

20,000 homes, but still not enough:  
A relational comparative study of the piloting phase of Canada's 20K Homes campaign  
to understand how it fits in with current efforts to end homelessness

by

Brittany Rea

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Affairs in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

in

Geography

Carleton University  
Ottawa, Ontario

© 2018

Brittany Rea

## **Abstract**

The purpose of this study is to understand how Canada's 20K Homes campaign fits in with current efforts to end homelessness. Focusing on the piloting phase of the campaign, this thesis takes a relational comparative approach to Ottawa's action week and Waterloo's and Hamilton's registry week. It links key concepts in geography with social movement theory and uses data collected through semi-structured interviews and documentation to address the following research questions: 1) What factors shape the timing, development and characteristics of the campaign at the national and local levels? 2) Why did conveners at the local level agree to pilot the campaign? 3) What are the key components of action/registry week? and 4) How will each pilot community come up with the resources needed to house people for the campaign? Based on the findings from this research, it is argued that the 20K Homes campaign not only supports but will help strengthen a fairly new approach to homelessness in Canada – one based on Housing First. While there may be enough existing resources within communities to support the campaign, there are not enough to end homelessness. With no new resources being provided through the campaign, new investments in affordable housing and supports are needed by senior levels of government to end homelessness.

## Acknowledgements

There are several people I want to say thank you to for their support on this research project. First, thank you to my academic advisor, Dr. Fran Kłodawsky, for working with me over the past three and a half years on this research project, and for connecting me with Mike and the Ottawa Alliance. Without this connection, I may not have had the opportunity to do research on the 20K Homes campaign. Thank you for advising me on the research and interview questions and on how to do a relational comparative analysis. More so, thank you for seeing me through this research project to the very end. I wish you a very happy retirement.

Second, thank you Mike and the Ottawa Alliance for suggesting that I do research on Ottawa's action week and for agreeing to collaborate on this research project as a third-party recruiter and gatekeeper. Thank you to the Canadian Alliance to End Homelessness, the City of Hamilton and Region of Waterloo for inspiring me to do a comparative study and for being enthusiastic about participating in this research project. Thank you to all my interview participants for agreeing to participate in this research project. Your time is truly appreciated and your insights on the 20K Homes campaign have been very informative.

Third, thank you Dr. Pablo Mendez for agreeing to be a second reader. Your support and advice at the beginning of this research project has not been forgotten and is much appreciated as well.

Fourth, thank you Dan Patterson for being the emotional support cat I never had. Thank you for our conversations and for your (un)solicited advice on my thesis. Also, thank

you for treating me to lunches, coffee and gelato. You've made my time at Carleton fun and not all work. More so, you've been so kind and are truly a good friend.

Fifth, thank you Dr. Jennifer Ridgley for letting me work with you as a TA and RA. You have given me the opportunity to further develop my teaching and research skills. Not only has this work helped me pay my tuition and living expenses, it has also help build my confidence.

Sixth, thank you to all the graduate students for your support over the past three years. I especially want to thank: Christian, for working evenings and weekends with me in the grad office. You have made those long hours more tolerable and fun. Saille, for talking with me about my research project and for your input on the tables and flow charts included in this thesis. Keegan, for forwarding my name to Dr. Gita Ljubicic and to Roz. Presenting for GEOG 5905 helped strengthen my methodology chapter and working at the Ottawa Septic System Office has helped me afford grad school.

Seventh, thank you Roz and the OSSO for being understanding and flexible with my work schedule while I finish my thesis.

Finally, and most importantly, thank you to my girlfriend, Ada, family (mom and Gary, dad, Krystal and Dave, Xandinn, William, Alex), and dog (Shylow), for all your love and support. To my family, you have been very patient with me and my post-secondary studies over the last nine years. You can be assured that I am done with school for a while. To Shylow, thank you for accompanying me to Ottawa, making our apartment a home, waiting patiently for me to come home from classes, our leisurely walks, and visits back home to Niagara. Rest in peace my beautiful friend. Lastly, to Ada, you have been so

encouraging over the past seven months. Thank you for our daily texts, evening conversations, weekend video chat dates, and spontaneous visits. Your surprise grocery and dinner deliveries saved me time and money, so I could get my thesis done. This was much appreciated. Thank you as well for getting our good friends in Niagara to mail me inspirational cards. Love you all.

## Table of contents

<b>Abstract .....</b>	ii
<b>Acknowledgements .....</b>	iii
<b>Table of contents .....</b>	vi
<b>List of appendices .....</b>	xi
<b>Chapter one: Introduction to the 20K Homes campaign .....</b>	p.12
1.0. Overview .....	p.12
1.2. Research objective, questions, & thesis statement .....	p.13
1.3. Rationale for this study .....	p.14
1.4. Thesis outline .....	p.15
<b>Chapter two: Conceptual framework .....</b>	p.18
2.0. Introduction .....	p.18
2.1. Conceptualizing 20K Homes as a "social movement campaign" .....	p.18
2.2. Distinguishing between "Campaign" & "Social Movements" .....	p.19
2.3. Conceptualizing: space, place, scale, networks .....	p.21
2.4. Why social movement campaigns develop .....	p.29
2.5. Factors that shape the development of social movement campaigns .....	p.33
2.6. Social movement campaign outcomes .....	p.48
2.7. Conclusion .....	p.49
<b>Chapter three: National context of the 20K Homes campaign .....</b>	p.50
3.0. Introduction .....	p.50
<i>Part I - Homelessness: definitions, scope &amp; causes .....</i>	p.51
3.1. Introduction .....	p.51
3.1.1. Defining homelessness .....	p.51
3.1.2. Homelessness in human geography .....	p.57
3.1.3. The scope of homelessness in Canada .....	p.61
3.1.4. What causes homelessness? .....	p.63
<i>Part II - A brief history on Canada's affordable housing &amp; homelessness crisis .....</i>	p.65
3.2. Introduction .....	p.65
3.2.1. Policy responses to affordable housing & homelessness since the 1990s ..	p.69
3.2.2. Housing First .....	p.72
3.2.3. At Home/Chez Soi .....	p.73
3.2.4. Housing First in Alberta .....	p.74
<i>Part III - Towards a Housing First approach to homelessness .....</i>	p.75
3.3. Introduction .....	p.75
3.3.1. A renewal of the HPS .....	p.75
3.3.2. Ontario's Community Homelessness Prevention Initiative .....	p.78
3.3.3. 10-Year Plans to End Homelessness .....	p.80
3.3.4. Critics of Housing First .....	p.81

<i>Part IV- Politics between conveners at the national &amp; international levels .....</i>	p.85
3.4. Introduction .....	p.85
3.4.1. The development of the Canadian Alliance to End Homelessness .....	p.85
3.4.2. The American 100K Homes campaign .....	p.86
3.4.3. Work in Calgary/Alberta on ending homelessness .....	p.90
3.4.4. Political connections between conveners at the national & international levels .....	p.90
<i>Part V - The goal &amp; core principles of the 20K Homes campaign .....</i>	p.92
3.5. Introduction .....	p.92
3.5.1. Focusing on the "most vulnerable" .....	p.92
3.5.2. The core principles of the 20K Homes campaign .....	p.96
<b>Chapter four: Research methodology .....</b>	p.98
4.0. Introduction .....	p.98
4.1. How I came to do research on the 20K Homes campaign .....	p.98
4.2. Why a relational comparative approach was taken in this study .....	p.104
4.3. Interview participants .....	p.107
4.4. Recruitment strategies & methods .....	p.109
4.5. Research methods & strategies for data collection .....	p.117
4.5.1. Semi-structured interviews .....	p.117
4.5.2. Documentation review .....	p.125
4.5.3. Participant observation .....	p.127
4.5.4. 'Follow-the-campaign' .....	p.131
4.6. Data analysis .....	p.134
4.7. Ethical considerations .....	p.135
4.8. Conclusion .....	p.137
<b>Chapter five: Research findings and analysis .....</b>	p.139
5.0. Introduction .....	p.139
<i>Part I - Setting the local context .....</i>	p.140
5.1. Introduction .....	p.140
5.1.1. Ottawa .....	p.140
5.1.2. Region of Waterloo .....	p.142
5.1.3. Hamilton .....	p.143
5.1.4. Conclusion .....	p.144
<i>Part II - Reasons why conveners agreed to pilot the campaign .....</i>	p.146
5.2. Introduction .....	p.146
5.2.1. Aligns with federal & provincial funding requirements .....	p.146
5.2.2. Aligns with 10-Year Plans to End Homelessness .....	p.147
5.2.3. Housing First .....	p.148
5.2.4. Supports & strengthens systems planning .....	p.149
5.2.5. Raise awareness & educate the public .....	p.151
5.2.6. Community engagement .....	p.152

5.2.7. Leadership .....	p.154
5.2.8. Advocacy .....	p.156
5.2.9. Point-in-Time Count .....	p.160
5.2.10. Conclusion .....	p.162
<i>Part III - What are the key components of action/registry week? .....</i>	p.164
5.3. Introduction .....	p.164
5.3.1. Focusing on the "most vulnerable" .....	p.164
5.3.2. Human resources .....	p.168
5.3.2.1. Conveners .....	p.169
5.3.2.2. Internal staff .....	p.171
5.3.2.3. Frontline staff & volunteers .....	p.174
5.3.3. Networks of "support" .....	p.177
5.3.3.1. Leadership support by the CAEH .....	p.178
5.3.3.2. Training & technical support by Community Solutions .....	p.180
5.3.3.3. Agency support .....	p.184
5.3.3.4. Internal support .....	p.185
5.3.3.5. Ottawa' action team - member support .....	p.186
5.3.3.6. Police support .....	p.188
5.3.3.7. The City of Ottawa: Political support .....	p.188
5.3.3.8. The Province of Ontario: Political support .....	p.192
5.3.3.9. No support from the Federal Government - A missed opportunity? .....	p.193
5.3.4. Financial and material resources .....	p.194
5.3.4.1. Administrative dollars .....	p.195
5.3.4.2. Sponsorship .....	p.197
5.3.4.3. In-kind donations: Training & technical support .....	p.197
5.3.4.4. Gift cards .....	p.198
5.3.4.5. Food & refreshments .....	p.199
5.3.4.6. Spaces for training, headquarters, & community debrief .....	p.199
5.3.4.7. Promotional material .....	p.203
5.3.4.8. Summary of action/registry week budget .....	p.204
5.3.5. Spatial strategies & methods for recruitment .....	p.205
5.3.5.1. Spatial strategies & methods for recruiting frontline staff & volunteers .....	p.205
5.3.5.2. Spatial strategies & methods for recruiting survey participants .....	p.218
5.3.6. Training .....	p.228
5.3.7. Data .....	p.235
5.3.7.1. Data to strengthen local service systems .....	p.236
5.3.7.2. Data collection & entry as a form of community engagement .....	p.237
5.3.7.3. Data to raise awareness & educate the public .....	p.237
5.3.7.4. Data to track and report on progress .....	p.242
5.3.7.5. Data to advocate .....	p.243
5.3.7.6. Conclusion .....	p.244

5.3.8. VI-SPDAT - Common assessment tool .....	p.245
5.3.8.1. Why conveners agreed to use the common assessment tool ....	p.248
5.3.8.2. Common assessment tool fostered community engagement ...	p.250
5.3.8.3. How the VI-SPDAT works .....	p.250
5.3.8.4. What the VI-SPDAT assesses .....	p.251
5.3.8.5. How appropriate is the VI-SPDAT for assessing the needs of the "hidden" homeless? .....	p.251
5.3.8.6. How does the common assessment tool meet local needs? .....	p.256
5.3.8.7. A problem with prioritization .....	p.257
5.3.9. Media .....	p.258
5.3.9.1. Media coverage on the local campaigns .....	p.259
5.3.9.2. Media interviews .....	p.263
5.3.9.3. Promotional material .....	p.266
5.3.9.4. Alternative forms of media .....	p.267
5.2.10. Community debrief .....	p.271
5.3.11. Next steps .....	p.281
5.3.11.1. Tracking & reporting on data .....	p.282
5.3.11.2. Change in leadership structure and merging of priority lists in Ottawa .....	p.283
5.2.11.3. Another registry week in Hamilton .....	p.284
5.3.11.4. Strengthening the coordination of Hamilton' service system .....	p.284
5.3.11.5. Continue learning & sharing .....	p.285
5.3.11.6. Follow-up with community partners & engagement .....	p.286
5.3.11.7. Continue advocating for new affordable housing and supports .....	p.287
5.3.12. Conclusion .....	p.288
<i>Part IV - How will pilot communities come up with the resources needed to house people for the campaign? .....</i>	p.289
5.4.1. Introduction .....	p.289
5.3.2. Homelessness funding .....	p.290
5.3.3. The private sector .....	p.293
5.3.4. Broadening the Base .....	p.296
4.3.5. The faith-based sector .....	p.297
5.3.6. The service sector .....	p.298
5.3.7. Everyday citizens .....	p.298
5.3.8. Conclusion .....	p.299
<b>Chapter six: Conclusion .....</b>	<b>p.301</b>
6.0. Introduction .....	p.301
6.1. Review of research objective, questions, & thesis statement .....	p.301
6.2. Key findings .....	p.302
6.2.1. What factors shaped the timing, development & characteristics of the campaigns .....	p.302

6.2.2. Reasons why conveners agreed to pilot the campaign .....	p.302
6.2.3. Key components of action/registry week .....	p.303
6.2.4. How pilot communities will come up with the housing resources .....	p.305
6.3. Final thoughts .....	p.306
6.4. Update on the 20K Homes campaign's progress .....	p.308
6.5. Identifying areas for future research .....	p.309
<b>Appendices</b> .....	p.310
<b>Notes</b> .....	p.351
<b>References</b> .....	p.359

## **List of appendices**

Appendix A – Map & Table of 61 Designated Communities Under the HPS .....	p.310
Appendix B – 16 Directives Under the HPS .....	p.312
Appendix C – A History of Affordable Housing & Homelessness: Timeline .....	p.313
Appendix D – Interview Participants .....	p.314
Appendix E – CUREB Clearance Forms .....	p.315
Appendix F – Supporting E-mail for Letters of Invite .....	p.317
Appendix G – Letters of Invite for Conveners .....	p.318
Appendix H – Letters of Invite for Spokespersons .....	p.328
Appendix I – Letter of Invite to Third-Party Recruiter .....	p.334
Appendix J – Letter of Invite to Frontline Staff & Volunteers .....	p.336
Appendix K – Original Consent Forms .....	p.338
Appendix L – Interview Schedule .....	p.342
Appendix M – Amended Consent Form .....	p.344
Appendix N – Setting the Local Context .....	p.346
Appendix O – Map of Pilot Communities .....	p.347
Appendix P – Reasons Why Conveners Agreed to Pilot the 20K Homes Campaign ...	p.348
Appendix Q – Key Components of Action/Registry Week .....	p.349
Appendix R – Financial & Material Resources .....	p.350

## **Chapter one**

### **Introduction to the 20K Homes campaign**

#### *1. Overview*

Over the last twenty-five years, there has been “a dramatic increase in the number of individuals and families experiencing homelessness [in Canada]” (Adamo et al., 2016, p.12). It is estimated that more than 235,000 Canadians experience homelessness each year, and more than 35,000 Canadians experience homelessness on any given night (Gaetz et al., 2016, p.5). These numbers are likely to be much higher as many people experiencing homelessness are not connected to the service system (Peters, 2012; Adamo et al., 2016). Problematically, at the time this study began, Canada was the only G-8 country without a national housing strategy. Since the 1990s, there has been much research and advocacy work on homelessness and the need for affordable housing.

One important development in this work has been the 20,000 Homes Campaign (hereinafter 20K Homes). According to the “20,000 Homes Campaign – Concept Overview” (20K Homes & CAEH, n.d., p.1), “The 20,000 Homes campaign is a national movement of communities working together to permanently house 20,000 of Canada’s most vulnerable homeless people by July 1, 2018.” Nationally, the 20K Homes campaign is being convened by the Canadian Alliance to End Homelessness (hereinafter CAEH), a non-profit organization located in Calgary, Alberta. “The [20K Homes] campaign was inspired by the successful 100,000 Homes Campaign in the United States, but has been adapted to work in a Canadian context” (*ibid*).

The 20K Homes campaign launched nationally back in June 2015. Prior to its launch, the region of Waterloo and cities of Ottawa and Hamilton piloted the first phase of

the campaign, most widely known as a “registry week”, but in Ottawa, known as an “action week”. The main objective of registry/action week is to survey people experiencing homelessness so that they can be prioritized for permanent housing with supports. Registry/action week is typically a week long and includes: two days of training, three days of surveying, and a community debrief. Back in the fall of 2014, the Region of Waterloo launched a registry week and Waterloo region became the first community to pilot the campaign. This was followed by the Alliance to End Homelessness Ottawa, a non-profit community-based organization, launching an action week in the third week of April 2015, making Ottawa the second community to pilot the campaign. Then the City of Hamilton launched a registry week in the last week of April 2015, and Hamilton became the third and final community to pilot the campaign.

### *1.2. Research objective, questions, & thesis statement*

This thesis focuses on the piloting phase of the 20K Homes campaign and takes a “relational comparative approach” (Ward, 2008; 2010) to Ottawa’s action week and Waterloo’s and Hamilton’s registry weeks. The purpose of this study is to understand how the 20K Homes campaign fits in with current efforts to end homelessness. To address this central research question, the following sub-questions are explored:

1. What factors shape the timing, development and characteristics of the 20K Homes campaign at the national and local levels?
2. Why did conveners at the local level agree to pilot the campaign?
3. What are the key components of action/registry week?
4. How will each pilot community come up with the resources needed to house people for the campaign?

Addressing these research questions, I make the following thesis statement: The 20K Homes campaign not only supports but marks a fairly new approach to homelessness in Canada – one based on Housing First. While there may be enough existing resources within communities to support the campaign locally and nationally, there are not enough to end homelessness. With no new resources being provided through the campaign, new investments in affordable housing and supports are needed by senior levels of government to ‘end’ homelessness.

### *1.3. Rationale for this study*

There are four reasons why this study on the 20K Homes campaign is an important contribution to knowledge. First, the campaign is happening at a moment of transition. This transition is marked by a new approach to homelessness – one based on Housing First. This moment of transition is an important factor shaping the timing and development of the campaign. In agreement with one convener interviewed for this study, it is argued in this thesis that the 20K Homes campaign not only supports but helps strengthen this new approach to homelessness. It is understood here that this new approach to homelessness – and by extension, the 20K Homes campaign – fits within a larger political economic project of neoliberalism (Stanhope & Dunn, 2011). This study, therefore, contributes to our understanding of the conditions under which certain individuals and organizations can organize and certain resources get mobilized. Second, this study contributes to a growing body of knowledge and our conceptualization of ‘hidden’ homelessness. Hidden homelessness has received little attention in policy and (geographic) research (Peters, 2012). Third, most of the social movements literature focuses on the ways in which resources are mobilized and obtained through networks. Very little is known about the

social relationships that make up these social structures, particularly, who the key players are and how power operates through these networks (however, see Bosco, 2001). While this study rejects using “networks” as a master concept for understanding the development and key components of the 20K Homes campaign, it contributes to network theory by focusing on the relationships between conveners, member organizations, and/or community partners involved in the piloting phase of the 20K Homes campaign. Fourth, and finally, the findings from this study challenge us to think about the extent to which a grassroots approach to ending homelessness can create social change.

#### *1.4. Thesis outline*

This thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter one provided an overview of homelessness in Canada and on the 20K Homes campaign as a response to homelessness. An outline of the central research question and sub-questions were provided, followed by a thesis statement and rationale for why this study is important.<sup>1</sup>

Chapter two (the next chapter) provides a conceptual framework for this thesis. It begins with conceptualizing the 20K Homes campaign as a social movements campaign and by distinguishing between social movements and campaigns. Key concepts in geography are defined, including space, place, scale and networks. A review of the literature is provided looking at the ways in which geographers and other scholars have combined these key concepts in geography with social movement theory to understand the timing, development and characteristics of social movements. I draw on this body of literature to inform this study on the 20K Homes campaign.

Chapter three sets the context for this study. The first part of this chapter begins with a discussion on defining homelessness, details on the scope of homelessness, and the causes of homelessness. Part two of this chapter then situates the 20K Homes campaign within historical context of an affordable housing and homelessness crisis that began in the 1990s, followed by a discussion on policy responses to housing and homelessness since the 1990s. A discussion on Housing First is provided, including early adoptions and studies of this program in Canada. Part three of this chapter highlights recent changes in Canada's service system towards a Housing First approach to homelessness. Part four wraps up this chapter providing political context around the development of the CAEH and the American 100,000 Homes campaign.

Chapter four provides an overview of the research methodology for this study. Section one begins with a discussion on how I came to do research on the 20K Homes campaign; section two gives justification for why a relational comparative approach was taken in this study; section three provides a description of the participants interviewed for this study; section four provides a discussion on the strategies and methods used for recruitment; section five outlines the research methods and strategies for data collection; and section six describes the process of transcribing and analyzing the data collected for this study.

Chapter five analyzes and discusses the findings from this study. Part one sets the context by providing background information of each pilot community; part two explores reasons why conveners from each pilot community agreed to pilot the campaign; part three identifies and discusses the key components of action/registry week; and part four

examines how pilot communities will come up with the resources needed to house people for the campaign.

Chapter six concludes this thesis with a review of the research objective, questions, and central argument. A summary of the research findings is provided and an update on the campaign's progress. Some final thoughts are then given as to how the 20K Homes campaign fits in with current efforts to end homelessness.

## **Chapter two:**

### **Conceptual framework**

#### *2.0. Introduction*

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a conceptual framework for studying the piloting phase of the 20K Homes campaign. This is done by linking key concepts in geography with social movement theory to inform the timing, development and characteristics of the 20K Homes campaign both at the local and national levels; the key components of action/registry; and how each pilot community will come up with the resources needed to house people for the campaign. Section one begins by conceptualizing the 20K Homes campaign as a “social movement *campaign*” (Staggenborg & Lecomte, 2009 – original *emphasis*). In section two, I make an important distinction between “social movements” and “campaigns” and provide justification for why this difference is important. Section three reviews how key concepts in geography have been defined throughout the literature, including: space, place, scale and networks, and how they will be used in this thesis.<sup>2</sup> Section four will then provide a review of how geographers and other scholars have bridged these key concepts in geography with social movement theory to explain why and how social movements develop, and with what outcomes.

#### *2.1. Conceptualizing 20K Homes as a social movement campaign*

The 20K Homes campaign is conceptualized in this thesis as a social movement *campaign*. This is because the 20K Homes campaign is part of a growing international movement towards Housing First. Although the 20K Homes campaign is widely known as a *national* movement, it is a growing multi-scalar initiative involving networks of individuals and organizations from the local, national and international levels. It is place-

based in the sense that, as one convener interviewed for this study explained, “ultimately [...] the campaign lives in communities.” This means that the events associated with the campaign are grounded in particular communities – that the national and local campaigns are contingent on one-another. Each local campaign has its own shape and character and is interconnected to others through sharing knowledge, resources, and ‘best’ practices. Simply put, the 20K Homes campaign is a growing multi-site, multi-scalar “geographically uneven and geographically dispersed “network of spatial connectivity,” comprising geographic nodal points of varying intensity in terms of activity, influence, and decision-making”, borrowing from Conway (2008, p.216-217 with reference to Leitner & Sheppard, forthcoming).

## *2.2. Distinguishing between “campaigns” and “social movements”*

Despite the 20K Homes campaign being referred to as a national *movement*, the term “movement” is avoided here because there are important distinctions between “campaigns” and “social *movements*” that need to be considered. Distinguishing between “campaigns” and “social movements” is necessary for establishing what is being studied in this thesis, and subsequently, to begin to understand why the 20K Homes campaign has developed.<sup>3</sup>

Rorty (1995) has written a whole article on “Campaigns” and “Movements”. He argues, “[A] campaign [is] finite, something that can be recognized to have succeeded or to have [failed]. Movements, by contrast, neither succeed nor fail. They are too big and too amorphous to do anything that simple” (p.56). Campaigns, in other words, are visible, goal oriented, time specific with concrete outcomes (Staggenborg & Lecomte, 2009).

Movements, by contrast, are not always apparent, have broader objectives and are ongoing – the goals they set out to achieve are continuously worked at and striven for.

Tilly & Wood (2013, p.4) define a *campaign* as “a sustained, organized public effort making collective claims on target authorities[.]” According to these scholars, “a *campaign* extends beyond any single event” (*ibid* – original *emphasis*). This is supported by Marwell & Oliver (1984, p.12), who define *collective campaigns* as “an aggregate of collective events or activities that appear to be oriented toward some relatively specific goal or good, and that occur within some proximity in space and time.” In other words, collective campaigns are interconnected events that are subject to temporal and spatial variation. Tilly & Wood (2013, p.4) further explain that:

“A campaign always links at least three parties: a group of self-designated claimants, some object(s) of claims, and a public of some kind. The claims may target governmental officials, but the “authorities” in question can also include owners of property, religious functionaries, and others whose actions (or failure to act) significantly affect the welfare of many people. Not the solo actions of claimants, object(s), or public, but interactions amongst the three, constitute a social movement.”

Based on this view, campaigns are a form of contentious politics involving multiple groups of people and/or organizations with competing interests.

Campaigns are a constituent part of social movements. Staggenborg & Lecomte (2009, p.3) agree, stating, “Movements ebb and flow with campaigns.” They explain that “movements need campaigns to remain visible and relevant” (p.1). Campaigns are important because they make movements both visible and tangible by their activities and outcomes. Since “campaigns” and “movements” share similar characteristics, they are easy to confuse, and campaigns, “sometimes by analogy, [attract] the label “movement.”” (Tilly

and Wood, 2013, p.11). It is due to their contingency that I can draw on social movements theory to help inform this study on the 20K Homes campaign.

### *2.3. Conceptualizing: space, place, scale, networks*

Geographers and other scholars have critiqued the traditional social movements literature for failing to recognize the significance of geography in understanding social movements (Miller & Martin, 2000; Conway, 2008). As Ramutsindela (2009, p.199) explains, all social movements have “a spatial context that cannot be ignored if we are to fully understand them.” More recently, critical geographers and other scholars have made important contributions to the study of social movements using key concepts in geography, including: space, place, scale, and networks (Routledge, 1992, 1993, 2000 & 2003; Miller, 2000; Bosco, 2001; Kurtz, 2003; Martin, 2003; Wolford, 2004; Larsen, 2008; McFarlane, 2009; Nicholls, 2009). These concepts have been used as tools for studying the “spatial arrangements” of social movements (Conway, 2008). Critical geographers argue that these spatial arrangements are relational, socially constructed concepts, and mutually constituted. They also argue “that spatial arrangements are actually produced and reproduced through ongoing practices” and that “Social relations are conditioned by hegemonic spatial discourses and arrangements which are typically experienced as pre-given, fixed and even “natural”” (borrowing from *ibid*, p.212).

“Space”, for example, has traditionally been conceptualized as a “stage” on which social and economic relations unfolded (Herod, Rainnie, & McGrath-Champ, 2007; Herod, 2014). Doreen Massey (1992) argues that space is not static or absolute, it is relational and socially constituted. According to Kitchin (2009, p.272), “space is always in the process of becoming; it is always in the process of taking place. Space [...] is a practice, a doing, an

event, a becoming – a material and social reality forever (re)created in the moment. [...] space gains its form, function, and meaning through ‘practice.’” Based on this view, space is always being made and remade. Not only is it socially constituted but also has material outcomes. Peet & Thrift (1989, p.18 – original *emphasis*) argue, however, that “Space is not just a reflection of the social but a *constitutive element of what the social is.*” These matters, they explain, are summarized by Massey (1984, p.6; also see Massey 1992), who argues that not only is “the spatial socially constructed: the social is spatially constructed too.” She explains, “‘Space’ is created out of the vast intricacies, the incredible complexities, of the interlocking and non-interlocking, and the networks of relations at every scale from local to global” (Massey, 1992, p.80). For Massey, “space” is the ‘fabric’ of everyday life. It is part of and made up of other spatial arrangements. She argues too that space is infused with power, it is “a complex web of relations of domination and subordination, of solidarity and cooperation” (*ibid*).

As Conway (2008, p.212) states, “Understandings of “place” have been similarly problematized.” “Place” has conventionally been understood as a discrete territory “with cohesive communities, bounded cultures and fixed identities” (*ibid* with reference to Massey, 1994). According to Nicholls (2009, p.79 with reference to Agnew, 1987, p.28), places have been conceptualized as:

“sites where wider economic and political processes [play] out (*locations*), social and organizational relations develop to mediate micro responses to macro level processes (*locale*) and spatial imaginaries form to give people a sense of meaning in their particular works (*sense of place*).”

Massey (1994) argues that “place” is not bounded and fixed, it is open, a process. It is made and remade by our social relations and practices (also see, Conway,

2008). It is interconnected with other places and exists at multiple scales (Massey 1994; Cresswell, 2009). Leitner & Sheppard (2009, p.236) explain that these “horizontal and vertical connectivities” shape the “heterogeneity and political dynamics” of place. Massey (1994) agrees that “place” is not homogenous but rather made up of multiple identities, plural cultures, and are full of internal conflict. “Place” too takes on multiple meanings and has material outcomes (Cresswell, 2009).

More recently, critical geographers, particularly within urban studies, have adopted a relational/territorial approach to the study of “place” (see Beaumont & Nicholls, 2007; Ward, 2008; Brenner, 2009; McCann & Ward, 2010; Ward, 2010; Cook & Ward, 2011; Clarke, 2012; Cochrane & Ward, 2012). These scholars argue that “place” is both a relational and territorial concept. They recognize that while “place” is open and shaped by larger political and economic processes, they are still subject to their own practices, jurisdiction, and governing bodies (Delaney, 2009). As Brenner (2009, p.31) states, however, “it would be a serious mistake to reduce all aspects of social space to [territorial] form.” That’s because these territorial characteristics of place can only be understood in relational terms (Bosco, 2001; Brenner, 2009). A relational/territorial approach is adopted in this study to examine the activities associated with piloting of the 20K Homes campaign.

Conway (2009, p.298) points out that “While all social movements have their own spatialities and territories, they are not all place based in the same ways or to the same degrees.” As will be demonstrated in this thesis, Ottawa’s action week was more place based and took on more distinct characteristics than Waterloo’s and Hamilton’s registry weeks because it was convened by a community-based organization.

Critical geographers and other scholars have further challenged conventional understandings of scale. Scalar units (i.e. local, regional, national, global) have often been viewed as self-contained and hierachal with smaller units nested inside larger ones (Massey, 1992; Brenner, 2009; Wekerle, Sandberg, & Gilbert, 2009; Leitner & Sheppard, 2009; Conway, 2008). It has also been assumed that scalar interactions and power relations operate in a top-down, unidirectional manner, and that “smaller-scale entities are not directly interconnected horizontally in any significant way and, thus, are dependent on layer scales” (Leitner & Sheppard, 2009, p.235). Critical geographers and other scholars argue, however, that scalar units are not single, bounded and fixed, they are socially and discursively constructed, mutually constituted, and co-produced with material outcomes (Conway, 2008; Leitner & Sheppard, 2009; Mahon & Keil, 2009). They also argue that our social relations are infused with power and that this power is multidirectional, operating both within and between scalar units.

A relational, multiscalar approach to scale has raised questions about the role and significance of the nation state. Mahon & Keil (2009) argue that the adoption of a multiscalar approach “does not mean that the nation state has literally hollowed out. Rescaling [...] is not a zero sum process in which new policy roles at the supranational scale and the rediscovery of urban mean the eclipse of the nation state” (p.13). They continue, “the national scale, far from withering away, often retains an important role as “scale manager” in the emergent structures for metagovernance” (p.14). Other scholars have questioned what sort of impact this rescaling has had on our ability to organize politically. For example, Conway (2009, p.295 – original *emphasis*) states:

“If we are committed to a constructivist perspective on scale and recognize that the manipulation of scale is essential to the exercise of power in the contemporary period, then it seems important to ask whether and how non-elite social actors are also actively remaking scale in response to neoliberal and imperialist globalization, not just in the frontal contestation with economic and political elite *but also within and among social movements themselves.*”

Critical geographers and scholars have called for a relational, multiscalar approach to the study of social movements (Conway, 2009; Leitner & Sheppard 2009; Mahon & Keil, 2009). A focus on scale has raised concerns about the marginalization of other concepts (or spatialities) (Leitner & Sheppard, 2009). Leitner & Sheppard (2009, p.232), for example, argue that “[O]ther spatialities do not simply exist alongside, but are also co-implicated with, scale.” Brenner (2009, p.32 – original *emphasis*) states, “To reduce sociospatiality as a whole to its scalar dimensions lead to the methodological dead-end of *scale-centrism*.” Likewise, Leitner & Sheppard (2009) argue that “an exclusive focus on scale for conceptualizing the spatiality of politics is problematic” because it “presumes that vertical, interscalar relations dominate the spatiality of politics” (p.234 with reference to Sheppard, 2002); it “is suggestive of hierachal power relations” (p.235); and because “scale theorists typically pose a nested sequence of scale [...] at the centre of their analysis” (p.236). A relational, multiscalar approach is adopted in this thesis – one that is sensitive to the ways in which scale is co-constituted with other spatial arrangements and operates in a multidirectional manner.

It has been questioned whether place and scale are adequate concepts for making sense of human behaviour, especially in a world that has become increasingly interconnected (see Nicholls, 2007). Increasingly social movements are being studied through a “network” lens, suggesting that the place and/or scale are not adequate concepts.

There are debates throughout the literature, however, as to whether a network approach is more useful than these previous concepts (Conway, 2008). This to some extent depends on how we conceptualize “networks.” According to Herod & Wright (2002, p.8), early network theorist,

“Bruno Latour (1996:370), has suggested that the world’s complexities cannot be captured by “notions of levels, layers, territories, [and] spheres,” and should not be thought of as being made up of discrete levels of bounded spaces which fit together in much the same way that Matryoshka dolls are contained one within the other. Instead, he avers, the world needs to be understood as networked together, as being “fibrous, thread-like, wiry, stringy, ropy, capillary[.]” descriptors that generate quite disparate understandings of the relationships between places and of scale.”

These “horizontal, capillary-like inter-linkages” are fluid, multiple and overlap (Brenner, 2009, p.46 with reference to Leitner, 2004, p.248-249). Other scholars studying networks have emphasized “transversal, ‘rhizomatic’ forms of interspatial interconnectivity [as well]” (Jessop, Brenner, & Jones, 2008, p.390 with reference to Amin, 2002; Castells, 1996; Taylor, 2004). This “one-sided focus on horizontal, rhizomatic, topological, and transversal interconnections”, borrowing from Jessop et al. (2008, p.391), leads to network centrism and ignores the hierachal power relations that permeate these structures (Grabher, 2009). Brenner (2009, p.47) explains:

“[...] contrary to popular representation of networks as non-hierarchical and democratic, many actually existing networks are internally stratified and externally exclusionary. They contain power hierarchies that marginalize some social forces at the expense of others, both within and beyond the network (Leitner and Sheppard 2002). They may be manifested through the differential abilities of participants to influence network operations; through the establishment of the division of labour within the network that differently allocates resources, tasks, and burdens among participants; or through the establishment of distinctive rules of closure that limit participation within the network to particular individuals, groups, or organizational entities. While these network-based power relations may be expressed in variegated socio-organizational forms, they express [uneven spatial development] insofar as they are articulated in distinctively geographical patterns.”

Massey (1994) refers to these social relations as “power geometries”, which she argues are embedded in networks. With attention paid to power in relation to flows and movement, Massey points out that different individuals and social groups “are placed in very distinct ways in relation to these flows and interconnections”, with some people more in control of these flows and movements than others who “are more on the receiving-end of it” (p.3). In agreement with Bosco (2001), Massey’s “power geometries” argument is useful for studying the types of relationships that exist between actors within social movement networks and how these relationships impact the ability to organize. In this thesis, attention is paid to the relationship within and between convening organizations at the local level, their relationship with members and/or community partners, and with conveners from the national and international levels.

Critical geographers and scholars have conceptualized networks relationally, arguing that they are co-constituted with other spatial arrangements. For example, it is argued that networks “stretch through time and space” (Murdoch, 1997, p.334), and they “flow between” and connect different places at different times (Clarke, 2009). It is also argued that they are “embedded in particular locations and places” (Bosco, 2001, p.310-311). This supports Massey’s argument that places are open and relational. She states that “each ‘place’ can be seen as a particular, unique, point of intersection [of these networks]” (1994, p.7). In other words, “place” is what ties these social relations together (*ibid*). Likewise, Beaumont & Nicholls (2007, p.2559) argue that “Territories do not come at the expense of extensive networks and flows but, rather, they are constituted by and contribute to these social networks.” It is further recognized that networks are “capable of operating at different spatial scales” (Bosco, 2001, p.312; also see McCann & Ward, 2010).

According to Mahon & Keil (2009, p.17), “[networks] are not free-floating alternatives to scalar arrangements but are embedded in them.”

One of the challenges writing this thesis was deciding whether to use “networks” as a master framework for this study on the piloting phase of the 20K Homes campaign. Bosco (2001, p.301) argues that “networks” is a useful tool for studying social relations without “reducing social movements to homogenous or ‘concrete’ entities.” Likewise, Brenner (2009, p.47) argues that “social movement networks are generally embedded within and intertwined with place and territories, and they are always articulated in scale-differentiated forms, yet their geographies cannot be reduced to any of the latter dimensions of sociospatiality.” In agreement with these scholars, it is recognized here that “networks” are mutually constituted with other spatial arrangements; however, I have chosen not to use “networks” – or any other spatial arrangement for that matter – as a master framework for this study. As Leitner & Sheppard (2009, p.239) caution us, “[P]rivileging any one spatiality, or subsuming their multiplicity under one master concept, is problematic and insufficient. Multiple spatialities are co-implicated and co-constitutive in complex ways due to social movement struggles, with unpredicted consequences.” In agreement with these scholars, “networks” is not used as a master framework in this thesis to avoid any assumptions that the 20K Homes campaign is merely horizontally structured or that it can be simply understood or reduced to a single spatial arrangement. This is not to say that all spatial arrangements held equal weight either. They didn’t. There are important distinctions to be made within and between pilot communities with regards to these spatial arrangements. For example, the spatial strategies were used and will be used to mobilize resources during and following action/registry week.

## *2.4. Why social movement campaigns develop*

Human geographers and other scholars have used these key concepts in geography as analytical tools for understanding why social movements, and by extent social movement campaigns, develop where they do. Social movements are both historical and geographical developments. According to Tilly & Wood (2013, p.37), social movements are “political phenomenon deeply embedded in regional and national histories.” They argue that “history helps because it calls to attention [the] shifting political conditions that made social movements possible” (p.4). They also argue that “history helps because it explains why social movements incorporate certain features” (p.4). In the next chapter, I situate the 20K Homes campaign in context of a recent transition in the homelessness service system and the American 100,000 Homes campaign. This history is important for understanding why the local and national campaigns came about and incorporate certain features, such as a Housing First, a common assessment tool and systems planning.

Geography is important for understanding the temporal and spatial variations in social movements. Geographers have paid close attention to the spatially uneven ways in which larger political and economic processes have unfolded in different places at different times, causing various social inequalities, which subsequently has led to social movement development when these problems are ignored (Ramutsindela, 2009). Miller (2000), for example, uses Jürgen Habermas’ “colonization of the lifeworlds” theory as a framework for explaining how economic and state systems affect people’s “lifeworlds” unevenly, causing multiple grievances and giving rise to social movements. Likewise, Routledge (1993) examines how the state and economic development threatened the identity, culture, and livelihoods of people in India, leading to “terrains of resistance”. As Nicholls (2007)

explains, these political and economic processes create an unequal distribution of resources and different political opportunities in different places, which has influenced people's ability to organize. Not only are these political opportunities (and resources) spatially uneven horizontally, they are also vertically uneven across geographic scales (*ibid*).

In the following chapters, I will demonstrate how the movement towards a Housing First approach to homelessness has been geographically uneven, with some communities across Canada, including Ottawa, Waterloo, and Hamilton, having more advanced Housing First programs than other communities, making them suitable candidates for piloting the 20K Homes campaign. It will also be demonstrated how the recent transition in the service system has been accompanied by an unequal distribution of resources, which has had an impact on each pilot community's ability to organize for action/registry week. In addition, it will be demonstrated how political opportunities were unevenly articulated between pilot communities, challenging our assumptions about "place." Finally, it will be demonstrated how these political opportunities and resources were not only unevenly distributed between pilot communities but also between the local and national levels.

"Place" has been used as a conceptual tool for studying social movements (Nicholls, 2007; see Schatz, 2010). According to Brenner (2009, p.40), "social movements frequently assume a place-based form." Using a context-based approach to study the Baliapal and Chipko movements in India, Routledge (1993, p.21) argues:

"First, the concept of place informs us about why social movements occur where they do and the context within which movement agency interpellates the social structure. Second, the concept of place informs us about the nature of specific movements, since the particularities of place inform and affect the character, dynamics and outcomes of movement agency. Finally, a research paradigm that is sensitive to place provides the means of understanding the spirit of movement agency, that which inspires and motivates people, the articulation of the experiences of everyday life."

To summarize, “place” is a useful conceptual tool for understanding the development, characteristics and outcomes of social movements. Routledge (1992, p.589 & 1993, p.27) points out that:

“[...] while much research on social movements is location-specific or recognizes the importance of territoriality in movement practice (Sorokin, 1962; Katzenelson 1981; Hannigan, 1995), questions concerning the effects of locality upon movement action and the reasons why particular movements arise in particular places frequently remain unanswered (e.g., see Della Seta, 1978; Katz and Mayer, 1985; Walton, 1979; Burgess, 1982).”

This study helps fill these gaps. Taking a relational-territorial approach in this studying, part one of the analysis examines reasons why conveners from Ottawa, Waterloo and Hamilton agreed to pilot the 20K Homes campaign, and part two examines the key components of action/registry week, including short-term outcomes and next steps.

Networks have been used to understand the more complex ways in which social movements and social movement campaigns have developed. Studies show, for example, that pre-existing networks and/or past organizing efforts have been major factors that contribute to the development of movements and campaigns (see Gerhards & Rucht, 1992; Bosco, 2001; Staggenborg & Lecomte, 2009; Choudry & Thomas, 2013; see Cress & Snow, 1996 for an exception). It has also been found that succeeding social movement campaigns have helped strengthen ties and have helped these pre-existing networks grow (Staggenborg & Lecomte, 2009). One thing that “remains unclear”, however, is “whether and how the spatial dimensions of different relations in a network may actually affect the development of such social movement processes” (Bosco, 2001, p.310). In the following chapters, I will demonstrate how the development of the 20K Homes campaign was in part

shaped by prior connections between conveners at the national and international levels as well as the national and local levels.

Up to this point, this section has largely focused on why social movements develop more broadly. Consideration is now given to why social movement campaigns develop, more specifically. Choudry & Thomas (2012, p.219 – *my emphasis*) found in their research on labour organizing that campaigns were “used to *win gains* for workers and to build broader *awareness* of and support for *systematic change* in relation to their working conditions[.]” Also, campaigns “serve[d] to *educate* the wider community about issues faced by migrants and immigrant workers” and to “[make] *claims on the state* (where pertinent, municipal, provincial or federal levels of government) and demand that it *intervene* to improve conditions for marginalized workers” (*ibid*). These reasons for organizing are important as they help inform why conveners from Ottawa, Waterloo, and Hamilton agreed to pilot the 20K Homes campaign.

“Networked modes of organization” have been deployed to achieve movement goals and objectives (Brenner, 2009, p.47; also see Nicholls, 2007). Setting goals and objectives are an important part of campaign organizing as they “deal with what [individuals and organizations] want to achieve” (Poudel & Luintel, 2003, p.62). Staggenborg & Lecomte (2009, p.3) point out that some campaigns may have “more specific goals [and demands] than others.” They argue that “Campaigns with specific and limited demands are most likely to produce concrete results such as policy outcomes” (p.15). This suggests that clear and concrete goals are important to the success of social movement campaigns. According to these scholars, “[Campaigns are more or less successful in mobilizing and achieving goals,] [d]epending on political opportunities as

well as leadership, organization and framing” (p.3). The ability to set and achieve local campaign goals also depends on the resources available. The factors are important for shaping the development and outcomes of action/registry week.

Social movement campaigns take on different forms (Staggenborg & Lecomte, 2009, p.3). These may include protest campaigns, public awareness campaigns and *advocacy* campaigns. Although I have conceptualized the 20K Homes campaign as a social movement campaign, the national and local campaigns have an advocacy component. Advocacy helps explain why social movement campaigns develop. According to Poudel & Luintel (2003, p.60), “[Advocacy is] a strategy and a tool to change policies and practices of institutions [...] Advocacy is the speaking up about a problem or an issue in the relevant political arena in order to improve the situation of those affected by that particular problem.” Advocacy then is about making changes to public policies and political institutions that put certain groups of people at a disadvantage. It’s about making sure these disadvantaged groups are represented, and ultimately, it works toward creating a more inclusive system.

### *2.5. Factors that shape the development of social movement campaigns*

Geographers and other scholars have used key concepts in geography to understand what factors shape the development and characteristics of social movement and campaigns (Nicholls, 2007 & 2009). These factors may include, but are not limited to: organizational structure, framing, resources mobilization, political opportunities, support, recruitment, and media. These factors enable the mobilization process (i.e. planning, organizing, and implementation) and are what give social movements and campaigns their form and function. These factors are reviewed and discussed in more detail here.

One significant difference between Waterloo's and Hamilton's registry weeks and Ottawa's action week were their organizational or leadership structures. Waterloo's and Hamilton's registry weeks were convened by municipal governments, whereas, Ottawa's action week was convened by a non-profit community-based organization. There are important distinctions made throughout the literature between formal and informal leadership structures.

Formal leadership is generally characterized as being 'vertically' or hierarchally structured and often institutionalized (Juris 2004a, b, 2005; Tormey, 2005; Routledge & Cumbers, 2009). This is because leadership and organizing are approached from the 'top-down' by a centralized power source (Juris 2004a, b, 2005). This is usually a single leader and small group of decision-makers (Tormey, 2005). Formal leadership structures are perceived as being more legitimate (Juris, 2004a) According to Routledge & Cumbers (2009, p.49 with reference to Juris 2004a & b), "vertical social relations [are] based on [delegation] and formal organizational processes." These formal organizational processes tend to be bureaucratic and exclusionary in practice (Juris, 2004a, 2005; Tormey, 2005; Routledge & Cumbers, 2009). Formal leadership structures usually engage a smaller number of participants (Tormey, 2005), however, "are able to mobilize large numbers through the articulation of clear goals and objectives" (Routledge & Cumbers, 2009, p.51 with reference to Juris, 2004a).

By contrast, informal leadership is characterized as being 'horizontally' structured, meaning, organizing is approached from the 'bottom-up' and tends to be more 'grassroots' (Juris, 2004a & b, 2005). Power within these networks is more decentralized as participants are given more autonomy (Juris, 2004a & b, 2005). They engage in more democratic and

collective forms of decision-making – decisions are often based on consensus rather than representation (*ibid*; Tormey, 2005). Juris (2005), however, warns us not to romanticize about these horizontal networks. He explains:

“Specific networks involve varying degrees of organizational hierarchy. [...] Horizontal relations do not suggest the complete absence of hierarchy, but rather the lack of formal hierarchical designs. This does not necessarily prevent, and may even encourage, the formation of informal hierarchies.” (p.257)

Practices within these horizontal networks include collaboration, mutual sharing and learning, and direct action (Juris, 2004a &b, 2005, Tormey, 2005). Overall, these horizontal networks are open to participation (Juris, 2005) and are more inclusive (Tormey, 2005).

Ramutsindela (2009, p.202) points out that the “dichotomy between [...] formal and informal” is problematic (p.202). Distinguishing between these two leadership structures is not so clear cut. Borrowing from Juris (2005), these categories are often “contradictory” and highly “contested” concepts. Part of the reason for this, as Ramutsindela explains, is that “social movements are intimately connected to the activities of the state and therefore blur the boundaries between formal and informal politics” (p.203). Building on this body of literature, similarities and differences between formal and informal leadership structures will be explored in this thesis. Consideration is given to why these similarities and differences exist and what the implications are in terms of campaign organizing.

The organizational structure of a campaign “only provides the basis for a mobilization process” (Gerhards & Ruch, 1992, p.572). Other factors shaping their development and characteristics need to be considered as well. Scholars, for example, argue “framing” is an important (if not, the most important) factor that shapes campaign organizing (see Gerhards & Rucht, 1992; Staggenborg & Lecomte, 2009; Greenberg, May,

& Elliot, 2005; Cress & Snow if, 2000). Framing involves: identifying, interpreting, debating and negotiating a problem or issue that needs to be addressed (Benford, 1997). In other words, framing is a highly contested process. Gerhards & Rucht (1992, p.572) argue that, “The issue at stake has to be perceived as important and provoking [and] the proposed action must be acceptable[.]” Framing a problem must be done properly then to create buy-in and support.

Snow et al. (1986, p.464), define a frame alignment as “the linkage of individual and SMO [social movement organization] interpretative orientations, such that some set of individual interests, values and beliefs and SMO activities, goals, and ideology are congruent and complementary.” Other studies show that this linkage may not just be between an individual and an organization. Croteau & Hicks (2003, p.252), for example, argue that successful framing requires a “consonant frame pyramid”, meaning, individual, organization and coalition frames must align with each other. According to Gerhards and Rucht (1992), a “master frame” is the greatest ideological extent for which all other (smaller) frames fall under and can relate to. A master frame must be broad enough to link organizational frames together (*ibid*). The broader and more inclusive a master frame is, the more likely individuals and groups will engage in collective action (*ibid*).

When individual, organization and master frames do not match, this is called a *misalignment* (Croteau & Hicks, 2003). According to Croteau & Hicks, “Frame misalignments are at the heart of frame disputes” (p.265). A framing dispute can happen between an individual and organization, between organizations, or within an organization/coalition (*ibid*). Misalignment occurs “due to varying degrees of power,

different organizational structures, and varying degrees of “fit” between organizational frames and the existing political opportunities and constraints” (p.251). Unresolved framing disputes “can undermine a coalition’s goal of collaborative work” (p.254). Croteau and Hicks explain, “coalition framing [...] requires a delicate balance of compromise” and that “an overtly broad frame aimed at eliciting widespread participation is likely to produce shallow commitment and leave the door open for considerable internal conflict” (p.266). The findings from their research showed that “Actors who could bring the key resource of money to the table [...] were better able to influence the direction of the coalition, its agenda, and its frame” (p.268). The findings from this study show similar results. As one can and will continue to see, “power is enmeshed in the framing process, and lack of power is implicated in some frame failures” (*ibid*, p.270).

While Croteau & Hicks’ frame consonance pyramid is an important contribution to the social movements literature, it fails to recognize the importance of geography in the framing process. Geographers and other scholars studying social movements have examined the ways in which social actors have strategically and discursively constructed scale frames in a manner that resonates with social actors at different geographic scales to address or resolve a political problem (Kurts, 2003; also see, Conway, 2009; Leitner & Sheppard, 2009; Wekerle, Sandberg, & Gilbert, 2009). According to Conway (2009, p.284), “Scale framings are often contested [...] and not necessarily enduring.” This is due to competing interests. Leitner & Sheppard (2009, p.234) point that “an [...] underexamined aspect of scale in contentious politics involves the difficulties faced when conflicting scale frames and scalar strategies

coexist within social movement alliances, potentially undermining their cohesion and shaping their strategies.”

In this study, I combine the social movements literature with geography to examine framing around “homelessness” and “registry week” to understand how conveners at the local level: built legitimacy around their work; garnered support from volunteers, member organizations and/or community partners; and gained access to resources needed to run their local campaigns.

Resource mobilization theory focuses “on the roles organizations and institutions [...] play in pooling, coordinating, and deploying resources in optimal ways” (Nicholls, 2007, p.609 with reference to Kriesi, 1996 & McCarthy, 1996). Central to this body of literature is the argument that resources are crucial for the development and sustainability of social movements (McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Cress & Snow, 1996; Edwards & McCarthy, 2004; Ramutsindela, 2009; Corrigall-Brown, 2016; however, see Corrigall-Brown et al., 2009 for an exception). Cress & Snow (1996, p.1080) argue that it is difficult to define what resources are given their “ubiquity” throughout the literature. These scholars identify four type of resources, including: moral resources, material resources, informational resources and human resources. While these categories have helped inform the key components of action/registry week, they are too broad with much overlap and are context specific. These scholars question also whether some resources are more important than others. Snow, Soule & Cress (2005, p.1204) point out:

“Although people, money, and legitimacy are typically mentioned as major resources [throughout the literature] (Jenkins[,] 1983), there continue to be efforts to clarify conceptually and operationally what constitutes an essential resource and

to assess the relative importance of various resources (e.g., see Cress [&] Snow[,], 1996; Edwards [&] McCarthy[,] 2004)."

In this study, not only are key resources identified and assessed, but also, consideration is given to what resources *are not* being mobilized and what the implications might be in terms of achieving the long-term campaign goals. A third concern Cress & Snow (1996) have is, where do resources come from? These scholars identify two types of sources where resources may come from: *external sources*, which include individuals, organizations, and institutions who are not directly involved in the mobilization process, and *internal sources*, which include those individuals, organizations, and institutions who are directly involved in the mobilization process. According to Croteau & Hicks (2003, p.268; also see Zald & Berger, 1978), "Less-hierarchical organizations with fewer resources are more apt to be dependent upon voluntary membership and support." Corrigall-Brown (2016) points out, however, that members are often resource poor. Social movement organizations (e.g. coalitions, non-profits, NGOs, insurgencies) are therefore more likely to be dependent on external organizations/institutions for resources (Zald & Berger, 1978; Cress, 1997; Cress & Snow, 1996 & 2000; Croteau & Hicks, 2003; Corrigall-Brown, 2016). One exception to this was found in Özdemir's (2012, p.34) study, where "It [was] demonstrate[d] that it was still possible for NGOs to conduct successful advocacy campaigns depending solely on their own resources and social media without the support of external agencies and huge campaign budgets." Nicholls (2009, p.86) explains that "[...] resource-poor organizations and individuals typically lack the financial resources needed for greater mobility, reducing their capacities to start and develop relations with diverse and distant others." This has important implications in terms of how pilot communities came up with the resources

needed for action/registry week and how they will come up with the resources needed to house people for the campaign.

Geographers and other scholars have demonstrated how networks play an important role in the collection and mobilization of resources (Wagner & Cohen, 1991; Bosco, 2001; Nicholls, 2007; Whitzman, 2007; Ross, 2011; Staggenborg & Lecomte, 2009; however, see Corrigall-Brown, 2009 for an exception). Bosco (2001, p.311) states, “defining social movements as networks means viewing participants and their actions as interdependent and seeing ties among them as channels that allow the flow of both material and non-material resources.” Nicholls (2007, p.619) argues, “that successful social movements tend to depend on both territorially intensive and geographically extensive relations for pooling and deploying resources.” In this study, I will demonstrate how conveners at the local level drew on individuals, member organizations and/or community partners from the local, national and international levels for pooling together resources to get their local campaigns up and running. Nicholls (2007, p.615-616 with reference to Tilly, 2005) argues too that networks built on trusting relationships are important because they increase the chances that actors will “contribute their [precious] resources to social movement campaigns and stick to these enterprises even when the risk of involvement mount.” In this study, I will demonstrate how strong ties within the informal leadership structure, in part, enabled the circulation and pooling of more material resources.

Borrowing from Leitner & Sheppard (2009), geographers and other scholars studying scale relations have shown how social actors have strategically ‘jumped’ scales<sup>5</sup> upwards or downwards to gain representation and/or access to resources; to “expand their power” (p.233); to “legitimize or challenge existing power relations” (p.231); and/or to

“shape political outcomes” (p.231; for examples, see Miller, 2000; Whitzman, 2007; Conway, 2008; Klodawsky, Siltanen, & Andrew, 2013). Most of these examples show how social actors have “overcome the limitations of localness through scale jumping [upwards]”, borrowing from Leitner & Sheppard (2009, p.233). While this thesis demonstrates how conveners at the local level ‘jump’ scales upward to gain representation and access to resources, it also demonstrates how conveners at the local *and* national levels scale downward to “leverage off” existing resources and legitimize their power.<sup>6</sup>

In his study on the *Madres de Plaza de Mayo* social movement, Bosco (2001, p.318) examines “how different network relations that operate a variety of spatial scales [either] facilitate or constrain the access to resources available elsewhere or to positions of power and control.” He draws on Burt’s (1992) ‘structural holes’ argument regarding network relations to understand how the *Madres de Plaza de Mayo* social movement group in Argentina gained access to resources from the *Madres* group in Europe. Bosco explains Burt’s ‘structural holes’ argument like this:

“According to Burt, disconnections in a network often prevent actors from establishing strategic linkages with others. But these ‘structural holes’ (Burt 1992) can be used as an advantage if groups build ‘bridges’ that span the holes<sup>[7]</sup>. In Burt’s theory, bridges are strategic network relations that can maximize information exchange, minimize redundancy and enhance actors’ capacity to acquire or have access to resources. Regarding social movement networks, for example, bridges to other networks can become strategic relations that maximize opportunities for cooperative relations, the pooling of resources, and the joint planning of mobilizing strategies among different groups (Knoke and Wisely, 1990). [...] In the case of the *Madres*’ network, groups of Argentines in Europe became intermediary nodes through which bridges to European social movements were constructed. These strategic bridges functioned as routes for the circulation of resources that the *Madres* needed.” (p.319)

Building on Burt’s Structural Holes argument, I will demonstrate in this thesis how conveners at the local and national levels to varying degrees formed ‘bridges’ to gain access

to resources needed to carry out action/registry week. Also, it will be demonstrated how building more ‘bridges’ will be necessary for the long-term sustainability of the campaign.

In his research on grassroots globalization networks, Paul Routledge (2003) puts forth the idea of “convergence space” as a conceptual tool for understanding how social actors from different places and geographic scales converge through transnational webs where they negotiate and dispute “interests, goals and strategies” (Nicholls, 2007. P.611), “that are essential for the mobilization of collective action” (Leitner & Sheppard, 2009, p.239). This notion of convergence space is a useful concept for understanding how conveners, frontline staff and volunteers who were part of the 20K Homes campaign network converged in different places at different times, before, during and/or after the piloting phase of the campaign to share knowledge and materials needed to conduct an action/registry week.

“Support” is broadly defined throughout the literature. Cress & Snow (1996) distinguish between two types of support which they refer to as “moral resources”. These are sympathetic support and solidaristic support. These scholars define sympathetic support as “Statements [...] that are supportive of the aims and actions of [...] SMOs” (p.1095). Positive statements include words of approval and encouragement. There is no involvement (direct or indirect) in collective actions themselves. Lacey (2011, p.353) argues that sympathetic support “from perceived legitimate actors can be the key to bestowing legitimacy on SMOs themselves.” Sympathetic support is the most basic form of support a SMO can receive and has no material outcome.

Cress & Snow (1996, p.1095) define solidaristic support as “Participation [...] in the collective actions of the SMO.” It is unclear, however, whether this participation is

direct or indirect. In this thesis, individuals who provided solidaristic support were *not* directly involved in action/registry week. Lacey (2011, p.353) argues solidaristic support involves a “larger commitment” and the “lending [of] resources”. Since solidaristic support involves action, it is more tangible than sympathetic support and has material outcomes. Lacey as well as other scholars (see Edwards & McCarthy, 2004) point out that moral resources usually come from external organizations. It will be demonstrated later in this thesis, however, that moral resources – and sympathetic support, more specifically – came from within convening organizations as well.

One problem with Cress & Snow’s typology of resources is that it overlooks the significance of political opportunity and political support in the mobilization process. Political institutions or governing bodies have played an active role in providing moral resources. Routledge (1992, p.592) points out that “Competing [political] parties have attempted to win electoral support by championing people’s movements (see, for example, Lynch, 1969; 1974; Gough, 1974; Wiebe, 1975; Ghose, 1975; Oommen, 1975, 1977; Omvedt, 1980, 1982; Dhanagre, 1983a; and Banerjee, 1984)” For example, Staggenborg & Lecomte (2009, p.14) found in their research that “In 1995, the Bread and Roses campaign preceded a Quebec referendum on sovereignty, and nationalists were eager to attract feminist support[,]” whereas in the 2000 World March of Women campaign, “[there] was no such incentive for the [provincial] government to cooperate with feminists.” The findings from their research suggests that politicians will only support collective action and provide material concessions if it is in their best interest to do so, and that political opportunities will always have a positive impact on campaign outcomes. The findings from this study challenges us not to assume that political opportunity will always

lead to political support and material concessions. Routledge (1992, p.592) states that because “[...] political parties have cynically manipulated people’s movements for their own purposes, many have become wary of such support.” The findings from this study suggests, however, that political opportunities may be missed or not acted on.

Cress & Snow (1996, p.1091) question whether “[external] support or patronage lead[s] to co-optation or control.” They argued that resource mobilization leads to social control when the interests of the external sponsor (e.g. the state) takes priority leading to the moderation of campaign goals and strategies to secure resources (*ibid*). Elites are unlikely to support social change if it is not in their best interest to do so (Corrigall-Brown, 2016 with reference to Tilly, 1978). “For this reason[,]” Corrigall-Brown (2016, p.332) explains, “we should not expect elites to fund social movements, or at least not movements that ask for large social change.” According to Corrigall-Brown (2016, p.333):

“Glaeser (2003) argues that funder control is especially powerful over smaller non-profits whose behaviour they can strongly influence. These smaller, and often younger, non-profits tend to be in a more vulnerable financial position, while, larger, established non-profits have more secure and diversified funding base. As a result, these smaller groups typically have to actively pursue funding tied more closely to a donor’s interests than to a non-profit’s mission.”

Co-optation occurs when the external sponsor does not require a moderation of goals and strategies but helps channel them more effectively (*ibid*; Cress & Snow, 1996). According to Corrigall-Brown (2016, p.332), this type of support “can redirect movements and organizations away from contentious activities (Arnone 1980; Brulle and Jenkins 2005; Colwell and Culleton 1993; Dowie 1996; Garrow 1987; Gottlieb 1993) and towards a focus on discrete projects and service delivery (Jalali 2013; Rahman 2006; Ulvila and Hossain 2002).” As will be demonstrate later in this thesis, the findings from this study show that

external support (or lack thereof) from the City of Ottawa led to a moderation in action week goals and strategies, and eventually, control over the next steps of the local campaign.

While Cress & Snow's typology is foundational for understanding the types of support received, geographers and other scholars emphasized the importance of networks through which support is given. Studies show that networks play an important role in the process of collaboration and decision-making (Conway, 2008; Choudry & Thomas, 2013; Klodawsky, Siltanen & Andrew, 2013; Siltanen, Klodawsky, & Andrew, 2015). These networks are also important for understanding how social actors gain credibility (Choudry & Thomas, 2013; Siltanen, Klodawsky, & Andrew, 2015). These networks are examined more closely in this thesis.

Geographers and other scholars have examined the spatial strategies and tactics social actors have used to carry out their movement or campaign goals and objectives, and to understand how these spatial strategies and tactics shaped movement or campaign outcomes (Nicholls, 2007; see Boykoff, 2000; Miller; 2000; Bosco, 2001; Granzow & Dean, 2007; Dirks, 2015). Poudel & Luintel (2003, p.62-63) argue:

“In order to achieve the set objectives, the advocacy groups or networks should set their strategies very clearly. Strategies should be devised in such a way that it could constructively influence the existing policies and practices at its different levels. The larger political context of the issue should also be considered while setting the strategies. The strategies should be such that the advocacy should help enlarge its allies, gain wider support and single out the opponents. There are many ways to formulate strategies which, however, depend heavily on local context.”

In this study, attention is paid to the spatial strategies conveners used for recruitment. As Miller (2000) points out, *recruitment* strategies often have a spatial dimension to them. Studies show that “networks play a crucial role in the process of recruitment” (Bosco, 2001, p.307; see Snow et al., 1980; Klandermans & Oegema, 1987;

Gerhards & Rucht, 1992; Staggenborg & Lecomte, 2009). The findings from these studies show that the organizational structure, resource base, and characteristics of a movement or campaign shapes “its recruitment strategies and growth”, borrowing from Snow et al. (1980, p.787). Snow et al. (1986, p.468) point out, however, that while “Networks frequently function to structure movement recruitment and growth, [...] they do not tell us what transpires when constituents and bystanders or adherents get together.”

Snow et al. (1980) argue that recruitment and engagement take place either through “public channels” or “private channels” and all information gets communicated either “face-to-face” or “mediated” through different forms of mass communication. According to these scholars, a movement’s “[resource base and strategy] determines the patterns and channels used for recruitment” (p.975). They also point out that:

“not all [...] movements [...] use [these] network channel[s] to the same extent since they do not all constitute open networks. Some movements are more restrictive than others in that membership eligibility is contingent on the possession of certain scribed or achieved attributes” (p.796)

These scholars suggest that movements that foster open networks will try to attract new members via “public places rather than from among extramovement interpersonal associations and networks”, and movements that are more restrictive and exclusive “will attract members primarily from among extramovement interpersonal associations and networks, rather than from public places” (p.796), to maintain a closed network. These scholars further point out that the “spread and growth” of a movement has often been linked to it “goals and values” (p.796). In this study, I combine Snow et al.’s “microstructural approach” to recruitment with network theory to analyze the spatial strategies and methods conveners used for recruiting frontline staff, volunteers, and survey participants during

action/registry week. These spatial strategies used for recruitment shaped local campaign outcomes.

Media plays an important role in the mobilization process. There is some debate throughout the literature as to which media spaces are most useful and effective in carrying out movement or campaign goals and objectives. These studies show that this depends on an organization's resource base and strategies used. Özdemir (2012), for example, found that resource poor non-government organizations were more likely to advocate online because it was "more cost effective" (p.23) and helped "reduce [...] dependency on mass media" (p.33). It also "promote[d] active participation of supporters" and allowed for information to be "easily [...] widespread" (p.23). While media in all its forms is useful for educating and raising public awareness as well as advocacy, it is not always effective for winning financial or material concessions (for example, see Dirks, 2015).

According to Greenberg, May, & Elliot (2005, p.137), "Researchers often argue that voluntary organizations will have difficulty influencing policy media agendas because they lack necessary *capital* and other forms of material resources." McCarthy & Zald (1977, p.1229) point out that, "Much publicity is dependent upon a SMO's ability to induce the media to give free attention, as most SMOs cannot actually afford the high costs of national advertising." According to these scholars (with reference to Hubbard, 1968; Lipsky, 1968; Turner, 1969), "Media bargaining" can be understood as a form of SMO advertising. They explain, "By staging events which will possibly be "newsworthy," by attending to the needs of news organizations, and by cultivating representatives of the media, SMOs may manipulate media of their activities more or less successfully" (p.1230). Benford & Snow (2000, p.267) argue, however, "[...] that social movement activists rarely

exercise much control over the “stories” media organizations choose to cover (Entman & Rojecki 1993; McCarthy et al 1996) or how the media represent the activists’ claims (Baylor 1996, Gamson & Modigliani 1989; Klandermans & Goslinga 1996).” This active role of media in “framing discussions” has been found in other areas of research as well, such as on policy mobilities (borrowing from/see McCann, 2008, p.13). In this thesis, I examine the ways that conveners at the local level used media to varying degrees for recruitment; to raise public awareness and to advocate for more resources; and to create spaces for engagement.

### *2.6. Social movement campaign outcomes*

The factors discussed above affect the *outcomes* of social movement campaigns. Therefore, the outcomes of social movements campaigns need to be considered. Staggenborg & Lecomte (2009, p.5) argue “that the outcomes of campaigns depend on the characteristics of movement communities[.] According to these scholars, “Movement campaigns have both short and long-term outcomes for movement communities, subsequent campaigns, and public policy which may be positive or negative” (*ibid*). Short-term outcomes include the immediate achievements of the mobilization process. Long-term outcomes include the overall impact the mobilization process has on the issue or problem it seeks to address – this takes time to notice. Likewise, Cress & Snow (2000, p.1065) identify two types of outcomes throughout the literature: direct outcomes, such as material gains and policy change; and indirect outcomes, such as moving public opinion, developing counter-movements, and influencing participants’ personal and career trajectories. Direct outcomes are usually associated with campaign goals; whereas, indirect outcomes are not – they are a secondary effect. Staggenborg & Lecomte (2009) point out

that “campaigns do not always have discernable outcomes” (p.1) and “not all campaigns are equally consequential” (p.15). Stated another way, campaign outcomes are not always apparent and not all campaigns have the same outcomes. In this thesis, I identify and discuss the short-term outcomes of action/registry week and next steps. I also consider the overall impact the 20K Homes campaign will have on ending homelessness.

### *2.7. Conclusion*

This chapter began by defining the 20K Homes campaign as a social movement campaign. I drew on the social movements literature to distinguish between “movements” and “campaigns”, arguing, again, that this difference is important for establishing what is being studied in this thesis, and to begin to understand how the 20K Homes campaign has developed. I then bridged key concepts in geography with social movement theory to provide a conceptual framework for studying the piloting phase of the 20K Homes campaign. Doing so, I reviewed what geographers and other scholars have said about why and how social movements and campaigns develop and with what outcomes. The next chapter will provide context around the 20K Homes campaign to understand what factors have shaped the timing, development and characteristics of the campaign at both the national and local levels.

## **Chapter three:**

### **National context of the 20K Homes campaign**

#### *3.0. Introduction*

The purpose of this chapter is to identify factors that shape the timing, development and characteristics of the 20K Homes campaign at a national level. Taking a relational-territorial approach in this study, it is understood here that the 20K Homes campaign has in part been shaped by larger interconnected and interdependent multiscalar political processes that have manifested at different times in different places.<sup>8</sup> To demonstrate, this chapter is split into five parts. Part I begins with a review and discussion on the definition, scope, and causes of homelessness in Canada. Part II then situates the 20K Homes campaign within historical context of a shortage of affordable housing and a homeless crisis that began in the 1990s. A review of relevant policy responses to homelessness since the 1990s will be provided. Part III further situates the campaign within the context of a recent transition in Canada's homelessness service system – one that is focused on a Housing First approach to homelessness. Again, it is argued that the 20K Homes campaign not only supports but helps strengthen this new approach to homelessness. Part IV then traces the 'origins' of the campaign back to the development of the Canadian Alliance to End Homelessness and the American 100K Homes campaign. Demonstrated here is how political interactions between conveners at the national and international levels are contributing factors that shaped the timing and development of the campaign. Finally, in Part V, the goal and core principles of the 20K Homes campaign at the national level are identified and discussed.

## **Part I – Homelessness: definitions, scope & causes**

### *3.1. Introduction*

Part I of this chapter is divided into three sections. Section one begins with a review and discussion on definitions of homelessness. Human geographers and other scholars have made important contributions to this literature by linking our conceptualizations of homelessness with understandings of place. An important distinction made throughout this literature has been between those people experiencing “absolute” and “visible” homelessness and those people experiencing “relative” or “hidden” homelessness. While there has been much research on the “absolute” and “visible” homeless, little is known about the “hidden” homeless. This study on the 20K Homes campaign is therefore an important contribution to academic knowledge as it builds on our understanding of who the “hidden” homeless are. Section two provides more details around the scope of homelessness in Canada and section three reviews the causes of homelessness in Canada. A structuralist approach to homelessness is taken in this study.

#### *3.1.1. Defining homelessness*

Defining homelessness is a contentious issue (Novac et al., 2002; Hiebert et al., 2005; Tutty et al., 2009; Peters, 2012). How homelessness is defined matters because it determines the size of the ‘problem’, and it informs policy decisions, including, what programs and services get funded and who receives that funding (Novac et al., 2002; Hiebert et al., 2005; Echenberg & Jensen, 2012; Peters, 2012). How homelessness is defined in policy matters because it may influence a community’s campaign efforts, including, their campaign goals, strategies and outcomes.

As Echenberg & Jensen (2012, p.1) explain, there is no “official” definition of homelessness in Canada, “and advocates, researchers, and policy makers have interpreted the issue in a multitude of ways.” Various definitions and typologies for homelessness exist throughout the literature. Generally, it is agreed that homelessness exists on a continuum. There are, however, a lot of ‘grey’ areas along this continuum in terms of where one category of homelessness begins and where another one ends (Novac, 2006).

The most common and basic definition of homelessness cited throughout the literature was established by the United Nations Statistical Division (2008). This definition consists of two categories: absolute and relative homelessness.<sup>9</sup> Absolute homelessness, sometimes referred to as ‘visible’ homelessness, is used to describe people who are sleeping on the streets (‘sleeping rough’), in emergency shelters, and/or in spaces not intended for human habitation (i.e. parks, vacant building, encampments)<sup>10</sup> (Novac et al., 2002; Novac, 2006; Kauppi et al., 2017). The average Canadian is most familiar with this type of homelessness (Tutty et al., 2009; Hiebert et al., 2005). It is perceived as ‘real’ homelessness because it means to be literally “roofless” or “houseless” (Novac et al., 2002; Peressini et al., 2010), and because, it is most visible to the public (Hiebert et al., 2005). Homelessness, however, isn’t always visible, which is why it is argued here, and elsewhere, that absolute homelessness is too narrow a definition and excludes many other housing experiences (*ibid*; Peressini et al., 2010).

Relative homelessness, sometimes referred to as ‘hidden’ homelessness, is used to describe people who are living in temporary, substandard and/or precarious housing situations (Hiebert et al., 2005; Novac, 2006; Tutty et al., 2009; Echenberg & Jensen, 2012; Thurston et al., 2013). In other words, these people are “at-risk” of becoming (absolutely)

homeless (Fiedler, Schuurman & Hyndman, 2006). These housing experiences are less visible to the public, which is why they are referred to as ‘hidden’ homelessness (Novac et al., 2002; Kauppi et al., 2017). It is also why “their status as homeless people is frequently not recognized as a form of homelessness” (Kauppi et al., 2017, p.9 with reference to Erickson, 2004). According to Peressini, McDonald, & Hulchanski (2010, p.2), relative homelessness is meant to be “very broad and inclusive[.]” Turner, Redman, & Gaetz (2017, p.7) argue that by “broadening the definition beyond the visibly (and chronically) homeless, we bring into question the overall goal of ending homelessness and how to achieve it.” Using a broad and inclusive definition, then, particularly in policy, is important because it means more people can access supports and services, which subsequently, helps prevent, reduce and end homelessness.

The term relative homelessness is used to describe ‘hidden’ homelessness in its broadest sense. However, more narrow definitions of ‘hidden’ homelessness exist throughout the literature. One example of where this term is used more narrowly is in Echenberg & Jensen’s (2012) typology made up of three categories: absolute, hidden, and relative homelessness. What’s interesting here is how relative and hidden homelessness are treated as two separate categories. Echenberg & Jensen (2012, p.1) argue that hidden homelessness sits “in the middle of the continuum[,] [and] includes people without a place of their own who live in a car, with family or friends, or in a long-term institution.” This definition supports the idea that absolute homelessness isn’t always visible, as sleeping in a vehicle is less visible than sleeping on a sidewalk. Some other examples of absolute homelessness that are more ‘hidden’ include (but are not limited to): sleeping in vacant buildings, encampments, and/or under bridges. Relative homelessness, Echenberg &

Jensen (2012, p.1) explain, “is a broad category that includes those who are housed but who reside in substandard shelter and/or who may be at risk of losing their home.” The distinction made here between hidden and relative homelessness is based on whether an individual has tenure. This distinction between “hidden” and “relative” homelessness has important implications for this study, particularly, with regards to how conveners at the local level defined ‘hidden’ homelessness and who was eligible to take the action/registry week survey and be prioritized for permanent housing and supports.

The problem with categories such as absolute, visible, relative and hidden homelessness is that they “are merely broad descriptors” (Distasio, Sylvestre, & Mulligan, 2010, p.2), and tell us nothing about “the specific housing situation and the duration and/or frequency of homeless episodes”, which more recent definitions “take into account” (Echenberg & Jensen, 2012, p.1).

In 2012, the Canadian Observatory on Homelessness (hereinafter, COH) created a *Canadian Definition of Homelessness*, arguing “for the need to use common language to guide enumeration, evaluate outcomes and progress, share and coordinate innovative action strategies and put forward stronger policy responses” (Kauppi et al., 2017, p.7). The COH’s definition on homelessness is a typology that consists of four categories that exist on a continuum. These four categories include: 1) the unsheltered or absolute homeless – people sleeping on the streets and/or in spaces that are inappropriate for human habitation (i.e. streets, parks, vacant buildings); 2) the emergency sheltered – people staying in emergency shelters and using supports; 3) the provisionally accommodated – people living in temporary housing without a lease (i.e. transitional homes, motels, institutions), and; 4) the at-risk of homelessness – people who are about to lose their housing due to financial

difficulties and/or because of unsafe/unhealthy living conditions (COH, 2012, p.1). This typology has been endorsed by community partners at the national, provincial, regional and local levels (see COH, c.2017, “Canadian Definition of Homelessness”). Worth mentioning here, it has been “adopted in the Expert Advisory Panel on Homelessness” at the provincial level (Kauppi et al., 2017, p.7; see MMAH, 2015), and at the local level, it has been “endorsed” by the Regional Municipality of Waterloo in 2012 (Region of Waterloo, 2014, November, “HHSS Action Framework: Progress Highlights (2011-2013)”, p.23). The typology is useful because it distinguishes between the unsheltered or absolute homeless and the emergency sheltered. It also acknowledges that people experiencing absolute homelessness may be sleeping in public or private spaces that are inappropriate for human habitation. This further supports the idea that absolute homelessness may be ‘visible’ or ‘hidden.’ Having said that, this typology uses ‘hidden’ homelessness in a narrow sense, using it merely to describe ‘couch surfers’ – “people who stay with friends, family, or [...] strangers” (p.3). While this typology is great for capturing a variety of housing situations, it says little about the duration and/or frequency of homeless episodes.

Kuhn & Culhane (1998) created a typology consisting of three categories that consider the length and frequency of homeless episodes. These categories include the transitionally, episodically, and chronically homeless. The transitionally homeless enter the emergency shelter system for a short period of time (*ibid*) – typically they enter the shelter system once (*ibid*) and stay for less than one month (Gaetz et al., 2013). They are likely to be young and are the least likely of the three categories to have poor physical health, mental health, and/or addictions (Kuhn & Culhane, 1998). In Canada, it is estimated

that the transitionally homeless make up about 88-94 percent of the total homeless population (Aubry et al., 2013).

The episodically homeless “move in and out of homelessness” (COH, c.2017, “Addressing Chronic Homelessness”). In Canada, the federal government defines the episodically homeless as individuals who experience three or more episodes of homelessness within a year (ESDC, 2016, August 15).<sup>11</sup> Simply put, the episodically homeless experience short but intermittent and frequent episodes of homelessness. According to Kuhn & Culhane (1998), they are likely to be young, however, they are more likely than the above group to have poor physical health, mental health, and/or addictions. They are also more likely to experience long periods of unemployment (*ibid*). It is estimated that there are between 6,000 and 22,000 individuals experience episodic homelessness annually in Canada (Gaetz et al., 2014). This is about 3-11 percent of the total homeless population (*ibid*; Aubry et al., 2013).

The chronically homeless experience homelessness for long periods of time. In Canada, the federal government defines the chronically homeless as individuals who experience six or more consecutive months (or 180 consecutive nights) of homelessness within a year (ESDC, 2016, August 15). Unlike the episodically homeless, the chronically homeless experience fewer episodes. They are more likely, however, to be older and experience more severe forms of poor physical health, mental health, and/or addictions (Kuhn & Culhane, 1998). They are also more likely to experience “hard-core” unemployment (*ibid*). It is estimated that between 4,000 and 8,000 individuals experience chronic homelessness annually in Canada (Gaetz et al., 2014). This is about 2-4 percent of the total homeless population (*ibid*; Aubry et al., 2013).

What's useful about Kuhn & Culhane's typology is that it contains an "element of time" (Echenberg & Jensen, 2012, p.2). It informs us of the duration and frequency of one's homelessness, which can have "important consequences for how [homelessness] is understood and addressed" (*ibid*). Unfortunately, however, the groups described above typically fall under the umbrella of absolute homelessness, meaning, that this typology tells us little about the variety of housing experiences in which people live.

### *3.1.2. Homelessness in human geography*

Most academic studies focus on absolute homelessness (Peters & Robillard, 2009; Peters, 2012). Since "men are more likely to be visibly homeless, sleeping rough or in shelters" (Whitzman, 2006, p.384), more recent studies on this homeless population tend to focus on marginalized groups (see Bridgman, 2002; Hiebert et al., 2005; Klodawsky, 2009), or on a diversity of homeless subpopulations (see Aubry et al., 2003; Aubry et al., 2005). Two studies worth mentioning here include: Bridgman's (2002), who highlights the value of using ethnographic research when evaluating the utility and constraints of a new shelter design from the perspective of chronically homeless women in Toronto, and Klodawsky's (2009), who considers how neoliberal policies might exclude chronically homeless women from urban spaces and make them less visible with sensitivity to gender and race.

There is a growing body of literature in human geography and related fields on 'hidden' homelessness. These studies note that many homeless subpopulations, including (but not limited to): women, youth, families, immigrants, and indigenous people are more likely to experience hidden homelessness (Novac et al., 2002 & 2006; Hiebert et al., 2005; Fiedler et al., 2006; Whitzman 2006; Klodawsky, 2006; Burrell, 2010; Distasio et al., 2010;

Peters, 2012; Kauppi et al., 2017). These studies, as well as others (May, 2000; Hiebert et al., 2005; Peters & Robillard, 2009), “suggests that some [homeless] groups are more likely than others to access their personal [support] networks to avoid staying in shelters or rough sleeping”, borrowing from Peters (2012, p.323). As Distasio et al. (2010) suggest, these personal support networks keep these homeless subpopulations “hidden” from mainstream society. More so, the types of social support homeless people receive (i.e. formal/informal) are used to distinguish between absolute and hidden homelessness (*ibid*). As will be demonstrated in the chapter five, conveners in this study referred to these support networks when distinguishing between the visible and hidden homeless.

Definitions of homelessness are often associated with understandings of place. Valentine (2001, p.92), for example, points out that “early academic definitions of homelessness emphasized the absence of a place to sleep and receive mail[.]” Kłodawsky (2006, p.378) and other feminist researchers argue, however, that we need to “recognize that houselessness is not the same as homelessness[.]” To be “houseless” means to be without physical shelter (Echenberg & Jensen, 2012), whereas, to be “homeless” means that the social connections and/or emotional feelings (i.e. a sense of belonging, safety, and control) are either threatened or lost. For example, for some women, a house may no longer be a home when it is no longer a safe place to live (Tutty et al., 2009).<sup>12</sup> To be “houseless” is normal, but being “homeless” remains invisible (Kłodawsky, 2006). For this reason, Springer (2000) makes a distinction between being “houselessness” (being without physical shelter) and “homelessness” (being temporarily or precariously housed), to avoid “confusion over the affective connotations of the word home” (Echenberg & Jensen, 2012, p.5). Other human geographers and scholars have discovered that a person’s definition or

feelings of “home” may not conform to society’s standards (Peters, 2012; see Veness, 1993; Fotheringham et al., 2014). These conceptualizations of “homelessness” and “home” have important policy implications.

Whitzman (2006, p.384) argues that people experiencing homelessness can be made invisible in a “spatial sense” and in a “policy sense”. This scholar along with other human geographers and researchers point out homelessness is often portrayed in large urban areas (Klodawsky, Farrell, & D’Aubry, 2002; Kauppi et al., 2017). Most images of homelessness show single older white men living on the streets with poor physical and mental health and addictions (Klodawsky et al., 2002; Whitzman, 2006). Kauppi et al. (2017, p.xi) explain, “Such images often show groups of people congregating around homeless shelters, people sleeping in bus shelters or on park benches, and people panhandling for spare change in public spaces[.]” According to Whitzman (2006, p.384), “Soup kitchens, drop-ins, shelters for homeless people and other visible symbols of homelessness are concentrated in downtown areas of larger cities.” Greenberg, May, & Elliot (2005, p.139) argue that these representations of homelessness “inform the kinds of policy solutions that tend to get considered for dealing with the problem.” For this reason, there is a growing interest among human geographers and researchers to focus on hidden homelessness in small towns, suburban, rural and remote areas (see Fielder et al., 2006; Whitzman, 2006; Peters & Robillard, 2007, 2009; Peters & SIMFC, 2009; Christensen, 2011; Kauppi et al., 2017). It is suggested here that these representations of homelessness informed the type of spatial strategies conveners in this study used for finding and recruiting surveying participants for action/registry week.

Kauppi et al. (2017) note that there is a large portion of the hidden homeless population who do not access services, and therefore, are invisible to the service system. Findings from their study show that reasons why many hidden homeless people are not connected to the service system include: they choose not to access services; they do not believe that the services will meet their needs; they may not be eligible to receive services; and they do not perceive themselves as homeless or someone doesn't (*ibid*, p.50). Other reasons why the hidden homeless may not be connect to the service system include: they may not be aware of the services available to them or how to navigate the system (Distasio et al., 2010); or because, there is a stigma attached to the service system (*ibid*; Whitzman, 2006; Kauppi et al., 2017). In this study, an important distinction was made between homeless people who were and were not connected to the service system. This distinction suggests that those people not accessing services are the 'real' hidden homeless – they are 'invisible' to the service system. It also helps inform who was included and excluded from the action/registry week survey and has important policy implications. It also raises an important question about this study: What spatial strategies did conveners use to find and recruit survey participants for action/registry week?

Researchers have emphasized the importance of using service providers to find and recruit the hidden homeless (Fiedler et al., 2006; Whitzman, 2006; Peters & Robillard, 2007). Service providers may have prior connections with the hidden homeless, and therefore, are able to reach out and contact them for recruitment (see *ibid*). Peters & Robillard (2007) found that service providers had a rapport and established trust with the hidden homeless which benefitted their research. Findings from this study on the 20K Homes campaign shows that conveners from each pilot community strategically used

service providers to find and recruit participants for the action/registry week survey. Peters & Robillard also attempt to recruit those not connected to the service system by recruiting outside the downtown core. Findings from this study show that a similar strategy was employed during Hamilton's registry week. In Kauppi et al.'s (2017, p.138) study, they found that street outreach served as an important "point of entry" into the service system. Findings from this study support this argument. It is further suggested that drop-ins and day programs that are often associated with absolute homelessness, "can also provide valuable resources for hidden homeless individuals [who are accessing services]" (Peters, 2012, p.335 with reference to Johnsen, Cloke & May, 2005). In this study, these places were important for connecting with the hidden homeless as well.

### *3.1.3. The scope of homelessness in Canada*

This thesis began by providing an overview on the scope of homelessness in Canada. The purpose of this section is to provide a breakdown of this scope by focusing briefly on homeless subpopulations. Women make up approximately 27.3 percent of the total homeless population, and youth make up approximately 18.7 percent (Gaetz et al., 2016, p.5). Canada's indigenous people make up between 28 and 34 percent of the shelter population, and yet, they make up 4.3 percent of Canada's total population (*ibid*). As noted throughout the literature, Canada's indigenous people are overrepresented amongst the homeless. While the average shelter stay for homeless individuals and youth is approximately 10 days, for homeless families, their shelter stays are twice as long (*ibid*). Since mid-2000s, homelessness in Canada has become more diverse and marginalized groups are at greater risk of becoming homeless (*ibid*).

It is estimated that between 13,000 and 33,000 Canadians are chronically and episodically homeless each year (Gaetz, Gulliver, & Richter, 2014, p.5). Since many ‘hidden’ homeless people are not accessing supports and services, they are more difficult to enumerate and are often unaccounted for in national statistics (Whitzman, 2006; Echenberg & Jensen, 2012; Peters, 2012; MMAH, 2015; Peters & Craig, 2014). According to Echenberg & Jensen (2012, p.3), “The lack of reliable data may limit the country’s ability to address homelessness and has been a focus for international criticism.” Also, absolute and hidden homelessness “are not completely separate groups” (Peters & Robillard, 2009, p.654) – an individual can move between these two categories (Peters, 2012; Adamo et al., 2016). Still, it is estimated that approximately 50,000 Canadians experience ‘hidden’ homelessness on any given night (Gaetz et al., 2013, p.4). According to the Federation of Canadian Municipalities and other organizations, “for every homeless person visible on the street, there are four whose homelessness is hidden” (Echenberg & Jensen, 2012, p.1; Condon, Newton, & SPARC, 2007, p.5).

For these reasons, hidden homelessness has received little attention in policy and (geographic) research (Peters, 2012). Based on the results from Eberle et al.’s (2009) study on the hidden homeless population in Vancouver, it is estimated that 3.5 out of 4 homeless people are hidden (Gaetz et al., 2013). At a national level, it is estimated that 50,000 Canadian experience hidden homelessness each night (Gaetz et al., 2014). Based on the findings from this research, it is agreed here with Peters (2012, p.323) that “more research on hidden homelessness could make a significant contribution to our understanding of homelessness in general.” This study contributes to a growing body of literature on the ‘hidden’ homeless.

### *3.1.4. What causes homelessness?*

As Gaetz & Dej (2017, p.27) explain, “The causes of homelessness are complex and involve a number of interacting factors that may play out in different ways from individual to individual.” Put another way, there is “no single cause” of homelessness (*ibid*, p.16), and the reasons why a single mother will become homeless may look different from why a young indigenous man becomes homeless. Homelessness is caused by individual factors, structural factors, and system factors. Individual factors are “personal circumstances” (COH, c.2017, “Causes of Homelessness”) that may cause homelessness. Examples include: poor physical or mental health, substance abuse, family conflict, family or relationship breakdown, domestic violence and abuse (Novac et al., 2002; Shapcott & Salazar, 2006; Winland, Gaetz, & Patton, 2011; Gaetz et al., 2013; MMAH, 2015; Gaetz & Dej, 2017; Kauppi et al., 2017). Structural factors are larger social and economic processes that may cause homelessness. Examples include: a lack of affordable housing, poverty, unemployment or underemployment, low-income, and discrimination in the job market or housing market (Novac et al., 2002; Shapcott & Salazar, 2006; Gaetz et al., 2013; MMAH, 2015; Adamo et al., 2016; Gaetz & Dej, 2017; Kauppi et al., 2017). System factors are institutional gaps or failures that may cause homelessness. Examples include: “difficult transitions from child welfare, inadequate discharge planning for people leaving hospitals, corrections and mental health and addictions facilities[,] and a lack of support for immigrants and refugees” (COH, n.d., “Causes of Homelessness”; also see MMAH, 2015; Kauppi et al., 2017). It can also include a lack of support from the education system (Novac et al., 2002). While it is recognized here that all factors need to be taken into consideration when “addressing the root causes of homelessness” (MMAH, 2015, p.1), this thesis takes

a structural approach to ending homelessness. As Hulchanski explains, “While homelessness is not only a housing problem, it is always a housing problem” (2006, p.226; also see Hulchanski 2002 & 2005). According to the MMAH (2015, p.14), “For 90 per cent of homeless people in Canada, poverty and the limited availability of affordable housing are the main factors that lead to homelessness.” Situating the 20K Homes campaign within a grassroots framework, it is agreed here with Adamo et al. (2016, p.52) that, “The root causes of homelessness and precarious housing are multi-scalar and can only be addressed through enabling legislation and policy changes at the provincial and federal levels.

## **Part II – A brief history on Canada’s affordable housing and homelessness crisis**

### *3.2. Introduction*

To understand why the 20K Homes campaign is happening here and now, we need to situate the campaign in context of Canada’s history of affordable housing and homelessness. It is essential to understand that the 20K Homes campaign is happening at a time where there is a shortage of affordable housing across the country.<sup>13</sup> This shortage of affordable housing is an outcome of policy changes made by senior levels of government starting in the 1980s and accelerating in the 1990s, marking a shift to “roll-out” neoliberalism (Peck & Tickell, 2002).<sup>14</sup>

In the 1980s, the federal government began making cuts to affordable housing and social assistance programs, and in 1993, it stopped directly funding *new* social housing programs.<sup>15</sup> The federal government also cut direct funding for subsidies on approximately 550,000 existing social housing units (Hulchanski, 2006). According to Hulchanski (2006, p.231), this was a direct cut of “approximately \$2 billion of federal money spent annually on housing (1 percent of total federal spending)[.]” This was a significant loss considering the federal government made huge investments in social housing in recent decades prior.<sup>16</sup> In addition, the federal government cut transfer payments to provinces and territories for social housing programs (see Hulchanski, 2002 & 2006).<sup>17</sup> In 1996, the federal government “downloaded” (Hulchanski, 2002; Shapcott & Salazar, 2006) its social housing responsibilities onto the provinces and territories, meaning, the provinces would be responsible for maintaining the existing social housing stock once federal funding under operating agreements expired.<sup>18</sup> According to Klodawsky & Evans (2014, p.77):

“[T]he assumption [was] that private markets and the provinces would fill any remaining gaps through incentives to increase the affordability of home ownership, increase levels of private rental market housing, and/or social housing development under provincial oversight. The outcome of this shift has been a patchwork of provincially driven programs that are uneven in scope and depth.”

In 1998, the Province of Ontario further downloaded its social housing responsibilities onto municipal governments. At the same time, the federal government made changes to the *National Housing Act* to mitigate the role of the Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation in the provision of affordable housing (Shapcott & Salazar, 2006). In short, senior levels of government had stepped away from their affordable housing responsibilities in the 1990s.

The withdrawal of senior levels of governments from affordable housing programs had serious repercussions. Without investments in new social housing programs, there became a shortage of affordable housing across Canada. Not only did this put more Canadians at risk of becoming homeless, it actually increased the number of homeless people. As Kłodawsky (2013, p.7 with reference to Hulchanski, 2002) points out, “There was compelling evidence that federal and provincial cutbacks had contributed to sharp rises in the growth of homelessness among singles and families, adults and youth.” According to Adamo et al. (2016, p.5), “the dramatic increase in homelessness” was most apparent “in major urban centres, leading the Big City Mayor’s Caucus of the Federation of Canadian Municipalities to declared homelessness a “national disaster” in 1998.”

The increase in homelessness was exacerbated by other factors as well. Not only did senior levels of government cut funding for affordable housing programs, they cut funding for other social programs as well. For example, in 1995, the federal government rolled back funding for social assistance, post-secondary education, and healthcare

(Hulchanski, 2002). At the same time, the Province of Ontario cut social assistance by 21 percent (*ibid*). Cuts to social welfare programs placed greater responsibility on individual Canadians for their own welfare (likewise, see Greenburg, May, & Elliot, 2005). This period was also characterized by an increase in population, the “hollowing out of [the] industrial core” (Gaetz, Gulliver & Richter, 2014, p.31), the fall of the middle-class, and an increase polarization between Canadians.<sup>19</sup> Since this time, it has become more difficult for young Canadians to find fulltime work (*ibid*). With falling wages (as well as cuts to social assistance programs and inflation rates), low-income and middle-income Canadians have had fewer affordable housing options available to them (*ibid*).

Since 1993, more than 100,000 social units have been lost due to disinvestments (Woolley, 2015), and there have been no new investments in social housing programs (CHRA & CEL, 2014). According to Hulchanski (2006, p.231), “Dismantling the social housing supply program” had a significant impact on provincial and municipal governments. It “meant [they] had to bear the indirect costs associated with inadequate housing and homelessness. These include the cost of physical and mental health care, emergency shelters and services, and policing” (*ibid*). What’s been highly problematic is that provincial and municipal governments do not have the financial resources to bear these costs. One consequence of this has been that the emergency shelter system has increasingly functioned under pressure and over capacity.<sup>20</sup> Dismantling the social housing supply also meant that many Canadians would have to wait longer to receive social housing.

There are approximately 600,000 federally funded social housing units across Canada (CHRA & CEL, 2014). Of these units, 550,000 were built prior to 1993 and need repair (*ibid*).<sup>21</sup> What’s more, 544,000 social housing units are federally funded under

operating agreements, which are declining and expected to reach \$0 by 2040 (*ibid*).<sup>22</sup> In Ontario, where municipal governments are expected to maintain the existing social housing stock once operating agreements expire, this poses a big problem. Municipal governments do not have the financial resources to maintain the existing social housing stock, making *new* investments in affordable housing out of reach. Without adequate funding for maintenance, these older social housing units are becoming unsuitable to live in (see *ibid*). Unfortunately, as federal funding under these operating agreements decline, it is anticipated that municipal governments will face greater “financial uncertainties” (Adamo et al., 2016, p.3). The CHRA & CEL (2014) estimate that up to 365,000 low-income households may be at risk of poverty or losing their homes if federal funding under operating agreements are not renewed. Aboriginal families and individuals with poor physical and mental health are deemed most at risk (*ibid*).

State restructuring since the 1990s has led to complex multi-scalar partnerships and new forms of urban governance (Peck & Theodore, 2001). Municipalities have had to partner with the private and voluntary sectors to come up with affordable housing and homelessness solutions. With cuts to social housing and social welfare programs, Canadians have become increasingly dependent on the private market to find affordable housing (Woolley, 2015).<sup>23</sup> Depending on the private sector for the provision of affordable housing is problematic. Not only has the costs of private market housing increased, Canadians have seen a decline in private market rental housing. This is a result of legislation that was passed in the 1970s allowing for condominium development and ownership (Hulchanski, 2002). Adamo et al. (2016, p.43) explain, “These legislative changes combined with the increased cost of construction, higher property taxes and

concern about the regulation of rents led to a dramatic reduction in the development of purpose-built rental housing by the private sector over the last two decades.” Falvo (2015) further explains that for developers to make a profit from private market rental housing, the cost of a one or two-bedroom apartment would have to be rented at a significantly higher price than what’s deemed affordable. The implications here is that the goal of the private sector is to make a profit, and therefore, it cannot be relied on to provide affordable housing. Since the 1980s, the cost of private market rental housing has become unaffordable. The result has been an inadequate and aging supply of private market rental housing, an increase in demand, low vacancy rates and rising rental costs (Gaetz et al., 2013). Overall, “The reductions in rental housing”, Gaetz et al. (2013, p.15) explain, “combined with stagnating or declining incomes, benefit reductions, and economic changes means that since the 1980s, more and more Canadians are spending a larger percentage of their income on housing.” In fact, of all Canadian renters<sup>24</sup>, 27.2% (981,755 households) are in core housing need and 10.5% (380,615 households) are in severe housing need (CMHC, 2010, October).<sup>25</sup> Being in core and severe housing need puts these households at greater risk of becoming homeless. With no support from senior levels of government and little reliance on the private sector to help supply affordable housing, municipal governments and non-profit organizations have had to advocate and look elsewhere to find ‘solutions’ to homelessness.

### *3.2.1. Policy responses to affordable housing & homelessness since the 1990s*

Advocacy efforts by municipal governments, advocates, and homeless people themselves at the end of the decade put pressure on senior levels of government to respond

to a growing homelessness issue (Klodawsky et al., 2002; Klodawsky & Evans, 2014). Since then, responses have been slow and reluctant (Klodawsky et al., 2002).

The federal government has launched two programs: The National Homelessness Initiative (hereinafter NHI) and the Affordable Housing Initiative (AHI). The NHI was first launched in 1999. At this time, the federal government invested \$753 million over three years (2000-2003) into this program, taking a “decentralized approach” to homelessness (COH, c.2017, *Canada – National Strategies to Address Homelessness*). This meant that the federal government gave funding directly to local communities to do research and development, raise awareness, and reduce homelessness (*ibid*). Adamo et al. (2016, p.5) argue that “Although federal funding under the NHI was modest, it signaled a renewed federal role in homelessness issues in Canada, with a strong emphasis on community-driven planning.” In 2004, the federal government extended the program for another three years (2004-2007), investing \$405 million (COH, c.2017, *Canada – National Strategies to Address Homelessness*). In 2006, the NHI was renamed the Homelessness Partnering Strategy (hereinafter the HPS), and in 2007, the conservative government extended the program for four years (2007-2011), investing \$539.2 million (ESDC, 2014, October 24). The HPS was then extended for another three years (2011-2014), worth \$404.4 million (*ibid*). According to Adamo et al. (2016, p.5), “Although some early planning efforts pre-date the NHI/HPS, it was this initiative that gave birth to municipal and community-based plans to prevent and end homelessness in Canada.”

In 2001, the federal government launched the AHI. Through this program, the CMHC transfers funds to the provinces and territories, who are required to match these funds and allocate all funding under the program towards creating more affordable housing

options for Canadians. Between 2001 and 2011, the CMHC (c.2018b, *IAH*) transferred over \$1.9 billion dollars to the provinces and territories, and between 2011 and 2017, it has transferred over \$1.432 billion. The program has been extended until 2019.

The HPS (NHI) and AHI are the only two homelessness and housing programs that have been federally funded since the 1990s (CHRA & CEL, 2014). Over time, funding under these programs have stagnated (*ibid*; Adamo et al., 2016; Press, 2016)<sup>26</sup>, “despite inflationary pressures and an overall growth in homelessness and precarious housing across Canada since 2000” (Adamo et al., 2016, p.3)<sup>27</sup>; their timelines are too short (Klodawsky & Evans, 2014); and the need for new affordable housing is outside their mandates (CHRA & CEL, 2014; Klodawsky & Evans, 2014; Noble et al., 2015). Without adequate and sustained funding for these programs, the PHIR (2015, p.2) states that it is “unclear how chronically and episodically homeless populations will be housed” and suggests that “cities will likely be forced to make difficult decisions, prioritizing those most in need and most vulnerable at the expense of “lower acuity” individuals and families languishing on [social housing] waiting lists.” This has important implications for how conveners from each pilot community framed “homelessness” and raises questions around how they will find the resources needed to house people for the campaign. Although it is agreed here with the CHRA & CEL (2014, p.5) that the AHI is “important source[s] of federal funding”, it is the evolution and recent renewal of the HPS that is of particular interest to this study. Recent changes to this program help inform the timing and development of the 20K Homes campaign.

### *3.2.2. Housing First*

The 20K Homes campaign is timely given the recent transition in Canada's homelessness service system. This transition has been characterized by a Housing First approach to homelessness. Housing First, according to Gaetz, Scott, & Gulliver (2013, p.2), "is a recovery-oriented approach to homelessness that involves moving people who experience homelessness into independent and permanent housing as quickly as possible, with no preconditions, and then providing them with additional services and supports as needed [to stay housed]." Put another way, "Access to permanent housing is provided with no "housing readiness" requirements (i.e. housing [is] not conditional on sobriety or abstinence)" (Adamo et al., 2016, p.16). Housing First is based on the belief that housing is a basic human right, and that "affordable and appropriate housing is foundational to improving housing stability" (*ibid*, p.39). It is different from traditional approaches to homelessness which have relied on emergency responses to homelessness (i.e. emergency shelters) and "housing readiness" programs (*ibid*; Stanhope & Dunn, 2011; Noble et al., 2015).

Housing First became popular following Sam Tsemberis' Pathways to Housing program, which took place in New York during the 1990s (COH, c.2017, *Housing First*; see also, Tsemberis & Eisenber, 2000; Gulcur et al., 2003; Tsemberis, Gulcur & Nakae, 2004; Henwood et al., 2013).<sup>28</sup> Since this time, Housing First has grown internationally as a philosophy and adapted as a program and systems approach to homelessness (Pleace & Bretherton, 2012; Gaetz, Scott & Gulliver, 2013; Henwood et al., 2013, Adamo et al., 2016). Housing First is being endorsed in public policies as a 'best' practice because there is lots of evidence-based research that shows it is effective in reducing homelessness, it

saves taxpayers money, and it focuses on “consumer’s choice” (Eberle et al., 2001; Culhane, Metraux & Hadley, 2002; Gilmer et al., 2010; Pomeroy, 2005, 2008; Rosenheck et al., 2003; Perlman & Parvensky, 2006; Toronto (Ont.), 2007; Mare & Rosenheck, 2007; Shapcott, 2008; Larimer et al., 2009; CEL & MHCC, 2014)<sup>29</sup>. Central to this body of literature is the argument that it generally cost less to provide permanent housing and supports for people experiencing homelessness than it does to leave them homeless and living off the emergency shelter/institutional system(s) (Adamo et al., 2016; however, see Waegemaker Schiff et al., 2012).

### *3.2.3. At Home/Chez Soi*

Canada’s At Home/Chez Soi project is the largest Housing First study that exists to date. It was launched by the Mental Health Commission of Canada (MHCC) and received \$110 million in federal funding, “which [was] a significant single investment that highlight[ed] the degree to which Housing First [was] emerging as priority”, Gaetz, Scott, & Gulliver (2013, p.4) argue. This project ran for five years (2008-2013) and took place in five Canadian cities: Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, Winnipeg and Moncton. As Turner et al. (2014, p.4) explain, the purpose of the project was “to test the efficacy and cost effectiveness of Housing First[.]” Findings from the At Home study showed that out of 2,148 *chronically* homeless individuals with mental illness, those who were placed in Housing First programs had higher retention rates (73 percent) than those individuals who were placed in regular treatment programs (32 percent) (CEL & MHCC, 2014, p.17). It was also found that the average cost savings of permanently housing “high needs” individuals through HF programs was just under \$10 per person and over \$3 for “moderate

needs” individuals (*ibid*, p.5). Over nine hundred people received permanent housing with supports through the At Home/ Chez Soi project (CEL & CHCC, 2012).

### *3.2.4. Housing First in Alberta*

There was a lot of work around Housing First taking place in Alberta at the same time as the At Home/Chez Soi pilot project. Starting in 2008, seven communities in Alberta, including: Calgary, Edmonton, Red Deer, Lethbridge, Medicine Hat, Wood Buffalo, and Grande Prairie, began implementing Housing First locally. Early learnings from these programs quickly led to a systems response to homelessness at a provincial level (Turner et al., 2014). Between 2009 and 2013, these seven communities permanently housed 8,748 people with supports by working together (*ibid*, p.3). As a result, significant reductions in homelessness were achieved at the provincial and local levels. The province, for example, saw homelessness decrease by 16 percent (Ostroff, 2015, August 13). Locally, Edmonton saw homelessness decrease by 29 percent; Wood Buffalo saw homelessness decrease by 44 percent; Lethbridge saw homelessness decrease by 59 percent; and Medicine Hat saw homelessness decrease by 40 percent (Turner et al., 2014, p.3). By 2015, this latter community was “on the cusp of becoming the first city in Canada to actually end homelessness” (Gaetz et al., 2014, p.45).<sup>30</sup>

The At Home/Chez Soi project and work taking place in Alberta were important because they provided further evidence that Housing First helped save money and reduced homelessness, but in a Canadian context (CEL & MHCC, 2014). More importantly, however, is that they inspired a new approach to homelessness in Canada (Gaetz et al., 2013; Gaetz & Dej, 2017). This transition in the homelessness service system is discussed next.

## **Part III – Towards a Housing First approach to homelessness**

### *3.3. Introduction*

Canada's service system is in a process of transition. This transition has been characterized by policy changes and new funding requirements at the federal, and to some extent, the provincial and municipal levels that focus on a Housing First approach to homelessness. These policy changes and new funding requirements are important because they help inform the timing and development of the 20K Homes campaign. They also have shaped the goals and objectives of the 20K Homes campaign both at the national and local levels. More so, they have important implications in terms of how conveners both at the local and national levels came up with the resources to fund their campaigns, and how each pilot community will come up with the resources to house their portion of the campaign's 20,000 people.

#### *3.3.1. A renewal of the HPS*

The findings and outcomes of the At Home/Chez Soi study and work taking place in Alberta led to a shift in federal funding requirements under the HPS (Adamo et al., 2016). This shift marked a new approach to homelessness in Canada – one based on Housing First. As part of Canada's 2013 Economic Action Plan, the conservative government announced its renewal of the HPS with a focus on Housing First. According to ESDC (2016, August 23): “The implementation of a Housing First approach builds on the outcomes of the Mental Health Commission of Canada’s [...] At Home/Chez Soi demonstration research project, as well as outcomes in several other Canadian communities.” It is understood here that these other communities were the seven from

Alberta. The renewal of the HPS included a \$600 million investment spread over five years – from April 2014 to March 2019 (*ibid*). To be eligible for this funding, 61 designated communities under the HPS are now required to allocate a percentage of this funding towards Housing First programs and supports (see **Appendix A** for Map & Table of 61 Designated Communities Under the HPS). As of April 1, 2015, Canada's ten largest designated communities<sup>31</sup>, also known as “Canada's Big 10”, according to one convener, are now required to allocate *at least* 65 percent of their HPS funding towards Housing First programs and services, and as of April 1, 2016, the remaining 51 designated communities are required to allocate *at least* 40 percent of their HPS funding towards Housing First programs and services (ESDC, 2016, August 15; Gaetz, Gulliver, & Richter, 2014; Adamo et al., 2016; Aubry, Nelson, & Tsemeris, 2015; refer back to **Appendix A**).

The federal government has provided 16 directives to help designated communities implement Housing First and meet the funding requirements (see ESDC, 2016, August 15 & **Appendix B**). Four directives are worth mentioning here: Directive 1) requires designated communities to focus on permanently housing the chronically and episodically homeless first (*ibid*). Once designated communities have housed 90 percent of these homeless populations, they can begin to focus on other local priority groups (*ibid*). Directive 5) requires designated communities to coordinate and leverage off resources with community partners (*ibid*). Directive 12) requires designated communities to collect data using a common assessment tool to make informed decisions and measure progress (*ibid*). Finally, Directive 15) requires designated communities to raise awareness and educate the public on homelessness and to advocate for policy changes (*ibid*). These directives are

worth mentioning because, as will be demonstrated in chapter five, they are supported by the 20K Homes campaign.

Adamo et al. (2016, p.17) point out that “despite changes in priority and focus, the total value of federal investment in the HPS program has [...] declined under the most recent renewal.”<sup>32</sup> According to Gaetz et al. (2014, p.53), “if and when reductions in homelessness are achieved, most likely after year five, the federal government could begin to draw down its HPS investment.” The implication here is that rather than investing cost savings in other priority groups and/or invest more money into this program, the federal government will simply cut back.

Although it is argued in this thesis that policy changes at the federal level marked a shift towards Housing First, it is emphasized here that this shift and its impacts on communities has been progressive and uneven. As I have begun to demonstrate and will continue to demonstrate, some communities have more developed Housing First programs than others due to early adoption and implementation. This has important implications for why Ottawa, Waterloo and Hamilton were ‘chosen’ and agreed to be pilot communities for the 20K Homes campaign.

Within the homelessness service system, service providers with supported housing and case management programs received additional funding because they met new funding requirements under the HPS, meanwhile, other service providers (i.e. drop-ins, outreach and transitional housing programs) lost funding, and in some cases, were at risk or even had to close their doors temporarily because they have been classified as emergency responses to homelessness, and do not meet funding requirements (see Dube, 2015; Jackson, 2015; Pearson, 2015, February 8, 25 & March 25; Schooley, 2015; Spears, 2015;

Villeneuve, 2015). As will be demonstrated in chapter five, this uneven impact on service providers shaped the characteristics of each local campaign.

### *3.3.2. Ontario's Community Homelessness Prevention Initiative*

Not only has Housing First become a new mandate under the federal HPS, it is also being incorporated in “many provincial funding initiatives across Canada” (Adamo et al., 2016, p.16). Of interest here are policy changes that have taken place in Ontario. In 2014, the Province of Ontario released its second poverty reduction strategy: *Realizing Our Potential: Ontario's Poverty Reduction Strategy 2014-2019* (Ontario & CEL, 2014). Outlined in this strategy are four goals: 1) A recommitment to reducing child poverty by 25 percent (*ibid*, p.9)<sup>33</sup>; 2) “Expanding [this] focus to support employment and income security for the most vulnerable [populations in Ontario]” (*ibid*, p.1), including, “individuals and families that are homeless or at risk of homelessness” (Adamo et al., 2016, p.19); 3) To “establish a long-term goal to end homelessness in Ontario” (Ontario & CEL, 2014, p.5), *with a focus on Housing First*, and; 4) To develop homelessness reduction indicators (*ibid*, p.46), through the creation of a Local Poverty Reduction Fund. The strategy does not provide a definition for homelessness; neither does it provide any targets or timeline for when it plans to end homelessness (Adamo et al., 2016).

These goals and gaps are what led to the formation of an Expert Advisory Panel on Homelessness in January 2015. According to Hope & MMAH (2015, November 15),

“The purpose of the Panel was to provide expert advice to the ministers on: Defining homelessness in Ontario[;] Measuring homelessness and collecting data to track progress[;] Prioritizing and setting targets[; and] Expanding the base of evidence and building capacity to address homelessness[.]”

On October 28, 2015, the EAPH released “A Place to Call Home”, making 23 recommendations to the ministers (*ibid*; see Matthews et al., 2015). Based on the recommendations of the EAPH, the Province of Ontario committed to: 1) end chronic homelessness in 10 years; 2) adopt both the COH’s definition of homelessness and the federal government’s definition of chronic homelessness; 3) prioritize the following homeless groups: youth, Aboriginals, the chronically homeless, and individuals transitioning out of provincially-funded institutions and service systems; invest \$10 million over two years towards a Poverty Reduction Fund; and develop a methodology for collecting data and measure progress towards ending homelessness (Hope & MMAH, 2015, November 20).

As part of its work in ‘ending’ chronic homelessness, the Province acknowledges that the most appropriate solutions to homelessness are ones that meet individuals needs (Ontario & CEL, 2014). For this reason, the Province launched the Community Homelessness Prevention Initiative (hereinafter CHPI) in 2013 (*ibid*). The CHPI “encourages local and tailored solutions through a Housing First approach [to homelessness]” (*ibid*, p.33). Between 2014 and 2015, the Province invested \$251 million into this program (*ibid*, p.34; also see Matthews, c.2018). This funding helped 30,500 households experiencing homelessness obtain housing, and 104,400 households at-risk of becoming homelessness stay housed (CEL & Ontario. MMAH, 2016, p.8). Between 2014/2015, the Province enhanced the program by \$42 million, and since then, it has been capped at \$294 million per year (Matthews, c.2018). The Province acknowledges that funding under this program is not enough to meet provincial housing needs and that federal investments are required (Province of Ontario, 2016, March 31).<sup>34</sup>

### *3.3.3. 10-Year Plans to End Homelessness*

Over the last ten years, many cities across Canada have developed 10-Year Plans to End Homelessness. As Adamo et al. (2016, p.3) explain, “10-year plans are important tools to identify local housing and service needs, define community priorities and objectives, and target public investments towards the goal of reducing homelessness.” Although 10-years plans originate from the United States (see *ibid*; Klodawsky, 2009), in Canada, *Calgary’s 10-Year Plan to End Homelessness* was developed and implemented by the Calgary Homeless Foundation in 2008 (CHF, c.2018; CEL & CHF, 2008), making Calgary the first municipality in Canada to have a 10-year plan to end homelessness. Soon after the release of Calgary’s 10-year Plan, the six earlier mentioned communities in Alberta began to follow suit, and Alberta became “the first province to commit to ending [chronic] homelessness with the release of *A Plan for Alberta to End Homelessness in 10 Years*” (Gaetz et al., 2016, p.40 – *original emphasis*; see Alberta. Secretariat for Action on Homelessness, 2008). Since then, 10-year plans have become a “common feature” in policy making across Canadian municipalities (Adamo et al., 2016, p.5). In Ontario, municipalities are now required to have 10-year plans under the province’s new 2011 Housing Act (*ibid*).

10-year plans are now designed to align with federal (i.e. HPS and AHI) and provincial funding requirements and draw on funding from these programs and local resources to support their implementation (Adamo et al., 2016). For example, key components of 10-year plans generally include a focus on Housing First, creating locally integrated homeless service systems, and prioritizing and ending chronic homelessness (Klodawsky, 2009; Adamo et al., 2016; Gaetz et al., 2016). In addition,

*“Most plans [have] clear timelines (e.g. 5 or 10-Year Plans) with specific targets and benchmarks to increase the supply of affordable housing and to reduce/end homelessness at an urban or regional scale. The plans also involve more rigorous approaches to monitor, evaluate and report on progress at different stages of plan implementation both to track plan performance against targets and to enable cities to refine plan goals, objectives and investment strategies in response to new information”* (Adamo et al., 2016, p.21 – *my emphasis*).

In their study on 10-year plans in four Canadian cities, Adamo et al. (2016, p.4) found that most Canadian municipalities have not achieved reductions in homelessness, “despite [10-year] plan interventions”, because these plans “are severely under-resourced”, and because, “municipalities have limited jurisdiction and authority over the key drivers of homelessness and precarious housing in Canada.” Similar trends have been found in the United States (see Leventhal, 2017).

### *3.3.4. Critics of Housing First*

At a time when evidence-based policy has gained precedence (Stanhope & Dunn, 2011), “Housing First has emerged as an important [form of] evidence-based [...] practice” (Noble et al., 2015, p.6). Stanhope & Dunn (2011) point out that while Housing First is based on progressive values (i.e. housing as a basic human right), the primary reason why it has become widely accepted in public policies is because it saves taxpayers money. Central to their work, these scholars argue that despite its intent, evidence-based policy decision-making is not value free. Building on these latter scholars’ research, it is understood here that just like in the States, conservative values are what “drove the adoption of Housing First” (p.280) in Canadian federal policy. Housing First has become a leading approach to homelessness (in Canada) because, again, it fits within a larger political economic project of neoliberalism (*ibid*).

Housing First programs have received criticism for focusing too narrowly and prioritizing chronically homeless individuals, particularly, older men with poor mental health and addictions (see Heffernan et al., 2015; Noble et al., 2015; Gaetz, 2014; Gaetz et al., 2016). Some researchers have questioned the appropriateness this model for certain homeless subpopulations (COH, c.2017, “Housing First”; see for examples, Rich & Clark, 2005; Goodman, 2014, April 21; Heffernan et al., 2015; Kirnishni, 2015, April 24). Research shows that Housing First can be adapted to meet the needs of these subpopulations (COH, c.2017, “Housing First”; see Gaetz, Homeless Hub, & CEL, 2014). As Gaetz et al. (2014) point out, however, even with these adaptations, there are still questions about the appropriateness of Housing First for certain homeless subpopulations (see Fotheringham, Walsh & Burrowes, 2014; Noble et al., 2015).

Most Housing First placements are through the private market (see Toronto, SSHA, & CEL, 2007; Aubry et al., 2014; CEL & MHCC, 2014; Stergiopoulos et al., 2014). Reasons for this include an inadequate supply of social housing (Aubry et al., 2014; CEL & MHCC, 2014) and “consumer choice” (Toronto, SSHA, & CEL, 2007; Gaetz et al., 2012; Latimer et al., 2014). Adamo et al. (2016, p.16 with reference to Gaetz et al., 2013) go as far as saying that “The *goal* [of Housing First] is to place individuals in private market rental housing, providing time-limited or long-term rent assistance and support services based on client need” (my *emphasis*). This supports the idea that the reason why Housing First has been endorsed in public policy is because it facilitates the market (Stanhope & Dunn, 2011), and because it takes the focus off the need to build new affordable housing (Klodawsky, 2009). Problematically, “In a tight housing market”, Gaetz et al. (2014, p.6) explain, “implementing a Housing First agenda becomes that much more challenging.”

What's also problematic is that time-limited programs could put participants at risk of becoming absolutely homeless, again, (COH, c.2017, "Housing First"), and contradicts the philosophy of meeting participants where they are at (Noble et al., 2015).

Housing First advocates suggest that providing permanent housing with supports through the private market is destigmatizing (i.e. compared to social housing).<sup>35</sup> Tim Richter, for example, states that while Housing First participants "have to meet the terms of [their] lease, [they] get to be like everyone else" (Ostroff, 2015, August 13). Kłodawsky (2009, p.601), however, questions whether Housing First has become popular because of the "implicit assumption" that it hides chronic homelessness behind the façade of "normal" housing. She also suggests that the reason why Housing First has become popular in Canada is to help municipal governments reduce the visibility of homelessness on the streets to attract downtown economic growth and development. This notion of invisibility is supported by Stanhope & Dunn (2011). Still, there is a stigma attached to homelessness, making it difficult for service providers to establish a rapport with landlords. Building a rapport with landlords is necessary for securing private market rental housing for Housing First programs; it also has important implications for how each pilot community will come up with the resources needed to house people for the 20K Homes campaign. Failure to establish relationships with landlords means that those people eligible and *prioritized* for Housing First programs and supports are left waiting for permanent housing longer (see Noble et al., 2015). By contrast, those who are placed into Housing First programs with supports may be "at risk of future homeless episodes" if they do not have access to other services (*ibid*, p.7).

While scholars agree Housing First is an important form of housing intervention, they also agree it is not a preventative approach to homelessness (Gaetz, Gulliver, & Richter, 2014; Gaetz, Homeless Hub, & CEL, 2014; Heffernan et al., 2015; Noble et al., 2015; Woolley, 2015). One must be absolutely homeless to be eligible and receive Housing First programs and supports (Heffernan et al., 2015). It does nothing to prevent those at-risk from becoming absolutely homeless – it does nothing to meet the needs of the ‘hidden’ homeless (Heffernan, 2015; Kirnishni, 2015, April 24). For this reason, new investments in affordable housing are needed to reach out to these ‘hidden’ populations as well (Gaetz, Gulliver, & Richter, 2014).

This section focused on the current transition in the homelessness service sector towards a Housing First approach to Homelessness. The next section focuses on politics between conveners at the national and international levels, and how this contributed to the timing, development and characteristics of the 20K Homes campaign.

## **Part IV – Politics between conveners at the national and international levels**

### *3.4. Introduction*

The purpose of Part IV is to demonstrate how political interactions between conveners at the national and international levels are contributing factors that shaped the timing, development and characteristics of the campaign. To demonstrate this, the ‘origins’ of the campaign are traced back to the development of the Canadian Alliance to End Homelessness, the American 100K Homes Campaign, and the work taking place in Calgary/Alberta around the same time.

#### *3.4.1. The development of the Canadian Alliance to End Homelessness*

In 2012, President and CEO Tim Richter resigned from the CHF to form and lead a new national organization called the Canadian Alliance to End Homelessness (hereinafter CAEH). The CAEH was “inspired” by the National Alliance to End Homelessness (NAEH) and was created with the intent of “build[ing] a national movement to end homelessness from the community up” (CAEH & CEL, 2012, p.3). The 20K Homes campaign would bring to light the CAEH’s efforts on ending homelessness. The focus of the CAEH would be to: 1. “Raise awareness of homelessness in Canada”; 2. “Mobilize communities and government to commit to ending homelessness with 10 Year Plans to End Homelessness”; 3. “Provide communities with the information, tools, knowledge and coaching necessary to develop and implement those plans”; and 4. “Proactively seek provincial and federal policy change to support ending homelessness” (CAEH, 2012, April 5).<sup>36</sup> It is understood here that these policy changes would include new investments in affordable housing. One tool provided to date by the CAEH has been the release of *A Plan*,

*Not a Dream: How to End Homelessness in 10 Years* (see CAEH & CEL, 2012) – a document that has been adapted from the NAEH’s original version and is intended to guide communities across Canada through the process of developing and implementing their own 10-year plans. While other national organizations have “signaled [...] their intent” and willingness to “[work] collaboratively” with the CAEH in their efforts to end homelessness, critics questions whether having another “national player” will “just increase competition and dilute the effort” (Gaetz, 2012, April 11).

### *3.4.2. The American 100K Homes campaign*

As mentioned in the first chapter of this thesis, the 20K Homes campaign has been inspired by the “success” of the American 100,000 Homes campaign. The 100,000 Homes campaign ran from July 2010 to July 2014 and involved 186 communities. It was nationally convened by Community Solutions, a non-profit organization based in New York, whose mission is to “[deploy] the best problem-solving tools from multiple sectors to help communities end homelessness and the conditions that create it” (Community Solutions, c.2016, “We Stand for Solutions”). The goal of the campaign was to permanently house 100,000 of America’s “most vulnerable” homeless people. It focused on Housing First and prioritized chronically homeless individuals and veterans. Within four years, the campaign “exceeded” its goal and housed 105,580 people (Leopold & Ho, 2015, p.1).

In a research report on an *Evaluation of the 100,000 Homes Campaign* by Leopold & Ho (2015), it was found that the 100,000 Homes campaign helped communities better identify and prioritize local housing resources, and it had the greatest impact on strengthening communities with moderate to high-functioning homeless service systems. The campaign also helped reduced homelessness nationally and in some participating

communities. When comparing campaign communities with non-campaign communities, it was found that overall, campaign communities achieved a 26 percent reduction in homelessness, whereas, non-campaign communities achieved a one percent reduction in homelessness (*ibid*, p.5). In 18 participating communities, it was found that 85 percent of individuals who were placed into permanent housing with supports maintained their housing after one year (Region of Waterloo, 2014, November 28). Campaign outcomes improved as well once monthly housing targets were established (Leopold & Ho, 2015).<sup>37</sup> It was further found that the campaign put pressure on communities to end chronic homelessness and it put 60 communities “on track” to end chronic homelessness within three years (*ibid*, p.1). Finally, the 100K Homes campaign provided further evidence that Housing First was an effective approach to homelessness (Leopold & Ho, 2015). Not only were significant reductions in homelessness achieved through the campaign using Housing First, there were also huge cost savings for taxpayers. According to the Region of Waterloo (2014, November 28, p.2), “total taxpayer savings from housing [over] 100,000 chronically homeless Americans [was estimated to save] more than \$1.3 billion annually[.]”

Critics of the 100,000 Homes campaign question who the 100,000 people were that were housed through the campaign (see DeJong in Leventhal, 2017 and Heffernan et al., 2015). While the 100,000 Home campaign focused on housing chronically homeless individual and veterans, Heffernan et al. (2015) point out that 80 percent of people permanently housed through the campaign were men and argue that the campaign ignored the ‘hidden’ homeless. They also note that people on social housing waitlists (i.e. families and women fleeing from domestic violence) were “bumped off” to make room for the chronically homeless.

Critics also point out that the 100,000 Homes campaign did not provide participating communities with funding to build *new* affordable housing (Leopold & Ho, 2015; Heffernan et al., 2015) and that it was dependent on the private market for finding housing solutions (*ibid*). Also, the 100,000 Homes campaign was less successful in using the data collected from registry weeks to advocate for policy changes at the local and national levels that would increase access to affordable housing (Leopold & Ho, 2015). Overall, it was found that the campaign gave little attention to the need for affordable housing, although, it did “[change] the housing resource conversation” in some participating communities (a senior Housing and Urban Development official quoted in Leopold & Ho, 2015, p.3).

Leventhal’s (2017) dissertation provides a more recent critique of the 100,000 Homes Campaign. The central research question asked in his study is whether the 100,000 Homes Campaign actually reduced chronic homelessness. After conducting structured interviews with leaders from the homelessness sector, who were well versed on the 100,000 Homes campaign, the findings from Leventhal’s study show that while the 100,000 Homes Campaign gave participating communities an better understanding as to who and how many individuals they were housing each month, helped them with systems planning, and overall, “was beneficial to [their] ability to end chronic homelessness” (p.36), there was “no evidence that the 100,000 Homes Campaign made a statistically significant difference in reducing the prevalence of chronic homelessness in [these communities]” (p.95). One reason for this, Leventhal explains, is that the “inflow” – that is the number of people entering chronic homelessness at the time the campaign began and throughout its duration – was not considered. Leventhal says it is “important to ask whether any ongoing social

problem can actually be solved outright, or only managed” (p.92). He also found that while setting goals and using promising practices had “value” (p.54), the 100,000 Homes campaign failed to reach its publicly stated goals, which ran “the risk of harming popular support for future efforts” (p.46), and overall, the campaign lacked proper evaluation. Critical of the 100,000 Homes Campaign evaluation report written by Leopold & Ho, which depicts the campaign as a “success” and uses Housing and Urban Development data, Leventhal points out that nowhere in this report does it “mention the fact that the 100,000 Homes campaign did not achieve its original goal of ending chronic homelessness” (p.30). He also points out that Leopold & Ho’s evaluation report is potentially biased as the funding for this study was given by Community Solutions – the “organizer and sponsor” of the 100,000 Homes campaign (p.29). Leventhal questions “whether researchers in the field can overcome their own advocacy biases to analyze why widely-adopted methodologies are not ending homelessness” (p.91) He further finds that while the 100,000 Homes campaign “promoted itself as though it generated [...] 100,000 units”, borrowing from Culhane in Leventhal (2017, p.46), the bulk of these units came from federal housing vouchers provided by Congress. Leventhal argues that it “was the availability of [these] federal housing vouchers, especially VASH [Veterans Assisted Supportive Housing] vouchers” that was “the most decisive factor in the decline in veteran and chronic homelessness between 2007 and 2016” (p.95). Finally, Leventhal found that 100,000 Homes Campaign “had nothing to do with generating [these] vouchers”, again, borrowing from Culhane in Leventhal (2017, p.46), and that it did not give credit to Congress for providing these resources. Leventhal concludes his dissertation by making three recommendations: First, to “Implement more robust and sophisticated data gathering”;

second, to “Standardize CoC [Continua of Care] boundaries and county methodologies”; and third, to “Study the inflow into chronic homelessness to help establish more realistic targets” (p.93-94).

Overall, the findings from these studies on the 100,000 Homes campaign have important implications for the short and long-term outcomes of the 20K Homes campaign.

#### *3.4.3. Work in Calgary/Alberta on ending homelessness*

Not only was the 20K Homes campaign inspired by the American campaign but also by the work taking place in Calgary/Alberta (Tim Richter in “Finding homes for 20,000 Canadians by 2018”, 2015, June 16).<sup>38</sup> Calgary, specifically, Tim Richter explains, has always been ahead of other Canadian municipalities in terms of finding solutions to end homelessness (*ibid*). At the time of his resignation, Tim Richter (in Turner, 2012, April 5) said, “I’m absolutely convinced based on what I’ve seen in Alberta...that a movement of cities will end homelessness in our country.”<sup>39</sup> Seeing the reductions in homelessness and cost savings in Alberta made him believe that this approach to homelessness could be adapted to work in other Canadian municipalities as well.

#### *3.4.4. Political connections between conveners at the national and international levels*

The 20K Homes campaign has further been shaped by personal and political connections made between conveners at the local and international levels. At the time Tim Richter was working at the CHF, the 100K Homes campaign was taking place in the States. According to one convener interviewed for this study, Tim Richter had been following the American campaign “over the years” and “was always very much interested in bringing it to Canada. One of his roles at the CHF was “leading the implementation of Calgary’s 10-

Year Plan to End Homelessness” (CAEH, c.2018, “About Us: Our Team”). Part of this work also involved implementing a *common assessment tool* in Calgary – the *same* one used for the 100K Homes campaign in the States. According to the above-mentioned participant interviewed for this study, it was through the implementation of this common assessment tool in Calgary that Tim Richter was able to directly reach out and connect with Becky Kanis, who worked for Community Solutions and was the Director of the 100K Homes campaign at the national level. It was through this connection that Tim Richter was able to express his interest in the campaign to Becky Kanis and bring it to Canada, including, the common assessment tool that would be used for action/registry week.

Although the 20K Homes campaign has been inspired by the American campaign and the work that took place in Alberta, the roots of the campaign do not stop there. The origins of the campaign have also been linked to Canada’s affordable housing and homelessness crisis, and the current transition in Canada’s homelessness service sector. These factors have set to conditions for the timing and development of the 20K Homes campaign and support the idea that the origins of the campaign cannot be linked to a single event but to larger interconnected and interdependent multiscalar political processes happening at different times in different places. A timeline summarizing these events can be found at the end of this thesis (see **Appendix C** for a History of Affordable Housing and Homelessness in Canada).

## **Part V – The goal and core principles of the 20K Homes campaign**

### *3.5. Introduction*

Part V of this chapter reviews the goal and core principles of the 20K Homes campaign at the national level. The goal and core principles align with federal HPS and provincial CHPI requirements. They also align with 10-Year Plans. It is suggested here that the current political context shaped the goal and core principles of the campaign.

#### *3.5.1. Focusing on the “most vulnerable”*

The 20K Homes campaign aims to permanently house 20,000 of Canada’s “most vulnerable” homeless people by July 1, 2018. Who are Canada’s “most vulnerable” homeless people? There is a great deal of debate about this in the literature. At a time when resources are scarce, one question that comes up in housing policy is, which homeless group ought to receive these limited resources? (Stanhope & Dunn, 2011). “In recent years,” Pearson (2007, p.v.) points out, the chronically homeless have received “increased public attention”, and as demonstrated above, they have also been given priority in public policy. As Gaetz et al. (2014, p.46) state, there are “compelling reasons” to prioritize chronic (and episodic) homelessness. According to Matthews et al. (2015), these reasons are both moral and economic. Not only are they physically without a home, but, as Gaetz et al. (2014, p.40) explain:

“their personal struggles - mental and physical health issues, addictions, legal and justice issues, discrimination - tend to be much more severe [than other homeless subpopulations. ...] Because of the rigours of life on the streets, this group is much more likely to experience catastrophic health crises requiring medical intervention and a high level of run ins with law enforcement.”

Even though the chronically homeless make up a small portion of Canada's total homeless population (less than 15 percent), they (and the episodically homeless) use approximately half the resources in the emergency shelter and institutional systems (Pomeroy, 2005; Aubry et al., 2013; Gaetz et al., 2014, Matthews et al., 2015). Similar trends exist in the States (see Kuhn & Culhane, 1998). Sometimes referred to as "long-stay shelter clients", these chronically homeless individuals and families are the "hardest-to-serve" (Pearson et al., 2007, p.v.) and 'hard to house' (Gaetz, 2014, p.1) because their needs are high and complex. It is believed that prioritizing the chronically homeless with highest needs for permanent housing and supports will not only lead to "significant cost savings" (Matthews et al., 2015, p.31), but also, that the money saved from this approach can be used to help those who are chronically homeless with moderate and low needs next. The result being a more effective and efficient use of limited resources.

At the national level, the 20K Homes campaign focuses on housing chronically homeless Canadians.<sup>40</sup> This has important implications for those people experiencing 'hidden' homelessness. As already mentioned earlier in this chapter, geographers and "researchers have found that men (older white men in particular) are overrepresented in the chronically homeless population", borrowing from Matthews et al. (2015, p.20). As Turner, Redman, & Gaetz (2017, p.3) explain,

"One of the main problems with focusing narrowly on chronic homelessness is that we can exclude key populations who are extremely vulnerable in other ways, including women fleeing violence, Indigenous Peoples in substandard housing, couch surfing youth, young people vulnerable to criminal and sexual exploitation, and racialized communities and new comers."

Stated another way, focusing narrowly on chronic homelessness means we are excluding the 'hidden' homeless. By excluding these marginalized groups in public policy and service

provision, their homelessness remains ‘hidden’ (Kauppi et al., 2017). More so, by excluding them in our campaign efforts, their ‘invisibility’ is perpetuated.

It is important to recognize that the needs of the chronically homeless are not the same as for these other marginalized groups. What’s more, the literature shows that the ‘hidden’ homeless are not a homogenous group and that the subpopulations who make up this homeless population have various needs. For example, Tutty et al. (2009, p.8) argue that “Individuals working in the homeless sector often have little understanding of the unique needs of women.” These scholars refer to abused and homeless women as “Canada’s most vulnerable women” (p.5). According to Matthews et al. (2015, p.11), “When it comes to trauma, women’s experiences, responses to and recovery from trauma are different from those of men.”

Likewise, it can be argued that homeless youth and adolescents, who are also susceptible to violence, may experience trauma differently from their adult counterparts. According to Gaetz et al. (2014), homeless youth and adolescents have developmental needs that need to be considered when transitioning into adulthood. He argues “that service provision [for youth] must [...] take into account and respond to [their] different needs [...] based on [their] age, gender, sexual orientation, family structure and experience of marginalization” (p.6).

Canada’s Indigenous peoples further have unique needs. They require culturally appropriate policies, programs and services (Novac et al., 2002; Leach, 2010; Windland, Gaetz, & Patton, 2011; Gaetz et al., 2014; Walsh et al., 2014; Gaetz et al., 2016); culturally appropriate housing (Distasio, Sylvestre, & Mulligan 2010); and the right to self-

determination and self-organization when it comes to addressing their homelessness and housing needs (Geoffrey & DeVerteuil, 2010).

Immigrants and refugees may require: welcome information, translation services, employment services, legal information or trauma counselling upon their arrival to Canada (Wayland 2007). As Matthews et al. (2015) point out, however, the needs of immigrants may not be the same as the needs of refugees. One reason why families – many of which include single-parent women, Indigenous peoples, immigrants and refugees – “are a particularly vulnerable sub-population that requires immediate and targeted interventions is [because of] the presence of children”, Walsh et al. (2014, p.13) explain. Kothari (2009, p.25) argues that funding should be directed towards women, Aboriginal people, the elderly, people with mental or physical disabilities, youth and migrants, who are “particularly vulnerable” to housing discrimination.

There are strong arguments for why we should prioritize these marginalized and more often ‘hidden’ groups as well (Gaetz et al., 2014). First and foremost, they represent a larger portion of Canada’s homeless population. Second, focusing on those populations who are at-risk of becoming absolutely homeless “may be a [necessary] prevention priority” (*ibid*, p.47). As Turner et al. (2017, p.3) explain, “Waiting for these groups to become chronically homeless before we offer them serious help to avoid or exit homelessness is expensive and damaging to individuals, families and communities.” To address their needs, however, requires a shift in focus from narrowly understanding homelessness as an individual problem to more broadly thinking about homelessness as a structural problem that is related to poverty and a lack of affordable housing (Stanhope & Dunn, 2011).

### *3.5.2. The core principles of the 20K Homes campaign*

At the national level, the CAEH has identified seven principles of the 20K Homes campaign. These seven principles are outlined on the campaign's Concept Overview (20K Homes & CAEH, 2014, p.2-3), and include: 1) "Knowing every homeless person by name and understanding each person's needs and preferences"; 2) "Implementing Housing First in a way that makes sense for each community"; 3) "Understanding the community's unique set of strengths and challenges through the use of a Community Self-Assessment Tool"; 4) "Using data to track progress and to make decisions to improve a community's homeless programs and the system as a whole"; 5) "Building a coordinated system of care in which communities move from multiple silos to a single system able to quickly find housing for anyone experiencing homelessness"; 6) "Learning from other communities across Canada"; and 7) "Providing a united voice at a national and provincial level to secure the housing and resources necessary to end homelessness in Canada." These core principles strategically align with federal and provincial funding requirements and with local homelessness programs to build legitimacy and credibility around the campaign and to create community buy-in.

One thing that needs to be considered is, what do coordinated homelessness service systems look like? The 20K Homes campaign supports a collective impact model. To build coordinated homelessness service systems, communities must move from working in "multiple silos to a single system [that is] able to quickly find housing for anyone experiencing homelessness" (20K Homes & CAEH, 2015, "Concept Overview", p.2). The 20K Homes "Collective Impact Worksheet" (20K Homes & CAEH, n.d., p.1) states, "In order to mobilize a community around the housing process, local stakeholders must come

together around a common aim, demonstrate a willingness to share information and solutions, combine resources, and share recognition.” Coordinated homelessness service systems “are simple to navigate, while targeting resources quickly and efficiently to the people who need it the most” (20K Homes & CAEH, n.d., “Community Agreement”, p.1).

The goal and seven core principles of the 20K Homes campaign align with federal and provincial funding requirements. They also aligned with community 10-year plans. It is argued here that the 20K Homes campaign not only supports but will help strengthen a new approach to homelessness. As will be demonstrated in the next chapter, this alignment was strategic so that conveners could use homelessness funding to support their local campaign efforts. Although the 20K Homes campaign focuses on housing the chronically homeless at the national level, the CAEH has strategically framed the campaign using “most vulnerable” instead of “chronically homeless”, allowing for more flexibility so that the campaign aligns more broadly with local needs. But what if local needs do not align with the government funding requirements? How will conveners resource their local campaigns? These questions will be addressed.

## **Chapter four:**

### **Research methodology**

#### *4.0. Introduction*

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the research methodology for this study on the 20K Homes campaign. Part one begins with an explanation on how I came to do research on the 20K Homes campaign. Part two provides justification for why a relational comparative approach was taken in this study. Part three describes the participants interviewed for this study. Part four provides a discussion on the strategies and methods used for recruitment. Part five outlines the research methods and strategies used for data collection. Consideration is given to their strengths and limitations and justification will be provided for why they were chosen. Semi-structured interviews and a documentation review were the primary methods used for data collection in this study. Participant observation and ‘follow-the-campaign’ methods were also used strategically to build a rapport with interview participants and gain access to data. Part six describes the process of transcribing and analyzing the data collected using a latent content approach and NVivo software. Finally, in part seven, ethical matters regarding this research project are considered.

#### *4.1. How I came to do research on the 20K Homes campaign*

The purpose of this section is to explain how I came to do research on the piloting of the 20K Homes campaign. Like many graduate students who enter a master’s program, I had high (and perhaps some unrealistic) expectations on what I wanted out of a research project. I wanted to explore an issue related to homelessness and housing and was not willing to change my area of interest. The difficulty was finding a research focus. At one

point, I was offered a dataset from my academic advisor with the hope it would help me figure this out. I declined the dataset, however, because I wanted to collect my own data and interview people experiencing homelessness. Had I accepted the dataset from my academic advisor, our research interests would have been more complementary, and I may have been eligible for funding, or perhaps I would have finished my thesis sooner.

I also had a strong desire to do collaborative research. Doing collaborative research involves doing research “with” an individual, organization or institution (Pushor, 2008, p.91). The purpose of collaborative research is to challenge the hierarchical power relations that exist in traditional research practices (*ibid*). It requires a good rapport, trust, negotiation, and reciprocity between the researcher and the collaborator (*ibid*, p.92). It also requires that the research project is of “mutual interest and benefit” to both the researcher and collaborator (*ibid*, p.91). Building a relationship based on trust, negotiation and reciprocity takes time and careful planning when designing a research project (*ibid*).

Even though I was living and attending grad school in Ottawa, I had every intention of doing collaborative research back home in the Niagara Region. I thought it would be easier to do research there because I was most familiar with its homelessness and housing landscape. Also, I had done volunteer work with two local homeless shelters. I thought my volunteer experience would help me gain access to participant subjects (i.e. people experiencing homelessness). The problem was, even though I had volunteer experience within the services system, my connections with gatekeepers were weak and limited. Abrams (2010, p.542) argues, “Researchers must take time to build connections with gatekeepers who provide access to a given population of interest.” Sanghera & Thapar-

Björkert (2008, p.544) explain, “The gatekeeper is often the first point of contact in the field research process[.]”

I explained to service providers that I was a graduate student interested in doing a research project on a homelessness and housing issue, hoping I would ‘find’ a problem in need of investigation. Instead, I found service providers were hard to engage. There are a few possible reasons for this. One reason being that gatekeepers tend to have a real or perceived duty to protect vulnerable populations (for example, see Heath et al., 2007; Runnels et al., 2009; Rugkåsa & Canvin, 2011). As gatekeepers, service providers tend to be protective of the homeless populations they serve. Another possible reason why gatekeepers are hard to engage is because they see “research engagement” as additional work (Clark, 2010, p.488 with reference to Munro et al., 2005). A third possible reason is because they lack the resources. Clark (2010, p.488) states:

“At a more practical level, non-engagement may be explained on the more material levels of lack of time, resource, and disruption to the individual or organization. [...] Finding information, providing links, answering queries, and approaching the participants in question, can all drive resources away from the central aims of the organization in question.”

Service providers typically operate over capacity and are stretched for resources. With limited time, energy and funding, they are not going to give up these resources, especially when competition for these resources is high, unless they see the research project as beneficial to their own work. This brings us to a fourth possible reason why service providers were hard to engage. According to Sanghera & Thapar-Björkert (2008, p.555), “Gatekeepers are often reluctant to invest time in activities that they do not believe will directly benefit them.” Unfortunately, I had nothing to offer to the service providers I reached out to. According to Clark (2010, p.495),

“Research engagement is rarely financially reimbursed and any costs associated with engagement often have to be absorbed by the gatekeeper. If this cost is perceived to be sufficiently high to disrupt the accomplishment of the primary aims, purposes and interests of the gatekeeper in question then [...] these can be a threat to engagement.”

If I wanted to work collaboratively with (a) service provider(s), I would have to demonstrate how my study would be mutually beneficial for me (the researcher) and for them. Realizing this, I knew that doing a study in Niagara while living and attending grad school in Ottawa would not be feasible and that I had to be more openminded to doing research elsewhere. I was advised by my academic adviser to familiarize myself with homelessness and housing issues in Ottawa. I was also advised to do some volunteer work with the Alliance to End Homelessness Ottawa (hereinafter the Alliance) and to reach out to the organization’s Executive Director, whom my academic advisor had a prior connection with.

The Alliance is a non-profit membership-based organization working to end homelessness in Ottawa. It was established in 1995 by “a network of local service providers and non-profit housing organizations”, borrowing from Klodawsky (2007, p.2853), in response to a diminishing supply of affordable housing (Klodawsky, Farrell, & D’Aubry, 2002) and provincial cuts to social assistance programs (Layton & Shapcott, 2007) that led to a growing number in homelessness in the Ottawa region (*ibid*; Klodawsky et al., 2009). At the time of its formation and since then, the Alliance has fostered community inclusiveness and collaboration in its efforts to end homelessness (Klodawsky, 2007 & 2014). Over time, the Alliance has gained a reputation for being grassroots and a democratically run organization. Having said that, the Alliance has also been criticized for having a “bureaucratic decision-making structure” (Greenberg, May & Elliot, 2005,

p.142). At the time this research project began, the Alliance had 54 local agencies as well as individual members. Internally, the Alliance consists of four committees: 1) a Communications, Outreach and Cultivation Committee – which delivers messages to the public using a variety of media forms to educate and raise awareness about homelessness; 2) a Membership Development Committee – which focuses on growing the Alliance’s membership; 3) a Policy and Political Analyst Committee – which does research related to housing and homelessness to help inform policy decisions; and 4) a Research Committee – which “prioritizes and facilitates” internal research projects and “connect[s] the work of the Alliance [...] to the broad[er] research community” (ATEH, 2015, “Volunteer with the Alliance”).<sup>41</sup> In addition, the Alliance has a Board of Directors (formerly known as the Steering Committee) consisting of 23 individual members who take part in collective decision making on behalf of the organization (*ibid*).

Following my academic advisor’s advice, I reached out to the Executive Director of the Alliance and did a volunteer outreach workshop with the organization. It was during this workshop that I first heard about the 20K Homes campaign and that Ottawa would be participating as a pilot community. Not only did the volunteer outreach help me learn about the campaign, it gave me the opportunity to build trust and establish a rapport with the Alliance. Soon after the workshop, I began following the Alliance on social media and saw a post that it was looking for survey/data volunteers to help with Ottawa’s action week. Interested to learn more, I followed-up with the Executive Director to inquire about the campaign. It was during this telephone conversation that they suggested that I do research on Ottawa’s action week and agreed that the Alliance would work “collaboratively” on the research project as a third-party recruiter and gatekeeper.

One thing that is worth considering here is why the Alliance agreed to collaborate with this research project? Collaborative research between academic researchers and community organizations has become more prevalent in recent decades (Macmillan & Scott, 2003 with reference to Bell & Read, 1998). According to Klodawsky (2007), this is because there has been increasing pressure on the voluntary sector to form new partnerships (i.e. with universities) to provide evidence-based policy research to promote their agendas.

Clark (2010) identifies three reasons why researchers think gatekeepers are willing to engage in a research project. The first reason is political representation: gatekeepers are willing to engage in a research project if it represents, articulates and legitimizes their aims and interests (*ibid*, p.491). The second reason why researchers think gatekeepers are willing to engage in a research project is because they may have a perceived “civic or moral responsibility [or duty] to engage” (Clark, 2010, p.490). The third reason why researchers think gatekeepers get involved is to “identify ‘good practice’ that could then be used to facilitate change” (*ibid*, p.493). In line with the goals of Ottawa’s action week, it is understood here that the reason why the Alliance was willing to collaborate with me was because the organization saw this research project as an opportunity to build momentum around action week; to foster community engagement; and to give voice to its advocacy efforts. Specifically, this study would help inform public policy on the need for new affordable housing. This study supported Ottawa’s local campaign efforts and the interests of the organization.

#### *4.2. Why a relational comparative approach was taken in this study*

The original intent of this thesis was to focus on Ottawa's action week. However, the opportunity arose to collect data on Waterloo's and Hamilton's registry weeks and to do a relational comparative study. This section provides justification for why a relational comparative approach was taken in this study. Comparing Ottawa's action week and Waterloo's and Hamilton's registry weeks is done so in a manner that considers both external factors, such as larger political processes that shape the timing, development and characteristics of the local and national campaigns, and internal factors, such as geography and jurisdiction (Adamo et al., 2016), local politics and campaign goals, resources and leadership structure. With these external and internal factors taken into consideration, it is acknowledged here that these local campaigns are not mutually exclusive or inherently different (Ward, 2010). They inform one-another and can be used to ask questions about one-another (*ibid*). As suggested elsewhere, a relational approach "seeks to move beyond the rather fixed and static theorizations of place, space and scale" (*ibid*, p.473). It allows us to acknowledge "both the territorial and relational histories and geographies" of the 20K Homes campaign, borrowing from Ward (2010, p.480).

According to Mills (2008, p.101), "Comparative research poses several key methodological problems that continue to frustrate, captivate, and stimulate researchers." One important thing that needs to be considered when doing a comparative study is the case selection (*ibid* with reference to Ebbinghaus, 2005) – that is, why are certain sites (or locations) chosen for analysis. Although the cases for this study were already predetermined, it is worth considering why Ottawa, Waterloo and Hamilton were 'chosen' as pilot communities for the 20K Homes campaign. Mills (2008, p.101) points out, "In

cross-national comparative research, cases have been preselected due to historical and political processes.” The pilot communities ‘chosen’ for the 20K Homes campaign were selected due to historical and political processes as well. As demonstrated in the last chapter and will continue to demonstrate, these historical and political processes are interconnected and have manifested at different times in different places.

Another reason why then Ottawa, Waterloo and Hamilton were ‘chosen’ as pilot communities was because their local service systems were further advanced than other communities. Ottawa, Waterloo and Hamilton were ‘chosen’ strategically to pilot the campaign as well because of their mid-size city status (based on population size). One convener explained, “You don’t want to pilot something in Toronto.” The implication here is that larger cities have larger homeless populations, and so, testing campaign strategies, approaches, and practices where it matters most would be unadvised. In other words, it is better to test campaign strategies, approaches, and practices in mid-size cities where they provide effective learning experiences and can be refined without any major repercussions.

Ottawa, Waterloo, and Hamilton were further ‘chosen’ as pilot communities because conveners at the local and national levels had prior connections with each other. These prior connections are important as they help explain why Ottawa, Waterloo and Hamilton became pilot communities. According to one convener, the idea of bringing the 20K Homes campaign to Canada was officially brought up during the 2014 National Conference on Ending Homelessness in Vancouver. The purpose of this announcement, they explained, was to get a general idea as to how many communities would be interested in participating in the campaign and which ones would even be interested in piloting it. Following this announcement, a “feasibility study” was conducted, they said, which

involved “high level [...] interviews with about 20 people or so – primarily [with] people [at] a [...] more national or multi-sectorial level, but [...] also [with] a cross-section of people working at the local level”, another convener explained. According to the former convener, the CAEH “had the most interest from Ottawa, Hamilton, and Waterloo.” It is questioned here why conveners from each pilot community were interested in piloting the campaign – a question that will be addressed in the next chapter.

Finally, piloting that campaign specifically in Ottawa was strategic and timely. According to Tim Richter (2015, April 20) from the CAEH, Ottawa was chosen as a pilot community because it has “a longstanding record of leadership and innovation in ending homelessness and as the nation’s capital, [it] would put ending homelessness literally on the doorstep of Parliament.”<sup>42</sup> With a federal election taking place in the Fall of 2015, piloting the campaign in Ottawa would provide “[an] opportunity to put ending homelessness on the national agenda” (*ibid*). While piloting the campaign in the nation’s capital was perceived as a real political opportunity, it is questioned here how much of an effect piloting the campaign in Ottawa had on gaining federal support – or any sort of political support for that matter? This is explored later as well.

Another thing that needs to be considered when doing a comparative study is the “scale of analysis” (Blatter, 2008) – that is, the number of cases being explored. One problem when examining one or a few cases is, even though it allows for multiple characteristics or categories to be identified with thick descriptions, it is difficult to generalize and apply these categories across multiple contexts (*ibid*). The categories in this study used to discuss the similarities (and differences) between Ottawa’s action week and Waterloo’s and Hamilton’s registry weeks are not based on a standard set of criteria and it

was not intended here to create such a model. The categories used in this study are context specific, and therefore, it should not be assumed that they are applicable in other contexts as well (i.e. future campaigns/registry weeks).

#### *4.3. Interview participants*

In this study, semi-structured interviews were conducted with a variety of participants, including: seven conveners, one agency staff, three frontline works, five volunteers, and three spokespeople. In total, nineteen participants were interviewed for this study (see **Appendix D** for a breakdown of interview participants). The word “convener” is used in this thesis to describe those individuals and organizations that were responsible for campaign organizing at the local, national and international levels. This includes individuals who worked for the Alliance to End Homelessness Ottawa, the Region of Waterloo, the City of Hamilton, the Canadian Alliance to End Homelessness and Community Solutions. “Agency staff” is used to describe one individual that sat on Ottawa’s action team – a planning and organizing committee for the local campaign. “Frontline staff” is used to describe those individuals who were involve in Ottawa’s action week as survey team leads. “Volunteers” were individuals from the community who were recruited by the Alliance and helped administer the action week survey and/or did data entry. “Spokesperson” is used to describe those individuals from the City of Ottawa and a local initiative called Broadening the Base, who represented and spoke on behalf of their organization during action week and provided sympathetic or solidaristic support for the local campaign. For theoretical and practical reasons, *there were no vulnerable populations (i.e. people experiencing homelessness) interviewed for this study*. Prior to having any contact with interview participants, a research protocol was filled out and submitted to

Carleton University's Research Ethics Board for clearance. Once clearance was received the recruitment and interview process began (see **Appendix E** for CUREB clearance forms).

Valentine (1997, p.112) argues, “Choosing who to interview is [...] often a theoretically motivated decision.” The choice to recruit conveners, agency and frontline staff, volunteers and spokespersons was guided by the research questions being asked (Eide, 2008). These interview participants were all involved in the campaign, either directly or indirectly, with different roles and responsibilities, and therefore, could provide “the richest and most complex source of information” (Eide, 2008, p.743). What’s more, conveners, agency and frontline staff, and community partners were all connected to the social service sector either directly or indirectly, some for many years, and therefore, they had knowledge and experience with the history of homelessness and housing in Canada, including, the recent transition in the homelessness sector towards Housing First. Volunteers either: worked, were working (indirectly) or volunteering, or were planning to work in the homelessness service sector. One participant interviewed for this study identified themselves as a person with lived experience. Other participants mentioned having an indirect experience with homelessness. Overall, the benefit of recruiting and interviewing a variety of stakeholders was that they were able to provide multiple perspectives on the research topic being explored (Pushor, 2008).

One limitation of this study is that only a small number of interviews were conducted in Waterloo and Hamilton (refer back to **Appendix D**). As noted throughout the literature, a small sample size makes it hard to generalize research findings. According to Clark (2008, p.169), “Sample sizes should be sufficiently large to allow meaningful

comparisons to be made.” Baker & Edwards (2012, p.5 with reference to “expert voices” Brannen and Becker in the same work) explain, “[A] small number of interviews may not enable researchers to compare particular groups or to consider frequency distribution.” The limited number of interviews from Waterloo and Hamilton made it difficult at times to compare local campaigns. This is why other methods, including a documentation review and ‘follow the campaign’ methods, were also employed in this study. Charmaz (2012, p.22) explains, “Mixed qualitative methods can strengthen a study with a small number of interviews.” Drawing on these other methods helped fill gaps in the interview data. The limited number of interviews from Waterloo and Hamilton also made it difficult to draw on a variety of perspectives and has led to particular biases. Given interviews were conducted with conveners from Waterloo and Hamilton, this study lacks more critical perspectives on these local campaigns. Gifford (2012, p.1) states, “Researcher must attempt to incorporate enough interviewees so as to cover all the opinions they anticipated.” Obtaining a large sample from Waterloo and Hamilton was not possible for practical reasons (i.e. time and cost). Obtaining a large sample size was also not necessary for theoretical reasons. Borrowing from Fawcett (2008, p.669), there was enough data to “address the research question” being asked.

#### *4.4. Recruitment strategies and methods*

This section outlines the process of recruiting interview participants for this study. Two strategies were used for recruitment. The most effective strategy involved reaching out to conveners, agency staff, frontline staff, volunteers and spokespersons either by e-mail or in person and recruiting them directly. Fourteen interview participants were recruited using this strategy. The other strategy involved the Alliance sending out a mass

e-mail to frontline staff and volunteers as a third-party recruiter. The remaining five interview participants were recruited using this strategy. The findings from this study show that having pre-existing relationships with interview participants, reaching out to them directly, and being affiliated with the Alliance, were all important for recruiting interview participants for this research project.

The most effective strategy for recruitment was reaching out to conveners, agency staff, frontline staff, volunteers and spokespeople either by e-mail or in person and recruiting them directly. Conveners and spokespersons were sent a letter of invite addressed to them via e-mail (see **Appendices F, G, & H** for supporting e-mail and letters of invite to conveners and spokespeople). Contact information was obtained either through the Alliance or online. One agency staff, two frontline workers, and one volunteer part of a local outreach team were recruited by printing letter of invites and handing out hard copies to these individuals in person while attending a monthly outreach meeting as a volunteer with this program.

The other recruitment strategy involved having the Alliance send out a mass e-mail to all frontline staff and volunteers as a third-party recruiter. Here, a third-party recruiter refers to an individual part of an organization who is directly involved in recruiting participants for a research project in addition to the researcher (see Rugkåsa & Canvin, 2011, for another example). Four volunteers and one frontline worker was recruited using this strategy. At the beginning of June 2015, a letter of invite was sent to the Alliance via e-mail requesting its help as a third-party recruiter for this project (see **Appendix I** for Letter to Third-Party Recruiter). As a third-party recruiter, the role of the Alliance was to forward a letter of invite via mass e-mail to all frontline staff and volunteers who

participated in action week to inform them about the research project, and to contact me (the researcher) if they were interested in participating in this study (see **Appendix J** for letter to frontline staff and volunteers). The Alliance agreed to be a third-party recruiter and sent out two e-mail notifications: one at the end of June 2015 and another at the end of July 2015. Once conveners, agency and frontline staff, volunteers, and spokespeople received the letter of invite and expressed interest in participating in this research project, follow-up e-mails were sent back and forth to set up a date, time and location for the interviews.

As Sanghera & Thapar-Björkert (2008, p.549) point out, “In many research contexts, researchers are not able to approach potential participants directly, but have to negotiate access through [a gatekeeper.]” Without the help of the Alliance, my ability to reach out and recruit frontline staff and volunteers would have been much more limited. I was not permitted to recruit frontline staff and volunteers during action week, and the Alliance was not permitted to share their contact information with me for confidentiality reasons. The Alliance did have access to this information, however, and it was able, willing, and did send a mass e-mail with a letter of invite attached to all frontline staff and volunteers on my behalf. Doing so, the Alliance played a “bridging role” (Rugkåsa & Canvin 2011, p.135), connecting me (the researcher) with frontline staff and volunteers, demonstrating how gatekeepers can provide “a solution to problems of contacting the research participants” (Clark, 2010, p.487-488).

Some studies show that gatekeepers limit the extent of the recruitment pool (McKechnie, 2008; Temple, 2008; Abram, 2010). Contrary to these studies, it was found that the Alliance maximized the extent of the recruitment pool. By sending out a mass e-

mail to *all* frontline staff and volunteers, the Alliance provided access to the greatest extent of participants possible. Although it would have been possible to use “nonpersonal recruitment methods” (Rugkåsa & Canvin, 2011, p.136), such as flyers or newspapers, they would have been costly and not as far reaching. Having the Alliance as third-party recruiter was therefore a more viable option. As gatekeeper, it provided quick and easy access to frontline staff and volunteers (Abrams, 2010; Jensen, 2008; Clark, 2010).

Having the Alliance send out a letter of invite to frontline staff and volunteers via mass e-mail served as a formal introduction to me (the researcher) and to the research project (Jensen, 2008). According to Sixsmith et al. (2003, p.582 with reference to Seidman, 1998), “[Gatekeepers] have local influence and power to add credibility and validity to the project by their acceptance of it.” Having a letter of invite sent by the Alliance indicated the organization’s support for the research project and enhanced my credibility and validity as a researcher. Also, receiving a letter of invite from a familiar and trusted organization as opposed to an unknown researcher helped legitimize the research project.

According to Jensen (2008, p.2; see also, Rugkåsa & Canvin, 2011), gatekeepers may have “inside” information about participants. Of the four volunteers recruited via mass e-mail, one of these individuals the Alliance had “inside” information about. Specifically, this individual worked in homelessness policy with the federal government, and therefore, could provide rich data for this study (Jensen, 2008). Knowing this, the Alliance reached out to this individual to “vouch for [my] credibility and trustworthiness [as a researcher]”, borrowing from Rugkåsa & Canvin (2011, p.135). This further demonstrates how the Alliance played a “bridging role” between me and interview participants. This opportunity

to connect with and recruit a federal employee highlights one of the advantages of doing research in Ottawa. It is worth mentioning here too that one of the four volunteers recruited through mass e-mail I had met during action week, further demonstrating how these prior connections were important for recruitment.

There are debates throughout the literature as to whether gatekeepers will provide information for data collection. Clark (2010, p.487) argues that “gatekeepers will remain largely independent to the participants of a research study and they will not directly provide the material that constitutes the information required for the data collection phase of research[.]” In other words, he states, “[Gatekeepers] are not ‘researched’ themselves” (*ibid*, p.496). Campbell et al. (2006, p.99), on-the-other-hand, argue “that gatekeepers are [...] resources”, meaning, they “may be an interviewee[.]” In the context of this research, being interviewed and providing information for the purposes of data collection was negotiated with the Alliance as part of working collaboratively on this research project.

Perhaps the biggest challenge working with a third-party recruiter and gatekeeper was losing some control over research process. This loss of control manifested itself in different ways. At one point this loss of control was experienced during the recruitment. For example, when the Alliance sent out the initial e-mail about this research project, it was sent as part of a larger e-mail updating frontline staff and volunteers on Ottawa’s Action Week and the upcoming national launch of the 20K Homes campaign that would be taking place in Toronto in June 2015. One problem with this recruitment method is that recipients may view the e-mail “as a source of spam” (Saumure & Given, 2008, p.928). Information about this research project was added at the bottom of the e-mail along with the letter of invite sent as an attachment. There was speculation that frontline staff and

volunteers either did not read the e-mail entirely or at all, because initially, responses were low. This speculation was confirmed when speaking with an interview participant about the recruitment process, who admitted they did not read the initial e-mail in its entirety. This problem around e-mail may have reduced the recruitment pool. At the end of July, the Alliance was asked and agreed to send out a second e-mail notification about this research project as a stand-alone e-mail. As a lesson learned, it would benefit the researcher to ask that all letters of invite be sent as a stand-alone e-mail when negotiating with a third-party recruiter.

Third-party recruiters and gatekeepers may influence the research schedule (Campbell et al., 2006; Broadhead & Rist, 1976). For example, I had initially asked the Alliance to e-mail a letter of invite for this research project to frontline staff and volunteers at the beginning of June. However, the Alliance withheld sending the e-mail until the end of the month when it sent out the mass e-mail updating people about the campaign. Likewise, it was requested that the Alliance send out a third (and final) e-mail early August as a last call and attempt to recruit participants for this study. The request, however, was respectfully declined by the Alliance. The reason for this was because the Alliance had an e-mail policy that capped the number of e-mail notifications it sent out regarding the same subject. Once the request was declined, access to volunteers was lost, reducing the size of the recruitment pool. As a lesson learned, it is important that researchers are aware of any policies when working with third-party recruiters and gatekeepers at the onset. Knowing the Alliance's e-mail policy at the beginning of the recruitment process would have helped me plan the timing and implementation of the recruitment better.

Rugkåsa & Canvin (2011) argue that gatekeepers may not want to help with the recruitment process if it costs the individual or organization time, money, and resources. They point out that gatekeeping can be financially straining, particularly for small organizations (*ibid*). When the letter of invite was sent out for this research project, one individual from the Alliance expressed concern, asking if the organization was funding this research project. Although the individual who expressed concern was assured that the Alliance was not paying for this research project, as Clark (2010, p.488) argues, “[...] where organizations act as gatekeepers, good lines of communication are often needed to ensure that staff are aware of the research project and researchers. Failure to give updated information can cause disruption for all concerned[.]”

Since the Alliance was no longer available to help with the recruitment, I tried recruiting frontline staff myself. This was done by searching for a generic e-mail address online for each organization that participated in Ottawa’s action week and e-mailing them a letter of invite.<sup>43</sup> Four agency staff from different organizations replied but no interviews were arranged. There are a few reasons why this approach didn’t work. In one case, the frontline worker who participated in Ottawa’s action week no longer worked for the organization. In another case, a letter of invite was forwarded to a frontline worker, but they did not reply. In a third case, the organization was merely used as a survey location for action week. Other possible reasons why this approach did not work was because, again, the e-mail was viewed as spam, or perhaps people were not interested or were too busy to participate in this study. Overall, this strategy was not effective for recruiting frontline staff.

Four individuals from Ottawa and Hamilton expressed interest in participating in this study. Two of these individuals were a spokesperson and frontline worker from Ottawa's action week. The other two individuals were a convener and person with lived experience from Hamilton's registry week. Interviews were either scheduled or in the process of being scheduled with these individuals. However, when I followed-up with these individuals, I did not hear back from them. There were personal and professional reasons for this. For instance, when trying to schedule an interview with the two individuals from Ottawa, and the convener from Hamilton, they could not commit because of their busy work schedules. When arranging an interview with the person who identified as having lived experience, they informed me they were at-risk of losing their housing.

One thing that needs to be considered when recruiting participants and deciding to do a comparative study is the adequacy of the sample size (Eide, 2008). That is, the number of people recruited. More people were recruited, and more data was collected from Ottawa's action week than from Waterloo's and Hamilton's registry weeks. No agency staff, frontline workers, volunteers, or spokespersons from Waterloo's and Hamilton's registry weeks were recruited for this study. Consequently, this study fails to draw on different experiences and perspectives from these local campaigns as well. Regardless, Eide (2008, p.744) asks, "are there enough data collected to develop rich thick descriptions of the phenomena under study?" With only one convener from each pilot community (Waterloo and Hamilton) recruited for this study, it was difficult at times throughout the analysis to make comparisons and develop thick descriptions because information was missing. In some cases, missing information could be obtained from the documentation review. In other cases, I followed up with conveners after the formal interview via e-mail

to try and fill-in the gaps. Recognizing that all knowledge is partial, I had to accept working with the information that was provided and practice asking questions about the data.

As a final thought on the recruitment process, researchers need to be aware of ‘hidden’ gatekeepers. When recruiting conveners from the formal leadership structure, I learned from one individual that they had to ask their administration for permission to participate in this study. Although permission was granted, this may not always be the case. It is recognized here that a researcher may have to pass through multiple gates to gain access to participants.

#### *4.5. Research methods and strategies for data collection*

This section provides a discussion on the research methods and strategies used for data collection. Semi-structured interviews and a documentation review were the two primary methods used for data collection. A description of the interview process and types of documents used to collect information on the campaign are provided. ‘Participant observation’ and ‘follow-the-campaign’ methods were strategically used to establish and maintain a rapport with many interview participants. These methods also helped inform the methodological approach of this thesis. Justification for using each research method is provided, including, their strengths and limitations. Overall, the methods chosen in this study relate to the research questions asked and conceptual framework applied (McCann, 2011).

##### *4.5.1. Semi-structured interviews*

Semi-structured interviews were one of the two primary methods used in this study for data collection. Semi-structured interviews are useful for “collect[ing] a diversity of

meaning, opinion and experiences, [as] interviews provide insights into differing opinions or debates within a group but can also reveal a consensus on some issues” (Dunn, 2010, p.302 cited in Mahdi, 2015, p.87). Semi-structured interviews permit that the researcher prepare a list of topics or open-ended questions to discuss with participants (also known as an interview schedule) and have the flexibility to explore issues in more detail with respondents (Kitchin & Tate, 2000; Dunn, 2005). In other words, the researcher is not restricted to the list of topics or questions being explored (Dunn, 2005), and therefore, the flexibility of semi-structured interviews allows for a richer and more detailed dataset (Burgess, 1984; Valentine, 1997). Having a list of topics or questions prepared is useful for the researcher to compare responses across different contexts (Fetterman, 2008), making it an appropriate method for this relational comparative study.

Interviews took place between June and August 2015. Most interviews involved one face-to-face conversation with individual participants. Face-to-face interviews are more “personal” (Kitchin & Tate, 2000), allowing me (the researcher) to “develop [a better] rapport with participants, thereby increasing the likelihood of learning details about their views” (Plano Clark, 2008, p.432). Conducting interviews in person was possible because most participants were “geographically accessible” (*ibid*). Interviews took place either at the participant’s office, at Carleton University, or another safe and mutually agreed upon location. Participants interviewed in person were offered refreshments at the beginning of the interview and those interviewed at Carleton University were compensated for parking.

The remaining six interviews were conducted over telephone and took place in the privacy of my (the researcher’s) home. As Hughes (2008, p.862) points out,

“Low administration costs are associated with telephone interviews compared to face-to-face interviews, which incur the cost of travel and time expenses. This method is widely recognized as cost effective, especially when interviewing participants across geographically dispersed areas.”

Telephone interviewing was most practical for conveners located outside of Ottawa due to time and travel constraints. Two volunteers from Ottawa took advantage of this interview method out of convenience as well.

Before interviews were conducted, participants were given a letter of consent either in person or by e-mail that they were required to read and sign if they agreed to participate in this study (see **Appendix K** for Original Consent Forms). Once the consent form was signed, participants were asked up to thirty-one questions, depending on their role during the campaign. All responses were audio-recorded, and notes were taken for backup. The length of interviews varied between twenty minutes and an hour and fifteen minutes. On average, interviews took one hour to complete. At the end of the interview, participants were given the opportunity to make changes to their responses and to ask questions about the study. They were also given one month from the interview date to opt out of this study. All responses were transcribed within a few days if not the same day as the interview.

In preparation for the interviews, a list of open-ended questions was prepared to ask participants (see **Appendix L** for Interview Schedule). The first question on the interview schedule was asked to collect general information about the 20K Homes campaign: its ‘origins’, goal, timeline and objectives. The second question was asked to understand the similarities and differences between the Canadian and American campaigns, and how the Canadian campaign had been adapted from the States. The third interview question was asked to gain insight on the similarities and differences between Ottawa’s action week and

Waterloo's and Hamilton's registry weeks. Attention was paid to how the different leadership structures played an important role in shaping local campaign characteristics and how homelessness was defined for the purposes of the action/registry week survey. The fourth question was asked to gain an understanding of what Housing First meant (locally and nationally) and the fifth question was asked to make connections between Housing First as a core principle of the campaign and recent policy changes in Canada towards this approach to homelessness. Questions six through nine were asked to understand how conveners came up with the resources to fund their local campaigns and how they will come up with the resources needed to house people for the campaign. The goal here was to identify the different pools of resources available to conveners, which pool of resources were more prominent between the in/formal leadership structures, and what the implications were in terms of campaign characteristics and outcomes. Question 10 was asked to gain insight on how pilot communities were impacted by the recent transition in the homelessness sector towards Housing First and new government funding requirements. The objective was to understand how these impacts shaped campaign characteristics as well. Question 11 was asked to gain insight on how the campaign would help strengthen the coordination of local homelessness services systems. Questions 13 and 14 were asked to gain insight on how the expiration of federal operating agreements for social housing would impact pilot communities and to place the campaign within context of the need for more affordable housing. Questions 15 and 16 were asked to gain a better understanding of who interview participants were and where they were coming from. The objective was to understand how their experiences and perspectives on homelessness and housing shaped their understanding the campaign. Questions 19 to 27 were asked to collect

information on the action/registry week training, surveying, and community debrief. The purpose of these questions was to understand how these different activities connected with the goals and objectives of the campaign at a local and national levels. They were also asked to gain insight on the different roles, responsibilities, and experiences of interview participants during action/registry weeks. These questions were further asked to understand the similarities and differences in local campaign activities across pilot communities and between leadership structures. Questions 29 to 31 were asked to see how interview participants understood the current state of homelessness in their community and how they saw the campaign fitting in with current efforts to end homelessness.

The flexibility of (semi-structured) interviews provides an opportunity for respondents to ask questions and bring new issues to the interviewer's attention that they may want to further explore in more detail (Silverman, 1993). For example, some interview participants talked about focusing on the "hidden homeless" while others talked about housing the "chronically homeless" homeless. This prompted me (the researcher) to ask how these terms were being defined. Doing so allowed me to gain insight on the different campaign goals and objectives between the formal and informal leadership structures.

Sometimes interview participants may be uncertain or confused by the questions being asked, which can threaten the rapport between the researcher and the interview participant and even break the researcher's confidence (Dunn, 2005). There were moments throughout the interviews where participants were either confused or uncertain how to answer the question being asked. For example, when participants were asked how housing was being funded for the campaign, many were uncertain or confused by the question. A possible reason for confusion is because the word "funded" seemed to imply that additional

money was being provided for housing. Another possible reason for this uncertainty is because coming up with the housing resources is one of the more ambiguous aspects of the campaign. Perhaps a better question to ask would have been, “Tell me how your community will come up with resources to house people for the campaign?” As a lesson learned, more care should have been taken when wording interview questions. Also, it would have been useful to have asked the Alliance to review the list of questions prior to the interviews. Doing so, the Alliance could have “checked, verified, and scrutinize”, borrowing from Dunn (2005, p.104), the questions being asked. This would have allowed the Alliance to be more engaged in the research process, help build a rapport with participant subjects, and allowed for a richer data set.

Peck & Theodore (2012, p.26) argue that one limitation of interviews is that they “are somewhat staged and often rather scripted encounters[.]” These staged and scripted encounters were experienced with some conveners. For example, while reviewing online newspapers on the campaign, it was found that some of the responses conveners provided during interviews were like the responses they gave to the media. Also, in some cases, conveners did not respond to the interview question being asked but instead referred me (the researcher) to reports or other documents. Peck & Theodore (2012, p.26) also argue that “interviews should be interactive, dynamic encounters, not merely extractive, fact/opinion-gathering exercises; they entail dialogue as much as digging.” Through this experience, it was found that the level of interaction depended on my (the researcher’s) experience with conducting interviews and ability to probe for responses, as well as the interview participant’s level of engagement.

Using as audio-recorder during interviews had its merits. It allowed for “a more accurate and detailed record of the conversation” and served as a useful tool for transcribing and revisiting the interviews later (Valentine, 1997, p.123). It also allowed for a more natural conversation to take place between me (the researcher) and the interview participant (Silverman, 1993; Dunn, 2005). There were disadvantages with using an audio-recorder as well. It is recommended that interviews be conducted in a quiet area where there is not a lot of background noise that can reduce the quality of the audio-recording (Jacob & Furgerson, 2012). It is also recommended that interviews be conducted in a private space to avoid disturbances or distractions (Valentine, 1997). Some interviews for this study took place in locations that were convenient for participants (i.e. a café, office, train station). These locations had (a lot of) background noise that reduced the quality of the audio-recording, which made it difficult for transcribing. These interviews were conducted in spaces that lacked privacy as well, which raises ethical concerns about confidentiality.

Notes were taken for backup in case the audio-recorder stopped working (Kitchin & Tate, 2000; Dunn, 2005). Plano Clark (2008, p.432) argues that the interviewer should “be able to take notes unobtrusively so that he or she is able to listen and maintain eye contact with the interviewee during the conversation.” Conversation with interview participants often moved too quickly for my (the researchers) handwriting (Kitchin & Tate, 2000), making it hard to keep detailed notes. In some cases, notes were too messy, making them hard to read and incomplete. In other cases, particularly during telephone interviews, I became so focused on notetaking that it disrupted the flow of the conversation and, at times, I was not always prepared to ask the next question (Dunn, 2005). According to Dunn (2005, p.1999), “This undermines rapport and detracts from attentive listening.” Over time,

however, I learned to take shorthand notes, “captur[ing] the gist of what was said” (Dunn, 2005, p.119). This improved the flow of the interview conversations and permitted me (the researcher) to actively listen to participants. Other than for backup purposes, the notes served little purpose. As a lesson learned, relying more on the audio-recorder and taking less notes (or no notes) would have helped build and maintain a stronger rapport with participants.

One shortcoming of conducting telephone interviews is that they are “less personal” than face-to-face interviews (Kitchin & Tate, 2000, p.216). This can make it difficult to build trust and a rapport with interview participants (Hughes, 2008). In this study, it did not help that there was either only one or (in most cases) no prior connection with participants prior to the telephone interviews. Having a prior connection would have helped establish trust and rapport.

Hughes (2008, p.862) argues that while the respondent’s voice is an important cue for detecting shift in tone during telephone interviews, “the nuances of body language and other non-verbal cues associated with face-to-face interactions may be lost over telephone[.]” Loss of these non-verbal cues can be a “threat to rapport”, borrowing from Egan (2008, p.244). The importance of these non-verbal cues, however, depends on the study being conducted. Although these non-verbal cues were helpful with navigating face-to-face conversations with participants, the loss of these non-verbal cues over telephone was not a big deal given the nature of the research problem and questions being asked.

Hughes (2008, p.862) also points out that it can be difficult to “gain the full attention of the [interview] participant [over telephone.]” In this study, gaining the full attention of interview participants depended on where they were located at the time of the

telephone interview. Gaining the attention of interview participants over telephone can be particularly difficult when they are in the comfort of their own home or on the go because they may be distracted by their surroundings.

Finally, Hughes (2008) argues that interview participants' responses tend to be briefer over telephone than face-to-face interviews. This was found true in this study as the total length of interviews was shorter for conveners and volunteers over telephone than in person. Perhaps this has to do with the impersonal nature of telephone conversations. This impacted the quality of responses, including their depth and richness.

#### *4.5.2. Documentation review*

Data for this study were also collected through a documentation review. Most information and materials were gathered from the "Registry Week Toolkit", which can be found on the 20K Homes website. This toolkit includes forms, templates, and sample material from Canada and the US. This toolkit was useful for identifying and discussing the key components of the local campaigns. Campaign information and materials were gathered from conveners' organizational websites, social media sites (including Facebook and Twitter), and online newspaper articles as well. Online newspaper articles and social media sites were useful for identifying recruitment strategies and methods. They were also useful for collecting background information on convening organizations and on homelessness and housing both locally and nationally. Online newspaper articles were particularly useful for following the campaign's development, understanding why pilot communities got involved, and for identifying critiques and shortcomings of the campaign (Budd, 2008). Furthermore, government websites were accessed, including, documents, reports and plans found on these websites, to collect information on homelessness and

affordable housing goals, targets, timelines, and funding requirements. Finally, journal articles, reports, blogs, and community profiles were accessed online from the Homeless Hub to gather more background information on homelessness at the local and national levels.

A documentation review was an appropriate method for a comparative study as it permits information collected using multiple methods and sources to be cross-checked. It also helped fill in the gaps when information was missing or could not be obtained from interviews (CDC, 2009). In addition, the information gathered from the documentation review helped raise questions about the local campaigns.

One limitation of using this method was that some documents could not be accessed. Specifically, minutes from planning meetings for Ottawa's action week could not be obtained. When these documents were requested, the Alliance denied access to them. As Kitchin & Tate (2000) explain, gatekeepers may permit or deny the researcher access to important documents. The reason I (the researcher) was denied access to minutes was because they were scarce and lacked detail due to time constraints. In other words, the minutes would not have provided sufficient information or anything of great value. Burgess (1984) suggests that access to documentary material can be negotiated. As a way of negotiating access to minutes, or at least the information they would have provided, the Alliance invited me to ask questions about the planning meetings during interviews and to sit-in on the last planning meeting, which I did attend.

Another challenge faced when doing a documentary review for this study was that over time, some of the information found on conveners' and government websites became obsolete and online newspaper articles became expired (CDC, 2009). This is likely to

happen when a research project take a few years to complete. When this happens, it may not be possible to double-check the accuracy of information or reference check. To avoid this issue, print copies of all information from these sources can be made, if possible, and sources should be properly referenced when initially accessed.

#### *4.5.3. Participant observation*

An attempt was made to recruit frontline staff and volunteers and use participant observation as a method for data collection during Ottawa's action week. Walsh (2009, p.77) defines participant observation as where:

“the researcher attempts to learn about a particular socio-cultural space and those who inhabit it by taking part and continually reflecting on what is happening. Unlike other qualitative methods, participant observation involves examining what people do, rather than only what they say or what they say they do.”

Initially my plans to do participant observation would also involve introducing my research project to frontline staff and volunteers, collecting contact information from them to schedule interviews, and asking them questions “to better understand how [they] interpret and give meaning to their own experiences” (Hedican, 2008, p.252), and recording their responses. To do all this would require clearance from CUREB, which would further require permission from the Alliance to access the research setting and participants, and subsequently, consent would be required from all frontline staff and volunteers who participated in Ottawa's Action Week. As Vannini (2008, p.278) explains:

“Because participant observation studies generally require a high degree of interaction between researchers and informants, ethical issues surrounding privacy often arise. Therefore, researchers typically should clearly disclose their identities, roles, and objectives from the very beginning of their research.”

Frontline staff and volunteers had a right to know that research was being conducted, what the research project was about, and to agree or disagree to take part in it.

Permission from gatekeepers may be required to conduct a study in a particular space (Kitchin & Tate, 1999 cited in Campbell et al., 2006). When I asked the Alliance if I could recruit frontline staff and volunteers and do “participant observation” during action week, the Alliance respectfully declined my request. As Sanghera & Thapar-Björkert (2008, p.594) explain, “Gatekeepers have the power to refuse permission for a researcher to recruit participants in a particular setting.” Access was denied due to short notice and because the research project was not part of the initial action week plans. Trying to get frontline staff and volunteers to sign consent forms and provide contact information would have been very time consuming. Van den Hoonaard (2008, p.282) even argues that “consent forms (and even information sheets) are impossible to use” when there is a “large number of people[.]” Asking frontline staff and volunteers questions related to this study would have also interfered with their roles and responsibilities. What’s more, according to the Alliance, there was a potential conflict of interest between this research project and the action week survey with regards to ethics.

The Alliance was willing to negotiate access to action week and frontline staff and volunteers. Although I was not permitted to recruit frontline staff and volunteers and ask them questions related to this research project during actions week, I was permitted to participate in action week as a volunteer and reflect on my experience to help inform this research project. This form of participant observation is supported by Walsh (2009). This situation demonstrates how gatekeepers can limit “opportunities to interact with others in the chosen research site” (Kearns, 2000, p.114 cited in Campbell et al, 2006, p.101) and

how they can limit the “conditions of entry” (Broadhead & Rist, 1976, p.325). The situation also demonstrates how access to the research setting and research participants can be negotiated between the gatekeeper and researcher (Macmillan & Scott, 2003; Walsh, 2009). With the support of the Alliance, I participated in action week by attending the frontline staff training and community debrief, and by picking-up multiple shifts as a survey and data entry volunteer. Even though I was a “volunteer”, the Alliance placed me in the frontline staff training intentionally to gain a richer experience. Over a short period of time, I became more immersed in action week by taking on some responsibilities of a frontline worker while out with the survey teams and by being asked to share my experience with the media.

Participating in Ottawa’s action week had many benefits. First, I was able to take part in the activities I was examining (Race, 2008), and in doing so, I was able to gain a better understanding of these activities (Berg, 2008). I got to learn “new roles and responsibilities” (Schensul, 2008, p.523), and in doing so, I got to position myself as a volunteer, and (to some extent) as a frontline worker and try to see activities unfold from their perspectives (Ballinger, 2008). I got to learn “how things work[ed]” (Johnson, 2008, p.321), such as the survey tool, and was able to collect action week materials (i.e. the training kit and community debrief pamphlet), which provided useful information for data collection and recruitment. Borrowing from Schensul (2008, p.523), I was also able to “observe and record, [...] note what terms [meant during the training,] and how activities [were] carried out [throughout the week,] and observe patterns [...] in roles and responsibilities and decision-making, power differentials, and resource distribution[.]” I

was further able to record my “own perceptions of events, feelings, and thoughts” (Race, 2008, p.242).

Writing about participant observation, Morgan & Guevara (2008, p.728) argue that one “ongoing issue with this method [is] the creation and management of relationships[.]” Participating in Ottawa’s action week helped me build a stronger relationship and trust with the Alliance. By participating in the training, the surveying, and the community debrief, I was able to show the Alliance that I was sincerely interested in learning about the campaign, which further helped build legitimacy around this research project and me as a researcher. In addition, participating in action week allowed me (the researcher) to network and build rapport and trust with conveners from the national and international levels, and with frontline staff and volunteers. When connecting with these people, I was transparent by explaining that I was participating as a volunteer in Ottawa’s action week and that I was a graduate student interested in doing a research project on the campaign. It was through these connections that I was invited by the CAEH to attend the national launch of the 20K Homes campaign in Toronto mid-June 2015. Also, through these connections, I became a volunteer for a local outreach team where I was then able stay in contact with action week participants *after* the local campaign, which helped with recruitment.

Participant observation can be a useful method for data collection when doing a comparative study. Schensul (2008, p.523) explains, “As observers narrow and focus their interests, they may wish to observe more systematically by using a process of comparison and contrast, which seeks to describe variation in events, processes, or behaviors identified in [participant observation] and to discover what might account for these variations.” It is understood here that observation could take place in multiple research settings. Doing a

comparative study, however, does not have to be a “multisite endeavor” (Peck & Theodore, 2012, p.24). A *relational* comparative approach “questions [...] causality” and “challenges [the need] to establish universals” (Mills, 2008, p.103).

#### 4.5.4. ‘Follow-the-campaign’

‘Follow-the-thing’ has become a popular method in human geography and ethnographic research for studying “the life course” of people, objects, and places and understanding how they move, interact, and change “over time and space” (Pfaff, 2010, p.345; for examples, see Cook et al., 2004 & 2006; Cook & Harrison, 2007; Larner & Laurie, 2010; Peck & Theodore, 2012). While much of this work has focused on policy mobilities and mutations and using ‘follow-the-policy’ as a research method, what appears to be missing from this body of literature is the study of political actions or events that come about because of policy mobility and change, and how these political actions move, change and interconnect over time and space. To inform this research, ‘follow-the-campaign’ was used as a strategy to watch how the 20K Homes campaign moved and transitioned from its piloting phase to its national launch. This involved following the campaign to its national launch in Toronto and to the National Conference on Ending Homelessness that took place in Montreal at the beginning of November 2015. Borrowing from McCann & Ward (2012, p.12), the two-day workshop and conference were “relational sites” where municipal governments and non-profit organizations from across Canada gathered to learn more about the campaign, how to conduct a Registry Week in their own communities, sign-up, receive a toolkit, and listen to conveners from Ottawa, Waterloo and Hamilton share their action/registry week experiences and learnings. Similar to the findings in McCann & Ward’s (2012) research, the national launch and conference were “where the

past, present and potential future of [the campaign] co-existed”, and where, “Past ‘successes’, current ‘problems’ and future ‘scenarios’ [were] discussed comparatively, conditioning and shaping the paths or tracks along which [the campaign] would move.”

In agreement with Peck & Theodore (2012, p.28), doing research on mobilities and mutations does not have to be a multisite endeavor, that “it must be multidirectional.” This means that the interconnections of mobilities and mutations need to be “critically interrogate[d]” both “between places and across scales” (Peck & Theodore, 2010, p.171). ‘Follow-the-campaign’ allowed me to ‘join the dots’ (Jacobs, 2012) by making connections and identifying variations between campaign goals, motives, and practices across pilot communities and between the local and national levels. I became aware of the similarities and differences in leadership structures and how they shaped local campaign characteristics. I got to see how materials moved and mutated (i.e. the survey tool) in different contexts (local and national). What’s more, this method allowed me to be “attentive to hierarchical and nodal sources of power” and the “asymmetries in capacities and resources” (Peck & Theodore, 2012, p.25). It was strategic for keeping updated on the campaign (locally and nationally) and identifying next steps. More so, this method allowed me to work ‘backwards’ and ‘forwards’ (McCann & Ward, 2012) in terms of tracing the origins, growth and development of the 20K Homes campaign.

Jacobs (2012) and McCann & Ward (2012) argue that careful reflection is needed on how we do research on things that move. Although I did not observe and participate in Waterloo’s and Hamilton’s registry weeks, by attending the two-day workshop and conference, I was able to learn about these local campaigns. Also, it was at the national launch where I initially connected with conveners from Waterloo and Hamilton, and

through these connections, the idea of doing a comparative study was suggested and the opportunity for recruitment. In other words, attending the workshop in Toronto and the conference Montreal provided opportunities for this research (McCann & Ward, 2012).

Following research is expensive, time consuming, and may require traveling long distance for both the researcher and campaign organizers. In some cases, it may not be possible. One popular strategy for addressing these “administration costs”, borrowing from Hughes (2008), is the role of the internet. As part of the 20K Homes campaign learning platform, the CAEH has created a website and Facebook page, and has run a series of webcasts, where conveners from participating communities (and researchers to some extent) can share knowledge, information, resources, work through next steps, ask questions, and keep updated on the campaign. These virtual spaces are particularly useful when conveners and researchers cannot be physically present.

Access to these physical and virtual spaces do raise important methodological and theoretical questions about doing research on mobilities and mutations. For example, to what extent are researchers required to follow the things they study? Do I as a researcher have an obligation to follow Ottawa’s action week and Waterloo’s and Hamilton’s registry weeks past the piloting phase of the campaign? According to McCann & Ward (2012, p.14-15), “If [...] policy actors are engaged in a range of contingent and tactical learning and sharing practices as part of their ‘local’ work, then it is incumbent on the researchers to be there – literally when possible, figuratively when not – to gain a detailed appreciation of the practices through which policy actors draw on circuits of policy knowledge as they cobble together their policies and cities.” Following-the-campaign to Toronto and Montreal, and online, and continuing to do so, has allowed me (the researcher) to gain a

fuller appreciation of the ways in which conveners draw on different circuits to gain and share knowledge and resources to inform their ‘local’ campaigns and work on ending homelessness.

#### *4.6. Data analysis*

In preparation to analyze the data collected for this study, all nineteen interviews were transcribed and saved using Microsoft Word (Waldbrook, 2013), and then uploaded onto NVivo software. Most data collected online, including information from organization and government webpages, documents, reports, plans, and blogs; social media sites; and online newspaper articles, were also uploaded onto NVivo software using the program’s NCapture tool. Once uploaded, all transcripts and documents were analyzed using a latent content approach. This involved reading, coding, and organizing transcripts and documents into themes (Dunn, 2005; Baxter, 2009). The purpose was “to identify consistent patterns and relationships between [...] themes” (Julien, 2008, p.120), and to find “deeper meanings” in the data collection (Baxter, 2009, p.279).

I started the analysis by identifying the key components of Ottawa’s action week and Waterloo’s and Hamilton’s registry weeks. In total, eleven components were identified. I had some idea what these categories would be prior to the analysis because I was familiar with the key components and resources found in the 20K Homes campaign toolkits; and I was familiar with the resource mobilization literature. Having this prior knowledge made it easier to identify themes. While reading and coding the data, other themes started to appear, and two other research questions emerged: Why did pilot communities become involved in the 20K Homes campaign? How will they come up with the resources to house people for the campaign? Overall, much of the analysis involved

sifting through the data and refining themes into more succinct categories. After all the data was coded and organized into themes, the information was ready to be interpreted.

#### *4.7. Ethical considerations*

The purpose of this section is to give some ethical considerations to this study. One of the major benefits of doing this research project was having the opportunity to speak with executive directors, senior managers, and government officials. One of the challenges of doing research with these individuals, however, was that it involved some professional risk. Professional risk typically stemmed from competing interests amongst conveners and community partners. One way of mitigating professional risk was by agreeing with interview participants to keep their responses confidential. Having said that, it was initially promised that interview participants and their organizations would be anonymous (refer back to **Appendix K**. This meant that all identifiers would be removed from responses to ensure that there was no possible way of identifying participants and their organizations. Overtime, however, it became apparent that anonymity could not be promised. One reason for this, borrowing from Macmillan & Scott (2003, p.104), is that some “[interview] participants [...] are quite knowledgeable about the [research] setting and its key ‘players’.” One of the ongoing concerns then when directly quoting interview participants throughout this thesis was that they would be able to identify each other through the text when it came time to sharing the findings. According to MacMillan & Scott (2003, p.104), “where research takes place amongst a variety of potential non-academic audiences[,] local interest in the results of the research may be heightened and may, therefore, raise the stakes in safeguarding the interests of participants, especially where power relations are involved.” This thesis includes the voices of a variety of stakeholders involved in the

piloting of the 20K Homes campaign, many of whom requested a copy of the findings from this study once complete. Extra care, therefore, needed to be taken to protect interview participants, especially because there are power imbalances in terms of access to resources. One problem found, however, when writing this thesis is that given the “small world” (*ibid*) in which the piloting phase of the 20K Homes campaign took place, anonymity could not be promised. For this reason, an amendment was made to the original letter of consent notifying participants that anonymity could not be promised but that their responses could be kept confidential (see **Appendix M** for Amended Consent Form). This change to the consent form put this research project at risk of losing valuable data as participants had the option to either agree to the changes made to the consent form or to have their responses completely removed from the dataset. All but two participants either agreed to the changes made to the consent form or did not respond. For those who did not respond, it was stipulated in the consent form that it would be assumed they agreed to the changes made if they did not respond. The two remaining participants were concerned with how the information they provided would be represented in this thesis. England (1994) states that researchers need to be responsible for their own research. This means the researcher must take care when writing with how they represent informants and the information they provide. As a researcher, I had a responsibility to take care in how I represented interview participants, the organizations they were associated with, and the information they provided. In one scenario, one of the two participants requested to see the thesis before final submission. This would involve sending direct quotes from their transcript that would be used in the thesis – including the context around these quotes – to them, that way, they could vet or authorize the quotes chosen (Dunn, 2005). Dunn (2005, p.123) argues, “This

process of participant checking continues the involvement of the informants in the research process and provides them with their own record of the interview.” Also, it “will normally improve the quality of [the] record” (*ibid*).

In the second scenario, the other participant did not agree with the changes made to the consent form and asked that their transcript be removed from the dataset. It was explained to this participant that the information they provided was insightful and that it would be difficult to remove their transcript from the dataset considering I had already been exposed to the knowledge they provided. The participant agreed to keep their responses as part of the dataset under the condition that they were not directly quoted in this thesis and could have a copy of their transcript. While matters around professional risk and privacy can be discussed and negotiated with interview participants, it is agreed here with MacMillan & Scott (2003, p.104) that extra care may be required “to protect the identities of our research participants.”

#### *4.8. Conclusion*

This chapter provided an overview of the research methodology for this study on the 20K Homes campaign. Part one began by explaining how I came to do research on the campaign. Emphasized was the importance of networking when coming up with a research project. Part two identified and discussed why a relational comparative approach was taken in this study. Again, “comparison” means thinking relationally about the local campaigns to ask questions about one-another and to inform one-another. It is about recognizing that these local campaigns are shaped by internal and external factors. Part three described the participants interviewed for this study – the choice of interview participants was influenced by the research questions being asked. Part four discussed the strategies and methods used

for recruitment. Reaching out and making personal connections with interview participants was more effective than using a third-party recruiter. Part five outlined the research methods and strategies used for data collection. Semi-structured interviews and a documentation review were the two primary methods used for collecting data for this study. Participant observation and ‘follow-the-campaign’ methods were used strategically to build a rapport with conveners, to collect data on Waterloo’s and Hamilton’s registry weeks, and to track the growth and development of the campaign more broadly. Part six described the process of transcribing and analyzing the data collected using a latent content approach and NVivo software. This approach was particularly useful for doing a relational comparative study. Finally, in part seven, ethical consideration was given to participant identification, including a discussion on how a switch from anonymity to confidentiality was negotiated with two interview participants.

## **Chapter five:**

### **Research analysis and findings**

#### *5.0. Introduction*

Using the data collected from the semi-structured interviews and from the documentation review, this chapter examines the similarities and differences between Ottawa's action week and Waterloo's and Hamilton's registry weeks. The findings from this study show that there are important distinctions within and between the formal and informal leadership structures. Part one sets the local context by providing an overview of the homelessness and housing in each pilot community at the time action/registry week was being launched. Part two addresses why conveners agreed to pilot the 20K Homes campaign. Part three identifies and discusses the key components of action/registry week. Finally, part four addresses how each pilot community will come up with the resources needed to house people for the campaign.

## **Part I – Setting the local context**

### *5.1. Introduction*

Part I of this analysis provides an overview of homelessness and housing at the local level and at the time the three pilot communities launched their campaigns. **Table 4** consists of population, shelter, income and affordable housing data for each pilot community and comes from a variety of sources (see **Appendix N** for Setting the Local Context). It will be used to form a discussion and summary for this section. Before we begin, it is worth mentioning here that the data for Waterloo is from 2014 and 2015 for Ottawa and Hamilton. The data represents the housing and homeless situation in each pilot community at the time their local campaign was launched. For some fields on the table, the data for the relevant year was not available. In these cases, the field either indicates that no data is available, or it has been filled in with data available from the closest year. It is worth mentioning too that *shelter data* was used to report on homelessness in each pilot community. This means the data does not include homeless people who are not connected to the service system. Overall, the data suggests that there is a shortage of affordable and an increase and/or underrepresentation of homeless people in each pilot community.

#### *5.1.1. Ottawa*

Ottawa is in Southeastern Ontario and is the capital city of Canada (see **Appendix O**). At the time of the 2011 Canadian census, Ottawa had a population of 883,391<sup>44</sup>, making it the fourth largest urban area in Canada and second largest in Ontario (Statistics Canada, 2012, “Ottawa - Gatineau”). Aside from the government being a major employer, Ottawa is known for its high-tech industry.

With regards to homelessness, in 2015, 6,825 individuals accessed emergency shelter in Ottawa with the average stay being 73 nights (Bulthuis & CEL, 2016). Of those who accessed emergency shelter, 448 individuals were chronically homeless and 80 were episodically homeless (*ibid*).<sup>45</sup> In 2015, Ottawa saw a decrease in the average length of shelter stays but an overall increase in the number of individuals experiencing homelessness (*ibid*). In the same year, Ottawa had a total of eleven emergency shelters and 1,154 emergency shelter beds (COH, c.2016, “Ottawa, ON”).<sup>46</sup>

With regards to housing, in 2015, the rental vacancy rate in Ottawa was 3.4 percent (COH, c.2016, “Ottawa, ON”). The average market rent for a bachelor apartment the same year was \$801 (Bulthuis & CEL, 2016). Meanwhile, the amount an individual received on Ontario Works (OW) was \$681 a month, which does not cover the cost of rent (*ibid*). Individuals on the Ontario Disability Support Program (ODSP) received \$1,110 a month, meaning, 72 percent of their cheque was going toward rent (*ibid*). Minimum wage was \$11.25/hour, meaning, 41 percent of their monthly paycheque was put towards rent (*ibid*). The unemployment rate was estimated at 6.5 percent (GNCC, 2015, December 9, with reference to Statistics Canada, Central 1 Credit Union). In 2013, there were 23,471 social housing units in Ottawa (COH, c.2016, “Ottawa, ON”)<sup>47</sup>, and in 2015, the City of Ottawa spent \$172,000 on social housing (City of Ottawa, 2015, “2016 Operating and Capital Budget”). At the same time, there were 10,479 households waiting for affordable housing with wait times averaging 5 years (CEL, 2016). In 2011, 11.2 percent of all households in Ottawa were in core housing need (COH, c.2016, “Ottawa, ON”). These statistics show there is a shortage and need for affordable housing.

### *5.1.2. Region of Waterloo*

The Region of Waterloo is in Southern Ontario and includes the cities of Kitchener, Waterloo and Cambridge; as well as four townships (Region of Waterloo, 2015, November 2; refer back to **Appendix O**). At the time of Canada's 2011 census, the population of Waterloo Region was 477,160 making it the tenth largest urban area in Canada and the fourth largest in Ontario (Statistics Canada, 2012, "Kitchener – Cambridge – Waterloo"). As Tim Richter points out, the Region of Waterloo is "known to be a hotbed of research and on the cutting edge of technology" (Jackson, 2014).

With regards to homelessness, in 2014, 3,219 individuals accessed an emergency shelter and the average length of stay was 25 days (Region of Waterloo, n.d., "HSDS 2014/2015"). Of those who accessed emergency shelter, 61 of these individuals were chronically homeless and 178 individuals were episodically homeless (Region of Waterloo, n.d., "HSDS 2015/2016," p.1). While average lengths of stay appear to have stabilized and the total number of individuals staying in emergency shelters has declined, as will be demonstrated in Part II of this analysis, the reason for this 'decline' is likely due to the displacement of chronically homeless individuals from the emergency shelter system, as a result of the closure of the Kitchener-Waterloo Out of the Cold Program that took place in the Winter of 2014/2015. For this reason, it is speculated there that the homeless population is underrepresented in this dataset. In 2015, there were a total of seven emergency shelters and 179 shelter beds in the region (COH, c.2016, "Waterloo Region, ON").<sup>48</sup>

With regards to housing, in 2014, the rental housing vacancy rate was 2.3 percent (Region of Waterloo, n.d., "HSDS 2014/2015"). This is low and indicates that there is a

short supply of rental market housing. The average cost of a bachelor apartment in 2014 was \$667 (*ibid*), and yet, the amount an individual received per month on OW was only \$656, and \$1,098 for those on the ODSP (Region of Waterloo, n.d., “HSDS 2015/2016”). The amount received from OW does not cover the cost of rent and those who received ODPS spent 61 percent of their cheque on rent. In addition, those individuals working minimum wage – \$11 dollars an hour (Region of Waterloo, n.d., “HSDS 2014/2015”) – spent 37 percent of their income on rent. The unemployment rate was 5.8 percent (GNCC, 2015 with reference to Statistics Canada, Central 1 Credit Union). Aside from the private rental market, the Region of Waterloo owned 10,281 social housing units as of 2012 (Region of Waterloo, n.d., “HSDS 2014/2015” & “HSDS 2015/2016”)<sup>49</sup>, and in 2014, it spent approximately \$54,884 on social/subsidized housing programs combined (Region of Waterloo, n.d., “2015 Program Budgets”). At the same time, there were 2,962 households on the affordable housing waitlist with the average wait time of 3 years (CEL, 2015). In 2011, 10.3 percent of households in the region were in core housing need (COH, c.2016, “Waterloo Region, ON”).<sup>50</sup> Again, these statistics show there is a shortage and need for affordable housing.

#### *5.1.3. Hamilton*

Hamilton is in Southern Ontario (refer back to **Appendix O**). In 2011, it had a population of 519,949, making it the ninth largest urban area in Canada and the third largest in Ontario (Statistics Canada, 2012, “Hamilton, Ontario”). Hamilton was “formerly highly industrialized, [and] today [is] known for [its] reputable health care and educational institutions” (City of Hamilton, 2015, November 2, slide 2).

With regards to homelessness, in 2015, 5,653 individuals accessed emergency shelter in Hamilton at some point in the year (COH, c.2016, “Hamilton, ON”).<sup>51</sup> In relation to previous years, this number has increased (see City of Hamilton, 2015, November 2, slide 3). At the same time, the city had a total of 6 emergency shelters and a total of 358 shelter beds (COH, c.2016, “Hamilton, ON”).<sup>52</sup>

According to one convener interviewed for this study, in 2015, Hamilton had “the second hottest housing market in Canada”. At the time, the vacancy rate in Hamilton was 1.8 percent (COH, c.2016, “Hamilton, ON”).<sup>53</sup> This is a low vacancy rate. At the same time, the average cost to rent a bachelor apartment was \$589 (CMHC, 2015, October). The amount an individual received per month from OW and ODSP were the same as Ottawa in 2015.<sup>54</sup> So was minimum wage. This means an individual spent 89 percent of what they receive from OW on rent or 53 percent of what they received if on the ODSP. The unemployment rate was 6.2 percent (GNCC, 2015 with reference to Statistics Canada, Central 1 Credit Union). The City of Hamilton spent \$120,898 on social and subsidized housing in 2015 (City of Hamilton, 2015, “Financial Report”), and in 2016, there were 14,600 social housing units across the city (COH, c.2016, “Hamilton, ON”).<sup>55</sup> In 2015, there were 5,685 households on the affordable housing waitlist with average wait times of 3 years (CEL, 2016). In 2011, 13.4 percent of all households in Hamilton were in core housing need (COH, c.2016, “Hamilton, ON”).<sup>56</sup> Similar to Ottawa and Waterloo, these statistics show there is a shortage and need for affordable housing in Hamilton.

#### *5.1.4. Conclusion*

The purpose of Part I of this analysis was to provide an overview of homelessness and affordable housing for Ottawa, Waterloo and Hamilton – the three pilot communities

for the 20K Homes campaign. Again, the data presented here represents the homelessness and affordable housing landscape at the time each local campaign was being launched. Like national trends, the data presented here suggests that homelessness is on the rise and/or underrepresented in each pilot community and that there is a shortage and need for affordable housing in each pilot community. This helps explain why conveners from pilot communities agreed to pilot the campaign, which is discussed next.

## **Part II – Reasons why conveners agreed to pilot the campaign**

### *5.2. Introduction*

The purpose of this section is to identify and discuss reasons why conveners from Ottawa, Waterloo and Hamilton agreed to pilot the 20K Homes campaign. Nine reasons have been identified that help explain why conveners agreed to do so. These reasons include: 1) the campaign aligned with senior level of governments' funding requirements; 2) the campaign also aligned with each pilot community's 10-Year Plan to End Homelessness; 3) the campaign supports a Housing First approach to homelessness; 4) the campaign supported and would help strengthen local planning systems; 5) the campaign would allow each pilot community to gain national representation as leaders and innovators in ending homelessness; 6) registry week would help inform conveners from the formal leadership structure on how to do a Point-in-Time (PiT) Count; 7) to raise awareness and educate the public on homelessness and the need for affordable housing; 8) to foster community engagement; 9) and to advocate for senior levels of government to make investments in new affordable housing. The reasons identified here have largely been informed by and build on a *20,000 Homes Campaign Registry Week Pilot Report* published by the Region of Waterloo (2015); however, this study has identified additional reasons why conveners have agreed to pilot the campaign. The nine reasons identified are discussed in more detail below. Overall, it is argued that the 20K Homes campaign not only supports but helps strengthens local efforts to end homelessness.

#### *5.2.1. Aligns with federal and provincial funding requirements*

First and foremost, conveners agreed to pilot the 20K Homes campaign because it aligned with new federal and provincial funding requirements. The campaign supports a

Housing First approach to homelessness which is now mandated under the federal HPS and provincial CHPI. As Service Managers for homelessness – a role designated by the Province – conveners from the formal leadership structure receive federal HPS dollars and provincial CHPI dollars directly from senior levels of government and are responsible for allocating this funding. Conveners from Waterloo and Hamilton agreed that the campaign would provide the tools needed to decide how to allocate this funding. In Ottawa, even though it is the municipal government, *not* the Alliance, that is Service Manager for homelessness, the Alliance agreed to pilot the campaign because it supported the work of the City and would help inform the City on how to allocate this funding. This alignment between the campaign and Federal and Provincial funding requirements, including who has access to these resources, has important implications in terms of how conveners from each pilot community resourced their local campaigns and how they will come up with the housing resources for the campaign.

#### *5.2.2. Aligns with 10-Year Plans to End Homelessness*

Conveners agreed to pilot the campaign because it also aligned with their community's 10-Year Plan to End homelessness. Ending chronic homelessness, Housing First, systems planning, community collaboration, making data informed decisions, tracking and measuring progress, and advocacy, are all key components found in Ottawa's, Waterloo's, and Hamilton's 10-Year Plans (see Regional Municipality of Waterloo, 2007; City of Hamilton, 2013; City of Ottawa, 2013). As municipal governments, the Region of Waterloo and City of Hamilton are responsible for facilitating the development and implementation of their community's 10-Year Plan. Conveners from these two pilot communities agreed that the campaign supported and would help strengthen their work in

implementing their community's 10-Year Plan. In Ottawa, it is the City of Ottawa, *not* the Alliance, that is responsible for facilitating the development and implementation of the community's 10-Year Plan.<sup>57</sup> Having said that, Ottawa's 10-Year Plan:

"represents a commitment to [the] community that [it] will work together as individuals, organizations and government bodies to ensure that everyone has a safe and affordable home and that people have access to the supports they need to remain housed, as their life circumstances change" (ATEHO, 2015, April 23, slide 5; Burelle, 2016, October 20, p.2).

Rooted in this commitment is the belief that homelessness is a social responsibility. The same belief is rooted in the core values of the Alliance. According to one convener, the Alliance agreed to pilot the campaign to take "shared ownership" and responsibility of the 10-Year Plan. What's more, the campaign would provide conveners at the local level with the appropriate tools and resources needed to further carry out their 10-Year Plans.

#### *5.2.3. Housing First*

One reason why Ottawa, Hamilton and Waterloo were 'chosen' to be pilot communities was because they have a "history of supporting Housing First programs" (borrowing from "City of Hamilton Seeks Volunteers" 2015, March 16; see also "City of Hamilton looking for volunteers", 2015, March 23; Hayes, 2015, April 30). The City of Ottawa and Region of Waterloo began implementing Housing First in 2008. Since then, the Region of Waterloo has permanently housed 521 individuals with supports through its STEP Home program (Jackson, 2014; Region of Waterloo, 2014, December 3, slide 49; 2015, February, slide 6). Hamilton had four Housing First programs prior to the campaign: Transitions to Home for adult men (est. 2009); Supporting Our Sisters for adult women (est. 2011); Housing First for Youth (est. 2013), and Homeward Bound for Aboriginal men,

women and youth (est. 2013) (City of Hamilton, 2015, November 2, slide 8). In 2014, “the City [of Hamilton] housed 102 men and 46 women” using Housing First (Bennett 2015, April 30; see also “City of Hamilton Seeks Volunteers”, 2015, March 16; “City of Hamilton looking for volunteers”, 2015, March 23). Conveners were therefore willing to pilot the 20K Homes campaign because it supported and would help strengthen these local programs. More so, the campaign would help conveners further carry out Housing First as an approach to homelessness in their community.

#### *5.2.4. Supports and strengthens systems planning*

Conveners agreed the campaign not only supported but would help strengthen systems planning in their community. Specifically, it would provide the opportunity to create a by-name list and prioritize those “most vulnerable” for Housing First programs and supports. Likewise, it would help conveners prioritize limited resources in a more “effective” and “efficient” manner, borrowing from City of Hamilton (2013; see also Hayes, 2015, April 30). This, conveners and community partners explained, meant making sure individuals received the supports and services that they needed. Conveners further agreed that the campaign would give them the opportunity to strengthen the coordination and integration of the local service system by not only further implementing Housing First as a philosophy and practices, but also by improving strategies and practices within the service system. For the Alliance, this meant “work[ing] with the city to improve and co-ordinate existing social services” (Kirnishni, 2015, April 22). For conveners from the formal leadership structure, this would entail working with community partners to do the same thing.

Piloting the campaign in Waterloo was particularly timely given the upcoming closure of the Kitchener-Waterloo Out-of-the-Cold (K-W OOTC) program. This program consisted of eleven churches that “provided meals and overnight shelter on a rotating basis throughout the winter months. In mid-2014, local churches began to announce that they would not be re-opening for overnight shelter for the 2014/15 winter season” (Region of Waterloo, 2015, “Pilot Report” p.8).<sup>58</sup> This would displace those people who accessed the overnight shelter, putting pressure on the regional government to respond. In response to the program’s closure, the Region and other stakeholders throughout the local Homelessness and Housing Stability System, “came together to develop a transition plan that included six key components. One of these components was to conduct a community-wide registry” (*ibid*; see Region of Waterloo, 2015, August, “OOTC Transition”). At the same time, the region’s STEP Home program received additional resources because of new changes made to Federal and Provincial funding requirements. These additional resources included four intensive support workers funded with provincial investments made in 2014 to the new CHPI, and 40 flexible rent subsidies (*ibid*). According to one convener, the region “needed a method to [prioritize and] allocate [these resources.]” The results from the registry week survey would help inform “the process of prioritizing the new rent assistance subsidies, to ensure that they were matched with people with the highest level of vulnerability and acuity (depth of need)” (Region of Waterloo, 2015, “Pilot Report”, p.8). Not only would a registry week be “the start of a process to collectively identify[ing] those experiencing homelessness who are the most vulnerable and house them as quickly as possible”, it would allow for “the continuation of [this] work through STEP Home” (Region of Waterloo, 2014, November 19, p.1).

Building on what one convener said, it is emphasized here that the 20K Homes campaign did not mark the start of systems change in pilot communities. Ottawa, Waterloo and Hamilton already had well coordinated homelessness service systems prior to piloting the campaign. For example, one spokesperson pointed out that Ottawa was already using a hub model where services were being provided from a centralized location. Ottawa also had a coordinated access group that worked on improving strategies and practices within the system and made sure people were receiving appropriate supports and services needed. Not only did pilot communities already have Housing First programs, homelessness service providers in Ottawa and Waterloo were already implementing a common assessment tool. Like the American 100K Homes campaign, it is questioned here how much of an impact the 20K Homes campaign will have on improving these local service systems? This is a question that needs further investigation but goes beyond the scope of this study.

#### *5.2.5. Raise awareness & educate the public*

Despite the CAEH emphasizing that the 20K Homes campaign was a “housing intervention” and not “an awareness-raiser” (Hayes 2015, April 30), conveners agreed to pilot the campaign because it provided an opportunity to raise awareness and educate the public on homelessness and the need for affordable housing. To achieve this, the objective of action/registry week was to connect with as many people as possible to understand the scope of homelessness and the level of need locally. How exactly conveners connected with these individuals will be explored in the next part of this analysis.

Raising public awareness is a key component found only in Hamilton’s 10-Year Plan. According to one convener, the City of Hamilton saw registry week not only as an opportunity to raise general awareness, but also to target and educate different sectors that

were indirectly impacted by homelessness, including the health, business and private sectors. It is understood here that these different sectors were targeted strategically with the intent of strengthening the coordination and integration of the local service system and finding more housing solutions.

With the closure of the K-W OOTC program, “there [was] a need to confirm and more transparently demonstrate an awareness of those experiencing homelessness across [the] community” (Region of Waterloo, 2014, November 19, “Key Messages for Why Doing”, p.1). This is because the closure of the K-W OOTC program made homelessness in the community less visible, and therefore, the Region was under pressure to demonstrate that the needs of those people that were accessing this program were not being ignored. According to the Region of Waterloo (2014, November 28, “Key Messages”, p.2), the registry week process would “ensure everyone experiencing homelessness [was] accounted for[.]” It would also “increase information” on homelessness in the community (Region of Waterloo, 2014, November 19, “Key Messages for Why Doing”, p.1). One convener explained, “everybody had little bits of data and we wanted a full comprehensive picture for across our whole community.” In the next part of this analysis, consideration will be given to how conveners raised awareness and collected information during action/registry week.

#### *5.2.6. Community engagement*

Conveners agreed to pilot the campaign because it fostered community engagement. It provided space where people could get involved and work together to end homelessness. One significant difference between Ottawa’s action week and Waterloo’s and Hamilton’s registry weeks, however, as one convener pointed out, was that:

*“[T]here was [...] a lot more attention [in Ottawa] to [the local campaign] being a catalyst for volunteer participation as both a goal and a strategy, [whereas in Hamilton and Waterloo, volunteer participation] was [...] more of a strategy than a goal[.]”*

Another convener explained:

*“I think we [the Alliance] saw the campaign as an opportunity – one of the other roles that I think the Alliance has is one of convening broad community engagement in a shared ownership if you will for housing those who are homeless within our community – and we saw this campaign very much as a huge public engagement exercise, and that is something the Alliance has played a role in, more so than the City, I would say, and so, I think that was one of our draws to the campaign.”*

The Alliance has a history of working together with the community in its efforts to end homelessness (see for example, Aubry et al., 2007; Klodawsky et al., 2005; Klodawsky, 2007; Klodawsky et al., 2009). By agreeing to pilot the campaign, the Alliance was taking the opportunity to build on its reputation as a leader in engaging the community around local efforts to end homelessness. The Alliance also saw the campaign as an opportunity for the community at large to take shared ownership of the 10-Year Plan. It agreed to pilot the campaign “... to inspire action” (ATEH, 2015, April 23, slide 6). It provided a space where “everyday citizens [could] get involved in creating and leveraging new and innovative housing solutions” (Bulthuis, 2015, March 16; also see *ibid*). The Alliance even went as far as calling the local campaign “action week” instead of “registry”. Mike Bulthuis, Executive Director of the Alliance at the time, explained during a session at the 2015 National Conference on Ending Homelessness, in Montréal, that there were two reasons for this: First, the word “action” was chosen because of the direct meaning of the word. Second, “action week” was chosen over “registry week” to not confuse the work of the local campaign with the work of The Registry (more formally known as the Social Housing Registry of Ottawa).<sup>59</sup> This catalyst for volunteer participation made Ottawa’s

action week a more open campaign network. Also, in agreement with participants interviewed for this study, it made Ottawa's action week a more grassroots campaign. In the next part of this analysis, consideration will be given to how conveners created spaces for community engagement throughout action/registry week.

#### *5.2.7. Leadership*

By agreeing to pilot the campaign, the Alliance, Region of Waterloo, and City of Hamilton, and the communities they represented, would receive national representation as leaders and innovators in ending homelessness. This meant being at the forefront of a fairly new approach to homelessness and creating "affordable housing solutions", borrowing from ATEHO (2015, "Ottawa joins Canada's 20,000 Homes Campaign")<sup>60</sup>, with limited resources. Having this reputation is important for municipal governments who are under pressure to show that they are doing something to address homelessness in their community. It would also help build legitimacy around their local efforts. By contrast, not only would the Alliance be fulfilling its mission "to be a leader in the local movement to prevent and end homelessness in Ottawa" (AEHO, n.d., "Who We Are"), it would be a leader at the national level as well. Also, the Alliance would get to build on the community's "reputation" as a leader and innovator in ending homelessness (Richter 2015, April 20).<sup>61</sup>

Piloting the campaign in the nation's capital came with a couple interesting assumptions. First, there was an assumption that because Ottawa is the nation's capital, it should have a leadership role in the campaign. There was also an assumption that Ottawa would be the *first* community to pilot the campaign. This assumption was challenged, however, as Waterloo became the first community to pilot the campaign. To understand

why Waterloo became the first pilot community, it is important to keep in mind what was going on in the community at the time. Again, these “local” politics helped shape the timing and development of the campaign. Being first to pilot the campaign would enhance both the Region’s and community’s leadership status.

Joining the campaign, conveners would become part of a “national learning platform” (20K Homes & CAEH, n.d., “Community Agreement”). This platform would provide conveners the opportunity to “[learn] from other communities across Canada” (*ibid*, p.7). It would “provide multiple avenues for sharing best practices and developing solutions together” (*ibid*). The learning platform would consist of physical and virtual spaces where participating communities could share their campaign experiences, learnings, materials; ask questions; share ideas; “and celebrate and support each other” (*ibid*, p.7). Central to the learning platform would be the “Registry Week Toolkit” found on the 20K Homes campaign website. Conveners at the national and international levels pointed out that over time, the toolkit would grow as more communities sign on to the campaign and contributed resources. It is questioned here, however, how useful these resources will be when they are subject to local adaptation? Each community that joins the campaign will have its own goals, leadership structure, and method for doing things.

Pilot communities would play a pivotal role in creating this learning platform. The materials and “lessons learned” from these communities “would help inform the campaign moving forward” (City of Hamilton, 2015, April 23, p.1). Being the first pilot community, Waterloo’s registry week would be important for informing the pilot phase of the campaign as well.<sup>62</sup> Specifically, it was found that conveners from Hamilton participated in Waterloo’s registry week. Doing so, one convener explained, the City of Hamilton was

able to gain “firsthand experience” and draw on the lessons learned to help inform Hamilton’s registry week. How useful the experience and lessons learned from Waterloo’s registry week were for informing Hamilton’s registry week is uncertain.

According to the Region of Waterloo (2014, November 19, “Key Messages for Why Doing” p.1), the 20K Homes campaign supported its Housing Stability System Learning Culture. Not only would pilot communities help inform the campaign moving forward, they would be able to draw on “support and experience from Community Solutions with the U.S. 100,000 Homes campaign” to help inform their local campaigns, borrowing from the Region of Waterloo (*ibid*). In addition, they would be able to draw on support from the CAEH. In the next part of this analysis, consideration will be given to the type of support both Community Solutions and the CAEH provided pilot communities. Conducting a registry week also helped the Region of Waterloo “reinforce and further accelerate learning from [the Canadian Mental Health Commission’s Housing First Training and Technical Assistance program]” (Region of Waterloo, 2015, “Pilot Report”, p.9).

#### *5.2.8. Advocacy*

Conveners from Ottawa and Hamilton agreed to pilot the campaign because they saw it as a “call to action”— as an opportunity to advocate for a national housing strategy and for all levels of government to make new investments in affordable housing and homelessness supports (ATEHO, n.d., “Media Q&A”; 2015, April 23; City of Hamilton, 2015, April 30, “20K Homes Campaign”). Interestingly, while advocacy is a key component found in all three pilot communities’ 10-Year Plans, it did not appear to be a motivating reason why the Region of Waterloo agreed to pilot the campaign. This suggests

that Region was more focused on meeting its mandate than it was on addressing the root cause of homelessness. One convener from the Region pointed out that the campaign did not provide communities at the local level with any new funding. They said:

*“I think it needs to be recognized that the campaign nationally requires funding, but locally, the campaign doesn’t provide any new funding to communities to offer programs or services, and I think that’s what some people get confused about. They think it’s about building 20,000 new homes and it’s not about that. It’s about taking our existing resources and using them differently and tapping into unused resources potentially in our community. So, while nationally certainly [the campaign] needs funding to do work in terms of training and collecting data and promoting and supporting the campaign, locally it doesn’t mean new money to communities.”*

The 20,000 Homes campaign does not offer communities funding for new homelessness programs and services. Neither does it provide funding to build new affordable housing. The goal of the campaign is to maximize and leverage off existing resources within communities, which was not “broadly understood” from at the beginning of the campaign, this convener explained. The problem with this grassroots approach, however, is that is can only go so far. Another convener explained:

*“I think there is an advocacy component to the campaign, right? So, it is advocating for new resources as well. I don’t think that – that’s where I think there is a bit of a difference between the Canadian and the American campaigns, which I think – and I think there are some within the 20K Homes campaign in what I hear from talking about the campaign – not just in Ottawa but other communities – there is a belief that this is simply about using the resources that we have. I would say we can make some progress that way, but I don’t think it’s going to fix homelessness by doing that. I don’t think there are enough resources in the system right now. So, to me, this is an advocacy for growth as well.”*

There is recognition here that while there may be enough resources to house people for the campaign, there is not enough to end homelessness. There is also recognition in each pilot community that “everyone has a role to play” when it comes to ending homelessness,

borrowing from Region of Waterloo (2007, p.411; also see, ATEHO, 2015, April 23; Kirnishni, 2015, April 22), and that “all levels of government need play a more active role in the issue”, borrowing from the City of Hamilton (2015, April 23, p.3). Even though advocacy was not a motivating reason for the Region to join the campaign, Waterloo’s registry week would still be part of a national advocacy to end homelessness.

There was more pressure put on the local government during Ottawa’s action week to make a stronger commitment towards the provision of affordable housing. Although the Alliance recognizes that the City alone cannot meet affordable housing needs (see ATEHO, n.d., “Media Q&A”), it saw action week as an opportunity to push the municipal government to commit to a higher housing target. One convener explained:

*“What was exciting was this notion of an aspirational target that I think [...] the Alliance kind of always wanted to try to pursue a little bit more. So, we got the 10-Year Plan – I think that is incredible – well I think that is a really strong foundation – the 10-Year Plan to End Homelessness. We’ve had for the past 10 years in our annual report cards clear targets of how many new households we would like to see in affordable housing every year, and so, we’ve always been drawn to these kinds of targets. But at the end of the day, I would say that while our 10-Year Plan is a good framework, it is not the clearest in articulating targets. The targets within the 10-Year Plan that are stated at this point over the next two years are very much based on funding levels that have been announced by the three orders of government, and then, [unclear] play out how much and many units of housing or how many housing allowances will that amount of funding create – well that’s how many folks we will be able to end homelessness for – and that’s a huge part and governments will always have a lead I think in this work. But I would say, personally, and I think the Alliance believes that we need to go beyond that. Right? We need to respond more to the need and hit all targets based on meeting the need, and so, what we saw in the 20K Homes campaign was a desire to state a goal – a somewhat audacious goal – and then encourage the community to rally that and make sure that goal is met. And to do so would mean governments have a part in that, so too does the private sector, so too does the community, and so on. So, I think it was that it was a kind of articulated goal, as one key thing addressed[.]”*

According to this convener, the targets and timelines laid out in Ottawa’s 10-Year Plan are short-term and based on available funding – not on actual need. This critique of Ottawa’s

10-Year Plan is supported by the literature. Adamo et al. (2016, p.28) argue that the targets and timelines of Ottawa's 10-Year Plan are "modest" compared to other cities involved in their study (Calgary, Toronto and Vancouver). Looking at Ottawa's 10-Year Plan, it aims to permanently house 100 long stay shelter clients with supports by the end of 2015; reduce emergency shelters stays to 30 days or less by 2024; and created 130 new affordable housing units between 2013 and 2015 (City of Ottawa, 2013). Adamo et al. point out that the City of Ottawa's previous commitment to creating 500 new affordable housing targets annually "was not carried forward" with the 10-Year Plan (*ibid*). In mid-July 2014, one spokesperson pointed out, the City of Ottawa started working with local service providers with a focus on surveying long-stay shelter clients and prioritizing them for permanent housing and supports. This was part of a growing trend amongst Canadian municipalities to end chronic homelessness with limited resources. Through this work, 250 long-stay shelter clients had been identified and would become the City's target over the next two years. Unfortunately, there were 526 chronically and episodically homeless men and women in Ottawa in 2014 (ATEHO, 2015, "2014 Progress Report"), meaning that the City's target would not even account for half the people staying in the emergency shelter system. The Alliance has stated, "To achieve the results we want, we need to do more in the short-term, to get ahead for the long-term" (ATEHO, 2015, April 23, slide 4). This means to end homelessness the community needs to set housing targets based on local need. Knowing that the City could do better, the Alliance agreed to pilot the campaign because it wanted to push the City for higher housing targets.

Outlined in Hamilton's *Housing and Homelessness Action Plan* is a target to build 300 new affordable rental housing units per year (City of Hamilton, 2013, p.91).<sup>63</sup>

According to Gillian Hendry, Director of the Housing Services Division with the City of Hamilton, the city is “nowhere near that [target]” (City of Hamilton, 2015, April 30). Although the City of Hamilton agreed it saw the campaign as an opportunity to advocate for all levels of government to commit to more affordable housing, there was more emphasis placed on senior levels of government to make a stronger commitment toward affordable housing than there was on the City itself. Perhaps part of the reason stems from the fact that municipal governments have limited resources to meet local affordable housing needs. Still, there is recognition that the municipal government needs to do more. Being part of an advocacy that targets the City’s very own governing body speaks to the internal politics and vertical decision-making process that goes on within the City.

#### *5.2.9. Point-in-Time Count*

Around the same time the 20K Homes campaign was being piloted, the Federal Government was in the early stages of planning to launch a Point-in-Time (PiT) Count that would take place between January and April 2016. According to the COH (c.2017, “Point-In-Time Counts”), “PIT Counts are a measure of the number of homeless people on a specific day[.]” One convener explained that the difference between a registry week (or action week) and a PiT Count is:

*“The Registry Week will give you information that lets you know the level of vulnerability that people have in the community: medium, high, or low; and the PiT is just going to give you a number and demographic information. It's not going to identify level of acuity.”*

According to the 20K Homes “Community Agreement” (20K Homes & CAEH, n.d., p.3), “the Registry Week process is first and foremost a housing intervention.” The purpose of the PiT count would be “to better understand the scope of homelessness and improve [The

Ministry of Employment and Social Development’s] ability to track progress at a national level” (Region of Waterloo, 2015, “Pilot Report” p.10). The 61 designated communities under the HPS, including, Ottawa, Waterloo and Hamilton, would be encouraged to do a PiT Count, and would received funding through this program to do so. Conveners from Waterloo and Hamilton agreed to pilot the 20K Homes campaign because it would provide an opportunity to “tap [into] some of [the] methodologies [needed to do a PiT Count] ahead of time”, one convener explained. It is understood here that this meant using the learnings from registry week (i.e. spatial strategies and methods for surveying, safety procedures) to “help inform” the PiT count process, as another convener put it. The Region was even hoping that the data collected from registry week would fulfill the requirements of a PiT Count (Region of Waterloo, 2014, November 19). This would save the Region limited staff time, money, and additional resources.

There was no mention of a PiT Count being a motivating reason why the Alliance agreed to pilot the campaign. The reason for this was explained in an online newspaper article published by the Ottawa Citizen (Duffy 2016, January 5). In this article it states that the City of Ottawa “opted out” of doing a PiT Count because “it already [had] extensive data about the local homeless population” (*ibid*). This decision was supported by the Alliance who, “For the past decade, [...] counted the number of people using emergency shelters and tallied their average length of stay as part of an annual public report” (*ibid*). The public report referred to here is the Alliance’s annual “Progress Report on Homelessness in Ottawa” (formerly referred to as a “report card”). In an interview with the Ottawa Citizen, Mike Bulthuis, Executive Director of the Alliance, stated that “the federally sponsored survey would not tell Ottawans anything new”, and that researchers

were more interested in collecting information on the local ‘hidden’ homeless population, which the PiT Count would not capture (*ibid*). A common critique found on PiT Counts is that they “typically underestimate the magnitude of homelessness both because of their limited geographic reach [...] and ability to count only the “visible homeless” in a community” (Adamo et al., 2016, p.33; also see, Shapcott & Salazar, 2006). PiT Counts are designed “to count individuals in a community who are, at a given time, staying in [emergency] shelters or “sleeping rough” (e.g., on the street, in parks)” (ESDC, 2018, March 12); they are not conducive for counting for ‘hidden’ homeless. By agreeing to participate in the 20K Homes campaign, the Alliance wanted to collect information on the visible and ‘hidden’ homeless in Ottawa during action week. The focus of action/registry week will be discussed in the next part of this analysis, including, how conveners define homelessness for the survey.

#### *5.2.10. Conclusion*

Part II of this analysis identified and discussed reasons why conveners agreed to pilot the 20K Homes campaign. Nine reasons were identified, including: 1) the campaign aligned with federal HPS and provincial CHPI funding requirements; 2) the campaign also aligned with each pilot community’s 10-Year Plan to End Homelessness; 3) the campaign supported and would help strengthen pilot communities’ Housing First approach to homelessness; 4) the campaign supported and would help strengthen the planning, coordination, and integration of local services systems; 5) the campaign would allow each pilot community to gain national representation as leaders and innovators in ending homelessness; 6) the local campaigns would help inform the City of Hamilton how to do a Point-in-Time (PiT) Count and would replace a PiT Count in Waterloo region; 7) the

campaign would help raise awareness and education the public on homelessness and the need for affordable housing; 8) the campaign fostered community engagement; 9) and to advocate for senior levels of government to make investments in new affordable housing. Ottawa's action week placed more emphasis on community engagement and advocacy, including, pushing the City of Ottawa to commit to a higher housing target. A summary of these reasons can be found in **Table 5** (see **Appendix P**). Part III of this analysis identifies and discusses the key components of action/registry week.

## **Part III – What are the key components of action/registry week?**

### *5.3. Introduction*

Part II of this analysis explored reasons why conveners agreed to pilot the 20K Homes campaign – to understand the goals and objectives of action/registry week. Part III seeks to understand how conveners achieved the goals and activities of their local campaigns. To achieve this research objective, Part III of this analysis identifies, examines and discusses the key components of action/registry week. In total, eleven components have been identified. These include: a focus, human resources, support, financial and material resources, recruitment, training, data, a survey tool, media, a community debrief and next steps (see **Appendix Q** for flow chart on key components of action/registry week). The key components identified here have been informed by the 20K Homes campaign toolkit and by the social movements literature. They are not meant to be universal or exhaustive. Neither is it suggested here that they hold equal weight. While the key components identified here are important for carrying out the goals and activities of action/registry week, no new affordable housing resources have been identified. New investments in affordable housing and homelessness supports are needed to end homelessness.

#### *5.3.1. Focusing on the “most vulnerable”*

The purpose of this section is to understand who was targeted in each pilot community for the housing intervention? To achieve this objective, this section explores how conveners defined the “most vulnerable” homeless people in their community. Knowing who the “most vulnerable” homeless people are in each pilot community is not

only important for understanding who would be targeted to receive permanent housing and supports, but also because, it has important implications for those people in each pilot community who were homeless or at-risk of becoming homeless and in need of affordable housing, but who were not eligible to participate in the action/registry week survey.

In line with the target population for the campaign at the national level, conveners from Waterloo and Hamilton described chronically homeless individuals with high acuity as the “most vulnerable” homeless people in their communities. This included people sleeping on the streets and in emergency shelters, otherwise known as the “visibly” homeless. To understand why the Region of Waterloo and City of Hamilton focused on this target population, it is important to keep in mind their mandate and who is deemed most suitable for Housing First programs and supports. One convener explained that the City of Hamilton was “defining chronic homelessness according to the Federal Government’s definition because [it is] mandated [to do so] under the Homelessness Partnering Strategy.” This, they explained, included “anyone who is experiencing homelessness for more than 180 days.” Waterloo region is a designated community under the HPS and is required to follow the same mandate. The chronically homeless are also the target population of each of these pilot community’s 10-Year Plan. Not only did Hamilton’s and Waterloo’s registry weeks focus on the chronically homeless, but specifically, those chronically homeless individuals with high acuity. The convener mentioned above further explained that people with high acuity have “a multitude of barriers or challenges or issues in their lives, which may be creating or exasperating their homelessness experience.” It is understood here that focusing on chronically homeless individuals with high acuity meant focusing on those who experience long periods of

homelessness *and* struggled with poor physical health, mental health, and/or addictions. These homeless individuals would be prioritized for permanent housing and supports. As this convener pointed out, the framing around the campaign at the national level with a focus on acuity was broad enough to include the chronically homeless as mandated under the HPS.

One of the goals of Ottawa's action week was to put pressure on the City of Ottawa to push for higher housing targets based on the level of need. This meant demonstrating to the City of Ottawa that the number of people in need of affordable housing, locally, exceeded the number of people that could be housed with available funding. To demonstrate there was a higher level of need within the local community, the focus of Ottawa's action week was on surveying those people experiencing homelessness who were not already on the City of Ottawa's priority list. This would include the "visible" *and* "hidden" homeless. One convener explained:

*"So, we looked at the Canadian Observatory's four classifications of homelessness. We went with basically, if you don't have any secure tenure as the way we defined it, and so, this included folks who were obviously living on the street, living in cars or hidden places, those sleeping in shelters, those who are couch surfing – because if I'm staying on your couch, I'm depend on you saying that tomorrow I can stay over again, but if I sign a lease, then I have a right to be there tomorrow, and so, there are some transitional housing programs where one does sign a lease – those were excluded. So, I think that – I guess the question is, do I have a lease which offers me security or tenure, even for a limited period? – is the way we sort of [unclear]."*

To reiterate, another convener explained:

*"So, [the Alliance] specifically included people who didn't have a permanent lease – and that's as extensive as it got. So, if people were in a transitional home but they were going to be kicked out essentially after a year, or like [if] it was a one-year program, we would count that as well. But people who are living on the street, as*

*well as people who are in shelters, couch surfing, and member of that hidden homeless population, we tried to target as well.”*

Simply put, anyone without secure tenure or a permanent lease would be eligible to participate in the action week survey. The reason why the Alliance went with this definition of homelessness is because only those people without secure tenure or a permanent lease are eligible for Housing First programs and supports. A person would not be considered for permanent housing if they already had secure tenure or a permanent lease. While it is understood here that this definition of homelessness was chosen strategically based on program requirements, it excludes those people who have permanent housing but are at-risk of becoming homeless because their housing is either unaffordable, unsafe, or unsuitable to live in. If the Alliance and Ottawa as a community is serious about setting housing targets based on need and ending homelessness, then those people at-risk of becoming homeless need to be included as well. This is difficult to achieve, however, when the Alliance and community at large lack resources needed to provide affordable housing for these more hidden homeless populations as well. The target population for Ottawa’s action week was thus very much determined based on available funding requirements.

Saying that the Alliance focused on surveying the ‘hidden’ homeless is *not* to say that the Region of Waterloo and the City of Hamilton did not include the ‘hidden’ homeless in their registry week surveys. They did. Waterloo’s registry week, for example, also focused on singles experiencing homelessness “known to STEP Home and at-imminent risk or hidden homeless through couch surfing or in hospital or correction facilities” (Region of Waterloo, 2014, November 19, p.2). It is understood here that those known to STEP home had a prior connection with the Homelessness and Housing Stability System

and were likely those who were displaced by the closure of the K-W OOTC program. This means Waterloo's registry week excluded those people who were not connected to the local service system as well.

For Hamilton's registry week, one convener referred to the "hidden" homeless as:

*"[Those] people who are not accessing formalized supports – or sleeping rough. So, anyone who is basically not in a shelter and not sleeping rough and relying on informal supports for a lack of options – is hidden homeless. So, some people stay with family or friends, because that's their choice, or that's their cultural experience. So, it might be – it might be that's their living arrangement and that's their choice, and that's fine. But, again, it's because they have a lack of options, or lack of income, and can't live in their own place but not something different."*

What Ottawa's action week and Waterloo's and Hamilton's registry weeks had in common was that they focused on individuals without secure tenure or a permanent lease because these are the people who are eligible for Housing First programs and support. These local campaigns excluded those people who had permanent housing but were at-risk of becoming homeless and those people who had no connection to the local service system.

### *5.3.2. Human resources*

Cress & Snow (1996, p.1095) define human resources as "people who donated resources, time and energy to [a social movement organization]." These people are directly involved in organizing activities for the SMO. In this thesis, human resources are defined as individuals who were directly involved in action/registry week and donated their time, energy and resources to the local campaign. Cress & Snow identify three types of human resources: leaders, cadres and captive audiences. In agreement with Lacey (2011, p.346), "these categories can be adapted to analyze how" human resources were mobilized during action/registry week. In this study, four types of human resources were identified: conveners, internal staff, frontline staff and volunteers. While these human resources were

necessary for carrying out the events of action/registry week, they fell short of providing new housing resources needed to achieve the short and long-term goals of the campaign.

### 5.3.2.1. *Conveners*

Social movements scholars talk about *leadership* in two ways. One way is by focusing on *individual* leaders and how their role, responsibilities, and character shape collective action (Morris & Staggenborg, 2004). The other way leadership is talked about is by focusing on the *organization* that the individual represents and how its structure and character shapes the ability to organize (*ibid*). Although this study is primarily concerned with the structure of convening organizations, consideration is given here to the role and responsibilities of individual leaders. Cress & Snow (1996, p.1095) define leaders as “Individuals who provide relatively stable organizational guidance and who function as spokespersons.” In this study, one individual from each pilot community acted as a leader, or what is referred to here as a “convener.”<sup>64</sup> Conveners acted as “runners” and “spokespersons” during action/registry week. There were some significant differences, however, between how conveners from the formal and informal leadership structure carried out their role and responsibilities. Conveners from the Region of Waterloo and City of Hamilton took a relatively more ‘top-down’ approach to leadership while the convener from the Alliance took a relatively more ‘bottom-up’ approach to leadership. The roles and responsibilities of conveners are discussed here.

Conveners referred to themselves as “runners.” As runners, they were responsible for making sure the action/registry week process came together. Generally, this involved being “a primary point of contact”, as one convener referred to it, and a problem solver throughout the week. One convener described their role as a runner like this:

*“There was one afternoon one of our orders of gift cards hadn’t come in, and so, we had to rush to purchase gift cards, and I quickly discovered there was not a single Tim Hortons that held 2000 gift cards, which ended in running to several different Tim Hortons – and you can’t buy 400 gift cards on one receipt. So, they had to print [...] 400 receipts! So, all of that took time; and so, I spent maybe even a couple hours at Tim Hortons.”*

In Ottawa and Waterloo, it was found that this also involved running completed surveys from survey teams to data entry volunteers. When not “running,” conveners were stationed at headquarters acting as a go-to person for guidance. One convener, for example, explained they helped internal staff from the City of Hamilton rework the schedule when volunteers did not show up for their shift. Overall, being a runner involved running last minute errands to ensure the events of action/registry week came together.

Conveners from Waterloo and Hamilton were more involved in what one convener referred to as “logistical things”. For example, in Hamilton, not only did the convener help internal staff reorganize the schedule and make sure volunteers were debriefed at the end of each survey shift, they “facilitated some of the debrief sessions” as well. For Ottawa’s action week, the scheduling was done by an internal staff member from the Alliance and the facilitation of debrief sessions at headquarters was run by volunteers due to a lack of human and financial resources available internally to the organization.

Overall, conveners from the Region of Waterloo and City of Hamilton took a more ‘top-down’ approach to leadership and took more control over the registry week process. They were responsible for delegating tasks to internal staff from other divisions and/or departments and for “oversee[ing] the staff that did the work.” By contrast, the convener from the Alliance took a ‘bottom-up’ approach to leadership, acting more as a facilitator

and fostering collaboration between internal staff, member organizations, community partners and volunteers during action week.

Conveners also acted as spokespersons. This involved speaking at both the training and community debrief, providing local context around the campaign and justification for why their community was getting involved. It also involved speaking with the media and dealing with what one convener referred to as “the big picture pieces.” In Ottawa, not only did the spokesperson speak with the media, they were actively involved in what one convener referred to as “media engagement”. This, they explained, involved “facilitate[ing] media connections.” The spokesperson in Ottawa therefore became a ‘bridge’ through which volunteers and survey participants became connected with media thereby creating spaces for community engagement. There was no mention of conveners as spokespersons in Waterloo and Hamilton actively engaging volunteers and survey participants with the media. This supports the idea that community engagement for the Alliance was an action week goal.

#### *5.3.2.2. Internal staff*

Cress & Snow (1996) identify a cadre as an important human resource. Throughout the literature, a cadre is used to describe a group of people whose labour is used for social movement organizing. Cress & Snow describe this group of people as “the muscle behind the work of the organization” (p.1100). Likewise, Lacey (2011, p.348) describes this group of people as the “backbone”. McCarthy & Zald (1997, p.1234) argue that “the larger the income flow to a SMO[,] the more likely that cadres and staff are professional and the larger are these groups.” The findings from this study support this argument. It was found that conveners coming from the formal leadership structure had more financial resources

and a larger pool of staff available to them internally. Coming from the informal leadership structure, the Alliance had fewer financial resources and only one internal staff available to do most of the planning and coordination for Ottawa's action week.

Since registry week supported the Region of Waterloo's and City of Hamilton's approach to homelessness, conveners could leverage off internal staff hours to plan and carry out their registry weeks. In Waterloo, "21 Region employees" were involved in registry week (Region of Waterloo, 2015, "Pilot Report", p.11). This network of internal staff came from different departments/divisions, including: Human Resources, Communications, Information Technology, and Legal (ibid, p.4). Each department/division was assigned a specific task that was important for bringing the registry week process together. According to the Region of Waterloo's Housing Services: Human Resources was responsible for "volunteer paperwork"; Legal prepared consent forms; Information Technology helped create maps of survey locations and provided video, phone and picture support during registry week; and Communications was responsible for "Tweets [and] Press Information" (Region of Waterloo, 2014, December 3, slide 13).

In Hamilton, a network of internal staff was involved in registry week, making up "designated focal points who were responsible for: 1) overall coordination; 2) volunteer recruitment; 3) communications[,] [and]; 4) data management" (City of Hamilton, 2015, November, "Hamilton Registry Week Overview", p.2). According to one convener, Administration helped with logistics, including: managing volunteer applications, booking "various [survey] site locations", and coordinating the training; Communications helped "advertise for volunteers" and "raise awareness" throughout registry week, and; Policy and

Contract Analysts from the Legal Department reviewed the “Community Agreement” and volunteer paperwork.

One convener thought, “having a coordinator and people with specific kind of roles and responsibilities was really important, because, not one person can manage the list of things that will come up. So, having that support is critical.” Having a large network of internal staff may have certainly been beneficial, however, it was not required. The Alliance did not have a large network of internal staff available to it. Instead, it had funding to hire one project coordinator for action week and was much more dependent on volunteers throughout the week. According to one convener, the project coordinator was responsible for: outreach and volunteer recruitment, coordinating survey locations with host agencies, forming survey teams and creating schedules, facilitating the registration process at the frontline staff and volunteer training, and facilitating the survey teams during the action days. The project coordinator, they continued to explain, did all the “legwork” with some help and guidance of the convener or leader.

The size of conveners’ network of internal staff had important implications in terms of local campaign outcomes. Given the Region of Waterloo and City of Hamilton had relatively large pools of human resources available to them, one convener from the Alliance expressed: *“I can’t help but feel that [Waterloo’s and Hamilton’s] campaigns were a little bit better – I don’t want to be unfair to ourselves, but – a little bit better organized and had a few more resources at their disposal.”* The findings from this study support this statement. The City of Hamilton, for example, had internal trauma counselors available at headquarters for volunteers during registry week, if needed. It also had translation services available internally for survey participants. Not only does this support

the idea that conveners from the formal leadership structure had more resources available to them, it also suggests that they had more formal procedures around volunteer safety and participation. Although there was no mention of such human resources being available during Waterloo's registry week, in a later section it will be demonstrated how conveners from the formal leadership structure had larger campaign budgets, further supporting the idea that Waterloo's and Hamilton's registry weeks were better resourced than Ottawa's action week.

#### *5.3.2.3. Frontline staff & volunteers*

Cress & Snow (1996) refer to captive audiences as those people who are targeted for resources and recruitment. These people, according to Lacey (2011), are not involved in the organizing or decision-making of events but rather participate in them. In this study, conveners from all three pilot communities targeted frontline staff and volunteers for resources and recruitment. They were not involved in the organizing or decision-making of action/registry events but participated in them either as part of survey teams leads or volunteers or as data entry volunteers. The similarities and differences between and within these two groups is discussed next.

In all three pilot communities, conveners recruited individuals working in the local homelessness sector to act as survey team leads. In Ottawa, this included "frontline staff" whose agency was a member organization of the Alliance; in Waterloo, this included 37 "agency staff" who worked in the HHSS (Region of Waterloo, 2015, February, slide 15); and in Hamilton, this included "professional staff" whose agency was a community partner with the City of Hamilton. In this thesis, these local terms will be used where appropriate and "frontline staff" will be used when speaking about the local campaigns collectively.<sup>65</sup>

The reasons why conveners targeted frontline staff was strategic. First, these individuals facilitated important connections between conveners and survey participants, including those experiencing ‘hidden’ homelessness. Since frontline staff worked with people experiencing homelessness daily, they already had a pre-existing relationship with many of these people, which helped build legitimacy and trust around the campaign. Due to these pre-existing relationships, frontline staff became ‘bridges’ through which survey participants could potentially connect with the service system and gain access to permanent housing and supports.

Second, frontline staff were “skilled professionals”, as the Alliance referred to them (ATEHO, 2015, “Ottawa joins Canada’s 20,000 Homes Campaign” & “Media Q&A”). This meant that because frontline staff worked with survey participants daily, they knew how to engage with them in a safe manner. Having skilled professionals as team leads appeared to be particularly important for Hamilton’s registry weeks as there were relatively strict policies and procedures around volunteer safety and engagement. What’s interesting here is that while one of the goals of Hamilton’s registry week was to help raise community awareness and destigmatize homelessness, having these formal policies and procedures around safety may have reinforced this stigmatization.

Generally frontline staff: required training, facilitated the administration of the survey, and had the option to attend the community debrief. In Waterloo, agency staff were also involved in surveying (see Region of Waterloo, 2015, August “Pilot Report”). This suggests the Region was not interested in engaging the broader community. In Ottawa, it was found that frontline staff were not only responsible for facilitating connections between volunteers and survey participants, but also for facilitating the survey team’s

connection with headquarters and host agencies. Although there is no data to show this, it is likely that frontline staff from the other two pilot communities were required to facilitate these connections as well. Frontline staff part of Ottawa's action week further helped the Alliance facilitate media connections with volunteers, host agencies, and survey participants, creating more spaces for community engagement.

Conveners also targeted volunteers for resources and recruitment. Generally, volunteers: required training; acted as "survey volunteers", borrowing from the Bulthuis (2015, March 16)<sup>66</sup>; and had the option to attend the community debrief as well. Survey volunteers conducted surveys with survey participants. In Ottawa, volunteers were asked to carry out other roles as well. As described by Bulthuis (*ibid*): "Headquarter volunteers" were stationed at St. Alban's Church and were responsible for "coordinating refreshments and supplies, helping [...] collect surveys, [...] and assisting in general set-up and clean-up." There was also a volunteer who ran the volunteer debrief sessions at headquarters. "Data entry volunteers" were responsible for entering all information collected from the survey onto a database. "Documentation volunteers" were responsible for capturing the names, faces and stories of those who agreed to participate in the action week survey "through photography, film, design, poetry and writing" (*ibid*).

In Waterloo and Hamilton, data entry and communications were all done by internal staff. For example, "16 Regional Housing Services staff" did all the data entry for Waterloo's registry week (Region of Waterloo, 2015, "Pilot Report", p.12). One difference found, however, was that while the Region of Waterloo's Information Technology department did all the documentation for registry week, the City of Hamilton hired a production company to do this work. This further supports the idea that conveners from

the formal leadership structure had more financial and human resources available to them internally to support their local campaigns.

Croteau & Hicks (2003, p.268) argue, “Less-hierarchical organizations with fewer resources are more apt to be dependent upon voluntary membership and support.” The findings from this study support this argument. With fewer financial and human resources available to it internally, the Alliance was more dependent on member organizations, community partners, and volunteers to support Ottawa’s action week. This dependence fostered community engagement and, as participants interviewed for this study pointed out, led to a more grassroots campaign. More so, this dependence has important implications for how the Alliance will come up with the resources needed to house people for the local campaign.

#### *5.3.3. Networks of support*

The objective of this section is to identify the types of support conveners received for their local campaigns and to better understand the type of relationships conveners had with supporters. Seven types of support were identified for action/registry week: leadership support, training and technical support, agency support, internal support, membership support, police support, and political support (or a lack thereof). The types of support identified here did not hold equal weight within and between each pilot community. The findings from this study show that being a community-based organization, the Alliance depended more on its members and community partners for support. Again, this dependence fostered community engagement and a more grassroots campaign. While the support conveners received was important for carrying out the activities and achieving the goals of action/registry week, again, no new housing resources were provided.

### *5.3.3.1. Leadership support by the CAEH*

As convener of the 20K Homes campaign at the national level, the CAEH was not directly involved in the planning and implementation of Ottawa’s action week and Waterloo’s and Hamilton’s registry weeks. This indirect involvement made the CAEH’s leadership support a type of moral resource and not a human resource. Morris & Staggenborg (2004) argue that leaders “inspire commitment”. The CAEH has inspired commitment through the *20,000 Homes Campaign Community Agreement* (see 20K Homes & CAEH, n.d.). According to this agreement, the CAEH promises participating communities at the local level to be:

“*a coach* to help [them] meet [their] goals in a way that makes sense in [their] community and [promises to] connect [them with] training and technical assistance on solutions that work; *a champion* to amplify local results and collective impact; *a problem-solver* to learn and improve as [they] go; and importantly, *an advocate*, to push for government investment that advances an end to homelessness in Canada” (p.2 – original emphasis).

The CAEH acted as a coach by offering conveners guidance throughout action/registry week. According to one convener, this involved being available and helping pilot communities anyway it could. This support was especially important for the Alliance, which was particularly dependent on the CAEH for guidance. For example, when it came to developing privacy forms and releasing survey information to the City of Ottawa, the Alliance “consulted” with the CAEH because it lacked the human resources internally to do this (ATEH, 2015, “Action Week Check-List”, p.5). By contrast, the City of Hamilton and Region of Waterloo had internal support from their legal departments to help with this. For example, in Hamilton, it was found that the City had a policy analyst and contract analyst help draft volunteer paperwork. This suggests that processing volunteer paperwork

was done more formally through the City and that the City was not dependent on the CAEH for consultation. In other words, conveners from the formal leadership structure had the human resources available to them internally, and therefore, were less dependent on the support of an external organization for organizing their registry weeks. This is not to say, however, that conveners from the formal leadership structure did not consult with the CAEH at all.

Building on Burt's *Structural Hole* argument, the CAEH also acted as a liaison or 'bridge' between conveners at the local level and Community Solutions at the international level. According to one convener, this role as a liaison was important because the CAEH was able to engage "Community Solutions to provide on-the-ground support [...] to get the [action/]registry week done." As a liaison, the CAEH became the bridge through which conveners at the local level were able to gain access to sample material as well as training and technical support needed to support their local campaigns that they otherwise may not have had access to.

Tim Richter from the CAEH acted as a spokesperson and represented the 20K Homes campaign at a national level. As spokesperson, he was responsible for speaking at each pilot community's training and community debrief, providing background information about the 20K Homes campaign, including its national context, and helped facilitate discussion with frontline staff and volunteers. His role as spokesperson and as a representative was intended to build legitimacy around the campaign and for creating community buy-in. Throughout this analysis, I will continue to demonstrate the ways in which the CAEH supported pilot communities, including: problem solving, sponsorship, and acting as a champion.

### *5.3.3.2. Training and technical support by Community Solutions*

Community Solutions provided each pilot community training and technical support. This support included: “advice and sample materials [from the 100K Homes campaign], leading portions of the volunteer training, providing a database, and supporting data entry and analysis” (Region of Waterloo, 2015, “Pilot Report”, p.10). As one convener explained, Community Solutions “help[ed] bring the campaign off the ground.”

During the training, Community Solutions provided background information on the 100K Homes campaign, a review of collective impact and Housing First, and a walk-through of the survey kits and survey tool. Everything Community Solutions presented at the training was framed to build legitimacy around the organization and American campaign to create community buy-in for the Canadian campaign. This included drawing on a convener’s experience with the 100K Homes campaign in the States. For example, Community Solutions shared success stories from the 100K Homes campaign through images and video. One story included a “before” and “after” picture of a homeless man named Ed Givens from Los Angeles who was prioritized and placed into permanent housing with supports through the campaign (see Broffman & Richter, 2015, April 17 & 18, slides 4 & 5). These images were chosen strategically to trigger an emotional response from their targeted audience. The “before” picture shows Ed on the street in poor physical health due to being chronically homeless for 30 years with an alcohol addiction (*ibid*, slide 4). This image of Ed is like most images of homelessness and played into the dominate discourse and stereotype which blames individuals for their own homelessness. The “after” image shows Ed almost unrecognizable looking physically healthy and well. The picture was intended to show its targeted audience the positive impact permanent housing with

supports had on people's health and well being (*ibid*, slides 5). The story of Ed and the overall success of the 100K Homes campaign was further proof that Housing First worked as an approach to homelessness. It is questioned here, however, how much buy-in was created when pilot communities already supported this new approach to homelessness and whether this jeopardized the credibility and legitimacy of these convening organizations at the national and international levels?

The trainer shared their experience with administrating the survey for the 100K Homes campaign as well. This was important as some frontline staff and volunteers were either skeptical or hesitant about the survey. One volunteer, for example, observed that some people were concerned with the survey taking too long to administer with each survey participant. They explained:

*"Everyone [...] kept kind of questioning how [the survey] was going to be done in 11 minutes, [and] it was just told, this was done in the States, it was used in the States very effectively, and it may seem kind of difficult now to be able to do that but, it can be done in that short of a time, it's just a matter of keeping [survey participants] on task, and moving through the questions. I guess, yes, just past experience. The survey was – volunteers were told about the past experience with the surveys and how it was carried out."*

The trainer could convince volunteers that the survey would not take too long because, based on their prior experience with the 100K Homes campaign, they had seen it done in eleven minutes. There were also concerns that the questions on the survey were too personal and whether it was appropriate to be asking survey participants these questions.

For example, one convener said:

*"So, we thought people would not answer the [survey] questions. [...] She [the trainer from Community Solutions], was able to say, well, you know, our experience in other communities was ..., and so, I think as long as whoever is training and had that information available to confront people, they would have*

*had to have the experience. But those are the questions that come up that you need to be prepared to answer.”*

The trainer could convince volunteers that people experiencing homelessness would answer the questions on the survey because, once again, based on their experience in the States, they found that survey participants were open and willing to sharing personal information. But it is questioned here whether it was still appropriate to ask these survey questions. Although the survey was optional and survey participants had the option to opt out at any time, being in a vulnerable situation and given the opportunity to be prioritized for permanent housing with supports, people may have felt pressured into taking the survey and answering the questions, especially if it appeared to be their only hope for getting the support that they needed to end their homelessness. In addition, there were concerns around volunteer safety. One convener explained:

*“I think one of the interesting observations is that people have a sense of wanting to do something meaningful except they want to come out and help – I use that term sort of loosely but, once they’re there, I got then sense that people are typically anxious, especially people that had never had any form of engagement with someone experiencing homelessness, or in crisis, or in a very vulnerable situation. So, there was lots of concern around consent, like, consent of what I am consenting to, what happens if I get hurt, or concern around safety. I think relying on the 100K Homes campaign really helped because it demonstrated people had done this time and time again, and that it’s actually a very safe process, that there are measures put in place to protect people, but at the same time, to acknowledge that people experiencing homelessness are not necessarily any more dangerous than – to [unclear] society, and it was a great opportunity to destigmatize a lot of the assumptions that people have.”*

Fear around safety stemmed from the stigma around homelessness and stereotypes that homeless people are dangerous or violent. By sharing with volunteers that registry week was carried out throughout the States safely, the trainer could mitigate people's concern about administering the survey. This was important as conveners depended on volunteers'

help to conduct the surveys. More so, this destigmatization was an important goal of Hamilton's registry week.

Community Solutions further provided each pilot community with a database. This was used to store all information collected from the survey and to keep an updated priority list of individuals for housing and supports moving forward with the campaign. The trainer guided data entry “volunteers” through the process and helped conveners analyze the data in preparation for showing survey results at the community debrief. Conveners from all three pilot communities described the data entry and analysis as quick and “intense” (Region of Waterloo, 2015, “Pilot Report”, p.12). This is because the database came with a dashboard that helped conveners aggregate the results from the survey (*ibid*). This allowed for a quick turnaround on the results. One convener explained:

*“Well the database had a dashboard connected to it so that potentially once you entered the data, it’s already all rolled up and ready to go. So, that is what made it all go so quickly. And then we had a PowerPoint already to go, [...] the data just needed to be plugged in, and so, that is how it happened so quickly as it did.”*

This convener further explained that “The campaign really emphasize[d] gathering data and carrying it back really quickly to keep the energy and enthusiasm energy level up.” Overall, the “quick turnaround [was to keep] people engaged” (Region of Waterloo, 2015, February, slide 39).

Finally, Community Solutions gave pilot communities sample material from the 100K Homes campaign. Providing these resources was strategic to help prevent conveners from spending limited time and money developing these resources on their own, and instead, allowed them to focus more on getting people prioritized for housing as quickly as possible. One convener expressed:

*“We were lucky enough to have the learning from the 100,000 Homes campaign. I think upstarting in Canada – we are starting in a different position than they when they were starting the 100,000 Homes campaign in the States. It certainly – all the resources that had been developed by different communities, Community Solutions was able to share with us, and so, we were able to take those and tailor them to fit our community and moving forward a little more quickly than it would have been when it first started in the States.”*

This convener pointed out that pilot communities had access to ‘best’ practices and lessons learned from approximately 200 communities that campaigned in the States. According to this convener, these resources were particularly important for Waterloo’s registry week – despite being subject to local adaption – because, it was the first community to pilot the campaign and no other resources existed at the time. The Region had to ‘jump’ scales to gain access to these resources which it otherwise would not have had access to. Community Solutions became a ‘bridge’ through which the Region could access these resources at the international level.

#### *5.3.3.3. Agency support*

Local agencies in all three pilot communities demonstrated solidaristic support by donating staff hours and by agreeing to host survey locations for action/registry week. While frontline staff were directly involved in action/registry week as survey team leads, agency staff were indirectly involved in the planning, organizing, and carrying out the activities of action/registry week. These were individuals who worked *for* and *at* host agencies during action/registry who played an important role in getting training, survey, and/or data entry locations ready for frontline staff and volunteer (ATEHO, 2015, April 23), and recruiting survey participants for the survey. For example, one volunteer described the role of agency staff like this:

*“We went to this drop-in centre, which [was] in the basement of a church downtown Ottawa, and we had the lady who, again, [was] just sort of the coordinator of the drop-in centre, and she had it pretty well organized for us. So, in the end, it was quite easy. [...] She had sort of had a list of people that she had lined up that she thought were appropriate for the interview. There [were] seats. There were two rooms set aside – one for my wife and one for myself were we could interview people. And so, we introduced ourselves, [and] she said, “Okay, go to your little room with your list [of questions], I’ll bring an individual in and introduce you and sit down and do the interviews.” It was fairly organized.”*

Described here, agency staff and host survey locations became the bridge through which conveners and survey teams connected with people experiencing homelessness and getting survey participants prioritized for Housing First programs and supports. Conveners could use these spaces and leverage off staff hours because action/registry week supported their everyday work.

#### *5.3.3.4 Internal Support*

It is articulated throughout the literature that sympathetic support comes from external organizations (see Cress & Snow, 1996; Lacey, 2011). The findings from this study show, however, that sympathetic support came from inside convening organizations as well. Prior to agreeing to pilot the campaign, conveners sought approval from inside their own leadership structures. This process of approval looked different between the formal and informal leadership structures. Conveners from Waterloo and Hamilton were required “to vet through [their] own systems and levels for approval”, as one convener explained. Here “vetting” is understood as needing to be able to demonstrate to senior management how the 20K Homes campaign supported the City’s/Region’s work towards ‘ending’ homelessness to gain their approval. Conveners from both pilot communities received approval from senior management. In Hamilton, registry week was also “endorsed” by City Council, according to one convener. By contrast, one convener from

the Alliance said they spoke with its Board of Directors about the idea of doing an action week and the Board voted on it. Building on Lacey's (2011) argument, gaining internal approval helped conveners build legitimacy around action/registry week. There was no mention, however, of senior levels of management, Council, or Board members being directly involved in action/registry week, suggesting there was a lack of solidaristic support within convening organizations. More so, municipal governments did not make a stronger commitment towards affordable housing.

#### *5.3.3.5 Ottawa's action team – member support*

Communities interested in doing a registry week are encouraged to form a planning committee (see CAEH & 20K Homes, n.d., “*Building a Strong Local Team*”). The planning committee must have a backbone organization and is encouraged to include community partners (*ibid*). In this study, it was found that the planning committee’s shape depended on the organizational structure and characteristics of the local campaigns. As already demonstrated, the Region of Waterloo and City of Hamilton had an internal network of human resources available to plan and organize registry week. The Alliance, however, being a community-based organization, formed an “action team” made up of member organizations and community partners who were involved in the planning process. Community partners included: The City of Ottawa, the local police and BIA. It is understood here that while these member organizations and community partners were not directly involved in executing the plans for action week, they did influence the decision-making process and offered various forms of moral support. These various forms of moral support are explored next. Having an action team made up of member organizations and

community partners was important for achieving broad community engagement and made Ottawa's action week a more grassroots campaign.

One source of solidaristic support came from a local outreach team in Ottawa, whose parent organization is a member of the Alliance. An individual who represented this outreach team sat at the planning table and was able to persuade the Alliance to use the outreach team as a resource for action week. As an agency staff member explained, "*I communicate[d] a lot with the people that were around the table and I wanted to promote what our [outreach] team could do to support the campaign, because it's an on-foot program[.]*" Indicated here, the outreach was an important resource because it acted as a 'bridge' that could connect the Alliance with people living on the streets, including those who were not accessing formal services, and help them get on the by-name list for permanent housing and supports. The outreach workers could also act as team leads for the street surveying. Simply put, the outreach could help the Alliance achieve its campaign goals. There were other motives behind offering the outreach as well. The reason why this agency staff was so keen to offer the outreach in support of action week was to help legitimize the outreach as a valuable service. This agency staff member continued to explain, "*[T]here's fewer outreach teams on the streets now because of the Housing First model and because of redirection in funding – but I still think it's a valuable service.*" When the Federal Government redirected funding toward Housing First back in 2013, outreach programs lost funding because they are an emergency response to homelessness and not perceived as a solution. One frontline worker explained the repercussions of the federal government's new mandate like this:

*“Cutting out the outreach will make the job [of permanently housing people] harder because the outreach is the bridge between service providers and people on the street, and if you don’t have any outreach, then you don’t have any clients coming in to get help, or coming in to do surveys, or coming in to do anything.”*

The outreach is important for getting people connected to the service system and with Housing First programs and supports. By helping the Alliance connect with survey participants during action week, the outreach could demonstrate how useful it was as a service. This was important as it could potentially influence future funding and policy decisions and the long-term survival of this program.

#### *5.3.3.6. Police support*

Participating communities are encouraged to ask their local police to support their local campaign (see “*Building a Strong Local Team*”). The Alliance did ask the Ottawa Police to support action week.<sup>67</sup> A police officer attended the final planning meeting where it was agreed that the Ottawa Police would not ‘sweep’ the streets during action week.<sup>68</sup> This would help teams find people on the streets who they could survey, and subsequently, be prioritized for permanent housing and supports. Although agreeing to not ‘sweep’ the streets would be helpful during action week, the Ottawa Police could have shown stronger support by agreeing to have a couple officers act as team leads for the survey (20K Homes & CAEH, n.d., “Letter to Police Chief”).

#### *5.3.3.7. The City of Ottawa: Political support*

Seeking broad community engagement and pushing for higher housing targets, the Alliance sought support from the City of Ottawa. According to Mike Bulthuis, Executive Director of the Alliance at the time, there was “municipal hesitation” at first to support the local campaign (2015, November 2, *NCEH: 20,000 Homes Campaign overview and*

*learnings from early pilots).* One convener suggested: “*There were politics involved in some ways.*” Another convener said: “*I think there was a bit of tug-of-war between competing interests in terms of what people want to get out of* [the campaign].” While both the Alliance and City of Ottawa want to end homelessness, they have different ideas on how to achieve this.

Considering housing is a basic human right that everyone should have access to, the Alliance makes a strong argument that to truly end homelessness, housing targets should reflect local need and should include the ‘hidden’ homeless. The Alliance also argues that the City of Ottawa (and city as a whole) can do better when it comes to the provision of affordable housing. This latter convener continued to say:

*“I referred to Ottawa’s experience as bit of an insurgency [...] because the Ottawa Alliance is wanting to achieve reductions in homelessness, wanting to eliminate homelessness, but it doesn’t have the resources, or the authority, and it is outside the formal structure, and so, I think the Ottawa Alliance, and [name] specifically, had a lot of work to do to cultivate that relationship with the – with [its] own membership, but also with the City of Ottawa. Right? [...] To bring along a partner that’s – I mean, not necessarily unwilling, but has their own focus, right?”*

Coming from the outside the formal leadership structure, the Alliance has limited resources, and therefore, is largely dependent on the City of Ottawa’s support to house people for the campaign. Although the Alliance has power to influence policy decisions using the data collected from the campaign, as Service Manager for homelessness, the City of Ottawa not only receives but has the power to decide how it wants to allocate these resources. The situation described here has important implications in term of local campaign outcomes and next steps.

The City of Ottawa argues there is not enough resources to house everyone, and so, with limited resources, it is focused on permanently housing long-stay shelter clients with supports. The reason for this, again, is that, while long-stay shelter clients make up a small portion of the total homeless population, they are a huge cost to the public system. The City has criticized the campaign for wanting to achieve higher housing targets when it does not offer communities new resources.

How then did the Alliance garner support from the City of Ottawa? Strategically, by discursively reframing action week as an awareness raising and advocacy exercise rather than as a housing intervention. This reframing around the campaign was a contentious process involving competing interests. As one convener explained:

*“I think [...] what was interesting to me in Ottawa was the pressure that [name] was under to ‘water down’ or back away from setting targets, and kind of put a bit of pressure – and I don’t know if “pressure” is the right word necessarily, but – you know, kind of pushing to focus [the campaign] more as an awareness raising exercise and advocacy exercise verses a housing intervention, right? [...] I think that was my principle worry was that we would be ‘soft peddling’ targeting, we would be looking at this like it’s an awareness raising exercise, or count, or something, and that, again, is I think was just a natural by-product of the negotiation that was happening.”*

Reframing action week as an awareness raising and advocacy exercise rather than a housing intervention would take the pressure off the City of Ottawa to make a stronger commitment towards housing. Doing this was contrary to the goals and strategies of the campaign both at the local and national levels, and yet, doing so suggested that the City was unwilling to make a stronger commitment towards housing or broaden its focus without new resources. The Alliance had to do this, however, nationally, as it was dependent on the City for leveraging off resources. This had further implications in terms of local campaign outcomes.

Reframing the campaign required a lot of negotiation not only between the Alliance and the City of Ottawa, but also, between the Alliance and the CAEH. One convener explained:

*“So, there was just conversations back and forth between us [the CAEH and the Alliance] about how we continue to keep the focus on housing, and frankly, I can – because [name] is present in the system and has a role in the system, it’s a bit more challenging for him to say some things, you know? So, when I went to Ottawa to observe action week, and when I spoke at the debrief, I [was] able to emphasize the housing. So, I was able to emphasize the focus, and so, the national campaign and the local campaign had these mutually reinforcing roles. Right? And I can support [name] in keeping that focus, or in doing elements of the campaign, or whatever. And ultimately for us, the campaign lives in communities. Right? It’s like [laughs] – it’s like the Home Depot motto: “You can do it, we can help.”*

Since the Alliance was dependent on the City for resources, it had to adapt its campaign goals and strategies to garner the City's support. Despite the CAEH's efforts to keep the focus on housing, with no new resources to offer local communities, the City's interests could not be changed. Since the City has more resources and control over these resources, it has the power to decide how those resources are allocated, and subsequently, it had the power to shape the strategies and goals of action week.

So, how did the City of Ottawa support the local campaign? One City representative made an appearance and spoke at the frontline staff training. During the training, there was confusion around why Ottawa was getting involved in the campaign, to which this individual reiterated how the campaign supported the community's approach to homelessness and would help carry out this work. This suggests that the support from the City was important in building legitimacy around the campaign and creating community buy-in, perhaps more so than was Community Solution's and the CAEH's support.

Another City representative attended the community debrief and acted as a spokesperson. One participant interviewed for this study explained that this City representative, “*was there to be a cheerleader, an advocate, and help [the Alliance] amplify their message*” – to advocate for senior levels of government to invest in affordable housing. Described here is the extent to which the City of Ottawa was willing to support action week. While having City representatives act as spokespersons during action week was important for building legitimacy around the campaign and creating community buy-in, Ottawa’s action week was never officially endorsed by City Council. What’s more, there was an overall lack of solidaristic support from the City.

This was perceived by one convener as a missed opportunity. They expressed, “*I would love to have seen more participation from the City in the training myself, but that I know can be tough.*” Although the City was already familiar with the survey tool, which was the focus of the training, it could have shown stronger support for the campaign by having City officials and/or representatives go out and do some surveying. More importantly, while the City’s words of approval and encouragement may have helped build legitimacy around the local campaign and create community buy-in, a stronger commitment from the City of Ottawa was needed to push for higher housing targets.

#### *5.3.3.8. The Province of Ontario: Political support*

Political support did present itself during Hamilton’s registry week. The Provincial Government offered support for the campaign both at the local and national levels. Ted McMeekin, Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing spoke at the volunteer training session during Hamilton’s registry week. According to Kelly Bennett from CBC Hamilton (2015, para.18), “Ted McMeekin [...] said the work the volunteers were preparing to do

[was] “almost holy.”” This statement not only signified Provincial support for the work of the volunteers, it brought legitimacy to their work as well. At the same time, Ted McMeekin promised the CAEH \$50,000 to support the campaign (*ibid*). What’s interesting here is how Hamilton became a ‘bridge’ throughout which the CAEH could leverage off financial resources from the Province to bring legitimacy to the organization and to its work on ending homelessness. It is questioned here, however, where this money came from? Was this new funding or from an existing program? If from an existing program, will it be stretched over a larger area? Should this funding not have gone instead directly into creating more affordable housing units? While the support from the Province was important for building legitimacy around the campaign and for its on-going sustainability, new investments from the Province are needed to end homelessness.

#### *5.3.3.9. No support from the Federal Government – A missed opportunity?*

It is worth considering here the lack of support from the federal government during the piloting phase of the 20K Homes campaign as well. This is worth considering for two reasons. First, the campaign was being piloted in the nation’s capital which was perceived as a real political opportunity. Also, the piloting of the 20K Homes campaign was happening months before the 2015 federal election. One convener thought, “*With the federal election it would have been awesome to have Thomas Mulcair or Justin Trudeau out doing a couple surveys. You know? Just to get a sense of whose out on the streets in the shadows of Parliament Hill.*” These prime ministerial candidates were looking to gain electoral votes, and so, engaging them in action week and convincing them to make affordable housing and homelessness a part of their political platforms would have been strategic for winning financial and material resources for the campaign. Unfortunately, no

such support was received from the federal government. One convener thought the Alliance did receive support from the federal government for action week. They said, “*I was very happy that folks from HPS came [out].*” It was later found out, however, that the individual working for the HPS was volunteering autonomously and not as a federal representative.

The findings from this study challenge the assumption other scholars have made that political opportunities will lead to political support and material concessions, particularly, when it serves politicians’ own interests (e.g., Staggenborg & Lecomte, 2009). The findings from this study also challenge the assumption that there was more political opportunity piloting the campaign in the nation’s capital. It is worth considering why political support for the campaign presented itself in Hamilton and not in Ottawa. Perhaps one reason why political opportunity presented itself in Hamilton was because the Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing also happened to be a local MPP in Hamilton at the time. Another possible reason is that conveners from the local and national levels needed to be proactive in seeking federal support or that action week did not receive enough media attention (discussed later). Having said that, it is questioned here how the Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing found out about the campaign and under what circumstances they were willing to attend the registry week training. It should be kept in mind also that Ottawa’s action week took place the third week of April 2015, whereas, campaigning for the federal election did not start until the first week of August 2015.

#### *5.3.4. Financial and material resources*

This section addresses how conveners from each pilot community came up with the financial and material resources needed to run their campaigns. Three channels have been identified through which conveners unevenly obtained their financial and material

resources for action/registry week. These are: administrative dollars, in-kind donations and sponsorship. The channels identified here have important implications for how each pilot community will come up with the resources needed to house people for the campaign. Coming from the formal leadership structure, the Region of Waterloo and City of Hamilton had homelessness funding available to them internally they could leverage off to fund their registry weeks. Having homelessness funding available to them internally meant they were not dependent on community partners for sponsorship and in-kind donations to support their registry weeks. Coming from the informal leadership structure, the Alliance did not have access to homelessness funding and had a small budget. For these reasons, it was more dependent on its network of member organizations and community partners for sponsorship and in-kind donations to carry out action week. This dependence, again, fostered community engagement and made for a more grassroots campaign. While the financial and material resources identified here were important for getting each pilot community's local campaign up off the ground, again, no new housing resources were identified.

#### *5.3.4.1. Administrative dollars*

Conveners allocated administrative dollars towards their action/registry weeks. These were financial resources available internally to conveners that generally covered the cost of materials needed for the training and survey kits. According to conveners, the cost of their action/registry week aligned with their internal administrative budgets. When asked how much the Alliance spent towards action week, one convener replied: "*I would say, at the end of the day, the Alliance probably put out ... a little less than a thousand dollars*

*from [its] own budget[.]*" This money, they explained, was used to pay for the materials needed for the training and survey kits, and to hire a graphic designer to develop a logo.

Coming from the formal leadership structure, the Region of Waterloo and City of Hamilton had homelessness funding available to them internally, and therefore, had larger budgets. The Region allocated \$12,000 from its 2014 Housing Services budget towards registry week (Region of Waterloo 2015, "Pilot Report, p.11"). Of this budget, less than \$6,000 was put towards paying the cost of training and technical support provided by Community Solutions. The remaining amount was used to purchase training and survey kit materials, food and refreshments (Region of Waterloo, n.d., "Registry Week Budget").

According to one convener, the City of Hamilton allocated \$15,000 from its Housing Services budget towards registry week. This, they explained, covered the cost of training and survey material, the hiring of a production company for a registry week video, and the facilities rented for the registry week training and headquarters. This convener mentioned too that the City of Hamilton had funding through a program called the Core Learning Collaborative to offer extended training.

Since the campaign aligned with Federal HPS and Provincial CHPI funding requirements, and because the Region of Waterloo and City of Hamilton were Service Managers for homelessness locally, conveners from the formal leadership structure could leverage off funding from these programs to support their registry weeks. Since the City of Ottawa was Service Manager for homelessness locally, the Alliance did not have access to homelessness funding it could leverage off to support action week. Without access to this funding and a budget of less than \$1000, the Alliance was more dependent on sponsorship

and in-kind donations to carry out action week. These other channels of funding are discussed next.

#### *5.3.4.2. Sponsorship*

The CAEH sponsored each pilot community's action/registry week. In Ottawa and Hamilton, this sponsorship covered the full cost of training and technical support provided by Community Solutions. One convener explained that there was no expectation for the Alliance to pay for the training and technical support because piloting the campaign was a mutual learning experience between conveners at the local and national levels. For the Region of Waterloo, however, the situation was slightly different. Since the Region asked the CAEH if Waterloo could be a pilot community for the campaign, one convener explained that the CAEH had not originally budgeted for three pilot communities, and so, it made an agreement with the Region that Waterloo could be a pilot community for the campaign if it agreed to pay for half the cost of the training and technical support. Like Hamilton, the Region became a 'bridge' through which the CAEH could leveraged off homelessness funding to support the campaign and legitimize itself as a new leader in ending homelessness.

#### *5.3.4.3. In-kind donations: Training and technical support*

Of the \$6,000 the Region of Waterloo was required to pay for training and technical support, a portion of this cost was covered by the 2014 Housing Services budget, and a portion was covered by four former K-W OOTC churches through in-kind donation (Region of Waterloo, Housing Services, 2015, "Pilot Report", p.11). This was in support of the K-W OOTC transition. Demonstrated here, these churches became 'bridges' through

which the Region could leverage off financial resources needed for training and technical support.

#### 5.3.4.4. Gift cards

As one convener explained, gift cards were given to survey participants during action/registry week to compensate them for their time. In Ottawa, all gift cards were donated in-kind by member organizations of the Alliance. One convener explained, “[W]hen it came to the need of gift cards, we had an anonymous donor come forward and say, we'd like you give you 2000 [dollars] to purchase a good number of those, and then we had another one of our member organizations say the same thing.” Donating gift cards is one example of how member organizations showed engagement and was important for carrying out action week. In Waterloo and Hamilton, the cost of gift cards was covered using administration dollars, with the exception that a portion of the gift cards used for Waterloo’s registry week was covered by the same four K-W OOTC churches mentioned above (Region of Waterloo, 2015, “Pilot Report”, p.11).

One difference found between the formal and informal leadership structures was the value of the gift cards. Ten-dollar gift cards were handed out during Waterloo’s and Hamilton’s registry weeks and five-dollar gift cards were handed out during Ottawa’s action week. With homelessness funding available to them internally, conveners from the formal leadership structure could afford more expensive gift cards. Not only did the Alliance have a small budget and was dependent on its members for donating gift cards, but also, the value of the gift cards donated suggest that member organizations had small budgets as well.

#### *5.3.4.5. Food & refreshments*

Food and refreshments were provided for frontline staff and volunteers throughout action/registry week. All food and refreshments for the training, headquarters and community debrief were donated in-kind for Ottawa's action week. Providing food and refreshments was another way in which member organizations and volunteers could contribute to and engage in action week. The Alliance was also able to leverage off supplies (e.g. snacks, clothes, toiletries etc.) provided by the outreach team to give to survey participants.

The food provided at headquarters during Waterloo's registry week was donated by one of the K-W OOTC churches. Like the outreach for Ottawa's action week, this K-W church and another church provided snacks and clothes for volunteers and survey participants (Region of Waterloo, n.d., "Registry Week Budget"). Providing food and clothes for registry week is another example of how the churches supported the local campaign through the K-W OOTC transition.

Refreshments provided for Hamilton's registry week were included in the Housing Services budget, demonstrating that the City was not dependent on in-kind donations.

#### *5.3.4.6. Spaces for training, headquarters, & community debrief*

Space was needed to carry out the action/registry week activities. For Ottawa's action week, spaces for the training, data entry and headquarters were donated in-kind by member organizations of the Alliance, and the space for the community debrief was sponsored by the Rideau BIA – a community partner of the Alliance. Having a small office that was co-located, the Alliance did not have space available to it internally, and therefore,

was dependent of member organizations and community partners to borrow space needed to carry out action week. Providing these spaces, once again, was a way in which member organizations could contribute to and were engaged in action week.

For Waterloo's and Hamilton's registry weeks, data entry took place internally at the Region/City, and both community debriefs took place at Regional/City Council Chambers. These spaces were internally available to conveners, and so, they could use these spaces for the campaign because it supported the regular work of the Region/City. In other words, the Region and City were not dependent on community partners for providing these spaces. Waterloo's two training days were divided between the Region and one of the four OOTC churches mentioned above. The registry week headquarters was also located at this church. The volunteer training for Hamilton's registry week took place at a recreation centre and headquarters was located at a local church. One difference here is that the space provided by the K-W OOTC church for the training and headquarters for Waterloo's registry week was donated in-kind, according to one convener, whereas, the spaces for the training and headquarters for Hamilton's registry week were rented by the City, according to another convener. Having the spaces for the training and headquarters donated in-kind for Waterloo's registry week is another example of how the church supported the K-W OOTC transition. These examples further support the idea that the Region and City were not dependent on community partners for in-kind donations.

Although the Alliance did ask to use space for headquarters, one convener said that overall, "*There were actually few asks [for donations.] [...] People came forward.*" This act of giving was anticipated due to the Alliance's history of collaboration. The latter convener explained:

*“I think we knew we had over 50 organizational members and that much of the Alliance’s way of working throughout our life as an organization has been by pooling together the contributions both financial and in-kind from our members, and so, I think that was kind of the approach that was on our mind as we’ve moved forward.”*

This history of collaboration has become part of the Alliance’s way of organizing, and therefore, it could count on its members to provide financial and material resources for action week. This “ethos of collaboration”, borrowing from Klodawsky (2014), was not found during Waterloo’s and Hamilton’s registry week, and comes from years of working together and building trusting relationships.

Aside from the four churches coming forward to donated space and money in support the K-W OOTC transition, no other community partners came forward and offered resources. Likewise, in Hamilton, there was no mention of community partners coming forward and offering resources – even when the City approached community partners to rent space for the training and headquarters. This suggests that the City of Hamilton and Region of Waterloo had relatively “weak ties” and more formal relationships with community partners, whereas the Alliance had relatively “strong ties” or more informal relationships with member organizations and community partners, borrowing from Clarke (2009).<sup>69</sup> One convener from the City of Hamilton claimed there was no need to fundraise. They explained, *“One of the benefits of having a municipality conduct [a registry week] is that we didn’t have to worry about fundraising because we could leverage off existing resources in house. We had the capacity to manage that.”* Since the campaign aligned with homelessness funding requirements, and because conveners from the formal leadership structure were service managers for homelessness, they could use this funding for their

registry weeks. Having access to this funding supports the idea by one convener that Waterloo's and Hamilton's registry weeks were better resourced.

At a time when resources are scarce, one thing that is questioned here is why funding is being spent on events such as a registry week when there is an opportunity to fundraise and when the funds that are available could (should?) go directly into housing and supports? It worth keeping in mind that the City of Hamilton and Region of Waterloo likely had larger budgets than most community partners. One convener said the reason why the Region of Waterloo didn't fundraise for registry week was because there wasn't enough time in the weeks leading up to it. They explained things were "moving so quickly" and if the Region "had more time", it could have done more. When speaking with this convener, there was a sense of regret that the Region did not fundraise. Perhaps it is because municipal governments are under pressure to demonstrate fiscal responsibility – or to use resources efficiently. From this missed opportunity, the Region learned to "[b]e prepared to resource [registry week] – [... to] seek opportunities for in-kind [donations] and sponsorship" (Region of Waterloo, 2015, February, "Registry Week Pilot", slide 40).

Another possible reason why conveners did not fundraise may be that designated communities under the HPS have certain mandates and are required to use their grant money within a certain timeframe (see ESDC, 2018, "Terms & Conditions"). Perhaps too, using this money would show senior levels of government that the funding is needed and would put pressure on them to provide more? Still, fundraising would have fostered community engagement and a shared responsibility for homelessness. Not taking advantage of fundraising suggests conveners from the formal leadership structure were more interested in meeting their mandate than community engagement.

Although the Alliance was dependent on member organizations and community partners for financial and material resources for action week, and this notion of working together and pooling together resources fostered community engagement and made Ottawa's action week a more grassroots campaign, it is important to keep in mind the context in which this collaborations and sharing was permitted. Perhaps part of the reason why member organizations were willing to share their resources with the Alliance for action week was because the goals of the campaign aligned with their own mandates as well. Had the campaign not aligned with government funding requirements, would member organizations been (as) willing to share their limited resources with the Alliance for action week?

#### *5.3.4.7. Promotional material*

Conveners used promotional material to raise awareness about action/registry week. One difference found amongst pilot communities was the types of promotional material used and how they were produced. Both the Region of Waterloo and City of Hamilton had production videos made to promote their registry weeks, which were shared at their community debriefs. Hamilton's registry week video was even later used in the CAEH's 20K Homes campaign promotional video (see CAEH, 2015, June 9). What's interesting is that while the City of Hamilton used administration dollars to hire a production company, the Region of Waterloo drew on corporate services (i.e. its Information Technology department) to create a video. This suggests that either the Region was trying to use its internal resources more efficiently or it did not have the same financial resources at its disposal. With a budget of \$1000 dollars, one convener explained that the Alliance put \$200 dollars towards hiring a graphic designer to create a logo for action week.

It did not have the financial and human resources available to it internally like the City and Region.

#### *5.3.4.8. Summary of action/registry week budget*

**Table 6** provides a summary of each pilot community's budget for action/registry week (see **Appendix R – Financial & Material Resources**). It includes a breakdown of the financial and material resources acquired and the channel through which they came from. This table is partial and is based on the information that was collected from interviews. The Alliance spent \$1,000 of its annual budget towards Ottawa's action week. This does not include the amount provided through sponsorship and in-kind donations. Assuming the total amount in sponsorship each pilot community received from the CAEH for training and technical support was \$12,000, Ottawa's action week cost a minimum of \$13,000.<sup>70</sup> If the cost of in-kind donations were factored in, action week was more likely to cost around \$20,000. The total cost of Waterloo's registry week was \$20,000. This amount includes \$12,000 from the Region's 2014 Housing Services budget, \$2,000 donated in-kind by the four K-W OOTC churches, and \$6,000 in sponsorship from the CAEH. The City of Hamilton spent \$15,000 of its Housing Services budget towards registry week. According to one convener, this included the cost of the training and technical support provided by the CAEH. It is worth mentioning here that none of these totals include the cost of volunteer and staff hours. Conveners could leverage off staff hours because the campaign supported their work. Overall, conveners from the formal leadership structure had more financial resources available to them internally to support their registry weeks whereas the Alliance was more dependent on member organizations and community partners to carry out action

week. This dependency, again, fostered community engagement and a more grassroots campaign.

### *5.3.5. Spatial strategies & methods for recruitment*

The purpose of this section is to understand how conveners recruited frontline, volunteers and survey participants for their local campaigns. To achieve this objective, this section examines the spatial strategies and methods conveners used for recruitment and is divided into two sub-sections. Sub-section one focuses on the spatial strategies and methods conveners used to recruit frontline staff and volunteers. Sub-section two focuses on the spatial strategies and methods used to recruit survey participants. The findings from this study show that conveners depended on their pre-existing campaign networks for recruitment. Also, the organizational structure and characteristics of each local campaign shaped the recruitment process.

#### *5.3.5.1. Spatial strategies & methods for recruiting frontline staff & volunteers*

Although broad community engagement was a motivating reason why the Alliance agreed to pilot the 20K Homes campaign and one of the main objectives of action week, the findings from this study show that the City of Hamilton was more successful recruiting frontline staff and volunteers for its local campaign. More than 150 frontline staff and volunteers participated in Hamilton's registry week (City of Hamilton, 2015, April 30, "Community Debrief", slide 4)<sup>71</sup>, meanwhile, approximately 120 frontline staff and volunteers participated in Ottawa's action week (ATEH, 2015, April 23, slide 9)<sup>72</sup>. Waterloo's registry week engaged the fewest number of frontline staff and volunteers. A total of 81 individuals participated in Waterloo's registry week (Region of Waterloo, 2015,

“Pilot Report”, p.3). Of these 81 individuals: 21 were Regional staff, 37 were agency staff from the HHSS, 14 were community volunteers, and 9 were from community partner organizations (*ibid*, p.11). In other words, 60 frontline staff and volunteers were engaged in Waterloo’s registry week. To understand why these different levels of engagement existed in each pilot community and why more frontline staff and volunteers participated in Hamilton’s registry week, consideration is given here to the different spatial strategies and methods used for recruitment.

Seven strategies were identified for recruitment, including: convening organizations’ websites, mass e-mail, social media (including Facebook and Twitter), outreach, “standing meetings and events” (City of Hamilton, 2015, November, p.2), the local newspaper, and “Key Messages” (see Region of Waterloo, 2014, November 19 & 28). In addition, three sign-up methods were identified for recruitment. These include: e-mail, telephone, and mail-in applications. Before going into detail on each strategy and method, it is emphasized here that they are not meant to be exhaustive and do not hold equal weight in each pilot communities. Overall, the findings from this study suggest that conveners with more financial and human resources available to them internally had greater “mobilization potential” (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987).<sup>73</sup> Even though the Region of Waterloo and City of Hamilton had more financial and human resources available to them internally, their registry weeks were more restrictive of “volunteer” participant than Ottawa action week, which fostered a more open campaign network.

Conveners used their organizational websites to post information about the 20K Homes campaign. These websites were useful as they served as hubs where information about the campaign could be stored and shared. Conveners from Ottawa and Hamilton

created a webpage for the 20K Homes campaign, which included sign-up information for action/registry week. Having a separate webpage designated for the campaign was strategic as it emphasized the importance of the event and could easily be accessed by online users. Although information about the 20K Homes campaign was posted on the Region of Waterloo's website, it was posted on the HHSS webpage and did not include any sign-up information with regards to registry week. This indicates that the webpage was merely for storing and sharing information and was targeted towards agency staff working in the HHSS. It also suggests that the Region was not looking to engage many volunteers. Even though conveners' organizational websites are open to the public, it is unknown how effective this strategy was for recruitment and for making new connections.

Conveners from Ottawa and Hamilton sent out mass e-mails to member organizations/community partners, targeting frontline staff by informing them about the campaign and how to get involved. In Ottawa, this mass e-mail was targeted towards past volunteers as well. One volunteer explained:

*“I just received one of the e-mails sent out to all social work students requesting volunteers for the campaign, and I’d already done one of my courses for school. We had met with [name] from Alliance to End Homelessness, and we were doing a research project on [the] organization, and we’d went to one of[the] meetings [...] and presented our knowledge about the organization to our class. So, I already knew [about] the Alliance to End Homelessness, and it was interesting the work that they were doing. So, when I got the e-mail, I decided to get involved.”*

The Alliance has a history of working with the local universities in its efforts to end homelessness (Klodawsky, 2007; Klodawsky et al., 2009). As demonstrated here, the Alliance depended on its prior connection with the university for recruiting volunteers for action week. At the same time, this volunteer had a prior connection with the Alliance

through their studies, and so, they were already familiar with the organization and the work it did. These prior connections were important for building trust and legitimacy around the organization and the local campaign.

The mass e-mail the City of Hamilton sent out included a promotional flyer with a link to its website, inviting community partners to sign-up for registry week. The City encouraged recipients to circulate the e-mail “through their e-mail networks” (City of Hamilton, n.d., “Follow-up e-mail”). Doing so, the City was trying to tap into community partners’ extended networks to increase the mobilization potential for registry week. This too was strategic for building trust and legitimacy around the municipal government and the local campaign.

While conveners from all three pilot communities used social media (Facebook and/or Twitter) to raise awareness and foster community engagement for action/registry week, only the Alliance used social media as a method for recruitment. With limited human and financial resources available to it internally, social media was a viable recruitment method for the Alliance because it saved time; required little human resources and no additional cost. Also, using social media could potentially help the Alliance achieve broad community engagement and gain access to resources it was dependent on for carrying out action week.

The Alliance posted on Facebook and Twitter to inform people about the campaign and to encourage them to sign-up. Some of these posts included a link to the campaign webpage found on the organization’s website where more information about the campaign was provided and how to sign up. People part of the Alliance’s social media networks were encouraged to share and/or retweet information about action week amongst their own

social media networks using the hashtag #20KHome and/or @ATEH\_Ott. Doing so would help the Alliance quickly spread information about the campaign across a larger network of people and would potentially help increase the mobilization potential for action week. Having said that, more information is needed to understand how effective these social media sites were for recruiting frontline staff and volunteers for action week.

Conveners from Waterloo and Hamilton posted information about the 20K Homes campaign on Twitter. For Hamilton's registry week, this included a link to the campaign webpage found on the City of Hamilton's website. Although this webpage included sign-up information for registry week, there was nothing mentioned on Twitter by the City (or Region) about signing up. This suggests that Twitter was not intended to be used as a recruitment tool. Instead, the City of Hamilton and Region of Waterloo used this social media site to raise awareness and foster community engagement. The Region, for example, posted a YouTube video, the survey results, and a final registry week report on Twitter. Posting these resources on Twitter made them accessible to a wider audience, which would help raise awareness and educate the public on the homelessness, the need for affordable housing, and the campaign.

Like the Alliance, the City of Hamilton and Region of Waterloo also encouraged people to follow registry week on Twitter, and to re/tweet information about the campaign using the @RegionWaterloo/@CityofHamilton username and the #20KHomes hashtag. Although more information is needed to know how many people got involved online and how much awareness was raised through social media, according to the City of Hamilton, "Projecting live Twitter feed at events (training and debrief) helped #20homes to become the number one trending item on Twitter for Hamilton" (2015, November, p.2). This

suggests that Twitter was a useful tool for spreading awareness about the campaign, at least in Hamilton. It also helps explain why the City was more successful than the Alliance at recruiting a larger number of volunteers. If #20homes was the number one trending item on Twitter, this means people were active and sharing information about registry week online, and that it reached a wider audience. This would have helped increased the mobilization potential for Hamilton's registry week. People who knew about Hamilton's registry week through social media and were interested in getting involved could inquire about signing up. More data is needed, however, to confirm how effective the methods really was for recruitment.

The City of Hamilton strategically used Twitter to provide an alternative form of community engagement as well. In a "Follow-up E-mail for Community Partners", the City of Hamilton (n.d.) stated, "for people who wish to be involved in Hamilton's Registry Week Activities, but are not available during survey shifts", they could "contribute" by "promoting the campaign on Twitter" either by "Re-tweeting campaign messages from @cityofhamilton", or by "using the hashtag #20kHomes[.]". Through Twitter, the City created an alternative space through which people could participate in registry week.

Nothing was found posted by the Region of Waterloo or City of Hamilton on Facebook about the 20K Homes campaign or registry week. This suggests that they were not interested in taking advantage of this online tool to recruit people for registry week or to even raise awareness and foster community engagement. This supports the idea that conveners from the formal leadership structure were not seeking broad community engagement. Although the City of Hamilton did not post information about the campaign on Facebook, it was found that some community partners did. This enabled sign-up

information to reach a wider audience, and subsequently, increased the mobilization potential for Hamilton's registry week. This also helps explain why conveners from Waterloo and Hamilton were perhaps more reluctant to use social media. Once this information was online, conveners have little control over the speed and extent to which this information could spread. Later in this analysis I will demonstrate how other forms of media were used to raise awareness and foster community engagement for action/registry week.

The Alliance used public outreach as a recruitment method. One convener explained this involved going out into the community, "boots-on-the-ground", and telling the public and member organizations face-to-face about the 20K Homes campaign, Ottawa's action week, and how they could get involved. Outreach is part of the everyday work of the Alliance, and so, the Alliance could use the outreach not only as a strategy for recruitment, but also, for raising awareness and educating the public on homelessness and the campaign. One convener thought the outreach "really drew on folks' excitement and interest." Having said that, conveners agreed that the recruitment process should have started earlier and that the outreach was not very effective for reaching out to a wider audience. The latter convener explained:

*"There [was] a bit of a capacity challenge in the weeks leading up to [action week]. It would have been great if we perhaps even given additional presentations to other organizations or at other locations available at some point. It's just we didn't have enough hours in a day to get everybody, and that's a learning I think for – if we were to do something like this again."*

Unlike the City of Hamilton which had a whole communications team available internally to it to help with the recruitment, the Alliance had one project coordinator – and the help of a couple volunteers – to do public outreach. With only eight weeks to plan for action

week, the Alliance did not have time, neither did it have enough human and financial resources available to it internally, to reach out and make new connections, despite wanting to engage the broader community in action week.

The City of Hamilton made registry week an “agenda [item] at standing meetings and events” (City of Hamilton, 2015, November, p.2). These were face-to-face interactions with community partners from the local homelessness service system. Since registry week supported their local work, the City could incorporate the campaign as an agenda item at standing meetings and events. While this strategy was useful for recruiting professional staff as team leads, it was not useful for recruiting volunteers. For this reason, other methods of recruitment were needed to target volunteers to help carry out the surveying.

The City of Hamilton was the only convener found to use local newspapers as a recruitment method for its local campaign. Articles were found in the Hamilton Spectator and Flamborough Review, informing local citizens of the 20K Homes campaign, Hamilton’s registry week and the sign-up application (see “City of Hamilton looking for volunteers”, 2015, March 15; Nolan, 2015, March 21). The newspaper is useful for circulating information to a large audience, including people coming from different socio-economic backgrounds. It also helps fill the digital gap within a community. Although the newspaper comes at a cost to the reader, this cost is small, and in some places, the newspapers can be accessed for free (i.e. libraries, coffee shops, etc.). For these reasons, it is a more effective recruitment strategy than Outreach, Facebook and Twitter, and helps explain why the City was more successful than the Alliance at engaging a larger number of volunteers.

No articles were found in local newspapers seeking volunteers for Ottawa's action week. This suggests that the Alliance did not use local newspapers to recruit volunteers for action week, possibly because the cost of advertising was outside the organization's budget. However, it is questioned here whether it would have been more useful to put the money for developing a logo towards a newspaper ad? This put the Alliance at a disadvantage in terms of reaching a wider audience and potentially engaging more volunteers in action week. Since the Alliance was on a tight budget, outreach and online methods were more viable options for reaching out to the public because (again) they came at no additional cost to the organization.

Although the Region of Waterloo had the largest budget out of all three pilot communities, there were no articles found in local newspapers seeking volunteers for Waterloo's registry week. This supports the idea that the Region was not looking to engage many volunteers.

Unfortunately, little is known about how the Region of Waterloo recruited "volunteers" for registry week. At best, it can be speculated that this was done through private interactions. The only information found related to recruitment was on one of two "Key Messages" documents and two news articles found online. On the one "Key Messages" document, it states that agency staff, community partners and volunteers were "invited to participate [in the registry week]" and that "**If people are interested in the Registry Week, they should attend the Community Debrief session**" (Region of Waterloo, 2014, November 28, p.2 – **bold** original). It is uncertain how these "Key Messages" documents were circulated; however, the title of the former document suggests that they were targeted toward agency staff working in the local HHSS (see Region of

Waterloo, 2014, November 19). This document provides evidence that the Region was not seeking broad community engagement and suggests “volunteers” were invited to participate through private interactions.

The two online news articles mention the date and location of the community debrief, with one stating that a media advisory was to come (see Exchange Magazine, 2014, November 25), and the other article referring to the community debrief as a “public meeting” (see D’Amato, 2014, November 27). A media advisory was not found of Waterloo’s community debrief and there is some ambiguity as to who the “public” are. It is questioned here whether this included the wider community? If the Region was interested in engaging the wider public, it is believed here that this invite would have been stated clearer. Instead, the ambiguity suggests that the Region was not interested in engaging the wider public. This lack of interest is perceived here as a missed opportunity to: raise awareness and educate the public about homelessness and the need for affordable housing; and make new connections and find additional resources needed to house people for the campaign.

Three sign-up options were identified: e-mail, telephone and regular mail. In Ottawa, frontline staff and volunteers had the option to e-mail or phone-in to sign-up for action week. A telephone option is useful for people without internet. In Hamilton, an application form was available online. Volunteers were required to fill out the application form and could either submit it online via e-mail or mail in a hardcopy to the City. Even though this method does not address the digital divide within a community, the City still managed to recruit more people for registry week. The small number of volunteers engaged in Waterloo’s registry week suggests that application forms and sign-up options were not

available and that these people likely agreed to participate in the local campaign through private interactions with the Region.

According to one convener, the reason why the Region of Waterloo engaged a smaller number of volunteers was because it surveyed a relatively smaller geographic area. Although this may have been a legitimate reason, the characteristics of these people need to be considered. Volunteers included: staff from the former K-W OOTC program, staff from the local BIA, staff from the Health system, local funders and universities (Region of Waterloo, 2014, November 28, p.2 & 2015, “Pilot Report”, p.12). These findings suggest volunteers had a prior connection and strong ties with the Region and/or HHSS. The calibre of volunteers suggests that the Region was much more selective in its recruitment process. Also, the little information found on recruitment further suggests that the Region was not seeking broad community engagement and was much more restrictive in its recruitment process. For these reasons, it is argued here that the Region fostered a closed and exclusive campaign network.

Although the Alliance did not recruit and engage as many people as it had hoped, one convener pointed out that the volunteers who participated in Ottawa’s action week came “from all walks of life, not just the system.” This included at least one person with lived experience and individuals who had been personally affected by homelessness. Three participants interviewed for this study agreed that this broader community engagement made Ottawa’s action week a more “grassroots” campaign. In agreement with these participants, it is argued here that the Alliance fostered a more open and inclusive campaign network.

Out of the 150 people who participated in Hamilton's registry week, it is unknown how many of these people worked in the local service system. The demographics of volunteers is also unknown. What is known is that Hamilton's registry week included at least one person with lived experience. Also, even though 150 people participated in Hamilton's registry week, it was found that the City of Hamilton received 200 volunteer applications.<sup>74</sup> One convener explained, "*So, we actually had to start turning volunteers away because we had reached our target – pretty quickly actually. It only took us about three weeks to secure 200 volunteers, and that was pretty incredible.*" Although there may have been practical reasons why volunteers were turned away from participating in Hamilton's registry week, doing so suggests that the City of Hamilton was not interested in seeking broad community engagement. More so, it supports the idea that the City of Hamilton was more restrictive in engaging volunteers. It is argued here that although the City of Hamilton recruited more volunteers, it fostered a more closed and exclusive campaign network than the Alliance.

The findings here raise questions about Ottawa as well. If broad community engagement was an action week goal, did the Alliance have a target number of volunteers it wanted to engage? Would the Alliance have put a cap on the number of volunteers it recruited or was it truly a no catalyst for volunteer participation? Would it have turned away volunteers?

To understand why the Region of Waterloo and City of Hamilton were more reluctant to engage a larger number of volunteers, I draw on McCarthy & Zald (1997) to address this question. According to these scholars:

“[Social movement organization] leaders have been skeptical of the involvement of conscience constituents [...] Conscience constituents are fickle because they have wide-ranging concerns. [...] Not only may the involvement of conscience and beneficiary constituents lead to interpersonal tensions, it also leads to tactical dilemmas” (1977, p.1232).<sup>75</sup>

Simply put, leaders may be hesitant about engaging many participants because it can lead to competing interests, strategies and tactics. It is understood here that the Region and City did not promote community engagement to protect their own interests. These conveners had their own campaign goals, focus and approach to homelessness that the campaign supported and that met specific mandates. Engaging the broader community could have put these local campaigns at risk of being closely scrutinized and criticized. It could have derailed plans and threatened their own interests. For these reasons, conveners from the formal leadership structure fostered relatively closed and exclusive campaign networks.

Being a membership-based organization that depended on the community at large for financial and material resources, the Alliance had to be open to new ideas and willing to negotiate multiple interests. Also, being an advocacy group, the Alliance was looking for ways “to challenge the status quo”, as once convener put it. Therefore, it was seeking broad community engagement.

In conclusion, it was found that conveners depended on their pre-existing campaign networks to recruit frontline staff and volunteers for action/registry week. It was also found that the organizational structure and characteristics of each local campaign shaped the recruitment process. These findings are in line with the literature. Although the Alliance was seeking broad community engagement, it did not have the human or financial resources to access enough recruitment channels to achieve this. Engaging a larger number

of volunteers would have expanded the local campaign network, which could have potentially led to the mobilization of more resources and helped raise more awareness and achieve greater advocacy. While conveners from the formal leadership structure had more financial and human resources available to them, had access to more recruitment channels, and had greater mobilization potential, they were not interested in broad community engagement and were more restrictive in the recruitment process. This was to protect their own interests and meet their mandates.

#### *5.3.5.2. Spatial strategies & methods for recruiting survey participants*

The purpose of this section is to identify and discuss spatial strategies and methods conveners used to recruit survey participants for action/registry week. The findings from this study show that conveners were dependent on their pre-existing networks for finding and recruiting survey participants. Also, in line with the literature, the spatial strategies employed for recruitment were highly influenced by the larger political context and were intended to achieve their local campaign goals and influence policy decisions. While conveners strategically surveyed in spaces known to be accessed by the hidden homeless, they only surveyed those people who had some form of connection with the local service system. This has important implications for the those hidden homeless populations who are not connected to the service system at all.

Networks are a useful conceptual tool for analyzing how survey participants – that is, people experiencing homelessness – were recruited for action/registry week. One convener described the surveying for Ottawa's action week as being “done by almost all of the *networks* that work with the street involved population” (my *emphasis*). Similar was found in Waterloo and Hamilton as well. These “networks” include member

organization/community partners part of each pilot community's local homeless service system. Conveners depended on these networks for finding and recruiting survey participants, including, the 'hidden' homeless. These member organizations and community partners were the 'bridges' through which conveners could administer the survey and prioritized individuals for Housing First programs and supports. These 'bridges', however, fell short in their extent as they did not reach those people who had no connection with the local service system at all. This suggests that only those people connected to the service system could be prioritized for permanent housing and supports. To ensure everyone has access to affordable housing and supports, new investments are needed.

Communities interested in doing a registry week are advised to map out their survey locations by identifying "hot spots" (see 20K Homes & CAEH, n.d., "*Mapping Survey Locations*"). "Hot spots" are meant to be places frequented by people experiencing homelessness and easy to find. Not surprisingly, each local campaign had what one convener referred to as a "downtown focus". This was strategic because, as another convener explained, the downtown "*is typically the place where the majority of services for people experiencing homelessness are located, and typically, [is] where people in absolute homelessness or sleeping rough are most visible in our community.*" Surveys generally took place on the streets, in emergency shelters, and at drop-in centres – places typically associated with the absolute, visible, and chronically homeless. In Ottawa and Hamilton, day programs and community health centres were also identified. Since Waterloo's registry week took place at the end of Fall 2014, surveys were conducted at soup kitchens and two Out of the Cold sites, which "were still running at the time", one

convener explained. Focusing on the downtown was strategic then for finding and surveying the absolute, visible, and chronically homeless and achieving the goals of action/registry week.

According to the Region of Waterloo (2015, “Pilot Report”, p.11), “Staff from agencies within the [HHSS] provided input on the local approach to surveying. Based on their feedback, a number of survey methods were used, to ensure the most comprehensive results possible.” Asking agency staff for help with identifying survey locations was strategic because they worked with people experiencing homelessness daily and were knowledgeable about where these people stayed. By gaining access to these spaces, the Region could survey as many people as possible, which would help raise awareness and prioritize these people for permanent housing and supports.

If the focus of action/registry week was downtown and in spaces often associated with the absolute, visible, and chronically homeless, what strategies did conveners use to reach out to the “hidden” homeless? Again, conveners were dependent on their local service systems for finding and recruiting the hidden homeless. In the weeks leading up to action/registry week, conveners reached out to agency staff to ask if their agency would be a host location for the survey and to help with the recruitment process. At the same time, conveners developed promotional material to inform people experiencing homelessness about the survey. For Hamilton’s registry week, flyers were “distributed broadly” (City of Hamilton, 2015, November, p.2). One convener explained that the City of Hamilton strategically “posted under websites and libraries and things like that” to reach out to the ‘hidden’ homeless. Likewise, for Waterloo’s registry week, “flyers were posted in community gathering spaces to inform people experiencing homelessness of the upcoming

registry week” (Region of Waterloo, 2015, “Pilot Report”, p.12), however, this method was to target the chronically homeless.

Flyers are a viable method for recruitment considering other methods, like the internet, are relatively expensive for people experiencing homelessness and may be inaccessible. One problem with using flyers as a recruitment method, however, is that they are only seen by those people accessing the places where they are posted. So, if flyers were posted within agencies and libraries, they would have only been seen by people accessing those services. Likewise, posting information about the local campaign on websites may have been farther reaching than fliers, but these websites are only accessible to those people who are familiar with them and does not negate that the survey was exclusive of those people who were at-risk of losing their permanent housing.

For Ottawa’s action week, the Alliance asked agency staff for help with reaching out to subpopulations part of the ‘hidden’ homeless using different “methods of outreach” (ATEH, 2015, “Action Week Check List”). Asking agency staff for help to reach out to the ‘hidden’ homeless was strategic as it would allow the Alliance to survey more people and demonstrate that there was a greater need for affordable housing locally. It is unknown for certain what these different methods of outreach were. Consideration was given to creating promotional material (i.e. flyers and posters) for agencies/individuals (*ibid*). It is understood here that this meant flyers/posters would be/were given to agencies to post internally and/or to distribute to people they knew who were experiencing homelessness. Alternatively, it is possible that agency staff reached out to people they knew were experiencing homelessness personally to tell them through “word-of-mouth” about the survey, borrowing from one agency staff member. Unlike fliers, this method does not

require a printing cost, and therefore, is useful for non-profits, like the Alliance, that are on a low budget. Having said that, this method is ineffective in that it is not far reaching. What's more, this method runs the potential risk of agency staff deciding for themselves who they think should be prioritized for permanent housing and supports.

The Alliance used real outreach workers to lead the street survey teams and help find the “hidden” homeless as well. One outreach worker described their role as a team lead like this:

*“I made sure to find those ones I knew wouldn’t do [the survey] unless we caught them, which I feel is very important because, as I was saying earlier, when you’re doing a campaign like this, putting these things at the surfaces is great, because a lot of people do go and use those services, but there are a lot of people who don’t. [...] I think that the campaign can really utilize some of the outreach teams better in the sense of getting out on the streets and getting a lot of people. Because a lot of the people [...] fall under that category that don’t go to shelters, don’t live in shelters, [they’re] couch surfing, staying at friends’ houses, but they’re still homeless. Those are the people I wanted to find as an outreach leader.”*

It is suggested here that the outreach is a valuable service because it has important connections with people experiencing homelessness who are not accessing formal supports, and therefore, are hard to find. Explaining why some people experiencing homelessness do not use emergency shelters, this outreach worker said:

*“From what I’m told and from what I have seen over the years, there are a variety of different reasons, but I think the biggest one for me is, a lot of these people have been burned by services in the past. They were in group homes or other facilities or something somewhere and something happened to burn that bridge.”*

It is understood here that people experiencing homelessness may feel reluctant or perhaps unable to access these formal supports when a ‘bridge’ is burnt. A ‘bridge’ is burnt when the relationship between the person experiencing homelessness and the service provider has been damaged. For example, a ‘bridge’ may be burnt when an emergency shelter

becomes unsafe or disruptive to stay in, or when the person experiencing homelessness is unable to follow the rules. When a ‘bridge’ is burnt, a ‘hole’ or gap exists between people experiencing homelessness and those services. According to this outreach worker, the outreach is important because it bridges the gap “between the services and people out on the street.” Put in other words, the outreach helps connect or reconnect people experiencing homelessness to the service system. Utilizing the outreach for action week then was strategic because it helped the Alliance find and survey the ‘hidden’ homeless and get them on the priority list for permanent housing and supports. Doing so, it would be able to demonstrate that there is a higher need for affordable housing locally. But that’s not all. Leading the survey teams gave the outreach a chance to prove itself as a valuable service. Another outreach worker explained:

*“There were people we were specifically looking for that we know don’t go to shelters, that we know live in ‘tent city’, and how are these people going to find them if they never been out on the streets looking for them? And so, [the Alliance] gave us an opportunity to do that. To bring [people experiencing homelessness] to them. Right? And that was exciting for me. That call to action was exciting and doable and possible. [...] I guess there’s always like – for me, it feels like there is always something in action, but there is not much I can do, and I was like, oh that’s simple! Take you out on the street? I can do that!”*

Leading the survey teams gave the outreach the opportunity to show their knowledge and skills, which was important for building legitimacy around the service. This experience was important as it could potentially help influence funders and policymakers’ decisions. Likewise, the Alliance provided a space where the outreach team could get involved, which was one of the main goals of action week. It is important to recognize, however, that while these “street people” that the outreach was able to connect with for the action week survey may have been experiencing more hidden forms of homelessness, they were still absolutely

homeless or without permanent housing. In other words, the outreach is less useful for finding and recruiting people at-risk of losing their permanent housing.

To reach out to the ‘hidden’ homeless during Waterloo’s registry week, focus was on those individuals “known to STEP Home” (Region of Waterloo, 2014, November 19, p.2). According to the Region of Waterloo, “During the pre-Registry Week period, agency staff surveyed people experiencing homelessness who they knew would remain homeless over the survey period but whom they would be unable to survey on either of those days” (2015, “Pilot Report”, p.12). This included individuals staying in motels, hospitals, jail, treatment centres, encampments, and couch surfing (*ibid*). One convener explained: “People who were quite involved on the streets or in the housing stability system would be couch surfing in the shelter one night around the community, and then, there was a small group of folks who were primarily camping near-round.” Described here is the transient nature of homelessness – that people experiencing homeless are highly mobile and that one’s homelessness status is not static but fluid and contingent on place. This explains how agency staff from STEP Home knew where these individuals were staying – they had a prior connection with these individuals who were alternating between visible and hidden forms of homelessness. Had agency staff not had a prior connection with these individuals, they would have not known where to find them. Individuals staying in these places did not have permanent tenure, and therefore, were eligible to take the survey.

Conveners used other strategies for reaching out to the “hidden” homeless as well. For example, surveys were conducted at drop-in centres and/or day programs knowing, as one convener explained, that these services were sometimes accessed by the hidden homeless. One frontline worker continued to explain that these were “*people who might*

*not be staying in shelters but might go to the drop-ins for meals.” Interestingly, one volunteer said, “I think that the day programs are not an appropriate place to be interviewing people, because people for the most part are housed. So, maybe just some more [...] prep work around being really strategic around where you are going [to do the surveys.]” It is suggested here that most people accessing the drop-ins have a lease and are not eligible for Housing First programs and supports. While this may be a valid argument, many of those people accessing these programs are living paycheque-to-paycheque and are desperately seeking affordable housing and have limited options. If they can’t be helped through the survey, how will their needs be met? Also, there are some people accessing these programs who are living in temporary living accommodations and are eligible for Housing First programs and supports. More so, not all people living on the street access emergency shelters but will use the drop-ins. The Alliance strategically chose to survey at drop-ins because it wanted to find these people and as many of them as possible. It wanted to get those people who were eligible on the priority list to highlight the larger issue around the need for affordable housing.*

In all three pilot communities, surveys were conducted with individuals staying in short-term transitional housing programs. Similar to the outreach, transitional housing programs, including: Phoenix Place and Honouring the Circle in Hamilton, and Cornerstone’s McPhail residence in Ottawa – all which provide transitional housing for women – were cut funding when the Federal Government redirected funds towards Housing First back in 2013. The repercussions of these funding cuts varied. For Cornerstone, this meant less services would be available through this program; for Phoenix Place, the loss of funding was a threat to program closure; and for Honouring the Circle,

the loss of funding meant it had to temporarily close its doors. Questions arose, including: “What [would] happen to the women staying at the transitional home?” (Windigo, 2015). Would they be “Placed into housing first, return to domestic violence, be on the street?” (*ibid*). Surveying at local transitional housing programs was strategic then because not only were these programs temporary, but also, the people staying within these programs were at-risk of losing their temporary housing or had services taken away from them.

Like Waterloo’s registry week, surveys for Ottawa’s action week were conducted at a local hospital as a strategy for reaching out to the “hidden” homeless. Studies show that some people receiving psychiatric care are either at-risk of being discharged into homelessness because of poor discharge planning or lack thereof, or because they have nowhere else to go (Shapcott & Salazar, 2006; City of Hamilton, 2013; Forchuck et al., 2013; Gaetz, Scott & Gulliver, 2013; Thomson, 2014; Kauppi et al., 2017). These studies suggest that stronger policy enforcement and sufficient funding to support discharge planning is needed to prevent people in psychiatric care from being discharged into homelessness. These studies suggest too that housing alone is not enough when it comes to ending homelessness. Surveying at the hospital during registry/action week was strategic for getting people at-risk of homelessness and in psychiatric care prioritized for Housing First programs and supports.

Unfortunately, there was a missed opportunity in Ottawa to survey at multiple hospital locations. One volunteer explained:

*“Well, I know that they weren’t able to – I think they were only able to get into one of the hospitals to do the surveys there. So, if they were able to – and I don’t know if they just didn’t have enough time to … to coordinate with the other hospitals in order to get involved there, or if there was some other issues that came up, but, it was probably good to have surveyors at each of the hospitals.”*

Surveying at multiple hospital locations would have helped the Alliance reach out to more people and get them on the by-name list for permanent housing and supports. This would have helped the Alliance demonstrate that there is a greater need for affordable housing locally.

It needs to be considered why the Alliance was only able to survey at one hospital location. It was confirmed by one convener that the Alliance lacked the resources to do more outreach prior to the action week. They explained:

*"I guess that's where there is a bit of a capacity challenge in the weeks leading up to it. It would have been great if we perhaps even given additional presentations to other organizations or at other locations available at some point. It's just we didn't have enough hours in a day to get everybody, and that's a learning, I think, for – if we were to do something like this again."*

When this convener was asked what they wish they had done differently, they continued to explain that they would not have done things differently but rather wished they had more resources. They said, "*[...] I think that additional resources [...] in context of say, another staff body or two, to be able to reach out to all organizations earlier on in the weeks leading up to the campaign, with how to locate additional survey teams.*" The Alliance did not have enough time and human resources to do more outreach prior to action week because it lacked the financial resources to support another staff body or two. This problem stems from a larger issue around non-profits being significantly underfunded and the need for stronger investments in homelessness programs and services. With only one project coordinator doing the outreach prior to action week, the Alliance was limited in its capacity to reach out and find more people for the survey. The lack of resources available to the Alliance impeded on the strategies and goals of the local campaign. Regardless of not

having enough resources, by the end of Ottawa's action week, 461 individuals had been surveyed who were not on the City of Ottawa's priority list (ATEHO, 2015, April 23). By the end of Waterloo's registry week, 281 individuals had been surveyed (Region of Waterloo, 2014, December 3), and by the end of Hamilton's registry week, 454 individuals had been surveyed (City of Hamilton, 2015, April 30, "Community Debrief").

Above I have identified and discussed the spatial strategies and methods conveners used to recruit survey participants for action/registry week. Conveners relied on their local networks to find and recruit people experiencing homelessness, including the 'hidden' homeless. Emphasized here is that survey participants had some form of connection with the service system. But what about those people who have no connection to the service system or were not eligible to take the survey? How will affordable housing needs be met?

#### *5.3.6. Training*

In all three pilot communities, frontline staff and volunteers were required to attend one of two days training. The purpose of the training was to contextualize the 20K Homes campaign and learn how to administer the survey. Routledge's notion of "convergence space" is a useful conceptual tool for understanding how conveners converged with frontline staff and volunteers in these spaces at different times to learn and share knowledge needed to conduct the action/registry week survey. The findings from this study show that the training not only provided an important space for learning and sharing knowledge and 'best' practices, it was also an important space for fostering community engagement. These are discussed here.

The first part of the training introduced the 20K Homes campaign; an explanation for why it was important for communities to get involved locally and nationally; background information on the American 100K Homes campaign; and an overview of Housing First and collective impact as ‘best’ practices for addressing homelessness. The second part of the training focused on the roles and responsibilities of survey volunteers; a review of the survey kits (i.e. confidentiality, media, and consent forms); and an introduction and “walk-through”, as one volunteer put it, of the survey tool. According to one convener, the training was part of a larger process of seeing how pilot communities would respond to the survey tool and the campaign overall.

The walk-through of the survey questions allowed frontline staff and volunteers to become familiar with the survey. They learned how to ask certain questions (e.g. observation questions), and were given a “rationale”, as a convener put it, for why certain questions were being asked. Walking through the survey also gave them an opportunity to ask questions and discuss some of the wording around the survey tool. For example, one convener explained:

“[There were] a lot of “What about?”, “How if?”, “How about?” – kind of questions. “Well how about? – How do we define Aboriginal? How do we define First Nation?” “Could we also ask these questions? – or this question about veterans?” “Or that question about...?”, you know what I mean? So, a lot of those kinds of things.”

By walking through the survey, and asking and discussing questions on it, frontline staff and volunteers became engaged with the material being learned. Frontline staff and volunteers were also given the opportunity to provide feedback to Community Solutions

on the survey tool. This feedback contributed to the on-going development of the survey tool. As one convener explained:

*“The tool itself [...] is constantly being evaluated, and actually, based on a lot of feedback that [Community Solutions] received from many communities who used the VI-SPDAT, there were many adjustments made to it, and OrgCode actually released in May [2015] an updated version, which took into account a lot of the points of feedback that [Community Solutions] was getting from volunteers, from non-profit organizations, from government that have been done. So, its been revised.”*

This supports the idea that the training provided a space for learning and sharing knowledge and ‘best’ practices. Furthermore, it demonstrates that this learning and sharing is a mutual, multiscalar, and dynamic process (Routledge, 2003).

Frontline staff and volunteers were then given safety tips and information on how to engage with survey participants (see Community Solutions & CAEH, 2015, April 17 & 18, slides 23-26). This provided frontline staff and volunteers the opportunity to become more engaged by asking more questions and learning more about their roles and responsibilities. One convener thought, “[Community Solutions] *did a lot of effective troubleshooting in terms of helping people kind of navigate: What if this happens? What if this happens? What if a person says this?*” By considering different scenarios and having the learnings from the American 100K homes campaign, as some participants pointed out, frontline staff, and more so, volunteers, could address their concerns around the survey.

At the end of the training, frontline staff and volunteers were given the opportunity to do one-on-one “role playing”, as one convener described it. This involved practicing the survey script and questions with each other. This allowed them to engage more with the material and to become more comfortable with the survey process. By the end of the training, frontline staff and volunteers walked away from the training with the knowledge

and skills needed to be team leads/conduct the surveys. More so, frontline staff were given the opportunity to either develop or refine the skills needed to strengthen a “data-driven approach” to homelessness in their communities, borrowing from Leopold & Foster (2015, March 24).

There were some differences in each pilot community’s training session that are worth mentioning. One key difference was in the structure of the training sessions. While all three pilot communities had two days of training, in Hamilton and Ottawa, the first day of training was for frontline staff, and the second day of training was for volunteers. According to one convener, this was intended to accommodate the different levels of experience working with homeless people. In Waterloo, where the people engaged in registry week were closely connected to the service system, the option was given for volunteers to chose between one of the two days of training being offered, based on their availability, one convener explained. Based on these finding, organizational structure and characteristics shaped the training process.

For Hamilton’s and Waterloo’s registry weeks, more spaces were created in the training sessions for engagement. For example, in Hamilton, the roles and responsibilities of data entry volunteers and headquarter volunteers were also covered in the training session. Neither was found during Ottawa’s and Waterloo’s training sessions. There are a couple possible reasons for this difference. First, the notion of using a common assessment tool was new to Hamilton, and so, the City may have been more stringent on including the data entry in the training session. Second, engaging volunteers from the community to be headquarter and data entry volunteers likely meant that the City was being formal about the training process.

According to one convener, during the training session for Waterloo's registry week, survey teams were given the opportunity "to meet together with their teams [and] to make their plans for going out and doing the surveying." What's interesting here is how the survey teams became part of the planning process. Engaging a small number of volunteers who were closely connected with the local service system permitted spaces to be created for alternative forms of engagement. Although the Region was not open to broader community engagement, it was open to engaging volunteers closely connected to the local service system.

The volunteer training session for Ottawa's action week and Hamilton's registry week had particularly high levels of engagement and excitement (see Hayes 2015, April 27). Referring to the volunteer training sessions in Ottawa, one convener said:

*"One of the things that gave me goosebumps almost was these adults who volunteered. The training was a Saturday morning. So, these are folks who are coming out – there is no compensation of course. They're learning about this tool, and then, seeing this room full of adults' sort of role playing and testing each other with the survey tool just to me was one expression of people's commitment and attachment to this – to the degree to which people took it seriously. The intentionality of the care the volunteers brought to this campaign, I think, was inspiring for sure. But it also gave a good sense – an open drive to do this kind of engagement exercise more often, which again, for the Alliance, is part of what we do. Like, it really reinforced that there is interest in community to partner together on this issue."*

Having the broader community involved in the training showed that there are people who do care and want to be involved in addressing homelessness. It was also reassuring for the Alliance because it showed that collective responsibility is possible and that it could depend on the community at large to achieve the goals of the campaign. More so, the knowledge

and skills developed from the training empowered volunteers to act and provoked feelings of doing something meaningful.

There was a mixed response from frontline workers/agency staff amongst each pilot community towards the training. For Waterloo's registry week, one convener thought "people really appreciated the training." In Hamilton, it was found that "team leads were interested in learning about the VI-SPDAT" (City of Hamilton 2015, November). This was probably because the survey tool was new to the community and/or was thought to help strengthen the local service system. In Ottawa, two conveners thought the training went well. One convener said, "*Overall, I was really taken by how engaged people were. You know people were committed to an afternoon of training and they were convinced to go and do the surveys. So, it was really positive.*" The second convener agreed stating, "*Let's just say [...] the energy – the participation was amazing.*" One frontline worker, however, expressed that they already received training on the survey tool and that the training session for action week "*was more for the volunteers.*" The information provided in the training was intended to build legitimacy around the survey tool and create buy-in from the community, however, this wasn't needed as the tool was already being implemented locally. The different responses to the survey tool reflect the uneven change in the service sector toward a data-driven approach to homelessness. Despite receiving training prior to action week, one frontline worker was enthusiastic about the training. They said:

*"We all got to sit down in a room – everyone who actually cared about the issue of homelessness and who actually knew the clients out on the streets – we all got to get together and rally! And just exchange information! And get hyped and excited! And hit the streets and do something about it!"*

Described here, the training was a networking opportunity for frontline staff. For them (and volunteers), the training was a space to share knowledge, resources and contact information. For this study, it was an opportunity to find volunteer work and maintain connections with frontline staff and volunteers involved in action week, which helped with the recruitment process and informed the methodology of this study. Overall, frontline staff and volunteers received the training sessions well.

Another noteworthy difference in the training sessions was that for Hamilton's registry week, the City of Hamilton had an additional resource that it could provide survey team leads with extensive training. One convener explained,

*"We were fortunate enough to have a local resource fund[ed] through the Federal Homelessness Partnering Strategy that's called the Core Learning Collaborative, and the Core [Learning] Collaborative, they provide training primarily to frontline staff on various different topics related to providing services to people experiencing homelessness. So, they do a lot of anti-racist and anti-oppression training; they do training on mental health and addiction, and so, they actually provided training and supports for the team leads around how to engage with people when participating in the registry week. We did some safety planning; we did some training around how to support the volunteers; but also, how to navigate that engagement with the people that might be approached and asked to complete the survey."*

Some of the training needed for registry week (i.e. engagement and safety) aligned with the training offered by the Core Learning Collaborative. For this reason, the City could leverage off the training from the Core Learning Collaborative to provide extensive training for registry week. Doing so, it maximized its Federal HPS funding and was able take "risk mitigation measures [mandated] by the municipal government", borrowing from Amanda DiFalco (City of Hamilton, NCEH 2015, November 2). Having to take risk mitigation measures suggests, again, that the City of Hamilton engaged in a more formal training process. Overall though, the extensive training provided team leads a space for

engagement as well as sharing knowledge and ‘best’ practices. More so, having this local resource (the Core Learning Collaborative) available internally supports the idea of one convener, that conveners from the formal leadership structure had more resources at their disposal, and therefore, had better resourced campaigns. Having said that, there was no mention of extensive training being offered to agency staff during Waterloo’s registry week. Perhaps it is because the Region did not have a local resource available it due to the uneven distribution of Federal HPS dollars? Not having this additional resource shaped the characteristics of Waterloo’s registry week and ability to organize. It is uncertain whether a local resource like the one in Hamilton exists in Ottawa. Even if it did, it would be the City of Ottawa, not the Alliance, who had control over this local resource because it is Service Manager for homelessness. Even still, this could have been a way the City of Ottawa showed stronger support for local campaign.

The training provided a space where conveners could come together with frontline staff and volunteers to share knowledge and resources needed to conduct a registry week. Through the training, conveners were able to create spaces for community engagement. For conveners, this engagement exercise was perceived to help legitimize the use of the survey tool locally. Coming from the formal leadership structure, the City of Hamilton had additional resources available to it to provide frontline staff extensive training and engaged in a more formal training process. Overall, it was found that organizational structure and characteristics shaped the training process.

#### *5.3.7. Data*

The purpose of this section is to identify and discuss reasons why data was a key component of action/registry week. There are five main reasons why the data was

important. These reasons are: systems planning, community engagement, raising awareness and educating the public, tracking and reporting on progress, and advocacy. In Ottawa, the data was particularly important for pushing the City of Ottawa for higher housing targets, and in Waterloo, the information from the data would be adequate for replacing a PiT Count. These reasons are explored in more detail next. Overall, the data was important for achieving the goals of action/registry week and shaping outcomes.

#### *5.3.7.1. Data to strengthen local service system*

The data was important for strengthen local planning systems. It would be used to create a by-name list of the “most vulnerable” homeless people in each pilot community and prioritize them for permanent housing and supports. It would also be used to help pilot communities make informed decisions on how to allocate limited resources. This meant matching people with appropriate supports based on their needs and using these supports in an effective and efficient manner. In Waterloo, the data would be particularly useful for informing the allocation of additional resources given to STEP Home. Making data-informed decisions is a key component found in each pilot community’s 10-Year Plan, and so, not only would the data help strengthen local planning systems, it supported their local efforts to end homelessness (Regional Municipality of Waterloo, 2015, “Pilot Report”, p.15). What’s more, the data would help improve the coordination of local service systems. Generally, this meant sharing the information with service providers from different sectors to identify service gaps and create better responses to homelessness. For example, the City of Hamilton explained, “if we learn that there is a significant number of people frequently accessing the ER[,] we can share this aggregated information with our health sector and discuss developing target interventions strategies” (2015, April 23, p.3; see also, Kirnishni,

2015, April 23). Likewise, in Waterloo, this meant combining the results from registry week with input from support workers and shelter data to prioritize resources (Region of Waterloo, 2015, August 11). The data then was important for identifying who to prioritize and how to prioritize resources. It would support pilot communities with creating a more integrated system of care as well as help them identify next steps.

#### *5.3.7.2. Data collection & entry as a form of community engagement*

The data collection process fostered community engagement. Forming survey teams created spaces of engagement for frontline and volunteers. By signing-up to be part of the survey teams and help administer the surveys, frontline and volunteers were given the opportunity to be part of the data collection process and be part of a larger process of helping end homelessness in their community. In Ottawa, more spaces for volunteer engagement were created through the data entry process. Again, having volunteers help with the data entry during action week was important as the Alliance did not have enough human resources available to it internally, and therefore, was more dependent on volunteers to do this. Having volunteers help with the data entry process supports the idea that Ottawa's action week was a more grassroots campaign.

#### *5.3.7.3. Data to raise awareness & educate the public*

The data was important for raising awareness and educating the public on homelessness and the need for affordable housing. It was intended to provide a “snapshot” to better understand the scope of homelessness and level of need at the local and national levels. There appeared to be some agreement that the data provided a good understanding of the scope of homelessness locally. One convener from the Region of Waterloo said:

*“It is the best data that we ever had. People found it very interesting and enlightening. We had a lot of community interest following up on the data. So, for the first time, we really had comprehensive information that we were able to report back [on] regarding the number of veterans, for example, or aboriginal.”*

Waterloo did not have a community-wide registry prior to the campaign, just the information collected from “funded programs” and the K-W OOTC churches, borrowing from this convener. Not only would the campaign allow the region to conduct a registry week/PiT count and “have access to system-wide data”, borrowing, again, from this convener, the data would provide more extensive and detailed information on the local homeless population, including certain segments of the homeless population, which was not available before.

The data collected from Ottawa’s action week represented a portion of the local homeless population that had not already been surveyed through the City of Ottawa’s work. One frontline worker thought:

*“So, it was really good at making a commitment to make sure everybody was captured despite the level of risk that they might have been involved in in terms of their sleeping arrangements that night. Like, you could be couch surfing, you could be sleeping under a bridge, you could be accessing emergency services, and it did a really good job of capturing everybody within that spectrum, which was really good. Also, like I said too, just the amount of people they were able to capture in sort of every stage of homelessness or every sort of level of vulnerability within the city. So, they caught a lot of people who were chronically homeless and were actually the targeted population for the [housing] intervention, but it also gave a really good understanding of how many people are couch surfing, because that was something that would be captured really well through people doing [the survey] in the drop-in centres, because people who were couch surfing or still living in poverty, they’re still homeless, but you wouldn’t necessarily capture them doing just shelter surveys or the canvassing of the streets.”*

Acknowledged here are the efforts made by the Alliance to reach out to as many people experiencing homelessness as possible. What this frontline worker does not acknowledge,

however, or question rather, is what the data represents. Another convener from Hamilton's registry week agreed that:

*"One of the things the survey does really well is it targets people experiencing different types of homelessness. So, it targets people who are absolutely homeless. So, people who are on the streets, leaving hospitals, it targets – it could target, if you wanted to, people who are accessing the shelter system. So, depending upon what your community looks like in terms of its system, the data will reflect that."*

Suggested here is that the data reflects the local service system – those people who are accessing services. Interestingly, while the City of Hamilton agreed to pilot the campaign, “To understand the big picture of need [of homelessness locally]” (City of Hamilton, 2015, April 30, “Community Debrief”, slide 5), and claimed registry week was “a comprehensive check-in across [the] community to identify and enumerate as many people as possible experiencing homelessness” (City of Hamilton, n.d., “Fact Sheet”, p.1), it was later claimed that registry week “was not a comprehensive look at homelessness in Hamilton” (Bennett 2015, April 30). The above-mentioned convener continued to explain:

*"It's not a true representation of everyone experiencing homelessness in our community – to be mindful of what that data represents. So, in particular, an acknowledgement that while most of – for example – while most of the people that we surveyed were male, it's not to say that there aren't as many women or transgendered individuals in our community that are experiencing homelessness. It probably means that the system access points are easier for men. For example, we have a lot more men's shelters beds than we do women's shelter beds in our system, and so, that is an acknowledgement that it is not a reflection that more men experience homelessness. It's a reflection that accesses and services may be more available to men than women. And women may – and people in our transgender community may – experience homelessness differently as a result of very unique sets of circumstances. Yeah. I think that, again, depending – every community is going to be different. So, for Hamilton, for example, we have 192 beds for men and 20 beds for women. It's an obvious difference."*

This notion that emergency shelters and services have been historically geared towards men is supported in the literature (see Klodawsky et al., 2002). This difference was

reflected in the data. When asked what the repercussions of not targeting other homeless subpopulations were, this convener responded:

*“So, what we need to do is be careful not to allocate all of our resources under Housing First through the registry week. Because we have to acknowledge that there are people who don’t access the system in the same way but may still qualify for those supports or be eligible for those supports, and that those supports may be important to that person, but just because they weren’t surveyed, and just because they’re not accessing the system in the same way, doesn’t mean we can’t find other ways to access these individuals. So, one thing we know through registry week and point-in-time counts that we know is very challenging is how do we connect with and reach out to people who are hidden homeless.”*

It is questioned here what sort of efforts conveners will make to support those people who are not eligible to take the survey, but are still in need of affordable housing and supports? Focusing on only those people who are eligible for Housing First programs and support is not enough when the need for affordable housing is much higher than what the eligibility criteria will allow. The only way to reach out and connect with the hidden homeless is by providing an adequate supply of affordable housing.

It was found that the Alliance agreed to give the outreach team permission to use the results from the survey for the public outreach component of their work. This was strategic on the Alliance’s part for reaching out a wider audience to educate them and raise their awareness about homelessness and the need for affordable housing. Reaching out to this wider audience would potentially strengthen the organization’s advocacy efforts. The data was important then for the long-term sustainability of the campaign and local efforts to end homelessness. More so, it was important for the ongoing sustainability of the outreach. Allowing the outreach to share this information kept the team engaged and would further allow it to demonstrate that it is a valuable service.

It is questioned here how accurate the data was in representing homelessness at a local level? Looking at the survey results from Ottawa’s action week and Waterloo’s and Hamilton’s registry week that were shared at the community debrief (see ATEHO, 2015, April 23, slides 20-37; Region of Waterloo, 2014, December 3, slides 26-39; City of Hamilton, 2015, April 30, “Community Debrief”, slides 8-20), approximately 30 percent of survey participants identified themselves as “female” in all three pilot communities. While these findings align with the national average (see Gaetz et al., 2016), they give the impression that men are more susceptible to homelessness than women. However, this is not necessarily the case as the above-mentioned convener explained. In Hamilton, 19 percent of individuals surveyed identified themselves as “youth.”<sup>76</sup> This is in line with the national average as well (see Gaetz et al., 2016). The rates of youth homelessness in Ottawa and Waterloo were much higher<sup>77</sup>, however, making up approximately a third of the homeless population surveyed in each pilot community.<sup>78</sup> Likewise, 30 percent of survey participants in Ottawa identified themselves as Aboriginal.<sup>79</sup> This was further in line with the national average (see Gaetz et al., 2016). In Hamilton, 26 percent of survey participants identified themselves as Aboriginal, and in Waterloo, 14 percent of survey participants identified themselves as Aboriginal. Finally, in Hamilton, ten percent of survey participants identified themselves as an immigrant or refugee; and six percent of survey participants identified themselves as immigrants and refugees in Waterloo.<sup>80</sup> Despite the goal of Ottawa’s action week to include the ‘hidden’ homeless, immigrants and refugees were not included the survey results. Their absence perpetuates their ‘hidden’ status. It is agreed here with the convener above that the action/registry week data provides a distorted picture of homelessness in each pilot community. Despite local efforts to include the ‘hidden’

homeless, the data only represents those people who had some form of connection to the service system.

#### *5.3.7.4. Data to track and report on progress*

The data collected from action/registry week would be used to build a database that would allow pilot communities to track and report on progress towards achieving reductions in homelessness. Participating communities are required to report back to the CAEH on their housing placement rates monthly (see 20K Homes & CAEH, n.d., 2015, “*Community Agreement*”). The Region of Waterloo and City of Hamilton would be responsible for this. In Ottawa, however, the City of Ottawa would be responsible for reporting back to the CAEH. The aggregated results from registry/action week and monthly housing rates would be given to the CAEH so that national progress towards housing 20,000 could be tracked and displayed on the 20K Homes campaign website.<sup>81</sup> Collecting and reporting data is necessary not only for measuring progress toward the campaign’s goal but also for comparing results, as one convener pointed out, and for being transparent (*ibid*, p.1). Tracking and measuring progress would also help conveners fulfil the requirement of their community’s 10-Year Plan.

In Ottawa, this database would include information on people experiencing homelessness that was not already collected by the City of Ottawa. For the region of Waterloo, the data would “be used to create a community-wide registry” (News Staff, 2014, November 30). One convener explained that the local churches part of the K-W OOTC program collected “bits of data” on the people they were serving over the years, implying that the information the community had on homelessness was inconsistent and incomplete. The data from registry week would help fill the gaps. The campaign would

allow the Region to begin the process of collecting person specific data, setting targets, and sharing results. This convener continued to explain:

*“But it also – the process of gathering person specific data, that you can follow up on, and help people get housed, and develop a process and a focus on housing people with sort of a monthly target. We've never been asked or needed to provide monthly information, and having that real-time information in our community, or getting to a point where we are collecting it and sharing it with service providers on a monthly basis. I can't fully anticipate all the ways it will change, but it's going to change the way we do our work.”*

The Region found out later too that “the information required for a PiT Count [could] be obtained through a Registry Week” (Region of Waterloo, 2015, “Pilot Report”, p.10). This meant that the region of Waterloo would not be participating in the upcoming 2016 national PiT Count. In Hamilton, HIFIS was already being used throughout the service system, but the City agreed that the data collected from registry week would be “person specific” and useful for prioritizing people and resources.

#### *5.3.7.5. Data to advocate*

The data was further important for advocacy. The aggregated results from the survey would be used as evidence to show both the public and senior levels of governments the scope of homelessness and the level of need at the local and national levels. The intention was to “move public opinion and [gain] political support [for] a national housing strategy”, as one convener explained. Moving public opinion and gaining political support was particularly important in Ottawa where the Alliance was dependent on the community at large for housing because it did not have access to homelessness funding, and because one of the goals of action week was to put pressure on the municipal government to commit to higher housing targets. One convener said:

*"It was interesting that in Ottawa when they did the surveys there was about 400 or so people that the – one of the things we get a lot when we are talking to communities is, "We already did this" and "We already know everybody", but what Ottawa's surveys proved was that the City did not know everybody. Right? Because they had surveyed people in the shelter with the – with a similar survey – 400 and sum, and so, when Ottawa did its survey, it went out to see and talk to people that weren't in the original batch – that weren't on the City's original list, and that they were able to find so many people, like way more than the City expected. Certainly, more people outside than what the City believed were there. Like more than double. It was important – I think – because we certainly get a lot of, "We already know" or "We are already doing it". I can guarantee you that that is not the case in 99.9% of communities."*

The Alliance wanted to use the data collected from action week to demonstrate to the City of Ottawa that the level of need locally was higher than current housing targets and that current funding levels were not enough. The Alliance wanted to demonstrate that the size of the homeless population in Ottawa was much bigger than merely those people living in emergency shelters. It is questioned here though how effective the data was in convincing the local government to commit to higher housing targets when it had already demonstrated that it was not willing to make a stronger commitment when the Alliance tried to garner its support? Likewise, it is questioned here how effective the data would be for convincing senior levels of government to make a stronger commitment towards new investments in affordable housing?

#### *5.3.7.6. Conclusion*

In this section, I identified and discussed five reasons why data was a key component of action/registry week. It was suggested that the data would help inform conveners who to prioritize for permanent housing and supports, how to prioritize limited resources, and how to improve the coordination of their community's service systems. The process of data

collection and entry fostered community engagement. The data was also important for raising awareness and educating the public on homelessness and the need for affordable housing. It was also suggested that the data did not provide an accurate representation of homelessness in pilot communities, that the “snapshot” it created was distorted in showing only those people who had some form of connection with the local services system. In addition, the data would be important for tracking and reporting on progress toward achieving reductions in homelessness both locally and nationally and would be used to replace a PiT Count in Waterloo. Finally, the data was intended to provide evidence needed to move public opinion; to advocate for senior levels of government to make new investments in affordable housing; and for the City of Ottawa to commit to a higher housing target.

#### *5.3.8. VI-SPDAT – Common assessment tool*

The purpose of this section is to address how pilot communities collected the data for their local campaigns. Communities that sign-on to the 20K Homes campaign are required to use a common assessment tool (see 20K Homes & CAEH, n.d., “*Community Agreement*”).<sup>82</sup> The common assessment tool used was the Vulnerability Index - Service Prioritization Decision Assistance Tool (hereinafter the VI-SPDAT). The VI-SPDAT is a pre-screen tool that helps communities identify people experiencing homelessness with “high needs” and prioritizes them for Housing First programs and supports (Aubry et al., 2015). The VI-SPDAT was developed collaboratively by OrgCode and Community Solutions and was the common assessment tool used for the American 100K Homes campaign. According to OrgCode & Community Solutions (n.d.), the VI-SPDAT is an “evidence informed tool”. This means it has been grounded in medical research, tested and

refined (*ibid*). At a time when the federal government has mandated an evidence-based approach to homelessness, and local 10-Year Plans to End Homelessness call for responses to homelessness that are grounded in evidence and have measurable outcomes, the VI-SPDAT ‘meets’ these requirements as a form of evidence-based practice.

Critics of the VI-SPDAT have questioned its evidence-base, arguing that it “is not a psychometrically validated tool”, borrowing from Culhane (in Leventhal, 2017, p.37). Brown et al.’s (2018) study is the only one that exists to date on the psychometric properties of the VI-SPDAT. “Using Homelessness Management Information System data”, the purpose of their study was “to examine the internal consistency, test-retest, and inter-rater reliability of the VI-SPDAT when implemented in real-world practice” (p.3). The findings from their study showed that the VI-SPDAT had inadequate psychometric properties, meaning, that the reliability and validity of the VI-SPDAT were weak (*ibid*). There are several reasons for this. First, “These weaknesses”, Brown & Cummings (2018, July 5) explain, had to do with “problems with the tool itself.” Specifically, “The questions [on the VI-SPDAT] did not fully measure the concept of vulnerability” (*ibid*). This suggests that the notion of “vulnerability” took on multiple meanings. The second reason for these weaknesses had to do with how the tool was implemented in the “real-world” (*ibid*). Specifically, it was found that “The VI-SPDAT did not produce consistent results” (Brown & Cummings, 2018, July 5). One reason for this inconsistency in scores had to do with service providers “inflat[ing]” the surveyee’s score, as Culhane (in Leventhal, 2017) put it, when answering observational questions on the VI-SPDAT. This was “in an effort to advocate for clients to attain housing”, Brown et al. (2018, p.6) explain. Another reason for the inconsistency in scoring had to do with the fact that some administrators had

“inadequate training” with the survey tool (*ibid*). Having “untrained volunteers” administering the VI-SPDAT and “making life and death decisions [...] with scarce public resource[s]” during the 100K Homes Campaign was one main concerns Culhane had with the survey tool (Leventhal, 2017, p.37). Brown et al. (2018, p.1) explain that the “psychosocial or health domains [on the VI-SPDAT] may not be easily perceivable, particularly among assessors without clinic training.” A third reason why the VI-SPDAT did not produce consistent results was because it “primarily relies on self-report of those assessed” (Brown et al., 2018, p.1). Survey participants have been found to self-report “inaccurately”, borrowing from Brown & Cummings (2018, July 5; also see Brown et al., 2018; Culhane in Leventhal, 2017). According to Brown et al. (2018), this inaccuracy in self-reporting has important implications. They explain, “Underreporting such vulnerabilities on the VI-SPDAT may inadvertently limit one’s opportunities for housing and support services by producing lower scores” (p.1). Likewise, “People who over-report their vulnerability may be prioritized for higher-level support services than necessary” (*ibid*). This, they further explain, can be costly to the public system. A third reason why the VI-SPDAT was found to be a poor psychometric tool was because it poorly predicted whether an individual would become homeless again (Brown et al., 2018). Instead it was found that “The type of housing support a person [received] was a better predictor of [them] returning to homelessness than their VI-SPDAT score” (Brown & Cummings, 2018, July 5). Finally, it was found that despite the type of housing intervention recommended by the survey tool, “Most individuals [received housing] in a setting other than recommended based on their VI-SPDAT score” (Brown et al., 2018, p.3). The likely reason for this, Brown et al. (2018) explain, had to with a lack of housing resources available in the

community being investigated. Brown & Cummings (2018, July 5) suggest that “Communities that have adopted the VI-SPDAT as the primary method for making housing recommendations should integrate other assessments that are more comprehensive in nature and that include other sources of information in addition to self-report.” They also suggest that “Additional research and development of the VI-SPDAT and other coordinated assessment tools, such as the [Vulnerability Index – the full version of the survey tool –], can help improve these tools and ensure people are prioritized appropriately and given the support services and housing they need.”

#### *5.3.8.1. Why conveners agreed to use the common assessment tool*

Consideration needs to be given as to why conveners agreed to use this common assessment tool. At the time the 20K Homes campaign was being piloted, the use of a common assessment tool was not new to Ottawa’s and Waterloo’s service sectors. According to one spokesperson interviewed for this study, back in July 2014, the City of Ottawa allocated HPS dollars towards training local agency staff on the full version of this survey tool to create a priority list targeting long-stay shelter users for Housing First programs and supports. At the same time, the pre-screen tool was being used. Likewise, the Region of Waterloo had been collaborating with agencies within the HHSS using the VI-SPDAT (Region of Waterloo, 2015, “Pilot Report”, p.9). Since the survey tool was already being used locally, the Region of Waterloo claimed, “Registry week provided the opportunity for agencies to gain more direct experience with the VI-SPDAT and see how results [could] amplify their work to end homelessness” (*ibid*). As a decision assistance tool, the VI-SPDAT also provided a useful method for figuring out who would receive the additional resources given to STEP Home. Overall, the campaign would help conveners

build legitimacy around the survey tool and help further advance the use of this survey tool in their community (Region of Waterloo, 2015, February).

The VI-SPDAT had not been used in Hamilton prior to the campaign. At the 2015 NCEH, Amanda Di Falco, Manager of Homelessness Policy & Programs at the City of Hamilton, mentioned during an overview session of the 20K Homes Campaign that there was some “local resistance” around the survey tool. However, the City of Hamilton agreed to use this common assessment tool. One convener explained:

*“I think [the campaign] helps the local context because what it will help [the city of Hamilton] to do is to start learning more from a quantifiable perspective how to shape the system moving forward. In particular, thinking about assessments, it is not something that Hamilton traditionally does in a standardized way. It is something that the community has become very keen on doing moving forward, and so, born out of this, [the city of Hamilton has] been able to test the VI-SPDAT and say that this assessment tool makes a lot of sense for [the city] moving forward. It’s not the be all and end all. It is yet another tool in the toolbox to help [the city] think as a system of how [to] support people moving forward.”*

It is understood here that the City of Hamilton agreed to use this common assessment tool because it supported a new approach to homelessness. It would help the local service sector make evidence-based decisions in response to homelessness and it would provide consistent and measurable outcomes. In other words, the VI-SPDAT provided a method for showing transparency and accountability in how the community responded to homelessness. Overall, the VI-SPDAT would help pilot communities strengthen the planning and coordination of their local service systems by helping decided who to prioritize and how to prioritize limited resources.

#### *5.3.8.2. Common assessment tool fostered community engagement*

The VI-SPDAT fostered community engagement. It could be conducted by volunteers with the assistance of professional staff (20K Homes & CAEH, 2015, p.19). It therefore provided a means by which the community at large could get involved in efforts to end homelessness. This was particularly important in Ottawa where one of the main goals of action week was broad community engagement. There was also some general agreement that the VI-SPDAT was a “great action and awareness tool”, borrowing from the Region of Waterloo (2015, February, slide 40). It provided a method for collecting data to bring awareness to the scope of homelessness locally and nationally, and to move public opinion and advocate for new resources. What’s more, the continual use of the survey tool (beyond action/registry week) would help “refocus polices and programs toward helping people with the greatest depth of need to access permanent housing as quickly as possible” (Region of Waterloo, 2015, August 11, p.6). In short, the VI-SPDAT built momentum around the campaign and around local efforts to end homelessness.

#### *5.3.8.3. How the VI-SPDAT works*

The use of this common assessment tool has important implications in terms of shaping local campaign outcomes. To understand why this is, it is important to understand how the survey tool works and what it assesses. The VI-SPDAT consists of standardized questions related to an individual’s “history of housing and homelessness, as well as their health and social needs” (City of Hamilton, 2015, April 23, p.1). A score is assigned for each question answered on the survey and gets totaled up to measure an individual’s vulnerability (level of need)/acuity. Those who score high on the survey are categorized as having “high needs” and are prioritized for Housing First programs and supports. Those

with a medium score are categorized as having “moderate needs” and are eligible for supports and to take the full assessment. Finally, those who score low on the survey are categorized as having “low needs” and are considered to be able to exit homelessness on their own. This means they are not prioritized for Housing First programs and they are not eligible for a full assessment.

#### *5.3.8.4. What the VI-SPDAT assesses*

One thing that needs to be considered is what the VI-SPDAT assesses. Several individuals interviewed for this study pointed out that the questions on the VI-SPDAT focus on one’s length of homelessness, physical and mental health, substance (ab)use, as well as risk of safety and legal issues often associated with living on the streets and in emergency shelters. Based on these observations, it is concluded here that the VI-SPDAT assesses the needs of people who are absolutely and chronically homeless. Those who score high in these areas are categorized as “most vulnerable.” The VI-SPDAT is meant to help pilot communities accelerate their work on ending chronic homelessness by prioritizing these people for Housing First programs and supports.

#### *5.3.8.5. How appropriate is the VI-SPDAT for assessing the needs of the “hidden” homeless?*

If the VI-SPDAT focuses on the absolute and chronically homeless, it is questioned here how appropriate the survey tool is for assessing the needs of people experiencing ‘hidden’ homelessness? This question is important because the tool is intended to help communities decide how to prioritize resources to meet individual needs. Also, it is important because one of the main objectives of Ottawa’s action week was to focus on the

‘hidden’ homeless. Both the literature and findings from this study show that while the VI-SPDAT is useful for assessing the needs of the absolute and chronically homeless, it is inadequate for assessing the needs of the ‘hidden’ homeless. As Matthews et al. (2015, p.34) explain:

“A limitation of common measurement approaches is that they do not enumerate the hidden homeless – a group that accounts for the bulk of the homeless population. These methods undercount women, Aboriginal Peoples, immigrants, racialized people, youth, and people from LBTTQ communities. This reality underscores the need for a range of approaches to enumeration in order to reflect the diverse realities of Ontarians who are homeless.”<sup>83</sup>

Studies show that homeless women, youth, and indigenous people are at greater risk of violence as well as poor physical and mental health (Novac et al., 2002; Whitzman, 2006; Peters & Robillard, 2009; Tutty et al., 2009; DeVerteuil & Wilson, 2010; Morgan, 2010; Hwang et al., 2011; Peters, 2012; Maracle, Mayo, & McCormack, 2015; Haight, 2016; Kauppi et al., 2017). In line with the literature, the results from Ottawa’s action week show that 91 percent of youth and 89 percent of Aboriginal people reported having a mental health condition; and 79 percent of Aboriginal people reported having a serious health condition (ATEH, 2015, April 23, slides 27 & 30).

Having said all that, the VI-SPDAT does not adequately assess the needs of homeless women. For example, a couple frontline staff and a volunteer thought that the questions on the VI-SDPAT focused more on physical health and substance (ab)use than on mental illness. It is implied here that the survey tool inadequately assesses the needs of people with severe mental illness. Studies show that only a small portion of homeless women abuse drugs and/or alcohol (Whitzman, 2006; Hwang et al., 2011). While the VI-SPDAT assesses the risk of victimization often associated with living on the streets and

emergency shelters, it does not assess the risk of domestic violence. Problematically, one of the leading causes of women's homelessness is domestic violence (Fotheringham, Walsh, & Burrowes, 2014). According to Tutty et al. (2009, p.8), "Individuals working in the homeless sector often have little understanding of the unique needs of women." Unfortunately, the needs of women were not assessed by the survey tool.

The VI-SPDAT focused on adults and was inadequate for assessing the needs of youth. Studies show youth require positive development, life skills, and adult support and mentoring to exit out of homelessness (Novac et al., 2002; Gaetz, 2014). For Ottawa's action week, four questions were added at the end of the survey to collect information on youth. These questions were related to school status and "positive" adult support. Problematically, these questions were not included in the scoring. This suggests that youth were not given fair representation when assessing their vulnerability. Youth could have scored higher if these questions were included, which could have potentially placed them in a higher vulnerability bracket. This could have increased their chances of being prioritized for permanent housing and supports. It wasn't until the Fall of 2015 that Community Solutions announced at the NCEH that a youth version of the survey tool was available for communities.

Some frontline staff pointed out during the training that the VI-SPDAT was not culturally appropriate for assessing the needs of Aboriginal people. Studies show that Aboriginal people require culturally appropriate policies, programs and services (Novac et al., 2002; Leach, 2010; Windland, Gaetz & Patton, 2011; Gaetz, 2014; Walsh et al., 2014; Gaetz et al., 2016). They also require culturally appropriate housing (Distasio, Sylvestre, & Mulligan, 2010). More so, it's been implied that they require the right to self-

determination and self-organization when it comes to addressing their homelessness and housing needs (see DeVerteuil & Wilson, 2010). Aside from one demographic question found at the end of the survey asking individuals if they identified as either: Aboriginal, Inuit, Metis or First Nations, there were no other questions on the survey tool specific to these groups. Given “Aboriginal people” are made up of many indigenous groups, a standardized approach to assessing their needs is not appropriate. Collaborating with these groups would be useful for developing more culturally appropriate assessment tools that meet their needs.

The VI-SPDAT was not appropriate for assessing the needs of families. This is because the version of the survey tool used during action/registry week was for individuals experiencing homelessness and not meant to be used to survey families. Mike Bulthuis, Executive Director of the Alliance, explained at that using the individual version of the survey tool on families would require each family member to take the survey, which would result in each family member showing a different level of need, and subsequently, they would be recommended for a different type of support.<sup>84</sup> Put simply, the version of the VI-SPDAT adopted for the campaign could only assess the needs of the individual and not the family unit. Having said that, a family version of the survey tool did exist at the time the 20K Homes campaign was being piloted and was used during Waterloo’s and Hamilton’s registry weeks. Six families (or 21 individuals) “were identified as experiencing homelessness” during Waterloo’s registry week (Region of Waterloo, 2015, “Pilot Report”, p.13). However, these families were excluded from “the Registry Week analysis because families were already being served through a separate family initiative (the Family Shelter Diversion and Rapid Rehousing pilot)” (*ibid*). Fifteen families were surveyed

during Hamilton's registry week but were also excluded from the data analysis (City of Hamilton 2015, April 30, "Community Debrief", slide 8). It is unknown if these families were being served through a separate program.

According to one convener, there were plans to conduct the survey at a family shelter during Ottawa's action week, however, this did not take place because only the individual version of the VI-SPDAT was available. It is unclear whether this meant the individual version of the survey tool was only available for action week or if it was the only version of the survey tool available in Ottawa at the time. Not having the appropriate survey tool impeded the Alliance's goal to capture the 'hidden' homeless. In other words, the Alliance did not have the proper tools needed to achieve its local objectives despite the CAEH promising to help communities meet their goals. Excluding homeless families from the survey both at the local and national levels perpetuated their 'invisibility.'<sup>85</sup>

The VI-SPDAT was not adequate for assessing the needs of immigrants and refugees either. While the survey tool measures vulnerability based on poor physical and mental health and addictions, "homeless immigrants are documented to be healthier, less likely to suffer from chronic diseases, mental health issues and/or substance abuse than their non-immigrant counterpart" (Walsh et al., 2015, p.4 with reference to Chiu et al., 2009). This suggests that most immigrants and refugees would have scored low on the survey, and subsequently, would not have been prioritized for permanent housing and supports. Immigrants are more susceptible to "physical/emotional abuse" and family issues" (Walsh et al., 2015, p.4 with reference to D'Addario et al., 2007; Hiebert et al., 2005). These indicators of risk were not included in the assessment.

At the time the 20K Homes campaign was being piloted, only an English version of the VI-SPDAT was available.<sup>86</sup> This was understandably received with criticism in Ottawa where a relatively large portion of the population speak French. Having a French version of the survey tool was important for connecting with as many homeless people as possible and prioritizing them for permanent housing and supports. Despite not having a French version of the survey tool available, conveners in Ottawa and Hamilton found ways to deliver the survey in French.<sup>87</sup> The City of Hamilton had translation services available to it internally that Housing Services could leverage off for registry week. The Alliance did not have translation services available to it internally, and so, it fell back on its network of volunteers to provide these services. A couple volunteers at headquarters were able to connect with survey teams using walkie-talkies to translate the survey for survey participants into French when needed.<sup>88</sup> These volunteers became ‘bridges’ through which translation services could be delivered to survey participants at multiple survey locations. Having volunteers translate the survey in French fostered community engagement and made Ottawa’s action week a more grassroots campaign. Overall, having translation services allowed conveners to connect with as many survey participants as possible.

In short, despite conveners’ efforts to include the “hidden” homeless in the action/registry week survey, the VI-SPDAT is designed to prioritize chronically homeless individuals with high acuity for permanent housing and supports. It is not appropriate for assessing the needs of the hidden homeless.

#### *5.3.8.5. How does the common assessment tool meet local needs?*

One general concern about the common assessment tool that came up during a 20K Homes session at the 2015 NCEH was how it would meet local needs? Conveners at the

national and international levels acknowledged that homelessness looked different in every community and agencies had different definitions and priorities on who to house first. Both the action/registry week training and 2015 NCEH were important spaces where people working in the homeless service system could come together to develop a common language around the survey tool. In agreement with Laforest and Orsini (2005), this practice of standardization was found to “stifle innovation”. This is ironic considering pilot communities were supposed to be leaders and innovators in ending homelessness. Although some of the wording around the survey tool was changed to reflect the Canadian context and conveners were allowed to add demographic questions at the end of the survey, they were not permitted to change the original set of questions on the survey tool, and demographic questions were not included in the scoring.<sup>89</sup> These demographic questions were important as they helped conveners identify local priority groups. Still, these priority groups only included those individuals who were connected to the system and without secure tenure.

#### *5.3.8.6. A problem with prioritization*

Perhaps the biggest criticism on the survey tool was that it *prioritizes* people experiencing homelessness for permanent housing and supports. While this tool is an important “component of [a] housing intervention”, borrowing from one convener, this practice of prioritization goes against the philosophy of Housing First, which is that housing is a basic human right. In all three pilot communities there was general agreement that with limited resources, prioritizing the “most vulnerable” homeless people was necessary. There was also recognition, however, that everyone should have access to “adequate, safe, and affordable housing”, borrowing from Gillian Hendry, Director of

Housing Services (City of Hamilton, 2015, April 30, “20K Homes Campaign”), and that new investments in affordable housing were needed to end homelessness.

Similar criticism was found on the survey tool in Leventhal’s (2017) research on the 100K Homes campaign. Culhane (in Leventhal, 2018, p.37) pointed out that using the VI-SPDAT to prioritize chronically homeless individuals with acuity was “not consistent with the law.” In an interview with Leventhal, he said, “the Congress has designated [housing] vouchers for people who are chronically homeless. Not chronically homeless people who score on the Vulnerability Index at x, y and z” (Leventhal, 2018, p.37). According to Leventhal,

“[Culhane] cited guidance from HUD (2015) regarding assessment and assessment tools, in which HUD reiterates, Culhane said, “that people can use assessment and assessment tools but there’s no legal authority for selecting people beyond the chronic homelessness designation as to who should get a voucher or not”” (ibid).<sup>90</sup>

A similar argument can be made within the Canadian context. At the time this study began, the federal government of Canada had mandated designated communities under the HPS to prioritize chronically homeless individuals for Housing First programs and services. *Not* chronically homeless individuals with high acuity.

#### *5.3.9. Media*

Media was another key component of action/registry week. Media was used to: raise awareness about the campaign, homelessness and the need for affordable housing; foster community engagement; and advocate for governments to invest in new affordable housing and supports. In other words, the media was important for achieving local and national campaign goals. The findings from this study show that the level of media coverage each local campaign received depended on whether it was perceived a

“newsworthy” or not. Also, it was found that conveners from the formal leadership structure had more financial and human resources available to them, and therefore, were able to promote their campaigns better.

#### *5.3.9.1. Media coverage on the local campaigns*

There was a difference in opinion amongst participants interviewed for this study around the level of media interest. One convener thought that Ottawa’s action week received “*quite a bit of media interest.*” However, two frontline staff and a volunteer thought that there wasn’t enough media interest. One of these frontline workers expressed that “*A little more media [interest] would have been nice.*” The other frontline worker claimed the campaign needed “*way more media attention.*” Meanwhile, a volunteer said, “[the campaign] got a little publicity, but wasn’t very high profile.” When asked why they thought the campaign wasn’t high profile, they replied:

*“Well, both my wife and I are involved with enough organizations, clubs, and enviably, no one ever takes responsibility to be our media relations – getting the word out sort of thing, and I think that was a really important aspect, and more, there is always competition for people’s time. So, you got to get somebody out there giving stories to the newspaper, doing the radio interview. I know there was some radio interviews – we actually witnessed a couple while we were doing our volunteering. But we get the Ottawa Citizen, we’re informed just as anybody in terms of what’s going on, and it just wasn’t a big big headline – issue, obviously. Just maybe it doesn’t lend itself to being like that? I don’t know.”*

One frontline worker thought the lack of media interest had “[nothing] necessarily to do with the Alliance and how they carried [the campaign] out.” They said, “*That’s just the media [not] wanting to be involved, I guess.*” One frontline worker thought the Alliance “*had a good communications team.*” As will be demonstrated later in this section, Ottawa’s action week had a strong public relations component. It actively engaged “volunteers” and

survey participants with the media and/or in storytelling. There is some general agreement, however, that the campaign lacked media interest.

In an online news search, the following media coverage was found on Ottawa's action week: one article and one video by CTV News Ottawa; two article each from Radio Canada and the Ottawa Citizen, and; one article from Metro. A total of six news articles and one video were found. One of these articles announced the police's involvement in Ottawa's up-coming action week (see Metro, 2015, April 19), but did not include volunteer sign-up information. No other articles were found prior to action week announcing the upcoming event. Two of the above-mentioned articles covered the launch of action week and information on the community debrief (see Kirnishni, 2015, April 23; Garon, 2015, April 20), and three articles and the one video provided a summary of the survey results (see Skube, 2015, April 27; Radio-Canada, 2015, April 23; Kirnishni, 2015, April 24; Skube, 2015, April 27). Two of these articles and the one video had an advocacy component (see Kirnishni, 2015, April 23 & 24; Skube, 2015.).

Part of the reason why Ottawa's action week did not receive much media coverage may be that while there were two media advisories on the event (see ATEHO, n.d., "Action Week Check-List"), there appeared to be no press release. Perhaps the reason for this is because it was beyond the Alliance's budget, and therefore, was more dependent on mass e-mail and social media to get the word out. Another part of the reason may be that Ottawa is a government city, and so, as the above-mentioned volunteer suggested, it is hard to compete for the media's time. Furthermore, there is a stigma attached to homelessness, which is still widely perceived as an individual problem rather than a structural issue. With that there is lack of empathy for people experiencing homelessness and a lack of interest

in the matter. For these reasons, an event such as action week may not have been perceived as a newsworthy item compared to other stories.

According to the City of Hamilton (2015, “Hamilton Registry Week Overview”, p.2), press releases were provided “for [the] volunteer recruitment, the launch of surveying and the community debrief.” Unlike the Alliance, the City could submit several media releases because it had the financial resources to do so. Six news articles were found online covering Hamilton’s registry week, including: two from the Hamilton Spectator, three from CBC Hamilton, and one from the Flamborough Review. Two of these articles provided sign-up information for registry week (see Bennett, 2015, March 17; Flamborough Review, 2015, March 23; see also “City of Hamilton Seeks Volunteers”, 2015, March 16). The latter article also included information on the community debrief. Two of the articles above were published on the second day of surveying, covering information about the 20K Homes campaign, the registry week process and community debrief (Bennett, 2015, April 30; Hayes, 2015, April 27). The remaining two articles summarized the results of the survey (Bennett, 2015, April 30; Hayes, 2015, April 30). Of the six articles found, two had advocacy components (see Bennett, 2015, April 30 & Hayes, 2015, April 30). Despite the City of Hamilton having more financial resources available to it than the Alliance, it appears that Hamilton’s registry week and Ottawa’s action week received about the same level of media coverage. Having said that, the online news articles identified here are not meant to be exhaustive.

Waterloo’s registry week appeared to receive the most media coverage at a local level. The first announcement for Waterloo’s registry week was found on the Region’s Community Services website (see Region of Waterloo Community Services, 2014,

November 24). This announcement included information on the community debrief and states that a media advisory for this event was to come (*ibid*). Despite only having one media advisory for the community debrief, Waterloo's registry week "received considerable media attention, with over two dozen articles, radio interviews and television reports" (Region of Waterloo, 2015, "Pilot Report", p.22). Eight news articles and one video were found online, including: four articles from the Waterloo Record; two articles from Metroland Media, one article from 570 News; one article Exchange Magazine; and one video from CTV Kitchener. In the days leading up to the surveying, three of these articles echoed the Region's announcement on the Community Service's website (D'Amato, 2014, November 27; Exchange Magazine, 2014, November 25; Desmond, 2014, November 26). One of these articles covered the launch of the surveying (see News Staff, 2014, November 30); three articles and the one video summarize the results from the survey (CTV News Kitchener, 2014, December 3; Desmond, 2014, December 3; Jackson, 2014, December 4; Editorial, 2014, December 9); and one article published two weeks after the community debrief talked about the 20K Homes campaign and the need for affordable housing (Ponciano, 2014, December 18). Two of these articles included the information on the community debrief with the one stating that a media advisory was to come (see D'Amato, 2014, November 27; Exchange Magazine, 2014, November 25).

There are two possible reasons why Waterloo's registry week received a high level of media interest. First, it was the first community to pilot the campaign, and so, for a midsized city demonstrating leadership in ending homelessness, this was considered "big" news. Also, it is important to keep in mind what was going on in the community at the time. With the closure of the K-W OOTC program and the winter months approaching, the

Region was under pressure to show the community that it was responding to the displacement of some homeless individuals. Overall, more financial resources for media advisories/press releases do not necessarily lead to more media attention. The level of media coverage an event such as action/registry week receives depends on whether it was perceived as a “newsworthy”.

#### *5.3.9.2. Media interviews*

Media interviews were conducted during action/registry week and were found to foster community engagement. Since community engagement was an action week goal, the Alliance needed to create spaces for engagement. One way of achieving this was through the media. One convener explained that their role as spokesperson was to facilitate media connections with volunteers and people experiencing homelessness. By facilitating media connections with volunteers and people experiencing homelessness, the Alliance created a space in which those people participating in action week could become involved. It allowed these people to share their homelessness/action week stories and experiences. Conveners from Waterloo and Hamilton did not mention actively engaging “volunteers” and people experiencing homelessness with the media. This does not mean these people were not involved with the media but rather suggests that community engagement was not a goal.

Looking at the online news articles found for action/registry week, despite the Alliance’s media engagement efforts, more individuals/community partners seemed to be engaged with the media during Hamilton’s registry week than Ottawa’s action week and Waterloo’s registry week. In the online news articles found for Ottawa’s action week, it was found that media interviews were conducted with: the Alliance, including the Executive Director and a board member; the CEO of the CAEH; two agency staff from the

local service sector; three volunteers; and one survey participant. A total of nine individuals were found engaged with the media.

In the online news articles found for Waterloo's registry week, the same number of individuals were found engaged with the media. Media interviews were conducted with the Region, including a staff member from Housing Services, the regional chair and a council member; the CEO of the CAEH, a K-W OOTC coordinator and volunteer; and one agency staff member from the HHSS. Media interviews with the Region and an agency staff member from the local HHSS were also found in the CTV Kitchener video.

In the online news articles found on Hamilton's registry week, media interviews were conducted with: the City of Hamilton, including, two staff members from Housing Services and a Council member; the CEO of the CAEH; the minister of housing; three agency staff from the local service sector; one volunteer; five survey participants; one individual with lived experience; and a representative from Community Solutions. Based on these findings, sixteen individuals were engaged with the media during Hamilton's registry week – the most people engaged with the media out of all three pilot communities.

It is worth pointing out that senior level staff and councillors from the City of Hamilton and Region of Waterloo were involved with the media during registry week. This is another way of demonstrating how conveners from the formal leadership structure received internal support. The City of Ottawa was not found present in the media covering action week. This further suggests that support from the City of Ottawa for action week was minimal. The CAEH, Community Solutions, and the Minister of Housing appeared in the media coverage on Hamilton's registry week as well. This involvement with the media further demonstrates how community partners at the provincial, national, and international

levels provided support for Hamilton's registry week. Having these key actors involved with the media helped build legitimacy around the local and national campaigns.

Only one person with lived experience was found in the media coverage on the campaigns and that was for Hamilton's registry week. This person appeared in both the local and national news on the campaign. People with lived experience were not found in the media coverage on Ottawa's action week and Waterloo's registry week. Why did this one person with lived experience from Hamilton's registry week make it into the media coverage on the campaign? Perhaps the reason for this is because they are a Housing First 'success story' and by sharing their story, they helped build legitimacy around the local and national campaigns.

What's interesting here too is that five survey participants appeared in the media coverage on Hamilton's registry week while only one survey participant appeared in the media coverage on Ottawa's action week. This is striking because the goal of Ottawa's action week was to seek broad community engagement. What is worth mentioning here though is that the Alliance did launch its public relations campaign prior to action week, which focused on engaging and documenting the stories of several survey participants. This is discussed in more detail below. No survey participants appeared in the media coverage on Waterloo's registry week and there was nothing found with regards to the Region trying to capture their stories. This suggests it was not seeking broad community engagement. More "volunteers" appeared in the media coverage on Ottawa's action week. This was important for achieving the goals of the local campaign.

### *5.9.3. Promotional material*

Conveners used promotional material to raise awareness around homelessness and their local campaigns. Both the Region of Waterloo and City of Hamilton had registry week videos made (see Region of Waterloo 2014, December 4 & 2015, August 14; City of Hamilton 2015, April 30, “20K Homes Campaign”). Posting these videos online made them accessible to a wider audience, bringing more awareness to these local campaigns. Parts of Hamilton’s registry week video were even included in the CAEH’s 20K Homes promotional video (see CAEH 2015, June 9). Not only would this bring more awareness to the local campaign, it meant Hamilton’s registry week would receive national representation, building on its status as a leader in ending homelessness. Hamilton’s registry week video also had an advocacy component to it. This would help raise awareness around the need for affordable housing locally *and* nationally.

Through the production of Waterloo’s and Hamilton’s registry week videos, space was created for community engagement. The initial video for Waterloo’s registry week included interviews with an agency staff from the HHSS and a volunteer with the K-W OOTC program. The follow-up video included interviews with two additional agency staff; stand alone appearances of eighteen “volunteers”; and the voice and appearance of Tim Richter from the CAEH. Two agency staff were interviewed for Hamilton’s registry week video. However, there were no volunteers or the CAEH in this video. Having agency staff, volunteers, and/or community partners part of these videos brings credibility and legitimacy to registry week. Hamilton’s registry week video also included an individual with lived experience. Again, this individual’s experience and story was further evidence that Housing First as an approach to homelessness ‘worked.’ Hamilton’s registry week

video further included an interview with the Director of Housing Services, demonstrating sympathetic support from internal senior level staff.

The Alliance did not have the financial and human resources available to it internally to create a promotional video. Instead the Alliance paid for a logo to be developed to raise awareness on homelessness and action week.<sup>91</sup> Although an action week logo may have helped raise awareness, it did not foster community engagement. Perhaps a better approach would have been to have a group of volunteers design a logo or to have a logo competition open to the broader community. This would have saved the Alliance from paying for a graphic designer and would have created another space for community engagement.

Promotional videos were made on action week despite the Alliance not having the financial and human resources available to it internally. These videos were published by the United Way Ottawa and can be found online via YouTube (see United Way Ottawa 2015, April 21-24). They include one-on-one interviews with: the Executive Director of the Alliance, the CEO of the CAEH, two volunteers, and a survey participant. These videos helped raise awareness on homelessness and action week and foster community engagement. More so, having these videos developed by a member organization of the Alliance further demonstrates how Ottawa's action week was a more grassroots campaign.

#### *5.3.9.4. Alternative forms of media*

Conveners from Ottawa and Hamilton used other forms of media to raise awareness and/or foster community engagement during action/registry week. Documentation was used in Ottawa, and an impact wall and infographic were created in Hamilton. In the weeks

leading up to and during action week, the Alliance with the help of volunteers launched its public relations campaign. This involved documenting the names, faces and stories of survey participants who were “willing to share themselves in this way” (Bulthuis, 2015, March 20).<sup>92</sup> This public relations campaign called, “I am homeless … not nameless” was a unique component of action week (*ibid*; also see Bulthuis 2015, March 16, “The 20,000 Homes Campaign comes to Ottawa”). The purpose of the documentation was to build momentum around action week through the creation of a “build-up story” (ATEHO 2015, “Action Week Check-List”), and to “build public awareness [around] those living without a home” (Bulthuis 2015, March 20; also see, Bulthuis 2015, March 16; & March 20) Documenting these stories was further important for destigmatizing homelessness and educating the public on the need for affordable housing.

The documentation was also a strategy used to foster community engagement. The Alliance states, “By engaging homeless individuals firsthand, we aim to encourage housing solutions that integrate the stories, needs and perspectives of our homeless neighbours” (ATEHO 2015, “Media Q&A”). The standardized survey did not allow for the same level of understanding or engagement. By engaging in storytelling with these survey participants, it is possible that a deeper understanding of their needs was gained.

One convener expressed they were concerned about the public relations campaign, explaining they thought it would send the wrong message to the public on why Ottawa was participating in the 20K Homes campaign. They said, “*I had some anxiety about the public relations’ sort of goal of capturing stories. I was very anxious that the focus of the action week (i.e. action and housing) might get lost in the “I’m homeless, not nameless” campaign. It was just sort of media communication side.*” This convener was worried that

people would think action week was about raising awareness on homelessness and take the focus away from it being a housing intervention. In a media interview with the Hamilton Spectator (Hayes 2015, April 30), Tim Richter, President and CEO of the CAEH made it clear that the 20K Homes campaign was “not a … census, or a study or [...] an awareness-raiser. [It was] a community-wide housing intervention.” The difference in messaging is important because the campaign was intended to put pressure on communities and government to act and to achieve reductions in chronic homelessness. For the Alliance, however, the public relations campaign was strategic. Documenting these stories could help create empathy around homelessness and buy-in from the community to support the campaign. This was necessary for fostering community engagement and because the Alliance was dependent on the community at large to provide resources.

Overall, the documentation went beyond “knowing every person by name” and treating survey participants as numbers to be knocked off a priority list. The storytelling allowed *some* individuals to share their homeless experiences and housing needs in more detail. By capturing the names, faces *and* stories of these survey participants, the documentation created a more personal experience. Unfortunately, not every survey participant got to share their story and it is unknown whether these stories were used to help find housing that met people’s needs. The process of storytelling takes a lot of time, energy, human and material resources for understanding the needs of homeless people. For these reasons, a data driven approach may be more practical and effective for creating a sense of urgency and putting pressure on communities and governments to act.

One-way awareness was raised, and volunteers were engaged during Hamilton's registry week by creating an impact wall. One convener explained that the impact wall was a space within the registry week headquarters where people could:

*[...] write down their sentiments, feelings, thoughts, whatever they wanted to put on a colorful piece of paper, and they could draw or write, and then, they put it on this wall that we [had] and we were able to capture kind of everybody's thoughts, and ideas, and feelings in that moment. And it was [...] overwhelmingly positive. I don't think there [was] one negative thing on that wall. It was all about [...] people's reflection on what they experience[d] and [the] opportunity to be able to learn something about their community[.]*

The purpose of the impact wall, according to this convener, was to help destigmatize, raise awareness, and to educate the public on homelessness. According to this convener, going out and interacting with survey participants and reflecting on those experiences helped interrupt some assumptions volunteers had around homelessness, such as they are “dangerous” or “violent” people. While the impact wall may have engaged volunteers, and helped raise their awareness, this happened within headquarters, meaning, the messaging was not far reaching. More so, it did not include the experiences of survey participants. Documenting the stories of survey participants, having “volunteers” help capture these stories, and delivering these stories to a wider audience, made Ottawa’s action week a more grassroots campaign.

Finally, the City of Hamilton distributed an infographic pamphlet that summarized the results from the registry week survey to people who attended the community debrief. The infographic included a summary of the findings from the survey and served as an alternative method for spreading awareness and educating the public. The infographic was made available on the City of Hamilton’s website, meaning, it could be accessed by a wider audience.<sup>93</sup>

Conveners from Ottawa and Waterloo did not distribute an infographic at their community debrief. One possible reason why the Alliance did not produce and distribute an infographic may be because it publishes a progress report on homelessness in Ottawa annually. Another reason may be because of printing costs. Even though the Region had more resources available to it, there was no mention of an infographic produced and distributed during Waterloo's community debrief. Perhaps it is because the Region appeared to be more fiscally conscious. Also, the Region did create an additional promotional video.

#### *5.3.10. Community debrief*

At the end of action/registry week, a community debrief was held. Like the training sessions, the community debriefs included context around the 20K Homes campaign, a rationale for why the city/region was getting involved, an overview of the registry week process, and a presentation with the results from the survey. Overall, the community debrief served three purposes: 1) to raise the public's awareness on homelessness and the need for affordable housing; 2) to provide a space for engaging the community to come up with solutions to end homelessness; 3) and to serve as a call to action. These objectives held different weight in each pilot community and were important for achieving the goals of action/registry week and shaping outcomes.

Several participants interviewed for this study expressed that they were “impressed” by the “quick” turnaround time between the surveying and community debrief. As one convener explained, the data collection and entry took place over three days. This was followed by a “buffer day between the survey and community debrief”, borrowing from Amanda Di Falco, Manager of Homeless Policy and Programs at the City

of Hamilton (2015, November 2, “NCEH: 20K Homes Campaign 101 and Early Learnings from Pilot Communities), where conveners with the help of the CAEH and Community Solutions, analyzed the data collected from the surveys and created a PowerPoint presentation with the aggregated results from the survey that would be shared at the community debrief, which was the following day. One convener expressed that the quick turnaround was *“one of the amazing and unique things about the campaign.”* Another convener explained:

*“We’re trying to build a new culture around homelessness – one that is focused on action, one that is focused on creating a sense of urgency, one that is focused on setting clear targets and priorities and knowing people by name. The community debrief is a way to do that. I mean the fact that it happens the day after you’ve finished all your surveys is big because when you do a point-in-time count the results come out months after. We are able to turn around that same day. So, this is part of creating that sense of urgency.”*

The quick turnaround was intended to build momentum around the campaign and challenge the “inertia” within the homeless system, as one convener referred to it, by putting pressure on communities and governments at large to act – to provide support for the campaign and to work together to end homelessness.

Tied to the goals of action/registry week, the community debrief was an important space for raising awareness and educating the public about the campaign, homelessness and the need for affordable housing. Like the training, people learned about the 20K Homes campaign and its national context. They also learned about the “success” of the American 100K Homes campaign. Again, this was intended to build legitimacy around the campaign and these organizations. In Waterloo and Hamilton, these introductions were accompanied by a registry week video. The community debrief was a space where the results of the

action/registry week survey could be shared for the first time. Showing the results of the survey was intended to help raise the public's awareness and move their opinion. It was intended to create a sense of urgency and put pressure on the community to act.

The community debrief was a call to action. Ottawa's and Hamilton's community debriefs called on all orders of government to step forward and provide political support for ending homelessness and emphasized the need for a national housing strategy. Ottawa's and Waterloo's community debriefs (also) called on the community to step forward and provide support for the campaign. This call to action component held more weight during Ottawa's community debrief. This is because the Alliance was dependent on the community at large to provide housing resources for the local campaign. What is questioned here, however, is the extent to which governments, community partners, and everyday citizens stepped forward?

During the community debrief for Ottawa's action week, a keynote speaker from the City of Ottawa stepped forward to make a statement in support for the local campaign. This statement emphasized how important it was to keep the pressure on the federal government to make new investments in affordable housing. At the same time, the City of Ottawa announced it was committed to housing 250 people. While one convener expressed, "We were really excited to see the City [of Ottawa] announce its housing target", this commitment was nothing new. One spokesperson interviewed for this study pointed out that the City of Ottawa already had plans to house 250 long-stay shelter users with high needs over the next year and a half using homelessness funding that was already available to it. This announcement indicated that despite the results from the action week survey showing that there was a greater need for affordable housing in Ottawa, the City of Ottawa

was unwilling to commit to a higher housing target. When following-up with the City of Ottawa after the campaign, one City representative explained that:

*“Given that we’re a government, we’ve already blessed the housing plan, and embarked on it and its got its set goals. [The City of] Ottawa can’t just say – we can’t simply throw up our hands and say, “Okay, we want to jump on board with your [the Alliance’s] metric as well.” That has to go through council, and there has to be council resolution on that, and we’ve already endorsed our plan. So, our perspective was, we certainly want to work alongside and in collaboration with the housing service providers and advocates, but – you’re right, we don’t have a stake in that 20K Homes campaign with a number of X homes, but we were there in terms of support and actually helping house people. So, I mean at the end of the day, given that we work in collaboration and in respects with the Alliance, we’ve kind of adopted the Alliance’s target. If it’s the Alliance’s target for the community, then it is our target for the community. Right? So ...”*

The City may have agreed to a target and started working towards that target and the objectives of the 10-year Plan, but the Plan is not ‘set in stone.’ Ten-year plans are meant to be “living and adaptive documents” (CAEH & CEL, 2012, p.4). Documents such as these are intended to have clear targets and timelines that should be revisited and revised accordingly. Setting higher housing targets may require going through council but that does not mean it can’t or shouldn’t be done. If the process is too cumbersome, then the City needs to cut the red tape around affordable housing. Without disregarding that municipal governments alone cannot meet affordable housing needs, the issue described here goes beyond a lack of funding, it is also a lack of political will to try. This unwillingness to set higher housing targets is one of the shortcomings of the local campaign.

Once the keynote from the City of Ottawa made their announcement, another keynote speaker stepped forward from a local group called Broadening the Base (BtB) to announce its commitment to working together with the Alliance and the community to help house people moving forward with action week. In an initial report, it states that:

“[BtB] is a community-centered, collaborative and inclusive Ottawa initiative with the purpose of catalyzing and leveraging land, property, philanthropic and development resources to support the building of [...] new affordable housing units” (BtB, 2015, p.1).

One participant interviewed for this study explained another way that this initiative focused on “rejuvenating, repurposing [and] co-purposing” philanthropic real-estate buildings into affordable housing. BtB includes “representatives from social and affordable housing organizations, local business and the community at-large” (*ibid*). At the time of the community debrief, however, it was unclear what sort of commitment this group was willing to make toward Ottawa’s action week.

Aside from the City of Ottawa and BtB, no other community partners or member organizations or individuals stepped forward to offer housing resources for the campaign. Nothing was found showing that anyone stepped forward during Hamilton’s community debrief as well. Only in Waterloo did “new partners [reach] out as a result of the [registry week] data” (Region of Waterloo, 2015, February, slide 39). These new partners included: veterans, aborigines and landlords (*ibid*). It is uncertain whether these new partners stepped forward during the community debrief or if they reach out afterwards. It is also unknown how these new partners supported the local campaign. That is, what types of resources, if any, did they contribute?

It is questioned here why Waterloo’s registry week was successful in gaining support from the data whereas Ottawa’s action week and Hamilton’s registry week were not? Perhaps one reason for this has to do with the level of engagement. The community debrief was a community engagement exercise. For the most part, however, these debriefing events appeared to attract mostly those people who were working in or closely

connected with the services system. In Ottawa, for example, while two conveners thought the community debrief had a good turnout, one volunteer thought there weren't enough volunteers who attended, and one agency worker thought the community debrief was poorly attended. One convener said:

*"So, you had the Deputy Mayor there, and it's important to engage political leadership, community leadership, the coalition – the local coalition of the willing. Right? And again, that may or may not be whose normally in the system, right? [...] But in the room, in Ottawa, there was advocates, federal officials, provincial officials, there were funders, there was a couple of wealthy individuals who were quite interested – who make major investments in the Ottawa homeless system. So, it was a good turnout. We had a lot of the right people there and members of the public who were engaged in it – and the media of course"*<sup>94</sup>

Meanwhile, based on the agency worker's observations, they said:

*"I found it to be a little bit more political than it was... I don't think there was enough people there. I don't know why. I don't think it was greatly attended. It – the people that attended already buy into it, and I think, again, it's about communication and marketing – how do you engage the business sector, the – the property owner sector – that's the people you're going to need to get to buy into it, and at this point, I think it was a lot of people talking to people who already knew about it, and who participated in it, and so, that was good because people who participated in it got to see the results and the outcomes. [...] But it was talking heads, it was politicians, and it was social service agencies, and it was business – all the people that [were] at the meetings. [...] Now, I saw in the audience a few who were not involved that were curious about it, but it was a – it was an empty hall compared to what it could have been."*

Based on this view, more effort should have been put towards attracting and creating buy in from the private sector. Without making these new connections, it is suggested that finding housing resources for the campaign will be difficult without government support. While engaging political leaders was perceived by conveners as important for getting the message out and building legitimacy around the campaign, these political leaders showed no interest in making a stronger commitment towards affordable housing, suggesting that their attendance was nothing more than an act of tokenism.

The level of engagement varied among pilot communities. In Hamilton, one convener said there was time given after the results of the survey were presented to talk “*a little bit about what the data meant[.]*” In Ottawa and Waterloo, time was given for people out in the audience to ask questions, provide feedback, and/or ideas on ways to get involved in local efforts to end homelessness (Region of Waterloo, 2015, “Pilot Report”). At this time, a woman attending the community debrief in Ottawa raised her hand, stood up, and expressed that she wanted to help but wondered how she was supposed to do this when she didn’t have lots of money to house people. She brought to question the extent to which “everyday citizens”, borrowing from Burkholder & Dej (2015, March 17) could help.<sup>95</sup>

With the role of everyday citizens in mind, another convener said:

*“I wonder what is the work of community agencies and people who are already on the ground, and that grassroots dynamic? Can people actually raise consciousness enough? Like can we get it done as a city without government support? It’s pretty dang hard but, I wonder sometimes if informal supports and ways of responding to this crisis could potentially occur just coming from normal citizens. I think that’s a lot less likely to happen, but, I’ll leave that out there as the hopeful option perhaps.”*

What’s being questioned here is whether a grassroots approach to ending homelessness is possible. Can everyday people house the homeless without relying on formal leadership? With over 20 years of disengagement by senior levels of government, a grassroots approach to homelessness may feel like our only hope. While a grassroots approach to homelessness may be possible, the ‘problem’ is so big, expensive and urgent that it is believed here that only senior levels of government can respond fast enough.<sup>96</sup> Also, senior levels of government have a responsibility to Canadians for fixing a homelessness and affordable housing crisis they started 25 years ago.<sup>97</sup> Having said that, it is agreed here with conveners that “everyone has a role to play” when it comes to housing the homeless. This includes

everyday citizens who have the power and social responsibility to stay informed, advocate, and vote on these matters.

During Ottawa's and Waterloo's community debrief, it was found that people were encouraged to give in-kind donations (e.g. furniture, storage space, corporate sponsorships, etc.) and there was discussion around starting working groups (see ATEHO, 2015, April 23; Region of Waterloo, 2014, December 3). One convener thought this helped build momentum around the campaign. In Ottawa, it was found too that the audience was further challenged to think about more meaningful ways in which they could get involved. This sparked conversation around what it takes to end homelessness and what next steps need to be taken. This was explained by one convener, who stated:

*"There's so much positive – and it is positive – but there is such a strong charitable response to homelessness as an issue – and that's beautiful and it's proven by people's warm hearts and care for our community. But sometimes it's not necessarily the most solution oriented, right? So, running another meal program is really important to meet today's needs but it's not necessarily going to create housing or – and so, what I see the campaign doing, which is a real challenge, is bringing the community into a conversation around what is the solution to end homelessness? Not just what does it mean to help manage somebody's homelessness, but what do we need to do to end somebody's homelessness and how do we make that the goal? Not just that they have clothes to wear, a hat and school supplies. All those are important things, but, we also need to ensure that we don't simply focus on the here and now. And I think the campaign created that space."*

Action week challenged people to think beyond emergency responses to homelessness by bringing affordable housing into the conversation as both a response and a preventative approach. It brought to question the ways in which everyday citizens could play a more active role in making sure affordable housing needs could be met. One City of Ottawa representative thought "*the positioning of the [community] debrief [...] was really trying to activate [the audience] as future advocates.*" This was important for achieving the long-

term goals of the campaign. There was a sense of dissatisfaction amongst the action week audience, however. Perhaps it was because people could give in-kind donations at anytime and were looking for a space in which ongoing support could be provided. One volunteer explained:

*“One of the I guess – and this is probably a common difficulty or challenge with movements like this, is like, you can do a lot of awareness raising, and advocacy, and data collection and stuff, but then, what’s the next step of what to do with it? That’s a lot more challenging. That was... From what I remember, there wasn’t too many ideas off the bat. It was more – it was a lot of questions, “Well – what can we do now?”, and people wondering – people – it was good to see volunteers who had been there for the survey saying, “Well what can I do now? I wanna – I wanna do more. I don’t – I’ve done these surveys now. I don’t – I just don’t want to sit back and see what happens, I want to get involved and do something more”, and there wasn’t any immediate avenues for them to pursue.”*

Unfortunately, the momentum around action week died down and, borrowing from one convener, people were left questioning, “what’s next?” This ambiguity had important implications in terms of next steps. It also suggested that creating spaces for engagement would be important for the ongoing sustainability of the campaign.

The CAEH encouraged pilot communities to set an initial monthly housing target by the end of action/registry week using the results from the survey and announcing it at the community debrief. An initial monthly housing target is the number of people experiencing homelessness that a participating campaign community is *willing* to commit to housing each month. The Region of Waterloo and City of Hamilton announce their community’s initial housing target. Of the 454 individuals surveyed during Hamilton’s registry week, the City identified 109 individuals as “most vulnerable” (Bennet, 2015, April 30; see also Hayes, 2015, April 30), and committed to housing 121 chronically/episodically homeless individuals with high acuity “in Fiscal Year 2015” (City

of Hamilton, 2015, November 2, slide 7). According to the Hamilton Spectator, it was “[...] the first time [that] Hamilton [had] established a concrete baseline for tackling homelessness” (Hayes, 2015, April 30). Of the 339 individuals surveyed during Waterloo’s registry week, the Region committed to housing 40 chronically homeless individuals with “high needs” over the 2014/15 winter season. These targets, however, were nothing new. As one convener explained:

*[...] through the federal homelessness funding, [the City of Hamilton] had already committed to housing 121 people per year, and so, [it] maintained that commitment acknowledging there was 109 individuals that were identified throughout the registry week that [it] would follow-up [with] directly to ensure that people were connected to Housing First supports if they qualified. So, the 109 were eligible based on their chronicity qualifications if you will for a lack of a better word.”*

Likewise, the 40 individuals that the Region committed to housing were based on the resources identified through STEP Home at the time of the K-W OOTC transition. Interestingly, 127 individuals surveyed during Waterloo’s registry week scored as “high needs”. These findings suggest that, like the City of Ottawa, the City of Hamilton and Region of Waterloo were only willing to set housing targets based on available homelessness funding and were not willing to push for higher housing targets based on actual need.

Despite one of the goals of action week being to set an “ambitious” housing target based on local need (ATEHO, n.d., “Media Q&A for ATEH”, p.1), and having the data to do so, the Alliance did not announce an initial housing target at the community debrief. One convener explained there were a couple reasons for this. First, the Alliance did not want “to compete messaging [...] with Broadening the Base”, which was in the process of setting its housing target, and so, the Alliance did not want to confuse BtB’s target with the

collective target for action week. Second, this convener explained, it was believed that an *official* housing target could not be set without knowing how many communities in total would be participating in the campaign and figuring out what portion of 20,000 people each community would be responsible for housing. At the time the campaign was being piloted, it was too early to know what the *official* monthly housing target rate would be and whether it would be the same for each community.<sup>98</sup> Finally, this convener explained, “[the Alliance’s] *goal* [was] to house every person who is homeless”. In other words, the goal was to develop local housing targets based on *need*.

Overall, the community debrief was important for creating a sense of urgency and building momentum around the campaign. It was a call to action and provided a space for raising awareness and engaging the community. While the community debrief provided a space for the public to ask questions and identify ways to stay involved in the campaign, in Ottawa at least, there was some ambiguity around what the next steps of the campaign were. This ambiguity had important implications for the local campaign moving forward.

#### *5.3.11. Next steps*

There was general agreement amongst participants interviewed for this study that the next step of the campaign was to permanently house individuals surveyed with supports. There were different ideas on how to achieve this and there were other immediate steps that needed to be taken. The purpose of this section is to identify and discuss those immediate next steps. The immediate next step for Waterloo’s and Hamilton’s registry week would be to track data and report on progress. The immediate next step for Ottawa’s action week would be changing leadership structures and merging priority lists. Pilot communities would also be asked to share their campaign experiences and learning with

other communities. Conveners from the formal leadership structure would further be asked to pilot other phases of the campaign. In Ottawa, there was an expectation that the Alliance would follow-up with member organizations and community partners. In Hamilton, it was found that intermediate steps would be to conduct another registry week and work on strengthening the local service system. Finally, a long-term step identified would be using the data for the action/registry week surveys to advocate for senior levels of government to make new investments in affordable housing. These next steps are discussed here.

#### *5.3.11.1. Tracking & reporting on data*

Following registry week, both the Region of Waterloo and City of Hamilton would be responsible for tracking and reporting their housing placements to the CAEH. One convener explained:

*“So, the Registry Week really is just a start and a kickoff. So, we’re just getting fully into it now, but, it means, developing and maintaining your priority list. Rolling out coordinated assessment across your community. Inventorying the resources that you have, to support people being housed. Understanding how many people are entering homelessness and exiting homelessness, so you can identify – get to a point where you can identify a monthly housing target. How many people do we have to house each month in order to functionally end homelessness in our community by a certain timeframe? So, if our community wants to functionally end homelessness in three years, we have to look at the list to understand how many people are coming off each month, how many people get on each month, and then, how long it will take to functionally end homelessness in our community. So, that is all part of the campaign, and so, that’s just the part that we are getting into now.”*

Now that the Region of Waterloo and City of Hamilton had developed a priority list, not only would they be responsible for tracking and reporting on progress, but also for maintaining that list. This meant taking those people at the top of the priority list and placing them into permanent housing with supports and making sure that new people were being added to the list. To keep an updated and well-maintained list would require making

sure agencies were using the common assessment tool, entering the data collected into the database on an ongoing basis, and identifying resources available in the community that could be used to house people. Setting an official monthly housing target would be important for: tracking and reporting on progress locally and nationally, developing targets, and tracking and reporting on progress towards each community's 10-year plan to end chronic homelessness (City of Hamilton, 2015, November, "Campaign Update"). One convener pointed out that as more communities join the campaign and report on progress, national comparisons could be made.

#### *5.3.11.2. Change in leadership structure and merging of priority lists in Ottawa*

The immediate next step following Ottawa's action week was changing leadership structures and merging priority lists. Two weeks after action week, the City of Ottawa took ownership of the data collected from the survey. This meant that the City of Ottawa, like the other two municipally convened pilot communities, would be responsible for tracking and reporting housing placements to the CAEH. When speaking with one convener, they explained that the Alliance and the City of Ottawa were in the process of finalizing a "*joint agreement in terms of moving forwards [with the] formalized campaign.*" Part of this agreement would involve merging the by-name list from Ottawa's action week with the City of Ottawa's priority list of long-stay shelter clients.<sup>99</sup> In the third part of this analysis, consideration will be given to why there was a change in leadership structure following action week. This change in leadership structure and merging of priority lists have important implications in terms of achieving local campaign goals.

#### *5.3.11.3. Another registry week in Hamilton*

There were intermediate plans in Hamilton to do another registry week. There were plans to combine the upcoming 2016 national PiT Count with another registry week (City of Hamilton, 2015, November 2, slide 11). It is understood here that this second registry week would focus more on targeting and prioritizing indigenous people. Perhaps the reason for this focus is because indigenous people are overrepresented amongst the homeless population locally and therefore were identified as a local priority group.

When asking whether Ottawa and Waterloo would be doing another registry week, one convener said it was uncertain whether Ottawa would be doing a second registry week and that if it did, the goal would be finding those people not counted for yet. Perhaps the reason for this uncertainty had to do with the change in leadership structures. It would be difficult to garner support from the City of Ottawa for another action week when it had already demonstrated that it is unwilling to make a stronger commitment toward housing. Finding more people to add to the priority list would, however, keep the pressure on the local government to push for higher housing targets. Doing another action week would require more financial and material resources to organize as well. Another convener said that Waterloo would not be doing another registry week. They explained that the focus now would be on keeping an updated priority list that could provide point-in-time information “at any time.”

#### *5.3.11.4. Strengthening the coordination of Hamilton’s service system*

Another step identified in Hamilton involved asking questions about the data and strengthening the coordination of the local service system. One convener said, “*I think we*

*are gunna take a little bit more time to make sure that we're using the opportunity to ask meaningful questions in a local context as well[.]*" Although the nature of these questions is unknown, they probably helped inform the next registry week process. This convener also said:

*"So, I think one of the things that we're focusing in on that is sort of happening simultaneously is thinking about the way in which we work as a system. So, it's not just about how each program functions or what it delivers, but how we come together as a system to support people. So, one of the ways that we're doing that through the registry week, we've looked at our Housing First programs with the various different agencies of which surveys were conducted. So, for example, if a person completed their survey at our youth shelter, we have connected that youth shelter with Housing First workers, directly having a conversation with them about the youth that were identified through our registry week list, to make sure people are connected as a starting point, but what that does is, it also fosters an ongoing relationship for any youth that may be eligible for Housing First programs and supports in the future."*

Using the data from registry, 'bridges' are now being built or connections are now being made between local agencies and Housing First programs. These 'bridges' are important as they allow agencies to refer people experiencing homelessness who have been assessed with high needs directly to Housing First programs with caseworkers. This practice has helped strengthen Hamilton's local system. This new practice was not identified in Ottawa and Waterloo. Perhaps it is because these local services systems were already coordinated this way?

#### *5.3.11.5. Continue learning & sharing*

Another important next step following the piloting phase of the campaign would be continued learning and sharing. Conveners from each pilot community were invited to attend the national launch of the 20K Homes campaign that took place in Toronto in June 2015 and the 2015 NCEH in Montreal. They were asked to share their campaign

experiences and learnings with other communities interested in signing on to the campaign. They were also asked to contribute materials to the registry week toolkit. The Region of Waterloo and City of Hamilton would continue to pilot “other aspects of the [campaign]” as one convener put it, also. For example, they were asked to pilot the tracking and reporting process. All of this would help inform other communities and would be an important part of developing the 20K Homes campaign learning platform.

#### *5.3.11.6 Follow-up with community partners & engagement*

There appeared to be an expectation in Ottawa that the Alliance would follow-up with community partners and provide other spaces for engagement. One criticism found once action week was over, however, was that there was no follow-up. One agency staff explained:

*“I think they need to continually follow-up with the partners that were around the [planning] table. [...] Keep us informed and up-to-date on how we can – how we can support on an ongoing – I mean, I think it’s great for our awareness building. I think it’s amazing for our awareness building. But you gotta keep the momentum going.”*

At the time the Alliance sent out a mass e-mail regarding the national launch of the 20K Homes campaign, there was no update on the progress of the campaign at the local level. Updating frontline staff, volunteers, and community partners on the local campaign and keeping the momentum going was important for showing them that their time, energy and limited resources had not gone to the wayside. Recognizing this, one convener said:

*“... Yeah, and – and I’m mindful of, it’s been 4 months now [since action week] and we don’t want to lose the momentum. In the course of the 4 months already, it’s evolved of course, but I think that’s in mind in terms of we need to get going on identifying the next step and how do we keep the community engaged in this process? It was an action week, but we don’t want to see it as a week-long initiative*

*that is now done. So, again, I don't know if I would have done things differently but it's certainly on my mind that we don't lose that."*

How will the Alliance keep the community engaged in the process moving forward? How does a change in leadership structure affect this process? The community could be engaged through another action week, however, getting more people on the by-name list with the intention of permanently housing them with supports is difficult when there are not enough resources. It is suggested here that any future engagement with the community will have to focus more on advocacy. Continued advocacy would be an important next step.

#### *5.3.11.7. Continue advocating for new affordable housing and supports*

The Alliance, City of Ottawa, frontline staff and volunteers all agreed that an important next step of the campaign was to continue advocating for new affordable housing. One volunteer said:

*"Well it was explained that ultimately the reason why this was started was to generate enough data to take to decision-makers to argue that we need more houses for people who are homeless. So, I think the next step would have to be for the organization to look at the data, find out what exactly it means, and start knocking on doors of politicians at the municipal, provincial, federal level. In some respects, I think it covers all three levels."*

This advocacy would take time to grow. It would require ongoing data collection and analysis and taking the aggregated results from the local and national campaigns to demonstrate to governments the level of need. Back in November 2015 at the NCEH in Montréal, Tim Richter said it would not be until all resources were maximized and all 20,000 people were housed that it would be more convincing for politicians to reengage in affordable housing and that we could start focusing on housing the 'hidden' homeless as well. It is questioned here, however, how useful the results from the campaign will be? At the time of this announcement, all three levels of government showed no interest in making

a stronger commitment towards affordable housing.<sup>100</sup> Also, there has been multiple advocacy groups and research projects over the last 25 years raising awareness on homelessness and the need for affordable housing.

#### *5.3.12. Conclusion*

Part three of this analysis identified and discussed the key components of action/registry week. These key components include: a focus, human resources, support, financial and material resources, recruitment, training, data, a survey tool, the media, a community debrief and next steps. While these components were key to getting the local campaign off the ground and for achieving their goals, no new affordable housing resources had been identified. This raises an important question, how will pilot communities come up with the resources needed to house people for the campaign? This question is explored next.

## **PART IV – How will pilot communities come up with the resources needed to house people for the campaign?**

### *5.4.1. Introduction*

There is one last question that needs to be addressed in this thesis. That is, how will each pilot community come up with the resources needed to house people for the campaign? According to 20K Homes campaign “Public Relations Tool Kit”, “The campaign itself does not come with new resources” (20K Homes & CAEH, 2015, June 12). With no new resources being offered through the campaign, a shortage of affordable housing across the country, and no new investments by senior levels of government in affordable housing and supports, it is unclear how participating communities are going to come up with the resources needed to house people for the campaign. This ambiguity has important implications in terms of achieving campaign goals and outcomes as well as long-term efforts to end homelessness.

To house 20,000 people for the campaign, communities will “maximize [their] existing resources” (20K Homes & CAEH, 2015, June 12, p.15). This means working together with community partners to pool together and share limited resources and using them “efficiently and effectively” (City of Hamilton, 2015, April 7, p.2). It also means prioritizing “finite” resources to help people with the “highest level of need” first (Broffman, A., Community Solutions in Hayes, 2015, April 30). Tim Richter stated, “We’re going to extract every ounce of value we can from existing resources to get people housed” (20K Homes & CAEH, 2015, June 12, p.12; CNW Group Inc., & Cision, c.2018).

While existing resources may be enough to house 20,000 people for the campaign, they are not enough to end homelessness.

To understand how pilot communities will come up with housing resources needed to house people for the campaign, this section identifies and discusses: 1) what housing resources each pilot community had available them at the end of action/registry week to house people for the campaign; 2) and the opportunities, challenges and strategies around mobilizing housing resources for the campaign. The findings from this study show that the Alliance is more dependent on the community at large for mobilizing housing resources for the campaign than are conveners from the formal leadership structure. This is because the latter conveners have access to homelessness funding. Making new connections will be necessary for obtaining housing resources and for the on-going sustainability and success of the local and national campaigns.

### *5.3.2. Homelessness funding*

The primary channel through which pilot communities will come up with the resources to house people for the campaign is by leveraging off existing homelessness funding. The core principles of the 20K Homes campaign align with Federal HPS and Provincial CHPI funding requirements. They also aligns with each pilot community's 10-Year Plan. Conveners are therefore able to leverage off federal, provincial and municipal homelessness funding to house people for the campaign because it aligns with these programs. What's important to emphasize here is that funding for these programs was not won through the campaign, nor did the piloting of the campaign result in any or all levels of government investing more money into these programs.

Although the cities of Ottawa and Hamilton and the region of Waterloo are designated communities under the Federal HPS, conveners do not have equal access to homelessness funding under this program. One convener explained:

*“The City [of Hamilton] has oversight around most of the resources that go towards housing and homelessness. So, we were able to leverage off [...] those resources to help not only with registry week, but more importantly, what we do with that information after the registry week.”*

Both the City of Hamilton and Region of Waterloo are services managers for homelessness, and so, they receive HPS and CHPI funding from senior levels of government that they are responsible for allocating as they see fit. They were able to leverage off these resources to fund their registry weeks and will continue to leverage off these resources to permanently house chronically homeless individuals with high needs for the campaign.

Although the Region of Waterloo is a designated community under the HPS, it does not receive the same amount of funding as do the other two pilot communities. One convener explained this is because “Canada’s Big 10” communities, including Ottawa and Hamilton, receive 80 percent of HPS funding, whereas the other 51 communities, including Waterloo, receive the remaining 20 percent.<sup>101</sup> The difference in funding levels impacts designated communities differently. This convener explained:

*“So, to put that in context [of Waterloo], the Federal funding that [is] received in comparison to [...] provincial funding and [...] funding that [the] regional government provides – the Federal funding only counts for ... I’m just trying to remember if it’s 4 or 7 – it’s like ... 4 percent or 7 percent of [...] local funding – for homelessness. So, its level of impact in [the] community is much different than it might be in Hamilton or Ottawa or Toronto or ...”*

Described here, the region of Waterloo relies more on homelessness funding from the provincial and regional governments than it does on homelessness funding from the federal

government. It is suggested here that this difference in funding levels helps explain why the City of Hamilton had more resources available to it than the Region of Waterloo did to organize registry week. According to this convener, the Region of Waterloo allocates all its homelessness funding towards Housing First. This has important implications for those people experiencing homelessness or at-risk of becoming homeless within the local community who are not eligible for these programs. Unless new investments are made in affordable housing and supports, these people do not have access to programs and supports.

Since the City of Ottawa is service manager for homelessness locally, the Alliance is very much dependent on its support for housing people for the campaign. Based on the information provided by one spokesperson, it is understood here that this is the reason why the City of Ottawa took ownership of the data collected from action week moving forward with the campaign. As Service Manager for Homelessness, the City of Ottawa has access to more resources, and specifically, homelessness funding. It has the power to decide how homelessness funding gets prioritized and allocated. Since the City of Ottawa has its own focus (on long-stay shelter clients) and its own priority list, it is understood here that those people on the by-name list created during action week, including the ‘hidden’ homeless, will not be prioritized for permanent housing and supports until those people identified by the City of Ottawa are housed first. One convener said that:

“[the Alliance would] *certainly [follow] along with the City in terms of how many folks have been housed[.] [...] So, for different reasons, [the Alliance is] monitoring – not so much the use of their data but whether [it’s] seeing action arising from their data[.] But [the Alliance is] dependent upon the City for watching that.”*<sup>102</sup>

This new leadership structure has important implications in terms of campaign goals and outcomes. Unless the Alliance finds other community partners with resources to house

people off the by-name list, including the ‘hidden’ homeless, the focus and goals of Ottawa’s action week will shift to reflect the interests of the City of Ottawa.

Conveners may be able to leverage off government funding to house people for the campaign, however, we know that funding for these programs are in decline and not enough to end homelessness. We also know that a grassroots movement in which affordable housing is a collective responsibility will require finding other pools of resources to tap into. So, where are these other resources coming from? This is explored next.

#### *5.3.3. The private sector*

The private sector was identified as a key partner in mobilizing housing resources for the campaign moving forward. By private sector, I am referring specifically to landlords and developers. Engaging landlords and developers will require reaching out and asking them to reserve affordable housing units for people eligible for Housing First programs and supports. Conveners from Hamilton and Waterloo agreed that more work needed to be done to engage with the private sector and was an important next step. One convener said:

*“[W]e would probably want to engage more with the private sector and try to find ways for the private sector to support the campaign because we rely heavily on our existing funding dollars. We didn’t really do a lot of – well for a lack of time, we didn’t really spend a lot of time strategically thinking about … developing sort of those types of relationships.”*

Without the support of senior levels of government and not enough public dollars available locally, municipal governments are dependent on the private sector for the provision of affordable housing to meet local need. It is questioned here how conveners from the formal leadership structure plan to engage landlords and developers when they are often reluctant

to provide affordable units, especially to people experiencing homelessness? One participant interviewed for this study thought engaging landlords would be difficult because of the stigma around homelessness. They explained:

*“Even if they go out and speak to these landlords, they don’t want – landlords don’t want to be part of the program because they think it is a lot of trouble. They think that their units and that their housing – properties are [going to] be ... devalued because of having a vulnerable sector living in them. [...] I know that in my world, a long time ago, when I would be referring to housing programs – the Housing Response Team, right? They’ll go out and they’ll connect with landlords, and I know they are trying to do that now, but people don’t necessarily want the homeless in their housing units. So, I think that the struggle is [going] to be – unless the City of Ottawa or other organizations are willing to build ... purpose-built shelters, subsidized housing units, whatever it might be, I think it’s going to be a struggle.”*

Studies show that while the struggle to engage landlords is a valid concern, with the right skills, support and tools, supported housing can be negotiated (Pomeroy, 2005; Gaetz, Scott, & Gulliver, 2013; Gaetz & CEL, 2014; CEL & MHCC, 2014; Noble et al., 2015). Moving forward with the campaign, conveners and housing providers will have to come up with strategies for negotiating with landlords and developers to successfully obtain housing resources. As a lesson learned, the Region of Waterloo (2015, February, slide 40) advised other communities thinking of signing on to the campaign to “Be prepared to sell it to different audiences”. It is understood here that this means spending more time prior to registry week planning how to target different audiences for resources. This suggests that communities signing onto the campaign will require the proper tools and guidance needed to engage landlords.<sup>103</sup>

Unlike conveners from the formal leadership structure, the Alliance is dependent on the City of Ottawa to engage with landlords and developers. As one spokesperson explained, being a municipal government, the City of Ottawa can offer landlords and

developers incentives in return for reserving affordable housing units – something the Alliance cannot do because it lacks the resources and power over policy decision-making. This spokesperson explained the importance of engaging the private sector like this:

*“So, you’ve got the municipal government, provincial government, federal government, and the private sector, and if you look at it as legs that hold up a table, the feds are disappearing. So, that leg is disappearing, and the private sector really isn’t there. So, how well does a table balance on two legs? You know? Not very well. So, regardless of what the outcome is with the federal government, we need to really develop [that] relationship with the private sector. Cause if we have – we can balance on three legs, but ... it would be better if we had all four.”*

It is questioned here why there is more interest in developing relationships with the private sector than advocating for the federal government to reengage? Relying on the private sector is problematic because it is interested in making a profit, and so, anything rented (or owned) must be sold above average cost, which makes it unaffordable to low-income earners (Falvo, 2015, February 5). Put simply, landlords and developers are generally not interested in providing affordable housing units. Depending on the private sector to create affordable housing options is difficult then, because, landlords and developers need to see the value in it.

More recently, there has been talk at the provincial level to make inclusionary housing mandatory in Ontario. As Adamo et al. (2016, p.53) explain:

“inclusionary housing (also referred to as inclusionary planning or inclusionary zoning) [...] is a policy tool that permits municipalities to require a specified percentage of affordable housing units, at a rent below what the market would otherwise provide, be built as part of all new residential developments. Costs to developers are typically offset by way of concessions such as density bonusing height or density in exchange for a percentage of affordable rental units, to ensure that developers maintain a reasonable return on investment.”

If this policy is passed, municipal governments may take advantage of this planning tool to find housing for the campaign.

#### *5.3.4. Broadening the Base*

Aside from government funding, only in Ottawa were housing resources secured prior to the local campaign. In the weeks after action week, *Broadening the Base* (2015, p.1) announced that:

“1,500 new affordable housing units [would be created] over the next five years[,] provid[ing] sustainable, long term and affordable accommodation for key vulnerable populations including: the chronically homeless; low income families with young children; youth at risk; Aboriginal people, and; vulnerable seniors.”

It is understood here that those people housed through BtB will be counted towards the city’s housing target for the 20K Homes campaign. So, the 1,500-people housed through BtB and the 250 people housed by the City of Ottawa would become part of Ottawa’s “collective goal”, as one spokesperson put it, towards housing people for the 20K Homes campaign. BtB would help house priority groups (i.e. Aboriginals and youth) identified through action week and populations more susceptible to ‘hidden’ homelessness, who are not on the City of Ottawa’s priority list.

It needs to be considered why an opportunity like BtB presented itself in Ottawa and not in Hamilton and Waterloo. When planning a registry week, conveners are encouraged to reach out to community partners to gather resources that can be used to house people for the campaign (see 20K Homes & CAEH, n.d., “Lining Up Your Supply”). One convener pointed out that the Alliance had an action team “to inform this process”, suggesting that the City of Hamilton and Region of Waterloo did not have a planning committee to inform this process. Having said that, this convener explained that the City

of Hamilton did reach out to community partners prior to registry week. Having an action team inform this process in Ottawa was necessary, because, unlike conveners from the formal leadership structure, the Alliance did not have homelessness funding it could draw on to house people for the campaign, and therefore, was dependent on the community at large from the get-go. Without the support of the community, housing people for the campaign would be impossible. Although the Region of Waterloo and City of Hamilton are dependent on community partners to push for higher housing targets and for meeting local housing needs, they had access to a pool of homelessness funding they could draw on first, and so, they were not immediately dependent on community partners for providing housing resources for their local campaigns. Having a planning committee inform this process for action week suggests, however, that BtB was not an outcome of action week. This partnership was pre-existing to the local campaign. It was because the goals of these two campaigns aligned that the Alliance was able to leverage off the housing resources from BtB to support action week.

What's interesting about BtB is that it challenges us to think about the way in which we conceptualize "new" and "existing" resources. The affordable housing units created through BtB are not pre-existing, and yet, the buildings or structures in which these new units will be created are. While BtB is certainly innovative, the city of Ottawa cannot depend on "philanthropic givings" alone, borrowing from keynote speaker, to solve its affordable housing problem.

#### *5.3.5. The faith-based sector*

Aside from BtB, one convener mentioned there were a few local churches in Ottawa that wanted to pool together funds to create rent supplements to help house people for the

local campaign. It is unknown, however, whether this type of support was given and whether this was in response to the results from the survey or if this was something discussed prior to action week.

In Waterloo, a local church did contribute \$10,000 towards a “New home set-up pilot” that would “help STEP Home participants settle into their new homes” (Region of Waterloo, Housing Services, 2015, August, “Pilot Report”). This in-kind donation is unique to Waterloo and stems from the K-W OOTC transition. While this donation is important for achieving the goals of Waterloo’s registry week, it suggests that the Region has more work to do to reach out and connect with new partners to secure housing resources for the campaign.

#### *5.3.6. The service sector*

Following Waterloo’s registry week, there was evidence that the local service system had been strengthened. STEP Home partnered with Waterloo Regional Homes for Mental Health, receiving 8 rent subsidies to prioritize and allocate to people with “high needs” (Region of Waterloo, 2015, “OOTC Transition”). With another four “high needs” people receiving rental assistance through the Region’s Housing Assistance with Support program (*ibid*)<sup>104</sup>, the Region exceeded its initial registry week goal and permanently housed 50 chronically homeless individuals over the 2014/2015 winter season (Region of Waterloo, 2015, August 11 & “Pilot Report”).<sup>105</sup>

#### *5.3.7. Everyday citizens*

Everyday citizens were identified as having an important role to play in mobilizing housing resources for Ottawa’s local campaign. The Alliance was “asking everyday

citizens to get involved in creating and leveraging new and innovative housing solutions” (Burkholder & Dej, 2015, March 17). This suggests that the Alliance was depending on everyday citizens to come up with new housing solutions. As demonstrated at the community debrief, however, people were looking for ways to get involved. One convener said, “*I would love to see some communication in the future tapping into those networks of [...] volunteers, and say, if you are still interested in this, would you come to – whether it is a meeting or being able to create a resource[.]*” Engaging everyday citizens will require creating other spaces for community engagement. There appeared to be some indication by this convener that everyday citizens were being asked to write letters to their MPs and MPPs. Writing letters was considered strategic for reengaging senior levels of government in housing and homelessness issues and for achieving the long-term goals for the campaign – that is, long-term investments in affordable housing and supports.

#### *5.3.8. Conclusion*

Part three of this analysis explored how conveners from each pilot community will come up with the resources needed to house people for the campaign. It was found that unlike conveners from the formal leadership structure who have access to and will draw from homelessness funding to house people for their local campaigns, the Alliance is more dependent on the community at large, and the City of Ottawa particularly, for finding housing resources to support the local campaign. While conveners from Ottawa and Waterloo have identified additional resources through the faith-based and service sectors, conveners from all three pilot communities will be required to make new connections and create alternative spaces for engagement to find housing resources for their local campaigns. While leveraging off existing resources within communities may be enough to

house people for the campaign, they are not enough to end homelessness. With no new resources provided through the campaign, new investments in affordable housing and supports are needed by senior levels of government to end homelessness.

## **Chapter six:**

### **Conclusion**

#### *6.0. Introduction*

To conclude this thesis, this chapter begins with a review of the research objective, questions, and central argument. A summary of the key findings is provided and some final thoughts on how the 20K Homes campaign fits in with current efforts to end homelessness. An update on the campaign's progress is provided and areas for further research are identified.

#### *6.1. Review of research objective, questions and thesis statement*

The main objective of this study was to understand how the 20K Homes campaign fits in with current efforts to end homelessness. In exploring this central research question, I addressed the following sub-questions:

1. What factors shape the timing, development and characteristics of the campaign at the national and local levels?
2. Why did conveners at the local level agree to pilot the campaign?
3. What are the key components of action/registry week?
4. How will each pilot community come up with the resources needed to house people for the campaign?

In addressing these questions, I argued that the 20K Homes campaign not only supports but strengthens a fairly new approach to homelessness in Canada – one based on Housing First. While there may be enough existing resources within participating communities to house people for the campaign, these resources are not enough to end homelessness. With no new

resources provided through the campaign, new investments in affordable housing and supports are needed by senior levels of government to end homelessness.

## *6.2. Key findings*

Provided here is a summary of the key findings from this research project:

### *6.2.1. What factors shaped the timing, development & characteristics of the campaigns:*

- Canada's affordable housing and homelessness crisis that began in the 1990s
- The recent transition in the homelessness service system towards a Housing First approach to homelessness.
- The “success” of the American 100K Homes campaign
- Politics between the CAEH and conveners at the local and international levels and politics within each pilot community.
- Similarities and differences between formal and informal leadership structures: Waterloo’s and Hamilton’s registry weeks were convened by municipal and regional governments, whereas, Ottawa’s action week was convened by a non-profit community-based organization.
- The local campaigns were shaped by local context and cross-site learnings as well.

### *6.2.2. Reasons why conveners agreed to pilot the campaign:*

- The campaign aligned with federal and provincial funding requirements as well as each pilot community’s 10-Year Plan to End Homelessness.
  - The Alliance wanted to take shared ownership of Ottawa’s 10-Year Plan.
- The campaign would help strengthen each pilot community’s local service system and approach to homelessness. It would:

- help the Region of Waterloo allocate additional resources given to step home through the K-W OOTC transition;
  - allow the City of Hamilton to establish a baseline target;
  - and give the Alliance the opportunity to push the City of Ottawa for higher housing targets.
- The campaign provided the opportunity to raise awareness and to educate the public on homelessness and the need for affordable housing.
    - Conveners from Ottawa and Hamilton saw the campaign as an opportunity to advocate for senior levels of government to make new investments in affordable housing.
    - Awareness, community engagement, and advocacy held more weight during Ottawa's action week.
  - The campaign gave conveners the opportunity to be leaders and innovators in ending homelessness locally and nationally.
  - To inform (in Hamilton)/replace (in Waterloo) the 2016 national PiT Count.

#### *6.2.3. Key components of action/registry week*

- Waterloo's and Hamilton's registry weeks focused on prioritizing chronically homeless individuals with high acuity for Housing First programs with supports. Ottawa's action week focused on surveying people not on the City of Ottawa's priority list, including the "hidden" homeless.
  - In all three pilot communities, those individuals who had secure tenure but were at risk of becoming homeless were *not* eligible for Housing First programs and

supports. In other words, those without tenure were eligible for the action/registry week survey.

- To different extents, conveners depended on their (pre-)existing campaign networks to recruit frontline staff, volunteers and survey participants; and to mobilize and obtain resources needed for their local campaigns. Growing these networks will be a crucial next step for finding housing resources and for the ongoing sustainability of these campaigns.
- Conveners from the formal leadership structure had more resources available to them internally to carry out registry week. They were less dependent on the community at large to support and resource their local campaigns. These campaigns were better resourced and organized. The Alliance had fewer resources available to it internally to carry out action week. It was more dependent on members and community partners for support and resources. This dependence made Ottawa's action week a more grassroots campaign.
- Overall, while the support and resources mobilized were important for carrying out action/registry week, no new resources were identified.
- The data collected during action/registry week only captured those people experiencing homelessness who had some form of connection with the local service system.
- The survey tool prioritized chronically homeless individuals with high acuity for Housing First programs and supports. Despite conveners' efforts to include the "hidden" homeless, the survey tool was not suitable for assessing their needs.

- The training, community debrief, and media were important for creating spaces for raising awareness, community engagement, and advocacy.
  - Framing action week as an awareness raising exercise was a strategy the Alliance used to garner the support of the City of Ottawa and came at the cost of the initial goals and strategies of action week.
  - Creating more spaces for community engagement will be particularly important for the on-going sustainability of action week.
  - Media engagement was dependent on whether the local campaigns were considered “newsworthy”
  - The housing targets announced by municipal governments at the community debriefs were based on available homelessness funding.
- Conveners from the formal leadership structure would be responsible for tracking and reporting on progress following registry week. The City of Ottawa, not the Alliance, would be responsible for this.
  - A change in leadership structure following action week would result in merging the by-name list with the City of Ottawa’s priority list and prioritizing long-stay shelter clients for Housing First programs and supports.

#### *6.2.4. How pilot communities will come up with the housing resources*

- Conveners from the formal leadership structure have access to homelessness funding they can draw on to start housing people for the campaign. The Alliance is dependent on community partners, including the City of Ottawa, to start housing people for the local campaign.

- Only the Region of Waterloo had community partners reach out as result of the registry week data.
- Building relationships with landlords would be an important next step in finding housing resources for the local campaigns. The Alliance would be dependent on the City of Ottawa to do this.

### *6.3. Final thoughts ...*

Following the national launch of the 20K Homes campaign back in June 2015, the new liberal government announced Canada would be admitting 25,000 Syrian refugees over the winter months. This announcement left many Canadians questioning why the federal government was housing “other people” and not “our own?” David Gratzer (2015, December 2), a critic in support of the Syrian refugee campaign, asked instead:

“[...] if we can set deadlines, find funding and race against time to help thousands of refugees, can we do the same to house Canada’s homeless population? [...] the very act of setting an ambitious national goal meant that resources suddenly appeared out of thin air. [...] If we can do all this once on a deadline — why not twice?”

He juxtaposes the resettlement deadline for Syrian refugees with the homeless Canadians that would be “suffering on winter streets due to entirely treatable illnesses”, hoping that the federal government would respond to the latter “with the same sense of urgency” (*ibid*). Homelessness has been an urgent matter for twenty years. At what point then is a government willing to get involved in creating housing solutions for the those who are homeless? If we apply the lessons learned from the Syrian refugee campaign to the 20K Homes campaign, it’s that creating a sense of urgency and setting ambitious housing targets is not enough when it comes to motivating governments to solve a housing crisis; they are

only interested in creating housing solutions when it is in their best interest to do so. The new liberal government promised to “expand Canada’s intake of refugees from Syria by 25,000 through immediate government sponsorship” and to “work with private sponsors to accept even more” as part of its elections campaign platform (Liberal Party of Canada, c.2018), and so, it was under pressure to deliver on that promise. It is questioned here, if the opportunity was taken when piloting the campaign in Ottawa to garner the support of the liberal government to house 20,000 most vulnerable homeless Canadians and/or develop a national housing strategy as part of its campaign platform, would the party have kept its promise?

In the Fall of 2017, the liberal government announced its 10-year, \$40 billion National Housing Strategy (see Government of Canada, 2017, November 22). In the year prior to this announcement:

“National consultations were launched to solicit the views of individual Canadians and housing organizations, experts and stakeholders on the vision, outcomes, themes and principles for a National Housing Strategy. [...] all of the input received through the consultations [would] be used to develop recommendations for a National Housing Strategy” (COH, 2017, “What We Heard”; see, Government of Canada, 2016).

Given that one of the core principles of the 20K Homes campaign is to advocate for senior levels of government to make new investments in affordable housing through the development of a national housing strategy, it is questioned here if and how the Government of Canada’s announcement will affect the goals of the campaign? It’s emphasized here that the announcement of a new national housing strategy was part of the Liberal’s elections campaign platform and not a material gain from the campaign itself. As part of its elections platform, the Liberals promised to “renew federal leadership in housing,

staring with a new, ten-year investment in social infrastructure” (Liberal Party of Canada, c.2018), because it was in their best interest to do so and was, again, it was under pressure to deliver on this promise.

#### *6.4. Update on the 20K Homes campaign’s progress*

In the Fall of 2017, the CAEH announced a new goal and timeline for the 20K Homes campaign. The campaign would aim to house 20,000 most vulnerable homeless Canadians *and* end chronic homelessness in 20 communities by 2020 (CAEH, 2017, October 25). According to the CAEH, “The new goal reflects lessons from the first two years of the campaign, opportunities presented by shifting federal policy and a desire in campaign communities to move more aggressively on ending homelessness” (*ibid*). It is understood here that initial monthly housing targets were not high enough to reach the campaign’s initial deadline, and so, communities would have to push for higher monthly housing targets to meet their collective goal by the campaign’s new deadline. Also, the changes in federal policy suggest that funding would be available to make ending chronic homelessness possible in 20 communities. If the piloting phase of the campaign has taught us anything, however, it’s that, to achieve real reductions in homelessness, the hidden homeless must be included as well.

At the time of this writing, 44 communities were signed on to the campaign, 15,334 people had been permanently housed with supports, and there were 735 days left of the campaign (20K Homes & CAEH, c.2018, “Track Our Progress”). With official monthly housing targets set and changes in federal policy, it is anticipated here that participating communities will exceed their goal of housing 20,000 “most vulnerable” homeless people by the campaign’s new deadline.

### *6.5. Identifying areas for future research*

This thesis took a relational comparative approach to studying the piloting phase of the 20K Homes campaign, focusing on Ottawa's action week and Waterloo's and Hamilton's registry weeks. Longitudinal studies are needed to track each pilot community's progress towards housing people for the campaign. Future research may even compare the similarities and differences between Hamilton's first and second registry weeks. A national study is needed and anticipated – one that evaluates the overall impact the 20K Home's campaign has had on ending chronic homelessness in Canada – like the evaluation report for the 100K Homes campaign in the States.

One shortcoming of this research project is that it is limited to the Canadian context. Drawing on the American 100K Homes campaign and the Canadian 20K Homes campaign, World Habitat has launched the European End Street Homelessness Campaign, which “aims to end chronic homelessness in up to 50 European cities by 2020” (World Habitat, 2017). Another possible area for future research then would be to do a relational comparative study of the American, Canadian and European campaigns.

## Appendix A – Map & Table of 61 Designated Communities Under the HPS



Figure 1: Map reproduced from ESDC (2017, April 28)

<b>61 Designated Communities Under the HPS</b>				
<b>AB</b>	<b>NB</b>	Thompson	Peterborough	Trois-Rivières
Calgary*	Bathurst	Winnipeg*	Sault Ste. Marie	Thompson
Edmonton*	Fredericton	<b>ON</b>	Barrie (Simcoe)	<b>PEI</b>
Grande Prairie	Moncton	Belleville	Sudbury	Charlottetown-Summerside
Lethbridge	Saint John	Brantford	Thunder Bay	<b>SK</b>
Medicine Hat	<b>NL</b>	Dufferin County	Toronto*	Prince Albert
Red Deer	St. John's	Durham	Waterloo	Regina
Wood Buffalo	<b>NS</b>	Guelph-Wellington	Windsor	Saskatoon
<b>BC</b>	Cape Breton	Halton	York	<b>YT</b>
Kamloops	Halifax*	Hamilton*	<b>QC</b>	Whitehorse
Kelowna	<b>NU</b>	Kingston	Drummondville	
Nanaimo	Iqaluit	London	Gatineau	
Nelson	<b>NWT</b>	Niagara Region	Montreal*	
Prince George	Yellowknife	Nipissing/North Bay	Quebec City*	
Vancouver*	<b>MB</b>	Ottawa*	Saguenay	
Victoria	Brandon	Peel	Sherbrooke	

**Table 1:** The information from this table has been obtained and adapted from ESDC (2017, April 28)

\*Canada's ten largest communities that receive the most HPS funding (ESDC, 2018, June 1).

## **Appendix B – 16 Directives Under the HPS**

Directive 1: Chronically and episodically homeless populations*
Directive 2: Connecting to and maintaining housing
Directive 3: Emergency housing funding
Directive 4: Treatment services and case management
Directive 5: Coordination of resources and leveraging*
Directive 6: Sustainability
Directive 7: Placement of clients in interim and transitional housing
Directive 8: Supporting homeless veterans
Directive 9: Capital investments
Directive 10: Basic needs services
Directive 11: Prevention
Directive 12: Data collection, sharing and dissemination*
Directive 13: Persons with Lived Experience of Homelessness
Directive 14: Education, training, and employment services
Directive 15: Advocacy, public education, and awareness*
Directive 16: Official Language Minority Communities

**Table 2:** The information from this table has been reproduced from ESDC (2016, August 15).

\*These directives are supported by the 20K Homes campaign.

## Appendix C – A History of Affordable Housing & Homelessness: Timeline

1993	1995	1996	1998	1999	2001	2006	2008	2009	2010	2012	2013	2014	2015	2018
Fed. funding for new social housing stops.	Senior levels of cut funding for other social programs.	Fed. govt downloads social housing responsibilities onto provs. & terrs.	Prov. Ont. downloads social housing responsibilities onto mun. govts.	Fed. govt. launches NHI.	Fed. govt. launched AHI.	NHI renamed HPS.	At Home/Chez Soi + HF in Alberta					Ontario's 2 <sup>nd</sup> Poverty Reduction Strategy Released	Canadian 20K Homes Campaign	
			Role of CMHC mitigated.				First 10-Year Plan developed & implemented by the CHF		American 100K Homes Campaign			EAPH released "A Place to Call Home"		
			FCM declares homelessness a "national disaster."							CAEH formed	Renewal of HPS with a focus on HF	CHPI launched with focus on HF		

**Figure 2:** A timeline showing a history of affordable housing and homelessness in Canada since the 1990s

## Appendix D – Interview Participants

	<b>Conveners</b>	<b>Agency Staff</b>	<b>Frontline Staff</b>	<b>Volunteers</b>	<b>Spokespeople</b>
<b>Ottawa</b>	2	1	3	5	3
<b>Waterloo</b>	1				
<b>Hamilton</b>	1				
<b>National</b>	2				
<b>International</b>	1				
	7			<b>Total # Participants:</b>	<b>19</b>

**Table 3:** provides a breakdown of participants interviewed for this study on the piloting of the 20K Homes campaign.

## Appendix E – CUREB Clearance Forms



Carleton University  
Research Ethics Office  
Research Ethics Board  
511 Tory, 1125 Colonel By Drive  
Ottawa, ON K1S 5B6 Canada  
Tel: 613-520-2517, ethics@carleton.ca

### Ethics Clearance Form – New Clearance

This is to certify that the Carleton University Research Ethics Board has examined the application for ethical clearance. The REB found the research project to meet appropriate ethical standards as outlined in the *Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Human, 2nd edition*, and the *Carleton University Policies and Procedures for the Ethical Conduct of Research*.

Date of Clearance: May 27, 2015

Researcher: Brittany Rea (Student Research: Master's Student)

Department: Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences\Geography and Environmental Studies (Department of)  
University: Carleton University

Research Supervisor (if applicable): Prof. Fran Klodawsky

Project Number: 102986

Alternate File Number (if applicable):

Project Title: 20,000 Homes – How a National Initiative Becomes Mobilized & Localized: An Examination of Ottawa's Action Week

Funder (if applicable):

Clearance Expires: May 31, 2016

---

#### All researchers are governed by the following conditions:

**Annual Status Report:** You are required to submit an Annual Status Report to either renew clearance or close the file. Failure to submit the Annual Status Report will result in the immediate suspension of the project. Funded projects will have accounts suspended until the report is submitted and approved.

**Changes to the project:** Any changes to the project must be submitted to the Carleton University Research Ethics Board for approval. All changes must be approved prior to the continuance of the research.


**Adverse events:** Should a participant suffer adversely from their participation in the project you are required to report the matter to the Carleton University Research Ethics Board. You must submit a written record of the event and indicate what steps you have taken to resolve the situation.

**Suspension or termination of clearance:** Failure to conduct the research in accordance with the principles of the *Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans, 2nd edition* and the *Carleton University Policies and Procedures for the Ethical Conduct of Research* may result in the suspension or termination of the research project.



Louise Heslop

Chair, Carleton University Research Ethics Board



Andy Adler

Vice-Chair, Carleton University Research Ethics Board

**Figure 3:** Clearance to do research on Ottawa's action week.



Carleton University  
Research Ethics Office  
Research Ethics Board  
511 Tory, 1125 Colonel By Drive  
Ottawa, ON K1S 5B6 Canada  
Tel: 613-520-2517, ethics@carleton.ca

#### Ethics Clearance Form – Change to Protocol

This is to certify that the Carleton University Research Ethics Board has examined the application for ethical clearance. The REB found the research project to meet appropriate ethical standards as outlined in the *Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Human, 2nd edition*, and the *Carleton University Policies and Procedures for the Ethical Conduct of Research*.

Date of Clearance: July 30, 2015

Researcher: Fran Klodawsky (Primary Investigator)

Brittany Rea (Student Research: Master's Student)

Department: Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences\Geography and Environmental Studies (Department of)  
University: Carleton University

Research Supervisor (if applicable): Prof. Fran Klodawsky

Project Number: 102986

Alternate File Number (if applicable): N/A

Project Title: 20,000 Homes – How a National Initiative Becomes Mobilized & Localized: An Examination of Ottawa's Action Week

Funder (if applicable): N/A

Clearance Expires: May 31, 2016

---

#### All researchers are governed by the following conditions:

**Annual Status Report:** You are required to submit an Annual Status Report to either renew clearance or close the file. Failure to submit the Annual Status Report will result in the immediate suspension of the project. Funded projects will have accounts suspended until the report is submitted and approved.

**Changes to the project:** Any changes to the project must be submitted to the Carleton University Research Ethics Board for approval. All changes must be approved prior to the continuance of the research.


**Adverse events:** Should a participant suffer adversely from their participation in the project you are required to report the matter to the Carleton University Research Ethics Board. You must submit a written record of the event and indicate what steps you have taken to resolve the situation.

**Suspension or termination of clearance:** Failure to conduct the research in accordance with the principles of the *Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans, 2nd edition* and the *Carleton University Policies and Procedures for the Ethical Conduct of Research* may result in the suspension or termination of the research project.



Louise Heslop

Chair, Carleton University Research Ethics Board



Andy Adler

Vice-Chair, Carleton University Research Ethics Board

**Figure 4:** Clearance to do research on Waterloo's and Hamilton's registry weeks.

## **Appendix F – Supporting E-mail for Letters of Invite**

Dear [REDACTED],

My name is Brittany Rea and I am a Master's student in the Geography and Environmental Studies Department at Carleton University.

I am sending you this e-mail with a letter attached inviting you to participate in a study on Ottawa's Action Week – part of the 20,000 Homes campaign. The aim of my study is to understand how this national initiative has been mobilized and localized. As the convener of the local campaign, your experience is invaluable to my study.

If you are interested in participating in my study, please see the letter attached for details, and contact me directly either by phone or e-mail.

Kindly,

Brittany Rea

M.A. in Human Geography

Carleton University

Phone: [REDACTED]

E-mail: [brittany.rea@carleton.ca](mailto:brittany.rea@carleton.ca)

## Appendix G – Letters of Invite for Conveners



### Letter of Invitation

**Title:** 20,000 Homes: How a National Initiative Becomes Mobilized & Localized – An Examination of Ottawa’s Action Week

**Date of Ethics Clearance:** May 27, 2015

**Ethics Clearance for the Collection of Data Expires:** May 31, 2016

Wednesday, June 10, 2015

Dear

My name is Brittany Rea and I am a Master’s student in the Geography and Environmental Studies Department at Carleton University. I am working on a research project with the supervision of Dr. Fran Kłodawsky.

I am giving you this letter to invite you to participate in a study on Ottawa’s Action Week – part of the 20,000 Homes campaign. The aim of my study is to understand how this national initiative has been mobilized and localized. Your experience is invaluable to my study.

This study involves one interview that should take 60 minutes to complete. With your consent, you will be asked 20 questions and all answers will be audio-recorded. You may notice that some of the questions I ask in my study will be similar to those asked during Ottawa’s Action Week’s debrief sessions. During the interview, I (the interviewer) will take notes for backup. You will have the option to refuse to answer any question(s), and/or to opt-out of the interview at any time. As a token of appreciation, I will be providing you with refreshments.

You will have up until one month after the date of the interview to request that one or more of your responses be excluded from this study, or to opt-out of this study completely. If you do choose to opt-out, all information you provided will be destroyed immediately.

The audio-recording will be saved as an audio-file on an encrypted USB key and removed from the audio-recorder. A transcribed copy of the recording will also be saved to the same USB key. The USB key and hardcopy notes taken during the interview will be locked in a personal drawer in the graduate office at Carleton University. Only I (the researcher) and my supervisor will have access to the research data. The audio-file, transcription, and hardcopy notes from the interview will be destroyed by January 1st, 2017, as they will not be needed anymore.

While this study involves minimal professional and emotional risk, care will be taken to protect your / your organization's identity. This will be done by coding your role in this campaign as a "controller." I would like to emphasize that *your name and organization will be kept anonymous*.

I am more than willing to conduct the interview at your office for your convenience. If this does not work, please let me know and we can make alternative arrangements. I recommend Carleton University, and I will compensate the cost (up to \$7.00) for parking or for a bus ticket if conducting the interview at this location.

If you are interested in participating in this study, please contact me directly either by phone [REDACTED] or e-mail: [brittany.rea@carleton.ca](mailto:brittany.rea@carleton.ca). Thank you.

This ethics protocol was reviewed by Carleton University's Research Ethics Board, which provided clearance to carry out this study. Should you have questions or concerns related to your involvement in this study, please contact:

**CUREBs Contact Information:**

Professor Louise Heslop, Chair  
Professor Andy Adler, Vice-Chair  
Research Ethics Board  
Carleton University  
511 Tory  
1125 Colonel By Drive  
Ottawa, ON K1S 5B6  
Tel: 613-520-2517  
E-mail: [ethics@carleton.ca](mailto:ethics@carleton.ca)

**Figure 5:** This letter of invite was sent to the Alliance to End Homelessness Ottawa. This form has been modified to protect the individual's identity.



**Canada's Capital University**

**Letter of Invitation**

**Title:** 20,000 Homes: How a National Initiative Becomes Mobilized & Localized – An Examination of Ottawa’s Action Week

**Date of Ethics Clearance:** May 27, 2015

**Ethics Clearance for the Collection of Data Expires:** May 31, 2016

**Tuesday, June 9, 2015**

Dear

My name is Brittany Rea and I am a Master’s student in the Geography and Environmental Studies Department at Carleton University. I am working on a research project with the supervision of Dr. Fran Kłodawsky.

I am giving you this letter to invite you to participate in a study on Ottawa’s Action Week – part of the 20,000 Homes campaign. The aim of my study is to understand how this national initiative has been mobilized and localized.

your experience is invaluable to my study.

This study involves one phone interview that should take up to 60 minutes to complete. With your consent, you will be asked 16 questions and all answers will be audio-recorded. During the interview, I (the interviewer) will take notes for backup. You will have the option to refuse to answer any question(s), and/or to opt-out of the interview at any time.

You will have up until one month after the date of the interview to request that one or more of your responses be excluded from this study, or to opt-out of this study completely. If you do choose to opt-out, all information you provided will be destroyed immediately.

The audio-recording will be saved as an audio-file on an encrypted USB key and removed from the audio-recorder. A transcribed copy of the recording will also be saved to the same USB key. The USB key and hardcopy notes taken during the interview will be locked in a personal drawer in the graduate office at Carleton University. Only I (the researcher) and my supervisor will have access to the research data. The audio-file, transcription, and hardcopy notes from the interview will be destroyed by January 1st, 2017, as they will not be needed anymore.

While this study involves minimal professional and emotional risk, care will be taken to protect your / your organization's identity. This will be done by coding your role in this campaign as a "controller." I would like to emphasize that *your name and organization will be kept anonymous*.

Please note that the phone interview will take place in my private office at home to ensure privacy during the audio-recording.

If you are interested in participating in this study, please contact me directly either by phone [REDACTED] or e-mail: [brittany.rea@carleton.ca](mailto:brittany.rea@carleton.ca). Thank you.

This ethics protocol was reviewed by Carleton University's Research Ethics Board, which provided clearance to carry out this study. Should you have questions or concerns related to your involvement in this study, please contact:

**CUREBs Contact Information:**

Professor Louise Heslop, Chair  
Professor Andy Adler, Vice-Chair  
Research Ethics Board  
Carleton University  
511 Tory  
1125 Colonel By Drive  
Ottawa, ON K1S 5B6  
Tel: 613-520-2517  
E-mail: [ethics@carleton.ca](mailto:ethics@carleton.ca)

**Figure 6:** This letter of invite was sent to the Canadian Alliance to End Homelessness. This form has been modified to protect the individual's identity.



**Canada's Capital University**

### **Letter of Invitation**

**Title:** 20,000 Homes: How a National Initiative Becomes Mobilized & Localized – An Examination of Ottawa’s Action Week

**Date of Ethics Clearance:** May 27, 2015

**Ethics Clearance for the Collection of Data Expires:** May 31, 2016

**Tuesday, June 9, 2015**

Dear

My name is Brittany Rea and I am a Master’s student in the Geography and Environmental Studies Department at Carleton University. I am working on a research project with the supervision of Dr. Fran Kłodawsky.

I am giving you this letter to invite you to participate in a study on Ottawa’s Action Week – part of the 20,000 Homes campaign. The aim of my study is to understand how this national initiative has been mobilized and localized.

your experience is invaluable to my study.

This study involves one phone interview that should take 60 minutes to complete. With your consent, you will be asked 20 questions and all answers will be audio-recorded. You may notice that some of the questions I ask in my study will be similar to those asked during Ottawa’s Action Week’s debrief sessions. During the interview, I (the interviewer) will take notes for backup. You will have the option to refuse to answer any question(s), and/or to opt-out of the interview at any time.

You will have up until one month after the date of the interview to request that one or more of your responses be excluded from this study, or to opt-out of this study completely. If you do choose to opt-out, all information you provided will be destroyed immediately.

The audio-recording will be saved as an audio-file on an encrypted USB key and removed from the audio-recorder. A transcribed copy of the recording will also be saved to the same USB key. The USB key and hardcopy notes taken during the interview will be locked in a personal drawer in the graduate office at Carleton University. Only I (the researcher) and my supervisor will have access to the research data. The audio-file, transcription, and hardcopy notes from the interview will be destroyed by January 1st, 2017, as they will not be needed anymore.

While this study involves minimal professional and emotional risk, care will be taken to protect your / your organization's identity. This will be done by coding your role in this campaign as a "controller." I would like to emphasize that your name and organization will be kept anonymous.

Please note that the phone interview will take place in my private office at home to ensure privacy during the audio-recording.

If you are interested in participating in this study, please contact me directly either by phone [REDACTED] or e-mail: [brittanv.rea@carleton.ca](mailto:brittanv.rea@carleton.ca). Thank you.

This ethics protocol was reviewed by Carleton University's Research Ethics Board, which provided clearance to carry out this study. Should you have questions or concerns related to your involvement in this study, please contact:

**CUREBs Contact Information:**

Professor Louise Heslop, Chair  
Professor Andy Adler, Vice-Chair  
Research Ethics Board  
Carleton University  
511 Tory  
1125 Colonel By Drive  
Ottawa, ON K1S 5B6  
Tel: 613-520-2517  
E-mail: [ethics@carleton.ca](mailto:ethics@carleton.ca)

**Figure 7:** This letter of invite was sent to Community Solutions. This form has been modified to protect the individual's identity.



**Canada's Capital University**

**Letter of Invitation**

**Title:** 20,000 Homes: How a National Initiative Becomes Mobilized & Localized – An Examination of Ottawa’s Action Week

**Date of Ethics Clearance:** May 27, 2015

**Ethics Clearance for the Collection of Data Expires:** May 31, 2016

Wednesday, July 8, 2015

Dear

My name is Brittany Rea and I am a Master’s student in the Geography and Environmental Studies Department at Carleton University. I am working on a research project with the supervision of Dr. Fran Klodawsky.

I am giving you this letter to invite you to participate in a study on Ottawa’s Action Week – part of the 20,000 Homes campaign. The aim of my study is to understand how this national initiative has been mobilized and localized.

your experience is invaluable to help geographers such as myself understand why movements such as the 20,000 Homes campaign are grounded in particular localities *and* understood relationally.

This study involves one phone interview that should take 30-60 minutes to complete. With your consent, you will be asked 33 questions and all answers will be audio-recorded. During the interview, I (the interviewer) will take notes for backup. You will have the option to refuse to answer any question(s), and/or to opt-out of the interview at any time.

You will have up until one month after the date of the interview to request that one or more of your responses be excluded from this study, or to opt-out of this study completely. If you do choose to opt-out, all information you provided will be destroyed immediately.

The audio-recording will be saved as an audio-file on an encrypted USB key and removed from the audio-recorder. A transcribed copy of the recording will also be saved to the same USB key. The USB key and hardcopy notes taken during the interview will be locked in a personal drawer in the graduate office at Carleton University. Only I (the researcher) and my supervisor will have access to the research data. The audio-file, transcription, and hardcopy notes from the interview will be destroyed by January 1st, 2017, as they will not be needed anymore.

While this study involves minimal professional and emotional risk, care will be taken to protect your / your organization's identity. This will be done by coding your role in this campaign as a "convener." I would like to emphasize that *your name and organization will be kept anonymous.*

Please note that the phone interview will take place in my private office at home to ensure privacy during the audio-recording.

If you are interested in participating in this study, please contact me directly either by phone [REDACTED] or e-mail: [brittany.rea@carleton.ca](mailto:brittany.rea@carleton.ca) by August 31, 2015. Thank you.

This ethics protocol was reviewed by Carleton University's Research Ethics Board, which provided clearance to carry out this study. Should you have questions or concerns related to your involvement in this study, please contact:

**CUREBs Contact Information:**

Professor Louise Heslop, Chair  
Professor Andy Adler, Vice-Chair  
Research Ethics Board  
Carleton University  
511 Tory  
1125 Colonel By Drive  
Ottawa, ON K1S 5B6  
Tel: 613-520-2517  
E-mail: [ethics@carleton.ca](mailto:ethics@carleton.ca)

**Figure 8:** This letter of invite was sent to Region of Waterloo. This form has been modified to protect the individual's identity.



**Canada's Capital University**

**Letter of Invitation**

**Title:** 20,000 Homes: How a National Initiative Becomes Mobilized & Localized – An Examination of Ottawa’s Action Week

**Date of Ethics Clearance:** May 27, 2015

**Ethics Clearance for the Collection of Data Expires:** May 31, 2016

**Wednesday, July 8, 2015**

Dear

My name is Brittany Rea and I am a Master’s student in the Geography and Environmental Studies Department at Carleton University. I am working on a research project with the supervision of Dr. Fran Kłodawsky.

I am giving you this letter to invite you to participate in a study on Ottawa’s Action Week – part of the 20,000 Homes campaign. The aim of my study is to understand how this national initiative has been mobilized and localized.

your experience is invaluable to help geographers such as myself understand why movements such as the 20,000 Homes campaign are grounded in particular localities and understood relationally.

This study involves one phone interview that should take 30-60 minutes to complete. With your consent, you will be asked 33 questions and all answers will be audio-recorded. During the interview, I (the interviewer) will take notes for backup. You will have the option to refuse to answer any question(s), and/or to opt-out of the interview at any time.

You will have up until one month after the date of the interview to request that one or more of your responses be excluded from this study, or to opt-out of this study completely. If you do choose to opt-out, all information you provided will be destroyed immediately.

The audio-recording will be saved as an audio-file on an encrypted USB key and removed from the audio-recorder. A transcribed copy of the recording will also be saved to the same USB key. The USB key and hardcopy notes taken during the interview will be locked in a personal drawer in the graduate office at Carleton University. Only I (the researcher) and my supervisor will have access to the research data. The audio-file, transcription, and hardcopy notes from the interview will be destroyed by January 1st, 2017, as they will not be needed anymore.

While this study involves minimal professional and emotional risk, care will be taken to protect your / your organization's identity. This will be done by coding your role in this campaign as a "convener." I would like to emphasize that *your name and organization will be kept anonymous*.

Please note that the phone interview will take place in my private office at home to ensure privacy during the audio-recording.

If you are interested in participating in this study, please contact me directly either by phone [REDACTED] or e-mail: [brittanycraig@carleton.ca](mailto:brittanycraig@carleton.ca) by August 31, 2015. Thank you.

This ethics protocol was reviewed by Carleton University's Research Ethics Board, which provided clearance to carry out this study. Should you have questions or concerns related to your involvement in this study, please contact:

**CUREBs Contact Information:**

Professor Louise Heslop, Chair  
Professor Andy Adler, Vice-Chair  
Research Ethics Board  
Carleton University  
511 Tory  
1125 Colonel By Drive  
Ottawa, ON K1S 5B6  
Tel: 613-520-2517  
E-mail: [ethics@carleton.ca](mailto:ethics@carleton.ca)

**Figure 9:** This letter of invite was sent to City of Hamilton. This form has been modified to protect the individual's identity.

## Appendix H – Letters of Invite for Spokespersons



### Letter of Invitation

**Title:** 20,000 Homes: How a National Initiative Becomes Mobilized & Localized – An Examination of Ottawa’s Action Week

**Date of Ethics Clearance:** May 27, 2015

**Ethics Clearance for the Collection of Data Expires:** May 31, 2016

Wednesday, July 8, 2015

Dear

My name is Brittany Rea and I am a Master’s student in the Geography and Environmental Studies Department at Carleton University. I am working on a research project with the supervision of Dr. Fran Klodawsky.

I am giving you this letter to invite you to participate in a study on Ottawa’s Action Week – part of the 20,000 Homes campaign. The aim of my study is to understand how this national initiative has been mobilized and localized.

your experience is invaluable to my study.

This study involves one interview that should take 30-60 minutes to complete. With your consent, you will be asked 21 questions and all answers will be audio-recorded. During the interview, I (the interviewer) will take notes for backup. You will have the option to refuse to answer any question(s), and/or to opt-out of the interview at any time. As a token of appreciation, I will be providing you with refreshments.

You will have up until one month after the date of the interview to request that one or more of your responses be excluded from this study, or to opt-out of this study completely. If you do choose to opt-out, all information you provided will be destroyed immediately.

The audio-recording will be saved as an audio-file on an encrypted USB key and removed from the audio-recorder. A transcribed copy of the recording will also be saved to the same USB key. The USB key and hardcopy notes taken during the interview will be locked in a personal drawer in the graduate office at Carleton University. Only I (the researcher) and my supervisor will have access to the research data. The audio-file, transcription, and hardcopy notes from the interview will be destroyed by January 1st, 2017, as they will not be needed anymore.

While this study involves minimal professional and emotional risk, care will be taken to protect your / your organization's identity. This will be done by coding your role in this campaign as a "convener." I would like to emphasize that *your name and organization will be kept anonymous*.

I am more than willing to conduct the interview at your office for your convenience. If this does not work, please let me know and we can make alternative arrangements. I recommend Carleton University, and I will compensate the cost (up to \$7.00) for parking or for a bus ticket if conducting the interview at this location. Another option may be a private telephone interview with you from my private office at home.

If you are interested in participating in this study, please contact me directly either by phone [REDACTED] or e-mail: [brittany.rea@carleton.ca](mailto:brittany.rea@carleton.ca) by August 31, 2015. Thank you.

This ethics protocol was reviewed by Carleton University's Research Ethics Board, which provided clearance to carry out this study. Should you have questions or concerns related to your involvement in this study, please contact:

**CUREBs Contact Information:**

Professor Louise Heslop, Chair  
Professor Andy Adler, Vice-Chair  
Research Ethics Board  
Carleton University  
511 Tory  
1125 Colonel By Drive  
Ottawa, ON K1S 5B6  
Tel: 613-520-2517  
E-mail: [ethics@carleton.ca](mailto:ethics@carleton.ca)

**Figure 10:** This letter of invite was sent to the City of Ottawa. This form has been modified to protect the individual's identity.



**Canada's Capital University**

**Letter of Invitation**

**Title:** 20,000 Homes: How a National Initiative Becomes Mobilized & Localized – An Examination of Ottawa’s Action Week

**Date of Ethics Clearance:** May 27, 2015

**Ethics Clearance for the Collection of Data Expires:** May 31, 2016

Wednesday, July 8, 2015

Dear

My name is Brittany Rea and I am a Master’s student in the Geography and Environmental Studies Department at Carleton University. I am working on a research project with the supervision of Dr. Fran Klodawsky.

I am giving you this letter to invite you to participate in a study on Ottawa’s Action Week – part of the 20,000 Homes campaign. The aim of my study is to understand how this national initiative has been mobilized and localized.

your experience is invaluable to my study.

This study involves one interview that should take 30-60 minutes to complete. With your consent, you will be asked 19 questions and all answers will be audio-recorded. During the interview, I (the interviewer) will take notes for backup. You will have the option to refuse to answer any question(s), and/or to opt-out of the interview at any time. As a token of appreciation, I will be providing you with refreshments.

You will have up until one month after the date of the interview to request that one or more of your responses be excluded from this study, or to opt-out of this study completely. If you do choose to opt-out, all information you provided will be destroyed immediately.

The audio-recording will be saved as an audio-file on an encrypted USB key and removed from the audio-recorder. A transcribed copy of the recording will also be saved to the same USB key. The USB key and hardcopy notes taken during the interview will be locked in a personal drawer in the graduate office at Carleton University. Only I (the researcher) and my supervisor will have access to the research data. The audio-file, transcription, and hardcopy notes from the interview will be destroyed by January 1st, 2017, as they will not be needed anymore.

While this study involves minimal professional and emotional risk, care will be taken to protect your / your organization's identity. This will be done by coding your role in this campaign as a "convener." I would like to emphasize that *your name and organization will be kept anonymous*.

I am more than willing to conduct the interview at your office for your convenience. If this does not work, please let me know and we can make alternative arrangements. I recommend Carleton University, and I will compensate the cost (up to \$7.00) for parking or for a bus ticket if conducting the interview at this location. Another option may be to have a private telephone interview with you from my private office at home.

If you are interested in participating in this study, please contact me directly either by phone [REDACTED] or e-mail: [brittany.rea@carleton.ca](mailto:brittany.rea@carleton.ca) by August 31, 2015. Thank you.

This ethics protocol was reviewed by Carleton University's Research Ethics Board, which provided clearance to carry out this study. Should you have questions or concerns related to your involvement in this study, please contact:

**CUREBs Contact Information:**

Professor Louise Heslop, Chair  
Professor Andy Adler, Vice-Chair  
Research Ethics Board  
Carleton University  
511 Tory  
1125 Colonel By Drive  
Ottawa, ON K1S 5B6  
Tel: 613-520-2517  
E-mail: [ethics@carleton.ca](mailto:ethics@carleton.ca)

**Figure 11:** This letter of invite was also sent to the City of Ottawa. This form has been modified to protect the individual's identity.



**Canada's Capital University**

**Letter of Invitation**

**Title:** 20,000 Homes: How a National Initiative Becomes Mobilized & Localized – An Examination of Ottawa’s Action Week

**Date of Ethics Clearance:** May 27, 2015

**Ethics Clearance for the Collection of Data Expires:** May 31, 2016

Tuesday, June 9, 2015

Dear

My name is Brittany Rea and I am a Master’s student in the Geography and Environmental Studies Department at Carleton University. I am working on a research project with the supervision of Dr. Fran Kłodawsky.

I am giving you this letter to invite you to participate in a study on Ottawa’s Action Week – part of the 20,000 Homes campaign. The aim of my study is to understand how this national initiative has been mobilized and localized. Your experience is invaluable to my study.

This study involves one interview that should take 30 minutes to complete. With your consent, you will be asked 9 questions and all answers will be audio-recorded. During the interview, I (the interviewer) will take notes for backup. You will have the option to refuse to answer any question(s), and/or to opt-out of the interview at any time. As a token of appreciation, I will be providing you with refreshments.

You will have up until one month after the date of the interview to request that one or more of your responses be excluded from this study, or to opt-out of this study completely. If you do choose to opt-out, all information you provided will be destroyed immediately.

The audio-recording will be saved as an audio-file on an encrypted USB key and removed from the audio-recorder. A transcribed copy of the recording will also be saved to the same USB key. The USB key and hardcopy notes taken during the interview will be locked in a personal drawer in the graduate office at Carleton University. Only I (the researcher) and my supervisor will have access to the research data. The audio-file, transcription, and hardcopy notes from the interview will be destroyed by January 1st, 2017, as they will not be needed anymore.

While this study involves minimal professional and emotional risk, care will be taken to protect your / your organization's identity. This will be done by coding your role in this campaign as a "controller." I would like to emphasize that *your name and organization will be kept anonymous.*

I am more than willing to conduct the interview at your office for your convenience. If this does not work, please let me know and we can make alternative arrangements. I recommend Carleton University, and I will compensate the cost (up to \$7.00) for parking or for a bus ticket if conducting the interview at this location.

If you are interested in participating in this study, please contact me directly either by phone [REDACTED] or e-mail: [brittany.rea@carleton.ca](mailto:brittany.rea@carleton.ca). Thank you.

This ethics protocol was reviewed by Carleton University's Research Ethics Board, which provided clearance to carry out this study. Should you have questions or concerns related to your involvement in this study, please contact:

**CUREBs Contact Information:**

Professor Louise Heslop, Chair  
Professor Andy Adler, Vice-Chair  
Research Ethics Board  
Carleton University  
511 Tory  
1125 Colonel By Drive  
Ottawa, ON K1S 5B6  
Tel: 613-520-2517  
E-mail: [ethics@carleton.ca](mailto:ethics@carleton.ca)

**Figure 12:** This letter of invite was sent to Broadening the Base. This form has been modified to protect the individual's identity.

## Appendix I – Letter of Invite to Third-Party Recruiter

### Third Party Recruitment E-mail

Dear [redacted]

I hope you are well [redacted]. I am excited to say that I now have Carleton University's Research Ethics Board's approval to start my research.

We discussed a couple months ago the possibility of the Alliance to End Homelessness Ottawa being a third party recruiter for my study. This e-mail is to ask if the Alliance is still open to being a third party recruiter for my research.

I would like to take a moment to explain what the role of a third party recruiter would involve, and emphasize why having the Alliance as a third party recruiter is central to my research.

When I talked to you a couple months ago about doing research on Action Week, I think the intention was to only recruit member organizations and staff of the Alliance for my study. After participating in Action Week, however, I think recruiting *all* participants in Action Week would be of most value to my study – this includes volunteers, frontline staff, Community Solutions,

the Canadian Alliance to End Homelessness, and keynote speakers from the community debrief. These key actors and their experiences as participants in Action Week are crucial for understanding how the 20,000 Homes campaign becomes mobilized and localized.

If the Alliance agrees to be a third party recruiter, this would involve sending an e-mail to ~~#online workers and volunteers~~ with my letter of invite (attached) as an attachment. The letter of invite asks participants to contact me directly either by phone or e-mail if they are interested in participating in my study; however, please feel free to reiterate this in the e-mail.

Having the Alliance as a third party recruiter is central to my research. Without your help, it would be most difficult gaining access to volunteers. The Alliance has contact information for volunteers from Action Week. This information I do not have access to for confidentiality reasons. In addition, if the Alliance agrees to help with the recruitment process, this would reaffirm its role as a collaborator in my study, and will help me gain the trust of potential participants by legitimizing my study as a third party recruiter.

I would like to inform you of my alternative method for recruitment in case the Alliance chooses not to be a third party recruiter. I would recruit frontline workers and volunteers myself. This would involve sending an e-mail with a letter of invitation attached or making a phone call to member organizations of the Alliance by looking up their contact information online using the list of organizations on the back of the community debrief pamphlet that was provided during Action Week. I would either ask to speak directly with frontline workers who participated in Action Week or direct the e-mail to them. In addition, I would be able to recruit a couple volunteers in person, as I have remained in contact with these people since Action Week. These few volunteers and I are new volunteers for [redacted]. This would involve me asking the [redacted] and [redacted], in person, at the beginning of our next volunteer meeting (at the end of June), if I can have 5 minutes at the

end of the meeting to speak to those volunteers who participated in Action Week. If the coordinators agree, I will introduce my study and provide hardcopies of my letter of invite to these volunteers. Finally, I would try a snowball method to gain access to other volunteers. This would involve asking potential participants I am in contact with if they know of any other volunteers who participated in Action Week. If so, I would then ask if they would mind giving a copy of my letter of invite to these other volunteers either in hardcopy or digital format.

Please note that if the Alliance does not want to be a third party recruiter, I fully respect this decision.

Regardless of whether or not the Alliance chooses to be a third party recruiter, I will send separate e-mails to

to invite all to participate in my study. This will require doing a simple web search to find the e-mail addresses of those key actors from the latter organizations. I am asking for your permission to carbon copy the Alliance (you) to the e-mails I send to these people. Again, this would reaffirm the role of the Alliance as a collaborator in my study and to gain the trust from these other coordinators by helping legitimize my study.

As a final note, I would like to share with you that this e-mail and the letter of invitation are part of Carleton University's Research Ethics Board's protocol and have received clearance. If you have any questions or concerns about your involvement as a third party recruiter for my study, please do not hesitate to contact CUREB (see contact information below).

Kindly,

Brittany Rea

**CUREB's Contact Information:**

Professor Louise Heslop, Chair  
Professor Andy Adler, Vice-Chair  
Research Ethics Board  
Carleton University  
511 Tory  
1125 Colonel By Drive  
Ottawa, ON K1S 5B6  
Tel: 613-520-2517  
E-mail: [ethics@carleton.ca](mailto:ethics@carleton.ca)

**Figure 13:** This letter of invite was sent to the Alliance to End Homelessness Ottawa requesting it be a third-party recruiter for this study. It has been modified to protect the individual's identity.

## Appendix J – Letter of Invite to Frontline Staff & Volunteers



**Canada's Capital University**

### **Letter of Invitation**

**Title:** 20,000 Homes: How a National Initiative Becomes Mobilized & Localized – An Examination of Ottawa’s Action Week

**Date of Ethics Clearance:** May 27, 2015

**Ethics Clearance for the Collection of Data Expires:** May 31, 2016

**Monday, June 1, 2015**

Dear Frontline Staff / Volunteer,

My name is Brittany Rea and I am a Master’s student in the Geography and Environmental Studies Department at Carleton University. I am working on a research project with the supervision of Dr. Fran Kłodawsky.

I am giving you this letter to invite you to participate in a study on Ottawa’s Action Week – part of the 20,000 Homes campaign. The aim of my study is to understand how this national initiative has been mobilized and localized. As a frontline staff / volunteer for Action Week, your experience is invaluable to my study.

This study involves one interview that should take 60 minutes to complete. With your consent, you will be asked 20 questions and all answers will be audio-recorded. You may notice some of the questions I ask in my study will be similar to those asked during the Action Week debrief sessions. During the interview, I (the interviewer) will take notes for backup. You will have the option to refuse to answer any question(s), and/or to opt-out of the interview at any time. As a token of appreciation, I will be providing you with refreshments.

You will have up until one month after the date of the interview to request that one or more of your responses be excluded from this study, or to opt-out of this study completely. If you do choose to opt-out, all information you provided will be destroyed immediately.

The audio-recording will be saved as an audio-file on an encrypted USB key and removed from the audio-recorder. A transcribed copy of the recording will also be saved to the same USB key. The USB key and hardcopy notes taken during the interview will be locked in a personal drawer in the graduate office at Carleton University. Only I (the researcher) and my supervisor will have access to the research data. The audio-file, transcription, and hardcopy notes from the interview will be destroyed by January 1st, 2017, as they will not be needed anymore.

While this study involves minimal professional and emotional risk, care will be taken to protect your / your agency's identity. This will be done by coding you either as a "frontline staff" or "volunteer", depending on your role during Action Week. I would like to emphasize that *all names and agencies will be kept anonymous*.

If you were a frontline staff during Action Week, I am more than willing to conduct the interview at your office for your convenience. If this does not work, or if you were a volunteer during Action Week, the interview will take place in a safe and mutually convenient location. I recommend Carleton University, and I will compensate the cost (up to \$7.00) for parking or for a bus ticket if conducting the interview at this location.

If you are interested in participating in this study, please contact me directly either by phone [REDACTED] or e-mail: [brittany.rea@carleton.ca](mailto:brittany.rea@carleton.ca). Thank you.

This ethics protocol was reviewed by Carleton University's Research Ethics Board, which provided clearance to carry out this study. Should you have questions or concerns related to your involvement in this study, please contact:

**CUREBs Contact Information:**  
Professor Louise Heslop, Chair  
Professor Andy Adler, Vice-Chair  
Research Ethics Board  
Carleton University  
511 Tory  
1125 Colonel By Drive  
Ottawa, ON K1S 5B6  
Tel: 613-520-2517  
E-mail: [ethics@carleton.ca](mailto:ethics@carleton.ca)

## Appendix K – Original Consent Forms



### Consent Form

**Title:** 20,000 Homes: How a National Initiative Becomes Mobilized & Localized – An Examination of Ottawa’s Action Week

**Date of ethics clearance:** May 27, 2015

**Ethics Clearance for the Collection of Data Expires:** May 31, 2016

I \_\_\_\_\_, choose to participate in a study on Ottawa’s Action Week – part of the 20,000 Homes campaign. This study aims to understand how this national initiative becomes mobilized and localized. The researcher for this study is Brittany Rea, a Master’s student in the Geography & Environmental Studies Department at Carleton University. She is working under the supervision of Dr. Fran Klodawsky in the Geography & Environmental Studies Department at Carleton University.

---

I understand that this study involves one interview that should take between 30 and 60 minutes to complete. With my consent, the researcher will ask me 18, 19, 21, 23, 30 or 33 questions (researcher circle appropriate number as indicated on participant’s letter of invite) – depending on my role during Action Week, and all answers will be audio-recorded. During the interview the researcher will take notes for backup. I will have the option to refuse to answer any question(s) and/or to opt out of the interview at any time. If applicable, the researcher will cover the cost of parking or for a bus ticket (up to \$7.00) if the interview is conducted at Carleton University; in addition, she will be providing me with refreshments during the interview as a token of appreciation.

I understand that I will have up until one month after the date of the interview to ask that one or more of my responses not be included in this study, or to opt-out of this study completely. If I do choose to opt-out of this study, I understand that all information I provided will be destroyed immediately. I can opt-out of this study by phoning or e-mailing the researcher via the contact information provided below.

I understand that the audio-recording will be saved as an audio-file on an encrypted USB key and removed from the audio-recorder. A transcribed copy of the recording will also be saved to the same USB key. The USB key and hardcopy notes taken during the interview will be locked in a personal drawer in the graduate office at Carleton University. Only the researcher and her supervisor will have access to the research data. The audio-file, transcription, and hardcopy notes from the interview will be destroyed by January 1st, 2017, as they will no longer be needed at this time.

I understand that this study involves minimal professional and emotional risk, as my participation took place in a politically charged environment, I was likely collecting and/or handling confidential information involving intimate details about homeless people’s lives, and because I may not have agreed with some

Page 1 of 2

---

This document has been printed on both sides of a single sheet of paper.  
Please retain a copy of this document for your records.

aspects of Ottawa's Action Week. I also understand that none of the questions in this study will ask that I break confidentiality as a participant in Action Week. I further understand that care will be taken to protect my / my organization's identity. This will be done by coding my identity either as a "volunteer", "front-line worker", or "convener", depending on my role during Action Week. I understand that all names, agencies, and organizations will be kept anonymous.

I understand that as a participant in Action Week, my experience is invaluable to this study. By participating in this study, I will have another opportunity to reflect on my experience and share this information as a contribution to knowledge. If I would like a copy of the findings from this study, I can receive an electronic copy by either phoning or e-mailing the researcher using the contact information provided below.

I understand that this ethics protocol was reviewed by Carleton University's Research Ethics Board, which provided clearance to carry out this study. If I have any questions or concerns related to my involvement in this research, I can contact:

**CUREBs Contact Information:**

Professor Louise Heslop, Chair  
Professor Andy Adler, Vice-Chair  
Research Ethics Board  
Carleton University  
511 Tory  
1125 Colonel By Drive  
Ottawa, ON K1S 5B6  
Tel: 613-520-2517  
E-mail: [ethics@carleton.ca](mailto:ethics@carleton.ca)

**Researcher's Contact Information:**

Brittany Rea  
Geography & Environmental Studies  
Carleton University  
Tel: [REDACTED]  
E-mail: [brittany.rea@carleton.ca](mailto:brittany.rea@carleton.ca)

**Supervisor's Contact Information:**

Dr. Fran Kłodawsky  
Geography & Environmental Studies  
Carleton University  
Tel: 613-520-2600 Ext. 8689  
E-mail: [Fran.Kłodawsky@carleton.ca](mailto:Fran.Kłodawsky@carleton.ca)

I agree to be audio-recorded:  Yes  No

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature of participant

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature of researcher

19/08/15  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

**Page 2 of 2**

This document has been printed on both sides of a single sheet of paper.  
Please retain a copy of this document for your records.

**Figure 14:** Consent form used to interview conveners, agency and front staff, volunteers, and spokespeople involved in Ottawa's action week.



### **Consent Form**

**Title: 20,000 Homes: How a National Initiative Becomes Mobilized & Localized – An Examination of Ottawa’s Action Week**

**Date of ethics clearance:** May 27, 2015

**Ethics Clearance for the Collection of Data Expires:** May 31, 2016

I \_\_\_\_\_, choose to participate in a study on Ottawa’s Action Week – part of the 20,000 Homes campaign. This study aims to understand how this national initiative becomes mobilized and localized. The researcher for this study is Brittany Rea, a Master’s student in the Geography & Environmental Studies Department at Carleton University. She is working under the supervision of Dr. Fran Kłodawsky in the Geography & Environmental Studies Department at Carleton University.

---

I understand that this study involves one interview that should take between 30 and 60 minutes to complete. With my consent, the researcher will ask me 31 questions and all answers will be audio-recorded. During the interview the researcher will take notes for backup. I will have the option to refuse to answer any question(s) and/or to opt out of the interview at any time. If applicable, the researcher will cover the cost of parking or for a bus ticket (up to \$7.00) if the interview is conducted at Carleton University; in addition, she will be providing me with refreshments during the interview as a token of appreciation.

I understand that I will have up until one month after the date of the interview to ask that one or more of my responses not be included in this study, or to opt-out of this study completely. If I do choose to opt-out of this study, I understand that all information I provided will be destroyed immediately. I can opt-out of this study by phoning or e-mailing the researcher via the contact information provided below.

I understand that the audio-recording will be saved as an audio-file on an encrypted USB key and removed from the audio-recorder. A transcribed copy of the recording will also be saved to the same USB key. The USB key and hardcopy notes taken during the interview will be locked in a personal drawer in the graduate office at Carleton University. Only the researcher and her supervisor will have access to the research data. The audio-file, transcription, and hardcopy notes from the interview will be destroyed by January 1st, 2017, as they will no longer be needed at this time.

I understand that this study involves minimal professional and emotional risk, as my participation took place in a politically charged environment. I was likely collecting and/or handling confidential information involving intimate details about homeless people’s lives, and because I may not have agreed with some aspects of my pilot’s Registry Week. I also understand that none of the questions in this study will ask that I break confidentiality as a participant in Registry Week. I further understand that care will be taken to

Page 1 of 2

---

**This document has been printed on both sides of a single sheet of paper.  
Please retain a copy of this document for your records.**

protect my / my organization's identity. This will be done by coding my identity either as a "volunteer", "front-line worker", or "convener", depending on my role during Registry Week. I understand that all names, agencies, and organizations will be kept anonymous.

I understand that as a participant in Registry Week, my experience is invaluable to this study. By participating in this study, I will have another opportunity to reflect on my experience and share this information as a contribution to knowledge. If I would like a copy of the findings from this study, I can receive an electronic copy by either phoning or e-mailing the researcher using the contact information provided below.

I understand that this ethics protocol was reviewed by Carleton University's Research Ethics Board, which provided clearance to carry out this study. If I have any questions or concerns related to my involvement in this research, I can contact:

**CUREBs Contact Information:**

Professor Louise Heslop, Chair  
Professor Andy Adler, Vice-Chair  
Research Ethics Board  
Carleton University  
511 Tory  
1125 Colonel By Drive  
Ottawa, ON K1S 5B6  
Tel: 613-520-2517  
E-mail: [ethics@carleton.ca](mailto:ethics@carleton.ca)

**Researcher's Contact Information:**

Brittany Rea  
Geography & Environmental Studies  
Carleton University  
Tel: [REDACTED]  
E-mail: [brittany.rea@carleton.ca](mailto:brittany.rea@carleton.ca)

**Supervisor's Contact Information:**

Dr. Fran Klodawsky  
Geography & Environmental Studies  
Carleton University  
Tel: 613-520-2600 Ext. 8689  
E-mail: [Fran.Klodawsky@carleton.ca](mailto:Fran.Klodawsky@carleton.ca)

I agree to be audio-recorded:  Yes  No

---

Signature of participant

---

Date

---

Signature of researcher

---

Date

Page 2 of 2

This document has been printed on both sides of a single sheet of paper.  
Please retain a copy of this document for your records.

**Figure 15:** Consent form used to interview conveners from Waterloo's and Hamilton's registry weeks.

## **Appendix L – Interview Schedule**

*Thank you for participating in my study on the 20,000 Homes campaign. I am going to ask you a series of questions which should take between 30-60 minutes to complete. Please answer these questions to the best of your knowledge and feel free to elaborate on your responses where you think it might be useful.*

*These Questions Pertain to (Ottawa/Hamilton/Waterloo)’s Role in the 20,000 Homes Campaign:*

1. Tell me about the 20,000 Homes campaign?
2. Is there anything about (Ottawa/Hamilton/Waterloo)’s campaign that sets it apart from the American campaign?
3. Is there anything about (Ottawa/Hamilton/Waterloo)’s campaign that sets it apart from the other two pilot cities?

*These Questions Pertain to the Implementation of the Housing First Model:*

4. What is Housing First?
5. How did Housing First become the model of choice for the 20K Homes campaign?

*I am going to ask you some questions around funding for the 20K Homes campaign. You may not know some of the answers to these questions. If not, just say so but please do try your best to answer them to the best of your ability.*

*These Questions Pertain to Funding around the 20K Homes Campaign:*

6. How much did your community budget to spend on its Action Week / Registry Week?
7. How did your community come up with funds for its Action Week / Registry Week?
8. Were there any uncovered costs? If so, how were these costs met?
9. How is housing for the 20K Homes campaign being funded?
10. Under the Homelessness Partner Strategy, 65 percent of federal funding has been redirected towards the Housing First approach. What sort of impact has this redirection of funds had on homeless supports and services in your community?
11. How does your community plan to improve its system of care for homeless people?
12. Long term operating agreements for social housing declined \$1.6 billion this year and are due to expire (or reach \$0) in 2040 (Bulthuis, 2015). What do you anticipate being the local impact of these operating agreements ending?
13. Is there any documentation available to the public that specifies how money your community receives/spends on social housing?

*Background Information about Participants:*

14. How are you affiliated with (Ottawa/Hamilton/Waterloo)’s campaign?
15. How long have you been involved working with homeless people (either directly or indirectly)?

*These Questions Pertain to Action Week:*

16. What motivated you to participate in (Ottawa/Hamilton/Waterloo)’s Action Week?
17. Tell me about Action Week? (Give me an overview)

*Training Day(s):*

18. What was the training about? (Give me an overview)
19. Was there anything you found particularly useful or interesting to learn about? Why?
20. Were there any concerns or challenges that arose during training?
21. How were these concerns or challenges addressed?

*Action Days:*

22. Please tell me about your role as a (role) during Action Week?
23. Was there anything you really enjoyed about being a (role)? Why?
24. Where were any concerns or challenges you faced as a (role)?
25. How were these concerns or challenges addressed?

*Community Debrief:*

26. Tell me about the community debrief? (Give me an overview)
27. Overall, how do you feel about the results from the survey?
28. What next steps do you think need to be taken?
29. Is there anything about (Ottawa/Hamilton/Waterloo)'s Action Week you would have done differently?
30. Overall, how do you see the 20K Homes campaign fitting in with efforts to end homelessness?

*That concludes our interview. Would you like to add, change, or have any of your responses removed? Thank you. Please remember you may opt-out of this study at any time up to one month after the date of the interview and to hold on to your signed copy of the letter of consent. I am going to turn off the audio-recorder now.*

## Appendix M – Amended Consent Form



Canada's Capital University

### Consent Form

**Title:** 20K Homes but still not enough: Examining the campaign in Ottawa, Hamilton and Waterloo and its anticipated impact on 'ending' homelessness

**Date of Ethics Clearance:** May 27, 2015

Thursday, August 22, 2016

Dear Participant,

This letter is in regard to my research on the 20K Homes campaign.

I am excited to inform you that the analysis and writing process are underway. I have encountered a particular problem during the writing process, however, which is why I am contacting you.

Last summer you participated in a protocol which involved signing a consent form prior to being interviewed. In the letter, I promised that your/your organization's identity would be kept anonymous in my thesis by coding your/your organization's identity as a "convener", "front-line staff", or "volunteer", depending on your role in the campaign. In other words, I promised to ensure that your name and organization would not be identified in the thesis, either implicitly or explicitly. It is now clear that I cannot guarantee anonymity, given your/your organization's significant role in the campaign.

Given this situation, you may wish to withdraw your data from the study. However, I would like to ask your permission to make an amendment to the initial consent form. This would include keeping your remarks about the organization confidential, but not assuring anonymity because of the important role that you/your organization played in the campaign.

Please indicate whether or not you agree with this amendment by checking "Yes" or "No" below, sign and date this consent form, and then return it to me via e-mail: [brittany.rea@carleton.ca](mailto:brittany.rea@carleton.ca). In the event that I do not hear back from you by Friday, September 2, 2016, I will assume that you have no objections to the amendment put forward in this agreement. If you have any concerns, please contact me. Thank you.

This ethics protocol was reviewed by Carleton University's Research Ethics Board, which provided clearance to carry out this study. Should you have questions or concerns related to your involvement in this study, please contact:

Page 1 of 2

---

This document has been printed on both sides of a single sheet of paper.  
Please retain a copy of this document for your records.

**CUREBs Contact Information:**

Professor Louise Heslop, Chair  
Professor Andy Adler, Vice-Chair  
Research Ethics Board  
Carleton University  
511 Tory  
1125 Colonel By Drive  
Ottawa, ON K1S 5B6  
Tel: 613-520-2517  
E-mail: [ethics@carleton.ca](mailto:ethics@carleton.ca)

**Researcher's Contact Information:**

Brittany Rea  
Geography & Environmental Studies  
Carleton University  
Tel: [REDACTED]  
E-mail: [brittany.rea@carleton.ca](mailto:brittany.rea@carleton.ca)

**Supervisor's Contact Information:**

Dr. Fran Kłodawsky  
Geography & Environmental Studies  
Carleton University  
Tel: 613-520-2600 Ext. 8689  
E-mail: [Fran.Kłodawsky@carleton.ca](mailto:Fran.Kłodawsky@carleton.ca)

I agree to the amendment above:  Yes  No

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature of participant

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

## Appendix N – Setting the Local Context

Pilot City	Waterloo (2014)	Ottawa (2015)	Hamilton (2015)
Population	477,160	883,391	519,949
<b>Shelter Data</b>			
Number of individuals who accessed emergency shelter	3,219	6,825	5,653
Individuals experiencing “chronic” homelessness	61	448	N/A
Individuals experiencing “episodic” homelessness	178	80	N/A
Average shelter stays	25 days	73 nights	N/A
Total # of shelters	7 (2015)	11	6
Total # of shelter beds	179 (2015)	1,154	358
<b>Income Data</b>			
OW/individual/month	\$656	\$681	
ODSP/individual/month	\$1,098	\$1,110	
Minimum wage	\$11.00/hr	\$11.25/hr	
Unemployment rate	5.8%	6.5%	6.2 <sup>1</sup>
<b>Affordable Housing Data</b>			
Average market rent (bachelor apartment)	\$667	\$801	\$589 <sup>2</sup>
Rental vacancy rate	2.3%	3.4%	1.8%
Households in core housing need (2011)	10.3%	11.2%	13.4%
Social housing units	10,381 (2012)	23,471 (2013)	14,600 (2016)
Households on affordable housing waitlist	2,962	10,479	5,685
Wait time for affordable housing	3 years	5 years	3 years
City’s budget on social/subsidized housing	\$54,884 <sup>3</sup>	\$172,000 <sup>4</sup>	\$120,898

**Table 4:** provides an overview of homelessness and housing in each pilot community.


<sup>1</sup> Unemployment rate for Hamilton-Niagara Peninsula.

<sup>2</sup> Average for Hamilton not including CMA.

<sup>3</sup> This amount includes Non-Profit/Co-op housing, Waterloo Region housing, and private market rent subsidies.

<sup>4</sup> It is unclear what this cost includes/how “social housing” is defined.

## Appendix O – Map of Pilot Communities



**Figure 15:** shows a map of Ottawa, the Region of Waterloo, and Hamilton – the three pilot communities for the 20K Homes campaign – highlighted in green. It has been modified from: Southern Ontario [computer file]. (no date). St. Catharines, Ontario: Brock University Map, Data & GIS Library. Available: Brock University Map, Data & GIS Library Controlled Access <https://brocku.ca/library/wp-content/uploads/sites/51/MDG-Southern-Ontario-base.pdf> (Accessed July 05, 2018).

## Appendix P – Reasons Why Conveners Agreed to Pilot the 20K Homes Campaign

Reasons for Piloting Campaign	Alliance to End Homelessness Ottawa	Region of Waterloo	City of Hamilton
Aligns with Federal & Provincial Funding Requirements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Supports City of Ottawa work; helps inform allocation of resources</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Service Managers for Homelessness; helps inform allocation of resources</li> </ul>	
Aligns with 10-Year Plans	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Enables Alliance to take shared ownership of 10-Year Plan</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Enables the Region/City to fulfill its role in implementing 10-Year Plan.</li> </ul>	
Housing First	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Implemented since 2008</li> </ul>		Implemented since 2009
Systems Planning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Alliance will work with City of Ottawa to improve systems planning</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Response to OOTC transition</li> <li>▪ Inform allocation of additional resources given to STEP Home</li> </ul>	
Raise Awareness & Educate the Public		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Increase transparency and information</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Raise public awareness</li> <li>▪ Educate different sectors</li> <li>▪ Destigmatize</li> </ul>
Community Engagement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Community engagement a goal; shared ownership of 10-Year Plan</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Community engagement a strategy</li> </ul>	
Leadership	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ 2<sup>nd</sup> pilot community</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ 1<sup>st</sup> pilot community</li> <li>▪ Supports HHSS learning culture</li> <li>▪ Support CMCH HF Training and Technical Assistance program</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ 3<sup>rd</sup> pilot community</li> </ul>
Advocacy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Push City of Ottawa for higher housing targets</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Advocacy not a motivating factor; focused on meeting mandate</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Advocacy directed more towards senior levels of government</li> </ul>
Informs PiT Count	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ No intentions on doing PiT Count; focus on ‘hidden’ homeless</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Inform or replace PiT Count</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Inform PiT Count</li> </ul>

**Table 5:** shows reasons why conveners from each pilot community agreed to join the campaign.

## Appendix Q – Key Components of Action/Registry Week



**Figure 16:** shows the key components of action/registry week.

## Appendix R – Financial & Material Resources

Funding Source	Ottawa	Waterloo	Hamilton
<b>Administrative Dollars</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Training &amp; survey kit materials: paper, photocopying, file-folders, pens/pencils, clipboards</li> <li>• Logo (graphic designer)</li> </ul> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>\$1,000</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Training &amp; survey kit materials: \$10 gift cards, paper, photocopying, clipboards, flashlights/batteries, lanyards, vinyl holders.</li> <li>• Training &amp; technical support (&lt;\$6,000)</li> <li>• Food &amp; refreshments</li> </ul> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>\$12,000</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Training &amp; survey kit materials: \$10 gift cards, paper, photocopying, pens/pencils, lanyards, vinyl holders.</li> <li>• Registry week video (production company)</li> <li>• Core Learning collaborative</li> <li>• Facilities rented: Bennetto Recreation Centre (training); First Pilgrim United Church (headquarters)</li> </ul>
<b>In-Kind Donations</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• \$5 gift cards (anonymous, member organizations)</li> <li>• Money donations (member organizations)</li> <li>• Food/refreshments (catering by the Mission)</li> <li>• Facilities: Ottawa United Way (training/computer lab); St. Alban's/Centre 454 (headquarters)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• \$10 gift cards + training &amp; technical support (partially covered by four OOTC Churches).</li> <li>• Facilities: Region/Trinity Church (training); Trinity Church (headquarters); Region (data entry); Council Chambers (community debrief)</li> </ul> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>\$2,000</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Translation services</li> <li>• Facilities: City Hall (data entry); Council Chambers (community debrief)</li> </ul>
<b>Sponsorship</b>	<p>-Training and technical support sponsored by the CAEH            -Ottawa Little Theatre (facility for community debrief) sponsored by the Rideau BIA</p>	<p>-Training and technical support sponsored by the CAEH</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>\$6,000</b></p>	<p>-Training and technical support sponsored by the CAEH</p>
<b>Total cost of action/registry week</b>	N/A	<b>\$20,000</b>	<b>\$15,000</b>

**Table 6:** shows what financial and material resources were mobilized during action/registry week, including, the channels through which these resources were obtained.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> The structure of this chapter outline is borrowed from Mahdi's (2015) thesis.

<sup>2</sup> The objective of section has been borrowed from Mahdi's (2015) thesis.

<sup>3</sup> Full credit goes to Dr. Fran Kłodawsky for this remark.

<sup>4</sup> Partial credit is given to Dr. Fran Kłodawsky for pointing out that these categories are context specific.

<sup>5</sup> Smith (1992) developed the term 'jumping scale' to refer to the ways in which people experiencing homelessness 'jumped' scale "[upward and downward] to challenge power relations [... and] to gain advantage", borrowing from Mahon & Keil (2009, p.19).

<sup>6</sup> "Leverage (off)" was a common word/phrase used by conveners.

<sup>7</sup> Bosco (2001, p.226) notes, "In Burt's (1992) network theory of competition, a structural hole is a relationship of non-redundancy between two nodes, or a 'disconnection' between players in a network."

<sup>8</sup> The wording of this statement may have been borrowed/paraphrased from a secondary source found online (a Google book), however, this source cannot be found for verification. I do not wish to take full credit for this statement if this is the case.

<sup>9</sup> Primary and secondary homelessness are the original terms used by the UNSD (2008). According to Hiebert, D'Addario & Sherrell (2005), these two categories have been adapted by Peressini et al. (1995). Absolute and relative homelessness are more commonly used throughout the literature and are the terms used in this thesis.

<sup>10</sup> For more examples, see: Novac et al., 2002; Shapcott & Salazar, 2006; Peressini et al., 2010; Kauppi et al., 2017.

<sup>11</sup> Episodes must be 30 days apart or more (ESDC, 2016, August 15).

<sup>12</sup> For other examples, see: May, 2000; Novac et al., 2002; Walsh, Rutherford, & Kuzmak, 2009; and Fotheringham, Walsh & Burrowes, 2014.9

<sup>13</sup> Housing is considered affordable when it costs no more than 30 percent of a household's gross income (CMHC, c.2018a).

<sup>14</sup> Juris (2004a, p.37) describes roll-out neoliberalism as "a range of extra-market forms of regulation and governance, including partnership models of development, support for voluntary associations, and increased expenditure on penal and welfare. These trends have been accompanied by the decentralization and devolution of policy-making and the rise of new financial architectures and social policies, including the criminalization of poverty, the normalization of contingent work, and increasing levels of incarceration."

<sup>15</sup> This excluded initial funding for approximately 500,000 social housing units and housing on native reserves (Hulchanski, 2006). According to the Shapcott & Salazar (2006), funding for co-op housing was also an exception. Social housing (a.k.a. public housing) is

defined here as “non-market housing that is owned and managed by government, non-profits, or non-equity co-operatives” (Hulchanski, 2002, p.8-9). “Affordable Housing” is an umbrella term in which “social housing” falls under.

<sup>16</sup> Worth mentioning here, between 1963 and 1975, an average of 20,000 to 25,000 social housing units were built *annually* (Hulchanski, 2002). This illuminates the capacity at which affordable housing can be provided if all levels of government work together. About 200,000 social housing units were built during this time (*ibid*). Another 300,000 social housing units were built between 1975 and 1993 (*ibid*). Overall, approximately 550,000 social housing units were built between 1964 and 1993 (*ibid*).

<sup>17</sup> Currently, the CMHC transfers approximately \$1 billion annually to provinces & territories who have signed a Canada Social Housing Agreement (Housing Services Corporation, 2014).

<sup>18</sup> Quebec, Alberta and PEI are the exception. These provinces did not sign the Canada Social Housing Agreement (Housing Services Corporation, 2014; CHRA & CEL, 2014).

<sup>19</sup> Since 1993, Canada’s population has increased by 22 percent (Gaetz et al., 2014).

<sup>20</sup> According to Gaetz et al. (2016, p.31), “Canada’s emergency shelter system is operating at over 90% capacity.” In 2005, it was operating at 82.7%, and in 2014, it was operating at 92.4% (*ibid*).

<sup>21</sup> These units make up approximately five percent of all Canadian households (Hulchanski, 2002).

<sup>22</sup> CHRA & CEL (2014, p.5) point out that “at its peak”, federal funding for social housing programs under these operating agreements were worth \$2 billion. In 2014, the federal government spent \$1.6 billion on these programs (*ibid*). This funding is projected to decline to \$1 billion in 2020, \$530 million in 2025, \$81 million in 2031, and \$0 by 2040 (*ibid*). This does not include housing on reserves (*ibid*).

<sup>23</sup> According to Hulchanski (2006, p.223), “95 percent of Canadian households obtain their housing from the private market.”

<sup>24</sup> According to Gaetz et al. (2013, p.18), “over 30% of Canadians live in rental housing[.]”

<sup>25</sup> According to the CMHC (2010, October, p.1), “A household is in core housing need if its housing does not meet one or more of the adequacy, suitability or affordability standards [and if it spends more than 30% of its gross income on rent.]” A household is in “severe housing need” if it spends more than 50% of its gross income on rent (*ibid*).

<sup>26</sup> Since 2003, the HPS has been capped at \$135 million per year (Adamo et al., 2016, p.29). Since 2008, the AHI has been capped at \$253 per year (CHRA & CEL, 2014, p.5). In total, the federal government spent \$372 million per year on the HPS and AHI (*ibid*).

<sup>27</sup> According to Press (2016), “Sources say that the government estimates that it would need to add \$30 million to the [HPS] just to catch up with inflation.”

<sup>28</sup> The first Housing First program, Houselink, was launched in Toronto, Ontario, during the 1970s (see Bridgman, 2002). According to Gaetz et al. (2013, p.3), the program

“developed an approach to working with people with mental health and/or addictions issues where the provision of housing was considered a priority.”

<sup>29</sup> There are five core principles of Housing First: 1) Immediate access to permanent housing with no housing readiness requirements; 2) Consumer choice and self-determination; 3) Recovery orientation to services; 4) Individualized and client-driven supports; 5) Social and community integration (Gaetz et al., 2016, p.15).

<sup>30</sup> It is understood here that “end homelessness” means to have no chronically homeless individuals sleeping on the streets and to have emergency shelters functioning at normal capacity with shelter stays under 10 days. By 2015, Medicine Hat had no one living on the streets, and emergency shelter stays were under 10 days (Ostroff, 2015, August 13). However, the city was waiting until the end of the year to see if the system would sustain itself, before announcing its success (*ibid*). By October, the system had sustained itself, and Medicine Hat announced it was the first city in Canada to ‘end’ chronic homelessness (see Froelich, 2015, October 11). At the time of this writing, the city had maintained its “homeless-free status” for almost three years (Lawrynuik, 2017, January 26).

<sup>31</sup> These 10 “largest communities” include: Vancouver, Calgary, Edmonton, Winnipeg, Toronto, Hamilton, Ottawa, Montréal, Québec City and Halifax (ESDC, 2018, June 1).

<sup>32</sup> According to Adamo et al. (2016, p.49), “Beginning in 2014, HPS will invest \$119 million per year, a reduction of \$16 million annually.”

<sup>33</sup> In 2008, the Province of Ontario released its first poverty reduction strategy: *Breaking the Cycle: Ontario’s Poverty Reduction Strategy 2009-2013* (Ontario & CEL, 2008). In this strategy, the Province made a commitment to reduce child poverty by 25 percent in five years (*ibid*, p.1). Had the province achieved its goal, this would have lifted 90,000 children out of poverty (Hurley, 2015, March 30). Instead, child poverty was reduced from 15.2 percent in 2008 to 13.6 percent in 2011 (Ontario & CEL, 2014, p.9). In total, “47,000 children and their families were lifted out of poverty [over three years], and “In 2011 alone, 61,000 children and their families were prevented from falling into poverty” (*ibid*). According to one source, the Province blamed the federal government for not reaching its goal (Hurley, 2015, March 30).

<sup>34</sup> The information on this website has been updated.

<sup>35</sup> According to Gaetz (2014, p.7), it is a common misconception that Housing First programs “only [provide] people with the option of scattered site, private sector housing.” Some Housing First programs, such as the ones in Calgary, Lethbridge and Toronto, do provide congregated and/or social housing options as well (see Toronto et al., 2007; Gaetz et al., 2013).

<sup>36</sup> Webpage is no longer available.

<sup>37</sup> Originally, the 100,000 Homes campaign was intended to run for three years. However, by the end of 2011, it was projected that only 30,000 people would be permanently housed by the end of the campaign (Leopold & Ho, 2015, p.1). That’s 70,000 housing placements short from achieving its goal (*ibid*, p.1). To hit its target of 100,000, the campaign was extended by a year, and a monthly baseline target of 2.5 percent was established (*ibid*,

p.13). In addition, the campaign expanded its focus to include chronically homeless individuals with moderate and low needs, and boot camps were improved so that they focused on housing placements (*ibid*). As a result, monthly housing placements increased on average from 1.6 percent to 5.1 percent, and the campaign goal was exceeded (Region of Waterloo, 2014, November 28, p.1).

<sup>38</sup> This article can no longer be found online or has been updated/modified (but see, 20K Homes & CAEH, 2015, June 16, “Finding homes for 20,000 Canadians by 2020”)

<sup>39</sup> See <sup>36</sup>

<sup>40</sup> As the 20K Homes campaign progresses, smaller communities are permitted to focus on housing the episodically homeless once they have prioritized and housed the chronically homeless.

<sup>41</sup> This webpage is no longer available.

<sup>42</sup> This webpage is no longer available.

<sup>43</sup> A list of participating organizations was found on the back of Ottawa’s action week community debrief pamphlet.

<sup>44</sup> The number provided here is for Ottawa – Gatineau. It’s worth mentioning, however, that only the Ontario part of Ottawa-Gatineau was included in the action week survey. Put another way, Gatineau was not included in Ottawa’s action week survey.

<sup>45</sup> The numbers provided here were calculate by adding the total number of single men and women experiencing chronic/episodic homelessness and *does not* include family units.

<sup>46</sup> Information accessed in 2016. Year on the COH’s webpage has been updated (2017) but the statistic remain the same.

<sup>47</sup> Year and statistic have been updated (2017) on the COH’s webpage since this time. However, see also Desrosiers (2015, May 4).

<sup>48</sup> Information accessed in 2016. Year and statistics have been updated (2017) on the COH’s website since then.

<sup>49</sup> Referred to as “Community Housing.”

<sup>50</sup> Information accessed in 2016. Webpage has been updated (2017) but statistics remain the same.

<sup>51</sup> Information accessed in 2016. Statistic on COH’s website has been updated (2017) but the year has stayed the same.

<sup>52</sup> Information access in 2016. Information on the COH’s webpage has been updated (2017) since this time.

<sup>53</sup> Information accessed in 2016. Information on the COH’s webpage has been updated (2017) since this time.

<sup>54</sup> Same rate applied across the province of Ontario (see ISAC, 2015, October 1).

<sup>55</sup> Information accessed in 2016. Year on the COH’s webpage has been updated (2017) but the statistic remains the same.

<sup>56</sup> Information accessed in 2016. Webpage has been updated (2017) but year and statistic remain the same.

<sup>57</sup> I do not take credit for this statement; however, primary source from the City of Ottawa website cannot be found.

<sup>58</sup> For reasons why churches began to close their doors, see “Appendix A: Summary of OOTC Site Closure Announcements” (Region of Waterloo, 2015, August, “OOTC Transition” p.33).

<sup>59</sup> Stated on The Registry’s (c.2014) website, “The Social Housing Registry of Ottawa (The Registry) is a not-for-profit organization [in Ottawa] that maintains the central waiting list for people applying for rent/geared-to-income (RGI) housing.”

<sup>60</sup> Information accessed in 2015. ATEH Ottawa website has been updated since this time.

<sup>61</sup> See <sup>42</sup>

<sup>62</sup> I do not wish to take credit for this statement. Source cannot be found but thought it was important to include in this thesis for the reasons discussed.

<sup>63</sup> Hamilton’s *Housing and Homelessness Action Plan* includes five targets. The other four targets are: “reduce the social housing waitlist by 50 percent by 2023”; “each emergency shelter sector (men’s, women’s, youth and family) identify and achieve annual targets for shorter shelter stays”; “100 percent of social housing providers implement community development plans by 2018”; and “The City of Hamilton Housing Services Division adopts a citizen engagement model by 2015” (City of Hamilton, 2013, p.91).

<sup>64</sup> In this thesis, the word “convener” is used interchangeably to refer to those individuals and organizations that were leading the campaign at the local and national levels.

<sup>65</sup> There are two reasons why I chose “frontline staff” as the general term for this analysis. First, although “professional staff” was formally used in Hamilton, one convener from Hamilton informally referred to these individuals as “frontline staff”. Also, as the word implies, frontline staff were individuals who worked “directly” with survey participants on a day-to-day basis, borrowing from Cambridge University Press (2018).

<sup>66</sup> Information accessed in 2015. Webpage is no longer available as the ATEHO’s website has been updated since then (2017).

<sup>67</sup> No data available for Waterloo’s and Hamilton’s registry weeks.

<sup>68</sup> Street “sweeping” involves police officers asking people sleeping on the streets to remove themselves from the space they are occupying. This practice became popular in Ontario in 2000, when the Government of Ontario (1999) released its “Safe Streets Act, 1999”, claiming to protect the public from “aggressive” street solicitors. Geographers and other scholars from Canada and the States have been critical of such practices, arguing that it is “counter productive” and merely criminalizes people experiencing homelessness (COH, c.2017, “Coalition for the Repeal of Ontario’s Safe Streets Act”; also see, Smith

1992, 1993; Mitchell, 1997; Cress & Snow, 2000; Esmonde, 2002; Schneiderman, 2002; Gaetz, 2004, 2009, 2013; Williams, 2005; Eick, 2007; O’Grady, Gaetz, & Buccieri, 2011, 2013; Steffen, 2012).

<sup>69</sup> While these concepts are borrowed from Clarke (2009), they take on a slightly different meaning. Clarke associates informal relationships with weak ties and formal relationships with strong ties. In this thesis, these associations are reversed.

<sup>70</sup> How was this amount determined? By adding the total amount of sponsorship. The Region of Waterloo was required to pay for half of the training and technical support (\$6,000) and the CAEH covered the other half (\$6,000 – a total of \$12,000).

<sup>71</sup> It is unknown how many frontline staff and volunteers attended each event (i.e. the training, surveying, data entry, community debrief).

<sup>72</sup> More than 120 frontline staff and volunteers attended the action week training and orientation (ATEHO, 2015, April 23, slide 9). Fewer people were available for the survey and data entry shifts.

<sup>73</sup> Klandermans & Oegema (1987, p.519) define “mobilization potential” as, “the people in a society who could be mobilized by a social movement.”

<sup>74</sup> The attrition rate was 38 percent (City of Hamilton, 2015, November, p.2).

<sup>75</sup> McCarthy & Zald (1977, p.1222) refer to conscience constituents as “direct supporters of a SMO who do not stand to benefit directly from its success in goal accomplishment.”

<sup>76</sup> Calculated by taking the total number of people between ages 14 and 25 (85 youth) and dividing by total number of “individuals surveyed” (454 individuals) (City of Hamilton, 2015, April 30, slides 8 & 10).

<sup>77</sup> “Youth” defined as ages 16-25 (ATEHO, 2015, April 23, “Community Debrief”; Region of Waterloo, 2014, December 3).

<sup>78</sup> These higher rates suggest that youth homelessness is becoming more visible. One convener thought this was due to the breakdown of the foster care system. Thirty-nine percent of youth surveyed in Hamilton reported that they had been in foster care (City of Hamilton 2015, April 30, slide 20).

<sup>79</sup> This number (30 percent) was calculated by taking the total number of people who identified as “Aboriginal” (140) and dividing it by the total number of surveys completed (461) (ATEHO, 2015, April 23, “Community Debrief”, slide 29).

<sup>80</sup> It is unclear how each pilot community defined “immigrants” and whether this definition included people with precarious immigration status.

<sup>81</sup> You can track the campaign’s progress here: <http://www.20khomes.ca/track-our-progress/>.

<sup>82</sup> Signing the “Community Agreement” meant that conveners were not permitted to develop or use another survey tool for their local campaigns (see 20K Homes & CAEH, n.d., “Community Agreement”).

<sup>83</sup> One method for finding immigrants at-risk of homelessness was a census-based housing indicators approach employed by Fiedler, Schuurman, & Hyndman (2006). They use this approach to “examine the geographies of immigrants at-risk of [absolute] homelessness [and] to discern where ‘hidden’ homelessness might be occurring [in Greater Vancouver]” (p.205). Perhaps a more rigorous approach involving mixed methods (i.e. census-based housing indicators and targeting “hot spots”) would be a useful approach for future surveys.

<sup>84</sup> This was explained either during Ottawa’s action week or at the 2015 NCEH.

<sup>85</sup> During a 20K Homes campaign overview session at the 2015 NCEH, it was explained by the CAEH and Community Solutions that the 20K campaign focused on prioritizing *individuals* for permanent housing and supports. Focusing on individuals does nothing to address family homelessness and could potentially impede on reaching the campaign’s target quicker. Understandably, including families in the campaign would be difficult as they require larger affordable housing unit and there are not enough resources available (Hulchanski, 2002). Affordable housing with larger units are needed to end family homelessness (Wayland, 2007).

<sup>86</sup> The CAEH and Community Solutions announced during an overview session on the 20K Homes campaign at the 2015 NCEH that a French version of the survey tool was available.

<sup>87</sup> It is unknown whether translation services were needed/provided during Waterloo’s registry week.

<sup>88</sup> During an overview session on the 20K Homes campaign at the 2015 NCEH, Mike Bulthuis explained that delivering the survey in French was difficult because the English version of the survey was not allowed to be translated.

<sup>89</sup> Observation questions were omitted from Ottawa’s action week survey.

<sup>90</sup> Leventhal references two sources from HUD (2015). It is unclear here which one he is referring to here, and so, both sources are cited in this thesis.

<sup>91</sup> It is uncertain what logo this was.

<sup>92</sup> Link to webpage broken.

<sup>93</sup> This infographic has been updated with more recent information from Hamilton’s latest registry week.

<sup>94</sup> Aside from this one interview, there is no other information (i.e. from the interviews, documentation review, personal observations) that provide evidence that senior government officials attended the community debrief/provided this type of sympathetic support, which is why, it is questioned here the validity of this statement.

<sup>95</sup> Link to webpage broken.

<sup>96</sup> For similar arguments, see FCM (2016, September 30) & Tory & Iveson (2016, September 30)

<sup>97</sup> For a similar argument, see Ball (2015, October 23; however, see Marketwire, 2015, June 25)

<sup>98</sup> An official housing target is the minimum number of individuals participating communities are required to house each month to reach their goal of housing 20,000 people by the campaign’s deadline. In the States, a monthly housing target and an extended deadline was set half way through the 100K Homes campaign when it was realized their goal would not be reached by the initial deadline (see Leopold & Ho, 2015). Similar trends have been found with the Canadian campaign. In the Fall of 2017, the CAEH announced a new goal to end chronic homelessness in 20 communities and to house 20,000 “most vulnerable” homeless people by July 1, 2020 (see [www.20khomes.ca](http://www.20khomes.ca)).

<sup>99</sup> There was also conversation about merging these two lists with the city of Ottawa’s social housing wait list. If this were to happen, it is understood here that those people who scored with high acuity on the VI-SPDAT, and subsequently, the full assessment, they would be prioritized for permanent housing and supports, and those people at the top of the social housing wait list would potentially be bumped-down the merged priority list.

<sup>100</sup> Interestingly, in the Fall of 2017, the new Liberal government committed \$40 billion over ten years towards a new National Housing Strategy (see Government of Canada, 2017). This commitment would shape the goals and outcomes of the campaign moving forward.

<sup>101</sup> This convener pointed out that while the region of Waterloo is the 10<sup>th</sup> largest community in Canada by population size, it is not considered one of “Canada’s Big 10”. This is because the 10 largest communities have been “identified [based on] having the most significant problems with homelessness” (ESDC, 2018, June 1). In other words, “Canada’s Big 10” have been determined by the size of their homeless populations and not by the size of their total populations.

<sup>102</sup> Since action week, not only has the local campaign changed leadership structures, but also, the Alliance has taken on a new Executive Director. Geographers and other scholars writing on SMOs have found important links between adherent turnover (be it leaders, staff, members, etc.) and the inability of SMOs to sustain themselves (see Zald & Berger, 1978; Cress, 1997; Bosco, 2001; Whitzman, 2007). Given the Alliance has a Board of Directors and the Executive Director position has been filled, the sustainability of the Alliance as a non-profit organization is not what’s being questioned here. However, a new Executive Director may have their own priorities and agenda (an issue explored in Leed’s 1964 work – referenced in Zald & Berger, 1978), and therefore, the local campaign may ‘fall to the wayside’, especially if the Alliance is not leading the local campaign moving forward. Its questioned here whether the new Executive Director will continue to work with the City of Ottawa towards the local campaign goals.

<sup>103</sup> More recently, ESDC (2018) has developed the “Landlord Engagement Toolkit” to help communities implement Housing First.

<sup>104</sup> Numbers don’t match.

<sup>105</sup> In total, 85 people were permanently housed over the winter season, including, 35 non-high needs people staying at a local YWCA Transitional Shelter also received permanent housing (Region of Waterloo, 2015, August 11, p.7).

## References

- 20K Homes & CAEH. (n.d.). 20,000 Homes Campaign – Concept Overview [PDF file]. Retrieved from <http://www.20khomes.ca/wp-content/uploads/1-CAEH-20K-Homes-Campaign-Concept-Backgrounder.pdf>
- 20K Homes & CAEH. (n.d.). 20,000 Homes Campaign Community Agreement [PDF file]. 1-9. Calgary, Alberta, Canada: Canadian Alliance to End Homelessness. Retrieved from <http://www.20khomes.ca/wp-content/uploads/20K-Homes-Community-Agreement-FINAL-3.pdf>
- 20K Homes & CAEH. (n.d.). Building a strong local team. [PDF file]. Retrieved from <http://www.20khomes.ca/wp-content/uploads/1-Building-a-Strong-Local-Team-Introduction.pdf>
- 20K Homes & CAEH. (n.d.). Collective Impact Worksheet [Word Document]. Retrieved from <http://www.20khomes.ca/wp-content/uploads/8-Collective-Impact-Team-Worksheet.docx>
- 20K Homes & CAEH. (n.d.). Letter to Police Chief Requesting Support [Word document]. Retrieved from <http://www.20khomes.ca/wp-content/uploads/7-Letter-to-Police-Chief-Requesting-Support.docx>
- 20K Homes & CAEH. (n.d.). Lining Up Your Supply [Word document]. Retrieved from <http://www.20khomes.ca/wp-content/uploads/1-Lining-Up-Your-Supply-Introduction.docx>
- 20K Homes & CAEH, (n.d.). Mapping survey locations [Word document]. Retrieved from <http://www.20khomes.ca/wp-content/uploads/1-Mapping-Survey-Locations-Introduction.docx>
- 20K Homes & CAEH. (2015, June 12). 20,000 Homes Campaign Public Relations Tool Kit [PDF file]. 1-23. Retrieved from <http://www.20khomes.ca/wp-content/uploads/Final-PR-Toolkit-June-12-2015.pdf>
- 20K Homes & CAEH. (2015, June 16). Finding homes for 20,000 Canadians by 2020. Retrieved from <http://www.20khomes.ca/finding-homes-for-20000-canadians-by-2020/>
- 20K Homes & CAEH. (2017, October 25). CAEH Announces Drive to End Chronic Homelessness in 20 Communities by 2020 [Announcement]. Retrieved from <https://mailchi.mp/caeh/caeh-announces-drive-to-end-chronic-homelessness-in-20-communities-by-2020>
- 20K Homes & CAEH. (c.2018). Track Our Progress [Webpage]. Retrieved from <http://www.20khomes.ca/track-our-progress/>
- Abrams, L. S. (2010). Sampling ‘Hard to reach’ populations in qualitative research: The case of incarcerated youth. *Qualitative Social Work*, 9(4), 536-550.  
doi:10.1177/1473325010367821
- Adamo, A., Klodawsky, F., Aubry, T., & Hwang, S. (2016). Ending Homelessness in Canada: A Study of 10-Year Plans in 4 Canadian Cities. Toronto, Ontario: Research Alliance for

Canadian Homelessness, Housing, and Health & Centre for Urban Health Solutions, St. Michael's Hospital. Retrieved from  
[http://homelesshub.ca/sites/default/files/Ending%20Homelessness%20in%20Canada\\_October%202016.pdf](http://homelesshub.ca/sites/default/files/Ending%20Homelessness%20in%20Canada_October%202016.pdf)

Agnew, J. *Place and politics: the geographical mediation of state society*. Boston: Allen & Unwin.

Alberta. Secretariat for Action on Homelessness. (2008). *A plan for Alberta: Ending homelessness in 10 years*. Edmonton, Alberta. Alberta Secretariat for Action on Homelessness.

Alliance to End Homelessness Ottawa (AEHO). (n.d.). *Media Q&A for ATEH and Partners Spokespeople* [Word Document]. Retrieved from <http://www.20khomes.ca/wp-content/uploads/10-OATEH-Qs-and-As.docx>

Alliance to End Homelessness Ottawa. (n.d.). *Who We Are*. Retrieved from  
<https://www.endhomelessnessottawa.ca/what-we-do/>

Alliance to End Homelessness Ottawa. (2015). *2014 Progress Report on Ending Homelessness in Ottawa*. (M. Bulthuis, Ed.) Ottawa, Ontario: Alliance to End Homelessness Ottawa. Retrieved from [http://endhomelessnessottawa.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/aeho\\_annualreport-2014en\\_digital.pdf](http://endhomelessnessottawa.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/aeho_annualreport-2014en_digital.pdf)

Alliance to End Homelessness Ottawa. (2015). 20,000 Homes Action Week Check-List [Word document]. *Alliance to End Homelessness Ottawa*, 1-7. Ottawa, Ontario. Retrieved from <http://www.20khomes.ca/wp-content/uploads/5-Ottawa-20K-Check-List-critical-path.docx>

Alliance to End Homelessness Ottawa. (2015). *Ottawa joins Canada's 20,000 Homes Campaign*. Retrieved from <http://endhomelessnessottawa.ca/20kottawa/>

Alliance to End Homelessness Ottawa. (2015). Volunteer with the Alliance. Retrieved from  
<https://www.endhomelessnessottawa.ca>

Alliance to End Homelessness Ottawa. (2015, April 23). *Community Debrief and Call to Action: Ottawa's participation in 20,000 Homes* [Pdf]. Ottawa, Ontario, Canada. Retrieved from <http://www.20khomes.ca/wp-content/uploads/3-Ottawa-Community-Debrief.pdf>

Amin, A. (2002). Spatialities of globalisation. *Environment and Planning A*, 34(3), 385-399. doi: 10.1068/a3439

Arnone, R. (ed.). (1980). *Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism*. Boston, MA: G.K. Hall.

Aubry, T. D., Bonetta, C., Kłodawsky, F., Birnie, S., Nemiroff, R., Canadian Electronic Library (Firm), ... University of Ottawa. Centre for Research on Educational and Community Services. (2014). *Panel study on persons who are homelessness in Ottawa: Phase 2 results: Final Report*. Beaconsfield, Quebec: Canadian Electronic Library.

Aubry, T., Farrell, S., Hwang, S.W., & Calhoun, M. (2013). Identifying the patterns of emergency shelter stays of single individuals in Canadian cities of different sizes. *Housing Studies*, 28(6), 910-927. doi: 10.1080/02673037.2013.773585

- Aubry, T. D., Kłodawsky, F., Hay, E., Birnie, S. (2003). *Panel Study on Persons Who Are Homelessness in Ottawa: Phase 1 Results*. Ottawa, Ontario: University of Ottawa, Centre for Research on Educational and Community Services.
- Aubry, T., Kłodawsky, F., Nemiroff, R., Birnie, S., & Bonetta, C. (2007). Panel Study on Persons Who are Homeless in Ottawa: Phase 2 Results (Ottawa: Centre for Research on Educational and Community Services, University of Ottawa).
- Aubry, T., Nelson, G., & Tsemeris, S. (2015). Housing first for people with severe mental illness who are homeless: A review of the research and findings from the at home-chez soi demonstration Project/D'abord chez soi pour les personnes souffrant de maladie mentale grave qui vont sans abri: Une revue de la recherche et des résultats du projet de démonstration at homme-chez soi. *Canadian Journal of Psychiatry*, 60(11), 467-474.
- Baker, S. E. & Edwards, R. (2012). Introduction. In Baker, S. E. & Edwards, R. (Eds.), *How many qualitative interviews is enough? Expert voices and early career reflections on sampling and cases in qualitative research*, 3-6. Southampton, Great Britain. National Centre for Research Methods Review.
- Ball, D.P. (2015, October 23). Liberal to get ‘back into the game’ on housing, says MP Adam Vaughan. *The Tyee*. Retrieved from <https://thetyee.ca/News/2015/10/23/Liberals-Back-into-Housing/>
- Ballinger, C. (2008). Research Justification. In Given, L. M. (Ed.), *The sage encyclopedia of qualitative research methods*, 1 & 2, 780-783. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore. SAGE Publications, Inc.
- Banerjee, S. (1984). *India's Simmering Revolution*. London: Zed Press.
- Baxter, J. (2009). Content Analysis. In Kitchin, R., & Thrift, N. (Eds.), *International Encyclopedia of Human Geography*, 275-280. London, Ontario: Elsevier Ltd.
- Baylor, T. (1996). Media framing of movement protest: the case of American Indian protest. *Soc. Sci. J.* 33, 241-255.
- Beaumont, J., & Nicholls, W. (2007). Between relationality and territoriality: Investigating the geographies of justice movements in the Netherlands and the United States. *Environment and Planning A*, 39(11), 2554-2574. doi: 10.1068/a38344
- Becker, H. S. (2012). Expert Voices. In Baker, S. E. & Edwards, R. (Eds.), *How many qualitative interviews is enough? Expert voices and early career reflections on sampling and cases in qualitative research*, 15. Southampton, Great Britain. National Centre for Research Methods Review.
- Bell, E., & Read, C. (1998). *On the Case: Advice for Collaborative Studentships* ESRC.
- Benford, R. D. (1997). An insider’s critique of the social movement framing perspective. *Sociological Inquiry*, 67(4), 409-430. doi: 10.1111/j.1475-682x.1997.tb00445.x
- Benford, R. D, & Snow, D. A. (2000). Framing processes and social movements: An overview and assessment. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 26(1), 611-639. doi: 10.1146/annurev.soc.26.1.611

- Bennett, K. (2015, March 15). Plan to house 20K Homeless people will be piloted in Hamilton. *CBC News*. Retrieved from <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/hamilton/news/plan-to-house-20k-homeless-people-will-be-piloted-in-hamilton-1.2998439>
- Bennett, K. (2015, April 30). Hamilton's homeless priority list to target 109 people. Hamilton, Ontario, Canada: CBC News. Retrieved from <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/hamilton/news/hamilton-s-homeless-priority-list-to-target-109-people-1.3055665>
- Berg, B. L. (2008). Social Sciences, Qualitative Research In. In Given, L. M. (Ed.), *The sage encyclopedia of qualitative research methods, 1 & 2*, 826-831. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore. SAGE Publications, Inc.
- Blatter, J. K. (2008). Case Study. In Given, L. M. (Ed.), *The sage encyclopedia of qualitative research methods, 1 & 2*, 68-71. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore. SAGE Publications, Inc.
- Bosco, F. J. (2001). Place, space, networks, and the sustainability of collective action: The Madres de Plaza de Mayo. *Global Networks*, 1(4), 307-329. doi:10.1111/1471-037400018
- Boykoff, J. (2011). The Anti-Olympics. *New Left Review*, (67), 41-59.
- Brannen, J. (2012). Expert Voices. In Baker, S. E. & Edwards, R. (Eds.), *How many qualitative interviews is enough? Expert voices and early career reflections on sampling and cases in qualitative research*, 16-17. Southampton, Great Britain. National Centre for Research Methods Review.
- Brenner, N. (2009). A Thousand Leaves: Notes on the Geographies of Uneven Spatial Development. In Mahon, R., & Keil, R. (Eds.), *Leviathan Undone? Towards a political economy of scale*, 27-49. Vancouver: UBC Press.
- Bridgman, R. (2002). Housing chronically homeless women: “inside” a safe haven. *Housing Policy Debate*, 13(1), 51. doi: 10.1080/10511482.2002.9521435
- Broadening the Base (BtB). (2015, April). *Broadening the Base (BtB): A Community Initiative to Meet Critical Affordable Housing Needs in Ottawa* [Report]. 1-12. Ottawa, ON. Retrieved from <http://btbottawa.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/BtB-Overview-April-2015.pdf>
- Broadhead, R. S., & Rist, R. C. (1976). Gatekeepers and the social control of social research. *Social Problems*, 23(3), 325-336. doi: 10.1525/sp.1976.23.3.0300080
- Broffman, A., & Richter, T. (2015, April 17 & 18). Ottawa 20,000 Homes Action Week Training [PowerPoint]. *Community Solutions & CAEH*. 1-32. Ottawa, Ontario. Retrieved from [http://www.20khomes.ca/wp-content/uploads/2-Action-Week-Training\\_Ottawa.pptx](http://www.20khomes.ca/wp-content/uploads/2-Action-Week-Training_Ottawa.pptx)
- Brown, M., & Cummings, C. (2018, July 5). *New Research on the Reliability and Validity of the VI-SPDAT: Implication for Coordinated Assessment*. Retrieved from <http://homelesshub.ca/blog/new-research-reliability-and-validity-vi-spdat-implications-coordinated-assessment>

- Brown, M., Cummings, C., Lyons, J., Carrión, A., & Watson, D. P. (2018). Reliability and validity of the vulnerability index-service prioritization decision assistance tool (VI-SPDAT) in real-world implementation. *Journal of Social Distress and the Homeless*, 1-8. doi: 10.1080/10530789.2018.1482991
- Brulle, R. J., & Jenkins, J. C. (2015). 'Foundations and the Environmental Movement: Priorities, Strategies and Impact.' In Faber, D. R., & McCarthy, D. (eds.), *Foundations for Social Change: Critical Perspectives on Philanthropy and Popular Movements*. Lanham, MD: Roman and Littlefield.
- Budd, J. (2008). Critical Theory. In Given, L. M. (Ed.), *The sage encyclopedia of qualitative research methods, 1 & 2*, 174-179. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore. SAGE Publications, Inc.
- Bulthuis, M. (2015, March 16). *The 20,000 Homes Campaign comes to Ottawa*. Alliance to End Homelessness Ottawa. Retrieved from <http://endhomelessnessottawa.ca/the-20000-homes-campaign-comes-to-ottawa/>
- Bulthuis, M. (2015, March 20). *Get involved in Ottawa's 20,000 Homes campaign!* [Webpage] Alliance to End Homelessness. Retrieved from <http://endhomelessnessottawa.ca/>
- Bulthuis, M., & Canadian Electronic Library (Firm). (2016). *2015 progress report on ending homelessness in Ottawa*. Ottawa, Ontario: Alliance to End Homelessness Ottawa.
- Burelle, Janice. (2016, October 20). *National Housing Strategy Update* [Memo Pdf]. Ottawa, Ontario. Community & Social Services, City of Ottawa. Retrieved from [http://app05.ottawa.ca/sirepub/cache/2/ijyhb5jcelnfgqk03do410ls/4007090708201810433\\_0461.PDF](http://app05.ottawa.ca/sirepub/cache/2/ijyhb5jcelnfgqk03do410ls/4007090708201810433_0461.PDF)
- Burgess, R. (1982). The politics of urban response in Latin America. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 6. 465-479.
- Burgess, R.G. (1984). *In the field: An introduction to field research*. Boston; London: Allen & Unwin.
- Burkholder, K. & Dej, E. (2015, March 17). The 20,000 Homes Campaign: I Am Homeless... Not Nameless. Alliance to End Homelessness. Retrieved from <http://endhomelessnessottawa.ca/>
- Burrell, M. (Ed.). (2010). Homelessness and dispossession. *Parity*, 23(9). Canada; Australia.
- Burt, R. S. (1992). *Structural holes: The social structure of competition*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Calgary Homelessness Foundation (CFH). (c.2018). History: Calgary Homelessness Foundation. Retrieved from <http://calgaryhomeless.com/about/history/>
- Cambridge University Press. (c.2018). Frontline. *Cambridge English Dictionary*. Retrieved from <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/frontline>

- Campbell, L. M., Gray, N. J., Meletis, Z. A., Abbott, J. G., & Silver, J. J. (2006). Gatekeepers and keymasters: Dynamic relationships of access in geographical fieldwork. *Geographical Review*, 96(1), 97-121. doi: 10.1111/j.1931-0846.2006.tb00389.x
- Canadian Alliance to End Homelessness (CAEH). (2012, April 5). The Canadian Alliance to End Homelessness: New Alliance Champions End to Homelessness in Canada [webpage]. Marketwired & West Corporation. Retrieved from <http://www.marketwired.com/>
- Canadian Alliance to End Homelessness. (2015, June 9). CAEH 20 000 Homes Campaign [video file]. Retrieved from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NwxDmNJhCdM>
- Canadian Alliance to End Homelessness. (c.2018) About Us: Our team. Retrieved from: <http://caeh.ca/our-team/>
- Canadian Alliance to End Homelessness, & 20K Homes. (c.2018). Registry week toolkit. Retrieved from <http://www.20khomes.ca/resources/registry-week-toolkit/>
- Canadian Alliance to End Homelessness, & Canadian Electronic Library (Firm). (2012). *A plan, not a dream: How to end homelessness in 10 years*. Calgary, Alberta: Canadian Alliance to End Homelessness.
- Canadian Electronic Library (Firm). (2015). *2015 waiting list survey report: ONPHA's report on waiting lists statistics for Ontario*. Toronto, ON, CA: Ontario Non-Profit Housing Association.
- Canadian Electronic Library (Firm). (2016). *2016 waiting list survey report: ONPHA's final report on waiting lists statistics for Ontario*. Toronto, ON, CA: Ontario Non-Profit Housing Association.
- Canadian Electronic Library (Firm), & Calgary Homeless Foundation. (2008). *Calgary's 10 year plan to end homelessness*. Calgary, Alberta: Calgary Homeless Foundation.
- Canadian Electronic Library (Firm), & Mental Health Commission of Canada. (2012). *At home/Chez soi: Interim report*. Calgary, Alta.: Mental Health Commission of Canada = Commission de la santé mentale du Canada.
- Canadian Electronic Library (Firm), & Mental Health Commission of Canada. (2014). *National final report: Cross-site at home/chez soi project*. Calgary, Alberta: Mental Health Commission of Canada.
- Canadian Electronic Library (Firm), & Ontario. Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing. (2016). *Ontario's long-term affordable housing strategy: Update*. Ottawa, Ontario: Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing.
- Canadian Housing and Renewal Association (CHRA), & Canadian Electronic Library (Firm). (2014). *Housing for all: Sustaining and renewing housing for low-income households: A call for federal reinvestment as operating agreements expire*. Ottawa, Ontario: Canadian Housing and Renewal Association.
- Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC). (2010, October). Research Highlights: 2006 Census Housing Series: Issue 8 – Households in Core Housing Need and Spending at Least 50% of Their Income on Shelter. Canada: Canadian Mortgage and Housing

Corporation. Retrieved from <https://www.cmhc-schl.gc.ca/odpub/pdf/67118.pdf?fr=1518704470734>

Canadian Mortgage Housing Corporation. (2015, October). *Rental Market Report: Hamilton and Brantford CMAs*. Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation. Retrieved from [https://www.cmhc-schl.gc.ca/odpub/esub/64391/64391\\_2015\\_A01.pdf](https://www.cmhc-schl.gc.ca/odpub/esub/64391/64391_2015_A01.pdf)

Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation. (c.2018a). *About Affordable Housing in Canada*. Retrieved from <https://www.cmhc-schl.gc.ca>

Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation. (c.2018b). *Investment in Affordable Housing (IAH)*. Retrieved from <https://www.cmhc-schl.gc.ca/en/inpr/afhoce/fuafho/>

Canadian Observatory on Homelessness (COH). (2012). *Canadian Definition of Homelessness*. Toronto, Ontario: Canadian Observatory on Homelessness Press. Retrieved from <http://homelesshub.ca/sites/default/files/COHhomelessdefinition.pdf>

Canadian Observatory on Homelessness. (c.2016). *Hamilton, ON* [Community Profile]. Retrieved from <http://homelesshub.ca/community-profiles/ontario/hamilton>

Canadian Observatory on Homelessness. (c.2016). *Ottawa, ON* [Community Profile]. Retrieved from <http://homelesshub.ca/community-profiles/ontario/ottawa>

Canadian Observatory on Homelessness. (c.2016). *Waterloo Region, ON* [Community Profile]. Retrieved from <http://homelesshub.ca/community-profiles/ontario/waterloo-region>

Canadian Observatory on Homelessness. (c.2017). *Addressing Chronic Homelessness*. Retrieved from <http://homelesshub.ca/solutions/prevention/addressing-chronic-homelessness>

Canadian Observatory on Homelessness. (c.2017). *Canada – National Strategies to Address Homelessness*. Retrieved from <http://homelesshub.ca/solutions/national-strategies/canada>

Canadian Observatory on Homelessness. (c.2017). *Canadian Definition of Homelessness*. Retrieved from <http://homelesshub.ca/homelessdefinition>

Canadian Observatory on Homelessness. (c.2017). *Causes of Homelessness*. Retrieved from <http://homelesshub.ca/about-homelessness/homelessness-101/causes-homelessness>

Canadian Observatory on Homelessness. (c.2017). *Coalition for the Repeal of Ontario's Safe Streets Act*. Retrieved from <http://homelesshub.ca/safe-streets-act>

Canadian Observatory on Homelessness. (c.2017). *Housing First*. Retrieved from <http://homelesshub.ca/solutions/housing-accommodation-and-supports/housing-first>

Canadian Observatory on Homelessness. (c.2017). *Point-In-Time Counts*. Retrieved from <http://homelesshub.ca/solutions/monitoring-progress/point-time-counts>

Canadian Observatory on Homelessness. (c.2017). *Waterloo Region, ON* [Community Profile]. Retrieved from <http://homelesshub.ca/community-profiles/ontario/waterloo-region>

Canadian Observatory on Ending Homelessness. (c.2017). *What We Heard: Shaping Canada's National Housing Strategy*. Retrieved from [www.homelesshub.ca](http://www.homelesshub.ca)

- Castells, M. (2010). *The rise of the network society* (2nd, with a new preface. ed.). Malden, Massachusetts; Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). (2009). *Data collection methods for evaluation* (No.18). Retrieved from  
<http://www.cdc.gov/healthyyouth/evaluation/pdf/brief18.pdf>
- Charmaz, K. (2012). Expert Voices. In Baker, S. E. & Edwards, R. (Eds.), *How many qualitative interviews is enough? Expert voices and early career reflections on sampling and cases in qualitative research*, 21-22. Southampton, Great Britain. National Centre for Research Methods Review.
- Chiu, S., Redelmeier, D. A., Tolomiczenko, G., Kiss, A., & Hwang, S. W. (2009). The health of homeless immigrants. *Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health*, 63(11), 943-948.
- Choudry, A., & Thomas, M. (2013). Labour struggles for workplace justice: Migrant and immigrant worker organizing in Canada. *Journal of Industrial Relations*, 55(2), 212-226.  
doi: 10.1177/0022185612473215
- Christensen, J. B. (2012). *Homeless in a homeland: Housing (in)security and homelessness in Inuvik and Yellowknife, Northwest Territories, Canada*.
- City of Hamilton. (n.d.). Follow-up Email for Community Partners [Word document].
- City of Hamilton. (n.d.). Hamilton's Registry Week – Fact Sheet (April 26<sup>th</sup> – April 30<sup>th</sup>) [Word document]. 1-2. Retrieved from <http://www.20khomes.ca/wp-content/uploads/11-Registry-Week-Fact-Sheet.docx>
- City of Hamilton. (2013). *Housing and Homelessness Action Plan*. Hamilton, Ontario, Canada.  
Retrieved from  
<https://d3fpplflm7bbt3.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/media/browser/2015-02-01/housingandhomelessnessactionplanfull.pdf>
- City of Hamilton. (2015). *City of Hamilton Financial Report 2015* [PDF]. City of Hamilton. Hamilton, Ontario: Retrieved from  
<https://d3fpplflm7bbt3.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/media/browser/2016-07-06/2015-city-of-hamilton-financial-report-final.pdf>
- City of Hamilton. (2015, April 7). 20,000 Homes Campaign: Hamilton Registry Week April 26 – 30<sup>th</sup>, 2015 [Word document]. 1-2.
- City of Hamilton. (2015, November). City of Hamilton – Hamilton Registry Week Overview: 20K Homes [Word document]. *City of Hamilton*, 1-3. Hamilton, Ontario.
- City of Hamilton, Housing Services. (2015, November 2). *Hamilton 20,000 Homes Campaign Update* [PDF]. 1-12. Hamilton, ON: City of Hamilton.
- City of Hamilton. (2015, April 23). 20,000 Homes Key Messages / FAQ. 1-3. Hamilton, Ontario, Canada: City of Hamilton. Retrieved from <http://www.20khomes.ca/wp-content/uploads/9-FAQ-Key-Messages.docx>

- City of Hamilton. (2015, April 30). *20K Homes Campaign – Hamilton, Ontario* [Video File]. Retrieved from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eILfwdTbGNI>
- City of Hamilton. (2015, April 30). 20,000 Homes Registry Week Community Debrief [PDF file]. Retrieved from [http://homelesshub.ca/sites/default/files/Community%20Debrief%20Presentation%20-%20FINAL%20VERSION%20-%20APR30\\_WITH%20VIDEO.pdf](http://homelesshub.ca/sites/default/files/Community%20Debrief%20Presentation%20-%20FINAL%20VERSION%20-%20APR30_WITH%20VIDEO.pdf)
- City of Hamilton Seeks Volunteers to Participate in 20,000 Homes Campaign Registry Week [Word Document]. (2015, March 16). Retrieved from <http://www.20khomes.ca/wp-content/uploads/6-City-of-Hamilton-Seeks-Volunteers.docx>
- City of Ottawa. (2013). A Home for Everyone: Ottawa's 10-Year Plan, 2014-2024. Ottawa, Ontario, Canada. Retrieved from <http://ottawa.ca/en/residents/social-services/housing#our-10-year-housing-homelessness-plan>
- City of Ottawa. (2015). *2016 Operating and Capital Budget – Tax and Rebate Supported Programs* [PDF]. Ottawa, ON: City of Ottawa. Adopted December 9, 2015. Retrieved from [http://documents.ottawa.ca/sites/documents.ottawa.ca/files/documents/2016\\_final\\_adopted\\_budget\\_book\\_condensed\\_en.pdf](http://documents.ottawa.ca/sites/documents.ottawa.ca/files/documents/2016_final_adopted_budget_book_condensed_en.pdf)
- Clark A. M. (2008). Critical Realism. In Given, L. M. (Ed.), *The sage encyclopedia of qualitative research methods, 1 & 2*, 167-170. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore. SAGE Publications, Inc.
- Clark, T. (2010). Gaining and maintaining access: Exploring the mechanisms that support and challenge the relationship between gatekeepers and researchers. *Qualitative Social Work*, 10(4), 485-502. doi: 10.1177/1473325009358228
- Clarke, N. (2009). Networks, Urban. In Kitchin, R., & Thrift, N. (Eds.), *International Encyclopedia of Human Geography*, 414-418. Southampton, United Kingdom. Elsevier Ltd.
- Clarke, N. (2012). *Urban policy mobility, anti-politics, and histories of the transnational municipal movement*. London, England. SAGE Publications. doi: 10.1177/030912511407952
- CNW Group Inc., & Cision. (c.2018). Nation-Wide Campaign Launched Today to House 20,000 Homeless Canadians. Retrieved from <https://www.newswire.ca/>
- Cochrane, A., & Ward, K. (2012). Researching the geographies of policy mobility: Confronting the methodological challenges. *Environment and Planning A*, 44(1), 5-12. doi: 10.1068/a44176
- Colwell, M., & Culleton, A. (1993). *Private Foundations and Public Policy: The Political Role of Philanthropy*. New York, NY: Gatland Publishing.
- Community Solutions. (c.2016). What we stand for. Retrieved from <https://www.community.solutions/>

- Condon, M., Newton, R., & Social Planning and Research Council of British Columbia. (2007). *In the proper hands: SPARC BC research on homelessness and affordable housing*. Vancouver, British Columbia: Social Planning and Research Council of British Columbia.
- Conway, J. (2008). Geographies of transnational feminism: The politics of place and scale in the world march of women. *Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State and Society*, 15(2), 207-231. doi: 10.1093/sp/jxn010
- Conway, J. (2009). The Empire, the Movement, and the Politics of Scale: Considering the World Social Forum. In Mahon, R., & Keil, R. (Eds.), *Leviathan Undone? Towards a political economy of scale*, 281-299. Vancouver: UBC Press.
- Cook et al., I. (2004). Follow the Thing: Papaya. *Antipode*, 36(4), 642-664.
- Cook et al., I. (2006). Geographies of food: Following. *Progress in Human Geography*, 30(5), 655-666. doi: 10.1177/0309132506070183
- Cook, I., & Harrison, M. (2007). Follow the Thing: West Indian Hot Pepper Sauce. *Spice and Culture*, 10(1), 40-63. doi: 10.1177/1206331206296384
- Cook, I. R., & Ward, K. (2011). Trans-urban networks of learning, mega events and policy tourism: The case of Manchester's commonwealth and Olympic games project. *Urban Studies*, 48(12), 2519.
- Corrigall-Brown, C. (2016). Funding or social movements. *Sociology Compass*, 10(4), 330-339. doi: 10.1111/soc4.12362
- Corrigall-Brown, C., Snow, D. A., Smith, K., & Quist, T. (2009). Explaining the puzzle of homeless mobilization: An examination of differential participation. *Sociological Perspectives*, 52(3), 309-335. doi: 10.1525/sop.2009.52.3.309
- Cress, D. M. (1997). Nonprofit incorporation among movements of the poor: Pathways and consequences for homeless social movements organizations. *The Sociological Quarterly*, 38(2), 343-360. doi: 10.1111/j.1533-8525.1997.tb00481.x
- Cress, D. M., & Snow, D. A. (1996). Mobilization at the margins: Resources, benefactors, and the viability of homeless social movement organizations. *American Sociological Review*, 61(6), 1089-1109.
- Cress, D. M., & Snow, D. A. (2000). The outcomes of homeless mobilization: The influence of organization, disruption, political mediation, and framing. *American Journal of Sociology*, 105(4), 1063-1104. doi: 10.1086/210399
- Cresswell, T. (2009). Place. In Kitchin, R., & Thrift, N. (Eds.), *International Encyclopedia of Human Geography*, 169-177. Egham: Elsevier Ltd.
- Croteau, D., & Hicks, L. (2003). Coalition framing and the challenge of a consonant frame pyramid: The case of a collaborative response to homelessness. *Social Problems*, 50(2), 251-272. doi: 10.1525/sp.2003.50.2.251

CTV Kitchener. (2014, December 3). Count of Waterloo Region's homeless population turns up 339 people. Retrieved from <https://kitchener.ctvnews.ca>

Culhane, D. P., Metraux, S., & Hadley, T. (2002). Public service reductions associated with placement of homeless persons with severe mental illness in supportive housing. *Housing Policy Debate, 13*(1), 107-163. doi: 10.1080/10511482.2002.9521437

D'Amato, L. (2014, November 27). D'Amato: Our attitude toward the homeless makes me proud. *Waterloo Region Record*. <https://www.therecord.com>

D'Arddario, S., Hiebert, D., & Sherrell, K. (2007). Restricted access: The role of social capital in mitigating absolute homelessness among immigrants and refugees in the GVRD. *Refuge: Canada's Journal on Refugees, 24*(1).

Delaney, D. (2009). Territory and Territoriality. In Kitchin, R., & Thrift, N. (Eds.), *International Encyclopedia of Human Geography*, 196-208. Amherst: Elsevier Ltd.

Della Seta, P. (1978). Notes on urban struggles in Italy. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 2*, 303-329.

Desmond, P. (2014, November, 26). Waterloo Region adds flexibility for housing subsidies. *Waterloo Region Record*. <https://www.therecord.com>

Desmond, P. (2014, December 3). Homelessness survey paints bleak picture of needy in Waterloo Region. *Waterloo Region Record*. Retrieved from <https://www.therecord.com>

Desrosiers, S. (2015, May 4). High price of being poor. *Ottawa Sun*, Retrieved from <http://ottawasun.com/2015/05/04/high-price-of-being-poor/wcm/58ddc220-5852-4361-98ec-ad452f0ffff1>

DeVerteuil, G., & Wilson, K. (2010). Reconciling indigenous need with the urban welfare state? Evidence of culturally-appropriate services and spaces for aboriginals in Winnipeg, Canada. *Geoforum, 41*(3), 498-507. doi: 10.1016/j.geoforum.2010.01.004.

Dhanagre, D. N. (1983a). *Peasant Movements in India 1920-1950*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Dirks, Y. (2015). Community campaigns for the right to housing: Lessons from the R2H Coalition of Ontario. *Journal of Law and Social Policy, 24*, 135-142.

Distasio, J., Sylvestre, G., & Mulligan, S. (2010). Hidden Homelessness among Aboriginal Peoples in Prairie Cities. In Hulchanski, D. J., Campsie, P., Chau, S., Hwang, S., & Paradis, E. (Eds.), *Finding Home: Policy Options for Addressing Homelessness in Canada* [e-book], 1-22. Toronto, Ontario: Cities Centre, University of Toronto.

Dowie, M. (1996). *Losing Ground: American Environmentalism at the Close of the Twentieth Century*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.

Dube, D. E. (2015, July 7). Community rallies to reopen Odawa Native Friendship Centre. Ottawa, Ontario, Canada. Retrieved from <http://www.ottawasun.com/2015/07/07/community-helps-reopen-odawa-native-friendship-centre>

- Duffy, A. (2016, January 5). Canada's homeless to be counted on one day across country, but not in Ottawa. Ottawa, Ontario, Canada: Ottawa Citizen. Retrieved from <http://ottawacitizen.com/news/local-news/canadas-homeless-to-be-counted-on-one-day-across-country-but-not-in-ottawa>
- Dunn, K. (2005). Interviewing. In I. Hay, *Qualitative research methods in human geography*, 100-138. South Melbourne, Vic.; New York: Oxford University Press.
- Dunn, K. (2010). Interviewing. In I. Hay (Ed.) *Qualitative Research Methods in Human Geography*, 3, 107-127. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press.
- Ebbinghaus, B. (2005). When less is more: Selection problems in large- N and small- N cross-national comparisons. *International Sociology*, 20(2), 133-152. doi: 10.1177/0268580905052366
- Eberle, M., Kraus, D., & Serge, L. (2009). Results of the pilot study to estimate the size of the hidden homeless population in Metro Vancouver. Research report. Vancouver, British Columbia: Mustel Research Group marketPOWER Research Inc.
- Echenberg, H., Jensen, H., Canada. Library of Parliament. Social Affairs Division, Canada. Parliamentary Information and Research Service, & Canadian Electronic Library (Firm). (2012). *Defining and Enumerating Homelessness in Canada*. Ottawa, Ontario: Library of Parliament.
- Editorial. (2014, December 9). Homelessness comes into focus. *Waterloo Region Record*. Retrieved by <https://www.therecord.com>
- Edwards, B., & McCarthy, J. D. (2004). Resource and social movement mobilization. In Kriesi, H., Soule, S. A., & Snow, D. A. (Eds.), *The Blackwell companion to social movements*, 116-152. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing.
- Eick, V. (2007). Chapter 13: Space Patrols – the New Peace-Keeping Functions of Nonprofits: Contesting Neoliberalization or the Urban Poor? In Sheppard, E.S., Peck, J., & Leitner, H, *Contesting neoliberalism: Urban frontiers*, 266-290. New York: Guilford Press
- Eide, P. J. (2008). Recruiting participants. In Given, L. M. (Ed.), *The sage encyclopedia of qualitative research methods*, 1 & 2, 743-745. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore. SAGE Publications, Inc.
- Egan, J. (2008). Email Interview. In Given, L. M. (Ed.), *The sage encyclopedia of qualitative research methods*, 1 & 2, 862-863. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore. SAGE Publications, Inc.
- Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC). (2014, October 24). *Summative Evaluation of the Homelessness Partnering Strategy*. Retrieved from: [http://www.edsc.gc.ca/eng/publications/evaluations/social\\_development/2014/hps.shtml](http://www.edsc.gc.ca/eng/publications/evaluations/social_development/2014/hps.shtml)
- Employment and Social Development Canada. (2016, August 15). *Homelessness Partnering Strategy Directives 2014-2019*. Retrieved from <https://www.canada.ca/en/employment-social-development/services/funding/homeless/homeless-directives.html#d1>

- Employment and Social Development Canada. (2016, August 23). Understanding Homelessness and the Strategy. Retrieved from <https://www.canada.ca/en/employment-social-development/programs/communities/homelessness/understanding.html>
- Employment and Social Development Canada. (2017, April 28). Designated Communities. Retrieved from <https://www.canada.ca/en/employment-social-development/programs/communities/homelessness/designated.html>
- Employment and Social Development Canada. (2018). The Landlord Engagement Toolkit: A Guide to Working with Landlords in Housing First Programs. Retrieved from [http://homelesshub.ca/sites/default/files/LANDLORD%20TOOLKIT\\_ENG\\_web.pdf](http://homelesshub.ca/sites/default/files/LANDLORD%20TOOLKIT_ENG_web.pdf)
- Employment and Social Development Canada. (2018, March 12). *Backgrounder: Point-in-Time Counts*. Retrieved from <https://www.canada.ca/en/employment-social-development/news/2018/03/backgrounder-point-in-time-counts.html?wbdisable=true>
- Employment and Social Development Canada. (2018, June 1). Terms and Conditions of the Homelessness Partnering Strategy. Retrieved from <https://www.canada.ca/en/employment-social-development/services/funding/homeless/homeless-terms-conditions.html>
- England, K. V. L. (1994). Getting Personal: Reflexivity, Positionality, and Feminist Research. *The Professional Geographer*, 46(1), 80-89.
- Entman, R.M., & Rojecki, A. (1993). Freezing out the public: elite and media framing of the U.S. anti-nuclear movement. *Polit. Commun.* 10, 155-73.
- Erickson, V. (2004). Hidden Homelessness. In Levinson, D. (Ed.) *Encyclopedia of Homelessness*, 204-208. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, Inc.
- Esmonde, J. (2002). Criminalizing Poverty: The Criminal Law Power and the Safe Streets Act. *Journal of Law and Social Policy*, 17(4), 63-68. Retrieved from [http://www.legalaid.on.ca/en/publications/downloads/journal\\_voll7/Esmonde.pdf](http://www.legalaid.on.ca/en/publications/downloads/journal_voll7/Esmonde.pdf)
- Exchange Magazine. (2014, November 25). Waterloo Region first community in Canada to pilot 20,000 Homes Campaign. Retrieved from [www.exchangemagazine.com](http://www.exchangemagazine.com)
- Falvo, N. (2015, February 5). *Responsibility for Housing*. Canadian Observatory on Homelessness. Retrieved from <http://homelesshub.ca/blog/responsibility-housing>
- Fawcett, B. (2008). Poststructuralism. In Given, L. M. (Ed.), *The sage encyclopedia of qualitative research methods*, 1 & 2, 666-670. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore. SAGE Publications, Inc.
- Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM). (2016, September 30). Canada's mayors call for national leadership now to tackle the housing crisis [webpage]. Ottawa, Ontario. Retrieved from <https://fcm.ca/home/media/news-and-commentary/2016/canada%E2%80%99s-mayors-call-for-national-leadership-now-to-tackle-the-housing-crisis.htm>

- Fetterman, D. M. (2008). Ethnography. In Given, L. M. (Ed.), *The sage encyclopedia of qualitative research methods, 1 & 2*, 287-292. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore. SAGE Publications, Inc.
- Fiedler, R., Schuurman, N., & Hyndman, J. (2006). Hidden homelessness: An indicator-based approach for examining the geographies of recent immigrants at-risk of homelessness in Greater Vancouver. *Cities*, 23(3), 205-216. doi: 10.1016/j.cities.2006.03.004
- Finding homes for 20,000 Canadians by 2018. (2015, June 16). News Talk 770. Retrieved from <https://globalnews.ca/radio/newstalk770/?gref=newstalk770>
- Flamborough Review. (2015, March 23). City of Hamilton looking for volunteers for 20,000 Homes Campaign registry. Retrieved from <https://www.flamboroughreview.com/news-story/5547303-city-of-hamilton-looking-for-volunteers-for-20-000-homes-campaign-registry/>
- Forchuck, C., Godin, M., Hoch, J. S., Kingston-MacClure, S., Momodou S Jeng (Mo, Puddy, L., ... Jensen, E. (2013). Preventing psychiatric discharge to homelessness. *Canadian Journal of Community Mental Health*, 32(3), 17.
- Fotheringham, S., Walsh, C. A., & Burrowes, A. (2014). 'A place to rest': The role of transitional housing in ending homelessness for women in Calgary, Canada. *Gender, Place and Culture*, 21(7), 834-853. doi: 10.1080/0966369x.2013.8106054
- Froelich, A. (2015, October 11). Medicine Hat, Alberta Becomes First Canadian City to End Homelessness. *Activist Post*. Retrieved from <https://www.activistpost.com/2015/10/medicine-hat-alberta-becomes-first-canadian-city-to-end-homelessness.html>
- Gaetz, S. (2004). Safe streets for whom? Homeless youth, social exclusion, and criminal victimization. *Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice/Revue Canadien De Criminologie Et De Justice Penale*, 46(4), 423-455. doi 10.3138/cjccj.46.4.423
- Gaetz, S. (2009). Chapter 3.2: Whose safety counts? Street youth, social exclusion and criminal victimization. In Hulchanski, D. J., Campsie, P. Chau, S., Hwang, S., & Paradis, E. (Eds.), *Finding home: Policy options for addressing homelessness in Canada* (e-book). Toronto, Ontario: Cities Centre, University of Toronto. Retrieved from <http://www.homelesshub.ca/sites/default/files/3.2%20Gaetz%20-%20Whose%20Safety%20Counts.pdf>
- Gaetz, S. (2012, April 11). New Canadian Alliance to End Homelessness will make an impact! *Homeless Hub*. Retrieved from <http://homelesshub.ca/blog/new-canadian-alliance-end-homelessness-will-make-impact>
- Gaetz, S. (2013). The criminalization of homelessness: A Canadian perspective. *European Journal of Homelessness*, 7(2), 357-362. Toronto, Ontario. Retrieved from [https://www.feantsa.org/download/sg\\_response7772916537698278481.pdf](https://www.feantsa.org/download/sg_response7772916537698278481.pdf)
- Gaetz, S., & Dej, E. (2017). A New Direction: A Framework for Homelessness Prevention. Toronto, Ontario: Canadian Observatory on Homelessness Press. Retrieved from <http://homelesshub.ca/sites/default/files/COHPPreventionFramework.pdf>

- Gaetz, S., Dej, E., Richter, T., & Redman, M. (2016). The State of Homelessness in Canada: 2016. Toronto, Ontario: Canadian Observatory on Homelessness Press. Retrieved from [http://homelesshub.ca/sites/default/files/SOHC16\\_final\\_20Oct2016.pdf](http://homelesshub.ca/sites/default/files/SOHC16_final_20Oct2016.pdf)
- Gaetz, S., Donaldson, J., Richter, T., & Gulliver, T. (2013). The State of Homelessness in Canada 2013. Toronto, Ontario: Canadian Homelessness Research Network Press. Retrieved from <http://homelesshub.ca/sites/default/files/SOHC2103.pdf>
- Gaetz, S., Gulliver, T., & Richter, T. (2014). The State of Homelessness in Canada: 2014. Toronto, Ontario: The Homeless Hub Press. Retrieved from <http://homelesshub.ca/sites/default/files/SOHC2014.pdf>
- Gaetz, S., Homeless Hub (Online service), & Canadian Electronic Library (Firm). (2012). *The real cost of homelessness: Can we save money by doing the right thing?* Toronto, Ontario: Homeless Hub.
- Gaetz, S., Homeless Hub (Online service), & Canadian Electronic Library (Firm). (2014). *A safe and decent place to live: Towards a housing first framework for youth.* Toronto, Ontario: The Homeless Hub Press.
- Gaetz, S., Scott, F., & Gulliver, T. (Eds.) (2013). Housing First in Canada: Supporting Communities to End Homelessness. Toronto, Ontario: Canadian Homelessness Research Network Press.
- Gamson, W.A., & Modigliani, A. (1989). Media discourse and public opinion on nuclear power: a constructionist approach. *Am J. Soc.* 95, 1-37.
- Garon, G. (2015, April 20). Reconstruct the lives of the homeless in 60 questions. *Radio-Canada*. Retrieved from <https://ici.radio-canada.ca>
- Garrow, D. J. (1987). *Philanthropy and the Civil Rights Movement*. Working Paper. New York, NY: Center for the Study of Philanthropy, Graduate School and University Center of the City University of New York.
- Gerhards, J., & Rucht, D. (1992). Mesomobilization: Organizing and framing in two protest campaigns in west Germany. *American Journal of Sociology*, 98(3), 555-596. doi: 10.1086/230049
- Gifford, L. (2012, March 5). *Research Methods: The Interview* [Word Document]. Retrieved from <https://www.colorado.edu/geography/foote/geog5161/presentations/2012/Gifford-Interviewing.docx>
- Gilmer, T. P., Stefancic, A., Ettner, S. L., Manning, W. G., & Tsemberis, S. (2010). Effect of full-service partnerships on homelessness, use and costs of mental health services, and quality of life among adults with serious mental illness. *Archives of General Psychiatry*, 67(6), 645-652. doi: 10.1001/archgenpsychiatry.2010.56
- Glaeser, E. L. (2003). Introduction. In E. L. Glaeser (Ed.), *The Governance of Not-for-Profit Organizations*, 1-44. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press.
- Goodman, L. A. (2014, April 21). ‘Housing First’ approach may put homeless youth last, report warns, *The Canadian Press*. <https://www.ctvnews.ca>

- Gottlieb, R. (1993). *Forcing the Spring: The Transformation of the American Environmental Movement*. Washington, DC: Island Press.
- Gough, K. (1974). Peasant uprising in India. *Economic and Political Weekly* 9, 32-4, 1391-141.
- Government of Canada. (2016). *What We Heard: Shaping Canada's National Housing Strategy*. Retrieved from [http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection\\_2017/edsc-esdc/Em12-30-2016-eng.pdf](http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2017/edsc-esdc/Em12-30-2016-eng.pdf)
- Government of Canada. (2017). *Canada's National Housing Strategy: A Place to Call Home*. Retrieved from <https://www.placetocallhome.ca/>
- Government of Ontario. (1999). *Safe Streets Act, 1999, S.O. 1999*, chapter 8, 1-3. Retrieved from [https://www.ontario.ca/laws/docs/99s08\\_e.doc](https://www.ontario.ca/laws/docs/99s08_e.doc)
- Grabher, G. (2009). Networks. In Kitchin, R., & Thrift, N. (Eds.), *International Encyclopedia of Human Geography*, 405-413. Bonn, Germany: Elsevier Ltd.
- Granzow, K., & Dean, A. (2007). Revanchism in the Canadian West: Gentrification and resettlement in a prairie city. *Topia*, (18), 89-106.
- Gratzer, D. (2015, December 2). Our next great national project: Let's end homelessness. *The National Post*. Retrieved from <http://nationalpost.com/>
- Greater Niagara Chamber of Commerce (GNCC). (2015, December 9). *Niagara and the Ontario Economic Update 2016*. Retrieved from <https://gncc.ca/niagara-and-the-ontario-economic-update-2016/>?
- Greenberg, J., May, T., & Elliott, C. (2006). Homelessness and media activism in the voluntary sector. A case study. *The Philanthropist*, 20(2), 131.
- Gulcur, L., Stefancic, A., Shinn, M., Tsemberis, S., & Fischer, S. N. (2003). Housing, hospitalization, and cost outcomes for homeless individuals with psychiatric disabilities participating in continuum of care and housing first programmes. *Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology*, 13(2), 171-186. doi: 10.1002/casp.723
- Haight, K. (2016, December 12). *Environmental Scan: Subpopulation Housing Needs in Lethbridge: Final Report*. Retrieved from <http://www.bringinglethbridgehome.ca/sites/default/files/Enviro%20Scan%20for%20City%20of%20Lethbridge%20December%202016.pdf>
- Hannigan, J. A. (1985). Alain Touraine, Manual Castells and social movement theory a critical appraisal. *The Sociological Quarterly*, 26(4), 435-454. doi: 10.1111/j.1533-8525.1985.tb00237.x
- Hayes, M. (2015, April 27). Volunteers hit the streets to collect data and stories of Hamilton's homeless. *The Hamilton Spectator*. Retrieved from <https://www.thespec.com/news/story/5587731-volunteers-hit-the-streets-to-collect-data-and-stories-of-hamilton-s-homeless/>

- Hayes, M. (2015, April 30). The grim reality of homelessness. *The Hamilton Spectator*. Retrieved from <https://www.thespec.com/news-story/5595392-the-grim-reality-of-homelessness/>
- Heath, S., Charles, V., Crow, G., Wiles, R. (2007). Informed consent, gatekeepers and go-betweens: Negotiating consent in child- and youth-orientated institutions. *British Educational Research Journal*, 33(3), 403-417. doi:10.1080/01411920701243651
- Hedican, E. J. (2008). Empathy. In Given, L. M. (Ed.), *The sage encyclopedia of qualitative research methods, 1 & 2*, 252-253. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore. SAGE Publications, Inc.
- Heffernan, T., Todorow, M., & Luu, H. (2015, July 7). *Why Housing First won't end homelessness*. Retrieved from <http://rabble.ca/blogs/bloggers/views-expressed/2015/07/why-housing-first-wont-end-homelessness>
- Henwood, B. F., Shinn, M., Tsemberis, S., Padgett, D. K. (2013). Examining provider perspectives within housing first and traditional programs. *American Journal of Psychiatric Rehabilitation*, 16(4), 262-274. doi: 10.1080/15487768.2013.847745
- Herod, A. (2014). O conhecimento geográfico sobre os trabalhadores: Reflexões sobre as pesquisas nos estados unidos e Brasil | Geographical scholarship on workers: Reflections in the field in the United States and Brazil. *Revista Pegada Eletrônica*, (15), 2-41.
- Herod, A., Rainnie, A., & McGrath-Champ, S. (2007). Working space: Why incorporating the geographical is central to theorizing work and employment practices. *Work, Employment & Society*, 21(2), 247-264. doi: 10.1177/0950017007076633
- Herod, A., & Wright, M. W. (2002). Placing Scale: An Introduction. In Herod, A., & Wright, M. W. (Eds.), *Geographies of power: Placing scale*. Malden, Massachusetts; Oxford, United Kingdom: Blackwell Publishers.
- Hiebert, D., D'Addario, S., Sherrell, K., & Chan, S. (2005). **The profile of absolute and relative homelessness among immigrants, refugees, and refugee claimants in the GVRD: Final Report**. Vancouver, British Columbia: MOSAIC. Retrieved from <http://www.urbancentre.utoronto.ca/pdfs/elibrary/HLN-among-Immigrants-Vancou.pdf>
- Hope, J. (2015, November 20). Long-term affordable housing strategy update [PowerPoint slides]. Presented at the Ontario West Municipal Conference, London, Ontario. *Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing (MMAF)*. Retrieved from <https://www.amo.on.ca/AMO-PDFs/Events/15OWMC/LongTermAffordableHousingStrategy.aspx>
- Housing Services Corporation. (2014). *Canada's Social and Affordable Housing Landscape: A Province-to-Province Overview*. Toronto, Ontario: Housing Services Corporation. Retrieved from [531-Canada-Social-Housing-Landscape\\_2014.pdf](531-Canada-Social-Housing-Landscape_2014.pdf)
- Hubbard, H. (1968). Five Long Hot Summers and How They Grew. *Public Interest* 12 (Summer), 3-24.

- Hughes, R. (2008). Telephone Interviews. In Given, L. M. (Ed.), *The sage encyclopedia of qualitative research methods, 1 & 2*, 862-863. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore. SAGE Publications, Inc.
- Hulchanski, J. D. (2005). No homeland for the poor: Houselessness and Canada's unhoused population. Presented at the Canadian Conference on Homelessness, Toronto, May 2005. Retrieved from <http://76.74.229.4/~tdrcnet/resources/public/Report-05-05-20-DH.pdf>
- Hulchanski, J. D. (2006). What Factors Shape Canadian Housing Policy? The Intergovernmental Role in Canada's Housing System. In Young, R., & Leuprecht, C. (Eds.), *Canada, State of the Federation 2004: Municipal - Federal - Provincial Relations*, 221-247. Montreal & Kingston, Ontario: McGill-Queen's University Press. Retrieved from <http://www.ppm-ppm.ca/SOTFS/Hulchanski.pdf>
- Hulchanski, J.D., & Canadian Policy Research Networks. (2002). *Housing policy for tomorrow's cities*. Discussion paper for the Family Network. Ottawa, Ontario: Canadian Policy Research Networks Inc.
- Hurley, Meghan. (2015, March 30). Ottawa to receive \$71M in provincial funding to help prevent homelessness. *Ottawa Citizen*. Retrieved from <http://ottawacitizen.com/news/local-news/ottawa-to-receive-71m-to-help-prevent-homelessness>
- Hwang, S. W., Aubry, T., Palepu, A., Farrel, S., Nisenbaum, R., Hubbley, A. M., ... Chambers, C. (2011). The health and housing in transition study: A longitudinal study of the health of homeless and vulnerably housed adults in three Canadian cities. *International Journal of Public Health*, 56(6), 609-623. doi: 10.1007/s00038-011-0283-3
- Income Security Advocacy Centre (ISAC). (2015, October 1). *OW & ODSP Rates and OCB amounts as of October 2015* [Word Document]. Toronto, ON: Income Security Advocacy Centre. Retrieved from [http://incomesecurity.org/publications/social-assistance-rates/OW\\_and\\_ODSP\\_rates\\_and\\_OCB\\_as\\_of\\_Oct-2015.doc](http://incomesecurity.org/publications/social-assistance-rates/OW_and_ODSP_rates_and_OCB_as_of_Oct-2015.doc)
- Jackson, E. (2015, March 27). City opens \$50K slush fund for homeless drop-in centres. Ottawa, Ontario, Canada: Ottawa West News. Retrieved from <http://www.ottawacommunitynews.com.news-story.5528893-city-opens-50k-slush-fund-for-homeless-drop-in-centres/>
- Jackson, J. (2014, December 4). Mental health, addiction prevalent among the homeless: regional survey. *Cambridge Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.cambridgetimes.ca>
- Jacob, S. A., & Furgerson, S. P. (2012). Writing Interview Protocols and Conducting Interviews: Tips for Students New to the Field of Qualitative Research. *The Qualitative Report*, 17(42), 1-10. Retrieved from <https://nsuworks.nova.edu/tqr/vol17/iss42/3>
- Jacobs, J. M. (2012). Urban geographies I: Still thinking cities relationally. *Progress in Human Geography*, 36(3), 412-422. doi: 10.1177/0309132511421715
- Jenkins, J. C. (1983). Resource mobilization theory and the study of social movements. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 9(1), 527-553. doi: 10.1146/annurev.so.09.080183.002523

- Jensen, D. (2008). Access. In Given, L. M. (Ed.), *The sage encyclopedia of qualitative research methods, 1 & 2*, 2-3. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore. SAGE Publications, Inc.
- Jessop, B., Brenner, N., & Jones, M. (2008). Theorizing socio-spatial relations. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 26(3), 389-401. doi: 10.1068/d9107
- Johnsen, S., Cloke, P., & May, J. (2005). Day centre for homeless people: Spaces of care or fear? *Social & Cultural Geography*, 6(6), 787-811. doi 10.1080/14649360500353004
- Johnson, J. M. (2008). Existentialism. In Given, L. M. (Ed.), *The sage encyclopedia of qualitative research methods, 1 & 2*, 318-321. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore. SAGE Publications, Inc.
- Julien, H. (2008). Content Analysis. In Given, L. M. (Ed.), *The sage encyclopedia of qualitative research methods, 1 & 2*, 120-122. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore. SAGE Publications, Inc.
- Juris, J. S. (2004a). *Digital age activism: Anti-corporate globalization and the cultural politics of transnational networking*. PhD. Dissertation. Berkley, California: University of California.
- Juris, J. S. (2004b). Networked social movements: global movements for global justice. In Castells, M. (Ed.), *The network society: A cross-cultural perspective*, 341-362. Cheltenham, United Kingdom; Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Juris, J. S. (2005). Social forums and their margins: Networking logics and the cultural politics of autonomous space. *Ephemera*, 5(2), 253-271.
- Katz, S., & Mayer, M. (1985). 'Gimme shelter': self-help housing struggles within and against the State in New York City and West Berlin. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 9, 15-45.
- Katzenbach, I. (1981). *City Trenches*. New York: Patheon.
- Kauppi, C., O'Grady, B., Schiff, R., Martin, F. and Ontario Municipal Social Services Association. (2017). *Homelessness and Hidden Homelessness in Rural and Northern Ontario*. Guelph, Ontario: Rural Ontario Institute. Retrieved from <http://www.ruralontarioinstitute.ca/file.aspx?id=ae34c456-6c9f-4c95-9888-1d9e1a81ae9a>
- Kearns, R. (2000). Being there: research through observing and participating. In Hay, I. (Ed.), *Qualitative Research Methods in Human Geography*, 103-121. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kirnishni, T. (2015, April 23). Pilot project's Ottawa survey aims to 'triage' city's homeless. Ottawa, Ontario, Canada: Ottawa Citizen. Retrieved from <http://ottawacitizen.com/news/local-news/pilot-projects-ottawa-survey-aims-triage-citys-homeless>
- Kirnishni, T. (2015, April 24). Survey offers glimpse of face of homelessness in Ottawa. Ottawa Citizen. Retrieved from <http://ottawacitizen.com/news/local-news/survey-offers-glimpse-of-face-of-homelessness-in-ottawa>

- Kitchin, R. (2009). Space II. In Kitchin, R., & Thrift, N. (Eds.), *International Encyclopedia of Human Geography*, 268-275. Maynooth: Elsevier Ltd.
- Kitchin, R., & Tate, N. (1999). *Conducting Research in Human Geography: Theory, Methodology and Practice*. Harlow, England: Pearson Education.
- Kitchin, R., & Tate, N. J. (2000). *Conducting research in human geography: Theory, methodology and practice*. New York; Harlow: Prentice Hall.
- Klandermans, B., & Goslinga, S. (1996). Media discourse, movement publicity, and the generation of collective action frames: theoretical and empirical exercises in meaning construction. See McAdam et al (1996). 312-37.
- Klandermans, B., & Oegema, D. (1987). Potentials, networks, motivations, and barriers: Steps towards participation in social movements. *American Sociological Review*, 52(4), 519-531.
- Klodawsky, F. (2006). Landscapes on the Margins: Gender and Homelessness in Canada. *Gender, Place & Culture*, 13(4), 365-381. doi: 10.1080/09663690600808478
- Klodawsky, F. (2007). ‘Choosing’ participatory research: Partnerships in space – time. *Environment and Planning A*, 39(12), 2845-2860. doi: 10.1068/a3996
- Klodawsky, F. (2009). Home spaces and rights to the city: Thinking social justice for chronically homeless women. *Urban Geography*, 30(6), 591-610. doi: 10.2747/0272-3638.30.6.591
- Klodawsky, F. (2013). Ending homelessness in Ottawa, Canada: Right to housing and right to the city. In Boniburini, I., Moretto, L., Smith, H., & Le Maire, J. (Eds.) *The right to the city. The city as common good. Between social politics and urban planning*, 157-176. Cahier de La Cambre, Bruxelles: La Lettre volée. Retrieved from [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/269093435\\_ENDING\\_HOMELESSNESS\\_IN\\_OTTAWA\\_CANADA\\_RIGHT\\_TO\\_HOUSING\\_AND\\_RIGHT\\_TO\\_THE\\_CITY](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/269093435_ENDING_HOMELESSNESS_IN_OTTAWA_CANADA_RIGHT_TO_HOUSING_AND_RIGHT_TO_THE_CITY)
- Klodawsky, F., Aubry, T., Nemiroff, R., Bonetta, C., & Willis, A. (2009). A Longitudinal Approach to Research on Homelessness [e-book]. In F. H. Canada, D. J. Hulchanski, P. Campsie, S. Chau, S. Hwang, & E. Paradis (Eds.). Toronto: Cities Centre, University of Toronto. Retrieved from [www.homelesshub.ca/FindingHome](http://www.homelesshub.ca/FindingHome)
- Klodawsky, F., & Evans, L. (2014). Homelessness on the Federal Agenda: Progressive Architecture but No Solution in Sight. *Canada in Cities: the Politics and Policy of Federal-Local Governance*, 75-101. Graham, K.A., & Andrew, C. (Eds.) Montreal and Kingston, Ontario: McGill-Queens University Press.
- Klodawsky, F., Farrell, S., & D'Aubry, T. (2002). Images of homelessness in Ottawa: Implications for local politics. *Canadian Geographer / Le Géographe Canadien*, 46(2), 126-143. doi: 10.1111/j.1541-0064.2002.tb00735.x
- Klodawsky, F., Siltanen, J., & Andrew, C. (2013). Urban contestation in a feminist register. *Urban Geography*, 34(4), 541-559. doi: 10.1080/02723638.2013.799316

- Klodawsky, F., Young, M., Aubry, T., Nicholson, C., & Behnia, B. (2005). THE PANEL STUDY ON HOMELESSNESS: Secondary data analysis of responses of study participants whose country of origin is not Canada. *Canadian Issues*, 123.
- Knoke, D. & Wisely, D. (1990). Social Movements. In Knoke, P. (Ed.), *Political networks: The structural perspective*, 57-84. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Kothari, M., United Nations Human Rights Council, & United Nations. General Assembly. (2009). *Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development: Report of the special rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living, and on the right to non-discrimination in this context*. New York, New York: United Nations General Assembly.
- Kriesi, H. (1996). The organizational structure of new social movements in a political context. In McAdam, D., McCarthy, J., & Zald, M. (Eds.), *Comparative perspectives on social movements*, 152-184. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
- Kuhn, R., & Culhane, D. P. (1998). Applying cluster analysis to test a typology of homelessness by pattern of shelter utilization: Results from the analysis of administrative data. *American Journal of Community Psychology*, 26(2), 207-232. doi: 10.1023/A:1022176402357
- Kurtz, H. E. (2003). Scale frames and counter-scale frames: Constructing the problem of environmental injustice. *Political Geography*, 22(8), 887-916. doi: 10.1016/j.polgeo.2003.09.001
- Lacey, J. (2011). Turkish Islam in Ireland: Exploring the modus operandi of Fethullah Gülen's neo-brotherhood. In Cosgrove, O., Cox, L., Kuhling, C., & Mulholland, P. (Eds.), *Ireland's New Religious Movements*, 337-357. Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
- Laforest, R., & Orsini, M. (2005). Evidence-based engagement in the voluntary sector: Lessons from Canada. *Social Policy & Administration*, 39(5), 481-497. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9515.2005.00451.x
- Larimer, M. E., Malone, D. K., Garner, M. D., Atkins, D. C., Burlingham, B., Lonczak, H. S., ... Marlatt, G. A. (2009). Health care and public service use and costs before and after provision of housing for chronically homeless persons with severe alcohol problems. *Jama*, 301(13), 1349-1357. doi: 10.1001/jama.2009.414
- Larner, W., & Laurie, N. (2010). Travelling technocrats, embodied knowledges : Globalising privatisation in telecoms and water. *Geoforum*, 41(2), 218-226. doi: 10.1016/j.geoforum.2009.11.005
- Larsen, S. C. (2008). Place making, grassroots organizing, and rural protest: A case study of Anahim Lake, British Columbia. *Journal of Rural Studies*, 24(2), 172-181. doi: 10.1016/j.jrurstud.2007.12.004
- Latimer, E., Rabouin, D., Méthot, C., McAll, C., Ly, A., Forvil, H., Crocker, A., Poremski, D., Bonin, J-P., Fleury, M-J., & Braithwaite, E. (2014). At Home/Chez Soi Project: Montréal

Site Final Report. Calgary, Alberta. Mental Health Commission of Canada. Retrieved from <http://www.mentalhealthcommission.ca>

Latour, B. (1996). On actor-network theory: A few clarifications. *Soziale Welt*, 47(4), 369-381.

Lawrynuik, S. (2017, January 26). Medicine Hat maintaining homeless-free status 2 years on. *CBC News*. Retrieved from [www.cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/medicine-hat-homeless-free-update-1.3949030](http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/medicine-hat-homeless-free-update-1.3949030)

Layton, J., & Shapcott, M. (2008). *Homelessness: How to end the national crisis* (Rev. and updated.). Toronto: Penguin Canada.

Leach, A. (2010). The Roots of Aboriginal Homelessness in Canada. In Burrell, M. (Ed.), *Homelessness and dispossession. Parity*, 23(9). Canada; Australia.

Leeds, R. (1964). The Absorption of Protest: A Working Paper. In Cooper, W. W., Leavitt, H. J., & Shelly II., M. W. (Eds.), *New perspectives in organizational research*, 115-135. New York: Wiley.

Leitner, H. (2004). The politics of scale and networks of spatial connectivity: Transnational interurban networks and the rescaling of political governance in Europe. In Sheppard, E. S., & McMaster, R. B. (Eds.), *Scale and geographic inquiry: Nature, society, and method*. Oxford; Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers.

Leitner, H., & Sheppard, E. (2002). "The city is dead, long live the net": Harnessing European interurban networks for a neoliberal agenda. In Brenner, N., & Theodore, N. (Eds.), *Space of neoliberalism: Urban restructuring in North America and Western Europe*, 148-171. Oxford; Malden, Massachusetts. Blackwell Publishers.

Leitner, H., & Sheppard, E. (forthcoming/2009). The Spatiality of Contentious Politics: More than a Politics of Scale. In Mahon, R., & Keil, R. (Eds.), *Leviathan Undone? Towards a political economy of scale*, 231-245. Vancouver: UBC Press.

Leopold, J., & Foster, L. (2015, March 24). *A data-driven approach doesn't have to be impersonal*. Retrieved from <https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/data-driven-approach-doesnt-have-be-impersonal>

Leopold, J., & Ho, H. (2015). *Evaluation of the 100,000 homes campaign* [Research Report]. Urban Institute.

Leventhal, G. L. (2017). *The Stubborn Persistence of Homelessness* (Doctoral dissertation).

Liberal Party of Canada. (c.2018). Liberal Party of Canada: Affordable Housing [webpage]. Retrieved from <https://www.liberal.ca/realchange/affordable-housing/>

Liberal Party of Canada. (c.2018). Liberal Party of Canada: Syrian Refugees [webpage]. Retrieved from <https://www.liberal.ca/>

Lipsky, M. (1968). Protest as a Political Resource. *American Political science Review* 62, 1144-58.

Lynch, O. (1969). *The Politics of Untouchability*. New York: Columbia University Press.

- Lynch, O. (1974). Political mobilization and ethnicity among Adi-Dravidas in a Bombay slum. *Economic and Political Weekly* July-September, 1657-1668.
- Macmillan, R., & Scott, A. (2003). On the case? Dilemmas of collaborative research. *Area*, 35(1), 101-105. doi: 10.1111/1475-4762.00115
- Mahdi, A., & Carleton University. Theses and Dissertations. Geography. (2015). *The everyday health geographies of bhutanese and nepalese migrants in Ottawa: Health, wellbeing and therapeutic networks*. Ottawa, Ontario.
- Mahon, R., & Keil, R. (2009). Introduction. In Mahon, R., & Keil, R. (Eds.), *Leviathan Undone? Towards a political economy of scale*, 3-23. Vancouver: UBC Press.
- Maracle, Y., Mayo, S., & McCormack, C. (2015). Profile of Hamilton's Aboriginal Residents. Hamilton, Ontario: Social Planning and Research Council of Hamilton. Retrieved from <http://www.sprc.hamilton.on.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Profile-of-Hamiltons-Aboriginal-Residents.pdf>
- Mares, A. S., & Rosenheck, R. A. (2007). HUD/HHS/VA Collaborative Initiative to Help End Chronic Homelessness, National Performance Outcomes Assessment: Preliminary Client Outcomes Report. Washington, DC: VA Northeast Program Evaluation Center. Retrieved from <https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/180371/report.pdf>
- Marketwired. (2015, June 25). Supreme court slams door shut on Canada's Housing Crisis. Toronto, Ontario. Marketwire & West Corporation. Retrieved from [http://www.marketwired.com/printer\\_friendly?id=2033162](http://www.marketwired.com/printer_friendly?id=2033162)
- Martin, D. G. (2003). "Place-framing" as place-making: Constituting a neighborhood for organizing and activism. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 93(3), 730-750. doi: 10.1111/1467-8306.9309011
- Marwell, G., & Oliver, P. (1984). Collective action theory and social movements research. In Kriesberg, L. (Ed.), *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change*, (7), 1-27. Greenwich, Connecticut: JAI Press Inc.
- Massey, D. (1984). Introduction: Geography Matters. In Massey, D., & Allen, J. (Eds.), *Geography matters! A reader*. 1-11. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Massey, D. (1992). Politics and space/time. *New Left Review*, (196), 65-84.
- Massey, D. B. (1994). A Global Sense of Place. In *Space, place, and gender*, 146-156. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
- Matthews, D. (c.2018). Realizing our potential: Ontario's Poverty Reduction Strategy (2014-2019) [webpage]. *Queen's Printer for Ontario*. Retrieved from <http://www.ontario.ca/page/realizing-our-potential-ontarios-poverty-reduction-strategy-2014-2019-all>
- Matthews, D., McMeekin, T., Canadian Electronic Library (Firm), Ontario. Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, & Expert Advisory Panel on Homelessness (Ontario). (2015). *A place to call home: Report of the expert advisory panel on homelessness*. Toronto, Ontario: Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing.

- May, J. (2002). Of nomads and vagrants: Single homelessness and narratives of home as place. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 18(6), 737-759. doi: 10.1068/d203t
- McCann, E. J. (2008). Expertise, truth, and urban policy mobilities: Global circuits of knowledge in the development of Vancouver, Canada's 'four pillar' drug strategy. *Environment and Planning A*, 40(4), 885-904. doi: 10.10688/a38456
- McCann, E. (2011). Urban policy mobilities and global circuits of knowledge: Toward a research agenda. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 101(1), 107-130. doi: 10.1080/00045608/00045608.2010.520219
- McCann, E., & Ward, K. (2010). Relationality/territoriality: Toward a conceptualization of cities in the world. *Geoforum*, 41(2), 175-184. doi: 10.1016/j.geoforum.2009.06.006
- McCann, E., & Ward, K. (2012). Assembling urbanism: Following policies and 'Studying through' the sites and situations of policy making. *Environment and Planning A*, 44(1), 42-51. doi: 10.1068/a44178
- McCarthy, J. (1996). Mobilizing structures: constraints and opportunities in adopting, adapting, and inventing. In McAdam, D., McCarthy, J., & Zald, M. (Eds.), *Comparative perspectives on social movements*, 141-151. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
- McCarthy, J. D., Smith, J., Zald, M. N. (1996). Assessing public media, electoral, and governmental agendas. See McAdam et al 1996, 291-311.
- McCarthy, J. D., & Zald, M. N. (1977). Resource mobilization and social movements: A partial theory. *American Journal of Sociology*, 82(6), 1212-1241. doi: 10.1086/226464
- McFarlane, C. (2009). Translocal assemblages: Space, power and social movements. *Geoforum*, 40(4), 561-567. doi: 10.1016/j.geoforum.2009.05.003
- McKechnie, L. E. F. (2008). Observational Research. In Given, L. M. (Ed.), *The sage encyclopedia of qualitative research methods*, 1 & 2, 573-575. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore. SAGE Publications, Inc.
- Metro. (2015, April 19). Alliance to End Homelessness aims to house 20,000 people by 2018. Retrieved from [www.metronews.ca](http://www.metronews.ca)
- Miller, B. A. (2000). *Geography and social movements: Comparing antinuclear activism in the Boston area*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Miller, B. A., & Martin, D. (2000). "Missing Geography: Social Movements on the Head of a Pin?" In *Geography and Social Movements: Comparing Antinuclear Activism in the Boston Area*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Mills, M. C. (2008). Comparative Research. In Given, L. M. (Ed.), *The sage encyclopedia of qualitative research methods*, 1 & 2, 100-103. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore. SAGE Publications, Inc.

- Mitchell, D. (1997). The annihilation of space by law: The roots and implications of anti-homeless laws in the United States. *Antipode*, 29(3), 303-335. doi: 10.1111/1467-8330.00048
- Morgan, D. L., & Guevara, H. (2008). Rapport. In Given, L. M. (Ed.), *The sage encyclopedia of qualitative research methods, 1 & 2*, 728-729. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore. SAGE Publications, Inc.
- Morgan, N. (2010). *Room to grow: Meeting the housing needs of homeless youth*. Centre for Addiction and Mental Health.
- Morris, A., & Staggenborg, S. (2004). Leadership in Social Movements. In Snow, D., Soule, S., & Kriesi, H. (Eds.), *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*. Oxford: Blackwell, 171-196.
- Munro, E. R., Holmes, L. and Ward, H. (2005). 'Researching Vulnerable Groups: Ethical Issues and the Effective Conduct of Research in Local Authorities', *British Journal of Social Work*, 35(7), 1023-38.
- Murdoch, J. (1997). Towards a geography of heterogeneous associations. *Progress in Human Geography*, 21(3), 321-337. doi: 10.1191/030913297668007261
- News Staff. (2014, November 30). Waterloo Region the first community to participate in Canada-wide campaign to battle homelessness. Retrieved from [www.570news.com](http://www.570news.com)
- Nicholls, W. J. (2007). The geographies of social movements. *Geography Compass*, 1(3), 607-622. doi: 10.1111/j.1749-8198.2007.00014.x
- Nicholls, W. (2009). Place, networks, space: Theorising the geographies of social movements. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 34(1), 78-93. doi: 10.1111/j.1475-5661.2009.00331.x
- Noble, A., Pettes, T., Boros, C., Raising the Roof (Organization), & Canadian Electronic Library (Firm). (2015). *Beyond housing first: A holistic response to family homelessness in Canada*. Toronto, Ontario: Raising the Roof.
- Nolan, D. (2015, March 21). Hamilton joins program to house 20,000 homeless. *The Hamilton Spectator*. Retrieved from <http://www.pressreader.com/canada/the-hamilton-spectator/20150321/281616713857336>
- Novac, S., Canadian Housing and Renewal Association, & Status of Women Canada. (2002). On Her Own: Young Women and Homelessness in Canada. *Policy Research*. Ottawa, Ontario: Status of Women Canada. Retrieved from [http://ywcacanada.ca/data/research\\_docs/00000271.pdf](http://ywcacanada.ca/data/research_docs/00000271.pdf)
- Novac, S., & National Clearinghouse on Family Violence (Canada). (2006). *Family Violence and Homelessness: A Review of the Literature*. Ottawa, Ontario: National Clearinghouse on Family Violence.
- O'Grady, B., Gaetz, S., & Buccieri, K. (2011). *Can I see your ID? The policing of youth homelessness in Toronto*. Toronto, Ontario: JFCY & Homeless Hub. Retrieved from [http://www.homelesshub.ca/sites/default/files/CanISeeYourID\\_nov9.pdf](http://www.homelesshub.ca/sites/default/files/CanISeeYourID_nov9.pdf)

- O'Grady, B., Gaetz, S., & Buccieri, K. (2013). Tickets ... and more tickets: A case study of the enforcement of the Ontario Safe Streets Act. *Canadian Public Policy / Analyse De Politiques*, 39(4), 541-558. doi: 10.3138/CPP.39.4.541
- Omvedt, G. (1985). After the failures, a 'new-style communism'. *The Guardian* 27 March, 17.
- Ontario. (2016, March 31). Poverty reduction strategy (2015 annual report) [webpage]. Retrieved from <https://www.ontario.ca/page/poverty-reduction-strategy-2015-annual-report>
- Ontario, & Canadian Electronic Library (Firm). (2008). *Breaking the Cycle: Ontario's Poverty Reduction Strategy 2009-2013*. Toronto, Ontario: Ontario.
- Ontario, & Canadian Electronic Library (Firm). (2014). *Realizing our potential: Ontario's poverty reduction strategy 2014-2019*. Toronto, Ontario: Ontario.
- Oommen, T. K. (1975). Agrarian legislations and movements as sources of change. *Economic and Political Weekly* 19(49), 2078-2083.
- Oommen, T.K. (1997). From mobilization to institutionalization: the life cycle of an agrarian labour movement in Kerala. In Malik, S. C. (ed.), *Dissent, Protest and Reform in Indian Civilization*. 286-302. Delhi: Delhi University Press.
- OrgCode & Community Solutions (n.d.). The SPDAT and VI-SPDAT: Tools Grounded in Evidence [PDF file]. 1-8. Retrieved from:  
[http://ceslosangeles.weebly.com/uploads/1/2/2/1/1221685/spdat\\_vi-spdat\\_evidence\\_brief\\_final.pdf](http://ceslosangeles.weebly.com/uploads/1/2/2/1/1221685/spdat_vi-spdat_evidence_brief_final.pdf)
- Ostroff, J. (2015, August 13). Canada Could End Homelessness. And It'll Only Cost You \$46 A Year. Canada: Huffington Post. Retrieved from  
[http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/08/13/housing-first-federal-election\\_n\\_7949510.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/08/13/housing-first-federal-election_n_7949510.html)
- Özdemir, B. P. (2012). Social media as a tool for online advocacy campaigns: Greenpeace Mediterranean's anti genetically engineered food campaign in Turkey. *Global Media Journal: Canadian Edition*, 5(2), 23-39.
- Pearson, M. (2015, February 8). Centretown homeless provider loses funding, fears future. Ottawa, Ontario, Canada: Ottawa Citizen. Retrieved from  
<http://ottawacitizen.com/news/local-news/centretown-homeless-provider-loses-funding-fears-future>
- Pearson, M. (2015, February 25). Odawa protest demands cash for homeless drop-in program (with video). Ottawa, Ontario, Canada: Ottawa Citizen. Retrieved from  
<http://ottawacitizen.com/news/local-news/odawa-protest-demands-cash-for-homeless-drop-in-program>
- Pearson, M. (2015, March 25). City restores Sen Mile, and other council news. Ottawa, Ontario, Canada: Ottawa Citizen. Retrieved from <http://ottawacitizen.com/news/local-news/what-happened-at-ottawa-city-council-2>

- Pearson, C. L. (2007). The applicability of Housing First models to homeless persons with serious mental illness [Final report]. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and Research.
- Peck, J., & Theodore, N. (2001). Exporting welfare/importing welfare-to-work: Exploring the politics of third way policy transfer. *Political Geography*, 20(4), 427-460. doi: 10.1016/S0962-6298(00)00069-X
- Peck, J., & Theodore, N. (2010). Mobilizing policy: Models, methods, and mutations. *Geoforum*, 41(2), 169-174. doi: 10.1016/j.geoforum.2010.01.002
- Peck, J., & Theodore, N. (2012). Follow the policy: A distended case approach. *Environment and Planning A*, 44(1), 21-30. doi: 10.1068/a44179
- Peck, J., & Tickell, A. (2002). Neoliberalizing space. *Antipode*, 34(3), 380-404. doi: 10.1111/1467-8330.00247
- Peet, R., & Thrift, N., & Taylor & Francis Group. (1989; 2003). In Peet, R. & Thrift, N. (Eds.), *New Models in Geography*, (1), 3-29. London: Routledge. doi: 10.4324/9780203036358
- Peressini, T., McDonald, L., & Hulchanski, D. (2010). Towards a Strategy for Counting the Homeless. In: Hulchanski, J. D., Campsie, P., Chau, S., Hwang, S., & Paradis, E. (Eds.), *Finding Home: Policy Options for Addressing Homelessness in Canada* [e-book], 1-24. Toronto, Ontario: Cities Centre, University of Toronto. Retrieved from: <http://homelesshub.ca/sites/default/files/8.3%20Peressini%20et%20al%20Counting%20the%20Homeless.pdf>
- Perlman, J., & Parvensky, J. (2006). Denver housing first collaborative cost benefits analysis and program outcomes report. *Colorado coalition for the Homeless*. Retrieved from [https://shnny.org/uploads/Supportive\\_Housing\\_in\\_Denver.pdf](https://shnny.org/uploads/Supportive_Housing_in_Denver.pdf)
- Peters, E. (2012). 'I like to let them have their time'. Hidden homeless First Nations people in the city and their management of household relationships. *Social & Cultural Geography*, 13(4), 321-338. doi: 10.1080/14649365.683805
- Peters, E., & Craig, S. (2016). *Aboriginal homelessness in Flin Flon, Manitoba*. Research report. Flin Flon, Manitoba: Canadian Centre for Policy Research. Retrieved from <http://ion.uwinnipeg.ca/~epeters/Flin%20Fion%20Final%20Report-2.pdf>
- Peters, E., & Robillard, V. (2007). *Service Needs and Perspectives of Hidden Homeless First Nations People in Prince Albert*. Research report. Saskatoon, Saskatchewan: Department of Geography, University of Saskatchewan. Retrieved from <http://ion.uwinnipeg.ca/~epeters/Services%20report%20to%20PAGC.pdf>
- Peters, E. J., & Robillard, V. (2009). "Everything You Want is There": The Place of the Reserve in First Nations' Homeless Mobility. *Urban Geography*, 30(6), 652-680. doi: 10.2747/0272-3638.30.6.652
- Pfaff, J. (2010). A mobile phone: Mobility, materiality and everyday Swahili trading practices. *Cultural Geographies*, 17(3), 341-357. doi: 10.1177/1474474010368606

- Plano Clark, V. L. (2008). In-Person Interview. In Given, L. M. (Ed.), *The sage encyclopedia of qualitative research methods, 1 & 2*, 432. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore. SAGE Publications, Inc.
- Pleace, N., & Bretherton, J. (2012). What do we mean by housing first? Categorizing and critically assessing the housing first movement from a European perspective. Presented at the European Network for Housing Research. Retrieved from [https://www.york.ac.uk/media/chp/ENHR\\_HF\\_paper\\_Nicholas%20&%20Jo.pdf](https://www.york.ac.uk/media/chp/ENHR_HF_paper_Nicholas%20&%20Jo.pdf)
- Polvere, L., MacLeod, T., Macnaughton, E., Caplan, R., Piat, M., Melson, G., Gaetz, S., & Goering, P. (2014). Canadian Housing First Toolkit: The At Home/Chez Soi experience. *Calgary and Toronto: Mental Health Commission of Canada and the Homeless Hub*.
- Pomeroy, S. (2005). The cost of homelessness: Analysis of alternate responses in four Canadian cities [final report]. Prepared for the National Secretariat on Homelessness. Ottawa, Ontario. Retrieved from <http://homelesshub.ca/resource/cost-homelessness-analysis-alternate-responses-four-canadian-cities>
- Ponciano, C. (2014, December 18). Region's survey highlights problem of homelessness. *Elmira Independent*. Retrieved from <https://www.southwesternontario.ca>
- Population Health Interventions Research to End Homelessness (PHIR). (2015, February 4). Draft Report: Barriers and Facilitators to Plan Success [Word Document].
- Poudel, M., & Luintel, T. R. (2003). Strategies and Practices of Advocacy: Gender Advocacy against Trafficking in Women in Nepal. *Occasional Papers in Sociology and Anthropology*, 8, 59-76. Retrieved from [https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/1810/229180/OPSA\\_08\\_05.pdf?sequence=2](https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/1810/229180/OPSA_08_05.pdf?sequence=2)
- Press, J. (2016, March 18). Budget will build up affordable housing, sources say. *CTV News*. Retrieved from <https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/budget-will-build-up-affordable-housing-sources-say-1.2823465>
- Pushor, D. (2008). Collaborative Research. In Given, L. M. (Ed.), *The sage encyclopedia of qualitative research methods, 1 & 2*, 91-94. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore. SAGE Publications, Inc.
- Race, R. (2008). Education, Qualitative Research In. In Given, L. M. (Ed.), *The sage encyclopedia of qualitative research methods, 1 & 2*, 240-243. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore. SAGE Publications, Inc.
- Radio-Canada. (2015, April 23). Towards a more accurate picture of homelessness in Ottawa. Retrieved from <https://ici.radio-canada.ca>
- Ramutsindela, M. (2009). Social Movements. In Kitchin, R., & Thrift, N. (Eds.), *International Encyclopedia of Human Geography*, 199-203. Rondebosch: Elsevier Ltd.
- Region of Waterloo. (n.d.). *2015 Program Budgets* [PDF]. Kitchener, ON: Regional Municipality of Waterloo.

Region of Waterloo. (2007, November). All Roads Lead to Home: A Homelessness to Housing Stability Strategy for Waterloo Region. Region of Waterloo, Ontario, Canada. Retrieved from  
[http://communityservices.regionofwaterloo.ca/en/communityPlanningPartnerships/resources/Attachment\\_Strategy\\_2012\\_PDF.pdf#Attachment\\_Strategy\\_2012\\_PDF.pdf](http://communityservices.regionofwaterloo.ca/en/communityPlanningPartnerships/resources/Attachment_Strategy_2012_PDF.pdf#Attachment_Strategy_2012_PDF.pdf)

Region of Waterloo. (2014, December 4). Waterloo Region Registry Week 20K Homes [Video File]. Retrieved from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=may3LtU2EiA>

Region of Waterloo. (2015, August 14). Waterloo Region 20,000 Homes Campaign [Video File]. Retrieved from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4TUQLuizQRI>

Region of Waterloo, Housing Services. (2014, November). *Homelessness to Housing Stability Strategy Action Framework: Progress Highlights (2011-2013)*, 1-27. Waterloo, Ontario: Regional Municipality of Waterloo. doi: 1595686

Region of Waterloo, Housing Services. (2014, November 24). Waterloo Region first community in Canada to pilot 20,000 Homes Campaign. Retrieved from  
<https://www.regionofwaterloo.ca/Modules/News/index.aspx?feedId=b6f610d4-8cd7-46ef-91d9-c3d317618f5c&newsId=266582f3-2e15-4558-96ff-b6f7f924db53>

Region of Waterloo, Community Services, Housing Services. (2015, August). Out of the Cold (OOTC) Transition: Final 2014/2015 Evaluation Report [PDF File]. Waterloo, ON: Regional Municipality of Waterloo.

Region of Waterloo, Community Services, Housing Services. (2015, August 11). Media release: Out of the Cold (OOTC) Transition: Final 2014/15 Evaluation Report [PDF File]. 1-8. Waterloo, ON: Regional Municipality of Waterloo.

Region of Waterloo, Housing Services. (2015, November 2). *20K Homes Campaign Waterloo Region: CAEH National Conference on Ending Homelessness* [PDF]. 1-12. Kitchener, ON: Regional Municipality of Waterloo. doi: 1741355

Region of Waterloo, Housing Services. (n.d.). *Housing Stability Data Summary (HSDS) 2014/2015* [PDF]. 1-2. Kitchener, ON: Regional Municipality of Waterloo. Revised July 1, 2015. Report: 1901719

Region of Waterloo, Housing Services. (n.d.). *Housing Stability Data Summary (HSDS) 2015/2016* [PDF]. 1-2. Kitchener, ON: Regional Municipality of Waterloo. Report: 2173996

Region of Waterloo, Housing Services. (n.d.). Registry Week Budget [Excel spreadsheet]. Retrieved from [http://www.20khomes.ca/wp-content/uploads/3-Registry\\_Week\\_Budget\\_Waterloo.xlsx](http://www.20khomes.ca/wp-content/uploads/3-Registry_Week_Budget_Waterloo.xlsx)

Region of Waterloo, Housing Services. (2014, November 19). *Key Messages for Housing Stability System: Canadian 20,000 Homes Campaign: Waterloo Region Registry Pilot – Why Doing* [Word document]. 1-2. Kitchener, ON: Regional Municipality of Waterloo. doi: 1741355

Region of Waterloo, Housing Services. (2014, November 28). Key Messages: Waterloo Region Registry Pilot for the Canadian 20,000 Homes Campaign, 1-3. Region of Waterloo,

Ontario, Canada. Retrieved January 10, 2017, from [http://www.20khomes.ca/wp-content/uploads/7-Waterloo-General\\_Key\\_Messages\\_for\\_Registry\\_Week.docx](http://www.20khomes.ca/wp-content/uploads/7-Waterloo-General_Key_Messages_for_Registry_Week.docx)

Region of Waterloo, Housing Services. (2014, December 3). *Waterloo Region Registry Week Community Debrief* [PowerPoint]. Kitchener, ON: Regional Municipality of Waterloo. doi: 1738899

Region of Waterloo, Housing Services. (2015, February). *20,000 Homes Campaign Registry Week Pilot* [PowerPoint]. 1-42. Region of Waterloo, ON: Regional Municipality of Waterloo. doi: 1815633

Region of Waterloo, Housing Services. (2015, August). Waterloo Region 20,000 Homes Campaign Registry Week Pilot Report. Waterloo, ON: Regional Municipality of Waterloo. Retrieved from [http://homelesshub.ca/sites/default/files/DOCS\\_ADMIN-%231942440-v1-20K\\_Homes\\_Registry\\_Week\\_Pilot\\_Report\\_August\\_2015....pdf](http://homelesshub.ca/sites/default/files/DOCS_ADMIN-%231942440-v1-20K_Homes_Registry_Week_Pilot_Report_August_2015....pdf)

Rich, A. R., & Clark, C. (2005). Gender differences in response to homelessness services. *Evaluation and Program Planning*, 28(1), 69-81. doi:10.1016/j.evprogplan.2004.05.003

Richter, T. (2015, April 20). *The 20,000 Homes Campaign and the Beginning of the End of Homelessness in Canada*. Alliance to End Homelessness Ottawa. Retrieved from: <http://endhomelessnessottawa.ca/the-20000-homes-campaign-and-the-beginning-of-the-end-of-homelessness-in-canada>

Rorty, R. (1998). Movements and campaigns (A tribute to Irving Howe). *Dissent* 42(1), 55-60.

Rosenheck, R., Kasprow, W., Frisman, L., & Liu-Mares, W. (2003). Cost-effectiveness of supported housing for homeless persons with mental illness. *Archives of General Psychiatry* 60(9), 940-951. doi: 10.1001/archpsyc.60.9.940

Ross, S. (2011). Social unionism in hard times: Union-community coalition politics in the CAW Windsor's "manufacturing matters" campaign. *Labour/Le Travail*, 68, 79-115.

Routledge, P. (1992). Putting politics in its place. *Political Geography*, 11(6), 588-611. doi: 10.1016/0962-6298(92)90058-2

Routledge, P. (1993). *Terrains of resistance: Nonviolent social movements and the contestation of place in India*. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger.

Routledge, P. (2000). Geopoetics of resistance: India's Bajipal movement. *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 25(3), 375-389. doi: 10.1177/030437540002500312

Routledge, P. (2003). Convergence space: Process geographies of grassroots globalization networks. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 28(3), 333-349. doi: 10.1111/1475-5661.00096

Routledge, P., & Cumbers, A. (2009). *Global Justice Networks: Geographies of transnational solidarity*. Manchester, United Kingdom: Manchester University Press.

Rugkåsa, J., & Canvin, K. (2011). Researching mental health in minority ethnic communities: Reflections on recruitment. *Qualitative Health Research*, 21(1), 132-143. doi:10.1177/1049732310379115

- Runnels, V., Hay, E., Sevigny, E., & O'Hara, P. (2009). The ethics of conducting community-engaged homelessness research. *Journal of Academic Ethics*, 7(1-2), 57-68. doi: 10.1007/s10805-009-9083-2
- Sanghera, G. S., & Thapar-Björkert, S. (2008). Methodological dilemmas: Gatekeepers and positionality in Bradford. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 31(3), 543-562. doi:10.1080/01419870701491952
- Saskatoon Indian and Métis Friendship Centre (SIMFC), in partnership with the University of Saskatchewan. (2009). Knowledge sharing by First Nations and Métis homeless people in Saskatoon. Retrieved from [http://ion.uwinnipeg.ca/~epeters/SIMFC\\_Aboriginal\\_Homelessness\\_in\\_Saskatoon\\_FINAL\\_REPORT\\_2009.pdf](http://ion.uwinnipeg.ca/~epeters/SIMFC_Aboriginal_Homelessness_in_Saskatoon_FINAL_REPORT_2009.pdf)
- Saumure, K., & Given, L. M. (2008). Virtual Research. In Given, L. M. (Ed.), *The sage encyclopedia of qualitative research methods*, 1 & 2, 926-929. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore. SAGE Publications, Inc.
- Schatz, D. (2010). Unsettling the politics of exclusion: Aboriginal activism and the Vancouver Downtown East Side. Paper presented for the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association. Retrieved from <https://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2010/Schatz.pdf>
- Schensul, J. J. (2008). Methods. In Given, L. M. (Ed.), *The sage encyclopedia of qualitative research methods*, 1 & 2, 521-526. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore. SAGE Publications, Inc.
- Schneiderman, D. (2002). Chapter 5: The Constitutional Disorder of the Safe Streets Act: A Federalism Analysis. In Hermer, J., & Mosher, J. (Eds.), *Disorderly People: Law and the Politics of Exclusion in Ontario*, 77-90. Halifax: Fernwood Press.
- Schooley, L. (2015, July 7). Odawa native homeless drop-in centre finds the funds to reopen. Ottawa, Ontario, Canada: Metro. Retrieved from <http://www.metronews.ca/news/ottawa/2015/07/07/odawa-native-homeless-drop-in-centre-finds-the-funds-to-reopen.html>
- Seidman, I. (2013). *Interviewing as qualitative research: A guide for researchers in education and the social sciences* (4<sup>th</sup> ed.). New York: Teachers College Press.
- Shapcott, M., & Salazar, R. G. (2006). *Framework for the Blueprint to End Homelessness in Toronto*. Toronto, Ontario: Wellesley Institute. Retrieved from <http://homelesshub.ca/sites/default/files/2th3lhkf.pdf>
- Shapcott, M., & Wellesley Institute. (2008). *Wellesley institute national housing report card 2008: Feds, most provinces fail to meet their commitment to increase affordable housing funding by \$2 billion*. Toronto, Ontario: Wellesley Institute.
- Sheppard, E. (2002). The spaces and times of globalization: Place, scale, networks, and positionality. *Economic Geography*, 78(3), 307-330. doi: 10.1111/j.1944-8287.2002.tb00189.x

- Siltanen, J., Kłodawsky, F., & Andrew, C. (2015). 'This is how I want to live my life': An experiment in prefigurative feminist organizing for a more equitable and inclusive city. *Antipode*, 47(1), 260-279. doi: 10.1111/anti.12092
- Silverman, D. (1993). *Interpreting qualitative data: Methods for analysing talk, text, and interaction*. London; Thousand Oaks [California]: Sage Publications.
- Sixsmith, J., Boneham, M., & Goldring, J. E. (2003). Accessing the community: Gaining insider perspectives from the outside. *Qualitative Health Research*, 13(4), 578-589. doi: 10.1177/1049732302250759
- Skube, M. (2015). *CTV News Ottawa: Homelessness at risk of violence* [Video File]. Retrieved from <https://ottawa.ctvnews.ca/video?clipId=601243>
- Skube, M. (2015, April 27). Combating homelessness with 'housing first' approach. *CTV News Ottawa*. Retrieved from <https://ottawa.ctvnews.ca>
- Smith, N. (1992). Contours of a spatialized politics: Homeless vehicles and the production of geographical scale. *Social Text*, 10(4), 54.
- Smith, N. (1993). Chapter 6: Homeless/global: Scaling places. In Bird, J., & ProQuest (Firm) (Eds.), *Mapping the futures: Local cultures, global change*, 87-120. London; New York: Routledge.
- Snow, D. A., Rochford, E. B., Worden, S. K., & Benford, R. D. (1986). Frame alignment processes, micromobilization, and movement participation. *American Sociological Review*, 51(4), 464-481.
- Snow, D. A., Soule, S. A., & Cress, D. M. (2005). Identifying the precipitants of homeless protest across 17 U.S. cities, 1980 to 1990. *Social Forces*, 83(3), 1183-1210. doi: 10.1353/sof.2005.0048
- Snow, D. A., Zurcher, L. A., & Ekland-Olson, S. (1980). Social networks and social movements: A microstructural approach to differential recruitment. *American Sociological Review*, 45(5), 787-801.
- Sorokin, P. (1962). *Social and Cultural Dynamics*. New Jersey: Free Press.
- Spears, T. (2015, February 4). Odawa native group says funding cuts will force closing of homeless centre. Ottawa, Ontario, Canada: Ottawa Citizen. Retrieved from <http://ottawacitizen.com/news/local-news/odawa-native-group-says-city-cuts-will-force-closing-of-homeless-centre>
- Springer, S. (2000). Homelessness: A proposal for a global definition and classification. *Habitat International*, 24(4), 475-484. doi: 10.1016/S0197-3975(00)00010-2
- Staggenborg, S., & Lecomte, J. (2009). Social movement campaigns: Mobilization and outcomes in the Montreal women's movement community. *Mobilization: An International Journal*, 14(2), 163-180.

- Stanhope, V., & Dunn, K. (2011). The curious case of housing first. The limits of evidence based policy. *International Journal of Law and Psychiatry*, 34(4), 275-282. doi 10.1016/j.ijlp.2011.07.006
- Statistics Canada. (2012). Census metropolitan area of Hamilton, Ontario. *Focus on Geography Series, 2011 Census*. Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 98-310-XWE2011004. Ottawa, Ontario. Analytical products, 2011 Census. Last updated October 24, 2012.
- Statistics Canada. (2012). Census metropolitan area of Kitchener – Cambridge – Waterloo, Ontario. *Focus on Geography Series, 2011 Census*. Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 98-310-XWE2011004. Ottawa, Ontario. Analytical products, 2011 Census. Last updated October 24, 2012.
- Statistics Canada. 2012. Census metropolitan area of Ottawa – Gatineau, Ontario / Quebec. *Focus on Geography Series, 2011 Census*. Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 98-310-XWE2011004. Ottawa, Ontario. Analytical products, 2011 Census. Last updated October 24, 2012.
- Steffen, C. G. (2012). The corporate campaign against homelessness: Class power and urban governance in neoliberal Atlanta, 1973-1988. *Journal of Social History*, 46(1), 170-196. doi: 10.1093/jsh/shs031
- Stergiopoulos, V., O'Campo, P., Hwang, S., Gozdzik, A., Jeyaratnam, J., Misir, V., Nisenbaum, R., Zerger, S., & Kirst, M. (2014). At Home/Chez Soi Project: Toronto Site Final Report. Calgary, Alberta: Mental Health Commission of Canada. Retrieved from: <http://www.mentalhealthcommission.ca>
- Taylor, P. J. (2004). *World city network: A global urban analysis*. London; New York: Routledge. doi: 10.4324/9780203634059
- Temple, B. (2008). Cross-Cultural Research. In Given, L. M. (Ed.), *The sage encyclopedia of qualitative research methods*, 1 & 2, 91-94. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore. SAGE Publications, Inc.
- The Registry. (c.2014). What is the Registry? Retrieved from <http://www.housingregistry.ca/>
- Thomson, M. (2014). *Preventing Homelessness through Mental Health Discharge Planning: Best Practices and Community Partnerships in British Columbia*. M. Thomson Consulting. Retrieved from [http://homelesshub.ca/sites/default/files/Vol3\\_LiteratureReview.pdf](http://homelesshub.ca/sites/default/files/Vol3_LiteratureReview.pdf)
- Thurston, W. E., Turner, D., Milaney, K., Coupal, S., Calgary Homeless Foundation, & Canadian Electronic Library (Firm). (2013). *No Moving Back: A Study on the Intersection of Rural and Urban Homelessness for Aboriginal People in Calgary, Alberta*. Calgary, Alberta: Calgary Homeless Foundation and Aboriginal Friendship Centre of Calgary.
- Tilly, C. (1978). *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing.
- Tilly, C. (2005). *Trust and rule*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

- Tilly, C., & Wood, L. J. (2013). *Social Movements, 1768-2012*. (Third ed.). London: Routledge.
- Tormey, S. (2005). After the party's over: The horizontalist critique of representation and majoritarian democracy – Lessons from the Alter-Globalisation Movement (AGM). *Conference paper presented at the European Consortium on Political Research*, Granada, 2005.
- Toronto (Ont.). Shelter, Support & Housing Administration, & Canadian Electronic Library (Firm). (2007). *What housing first means for people. Results of streets to homes 2007 post-occupancy research*. Toronto, Ontario: Toronto Shelter, Support & Housing Administration.
- Tory, J. & Iveson, D. (2016, September 30). How to tackle the housing crisis in Canada's cities. Toronto, Ontario. *The Globe and Mail*. Retrieved from <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/how-to-tackle-the-housing-crisis-in-canadas-cities/article32151195/>
- Tsemberis, S., & Esienberg, R. F. (2002). Pathways to housing: Supported housing for street-dwelling homeless individuals with psychiatric disabilities. *Psychiatric Services* 51(4), 487-493.
- Tsemberis, S., Gulcur, L., & Nakae, M. (2004). Housing first, consumer choice, and harm reduction for homeless individuals with a dual diagnosis. *American Journal of Public Health*, 94(4), 651-656. doi: 10.2105/AJPH.94.4.651
- Turner. (2012, April 5). Tim Richter resigns as head of Calgary Homeless Foundation.
- Turner, A., Canadian Electronic Library (Firm), & University of Calgary. School of Public Policy. (2014). *Beyond housing first.: Essential elements of a system-planning approach to ending homelessness*. Calgary, Alberta: Scholl of Public Policy, University of Calgary.
- Turner, A., Redman, M., & Gaetz, S. (2017). *Defining & measuring an end to homelessness: Considerations for the National Housing Strategy*. Toronto, Ontario: Canadian Observatory on Homelessness Press. Retrieved from: <http://homelesshub.ca/sites/default/files/TS-AWH-COH-EndingHomelessnessNHS.pdf>
- Turner, R. H. (1969). The Public Perception of Protest. *American Sociological Review* 34 (December), 815-31.
- Tutty, L. M., Canada. Human Resources and Social Development Canada. Homelessness Knowledge Development Program, Canadian Electronic Library (Firm), & RESOLVE Alberta. (2009). *I built my house of hope: Best practices to safely house abused and homeless women*. Calgary, Alberta: RESOLVE Alberta.
- United Nations Statistical Division. (2008). *Homelessness*. Retrieved from [http://www.ohchr.org/\\_layouts/15/WopiFrame.aspx?sourcedoc=/Documents/Issues/Housing/homelessness.pdf&action=default&DefaultItemOpen=1](http://www.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/WopiFrame.aspx?sourcedoc=/Documents/Issues/Housing/homelessness.pdf&action=default&DefaultItemOpen=1)
- U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, (2015, February 2). Assessment tools for allocating homeless assistance: state of the evidence.

U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, (2015, December 3). SNAPS in Focus: Final rule on defining “chronically homeless” Part I: How we got here. Retrieved from <https://www.hudexchange.info/news/snaps-in-focus-final-rule-on-defining-chronically-homeless-part-i-how-we-got-here/>

United Way Ottawa. (2015, April 21). *Preparing for the 20,000 Homes Campaign* [Video File]. Retrieved from [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sHIsc\\_iFXe4](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sHIsc_iFXe4)

United Way Ottawa. (2015, April 22). *Homeless but not faceless: Joey shares his story* [Video File]. Retrieved from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1p8xcHTILm4>

United Way Ottawa. (2015, April 23). *Heather Stearns: Ottawa volunteers unite to learn more about our city's homeless* [Video File]. <https://youtube.com/watch?v=7kxfWg5zJ84>

United Way Ottawa. (2015, April 24). *City-wide survey puts a face to homelessness in Ottawa* [Video File]. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FMLI8MhOTFI>

Valentine, G. (1997). Tell me about...: using interviews as a research methodology. *Methods in human geography: A guide for students doing a research project*, 110-126.

Valentine, G. (2001). *Social geographies: Space and society*. Harlow, Essex. Pearson Education Limited.

van den Hoonaard, W. C. (2008). Ethics Review Process. In Given, L. M. (Ed.), *The sage encyclopedia of qualitative research methods*, 1 & 2, 280-282. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore. SAGE Publications, Inc.

Vannini, P. (2008). Ethics and New Media. In Given, L. M. (Ed.), *The sage encyclopedia of qualitative research methods*, 1 & 2, 277-279. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore. SAGE Publications, Inc.

Veness, A. R. (1993). Neither homed nor homeless: Contested definitions and the personal worlds of the poor. *Political Geography*, 12(4), 319-340. doi. 10.1016/096298(93)90044-8

Villeneuve, C. (2015, March 26). Local drop-in centre under attack: Funding cuts target Ottawa's most marginalized. Ottawa, Ontario, Canada: *The Leveller*. Retrieved from <http://www.leveller.ca/2015/03/drop-in-centre-under-attack/>

Waegemakers Schiff, J., Rook, J., Homeless Hub (Online service), & Canadian Electronic Library (Firm). (2012). *Housing first: Where is the evidence?* Toronto, Ontario: Homeless Hub, University of Calgary, Social Work.

Wagner, D., & Cohen, M. B. (1991). The power of the people Homeless protesters in the aftermath of social movement participation. *Social Problems*, 38(4), 543-561. doi: 10.1525/sp.1991.38.4.03a00090

Waldbrook, N. A., & Queen's University. Theses and Dissertations. (2013). *Homelessness, stable housing, and opportunities for healthy aging: Exploring the relationships*. Kingston, Ontario.

- Walsh, C. A., Hanley, J., Ives, N., & Hordyk, S. R. (2016). Exploring the experiences of newcomer women with insecure housing in Montréal Canada. *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, 17(3), 887-904. doi: 10.1007/s12134-015-0444-y
- Walsh, C., Jackson, N., Bell, M., University of Calgary. Faculty of Social Work, Canada. Employment and Social Development Canada. Homelessness Partnering Strategy, Calgary Homeless Foundation, ... Canadian Electronic Library (Firm). (2014). *Permanent supportive housing for families with multiple needs: A report*. Calgary, Alberta: Calgary Homeless Foundation.
- Walsh, C. A., Rutherford, G. E., & Kuzmak, N. (2009). Characteristics of home. Perspectives of women who are homeless. *The Qualitative Report*, 14(2), 299.
- Walsh, K. (2009). Participant Observation. In Kitchin, R., & Thrift, N. (Eds.), *International Encyclopedia of Human Geography*, 77-81. Brighton, United Kingdom. Elsevier Ltd.
- Walton, J. (1979). Urban political movements and revolutionary change in the Third World. *Urban Affairs Quarterly*, 15(1), 3-22.
- Ward, K. (2008). Editorial—Toward a comparative (re)turn in urban studies? Some reflections. *Urban Geography*, 29(5), 405-410. doi:10.2747/0272-3638.29.5.405
- Ward, K. (2010). Towards a relational comparative approach to the study of cities. *Progress in Human Geography*, 34(4), 471-487. doi: 10.1177/0309132509350239
- Wayland, S. V., Canadian Housing and Renewal Association, & Canadian Electronic Library (Firm). (2007). *The housing needs of immigrants and refugees in Canada: A background paper* (Final version. ed.). Ottawa, Ontario: Canadian Housing and Renewal Association.
- Wekerle, G. R., Sandberg, L. A., & Gilbert, L. (2009). Regional Resistance in an Exurban Region: Intersections of the Politics of Place and the Politics of Scale. In Mahon, R., & Keil, R. (Eds.), *Leviathan Undone? Towards a political economy of scale*, 247-264. Vancouver: UBC Press.
- Whitzman, C. (2006). At the intersection of invisibilities: Canadian women, homelessness and health outside the ‘big city’. *Gender, Place & Culture*, 13(4), 383-399. doi: 10.1080/09663690600808502
- Whitzman, C. (2007). The Loneliness of the Long-Distance Runner: Long-Term Feminist Planning Initiatives in London, Melbourne, Montréal and Toronto. *Planning Theory & Practice*, 8(2), 205-227. doi: 10.1080/14649350701324433
- Wiebe, P. (1975). *Social Life in an Indian Slum*. New Delhi: Vikas.
- Williams, J. C. (2005). The politics of homelessness: Shelter now and political protest. *Political Research Quarterly*, 58(3), 497-509. doi: 10.2307/3595618
- Windigo, D. (2015, May 26). *Hamilton's Native Women's Centre Shuts Down Transitional Housing Program* [Video File]. National News. Retrieved from <http://aptnews.ca/2015/05/26/hamiltons-native-womens-centre-shuts-transitional-housing-program/>

Windland, D., Gaetz, S., & Patton, T. (2011). Family Matters - Homeless youth and Eva's Initiatives "Family Reconnect" Program. Toronto, Ontario: The Canadian Homelessness Research Network Press. Retrieved from  
[http://homelesshub.ca/sites/default/files/FamilyMatters\\_April2011.pdf](http://homelesshub.ca/sites/default/files/FamilyMatters_April2011.pdf)

Wolford, W. (2004). This land is ours now: Spatial imaginaries and the struggle for land in Brazil. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 94(2), 409-424. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8306.2004.09402015.x

Woolley, E. (2015, January 23). *Why is homelessness still a problem?* Toronto, Ontario: Canadian Observatory on Homelessness/Homeless Hub: York University. Retrieved from <http://homelesshub.ca/blog/why-homelessness-still-problem>

World Habitat. (c.2017). *Introducing the European End Street Homelessness Campaign Toolkit* [Webpage]. Retrieved from <https://www.world-habitat.org/our-programmes/homelessness/campaign-toolkit/>

Zald, M. N., & Berger, M. A. (1978). Social movements in organizations: Coup d'etat, insurgency, and mass movements. *American Journal of Sociology*, 83(4), 823-861. doi: 10.1086/226634