
by

Scott Bryce Aubrey

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Abstract

Civil-military relations (CMR) theory often holds that internal threat reduces civil control. However, this is not always the case: Turkey, which faced constant internal threats between 1980 and 2016, saw several periods of increasing civil control, particularly under President Özal (1989-1993) and the AKP after 2002. This study proposes that ‘competitive securitization’ between civil and military authorities explains these disparities in civil-military outcomes. In this framework, internal threat itself does not decreases civil control. Rather, civilian and military agents each ‘securitize’ internal threats, legitimizing measures that shift the civil-military balance-of-power in their favour. Where military securitization is more successful, civil control decreases, and vice-versa for civilians. This study applies this framework to eight key periods in Turkish CMR between 1980 and 2016. It finds that, with the exception of the early 2000s when EU accession dominated CMR dynamics, ‘competitive securitization’ provides a strong explanation for changes in Turkey’s civil-military balance-of-power.

Keywords: Civil-military relations, Turkey, securitization, internal threat, civil-military balance of power.
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## Abbreviations

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AKP</td>
<td>Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANAP</td>
<td>Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCG</td>
<td>Western Study Group (Bati Çalışma Grubu)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDP</td>
<td>Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGS</td>
<td>Chief of the General Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHP</td>
<td>Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMR</td>
<td>Civil-Military Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSP</td>
<td>Democratic Left Party (Democratik Sol Parti)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTP</td>
<td>Democrat Turkey Party (Demokrat Türkiye Partisi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DYP</td>
<td>True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GM</td>
<td>Gülen Movement (Hizmet / Cemaat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDP</td>
<td>Peoples’ Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEP</td>
<td>People’s Labour Party (Halkın Emek Partisi)</td>
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<tr>
<td>JİTEM</td>
<td>Gendarmerie Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism (Jandarma İstihbarat ve Terörle Mücadele)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MGK</td>
<td>National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHP</td>
<td>The Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Haraket Partisi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MİT</td>
<td>National Intelligence Organization (Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSP</td>
<td>National Salvation Party (Milli Selâmet Partisi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ÖHAL</td>
<td>Regional State of Emergency Governorate (Ölağanüstü Hâl Bölge Valiliği)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ÖYM</td>
<td>Specially Authorized Courts (Özel Yetkili Mahkemeler)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RP</td>
<td>Welfare Party (Refah Partisi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHP</td>
<td>Social Democrat Populist Party (Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBMM</td>
<td>Turkish Grand National Assembly (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKK</td>
<td>Kurdistan Worker’s Party (Partiya Karkarên Kurdistanê)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PYD</td>
<td>Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TİKKO</td>
<td>Liberation Army of the Workers and Peasants of Turkey (Türkiye İşçi ve Köylü Kurtuluş Ordusu)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSK</td>
<td>Turkish Armed Forces (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TÜSAİD</td>
<td>Turkish Industry and Business Association (Türk Sanayicileri ve İş İnsanları Derneği)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YAŞ</td>
<td>Supreme Military Council (Yüksek Askeri Şûra)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YÖK</td>
<td>Council of Higher Education (Yükseköğretim Kurumu)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YPG</td>
<td>Peoples’ Protection Units (Yekîneyen Parastina Gel)</td>
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Note: For acronyms referring to organizations in Turkey, this thesis uses the Turkish (or Kurdish) acronym, rather than an acronym for an English translation.
Note on Turkish Spelling and Pronunciation

This thesis makes use of the modern Turkish alphabet. The alphabet is in a modified Latin script. It was introduced as a standard in 1928 as part of a series of reforms under the administration of the Republic of Turkey’s founder and first President, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.

The script has 29 characters that are mostly pronounced similarly to their counterpart in English orthography. However, a number of letters are sufficiently distinct to warrant a comment on pronunciation here:

c—Pronounced dj; same as jasmine or age.
ç—Pronounced ch; same as chair or match.
g—Pronounced hard g, same as gear or again.
ğ—Not verbalized, extends vowel: “Erdoğan’ pronounced [ER-DOH-AHN].
i—Pronounced somewhat like eh; similar to open. IPA /ɯ/. Not used in English.
j—Pronounced soft j; same as genre or pleasure.
o—Pronounced o; same as okay or more
ö—Pronounced eu; same as French bleu.
s—Pronounced s; same as sample or ask.
ş—Pronounced sh; same as shall or ashen.
u—Pronounced u; same as under or run.
ü—Pronounced oo; same as French tu or sûr.

Turkish does not use the letters q, w, or x. There are also some vowels with circumflex accents, particularly in loanwords. However, these are rare and mainly used only when their absence would produce a misunderstanding, such as the difference between kar (snow) and kâr (profit).

The pronunciation of a Turkish word is almost always equivalent to its spelling, and there are very few cases where context changes a letter’s sound; i.e. letter combinations that do not correspond with usual pronunciation, like ight in English, are extremely rare.
Chapter I: Introduction

1.1 Research Problem

In civil-military relations (CMR) theory, there is a broad consensus that internal threat hampers civil control of the armed forces. This is often seen as a corollary to the notion that strong external threat improves civil-military cooperation and civil control. In addressing external threat, a military aligns with the civilian agents—and vice versa—against a common enemy. The military consequently remains inside a traditional role, defending the nation from a definable adversary. To address internal threat, by contrast, the military must step outside this traditional role. It is politicized, forced to engage in politicking to identify and engage malleable and vague adversaries.

Yet the proposal—that internal threat reduces civil control—faces a swathe of counter-examples, where outcomes are not so clearly negative. In Israel, where internal threat has long been a greater concern than external threat, there has been no real deterioration in civil control.¹ In Indonesia, the military has long been dominant and internal threat has been a key discourse, but the military—deeply involved in society—has seen its political role reduced.² These and others, like India,³ Colombia and Peru,⁴ challenge a direct, inverse causal relationship between civil control and internal threat.

² While the military remains highly influential in Indonesian society, it has collaborated with the civil authority to achieve common objectives. While not equivalent to true civil control, Indonesian “transactional” CMR does not fit the traditional model. Leonard C.Sebastian, Emirza Adi Syailendra, and Keoni Indrabayu. “Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia after the Reform Period.” Asian Policy 13 no. 3 (2018): 52-55.
Turkey also falls into this category. Between 1980 and 2016, it has faced an ongoing Kurdish nationalist insurgency, rising Islamism threatening its secular Kemalist ideal, and fears of a ‘parallel state.’ Yet near-consistent internal threat has not resulted in consistently diminishing civil control. In fact, the 21st Century has seen a dramatic reduction in the influence of the Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri (Turkish Armed Forces, TSK).

This project asks: Why does internal threat in Turkey produce generally worsening civil control for 1980-2001, but generally strengthening civil control for 2002-2016? I hypothesize these disparate outcomes result from differences in how civil and military actors treat internal threat. Specifically, I propose that both civil and military actors securitize internal threat, and use that securitization to shift in their favour the balance of power between them. In other words, the absence or presence of internal threat does not produce civil-military outcomes; the manner in which internal threats are securitized by civil and military actors produces civil-military outcomes.

This project aims to develop a framework of ‘competitive securitization’ for civil-military relations and applies it to the Turkish case for 1980-2016.

1.2 Literature Review

This project draws principally on two sets of literature: (1) Civil-military relations theory; and (2) Civil-military relations in Turkey. I hope to make two principal contributions to CMR theory, and one to its study in Turkey. With regard to CMR theory, I first aim to develop an understanding of the role internal threat plays in CMR by arguing that both civil and military agents ‘securitize’ internal threat in competing moves that aim to justify extraordinary actions that reshape the civil-military balance of power.\(^5\) Second, I hope to

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introduce more fully a notion of power in CMR, borrowing the idea from international relations theory that power can be ‘soft,’ co-optive or attractive, rather than just coercive.6 These concepts are combined as a ‘competitive securitization’ framework in Chapter II.

In Turkish civil-military relations, power is already a relatively well developed concept, and the notion of civil-military competition is present in the literature. However, traditional studies of CMR in Turkey assume a principle of military primacy, borrowed from CMR literature, wherein the question of military intervention rests on two related concepts: military control of the state’s hard power resources; and the ‘guardian’ mentality of a Kemalist military.7 I argue that these concepts are insufficient to explain instances during periods of military dominance where civil control rose substantially, such as under President Turgut Özal (1989-1993). They also face challenges explaining the civilianization of the military in the 2000s and 2010s, even when foreign pressure, like European Union accession, is factored in. A ‘competitive securitization’ analysis of changes in relative civil and military power, by contrast, can account for these changes.

1.2.1 Civil-Military Relations Theory

Civil-military relations theory generally does not prioritize analyzing power relations between civil and military actors. The ‘civil-military problematique,’ was described by Peter Feaver as how “to reconcile a military strong enough to do anything the civilians ask them to do with a military subordinate enough to do only what civilians authorize them to do.”8 This is, of course, centrally a question of power. However, responses to it

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have generally focused on resolving this question by stepping around the issue of power and focusing elsewhere; on professionalization, democratization, or interest-based strategic interaction. This project, however, proposes that relative civil-military power and the ways in which that balance can change should be a central concern for CMR. This is particularly true of states like Turkey without full democratic civil control.

The traditional approach to civil control is that of Samuel Huntington. He argued control occurs through two mechanisms. The first, ‘subjective control,’ occurs when the civilian government reduces the power of the military relative to its own. However, this comes at the significant cost of reducing the military’s capacity to fulfill its principal purpose: national defence. Huntington’s preferred alternative was ‘objective control’ through professionalization. Military leadership should become a profession, separate from the civilians, whose professional ethos would prevent politicization and ensure loyalty to the government no matter its leadership.⁹

Huntington’s contemporary, Morris Janowitz, proposed a more sociological view of professionalization, also in the ‘separation theory’ tradition. Although he provides no clear theory of how civilian control is achieved, he does suggest that professional ethics and a civilianization of the officer corps should limit the military’s desire to counteract efforts to bolster civil control.¹⁰ Civilian oversight, treatment of military service as an occupation, and greater military engagement with the public would lead to a convergence of military and civilian culture and interests. Both Janowitz and Huntington share the view that the military should police itself, and the civilian should permit it space to do so.

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‘Separation theory’, particularly à la Huntington, predominates in CMR theory. This is partially due to the field’s emphasis on empirical studies over theory-crafting. The (growing) theoretical literature that exists usually does not include power as a mechanic.

Feaver proposed an alternative, the principal-agent model. He argued that day-to-day CMR should be conceptualized as a two-stage game, wherein the principal—the civilian—incentivizes its agent—the military—to ‘work’ more than ‘shirk’ through ‘reward’ and ‘punishment.’ This strategic interaction, however, relies on the proposition that the civilian is the dominant authority, a challenge Feaver notes may pose problems in application to military intervention, or in “coup-ridden” states like Turkey. Taking a similar approach, Peter Roman and David Tarr argue that civil-military interactions in the United States after 1986 should be thought of in terms of jointness, an interaction of professionals with different backgrounds, engaged in collegial problem-solving. The strategic interaction models of Feaver, Roman and Tarr step around the question of power by assuming it lies with the civilian.

Bland’s “unified theory”, applying regime theory to CMR with civil and military actors sharing responsibility for certain elements of civil control, reduces power to a background variable. Regime theory’s focus on the development of norms and rules of behaviour permits a power imbalance to exist, but for CMR itself it becomes little more than an issue informing how those rules develop. This emphasis on moving CMR away

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13 Ibid., 292-293.
from its traditional focus on ‘control’ or ‘intervention’ has grown substantially in recent years. Notable is Bruneau and Matei’s trinity model, analyzing control, effectiveness and efficiency. The model focuses on democratic control, but consciously ensures it can be applied to both consolidated and developing democracies so that it can address practical problems faced by civilian and military leaders.\footnote{The trinity model focuses on six military and security roles: Wars, Internal Wars, Terrorism, Crime, Humanitarian assistance, and Peace operations. Florina, Matei C. “A New Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations.” In The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations, eds. Thomas Bruneau and Florina C. Matei, (London: Routledge, 2013): 29-31.} Still, this also moves power to the background, creating issues in analyzing civil-military conflict.

With regard to internal threat, Michael Desch is likely the preeminent CMR theorist. He argues civil control is determined by the nexus between external and internal threats.\footnote{Michael C. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2001): 14-17.} Desch’s consequent argument that peacetime generally reduces civil control includes a clear concept of power, as civil control only occurs when the government pays attention to military affairs, thereby reducing military autonomy.

Finer’s analysis of military regimes was among the first to directly account for relative power. Moreover, he provides an account that emphasizes a form of power that could be considered ‘soft’—legitimacy. He proposed the military is likely to intervene where traditional authorities lack legitimacy.\footnote{Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962): 84-85.} This view, built on the idea that the military became a guarantor of popular will with the rise of nationalism, explicitly accounts for soft power by including “political culture,” as a civilian power resource. However, as Luckham later noted, Finer’s use of culture only accounts for differences between developed and developing states, not those between developing countries.\footnote{A. Robin Luckham, “A Comparative Typology of Civil-Military Relations,” Government and Opposition 6 no. 1 (1971): 10.}
Luckham built on Finer’s work to develop an explicit model of civil-military power. He argues three variables determine a military’s role: strength of civil institutions, military institutions, and the permeability or integration of military boundaries. Using this model, he proposed a typology of military roles.\textsuperscript{20} His model includes a balance of power concept that differentiates between power to coerce and power to attract. He notes that the military has a superior power to coerce, but this diminishes with more developed political institutions. However, his model, while accounting for consequences a balance of power, has no mechanism for actors to “cash force into power.”\textsuperscript{21}

I argue such a mechanism can be provided by combining Nye’s concept of soft power, in which power capabilities are employed to coerce (hard power) or attract (soft power) with Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde’s securitization theory. Securitization provides an explanation regarding how civil and military actors alter their relative power by identifying an existential threat and demanding extraordinary powers to address it, thereby converting threat into power. I refer to this as ‘competitive securitization.’ It is discussed in detail in Chapter II.

1.2.2 Turkish Civil-Military Relations

The literature on Turkish CMR has focused principally on the issue of military guardianship. Since 1960, Turkey has experienced four successful coups, each with the stated intent to restore the Turkish Republic to the path intended by its first President, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Kemalism, based on Atatürk’s six principles of republicanism, nationalism, populism, statism, secularism (or laicism) and revolution, was embedded in the constitution in 1937. It has become a core feature of the Turkish military’s self-

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 22-30.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 16.
perceived role in national defence. This tradition of Kemalist guardianship remained influential throughout the 20th century, only declining since the early 2000s.

The English literature on Turkish praetorianism and its decline has seen significant attention recently. This literature has tended to emphasize as causes: democratization, the EU accession process, a changing military culture, or other similar factors. Perhaps the most significant English-language study of Turkish CMR is William Hale’s *Turkish Politics and the Military*. It examines the political role of the Turkish military from the Ottoman Empire into the early 1990s, with a focus on the period since 1960. His principal thesis, borrowing from Eric Nordlinger’s typology of CMR, is that Turkey was an example of an ‘arbitrator-type’ guardian regime. For Hale, the military played a key role in preserving state structures through intervention, but also willingly withdrew despite its questionable commitment to liberal democracy.

This ‘guardian model’ is among the most dominant in the literature. It stems from Turkey’s “statist tradition,” described most influentially by Metin Heper, who argued that the Ottoman-Turkish polity experiences the emergence of a powerful state, autonomous from civil society, wherever state consensus collapses. He has since built on this thesis, proposing the post-2002 rise of civil control is the result of the military adopting a critical approach to Kemalism, emphasizing the ideology’s democratic dimensions and accepting “civilians have a right to be wrong.” Similar ‘guardianship’ analyses produced two main reasons for civil control: The first emphasizes the internal transformation of the Turkish military itself, as Heper does, while the second emphasizes external pressures.

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22 *Turkish Constitution, 1924*, c. 1, art. 2, Turkish Grand National Assembly.
As Metin Gürcan notes, the focus on internal changes within the armed forces is the less dominant explanation. This is driven by the lack of TSK transparency—in Gürcan’s words, the “Black Box”—and the consequent lack of data. However, Gürcan’s research indicate the High Command’s efforts to instill a more heterogeneous, diverse, and flexible understanding of the military’s role in politics likely increased civil control.26

The core of this explanation rests in the military’s willingness to reform itself to preserve Turkish interests. Aylin Güney’s description of this process as “civilianization without democratization” noted that a core driver for self-criticism by the military was the criticisms of Turkish CMR in the EU’s Progress Reports, given military support for EU accession. While the civilian later employed accession to strengthen its position, the key was that its interests converged with those of the military on EU accession.27

Zeki Sarigil’s assessment of the Turkish military also echoes this explanation in applying Feaver’s principal-agent theory to Turkey. His core thesis is that the military and civilians have shifted over time between roles of principal and agent. The 1960 coup, therefore made the military, rather than civilian government, the principal. After 2000 the civilian again became the principal and the military the agent due to economic stability and changes in military culture that emphasize the importance of EU integration.28 The proposal the TSK’s Kemalist mission to modernize Turkey includes Europeanization—and thus the requisite democratic civil control for EU accession—is common in the literature. It is echoed by Nil Satana, who proposes a developing “postmodern military”

whose conception of threat has changed so it willingly relinquishes its guardianship role.\textsuperscript{29} She proposes that while this behavioural change in the military was underway by 2008, it still requires additional spurring onward by civil society and the government.

I believe that a competitive securitization framework, accounting for relative power, provides important insight on how internal threat has driven Turkish CMR. Many studies examine internal threat, but traditionally focus on threat as an incentive for intervention by the TSK. By noting civilians can also employ threat to their advantage, competitive securitization can better account for rising civil control in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century.

1.3 Hypothesis and Methodology

I hypothesize civil and military actors securitize internal threat, justifying shifts in the balance of power in their favour and thus producing concordance or discordance between them. My dependent and independent variables are civil-military concordance and civil-military securitizing moves, respectively. Changes in relative power—military autonomy and elite homogeneity—is the mechanism by which securitization produces outcomes.

The main dependent variable, concordance, is a measure of civil-military outcomes. It uses Rebecca Schiff’s concordance theory, which defines concordance as agreement between the military, political elite and citizenry on four indicators: composition of the officer corps, political decision-making, recruitment method, and military style.\textsuperscript{30} However, I restrict possible actors to the military and government. I then determine whether concordance is present by applying principal-agent theory, where concordance

\textsuperscript{29} Nil S. Satana. “Transformation of the Turkish Military and the Path to Democracy,” \textit{Armed Forces and Society} 34 no. 3 (2008): 358.

\textsuperscript{30} Schiff, \textit{The Military and Domestic Politics}, 14.
occurs when the military ‘works’ but is considered coerced were the government ‘punishes,’ and vice versa.\(^{31}\)

I propose civil-military concordance is determined indirectly by securitizing moves made by civil and military actors. This independent variable is taken from securitization theory, wherein a securitizing agent identifies an existential threat to a specific referent object, thereby justifying exceptional action to address it.\(^ {32}\) The interaction of civil and military securitization produces a CMR outcome by altering relative civil-military power.

My causal argument rests on this idea that CMR outcomes tied to the civil-military balance of power, such that concordance can be coerced. Power is measured for the military in terms of autonomy, and for the government by homogeneity. Securitization produces changes in power, and the balance of power in turn produces a CMR outcome.

I apply this framework to using a case study methodology to Turkish CMR, identifying securitizing moves from 1980-2016. I then examine the aftermath of those securitizing moves to assess whether the civil-military balance of power (autonomy vs. homogeneity) changes. From there, concordance is determined by whether the TSK and government ‘work’ or ‘shirk’ and ‘reward’ or ‘punish’ respectively. My research relies primarily on secondary sources, contemporary reports or news, and public statements from the Turkish government and armed forces.

1.4 Outline of Project

This study proceeds as follows: Chapter II describes in detail the proposed competitive securitization framework. It discusses this study incorporates a balance of power concept


into CMR theoretically, and then discusses how securitization can be discussed both competitively and between substate actors. It concludes with a description of the competitive securitization framework and how it is operationalized in the Turkish case.

Chapter III applies the competitive securitization framework to Turkish CMR for 1980-1997. This period was largely one of TSK predominance, where the civilian government was less capable of securitizing internal threat. It discusses four periods of securitization and internal threat, in 1980, 1987, 1993 and 1997.

Chapter IV continues this analysis, applying the framework to Turkish CMR for 2003-2016. This was a period of broadly increasing civil control, where the military began to see its securitization be less effective than its civilian counterparts. It discusses securitization and internal threats in 2003/4, 2007, 2013 and 2015.

Chapter V concludes the study, summarizing and assessing the main findings of Chapters III and IV. It goes on to note the contributions made by the study, as well as its limitations, concluding with comments on future research.
Chapter II: Competitive Securitization Framework of CMR

This chapter aims to outline the theoretical framework that this project will test. It aims to introduce two key concepts from the international relations literature into civil-military relations: (1) securitization; and (2) balance of power. Taken together, these theories provide a valuable tool to measure civil-military outcomes, particularly in cases of competition between civilians and military.

This chapter outlines a securitization framework for analyzing the civil-military balance of power, specifically with reference to internal threat. As noted in Chapter I, it will be referred to as the ‘competitive securitization framework.’ Chapter II is divided into three sections: (1) Power in CMR and its impact on concordance; (2) securitization and internal threats; and (3) a description of ‘competitive securitization.’

2.1 Power in Civil-Military Relations

The CMR literature has under-engaged power. The bulk of CMR literature focuses on issues like a military’s institutional qualities or the impact of civilian politics. Because power is assumed to lie with the military, civilian control revolves around persuading it to behave. This project aims to resolve this tension by centring the civil-military balance of power in its analysis of how internal threat affects the civil-military dyad.

2.1.1 Soft Power and Civil-Military Relations

I borrow my understanding of power mainly from the field of international relations (IR). While it is a key component of all subfields of political science, few have developed it as systemically. While there is lack of consensus on what specifically is considered ‘power,’ in IR, it is most frequently studied through the lens of realism, a theoretical view that considers states rational actors in an anarchic international system. Since early modern
realists like Morgenthau that viewed the pursuit of power for its own sake as a driving force,\(^1\) modern, structural variants of realism consider the pursuit of power as the means to an end: Waltz argued that in an anarchic political system, power is the only way to ensure security, an understanding echoed by Walt.\(^2\) Others argue that the only true means to achieve security is to maximize their power relative to all others, as per Mearsheimer.\(^3\) These realist analyses measures power in terms of capabilities: size of the military, defence expenditure, GDP, industrial output, strategic resources, or others.

These traditionally realist definitions of power are the kind most frequently applied—at least implicitly—to CMR. If a military controls the armed forces and its equipment, how could civilians increase their relative power without politicizing the military, thus weakening its capacity to provide national security?\(^4\) Yet this proposition misses other dimensions of power that often privilege civilian government: a state’s legal framework, ability to govern,\(^5\) popular support, economic reform, etc. In CMR, these other dimensions of power are important because the *civil-military problematique*—how to reconcile a military powerful enough to do anything civilians ask of it with one that does only what they authorize—is fundamentally one of balance of power.

Power is the ability to cause other actors to do something they otherwise would not—for example, stopping a praetorian military from intervening. This can involve tools


\(^4\) Some CMR theories do emphasize the importance of different forms of power, like Luckham’s proposal the military’s ability to coerce diminishes as political institutions are more developed. Yet they generally still emphasizes inducement and coercion. Legitimacy is considered, but this ability to “attract” the military should also be considered power. Luckham, “A Comparative Typology of Civil-Military Relations,” 16.

\(^5\) As Finer notes, the military is uniquely unsuited to governance. It is difficult for military regimes to gain and keep legitimacy, and frequently must “civilianize” to do so. Finer, *The Man on Horseback*, 14-22.
other than ‘hard’ military capabilities.⁶ ‘Soft power’ refers to an one’s ability to persuade or co-opt another into a course of action, rather than coerce.⁷ An actor converts ‘power capabilities’—tools or policy options—into behavioural change. Some resources are more suited to specific types of power, but power is hard or soft based on how behaviour is changed. See Fig. 1.

In applying the soft power concept to CMR, it becomes the central form of power in the civil-military dyad outside the context of military intervention. The civil government, also has hard power resources, such as instituting civilian oversight mechanisms or passing legislation.⁸ But many of its tools are soft, like legitimacy, its legal framework, or administration experience. Governments thus can choose between coercive and inducive options to compel its military. Outside of active military intervention, it may even have the advantage, at least in states with consolidated civil control.

The main contribution of soft power for CMR is to reject Huntington’s dichotomy between objective and subjective control. If subjective civil control means reducing the military’s power relative to the civilian, reducing its soft power should not negatively affect its ability to provide national security.⁹ By persuading the military to obey the

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⁷ Ibid., 8.
civilians through legal processes, institutional changes, or public relations, a civilian can weaken a military’s ability to engage in politics, without harming its defence capability and without professionalization.

2.1.2 Balance of Power and Civil-Military Concordance

The concept of a balance of power (BoP) is borrowed from IR. The concept, stemming from 18th and 19th century European diplomacy, faces challenges in application to CMR. After all, civilians and the military do not fit traditional BoP, which focuses on competing states. Still, we can study CMR as a competition, where the civilian and military must agree on an issue despite diverging preferences.

Rebecca Schiff’s concordance theory provides the starting point for this framework. The theory asserts that the likelihood of military intervention is determined by whether three partners—the military, political elite and citizenry—can agree on officer corps composition, political decision-making, recruitment method, and military style. Disagreement on these increases the likelihood of intervention. Schiff emphasizes cultural factors as well, suiting the theory both for incorporating soft power and for applying to cases where professional militaries intervene, as in Turkey.

Schiff is a useful starting point, but poses three significant challenges for BoP in CMR: (1) an ambiguous definition of concordance ‘partners’; (2) unclear criteria for ‘concordance’; and centrally (3) no consideration of relative power.

Defining the ‘partners’ is the most pressing problem. Only the military is defined in the theory, as the armed forces and its personnel. The political elite is defined by its

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12 Schiff, *The Military and Domestic Politics*, 43.
13 Ibid., 32-33.
function, where it has influence over military structure and composition. The citizenry is just all non-elites interacting with the military. These definitions, particularly ‘elite’ and ‘citizenry,’ are highly heterogeneous and consist of many parts with divergent interests.

This can be resolved if we consider homogeneity and heterogeneity to be themselves a dimension of power. As Huntington notes, the heterogeneity of civilian groups “make[s] it impossible to maximize their power as a whole with respect to the military”. While the citizenry’s interests are so diverse that it is not particularly useful to CMR as an actor itself, its support for the government can be considered part of a broader civilian indicator of power, ‘elite homogeneity’. Similarly, we can think of the military’s institutional coherence as part of its indicator of power, ‘military autonomy.’

The second challenge, Schiff’s unclear criteria, requires a mechanism to explain how civil-military ‘concordance’ occurs. The mechanism would need to be simplified from Schiff’s four concordance indicators to agreement on a single structural issue. For this study, this would be the issue of the political role of Turkey’s military.

Feaver’s agency theory is useful for this purpose. Applied to concordance, his two-player sequential game can be transformed into a normal-form game assessing structural, rather than day-to-day, issues. The military and the government each choose whether to attempt to compel the other, resulting in the possibility for multiple types of concordance. If the military works, concordance is achieved; this may be full concordance, wherein the civilian ‘rewards’ the military, or a coerced concordance where it uses its power to

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14 Ibid., 43-44.
15 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 80.
16 Feaver, Armed Servants, 5.
‘punish’. Similarly, the civilian may respond to a military that ‘shirks’ by appeasing it and with a ‘reward’ or attempting to coerce it back into line.

Finally, there is no consideration of relative power in Schiff’s theory. For this, as I noted above, we should think about power in CMR as ‘homogeneity,’ when referring to the civilian government, and ‘autonomy’ when referring to the military. This definition captures soft power as discussed in section 2.1.1, alongside traditional measurements.

Power in CMR has both formal and informal dimensions. Formal shifts in relative power might include changes in a military’s constitutional / legal role, civilian oversight, or military promotions. By contrast, informal shifts might include wealth accumulation, 17 or purges of the officer corps, as in Azerbaijan between 1993 and 1997. 18 ‘Autonomy’ and ‘homogeneity’ can account for both dimensions.

Borrowing from the assumptions above, we can plot a “concordance game” into a two-player normal form game borrowing from Feaver’s model. In the game, the military chooses to ‘work’ or ‘shirk’, thus deciding whether concordance is achieved, while the civil actor chooses to ‘punish’ or ‘reward,’ deciding whether that concordance is coerced. These choices are informed by relative power, both in its formal and informal dimensions. See Fig. 2 for an illustration of this game.

Of course, changes to relative power occurs both formally and informally. I argue one of the core mechanisms of change is securitization, particularly securitization of

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17 As in the Egyptian case, where the military’s economic activity provides it significant independence, as its activity accounts for a significant proportion of national production. See Jessica Noll, “Egypt’s Armed Forces Cement Economic Power: Military Business Expansion Impedes Structural Reform,” Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Comment no. 5 (February 2017).

internal threats. External influences, whether threats, like a peer-competitor, or norms, such as NATO or EU support for democratic civil control, can also produce BoP changes.

However, as Desch notes, external threats tend to produce a unifying effect between civil and military actors.\(^\text{19}\) Consequently, securitization of internal threat is the better candidate for actors to acquire power, particularly in cases of competitive civil-military interaction. This is discussed further in the following section.

### 2.2 Securitization and the Civil-Military Balance of Power

Securitization is rarely applied to CMR itself outside specific case studies. Securitization theory has made substantial inroads into security studies, including military politics, but the impacts of securitization on CMR itself is rarely more than incidental. Similarly, where CMR literature addresses securitization, it tends to provide context rather than being incorporated into a CMR model. I propose that securitization is a key mechanism by which civil and military actors shift the balance of power between them.

\(^\text{19}\) Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military*, 13-14.
2.2.1 Securitization Theory

Securitization theory was first comprehensively advanced as an analytic framework in Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde’s 1998 *Security*. It consolidated a decade of research from the Copenhagen School that sought to “broaden” the agenda of security research beyond its state-centric and military-focused literature.²⁰ Its central argument holds that ‘security’ constitutes a practice, wherein a ‘securitizing actor’ claims a need and right to address the issue through extraordinary means.²¹ This is accomplished through a ‘speech act,’ in which: (1) a referent object is identified to be existentially threatened; and (2) the audience ‘accepts’ the securitizing move; which permits (3) traditional rules of politics to be broken in addressing the existential threat. These moves occur within specific sectors, namely the military, environmental, economic, societal and political.

Securitization theory lends itself well to an analysis of CMR. It has two core units of analysis: (1) Referent objects; and (2) Securitizing actors. Referent objects tend to be states or nations in most issues of security. Still, it can conceptually include system-level objects, such as global climate change,²² or micro-level objects, such as the individual. Securitizing actors are persons or groups that perform a speech act, like politicians, governments, officials, or others. These actors must have a position of authority in their relationship with an audience, increasing the likelihood their securitizing move will be accepted by the audience.

These concepts map well to a CMR framework. To borrow the three key actors of CMR in concordance theory—the military, political elite, and citizenry—each plays role

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²² Ibid., 36.
in securitization. Military and political elites can both be considered distinct securitizing actors, as both have substantial authority on security matters to their audience, the citizenry. While this removes the citizenry as an actor, as discussed in the previous section, it retains Schiff’s proposal that the citizenry plays an important role in concordance. The referent object maps to the state, as in traditional CMR literature that addresses threat and CMR, but could also include other issues like democracy, military professionalism, economic stability or others.

There are, of course, numerous challenges to securitization theory itself that bring into question the usefulness of applying it to CMR. The foremost for a project proposing to use securitization to explain civil-military outcomes is the critique that the theory itself has little explanatory power. While providing an interesting description of the processes that inform security, this critique goes, securitization theory provides no real causal mechanism. This view is in fact echoed by Wæver, who advocates securitization be viewed as an act that transforms the relationship between rights and duties, not one that has a causal line from speech to its effects. However, this is far from the only way securitization has in fact been employed; proposing a relationship between the securitizing speech act and political effects has been a mainstay of securitization literature, particularly in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.

23 Schiff The Military and Domestic Politics, 44.
24 Examples of securitization may include: Democracy—Egypt’s coup against the Muslim Brotherhood; Military Professionalism—Syrian purges of its officer corps after the Six Day War; and Economic Stability—Among those issues cited as potential rationale for a military coup against Maduro’s Venezuela.
A second challenge is that securitization lacks a clear methodological framework. It is frequently unclear what qualifies as ‘successful’ securitization, with the implication that securitization can only effectively be assessed in those cases where it is successful. While *Security* attempts to clarify ‘success,’ the book has no clearly consistent criteria. While resolving this challenge is beyond the scope of this study, we can avoid this challenge by treating securitization as a method to acquire power, as discussed in the previous section. By this metric, securitization is ‘successful’ insofar as it permits civil and military actors to justify changes to the civil-military BoP.

Finally, there is a challenge in applying securitization to a civil-military dyad between two actors. This is for two reasons: (1) if both civil and military actors are distinct securitizing actors, then securitizing moves create competing securitization processes not present in traditional securitization theory; and (2) civil-military interaction covers many dimensions beyond security, particularly when assessing issues outside military intervention in politics. However, this project is designed in a way that mostly resolves these challenges.

With regard to the first problem, the focus on a civil-military BoP as discussed in section 2.1 allows for civil and military agents to engage in competitive securitizing processes. In this sense, the key question is whether the civil or military actor is the *dominant* securitizing actor, whether both actors are cooperating on the same securitizing move or whether the moves compete. This is discussed in more detail in section 2.3.

Regarding the second question, this project resolves the challenge by focusing exclusively on internal threat, and its effects on CMR. While the Turkish case includes dimensions of CMR outside of security, such as questions of operational oversight or
others that Feaver would consider ‘day-to-day.’ It focuses on the influence internal threats have on these processes. With this context, securitization provides a valuable framework for linking causes (internal threat) to effects (changes in the civil-military BoP). The role of internal threat in civil-military securitization processes is discussed in more detail in the next section.

2.2.2 Securitization and Internal Threat

Threat is a significant element in the CMR literature, although it tends to be implicit, rather than explicit. Lasswell’s ‘garrison state’ proposed security concerns would increasingly drive specialists of violence to dominate the state, creating ever-converging interests between the military and the political—and implicitly, produce civil control.\(^{28}\) Huntington similarly proposed that the need for professionalization—and thus civil control—stemmed from an increasingly threatening international environment.\(^{29}\) His dominance in CMR theory makes this view common. Both draw on an understanding of the relationship between modern statehood and military professionalism in Europe wherein military science is a reaction to other increasingly centralized—and therefore threatening—governments, and simultaneously increases threat where it is adopted.

Desch’s *Civilian Control* is a more modern formulation of the relationship between threat and civil control. He proposed that the interaction of external and internal threat played a significant role in civil control. In his framework, he retained the idea that high external threat produced a ‘rally-around-the-flag’ effect as military and political interests converge. He proposed that the inverse would be true of internal threat. Where internal threat is high, political and military elites diverge, as both are pulled in various directions.

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\(^{29}\) Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 63-64.
by internal pressures. Consequently, the best civil control occurs in cases of high external but low internal threat, and the worst when the dynamic is reversed.

Desch’s model is dominant in the empirical literature of CMR and threat. His own study applied it to the United States, the Soviet Union, Germany, France, Japan, Brazil and Chile. It has since been applied more widely, as in Staniland’s comparative analysis of civil control in Pakistan and India, and Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas’ analysis of the relationship between domestic crises and military intervention in Latin America.

I propose that, while there is no question that internal threat significantly complicates civil control, it does not structurally necessitate a deterioration. Borrowing from Pusane’s study of the PKK’s impact on CMR in Turkey, whether internal threat produces increased or decreased civil control depends on the interaction between civil and military actors. I argue that securitization is a central dimension of this interaction.

In this context, internal threat does not simply produce better or worse outcomes on its own. Instead, the key mechanism is found in how civil and military actors portray the threat to their audience. With a successful securitizing move, the civil or military actor is granted the ‘right’ to move outside of ordinary politics to alter the BoP. Securitization of an internal threat in this sense provides the civilian or military with power resources, as described by Nye, which can then be converted to power. These power resources can be used to shift the civil-military balance. This may include using internal threat to justify

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limiting the military’s constitutional or advisory role, or conversely to justify to the public through informal means the necessity of military intervention to resolve a crisis.

I acknowledge that the bulk of empirical CMR research views internal threat as more likely to produce a decrease in civil control. However, this is compatible with my competitive securitization framework, because the military will frequently be seen by the public (the audience) as more capable of dealing with internal threats. Consequently, the military’s securitizing move is probably more likely to be successful than the civilian’s. However, the possibility of a competing civil securitizing move also provides an explanation for those cases where internal threat increases or has little effect civil control.

2.3 Competitive Securitization Framework for CMR

This section synthesizes the previous sections to provide a mechanical link between the securitization of internal threat, the civil military BoP, and CMR outcomes.

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33 There is evidence for this relationship between military popularity and internal threat, at least in the case of Turkey. See: Zeki Sarigil, “Deconstructing the Turkish Military’s Popularity,” *Armed Forces and Society* 35 no. 4 (2009): 709-727.
In the competitive securitization framework there are two mechanisms at play. The first is the securitization process. This process, as described in section 2.2, provides civil and military actors with the ability to make a securitizing move, justifying through an internal threat actions that shift the balance of power in their favour through formal or informal means. This BoP will then determine whether the civil and military actors ‘punish’ or ‘reward’ and ‘work’ or ‘shirk’ respectively with reference to reforms of civil control as in the concordance game described in section 2.1. This, in turn, produces CMR outcomes with regard to concordance. See Fig. 3.

Given an internal threat, both civil and military securitizing actors have an opportunity to make a securitizing move, which can be either successful or unsuccessful. For the purposes of this study, an unsuccessful securitizing move is functionally equivalent to not making a move. This securitizing move should have a direct impact on increasing that actors power if it leads to formal and informal changes. It consequently should map to decisions to work or shirk and punish and reward (and thus concordance outcomes) described in Fig. 2 in section 2.1.
With this concept, we can produce a normal-form game linking securitization to a predicted civil-military concordance outcome. See Fig. 4. If a BoP concept can apply to CMR, the change in relative power should inform military and civil actors’ decisions in the concordance game described in section 2.2. In this context, where the military has more power (autonomy), it is more likely to ‘shirk,’ and more likely to ‘work’ where it is decreasing. Similarly, where the civilian government has more power (homogeneity), it is more likely to choose ‘punish,’ and more likely ‘reward’ where it has less.

In quadrant 1, neither the civilian government nor the military make a successful securitizing move. This typically implies the ideal type of concordance as identified by Schiff, where both actors agree on reforms. Without any pressing internal threat, neither seek to shift the BoP in their favour, so neither defect. However, there are a wide number of issues that might affect CMR in the absence of securitization, so this prediction is in no way certain. Fortunately, this study explicitly examines successful securitizing moves, so this result should not appear.

In quadrant 2, only the civilian government makes a successful securitizing move. It identifies an internal threat and justifies government action as the principal means to resolve it. This may imply a move that targets the military as a threat, the military option as ineffective, or the need for security options more directly under government control. The consequence is a shift in the BoP in the government’s favour, enabling it to punish the military in order to compel it to comply. The result is a coerced concordance.

In quadrant 3, only the military makes a successful securitizing move. It identifies an internal threat and justifies military leadership as the principal means to resolve it. This may imply a move that identifies the government as a threat, government oversight as
reducing military effectiveness, or a lack of progress by civilian government in resolving the threat. The consequence is a shift in the BoP in the military’s favour, enabling it to shirk and resist reforms toward civil control. The result is an appeased discordance.

In quadrant 4, both the military and the civilian government make securitizing moves. These moves are either competing, in that they identify different referent objects or sources of threat, or they may be cooperative, in that they identify the same referent object and threat. Where moves compete, both the military and civilian governments are incentivized to shirk or punish respectively. This more extreme conflict results in coerced discordance. In the case of a cooperative move, both are in agreement with regard to threat, and are consequently not incentivized to defect, resulting in full concordance.

2.4 Typology for the Competitive Securitization Framework

The competitive securitization framework has three elements with different potential outcomes: (1) Securitizing moves by the military and the civilian; (2) the civil-military BoP, measured in military autonomy and elite homogeneity; and (3) civil-military outcomes, with the potential outcomes as described in Fig. 2 in section 2.1.2.

2.4.1 Securitizing Moves:

Determined by an interaction of successful securitizing moves by civil or military agents.

- **Military:** The military actor is an agent representing the military who identifies a referent object as being under threat. Most frequently a prominent officer or military-dominated body, such as a National Security Council.

- **Civilian:** The civilian actor is an agent representing the government who identifies a referent object as being under threat. Most frequently an elected politician, a minister, or the dominant political party.
Both: A situation in which both a civilian and military agent make a securitizing move. These can be competitive and result in a conflictual discordance, or cooperative and in concordance.

Neither: A situation where neither actor makes a securitizing move. This should indicate concordance.

2.4.2 Civilian and Military Indicators of Power

Military Autonomy: My assessment of military autonomy borrows principally from Cizre’s 1997 “The Anatomy of the Turkish Military’s Political Autonomy,” which identifies seven indexes of autonomy: the National Security Council; the Presidency; organization of defence; military budgets; defence procurement and modernization; internal security and intelligence; and senior promotions.34

- Increasing: Military Autonomy can be said to be increasing where the military improves or retains its freedom of action on a majority of indexes.
- Decreasing: Military Autonomy can be said to be decreasing where the military loses freedom of action on a majority of indexes.

Elite Homogeneity: Elite homogeneity refers to the civilian government’s ability to act in solidarity on civil-military relations issues. This can be measured principally through public support for the dominant civilian leader, the leader’s support in the Grand National Assembly, and election results.

- High: Elite homogeneity can be said to be high where the civilian government is not experiencing significant challenges on at least two listed indicators.

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34 Cizre, “The Anatomy of the Turkish Military’s Political Autonomy,” 151-166.
• **Low:** Elite homogeneity can be said to be low where the civilian government is experiencing significant challenges on at least two listed indicators.

2.4.3 Civil-Military Outcomes

Depending on whether the government and military reward or punish and work or shirk respectively, they will produce civil-military outcomes according to the concordance model. These are described below.

- **Full Concordance:** Full, cooperative agreement between both partners on internal threat. This is the ideal form of concordance most frequently referred to in Schiff’s model.

- **Coerced Concordance:** Agreement in which the civilian exerts power to bring about a agreement on internal threat, typically involving curbing military autonomy.

- **Appeased Discordance:** Disagreement on internal threat where the military shirks, and the civilian rewards the military in attempt to prevent further shirking.

- **Coerced Discordance:** Disagreement on internal threat in which the civilian attempts to halt a shirking military through the use of punishment.

The following two chapters apply this model to the Turkish case. Chapter III examines Turkish CMR for 1980-1997, while Chapter IV examines Turkey for 2003-2016.
Chapter III: Securitization in Turkish CMR, 1980-1997

This chapter and Chapter IV apply the competitive securitization framework to eight periods in Turkish CMR. This chapter examines cases between 1980 and 1997, Chapter IV addresses cases from 2003 to 2016. Both chapters seek to explain the changes in the balance of power between the Turkish military and civilian government. They take specific ‘securitizing moves’ made by military or civilian securitizing actors with regard to internal threats and examine the effect of those moves on military autonomy and elite homogeneity. The assessment of each period is divided into three main sections: (1) Background, describing the circumstances affecting internal security leading up to the securitizing move; (2) Securitizing Moves, assessing the interaction of military and civilian securitization; and (3) Balance of Power, assessing changes in military autonomy and elite homogeneity. Each analysis concludes with a section on the period’s civil-military outcome, based on the concordance model described in Chapter II. This section summarizes the link between securitization and a shift in balance of power, as well as the form of concordance or discordance the period produced.

This chapter examines the CMR dynamics resulting from the 12 September 1980 coup, a period under a relatively authoritarian constitution that provided a significant political role for the military. In contrast to the 2003-2016 period in Chapter IV—a time of declining military influence in politics—this period was the height of the military’s political role. Excepting a brief recession in political clout during the administration of Turgut Özal, a rare politician able to assert his preferences over the military, the military enjoyed a predominant position in politics.
This chapter begins in 1980, with the coup of 12 September. This period was selected due to the extreme internal security challenges that preceded the coup, and the radical restructuring of the state the Turkish military engaged in following the coup. This extreme example highlights the manner in which the military can use securitization to increase its relative power. The next case looks at the 1987 efforts by Turgut Özal’s government to strengthen civilian control over counterinsurgency following the rise of the PKK. This provides a counterexample, describing how civilians employ securitizing moves to decrease military autonomy and to bolster its own homogeneity. The following sections then apply the framework to key moments in Turkish CMR in 1993 and 1997 to examine the connection between power and securitization.

This chapter is intended to provide both an empirical overview of Turkish civil-military relations, and a test case for the competitive securitization framework. Discussion of the findings and implications for wider use are in Chapter V.

### 3.1 Securitizing Moves: 1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Background</th>
<th>Securitizing Move</th>
<th>Balance of Power</th>
<th>Civil-Military Outcome</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Extreme left-right violence and government paralysis.</td>
<td>Military: CGS Evren post-coup speech on the military government’s rational and program.</td>
<td>Increasing</td>
<td>Low</td>
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*Figure 5: Competitive Securitization Framework: Turkey, 1980*

#### 3.1.1 Background:

Deep political polarization had been a feature of Turkish politics since the 1960 military coup and the attendant left-right political violence had spurred Turkey’s 1971 coup. After civilian rule was restored, left-right polarization and violence returned with it, reaching levels far beyond 1968-71. Statistics released in 1982 reported 9,765 clashes or armed
attacks, 4,040 deaths, 11,160 injuries due to terrorism and political violence (excluding alleged terrorists), and 804,197 weapons seized (94% of these only after the 1980 coup).\textsuperscript{1}

Ultranationalist ‘idealistic’ clubs, most notably *bozkurtlar* (Grey Wolves), clashed on the streets with a wide array of left-wing militant organizations, engaging in assassinations and other violence.\textsuperscript{2} Many organizations had direct ties to political parties; the Grey Wolves, for example were supported by Alparslan Türkç, the leader of the nationalist *Milliyetçi Haraket Partisi* (The Nationalist Action Party—MHP).

Spiraling political violence was the driving consideration in the 1980 coup. Successive governments proved unwilling or unable to deal with the crisis, which some at the time referred to as “civil war.”\textsuperscript{3} Heterogeneity in civilian government compounded instability, with no political alliance able to control the *Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi* (Turkish Grand National Assembly—TBMM) for long.\textsuperscript{4} Turkey saw ten governments from 1971 to 1980, and only one—a four-party coalition under Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel—that lasted over a year.\textsuperscript{5} This instability was most clearly illustrated after April 1980, when former President Fahri Korutürk’s term expired, leaving the TBMM to elect a new President. However, it was so fractured that it repeatedly failed to elect a new President after over 100 rounds of voting.\textsuperscript{6} The combination of political violence and government paralysis caused the TSK launch a coup on 12 September 1980.


\textsuperscript{3} “MHP: Türkiye’de iç savaş tezgâhlanıyor.” *Cumhuriyet*, 4 December 1979, p. 1

\textsuperscript{4} Ibid., 209-210.


\textsuperscript{6} Ibid., 232-233.
A new feature of political violence in the 1970s—one that was not a significant factor before the earlier 1971 coup—was Kurdish nationalist violence. Most notably, the Partiya Karkarên Kurdistanê (Kurdistan Worker’s Party—PKK) emerged as a political and military force.\(^7\) While it would not become the principal Kurdish militant group until 1984, the PKK caused 354 deaths—mostly ethnic Kurds—from its founding in 1978 to 1980.\(^8\) In this early stage, the PKK downplayed its leftist ideological origins, avoiding the word “communist” in favour of “workers” and “revolutionaries” in its manifesto. It only adopted the Maoist conception of ‘people’s war’ when the insurgency resumed in 1984.

3.1.2 Securitizing Moves: Military

The military was the principal securitizing actor. The speech act occurred shortly after the 12 September coup in a speech by Kenan Evren, Chief of General Staff (CGS) and Chairman of the Milli Güvenlik Kurulu (National Security Council—MGK).\(^9\) The speech sought to justify the military’s action, arguing the unity of Turkey and its people’s lives faced an existential threat from three sources: (1) anarchy; (2) partisan violence; and (3) government inaction. This securitizing move led to Turkey’s 1982 Constitution, which sought to address each of these threats.

Regarding anarchy, Evren emphasized the military had little choice but to intervene for fear of state collapse in Turkey. He argued that, although a coup would mean extreme political and legal disruption, the threat of state collapse warranted the response:

> The dimensions of the incidents of anarchy and violence employing hostile methods and goals necessitated special legislative measures, administrative reorganizations, the promotion of social conditions and the rearrangement of national education and business life ... [but] the term, state of law ... was

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\(^7\) Saray, Political Violence and Terrorism in Turkey, 1976-80, 203.


interpreted by certain institutions as the protection of individuals, even if this meant the disruption of the state … [which was] left without any protection.\textsuperscript{10}

Evren argued that, even where legal authorities took action, the opposition demanded compromises that made such steps ineffective. He claimed that constitutional institutions meant to preserve the nation were “transformed into conflicting authorities.” Without TSK action, therefore, the state would “collapse and would be destroyed.”

The speech also emphasized the threat of partisan violence. From Evren’s view, the threat was not only that violence had escalated, but that the violence had become cyclical and self-reinforcing. It had created the feedback loop, increasing polarization in Turkey and pulling the country away from its Kemalist roots:

Turkish citizens who share the same religious and national values have been divided into several camps through partisanship and concocted divisiveness and have been incited to kill each other pitilessly as if they were enemies. Ten years ago, who would have thought that our Republic, founded on the principles of Atatürk, would be brought to this state?

The key existential threat for Evren was not the violence in itself. Rather, it was the underlying polarization. Extreme partisanship meant, for Evren and the TSK, that Kemalist democracy was failing. This rationale would justify the 12 September military regime’s later amendments to the Martial Law Act, which enabled it to “ban strikes, public meetings and demonstrations, suspend newspapers and other publications, and to dismiss local and central government staff” unilaterally, without civilian or public input and appeal.\textsuperscript{11} From Evren’s view, it was only by correcting the underlying partisanship that violence could be stopped.

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{11} The military regime was officially run by the National Security Board (\textit{Milli Güvenlik Kenseyi—NSB}) led by the CGS (Kenan Evren) and all of Turkey’s force commanders, although in 1981 a “Constituent Assembly,” was created. It was a bicameral government of the NSB and a “Consultative Assembly” of 160 civilians appointed by the NSB. Hale, \textit{Turkish Politics and the Military}, 251.
Throughout the speech, Evren emphasized the repeated warnings he and the General Staff had given politicians and Turkish society. On 30 August, only two weeks previously, for example, Evren gave a speech on Turkey’s Armed Forces Day which, while calling for an end to martial law, argued that “finding a solution [to anarchy] is the duty of the [TBMM].”¹² This notion was echoed again in the post-coup speech:

The Turkish Armed Forces, which have been closely observing these extremely regrettable events for some time, had warned all the constitutional organizations, which were unable to exercise the authority that was granted to them by the nation and which were impotent in the face of this terrible course of events … Since 22 March 1980, our assemblies which passed some ineffective laws following this letter of warning, have wasted time.

Government inaction reinforced the long-held military belief that it could not trust civilians with democracy.¹³ The belief had a long history, and for Evren, the failure of the 1971 intervention proved that it was not enough to simply overthrow PM Demirel—who had also been PM in 1971—and his government. The TSK needed to entirely restructure Turkish politics. To this end, the TSK banned parties and politicians believed responsible for the paralysis and violence, including Türkeş and the MHP, Demirel and his Justice Party, Bülent Ecevit’s Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party—CHP), and Necmettin Erbakan’s Islamist Millî Selâmet Partisi (National Salvation Party—MSP).¹⁴

The government, for its part, took no steps toward a counter-securitization in the face of the coup and Evren’s speech. It had been paralyzed by weeks of political turmoil. The MSP had led massive demonstrations in Konya on 6 September, calling for an Islamic state just a week after its leader, Erbakan, had refused to attend Armed Forces

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¹⁴ Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military, 252-53.
Day, saying he was “neither against nor on the side of” the holiday. Moreover, Ecevit and the CHP had appeared to align with Erbakan, joining with them in an attempt to force Demirel’s government to resign—despite having no plans to replace it. Ecevit also appeared to be stoking leftist extremism, calling for workers to join the political struggle on the streets; in his words, to “come down from the stands and onto the pitch.” After the coup, some did criticize the TSK—including a conspiratorial accusation from Demirel that it had deliberately permitted violence to escalate out of control—but none of these reach the criteria to constitute a securitizing move.

3.1.3 Balance of Power:

Military Autonomy: Increasing

The TSK’s freedom of action expanded across all seven indicators of military autonomy: the MGK; the Presidency; defence organization; military budgets; defence procurement and modernization; internal security and intelligence; and senior promotions. Most notably, TSK power was not only increased by the military regime; the 1982 Turkish Constitution legitimated the TSK’s bolstered autonomy as a corrective to anarchy.

The MGK was heavily empowered by the 1982 constitution, and was effectively converted into the principal governing body of the 12 September regime, the National Security Board. This privileged position was retained with the return to civilian government. The MGK’s constituting article, Article 118, was placed under the Constitution’s chapter governing Turkey’s Executive Branch. The article mandated Turkey’s Council of Ministers (cabinet) give “priority consideration” to MGK

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17 *Turkish Constitution, 1982*, c. 2, l, no. 2, art. 118.
recommendations. It also ensured the body’s balance would remain in the TSK’s favour. Chaired by the President, it consisted of the Prime Minister, the Defence Minister, the CGS, and the force commanders of the Army, Navy, Airforce and Gendarmerie. The MGK’s informal powers were aksi greatly expanded, with the TBMM and the government frequently acting as a rubber stamp for its recommendations through the early-mid 1980s. Protesting MGK policies was forbidden during the 12 September regime and into the early years of restored civilian government.

The Presidency was brought directly under the control of the TSK. CGS Evren was personally elected to the post, without contest, as an addendum to the constitutional referendum on 7 November 1982 that passed with 90% of the vote. Moreover, the constitution’s Provisional Article 2 provided the military direct access to the Presidency in the form of a Presidential Council of the CGS and his force commanders. The Council remained in force for six years. The Presidency was also granted significantly expanded powers and assumed a more explicitly Kemalist guardianship role, while remaining within the framework of Turkey’s parliamentary system. The president was empowered to appoint members of judicial bodies, including the Constitutional Court, return legislation to parliament or refer it to the Constitutional Court for annulment, to call the Council of Ministers and MGK to meet, and to represent the military in the TBMM.

On the organization of defence, budgets, and procurement, the military was greatly empowered. While powers over these issues began to return to civilian government with the 1983 general elections, the devolution were limited. That year, Turgut Özal, a civil

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19 Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military, 257.
20 Ibid., 258.
servant of the pre-coup Demirel administration who was kept on in the military regime as Deputy PM for Economic Affairs, founded the Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party—ANAP). Consisting of a big-tent coalition of pro-Western liberals, former MSP Islamists, and former MHP ultranationalists, ANAP won the election with 45% of the vote. It focused its platform on economic questions, in order to mollify a TSK wary of trusting civilians with democracy.\textsuperscript{21} The 1982 Constitution had granted no auditing powers to the government in procurement and on defence budget details, and beyond traditional funding the TSK ensured it had access to extra-budgetary funds. With regard to promotions, no changes were made to reduce the pre-coup powers of the Yüksek Askeri Şûra (Supreme Military Council—YAŞ), ensuring the council a monopoly of control over military appointments.\textsuperscript{22} Only those appointment that were the responsibility of other constitutional authorities, like the Presidency’s ability to appoint of the CGS, saw civilian control—and even on those matters, the General Staff still had significant input.

Finally, the TSK radically expanded its authority over internal security. The military regime’s immediate efforts to end political violence had been harsh, occasionally extreme, and many of the authorities it assumed in this period were retained under civilian government. Through the Jandarma Genel Komutanlığı (Gendarmerie General Command—JGK), the TSK had indirect control over most domestic counterterror operations. Under Law No. 2803 on the Duties and Powers of the Gendarmerie, the JGK’s General Commander was appointed on the proposal of the CGS, with a suggestion from the Ministry of the Interior.\textsuperscript{23} The powers of security forces under

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Hale, \textit{Turkish Politics and the Military}, 276-280.}
\footnote{YAŞ is the body responsible for military and appointments for senior staff. Ibid., 205.}
\end{footnotes}
martial law were greatly expanded, granting police and gendarmes more latitude to detain and use force against militants or protesters.\textsuperscript{24} Security forces also took control of public communication of the Kurdish question after the PKK’s August 1984 declaration of a ‘people’s war’ against the Turkish State, engaging reporters to communicate the nature of the PKK threat and its intentions.\textsuperscript{25} The TSK addressed the expansion of Kurdish nationalist sentiment in 1983 by advancing Law No. 2932. The law banned the use of non-Turkish native languages in an effort to decrease the use of Kurdish and hamper Kurdish nationalist mobilization.\textsuperscript{26}

\textit{Elite Homogeneity: Low}

The 12 September coup and its aftermath were overwhelmingly negative for elite homogeneity. All the major political voices of the 1970s, from Demirel and Ecevit, to Türkeş and Erbakan, were banned from politics. Homogeneity decreased on two of three indicators: support for the dominant civilian leader and the leader’s support in parliament. Only in elections did the civilian government secure some victories.

Under the 12 September Regime, there was no dominant civilian leader. This enabled the emergence of Turgut Özal as a political force. He had made a name for himself in January 1980, with his work on the Demirel government’s economic reforms. This allowed him to avoid a ban and become Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs under military rule.\textsuperscript{27} He used this position to build a diverse coalition of former members of the Justice Party, the MSP and the MHP under the ANAP banner, contesting

\textsuperscript{26} Graham E. Fuller and Henri J. Barkey, \textit{Turkey’s Kurdish Question} (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998): 64.
\textsuperscript{27} Hale, \textit{Turkish Politics and the Military}, 248.
and defeating a military-backed party in the November 1983 elections with 45.1% of the vote.\textsuperscript{28} ANAP followed this success with a 41% plurality in the March 1984 local elections, demonstrating it had the electoral strength to survive in post-coup Turkey.

However, Özal’s public support was unclear despite these successes. While the citizenry was strongly supportive of a return to civilian government, the Özal administration was frequently seen as illegitimate. This sentiment had two principal sources: (1) ANAP was believed to benefit from military restrictions on political participation; and (2) The arbitrary and informal nature of Özalist liberalizing economic reforms raised well-justified concerns over corruption.\textsuperscript{29} Özal built a strong centre-right coalition that became increasingly popular over the course of his administration, but these shadows on his legitimacy gave stores of ammunition to his opposition. In contrast to the 12 September Regime, suggestions of illegitimacy dogged Özal’s early administration.

Compared to the military regime, the tangibility of Özal’s public support was precarious. While there had been concern over the military government’s abuse of martial law, power to silence and detain, and (allegations of) torture, the 1982 referendum demonstrated near-universal support (91.4% in favour, 91.3% turnout) for TSK-led reforms.\textsuperscript{30}

The Özal administration also faced persistent opposition in the TBMM. While ANAP had a majority, the party’s big-tent nature ensured that it had difficulty coming together on a single platform.\textsuperscript{31} Additionally, the military regime continued to ban the two parties that many in parliament believed would pose a serious challenge to him:

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., 268, 278.
\textsuperscript{30} Hale, \textit{Turkish Politics and the Military}, 251-253, 256.
\textsuperscript{31} Tanel Demirel, “The Turkish Military’s Decision to Intervene: 12 September 1980,” \textit{Armed Forces and Society} 29 no. 2 (2003): 258.
Demirel’s **Doğru Yol Partisi** (True Path Party—DYP) and the **Democratik Sol Parti** (Democratic Left Party—DSP) led by Ecevit’s wife, Rahşan. Parliamentary pressure from the opposition also started to seep into ANAP, with deputies of his own party—many former members of banned parties—frustrated by Özal’s inaction and apparent willingness to use the bans to benefit his political prospects. This pressure eventually forced Özal to back a referendum in 1985 to lift the ban on many pre-coup politicians.32

### 3.1.4 Civil-Military Outcome: Appeased Discordance

The 12 September Regime securitized anarchy, violence, and government paralysis as an existential threat to the Turkish State. The consequence was the 1982 Constitution, which transformed Turkish politics by bolstering the TSK’s means of political intervention. The new constitutional order was more authoritarian and centralized than its predecessor, providing the civilian government only limited avenues for political expression and instituting sweeping bans on pre-coup politicians that reverberated throughout the 1980s.

The CMR outcome in 1980 was ‘appeased discordance.’ The military shirked, both through its coup operations and in the aftermath. While the TSK returned governance to civilians relatively swiftly, it would not trust them with democracy. The civilians, for their part, rewarded the military. Demirel willingly stepped down in 1980, even if he later criticized the operation, and PM Özal sought to appease the military in his early years, ceding foreign and security policy to the TSK. This outcome matches the competitive securitization framework’s proposed causal link: The military, the only actor with a successful securitizing move, alone took assertive concordance action by shirking.

32 Though Ozal was reticent to enable a revival of pre-coup politicians, this was necessary to prove his government was legitimate and didn’t only rule through a lack of opposition. Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, 277
3.2 Securitizing Moves: 1987

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Figure 6: Competitive Securitization Framework: Turkey, 1987

3.2.1 Background:

The most significant shift in internal security between 1980 and 1987 was the rise of the PKK as the dominant insurgent force in Turkey. The 12 September Regime’s crackdown had reduced open left-right conflict, but measures against Kurdish nationalists had, if anything, increased the violence. Its actions in southeastern Turkey had convinced the PKK to adopt a new political and military program at its second congress in August 1982, drawing from the Maoist conception of a ‘people’s war.’

The PKK engaged the TSK and other security forces over the course of 1982-3, but its propaganda emphasized objectives short of separatism. Due to the secure position state forces had in cities in southeastern Turkey, the PKK was forced to operate principally in rural areas. However, even these actions caused deep concern in the TSK. President Evren, in 1983 raised the spectre of separatism, saying “The Apoists would control [southeastern Turkey, the Kurdish region]. They have declared Diyarbakır their capital. Should these actions succeed, these lands will be detached from us. This is what we should fear.”

On 22 July 1984, the low-level conflict erupted into a full-scale insurgency. Attacks by the PKK on installations near Eruh and Şemdinli marked the beginning of a new phase.

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33 Ciğerli and le Saout, Öcalan et la PKK, 68-69.
34 “Apoist” is a reference to followers of Abdullah Öcalan, called ‘Apo’ by his followers because it is a short form of ‘Abdullah,’ and means ‘uncle’ in Kurdish. Quoted in ibid., 70.
of Kurdish political violence.\textsuperscript{35} Clashes between PKK militants and the TSK, along with gendarmes and police, became increasingly frequent through the mid-1980s. Precise numbers are highly unreliable, particularly for this early period of the conflict, but according to JGK data, 3,568 people were killed as a result of the conflict in 1984-1991.\textsuperscript{36} The JGK took most of the responsibility for combatting the PKK, but Turkey’s liberal Internal Service Law and the ongoing state of Martial Law allowed for significant Army involvement.\textsuperscript{37} The 1983 Gendarmerie Law technically provided for significant input from provincial governors, as Gendarmerie Regional Commands were legally responsible to them. In practice, however, the TSK asserted JGK had control of Regional Commands on issues of safety, law and order—in other words, most gendarmerie operations.

The PKK made extensive use of the mountains in Iraq, Syria and Iran to carry out its operations. This international dimension significantly complicated the Turkish State’s operations against the PKK. The conclusion of the Iran-Iraq War in 1989, for example, made weapons abundant in northern Iraq and thus smuggling became a chief security concern. It forced Ankara to expend significant money on the infrastructure and development of southeastern Turkey to ensure rapid responses to border incidents.\textsuperscript{38} Additionally, the anti-Kurdish Anfal genocide in Iraq and a 1991 crackdown forced thousands of Kurdish refugees toward Turkey’s Iraqi and Iranian border, opening ties between the PKK and Iraqi Kurdish organizations. Foreign state support for the PKK, particularly by Syria and Iran, also became increasingly pressing. This linked the PKK


\textsuperscript{36} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{37} Sarıibrahimoğlu, “Gendarmerie,” 144-145.

\textsuperscript{38} Andrew Mango, \textit{Turkey and the War on Terror: For Forty Years We Fought Alone} (London: Routledge, 2005): 39-40
question to Syria’s disputes with Turkey over water and control of the disputed Hatay region, as well as to questions of Turkey’s NATO membership and trade ties with Iran.\(^{39}\) This foreign dimension meant greater TSK responsibility for the PKK, as the Özal government broadly left issues of foreign affairs to President Evren and the MGK.

In the political arena, by 1987, Özal’s government had begun to face increasing pressure from his political rivals due to the lack of a “real” opposition. While the 1985 reforms had enabled many pre-coup politicians to enter government, they were still restricted. The 1982 Constitution’s Provisional Article 4 prevented pre-coup party leaders from establishing, joining or have relations with any political parties before 1992.\(^{40}\) Despite his reticence, Özal put up the article’s repeal, along with a number of other constitutional amendments, for referendum in May 1987, which passed with 50.2%. Özal thus faced an increasingly precarious political position as former leaders returned to government. This weakened his hand against the generals and demanded a new approach.

Finally, the role of religion in society was changing. Among the many policies the 12 September Regime had advanced was that of ‘Turkish-Islamic Synthesis.’ Traditional Kemalist thought sought to distance Turkish identity from religion in order to break with the Ottoman legacy. However, the National Security Board had recognized that this had in part contributed to the 1970s’ extreme left-right violence.\(^{41}\) The generals’ response was to employ Islam as a tool that could unite Turks, providing an anti-communist bulwark and co-opting anti-Kemalist ultranationalists. However, by the late 1980s, this had also

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\(^{40}\) Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, 279-280.

provided an avenue for political Islam to re-enter the public discourse, led by an Erbakan seeking to revive his MSP in some form. Özal’s government, in part made up of former Islamists, were susceptible to this influence.

3.2.2 Securitizing Moves: Civilian

Both the military and the civilian government engaged in securitizing moves in 1987. While the military, particularly through the MGK and President Evren, remained dominant, PM Özal took moves to assert more civil control over counterinsurgency. Özal’s principal securitizing move came in January 1987. A statement by the State of Emergency Coordination Council of the Prime Ministry outlined a proposal to replace Martial Law with what would become the Ölağanüstü Hâl Bölge Valiliği (Regional State of Emergency Governorate—ÖHAL region). While Evren and the generals accepted the ÖHAL region, they were extremely reticent. The military, for its part, attempted—and ultimately failed—to securitize religious fundamentalism, which it linked to the PKK.

The ÖHAL region, instituted in July 1987, was a significant break in Turkey’s counterinsurgency policy. It represented a shift from almost exclusive control of counterinsurgency by the TSK and the JGK to a civilian system that greatly expanded the powers of governors and the Council of Ministers. While under the martial law regime, the martial law commander was responsible for directing counterterror activities, ÖHAL placed them under a civilian ÖHAL Governor. It also granted the ÖHAL Governor the ability to request additional TSK and Gendarmerie forces through the Ministry of the Interior, granting increased input on counterinsurgency by the Council of Ministers—and

42 Ibid.
thus, PM Özal—in a way in which had previously been impossible. These changes, and
the greater civilian role triggered intense resistance from the TSK and President Evren;
future CGS Doğan Güreş (1990-1994) would later call ÖHAL his “greatest challenge,”
due to its unclear chain of command.\textsuperscript{45} President Evren also took the unusual step to
invoke his constitutional powers to personally chair the Council of Ministers meeting in
March when the ÖHAL was discussed.\textsuperscript{46} Özal anticipated this kind of resistance, already
present in late 1986, and reconceptualised how the PKK was securitized.

On 8 January 1987, the Prime Minister’s State of Emergency Council released a
statement on the ÖHAL proposal. This followed a meeting with all governors under a
state of emergency, including the governors of the 10 provinces that would constitute the
ÖHAL region: Adıyaman, Bingöl, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Hakkari, Mardin, Muş, Siirt,
Tunceli, and Van. It explained:

The courageous efforts and vigilance of the security forces, and especially the
support of the people, have been prominent factors in achieving [an improvement
in security under martial law]. However, despite these positive developments the
importance of maintaining our efforts and vigilance in national unity and
solidarity has been stressed, due to our country’s geopolitical position and the
goals and activities of foreign forces vis-à-vis our country.\textsuperscript{47}

The core change in securitization was the emphasis on foreign dimensions of the
PKK insurgency. This allowed the government to accomplish two goals: (1) align with
ongoing securitization by the TSK and President Evren of the transnational nature of the
PKK insurgency; and (2) make national unity a referent object, under existential threat
not just by the PKK, but also by Turkey’s militarized response. This enabled the ÖHAL
proposal to provide the TSK an opportunity to support democratization, while also

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{46} “Evren Not Replacing Ozal by Chairing Meeting,” \textit{Anatolia}, 9 March 1987, FBIS-WEU-87-046, T: 1.
\textsuperscript{47} “State of Emergency Council Assesses Order,” \textit{Ankara Domestic Service}. 
preserving an alternate avenue of influence through the foreign dimensions. As a secondary, parallel effect, ÖHAL’s foreign dimensions also became an avenue for greater influence by Özal in foreign affairs. Most notably, this was borne out in 1988, when the PM accepted tens of thousands of Kurdish refugees from Iraqi chemical weapon attacks, overriding TSK concerns and providing a significant role for the Defence Ministry.48

The General Staff was frustrated by Özal’s efforts, but its own securitizing move was ultimately unsuccessful. The military chose to securitize the breakdown of its own Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. Özal’s links to Islamism had long concerned President Evren and the General Staff, who repeatedly raised this criticism.49 However, securitization failed because the speech acts were mostly kept private, or were relatively low-key.

The clearest publicized speech act is President Evren’s address at Eskişehir Anadolu University in November 1986. The statement was not a new criticism; in the lead-up to the November 1983 general elections, Evren had made a TV broadcast in which he argued that the people should not vote to “allow a small minority to destroy the state”—in other words, not for Özal. His November 1986, echoed this sentiment:

> These [Islamist] movements that were active in the past, that aim at destroying all the values that form the foundation of the regime in Turkey, and that were halted with the 12 September operation, are trying to become active in our country again … [Do not] be taken in by this game and [be] alert at all times.50

Evren’s words were in part a response to Özal’s increasing tendency to advance measures that pandered to ANAP’s Islamic wing. This included permission for female

49 Özlem K. Pusane, “Turkey’s Struggle with the PKK and Civilian Control over the Turkish Armed Forces,” Conflict, Security and Development 16 no. 3 (2016): 271.
students to wear headscarves at university—a measure Evren strongly condemned—
alongside changes that provided prayer time for civil servants, and expanded options for
religious education. The General Staff joined Evren in condemning rising political
Islam, and in December, the MGK considered measured to combat “fundamentalism.”

However, although Evren frequently criticized Özal for his willingness to bend to
Islamists, his speech act failed because it was frequently in private. Additionally, in
public, Özal sought to assure his audience that there were no substantive differences in
opinion between him and the President, nor him and the generals. As a result, Özal’s re-
contextualized securitization of the PKK as a civilian problem proved far more successful
than Evren’s securitization of Islam for the period immediately after 1987.

3.2.3 Balance of Power:

Military Autonomy: Decreasing

Military autonomy should considered to be decreasing because of the seven indicators,

four decreased: the Presidency, military budgets, internal security, and senior promotions.

Özal’s most significant breakthrough on military autonomy was his demilitarization
of the Presidency. In practice, the move was based functionally in self-preservation;
despite ÖHAL, successes in foreign policy, and a recovering economy, ANAP was losing
steam. In the 1989 local elections, it was third party after Erdal İnönü’s Sosyaldemokrat
Halkçı Parti (Social Democrat Populist Party—SHP) and Demirel’s DYP, demonstrating
it was likely that ANAP would lose the 1991 general elections. With that in mind, after

51 Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military, 281.
52 Yavuz Gokmen and Muharrem Sarikaya, “Report Details Fundamentalism Countermeasures,” Hurriyet,
53 Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military, 297-300.
54 Levent Gönenç, “Presidential Elements in Government: Turkey,” European Constitutional Law Review 4
Evren’s term expired in November 1989, Özal used his majority in the TBMM to secure his own election to the Presidency. This granted Özal not only a tool for his political fights with the SHP-DYP coalition when it came to power in 1991, but also a position to criticize the General Staff from safety and remove a key tool of the TSK’s political influence. The position granted Özal access to foreign and defence policy in a manner he had not possessed as Prime Minister and he was able to raise the question of oversight for military budget in a manner that had not been possible for a civilian since before the 12 September coup. Özal also eliminated the Presidential Council that gave the CGS and the force commanders direct advisory access to the Presidency.

The ÖHAL region granted significant control over internal security to the civilian government. Prior to 1987, Özal had only once been able to advance a major internal security initiative, namely the village guard system that armed rural citizens as a counterterror measure. ÖHAL, alongside general benefits to civil control, strengthened civil control of the village guard system by making the civilian ÖHAL Governor the main point of contact for village leaders. Additionally, Özal was able to increase civilian participation in intelligence. In late 1987, Turkey’s civilian Millî İstihbarat Teşkilatı (National Intelligence Organization—MİT) was made responsible for the governors’ intelligence in the ÖHAL region, displacing the JGK’s monopoly of counterinsurgency intelligence through its then-secret intelligence branch, Jandarma İstihbarat ve Terörle Mücadele (Gendarmerie Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism—JİTEM). MİT reported

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55 In Turkey, prior to 2014, the president was elected by the TBMM, rather than in a direct election.
56 Ibid., 508-510.
directly to civilian governors and even had power to temporarily or permanently expel suspicious gendarmes.⁵⁹ A larger MİT role was combined with changes to its recruitment and appointment process that gave the PM far more control. Özal resisted leaving the PKK purely to the military, taking an interest in political solutions. In April 1991, he worked with the DYP-SHP government to pass a Law for the Suppression of Terrorism, reforming parts of the Turkish Penal Code that targeted Kurdish political mobilization by removing the ban on societies advocating Marxist or religious reform.⁶⁰ By 1992, Özal was exploring an—ultimately doomed—negotiated solution to the PKK conflict.

On senior promotions, PM Özal was able to persuade President Evren to appoint his preferred CGS candidate in 1987, Necip Torumtay, over the General Staff’s preference, General Necdet Öztorun.⁶¹ Although as President, Özal was unable to so effectively advance his preferences at the YAŞ for other senior posts, his position as President by its virtue alone granted him greater input than he had previously; Özal was later able to force CGS Torumtay to resign before the General’s four-year term expired.⁶²

**Elite Homogeneity: High**

Elite homogeneity is complex for this period, but should be considered high, as support for the dominant civilian leader and the leader’s support in parliament remained relatively strong until 1991. Elections went poorly for ANAP after 1987.

In 1987, Özal won another majority government, but ANAP’s vote share fell from 45.1% to 36.3%. Özal faced an increasingly precarious political position as pre-coup party leaders returned to government. His efforts to table but block the constitutional

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⁶¹ Pusane, “Insurgencies, Counterinsurgencies, and Civil-Military Relations,” 54-56.
referendum on the removal of political bans on opposition candidates like Ecevit and Demirel in 1987 failed when the referendum passed. The 1989 local elections saw ANAP drop from its 1983 41.5% plurality of the vote to only 21.8%, the third party behind SHP and DYP. This trend continued in 1991’s general elections, as Demirel’s DYP won a plurality with 27% of the vote, with ANAP—now led by Mesut Yılmaz—in second, just ahead of İnönü’s SHP. This election produced a DYP-SHP coalition, hostile to Özal.

Despite ANAP’s electoral failures, Özal’s personal popularity remained strong. During his time as PM and in his Presidency, Özal advanced and implemented radical economic reforms. A neoliberal, pro-capital, and export-oriented style transformed the Turkish economy and earned him a wide base of support. As ANAP hemorrhaged votes, marred by corruption allegations, Özal was relatively free of condemnation—even if his refusal to close export subsidy loopholes contributed significantly to that corruption.

The question of Ozal’s support in the TBMM also became more complex with the ascension of the DYP-SHP coalition under Prime Minister Demirel. Between 1987 and 1991, when either Özal or his close ally, Mesut Yılmaz, were Prime Minister, Özal’s support was firm, and majority government provided a smooth legislative agenda. By contrast, Özal clashed frequently with PM Demirel and his government, and made liberal use of ‘bypass laws’ to force his agenda past government opposition. However, the key metric by which TBMM support is classified as ‘high’ for the period is that Özal’s

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63 Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, 279-80
66 Ibid., 122
clashes with PM Demirel did not see them lose alignment on the military. In November 1991, for example, the government proposed a reduction of TSK personnel from 470,000 to 280,000. 68 Despite deep misgivings by the General Staff, and protests from CGS Torumtay’s successor, CGS Doğan Güreş, Demirel’s willingness to support Özal on the issue convinced the TSK to assent to the reduction.

3.2.4 Civil-Military Outcome: Coerced Concordance

The Özal administration securitized martial law and rejected a fully militarized response to the PKK Insurgency. It advanced the ÖHAL region as an alternative, proposing to reform counterinsurgency policy and place significant power in civilian hands. The military sought to securitize ANAP’s ties to Islamism, but failed largely due to its quiet approach to the question and Özal’s repeated reassurances to the public. The consequence was an empowered ANAP government that won a majority (if weakened from 1983) victory in the 1987 elections. This led to Özal’s election to the Presidency and secured him means to continue to reduce military autonomy.

The CMR outcome of the 1987 period was ‘coerced concordance.’ The military worked, in spite of a reticence to accept Özal’s infringement on its 12 September powers. The Özal government, in contrast to its earlier conciliatory policy, capitalized on this and asserted its preferences in military decision-making. While there is little question that the military remained legally dominant and civil control was not established, Özal’s capable statecraft and securitization gave him a larger role in internal security and defence policy. This coincides with the competitive securitization framework’s proposed causal link: The government, the only actor with a successful securitizing move, ‘punished’ the military.

68 Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military, 293-294.
3.3 Securitizing Moves: 1993

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Figure 7: Competitive Securitization Framework: Turkey, 1993

3.3.1 Background:

On 17 April 1993, President Turgut Özal died of a heart attack at a difficult moment for Turkey. The Armenian-Azerbaijani war over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region had escalated with Armenia’s fist open incursion into Azerbaijan proper, worrying Turkey for the future of its newly-independent Turkic neighbour. Wars in Yugoslavia remained a serious concern. Turkey-Iran tensions rose as both countries struggled to find a place in a post-Cold War world, competing over influence in the new nations of the Caucasus and Central Asia. Turkey’s ties to Azerbaijan were particularly contentious, given irredentist noises in Baku over Turks in Iranian Azerbaijan struggling against “oppression.”

Most pertinently for this study, Özal’s death cut short nascent peace negotiations between the PKK and Ankara. The 1991 Gulf War strengthened pan-nationalist Kurdish voices in Syria and Iraq; the sentiment slowly diffused across the border and bolstered PKK popular support. This induced Özal to advance a political solution, and he took a personal role in preparing the tentative agreement on which negotiations would have been based. After talks in February, the PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire on 17 March.

However, the President’s death heralded the death of the ceasefire; just a month afterward, PKK elements killed 33 Turkish soldiers and 5 civilians in an ambush by Bingöl. While the attack apparently took place without his consent, Ocalan called it “retaliation” for TSK actions during the ceasefire, officially resuming the conflict on 8 June.

The ceasefire’s collapse triggered the most significant surge in PKK violence in history. Recognizing the failure of the rural, take-and-hold tactics it had pursued in the 1980s, the PKK changed its approach. Seeing a link between political support for its agenda and violence, it adopted terroristic, urbanized tactics. This change led to deaths far in excess of those it had caused in the 1980s, or even those of the left-right chaos of the 1970s. The 1992-1995 period saw an estimated 16,613 deaths related to PKK insurgency—up from just 3,568 for 1984-1991.

The military’s response was predictable: without a strong civilian agent discussing political resolution, a counterinsurgency ‘surge’ was pursued. This reversal of late-Özal administration policy required the TSK to reassert itself politically. The Gulf War had triggered a surge in national consciousness among Kurds, and the PKK capitalized on this by supporting Serhildan, a series of popular anti-police or anti-state protests in Kurdish majority towns, like Diyarbakır, Cizre, and Şırnak. This coincided with growing support for political parties dominated by Kurds, most notably the Halken Emek Partisi.
(People’s Labour Party—HEP). Repression by police and gendarmes became widespread, and this period became known as the “special” or “dirty” war among Kurds. Cross-border hit-and-run operations planned using intelligence from collaborators in Turkey, from PKK strongholds in the Syrian or Iraqi Kandil mountains, became increasingly common. However, state efforts to locate collaborators in small towns or otherwise re-establish state control over small villages produced violent forms of suppression that often increased local sympathy for the PKK.78

3.3.2 Securitizing Moves: Both (Cooperative)

After Özal’s death, the TSK set out to reassert control over internal security. It began its securitization when CGS Doğan Güreş took over public communications on the PKK. He argued PKK insurgency demanded a greater TSK role, raising a possible return to martial law. The government, led by Demirel, succeeding Özal as President, and Tansu Çiller, succeeding Demirel as PM, initially shied away from the military. By late 1993, the TSK had persuaded them into lockstep with the CGS’s rhetoric on the PKK and Islamism.

The TSK’s securitizing move was CGS Güreş’s interview with Hürriyet on 9 July, 1993. He contended that the PKK represented an existential threat to Turkey’s territorial integrity, and argued the TSK was best placed to respond to it. In his words:

I have established that the PKK has selected Turkey’s territorial integrity as its target. Therefore, as far as strategic concepts are concerned, I have changed the priorities of the Turkish Armed Forces vis-à-vis possible threats. I said that the question of internal threat is the first priority. I decided on that when I was appointed Chief of the General Staff. I informed the commanders not to show me any other threat when drawing up their tactics.79

78 Ibid., 75-76
By calling the PKK the TSK’s “first priority,” Güreş sought to bring authority for counterinsurgency directly under the TSK. This would reverse Özal-era policy, when the Interior Ministry had substantially more responsibility in the ÖHAL region. He also sought to reverse the trend of the late 1980s and early ’90s that focused the military on external threats by returning to the TSK an internal security role.

Notably, Güreş also began securitizing Islamism during the same interview. He called those questioning the place of secularism in the Constitution “fanatics” and stated “[Turkey’s] democratic, secular, and social state of law, which is committed to Atatürk’s concept of nationalism ... cannot be debated.” These comments were likely in reference to Necmettin Erbakan’s Refah Partisi (Welfare Party—RP). The party had seen quickly-growing electoral success, doubling its share of the vote in the 1989 local elections and winning 100 municipalities. It soon entered parliament with 16.2% of the TBMM, or 62 seats. The party was increasingly opposed to Turkey’s secular identity, questioning the subordination of religion to state secularism advocated by those like Güreş. While securitization of Islamism did not near the level it would after 1995, it was a beginning.

Civilian securitization was dragged along behind Güreş. Both President Demirel and Prime Minister Çiller considered other options for much of 1993, but Demirel had joined the TSK by July and Çiller fully backed Güreş’s securitization by November.

From the outset, Demirel and Çiller shared the military’s concerns over Islamism, but the last years of Özal’s leadership had made a political resolution to the Kurdish question far more palatable. Then-PM Demirel, although uncomfortable with Özal’s

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Kurdish opening, visited Diyarbakır, a Kurdish-majority province, in March 1993 and openly recognized Turkey’s “Kurdish Reality,” echoing previous statements he had made in 1991. Çiller also explored options for civilian-led approach to the PKK, namely: (1) a parliamentary Security Council to investigate the Kurdish question; (2) Kurdish-language education and broadcasts on state television; and (3) a ‘Basque model’ granting greater authority to local administrators, with a parallel effort to secure counterterrorism support from Turkey’s neighbours. However, lacking Özal’s strong reputation vis-à-vis the TSK, such efforts soon stalled.

Shortly after becoming President, Demirel closed ranks with the TSK, vocally supporting the anti-PKK crackdown. While Çiller also supported these moves, with her Interior Minister, Mehmet Gazioğlu, stating “we will wipe [the PKK] out … the Army is in full control of the situation,” she continued to float political options. However, she soon came under fire when President Demirel called her proposal for a ‘Basque model’ “a waste of time [that] would only mean dampening the struggle.” Criticism mounted from political and media sources, and CGS Güreş pressured her toward a more hardline stance. By January, she had fallen largely in-line with the military’s position. In an interview with Le Monde, responding to whether she believed the only solution to the

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83 The question of “minorities” in Turkey had generally been dismissed by most Turkish governments, which argued that any group that made its home in Turkey consisted of “Turks.” These approaches echo Kemal’s quote “Ne mutlu Türküm diyene,” (How happy is he who calls himself a Turk).
84 Barkey and Fuller, Turkey’s Kurdish Question, 137.
86 Barkey and Fuller, Turkey’s Kurdish Question, 137-138.
PKK was military in nature, Çiller replied that people in southeastern Turkey wanted the state to protect them, deliberately splitting the question of the PKK from the question of Kurds in Turkey. She considered the former a military question; but the latter would be addressed by “democratization, not only for this region, but for all of Turkey.”

3.3.3 Balance of Power:

Military Autonomy: Increasing

Güreş’s securitization of the PKK as the principal threat to Turkey’s territorial integrity enabled the TSK to wrest near-full control over counterinsurgency from the government. This was positively received by the Turkish public, concerned by PKK statements that it would adopt a terror campaign targeting major cities across Turkey. The TSK rapidly strengthened its control across indicators of military autonomy with government assent, particularly on MGK, the Presidency, senior promotions, and internal security. Control of others, like defence budgets and posture, did not grow but remained a TSK domain.

Güreş managed to increasingly dominate civilians in the MGK on internal security issues by providing a bargain: accede to military demands and receive political support. From early on, Çiller was excluded from MGK planning on the PKK. By early July, all firsthand reports from the ÖHAL region appear to have gone not to Çiller, but her deputy PM, Erdal İnönü, a politician seen as more amenable to TSK interests given his support for the 1980 coup. Excluded from the MGK on PKK issues and facing the opposition’s vocal criticism on her lack of policy experience, Çiller took the TSK’s bargain. Doing so,

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Çiller secured a base of support that ensured her political survival, in exchange for simply needing to furnish the TSK with logistical needs and vocally support a military solution. This also extended to the Presidency, as Demirel—lacking the kind of deep connection to his former party that Özal had held with ANAP—slipped increasingly into the military’s orbit as he became disconnected from the DYP. Given Demirel’s long history of tensions with the TSK, rapprochement with him significantly benefitted the generals.

Senior promotions shifted further under military control—even where civilians had the legal authority. CGS Güreş secured a term extension in 1993 through negotiation and pressure on PM Çiller. He and the force commanders continued to have a dominant role on YAŞ appointments, with governments often acting the rubber stamp for TSK policy.

Internal security became a near-exclusive military concern as the line separating Army from Gendarmerie blurred. The JGK and its intelligence body, JİTEM, adopted a greater counterinsurgency role as MIT influence over internal security and gendarmes was reduced, displaced by rising TSK participation in strategic planning and operations. Gendarmerie Public Security Commands established by ÖHAL were increasingly linked to TSK systems, and the military deepened its engagement with ÖHAL governors. Elite Homogeneity: Low

Elite homogeneity decreased along two indicators, elections and support in the TBMM. Support for the dominant civilian leader, Çiller, can be said to break about even. Despite enormous challenges, she could rely on the TSK for political support after falling in line.

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92 Ibid., 162.
94 Ibid., 183.
On elections, support began to fracture by 1991. The DYP’s plurality win that year—taking 179 of 450 seats in 1991 compared to ANAP’s 112—signaled a return to unstable coalition governments. This was delayed by Demirel’s premiership, who kept the DYP-SHP coalition on stable ground. However, the SHP leadership was far more suspiscious of Çiller, who lacked the political experience to deflect such challenges.\(^9^5\) Her strength stemmed from a personal dynamism that played on a Turkish post-Cold War nationalist instinct.\(^9^6\) While this placed her above the competition in the DYP, it was not enough to truly overcome electoral weakness—a challenge exacerbated by the persistent difficulty that Turkish democracy faced in developing healthy interparty competition.

Tensions in her coalition worsened Çiller’s already difficult situation in the TBMM. She presided over a deeply heterogenous DYP-SHP government and was met with criticism from her own ministers. In the TBMM, she faced competition from the political Islam of Erbakan’s RP at the same moment the TSK abandoned the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis.\(^9^7\) Moreover, she saw little support in Demirel’s Presidency, who aligned with the generals far more than with her. The TSK, still mistrustful of Çiller even after she fell in-line, did support her enough to prevent political challenges from overwhelming her, but did little more than that.\(^9^8\) Public support for Çiller existed, but this and TSK support was insufficient to overcome deep divisions reverberating across post-Özal Turkey.

3.3.4 Civil-Military Outcome: Full Concordance

The military securitized the escalating PKK insurgency, calling for a return to a fully militarized solution. It also securitized, to a lesser degree, political Islam. The failure of

\(^9^6\) John Brown, “Tansu Çiller and the Question of Turkish Identity,” 55-56.
\(^9^7\) Brown, “Tansu Çiller and the Question of Turkish Identity,” 56-57.
Özal’s political approach to the Kurdish question caused PM Çiller to align with TSK on all questions of internal security, despite early efforts to make her own way. This allowed the military to significantly expand its powers in the MGK and on internal security, but it did not seek to extend its reach beyond reversing the more “egregious” Özal-era reforms. Civilian government under Çiller, suffering intense political pressure and low homogeneity, relied on TSK support to compensate for its political vulnerability.

The CMR outcome of the Çiller administration was ‘full concordance.’ The military worked, increasing its political autonomy and influence, but did not take exceptional steps to deepen military tutelage. The government, in turn, rewarded the military. Çiller, as well as Demirel, supported the TSK on all major policy points in exchange for political support. This outcome agrees with the competitive securitization framework’s causal link: Both government and military made complementary securitizing moves, and both took conciliatory actions, with the military working and the government rewarding it.

### 3.4 Securitizing Moves: 1997

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* After the 1997 securitizing move, the TSK’s legal power decreased, but its informal power significantly increased through greater ties to civil society in the so-called “February 28 Process.”

#### Figure 8: Competitive Securitization Framework: Turkey, 1997

### 3.4.1 Background

Refah Partisi was one of several Islamist parties that split off the MSP after its closure in 1980. These Millî Görüş (National Vision) parties were allowed to organize in the ’80s as part of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. The military regime believed they could provide a unifying identity—a Kemalized Islam—that would counteract the extreme polarization of
the 1980s and provide an anti-communist bulwark. RP remained a minor political force through the late '80s and early '90s, under the shadow of the dual popularities of Özal’s ANAP and its principal competitor, Demirel’s DYP. Still, Özal’s prominence provided sufficient space for conservative activism—and thus the RP—to grow.

The RP’s first real post-Özal breakthrough was 1994’s local elections, where it took 19.7% of the vote. A run of corruption scandals and a revolving door of collapsing coalition governments in 1995 made RP appear a relatively unscathed outsider. Equally, once in control in the cities, RP delivered on the ‘Three Ç’s’ (‘çop, çamur ve çukur,’ or ‘garbage, mud and potholes’) of municipal governance, a factor key to winning elections in Turkey. Taken together, this granted RP its stunning electoral success in the 1995 general elections. It won 158 of 550 seats in the TBMM and became first party. Despite efforts toward a minority DYP-ANAP coalition, talks collapsed and the DYP withdrew. It instead formed a majority coalition with RP as the senior party, marking the Republic’s first-ever Islamist government. This government, colloquially referred to as Refahyol, saw Erbakan take over from Çiller as PM, while she stayed on as a Deputy PM.

Erbakan’s rise coincided with the height of PKK insurgency. The PKK secured historic levels of control in the countryside, isolating state-controlled towns and cities from the rest of the country. It incited several popular uprisings, referred to collectively as Serhildan, in Kurdish cities. These frequently saw clashes between demonstrators and police and Gendarmerie forces. After a run of terror attacks in 1991-95, The PKK

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100 Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military, 284
103 “Islamist-led coalition fires hopes of Refah mayors,” Hürriyet Daily News, 10 July 1996.
shifted to near-conventional warfare, attempting to seize towns and urban territory, often at great cost. The JGK reacted harshly to PKK’s efforts to deny state access to Kurdish towns, and forcibly evacuated villages to deny PKK guerillas the territorial control they needed to do so. From 1990-2000, some 1,000-2,000 villages and 380,000-1,000,000 people were affected. Gendarmes and village guards were regularly accused of committing extrajudicial killings and disappearances, as well as destroying forests and other sources of rural communities’ livelihoods to deny the PKK those resources.

3.4.2 Securitizing Moves: Military

1997’s securitizing move was the MGK Recommendations of 28 February, beginning a process that eventually led to PM Erbakan’s resignation. It built on nascent securitization of Islamism in 1993, positioning it as the principal threat to Turkey, both undermining Kemalism and empowering separatist elements. For its part, Erbakan’s government avoided direct securitization of the TSK. While it did criticize the military’s pro-EU policy and its stringent secularism in its 1994 and 1995 electoral campaigns, once in government it became deeply concerned with the potential for military intervention. It consequently ceded much foreign and security policy to the DYP and deputy PM Çiller, its pro-military coalition partner.

While then-CGS İsmail Karadayı and the MGK’s Secretary-General, İlhan Kılıç, still saw the PKK as an existential threat, the Recommendations make it clear that Islamism had replaced it as the military’s pre- eminent concern. However, it did not

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abandon securitization of the PKK, rather, it linked the PKK to the RP. Erbakan’s 1995 reliance on the Kurdish vote had led him to repeatedly take unsuccessful steps to broker peace between the PKK and the TSK. The Recommendations condemned this, as well as other RP efforts to use Islam to increase national unity and undermine the PKK:

XVII. Initiatives that aim at solving the country's problems on the basis of "umma" [religious community] rather than "nation" and that encourage the separatist terror organization (Kurdistan Workers Party [PKK]) by approaching it on the same basis [i.e., as a part of the umma] should be prevented by legal and administrative means.

The RP, despite its insistence it was simply a secular party opposed to the excesses of Kemalist secularism, took many positions that opened it to TSK criticism: scepticism for EU accession, opposition to conscription and demands to end to the exclusion of graduates from the religious İmam Hatip schools from military academies. The RP had also, in 1995, floated the possibility of reforming Article 24 (freedom of religion) of the Constitution, a cornerstone of the legal component of Kemalist secularism. With all this, the TSK had plenty of ammunition with which to advance an anti-RP campaign.

In 1996, the TSK launched a process some scholars label an internally-directed psychological warfare operation, given its links to the Psychological Operations Unit of

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110 In his 1991 book, Türkiyi'nin Temel Meseleleri, Erbakan asserted that the EU’s promoted Christianity over Islam, and membership would represent a threat to Turkish Islam. Alessio Calabro, “Islamist Views on Foreign Policy: Examples of Turkish Pan-Islamism in the Writings of Sezai Karakoç and Necmettin Erbakan,” Insight Turkey 19 no. 1 (2017): 172-173.
112 RP had campaigned in part on the slogan, “‘Refah into the government, İmam Hatip graduates into the army!’” These schools were government-run secondary-level schools that provided religious instruction to students, including training imams. Since 1980, a number of restriction on these graduates were dropped as part of the military regime’s support for the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, but many restrictions remained. Iren Ozgur, Islamic Schools in Modern Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015): 53.
the TSK General Staff.\textsuperscript{114} This ‘February 28 Process’ saw the military engage academia, unions, business and the media to build an anti-Islamist coalition. It capitalized on public anti-RP sentiment, which significantly intensified after the November 1996 Susurluk Scandal, when a car crashed near the eponymous town. The car contained a senior police official, a DYP deputy, and a former leader of the Grey Wolves, appearing to confirm long-held fears of the Turkish ‘deep state.’\textsuperscript{115} Although the DYP should theoretically have been affected more deeply by the scandal, the RP drew public ire by downplaying the incident in an apparent effort to protect its coalition partner—to the TSK’s benefit.

On 28 February 1997, the already embattled Refahyol government was given the MGK’s memorandum. The 18-point list of demands was deliberately unacceptable to Erbakan, and would have meant turning on his base.\textsuperscript{116} While the RP stalled, civil society joined the TSK in condemning its Islamic “reactionism”: Papers with ties to the TSK regularly printed stories on RP scandals;\textsuperscript{117} the opposition in the TBMM moved—unsuccessfully—to censure Refahyol in late April; a coalition of influential union federations called for the government’s resignation in early May; and business interests, most notably Türk Sanayicileri ve İş İnsanları Derneği (Turkish Industry and Business Association—TÜSAİD) joined the denunciations in late May.\textsuperscript{118}

Faced with enormous civil society pressure echoing the TSK’s securitization of “reactionism,” Erbakan resigned on 18 June, hoping that Çiller would be installed as PM

\textsuperscript{114} Ömer Aslan, “‘Unarmed’ We Intervene, Unnoticed We Remain,” \textit{British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies} 43 no. 3 (2016): 367-8.
\textsuperscript{115} The Grey Wolves leader was implicated in several murders. Sooyler, \textit{The Turkish Deep State}, 146-147
\textsuperscript{116} For original Turkish text and pre-AKP analysis, see Günay, “Research Notes: Implementing the ‘February 28’ Recommendations.”
\textsuperscript{117} \textit{Hürriyet, Sabah, Milliyet, Radikal} and \textit{Cumhuriyet} were the main papers to join in the effort. See Kuru, “The Rise and Fall of Military Tutelage in Turkey,” \textit{Insight Turkey} 14 no. 2 (2012): 51.
\textsuperscript{118} Karabelias, “The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Post-War Turkey, 1980-95,” 142.
and save the Refahyol coalition. However, TSK concerns over the DYP’s cooperation with the RP’s Islamism prevented that resolution. Instead, on the advice of the generals, President Demirel gave ANAP’s Mesut Yılmaz a mandate to form government, resulting in a coalition of ANAP, the Democratic Left Party and Democrat Turkey Party.

3.4.3 Balance of Power:

**Military Autonomy:** Decreasing

The TSK did not use the February 28 Process to constitutionally empower itself as it had in all its previous coups. Instead, it sought to replace the military’s legal interventionist role with a more subtle form of political influence—soft power, rather than hard power. The TSK recognized its aspiration for accession to the European Union would demand a reduced role in politics, but it could not simply trust civilians with government.

Rather than intervene through legal means, the TSK would engage in an ongoing process against “reactionism.” In the words of CGS Hüseyin Kıvırkoğlu (1998-2002), “The February 28 process is not over; its duration may be 10 years, 20 years, 100 years or 500 years. As long as religious reactionism continues, the February 28th page shall never be closed.” The TSK hoped that its networks in the unions, the media, the judiciary, business and academia would enable to sustain a constant counter-Islamist process. It expanded suppression of dissident media, with the 2001 EU Progress Report evaluating “serious problems” related to freedom of expression, including an estimated 80 journalists jailed for political activities—up from about 40 total in 2000. In short, the

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121 Quoted in Aslan, “Unarmed We Intervene, Unnoticed We Remain,” 375
122 Ibid., 369-375.
military hoped to alter its ‘coup style’ from the old—tanks in the street, a resolution of
the crisis, and a return to barracks—to a new, constant preservation of Atatürk’s vision. A
new sort of coup wherein governments were compelled to resign, rather than overthrown.
With this new strategy, the door was opened for military-led civilianizing reforms.

The traditional measures of military autonomy saw reduced military influence. The
MGK was adapted to strengthen civilian participation, but still ensured military primacy.
For example, a Prime Minister’s Crisis Management Centre was created for the MGK in
September 1997, granting the PM a significant role in case of existential threats—
including Islamic “reactionism”—while still providing a significant role for the CGS.124
By October 2001, a constitutional amendment passed that altered Article 118, the article
governing the MGK’s role. It decreased the consideration governments must give MGK
decisions (from “priority consideration” to “evaluate”), emphasized its advisory role, and
added four civilians: Three deputy PMs and the Minister of Justice.125 The generals still
dominated MGK meetings, but were more willing to sustain civilian engagement.

The TSK sought to counter Islamism, but used civilian allies to do so. Its ties to the
judiciary helped the RP receive a ban by the Constitutional Court in 1998, and in July
2000, Erbakan received a one-year prison sentence and was banned for life from political
activities for “inciting hatred”—a similar fate to politicians the TSK ousted in 1980.126
At the same time, the military accepted a reduced legal role vis-à-vis the judiciary: In
June 1999, Article 143 of the Constitution was changed, replacing the military judge in

124 EU, European Commission, *1998 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession*, Brussels,
1998, 11-12, 19.
125 Sarigil, Turkish Military: Principal or Agent 178
126 The ban was issued for a 1994 speech. Gorvett, The EU Watches as Turkey’s Military, Banned Islamists
and Emerging Civil Society Vie for the Future, 1.
State Security Courts with a civilian; and in December, a law preventing security forces officials from being prosecuted for human rights violations was repealed.\textsuperscript{127}

Internal security and intelligence saw a shift in the TSK’s favour. Islamism became a preoccupation of internal security, and a new unit, the *Batı Çalışma Grubu* (Western Study Group—BCG) under General Staff authority was reportedly created to monitor political orientations among civil society, elected officials, bureaucrats, political parties and the media.\textsuperscript{128} The military continued to exercise near-absolute authority over the PKK insurgency, launching two cross-border operations into Iraq in 1997 without notifying the government.\textsuperscript{129} The CGS, concerned by reports of excessive violence by counterinsurgency forces, did take steps to educate officers in public diplomacy, but these measures rarely saw any civilian input.\textsuperscript{130}

Military autonomy technically decreased in 1997. However, this was mainly due to the TSK’s interest in adapting its political role. It still saw itself as the guarantor of Turkish Kemalism, but the success of the 1997 post-modern coup provided an alternative approach: The military’s tutelary role could be informal, rather than legal.

*Elite Homogeneity: Low*

Homogeneity suffered significantly with the collapse of *Refahyol*, resuming a decade-long trend of unstable coalition governments. With Erbakan’s resignation, the opposition, led by ANAP’s Mesut Yılmaz, formed a three-party minority coalition between ANAP, DSP and *Demokrat Türkiye Partisi* (Democrat Turkey Party—DTP). This government

\textsuperscript{127} Sarigil, “The Turkish Military: Principal or Agent?” 178.

\textsuperscript{128} The alleged organization was made public during the Ergenekon trials, and due to the nature of those trials its existence cannot be conclusively confirmed. Ümit Cizre, “Prime Movers, Specific Features and Challenges of Security Sector Reform in a ‘Guardian State’: The Case of Turkey,” *Geneva Centre for DCAF Policy Paper* 17 (2007): 1-21. 14-15


\textsuperscript{130} Barkey and Fuller, *Turkey’s Kurdish Question*, 141
was supported by CHP in the Assembly, but it collapsed in January 1999 when the CHP withdrew its support over the “Türkbank scandal” that embroiled ANAP in 1998.131

Yılmaz’s junior coalition partner, Bülent Ecevit of the DSP, was asked to form a caretaker government until elections on 19 April 1999. In spite of the arrest of Abdullah Öcalan the month prior, the public was frustrated by corruption and perceived political stagnation.132 This produced another deeply divided parliament: DSP took a plurality with 136 seats, and was followed by MHP, the Virtue Party (An RP successor, banned in 2001), ANAP and the DYP, while the CHP lost all 55 of its seats.133

Ecevit formed a coalition government with ANAP and the MHP, but internal disputes within DSP led to frequent changes in cabinet. From May 1999 to November 2002, Turkey saw 15 rotations among its Ministers of State.134 The conflicts eventually resulted in a split, as part of the DSP resigned and peeled off to form a new party. Ecevit was able to capitalize on the Turkish military’s shift away from legal intervention to back strengthened civil control in some areas, largely after Turkey’s candidacy for EU Membership was announced in 1999. Most notably, he successfully advanced a 2002 revision to the Law on the Organization, Duties, and Powers of the Gendarmerie, barring military officials from acting for ÖHAL Governors in their absence.135 He also instituted a number of economic reforms, reviving Turkish neoliberalism in a manner not seen since Özal, and which would set the stage for Turkey’s economic rise under the AKP.136

133 Ibid., 188.
134 Gorvett, Talking Turkey: Call For Early Elections Sets Off Political Crisis for Turkey’s Coalition, 2
Still, the lack of broad support or high-level unity limited the practical implementation of civil control, forcing the government to generally follow behind the military.

3.4.4 Civil-Military Outcome: Appeased Discordance

The TSK securitized Islamist “reactionism” and the RP directly. The speech act itself, the MGK Recommendations, set in motion the February 28 Process. This process allowed the military to radically expand its soft power through ties to civil society. It allowed the General Staff to exchange autonomy for an alternative form of power, a ‘postmodern’ strategy that it hoped would be the backbone of its political influence for the foreseeable future. This strategy threw elite homogeneity into chaos, fragmenting already weak political parties and triggering several years of unstable coalition governments.

The CMR outcome of the 1997 postmodern coup was ‘appeased discordance.’ The military shirked, overthrowing a democratically-elected government due to its Islamist politics. The government rewarded the military. As Demirel had done in 1980, Erbakan resigned willingly. Future governments under Yılmaz and Ecevit were very cautious not to cross the military. While Yılmaz would condemn the influence of the February 28 Process in 2001, he waited until the electoral tides seemed to be turning against the TSK and his ANAP was the junior coalition partner.137 This outcome coincides with the competitive securitization framework’s causal link: The military, as the only actor to make a successful securitizing move, was also the one to take assertive action in shirking.

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Chapter IV: Securitization in Turkish CMR, 2003-2016

This chapter studies Turkish CMR under the still-governing Justice and Development Party. It follows the same organization as Chapter III, dividing the analysis of each case into sections on background, securitizing moves, BoP, and civil-military outcome.

In contrast to Chapter III, this section covers a period of declining military power. Although many have argued persuasively that civil control was not truly established until the aftermath of the July 15 coup attempt (and many others argue that it is still not established as of writing), this period saw enormous changes increasing civil control.

Notably, this chapter also includes a section on the early rise of the government of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The section still applies the competitive securitization framework to this period, but it has significant limitations. It is included as an outlier to this study, as the significant influence of Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership radically transformed Turkish CMR. Consequently, the effect of securitization on the civil-military BoP for this period is difficult to determine, despite the 2004 resumption of PKK insurgency. The period is useful as context for later periods’ securitizing moves, and it also provides value in assessing the explanatory limits of the competitive securitization framework.

The empirical study concludes in spring 2016, prior to the 15 July 2016 coup attempt. While 15 July should be assessable by competitive securitization, particularly given the government’s post-coup securitization of the Gülen Movement, believed by it to be responsible for the putsch, it is beyond the scope of this study. The main reason for this exclusion is that the military ceased its securitization practices—particularly contra-government securitization—of the type it has engaged in for 1980-2016. However, 15 July is briefly discussed in Chapter V, section 5.4, under possible future research.
### 4.1 Securitizing Moves: 2003/4

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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<th>Securitizing Move</th>
<th>Balance of Power</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003/</td>
<td>Resumption of PKK Insurgency; Election of first AKP government.</td>
<td>Both (Comp.): High-level TSK &amp; AKP agreement on EU accession; low-level dispute on PKK &amp; Islam.</td>
<td>Decreasing High</td>
<td>Full** Concordance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td></td>
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** The 2003/4 period is considered ‘full concordance’ because of civil-military agreement on EU accession.

2003/4 is notable for its lack of a single securitizing moment. Moreover, it does not fit with the thesis of this study, as the EU accession process overtook securitization as an influence on civil-military BoP. While this section applies the competitive securitization framework to the period, the EU is a significant confounding variable for the analysis.

#### 4.1.1 Background

The aftermath of the 1997 coup was fundamentally different to that of 1980. In 1980, the threat had been the radical polarization of Turkish society and an ensuing paralysis of civilian politics and nationwide violence. The General Staff responded to both prongs: A new, authoritarian constitution with a greater legal basis for TSK interventions to restore functioning governance; and the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis to soften polarization through an identity at once Kemalist and Islamic. In 1997, the threat was inverted. Islamism à la Erbakan was seen as an identity that might replace, rather than synthesize with, Kemalist Turkishness. Consequently, the General Staff’s solution was also inverted. The February 28 Process intended to democratize Turkey, restoring its European trajectory, while also restoring a purist vision of Kemalist secularism. The military therefore continued to hold onto the informal ties to Turkish civil society that had defined the February 28 Process.

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1 Cizre and Menderes Çınar, “Turkey 2002,” 312.
The TSK’s purist secularism, however, faced two problems. The first was the EU, which issued regular progress reports from 1998 that consistently noted the military’s political role as a barrier to membership. The second was Yılmaz’s ANAP. A coalition member of each government from 1997-2002, Yılmaz continuously engaged in a counter-securitization of “reactionism,” arguing for a liberalization that would permit Islamism.² In its place, he securitized military intervention as a threat to a European Turkey, arguing it fostered a ‘national security syndrome’ that legitimized interventionism and held back EU integration.³ He highlighted a disagreement between military tutelage and democracy. As one observer noted, “The [TSK] forces that hold to the ‘national security’ concept, see a contradiction between reaching Western standards and their own power.”⁴

The Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party—AKP) was founded by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in this context. The party was a coalition of former members of banned Islamist parties and other centre-right politicians. The AKP advanced a pragmatic platform that emphasized economic development and anticorruption, tailored as a response to the 2001 economic crisis and the persistent accusations of corruption against not just the Ecevit government, but all the major parties.⁵ Just 14 months after it was founded, the AKP won a shock victory in the November 2002 elections with 34% of the vote, securing the first stable majority government since Özal with 363 seats in parliament. To some in the General Staff, this proved the Copenhagen Criteria had opened Turkey to a return of “reactionism,” just in a neoliberal, EU-oriented cloak.

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² Ibid., 313-14.
The PKK threat was transformed. Öcalan’s capture created divisions in the PKK and caused it to declare a unilateral ceasefire in 2000. On trial and imprisoned, Öcalan sought to reframe the PKK’s objectives, away from its Marxist-Leninist and separatist roots and toward ‘democratic confederalism,’ a vision of local autonomy that could operate within Turkish sovereignty. This change triggered several party congresses and reorganizations, and while the PKK initially accepted new principles of peaceful struggle, legal change was slow and nonresponsive, increasing nationalist sentiment. The creation of an autonomous Kurdistan in Iraq with the US’s 2003 invasion compounded this feeling and the PKK resumed armed struggle on 1 June 2004. Violence jumped, from 517 deaths in 2000-2003 (with well over half before the ceasefire in 2000) to 1,196 for 2004-2007. While violence did not near the levels of the ’90s and the PKK had a less confrontational, non-secessionist ideology, it still raised a renewed spectre of secession.

4.1.2 Securitizing Moves: Both (Competitive)

Securitizing moves in 2003/4 are typed as ‘Both (Competitive).’ However, this typology is not as clear cut as in other periods. There are no clear securitizing moves illustrative of the full period on either the part of the AKP nor the TSK. Consequently, securitization in this period cannot be clearly linked to shifts in BoP: Early AKP government was marked by deliberate efforts to downplay links to Islamist politics; and while the TSK was

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8 Yegen, “Armed Struggle to Peace Negotiations,” 377-8

cautious and hostile, it had overriding interests in EU accession that enabled limited cooperation. This period serves as a useful counterexample to my overarching thesis, and illustrates that where internal threats are not predominant, or cannot be linked to a dominant external threat, securitization will not produce shifts in relative power.

2003/4 saw consistent low-level securitization of Islamism by the TSK. These steps were largely cautionary in nature, rather than conflictual; the generals sought to maintain the status quo, not shift the BoP. TSK press releases consistently raised issues of secularism, and CGS Hilmi Özkök (2002-2006)—while a generally liberal CGS—took issue with AKP reforms of the Yüksekoğretim Kurumu (Council of Higher Education—YÖK). In May 2004, Özkök released a statement calling the AKP’s draft law on YÖK, which removed military officials from the Council and included the right for women to wear headscarves at university, contrary to “the fundamental character of the Republic.”

MGK Secretary-General, Tuncer Kılınç also voiced concerns that EU reforms could open the path for a return of Islamist influence. References reiterating the foundational nature of secularism were consistent, but rarely neared serious challenges to AKP legitimacy.

The AKP, likewise, was cautious in its criticism of the military. Instead, it emphasized military reform in the context of EU accession and the preservation of the rule of law. It was highly responsive to criticisms from CGS Özkök, particularly in light of his liberal democratic outlook on CMR. The AKP took careful note of TSK red-lines, and did not make the CGS responsible to the Defence Minister rather than the PM as it once proposed. It employed a “silent” representation of Islamic identity that, in Erdoğan’s

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10 Gürcan, *Opening the Black Box*, 102.
words, “left religious politics behind,” and avoided the anti-secularist confrontations of the RP.\textsuperscript{13} The early AKP, from a neoliberal political centre, saw the antidote to the TSK’s illiberal secularism in economic and democratic reform, rather than securitization.\textsuperscript{14}

On the Kurdish question, the AKP clashed with General Staff in its first years, but they aligned soon after armed conflict resumed.\textsuperscript{15} Even the AKP’s early reforms that aimed to de-securitize the Kurdish question explicitly sought to avoid an association between Islamism and Kurdish separatism of the type that contributed to Erbakan’s fall. It passed several reforms, permitting Kurdish-language broadcasts and courses and releasing former Kurdish MP Leyla Zana and a number of her associates after 10 years of imprisonment, in accordance with a European Court of Human Rights ruling.\textsuperscript{16} While these reforms were limited in nature and did not acknowledge the unique position and history of Kurds in Turkey, they represented a real effort by the AKP—and with the reticent consent of the TSK—to engage the Kurdish public and sideline the PKK.\textsuperscript{17}

This process culminated in 2005 with Erdoğan’s Diyarbakır speech, when the PM openly stated “the Kurdish problem belongs to everyone.” He acknowledged Turkey had made mistakes on the issue in the past and committed to a democratic resolution.\textsuperscript{18} The speech triggered the PKK to announce a one month ceasefire,\textsuperscript{19} but the AKP—like most

\textsuperscript{13} “Erdoğan: Dinci siyaseti bıraktık,” Hürriyet, 16 May 2000.
\textsuperscript{15} Mango, \textit{Turkey and the War on Terror}, 78-79
\textsuperscript{17} The AKP retained the Kemalist notion of “\textit{Ne mutlu Türküm diyene},” which considered all those within Turkey to be Turks, functionally denying the existence of Kurds. The reforms passed in this period followed this process, allowing “minority” languages without recognizing the possibility for a non-Turkish associated identity. Similarly, implementation was slow and limited. Kurdish language broadcasts were tightly controlled and had extremely limited airtime. See Kirişçi, “The Kurdish Issue in Turkey.”
governments before it—sought to separate the “Kurdish issue” from the PKK, and soon began to securitize the PKK, joining the TSK in viewing militarization as the only answer to insurgency. In September 2005, Erdoğan noted that he and the military were aligned in rejecting negotiations with the PKK, shortly after an August MGK meeting in which the General Staff reiterated the importance of the “total struggle” against the PKK.

4.1.3 Balance of Power:

Military Autonomy: Decreasing

Military autonomy decreased along most indicators: the MGK; defence organization; military budgets; and procurement and modernization. Only three, the Presidency; internal security; and senior promotions saw little change. Most importantly, most changes were tacitly if not vocally supported by General Staff, with both CGS Özkök and his successor, Yaşar Büyükanıt, in favour of EU reforms. As Büyükanıt argued in 2003:

[The] Turkish Armed Forces cannot be against the European Union because the European Union is the geo-political and geo-strategic ultimate condition for the realization of the target of modernization which Mustafa Kemal Atatürk chose for the Turkish nation.

Equally as important as CMR reform was the slow evaporation of the February 28 Process ties between civil society and the TSK. This informal power, intended to make up for the loss of the TSK’s legal political role, gradually decreased through the 2000s.

The MGK saw the most significant change. In 2003-4, the sixth and seventh EU reform packages saw the MGK’s executive function removed, making it an advisory body. The role of Secretary-General was civilianized, meetings became bimonthly and lost their previous confidential status, and the MGK’s liberal access to public agencies

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21 “MGK’de Gündem PKK” Cumhuriyet, 23 August 2005, p. 4
22 Kirişçi, “Turkey and the EU: The Domestic Politics of Negotiating Pre-Accession,” 62.
was eliminated.  

Civilian access to military planning was also significantly increased; CGS Özkök supported the AKP decision to back the 2004 Annan Plan on Cyprus in a major reversal of Turkey’s Cyprus policy, and did not intervene on an act the TBMM passed permitting US soldiers to deploy in Turkey for the 2003 Iraq War, despite his personal opposition. Oversight for financing and procurement was greatly boosted with the 2003 amendments to the Law on Public Financial Management and Control and the Court of Auditors was empowered to audit TSK-owned properties. These EU-oriented reforms eventually resulted in the opening of accession negotiations in 2005.

The Presidency remained solidly a TSK asset throughout the 2000-2007 term of Ahmet Necdet Sezer. A former Constitutional Court Judge who rose to prominence after the 1980 coup, he was among the most active ‘guardian’ presidents in Turkish history, filling the legal space that the TSK had given up. He exercised his veto 72 times against the AKP and referred laws to the Constitutional Court 26 times during his tenure.

On internal security, the TSK retained a significant role after the AKP joined it in securitizing the PKK. From 2005-2007, the AKP supported several reforms intended to bolster police and military capacity to combat the PKK. These include changes to the Penal Code, the Criminal Procedure Code, the Police Powers and Duties Law, and most significantly, the 2006 amendments to the Anti-Terror Law, significantly broadening its applicability and returning (temporarily) counterterror jurisdiction to the military.

23 Sarıgil, “The Turkish Military: Principal or Agent?” 11-12.
25 This led to the “Hood incident,” when US soldiers captured and interrogated Turkish soldiers in Iraq. The AKP and the TSK saw rare alignment in condemning this. Çiğerli and Le Saout Öcalan et le PKK, 286-287
27 Sezer’s guardianship particularly sought to protect the judiciary. Many vetoed bills had aimed to bolster AKP influence in the judiciary. He also joined the TSK in vocally condemning political Islam. Ibid.
The TSK’s willingness to abandon its tutelary powers in pursuit of EU accession also reduced its ability to sustain the February 28 Process. Legal changes began reduce the civil-military ‘knowledge asymmetry’ that prevented substantive civilian input on security even where it was legally permitted. The civilianization of the National Security Policy Document development process, for example, granted AKP access to far more TSK data than previously available.\(^{30}\) Similarly, reforms reduced TSK influence in the judiciary and the media. The MGK representative on Turkey’s Film Board was removed, the role of state security courts was reduced, and military courts were barred from trying civilians in peacetime.\(^ {31} \) Together, these reforms paved the way for a disintegration of the TSK’s influence in civil society, despite limited corrective efforts by the generals.\(^ {32} \)

**Elite Homogeneity: High**

Elite homogeneity was secure across all indicators: public support for the dominant civilian leader, the leader’s support in the TBMM, and election results. The AKP’s 2002 electoral success allowed it to increasingly dominate the political stage in Turkey through its reputation for economic stewardship. While it deferred to the TSK, seeking to avoid the return of the February 28 Process, this did little to hamper its political prospects.

Erdoğan, elected mayor of Istanbul in the 1994 elections as an RP member, had been banned from politics after the 1997 coup. His ally, Abdullah Gül assumed the Prime Ministry in his place. However, just two months after the election and under pressure from both the AKP and the CHP, the Constitutional Court dropped the ban.\(^ {33} \) This

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\(^{30}\) For example, CGS Özkök issued several statements protesting negative media depictions of the military. Cizre, “Prime Movers, Features and Challenges of Security Sector Reform in a ‘Guardian State’”, 14

\(^{31}\) Sarigil, “Turkish Military: Principal or Agent,” 11-12.

\(^{32}\) Gürcan, *Opening the Black Box*, 101-102.

allowed Erdoğan to run for a by-election in Siirt, where he won a clear victory with 84% of the vote. Gül resigned, allowing Erdoğan to become PM. This centralized the party, securing ever greater personal support for Erdoğan as he became the AKP’s focal point.34

Alongside Erdoğan’s personal support, his party’s 2002 victory had secured him a majority in the TBMM.Remarkably, the AKP’s big tent approach to politics didn’t cause a fracture, despite deep divides between centre-right ANAP politicians, liberal businesspeople, and ‘Muslim-democrats’ from the National Vision movement and RP.35 A pro-EU position and commitment to economic reform even secured the AKP support across the aisle from the CHP opposition. Its efforts to privatize the Turkish economy and build a new, neoliberal Turkey secured votes of a new class of business people buoyed by its success and caused the CHP to align.36 This economically-oriented politics bought the reluctant acceptance of the TSK, thus ensuring a relatively stable run in the TBMM.

The AKP’s economic success in its early years, building off of reforms from the preceding Ecevit government, translated into significant electoral success. In the 2004 local elections, the AKP radically improved its vote share from the 2002 general election, up almost ten points to 41.7% and securing 56% of the 914 mayoralities up for grabs.37 In these elections, the party first experimented with new distributive neoliberal policies that would become the backbone of its electoral strength for the following 11 years. AKP export driven-liberalization allowed it to make significant developments in areas like housing through a pragmatic use of institutions such as Toplu Konut İdaresi Başkanlığı

34 Ibid., 74-75.
(Mass Housing Development Authority—TOKİ).38 By linking economic development to its electoral success, the AKP secured a potent voter base.

4.1.4 Civil-Military Outcome: Full Concordance

The TSK and the AKP government engaged in extended, low-level securitization against one another. The TSK securitized political Islam, while the AKP securitized the TSK’s militarized approach to the PKK. Neither of these securitizing moves proved sufficient to alter the balance of power due to the crowding-out effect of EU accession measures. Military autonomy decreased with the EU reform packages, and the AKP’s homogeneity increased despite the TSK’s efforts to weaken it.

The CMR outcome of 2003/4 was ‘full concordance.’ Despite making competitive securitizing moves, the military worked and the AKP rewarded it. The military accepted with little frustration the EU reforms, even those that the generals were reluctant over. The AKP, meanwhile, was deliberate in downplaying its Islamist roots and was cautious not to excessively confront the military. This outcome does not fit within the competitive securitization framework’s proposed causal link: Both actors made successful securitizing moves, but neither took the assertive action, for the military to shirk or the government to punish it. There are several plausible explanations for this. Of these, the most likely are: (1) The EU effect, where accession was a joint TSK-AKP goal and overrode securitization for balance of power; and (2) the February 28 Process, which the TSK hoped would continue, convinced the TSK it could bide its time and not shirk, while simultaneously convincing the AKP to wait for the tide to shift in its favour.

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38 Ibid., 204-205
4.2 Securitizing Moves: 2007

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<th>Balance of Power</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Presidential candidacy of AKP’s Gül; Continued PKK Insurgency.</td>
<td>Both (Comp): CGS Büyükanıt’s E-Memorandum; AKP Council of Ministers Press Release</td>
<td>Decreasing</td>
<td>Coerced Discordance</td>
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**Figure 10:** Competitive Securitization Framework: Turkey, 2007

4.2.1 Background

The AKP’s growing political strength began to concern the TSK in the lead-up to the 2007 Presidential elections. With the resolution of the 2001 economic crisis, and particularly after the New Turkish Lira monetary revaluation of 2005, the AKP’s reputation as an economic “fixer” was fixed in the public mind.\(^{39}\) EU reforms had also strengthened the AKP’s unfettered access to facets of public administration that had once been carefully monitored by the military, giving Turkey a reputation as a strong “Muslim Democracy.”\(^{40}\) Per one commentator: “The 2000s were years of cooperation between the new Islamist politicians and capital and business circles. The US and England called it the ‘Moderate Islamic Order.’”\(^{41}\) Given the loss of a legal tutelary role for the TSK, AKP popularity raised questions over whether the February 28 Process could maintain Kemalism.

While the pro-Kemalist President, Sezer, provided valuable legal leverage for the military, his term was nearing its end. He had consistently aligned with the military, liberally exercising his veto in a manner far more active than traditional for the post.\(^{42}\) With Sezer’s 7-year term set to expire in April 2007, the TSK feared losing its ally; the

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\(^{39}\) “Turkey’s Money Loses its Zeroes,” Deutsche Welle, 1 January 2005.


\(^{42}\) Gönenç, “Presidential Elements in Government,” 517.
TBMM, which elected the President, still had an AKP majority and would not face elections until the summer.\textsuperscript{43} This concern caused CGS Büyükanıt, assuming the post in 2006, to confront the AKP. He stated on 12 April: “I hope a president is chosen that is sincerely dedicated to … a secular and democratic state.” The prospect of an AKP presidency prompted political manoeuvering by the TSK in an effort to delay elections.\textsuperscript{44}

Underlying the rising political tensions between the government and the generals was the continuing PKK insurgency. While the conflict was not as intense as in the 1990s, 1196 people died in 2004-2007.\textsuperscript{45} Turkey struggled to secure support in the West against the PKK in a post-9/11 counterterror climate that shifted popular conceptions of terror toward Islamic extremism. Near-exclusive focus on Islam pushed the Marxist-inspired Kurdish insurgency to the back of the West’s counterterror program, causing frustration among Turks.\textsuperscript{46} In April 2007, frustrated by its demands for reform without counterterrorism support, CGS Büyükanıt accused the EU of seeking to divide Turkey without ever intending to grant it membership.\textsuperscript{47} This posed challenges to the AKP. It depended on the TSK’s support for EU reforms to reduce its political role. Both AKP and TSK aligned on the PKK itself. Despite its shift from a program of secession to Öcalan’s new ‘democratic confederalism,’ both were concerned by the potential for secessionism to re-emerge. However, the AKP benefitted greatly from the separation of the question of the PKK—which demanded a TSK/JGK-led military response—to the Kurdish question generally—where AKP civilian leadership was possible.

\textsuperscript{44} “AKP’de Çankaya alarmı: Cumhurbaşkanlığı seçimi öncesinde gerilim yaratacağı yaratacağı düşünülen toplantı ve etkinlikler ieri tarihle ertelendi,” Cumhuriyet, 21 March 2007, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{45} UCDP, “Actor—PKK.”
\textsuperscript{46} Mango, Turkey and the War on Terror, 91-93.
\textsuperscript{47} Kirişçi, “The Kurdish Issue in Turkey,” 340-341.
The combination of growing TSK frustration with the AKP’s Islamic-inspired politics and the limits of Kurdish reform set the stage for a clash. In the TSK’s view, both challenges were one and the same, stemming from its handover to civilian authorities—of trusting civilians with democracy. It therefore sought to revive the February 28 Process by forcing the issue in its favour through the 27 April 2007 E-Memorandum.

4.2.2 Securitizing Moves: Both (Competitive)

The military and the government made separate, competing securitizing moves in 2007. The process was initiated by the Turkish General Staff, which released a statement on its website calling on the AKP to withdraw its candidate for the Presidency, former PM Abdullah Gül. The AKP responded by counter-securitizing TSK intervention, and committing to Gül’s candidacy. The moves triggered a securitizing contest. Both military and government statements enjoined the public to protect Turkish democracy, but identified different sources of threat: “reactionism” and interventionism respectively. The contest would demonstrate that, while the TSK’s ties to civil society remained deep, it could not sustain military tutelage through informal means. Reducing its legal strength had placed the General Staff on an equal level to the civilian government, reducing the securitizing competition to a test of military vs. civilian soft power.

On 27 April, three days after Erdoğan announced Gül’s candidacy, CGS Büyükant, issued the E-Memorandum. It began by accusing the AKP of, to quote, “undermin[ing] the basic values of the Turkish Republic, secularism being at the forefront”48 It listed “anti-Republican” actions the AKP had taken, such as permitting the celebration of religious holidays in schools, and stated civilian institutions were taking “no preventative

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48 Ural, “Results of the April 27, 2007 Turkish Military’s E-Memorandum,” 728.
measures” against reactionism. It linked the AKP’s religiosity to political violence, namely the April 2007 murder of three employees of a Bible publishing house. The E-Memorandum concluded by stating the TSK “is not neutral” in the question of constitutional secularism and Gül’s candidacy, and it “would reveal its attitudes and behaviors clearly and transparently when necessary. No one should ever doubt it.”

CGS Büyükanıt’s memo also included a condemnation of the AKP’s efforts to court the Kurdish vote by including a seemingly separate jab at the PKK in a memo dedicated to Islamism: “Briefly, whoever is against the philosophy of the Great Leader Atatürk, ‘How happy is he who says I am a Turk’ is the enemy of the Republic of Turkey and so will he stay.” As in 1997, the TSK aimed to link the twin threats of “reactionism” and Kurdish separatism, thereby linking the Republic’s secular Kemalist identity with its territorial integrity.

As in 1997, the military did not openly threaten the government. It sought to repeat the February 28 Process, forcing the AKP to willingly resign from government. However, the AKP Council of Ministers contested the memorandum. It issued a press release the next day, stating the military’s “expression against the Government on any subject is unthinkable in a democratic state of law.” It accused the TSK of unduly influencing the presidential election and the Constitutional Court’s decision on whether Gül’s Islamist background should bar him from running. It ended by securitizing intervention as a threat to Turkish stability, democracy and EU integration:

We should defeat the efforts of some malicious persons to put the [TSK] against our Government … Those who harm trust and stability know that they would carry the responsibility of the negative results this would generate for our country.  

50 Ural, “Results of the April 27, 2007 Turkish Military’s E-Memorandum,” 731.
The consequences of the competitive TSK-AKP securitization process is complex. The TSK’s initially appeared to be the more successful. The memo dominated the media, inspiring a series of articles condemning Gül’s candidacy, with one referring to him as a “soldier of the civil coup.” The E-memorandum also successfully prevented him from being elected in the first round of TBMM voting. It convinced a cadre of deputies to abstain so only 357 of the 367 required votes could be secured. CHP leader Deniz Baykal to argue the vote was invalid due to the lack of quorum—an assessment later supported by the Constitutional Court. It also triggered large protests in Istanbul in support of secularism, alongside supportive statements from major civil society associations, such as TÜSİAD, in a manner strongly reminiscent of the February 28 Process. Even on Gül’s election in the third round of voting, it was unclear who was on top. Despite Gül’s efforts to reassure the public of his commitment to secularism, the generals refused to attend his swearing-in ceremony and media speculated about the possibility of a coup.

However, the AKP enjoyed a positive reputation for the economic success of its neoliberal reforms. The party’s ability to sustain a stable majority government for five years—something Turkey had not seen since Özal’s ANAP—provided it substantial popular support, with polls predicting 41.3% for the AKP in the upcoming July general election. Moreover, AKP stability had reduced the reputation of the TSK’s political role; about 39.3% of Turks favoured of military intervention, with 42.7% opposed. While the margins were not large, repeating the February 28 Process demanded the TSK pay

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attention to uncertain popular support. The TSK chose not to intervene due to this uncertainty, but its relationship with Gül and the AKP became extremely tenuous.

4.2.3 Balance of Power:

Military Autonomy: Decreasing

The events of 2007 triggered a gradual reduction of public trust in the TSK, permitting CMR reforms to continue unabated across the seven indicators of military autonomy.

The most significant changes occurred in the Presidency and senior promotions, due respectively to the election of an AKP candidate for the Presidency and the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials. Taken together, this was a radical shift for in Turkish history, cutting the TSK off from the core tools it used to preserve its own autonomy.

The loss of the Presidency to Gül was significant. While legally a figurehead, the Presidency had traditionally been the method through which the TSK placed pressure on the civilian government. It consistently relied on allies in the office to adopt a guardianship role. President Sezer, a former Constitutional Court judge appointed by Evren in 1988, had played this role vis-à-vis the AKP government, vetoing as late as May 2007 the AKP’s efforts to make the Presidency a directly elected office by referring the matter for referendum. Without an ally in the Presidency, the TSK lost the ability to legally intervene in constitutional questions and opened the gate to reform. The AKP’s October 2007 success in passing a constitutional referendum to make the President directly elected made permanent this loss. Additionally, it enabled the 2010

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57 The referendum also reduced quorum for GNA decisions from 67% to 33%, preventing the Constitutional Court from blocking the AKP’s parliamentary majority as it had done in the April-May presidential election. Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, “Kulturkampf in Turkey: The Constitutional Referendum of 12 September 2010,” South European Society and Politics 17 no. 1 (2012): 2-3.
constitutional referendum, which reformed the Constitutional Court, making it more responsible to the AKP-dominated legislature and allowing it to try Generals.

More directly damaging to the military’s political role were the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials over two alleged coup plots. While it is beyond the scope of this document to assess the reality behind the trials, they had a clear effect on the military. Waves of arrests led to the imprisonment of hundreds of military officers, including CGS İlker Başbuğ (2008-2010), who had participated in the creation of the E-Memorandum, resulting in trials that lasted years. In the early years of the trials, the military attempted to push back in small ways. CGS Başbuğ condemned the June 2009 publication by Today’s Zaman of a story accusing a Colonel—who would be arrested in November in connection to Ergenekon—of preparing an “Action Plan against Reactionaries,” and in April 2011, CGS İşık Koşaner released a public statement disputing a court decision not to release those detained in the Balyoz case.

2011 was the first year that civilians were able to appoint the force commanders after a series of protest resignations of Turkish brass in July, including CGS Koşaner and all four force commanders, left the posts empty. However, even leading up to the resignations, the YAŞ, had increasingly—if reticently—taken account of the AKP’s preferences in appointments to senior staff, with the AKP vetoing the appointments of 11 Generals who were suspects in the Balyoz case. President Gül also vetoed the appointment to Land Forces Commander of a general involved in the E-Memorandum.

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59 “Court Arrests Col. Çiçek, Suspect of Alleged Coup Plot,” Anadolu Ajansı, 12 November 2009.
60 Gürcan, *Opening the Black Box*, 110-112.
62 Bardakçı, “Coup Plots and the Transformation of CMR in Turkey under AKP Rule,” 419
However, the TSK’s rapidly deteriorating reputation and the need to strengthen public relations caused Koşaner’s successor, CGS Necdet Özel to pursue a much more collaborative approach with the AKP government.

Additionally, civilian oversight was greatly expanded. In 2008, President Gül raised concerns about military dismissals of personnel engaging in Islamist activities during a meeting of the YAŞ. This led to the 2010 decision to abolish judicial immunity for YAŞ appointees. The General Staff’s dominant role in the MGK was slowly reduced, and in 2010 the government reviewed the National Security Policy Document for the first time. It thereafter took a leading role in its development.

On issues of internal security, the perceived threat of military coup enabled the government to take on a much greater role. In 2011, the JGK finally acknowledged the existence of its counter-guerilla intelligence organization, JİTEM. This coincided with a leak revealing AKP efforts to replace the gendarmerie with civilian intelligence on the PKK, as in 2009, an AKP delegation, supported by MİT, met with the PKK in Oslo, Norway. The leak led the AKP to make public its diplomatic initiative toward the PKK, excluding the military from much of process. The conclusion of these civilian-led secret talks with the PKK leadership produced in 2010 the Public Order and Security Under-Secretariat, greatly strengthening civilian control in internal and national security.

By 2013, the military’s capacity to intervene in politics was drastically reduced. In July, the TBMM amended the TSK Internal Service Law 35, which had previously been

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used to justify military intervention to restore civilians to a Kemalist path. Moreover, a February 2013 constitutional draft threatened to make the CGS accountable to the PM.

*Elite Homogeneity: High*

The government’s homogeneity continued to increase after the E-Memorandum across all three indicators: public support for the dominant civilian leader, the leader’s support in the Grand National Assembly, and election results. Despite the efforts of the TSK General Staff and CGS Büyükanıt to disrupt its rise, their efforts backfired. With the Ergenekon and Balyoz cases, the February 28 Process was dead; with it, the AKP’s predominance in the bureaucracy and civil society was secured.⁶⁶

Public support for Erdoğan had plainly increased. The AKP again grew its vote percentage from the low 40s to 46.6% in the 2007 general elections.⁶⁷ This secured Erdoğan another majority government, and paved the way for the consolidation of the AKP victory over military tutelage at the 2008 closure case on the E-Memorandum in the Constitutional Court. Further, with the retreat of military tutelage, Erdoğan’s tacit cooperation with the relatively popular moderate Islamist movement of Fethullah Gülen, a Turkish preacher who fled the February 28 Process to Pennsylvania, United States, could consolidate. An AKP-Gülen Movement (GM) alliance had grown since the AKP’s 2002 election, but reached its height during the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials.⁶⁸

The alliance with the GM also strengthened Erdoğan’s support in the TBMM. A large segment of the AKP party were also part of or associated with the GM. Both had a pro-Western agenda that made them natural allies, and the GM’s inroads in Turkey’s

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⁶⁶ This included AKP allies. At the time, it also meant persons purportedly linked to the Gülen Movement.
⁶⁷ Ural, “Results of the April 27, 2007 Turkish Military’s E-Memorandum,” 733.
bureaucracy and civil society, including businesses, unions and education, provided the AKP deeper institutional roots. The AKP’s political popularity, similarly, granted the GM access to government. The CHP, concerned by the relationship, twice submitted motions to investigate the GM in 2005 and 2007, but these were rejected by the AKP.

In elections, the aftermath of the E-Memorandum was mostly beneficial. The AKP followed up its general election win with a constitutional referendum on 21 October 2007, passing with almost 69% of the vote. The reforms reduced the president’s term limit to five years from seven, and the TBMM’s term from five to four. While the AKP lost some of its vote share in the 2009 local elections, falling to about 38%, it more than made up for these in the 2011 general elections, where it raised its share to a record high of 49.8% of the popular vote. The AKP’s continued economic success, combined with its democratic reputation, ensured consistently strengthening homogeneity.

4.2.4 Civil-Military Outcome: Coerced Discordance

The TSK and AKP securitized one another directly. CGS Büyükanıt’s E-Memorandum sought to repeat the February 28 Process, minimally by compelling the AKP to withdraw Gül’s presidential candidacy. The AKP argued Turkish democracy and rule of law were endangered by TSK tutelage. Both securitizing moves were successful, causing a prolonged clash between civil and military authorities, culminating in the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials. These profoundly reduced military autonomy, allowing the AKP to use them to end the threat of a new 28 February Process. The AKP simultaneously won increasing popular support, consolidating it as the dominant party.

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69 Ibid., 397.
71 Marschall et al. “Does Housing create votes?” 203.
The CMR outcome of the 2007 E-Memorandum was ‘coerced discordance.’ The military shirked in seeking to end Gül’s presidential prospects. The government punished the military by passing repeated measures to bolster civil control and by supporting the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials. While the extended standoff ended in the AKP’s favour, the party’s efforts to coerce the military out of politics was met with tense resistance. This outcome coincides with the competitive securitization framework’s proposed causal link: Both the military and the government made securitizing moves, and both took assertive moves by respectively shirking and punishing vis-à-vis the other.

### 4.3. Securitizing Moves: 2013

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*Figure 11: Competitive Securitization Framework: Turkey, 2013*

#### 4.3.1 Background

The Ergenekon and Balyoz coup trials entirely transformed the relationship between the TSK and the AKP. The trials’ public nature radically reduced public trust in the military. Just after the E-Memorandum, in May 2007, a Gallup poll measured public confidence in the military at 81%, making it the country’s most trusted institution, well ahead of the judiciary at 67% or the government, at 56%. By August 2013, just before the sentencing of 19 people related to Ergenekon, trust in the military among urban Turks had dropped to 59%. The new CGS, Necdet Özel—the AKP’s preferred candidate in 2011—took a

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73 Notably, trust among rural Turks had scarcely dropped at all, remaining at 81%. Trust in the government had similarly dropped among urban Turks, but had risen in rural communities, up to 68%. The cause of this
more cooperative approach, and played down civil-military tensions. With CMR issues falling to the background, other internal threats came to the fore.

The newest threat was that of Fetullah Gülen. The preacher, a state Imam before the 1980 coup, wanted to play the role of a moderate, Sufi-inspired, Islamist voice in Turkish politics. He and his followers became involved with education in the 1970s, developing small community centres that expanded into larger schools through the 1980s. By the 1990s, the Gülen Movement (GM), also called Hizmet (service) or Cemaat (community), was known nationwide. It expanded internationally, especially in the post-Soviet Turkic states in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Notably, it kept its distance from Erbakan’s National Vision parties, tacitly supporting the February 28 Process in its newspaper, Zaman. While the February 28 Process forced Gülen to flee the country to the US, where he has lived since, this provided its own advantages. An outsider status made the GM a powerful legitimating tool in Erdoğan’s efforts to break with Erbakan’s Islamism in founding the AKP. This alliance remained discreet, as the TSK was watching it closely, and the AKP hoped to avoid a revival of 28 February.

The 2007 E-Memorandum functionally ended the threat of such a revival. GM allies reportedly played a major role in the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials, supported by members of the AKP. By 2010, many ardent secularists in the TSK and the judiciary had been replaced by persons friendlier to the religious ideologies of the AKP and the GM.

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reduction may have been caused by the TSK’s increasing alignment with the government over coup trials. Jan Sonnenschein, “Urban Turks’ Trust in Major Institutions Drops Sharply,” Gallup, 15 August 2013.


77 The AKP now blames the trials entirely on GM. It has supported the overturning of related convictions. Solaker, “Turkish appeals court overturns ‘Ergenekon’ coup plot convictions,” Reuters, 21 April 2016.
However, apparent victory came along with rising tensions between the erstwhile allies. These first became public with the Mavi Marmara incident, when a flotilla from Turkey, supported by the AKP, sought to breach an Israeli blockade of Gaza. Gülen condemned the flotilla as illegal, and soon split from the AKP on Syria and Iran. The ultimate break occurred in the February 2012 “MİT Crisis.” Reportedly, a Gülen-aligned state prosecutor subpoenaed the MİT Chief, Hakan Fidan, an AKP loyalist, over secret negotiations with the PKK in Oslo, forcing PM Erdoğan to shield the MİT with two emergency measures. This led to Erdoğan’s first indirect reference to the GM as a ‘parallel state,’ when he called the Özel Yetkili Mahkemeler (Specially Authorized Courts—ÖYM), thought to be staffed by Gülen supporters, a “state within the state.”

Simultaneously, the conflict with the PKK had begun to shift. Since 2007, violence continued to escalate, with an estimated 2,387 deaths in 2008-2013. However, AKP-PKK negotiations, which took place in Oslo, Norway between 2009 and 2011 and were kept out of the public eye, were beginning to bear fruit. A tentative agreement was reportedly reached in 2012, with Hakan Fidan suggesting that the PKK and the Turkish government were broadly in agreement about the need to end the conflict. However, leaks of the talks soon brought intense criticism from opposition parties. This eventually caused the Oslo process to collapse. Without talks, the conflict escalated. The PKK aimed to capitalize on the growing Syrian war, launching a series of deadly—

79 Note: ‘Parallel state’ is put in quotations because its use in Turkey does not fit the traditional academic use of the term. In Turkey, its use is closer to the academic notion of a ‘deep state.’ It typically refers to partisan organizations that fulfill parallel roles to those of state structures, like those of the Nazi party in 1930s Germany, see: Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004): 123-124
81 UCDP, “Actor—PKK.”
82 I. Aytaç Kadıoğlu, “The Oslo Talks: Revealing the Turkish Government’s Secret Negotiations with the PKK,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 9-11
but costly—attacks, kidnappings and other clashes. The International Crisis Group remarked in a 2012 report that the escalation “add[ed] up to dangerous backsliding, undermining one of the most productive attempts to end the 28-year-old conflict.” A rising death toll made it clear a solution was necessary. Negotiations soon began between the government and Öcalan, still jailed, who corresponded with the PKK leadership in northern Iraq though Turkish officials. These secret talks eventually produced in a revived Solution Process, and Öcalan declared a ceasefire in March 2013.

4.3.2 Securitizing Moves: Civilian

The securitizing move in 2013 was entirely civilian. While the TSK participated in some securitization processes, they were dominated by civilians. The AKP, as in 2007, saw Turkish democracy as being undermined, this time by the GM rather than the TSK. The move succeeded, triggering a slow purge of Gülen-associated officials in the judiciary, bureaucracy and military. Notably, the GM was also linked to AKP de-securitization of the PKK, with the AKP accusing it of derailing the Solution Process. While these moves did not target the TSK, they still affected CMR by legitimizing greater civil control; only the AKP could be trusted to defend the Republic.

By late 2013, AKP-GM tensions had risen exponentially. Gülen’s alignment with the anti-AKP Gezi Park protesters that summer, along with a highly public corruption probe against AKP officials had made it clear the alliance had collapsed. In December, Erdoğan accused the GM of co-opting Turkey’s legal and law enforcement infrastructure.

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and creating a “parallel state/organization.” He referred to the graft probe as a “coup.”

To close the probe, the AKP soon began purging alleged GM allies from the police and judiciary, sacking prosecutors, judges, police chiefs and others. Tensions led the AKP to reverse course on Ergenekon and Balyoz, accusing purported Gülenists of fabricating evidence and intimidating officers to dismantle the secularist establishment.

The GM continued to take on an ever larger place in AKP rhetoric. In the lead-up to the August 2014 presidential elections, the AKP sought to excise Gülenists from the law and security bureaucracy. It abolished the ÖYM courts in March, and announced in June it would close police academies thought to be dominated by GM. After allegedly GM-linked individuals opened an investigation into the NGO that led the Mavi Marmara flotilla, Erdoğan sought to link the MHP and CHP to Gülen at a rally in Hatay, accusing all of supporting Israel’s “barbarism” in Gaza. Throughout its election campaigns, especially ahead of the March local elections, the AKP suffered repeated damaging leaks, allegedly done by GM. After the local elections, Erdoğan committed to ban Twitter—a key source of leaks—and to “root out” the Republic’s GM-affiliated enemies.

The AKP’s securitization of the GM extended to the PKK. Gülen’s response to the announcement of MİT-PKK talks was mild, only stating “There is benefit in peace.” Gülen and his allies’ apparent reservations over the Solution Process, alongside PKK accusations that Gülen had sabotaged the Oslo talks, caused many to believe that the GM

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86 Term also applied to (PKK-linked) KCK. Taş, “A History of Turkey’s AKP-Gülen Conflict,” 400-401.
88 “Special courts abolished as Turkish President Gül signs law,” Hürriyet Daily News, 6 March 2014.
89 Rasim O. Kütahyalı, “Turkey to close down police academies.” Al-Monitor, 4 June 2014.
90 “Erdoğan Hatay’dan İhsanoğlu ‘İthal Aday’ Dedi (2),” Haberler, 20 July 2014.
91 Erdoğan urged his supporters to the polls in the local elections to deliver an “Ottoman slap” to the followers of Gülen; a reference to a fighting technique purportedly used by Ottoman soldiers in the late 1800s. See: Daniel Dombey, “Turkey blocks access to Twitter,” Financial Times, 20 March 2014.
would also sabotage to Solution Process.\textsuperscript{93} To capitalize on this, the AKP tried to strike a balance, arguing the GM and other parties were “against peace” in addressing its Kurdish base, while downplaying the Solution Process to nationalists. Such accusations were supported indirectly by a broadly held belief among Kurds that Gülen and his followers were unfriendly not just to peace with the PKK, but to even the limited reforms the AKP had advanced. The co-chair of the legal pro-Kurdish party, Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi (Peace and Democracy Party—BDP), Selahattin Demirtaş, echoed this in a March 2013 interview with \textit{Al Jazeera Türk}.\textsuperscript{94} Demirtaş suggested that the GM did not have a “warm approach” to peace with the PKK, stating: “Tensions between the government and Cemaat have directly caused a disruption in the solution process.”

The military was largely silent in this securitization process. It followed the AKP’s lead, but took no initiative for its own securitizing moves. The MGK, on 30 October 2014, first referred to “illegal organizations under legal masks” as a threat to national security. The Gülen Movement was later listed on the MGK National Security Policy Document in April 2015.\textsuperscript{95} The TSK also trailed behind on PKK-related issues. CGS Özel avoided making political statements, preferring informative, factual releases that emphasized the importance of rule of law or defended its ability to operate in spite of the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials.\textsuperscript{96} Any statements related to the PKK were broadly in-line with the AKP government, with reporting on terrorism limited mostly to before the December 2013 announcement of the Solution Process.


\textsuperscript{94} Gonca Şenay, “Süreci ancak Öcalan bitirebilir,” \textit{Al Jazeera Türk}. 18 March 2014.

\textsuperscript{95} “Through each of these crises Erdoğan has managed to transform any manifestation of opposition into a matter of national security, as well as to undermine the rule of law and separation of powers.” See: Hakki Taş, “Turkey: From Tutelary to Delegative Democracy,” \textit{Third World Quarterly} 36 no. 4 (2015): 783

\textsuperscript{96} Gürcan, \textit{Opening the Black Box}, 113-117.
4.3.3 Balance of Power:

Military Autonomy: Decreasing

Military autonomy continued to decrease gradually after 2013: The Presidency, under AKP control, became increasingly political; civilians began to dominate in the MGK; defence organization, budgeting, and procurement saw less General Staff input as the AKP increasingly asserted itself with regard to the Syrian war; senior promotions in the post-Ergenekon environment were approved with government assent; and significantly, internal security became increasingly the domain of the AKP-aligned MİT. Each of these changes were closely related to the ongoing AKP-GM split, with the government justifying purges and its growing control of the military as a method to prevent a coup by Gülen’s ‘parallel state.’

The Presidency came more securely under civilian control with the August 2014 election. Erdoğan’s was the first direct election to the post, and his comfortable victory with 52% of the vote made it clear that the traditional guardianship role of the Presidency had ended. It would become an increasingly political office. In turn, the TSK accepted its reduced political role, with a statement by CGS Özel ahead of the March 2014 local elections rejecting calls for it to intervene:

We are sadly witnessing recent attempts to use various incidents to draw the [TSK] into political debates before the local elections ... The Turkish Armed Forces are of the opinion that they ought to stay out of debates for the well-being of our State, as well as the peace and security of our Glorious Nation.

The MGK came under greater civil control. Its statement in October 2014 referred to the GM indirectly as “illegal organizations under legal masks.” Shortly afterward, in

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98 Quoted in Gürcan, Opening the Black Box, 116.
April 2015, the Gülen Movement was listed as an “internal threat” in the MGK National Security Policy Document.\textsuperscript{99} The decreasing willingness of the General Staff to assert an independent political position, particularly around the AKP-GM split, enabled a more coordinated civil-military position. This coordination extended to issues of defence: The TSK Internal Service Law was amended in 2013 to emphasize external threats; TSK members were barred from political activities; the 2010 constitutional referendum opened dismissals of personnel by the YAŞ to civilian review; and an agreement in principle, although never implemented, was reached on making the CGS responsible to the defence minister.\textsuperscript{100} Senior promotions by the YAŞ took account of AKP preferences, including in August 2013 shuffling all four force commanders of Turkey’s service branches.\textsuperscript{101}

On internal security and intelligence, two key shifts took place. The first was AKP efforts to purge Gülenists from the bureaucracy, bringing a new internal threat to the fore. The second was rising support for a political answer to the Kurdish question, both for the Solution Process and for reforms on expression of Kurdish identity. The Solution Process shifted responsibility for the PKK from the JGK and its Gendarmerie intelligence bodies to the MİT, a civilian agency with deep ties to the AKP that was led by Hakan Fidan, an Erdoğan ally.\textsuperscript{102} Similarly, the AKP sought to strengthen its ties to Kurdish civil society. It created a “Wise People’s Commission” of academics, authors and local leaders in April 2013 to engage the public on the Solution Process. In September, the AKP announced a “democratization package,” removing constitutional barriers for the Kurdish language, paving the way for Kurdish schooling and recognition of Kurdish names for towns and

\textsuperscript{99} Taş, “A History of Turkey’s AKP-Gülen Conflict,” 401.
\textsuperscript{100} Güler & Bölücek, “Motives for Reforms on CMR in Turkey,” \textit{Turkish Studies} 17 no. 2 (2016): 263-264.
\textsuperscript{101} Lale Sarıibrahimoğlu, “Turkey overhauls its top ranks,” \textit{Janes IHS}, 5 August 2013.
\textsuperscript{102} Sooyler, \textit{The Turkish Deep State}, 206-207.
Both processes, the AKP-GM split and politicization of the Kurdish question, reduced TSK input on internal security. This was formalized by July 2013 amendments to the Internal Service Law, altering TSK duties from “the protection of the constitutional order of the State, its nation and integrity … against all internal and external threats,” to “protect[ing] the Turkish homeland against threats and dangers to come from abroad.” The law emphasized an externally-oriented defence role.104

**Elite Homogeneity: High**

Despite the AKP-GM split, elite homogeneity is ‘high’ in 2013. Its remarkable successes in the 2014 local and presidential elections constitute a clear indication of public support for the dominant civilian leader, Erdoğan, and for the party’s electoral prospects. While rising political competition in 2013 produced some problems for support in the TBMM, these were not sufficient to overshadow the AKP’s electoral success.

The success of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as President in the first-ever popular election to the post are a clear indication of popular support. The remarkable performance of the BDP’s presidential candidate, Selahattin DemirTaş, reaching almost 10%, signalled a trend away from the AKP in the Kurdish-majority regions of southeastern Turkey.105 However, Erdoğan still took 50.6% of the region’s vote, compared to DemirTaş’s 38.5%. It would not be until 2015 that this trend truly harmed AKP electoral prospects.

The AKP’s local election victory demonstrated that, despite the 2013 Gezi Park protests accusing the AKP and Erdoğan of authoritarianism, the AKP remained a potent political force. The purported “coup attempt” by the GM—its damaging leaks and graft

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104 Quoted in Güler and Bölücek, “Motives for Reforms on Civil-Military Relations in Turkey,” 258.
Erdoğan’s increasing turn toward a populist style of politics, however, frustrated elements of his own party. The conservative-democratic core of his party, particularly the wings represented by Abdullah Gül and Bülent Arınç, had sought a more conciliatory approach to the Gezi Park protesters. This caused Erdoğan to sideline such prospective political rivals in the AKP, while still emphasizing the importance of combatting the ‘parallel state’ and the GM. Gül, who had been targeted by Erdoğan’s presidential campaign, chose to step back from politics after the AKP’s first Extraordinary Congress in August 2014. There, the President-elect also supported his ally, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, to succeed him as Prime Minister.

The elections in March and August demonstrate that on two indicators, the AKP’s homogeneity should be considered high. The conflicts between Erdoğan’s vision for a more populist AKP and its traditionalists, while important, remained relatively contained, particularly after Güл chose to step back from politics.

4.3.4 Civil-Military Outcome: Coerced Concordance

The AKP securitized GM’s ‘Parallel Devlet’ (Parallel State) as the main internal threat to Turkish security, while de-securitizing the PKK conflict through the Solution Process. The TSK, severely politically weakened following the coup trials, took no response to AKP securitization of the GM. This allowed the government to expand influence across indicators of military autonomy. By securing the Presidency and the MGK, the AKP

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ensured the TSK would have few tools to repeat the February 28 Process. Additionally, by limiting JGK operations in favour of MIT and political resolution, the TSK lost much of its authority to intervene in politics. While the securitization of GM hampered the AKP’s homogeneity, it was still able to consolidate and bolster its dominant status.

The CMR outcome of 2013 was ‘coerced concordance.’ Although it walked back from Ergenekon and Balyoz, the AKP was deeply suspicious of the TSK, and punished it accordingly. Erdoğan’s government took greater control of policy areas traditionally dominated by the TSK. The military, suffering from the effects of the trials, worked. It took no major steps to reassert itself, choosing instead to pursue a conciliatory approach to the AKP. This outcome coincides with the competitive securitization framework’s proposed causal link: The government, as the only actor to make a successful securitizing move, was also the only one to take assertive action in punishing the military.

4.4 Securitizing Moves: 2015

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Figure 12: Competitive Securitization Framework: Turkey, 2015

4.4.1 Background

Securitization in 2015 shift were triggered by the Turkish general elections on 7 June that year. The AKP remained lead party, but lost its majority after the upset performance of the Halkların Demokratik Partisi (Peoples’ Democratic Party—HDP), a pro-Kurdish successor of the BDP, which secured 80 seats. No coalition agreement between the AKP, CHP, MHP or HDP materialized, paralyzing the TBMM and leading to an interim
government under PM Davutoğlu. Parliamentary paralysis eventually led President Erdoğan, in August, to announce snap elections for November. This would dominate government securitization in 2015, including how it engaged the TSK.

After the June election, a series of events significantly worsened Turkey’s security environment. In July, the ceasefire with the PKK collapsed, ending two and a half years of the Solution Process. This began the insurgency’s deadliest period since the 1990s. Violence reached its height in winter 2015 and 2016, with an average of 207 deaths per month, and is ongoing (although much reduced) as of July 2019. Between July 2015 and July 2016, 2240 PKK militants, security forces, civilians and others were killed.

The escalation in conflict was exacerbated by the increasingly international dimensions of Kurdish nationalist militancy. The PKK’s close ties to and support of the Syrian Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat (Democratic Union Party—PYD) and its military branch, Yekîneyen Parastina Gel (Peoples’ Protection Units—YPG), as well as cordial ties with the Peshmerga of Iraqi Kurdistan granted it significant expertise in the urban tactics built in the fight against Daesh. The PYD/YPG’s remarkable success against Daesh in the siege of Kobane, a small Syrian city near the Turkish border, had revitalized nationalist sentiments among Turkish Kurds and triggered protests over Turkish inaction against Daesh. PKK militants crossed the border to assist the PYD/YPG, gaining experience that made successful urban warfare in Turkey seem achievable.

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These tactics, including suicide attacks, initially had a remarkable effect in seizing and penetrating urban areas. Success triggered a heavy crackdown by Turkish security forces and a reformed Gendarmerie, now under the purview of the Ministry of Interior, rather than the TSK. However, emergency measures and increased security presence in southeastern cities like Diyarbakır, Cizre, Silop, and Sırnak had made PKK urban attacks extremely costly for the militants; unsustainably so by March/April 2016. Further, shuttering links between the PKK and the PYD/YPG in Syria and across the Kandil Mountains became the principal concern of Turkish border forces.

Alongside renewed PKK insurgency, the AKP-GM split continued to escalate. The AKP began to pursue GM-affiliated institutions, including schools (foreign and domestic), banks, and other businesses. Several media outlets were raided in 2015, including Zaman, Koza-Ipek, Nokta, and others, in connection with the ‘parallel state.’ In October, just before November 2015 elections, GM-affiliated networks were blocked by Turkey’s major broadcasters on government orders. This escalation continued through 2015/2016, although it would be relegated to a secondary status relative to the PKK insurgency for the period under study, prior to the 15 July 2016 coup attempt.

4.4.2 Securitizing Moves: Both (Cooperative)

The main securitizing move in 2015 was an MGK press release on 2 September 2015. It was released following President Erdoğan’s announcement of the snap election on 24 August, and was the first joint government-military statement securitizing both the GM and the PKK. The press release combined the civilian and military securitizing strategies

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of 2007 by considering both Turkish democracy and territorial integrity under threat. The move would be used after the November general election to justify a further expansion of the anti-Gülenist crackdown and a remilitarization of the Kurdish question.

The press release was the MGK’s first statement addressing the resumption of the PKK insurgency. It used PKK attacks to build a contradistinction between “segments of society that [were] democracy-conscious, with a respect for human rights and freedoms,” and those that were not. This was a significant divergence from prior AKP rhetoric, which saw the protection of democracy as a justification for political solutions; now, democracy justified a militarized response. This distinction would later be used to pursue legal prosecution of members of the HDP, which was increasingly linked to the PKK and internal threats.\footnote{Ödül Celpe, “The Moderation of Turkey’s Kurdish Left: The Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP),” \textit{Turkish Studies} 19 no. 5 (2018): 732-734.} The press release also echoed government rhetoric that increasingly linked the PKK to its Syrian sister organization PYD/YPG since the resumption of insurgency. It made the first reference to “other terror organizations” beyond Daesh in Syria since October 2014. It also referenced the Erdoğan government’s proposal to create a safe zone in Syria (“Terör Örgütlerinden Arındırılmış Bölge”—Terrorist Organization-Free Zone), which segments of Turkish society—particularly critics like HDP leader Demirtaş—considered a cover for anti-PKK and anti-PYD/YPG operations.\footnote{“Kurd leader attacks Turkey’s ‘safe zone’ plan for Syria,” \textit{BBC News}, 29 July 2015.}

The MGK statement also escalated securitization of the GM. While references to the ‘parallel state’ had been included in MGK statements since October 2014, previous statements had only noted that the struggle was ongoing, and once in April 2015 the ‘parallel state’ was called an “internal threat”.\footnote{Taş, “Turkey: From Tutelary to Delegative Democracy,” 783.} This was exceptional for two reasons.
First, it emphasized that the MGK considered the GM to be developing structures “domestically and abroad,” a reference to Ankara’s diplomatic efforts to extradite Gülen from the US and shutter GM schools in foreign countries. Second, it emphasized the “illegal economic dimensions” of the ‘parallel state.’ This comment sought to justify the government’s growing efforts to freeze the GM assets, such as its May 2015 seizure of Bank Asya, whose founders followed Gülen’s teachings.

The government and the TSK increasingly shared a common public stance on the GM and the PKK. In Erdoğan’s August 2015 speech at the handover ceremony from CGS Özel to CGS Hulusi Akar, the President emphasized the importance of unity among “The [TSK] along with other state bodies.” He argued that Akar would “have greatly significant responsibilities” in combatting “parallel state structures” and frustrating anti-democratic and terrorist forces. Both Özel and Akar echoed this in their comments, referring to the ‘parallel state’ having inflicted a “trauma” through Ergenekon and Balyoz. They called for the “most effective and heaviest response” against terrorism.

The TSK emphasized its depoliticized role. A series of media stories in late 2015 and early 2016 suggested that the generals might “return to politics.” In response, CGS Akar released a statement on 31 March rejecting the allegations. Notably, given the coup attempt that would occur on 15 July 2016, the statement rejected allegations of ‘parallel state’ infiltration, stating it would not “tolerate any concessions to illegal phenomenon and/or actions that would digress from the chain of command.” The military was also

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120 “Gülen, PKK leaders remain on Turkey’s ‘most wanted’ list,” Hürriyet Daily News, 14 December 2015; Samantha Brletich, Tajikistan, Turkey and the Gülen Movement,” The Diplomat, 21 August 2015.
123 “Yeni komutandan ‘Paralel’ ve ‘PKK’ vurgusu,” Bursa Hakimiyet, 19 August 2015.
increasingly frustrated by the HDP’s protests against its anti-PKK operations in the southeast. This brought it in-line with the AKP’s decision to cut the links between the HDP and Öcalan that had developed over the course of the Solution Process.\textsuperscript{126}

Taken together, the TSK’s collaboration with and support of AKP securitization of the GM and PKK in 2015 represented a significant shift. While in 2013, the Turkish General Staff simply backed away from securitization and allowed the government to lead, it took an active role in supporting the government in 2015.

4.4.3 Balance of Power:

*Military Autonomy: Decreasing*

Military autonomy continued the civilian-led downward slide it had been on since 2007: The Presidency became increasingly political, further collapsing the post’s traditional guardian role; the military retreated from politics; the YAŞ assented to government preferences in senior promotions; and the Gendarmerie was again made responsible to the Ministry of the Interior in peacetime, removing it from the TSK’s purview. While there were no legal or informal changes to issues related to expenditure or procurement, the government continued to take the principal role in the organization of defence. While the period examined is short—particularly given the radical changes that would soon take place after the 15 July coup—many of these shifts can still be tied to the shift in competitive securitization after the June general election.

The Presidency played an increasingly political role in 2015, and a core part of the AKP’s election campaign was the question of constitutional amendments to replace Turkey’s parliamentary system with a presidential one. The Presidency was designed in

\textsuperscript{126} Celep, “The Moderation of Turkey’s Kurdish Left,” 742.
the 1982 Constitution to be a non-political role. In this framework, after an election, the President-elect “shall sever his relations with his party” ensuring political impartiality—and implicitly tying it to the TSK.127 This made the post into a “guardianship” role, but the distinction collapsed with the introduction of a popular vote, as Erdoğan’s Presidency broke significantly even with that of Abdullah Gül. His active campaigning for the AKP in both the June and November 2015 elections, according to the 2015 EU Progress Report, “was perceived … as overstepping the President’s constitutional prerogatives.”128 This more partisan role further separated the post from its traditional pro-military status.

The TSK made consistent efforts to avoid intervening in politics. According to the EU Progress Report, it “did not exert any undue influence on politics and abstained from commenting on political issues beyond their professional remit.”129 Namely: The MGK was dominated by civilian opinion; no officer defied the Ergenekon and Balyoz judicial process, even after the AKP disavowal; and the YAŞ, although not legally required to do so, accepted civilian preferences in appointing CGS Akar and the force commanders.130 This retreat was directly informed by government securitization of the GM and its ‘parallel state,’ as the General Staff hoped to avoid being targeted in that process.

There were no legal changes to issues of military expenditure and procurement in 2015.131 However, the civilian government took increasing control of the organization of defence, particularly regarding Syria. The most significant step in this regard is the government’s pursuit of a safe zone in Syria, and seeking US support to that end. This

127 Turkish Constitution, 1982, c. 2, I, no. 1, art. 101.
129 Ibid., 11
131 Notably, there would not be even after the 15 July coup attempt. EU Progress Report on Turkey, 14.
plan was, even then, linked to Turkey’s desire to prevent the union of PKK-affiliated
PYD/YPG cantons in northeastern and northwestern Syria.\textsuperscript{132} The PYD/YPG’s rise after
its success against Daesh in Kobane made its links to the PKK of paramount importance,
given the extremely deadly and urban nature of the PKK’s 2015 campaign.

Finally, on internal security, civilian oversight rose. The PKK’s deadly urban
campaign caused Turkey to remilitarize its approach to the Kurdish question. While the
TSK gained a voice on internal security from militarization, new civilian oversight
prevented an increase in military autonomy. Notably, a “Domestic Security Package,”
Law No. 6638 in March 2015, took the remarkable step of returning control of the JGK
and Gendarmerie Regional Commands from the TSK back to the Ministry of the
Interior.\textsuperscript{133} This allowed for a radical remilitarization of counterinsurgency policy without
significantly increasing military autonomy.

Joint civil-military securitization of the GM and the PKK enabled the government
to further establish civil control over the military. While the TSK’s legal framework
remained outsized from Western standards, the AKP’s growing capability to securitize
internal threats compelled the TSK to support the civilian government.

\textit{Elite Homogeneity: Low}

Elite Homogeneity took a major blow in the June 2015 general elections. While the AKP
remained the dominant party in the TBMM, the election triggered major divisions within
the party and demonstrated a public disappointment with the AKP. While public support

\textsuperscript{133} Wendy Zeldin, “Turkey: Recent Developments in National and Public Security Law,” \textit{Global Legal
for the dominant civilian leader, President Erdoğan, remained relatively consistent, the election loss and divisions in the TBMM are sufficient to consider homogeneity ‘low.’

The June election marked a remarkable shift in Turkish politics. For the first time since its 2002 victory, the AKP lost 53 seats in the TBMM and thus its 13-year majority. Equally remarkable was the rise of the HDP, which capitalized on the success of one of its leaders, Selahattin Demirtaş, who took almost 10% of the vote in the 2014 Presidential elections. The campaign was a remarkable success, allowing the HDP to surpass the 10% threshold by obtaining 8.49% of former AKP voters, securing 80 seats in the TBMM. However, the lack of a majority party paralyzed the legislature. The AKP, CHP, MHP and HDP all failed to come to any coalition agreements. Further, the interim government faced continuing challenges from the TBMM opposition, with all five CHP members invited to the interim government under PM Davutoğlu rejecting the invitation. Only one of three MHP deputy accepted, although two of three HDP candidate did so.

The AKP restored its majority in the November 2015 elections. Raising its share of the vote to 49.5%, up from 40.9% in June. It accomplished this with a threefold strategy: (1) making security, especially the PKK, a key part of its platform; (2) reducing its emphasis on introducing a presidential system to Turkey; (3) emphasizing the failure of coalition talks. However, this success also exacerbated tensions within the AKP; President Erdoğan and PM Davutoğlu were well-known to disagree on the question of presidentialism in Turkey and the AKP’s populist political strategy. This divided the AKP in Parliament, and over the course of Winter 2015/2016, Davutoğlu increasingly

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135 It took votes from all parties, but especially from the HDP, regaining much of the Kurdish base HDP had taken from it in June. Bardakçı, “2015 Parliamentary Elections in Turkey,” 14-16.
garnered support among a conservative-democratic wing of the AKP, raising public speculation that he would challenge Erdoğan on *de facto* leadership of the party.

Erdoğan’s predominance in the AKP, and his popular support would be fully secured in spring 2016. PM Davutoğlu resigned in May, and committed not to say a “single word” against Erdoğan, ensuring homogeneity would rise ahead of the 15 July coup attempt. Still, this was not sufficient to alter a ‘low’ classification.137

4.4.4 Civil-Military Outcome: Full Concordance

The AKP and the TSK cooperatively securitized the GM and the PKK. The collapse of the Solution process greatly expanded the role the TSK could play in addressing internal threats. Similarly, the spectre of the GM increasingly dominated the AKP’s strategic thinking, and the TSK supported that development. The consequence was further decreases in the TSK’s autonomy, where even though the TSK assumed new controls over fighting insurgency, the AKP still reduced the range of its freedom of action politically. The AKP, suffering from increasing public frustration, lost the June 2015, causing ongoing internal problems even though it regained its majority in November.

The 2015 CMR outcome was ‘full concordance.’ The military worked, combatting PKK insurgency and accepting limits on its political power. The government rewarded the military. It granted it a renewed leadership on a militarized response to the PKK, and the AKP took no steps to establish greater control of the military budget. This outcome coincides with the competitive securitization framework’s proposed causal link: Both the military and the AKP engaged in mutually supportive securitization of the GM and the PKK, and both took cooperative actions by working and rewarding respectively.

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Chapter V: Conclusion

5.1 Main Findings:

This study tested the competitive securitization framework, outlined in Chapter II, to the case of Turkish CMR for 1980-2016. It aimed to test a number of hypothesis related to the competitive securitization framework: (1) is securitization linked shifts in the civil-military BoP; (2) do different dynamics of civilian and military securitization produce specific civil-military outcomes; and (3) whether applying securitization and relative power to CMR analysis strengthened explanatory power for CMR theory or Turkish CMR. This section discusses the implications of the findings in Chapter III and IV for the study’s hypothesis. For reference, see the chart summarizing the eight cases in Fig. 13.

5.1.1 Securitization and Balance of Power:

The qualitative analysis of the causal relationship securitization has with civil-military BoP held for most of the cases examined. Notably, there is a difference between securitization’s effects on military autonomy versus elite homogeneity, as securitizing moves appear to have a stronger impact on the latter than the former. Of the eight cases examined, the military made successful moves in six. However, the military’s power only increased in three of those cases, and in one, 1997, the increase in power was informal; the TSK’s formal autonomy decreased. By contrast, of six government securitizing moves, its homogeneity was ‘high’ in four.

However, this difference between securitization and shifts in power is not as significant as a surface-level comparison of securitizing moves and power suggests. In cases where the balance of power typology does not coincide with the securitization dynamic, for both military autonomy and elite homogeneity, a successful military or
### Competitive Securitization Framework: Turkey, 1980-2016

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* After the 1997 securitizing move, the TSK’s legal power decreased, but its informal power significantly increased through greater ties to civil society in the so-called “February 28 Process.”

** The 2003/4 period is considered ‘full concordance’ because of civil-military agreement on EU accession.

**Figure 13: Competitive Securitization Framework: Turkey, 1980-2016**
civilian securitizing move usually produced some effect that offset its decreasing power.

In 1993, the Çiller government made a securitizing move, cooperative with TSK securitization, and its homogeneity is typed ‘low.’ However, alignment with the TSK prevented DYP’s coalition with SHP from collapsing. It also allowed Çiller to counteract rising opposition in the TBMM and ease President Demirel’s suspicion of her. Similarly, while the TSK’s autonomy decreased in 2007, the E-memorandum forced the AKP into an extended legal struggle. It took until the height of the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials and the 2011 protest resignations of CGS Koşaner and the force commanders that the TSK lost its ability to mitigate decreasing autonomy. Securitizing moves by the military and government in 2015 also mitigated decreasing power. The AKP’s move saw it regain a majority in parliament in November’s snap elections, after losing it in June. The military move, supporting the AKP on the GM and the PKK allowed it to avoid continued legal punishment by the AKP. It also gained a small voice back on counter-insurgency as the PKK resumed its armed conflict, even if changed responsibility for the JGK more than offset that increase.

The only discrepant period in which there was no offsetting effect of securitization is 2003/4. In that period, the TSK’s autonomy decreased significantly as the 6th, 7th, and 8th EU reform packages were implemented. Securitization of the AKP’s ties to political Islam and the RP did nothing to halt rising civil control. As discussed in Chapter IV, there are two probable explanations that securitization did not slow decreasing autonomy: (1) the TSK agreed with the AKP on EU accession, and this foreign dimension overrode traditional civil-military BoP concerns; and (2) the TSK saw promise in the February 28 Process, believing it might offset lost legal powers with greater informal power. Although
2007 would prove the belief in a continued February 28 Process unfounded, it, combined with EU aspirations, explains why a guardian military would accept rising civil control.

In sum, there is a clear causal relationship between securitization and balance of power for the cases studied. Apart from 2003/4, in the cases where the typology does not match theoretical predictions (1993, 2007, and 2015), a closer examinations shows that successful securitization had still offset the loss of power. Such a finding suggests future applications of competitive securitization should include an additional variable to better capture these cases of ‘offsetting’ securitization.

5.1.2 Securitization and Civil-Military Outcome:

Findings on the relationship between securitization and civil-military outcomes is more unequivocally in line with the initial hypothesis. For all cases except 2003/4, the civil-military outcome corresponds with the dynamics of securitizing moves.

As proposed in Chapter II, where only the military or the civilians makes a securitizing move, that actor will also be the only one to take a ‘hostile’ move—to ‘shirk’ or ‘punish’ respectively. Consequently, the result should be ‘appeased discordance’ in cases of military securitization or ‘coerced concordance’ in civilian securitization. This dynamic—only one actor making a successful move—was the most common, occurring in 1980, 1987, 1997, and 2013. In each, the actor with the successful move took a hostile move on concordance, while the other was conciliatory. In 1980: the TSK ‘shirked’ in building the September 12 Regime; the government ‘rewarded’ it by resigning. In 1987, the government ‘punished’ the military in creating the ÖHAL region; the military reluctantly cooperated. In 1997, the military ‘shirked’ by initiating the February 28 Process; the government resigned. In 2013, the government ‘punished’ by taking over the
PKK issue through the Solution Process and by politicizing the Presidency; the TSK accepted a decreased political role. Consistently, the securitizing move indicated intent to take a hostile concordance move, or was itself part of a hostile concordance move.

Where both the military and civilians make cooperative securitizing moves, we should expect ‘full concordance’ to result. This occurred in 1993 and 2015. In the former, the Çiller government cooperated with the military’s efforts to remilitarize the state response to the PKK after Özal’s death and the collapse of his political solution. In the latter, ahead of the November 2015 snap elections, the TSK cooperated with the AKP government in securitizing the GM and the resumed PKK insurgency. In both cases, while either the military or the government took the lead, the other supported its securitizing move with their own.¹

Where both military and civilians make securitizing moves that are incompatible or are directly competing, ‘coerced discordance’ should occur. A struggle between the military’s ‘shirking’ and the government’s ‘punishment’ should take place. This occurred only twice in the period under study: in 2003/4 and 2007. Of these, only 2007 fits the model. CGS Büyükanıt’s E-memorandum, citing Islamism as a threat to Kemalist values, instigated a prolonged struggle for survival by the AKP. The AKP’s response, citing interventionism as a threat to Turkish democracy, would in turn trigger a collapse in TSK popularity and radically reduce its political role. While the AKP was more successful in the long-term, the post-2007 struggle was a clear case of ‘coerced discordance’: coerced in the sense it took two coup trials (Ergenekon and Balyoz) to bring the TSK in line; discordance in the sense the TSK attempted to repeat its 1997 ‘postmodern coup’.

¹ This matches the ideal form of concordance, in which all elements of the civil-military relationship agree on the role of the military in society, as described in Schiff, The Military and Domestic Politics, 43-44.
The 2003/4 case, as discussed previously, does not fit theoretical predictions, either in terms of changes in the civil-military BoP or civil-military outcome. While both TSK and AKP made competing securitizing moves, the outcome was ‘full concordance.’ The best explanation for a civil-military outcome inconsistent with securitization dynamics is the overriding role of the EU accession drive, which made internal threats much less pressing. Notably, this finding is consistent with Desch’s structural theory of CMR in *Civilian Control of the Military*. For Desch, high external threat (or, in this case, possible EU accession) and low internal threat (the renewed low-intensity PKK insurgency) should produce strong civilian control (a TSK willing to accept reform).² The TSK’s interest in using informal power by “continuing” the February 28 Process likely also played some role in producing ‘full concordance;’ it is difficult to call the period one of ‘high civil control,’ as Desch’s model might label it. However, the ‘full concordance’ outcome in 2003/4 does suggest the need to incorporate some form of external indicator in the competitive securitization framework.

Of the eight cases studied, seven matched theoretical expectations. This outcome makes sense when considering the nature of a securitizing move. When an actor has committed to making a speech act, they are seeking to invoke a state of exception, by which traditional rules are bent to address an existential threat. Any effort to invoke such an exception within the realm of CMR, if unilateral, is necessarily going to break the existing form of civil-military concordance. It is an indicator of intent to take exceptional action (either to ‘punish,’ in the government’s case; or to ‘shirk,’ in the military’s), unless some demand or set of demands are met.

² Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military*, 4-5.
5.2 Contributions

This study has made three principal contributions to the literature by providing: (1) a model for competitive securitization in CMR theory; (2) a balance of power mechanism for CMR; and (3) a new way to think of the role of internal threat in Turkish CMR

First, the competitive securitization framework emphasizes the important role securitization has in producing civil-military outcomes. Most inclusions of securitization in CMR focus on securitization by the state, without distinguishing between civilian and military securitization and noting the ensuing competitive dynamics.\(^3\) Accounting for competing civil-military discourses of threat provides a new way to examine public statements by civilian and military actors. While Turkey is relatively unique in the TSK’s high levels of contra-government public diplomacy, many militaries periodically diverge from their government in public statements. Contextualizing those actions as part of competitive securitization processes provides useful insights for both the CMR and securitization literatures. It also provides another tool for CMR theory to assess how civil control occurs, outside the Huntingtonian separation paradigms that remain predominant in the CMR theory.\(^4\) Speech acts, rather than professionalization, can induce changes in behaviour, at least in states with transitional or developing civil-military relations. Lastly, securitization provides a useful corrective on how internal threat impacts civil-military relations. It is not the threat itself that determines civil-military outcomes, nor does internal threat necessarily reduce civil control, as Desch proposes. Rather, what matters is how civilian and military actors securitize that threat.

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\(^4\) Bruneau, “Impediments to the Accurate Conception of Civil-Military Relations,” 15.
Second, I provide a balance of power mechanism that emphasizes soft power dimensions: military autonomy and elite homogeneity. These variables provide a useful tool for both of the principle CMR theories I borrow from. For Schiff, her concordance model has a relatively broad conception of what precisely constitutes ‘agreement’ between political elites, the military and the citizenry. Relative power provides an explanation for how a political elite with high homogeneity can compel a military with low autonomy, or vice-versa. By allowing power to influence concordance, we can understand different types of ‘agreement,’ such as the coerced, appeased, and full variants in this study. Similarly, Feaver’s principal-agent model has been criticized for the difficulty in applying the model to crises. The use of military autonomy and elite homogeneity, however provides a useful additional point for his model, influencing the costs for the civilian actor seeking to monitor and ‘punish’ the military, and the military seeking to pursue its own interests and ‘shirk’. A highly heterogeneous government, for example, would be unlikely to punish the military even if it shirks; it may even permit it to shirk for political support, as the Çiller government did. Similarly, a highly autonomous military may choose to shirk and bear the consequences, as the TSK did after the February 28 Process, accepting legal restrictions in favour of informal power.

Finally, this project provides some valuable contributions with regard to the study of Turkish CMR specifically. It provides a theoretical model for how Turkish politicians and the military use different sources of internal threat to alter dynamics of civil-military relations in Turkey. This project is also one of relatively few English-language studies that comprehensively examines the relationship between internal threat and Turkish CMR

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all the way up to the July 15 coup.\(^6\) This is valuable because it highlights how changing sources of internal threat (namely left-right violence, the PKK, Islamism, and the GM) have had differing effects on Turkish CMR; it is a consequence of how the civilian and the military address that threat. It is also the only English-language project I am familiar with that explicitly examines ongoing competition over relative power between the Turkish military and government.

### 5.3 Limitations

This study has several limitations. There are three that are particularly notable: (1) the securitization-to-consequence causal link; (2) the reduction of the civilian and military to single actors; and (3) the prediction problem.

First, there is some problem in linking a securitizing move to changes in relative civil-military power. The act of securitization itself is not one meant to produce a specific policy or other effect. Wæver explicitly argued that securitization should not be seen as a causal mechanism.\(^7\) Of course, securitization has been examined a causal mechanism in studies apart from this one, but there are drawbacks to doing so. The principle one is that this study links securitization of internal threat to changes in power by context; when MİT took an increasing role over PKK intelligence vis-à-vis the Gendarmerie in 2013, the policy was in-line with AKP’s de-securitization of the PKK. This link is a consistent inference, but it is cannot by clearly established that the securitizing move caused the change without access to classified documents and private correspondence. Still, I believe

\(^6\) For another comprehensive survey, see Pusane’s 2007, “Insurgencies, Counterinsurgencies and Civil-Military Relations.” Her model of dynamic civil-military interaction also addressed the fact that internal threat does not consistently decrease civil control. However, she focused exclusively on insurgency, both the control of and the threat of. My competitive securitization framework describes how all internal threats can influence a wide variety of CMR areas, depending on how the threat is framed by a speech act.

\(^7\) Wæver, “The Theory Act.”
this issue should not significantly affect interpretation. The point of a securitizing move is to enable such changes, rather than directly cause them. However, several changes to CMR that I analysed are more difficult to link directly to the speech act.

Second, I reduce the military and the civilian government to single actors. This was necessary simplification, but overlooks significant differences in opinion in different parts of each organization. I generally considered the General Staff, and particularly the CGS, as co-equivalent with the military as an institution. However, the different force commanders and their branches, particularly the JGK, have radically different views on the military’s political role. Even that understates the importance of junior officers, who have played enormously important roles the history of Turkish CMR. In the 1960 coup, for example, most of the General Staff was not supportive of the operation, but it was organized nonetheless mostly by more junior staff.8 Similarly, the civilian actor has often been at odds with one itself, particularly in coalition governments. This simplification means that it is difficult to clearly determine civilian or military responsibility for some speech acts. Take Yılmaz’s 2001 condemnation of the February 28 Process; was this a securitizing move?9 It goes against then-PM Ecevit’s highly deferential approach to the military, but Yılmaz was a Deputy PM in that government. Reduction of the civilian and military to single actors harms analytical clarity.

Finally, this study relies on an adaptation of Schiff’s concordance theory and Feaver’s principal-agent model, which both claim predictive power. For Schiff, the fewer concordance indicators on which the political elite, military and citizenry, ‘agree,’ the more likely is the military to intervene. For Feaver, the likelihood of the civilian principal

8 Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, 102-105.
‘punishing’ the military agent is determined by how costly that punishment is, and the likelihood of military ‘shirking’ is determined by the likelihood of detection and ‘punishment.’ My competitive securitization framework makes a similar implicit proposal: The success of either a civilian and military securitizing move will allow that actor to tilt the balance of power in its favour. However, for reasons discussed in Chapter II, section 2.2.1, one cannot determine the success of a securitizing move without that change in power; the policy outcome. For this reason, the competitive securitization framework is better suited as an explanatory tool than a predictive one in analyzing changes in relative civil-military power.

5.4 Future Research

This project is intended as an exercise in theoretical development, but has highlighted areas in which further research might be valuable. First, the concept of competitive securitization in CMR opens up the possibility of other uses of securitization in CMR. It demonstrates that securitization can be applied as a causal mechanism in CMR research, which suggests that it may influence other areas of policy, such as the role of external threat in CMR dynamics. Exploring other avenues in which securitization affects CMR may be particularly useful in traditional military arenas: What role does it have on ongoing operations, such as the link between securitization of Islamic terrorism and wars like NATO’s intervention in Afghanistan? What role in planning, like the securitization of the ‘domino effect’ of communism on Cold War ‘containment’ policy?

Second, future research will depend on refining the competitive securitization framework and ensuring it is generalizable. Consequently, identifying other countries or cases with identifiable and distinct processes of securitization of internal threats by both
the military and the government and testing the model is essential. Principal among these, and still in Turkey, are the events of 15 July 2016 and their aftermath. At first glance, it appears to fit well in competitive securitization. The putschists’ Martial Law Declaration might constitute the military securitizing move and President Erdoğan’s FaceTime interview with CNN Türk is a viable speech act. The post-coup purges of the military, new laws, and the ensuing two-year state of emergency are clear changes to the balance of power, not to mention the 2018 constitutional referendum held under that state of emergency that gave Turkey a presidential system of government. However there are complications: the self-styled ‘Peace at Home Council’ cannot be said to truly represent the military as an actor. Most of the TSK remained aligned to the government, and the actions of loyalists are responsible for the coup’s failure, such as those of officers at Eskişehir Combined Air Operations Center. Moreover, the group this study used as a proxy for the military, the General Staff, remained loyal. CGS Hulusi Akar, Ümit Dündar (Land—acting CGS after CGS Akar’s detention), Abidin Ünal (Air), Bülent Bostanoğlu (Navy), and Galip Mendi (Gendarmerie) all were either detained by coup plotters—two force commanders (Ünal and Mendi) and CGS Akar—were uninvolved or took action to stop it. Even CGS Akar took (limited) preventative steps in coordination with MİT earlier in the day and refused to defect when asked to lead coup operations. The General Staff’s loyalty makes it difficult to fit 15 July into the model. Further research is required

Some other potentially viable examples might include: Egypt, particularly post-2011 differences in securitization between the military and the Mubarak regime or the

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11 Ibid., 6-8
Morsi government;\textsuperscript{12} Pakistan, particularly comparing the approaches of the Musharraf military regime and the post-2008 civilian administrations to Baluchistan;\textsuperscript{13} Azerbaijan, namely the role of civil-military competition during the Nagorno-Karabakh War in transitions between the Matalibov, Elchibey and Aliyev administrations;\textsuperscript{14} or Indonesia, possibly the lead-up to the 1998 collapse of the Suharto administration and ensuing efforts to implement reforms with a military widely viewed as a guarantor of internal security.\textsuperscript{15} Such case studies would demonstrate whether my model is generally applicable to countries with developing CMR, or if there is something unique about the Turkish case that should be more closely examined.

Third, it may be valuable to engage in a more detailed study of other sources of power in CMR. This study has principally examined the relationship between internal securitization and power; the 2003/4 case in Chapter IV demonstrates this is not always the best approach. Adding an external variable to assess how foreign affairs are securitized and affect balance of power may be valuable. A possible case might be Iran’s Revolutionary Guard (IRGC), which long opposed President Rouhani’s advocacy of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action nuclear accord. The US’s May 2018 withdrawal and the ensuing capital flight has caused the IRGC to examine an expanded commercial and economic role for itself.\textsuperscript{16} An external variable would be valuable in providing a more comprehensive picture on how civilian and military actors alter their relative power.

\textsuperscript{15} Sebastian, Syailendra, and Indrabayu. “CMR in Indonesia after the Reform Period,” 77.
Lastly, a significant objective for this study was to assess the role of securitization in the collapse of military tutelage and the rise of civil control in Turkey. However, this narrow case study makes it unclear whether the competitive securitization framework could apply to other typologies of CMR. A potentially valuable avenue of research would be to adapt the framework to apply to countries with democratic civil control, particularly one where Huntingtonian theory has significant explanatory power. The United States is a contender, particularly in moments of crisis. General MacArthur’s comments on the possible use of nuclear weapons against China in 1950-51 by and President Truman’s eventual relief of the Supreme Commander, could be an interesting case. Some non-crisis periods may also be viable, such as the decision to extend the US bombing campaign into Cambodia during the Vietnam War. Of course, such a study on a state with democratic civil control would likely focus on civilian securitization, as there may be insufficient instances of military securitization to engage in a comprehensive study. The military may play little, if any, role in internal security. Consequently, applying the model to these states would demand a significant reworking of the model to privilege the civilian actor and focus on external securitization.

17 Of course, one might argue that the caesarean popularity of MacArthur bars this case as one of ‘democratic civil control.’ Daniel Bessner and Eric Lorber, “Toward a Theory of Civil-Military Punishment,” Armed Forces and Society 38 no. 4 (2012): 653-658.
Appendices

Appendix I: Securitization, 1980

1.1: Speech by CGS Kenan Evren, 12 September 1980

Text:

[On Prior Warnings]
To the lofty Turkish nation:

In my address to you on the occasion of 30 August victory day—during the limited time that was allotted to me—I tried to explain to you as much as possible through radio and television the political and economic situation in our country as well as the necessary measures against the anarchic and divisive incidents. It should again be recalled that during the last two years, on each and every occasion, while addressing you on the radio and television, I have pointed out those vital issues. [The situation has] reached a dimension that threatens the survival of our state and people, resulting in the worst crisis our country has experienced since the establishment of the Republic… anarchic and violent incidents have claimed the lives of about 20 citizens every day.

Turkish citizens who share the same religious and national values have been divided into several camps through partisanship and concocted divisiveness and have been incited to kill each other pitilessly as if they were enemies. Ten years ago, who would think that our Republic, founded on the principles of Atatürk, would be brought to this state?

[On Government Paralysis]
Promises by various governments that came to power that resolutions and measures would ensure domestic security would be urgently taken in a bid to combat civil war—numerous examples of which are cited in history—which was being intensified by each passing year, and its penetrating and devastating effects were forgotten through clashes of political interests, petty partisanship, whimsical stands, illusions, unreasonable demands and overt and covert aspirations that are incompatible with the nature of the Turkish state.

… the deputies and senators who were charged with representing the nation have remained bystanders to these developments in the [TBMM] for months for the sake of their parties’ interests and discipline. All measures taken by the governments in power with the hope of settling the problems were denounced by the opposition parties and were undermined even in cases in which these measures were in the interest of the country.

…

The multifaceted authorities provided by the constitution were, in practice, transformed into conflicting authorities. While subversive incidents incited by both domestic and foreign sources were affecting our religion, our thoughts and all other fields, it is sad that those [engaged in politicking]… were not aware that they would be left under the debris of the state that they would cause to collapse and would be destroyed.

…

By filling all the levels of the state organization with persons sharing their political views, the political parties that assumed power forced the civil servants and the citizens to take sides and form camps… This caused the formation of sources supporting anarchy and secessionism and of opposing camps among civil servants and even among the police and the teachers.

Thus, our impartial people were forced to seek from the political parties what they expect from the state. The state authority was thus condemned to disappear and, rather than protect the rights and laws of the citizens and offer them impartial service, the prestige of the state was condemned to slowly vanish. Subsequently, a total vacuum was created in our country.

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Since 22 March 1980, our assemblies, which passed some ineffective laws following this letter of warning, have wasted time... Our legal organs, which are expected to solve the public order issue and the economic crisis and to enact laws, have remained indifferent in the face of this nightmare that descended on the country.

[On Sectarian Violence and Anarchy]

Despite the fact that our constitution clearly states that Turkish citizens cannot be criticized because of their religious beliefs, our political parties—which are pursuing only one scheme—have considered it beneficial to incite sectarian differences—which were forgotten during the term of the Republic and the lofty Atatürk—and have incited our citizens to massacre each other for the sake of political interests. It has been forgotten that all who live within the borders of the Turkish Republic and who consider themselves Turkish citizens form the Turkish nation as one body. Provokers who want to prevent the fraternal unity of our citizens belonging to different sects have received political support.

Terror has claimed 5,241 lives in the last two years. During the War of Independence 5,713 persons were killed and 18,480 were wounded in the Battle of Sarkarya. Even this simple comparison reveals that an undeclared war, which has no regard for human feelings is being fought in Turkey.

[On Interim Politics]

As of today, legislative and executive authority will be employed by the National Security Council—composed of the Ground, Air and Naval forces commanders and the commander of the Gendarmerie—under my leadership until a new government and legislative organ is formed. I believe in the necessity of raising out national culture above the current level of civilization, as stated by Atatürk, securing the most modern and developed equipment and resources and realizing as soon as possible a period of speedy development.

The Turkish Armed Forces, which have through their stands on numerous occasions proved their faith in the democratic and free parliamentary system, will as soon as possible establish the Council of Ministers and will leave the responsibility of administration to this Council. Following the completion of a constitution, an election law and a political parties law... the Turkish Armed Forces will hand over the governing of the country to an administration. ... Until these arrangements are completed, all kinds of political activities in our country have been stopped at every level. The political parties, the activities of which have been stopped as a necessity, will be allowed to engage sufficiently in activities prior to the elections, the time and conditions of which will be announced in accordance with the new stipulations in the constitution and with the new law on elections and political parties.

The leaders of the AP, the CHP, the MSP and the MHP are, for the time being, confined to reside in the specified places under the protection and supervision of the Turkish Armed Forces in order to ensure their security of life. They will be released when the situation is suitable.

Dear citizens, any resistance, demonstration or stand against the Turkish Armed Forces—which are an inseparable and loyal part of the nation—or the new administration will be strictly and instantly broken up and punished. I am calling on all our citizens not to heed provocations—so that bloodshed can be prevented in the country—to act peacefully in line with communiques being published and not to go out into the streets and to forget their disputes with affection and to be helpful to the new administrations with the awareness that we are all Turkish citizens with equal rights, living on this sacred land. I expect this of the Turkish citizen’s patriotic and noble character and wish them a happy and bright future.
Appendix II: Securitization, 1987

II.1: State of Emergency Council of the Prime Ministry, 8 January 1987
Release to Ankara Domestic Service: ²

The Prime Ministry’s State of Emergency Coordination Council met today to assess public order and security in the provinces where the State of Emergency is in force and in the country at large. Members of the council and the governors of the provinces in which State of Emergency is in force attended the meeting headed by Minister of State and Council Chairman Kazım Oksay. A statement issued after the meeting says that the situation in these provinces has greatly improved. The statement situation in these provinces has greatly improved. The statement adds that in many provinces no ideological incidents in general.

The statement adds: The courageous efforts and vigilance of the security forces, and especially the support of the people have been prominent factors in achieving this improvement. However, despite these positive developments the importance of maintaining our efforts and vigilance in national unity and solidarity has been stressed, due to our country’s geopolitical position and the goals and activities of foreign forces vis-à-vis our country.

Appendix III: Securitization, 1993

III.1: Hürriyet Interview with Chief of Staff Doğan Güreş, 9 July 1993
Text: ³

[On the PKK]

We have been carrying out wide-scale operations on the Gabur and Namaz mountains over the past three or four days. We have established from their messages on field radios that they are being destroyed. We have not left any stone unturned in those areas. We have dropped 500-pound bombs on our targets. Holding out against those bombs is impossible. You will find their dead bodies if you search the area in several months. The PKK is suffering many casualties. According to the assessments I have made, we will be able to cripple the PKK in a very short period. We are very determined in that regard. However, we may seriously consider placing the question of martial law on the agenda if we fail to render the PKK ineffective by the end of next winter.

…

I have established that the PKK has selected Turkey’s territorial integrity as its target. Therefore, as far as the strategic concepts are concerned, I have changed the priorities of the [TSK] vis-à-vis the possible threats. I said that the question of internal threat is the first priority. I decided on that when I was appointed [CGS]. I informed the commanders not to show me any other threat when drawing up their tactics.

The Irish Republican Army [IRA] issues a warning before detonating its explosives. That does not apply to the PKK. It has been killing people, including children. It has even claimed that it has sought vengeance for the incidents in Sivas. It is true that the IRA is a terrorist organization, but it has certain humanitarian aspects. Even the West has realized PKK’s nature.

…

[On Coup Rumours]

I uphold democracy. Claims that were suddenly put forward in connection with the possibility of a coup. I have been grieved and offended by those claims. The word coup muse not

be mentioned in Turkey. We must not use that word anymore. Democracy and the democratic establishment are functioning. Our press is effectively controlling the situation. The [TBMM] is functioning and enacting necessary laws. The Turkish nation must not believe in the claims that are made in connection with the question of a possible coup. As far as I am concerned, those are “inauspicious” claims.

The Turkish Armed Forces are not uncontrolled. The inspectors immediately take action whenever and incident occurs. … For example, we have instructions on the procedure that applies to the ground forces personnel who enter the [ÔHAL region] and neighbouring areas without authorization. I was informed today that several military personnel have been arrested in Mus. … Legal proceedings have been initiated against those who were found guilty, including commissioned officers.

**On Secularism in Turkey**

The Constitution is very valuable. Can the Constitution be violated? That is a criminal offence. Article 2 says: Turkey is a democratic, secular and social state of law, which is committed to Atatürk’s concept of nationalism and based on these basic principles. Article 4 says: The characteristics of the Republic, which are outlined in Article 2, cannot be changed. Nor can a proposal be made for such a change. That means the matter cannot be debated.

The question of secularism was also discussed in the meeting I held with esteemed Çiller. The [TSK] is very sensitive on that matter. More than 90 percent of the population in this Islamic country is sensitive on the question of secularism, that is, excluding a number of fanatics. Secularism is the guarantor of the Islamic faith. The people are forced to perform prayers in countries that are not secular. They are threatened to fast.

**[On PM Çiller]**

We asked for an appointment to see the esteemed Prime Minister in order to wish her success. She said she would receive us on Monday. We called on her on that day. The members of the press and the Turkish Radio and Television Network were not there. That may have created questions. We called on President Demirel when he was appointed Prime Minister. That was before he received a vote of confidence. However, he was appointed Prime Minister. Our meeting with esteemed Çiller was very successful. We replied to all her questions. As far as the laws are concerned, the Prime Minister is my boss. We discussed many of the problems.

She asked me to express my views. She also asked the other commanders to do the same. She is a very shrewd person. I have frequently briefed the esteemed Prime Minister. We confer by telephone when necessary every day. She is very determined. She said that we have her full political support. That was exactly what the former governments said as well. I do not wish to criticize them. However, that was what esteemed Çiller said first. We welcomed her approach.

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**III.2: Le Monde Interview with PM Tansu Çiller, 8 January 1994**

Text:“

**[On Integration with Europe]**

[Le Monde]: Is Turkey ready for customs union with the European Union in 1995?

[Ciller]: Oh yes! We are moving toward that very quickly. It is costing us dearly and is putting a heavy burden on our economy. Despite that, we are persisting in pursuing our objective. Turkey is one of the most open countries, especially toward Eastern Europe. This must be acknowledged by our friends … in the European Union, and we must pursue the negotiations in

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this area. There is no other country that has taken this step by itself, without receiving some help. If you look at what Spain, Portugal and Greece obtained, there is no comparison. It must be acknowledged that Turkey, which is at the crossroads of North and South, East and West, is essential for the stability of Europe.

[Le Monde]: One of the obstacles to your entrance into the European Union remains the Cyprus question. Will there be any change on this point?

[Çiller]: First of all, I am anxious to state that we have nothing to gain from the impasse in Cyprus. We are in favour of a solution accepted by all the parties involved and we want to make a contribution to that solution. Please note that I have never used this problem in our debates on domestic policy, as I could have done.

[Le Monde]: Do you think that the arrival of a new government in Northern Cyprus will help solve the problem? Are you prepared to hand back part of the territory...?

[Çiller]: We are more open to peace than we have ever been. I would like to see a similar attitude from the Greek Side. The return of territory is not the main issue. It is essential that the two communities agree to a durable solution. To achieve that, many things must be done. As for us, our hands are not tied.

... [On the PKK and Kurds in Turkey]

[Le Monde]: In recent months we have seen a worsening in the conflict ... [with] the Kurdish separatists. How do you gauge the attitude of European countries on this matter.

[Çiller]: We have always said that, according to the principle of communicating vessels, if organizations are declared illegal in one—in Germany for example—terrorism will move to another country. The United Kingdom, France, and even the Netherlands where no [Kurd] organization has ever been banned, have become aware of this. I think it is high time to tackle this problem. We share the same values: democracy, the protection of human rights, and we must support each other. We must not mix up the problem of the PKK with the problem of the Kurds living in Turkey or elsewhere in the world. In 1993, 2000 people were killed in Turkey. The vast majority of them were Kurds killed by the PKK. We are trying to protect our citizens, whatever their origin.

[Le Monde]: For you, is not the only solution to the PKK problem a military solution?

[Çiller]: I spent the New Year in southeast Anatolia. In the streets and on the balconies, the attitude of the people toward me was the same as in any other Turkish town: There were large displays of affection for me in a relaxed atmosphere. That is the situation. The people are afraid of the PKK and they want the Turkish state to protect their lives and give them work. We are investing more than 11 times the amount in this region than we are taking out.

We believe in the process of democratization and we are going to take major steps in that direction. Please note that this is not a concession to the PKK. Democracy has already travelled a long road in this country since the 1940s. We are going to continue. We are aiming at democratization, not only for this region but for all of Turkey.

I would emphasize that there is no minority in this country. Everyone has the right to vote and can be elected to Parliament. Some of the most important members of my government are Kurds and, when I appointed them, I did not even ask myself about their origin.

Appendix IV: Securitization, 1997

IV.1: MGK Recommendations, 28 February 1997

Memorandum: 5

5 Translated in Günay, “Research Notes: Implementing the 'February 28' Recommendations,” 1-20.
I. The principle of secularism should be strictly enforced and laws should be modified for that purpose, if necessary.

II. Private dormitories, foundations, and schools affiliated with Sufi religious orders (tarikats) must be put under the control of relevant state authorities and eventually transferred to the Ministry of National Education (MNE), as required by the Law on Unified Education (Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu).

III. With a view toward rendering the tender minds of young generations inclined foremost toward love of the republic, Atatürk, the homeland, and the nation, and toward the ideal and goal of raising the Turkish nation to the level of modern civilization, and to protect them against the influence of various quarters: 1) An eight-year uninterrupted educational system must be implemented across the country. 2) The necessary administrative and legal adjustments should be made so that Koran courses, which children with basic education may attend with parental consent, operate only under the responsibility and control of the MNE.

IV. Our national education institutes charged with raising enlightened clergy loyal to the republican regime and Atatürk’s principles and reforms must conform to the essence of the Law on Unified Education.

V. Religious facilities built in various parts of the country must not be used for political exploitation to send messages to certain circles. If there is a need for such facilities, the Chairmanship for Religious Affairs should evaluate the need, and the facilities must be built in coordination with local governments and relevant authorities.

VI. Activities of religious orders banned by Law no. 677, as well as all entities prohibited by said law, must be ended.

VII. Media groups that oppose the TSK and its members should be brought under control. These [groups] try to depict the TSK as inimical to religion by exploiting the issue of personnel whose ties to the TSK have been severed by decisions of the YAŞ based on their fundamentalist activities.

VIII. Personnel expelled from military service because of fundamentalist activities, disciplinary problems, or connections with illegal organizations must not be employed by other public agencies and institutions or otherwise encouraged.

IX. The measures taken within the framework of existing regulations to prevent infiltration into the TSK by the extremist religious sector should also be applied in other public institutions and establishments, particularly in universities and other educational institutions, at every level of the bureaucracy, and in judicial establishments.

X. Iran's efforts to destabilize Turkey's regime should be closely watched. Policies that would prevent Iran from meddling in Turkey's internal affairs should be adopted.

XI. Legal and administrative means must be used to prevent the very dangerous activities of the extremist religious sector that seeks to create polarization in society by fanning sectarian differences.

XII. Legal and administrative proceedings against those responsible for incidents that contravene the Constitution of the Turkish Republic, the Law on Political Parties, the Turkish Penal Code, and especially the Law on Municipalities should be concluded in a short period of time, and firm measures should be taken at all levels not to allow repetition of such incidents.

XIII. Practices that violate the attire law and that may give Turkey an anachronistic image must be prevented.
XIV. Licensing procedures for short- and long-barrel weapons, which have been issued for various reasons, must be reorganized on the basis of police and gendarmerie districts. Restrictions must be introduced on this issue, and the demand for pump-action rifles, in particular, must be evaluated carefully.

XV. The collection of [animal] sacrifice hides by anti-regime and uncontrolled [unregulated] organizations and establishments for the purpose of securing financial resources should be prevented, and no collection of sacrifice hides should be allowed outside the authority recognized by law.

XVI. Legal proceedings against bodyguards dressed in special uniforms and those responsible for them should be concluded speedily, and, taking into account the fact that such illegal practices might reach dangerous proportions, all private bodyguard units not envisaged by the law should be disbanded.

XVII. Initiatives that aim at solving the country's problems on the basis of "umma" [religious community] rather than "nation" and that encourage the separatist terror organization (Kurdistan Workers Party [PKK]) by approaching it on the same basis [i.e., as a part of the umma] should be prevented by legal and administrative means.

XVIII. Law no. 5816, which defines crimes against the great savior Atatürk, including acts of disrespect, must be fully implemented.

Appendix V: Securitization, 2007

V.I: Chief of Turkish General Staff Press Release, 27 April 2007

Press Release:*

It has been observed that there is a part of society that is in an ongoing struggle to undermine the basic values of the Turkish Republic, secularism being at the forefront, and those activities have increased in the recent period. The following ongoing activities have been submitted to the relevant authorities under suitable conditions: the desire to redefine basic values, and a wide range of activities, which extend as far as to arrange alternative celebrations of our national holiday, which is a symbol of our nation’s coherence, the independence of our state and our nation’s unity.

Those that attempt to carry out these activities exploit the sacred religious emotions of our people without shame, transformed into an open challenge to the government in the guise of religion, in an attempt to conceal their actual purpose. By bringing activities that draw attention to women and children, these actions resemble those that attempt to destroy the unity and integrity of our country.

In this context;

In Ankara, a Koran reading contest was scheduled on the same day as the April 23 National Sovereignty and Children’s Day celebrations, but the contest was cancelled due to a sensitive media and public pressure.

On April 22, 2007 in Şanlıurfa with the participation of groups from the districts of Mardin, Gaziantep and Diyarbakır, a choir was created and young girls were forced to sing religious refrains at a time when they should have been in bed and in old-fashioned costumes not suitable for their age. Additionally, the attempts to remove pictures of Atatürk and the Turkish flag in the middle of the night revealed the true intent and purpose of the organization of such activities.

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Furthermore, all school principals in the district of Altındağ in Ankara were ordered to participate in the “Holy Birth Celebration”; at an event organized by the District Mufti of Denizli with the cooperation of a political party, elementary students sang religious refrains with their heads covered; in spite of having four mosques in the town of Nikfer, in the county of Tavas in Denizli, Atatürk Elementary School women were forced to listen to presentations about preaching and religion, and similar news has been heard.

The National Ministry of Education has determined the events that will be celebrated in schools. However, it has been established that such celebrations were realized upon instructions that were not regulated in directives. Also, it has been observed that although the General Staff had informed the authorized institutions, no preventive measure had been taken.

The fact that an important part of the related activities had been realized with the authorization and within the knowledge of civilian authorities which should intervene to such events and prevent them makes the matter even graver. It is possible to further demonstrate more examples.

Those that are anti-Republican, with no other purpose than to erode the basic characteristics of the state with this retrogressive approach, have expanded the scope of their activities over the past few days with the developments and discourse of the last few days with courage.

The developments in our region reveal many examples which might result from playing with religion and abusing beliefs for a political rhetoric and purpose from which lessons should be drawn.

It is possible to observe in our country as well as in other countries that a political rhetoric or ideology which is tried to be built on a sacred belief suppresses the belief and turns out to something else. It can be argued that the event which occurred in Malatya is a stunning example of this. There is no doubt that the only condition for the State of the Republic of Turkey to live in peace and stability as a modern democracy is to protect the essential characteristics of the State determined in our Constitution.

As a matter of fact, such behaviors and implementations are totally in contradiction with the principle “Being committed to the regime of the Republic not in words but in deeds and reflecting this with acts” stated by the General Chief of Staff in a press conference held on the 12th of April, 2007 and they do violate the basic qualifications and provisions of the Constitution. In recent days, the outstanding problem in the Presidential elections has been the discussion of secularism. This situation is observed with concern by the Turkish Armed Forces. It should not be forgotten that the Turkish Armed Forces is not neutral in these discussions and is the absolute defender of secularism. Furthermore, the Turkish Armed Forces is definitely against the ongoing discussions and negative comments and would reveal its attitudes and behaviors clearly and transparently when necessary. No one should ever doubt about it.

Briefly, whoever is against the philosophy of the Great Leader Atatürk “How happy is he who says I am a Turk” is the enemy of the Republic of Turkey and so will he stay.

The Turkish Armed Forces still maintains its firm determination to fully carry out its clear duties assigned to it with laws in order to protect these qualifications and its commitment and faith in this determination are absolute.

Announced with respect to the public.

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*V.2: Council of Ministers of Turkey Press Release, 28 April 2007*

Press Release: 7

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7 Ibid.
Yesterday a declaration expressing the opinions of the General Staff on various subjects has been served to media organs in midnight and has been published in the website of the General Staff. This declaration has been perceived as a clear attitude against the Government. There is no doubt that in a democratic environment, even thinking about this is unaccustomed. We would like to express that, the fact that the General Staff which is an institution associated to the Prime Minister uses an expression against the Government in any subject is unthinkable in a democratic State of law. The General Staff is an institution under the command of the Government, the functions of which are determined with the Constitution and the related laws. According to our Constitution, the General Chief of Staff is accountable to the Prime Minister regarding its duties and authorities.

The fact that this text has been served to media organs and its timing in the website are meaningful. First of all, it is extremely remarkable that such a text comes out in the process of the presidential election of the 11th president which is the supreme authority of our State and, moreover, in the middle of the night. That this fact happens in this fragile period when discussions are ongoing on the Constitutional Court would be perceived as an attempt aimed at influencing the supreme justice.

It should be clear to everyone that our Government is more supporting and fragile than anyone else in what concerns the principal and indispensable common values indicated in articles 1, 2 and 3 of the Constitution, the unity and integrity of our country, the notability of our nation and the qualifications of Turkey as a secular, democratic and social State of law. Turkey’s national unity and integrity and the welfare of the Turkish Nation is possible with the protection of those values.

It is not possible to approve any behaviors and acts that are revealed from time to time by real and legal persons against the basic qualifications of our Republic, the Constitution as well as the laws. Anyway, in such situations, starting from the public prosecutor, the investigating authorities hold the authority to make the necessary investigations without taking any permit from anyone. Doing the necessary in these matters is their duty.

Furthermore, it is out of question that our government and the associated units remain insensitive to the implementations that are declared by media organs or are expressed in various environments and are in contradiction with the basic values of our State.

Therefore, it has been very regrettable that certain statements regarding the relations between the Government and the General Staff which are very inaccurate took place in the related text. For the healthy functioning of the process aimed at strengthening Turkey, modernizing it and increasing its democratic standards, it is compulsory that all the basic institutions of our State be more prudent and attentive on these subjects Otherwise unrecoverable damages would have been given to the strengthening of our State, the peace and wealth of our country. The primary duty regarding the protection of the basic values of the State belongs to the Government. Since the Government is uncompromisingly a supporter of this subject, the fact that all the institutions associated to the Government be also supporting in this direction is after all natural.

Each problem of Turkey would be resolved within the rules of law and democracy. An adverse thought and attitude shall on no account be accepted. The mission that everybody and each institution shall fulfill is to ease the functioning of this process. The damage given to our country and our nation by being in other searches has been experienced with enough sorrow in the past.

Our government is firmly committed to further strengthen our Republic which is a democratic, secular and social State of law and to prevent our democracy from being damaged. Our Republic and democracy is an irrevocable, unalienable acquisition. Today we should struggle to find out how we can walk stronger to the future in harmony and cooperation to protect the basic qualifications of our State.

Instead of consuming our energy with internal discussions, we should struggle in order to further strengthen our country in global competition and increase the wealth and happiness of our
nation. In this context, we should defeat the efforts of some malicious persons to put the Turkish Armed Forces against our Government.

All the persons having a sense of responsibility should avoid behaviors that damage the respectability of Turkey in the international community, harm our position in the modern world, threat the stability of the Turkish economy, are against democracy and inflict a deep wound in the Turkish conscience. Those who harm trust and stability should know that they would carry the responsibility of the negative results this would generate for our country and our nation.

Appendix VI: Securitization, 2013

VI.1: MGK Meeting Press Release, 30 October 2014

At the meeting:

I. Issues concerning our country’s security, our people’s happiness and public order were discussed in detail. Within this scope, it is emphasized that the struggle will be continued with determination against parallel organizations and illegal formations under both legal and illegal masks that conduct illegal activity which threatens our national security and disrupts public order.

The continuing Solution Process was discussed within the context of the multidimensional struggle against terrorism; the positive atmosphere created by the continuation of the process and the determination to protect public order and security against provocative incidents aimed at disrupting the peaceful atmosphere was confirmed.

II. The impact of the conflict environment in Syria, which is about to complete its fourth year, on the security and stability of our country and region were discussed, taking into account the latest regional and international developments in this regard.

III. Developments in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean, particularly maritime jurisdictions, were reviewed; it is stated that all kinds of required measures will be taken with determination in the coming period for the security of benefits within Turkey’s own continental shelf and as the guarantor country of the registered territorial rights of the Republic of Northern Cyprus.

IV. ISIS and other terrorist organizations in Iraq and Syria, our country’s work in this struggle within the International Coalition, sponsored groups going to Turkey, the status of the moderate opposition, and our humanitarian assistance to displaced persons were discussed. Additionally, the recent developments in the political process within Iraq were reviewed, and the desire to strengthen bilateral relations was confirmed.

V. The regional consequences of latest developments in the Israel-Palestine Conflict, particularly the ceasefire in Gaza, and the current situation in Libya and Yemen were also comprehensively discussed.

VI. In evaluating the successful political process and developments in Afghanistan, Turkey’s support was highlighted. Additionally, the elections in Ukraine and Tunisia were reviewed.

Submitted with respect to the public.\(^8\)

\(^8\) Approximate translation. Retrieved from the MGK Press Releases Archive.
Appendix VII: Securitization, 2015

VII.1: MGK Meeting Press Release, 2 September 2015

At the meeting:

I. Issues related to our citizen’s peace and security and provision of public order were thoroughly discussed, and measures on threats to the internal and external security of our country, both planned and currently being taken, were evaluated.

It was emphasized that terrorist attacks intended to disrupt the atmosphere of tranquility and peace, will not accomplish their goal to weaken our nation’s centuries of feelings of brotherhood and desire to live together.

It was welcomed that all segments of society that are democracy-conscious, with a respect for human rights and freedom, condemn deliberate actions of terrorism of the separatist terror organization against the lives of our citizens and security forces, domestically and abroad, and the need to closely cooperate with international public opinion on the fight against terrorism was considered.

It was stated that the determination of the struggle with the construction of the Parallel State, domestically and abroad, including the illegal economic dimension, will continue.

It was expressed that in our country, a democratic and lawful state, no extralegal structure and action will be permitted and the fight against such activities will continue until they are ended, and that this struggle will be conducted within the framework of the law.

II. Information was provided to the council on the measured to be taken during the general elections to be held on 1 November 2015, to ensure that the will of our people is far from all forms of pressure so it is freely reflected at the ballot box.

III. The ongoing developments in Syria were thoroughly evaluated, border security measures were revised; regarding restoring an atmosphere of the peace and tranquility in Syria, the maintenance of our determined desire and position, including acting together with International Coalition Against Daesh forces, was confirmed.

It was emphasized that the struggle against Daesh and other terror organizations located in Iraq and Syria will be conducted with the same determination; it was expressed that in the application of a “zone free of terror organizations,” (buffer zone) to implemented within the borders of Syria, the preservation of the Syrian people’s right to life will play an important role.

The European nations worrying attitude manifested toward Turkey’s capable administration of the refugee influx was met with concern, it was evaluated that this matter should be approached within the scope of fundamental human rights.

IV. Ongoing developments in the Middle East and North Africa, particularly in Yemen, Libya and Egypt were discussed.

Submitted with respect to the public.9

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