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THIRD PARTY INVOLVEMENT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION:
THE U.S. ROLE IN THE MIDEAST CAMP DAVID NEGOTIATIONS, 1977-79.

by
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ABSTRACT

Mediation literature emphasizes the importance of impartiality of third parties, and contends that impartiality is necessary for third parties' acceptability and effectiveness. This study examines the impartiality condition in light of the Mideast Camp David negotiations, 1977-79. The findings confirm the study's main thesis which asserts that impartiality may be neither necessary for a third party's acceptability nor crucial for his effectiveness. In fact, the study argues, criteria such as a third party's skill, influence, power, and resources may be more important to acceptability and effectiveness than his impartiality.

II

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Finally, I, of course, bear sole responsibility for the final version of this study.

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INTRODUCTION

Thanks to American mediation, the three-decade long state of war between Egypt and Israel formally ended when Egyptian President Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Begin signed in Washington a peace treaty on March 26, 1979. The peace treaty marked a culmination to President Carter's Camp David negotiations. From late November 1977 to August 1978, U.S. mediation took a low key form; U.S. encouraged Egypt and Israel to negotiate directly with each other with U.S. acting as their consultant. Realizing that bilateral face-to-face negotiations between Egypt and Israel produced little progress, Carter invited Sadat and Begin in August to come to the U.S. for summit talks at Camp David. The Camp David summit was held on September 5, 1978, involving active American participation over thirteen days of intensive negotiations. The Camp David negotiations produced two main documents: "the framework of peace in the Middle East," and "the framework for the conclusion of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel." Between September 17, 1978 and March 26, 1979, American efforts concentrated on producing an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty by ironing out the differences between the two countries.

The mediation literature maintains that the third party

must be impartial in order for him to be both acceptable and effective. As we will see later, Egypt welcomed U.S. active involvement in the negotiations in spite of American pro-Israel bias. The biased mediator, the U.S., was not only acceptable but effective as well. American active role in the negotiations helped in producing a spectacular outcome in the form of a peace treaty. American mediation in the Camp David process is clearly one example in which an intermediary, despite his lack of impartiality, was both acceptable to the party he was perceived as biased against and effective in the negotiations. This empirically negates the common assumption in the mediation literature about the necessity of the third party's impartiality.

This study will attempt to analyze the Camp David negotiations in light of the following questions: a. Did lack of impartiality on the part of the mediator preclude the acceptance of his role by the parties? b. When could a third party mediator be biased and still acceptable? c. What were the effects of a third party's interests on the impartiality condition? d. Was the biased third party effective in his efforts? Why? And, now? These questions capture the essence of the whole study herein. If the answers indicate that a third party was --in spite of his lack of impartiality-- both acceptable as well as effective, we could deduce that mediator's impartiality was not crucial in the Camp David negotiations.

In light of the U.S. role in the Camp David negotiations, we take the view that acceptability as well as effectiveness of a third party rest on other considerations beside impartiality. American mediation was accepted by Egypt and achieved success because of such considerations as: American leverage over Israel, American economic and military power, Egypt's eagerness to develop closer ties with the U.S., reaping the benefits of such a relationship with the U.S., and the alternative to American mediation being a Geneva conference which Egypt was not in favor of. Impartiality, although important, cannot alone guarantee acceptance of a third party nor can it accomplish success for him. Therefore, our main thesis is that impartiality of a third party may neither be necessary for his acceptance by the protagonists nor crucial for his effectiveness and success.

Finally, this study focuses on the negotiating process, and not so much on the political implications of the Camp David negotiations. The narrow focus of the study is centered around the question of "how to achieve agreement" between the parties. We will show that an agreement can be achieved by two steps: (a) limiting the range of bargaining to manageable issues, and (b) determining the settlement point, or working out a package deal. The agreement achieved in this method may not settle the whole conflict, but can certainly be a significant first step toward it. The agreement through negotiations can build trust between

the protagonists and prove to them that diplomatic means can be a fruitful alternative to violence.

In chapter I, we review the relevant literature on impartiality and third party mediation. We suggest two conflict resolution stages which the third party must follow to produce agreement and achieve success. The second chapter (chapter II) concentrates on providing a short historical background to the Arab-Israeli conflict, 1948-1977. In chapter III, we analyze American interests in the Middle East, and the acceptability of American mediation by both Egypt and Israel. In the final chapter (chapter IV), we analyze the functions performed by the U.S., and we apply the issues involved in the Camp David negotiations to our conflict resolution stages. Before we move on to the main chapters of this study, however, let us explore the importance of the Camp David process.

The Case Study: Why Camp David?

There have been many attempts to negotiate a peaceful settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict and put an end to the violence and bloodshed caused by the continuation of the conflict. Of those attempts, Camp David stands out as the most successful first step in this regard. An analyst finds the Camp David process (1) an attractive case study, for there are many special features in it which in turn make his analysis

distinctive and interesting. Following are some of those features:

1. Despite their limited and modest scope in the overall conflict, Camp David negotiations culminated on March 26, 1979 in a monumental success -- a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. To be sure, this can be considered a breakthrough in the conflict which for three decades seemed intractable.

2. Absence of impartiality, to the surprise of our theorists, was not at all a negative factor in the negotiations. Egypt welcomed, and indeed for a long time sought, American mediation in spite of U.S. pro-Israel bias. Ironically, Egypt urged an active American participation while Israel wanted to give U.S. a minimum role in the actual negotiations (Touval, 1982: 296).

3. Camp David is a perfect example to negate the impartiality requirement the theoreticians emphasize so much. Impartiality is defined as the condition in which the third party is free from biases in favor of one side or the other, and free from dependence on a political entity whose interests are at stake in the settlement at hand. There is no doubt that:

a. United States had a strong pro-Israel bias, manifested through its absolute and unequivocal commitment to Israel's security and prosperity;

b. The American Jewish community influenced U.S. administrators' policies in the Middle East, thus restraining

the American government's independence. A tightly-knit, well organized, and influential group, the American Jews succeeded in thwarting Carter's efforts to convene a Geneva Conference on the Middle East with Soviet co-chairmanship in 1977. The American Jewish community was mobilized at Israel's request; Israel opposed Soviet and PLO participation in the aborted conference. In a more significant way, albeit discreet, the American Jewish community and the Israeli lobbyists limited the range of Camp David negotiations, which emerged as the only alternative to a Geneva peace conference. The bargaining range was limited to the issues concerning the Egyptian-Israeli conflict (i.e., the return of the Sinai to Egypt and the normalization of relations between Egypt and Israel). President Carter would have met with strong Israeli opposition as well domestic pressure, had he attempted to undertake conclusive negotiations on the other issues, particularly the Palestinian problem. Tahseen Basheer, Egypt's Ambassador to Canada, made explicit that at Camp David "the result fell, as it had to, within the parameters of what American domestic politics would allow" (Quoted in Tillman, 1982: 26).

The Egyptians favored American active participation in the negotiations simply because they correctly perceived that U.S. has a strong leverage over Israel, which they hoped America would use. Due to the influence of the American Jewish community, however, Carter was not in any position to exert full

pressure on Israel. Thus, despite his announced commitment to a comprehensive peace in the Middle East, Carter had to acquiesce to Israel and its supporters and concentrate mainly on an Egyptian-Israeli agreement. Consequently, much credence was given to the allegation that the purpose of Camp David from the outset was to establish separate peace between Egypt and Israel at the expense of the Palestinians, the crux of the conflict.

4. In Camp David two opposing biases emerged: The American government and public opinion at the time of Camp David negotiations maintained a partial stance to Israel's advantage; but President Carter maintained a personal pro-Sadat bias (Time, October 11, 1982: 51). At first glance, it would seem that one must have cancelled the other, and that the third party was even-handed in the negotiations. Unfortunately that was not the case; the U.S. maintained its pro-Israel bias while President Carter used his friendship with Sadat to squeeze more concessions from the Egyptians.

5. President Carter not only presided over the Camp David summit but negotiated minute details of all issues with Egypt and Israel. Such close attendance by a chief of state to the negotiations is rare, and is indicative of the strong American concern in a peaceful settlement in the Middle East.

6. Another special feature of Camp David was the physical isolation of the principals from the outside world, and the

restriction of media access to the actual negotiations. The Camp David site (with its physical isolation, security fences, and the all-encompassing functions it was equipped to serve) was suitable for a revolution --any outpost or castle, where big schemes might be planned and fancy dreams might be imagined. Camp David can be likened to a laboratory, where President Carter played the role of the scientist while all others took suitable parts in his big experiment.

7. Finally, first-hand accounts (2) of the negotiations have already been published, which facilitate our research and make the evidence more conclusive.

FOOTNOTES

1. The term "Camp David process" refers, in this study, to American mediation efforts covering the period from Sadat's Jerusalem trip in 1977 to the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of Peace on March 26, 1979. It is important to distinguish between the Camp David summit which took place between September 5-17, 1978 and the Camp David process mentioned above.

2. Keeping Faith (1982), President Carter's memoirs; Breakthrough (1981) by former Israeli Foreign Minister, Moshe Dayan; Battle For Peace (1981) by former Israeli Defence Minister, Ezer Weizman.

CHAPTER I

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Third party mediation is universally acknowledged as an effective method of conflict resolution (Young, 1967; Jackson, 1952; Stenelo, 1972; Stevens 1963). Arthur Lall provides an appropriate definition of third party mediation in international conflicts. Mediation, he writes, is

The injection of a third state...at the request of or with the consent of the parties to an international dispute or situation, with the view to assisting in or obtaining its settlement, adjustment, or amelioration (1966:12).

It is essential, as the above definition implies, that the third party obtains invitation by or at least consent of the disputants to mediate the conflict. Invited third parties are usually more effective and successful in the resolution of conflict. Third parties who interpose themselves between the disputants without some kind of invitation may be viewed with suspicion or met with less cooperation. Non-invited third parties are generally deprived of the legitimacy which they need to be genuinely trusted by the parties and to be successful in producing an agreement. Invited third parties, on the other

hand, come from a position of relative strength (Rubin, 1981: 11). They know that they are attractive enough to be invited, and that the parties to a dispute must be ready for a settlement (Rubin, 1981: 11).

"Receptivity" to Mediation

The protagonists are not always willing to invite third parties, and are not always receptive to their mediatory efforts. Pruitt lists some of the conditions which encourage receptivity to third party mediation (1981: 202-3). According to him, the opponents are receptive to mediation when:

1. one party finds its opponent too uncompromising;
2. one party sees itself "weak vis-a-vis the other party";
3. it is hard for one party to make a unilateral concession;

4. the negotiators face a deadlock, especially if the deadlock concurs with time pressure for an agreement. We might add two essential points to the above list:

5. when the protagonists feel the possibility is high for "reaching an agreement in which each party would be better off, or no worse off, than if no agreement is reached" (Deutsch and Krauss, 1962: 52), and

6. when an "attractive" third party is available to mediate the conflict.

The third party's attractiveness depends on such qualities and conditions as saliency, trust, respect, and most importantly impartiality. Saliency of a third party, according to Young, refers to:

...The prominence or uniqueness of the third party itself....

Saliency...may fall to a third party because of its focal or noticeable position in the structure of the international system at any given time (1967: 84).

In this sense, the protagonists look up to the third party and seek his assistance (or welcome it if it is offered) to resolve their conflict. The third party must also be respected and trusted by the disputing parties who feel that he "empathizes with their problems, understands, is sympathetic, or is close to the realities of the bargaining process". (Young, 1967: 85). Jackson argues that:

It would be difficult, for a single mediator, who was distrusted by one of the parties, to carry out any useful function (1952: 129-30).

Finally, since impartiality is the main subject of our thesis, we deal with it later in this chapter.

Our task in this chapter is two fold:

- 1) To review the theoretical literature on the impartiality condition.
- 2) To assess, in light of impartiality, the functions which

are necessary for third party's effectiveness and success. To reiterate, the first section of this chapter is on third party's impartiality, followed by the third party functions in the second section. First, however, we begin with examining the impartiality condition.

Third Party's Impartiality

According to Young:

Impartiality refers to a situation in which the third party favors neither side to a crisis and remains indifferent to the gains and losses of each side (1967: 81).

In his much-quoted book, *The Intermediaries*, Young mentions two other impartiality-related concepts -- neutrality and independence. Neutrality, Young writes, refers to:

...a situation in which the effects of the actions of a third party can be said to have no influence toward terminating a crisis more in favor of one side than the other (1967: 81-2).

In real life, neutrality is impossible to achieve (Young, 1967: 82). Nor can anyone expect a strictly neutral third party to be effective in the resolution of serious disputes (Douglas, 1955: 551). Gulliver further argues that the third party...

himself interacts with each party and with both together, and they may communicate to and through him. He becomes a party in the negotiations. He brings with him, deliberately or not, certain ideas, knowledge, and assumptions, as well as certain interests and concerns of his own and those of other people who he represents. Therefore he is not, and cannot be, neutral and merely a catalyst (1979: 213).

Independence, on the other hand, refers to the situation where a third party is:

...free from attachment to or dependence on a political entity that has a stake in the outcome of the crisis at hand (Young, 1967: 33).

This concept is essential, for without constraints from any political entity, whether constituency or partners, the third party can enjoy maximum flexibility in his mediatory efforts (Young, 1967: 33). Since strict neutrality is unrealizable, in this study we will be concerned only with the concepts of independence and impartiality; for brevity and appropriateness, however, the two concept will be referred to by the term impartiality. Impartiality, in the new definition, refers to the condition in which the third party is free from biases in favor of one side or the other, and free from dependence on a political entity whose interests are at stake in the settlement at hand.

Impartiality is the one "basic quality" most emphasized by mediation literature: it is emphasized because it is perceived to be a necessary requirement for third party's acceptability by

both sides of the dispute, and effective execution of his mediatory role (Jouval, 1975: 51). Northedge and Donelan claim that:

...mediation may be objected to if one or other of the parties believes that any conceivable mediator would tend to be biased against itself and in favour of the other side (1971: 229).

Acceptability of third party involvement is significant because of the common assumption that "mediation is essentially a voluntary phenomenon...(Raman, 1975: 19). As for the effectiveness of the third party, the literature makes clear that a biased mediator will be ineffective, regardless of his skills, characteristics, and the functions he can perform. The implied reasoning of this is that a biased mediator is viewed with suspicion and distrust by the party which perceives itself biased against. Thus, the biased third party would not be able to commence his mediation efforts; if he does, however, he would be deprived of the full collaboration and flexibility of the disadvantaged party.

An important factor in impartiality is the involvement of the third party's or third party's allies' interests in the conflict. It is argued that when the interests of the third party are directly involved, the third party will find it hard to be impartial; but when his "interests are not directly affected (he) will find it neutral to assess the situation in

terms of general impartial criteria (Harsanyi, 1969: 522)". The reason why the involvement of a third party's interests affect his impartiality is because if he is a powerful actor he may influence the terms of the settlement. Cross argues that when the third party becomes "concerned with the specific properties of the settlement, he will not be acceptable as a mediator... (1969: 197)". When a third party's interests are at stake in the negotiations, impartiality is necessarily affected. The third party which has vital interests at stake can be expected to have certain views about how the dispute should be settled, its views and initiatives may be enunciated to the parties.

The mediation literature maintains that when a third party's interests are at stake he can be expected to participate in the negotiations not just as a mediator but as a full-fledged negotiator (Weber and Tietz, 1978: 28). However, the third party may become an active participant in the negotiations without confining himself to a specific role. The third party can modify the conflict structure by his active participation, but his impartiality may be questioned. Young explains what active participation of the third party is.

The concept of active participation refers to situations of direct diplomatic contact on a three-cornered basis. In such circumstances an outside party might play any or all of the roles a third-party participant can undertake in a direct negotiation and bargaining situation. Such roles may range from conciliation through mediation to generation and application of various types of pressure (1967: 59).

The primary objective of active participation is to do whatever is necessary to facilitate and arrive at an agreement, an agreement that is valued not only by the protagonists but by the third party as well.

In spite of the strong advocacy of impartiality in the mediation literature, we believe that while impartiality is important it is not crucial in all cases for either the third party's acceptability or effectiveness. Our contention is supported by the historical evidence, in which "biased" parties were not only acceptable but successful intermediaries as well (Touval, 1975: 51-69)(1). In fact, in some cases, impartiality of the third party may be counter-productive. Simmel argues that the third party

whom love or duty, fate or habit made equally intimate with both, can be crushed by the conflict --much more so than if he himself took sides. The danger is increased because the balance of his interests, which does not lean in either direction usually does not lead to successful mediation...(1950: 150-1).

A third party is judged on his ability to achieve an acceptable agreement between the parties (Fisher, 1981: 97) and not on his impartiality. But a third party's effectiveness depends to a large degree on the functions he may perform. Ott argues that "the presumed effectiveness of the mediator derives from the diverse functions he can serve in a conflict (1972:

597)". We can divide the mediator's functions into three categories:

- (A) Process-Oriented Functions.
- (B) Concession-Oriented Functions.
- (C) Content-Oriented Functions.

Third Party Functions

A) **Process-Oriented Functions:** The third party must attempt to improve the communication and clear the misunderstandings between the protagonists.

The availability of communication channels may serve to clear misperceptions and misinterpretations which prevail in a conflict situation (Young, 1967: 64). Rubin and Brown maintain that, in various experiments, the effectiveness of bargaining increased when the parties were allowed unrestricted communication with their opponents (1975: 99). It is also through communication and persuasion that one can attempt to modify the opponent's preferences and goals (Mitchell, 1981: 226), and allay his fears and understand his concerns. In intense conflict situations, the opportunity afforded to the protagonists to communicate freely and directly is usually non-existent. The protagonists rely primarily on their own analysis and interpretation of each other's behavior which are

affected by past behavior and experience, thereby leading (as it did in the past) to distorted images and misperceptions.

Wrong analysis and misinterpretations are not unusual and can be very dangerous, especially in crisis situations. The third party can play a significant role in improving communication between the protagonists and using it constructively (Fisher, 1978: 47-57). His best strategy is to involve along his side all the parties "in defining, identifying, and solving the problem" (Burton, 1969: 62). Rubin and Brown maintain that

(T)he effectiveness of bargaining depends in large part upon the exchange of sufficient credible information between the parties. When the information exchanged appears to be insufficient or distorted, bargainers have little or no basis on which to assume good or equitable intentions on the part of the other. Nor is there a sufficient basis for recognizing common interests (1975: 92).

The mediator may teach the principals how to communicate more effectively (Rubin, 1981: 22). Rubin and Brown assert that conflict was reduced in the "tutored communication condition" (1975: 94). The mediator may also encourage face-to-face dialogues between the principals (Fisher, 1978), in which they can learn relevant and undistorted information from each other. However, the mediator is well advised to regulate the communication between the principals when it is poor and unproductive. Deutsch argues that:

...poor communication enhances the possibility of error and misinformation of the sort which is likely to reinforce the pre-existing orientations and expectation toward the other (1969:12).

Another reason why mediators are advised to regulate the communication is to prevent a probable intensification of the conflict. The mediator's role is to "separate the opposing sides and serve as a filter through which their heated communication must pass" (Rubin and Brown, 1975: 105).

The site of negotiations and the role of the media play a significant part in the communication process. Burton argues that "(i)n order to create a problem-solving environment, it is desirable for discussions to take place outside the region concerned" (1972: 22). The physical insulation of the principals from the conflict environment and their constituents may be complemented by restricting the access to the media. Regulating communication with the outside serves to tune down the rhetoric of the principals which is directed to external audience, usually their constituents (Fisher, 1978). Controlling access to the outside world puts the mediator in the driver's seat, where he should be, to manage the negotiations.

In short, improving the communication process is probably the most significant function the third party mediator should perform. In fact, some mediation theorists define the role of mediators in terms of their control over communication. The mediator, Schelling writes, is best described as...

an element in the communication arrangements or as a third party with a payoff structure of his own who is given an influential role through his control over communication (1960: 44).

3) Concession-Oriented Functions: To induce concession-making by the protagonists, the third party can establish trust, and ease the tensions, provide face-saving, circumvent commitments, use the "single negotiating text" procedure, make alliances, offer rewards, and impose deadlines (time limits).

1. Establish Trust, and Ease Tensions:

Ann Douglas writes:

The mediator, in the role of custodian of the emotional climate among conferees, has various means at his disposal for liquidating the tensions which may arise on an individual level (1955: 548).

The mediator may encourage the negotiators to express their grievances and emotions with the objective of easing the tension among them, allowing them to "let off steam". But, in fact, the mere presence of a third party in the negotiation conference causes a positive change in the behavior of the parties (Pruitt, 1981: 203). The mediator must also establish trust not only between the protagonists and himself, but between the protagonists themselves as well. Parties' trust of the mediator is essential, particularly in the situations where the

protagonists communicate through him with each other. In general, however, impartial third party mediators are more trusted than biased ones.

2. Face-Saving:

The mediator can provide face-saving ways to help the parties make concessions. Negotiators are sometimes reluctant to make a concession not because of the merits of the concession but because:

- a. they might be publicly committed to an issue; or
- b. they do not wish to give an impression that they are "soft" and weak, increasing the opponent's appetite for further concessions.

The mediator can provide a rationalization or an excuse through which the negotiator can make a concession without being blamed by his constituency for breaking a commitment. The mediator may also have to convince the negotiator that the latter's concession will be presented to the opponent as a hard won concession and will not be seen as a sign of weakness.

3. Circumvent over-Commitment:

Over-commitment occurs when one party is committed to a specific outcome which the other party cannot be realistically expected to accept. Over-commitment, whether unilateral or

concurrent, can be a serious impediment to progress in bargaining. Depending on the specific situation, the third party will have to circumvent such a problem, otherwise the negotiations will be stalemated. Essentially the mediator will have to search for creative solutions or decommitting formulas which can provide the over-committed party with face-saving means (Stevens, 1963: 134). Young suggests some of such means:

(b) development of rationalizations which the parties could use to justify withdrawing from commitments; demonstrations (sincere or contrived) of the present irrelevance of the commitment; the elaboration of mutual benefits to be had from moving beyond the fixated point of commitment; and the injection of a willingness to assume part of the responsibility for the ultimate termination arrangement (1967: 43). Brackets are in the original text.

4. The "Single Negotiating Text":

Roger Fisher and William Ury developed the "single negotiating text" procedure as an alternative to negotiation agenda (Fisher, 1978). It is asserted that the "single negotiating text" is superior to the procedure of setting agendas (Fisher, 1978: 127). In the text procedure, the third party possesses maximum flexibility in dealing with the parties in a problem solving atmosphere. In the agenda setting environment, the parties and not the mediator possess virtual control of the bargaining process. Setting the agenda might itself be an insurmountable problem, requiring an unreasonable amount of time.

The "single negotiating text" requires the mediator to listen to the parties, study closely all the issues involved, and prepare on his own a single text outlining the various aspects of a possible agreement. After preparing his text, the mediator requests feedback (criticisms and suggestions) from the parties to improve it. The text may be revised several times, taking into consideration the continuous feedback of the negotiators until they are satisfied with a single text.

Essentially, the final text is an agreement which the third party can submit to the negotiators for formal approval or rejection. Fisher enumerates the advantages of the "single negotiating text" procedure. He writes:

It avoids the otherwise overwhelming pressure on the parties to crystallize and harden their positions; it allows progress to be made without anyone's having to make "concessions;" it directs the parties' attention to the future by focusing on the means for coping with practical problems...; it allows a party who fears the slippery slope to refrain from giving up anything until it sees the end of the road; it facilitates corridor diplomacy ('we might be able to accept clause 41 if you would accept clause 128'); and finally, at the end of the line, there is a single text of a proposed agreement...(1978: 128).

This procedure requires dynamic, high skilled, and authoritative (heads of governments, for example) mediators. But, despite the recent development of this innovative problem solving procedure, it was successfully used in the Camp David negotiations. The

"single negotiating text" promises to be an effective problem solving method and is likely to be used frequently in future negotiations.

5. Make Alliances:

The third party can maximize his effectiveness by using whatever personal alliances and friendships he has with the individuals of each party. For example, in the 1973-75 Mideast negotiations, the Kissinger-Sadat friendship contributed to Egyptian compromise and flexibility. Concessions may be made in order to maintain or cement a personal friendship between the party making the concession and the mediator.

6. Offer Rewards:

In order to speed up the rate of concessions by the negotiators, the third party may offer them rewards: economic aid, oil supplies, guarantees, the construction of new airfields and the like. Third party's reward incentives encourage the protagonists to be more flexible and forthcoming, especially if the rewards are made explicitly contingent upon their agreement. In the Kissinger shuttle diplomacy, for example, American economic and military rewards to Egypt and Israel played a significant role in achieving the 1973-75 agreements between the two countries.

7. Impose Deadlines (Time Limits):

The imposition of deadlines can be beneficial in the negotiations (Pruitt, 1981: 205). Deadlines are commonly used to pressure the parties to make concessions without spending much time on procedural and trivial matters. Research has shown that deadlines imposed appropriately by the mediator softened the attitude of the protagonists and "produced greater or more frequent concessions" (Rubin and Brown, 1975: 123). The effectiveness of time pressures appears to be high in the following situations:

1. When parties fear the loss of mediator's services (or participation) if no progress is made;
2. when high costs are imposed along with time pressures; and,
3. if the negotiators have been concealing their true position or bluffing.

(c) **Content-Oriented Functions:** Functions in this category deal with the conflict issues and with the substance of the negotiations. The third party may put forth his own views and proposals on the different issues involved. He may, also, limit the range of the negotiations to the manageable issues from which he could work out an acceptable package deal agreement.

1. Third Party's Views and Proposals ("Enunciation"):

"Enunciation" may serve as a constructive basis in the negotiations, "provided only that the criterion enunciated...is not clearly unreasonable...(Kaplan, 1963: 264). If the third party's views and proposals are reasonable to both parties, impartiality (or lack of) will be positively affected and modified. In the case where a third party's proposals are impartial (i.e., do not contribute to a bias for or against one of the protagonists), they may automatically enhance conflict resolution through the creation of salient solutions. Young explains:

The importance of enunciation lies in the possibilities of creating saliences and focal points on which mutual expectations can center and of establishing at least minimal consensus concerning the precise points at issue (1967: 53).

Therefore, through enunciation the third party can provide an external option that may be satisfactory to the protagonists.

2. The Conflict Resolution Stages:

Whether the third party is impartial or not, he has to follow two conflict resolution stages: a) limiting the bargaining range; and b) determining the settlement point.

a. "Limiting the Bargaining Range":

An important obstacle to the reduction and, consequently, termination of international conflicts, is the insistence of the parties to achieve all-or-nothing agreements. Limiting the bargaining range is certainly an effective method whereby conflicts can be clearly defined and settled in a series of steps. The third party can limit the bargaining range by focusing on a certain number of issues at one time. Of course, conflict resolution is achieved only when all issues in the conflict are resolved. Through limiting the bargaining range, the third party can resolve the conflict in inter-connected steps. Fisher's (1964) concept of fractionating conflict is similar but not identical to limiting the bargaining range. They are similar in that they both require the third party to concentrate on a certain number of issues at one time. But while limiting the bargaining range refers to locating the spectrum on which a settlement is possible, fractionating conflict refers to negotiating issues separately to avoid any negative spillover. Limiting the bargaining range may be the most crucial part in the mediator's role. Douglas argues that:

(T)he critical part of bargaining is not achieving agreement to divide the losses, but ascertaining the satisfactory range within which...compromise will take place...(Douglas, 1955: 547).

TABLE 1-1: The Mediator's Worksheet

Competitive	Competitive/ Cooperative	Cooperative
List all issues which are characterized as pure conflict issues.	List all issues which display a mix of conflict and cooperation. As a mediator, in this stage, you will have to concentrate on the issues in this category.	Issues in this category will have to be used for trade-offs and abridging the gap which tough issues create.

Influenced by subjective passion, protagonists may see their relationship in terms of only pure conflict, which cannot be reconciled without the restoration of "justice". Usually one side is required to succumb to the demands of the other if an agreement is to be reached, which in part explains why their conflict has persisted for so long. The mediator, however, can identify types of behavior between the protagonists: competitive (pure conflict), competitive/cooperative, and cooperative behavior. The mediator then can classify all issues involved according to the three types of behavior, as shown in Table 1-1.

The classification of issues helps the mediator to delimit the range of bargaining (2) to those issues in the competitive/cooperative and cooperative categories. The strategy of limiting the range of bargaining to manageable issues "involves the benefit of negotiation on some relevant issues, at the cost of excluding others from consideration" (Mitchell, 1981: 215). According to Mitchell this strategy

may be carried out either by controlling the agenda, and hence, largely controlling the nature of any discussion and agreement, or by specifically reserving key items which will not be introduced into the discussion... (1981: 215).

The main purpose of limiting the bargaining range is to modify (i.e., expand) the contract zone (3). The term contract zone simply refers to the zone or space where the interests (expressed in demands) of the parties converge. In Figure 1-1

FIGURE 1-1*: A contract zone prior to the negotiations

*Adapted from Hopmann and Druckman (1981: 205).

FIGURE 1-2: Expanding the contract zone through limiting the range of bargaining

(4), the contract zone may be clarified. Hopmann and Druckman explain the structure of the figure. They write (1981: 204):

- "The horizontal axis represents an issue dimension along which the negotiating parties are assumed to have conflicting interests."

- "Lines A-A' and B-B'...represent the payoffs that two nations...would receive from agreements at any point along those lines."

- "These payoffs are scaled on a vertical dimension that is subjectively standardized as the relative gains, or losses that a party would receive relative to the status quo."

- "On the horizontal line, 0 represents the neutral point or the point of indifference... ."

In Figure 1-1, the area bEa is the contract zone "within which the parties propose to move around until they can reach consensus on a single settlement point" (Douglas, 1957: 73), or package deal. Nation Y maximizes its payoff as the settlement point moves rightward on the contract zone, b-a. Nation X, by contrast can maximize its payoff by achieving a settlement point as close as possible to b. However, an equitable settlement would be a point anywhere on the dotted vertical line, E-d.

The importance of limiting the range of bargaining is to expand the size of the contract zone. The strategy is to eliminate the "pure conflict" issues from the horizontal line, thereby shifting the line a'-b' in Figure 1-2 to the new line,

H-h. [The payoff lines are not affected by the shift of line a-b to a new line (H-h), so they remain unchanged.] Bargaining now focuses only on the issues in the competitive/cooperative categories. In the new situation, the contract zone has expanded from DEa to mEn, allowing more room for compromise and flexibility. Moreover, through the convergence of interests between the parties, the possibilities of reaching an acceptable agreement are significantly increased.

The size of the contract zone can also be expanded by modifying the payoff structure. The payoff structure can be modified either by increasing the "potential rewards of agreement" (Hopmann and Druckman, 1981: 206), or increasing the potential costs of no agreement (Kerr, 1954: 238-9). The mediator may modify the payoff of either or preferably both parties by using his leverage means and influence (financial, political, or economic). The disputants who expect the third party to reward them for their agreement obviously take into consideration the potential rewards in their cost/benefit analyses. The expectations of Egypt and Israel to get American rewards weighed heavily in the cost/benefit calculations of both countries during Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy. Figures 1-3, 1-4, and 1-5 illustrate three situations where the mediator has modified the payoff of respectively nation X, nation Y, and nations X and Y simultaneously.

In figure 1-3, as a result of change in X's payoff, the

FIGURE 1-3: Expansion of the contract zone by modifying nation X's payoff

FIGURE 1-4: Expansion of the contract zone by modifying nation Y's payoff

payoff line $A-A'$ is shifted to $J-K$. The equilibrium is on point E . In the new situation, Y 's possible payoff in the negotiations is increased by the area $EFPE'$. Also, the contract zone available has expanded from bEa to $bE'z$, thus increasing the chances for agreement. Figure 1-4 portrays a situation in which the mediator has affected Y 's payoff line $B-B'$, causing it to shift upward to the left with a new equilibrium point on D . The contract zone has expanded from bEa to sDa , increasing X 's payoff by the area $sDEb$.

The most equitable situation, however, is when the mediator can modify concurrently the payoff structure of both parties. In Figure 1-5, both payoff lines $A-A'$ and $B-B'$ shift upward, increasing the payoff of both parties by equal portions, $E'TaE$ and $GE'Eh$. The expansion of the contract zone from bEa to $GE'T$ gives both parties more room for compromise in the negotiations. Finally, it should be noted that only powerful mediators may be able to pressure one or both parties to move closer to their opponent. However,

the strength of the pressure toward agreement generated by third parties will be a function of the amount of trust and confidence placed in them by the bargainers (Kubin and Brown, 1975: 62).

b. Determining the Settlement Point:

The second stage in mediation is assisting the negotiators to locate a settlement point or work out a package-deal

FIGURE 1-5: Concurrent payoff modification

acceptable to both. In a single issue bargaining, the mediator seeks to locate specific point to which the parties can agree. The mediator can suggest a midpoint solution (i.e., a 50-50% solution), or any point between the demands of the two sides. In multi-issue bargaining, the mediator may produce an acceptable solution by arranging a package-deal. In a package-deal, the mediator can satisfy both sides relatively equally by meeting some of each party demands. Also, trade-offs can be successfully arranged in a package-deal; for example, player X concedes on an issue or drops a demand in exchange of a desired concession on a different issue by actor Y.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we reviewed the relevant literature on the role of third parties in international mediation. We pointed out the overemphasis placed, by prominent theoreticians, on the impartiality of the mediator. Our contention was that while impartiality was desirable, its absence neither made the mediator unacceptable nor ineffective. In light of the historical evidence as well as the evidence from our case study which cast doubt on the common view of the need for impartiality, we hypothesized that mediator's impartiality is neither necessary for his acceptability nor crucial for his effectiveness.

Impartiality is important, but there are other qualities which are equally important and desirable, such as trust, skill, authority, knowledge etc. The mediator also has to perform a variety of functions which require a great deal more than just impartiality; and he can, in most instances, perform the necessary functions whether or not he is impartial. The parties agree to mediation not because there is an impartial intermediary available, but because they believe that they can gain more from mediation than without it.

The mediator, whether or not impartial, can help parties to a conflict identify the issues involved and define clearly their conflict. Conflict resolution rests on practical matters such as defining the conflict and providing proposals and solutions. To say that impartiality is a "basic quality" which is necessary for third party's acceptability and effectiveness, is perhaps misleading. Third parties are ultimately judged not on the basis of their impartiality, but on the basis of their contribution to conflict resolution.

In light of the Camp David negotiations, we show in the following chapters that there were important factors which contributed to the acceptability of the biased intermediary, the U.S., by the disadvantaged party, Egypt. These key factors may be summarized in the following:

1. Third party's high military and economic resources and its reward power.

2. Third party's ability to restrain the favored party (i.e., Israel).

3. Lack of options for the disadvantaged party (i.e., Egypt).

4. Growing friendship and trust between the disadvantaged party and the mediator.

5. Earlier successful mediation by the third party (the 1973-75 Kissinger's Mideast negotiations).

The effectiveness of the third party, in the Camp David negotiations was due to the following factors:

1. The third party's ability to define clearly the conflict between the protagonists.

2. The functions, guarantees, and resources which the third party's mediation provided.

FOOTNOTES

1. Anglo-American mediation in the Italian-Yugoslav dispute over Trieste (1954), American mediation between Saudi Arabia and Egypt over Yemen (1963), Soviet mediation between India and Pakistan (1965), and American mediation in the Middle East (1973-75); for full description of these cases see Touval, 1975: 56-61.

2. Ikle (1964) uses the term "limiting the bargaining range".

3. Some writers use the term "bargaining space".

4. Hopmann and Bruckman (1981) developed this figure as "A Simple Bargaining Model" (p. 205).

CHAPTER II

THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.

Our task in this chapter is to review the major events which shaped the conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors during the period 1948-1977. We also review the mediation attempts by many parties, especially the United States. We hope that this chapter will provide a brief, albeit sufficient, background to the nature of the conflict and its difficult issues which President Carter had to deal with in the Camp David negotiations.

Deciding to abdicate its mandate responsibilities in Palestine, the British government turned the Palestine problem over to the UN on April 2, 1947. A UN commission was set up to investigate the Palestine problem and recommend a solution. The UN commission, after months of investigation, recommended that Palestine be partitioned into two states: an Arab state and a Jewish state. The commission's partition plan won a UN vote on November 29, 1947. Instead of solving the problem, the partition plan exacerbated the conflict and caused an escalation in the fighting between the Israelis (Jewish immigrants) and the

Palestinians (the indigenous Arab population of Palestine).

Britain, unable to control the fighting, formally ended its Palestine mandate on May 14, 1948. Availing themselves of this opportunity, the Israelis declared the birth of Israel on that very same day, which the Truman Administration supported by extending its recognition within a few minutes. On May 15, 1948 armies from Egypt, Syria, Jordan and elsewhere entered Palestine to salvage as much Arab territory as was possible. However, by January 1949, Israel emerged victorious over its enemy armies which were deficient in organization, in arms and in recruits. Armistice agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbors were signed in 1949.

Israeli conquest was not total, however. Jordan, whose army fared much better than the rest of the Arab armies, managed to keep out of Israeli control the West Bank including the old city of Jerusalem. Also, the Gaza Strip was held by the Egyptian army. However, thousands of Palestinians were forced to flee from the territories which fell under Israeli control (O'Ballance, 1957: 209). Palestinian refugees sought shelter in Jordan and elsewhere in the Arab world, but the majority settled on the West Bank and on the Gaza Strip. The Palestinian refugees, supported by the Arab states, viewed their problem as temporary; that they someday would be enabled to return to their lost homes and property.

Israel, during the 1950s and most of 1960s, was treated

with contempt and angry rhetoric by the Arabs. Israel, to them, was considered an alien entity in the Arab World, a cancer in the Arab body. Some viewed it as an agent to the colonial powers, who abetted its creation to "kill two birds with one stone": (1) to destroy the Arab nation by implanting Israel in the heart of the Arab World; (2) to relieve whatever guilt feelings the Europeans had over the Nazi holocaust against the Jews. Therefore, the Arabs refused to recognize Israel, and vowed to even destroy it.

Israel, on the other hand, was adamant on the refugee question; it neither allowed the refugees to return, nor proposed to compensate them. Three concerns ranked high on the minds of the Israeli foreign policy makers: Israel's survival, security, and legitimacy as a Middle Eastern nation. The foreign policy of Israel aimed at achieving and sustaining military superiority over the Arabs to meet what it perceived as growing Arab encirclement.

Arab perception of Israel being an agent of Western colonialism was reinforced by the 1956 War, following President Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal. Israel, in complicity with Britain and France, attacked Egypt and occupied the Sinai Peninsula. Pressure from the U.S. and the USSR forced Britain and France to negotiate a peaceful settlement and withdraw from Egyptian territory. The Eisenhower Administration also forced Israel to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula; Israel

completed its withdrawal by early 1957.

Israel maintained that its 1956 Sinai campaign was triggered by Egyptian provocations, especially the closure of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli navigation. It was only a happy coincidence, the Israelis maintained, that at the same time France and Britain (for different reasons) were planning to invade Egypt. Whether or not Israel was justified in its 1956 invasion of Egypt, Arab perceptions and images of Israel were greatly reinforced as a result of the invasion.

The situation deteriorated once again in early 1960s as a result of: (1) a deadly arms race between Israel and the Arab states; (2) Israeli plan to divert waters of the River Jordan, which would entail high economic losses to Jordan; (3) the creation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) by the Arab League in 1964; and (4) a growing number of Fedayeen (Palestinian guerrilla) operations against Israel. And, in May 1967, the situation took a turn to the worse when the USSR informed Egypt of an impending Israeli attack against Syria. In order to deter the perceived Israeli attack, Nasser undertook a series of highly publicized actions such as closing the Straits of Tiran to Israeli navigation, putting the Egyptian armed forces on a high state of alert (Rikhye, 1980: 198-203), and signing a defence agreement with Jordan.

Nasser's muscle showing, it seemed, won him a political victory which he hoped would put him in a strong bargaining

position vis-a-vis Israel. But Israel was not in a mood of accepting Nasser's demands in order to deescalate the conflict; nor were the Israelis intimidated or deceived by Nasser's rhetoric. Egypt in reality was not capable of militarily attacking Israel because over 50,000 of its best troops were still involved in the Yemen civil war. Israel, therefore, decided to take advantage of the military situation and strike first under the pretext of Egyptian provocations (Rikhye, 1980: 145).

On June 5, 1967, Israel launched a blitzkrieg on Egypt, and Syria. (Jordan, honoring its defence agreement with Egypt and Arab League obligations, joined the fighting to alleviate Israeli pressure on the Syrian and Egyptian fronts.) Five days later Israel had captured vast new Arab lands: the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights, Gaza Strip and the West Bank of Jordan. Tens of thousands of new refugees were dispersed to Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and elsewhere. And, of course, thousands were killed and injured in the course of the war.

Israel's spectacular victory eased the security concern it had. For the first time Israel felt reassured of its viability and survival. The new territories were a valuable strategic asset; they could now be used not only to give Israel military advantage over its enemy, but also to give it a bargaining advantage vis-a-vis the Arabs. In fact, Israel may have become more ready for peace (although on its terms) than ever before in

its short history. But the Arabs, especially Egypt, feeling humiliation and indignation over their military defeat by Israel, vowed to liberate their land by force. Their motto was that "what was usurped by force could be redeemed only by force."

Following the Khartoum Arab Summit which was concluded on September 1, 1967, the Arabs declared their famous "three nos": no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, and no negotiations with Israel. Of course, the Arabs strongly desired and needed peace, but not the kind in which Israel dictated its terms. Israel, they believed, was an expansionist power which wanted to annex their land. They believed that they must establish a balance of power with Israel, thereby strengthening their bargaining position before they could agree to negotiation and peace with Israel.

The UN role in the June War and in the escalation period which preceded the war was not productive, to say the least. In fact, some writers blame the UN Secretary General's poor judgement for the outbreak of the June War.

Attempting to politically outmaneuver Israel and deter it from attacking Syria, President Nasser requested the UN Secretary General, U Thant, to withdraw the UN peace-keeping force from the Sinai. Nasser's purpose was only to deter Israeli aggression by giving her an impression that he was willing to go to war in defence of Syria. The Secretary

General's response was to order an immediate withdrawal of the UN forces. Since the Sinai Peninsula is an Egyptian territory, there was no question that Egypt had the right to request the withdrawal of the UNEF and to redeploy its forces wherever it wished on its sovereign territory. But these Egyptian actions and the corresponding Israeli counter-reactions were sure to escalate the conflict and lead to an inevitable outbreak of war between Israel and the Arabs (Rikhye, 1980). This action by the Secretary General subsequently stirred a controversy over the political wisdom of the withdrawal, and some charged that the Secretary General failed to bring the matter before the Security Council in order to demonstrate the seriousness of the situation. Nasser himself was disappointed by the UN reaction, he did not expect the UN to withdraw its forces at a simple request and in such a hurry. The UN reaction was a disappointment because the UN, the U.S., Britain and others were reassured of Egyptian intentions up to the last minute. Nasser confirmed through his diplomatic channels that Egypt would not initiate a war with Israel, unless Israel attacked Syria first.

In spite of this mishap which raised many questions about the UN role, the Security Council convened to study the situation created by the June War. On November 22, 1967, the Security Council adopted Resolution 242, which Israel, Jordan, and Egypt had approved. In its preamble, the Resolution emphasized "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory

by war", meaning that Israel would have to withdraw from Arab land occupied in the June War. The Resolution also emphasized "the need to work for a just peace in which every state in the area can live in security", reassuring Israel of peace and security. But, unfortunately, the Security Council Resolution treated the Palestinian problem as merely a refugee problem (1). As we will see later, Resolution 242 became the basis for the Camp David process and its principles were crucial in the negotiations and were a subject of a strong controversy, especially over the "non-acquisition of territory by war" clause.

The UN Secretary General appointed the senior Swedish diplomat, Gunnar V. Jarring, as his Special Representative to study the problem with the concerned parties and promote a peaceful settlement to the Middle East conflict. (The appointment of a UN Special Representative was in accordance with the Security Council Resolution 242.) The Jarring mission lasted from 1967-1972. However the progress was very limited, covering mainly issues such as the exchange of prisoners of war, preserving the ceasefire, and the opening of the Suez Canal.

Further progress for the Jarring mission necessitated substantial change in the announced positions of the parties, which sustained a severe deadlock. For example, in a Newsweek interview (February 12, 1969), President Nasser insisted that Israel's total withdrawal from the occupied Arab land was a

precondition to direct Arab talks with Israel. On the other hand, the Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol, in an interview with the same magazine on February 17, 1969, insisted on Arab agreement to face-to-face negotiations with Israel, and hinted that Israel would not under any circumstances withdraw from occupied Arab lands. Meanwhile the ceasefire was repeatedly violated by both sides and the situation worsened rapidly as Egypt stepped up its "War of Attrition" against the Israeli forces on the Suez Canal.

Lack of progress by the jarring mission prompted France, the USSR, and the U.S. to come up with new proposals and France called for a Four-Power conference on the Middle East, an attempt by President de Gaulle to reassert France's great power image. The Soviet Union proposed a bilateral conference between itself and the U.S. to find a settlement for the conflict in the Middle East. However, the most important of these proposals was the "Rogers Plan", which was announced on December 9, 1969 by the U.S. Secretary of State, William P. Rogers. The "Rogers Plan" supported UN Security Council Resolution 242, and publicly called for substantial Israeli withdrawal from Arab territories in exchange for Arab's commitment to peace with Israel. Unfortunately, Israel feared the "Rogers Plan" and, supported by a strong U.S. domestic opposition, did everything to kill it. It also appeared that Rogers did not have the full backing of President Nixon and his powerful National Security Adviser,

Henry Kissinger.

The cool reception to his plan did not discourage Secretary Rogers who made two other initiatives in 1970 and 1971. Rogers' initiatives brought about a ceasefire on the Suez Canal and an end to the "War of Attrition". But Secretary Rogers' proposal for an interim agreement between Israel and Egypt met total failure because Israel flatly rejected it. According to the interim proposal, Egypt would have accepted a partial withdrawal by Israel, if Israel accepted only in principle to withdraw completely later on.

Anwar Sadat succeeded President Nasser, following Nasser's death in September 1970. The pro-Western Sadat was more willing than his predecessor to make peace with Israel. He declared to the Egyptian Parliament on February 14, 1971 that "Egypt was willing to conclude a peace agreement with Israel...and to give Israel all the guarantees she had asked for (el-Sadat, 1978: 279)". Unfortunately, neither Israel nor the U.S. took Sadat seriously and pursued his idea. In fact, Sadat and his advisers had in vain tried to convince the U.S. government to take a more active role in promoting a Middle East settlement. Subsequently, a stalemate persisted until the October War broke out in 1973.

When the Egyptian army attacked Israeli forces on Sinai in October 1973, the aim Sadat claimed, was, to break the "no war, no peace" stalemate in the Middle East (el-Sadat, 1978: 238).

It was, then, envisioned that the Egyptian army would force the Israeli army to at least retreat in the Sinai a few miles, destroying Israel's military invincibility, and regaining the needed confidence to negotiate a peaceful settlement to the conflict. Egypt succeeded in its strategy and cultivated not a military victory over Israel but a political and psychological one. Egypt's bargaining position vis-a-vis Israel's was measurably strengthened in the aftermath of the October War.

The October war created a totally new but propitious situation, a situation which gave the U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, a valuable opportunity to try his own diplomacy to negotiate a settlement to the conflict. The military imbalance before October was unquestionably to Israel's advantage and discouraged Kissinger from any involvement; Kissinger then believed that the Middle East "isn't ready for me" (Rubin, 1961: 48). Kissinger's efforts lasted nearly two years, involving thousands of hours of negotiations and over 300,000 miles of flying between Washington and Middle Eastern capitals (Sheehan, 1976). These negotiations brought about two disengagement agreements between Israeli and Egyptian forces, and one disengagement between Syrian and Israeli forces.

The success of Kissinger's step-by-step negotiations could easily be attributed to the identity of the party Kissinger represented --U.S. government-- to which Israel was willing to make the required concessions. U.S. was (and still is) the only

party with strong leverage over Israel, for U.S. alone could not, was willing to guarantee Israel's ultimate security. Had Kissinger seriously capitalized on this, he may have been able to deal effectively with the Palestinian problem. But the domestic environment in U.S. (the Watergate Scandal), and the lack of legitimacy given to the non-elected president, Gerald Ford, who succeeded Nixon, contributed to Kissinger's failure in dealing with the Palestinian problem. However, Egypt considered Kissinger's agreements as a first step and a confidence building measure between Israel and its neighbors.

Kissinger's negotiations gained Sadat's trust and respect for the United States. To Sadat, perhaps the best accomplishment achieved by the step-by-step diplomacy was that it "clearly engaged U.S. prestige, participation, and expenditure in the continued search for peace in the Arab-Israeli zone of the Middle East (Reich, 1977: 351)". Only continued U.S. involvement could guarantee Israeli concessions, which would advance the peace process. The election of President Carter in 1976 assured Sadat of U.S. continued commitment to the peace process begun in 1973.

U.S. efforts in the first year of the Carter Administration concentrated on understanding the issues involved in the conflict. Carter and his officials also tried "to induce a greater flexibility in the obdurate positions long held by the opposing sides (Bradley, 1981: 17). There was, moreover, an

attempt by the U.S. to co-chair with the USSR a Geneva conference on the Middle East. A Geneva conference would have the benefit of involving all parties concerned, including the Soviet Union whose guarantees to a Mideast settlement were essential. Unfortunately, however, the Geneva conference idea met strong opposition from Israel and lack of enthusiasm from Egypt and was finally abandoned.

The reasons behind Israel's opposition to a Geneva conference were:

1. Israel wanted to avoid any PLO participation, which could amount to recognition of Palestinian national rights (Touval, 1982: 267).

2. Israel feared that the superpowers may exert undue pressure on it, as they compete for Arab favor in Geneva.

Egypt, on the other hand, was not in favor of a Geneva conference for the following reasons:

1. Soviet participation in a Geneva conference, which Egypt feared would give the Soviet Union a valuable opportunity to reassert its influence in the Middle East, perhaps causing a sabotage to the whole peace process.

2. In a Geneva conference, U.S. would be reluctant to pressure Israel for concessions in order to reach agreement in which the Soviets would share credit without paying any of the costs.

3. A Geneva conference would give Syria, a rival to Egypt in inter-Arab politics, a veto power over any agreement between the Arabs and Israel.

The abandoning of the Geneva conference idea created a deadlock in the Middle East. New initiatives were needed to break the deadlock and move the peace efforts forward. It was during this time that direct talks between Egypt and Israel were secretly held in the Moroccan capital. These secret talks, it seemed, were in preparation for Sadat's trip to Jerusalem. Sadat's historic trip took place in November 19-21, 1977.

Sadat claimed that his trip to Jerusalem intended to break the wall of suspicion and hatred between the Arabs and Israel (el-Sadat, 1976: 303). Indeed, the psychological impact was enormous on both sides, but the Israelis were deeply touched by Sadat's symbolic gesture (Fisher, 1978: 21). The Jerusalem trip also achieved important practical results as it forced the Israeli people and government to "reassess what they had formerly considered to be their minimal demands for peace (Rabin, 1979: 324)". Now Egypt and Israel were holding frequent face-to-face negotiations with each other to iron out their differences and arrive at a peaceful settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Two committees were established, a military committee to study military matters and a political committee entrusted the task of negotiating political matters.

In spite of months of negotiations between Egypt and

Israel, little or no progress was made. During this stalemate period, the U.S. was applying heavy pressure on the Israeli government to make it more flexible in the negotiations. For example, the Carter Administration submitted to the Congress in February 1978 an "arms package" in which arms supplies to Israel would be connected with those to Egypt and Saudi Arabia (Bradley, 1981:25). The "all-or-nothing" package was approved in the Senate by a vote of 54-44, which proved to the Israelis that the American government was determined to exercise on Israel whatever leverage it had. However, Sadat finally broke off the negotiations with Israel to protest against Israeli inflexibility and to "set the stage for U.S. participation (Carter, 1982: 31)".

The time for U.S. active involvement could not have been better since the stalemate dragged on for over eight months (December 1977-August 1978). Also, Israel now had a tough and capable leadership in the person of Prime Minister Begin and his right wing government. In the past Begin and his party were "the only formidable opposition" to Israeli concessions, but with Begin at the helm of power he could make big concessions without a serious challenge to his authority (Touval, 1982: 11). With such considerations as well as fear of deterioration in the Egyptian-Israeli relations, President Carter made his decision to invite President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin for summit meetings with him in Camp David.

The summit meetings were held in the Camp David presidential retreat between September 5-17, 1978. (Table 2-1 lists the members of the Egyptian, Israeli, and American delegations to the summit.) Only one bilateral session between Sadat and Begin was held at the summit. During the Sadat-Begin session, President Carter was present but had a minimal role in the discussions. Since this session was unproductive, President Carter took total charge of subsequent negotiations between the two sides. President Carter held talks with each side separately and then produced a set of his proposals in one package which he submitted to the two sides for their feedback. The feedback helped President Carter refine his proposals which he submitted in a new draft to the two parties. President Carter usually discussed the controversial matters with the principals, but negotiated the details and legal matters with their aides and advisers. Prime Minister Begin, however, showed more inclination than President Sadat to negotiate on the details, but he trusted his aides and gave them ample authority.

The Camp David summit negotiations lasted for thirteen days and produced two major documents: (a) "the framework of peace in the Middle East", and (b) "the framework for the conclusion of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel". These documents were signed by the parties in an official White House ceremony in Washington on September 17, 1978. In the period between

TABLE 2-1: Egyptian, Israeli, and American Delegations to the Camp David Summit negotiations

REPRESENTING EGYPT:

Anwar el-Sadat, President
 Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel, Minister of Foreign Affairs
 Boutros Ghali, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
 Osama el-Baz, Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs
 Ashraf Ghorbal, Ambassador to the United States
 Ahmed Maher, Director of the Foreign Minister's Cabinet
 Abdul Rauf el-Reedy, Director of Policy Planning, Foreign Ministry
 Nabil el-Araby, Legal Director of Foreign Ministry
 Ahmed Abou el-Gheite, Office of the Foreign Minister

REPRESENTING ISRAEL:

Menachem Begin, Prime Minister
 Moshe Dayan, Foreign Minister
 Ezer Weizman, Defense Minister
 Aharon Barak, Attorney General and Member-designate of Supreme Court
 Avraham Tamir, Major General, Director of Army Planning Branch
 Simcha Dinitz, Ambassador to the United States
 Meir Rosenne, Legal Adviser to the Foreign Minister
 Elyakim Rubenstein, Assistant Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
 Dan Pattir, Public Affairs Adviser to the Prime Minister

REPRESENTING THE UNITED STATES:

Jimmy Carter, President
 Walter Mondale, Vice President
 Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State
 Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Adviser to the President
 Hamilton Jordan, Staff of the President
 Jody Powell, Press Secretary of the President
 Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs
 Alfred Atherton, Ambassador at Large
 Hermann Eilts, Ambassador to Egypt
 Samuel Lewis, Ambassador to Israel
 William Quandt, Staff of National Security Council

Source: Carter, J. (1982) Keeping Faith. New York: Bantam Books.

September 17, 1978 and March 26, 1979, the negotiations concentrated exclusively on the following issues which were part of the peace treaty:

- (1) Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula.
- (2) Sovereignty over the Sinai.
- (3) Demilitarization of the Sinai.
- (4) Free Israeli navigation through the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran.
- (5) Normalization of relations and the exchange of ambassadors between Israel and Egypt.

Summary and Conclusions

In this conclusion we review the issues in the Arab-Israeli conflict between 1943-November 1977.

Conflict Issues, 1948-1967

a. The Existence of Israel:

Israel insisted on its full right to exist as a legitimate and independent Jewish state. The Israelis demanded Arab recognition and acceptance of their state as a Middle Eastern state. The Arabs, however, were shocked by the Palestinian tragedy and believed that the suffering and displacement endured by the Palestinians was a consequence of the creation of Israel. They, consequently, refused Israel any recognition, and some of them even called for the liquidation of the Jewish state.

b. Palestinian Refugees:

During and in the aftermath of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war tens of thousands of Palestinian fled or were forced to flee by the Israelis to the West Bank of Jordan and to neighboring Arab countries. The question on this issue was whether to allow the refugees to return, or to let them settle wherever they wished in the Arab countries and provide them with some compensation by Israel. Israel neither wanted to allow the refugees to return nor did it propose to compensate them. Israel ignored the refugees and claimed that the Arabs caused the refugee problem and, thus, they should be responsible for accommodating the refugees.

Between 1948-1967, the conflict essentially was a Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which involved Egypt and other Arab countries on behalf of the Palestinians in continuous struggle with Israel.

Conflict Issues, 1967-November 1977

The 1967 Arab-Israeli War broke out on June 5 when Israel launched a preemptive strike against Egypt and Syria. Israel defeated the Arab armies and occupied vast Arab lands: Gaza Strip, Sinai, the Golan Heights, the West Bank, and most importantly the old city of Jerusalem. As a result of the June War, the Arab-Israeli conflict widened and became substantially more complicated. No longer were the Arab countries merely involved on behalf of the Palestinians; they now had to liberate

their own occupied land and restore their injured pride. The main issues in the conflict in the period 1967-November 1977 may be summarized in the following:

I. The Palestinian Problem

The Palestinian problem remained the core of the conflict. This period also witnessed a sharp rise in Palestinian nationalism, an increase of international support of the Palestinians, and the preeminence of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The Palestinians became more than ever determined to liberate their land and exercise their right of self-determination.

a. A Palestinian state:

Israel strongly rejected the idea of creating a state for the Palestinians alongside its border. The Arabs were split on this issue, however. The extremists, on the one hand, rejected any notion of compromise; their goal was to eliminate Israel altogether. For example, the PLO's announced objective was to establish in place of Israel a non-racist, secular, democratic state open to all groups in Palestine. The extremists led by Libya included Syria, Iraq, and Algeria. The moderates, on the other hand, advocated the view that (1) the Arabs must recognize at least de facto the state of Israel; (2) the Palestinians must be allowed self-determination by either establishing on the

Gaza Strip and the West Bank an independent state or joining Jordan in a confederate state. The moderates led by Egypt included Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Tunisia, Oman, and some West Bank leaders. Although the extremists' views have never faded away, the views of the moderates have become more prominent, especially since the October War in 1973.

b. East Jerusalem (Arab Jerusalem):

Israel unified East and West Jerusalem and declared the whole city its "eternal capital". The Arabs, supported by the community of nations through declarations and UN resolutions, condemned the Israeli action and demanded Israel to rescind it. The PLO announced its intention to make East Jerusalem a capital for a Palestinian state once a settlement has been reached.

c. Gaza Strip and the West Bank:

The Arabs demanded total Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and sovereignty over these areas be given to Jordan or to a Palestinian state. Israel, however, considered these areas as liberated territory and vowed to annex them.

II. The Egyptian-Israeli Conflict

The Sinai Peninsula: a) Egypt demanded total Israeli withdrawal, while Israel vowed to keep the territory under its

control. b). Israel demanded to be allowed free navigation through the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran. Egypt was willing to compromise but only in an overall settlement with Israel. c) Israel demanded from the Arabs, and especially from Egypt, direct negotiations and peace treaties. The Arabs, including Egypt, thought it unthinkable in this generation to make peace with Israel or even negotiate with it.

III. The Israeli-Syrian Conflict:

The main issue is sovereignty over the strategic Golan Heights, which Israel was determined to retain for itself.

IV. The Israeli-Jordanian Conflict

The issues between Israel and Jordan were not clearly defined, especially since Jordan waived its right to speak on behalf of the West Bankers and the refugees residing in Jordan proper, following the 1974 Arab Rabat Summit. At the Rabat Summit, the Arab leaders unanimously endorsed the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Jordan showed willingness to form a Jordanian-Palestinian state along the lines of King Hussein's 1972 United Arab Kingdom (UAK) scheme. However, Jordan wanted the Palestinians and especially the PLO to agree to it. Finally, since Jordan has been directly

affected by the conflict, Jordan sought an overall peaceful settlement in which normal relations with Israel would be established.

Finally, we can say that until November 1977 each side was adamantly stuck to its long-held position. The Arabs still, at least in rhetoric, adhered to the "three nos" of the 1967 Khartoum Arab Summit: No negotiation with Israel, no peace, and no recognition. However, there were signs of moderation and compromise, especially in Egypt and in Jordan. Israel, on the other hand, not only remained stuck to Eshkol's position of no return to pre-1967 borders, but, as a result of Begin's election in June 1977, Israel's position hardened even more.

FOOTNOTES

1. The full text of the Security Council Resolution 242 will be found in the Appendix.

CHAPTER III

THE U.S. ROLE: THE ACCEPTABILITY PROBLEM

When President Carter came to office he assigned a high priority to reaching a peaceful settlement for the Arab-Israeli conflict. He also pledged to play an active role in Mideast negotiations, but he wanted to wait for the right time to get involved. That right time finally arrived nearly one year after Sadat's Jerusalem trip in November 1977, which marked a new era of good relations between Israel, U.S., and Egypt. The Carter-Sadat-Begin Camp David summit began on September 5, 1978, and lasted thirteen days, producing a framework for peace in the Middle East. However, Camp David negotiations bore fruit only when Israel and Egypt signed a peace treaty on March 26, 1979. Although Camp David's shortcomings were evident, especially the lack of progress on the Palestinian dimension of the conflict, the outcome was unquestionably monumental. It made Kissinger's preceding agreements seem trivial in comparison. In this chapter, we focus mainly on the acceptability criterion; the effectiveness criterion will be dealt with in chapter IV. We begin, however, with examining the U.S. interests in the Middle East, and then, define the American role in the negotiations.

The U.S. Interests and Objectives:

American national interests are critically at stake in the Middle East, which makes any settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict of utmost concern to the American government. The United States has been pressured, especially after the oil embargo which accompanied the 1973 October war, to play a key role in Mideast peace talks. Such a role is intended to guard American vital interests: regionally in the Middle East and globally in the East-west spectrum. Below is a partial list of American interests and objectives in the Middle East:

1. Preservation of Israel's security and survival, which U.S. supports through long-standing commitments and large military and economic aid to Israel. American politicians, not only for domestic considerations but also for a genuine belief on their part that Israel is a reliable ally and a strategic asset to the U.S., vie for support and close relations with Israel. Carter, for example, writes:

When I announced as a candidate, I singled out for support ...the American commitment to the security of Israel (1982: 274).

2. Avoidance of a thermonuclear war against the Soviet Union over the Middle East. The United States, and logically the Soviet Union, want to avoid an eruption of another Arab-Israeli war, lest they might be drawn into it.

3. Maintenance of uninterrupted flow of Arab oil to the U.S. and its allies in Europe and Japan whose economies depend heavily on oil as a source of energy.

4. Expansion of American influence in the Middle East by winning Arab favor and strengthening political and economic ties with the "moderate" Arab states (Bradley, 1981: 1). Also of special concern to President Carter himself was protecting President Sadat and encouraging Egypt's evident flexibility, moderation, and pro-western orientation (Carter, 1982: 275).

5. Promotion of American principles of freedom and justice throughout the world, which were championed vigorously than ever before by the Carter Administration in its "human rights" policy. The "human rights" policy has naturally extended to the plight of the Palestinian refugees who were the real victim of the Arab-Israeli conflict. President Carter showed real concern and empathy with the Palestinians, particularly in the first year of his administration, and he wanted to help restore their human rights. He writes:

In my opinion it was imperative that the United States work to obtain for these people (the Palestinians) the right to vote, the right to assemble and to debate issues that affected their lives, the right to own property without fear of its being confiscated, and the right to be free of military rule (Carter, 1982: 272).

6. Finally, supplanting Soviet influence (Carter, 1982: 274-5), and replacing the Soviet Union as the chief source of weaponry in the Arab world.

The U.S. Role Defined

President Carter defined the American role in the negotiations in terms of full participation (U.S. Department of State Bulletin, May 1979: 40). "I reserved the right," Carter pointed out, "and had the duty, to put forward compromise proposals, and might on occasion merely adopt either the Egyptian or the Israeli position if I believed it to be the best (Carter, 1982: 333)". In fact, Carter's active participation in the negotiations was very helpful because neither Egypt nor Israel could afford to ignore the views and the wishes of the president of the most powerful nation without jeopardizing their own interests (Jouval, 1982: 314).

The Acceptance of the U.S. Role

The mediation literature maintains that a third party who lacks impartiality will not be an acceptable mediator to the protagonists, especially to the party which perceives him as biased against it. The following section shows that the biased third party, the U.S., was acceptable not only to Israel but also to Egypt. First we show why the U.S. was an acceptable

mediator to Egypt, despite American pro-Israel bias. Then, we show that, for many good reasons, the U.S. was an acceptable mediator to Israel.

Egypt's Acceptance of U.S. Third Party Role and of the Camp David Negotiations:

There are many factors which might serve to explain why Egypt accepted, and indeed was eager to enlist, American mediatory efforts.

1. Sadat's assumption of the presidency indicated a substantive change in the orientation of the Egyptian foreign policy. In contrast with his predecessor President Nasser, Sadat was staunchly pro-Western and fiercely hostile to the Soviet Union and its supporters within Egypt. Sadat jailed his leftist opponents and in an attempt to mitigate Soviet reaction to his actions against the Communists in Egypt he signed a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union. However after he consolidated his power, Sadat expelled over 17,000 Soviet advisers in 1972, thereby dealing a hard blow to the Soviets and their Egyptian supporters.

The ~~expulsion~~ of the advisers essentially aimed at impressing Washington by fulfilling one of its major requirements for closer relations between Egypt and the U.S. (Sheehan, 1970). Cognizant of American rhetoric against

Communism and Soviet expansionism, Sadat thought that by distancing Egypt from the Soviet orbit, the U.S. would be appreciative and gladly step in to help Egypt. Although the Nixon Administration warmly welcomed Sadat's gesture, its attitude was discouraging to Sadat because the U.S. was unwilling to jeopardize the Soviet-American detente, which was at its peak in 1972 (Heikal, 1975: 205-6).

Sadat and his officials were increasingly frustrated as they tried all kinds of conventional diplomacy to attract American involvement in a Mideast peace process. The level of desperation could be sensed from the following unconventional plea to Kissinger sent by an Egyptian ambassador:

On one of my recent excavations/ I ran across an old exclamation/ It was in Amenhotep's tomb/ The god of medicine of ancient gloom/ It said, 'come and visit my Nile'/ And you do not have to stand in file/ For your stomachaches I have a cure/ And for your headaches for sure/ How about it, dear Henry/ Shall we make the Middle East a double entry (Sheehan, 1976: 17-18).

This plea, too, failed to attract the proper attention, for the Middle East was not yet ready for the American National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger. Kissinger believed that the chance of reaching an agreement in the Middle East was slim; the balance of power in the region was still in Israel's advantage and Israel was not willing to compromise for something less than full peace, a precondition then unacceptable to Egypt. Thus, to strengthen Egypt's bargaining position vis-a-vis Israel's and to

break, the "no peace, no war" stalemate, Sadat went to war in October 1973. The October War did indeed succeed in breaking the stalemate and in bringing the much sought after American involvement. Kissinger, who by now has become Secretary of State, started his highly praised shuttle diplomacy.

Sadat was impressed with the progress achieved through Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy but he wanted the U.S. to try for a comprehensive settlement for the Arab-Israeli conflict. (It will be recalled that Kissinger achieved only disengagement of forces agreements as well as minor Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai.) Therefore, Sadat attempted to convince U.S. of the compatibility of the strategic interests of Egypt and the West by unilaterally abrogating the friendship treaty which he himself had signed with the Soviet Union in 1972. In July 1977, Sadat ordered his forces to attack Libya, which the U.S. treated as a Soviet proxy. When such actions failed to stimulate active American involvement in the search for a Mideast settlement, Sadat surprised the world with his dramatic decision to go to Jerusalem and address the Israeli Knesset (Parliament). Sadat's Jerusalem trip finally led to the Camp David negotiations.

Sadat wanted American participation because he genuinely believed that the U.S. was the only country which has strong leverage over Israel. President Eisenhower's effective pressure on the Israelis for the withdrawal from the Sinai in 1956 demonstrated American resolve to use such leverage. Sadat

believed that U.S. still possessed leverage over Israel. He once told the famous Egyptian journalist, Mohammed Heikal, that "that man (Kissinger) is the only person who can order that woman (Golda Meir) to get out and be obeyed" (Heikal, 1978: 725). In fact, Sadat believed that the U.S. held all the cards in the Middle East game. Even when President Carter disagreed that United States held 99 per cent of the cards in the Middle East, Sadat insisted that "(i)t is not 99 per cent, but 99.9 per cent" (Hirst, 1981: 342).

Sadat's fundamental strategy was to impress on the Americans that Egypt and U.S. shared one common strategy: supplanting Soviet influence from the Middle East, and weakening the "radical" governments who maintained anti-American attitudes in the region (Rubin, 1981: 53). Moreover, Sadat wanted to make inroads into Israel's position in America by linking the American-Egyptian relationship to

a strategic end (Said, 1979: 200). And later, he wanted to replace the Shah of Iran as a policeman of the Middle East against Communism and Soviet expansionism.

2. Carter's pronouncements and statements regarding the Middle East conflict were very favorable, and displayed an unprecedented compassion toward the Palestinians. Carter called for Israel's withdrawal to 1967 borders (Carter, 1982: 281); restoration of Palestinian national rights (Carter, 1982: 277); and even shook hands with a PLO representative at the UN

(Carter, 1982: 281), something no high official, let alone a U.S. president, had previously dared to do. All of these did not go unnoticed by the Arabs, and especially by Sadat who felt that Carter was eager to play an active and evenhanded role.

3. Egypt's economic conditions were deteriorating, a settlement of the conflict would reduce the military burden and direct all energies toward economic welfare and prosperity. Sadat hoped that a settlement of the conflict would also encourage the U.S. to extend its help for Egypt. Sadat believed the U.S. could initiate a Marshall Plan to rescue Egypt's desperate economy (Hirst, 1981: 313).

4. Finally, Egypt's alternatives to American mediation were less attractive: (a) a Geneva conference which Egypt did not favor, or (b) the status quo in which the situation may deteriorate and lead to war with Israel.

Israel's Acceptance of U.S. Third Party Role and of the Camp David Negotiations:

Israel's acceptance of an active American role in the negotiations at Camp David can be explained by the following:

1. U.S.-Israel special relationship: American commitment to the survival of the state of Israel is unquestioned, for successive American administrations beginning with the Truman Administration have pledged this commitment. The U.S.

recognized the new state of Israel only ten minutes after its declaration of independence in 1948 (Tillman, 1982: 17); and since then U.S. has been Israel's underwriter and ardent supporter. Israel's acceptance of the American role in Camp David was affected measurably by the special relationship between Israel and the U.S.

2. The influence of the American Jewish community: The strongest and most faithful supporters of Israel come from the American Jewish community. The American Jewish community influenced President Truman's decision to recognize and support the new state, and to a large extent shaped the American Mideast foreign policy. The community sent annually millions of dollars in tax-free donations to help Israel. Within the U.S., the Jewish community served as a public-relations network, responsible for promoting Israel's interests and rallying support to Israel from members of the U.S. Congress. Moreover, candidates of all levels believe that the Jewish vote is crucial in American elections, competing for it by pledging generous support and aid to Israel.

Thus, it becomes clear why Israel would accept and even welcome American participation in the peace talks on the Middle East. American elected government and public officials need Jewish votes and financial contributions to ensure their political survival; this is a leverage which is used by Israel's supporters and lobbyists to constrain the American government in

exercising undue pressure on Israel. In other words, if the U.S. President or any of his officials tried to pressure Israel, the Jewish community would promptly mobilize to alleviate the pressure. For example, the Ford Administration threatened to reassess the American-Israeli relations in order to pressure Israel to be more flexible in the Kissinger negotiations. As a result of the pressure exerted on the President from the American Jewish community and the Israeli lobbyists, the reassessment idea was abandoned. The Carter Administration was also subjected to similar pressure from the Jewish community. The Carter Administration had to rescind its UN vote for a resolution condemning Israeli actions on the occupied West Bank, for example.

3. The alternative was disadvantageous for Israel: Israel had to agree to Camp David negotiations because the alternative to these negotiations would have been a Geneva conference, which Israel vehemently opposed. In fact, when the U.S. and the USSR issued a joint communique for the reconvening of the Geneva conference, the American Jewish community mobilized its "shock troops", forcing President Carter to abandon the idea altogether (Carter, 1982: 293).

4. Bilateral negotiations between Israel and Egypt were automatically to Israel's advantage: The exclusion of Jordan, Syria, and the PLO in the Camp David negotiations gave Israel automatic advantage, since Israel would not bargain seriously on

issues other than those of immediate concern to Egypt. Israel was all along ready to compromise on the return of Sinai to Egyptian sovereignty, provided that Egypt sign a peace treaty with Israel. Camp David would achieve (as it has done) for Israel two important objectives: neutralize Egypt and its army --the strongest in the Arab Front-- thereby enjoying absolute military superiority over any possible combination of two or more Arab armies; and continue its occupation (or de facto annexation) of Arab Jerusalem, Gaza strip, the West Bank, and the Syrian Golan Heights (Said, 1979: 192).

Conclusion

It should be emphasized as a conclusion to this chapter that national parties tend to weigh their benefits and losses and proceed accordingly. Both Egypt and Israel accepted American mediation because it simply served their national objectives and interests. Egypt, despite the contention that U.S. was biased in favor of Israel, accepted American involvement even participation in the negotiations because: a. Egypt realized as early as 1970 that only U.S. can make peace in the Middle East. b. U.S. national interests required a just and durable settlement to the conflict. The fact that U.S. held strong pro-Israel bias was something the Arabs had to live with and only hope, as American-Arab ties get stronger, to reduce

this American bias. In the following chapter (chapter IV), we analyze the second criterion for the impartiality condition --third party's effectiveness.

CHAPTER IV

THE U.S. ROLE: THE EFFECTIVENESS PROBLEM

The mediation literature maintains that if a third party is not impartial, he will be neither acceptable to the protagonists nor effective in his efforts. In the previous chapter, we discussed the acceptability criterion. We showed that the U.S., in spite of its lack of impartiality, was acceptable to both Egypt and Israel. However, if a biased mediator is acceptable by the parties, he may not necessarily be effective. In this chapter, we show that the U.S. was effective in spite of its pro-Israel bias.

The effectiveness of a third party can be attributed to:

- a. The functions a third party may perform to facilitate conflict resolution;
- b. the third party's ability to extract significant concessions; and
- c. the successful conclusion of the negotiations, usually culminating in an agreement or a treaty.

Without much laboring, we can assert that in Camp David this last criterion was met in the signing of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel on March 26, 1979. The following analysis

will, therefore, focus on the first criterion and second criteria --third party functions and third party's ability to extract significant concessions.

' The Functions Performed by the U.S.

The functions performed by U.S. can be organized into three main categories: Process-oriented, concession-oriented, and content-oriented functions.

A) Process-Oriented Functions: Improving communication and clearing misunderstandings.

1. Improve Communication:

a. Phase I (November 1977-September 1978):

Sadat's Jerusalem trip in November, 1977 opened all channels of communication between Egypt and Israel. Face-to-face negotiations between Israeli and Egyptian officials were conducted both in Israel and in Egypt. Several bilateral meetings between President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin took place in this period. Moreover, a strong friendship developed between Sadat and Israeli Defence Minister, Ezer Weizman. The Sadat-Weizman friendship was a constructive "additional avenue of communication between the two delegations (Carter, 1982:

343)" in the Camp David summit. The conflict did not disappear as a result of direct communications, but at least the two nations received from each other first hand information which paved the way for agreement in the Camp David summit.

During this phase, U.S. encouraged Egyptian-Israeli bilateral talks (Carter, 1982: 293). Carter consistently encouraged Sadat to negotiate directly with the Israelis, even before Sadat made his Jerusalem trip.

b. Phase II (October 1978-March 1979):

This period covers the Camp David Summit negotiations as well as the negotiations leading to the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. In the Summit, the parties were housed in separate buildings on an isolated mountain retreat. The retreat, Carter claimed, "engenders an atmosphere of both isolation and intimacy" (Carter, 1982: 324). Moreover, the seclusion of the Camp David retreat served to essentially cut-off the principals from their respective constituencies (Carter, 1982: 324), by regulating media coverage on the negotiations. In fact, only Carter's press secretary, Jody Powell, was entrusted the task of the daily briefings to the press on the negotiations (Carter, 1982: 317). Control of the communication process with the outside world appears to have been motivated by Carter's belief that "success would have been impossible if we (the Principals) had explained our own opinion to the press each day" (Carter,

1982: 331).

In the course of the negotiations, President Carter started with supervising a meeting between Sadat and Begin; his participation in the discussion was minimal (Carter, 1982: 350). The Sadat-Begin session which took place on September 7, 1978 was disastrous and therefore was the first and last of its kind (Carter, 1982: 316, 351). Both Begin and Sadat, during that supervised session, were not as preoccupied with solving their problems as they were with complaints, arguments, and accusations of one another. The session made each party even more convinced with its own "righteousness" and more skeptical about the other party's real intentions. For a moment, Carter, and everybody else seemed discouraged about the difficulty of reconciling what appeared to be irreconcilable. Dayan, who was then Israel's Foreign Minister and a member of its delegation to Camp David, made the following comment on the Sadat-Begin session:

The only constructive outcome was Carter's conclusion that it was up to the United States to put forward her own proposals. Carter realized that the gap between the Egyptian and Israeli leaders was very wide, the chance of their reaching and understanding extremely slim. They would need to moderate their positions, and this could be brought about only if America demanded it of them (1981: 163).

As a consequence of the Sadat-Begin unproductive session in Camp David, President Carter decided to take control of the communication between the two sides and limit Sadat-Begin

encounters. Throughout the subsequent negotiations, Carter skillfully and effectively regulated the communication process. On one occasion when he learned that Begin was unexpectedly visiting Sadat, Carter rushed to the meeting, "because," Carter wrote, "it was crucial for me to intercede if they were arguing" (1982: 400).

Carter's task, however, was no less difficult in the new situation, where he had to hold separate sessions then shuttle back and forth between the two sides. Sometimes Carter had to negotiate minute details with Sadat's and Begin's subordinates, but often the details were left to Secretary of State Vance and his counterparts on the Egyptian and Israel sides. However, by controlling the communication process, Carter managed to set the day-to-day agenda on his own, and regulate the transactions between the two sides. Figure 4-1 illustrates the communication process and the parties interactions in the Camp David Summit.

Control of the communication process was enhanced, to a large extent, by the contrasting personal characteristics and negotiating styles of President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin (Carter, 1982: 342). Sadat was concerned only with major issues; once he had agreed to them in principle, he would let his advisers work on the details (Carter, 1982: 355). Sadat also tended to exclude his advisers from important decisions and seemed unrelaxed in their presence. Carter wrote: "Sadat wanted to make Egypt's decisions himself, did not like to have

FIGURE 4-1: Communication at Camp David

aides present when he was with me...(1982: 342)". The friction between Sadat and his aides was too obvious, and once Carter observed a heated argument between Sadat and his aides on the front porch of Sadat's Camp David cottage (Carter, 1982: 383). Begin, on the other hand, was interested in negotiating all minute details, but "relied very heavily on his aides and advisers (Carter, 1982: 342)". Begin was also very close to his advisers and aides and they showed genuine respect for him (Dayan, 1981: 100).

2. . Clear Misunderstandings:

A significant function is to clear whatever misunderstandings exist between the parties. In the Camp David negotiations a misunderstanding arose over a statement made by President Sadat to the Israeli Knesset. Begin alleged that Sadat was insincere when he pledged to the Knesset that: "My forces will not exceed the Mitla and Gidi passes" (Carter, 1982: 353). Begin misunderstood Sadat's pledge, thinking that the statement had a double meaning designed to deceive the Israelis. In order to clear this misunderstanding, President Carter asked Sadat to repeat his statement and explain it to him and to Prime Minister Begin. Sadat did so, and the misunderstanding was cleared, averting the possibility of an acrimonious debate on what was said and what was meant. Carter explained his role in

such situations: "I acted as a referee and put them back on track, and on occasion explained what was meant when there was an obvious misinterpretation (Carter, 1982: 353)."

B) Concession-Oriented Functions:

The third party may perform the following functions:

1. Establish Trust, and Ease Tensions:

Carter sought strongly to establish mutual trust and understanding among himself, Sadat, and Begin (Carter, 1982: 306, 322, 339, 340). He was dismayed when he discovered that "Sadat seemed to trust me too much, and Begin not enough (Carter, 1982: 322)".

Carter also sought to ease the parties' tensions and concerns by encouraging them to have a "positive attitude" (Carter, 1982: 339). Often he stood in defence of the other side (in its absence) by explaining the systems of government or the traits of the personalities and their past experiences (Carter, 1982: 340).

2. Face-Saving:

By undertaking such an active role, U.S. had, in effect, provided both parties ways to make concessions without losing

face (Carter, 1982: 345). When one party conceded on an issue its excuse was that it only conceded to President Carter personally, or to its ally U.S. (Dayan, 1981: 163).

3. Circumvent Over-commitment:

The best example of this in Camp David was when Prime Minister Begin ideologically committed himself to the non-removal of the Sinai settlements and their inhabitants (Carter, 1982: 347). President Carter managed to get around Begin's commitment through an ingenious idea: To relieve Begin from any decision on it, turn the settlements issue over to the Israeli Knesset to vote for removal or non-removal; thereby sparing Begin the blame for whatever the Knesset's decision might be. Begin took a neutral stance on the issue, but not without pressure from the U.S. President, and the Knesset approved on September 27, 1978 total Israeli evacuation of the Sinai settlements.

4. Make Alliances:

Carter himself realized that making alliances to facilitate concession-making was important. He wrote, "it was a good negotiating tactic by either Sadat or Begin first to reach an agreement with me and then to have the two of us confront the third (Carter, 1982: 366)". This strategy was used effectively not only in inter-group negotiations but in intra-group ones as

well. When Begin was too intransigent on an issue, Carter used the help of Begin's aides and advisers to change his mind (Carter, 1982: 395). And, whenever Carter had any difficulty with the members of the Egyptian delegation, he bypassed them and went directly to Sadat, who would not turn him down. The Carter-Sadat, Carter-Dayan friendships made Carter's role in the negotiations much easier. Carter exploited these friendships and alliances often effectively, since "in Sadat's case, the leader was much more forthcoming than his chief advisers, and in Begin's case, the advisers were more inclined to work out difficult problems than was their leader (Carter, 1982: 342)". Figure 4-2 illustrates the alliance possibilities which President Carter utilized for the extraction of concessions from both sides.

5. Offer Rewards:

In Camp David, Carter's approach was first to emphasize the advantages to both parties from their agreement (Carter, 1982:395). U.S. rewarded both Israel and Egypt with approximately \$4.5 billion in economic and military aid as bonus for the signing of the peace treaty; that in addition to the annual aid both countries receive from U.S. (Bradley, 1981: 40). Israel was also provided with American commitments to ensure through 1990 oil supplies; help Israel in the construction of new airfields as a compensation for the abandoned Sinai.

FIGURE 4-2: Alliances used by Carter to extract concessions

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airfields; and assist Israel in taking appropriate measure, if if Egypt violates the treaty. It was widely believed that without American financial rewards and guarantees, the peace treaty would not have materialized.

6. Impose Time Limits:

Time limits can be used to pressure parties to make further concessions. (Rubin, 1981: 26), or else if time runs out lose third party's efforts, help, and possible rewards. In Camp David, President Carter did not impose time limits at first (Carter, 1982: 317), but later, in an attempt to pressure the Egyptians and the Israelis to make concessions, he informed both delegations that he would be reporting to Congress on Sunday, September 17, 1978, explaining to its members why the negotiations were not successful (Carter, 1982: 391, Dayan, 1981: 173). The fact that the final agreement was reached on Sunday indicates the effective impact of the imposed deadline. Also, President Carter used the possibility of abandoning his third party role to pressure the two sides for further concessions. Such a threat came in the form of an implicit deadline on March 12, 1979, in which "preparation for Carter's departure from Jerusalem helped to soften Israel and speed up its concessions (Touval, 1982: 317)".

C) Content-Oriented Functions:

1. Third Party's Views and Proposals ("Enunciation"):

Carter made known the U.S. position on most issues in the conflict when he was visiting Sadat in January 1978 and on other occasions as well. Thus, once Sadat and Begin accepted Carter's invitation to Camp David, it was presumed automatically that they expected, and were ready, to make important concessions (Carter, 1982: 517). Enunciation was helpful because both Egypt and Israel were aware of American vital interests in the Middle East and expected U.S. to assert forcefully its position to protect such interests. During the negotiations, Carter resisted Begin's attempt to undermine the enunciated principle of considering the UN Security Council Resolution 242 as the basis of all Mideast negotiations. Begin insisted that Resolution 242 was not applicable to the West Bank. He particularly objected to the resolution's preamble, which emphasized the "inadmissibility" of the acquisition of territory by war", as he considered that Israel had the right to keep the territory which Israel captured in a "defensive" war in 1967. Begin's position infuriated Carter who retorted to Begin: "If you had openly disavowed United Nations Resolution 242, I would not have invited you to Camp David nor called this meeting.

TABLE 4-1: Suggestions to the third party mediator

Functions	Advice to the mediator
A. Process-Oriented: Communication Clear Misunderstandings	Encourage direct contact between the parties; if direct contact was counter-productive, regulate or even control the communication process. Clear whatever misunderstandings exist between the parties.
B. Concession-Oriented: Build Trust Ease Tension Face-Saving Circumvent Commitment Use A Single Negotiating Text Make Alliances Impose Deadlines Offer Rewards	Encourage trust not only between you and the parties but between the parties themselves as well. Allay the fears of the parties and ease their tension. Provide face saving ways to both sides. There are instances when a party wants to concede on an issue but only needs a way to justify making a concession. Commitments may stand in the way of agreement between the parties. Provide ways for relieving commitments: rationalize the irrelevance of an over-commitment, or invent new ways to circumvent it. The single negotiating text helps you overcome agenda setting problems. Use whatever friendships and alliances you may have to soften bargainers' demands and get their compliance. Impose deadlines to pressure for concessions, but avoid imposing too many because they might compromise your credibility and lose effectiveness. Offer rewards for flexibility.
C. Content-Oriented: Make Proposals and Enunciate Your Views Use The Conflict Resolution Stages	Establish a third option to the parties by making proposals and enunciating your own views. If your views and proposals are not clearly unreasonable, they may become a focal point of agreement. Limit the range of bargaining and work out a package deal agreement from range.

(Carter, 1982: 374)". Table 4-1 contains some of the functions a third party is advised to perform in situations similar to the Camp David negotiations.

2. The Conflict Resolution Stages:

a. Limiting The Bargaining Range:

President Sadat's Jerusalem trip in November 1977 changed dramatically the formal position of Egypt, and to a lesser degree the position of Israel. Sadat declared to the Israeli Knesset that Egypt was prepared not only to recognize and negotiate with Israel but to make "durable peace based on justice" as well (el-Sadat, 1978: 330-43). Sadat's initiative opened new avenues for conflict resolution. Sadat's initiative provided Israel with important and attractive Arab concessions such as Egypt's readiness to negotiate face-to-face with Israel and Egypt's recognition of Israel's right to exist permanently as a Middle Eastern state.

Direct negotiations between Egypt and Israel were immediately held to iron out the differences between the two sides. In the meantime, Prime Minister Begin was preparing his response to Sadat's initiative; that response appeared in late December 1977 in the form of an autonomy plan for the Palestinians --the Begin Autonomy Plan. "The Begin Autonomy Plan" was a disappointment to President Sadat who expected the

Israelis to be more generous. A dangerous stalemate developed as a consequence of, what was perceived to be, the lack of proper response by Israel to the Sadat initiative. The stalemate persisted for more than eight months, perpetuated by Sadat's deliberate attempt to involve the Americans in the negotiations.

During the stalemate period, the U.S. was preparing for its active role in Mideast negotiations. American officials made frequent visits to the Middle East, and President Carter met frequently with Mideast political leaders. Table 4-2 provides a chronology of U.S. efforts between December 1977 to August 1978. The objective of U.S. activities was to find exactly what each side wanted and was willing to concede on for the goal of peace. Understanding the issues involved, and creating a large bargaining space between Egypt and Israel were of utmost concern to the Americans.

The stalemate period afforded the Americans the opportunity to enunciate their own position and views regarding the issues of the conflict. The Aswan Formula, although it was only one among many American declarations and proposals, represented clearly and decisively the views of the Carter Administration. While on a visit to Egypt on January 4, 1978, President Carter announced the Aswan Formula. He declared in it that there must be peace accompanied by normal relations between Israel and the Arab states; Israel must relinquish Arab territories occupied in

TABLE 4-2: Chronology of American activities prior to the Camp David summit.

1977 December 9	Vance begins tour of Middle Eastern capitals --Cairo, Jerusalem, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Riad.
December 16-17	Begin and Carter confer in Washington.
1978 January 1-4	Carter's meetings with King Hussein (in Tehran), King Khaled and Crown Prince Fahd, and Sadat in Aswan.
January 16	Vance in Jerusalem
January 20	Vance in Cairo
Jan. 21-Feb. 1	Atherton shuttles
February 21	Atherton begins another shuttle
March 20-22	Begin holds talks with Carter
April 21-25	Atherton shuttles
April 26	Dayan meets Vance in Washington
May 1-2	Begin in Washington
June 30-July 3	Mondale in Jerusalem and in Alexandria
July 28	Atherton begins another shuttle
August 5-8	Vance visits Israel and Egypt

*Extracted from Touval, 1982: 293.

1967; and "there must be a resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects which must recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and enable the Palestinians to participate in the determination of their own future (White Paper issued by Egyptian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1980: 30-1)". The American government used its enunciated views not only to impress the Arab states and lure them to join in the negotiations to be sponsored by the U.S., but to present Egypt and Israel a third alternative.

Table 4-3 represents the pre-Camp David Egyptian, American, and Israeli positions on the main issues in the Arab-Israeli conflict. From this table, we can determine how President Carter limited the bargaining range in Camp David. In fact, President Carter himself made many lists of the issues involved in order to determine the gap between Israel and Egypt. As we can see in Table 4-3, there were issues of disagreement, issues of partial agreement, and issues of agreement between the parties.

Disagreement Issues:

1. The Sinai Peninsula:

The Egyptian President insisted that the Sinai settlements be totally dismantled, while Israeli Prime Minister Begin was

TABLE 4-3: Parties' positions on the main issues prior to the Camp David summit

EGYPT	UNITED STATES	ISRAEL
<p>Total Israeli withdrawal with return of sovereignty to Egypt; demilitarized zones; no Israeli settlements. Total removal of Israeli airfields; compensation for Sinai oil consumed by Israel.</p>	<p><u>The Sinai Peninsula</u> Total Israeli withdrawal with return of sovereignty to Egypt; demilitarized zones; no Israeli settlements; no clear position on airfields.</p>	<p>Partial withdrawal, but return of sovereignty to Egypt; continued Israeli use of airfields under U.S. supervision, however.</p>
<p>Willing to consider: end the economic embargo against Israel, open borders, and free Israeli navigation in Suez Canal and in Strats of Tiran. In proper time willing to extend diplomatic recognition and exchange ambassadors.</p>	<p><u>Egyptian-Israeli Peace</u> Full peace and normal relations between Israel and Egypt.</p>	<p>Insisting on full peace and normal relations; requesting everything peace entails.</p>
<p>After a five-year period Israeli withdrawal approximately to pre-1967 borders; Arab sovereignty; no settlements; unlimited return of refugees.</p>	<p><u>The West Bank And The Gaza Strip</u> After a five-year period Israeli withdrawal to pre-1967 borders with minor adjustments; Arab sovereignty; no Jewish settlements.</p>	<p>Partial military withdrawal; no return to pre-1967 borders; continued Israeli sovereignty; Israeli settlements to remain; limited return of refugees.</p>

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TABLE 4-3 (cont'd)

EGYPT	UNITED STATES	ISRAEL
<u>Form Of A Palestinian Entity</u>		
Palestinian self-determination.	Palestinian entity connected with Jordan.	No Palestinian state; full autonomy.
No division of the city; Arab sovereignty; free access to holy shrines.	<u>Jerusalem</u> No division of the city; sovereignty to be determined in negotiations; free access to holy shrines.	Undivided capital to Israel; sovereignty non-negotiable; free access to holy shrines.
Israeli withdrawal to pre-1967 international borders.	<u>The Golan Heights</u> Vague on withdrawal; face-to-face negotiations between Israel and Syria.	No withdrawal; direct negotiations with Syria.

ideologically committed to preserve them. Also, there was a strong disagreement on the Sinai airfields which Israel built there during the occupation period. Sadat wanted Israel to turn them over to Egypt, while the Israelis wanted to keep using them under American supervision.

2. The West Bank and The Gaza Strip:

Egypt and Israel were in total disagreement on the question of who would eventually assume sovereignty: Egypt wanted eventual Arab sovereignty while Israel wanted continued Israeli sovereignty. Egypt also insisted on Israeli withdrawal to pre-1967 borders with only minor border rectifications. But Israel insisted on keeping control of the territories. [The Israeli position clearly violated the "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war" clause of Security Council Resolution 242; Prime Minister Begin argued "that Israel had not initiated the 1967 war, and that if a war was defensive, then occupied territory could be kept by the victor (Carter, 1982: 354)".] Moreover, on the question of whether or not to remove Jewish settlements on the West Bank and The Gaza Strip, Egypt considered the settlements "illegal and obstacle to peace" and demanded their total evacuation. (Incidentally, the U.S. also considered the settlements "illegal and obstacle to peace".) Israel, on the other hand, insisted that Jews have a legal right to settle anywhere on the "Judea-Samaria" region. Finally, in

disagreement with Egypt, Israel wanted to allow only a limited number of Palestinian refugees to be able to return to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

3. Form of A Palestinian Entity:

Egypt believed an independent Palestinian state in the future would be desirable and inevitable, "but preferred limits on its independence" (Carter, 1982: 327, 354). Israel, however, rejected any entity which may lead to an independent Palestinian state alongside its borders, not even in the distant future.

4. Jerusalem:

The question of sovereignty over East Jerusalem seemed impossible to settle; Israel, by making the city its capital, made it a non-negotiable item.

5. The Golan Heights:

The disagreement here arose as a result of Israel's refusal to agree to withdraw to pre-1967 international borders with Syria. Also, since the territory was Syrian, Israel, supported tacitly by the U.S., insisted on direct negotiations between itself and Syria.

Partial-Agreement Issues:

1. The Sinai Peninsula:

Israel was willing to withdraw from most of the Peninsula; but Egypt insisted on total (as opposed to partial) Israeli withdrawal. In general, however, the Israelis were ready to be more flexible, if total withdrawal were to be the price for peace with Egypt.

2. Egyptian-Israeli Peace:

Egypt was willing to extend diplomatic recognition to Israel and exchange ambassadors but preferred to delay such actions for a proper future time. Israel, on the other hand, insisted on prompt Egyptian formal recognition and exchange of ambassadors; Israel wanted Egypt to prove its good intentions through concrete actions, not just promises.

Agreement Issues:

1. The Sinai Peninsula:

Israel agreed to allow Egyptian sovereignty over the Sinai peninsula. (This was a key compromise in exchange of which Israel expected Egyptian flexibility on other issues.)

2. Egyptian-Israeli Peace:

Egypt was willing to end its economic embargo against Israel, and guarantee Israeli free navigation through the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran.

3. Jerusalem:

All parties agreed that Jerusalem must remain an undivided city. However, the Egyptian position of wanting Jerusalem to remain undivided with coequal Israel/Arab sovereignty was, as Begin charged, "a contradiction in terms (Carter, 1982: 354)". And, all parties agreed on providing Jewish, Christian, and Muslim pilgrims free access to the holy shrines in the city.

Table 4-4 summarizes the positions of Egypt and Israel using the "disagreement/partial-agreement/agreement" criteria. Table 4-4 shows that it was reasonable for President Carter to postpone, for a later date, conclusive negotiations on the West Bank and Gaza, the form of a Palestinian entity, Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights. The positions of Egypt and Israel on the issues in these categories were extremely divergent and could not have been brought close enough to permit agreement. The difficult issues could have been divisive, had President Carter pursued their negotiations more vigorously. Nevertheless, the negotiators dealt with such issues in order to establish some understandings and guidelines to be followed in future.

TABLE 4-4: Issues Categorized

	Disagreement	Partial-agreement	Agreement
The Sinai Peninsula	Settlements Airfields	Withdrawal	Sovereignty
Egyptian-Israeli Peace		Timing of recognition and exchange of ambassadors	Normal economic relations Free navigation
The West Bank and the Gaza Strip	Sovereignty Israeli withdrawal Settlements Number of refugees to return		
Form of A Palestinian Entity	Independent Palestinian state		
Jerusalem	Sovereignty		Undivision of the city Free access to the holy shrines
The Golan Heights	Sovereignty Withdrawal		

negotiations. There might have been another reason for dealing with the issues connected with the Palestinian problem, mainly protecting Sadat against Arab criticism. "The Palestinian chapter in the Camp David accords," Ben-Yishai argued, "served primarily to provide Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat with an ideological fly leaf to defend himself against Arab rage over his perceived betrayal of the Palestinian cause (1981: 43)". Finally, the Jerusalem issue was totally deleted from the negotiations with consent of all parties (Carter, 1982: 397). And the negotiators totally ignored the Golan Heights issue.

In the Camp David Summit, the goal was to work out a "framework of peace in the Middle East," and a "framework for the conclusion of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel." In the "framework of peace in the Middle East," the parties established some understanding on most issues: Issues connected with the Palestinian problem would be left for future negotiations between the parties, perhaps involving Jordan and other "moderate" Arab states. ~~The most important~~ understanding, however, was that of limiting the bargaining range to the return of Sinai to Egypt and establishing peace between Egypt and Israel. Limiting the bargaining range helped the principals to concentrate, in the second stage, on manageable issues which could produce an agreement.

Limiting the bargaining range was a decisive step in the negotiations, but it required hard work especially on the part

of the mediator. In the Summit, President Carter and his aides asked the Egyptians and the Israelis to present their ideas and proposals (Weizman, 1981: 367), then they would produce an American draft incorporating the best elements of the parties' proposals. The American draft, then, would be presented to the parties to get their feedback (suggestions and criticisms), which would be taken into consideration in the subsequent drafts (Carter, 1982: 356). The drafting process was not only a slow and a painstaking task but was one which required a great deal of skill and wisdom on the part of the mediator. A delicate balance of interests and demands had to be maintained carefully in abridging the gap between the parties. It is believed that President Carter and his aides produced twenty three drafts until they finally worked out an agreement acceptable to Egypt and Israel (Newsweek, October 2, 1978: 39).

b. Determining An Agreement Package Deal

In this stage, Carter and his team worked on the specific issues and details of the conflict to produce a package deal which Egypt and Israel could accept. The package deal was essentially an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. President Carter and his officials worked vigorously between September 17, 1978 and March 26, 1979 to solve all problems which stood in the way of total peace between Egypt and Israel.

Carter's Solutions:

A. The Sinai Settlements:

The Sinai settlements seemed, as a result of Begin's commitment and determination not to allow their evacuation, an insurmountable obstacle for a moment; but Carter was able through an ingenious idea to circumvent Begin's commitment. The idea was to relieve Begin from making a decision on the settlements and turn the issue over to the Israeli Knesset for decision. Begin was saved blame and breaking an ideological commitment; and the idea was successful -- on September 27, 1978, the Knesset approved the removal of the Sinai settlements.

B. Resolution 242:

Begin insisted on excluding from the final draft of the agreement the important "non-acquisition" clause of Resolution 242. Sadat, on the other hand, was vehemently opposed to the exclusion of the clause. To break the deadlock, Carter suggested to delete any specific mention of the clause and instead to refer in the final draft to the Resolution "in all its parts". Both Egypt and Israel accepted the American proposal.

C. Oil Supplies:

Begin wanted Egypt to make a commitment to sell Egyptian oil to Israel. However, Sadat refused to make any written

guarantees for oil sales to Israel. To relieve the dilemma, Carter extended from five to fifteen years an earlier U.S. commitment made to Israel by Kissinger in 1975, guaranteeing oil supplies.

D. Sinai Airfields:

To facilitate an Israeli concession to relinquish Sinai airfields, U.S. pledged to assist Israel in the construction of new airfields in the Negev desert.

E. Priority of Guarantees:

Israel requested a pledge from Egypt in which Egypt would give priority to its treaty obligations with Israel over Egyptian obligations to the Arab countries. The problem was settled by vague rewording of the "priority of guarantees", allowing Egypt and Israel to use their own interpretation on the issue.

F. Trade-offs:

Finally, Egypt wanted from Israel a precise timetable for withdrawing from the Sinai. Israel, on the other hand, wanted Egypt to speed up the exchange of ambassadors with Israel. Carter made a trade-off compromise which was acceptable to both sides. In the compromise Egypt would be required to exchange

TABLE 4-5: Specific Problems and Carter's Solutions

ISSUES	PROBLEMS	
A. The Sinai Settlements	Begin's commitment to no evacuation	Relieve Begin of the evacuation decision by turning the issue to the Israeli Knesset.
B. Resolution 242	Exclusion or inclusion of the "non-acquisition of territory by war" clause	Not to quote the clause, but to refer to Resolution 242 in "all its parts"
C. Oil Supplies	No oil sales guaranteed in writing	American (instead of Egyptian) guarantees to Israel
D. Sinai Airfields	Israel's reluctance to relinquish the airfields	American assistance in the construction of new airfields
E. Priority of Obligations	Israeli fear that Egypt will not honor its treaty obligations, giving priority to its Arab obligations instead	Vague rewording, allowing both sides to use their own interpretations; also, U.S. written guarantees to Israel
F. Trade-offs	Egypt wanted a precise withdrawal timetable. Israel wanted a speed up of exchange of ambassadors.	Trade-off: The exchange of ambassadors when withdrawal is halfway completed

ambassadors once Israeli withdrawal was halfway complete (Newsweek, March 26, 1979: 30). Table 4-5 summarizes the above problems and the solutions invented by President Carter.

Factors Contributed to The U.S. Effectiveness

1. Third party's identity, characteristics, and qualifications:

In Camp David, President Carter himself was strongly involved in the negotiations. In his role as an active mediator he commanded the respect and trust of both the Israelis and the Egyptians (Carter, 1982: 322). The trust was generated by :

- a. Carter's sympathy with both Israel and Egypt.
- b. The strong personal relationship between Carter and Sadat, and and U.S. and Israel.

President Carter's knowledge of the intricate details of the issues involved (Carter, 1982: 319), and his understanding of the personality of both Sadat and Begin made him a more effective third party. The fact that the mediator at Camp David was the President of the U.S. himself with all the authority it entailed was very important for two main reasons:

- a. The President's image, prestige, and political prospects were at risk if the Camp David negotiations failed. Weizman claimed that these concerns were very much on Carter's mind. For example, to get Sadat to acquiesce to Carter's proposal for breaking the deadlock over Resolution 242, Carter "explained

that the present impasse was endangering his political prospects (Weizman, 1981: 372)".

b. The President, with all the resources under his authority, possessed formidable leverages against Egypt and Israel. President Carter also showed high resolve to utilize his authority and U.S. resources to pressure for an agreement between Egypt and Israel.

2. Sadat-Carter Friendship:

Sadat was strongly concerned about Carter's image and therefore was doing all he could to make the negotiations successful. Sadat all along gave Carter many essential compromises, and reassured him of complete success (Carter, 1982: 417). Whenever, Carter needed a new compromise from Sadat, he played on Sadat's ego of being a peace-maker and was usually effective. Also, Carter was effective in persuading Sadat to change his mind, for example, as happened when on the eighth day of the summit. Sadat and his team felt that the negotiations would not lead anywhere as a result of Israeli intransigence, so they packed up their belongings and were ready to abandon the negotiations. When Carter heard of Sadat's intention to leave, he sped to Sadat's cottage and after a short talk with Sadat everything was fine. Sadat explained to the reporters what changed his mind on abandoning the negotiations:

"Immediately, I find President Carter is visiting me in Dogwood cabin, where I was under house detention. I have a very soft spot for...Carter...(Newsweek, October 2, 1978: 49)".

3. Dayan-Carter Friendship:

Carter used his friend Dayan, the Israeli Foreign Minister, to soften and even change Begin's attitude and position on some issues. Dayan was well respected by Begin and seemed to have "the knack of finding formulations that didn't hurt Begin's ideology (Newsweek, October 2, 1978: 40)". Figure 4-3 represents all relationships and their intensity between the principal negotiators and all participants in the Camp David summit negotiations.

4. American Interests and Security:

Carter impressed forcefully on both sides that "deterioration in the present situation...might lead to war that involved the security of my country" (Carter, 1982: 367). Both Egypt and Israel accepted the American argument that a deterioration in the situation in the Middle East would adversely affect American national interests in the region.

5. American leverage:

United States used as a leverage its favor, after which Israel and Egypt were competing to elicit substantial concessions from both sides (Rubin, 1981: 26; Carter, 1982: 366,

FIGURE 4-3: The relationship between the chief negotiators and all parties in Camp David

368). If Egypt did not make the concessions Carter requested, U.S.-Egyptian relations would have been adversely affected (Carter, 1982: 392). Also, "failure of the talks would be 'catastrophic' for relations between Israel and the United States (Dayan, 1981: 173)," Carter told the Israelis. Thus, Egypt and Israel were obliged to give concessions, so as not to lose to one another U.S. favor.

6. Promises of Economic and Military Assistance:

Promises of economic and military aid were instrumental incentives for Egyptian and Israeli flexibility. U.S. Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, made a strong link between American aid to Egypt and its agreement to a peace treaty with Israel (Touval, 1982: 317). When Carter's negotiations with Begin on March 13, 1979 were unproductive as a result of the latter's inflexibility, Brown presented "his counterpart, Ezer Weizman, with the first detailed list of what the U.S. was willing to give Israel in military aid in return for peace (Newsweek, October 2, 1978: 34)". This strategy is similar to Nixon's "hardware for software" strategy in which Nixon "would be responsive to Israeli requests for armaments if Israel gave us (the Americans) some latitude in negotiations...(Kissinger, 1979: 371)".

7. Pressure on Begin:

Carter often blamed Begin for lack of flexibility on part of the Israelis. "I told him (Begin), " Carter wrote, "that peace in the Middle East was in his hands, that he had a unique opportunity to either bring it into being or kill it...(1982: 313)". In fact, Carter's desperate trip to Israel in March intended to put public pressure on Begin to be more flexible. In his speech to the Israeli Knesset on March 12, 1979, Carter charged that: "(t)he people were ready for peace, but that the leaders had not yet shown that they had the courage to take a chance on peace (Carter, 1982: 422)". Carter's pressure on Begin was effective in many crucial instances.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In this study we reviewed mediation literature to examine the emphasis placed on the impartiality of the third party. In chapter I, we showed that prominent theoreticians advocated the impartiality condition, contending that impartiality was necessary for third party's acceptability as well as effectiveness. For example, Oran Young in *The Intermediaries* (1967) claimed that impartiality was one of the "basic qualities" which a third party must have. To examine the validity of the theoretical assumption on impartiality, we adopted Touval's (1975) two criteria: The acceptability of the third party and his effectiveness. We discussed such questions as:

- Was the mediatory role of the biased third party acceptable to the protagonists? Why?

- Was the biased third party effective (i.e., produced agreement) in his mediatory efforts? How? And, why?

On the basis of our case study, we conclude that impartiality of a third party may not at all be necessary for protagonists' consent to third party's involvement in the resolution of their conflict. Nor is it correct to assume that

only impartial third parties are effective in producing agreement. As our study proves, in the Camp David negotiations the biased third party, the U.S., was both acceptable and effective in its role.

In spite of Egyptian perception that the U.S. was pro-Israel, Egypt not only accepted but welcomed U.S. involvement in a Middle East peace process. In fact, as we showed in chapter III, Egypt urged for years active American involvement. Cairo made important gestures designed to lure Washington into undertaking an active role in the Middle East. For example, the expulsion of over 17,000 Soviet advisers from Egypt in 1972, the unilateral abrogation of the Egyptian-Soviet friendship treaty in 1975, and Sadat's Jerusalem trip in 1977, were intended to strengthen the Egyptian-American relationship, consequently attracting Washington to play a prominent role in the Middle East.

There were many factors behind Egyptian eagerness to involve U.S. in an active role in a Mideast peace process:

1. American leverage and influence over Israel: Israel was the party asked to trade-off tangible concessions for Egyptian intangible concessions. Without American pressure as well as American guarantees, Israel would be very reluctant to give any significant concessions to Egypt. Sadat strongly believed in American leverage over Israel, a factor that ranked high in his calculations as he sought American involvement.

2. Sadat hoped by involving the U.S. in a Mideast peace process, the U.S. would initiate a "Marshall Plan" to bolster Egypt's faltering economy and help Egyptian reconstruction efforts.

3. Egypt sought American mediation also because the alternatives available to it were less attractive -- a Geneva peace conference, or the "no war, no peace" status quo.

4. Finally, Egypt wanted American involvement because the U.S. proved in the Kissinger 1973-75 negotiations to be trustworthy and capable of producing positive results.

As for the effectiveness of the third party, there is no doubt that the U.S. was successful in its mediatory role in Camp David. The Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty bears witness to the effectiveness of U.S. mediation. In chapter IV, we examined the effectiveness criterion in the context of third party functions. Without U.S. active involvement in the negotiations and the peace process, the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty may have never materialized. American mediation brought the Egyptian-Israeli relations, at least in the short run, from the wrath of wars to the security of peace and normal relations.

American success may be attributed to the following:

1. Carter's ability to work out a package deal agreement in which, at least, the minimum dispositions of both Egypt and Israel were met.

2. U.S. ability to utilize its reward power to entice the

parties to reach agreement. American financial commitments and other incentives were contingent upon parties' agreement. This undoubtedly figured high in the cost/benefit calculations of each party.

3. Carter's ability to use effectively his friendship with Sadat to get major concessions from Egypt. Also, Carter's ability to utilize his friendship with Dayan to soften Begin's obdurate attitude and get concessions from Israel. As shown in Figures 4-2 and 4-1, the inter-group alliances were instrumental in getting concessions from both sides.

Our case study provides conclusive evidence negating the contention which assumes impartiality to be necessary in all situations. But we do not claim that impartiality is irrelevant or unnecessary in all circumstances. We only assert, based on our findings in this case study, that impartiality is unnecessary or has little relevance in the following situations:

A. When the third party is a powerful actor in international affairs. The fact that the third party is powerful might be the key to the acceptance of his role and his effectiveness. In the Camp David process, the U.S. used its reward power to get the parties to agree to its role and to facilitate final agreement. U.S. rewarded Egypt and Israel with huge military and economic aid, which only a powerful actor (a great power or a superpower) could have afforded.

B. When the third party possesses strong influence and

leverage over his ally, for whom the third party maintains bias. In such a situation, the unfavored party (i.e., the party against whom the bias is directed) may induce the third party his influence on the latter's ally. In the Camp David process, Egypt sought American active participation in the negotiations, in part, because U.S. had strong leverage over Israel. The U.S. is perhaps the only country which could force the Israelis to change their mind and make necessary concessions.

C. When the third party has vital interests at stake in the conflict at hand. The U.S. had vital interests in the Middle East which it was determined to protect. The U.S. announced to the parties its own views on the issues of the conflict and none of the parties seriously disputed the U.S. right to assert its position in the negotiations. As we mentioned earlier, if third party's enunciated views were not clearly unreasonable such views could serve as a focal point of agreement between the parties. Often times in the Camp David negotiations, U.S. views were more acceptable to the parties than were each other's views. In so far as impartiality is concerned however, the third party's interests and enunciations seem to modify the third party's bias. Impartiality becomes less important to the unfavored party because the interests of the third party constrain him from being clearly reasonable. In our case study, U.S. interests in the Arab World would have been jeopardized if the U.S. was totally one-sided to Israel's

advantage.

D. When the third party maintains strong relationships with influential decision makers. In the Camp David negotiations, American pro-Israel bias was somewhat modified by the strong Carter-Sadat friendship.

One of the significant strengths of Camp David was the existence of inter-group personal relationships. Carter maintained a strong relationship with Dayan on the Israeli side and a strong relationship with President Sadat on the Egyptian side. Also, Sadat maintained a strong relationship with Israeli Defence Minister Ezer Weizman whom he liked (Carter, 1982: 343). These relationships served very constructively in the Camp David negotiations. To be sure, the inter-group personal relationships in Camp David confront mediation literature with a new fact: That it may be wrong to assume that each delegation in the negotiations must be considered as one unit, without any consideration to the different styles and characteristics of the individual participants within each delegation.

Fisher maintains that some members of a delegation may be more constrained than others in participating in the inventing of new solutions which may contradict their public positions (1978: 64-5). In our case study, Dayan and Weizman were less inhibited than Prime Minister Begin in the search for new solutions and making concessions (Carter, 1982: 256, 378, 395). And, they were, in many instances, helpful in convincing Begin

to make a concession or compromise on an issue. The opposite situation existed on the Egyptian side; Sadat was more forthcoming than were his advisers and aides. The Carter-Sadat relationship, we believe, was one of the most significant factors contributing to Egyptian flexibility and compromise. The different negotiating styles of Begin and Sadat made Carter's role much easier, and enhanced his efforts.

Finally, we believe that our case study has contributed to a better understanding of the role of third parties in the following ways:

1. Impartiality of a third party may not be as important as mediation literature maintains.

2. Third party's influence, leverage, resources and his willingness to use his resources may be the prime factors, contributing to third party's acceptability and effectiveness.

3. High level involvement (by heads of government, for example) gives more significance to the negotiations and produces faster and more important results.

4. Practical results can be produced through limiting the range of bargaining and working out of a package deal agreement which meets the minimum demands of both sides in the negotiations.

5. Finally, delegations do not necessarily act as cohesive units. Different participants within each delegation may take different positions, depending on their professional

backgrounds, positions, or personal styles which may contribute significantly to conflict resolution. We concur, therefore, with Fisher's contention that the mediator must learn about the individual participants and encourage the moderate elements within each delegation (1978: 123).

APPENDIX

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

RESOLUTION 242

(November 22, 1967)

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concerns with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. Affirms that the fulfilment of the Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

(i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and

recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. Affirms further the necessity

(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the State concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution.

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

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