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**The Selective Maintenance of International
Peace and Security:**
**The Role of Great Powers and United Nations
Conflict Management**

by

DANIELA ZANE, B.A.

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs

Carleton University

Ottawa, Ontario

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The undersigned hereby recommend to the Faculty of
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Christopher J. Maule, Director
The Norman Paterson School
of International Affairs

Professor B. Tomlin, Supervisor

ABSTRACT

The first forty years of United Nations conflict management were characterized by selective involvement in disputes according to the interests of the great powers. With the goal of exploring the connection between great power interest and U.N. involvement, this paper poses two research questions: What are the conditions under which great powers support or oppose U.N. involvement? And, is there a connection between this support or opposition and the degree of U.N. involvement which results? To answer the first question, four hypotheses were generated from the literature on U.N. conflict management, and then tested using twelve cases of international conflict. The findings indicate that the following conditions may not be especially accurate predictors of great power predispositions: a conflict which engages great power security interest and the presence of cold war or ideological issues. Certain conditions also emerged which appear to be of more value in predicting great power predispositions: great power security interest combined with a great power wishing to limit its involvement, great power support for the aggressor, and a great power seeking legitimization for its actions. To answer the second question, the same twelve cases were used but considering great power support or opposition as the independent variable and U.N. involvement as the dependent variable. The findings indicate that great power opposition leads to less U.N. involvement, while great power support or a combination of support and opposition leads to greater U.N. involvement, thus underscoring the need to identify the conditions underlying great power predispositions.

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Chapter One - Introduction

In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf. (Article 24, paragraph 1)¹

The Charter of the United Nations, signed by some fifty countries towards the end of the Second World War, was intended to be the blueprint for a new and peaceful world order based upon a system of collective security overseen by the great powers of the day: the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, China, and France. Great power hegemony was established as a supporting principle of the U.N. system, the rationale being that the great powers would work together to manage conflicts which threatened international peace and security.

The following four decades of U.N. history, however, were characterized by great power discord, not agreement, and by selective conflict management, not collective security. This paper seeks to focus upon the issue of selective conflict management within the United Nations, and in particular to explore the role of the great powers in determining which conflicts the U.N. would become involved in managing. Specifically, two questions may be put forth for analysis: what are the conditions under which the great powers support or oppose U.N. conflict management involvement? And, is there a connection

¹ The Charter of the United Nations, Scranton, PA, The Haddon Craftsmen, 1945, p. 181.

between this support or opposition and the degree of U.N. involvement which results?

Background

Great power control over U.N. conflict management, and over the United Nations in general, was intentionally built into the U.N. system. As early as 1940, the United States government began sketching the outlines of a world organization which would replace the defunct League of Nations when the war ended. Learning from the failure of the League to stem German, Japanese, and Italian aggression before World War II, American policymakers agreed that the new institution must abandon the League principle of unanimity, give special executive privileges to the great powers, and possess armed forces of its own.²

In consultation with the British and the Soviets, the Americans developed these preliminary ideas throughout the war, and in July of 1944 offered "Tentative Proposals for an International Organization." The U.S. proposals, although modified through great power negotiation at Dumberton Oaks and by middle and smaller powers during the San Francisco Conference, in essence provided the basis for the U.N. Charter.³

The Charter entrenches great power hegemony by giving only the "Big

² Evan Luard, A History of the United Nations. Volume 1: The Years of Western Domination, 1945-1955, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1982, p. 18.

³ Luard, pp. 18-29.

5" permanent seats on the Security Council, the U.N. organ primarily responsible for maintaining international peace and security.⁴ In the case of an international dispute (Chapter VI), the Security Council may act by: calling upon the parties to peacefully settle their differences (Article 33, paragraph 2), recommending "appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment" (Article 35, paragraph 1), and/or recommending "terms of settlement" (Article 37, paragraph 2). If confronted with "threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression" (Chapter VII), the Security Council's powers grow considerably; the body is authorized by the Charter to use force to restore international peace and security (Article 42), and to call upon any U.N. member for assistance (Article 43, paragraph 1). While the Charter provides for six non-permanent seats on the Council to be taken by other U.N. members on a rotating basis, only the permanent five have the right to veto any Security Council proceeding. (Article 26, paragraph 3)⁵

As mentioned above, the intention of those who drafted the Charter was not to give the great powers such privileges simply because they had more money and more arms than other nations. Rather, the idea behind great power hegemony was to make the United Nations an effective keeper of the

⁴ Article 23, paragraph 1 of the U.N. Charter stipulates that the Security Council shall consist of 11 members, with China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States as the five permanent members.

⁵ Article 26, paragraph 3 articulates one exception to the great power veto: "a party to a dispute must refrain from voting." However, as Luard states on page 48, this exception has all been ignored by the great powers; in practice, he states, they are rarely prevented from voting.

peace. By taking into account the realities of post-war power relations, the drafters had hoped to provide the "Big 5" with the power to maintain international peace and security, and inspire in them the duty to do so as well.⁶ At the time,

[t]his was the hope, amounting almost to a belief, that the United Nations would be able to function with the advantage, denied to the League from the beginning, of the active participation and cooperation of the great powers that were primarily responsible for victory in the war about to be ended.⁷

What the Charter drafters could not have anticipated was the lack of cooperation among the great powers, and specifically between the United States and the Soviet Union, which would characterize the functioning of the U.N. during the following years. This great power disunity essentially emasculated the collective security provisions of the Charter. While in theory the Security Council should have helped to resolve all disputes peacefully as well as to direct the use of force against threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression, "in practice what occurred was the mobilization of support for collective security actions on a case-by-case basis judged by the political affiliations of the members colored by self-serving precedential logics."⁸

In effect, great power hegemony, and especially the great power veto,

⁶ Leland M. Goodrich and Anne P. Simons, The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, Washington D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1962, p. 264.

⁷ Goodrich and Simons, p. 22.

⁸ Frank Lester Sherman, Partway to Peace: The United Nations and the Road to Nowhere?, Ph.D dissertation, State College, PA, The Pennsylvania State University, 1987, p. 265.

resulted in the Security Council acting to encourage the peaceful settlement of some disputes, while ignoring others. And with the exceptions of the Uniting for Peace resolution used in Korea and the recent U.S.-led war to expel Iraq from Kuwait, Chapter VII of the Charter has not been put into practice at all. As Ruggie states: "Thus, in the context of collective conflict management, the pertinent question to ask of the U.N. is not 'Will the peace be kept?' but 'Whose peace will be kept?'"⁹

This paper will examine just this issue of selective conflict management by the United Nations, with a particular emphasis on the role of the great powers. An additional question must now be raised: Why is it important to identify conditions under which great powers support or oppose U.N. conflict management involvement, and then link great power attitudes to U.N. involvement?

It must be recognized that since 1945 the U.N.'s role as a world conflict manager has been quite limited, especially in light of the role which its founders perhaps too optimistically envisioned it would play. The U.N. Security Council has failed to intervene in many of the world's most dangerous and intractable conflicts, due in large part, this paper will argue, to the influence of the great powers. By exposing in detail great power influence, and specifically identifying a set of conditions under which the great powers will support or

⁹ John Gerard Ruggie, "Contingencies, Constraints, and Collective Security: Perspectives on UN Involvement in International Disputes," International Organization, Vol. 28, No. 3, Summer, 1974, p. 507.

oppose U.N. involvement, this paper can help illuminate both the opportunities which exist for U.N. conflict management and the constraints under which an organization made up of sovereign states and dominated by self-interested great powers must operate.

In a broader sense, exploring the role of the great powers in U.N. conflict management will also paint a portrait of how the organization operates. Historically, the United Nations has had two images, one idealistic and one realistic.¹⁰ The idealist image emphasizes how the U.N. was intended to function: as an international actor maintaining world-wide peace and security through great power cooperation. The realist image, on the other hand, describes how the Organization often has functioned in the past: as an instrument of the great powers selectively managing conflict through power politics. The analysis in this paper may shed light on these two images, suggesting which more accurately captures U.N. behavior.

Methodology

Before explaining this paper's approach to the question, key terms must be defined and basic assumptions presented. First, this study will focus exclusively on the United Nations as a conflict manager, and will not include those regional organizations and ad hoc agents which also manage conflict in

¹⁰ Kinhide Mushakoji, "The U.N. System: Structural Transformation and Crisis," In: Daniel P. Frei, ed., Managing International Crisis, Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, 1982, p. 147.

the international system. The term "great powers" is defined as the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council; a special note, however, must be made about China. Although China was an original signatory power to the U.N. Charter and has been allotted a permanent seat on the Security Council since the organization's founding, the country only took that seat in October of 1971 as the People's Republic of China. For the purposes of this study, the PRC will only be included as a great power from that date onwards.

The assumption most central to this paper is that the great powers, by virtue of their prominent positions and special voting privileges within the Security Council, do exercise a degree of influence over the U.N.'s conflict management agenda, and that this influence is important enough to be considered a major factor in determining the set of disputes which the United Nations becomes involved in managing.

A second, and related, assumption is that the body of conflicts which could or should be managed by the U.N. is much larger than the body of conflicts which the U.N. actually does manage. While this point may seem obvious, only recently has the literature on collective conflict management focussed on it in a systematic way.

Frank Sherman, for example, in his 1987 Ph.D dissertation, examines the effectiveness of the U.N. and other organizations as conflict managers by including in his dataset all conflicts which meet the organizations' constitutional mandates for agenda inclusion, whether they were managed or not. He then

considers the reasons why a particular conflict, or set of conflicts, was or was not managed. Sherman believes that such a complete study is necessary, not only to determine the structure of power and influence in the international environment in which conflict is managed, but also because of a recent and disturbing trend:

the number of [management] agents ignoring disputes that are relevant for their constitutional and historical patterns of conflict management are increasing at a greater rate than the overall level of disputes.¹¹

Similar to the Sherman study, this paper considers the disparity in number between conflicts which could be managed by the U.N. and conflicts which are managed to be important. More specifically, the paper assumes that the great powers significantly influence this disparity, and it seeks to identify the particular conditions under which they will support or oppose involvement by the U.N. in the management of conflicts.

In approaching the issue, the paper will first review the literature on U.N. conflict management, drawing out those conditions which various authors identify as determining great power support for or opposition to U.N. conflict management involvement. These conditions will then be consolidated into four testable hypotheses.

The body of literature referred to in this paper includes both empirical

¹¹ Sherman, p. 409.

and non-empirical studies of U.N. effectiveness.¹² It must be noted that not one of these studies focuses specifically upon great power influence over U.N. conflict management; in fact, most studies are concerned with U.N. success, not involvement, as a conflict manager, and use a variety of factors to explain U.N. effectiveness. However, the studies do give considerable attention to great power influence, thereby permitting the generation of hypotheses.

The hypotheses, to be presented in Chapter Two along with the literature review, will then be tested using twelve cases of conflict which occurred between 1945 and 1975. These twelve cases are: Soviet Claims on Turkey, 1945-47; Kurdistan, 1945-46; the Berlin Blockade, 1948-49; East European Human Rights, 1949-50; the Suez War, 1956-57; the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962; the Czech Invasion, 1968; the Gulf of Tonkin Incidents, 1964; the Sudanese Civil War, 1968-72; Bangladesh, 1970-74; the Yom Kippur War, 1973; and South Vietnam - People's Republic of China (PRC), 1974. As will be outlined in Chapter Three, the cases were chosen to represent considerable variation in the independent variables of the hypotheses, as well as in three additional areas: system era, location of the conflict, and parties to the conflict.

The paper will then present a test of the hypotheses in Chapter Four, determining whether the set of conditions in each conflict relates to the management outcome in the hypothesized manner. Great power support for

¹² The empirical studies are: Northedge and Donelan (1971); Haas, Butterworth, and Nye (1972); Ruggie (1974); Pelcovits and Kramer (1976); Butterworth (1978); Zacher (1979); Haas (1983); Wilkenfield and Brecher (1984); and Sherman (1987). The non-empirical studies are: Junn (1983); Vayrynen (1985); and Sherry (1986).

or opposition to U.N. involvement will be indicated and described, and the hypotheses will be evaluated as to their accuracy in predicting support or opposition. An attempt will be made to identify the conditions under which great powers support or oppose U.N. conflict management involvement.

Chapter Five will take the central question of this paper one step further by comparing great power support or opposition with the nature and degree of U.N. involvement which occurred in each case, thereby determining whether or not great power attitudes made a difference in how and whether the conflict was actually managed by the United Nations.

Conclusion

It has often been said that the United Nations is an organization established by the great powers for the great powers. Perhaps nowhere is this more true than in the Security Council, the main organ of the U.N. for dealing with conflicts which threaten international peace and security, and the one in which the great powers wield obvious influence. While great power control over the U.N.'s conflict management agenda has been asserted by different scholars, a specific study on just this issue is notably absent from the literature.

The purpose of this paper is to fill that gap, by using the current literature to focus on conditions under which great powers support or oppose U.N. conflict management involvement. Identifying these conditions is an important task, and one which will help illuminate the complex workings of the

United Nations as it is poised to assume an increasingly important role in the management of international conflict.

Chapter Two - Review of the Literature

Chapter Two will begin the process of identifying a set of conditions under which the great powers of the Security Council support or oppose U.N. conflict management involvement. First, four hypotheses which have been derived from the literature will be presented, together with some commentary and explanation. Second, the chapter will demonstrate how these hypotheses were derived from the body of literature on U.N. conflict management. Finally, the chapter will conclude by explaining in more detail why these four hypotheses were chosen and why others were not, arguing that they represent the most significant assertions made in the literature about the conditions under which the great powers support or oppose U.N. involvement in managing a dispute.

The Hypotheses

In all, twelve different sources, identified in Chapter One, make up the body of literature from which the hypotheses were derived. The process of generating the hypotheses began with the identification of those conditions which each author observed as influencing great power support for or opposition to U.N. involvement in a dispute. Then, the body of literature was considered as a whole, cross-referencing different conditions to determine which seemed most significant in terms of the number of sources which

discussed the condition, and the degree of analysis which it received. The most significant conditions were then consolidated, and the following four hypotheses were generated:

1. Great powers are more likely to oppose U.N. involvement in conflicts that directly engage their own security interests, except in situations where they wish to limit their involvement or cut costs associated with the conflict.
2. Great powers are more likely to oppose U.N. involvement in conflicts over cold war and ideological issues.
3. Great powers are more likely to oppose U.N. involvement in conflicts where they have offered support to the aggressor.
4. Great powers are more likely to support U.N. involvement in conflicts where they seek to legitimize policies through international consideration of the conflict.

Before explaining how these hypotheses were derived from the literature, several comments are necessary. Firstly, it must be noted that most of the conflicts analyzed in the literature occurred during the cold war era in international relations. Thus, most studies emphasize superpower competition as being a major determinant of great power policies in the United Nations, and particularly in the Security Council. For example, Mark Zacher bases his assessments of great power behavior upon principles of state behavior in a competitive, bi-polar system.¹ While the hypotheses are not meant to apply only within such a system, it must be recognized that they reflect a cold war orientation.

¹ Mark W. Zacher, International Conflicts and Collective Security, 1945-77, Toronto, Praeger Publishers, 1979. See, in particular, pages 6-14.

A second important point about the hypotheses is that they imply inversion. In other words, the first hypothesis states that the great powers will probably oppose U.N. management in conflicts which engage their security interests, and it follows that the great powers will probably support U.N. management in conflicts which do not engage their security interests. The hypotheses were deliberately arranged and worded to imply inversion, with the rationale being that they would apply to situations where the conditions described would vary in their presence.

A third issue is raised by the observation that each hypothesis isolates a set of conditions, without indicating their interrelationship. In other words, there is no statement about the number of conditions that must be present in a conflict to either encourage or prevent U.N. involvement. Perhaps only one is enough, or perhaps two or more are needed, or perhaps the number needed depends on other circumstances surrounding the conflict. In addition, the question of what happens when both conditions encouraging and preventing U.N. involvement are present has not been addressed in the hypotheses. This situation reflects the current state of knowledge in the field, and it is hoped that the analysis of the hypotheses using the cases presented in Chapter Four will shed light on the subject of the interaction of different conditions.

Finally, it is important to note that these four hypotheses do not comprehensively cover the entire range of conditions described in the literature as affecting great power support for or opposition to U.N. involvement.

However, the hypotheses represent those conditions which were judged to be most significant, and which enjoyed the highest degree of support and consensus in the literature. Why and how other conditions were excluded will be explained in detail in the concluding section of this chapter.

Explaining Hypothesis 1

The idea behind the first part of this hypothesis, that the great powers will oppose U.N. involvement if a conflict directly engages their own security interests, is at least mentioned in every one of the twelve sources used to generate the hypotheses. Furthermore, four out of these twelve sources mention the second part of Hypothesis 1 as well; namely, that great power opposition due to the engagement of their security interests will turn to support if the great powers wish to limit their involvement or cut costs in a conflict. These four sources are: Haas, Butterworth, and Nye (1972); Ruggie (1974); Pelcovits and Kramer (1976); and Sherry (1986).

F.S. Northedge and M.D. Donelan, in their 1971 work International Disputes: The Political Aspects, examine the political underpinnings of international dispute creation and management. The authors' conclusion that great power interest in a conflict often prevents its management by the U.N. is derived from both observations on the nature of politics and empirical assessments of the extent of U.N. involvement in international disputes since

1945.²

According to Northedge and Donelan, disputes occur inevitably within an international system composed of nation-states striving to assure their security requirements.³ "World government" is not defined by the United Nations, but rather is composed of the complex relations among the states of the system, who negotiate, argue, form alliances, restrain one another, and go to war. This entire scenario is dominated by the great powers, for "great powers often have world-wide views of their security; and therefore see it justifiable to intervene in various cases to seek an outcome which they desire."⁴

While they must act to assure their security requirements, the great powers also have primary responsibility within the system for limiting disputes. They can limit disputes in a number of ways: by "overwhelming power," or imposing their will; by maintaining a balance of power; by promoting economic and security cooperation; or by the power of ideas.⁵ At the United Nations, the great powers can cooperate within the Security Council to limit disputes.

The authors note, however, that states bring only certain types of

² F.S. Northedge and M.D. Donelan, International Disputes: The Political Aspects, London, Europa Publications, 1971.

³ Northedge and Donelan define "dispute" as a conflict not only of will, but of justice and truth as well.

⁴ Northedge and Donelan, p. 135.

⁵ Northedge and Donelan state: "The great powers are not simply great powers but great cultures, and the ideas that they propagate about international politics have a deep influence on the conduct of the world of states as a whole." p. 168.

disputes before the U.N., and that the great powers are no exception to this rule. Using an empirical study of U.N. involvement in 50 international disputes since 1945, the authors found that in cases of conflict which were between the superpowers, involved their alliances, or arose within their spheres of influence, the U.N. played no role or a minimal role. In such conflicts vital to their security interests,

the superpowers, sometimes with each other's tacit agreement, have made it abundantly clear that they intend to remain paramount within their own spheres of influence and that there is nothing the U.N. or any other international organization can do to change the situation.

To further support their assertions, Northedge and Donelan note that in the 17 cases out of 50 which they judged to be characterized by extensive U.N. involvement, only one was located in Europe and none arose directly within a superpower sphere.

In Conflict Management in International Organizations (1972), Ernst B. Haas, Robert L. Butterworth, and Joseph S. Nye arrive at a similar conclusion. This study examines the influence of the United Nations and various regional organizations upon 146 cases of conflict between 1945 and 1970. In particular, the study seeks to explain why U.N. management is successful in abating some conflicts and unsuccessful in others. Regarding the influence of the great powers, the authors put forth a specific question: "Is success easily explained in terms of popular impressions that the more powerful nations settle

their quarrels bilaterally?"⁶

Essentially, the authors find justification for this popular impression in their study. Their research indicates that: first, the "major hegemonic powers" prevent disputes which they have caused from being resolved by the U.N.; second, disputes between the superpowers and between their blocs are not well-managed by the U.N.; and third, "the weaker the antagonists the greater the organization's chances of managing the conflict."⁷

In other words, the study recognizes that disputes in which the great powers are involved are less likely to be well-managed, or managed at all, by the United Nations. Furthermore, the study equates great power disinterest in a conflict with a lack of opposition to U.N. involvement, which amounts to the inversion of Hypothesis 1. "We can conclude," state the authors, "that whenever the stronger nations are sufficiently disinterested, uncertain, or resigned, they will not block the implementation of a resolution that they do not favor in principle."⁸

However, Haas, Butterworth, and Nye do cite one exception to the above generalizations. While they associate great power security interest in a conflict with opposition to U.N. involvement, the authors note that this opposition may change to support if a great power "appears eager to avoid

⁶ Ernst B. Haas, Robert L. Butterworth, and Joseph S. Nye, Conflict Management in International Organizations, Morristown, NJ, General Learning Press, 1972, p. 3.

⁷ Haas, Butterworth, and Nye, pp. 22-24.

⁸ Haas, Butterworth, and Nye, p. 32.

escalation or cut its losses, [or] can think of no other way to keep the conflict from getting worse." In such cases, they explain, the U.N. may be "marginally useful."⁹ Thus, the Haas, Butterworth, and Nye study provides support for both parts of the first hypothesis.

John Gerard Ruggie, in his 1974 article "Contingencies, Constraints, and Collective Security: Perspectives on U.N. Involvement in International Disputes," also finds that the great powers oppose U.N. involvement in conflicts which engage their own interests, but that this practice varies according to the concentration and symmetry of resources in the organization at a given point in time.¹⁰ This qualified conclusion reflects Ruggie's novel approach to explaining U.N. behavior, which is built around the assertion that as the "task environment" of the U.N. changes, U.N. actions change in response.¹¹

Ruggie acknowledges that recent contributions in the field recognize the importance of the international environment as a determinant of U.N. behavior. However, he criticizes these studies for relying on "single factor, empirical characterizations of the international environment." For example, he notes that three environmental factors are most often cited in the literature as being crucial to determining U.N. behavior: the nature of the issue; the hierarchy of

⁹ Haas, Butterworth, and Nye, p. 20.

¹⁰ John Gerard Ruggie, "Contingencies, Constraints, and Collective Security: Perspectives on U.N. Involvement in International Disputes," International Organization, Vol. 28, No. 3, Summer 1974, pp. 493-520.

¹¹ Ruggie defines the "task environment" of an organization as: "the subset of 'everything out there' that is relevant to goal setting and goal attainment within the context of a specific issue or decision." p. 506.

powers; and international alignment patterns. In isolation, each factor has an accuracy rate in accounting for U.N. behavior which he believes can be improved: 53 percent, 63.3 percent, and 71.7 percent, respectively.¹²

Instead of studying these factors, Ruggie chooses to focus on the concentration of resources in the organization (on a spectrum from concentrated to dispersed), and on the manner of concentration of these resources (which ranges from symmetrical to asymmetrical). Ruggie then generates four "behavior settings" based on these factors, and applies them to twenty years of U.N. behavior.¹³

The author finds that during "the formative years" of the U.N. (1945-1947), when resources in the organization were concentrated asymmetrically in the hands of the great powers, the U.N. would generally not intervene in a conflict which involved the great powers. This observation can be extended to the years 1948-1955, in which resources were concentrated symmetrically in the hands of the superpowers. In particular, he notes, the U.N. would not become involved in intra-bloc conflicts. Usually, the U.N. would not become involved in inter-bloc conflict either; however, Ruggie does cite one important exception. If both blocs would be "adversely affected by the continuation of

¹² In other words, Ruggie finds that examining the nature of the issue in a dispute will correctly predict U.N. involvement in 53 percent of cases, etc. See Ruggie, pp. 497-504.

¹³ The behavior settings are plotted on a point graph, with concentration of resources the vertical axis and manner of concentration the horizontal axis. The settings are as follows: X1 (concentrated, asymmetrical); X2 (concentrated, symmetrical); X3 (dispersed, symmetrical); X4 (dispersed, asymmetrical).

the conflict," in other words wishing to impose restraint on the situation, the U.N. would become involved.¹⁴ This exception provides support for the second part of Hypothesis 1.

The years 1956-61, in which resources began to be more dispersed due to the rise of the Third World bloc in the U.N. but were still symmetrically distributed between the superpowers, saw a weakening of the connection between great power interest and a lack of U.N. involvement. Ruggie observes a similar weakening in the next era, 1961-1974, in which resources become asymmetrically dispersed. He does acknowledge, however, that the connection still exists:

[In this era] the superpowers are finding it difficult to harness the U.N. as an extension of their own policies, although all of the great powers [still] appear able to prevent the Organization from attempting to regulate their behavior.¹⁵

Great power interest, Ruggie acknowledges, is one significant factor influencing whether or not the U.N. becomes involved in managing a conflict, but its degree of influence varies according to the concentration and symmetry of resources in the U.N. at a given time. Other factors also affect U.N. behavior, and by looking at them as a whole through the application of his "behavior setting" model, Ruggie attains an 80 percent accuracy rate in predicting U.N. involvement.¹⁶

¹⁴ Ruggie, p. 512.

¹⁵ Ruggie, pp. 511-514.

¹⁶ Ruggie, p. 515.

In their 1976 study "Local Conflict and U.N. Peace-keeping: The Uses of Computerized Data," N.A. Pelcovits and Kevin L. Kramer come to a different conclusion concerning the relationship between great power interest and U.N. peace-keeping. They find that great power interest in a conflict is a necessary prerequisite for U.N. involvement, specifically in the form of peace-keeping, to occur. However, they find this conclusion to be relevant primarily to cases of local conflict in areas of superpower contention, and explain great power interest in terms of their need for restraint, thus supporting the second part of Hypothesis 1.¹⁷

Pelcovits and Kramer set out to examine "what impels toward U.N. intervention," and, in particular, what conditions must be present for U.N. peace-keeping to occur. Through the analysis of "CASCON," a computerized data set of 52 post-World War II local conflicts, the authors identify seven cases of U.N. peace-keeping. After examining these cases and comparing them to cases in which peace-keeping was absent, they conclude that

great power involvement (GP) was closely linked to international organization intervention (IO). The mean intensity of shared factors was 94.2%, and the correlation between GP and IO variables showed a coefficient of .805. This relationship was the sole significant one discovered in the CASCON data with a bearing on IO intervention in local conflict.¹⁸

Speculating as to why this relationship exists, the authors note two

¹⁷ N.A. Pelcovits and Kevin L. Kramer, "Local Conflict and U.N. Peace-keeping: The Uses of Computerized Data," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 4, December, 1976, pp. 533-552.

¹⁸ Pelcovits and Kramer, p. 533.

possible reasons: first, the relationship may reflect a desire on the part of the great powers interested in a local conflict to impose restraint on the conflict and thus avoid unwanted involvement; second, the relationship could be indicative of great power desire to control events and thus avoid a loss of world-wide prestige. In summarizing their findings, the authors emphasize the first explanation:

One can safely conclude on the basis of the correlation [between great power interest and U.N. involvement] that a prime utility of international peace-keeping is to avoid escalation of a conflict which might drag great powers into hostilities and overshadow their ability or desire to be more restrained in their actions.¹⁹

Pelcovits and Kramer find support for this assertion in the observation that, with the exception of the Congo operation, all seven cases of U.N. peace-keeping occurred in the Middle East and Asia, areas of superpower contestation. They assert that conflicts in these areas would have the potential of dangerously drawing in the superpowers, thus compelling them to support U.N. involvement in the form of peace-keeping as a constraining mechanism.²⁰

The authors also note that if the data reveals that U.N. peace-keeping only occurs when levels of great power involvement are high, the obverse does not follow. In other words, a high level of great power interest in a conflict may not, and often does not, lead to the introduction of U.N. peace-keeping forces.

¹⁹ Pelcovits and Kramer, p. 547.

²⁰ Pelcovits and Kramer, pp. 547-548.

This latter observation is especially true for conflicts which occur within a great power's sphere of influence, or which in other words directly engage a great power's security interests. The authors point out that no peacekeeping operations occurred within the purview of great power alliances: "In its sphere of hegemony, a great power was perceived as committed to political and strategic aims not subject to the restraint of international peace-keeping."²¹

Robert L. Butterworth, in his 1978 article "Do Conflict Managers Matter?", gives some brief comments on the general lack of success of managers in dealing with conflicts characterized by great power involvement. His study does not focus on this issue, but rather seeks to empirically define how much management efforts have "mattered" in cases of inter-state conflict. Examining 310 conflicts which occurred between 1945 and 1974, Butterworth determines overall whether managers were involved in the conflicts, whether they were successful in managing the conflicts, and whether they demonstrated any long-term influence in shaping future conflict patterns.²²

Butterworth's results indicate that management agents matter "a great deal" in terms of their involvement in conflicts, "to a limited extent" in terms of their success in managing the conflicts, and "very little" in terms of changing the international system.²³ Regarding the issue of great power interest, the

²¹ Pelcovits and Kramer, p. 548.

²² Robert Lyle Butterworth, "Do Conflict Managers Matter?", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 2, June, 1978, pp. 195-214.

²³ Butterworth, "Do Conflict Managers Matter?", p. 195.

author finds that "for many reasons," only 22 percent of conflicts involving the superpowers and only 19 percent of conflicts involving opposing cold war blocs were managed by agents, including the United Nations.²⁴

In his 1979 study International Conflicts and Collective Security 1945-77, Mark W. Zacher recognizes the low rate of U.N. involvement in conflicts within and between superpower blocs, conflicts which by their nature directly engage great power security interests. Zacher's study is ambitious, setting out to explain both international organization success and involvement in managing 93 wars, crises, and military interventions which took place between 1946 and 1977. Zacher focuses upon the United Nations as a conflict manager, but also includes several regional organizations in his analysis: the Organization of American States (OAS), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the Arab League.²⁵

Zacher's approach assumes first of all that an organization's response to a conflict as well as the conflict outcome are governed by specific forces: "the character of the security coalitions among their memberships and the allegiance of conflicting parties to these memberships."²⁶ Zacher then formulates five hypotheses concerned with conflict alignment patterns in a competitive, bi-polar system which also has non-aligned members, and goes

²⁴ Butterworth, "Do Conflict Managers Matter?", pp. 206-207.

²⁵ Mark W. Zacher, International Conflicts and Collective Security 1946-77, Toronto, Praeger Publishers, 1979.

²⁶ Zacher, p. 6.

on to postulate the results of these alignments for U.N. intervention and success.²⁷

Two of these five hypotheses concern inter-bloc and intra-bloc conflicts. The first hypothesis examines intercoalition conflicts in a competitive system, and postulates that U.N. intervention will occur only if the allies of the victim hold a two-thirds or greater majority in the U.N. However, this intervention will not be successful as long as the victim's allies support it.²⁸

The second hypothesis examines intracoalition conflicts. If a conflict is between members of a nonsubordinate grouping, meaning a grouping composed of more than one-third of U.N. membership, no intervention will occur. If the conflict is between members of a subordinate grouping, one composed of one-third or less of U.N. membership, and the victim wants to leave the bloc to join either a rival coalition or the non-aligned, then intervention will occur. However, if the victim does not want to leave, no intervention will occur.²⁹

Basically, the results of Zacher's study support his two hypotheses on inter-bloc and intra-bloc conflicts. He finds that there is a strong tendency for

²⁷ Actually, Zacher puts forth six hypotheses in his study. The hypothesis which deals with conflict in a consensual system has been left out of the analysis, because the international system during the years of this study was not characterized by his definition of consensus: "a general commitment to protect the security of all [system] members, [in which] it is the mere threat or act of aggression, and not the particular policies of the states involved, that 'triggers' their opposition to the aggressing state." (p. 10)

²⁸ Zacher, p. 17.

²⁹ Zacher, p. 18.

the U.N. not to become involved in intercoalition conflicts. Regarding intracoalition conflicts, Zacher also finds a strong tendency for the U.N. not to become involved, except when one party tries to leave a small grouping, and the rival grouping constitutes more than two-thirds of U.N. membership.³⁰

In sum, Zacher asserts that intra-bloc and inter-bloc conflicts, which imply great power security interest, are usually not managed by the United Nations, perhaps because

on matters that are crucial to their own security, the great powers are very reluctant to allow for even the possibility that they might in the future be pressured to adopt a particular policy that they would not otherwise adopt.³¹

In his 1983 article "Regime decay: conflict management and international organizations, 1945-1981," Ernst B. Haas reaches a similar conclusion to the one put forth in the 1972 Haas, Butterworth, and Nye study: that conflicts between the superpowers have not been well-managed by the U.N. In this study, Haas takes a different approach than the previous one, presenting the activities of the U.N., the OAS, the OAU, the Arab League, and the Council of Europe as "a collective conflict management regime." Haas concentrates on explaining the "decay" of this regime using 282 disputes which occurred between 1945 and 1981.³²

³⁰ Zacher, p. 78.

³¹ Zacher, p. 73.

³² Ernst B. Haas, "Regime Decay: Conflict Management and International Organizations, 1945-1981," International Organization, Vol. 37, No. 2, Spring, 1983, pp. 189-235.

In the section of his study which focusses upon the United Nations, Haas cites ten characteristics of U.N. success over its history. The observation relevant to Hypothesis 1 is Haas' statement that "disputes involving the superpowers are very rarely managed with success."³³ But, similar to Ruggie, he goes on to indicate that the ability of the great powers to prevent U.N. involvement in conflicts vital to their interests may be weakening over time.

Discussing the early years of the U.N. (1945-1947), which he characterizes as "concert," Haas notes that the "Big Four would keep disputes among themselves off the [Security Council] agenda and confine the U.N. caseload to disputes of no great salience in their foreign policies."³⁴ In "the current era" of U.N. activity (1971-present), superpower influence is "muted." For example,

in recent years the United States moderated its power to act unilaterally, partly in response to U.N. involvement, in the Iranian hostage crisis and the second Panama canal episode.³⁵

Thus, Haas' study reflects the general movement of the literature towards equating great power interest in a conflict with a lack of U.N. involvement. Like Ruggie, he qualifies his conclusions to reflect different eras of U.N. history.

Robert S. Junn, in "Voting in the United Nations Security Council" (1983), observes that use of the veto by the great powers in the Security Council can

³³ Haas, "Regime Decay," pp. 206-207.

³⁴ Haas, "Regime Decay," p. 219.

³⁵ Haas, "Regime Decay," p. 210.

be partly explained by the desire of those powers to protect their "vital interests."³⁶ Junn begins his study by asserting that all vetoes in the Security Council have been exercised on just five issues: membership admission, the peaceful settlement of disputes, collective security measures, the regulation of arms, and the appointment of the Secretary-General.³⁷

Regarding the second and third issues, Junn notes that both the Soviet Union and the Western powers have in the past used the veto to protect their vital interests, and those of their allies, such as in the case of the Soviet Union vetoing U.N. involvement in its 1956 invasion of Hungary.³⁸ In conclusion, Junn finds that the use of the veto in the Security Council is confined to two areas: situations which engage the vital interests of the great powers, in which case the veto is intended to obstruct the Security Council from functioning; and affairs of other nations considered significant by one or more permanent members of the Security Council, in which case the veto is intended to provoke a compromise.³⁹ Through his study of the veto, Junn thus supports the relationship between great power interest and opposition to U.N. involvement noted in the first hypothesis.

The 1984 study done by Jonathan Wilkenfield and Michael Brecher,

³⁶ Robert S. Junn, "Voting in the United Nations Security Council," International Interactions, Vol. 9, No. 4, 1983, pp. 315-352.

³⁷ Junn, p. 317.

³⁸ Junn, p. 333.

³⁹ Junn, p. 336.

entitled "International Crises, 1945-1975: The U.N. Dimension," stands out in this literature review because it contradicts the first part of Hypothesis 1. After analyzing U.N. involvement and success in managing 160 crises between the years 1945 and 1975, the authors found significant support for their hypothesis that the higher the level of superpower involvement in a crisis, the more likely it is that the United Nations will become involved, and the more likely it is that this involvement will be successful.⁴⁰

Specifically, the authors found that as superpower involvement in a crisis increased, the probability of U.N. involvement, the level of U.N. activity, and the effectiveness of U.N. action increased as well.⁴¹ In cases in which both superpowers were crisis actors, 60 percent exhibited Security Council or General Assembly activity, as compared to 38 percent for all other cases.⁴²

It is not clear whether Wilkenfield and Brecher's study presents a challenge to Hypothesis 1, or whether the study's findings can be explained through its emphasis on examining crises, not conflicts. The authors define a crisis for a state as

a situational change in its external or internal environment which triggers three interrelated perceptions by its decisionmakers: threat to basic values; a sense of finite time for response to those threats; and a rise in the likelihood of its involvement in some

⁴⁰ Jonathan Wilkenfield and Michael Brecher, "International Crises, 1945-1975: The U.N. Dimension," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 1, 1984, pp. 45-67.

⁴¹ Wilkenfield and Brecher, p. 59.

⁴² Wilkenfield and Brecher, p. 64.

form of military hostilities before the threat has been overcome.⁴³

Thus, a crisis appears to be more serious in terms of consequences than a conflict, and the pressure of time upon key decisionmakers is a factor as well. Perhaps, then, the study's finding could be explained by the second part of Hypothesis 1, in which superpowers confronting each other will support U.N. involvement in order to impose restraint upon the situation. In addition, because superpower crises involve a threat of world-wide nuclear war, perhaps such a situation galvanizes the other members of the U.N. as well as the Secretary-General into taking some kind of preventative action through the Organization. The anomaly of Wilkenfield and Brecher's finding are puzzling, and worthy of further attention.

Raimo Vayrynen wrote two articles in 1985 which discuss the connection between great power interest in a conflict and subsequent opposition to U.N. involvement. The first article, entitled "Focus On: Is There a Role for the United Nations in Conflict Resolution?", examines the past, present, and future roles of the U.N. as a conflict manager. Vayrynen asserts that simply the nature of the issue in a conflict (cold war or non-cold war) and the hierarchy of powers involved (great power or non-great power) does not necessarily indicate whether or not U.N. management will occur. A more appropriate indicator of involvement, he notes, is the pattern of alignment between parties to a conflict,

⁴³ Wilkenfield and Brecher, p. 47.

i.e. whether the conflict is inter-bloc or intra-bloc.⁴⁴

However, when discussing the U.N.'s record as a conflict manager, Vayrynen points out that the Organization's involvement is often compromised and complicated by great power interest in a conflict. U.S.-Soviet maneuvering in the Middle East, for example, "has meant that the United Nations is constantly being pushed aside." In Afghanistan, the Soviets continue their offensive while the United States gives aid to counter-attacking rebel forces: "This suggests that the ability of the United Nations to bring about a solution is meager in disputes where the great powers stand at loggerheads without incentive to compromise."⁴⁵

The author comes to a similar conclusion in the second article, "The United Nations and the Resolution of International Conflicts." He notes that throughout its history as a conflict manager, the U.N. has been dominated by great powers concerned with assuring their security requirements, usually at the expense of collective security.⁴⁶ During the era of U.S. hegemony in the United Nations (1948-1963), for example,

the world organization was used rather to maintain the American world order where its interests on the stability of that order were threatened than to promote collective security through

⁴⁴ Raimo Vayrynen, "Focus On: Is There a Role for the United Nations in Conflict Resolution?", Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 22, No. 3, 1985, p. 190.

⁴⁵ Vayrynen, p. 192.

⁴⁶ Raimo Vayrynen, "The United Nations and the Resolution of International Conflicts," Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 20, 1985, pp. 141-171.

cooperation between the victorious powers.⁴⁷

During this time, U.N. peace-keeping was never extended to the immediate sphere of Soviet interest, and nor were peace-keepers ever sent to East and Southeast Asia, areas usually considered part of the U.S. sphere of influence. Vayrynen notes that the world economy was expanding at this time, encouraging multilateral approaches to issues among the major powers. However, this economic expansion did not reach into the security realm, where "unilateral national and regional arrangements dominated."⁴⁸

In the subsequent eras of U.N. history, which Vayrynen titles "signs of duopoly and fragmentation" (1964-1974) and "fragmentation and disagreement" (1975-1984), the great powers continue to solve conflicts within their own spheres of influence directly; the United Nations' role is thus limited in managing conflicts which engage great power security interests.⁴⁹

George L. Sherry, in "The United Nations, International Conflict, and American Security" (1986), provides insight as to how an American strategist might view the U.N.'s role as a conflict manager. Sherry asserts that it is unrealistic for the U.N. to be considered as a world government. Rather, the Organization provides a framework for multilateral cooperation among states, provided they are willing to cooperate in the first place. The author points out

⁴⁷ Vayrynen, p. 151.

⁴⁸ Vayrynen, pp. 153-155.

⁴⁹ Vayrynen, pp. 156-162.

that there are circumstances in which the U.N. is useful to the United States: when problems defy unilateral solution, when support is needed for U.S. interests, when affirmation of the legitimacy of U.S. behavior is required. He also notes that there are cases when little can be done in the U.N. to resolve conflict; namely, when one or both superpowers are directly involved.

However, Sherry also notes that while great powers may oppose U.N. involvement when their security interests are engaged, this opposition may become support when the superpowers are involved in local conflicts which seem to have potential for escalation. In such cases, the great powers may support U.N. management to limit the conflicts, and hence limit their involvement.⁵⁰ Sherry's article is thus the fourth source which cites both parts of the first hypothesis.

The last work to be covered with respect to Hypothesis 1, Frank Lester Sherman's 1987 Ph.D dissertation Partway to Peace: The United Nations and the Road to Nowhere?, supports the idea that great power interest in a conflict will result in a lack of U.N. conflict management.⁵¹ His study is a complex and multi-level analysis of why certain cases of conflict end up on the "overt agenda" of the U.N., while others are relegated to the "veiled agenda" or the

⁵⁰ George L. Sherry, "The United Nations, International Conflict, and American Security," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 101, No. 5, 1986, pp. 753-771.

⁵¹ Frank Lester Sherman, Partway to Peace: The United Nations and the Road to Nowhere?, Ph.D Dissertation, State College, PA, The Pennsylvania State University, 1987.

"averted agenda," and therefore never come before the Organization at all.⁵²

While other factors are also important, Sherman's findings indicate that "disputes where referrals are rejected or fail are those that directly affect or involve large, great, or superpowers."⁵³ Specifically, 56.3 percent of all cases which fall into the veiled or averted agenda categories represent a threat to great power interests.⁵⁴ This finding, states Sherman,

gives further credence to the claim that the U.N. organization was originally designed to portray and support great power interests and great power conceptions of the proper development and behavior in the international political system.⁵⁵

It is clear from the above catalog of sources that the issue of great power interest in a conflict is an important condition cited in the literature as determining great power attitudes toward U.N. involvement in a conflict. The degree of support which this condition achieves in the literature is considerable; all twelve sources cite the condition as being important, and several assert that it is the most important determinant of U.N. behavior. Whether great power interest will result in the presence or lack of U.N. involvement, however, is the subject of some controversy, as was discussed in

⁵² Sherman defines the "overt agenda" as those conflicts which are actively and publicly debated within the U.N. system. The "veiled agenda" is composed of conflicts which are intentionally kept from being considered by the U.N., usually for political reasons. The "averted agenda" contains those conflicts which, because of an unintentional and structural motivation of bias, are never even considered by relevant actors for U.N. management. See Sherman, pp. 252-56.

⁵³ Sherman, p. 370.

⁵⁴ Sherman, p. 375.

⁵⁵ Sherman, p. 377.

the analysis of Wilkenfield and Brecher (1984).

The second part of Hypothesis 1, that the great powers will support intervention if a conflict engages their security interests and they want to impose restraint or cut costs, is fairly well-represented in the literature. As explained above, four sources, Haas, Butterworth, and Nye (1972) Ruggie (1974), Pelcovits and Kramer (1976), and Sherry (1986), cite this factor as an important exception to the general rule equating great power interest with a lack of U.N. involvement.

Explaining Hypothesis 2

The second hypothesis of this study, which states that great powers are more likely to oppose U.N. involvement in conflicts over cold war and ideological issues, is the product of fewer sources than the first hypothesis. Three studies, by Haas, Butterworth, and Nye (1972), by Butterworth (1978), and by Haas (1983), indicate that if a conflict is over issues related to the cold war or to contrasting ideologies, then U.N. involvement will not occur. All three studies draw this conclusion without defining exactly what constitutes a cold war or ideological issue.

In their study, Haas, Butterworth, and Nye examine the popular theory that the type of issue surrounding a conflict determines U.N. success in managing it. Specifically, they question whether the theory that the U.N. cannot deal with cold war issues and can only deal with decolonization issues,

is justified. Their findings indicate that it is correct: the U.N. maintains a low success rate in managing cold war issues, and "it remains overwhelmingly apparent that the U.N. is only capable of managing conflicts involving decolonization or no larger world issues at all."⁵⁶

Robert L. Butterworth cites cold war and ideological issues as conditions which, along with great power involvement, appear to prevent successful conflict management. According to his study, managers were successful in 24 percent of cases involving contending ideologies, and in just 14 percent of cases involving cold war tensions.⁵⁷

The 1983 study by Haas also mentions cold war issues as being especially difficult for U.N. management. Similar to the 1972 Haas, Butterworth, and Nye study, this work states that among different types of issues managed by the United Nations, decolonization issues have been the most readily managed while cold war issues have been the most rarely managed. In general, Haas states, "cold war alignments complicate the management of conflict considerably."⁵⁸

Identified by three out of the twelve sources cited in this literature review, the connection between cold war and ideological issues and the great powers opposing U.N. involvement achieves a medium degree of support in the

⁵⁶ Haas, Butterworth, and Nye, p. 20.

⁵⁷ Butterworth, "Do Conflict Managers Matter?", p. 207.

⁵⁸ Haas, "Regime Decay," p. 204.

literature. As all three sources agree on its implications, the condition can also be said to achieve wide consensus. One problem with this hypothesis, however, is that since the authors of the studies do not define cold war or ideological issues, it is difficult to determine what the indicators of these conditions should be. This problem will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Three, where the indicators of the various conditions present in the hypotheses will be identified.

Explaining Hypothesis 3

Hypothesis 3 states that great powers are more likely to oppose U.N. involvement in conflicts where they have offered support to the aggressor. Two sources out of twelve, the Zacher and Junn studies, identify this condition as being important. Before discussing these studies, a few points are necessary to clarify Hypothesis 3. First, the hypothesis does not imply a situation in which a member of one bloc supports the aggressor to the conflict while a member of an opposing bloc opposes the aggressor. This type of situation falls into the category of an inter-bloc conflict, which engages great power security interests and is therefore represented in Hypothesis 1. Rather, the hypothesis is meant to reflect a situation in which either all great powers support the aggressor, or great powers which do not actively support the aggressor do not actively oppose it.

In his 1979 study, Zacher asserts the relationship hypothesized between

great power support for the aggressor in a conflict and opposition to U.N. involvement. Specifically, Zacher notes the following prerequisite for U.N. intervention and success in a conflict to occur: the aggression must not be supported by any major security grouping. States, he notes, will oppose organizational involvement in a conflict "if they support the aggression or are indifferent regarding it."⁵⁹

Junn, in his 1983 study "Voting in the United Nations Security Council," notes the same relationship in a more general way. Junn discusses the difficulties which great power support for the aggressor in a conflict presents for U.N. conflict management, and notes:

It would appear from the evidence to date that measures for collective action against aggression (or recalcitrants) can be effective only if the aggressor is totally isolated from any permanent member of the Security Council.⁶⁰

In other words, great power support for the aggressor complicates U.N. conflict management so as to prevent its occurrence.

The hypothesis that great powers are more likely to oppose U.N. involvement in conflicts where they have offered support to the aggressor is discussed in the two sources noted above. Thus, Hypothesis 3 achieves a moderate degree of support. Because each source focusses on the issue differently, the idea of consensus is not relevant.

⁵⁹ Zacher, p. 13.

⁶⁰ Junn, p. 329.

Explaining Hypothesis 4

Hypothesis 4, the last to be explained in this literature review, states that great powers are more likely to support U.N. involvement in conflicts where they seek to legitimize policies through international consideration of the conflict. The key term in this hypothesis is legitimization; it is employed in the sense of a great power using the U.N. to bestow international legitimacy upon its policies. This condition is discussed in three out of twelve sources, and all agree on its connection to great power attitudes toward U.N. involvement.

Northedge and Donelan discuss great powers seeking legitimacy for their actions when they relate possible reasons why states refer disputes to the United Nations. The authors cite four such reasons: when states do not expect action to be taken, but want the issue debated; when states believe the issue will get a "friendly hearing;" when states believe they can "score points" off the enemy this way; and, finally, when all other means of resolving a dispute have been exhausted and a state considers force. In the case of the last reason, the authors note that it may indicate a situation in which great powers try to secure some sort of legality on their use of force in a conflict.⁶¹

Raimo Vayrynen, in his 1985 article "The United Nations and the Resolution of International Conflict," also notes that great powers may support U.N. involvement in a conflict in order to legitimize their policies. Specifically, Vayrynen discusses this condition when evaluating what he terms as the era of

⁶¹ Northedge and Donelan, pp. 221-224.

U.S. hegemony in the United Nations (1948-1963). Vayrynen posits possible reasons why the U.N. could have been helpful to hegemonic powers. He notes that the U.S. maintained its version of world order mostly through unilateral intervention and covert operations; however,

not infrequently the dominant power also resorted to the United Nations, which provided a multilateral channel for cooperation with other major powers and could also legitimize collectively the politics of order.⁶²

George Sherry also uses the example of the United States to illustrate Hypothesis 4. In his 1986 article, Sherry discusses the usefulness of the United Nations to the U.S. While he notes that much of U.N. activity is political, and thus usually counterproductive to U.S. interests, he also asserts that the Organization can be quite useful:

Like other governments, the United States participates in this process [of U.N. diplomacy] to obtain from the United Nations support of United States interests, affirmation of the legitimacy of United States behavior, and a sounding board for United States views on a variety of international problems.⁶³

These three sources indicate a willingness on the part of the great powers to use the United Nations in order to internationally legitimize policies, especially the use of force, which the great powers have already decided upon unilaterally. Thus, the desire of great powers to legitimize their actions encourages support for U.N. management involvement in a dispute.

⁶² Vayrynen, "The United Nations and the Resolution of International Conflicts," p. 153.

⁶³ Sherry, p. 767.

Conclusion

Chapter Two has explained how the four hypotheses put forth in this study were derived from the literature on U.N. conflict management. This explanation would not be complete, however, without discussing why these hypotheses were chosen for analysis, and why others which also could have been derived from the literature were not included. Essentially, the four hypotheses represent those conditions which emerged from the literature as the most significant factors influencing great power attitudes toward U.N. involvement. In other words, the conditions chosen were discussed in more than one source and in detail, often as the focal point for analysis in the source. Furthermore, an effort was made to choose those conditions which could be most clearly indicated as to their presence or absence. For example, great power support for the aggressor probably would be easier to determine than great power desire to debate an issue, which was cited by Northedge and Donelan as one reason why a great power would support U.N. involvement. Finally, it must be noted that the effort to limit various conditions, based upon the criteria noted above, was made in the first place for the practical purpose of avoiding a study which would be overly complex.

In addition to the four conditions chosen for analysis, the literature cites five other factors influencing great power support for or opposition to U.N. involvement. Northedge and Donelan mention three conditions under which states will support U.N. involvement: when the state does not expect action to

be taken, but wants the conflict debated; when the state thinks the issues surrounding the conflict will get "a friendly hearing"; and when the state believes it can "score points" off its enemies through U.N. involvement.⁶⁴

Mark Zacher, in explaining the hesitation of the Western powers in referring the Berlin crisis of 1948 to the United Nations, cites one condition under which great powers will oppose U.N. involvement: when they are unsure of their policy in a conflict.⁶⁵ Finally, Sherry notes a condition under which great powers will support U.N. involvement, with reference to the situation of the United States during the 1956 invasion of Hungary: when a great power does not want to act on a conflict, but needs to show its domestic audience that it is taking some action. As Sherry relates, "the United Nations did precisely what the United States needed it to do - namely, get the Eisenhower administration off the hook politically when the American public was clamoring for it 'to do something.'"⁶⁶

Each of these five conditions is briefly mentioned in just one source. It could be pointed out as a criticism of this criterion for selection that the condition of great power support for the aggressor, in Hypothesis 3, is discussed in just two sources. However, both studies which cite this condition discuss it and its implications in some depth, in particular presenting empirical

⁶⁴ Northedge and Donelan, pp. 221-224.

⁶⁵ Zacher, p. 73.

⁶⁶ Sherry, p. 756.

data to support its connection to great power attitudes and U.N. involvement. In contrast, the five conditions described above are not discussed in great detail, and nor are they a central focus of attention in the sources which note them. In fact, the last two conditions described, great power uncertainty over policy and great power need to "get off the hook" domestically, are offered more as explanations for great power behavior in a certain case, such as during the Berlin crisis or the invasion of Hungary, than as generalizations about great power attitudes toward U.N. involvement.

In addition, the five conditions which were not included in this study were judged to be somewhat more difficult to operationalize than the conditions which were chosen. For example, how does one know when a great power "wants" something, such as debate of a conflict or the opportunity to show up its rivals? All five conditions concern great power motivations or needs, which are more difficult to objectively determine than, for example, a situation which engages great power security interests. Of course, it can be argued then that the condition of Hypothesis 4, great powers seeking legitimization for their actions, is also a question of great power motivation and difficult to determine. This is true; however, legitimization is featured in three different sources as an important condition under which great powers will support U.N. involvement.

In sum, the above five conditions were excluded from this study mainly because they were judged to be only marginally important. That they are

mentioned in the literature should not be forgotten, however. While they may have been judged as outside of this study's scope, these conditions may suggest other avenues to explore in analyzing great power attitudes toward U.N. involvement.

This chapter has provided the essential background for testing the four hypotheses using cases. The following chapters will test the observations drawn from the literature, thus evaluating not only the accuracy of theoretical observations present in the literature, but the usefulness of these ideas in accounting for U.N. behavior as well.

Chapter Three - International Conflict: Cases and Indicators

The next step in identifying the conditions under which the great powers will support or oppose U.N. involvement is presenting those cases of international conflict which have been chosen to test the hypotheses. This chapter will show how twelve cases of conflict between 1945 and 1975 were selected which represent considerable variation in the independent variables, as well as in three additional contextual conditions: system era, location of the conflict, and parties to the conflict.

First, the indicators for the independent variables will be presented, with the goal of making clear the criteria that were used to establish whether the conditions stipulated in the hypotheses were present or absent in a particular case. The additional conditions described above will also be defined and discussed in detail.

Second, the chapter will present the twelve cases chosen for analysis, explaining how and why they were chosen out of hundreds of possible cases of conflict occurring between 1945 and 1975. The distribution of independent variables across the different cases will be discussed, establishing that the cases represent a considerable degree of variation. Finally, a brief synopsis of each case will be presented, with emphasis on describing the presence of relevant indicators for the independent variables.

Indicators

Before discussing the indicators for the independent variables, it is useful to restate the hypotheses:

1. Great powers are more likely to oppose U.N. involvement in conflicts that directly engage their own security interests, except in situations where they wish to limit their involvement or cut costs associated with the conflict.
2. Great powers are more likely to oppose U.N. involvement in conflicts over cold war and ideological issues.
3. Great powers are more likely to oppose U.N. involvement in conflicts where they have offered support to the aggressor.
4. Great powers are more likely to support U.N. involvement in conflicts where they seek to legitimize policies through international consideration of the conflict.

The condition in the first part of Hypothesis 1, "conflicts that directly engage great power security interest," will be indicated by the following circumstances: the conflict is between or among the great powers; the conflict is between or among great power allies; the conflict is inter-bloc; the conflict is intra-bloc¹; the conflict arises within a great power sphere of influence.

Some comments are required in order to clarify the last indicator. A great power sphere of influence is defined as a geographical area in which a great power may intervene, with force if necessary, without being challenged

¹ Inter-bloc conflicts are defined as occurring between the cold war blocs of states headed, respectively, by the United States and the Soviet Union. Intra-bloc conflicts are defined as occurring between or among members of one of those two blocs.

by any other power.² This paper will consider the following as spheres of influence for the great powers between the years 1945 and 1975: Latin America and the Caribbean for the United States; Eastern Europe for the Soviet Union³; some former colonies for France and the United Kingdom⁴; Indo-China for the People's Republic of China after 1971.⁵

The condition in the second part of the hypothesis, "situations where great powers wish to limit their involvement or cut costs associated with the conflict," will be indicated by words and/or actions of the great powers intended to distance themselves from the conflict, such as speeches calling for restraint on both sides, diplomatic pressure placed on either or both sides to resolve the conflict, and withdrawal of diplomatic, economic, military, and/or political support.

Hypothesis 2 has two separate, but related, independent variables: "cold war issues" and "ideological issues." The presence of cold war issues in a conflict will be indicated by the competitive involvement of the superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. The presence of ideological issues will

² Paul Keal, Unspoken Rules and Superpower Dominance, London, MacMillan Press, 1983, p. 1.

³ Keal, pp. 2-4.

⁴ Britain's sphere of influence extends to those colonies which now make up the Commonwealth, while France's sphere of influence is considered to include former French colonial possessions in Africa, at the present time composed of twenty-one independent states. Corneliu Bogdan and Eugen Preda, Spheres of Influence, Boulder, CO, Social Science Monographs, 1988, pp. 2, 132-33.

⁵ Keal, see especially pp. 221-2.

be indicated by competitive superpower involvement again, but involvement accompanied by mutual recriminations over the nature of the other's ideological perspective, i.e. capitalist or communist.

The independent variable of the third hypothesis, "great powers supporting the aggressor in a conflict," will be indicated by documented tangible and intangible assistance, such as money, weapons, food, and diplomatic support, given to the party who initiated the conflict.⁶

The condition in Hypothesis 4, "great powers seeking to legitimize policies through international consideration of the conflict," is difficult to operationalize because the indicator must capture great power intention, which is not as easy to document as troop movements or speeches calling for restraint on both sides in a conflict. A great power seeking to legitimize its policies will be indicated by that power unilaterally considering or using force, and then intending to justify its actions before the international community. Secondary sources will be used in this case to indicate the intentions of the great powers.

Three additional contextual conditions were also identified which may influence the effects of the independent variables, and should therefore be varied among the cases as well: system era, location of the conflict, and parties to the conflict. Regarding system era, various sources in the literature,

⁶ It is recognized that at times great power assistance to the aggressor in a conflict is a matter of state secrecy; this paper chooses to focus on support which is documented in secondary accounts of the conflicts.

for example Ruggie (1974) and Nye (1983), divide U.N. history into these distinct blocks of time which are characterized by particular power alignments within the Organization, and by particular patterns of great power behavior. For the purposes of this study, the Haas chronology is adopted, which divides the period between 1945 and 1980 into four system eras, 1945-47, 1948-55, 1956-70, and 1971-80.⁷ It was considered important to vary the selection of cases in terms of system era, so that great power attitudes could be tested over time, over different alignments of power, and over patterns of great power behavior.

It was also considered important to vary the cases of conflict in terms of geographical location, in order to present a selection which occurred both inside and outside of various great powers' spheres of influence. Location of the conflict simply refers to the geographic area of the world in which it took place, for example, Europe or South Asia or Africa.

Parties to the conflict, using Butterworth's definition, refers to "only those actors that were directly and overtly involved in the conflict (those with troops fighting in a violent one; central protagonists in a nonviolent one.)"⁸ An attempt was made to vary conflicts in terms of the parties involved, and especially in terms of the great powers involved, in order to represent a broad

⁷ Haas, "Regime Decay," pp. 218-228. This chronology is generally accepted, although there is some disagreement as to when the fourth system era begins. Ruggie, for example, identifies 1962, not 1970, as the beginning of the fourth era.

⁸ Robert Lyle Butterworth, Managing Interstate Conflict, 1945-74: Data with Synopses, Pittsburgh, PA, University Center for International Studies, 1976, pp. 3-4.

spectrum of different types of conflicts which occurred within the international system.

Choosing the Cases

Twelve cases were chosen which together represent a degree of variation among the independent variables and additional conditions sufficient to allow the cases to serve as appropriate examples for the testing of the hypotheses. These twelve cases are: Soviet Claims on Turkey, 1945-47; Kurdistan, 1945-46; the Berlin Blockade, 1948-49; East European Human Rights, 1949-50; the Suez War, 1956-57; the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962; the Czech Invasion, 1968; the Gulf of Tonkin Incidents, 1964; the Sudanese Civil War, 1968-72⁹; Bangladesh, 1970-74; the Yom Kippur War, 1973; and South Vietnam - PRC, 1974.

The conflicts were chosen by searching through three compendiums of cases of conflict, by Butterworth, Zacher, and Donelan and Grieve.¹⁰ Because it provided the most complete and useful descriptions of cases, the Butterworth compendium was used to establish an initial set of 53 conflicts

⁹ It is generally acknowledged that the Sudanese Civil War lasted from 1955 to 1972. (See, for example, Cecil Eprile, War and Peace in the Sudan, 1955-1972, London, David & Charles, 1974; and Edgar O'Ballance, The Secret War in the Sudan: 1955-1972, London, Faber and Faber Limited, 1977.) These sources also note that Soviet support for the Northern government forces did not begin until 1968; therefore the years 1968-1972 have been chosen as the period of this conflict which will be under scrutiny.

¹⁰ Robert Lyle Butterworth, Managing Interstate Conflict; Zacher, International Conflicts and Collective Security, 1946-77 (Appendix); and M.D. Donelan and M.J. Grieve, International Disputes: Case Histories 1945-1970, London, Europe Publications, 1973.

which fit, more or less, into one of the four system eras noted above, and reflected at least one of the four hypotheses. These 53 cases were then cross-referenced using the other two compendiums, and twelve were chosen with the goal of reflecting as much variation as possible in the independent variables and the three contextual variables. (see Table 1)¹¹

The conditions represented in the independent variables are quite evenly distributed among the cases: seven cases reflect the first part of Hypothesis 1, three cases reflect both parts of Hypothesis 1, six cases reflect the second hypothesis, two reflect the third hypothesis, and three reflect the fourth hypothesis. Often, one case of conflict will reflect more than one, and some up to three, of the hypotheses in various combinations.

In terms of system era, two cases occur in the first era (1945-47), two occur in the second era (1948-55), four occur in the third era (1956-70), one occurs between the third and fourth eras, and three occur in the fourth era (1971-1980). The locations of the conflicts are also quite evenly distributed: one occurs in the Near East, three in the Middle East, three in Europe, one in Latin America, two in South East Asia, one in South Asia, and one in Africa. The cases also feature all the great powers at least once as parties to the conflicts: the USSR is a party to six, the U.S. is a party to five, the UK is a party to three, France is a party to two, and the PRC is a party to one conflict.

¹¹ It should be noted that an additional factor influencing the choice of conflicts was whether a conflict was described in all three compendiums, the intention being that more and varied information would be available on all aspects of the conflict. This may have biased the selection in favor of better-known conflicts.

**Table 1:
Distribution of Independent Variables and Three Contextual Variables**

Case	Independent Variables*	System Era+	Location	Parties
Soviet Claims on Turkey (1945-46)	1a,2	1	Near East	USSR v Turkey, U.S., UK
Kurdistan (1946-47)	3	1	Middle East	Iran, Iraq v Kurds
Berlin Blockade (1948-49)	1a,2,4	2	Europe	USSR, East Ger. v West Ger., U.S., UK, France
East European Human Rights (1949-50)	1,2	2	Eastern Europe	East European countries, USSR v U.S., Others
Suez War (1956-57)	1a,1b,4	3	Middle East	Egypt v Israel, UK, France
Cuban Missile Crisis (1962)	1a,2	3	Latin America	U.S. v USSR, Cuba
Czech Invasion (1968)	1a,2	3	Eastern Europe	USSR v Czechoslovakia
Gulf of Tonkin Incidents (1964)	1a,2,4	3	South East Asia	U.S. South Vietnam v North Vietnam
Sudanese Civil War (1968-72)	3	3-4	Africa	North, USSR, Egypt v South
Bangladesh (1970-74)	1a,1b	4	South Asia	West Pak. v East Pak., India
Yom Kippur War (1973)	1a,1b	4	Middle East	Israel v Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq
South Vietnam - PRC (1974)	1a	4	South East Asia	South Vietnam v PRC

* 1a = engagement of GP security interest
1b = GP seeking to limit involvement or cut costs
2 = cold war or ideological issues
3 = GP support for the aggressor
4 = GP seeking legitimization

+ System Era 1 = 1945-1947
System Era 2 = 1948-1955
System Era 3 = 1956-1970
System Era 4 = 1971-1980

Synopses of the Cases

This section will briefly introduce each case, paying particular attention to how each reflects one or more of the hypotheses put forth in this study.

Soviet Claims on Turkey, 1945-47

The case concerns three Soviet demands made on Turkey in 1945: that the USSR be allowed to establish military bases in the Dardanelles and Bosphorus Straits; that the Montreaux Convention, which closed the Straits to all vessels not from the Black Sea, be revised; and that Turkey return the provinces of Kars and Ardahan. The UK, the U.S., and Turkey stated that they would discuss revising the Convention, but later that year and in 1946 the Soviets again demanded bases in the Straits.

This case reflects the first hypothesis, as indicated by the presence of the U.S., the UK, and the USSR as direct parties to the conflict. Competitive superpower involvement was also present in this case, especially after 1947, when Turkey, under pressure from the USSR, requested and received U.S. military aid to modernize its army and forestall Soviet aggression. At this point, "the initial issue of regulation of the Straits became part of the question of Western support for the Greek and Turkish governments against communist rebels and subversion."¹² Thus, the case reflects Hypothesis 2 as well.

¹² Butterworth, p. 42.

Kurdistan, 1946-47

The case of Kurdistan involves the agitation of Kurdish tribes in Iran and Iraq for autonomy and then independence, supported by the USSR which hoped to pressure Turkey and to merge an independent Kurdish state with Azerbaijan. While the USSR was not directly involved in the conflict, it did give support to the Kurdish insurgents by encouraging rebel leaders, providing rebel organizations with printing presses, shipping arms to rebel bases, and even sending Soviet troops into the part of Iran which the Kurds had declared an independent state.¹³ This tangible and intangible assistance, documented in the literature, indicates great power support for the aggressor, and therefore reflects Hypothesis 3.

Berlin Blockade, 1948-49

The Berlin Blockade conflict arose over tensions between the USSR, on the one hand, and the U.S., the UK, and France on the other concerning their post-war zones of occupation in Berlin. When the Western powers instituted currency reform in their zones in June of 1948, the USSR blockaded Berlin by land, forcing the U.S. to airlift supplies to West Berliners until the conflict was resolved almost a year later.¹⁴

The circumstances of the case indicate the presence of the independent

¹³ Butterworth, pp. 59-60.

¹⁴ Donelan and Grieve, pp. 28-31.

variables found in three hypotheses: Hypothesis 1, Hypothesis 2, and Hypothesis 4. Clearly, the Berlin Blockade represents a direct engagement of great power security interest, with four great powers, the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, and France, being parties to the conflict. In addition, the case also demonstrates the competitive involvement of the superpowers, with the USSR and the U.S. (aided by France and Britain) vying for control of Berlin. And while the blockade would be lifted in May of 1949, "the status of Berlin and of Western access to it remained a barometer of cold war tensions."¹⁵

Finally, there is some evidence in the literature that the case also represents an attempt by the great powers to legitimize their actions in Berlin by bringing the issue before the United Nations. Hypothesis 4 is indicated by the U.S., Britain, and France deciding upon and implementing the airlift in response to the Soviet blockade, and then later seeking international support for their position. Butterworth, for example, states that the U.S. had to insist that its U.N. appeal was genuine, and "not just for its image."¹⁶

East European Human Rights, 1949-50

This dispute originated with the seizure and imprisonment of various clergymen in Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania, including the well-known Cardinal Mindszenty of Hungary, by communist governments. The U.S. and

¹⁵ Butterworth, p. 99.

¹⁶ Butterworth, p. 99.

the UK protested that these acts were violations of the Paris Peace Treaties concluding World War II. During debate of the issues in the General Assembly, the Western powers accused the three East European states of repressing their citizens, and also "criticized the political institutions, the judicial system, and the regulation of the press in East European states." Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania, diplomatically supported by the Soviet Union, opposed the Western attack by claiming that the clergymen constituted legitimate threats to their governments.¹⁷

This conflict reflects Hypothesis 1 for two reasons: first, it occurred in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union's sphere of influence; and second, the conflict was inter-bloc in nature. In addition, the issues in this case were clearly ideological; thus, Hypothesis 2 is represented. The dispute was characterized by competitive superpower involvement in which mutual recriminations were made not only over the alleged violation of the clergymen's human rights, but over the nature and principles of government in the East European states as well.

Suez War, 1956-57

The UK, France, and Israel all had pressing problems with Egypt in the period right before Prime Minister Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal in July of 1956. The UK was concerned with its position in the Arab world, and

¹⁷ Butterworth, 123.

specifically with the threat of Egyptian nationalism; France believed that Egypt was aiding revolutionaries in Algiers; and Israel was under guerilla attack from the Gaza Strip and was denied access to the Canal by Egypt.¹⁸

In response to Nasser's nationalization of the Canal, Israel, France, and the UK secretly planned an attack on the Sinai, in which Israel would invade and then the UK and France would follow claiming the need to protect the Canal. Israel attacked on October 29, with French and British support following a few days later.¹⁹

The conflict reflects both parts of Hypothesis 1. The Suez War obviously engaged the security interests of France and Britain; in addition, seen from the perspective of the United States and the Soviet Union, the war was between their allies. France, Britain, and Israel were all close allies of the U.S., while Egypt had just signed an arms deal with the Soviet Union.²⁰ Thus, the war engaged the security interests of four great powers.

Furthermore, the actions of the United States in response to the war indicate the second part of Hypothesis 1, in which a great power whose security interests are engaged seeks to limit its involvement in a conflict. As the war continued, the United States sought to limit its involvement in the conflict and, indeed, to limit the conflict itself by pressuring its allies to

¹⁸ Donelan and Grieve, pp. 123-5.

¹⁹ Donelan and Grieve, pp. 125-9.

²⁰ Butterworth, p. 220.

withdraw. The United States took such action not only because it "felt betrayed" by France and Britain, but also because

the affair looked as though it might escalate when the USSR appeared to threaten the UK and France with atomic attacks if the invasion was not stopped, and the U.S. then felt compelled to make counter-threats.²¹

The behavior of France and the UK in this conflict indicate the conflict's reflection of Hypothesis 4 as well. Israel, France, and the UK drew up a secret plan to regain access to the Canal in which Israel would invade, and then France and Britain, claiming the need to protect the Canal before the international community, would intervene. This is a clear case of great powers deciding upon the use of force, and then seeking to justify their actions before an international audience.

Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962

Fidel Castro's increasingly tight alliance with the Soviet Union during the early 1960s caused U.S.- Cuban relations to deteriorate to the point where the U.S. sponsored an invasion of the country by approximately 1,000 Cuban exiles on April 17, 1961. The invasion attempt failed, and Cuba further tightened its ties with the Soviet Union.²²

Tensions from this episode led into October of the next year, when the United States discovered that the increased Soviet military aid to Cuba

²¹ Butterworth, p. 221.

²² Zacher, p. 241.

included nuclear missiles. President Kennedy instituted a naval quarantine, and after four tense days Khrushchev agreed to dismantle the weapons.²³

The crisis clearly reflects Hypotheses 1 and 2. Soviet and American security interests were directly engaged for two reasons: the conflict was directly between them, and the conflict occurred in Latin America, considered a U.S. sphere of influence. Cold war issues were involved as well, indicated by the presence of competitive superpower involvement as the U.S. and the USSR disputed the presence of nuclear missiles in Cuba.

Czech Invasion, 1968

As early as 1963, the Czech government began experimenting with a mixture of democracy and socialism. By 1968, the USSR and other East European states had become concerned with the pace of change in Czechoslovakia, and began negotiations with the government. When the Czech reform movement began to grow, Warsaw Treaty Organization units from the USSR, Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland invaded on the night of August 20, 1968.²⁴

This conflict reflects the first hypothesis because of its intra-bloc nature; the Czech reforms engaged Soviet security interests internally through the USSR's perceived threat to its East European communist satellites. In addition,

²³ Butterworth, pp. 340-41.

²⁴ Donelan and Grieve, pp. 274-78.

the conflict occurred within the Soviet Union's sphere of influence.

The conflict also reflects cold war and ideological issues, as the invasion was accompanied by denunciations of the Soviet system by France, Britain, and the United States. Furthermore, the situation in Czechoslovakia which led to the WTO invasion in the first place concerned "the political experiment of mixing democracy and socialism," the two systems of government supported respectively by the United States and the Soviet Union.²⁵

Gulf of Tonkin Incidents, 1964

By 1962, the United States had become "a full-fledged party in the Vietnamese civil war," not only supplying arms and advisors to the South, but undertaking combat operations against the communist North as well.²⁶ The "obvious turning point" in the war, paving the way for the introduction of American troops into Vietnam, occurred in August of 1964 in the Gulf of Tonkin. On August 2, the United States charged North Vietnam with attacking the U.S. destroyer Maddox without provocation. North Vietnam acknowledged the attack, but defined it as retaliation for the United States supporting South Vietnamese attacks on North Vietnamese islands. On August 4, the U.S. announced attacks on two more of its destroyers, and bombed North

²⁵ Butterworth, p. 428.

²⁶ Butterworth, p. 322.

Vietnamese facilities in response.²⁷ The United States reported its "self-defense" actions to both the U.S. Congress and the United Nations. On August 7, the U.S. Congress unanimously passed a resolution giving the President permission to "take all necessary measures" to defend U.S. forces.²⁸

The Gulf of Tonkin Incidents represent a combination of Hypotheses 1, 2, and 4. U.S. security interests were directly engaged, as the United States was exchanging fire with North Vietnam, an ally of the Soviet Union. Cold war issues were also present, as indicated by the competitive involvement of the United States and the Soviet Union to, respectively, promote democracy or encourage communism in Vietnam. Hypothesis 4 is indicated by the U.S. using force in the Gulf of Tonkin, and then seeking justification for its actions before a domestic and international audience.

Sudanese Civil War, 1968-72

The civil war had its roots in the British unification of the North and the South of Sudan at independence. Tensions soon grew between the two parts of the country, which were unequally developed and ethnically and religiously different; in 1963, the South began launching rebel attacks on the North-dominated government. From 1968 to 1972, the North countered these attacks

²⁷ Butterworth, pp. 323-324.

²⁸ Donelan and Grieve, p. 102.

with Soviet assistance.²⁹

The case reflects the third hypothesis, although it does seem unclear exactly who was the initial aggressor in this war. It is clear, however, that the USSR offered support to the North through weapons shipments, Soviet advisors (up to 3,000 by 1971), and assistance in air attacks.³⁰

Bangladesh, 1970-74

Tensions between East and West Pakistan began soon after the partition of India. By 1970, East Pakistan was hopeful of its release from West Pakistan's domination by the election of its own leaders; however, these hopes were dashed in the spring of 1971 when West Pakistanis attacked in Dacca and arrested the Eastern political leader, Shaik Mujib. The East declared the independence of Bangladesh soon after, and a civil war began.³¹ Bengali leaders fled to India, where they were trained and armed. In November of 1971, Indian and Bengali forces invaded East Pakistan, and on December 3 full-scale war erupted.³²

This case reflects both parts of Hypothesis 1. The Bangladesh war was fought between India and Pakistan, both great power allies. India was an ally

²⁹ Butterworth, pp. 357-60.

³⁰ Butterworth, pp. 358-9.

³¹ Butterworth, pp. 455-56.

³² Zacher, p. 270.

of the Soviet Union, having received Soviet military planes and arms just prior to the invasion as a result of the recently-signed Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the USSR.³³ Pakistan was allied at this point with both the United States and the People's Republic of China. The PRC offered Pakistan "full diplomatic support," but no weapons. And while Pakistan urgently requested U.S. assistance, the United States only sent destroyers to the Bay of Bengal, "allegedly to evacuate U.S. citizens from East Pakistan, but more likely to counter the presence of Soviet vessels already in the Bay."³⁴ Thus, the conflict aroused the security interests of three great powers: the USSR, the PRC, and the U.S.

With respect to the actions of the United States, the conflict also reflects a great power wishing to limit its involvement in a conflict, or the second part of Hypothesis 1. Prior to this conflict, the U.S. had been a staunch ally of Pakistan, giving the country millions of dollars worth of foreign aid and military hardware. Instead of aiding Pakistan when war broke out, however, the United States actively worked to distance itself from the conflict:

The U.S. had become concerned over the spreading hostilities early in the war; in April it had stopped shipping arms supplies to Pakistan, and, when India openly entered the war, it urged both sides to withdraw their troops from the border.³⁵

³³ Butterworth, p. 456.

³⁴ Butterworth, p. 457.

³⁵ Butterworth, p. 457.

Yom Kippur War, 1973

In 1973, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq decided it was an opportune time to massively challenge Israel in the Middle East; on October 6, an important Jewish holiday, the countries attacked. Israel was unprepared, but after initial losses began to gain ground until it had completely surrounded and cut off Egyptian forces in the Sinai.³⁶

The conflict engaged the security interests of the U.S. and the USSR through the fighting of their allies, Israel and Egypt. Interestingly, in terms of the Soviet response, the case is also an example of a great power wanting to cut its costs in a conflict. Although the Soviet Union supported the aggressors with arms and resisted involvement of the U.N. Security Council, as soon as Egypt was surrounded by Israel, "U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger visited Moscow on October 20 to discuss the conflict in response to an urgent request from Soviet First Secretary Brezhnev." Subsequently, the Soviet Union joined the United States in calling for a quick resolution to the conflict.³⁷

South Vietnam - PRC, 1974

The conflict between these two countries erupted after the prospect of oil discovery on the Parcel Islands of the South China Sea, which both parties claimed. When South Vietnam sent military missions to some islands, the PRC

³⁶ Butterworth, pp. 468-470.

³⁷ Butterworth, p. 469

responded by occupying a group of islands with 600 troops and 11 warships.³⁸ This case reflects the first hypothesis, as the South China Sea is within the PRC's immediate sphere of influence.

Conclusion

Chapter Three has laid the groundwork for testing the hypotheses using twelve cases of conflict which represent reasonable variation in the independent variables, as well as in the contextual conditions of system era, location of the conflict, and parties to the conflict. These variables have been operationalized and the cases which will be used to test them have been introduced. Chapter Four will examine the relationship between the hypothesized conditions and great power attitudes to determine whether or not the hypotheses can be supported with reference to actual case studies.

³⁸ Zacher, pp. 273-274.

Chapter Four - Testing the Hypotheses

Chapter Four will test the hypotheses, determining the role played by the great powers in influencing U.N. involvement in international disputes. First, the dependent variable, great power support for or opposition to U.N. involvement, will be explained. Indicators for the variable will be presented, with the goal of clarifying how great power behavior in a conflict was judged to be supportive of or opposing U.N. involvement.

Second, great power behavior in each case will be examined, and the results will be compared with the great power behavior which was predicted, permitting an assessment of the accuracy of the hypotheses in each case. Finally, the results of the testing will be examined as a whole, and some conclusions on the usefulness of the hypotheses in defining a set of conditions under which great powers support or oppose U.N. involvement will be presented.

The Dependent Variable

Great power attitudes toward U.N. involvement will be indicated by the actions of the great powers themselves, both inside and outside the United Nations. Great power actions which indicate support for U.N. involvement are as follows:

1. referral of the conflict to the Security Council and/or to the General Assembly;

2. sponsoring or co-sponsoring Security Council and/or General Assembly resolutions concerned with ending the conflict;
3. voting in support of such resolutions.

Great power actions which indicate opposition to U.N. involvement are as follows:

1. great power agreement not to refer the conflict to the United Nations;
2. declining offers to assist managing the conflict by the U.N. Secretary-General;
3. once a conflict has been referred to the Security Council or to the General Assembly, objections as to the organ's competence in dealing with the conflict;
4. voting against General Assembly resolutions concerned with ending the conflict;
5. great power veto of Security Council consideration of the conflict, or of resolutions concerned with ending the conflict.

Some comments are necessary to clarify these indicators. First, the indicators emphasize active great power support or opposition; in other words, the great power must actively do something to either promote or discourage U.N. involvement in order for its behavior to be judged supportive or opposing. A lack of active support is not considered to be opposition, nor is a lack of active opposition considered to be support.

Furthermore, it must be noted that indicators for both support and opposition may be present for the same great power at different points in the conflict. The United States, the United Kingdom, and France, for example, initially indicated opposition to U.N. involvement in the Berlin Blockade (1948-49), but then later raised the issue in the Security Council after their airlift to

West Berlin proved successful, thus indicating support for the Organization's involvement.¹ Such situations will be dealt with on an individual basis, and a judgement will be made as to whether the great powers displayed support or opposition overall.

It is also important to note that no attempt has been made to distinguish among the different indicators in terms of their intensity. For example, a great power veto probably represents a higher degree of opposition to U.N. involvement than protests about the General Assembly's competence in considering a dispute. However, the measurement problems associated with determining intensity were judged to be too great to permit the inclusion of this variable in the study.

Testing the Hypotheses

Table 2 presents the results of the tests of the hypotheses for the twelve cases. Column 1 presents the cases of international conflict, while Column 2 describes the independent variables which were present in the case, as indicated by the examination of the literature on the cases, presented in Chapter Three. The numbers in Column 2 indicate how many of the variables were present in a conflict, not the hypotheses which the cases reflect. These numbers are then carried over to each subsequent Column, in order to help

¹ Butterworth, pp. 98-99.

Table 2: International Conflict Cases and Characteristics of Testing the Hypotheses

1	2	3	4	5	6
Case	Independent Variable	Great Power(s)	Dependent Variable - Hypothesized	Dependent Variable - Occurred	Hypothesis Supported?
Soviet Claims on Turkey (1945-46)	1) GP security interest 2) cw issues	1) U.S., UK, USSR 2) U.S., USSR	1) opposition 2) opposition	1) opposition 2) opposition	1) YES 2) YES
Kurdistan (1946-47)	1) GP support for aggressor	1) USSR	1) opposition	1) opposition	1) YES
Berlin Blockade (1948-49)	1) GP security interest 2) cw issues 3) GPs seeking legitimization	1) U.S., UK, France, USSR 2) U.S., USSR 3) U.S., UK, France	1) opposition 2) opposition 3) support	1) U.S., UK, France support; USSR opposition 2) U.S. support; USSR opposition 3) support	1) NO; YES 2) NO; YES 3) YES
East European Human Rights (1949-50)	1) GP security interest 2) cw/ideo. issues	1) USSR 2) U.S., USSR	1) opposition 2) opposition	1) opposition 2) U.S. support; USSR opposition	1) YES 2) NO; YES
Suez War (1956-57)	1) GP security interest 2) Security interest but GPs seek limits 3) GPs seeking legitimization	1) UK, France, USSR 2) U.S. 3) UK, France	1) opposition 2) support 3) support	1) UK, France opposition; USSR support 2) support 3) opposition	1) YES; NO 2) YES 3) NO
Cuban Missile Crisis (1962)	1) GP security interest 2) cw issues	1) U.S., USSR 2) U.S., USSR	1) opposition 2) opposition	1) support 2) support	1) NO 2) NO
Czech Invasion (1968)	1) GP security interest 2) cw/ideo. issues	1) USSR 2) U.S., USSR	1) opposition 2) opposition	1) opposition 2) U.S. support USSR opposition	1) YES 2) NO; YES
Gulf of Tonkin Incidents (1964)	1) GP security interests 2) cw issues 3) GP seeking legitimization	1) U.S., USSR 2) U.S., USSR 3) U.S.	1) opposition 2) opposition 3) support	1) support 2) support 3) support	1) NO 2) NO 3) YES
Sudanese Civil War (1968-1972)	1) GP support for aggressor	1) USSR	1) opposition	1) opposition	1) YES
Bangladesh (1970-74)	1) GP security interests 2) Security interests but GP seeks limits	1) USSR, PRC 2) U.S.	1) opposition 2) support	1) USSR opposition; PRC support 2) support	1) YES; NO 2) YES
Yom Kippur War (1973)	1) GP security interests 2) Security interests but GP cuts costs	1) U.S. 2) USSR	1) opposition 2) support	1) support 2) support	1) NO 2) YES
South Vietnam - PRC (1974)	1) GP security interests	1) PRC	1) opposition	1) opposition	1) YES

the reader follow the test horizontally across the page.

Column 3 indicates to which great powers the independent variables apply. Column 4, "Dependent Variable - Hypothesized," indicates whether great power support or opposition should be present in each situation, according to the relevant hypothesis. Column 5, "Dependent Variable - Occurred," indicates whether great power support or opposition actually was present. Finally, Columns 4 and 5 are compared to determine whether the particular hypothesis was supported or not, and this is indicated in Column 6.

The following section will go through Table 2 in a systematic manner, case by case, with an emphasis on describing what kind of action was taken by the great power which indicated support for or opposition to U.N. involvement.

Soviet Claims on Turkey, 1945-46

This conflict reflects two independent variables, great power security interest and cold war issues, representing Hypotheses 1 and 2, respectively. Column 3 shows that the security interests of the U.S., the UK, and the USSR were engaged by this conflict; according to Hypothesis 1, all three powers should therefore oppose U.N. involvement (Column 4). Column 3 also shows that the U.S. and the USSR should oppose U.N. involvement because cold war issues were involved in the case.

Butterworth reports that in 1945 and 1946, the U.S., the UK, and the

USSR discussed referring the conflict to the United Nations for management. However, "given doubts that the U.N. could resolve this dispute, the U.S. agreed not to bring the issue up at the 1946 session."² Thus, all three great powers indicated their opposition to U.N. involvement by agreeing not to bring the conflict before the U.N.; this result is registered in Column 5. A comparison between Columns 4 and 5 shows support for both Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 in this case (Column 6).

Kurdistan, 1946-47

This case reflects the independent variable of great power support for the aggressor in a conflict, which is represented by Hypothesis 3. Column 4 shows that given Soviet support for the Kurds in this case, the USSR should have opposed U.N. involvement. In fact, the literature on the conflict does indicate some Soviet opposition.

In the spring of 1946, Iran complained to the Security Council about the presence of "foreign military forces" on its territory, referring to the Soviet troops stationed in that part of Iran where the Kurds were fighting for an independent state. International pressure mounted for a Soviet withdrawal, and on March 26 the Soviet Union announced that it would remove all troops within a few weeks. As the weeks went by with no indication of an impending Soviet withdrawal, the Security Council remained seized of the issue. At this point,

² Butterworth, p. 42.

the Soviet delegate to the U.N., A. Gromyko, protested the Council's competence in considering the issue, as "his government had reached an accord with the Iranian Government which removed the basis of the Iranian complaint."³

Thus, Soviet opposition is indicated by objections to the Security Council's competence in dealing with the issue; this result is registered in Column 5. Column 6 shows that Hypothesis 3 is indeed supported in this case.

Berlin Blockade, 1948-49

This case is complicated because it reflects three independent variables: great power security interest (Hypothesis 1), cold war issues (Hypothesis 2), and great powers seeking to legitimize their actions (Hypothesis 4). Number 1 of Column 3 shows that the security interests of four great powers, the U.S., the UK, France, and the USSR were engaged. According to Hypothesis 1, great power opposition to U.N. involvement should result (Column 4). Number 2 of Columns 3 and 4 show that the U.S. and the USSR should oppose U.N. involvement because of the presence of cold war issues in the conflict. Number 3 of Column 3 shows that the U.S., the UK, and France were seeking to legitimize their actions in this conflict; these powers, according to Hypothesis 4, should support U.N. involvement (Column 4, Number 3).

³ William Eagleton Jr., The Kurdish Republic of 1946, New York, Oxford University Press, 1963, pp. 72-80.

In fact, as noted previously, the U.S., the UK, and France at first opposed U.N. involvement. As the airlift began, "an offer of help from U.N. Secretary-General Lie was declined at that time, the U.S. preferring to engage in multilateral negotiations." After several months of the airlift and a lack of progress in negotiations, the U.S., UK, and France referred the issue to the Security Council.⁴ In this case, it was judged that this decision to refer the issue to the Security Council represented overall support for U.N. involvement on the part of the three Western powers (Column 5); therefore, Hypotheses 1 and 2 are not supported, but Hypothesis 4 is supported (Column 6).

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, the country showed clear signs of opposition to U.N. involvement when it vetoed a Security Council resolution sponsored by Belgium, Canada, China, Columbia, and Syria calling for an end to the blockade and the resumption of talks among the great powers (Column 5, Numbers 1 and 2).⁵ For the Soviet Union, then, Hypotheses 1 and 2 are supported (Column 6, Numbers 1 and 2).

East European Human Rights, 1949-50

Columns 2 and 3 show that in this case the security interests of the USSR were engaged, and cold war issues were present for the U.S. and the USSR. Therefore, as shown in Column 4, great power opposition to U.N.

⁴ Butterworth, pp. 98-99.

⁵ Donelan and Grieve, pp. 30-31.

involvement should be expected.

Between March 16 and March 19, 1949, both Bolivia and Austria referred the issue of human rights violations in Eastern Europe to the U.N. General Assembly for consideration. The Soviet Union objected to the General Assembly considering the issue, thus showing opposition to U.N. involvement (Column 5). As registered in Column 6, Hypotheses 1 and 2 are supported in this case by the actions of the Soviet Union.

The United States participated in the ensuing General Assembly debate, joining in the accusations against Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania.⁶ The U.S. also declared its support for an examination of the situation by the U.N., and voted in favor of the various resolutions which were passed that spring expressing the General Assembly's concern and calling on the East European states to cooperate with the U.N.⁷ Thus, the United States showed support for U.N. involvement, as noted in Column 5, Number 2; Column 6, Number 2 indicates that Hypothesis 2 was not supported in this case with respect to the actions of the U.S.

Suez War, 1956-57

This case includes three independent variables, as shown in Column 2: great power security interests, security interest combined with the great power

⁶ Butterworth, pp. 122-24.

⁷ United Nations Bulletin, Vol. VI, January 1 - June 15, 1949, pp. 416-21.

seeking to limit its involvement, and great powers seeking legitimization. The Table shows that the security interests of the UK, France, and the USSR were engaged; therefore, opposition to U.N. involvement should be expected according to Hypothesis 1 (Columns 3 and 4, Number 1).

The Table also shows that the security interests of the U.S. were engaged, but that the U.S. also sought to limit its involvement in the conflict; thus, support for U.N. involvement should be expected, according to the second part of Hypothesis 1 (Columns 3 and 4, Number 2). Finally, the Table shows in Columns 2 and 3, Number 3, that the UK and France sought legitimization for their use of force in this conflict; Column 4, Number 3 shows that support for U.N. involvement should be expected according to Hypothesis 4.

After Israel attacked Egypt on October 29, 1956, France and Britain publicly issued an ultimatum to Israel and Egypt demanding a cease-fire and a pull-back of forces. As Butterworth, Donelan and Grieve, and Zacher all note, this action was not intended to stop the conflict but rather to justify in advance the subsequent use of force by the two countries. The UK and France, however, did not use the United Nations for this purpose. Instead, they opposed U.N. involvement, specifically by vetoing a Security Council resolution sponsored by the United States calling for a cease-fire and a troop withdrawal.⁸ A few days later, when the U.S. pushed a cease-fire resolution through the General Assembly, Britain and France were two of only five

⁸ Butterworth, p. 221; Donelan and Grieve, pp. 127-129; Zacher, p. 275.

countries which opposed it.⁹ In terms of French and British actions, Hypothesis 1 is thus supported, but Hypothesis 4 is not (Column 6, Numbers 1 and 3).

United States support for U.N. involvement is indicated by the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions described above. After the French and British vetoes in the Security Council, the U.S. referred the conflict to the General Assembly, where it sponsored and lobbied for a cease-fire resolution, as well as a resolution creating the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) to supervise troop withdrawals and monitor the cease-fire.¹⁰ The second part of Hypothesis 1 is thus well-supported (Column 6, Number 2).

As for the USSR, its security interests were engaged by this conflict, but it showed support for U.N. involvement. The Soviet Union voted in favor of the General Assembly resolution calling for a cease fire, and, although "deeply engaged in the simultaneous crisis in Hungary, also sponsored condemnatory resolutions" on the Suez issue.¹¹ Thus, as Column 6, Number 1 indicates, Hypothesis 1 is not supported by the actions of the Soviet Union.

Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962

Given that U.S. and Soviet security interests were engaged in this

⁹ The resolution passed November 2 by a vote of 64 to 5, with Australia, Britain, France, Israel, and New Zealand voting against. Donelan and Grieve, p. 127.

¹⁰ Butterworth, p. 221.

¹¹ Donelan and Grieve, p. 127.

conflict, and that cold war issues were involved (Columns 2 and 3), both U.S. and Soviet opposition to U.N. involvement could be expected (Column 4). However, on the day that President Kennedy announced to the world the discovery of nuclear missiles on Cuba, October 22, 1962, he also called for a meeting of the Security Council to discuss the issue.¹² On October 23, furthermore, the U.S. introduced a draft Security Council resolution calling for the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba under U.N. observation.¹³ These two actions, as shown in Column 5, indicate U.S. support for U.N. involvement.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union did not use its veto, but rather presented a counter-resolution in the Security Council condemning the U.S. naval blockade. This action shows some degree of support for, not opposition to, U.N. involvement (Column 5). Thus, neither Hypothesis 1 nor Hypothesis 2 are supported in this case, as indicated in Column 6.

Czech Invasion, 1968

The security interests of the Soviet Union were engaged by this conflict; therefore, as shown in Column 4, Number 1, its opposition to U.N. involvement could be expected. In addition, the presence of cold war and ideological issues in this conflict, according to Hypothesis 2, should lead to great power opposition on the part of both the Soviet Union and the United States (Column

¹² Zacher, p. 244.

¹³ Butterworth, p. 235.

4, Number 2).

The day after Warsaw Treaty Organization troops invaded Czechoslovakia on August 20, 1968, Canada, Denmark, France, Paraguay, the UK, and the U.S. asked the Security Council to consider the situation. U.S. support for U.N. involvement is indicated by this action, and also by the fact that the U.S. voted in favor of a resolution condemning the invasion and calling for the withdrawal of "foreign troops" from the country.¹⁴ U.S. support is registered in Column 5, Number 2; a comparison between Columns 4 and 5, Number 2, shows that Hypothesis 2 was not supported for the United States in this case (Column 6, Number 2).

The resolution which the United States voted in favor of was vetoed by the USSR, whose delegate denied the U.N.'s competence in dealing with the matter.¹⁵ Thus, Soviet opposition was present (Column 5, Numbers 1 and 2), and both Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 are supported for the Soviet Union (Column 6, Numbers 1 and 2).

Gulf of Tonkin Incidents, 1964

This case includes three independent variables, great power security interest, cold war issues, and a great power seeking legitimization for its actions (Column 2). U.S. security interests were engaged and cold war issues

¹⁴ Butterworth, p. 429.

¹⁵ Butterworth, pp. 429-30.

were involved, and the hypotheses indicate that this should produce opposition (Column 4, Numbers 1 and 2). However, the U.S. was also seeking legitimization, which should produce support (Column 4, Number 3). Soviet security interests were also engaged and cold war issues were involved, so Soviet opposition to U.N. involvement could be expected (Column 4, Numbers 1 and 2).

The actions of both the United States and the Soviet Union in this conflict show support for U.N. involvement. After the Gulf of Tonkin Incidents occurred, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Adlai Stevenson called for an urgent meeting of the Security Council to discuss the matter.¹⁶ When the Security Council did meet, and the United States reported its actions in the conflict,¹⁷ it was "at the urging of the Soviet Union [that] both North and South Vietnam were asked to present their cases to the Council."¹⁸ Thus, both countries encouraged the referral of the conflict to the Security Council. For the United States, therefore, Hypotheses 1 and 2 are not supported, but Hypothesis 4 is supported (Column 6). As shown in Column 6, Numbers 1 and 2, Hypotheses 1 and 2 are not supported for the USSR in this case.

¹⁶ John Galloway, The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, Cranbury, NJ, Associated University Presses, Inc., 1970, p. 72.

¹⁷ Butterworth, p. 324.

¹⁸ Galloway, p. 73.

Sudanese Civil War, 1968-72

Columns 2 and 3 show that the Soviet Union was supporting the aggressor in this conflict, Northern Sudan; Column 4 therefore shows that Soviet opposition to U.N. involvement could be expected. The literature on the Sudanese Civil War indicates that the Soviet Union, along with the other permanent members of the Security Council, agreed not to refer the issue to the United Nations for management; thus, Soviet opposition to U.N. involvement was present.

Throughout the conflict, the Southern rebels, who were fighting for an independent state in South Sudan against the Northern-based government, tried to provoke United Nations intervention. In 1962, 1965, and 1970, for example, the Sudan African National Union (SANU) informed the General Assembly of government "atrocities" committed by government troops in the South, and urged intervention. According to Edgar O'Ballance, the 1964 attacks on government troops by SANU forces which started an intense phase in the civil war were intended to internationalize the conflict, thereby encouraging U.N. involvement.¹⁹

The United Nations, however, showed little response, due, argues one source, to "the attitudes and roles of the major powers [who] bolstered the position of the Sudan government." The permanent members of the Security

¹⁹ Edgar O'Ballance, The Secret War in the Sudan: 1955-1972, London, Faber and Faber Limited, 1977, pp. 53-81. Regarding the 1970 petition, see Cecil Eprile, War and Peace in the Sudan 1955-1972, London, David & Charles, 1974, p. 51.

Council, and especially the United States and the Soviet Union, recognized the sovereignty of the Northern-based government and favored Sudanese unity; "these factors made the United Nations quiescent on the Sudan war."²⁰ As noted in Column 5, therefore, Soviet opposition indeed occurred; Column 6 indicates that Hypothesis 3 is supported in this case.

Bangladesh, 1970-74

The security interests of both the USSR and the PRC were engaged in this conflict, as shown in Columns 2 and 3, Number 1. According to Hypothesis 1, these countries should oppose U.N. involvement (Column 4). The security interests of the United States were engaged in this conflict as well; however, the U.S. also sought to limit its involvement in the conflict (Columns 2 and 3, Number 2). Thus, according to the second part of Hypothesis 1, the U.S. should support U.N. involvement (Column 4).

United States actions in the Bangladesh conflict do indeed indicate its support for U.N. involvement (Column 5, Number 2). War erupted in East Pakistan on December 3; the following day, the U.S., along with other countries, referred the conflict to the Security Council. As the conflict passed from the Council to the General Assembly and then back again, the United States supported various resolutions calling for a cease-fire and the withdrawal

²⁰ Dunstan M. Wai, The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan, New York, Africana Publishing Company, 1981, pp. 125-141.

of troops.²¹ Thus, as Column 6, Number 2 indicates, the second part of Hypothesis 1 is supported.

The actions of the Soviet Union indicate opposition to U.N. involvement (Column 5, Number 1). The Soviet Union vetoed every resolution produced by the Security Council calling for a cease-fire and troop withdrawals, at least until West Pakistan surrendered on December 16 and India declared a unilateral cease-fire anyway. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is supported, as shown in Column 6, Number 1.

The People's Republic of China took its Security Council seat for the first time during the Bangladesh conflict. Throughout the conflict, the PRC supported U.N. involvement by voting in favor of the various resolutions calling for a cease-fire and troop withdrawals.²² In fact, the PRC representative moved one resolution himself in the Security Council which strongly condemned India for "subverting, dismembering, and committing aggression against Pakistan."²³ Chinese support is registered in Column 5, Number 1; Hypothesis 2 is thus not supported for the PRC in this case.

Yom Kippur War, 1973

This conflict engaged the security interests of the U.S., which could

²¹ Zacher, p. 270.

²² K.P. Misra, The Role of the United Nations in the Indo-Pakistani Conflict, 1971, London, Vikas Publishing House, 1973, pp. 143-144.

²³ K.P. Misra, p. 166.

therefore be expected to oppose any U.N. involvement according to Hypothesis 1 (Columns 2, 3, and 4, Number 1). The Soviet Union's security interests were engaged as well; however, the USSR wanted to cut costs in the conflict, and therefore, according to the second part of Hypothesis 1, should support U.N. involvement (Columns 2, 3, and 4, Number 2).

Egypt and Syria attacked Israel on October 6; the Security Council met two days later, and on October 9 the United States called for a cease-fire, which was opposed by the Soviet Union. During the next two weeks, Israeli troops steadily gained on the Egyptians, until they were encircled and cut-off in the Sinai. After a visit to Moscow by U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger, the Soviet Union co-sponsored a series of Security Council resolutions with the United States which called for a cease-fire and troop withdrawal, and which eventually established UNEFII to supervise both.²⁴

These events indicate U.S. support for U.N. involvement in the conflict, shown in Column 5, Number 1, which does not support the first Hypothesis (Column 6, Number 1). While the Soviets initially opposed U.N. involvement, overall they were judged to be supportive (Column 5, Number 2); thus, as shown in Column 6, Number 2, the second part of Hypothesis 1 is supported.

South Vietnam - PRC, 1974

This conflict engaged the PRC's security interest, as indicated in

²⁴ Butterworth, pp. 469-70, Zacher, p. 273.

Columns 2 and 3; therefore, Chinese opposition to U.N. involvement could be expected (Column 4). The literature on the conflict indicates that the permanent members of the Security Council tacitly agreed not to refer the issue to the United Nations. When Vietnam appealed to the President of the Security Council to consider the PRC's military take-over of the Parcel Islands, "the president replied that there was not enough support to put the matter on the agenda."²⁵ The literature reports that the PRC was opposed to U.N. involvement, while the other permanent members of the Council remained "avowedly neutral."²⁶ Thus, Hypothesis 1 is supported (Column 6).

Analysis and Conclusions

What do the results of the analysis of the twelve cases of international conflict, presented in Table 2, indicate about the accuracy of the four hypotheses concerning great power support for or opposition to U.N. involvement? Do the tests indicate that the independent variables drawn from the literature do indeed represent important conditions under which great powers will support or oppose U.N. involvement? Do some hypotheses indicate conditions which are more important than others?

The paper will attempt to answer these questions by examining both the overall accuracy of the hypotheses and the accuracy of each hypothesis

²⁵ Zacher, p. 274.

²⁶ "Like Oil and Water," The Economist, January 26 - February 1, 1974, p. 44.

individually in predicting great power attitudes. It must be noted that the unit of analysis for the testing of the hypotheses is each great power to whom independent variables apply. In other words, the security interests of three great powers may be engaged by the circumstances of one conflict, as the interests of the U.S., the UK, and the USSR were in the case of Soviet Claims on Turkey (1945-46). The resulting support or opposition to U.N. involvement is considered separately for each great power; therefore, Hypothesis 1 is tested three times in this case. Because all three great powers opposed U.N. involvement, as hypothesized, this case yields three occasions in which Hypothesis 1 is supported.

This method of testing the hypotheses, counting as one test each time an independent variable applies to one great power, yields 43 separate tests of the hypotheses. Overall, 24 of the 43 tests, or 55.8 percent, demonstrate support for the relevant hypotheses, while the hypotheses are not supported in 19 of the 43 tests, or 44.2 percent. What do these results mean? The four hypotheses tested were identified in the literature as the most significant conditions determining whether great powers will support or oppose U.N. involvement. According to Table 2, however, these are related to actual great power behavior in slightly more than half of the cases examined here, while the test results were contrary to the hypotheses in just under half of the cases. This shows that the chosen set of independent variables does have some predictive value. In order to get a complete picture of the influence of the set

of independent variables chosen, however, the accuracy of each hypothesis must be examined individually.

Hypothesis 1 states that great powers are more likely to oppose U.N. involvement when a conflict directly engages their own security interests, unless they seek to limit their involvement or cut costs in the conflict. Table 2 shows that 20 of the 43 tests are of the first part of Hypothesis 1. This independent variable emerged from the literature as the single most important condition determining great power attitudes toward U.N. involvement. All twelve sources used for this study indicate that if a great power's security interests are engaged, it will oppose U.N. involvement, based on the rationale that the great power would not want the meddling of an international organization to possibly compromise its security.

Out of the 20 tests of Hypothesis 1 presented in this study, ten, or 50 percent, supported the Hypothesis, while the remaining ten did not. However, the results are quite different for the second part of Hypothesis 1, which states that great powers whose security interests are directly engaged by a conflict, but who also seek to limit their involvement or cut costs in a conflict, will support U.N. involvement. This hypothesis is tested three times, once in each of the following cases: the Suez War (1956-57), Bangladesh (1970-74), and the Yom Kippur War (1973). In all three cases, the great power that sought to limit its involvement or cut costs supported U.N. involvement. When these results are combined with those for the first part of Hypothesis 1, the hypothesis is

supported in 56.5 percent of cases (13 out of 23), and not supported in 43.5 of cases (10 out of 23).

Hypothesis 2 states that great powers are more likely to oppose U.N. involvement in conflicts over cold war or ideological issues. Twelve tests out of 43 are concerned with this independent variable. In five of twelve cases, or 41.7 percent, the hypothesis is supported; in seven of twelve, or 58.3 percent, the hypothesis is not supported. This variable therefore shows a higher rate of failure than of success in predicting great power attitudes.

Hypothesis 3, which states that a great power supporting the aggressor in a conflict will oppose U.N. involvement, was tested twice, in the cases of Kurdistan (1946-47) and the Sudanese Civil War (1968-72). In both cases, the hypothesis is supported.

Hypothesis 4, which states that great powers will support U.N. involvement when seeking to legitimize their actions, was tested six times. The hypothesis was supported in four of the six tests, or 66.7 percent. In two of the six tests, or 33.3 percent, the hypothesis was not supported.

Considered individually, then, the testing of the hypotheses yielded the following accuracy rates: 56.5 percent for Hypothesis 1; 41.7 percent for Hypothesis 2; 100 percent for Hypothesis 3; and 66.7 percent for Hypothesis 4.

A number of conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. First, the first part of Hypothesis 1 appears to have a zero accuracy rate, as it is falsified in as many cases as it is confirmed. In other words, great power security interest

leads to great power support for and opposition to U.N. involvement in exactly the same percentage of cases. This result is surprising, especially considering the emphasis which was placed on great power security interest as a condition encouraging great power opposition to U.N. involvement in the literature.

Likewise, the presence of cold war and ideological issues does not seem to be a particularly accurate indicator of great power opposition; 41.7 percent of the tests supported the hypothesis, while 58.3 percent of the tests did not. These results indicate that the independent variables represented by the first part of Hypothesis 1 and by Hypothesis 2, the engagement of great power security interests and cold war and ideological issues, may need some refining.

On the other hand, the second part of Hypothesis 1, that great powers whose security interests are engaged in a conflict and who seek to limit their involvement or cut costs will support U.N. involvement, is supported by the tests. From this result the conclusion can be drawn that the independent variable of the second part of Hypothesis 1 does indeed indicate a condition under which great powers will support U.N. involvement.

Hypothesis 3 is also supported by the tests. Thus, the conclusion can be drawn that the independent variable of great powers supporting the aggressor in a conflict is a condition under which great powers will oppose U.N. involvement.

The tests offer substantial support for Hypothesis 4, indicating that great

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power efforts to legitimize their actions in a conflict is an important influence on their support for U.N. involvement. In six tests conducted in this study, a great power sought to legitimize its actions in a conflict through international consideration. In four of six tests, the great power chose the United Nations as the forum in which to present its case. In two of six tests, represented by the actions of the UK and France during the Suez War (1956-57), the great powers sought to legitimize their actions by publicly issuing an ultimatum. Furthermore, in each of the six tests of Hypothesis 4, the great power seeking legitimization of its actions also had its security interests engaged by the conflict, and in four of the cases the great power supported U.N. involvement. These results indicate that the seeking of legitimization by the great power has relatively more importance in determining its behavior than the engagement of its security interests.

The findings detailed above may also indicate several flaws in the design of this study. For the hypotheses predicting great power support, for example, the number of tests which could be done was quite small. The second part of Hypothesis 1 was tested only three times; Hypothesis 3 was tested only two times; and Hypothesis 4 was tested only six times. In comparison, the first part of Hypothesis 1 was tested 20 times, and Hypothesis 2 was tested twelve times. Perhaps if many tests had been conducted for each hypothesis, different results might have emerged.

In addition, no attempt was made in this study to systematically control

the combination of hypotheses which applied to one great power in each case of conflict. For example, of the 20 cases in which Hypothesis 1 was tested, six were situations in which only Hypothesis 1 applied to the great power, eight were situations in which Hypothesis 2 applied as well, four were cases in which Hypothesis 4 applied as well, and two were cases in which Hypotheses 1, 2, and 4 all applied. Although each hypothesis was tested separately, it is possible that combinations influenced the outcome of each individual test.

Also, this study does not deal well with situations in which great power attitudes toward U.N. involvement change during the course of a conflict. In order to reduce the complexity of the analysis, a judgement was made about overall support or opposition. While practical, this judgement may not reflect the complexity of forces influencing the great power throughout the conflict.

Finally, the findings indicate an additional research question which will be considered in the following chapter. Up to this point, the study has assumed that the great powers exercise a considerable degree of influence over the U.N.'s conflict management agenda. In fact, this assumption provided a primary reason for undertaking this study in the first place; if the great powers do indeed "control" the Security Council, the most important organ of U.N. conflict management, then the identification of a set of conditions under which great powers support or oppose U.N. involvement is important because U.N. involvement may therefore be predicted.

The following question is put forward for further analysis: do great

power attitudes toward U.N. involvement influence whether and how the Organization manages the conflict? In other words, does great power support increase the prospects for U.N. involvement, and does great power opposition lead to less U.N. involvement? Chapter Five will attempt to answer these questions using the twelve cases chosen for this study.

Chapter Five - U.N. Involvement

Chapter Five will shift the analytical focus of this paper from exploring the conditions underlying great power attitudes toward U.N. involvement to examining the connection between these attitudes and U.N. involvement in the management of international conflict. Specifically, the following questions may be posed: does great power support lead to greater U.N. involvement in conflict management, and does great power opposition lead to less U.N. involvement? The chapter will examine these questions using the cases already analyzed in Chapter Four.

In this chapter, however, each conflict case, and not each great power, is the unit of analysis. The dependent variable of the previous analysis, great power support or opposition, becomes the independent variable of this analysis, while U.N. involvement becomes the dependent variable. Thus, by analyzing the same cases but with a different question in mind, this chapter will assess a major assumption underlying this paper: that great powers strongly influence whether, and the degree to which, the United Nations becomes involved in the management of international conflict.

The Dependent Variable

Both the nature and the level of U.N. involvement will be examined for each of the twelve cases of international conflict. The nature of U.N.

involvement refers to the actual steps that were taken, if any, within the U.N. to manage the conflict, such as referral to the Security Council or General Assembly resolutions. The level of U.N. involvement simply ranks these steps in order of their degree of commitment as follows, with 0 being the lowest degree of involvement and 5 being the highest:

0. No U.N. involvement;
1. General Assembly and/or Security Council referral;
2. General Assembly and/or Security Council debate;
3. General Assembly and/or Security Council resolutions;
4. The establishment of peace-keeping operations by the General Assembly or Security Council.

Testing the Cases

Table 3 presents the results of the analysis of the relationship between great power attitudes and U.N. involvement. This section will go through the Table case by case, reviewing great power attitudes, and relating these to any U.N. involvement that occurred.

Soviet Claims on Turkey, 1945-46

The attitudes of the U.S., the UK, and the USSR toward U.N. involvement in this case were all characterized by opposition. The great powers apparently discussed referring the case to the U.N. for management,

Table 3: Great Power Attitudes and U.N. Involvement

Case	Great Power(s)	Great Power Support/ Opposition	Nature of U.N. Involvement	Level of U.N. Involvement
Soviet Claims on Turkey (1945-46)	U.S., UK, USSR	Opposition	None	0
Kurdistan (1946-47)	USSR	Opposition	None	0
Berlin Blockade (1948-49)	U.S., UK, France, USSR	Support (U.S., UK, France)/ Opposition (USSR)	SC referral; SC debate; SC res. proposed; Soviet veto	1,2 (veto)
East European Human Rights (1949-50)	U.S., USSR	Support (U.S.)/ Opposition (USSR)	4 GA res.s; ICJ referral	1,2,3
Suez War (1956-57)	U.S., UK, France, USSR	Opposition (UK, France)/ Support (U.S., USSR)	SC res. proposed; French and British veto; GA res.; UNEF formed	1,2 (veto); 1,2,3,4
Cuban Missile Crisis (1962)	U.S., USSR	Support	SC referral; SC debate	1,2
Czech Invasion (1968)	U.S., USSR	Support (U.S.)/ Opposition (USSR)	SC referral; SC debate; SC resolution proposed; Soviet veto	1,2 (veto)
Gulf of Tonkin Incidents (1964)	U.S., USSR	Support	SC referral	1
Sudanese Civil War (1968-72)	USSR	Opposition	None	0
Bangladesh (1970-74)	U.S., USSR	Support (U.S.)/ Opposition (USSR)	SC referral; Soviet vetoes; GA res.; SC res.; UN observers	1,2 (vetoes); 1,2,3,4
Yom Kippur War (1973)	U.S., USSR	Support	SC referral; SC debate; SC res.; UNEFII	1,2,3,4
South Vietnam - PRC (1974)	PRC	Opposition	None	0

but decided against it; no U.N. involvement resulted in this case (level 0).

Later, the issue of Soviet Claims on Turkey was dealt with by the United States under the Truman Doctrine.¹

Kurdistan, 1946-47

There is evidence in the literature that the Soviet Union opposed U.N. involvement in this case by protesting the Security Council's competence in dealing with Soviet troops stationed in Iran to support the Kurds. No U.N. involvement occurred (level 0), and the issue was resolved, at least for a time, in 1947 by the USSR removing its troops from the area and Iran and Iraq "reasserting control over the Kurdish tribes within their borders."²

Berlin Blockade, 1948-49

This is the first of four cases in which some great powers supported U.N. involvement and some opposed it. In this conflict, the U.S., the UK, and France were in favor of U.N. involvement, while the USSR was opposed. The issue of the Soviet blockade of West Berlin was referred to the Security Council in September of 1948. A debate ensued and the "neutral six" countries sponsored a Security Council resolution calling for a lifting of the blockade and

¹ Butterworth, p. 42.

² Butterworth, p. 61.

a resumption of talks; the resolution was, however, vetoed by the Soviet Union.³ This case reached level 2 of U.N. involvement, and any further progress was forestalled by the veto. In the spring of 1949, the conflict was resolved through great power negotiation.

East European Human Rights, 1949-50

The United States supported U.N. involvement, while the Soviet Union opposed U.N. involvement. The issue of human rights violations in Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania was dealt with in the General Assembly, where various resolutions were passed in the space of a year calling for reports from the East European countries on their domestic situations or condemning violations reported there. One resolution referred the case to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion. Throughout the process, the East European countries ignored all appeals and characterized their actions as legitimate attempts to protect the integrity of their respective governments.⁴ The case reached level 3 of U.N. involvement, General Assembly resolutions.

Suez War, 1956-57

The UK and France opposed U.N. involvement in this case, while the U.S. and the USSR showed support. The conflict was referred to and debated

³ Butterworth, pp. 98-99.

⁴ Butterworth, pp. 122-24.

in the Security Council, where the United States proposed a resolution calling for a cease-fire and troop withdrawals. The UK and France vetoed the resolution, and the conflict was transferred to the General Assembly for consideration. The United States pushed through a similar resolution there on November 2, four days after Israel's attack on Egypt; on November 6, the General Assembly, upon the recommendation of Canada's Lester Pearson, created UNEF to oversee the cease-fire and troop withdrawals.⁵ Thus, this case reached level 2 in the Security Council, where further action was forestalled by great power vetoes; the conflict was then transferred to the General Assembly, where it reached the highest level of U.N. involvement, the creation of a peace-keeping operation.

Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962

Both the United States and the Soviet Union showed support for U.N. involvement in this case. The conflict was referred to and debated in the Security Council, but U.N. involvement did not go beyond that level (2).⁶

Czech Invasion, 1968

The U.S. showed support for U.N. involvement in this case, and the Soviet Union showed opposition. The day after the invasion of

⁵ Donelan and Grieve, pp. 127-129.

⁶ Donelan and Grieve, pp. 233-37.

Czechoslovakia, the United States, together with some other countries, referred the situation to the Security Council. A resolution condemning the invasion was proposed, but vetoed by the Soviet Union.⁷ U.N. involvement did not go beyond level 2, Security Council debate.

Gulf of Tonkin Incidents, 1964

The United States and the Soviet Union both showed support for U.N. involvement in this case. The conflict was referred by the U.S. to the Security Council; the Council, upon the urging of the Soviet representative, asked both sides to submit information about the events in the Gulf of Tonkin. Both North and South Vietnam did so, and the Council took no further action.⁸ The case therefore reached level 1, Security Council referral.

Sudanese Civil War, 1968-72

The Soviet Union opposed U.N. involvement in this case. During the course of the war, the Southern rebels made various attempts to involve the United Nations but received no response; according to at least one source, this was due to a tacit agreement among the great powers not to refer the conflict to the United Nations.⁹ No U.N. involvement occurred (level 0); the conflict

⁷ Donelan and Grieve, pp. 277-78.

⁸ Butterworth, pp. 323-24.

⁹ Wai, pp. 125-141. See also O'Ballance, p. 157.

was eventually resolved through mediation by Ethiopia and by the World Council of Churches.¹⁰

Bangladesh, 1970-74

This conflict is the fifth case characterized by different great powers supporting and opposing U.N. involvement. On December 4, the day after war erupted, the United States referred the conflict to the Security Council, where a subsequent cease-fire resolution was vetoed by the Soviet Union. The issue was transferred to the General Assembly, where a similar resolution was passed on December 7. On December 12, the United States again referred the conflict to the Security Council, where the Soviet Union continued to veto proposed resolutions. The PRC, meanwhile, voted in favor of the various Security Council and General Assembly resolutions. After Pakistan surrendered to India on December 17, a cease-fire resolution was passed in the Security Council, and U.N. observers were established to monitor troop withdrawals and relief efforts in the area.¹¹

Thus, the conflict reached level 2 in the Security Council. After further action was prevented by a veto, the General Assembly considered the conflict up to level 3. The conflict was then transferred back to the Security Council, where eventually a cease-fire resolution was passed and U.N. observers were

¹⁰ Butterworth, p. 360.

¹¹ Butterworth, pp. 457-48, Zacher, p. 270.

established (levels 3 and 4).

Yom Kippur War, 1973

Both the Soviet Union and the United States supported U.N. involvement in this conflict. Two days after Egypt and Syria attacked Israel, the Security Council met to debate the conflict. The United States called for a cease-fire, which was opposed by the Soviet Union. Two weeks later, with Egyptian troops encircled in the Sinai, the Security Council met again, and a series of resolutions were adopted calling for a cease-fire and troop withdrawals. The Security Council also established UNEFII to monitor the situation.¹² After a false start in which the conflict was referred to and debated in the Security Council, but went no further, U.N. involvement moved through level 2 to level 4, the establishment of peace-keeping operations.

South Vietnam - PRC, 1974

The PRC opposed U.N. involvement in this case. South Vietnam did try to refer the issue to the Security Council, but the PRC was opposed and the other great powers remained neutral. No U.N. involvement occurred in this case.

¹² Zacher, p. 273.

Analysis and Conclusions

In order to analyze the results of Table 3, it is useful to divide the cases into four groups according to great power attitudes toward U.N. involvement, as in Figure 1. Group 1 contains four cases, Soviet Claims on Turkey, Kurdistan, the Sudanese Civil War, and South Vietnam-PRC, which are characterized by great power opposition. Group 2 is composed of three cases, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Gulf of Tonkin Incidents, and the Yom Kippur War, which show great power support. Group 3 is made up of the five cases in which both great power support and opposition are evident: the Berlin Blockade, East European Human Rights, the Suez War, the Czech Invasion, and Bangladesh.

Comparing the groups in terms of U.N. involvement yields a number of interesting results which point toward a strong connection between great power attitudes and U.N. involvement. First, in all four cases characterized by great power opposition, no U.N. involvement occurred. By contrast, every case in which great powers supported U.N. involvement, or in which some mixture of support and opposition occurred, (with the exception of East European Human Rights), resulted in U.N. involvement at the Security Council level. Of the three cases characterized by great power support, one case resulted in U.N. peacekeeping established by the Security Council, the highest level of U.N. involvement. Of the five cases showing great power support and opposition, vetoes were present in four cases, as could have been

Figure 1: Division of Great Power Attitudes

Group 1 - Opposition

Cases	Great Power(s)	Great Power Support/ Opposition	Nature of U.N. Involvement	Level of U.N. Involvement
Soviet Claims on Turkey (1945-46)	U.S., UK USSR	Opposition	None	0
Kurdistan (1946-47)	USSR	Opposition	None	0
Sudanese Civil War (1968-72)	USSR	Opposition	None	0
South Vietnam-PRC (1974)	PRC	Opposition	None	0

Group 2: Support

Cases	Great Power(s)	Great Power Support/ Opposition	Nature of U.N. Involvement	Level of U.N. Involvement
Cuban Missile Crisis (1962)	U.S., USSR	Support	SC referral; SC debate	1,2
Gulf of Tonkin Incidents (1964)	U.S., USSR	Support	SC referral	1
Yom Kippur War (1973)	U.S., USSR	Support	SC referral; SC debate; SC res.; UNEFII	1,2,3,4

Figure 1: Division of Great Power Attitudes (continued)

Group 3: Support/Opposition

Cases	Great Power(s)	Great Power Support/Opposition	Nature of U.N. Involvement	Level of U.N. Involvement
Berlin Blockade (1948-49)	U.S., UK, France, USSR	Support (U.S., UK, France)/ Opposition (USSR)	SC referral; SC debate; SC res. proposed; Soviet veto	1,2 (veto)
East European Human Rights (1949-50)	U.S., USSR	Support (U.S.)/ Opposition (USSR)	4 GA res.s; ICJ referral	1,2,3
Suez War (1956-57)	U.S., UK, France, USSR	Opposition (UK, France)/ Support (U.S., USSR)	SC res. proposed; French and British veto; GA res. UNEF	1,2 (veto); 1,2,3,4
Czech Invasion (1968)	U.S., USSR	Support (U.S.)/ Opposition (USSR)	SC referral; SC debate; Soviet veto	1,2 (veto)
Bangladesh (1970-74)	U.S., USSR	Support (U.S.)/ Opposition (USSR)	SC referral; Soviet vetoes; GA res.; SC res.; UN observers	1,2 (vetoes); 1,2,3,4

expected. Two of these cases resulted in peacekeeping operations, one established by the General Assembly and one set in motion by the Security Council. Comparing the findings in Groups 2 and 3 yields an interesting conclusion: cases characterized by both great power support and opposition led to as great U.N. involvement as cases characterized only by great power support.

Based on these findings, the questions posed at the beginning of this chapter may be answered as follows. Great power support, even when accompanied by great power opposition, does lead to greater U.N. involvement in conflict management, and great power opposition leads to less U.N. involvement. In fact, in this analysis great power opposition consistently led to no U.N. involvement.

The analysis presented in this chapter also suggests a number of interesting observations besides those linking great power attitudes and U.N. involvement. For example, in two cases characterized by both great power support and opposition, U.N. management was kept alive after a great power veto by shifting consideration of the conflict to the General Assembly. According to the U.N. Charter, the Security Council was intended to be the Organization's prime organ for dealing with situations endangering international peace and security, while the General Assembly could contribute general recommendations in a broad way, but not much more. In both the Suez War and Bangladesh cases, however, the General Assembly emerged as an

important alternative course to Security Council consideration after that organ was paralyzed by a great power veto.

What also seems clear from the Suez War and Bangladesh cases is that a great power, when truly supportive of U.N. involvement, will work very hard to make the involvement actually occur. For example, in the Bangladesh conflict, the United States supported U.N. involvement by referring the conflict to the Security Council, and then sponsoring a resolution calling for a cease-fire between India and Pakistan. When the Soviet Union proceeded, in support of its ally India, to veto these initiatives, the United States moved the conflict to the General Assembly, where it pushed through a cease-fire resolution. Once Pakistani troops surrendered and the Soviets became more conciliatory, the U.S. transferred the conflict back to the Security Council and pushed for the positioning of a U.N. observer force in South Asia to monitor troop withdrawals.

The importance of superpower involvement was reflected in two works which initially presented some problems for the generation of Hypothesis 1 in the second chapter of this paper: "Local Conflict and U.N. Peace-keeping" by Pelcovits and Kramer, and "International Crises 1945-1975: The U.N. Dimension" by Wilkenfield and Brecher. The first work finds that great power interest in a conflict is a necessary prerequisite for U.N. peace-keeping to occur. Similarly, the second work indicates that as superpower involvement in a conflict increases, so does the probability that U.N. involvement will occur, and that the involvement will be successful. These ideas were found

incompatible with Hypothesis 1, which states that the presence of great power security interest in a conflict will encourage opposition to U.N. involvement.

The results of this study, however, seem to support the basic findings of the two works noted above: that while great power interest may not be a sufficient condition leading to involvement, great power interest does appear to be a necessary factor in prompting that involvement to occur.

The analysis in this chapter provides support for the underlying assumption of the study as a whole; namely, that the great powers do exercise an important influence in determining the body of conflicts which the United Nations will manage. The following chapter will analyze the implications of this finding, along with the findings of Chapter Four, and draw some conclusions as to their relevance, both for the past forty years of U.N. conflict management, and for the present era.

Chapter Six - Conclusions

The United Nations, in sum, can neither limit disputes nor solve them. It cannot impose its will for it has none. Its agents cannot act without the consent of states. It is an instrument of states.¹

This paper has attempted to explore in a systematic manner great power influence over United Nations conflict management, operating from the assumption that the permanent members of the Security Council largely control which conflicts are managed by the U.N. and which are not. Specifically, two research questions were posed: under what conditions will great powers support or oppose U.N. conflict management involvement? And, do great power attitudes toward U.N. involvement actually influence whether the organization becomes involved in conflict management activities?

To answer the first question, the literature on U.N. conflict management was explored, drawing out those conditions which various authors identified as determining great power support for, or opposition to, U.N. involvement. These conditions were consolidated into four hypotheses, which were tested using twelve cases of international conflict. The paper then considered the second research question, using the same twelve cases of conflict to test whether great power support leads to greater U.N. involvement, and whether great power opposition leads to less U.N. involvement.

¹ Northedge and Donelan, p. 183.

Analysis of Findings

A number of interesting findings emerged from the study. Regarding the four hypotheses taken as a whole, Chapter Four points out that they accurately accounted for great power behavior in just over half of the cases: 55.8 percent. As a set of conditions predicting great power attitudes, therefore, the hypotheses could be improved. Hypothesis 1, part 1, and Hypothesis 2, in particular, did not seem to account well for great power attitudes. The engagement of a great power's security interests, although cited extensively in the literature as a condition under which great powers will oppose U.N. involvement, accurately predicted great power opposition in only half of the tests. The presence of cold war and ideological issues, similarly, accurately predicted great power opposition in only 41.7 percent of the tests. The conclusion which can be drawn from these results is that Hypothesis 1, part 1, and Hypothesis 2 need to be refined.

On the other hand, Hypothesis 1, part 2, Hypothesis 3, and Hypothesis 4 proved more accurate in predicting great power support or opposition. In all three tests of Hypothesis 1, part 2, the great power whose security interests were engaged by the conflict, but who sought to limit its involvement or cut costs, supported U.N. involvement, as expected. This finding reflects an irony of U.N. conflict management. It seems as though a conflict must become so potentially dangerous and destabilizing as to threaten the international balance of power, or so costly as to waste many lives and much money, before a great

power will put its full weight behind U.N. involvement. This positive relationship between the intensity of a conflict and U.N. involvement has been noted in the literature, specifically by Haas, Butterworth, and Nye (1974) and by Haas (1983).²

Hypothesis 3 was tested twice, and in both cases the great power that supported the aggressor in a conflict opposed U.N. involvement, as predicted. This finding suggests that great power support for the aggressor is an important condition under which great powers will oppose U.N. involvement.

Tests of Hypothesis 4 revealed that efforts at legitimization on the part of a great power is an important condition under which great powers will support U.N. involvement. In four out of six tests, or 66.7 percent, the hypothesis was supported. This finding reflects another irony of U.N. conflict management. One main purpose of the United Nations is to maintain international peace and security. Yet, a great power will be likely to support U.N. involvement under circumstances in which the U.N. will not actually be used to manage the conflict, but instead will serve simply as a platform for the great power to justify policies of force. The findings of Hypothesis 1, part 2, and Hypothesis 4 suggest that at times great power support for U.N. involvement almost seems to undermine what that involvement was supposed to achieve in the first place: the management of conflict.

The testing of the hypotheses also suggests other interesting avenues to

² Haas, Butterworth, and Nye, pp. 13-17; Haas, p. 206.

explore. For example, as mentioned in Chapter Four, no attempt was made to relate the different hypotheses to the intensity of great power support for or opposition to U.N. involvement. Yet, the data shows that in each case in which a great power indicated opposition to U.N. involvement using the veto, that great power's security interests were engaged by the conflict.

In addition, no consideration was given as to which great power supported or opposed U.N. involvement in a certain test, only that a great power did so. The data indicates that an approach which discriminates among great powers might yield some interesting conclusions. For example, the Soviet Union cast four of the five vetoes reported in this study. And in all three tests of Hypothesis 1, part 2, it is either the United States or the Soviet Union, one of the two superpowers, which seeks to limit its involvement or cut costs.

Regarding the second research question, the findings indicate a strong link between great power attitudes toward U.N. involvement and the involvement which actually does occur. In this study, all four cases characterized by great power opposition led to no U.N. involvement. Cases characterized by great power support, on the other hand, led to greater U.N. involvement and, interestingly, so did cases characterized by a mixture of support and opposition.

The findings yield some interesting conclusions on the implications of great power disagreement, and particularly the use of the veto, for U.N.

involvement. The literature generally cites the veto power held by the permanent five members of the Security Council as one of the greatest obstacles to U.N. involvement.³ In this study, four of the five cases characterized by a mixture of great power support and opposition involved the exercise of the veto by a great power. Two of these four cases involving a veto reached the level of Security Council debate, while the other two reached the highest level of U.N. involvement, peace-keeping. In contrast, the U.N. was not involved at all in each of the four cases characterized by great power opposition. These findings suggest that opposition on the part of one great power coupled with indifference on the part of the rest may be a greater obstacle to U.N. conflict management than simply the exercise of the veto by a great power.

Considering the findings of the study overall, what vision of the United Nations as a conflict manager has emerged? As discussed in Chapter One, the United Nations has two images, one realistic and the other idealistic. The idealistic image presents the U.N. as an independent actor regulating conflict in order to maintain international peace and security. Within this image, the great powers discharge their special responsibility for keeping the peace effectively and equitably. By contrast, the realistic image of the U.N. emphasizes a political organization dominated by great powers which manage conflict according to national

³ See, for example, Vayrynen, "Focus On: Is there a role for the United Nations in Conflict Resolution?", p. 194, and Zacher, p. 35.

interest, not according to international need.

Most sources in the literature adopt the realist view of the United Nations, and of international organizations in general. According to this point of view, the U.N. is not a world government, but rather a group of "governments linked in permanent conclave."⁴ These governments can use the United Nations to "limit their disputes and the disputes of others, if they wish to do so."⁵ Within this perspective, conflicts are limited by the United Nations if such action would be in the national interest of the states involved and "action outside of the organization is either not possible or not desired."⁶

The portrait of the United Nations as a conflict manager which emerges from the study accords with this realist perspective. Regarding the influence of the great powers, the U.N. does seem to "mirror world politics rather than rule it."⁷ During the first four decades of the United Nations, the United States, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, Britain, and France remained the great powers of the world. The U.N.'s record as a conflict manager reflects their influence: according to the study, great power attitudes, and especially great power opposition, had a powerful influence on U.N. conflict management involvement.

⁴ Haas, Butterworth, and Nye, p. 46.

⁵ Northedge and Donelan, p. 180.

⁶ Haas, p. 190.

⁷ Haas, Butterworth, and Nye, p. 3.

This finding also justifies posing the first research question of the paper. The realist perspective recognizes that states will use the U.N. for their own interests, and that because the U.N. mirrors world politics, the great powers in particular will be able to harness the U.N. to their national policies. Given this situation of selective conflict management, it is important to identify the conditions under which great powers will support or oppose U.N. involvement, in order to form an idea of both the opportunities and the constraints under which the United Nations operates as a conflict manager.

The study has attempted to identify such a set of conditions, or at least to suggest which conditions identified in the literature seem to more accurately account for U.N. behavior in the twelve cases of international conflict which were discussed. However, it must be recognized that the body of literature used to generate the hypotheses on great power support and opposition refers mainly to the first forty years of U.N. history, which were characterized by East-West conflict. Furthermore, all twelve cases used to test the hypotheses occurred within this period. The findings can therefore be expected to reflect the bi-polar structure of power present in the world during that time. During the past two years, however, the structure of world power has been substantially altered. What relevance do the findings of the study have for the post-cold war era?

After the Cold War

The end of the cold war produced a world-wide surge of optimism, centered around the prospect of an international system no longer threatened by superpower rivalry and nuclear politics. Among the expectations aroused by such events as the falling of the Berlin Wall and the crumbling of communist regimes in Eastern Europe

was a role for the United Nations that would match its lofty purpose. With the Cold War over, threats to peace and stability could at last be managed as they ought to be managed.⁸

In 1991, United Nations actions to counter Iraqi aggression in Kuwait appear to have confirmed these expectations. With the Security Council no longer paralyzed along East-West lines, the U.N. approved successively stricter sanctions against Iraq, culminating in a massive, U.S.-led military effort to expel the Iraqis from Kuwait.

The behavior of the Security Council throughout the Gulf War demonstrated two new features of U.N. conflict management which characterize the current era: first, great power consensus, and second, a reduction in the use of great power veto.⁹ In addition to these positive developments, however, the new era has also ushered in new problems for U.N. conflict management. For example, many of the conflicts which occur today take place within, not between states. The U.N. Charter is ill-equipped to

⁸ John Newhouse, "The New Diplomatic Round: In a New Era and Groping," The New Yorker, December 16, 1991, p. 90.

⁹ Newhouse, p. 10.

deal with such conflicts, as it forbids the Organization to interfere in the internal affairs of member states. In addition, as great power consensus allows for the creation of large-scale peace-keeping operations, such as the operation in Namibia and the one proposed for Cambodia, the funds available to the Organization are not being appropriately increased.¹⁰

New questions are also being asked of the U.N. today, the most prominent of which concern the current composition of the Security Council and the role which the United States will play in the Organization. John Newhouse succinctly summarizes the various arguments in favor of changing the membership of the Security Council to include the economic powers of Japan and Germany, and perhaps even powerful developing countries such as Brazil, India, and Nigeria, as permanent members:

The 'Perm Five' membership is a relic of the second World War; Britain and France are no longer world powers; Japan and Germany are second only to the United States as economic powers, and are a good deal better off; if the Soviet Union splits into loosely connected pieces, why should one of the parts retain a permanent seat on the Council? Also, the only representative of the developing countries is China, whose regime is widely disapproved of and distrusted.¹¹

While all of the great powers, as can be expected, oppose changing the status quo, Newhouse reports that "the question is not what, exactly, will happen to the Security Council, but when it will happen."¹²

¹⁰ Newhouse, pp. 97-98.

¹¹ Newhouse, p. 100.

¹² Newhouse, p. 102.

Uncertainties about the U.S. role in the United Nations in this new era abound, beginning with the question of whether the country will start to honor its financial obligations to the Organization in a timely way. Furthermore, U.S. foreign policy is in flux, and it appears to carry U.N. conflict management policy with it. U.S. support was crucial to U.N. operations in the Persian Gulf War; in Yugoslavia, similarly, as the U.S. policy wavers, so does U.N. involvement.¹³

This last point brings the discussion around to the relevance which this study has to the changed situation in the U.N. and in the world during this post-cold war period. First, unless, or perhaps until, the Charter of the U.N. is changed, the United States, Russia (sitting in for the now-defunct Soviet Union), China, Britain, and France remain the five permanent members of the Security Council, and sole possessors of the veto. Thus, the ability of these powers to influence U.N. involvement remains, at least formally. What probably has changed, however, is the set of conditions under which the great powers will support and oppose U.N. involvement.

But even in the absence of superpower competition, great powers, whichever countries they may be in the future, will still look after their interests in the new era, and these could well include limiting their involvement in a conflict, supporting the aggressor, or seeking legitimization of their actions. Perhaps additional, new conditions influencing great power attitudes now exist.

¹³ Newhouse, p. 104.

What the study can contribute to this new situation, then, is affirmation of the importance of discovering and investigating these conditions, in the hopes of understanding great power behavior in the Organization, and thereby understanding both the possibilities and the limits of United Nations conflict management.

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