SIDA Officials, 2014). Even so, SIDA did not consider this particularly problematic, because for the most part, the strict division of labour between the ministries made joint planning a moot point (Personal Interviews SIDA Officials, 2014; Svensson 2011, 23).

Among SAF interviewees, there was a discrepancy in perspectives as to the desirable level of interaction with SIDA. Some soldiers argued that staff on the ground worked as closely together as the Swedish PRT model would allow (Personal Interview SAF Official, 2014). Others were frustrated by the inability to agree on a closer cooperation framework. These respondents largely argued that soldiers actively encouraged the civilian team to share their perspectives. However, SIDA was not as proactive in engaging their military colleagues, in inviting them to jointly visit with local authorities, or in volunteering detailed information of possible use to the military (Personal Interview SAF Officials, 2014). SIDA’s interpretation of WOG was perceived as excessively restrictive, often excluding even the mere presence of the military in the same area where SIDA projects were under way (Personal Interview SAF Official, 2014). In the end, a mutual lack of trust limited the civilian contribution to operational planning (Personal Interview SAF Officials, 2014).
Civilians from the MFA and SIDA were in unanimous agreement: the strict separation of security and development streams, inherent in the Swedish PRT setup, did not permit the civilian ministries to engage in closer cooperation with the military (Personal Interviews FBA and SIDA Officials, 2014). A continuous source of frustration for the civilian team was the military procedure of safeguarding confidential information while planning an operation. Lackenbauer argues that POLADs and DEVADs felt the military did not disclose all the information civilians needed in order to properly contribute to operation planning (Lackenbauer 2011, 13).

A more pressing issue for DEVADs was the lack of strategic guidance from Headquarters on what exactly “synergies” implied for SIDA, and how to translate this policy language into action on the ground (Svensson 2011, 24). From a humanitarian perspective, DEVADs were unsure as to the appropriate extent to which they were supposed to be consulting with the military (Tham, Och, and Hull 2011, 40–41). The SIDA leadership in Stockholm saw no part for civilians in advising the SAF on how to conduct military operations. By contrast, DEVADs in the field envisioned a larger role for themselves in counseling the military on the needs of local populations, and the importance of situating activities within the framework of larger development initiatives (Svensson 2011, 24). These diverging interpretations of “synergies” strained relations not only within SIDA, but also between SIDA, the MFA, and the SAF (Hedmark 2009, 21).

Frequent personnel rotations further exacerbated inter-departmental frictions. For example, one SIDA staff member reported having had an excellent rapport with military colleagues in late 2010, but the relationship became more awkward towards mid-2011, after the change of rotations (Personal Interview SIDA Official, 2014). SIDA was
frustrated with the loss of knowledge in between rotations, and the need to continuously re-educate the military on SIDA’s mission and operation. Much time was wasted in conversations between the counterparts, which in the end were counter-productive to the working process (Lackenbauer 2011, 9). In the end, the civilian advisory team was largely unable to make a tangible impact on the overall Swedish effort: a situation which the arrival of a SCR did not remedy (Personal Interview FBA Official, 2014).

On the eve of the permanent Swedish troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, the tensions among PRT staff in Mazar-e-Sharif had relaxed considerably for largely three reasons. On the one hand, having the end of the military mission in sight contributed to the warming of relations (Personal Interview SAF Official, 2014). On the other hand, the SAF had managed to adapt to SIDA’s philosophy and modus operandi. Over time, a natural process of trial and error learning occurred, so that by 2014 there was wide acceptance within the military that development work was not a job for soldiers (Personal Interviews SAF Officials, 2014). But the most important reason for relaxing the tensions on the ground was that the “synergies” rhetoric had lost its appeal in Stockholm. From 2010 onwards, deployed staff were officially no longer under any obligation to seek paths for cooperation (Personal Interviews SAF and SIDA Officials, 2014).

Östberg, Johanniesson, and Persson suggest that a major problem with cross-government coherence at the Swedish PRT was that the meeting agenda was not formalized (n.d., 401). The evidence from this study suggests otherwise. On the one hand, lacking a formal meeting agenda should not automatically be equated with lower WOG coherence. Informal interaction, mostly from living and working close together in an adverse environment, contributed to trust building among civilians and the military
(Svensson 2011, 21). Staff resolved many day-to-day issues over coffee or while playing sports after work (Personal Interviews SAF Officials, 2014). On the other hand, a formal meeting schedule was put in place after the arrival of the SCR. Thus, the main problem was not lacking a formal meeting agenda, but rather that the outcomes of the joint meetings could never extend beyond rudimentary information sharing.

Proponents of strategic culture may interpret the Swedish experience as a typically Swedish code of action, based on a strict division of labour between the security, development, and diplomacy streams. The problem with this argument is that it predicts ministries agreed at the outset on a common framework of cooperation. By contrast, the evidence suggests significant disagreements, both within and across ministries, as to the extent, nature, and utility of inter-agency cooperation. Particularly in 2009-2010, when the synergies rhetoric in Stockholm was at its peak, it is difficult to speak of a universal code of action accepted by all those who were deployed in the mission area. In time, the ministries readjusted their expectations and agreed on a model of coexistence, but this process was driven by internal factors (that is, the waning interest in WOG in Stockholm), and not elements of the external environment, as SC logic suggests.

Bureaucratic politics theory explains much of the cooperation dynamics within the Swedish PRT. For the most part, clashing organizational interests and lack of trust across departments stymied WOG progress. Against this background, individual personalities made little difference. Certainly civilian PRT leaders with cross-organizational experience were more knowledgeable on the modus operandi of other ministries, which made them more effective in clarifying expectations, diffusing tensions,
and increasing trust during the joint meetings. However, neither SCRs, nor their subordinates in the field (DEVADs and POLADs) had the discretion to initiate or engage in joint ventures beyond basic information sharing. The next section, which examines funding and project management within the PRT, further illustrates how SIDA Headquarters in Stockholm further limited the ability of staff in the field to create synergies with the military.

**Fund Pooling and Joint Project Management**

Sweden never established a financial pooling mechanism or any other type of joint funding or project management process (Personal Interviews SAF and SIDA Officials, 2014). The Riksdag never voted on a clear decision to large-scale civilian funds in support of military operations, largely because the political parties never managed to agree on the issue (Personal Interview FBA Official, 2014). Ministerial budgets thus remained completely independent. In the mission area, staff never shared funding, and in the best of cases merely consulted one another on the respective projects their ministries were financing (Personal Interview MFA Official, 2014).

SIDA funded long-term development programs negotiated yearly with the Afghan authorities. Money was channeled mainly through SAK and other NGOs that took charge of program implementation, follow-up, and evaluation. By contrast, the SAF had no budget for reconstruction or stabilization activities. The Swedish CO had access to a pocket fund that covered small-scale QIPs (bridges, wells, check points, provision of technical equipment) in support of the military mission. A separate QIP budget was available to the Finnish contingent posted to the PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif, mostly for compensation and covering the collateral damage costs of military operations (Personal
Interviews SAF, MFA and SIDA Officials, 2014). The Swedish MFA also managed a small fund for infrastructure initiatives, although the money was too little to exert any tangible stabilization impact (Personal Interview MFA Official, 2014).

In March 2008, the Swedish government approved a local fund for operations on the tactical level. The fund, amounting to SEK 10 million annually, was supposed to contribute to economies of scale and synergies among deployed Swedish personnel (Regeringens Proposition and 2008/09:69, 12). In consultation with the DEVADs, the head of the PRT could submit proposals for small-scale projects. Final decisions on project approval were not made jointly, but exclusively by the civilian team at the Kabul Embassy (Hedmark 2009, 23).

In the first years after taking over the PRT, frustration rose within the SAF due to their inability to engage in large-scale civilian activities. On the one hand, local authorities pressured the CO to provide funds for reconstruction, but the small military QIP fund did not suffice. On the other hand, whenever the military engaged in counterinsurgency activities, it was unable to offer large-scale injections of civilian funding as a means to securing the trust and allegiance of the local population in a recently cleared area. SAF had expected the Swedish civilian team to take charge of this final reconstruction stage of COIN operations. SIDA representatives refused, arguing that such practices were incongruous with the organization’s philosophy, and that the responsibility fell on local authorities (Lackenbauer 2011, 9-10). Fearing that the synergies rhetoric was a mere means to put a COIN strategy into effect, SIDA firmly rejected any form of financial cooperation with the SAF.
In 2010, the arrival of the SCR and subsequent expansion of the civilian team once again raised the military’s hopes to tap into funding for governance and stabilization activities. Word from the MFA Headquarters in Stockholm was that DEVADs and POLADs were to assume direct responsibility for the development and governance lines of operation. This generated within the Armed Forces a false expectation that SIDA would co-fund initiatives for military purposes, such as COIN operations or small-scale QIPs identified by patrolling CIMIC teams. However, DEVADs had received no specific instructions to that effect from SIDA Headquarters (Lackenbauer 2011, 12).

Interview data suggests that from September 2010 until the end of 2011, the SAF continuously approached DEVADs with requests to access SIDA money for stabilization activities (Personal Interviews FBA and SIDA Officials, 2014). These constant appeals for funding frustrated SIDA representatives, who were not at liberty to approve such spending without a specific parliamentary provision that allowed budget sharing between SIDA and the military (Personal Interview SIDA Official, 2014). Lacking a Riksdag authorization for fund-sharing, a consequence of coalition politics, was a direct caveat that severely restricted the scope of Swedish WOG on the tactical level. In time, as soldiers became better acquainted with SIDA’s funding procedures, the funding requests diminished significantly (Personal Interviews SAF and SIDA Officials, 2014).

Since financial collaboration was not an option, some of the more proactive DEVADs explored alternative ways to contribute to stabilization efforts. As one respondent stated, “We simply tried to make the synergies narrative work” (Personal Interview SIDA Official, 2014). In one notable example, DEVADs at the PRT had taken the initiative to implement a survey for the civilian population in the most conflict-prone
areas where the Swedish military was active. The survey’s goal was to gauge the perceptions of locals on whether security had improved since the arrival of ISAF forces, due to the work of NGOs, or for other reasons. DEVADs prepared the survey and discussed the questions in tandem with their military colleagues. Upon sending it to SIDA Headquarters for approval, the incumbent director of SIDA’s Afghanistan unit issued specific instructions for DEVADs to drop all security-related questions from the survey. The reasoning was that including such questions meant encroaching on the security line of operations, which ran against SIDA’s organizational goals and purposes (Personal Interview SIDA Official, 2014). The survey never saw the light of day in its original format.

In a similar fashion, some MFA staff on the ground showed initiative in contributing more actively to stabilization activities. In 2012, the SCR filed a formal request with the MFA Headquarters for a separate budget, to be used for stabilization purposes. The proposal was denied on the grounds of the sensitivity of the link between development and security operations. Moreover, the timing of the request was inopportune, as the synergies rhetoric had already lost popularity in Stockholm (Personal Interview MFA Official, 2014).

In sum, Sweden lacked even the most rudimentary provisions for fund sharing and joint project management in the mission area. Against this backdrop, much of the ministries’ behavior was consistent with bureaucratic politics theory. Bureaucratic politics explains the ambition of the SAF and the MFA to expand their organizational influence by procuring independent budgets for stabilization. SIDA’s staunch resistance to encroachments on its area of operations similarly fits with bureaucratic politics logic.
By contrast, the initiative of some SCRs and DEVADs to stimulate joint initiatives is consistent with principal-agent dynamics. Being posted abroad meant that staff was physically removed from the direct supervision of Headquarters. This allowed civilians some margin to take initiative, to make personal assessments of the local context, and to propose joint activities with the military based on these assessments. While civilian staff was under overarching instructions to keep development and security operation separate, there was also rhetoric to seek synergies with the military. Since these two seemingly contradictory policy provisions were left vague, individuals had to rely on their personal interpretations of what “synergies” implied vis-à-vis their interactions with the military. Hence, some more proactive SIDA and MFA employees sought to stimulate synergies with the military, each within the limits that their organization allowed.

DEVADs, restricted by SIDA’s overarching provisions for aid disbursement, attempted to launch joint projects outside of fund-sharing. SCRs, who unlike DEVADs were under no formal obligation to spend MFA money according to ODA guidelines only, went as far as to request full-fledged stabilization budgets. However, the Headquarters of both ministries chose to enforce the caveat of separating the security, diplomacy, and development lines of the Swedish operation. In both cases, strategic caveats on inter-ministerial action, coupled with stringent ministerial oversight over staff on the ground, trumped personal initiatives to create inter-agency synergies.

**Divided Responsibilities: Swedish Whole-of-Government in the Field**

Overall, Sweden failed to make tangible progress in terms of inter-agency integration on the tactical level. The already weak ambition for synergies in Stockholm did not materialize in Afghanistan. Sweden settled for a less-ambitious WOG formula,
based on working in isolation (Hauck and Rocca 2014, 10; 13; 37; Wittkowsky and Wittkampf 2013, 3). Within the PRT, Swedish ministries maintained a rudimentary cooperation framework that remained relatively constant throughout the years, and rarely extended beyond basic information sharing (Personal Interviews AF and SAK Officials, 2014). The table below illustrates the state of Swedish WOG in Afghanistan:

Table 3: Swedish Inter-Agency Cooperation in Afghanistan, 2006-2014

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<th>PRT Structure</th>
<th>Joint Meetings</th>
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The first phase covers the period from the Swedish takeover of the PRT in 2006 until the end of 2009. Across the board, WOG indicators stand at the lowest “communication” level. In terms of structure, the PRT was military-lead and military-dominated. The joint meeting schedule was not fully formalized, and depended on the preferences of the CO in charge. Civilians were mostly passive participants, finding it difficult to make their voice heard in joint discussions. Information-sharing was limited. With the exception of POLADs, who enjoyed a direct link with the military CO, the rest of the civilian advisory team worked in isolation. Tensions flared up among civilian and the military staff due to unfounded expectations about what each ministry could deliver. Ministerial budgets were managed independently, with no prospects for joint funding.
The second stage, 2010 to 2012, reflects the switch to double-headed PRT leadership, and the subsequent expansion of the civilian advisory team. The SCR’s presence mollified some of the mistrust among civilians and the military, but had a negative impact on the cohesion within the civilian team. For this reason, the WOG indicator under “PRT Structure” remains unchanged. The PRT adopted a more formalized meeting structure, officially facilitated by either one or both PRT commanders. While the number and variety of meetings increased, the outcomes remained restricted to information-sharing, with no ambition for joint decision-making. Hence, a mere increase in the amount of joint meetings cannot be considered a reliable indicator for WOG coherence.

A limited degree of joint capacity analysis was achieved, particularly during the attempts for joint planning. However, barring the arrangements to stay out of each other’s way, there is no evidence of more sophisticated joint programming. In terms of inter-agency tensions and trust, the effects were mixed. On the one hand, the SAF was relieved to delegate all civilian liaison functions to the SCR’s team. On the other hand, frustrations arose due to unrealistic expectations about the SCR function and scope of authority. In sum, in 2010-2012 Swedish WOG oscillated between communication and coexistence, but failed to fully evolve to the coexistence level.

The third phase, from 2013 to the end of 2014, marks the full transition of the Swedish PRT to a civilian-lead Transition Support Team. During this stage, all WOG indicators stand at the lowest end of the integration scale. Switching to fully civilian leadership cannot be considered a sign of WOG progress, for largely two reasons. First, it was not a strategic attempt to foster inter-agency cooperation, but rather a preparative
step for the Swedish permanent troop withdrawal. Second, civilians and the military worked even more independently than before, with the SCR team focusing primarily on relations with civilian entities outside of the TST. Furthermore, installing the civilian PRT head had some unexpected negative effects, such as isolating POLADs and making it difficult to exercise their advisory function. Attempts at joint operations planning were abandoned, with the exception of updating one another on transition-related issues.

Overall, the Swedish experience in Afghanistan illustrates how a modest and short-lived strategic ambition for civil-military synergies never materialized on the ground. Within the Swedish parliament, the political negotiations regarding the WOG model were overly focused on placing caveats on joint inter-ministerial action, while deliberately failing to provide concrete guidelines on ways to enhance civil-military cooperation. Against this backdrop, ministries in the field reverted to bureaucratic practices. At the PRT, bureaucratic squabbles over the WOG concept were exponentially exacerbated, as people generally tended to understand “synergies” from the standpoint of their own organizational interest.

Tham, Och, and Hull argue that it was up to the people in the field to interpret the meaning of “synergies,” and to resolve arising issues on the go (Tham, Och, and Hull 2011, 39–40). This study takes a slightly different approach. Staff on the ground was largely left to their own devices in figuring out how to work together, but this is not to say that individuals from all ministries had equal leeway to interpret “synergies” proactively. SIDA in particular had very limited discretion from Headquarters in seeking collaborative ventures with the military. SIDA officials in Stockholm carefully scrutinized all initiatives on the field level so as to ensure no overlap with the military
line of operation. Generally, deployed staff was aware that initiatives involving explicit fund-sharing or joint project management with the military would not be endorsed by Stockholm. Some more proactive DEVADs thus explored less contentious ways for creating synergies, but even these failed to gain approval at Headquarters. All this is suggesting not only tight oversight over staff on the ground, but also explicit disincentives for SIDA personnel to engage with the military in any activities beyond basic information-sharing.

In this context, the individual personalities of personnel on the ground mattered little for advancing the overall WOG model. Certainly SCRs had enough clout to influence the general tone of joint meetings. Civilian leaders with a military background or past experience working across government departments were generally more skilled in steering the meetings, diffusing tensions, and increasing trust among the meeting participants. These findings suggest that solid pre-deployment training in civil-military issues can partially contribute to a more advanced WOG model. However, without an explicit provision from the Riksdag, and no authorization from Headquarters, even these senior civilian leaders lacked the authority to independently implement large-scale joint ventures. Ultimately, the strategic caveats on inter-ministerial action, coupled with stringent oversight from Stockholm, trumped personal initiatives in the field.

Bureaucratic politics theory largely accounts for the dynamics within the Swedish PRT. Less consistent with BP’s rigid role conceptions logic is the ability of soldiers to adapt to SIDA’s modus operandi. Through trial and error, the Swedish military eventually increased their awareness of SIDA’s mission and operations. This process of grassroots learning may have dissipated inter-departmental tensions, but it did little to
advance the overall WOG model. On the contrary, since the strategic caveats on civil-military cooperation did not relax, staff adopted a model of working in isolation, rather than together. Proponents of strategic culture might argue that a shared code of behavior, based on a clear separation of roles, emerged towards the end of the Swedish military mission. Whether the Afghanistan experience gave rise to a strategic culture that will shape future Swedish engagements in multinational operations remains to be seen.
Networked Security: the German Whole-of-Government Approach in Berlin

In Germany, the reference term for whole-of-government is Vernetzte Sicherheit, or networked security. Much like Sweden, Germany has a tradition of coalition governments, a decentralized government structure with highly autonomous ministries, and a pacific stance in foreign policy. The puzzle is thus why, in a striking difference to the Swedish approach, German WOG progressed to coordinated action, and even included partial provisions for civil-military cooperation in counterinsurgency scenarios. To tease out the main drivers of German Vernetzte Sicherheit, this chapter examines patterns of inter-agency integration on the domestic level.

In Berlin, cross-government coherence proceeded in three stages. From 2001 to the end of 2004, inter-ministerial cooperation stood at the lowest end of the WOG scale. During the second phase, 2005-2009, German WOG gradually transitioned to co-existence, mainly in the aspects of inter-ministerial meetings and financial pooling. Finally, from 2010 to 2014, there was partial progress to coordinated action, but only in terms of financial pooling, and only between two ministries: the German Federal Foreign Office and the German Armed Forces.

German networked security was a product of coalition politics in a parliament that, especially prior to 2009, was constantly divided over the military aspect of the Afghanistan engagement. Germany’s continued presence in Afghanistan hinged upon an annual mandate review and approval by a coalition-lead parliament. Passing the mandate required garnering broad political buy-in, which is why the German contribution to ISAF was packaged as a civilian reconstruction support mission, not an offensive operation.
This kind of framing stunted WOG developments at the outset, because it did not contemplate counterinsurgency scenarios, or civil-military cooperation in COIN-type initiatives. Nonetheless, negotiations on non-related issues triggered some important cross-departmental cooperation initiatives. After the federal elections of 2009, the reconfiguration in the German parliament brought to power a more like-minded coalition that largely recognized the need to scale up both military and civilian efforts. The new government spearheaded a fund-pooling initiative that partially propelled the WOG model towards coordinated action. Deteriorating security on the ground, and ongoing talks of NATO’s permanent withdrawal from Afghanistan, were the permissive conditions that enabled progress in the German WOG model. Finally, the ideological inclinations and personal experience of BMZ ministers also left an imprint on inter-agency dynamics.

The chapter begins with an outline of Germany’s engagement in peace operations, and the domestic structures and processes that predetermine Germany’s involvement in overseas missions. Next, Germany’s contribution to ISAF is examined in greater detail. After a brief overview of the strategic and operational setup of the German engagement, the chapter analyses the forces that drove the development of German networked security. What follows is a detailed examination of WOG advancements on the strategic level, as per the indicators on the integration scale. The chapter concludes with an overview of the main findings.

**Germany in Peace Operations**

In the aftermath of World War II, the official German foreign policy narrative has emphasized pacifism, multilateralism, and an aversion to all things military (Hilpert
The newly created German Armed Forces (*Bundeswehr*) were mandated to act as a Cold War deterrent, not an offensive force (von Bredow 2011, 6). Scholars have argued that, on the whole, Germans do not perceive their army as an offensive force, much less one to be used in peace enforcement operations overseas (Noetzel and Schreer 2008b, 44; Post 2015, 272; von Bredow 2011, 2). Rather, German soldiers in the field are seen as development workers in uniform, deployed in support of peacekeeping efforts (Hilpert 2014, 50). These arguments of a dominating German strategic “culture of restraint” have come into question in recent years, as Germany has progressively become involved in counterinsurgency operations (Noetzel and Schreer 2008b, 44; Post 2015, 272; von Bredow 2011, 2).

Germany’s domestic governance model, enshrined in the Constitution of 1949 so as to avoid the mistakes leading to World War II, affects the country’s overseas engagements in largely two ways. First, German government structure is highly decentralized, and severely limits the Chancellor’s power to impose policy decisions on individual departments. Ministries enjoy a large degree of autonomy in policymaking and implementation, and operate according to a strict division of labour, as per their respective areas of competence. Staff is usually held accountable only for the results of their own departmental policies, not for inter-ministerial endeavours. There is no formal incentive scheme for inter-ministerial cooperation, especially in matters of foreign and security policy (Post 2015, 285).

Second, the Chancellor has no authority to single-handedly commit troops overseas. All military deployments abroad are to be debated and authorized annually by

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38 In theory, the Chancellor reserves the right to overrule any minister, but in practice this is a rare occurrence.
the German Parliament (*Bundestag*). Since the early 1990s, the Bundestag has held over 240 debates concerning overseas troop deployments – considerably more than in other NATO countries (von Bredow 2011, 6). These practices have resulted in naming the Bundeswehr “a parliamentary army” (Bake and Meyer 2012, 67). Other aspects of overseas engagements, such as diplomacy and international development cooperation, are not subject to the same level of constant parliamentary scrutiny, and remain a prerogative of the respective ministries (Hilpert 2014, 100).39

To complicate matters further, negotiating overseas deployments within the Bundestag requires intensive negotiations and compromise (Noetzel and Schreer 2008a, 218). This is because the German electoral system makes it highly unlikely for one single party to gain parliamentary majority (Noetzel and Rid 2009, 78–79). Coalition governments have thus been the norm. Within the ruling coalition and beyond, consensus-building involves accommodating a broad variety of often diverging political interests.

One major player on the German political arena is the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Together with its smaller Bavarian branch, the Christian Social Union (CSU), the CDU has usually been elected as one of the major coalition partners. Its main political opponent is the centre-left Social Democratic Party (*Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*, SPD), the second-largest party in Germany

39 Hilpert claims that the main obstacle to a more integrated German WOG model is the Federal Constitution, because it limits the Bundestag’s authority to vote directly on diplomacy and development policy (2014, 129). This argument is not entirely convincing. Certainly the ministries reserve the prerogative to set policy within their respective domains. However, it is within the purview of the Bundestag to vote on specific cross-government coherence measures, such as joint institutions and funding mechanisms. As this chapter demonstrates later on, several such proposals have been debated within the German parliament during the years of the Afghanistan engagement. Some of the initiatives were struck down, while others were adopted.
with a platform based on social justice and worker’s rights (Dahmann 2009). The Greens, a party that evolved out of several non-mainstream social protest movements in the 1980s, is similarly focused on social justice and environmental protection issues (Deutsche Welle 2017). The Free Democratic Party (Freie Demokratische Partei, FDP), usually labeled as “the party of the wealthy,” supports economic liberalization, and represents the interests of small and mid-size businesses. Finally, among the more radical parties is the Left Party (Die Linke), with a strongly pacifist, anti-NATO agenda (Dahmann 2009).

When key ministries fall in the hands of parties on opposite ends of the ideological spectrum, consensus-building becomes even more difficult. The German Federal Foreign Office (Aussenwartiges Amt, AA) and the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung, BMZ) have traditionally been held by opposing parties, which fuels a long-standing rivalry between the two (Personal Interviews Bundeswehr and BMZ Officials, 2014; 2015).

When it comes to participation in peace operations, diverging views on development cooperation between AA and the BMZ have resulted in inter-ministerial clashes over the most appropriate way forward. The AA complains that the BMZ receives the lion share of development cooperation assistance, even though the AA is officially representing the entire German contingent abroad. The BMZ retorts that development assistance should not be subjected to political goals, and should therefore remain in the hands of independent experts (Personal Interviews BMZ Official, 2015). These
arguments were largely rehashed during Germany’s engagement in Afghanistan, as seen in the next section.

**Germany in Afghanistan, 2003-2014**

This section focuses on the German contribution to ISAF, Germany’s first significant experience with civil-military cooperation in a conflict zone. The first part briefly outlines the strategic and operational setup of the German presence in Afghanistan. Given the strictly autonomous tasks, operations and chains of command of the German ministries, the puzzle is why departments sometimes chose to cooperate. To shed light on this issue, the second part traces inter-agency integration dynamics in Berlin.

**Strategic and Operational Setup of the German Engagement**

Soon after Germany joined ISAF, a strategic decision was made that the BMZ and AA would align their priorities with the Bundeswehr, concentrating their efforts in the same provinces where the German military was active (“Afghanistan” 2016; German Institute for Development Evaluation 2014, 5). By 2003, the Germans were responsible for six provinces in northern Afghanistan: Baghlan, Balkh, Badakhshan, Kunduz, Samangan and Takhar, in addition to the capital Kabul. On the ground, the military contingent was organized into two PRTs, in Kunduz (2003-2013) and Fayzabad (2004-2013), as well as one Provincial Advisory Team (PAT) (2008-2014) in the more remote

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40 German soldiers were active during the crisis on the Balkans, but only as an impartial stabilizing force and a provider of humanitarian aid (Noetzel 2010b, 486). Rather than engaging in hostilities, the military was delivering aid and rebuilding the destroyed homes of Albanian Kosovars (Mockaitis 2004, 19). All this implied coordinating, but expressly not integrating civilian and military elements (Noetzel 2010b, 487).
Takhar region. The number of troops deployed to the PRTs oscillated between 500-1200. By contrast, civilian staff at the largest PRT numbered only about ten persons. Formally, the AA was in the lead of the entire German presence in Afghanistan. In practice, AA did not marshal the authority to set policies or direct the work of other ministries. Neither were other ministries directly accountable to AA: all reported up separate chains of command. At each of the PRTs in Kunduz and Fayzabad, AA deployed one Senior Civilian Representative (SCR), as well as one political adviser, one cultural adviser, and at times a legal adviser for the PRT commander.

The BMZ was in charge of German development cooperation programs (GDC). In Berlin, the staff at the Afghanistan-Pakistan Division set the pace for the BMZ engagement. Usually, BMZ personnel deployed to the field under contract with one of the ministry’s implementing agencies. On average, one such BMZ representative was attached to each one of the PRTs.

On the ground, two government-owned implementing agencies carried out programs for both AA and the BMZ were carried out by two implementing agencies, the German Society for International Cooperation (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, or GIZ), and KfW Development Bank (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, KfW).  

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41 The PAT was a small scale PRT-type unit. Initially, the intention was to staff it with approximately 40 persons, 35 of whom military. Towards 2011, the military staff had increased to approximately 60, accompanied by two civilians. The rationale behind opening the PAT was showing the face of the Bundeswehr among the Afghan population, and providing basic services in areas further away from the PRTs. Noetzel argues that the opening of the PAT demonstrated a willingness on behalf of German military commanders to exchange force protection for more presence in the remote areas (2010a).

42 On the ground, a limited amount of civilian personnel worked out of an Embassy in Kabul, a Consulate in Mazar-e-Sharif, and at the German PRTs. AA staff posted to the PRTs were part of the chain of command of the Embassy in Kabul, of Headquarters in Mazar-e-Sharif, and also directly to the Federal Foreign Office in Berlin.

43 Some of these advisers could be either from the military, or civilians on short-term contracts with the Bundeswehr.
or KfW). Both institutions are government-owned, but autonomous and do not form part of the executive. The GIZ specializes in technical cooperation. In the field, it relied on a large team of experts (reaching 300 to 400 at peak times), all working outside of the PRTs. KfW funds primarily large infrastructure projects in the water and energy sectors. KfW staff on the ground was considerably less, averaging at 5-10 employees working out of a civilian office outside of the PRTs. As per a general contract signed in the 1950s, both GIZ and KfW enjoyed a high degree of independence from BMZ and AA in program design and implementation (Personal Interviews KfW Official, 2015).

In sum, the German setup in Afghanistan was highly decentralized, with no one ministry clearly in the lead. This arrangement exacerbated departmental turf wars over the WOG concept. However, as seen later on, the German WOG model also registered some progress that is not easily explained by bureaucratic resistance alone. The next section illustrates how party politics and coalition consensus-building shaped German networked security.

The Makings of German Networked Security

At the outset, German political parties had diverging views regarding the type of mission, overarching goals, and the most appropriate strategy to follow in Afghanistan (Hynek and Marton 2011). Over the years, these differences became more acute, effectively stunting the debate and narrowing the margin of action (Noetzel and Rid 2009, 78–79).

In 2001, a coalition of SPD and Greens held a narrow parliamentary majority. Although these two parties normally supported similar platforms, there was no firm consensus among the coalition partners to approve the first ISAF contribution mandate.
The Greens were openly opposed to addressing terrorism by military means, and they were supported by some of the more leftist SPD members (Hilpert 2014, 43). To make sure the mandate would pass, Chancellor Schroeder resorted to calling a no confidence vote, thus forcing their coalition partner to either support the mandate or risk dissolving the government and calling elections if the vote failed (Noetzel and Rid 2009, 80). This struck home with the Greens, who worried they might lose their seats in the Bundestag in the event of a new election (Hilpert 2014, 44).

In the end, the mandate passed, but in order to accommodate the opposition, Germany’s participation in ISAF was framed as a non-combat mission, and strict caveats were imposed on the operation of the Bundeswehr (Auerswald and Saideman 2016, 141; Kaim 2008, 615; Noetzel and Schreer 2008, 43; von Bredow 2011, 5). Emphasizing the civilian reconstruction aspect of the German engagement was necessary in order to secure parliamentary majority in support of the mandate (Hilpert 2014, 50). Since this kind of framing implied that the Bundeswehr was not to conduct COIN operations, specific provisions for cooperation with civilian ministries in COIN scenarios became a moot point. This limited the scope of German WOG development at the outset, restricting it to moderate-level integration models in the best of cases.

In 2002, the Red-Green coalition was re-elected. Policymakers continued to rehash humanitarian arguments, and to refer to a comprehensive approach as the way forward in Afghanistan. This ensured the approval of subsequent ISAF contribution mandates, almost always by a two-thirds majority. Yet this apparent consensus was not

44 For example, troops were not allowed to operate outside of Regional Command-North (RCN), except in dire emergencies and rescue situations. Military force was to be employed only for self-defence purposes (Noetzel and Rid 2009, 75).
due to a prevailing strategic culture of pacifism and multilateralism, as some authors have implied (Becker 2013; Longhurst 2005). In fact, parties harbored different views on the type of mission and the role of its military and civilian components (Harsch 2011, 22; Noetzel 2011, 399; Noetzel and Rid 2009, 80).

Narratives from the CDU/CSU and FDP opposition tended to converge. These parties framed the mission in terms of an armed conflict and protection of national interest, and welcomed a more active role for the military, as well as increasing development and reconstruction support. At the other end of the spectrum, the SPD and the Greens evoked humanitarian and stabilization arguments, generally calling for a reduced role of the military. Finally, the Linke adopted a radical stance, branding the operation as an example of US and German militarism, and calling for an immediate pullout from Afghanistan (Hynek and Marton 2011).

Disagreements within parties also emerged, particularly in the ranks of the conservatives and the Greens (Noetzel and Rid 2009, 80-81). Some conservatives saw the operation in Afghanistan as yielding to pressure from the United States (Noetzel and Rid 2009, 80). Other CDU members agreed with Die Linke’s concerns that participating in ISAF might actually be detrimental, not beneficial, to Germany’s national security (Noetzel and Rid 2009, 81). As to the Greens, the anti-militarization currents within the party were becoming more pronounced, and a faction that rejected the Afghanistan intervention altogether was developing within the party (Personal Interview AA Official, 2015).45

45 After 2005, the voting of the Greens became consistent: a third against, the majority abstained, and a small faction in favor of the Afghanistan mission (Personal Interview AA Official, 2015).
With regard to networked security in particular, the political consensus was similarly deceptive. Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder (SPD) had argued for a comprehensive approach that would employ political, development, as well as military means (Hilpert 2014, 43). However, some of his party members decidedly opposed the WOG concept. One of them was Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, who was also serving as BMZ minister. Within the SPD, Wieczorek-Zeul was considered part of the group with a more leftist orientation. A strident critic of mixing development and military lines of operation, she once stated in an interview that “[In Afghanistan], men with rifles should not be seen standing next to development workers” (Graw 2007).

In the federal elections of 2005, a CDU/CSU/SPD grand coalition was elected, with the Greens passing in opposition. In Berlin, the strategic rhetoric on Afghanistan remained largely unchanged. On the ground, insurgency activity started seeping in from Southern Afghanistan into the Northern provinces where the German military was active. The worsening security situation demanded a readjustment of the Bundeswehr’s restrictive rules of engagement. With little guidance from Berlin on how to proceed, the Bundeswehr initiated a bottom-up process of slow adaptation to COIN operations (Behr 2011, 52-54).

Back in Berlin, parts of the political and military elite opposed the application of a COIN strategy in Afghanistan. The way to deal with their concerns was to avoid a broad debate on the hard aspects of COIN altogether. There was no consensus-building process

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46 As seen in the next chapter, during Wieczorek-Zeul’s tenure as minister, BMZ staff on the ground kept a physical distance from the military at all times (Personal Interview Bundeswehr Official, 2014).
47 Germany’s first counterinsurgency operation was Harekate Yolo II in late 2007. In 2008, Germany over command of NATO Quick Reaction Forces (QRF) - another notable sign of the gradual shift away from stabilization and towards a COIN approach (Runge 2009, 13).
in the Bundestag as to how COIN operations would be conducted (Hilpert 2014, 193). In a similar vein, there was no discussion or instructions provided to deployed staff on how to incorporate civilian funds into a COIN strategy (Personal Interviews Bundeswehr Officials 2014; 2015). During the parliamentary debates, some politicians voiced their support for a combined, comprehensive, civil-military mandate in Afghanistan, but their appeals never lead to specific negotiations (Hilpert 2014, 93). The BMZ energetically refused to provide quick and visible development funding injections for the regions recently cleared of insurgents (Gareis 2010, 241; Noetzel and Schreer 2008b, 45). BMZ officials were concerned that the *vernetzte Sicherheit* rhetoric might be used to force the ministry into “winning hearts and minds” – a concept incompatible with the organizational essence of the development ministry (Personal Interviews BMZ Official, 2015).

A more problematic aspect of the prevailing strategic narrative was that the Bundeswehr was vaguely tasked with supporting reconstruction, but its precise role in civil-military cooperation was obscured by the excessive focus on civilian activities (Hilpert 2014, 50). It was unclear how the military was to assist in civilian reconstruction without access to its own budget for civilian activities, or the possibility to share funding with other ministries. The excessive strategic focus on reconstruction effectively warped the military’s understanding of their responsibilities under a WOG approach. Especially prior to 2009, soldiers on the ground came under intense pressure from Headquarters to engage in quick impact projects that served largely military purposes, and interactions
between the Bundeswehr and their civilian counterparts remained minimal (Personal Interview Bundeswehr Official, 2014).\(^{48}\)

In 2009, the federal elections marked a shift on the domestic political arena, as the SPD was ousted from power. A CDU, CSU and FDP coalition gained parliamentary majority, with the FDP heading both the BMZ and AA. Within the new ruling coalition, support for the annual contribution to ISAF was generally high. The parties shared an understanding that the nature of the German engagement was a war-like intervention, and favoured a strategy based on increased civilian, as well as military means (Hynek and Marton 2011).

In the past, both the CDU and the FDP had supported increased integration between the security, diplomacy and development streams. In 2008, the CDU had proposed creating a National Security Council, to centralize strategy formulation and decision-making in security policy, but the initiative was struck down in the Bundestag (Noetzel 2010b, 500).\(^{49}\) In turn, the FDP had openly critiqued German development cooperation policy under the previous SPD-lead governments (Berlin Policy Journal 2010).\(^{50}\) FDP leaders believed that the structure of development cooperation reflected an incoherent foreign policy stance on the international level. Prior to becoming part of the governing coalition, the FDP had proposed effectively abolishing the BMZ by merging it

\(^{48}\) In the words of one respondent, it was only after 2009 that the military’s focus shifted towards what CIMIC units were really supposed to do: liaising, village profiling, and information exchange (Personal Interview Bundeswehr Official, 2014).

\(^{49}\) The CDU’s idea proved all the more controversial, because the name of the proposed joint institution suggested not only a militarization, but an Americanization of German security policy – an issue that was considered unacceptable by most other parties (Noetzel 2010b, 500).

\(^{50}\) Unlike the more value-driven, needs-based approach of the SPD, the FDP espoused the view that German development policy could be interest-driven, and should be directed where it was likely to achieve better results (Berlin Policy Journal 2010).
with AA. The idea was struck down during the coalition negotiations (Berlin Policy Journal 2010). Nonetheless, it was testament to the FDP’s support for a unification of the political and development lines of operation.

In short, the federal elections of 2009 brought about a shift in political power that directly affected the course of the overall Afghanistan strategy, and with it, the German WOG model. As politicians finally started referring to Afghanistan as an armed conflict, the strategic narrative definitively shifted away from civilian reconstruction and towards war-fighting (Noetzel 2011, 405; 407; Schroer 2014, 88). More importantly, the new conservative-liberal coalition took steps to enable civil-military cooperation in COIN-type scenarios. Less than a year after the elections, Cabinet announced the creation of a new Stabilization Fund for the Federal Foreign Office. A budgetary injection of 180 million Euros, the Stabilization Fund brought the AA portfolio almost to the level of the BMZ (Behr 2011, 43; German Institute for Development Evaluation 2014, 4). However, unlike BMZ funds, this stabilization money could be used in support of offensive military operations in tandem with the Bundeswehr.

Within the Bundestag, the Stabilization Fund was approved with minimal opposition. Taking advantage of the propitious political climate, Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle, himself an ISAF supporter, successfully argued that as the official representative for the entire German engagement, AA required an increase of funding to invest in stabilization initiatives (Personal Interview BMZ Official, 2015). Westerwelle’s argument resonated strongly in view of worsening security in Afghanistan, and the

51 The Stabilization Fund was part of an overall call for a “civilian surge” on the international level, which in Germany translated into an initiative to double the total amount of development assistance for Afghanistan, reaching 403 million Euros a year (Hynek and Marton 2011).
negotiations of NATO’s impending permanent withdrawal from Afghanistan, all of
which provided for a new twist in the strategic narrative: stabilize now or lose the country
forever (Personal Interview BMZ Official, 2015).

Another notable impact of the 2009 elections was the change of BMZ leadership.
Minister Dirk Niebel (FDP) set out to implement a series of efficiency-focused
institutional reforms that his party had been insisting on for years. A former paratrooper
and captain of the reserve, Niebel was an avid supporter of *vernetzte Sicherheit*, and
believed that the concept had not reached its full potential under the previous SPD-lead
governments. He urged for a recognition that security and development policy
complement one another (Berlin Policy Journal 2010). In a 2011 interview, he stated:
“It’s nice that development policy has recognized that it needs to cooperate with security
policy” (Beetle 2011).

Minister Niebel’s interpretation of networked security was certainly less
conservative than that of his predecessor, but it fell short of officially endorsing the
participation of BMZ in COIN operations. In official statements, Niebel stated that
*vernetzte Sicherheit* meant a sensible division of labour between civilians and the
military for their own benefit (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit
und Entwicklung 2010). While it was not clear what exactly this division of labour
entailed, Niebel advocated for increased “consultations” among all relevant actors –
something that was already happening on the ground (Berlin Policy Journal 2010).
Despite his cautious interpretation of networked security, Niebel undertook several
WOG-informed reforms of BMZ policy and practices. Soon after taking up office, he
created an inducement mechanism in the form of an additional 10 million Euros annual
budget for those NGOs that operated in the same provinces as the Bundeswehr (Berlin Policy Journal 2010; Government of Germany 2010). Furthermore, BMZ staff posted to the PRTs received new instructions (Gareis 2010, 241). Deployed staff were asked, but not obligated, to use the offices within the PRTs, and to work in closer cooperation with the military (Personal Interviews AA Officials, 2015).

Similar changes were occurring within the Ministry of Defence. New minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg (CSU) fully exploited his predecessor’s political downfall to push for a more proactive COIN approach (Noetzel 2011, 409). Guttenberg’s own successor, Thomas de Maizière (CDU), pushed for further reforms to improve the efficiency and flexibility of the Bundeswehr. On the political arena, he enjoyed almost unanimous support (Heymann 2011). With the Armed Forces officially engaging in counterinsurgency operations, and the stabilization fund in place, the stage was set for cooperation in COIN-type ventures between AA and the Bundeswehr.

All this is to say that key persons in positions of authority had an impact on overall WOG developments. However, the authority of individual ministries did not extend beyond their own department, which limited their impact on the overall WOG model. A strategic merge of the security, diplomacy and development streams, reinforced by joint institutions and shared funding mechanisms, continued to depend on political

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52 The NGOs complained energetically about these funding conditions, but to no avail (Die Bundesregierung 2010; Die SPIEGEL 2010).

53 As the following chapter shows, these measures had a partial effect towards a more integrated WOG model. Eventually, BMZ representatives on the ground started showing more willingness to align efforts with the Bundeswehr, for example in plans to scale up development efforts in relatively safe districts (Personal Interviews AA Officials, 2015).

54 The previous minister Franz Joseph Jung (CDU) had lost political credibility after refusing to admit publicly that a German commander had ordered an attack killing more than 100 civilians in Kunduz. Noetzel argues that the Kunduz affair contributed indirectly to bureaucratic changes within the Ministry of Defense which, in turn, facilitated the shift towards COIN operations (Noetzel 2011, 412).
consensus and approval within the Bundestag. Even during the tenure of the
conservative-liberal coalition, which was the most propitious time for WOG progress, a
full integration of BMZ in counterinsurgency activities was not contemplated.

In sum, in a matter of only four years (2005-2009), German WOG shifted towards
a more integrated level on the WOG scale. The transition was slow at first, and became
more pronounced after the 2009 federal elections. These rapid developments do not fit
well with strategic culture logic. Since strategic culture is presumed to be highly resilient
to change, it is difficult to argue that fundamental changes can occur in the short time
span of four years, and without a significant external shock. Strategic culture advocates
may claim that the Bundeswehr’s adaptation to COIN operations is an example of fine-
tuning. But fine-tuning implies minor adjustments, not major changes that run counter to
the culture’s core values. The Bundeswehr’s involvement in offensive operations does
not fit with the alleged German foundational value of pacifism. Furthermore, the delay in
getting involved in COIN operations clashes with the foundational element of
multilateralism. NATO had already been pressuring Germany for years to live up to
commitments to international allies (Kaim 2008, 616). Berlin turned a deaf year to these
complaints, until German casualties in Afghanistan started rising. The rationale for
engaging in COIN then became the safety of German soldiers – an argument more in line
with national interest than with values of multilateralism.

Bureaucratic politics falls short in tracing the fluctuation of the German WOG
model, because integration feats (or failed attempts at establishing joint structures) were
largely a product of specific political negotiations, the results of which depended on who
held the majority in parliament, and who headed specific ministries. BP logic is
nonetheless useful in illustrating how, given a propitious domestic political climate, the Foreign Office was able to negotiate an additional stabilization budget. Receiving the extra funding fit perfectly with the organizational interest of AA, even more so because final decisions on fund management remained entirely with the Foreign Office. Bureaucratic politics also explains why, as the Bundeswehr sought to redefine its organizational purpose after the end of the Cold War, there was an initial enthusiasm about a WOG approach within the military. The next section elaborates on this point by analyzing official policy documents with references to networked security.

**Whole-of-Government Policy**

This section presents a chronological account of the most important German policy documents that made references to inter-ministerial coherence, in foreign and security policy and in Afghanistan in particular. The analysis illustrates a pervasive framing of the German engagement as a civilian reconstruction mission, and a policy language that remains vague for the most part. Since the reconstruction rhetoric implied civilian means would not be used during military operations, the prevailing strategic narrative effectively lifted the urgency to formally integrate civilian and military instruments (Lombardi 2008, 590; Noetzel 2010b, 491; Noetzel 2011, 403; Noetzel and Schreer 2008b, 44).

Germany never adopted a comprehensive national strategy on inter-agency cooperation, neither on paper nor in practice (Wittkowski et al. 2011, 1). The reason, several interviewees argued, was that negotiating such a document within the Bundestag would result in severely diluting the language in the final version of the text (Personal Interviews AA and BMZ Officials, 2015). Instead, Germany opted for several papers,
signed jointly but spearheaded by individual departments, which dealt with separate aspects of out-of-area engagements. Any jointly endorsed policy papers were adopted after intense back and forth negotiations between the ministries. Accommodating the concerns of all ministries inevitably resulted in vague policy language (Personal Interviews BMZ and Bundeswehr Officials, 2014; 2015).

In 2003, the German government published its first Afghanistan Concept. The document reasserted the autonomy of each ministry’s policy areas, stressing that the military was to keep as light a footprint as possible in the mission area (Der Bundesregierung 2003). Two updates of the Afghanistan Concept followed in 2008 and 2011, without much change in the policy language. Perhaps more importantly, the 2011 update contained no guidance on how the military and civilians were to cooperate in COIN-like scenarios, even though the Stabilization Fund had already been in place for at least one year.

In 2004, Germany adopted the Action Plan for Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution, and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding (Aktionsplan Zivile Krisenprävention, Konfliktlösung und Friedenskonsolidierung) (Bundesregierung 2004). Spearheaded by AA, the Plan was a product of two years of coalition debates, and broad consultations with experts from other Federal ministries, civil society, and academic circles (Post 2015, 274). As a civilian document dealing with crisis prevention, the Action Plan was not applicable in situations of ongoing conflict. The text offered a laundry list of proposals to increase inter-agency coherence, including the establishment of the Interministerial Steering Group (ISG), a formal inter-agency coordination body for
However, the Plan did not deal with military issues. Except for a brief outline of joint training, the document offered little guidance on inter-agency cooperation. Civilian and military forces were to coordinate, but to avoid encroaching on each other while doing so (Bundesregierung 2004, 2; 12-13). Specifically what kinds of activities would be considered an encroachment remains unclear. By 2011, the Action Plan had largely lost momentum, as ministries reverted to their usual stove-piping practices (Alamir 2011). After the elections of 2013, there was a renewed interest on behalf of the government in implementing the suggestions in the Action Plan (Personal Interview Bundeswehr Official, 2014). However, this impetus had little relevance for the Afghanistan engagement, since the Bundeswehr was mere months away from closing down the PRTs.

In 2006, the German Armed Forces released an update of their White Paper on the Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Situation of the Bundeswehr (Weißbuch 2006 zur Sicherheitspolitik Deutschlands und zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr) (Federal Ministry of Defence 2006). With this publication, the Bundeswehr became the first to openly discuss cross-departmental cooperation in conflict contexts. Networked security was interpreted from a military perspective, as an essential part of the changing role of the Armed Forces organization in the post-Cold War era (Federal Ministry of Defence 2006, 6-7). Initially, this eagerness of the Bundeswehr to adopt “networked security” as a basic principle of working relations caused tension with the BMZ (Post 2015, 289). In the end, since the White Paper did not have the status of an overarching

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55 In the end, the Steering Group assumed primarily an advisory role, devoid of major political or operational importance (Alamir 2011; Gareis 2010, 241). With regard to the PRTs, the ISG played no significant part (Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 27).
guiding document, these disagreements were quickly resolved on the working level
(Personal Interview Bundeswehr Official, 2014).

Overall, the language in the White Paper is vague and at times contradictory: the
text reaffirms the independence of German ministries, yet at the same time it calls for
closer inter-ministerial cooperation in peace operations. Some key aspects of WOG, such
as joint institutional structures, more effective cross-departmental information exchange,
a shared institutional understanding among all actors involved, and the experiences from
the German PRTs, received special mention (Federal Ministry of Defence 2006, 10-11;
22-23; 71; 120). But the document did not significantly elaborate on either. One
Bundeswehr official remarked that, from the viewpoint of staff deployed to Afghanistan,
“[the White Paper] was not really something that guided our thinking” (Personal
Interview Bundeswehr Official, 2014).

In 2012, the AA, BMZ and the Ministry of Defence co-signed the Interagency
Guidelines for a Coherent Policy of the Federal Government Towards Fragile States (Für
eine kohärente Politik der Bundesregierung gegenüber fragilen Staaten -
Ressortübergreifende Leitlinien) (Auswärtiges Amt et al. 2012). The Guidelines were a
product of the 2009 CDU/CSU/FDP coalition agreement. At the joint press conference
announcing the release of the policy, ministerial officials (including then-BMZ Minister
Niebel) remarked that the networked security rhetoric had failed to materialize so far.
Releasing the Fragile States Guidelines, the government representatives argued, was a
step towards rectifying this situation (Post 2015, 284).

The Guidelines constituted the most explicitly WOG-informed policy document
thus far. Several WOG elements received special mention: relying on inter-agency
coordination bodies, enhancing effective cross-departmental information exchange, and a joint inter-ministerial strategy. Still, the emphasis on a clear ministerial division of labour remained. In the name of greater efficiency, actors were to focus on their separate areas of expertise (Auswärtiges Amt et al. 2012, 1-7).

On paper, these Guidelines represented the most direct effort to address WOG principles in German policy. In practice, the impact of this text was insignificant. Few of the interviewees knew of this document’s existence. Those who were aware of it argued that the policy had no tangible effect on their daily work (Personal Interviews AA, BMZ and Bundeswehr Officials, 2014; 2015).

In addition to these jointly signed documents, a series of policy papers were published by individual ministries. For the most part, these failed to contribute anything new to the WOG debate. The BMZ shied away from using the term vernetzte Sicherheit. The 2005 BMZ Sector Strategy for Crisis Prevention mentioned civil-military cooperation, but only in the context of security sector reform and DDR (Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development 2005, 24). There were no references to civilians executing or supervising reconstruction projects in tandem with the military. Instead, the BMZ made the case for “joint responsibility – separate responsibilities,” meaning that departments would contribute equally to strategy formulation, but each ministry was to act autonomously and within their own area of responsibility (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 2007, 29). In its 2014 strategic paper on Afghanistan, the BMZ took special care to distance itself from the responsibilities of AA under the Stabilization Fund (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 2014).
In stark contrast to the policy language in BMZ documents, the Ministry of Defence was more proactive in addressing joint efforts and civil-military cooperation in general. The 2003 Defence Policy Guidelines (Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien), while lacking a direct reference to networked security, nonetheless recognized the increased involvement of the Bundeswehr in humanitarian relief operations, and stressed the need to develop a framework for cooperation with other government institutions and NGOs for such cases (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung 2003, 18). The 2011 update of the Defence Policy Guidelines contained an explicit reference to a whole-of-government approach in its first sentence (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung 2011, 1). The document reflected a shift towards a national self-assertion strategy for the Bundeswehr, with evident elements of a hard power approach and a securitization of WOG (Schröer 2014, 91). The text made the case for a comprehensive national security policy, merging diplomacy, economic, humanitarian, social and military measures. To achieve this, the document argued, all German departments would have to “take far-sighted, whole-of-government action while taking into account their responsibilities and capabilities laid down in the Constitution” (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung 2011, 5). The proactive tone of this language was diluted by the reference to the German constitution, which reaffirmed the independence of the ministries.

In sum, instead of a joint official policy document on WOG, German ministries issued separate papers, each informed by the organizational interests of the ministry that spearheaded the text. Rather than a common agenda and shared responsibilities, the documents focused on separate tasks, and generally avoided more controversial issues, such as specific guidelines for civil-military cooperation.
The official documents show little evidence of a commonly accepted strategic culture of cooperation among the ministries. On the contrary: there are notable differences in the interpretation of networked security across departments, particularly the BMZ and the Bundeswehr. Eventually, through trial and error, the military learned not to encroach on the realm of operation of the BMZ (Personal Interview Bundeswehr Official, 2014). But the policy documents had little to do with this grassroots learning process, as their language was too abstract, and did not serve as a good reference point on how to approach cooperation with other departments (Personal Interviews AA, BMZ and Bundeswehr Officials, 2014; 2015). Bureaucratic politics helps understand how, as politicians in parliament were reluctant to debate civil-military issues, the ministries were left to interpret the WOG concept according to their respective organizational interests. This resulted was a disjointed patchwork of policy documents of little practical use.

**Whole-of-Government Institutions and Inter-Ministerial Cooperation**

Formally, the institution in charge of coordinating inter-ministerial initiatives is the Chancellor’s Office. Within the Chancellery, the Federal Security Council (*Bundessicherheitsrat*) is a Cabinet committee responsible for domestic and foreign security. All relevant international actors, including the cabinet ministers of foreign affairs, defence, and development cooperation, participate as members. In theory, the Federal Security Council is not subject to parliamentary oversight, and can make decisions on its own authority. In practice, however, the role of the Council has weakened considerably in the past two decades. Currently, its role is restricted to matters of German arms exports and providing a discussion forum for foreign and defence policy issues (Johnston 2011, 75). As for the German Foreign Office, it formally represents the
entire German contingent in overseas missions, but lacks a proper coordination division within the ministry. Past attempts to establish a body with genuine executive authority in coordinating foreign and security policy failed to gain traction in the Bundestag. One example is the CDU’s proposal in 2008 for a National Security Council that would allow for joint analysis and strategy formulation in security policy. The initiative was quickly struck down in parliament, but it served to illustrate the disposition of the conservative party to implement WOG-informed institutional reforms (Noetzel 2010b, 500).

In the end, a permanent consultation forum at the State Secretary level was established for the Afghanistan engagement. The highest-level civil servants at the Bundeswehr, AA, BMZ, BMI, the Chancellery, and the Secret Service met once a month. Representatives from other ministries also participated on an ad hoc basis. Meeting agendas were set at the Chancellery, but each department was free to propose topics. The chairmanship rotated among the permanent meeting representatives (Personal Interviews Bundeswehr Official, 2014).

In the early days, the State Secretary forum was rather hands-on and operational. Participants discussed the security situation in Afghanistan, investments in specific projects, at times even implementation of individual projects on the ground. In time, the operational coordination shifted to the PRTs, while the meetings in Berlin took a more strategic turn, broadly touching on security developments, political trends, and future steps for Germany (Personal Interview BMZ and Bundeswehr Officials, 2014; 2015).

Typically, the meetings followed a pre-established format, starting with a security briefing. Participants then took turns reporting on new and pending issues within their

56 These are not the politically appointed secretaries of state in Parliament, but the civil servants who occupy the highest civilian administration post immediately below the Minister.
ministry. Possible points of overlap in activities across ministries were also debated.
Deployed staff did not participate via VTC from Afghanistan. Instead, division heads
transmitted the information to personnel on the ground via each ministry’s separate
information channels (Personal Interview Bundeswehr Official, 2014).

The State Secretary forum lacked executive authority, and any decision of more
than minor importance was reviewed within each ministry separately. One joint decision
of the forum was to develop a tracking and measuring system of project output on the
ground. Staff would enter information into a large database, which then allowed pulling
descriptive data: number of teachers trained, or kilometers of road built, in a specific time
period. This information then served to compile the biannual progress reports to the
Bundestag. The system provided only a general view on current and completed projects.
It did not permit evaluating project sustainability or measuring long-term development
impacts (Personal Interview BMZ Official, 2015).

Overall, the purpose of the State Secretary forum was to share information and
maintain the Afghanistan issue on the political agenda. Some evidence suggests that
participants deliberately overlooked debating the thorniest issues. For example, the
ministries chose to ignore their diverging definitions of the most acceptable level of
security to operate in the field, even though this was an issue that obstructed the work of
staff on the ground (Personal Interview Bundeswehr Official, 2015).  

57 The Bundeswehr upheld a narrow definition of security: functioning Afghan security forces, provision of
physical security, and clearing up an insurgent area. By contrast, the BMZ used a broader, human security
definition. Friction arose among the deployed personnel on account of these differences. Back in Berlin,
neither ministry clearly articulated what their position meant in practical terms. Despite being aware of the
tension on the ground, staff in Germany never conducted a proper analysis of the underlying causes of the
confusion (Personal Interview Bundeswehr Official, 2015).
The atmosphere during the State Secretary meetings was generally collegial and tension-free. Most interviewees considered the information exchange useful for their work in Berlin, but of little practical relevance to their colleagues in the field. A better understanding of the rules, regulations and limits of other ministries was the most frequently cited benefit of the meetings. Clearing up practical misunderstandings may have been useful, but it lead to less coherence, not more. The military grasped relatively quickly that “civilian reconstruction support” did not mean dipping into BMZ funding, and that development was not the military’s job (Personal Interviews BMZ and Bundeswehr Officials, 2014; 2015).

Other regular and ad hoc meetings occurred on the working level. Division heads and desk officers met weekly or bi-monthly to deal with tactical issues. Usually, the tactical meetings included a VTC with the personnel on the ground. Participants included the military commander and the civilian head of the PRT, members from the Embassy, AA, BMZ and BMI staff on the ground, plus the AA and BMI desk officers, and the Ministry of Defence in Berlin. Discussions mostly revolved around specific demands from Berlin that staff on the ground considered unreasonable. Decision-making on specific issues remained in the hands of each ministry separately.

To sum up, in the absence of political pressure to do more than just consultations, the inter-ministerial meetings in Berlin served mainly to clarify operational guidelines so as to avoid encroaching on the line of operation of other departments. As per the predictions of bureaucratic politics theory, the ministries protected their autonomy within their respective fields of expertise. However, BP logic also expects ongoing struggles for domination and tension across departments, which is not borne out by the evidence in
Germany. The Bundeswehr’s ability to adapt and respect the independent operations of BMZ is inconsistent with the strict military role conceptions of Keane and Wood’s BP-role model theory. Finally, the diverging perceptions of security across ministries do not fit well with strategic culture arguments of shared values and commonly accepted norms of action. To present a more complete picture of joint institutional structures, the next section discusses German fund pooling initiatives.

Integration of Financial Resources

Despite maintaining completely separate budgets and funding areas in Afghanistan, German ministries boast two notable instances of fund sharing: the Provincial Development Fund (PDF) and the Stabilization Fund. To illustrate the makings of this unexpected cooperation, this section starts with a brief outline of each ministry’s funding setup, and then moves on to an analysis of the Provincial Development Fund and the Stabilization Fund, respectively.

The German military lacked a budget for large-scale reconstruction activities. In theatre, PRT commanders managed a pocket fund of 30,000-40,000 Euros per rotation, to use for small QIPs in the vicinity of the military camp. Initially, the Bundeswehr expected to tap into the BMZ budget for support of counterinsurgency operations. While this possibility never materialized, the Bundeswehr was able to collaborate with AA after the establishment of the Stabilization Fund in 2010 (Noetzel 2010a).

The BMZ controlled the lion’s share of civilian funding, intended exclusively for long-term development initiatives. Programming for Afghanistan rested on five sectoral priorities: good governance, energy, drinking water supply and sanitation, sustainable economic development and basic education and vocational training (Federal Ministry for
Economic Cooperation and Development 2016). Decisions on how to spend these funds were not made unilaterally in Berlin, but in extensive annual negotiations with the Afghan authorities. Once approved, additional consultations were held every six months (German Institute for Development Evaluation 2014, 6). All this is to say that for the most part, the BMZ budget was highly inflexible, and hence unsuitable for financing QIPs or civilian support of COIN-type operations.

By contrast, AA had a limited mandate for spending ODA funding in crisis countries, mainly for projects in security-related issues, cross-cultural activities, the media, as well as elections and governance. Prior to 2010, AA staff only engaged in small-scale QIPs outside of the scope of the broad development cooperation agenda. The Stabilization Fund, discussed further on in this chapter, was a game-changer for the role of AA in Afghanistan, and in civil-military cooperation in general (Personal Interview AA Official, 2015).

Given this strict separation of ministerial budgets, the question is how the Provincial Development Fund (PDF) came about. Established in 2005, the PDF was a pooled funding initiative that financed small and medium development projects on the grassroots level, with the equal participation of AA, BMZ and the Bundeswehr. Its very existence defies the logic of bureaucratic politics, which cannot easily explain why deployed BMZ staff was allowed to participate in a joint endeavor, despite the general instructions of headquarters to maintain a clear line of separation with the military. Strategic culture explanations run counter to the widespread perception among German officials that pooled funding is not a viable alternative in Germany (Personal Interviews 58 Some examples of BMZ-funded projects were water supply plants, supporting entrepreneurs in setting up small and medium-sized companies, and large infrastructure (roads, bridges and schools).
BMZ and Bundeswehr Officials, 2014; 2015). In fact, after a special review of the matter, the Interministerial Steering Group concluded that fund pooling was incompatible with German government structures (Post 2015, 295). Furthermore, SC logic posits that change always comes from external factors. There is some evidence in support of this claim, since the PDF was established in response to requests of staff in the field to receive additional funding for joint community projects (Personal Interview Bundeswehr Official, 2014). However, as shown below, what finally gave life to the PDF was a political agreement on the domestic level.

In 2005, the SPD/Green coalition held a slim majority in the Bundestag (Auerswald and Saideman 2016, 143). Opposition parties tried to undermine the ruling coalition by exploiting the issue of missile defence development, which was on the agenda at the time. In April 2005, the Bundestag was to vote on Germany’s cooperation with the US and Italy on a battle management system for coordinating and integrating missile defense operations among NATO members. It was expected that the Bundestag would approve the motion without much deliberation (Boese 2005). However, in order to polarize the debate, the FDP introduced a resolution to ban US nuclear weapons from German soil (Meier 2008, 11). The Greens then headed the opposition of the missile defence program, and only agreed to support the initiative after extracting several concessions. One of these was that ten million Euros from the defence budget be rerouted to crisis management (Boese 2005). These funds, named the Nachtwi-Milienen after a former Green Party MP, gave start to the PDF (Post 2015, 296).

In sum, as the main coalition partners were struggling to achieve consensus on an unrelated issue, the ensuing political bargaining resulted in concessions that propelled the
German WOG model forward. This logic is consistent with Kingdon’s argument on policy streams and focusing events. Kingdon argues that a focusing event, such as a powerful symbol, can move an issue up the policy agenda. If the issue is effectively coupled with propitious political events, such as general elections and a realignment of ideological attachments in the government, the issue may result in policy change. Participants will bargain extensively and grant concessions to enlist the support of opponents (Kingdon 2002, 197–99). Similar dynamics are evident in Germany in 2005. Developing a missile defence program was a powerful symbol for the generally pacifist Green Party. As a main coalition partner at the time, the Greens were well-positioned to make demands for a trade-off. The PDF was thus born as a result of the concessions made to the Greens during negotiations of a side issue.

Germany’s second inter-ministerial financial cooperation mechanism was the Stabilization Fund, an additional budget of 180 million Euros for AA to use for stabilization initiatives in tandem with the Bundeswehr. In size, the Stabilization Fund came close to the BMZ budget, but its rationale and funding procedures differed considerably. The Fund’s objectives were clearly political: to demonstrate tangible benefits of the German presence in conflict-prone areas. To this aim, the Fund financed swift, selective and visible initiatives that did not require long-term planning, and responded to immediate local needs (German Institute for Development Evaluation 2014, 9). To AA, the Stabilization Fund provided a quicker and easier alternative to the cumbersome funding process of the BMZ (Personal Interview AA Official, 2015).

The Stabilization Fund was certainly not restricted to counterinsurgency operations alone. Since it aimed more broadly at stabilizing the area, the funds could and
were used outside of COIN scenarios. Nonetheless, from 2010 onwards AA had both the budget and the discretion to support the Bundeswehr in counterinsurgency initiatives. By 2011, cooperation between AA and the military was a regular occurrence (Personal Interview AA Official, 2014).

In Berlin, the establishment of the Stabilization Fund strained the relations between the BMZ and AA. The BMZ wished to have the lead on the new stabilization budget, as well as on development cooperation policy in Afghanistan overall. BMZ officials expressed several reservations regarding the Stabilization Fund, starting with the lack of experience of AA staff in implementing large-scale development programs. An additional problem from BMZ’s standpoint was that the stabilization initiatives were largely unsustainable, and did not foresee proper follow-up and evaluation of development impacts. Finally, a concern both AA and BMZ shared was that, if the two ministries were to work side by side, with similar budgets and in the same provinces in Northern Afghanistan, mission creep would be inevitable (Personal Interviews AA and BMZ Officials, 2014; 2015).

Policymakers had not foreseen these difficulties when setting up the Stabilization Fund, so ministerial staff was forced to work out a practical solution on the go (Personal Interview BMZ Official, 2015). Eventually, the BMZ and AA agreed to maintain a clear

59 The Stabilization Fund’s flagship program was the “Stabilization Program Northern Afghanistan” (SPNA), a large-scale infrastructure and capacity building initiative in 25 critical districts. SPNA projects ranged up to 150,000 Euros each. Typical examples of infrastructure projects were large bridges, schools, and roads. In addition, the SPNA offered training for District Development Assemblies (DDAs) on quality control, environmental impact of construction projects, community peacebuilding, gender mainstreaming, disaster prevention and institutional development (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit 2014).

60 Some examples of projects funded in recently cleared areas were small and medium-sized schools, hospitals, and roads. Stabilization funds could also be used for QIPs in the vicinity of the PRT, provided that CIMIC teams convincingly argued that the projects contributed to the overall stabilization of the area (Personal Interview AA Official, 2014). Further details on this topic are provided in the next chapter.
sectoral division of labour. AA would stay out of the five sectoral priorities of the BMZ, and would take over the health and higher education sectors: areas the BMZ traditionally avoided. Additionally, since the AA funded the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program, the BMZ agreed to stay out of reintegration programs altogether. Both ministries continued working side by side in the good governance sector, but AA developed programs within the districts, while the BMZ was engaged on the provincial level (Personal Interviews AA and BMZ Officials, 2015).

The question then becomes why Germany approved the Stabilization Fund in 2010, and not earlier. The most likely explanation is that the Fund was created when a propitious political climate within the Bundestag converged with external permissive conditions. In Kunduz province, the security situation had been deteriorating steadily for at least three years. Germany was thus faced with two options: to stay and fight or to pull out prematurely (Kaim 2008, 623).

Within the Bundestag, the “cut and run” option did not gain enough political support (Hett 2005, 15). In contrast to the 2002-2005 and 2005-2009 coalition governments, which constantly struggled to hammer out a consensus on Afghanistan, the conservative-liberal coalition shared a strategic vision of addressing the conflict by increasing both military and civilian means (Hynek and Marton 2011). Keeping the German troops in Afghanistan and doubling the civilian contribution was meant to serve as a stabilizing factor (Personal Interview Bundeswehr Official, 2014). Concerns over

61 Chancellor Merkel’s official statement justified the decision by referring to the famous German strategic culture values of multilateralism: a premature pullout would be unfair to allies, and would hurt Germany’s international reputation. This argument is difficult to accept, as Germany had already endured years of harsh criticism from NATO for not living up to its military engagements with ISAF, with no evident concern for its international reputation.
decreasing security on the ground, and the ongoing negotiations for the upcoming permanent NATO withdrawal, acted as permissive conditions to enable what Hilpert calls the explosion of the German stabilization narrative (2014, 106). Even so, thorny issues such as using civilian funds in counterinsurgency operations, and the possibility of the Stabilization Fund being confused with BMZ programming, were left out of the discussion agenda.

Proponents of strategic culture may disagree, arguing that external pressure, in the form of escalating violence in Afghanistan, was the main reason for setting up the Stabilization Fund. There is certainly evidence that the rising insurgent activity in Kunduz altered the strategic narrative, placing even greater urgency on stabilizing the province. This may explain why the Foreign Office received an additional budget for stabilization activities, but it says little about why the Bundeswehr remained in Afghanistan. A German strategic culture of restraint, based on a foundational value of pacifism, would dictate an immediate troop withdrawal when faced with the possibility of increased fighting. Furthermore, a strategic culture based on strict decentralization and division of labour does not explain why the AA and the military joined forces to cooperate in COIN scenarios.

A bureaucratic politics perspective is useful in understanding the attitudes of the ministries towards the Stabilization Fund. To AA, it was an opportunity to advance the organizational goals and increase the clout of the ministry. This logic also holds for the Bundeswehr. COIN was not officially part of the Bundeswehr organizational culture, but given that circumstances forced the German army to adapt to counterinsurgency
scenarios, the additional funds were welcome. The resentment of BMZ for not securing the lead over the stabilization budget is also consistent with BP logic.

Finally, bureaucratic politics illustrates how providing organizational inducements to only one ministry, in this case the German Foreign Office, may have long-term detrimental effects for relations with other civilian departments. The mainstream literature on civil-military cooperation largely overlooks issues of rivalry between civilian ministries, focusing disproportionately on tensions between Armed Forces and development workers. But evidence from Germany suggests that the activities of the Stabilization Fund caused a significant rift between AA and the BMZ, with lingering lack of trust that persisted long after the two ministries had worked out a practical solution to the problem of overlapping responsibilities (Personal Interviews BMZ Officials, 2015).

**Joint Pre-Deployment Training**

Each German ministry managed its own capacity-building institution, and developed a detailed training curriculum for staff embarking on overseas missions. Programs ran by different ministries varied in length and in material covered. The joint portion of these training opportunities was largely voluntary. Ministries welcomed, but did not require participation of staff from other ministries in their own training programs.

The Bundeswehr conducted extensive exercises in military matters. Civilian training was less detailed, especially in the early days of the German presence in Afghanistan. Mandatory, formal cross-ministerial briefings were usually reserved for staff in leadership positions and CIMIC soldiers. On average, these encounters accounted for 5 to 10 hours of time spent together before deployment. As for civilians, they rarely
took part in military exercises prior to 2011, according to interview data. For example, as late as 2010, the majority of BMZ staff preparing to deploy were not participating in joint exercises, apart from occasional meetings with their outbound counterparts from other departments (Personal Interviews BMZ Officials, 2015). Over time, joint training increased, although by 2014 the majority of respondents still found it insufficient (Personal Interviews AA, BMZ and Bundeswehr Officials, 2014; 2015).

Joint training opportunities offered by international organizations included general as well as specific topic courses on civil-military issues. Military staff officers posted to RCN trained at the NATO Joint Force Training Centre in Bydgoszcz, Poland. The German Ministry of Defense also operates a UN Training Centre attached to the infantry school in Hammelburg. The Centre offers pre-deployment courses for journalists, civilian employees of the Armed Forces, and national contractors. Personnel from AA and BMZ participated whenever their work schedules allowed, and usually contributed with briefings on the *modus operandi* of their ministry, and as role players during the practical exercises.

On the national level, the Civil-Military Cooperation Competence Centre in Nienburg is the Bundeswehr’s main joint training spot. CIMIC soldiers about to deploy to Afghanistan were required to participate in a one-week training course. Soldiers spend anywhere from a couple of hours to half a day in the company of civilians, mainly from the GIZ and German NGOs. Representatives from AA and the BMZ were regularly invited, but rarely participated as their busy agendas did not allow them to step out the office for a day or more (Personal Interview Bundeswehr Officials, 2014).
The AA operates the Centre for International Peace Operations (ZIF) in Berlin. It teaches courses on peace operations, short and long-term election observation, gender issues, and the comprehensive approach in multi-dimensional peace operations. ZIF also hosted a specialized joint preparation event for civilian and military leadership staff about to deploy to Afghanistan. Founded around 2003, this course was anywhere from one to two weeks long. Participants usually included the Ambassador, the SCR, CO and Deputy CO of the PRT, as well representatives from BMZ and the Ministry of Interior. Practical exercises, such as role-playing, were not included in this training before 2014 (Personal Interviews AA and BMZ Officials, 2015). The main goal was for staff in leadership positions to get to know one another, and to become acquainted with their respective roles in the mission area. Interview data suggests that not every ministry was able to send a representative to this training every year. Restricted staff availability made it difficult, sometimes impossible, to hold the event yearly. For those who attended, the main benefit was learning what they could and could not expect from colleagues at other departments. The briefings helped correct the military’s initial misunderstanding of the mission and funding procedures of the BMZ. Fostering personal relationships prior to deployment could iron out personality differences arising in the field. Some participants complained that the training exercise largely excluded lower-level staff, and was thus not useful for teambuilding purposes (Personal Interviews AA and BMZ Officials, 2015).

For both the military and civilians, especially those lacking previous deployment experience, the scarcity in joint pre-deployment training resulted in limited knowledge on civil-military issues. This problem was exacerbated by diverging rotational schedules, four to six months for the Bundeswehr versus one or two years for civilians, which
resulted in lack of knowledge transfer and became source of frustration for the BMZ (Personal Interviews BMZ Officials, 2015). From the viewpoint of the military, an ongoing problem was that civilians were rarely available to attend joint courses (Personal Interviews Bundeswehr Officials, 2014). Several members of the Armed Forces pointed out the Netherlands as an example of a training program worth emulating: civilians and the military trained together for three months before deployment, and participated in a wrap-up phase upon concluding their time in the field.  

In sum, joint training for those deploying to Afghanistan was available, but not firmly institutionalized across all ministries. Oversight in the form of mandatory courses was limited, and largely restricted to key persons in leadership positions. There were several non-mandatory training options, but no formal incentive or sanctions scheme to regulate attendance. Particularly in the case of the BMZ and AA, there were disincentives to participate in the non-mandatory courses, because staff often found it difficult to step away from work for days at a time. Interview data suggests that supervisors with previous experience in overseas missions were more likely to encourage and enable their subordinates to participate in non-mandatory joint sessions (Personal Interviews BMZ and Bundeswehr Officials, 2014; 2015).

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62 Members of the Armed Forces often gave the Netherlands as an example of an effective joint training program. Dutch civilians and the military trained together exclusively for three months before deployment, and participated in a wrap-up phase upon concluding their time in the field (Personal Interviews Bundeswehr Officials, 2014). The question remains whether the Dutch experience is applicable to other nations. The Dutch mission in Afghanistan was very small and specialized (rule of law, providing support to the police and police training), which made it easier to ensure that staff attended the joint training.  

63 The 2014 inter-ministerial lessons learned process tried to institutionalize joint training. A leadership training module was set up, whereby all future leaders would be required to attend training once a year. However, these developments had no practical effect on the Afghanistan mission, because the lessons learned process was not initiated until shortly before the Bundeswehr’s definitive withdrawal from Afghanistan (Personal Interview BMZ Official, 2015).
Networked Security in Berlin: Progress within Limits

The following table illustrates the level of WOG integration on German soil:

**Table 4: Inter-Agency Cooperation in Berlin, 2001-2014**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>WOG Policy Developments</th>
<th>Institutions and Inter-Ministerial Cooperation</th>
<th>Financial Pooling</th>
<th>Joint Training</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2001-2004</strong></td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Coexistence</td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2005-2009</strong></td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Coexistence</td>
<td>Communication → Coexistence</td>
<td>Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2010-2014</strong></td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Coexistence</td>
<td>Coordinated Action</td>
<td>Coexistence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Developments in the German whole-of-government model can be divided into three stages. During the initiation period, from 2001 until end of 2004, departments grappled with the implications of networked security: for their own organization, as well as for others. The strategic narrative, excessively focused on civilian activities, failed to properly account for the role of the military in a whole-of-government framework. Consequently, the parameters of German WOG were restricted to the low levels on the WOG scale. The official policy documents were vague, and reflected diverging understandings of the meaning of WOG. The ministries maintained strictly separate budgets and responsibilities. Mandatory joint training was restricted to briefings among the leadership staff. The State Secretary forum resulted in some joint decision-making on minor issues, and generated a degree of trust among the ministries. But the forum lacked authority to enforce joint program design or implementation of specific activities. Misunderstandings and false expectations flourished, particularly within the Bundeswehr,
where there was a perception that BMZ funds could be used in support of military objectives.

The second phase, 2005 to end of 2009, was a period of transition from communication to coexistence, but only in terms of integrated financial structures. The establishment of the Provincial Development Fund was Germany’s first milestone in financial pooling. The PDF was an example of partial joint programming and joint analysis, with all three ministries participating on equal footing.

During the third and final phase, 2010 to 2014, Germany made partial progress towards coordinated action. The newly established Stabilization Fund represented an active partnership between AA and the Bundeswehr, with joint design and implementation of specific activities and senior-level buy-in. By contrast, there were no significant developments along the other indicators of the WOG scale. The inter-agency guidelines for fragile states in 2012 attempted addressing networked security in more specific terms, but the policy lacked teeth and time to gain momentum. There were more opportunities for voluntary civil-military courses, but still no mandatory, formal joint training program. Since attendance was not obligatory, the amount of joint training deployed personnel received was not standardized. This was particularly true for staff at the civilian ministries.

Overall, progress in inter-agency integration was largely a product of coalition politics, the cohesiveness of the coalition regarding the Afghanistan engagement, and the concessions made in the Bundestag. Passing the ISAF mandate every year required accommodating the concerns of those parties that disagreed with specific aspects of the overall strategy in Afghanistan. Especially during the rule of the more divided Red-Green
and grand coalition governments, the political bargaining directly affected the German WOG model in at least three ways. First, in order to avoid further polarizing the issue and jeopardizing the annual ISAF contribution mandate, parties simply avoided an open debate on civil-military cooperation issues. This resulted in disjointed policies, no overarching body with coordination authority, and an unclear role for the military in civilian reconstruction efforts. Second, and perhaps more importantly, packaging the German engagement as a non-combative mission stunted WOG developments at the outset, because this kind of framing did not contemplate inter-agency cooperation in COIN scenarios.

Even in these unfavourable conditions, the German experience suggests that advancements in inter-agency coherence are possible, if political entrepreneurs exploit negotiations on side issues to extract concessions that move WOG forward. The events leading to the establishment of the Provincial Development Fund illustrate these dynamics. As shown in the next chapter, the idea for the PDF did not originate on the strategic level – staff on the ground had been asking for additional funds to carry out small and medium-scale projects. However, it was the political negotiations on Germany’s missile defence program that finally paved the way for the PDF.

In 2010, a more like-minded coalition in the Bundestag, combined with two permissive conditions – deteriorating security in Kunduz and NATO’s plans for permanent withdrawal from Afghanistan – resulted in further leaps in German fund pooling. In essence, the Stabilization Fund was a direct organizational inducement for the German Foreign Office to cooperate with the military. Since it was not preceded by an open debate on inter-agency integration issues, the Stabilization Fund created confusion
as to the responsibilities of AA and the BMZ. Resolving these issues on the go exacerbated the friction between the two civilian ministries. Eventually, tensions across all departments subsided as a result of a trial and error learning process. This is not to say that cooperation increased, but rather that departments learned how not to encroach on their respective areas of operation.

Finally, powerful individuals had some impact on the overall WOG model, although the scope of their personal authority was usually restricted to a particular ministry. What mattered most for WOG developments was the political orientation and personal experience of the BMZ minister in office. From 2001 to 2009, the BMZ head was an SPD leftist and WOG skeptic, which lead to clear line of separation between the functions of the BMZ and the Bundeswehr. After the elections of 2009, new BMZ minister Dirk Niebel was a liberal, and a former soldier. During his tenure, Niebel relaxed the caveats on the behaviour of BMZ staff in the field, but stopped short of making radical changes, such as enabling the BMZ to participate alongside the military in COIN operations.

Strategic culture theory elucidates why German ministries were set up to be so autonomous in the first place. SC also sheds light on why the decentralization of German government structures was upheld, in policy documents as well as in practice. A German culture based on curbing the centralization of executive authority explains why there was never sufficient enthusiasm in favour of an overarching coordination body with executive authority over all ministries, even during the most politically propitious times for WOG reforms.
Strategic culture is also useful when understood as an indirect force that shaped the approval of the Stabilization Fund. A shared perception of German soldiers as development workers in uniform, and a non-combative, reconstruction support role for the Bundeswehr, fit well with a plan to have the military conduct reconstruction projects alongside the AA. Put differently, in Germany the idea of a Stabilization Fund was not as controversial to approve as in Sweden, where a Nordic culture rooted in a strict separation between civilian and military means directly ruled out such types of joint efforts.

Where strategic culture falls short is in explaining the variation in German WOG developments. There is little evidence of a shared understanding of how ministries should cooperate. Contrary to SC logic, the PDF was not a product of external pressure, but of domestic forces, namely political concessions granted in parliament. External factors like the deteriorating security in Kunduz certainly paved the way for the Stabilization Fund. However, violence in Afghanistan had been rising since 2006, and the Bundeswehr was already conducting COIN operations by 2007. The question remains why the Stabilization Fund was established in 2010 and not sooner.

Bureaucratic politics cannot provide exhaustive explanations for Germany’s two fund pooling mechanisms, as these structures developed out of specific political agreements and not only as a result of converging ministerial interests. Moreover, the rigid role models assumption does not fit with the ability of the Bundeswehr to adapt in time, and learn to respect the working boundaries of their civilian colleagues. BP logic explains how providing direct organizational inducements for AA only exacerbated cross-departmental turf wars with the BMZ. Tension among civilian ministries deserves
more attention in the WOG literature, the larger portion of which is focused on the relationship between the military and development workers. However, Germany’s experience with the Stabilization Fund illustrates the potentially problematic nature of civil-civil cooperation. With this in mind, the following chapter delves into the dynamics of German networked security at the PRTs in Afghanistan.
German Whole-of-Government Action in Afghanistan

This chapter illustrates how the German networked security concept was applied in the mission area. The strategic imperative to frame the engagement as a reconstruction support mission directly affected the tactical setup of the German operation. German PRTs were placed under dual civil-military leadership, which reinforced a division of labour and restricted the scope of German WOG at the outset. Within these limits, individuals in the field were left to figure out how to work together on their own. Cooperation practices evolved on the basis of trial and error. Removed from direct supervision, deployed staff enjoyed large discretion within their limited areas, but only limited knowledge on the modus operandi of other departments. Over time, the ministries adapted to one another, but the process was uneven and grassroots, mostly without guidance from the capitol, and without specific oversight measures to enforce cross-government cooperation on the field level.

Personal preferences, especially those of the two PRT leaders, affected cooperation dynamics. However, the overall effect of personalities on the WOG model was moderate at best, for largely two reasons. First, the division of labour inherent in the German PRT setup did not permit senior officials to make executive decisions that affected the operations of other ministries. Second, much of what is generally attributed to personality traits was in fact rooted in strategic-level causes, such as inadequate personnel selection policies and performance evaluation procedures that effectively discouraged joint working.

Finally, Germany experimented with two different types of fund pooling. The Provincial Development Fund (PDF) was a smaller-scale community development
programme where all German ministries participated on equal footing. Despite a series of administrative and implementation hurdles, the PDF was largely considered successful. By contrast, the Stabilization Fund (SF) was a large-scale initiative where the German Foreign Office (AA) participated alongside the military in COIN operations. While the SF implied much more sophisticated joint planning and implementation of joint tasks, the venture completely excluded the BMZ, reinforced the division of labour between the BMZ and AA, and caused considerable tension between the two civilian ministries.

The chapter starts with an outline of the German PRT structure and a discussion of its implications for cross-government coherence. Next, I analyze the various types of joint meetings within the PRTs. The following section deals with fund sharing and joint project management, including ad hoc initiatives and large-scale fund pooling ventures. The chapter concludes with a summary of the main points.

The German PRT Model

In order to approve the first ISAF contribution mandate, the SPD/Green coalition agreed that the German presence was to maintain a civilian face, even though troops largely outnumbered the civilians on the ground (Personal Interview Bundeswehr Official, 2014). In practical terms, this meant a military-lead PRT was not viable. Similarly, the idea of subordinating a major military operation to purely civilian leadership failed to gain traction in government (Personal Interview Bundeswehr Official, 2014). To complicate matters further, the BMZ refused to cede control of the development agenda to the Federal Foreign Office (AA), and insisted on complete
operational and budgetary autonomy, with minimal contact between soldiers and development advisors in the field (Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 27–28).  

In the end, the matter was resolved by setting up a double-headed PRT structure under combined civil-military leadership. A Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) from AA and a military commander (CO) from the Bundeswehr shared the leadership functions. This arrangement continued until October 2012, when the PRT was formally transferred to the SCR. Far from intending to influence cooperation dynamics in the field, the switch to civilian leadership was merely symbolic: an indication to the locals that German troops were preparing for permanent withdrawal from Afghanistan (Personal Interviews BMZ and Bundeswehr Officials, 2014; 2015).

Within the PRTs, the SCR and CO maintained strictly separate realms of responsibility. The CO was in charge of all troops and military operations - civilian activities fell outside of his purview. Similarly, the SCR had no authority over the military. Less straightforward was the position of the SCR vis-à-vis civilian personnel. As the most senior-ranked civilian on staff, the SCR officially represented the entire German engagement, but had no practical authority over the staff, the agenda, or the daily business of other civilian ministries. The BMZ, the Ministry of Interior (BMI), GIZ and KfW all reported directly to their respective headquarters in Germany. In practice, the PRT was a four-pillar model, with independent chains of command for all departments.

64 On the issue of maintaining distance from the military, BMZ minister Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul took care to lead by example. In one episode from 2008, she visited Afghanistan but refused to travel from the airport to the PRT in a military vehicle. This posed significant logistical problems for staff on the ground, because the only ride available to the PRT was a military convoy (Personal Interview Bundeswehr Official, 2014).
The SCR and CO received their agendas separately from headquarters (Personal Interviews Bundeswehr Official, 2014). On matters that fell within their individual purviews, they made decisions independently and reported up separate chains of command. Issues concerning the PRT as a whole required negotiation and agreement between the two heads. Failure to agree meant the decision did not pass. Knowing one another, or at least having met their counterpart in advance, was the most important factor for achieving consensus between the PRT commanders (Personal Interviews Bundeswehr Officials, 2014).

A good CO-SCR personality match enabled cooperation initiatives, but always within the limited scope of action that the disjointed PRT model allowed. By contrast, if the two officials failed to see eye to eye, the tension between them reverberated throughout the entire PRT team (Personal Interviews Bundeswehr Officials, 2014). For instance, in 2008 the commanders of the PRT Kunduz scarcely communicated. They exchanged messages only via their deputies, and did not have regular one-on-one meetings. The acting SCR was perceived by the military as lacking empathy, inaccessible, and generally ill-chosen for the job. According to one Bundeswehr respondent, the senior civilian officer was simply biding his time, hoping to move on to another post as soon as possible without making any mistakes in Afghanistan. Even though AA had a mandate and a budget to share with the military, the Bundeswehr chose to circumvent the SCR, and approached local NGOs whenever they identified a possibility for a reconstruction project (Personal Interview Bundeswehr Official, 2014).

The first part of 2009 was a period of military dominance at the PRT Kunduz. A new and ambitious CO arrived, and assumed de facto command of the compound. He
controlled the meeting agenda, was more assertive in bringing up topics for discussion, and took initiative in decision making. During that time, it was not unusual to hold meetings without extending a courtesy invitation to the civilians (Personal Interview Bundeswehr Official, 2014).

Mid-2009 appears to have been period of good relations between the two commanders in Kunduz, followed by another fruitful stretch in 2011-2012, when the senior officials produced the first jointly signed six-month PRT plan (Personal Interviews AA, BMZ and Bundeswehr Officials, 2014; 2015). Another fallout followed towards late 2012, when the PRTs officially became civilian-lead. The CO struggled with the idea of ceding control to a civilian, and continued acting as if he held the leadership post. This type of behaviour significantly increased tensions during the final phase of the PRT.65 Another problematic issue was the discrepancy in the way AA and the Bundeswehr selected staff for the leadership posts. Military commanders were usually veterans with several deployments under their belt, while AA maintained a policy of hiring junior staff members in the position of Deputy SCR. Since it was the responsibility of the Deputy to fill in during the frequent absences of the SCR, it was not unusual for a junior-level officer to be placed on the same level as the CO, a full Colonel. The vast differences in professional experience between the two created an uneven power dynamic, and hampered the trust-building process (Personal Interview AA Official, 2015).

65 By way of an example, after the switch to civilian leadership, the military commander retained the same phone number. Unaware of the changes in PRT command, local representatives still used this number to contact who they thought was the PRT commander. Instead of referring the matters to the SCR, the CO continued to receive calls and to deal with local authorities and organizations as if he was still the PRT leader (Personal Interview Bundeswehr Official, 2014).
In sum, German PRTs were set up in a disjointed manner, as double-headed structures with independent chains of command for all ministries involved. Decision-making on daily operations was centralized around the two PRT heads, which meant that whenever their personalities were incompatible, departments tended to revert to bureaucratic practices. But even if the senior officials knew and liked one another, neither had discretion to direct the work of other departments, or to authorize joint ventures involving other ministries. The point here is that the positive effect of matching personalities on the overall WOG model was moderate at best. More than personality traits, staff selection procedures and inadequate performance evaluation schemes went a long way in determining the CO-SCR relationship and beyond. With this in mind, the next section examines the dynamics of daily cooperation within the PRTs.

Civil-Military Cooperation within the PRT

The two PRTs in Kunduz and Fayzabad, and the PAT in Takhar, had a similar daily work routine. The SCR and CO held private meetings to align priorities, agree on a common message to convey during the larger meetings, and exchange updates on crucial matters. Outside of the PRT, the commanders also attended meetings with local authorities, although not always together.  

If the meeting agenda was of relevance to only one side, the commanders attended separately.

Inside the PRTs, staff held regular joint meetings for representatives from AA, BMZ and the military. In 2003-2005, PRT staff held two meetings a day – a morning brief, and a commander’s update brief. An evening brief was added later on, with the two

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66 For instance, interview data shows that the two met weekly with the governors of Takhar and Kunduz provinces, at least since 2006 and until the closure of the PRT Kunduz.
commanders usually acting as co-chairs. The type and frequency of the meetings, as well as the participants, varied depending on the decisions of the two PRT heads. Until 2005, only key players at the PRT Kunduz attended: the two commanders, the BMZ representative, and the military heads of the most relevant branches (G2 for updates on the security situation, G9 for CIMIC activities). In time, the morning briefs became more inclusive: all military staff heads, the military Chief of Staff, the SCR deputy, the BMI representative, intercultural advisors, representatives of other nations and official visitors from Berlin were usually in attendance.

The briefs followed a clear military reporting structure. Military branch chiefs, followed by senior officers, took turns to report on events from the previous day, and plans for the next 24 hours. The army focused on security developments: intelligence reports, planned troop movements, and refugee flows. Soldiers also warned their civilian colleagues about impending threats that could hamper development activities. Civilians usually spoke last. They discussed ongoing development projects, future plans, and any new key players in the local area. Overall, soldiers dominated the scene in terms of numbers, topics discussed, and active contribution to the discussion.

The main goal of the morning and evening briefs was to exchange information and deconflict the meeting schedule with local authorities. Minor decisions were made on an ad hoc basis, such as the military monitoring a development project or reinforcing security in a specific area where reconstruction activities were taking place. Nonetheless, the BMZ usually insisted that the military stay away from project sites.

The morning and evening update briefs fell short of full-scale joint planning and joint strategy formulation. That said, interview data suggests that on the working level,
both civilian and military participants found the meetings beneficial. Military CIMIC teams, normally in charge of monitoring and liaising with the local population, found it helpful to count on a civilian perspective. In return, civilians were grateful to tap into the more extensive military information sources on security developments. BMZ representatives in particular appreciated the information, as it gave them a chance to warn partner NGOs to avoid a specific area if a military operation was about to take place. For several interviewees from AA and the BMZ, the morning briefs were the first opportunity to observe and understand the *modus operandi* of the military.

A larger joint PRT meeting was the commander’s update brief (COB), held daily in the 2003-2005 and weekly in later years. Overall, the frequency of the COB depended on the preferences of the PRT leaders during a particular rotation. In structure and purpose, the COB resembled the larger morning update briefs: de-conflict the meeting schedule, avoid duplication of efforts and exchange information. Participants included the two PRT heads, all military branch chiefs, BMZ representatives, and PRT staff from other nations. Each participant was allowed approximately two minutes to brief the commanders on their respective areas of responsibility. Soldiers primarily reported on the state of security in the surrounding areas, while civilians discussed short and longer-term development projects. Discussions of security issues were steered by the CO, those of reconstruction and political developments – by the SCR.

By 2009, the largest PRT joint meeting was the weekly hot washup, usually held each Friday. Participants discussed results from the past week and plans for the following week. COs tended to dominate this meeting in the initial years. Civilians usually participated as passive listeners in the background. Their time to speak was usually at the
end of the meeting, when participants were tired and had difficulty focusing. On some occasions, friction arose between the participants, resulting in the civilians’ refusal to join meetings for the upcoming days (Personal Interview Bundeswehr Official, 2014).

Towards the end of 2010, the dynamics had shifted, and an increasing degree of trust facilitated more effective information sharing. Civilians, particularly the BMZ, started contributing more actively to the discussion, briefing on their activities, exchanging views and asking questions of others (Personal Interview Bundeswehr Official, 2014).

In addition to the formal meeting agenda, the military head of CIMIC hosted ad hoc meetings on operational issues. Thus, from 2008 to 2011, the BMZ, AA and CIMIC staff met weekly in a smaller meeting format at the PRT Kunduz. Discussions revolved around support activities for the local administration. Civilians reported on specific practical issues that needed attention (for instance, a shortage of teachers in a specific area). Depending on the nature of the problem, participants delegated pending actions either to the military or to a civilian representative.

Some PRT meetings had a distinctly civilian character, and often did not include soldiers other than CIMIC staff. AA, BMZ, KfW and GIZ representatives met daily or weekly without the military present. In addition, a development board focusing on German-lead development initiatives was held once or twice a month, on the invitation of civilian and CIMIC staff. The main purpose of the development board was to avoid duplication of efforts among civilian actors from different nations, particularly Germany and the US. As the largest development actor in the region, USAID was heavily investing in programs in the vicinity of German PRTs. The development board this served to align
efforts and ensure that the Germans and Americans were not funding similar initiatives.\(^{67}\)

The development board meetings continued regularly until 2011.

From 2005 onwards, the PRT leaders in Kunduz started issuing a joint invitation to NGOs in the area to meet with PRT personnel every two weeks. Hosted by CIMIC staff, these meetings included international actors and civil society organizations operating in the area. US Forces, USAID, the US State Department, UNAMA, the Aga Khan Foundation, ACTED, and Kinderberg International were regular participants.\(^{68}\) CIMIC staff briefed attendants on security developments, demining activities, and key leaders in the area. Civilians offered unofficial information gleaned from locals on security developments. Both sides provided updates on the status of various ongoing development projects. Each brought to the table pressing issues that they could not resolve on their own, soliciting assistance from the others. No joint decision making took place during these meetings.

Based on the formal meeting agenda, participants reported to their respective superiors in Berlin via separate channels. Every ministry’s headquarters oversaw the work of their deployed personnel via regular VTCs or phone conferences. However, there was no direct VTC connection with Germany during the joint meetings (Personal Interviews AA, BMZ and Bundeswehr Officials, 2014; 2015). All this suggests a lack of

\(^{67}\) For example, on one occasion in 2010 USAID presented a project to support Kunduz University. AA staff at the PRT Kunduz then explained that the German government was already financing precisely such a project. USAID thus decided to direct its funds elsewhere.

\(^{68}\) Because these meetings were usually held within the PRT compound, many NGOs refused to participate for fear of compromising their neutrality. Eventually, meeting venues started rotating between the PRT and outside venues. In addition, INGOs also regularly hosted their own meetings on specific topics. These meetings were held on neutral ground, outside of the military compound. PRT staff was usually invited.
senior-level interest in implementing specific oversight measures to enforce joint working at the PRT level.

Joint reporting, as a form of direct oversight, suffered similar inadequacies. Staff on the ground was required to provide information for the weekly and annual progress reports to the Bundestag. Instead of jointly discussing and evaluating the report content, representatives sent information via their separate ministerial channels. More importantly, the reports did not always accurately reflect reality, as it was not unusual to overemphasize the success stories over the failures (Personal Interview Bundeswehr Official, 2014).69

In addition to the regular PRT meetings, the majority of civilian and military respondents gave significant importance to informal exchanges. For deployed staff, there was no going home after work. Living and working together, in a constrained space and in adverse conditions, stimulated informal exchanges. For civilians, it was a chance to raise issues of more direct relevance to their work: a possibility they did not always get during the formal, military-dominated meetings. In an informal environment, civilians more readily offered their interpretation on specific situations on the ground, shared perspective on the trustworthiness of local actors, and generally voiced any concerns that did not make it onto the formal meeting agenda. Through informal exchanges, both civilians and the military gained experience on the modus operandi of other ministries, and corrected any remaining prejudices on their own end.70 In the long term, informal exchanges

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69 Reporting on joint project financing was particularly problematic, as discussed in detail in the next section.
70 In one illustrative example, a Bundeswehr official reported an informal chat with a BMZ representative, at the end of which the latter admitted that spending time at the PRT made her realize that “soldiers are people, too” (Personal Interview Bundeswehr Official, 2014).
cooperation contributed to trust-building, and a grassroots process of accommodation to
the working process and limitations of other departments.

Many respondents argued that the meeting dynamics depended heavily on the
individuals involved, especially if they had previous experience in peace operations or
working across government (Personal Interviews BMZ and Bundeswehr Officials, 2014;
2015). Often, knowing the lay of the land stimulated a tendency to choose cooperative
strategies. One example is the BMZ representative who took over at the PRT Kunduz in
2009. A seasoned veteran with previous deployments to Regional Command-North, he
was familiar with military procedures and thus willingly collaborated with soldiers.

This is not to say that previous experience in the mission area always facilitated
cooperation. Sometimes, it distorted an individual’s ability to effectively prioritize tasks.

Some COs returning to Afghanistan for a second or third deployment were eager to pick
up where they left off, not recognizing that the objectives of their civilian colleagues had
changed in the meantime (Personal Interviews BMZ and Bundeswehr Officials, 2014;
2015).

Prior to 2009, the intensity of inter-ministerial exchanges at German PRTs was at
the lowest level. A formal inter-agency meeting structure was in place, but it was heavily
dominated by the military. A major source of frustration for soldiers and civilians alike
was lacking enough knowledge about the operation of their counterparts from other
departments. The Bundeswehr received no specific guidance on the roles and limitations
of civilian staff, or on civil-military cooperation in general. Similarly, short of being
instructed to keep a distance from the military, development advisers had little
information on the working rationale or goals of their Bundeswehr colleagues.
When it came to choosing collaborative strategies, the incentive structure within the Bundeswehr affected the decisions of military commanders. Often, a posting to Afghanistan was a step towards further promotion within the military ranks. Officers were pressed to show quick results during their short six month rotations. Consequently, many COs chose to focus on purely military outcomes to the detriment of collaborative solutions (Personal Interview Bundeswehr Official, 2014). It was not unusual for COs to avoid consulting the civilian team altogether, and simply inform them of an operation post-factum (Personal Interviews BMZ and Bundeswehr Officials, 2014; 2015).

Depending on the decision of the CO in charge, civilians were occasionally invited to contribute to operational planning, although this was not a regular occurrence. From the point of view of the military, the SCR often failed to advise the Bundeswehr how soldiers could contribute to longer-term development efforts in the provinces where the civilian ministries were operating (Personal Interview Bundeswehr Official, 2014).

Until late 2009, BMZ representatives refused to live or use their offices at the PRT. Development advisors carefully handpicked the occasions on which to visit the compound, usually only in cases of emergency. Consequently, the BMZ was naturally left out of the information-sharing process. From 2010 onwards, the BMZ became more proactive in collaborating with the military. New BMZ Minister Dirk Niebel’s official instructions for deployed staff were to use their offices at the PRTs, and to visit and exchange information with their colleagues at least once a day. There was no formal obligation to live at the PRT, but staff was expected to maximize interaction with the military (Personal Interviews AA and BMZ Officials, 2015). Overall, BMZ

71 BMZ staff lived and worked in the so-called “German house” (Deutsches Haus) in downtown Kunduz, where security details from the military were not allowed (Maaß 2007, 83).
representatives registered more presence at the PRTs, participated regularly in formal meetings, and were generally more willing to share information with the military (Personal Interviews Bundeswehr Officials, 2014). Nonetheless, the precise meaning of “maximizing interactions” was left to individual interpretation. Some BMZ representatives eventually moved into the PRT, while others used the offices but preferred to live outside of the compound. Some BMZ and AA officials continued to keep away from the military, while others more readily agreed to travel in military convoys.

Occasionally, the BMZ also started accepting the company of CIMIC soldiers when travelling outside of the PRT. Riding at the back of the civilian convoy, soldiers accompanied BMZ staff during the supervisory visits to project sites. As one BMZ representative noted, this was a useful way of illustrating first-hand to the military how the BMZ worked on the ground (Personal Interview BMZ Official, 2015). From the point of view of one Bundeswehr respondent, when civilians needed help to get things done quickly, many did not shy away from asking the military for help. Some spontaneous, minor cooperation initiatives were deliberately not reported up the chain of command, for fear of displeasing headquarters (Personal Interview Bundeswehr Official, 2014). These dynamics are consistent with principal-agency logic, which predicts agency slack when direct supervision is impossible.

In time, soldiers and civilians adapted to one another. Interview data revealed multiple examples of the military deferring to civilian expertise, and vice versa. From

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72 For instance, BMZ staff at the PAT in Takhar were still living outside of the PRT in early 2012, but they visited each evening to touch base with the rest, and attended regular PRT meetings at least once a week (Personal interview with BMVg/BMZ official, 2014).
2010 onwards, cross-departmental tensions subsided, and the overall degree of trust improved. These dynamics run counter to bureaucratic politics logic, which suggests consistently rigid role models, on behalf of the BMZ and especially the military. Despite these positive developments, the intensity of civil-military interactions remained irregular. For example, the PRT Kunduz enjoyed a “golden era of cooperation” between September 2010 and August 2011. Civilians and the military consulted one another regularly, exchanged thoughts and ideas on projects, and enjoyed full buy-in from the two commanding officers (Personal Interviews AA and BMZ Officials, 2015). However, this honeymoon period lasted only until the next staff rotation. These highly uneven patterns suggest a process of grassroots adaptation and trial and error learning, rather than a culture of cooperation, or a shared basic understanding of joint working.

In sum, there was a variety of joint PRT meetings, in different attendance configurations, but with largely similar outcomes: information sharing with the purposes of staying out of each other’s way. Oversight measures from Berlin to enforce a genuinely cooperative cross-government process were lacking. Inadequate promotion policies within the Bundeswehr often created direct disincentives to employ cooperative strategies. After the 2009 election, the new BMZ leadership relaxed the caveats on the interactions of deployed staff with the military, but fell short of implementing mandatory guidelines for joint working. Development advisers still enjoyed ample discretion to decide in what circumstances to seek the military’s assistance.

Lax oversight resulted in agency slack: deployed staff was able to get away with not reporting some joint venture failures, or spontaneous cooperation initiatives that were likely to generate disapproval at headquarters. But in order to remain undetected, this
shirking from the rules had to remain modest, and thus had a negligible impact on the overall WOG model. Staff in Afghanistan had no authority to single-handedly approve any kind of formal joint cooperation structures or large-scale joint ventures. Such decisions depended on a strategic consensus in Berlin, as Germany’s experience with fund pooling illustrates. The next section deals with fund-sharing initiatives on the tactical level.

**Fund Pooling and Joint Project Management**

On the ground, German ministries shared funding both in an organized and *ad hoc* fashion. *Ad hoc* activities were usually small-scale, irregular, and did not involve the participation of all three ministries. Germany’s two large-scale joint funding ventures were the Provincial Development Fund (PDF) and the Stabilization Fund (SF). Both involved joint decision-making and implementation of specific activities, and active partnership over a sustained period of time, although the latter excluded the participation of the BMZ. The first part of this section explores small-scale financial cooperation between BMZ and the Bundeswehr, and AA and the Bundeswehr, respectively. The main point here is that, unlike Sweden, Germany allowed limited cross-financing between the BMZ and the military. The last section analyzes the two larger pooling initiatives, the PDF and the SF.

**CIMIC is not Santa Claus: the Bundeswehr and the BMZ**

The Bundeswehr did not have a budget for large-scale civilian reconstruction activities in the field. COs had access to a pocket fund for quick impact projects, which started at 10,000 Euros in the early years and was eventually fixed at 30,000 to 40,000
The commander’s pocket fund was reserved for military use only. It was not used to co-finance projects with civilian ministries.
not necessarily the main obstacle at German PRTs. More problematic was the strategic framing of the networked security concept, which created within the Bundeswehr an unrealistic expectation to tap into BMZ’s large-scale development cooperation budget. This caused frustration on both sides and thwarted smaller-scale cooperation initiatives that would otherwise have seen the light of day (Personal Interviews BMZ and Bundeswehr Officials, 2014; 2015).

Another tactical-level effect of the networked security rhetoric was that the Bundeswehr came under enormous pressure to engage in QIPs. Each military contingent was evaluated by the amount of funds it invested in civilian reconstruction activities, without regard of the sustainability of the projects. More importantly, some projects were deliberately presented as joint ventures, when in fact they were implemented by a single ministry. One interviewee described a school construction project, where the BMZ financed the total cost of 500,000 Euro, while the Bundeswehr merely supervised the engineers at work. Later, official reports announced that the German Armed Forces had participated in a 500,000 Euro project, misleadingly implying the Bundeswehr co-funded the school construction in tandem with the BMZ. This type of distorted reporting occurred consistently throughout the operation of the PRTs (Personal Interview Bundeswehr Official, 2014).

Another recurrent issue that strained relations, particularly in the early years, was lack of knowledge on the goals, objectives and working procedures of other ministries. BMZ representatives did not understand how and why the Bundeswehr selected QIPs. In

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74 One CIMIC soldier noted that in the early years, the pressure to work on QIPs was so strong that he did not have time for the real CIMIC job, which was liaison and monitoring of local villages (Personal Interview Bundeswehr Official, 2014).
a similar vein, the Bundeswehr knew little of the funding rationale and procedures of the BMZ. Inefficient knowledge transfer between frequent military rotations exacerbated this problem. Soldiers kept requesting funding that fell outside of BMZ’s priorities, much to the consternation of their civilian colleagues who felt forced to repeatedly clarify their ministry’s funding philosophy (Personal Interview BMZ Official, 2015). The process was equally frustrating for the Bundeswehr: the military struggled to accept the project selection criteria and the cumbersome approval procedures of the BMZ (Personal Interviews Bundeswehr Officials, 2014). Learning each other’s ways through trial and error strained the working environment and obstructed trust building (Personal Interviews BMZ and Bundeswehr officials, 2014; 2015). Over time, both sides understood the procedures, operations and limitations of their counterparts, and modified their expectations accordingly. As a result, cross-government frictions subsided significantly (Personal Interviews BMZ and Bundeswehr Officials, 2014; 2015).

As early as 2005, BMZ was occasionally financing military QIPs in the vicinity of the PRTs in Kunduz and Fayzabad. This form of cooperation arose spontaneously on the ground, on the initiative of military CIMIC teams (Personal Interview Bundeswehr Official, 2014). During their routine liaison and monitoring trips to local villages, CIMIC soldiers identified possibilities for small-scale projects and applied to the BMZ for funding. The BMZ disposed of approximately 10 million Euros of flexible funding for development-oriented emergency aid, which could be used in such cases (Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 29). Funding applications were restricted to 5,000 USD per project. The final decision remained exclusively in the hands of the BMZ, and depended on whether the
proposal fit with the funding priorities of the development ministry. If a project appeared to serve more of a military than a development purpose, the proposal was rejected. Even though the BMZ steered clear of counterinsurgency initiatives, on the ground the cooperation with the military was pragmatic. As one soldier put it, if someone wished to get the job done, anything was possible (Personal Interview Bundeswehr Official, 2014).

Despite the limited discretion in their respective areas of operation, the two ministries found opportunities for small-scale joint action. Spontaneous collaborative efforts were not uncommon, although their nature and extent depended on whether those in charge considered it appropriate. Generally, the BMZ refused military protection of project sites, but soldiers sometimes supervised civilian-funded projects, especially if the development advisors were unable to access the area for security reasons. BMZ staff returned the favour by monitoring military QIPs in regions too far for the military to reach. 75 The Bundeswehr provided civilians with assets, such as heavy machinery and engineering expertise, and consulted with the BMZ on specific topics. Military reservists advised BMZ staff on technical issues, such as water purification or well-drilling techniques. If insurgency activity was obstructing development efforts in a specific area, BMZ representatives asked the military for assistance. Most of these initiatives were motivated by a desire to resolve practical problems on the ground. Often, informal relationships fostered in the off hours of the day triggered acts to assist colleagues with specific daily tasks (Personal Interviews BMZ and Bundeswehr Officials, 2014; 2015).

75 The Bundeswehr required that every soldier stay within one hour reach of the military base, so that in case of emergency they could be extracted with helicopters. Civilians were not bound by the one-hour rule, and were thus free to travel to more remote areas.
In sum, there is little evidence of a culture of cooperation between the BMZ and the Bundeswehr. Instead, the findings point to a process of bottom-up learning and accommodation to one another, mired with cross-departmental squabbling in the initial stages. Yet contrary to bureaucratic politics logic, soldiers managed to adapt and accept BMZ procedures, and to defer to civilian expertise.

The more important result of this trial and error learning process was that knowledge filtered back up the chain of command, and caused in a major reconceptualization of the role of the Bundeswehr in civilian activities. By 2014, the rhetoric within the Armed Forces had definitively shifted away from reconstruction and towards creating a civilian picture through liaison and monitoring. Virtually all respondents from the Bundeswehr stressed that the real job of a CIMIC officer in the field was monitoring villages and maintaining relationships with the local population - not development, reconstruction, or relief work (Personal Interviews Bundeswehr Officials, 2014). To emphasize this point, experienced soldiers joked that “CIMIC is not Santa Claus,” and used this phrasing as a motto in civil-military training courses.

Civilian Means for Political Ends: the Bundeswehr and AA

In Afghanistan, the German Federal Foreign Office focused on quick and visible projects aimed at achieving political goals. Generally, these were stopgap measures that did not require baseline studies or evaluations of long-term impacts. The rationale was providing quick relief alternatives to the cumbersome and time consuming process of the

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76 In one telling example, a Bundeswehr respondent compared German civilian activities with Swedish practices, arguing that the Germans eventually reoriented towards liaison and monitoring, while Swedish CIMIC teams remained overly focuses on military QIPs (Personal Interview Bundeswehr Official, 2014).
BMZ (Personal Interview AA Officials, 2015). AA projects were not included in the general development cooperation framework that was negotiated yearly with Afghan authorities. Officials from the Foreign Office participated in the official German delegation, but instead of negotiating, AA merely briefed local authorities on the projects the ministry had decided to implement (Personal Interview BMZ Official, 2015). All this is to say that, due to its flexibility, AA funding was well-suited to use in joint ventures with the military.

On the ground, AA enjoyed more discretion to work with the military than the BMZ. At the same time, the Foreign Office did not post enough staff at the PRTs to carry out or supervise even small-scale QIPs. Hence, motivated by practical considerations, SCRs established a cooperation model with the Bundeswehr’s CIMIC branch, whereby CIMIC teams acted as the implementing arm of AA projects. After considering the recommendations of local elders, AA negotiated with CIMIC and selected a project of common interest. The Foreign Office provided the funding in its entirety, and transferred it directly to the military. CIMIC teams then took charge of implementation, supervision, inspection of the final outcome, and reporting back to AA (Personal Interviews AA and Bundeswehr Officials, 2014; 2015).

Generally, these procedures mirrored the small-scale cooperation practices between the military and the BMZ, although the projects AA financed for the Bundeswehr were usually larger. Whenever the CO budget proved insufficient, or the proposal exceeded the BMZ funding limit of USD 5,000, the military would turn to the Foreign Office. AA staff inspected the project site, and approved the funding if it was considered within the priorities of the ministry. Typical examples of such initiatives were
the construction of a USD 130,000 school in the vicinity of Mazar-e-Sharif, building the Balkh Provincial Hospital, and a USD 10,000 reconstruction of a bridge in Kunduz.

From 2010 onwards, AA staff traveled in military convoys a lot more often (Personal Interviews AA and Bundeswehr officials, 2014; 2015). Collaborating with CIMIC teams was an important learning experience for Foreign Office personnel, who generally lacked expertise in development activities. Interview data suggests that, on occasion, CIMIC soldiers showed more cultural awareness and a better grasp of project sustainability, and sometimes counselled their counterparts from the Foreign Office in these matters (Personal Interview Bundeswehr Official, 2015).

**First Steps in Fund Pooling: The Provincial Development Fund**

The Provincial Development Fund (PDF), Germany’s flagship pooled funding initiative, was in operation by 2006. The AA, BMZ and the Ministry of Defence each contributed one million Euros to the fund, amounting to approximately 30% of the total annual budget. The BMZ covered structural costs, and made a one-time contribution of 3.5 million Euros as seed money during the first year.

Operating on both provincial and district level, the PDF aimed to reach remote rural areas that had so far remained at the margin of larger development initiatives. Projects were community-oriented, and included small-scale infrastructure (schools, bridges and roads), and community development support, such as beekeeping projects. Initiatives that required large-scale funding were not eligible, and would be financed by the BMZ or AA independently, based on the sectoral division of funding priorities.

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77 The Ministry of Interior (BMI) did not participate with a fund contribution.
Formally, the AA assumed leadership of the PDF, in line with Germany’s strategic narrative of a mission with a civilian face. In reality, the Foreign Office did not post enough staff to Afghanistan to be able to actively lead operations. More importantly, AA representatives did not marshal the authority to command staff from other ministries. As a result, the leadership and management of the PDF was a collaborative effort. Since the GIZ disposed of a large number of experts in the field, it was tasked with project implementation. The Bundeswehr took charge of promoting the PDF and identifying possibilities for projects. CIMIC soldiers were already conducting regular liaison and monitoring visits to local villages, so the military was eager to take on this task. From the point of view of the BMZ, the PDF was an outlet for the military’s long-standing desire to have a larger part in development initiatives (Personal Interview BMZ Official, 2014).

Two selection committees were set up to review funding proposals: the Provincial Development Council (PDC), and the District Development Council (DDC). The committees were composed of equal numbers of Germans and Afghans: one from each German ministry (AA, BMZ, GIZ and the Bundeswehr), and one Afghan representative from the Office of the Governor, the Provincial Council, the Department of Women’s Affairs, and the Department of Rural Development, respectively.\(^78\)

In addition to possibilities identified by CIMIC teams, local communities could submit funding proposals independently, via their district governor. The application guidelines required Afghans to commit to financing at least 10% of the project cost on their own. In tandem with the district development assembly, the district governor

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\(^78\) At times, the head of police or the highest-ranking military official also sat on the selection committee.
prioritized the applications and handed over pre-selected projects, usually at least thirty, to the GIZ.

Every four to six months, the PDF selection committees gathered to review project proposals. First, the German ministry representatives met separately in order to align priorities and negotiate common funding criteria. Next, selection committees adjudicated points to each application, depending on the previously agreed benchmarks. Community initiatives, such as small-scale infrastructure and income-generation proposals, were most eligible. The more people a proposal reached, the more likely it was to receive funding, especially if the beneficiaries were considered vulnerable populations, such as women, children, and ethnic minorities. Additional points were granted if the community could afford to independently finance more than the required 10% minimum. Next, the selection committees used open majority voting, taking into account the total number of points received. An overwhelming “yes” was required for a project to see the light of day. Proposals with seven or more votes in favour (that is, when more than half of the committee members approved) received funding automatically. Applications with less than five votes were rejected. Funding rewards were usually in the range of 8 to 10 million Euros (Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 29). Although the final authorization formally came from Berlin, staff in Afghanistan enjoyed complete autonomy in pre-selecting PDF initiatives.

Efficient prioritization and timely processing of applications were major challenges for the PDF, particularly in the early days. Afghan representatives were under heavy pressure from their constituents to vote for projects that came from their own communities. Thus, instead of prioritizing, Afghan committee members voted for every
proposal on the table. To complicate things further, district governors had no limit on the number of proposals per district that they could submit. Consequently, the number of applications increased exponentially. In 2009, headquarters in Berlin temporarily ceased all fund transfers so that staff on the ground could catch up on pending applications. As the PDF board reviewed old proposals (some submitted up to two years prior), it was necessary to weed out those that were no longer relevant. Afghans, on the other hand, were disappointed for not being able to submit new proposals.

In an effort to increase efficiency, in 2011 the German ministries agreed to introduce several modifications in the funding process. First, each district was allowed to submit up to four funding proposals maximum. The district governor was tasked with sifting through all applications, and submitting only those of the highest priority. It was also the governor’s responsibility to communicate with the unsuccessful applicants, and to assist them in submitting a better proposal next time.

Second, instead of equally distributing the votes among German and Afghans on the selection committees, the voting balance was shifted in favour of the Afghans. The German representatives gave up their independent ministerial votes, and consolidated the German position behind one single vote, cast by the representative of the BMZ. Because of the ministry’s expertise in long-term development, the German committee members agreed that the BMZ was best suited to represent the German position. Afghan committee members preserved their four votes, one per each departmental representative. This new system increased the efficiency of the voting procedures. It forced Afghans to prioritize

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79 Afghan committee members used this tactic to justify themselves in front of their constituents. If a proposal was rejected, they could claim they had supported it, but the final decision depended on the German committee members (Personal Interview BMZ Official, 2015).
voting, to negotiate actively with one another, and to justify their final decisions carefully, without losing the trust of their constituents (Personal Interview BMZ Official, 2015).

Overall, the voting process was dynamic and satisfying for all parties (Personal Interviews BMZ and Bundeswehr Officials, 2015). At first, the Bundeswehr was slightly disappointed, but quickly accepted that not every possibility CIMIC teams identified would receive funding. More problematic was motivating soldiers to participate in initiatives that they could not bring to completion. On average, the period needed to finalize a PDF project was longer than the four to six months a soldier usually spent in Afghanistan (Personal Interview Bundeswehr Official, 2015). All this suggests that the Bundeswehr’s performance evaluation practices rewarded quick, military outcomes over participation in longer-term joint ventures. While not necessarily the root cause, short military field rotations certainly made matters worse.

On the implementation side, PDF projects faced numerous challenges. Deteriorating security hampered progress in certain areas. Some of the initiatives were of questionable long-term sustainability (Personal Interviews AA and Bundeswehr Officials, 2014; 2015). Nonetheless, the majority of interviewees qualified the PDF as a flagship initiative and a hands-on example of German networked security on the ground. Runge suggests that the PDF was hijacked by the military to finance mostly hearts and minds projects for the German Ministry of Defence (2009, 15). Evidence from this study reveals a more nuanced picture. Bureaucratic politics logic certainly explains the enthusiasm of the Bundeswehr to get involved with the PDF. But the Bundeswehr was hardly in a position to dominate the project selection process. It is thus not likely that the
majority of approved projects served military ends, particularly after the Bundeswehr renounced its vote in favour of the BMZ. The Bundeswehr’s adaptation to a collaborative decision-making process is not consistent with bureaucratic arguments or rigid military role conceptions. More generally, the willingness of German representatives to forfeit individual voting powers and grant the BMZ exclusive representation authority on the PDF committees defies the logic of bureaucratic politics.

Strategic culture logic is more helpful in explaining the adjustments in the PDF voting procedures. The civilian and military representatives on the selection committees shared a belief in fostering local ownership through equal participation of the Afghan partners (Personal Interview BMZ Official, 2016). That is why PDF voting committees were set up in an egalitarian matter at the outset. The more experience Germans gained in managing the PDF, they corrected for some unexpected negative effects, which eventually lead to consolidating the German vote entirely in the hands of the BMZ. The main point here is that, while it is difficult to speak of an overarching culture of cooperation, German ministries nonetheless shared some foundational values that allowed for fine tuning the PDF voting procedures.

The Stabilization Fund

Partial progress towards a more integrated WOG occurred with the establishment of the Stabilization Fund (SF), which propelled more coordinated joint planning for COIN-type interventions between AA and the military. Set up in 2010 for the Federal Foreign Office, the SF did not exclusively finance COIN initiatives, but it provided a
source of large-scale civilian funding that could be used in tandem with the military, including in counterinsurgency scenarios.  

In the course of 2010 and early 2011, the Bundeswehr and AA actively collaborated in clearing unstable areas and immediately providing large injections of civilian funding as a stabilization measure. The AA worked alongside CIMIC staff, as well as combat battalion units. Shortly before conducting a clearing operation, the Bundeswehr alerted AA staff and transferred them to safe pockets, usually in armed protection units. As soon as the Bundeswehr finished clearing the area of insurgents, AA representatives met with local elders and offered to initiate reconstruction activities. Typical projects were repairing stretches of road, building schools or drilling wells: anything fast and visible that did not require cumbersome implementation procedures. Project implementation and supervision was in the hands of the Bundeswehr, and often the US Armed Forces (Personal Interview AA Official, 2015). BMZ staff refused to participate directly, and took great care to distance themselves from these ventures. BMZ representatives were often present on the sidelines, but only to clear misunderstandings about their funding procedures, and to emphasize to the local authorities that BMZ funds could not be used for quick impact projects.

Overall, AA and Bundeswehr representatives qualified their joint ventures as productive. Once again, the limited time span of military rotations was demotivating to soldiers and a source of frustration for civilians. Even shorter-term stabilization projects generally required at least a year to complete. With CIMIC staff rotating every six

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80 The fund’s largest program, Stabilization Program Northern Afghanistan (SPNA), is managed by KfW and implemented by the Aga Khan Foundation, ACTED, and Mercy Corps.

81 Combat battalion units conducted military QIPs, but in highly unstable areas (Personal Interview Bundeswehr Official, 2014).
months, most soldiers only participated in parts of different ongoing initiatives, with little opportunity to see one’s own project to completion. Others, particularly those with previous deployment experience in Afghanistan, often felt they knew the area better than their predecessors, which disrupted the continuity of ongoing projects (Personal Interview AA Official, 2015).

More controversial were the effects of the Stabilization Fund on relations between the AA and the BMZ. From the point of view of the BMZ, the fund contributed to blurring the lines between stabilization and long-term development programs. From the viewpoint of the BMZ, any of AA’s large-scale ventures (for instance, rebuilding the civilian Airport in Mazar-e-Sharif, or reforestation efforts in Takhar) could be considered long-term development initiatives (Personal Interview BMZ Official, 2015). In the end, the issue was resolved by agreeing on a strict separation of responsibilities, whereby the ministries worked in different sectors and on different administrative levels (provincial for the BMZ, district for AA). This division of labour agreement was worked out hastily, after the Stabilization Fund was already in place. Staff on the ground received instructions on their own area of responsibility, but no specific guidelines on what other ministries were doing (Personal Interview BMZ Official, 2015).

As a result, some functional overlaps and duplication of effort remained in the early years. This caused bureaucratic squabbles, and the level of trust between AA and BMZ representatives was low. Each ministry blamed the other for carrying out projects without previously consulting with their counterparts in other departments if a similar initiative was already under way (Personal Interviews AA and BMZ Officials, 2015).
While these tensions subsided in time, the SF brought about a rough adjustment period for AA and the BMZ.

Three main points follow from the above. First, the PDF was a truly cooperative venture, with all ministries participating on equal footing. Here, bureaucratic turf wars did not significantly obstruct the work process. On the contrary, the ministries agreed on forfeiting their individual powers in the name of projecting a unified German position. Second, the Stabilization Fund was a much larger venture, but it only resulted in partial progress on the WOG scale. This is because the SF excluded the participation of BMZ, cemented the division of labour with the Foreign Office, and contributed to lasting tension between the two civilian ministries. Third, past experience in peace operations could distort the capacity of an individual to effectively prioritize tasks in their current deployment. These findings suggest a need for continuous training in civil-military issues, even for staff with various deployments under their belt.

**Networked Security in the Field: Learning on the Go**

The table below summarizes German inter-agency cooperation on the tactical level:

**Table 5: German Inter-Agency Cooperation in Afghanistan, 2003-2014**

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<th>PRT Structure</th>
<th>Joint Meetings</th>
<th>Financial Pooling/Joint Projects</th>
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<td>2006-2009</td>
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<td>2010-2014</td>
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In the field, German WOG integration proceeded in three steps. The first stage, from 2003 to 2005, was a period of adjustment based on trial and error. In the words of one respondent, “people were dropped in the field and told to do their job” (Personal Interview Bundeswehr Official, 2014). Deployed staff had little knowledge on the rules and regulations of other ministries. Absent the instructions from BMZ Headquarters to stay away from the military, both soldiers and civilians lacked specific guidelines on cooperation. Consequently, the intensity of integration efforts remained at the “communication” level of the WOG scale. Often, the relationship between the two PRT heads was rocky. Joint meetings were held on regular basis, but tended to be dominated by COs and by military issues in general. Information-sharing was limited, because the level of trust between civilians and the military was low. Cooperation on joint ventures was incidental, small-scale, and did not involve the participation of all three ministries.

The second phase, 2006 to 2009, was a period of gradual transition towards a more integrated WOG model. While the PRT structure remained unchanged, by the end of 2009 there was evidence of more effective consensus building between the two PRT heads. There was no tangible change in the dynamics of joint meetings at the PRT. However, the Provincial Development Fund marked the first step towards “coordinated action” in terms of fund sharing. Even though the PDF only financed small to medium-scale initiatives, it was an example of joint decision-making capacity, and a commitment to joint decision-making with senior-level support.

During the last stage, from 2010 to the end of 2014, the PRT structure remained at the “co-existence” level. The SCR formally assumed leadership of the PRT, but in practice the chain of command remained unchanged. The switch to civilian leadership
occurred only shortly before the closure of the PRTs: too late to have any lasting impact on the daily PRT routine. More importantly, installing a civilian leader strained relations with the military, and thus cannot be considered an indicator of WOG progress.

By contrast, joint meetings and joint project financing transitioned to “coordinated action.” Meetings at the PRTs became more inclusive, with more effective information-sharing on behalf of the BMZ, and an increased level of trust between the participants overall. In the majority of cases, the outcomes of joint meetings remained restricted to information sharing. Nonetheless, the operation of the Stabilization Fund propelled some joint planning and implementation of specific COIN-type activities between AA and the Bundeswehr.

In the field, civil-military interactions were largely based on trial and error. The more time people spent together, the more they learned about their respective organizations, minimized preconceived notions, modified expectations accordingly, and became more willing to cede organizational authority when participating in joint ventures. This process of bottom-up learning was particularly evident in the military, and is generally inconsistent with bureaucratic politics logic.

While there is little evidence of an overarching German culture of cooperation, staff on the ground shared a belief in the value of fostering local ownership when implementing reconstruction projects. This eventually resulted in reforming the PDF procedures, in accordance with the fine tuning logic of SC theory. Towards the end of the German presence in Afghanistan, there was evidence of a broad consensus regarding the proper role of the military in peace operations. This agreement was a product of a
cumulative learning on the go. Whether it forms a shared foundational value upon which future German engagements will be based remains to be seen.

The vast majority of respondents stressed that strategic papers and joint meetings in Berlin had little to no impact on their daily work at the PRTs (Personal Interviews AA, BMZ and Bundeswehr Officials, 2014; 2015). Somewhat counterintuitively, the patterns of WOG integration on the ground mirror those in Germany. Progress in coherence on the strategic and tactical level proceeded in parallel, intensifying during the same time period, 2009 to 2014. This is because the major feats that propelled German WOG forward – the Provincial Development Fund, the Stabilization Fund, and the more active involvement of the BMZ in the PRTs from 2009 onwards – cannot be attributed to grassroots learning alone. These were a product of political negotiations in Berlin, and balance of power shifts within the Bundestag that caused changes in the BMZ leadership. In short, policy documents may have been useless to staff on the ground, but events and decisions in Berlin set the boundaries for German WOG in the field, and shaped cooperation practices in several ways.

In the initial years, the inability of the German political class to produce specific provisions for cross-government cooperation reinforced bureaucratic resistance. In the field, this translated into a working model based on strict ministerial division of labour, embodied first and foremost in the dual PRT leadership. Furthermore, the excessive strategic focus on civilian activities enabled distorted reporting, and fomented a warped performance evaluation structure within the Bundeswehr. With the lines of operation divided, and most joint meetings reduced to information-sharing forums, deployed staff had a limited scope of action to undertake formal
collaborative ventures. This holds true for mid-level staff, but also for PRT commanders, who lacked authority to make decisions overhauling the division of labour structure of the German PRTs.

That said, when physically removed from headquarters, individuals enjoyed large discretion to act within their limited areas. The PRT heads could set the tone of the joint meetings according to their personal preferences, deciding how often meetings were held, who participated, and to what extent each party contributed to the discussion. Short of joining or financing COIN operations, development advisors had ample leeway to determine when to travel in military convoys, request support of the Bundeswehr in supervising a project site, or use the BMZ emergency relief budget to fund military QIPs.\textsuperscript{82}

Schröer argues that the German networked security concept failed in its practical application, because it was not embedded into a larger strategic framework of security policy (2014, 79). The evidence from this study points to less extreme conclusions. On the ground, civil-military interactions were pragmatic and collegial. Staff resolved differences and managed daily problems, sometimes without strictly observing the division of labour. Getting the job done sometimes involved using informal relationships to call on colleagues for assistance. Some of these instances were not reported up the chain of command for fear of displeasing superiors in Berlin. Modest shirking from the rules was thus possible. Although such instances were incidental and small-scale, they

\textsuperscript{82} In this sense, the German experience starkly differs from Swedish practices. As shown in the previous chapter, Swedish development advisers were not even allowed to participate in minor joint ventures, such as implementing surveys in tandem with the military.
contributed to the grassroots accommodation process by building cross-departmental trust and decreasing tensions in the field.

Ministerial headquarters in Berlin did not implement strict oversight measures to enforce joint working in the field. There was no regular VTC contact with Germany during the joint PRT meetings, and deployed staff usually reported on the meeting outcomes via separate channels. A sanction scheme to punish non-compliance was similarly lacking. Staff selection and performance evaluation practices within AA and the Bundeswehr did not expressly reward collaborative strategies, and in some instances created direct disincentives for engaging in cross-government ventures, especially for those who desired promotion. The problem was compounded by the lack of knowledge on the operation of other ministries, which Berlin did little to correct.

In this context, some individuals chose to engage in joint initiatives, while others did not. Civil-military interactions fluctuated significantly over time, exacerbated by frequent staff rotations. The personal relationship and preferences of the PRT commanders determined the frequency of cross-government consultations and small-scale joint projects. Leaders who lacked empathy, teamwork skills, and the ability to take initiative failed to foster joint ventures. However, personalities were not entirely to blame. The findings suggest that individual preferences for stove-piping were often related to strategic-level causes, such as inadequate incentive schemes and staff selection policies. Overall, the effect of personalities on German WOG was larger on the tactical level than in Berlin, but in perspective it remained modest, largely due to the strategic caveats on inter-agency cooperation inherent in the German PRT model.
As a final note, Germany’s fund-sharing practices suggest that pooling mechanisms work better when they allow for equal participation of all ministries. The PDF, although smaller in size, was generally considered by respondents a successful venture, while the more large-scale Stabilization Fund garnered criticism. The complete exclusion of the BMZ from the SF arrangement caused duplication of effort, and strained relations between the BMZ and AA. It is useful to compare the German experience with evidence from the United Kingdom, where all ministries, including DFID, participated in the pooling mechanism. In the next two chapters, the British WOG model is presented in greater detail.
Politics, Prime Ministers, and Joined-Up Action: British Whole-of-Government in London

Analysts and political strategists praise the United Kingdom as a trend-setter in developing whole-of-government approaches in fragile states (Below and Belzile 2013, 5; Eronen 2008, 21; Krieger 2006, 14; Stepputat and Greenwood 2013, 16; Weiss, Spanger, and Meurs 2010). To unpack this statement, this chapter assesses British inter-agency coherence among government departments in London. British WOG integration proceeded in three steps, evolving from “coexistence” to “integrated action,” with the exception of the joint training variable which shifted from “communication” to “coexistence.”

Cross-departmental coherence in the UK is best explained by combining the Auerswald/Saideman logic on single-party parliamentary governments with theories of bureaucratic non-evaluation. Overall, British WOG developments were not driven by party politics or political compromise, but by the preferences and vision of the Prime Minister in office. In principle, Tony Blair was a supporter of a WOG approach in Afghanistan, and laid the groundwork for inter-agency integration in policy and institutional practice. However, his penchant for sofa-style leadership effectively obstructed collective governance. Moreover, Blair’s excessive focus on Iraq resulted in lax oversight of the Afghanistan engagement, and enabled tendencies of bureaucratic non-evaluation as regards the Helmand strategy. Blair’s successor Gordon Brown spearheaded institutional reforms that reflected his interests in population-centric approaches. Where Brown failed was in the active oversight: using the joint institutions to their full potential so as to ensure genuine joint action. His successor David Cameron
declared an integrated approach in Afghanistan as a priority. Hence, the British WOG model finally reached the “integrated action” level.

The chapter starts by briefly examining British experience and approaches to peace operations, and the strategic and operational setup in Afghanistan. What follows is a process tracing of British WOG development and its catalysts. I conclude with a short summary and an interpretation of the findings.

**British Peace Operations and the Joined-Up Approach**

Britain’s experiments with comprehensive approaches to statebuilding well predate the 9/11 attacks (Patrick and Brown 2007, 10). Years of imperial territory policing and counterinsurgency experiences during the Cold War and the Troubles in Northern Ireland, spearheaded strategic debates on the value of civil-military cooperation (Egnell 2009, 96). More recently, the British presence in Bosnia, Kosovo and Sierra Leone brought about a renewed interest in joined-up government (Gordon 2010, 122; 124; House of Commons Defence Committee 2010, 12–13; King 2012, 37). Britain’s historical legacy set the stage for a shared understanding of the importance of civil-military initiatives in stabilization operations, if strategic goals were to be successfully translated into tangible activities in the field (Egnell 2011, 300; Korski 2009, 16).

The key British ministries that deploy jointly during a peace operation are the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Ministry of Defence (MOD), and the Department of International Development (DFID), the latter created in 1997 as an

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83 More than just a principle of bureaucratic organization, the “joined-up approach” eventually became part of a deeper and more ambitious government reform plan in the 1950s (Gordon 2010, 122; 124).
independent agency. Policy design is in the hands of Cabinet, but highly centralized around the Prime Minister (PM), who enjoys significant executive authority in matters of military engagements overseas (Egnell 2009, 108; Farrell, Rynning, and Terriff 2013, 118; Patrick and Brown 2007, 15). The loosely-defined constitutional role of the PM means that the level of authority marshalled by the PM Office depends to a large extent on the personality of the incumbent (Bangham and Shah 2012, 4).

One of the exclusive prerogatives of the PM is committing the Armed Forces to overseas combat operations. The UK Parliament cannot dictate how the military is used. In theory, the FCO and DFID have a say in national security policy, as does the Cabinet Office. Within the Cabinet, a network of permanent and ad hoc committees ensures that the viewpoints and interests of all ministries are properly addressed during joint deliberations. Specialized committees, such as the House of Commons Defence Committee, are tasked with reviewing defence matters, but their authority is restricted to merely calling attention to specific issues (Egnell 2009, 106–7).

On paper, the British committee system is an embodiment of WOG principles (Egnell 2009, 106–7). In practice, however, the final word on foreign policy issues belongs to the Prime Minister. Consequently, the level of “jointness” of effort depends on whether the PM prefers to engage or bypass the committees in the decision-making process. As shown later in this chapter, Tony Blair largely eschewed the committee

\[84\] As regards the specific benefits of working in committees, Egnell argues that it ensures plenty of exposure to the modus operandi of other departments, which clarifies expectations of what others can deliver. Frequent inter-agency contact in the committee system fostered informal relationships, increase trust between the actors, and mitigate personality differences (Egnell 2009, 109).
system, which left a tangible imprint on British WOG developments during his tenure (Devanny and Harris 2014, 18).

In sum, much depends on the preferences of the individual holding the PM post. When the PM is the leader of the party controlling the Cabinet Office, the need for political bargaining is further reduced. Traditionally, the British Cabinet has been run by a single party. Between 2001 and 2010, the Labour government held parliamentary majority, under the leadership of Prime Ministers Tony Blair (1997-2007) and Gordon Brown (2007-2010). In 2010, the Conservative Party ousted Labour from Parliament, forming a coalition with the Liberal Democratic Party (Auerswald and Saideman 2016, 116). Importantly, the Conservatives headed the FCO, DFID, MOD, and the Prime Minister posts. Consequently, the 2010 coalition de facto operated as a single party majority government (Auerswald and Saideman 2016, 206).  

Strategic and Operational Setup of the British Engagement

On the strategic level, final decisions on WOG policy were in the hands of Cabinet and the Prime Minister, who received input from the relevant ministries as well as the select parliamentary committees. From 2010 onwards, a joint National Security Council (NSC) dealt with strategy in fragile states, including Afghanistan. On the tactical level, Britain operated a total of three PRTs in Afghanistan between 2003 and 2014. The first, approximately 150 staff strong and under the leadership of a military commander (CO), opened in 2003 in Mazar-e-Sharif, Balkh province. A smaller one with a team of

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85 Auerswald and Saideman’s argument is supported by evidence from Devanny and Harris, who note that the Liberal Democrats found it difficult to influence the agenda of the National Security Council, consistently losing out on important issues of disagreement with their coalition partners (2014, 30–31).
about 50, was established in Meymaneh, Faryab province, in 2004 (Gauster 2008, 28).

After ceding the PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif to Sweden, Britain relocated to Lashkar Gah, the provincial capital of Helmand. By 2010, the PRT Helmand was approximately 260 staff strong, with twenty-four FCO employees and thirty staffed by the Stabilisation Unit (SU) (United Kingdom Parliament 2010). In addition, District Stabilization Teams (DSTs) were deployed in ten of the fourteen Helmand districts. 86

The Makings of the British Whole-of-Government Approach

Initially, the rhetoric in support of a WOG approach in Afghanistan emerged directly from the office of Prime Minister Tony Blair (Farrell, Rynning, and Terriff 2013, 126). Blair’s liberal interventionist views, coupled with his staunch support of US policy against global terrorism, spearheaded British WOG efforts in the early stages. Himself a vocal WOG supporter, Blair committed the most prominent military experts to work on the plan of the Mazar-e-Sharif PRT (Patrick and Brown 2007, 9; Stapleton 2014, 25).

Ucko and Egnell argue that Blair’s vision of cross-government coherence was one where civilian activities were ancillary to the primary task of neutralizing global terrorism (2013, 82). In a similar vein, Cawkwell notes that the Blair administration perceived international development as an enabler of military objectives in the war against terror (2016, 41–42). From the very start of Blair’s tenure, civil-military

86 The UK also supported police reform in Helmand by advising senior officials, setting up the Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan, and running a police training centre in Lashkar Gah (United Kingdom Parliament 2010).
cooperation was articulated as part of a liberal interventionist stabilization strategy where the development and security streams were converging significantly (Howell 2010).  

Conceptually framing WOG in this way was a departure from European approaches, particularly in Sweden and Germany where policymakers struggled to reconcile civilian activities with politically-motivated stabilization initiatives. By nature, the British policy discourse implied uniting the development and security streams under one overarching, politically-motivated strategy: an idea that fit poorly with European civil-military cooperation concepts. A strategic culture, based on Britain’s historical legacy and vast experience in stabilization operations, elucidates why this kind of WOG framing was much less problematic in the UK than in Germany and Sweden.

Blair’s penchant for a presidential leadership style was another factor with direct implications for British cross-government coherence. During his premiership, he exercised an almost unprecedented level of personal influence on policy, and his Cabinet allowed him a considerable margin for independent action (Bangham and Shah 2012, 4; Devanny and Harris 2014, 19). Openly disapproving of the formal committee system, Blair once stated that committees “don’t really function for me, and they don’t enable me to have the sort of discussions I want to have” (Devanny and Harris 2014, 18). Instead, the Prime Minister liked to hold bilateral discussions with relevant ministries (Egnell

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87 For example, in 2001-2003 the New Labour government defined stabilization, through the democratization of Afghanistan and a focus on civilian reconstruction, as a way to counter the global terrorist threat (Cawkwell 2016, 44). In 2003-2004, both Prime Minister Tony Blair and then-Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown spoke of poverty and alienation as conditions that breed terrorism, thus connecting international development to national security objectives (Howell 2010).
After 9/11, Blair further restricted his inner circle of foreign policy advisers, preferring to work with a small team of people who were already “implicitly on side” (Devanny and Harris 2014, 20).

Korski claims that the most important obstacle to advancing cross-government coherence in Britain was that Whitehall itself lacked a properly established culture of joint working (2009, 14). This argument is convincing, given that Blair’s leadership style actively discouraged collective decision-making in the highest echelons of power. Put differently, Blair’s working style turned into a direct disincentive for cross-government cooperation. It eroded the influence of Cabinet, as well as the formal committee system, both vital arenas that served to air out inter-ministerial differences. The result was exacerbated bureaucratic competition and increasingly stove-piped policymaking (Korski 2009, 14).

In the first years of the Afghanistan engagement, departments fought relentlessly over the WOG concept (Below and Belzile 2013, 5; Egnell 2009, 107). Of all ministries, the MOD was the most supportive, particularly of the conflict prevention pools (Egnell 2009, 109; 111; Farrell, Rynning, and Terriff 2013, 129; Patrick and Brown 2007, 15). Dissatisfaction with DFID’s involvement in Iraq, and comprehensive approach doctrine developments within NATO and the EU, galvanized support for WOG within the military (House of Commons Defence Committee 2010, 13; Korski 2009, 14). Initially, the MOD was under the impression that DFID had the capacity to directly implement short term aid and stabilization projects. To mid-level military, DFID’s long-term objectives were

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88 For example, between September 11, 2001 and mid-January 2002, the Cabinet Secretary recorded 46 ministerial discussions on Afghanistan, of which 13 were in Cabinet (4 being very short), 12 in Cabinet Committees, and 21 were ad hoc (Bangham and Shah 2012, 4).
unworkable in the field. More senior MOD staff tended to perceive DFID as a mere enabler of military operations (Clarke 2012, 33; Farrell and Gordon 2009, 24; Harriman, Weibull, and Wiklund 2012, 20). Using the events in Basra, the MOD tried pressuring civilian ministries into adopting WOG principles (Korski 2009, 16). Despite their best efforts, by early 2006 the Armed Forces were still unsuccessful in securing enough support for a WOG doctrine within Whitehall (Teuten 2010, 2).

Civilian departments were notably less enthusiastic about the WOG concept. The FCO was least persuaded in the merits of an inter-agency approach, even though strategic relations with the MOD remained relatively tension-free (Egnell 2009, 109). Ever since the creation of DFID as an independent ministry in 1997, the FCO had resented relinquishing control over foreign aid and development policy (Patrick and Brown 2007, 14). Moreover, the FCO lacked an operational culture and struggled with operational issues in the field, from staff recruitment to effective strategy formulation to getting involved in tribal politics. Absent specific staff incentives to work in volatile environments, recruiting adequately trained personnel had become even more difficult (Farrell and Gordon 2009, 24). The resulting failure to make a tangible impact on the ground contributed to a growing crisis of morale within the FCO (Burke 2010, 38).

For DFID, cooperating with the military was initially problematic. The 2002 International Development Act (IDA) restricted DFID’s mandate to working on poverty alleviation and long-term development programs complying with ODA guidelines. Hence, DFID’s ability to divert funding for military or political purposes was severely
Initially, DFID was wary of broadening the definition of ODA and securitizing portions of its budget (Patrick and Brown 2007, 13–14; Teuten 2010, 2). Never fully approving of the MOD’s COIN model, DFID interpreted the WOG concept as a prime example of the very mistakes committed in Iraq (Gordon 2010, 130). In early 2006, senior DFID officials resisted the inclusion of their ministry into the overall UK COIN strategy, arguing that the wording of the IDA forbade using British development aid to advance military goals or to further national security interests (Farrell and Gordon 2009, 24).

A practical illustration of the failure of strategic civil-military cooperation during Blair’s tenure was the process of approving the first strategy for Southwestern Afghanistan, named the Joint Plan for Helmand (JPH) (Bennett 2014). On paper, the JPH was supposed to be the ultimate embodiment of WOG principles, and a prime example of a joint civil-military strategy. In practice, the jointness of effort during the draft negotiations proved deceptive. To make matters worse, implementing the strategy in the field practically resulted in a halt of civil-military cooperation in Helmand (Stepputat and Greenwood 2013, 18; Wiklund et al. 2011, 17).

The JPH grossly underestimated the level of threat and the amount of resources necessary in Helmand. The reason, according to Stapleton, was feeble senior-level support for the strategy, which resulted in insufficient intelligence on the operational environment in Helmand (2014, 29). This argument fails to convince, given the

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89 The International Development Act set forth poverty reduction as the primary objective of British aid. While this definition applied only to DFID funds, not FCO or MOD, the implied meaning was that 85% of British development assistance could not be used for stabilization purposes (Wild and Elhawary 2012, 6).

90 Clarke argues that this aversion to closer inter-agency cooperation resulted in a very limited input of DFID in the strategy for Iraq, which in turn had negative ripple effects on British WOG in Afghanistan (2012, 32–33).
determination of Cabinet to see the JPH through in 2005, despite having been informed of the concerns of personnel in the field, and contrary to the Peace and Conflict Reconstruction Unit’s urging for a more cautious approach (Foreign Affairs Committee 2009). Gordon argues that civilian as well as military officials were keenly aware of the inadequacies of the JPH, but Cabinet brushed aside their concerns without explanation (2010, 130). All this points to a need for more nuanced explanations than simply inadequate intelligence or a distracted Cabinet, all the while recognizing that the under-resourcing of troops could not have happened without the express authorization of the PM (Auerswald and Saideman 2016, 118; Bennett 2014).

At first glance, the decision to deprive the Helmand mission of valuable resources and capabilities appears inconsistent with Tony Blair’s discourse thus far. Despite his non-inclusive leadership style, Blair was a supporter of WOG principles, and as such would be expected to back the JPH with adequate equipment and resources. The question is why the PM, as well as his immediate entourage, deliberately ignored evidence about the inadequacies of the JPH.

One plausible explanation is that the failing British mission in Iraq served as a powerful focusing event that captured Blair’s attention, causing a shift in his immediate priorities. Achieving results in Basra relegated Afghanistan to secondary importance in Blair’s mind, causing him to lock up resources in Iraq to the detriment of the Helmand mission (Auerswald and Saideman 2016, 118–20). Blair’s refusal to withdraw troops from Basra at the time of deploying to Helmand additionally strained relations with some senior military officials (Cawkwell 2016, 59-60). Fearing that Britain was spreading herself too thin, Secretary of State for Defence John Reid conditioned his approval of the
troop deployment upon assurances that DFID would fully participate in the mission (Bennett 2014).

The events in Basra had the additional effect of stimulating perceptions within the PM’s inner circle that Afghanistan was a more benign alternative than Iraq to engage in reconstruction and development activities. This enabled the ambitions of a contingent of influential military lobbyists, namely Generals Fry, Dannatt, Walker and Jackson, who planned to divert attention away from the debacle in Basra by achieving quick results in Afghanistan (Bennett 2014; Cawkwell 2016, 51–52). These generals thus focused on approving the JPH at all costs, and rejected the concerns of their civilian and military colleagues (Cawkwell 2016, 43). Instead of holding an open and honest discussion, senior officials in Cabinet and at the MOD mutually reinforced each other’s beliefs that the undertaking was viable. The planning process included only a limited number of top government and military staff, under the leadership of Prime Minister Blair and Defence Secretary John Reid. Not surprisingly, the skepticism and concerns of mid-level officials failed to make impact on higher levels (Cawkwell 2016, 59-60). Civilians within the MOD were reluctant to harp on the issue, because the Chiefs of Staff were already in favour of the Helmand deployment (Bennett 2014). For the purposes of political expediency and despite evidence to the contrary from the field, the Helmand initiative was packaged as a peace support operation similar to the one in Mazar-e-Sharif (Cawkwell 2016, 54–55; Marston 2008, 2; Ucko and Egnell 2013, 83). This deceptive jointness of decision-making imposed an enormous strain on the institutional consensus on which civil-military efforts were based (Cawkwell 2016, 54-57). Cawkwell qualifies
2006-2009 as a period of breakdown in civil-military cooperation, and of the stabilization-based WOG narrative as defined by the Blair government (2016, 59-60).

After Gordon Brown assumed the PM post in mid-2007, the British WOG model definitively shifted away from its initial configuration under the Blair government (Cawkwell 2016, 44). In contrast to his predecessor, Brown espoused more left-wing convictions, and had a personal interest in international development (Devanny and Harris 2014, 20). His administration steered the adoption of a new strategy for Afghanistan, the Helmand Road Map (HRM), taking a turn towards traditional counter-insurgency operations with civilian reconstruction as a main priority (Ucko and Egnell 2013, 82). The HRM was based on a much more open evaluation process than the Joint Plan for Helmand (Devanny and Harris 2014, 20–21; Korski 2009, 20). The main focus was on generating peace dividends through non-kinetic initiatives in the framework of population-centric COIN initiatives that aimed to protect local civilians (Auerswald and Saideman 2016, 116; 122-125).

Simultaneously, Brown was under pressure from his political opponents in the Conservative Party to further deepen cross-departmental coherence through institutional reforms. Having previously supported the establishment of DFID as an independent entity not under FCO control, the Conservatives now openly advocated for a joint National Security Council (NSC) to deal with matters of national security, including Afghanistan (Gordon 2010, 134; Korski 2009, 20). In an effort to keep up with the political opposition, Brown took action (Korski 2009, 20). He took steps to bolster the formal committee system, but stopped short of establishing a NSC as per the blueprint requested by the Conservatives. Instead, Brown created a joint ministerial committee on
National Security, International Relations and Development (NSID), appropriately named to reflect his own personal focus on civilian reconstruction.

In sum, Gordon Brown made some concrete advances towards deepening the institutionalization of WOG principles. As shown later on, where he failed was in the active oversight: using the joint institutions to their full potential so as to ensure a genuine process of collective governance (Devanny and Harris 2014, 23). Moreover, studies on Brown’s personal abilities as a Prime Minister find that he had “little time for ministers” and preferred governing via telephone calls (Theakston 2010, 6). All this suggests that, much like in the Blair years, Brown’s leadership style did little to stimulate cross-government cooperation.

In Brown’s defence, it was during his premiership that Whitehall slowly started internalizing a method of joint working. Certainly, the process took time: in mid-2007 a full-fledged turf war was still raging between Cabinet and key ministries over the development of WOG principles. In time, the political pressure for inter-agency coherence showed some moderate successes. Both the FCO and the MOD started hiring across departments. In an effort to lead by example, the heads of DFID, FCO and MOD started travelling together, including to Afghanistan (Korski 2009, 20). DFID set out to increase staff incentives to deploy to hostile environments, mainly through picks for the next posting and promotion opportunities (House of Commons Defence Committee 2010, 91).

Senior FCO staff blocked the efforts of Cabinet to promote joint inter-departmental policy for countries at risk of instability. In turn, eager to preserve its institutional role, Cabinet rejected an initiative of the FCO, the SU and MOD to develop joint principles of the comprehensive approach. Proposals from the FCO-lead comprehensive approach working group, as well as from the MOD’s Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, were often blocked or watered down (Korski 2009, 17). DFID rejected the SU’s Joint Stabilization Assessment (JSA) framework, preferring to stick to its own departmental assessment methodology (Korski 2009, 18).
Under the tutelage of key ministerial leaders, namely David Miliband and Douglas Alexander, both the FCO and DFID made significant strides toward adopting WOG thinking. Some tension between DFID and the FCO remained, as the FCO perceived its role more in the policymaking realm and struggled with the implementation of projects due to lack of proper expertise and staff (Korski 2009, 21).

After the general elections of 2010, the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition headed by David Cameron brought about a renewed surge in WOG thinking. Cameron focused on achieving results where his predecessors had failed. His government proceeded to deepen the WOG reforms started by Gordon Brown. Whitehall issued a WOG-informed overarching strategy for addressing conflict and fragility (Below and Belzile 2013, 5). Both the Conservative Party and senior-level officials within FCO and the MOD pushed for DFID’s full involvement in stabilization activities (Gordon 2010, 134). On the administrative level, the Cameron government relaxed the restrictions of the IDA on ministries to commit fund specifically to poverty reduction (Wild and Elhawary 2012, 6). Simultaneously, a remarkable shift in development aid policy became evident thanks to a leaked DFID internal paper from August 2010. The document launched the idea that every British development project should make “the maximum possible contribution” to national security objectives (Howell 2010).

To sum up thus far, in stark contrast to Swedish and German approaches, the British WOG concept was intrinsically tied to stabilization activities at the outset.

92 The IDA restrictions were reinforced on the administrative level by the Labour government’s Public Service Agreements (PSAs), which set a three-year spending review period between Treasury and relevant ministries. In 2010, the Coalition government did away with the PSAs and replaced them with business plans from each department, which did not include a specific commitment to poverty reduction (Wild and Elhawary 2012, 6).
Strategic culture helps explain how Britain’s historical legacy resulted in a model where merging the security, development and diplomacy pillars was much less problematic than in Germany or Sweden. Nonetheless, strategic culture theory falls short in explaining cross-government coherence dynamics in London. There is certainly evidence of a prevailing culture of non-cooperation within Whitehall, particularly during the Blair administration. However, SC logic predicts that as policymakers receive information from the outside environment, the cooperation model would be corrected through fine-tuning. Events in the UK show exactly the opposite: politicians consistently refused to accept evidence from the field, if it did not fit with the initial plans for deployment to Helmand.

The dynamics around negotiating the JPH fit with broader theories on bureaucratic behavior, specifically Van Evera’s non-evaluation argument. Van Evera argues that government bureaucracies are poor self-evaluators, especially when fearing that a policy proposal would be squashed from the outset. The more important the policy, the more important interests it serves, and therefore the most important policies are the least evaluated. Evaluators can be ignored, or alternatively co-opted and domesticated with their own consent, if they wish to preserve good relations with the powerful (Van Evera 2003, 163–98). The JPH approval process is largely consistent with the non-evaluation argument: evidence from the field was ignored, while mid-level civilian and military officials were co-opted into supporting the views of their superiors.

Finally, the findings suggest that the Prime Minister, particularly his personal vision for WOG and his leadership style, had a broad impact on inter-agency coherence. Upon assuming the post, each Prime Minister adjusted the WOG model according to his
personal vision. Importantly, the Prime Minister’s preferences were not static. Major focusing events, such as events in Iraq, could cause a shift in a leader’s priorities, thereby affecting WOG outcomes. Finally, the British experience suggests that focusing events become permissive conditions for non-evaluation, especially in governments where decision-making power is centralized around a single individual.

**Whole-of-Government Policy**

British policy documents demonstrate a progressive commitment to WOG principles, which proceeded unevenly and according to the priorities of the Prime Minister in office. During Tony Blair’s tenure, the policy rhetoric was oriented towards humanitarian interventionism and the war on terror, with direct references to joined-up government (Lunn, Miller, and Smith 2008, 3–4). Less was offered in terms of concrete guidelines for civil-military integration. Overall, during Blair’s premiership the WOG policy agenda was not progressing as fast as its supporters anticipated (Lunn, Miller, and Smith 2008, 5).

In 2005, the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit (PMSU) issued a report called “Investing in Prevention: An International Strategy to Manage Risks of Instability and Improve Crisis Response.” Most notable about this text was the explicit reference to development cooperation assistance as part of a WOG approach: an issue that was controversial in Germany in Sweden. The document recommended that UK development aid be placed within a broader WOG strategy, as outlined in the OECD “Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States,” and integrating it with diplomatic and military efforts (Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit 2005, 13; 67). While unambiguous on the
need to merge the security and development streams, the text deals mainly with prevention response, and does not adequately address the inherent tensions between stabilization and development activities.

In the same year 2005, the notorious Joint Plan for Helmand was drafted by representatives of DFID, FCO, Preliminary Operations of the Ministry of Defence, and the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (Stapleton 2014, 30). While inter-ministerial consultations took place during the drafting of the text, the JPH was not based a common understanding of goals and priorities (Clarke 2012, 34). The text itself offered no clear guidelines on how civilians and the military were to cooperate in the framework of a COIN strategy (Farrell and Gordon 2009, 20). Finally, the JPH timelines were too restrictive for either FCO or DFID to properly staff the Helmand PRT (Foreign Affairs Committee 2009).

In 2006, the MOD took initiative in promoting WOG across departments by issuing a Joint Discussion Note on the comprehensive approach (Post 2015, 224). To tame down the resentment that a military-backed concept might engender, the document was labelled a “discussion note” (House of Commons Defence Committee 2010, 14). Even so, it was perceived as a military approach, and failed to gain sufficient support in Whitehall. In March 2007, the MOD followed up with an additional Joint Doctrine Note, “Countering Irregular Activity within a Comprehensive Approach,” where the language was significantly toned down and merely referred to continuous interactions between ministries (Post 2015, 224).

A surge in WOG-informed policy occurred under the Brown government. In line with the overall change of direction towards population-centric COIN operations, the
policy language became more specific, with an emphasis on rules and guidelines that regulated civil-military interactions, and would minimize potential negative effects. A seminal policy from the first year of the Brown administration was the Helmand Road Map (HRM). More detailed than the preceding JPH, the HRM rested on a politically informed counterinsurgency strategy, and boasted a clear strategic commitment and senior-level buy-in (Egnell 2011, 308; Rintakoski and Autti 2008, 195). The text was drafted after a broad, bottom-up process of consultations and input from the entire command chain, from staff posted to Afghanistan to policymakers in London. The HRM thus represented a much improved effort for whole-of-government planning (Thruelsen 2008, 7; Ucko and Egnell 2013, 95). Some of the HRM’s notable features were placing a civilian in charge of the Helmand PRT, and deploying stabilization and political advisors to Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) within the province, to develop community structures and foster trust in the local government (Farrell and Gordon 2009, 21; Ucko and Egnell 2013, 95).

In 2008, the strategic rhetoric was showing indications of DFID’s assimilation into a counterinsurgency framework. At the same time, the policy language became more precise, clarifying different types of civilian reconstruction initiatives and discussing the tension between them. The FCO, DFID and MOD jointly signed the Stabilization Unit (SU) guidelines pertaining to the UK concept of stabilization: a practical guide to implementing stabilization activities. The document expressly addressed the distinction between stabilization, humanitarian activities, and short-term

93 For instance, the House of Commons International Development Committee stressed the importance of swiftly initiating stabilization and development activities in clear-hold-build operations (2008, 60).
quick impact projects (Stabilization Unit 2008, 13). In addition, the guidelines made the case for joint civil-military planning. Using the HRM as an illustrative example, the document offered specific practical steps for creating an integrated stabilization plan (Stabilization Unit 2008, 21–24). Finally, the document directly addressed the controversial issue of carrying out stabilization activities as part of a COIN strategy. Noting the danger of compromising the neutrality and physical safety of humanitarian workers, the document called upon all parties to discuss ways to mitigate the potential risks in good time (Stabilization Unit 2008, 14–15). The last part of the guidelines was a Stabilization Task Matrix: a list of stabilization tasks in which civilians and the military could collaborate, distinguishing between the challenges of design and delivery (Teuten 2010, 4).

In 2009, there were two notable policy developments. First, the Brown administration presented a National Security Strategy (NSS), based on a political approach in combatting the insurgency in Afghanistan. Reducing the insurgency was a priority, while the secondary objectives addressed the narcotics trade, good governance, rule of law, and social/economic development (Foreign Affairs Committee 2009, 76). The strategy also addressed issues in joint planning that had remained unresolved by the JPH (Teuten 2010, 3).

Second, the MOD published a new doctrine, “Security and Stabilization: The Military Contribution”. A product of a joint inter-departmental effort, the text was

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94 For example, stabilization was framed as a long-term process that required an integrated civil-military operation in order to be properly implemented. Specific suggestions were offered on how to address the tension between stabilization and purely humanitarian operations (Stabilization Unit 2008, 14–15). QIPs were recognized as a common, yet often misused first step in a stabilization plan. A list of specific principles for QIP implementation, to be considered in order to minimize undesired side effects, was included at the end of the document (Stabilization Unit 2008, 8-9-28).
largely informed by the SU guidelines. An important innovation was introduced in the
practical implementation of WOG: the transformation of CIMIC elements into a new
entity called Military Stabilization Support Group (MSSG). The MSSGs operated as the
military counterpart of the Stabilization Unit, fostering civil-military cooperation on the
strategic, operational and tactical levels. In London, the Head of the MSSG worked
closely with the Armed Forces and the MOD, and was physically located on the SU
premises within DFID (Harriman, Weibull, and Wiklund 2012, 25).

In March 2010, during the final days of the Brown administration, the House of
Commons Defence Committee (HCDC) issued a report with specific recommendations to
Whitehall, FCO, DFID and the MOD on measures to further WOG integration, on the
home front as well as abroad. Most notable about this document was that it reflected an
increased pressure on ministries to adopt WOG principles. Departments were called upon
to work on overcoming inter-agency differences, ensure effective cross-departmental
information exchange, participate in more joint training, and develop proper staff
incentives for inter-agency cooperation. DFID in particular was urged to promptly
address some lingering interpretations of the IDA that continuously bred resistance to
cross-government cooperation. All ministries were asked to report back to the HCDC
with the specific measures they intended to undertake to stimulate cross-government
coherence (House of Commons Defence Committee 2010, 5–7).

During the premiership of David Cameron, an integrated approach in national
security issues was defined as a main priority going forward (Cabinet Office 2008, 41;
Wittkowsky and Wittkampf 2013, 1). Several seminal documents were issued in a
relatively short time span of three years. Cameron initiated his term by presenting to the
British Parliament a new National Security Strategy (NSS), broadly informed by WOG principles (Below and Belzile 2013, 5). The NSS critiqued the previous administration for failing to bring together the correct mix of people in order to address the Afghanistan crisis (HM Government 2010a, 16:4–5). More specifically, the text argued that a fully integrated approach in post-conflict stabilization should start with increased coherence among the ministries in London (Cabinet Office 2008, 8; 36). Pledges were made to strengthen the capacity of the military to work with civilians on short-term reconstruction projects in non-permissive environments, as well as to revamp stabilization efforts in recently cleared areas (Cabinet Office 2008, 39).

In late 2010, the Cameron administration requested a Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), aiming to ensure that Britain’s civil-military capabilities achieved a maximum effect (HM Government 2010a, 16:10). An explicit commitment was made to expanding both civilian and military capability, to be deployed jointly in stabilization missions overseas (HM Government 2010b, 1:3; 11).

In 2011, the government issued the Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS), the first official, WOG-informed overarching strategy for addressing conflict and fragility. Signed jointly by the FCO, DFID and the MOD, the document clearly articulated a commitment to strengthening cross-government coherence, and committed to a series of concrete actions (Department for International Development, Ministry of Defence, and Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2011, 19). Among the most notable examples were early warning joint assessments, joint Stabilization Response Teams in Helmand, and a single cross-government board to deal with conflict overseas. As an expression of a renewed commitment to the joint civil-military institutional framework,
the BSOS set up a £20 million Early Action Facility within the existing conflict pools to respond to unforeseen crises (Below and Belzile 2013, 6; HM Government 2010b, 1:46; DFID and MOD 2011, 19–24). The BSOS set up the overall political-strategic framework, brought together the different actors and departmental approaches, and clarified joint decision-making and evaluation mechanisms.

As a follow-up to one of the commitments in the BSOS, in 2012 the government introduced the Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability (JACS) framework. JACS aimed to integrate planning, policy, and resource management across the security, development and political domains (Below and Belzile 2013, 6; Fitzgerald 2014, 10). While not meant to replace individual department planning tools, JACS was supposed to serve as an overarching, joint foundation upon which to build up more specific individual ministerial programming (Fitzgerald 2014, 12–13). The main value of the JACS document was a step by step methodology on how to conduct an integrated analysis of a conflict situation. The framework fell short in clarifying how to overcome lack of senior-level buy-in and bureaucratic resistance in the implementation stage. Experts from the NGO community recommended that JACS be revised to include further detail on designing, commissioning, and using the results in an integrated manner, rather than focusing too much on the analysis itself (Wright 2012, 1–2).

All this is to say that, unlike Swedish and German policies, UK government papers were generally explicit in endorsing WOG and in addressing its components. British documents offered concrete recommendations and practical examples of ways to

95 The previously used methodology, called Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA), was developed by DFID and was thus not suitable for conducting a cross-departmental conflict analysis (Wright 2012, 1).
increase inter-agency coherence while mitigating the inherent risks for long-term
development. Civil-military cooperation and stabilization initiatives remained
inextricably linked in British policy texts, situating the UK WOG model mid-way
between European and American approaches. A similar tendency is evident in the
development of British joint institutions, as discussed in the following section.

**Joint Institutions and Inter-Ministerial Cooperation**

The UK lacks an over-arching joint institution with decision-making power in
matters of national security. The Cabinet Office and its committees serve as a forum
where ministries voice their viewpoints and engage in constructive consensus-building on
pressing issues (Patrick and Brown 2007, 16). Within Whitehall, several inter-agency
groups deal specific issues in Afghanistan, such as drugs, justice system reform, and
countering explosive devices (United Kingdom Parliament 2010). Three Cabinet-chaired
committees met weekly at Head of Department level, where representatives from the
Cabinet Office, FCO, MOD, DFID, Stabilisation Unit, and the Home Office worked to
prioritize efforts, oversee the completion of objectives, and coordinate policy advice for
Ministers (United Kingdom Parliament 2010). A series of other joint working groups
operated on the lower levels.\(^96\)

\(^96\) For instance, the Comprehensive Approach Working Group, composed of mid-level ministerial officials,
collected and documented lessons learned and best practices from staff posted in the field (Rintakoski and
Autti 2008, 198). Within the FCO, the Conflict Issues Group (CIG) managed the ministry’s involvement
with the conflict pools, and served as a point of liaison with DFID, the MOD, and the PCRU (Patrick and
Brown 2007, 14). The Afghan Communications Team (ACT), also FCO-based, was tasked with fostering
daily cross-departmental communication. An Afghan Information Strategy Group, consisting of
representatives from the ACT, FCO, MOD, DFID, Stabilisation Unit, British Embassy Kabul, ISAF,
Provincial Reconstruction Team Lashkar Gah and the UK Delegation to NATO, met on weekly basis to
discuss pressing issues arising in the field (United Kingdom Parliament 2010).
In 2004, in response to developments in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Blair administration created the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU). Tasked with improving cross-Whitehall responses in fragile states, the PCRU was meant as a major hub for boosting civilian efforts (Below and Belzile 2013, 7; Patrick and Brown 2007, 11). Its creation coincided with the views of military officials, who had long argued that progress in Afghanistan was slow due to lack of enough deployed civilian staff to support reconstruction activities (Ucko and Egnell 2013, 96).

In terms of institutional design, the PCRU was a supporting, standalone inter-departmental body with no executive authority (Krieger 2006, 12). It was managed by a four-person board of directors, composed of the FCO, MOD, DFID and the Cabinet Office, who reported to the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Committee in Cabinet. Its modest operating budget stood at about £10 million, and was not meant to finance civil-military initiatives in the field (Patrick and Brown 2007, 27).

At first, the PCRU was intended to define strategy and run operations overseas, but bureaucratic resistance trumped these ambitions. Ministries argued that granting executive authority to the PCRU was redundant, because there were already existing government mechanisms on the strategic and tactical level to assume such tasks (Patrick and Brown 2007, 28). Another thorny issue was allegiance. DFID housed and financed the PCRU, which caused concerns about co-optation (Krieger 2006, 18).

Eventually, it was agreed that the PCRU would work towards four overarching goals. The first was creating a stability assessment framework for countries of violent conflict where it was deemed worthwhile for the UK to send troops. Government officials
were to use this framework when setting appropriate short and long-term stability measures. Second, the PCRU was to develop in tandem with the MOD a comprehensive civil-military doctrine, bringing FCO and DFID officials into planning of military interventions, as well as post-conflict stabilization efforts. Third, the PCRU was to ensure a standing civilian corps of PCRU staff, consultants, and long-term contractions, ready to deploy to crisis countries. Finally, the PCRU was to encapsulate best practices and lessons learned, filtering those into evolving doctrine and joint training exercises (Patrick and Brown 2007, 28–29).

In sum, Tony Blair laid the groundwork for one of Britain’s seminal joint institutions, but never addressed some inherent problems in its legitimacy and functions. By 2007, the PCRU was still merely staffing the PRT, rather than contributing to joint planning and assessment (Korski 2009, 18). In addition, the organization was resented by some FCO officials, who believed it was best to leave the responsibility of deploying civilian police to the Foreign Service (Krieger 2006, 18). The failure of the Blair administration to deal with these issues largely reflects the Prime Minister’s leadership style, which was people-centered and lacking organizational focus (Theakston 2010, 6).

Upon assuming the PM post, Gordon Brown undertook a general reorganization of government with the purpose of demonstrating a break with Tony Blair’s leadership (Theakston 2010, 5). With DFID’s blessing, the Brown administration set forth to reform the PCRU in September 2007. The revamped organization was renamed to Stabilization Unit (SU) (Harriman, Weibull, and Wiklund 2012, 23; Stepputat and Greenwood 2013, 17). With a permanent staff of 60 employees from across government and a budget of £7 million (increased to £12.7 million in 2010), the SU boasted more resources,
responsibilities, and leeway than its predecessor to contribute to joint civil-military planning (House of Commons Defence Committee 2010, 29; Ucko and Egnell 2013, 96). The SU managed the Civilian Stabilization Group (CSG), a roster of approximately 800 deployable civilian experts from NGOs, as well as an additional two hundred Civil Service Stabilization Experts from different government ministries, specifically trained to operate in conflict environments (Below and Belzile 2013, 7).

The SU was conceived as a mediator and a neutral platform for inter-departmental interaction. With no single minister in charge, its influence in the Cabinet Office remained limited. However, maintaining a status of neutrality was the only way for the SU to assert its legitimacy with the ministries (Burke 2010, 40–41; Harriman, Weibull, and Wiklund 2012, 24-25). Both the MOD and DFID enjoyed close relationships with the SU (Below and Belzile 2013, 13; Clarke 2012, 33). By contrast, some resentment persisted within the FCO, fueled by perceptions that the Stabilization Unit was usurping the institutional responsibilities of the Foreign Service. Some FCO officials saw the mere existence of the SU as a testimony to their organization’s inability to assume an overarching coordination role, and an unpleasant reminder of inter-agency coherence failures during the British involvement in Iraq (Clarke 2012, 33).

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97 In order to provide a standing force of qualified personnel ready for deployment, while simultaneously minimizing training costs for those who ultimately did not deploy, the SU maintained approximately 35% of its core cadre trained at any given time (House of Commons Defence Committee 2010, 32).

98 During Brown’s tenure, the Conservatives vocally advocated for giving the SU a stronger voice (Burke 2010, 40–41).

99 Some concerns persisted that the relationship between the SU and DFID was bordering on cooptation. By 2010, DFID was still paying almost all of the SU operational costs (Burke 2010, 40–41). The last three SU Directors were former DFID employees (Below and Belzile 2013, 13).
Opinions on the strategic influence of the SU are mixed, but there appears to be consensus that it generated important positive effects on lower levels (Below and Belzile 2013, 8). First, the SU eased some of the inter-departmental tension arising from differences in work styles, strategic planning, service delivery, and even DFID’s reservations about politicizing development aid and the effects of stabilization initiatives. Second, the SU raised awareness about specific complexities on the ground, which fed into a joint, inter-departmental understanding about the obstacles at hand. Based on a shared picture of the issues in the field, stabilization advisers at FOBs in Afghanistan passed up the chain their knowledge and recommendations. This bottom-up learning process supported the progress of stabilization initiatives (Stapleton 2014, 34). Finally, in the long run the work of the SU significantly enhanced the ability of Cabinet to neutralize bureaucratic tensions and rally the ministries around the WOG concept (Teuten 2010, 3). Overall, the SU played an important role in steering government agencies towards a more unified view, common objectives, and ultimately a shared strategy (Burke 2010, 40).

Strengthening the committee system was another of Brown’s attempts to correct the course established by the previous administration. During the first months of his premiership, Brown abolished the Committee on Security and Terrorism, and replaced it with the Ministerial Committee on National Security, International Relations and Development (NSID). This move clearly represented a break with Blair’s primary focus on the global war on terror, and a shift toward Brown’s personal interest in international development issues. The NSID was an inter-departmental Cabinet sub-committee tasked to clarify government priorities in countries experiencing instability (Devanny and Harris 2014, 20; Korski 2009, 20). In practice, the NSID’s operation was criticized for lacking
rigour in terms of the regularity of meetings and the attention given to pressing national security issues (Richards 2012, 174).

In an attempt to invite outside expertise into decision-making on national security, Brown proposed creating a National Security Forum (NSF). This idea took some time to materialize - the Forum held its first meeting more than a year afterwards. Most of the NSF members were civil servants, police and military officers, as well as some academics and businessmen. Much like the NSID, the NSF met only sporadically and garnered harsh criticism for its inadequacy. In the words of Conservative and Shadow Foreign Secretary William Hague, Brown set up “his own National Security Committee to sound like ours… He forgot about it, then it met only three times in 21 months despite two wars being in progress” (Devanny and Harris 2014, 20-21). Eventually, the NSF was discontinued under the Cameron administration (Devanny and Harris 2014, 20–21).

David Cameron’s first act as Prime Minister was to create a joint National Security Council (NSC), which would stimulate a more collective decision-making in foreign policy (Devanny and Harris 2014, 21). The NSC was aimed to embody the British WOG model outlined in the NSS: to become a key umbrella structure guiding cross-departmental cooperation, and uniting the efforts of all departments in dealing with British national security and security threats (HM Government 2010a, 16:34). Its goal was to forge closer ties between civilian ministries and the military establishment, ensure a more inclusive process of decision-making, and limit the powers of the PM to govern through bilateral one-on-one meetings with separate ministries, particularly as regards
overseas missions like Afghanistan (Bangham and Shah 2012, 6; Gordon 2010, 134; Korski 2009, 20).  

In terms of structure, the NSC lacked innovation, as it largely resembled the NSID previously set up by Gordon Brown. A joint inter-agency body composed of relevant ministers or state secretaries, the NSC has three permanent and several ad hoc committees, one of which (currently defunct) was on Afghanistan (Devanny and Harris 2014, 25). The Secretariat, based within the Cabinet Office, includes representatives from DFID, MOD, FCO, Treasury and other relevant departments (United Kingdom Parliament 2010).

Where the NSC surpassed NSID was in the frequency of meetings, the breadth of topics on the agenda, and the level of commitment on behalf of the Prime Minister (Devanny and Harris 2014, 22–23). Under Cameron’s chairmanship, the NSC met weekly, and until 2014 discussed Afghanistan every fortnight. While it lacked authority to overrule or replace ministerial decision-making, the NSC served to provide strategic direction in integrated planning, and to align departmental objectives (Barry 2015; HM Government 2010a, 16:9; Stepputat and Greenwood 2013, 18). Cameron personally declared he envisioned the NSC less as a strategic discussion forum and more as a platform for joint decision-making and oversight: “In the NSC we discuss strategy, but I want us to determine policy, I want us to agree [on] action, and I want us to check that we have done what we said we were going to do…” (Quoted in Devanny and Harris 2014, 31).

100 In the words of one senior diplomat, the NSC was a welcome change, because prior to its existence the only individuals with any say in foreign policy were “the Prime Minister and seventeen teenagers” (Devanny and Harris 2014, 22).
Evaluations of the NSC focus on three main aspects. First, barring discussions on fund allocations for the Conflict Pool, the NSC was much more involved in operational and tactical issues than in strategy formation: a fact that reflected Cameron’s personal vision for the organization (Devanny and Harris 2014, 31). Second, David Cameron’s chairmanship style, reticent to intervene until the last moment, resulted in some poor decisions in the beginning, such as excessively focusing on current challenges in Afghanistan without considering long-term threats. Third, the usefulness of the NSC as regards Afghanistan was modest, because the Afghanistan issue was already subject to intense cross-departmental cooperation in other formats. Overall, senior staff from civilian ministries evaluated the NSC positively, while MOD staff complained that its military component was minimal and required urgent expansion (Devanny and Harris 2014, 34).

From 2011 onwards, the Building Stability Overseas Board (BSOB) steered the implementation of the BSOS. Reporting to the three Secretaries of State, the Board consisted of Directors from FCO, DFID and MOD, as well as the Cabinet Office and other relevant departments. Among the specific responsibilities of the BSOB were to provide strategic guidance to the Stabilization Unit and the Conflict Pool, and to oversee the conflict pool’s resource plan and reforms. Several inter-departmental working groups contributed to the BSOS (Below and Belzile 2013, 7).

Following an internal review in 2012, the Cameron government carried out further targeted reforms within the SU, aiming to strengthen the organization’s influence in senior policy circles. A Director who also sat on the BSOB and participated in NSC

101 Some examples are the Integrated Approach Working Group, and the Building Stability Overseas Steering Group (Below and Belzile 2013, 6-7).
meetings was placed at the head of the SU. The Deputy heads of FCO, MOD and DFID formed a new Management Board that met monthly to supervise the reforms, as well as the operational work of the SU. Finally, in an attempt to mend the ostensibly weak relationship between the SU and the FCO, the Stabilization Unit offices were relocated from DFID into the Foreign Office building (Below and Belzile 2013, 8).

The remaining question is whether these institutions actually helped alleviate tensions and increase trust across departments. Certainly, bureaucratic squabbles over diverging goals, objectives and strategic approaches never completely disappeared (Farrell, Rynning, and Terriff 2013, 165). However, inter-departmental frictions generally decreased over time (Egnell 2009, 109; 111; House of Commons Defence Committee 2010, 24). The most notable positive changes occurred in DFID, which not only embraced the concept of stabilization, but also underwent an internal reorganization so as to better reflect the ministry’s priorities in adopting an integrated approach to fragility and conflict (Below and Belzile 2013, 12). In a report to the House of Commons Defence Committee, DFID representatives declared that their ministry no longer perceived a conflict between the objectives of poverty alleviation and security, and so the IDA did not impede DFID’s participation in stabilization operations (House of Commons Defence Committee 2010, 27). By 2010, DFID officials were reporting significant improvements in staff attitudes towards the military (House of Commons Defence Committee 2010, 25). This remarkable turnaround in a relatively short period of time is not easily explained by bureaucratic politics or strategic culture, both of which posit that organizational cultures are tough and resistant to change.
In sum, developments in the British WOG institutional framework hinged upon the priorities of the Prime Minister in office. Moreover, the PM’s leadership style largely determined how the institutions functioned. The Blair administration took the first steps in establishing a joint institutional framework, but developing these institutions was not a priority for Tony Blair. Consequently, the PCRU was created in a hurry, and the government failed to conduct much-needed follow-up reforms (Patrick and Brown 2007, 29). Gordon Brown was more active in this regard, and his personal interest in development issues was evident in the institutional reforms implemented during his tenure. But to Brown, distancing himself from the previous administration was more important than providing a genuine stimulus to collective government. With the exception of the SU reforms, Brown created an otherwise hollow institutional structure that did not survive the end of his term. After 2010, Cameron’s more aggressive approach to imposing a model of collective decision-making achieved more concrete results, in institutional reform as well as in practical cooperation across agencies.

Integration of Financial Resources

In comparison with Swedish and German models, the British WOG approach boasts a demonstrably sophisticated fund pooling mechanism. In 2001, the Blair government established the Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP). Managed by the FCO and supervised by a committee of ministers, the GCPP was tasked with implementing a WOG approach to funding in weak states, including in Afghanistan.\(^{102}\)

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\(^{102}\) The process was spearheaded by DFID’s first secretary of state Clare Short, who supported the establishment of the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP), Britain’s first fund pooling mechanism. Later on the same year, the GCPP was created to fund initiatives beyond Africa (Patrick and Brown 2007, 10).
Initially, the fund received equal contributions from the FCO, DFID and the MOD (Patrick and Brown 2007, 19–20).\textsuperscript{103} Initiatives eligible for funding included short and medium-term stabilization projects in Afghanistan (Harriman, Weibull, and Wiklund 2012, 30–31; International Development Committee 2008, 55).\textsuperscript{104} The total budget for 2006 was £74 million, £20 million of which was destined for Afghanistan and split between a general country strategy and a counternarcotics strategy (Patrick and Brown 2007, 21–22). Stabilization activities could also be funded from the ministries’ own resources, which resulted in a complicated funding structure that limited the ability of Ministers to strategically shape investments (Gordon 2010, 133–34).

Within the GCPP, joint strategies were developed on the basis of a tri-partite bidding process. Winning bids were sent to a tri-departmental steering committee that recommended a course of action to Cabinet. Funding was allotted based on several criteria: the importance of the conflict to UK interests, the potential of achieving a positive impact on the ground, the likelihood an inter-agency approach would generate powerful synergies, and the ability to draw in other potential donors (Patrick and Brown 2007, 19–20).

Assessments of the GCPP’s performance are mixed. In the words of one senior-level employee, “joining up money does not ensure joined strategy” (Patrick and Brown 2007, 24). Some government officials argued that the fund encouraged open inter-agency

\textsuperscript{103} Later on this system changed, allowing for the GCPP to be funded by additional resources outside of ministerial budgets (Patrick and Brown 2007, 19–20).

\textsuperscript{104} Initially, the GCPP was financing long-term projects as well. However, ministries constantly fought over prioritizing poverty alleviation versus security projects. As a result, a natural division of labour occurred between the ACPP and the GCPP. The ACPP started financing long-term state-building initiatives, while the GCPP focused on short-term stabilization (Harriman, Weibull, and Wiklund 2012, 30–31).
dialogue. Drafting common strategies brought inter-departmental tensions in the open, spearheading a frank dialogue on thorny issues that the ministries were eventually forced to resolve (Patrick and Brown 2007, 21–22). Other witnesses worried that the limited resources of the GCPP lacked flexibility, and were unlikely to have a tangible long-term impact on the ground (Patrick and Brown 2007, 22; 24).

A larger risk was the temptation to usurp GCPP funding. Stabilization activities in Afghanistan and Iraq were already using up more than half of the funds initially meant for Africa (Gordon 2010, 133–34). With individual ministerial budgets programmed well in advance, departments had no access to contingency funds in times of unexpected emergencies. This increased the likelihood of raiding the pools for short-term, stop-gap measures, to the detriment of long-term development initiatives (Patrick and Brown 2007, 18). The FCO and MOD were particularly tempted to rely on flexible funding from the GPCC in emergency situations. As a result, managing the conflict pool turned into a constant negotiation act. To ensure that funds were not enabling strategies that served a single department’s aims, the GCPP was required to report annually on how a joint approach was achieved on the ground (Patrick and Brown 2007, 23-24).  

The pooling system was reformed during the Brown administration. In 2008, a single institution, named the Conflict Prevention Pool (CPP), was created to work on prevention only. A separate Stabilization Aid Fund was to focus on initiatives in hot conflict zones, such as Afghanistan. Overall guidelines and prioritizing among countries was set out in the NSS, while decisions on how to invest the funds were delegated to the operational and tactical levels. This new setup improved, although did not entirely

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105 Patrick and Brown argue that placing the conflict pool under the control of the Cabinet Office would have done away with the issue of usurping funds, but Cabinet refused to assume such a role (2007, 23-24).

More reforms followed after the Conservative-Liberal coalition assumed power in 2010. David Cameron’s government declared the fund pooling system a “core government asset,” and pledged to increase the funds to £300 million by 2014/2015 (HM Government 2010b, 1:45; Stepputat and Greenwood 2013, 18). The CPP and Stabilization Aid Fund were merged into a single Conflict Pool (CP), which was funded independently of ministerial budgets and financed the Stabilization Unit, among other things (Harriman, Weibull, and Wiklund 2012, 30–31; Stepputat and Greenwood 2013, 18). In 2012-2013, the CP allocation for Afghanistan was upwards of £69 million (Below and Belzile 2013, 9).

Thus revamped, the Conflict Pool was a joint institution that operated on the basis of a tri-partite process. Specific country strategies and goals were developed in negotiations between deployed personnel and officials in London. Regional or country teams from the FCO, DFID or the MOD applied to an interdepartmental project board, and if selected, took charge of project implementation. Strategic management was in the hands of a senior Program Board, consisting of a Senior Responsible Owner (SRO, or the relevant Regional Director) from either FCO or DFID, and representatives from the other ministries. Formally, the SRO was in charge of project results and delivery, while the Program Board retained control over expenditures more broadly. A tri-partite Conflict Pool Secretariat supported the work of project teams on the ground. Funds went into programs in local capacity building, political system transparency, and accountability in the security and justice sectors (Below and Belzile 2013, 9–10).
Critics point out that the CP managed relatively small amounts of money, which was arguably out of step with the growing overall British contribution to Afghanistan (Teuten 2010, 4). Two independent government reviews in 2012 criticized the pool’s lack of strategic effect and performance measurement system, as well as its cumbersome decision-making structure (Below and Belzile 2013, 10–11). However, Below and Belzile note that there were benefits from a more time-consuming decision-making process: it stimulated a feeling of joint ownership among departments, with ministries equally engaged in sharing expertise and capacity in project design (Below and Belzile 2013, 10–11). Moreover, the CP’s flexible nature enabled advanced allocation of funds in COIN operations, which in Teuten’s view was the greatest benefit of the pooling structure (2010, 4). Weiss, Stefani and Spanger note that fund pooling practices stimulated smoother inter-departmental relations (2010). Studies based on personal interviews reveal that individuals directly involved with the CP considered it a catalyst of inter-agency planning, shared analysis, and cross-departmental relationship building, both in London and in the field (Weiss, Spanger, and Meurs 2010).

Since the military otherwise lacked its own resources for stabilization activities, the MOD was particularly appreciative of the Conflict Pools. As for DFID, Below and Belzile found that “DFID does not need the Conflict Pool but the Pool needs DFID for its thematic and geographical expertise” (2013, 12). While this suggests a one-sided dependency relationship, in all likelihood the reality was more nuanced. Stepputat and Greenwood argue that DFID benefitted significantly from the CP, particularly because the pools propelled inter-agency cooperation in areas not covered by ODA funds, such as DDR and security sector reform, where DFID could draw on expertise from the MOD.
and the FCO while minimizing possibilities for outside encroachment on its organizational mandate and purpose (2013, 17). The pools also allowed DFID to participate in all steps of the planning process, making it easier for the ministry to ensure long-term development needs were taken into account (Below and Belzile 2013, 10–11). It is true that in time, as DFID’s bilateral programs grew, the ministry decreased its spending for small-scale projects through the Conflict Pool. However, DFID remained actively involved in the inter-agency decision-making and joint planning processes, contributing expertise and consulting on long-term development issues (Below and Belzile 2013, 12).

Three conclusions stem from the above. First, the British fund pooling mechanism progressively improved with each subsequent administration. During Blair’s tenure, lack of adequate oversight and reforms created a permissive environment for flourishing turf wars over funding. These findings do not fit well with strategic culture theory, which predicts that a commonly shared understanding of how the pools should be used would mitigate bureaucratic tensions. A more likely explanation is that the CP reforms reflect a gradual process of learning and adaptation on the strategic level.

Second, perhaps the most important lesson from the Cameron administration was that fund pooling has the potential to increase WOG integration when it is strategically formulated as an additional resource to existing ministerial funding (Below and Belzile 2013, 13). The combination of ODA and non-ODA resources was thought to increase the pool’s flexibility, and helped attract larger donors to relevant projects (Below and Belzile 2013, 10–11). The additional resources provided by the conflict pools stimulated bottom-
up joint ventures, ensuring a good balance between top-down and bottom-up initiatives (Weiss, Spanger, and Meurs 2010).

Third, in contrast to the German Stabilization Fund, which was controlled and operated exclusively by the Federal Foreign Office, the British pools boasted a joint, tripartite decision-making structure. Moreover, the CP operated as part of a joint national strategy, and with firm buy-in from the three Secretaries of State and the Prime Minster. This did not entirely eliminate inter-departmental tensions, but participation on equal footing for all departments fostered a shared stake in selecting projects for funding. All this is to say that, while the German approach enhanced the division of labour between the civilian ministries, British fund pooling represents a genuine step forward in the WOG model.

**Joint Pre-Deployment Training**

Overall, joint training initiatives in Britain developed in a similar fashion as in Sweden and Germany. DFID and the FCO did not allocate specific resources to joint training (Harriman, Weibull, and Wiklund 2012, 33). For the military, training with civilians was part of the mandatory pre-deployment courses, but the time spent together was usually limited, and contingent upon the availability of civilian staff. In time, the Armed Forces made efforts to include more civilian perspectives into the regular military training curriculum. The Operational Training and Advisory Group (OPTAG), an external organization that arose after the experiences in Northern Ireland, developed training scenarios based on population-centric approaches, which were adapted to train staff deploying to Afghanistan (Krieger 2006, 15). Rather than conducting large group
training sessions, OPTAG operates on the “train the trainers” principle (Johnson et al. 2009, 167).

In 2007, the SU hosted a large-scale joint civil-military planning exercise. Staff from civilian ministries was invited, but attendance was voluntary and depended on whether they had time to step away from their offices for the duration of the training. The approximately 400 civilians on the SU roster remained subject to only a limited screening, and even more limited joint training. Members of the Joint CIMIC Group (former MSSG) were the only ones receiving training for non-kinetic stabilization missions (Teuten 2010, 4).

For years, civilians from the SU and DFID spent little to no time training with the military prior to deployment. Briefings for outgoing staff were somewhat belatedly updated to include psychological perspectives from different cultural viewpoints (Stapleton 2014, 35). Both FCO and DFID struggled with a severe shortage of adequately trained deployable staff for Afghanistan. According to a NAO survey conducted in 2010, 40% of DFID personnel still considered their pre-deployment training insufficient (Burke 2010, 38). Some officials from other departments believed DFID did not make adequate efforts to properly recruit and train personnel for Afghanistan (Clarke 2012, 34–35).

To address this issue, the traditionally separate ministerial training programs started including more elements of joint learning. The MOD was particularly active in inviting specialists from civilian departments to contribute to military training activities.

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106 Pashtu language skills were in short supply among deployed civilian staff, and stabilization advisers in the field were often forced to use subpar translators (Stapleton 2014, 35).
That same year, the military’s traditional Joint Venture annual exercise was civilian lead and based on a strategic plan produced in a joint effort (Rintakoski and Autti 2008, 197). Several ministers attended the Joint Venture exercise together for the first time (Korski 2009, 20). Despite the military’s best efforts to include civilians in its training initiatives, finding civilian colleagues who would be available for more than a few hours at a time remained difficult (Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 43).

In 2009, the MOD created the Defence Cultural Specialist Unit (DCSU) in an effort to improve linguistic and cultural training, as well as local environment awareness. The DSCU was to advise military commanders in overseas operations (Burke 2010, 31). In addition, the MOD and FCO joined SU staff as lecturers in the pre-deployment training of employees in the SU rosters (Harriman, Weibull, and Wiklund 2012, 29).

By 2010, there was a notable increase in cross-departmental cooperation around lessons learned, including more frequent joint debriefing of officers and joint research on issues of interest (United Kingdom Parliament 2010). In addition to operating a number of joint pre-deployment courses, in 2010 the SU participated in a joint audit of conflict skills for deployable staff, aimed at identifying areas for further training (Burke 2010, 40). The Stabilization Unit also revised a DFID guideline publication on QIPs conducted by CIMIC staff (Burke 2010, 40). The SU and MSSG conducted a number of joint training activities. SU and FCO staff participated in the design and execution of military training courses. Civilians also increasingly trained with the military as part of their regular training programs. In 2012, there were plans for further expansion of the

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107 Teuten argues that making the most of the joint lessons learning process was a challenge, because the continued polarization of the political dialogue around the Afghanistan mission significantly constrained lesson dissemination to wider audiences (2010, 5).
joint training initiatives of FCO and the Armed Forces (Harriman, Weibull, and Wiklund 2012, 33).

All this is to say that there are no mandatory joint training sessions that allow British soldiers and their civilian colleagues to spend extensive time together prior to deployment. Prior to 2010, direct oversight of WOG integration in the form of mandatory pre-deployment training sessions was lax. There existed a variety of voluntary training opportunities which functioned as indirect incentives, but the opportunities to avail of them were few and far between, especially for civilian staff. Overall, the military was more active than civilian ministries in providing joint training for outgoing staff. While there was a surge of training opportunities during the Cameron administration, more research is needed to determine to what extent staff from civilian ministries was able to participate on regular basis.
The Prime Minister Effect: Strategic Developments of the Whole-of-Government Approach in London

British WOG developments on the strategic level proceeded in three steps, as outlined in the table below:

**Table 6: Inter-Agency Cooperation in London, 2001-2014**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WOG Policy Developments</th>
<th>Institutions and Inter-Ministerial Cooperation</th>
<th>Financial Pooling</th>
<th>Joint Training</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001-2006</td>
<td>Coexistence</td>
<td>Coordinated Action</td>
<td>Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coordinated Action</td>
<td>Coordinated Action</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2007-2009</td>
<td>Coexistence $\rightarrow$ Coordinated Action</td>
<td>Coordinated Action $\rightarrow$ Integrated Action</td>
<td>Coexistence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2014</td>
<td>Coordinated Action $\rightarrow$ Integrated Action</td>
<td>Integrated Action</td>
<td>Coexistence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tony Blair’s administration conceptually situated inter-agency coordination within the Prime Minister’s preferred liberal interventionist discourse. Policy documents from 2001-2006 framed civilian reconstruction as a supportive element against the war on terror. The strategic rhetoric implied a convergence of the security and development streams, yet the official documents lacked specific guidelines on how to overcome the tension between stabilization and long-term development activities. The Joint Plan for Helmand, a flagship initiative for this period, fell well short of a genuine cross-departmental effort, and thus cannot be considered an indicator for WOG progress.

The second phase, 2007-2009 under Prime Minister Gordon Brown, marked a transition towards a traditional counterinsurgency rhetoric where civilian and military
activities were of equal importance. The policy language became more detailed and prescriptive in nature, clarifying the different types of civilian activities and providing concrete practical examples on how to avoid the risks of conducting stabilization efforts together with the military. Adopting the Helmand Road Map definitively propelled the WOG policy indicator on to the coordinated action level of the integration scale.

In 2010-2014, British policies further transitioned to integrated action. The Cameron administration made more WOG policy publications that the two previous governments taken together. More importantly, a WOG approach to post-conflict stabilization was framed as a main priority, with the policy language clearly reflecting increased pressure on departments to demonstrate results in adopting WOG principles. For all intents and purposes, the 2011 Building Stability Overseas Strategy represents Britain’s first overarching WOG strategy.

The next two elements on the WOG scale, joint institutions and financial pooling, developed in parallel manner, gradually progressing from coordinated action to integrated action. In 2001-2006, the Blair government established a blueprint for a joint institutional framework with the creation of the PCRU and the GCPP. However, these nascent institutions were plagued by structural, operational and legitimacy issues that the Blair administration failed to resolve.

During the second period, 2007-2009, the Brown government initiated a process of institutional reorganization. Coherence practices began a transition from coordinated action to integrated action. Reforming the existing joint bodies, notably the Stabilization Unit and the conflict pools, was Brown’s main contribution to the WOG model. Where the government failed was in expanding and strengthening the institutional framework.
Lacking sufficient oversight and senior-level commitment, Gordon Brown’s flagship initiatives, the NSID and NSF, largely failed to make a tangible impact on cross-government cooperation.

In the third phase, more reforms by the Conservative–Liberal coalition propelled the WOG model on to the integrated action level. Both the Conflict Pool and the National Security Council exemplify senior-level support and participation in joint decision-making, in the context of a joint national strategy. Another important achievement was the internal reorganization of DFID, which fully subsumed the ministry into the common strategic and operational plan for stabilization operations.

Joint pre-deployment training was the WOG component that developed least rapidly. The evidence suggests a slow progression along the WOG scale, from communication in 2001-2006 to coexistence in 2006-2009, when joint training programs were expanded and large-scale joint exercises gained more visibility. During the third phase, 2010-2014, the data suggests increased participation of soldiers and civilians in integrated exercises. While it appears that more short-term voluntary opportunities for cross-departmental training were available from 2010 onwards, Britain still lacked a mandatory training program requiring civilian and military staff to train together for extended periods prior to deployment. All this is to say that the joint training opportunities served as an indirect incentive, rather than as an active oversight mechanism to ensure improved civil-military interactions in the field.

In sum, British interpretations of the WOG concept were inextricably linked to stabilization operations, with a unification of the security and development streams that was not evident in Germany and Sweden. A British strategic culture, rooted in decades of
experience in third party stabilization and counterinsurgency operations, can explain the British approach to WOG. A large part of the progress in inter-agency coherence was based on institutional learning, but contrary to SC predictions, this adaptation was not always based on fine-tuning after receiving signals from the outside environment. At times, policymakers decidedly refused to modify joint policies, despite evidence to the contrary.

The events around the approval of the JPH are more consistent with the logic of bureaucratic non-evaluation. Broader theories of bureaucratic politics explain the intense cross-departmental struggles prior to 2010. Finally, BP theory is useful in understanding how institutional reform is easier when it coincides with the organizational interests of key ministries, as British experiences with the Stabilization Unit and the conflict pools suggest.

Overall, the evidence points to the personal preferences of the incumbent Prime Minister as the main catalyst of cross-government coherence in the UK. Unlike in Sweden and Germany, broad negotiations and political compromise were unnecessary in the British case. On the contrary, the PM’s personal vision largely determined cross-agency integration dynamics. Each time a new PM was elected, the makeup of British WOG changed: from an ancillary tool against the war on terror under Blair, to a traditional population-centric strategy with Brown, and finally to an overarching priority approach to foreign policy during the Cameron administration. Tony Blair, and to a lesser extent Gordon Brown, had non-inclusive leadership styles that created direct disincentives for cross-ministerial cooperation, exacerbated bureaucratic tension, and ultimately undermined WOG progress.
Sustaining the attention of the Prime Minister was seminal in carrying through WOG reforms. Blair’s tenure shows how important side issues could distract the PM, resulting in suboptimal WOG outcomes. In the British case, focusing events also created the permissive conditions for non-evaluation, largely by enabling influential individuals around the PM to stifle broad political debates on the Joint Plan for Helmand.

Both Tony Blair and Gordon Brown failed in the active oversight, and in providing direct incentives for collective government. The former failed to strengthen the functions and legitimacy of the joint institutions; the latter did not use the institutional framework to its full potential. Compared with his two predecessors, Cameron was more successful in publishing WOG-informed policies (including an over-arching WOG strategy), reforming and expanding the joint institutional framework, providing adequate oversight and pressure on ministries, and incentivizing a model of collective government. Cameron’s inclusive leadership style had its drawbacks, but it was altogether more appropriate for fostering a culture of joint working in the highest echelons of power.

In sum, the personalities of individuals endowed with authority had a large impact on British WOG developments. In London, this largely meant Prime Ministers. In the mission area, the influential individuals capable of affecting WOG dynamics were the PRT commanders. The next chapter further elaborates on this point, as it moves on to analyse civil-military coordination practices at the British PRTs in Afghanistan.
British Whole-of-Government Models in Northern and Southern Afghanistan

Previous studies have concluded that British WOG developments in the mission area were much more readily apparent than in London (Farrell 2016, 9; Teuten 2010, 3). Compared to their Swedish and German counterparts, British PRTs were more heavily staffed with civilians. The Helmand PRT in particular boasted a much more sophisticated joint command structure (Labarre 2011, 20). At the same time, Helmand was a much more dangerous deployment area than the Northern Afghanistan provinces where the first two British PRTs were located.

This chapter argues that security on the ground was only a permissive condition for British WOG integration. Rather, adjustments in the strategic terms of reference for civil-military cooperation were the root cause for WOG developments on the tactical level. As argued previously, these adjustments largely depended on the Prime Minister in office. During the Blair administration, the first British PRTs in Mazar-e-Sharif and Meymaneh operated under the principle of strict separation between security and development activities. These terms of reference restricted the scope of cross-government coherence at the outset, allowing for only a moderately integrated WOG model at best. More importantly, a key permissive condition for achieving this best-case scenario was a peaceful local environment. This plan worked well in the Northern provinces. However, when the same PRT blueprint was transplanted to the much more volatile south, the results for civil-military cooperation were disastrous. Eventually, the Brown administration implemented the Helmand Road Map, a new strategic plan that united the
security and development streams under an overarching, traditional COIN model. This enabled the progression of British WOG towards a more integrated model.

Another factor with direct influence on tactical WOG developments was the level of discretion each administration granted individuals in positions of authority in the mission area. The higher the discretion, the more freedom leaders on the ground enjoyed to tailor operations according to their preferences. During Tony Blair’s premiership, commanders on the ground enjoyed ample freedom to make independent decisions, which resulted in some unilateral actions that were detrimental to civil-military cooperation. By contrast, Gordon Brown’s administration established joint structures that increased civilian oversight and restricted the ability of individual leaders to make one-sided decisions. In this context, and despite a continuously volatile operational environment, the British joint effort progressed to integrated action, the highest level on the WOG scale.

The chapter proceeds with an overview of the structure, operation and civil military cooperation of the first two PRTs in Mazar-e-Sharif and Meymaneh, Northern Afghanistan, which operated under British leadership between 2003 and 2006. What follows is an analysis of the Helmand PRT in southern Afghanistan, contrasting its operations under the Joint Plan for Helmand, and later on the Helmand Road Map. The chapter concludes with a summary of the main points.
British PRTs in Northern Afghanistan: Structure, Operation, and Civil-Military Cooperation

In the early 2000s, the Balkh and Faryab provinces in Northern Afghanistan were still one of the most stable in the country. Upon arrival, the UK applied a light footprint model under the assumptions of a peace support operation of a largely non-kinetic character. The PRTs in Mazar-e-Sharif and Meymaneh were relatively equal in size, approximately 100 and 70 staff strong, respectively. Both had a strong civilian component, with a triumvirate of DFID, FCO and MOD representatives jointly heading the operation. Military Mobile Observation Teams (MOTs) travelled around without heavy combat gear, and often lived in the surrounding villages (Gauster 2008, 28; Suhrke 2011, 7).

Staff at the Mazar-e-Sharif PRT regularly held joint briefings. The integrated command group, composed of civilian and military representatives, discussed security and development issues, and strove to make decisions on the basis of consensus (Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 44; Eronen 2008, 21). That said, in 2003-2006 the interactions between the military and the civilian contingent were mostly limited to information sharing. DFID worked independently with UNAMA on long-term development planning, and invited UNAMA representatives to the weekly PRT meetings (Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 44; Eronen 2008, 22). Cross-departmental tensions within the PRT were
negligible, although the same was not necessarily true of relations with outside actors (Labarre 2011, 12).\footnote{The Mazar-e-Sharif PRT generally enjoyed a good reputation among the local population, although there is some evidence that approval ratings were lower in the countryside (Gauster 2008, 28).}

In 2003-2006, DFID allotted a total of £1 million annually for the PRTs, meaning that British development advisers had a relatively modest budget to spend on the ground (Eronen 2008, 22; Stapleton 2014, 28). One of the main tenets of the British light footprint model was that PRT staff would identify possibilities for projects, but avoid getting involved in implementation (Gauster 2008, 28). DFID only financed projects if no local NGO could feasibly carry out the task with similar success (Gauster 2008, 53). British soldiers shied away from the typical military-lead QIPs, focusing instead on liaising and power brokering with the local population, regular patrols, and security sector reform (Stapleton 2014, 26). In short, the PRT team as a whole made explicit efforts to avoid being associated with reconstruction activities (McNerney 2005, 38–39; Stapleton 2014, 27).

Occasionally, the military relied on DFID funding for small-scale infrastructure and other reconstruction projects (McNerney 2005, 41). Some of these rare initiatives included renovations of office buildings and police headquarters, a library in Mazar-e-Sharif, literacy courses for police personnel, or purchasing office equipment and uniforms for law enforcement and other government ministries (Gauster 2008, 54). Official reports from Save the Children suggest that, at least in the early days, the follow-up, supervision, and final evaluation of these initiatives were perfunctory. At times, these
occasional hearts and mind projects resulted in duplication of efforts and strained relations with NGOs operating in the same area (Save the Children 2004, 27).

All this is to say that the early UK PRTs in Northern Afghanistan mimicked the American ones in size, but came much closer to European models in terms of structure and operation (Eronen 2008, 20–21). The British soft intervention approach, based on a separation of the security and development streams, restricted the scope of WOG integration at the outset. Since the interaction between civilians and the military was largely limited to information sharing, inter-agency coherence in the field was predetermined to reach moderate levels at best. The evidence reveals no major inter-departmental tensions in the consensual decision-making process, but it appears likely that working in isolation did not require frequent negotiations or making important joint decisions on thorny issues. Overall, this strategy worked in the Northern regions, because they were relatively peaceful (Gauster 2008, 28; Suhrke 2011, 7). However, as explained below, this PRT model proved inviable when transplanted to the much more volatile Helmand province.

The British PRT in Lashkar Gah

There were two distinct phases in the existence of the British PRT in Lashkar Gah, Helmand province. From its opening in 2006 until 2008, the PRT operated under

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109 In one notable example from December 2003, the British PRT set up a health camp in downtown Sar-e-Pul, immediately across the street from a local health centre operated by Save the Children. Local militia was used to publicize the event, thus antagonizing the local population who usually feared them. In addition, patients qualified the level of care as suboptimal, and the behavior of medical personnel culturally inappropriate (Save the Children 2004, 27).

110 In fact, the Mazar-e-Sharif PRT provided the blueprint according to which the Swedish PRT developed (Eronen 2008, 20–21).
the premise of a peace support operation, as set out in the overarching strategy, the Joint
Plan for Helmand (JPH). From 2008 onwards, the Helmand Road Map superseded the
JPH, overhauling the PRT structure and strategy and causing a notable shift in the
patterns of civil-military cooperation. The following two sections examine each of these
two periods in turn, contrasting the achievements in terms of WOG integration.


As discussed in the previous chapter, for reasons of expediency the initial British
contingent deployed to Helmand under the strategic assumption of a peace support
operation. Defense Secretary John Reid notoriously stated that the UK would be happy to
complete the mission “without a single shot fired” (Suhrke 2011, 7; 9). The tactical setup
in Helmand was based on only five weeks of field research (Fitzgerald 2014, 25). In
2005, after conducting a desk literature review study, a PCRU team composed of DFID,
FCO and Police Service staff deployed to Afghanistan to help generate a preliminary
support plan for the incoming British troops. Upon arrival, the group connected with a
military planning team from Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) that included a
POLAD and a DEVAD. The PCRU and PJHQ teams were supposed to develop a joint
plan, with the former focusing on civilian issues and the latter on military aspects
respectively (Fitzgerald 2014, 20).

Relations among the planning team members were strained at first, not least
because the PCRU was a relatively new institution that generated some suspicion in other
departments. However, the PCRU team leader was an expert with extensive military
experience, in Iraq as well as in other stabilization and post-conflict scenarios. The
civilian leader’s military background helped smooth out matters between the two teams (Fitzgerald 2014, 20).

In December 2005, the planning team presented the official proposal for the JPH to the Cabinet Office with the explicit disclaimer that the results were inconclusive, and more information was needed before sending a Task Force to Helmand. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the government ignored the warning, and maintained the originally scheduled deployment time (Farrell 2013, 118). In April 2006, the Sixteenth Air Assault Brigade deployed to take charge of the Task Force Helmand (TFH). The overall plan was to conform to an “ink spot strategy,” whereby the British would work jointly to take hold of key town centres and use them as bases to gradually spread out. DFID and FCO were to commence joint government and development initiatives in the area between the provincial capital Lashkar Gar and Gereshk. The British military was tasked with raiding areas and clearing them of insurgents (King 2012, 28).

All this is to say that staff sought to replicate the structure of the PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif, which had enjoyed a reasonable success in the North (Suhrke 2011, 7; 9). The Helmand PRT was to be headed by a Triumvirate committee of FCO, MOD and DFID representatives, based on consensus decision-making where civilian perspectives would stand at least on the same footing, if not above, military concerns. One problem with this arrangement was that the Mazar-e-Sharif blueprint did not reflect the vast differences in the operational environment in southwestern Afghanistan, which required a much tighter organizational structure in order to achieve objectives (Gordon 2010, 130–31).

Violence broke out as soon as the British arrived in Helmand. Throughout the summer of 2006, the local environment became less and less permissive (Farrell and
Staff faced considerable challenges in implementing the original strategy. The civilian contingent was largely confined to the military camp. With no access to the local population, the civilians were unable to conduct larger development and governance projects (Stapleton 2014, 31; Thruelsen 2008, 8; Ucko and Egnell 2013, 93). During one month in 2008, 75% of all civilian activities planned in Lashkar Gah were discontinued (Burke 2010, 38–39). Even scaling down large development projects to QIPs did not help, as local contractors were often intimidated or killed (Suhrke 2011, 10).

It soon became obvious that the peace support blueprint under which the mission was operating was incongruous with the operational reality, and thus a major reconceptualization of the JPH was required (Farrell 2013, 118; Suhrke 2011, 8). Instead of correcting course, senior-level officials in London worried about the excessive kinetic activity and demanded to see more reconstruction, as this was how the operation was initially presented to the public (Ucko and Egnell 2013, 92). Meanwhile, the British military in Helmand was in the middle of fighting a war (Ucko and Egnell 2013, 82; 93). Consistently shorted of adequate resources and equipment, and with insufficient numbers of Afghan National Security Forces to rely upon, the British forces found it difficult to carry out clear-hold-build operations. Completing the “hold” step proved particularly challenging, as the military repeatedly fought to clear the same areas (Auerswald and Saideman 2016, 122). Moreover, the wide discrepancies between the political rhetoric and the actions of personnel on the ground fueled scathing critiques of Whitehall for failing to provide adequate top-down direction and concrete guidance on civil-military cooperation (Barry 2015).
On the ground, the British forces had been under heavy pressure from the local authorities to cover more areas in the northern parts of Helmand province. After some initial resistance, the Sixteenth Air Assault Brigade decided to spread out the troops to more districts than originally planned. According to an investigation by the House of Commons Defence Committee, this decision was made by the commander on the tactical level, largely as a result of lacking explicit instructions from London (2013, 85–86). Brigadier General Ed Butler, commander of the Sixteenth Air Assault Brigade, received little strategic or operational guidance from the MOD or PJHQ prior to his deployment. His only instructions were to operate within the framework of the JPH, but precisely what that meant given the circumstances on the ground was left to the commander’s own interpretation (Auerswald and Saideman 2016, 120). The change of strategy was not presented to Cabinet for approval, as it appeared that politicians in London were not properly informed in time (Ucko and Egnell 2013, 86; 92).111

In short, the Sixteenth Air Assault Brigade discarded the original cross-departmental plan and drafted its own, circumventing consultations with FCO and DFID (Korski 2009, 18). Spread out too thin and under heavy attack, the British Armed Forces were forced to prioritize military objectives, and thus could not support their civilian colleagues in larger development and governance projects (Stapleton 2014, 26–27; Ucko and Egnell 2013, 92). Ucko and Egnell argue that veering off course in this manner violated the British counterinsurgency principle of close civil-military cooperation, and put the final nail in an already weak joint strategy (2013, 85–86).

111 There is some disagreement in the literature as to whether or not the decision to disperse the troops was sanctioned by the PJHQ. Korski argues it was not; Ucko and Egnell state that PJHQ approved the change of strategy (Korski 2009, 18; Ucko and Egnell 2013, 86). Whichever is true, the bottom line here is that the military commander was given discretion to change the course of the previously agreed strategy.
Given all of the above, cooperation on joint projects was minimal during the first two years in Helmand. The JPH had designated a total of £6 million for small-scale development projects in 2006-2007 (Farrell and Gordon 2009, 20). Short-term, military QIPs were financed by a smaller MOD fund that provided military commanders with “pocket money” of £40,000 per month (Maley 2014, 31). In highly volatile environments, military-lead hearts and minds projects were seen as an important contribution to force protection, so the PRT placed a premium on these types of initiatives. Some COs lamented that the pocket fund was negligible in comparison to the large sums handled by the militaries of other nations, especially the US. Others disagreed, arguing that throwing cash at a problem would not necessarily ensure achieving military objectives (House of Commons Defence Committee 2010, 52). The point here is that such short-term, stop-gap measures represented a notable departure from the previous British experiences in Northern Afghanistan, where engaging in QIPs was considered inappropriate (Maley 2014, 31; Stapleton 2014, 30). In addition, DFID’s strong resistance to working alongside the military resulted in slow and inadequate deployment of financial resources to Helmand (Korski 2009, 16).

Within the PRT, relations between civilians and the military were strained from the start, not least because the Sixteenth Air Assault Brigade failed to consult the civilian ministries when it decided to abandon the ink spot strategy (Korski 2009, 9). Another thorny issue was diverging interpretations of the level of threat considered acceptable to go out and conduct development activities. Soldiers felt that DFID representatives had an overly restrictive definition of a safe operating environment, and hence did not move in

112 In addition, DFID provided £30 million for a rural livelihood programme, to be channeled through the Afghan Ministry for Reconstruction and Rural Development (Farrell and Gordon 2009, 20).
fast enough to exploit opportunities for reconstruction in recently cleared areas (King 2012, 38). Some senior-level military officials, including Brigadier General Ed Butler, lamented that their civilian colleagues failed to appreciate the difficulties in executing a joint plan in a highly volatile environment (Ucko and Egnell 2013, 93). In turn, the civilians criticized the military for prioritizing kinetic activities and executing reconstruction projects with dubious sustainable development outcomes (Gordon 2010, 131). Against the backdrop of increasingly negative progress assessments, both DFID and the FCO became less willing to post personnel to the PRT. All this further limited the overall scope of civilian activities, as well as the military’s ability to capitalize on military successes (Farrell and Gordon 2009, 20–21; Korski 2009, 19).

In sum, in 2006-2007 the integrated effort at the PRT Helmand was flailing. The imperative to survive in the field and face the harsh demands of the mission resulted in some ad hoc cooperation, but the effect of these initiatives on the overall joint effort was negligible (Farrell 2016, 9; Farrell, Rynning, and Terriff 2013, 165). Ucko and Egnell call this period a flagrant failure of civil-military cooperation on the ground (Ucko and Egnell 2013, 86-87).

Three main points emerge from the above. First, aside from the undeniable negative impact of a volatile operational environment, the possibilities for tactical WOG integration in 2006-2007 were already limited at the outset by the restrictive strategic terms of reference set out in the Joint Plan for Helmand. Replicating the Mazar-e-Sharif PRT blueprint in Helmand implied a strict separation of the diplomacy, security and development streams, and the non-involvement of DFID into counterinsurgency operations. Against this background, the most that could be expected was a moderate-
level WOG approach. Importantly, this best-case scenario hinged upon a permissive operational environment, which did not play out in southern Afghanistan. All this is to say that the rising insurgency was a permissive condition that enabled the disintegration of the British WOG model during the first two years in Helmand.

Second, even though in theory the Helmand PRT was headed by a triumvirate, in 2006-2007 final WOG outcomes were not a product of broad negotiations and compromise. Instead, all hinged upon the personal decision of the acting military commander. Brigadier Ed Butler could have chosen to keep his troops concentrated to the originally planned ink spots, and to support the civilian team in reconstruction. Instead, he decided to focus on clearing more districts, to the detriment of civilian activities. The fact that such a major change of course was not approved in London suggests that during Blair’s administration, military commanders had ample discretion to act as they saw fit.  

Third, the personalities of other influential individuals in the field also influenced the overall WOG model, although their impact was not as profound as that of the military commander. More specifically, professional backgrounds were important in deciding when to choose collaborative strategies. Individuals with previous experience in both civilian and military capacities were more likely to stimulate joint working and neutralize tensions. The example with the PCRU leader of the initial joint Helmand reconnaissance team illustrates these dynamics. To further elaborate on this point, the next section delves

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113 This conclusion is consistent with other studies, which find that Blair’s leadership style was hands off, unless something went wrong (Theakston 2010, 6).
into developments under the Helmand Road Map, and the influence of stabilization
advisers (STABADs) in shaping civil-military cooperation dynamics.

**Correcting Course: The Helmand Road Map, 2008-2014**

In 2007, an increase in troops in Afghanistan coincided with a shift of strategy
and the creation of a joint structure to support inter-agency activities in Helmand (Burke
2010, 38–39). Freshly deployed staff from the PCRU and the Fifty-Second Brigade
joined forces to develop the Helmand Road Map, a new civil-military plan specifically
designed to correct for the gap between strategic goals and operational reality that was
evident in the JPH (Farrell and Gordon 2009, 21; Farrell, Rynning, and Terriff 2013, 164;
House of Commons Defence Committee 2010, 50). Based on the Brigade’s operational
plan, the mission concept definitively shifted away from post-conflict peace support and
towards a politically-lead COIN approach with an emphasis on stabilization at the district
level (Burke 2010, 39; Stapleton 2014, 26; Wiklund et al. 2011, 17).

The HRM was admittedly built around military goals. Nonetheless, by bringing
the focus back to stabilization rather than defeating the Taliban, it introduced an
important reconceptualization of civil-military cooperation. Development initiatives were
no longer undertaken for their own sake, but as a means to achieve stabilization in the
context of an overarching counterinsurgency strategy (Stapleton 2014, 26). Population
safety and minimizing the level of disturbance to local livelihoods became major
priorities for the military when carrying out kinetic operations (Ucko and Egnell 2013,
95–96).
More elaborate and comprehensive than its predecessor, the HRM was based on a bottom-up approach (Suhrke 2011, 16). The strategy design reflected wide consultations from practitioners and people in the field, particularly the PRT staff from the previous two years (Farrell and Gordon 2009, 21). Initial plans envisaged approximately forty civilian advisers, covering the five districts held by the British in Helmand province. In addition to staff at the PRT compound, civilians were to deploy to Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) across the province. The goal was to increase trust in local authorities, and to form community structures and links with the local government (Suhrke 2011, 16).

2008-2009 was an eventful period for British WOG. The newly arrived Sixteenth Brigade capitalized on the achievements of its predecessor by coordinating joint activities through a civil-military Joint Targeting Board (Farrell and Gordon 2009, 22). In addition, the PRT structure underwent several reforms aimed at improving civil-military cohesion. First, the TFH and the civilian component were merged into the Combined Civil-Military Mission in Helmand (CMMH) (Burke 2010, 39). Coordination of civil-military activities was placed in the hands of the Helmand Executive Group, a joint organism comprised of the Deputy Commander of Task Force Helmand, the DFID representative, the FCO head of civilian operations, and the FCO representative for counternarcotics and rule of law (International Development Committee 2008, 55). The civilian elements were closely integrated specifically with CJ3 (current operations), CJ5 (planning), and CJ9 (CIMIC) military branches (Rintakoski and Autti 2008, 197).

In a deliberate effort to encourage joint decision-making, the military Task Force Helmand shared the same physical space with the civilian advisors (Farrell 2013, 114; International Development Committee 2008, 54). Egnell argues that living and working
under the same roof went a long way in enhancing the joint planning process (Egnell 2011, 310). A joint planning methodology was used to produce campaign plans and set priorities for civil-military operations (Rintakoski and Autti 2008, 197). Eight steps of action guided all joint projects, from conception all the way through to implementation. These steps started with identifying priorities and desired effects from a civilian perspective. What followed was a joint decision on possible actions to take, joint preparation efforts, and developing a joint resource and action plan based on individual assessments of available resources. Plans usually involved a military-lead initiative immediately followed by civilian stabilization activities (Thruelsen 2008, 7–8).

This blueprint from the compound in Lashkar Gah was then replicated at the Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) across the district. In 2009, the first District Stabilization Teams (DSTs) deployed to four FOBs: Gereshk, Musa Qaleh, Garmsir and Sangin. The DSTs hosted a joint civil-military team of approximately 10 officials within the respective battle group (Burke 2010, 39). DSTs consisted of a stabilization adviser (STABAD, usually MOD civil servants), a political adviser, other civilian experts on specific subjects (i.e. agriculture), and either a UK Military Stabilisation Support Team (MSST), a US Civil Affairs Team, or a Danish CIMIC (Civil Military Co-operation) Support Team. The major task of the DSTs was to coordinate civil-military initiatives with the District Regimental, Battle Group or Battalion Headquarters (Boone 2009; United Kingdom Parliament 2010).

On the district level, the priority was developing major city centres and gaining the support of the local population (Teuten 2010, 4). It soon became clear that civilians were most useful when working as defence policy advisers directly with Brigade and
Divisional commanders (Stapleton 2014, 35). A triumvirate of equal representation of FCO, DFID and the Armed Forces produced a single joint blueprint, the District Stabilization Plan. Formally, the plan was civilian-owned, and approved by the Helmand Board which included the provincial governor, the PRT head and the ISAF representative in command. Afghan authorities participated in the development of the plan objectives, and were tasked with implementation (Stapleton 2014, 35–36). The Plan engaged the district authorities in political, governance, capacity-building and stability-related ventures, including after large-scale COIN operations (Stapleton 2014, 34–35).

Groups of five to six military personnel, called Military Stabilization Support Teams (MSSTs), served as the connecting brink between the TFH Battle Group and the PRT (Wiklund et al. 2011, 20). MSSTs were designed to enhance the civilian effect, to support project implementation, and to fill in for DSTs whenever the local environment was not permissive to civilian presence (Egnell 2011, 305; Farrell and Gordon 2009, 24; Stapleton 2014, 26; Wiklund et al. 2011, 21–22). The Task Force Battlegroup provided the necessary security protection for civilians and MSSTs working in the field (Teuten 2010, 4).

Progress reporting from the field was done jointly. A team of approximately 50 civilian staff headed the data-gathering process, and regularly dispatched reports to Whitehall through the Ambassador in Kabul (Burke 2010, 40). To measure the effectiveness of newly implemented civilian activities, the 52 Brigade also developed a new Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework (TCAF) (Farrell and Gordon 2009, 21–22).
In sum, the CMMH was a model for civilian-lead supervision of stabilization operations, in which planning, analysis, implementation, intelligence gathering, and media communications were conducted jointly (Burke 2010, 39). Notably more sophisticated than the previous cooperation framework, the CMMH’s detailed planning steps, regular reports, and joint assessment tools permitted a tighter oversight of the civil-military effort, and restricted the ability of single individuals to alter the course of the mission.

Another notable feat was switching to civilian PRT leadership in 2008. Reforming the PRT structure was specifically aimed at improving coherence in the field by unifying chains of command and overcoming the loss of knowledge resulting from short-term military rotations. The UK Senior Representative for Southern Afghanistan was given command of the PRT, and received a rank equivalent of a two-star major general. Deployment rotations for the civilian leader were set for one year at a minimum, with most representatives staying in Afghanistan for two years. The military commander of the Task Force in Lashkar Gah became nominally subordinate to the senior civilian official (Stapleton 2014, 30). While the civilian head was officially in charge of the overall stabilization and civil-military efforts, he had no authority to direct kinetic operations, and received guidance from the TFH Deputy Commander on military matters (Wiklund et al. 2011, 18).

It took the military time to adjust to the switch to civilian PRT leadership (Stepputat and Greenwood 2013, 18). Within the Armed Forces, some voices expressed a preference for reverting to the previous military leadership structure (Gordon 2010, 130–31). Gordon argues that formally establishing a civilian head had little effect on civil-
military cooperation within the PRT (2010, 130–31). Stapleton concurs that inter-institutional rivalries did not disappear; however, the civilian leadership stimulated shared discussions and civilian participation in the analysis of challenges faced in stabilizing already secured areas (2014, 27–30). Farrell notes that, while some civil-military tensions did remain, switching to civilian PRT leadership constituted a step in the right direction (Farrell 2013, 114).

Shifting gears in the mission area took time. Kinetic operations dominated over population-centric approaches until well into 2010 (Egnell 2011, 308). The District Stabilization Plan represented a unity of effort, but challenges remained as to sticking to the original objectives and the capacity of the local population to implement them (Stapleton 2014, 35–36). In 2008, there was evidence of progress in joint project planning, but some issues remained with regards to security protection and allocation of funds for a variety of joint projects (Marston 2008, 3).

Some coherence failures occurred along the chain of command. Andersen finds that some PRT heads felt they wasted a significant amount of time lobbying Embassy and government staff, while the Embassy complained that the PRT leader reported directly to Whitehall, thus isolating Embassy personnel (2014, 61). In addition, Stapleton argues that senior administration officials from both the military and civilian ministries failed to fully appreciate the contribution of STABADs on the tactical level. Top-level staff did not always make full use of the advisers’ specific knowledge on complex sociopolitical
realities and on the appropriate behavior in order to maximize stabilization outcomes (Stapleton 2014, 36).114

Barring these difficulties, civil-military cooperation in Helmand intensified after the implementation of the HRM (Foreign Affairs Committee 2009). In the first place, more civilians started deploying to the PRT (Stapleton 2014, 30). In 2006, the civilian contingent had consisted of one development advisor, one political adviser, and one senior UK representative for the southern province. Within two years, the civilian team had grown considerably (Stapleton 2014, 30). By 2010, there were between 80 and 90 civilians at the Helmand PRT, twenty of whom deployed at FOBs (Teuten 2010, 4; Ucko and Egnell 2013, 95–96).

Civilians started taking a more active part in decision-making on the ground (Farrell and Gordon 2009, 24). DFID started funding QIPs, such as infrastructure and support of agriculture, with clearly political ends: to contribute to a peace dividend in conflict areas. Among the most salient examples of joint initiatives was the Helmand River Basin Project (HRBP). It involved repairing an irrigation system, improving farming opportunities, and regulating water governance. Beyond the obvious long-term development benefits, the HRBP’s political purpose was to weaken the link between farmers and insurgents by reducing dependency on poppy seeds. The HRBP was a flagship example of inter-agency cooperation serving both development and stabilization goals within a commonly accepted counter-insurgency strategy (King 2012, 39).

114 One example of the military ignoring advice from STABADs concerned killing mid-level Taliban commanders, in hopes that would force the Taliban to negotiate. The tactic achieved the opposite effect, due to a failed understanding of social obligations in Afghan society: in the event of death, a Talib can rely on his brother to care for his family (Stapleton 2014, 36).
DFID also sought to actively participate in stabilization efforts alongside the FCO and the MOD, eventually becoming a key component of the overall COIN strategy (Wild and Elhawary 2012, 6). From 2008 onwards, there was a notable improvement in the conduct of British COIN operations overall (Farrell and Gordon 2009, 22). From the earliest stages of the “clear-hold-build” process, British forces relied on the stabilization advisers. STABADs consulted the military on a variety of issues, including population and internationally displaced persons’ movements, improving access to the area, and rebuilding local governance structures in order to create a plan of priorities for QIPs (International Development Committee 2008, 55). As a result of the efforts of the Stabilization Unit, civilian teams were able to deploy to areas cleared by the military within 24 to 48 hours (Burke 2010, 40).

Farrell et al. argue that despite some poor management and occasional lack of clear strategic direction, the clearing of central Helmand province in 2009-2010 went according to a well-organized civil-military plan. For civilian staff, insecurity remained the biggest concern (Farrell, Rynning, and Terriff 2013, 166). STABADs were unable to move freely around the province due to security concerns and the risk averseness of their superiors in London. By 2010, requirements were in place for civilians to be completely surrounded by the military whenever they traveled outside of the compound, which further limited the work of civilian advisers (Stapleton 2014, 37). STABADs were supposed to visit the Lashkar Gah PRT every six weeks, although in the end they visited every few months, and communicated mostly by email (Stapleton 2014, 34). Finally, some districts at times had to rely on only one stabilization adviser (Stapleton 2014, 40).
Tensions between civilian and military staff subsided over time, in no small part due to the establishment of the CMMH (House of Commons Defence Committee 2010, 35; King 2012, 38; Korski 2009, 18). A remaining source of friction between the MOD and FCO was the dual counterinsurgency-counternarcotics strategic goal of the Helmand mission. Poppy eradication became an FCO priority, but one that the military did not share. The British forces feared that conducting counternarcotics operations would upset farmers, lead to more fighting, and ultimately undermine the hearts and minds efforts of the counterinsurgency campaign (Clarke 2012, 35). Auerswald and Saideman argue that politicians in London advised field commanders to avoid getting involved in poppy eradication - what the authors call “soft caveats,” or restrictions on deployed forces that rarely translated into formal orders (2016, 118).

Finally, there remained some of the usual tension between DFID and the MOD as regards funding and management of reconstruction projects. Within the military, many still perceived DFID’s programs as an enabler to achieving military objectives. Others complained that DFID operated on time frames too long-term to observe tangible effects. From DFID’s perspective, military QIPs were conceived and delivered without regard for long-term sustainability or possible negative side effects. Civilians argued that they were unable to participate actively in military operational planning at least until 2008 (Gordon 2010, 131). Overall, however, military officials approved of the contribution of STABADs towards achieving a more integrated WOG. The decision to deploy SU and FCO staff throughout the districts, as opposed to focusing only on Lashkar Gah, was particularly well-evaluated as a lessons learned from the mistakes made in Basra (Burke 2010, 40).
Stapleton finds that, from the perspective of stabilization advisers, coherence on the ground was largely dependent on the personalities of deployed staff in the particular rotation (2014, 40). More specifically, one contributing factor appears to have been the perspective gained through previous experience in both civilian and military roles. Most STABADs were purposefully chosen for their military backgrounds, presuming they could speak the military language, and understand the challenges from a military, as well as a civilian perspective (Stapleton 2014, 36). The background of the civilian PRT leader also made a difference in the civil-military relationship. Whenever a leader was less effective, a well-trained and experienced staff member on the working level could offset the negative effects (House of Commons Defence Committee 2010, 50–51).

The joint institutions in London had positive ripple effects in the field, which also contributed to inter-agency coherence. Eronen argues that the conflict pools and Stabilization Unit had a positive impact on cooperation on the ground (2008, 21–22). Stapleton adds that the benefits of the SU were particularly visible at the FOBs across the district (2014, 34). There, STABADs actively contributed to ironing out organizational differences in approaches to planning and service delivery, forging a joint understanding of shared challenges and bridging the gap between civilian and military thinking (Stapleton 2014, 34). Harriman et al. note that the work of the Stabilization Unit spearheaded a bottom-up learning process that filtered up the organizational chains of command. Individuals returning home after deployment contributed to enhancing knowledge about other departments, increasing inter-departmental trust, and promoting a culture of civil-military cooperation (Harriman, Weibull, and Wiklund 2012, 24–25). These findings suggest that, apart from providing a sophisticated institutional structure
for joint planning and decision-making, the SU was also instrumental in the learning and
adaptation processes.

Farrell disagrees, arguing that cooperation in the field was not a product of
strategic-level causes, but of sharing the harsh realities of daily life in Helmand (2016,
10). Andersen adds that living together in Afghanistan lead to similar perceptions of the
challenges at hand, so staff on the ground agreed more easily on the way forward than
their counterparts back home. In London, ministries held long inter-agency debates on
issues that personnel in the field had long since resolved (Andersen 2014, 61; House of
Commons Defence Committee 2010, 25).

It certainly appears plausible that working under pressure in the field produced
incentives to resolve issues as quickly as possible, and that shared first-hand experiences
could have produced similar views on how to proceed. However, this argument is
problematic for largely two reasons. First, the logic is inconsistent with the evidence. In
fact, the data suggests that people on the ground often held very different perceptions of
the impeding challenges. Especially in 2006-2007, consensus on the way forward was far
from easy to achieve. The question remains why civilians and the military failed to see
eye to eye during this period, but started to get along better from 2008 onwards despite
no significant changes in the operational environment. Second, if deteriorating security
was a direct stimulus for inter-agency cooperation, then it remains unclear why final
outcomes vary across countries that all face a harsh operational environment. For
instance, Germany and Sweden also experienced an increasingly volatile security
situation in the North, albeit not as severe as in Helmand. Nonetheless, tactical WOG
integration in both countries proceeded in different ways, and never reached the level of the UK.

In contrast to Farrell and Andersen, Egnell argues the exact opposite: increased civil-military cooperation was a matter of a more permissive environment, resulting mostly from the arrival of US Marines to Helmand in spring 2009 (2011, 302-303-313). There are three problems with this logic. First, the Americans may have alleviated some of the pressure on the UK Armed Forces with regard to achieving specific military objectives, but it does not necessarily follow that the arrival of US soldiers was beneficial for the joint British civil-military effort. In fact, Farrell argues that by 2010, the US Marines Command, the US Embassy’s Regional Platform and the British PRT were still working at cross purposes, their development programs competing with one another (2016, 10).

Second, even if one accepts that the arrival of US troops improved the security conditions, the exact implications for WOG integration remain unclear. A safer operational environment would certainly permit implementing a larger quantity of projects. However, genuine progress in WOG integration is measured not by the number of projects implemented, but by the kind of joint activities the ministries undertake, as determined by the caveats in the strategic framework of cooperation set out in the country capital. In the North, the UK started off with a relatively restrictive WOG model that resulted in moderate-level integration even during the most peaceful times for the

\[\text{115}\] The Swedish and German experiences in Northern Afghanistan illustrate this point. Even during the most peaceful times in the Northern provinces, Swedish and German WOG barely reached the coexistence level. The main problem was not safety conditions on the ground, but rather a strategic inability to agree on merging security and development objectives under an overarching, politically motivated stabilization strategy.
Northern provinces. By contrast, despite rising violence in Helmand, the British WOG model progressed to a more integrated level, largely due to the structural reforms and the reconceptualization of the role of DFID that were part of the HRM. These findings suggest that the operational environment is a permissive condition, rather than a root cause of WOG integration.

**Summing Up British Experiences in Afghanistan**

British WOG developments on the tactical level are summarized in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PRT Structure</th>
<th>Joint Meetings</th>
<th>Financial Pooling/Joint Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003-2005</td>
<td>Coexistence</td>
<td>Coexistence</td>
<td>Coexistence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-2007</td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2014</td>
<td>Integrated Action</td>
<td>Coordinated Action → Integrated Action</td>
<td>Coordinated Action → Integrated Action</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The period from 2003 until the end of 2005 covers the operation in Northern Afghanistan, at the PRTs of Mazar-e-Sharif and Meymaneh. During this time, all WOG indicators stood at the coexistence level. The triumvirate leadership structure of the PRTs allowed for a limited degree of joint capacity analysis, although the strict separation of the security and development streams prevented the development of joint programming. A regular joint meeting agenda provided a formalized inter-agency coordination.
mechanism, but its powers were restricted to information sharing. Barring some isolated instances of ad hoc small project financing, the ministries did not engage in shared project funding or implementation. Coexisting within the PRT allowed for cross-departmental learning and developing a basic level of trust, but given the ministries worked largely in isolation, capitalizing on these trust dividends to achieve joint results was a non-starter.

The data from 2006 onwards reflects British tactical experiences in Helmand. The 2006-2007 period refers to the operation of the Helmand PRT in the framework of the Joint Plan for Helmand. During this time, all indicators regressed to “communication,” the lowest point on the WOG scale. Theoretically, the PRT structure, which previously stood at the coexistence level for the PRTs in the Northern provinces, remained unchanged. Yet in practice, the triumvirate leadership did not function in Helmand, as evidenced by the unilateral decision of the military commander of the Sixteenth Air Assault Brigade to redraw the plan without consultations with the civilian contingent. As the military spread out far and wide across the province to conduct kinetic operations, the implementation of joint activities practically stalled, making joint meetings moot. Tensions between civilians and the military increased, with clear indications of loss of trust across departments.

2008-2009 was a period of gradual transition towards integrated action, largely as a result of implementing the Helmand Road Map, which fully incorporated DFID into the planning and execution of traditional COIN operations. Switching to civilian PRT leadership did not give the senior civilian officer authority over the military, but it established a civilian-lead framework of joint action with clear joint planning and
implementation phases where civilian perspectives were prioritized and incorporated at every step. In contrast to Sweden and Germany, the British decided to install a civilian PRT leader much earlier in the mission. Moreover, the reform was meant as a genuine measure to increase inter-agency coherence, rather than a mere sign to locals of an imminent troop withdrawal. As regards the joint meetings, the data suggests a more active participation of civilians from 2008 onwards, despite remaining concerns with security, disagreements on fund allocation, and some lingering lack of trust across departments. Importantly, these results remain limited because no personal interviews with civilian representatives were conducted for this study. More detailed evidence from primary sources is needed to determine how effectively the civilian team contributed to joint planning and operations design.

Finally, 2010-2014 was a period of consolidation of the UK civil-military model, with all components transitioning to the integrated action level of the WOG scale. With DFID regularly participating in COIN operations, the UK civil-military effort achieved uniting the security and development streams under an overarching, civilian-lead, politically-motivated stabilization strategy. The British COIN model began taking into account civilian perspectives at all stages of the process, and fully involving civilians from both DFID and FCO in planning and execution of stabilization initiatives. Extending beyond the PRT and into a network of FOBs in the Helmand districts, the British WOG effort used a formalized, civilian-lead process of collaborative decision-making. Once again, these conclusions are limited by the lack of detailed first-hand data on how the daily meetings proceeded. More research is needed to determine how much and in what ways the civilian contingent contributed to the meetings. Personal interviews
with witnesses may uncover underlying tensions or limitations in the capacity of civilians to influence operations planning and design.

The question becomes why the British WOG model oscillated dramatically, first from moderate to low integration, and then back to fully integrated action. There is no question that the volatile environment in Helmand severely restricted the possibilities for joint project implementation, particularly in 2006-2007. However, there were two larger issues at stake. First, the initial design of the Helmand compound was modelled after the British PRTs in the North, which were based on separating the security and development streams. This framework truncated British WOG developments in southern Afghanistan, automatically relegating it to coexistence in the best of cases. More importantly, this best case scenario could only play out as long as the local environment remained relatively peaceful, which did not occur in Helmand. Put differently, the deteriorating security situation was not the main culprit, but a permissive condition that enabled the regression to a lower WOG in 2006-2007.

After 2008, a new Prime Minister in London meant a new strategy for Afghanistan, and with it came a reconceptualization of WOG that increased coherence in the field despite the volatility of the operational environment. This evidence fits with the Auerswald/Saideman logic, according to which a change of premiership in the country capital can have a tangible impact on performance in the field (2016, 112).

The second issue is that, particularly during Tony Blair’s tenure, military commanders had large discretion for independent action in the field, while adequate civilian oversight over the joint civil-military effort was lacking. In this case, the level of inter-agency coherence depended on the personal choice of the acting CO. The decision
of Brigadier General Ed Butler in 2006 to prioritize military objectives stunted WOG developments. By contrast, under the Brown administration, the ability of individuals to affect the broader course of the civil-military cooperation effort was significantly tempered by introducing a much more sophisticated mechanism for civilian oversight of stabilization operations. These findings are largely consistent with principal-agent logic, which posits that oversight measures curb agency slack.

The personal backgrounds of mid-level staff also had an impact on coherence. Individuals with a predominantly military background tended to prioritize military objectives, to the detriment of collaborative strategies. By contrast, persons with experience on both ends of the civilian-military spectrum, such as PCRU staff and STABADs, were more flexible and likely to place a premium on joint solutions, thus stimulating inter-agency coherence. Once again, all this suggests that the core driver of WOG coherence was not personalities, but rather personnel selection policies on the strategic level.

British WOG developments in Afghanistan do not fit well with the foundational element logic inherent in strategic culture theory. The foundational elements of the British PRT effort in Northern Afghanistan dictated little to no involvement of the military in large-scale civilian reconstruction initiatives. Foundational elements are expected to be highly resistant to change, yet in a matter of only two years (2006 to 2008), the British strategy made a definitive turn towards a fully integrated civil-military approach under a joint, politically-lead COIN strategy. This considerable change in foundational elements in such a short time runs counter to SC logic. Even if one accepts that policymakers in London fine-tuned regulatory practices in response to signals from
the outside environment, the foundational elements of the strategic culture should remain resilient. Moreover, strategic culture is a collective theory, and cannot provide satisfactory explanations of how, when and why single individuals are empowered to change strategy course on the ground, as the British case illustrates.

Bureaucratic politics theory helps explain how inter-departmental rivalries are exacerbated when working under duress in the field. The military’s occasional tendency to ignore civilian expertise, and their initial apprehensiveness towards a civilian PRT leadership, also fit with BP logic. Where BP falls short is in explaining why, in a relatively short period of time, the tensions between DFID and the Armed Forces subsided. On the tactical level, bureaucratic politics predicts rigid role conceptions on behalf of the military as well as DFID. This is inconsistent with the developments at the British PRT in Helmand, particularly after the establishment of the CMMH. On the one hand, it is not immediately apparent how a joint, civilian-lead and civilian-supervised planning and decision-making structure could advance the interests of the military establishment. On the contrary, BP theory dictates that the military would continuously resist the CMMH. Proponents of BP may argue that the Armed Forces saw in the CMMH an opportunity to advance their interests by tapping into DFID funding for counterinsurgency initiatives. Even so, the fact that DFID started funding QIPs and supporting COIN operations remains hard to explain. As argued in the previous chapter, there are strategic reasons for the shift in DFID’s concept of civil-military cooperation, for which bureaucratic politics alone cannot account.

To sum up, compared to Swedish and German models, Britain’s tactical-level coherence fluctuated more sharply, but also attained a higher level on the WOG scale,
even though the UK operated in a much more volatile environment than Sweden and Germany. Grassroots learning and institutional adaptation certainly contributed to strengthening the British WOG model over time. However, the main catalyst of British WOG coherence in the mission area was the implementation of the Helmand Road Map. Once again, these findings suggest that WOG dynamics are largely rooted in strategic-level causes. The final chapter summarizes the findings from all three cases, and proceeds to the implications for theory and policy.
Whole-of-Government Approaches in Afghanistan and Beyond

This research departed from the premise that whole-of-government approaches to peace operations are here to stay. Yet the factors that drive or obstruct civil-military cooperation, in country capitals and in the mission area, are still poorly understood. The analysis rested on two basic assumptions. First, when discussing integrated approaches, it is necessary to clarify what “more” or “less” integrated means in practical terms. WOG must be understood not as a static value, but as a continuum of inter-agency cooperation options (De Coning and Friis 2011, 9). Second, clarifying the reasons for progress and limits of coherence serves to produce more realistic and targeted policy recommendations for those nations interested in improving cross-agency integration.

The study proceeded in three steps. My first task was to develop a measuring tool for levels of civil-military coherence, on the strategic as well as on the tactical level. Next, I used this scale to measure WOG progress in Sweden, Germany, and the United Kingdom, over the entire duration of their contribution to the ISAF mission. As a final step, the study advanced propositions about the driving forces behind WOG patterns in each country, clearly distinguishing between root causes and permissive conditions. In many ways, this study responds to Auerswald and Saideman’s call for further research into how donor governments control their military and civilian departments in a mission area, and how the control mechanisms influence whole-of-government efforts overall (Auerswald and Saideman 2016, 224).

On the whole, the findings showed that national whole-of-government approaches were a product of domestic forces. The structure of the political institutions, and the preferences of individuals empowered by these institutions, were key determinants of
cross-government coherence. German and Swedish coalition governments operated on the basis of collective decision-making, as opposed to the British single party majority system that enabled single individuals with authority to make important policy decisions. Different decision-making processes produced different methods of national control over the military, diplomats, and development workers overseas, ultimately driving the variation in WOG outcomes. The findings also revealed that the personal preferences of individuals in positions of authority mattered, but much more in Britain than in Sweden and Germany. Cultural factors shaped WOG narratives, and determined what aspects of the civil-military relationship were considered most controversial in each country. The special role of the United States in the unique context of the Afghanistan mission was a factor all countries faced. In Sweden, the American campaign left an imprint on the political debates on Swedish WOG. For the UK, who shared operational space with the US, managing civil-military cooperation in theatre proved challenging. On balance, however, the overwhelming preponderance of the US was a constant, and thus insufficient in explaining WOG variation across the three case studies.

This chapter begins with a comparative summary of WOG progress across the three countries in question, on the home front as well as in Afghanistan. Next, I briefly discuss the main factors that propelled or hampered progress in each WOG model. What follows is a detailed review of the testable hypotheses in view of the main findings. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the implications for theory, policy, and areas for further research.
Unity of Effort? Comparing Whole-of-Government Outcomes in Sweden, Germany, and the United Kingdom

Table 8 summarizes final outcomes in WOG coherence in the national capitals of Sweden, Germany, and the United Kingdom, as of the end of 2014:

Table 8: Strategic Whole-of-Government Cooperation in Sweden, Germany, and the United Kingdom, 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>WOG Policy Developments</th>
<th>Institutions and Inter-Ministerial Cooperation</th>
<th>Financial Pooling</th>
<th>Joint Training</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sweden</strong></td>
<td>Communication Coexistence</td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Coexistence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Germany</strong></td>
<td>Communication Coexistence</td>
<td>Coordinated Action</td>
<td>Coexistence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>United Kingdom</strong></td>
<td>Coordinated Action → Integrated Action</td>
<td>Integrated Action</td>
<td>Integrated Action</td>
<td>Coexistence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sweden’s WOG model was the least advanced of the three. Coherence policies and financial pooling stood at the lowest end of the integration scale, while joint institutions, inter-ministerial meetings, and joint training were slightly more advanced. Next, Germany showed similar results in policy, institutional developments and joint training. However, the Germans achieved a more sophisticated fund pooling structure, which qualified as coordinated action. Finally, the United Kingdom boasts the most integrated WOG model, with all indicators except joint training reaching the highest level of the measuring scale.

Three conclusions follow from the data in Table 8. First, WOG policies in both Sweden and Germany were severely underdeveloped, whereas the United Kingdom
published a series of official papers clearly informed by WOG principles. As seen in chapters 3 and 5, the main reason was that, unlike in the UK, official statements in the Swedish and German coalition governments underwent a lengthy process of consultations, and the final text was significantly watered down so as to accommodate a variety of diverging interests.

Second, the greatest variance across countries was in financial pooling. Sweden avoided inter-ministerial budget sharing altogether. Germany adopted a moderately sophisticated pooling model, with one smaller-scale initiative (the Provincial Development Fund), and a Stabilization Fund that was large-scale, but did not include the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). The British conflict pools were the most advanced, with full participation of all three ministries and a joint decision-making mechanism.

Third, joint training registered the least variation across the board. In all three countries, the amount of voluntary national and multinational civil-military courses grew over the years. The British Stabilization Unit (SU) in particular was instrumental in ensuring the availability of trained civilians to deploy to conflict zones. Yet for many years, even SU staff rarely trained with the military. Neither country adopted a formal, standardized and mandatory joint pre-deployment training program for staff about to deploy overseas.

In a similar fashion, Table 9 illustrates the end state of tactical-level WOG coherence at the PRTs in Afghanistan, for all three nations:
Table 9: Tactical Whole-of-Government Cooperation in Sweden, Germany, and the United Kingdom, 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PRT Structure</th>
<th>Joint Meetings</th>
<th>Financial Pooling/Joint Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sweden</strong></td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Germany</strong></td>
<td>Co-existence</td>
<td>Co-existence → Coordinated Action</td>
<td>Coordinated Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>United Kingdom</strong></td>
<td>Integrated Action</td>
<td>Coordinated Action → Integrated Action</td>
<td>Coordinated Action</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Once again, Sweden ranks lowest on the WOG scale, with no significant variation across all indicators. Germany registered more advanced results in joint planning and execution of joint projects, largely due to the operation of the Provincial Development Fund and the Stabilization Fund. The UK occupies the highest step of the scale, particularly from 2008 onwards when the PRT Helmand transformed into a sophisticated joint and civilian-lead command structure, with joint planning, implementation, evaluation and reporting mechanisms.

In all three countries, the fluctuation in WOG outcomes over time usually followed balance of power shifts in country capitals, mostly as a result of elections. Each new government readjusted the WOG model according to its strategic vision and priorities. However, fundamental differences in domestic political structures resulted in diverging decision-making processes, between Sweden and Germany on the one hand and the UK on the other.
In Sweden and Germany, both coalition governments, decisions on inter-agency integration required extensive negotiations, which ultimately resulted in sacrificing the WOG issue in the name of sustaining a broad consensus on the Afghanistan engagement. Here, the personal preferences of influential individuals had only a limited effect on coherence patterns, because personal decisions could not override the broad political consensus.

By contrast, in the single-party parliamentary British system, the circle of individuals and institutions involved in decision-making was largely restricted to the Prime Minister’s office. Consequently, British inter-agency cooperation involved little negotiation and compromise, and depended mainly on the personal preferences of the incumbent Prime Minister. To further elaborate on these points, the following section presents a detailed discussion of the findings in view of each of the testable hypotheses.

**Towards a Whole-of-Government Approach: Drivers, Conditions, and Roadblocks**

The first three hypotheses explored the impact of bureaucratic politics on cross-government coherence. Hypothesis 1 posited that ministries that perceived WOG as serving their organizational purpose would support inter-agency integration, while those that considered WOG incompatible with their organizational interests would resist. This prediction is largely borne out by the data. Military establishments were by far the most enthusiastic supporters of WOG in all three countries. To various degrees, the military also tried, and failed, to pressure civilian ministries into adopting WOG as a frame of working relations in Afghanistan. The reasons for this eagerness were related to the need to redefine the role and purpose of military establishments after the end of the Cold War. These strategic considerations were reinforced by experiences from the field, where
deployed soldiers faced an overwhelming need and constantly asked for funds to implement reconstruction projects. The military took initiative to adopt and promote the WOG concept, because it initially understood WOG to mean dipping into development cooperation funding, which would greatly enhance the ability of soldiers to invest in military QIPs.

By contrast, civilian departments in all three nations were notably less enthusiastic about whole-of-government approaches. Foreign Offices, and particularly development cooperation agencies, perceived the military’s involvement in civilian activities as an encroachment on their organizational turf. Nonetheless, the data showed variation across the three countries in the levels of civilian support for a WOG approach. In Sweden, both the MFA and SIDA remained skeptical, to the point where the MFA was initially unwilling to post a Senior Civilian Representative to the PRT. One reason, interview data suggests, was that Swedish civilian departments tended to interpret the WOG concept not as a spectrum of cooperation options, but as a euphemism for COIN operations.

In Germany, civilian reservations towards WOG were less pronounced. Both the BMZ and the German Foreign Office (AA) funded small-scale military QIPs in Northern Afghanistan. With the Stabilization Fund in place, the Foreign Office became fully involved in counterinsurgency operations alongside the military. The BMZ firmly opposed the newly established stabilization role of the Foreign Office, and refused to participate in COIN operations. However, BMZ staff willingly and actively cooperated with the military in the framework of the smaller-scale, community-lead Provincial Development Fund.
Finally, the UK Foreign Office initially opposed a WOG approach, because it resented ceding control of the development cooperation budget to the newly founded DFID. Still, compared to the development cooperation agencies of Sweden and Germany, the British DFID registered the most dramatic turnaround in development policy thinking. In a matter of less than four years, DFID progressed from staunch opposition to WOG principles to full acceptance and participation in COIN operations.

In sum, bureaucratic turf wars abounded in all three countries, but the question remains whether they were the main cause of WOG progress. To this end, hypothesis 1a posited that a nation’s WOG model would advance only when all ministries simultaneously decided that it fit their respective organizational interests. There is little evidence to support this prediction. Despite intense bureaucratic resistance, cross-government coherence in Sweden and Germany moved to a more integrated stage. In Stockholm, the peak of the synergies ambition occurred in 2006-2009, even though interdepartmental turf wars over the concept were still raging. In Germany, the Bundestag approved the Stabilization Fund in the face of strong resistance from the BMZ. Similarly, British Prime Ministers implemented WOG-informed institutional and policy reforms in spite of DFID’s opposition. When DFID finally fell in line with the WOG concept in 2010, the British WOG model experienced a final surge.

At the PRT level, deployed staff often found it within their interest to help out one another, perhaps more often than their supervisors back home would have liked. The daily pressure of working in a conflict environment was a permissive condition that enabled spontaneous collaboration: *ad hoc* project monitoring and supervision, some cross-financing of QIPs, and civilians travelling in military convoys. But these instances
had to remain small-scale so as not to stir controversy at headquarters, and so their impact on the overall WOG model was negligible. All this is to say that, across the board, bureaucratic forces were not the main driver of WOG coherence.

Hypothesis 2 projected that civil-military tensions would persist over time. This prediction is largely unsupported by the findings. On the contrary, in all three countries, civilians and the military gradually adapted to one another, accepted the modus operandi of their counterparts, and the frictions from the early days gradually subsided. Here, the evidence points to four important conclusions. First, the root cause of inter-departmental tension was not necessarily incompatible organizational missions and objectives, but rather poor knowledge about how other ministries operated. As individuals learned more about the working rationale of other departments, unrealistic expectations were corrected, relations improved, and the levels of inter-departmental trust increased.

Second, decreased friction did not necessarily imply more cooperation across departments: that largely depended on strategic-level provisions for civil-military cooperation, as well as on the caveats civilian ministries imposed as regards working with the military. In Sweden, there were no clear civil-military cooperation provisions, and civilian ministries imposed tight caveats on their deployed staff. Consequently, staff in the field simply learned to stay out of each other’s way, and to operate in parallel, but not together. A similar process of accommodation occurred in Germany, where the caveats on the BMZ were much tighter than on AA.

The Bundeswehr eventually learned to respect the boundaries of the BMZ, and to rely instead on the German Foreign Office for stabilization operations. Finally, in Britain,
minimizing cross-departmental tensions contributed to a more advanced WOG model, but only after Whitehall implemented a complex overarching joint strategy for Helmand.

Third, this learning process was largely grassroots-based, and was particularly evident in the military. In 2014, the discourse of the military in both Sweden and Germany was substantially different from the early day enthusiasm to participate in reconstruction projects. Instead, the respondents from the Armed Forces repeatedly stressed that development and reconstruction were not appropriate tasks for soldiers, so the military should defer to civilian expertise in these areas. In the case of Germany, this bottom-up learning eventually resulted in a full reconceptualization of the role of the military in peace operations, moving away from the “development worker in uniform” model and towards support of the civilian effort through liaison and monitoring. The Armed Forces exhibited a level of flexibility and capacity to adapt that is generally inconsistent with bureaucratic politics logic. Put differently, bureaucratic politics theory is more useful in explaining the failures than the successes in inter-agency coherence.

Fourth, while friction between civilians and the military largely disappeared, some tension remained among civilian ministries. This was most evident in Germany, in the conflict between AA and BMZ over the Stabilization Fund. Although the practical issues surrounding the division of labour had long been worked out, interviews in 2014 and 2015 revealed lingering skepticism and lack of trust between the two civilian departments. These findings bring to light the issue of civil-civil cooperation, and suggest that institutional innovation that does not accommodate all ministries may exacerbate bureaucratic squabbles between civilian departments.
The next three hypotheses tested predictions derived from strategic culture theory. According to hypothesis 3, countries with a historical legacy of close cooperation between the military and civilian ministries would produce more integrated WOG models in Afghanistan than countries lacking such traditions. There is some evidence in support of this prediction. In 2001, the British WOG approach started off at a higher level on the WOG scale, and by 2014 it was significantly more advanced than Swedish and German models. This was in part due to Britain’s historical experience in imperial policing, peacekeeping, and counterinsurgency operations. Swedish and German ministries had a long tradition of civil-military cooperation within the national boundaries, but these experiences did not readily transfer overseas.

The corollary hypothesis 3a predicted that countries that shared similar strategic culture traits would achieve more similar WOG outcomes than countries with diverging strategic cultures. Both Sweden and Germany have traditionally championed foundational values of pacifism and multilateralism in foreign policy, as well as decentralization of power, departmental independence, and parliamentary control over engagements overseas. By contrast, Britain is a former empire with a history of military intervention and hearts and minds projects in conflict-prone areas, where the decision to commit troops abroad depends not on parliament, but on the Prime Minister. In short, Swedish and German WOG approaches are expected to be similar, while the British one would stand apart.

These predictions are largely unsupported by the evidence. In the end, the British WOG model was undoubtedly the most advanced, but strategic culture logic cannot satisfactorily explain the sharp fluctuations in coherence intensity. As shown in chapter 8,
British inter-agency cooperation in northern Afghanistan started off at a moderate level, then practically ceased in Helmand, and finally soared back to the highest level on the scale after 2008. As for Sweden and Germany, even though they shared some important strategic culture traits, there were significant differences between the Swedish and German WOG models. Inter-agency coherence in Sweden remained on the lowest end of the WOG scale, while Germany’s reached coordinated action.

Finally, hypothesis 4 posited that a WOG approach is largely a product of pressure from events in the mission area. Policymakers in country capitals were expected to take into account information from the outside, and adjust the inter-agency coherence framework accordingly. There is little support for this prediction across the three case studies. There was undoubtedly a process of grassroots learning that went up the chain of command to headquarters in country capitals. But a closer examination of the evidence suggests that bottom-up learning was not the primary trigger of major integration feats. In fact, politicians across the board often ignored, and in the case of Britain deliberately rejected, evidence from the mission area that did not fit with pre-established plans. In general, cross-government coherence progressed whenever new WOG-supporting coalitions, or Prime Ministers, came to power. In short, WOG models were shaped by domestic factors, such as political power shifts resulting from elections, and the nature of political bargaining (or lack thereof) inherent in domestic political structures.

Strategic culture arguments are more helpful if culture is understood as an indirect influence on how national political elites interpreted the WOG concept. As argued in chapters 3, 5 and 7, strategic narratives were largely shaped by practical considerations, such as expediency and accommodating the interests of the political opposition. In the
course of the bargaining, cultural aspects pre-determined the issues most likely to receive broad-base support – the least common denominator on which even political opponents could agree. Based on these shared values, coalition partners determined which aspects of WOG would be left out of the open debates, or sacrificed in the name of sustaining a broad consensus. Put differently, shared cultural values outlined the broad limits within which WOG would develop in each country.

In Britain, regardless of the Prime Minister in power, the WOG concept remained firmly rooted in stabilization operations, assuming a merge between diplomacy, security, and development objectives. This automatically meant that the British WOG model could potentially progress to the highest end of the WOG scale. By contrast, in Sweden, and to a lesser extent in Germany, conceptually linking WOG to stabilization was inherently problematic, which by default restricted the possibilities for WOG advancements.

In Sweden, even the champions of a synergies approach were wary of authorizing a stabilization fund for the MFA, or subordinating SIDA’s operation to political or military objectives. A Swedish culture, based on strict neutrality of humanitarian aid, helps explain why merging diplomatic, development and military means never gained traction in the Swedish parliament, even amongst WOG supporters. As several Swedish respondents noted, this was simply not how Sweden approached foreign aid (Personal Interviews MFA and SIDA Officials, 2014).

Much like Sweden, Germany emphasized the importance of ministerial independence. Beyond that, however, merging the development and security streams was less controversial in Germany than in Sweden. The German “civilian approach” implied a much larger role for the military in support of civilian activities. This was most evident in
2010, when Sweden rejected MFA petitions for a stabilization budget, while Germany proceeded to approve its own Stabilization Fund. The main reason, as chapter 5 has argued, was in a more like-minded and WOG-supporting German parliament. However, the findings also suggest a shared German aversion to conducting offensive military operations abroad. What worried Germans most was not necessarily politicizing development aid, but justifying the Bundeswehr’s presence overseas. If the army was not to fight, then it was in Afghanistan to support civilian reconstruction. As shown in chapters 5 and 6, framing WOG in this way had some unexpected negative side effects, such as a misguided focus on military QIPs, distorted reporting, and promotion schemes within the army that discouraged collective strategies.

The final six hypotheses tested the propositions of principal-agent and coalition politics logic. Hypothesis 5 predicted that, due to the nature of collective decision-making, coalitions would produce low to medium-level WOG integration models at best. These expectations were largely borne out in Sweden and Germany, both broad coalition governments where the perpetual need for negotiations and compromise watered down policy and institutional reforms, and in the Swedish case directly sacrificed the coherence issue in the name of reaching agreement on other aspects of the Afghanistan engagement.

In country capitals, Sweden and Germany started off at the bottom of the WOG intensity scale. In both countries, the Afghanistan engagement was framed as a non-combat mission so as to placate those parties that opposed it. Nonetheless, the political consensus to remain in Afghanistan was fragile, within the ruling coalitions and beyond. In the interest of approving the annual ISAF contribution mandates, politicians in both countries deliberately avoided discussing the most controversial aspects of a WOG
approach. One such issue was a concrete strategy for civilian activities in a COIN framework. The Germans consistently eschewed an open debate on this topic, even after approving the Stabilization Fund. The result was an overlap of functions between AA and the BMZ, scrambling to work out a solution on the go, and exacerbated bureaucratic struggles, especially between civilian ministries.

A more detailed look at the findings reveals that, in coalition governments, focusing events can function as windows of opportunity for political entrepreneurs to press for concessions that affect inter-agency coherence. In Germany, negotiations around a missile defence program eventually gave rise to the Provincial Development Fund, a major step forward in fund pooling. In Sweden, focusing events had the opposite effect. Opponents of the ISAF contribution mandate evoked the issue of Swedish support of US-lead counter-terrorism efforts to push for strict separation of civilian and military means in Afghanistan, thus stunting WOG developments.

Finally, evidence from the German case study suggests that sometimes, individuals in positions of authority can influence coherence patterns. However, in coalition governments, the overall effect of individual preferences on the WOG model is modest at best. Having a WOG supporter as BMZ minister was not enough to spearhead an overarching political agreement on submerging development cooperation within a COIN strategy. The broad coalition consensus trumped the influence of individuals on policy. In short, as Auerswald and Saideman argue, coalitions simply cannot change their minds that easily (2016, 220).

Hypothesis 5a posited that coalitions of more ideologically diverse parties would result in less integrated WOG approaches overall. The findings are largely consistent
with this prediction. At the time of entering Afghanistan, both the Swedish and German parliaments required a consensus between the Social Democrats and the Greens. Sweden had a minority social democratic government that relied on support from the Green Party as their traditional ally. Germany was ruled by a coalition of Social Democrats and Greens. In both countries, the Social Democrats and Greens had traditionally held similar platforms, yet on the Afghanistan issue they failed to see eye to eye. The Greens staunchly opposed military intervention, and were supported by the more leftist Social Democrat factions, as well as other parties from the more extreme left. In both countries, the ensuing negotiations and concessions saved the Afghanistan mandate, but at the expense of specific measures for increasing inter-agency coherence.

By contrast, when more like-minded parties gained parliamentary majority, Swedish and German WOG progressed to a more integrated stage. In Sweden, the WOG framework reached its peak in 2006-2010, during the rule of the centre-right Alliance. In Germany, major progress occurred after 2009, when newly elected conservative-liberal coalition spearheaded the establishment of the Stabilization Fund. All this suggests that, in addition to the cohesion of the ruling coalition, party ideology also affected coherence outcomes. Parties on the centre-left tended to be skeptical of a WOG approach, and worried about the potential negative effects of subordinating development aid to political or military objectives. By contrast, centre-right parties were generally more accepting of merging diplomacy, security and development streams. Consequently, leftist ruling coalitions were likely to ignore, avoid, or stunt attempts to integrate civil-military efforts. By contrast, centre-right coalition governments were more inclined to push forward WOG-informed reforms.
Hypothesis 5b dealt specifically with how coalitions control the types of interactions between diplomats, development workers, and the military. The expectation was that coalition governments would prioritize measures that tighten the caveats on inter-ministerial cooperation over measures that stimulate joint working. This was certainly true in Sweden, where none of the successive administrations adopted concrete measures to intensify inter-agency integration. Even during the peak of the synergies rhetoric in 2006-2010, Swedish governments maintained a series of direct caveats on cross-government action. Policy documents reiterated a strict separation of civilian and military means in official documents. The Swedish MFA and the military were deprived of funding for large-scale stabilization operations. In 2009, the WOG-supporting Alliance took some steps to relax the caveats by earmarking 25% of Swedish development cooperation funding for the provinces where the Swedish military was also active. In the grand scheme of the Swedish effort, these measures were notably modest, and did little to advance the overall WOG model. SIDA’s specific instructions and strict supervision over deployed staff limited even further the ability of development advisers to undertake joint ventures with the military.

Compared to Sweden, Germany was less centered on caveats, and more active in incentivizing joint civil-military initiatives. German policy documents used a less restrictive language, reiterating the importance of inter-ministerial independence yet making more explicit calls for increased inter-agency cooperation. Both the PDF and the Stabilization Fund functioned as major organizational incentives for increased inter-agency coherence. On the individual level, the head of the BMZ had some leeway to tighten or relax the caveats over deployed staff. During Dirk Niebel’s tenure as BMZ

minister, development advisers in the field had more discretion to stimulate exchanges with the military. Yet, as argued above, the results on the overall WOG model were modest, as coalition politics always trumped the preferences of individual ministers.

Neither Sweden nor Germany had formal, overarching incentive schemes to promote joint working, or sanctions that punished non-compliance. To complicate matters further, the existing performance evaluation and promotion procedures de facto disincentivized collaborative working. The findings revealed questionable staff selection practices, not only within the military but also for the Senior Civilian Representative post, and in the case of Germany, the Deputy SCR. All this suggests that much of the civil-military integration difficulties that are usually attributed to personality differences may in fact be due to ill-suited incentive and personnel selection schemes.

Hypothesis 6 explored the effect of decision-making dynamics in single-party majority governments, projecting that the level of WOG integration would reflect the personal preferences of the individual occupying the Prime Minister post. The findings from the British case study largely corroborated these predictions. Depending on the Prime Minister in office, the makeup of British WOG fluctuated: from a secondary objective to the war against terror under Blair, to traditional population-centric operations with a focus on development issues under Brown, and finally to an overarching, civilian-lead joint strategy with a priority status during the Cameron administration.

Two additional findings from the British case study deserve mention. First, beyond the PM’s personal vision for WOG, each premier’s leadership style affected cross-government coherence patterns. This was most evident in Tony Blair’s penchant for
consulting only a restricted circle of yes-men (and women), which became a direct disincentive for collective governance.

Second, much like in Sweden and Germany, focusing events also influenced coherence outcomes in the UK. However, the findings suggest a difference in the mechanism through which side issues influence integration patterns in single-party majority governments. In Britain, where the decision-making did not require broad consensus-building, inter-agency coherence was not used as a bargaining chip to press political opponents for concessions on tangential issues. Instead, focusing events worked in two ways: by deflecting the Prime Minister’s attention away from WOG reform, and by creating the permissive conditions for bureaucratic non-evaluation. As demonstrated in chapter 7, in both cases the results for British WOG were negative.

Hypothesis 7 addressed agent supervision, and predicted that in the absence of adequate oversight to enforce coherence in the field, the level of WOG integration in Afghanistan would reflect the personal preferences of the PRT leader(s). Overall, the prediction holds for the UK, but not for Sweden and Germany. The findings suggest that personal preferences have a larger effect on the overall WOG model in single-party majority governments than in coalitions.

In Sweden and Germany, oversight measures to increase coherence were either lax or non-existent. However, supervision to enforce the caveats on civil-military cooperation was stringent. This meant that deployed staff had limited discretion to engage in joint ventures with colleagues from other departments. Sweden was an extreme case, where oversight measures for increased coherence were entirely lacking, while SIDA headquarters closely supervised every initiative that arose in the field to make sure
all aspects of the development line of operation remained completely independent of security objectives.

In Germany, some measures for increased coherence were implemented after Dirk Niebel became BMZ minister. However, oversight to enforce these measures was generally lax. Development advisors in the field were allowed ample leeway to decide if and when to live at the PRTs or use the compound offices. At the same time, supervision to enforce civil-military caveats was less strict than in Sweden. BMZ staff had some discretion to fund small-scale military QIPs, use the military’s help in supervising and monitoring projects, travel in the company of soldiers, and occasionally receive assistance from the Armed Forces without reporting to their superiors in Berlin.

On the ground, the personal choices of Swedish and German PRT leaders affected civil-military relations within the PRT. In general, supervisors in country capitals did not supervise PRT commanders directly, via VTC or phone conference, to observe how they steered the joint meetings. Thus, PRT heads were able to manipulate the frequency, composition, and tone of the meetings according to their personal preferences. Senior civilian officials could avoid regular consultations and information-sharing with their military counterparts. Military commanders could cherry pick if, when, and to what extent to take into account civilian perspectives. In turn, these decisions affected the level of cross-departmental trust, the effectiveness of information exchange, and the amount of civilian input in the planning of military operations.

Beyond that, Swedish and German PRT commanders had little discretion to influence broader civil-military cooperation dynamics. The strategic consensus in Stockholm and Berlin had produced PRT models rooted in a strict inter-ministerial
division of labour. This separation of tasks, combined with careful supervision to enforce the caveats on civil-military cooperation, stripped Swedish and German commanders of agency to make tactical decisions that would spearhead large-scale joint ventures. In short, the personal preferences of Swedish and German PRT leaders had a modest impact on the overall WOG model.

By contrast, in the UK, the level of oversight over deployed staff hinged on the decision of the incumbent Prime Minister. The Blair administration granted military commanders large discretion to take initiative and alter course on the ground. This changed somewhat during Brown’s and Cameron’s tenure. The Helmand Road Map included formal processes of joint planning, decision-making, and reporting. Increased oversight meant that the discretion of individual commanders to single-handedly overhaul the strategic course was more limited than during the Blair years.

**Implications for Theory**

The most obvious overarching conclusion is that further theoretical research on civil-military cooperation should avoid perpetuating assumptions that civilian and military organizations are by default incompatible, which leads to inherently contentious relations between civilians and soldiers in the field. This research suggests that diverging organizational goals, incompatible missions, conflicting time frames and ill-matched rotational schedules were secondary obstacles along the way. Similarly, the security level of the operational environment was a key permissive condition, rather than a root cause of final WOG outcomes. The main challenge was the design of political institutions, and
the decision-making structures these institutions produced. Further theorizing should focus on these factors as the core drivers of WOG variation across countries.

Second, there is a need to go beyond the civil-military dichotomy, and extend theory building in civil-civil relations. Across the three case studies, the more problematic relationship was not between civilians and the Armed Forces, but among civilian ministries. Tensions and lack of trust between diplomats and development workers were much more persistent and difficult to overcome. One major obstacle to smooth civil-civil cooperation was fund-pooling reform that excluded the participation of one of the ministries. Further research can continue in this direction, paying special attention to the conditions that facilitate or hamper civil-civil cooperation in conflict zones.

A third key theoretical implication concerns national caveats on civil-military cooperation. Much of the current literature on whole-of-government approaches revolves around creating overarching structures endowed with authority to enforce inter-agency integration. While such measures for increased coherence are important, this study has demonstrated that existing caveats, especially on the operation of civilian ministries, are equally worthy of attention. More theorizing is needed to flesh out the variety of circumstances in which different types of governments tighten or loosen the caveats on civil-military cooperation.

One interesting finding from the Swedish and German case studies is that, in general, left-wing coalitions were more skeptical of integrated approaches than right-wing coalitions. Leftist parties were not only more averse to military intervention in conflict zones, but also more concerned that civil-military integration would translate into
politicizing development aid. Left-wing coalitions also tended to impose stricter caveats on civil-military cooperation, and more stringent supervision over deployed staff to ensure compliance with these caveats. Using these findings as a starting point, future theoretical studies could delve deeper into the conditions under which caveats on civil-military cooperation evolve.

Fourth, theories on WOG approaches should avoid imprecise statements that, when it comes to cooperation, all depends on personalities. Chapters 4 and 6 argued that much of what is generally attributed to personality types, such as an extroverted nature, open-mindedness, flexibility and the ability to work in a team, can actually be explained by outside factors: poor incentive structures, distorted performance evaluation practices, and lack of sufficient knowledge about the operation of other departments. Clearly distinguishing between these root causes is crucial, as they require different policy solutions.

This research was not designed to test a full array of psychological profiles. However, it seems plausible that certain personality types may increase an individual’s propensity to choose cooperative strategies. One way to proceed would be to extend Auerswald and Saideman’s theoretical model of behaviour versus outcome-oriented individuals, applying it not only to military commanders but also to civilian staff in conflict areas. Preliminary evidence from Germany and Sweden suggests that civilians who valued outcomes (getting things done in the field) were more likely to engage with the military, even at the risk of displeasing headquarters. By contrast, those focused on behaviour (regulations on what staff should and should not do) tended towards inaction,
especially in the absence of specific instructions from headquarters. Future studies can build on these insights.

Beyond genetic personality traits, more research is needed to tease out what outside factors motivate personal choices that ultimately lead to suboptimal WOG outcomes. As a starting point, chapter 6 demonstrated how the strategic framing of the WOG concept in Germany effectively distorted the performance evaluation scheme for military personnel, and resulted in routinely exaggerating the contribution of the military in official reports on joint activities. Chapters 3 and 5 drew attention to inefficiencies in the existing incentives: voluntary joint training courses existed, but civilian personnel often found it difficult to secure permission from their supervisors to attend. Future studies can extend this logic to other countries, seeking out what else motivates or dissuades staff from choosing collaborative strategies.

Another possibility for further theoretical exploration is using the insights from this study to research civil-military cooperation between countries and NGOs, in national capitals as well as in conflict areas. This is a potentially rich path for further inquiry, because non-government actors come in all shapes and sizes, and vary significantly in their level of acceptance of foreign forces. Some NGOs intentionally choose to cooperate with the military in the field. Others insist on avoiding foreign soldiers at all cost, yet anecdotal evidence revealed that even these organizations occasionally accept help from the military (Personal Interview Bundeswehr Official, 2014). To complicate matters further, the nationality of the foreign forces, and the specific government department,

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116 One example of such an organization is the German NGO Kinderberg International, which routinely collaborated with the Bundeswehr in Northern Afghanistan (Personal Interviews Bundeswehr Officials, 2014).
may affect the NGO’s decision to cooperate. For instance, to some non-state actors, building a bridge with money from the American military might be much more problematic than if the project was financed by the German Foreign Office.

In country capitals, some NGOs may be able to shape national WOG approached by exerting pressure on government agencies. Preliminary evidence from Sweden showed that the Swedish Afghanistan Committee (SAK), the largest Swedish non-governmental recipient of development cooperation funding for Afghanistan, actively opposed the Swedish government’s decision to concentrate aid in the provinces where the Armed Forces were active. SAK resented the political pressure to design specific relief programs for the northern provinces, and argued that aid should be allocated on the basis of need alone. While the organization did not refuse to engage in the north altogether, it was able to extract several concessions from the Swedish government. SAK reserved the right to work in any other Afghan regions considered worthy of help. For the northern provinces, SAK negotiated specific rules of communication with the Swedish military. The Armed Forces were to keep away from development projects sites, and were not permitted to use heraldic logos that could confuse the local population (Personal Interview SAK Official, 2014). To what extent some NGOs can affect national WOG models, and in what conditions, is a question worthy of further investigation.

Finally, it would be interesting to extend theorizing on the relationship between national WOG intensity and integration on the international level. The multinational character of peace operations demands a closer look at how the WOG frameworks of individual nations affect coherence within international organizations, such as the EU, NATO and the UN. The pervasive comprehensive approach rhetoric implies a positive
relationship between the levels of integration in country capitals and within international organizations. However, some authors reject such claims, arguing that coherence on the national level may be irrelevant, even detrimental for integration efforts within international organizations (Hull 2011, 8–9). An excessive focus on the country level may result in a narrow perspective, whereby nations fail to take into account coherence with international actors. On the ground, actors may become too tied up with national objectives, structures and processes (Hull and Derblom 2011, 21–22). While these are all valid concerns, they must be tested empirically. It is plausible to assume that different degrees of coordination intensity in country capitals will produce different results on the international level.

**Implications for Policy**

Weiss, Spanger, and Meurs argue that the best recipe for success in WOG integration is a combination between a bottom-up and a top-down approach, lead jointly by the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Development Cooperation, with consistent buy-in from the highest echelons of political power, and supported by institutional mechanisms such as pooling of human and financial resources (2010). The findings in this study suggest this is an idealistic situation that hardly applies in practice. Hence, the overarching lesson for policymakers is to adjust their expectations. International organizations should tamp down the coherence rhetoric, taking into account that the main drivers of cross-government integration – domestic political structures, and the caveats that stem from them – may not be easily amenable to policy solutions. To various degrees, nations will likely impose restrictions on when and how their civilian ministries work with the military in conflict zones. Instead of hoping these caveats would disappear,
policymakers should do better to recognize them, and seek ways to circumvent or mitigate their effect.

The first set of more specific policy recommendations pertains to the implications of this study for multinational peace operations. When deciding which country deploys where in a multinational effort, it is important to acknowledge national caveats on civilian ministries, not only on Armed Forces. In Afghanistan, the deployment decisions of ISAF-contributing nations largely reflected what their militaries could and could not do. Countries selected their areas of deployment depending on the restrictions on the operation and capabilities of their Armed Forces (Auerswald and Saideman 2016, 228). Sweden and Germany specifically chose the relatively peaceful Northern provinces, because of restrictions on using their Armed Forces in offensive operations overseas (Personal Interviews Bundeswehr and SAF Officials, 2014). While considering the limits of national military forces is crucial for the multinational effort, caveats on civilian ministries pose unique challenges in the mission area. In some cases, civilian caveats may even be more difficult to overcome than military ones. Swedish and German experiences from 2006 onwards illustrate this point. Both reluctantly initiated offensive operations, but while Germany relaxed the caveats on civilian engagement, Sweden upheld the restrictions on civil-military interactions.

Countries such as Sweden, with tight caveats on the operation of their civilian ministries, will likely not be effective if deployed to areas where the multinational strategy foresees traditional clear-hold-build operations. The findings suggest that, if civilians deploy alongside the military but without the budget or discretion to engage in
stabilization activities, the “hold” and “build” phases become difficult for the military to implement.

Furthermore, policymakers should take into account that deploying countries with widely mismatching civilian capabilities to the same mission area may have ambivalent effects on the multinational effort. On the one hand, national contingents with no money for civilian reconstruction may lose legitimacy in the eyes of the local population. This holds particularly true if other nations in the same area have the ability to invest in large-scale reconstruction projects. In the words of one Swedish military commander, local authorities often remarked there was no “R” in the Swedish Provincial Reconstruction Team, and lamented that Sweden lacked access to a reconstruction budget of similar magnitude to German and Turkish forces (Personal Interview SAF Official, 2014). All this implies that countries with lower-level WOG models may contribute to a general disillusionment, with potential negative effects on the overall multinational effort. More research is needed to tease out these relationships.

On the other hand, deploying countries with mismatching civilian capabilities to the same area of operation may offer soldiers an opportunity to apply for funding from other nations. Cross-national civil-military cooperation, or joint ventures between ministries from different countries, may allow Armed Forces to access additional money for reconstruction, thus circumventing the restrictive rules of engagement of their own civilian ministries. This study found that the Swedish military often co-financed projects with Finnish and US counterparts, both of whom enjoyed access to much larger civilian reconstruction budgets than the Swedish military commander. Among the typical
examples of such cross-national QIPs were small-scale road reconstructions and check points in the PRT vicinity (Personal Interviews SAF Officials, 2014).

Similarly, whenever the Bundeswehr failed to secure project funding from the German Federal Foreign Office (AA), soldiers often turned to USAID. A typical example was the construction of a 100,000 Euro road in the vicinity of the PRT Fayzabad in 2010. Through NATO channels, the German Armed Forces were able to tap into additional civilian funding for specific purposes. For instance, in 2004 the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) provided a budget to finance NATO efforts in the education sector, through which the Bundeswehr received 40,000 Euros (Personal Interviews AA and Bundeswehr Officials, 2014; 2015).

The German Federal Foreign Office financed American initiatives on an *ad hoc* basis, whenever funding from Washington was temporarily unavailable. Thus, AA financed a series of US-lead small and medium-scale infrastructure initiatives in the village of Talawka, in Gor Tepa, and in other critical areas. In the most remote parts of Kunduz province, AA staff collaborated with US Special Forces. German diplomats also occasionally carried out small-scale activities with UK, Dutch, and Belgian CIMIC teams.

Policymakers should keep in mind that cross-national cooperation may not always be fruitful or even viable. For nations cohabiting in the same mission area, jointly financing projects is feasible only under certain conditions. As a basic requirement, the immediate objectives of the collaborating parties should match. Thus, the Bundeswehr found that securing American funding for German military QIPs was only possible if it fit with the specific priorities of USAID. Some German soldiers reported applying for
funding several times, both to the US Army and USAID, but without success. Others complained that US funding guidelines were cumbersome and difficult to navigate for non-native English speakers (Personal Interviews Bundeswehr Officials, 2014).

A more important condition for cross-national cooperation to work is that there must be at least some overlap between the funding philosophies and reporting requirements of the ministries undertaking the joint endeavor. Lackenbauer argues that SIDA could not feasibly engage in cross-national ventures, because Swedish national development cooperation policies and reporting procedures were incompatible with those of other countries present in the same area (2011, 11). By way of an example, in 2012 SIDA rejected a proposal to cooperate with the German PRT in Kunduz on a USD 150 million, three-year project implemented by the UNDP. SIDA representatives felt that German reporting requirements were too lax by SIDA’s standards (Personal Interview SIDA Official, 2014). In a similar vein, Stapleton notes that the British approach to aid differed significantly from the American one, which obstructed joint initiatives with the US in Helmand (2014, 38).

The main policy lesson here is that cross-national cooperation is unlikely to work in the most extreme cases, where countries have vastly incompatible funding policies, and significant differences in reporting guidelines. If the goal is to maximize the potential effects of cross-national civil-military cooperation, such countries should not share operational space overseas. Furthermore, the ability of deployed staff to engage in cross-national ventures depends on the level of oversight and discretion allowed by headquarters. If countries with similarly tight caveats on civilian operations deploy to the same mission area, cooperation between them is unlikely. If the multinational strategy
foresees large-scale clear-hold-build operations with large injections of reconstruction funding in support of military efforts, then nations whose civilian ministries cannot engage in such operations should deploy alongside countries that can fill the gaps.

Finally, cross-national cooperation may not work if one country marshals significantly larger resources than others present in the same area. For the country with the larger budget, there is little motivation to engage in joint ventures or to accommodate the modus operandi of other departments. This was most evident in the UK experiences in Helmand. The British shared operational space with the United States, and the sheer preponderance of the American reconstruction budget overshadowed any possibilities for meaningful joint ventures (Stapleton 2014, 38).

The next set of recommendations pertains to specific measures countries can adopt on the home front, if their goal is to increase cross-government integration. The first overarching policy lesson here is that, given the limitations inherent in collective decision-making, coalition governments will likely have fewer options to increase coherence than single-party majority governments.

Even so, it does not necessarily follow that coalition-lead nations are left with no alternatives. Adopting integration measures may be possible even when the ruling coalition lacks interest in furthering coherence. This is because the constant negotiation required for every decision may lead to political entrepreneurs exploiting side issues, and extracting concessions that advance the WOG agenda. WOG proponents should seek to explore these opportunities, keeping in mind that coalition cohesiveness and how well the political opposition is organized will likely impact their chances for success.
Elections may also turn into windows of opportunity to move forward with WOG coherence. This holds for coalitions as well as single-party majority governments. A new and favourably inclined Prime Minister, or a like-minded coalition interested in pursuing a WOG agenda, can relax the caveats on civil-military cooperation, create formal inducements for departments to engage in joint ventures, and establish a structure for evaluation and supervision of joint action. The downside of this is waiting for the next election cycle, which may mean stalled WOG reforms for several years.

With respect to institutional reform aimed at increasing coherence, this study suggests three concrete policy lessons. First, WOG structures on the tactical level are likely to have a more pronounced impact on coherence intensity than those in country capitals. This holds particularly true for coalition governments, which tended to produce information-sharing forums with no executive authority on the home front. But if a formal joint decision-making structure is set up in the field, staff may be more amenable to ceding some departmental independence in the name of the joint venture. German experiences with the Provincial Development Fund illustrate these dynamics. In short, if WOG-inspired institutional reform is not feasible on the home front, supporters of WOG integration are advised to focus their efforts on negotiating the establishment of formal civil-military structures on the tactical level.

Second, and related to the above, policymakers should keep in mind that establishing a figurehead civilian leader does not translate into a genuine joint civil-military structure. Chapters 4 and 6 showed that merely placing PRTs under civilian leadership did not automatically equate to increased cross-government integration. On the contrary, Swedish and German experiences show that the presence of Senior Civilian
Representatives (SCRs) can contribute to stove-piping and isolated chains of command. SCRs were only as effective as the discretion they marshalled from headquarters to engage in joint ventures. In extreme cases, where countries impose tight caveats on the field operation of civilian ministries, a single military head of operations on the tactical level may be the better option.

A final policy lesson regarding institutional reform is that fund-pooling mechanisms that exclude the participation of one of the ministries are likely to obstruct joint working, cause overlap in departmental responsibilities, increase bureaucratic rivalries, and contribute to lasting tensions among departments. German experiences with the Stabilization Fund illustrate these dynamics. In countries where an all-inclusive pooling structure is impossible to negotiate, policymakers should carefully negotiate the terms of operation of the fund prior to its establishment. Potential overlaps with the activities of other departments should be addressed in advance, as opposed to post factum.

The next set of recommendations concern incentive schemes and oversight measures. Policymakers interested in increasing cross-departmental coherence should re-evaluate the incentive schemes and performance evaluation methods across departments. Chapters 3, 5, and 7 showed that formal incentives to stimulate cross-agency coherence, as well as sanctions to punish non-compliance, were underdeveloped among the ministries in all three countries. However, developing new incentive schemes from scratch will likely not suffice. Existing promotion practices should also be reviewed in order to determine if they inadvertently undermine coherence efforts. This problem appears to be particularly acute in the military, and is exacerbated by short field rotations.
The policy implications here are consistent with previous studies, recommending that soldiers not be rewarded for “ribbon cutting.” Performance evaluations should consider contributions to longer-term initiatives, even if they extend beyond the employee’s deployment rotation (Östberg, Johannisson, and Persson, n.d., 402).

With regard to oversight measures to enforce inter-agency coherence, this study takes a slightly different approach from the policy lessons championed in previous studies. The importance of oversight is hardly a new discovery. Much of the existing literature attributes integration failures on lacking institutions with an overarching authority to enforce collective governance.\(^\text{117}\) This has resulted in persistent calls for yet more oversight, misleadingly implying that nations can adopt similarly stringent supervision measures across the board.

This study points to more nuanced conclusions. Oversight is commensurate with the level of commitment to WOG principles of the incumbent government. Swedish and German experiences suggest that, in coalition governments with modest and relatively short-lived WOG ambitions, it is unrealistic to expect stringent supervision measures to enforce coherence. Evidence from Britain illustrates how, even in single-party majority governments, oversight measures may be lax if the Prime Minister’s attention is diverted away from the WOG agenda.

Coalitions and single-party majority governments that are committed to advancing WOG principles have several options to improve oversight measures. One alternative would be to install regular VTC or phone conference connections during the joint meetings in the field. This way, officials at country capitals can observe the quality

\(^{117}\) See, for example, Patrick and Brown (2007).
of the interactions, determine if all parties contribute equally, and address any issues accordingly. A system of joint report preparation can be implemented in the field, as opposed to each department compiling and sending data separately up their respective chains of command. This could alleviate the issue of tampering with report information, or exaggerating the role of the military in reconstruction projects. Another option would be to produce jointly signed civil-military planning directives in country capitals, and to require formal joint planning documents for each PRT rotation. In the end, all these measures will depend on the political consensus within parliament (for coalition governments), or on the preferences of the Prime Minister (for single-party majority governments). Policymakers should accept that, in many cases, a change of government may be the only viable alternative to pursue more stringent oversight measures for increased coherence.

The final set of policy recommendations concerns joint training. By the end of 2014, Sweden, Germany and the UK all boasted a wide variety of national and multinational civil-military courses, as well as briefings and other short-term opportunities for joint learning. The majority of respondents agreed that civil-military training is an excellent way to address what had long been identified as major obstacles on the ground: poor knowledge on the operation of other ministries, and scarcity of qualified deployable personnel. At the same time, most interviewees qualified the amount of joint training they received as insufficient. The problem appears to have been particularly acute in civilian ministries, where staff routinely participated as lecturers as part of military training, but had much less opportunity to learn about the work of their military colleagues.
Four lessons for policymakers follow from the above. First, if the goal is to improve and standardize the level of civil-military expertise across departments, voluntary courses do not suffice. A formal, joint civil-military program should be in place, with mandatory attendance requirements for both civilian and military staff. Across all ministries, field posting approvals should hinge upon completing this program. The second step is to ensure that department heads do not prevent subordinates from participating in training courses. One possible solution would be to implement a point system, whereby each staff member is required to cover a minimum amount of civil-military training hours and content per year. Third, instead of focusing on pre-deployment training, civil-military learning opportunities should be ongoing, regardless of whether the country is currently participating in a peace mission (Personal Interview SAF Official, 2014). Finally, it should be kept in mind that despite the availability of training programs, smaller countries may not have the luxury to choose among a wide pool of qualified applicants for senior-level posts (Auerswald and Saideman 2016, 223).

In conclusion, civilians and armed forces will continue to coexist in conflict zones, so the dynamics that govern civil-military interactions require continuous attention from academics and policymakers alike. The study has aimed to clarify the theoretical murkiness surrounding whole-of-government approaches, to dispel some myths about the ability of nations to integrate civilian and military efforts, and to help turn the WOG concept into a useful policy tool. The findings call for setting up reasonable expectations for inter-agency coherence, informed by the limits and opportunities inherent in domestic government structures and party politics in each country. Importantly, coordination is not an end goal by itself. It is one of many tools for achieving specific objectives within an
overarching peace operation strategy. Different objectives will likely require different
levels of coherence, within national capitals and beyond. An enhanced understanding of
what civil-military model nations can deliver can go a long way in clarifying how each
partner could contribute most effectively to a multinational effort.
Appendices

Appendix A: Provinces of Afghanistan

Source: www.afghan-web.com
Appendix B: List of Interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identification Code</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Deployment Experience</th>
<th>Deployment Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S001_06052014_TR</td>
<td>SAF</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>2012-2013 (7 months)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S002_07052014</td>
<td>SAF</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S003_08052014_TR</td>
<td>Swedish MFA</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>2007-2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S004_09052014_TR</td>
<td>SAF</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>11/2009-05/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S005_09052014_TR</td>
<td>SAF</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>2009-2010; 2010-2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S006_09052014_TR</td>
<td>Swedish MFA</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Prior to 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S007_12052014_TR</td>
<td>FOI</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>2009-2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S008_12052014_TR</td>
<td>FOI</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>2011-2012; 2013-2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S009_12052014_TR</td>
<td>SAF</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>04/2013-12/2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S010_13052014_TR</td>
<td>SAF</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>05/2010-05/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S011_14052014_TR</td>
<td>SAK</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Regular deployments from 2004-2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S012_15052014_TR</td>
<td>SAF</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Spring 2012 (6 months)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S013_15052014_TR</td>
<td>SIDA</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>2012-2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S014_15052014_TR</td>
<td>SIDA</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>09/2010-12/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S015_15052014</td>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S016_16052014</td>
<td>Swedish MFA</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S017_18062014</td>
<td>Swedish MFA</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>2012-2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G001_19062014</td>
<td>Bundeswehr</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>2009; 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G002_19062014</td>
<td>Bundeswehr</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>08/2011-03/2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G003_20062014</td>
<td>Bundeswehr</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>2007-2008; 2009-2010; 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G004_23062014</td>
<td>Bundeswehr</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>07/2013-01/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G006_23062014</td>
<td>Bundeswehr</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>2008; 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G007_24062014</td>
<td>Bundeswehr</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>2003; 2009; 2010; 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G008_24062014</td>
<td>Bundeswehr</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>01/2013-06/2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Dates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G009_25062014</td>
<td>Bundeswehr</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>2003; 2004; 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G010_25062014</td>
<td>Bundeswehr</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>09/2011-03/2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G012_27062014</td>
<td>Bundeswehr</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>7 deployments between 2004 and 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G013_02072014</td>
<td>Bundeswehr</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>02/2009-07/2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G014_04072014</td>
<td>Bundeswehr</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>2008; 2010; 03/2011-12/2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G016_03102015</td>
<td>KfW</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>01/2012-05/2013; 01/2015-05/2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G017_04102015</td>
<td>BMZ</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>03/2007-12/2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G018_19102015</td>
<td>BMZ</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>2010-2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G019_20102015</td>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>02/2009-08/2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G020_21102015</td>
<td>BMZ</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G021_21102015</td>
<td>BMZ</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G022_22102015</td>
<td>SWP</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G023_22102015</td>
<td>AA</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>06/2012-08/2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G024_26102015</td>
<td>BMZ</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>2008-2010; 2010-2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G026_27102015</td>
<td>AA</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>2010-2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G027_27102015</td>
<td>AA</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>2011-2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G028_28102015</td>
<td>BMZ</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>11/2011-07/2012; 08/2012-06/2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G029_14112015</td>
<td>KfW</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G030_22012016</td>
<td>AA</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>2006-2007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix C: Coding Scheme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CODE</th>
<th>MEANING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>restype</td>
<td>Response Type (e.g. positive judgement, negative judgement, suggestion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pos</td>
<td>positive judgement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>neg</td>
<td>negative judgement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>neutr</td>
<td>neutral judgement - neither good nor bad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>amb</td>
<td>judgement is ambiguous - there are both good and bad parts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sugg</td>
<td>suggestion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>issue</td>
<td>issues that arose in the course of answering the interview questions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DN</td>
<td>Don’t know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O</td>
<td>Other (neither yes, no or don’t know)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF</td>
<td>Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCC</td>
<td>Land Component Command (of the Armed Forces)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IJC</td>
<td>ISAF Joint Command (operational level, ISAF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LMT</td>
<td>Liaison and Monitoring Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry for Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Development and Cooperation Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOI</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBA</td>
<td>Folke Bernadotte Academy (MFA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOI</td>
<td>Swedish Defense Research Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAC</td>
<td>Swedish Afghanistan Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAZ</td>
<td>Mazar-e-Sharif</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAB</td>
<td>Kabul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KUN</td>
<td>Kunduz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAY</td>
<td>Fayzabad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAK</td>
<td>Bakhlan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAL</td>
<td>Balakhshan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAL</td>
<td>Taloqan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TST</td>
<td>Transition Support Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCN</td>
<td>Regional Command North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-military cooperation (military, G9/J9 branch)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Military commander of a PRT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCR</td>
<td>Senior Civilian Representative (civilian commander of a PRT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J9</td>
<td>Branch within AF responsible for CIMIC (joint multinational command)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>term</td>
<td>definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G9</td>
<td>CIMIC branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LO</td>
<td>Liaison officer (AF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEVAD</td>
<td>Development Advisor (SIDA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLAD</td>
<td>Political Advisor (FBA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>af catalyst</td>
<td>The first to push for or be most interested in a particular venture are the Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>af lead</td>
<td>The Armed Forces are in a leadership/dominant position vis-à-vis civilian ministries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>af no devpt</td>
<td>The Armed Forces do not carry out or otherwise get involved in large, long-term development projects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>afgh strat 2010 unrealistic</td>
<td>The Afghanistan Strategy from 2010 does not accurately reflects realities on the ground</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>after withdrawal</td>
<td>The role and contribution of Sweden in Afg after the withdrawal of troops/closing of PRTs in May 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agree on goals</td>
<td>Need for different ministries and agencies to agree on the overarching goals and objectives of the mission - key to WOG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>align devpt mil ops</td>
<td>The act of coordinating between the devpt ministry (SIDA, BMZ) and the AF on the provinces where they operate: eg if the AF are present in a given area, then SIDA’s development funds should also be focused in that area, and not elsewhere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>align devpt mil ops lacking</td>
<td>During the period in question, there was no coordination between devpt ministry and the AF on the provinces where they operate: eg if the AF are present in a given area, then SIDA’s development funds would also be focused in the same area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aprp</td>
<td>Afghan Provincial Reconstruction Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>better knowledge of other</td>
<td>Improved awareness about other Ministries, what they do and how they do things, what they can and cannot do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bmz funding process</td>
<td>the process of funding projects of the BMZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bmz not at prt</td>
<td>The BMZ representative did not have their office inside the PRT compound</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bp</td>
<td>Bureaucratic politics: each Ministry/agency has its own agenda that it fiercely protects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>breeds coop</td>
<td>The effect of the issue in question is that inter-ministerial cooperation is enhanced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cash for work</td>
<td>cash for work programs - a type of qip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cdc</td>
<td>Community Development Cluster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chain of command</td>
<td>Outline of the chain of command of a particular ministry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chain of command complicated</td>
<td>The chain of command is complicated and not always clear who responds to whom and for what kinds of activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cimic differences across nations</td>
<td>There are differences in the ways TCNs define and apply CIMIC in the field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cimic intl fund</td>
<td>Funds for cimic projects (short-term, QIP) shared by several nations on the ground</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cimic unappreciated by mil</td>
<td>CIMIC activities are not valued by the rest of the military, and/or the CO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>civ avoid mil</td>
<td>In Afghanistan, staff from the civilian ministries avoid being seen together with the military, so as not to compromise their neutrality and impartiality and lose the trust of the local population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>civ finance mil qip</td>
<td>The military (CIMIC) team identifies a need for a project in the field, which they bring to the attention of the civilian ministries on the ground and one of the civilian ministries ends up financing it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>civ mil analysis lacking</td>
<td>A lack of analysis of civil-military cooperation and the lessons learned in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>civ no time for jtr</td>
<td>Staff from civilian ministries have very limited, if any, time to attend the extensive pre-deployment training organized by the military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>civ work with mil</td>
<td>Civilians or civilian organizations that work closely with the military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>co budget</td>
<td>Budget of the military commander of the PRT designated for small WHM projects in the PRT area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coin approach</td>
<td>COIN clear-shape-hold-build-type operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>communication difficulties</td>
<td>Differences in language between civilians and the military - they usually use different words for the same concepts, or similar words for concepts they understand differently</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>comstrat debate</td>
<td>A debate concerning the common strategy between all the ministries involved in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>comstrat tactical effect</td>
<td>Effect of strategic civil-military debates in theatre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coop agreement ngo</td>
<td>A formal agreement of cooperation between civilians or the military and an NGO in the field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coop bel</td>
<td>Cooperation with Belgium in the field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coop in theatre independent</td>
<td>Cooperation between civilians and the military in theatre (in Afghanistan) was pragmatic and resolved directly between the actors involved; regardless of events in the national capital.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coop neth</td>
<td>Cooperation with the Netherlands in the field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coop ngo</td>
<td>Cooperation between civilians and/or military in the field and NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coop ngo lacking</td>
<td>There is no cooperation with NGOs in the field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coop other nations lacking</td>
<td>There was no cooperation with other nations in the field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coop slov</td>
<td>Cooperation with Slovenia in the field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coop swe</td>
<td>Cooperation with Sweden in the field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coop us</td>
<td>Cooperation with the US in the field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coop us difficult</td>
<td>Cooperation with the US in the field is difficult</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coop us lacking</td>
<td>There was no cooperation with the US in the field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coord forum</td>
<td>A coordination forum (not a full-fledged permanent coordination body, however). Lacks executive power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coord forum civ</td>
<td>A coordination forum where only civilian ministries and agencies participate (not the MoD or the AF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coord forum no strat influence</td>
<td>A coordination forum or meeting format between ministries/agencies that lacks any tangible influence on the larger strategy for Afghanistan, usually drafted on the political level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coord other nations fin</td>
<td>On the ground, the respondent's unit/group cooperated with the Finnish on joint projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coord other nations us</td>
<td>On the ground, the respondent's unit/group cooperated with the US on joint projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coordination with other nations</td>
<td>Coordination on projects and activities with other nations present in the area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cs pressure</td>
<td>The activity or event in question was influenced by pressure from civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cte crisis prev</td>
<td>&quot;Ressortkreis zivile Krisenprävention&quot; - German committee for crisis prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>culture clash</td>
<td>A clash of civilian culture and military culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dda</td>
<td>District Development Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ddp</td>
<td>District Development Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>devpt surge</td>
<td>The development surge (also called development offensive) - a period in 2009-2010, after the London Conference, when the German government decided to significantly increase the contribution of all Ministries to Afgh, and more significantly to allot 180 mil. euro a year to the Foreign Office for stabilization programs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>diverging timeframes</td>
<td>The timeframes of civilians and the military are different (one short term, one long-term)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>division of labour</td>
<td>Military and civilians working with a clear division of labour, strictly separating civilian and military tasks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>faster pipelines</td>
<td>The issue in question makes it quicker to introduce issues and move them up the pipeline for approval within each ministry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>financial inefficiency</td>
<td>The activity in question resulted in financial overlaps and inefficiencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fo funding process</td>
<td>The process of funding of the German Foreign Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ger afgh mandate</td>
<td>The German mandate for Afghanistan, presented and approved by Parliament every year - Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ger against coin</strong></td>
<td>Germany does not approve of the typical COIN strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ger cimic</strong></td>
<td>Outlines the way Germany understands and applies CIMIC in the field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ger constitution influence</strong></td>
<td>The influence of the German constitution on WoG. Usually refers to strict separation of all ministries, and that it is very difficult for the Chancellor to order the ministries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ger fragile states doc</strong></td>
<td>German strategic document on dealing with fragile states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ger involvement in afgh</strong></td>
<td>Outlines the typical characteristics, elements and beliefs behind the German involvement in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ger prt concept</strong></td>
<td>The German PRT concept - refers to either the strategic document or the general outline of the PRTs lead by Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ger ssr doc</strong></td>
<td>A strategic paper on SSR, mentioning WoG and agreed on by the main ministries in Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ger support civ engagement</strong></td>
<td>In Germany, the underlining concept of the involvement in Afgh is that it is mostly a civilian engagement - German are there mostly to support with civilian means, not to fight a war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>govt changes</strong></td>
<td>Changes in the government, such as changes in ministerial leadership (changes in individual ministers, or parties that hold that ministry)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>govt structure</strong></td>
<td>The structure of the government, whereby all Ministries and agencies are quite independent from one another, and from a central authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>guidelines coop humanitarians</strong></td>
<td>Guidelines for cooperation with humanitarian actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>include ngos</strong></td>
<td>The need to include non-governmental organizations and other non-governmental civil actors in a particular activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>info sharing</strong></td>
<td>The sharing of information between civilian ministries and the military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>informal coop irregular</strong></td>
<td>The informal cooperation (meetings, etc.) between individuals from different ministries is irregular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>informal meeting</strong></td>
<td>Informal meetings between civilians and the military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>interministerial negotiations</strong></td>
<td>The issue in question is a result of negotiations between the different ministries on a national level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>isolated budgets</strong></td>
<td>The budgets of different Ministries for Afghanistan are isolated; they do not share financial resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>joint planning lacking</strong></td>
<td>Joint civ-mil planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>joint planning limited</strong></td>
<td>A limited amount of joint planning between civilians and military. Civilians are asked to give their opinion on whether any impending military ops would derange their activities. Does NOT include planning for joint ventures - just an attempt to stay out of each other's way.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>jtr by civ</strong></td>
<td>A joint training opportunity organized by a civilian ministry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jtr by mil</td>
<td>A joint training opportunity organized by the Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>jtr civ train mil</td>
<td>joined pre-deployment activities, where civilians participate to train the military (often role playing) to teach them what civilians do in the field and how the military should interact with civilians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jtr exercises</td>
<td>Joined pre-deployment exercises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jtr increases coop</td>
<td>The effect of the joined pre-deployment training is an increased cooperation between civilians and the military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jtr intl</td>
<td>Joined pre-deployment courses, offered by international organizations (UN, NATO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jtr lacking</td>
<td>There is no joint preparation or pre-deployment training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jtr leadership module</td>
<td>A formal leadership training module where all PRT leaders meet and are trained before they deploy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jtr lessons learned</td>
<td>A post-deployment meeting, organized by the AF, upon the return of each 6-month rotation, to discuss lessons learned. Civilians are invited to this meeting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jtr meet before dep</td>
<td>A specific type of joint pre-deployment training where the main civilian and military actors who are about to deploy together meet, train and get to know one another before they go to the field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jtr mil train civ</td>
<td>A type of training whereby the civilians who are about to be deployed are trained by the military on security issues, mostly worst-case scenarios like how to act if they are abducted, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jtr need more</td>
<td>There is a need for more joined pre-deployment training; more interaction between civilians and the military before they go to AFGH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jtr no need more</td>
<td>There is no need for more joined pre-deployment training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jtr partial</td>
<td>Joint pre-deployment training is partial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jtr scarce</td>
<td>There is very little or no joint pre-deployment training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kfw funding process</td>
<td>The process of funding of the German KFW Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>knowledge breeds coop</td>
<td>The more people across ministries learn about one another, the closer they work together.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>knowledge transfer unsatisfactory</td>
<td>The knowledge transfer between the different contingents in the field is unsatisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>learning curve</td>
<td>The result in question was a product of a learning curve - usually associated with difficulties at the start, but improved with time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lessons learned process</td>
<td>An inter-ministerial process in Germany to evaluate the experience in Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>local envt affects wog</td>
<td>The local environment affects the frequency and quality of cooperation between the military and civilians in the field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>local evt primary</td>
<td>The most important factor that influences this situation is the local environment in the field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>local evt secondary</td>
<td>The local environment in theatre is only secondary to effective cooperation between civilians and the military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>locals demand funds</td>
<td>The local population demands more development funding than what they are receiving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>loss of interest in wog</td>
<td>The interest in the comprehensive approach/WOG/close cooperation between the military and civilians is waning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>low tension</td>
<td>The activity or issue in question is not a subject to controversy, and results in low tension across government departments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>low tension ger</td>
<td>The activity or issue in question is not a subject to controversy, and results in low tension across government departments IN GERMANY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>meeting admin</td>
<td>Meeting with administrative purposes only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>meeting desk off</td>
<td>Meetings on the tactical level (in Berlin), i.e. between the desk officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>meeting devpt</td>
<td>A meeting concerning development aspects in a given area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>meeting div heads</td>
<td>A regular meeting of the heads of division of the different ministries to discuss Afghanistan issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>meeting political</td>
<td>A meeting concerning political aspects and developments in a given area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>meeting predepl brief</td>
<td>A meeting between civilians and military, conducted prior to deployment; goal is for one side to brief the other about their activities in the field (one-sided)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>meeting predepl prt staff</td>
<td>A meeting between the civilian and military staff of the prt, conducted prior to deployment; goal is to get to know one another (two-sided dialogue).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>meeting security</td>
<td>A meeting concerning security aspects, such as security assessments in a given area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>meeting state secs</td>
<td>A regular meeting of the state secretaries in Berlin to discuss Afghanistan issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>meeting with scr</td>
<td>Meeting with the Senior Civilian Representative (Ambassador) in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mfa funds part of mod</td>
<td>The Ministry for Foreign Affairs channels some of the budget for the Ministry of Defense.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mfa lead</td>
<td>The Ministry for Foreign Affairs is in leadership/dominant position vis-à-vis the AF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mil assessment civ funding</td>
<td>An ad hoc type of cooperation between the military and civilians in the field, whereby the military identifies a need during their routine visits/assessments of the civilian situation, and then brings back these needs to the civilians who fund the required project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>min coord at home</td>
<td>Only minimal inter-ministerial coordination in the national capital is needed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mission creep</td>
<td>There is an overlap in the types of projects administered by the civilian ministries, and/or between them and the military. The division of labour is not clear.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>multinational ops challenging</td>
<td>A challenge arises in a mission area where there are multinational military forces, each with its own national caveats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nato concept</td>
<td>The NATO concept of comprehensive approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nato influence</td>
<td>Influences of NATO on the national WOG approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nato trust funds</td>
<td>NATO trust funds - shared among ministries (double-check what this means)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>need clear mandate</td>
<td>On a strategic level, there is a need for a clear mandate WOG; a national WOG strategy; specific instructions for civilian ministries and the military to cooperate, and how exactly they are supposed to work together</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>need coord mech</td>
<td>There is a need for an inter-agency coordination body or mechanism at the national capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>need for evaluation</td>
<td>There is a need to better evaluate &quot;success&quot; in Afghanistan - what it means and to what extent it has been achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>need more info sharing</td>
<td>There is a need for more information sharing across ministries and agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Description</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>oecd influence</td>
<td>The influence of the OECD, particularly its guidelines on development aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>overlap resources</td>
<td>An overlap of resources, indicating inefficiencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>parliament fpc</td>
<td>A Foreign Policy Commission within the Swedish Parliament; receives briefs on Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>past experience in afgh</td>
<td>A person or persons with previous experience in Afghanistan (usually viewed as an important factor that contributes to wog)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>past experience in peace ops</td>
<td>Experience in previous peace operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pdc</td>
<td>Provincial Development Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pdp</td>
<td>Provincial Development Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>peer pressure</td>
<td>The activity in question is a result of peer pressure - Sweden/Germany is looking at what other nations are doing, and trying to do the same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>period of deteriorating security</td>
<td>A period of time when the level of security in the field deteriorated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>personality factor</td>
<td>Cooperation depends mainly on the personalities of the individual people involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pol disagr</td>
<td>Political disagreements on whole of government among the main parties in government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>policy for coherence debate</td>
<td>A political debate on how to achieve coherence among policies in general</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>politician pressures for wog</td>
<td>There is a particular politician or politicians in the government that pressures for closer cooperation between the military and civilians in Afgh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>poor coord in practice</td>
<td>Although the idea exists on paper, in reality coordination across ministries/agencies is poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prep afgh govt negotiations</td>
<td>The process of preparing the negotiations with the Afghn government - which donor ministry will provide how much for what period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>progress report afgh</td>
<td>The annual progress reports on afgh, presented to Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>project sustainability</td>
<td>The issue of realizing that development projects must be sustainable in the long-term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prt civ lead</td>
<td>The PRT(s) are headed by a civilian (SCR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prt civ lead earlier</td>
<td>The PRT should have been placed under civilian lead much earlier (usually from the start)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prt civ mil lead</td>
<td>The PRT(s) is lead by both civilian and military, with separate powers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prt civ mil lead clarifies chain of command</td>
<td>A double-headed PRT avoids confusion in reporting lines within the PRT, such as: if there is a civilian matter, how can a military commander task the civilians to do it? Or vice versa - if there is a matter that concerns the military, and if the PRT head is civilian, with what authority can he task the military?</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>prt civ mil lead societal pressure</td>
<td>The PRT is double headed because of societal and public opinion pressure inside the donor nation - see the contribution as a civilian engagement, not fighting a war. Putting a CO in command of the PRT would have signified a predominantly military engagement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prt civ mil share expertise</td>
<td>Civilians and the military work on shared projects, whereby they share expertise - for example, civilians assess the long-term sustainability of the project, whereby the military provides physical/human resources to execute the project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prt civ monitor mil projects</td>
<td>Civilians at the PRT monitored military projects (QIPs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prt civ travel with mil</td>
<td>Civilians travel with military personnel in the field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prt civmil ratio stable</td>
<td>The ratio of civilians vs military in the PRT composition has been stable throughout the years; no significant changes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prt co scr visit together</td>
<td>The CO and the SCR of the PRT attended meetings outside of the PRT together; together they met with the local administration and other important local actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prt comm framework</td>
<td>A framework document for communication in PRT-like structures. A document the German ministries agreed on during an inter-ministerial lessons learned process that took place in Berlin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prt decisionmaking slow</td>
<td>Within the PRT, the process of reaching consensus among the CO and the SCR takes a long time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prt info sharing irregular</td>
<td>The quantity and quality of information sharing within the PRT is an irregular process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prt info sharing limited</td>
<td>At the information sharing meetings, the parties did not provide exhaustive details on each other's activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prt joint visits to ngo</td>
<td>Civilians and military from PRT went together to visit NGOs in the field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prt joint visits to projects</td>
<td>Civilians and the military at the PRT go together to visit/monitor projects, or to inaugurate finished projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prt leadchange amb</td>
<td>The change of PRT leadership from military to civilian had an ambiguous effect on cooperation between civilians and the military on the ground</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prt leadchange neg</td>
<td>The change of PRT leadership from military to civilian had a negative effect on cooperation between civilians and the military on the ground</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prt leadchange no effect</td>
<td>The change of PRT leadership from military to civilian had no tangible effect on cooperation between civilians and the military on the ground</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>prt leadchange pos</strong></td>
<td>The change of PRT leadership from military to civilian had a positive effect on cooperation between civilians and the military on the ground.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>prt leadchange reason division of labour</strong></td>
<td>The reason for the change of PRT from military to civilian leadership was the desire to divide responsibilities: the military deals with fighting and civilians deal with building ties with local society. The aim is not to force the military to do &quot;civilian things.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>prt leadchange reason pullout</strong></td>
<td>The reason for the change of PRT from military to civilian leadership was because the AF were preparing to pull out of Afghanistan, and to turn over the PRT structure to local management.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>prt leaders meet before depl</strong></td>
<td>If the leaders of the PRT meet and get to know each other at home before they deploy, they work more closely together when they are in the field.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>prt leadership unclear</strong></td>
<td>During the change of leadership in the PRT (into civilian), it remained de facto unclear who was in command.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>prt lo budget</strong></td>
<td>A liaison officer budget - comes out of the CO budget at the PRT.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>prt meeting civ</strong></td>
<td>A meeting in the PRT where only reps from civilian ministries participate; no military.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>prt meeting co scr</strong></td>
<td>Within the PRT, a meeting between the military commander and the Senior Civilian Representative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>prt meeting cub</strong></td>
<td>At the PRT, the Commander's Update Brief meeting. A joint meeting, where military and civilians inform the commander of current and future issues and tasks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>prt meeting info sharing regular</strong></td>
<td>Within the PRT, a regular information sharing meeting between the military and civilians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>prt meeting morning update</strong></td>
<td>A meeting in the PRT, organized by the civilians, where all civilian and military heads get together.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>prt meeting ngo</strong></td>
<td>A meeting with PRT staff and outsider civilians, such as local or international NGO reps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>prt meeting pm</strong></td>
<td>A meeting in the PRT, in the evening, briefing on what happened during the day and what is planned for the next day.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>prt meeting weekly</strong></td>
<td>A meeting once a week at the PRT, to recap what has happened during the past week and plans ahead.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>prt mil gather info for civ</strong></td>
<td>At the PRT, the military (usually liaison officers) gather information on the civilian situation and present it to the civilians. That is because the civilians do not have the staff to do their own research, and/or the security situation does not allow it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>prt mil lead</strong></td>
<td>The PRT(s) is lead by a military officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>prt more civ</strong></td>
<td>In time, the ratio of civilians vs military in the PRT composition has tended to include more civilians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>prt mostly mil</strong></td>
<td>The composition of the PRT is militarized: the staff is predominantly military, with few civilians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>prt must be mil lead</strong></td>
<td>The PRT must be lead by a military commander.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prt must meet before depl</td>
<td>It is better for WoG if the PRT staff meets and gets to know one another before deployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prt ngo present</td>
<td>At PRT meetings, local and/or international ngos were present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prt no joint meetings with locals</td>
<td>In Afghanistan, during the period in question, civilians and the military met with local authorities separately to discuss issues and/or projects. There were no joint civ-mil visits to Afghan authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prt qip recon insufficient</td>
<td>QIPs started or promised without sufficient previous knowledge of the situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prt setup</td>
<td>Refers to the setup of the PRT, specifically: whether it is civilian lead or military lead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prt staffing issues</td>
<td>Issues with PRT staffing that influence cooperation between civilians and the military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prt successful</td>
<td>The PRT concept and how it played out in the field is considered successful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prt working agreement</td>
<td>An agreement between the different ministries how the structure inside the PRT should look like, how the command structure should look like</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>public awareness</td>
<td>The activity in question helps raise public awareness about the mission in Afghanistan and the work of the ministries there</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>qip unintended effects</td>
<td>Unintended effects of quick impact projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rcdf</td>
<td>Regional Capacity Development Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rcn prt financial coop</td>
<td>Cooperation on projects between RC-North and the PRT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>report to parliament</td>
<td>Regular reports to Parliament what happens in Afgh (could be every week, in cases of emergency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reporting lines affect WoG</td>
<td>The way civilians and the military cooperate is affected by the type of reporting lines. For instance, if everyone - civ and mil - reports to one and the same person, versus everybody responding separately to their own ministry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rotation</td>
<td>The civilian and the military have different rotation times in Afghanistan - the military stays only for short-term periods, while civilians stay much longer. Different timelines for project completion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rotational chairmanship</td>
<td>The chairmanship of this group rotates among its members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scr figurehead</td>
<td>The Senior Civilian Representative, head of the TST, lacks executive decisionmaking power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>senior staff leadership</td>
<td>Staff at the senior level at each department/ministry leading the way in terms of woG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>societal pressure</td>
<td>The issue in question is affected by societal pressure on the home front, in the donor country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spaf</td>
<td>Swedish Public Authority Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>spna</td>
<td>A stabilization program funded by the German Foreign Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ssr funds</td>
<td>The MFA and MoD cost-share funds to train the Afghan National Security Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stabilization budget</td>
<td>Budget of the German MFA, designed for stabilization projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strats separate as per ministry</td>
<td>Separate WoG strategies available for each ministry/agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>swe against coin</td>
<td>On a political and strategic level, Sweden does not approve of the all-American COIN strategy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>synergies</td>
<td>A term used first in the 2010 Afgh strategy to indicate the level of cooperation between civilians and military. Represents a word weaker than cooperation, similar to cohabitation/co-existence. May indicate a common goal, but in the very broad sense (eg peace and security in Afghanistan), but not a more specific shared common goal between civilians and the military.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>teambuilding</td>
<td>The activity in question becomes a teambuilding (positive) experience for the parties involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tension</td>
<td>The issue/activity in question results in tension between the Ministries involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tension afgh</td>
<td>The issue/activity in question results in tension between the Ministries involved IN THE FIELD, IN AFGH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tension decrease</td>
<td>The activity or issue in question resulted in a decrease of tension between civilians and the military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tension fluctuates</td>
<td>The tension between civilians and the military fluctuates depending on the period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tension insignificant</td>
<td>The issue in question does not provoke significant tension between civilians and the military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total defense</td>
<td>A Swedish political tradition (find exact def!!)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>train separately</td>
<td>The military and the civilians usually train separately for their deployment in AFGH (may include some meetings, but the bulk of the training is done in isolation from one another)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>training helps</td>
<td>Joint pre-deployment training helps improve cooperation on the ground</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>transition phase</td>
<td>The transition phase refers to handing over the responsibilities to local authorities; the military pulling out of Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>un influence</td>
<td>The issue in question is a result of influence of UN policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vtc rcn and prt co</td>
<td>A VTC between RC-North and the PRT commanders. Does not include civilians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vtc with afgh</td>
<td>A direct connection with personnel deployed in Afgh is available during joint meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vtc with afgh lacking</td>
<td>There are no direct videoconferences between the country capital and the personnel posted in Afghanistan during the joint meetings (this means that each ministry has their own VTCs separately</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>white book</td>
<td>Strategic document, military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>wog fluctuate</strong></td>
<td>The frequency and quality of the cooperation between the civilians and the military has fluctuated throughout time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>wog improved in afgh</strong></td>
<td>WoG has improved on the tactical level, in the field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>wog improved in time</strong></td>
<td>During the time the TCN has been involved in Afghanistan, cooperation between civilians and the military has improved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>wog in peacetime</strong></td>
<td>Whole of Government coordination during peace time (a way to practice cooperation in a less stressful environment)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>wog must be civ lead</strong></td>
<td>The cooperation between civilians and the military (incl the PRT) should be civilian-lead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>wog not institutionalized</strong></td>
<td>There are no formal institutions on a national level that specifically support WoG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>wog rhetoric change</strong></td>
<td>A change in WoG rhetoric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>wog static</strong></td>
<td>WoG did not change in time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>wog static home</strong></td>
<td>WoG has remained static on the strategic level/at the capital of the TCN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>working group</strong></td>
<td>A joint working group that meets either regularly or ad hoc</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix D: Interview Questionnaire

SECTION 1: Verifying consent

Before beginning, I would like to again verify your consent to this interview. This is a requirement of our university’s rules for ethical research.

A1 Do you agree to participate in this interview? [closed, please select one]
YES = 1 Thank you and proceed
NO = 2 Thank you and terminate

A2 May I take written notes of our conversation to ensure accuracy? [closed, please select one]
YES = 1
NO = 2

A3 May I make an audio recording of our conversation to ensure accuracy? [closed, please select one]
YES = 1 Press Record button
NO = 2 If the respondent has replied NO to both of the above, terminate politely, explaining that you must have a record to ensure accuracy.

Thank you again for agreeing to participate.

SECTION 2: Respondent introduction

B1 Could you tell me, briefly, about the government agency you work for and your work there? [open, brief]
Probes:
• Which government ministry/agency do you work for?
• How long and in what capacity have you been acquainted with the ISAF mission? Please indicate exact time periods (if possible).

SECTION 3: Introducing the concept of “whole-of-government” / “comprehensive approach”

C1 What does the term “whole-of-government” (also known as “comprehensive approach,” “integrated approach” or “joined-up approach”) mean to officials at [government agency respondent works for], particularly as regards the ISAF mission? [open, brief]
Probes:
In your country, what ministries/agencies work side by side in the context of the contribution to ISAF?

Do civil society organizations participate in government consultations? If yes, which NGOs, how often and in what matters?

SECTION 4: Whole-of-government in your country capital

I’d like to ask you some specific questions about how government ministries and agencies in [your country] cooperate on the home front (in your country’s capital) as regards the contribution to ISAF.

D1 Does [respondent’s country] have a formal national strategy explicitly pushing towards inter-agency cooperation (that is, using terms like “whole-of-government,” “comprehensive approach,” “joined-up approach,” or other terminology implying the need for inter-agency coordination/cooperation)?

Yes = 1 (proceed to question D1.1)
No = 0 (proceed to question D1.2)

D1.1 If yes, please tell me more about this strategy.
Prompts:
- What is the specific name of the formal strategic document? (Please feel free to provide the name in your original languages, as well as an English translation if available).
- When was it adopted?
- Is the strategy to be renewed periodically? If yes, when is it due for renewal? If no, why?
- What was the impetus behind adopting such a strategy? Domestic, international influences, both, other? In your view, what factor(s) contributed most to the adoption of such a strategy?

D1.1.1 How (if at all) do you think having a formal national strategy impacts actual cooperation between civilians and the military in your country?
Prompts:
- If you believe having a national strategy does influence how civilians and military cooperate, how? In which areas specifically is this influence evident? Please provide examples.
- Do you think having a national strategy affects cooperation mainly in the country capital? Mainly in the field? Both? Why?
- If you think having the strategy has made no difference in the way ministries/agencies cooperate in your country, why is this?

D1.2 If there is no national strategy specifically geared towards inter-agency cooperation in your country, why isn’t there one?
Prompts:
• Was there ever an impetus to adopt such a strategy? If yes, who supported it and who opposed? Why wasn’t it adopted in the end?
• If there has been no impetus for such a strategy, why not?
• Do separate ministries/agencies have their own strategies reflecting a whole-of-government approach?

D1.2.1 How (if at all) do you think lacking a formal national strategy impacts actual cooperation between civilians and the military in your country?

Prompts:
• If you believe lacking a national strategy does influence how civilians and military cooperate, how? In which areas specifically is this influence evident? Please provide examples.
• Do you think lacking a national strategy affects cooperation mainly in the country capital? Mainly in the field? Both? Why?
• If you think lacking a formal strategy has made no difference in the way ministries/agencies cooperate in your country, why is this?

D2 Does [your country] have a permanent inter-agency coordination body (i.e. a permanent committee, a forum, a formal meeting group or any other permanent inter-agency coordination institution) for Afghanistan?

Yes = 1 (proceed to question D2.1)
No = 0 (proceed to question D3)

D2.1 If yes, please tell me how it works in practice [open, lengthy, high priority]

Prompts:
• What is the exact name of this body?
• When was it established? Does it still meet?
• Which ministries/agencies are represented? Are all of them represented equally at meetings?
• Who participates – government officials at what level?
• Is leadership shared, or does any ministry/agency usually run the show?
• How often do meetings take place?
• Who sets the meeting agenda?
• What is the purpose of the meetings? Information sharing, joint planning, discussion on joined projects between civilian and military, other?
• Are there any decisions taken at these meetings? If yes, on what matters? How are final decisions adopted?
• Is there a direct connection with the personnel currently deployed in Afghanistan at these meetings (i.e by conference call or VTC)? If yes, how often? What matters are discussed? Any decisions taken? If yes, on what matters?
• If there is direct feedback from the field, please describe if/how the information from the field affects the daily work in the capital. In your view, how would inter-agency cooperation in the capital be affected if these joint inter-agency conference calls /VTCs with personnel in the field are discontinued? What, if any,
difference would it make if each ministry/agency receives briefs from the field separately?

D3 Are there any ad-hoc inter-agency coordination formats (i.e. meetings in a need basis, steering committees, working groups)?

Yes = 1 (proceed to question D3.1)
No = 0 (proceed to question D4)

D3.1 If yes, please tell me how these work in practice [open, lengthy, high priority]
Prompts: same as in question D2.1

D3.1.1 What do you think is the impact of having formal inter-agency coordination bodies on actual cooperation across ministries and agencies in [country capital]? 
Prompts:
- If you see an impact, what is it? In which areas specifically is this impact evident? Please provide examples.
- If you see no impact on the level of cooperation across agencies, why do you think this happens?

D4 If there are neither permanent nor ad-hoc inter-agency coordination bodies, please explain if/how activities are coordinated across ministries/agencies [open, lengthy, high priority]

D4.1 In your view, what (if any) is the impact of lacking formal inter-agency coordination bodies on the actual level of cooperation across ministries/agencies in [country capital]?
Prompts:
- If you see an impact, what is it? In which areas specifically is this impact evident? Please provide examples.
- If you see no impact on the level of cooperation across agencies, why do you think this happens?

D5 Does [your country] have a formal financial pooling mechanism for the contribution to ISAF?

Yes = 1 (proceed to question D5.1)
No = 0 (proceed to question D5.2)

D5.1 If yes, please tell me how it works in practice [open, lengthy, high priority]
Prompts:
- Which ministries/agencies contribute to this fund?
- Are funds equally distributed among Ministries? If no, please explain which ministry/agency contributes more, and which less.
- What is the annual contribution of [ministry/agency respondent works for] to this fund? Has this amount changed throughout the years? Why?
- Is there evidence of any duplication/waste of financial resources across government agencies?
- Once a decision is taken on financial needs, how long does it take to deploy the financial resources?
- In your view, do the financial resources allotted for an intervention match the demands on the ground?

D5.2 Are there any other inter-agency cost-sharing mechanisms for the ISAF contribution?

Yes = 1 (proceed to question D5.2.1)
No = 0 (proceed to question D5.3)

D5.2.1. Please tell me how inter-agency cost-sharing works.
Prompts:
- How often and for what matters is cost-sharing used?
- Do ministries/agencies contribute equal amounts? Unequal? Why?
- In your view, does your country need a more sophisticated cost-sharing mechanism, such as a common financial pool, for Afghanistan? Why?

D5.3 If there are neither financial pooling nor cost-sharing mechanisms, please explain if/how ministries/agencies collaborate in financial matters related to the ISAF mission [open, lengthy, high priority]
Prompts:
- In your view, is it necessary for the ministries/agencies in [your country] to have some kind of an official inter-agency financial cooperation mechanism for Afghanistan?
- If yes, what kind would be most appropriate for [your country] – common financial pooling for joined projects, simple cost-sharing for administrative matters, other? Why? How would having one affect your work?
- If you do not think financial pooling or cost-sharing is necessary, why not?

D6 Does [your country] have joined inter-agency pre-deployment training?

Yes = 1 (proceed to question 6.1)
No = 0 (proceed to question 6.2)

D6.1 If yes, please tell me more about this training. [open, lengthy, high priority]
Prompts:
- How long is the training?
- Who does the training target? Officials on what level?
- Who are the trainers? Do civilians train the military and vice versa?
- What kinds of activities are included in the training?

D6.1.1 In your view, what (if any) is the effect of pre-deployment training on cooperation between civilians and the military?
Prompts:

- If you believe the training does influence how civilians and military cooperate, how? In which areas specifically is this influence evident? Please provide examples.
- Do you think the training affects cooperation mainly in the country capital? Mainly in the field? Both? Why?
- If you think the pre-deployment training has made no difference in the way ministries/agencies cooperate, why is this?

D6.2 If there is no joined pre-deployment training, what impact (if any) do you believe the lack of training has on inter-agency cooperation in the field?

D7 Are there other mechanisms of inter-agency cooperation and coordination in your country’s capital? If yes, please tell me what they are and how they work.

Prompts:

- Are there any informal cooperation channels? If yes, please explain how these work.

D8 Please give me your opinion on how interactions between civilians and military in your country’s capital have affected the level of tension among officials across government departments.

Prompts:

- In your view, when civilians and military work together, does it result in more tension between them? Less tension? No difference?
- If you see an increase in tension, in what ways specifically is this tension manifested? What specifically causes this tension? In your view, how can the tension be avoided?
- If you see a decrease in tension, in what ways specifically is this decrease manifested? What specifically helps alleviate the tension across departments?
- If you see no change in the level of tension, why do you think this happens?

SECTION 5: Whole-of-government in Afghanistan

Next I have a few specific questions about how officials from [Ministry/agency respondent works for] in [your country] cooperate with others in Afghanistan.

E1 Is the PRT lead by [your country] headed by:
[closed, please select one]

- Civilians = 1
- Military = 2
- Mixed (military and civilians on equal footing) = 3
- Separate (military and civilians with separate powers) = 4
- Other (please explain) = 5
E2 Please tell me more about any changes in the PRT leadership that may have occurred during the time of your country’s involvement in Afghanistan.

Prompts:
- Has there been a change from military head to civilian head of the PRT, or vice versa? If yes, when did this change occur? Why did the change occur? Did it affect the way civilians and military work together in Afghanistan? If yes, why and how – in what areas specifically? If no, why do you believe there was no effect on how civilians and military cooperate?
- If there has been no change in PRT leadership (i.e. from civilian to military or vice versa), why not? Was there ever an impetus for a change? If yes, by whom? Why didn’t it come to fruition in the end? If no, why has there never been a desire for such a change?

E3 Please tell me about the civil-military composition of the PRT lead by [your country]:

Prompts:
- What is the proportion of civilian to military staff within the PRT?
- Has this proportion changed throughout the years? If yes, how and why has it changed? If not, why not?

E4 Please tell me how the deployed civilian and military personnel interact in the field, within the PRT and beyond [open, high priority]

Prompts:
- Are there any formal meeting formats, committees, working groups? If yes, please provide the formal names of these meetings/groups (if any).
- Who participates – officials at what level?
- How often do meetings take place?
- Who sets the meeting agenda?
- What is the purpose of the meetings? Information sharing, joint planning, discussion on joined projects between civilian and military, other?
- Are there any decisions taken at these meetings? If yes, on what matters? How are final decisions adopted?
- Is there a direct connection with government officials in [country capital] at these meetings (i.e by conference call or VTC)? If yes, how often? Any decisions taken jointly with the staff in the capital? If yes, on what matters?
- If there is direct feedback from the [country capital], please describe if/how the information from [country capital] affects the daily work in the field. In your view, how would inter-agency cooperation in Afghanistan be affected if these joint inter-agency conference calls/VTCs [country capital] are discontinued? What, if any, difference would it make if each ministry/agency receives briefs from the field separately?
- Any ways of informal cooperation? If yes, please describe how it works.

E5 Please explain how financials are managed within the PRT. [open, high priority]

Prompts:
- Any fund pooling or cost-sharing? If yes, for what matters? Who contributes how much?
• Any evidence of waste of financial resources?

E7 Are there other instances of inter-agency cooperation in the field? If yes, please elaborate.
Prompts:
• Are there any informal cooperation channels? If yes, please explain how these work.

E8 Please give me your opinion on how interactions between civilians and military in Afghanistan have affected the level of tension among officials across government departments.
Prompts:
• In your view, when civilians and military work together in the field, does it result in more tension between them? Less tension? No difference?
• If you see an increase in tension, in what ways specifically is this tension manifested? What specifically causes this tension? In your view, how can the tension be avoided?
• If you see a decrease in tension, in what ways specifically is this decrease manifested? What specifically helps alleviate the tension across departments?
• If you see no change in the level of tension, why do you think this happens?

SECTION 6: Evolution of whole-of-government

Finally, I’d like to ask you some questions about how inter-agency cooperation has changes throughout the years, both in [your country’s capital] as well as in the field (in Afghanistan).

F1. Throughout the years, do you consider inter-agency cooperation in [your country’s capital] to have changed?
Prompts:
• If there is an increase in cooperation, in which aspects exactly? Please give some specific examples.
• What are the reasons for the increase in cooperation? Domestic, international, both? Which do you consider most important?
• If there has been no change in the level of inter-agency cooperation, why?
• If there is a decrease in cooperation, in which aspects exactly? Please give some specific examples.
• What are the reasons for the decrease in cooperation? Domestic, international, both? Which do you consider most important?

F2 Throughout the years, do you consider inter-agency cooperation in Afghanistan to have changed?
Prompts:
• If there is an increase in cooperation, in which aspects exactly? Please give some specific examples.
• What are the reasons for the increase in cooperation? Domestic, international, both? Which do you consider most important?
• If there has been no change in the level of inter-agency cooperation, why?
• If there is a decrease in cooperation, in which aspects exactly? Please give some specific examples.
• What are the reasons for the decrease in cooperation? Domestic, international, both? Which do you consider most important?
Appendix E: List of Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: Government departments that perceive WOG as a tool serving their organizational purpose will support a WOG approach, while those that believe WOG runs counter to their organizational interests will resist inter-agency integration.

Hypothesis 1a: Overall, a nation’s WOG model will move to a higher level on the WOG scale only when all ministries simultaneously decide that such developments advance their respective organizational interests.

Hypothesis 2: Regardless of advancements in WOG integration, tensions between civilian and military ministries are unlikely to subside.

Hypothesis 3: Countries with a historical legacy of close cooperation between the military and civilian ministries will produce more integrated WOG models in Afghanistan than countries that lack such traditions.

Hypothesis 3a: Countries that share similar strategic culture traits will implement more similar WOG designs in Afghanistan than countries with diverging strategic cultures.

Hypothesis 4: WOG developments, on the strategic as well as on the tactical level, will occur in response to pressure from events in the mission area.

Hypothesis 5: On average, coalition governments will produce low to medium-level WOG integration models, reaching no higher than the “coordinated action” level of the WOG scale.

Hypothesis 5a: Coalitions of more ideologically diverse parties will result in less integrated WOG approaches than coalitions of more like-minded parties.

Hypothesis 5b: On average, coalition governments will prioritize measures that tighten the caveats on inter-ministerial cooperation over measures that stimulate joint working.

Hypothesis 6: In single party majority governments, the level of WOG integration will reflect the personal preferences of the individual occupying the Prime Minister post.

Hypothesis 7: Absent adequate oversight, the level of WOG integration in the field will reflect the personal preferences of the PRT leader(s).
Appendix F: List of Tables – Sweden

**Table 10: Inter-Agency Cooperation in Stockholm, 2001-2014**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>WOG Policy Developments</th>
<th>Institutions and Inter-Ministerial Cooperation</th>
<th>Financial Pooling</th>
<th>Joint Training</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001-2006</td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-2009</td>
<td>Coexistence</td>
<td>Coexistence</td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Coexistence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2014</td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Coexistence</td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Coexistence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 11: Swedish Inter-Agency Cooperation in Afghanistan, 2006-2014**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>PRT Structure</th>
<th>Joint Meetings</th>
<th>Financial Pooling/Joint Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006-2009</td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2012</td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Communication → Coexistence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013-2014</td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Communication</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix G: List of Tables – Germany

Table 12: Inter-Agency Cooperation in Berlin, 2001-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>WOG Policy Developments</th>
<th>Institutions and Inter-Ministerial Cooperation</th>
<th>Financial Pooling</th>
<th>Joint Training</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001-2004</td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Coexistence</td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-2009</td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Coexistence</td>
<td>Communication → Coexistence</td>
<td>Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2014</td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Coexistence</td>
<td>Coordinated Action</td>
<td>Coexistence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 13: German Inter-Agency Cooperation in Afghanistan, 2003-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PRT Structure</th>
<th>Joint Meetings</th>
<th>Financial Pooling/Joint Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003-2005</td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-2009</td>
<td>Communication → Co-existence</td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Communication → Coordinated Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2014</td>
<td>Co-existence</td>
<td>Co-existence → Coordinated Action</td>
<td>Coordinated Action</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix H: List of Tables – United Kingdom

#### Table 14: Inter-Agency Cooperation in London, 2001-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WOG Policy Developments</th>
<th>Institutions and Inter-Ministerial Cooperation</th>
<th>Financial Pooling</th>
<th>Joint Training</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001-2006</td>
<td>Coexistence</td>
<td>Coordinated Action</td>
<td>Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-2009</td>
<td>Coexistence → Coordinated Action</td>
<td>Coordinated Action → Integrated Action</td>
<td>Coexistence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2014</td>
<td>Coordinated Action → Integrated Action</td>
<td>Integrated Action</td>
<td>Coexistence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 15: British Inter-Agency Cooperation in Afghanistan, 2003-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRT Structure</th>
<th>Joint Meetings</th>
<th>Financial Pooling/Joint Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003-2005</td>
<td>Coexistence</td>
<td>Coexistence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-2007</td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-2009</td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Communication → Coordinated Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2014</td>
<td>Integrated Action</td>
<td>Coordinated Action → Integrated Action</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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