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THE LANCASTER HOUSE CONFERENCE

A GAME THEORETICAL

EXPLANATION OF THE OUTCOME

by

George Betts, B.A.

© December 23, 1983 by George C. Betts

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate
Studies and Research in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

in International Affairs

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A GAME THEORETICAL EXPLANATION OF THE OUTCOME"
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ABSTRACT

In 1979, a conference was held in Lancaster House in London. The opposing sides in the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian war attended the conference, and both sides agreed to a British peace plan. Agreement was reached despite strong opposition from both sides. A deductive-nomological explanation, based on game theory, is used to explain the outcome of the Lancaster House Conference. The two opponents are said to be in a situation known in game theory as a 2X2 game. The model of the conference shows why mutual agreement is the logical outcome of the decisions of rational opponents, and why the decisions of the opponents were made in a particular order.

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Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

The Lancaster House Talks, which took place in London in 1979, resulted in an agreement in which opposing sides in Zimbabwe* allowed the distribution of political power to be determined in elections rather than on the battlefield. Previous attempts to negotiate a peaceful settlement had failed, and civil war had escalated to the point where neither side could win without great cost to itself and to the nation as a whole. The intervention of Britain, with the cooperation of the Front-Line States and the Commonwealth, created the conditions which forced the Salisbury regime and the Patriotic Front to accept a peaceful settlement. The conference, which lasted for fourteen weeks, was arranged and chaired by the British government, with Lord Carrington as British Foreign Secretary playing a vital role. As a result of the talks, the black majority in the former British colony was able to assert its right to participate fully in the political process, and the white minority lost its dominant position (while retaining some privileges). The Lancaster House Conference is thus an example of the resolution of a violent conflict through non-violent means.

*Refers to Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia, Zimbabwe-Rhodesia or present-day Zimbabwe

International conflicts such as the Zimbabwean war/are a tremendous burden on humanity, and efforts must be made to end them. But it is one thing to make a moral judgement and say that conflicts ought to be resolved without violence, and it is another to say how this can be done. To prevent international conflict, or to end it when it is already in progress, is a particularly difficult and pressing problem. If statesmen are to know how to resolve conflict, they must be able to generalize from past experience and apply the lessons of history to the present.

Presumably, for past experience to be valuable, the events of the past must be explained. But if each event in the past is thought to be unique, and each has an explanation which depends only on the specific circumstances of the event, it is not possible to apply the lessons, whatever they may be, to other events which are the result of different circumstances.

Historians explain historical events as though the succession of circumstances is in some way causal, but often a description of the sequence of specific events fails to elucidate the laws which can be applied to the explanation of other events. Social scientists seek to discover the laws or law-like relationships between

conditions or circumstances and the events which are being explained. However, there is still a great deal of disagreement whether there can be laws in the social sciences which are adequate for the explanation of historical events. The problem is a philosophical one. The natural sciences have progressed largely as a result of the elucidation of hypotheses which can be tested and found to be either true or false. If they are invariably found to be true, they become laws. In the social sciences, the discovery of laws which determine human behaviour, is complicated by the problem that humans are free to make choices, but the choices are partly determined by circumstance. In addition, if hypotheses in the social sciences are tested and found to have explanatory value in single cases, it is still difficult to say that these hypotheses will have explanatory value in other, similar circumstances. Laws in the social sciences are elusive, because hypotheses about human behavior are seldom found to be invariably true.

What then, is the value of explaining single historical events such as the Lancaster House Agreements? First of all, it serves to caution policy makers not to draw unjustified conclusions about the event. It would be tempting to conclude that, because

the Lancaster House talks resulted in the resolution of a conflict, then the techniques and approaches which were used in the talks can be applied to the resolution of other conflicts. The means whereby the conflict in Zimbabwe was resolved cannot be applied to other conflicts unless it is established why the particular circumstances had the particular result. Only when the event has been explained can the lessons of the event be learned. The explanation of the Lancaster House talks which is presented here is an attempt to show what law-like relationship existed between the circumstances of the event and the behaviour of the participants.

Historical accounts of the Lancaster House talks are replete with references to the circumstances in which the participants were "forced" to sign a peace agreement.¹ Joshua Nkomo, one of the co-leaders of the Patriotic Front, stated during the course of the talks, "The impression we have about the whole thing is that we have been having to go along a prepared road to a prepared destination."²

It is interesting to think that a road to a peaceful settlement can be prepared, and that those who are on that road are obliged to continue to a prepared destination. Nkomo's statement suggests that the

circumstances in which the Patriotic Front found themselves were deterministic in that there could be only one logical result. It is reasonable to ask, therefore, how the road was prepared; what were the circumstances of the event; and why did the particular circumstances seem to lead so inevitably to a prepared destination?

To answer such questions requires a precise definition of the questions themselves, and a definition of the nature of explanation. Because the Lancaster House talks ended in a peaceful settlement, agreed to by both the participants, it is reasonable to ask, "why was a peaceful settlement the outcome of the talks?" Because a peaceful settlement could only occur when both sides agreed to the peace proposals, the question to be answered is, "why did both sides agree?" Mutual agreement, or the known outcome of the talks, is thus the explanandum, or the thing to be explained.

An explanation of why the explanandum (E), or mutual agreement, was the outcome of the talks, can be approached using the deductive nomological approach to scientific explanation. To explain the occurrence of (E) is to show

"...that the phenomenon resulted from certain particular circumstances, specified in $C_1, C_2 \dots C_r$, in accordance with laws L_1

L₂...L . By pointing this out, the argument shows that, given the particular circumstances and laws in question, the occurrence of the phenomenon was to be expected; and it is in this way that the explanation enables us₃ to understand why the phenomenon occurred."

Thus, to explain why mutual agreement was the result of the Lancaster House talks is to show the conditions and laws which account for the outcome.

It can be shown that the participants in the Lancaster House talks, the Patriotic Front and the Salisbury delegation, were in a strategic relationship known as a "2X2 game". There were two distinct opponents, each with two distinct choices which they could make, and they were in a strategic relationship in that "the ability of one participant to gain his ends (was) dependent to an important degree on the choices or decisions which the other would make."⁴

Game theory provides a way to predict how rational opponents will make choices in most 2X2 games. The theory provides law-like statements which stipulate that, if the utility of various outcomes can be shown for each opponent, the logical outcome of the game can be shown. Game theory thus provides the laws which can account for the outcome of the conditions which existed at Lancaster House.

The game theoretical explanation of what happened at Lancaster House will thus be an explanation

of the outcome of the decisions which were made by the Salisbury regime and the Patriotic Front; it will not seek to explain why some issues were dealt with rather than others; nor will it predict or evaluate the long-term success of the peace-settlement. Moreover, although the roles of the British and the Front Line States will be examined in some depth, their decisions are not the subject of theoretical analysis. The British, with the cooperation of other states, were partly responsible for creating the conditions which determined the choices which the two opponents could rationally make, but it is specifically the outcome of the decisions of the opponents which is to be explained.

There are three steps which are used to show how game theory can be used to explain the outcome of the Lancaster House Conference. The first is to explain the theory of games, and how its models can be used to explain outcomes. Chapter Two, entitled Decisions and Game Theory, will serve this purpose.

The second step is to describe the fourteen weeks of talks which took place at Lancaster House in London. Included will be a brief history of the conflict, but the emphasis will be on the conditions which existed at the precise moment of decision.

Chapter Three, Zimbabwe: Conflict and Resolution, is a description of the talks, the nature of the opposing coalitions, and the choices which were available to them.

Step three is to show that the talks can be characterized as a 2X2 game, that is, there were two opponents who can theoretically be treated as individuals, and the opponents each had two alternatives from which to choose. In Chapter Four, Lancaster House Explanation: a 2X2 Game, it will be shown that the talks fit the 2X2 matrix used in game theoretical analysis. It will also be shown how the opponents evaluated their options, and thus their order of preference will be determined. Having done so, it will be possible to show which of the seventy-eight possible 2X2 games corresponded to the situation at Lancaster House.

In addition Chapter Four will show how the structure of the game and the preference orderings of the two opponents determined the decisions which were made, and how the logical outcome of the particular game which has been modelled corresponds to the outcome of the Lancaster House talks.

The steps thus include: a description of a theory; a description of an event; the demonstration

that the event fulfills the scope conditions necessary for an application of the theory; and the illustration that the results of the event are consistent with the results which the theory predicts. If the two results do not correspond, then the explanation cannot be said to be valid. But if the theory can reasonably be said to fit the event, and if the outcome of the event is the same as the logical outcome of the game which has been used to model the event, then the outcome of the talks at Lancaster House can be said to have been explained.

The value of an explanation of this kind is limited by problems with the theory itself. Game theory is a normative theory, and prescribes ways that decision-makers should make choices, provided that they are rational. The problem with the theory is that, by stipulating only how rational opponents will make choices, the laws of game theory are not really acceptable as laws in the scientific sense. This is so because: "A law-like sentence must not be logically limited to a finite number of instances."⁵

This limitation, however, applies not only to game theory but to all theory in the social sciences: "If we were to assume that all human behavior is absurd, neurotic, or psychotic, then there could be no

theory, either of games or of any other social phenomena."⁶

Therefore, using a theory such as the theory of games to explain a historical event, is to accept the limitations of all explanations in the social sciences. However, given that the Lancaster House talks resulted in a peace settlement, and given that game theory shows how this outcome can be explained if the participants are assumed to be rational, a game theoretical explanation of the event has validity. The validity of the explanation depends on the validity of the hypothesized relationships of the participants, and the validity of the preference orderings which have been inferred. Because there is not yet a way to predict whether all international decision-makers will be rational, game theory explanations of individual cases will be incomplete. To say that the opponents at Lancaster House behaved as the theory prescribes is not to say that game theory has been verified; it is only to say that the theory has explanatory value in this particular case; it shows why the opponents at Lancaster House had to go down a prepared road which led to a prepared destination.

Footnotes

1. Mariyawanda Nzuwah, "Conflict Resolution in Zimbabwe: Superpower determinants to the peace settlement" Journal of Southern African Affairs (Vol. 4, No. 4, October, 1979), page 8
2. West Africa, (London, 17 December, 1979) interview with Joshua Nkomo, page 2322
3. Carl G. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation (New York: The Free Press, 1965) page 340
4. Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963) page 5.
5. Carl G. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation page 340
6. James E. Dougherty, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International Relations (New York: Harper and Row, 1981, 2nd. ed.) page 513

Chapter Two

DECISIONS AND GAME THEORY

Game theory is a tool for the explanation of decision-making. To show how explanation is done requires a summary of the basic tenets of the theory, the conditions which must hold in order for explanation to be possible, and the criteria or laws which are used to explain the outcomes of the different types of games.

The most basic structure of a game is the 2X2 game. 2X2 games will be described with emphasis on those elements which are relevant to the explanation of the Lancaster House talks so that in later chapters it can be shown how the conference 'fits' a model of a game provided by the theory. Thus Chapter Two explains the type of analysis which will be used in subsequent chapters.

Any theory, whether it is used to explain decisions or other types of events, is a way to simplify reality in order to facilitate understanding. All international events have aspects which set them apart in such a way that they appear to be unique and therefore unsuitable for comparison with other events.

Theories, by their very nature, "...reduce a potentially infinite complexity to a perceivable structure."¹ Thus, if an event is to be explained with the aid of theory, it must be reduced to a simpler, more understandable structure. In theories there is always a trade-off between parsimony and fit, that is, if an event is reduced so much that it is no longer recognizable as that event, but it does conform to a model, it is difficult to say if the theoretical explanation is valid. However, some events cannot be fully understood unless they are subsumed within a simple structure. If this allows for a better understanding of the actual event, then the reduction can be said to have validity. Game theory is a way to conceptualize certain specific types of events; a way to reduce them to a more understandable model.

There are other ways to attempt an explanation of decision-making. Theories which have arisen from the behavioral sciences assume that "...forces outside the decision-maker, (social, economic, cultural, historical) or inside (instinctual, psychoanalytical) impinge on his being and control and direct his behavior."²

In this sense, the behavior of the individual is the dependent variable, or result, and the internal

or external characteristics are the independent variables, or causes. There is a problem, however, determining which cause or combination of causes is responsible for the conditions in which decision-makers find themselves at the moment they make choices. Game theory differs from other approaches in that it assumes the results of history, economics, or psychology as 'given'. The emphasis in game theory, unlike the behavioral sciences, is not on the reasons which individuals have for valuing some things more than others, but on the results of these valuations. If, as the result of any combination of causes, whether they are psychological, social, or historical, individuals prefer some things more than others, the reasons for these preferences are no longer necessary to explain how individuals will choose in given situations, but the existence of the preferences themselves is sufficient for explanation. If the preferences are known, then the decisions which are made can be explained. The theory is more concerned with the conditions which exist at the moment of decision than with preceding events. In this regard, a game theoretical explanation can be said to be, not a causal explanation, which relies on laws of succession, but an explanation based on laws of coexistence, in which

"...a particular fact was explained, not by causal antecedents but by reference to another contemporaneous fact."³

The contemporaneous facts which will be used for explanation are the conditions which existed when decisions were made. Thus, a game theoretical explanation of the outcome of the Lancaster House Conference will not be a historical or a psychological explanation, based on causal laws, but an explanation of how the conditions which existed at the moments of decision determined the outcome, based on laws of coexistence.

The idea that choices are determined is central to the theory. Game theory models are by nature deterministic as opposed to stochastic, that is, they predict single outcomes. As Bartos explains:

"...a deterministic model...yields, as a rule, predictions of single outcomes; a stochastic (probabilistic) model, on the other hand, predicts a whole distribution of outcomes."

"...the main approach of the theory of games is deterministic, since the objective is to identify one and only one solution of the game."

A game theoretical explanation, therefore, requires that the outcome of the actual event must be identical to the outcome which the theory shows will logically result from the model or the explanation is.

not valid. This first requirement is a necessary but not sufficient condition for explanation. There are many possible 2X2 games which can logically result in mutual agreement, but these games cannot all be said to explain the result at Lancaster House. For the explanation of the Conference to be valid, the model must also explain the sequence of the decisions which were made by the opponents. There were three stages in the Lancaster House Conference, and the model must show why the outcome of each stage, and the sequence of decisions at each stage, can logically be expected to occur. In addition, the model must have face-validity, that is, if the model results in the same outcomes and the same pattern of decisions as resulted at the Conference, but the model cannot be justified according to the subjective criteria of face validity, then the explanation will not be valid. The explanation of the outcome is falsified if any of the three criteria are not met at any of the three stages of the Conference.

Game theory regards bargaining as a "...process of strategic choice and value maximization."⁵ A strategic situation is one in which: "...the ability of one participant to gain his ends is dependent to an important degree on the choices or

decisions that the other participant will make."⁶

The maximization of value is assumed to be subject to the condition of rationality, which is defined as follows:

"Given social situations within certain kinds of decision-making institutions (of which parlor games, the market, elections, and warfare are notable examples) and in which exist two alternative courses of action with differing outcomes in money or power or success, some participants will choose the alternative leading to the larger payoff."⁷

This definition, assumes that rational individuals will choose the larger pay-off, but allows that some will not be rational. Game theory seeks only to explain those choices which are rational. An irrational decision, it can be argued, cannot be explained. If an individual prefers one outcome to another, but chooses the least preferred outcome, the choice is irrational. There is a problem, however, in assuming that individuals are able to make the complex calculations sometimes required for rational choice. The assumption of rationality is one of the simplifying assumptions of the theory, and though it cannot always be said to apply, it is useful. As Brams states:

"An epistemological assumption underlying all rational choice models is that actors are purposeful decision-makers, whether they be individuals or collectivities acting with a

unitary purpose. Even if an individual or collective actor does not actually make, or is not able to understand the calculations necessary for rationality, the rationalistic assumption may still satisfactorily account for his behavior by providing an explanation of his actions AS IF he pursued some postulated goal.

The measurement of 'value' or 'pay-off' can be done in several ways, and is necessary if a game theoretical explanation is to be possible. If individuals are to choose among alternatives, they must have ways of evaluating the consequences. It is not enough to evaluate the alternatives and decide which is most desirable; it must be determined which has the consequences which are the most acceptable and which are the least acceptable. There are three possible ways to show how alternatives are 'valued', according to whether they are measured on ordinal, interval, or ratio scales. These are as follows:

"If magnitudes are given in such a way that one can sensibly say of any two which is larger but can say nothing about the magnitude of these differences, these magnitudes are said to be given on an ordinal scale..."

"If differences of magnitude can be compared but nothing can be said about the ratio of magnitudes themselves, the magnitudes are said to be given on an interval scale."

"If ratios of the magnitudes themselves can be specified, the magnitudes are said to be given on a ratio scale."

At Lancaster House, the value of various options can only be shown on an ordinal scale. Little can be said of the exact value of each alternative to each participant, and it would be very difficult to measure the value of each alternative in such a way that the value to one could be compared to the value to the other. It can only be said of alternatives which has greater value and which has smaller, but nothing can be said of the magnitudes of these differences. Again it must be asserted that the reasons for preferring one outcome to another are not important in game theory, but the results of those preferences remain of utmost importance.

The meaning of 'utility' implied by ordinal measurement must be kept clear if it is not to be confused with the meaning which applies to utility on ratio or interval scales. In an ordinal scale:

"...it is meaningless to add two (numbers) together or to compare magnitudes of difference between them..."

"...the only meaningful numerical property is order. We may compare two indices and ask which is larger, but we may not add or multiply them."¹⁰

The preference ordering of the payoffs must also be 'transitive', which is the condition that if $A > B$, and $B > C$, then $A > C$. As Luce defines it:

"...if A is preferred in the paired comparison (A,B) and B is preferred in the paired comparison (B,C), then A is preferred in the paired comparison (A,C), and this holds for all triples of alternatives A,B, and C."

In any 2X2 game, there are four possible outcomes. If these can be called A,B,C, and D, and it can be said that an individual prefers A to B to C to D, then A can be assigned a higher value than B, B a higher value than C, and C a higher value than D. Thus A can be given the number 4; B the number 3; C the number 2; and D the number 1. On an ordinal scale, it would not make any difference if the preferred outcome was assigned the number 100, the second 25, the third 13, and the fourth 2. Because the only numerical property of the numbers is order, the size of the numbers make no difference as long as the order of preference is indicated. It may be true that both opponents prefer the same outcome, but for one the difference is between life and death while for the other the difference between one and the other outcome is minimal. On an ordinal scale, these differences do not affect the outcome of the game. As long as order is indicated the logical outcome of the game is the same regardless of the differences of importance to the opponents. On an ordinal scale, to speak of preference

as an index of utility is tautological. An alternative has greater utility if it is preferred to another; it is not preferred because the utility is greater.

Indeed, the outcomes which are preferred may only be so as the result of miscalculation, but the belief that they are 'better' is enough to explain the 'rationale' of decision-making. The mere fact that one outcome is preferred to another is the only judgement which needs to be made. For this reason, for the explanation of the outcome of the Lancaster House Conference, it is only necessary to show the preference orderings of the participants, and it is not necessary to attempt to measure them on a ratio or an interval scale. The reasons for the preferences can be suggested, and the order of the preferences can be inferred with reasonable confidence. To say that participants acted as if their preference order was the same as that hypothesized, lends credence to the ordering, but does not constitute proof that the order has been properly diagnosed.

However the knowledge of how the participants did choose is one way of showing what their preferences were.

"Explanations of the kind here considered may be schematically characterized as arguments of the form D-N (deductive nomological) in which the information or assumption that E is true provides an indispensable part of the only available evidential support for one of the explanans statements, say C₁. Let us call such explanations self-evidencing."¹²

In this case, where it is known that the explanandum E, or mutual agreement, did occur, and it is necessary to show that the preference orderings, or C₁, are correctly diagnosed, it can be shown that the outcome E is evidence of the preference orderings.

This is so only if E is the logical result of the ordering, based on the assumption of rational decisions. However, for the purpose of determining preference ordering, a self-evidencing explanation will be used here only to lend credence to the orders which have been inferred from statements of the participants. Preference ordering determines which game is being played. It is assumed that the ordering is valid only if the resulting game can be shown logically to result in the explanandum E or mutual agreement; if it can be shown logically to result in the sequence of moves which emerged at the conference; and if the preference order has face validity. The preference ordering is, thus, checked on the basis of three criteria. However, this method cannot constitute a proof of the proper

diagnosis of preference. Ultimately, the accuracy of the preference order depends on the subjective judgement of face validity.

Another simplifying assumption of game theory is that groups as well as individuals can be regarded as unitary decision-makers. As Luce states: "Any decision-maker -- a single human being or an organization, which can be thought of as having a unitary interest motivating its decisions can be treated as an individual in theory."¹³

Therefore, to show that the opponents at Lancaster House were in a 2X2 game, it must be shown that the two coalitions, the Salisbury regime and the Patriotic Front, had sufficient cohesion that each may be treated as an individual decision-maker. Either coalition may threaten to break up, and there may be dissension within the coalitions, but if each coalition ultimately retained its cohesion and there were no defections, then the opponents can be treated as individuals.

The 2X2 game is the simplest model of a strategic relationship which is possible in game theory. In these games, there are at least two individuals who are in a strategic relationship, and each must have at least two alternatives from which to choose. The

structure of the game, in normal form, is illustrated below:

		j	
		A ₂	B ₂
i	A ₁	A ₁ A ₂	A ₁ B ₂
	B ₁	B ₁ A ₂	B ₁ B ₂

The player 'i' is known as the 'row' player, and can choose between A₁ and B₁. The player 'j' is the 'column' player, and can choose between A₂ and B₂. The four possible outcomes of the game are represented in the four squares. If both players have identical preferences, and the preference order for each is (A₁A₂) > (A₁B₂) > (B₁A₂) > (B₁B₂), then (A₁A₂) will be 4;

$(A_1 B_2)$ will be 3; $(B_1 A_2)$ will be 2; and $(B_1 B_2)$ will be 1. The values are illustrated below:

		j	
		A ₂	B ₂
i	A ₁	4 4	3 3
	B ₁	2 2	1 1

The first number in each square represents the value to 'i'; the second the value to 'j'. The game which has been illustrated is an example of a 'no-conflict' game; it is not the hypothesized game at Lancaster House.

1. Conditions

The following six points summarize what must apply in order for an event to be called a 'game':¹⁴

1. There is a set of at least two decisions makers, called players.

2. At specified instances, one or more players must make decisions by choosing among

a specified set of alternatives. These decisions determine the resulting situations of a game. Thus a 'play' is a sequence of situations.

3. Each situation in turn determines which of the players is to make the next decision (whose 'move' it is) and the range of choices open to him.

4. Certain specified situations define the end of the particular play of the game.

5. A situation in which a particular play of a game ends is called an outcome of the game. Associated with each outcome is a set of payoffs, positive or negative values, one awarded to each of the players. The payoffs represent gains or losses.

6. A rational player is one who, having taken into account all the information available to him by the rules of the game,

makes his choices in such a way as to maximize the actual or statistically expected payoff to accrue to him (and to him only) in the outcome of the game.

There is a large number of possible 2X2 games which can be used to illustrate situations which fulfill all the conditions shown above. If the payoffs are shown on an ordinal scale, in which the numbers 1, 2, 3, and 4 are used to indicate order of preference, then the number of possible orderings is $4!$, or 24 for each opponent. Because each participant has 24 possible orders of preference, there are 24×24 distinct matrices which can be used to represent all 2X2 games. There are, therefore 24×24 , or 576 distinct matrices which can be used to represent all 2X2 games if an ordinal scale is used. However, because in some cases it makes no difference if the row and column players are interchanged (ie., the game is symmetrical), the number of games is reduced. In total, there are seventy-eight (78) distinct matrices.¹⁵

It is common to the terminology of game theory that all games can be categorized as either constant-sum or non-constant sum. These criteria lose their meaning when "value" is indicated by an ordinal

scale, but it is still common for some analysts to use the terms loosely. Because the only numerical property of the 'numbers' used on the ordinal scale is order, and because it is meaningless to add or subtract the values, constant-sum and non-constant sum criteria lose relevance.

The conditions which must exist for a game theoretical explanation of a situation are that there must be two distinct opponents, each with two distinct choices, and their relationship must be strategic. This will be called condition number 1, or C_1 . Secondly, the order of preference of each of the opponents with respect to each of the four possible outcomes must be determined, and shown on an ordinal scale. This preference ordering will be called condition number 2, or C_2 .

Once these conditions have been shown to exist, it is necessary to show how game theory can be used to explain rational choice. The laws of game theory, limited as they are to the explanation of rational choice, are not true laws in that they do not apply to all cases, but only to those in which the participants are assumed to be rational. Accepting this qualification that game theory laws are faulty, but accepting also that all theories of social science

suffer from the same problems, the laws of game theory will be shown 'AS IF' they were true scientific laws.

2. Laws and Natural Outcomes

Game theory laws are based on the assumption that opponents will attempt to maximize values. The natural outcome of the attempt to maximize value in a 2X2 game can be determined according to the criteria of dominating strategies, equilibrium, and Pareto optimality.

A dominating strategy is defined as follows:

"One strategy dominates another if and only if in using it a player does no worse and, in general, better, regardless of the strategy chosen by the other player."¹⁶

An 'equilibrium outcome' is one from which neither player can: "...shift without impairing his payoff, assuming that the other player does not shift."¹⁷

In games where at least one player has a dominating strategy, the 'natural outcome' of the game (to be defined below) is the same as the equilibrium outcome.¹⁸ In some games, however, neither player may

have a dominating strategy, and there can be two or more equilibrium outcomes.¹⁹

'Pareto optimality' refers to a situation in which: "...there is no other outcome in which both players get a larger payoff."²⁰

The natural outcome of a game of no opposition is the Pareto optimal outcome if one exists, and in games of complete opposition all outcomes are Pareto optimal. If an equilibrium is a Pareto optimal outcome, it is called a Pareto equilibrium; otherwise it is a Pareto-deficient equilibrium.

The three criteria, dominance, equilibrium, and Pareto optimality, are important in defining how rational opponents will choose their strategies. The 'natural outcome' of a game is the single outcome which will result from the strategies of rational opponents. The following are the laws which are used to explain how the natural outcome of the game is the logical consequence of the conditions:²¹

1. If both players have a dominating strategy, both will choose it. This will be called Law number 1, or L_1 .

2. If only one player has a dominating strategy, he will choose it, and the other will choose the strategy which maximizes his payoff under the assumption that the first player has chosen his dominating strategy. This will be called Law number 2, or L_2 .
3. If a game has a single Pareto equilibrium, the players will choose the strategy which contains it. This will be called Law number 3, or L_3 .
4. If neither player has a dominating strategy, and if the game has either no Pareto equilibrium or more than one, each player will choose the strategy which contains his maximum outcome. This will be called Law number 4, or L_4 .

The 'natural outcome' of the 'game' at Lancaster House must correspond to the actual outcome of the talks if the decisions of the opponents are to be explained. If the natural outcome of the game (which will be illustrated in Chapter Four) is anything other

than the actual outcome of the talks, then the explanation will not be valid.

In summary, a game theoretical explanation of the outcome of the Lancaster House conference requires that the following conditions be met:

- C_1 . there must be at least two distinct opponents, each with two distinct choices, and their relationship must be strategic;
- C_2 . the order of preference of each of the opponents, with respect to each of the four possible outcomes, must be determined, and shown on an ordinal scale.

These conditions, C_1 and C_2 , must be shown to exist. In combination with Laws L_1 , L_2 , L_3 and L_4 , the natural outcome of the game can be deduced. To know which laws apply, it must be shown whether one or both of the opponents have a dominating strategy; whether there are outcomes which are in equilibrium; and whether any outcomes are Pareto optimal. The natural outcome of the game which has been modelled must correspond to the actual outcome of the Lancaster House talks for the explanation to be valid.

In Chapter Three, the Lancaster House Conference will be described in detail. The data for the description has been taken from historical accounts, and news reports. The information which is given in Chapter Three will be the basis for the analysis which is to follow. Chapter Four will be an explanation of the outcome based on conditions 1 and 2, and laws L_1 , L_2 , L_3 and L_4 .

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Chapter Three

ZIMBABWE: CONFLICT AND RESOLUTION

To understand how the conflict in Zimbabwe was resolved at Lancaster House, we must know the conditions which gave rise to the struggle, the nature of the conflict as it had evolved by 1979, and the process whereby it was resolved.

1. Evolution of the Conflict

The conflict in Zimbabwe was over the allocation of political power. The white population controlled the state and its government, and resisted attempts by the black majority to gain equal rights.

The British had conquered the Shona and Ndebele tribes at the end of the nineteenth century, and had established the Rhodesian Protectorate in the area which had been the site of an early African civilization known as 'Great Zimbabwe'. White settlers, mainly from Britain, established a system of government which gave most political power to the whites. The black majority was ruled for almost a

century by white settlers who had little regard for black aspirations. Rhodesian whites were not unlike other Europeans in the way they governed the indigenous peoples of the European empires, but they were to be exceptionally resistant to any political changes which threatened what they believed to be their legitimate rights. As Rhodesian blacks became increasingly frustrated, government legislation became increasingly repressive.¹

After World War II, Britain's ties with most of its African empire were broken, and most of the former British colonies became independent states. In the colonies, independence was usually the result of an agreement between Britain and leading African nationalists, and independence on the basis of majority rule was accomplished without bloodshed. However, in colonies where white settlers had hoped to establish permanent "outposts of British civilization,"² the transition was not so easy. Rhodesian whites wanted an independent Rhodesia, and they had been allowed a considerable degree of internal self-government since 1923.³ Britain had not granted full independence, however, and had retained various powers relating to the rights of the black African majority.⁴ This reservation of powers by Britain was to be the legal

basis for the British claim to be the rightful governing authority in Rhodesia until 1979.

Britain refused to allow Rhodesian independence until the white population demonstrated a willingness to accept the principle of majority rule. The whites refused to allow substantial black representation in Parliament, although they accepted the possibility of a gradual increase.⁵ The deadlock, and the resulting frustration of the Rhodesian whites' desire for independence, led to the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965. Ian Smith, the head of the Rhodesian Front party, was Prime Minister of the illegal white government for the next fourteen years, during which African nationalist opposition to white rule was to become increasingly effective.

Black Rhodesian nationalists, who called themselves Zimbabweans, began military operations in 1964 against the Smith regime. There were two main nationalist organizations, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU). The two were united in the Patriotic Front (PF) in 1976; the PF was the spokesman for the nationalists at the Lancaster House Conference of 1979.

ZANU, the most powerful of the nationalist organizations, operated out of Mozambique. ZANU's

guerillas learned the techniques of insurgency and 'Peoples War' from the FRELIMO* guerillas who fought against Mozambique's Portuguese rulers. ZANU's support from the Communist Chinese and its recruitment from the Shona, Zimbabwe's largest tribe, made it an effective force, especially after 1972. ZANU's ability to expand into Rhodesia and control ever-expanding areas of the countryside marked a change from the "sporadic and militarily ineffectual actions of the Sixties, to protracted struggle."⁶

ZAPU, the second largest nationalist organization, operated out of Zambia. ZAPU had Soviet backing and much of its membership came from the Ndebele tribe, although its leadership included Shonas. ZAPU did not adopt the Maoist tactics of people's war, and was much less effective than ZANU at controlling the Zimbabwean countryside. However, ZAPU was to be of considerable importance in the civil war. ZAPU and ZANU had often been bitter rivals, but when they united in the Patriotic Front in 1976, they were able to present a unified front against the Smith regime. At the Lancaster House talks, the PF was led jointly by Joshua Nkomo, leader of ZAPU, and Robert Mugabe, leader of ZANU. Both Nkomo and Mugabe had spent a decade in Rhodesian detention camps. *

* Front for the Liberation of Mozambique

The Unilateral Declaration of Independence of 1965 had been condemned by much of the international community. The United Nations imposed 'voluntary' sanctions against Rhodesia in 1965, on Britain's recommendation. The sanctions were strengthened in 1966 and 1968, and became mandatory for UN member nations. However, due to South African support for the Rhodesian whites, and Britain's willingness to connive in violations of sanctions⁷, the Smith regime was able to remain in power and maintain its military effort against the guerillas. The African nationalists, on the other hand, had the support of other black African nations, in particular the Front Line States, as well as support from the Soviet Union and China.

From 1965 until the signing of the Lancaster House Agreements in 1979, there were at least four major efforts by members of the international community to persuade the Smith regime to accept a negotiated settlement with the nationalists. Smith, while often willing to appear conciliatory, was not willing to make reasonable concessions.⁸ Proposals were agreed to by the British Conservative Foreign secretary Sir Alec Douglas Home and Ian Smith in 1971. The Smith-Home proposals were rejected by the Zimbabwean people.⁹ In 1974, John Vorster of South Africa, with the

support of Kaunda of Zambia, persuaded Smith and the nationalists to negotiate, but the 'Victoria Falls' talks failed. South Africa had wanted an end to the war in Rhodesia, because the victory of FRELIMO in Mozambique over the Portuguese in 1974 had meant that Rhodesia was no longer a buffer between 'radical' black Africa and South Africa. Thus, Rhodesia was losing its strategic importance to the South Africans, and South African support for the white regime was waning.¹⁰ Zambia, for its part, had become reluctant to bear the burden of supporting the Zimbabwean nationalists in an escalating civil war.

In 1976, Henry Kissinger, American Secretary of State for the Nixon Administration, arranged negotiations between Smith and the newly created Patriotic Front, in Geneva. The negotiations failed, although Smith had at least agreed to the principle of majority rule, with conditions.¹¹ Majority rule was acceptable on the condition that international sanctions be lifted - an indication that sanctions were finally having an effect by 1976.

In 1977 Andrew Young, US President Carter's representative to the UN, and David Owen, Britain's Labour Foreign Secretary, arranged new negotiations. Once again the talks failed. Owen and Young were to

try once again in 1978, but by that time they had been pre-empted by events in Rhodesia. Ian Smith was by then negotiating for an internal settlement, an arrangement between some Rhodesian blacks and the Smith government. The Internal Settlement allowed whites to remain in control while appearing to have passed power to the Africans. In 1978, Smith came to an agreement with Muzorewa, Sithole, and Chirau, to form a transitional government to precede majority rule.

The Internal Settlement guaranteed the white stranglehold on power in Rhodesia, while having the appearance of a white capitulation to the African majority. The police, judiciary, and civil service were to remain in white hands, and the Internal Settlement constitution contained several unamendable provisions which protected white privilege.¹² However, the whites had at least relinquished exclusive power, and the new legislature was to have 72 seats elected by Africans and 28 reserved for whites.¹³

The elections which followed acceptance of the Internal Settlement gave Bishop Muzorewa 51 out of 72 African seats. The election turn-out had been heavy, as high as 64% of the eligible voters.¹⁴ The Patriotic Front had been invited to contest the elections on the conditions that they lay down their arms (which would

have been tantamount to surrender), but they refused. However, the Patriotic Front was not able to disrupt the elections, and it appeared that Muzorewa had a ringing endorsement as the new black Prime Minister of the newly-named Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

Smith appeared to have a fait accompli which would allow the whites to remain in control while at the same time getting international recognition. But the Internal Settlement was not entirely a sham. It was the greatest compromise which the whites had been prepared to make up to that point, and the reasons for the compromise require some consideration.

The guerilla war had escalated in 1977 to a point where it was no longer possible for Rhodesian whites to assume that they would win. In 1977 alone, there were 197 battle deaths of Rhodesian soldiers, when from 1972 to 1976 there had been a total of 215. The guerillas were experiencing similar increases in losses: they had 1774 deaths in 1977 while for the whole of the period 1972 to 1976 they had lost 1917.¹⁵ In addition to battle losses, the Rhodesian whites were losing many through emigration, what was called the 'yellow route' or 'taking the gap' by those whites who stayed behind.

The Internal Settlement, however, failed to result in an end to the war. It also failed to decrease the number of whites who left the country, and it failed to result in international recognition or the lifting of sanctions. Instead, despite Muzorewa's confidence that his new government could end the civil war, the conflict escalated.

Both sides were suffering as a result of the escalation. The Front Line States, especially Zambia and Mozambique, were increasingly apprehensive about the escalation due to the perilous state of their own economies and the military punishment which the Rhodesian Security Forces were inflicting on them. And the Zimbabwean nationalists, while gaining ground in the countryside, could only do so at a tremendous price

"...By September of 1979, both sides were near exhaustion." "Probably over a quarter of all cadres committed to the bush had perished" "Though the guerillas had effectively captured the rural hearts and minds and had almost paralyzed the administration, the white-led forces had never been beaten in conventional contacts and strikes."¹⁶

In early 1979, Bishop Muzorewa's government, which had failed to end the war with promises of amnesty and jobs to former guerillas, began the conscription of blacks. Black volunteers already formed a large segment of the Rhodesian Security

Forces, but whites were still the military leaders. It is clear that by 1979, the Salisbury regime and the Patriotic Front forces were near to military stalemate.

The whites and the blacks who participated in the Internal Settlement did not necessarily have the same goal. Bishop Muzorewa had hoped to end the war by persuading the guerillas to lay down their arms and accept an amnesty; instead they had continued to fight. The whites had hoped to create a semblance of majority rule in order to gain international recognition, the lifting of sanctions, and support in their war against the guerillas, but this objective was also thwarted.

South Africa was committed to increased support for the new government, both economically and militarily, but they continued to fear being drawn into direct confrontation with the African nations. The Salisbury regime and the white-led Rhodesian forces intensified the war, in an effort to weaken the will of Zambia and Mozambique to support the PF, and succeeded in "...bringing the economies of both countries to the point of collapse, as well as seriously undermining their security."¹⁷

The last hope of the Rhodesian whites to get an agreement which left them in effective control of

the country was recognition by Britain. In May of 1979, the British general election had resulted in the victory of the Conservative party led by Margaret Thatcher. The Conservative right wing, led by Julian Amery, had long been a supporter of Ian Smith, and in November of 1978 there had been a revolt in the Conservative Party when 116 Tories in the House of Commons went against their own party and voted against renewing the British legislation to extend the sanctions against Rhodesia for another year.¹⁸ The Conservative Election Manifesto of 1979 had said that sanctions would be lifted:

"...if the six principles which all British governments have supported for the last fifteen years are fully satisfied following the present Rhodesian election, the next government will have a duty to return Rhodesia to a state of legality, move to lift sanctions, and do its utmost to ensure that the new independent state gains international recognition."¹⁹

The six principles referred to in the Manifesto were: unimpeded progress toward majority rule; guarantees against retrogressive amendments to the constitution; the immediate improvement of the political status of the Africans; progress toward ending racial discrimination, the need for the British government to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia

as a whole; and the need to ensure, regardless of race, that there was no oppression of the majority by the minority and vice versa.²⁰

A commission led by Viscount Boyd was sent by Margaret Thatcher to report on the Internal Settlement elections, and in May 1979 the Boyd report was released. The elections were said to have been "fairly conducted and above reproach".²¹ Thatcher's recognition of the Salisbury regime and the Internal Settlement government seemed imminent.

White Rhodesians were elated, but prematurely. A few days before the Boyd report had been made public, Thatcher had appointed Lord Carrington as British Foreign Secretary. He had used the occasion of his appointment to state that British policy with regard to Rhodesia would only be decided after consultation with the Commonwealth, the United States, Europe, and African leaders.²² This was a significant change from the prospect of unilateral recognition of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia by Britain.

Lord Carrington, like the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), had advised Thatcher to be restrained with regard to recognition. The FCO:

"...feared the effect on Anglo-American relations, and especially economic retaliation by Nigeria; it was anxious about the

consequences for Anglo-American relations as well as with other members of the European community, and it foresaw the possibility of much greater Soviet and Cuban involvement (with African backing) in the war, which it forecast would not be ended by the Muzorewa government."²³

In the spring and early summer of 1979, another British delegation was sent to Africa, this time to discuss the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia constitution with African leaders. The delegation, headed by Lord Harlech, found that, although the Internal Settlement was not acceptable to African leaders, many felt that the changes were for the better if only because the infamous Ian Smith had been removed as Prime Minister. If the British were to launch a more aggressive diplomatic effort, and bring the PF into discussions with the Salisbury regime, the African leaders would support the British effort.²⁴

Thatcher, meanwhile, was still giving indications that her government meant to recognize the Salisbury regime. In an interview in Canberra in July, she stated: "British sanctions will lapse in November, and we doubt very much whether any renewal will go through the British parliament."²⁵

Later in July of 1979, Thatcher seems to have changed her mind. In an address to the British House of Commons, she affirmed her government's support of

the principle of black majority rule and the need to get international support before Britain's policy could be decided. Machel of Mozambique, who was listening to Thatcher on the BBC, was one of the few who took note of the change in Britain's Conservative Prime Minister.²⁶ He made arrangements for Mozambican observers to attend the upcoming Commonwealth Conference to be held in Lusaka, Zambia in August.

The Commonwealth Conference was a unique opportunity for Thatcher to indicate a change in British policy and arrange a new settlement for Rhodesia. The Commonwealth Conference would include the leaders of Zambia and Tanzania, and thus important representatives of Front-line States would be present. The support of the FLS was essential if the PF was to be persuaded to cooperate. Prior to the conference, Lord Carrington had been in touch with the Commonwealth Secretary General Sir Sridath Ramphal, and there is evidence that they were "...well on the way toward a new negotiating drive before Mrs. Thatcher accompanied the Queen and Carrington to Lusaka in early August."²⁷

On the eve of the conference, which lasted from August 1 to 7, Thatcher met with Nyerere of Tanzania, chairman of the FLS, and the possibility of a new settlement was discussed. Nyerere gave assurances

that some provision would be made to reserve seats for the whites in the new Zimbabwean legislature, an assurance which was to cause difficulties later.²⁸

2. Setting the Stage for Peace: The Lusaka Commonwealth Conference

On the first day of the conference, Prime Minister Thatcher stated to the Commonwealth representatives that the British aim "...is to bring Rhodesia to legal independence on a basis which the Commonwealth and the international community as a whole find acceptable."²⁹

In response to the British requirement of a consensus on the terms of a settlement in Rhodesia, an informal caucus of Commonwealth leaders met to work out the required conditions for a peace agreement. Kaunda of Zambia, Thatcher, Nyerere of Tanzania, Adefope (Nigerian Commissioner for External Affairs), Manley of Jamaica, and Fraser of Australia, agreed that it was Britain's responsibility to grant independence to Rhodesia once the following objectives were met:³⁰

1. genuine majority rule
2. involvement of all parties to the conflict in reaching a settlement
3. a democratic constitution, involving appropriate safeguards for minorities
4. free and fair elections, with British and Commonwealth observers

Thatcher, in return for agreeing to the principles, demanded a free hand at the conference. The British aim was to:

"...keep affairs firmly in British hands and not be encumbered by any commitments to outside participation either in the conference which the British government hoped to convene or in subsequent proceedings. In return for this, Britain was prepared to agree that the (internal settlement) Constitution should be changed and that it should be comparable to other ex-Colonial Constitutions."³¹

The stage had been set for the Lancaster House negotiations, the final and only successful attempt to end the conflict in Rhodesia. Britain still had to convince the two sides to attend, but that did not prove to be too difficult. In fact, the opponents were each in a position where failure to attend could be disastrous to their own strategic positions.

3. The Lancaster House Conference

a. Invitations

Neither the PF nor the Salisbury regime was pleased with the Lusaka proposals. To Muzorewa's government, the change in British policy was a bitter disappointment, especially after the Boyd Commission had given its seal of approval to the Internal Settlement elections. The Bishop and his colleagues had thought that British recognition of their government was imminent, and that they had only to wait till November when the British parliament was expected to vote against the renewal of sanctions against Rhodesia. Muzorewa called the Commonwealth peace proposals "unfair, and in fact, an insult."³² However, there were those in the Salisbury government who realized very quickly that if they were to have a last chance of recognition on their own terms, they would have to attend the Lancaster House Conference. Ian Smith, the Minister Without Portfolio, was the first to announce a willingness to attend, but Smith was no longer in a position to make unilateral decisions for Rhodesia, and Muzorewa held back.

The PF had been angry that the Lusaka proposals had included provisions which allowed the whites to retain reserved seats in the legislature, but this was a provision which Nyerere, head of the Front Line States, had accepted.

However, the PF were not totally unhappy about the Lusaka proposals, because they saw an opportunity to come to an arrangement which would forestall unilateral British recognition of their enemies. On August 7, 1979, Robert Mugabe announced his willingness to attend the Lancaster House talks, on the conditions that the Salisbury government relinquish power, the Rhodesian military forces disband, and the military forces of the PF be accepted as the national army.³³ Mugabe had in effect said that he would negotiate with the British if the Salisbury regime capitulated. The conditions were clearly unacceptable to Salisbury.

Muzorewa felt that the obduracy of the PF was an opportunity for his government, and on August 15, he announced his willingness to attend the Conference. He felt that the PF would continue to be intransigent, which would leave the British with no one to deal with except the Salisbury government. This, he thought, would result in his government's...

"...obtaining recognition from Britain of its legitimacy as a government and, flowing from that, the lifting of economic sanctions. Such actions, it was argued, would provide his government with the political legitimacy necessary to convince some guerilla elements and their international supporters particularly the Front Line States, of the futility of continued fighting..."³⁴

White Rhodesians, who still had effective control of the reins of government, were inclined to agree with this

assessment. They felt that a Conservative government, especially one led by Margaret Thatcher, who seemed to support them, would give them the best terms they could expect. They could not say "...let's hang on until a Tory government gets in," as they had when the Labour government's David Owen had tried to arrange a settlement.³⁵ Moreover, they were in much more difficulty than they had been in 1977, due to their military situation, and South Africa "...would certainly not countenance continued intransigence."³⁶

The Patriotic Front was under pressure from the Front Line States to drop the unreasonable conditions for attending the talks. Mugabe and Nkomo were reluctant to compromise because they felt that they had made significant gains in the war and that they were in danger of losing them. However, they were in danger of losing ground to the Salisbury government especially if they did not attend. They were in a difficult strategic position: one which was to become more familiar to them at each stage of the talks. They feared that:

"...the secret British intention was to go through the motions of seeking agreement from both sides but that, in fact, the real aim was to drive the PF into a situation where it would withdraw from the talks and so enable the British government to achieve a separate agreement with Muzorewa..."³⁷

They were soon to have their fears come very near to realization. Muzorewa had already accepted the invitation to attend, and at this point, British tactics became clear for the first time:

"They let it be known that if the Patriotic Front did not attend the Conference, Britain would carry on with Muzorewa alone. The logic was impeccable. Britain had agreed to give the opportunity to all parties to the conflict to take part in a Conference held in order to frame a new Constitution followed by the holding of fresh elections. Britain had not agreed to give a veto to any one party. If the Patriotic Front opted out, that was their affair, but they could not hold Britain to ransom."³⁸

In late August, the Patriotic Front leaders, Nkomo and Mugabe both agreed to attend the talks, without any preconditions. They were determined to prevent the outcome which the Salisbury government was determined to achieve, an outcome which Britain had made possible by threatening to go on without the PF.

Each side had agreed to attend, though for opposite reasons. They were caught in a strategic trap; as the Economist noted in early September, "...both sides face traps the avoidance of which could just condemn this conference to succeed."³⁹ It was an acutely perceptive observation, given the pessimism of many observers regarding the chances of a peaceful outcome to the talks.

b. Structuring the Conference

Lord Carrington, having secured the agreement of both sides to attend the conference, set about tackling the problem of how the talks were to be structured. Carrington was to chair the conference, and as the talks progressed, the Carrington style became clear. The conference began on September 10, 1979.

The first disagreement between the Salisbury delegation and the Patriotic Front was over seating arrangements. The PF insisted that Muzorewa's delegation should be part of the British delegation, and that the PF would only negotiate with the British. Carrington dismissed these objections, and stated firmly that there would be no haggling over procedure; the British had been given a free hand over the conduct of the conference, something which Prime Minister Thatcher had demanded and received at Lusaka. The PF, having probed, backed down, and accepted that the Salisbury delegation was not to be regarded as part of the British team, and that the seating arrangements reflected that there were two delegations negotiating with the British, not one.

Another, more important disagreement, was over the scope of the conference. The Salisbury delegation maintained that the talks had the single purpose of providing for a new

Constitution, while the PF maintained that agreement was only possible if all the issues were discussed, including provisions for the final transfer of political power.

Carrington agreed with the PF on this issue, but he added a refinement of his own. The issues were to be dealt with in three stages, first regarding the Constitution, the second concerning the transitional stage, and the third concerning a ceasefire.

The issues would be dealt with one at a time, and agreement would have to be reached on one stage before there could be any consideration of subsequent arrangements. Thus, there were to be three sets of proposals, and there would have to be agreement by both sides if the talks were not to come to an end. The step-by-step approach was an essential element of the way that the British structured the Conference. It was this approach which ensured that the strategic relationship of the participants would be as deterministic as it had been when the two sides had had to decide whether to attend the talks.

In Chapter Four it will be shown how this step-by-step approach was effective. Each step in the talks, and the outcome of each step, is considered one 'play' of the 'game'.

The basis for discussion throughout the talks were proposals which were presented by the British. Although both sides were to present their own proposals at various times

throughout the Conference, it was always the British proposals which would be the basis for negotiation. At each stage of the conference, the British were to offer their terms for what they considered a reasonable basis for a settlement. The reactions of each side to the proposals would be considered, and changes were sometimes made, mostly concerning details, which would make the proposals more palatable to either side. However, once initial changes had been made and Britain presented a final draft, the two sides were asked if they accepted or rejected what was offered. If one or both sides proved to be intransigent, a time limit would be imposed, after which Britain would threaten to terminate the Conference. Therefore, it can be said that after Britain has presented its final draft of proposals, the only choices which the participants could make were acceptance or rejection.

This is the basis of the contention that the two delegations had two alternatives from which to choose, thus making the situation a 2X2 game. The two available choices for either side were acceptance or rejection of British proposals. Carrington did not always observe his own deadlines, but ultimately at each stage the participants would have to make one of two choices, assuming that the terms or substance of the proposals could no longer change. This formula, while risky, was to be essential to the outcome. Carrington argued that:

"...once he changed his proposals in any fundamental way during the conference, there would be no end to it and the result would be confusion. In fact, during the whole of the negotiations, Carrington, except for very minor amendments, did not vary his proposals at all. He made up his mind and stuck to it."⁴⁰

The British management of the Conference was not supposed to favour one side or another, but in practice this did not always hold true. In his opening address to the Conference, Carrington stated the British objective:

"In other countries approaching independence, the United Kingdom's role has invariably been to establish just conditions for independence, and not to encourage the aspirations of this or that party. Our role in Rhodesia will be the same as in other dependent territories."⁴¹

Carrington's determination not to favour one side or another, however, was not unconditional. He had insisted that neither party had a veto, by which he meant that any side which ultimately refused to accept the British proposals could expect to be left out of any arrangement. But British policy allowed for the acceptance of an outcome to the talks in which only one side would benefit;

"...it was guided by what he [Carrington] called the 'first prize' and the 'second prize' to be won at Lancaster House. The first prize was an agreement with all parties; he was convinced that this was, in fact, the only way of ending the war and of avoiding damage to Anglo-African relations. Only if that

objective proved impossible to obtain would he be ready to settle for second prize, and agreement without the PF." 42

The notion that second prize meant an agreement without the PF is not immediately obvious, because it assumes that the Salisbury delegation agreed to British proposals while the PF held back. This is what actually happened at each stage of the conference, but the British were referring to a separate deal with the Salisbury regime as 'second prize' long before all the stages of the conference were finished. There was another possibility, in which the PF could have agreed to British proposals while the Salisbury delegation rejected them. Under these circumstances, Britain would have been in an embarrassing position, and would not have been able to recognize the Salisbury regime without going back on its word. Britain was to be spared this embarrassment only because the Salisbury delegation was always the first to agree to British proposals.

There was one more possibility, the outcome in which neither side would agree to Britain's terms. The possibility of this outcome, which would have meant that the status quo would have been maintained and no government in Rhodesia could have received British recognition, has been the subject of much controversy. If Britain is assumed to be as good as its word, it would only have recognized the Salisbury government if Muzorewa accepted British terms, and not otherwise.

However, the Thatcher government contained elements which were very much in favour of recognition of the Salisbury regime without any conditions. There were to be two points at which the issue threatened to destroy the British position at Lancaster House: one when the British Conservative Party held its annual conference in October; and when the legislation which had imposed sanctions came up for annual review in the British Parliament in November. In neither case did the Conservatives go against their leadership as they had the year before and demand that sanctions be lifted without conditions. This meant that the Salisbury regime was still caught in the strategic trap and had to agree to British proposals in order to get what it wanted; it could not just sit back and wait for the British to lift sanctions.

Thus, Britain had established very firm control of the Conference, and had established rules which were to be of the utmost importance to the outcome.

c. Steps in the Process

i. Constitutional Stage

The new Constitution was to be discussed first, followed by proposals of how it could be implemented. A draft Constitution was tabled by Britain (it had been made public on

August 14), and the two participants were asked for their reactions. The British draft differed from the 'Internal Settlement' constitution in several ways. There was to be no 'white blocking mechanism' against future constitutional amendments, and the Prime Minister was to have the power to make senior civil service appointments.⁴³ The proposals provided for retention of separate voting rolls for blacks and whites, but white reserved seats had been reduced from 28 to 20 out of 100.⁴⁴ The PF had hoped that the President would be given executive power, thus making the new parliament fundamentally different from a Westminster style of government, but the British had insisted that any new government should be similar in form to those in other former British territories, where Westminster style governments had been created. A Bill of Rights was included as part of the Constitution, which recognized the rights of all whites who had emigrated to Rhodesia since UDI. There were also safeguards against the wholesale expropriation of land, a provision which was meant to protect white property owners.⁴⁵

Both sides were opposed to aspects of the Draft Constitution. The PF in particular opposed the provision for a separate voting roll allowing for reserved white seats (although Nyerere had agreed to this in Lusaka). They also opposed the safeguards against expropriation which, they argued, would prevent the redistribution of land which was

required if the Africans were to have a fair settlement. In all, the PF had fourteen specific objections to the Draft Constitution.⁴⁶

The Salisbury delegation was opposed to aspects of the British proposals as well, and Ian Smith in particular opposed the removal of the 'white blocking mechanism' which would mean that the whites would lose their ability to dictate to parliament how the country could be run. However, Smith was no longer the voice of Rhodesia, and his objections would not be enough to carry the Salisbury delegation.

On October 3, Carrington presented a final draft of the Constitution, and gave the sides until October 8 to reply. On October 5, the Salisbury delegation voted 11 to 1 to accept, with Ian Smith as the only dissenter.⁴⁷ Muzorewa, after accepting the new Constitution, said that his government had accepted because: "...international recognition would not have been forthcoming"⁴⁸ had they refused. Salisbury's acceptance of the proposals made first and second prizes the only possible outcome for that stage of the talks. The PF now had only to choose between first and second prizes; acceptance meant that first prize would result, and rejection by the PF would mean that second prize would be the outcome.

The Patriotic Front, however, was adamant in its opposition to the new Constitution, in particular over the issue of land expropriation. Nkomo, in rejecting the British

proposals, announced:

"We have not come here to have a dictated settlement. Land is one of the most vital issues...the war is all about land."⁴⁸

When the PF failed to meet the deadline for agreement, Carrington indicated that he was ready to go on to the next stage of the talks with whoever was willing to continue. General Walls, the head of the Rhodesian Armed Forces, arrived in London to join the Salisbury delegation, and there were indications that the British were willing to go along with second prize. At this point, the South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha arrived in London, presumably to urge Britain to accept a separate deal with the Salisbury government, an outcome which would have pleased the South Africans immeasurably. However, the Commonwealth General Secretary Sir Sridath Ramphal was bitterly opposed to a separate deal with Salisbury, which he considered to be in contravention of the Lusaka proposals. The other members of the Commonwealth which had produced the Lusaka proposals, Nigeria, Jamaica, Zambia, and Tanzania, supported Ramphal and condemned the British willingness to carry on the talks without the PF.

Carrington's position in the Lancaster House talks was threatened by the possibility that at the scheduled Conservative Convention to be held in October, the right wing

Tories would pressure Thatcher to recognize the Salisbury government. The convention, however, did not result in a Tory revolt, and Carrington was able to return to Lancaster House with an endorsement from his party. The Salisbury government would have to continue to cooperate with Britain, but the PF had been given an indication that if they were to hold out against British proposals, then Carrington might have to accept second prize.

The PF was in a very difficult position. They had attended the talks with the intention of preventing British recognition of their enemies, but for them to accomplish this now meant that they would have to accept proposals which they had condemned. For them to accept the Constitutional proposals required an about turn in their policy and considerable loss of face.

A memorandum from the American Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was an opportunity to break the deadlock and gave the PF a way to save face. The memorandum indicated an American willingness... "to help with land compensation through a multi-donor programme within a wider Southern African concept."⁵⁰ Britain added assurances of its own that it would help in the land compensation program.

The PF responded to the assurances, and on October 18, they accepted the British Draft Constitution without changes. In a statement to the plenary session at Lancaster

House, they said that the American assurances:

"...go a long way in allaying the great concern we have over the whole land question.... We are now able to say that if we are satisfied about the vital issues of the transitional arrangements, there will be no need to revert to discussions on the constitution, including those issues on which we reserve our position."¹

It was a circumspect way of saying that the PF accepted the British proposals without conditions, and that they were willing to accept the British step-by-step approach.

The two sides had agreed to the Constitution, and first prize had been the outcome of the first stage of the talks, the first play in the game. The Salisbury delegation had been willing to accept important changes in their government, and had come very close to having the British recognition which they so much desired. The Patriotic Front had put up stiff resistance, but they had made a dramatic about-turn in their policy after some very vague (and largely unfulfilled) American promises of land compensation. They had been willing to accept despite their strong objections to the substance of the proposals, and they had not insisted that the terms be changed in the future. Both sides were making decisions because they had strategic considerations, and these considerations were more important than questions of substance.

ii The Transitional Stage

The talks which concerned the transitional stage were in some ways more difficult than the Constitutional talks. The strategic situation of the PF and the Salisbury regime again required them to make concessions which were unpalatable but necessary if they were to achieve their objectives.

Before the British proposals for the transitional stage were presented, the Patriotic Front presented proposals of its own. The PF wanted the creation of an eight man transitional council, composed of four members of the PF and four from the combined British and Salisbury governments.⁵² A United Nations force was to be responsible for keeping the peace. It was apparent that the PF wanted to have considerable authority during the transition, although they accepted that the eight man council would have to be chaired by the British.

Britain refused to accept the Patriotic Front proposals. On October 22, Britain presented its initial terms for the transition, which was to involve:

"Muzorewa abdicating power, the dissolving of (the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian) Parliament and the arrival in Rhodesia of a British Governor to take charge of affairs. This was to be followed quickly (in about two months) by an election supervised by Britain."⁵³

In addition, the Rhodesian Security Forces, the police and whole government administration in Salisbury were to remain intact and at the disposal of the British governor.

For the Muzorewa delegation, the proposals were a terrible blow. The government was required to resign outright, an indication that the British still regarded the Salisbury government as illegal. Muzorewa at first insisted that he must remain in power until the elections, but he was soon to back down. He would then require that his resignation be made contingent on the lifting of sanctions.

The PF also had reasons for rejecting the proposals. The major elements of their own transitional terms had been disregarded, in particular the requirement that UN forces maintain the peace prior to the election. In the place of UN troops, the Rhodesian Security forces would be used, a possibility which the PF regarded with justifiable suspicion. In stating their objections to the British terms, they said that the British reliance on the Rhodesian forces:

"...clearly exclude the Patriotic Front forces from the security forces at the disposal of the Governor. The British Government is saying quite clearly that it is the Patriotic Front forces who would prejudice the freedom of choice of the people of Zimbabwe but that the Regime's forces would not."⁵⁴

The PF believed that the Rhodesian Security Forces would prejudice the outcome of the elections, whether they were under the authority of a British Governor or not. In addition, the two month time limit which the British had imposed for the achievement of a ceasefire and the completion of elections was thought by the PF to be 'ridiculous'; they believed that it would take twice that long or longer.

At the time that the British proposals were being considered, the Rhodesian Security Forces conducted massive raids into Zambia, destroying transport facilities and striking at Nkomo's ZAPU bases. The raids were to be a warning to the PF that the Security forces were still capable of fighting effectively, but in fact the raids were to increase Zambia's determination that the war must come to an end. An increase in Zambian pressure on the PF to come to an agreement at Lancaster House was not altogether in the best interests of those from Salisbury who were hoping for second prize. However, the initial result of the raids was an enhanced PF determination to prevent the British from using these same Security Forces to keep the peace. PF intransigence was to the advantage of those who wanted a separate deal for the Salisbury regime.

Muzorewa had refused to resign as required, but he was under pressure from General Walls, the Rhodesian Commander, to concede. Walls had come to be regarded by many as the spokesman for Rhodesia's whites, in place of Ian Smith whose ability to control events had evaporated. Walls and other Rhodesian military personnel were very much in favour of the proposed British reliance on their forces, and they therefore pressured Muzorewa to abdicate. By the 28th of October, Muzorewa had agreed unconditionally to the British transition proposals. Carrington applauded the Bishop for his 'statesmanlike act'.⁵⁵

Muzorewa's acceptance had originally been made conditional on the lifting of sanctions, but he had backed down from this with good reason. The British Parliament was about to vote on the annual extension of sanctions, and the Salisbury delegation hoped that the Conservatives would not be able to resist the pressure to lift them. In that case, the Rhodesians would have achieved one of their major goals, even if the talks were to break down and neither side cooperated any further. However, the British were able to circumvent the problem. On November 7, Sir Ian Gilmour (who was Carrington's spokesman in the Commons, Carrington being a Lord), announced that the Thatcher government would not renew

sanctions, but that most would remain in force under other legislation. In addition, Gilmour introduced legislation which would provide the legal basis for the transitional period and enable the government to implement the independence constitution, appoint a British Governor, and hold elections.⁵⁶ The Governor's arrival in Rhodesia "...avoided any possible difficulty over the lifting of sanctions and recognition",⁵⁷ since Rhodesia would no longer be run by the illegal governments which had existed since UDI. The enabling legislation was passed by the British Parliament on November 8.

The British legislation was seen by the PF and others as evidence that Britain was once again considering second prize. Gilmour was accused by the British Labour opposition of accepting a separate deal by providing for the arrival of a British Governor with or without PF approval, and Gilmour increased the suspicion by refusing to guarantee that agreement from both sides was necessary to implement the proposals.

Carrington himself made it clear that second prize was increasingly possible. In an address to the British House of Lords he stated that the British still preferred a settlement acceptable to both sides,

"...but if this is not attainable we cannot allow the best to become the enemy of the good...with an agreement already reached on genuine majority rule, and an end to the rebellion against Britain's authority, there can be no turning back."⁵⁸

Once again, as in the Constitutional stage, the Commonwealth and leaders of the Front-Line states condemned the British willingness to carry on without agreement from the PF. Kaunda of Zambia arrived in London to appeal to Thatcher to modify the British proposals. Kaunda had been induced to renew his efforts after the latest Rhodesian raids into Zambia. He and Ramphal of the Commonwealth Secretariat succeeded in getting the British to modify their proposals, though only slightly. It was agreed that, in addition to the Rhodesian forces at the disposal of the Governor, a Commonwealth 'monitoring force' of several hundred men would be sent to Rhodesia. Britain was to contribute to the force by committing troops of its own. The changes were a long way from the original PF demand for a UN peacekeeping force, but to the PF the British concession was another opportunity to save face. Second prize was still an outcome which the PF sought to forestall, and they could only do this by agreeing to the British terms. They made only one more demand for change, that the wording of the proposals should indicate that PF forces as well as the Rhodesian Security Forces were to be at

the disposal of the Governor. Britain allowed this minor change, and of November 15 the Patriotic Front agreed to the transitional proposals. Once again, the two sides had made bitter choices and had agreed to conditions, which they had originally opposed. By this stage, a pattern had emerged. Britain would table proposals, the two sides would reject them, and the talks would appear to be deadlocked. Then, the Salisbury regime, thinking that it saw a chance to get second prize, would accept the proposals. Britain would threaten to accept second prize, and the PF, after hesitation, would also agree after minor face-saving concessions had been made. The outcome was always first prize, an agreement by both sides. The outcome of two "plays" of the game so far, had been mutual agreement.

iii Ceasefire

The third and final stage of the talks almost resulted in failure. While the first two stages had resulted in agreement, and the conference thus had considerable momentum, the ceasefire arrangements were to involve choices which, especially for the PF, could have meant the difference between decimation and victory.

On November 16, Britain tabled proposals for a ceasefire. The ten point plan called for a ceasefire to begin within 7 to 10 days of a final agreement, and a committee to oversee the ceasefire, composed of the commanders of the three armies (the Rhodesian Security Forces, ZANLA, and ZIPRA).⁵⁹ By the time the ceasefire was to begin, the guerillas were to be assembled, with their arms, at designated assembly points, and all guerilla infiltrations across the border were to cease.

The PF regarded the proposals as an invitation to suicide. They feared that the requirement for PF forces to go to assembly areas would leave them defenseless. They believed that

"...if the guerillas came out of the bush and were concentrated in their camps, a pretext would be found by the Rhodesians and South Africans to break the ceasefire, surround the camps, and decimate the guerillas."⁶⁰

At the time the ceasefire was being considered, Rhodesian forces staged another raid into Zambia; this despite the fact that General Walls, the Rhodesian Commander, was involved in talks with the British and PF Commanders over the role of the military ceasefire committee. PF distrust of the Rhodesians, under the circumstances, was justified. In response to the raids, Carrington issued a two point ultimatum. He wanted assurances that both sides would refrain from

cross-border raids, and he demanded that both sides agree to British proposals within 3 days, by November 26.⁶¹

The Salisbury delegation did not have significant objections to the ceasefire proposals, and on November 26, the day of the deadline, they agreed.

The Patriotic Front remained firmly opposed to the ceasefire arrangements, but they had little support from their Front Line State supporters. In a meeting in Dar es Salaam before the British deadline, they had met to work out their strategy. The Front Line States pressured the PF to return to London and continue the talks. The PF delegation returned to Lancaster House with ceasefire proposals of their own.

The PF proposals demanded a larger Commonwealth force, the dismantling of units of the Rhodesian army, and a two month period in which to make the ceasefire operative. Carrington, however, refused to allow any changes, and on December 3 he issued another ultimatum, this time giving the PF until December 8 to accept.

The Salisbury delegation was impatient with Carrington for allowing his deadline to expire without breaking off the talks and accepting second prize. They prepared to return to Rhodesia, confident that the PF would refuse the ceasefire provisions, leaving the

British with no choice but to accept a separate deal. Carrington was distraught. In a press interview on December 4 he said "...I do not despair of reaching an agreement, but I am as close to despair as I have been in the whole three months of negotiations."⁶²

Meanwhile, preparations were being made for the arrival of the British Governor in Rhodesia, with or without Patriotic Front approval. On December 12, before the PF had agreed to the ceasefire, Lord Soames, the new Governor, arrived in Salisbury. British sanctions were lifted the same day. Britain was in a dangerous position.

"...if the guerillas had not subsequently signed, Britain would have found itself in Rhodesia technically fighting a massive guerilla insurgency with almost no British troops and with every chance of international opprobrium."⁶³

The PF, however, were not about to allow the talks to break down completely and leave them in a situation which, while risky for the British, was equally risky for them.

Earlier in the talks, the Commonwealth High Commissioners in London had tried to get changes in the ceasefire proposals. They had asked Britain to give

assurances that South Africa would not intervene in the conflict, and that something be done to disarm the Rhodesian Air Force which was a threat to the Patriotic Front forces. They asked that the Commonwealth forces at the disposal of the Governor be adequate to keep the peace, and that consideration be given to changes in the number of assembly points for the guerillas.

Carrington gave the Commonwealth the assurances which they required, and the assurances went a long way toward allowing the PF to agree. The question of the number of assembly points was the last issue to be dealt with, and Carrington announced that he was willing to allow one more assembly point, which brought the number from 15 to 16. The PF did not intend to put all its forces in the assembly areas, and it buried a large percentage of its arms, but it nevertheless had been put in a very dangerous position.

On December 17, 1979, the Patriotic Front agreed to the ceasefire proposals. Four days later, on December 21, 1979, the Lancaster House Agreements were signed. The war in Rhodesia came to an uneasy end, and UN sanctions were lifted after a Security Council debate, on the same day.

First prize had been the outcome of three separate stages in the conference, despite considerable

problems and continual opposition to the proposals.

There were still to be difficulties in the period between the signing of the agreements and the elections, but ultimately the elections were held. Robert Mugabe of ZANU became the Prime Minister of the new nation of Zimbabwe, in April, 1980.

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Chapter Four

LANCASTER HOUSE, EXPLANATION: A 2X2 GAME

The Theory of games was described in Chapter Two, and the Lancaster House Conference was described in Chapter Three. In Chapter Four, it will be shown that the event was a 2X2 game which was played three times. Thus, the conditions which are a requirement of a deductive nomological explanation will be shown. It will also be shown how the conditions, in combination with the laws of game theory, explain the result of the conference.

The conditions which must exist in order for an event to be characterized as a 2X2 game were described in Chapter Two. The conditions are as follows:

C₁ There must be at least two distinct opponents, each with two distinct choices, and their relationship must be strategic

C₂ The order of preference of each of the opponents, with respect to each of the four possible outcomes, must be shown on an ordinal scale

1. Condition One: the two opponents; their two choices

a. The opponents

In order for a situation to be characterized as a 2X2 game, there must be at least two, and not more than two distinct opponents. For this to be the case at Lancaster House, it must be shown that the Salisbury delegation and the Patriotic Front were the principal opponents, and that the roles of Britain and other participants to the Conference were different from the roles of the two opponents. In addition, it must be shown that both delegations can reasonably be treated as individual decision makers rather than as several competing groups.

There were three main participants to the Conference, the PF, the Salisbury delegation, and the British delegation. South Africa and the Front-line States did not play a formal role in the Conference, and though they both had a stake in the outcome, they can be regarded as supporters of either side. The Commonwealth had been instrumental in setting up the talks, and was to exert continual pressure on Britain to modify its proposals at different stages, but

Britain had demanded a free hand in the running of the Conference, and they were not required to comply with Commonwealth demands. Ultimately, the Lancaster House Agreements, to be implemented, required only the signatures of Britain, the PF, and the Salisbury delegation.

How then, can the talks be treated as a 2X2 game if there were three direct participants? Britain was a direct participant, but it was not one of the opponents. Its role was similar to that of an experimenter, who structures the relationships of the opponents to see how they will make choices in specific situations. In games such as the 'prisoner's dilemma', for example, two prisoners are confronted with choices which are made available to them by the jailer.¹ Even though the prisoners do not meet with each other and are kept in separate cells, and even though they communicate only with the jailer, the game is really being played only between the prisoners; the jailer is not a third opponent. At Lancaster House, the role of Britain was similar to that of an experimenter in a simulated game, or to the jailer in the prisoner's dilemma. The two delegations did not negotiate directly with each other, in fact they made few efforts to communicate with each other; communication at the

Conference was only between the third party (Britain), and the two principal opponents, and not between the opponents themselves.

There were thus only two delegations at the Conference which can be considered as the opponents: The Salisbury delegation and the Patriotic Front.

Both the opponents represented loose coalitions. To show that the Conference was a 2X2 game requires that the opponents can be treated as individuals. As stated in Chapter Two, in order for a group to be regarded as an individual in theory, the group must be shown to have a unitary interest motivating its decisions.

i. The Salisbury Delegation (S)

The British had required that both delegations limit their membership to twelve.² The Salisbury delegation, led by Bishop Muzorewa, included six members of Muzorewa's UANC, four white cabinet ministers including Ian Smith, and the Reverend Sithole who was a claimant to the leadership of ZANU. The delegation was the representative of the Government of National Unity which had been created in the House of Assembly of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Muzorewa had at least a

plurality of votes in any decision, assuming that he could keep the loyalty of his UANC colleagues.

Muzorewa was to have the most trouble with Ian Smith, who still acted as though he was the voice of Rhodesia's white population.³ Smith could no longer command the support of the whites, much less claim to be the leader of the nation. He opposed acceptance of the Constitutional proposals, but was outvoted 11 to 1 by the delegation. Smith threatened to take the issue to the House of Assembly in Salisbury, where the whites were still able to block new legislation. This threat was a bluff, however, and Smith was later reported to have told the caucus of the Rhodesian Front party that Muzorewa had been right in accepting the new Constitution, because Muzorewa could not, as Prime Minister, refuse.⁴

Before the delegation left for London in September, Muzorewa was asked in the House of Assembly how his delegation would make decisions. He replied that decisions would be made on the basis of a majority within the delegation.⁵ The decision-rule for (S) was therefore based on majority vote.

At the Conference, when (S) had to make the crucial decisions of accepting or rejecting British proposals, Muzorewa would ask his delegation, in a

closed meeting, if there was any alternative to agreement.⁶ When no better alternatives were found, a vote was taken, and each time the vote resulted in a decision to accept the proposals.

The Salisbury delegation thus acted as though it had a unitary interest in accepting British proposals. There may have been different reasons for individual members to agree, because they may have had different views of the consequences of agreement. Some may have felt that agreeing to the proposals would result in a scaling down of the war, even if the PF ultimately refused to sign; others may have felt that the war could be continued with greater vigour if international recognition was achieved. Despite these differences, the delegation had a unitary interest in agreeing to the proposals, and (S) can thus be treated as an individual in theory.

ii. The Patriotic Front (PF)

The PF delegation, like the Salisbury delegation, was a loose coalition whose unity was only temporary. However, despite the differences which existed between its members, the PF also had a unitary interest which persisted throughout the conference.

There is much evidence that Nkomo of ZAPU

considered breaking away from the PF, thus isolating Mugabe's ZANU. Throughout the talks, Nkomo met with the British on many occasions, without Mugabe being present, while Mugabe refused to negotiate without the presence of Nkomo.⁸ The possibility of a coalition which included Nkomo and the Salisbury regime was a constant threat to Mugabe. Ultimately, however, Nkomo did not split with ZANU until after the Conference.

The two sections of the PF, (ZANU and ZAPU) made decisions differently. Mugabe governed ZANU by consensus; "...maintaining a balance between firebreathing radicals such as ZANU secretary Edgar Tekere and deputy army commander Rex Nhongo, and more moderate individuals like Tongogara, legal advisor Simbi Mubako, and intelligence-chief Emerson Munungagwa."⁹

This consensus of the six ZANU members of the PF delegation was in contrast to the other six (ZAPU) members. Nkomo was much more dictatorial with ZAPU and: "...ruled his delegation in the manner of a Matabele king, tolerating little debate and permitting less dissension."¹⁰

On the basis of ZANU's consensus and Nkomo's strict leadership of ZAPU, PF decisions were the result of mutual agreement between Mugabe and Nkomo. The

decision-rule for the PF, therefore, is that both sides had to agree for a decision to become operative. If one side disagreed with the other, (for example if one side had been willing to accept British proposals while the other had not,) and if the unity of the PF was to persist, then the preference of the dissenter prevailed.

There is some evidence that Nkomo and Mugabe disagreed over whether to accept the British proposals,¹¹ but ultimately the PF retained its unity. This was due to the unitary interest of ZANU and ZAPU. The PF had to remain united in order to maintain the support of their allies, and they feared that they would lose international support if they were held responsible for the breakdown of the peace talks.¹²

Because the PF had a unitary interest, and because the two sides did not split up until after the final agreement was signed, the PF can be treated as an individual in theory.

b. Choices Available to the Opponents

It has been shown that there were two distinct opponents at Lancaster House, the (PF) and (S.) For the conference to be a 2X2 game, there also had to be

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two distinct choices available to each of the opponents.

The British made proposals on three separate occasions, in the Constitutional, transitional, and ceasefire stages. At each stage they demanded that the two sides either accept or reject the proposals. Major changes in the proposals were not allowed, although minor changes were made.

The substance of the British proposals had a bearing on the preferences of the opponents for the different possible outcomes, but the substance of the proposals did not affect the structure of the game. At each stage, both sides had only to accept or reject, regardless of the fact that at each stage they were considering different terms.

The 2X2 game at Lancaster House can be illustrated as follows:

		PF	
		Y	N
S	Y	<div data-bbox="607 352 721 478"> YY a </div>	<div data-bbox="721 352 841 478"> YN b </div>
	N	<div data-bbox="607 478 721 604"> NY c </div>	<div data-bbox="721 478 841 604"> NN d </div>

The (PF) is referred to as the column player, while (S) is the row player. The first entry in each box is the possible pay-off to row (S), and the second entry is the pay-off to column (PF).

The four possible outcomes shown above can be described as follows:

Outcome 'a', (Y,Y), mutual agreement, called 'first prize' by the British. For conference to succeed, outcome 'a' is required at all stages. War ends.

Outcome 'b' (Y,N), only S accepts. Called 'second prize' by the British. Occurs at any stage, as long as S accepts, and PF rejects

Outcome, 'c' (N,Y), only PF accepts.

considered unlikely but a possibility if 'S' accepts first, then rejects after PF has accepted. This would have forestalled any British recognition of S.

Outcome 'd' (N,N), both sides reject.

Conference fails, war continues

These were the four possible outcomes at each stage of the conference. Because Lord Carrington required both sides to agree to the proposals before subsequent stages could be considered, the 2X2 game was maintained, as illustrated in Fig. 4:1

If the conference had been allowed to continue even though agreement had not been reached on previous stages, the process would have degenerated, and the number of possible outcomes would have multiplied. Fig. 4:2 below illustrates what would have happened if only two of the three stages had been considered and agreement had not been reached on one stage before proceeding to the next. The number of possible outcomes rises from 4 to 16, and if the third stage was added, (ceasefire), there would have been 64 possible outcomes.

Fig.4:1

Fig.4:2

Thus, the way that the conference was structured ensured that each side would only have two choices to make at each stage. This was so because the British required the two delegations to either accept or reject the proposals, and because agreement on one stage was necessary before subsequent stages could be considered.

The relationship between the two opponents was also strategic. This is important because not only were there two sides each with two choices, but the ability of one side to gain its ends was dependent to an important degree on the choices or decisions that the other participant would make. For example, it was impossible for the Salisbury delegation to unilaterally decide that they wanted outcome 'b' to occur, because this outcome could only be the result of a PF rejection of British proposals. The strategic relationship of the opponents was maintained at all three stages of the conference.

Condition One (C_1) has therefore been met: there were two opponents, each with two choices to make, and they were in a strategic relationship.

To say that the game which was played at Lancaster House was one specific game which was played three times, is to say that the British proposals had

the same effect on the preferences of each of the opponents at each stage. The preference ordering of each side must therefore be shown.

2. Condition Two: preference ordering

a. Method of determining ordering

Preferences for both opponents were decided on the basis of three criteria. The first step was to choose what subjectively appeared to be the most preferred to the least preferred outcomes for each player. These orderings were then put in a 2X2 matrix. Criteria one, therefore, is face validity.

The game was then examined to see whether the natural outcome of the game was 'a' (natural outcomes being determined by the laws which are listed in Chapter Two). If the natural outcome of the game was not 'a', or mutual agreement, then the preference orders would be re-examined for possible changes which could still meet the criterion of face value.

The third criterion was whether the game could reasonably explain the pattern of moves which emerged at the Conference. If a game had face validity, and a natural outcome of 'a', but did not show any logical

reason for one player to move first, and did not show why that move 'forced' the second player to accept, then the ordering was re-examined. This method made it possible to find logical contradictions in what might otherwise have seemed to be a reasonable ordering of preferences for either side. This is a form of self-evidencing explanation, as mentioned in the Chapter One. This method cannot be taken as a proof that the ordering is correct, but only as a way to check for inconsistencies.

The preference ordering of both delegations must now be shown.

1. Salisbury Delegation, Preferences

The Salisbury delegation made it clear, in public, that "lifting sanctions is their first prize."¹³ This shows that either outcome 'a' or outcome 'b' was their first preference, because only in these two cases could sanctions be lifted. However, there were times when (S) indicated that outcome 'b' was preferred to 'a'. After the Constitution had been accepted by both sides, Muzorewa and his people had prepared to leave the conference and return to Salisbury. They did so at a time when an agreement

with the PF was still possible. During the transition and ceasefire stages, (S) became impatient with Carrington for allowing the PF to ignore the deadlines for agreement, and once again indicated that they preferred 'b' most of all. Outcome 'b' will thus be given the number 4 to indicate that it was the most preferred outcome for (S). Outcome 'a', or mutual agreement, will be given the number 3 to indicate Salisbury's second choice.

There were two other possible outcomes to the conference, outcomes 'c' and 'd'. The possibility of outcome 'c', while remote, was the least preferable outcome for (S). If it had happened that only the PF had agreed to the British proposals, then outcome 'c' would have been the result, and (S) would have been responsible for the failure of the conference. Under such circumstances, the lifting of international sanctions and the recognition of (S) would have been least likely, while the PF would have retained its allies and could not be accused of intransigence. If both sides, on the other hand, had refused to agree to the British proposals, then neither could really be accused of destroying the possibility of peace. (S) would have preferred continued war with the possibility of future recognition from Britain, to continued war

without this possibility. Thus S preferred outcome 'c' the least and outcome 'd' the second least.

The preference ordering of S is shown below:

		PF	
		Y	N
S	Y	3	4
	N	1	2

Diagram illustrating the preference ordering of S. The matrix shows outcomes (3, 4, 1, 2) for S's choices (Y, N) against PF's choices (Y, N). A curved arrow points from outcome 4 to outcome 2, indicating a preference shift. Labels 'a', 'b', 'c', and 'd' are placed near the outcomes: 'a' and 'b' are near outcome 4, 'c' is near outcome 1, and 'd' is near outcome 2.

ii. The Patriotic Front, Preferences

Robert Mugabe, after accepting the invitation to Lancaster House, called the conference "...one of several British attempts to legitimize the Smith-Muzorewa regime."¹⁴ The PF's primary reason for attending the conference was the belief that international recognition of (S) was the least desirable of the possible outcomes. The Front-Line States, the major supporters of the PF, had given their blessing to the British initiative, and their position

had a direct bearing on the PF's desire to avoid being accused of rejecting a peaceful settlement. Outcome 'b', or what was called 'second prize' by the British, was therefore the PF's least desired outcome, and will be given the number 1.

According to Zartman, the PF saw a fair agreement as preferable to eventual military victory.¹⁵ The important qualifier in this statement is the word 'fair'. Prior to attending the Conference the PF had indeed shown a willingness to consider an agreement, but they did not want to give up at the conference what they felt they had won on the battlefield. The PF was not able to judge the fairness of the possible agreement until they saw the British proposals, and at each stage they were outraged. They were asked to accept reserved white seats in parliament, to allow the Salisbury government apparatus and military to remain intact and operating during the transition period, and worst of all, their forces were required to go to assembly areas, where they would be in a very vulnerable position even if not all their forces complied. The PF did not prefer this unfair agreement (in their eyes) to a continued war. They preferred continued war, or outcome 'd', but this outcome was only possible if (S.) also rejected the proposals.

Outcome 'd', therefore, is number 4 on the PF's ordinal scale.

If (S) had refused to accept the British proposals, it was possible that the PF would be left in the position of being the only opponent to agree. This outcome was highly unlikely, considering the PF's opposition to the proposals. They would not have been likely to agree, for example, to a Constitution which guaranteed reserved white seats, if (S) had not been first to agree to the Constitution. Outcome 'c', however, was still preferred to outcome 'a' or mutual agreement. This is because in outcome 'c', the proposals could not be implemented; they could only be implemented if the outcome was mutual agreement, or 'a'. The PF preferred 'c' to 'a' because 'c' offered at least the remote possibility that (S) would be held responsible for the failure of the talks, while the PF demonstrated its flexibility and retained the support of the Front-line States. Outcome 'c' is thus number 3, and outcome 'a' or mutual agreement is number 2. The possibility of outcome 'c' was remote, as will be shown.

The preference ordering of the PF was as follows:

		PF	
		Y	N
S	Y	2	1
	N	3	4

a b
 c d

3. The Game at Lancaster House

Having determined the preference ordering for the two opponents, the particular game which was played at Lancaster House can be illustrated as follows:

		PF	
		Y	N
S	Y	3 2	4 1
	N	1 3	2 4

This is game number 46 in Rapoport and Guyer's

taxonomy of 2X2 games.¹⁶ It is a game in which only one player has a dominating strategy, and it has what is called a 'force vulnerable equilibrium'.¹⁷ Of the seventy-eight 2X2 games which are possible on an ordinal scale, there are 3 classes. Game 46 is in the class of 36 games in which only one player has a dominating strategy. The other two classes of games are those in which both players have a dominating strategy, and those in which neither player has a dominating strategy. Each of the classes is divided into categories according to whether the game is one of no conflict, whether there is a stable equilibrium outcome, whether the equilibrium outcome is threat vulnerable or force vulnerable, and whether there is an unstable equilibrium outcome. In game 46, the row player (S) is the player with the dominating strategy, as will be discussed below. When moves are made simultaneously, and the game is played repeatedly, the game is of interest because the row player can depart from its dominating strategy by "rejecting", thus giving column its greatest pay-off; the row player has then confused the column player to such an extent that row can get its best outcome (b) in subsequent plays. Game 46 is called an 'avaricious induced'¹⁸ game when

• moves are simultaneous and plays are repeated.

However, at Lancaster House, the moves of the two players were not simultaneous, and the properties of the game are somewhat different. The properties of game 46, when moves are alternating as they were at Lancaster House, are discussed later in this chapter.

The two conditions, C_1 and C_2 have now been established. There were two opponents, each with two possible choices, and their relationship was strategic. The preferences of both sides have been determined in fulfillment of C_2 . These two conditions, in combination with the laws of how rational decision makers will make choices in the conditions, are the foundation of the deductive-nomological explanation of the outcome of the Conference.

4. Laws

The laws which determine how a rational individual will make choices in a 2X2 game, and thus the natural outcome, were listed in Chapter Two. They are as follows:

L_1 If both players have a dominating strategy, both will choose it

L_2 If only one player has a dominating strategy, he will choose it, and the other will choose the strategy which maximizes his pay-off under the assumption that the first player has chosen his dominating strategy

L_3 If the game has a single Pareto equilibrium, the players will choose the strategy which contains it

L_4 If neither player has a dominating strategy, and if the game has either no Pareto equilibrium or more than one, each player will choose the strategy which contains his maximum outcome

In game number 46, only one player has a dominating strategy.¹⁹ Therefore, L_1 does not apply to the game. L_2 , however, is applicable.

Dominating strategies are defined as follows: "one strategy dominates another if and only if in using it a player does no worse, and in general better, regardless of the strategy chosen by the other player."²⁰

In game 46, it is the row player, the Salisbury delegation, which has the dominating

strategy. (S) can do no better than to accept, because doing so makes their two greatest preferences, 3 and 4, possible. They will choose to accept the proposals regardless of whether or not the PF accepts.

The PF, on the other hand, do not have a dominating strategy. They will not decide how to choose until (S) has chosen; if they reject they could get their best outcome, 4, or their worst outcome, 1. If they accept, they could get the second best or the second worst outcomes, that is, 3 or 2.

If the dominating strategy of (S) is to accept, then the PF must also accept to prevent its worst outcome. Thus game 46 has a natural outcome of 'a', or mutual agreement, in accordance with L_2 .

L_3 refers to outcomes which are Pareto equilibria. Equilibrium is defined as: "one from which neither player can shift without impairing his payoff, assuming that the other player does not shift."²¹ In games in which at least one player has a dominating strategy, the natural outcome is the same as the equilibrium outcome. Therefore, outcome 'a' is the equilibrium outcome of game 46. L_3 refers to Pareto-equilibrium outcomes. An equilibrium outcome is Pareto optimal if "...there is no other outcome in which both players get a larger payoff."²² Outcome

'a', is therefore the only Pareto-equilibrium outcome of game 46, and the natural outcome of the game is also 'a', or mutual agreement, in accordance with L_3 .

L_4 refers to games in which neither player has a dominating strategy, and therefore does not apply to game 46.

Thus, in accordance with the applicable laws, L_2 and L_3 , outcome 'a' is the natural outcome of game 46. In this game, because the natural outcome is worse for the column player, the PF is called the 'disgruntled player'. The game is called 'force vulnerable' because (S), by choosing its dominating strategy (accept), can force the PF to shift from reject to accept. Before either side accepts, the PF is still able to get its best outcome. Once (S) accepts, the PF must choose between their worst and their second worst outcome. They can thus be forced to shift from rejecting to accepting.

a. Rules of alternating moves

L_2 stipulates that the player with the dominating strategy will choose it, while the other player can only assume that the first player will use this strategy. This assumption is only necessary when

the strategy choice of the other is not known, that is, when moves are made simultaneously. At Lancaster House, the moves were not simultaneous, but alternating. At each stage, the players knew the position of the other, though they did not necessarily know the preferences of the other. If one side accepted, it did so publicly, and unless acceptance was made public, one opponent could only assume that the other was still rejecting.

Recent work in game theory has examined the logic of games in which moves are alternating, rather than simultaneous. Brams has experimented with a number of simulated games, including game 46, and has described outcome 'a' in the game as an "absorbing outcome."²³ Absorbing outcomes are based on the following rules:²⁴

1. Both players simultaneously choose strategies, thereby defining an initial outcome
2. once at an initial outcome, either player can unilaterally switch his strategy and change that outcome to a subsequent outcome in the row or column in which the initial outcome lies

3. the other player can respond by unilaterally switching his strategy, thereby moving the game to a new outcome

4. these strictly alternating moves continue until the player with the next move chooses not to switch his strategy. When this happens, the game terminates and the outcome reached is the final outcome (absorbing outcome)

The final outcome, and the pattern of moves which will result from game 46 are as follows:²⁵

	Y	N
Y	(3 2)	4 1
N	1 3	2 4

Rule one stipulates that both players must initially choose simultaneously. Here, before either side has accepted, it is assumed that both sides have rejected. Thus the initial outcome of these simultaneous rejections is 'd'. The game as it stands is as follows:

		PF	
		Y	N
S	Y	3 2	4 1
	N	1 3	(2 4)

Rule two allows one player to shift unilaterally and change the outcome to a subsequent row or column in which the initial outcome lies. Because the PF already have their most preferred outcome, 'd', they will not shift first. (S), however, will use its dominating strategy and move to accept, shifting the outcome from 'd' to 'b'. This is illustrated as

follows:

		PF	
		Y	N
S	Y	3 2	4 1
	N	1 3	2 4

Rule 3 says that the second player can then unilaterally switch strategies and move the game to a new outcome. The PF will want to avoid it worst outcome, and they know that to avoid it they must now agree. The PF will then switch strategies and agree, even though they get only their second best outcome.

The moves of the game so far have been as follows:

← PF

		Y	N
	Y	3 2	4 1
↑	S	1 3	2 4
	N		

↑

Rule 4 states that the game will end when the player with the next move chooses not to switch again. Because after two moves in this game, the outcome is the only Pareto-equilibrium, (S) will not subsequently switch, and the game ends. The final outcome is 'a', or mutual agreement.

b. The moves at Lancaster House

The pattern of moves which will result from playing game 46 is precisely the pattern which emerged at Lancaster House. At each stage, the game was played once, and at each stage the final outcome was 'a'.

This is illustrated as follows:

i. ,Constitutional Stage

Sept. 13 Constitutional proposals formally presented.

Smith objects to removal of white blocking mechanism. PF has 14 objections to the proposals. The game is:

		PF	
		Y	N
S	Y	3 2	4 1
	N	1 3	(2 4)

Oct. 3 Carrington imposes deadline of Oct. 8 for acceptance of proposals.

Oct. 5 (S) agrees, saying that doing so made international recognition possible.

Oct. 8 The PF allows the deadline to pass without

agreeing. The game is now:

			PF	
		Y	N	
	Y	3 2	4 1	
↑	S			↑
	N	1 3	2 4	

Botha of South Africa arrives in London to request that Britain accept second prize.

Oct. 15 The PF announces that it will not leave the Conference even though they do not agree to the proposals.

Oct. 16 PF is banned from the talks.
Commonwealth critical of Carrington for banning PF. Americans propose scheme for land compensation.

Oct. 18 PF accepts.

The game is now as follows:

← PF

	Y	N
Y	3 2	4 1
N	1 3	2 4

↑ S ↑

The natural outcome of the first stage was 'a', or mutual agreement and the pattern of moves was the same as the logical pattern in game 46.

ii. Transition Stage

Oct. 22 Transition proposals tabled.

Muzorewa objects to requirement to abdicate power. PF opposes the British plan to keep Rhodesian Security Forces and government

administration intact. The game is:

		PF	
		Y	N
S	Y	3 2	4 1
	N	1 3	(2 4)

Rhodesian forces strike at ZAPU bases in
Zambia. Muzorewa is persuaded by military
advisors to accept.

Oct. 28 (S) accepts.

The game is:

		PF.	
		Y	N
↑ S	Y	3 2	4 1
	N	1 3	2 4

British parliament votes in favour of accepting the Transitional proposals.

Carrington threatens to accept second prize.
Kaunda of Zambia asks Britain to make minor changes in the proposals and pressures the PF to accept.

Nov. 15 PF accepts.

The game is now:

			←	
			PF	
		Y		N
	Y	3 2	4 1	
	N	1 3	2 4	
↑	S			↑

Once again the final outcome of the game was outcome 'a', and the pattern of moves is the same as the logical pattern in game 46.

iii. Ceasefire Stage

Nov. 16 Ceasefire proposals tabled. PF refers to the proposals as an invitation to suicide. (S) makes military strikes against Zambia.

The game is:

		PF	
		Y	N
S	Y	3 2	4 1
	N	1 3	(2 4)

Nov. 23 Carrington imposes a deadline of Nov. 26 for
an agreement. Nov.23 - (S) accepts. PF
allows the deadline to expire.

The game is:

PF

	Y	N
Y	3 2	4 1
N	1 3	2 4

↑ S ↑

Dec. 12 Lord Soames arrives in Salisbury and assumes control of the government administration and military. Carrington makes a concession to the PF and allows one more assembly point.

Dec. 12 PF agrees.

The game is:

← PF

	Y	N
Y	3 2	4 1
N	1 3	2 4

↑ S ↑

The pattern of moves at the Conference conformed at each stage to the pattern which can be logically expected to result from continuous plays of game 46 where moves are made alternately.

The explanandum, or mutual agreement at the Conference has thus been explained. Mutual agreement can logically be expected to result from the decisions of rational players who are engaged in this situation. Conditions C_1 and C_2 , in combination with laws L_2 and L_3 , and the rules for games in which moves alternate, explain the result, outcome 'a'. The game shows why mutual agreement will result, and why the players will move in a particular pattern.

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Chapter Five

CONCLUSION

Members of the international community had been trying for years to end the illegal government in Rhodesia and establish a system in which all citizens have equal rights. The Rhodesian problem had poisoned British politics since UDI, and the civil war threatened to expand to a much larger conflict, possibly involving the superpowers. The best efforts of Britain, the United States, and the Front-line States had failed to produce a peace settlement, and Britain in particular seemed to have lost control of events. By mid-1979, "...the chances of reaching a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia looked almost hopeless--barring the miracle of an agreement being worked out among the rivals themselves."¹

Nevertheless, the disastrous civil war was brought to an end after fourteen weeks of talks at Lancaster House in London. Britain had made a conditional promise to one side, and a conditional threat to the other side, and this resulted in a situation in which both sides accepted proposals which they could not otherwise have been expected to accept. Not only was the conflict in

Zimbabwe brought to an end, but Britain achieved its objectives almost without changes, and it was able to absolve itself of responsibility for Zimbabwe soon after the elections.

The explanation of the outcome of the Conference has been based on deductive-nomological reasoning. The conditions C_1 and C_2 , in combination with laws L_1 and L_2 , explain why the explanandum, mutual agreement, was the outcome of the Conference.

The value of this explanation can be challenged on two counts. First, the validity of the conditions, laws, and the deductive-nomological explanation can be questioned. Secondly, even if it is accepted that the explanation is valid, an understanding of a single case may be of little help in understanding other events.

Condition C_1 requires that there must be two distinct opponents, each with two distinct choices. At Lancaster House, the two opponents were coalitions which have been regarded as individuals. The game theoretical explanation of the Conference was based on the assumption preference orders for the two opponents could be shown. However, coalitions, being composed of more than one member, cannot be said to have strict preferences, even though the members may have a unitary

interest in the choice of a strategy. For example, Nkomo and Mugabe may have had different calculations of how preferable each of the four outcomes was, even though they always agreed on strategy. There is evidence that Nkomo was more in favour of an agreement than was Mugabe.² The possibility of a split in the Patriotic Front may have had an important effect on the decisions of the opponents. This possibility and the effect which it may have had are not captured in the model.

Condition C_2 requires that the preferences of the two opponents for the four outcomes must be shown. In addition to the problem that the preferences of coalitions may not be strictly ordered, there is the problem of determining just what those preferences are. The preferences which result in game 46 are said to be checked by examining whether the game has the same outcome and the same logical sequence of moves which occurred at the Conference. Ultimately, however, the preferences of the two opponents can only be decided according to purely subjective criteria. This subjectivity is a problem which is shared by a third party which attempts to resolve a conflict between two opponents. The third party does not have the luxury of knowing beforehand what the natural outcome of the

event will be; nor does it know the order in which the opponents will choose, and it therefore has no way to check its subjective judgement of those preferences. Even though the order of moves was identical at each stage of the Lancaster House Conference, the preferences of the opponents at one stage could not be an indication of the preferences at subsequent stages, because the substance of the proposals affected the preferences of the opponents at each stage. As a result of this uncertainty, a third party which is determined to end a conflict in this way must have considerable faith in its own judgement. For Britain, the price of failure would have been great, possibly resulting in British military involvement in the war. Lord Carrington and the Thatcher government needed not only good judgement and determination to end the Rhodesian conflict, they needed the courage to take risks. These are not attributes which can be learned easily by other third parties who wish to end other conflicts.

The laws which are a necessary component of a deductive-nomological explanation can also be called into doubt. Game theory does not really provide laws of decision-making because, as was shown in the Chapter One laws cannot logically refer to a finite set.³ The

laws of game theory only apply to the finite set of actors who will choose rationally. Game theory is prescriptive, showing how rational opponents ought to act, rather than predictive, showing how all opponents, whether rational or irrational, will act. It may have been rational for the opponents at Lancaster House to choose as they did, but there is no way to know if they chose because they were rational. The effect of emotional responses to issues, and the possibility that these responses could have resulted in a failure of the Conference, cannot be captured by the model. The problem, however, is not confined to game theory. Until it is possible to explain how all opponents will act in given conditions, it is only possible to explain how rational opponents will act.

Considering that not all behaviour in similar circumstances can be explained, is it reasonable to suggest that the British formula can be used in other settlements?

The conflict in South Africa is the closest parallel to that in Zimbabwe. In both cases, whites and blacks have competed for political power in one country. These are not cross-border disputes, but civil disputes, although the international community has a stake in the outcomes. If the black nationalist

movement in South Africa was able to challenge white power, and if the conflict was to reach a stalemate, then a third party could perhaps resolve the conflict and produce a peace settlement. However, for this to be done, the third party must take a tremendous risk by threatening to intervene in support of one side. This intervention need not be military; it could be anything which would shift the delicate balance in favour of one side. If it is assumed that the third party is able to judge the preferences of the opponents, and if the opponents can be manoeuvred into positions in which mutual agreement to proposals is the logical outcome of the decisions of rational opponents, the ultimate agreement could still be of little value. If an agreement is unresponsive to the genuine concerns of the opponents, and if the agreement does not resolve the issues which are at the root of the conflict, then the settlement could be meaningless.

The whites of South Africa are carefully monitoring the results of the Lancaster House Agreements, and if they believe that Zimbabwean whites are not better off under Mugabe than they were under Muzorewa, then they may be more reluctant than Zimbabwean whites were to accept a similar settlement. Nevertheless, the terms of a South African agreement

could be the same as those in the Zimbabwean settlement, and still the blacks and whites could both find that they are forced to accept them. However, the terms of a South African agreement need not be identical to the Lancaster House Agreement, as long as the terms have the desired effect on the preferences of the opponents. It is to be hoped that the conflict in South Africa will be resolved without an escalating civil war, but if war cannot be prevented, it may be possible to take steps to end it.

In Zimbabwe, it was possible to hold elections to determine the allocation of political power, but these elections could only be held after an initial agreement was reached. In most cases of international conflict, the implementation of the agreement cannot be enforced by elections. If the Patriotic Front and the Salisbury regime had been separate nations, representing separate people, then another way would have had to be found to enforce the agreement. At Lancaster House, Britain dictated a settlement, and though both sides opposed major aspects of the proposals, the agreement could be enforced by holding elections. Where there is no means of enforcing an agreement, there is no value in dictating a settlement. Instead, the conflict may have to be resolved by direct

negotiations between the opponents, with the possibility that the agreement will be sufficiently attractive to both sides that it will not need to be enforced. In the South African case, as in Zimbabwe, holding elections could determine the final allocation of power.

At Lancaster House, the opponents did not negotiate directly with each other; instead they negotiated separately with Britain. Other attempts to get the two sides to negotiate directly with each other had failed, and the Thatcher government was unwilling to repeat those failures. The British role at Lancaster House was dramatically different from that of the traditional third party, who mediates between opponents negotiating directly with each other. There was no effort to bring the two sides together to work out a settlement of their own. However the fact that Britain was able to dictate a settlement which achieved all of Britain's objectives does not indicate that a settlement would not have been reached by more traditional forms of negotiation.

The conflict in Zimbabwe was resolved only after the war had devastated much of the nation. Conflict resolution, to be most effective, must occur before the opponents have resorted to violence as a way

to settle their differences. If this is not possible, and war cannot be prevented, it still may be possible to terminate a conflict in such a way that the final outcome is not total victory for one side and total defeat for the other.

If an agreement is to be reached, then both sides must believe that the agreement makes them better off, that is, "...for each country the expected utility of continuing war must be less than the expected utility of the settlement."⁴ But the resolution of the civil war in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia illustrates that a clear dichotomy between war and peace is not always realistic. The two sides did not choose only between an agreement and continued war, they chose among four alternatives, only one of which meant a peaceful settlement. The model of the situation at Lancaster House shows that at least one of the opponents, the Patriotic Front preferred continued war (the status quo) to the proposed agreement. However, they accepted the agreement because there were other, relevant alternatives, in this case the possibility that Britain could tip the balance in the war in favour of the Salisbury regime. The sensitivity of the military balance, the condition of military stalemate or near stalemate, enhances the ability of the third party to

introduce new, relevant alternatives. This is not to say that a stalemate is a necessary condition for success. A third party may threaten to support one side and change the balance in the war, but if the side to be supported is relatively weak, then the third party may have to commit very large resources to force the stronger side to reconsider its preferences. The nearer the conflict to a stalemate, the fewer the resources necessary to tip the balance, and the fewer the risks of permanent third party involvement. At Lancaster House, the ability of the British to introduce new relevant alternatives which made agreement possible, was enhanced by the military stalemate in the civil war. Britain did not have to threaten to commit large forces on the Salisbury side to make the Patriotic Front prefer an agreement to 'second prize'.

The identity of the third party is also significant. The third party must not only have legitimacy, but it must also have the ability to use its resources effectively. One of the most effective resources used by Britain was the ability to make threats to one side and promises to the other. Threats and promises, to be effective, must be believed. It is difficult to speculate whether a British Labour

government could have made believable promises and threats to end the Zimbabwean conflict, but the Thatcher government which was elected just prior to the Lancaster House Conference was considered an ally of the Salisbury regime, and an opponent of the Patriotic Front. They were thus able to make believable promises to the Salisbury government, and believable threats against the Patriotic Front.

At Lancaster House, Britain was able to end a war, but only at the risk of becoming involved itself. The risks which Britain took resulted in an agreement between the opponents, and the achievement of a peace settlement for Zimbabwe is to be applauded. But without the determination and judgement of a Lord Carrington, similar attempts by third parties to end conflicts could have different results.

Footnotes

1. Colin Legum, Africa Contemporary Record, Vol. XII, 1979-80, p. A3
2. Ibid, p. A9
3. Carl G. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965) p. 340
4. Donald Whitman, "How a War Ends", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 16, No. 1, 1979, p. 745

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